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 303107811X, 9783031078118

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part I: Defence Forces Capabilities and The Threat Environment
Part II: The Reserve Defence Forces
Part III: Peacekeeping Operations
Part IV: Cyber Security in the Digital Age
Part V: Defence Forces Institutional Innovation and Civil–Military Relations
Part VI: The Principle of Irish Neutrality
Contents
List of Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
Defence Forces Capabilities & The Threat Environment
Ensuring the Jungle Doesn’t Grow Back: The Obligations Inherent to Irish Defence Policy
Introduction
Ireland’s Geographical Location and Jurisdiction: Where the State Exercises Sovereignty, Has Sovereign Rights, Duties, and Obligations
Maritime Jurisdiction and Responsibilities
Air Domain Jurisdiction and Responsibilities
Space Domain
Cyber Domain
Irelands Multilateral Responsibilities
The Current Security Environment from National, Regional, and Global Perspectives
Multilateral Framework, National Interests, and Implications for the Defence Forces
Ireland the EU and Strategic Autonomy
Ireland and Neutrality
Prospects of a Policy-Strategy Match
Defence Policy
Defence Expenditure and Resourcing
Governance
Capabilities
Capability Gap Matrix
Risk
Conclusion
A Brigade Commander’s Perspective: “Oglaigh na hEireann Has Been the People, Is the People, and Will Be the People”
The Recent Past
Why Do We Need to Spend on Defence?
The General Officer Commanding’s Challenge
Defence Forces Engagement with EU Partners
The Future
Disconnect and Mismatch: The Intellectual Formation of Irish Defence Policy and Practice
Situation—The Threat Assessment and Ireland’s 2015 White Paper on Defence
Disconnect—Ireland’s White Paper on Defence: Update 2019
The Perfect Storm—Fail to Prepare, Prepare to Fail
The Solution
Conclusion
The Irish Naval Service: The Burden of the Minimalist Approach
Introduction
On the Irish Naval Service
The Minimalist Approach to Maritime Security
Where the Naval Service Has Come From
An Islanders Perspective
What the Naval Service Does for Ireland
The Naval Service Today
Conclusion
Small Navies: Lessons for the Irish Naval Service
Changes in the Strategic Environment and the Need for Increased Flexibility
Operational Solutions for Small Navies
Conclusion
Irish Air Corps: Towards 2052
The Past Drives the Present into the Future
Policy Context
The Only Constant Is Change
Conventional Needs
Cost Misconceptions
Many Services, One Defence Forces
Space and Time
Space Vulnerability, New Entrants and Drones
The IAC and the Drone
Accommodating New Entrants
Accessing the Airspace
Enabling Change
Conclusion
The Reserve Defence Forces
Revitalizing the Irish Army Reserve Post-Commission on the Defence Forces: Moving from the Single Force Concept to a Total Force Policy
Introduction
The Argument
The Role of the Army Reserve in Irish Defence
Consistently Doing the Same Thing (Poorly)
Fulfilling the Commission’s Aspirations: De-coupling the Reserve from the Regular Army Force Structure
The Army Reserve Surge Brigade
The Army Reserve Combat Support Brigade
The Army Reserve Combat Service Support Brigade
Integrated Reservists
Unit Tiering
Benefits of the New Force Structure: A Genuine “Single Defence Force”
Command and Staff Arrangements
Operational Benefits
Strategic Benefits
Skills Retention Benefits
Policy Recommendations: Transitioning to a Total Force Policy Reserve
Conclusion: Why Bother Revitalizing the Reserve?
The Army Reserve: The Force-Multiplier for Irish Defence
Introduction
Understanding the Present
Developing a Future Reserve
Army Reserve (Integrated)
Army Reserve (Support)
Army Reserve (Specialists)
The Army Reserve as a Force-Multiplier
Learning from the Past
The Need for Incentives
The Need for Adequate Funding
‘Volunteer’ Status and Civilian Employment
The Benefits of Proper Integration
Targeted and Reasonable Goals
Acknowledging Reserve Specialists as Specialists
Leadership
Conclusion
Ireland’s Naval Service Reserve: An Analysis of Current Capabilities and Role for the Future
Introduction
Legislative Basis
Weathering the Storm: Current Capabilities and Challenges
The Horizon: Future Threats and Potential Roles
Threat Environment
Conclusion: Forecasting or Foreboding?
Peacekeeping Operations
Decolonisation, Conflict and Independence: The Impact of History on Ireland’s Approach to Peacekeeping
Introduction
Irish History and Peacekeeping Literature
Strategic Culture
That Which Surrounds
Decolonisation
Independence
Conflict
That Which Weaves Together
The Peacekeeping Tradition
The History of the Future
Conclusion
Ireland’s Largest Peacekeeping Mission—The Irish Defence Forces in UNIFIL
The Origins of UNIFIL
The Irish Defence Forces in UNIFIL: Traditional Peacekeeping, 1978–2001
The Irish Defence Forces in UNIFIL: Expeditionary Peacekeeping, 2006–Present
The Impact and Significance of the Irish Defence Forces Service with UNIFIL
Peacekeeping in the Digital Age: Future Threats and Capability Requirements
Introduction
The Changing Conflict Environment and the Evolving Role of Technology
Threats and Opportunities for Peace Operations
Policy Developments
Threats
Opportunities
Challenges
Implications for Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries
Capabilities, Training and Organisational Culture
Technology and Equipment
The Road Ahead
Cyber Security in the Digital Age
The Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping and the Role of the Irish Defence Forces
Introduction
Digital Technologies and the Changing Conflict Environment
UN Policy Developments
The Challenge Digital Technologies Pose for Peace Operations
The Opportunities Digital Technologies Present for Peace Operations
The Opportunities Digital Technologies Present for the Defence Forces
Conclusion
Cyber Resilience for Europe’s Armed Forces in the Twenty-First Century: A German Perspective
Introduction
Digitalisation in the Context of Security Policy
Opportunities of Digitalisation
New and Disruptive Technologies
Digitalisation in the Bundeswehr
The Challenge of Cyber Security
Responsible Use of New and Disruptive Technologies
The Cyber and Information Domain in the Bundeswehr
Resilience Through Digital Sovereignty
Trustworthy IT
Key Technologies
Core Command Capability
Capacity for Innovation
Digital Competence
Conclusion
The Irish Defence Forces in the Drone Age
Introduction
The Drone Age Landscape
Loitering Munitions
Swarming
Violent Non-State Actors
Uncrewed Ground Vehicles
Uncrewed Underwater and Surface Vehicles
Challenges and Opportunities Facing the Irish Defence Forces
Defence Forces’ Uncrewed Vehicles
Opportunities for All Services of the Defence Forces
Dilemmas
Conclusion
Defence Forces Institutional Innovation and Civil-Military Relations
A Research, Technology and Innovation Capability for the Defence Organisation
Introduction
Threat Environment
What is RTI for Defence?
Defence Research, Technology & Innovation Capability
The RTI Capability Structure
Developing the RTI Capability
Benefits of RTI
Challenges Ahead for RTI
Joint Working Opportunities
The Road Ahead
Shared Norms but Policy Incoherence: Analysing the Irish Defence Forces’ Marketplace Aspirations
Introduction
The Problem of Top-Cover
Common Norms, Competing Standpoints
The Interaction of Norms and Institutions
Corroborating Norm and Institutional Influence
Conclusion
Ireland and the Citizens in Uniform
Introduction
The Genesis for Military Representation in Ireland
Frustration, Negotiation, and Representation
Military Representation as a Threat to National Security
Changing Lives, and the Future
Affiliation to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions
Permanent Pay Review Body
Conclusion
The Principle of Irish Neutrality
Ireland, NATO and “the Return of Geopolitics” in Europe
Introduction
Ireland and NATO: Complicated Relations
Hybrid Interference and Transnational Security
Transnational Geopolitics and Cyber Security
Airspace Violations and Insecurity
Maritime Security in the North Atlantic
Conclusion
Irish Military Neutrality: A Historical Perspective for Modern Consideration
Introduction
Neutrality as Necessity (1923–1939)
Origins and Policy
The Report of the Army Organisation Board
Neutrality as Expediency (1939–1955)
The Emergency
18th Military Mission
After the War
Neutrality as Convenience (1955–Present)
Irish Neutrality in the Modern Era
Conclusion
Generating More Heat Than Light? The Debate Over Ireland’s Neutrality and the “European Army”
EEC and NATO
Defending Europe?
EEC Membership
“New Cold War”
European Integration
Partnership for Peace
“European army”?
Europe “worth defending”
Neutrality—A Considered Policy?
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security Edited by Jonathan Carroll Matthew G. O’Neill Mark Williams

The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security “This book is a critical and insightful contribution to the debate on Irish defence and the role of the Defence Forces. Uniquely, it brings together the voices of both scholars and practitioners to assess where Ireland stands in the face of contemporary threats but also its potential across multiple defence domains. Irish defence policy is in urgent need of serious and sustained attention. The authors of this important text fulfil that mission perfectly.” —Ben Tonra, Professor, MRIA, The School of Politics and International Relations (SPIRe), University College Dublin, Ireland “By mainly examining Ireland’s defence policy and the Irish Armed Forces, this edited volume provides valuable knowledge to both practitioners and scholars. The book is structured around five highly relevant themes, each contributing to the debate on the contemporary challenges of security policy and military transformation. Undoubtedly, any reader interested in international relations and/or security studies, and especially those focusing on small states studies and/or comparative strategy, will gain new insights by exploring this book.” —Håkan Edström, Associate Professor in Political Science, Swedish Defence University, Sweden

Jonathan Carroll · Matthew G. O’Neill · Mark Williams Editors

The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security

Editors Jonathan Carroll Texas A&M University College Station, TX, USA Mark Williams The Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice Queen’s University Belfast Belfast, UK

Matthew G. O’Neill The Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice Queen’s University Belfast Belfast, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-07811-8 ISBN 978-3-031-07812-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

I welcome this publication, which shines a light on all things defence both in Ireland and beyond. The publication entitled “The EU, Ireland, and Contemporary Security” provides a critique of, but also valuable inputs on the changing strategic environment and future challenges and potential future orientations for defence in Ireland. We should never be afraid of objective criticism and evidence-based assertions, but rather, reflect positively on them and consider how we can enhance the understanding and appreciation of defence in Ireland, particularly among civil society. I would like to thank all the contributors who have contributed to this publication. They come from a wide range of backgrounds and perspectives, from academia to practitioners and geographically from Ireland and, also, significant international contributions. I would like to congratulate the editors, Jon Carroll from Texas A&M University, and Matthew O’Neill and Mark Williams both from Queen’s University, Belfast. I would also like to thank the publishers at Palgrave Macmillan for their support and without whom we would not have this important publication. From a situation of negligible discussion on defence, this year we have had an abundance of riches with a number of key publications. In February 2022, we had the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, probably the most far-reaching and detailed review of the Defence Forces in the history of the State. And now, we have this international

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publication which examines and explores a wide range of issues from land and naval operations to cyber, peacekeeping, and military strategy. These publications will hopefully lift the discourse on defence in Ireland to a new level, reflecting the realities of the changing strategic environment, the return of power politics, and the implications of this for Ireland. They are a wake-up call to the new realities. Again, I would like to thank the editors and publisher for this contribution to the debate and wish you every success in this publication. Dublin 2, Ireland

Mr. Simon Coveney, T.D. Ireland’s Minister for Defence and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Acknowledgements

The genesis of this volume was a chance meeting by the Editors at the Defence Forces Review annual conference at University College Dublin in December 2019. At that conference, collegial and at times heated debate occurred throughout the day between Defence Forces personnel, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, defence and security academics, and a multitude of other stakeholders about the future direction of Irish defence. While intriguing, constructive, and indeed valuable, the Editors were struck by the fact that this debate was largely happening behind closed doors, leaving the wider political and public debates on defence shaped by journalists and social media. The expertise on Irish defence needed to be brought out into the open to ensure a more robust, accessible, and informed debate, and thus, this project began. With a collaborative project such as this volume, credit and thanks are owed to many far and wide for their contributions and support. The Editors would first like to thank the Politics and Development Studies Editorial team at Palgrave Macmillan, especially Alina Yurova and Geetha Chockalingam for bringing this publication to fruition with sage advice, support, and enthusiasm. We wish to extend our thanks to the Defence Force community with particular thanks to the Lieutenant General Sean Clancy, Chief of Staff of the Irish Defence Forces and Jacqui McCrum, Secretary-General at the Department of Defence and their staff for their valued support and cooperation. We also express our gratitude to Minister for Defence and

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney, T.D., and his staff. The contributions of Defence Forces and Department of Defence personnel made this volume possible. The Editors would also like to acknowledge the support from our many colleagues at Texas A&M University, and The Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Security Peace and Justice at the Queen’s University of Belfast. Furthermore, we would like to thank School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy, and Politics at Queen’s University, Belfast for providing funding for the volume indexing of the book through the Postgraduate-Led Initiative Funding. Finally, we would like to thank our contributors to this edited volume, who are some of the leading experts, both academic and practitioner, on Irish and wider European defence and security. The contributions of these experts are an invaluable first step towards wider discussion and understanding of defence and security issues within Ireland. We very much hope their voices will one day be joined by the many security and defence experts, both in the military and academia, who for various reasons could not ultimately participate in this project.

Introduction

Defence is a contentious issue in Ireland, both politically and publicly. In recent years, the utility, capabilities, and indeed the necessity of having the Defence Forces has been the focus of public, political, and academic discourse due to several events: increased tensions in Northern Ireland due to Brexit, Ireland’s accession to the UN Security Council, repeated incursions by Russian aircraft into Irish airspace, the COVID-19 Pandemic, Russian naval exercises off Ireland’s coast, and most recently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Despite the litany of security issues, the question has still been repeatedly asked by politicians and the public alike, why does Ireland need a military? Even more provocatively, some ask why a supposedly “neutral” country should invest in defence, instead of housing, social welfare, or healthcare. Heated political and public debates have questioned, and continue to question, the contribution of the Defence Forces to Irish life, society, and national security. For those advocates of Irish defence, the question is not whether Ireland needs a military, but whether the Defence Forces are fit for the security challenges the country currently faces, or for those ahead. These are all valid questions, and this volume aims to provide some answers, but also thought-provoking discussion on the future direction of Irish defence in a world of emerging and hybrid threats. The timing of this volume is significant. The Irish State as we know it today was established after the War of Independence and the AngloIrish Treaty of 1921. The Irish Free State was formally recognised in

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December 1922. At the time of writing, Ireland as a nation has just marked its centenary. In February 2022, the much-anticipated Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces was published, the most in-depth evaluation of Ireland’s security environment and defence capabilities in the history of the State, with recommendations to fundamentally reform the Irish defence framework to face current and future threats. The Report’s recommendations were not binding. There will, undoubtedly be renewed debate about the direction, shape, and even the nature of Irish defence going forward. Accordingly, one hundred years on from the foundation of the Irish State, and indeed from the establishment of the Defence Forces in 1923, it is only prudent to take stock of Irish defence, especially against the backdrop of an unprecedented and deteriorating security environment and an increasingly globalised Ireland. It is particularly appropriate to evaluate how well-prepared Ireland is, as an island state, for the evolving security environment, to ask tough questions, and to face uncomfortable, even stark, realities. Small nations often rely on military policies that aim to mitigate the underappreciation of threats, or lack of investment, with innovation, flexibility, and force multipliers through technology, the strategic use of reserve forces, and cooperative defence agreements with regional neighbours. Like many small nations in a world of emerging conventional and hybrid threats, Ireland is facing these same challenges, these same strategic choices. However, in some areas, there is a disconnect between the ways and means of Irish defence policy, and indeed, the ends. Solving this disconnect requires the evaluation of the threat environment facing Ireland and the Defence Forces, and an appraisal of where Irish defence is currently, and where it should go. Critically, what are the contemporary and future threats, and how should the Defence Forces adapt to meet them? The EU, Irish Defence Forces, and Contemporary Security provides a detailed exploration of Irish defence and the Defence Forces at the strategic, operational, and historical levels across six central themes. The six themes are Defence Forces capabilities and the threat environment, the Reserve Defence Forces, peacekeeping operations, cyber security in the digital age, Defence Forces institutional innovation and civil–military relations, and finally, the debates surrounding the principle of Irish neutrality. Within these six themes, this volume has gathered military practitioners, policymakers, and scholars from Ireland and the European Union in the first in-depth conversation and analysis on modern Irish defence to

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discuss, and in turn promote discussion, on where Irish defence is, and where it should go in the future, especially in terms of implementing the recommendations of the seminal Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces.

Part I: Defence Forces Capabilities and The Threat Environment The first and largest theme within The EU, Irish Defence Forces, and Contemporary Security explores Defence Forces capabilities, highlights key strategic issues, and most importantly, provides an evaluation of the threat environment Ireland faces now, and going forward. This theme provides the “ends” with which defence “ways and means” must be aligned to adequately counter existing threats. Opening this discussion is former Defence Forces Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Mark Mellett, providing the foundational context to this volume’s analysis by discussing Ireland’s defence obligations, his appraisal of the security challenges that lie ahead, and the Defence Forces’ ability to meet those challenges. Brigadier General Brian Cleary of the Irish Army joins this discussion with a personal exploration of how Ireland’s perception of security has transitioned over the course of his career, from an inward-looking focus on internal security during the Troubles to Ireland’s outward-looking heavy involvement in multilateralism through peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. Cleary highlights that over the course of forty years, Ireland’s Defence Forces have only diminished, while emerging threats and operational commitments have only increased, and that doing more with less has consequences for Irish security. Defence correspondent and former army officer, Tom Clonan, highlights attitudes towards communication and intellectual discourse within the Defence Forces that have led to a suboptimal articulation of threats to policymakers and even more so, to the Irish public. Consequently, Clonan argues that this culture has caused an underappreciation in public and political spheres as to why a neutral country such as Ireland, needs a military, and even more, why defence requires significant ongoing investment. Concluding this theme, discussion then turns to the Irish Naval Service, with a focus on maritime capabilities and innovation. Captain Brian Fitzgerald, former Chief of Naval Operations for the Irish Naval Serviceexamines the current and future challenges of protecting one of the largest maritime zones within the European Union and defending the western frontier of the European

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continent. Fitzgerald is joined in this examination of the Naval Service by Deborah Sanders of King’s College, London, with an explanation of the broader challenges and threats small navies face, and recommendations on how they are best mitigated to influence the future development of the Naval Service. Finally, Niall Buckley and Raymond Martin examine the Irish Air Crops (IAC) and how key technological and conceptual changes will likely impact on how the IAC address the problems and challenges that its second century of operations will bring. One hundred years ago, Ireland was at the forefront of aviation advances and the new State rapidly adopted the latest aviation developments.

Part II: The Reserve Defence Forces On the topic of Ireland’s Reserve Defence Forces, the second theme of this volume, three contributors discuss the future of the Army Reserve and the Naval Service Reserve in terms of operationalising the recommendations of the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. Jonathan Carroll of Texas A&M University, a former Army Reserve officer who has published extensively on the topic, argues for a fundamental revitalisation of the Army Reserve, no longer based on the existing Single Force Concept, but on a Total Force Policy instead. Carroll details what such an Army Reserve could and should look like, where dependence on the Army Reserve promotes positive reforms and operational utilisation, to fundamentally benefit the Defence Forces as a whole. Joining Carroll in providing recommendations for the future Army Reserve is Neil Richardson, a serving reserve officer, and current Secretary-General of the Reserve Defence Forces Representative Association. Like Carroll, Richardson proposes a reformed Army Reserve based on three distinct cohorts to argue how reforms can transform the Reserve into a force multiplier for the Irish Army. Concluding the evaluation of the Reserve Defence Forces are David Rodgers and Gavin Murphy with an analysis of the Irish Naval Service Reserve’s capabilities and role, and a discussion of what the future should look like for Ireland’s reserve maritime component to adequately support Naval Service operations.

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Part III: Peacekeeping Operations Ireland has the longest unbroken record of contributing to UN peacekeeping and stabilisation operations in history. As such, the third theme within this volume explores this critical contribution to international peace and security with three excellent chapters on Peacekeeping Operations. Natalia Hapek, of the University of Warsaw, explores the legacy of Irish overseas participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Hapek details the history of UNIFIL and how Ireland’s largest and longest overseas commitment has shaped the Defence Forces. For Hapek, UNIFIL provided the foundational experiences in operational peacekeeping abroad for the Defence Forces. Lebanon was also an environment that matured Irish troops militarily and culturally, acclimating them for future, and more robust, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Liberia, Chad, and Kosovo. Taking a different approach to Irish peacekeeping is Neil Dee, from the Azure Forum for Contemporary Security Strategy. Dee evaluates the impact of Irish history on Ireland’s approach to peacekeeping. Considering Ireland’s joining of the United Nations Security Council, Dee explores how decolonisation, conflict, and independence, three elements often highlighted as integral to Irish history, have interacted to shape Ireland’s peacekeeping policy and operations. Concluding the discussion on Ireland and peacekeeping, Dr. Annika Hansen explores the threats and capability requirements for peacekeeping in the digital age, specifically how information operations can be a force multiplier and misinformation mitigator at the operational level during peacekeeping missions in the twenty-first century.

Part IV: Cyber Security in the Digital Age The fourth theme of The EU, Irish Defence Forces, and Contemporary Security deals with Cyber Security in the Digital Age and examines the critical issue of developing adequate cyber defence in the Irish context to confront the most potent hybrid threats that often can bypass conventional defence capabilities. In this regard, the discussion is opened by Mark Williams and Matthew O’Neill of Queen’s University, Belfast, with their analysis of the strategic and operational consequences of new technologies’ role in a changing conflict environment. Arguing that the evolving role of technology in conflict settings, as well as emerging hybrid

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threats encountered in peace operations, necessitates adaptation of the Defence Forces’ approaches, tools, and capabilities, while also noting the opportunity this presents for the Defence Forces to be at the forefront of the development and deployment of new capabilities needed to support modern peace operations, and to champion a normative framework for the deployment of these capabilities. Lieutenant General Michael Vetter, Director-General of Cyber and Information technology at the German Ministry of Defence, then provides an overview of the cyber security threat environment from the perspective of EU cyber defence to argue the critical need for “cyber resilience” in European militaries. In a detailed discussion on current and future drone capabilities, Andy Scollick, argues for greater investment by the Irish Defence Forces in drone technology. By providing a comparative analysis of other small nations entering the “Drone Age,” Scollick lays out the potential for drone technology as both an emerging threat to, and a key force multiplier for, the Defence Forces.

Part V: Defence Forces Institutional Innovation and Civil–Military Relations The penultimate theme within The EU, Irish Defence Forces, and Contemporary Security is an exploration of the Defence Forces’ institutional innovation and civil–military relations, a key requirement for small nation militaries in a modern threat environment. Commandant Sharon McManus of the Defence Forces, and Sharon Breen from the Department of Defence, discuss the newly established joint Defence Forces/DOD Research, Technology, and Innovation (RTI) unit, formed to consider the significant potential of Ireland’s wider technology and research ecosystem to contribute towards the Irish defence framework, and especially the development of technology with defence applications. Discussing the potential pitfalls for RTI, Michael Mulqueen from the University of Central Lancashire, explores how different institutional understandings and perceptions of market norms created tensions between the Defence Forces, the Departments of Defence, Finance, and Transport when considering options for providing Ireland with Search and Rescue aviation services. Mulqueen’s analysis highlights the significant civil–military challenges in Ireland when the Defence Forces and government departments have differing conceptions of how to conduct and provision national defence, and how these challenges can impact defence innovation in the future. In terms of civil–military relations, Senior Chief Petty

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Officer Ruari DeBarra, illustrates that historically, defence reforms, when they come, are usually at the behest of the various Defence Forces’ representative associations. Yet these reforms and the practice of representative association lobbying, DeBarra argues, are neither the most productive, nor efficient means of obtaining beneficial reforms due to the adversarial climate created by such civil–military relations, especially when different associations diverge or disagree about what reforms should take priority.

Part VI: The Principle of Irish Neutrality The final theme within this volume surrounds the often-contested topic of Irish neutrality. Quite often, small nations seek to mitigate domestic defence shortfalls by joining military alliances or cooperative security arrangements. In the Irish context, as a perceived neutral country, there is significant public and political resistance to Ireland increasing its involvement with NATO beyond membership in the NATO affiliated Partnership for Peace (PfP). There is similar resistance to suggestions of Irish participation within an “EU Army.” Tackling this very issue of political and public opposition is Eoin McNamara from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, and the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies at the University of Tartu in Estonia. McNamara argues that Ireland is currently in a defence “no-man’s land” due to the return of geopolitics to Europe and the resurgence of tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation. This “no-man’s land,” McNamara explains, originates from the European desire for greater defence integration and capabilities development through NATO or EU CSDP which is politically infeasible in Ireland’s case, and the resultant need for independent Irish defence investment and innovation which is similarly inhibited by domestic political and public attitudes towards the Defence Forces and Irish neutrality. McNamara presents a solution to escaping this no-man’s land through a compromise, where Ireland moves to an arrangement lying somewhere in between current PfP membership and full NATO membership, to alleviate, at the very least, the significant pressure on the Defence Forces in the areas of cyber defence, and maritime and air policing operations. While McNamara discusses Ireland and NATO, Commandant Dan Ayiotis of the Military Archives explores the historical origins of Irish neutrality and compares these origins to modern social and political discourse in Ireland on maintaining neutrality. Ayiotis highlights that,

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historically, and in the present, Ireland has never been truly neutral, but instead has adopted a preferential pseudo-neutrality where tacit support for other nations’ military operations has been provided based on the Irish political and social perception of who is a friend and who is a foe. Ayiotis identifies three periods in Irish history, which he terms as neutrality as necessity, neutrality as expedience, and neutrality as convenience. Thus, since the creation of the State, Ireland may have claimed a status of neutrality, but has practised a policy of preferential favouritism during ongoing conflicts. Finally, like McNamara’s treatment of Ireland and NATO, and Ayiotis’s exploration of Irish neutrality historically, John Mulqueen explores the historical Cold War political and public debates on Irish neutrality, membership of NATO, and participation in an EU Army, and how these debates colour current and future discussions on Ireland’s attitudes towards increased EU military integration. Modern defence policy entails making difficult decisions, taking risks based on informed calculations as to where finite financial, personnel, and materiel resources are or should be allocated. These challenging decisions are even more acute for small nations like Ireland. With limited budgets and competing social and political priorities, Ireland has long faced the dichotomy of proximate conventional and hybrid threats that remains underappreciated either by policymakers or by the electorate. The following chapters aim to end this dichotomous approach to defence policy, to promote meaningful discussion, even debate, on providing for Ireland’s national defence now, and into the future. Jonathan Carroll Matthew G. O’Neill Mark Williams

Contents

Defence Forces Capabilities & The Threat Environment Ensuring the Jungle Doesn’t Grow Back: The Obligations Inherent to Irish Defence Policy Mark Mellett A Brigade Commander’s Perspective: “Oglaigh na hEireann Has Been the People, Is the People, and Will Be the People” Brian Cleary

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Disconnect and Mismatch: The Intellectual Formation of Irish Defence Policy and Practice Tom Clonan

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The Irish Naval Service: The Burden of the Minimalist Approach Brian FitzGerald

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Small Navies: Lessons for the Irish Naval Service Deborah Sanders Irish Air Corps: Towards 2052 Niall Buckley and Raymond Martin

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The Reserve Defence Forces Revitalizing the Irish Army Reserve Post-Commission on the Defence Forces: Moving from the Single Force Concept to a Total Force Policy Jonathan Carroll The Army Reserve: The Force-Multiplier for Irish Defence Neil Richardson Ireland’s Naval Service Reserve: An Analysis of Current Capabilities and Role for the Future David Rodgers and Gavin Murphy

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Peacekeeping Operations Decolonisation, Conflict and Independence: The Impact of History on Ireland’s Approach to Peacekeeping Neil Dee

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Ireland’s Largest Peacekeeping Mission—The Irish Defence Forces in UNIFIL Natalia Agnieszka Hapek

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Peacekeeping in the Digital Age: Future Threats and Capability Requirements Annika S. Hansen

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Cyber Security in the Digital Age The Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping and the Role of the Irish Defence Forces Mark Williams and Matthew G. O’Neill

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Cyber Resilience for Europe’s Armed Forces in the Twenty-First Century: A German Perspective Michael Vetter

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The Irish Defence Forces in the Drone Age Andy Scollick

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Defence Forces Institutional Innovation and Civil-Military Relations A Research, Technology and Innovation Capability for the Defence Organisation Sharon McManus and Sharon Breen

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Shared Norms but Policy Incoherence: Analysing the Irish Defence Forces’ Marketplace Aspirations Michael Mulqueen

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Ireland and the Citizens in Uniform Ruairí de Barra

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The Principle of Irish Neutrality Ireland, NATO and “the Return of Geopolitics” in Europe Eoin Micheál McNamara

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Irish Military Neutrality: A Historical Perspective for Modern Consideration Daniel Ayiotis

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Generating More Heat Than Light? The Debate Over Ireland’s Neutrality and the “European Army” John Mulqueen

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Conclusion

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Index

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List of Contributors

Daniel Ayiotis Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, Ireland Sharon Breen Department of Defence, County Kildare, Ireland Niall Buckley Irish Air Corps, Air Corps HQ, Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel, Dublin, Ireland Jonathan Carroll Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA Brian Cleary Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, Ireland Tom Clonan Senator & Security Analyst, Irish Senate, Dublin, Ireland Ruairí de Barra Irish Naval Service, and Permanent Defence Force Other Ranks Representative Association (PDFORRA), Cork, Ireland Neil Dee The Azure Forum for Contemporary Security Strategy, Dublin, Ireland Brian FitzGerald Irish Naval Service, Haulbowline, Ireland Annika S. Hansen Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin, Germany Natalia Agnieszka Hapek University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland Raymond Martin Irish Air Corps, Air Corps HQ, Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel, Dublin, Ireland

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Sharon McManus Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, Ireland Eoin Micheál McNamara Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Mark Mellett University College Cork, Cork, Ireland; Irish Defence Forces, DFHQ Newbridge, Ireland John Mulqueen Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Michael Mulqueen School of Justice, University of Central Lancashire, Lancashire, UK Gavin Murphy Irish Naval Service Reserve, Carrigaline, Cork, Ireland Matthew G. O’Neill The Senator George J Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK Neil Richardson Irish Army Reserve and Reserve Defence Forces Representative Association, Co. Roscommon, Ireland David Rodgers Irish Naval Service Reserve, Douglas, Cork, Ireland Deborah Sanders Defence London, London, UK

Studies

Department,

King’s

College

Andy Scollick Independent Consultant, County Cork, Ireland Michael Vetter German Ministry of Defence, Berlin, Germany Mark Williams The Senator George J Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK

List of Figures

The Irish Naval Service: The Burden of the Minimalist Approach Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4

The real map of Ireland Commissioning ceremony of L.E. JAMES JOYCE—Dublin 2015 L.E. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS (Offshore Patrol Vessel) Motor Torpedo Boats of the Marine and Coast-Watching Service 1939–1946

68 69 72 73

Revitalizing the Irish Army Reserve Post-Commission on the Defence Forces: Moving from the Single Force Concept to a Total Force Policy Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Pie chart of the Army Reserve Force Structure: Single Force Concept 2013–Present Pie chart on the Reimagined Army Reserve Force Structure

130 138

A Research, Technology and Innovation Capability for the Defence Organisation Fig. 1

The building blocks of the proposed RTI Capability Model

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List of Tables

Ensuring the Jungle Doesn’t Grow Back: The Obligations Inherent to Irish Defence Policy Table 1

An analysis of gapping in capabilities currently across the Joint Functions from the perspective of State defence

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Revitalizing the Irish Army Reserve Post-Commission on the Defence Forces: Moving from the Single Force Concept to a Total Force Policy Table Table Table Table Table Table

1 2 3 4 5 6

Historical Reserve Force Structures The Army Reserve “Surge” Brigade The Army Reserve Combat Support Brigade The Army Reserve Combat Service Support Brigade The Integrated Army Reserve Army Reserve Unit Tiering System

129 132 133 134 136 137

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Defence Forces Capabilities & The Threat Environment

Ensuring the Jungle Doesn’t Grow Back: The Obligations Inherent to Irish Defence Policy Mark Mellett

Introduction Every Nation has an Army. If not its own then someone else’s.1 So it was in Ireland over a hundred years ago with British forces underwriting the sovereignty of Great Britain and Ireland, shaping the character of Irish society. The right to live in a civil society is a human right of every man, woman, and child. It is where people are free, the institutions of state function and where the vulnerable are protected. In the lead up to the Irish War of Independence, the vulnerable were not protected and Irish people were not free, nor was the Irish State sovereign. A state’s sovereignty is inalienable, it being a paradox for the sovereignty and 1 In a letter to the Minister for Defence on 18 Apr 1948, Lt Gen Dan McKenna observed “if we are not prepared to garrison and defend our country someone else will come and do it for us,” in Michael Kennedy and Victor Laing (eds), The Irish Defence Forces 1940–1949: The Chief of Staff’s Reports (Dublin, 2014), 440.

M. Mellett (B) University College Cork, Cork, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] Irish Defence Forces, DFHQ Newbridge, Ireland

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_1

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sovereign rights of a state to be upheld by another’s military. Ireland’s sovereignty and sovereign rights, just like the freedom of her people were more imaginary than real, and so they remained until the Irish Free State and the Defence Forces were established. For almost 100 years Óglaigh na hÉireann has been the bedrock of Irish sovereignty, underpinning the framework for the institutions of Ireland’s civil society. Today our national, regional, and global security landscape has changed dramatically. One hundred years after the foundation of the Irish State it is only right to take stock against the backdrop of a deteriorating security environment, to see how well-prepared Ireland is for the evolving security environment as an island state in an interconnected world, and to comment on our future. It is impossible to cover all aspects of Ireland’s defence considerations in one chapter, accordingly by necessity some themes will be dealt with in a cursory manner. But, in examining Ireland’s approach to Defence this chapter will draw on several threads. (a) Examine Ireland’s geographical location and jurisdiction, where the State exercises sovereignty, has sovereign rights, duties, and obligations. (b) Analyse the current security environment from national, regional, and global perspectives. (c) Comment on the multilateral framework within which National Interests are exercised with a particular focus on the implications for the Defence Forces. (d) Assess, from the standpoint of Ireland’s Defence Policy, the prospects of a policy-strategy match in the context of capabilities, resourcing, and risk.

Ireland’s Geographical Location and Jurisdiction: Where the State Exercises Sovereignty, Has Sovereign Rights, Duties, and Obligations On foundation of the State, Óglaigh na hÉireann, had a responsibility to defend approximately 70,000 square kilometres on the island of Ireland, given that defence from the sea was to be undertaken by His Majesty’s Imperial Force.2 Today the Defence Forces have responsibility for a 2 Article 6 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921.

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growing jurisdiction where the State has expanding sovereign rights over an area ten times as large, with one of the largest maritime to land ratios in Europe, and a growing de facto multilateral responsibility and obligations encompassing the western approaches to the EU.3 In addition to more traditional interpretations, defence is increasingly considered from the perspective of multi domain integration across land, air, maritime, cyber, and space.4 The five military operational domains are not equal: space is global and encompasses the air, land, and maritime domains while the cyber and electromagnetic domain permeates and pervades all the others. Indeed, for clarity it is necessary to consider subdivisions when assessing roles and responsibilities with, for example, the maritime domain having air, surface, sub-surface, seabed, and sub-seabed domains. From a sovereignty and sovereign rights perspective Ireland’s current and future jurisdiction is significant with a potential to encompass up to one million square kilometres with one of the richest food producing ecosystems and renewable energy environments on the planet. By necessity therefore this chapter will look in greater detail at our maritime, air, and evolving domains, not necessarily well covered in the past, thereby providing a greater sense of Irish State responsibilities, obligations, and the required direction of defence for Ireland. It is widely acknowledged that the process of globalisation transforms both the concept and practice of state sovereignty.5 It is also argued that the idea that state sovereignty can be defined territorially or that the concept of state sovereignty denotes an autonomous international actor are no longer valid descriptions. Accordingly, while sovereignty is a relevant concept in the context of jurisdiction, defence and security there are also wider considerations in political, diplomatic, economic, societal, technological, legislative, and cultural terms. In terms of sovereign jurisdiction the Irish State exercises sovereignty over the land domain of the

3 Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government, Project Ireland 2040: National Planning Framework (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2018), 98. 4 British Ministry of Defence, Joint Concept Note 1/20: Multi-Domain Integration (London: Ministry of Defence, 2020). 5 Suzanne E. Gordon, “Changing Concepts of Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in the Global Economy: Is There a Territorial Connection?,” available at http://ccges.apps01. yorku.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/gordon-changing-concepts-of-sovereigntyand-jurisdiction-in-the-global-economy-is-there-a-territorial-connection.pdf.

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26 counties and the sea area out to the limit of the Territorial Seas at 12 nautical miles beyond which it exercises sovereign rights.

Maritime Jurisdiction and Responsibilities By the late 1900s in the words of the Chairman of the United Nations Law of the Sea drafting committee, Alan Beesley, “the law of the sea was in state of disorder bordering on chaos.”6 It is only in recent decades that coastal state sovereign rights have been codified. The introduction of new technology, evolutions in science, changes in market conditions, and the rate of resource usage have inter alia combined to necessitate more sophisticated ocean governance regimes. All of these add to the sophistication of the security arrangements such as those required to suppress unlawful acts in the case of maritime navigation and on fixed platforms which under the 2004 Maritime Security Act, ironically, are the primary responsibility of An Garda Síochána, not the Defence Forces.7 Concurrently, Ireland is obliged under international treaty to protect and preserve the marine environment. Furthermore, Ireland is signatory to the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC), obliging it to have a National Contingency Plan (NCP) for oil pollution in place applicable throughout the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Marine-based critical national infrastructure is set to increase exponentially in the coming decades in the renewable energy sector. With offshore gas production declining, gas field infrastructure presents opportunities for the production and storage of “green hydrogen.”8 The growth in fibre optic subsea cables provides for trans-Atlantic and regional interconnectivity, conveying trillions of euros per day, adding to the state’s critical national infrastructure and vulnerabilities. Electrical interconnectors, current and planned, link with the United Kingdom and EU, adding to the sea-based critical national infrastructure. In the Climate Action 6 Alan Beesley, “The Negotiating Strategy of UNCLOS III: Developing and Developed

Countries as Partners—A Pattern for Future Multilateral International Conferences?” Law and Contemporary Problems 46, no. 2 (1983), 183–194. 7 Irish Statute Book, “Maritime Security Act 2004,” available at https://www.irishstat utebook.ie/eli/2004/act/29/enacted/en/print#sec1. 8 ESB, “ESB and dCarbonX launch Kinsale Head Hydrogen Storage project,” Press Release 12 August 2021.

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Plan, the Government has committed to the installation of 7 GW of offshore renewable energy (ORE) by 2030 with a further commitment of more than 30 GW beyond that serving as a key enabler for EU Strategic Autonomy, helping to attain energy security.9 For Ireland, this requires the installation of significant fixed and floating offshore renewable energy infrastructure with an estimated value exceeding e60 billion.10 The designation of a network of Marine Protected Areas will help meet Ireland’s international obligations, contributing to a wider ecosystembased management framework with the ultimate aim of achieving Good Environmental Status in the coming years. The Maritime Area Planning Act 2021 provides for the biggest transformation in marine governance since the foundation of the State establishing the Maritime Area Regulatory Authority (MARA).11 Finally, Ireland’s Search and Rescue (SAR) system conforms with several international conventions ensuring adequate provision of SAR services.12

Air Domain Jurisdiction and Responsibilities In the context of the Air Domain, Ireland has air traffic management responsibilities within the area encompassing the Irish Flight Information Regions (FIR(s)) of Shannon FIR, the Shannon Oceanic Transition Area (SOTA) and Northern Oceanic Transition Area (NOTA). Through the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA), Ireland provides air traffic management services for 451,000 square kilometres of airspace.13 Though a crucial gateway for 90 per cent of air traffic between Europe and North America, 9 Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, Climate Action Plan 2021: Securing Our Future (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2021); Jennifer Bray, “Taoiseach Tells French Summit That Ireland Aims to Become Exporter of Energy,” The Irish Times, February 11, 2022. 10 UK prices for 30 GW of ORE were in the order of £48 Billon in 2018. Renewable UK, “A Sea of Opportunity,” available at https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.renewableuk. com/resource/resmgr/publications/offshore_wind_industry_counc.pdf. 11 Houses of the Oireachtais, “Maritime Area Planning Act 2021,” available at https://

www.oireachtas.ie/en/bills/bill/2021/104/. 12 Such as the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974: Chapter V “Search and Rescue.” Department of Transport, Tourism, and Sport, National Search and Rescue Plan (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2019). 13 Irish Aviation Authority, “En Route Services,” available at https://www.iaa.ie/airtraffic-management/en-route-services.

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Ireland does not have primary radar coverage over its FIRs which can and has given rise to security concerns such as the risk of potential disruption of civilian airspace by Russian Federation military aircraft and a reported agreement for UK military overflights.14

Space Domain Three fundamental principles guide the conduct of space activities, firstly the notion of space as the province of all humankind, secondly the freedom of exploration and use of outer space by all states without discrimination, and thirdly the principle of non-appropriation of outer space. These principles are codified in the five treaties and agreements of international space law. In the context of responsibilities from the Irish State perspective is the fact that each state is responsible for all spacerelated activities arising within its jurisdiction. This includes those relating to non-state actors or commercial interests. This places a particular responsibility for Ireland to have appropriate intelligence and governance structures to ensure space-related infrastructure in Irish jurisdiction is not used, especially by foreign states, for activities that are contrary to international law or to undermine State sovereignty. In recent years there have been growing concerns regarding inappropriate access to space infrastructure by foreign militaries.15

Cyber Domain Ireland ranks among the leading EU Member States in terms of the uptake and use of digital technologies which play a central role in supporting and facilitating economic and social life. Ireland’s economic growth is very much linked with the development of a global data ecosystem, our geographic position, open economy, and EU membership. As a result, Ireland has become host to a significant amount of data and economic activity. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) works collaboratively with the Defence Forces, An Garda Síochána and 14 Edward Burke, “What Are Russian Bombers Doing in Irish Airspace?” The Irish Times, March 10, 2020; George Allison, “Why Do British Jets ‘Protect’ Irish Airspace?” UK Defence Journal, March 10, 2020. 15 Jonathan Barrett and Johan Ahlander, “Swedish Space Company Halts New Business Helping China Operate Satellites,” Reuters, September 21, 2020.

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the National Security Analysis Centre (NSAC) in the Department of the Taoiseach. It also works closely with the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) in the Department of Defence and leads, with respect to a Threat Sharing Group comprising senior private sector cyber security specialists, critical infrastructure operators, the Defence Forces, and An Garda Síochána.

Irelands Multilateral Responsibilities Beyond the state’s sovereign jurisdiction Ireland’s international obligations and commitments have been inextricably linked to Ireland’s values for a fairer world; a just world; a secure world, and a sustainable world. Ireland’s foreign policy is deeply anchored in the values set out in the Irish Constitution. These are also reflected in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the principles which underpin the European Union. This explains Ireland’s sustained strong commitment to multilateralism, a commitment that underpins Ireland’s approach to membership of the United Nations Security Council for the period 2021/2022. Key to Ireland’s successful bid was the credibility Ireland leveraged from the longest unbroken record of UN peacekeeping with an estimated 70,000 individual tours of duty by Irish soldiers, sailors, and aircrew in the world’s most challenging theatres. Ireland’s approach in aiding victims of armed conflicts and other emergencies is to stress the importance of coherent, complimentary, and coordinated actions within a multilateral framework. Ireland emphasises the importance of systematically integrating protection of civilians and gender-based violence initiatives into policy and practice to protect the most vulnerable.

The Current Security Environment from National, Regional, and Global Perspectives While the preceding sections have outlined Ireland’s responsibilities across the various security domains, state security is inextricably linked with international and regional security. A safe and secure environment stimulates economic growth and foreign direct investment, which in turn enables improved public services and enhanced national infrastructure. Notwithstanding the Balkan Wars and the more recent war in Ukraine, for over 75 years there has been an extraordinary period of peace and

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security in Europe, further reinforcing the links between economics and security. This security has in no small way been the result of the multilateral manner the values and principles of the European Union have been institutionalised, building on the Philosophy of Robert Schuman. But it is also important to note that the EU institutions were facilitated by initiatives such as the U.S. Marshall Plan in the aftermath of the Second World War providing over $15 Billion to support European recovery that formed part of the foundations of the EU we know today. EU recovery was supported by U.S. interest in Europe, which today finds itself squeezed between the United States, China, and an aggressively resurgent Russian Federation that attempts to become stronger by making Europe look weaker. While traditionally state security arrangements are sovereign matters, in a multilateral framework of common interests, they are also a matter of reputation. Countries that do not provide adequately for their own security arrangements may be seen as “free riding” on the investment in defence and security made by neighbours. They may also unknowingly facilitate espionage, cyber, or hybrid targeting activities by foreign states against neighbours—a matter brought into even sharper focus following the invasion of Ukraine.16 The historical security challenges of dissident Republicanism notwithstanding, until very recently Ireland had enjoyed a relatively safe and secure environment, a privileged position that is taken for granted, especially when looking at regional and global challenges. The decision by the Russian Federation to communicate an intention to de facto annex approximately 5000 square kilometres of Ireland’s exclusive economic zone (equivalent to the combined area of Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford), using naval artillery and launching rockets for five days was unprecedented. It signalled contempt for the Irish people, an affront for Irish sovereign rights, the rights of fishermen, and our duties to protect the environment. In the space of a few days, the holes in Ireland’s defence architecture were laid bare for the world to see. Unfortunately, this disregard for the norms and principles of good order pales in significance when considered in the context of the Russian Federation’s full scale invasion of Ukraine. Unlike many other states, Ireland does not have a National Security Strategy, nor does it formally publish updated threat levels. While 16 Conor Gallagher, “Ireland and Finland: Similar Countries with Vastly Different Security Approaches,” The Irish Times, February 26, 2022.

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the current threat level regarding terrorism in Ireland is “moderate,” in Northern Ireland it is “severe,” meaning an attack is highly likely.17 Following the “Wizard Spider” criminal ransomware cyber-attack on Ireland’s Health Service Executive, it is reasonable to assume another criminal cyber-attack of similar scope and scale is highly likely suggesting a threat assessment of severe, if not critical. It also shows the critical infrastructure vulnerability to state actors’ nefarious disruptive activity, should they so desire. Over the past 15 years, the Global Peace Index has provided a rich source of data allowing for year-on-year analysis relating to up to 99.7 per cent of the global population.18 The Index shows that since 2010 the number of conflicts, globally, has risen by 88 per cent. There are currently three wars on Europe’s borders. The invasion of Ukraine by Russian Federation forces has already resulted in many deaths adding to the death toll linked to the hybrid war in Ukraine following the 2014 annexation of Crimea.19 In Syria, multiple proxy wars continue, which have caused over 500,000 deaths and displaced over 6 million people.20 In Libya, the civil war has reached somewhat of a stalemate. These and other conflicts contribute to a plethora of second order activities including irregular migration, people, and weapons trafficking, as well as a rise in piracy. Of the eighty-four crises in the world monitored by the International Crisis Group, eighteen are in countries that are negotiating accession to the EU or have a European outlook. While deaths from terrorism fell for the fifth consecutive year in 2019 in most regions, it has become more widespread in others. There is evidence that remnants of ISIS have linked up with disparate violent extremist groups, influencing across the Sahel. The Gulf of Guinea persists as a maritime security hotspot, with the illegal 17 Department of Defence, “Speech by the Minister with Responsibility for Defence Paul Kehoe T.D.,” February 25, 2020, available at https://www.gov.ie/en/speech/365 5ff-speech-by-the-minister-with-responsibility-for-defence-paul-kehoe-td/. 18 Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Peace Index 2021,” available at https:// www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GPI-2021-web-1.pdf. 19 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Conflict-Related Casualties in Ukraine,” available at https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/ Conflict-related%20civilian%20casualties%20as%20of%2030%20September%202021%20% 28rev%208%20Oct%202021%29%20EN.pdf. 20 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Update on the Extent of Conflict-Related Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic,” available at https://www.ohchr. org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27531&LangID=E.

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arms trade and people trafficking mixing with South American trafficked narcotics, thus fuelling criminality which spills into Europe and beyond, forcing instability and irregular migration.21 While states must treat the symptoms in places like the Mediterranean, the only hope for a cure is to treat the root causes. Prior to the Ukraine invasion, 85 per cent of the worldwide displaced were from developing countries: 57 per cent come from Syria, South Sudan, and Afghanistan alone.22 Other vectors driving instability in and between states include state sponsored cyber, hybrid, and espionage operations below the threshold of formally declared waefare, undermining the authority of legitimate institutions, perversely shaping the outcomes from democratic processes, and threatening critical national infrastructure such as electrical grids and trans-ocean fibre optic telecommunications.23 Estimates suggest that the annual cost of cybercrime damages is in the region of $6 trillion, and the rise of right-wing political ideologies is driving more nationalistic tendencies, often triggered by irregular migration. Increasingly impacting on security is the influence of climate breakdown and biodiversity loss affecting every aspect of life, damaging food systems, displacing millions, and shaping the future of conflict. With the average global temperature now 1.2 degrees higher than pre-industrial levels and the UN predicting this to rise to 2.4 degrees there are growing threats from weather-related disasters including rising water scarcity and sea level rises. The effects of population increase further add to insecurity with a tenfold increase in global population noted over the last 250 years. The UN estimate world population will pass 10 billion by 2050. The Global Hunger Index points to alarming levels of hunger in 11 countries, with serious levels in 40 more, which causes greater insecurity, and undermines peace. The relationship between climate change and deadly

21 ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January–31 March 2021,” available at https://www.skuld.com/ contentassets/a58fecffc88b4418959a19e6d2e07778/2021-q1-imb-piracy-report.pdf. 22 Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria, Handbook on CSDP (Vienna: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence, 2021). https://www. bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/handbook_on_csdp4.pdf. 23 John Mooney, “Navy Called in as Russians Suspected of Targeting Undersea Internet Cable,” The Sunday Times, August 15, 2021.

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conflict is complex and context specific, while the impact of COVID19 has signalled a clear link between intensifying pathogen emergence, climate breakdown, and biodiversity loss.

Multilateral Framework, National Interests, and Implications for the Defence Forces The Ireland of today is changed remarkably from that of 100 years ago. For one, the jurisdiction where the state has sovereignty or sovereign rights has increased significantly in the air and maritime domains, complicated by space and cyber. The bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom is dominated by the de jure multilateral codified relationship with our 26 EU partners. In many ways, Ireland has never been more interconnected with international, regional, governmental, nongovernmental, and market and civil society institutions and yet it sits as the lone EU sentinel in the Atlantic post Brexit. It is bound by a complex web of obligations and duties which crisscross the political, economic, societal, technological, environmental, and legislative pillars. But should there be surprise? 400 years ago, the English Poet John Donne in For Whom the Bell Tolls wrote, “No man is an island, entire of itself. Each is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less.” Many interpret Donne’s message as a metaphor of interdependence suggesting that it is within a framework of multilateralism not unilateralism that this interdependency will best thrive. Today, in a world of breakneck speed in terms of change and knowledge generation, humans are physically experiencing the effects of climate breakdown and biodiversity loss, they are seeing a general decline in peace and security, and states have never been more interdependent. In the era of the Anthropocene, it is human activity that is the dominant influence on climate, the environment and peace and security. So as a species it is the principle of multilateralism that defines human security and how the institutions of civil society should flourish. Against the backdrop of such an assessment, at every level within Defence, across all governmental levels, national and international, it is vital that cross cutting, integrated approaches are pursued. This all points to the requirement for a “whole of society approach” to defence and security such as practised in Finland, among other countries. Greater cohesion between the Defence

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Forces and the Department of Defence with a discerning National Security Committee, an operational National Security Analysis Centre and a codified and actioned National Security Strategy have never been more important. Such fundamentals are vital for a broader EU defence and security architecture, shaped to underpin EU “Strategic Autonomy.”

Ireland the EU and Strategic Autonomy The pessimistic security environment assessment leaves no other choice but to view Ireland’s defence and security through the prism of the multilateral framework of the EU, UN and its relationship with NATO and neighbours. Accepting that the European Union has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity, and democracy, outcomes such as Brexit point to a questioning of the strategic direction Europe must follow. This has profound implications for Ireland. It also has profound implications for Ireland’s reputation and interpretation of the principle of solidarity.24 For decades the “Brussels effect,” and the ability to spread rules and standards across the globe, has earned admiration worldwide; Europe became a world power without realising it. But things are changing, and the shared interests and principles of the European Union, including the promotion of peace and guarantee of security for its citizens and territory, are under threat. Internal and external security of the Union and its states are ever more intertwined, with peace at home depending on peace beyond EU borders. According to the EU Global Strategy, the EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.25 This points towards a credible, responsive, and joined-up EU. Credibility hinges on European unity, the effectiveness of its policies and adherence to its values with a growing acceptance of an integrated and comprehensive approach to human security. Militaries should act in consort with politicians, diplomats, NGOs, lawyers, investors in an appropriate institutional framework, often involving the EU and ideally underwritten by the UN acknowledging that dysfunctionality at UN level can sometimes exacerbate insecurity. 24 See Sophie Pornschlegel, Solidarity in the EU: More Hype Than Substance? (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2021). 25 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (Brussels: EEAS, 2020).

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Nested within the EU Global Strategy, the EU Strategic Compass is seen as one of the most resolute plans to close the gap between ambition and reality when it comes to external action, achieving unity in the EU’s response to defence and security.26 Ultimately the compass has in its sights the opportunity to leverage dormant or under developed provisions of the EU Treaties, such as Article 42(7) of the Treaty of the European Union.27 In essence, the “Strategic Guidance” strategy does this by formulating a common threat analysis of the EU, agreeing on strategic objectives to strengthen the EU as an actor in security and defence and offering political guidance for future military planning processes. Taken together they point to a more geopolitical EU that, in the words of the HRVP, must “learn to use the language of power” (Borell, 2019) developing capacity in crisis management, enhancing capability development, improving resilience, and maximising partnerships. The Strategic Compass also acts as a platform for the deepening of EU relations with NATO and partners like the United Kingdom and Norway. The November 2016 EU Council conclusions refer to Strategic Autonomy as the “capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible.” Many argue that the EU has neither the strategic culture nor the required capabilities to support strategic autonomy. But the requirement to acquire such autonomy is being influenced on many fronts. Firstly, thirty years ago, the EU represented a quarter of the world’s wealth. In 20 years, it will represent about 11 per cent of world GDP, less than half that of China, which PwC predict will be the world’s strongest economy followed by India and then America. Secondly, a new language of unilateralism has entered centre stage, with a decline of American soft power and a reawakening of isolationist tendencies. This brings into question the degree of certainty with which the EU can call on its old ally. Thirdly, and on the flip side, the United States is understandably frustrated with a sense that the EU in general and many of its Member States in particular, and this must include Ireland, have been happy to free ride, enjoying the security dividend that the United States and others provide. Fourthly is a growing desire within 26 FINABEL, European Army Interoperability Centre, “EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence: A New Approach in 2021,” available at https://finabel.org/eus-str ategic-compass-for-security-and-defence-a-new-approach-in-2021/. 27 European Parliamentary Research Service, Unlocking the Potential of the EU Treaties (Brussels: EPRS, 2020).

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the EU for greater congruence between Member States in their approach to defence. Hence, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Defence Fund (EDF), Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), and so on, each of which has implications for Ireland with resistance in some sectors to greater EU defence co-operation by Ireland. Fifth, the EU’s dependency on Russian energy supplies is a cause of weakness as evidenced in the recent difficulties in reaching consensus on the nature of sanctions against Russia. European strategic autonomy through energy security offers an extraordinary opportunity to Ireland in terms of ORE. Finally, the policy of unilateralism is starkly evidenced by the decision of the United Kingdom to exit the European Union prioritising national sovereignty over EU multilateralism. The concept of strategic autonomy was born in the field of the defence industry with the most ambitious of three visions being common defence and security, common financing, and procurement of capabilities, sharing of expensive military assets and technological innovation aimed at reducing defence costs. The concept now expands beyond the defence sector into other domains, including technological, energy, competition, climate, trade, and economic policies.

Ireland and Neutrality The ambitions and direction of the EU bear heavily on the future of Irish neutrality and while a deeper analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, the historical narrative has consistently been misrepresented and misunderstood. Within this volume, Daniel Ayiotis and John Mulqueen provide particularly valuable insights, with Ayiotis eloquently identifying three themes that capture the happenstance nature of Irish policy on neutrality, namely neutrality as necessity, neutrality as expedience, and neutrality as convenience. European Security and Defence Policy presents challenges for how Ireland advances. The reality however is that there is nothing new about this, and if anything, it is a matter that is likely to come more to the fore in the aftermath of Brexit with greater demands being placed on Ireland in the context of investment in defence as identified by the Commission on the Defence Forces.

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Prospects of a Policy-Strategy Match Drawing this chapter together it is clear that there are several macro considerations that bear on the future of the Irish Defence Forces. These relate to sovereignty, the security environment, multilateral obligations, and the peculiarities relating to our interpretation of neutrality. All influence the nature of Ireland’s defence policy. Accordingly, it is worth positioning these in the broader national landscape of what is increasingly known as the whole of government approach to defence and security, to assess the implications for neutrality and the capability realities of a fit for purpose Defence Forces for 2030 and beyond. Before concluding, it is valuable to look at Ireland’s national security arrangements from the perspectives of: (a) Defence policy. (b) Defence expenditure and resourcing. (c) Governance. (d) Capabilities. (e) Risk.

Defence Policy Policy is the set of goals or political objectives that a nation adopts to achieve a vital national interest. On matters so fundamental to the integrity of a state and its sovereignty or decisions which ultimately involve members of its military going into harm’s way it is reasonable to expect that policy should be rational. That is, that there should be a clear understanding of National Interests, with clear objectives agreed upon, multiple options known and examined, and choices weighted. It requires a decision-making process to set these goals or political objectives. Clausewitz wrote that politics provides the logic setting clear objectives and should not extend its influence to operational detail, while Sun Tzu argues that Generals who “are not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious.”28

28 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Peter Paret and Michael Howard, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 87; Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Translated by Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala Dragon Editions, 1988).

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After almost eight decades without a codified Defence Policy, the first Irish Defence White Paper was published in February 2000, with the second in 2015, and updated in 2019.29 The White Paper sets out Government’s long-term policy. The roles and tasks assigned to the Defence Forces drive the capabilities required across the five military domains to meet the priorities of Government with the Reserve Defence Forces required to augment the Permanent Defence Forces in times of crisis. Central to the roles and core to the purpose of every military force is the requirement to provide for the military defence of the State from armed aggression. The development of a strategy for this policy implementation ultimately is a task for the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces under the Minister for Defence. Two keys to a policystrategy match are first, appropriate objectives, and second, resourcing required capabilities. As a fundamental, defence capability is not something that can be turned on and off like a tap; once lost it takes decades to regenerate. Since the foundation of the Irish State resourcing has been a point of tension. Of course, over the decades other factors are points of friction, especially regarding civil–military relations which have policy formulation and implementation dimensions and consequences. Over the years, many reports have referenced these tensions. Eunan O’Halpin set out six historical factors underpinning the structural tension between the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces.30 (a) The shock of financing the National Army during and in the period after the Civil War together with haphazard and unplanned expansion. (b) The long-standing fear of an over-mighty military arising largely from the mutiny of 1924 and reinforced by the military involvement in the 1969 Arms Crisis.

29 https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/Eire_-_2000_-_White_Paper_on_Defence.pdf. Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2000); Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2015); Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence Update (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2019). 30 Eunan O’ Halpin, “Rethinking Irish Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century,” Defence Forces Review 13 (2016), 217–224.

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(c) The absence of long-term policy on how Ireland should be defended from external and internal threats. (d) The administrative culture which practises a “dual-structure” approach whereby technical expertise is second guessed by nonspecialist, cheese pairing administrators as identified by the Devlin Group.31 (e) Defence has had to fight on two fronts: simultaneously micromanaging the Defence Forces while protecting them from the depredations of the Department of Finance. (f) Political sensitivities over the very term “Defence Policy.” As a collective, they provide an interconnected tapestry that helps our understanding of defence policy, finance, governance, capabilities, and ultimately our tolerance of risk. It is unfortunate that policy curtailed the opportunity to address observations such as those of O’Halpin’s when defining the terms of reference for the Commission on the Defence Forces. As a result the Commission did not examine governance arrangements between the Defence Forces and the Department of Defence. Outside the Commission’s work other than a commitment to an ongoing Operational Readiness Review (OCR), and the 1991 Efficiency Audit Group Review there is little reference to any independent, externally led, review of the Department of Defence.32 The most significant external examination to date was the Devlin Report in 1969, over fifty years ago. Whereas, in the same period the Defence Forces have been subject to many externally led independent reviews.

Defence Expenditure and Resourcing Relative to the EU mean of 1.2 per cent, in 2019 Ireland’s percentage spend was six times smaller than its EU partners. Furthermore, there is a 31 Vincent Browne, “The Uncivil Civil Servants: The Obstruction of Reform,” available at https://magill.ie/archive/uncivil-civil-servants-obstruction-reform. The failure to reform the public service since the Devlin Report was published over 13 years ago has been a major contributor to the crisis in which we find ourselves. See Public Services Organisation Review Group, “The Devlin Report Part 3,” available at https://www.lenus. ie/bitstream/handle/10147/125894/DevlinReportPart3.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 32 The Civil Service Renewal Plan (2014) provides for an internally led Programme of Organisational Capability Reviews with an external review panel that does not undertake review work.

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disconnect between the ambitions of the 2015 White Paper on Defence and the budget provision, an issue starkly identified by the Commission on the Defence Forces. In short, this is causing a policy-strategy mismatch, with many of the programmes identified in the 2015 White Paper either not initiated or currently behind schedule. A second consideration relating to Defence Expenditure is remuneration, in particular the matter of pay and conditions for Defence Forces personnel. For the past number of years discharges of personnel have outstripped recruitment with an unsustainable “churn” rate which has resulted in around 1000 vacancies which is particularly acute in the Naval Service. Based on CSO data over the ten years leading up to 2021, in the context of average weekly earnings of Irish public sector bodies, the Defence Forces have been at the lowest for three years and second lowest over seven years. It is argued that the unique attributes of service in the military, being subject to military law, never withholding labour and being subject to an unlimited liability are sufficient criteria to merit a review of Defence Forces pay structures outside the framework of the collective. O’Halpin’s comments on the long-standing fear of an over-mighty military stem particularly from the 1924 “crisis,” which itself was largely a reaction to Government cutbacks which cut the Army from 52,000 in 1923 to 16,000 in 1924. According to Theo Farrell civilian control of the military appears to have been primarily exercised through control of army expenditure.33 As observed by Ronan Fanning, since the Department of Finance was run by former British civil servants who did not share the Army’s view of a military threat from Britain or Germany, it was content to starve the army of resources.34 Arguably this helped institutionalise a corporate culture in the Department of Finance in the context of its dealings with the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces which prevails to this date. The evolution of the European Defence Fund (EDF) incentivising and supporting collaborative, cross-border research, and development in defence is bringing change. It is increasing the EU’s technological edge and helping develop the capabilities that are key for the 33 Theo Farrell, “The Suicidal Army: Civil-Military Relations and Strategy in Independent Ireland,” in Tom Garvin, Maurice Manning, and Richard Sinnott (eds) Dissecting Irish Politics (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2004), 49. 34 Ronan Fanning, The Irish Department of Finance, 1922–58 (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978), 36–42.

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strategic autonomy and resilience of the EU. Complementing and amplifying Member States’ efforts, the EDF promotes cooperation among companies and research actors within the EU serving as a stimulant for defence-related economic activity as has recently been announced in Ireland.35

Governance Ireland’s national security arrangements were born out of the period leading up to and after independence. It is argued that a deep-rooted tension which may have its roots not just in the period following the Irish Civil War but, in the years, leading up to independence. The disruption throughout the War of Independence almost certainly spurned a level of resentment within a community of civil servants, many of whom switched loyalty from His Majesty to the new government. Fanning’s observations above support this thesis of an institutionalised antipathy towards defence in the Department of Finance, reinforced by events such as the 1969 Arms Crisis. The matter of trust in the Defence Forces while seldom a point of overt discussion has certainly been a driver of tension impacting on the cross-government governance arrangements.36 The nature of institutional constructs such as the National Security Committee and the slow progress of initiatives such as the National Security Analysis Centre together with the absence of a National Security Strategy add to suboptimal governance arrangements for Defence and Security. Paraphrasing Clausewitz, there can be no other way but to subordinate the military to the political. That is a fundamental of democracy but when the controls mitigating the risk of a fear of an unpredictable military create another risk associated with a wet blanket of bureaucracy with non-specialists second guessing technical expertise, a new risk emerges which undermines optimal governance. Irish Defence Forces command and control arrangements are unique among western militaries with no formalised structures for joint forces

35 Leigh McGowran, “10 Teams Shortlisted for SFI Challenge to Develop Tech for Defence Forces,” available at https://www.siliconrepublic.com/innovation/sfi-defence-for ces-research-challenge-shortlist-funding-ireland. 36 Conor Gallagher, “The ‘Cold War’ Between the Irish Military and the Civilians in Charge of Them,” The Irish Times, February 20, 2021.

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command. Defence Forces Headquarters is a de facto Army Headquarters primarily staffed by Army personnel augmented by Air and Naval personnel that make up a small percentage of the staff. The Chief of Staff does not command the Army, Naval Service, or the Air Corps. Instead, command flows directly from the Minister for Defence to the General Officers Commanding the Brigades, the Air Corps, and the Naval Service. This arrangement effectively bypasses the Chief of Staff and the General Staff who exercise influence with moral authority rather than actual authority resulting in communications and instructions from the Minister or his officials directly to subordinate commanders. The current system weakens the power of the Chief of Staff and the military while increasing the risk for the Minister and the State arising from a mishap or shortcomings in the rapid application of joint defence capabilities. The failure to exercise legislated institutional provisions such as the Council of Defence has been commented on as far back as Devlin. It is difficult to comprehend and adds to the sense that its non-use is related to a desire of civil authorities to maximise their power over the Defence Forces. The provisions of the Section in the Act relating to the Council of Defence are self-explanatory, with the Act specifying— there “shall stand established”—this is a mandatory provision. It is also important to consider Section 11(4)—the Council shall meet whenever summoned by the Minister. While this gives the Minister discretion for when they summon the Council to meet, they are nonetheless obliged to have the Council established. The Defence Act envisages a cohesive body (3 military, 2 civil) to “aid and counsel the Minister on all matters in relation to the business of the DOD on which the Minister may consult the Council.” It is remarkable that as an institution the Council receives no mention in the Commission on the Defence Forces.

Capabilities In specifying the roles assigned to the Defence Forces the White Paper on Defence articulates the need for the forces to be able to undertake a full spectrum of military tasks that range from support in peace-time operations overseas to war-fighting in defence of the State, as well as a broad range of support tasks and civil contingency tasks. Kent Andersson makes the point that capability is central to assessments and decisionmaking in the defence and security sector, but the understanding of the term seems to differ a lot. When considering if state X has the requisite

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variety in military capability to engage in conflict Y, Andersson points to the Joint Functions or Military Power concepts.37 Military capability is defined as the ability to attain operational success for a given scenario and achieving desired effects under specified standards and conditions through combinations of ways and means. The maintenance and development of military capability requires a broad range of actions within the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces. It consists of a conceptual component (the thought process), a moral component (the ability to get people to conduct operations, originating from Defence Forces values), and a physical component (the means of conducting operations). Even dissecting these elements reveals a fundamental weakness in the Irish Defence capability architecture. Without appropriate Joint, Land, Air, Maritime, and indeed Space, Cyber, and Reserve inputs to the thought process the conceptual component is suboptimal. Trying to get personnel to conduct operations without command vested in the Chief of Staff or clarity in employment law relating to reservists and questions regarding remuneration results in a suboptimal moral component. Finally, inadequate resourcing will always result in gaping gaps in the means to conduct operations and therefore a suboptimal physical component. Thus, Ireland’s conceptual defence trinity is fundamentally weak. This ultimately bears on the capabilities for which it will provide, and the gaps that it will accept.

Capability Gap Matrix The following table provides a non exhaustive, indicative analysis of gaps in capabilities currently in existence across the Joint Functions from the perspective of State defence (Table 1).

Risk A fundamental of governance is to ensure that processes and procedures help organisations achieve policy objectives while addressing uncertainty and acting with integrity. In short, it must manage risk which from a defence perspective is inextricably linked to threat. The provision, 37 Kent Andersson, “Notes on Military Capability Concepts and Their Relevance for Analysis of System Characteristics,” available at https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/ diva2:1473159/FULLTEXT01.pdf.

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Table 1 An analysis of gapping in capabilities currently across the Joint Functions from the perspective of State defence Command control

Intelligence

Manoeuvre joint fires

Force protection

Strategic reach Support logistics

Weak C2 Structure

No military intelligence Service

Weak Joint C2

Inadequate resourcing of cyber defence capabilities

No strategic reach in air

No Joint structure

Limited resourcing in specialists, analysts, and technology No primary radar, limited air surveillance, almost no sub-surface marine surveillance capability

Limited or almost no anti-missile defence

No space ground station

No strategic reach in maritime

No air intercept capability

Limited sub-surface maritime surveillance capability Limited inability to police airspace

Limited capability for troop evacuation.

Weak integration of Reserve

No defence industry and nascent Research Technology Innovation (RTI) Weak institutional arrangements to leverage the Reserve Inadequate maritime logistic support infrastructure on East and West coasts.

resourcing, and nature of our Defence Forces in the final analysis reflect a state’s risk tolerance. In his seminal book relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis Allison sets out several perspectives suggesting that policy formulation may be the result of organisational, governmental political, and rational perspectives.38 Allison suggests that when the organisational perspective is dominant the organisation responds from the sectoral perspective of the threat or opportunity to the organisation influencing the information and options presented to decision-makers. While in the governmental political perspective decision-making is the result of a bargaining process with time and influence pulling decisions to a point of compromise. Retired Colonel Dorcha Lee recalls remarks of the late T.K.

38 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

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Whitaker of the Department of Finance who at an exchange at the Military College said “on defence we are like an uninsured, untaxed motorist, skimping on car maintenance. So long as we don’t have an accident or are not stopped by the Guards, we will get away with it. As the years go by, all that money that would have been spent on defence would be available to invest in infrastructure, social services and creating employment. It is a gamble, if you like, on peace.”39 This sobering assessment goes to the heart of defence decision-making in Ireland with characteristics of Linblom’s “Muddling Through” in which limited policy analysis, bounded rationality, and limited theory in formulating policy present levels of risk.40

Conclusion Ireland’s current defence issues are complex. Many of these issues have been addressed by the Commission on the Defence Forces, which did not have a mandate under its Terms of Reference to examine policy. The report points to a vision for a joint military force capable of providing the people of Ireland with a safe and secure environment and enforcing and protecting Ireland’s sovereignty. It will uphold national values, reflect the diverse society it serves, and remain poised to meet the challenges of an evolving and complex world.41 Some strategic issues are beyond the scope of the Commission’s Terms of Reference. This chapter concludes that in the context of Government policy which sets a primary role to defend the State there is currently a policy-strategy mismatch in that the development of appropriate strategy is impossible because of governance, resourcing, and capability gaps. Moreover the Commission finds that it is essential to acknowledge and maintain the link between level of ambition, defence policy objectives and defence funding in all future policy discussion. In a globalised world characterised by regional governmental structures such as the EU and common security interdependencies with our nearest 39 Dorcha Lee, “‘A Gamble on Peace’—Dorcha Lee on T.K. Whitaker and Defence

Spending,” The Irish Times, December 30, 2021. 40 Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’,” Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 (Spring, 1959), 79–88. 41 Department of Defence, “Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces,” available at https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/eb4c0-report-of-the-commission-on-defenceforces/.

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neighbour the United Kingdom and an extraordinary dependency on foreign direct investment and foreign trade Ireland’s Defence strategy is a whole of society matter with trade, justice, enterprise, research, foreign affairs, defence, and civil society dimensions. Ireland’s current approach more than anything else is institutionally challenged with governance, resourcing, and inappropriate risk tolerance dimensions which manoeuvre us towards a tipping point. In the Jungle Grows Back, Robert Kagan sets out the question that is asked after a strategic shock—how did this come to pass? Too often the answer is slowly, then suddenly. The alarm bells are ringing, and Ireland needs to hear them. Many of the ingredients that have brought us to this situation are set out in this chapter. Many were beyond the scope. That said, before concluding it will be helpful to identify some enablers for a policy-strategy match. (a) Defence and security must become a whole of society matter with appropriate resourcing and cross cutting structures tested, and functioning, in particular the National Security Committee, the National Security Analysis Centre, National Emergency Coordination Centre, the National Cyber Security Centre. (b) As part of a whole of society approach to defence a marriage between Civil Defence and Reserve Defence Forces needs to be examined, as does the development of specialist capabilities in the Reserve in areas such as medical, cyber, and logistics. (c) Responsibility for Hybrid Defence should be allocated to Defence. (d) The silo approach to service delivery and procurement in areas such as Coast Guard Functions and Revenue Cutter fleet operations needs to be tested. (e) Ireland’s defence must be viewed through a lens of the multilateral framework of the EU, UN, and its relationship with NATO and neighbours. (f) Defence expenditure needs to be viewed as an investment centre with the potential to be in certain instances a profit centre rather than be seen just as a cost centre. (g) Defence expenditure needs to be increased significantly, addressing infrastructure and equipment shortcomings while also stimulating the opportunities from a national defence industry leveraging dual use technologies that will enhance force protection, stimulate employment, and improve overall capabilities. Enhanced skill levels

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of Defence Forces personnel should be recognised as a public good with wider state, societal, and enterprise utility. (h) Technology, particularly in areas such as automation, robotics, artificial and augmented intelligence, and virtual reality must be key force multipliers in the context of the delivery of defence, security, and government services. (i) The complexity and sophistication of the security environment require that Ireland’s defence capabilities are delivered through a joint framework across the domains of maritime, air, land, and cyber with the development of a node to access space. (j) Command vested in the Chief of Defence is a critical enabler for coherency and the Council of Defence should be leveraged. The women and men of our Defence Forces come from a proud tradition of volunteers. Their actions one hundred years ago have helped shape Ireland’s values for a fairer world; a just world; a secure world and a sustainable world. These values have been forged in a furnace of famine, migration, and oppression. Their actions have resulted in a foreign policy that is deeply anchored in the values set out in our Constitution the foreword to which was etched in the blood of those who volunteered one hundred years ago. Common values involve a marriage of our strategic intent as conveyed by the dictates of Irish civil society and our ethical approach to the conduct of operations. They are of relevance in the context of the benchmarks and goals set for us by our membership of the international community and our responsibility to protect, to lead, and to assist our fellow citizens. We live in an extraordinary time with a general decline in terms of global peace and security where power is sometimes inverted, and the rate of change is almost as if we are at war. We are seeing more unknown unknowns fuelling wicked problems, colliding in a perfect storm with climate breakdown, biodiversity loss, fake news, populism, and growing infiltration of our sovereign State in all domains. We need to remember and learn from our history. Paraphrasing the great philosopher George Santayana, “Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual.” Those who cannot

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remember the past are condemned to repeat it. We must never forget the experience and sacrifice of our forebears who helped end 700 years of occupation just as others must never forget the horrors of previous world wars. Day in day out our Defence Forces strive to ensure the jungle does not grow back. They are part of a continuum of service, part of the bedrock of our sovereignty, providing a framework for our civil society, providing the resilience to absorb the shock from the next unexpected event like the COVID-19 Pandemic. Brexit leaves Ireland as the EU’s lonely sentinel in the Atlantic, separated from its 26 EU partners and now being challenged by Russian Federation’s outrageous activities. Ireland on her own, with an under-resourced Defence Forces, has neither the capabilities nor the power to prevent an aggressive act. Sovereign rights that cannot be upheld are more imaginary than real. With the lowest investment in Defence in the EU we jeopardise our sovereignty and freedom while increasing risk for our partners and neighbours. We must value and invest in our defenders because in the words of the Byzantine Emperor Maurice, “A Nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten.”

A Brigade Commander’s Perspective: “Oglaigh na hEireann Has Been the People, Is the People, and Will Be the People” Brian Cleary

In February 2022, events in Eastern Europe took a cataclysmic turn and Russian military forces crossed the northern, eastern, and southern Ukrainian borders. The Russian invasion of Ukraine heralded a time of unthinkably tragic consequences for the people of that beleaguered country. It has also generated an uncertainty over European and global security the likes of which have not been imagined since the Second World War and the early Cold War. The global pandemic and its consequences may now be seen in a different, less malevolent light, as Russian missiles explode in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, and Vladimir Putin places his nuclear deterrence forces on high alert. At the time of writing, it has been two years since the Defence Forces launched Operation Fortitude—our direct military support to the

Quoted in 1922 by General Richard Mulcahy, Commander in Chief, Irish Army—Oglaigh Na hEireann. B. Cleary (B) Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_2

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national effort in countering the COVID-19 Pandemic. Life goes on, and in Ireland as the impact of the pandemic appears to be declining, the Government announced the lifting of restrictions which have severely inhibited societal routine over the period. Throughout that time, we continued to fulfil our duties through Operation Fortitude’s Joint Task Force (JTF), whose job it was to direct and co-ordinate the military response. On 9 February 2022, the much-awaited report outlining the deliberations of the Commission on the Defence Forces (CODF) was released.1 The report contains over 140 recommendations which, if implemented, will have far-reaching implications for the Defence Forces and those of us who remain in service. The pandemic transformed Ireland; some may say beyond recognition. Nevertheless, for the soldiers, sailors, and air crew of Oglaigh na hEireann, despite global contagion and potential global conflict, our routine and framework operations at home and overseas continue as normal. The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the Defence Forces provides direction and guidance to Brigade, Formation, and Service Commanders to enhance operational capacity and ensure that the Defence Forces remains operationally fit for purpose and capable of carrying out all roles assigned by the Government. Specific tasks are elicited from the assigned roles and are listed for the individual Brigades and Services. Aside from usual security duties in garrisons and facilities, framework operations describe those continuing on-island activities including Explosive Ordnance Disposal, security at vital installations such as Portlaoise Prison and the Irish Central Bank, operational support to the national police force An Garda Síochána, maritime security and fishery protection patrols, and the provision of the Emergency Air Ambulance Service. In addition, almost 600 Defence Forces personnel are participating in overseas multinational peace support, crisis management, and humanitarian relief operations in accordance with Government direction and legislative provisions.

1 In December 2020, the Government approved the establishment of a Commission on

the Defence Forces. Its terms of reference were to examine the immediate requirements of the Defence Forces while also seeking to develop a longer-term vision for beyond 2030. This is against a backdrop of the high-level defence goal of providing for the military defence of the State, contribute to national and international peace and security, and fulfil all other roles assigned by the Government.

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The establishment of Operation Fortitude’s JTF was a career defining moment for me as its first Commander. It was also a game changing moment for the Defence Forces, particularly when viewed within the historical context that forged its current institutional structure. Recalling events which occurred in the early days of the formation of the State, the fledgling cabinet, wary of its Free State Army and the crisis within its ranks, sought to reaffirm the subservience of the military to the civilian government. The structure of the modern Defence Forces reflects this historical wariness.2 Today it comprises two Army infantry brigades, a Defence Forces Training Centre, a Naval Service, and an Air Corps, with command authority for each of these entities vested in the respective Brigade or Service Commander. As such, they are technically stove piped within their specific domains. The Defence Forces Chief of Staff is assigned authority and responsibility by the Minister for Defence for all staff duties connected with the executive management of the Defence Forces. As such, he or she has limited legal, and no command authority, over the Brigades and Services. Although, it must be said that as the senior ranking officer in the organisation the COS directives and strategic intent are followed, and he or she holds de facto command. When the JTF was stood up in March 2020 it inferred command authority over large numbers of personnel from the Brigades and Services to me as its General Officer Commanding. Although the required legislative change to the Defence Act (which would have given me time-limited command authority) was not actually ratified, there was a definitive drive towards Mission Command, which provided me with a greater freedom of action and de facto command over a large swathe of Defence Forces assets and personnel.3 The establishment of a JTF with a single command entity, heralded a political declaration in terms of potential impacts on Defence Forces Structure and Command and Control (C2), and was strategic from an organisational sense as it signalled a statement of intent in terms of the military response to a national crisis. As an organisation, we do not often get licence to invoke such change. I believe that the JTF model will feed into our institutional evolution and long-term future and act as a catalyst 2 For more on this see Dan Ayiotis’ chapter on the history of Irish neutrality within this volume. 3 Mission Command: A style of military command, derived from Prussian doctrine which combines centralised intent with decentralised execution and promotes freedom and speed of action, and initiative within defined constraints.

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for the ongoing level of ambition discussions now emanating from the recommendations within the CODF Report. The JTF was unprecedented, in that it took a declared state of National Emergency, a strategic shock if you will, to create the conditions for the General Staff to take unilateral action.4 In normal times such an initiative would become mired in departmental and political bureaucracy, representation, and multifarious debate. The global crisis gave us the required latitude and political acceptance—in much the same way that national mobilisation occurred during the Second World War, or at the outbreak of “The Troubles” in 1969.5 However, despite the massive logistics and personnel support provided to the Irish Health Service Executive, including invaluable medical services delivered by our diminished Army Medical Corps, the Defence Forces was unable to provide a single functioning and staffed Field Hospital.6 Not surprisingly, the pandemic, like previous crises, has highlighted capability shortfalls and deficiencies within the Defence Forces, some of which can be attributed to the numerous organisational changes and review processes visited on the Defence Forces over the past two decades.

The Recent Past I joined the Permanent Defence Forces (PDF) in 1981, after serving for almost three years in the FCA.7 Over the intervening forty years, I have seen improvement, progress, and evolution, much of it for the betterment of an organisation that I hold dear. But, I have also seen much to ponder, to ruminate over, and frankly, question whether some changes have been for the best. Reflecting on my early career, the 1980s was a time when it was not unusual for the media to report that an Irish soldier had died in

4 The Defence Forces General Staff consists of the Chief of Staff of 3-Star General Officer Rank, two Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOS) for Operations and Support, respectively, both 2-Star General Officers, and a 1-Star Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS). 5 The Troubles: Known internationally as the Northern Ireland conflict which lasted

almost 30 years from 1969 to 1998. 6 HSE: Health Service Executive is the publicly funded health care system in the Republic of Ireland, responsible for the provision of health and personal social services. 7 The Permanent Defence Forces encompasses the regular Army, Naval Service, and Air Corps of full-time professionals. By comparison, the FCA: An Forsa Cosanta Aitiul (Local Defence Force) was the precursor to the current Army Reserve.

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South Lebanon.8 Thankfully one clear improvement has been that such tragedies have not been repeated in many years. The 1980s was also a time when the Defence Forces was heavily engaged in internal security duties around the country. We supported An Garda Síochána in operations to secure the border with Northern Ireland, and throughout the State. For example, during Operation Mallard in late 1987 many of us partook in a nationwide hunt for an Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) group led by the infamous terrorist Dessie O’Hare, aka “The Border Fox.” In the early 1990s as a Platoon Commander in the Army Ranger Wing (ARW), I deployed on several covert anti-terrorist and other Aid to the Civil Powers (ATCP) operations along the border and across the country in support of the police.9 This was at a time when the Defence Forces, and the Army, in particular, was organisationally and numerically much larger than it is now. In 1981 when I enlisted there were four infantry brigades, and the authorised establishment of the Defence Forces was 16,000, with a nominal strength of 14,000. This was supplemented by a 15,000 strong Reserve, the FCA, at least 40% of whom were “effective”—sufficiently militarily capable and deployable. By contrast, today’s Defence Forces strength and capability is sobering—the Army consists of two light infantry brigades, the establishment of the entire combined Army, Naval Service, Air Corps is 9500 personnel, but our strength hovers in the region of 8500. Our Army Reserve and Naval Service Reserve have significantly diminished and currently stand at approximately 1500 personnel, an estimated 50% of whom are considered effective. At the same time, Defence Forces operations and exercises have extended well beyond Irish shores, from South America to Southeast Asia and from the Baltic to Africa. The Defence Forces has established a wellfound reputation within the European military community conducting joint training and operations with our Swedish, Polish, Austrian, French, Norwegian, German, Danish, and Belgian counterparts, to name but a few. Robust deployments undertaken by Defence Forces personnel to locations like Somalia and East Timor in the 1990s honed our skillsets and firmly positioned our organisation as a partner of choice. For example, in 2008 in addition to its allocated defence vote, the Government spent 8 For a history of the Defence Forces deployments in Lebanon see Natalia Hapek’s chapter within this volume. 9 ARW: The Army Ranger Wing is the special operations force of the Defence Forces. It selects personnel from Army, Naval, and Air services.

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in the region of e60 million to finance the Defence Forces deployment to Chad. This was at a time when the Celtic Tiger economy was at its zenith and supplementary spending on defence was tolerable. So, it is somewhat ironic and personally dissonant when I say that despite the undoubtedly noteworthy achievements undertaken nationally and internationally, I have to stop myself sometimes from thinking that we are actually dis-improving. When I consider progressive developments, overseas for instance, where our Army Ranger Wing is recognised as a partner of choice within the EU Special Operations Forces community and is providing vital support to a German-led Task Force in MINUSMA, or where Irish troops form the backbone of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) with UNDOF in war-torn Syria, and when I reflect on the vital “Strengthening of the Nation” support delivered by all arms of the Defence Forces during the current pandemic, why is it then that so much political and social commentary, news coverage, broadsheet, tabloid, and social media reportage, is largely focused on a narrative of negativity relating to poor pay and conditions, recruitment and retention challenges, and an image of a Defence Force that is ineffectual?10 In 1994, the Government commissioned consultancy group Price Waterhouse to conduct a root and branch examination of the Defence Forces.11 The subsequent 1996 reorganisation resulted in a significant reduction of Defence Forces personnel from 13,000 to 11,500 coupled with a decision to sell several barracks and installations. These cuts were made to fund what was described as a major re-equipping programme. However, suggestions of an additional financial injection, given the fact that the Defence Forces had been so under-resourced in the previous 25 years, fell on deaf ears. Equipment and materiel was purchased, albeit in slow motion, and over the intervening 20 years investment in a fleet of Mowag Piranha Armoured Personnel Carriers for the Army, a modest number of rotary and fixed wing platforms for the Air Corps, and a ships replacement programme for the Naval Service were announced. At the

10 MINUSMA: The United Nations Multi-Dimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali. UNDOF: The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force tasked with maintaining the ceasefire between Israel and Syria. 11 The Price Waterhouse Report 1996—resulted from a Government commissioned root and branch examination of the DF. Arising from this a DF Reorganisation Implementation Plan was produced, the aim of which was to reduce DF strength and dispose of unwanted barracks in order to fund a re-equipment programme.

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time military planners argued for a 14,000 strong combined Defence Forces—excluding reserves. In contrast, the Department of Finance and Department of Defence preference was for a force of between 6000 and 8000 (subsequent reorganisation and implementation programmes reduced the force to its current establishment). And, when I reflect on the situation with our Reserve Defence Forces, I recall my early career as a Gun Position Officer in the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment where I witnessed first-hand the successful synergy between Permanent and Reserve (FCA) forces. In those days the FCA provided a recruitment pool which was used to bolster capability deficiencies that existed in the PDF. The backbone of artillery expertise was provided by Reservists who, by virtue of their proven skillsets, had transitioned to the PDF, notably without having to undergo the traditional formative training normally required for joining the PDF. Regretfully this opportunity is no longer available and despite ambitious pronouncements regarding the utility of the Reserve Defence Forces in the Government’s 2015 White Paper on Defence, the Reserve, both Army, and Naval, continues to wither on the vine. The fundamental issue here, and one which has been well documented over the years, is the apparent vice-grip on defence spending by the Department of Finance. And while it may seem justified in a climate where spending on health, education, homelessness, not to mention pandemics, continues to press the State coffers, the international standard of measurement would suggest that for a nation’s Defence Forces to be considered worthwhile, it should be based on a mix of ratios involving national wealth, population, foreign and security policy, and geopolitical position. The measurement often cited is a ratio of defence spending to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The EU average is in the region of 1.4%. Today, Ireland spends 0.27% of its GDP on Defence. This is the lowest in Western Europe.

Why Do We Need to Spend on Defence? A question which may reasonably be asked is, why does Ireland, a neutral country, need to invest in its military forces? This question has contributed to politically driven, public debate and occasional referenda on the requirements for, and contributions of, the Defence Forces to Irish society, national security, and multilateralism with the UN and within the EU. Events such as BREXIT, Ireland’s seat on the UN Security Council,

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Russian aircraft incursions into Irish airspace, and global pandemics have all served to bring issues on the utility, capabilities, and necessity of having a Defence Forces, into the public and political arena. Today as we observe high intensity conflict in Ukraine, the question is not so much why we need a Defence Forces, but instead, whether the Defence Forces is fit to face the challenges that our country, currently faces now, and more critically, into the future. It is a generally accepted principle that any State worth its salt will maintain a credible instrument of national defence and security. While the Defence Forces and Irish national security rely on the military trinity and synergy of Air, Sea, and Land capabilities, the Land Environment is where all matters political and military are ultimately decided. The Land Environment is where the populations are, where political systems function, and where you normally find belligerents who thrive on the indulgence of society’s understanding, apathy, or weakness. This applies as much to Ireland as it does to Afghanistan, Mali, or Syria—countries that I and many of my fellow colleagues are familiar with. For Ireland, as an Island Nation there is an absolute requirement to grow the interdependence between Land, Air, and Maritime military components. However, we only need to look at events in Ukraine to realise that it is on Land, here or far afield that engagement, conflict, or open warfare will occur. Our own national history reminds us of this. The impacts of BREXIT, Loyalist unrest in Northern Ireland, Republican populism, organised crime, and Far Right or Left narratives all co-exist and present growing threats to Irish stability and security. Similarly, our government-authorised overseas commitments serve to remind us further of our requirement to remain capable, vigilant, and numerically ready for land operations. People may perhaps forget that not so long-ago armed soldiers provided security as cash and bullion was transited around the Irish countryside by Securicor and other such companies. Defence Forces personnel stood outside our banks and post offices while large sums of money were being deposited. The Special Criminal Court, then on Dublin’s Green Street, was a regular security duty for Army personnel when court was in session, and troops being put on standby to quell riots in prisons was not unheard of. Memories can be short, and nowadays many citizens would likely express absolute surprise at the possibility of troops being deployed to quell unrest because of, for instance, the COVID pandemic. Perhaps they have a point. But when the likes of Ogra Shinn Fein, the youth wing

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of a party who have great aspirations to govern this State, mark the AngloIrish Treaty centenary with a tweet, which seems to overlook the tenets of the Good Friday Agreement, that says, “Despite what the Free State establishment want you to believe, the Treaty did not give Ireland independence. Ireland is not independent. But together we can change that,” and Sinn Fein itself continues to refer to Irish Republican Army (IRA) volunteers as “members of Oglaigh na hEireann,” maybe it’s time to sit up and take heed.12 Oglaigh na hEireann is the Irish Defence Forces, but what does it mean to members of Sinn Fein in 2022? And that is just the Republican sentiment. What about the Loyalists? What about the security challenges inherent to the growing calls for a United Ireland? Aside from our own domestic affairs, another, question that requires answers realtes to Ireland and its contribution to European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the context of our key role as an EU and transatlantic centre for technology, pharmaceuticals, and finance. In the weeks leading up to its invasion of Ukraine, a flotilla from Russia’s Northern Fleet left its base in Severomorsk on the coast of the Barents Sea and held readiness exercises 200 miles off the southwest coast and on the periphery of Ireland’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). While this provocative move was reported as a two-fingered salute to the US, EU, and NATO considering the then ongoing international brinkmanship over Ukraine, it exposed significant weaknesses in our air defence capabilities, as well as in the cyber and maritime domains. Many commentators suggest that Ireland is Europe’s weakest link when it comes to defence, security, and intelligence and that this is precisely the reason why Russia decided to conduct its maritime exercises in sight of our EEZ. And in terms of our ability to monitor airspace, Ireland is the only country in the EU that currently does not possess primary radar. Ireland’s air traffic control systems use secondary radar, which relies on the use of transponders in commercial aircraft. Russian military aircraft do not utilise transponders and are therefore invisible in Irish-controlled airspace. Under international law, Russia was legally entitled to conduct its exercises, but their decision to locate it in proximity to an air corridor which is considered one of the busiest in the world (approximately 75% of EU

12 The Good Friday Agreement: The bilateral international agreement, approved by voters across the island of Ireland, which brought an end to the violence in Northern Ireland.

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transatlantic flights to the United States overfly our airspace), is an indicator of their capacity to project forces far beyond their borders as well as the potential to disrupt international air traffic at a time of heightened international tension. Ireland relies heavily on foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly from US multinationals engaged in the digital, technological, and pharmaceutical domains. In addition, the State provides significant sponsorship and financial incentives to support these sectors. The same cannot be said, however, for our investment in defence and security. For instance, and as reported in a recent Irish Times editorial, an examination of our input to the EU’s Permanent Structured Co-operation framework (PESCO) would suggest that Ireland appears to be the most reluctant member.13 The editorial mentioned the senior EU Foreign and Security official, Josep Borrell’s appeal to EU Defence Ministers to step up their defence co-operation in the face of destabilising Russian activities. Ireland has common interests, interoperability challenges, and capability gaps, that could be built up and developed with other nations—but our engagement is minimal, in part due to political reluctance to be involved in an initiative that could be seen as an erosion of our “neutrality.” Or, as the Irish Times editorial infers, is it more likely to be linked to the wider impasse between the Department of Defence and Departments of Finance and Public Expenditure over funding on Security, Defence, and the Defence Forces? From an EU perspective, we are seen as the weak link, the reluctant member, the meagre spenders. But yet, thanks to our export-oriented economic model coupled with massive success in attracting FDI, Ireland is ranked as one of the wealthiest countries in the OECD and the EU.14 If the resultant flurry of opining, blogging, and reportage by academics, historians, politicians, and security experts as a consequence of the Ukrainian crisis is to be believed, then it would seem that the time has come for our nation to seriously examine the twentyfirst century threats we face; the time has come to identify defence and security gaps that exist, and the capabilities we require to fulfil national 13 No Stated Author, “The Irish Times view on EU defence co-operation: A reluctant member,” The Irish Times, November 18, 2021. PESCO: The PESCO framework, established in 2017 is a voluntary coming together of 25 member states to co-ordinate aspects of defence capabilities and has over 60 joint projects currently underway. 14 OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Of its 38 member states, Ireland is ranked 2nd by GDP per capita.

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security and support operations. And, as one of the wealthiest nations in the EU, it would seem that the time has come for us to review our commitment to EU security and defence.

The General Officer Commanding’s Challenge As General Officer Commanding (GOC) of one of the Defence Forces’ two Army Brigades, I remain cognisant of my Brigade’s Mission Statement which reflects the Government assigned roles laid down in the White Paper on Defence15 ; 1 Brigade secures its area of responsibility, trains, maintains and provides Forces and Capabilities for Conventional, Aid to the Civil Power, Aid to the Civil Authority, and Peace Support Operations in order to fulfil all roles assigned by Government.

No. 1 Brigade’s Area of Responsibility spans twelve of Ireland’s twentysix counties, an area of approximately 40,000 sq. km. To deliver all the operational outputs, 1 Brigade utilises Combat, Combat Support, and Service Support units encompassing three light infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, a cavalry squadron and other elements including, engineers, ordnance, medical, and logistics. The organisational structure of the Brigade aligns with international norms and models which we see working in NATO, EU, and UN Nations and on the missions we deploy to overseas. The Brigade structure provides an essential means to co-ordinate operations regionally, while allowing for Officers, NCOs, and Private ranks to engage in professional career development. The Brigade, however, reflects the well-documented human resource and retention challenges that the greater Defence Forces faces. Its battalions and Combat Support units are understaffed and have limited contingent capability. And added to that is a committed, functioning, but very limited, and understrength Army Reserve.16 The Brigade contributes to national resilience, internal security, multinational Crisis Management Operations (CMO) and, is expected to be a key component for national defence. However, the maintenance of the 15 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2015). 16 For more on the Army Reserve, see Richardson and Carroll’s chapters in this volume.

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current level of effort is constrained by multifarious issues including the retention of key specialists and leaders across all functional areas, limitations in and overtasking of units and an overseas tempo that, in the view of some international commentators is not sustainable. In any given year over a quarter of Irish Army personnel are either overseas or training to go. Currently, 572 DF personnel are deployed on fourteen missions supporting the UN, EU, and NATO (No. 1 Brigade provides approximately 35% of these personnel). The same commentators concur that Ireland’s overall defence spending is very modest when compared with other EU states and that a disconnect exists between allocated personnel and materiel resources and the stated commitments contained within the 2015 White Paper on Defence. A recent opinion piece by former Justice Minister Michael McDowell reflected on the significant wind down of the Reserve Defence Forces and questioned the wisdom of having so few citizens with the required military training needed to assist the PDF during times of national crisis—the closing lines of the McDowell article stated “We have taken the battery out of the national smoke alarm. Heaven help us when the fire starts.”17 Such fires are now burning in Ukraine. There are no surprises in these pronouncements, and the ongoing recruitment and retention struggles that the Defence Forces faces in this centenary year are fully reflected in the Strength versus Establishment figures for 1 Brigade. At the time of writing, 1 Brigade’s overall strength stands at 87% of establishment. And when those personnel deployed overseas and on personal or medical leave are considered, the Brigade stands at 78% of establishment, with little chance of any meaningful support from the Brigade’s diminished Army Reserve elements. This is a concern for those of us at the senior leadership level of the Army, particularly now as we digest the recommendations of the CODF Report. The Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney, shares these concerns. In a media interview prior to the release of the Report, he agreed that “capacity issues” which are undermining the Defence Forces “needed to be addressed” and that the publication of the CODF Report will “trigger a fundamental debate in Ireland about how we financially resource military and defence issues.” The great debate has begun and will hopefully inform the way forward for the Defence Forces. 17 Michael McDowell, “We Run Down the Defence Forces at Our Peril,” The Irish Times, February 2, 2022. Michael McDowell is a politician and barrister who formerly served as Tánaiste and Minister for Justice.

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In our postmodern society, the Defence Forces is faced with greater challenges and uncertainty than ever before, whether it be through hybrid18 conflict, peacekeeping operations, national crises, or on our dayto-day activities. Developments in today’s media and information world, for example, are proving to be as profound as any in the field of materiel, weaponry, and tactics—one needs only to reflect on the impact of the social media conspiracy theory-driven insurrection and attack against the US Capitol Building on 6 January 2021. The COVID Pandemic, although not unpredictable, has provided a perfect storm of irregularity— an unseen hybrid enemy, agnostic to jurisdictions and boundaries.19 In the early months of 2020, the United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guitierrez declared, “we are at war with a virus, and not winning it – this war needs a war time plan to fight it.” This pandemic has threatened the resilience of institutions that form the bedrock of Irish society, including the Defence Forces—hardly the direct conflict we prepare and train for but nonetheless find ourselves engaged in. Human activity is the dominant influence on climate and the environment, and it is highly likely that pandemics like COVID-19 and possibly worse, will continue to manifest themselves. The past two years of the pandemic are clear proof of the land-based challenges that the Defence Forces, and the Army in particular, faces in the future. Additionally, our support to national cyber defence is extremely limited, as is our capacity to monitor activities in the air and maritime domains—the ransomware attack on our Health Services and the ongoing military–political manoeuvring over Ukraine are stark reminders of our inability to defend the State. In a recent media interview the economist Dan O’Brien, noting the then deteriorating situation and growing tensions around Russia and Ukraine, reflected on what he described as a “new cold war.”20 He suggested, as with past conflicts, that Ireland may be able to “keep our heads down” but we cannot

18 Hybrid threats are actions conducted by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to undermine or inflict damage on a target by combining overt and covert military and non-military means. The May 2021 cyber-attack on the HSE is an example. 19 In a 2014 TED talk, Bill Gates forecasted a future pandemic, similar to COVID 19 and posited a symbiosis between the Health Services and the Military to provide key elements of the platform upon which to tackle the virus. 20 Dan O’Brien is Chief Economist with the Institute of International and European Affairs. Newstalk interview on Jan 12, 2022: How Ireland’s neutrality could be put to the test by the “new cold war.”

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ignore, from a European perspective, that Ireland is viewed as having a central role in the financial, pharmaceutical, and technological domains. For O’Brien, neutrality is a “perfectly fine” strategy, but neutrality can be challenged when a country has no way to defend itself. As the death toll in Ukraine continues to mount amidst burgeoning Russian aggression, Europe and the world stands at the edge of a precipice—it may not be unreasonable to suggest that we in Ireland are hanging onto that precipice by our fingertips.

Defence Forces Engagement with EU Partners The experiences gleaned over our 60-plus years of operations in some of the most challenging theatres in the world have allowed the Defence Forces to focus above all on the importance of coherent complementary and co-ordinated actions within multilateral frameworks. This is nothing new. The evolution of the Army Ranger Wing from the simply equipped commando type unit of the early 1980s to the modern day internationally respected Special Operations Force came through involvement in EU capability development and defence co-operation, and collaboration through exchange programmes and training opportunities with partner nations including Sweden, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and Austria. Furthermore, the ARW’s direct association with the French Army’s 1st Marine Parachute Infantry Regiment (1er RPIMA) improved the ARW’s ability to operate in marine, air, and land environments and culminated with the deployment of Army Rangers as part of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force to the EUFOR Chad/RCA mission in 2008.21 From the outset, ARW personnel were directly involved in the operational planning and preparation for the deployment of the initial entry force comprising SOF from France, Sweden, Austria, and Belgium. The subsequent follow-on deployments of conventional Defence Forces personnel to EUFOR Chad/RCA copperfastened the significance of Defence Forces’ involvement in EU-led military engagements and crisis management operations—both from an organisational development perspective and within the context of Irish 21 1er RPIMA: The 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment is one of 3 regiments in the French Army Special Forces Command. EUFOR Chad/RCA was the European Union mission in Chad and the Central African Republic between February 2008 and March 2009.

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foreign policy. These follow-on deployments were truly expeditionary in terms of scale and reach and marked a turning point for how the Defence Forces deploys to crisis operations. Army led operations continue particularly in North Africa and the Middle East, although not to the scale of the Chadian deployment, while recent events in Afghanistan saw a joint team (ECAT) of ARW and Department of Foreign Affairs officials deploy to Kabul to assist the internationally supported repatriation of Irish citizens during one of the largest airlift evacuations in modern history.22 In the past fifteen years, the Defence Forces has proven that it has the capacity to engage in expeditionary operations in austere environments and to successfully operate outside the comfort zone of UN Chapter VI “Peacekeeping” operations, participating in more robust Chapter VII “Peace Enforcement” missions.23 This is new territory for Ireland, territory that can make for uncomfortable debates at the political level. It’s a “chicken and egg” scenario because our capacity to operate meaningfully with EU and international partners in crisis management and other operations should be, in fact is, the benchmark and cornerstone upon which the Defence Forces can provide defence to the State. But, whether nationally or internationally, what the Defence Forces can provide is utterly undermined by the well-documented capability challenges, HR difficulties and financial resourcing deficiencies that continue to plague the organisation. Thus, the Defence Forces needs investment to serve in overseas operations that provide the critical experience to fulfil national security objectives at home, the conceptual chicken and egg.

The Future The 139-page Programme for Government: Our Shared Future 24 sets out in some detail the ambition of the Government to meet the challenges presented to the global community following the outbreak of the

22 Emergency Civilian Assistance Team. 23 Traditional peacekeeping missions fall under Chapter VI of the United Nations

charter which has measures to settle conflicts by peaceful means including negotiation, confidence building measures, etc. UNIFIL (Lebanon) is an example. Chapter VII mandates troops to use force if required. MINUSMA (Mali) is an example. 24 Department of the Taoiseach, Programme for Government: Our Shared Future (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2020).

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COVID pandemic.25 The introduction notes that “this is a programme to recover our economy…and respond to the challenges we face both nationally and internationally. The actions taken over the next five years will define this nation’s future direction for decades to come.” With Climate Change becoming an increasing security threat factor across the world, and a significant factor in the incidences of war, famine, forced migration, and disaster management, the Programme for Government recognises the vital role the Defence Forces should play in addressing these growing challenges. It also elaborates in prescriptive detail how the Irish military model will fit, or more so not, into international security architecture. For instance, it tells us that all overseas operations will be conducted in line with our position of military neutrality, Ireland’s participation in PESCO projects will be maintained on an opt-in basis with contributions being entirely voluntary and only in projects compatible with our policy of active military neutrality and non-membership of military alliances. Furthermore, Ireland will not be part of decision making or funding for lethal force weapons for non-peacekeeping purposes. When British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan was asked what the greatest challenge for a statesman was, he reportedly said “Events, dear boy, events.”26 As the events of February 2022 clearly showed, Ireland, the EU, and the world, had entered a period of sudden international “events.” The question for us is, how will we in Ireland rise to meet them? When we consider our national strategy of neutrality coupled with the above mentioned pronouncements of the Governmental programme, and the now-published CODF Report, it is fair to assume that not only those of us in uniform, but the entire citizenry will undoubtedly be transfixed by, as stated by Minister Coveney, the “fundamental debate in Ireland about how we financially resource military and defence issues.” Prior to the publication of its Report, I greatly appreciated the engagement that I and my fellow General Officers had with the CODF. As a GOC, any opportunity to engage with an expert group established to produce a vision and strategy for the future of defence is greatly welcomed, and the possibility of influencing the recommendations of the Commission was

25 Department of the Taoiseach, Programme for Government: Our Shared Future (Dublin: Government Printing Office, 2020). 26 Maurice Harold Macmillan was a British Conservative politician who was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1957 to 1963.

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an opportunity not to be missed. However, I am mindful that the nowpublished Report is not a result but rather a collection of non-binding recommendations. Implementation of key recommendations relating to, inter alia, Roles of the Defence Forces (Chapter 4), Capability Requirements for the Twenty-First Century (Chapter 6), and Defence Forces Structure (Chapter 7) will be crucial. From an Army perspective, and as outlined on page 63 of the Report, the Commission recommends the initiation of an immediate force design process assisted by international military expertise, to create a more agile and flexible force. If this future Army is expected to meet current and future operational taskings then it will require critical enablers providing significantly increased levels of mobility, firepower, force protection, medical services, and intelligence. Now, more than ever, expeditious implementation of the Commission’s findings must be prioritised. The CODF Report has acknowledged the limitations of the Defence Forces while delivering a definitive political-strategic statement regarding a Level of Ambition (LOA) for the Defence Forces.27 Right now, as I write, and as people die in the cities and towns of a country 1500 miles from Dublin, the future for Europe looks bleak. It is imperative, therefore, that the chosen LOA provides guidance for capability development for the whole of the Defence Forces so that we can contribute to a higher share of the EU burden and commit meaningfully to the Common Security and Defence Policy, as well as UN Charter Chapter VII type operations. Ultimately, however, and as asserted by many observers of this ongoing debate, the Government must consider increasing its level of defence spending to support a meaningful Capability Development and Implementation Plan that will serve to meet the challenges of what is now a dynamic and highly complex security environment. The CODF has identified a range of key capability requirements in the Land, Air, and Maritime domains that will need to be prioritised for LOA 2 to be met. Aside from augmented Air and Maritime elements to support Joint Operations, and changes to our High Level Command and Control structures, the CODF suggests a requirement for necessary materiel and resources to bolster Defence Forces competence in the fields

27 The CODF report details a framework focused around three tiers of LOA, each dependent on a benchmark commitment of increased military spending.

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of Intelligence and Cyber.28 As a Commander within the Land Component, my personal perspective and interpretation of LOA 2 is that the Army, at a minimum, should have an established organisation comprising two functioning All Arms Brigades, one Mechanised and one Light. The Mechanised Brigade should have Mechanised Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Air Defence. The Light Infantry Brigade should consist of Light Infantry Battalions (some with maritime capability) a Light Artillery and Surveillance and Target Acquisition Regiment and a Training Battalion to conduct, inter alia, weapons training, reconnaissance, preparation for crisis management operations, and other capabilities to support the Defence Forces Training Centre. We now inhabit a postmodern, social media, and fake news driven world, where populism and false narratives trump (no pun intended) the truth and create uncertainty. The Defence Forces remains as a disciplined body who will always take orders from our political masters and accept the decisions of the Government. The sense of loyalty and obedience espoused by the Defence Forces may be seen in some quarters as anachronistic, but it is also a prerequisite for democracy, and should not be viewed as a weakness. In response to the previously mentioned live fire naval exercises conducted by the Russian Navy off our southwest coast prior to the invasion of Ukraine, retired Defence Forces Chief of Staff Mark Mellett remarked that the planned naval exercise was provocative in both its timing and nature and leaves Ireland as the “EU’s lonely sentinel in the Atlantic where Russian military aircraft and intelligence gathering challenge norms and principles.” Perhaps Admiral Mellet could have added the word toothless to his “lonely sentinel” metaphor—but, I suspect he chose not to because, like myself, he believes that Ireland and its Defence Forces have an undeniable potential which will allow us to be firmly positioned as defenders of our State, and as a key player within the EU security architecture of the future. Surely the time has come for our Nation to step up to that plate?

28 Joint Operations: Complementary Forces from Army, Navy, Air, and Special Forces work together to achieve the mission, rather than planning and executing military operations separately.

Disconnect and Mismatch: The Intellectual Formation of Irish Defence Policy and Practice Tom Clonan

Situation---The Threat Assessment and Ireland’s 2015 White Paper on Defence At the beginning of the 2020s, the Republic of Ireland is confronted by a broad spectrum of dynamic global, regional, and domestic defence and security threats. Globally, the political, diplomatic, and economic capital of the United States has been eroded significantly. International powers and disruptive actors such as China and Russia are exploiting the loss of moral—and military—authority heretofore enjoyed by the United States. Disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, compounded by divisive and petulant foreign policy positions adopted by the Trump Administration have emboldened Chinese and Russian ambitions within their sphere of influence—particularly regarding strategic coercion, deterrence, and the use of force as a political tool. Regionally, along Europe’s eastern and southern borders, Russia is actively engaged in “Gray Zone” covert and overt operations in Ukraine,

T. Clonan (B) Senator & Security Analyst, Irish Senate, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_3

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the Baltic States, and in the Middle East.1 Germany’s 2016 White Paper on defence and security policy is explicit regarding the highly charged and fast-moving defence and security environment; The past years have shown that we must not take the achievements of the European post-war order for granted. We would not have believed it possible that borders would be redrawn by military force and in breach of international law in Europe in the 21st century. Wars and conflicts are raging on Europe’s doorstep. They have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and uprooted millions more. At the same time, fragile and failing states provide a fertile breeding ground for Islamist terrorism, which also poses a direct threat to us in Germany and Europe. Cyber space is increasingly becoming a theatre of conflict; the internet is not only a force for good – ideologies of hatred and violence are also spread there.2

The German White Paper recognises that we are at a significant turning point in geopolitical defence and security. The principal threats for Europe are defined as dynamic conventional and asymmetric threats from traditional state actors such as Russia to terrorist groups, organised criminal gangs, and attacks in the cyber domain. Ireland’s 2015 White Paper on Defence also acknowledges the changing security environment within which the Republic finds itself. Among emerging concerns, the 2015 White Paper identifies globalisation (including the threat of pandemics) as a threat accelerator, climate change, migration, energy security, inter and intra state conflict, cyber attacks, and terrorism. The 2015 White Paper also lists “emergencies and natural disasters,” “espionage,” and “transnational organised crime” as clear and present dangers to Ireland’s national security.3 The timing of the Irish White Paper was significant. Its predecessor, the 2000 White Paper was written in the afterglow of the Irish Peace Process and the Good Friday Agreement where a strong “peace dividend” was expected. The 2000 White Paper on Defence stated that “Ireland

1 Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Russia in the Gray Zone (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2019), 1. 2 German Federal Government, White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: German Federal Government, 2016), 6. 3 Department of Defence, Ireland, White Paper on Defence 2000 (Dublin: Government of Ireland, 2000), 16.

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faces a generally benign security environment. The external security environment does not contain any specific threats to the overall security of the State.”4 Few could have foreseen the World Trade Centre attacks of September 2001 and the impact that would have on international and domestic security. Even fewer would have predicted the invasion by the United States and its allies of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003. Nobody in Ireland would have predicted the death and injury of Irish citizens at the hands of Islamist extremists in the 9/11 attacks of 2001, the London 7/7 attacks of 2005, or the Bali and Madrid bombings of the same year. Nor would they have anticipated the murder and execution of Irish citizens Margaret Hassan and Ken Bigley in Iraq in 2004. Despite the benign predictions of the White Paper of 2000, Irish citizens would be killed and injured in almost every major terror attack involving European citizens over the following decade and a half. Indeed, Irish citizens were killed and injured in terror attacks within months of the publication of the 2015 White Paper, including the execution of three Irish citizens by Islamist extremists in Tunisia in June 2015, and the wounding of Irish citizens at the Bataclan Theatre attack in Paris in November 2015. The Defence Forces themselves also became involved in armed exchanges with Islamist radicals.5 Irish troops based in Syria engaged in firefights with al-Nusra affiliates by late 2014.6 At the time the 2015 White Paper was published, Ireland’s national press reported heightened awareness of the dramatic change in our security environment. The Irish Times observed; Estimates also indicate up to 40 Irish passport-holders are fighting in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria where, according to the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, systematic rape and war crimes have been committed by all parties to the conflict. Europe has also become de-stabilised. Emboldened perhaps by the West’s use of “preemptive” strikes against Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 on the pretext of protecting ethnic Russian interests. A semi-covert invasion of Ukraine in 2014 has led to fears of similar interventions and

4 White Paper on Defence 2000, 12. 5 C. Lally, “Irish Troops Prove Their Mettle on Hostile Syrian Front Line,” The Irish

Times, September 6, 2014. 6 T. Clonan, “Irish Peacekeepers Position at Golan in Line of Fire,” The Irish Times, September 2, 2014.

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black operations in the Baltic states in the near future. The White Paper reflects these realities and outlines the new risks and threats to Ireland’s security for the next decade. On external security, the primary threat is identified as that posed by international terrorism – with our citizens and infrastructure targets for extremists, or Ireland being used as a launch pad for terror attacks on our EU neighbours.7

Irish citizens had heightened awareness of growing domestic and international security threats at this time. This awareness continued into 2016 due to media coverage of high-profile Islamic State terror attacks throughout Europe over the following year, from the Bastille Day truck attack in Nice in July 2016, to the Christmas Market truck attack in December 2016. In June 2017, an Irish resident, Rachid Redouane, participated in the Islamic State attack in London. Killed at the scene, it was later reported that he and his accomplices had planned a similar attack in Dublin.8 In addition to these concerns, the predicted risk of cyber attacks on Irish critical infrastructure contained within the 2015 White Paper on Defence materialised in 2017 with attacks on Ireland’s primary energy infrastructure agency the ESB (Electricity Supply Board) and Ireland’s National Health Service (HSE). The “Spear Phishing” attack on the ESB network was linked to Russia’s GRU agency.9 Islamic State terror activity throughout the EU and links with Ireland continued to preoccupy Irish media throughout this period.10 In addition to these concerns, following the Brexit Poll of 2016, there was a concurrent rise in dissident Republican activity on the island, hand in hand with increased collaboration with organised crime drug gangs during this period. The Regency Hotel shooting of 2016 in which David Byrne was murdered—execution style—by members of the Hutch criminal gang was a watershed moment in the evolving linkage and collaboration

7 T. Clonan, “Defence White Paper Reflects Changed Security Environment,” The Irish Times, August 27, 2015. 8 P. Williams, “Revealed: London Bridge ISIS Group’s Plot to Attack Dublin Family Friendly Spot,” The Irish Independent, September 24, 2017. 9 L. Dearden, “Hackers Target Irish Energy Networks Amid Fears of Further Cyber Attacks on UK’s Crucial Infrastructure,” UK Independent Newspaper, July 15, 2017. 10 C. Lally, “Arrests of Alleged Islamist Extremists Show Threat to Ireland Is Real,” The Irish Times, May 10, 2017.

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between so-called organised crime on the island of Ireland and dissident terror groups. The high velocity Kalashnikov weapon used to murder Byrne—which sparked the subsequent Hutch-Kinahan feud—was a Romanian-manufactured AKM rifle of the type used by the Provisional IRA, and part of the Republican arsenal presumed decommissioned during the Peace Process.11 Ireland in the years 2017–2021 witnessed a rise in homicides by firearm associated with organised crime and narcoterrorism. Whilst Ireland’s murder rate is consistent with the EU average, Ireland’s homicide by firearm rate stands at 38%—five times higher than the EU average.12 During this period criminal gangs in Ireland have carried out planned executions and murders in a manner that would not have been tolerated by the Irish State during the Troubles. In 2020, Irish criminal gangs also murdered and dismembered a 17-year-old boy involved in drug activities.13 The threats outlined and predicted in the Irish 2015 White Paper on Defence, from the rise of international and domestic terrorism to the proliferation of organised crime networks, and the prospect of cyber attacks, materialised in its immediate aftermath. The UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy identifies the growing linkage between international terrorism and organised crime.14 There are particular risk factors for these linkages in Ireland involving criminal gangs and dissident Republican and Loyalist groupings. These risks are particularly acute post-Brexit.

Disconnect---Ireland’s White Paper on Defence: Update 2019 In conjunction with these developments, during this perfect storm of emerging threats for Irish citizens post 2015, the Department of Defence published its White Paper on Defence: Update 2019 which sets out the “strategic and comprehensive defence policy framework for the period 11 T. Clonan, “This Dublin Gun Violence Bears All the Hallmarks of Paramilitary Involvement,” The Guardian Newspaper (UK), February 10, 2016. 12 T. Clonan, “Why We Should Care About Gang Members Killing Each Other,” The Journal.ie, September 2, 2016. 13 C. Lally, “Man Released and Two Detained in Keane Mulready Woods Investigation,” The Irish Times, December 10, 2020. 14 United Nations, “Global Counter Terrorism Strategy” (A/RES/60/288), available at https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.

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up to 2025.”15 The document is organised along similar lines to the 2015 version with little or no change to the threat assessment. Regarding Brexit, the document contains a bland estimate of the situation; In terms of Brexit, both the EU and the UK share the same security and defence interests, and both are committed to the establishment of the necessary mechanisms to work closely together following the UK’s signalled departure from the EU. Both the UK and the EU are committed to the UK remaining firmly part of Europe and in a reciprocal way continuing to be an important part of the EU’s security.16

The White Paper Update of 2019 does not address the grave political, economic, and social implications of Brexit for Britain, Ireland, or the EU. It does not address the threat to the union of the United Kingdom— England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—implied within Brexit. The White Paper does not address the security and policing implications of a renewed border in the Irish Sea (or any new border for that matter), or the risk of heightened political instability consistent with a renewed focus on toxic identity politics on the island of Ireland. The polarisation amongst politicians in Northern Ireland along with the rise in civil disturbances and dissident paramilitary activity that took place after the advent of Brexit was neither anticipated, predicted, or dealt with in the White Paper Update of 2019. Nor did it consider the fast-approaching reality, palatable or otherwise in Ireland, of an all-island political, economic, defence, policing, and security entity here. In terms of cyber security, the White Paper Update of 2019 states that; Cyber security risks exist for government and public utilities as well as for commercial entities and individuals. The State has adapted to this, like many others, by both building capacity and systems to respond to incidents as and when they occur, and by taking measures to improve the resilience of critical national infrastructure and services. The former is embodied in the growth and development of the National Cyber Security Centre, the latter in the Network and Information Regulations 2018, which compels Critical National Infrastructure Operators to take a series of

15 Department of Defence, Ireland, White Paper on Defence: Update 2019 (Dublin: Government of Ireland, 2019), 2. 16 White Paper on Defence: Update 2019, 28.

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measures to protect their systems. The centrality of network and information technology issues to the global security environment notwithstanding, the unique concentration of major technology companies in Ireland underscores the importance of coordinated systems of resilience to protect the economic and social well-being of the State and its citizens.17

Despite the 2017 cyber attacks on the ESB and HSE, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) remains under-staffed, and the post of its national director remains unfilled. Ireland’s cyber defence remains fragmented and chronically under-resourced with functions split across the NCSC, the Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau (GNCCB) and the Defence Forces Communications and Information Services (CIS) Corps. The White Paper Update of 2019, whilst acknowledging the threat of cyber attack, did not meaningfully address the provocative weakness of our cyber readiness. In anodyne terms, the document suggests that sufficient steps have been taken to defend and protect the state from this emerging threat and safeguard its status as a major international hub for digital multinationals and data centres. At the time of the publication of the 2019 White Paper Update, 30% of the EU’s digital data was stored in Ireland with little or no protection. This precarious situation was well flagged in Irish mainstream media; Ireland currently has 54 separate data centres for international tech giants such as Microsoft, Google and Amazon. Unlike other countries, however, Ireland has no credible cyber response. If we value our FDI, we need to act on this deficiency immediately.18

The difficulties in recruiting and retaining specialists in the critical area of cyber security were also highlighted repeatedly in Irish media prior to publication of the 2019 White Paper Update. Media coverage of Ireland’s lack of cyber security preparedness was prominent across tabloid and broadsheet newspapers and was repeatedly discussed on broadcast and digital platforms. It was an open secret that Ireland, despite its international status as a global HQ and hub for digital and data services, was almost completely undefended in this area; 17 White Paper on Defence: Update 2019, 32–33. 18 T. Clonan, “Our Defence Forces are Effectively on Life Support,” The Journal.ie,

September 27, 2020.

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The national cyber security centre is grossly under-resourced, and it is unable to carry out the task it was established to do. Ireland’s security strategy expired last year and we are still waiting for a replacement. Ireland’s strategy is rudderless and lacking in direction.19

In late 2020, a serving Defence Forces officer, Commandant Derek McGourty, published a paper in the Defence Forces Review issuing a stark warning about the threat and likelihood of a cyber attack against sensitive economic or critical infrastructure in Ireland; The Irish Naval service has no anti-submarine capability and its ability to deter or even detect such maritime intelligence gathering is exceptionally limited. Neither has Ireland got the radar, air defence, and air interdiction capability necessary to deter and monitor Russian or other aircraft entering Irish airspace without permission and instead relies on the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force to carry out this task on its behalf … Ireland is home, according to some estimates, to over 30% of all European Union (EU) data, and to the European headquarters of many of the world’s leading technology companies. The country’s economic success is therefore closely tied up with its ability to provide a secure environment for these companies to operate … Of growing alarm then is Ireland’s lack of capacity in terms of cyber defence, leaving it vulnerable to cyberattack. This sense of vulnerability becomes heightened when one considers that Ireland’s rise as a global technology and communications hub has been accompanied by reports of growth in the Russian embassy in Dublin, suggested by some to mean that Ireland is now seen as a growing priority for Moscow.20

This explicit warning is in stark contrast to the lack of urgency or reality contained within the White Paper Update of 2019. Herein lies the problem and the central hypothesis of this chapter; the growing disconnect between defence strategy and policy documents published by Ireland’s government and Department of Defence, and the realities of Ireland’s status as Europe’s weakest link in terms of defence, intelligence, and security infrastructure. This disconnect in policy formation and the intellectual underpinnings of national defence is compounded by an

19 Flanagan, P, ‘Ireland Has Weak Cyber Security and is Wide Open to Attacks’, Irish Daily Mirror, February 12, 2018. 20 C. O’Keeffe, “Special Report: Ireland’s Defence Shortcomings a Clear and Present Danger to Global Stability,” The Irish Examiner, December 7, 2020.

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inability to comprehend an era of rapidly evolving, unprecedented threats to the state; Ireland’s defence strategies are ill-informed and ill-conceived.

The Perfect Storm---Fail to Prepare, Prepare to Fail Ireland’s cyber security capability is a useful case study of the disconnect between government and Department of Defence strategies, policies, and actual threat assessment. It also demonstrates the mismatch between Ireland’s cyber security capabilities and our ability to defend the national interest from even the most modest of attacks from a criminal group. Despite the vague reassurances contained within Ireland’s White Paper on Defence: Update 2019, that all measures were being adopted to secure the national cyber space nothing meaningful was enacted; a grave failing on the part of the Irish government and Department of Defence. The digital economy is of vital national importance, underpinning much of Ireland’s foreign direct investment. One-third of all EU internet data passes through Ireland. Despite the national and global significance of cyber security to Ireland and its centrality to Irish government’s political, diplomatic, and economic ambitions, there has been no strategic planning or investment for it. Irish cyber security, therefore, represents the antithesis of proper and prudent defence strategy and planning.21 There was no political cognition of our status as a global digital leader, or the strategic ways this vital interest could be secured, much less the military means required to achieve these objectives. In short, the government and Department of Defence failed to prepare for a foreseeable, predictable threat to the national interest. This failure came despite warnings in Ireland’s non-specialist popular press and grave predictions from serving officers of the Defence Forces. No action was taken by the Irish government, any minister, or department, to address the issues explicitly identified. In May 2021, Ireland suffered a major cyber attack on its Health Service Executive (HSE). Perpetrated by a Russian criminal gang, styled “Wizard Spider,” the attack was emblematic of the type of predictable and preventable attack hypothesised and foreseen by media and military experts—taking place

21 C. Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 4.

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as it did in an environment without adequate cyber security infrastructure or defences.22 In the aftermath of this cyber attack, which crippled Ireland’s health service at the height of COVID-19, further media reports highlighted the role that cuts to Ireland’s Defence Forces played in accelerating our vulnerability to such attacks.23 Aside from the cyber domain, which is central to Ireland’s stated political ends and ambitions as a global digital hub, for the purposes of this chapter it is also useful to look at Ireland’s national defence “means” regarding the wider spectrum of security and defence threats. One of the central themes of this volume is to assess whether our Defence Forces are fit to face challenges presented in turbulent times. Decades of severe cuts and personnel reductions by successive governments have left Ireland’s armed forces vulnerable at a time of emergent hybrid threats. The situation is emblematic of the disconnect between growing threats to the security of the state and a systematic erosion and degradation of the capability and preparedness of the Irish military to meet these challenges. With the Good Friday Agreement and Peace Process, the “peace dividend” has seen considerable re-structuring and reduction of our Defence Forces. This process began with the 1990 Gleeson Commission, swiftly followed by no less than three Efficiency Audit Groups in 1991, 1992, and 1994, leading to a 1996 Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan which oversaw the rationalisation of the Defence Forces from four commands to a four-brigade structure. Further re-organisation in 2011– 2012 reduced the brigades to three. Hand in hand came austerity cuts to pay and allowances which made Irish military personnel amongst the most poorly paid public servants in the state: many personnel earned less than the minimum wage.24 Reductions in personnel numbers, low pay, and unrelenting operational commitments led to an existential crisis in the Defence Forces prior to the publication of the Department of Defence White Paper 2019 Update. The crisis was not dealt with in the White Paper, despite widespread media coverage;

22 M. O’Halloran, “Cyber Security Role is Vacant Because of Low Salary,” The Irish Times, May 16, 2021. 23 N. O’Connor, “Ireland’s Response to the HSE Cyber Attacks Has Been Undermined by Government Cuts to Defence Forces,” The Journal.ie, May 20, 2021. 24 T. Clonan, “Defence Forces Personnel are the Lowest Paid Workers in the Public Service,” The Journal.ie, June 1, 2019.

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Despite putting themselves in harm’s way in the course of their duties – Irish military personnel, are the lowest paid workers in the public service, according to the CSO. A whopping 85% of Irish military personnel earn less than the average industrial wage. Ireland has the lowest defence spend in the EU as a per cent of GDP when it comes to military pay as well as allowances and equipment. As a consequence, turnover within the organisation has reached a critical point. Currently, there is an annual discharge rate of approximately 8.9% per annum. Internationally, the maximum acceptable turnover rate for the military is 5%. Soldiers, sailors and aircrew are leaving the defence forces in their droves.25

These well-flagged pay and associated retention issues were not addressed by three Public Service Pay Commissions in 2017, 2018, and 2019. In quantitative terms, the haemorrhaging of personnel from Ireland’s Defence Forces, at a time of heightened security threats, has been very damaging. At the time of writing, in the summer of 2021, only 7700 army, naval, and air corps personnel are available for duty, despite government commitments to maintain a minimum strength of 9500. In qualitative terms, those quitting the Defence Forces are often highly qualified, irreplaceable, personnel: IT specialists, aircraft and vehicle technicians, engineering and ordnance staff, pilots, and medical personnel. These are precisely the core skills required to combat current and emerging hybrid cyber security, terrorism, and organised crime threats from state and non-state actors. These include cyber attacks on critical digital infrastructure, aggressive probing of our air and sea defences, physical interference with critical infrastructure, and attacks on our citizens at home and abroad. Combined, these shortcomings lower Ireland’s status as a secure and stable environment for foreign direct investment. They also accelerate reputational damage to Ireland as Europe’s “weakest link” in intelligence, defence, and security. This weakness undermines Ireland’s political, diplomatic, economic, and social capital, and undermines our status as a neutral state. Gaps in our defence capabilities include the cyber realm, maritime space, controlled airspace, and capacity to mount land operations, in either aid to the civil authority or the civil power, or conventional military domains. Ireland’s territorial waters consist of 220 million maritime acres of ocean, 15% of the EU’s territorial waters. Ireland, however, cannot 25 Clonan, “Defence Forces Personnel are the Lowest Paid.”.

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properly patrol or monitor this important strategic asset. In 2020, chronic crew shortages led to the mothballing of several operational naval vessels—key capital assets—in Haulbowline Naval Base. Routine naval patrols were cancelled. In 2021, one-third of naval fishery patrols were cancelled due to crew shortages. This forced the Irish Sea-Fisheries Protection Authority to request emergency assistance from the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) to send an EU vessel to patrol Irish waters.26 Ireland’s Naval Service simply does not have the minimum resources to patrol or secure our maritime environment. Critically, nineteen major sub-sea fibre-optic cables, vital digital, and data links between Europe and the United States, are in Ireland’s coastal and inshore waters. Other vital oceanic cables lie within the limits of Ireland’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Despite our proximity to, and responsibility for, this critical global infrastructure, we cannot monitor or secure it. This weakness has been observed by other powers. In recent years, Russian submarines and aircraft have dramatically increased incursions into Irish-controlled sea and airspace.27 Despite this, our Air Corps do not have the aircraft, personnel, or equipment to detect or monitor Russian aircraft. Ireland is the only EU state without the primary radar necessary to monitor its own controlled airspace. Despite 75% of all air traffic from Europe to the United States passing through Irish-controlled airspace, Ireland, effectively blind, relies completely on secondary radar systems. Nor has Ireland the military resources to meaningfully intervene in our air space to prevent hostile incursions and relies instead on the Royal Air Force to patrol and secure our aerial sovereignty and jurisdiction.28 This does enormous damage to Ireland’s reputation as a neutral state and international hub for foreign direct investment in digital and data centres.29 Due to the dire shortage of qualified personnel, the Air Corps can no longer train its

26 C. Gallagher, “Ireland had to Rely on EU Ship to Patrol Fishing Waters due to Naval Shortages,” The Irish Times, June 4, 2021. 27 S. Carswell, “Russia to Keep Investigating Gap off Irish Coast—Ex NATO

Commander,” The Irish Times, March 13, 2020. 28 G. Allison, “Why Do British Jets Protect Irish Airspace?” UK Defence Journal, March 10, 2020. 29 E. Burke, “What Are Russian Bombers Doing in Irish Airspace?—Moscow Testing British-Irish Air Defence Links and Threatening State Role as Technology Hub,” The Irish Times, March 10, 2020.

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own pilots. Helicopter pilots have been recently sent to US military bases such as Fort Rucker in Alabama for specialised training. Fixed-wing pilots have been sent to Australia for flight training. This is extremely grave. When a military organisation cannot replicate and generate its own core competencies and skill sets, when it cannot retain and develop its essential corporate knowledge, it is destined to fail in its mission, and ultimately, as a military organisation.30 Army personnel are similarly stretched with soldiers working on average 64 hours per week to meet domestic security duties, including sensitive sites such as Portlaoise maximum security prison, whilst also regularly providing armed support to An Garda Síochána on Aid to the Civil Power Operations (ATCP). Army personnel are also deployed on thirteen foreign missions in twelve countries worldwide. With poor pay and long hours, many Irish soldiers earn less than the minimum wage.31 It is interesting to note that in the context of poor pay, high turnover of staff within the Defence Forces and in the context of rapidly evolving global, regional, and domestic threats—spending on the Defence Forces has dropped from 1.18% of GDP in 1994 to 0.3% of GDP spend in 2020. Ireland’s spend on defence is the lowest in the European Union and is a fraction of the EU average spend of 1.2% of GDP.32 At the time of publication of the White Paper on Defence Update of 2019, there was no mention of these risk factors to the integrity of our Defence Forces. Nor was there any mention of the 79% of commissioned officers, the professional leadership core of the Defence Forces, who stated an intention to leave the organisation prior to retirement age.33 Based on the advice and guidance to the government provided by civil servants in the Department of Defence, the armed forces have deteriorated to breaking point. For reasons outlined here, the Defence Forces have been degraded and are unfit to meet the current and future security 30 T. Clonan, “Our Defence Forces are Effectively on Life Support,” The Journal.ie, September 27, 2020. 31 Representative Association for Commissioned Officers (RACO), “Commission on the Defence Forces Briefing Document,” February 16, 2021. 32 Eurostat, Directorate General European Commission, “Government Expenditure on Defence,” March 3, 2021. 33 Representative Association Commissioned Officers (RACO), “RACO Member’s Survey Report,” Amarach Research, March 5, 2019.

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challenges confronting Ireland. These threats are not meaningfully dealt with in Department of Defence policy and documents authored by civil servants with no military experience or relevant qualifications.

The Solution In June 2020, the Irish Government set up a Commission on the Future of the Defence Forces.34 The Commission was given one year to report on the strategic direction of the Defence Forces in the next decade. It is vital that the Commission addresses the growing disconnect between successive White Papers on Defence and the dynamic, emerging threats that confront the State. The Commission must likewise address the accompanying mismatch of armed forces experiencing a period of unprecedented decline and growing dysfunction—from low morale, poor pay, and lack of investment—with a rapidly emerging range of threats to state security. Simply put, our armed forces are not fit to meet current or future challenges to Irish security and defence. Not only are our defence and security seriously compromised by disconnect and mismatch, but our neutrality status is also rendered meaningless by our inability to meet the minimum requirements of a credible defence in the cyber domain, on land, sea, and air. There is clearly a mismatch between the aspirations of successive White Papers on Defence and the threats confronting Ireland. These White Papers, written by civilian public administrators, do not adequately analyse these threats. Nor do these documents suggest an integrated whole of government strategic response, involving the Defence Forces, An Garda Síochána or any other key state stakeholders identified in successive national emergency plans and major emergency frameworks.35 This chapter proposes that Ireland’s defence and security strategies, plans, and white papers must be written by qualified defence professionals from within our armed forces and in collaboration with defence intellectuals— researchers and specialists from Ireland’s universities, a sector consistently ranked within the top 2% globally.

34 D. McConnell, “Commission on the Future of the Defence Forces to Be Established in New Government,” The Irish Examiner, June 15, 2020. 35 T. Clonan, T, “Emergency Effort Lacked Grit of Clear Leadership,” The Irish Times, January 15, 2010.

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A constellation of factors contributes to the neglect of Ireland’s armed forces. Culturally and historically, many Irish citizens, including most politicians and public representatives, have no experience of military service and a poor understanding of the function and roles of the Irish Defence Forces. Security and national defence only arise as political issues insofar as they affect public perception of risks posed by terrorism or natural and man-made disasters. The current acute situation however is egregious and requires urgent attention. A minimum starting point for addressing the mismatch and disconnects identified here would be by encouraging consultation and engagement—advice and advocacy of military experts directly to government and elected representatives. Military officers, from the Chief of Staff through the chain of command should have parity of esteem with senior civil servants and have priority of direct access to the Minister for Defence and Taoiseach to inform government policy and strategy on defence and security. It should not be the preserve of unqualified civil servants or politically appointed advisors. Serving officers, defence researchers, and specialists should regularly brief government and politicians directly, as is practice in the United States and Britain through House Armed Services Committee hearings, Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, and UK parliament Defence Select Committee hearings. For example, during the COVID-19 crisis, the public was informed, and the government advised by expert medical guidance of public health doctors, immunologists, infectious disease specialists, intensive care specialists, and anaesthetists. The thought leadership, advice, and guidance to the government came from medical professional groups, not “lay” civil servants. This chapter argues, based on the evidence presented here, and consistent with international best practice, that the thought leadership and principal advice and guidance to the government on defence, security, and intelligence matters must come primarily from qualified military and defence experts. Civil servants in the Department of Defence should confine themselves to an administrative support role to facilitate this process. The “Wizard Spider” attack, predicted by military officers, academics, and industry specialists, is evidence of the failure of the current approach for Ireland’s defence strategies where senior civil servants and political advisors have driven failed and myopic defence policies and have overseen the erosion of capacity in our armed forces. To allow equality of access and parity of esteem for expert military views at the heart of the government and policy making, the status and

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role of the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces must be amended by changes to the Defence Act to empower that office holder to act as a Chief of Defence. This would allow the incumbent chief executive powers and real command and control of the armed forces. It would also allow the Chief to report directly to the government, bypassing the Secretary General of the Department of Defence. For historical reasons dating back to Ireland’s Civil War (1922–1923) Ireland’s military is subordinated to civilian control to the extent that the Secretary General of the Department of Defence is the Defence Forces’ de facto commanding officer. It is unacceptable, dangerous, and at variance with international best practice that a lay civil servant, lacking appropriate military qualifications or military experience should exercise such control over the state’s armed forces. In Ireland’s case, civil service dominance of the security and defence agenda has led to intellectual disconnect between the threat assessment, strategic defence planning, and the catastrophic erosion of capacity within our military. Currently, control of the Defence Forces is vested in Article 13.4.2 of the Constitution which delegates control of the armed forces to the President of Ireland. Articles 13.5.1 and 13.9 of the Constitution qualify the President’s command to ensure the exercise of it is regulated and checked by law, and only under explicit direction of the government through the Council of Defence. In this manner, whilst the President enjoys de jure command, de facto command lies firmly in the hands of the Minister for Defence and Taoiseach of the day.36 The Defence Acts 1954–1998 further bind the Irish military to civilian oversight and control. Regarding command and control of the military, Section 17 of the Defence Act, 1954 states; Under the direction of the President and subject to the provisions of this Act, the military command of, and all executive and administrative powers in relation to, the Defence Forces including the power to delegate command and authority, shall be exercisable by the Government and, subject to such exceptions and limitations as the Government may from time to time determine, through and by the Minister.

This legislation explicitly “corrals” control of the military within the civil sphere and makes amenable every aspect of Irish military activity to 36 Bunreacht na hEireann, The Irish Constitution, Government of Ireland, 1937.

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civilian government direction and scrutiny. Section 17 (3) of the Defence Act further reinforces civilian control through the Minister for Defence. Consistent with the Carltona Principle, this gives the Secretary General of the Department of Defence de facto command and control of the Irish armed forces. This is an unusual and unsatisfactory situation. In addition to these constitutional and legal provisions, the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924 effectively vests command and control of the Irish military in a civilian—the Secretary General of the Department of Defence. This dominance by lay civil servants, based on Ireland’s unique and anachronistic legal and constitutional framework, has led to a suboptimal approach to defence and security in Ireland. Unfit for purpose, it is at variance with the thought leadership delivered in the international and security community through serving professional officers in collaboration with defence experts through research, publication, engagement, and consultation with the government. Publications such as the Defence Forces Review, are exemplar of the nascent intellectual tradition emerging in Ireland’s Defence Forces, publishing academic research on Irish defence, security, and strategic planning we have a precedent for such collaboration.37 The Defence Forces Review needs to be nurtured, properly resourced, and ought to enjoy the academic freedom of expression guaranteed under Ireland’s Universities Act. The Chief of Staff, serving professional officers and Ireland’s defence academic community can make a critical contribution to Ireland’s defence planning at this point of disconnect and mismatch. Through a CEO role for the Chief of Staff and the existing network of military professionals and defence specialists, Ireland already has the appropriate expert voices and thought leadership to contribute positively to our strategy and defence planning. This solution would be an important first step in resolving the disconnect and mismatch that overshadows our status as Europe’s weakest link in defence, intelligence, and security matters. Critically, it would be a vital first step towards validating and authenticating our neutral status—through an informed threat assessment and realistic defence strategies and planning. Ireland’s national defence strategy and planning must not be confined to a reactive threat-based assessment,

37 Oglaigh na hEireann, Defence Forces Review, Irish Defence Forces, 2007–2021.

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it requires instead a dynamic and proactive capabilities-based posture.38 The threats are dynamic and emergent. We need to promote a dynamic, proactive, and vocal community of defence intellectuals and military professionals to meet the significant security challenges that confront Ireland in the twenty-first century.

Conclusion To conclude, the most recent Department of Defence White Paper Update 2021 continues the long trend of failing to meaningfully address the immediate and emerging security and defence challenges that confront Ireland. Nor does it meaningfully address the crisis of recruitment and retention in the Defence Forces. Under “Other Policy Requirements,” however, the 2021 White Paper Update does mention the possibility of the creation of a “Research Technology and Innovation Unit.”39 This collaboration with academics and industry is to be welcomed, as is the Joint Department of Defence, Defence Forces involvement in Science Foundation Ireland’s SFI Defence Initiative. These developments will assist the nascent intellectual tradition that is essential to proactively address the rapidly evolving domestic and international security challenges that confront the Republic. Ireland has serious—grave—deficits in her capacity to meet the multiple acute threats that are emerging in the cyber, maritime, air, and ground domains. We need to foster the intellectual capacity, moral courage, and ethical leadership to openly debate and meet these challenges. Events in Kabul, Afghanistan in August of 2021 underlined our inability to act unilaterally to independently assist and airlift our citizens in extremis overseas. In the wake of Brexit, we must as an ethical categorical imperative begin to plan and design the defence, security, and policing architecture for the whole of Ireland—all-island—entity that is rapidly approaching. By whatever means—whether we like it or not—the reality of a “United Ireland” will be thrust upon all communities on this island in the very near future. This will have seismic security, defence, and policing implications. There is no mention of this rapidly evolving situation in any 38 M. Mazarr, K. Ley Best, L. Burgess, E. Larson, M. Linick, and D. Madden, The US Department of Defence Planning Process (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 2019), 13–14. 39 Department of Defence, Ireland, White Paper on Defence: Update 2021, 4.

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of our White Papers or indeed anywhere in our public discourse. As in all other matters highlighted in this chapter, if we fail to meaningfully engage and prepare for this eventuality, the outcomes may well be catastrophic. We must be intellectually and ethically proactive—now—to avoid a Balkan-style set of outcomes here in the coming decades.

The Irish Naval Service: The Burden of the Minimalist Approach Brian FitzGerald

Introduction The ‘Real Map of Ireland’ (Fig. 1) shows the totality of Irish jurisdictional interests and responsibilities. The maritime element of these interests represents an area ten times the size of Ireland’s landmass, a sea area of about one million square kilometres. However, of greater significance is the fact that this maritime area contains accessible natural resources of extraordinary value including wind, wave, and tidal energy, mineral deposits, marine life, fisheries, and underwater heritage. It offers unexplored areas for innovation, sustainable growth, and jobs. Naturally, this abundance of wealth and interests must be protected by the State, as Ireland’s prosperity and security depend on it. The protection of Ireland’s maritime jurisdiction, or strategic gateway, rests with Ireland’s principal seagoing agency, the Irish Naval Service, which employs a flotilla of nine ships to patrol these waters and serve Ireland’s interest abroad. However, in recent years the Naval Service has seen a substantial exodus

B. FitzGerald (B) Irish Naval Service, Haulbowline, Ireland

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_4

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Fig. 1 The real map of Ireland1

of personnel that has significantly impaired its ability to put ships to sea and deliver the necessary maritime operations to ensure this protection. In this chapter, I will outline the evolution and development of the Naval Service in the context of Ireland’s maritime policy requirements while also highlighting the limitations that confound its potential. The changes that should be implemented to ensure the Naval Service can continue to secure and defend Irish interests will also be proposed.

On the Irish Naval Service The Naval Service is based at Haulbowline Island in lower Cork harbour on Ireland’s South Coast. Cork harbour is one of the largest natural harbours in the world, making it a safe-haven for the full palette of waterbased activities normally associated with a Navy’s home port, such as 1 Issued by the Marine Institute (2010).

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infrastructure, dockyard support, and training and education facilities. Of strategic importance is the location of the Naval Base on the South Coast in terms of access to the area of maritime operations represented by Ireland’s jurisdictional interests. However, this also means that the Naval Service lacks a permanent presence at the centre of political power in the capital, Dublin, situated on the East Coast. As a result, the Naval Service has often lacked suitable representation during policy formulation processes, resulting in repeated mistakes that are, perhaps, surprising for an island nation. Principal among these mistakes has been an inability to arrive at a fit-for-purpose numerical establishment for the Naval Service within the overall umbrella organisation of the Defence Forces. Currently, out of the authorised establishment of 9500 personnel in the Army, Air Corps, and Naval Service that collectively make up the Defence Forces, the maritime arm has a cap of just 1094 to patrol and police circa one million square kilometres of ocean. Nevertheless, despite this foundational error, the Naval Service has delivered some extraordinary and exciting operations and initiatives that have more than proved its utility, usually while under severe resource limitations (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2 Commissioning ceremony of L.E. JAMES JOYCE—Dublin 2015

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The Minimalist Approach to Maritime Security The policy position surrounding the maritime component of Ireland’s Defence Forces is best described as minimalist. The Naval Service does not have a sub-surface or air capability to speak of which results in obvious weaknesses in Ireland’s defence and security architecture. Nonetheless, the outputs and operations of the surface fleet are optimised with the available ships. Classed as patrol vessels these ships are relatively small but their outputs of up to 210 patrol days per year represent significant service delivery. The experience of delivering more with less over a sustained period allowed the Naval Service to respond rapidly to the ebb and flow of maritime security issues beyond the traditional defence roles through various Service Level Agreements (SLA) and strategic collaborations with other Government Departments, academia, and industry. For example, SLAs with Ireland’s Sea Fishery Protection Authority and Irish Coast Guard frame fishery protection and much of the offshore maritime safety requirements in Ireland, respectively. Another example is the protocol between the Naval Service, Ireland’s police force An Garda Síochána, and Ireland’s customs and excise authority which guides the State’s implementation of drugs interdiction operations at sea. In this way, the Naval Service has expanded its relevance to Irish society and evidenced its value for money. In addition, through the fostering of a culture of innovation and response to the needs of academia and industry, the Naval Service has managed to demonstrate the possibility of shifting from being in a position of a net consumer to one that facilitates net production, arguably representing a model of public sector transformation that will be discussed subsequently in this chapter. This culture of cross-sectoral service delivery was initiated by the functional approach to the roles of the Naval Service adopted in Ireland’s first White Paper on Defence in 2000. Critically, based upon the establishment to deliver these functions and roles, the Naval Service underwent a period of fleet growth from seven to nine hulls and an increase in ship size that reflected the breadth and importance of the services to be delivered. However, a concurrent refusal to grow the establishment of the Naval Service, followed in fact by a series of cuts to the establishment, destabilised the already weak foundations and precipitated a decline of the organisation in recent years, which has included tying-up of sorely needed ships. Faced with this decline, in full view of the public and media, the

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issues surrounding Ireland’s Naval Service that have dogged its development since inception necessitate the finding of a different way to provide maritime security. Bold and significant decisions are needed to avoid irreparable damage whereby Ireland’s maritime defence and security needs cannot be met. These decisions will need to be based around a wider national maritime policy that places the maritime needs of the Defence Forces on an equal footing with both the Land and Air Components, the Army and the Air Corps. Whereas this may seem somewhat obvious for an island nation it has not been the case to date. The Irish Army alone has enjoyed pre-eminence across the Irish defence policy, strategy, and decision-making spectrum with obvious implications for resources and capabilities, despite the recent appointment of both senior Air Corps and Naval Service officers to the highest ranks of the Defence Forces General Staff, and to the position of Chief of Staff itself. That is not to say that the Army and Air Corps are well catered for. They are not. What it is saying is that if Ireland does not have a competent maritime staff at Defence Forces Headquarters, enjoying parity of esteem with its Air and Land colleagues and an equal voice in policy formulation, strategic implementation, and resource division, Ireland’s maritime defence and security operations will continue to falter in the long run. This has been the case down through the short history of the Naval Service and despite periods of growth, hope, and operational success, it finds itself once again in a period of decline, arguably when maritime security matters the most (Fig. 3).

Where the Naval Service Has Come From As the waters around Ireland and the ports of Lough Swilly in the northwest, Berehaven in the southwest, and Cork Harbour in the centre of the south coast remained under British control after Irish independence in 1922, Ireland was ill-prepared for their eventual acquisition (and consequent maritime jurisdiction) nearly two decades later in 1938. A Marine and Coast-Watching Service was established in 1939 to meet the minimum internal law requirements of Ireland declaring itself a ‘neutral’ state at the beginning of the Second World War. However, it was from the humble beginnings of this Marine and Coast-Watching Service that the Naval Service subsequently evolved in 1946. It is understood, but not certain that, because of British insistence in the Treaty of Independence that Ireland would not have its own Navy, the selection of the title ‘Naval Service’ was in deference to that requirement. Between 1946 and

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Fig. 3 L.E. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS (Offshore Patrol Vessel)

1973, Ireland had no more than a token Naval Service. Our jurisdiction was just three nautical miles offshore and our government lacked policy oversight of the maritime because of the delayed model of independence that saw Britain retain almost total policy control of the waters around our island until the return of the Treaty Ports in 1938. The Naval Service fleet hovered between no ships and three ships until the 1970s. Its relevance to both policymakers and the general public is reflected in a popular ballad by the famous Irish band—The Dubliners—who in 1968 sang about the three ships of the Naval Service at that time in the following terms to perverse acclaim: The Cliona, the Maeve and the Macha, The pride of the Irish Navy, When the Captain he blows on his whistle, All the sailors go home for their tea.

Humour aside, it was a damning indictment of Irish people’s understanding of the importance of maritime defence and security of their own island and the regional implications therein. This appears as stark when our nearest neighbour had a fundamental understanding of this importance and had a growing interest in Ireland’s ability to protect its own waters and the western approaches to these islands. Compounding

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Fig. 4 Motor Torpedo Boats of the Marine and Coast-Watching Service 1939– 1946

the situation, by 1969 the three ships had been mothballed, leaving the Naval Service without a navy. More hopefully, the 1970s brought an era of changes on the international stage including access to international support that contextualised the evolution of a modern era for the Naval Service (Fig. 4). The expansion of Ireland’s maritime jurisdictional interest from 3 to 200 miles, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), under the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Ireland’s joining of the European Economic Community (EEC) were gamechangers for both Ireland’s maritime interests and for the Naval Service tasked to protect them.2 Ireland was now being required to patrol its EEZ and area of continental shelf. This triggered inward investment by the EEC, most particularly around the protection of fisheries, and saw the Naval Service grow relatively rapidly in size by 1986 to seven ships, including a modern helicopter patrol vessel. A wealth of maritime domain 2 Today’s EU has evolved from the then EEC in 1972.

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experience and awareness in pursuit of Ireland’s interests was spawned including a commensurate public awareness. Expanding its maritime reach brought the Naval Service deep into the Northeast Atlantic and face to face with inter alia weather phenomena, international search and rescue, unauthorised military manoeuvres, marine life anomalies, seabed survey and exploitation, the interdiction of drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal cargo transportation, illegal dumping and pollution, fishing resource exploitation, sub-sea heritage exploitation, and an ever-present exposure to the wealth and potential of our waters. High profile examples of this expanded operational activity include the Naval Service’s search and rescue role in the Fastnet Race disaster in 1979, the coordination of the recovery operation in the aftermath of the Air India disaster in 1985, the interdiction of IRA gun running onboard the fishing vessel Marita Ann in 1984 and a litany of high-profile drug smuggling interdictions that began in earnest with the detention of the yacht Brime off the Kerry coast in 1993. Notably, throughout this time, the Naval Service detained a steady flow of fishing vessels for illegal activity within Ireland’s EEZ. As a result of these broad ranging and well publicised activities, the importance of the Naval Service as a central plank to our island’s defence and security architecture, began to be understood and appreciated. Then, in 2008, following Ireland’s submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Ireland’s already substantial maritime jurisdiction effectively doubled, and now reaches 600 miles into the Atlantic, placing an increased responsibility on the Irish State to protect, defend, and secure it. This responsibility was operationalised using the Naval Service, supported by the Air Corps Maritime Patrol Aircraft and the Army ashore.3 Despite both the role and jurisdictional expansion and the deepening understanding of capability requirements, the Naval Service remained a small surface fleet with neither sub-surface, nor air capability, as the once much heralded helicopter capability of the flagship was mothballed.4 This latter development may well have been the result of a twin service approach to the operation whereby the helicopters belonged to the Air Corps and operated from their home base near Dublin, only 3 https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm. See Fig. 1. 4 Sub-surface operational capability has been confined to the Naval Diving Section.

No meaningful submarine capability was developed, and the surface fleet has not been equipped to conduct sub-surface reconnaissance, surveillance, or search operations.

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deploying the necessary patrol elements to the ship. Meanwhile, the ship’s operational profile in delivering the full panoply of maritime defence and security operations often found itself constrained by the deployment, crew-changes, and redeployment of its non-generic aircraft. Having myself served onboard when the helicopter was an integral part of the operation of the ship, I found it to be an exciting period that saw both the Naval Service and the Air Corps significantly increase their operational capability, but it lacked sufficient understanding and support to grow towards a permanent maritime air-arm. The opportunity to use air assets as maritime force multipliers went unrealised, arguably due to the then absence of both maritime and air competence at the decisionmaking levels of Defence Forces Headquarters. Today’s Naval Service, lacking any air surveillance or air defence capability can neither ‘look up’ into the air domain nor ‘look down’ into the sub-surface domain. Consequently, other states, including non-EU states, aircraft, survey vessels, and sub-surface vessels visit our waters with impunity, highlighting Ireland as a weak link in both the national and regional defence and security architecture. Notwithstanding the obvious resource challenges that this presents, its relevance is growing as the twin topics of climate action and technological advancement bring the future exploitation of the sea into focus.

An Islanders Perspective Ireland is an island. Considering the extent of our seabed area, Ireland is the third largest EU State in the North Atlantic. This enormous maritime domain is an area where Ireland has jurisdictional rights and substantial interests. For example, the continental shelf allows light to penetrate the sea floor creating abundantly rich fishing grounds and vast areas where offshore structures can be built such as floating wind farms, wave and tidal devices, fish farms, and/or vast areas of sea can be developed as marine protection areas. With such growing interests and the advent of Brexit and its consequent annexation of the Irish EEZ from the rest of EU waters, the responsibility carried by Ireland to protect its jurisdiction is set in sharp relief. Not unlike property rights, jurisdictional rights that are not upheld, become more imaginary than real, with consequential poor outcomes for the State, its citizens, and the region. Recent examples of the impact of Brexit include disputed understanding of the rights of Irish fishers to fish within 12 nautical miles of Rockall and the use of Irish

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waters for military exercises by British and Russian ships. Ireland should not be found wanting in being able to defend and secure its maritime area of operations including all the activities taking place there and listed earlier, but also to deal with border incursions, fishing displacement, and the growing human security threats from people trafficking and illegal immigration. Evidencing the policy-enabled reach out to sea, according to the Government report Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth, Ireland plans to double its GDP from its maritime sector from 1.2 to 2.4% by 2030.5 Included in this policy document is the Government’s continuing recognition of the importance of creating the conditions needed for economic growth, investment, and job creation by ensuring a safe, secure, and protected environment consistent with the best international standards of governance and the protection of the maritime environment. The policy explains that Ireland must have in place effective and efficient security and surveillance arrangements and quality maritime regulatory regimes that meet best practice within which our ocean wealth6 can prosper. This is done to, inter alia, provide assurances to investors and meet our international maritime obligations. To achieve this endstate, the policy states that ‘Ireland must continually improve national capabilities in the area of security, safety, surveillance and eco-protection of the maritime domain.’ So, it would appear that whereas the wider cross-Government national policy is in place, the manifestation of the security, safety surveillance, and eco-protection capabilities of the State through its single agency/single Department approach is failing. One must wonder why? As the historical background of the Naval Service has proven, it can be said that there is a significant degree of ‘sea blindness’ in Ireland. 5 Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth, An Integrated Marine Plan for Ireland, DAFM, July 2012. Ireland’s Ocean Wealth includes: Some of the largest and most valuable sea fisheries resources in Europe, the western gateway for shipping to Europe’s busiest seaports, an ideal location for finfish, shellfish, and seaweed aquaculture, among the richest and most accessible renewable energy (wind, wave, and tidal) resources in the world, significant oil and gas resource potential as evidenced by recent discoveries and ongoing research, spectacular tourism and leisure opportunities and a rich maritime culture and heritage, a rich and diverse range of ecosystems, habitats and species and unique land seascapes. All of which contributes to our citizen’s wellbeing and quality of life, Irish flagged ships, including fishing vessels, trading globally, Irish qualified seafarers, fishers, and recreational craft users working, and Irish maritime companies and organisations providing global products and services. 6 A Footnote on the idea of what Ocean Whealt would be really good here.

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The security of trade routes, unrestricted maritime transport across the globe, and the lawful, uncontested access to marine resources are largely taken for granted. While ensuring that our island retains these relationships and trade cooperation, Ireland also has a sovereign duty to ensure its waters are not used for illegal or unlawful activity or as a staging area for such. Being able to control activities in Irish waters requires three distinct capabilities: . Surveillance, to know who is using our waters. (The Who and the Where) . Presence in our waters, to investigate incidents as an expression of Government authority. (The What, the Why, and the How) . Patrolling, to respond appropriately to any violation of laws or threats to national security or emergencies. (The Power Projection) State ships are the means of projecting, promoting, and maintaining Ireland’s sovereignty at sea. With just nine ships, many of which are now tied up, Ireland’s seagoing defence and security resources are extremely modest and now under-resourced. By any measure, Ireland’s minimalist approach to the resourcing of its Naval Service as provided for in the White Paper on Defence 2000 stands in increasing contrast to both the policy and the actual activity surrounding our maritime domain and interests.7 The White Paper on Defence 2015 provided some hope in the form of replacement ships including a Multi-Role Vessel to replace the helicopter patrol vessel and two coastal patrol vessels with countermine capabilities. However, the procurement of these capabilities has been delayed resulting in a yawning gap between the value for money extended use of aged ships versus the need for their timely replacement. Nevertheless, the issues surrounding personnel shortages hastened the tying-up of the aged ships resulting in a significant and avoidable gap in the State’s defence and security capabilities. Compounding the strategic challenges, Brexit has highlighted our isolation from the rest of EU waters, further underlining the importance of Ireland sustaining its maritime capabilities to meet the requirements of the EU Maritime Security Strategy. This strategy identifies the prosperity of the EU, its economic development, and the well-being of its citizens 7 Price Waterhouse Cooper Report on the Naval Service, 1998.

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as being critically dependent on the sea.8 Ireland’s geostrategic location means that we have a significant role to play in the implementation of this EU strategy and the importance and responsibility of this role have been increased by Brexit. Furthermore, Ireland’s regional maritime responsibilities are also growing through other means with Ireland’s participation in Europe’s Maritime Analysis Operations Centre—Narcotics (MAOC-N) in Lisbon through which the Naval Service’s contribution has resulted in several high-profile drug interdiction operations and participation in EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) missions in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean such as Operation IRINI, Europe’s military response to the instability in Libya and the associated migrant crisis, and Operation ATALANTA, Europe’s military response to piracy off the coast of Somalia. The Naval Service’s participation in operations such as IRINI and ATALANTA has brought much national and international acclaim.

What the Naval Service Does for Ireland In essence, the Naval Service protects Ireland’s interests at and from the sea. Currently, the Naval Service is tasked with a broad range of maritime defence, security, and other roles in line with the policy and strategy contexts outlined above. At the operational level, these roles are primarily delivered through operational deployment on maritime defence and security patrols that are multi-tasked to encompass national, regional, and international requirements. The palette of taskings includes, inter alia, maritime security, ocean governance, safety and surveillance, port security, fishery protection, drug interdiction, pollution control, and search and rescue. The Service also supports Army operations in the littoral and by sea lift. It provides support on Aid to the Civil Power and Aid to the Civil Authority operations, including, for example, maritime security

8 EU Maritime Strategic Interests are listed as: The safety and security of citizens; the prevention of conflicts, the preservation of peace, and the strengthening of international security; the security of EU ships; the security of critical maritime infrastructure (including off shore installations and underwater pipelines); the freedom of navigation and protection of international maritime trade (safe and secure maritime routes); the adequate control of the EU’s external maritime borders; the prevention of illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; the smooth and timely flow of maritime trade (supply chain security); the protection of the EU’s maritime domain against threats and risks through good (regional) maritime governance; the ecological integrity of the EU coastal areas, seas, and oceans; the promotion of international maritime cooperation and the rule of law.

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cordons, and possesses the primary diving team in the State. The Fisheries Monitoring Centre (FMC) at the Naval Base is the designated national centre with responsibility for monitoring all fishing activity within the Irish Exclusive Fishery Limits and all Irish fishing vessels operating around the world. In addition, the Naval Service is certified as interoperable with NATO under the Partnership for Peace Framework (PfP) and participates in EU Missions and UN Missions abroad in accordance with Government requirements. Notably, the Naval Service continues to make a significant contribution to the EU Naval Force Mission (ENFM) Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean through the deployment of staff at the Operational Headquarters in Rome, after first deploying ships to the region in 2015. Also, the Naval Service undertakes supply and reconnaissance missions to overseas peace support operations and participates in foreign visits in support of Irish trade and diplomacy. The Naval Service, An Garda Síochána, and the Revenue Commissioners have come together to form a national Narcotics Joint Task Force with links to the Lisbon-based Maritime Analysis Operations Centre— Narcotics (MAOC-N). In recent years, the Naval Service has been directly involved in seizures of over e2 billion worth of illegal drugs off the Irish coast and has contributed to many more MAOC-N coordinated seizures in the region. These include some of the largest historical cocaine seizures ever made in European waters. Countering narcotics trafficking is not just a national issue, but also a regional security obligation. The Naval Service has developed a Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) as a critical enabler in countering illegal activity, enhancing security of offshore resources and ocean energy and facilitating regional security collaboration resulting in the Naval Base at Cork evolving into a centre of maritime intelligence in Ireland. The Naval Service has a wealth of expertise, knowledge, and practical experience in the areas of maritime governance, surveillance systems, ship logistics, and diving and sub-sea operations (in particular remote operated vehicles). The professional knowledge of our mariners in relation to operations in the hazardous seas off the west coast of Ireland could prove to be invaluable in Ireland’s pursuit of its climate action goals with the development, installation, and maintenance of offshore wind—in particular floating wind—and wave energy installations and their associated security as identified and required by the Governmental policy, Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth. As with all naval ships down through history, the deployed Irish flotilla represents a floating laboratory with the ability to

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engage in testing of technology, ‘ground truthing,’ and driving end-user requirements in the maritime domain in support of both the academic and industry sectors, respectively.9 The key attributes of naval forces are tactical self-sufficiency, flexibility, independence from host nation support and a relatively long reach. Ships can deploy, withdraw, and re-deploy simply by exercising freedom of navigation over 70% of the Earth’s surface, thereby giving political and operational decision makers a wide range of operational choices. In a joint operation, the Naval Service can provide a capacity for several options ranging from re-supply to operational support. These capabilities can also be swiftly and flexibly moulded together to suit any task. For non-military operations, the Naval Service can assist in providing accommodation, medical support, refuge havens, and support to diplomatic and economic interests. In recent years Naval Service vessels have been deployed by the Irish Government on trade and diplomacy missions as far East as Tokyo, as far West as Panama, as far North as Reykjavik, and as far South as Cape Horn.

The Naval Service Today Today’s Naval Service is required to sustain the delivery of surveillance, presence, and response in Ireland’s considerable maritime jurisdiction, and beyond, in the protection and furtherance of Ireland’s interests. Our experience from the Mediterranean in Operation IRINI and its predecessor Operation SOPHIA in recent years have been game-changers where the Naval Service operated ‘cheek-by-jowl’ with several first-world navies, finding itself more than capable of doing so. Critically, the honing of one’s core maritime expertise in the challenging Northeast Atlantic off the west coast of Ireland makes for readably transferrable skills. These skills have now been certifiably endorsed with the achievement of a NATO/Partnership for Peace interoperability standard in 2021, meaning that Naval Service ships are now certified to operate together in future NATO-led PfP operations should the need arise. Interoperability with NATO forces is the gold standard for Ireland in terms of capability and proves the professionalism of our mariners and the capabilities of our ships within their class. Additionally, an innovative drive towards a post-modern 9 ‘Ground truthing’ occurs when naval vessels verify information gleaned from spacebased sensors and other remote sources.

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navy, through the development of strategic collaborations and networks arguably best demonstrates a form of public sector transformation of note. In recent years, the Naval Service entered academic partnership with Munster Technical University (MTU) for the purpose of delivering education and training to both military and civilian seafarers. As a result, Ireland’s National Maritime College of Ireland (NMCI) was built in Cork harbour immediately adjacent to the Naval Base. This unique partnership has proven to be very successful in focussing Ireland’s third level maritime education into a single, state of the art location or ‘one stop shop.’ The NMCI has since developed the Halpin Centre for research, facilitating inputs from both the MTU and Naval Service to the overall research effort in maritime and sustainable energy and represents another example of the importance of the Naval Service’s collaborative strategy. The partnership has proven to be a catalyst towards the implementation of an innovation agenda, setting the context for the paradigm shift whereby the Naval Service is moving from a position of being a net consumer to one that facilitates net production, thereby being an enabler of enterprise and producer of resources. It is through such collaborations that the Naval Service has managed to develop new value for money capabilities such as the remote operations vehicle (ROV) equipment in use by the diving section, the simulators in use within gunnery training and a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capability that each contributes towards the enhancement of Ireland’s maritime security. However, all of this would be rendered ineffective without the people needed to deliver it. Today, Ireland’s maritime security is most challenged by a recruitment and retention crisis that has resulted in almost half of the naval flotilla being tied up, thereby threatening the raison d’etre of the Naval Service. If navies exist to put ships to sea, then this crisis is an existential one. It is a matter of public record over recent years that the Naval Service finds itself unable to put ships to sea due to personnel shortages, and despite several initiatives, including a financial incentive scheme for seagoing, there is little sign that this crisis is ending. Put simply, there are more people leaving the Naval Service than are being recruited, and this negative trend has yet to be arrested at the time of writing. Furthermore, whereas this negative trend trajectory can be traced most immediately to the period post Ireland’s deployment of ships to Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean when sentiment surrounding the Naval Service was at a high, with efforts to correct the trend in recent years have failed to do so, perhaps

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the cause is more fundamental. With an establishment of 1094, and a current strength of just 870 in September 2021, the problem is somewhat obvious. But these figures belie the true depth of the problem, as they appear to reflect a pattern of similar retention problems elsewhere in the Defence Forces. The Naval Service being at circa 80% strength is not particularly shocking when the strength of the Air Corps is also around 80% and the Army is itself below strength at just over 90%. However, a more fundamental issue is missed. As all three Services struggle to deliver their roles while below strength, the difficulties appear to be more obvious in the Naval Service as it has manifested in the very visible capability loss of ships, of maritime strategic assets, being tied up. It suggests that the underlying issues may be more substantial and worthy of deeper examination. Instead of focussing on the strength figure which has been the case to date, it could be helpful to focus on the establishment figure to ensure that it offers a reasonable baseline. If found to be flawed, it would demonstrate that the foundations of the modern Naval Service are suboptimal, and if this reality is accepted, could unlock solutions denied by policy constraints heretofore. With the strength of the Naval Service being stubbornly stuck at below 900 for some time now and a series of initiatives to correct it having failed, consideration and review of the establishment figure is therefore timely. The current establishment of the Naval Service is set at 1094. This figure having been arrived at over several years and institutional reviews that tended to align with a contraction of the Defence Forces, and in particular the Army, over recent decades. However, throughout this period between the year 2000 and the present the maritime area of operations, the number of ships, and the roles of the Naval Service have each expanded considerably. In Ireland’s first White Paper on Defence in 2000, the Naval Service establishment was set at 1144, to cater for a fleet of seven ships. However, most importantly, the establishment was designed entirely around function. That is, the roles of the Naval Service were set, and the manning levels required to meet those roles were calculated in minute detail throughout the wide range of specialisations and subspecialisations associated with all navies. Bearing in mind the adage that armies equip people and navies populate equipment, these subsets get very specialised, oftentimes representing single points of failure should they be gapped, for example, a medic or a cook.

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Since the inception of the 1144 establishment for seven ships, the Naval Service has increased its fleet size to nine vessels on foot of Government policy requirements, and these ships are larger and more capable than their predecessors. Simultaneously, Ireland has doubled its maritime area of operations while there has been a significant increase in maritime security roles and a range of new defence considerations, for example, those consequential on Brexit, climate action, cyber-crime, and illegal use of the sea. Importantly, notwithstanding these increases, the establishment underwent a contraction to 1094. While on the surface, this was only a modest reduction of fifty sailors, the equivalent of one patrol vessel crew, the Naval Service had to simultaneously crew two additional vessels and manage a flotilla patrolling double the previous sea area. The inevitable detrimental effect of this personnel contraction and operational expansion is that the Naval Service career and lifestyle simply became too difficult for many sailors, and therefore, less attractive for potential recruits. Supporting this contention is the serious fall-off in strength in recent years followed Ireland’s withdrawal of ships from Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean, which had been having a positive effect on both recruitment and retention between 2015 and 2018. However, this evidence suggests that the positive effect of participation in an overseas mission was masking a deeper flaw. The fact that Ireland’s maritime defence and security capabilities remain diminished and efforts to correct this have thus far fallen short, suggests that the issues are more fundamental. Specifically, the Defence Forces Headquarters establishment is in effect an Army Headquarters, devoid of a substantive Naval or Air Corps component. Without parity of esteem at the decision-making level of the Defence Forces, the latter two services will remain subordinated, and unable to achieve adequate representation during the division of resources or policy formulation. Moreover, neither the 1144 or the 1094 establishment figures ever provided for a suitable training establishment, and thus trainee recruits have always been included in the strength figures, suggesting a false level of capability and further masking the more fundamental issues. The absence of a similar establishment for overseas service denies ongoing and attractive participation in overseas maritime missions which could deliver consequent positive impacts on recruitment and retention as witnessed during recent deployments to the Mediterranean and in the Army in general. Any Naval Service personnel deploying overseas leave a gap at

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home that must be filled. It is therefore hoped that the Commission on the Defence Forces recommendations will precisely address these issues. For the Naval Service to function correctly, it must be able to rotate personnel to and from operational service at sea commensurate with the size of its fleet. If it cannot do so, this island nation will be unable to deliver its maritime defence and security requirements. Requirements that continue to grow as humankind reaches further and further out to sea in pursuit of the oceans’ abundant dominion, transport, communications, and natural resources attributes. For example, the current climate action targets and the drive towards energy security will see an extraordinary increase in critical national infrastructure offshore that will need to be defended, protected, and secured. In my opinion, Ireland’s current maritime defence and security requirements suggest no less than a twelveship balanced fleet with new sub-surface, air and cyber capabilities, and a personnel establishment to reflect this. Such a fleet composition is the minimum required to deliver 24/7/365 patrolling of our rich and diverse waters while also contributing to UN and EU peace support and humanitarian operations with regular ship deployments. At the very least, this should be the minimum of our security ambitions. Whatever is decided, the establishment must be set in such a way as to ensure the operational outputs from the entire fleet. The opportunities for Ireland’s maritime economy are vast and Ireland’s Naval Service is required to deliver the defence and security environment within which these opportunities can be exploited. For such a small island country continuing with a single agency approach to the defence, security, protection, and enforcement of State requirements in the maritime domain through the utilisation of its Naval Service makes economic sense. To achieve this, it is crucial that the Naval Service can deliver capabilities where and when required, primarily and fundamentally, through the deployment of its ships.

Conclusion In recent years Ireland’s minimalist Naval Service has seen its bulwark buckle under the weight of increased roles while human resources diminish. In this post-modern era, the Naval Service has demonstrated enlightened cooperative and collaborative strategies with other Government departments, academia, and industry that have optimised efficiency and culminated in the largest fleet size, overseas deployments, and international recognition in the form of accreditation in its short history.

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However, the foundations of the organisation, in the form of its establishment appear to have been flawed at the outset, before being further eroded over time. This is surprising considering Ireland’s geostrategic importance as an island state, EU member in the Northeast Atlantic, and geophysical attributes with rich and abundant natural resources on and over a vast area of continental shelf. The Naval Service is required to stand sentinel at the approaches to our Island Nation and the western frontier of Europe and deliver service internationally where required. Its primary duty is to protect and further Ireland’s interests at and from the sea and keep Ireland open for business. The Naval Service must be maintained as a maritime force that delivers credible military options to Government, in isolation, or as part of an integrated Joint Future Force in support of the Irish national interest, alongside other levers of national power and combined with allies and partners. To meet the growing requirements of Ireland’s maritime defence and security needs and those presented by climate change, this Island Nation and the Islanders therein need a fit-for-purpose and vibrant Naval Service with parity of esteem with the other components of the Defence Forces to meet the myriad challenges presented by both the immediate and foreseeable future.

Small Navies: Lessons for the Irish Naval Service Deborah Sanders

The maritime domain is an environment of increasing significance for Ireland. In common with many small maritime states, Ireland claims a massive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), more than ten times its land mass, giving it considerable maritime rights and responsibilities under the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty. Ireland is also heavily dependent on sea transport routes, particularly via the United Kingdom, for its economic well-being.1 Ireland has ambitious plans to further develop its maritime interests. In recognising the importance of the sea for its economy Ireland is looking at expanding passenger and cargo capacity at all its ports.2 Ireland is additionally examining how to further develop its blue economy. This includes the establishment of an offshore maritime area as part of Ireland’s seventh national park and the 1 Robert McCabe, “Consultation Outcome: Submissions Received: Development of a Strategy for the Irish Maritime Directorate”, Department of Transport (Ireland), 12–14, https://www.gov.ie/en/consultation/7af2c-development-of-a-strategyfor-the-irish-maritime-directorate/. 2 Ibid., 3.

D. Sanders (B) Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_5

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development of its maritime infrastructure to be able to take advantage of the massive potential of offshore energy on its Atlantic coast as well as developing renewable offshore installations.3 Ireland’s blue economy has the potential to develop huge revenue for the State through sectors such as seafood, tourism, oil, gas, and renewable energy.4 The government has also identified the need to address what is commonly referred to in the academic literature as “new” maritime security threats including “waste, ghost nets and illegal dumping in the maritime environment”.5 Using the small navies literature, this chapter will examine some of the maritime security challenges small navies face and what solutions they have developed to see if any lesson can be learnt by the Irish Government as it looks to implement these ambitious maritime plans. While there is no established definition of what constitutes a small navy, it is generally recognised that this is simply a navy that has “limited means and aspirations”.6 Small navies can therefore be placed on a wide spectrum from those at one end whose aspirations are constrained by very limited means such as the Croatian or Latvian navies, as opposed to those at the other end of the spectrum, which include small navies that operate much larger and powerful assets with the capacity to project these over long distances, such as the Danish or Norwegian navies. Generally speaking, small navies do tend to be less focused on expansive blue water goals such as power projection, but as will be discussed can often face the same security challenges as larger blue water navies, with the latter having more capabilities and redundancy to address these challenges. Given that the Irish Naval Service is generally recognised as a small navy with both limited means and aspirations, this chapter will consider what challenges other small navies face as well as the solutions that have been adopted, to see what lessons might be applicable. The first lesson discussed in section one is how changes in the strategic environment in which many small navies operate have created the need for an increasingly flexible force. While the focus on “new” maritime security threats in the post-Cold War era has played to the strength of

3 “Development of a Strategy for the Irish Maritime Directorate”, Marine Notice No. 53 of 2020, Department of Transport (Ireland). 4 McCabe, op. cit., 12. 5 McCabe, 4. 6 Geoffrey Till, “Can Small Navies Stay Afloat?” Jane’s Navy International, May 2003.

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smaller navies, for many, the maritime threat environment has worsened and become much more challenging. Not only do small navies increasingly have to address a wide and varied range of maritime security threats, such as pollution, drug and people trafficking as well as illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, but more conventional and hybrid threats have also emerged posing real challenges. As a result, small navies are under increasing pressure to perform a much wider range of tasks, often simultaneously, placing much greater demands on them and making it harder to balance commitments against often limited resources. These multifaceted challenges facing many small navies are discussed in section one of this chapter. Section two then considers what responses other small navies have adopted to meet these diverse security challenges and outlines several potentially interesting lessons or takeaways for the Irish Naval Service. The Irish Navy is facing the same challenges as other small navies, most notably how to balance commitments and as discussed in section one, growing commitments, against limited resources. Ireland operates what could best be described as a very small navy. The Irish navy is made up of one Helicopter Patrol Vessel, three Offshore Patrol Vessels, two Large Patrol Vessels and two Coastal Patrol Vessels. This is roughly the same size as the Georgian Navy which has a small coastline of 130 km and a GDP that is more than twenty times smaller than Ireland.7 The problems facing the Irish navy have, in many ways, been compounded by years of neglect and under-investment. Estimates suggest that four of the navy’s nine vessels are currently out of action, including one which is undergoing a refit. As a result of the lack of working platforms, the Irish Navy has struggled to perform one of its key roles—fishery protection. Indicating the extent of the problem, as of mid-May 2021, almost a third of the navy’s patrol days had been cancelled by the Naval Service. This includes 86 days cancelled due to personnel shortages (including some caused by COVID-19) and 44 cancelled due to mechanical issues.8 The Irish Navy also lacks capabilities. It has no guided missiles, torpedoes or more importantly, sophisticated ship protection systems, but instead is austerely

7 Georgia’s GDP is USD 17.48 whereas Ireland’s GDP is USD 388.7 in 2019. 8 “Ireland Had to Rely on EU Ship to Patrol Fishing Waters Due to Naval Shortages”,

The Irish Times, 15 June 2021.

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equipped as a coastguard.9 If the Irish Government is to address the many security challenges it faces and successfully exploit its blue economy then there are some important lessons that could be learnt from other small navies. These include increasing their navies maritime power either quantitatively or qualitatively, the integration of technological innovation as well their active participation in maritime exercises and maritime security operations. While increasing the size of their fleet might be beyond many governments, other options such as adopting technological innovation and participation in maritime operations and training exercises can act as important force multipliers for small navies. As well as developing interoperability with allies and partners—something that might be particularly important given the range of challenges facing small navies, they can also play a key role in developing the skills and capability of service personnel. Participation in maritime operations can also help with the recruitment and retention of service personnel—an enduring problem for all small navies. As will be discussed later this is also a problem for the Irish Naval Service. In a letter published in the Irish Times in 2019 Commodore Michael Malone, the head of the Irish Navy, drew attention to the strain the service was under considering personnel shortages.10

Changes in the Strategic Environment and the Need for Increased Flexibility The first lesson identified in this chapter for the INS is just how quickly and radically the context in which small navies operate can change, increasing the range of tasks performed and their need for much greater operational flexibility. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its attempts to block the Kerch Straits in the Black Sea in 2018, as well as its more aggressive behaviour in the Baltic Sea, and the Atlantic, all suggest that the context in which small navies operate and the range of challenges that they face can change rapidly and fundamentally almost overnight. As will be discussed, this can create real problems

9 Brendan Flynn, “‘Can a New Defence Forces’ Commission Reboot Ireland’s Military?”, RTE News, 1 February 2021. 10 “Taoiseach Acknowledges Naval Service Is Short Staffed”, RTE News, 8 July 2019.

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because small navies can find themselves having to address, simultaneously, more traditional, or conventional military maritime challenges and hybrid challenges. The speed with which the Russian Federation annexed the Crimea, built up its forces on the peninsular and created a “new normal” in the Black Sea is an important lesson for Ireland and the INS as to how quickly and radically the context in which small navies operate can change. It also illustrates how, what might be thought of as more “traditional” or conventional military maritime threats, can come to dominate the security agenda. For the smaller navies of the Black Sea, Russia’s action has created an increasingly militarised maritime domain in which Moscow is able to control the Black Sea through the significant buildup of military power and the creation of a large Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) bubble centred on Crimea.11 As a result, traditional maritime security threats, including changes in the balance of power in the Black Sea, as well as increasing naval confrontation, such as challenges to Sea Lines Of Communications (SLOCS), are now key issues facing the many small navies operating in this region. The recent incident in which HMS Defender, a Royal Navy Type 45 destroyer, was shadowed by twenty Russian aircraft and two coastguard vessels on its innocent passage as it sailed near Crimea, on route to Georgia, aptly demonstrates the contested and challenging nature of the maritime domain in the region.12 The Black Sea, in common with the Baltic and Mediterranean, have traditionally been seen as “mature seas” with functioning navies and coastguards: local and international maritime law are policed and enforced with productive relations between most of the neighbours, and maritime disputes are typically resolved via international recognised processes.13 Recent developments in the Black Sea, however, demonstrate how quickly and easily a mature sea can become contested, placing considerable strain on small navies.

11 The Black Sea is home to the small navies of Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine as well as the Georgian Coast Guard. The Turkish Navy and Russian Black Sea Fleet are generally not regarded as small navies. Byron Chong, “The Role of the Black Sea in Russia’s Strategic Calculus”, Centre for Maritime Security, 2 April 2017. 12 “HMS Defender: Russian Jets and Ships Shadow British Warship”, BBC News, 23 June 2021. 13 William Combes, “Value of the Freedom of the Seas”, Baltic Defence College, July 2013, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028642.

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Developments in the Black Sea have also demonstrated that maritime law does not always protect state interests—this is an important lesson for states with small navies who are often more reliant on international law to protect and uphold their interests in the maritime domain. In the Black Sea, local and international maritime law and conventions have effectively been undermined and challenged by the Russian Federation. Since mid-May 2018, the coastguard service of the Russian FSB (the Russian Federal Security Service) has been stopping merchant ships heading to the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk as they transit the Kerch Straits from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov, challenging freedom of navigation and Ukraine’s Sea lines of Communication (SLOC’s). While the Russians have justified their “blockade” on the grounds of a potential terrorist attack on the Kerch Straits bridge, the economic costs to the Ukrainian economy have been enormous. States such as Ireland with a very small navy and heavily dependent on the sea for trade, are also vulnerable to a maritime blockade or a challenge to their SLOC’s. Russia has also developed other methods to challenge SLOCs in the Black Sea which further calls into question the strength of international maritime law and convention to protect states maritime interests. Russia has used maritime warnings under the pretext of conducting military exercises to restrict shipping traffic in certain marine areas, affecting Georgian maritime trade and fishing. In July and August 2019, Russia issued as many as 14 warnings for various areas in the Black Sea, in some cases prohibiting all navigation in these areas. Russian actions, which were not communicated in a timely fashion (or sometimes at all) and could therefore not be published, as per previous best practices for cooperation in international waters, demonstrate how easy it is for powerful states to challenge sea routes.14 In addition to undermining the SLOCs of littoral states and general freedom of navigation, Russia’s militarisation of the Black Sea has also increased the incidence of conflict at sea, something that is particularly challenging for small navies. Naval confrontation with Russia has, in effect, become the norm for the small Ukrainian navy. In November 2018 the Russian coastguard attacked and then seized three Ukrainian naval ships and 24 sailors heading from Odesa to the port of Mariupol; this was 14 Bernard Bartsch et al., “Antagonism in the EU’s Neighbourhood”, Berttelmann Stiftung, 2020, https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/ default-7b774a0527-1.

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despite the signing of an agreement between Russia and Ukraine in 2003 designating the Sea of Azov as internal water of both states. This incident shows how vulnerable small navies can be in a contested maritime domain even when they have agreed on the demarcation of maritime borders. The threats to small navies operating in contested seas have also increased due to the use of what has been termed “hybrid warfare” in the maritime domain. Although there remains much debate about definitions, the concept of hybrid warfare attempts to capture the complexity of twenty-first-century warfare, which involves a multiplicity of actors, blurs the traditional distinctions between types of armed conflict, and exploits the “grey zone” between war and peace.15 Given its need therefore to appear somewhat ambiguous to outside observers, maritime hybrid warfare will generally be conducted in the littorals and includes, but is not limited to, the “use of firearms and explosives, the arrest of ships, cyberattacks, threats of force, economic coercion and grey maritime networks”.16 Hybrid naval warfare is widely recognised as a weapon primarily used by Iran, China, and Russia and there has been a significant increase in the use of hybrid techniques by Moscow in various maritime theatres including the Baltic and Atlantic.17 A particularly concerning element of maritime hybrid warfare for Ireland, given Russian ambitions in the Atlantic, could be attacks against maritime infrastructure both on and below the sea, including offshore oil and gas installations and underwater cables.18 Given its location, Ireland is in many ways sheltered from many of the conventional and hybrid threats posed by the Russian Federation and others. As a member of the EU, Ireland is not, however, immune to security and economic challenges to fellow EU members in the Baltic and the Black Sea. More importantly perhaps, the Atlantic is also increasingly being recognised as a “contested” sea where the INS could face, simultaneously, new, conventional, and hybrid threats, which would severely compromise the ability of the Irish Government to protect and advance its maritime interests. The importance Moscow attaches to this region 15 James K. Wither, “Defining Hybrid Warfare”, Per Concordiam: Journal of European Security Defense Issues, 10, No. 1, 2020: 7–9. 16 Alexander Lott, “Implications of Hybrid Warfare for the Order of the Oceans”, Center for International Maritime Security, 3 August 2020. 17 Lott, 142. 18 James Stavridis, “Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming”, US Naval Institute,

Proceedings, Vol. 142/12/1, December 2016.

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has led to a reported increase in Russian submarine and surface activity in the North Atlantic and Irish Sea which has raised concerns over the Irish Naval Service’s ability to protect critical maritime infrastructure, the transatlantic fibre-optic cables that lie in Ireland’s waters, and Irelands SLOC’s.19 The Irish Navy has almost no subsurface sonar capability and no Anti-Submarine Warfare ability. In a sign of just how important this region is to Moscow, in the period between 2017 and 2020, Russia engaged in numerous training exercises in the North Sea, increasing both the size of deployments and the amount of time spent on deployment.20 The increase in Russian maritime operations in the Atlantic has started therefore to fundamentally change the environment in which the INS operates. State breakdown and instability in Egypt and Libya as well as the civil war in Syria also indicates how changes in the international system can also have a profound effect on the operating environment facing small navies—even those less likely to face conventional challenges. The migration crisis in the Mediterranean for example has led to the intensification of “new” maritime security challenges for many small navies. Managing irregular migration has become a major task for the Maritime squadron of the armed forces of Malta, as the number of asylum seekers and migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean by sea reached an all-time high of 1.4 million people in 2014–2015.21 Although the numbers fell to 140,000 in 2020, dealing with the huge task of search and rescue in the Mediterranean has become the main mission for the very small Maltese maritime squadron.22 As Malta has one of the highest numbers of irregular migrant arrivals as a percentage of its small population, managing irregular migration is the leading policy priority and has put additional pressure on its small navy. As a result of the emergence of these unforeseen and demanding “new” maritime security challenges, as well as hybrid

19 Corman O’Keeffe, “Special Report: Ireland’s Defence Shortcomings a Clear and Present Danger to Global Stability”, Irish Examiner, 7 December 2020. 20 Nicholas J. Myers, “Russian Navy Activity in the North Sea”, Wavell Room, 6 August

2020. 21 Isabella Lloyd-Damnjanovic, “Criminalisation of Search and Resecure Operations in the Med has been accompanied by rising migrant death rates!”, Migration Policy Institute, 9 October 2020. 22 Daniel Mainwaring, “On the Rocks: Malta-EU Relations in Times of Crisis”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 11 December 2020.

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and conventional threats, small navies such as the Irish Navy, could find themselves stretched in several directions increasing the need for a flexible force.

Operational Solutions for Small Navies So, what would constitute a flexible and adaptable small navy able to address these myriad security challenges and what solutions have been adopted that could apply to the Irish Naval Service? As the writings on organisation flexibility have noted, military flexibility has important conceptual and doctrinal components, and it also relies on command and cognitive skills.23 Conceptual and doctrinal flexibility is when a navy creates an environment where officers can challenge existing assumptions as well as the development of a balanced doctrine. In theory, the Irish Navy has several forums to debate doctrine and concepts. These include the Defence Force Review as well as SIGNAL the official magazine of RACO (the representative organisation of Commissioned officers). The cabinet also created an independent group to examine Ireland’s Defence Forces. The Irish military is also firmly committed to developing the intellectual and cognitive skills of its service personnel through their professional military education. In practice however, these avenues are somewhat limited and not helped by the lack of an official maritime strategy and maritime doctrine or a doctrine centre. Paradoxically, the limited size of the Irish Navy does, however, facilitate the creation of an enabling environment in which doctrine and concepts can be openly discussed. In an organisation such as the Irish Naval Service, where there is just one single naval base, where every officer knows every other officer by name, debate and flexible thinking could result from different patterns of behaviours: perhaps in Ireland’s case the creation of a more informal thinking and creative environment than might be the case for larger blue water navies.24 There are no intrinsic reasons therefore as to why small navies should be any less flexible than larger navies as flexibility has an important intangible component. Flexibility arises from the culture and 23 Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 24 Email exchange with Dr. Ian Speller, Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for Military History and Strategic Studies in the Department of History at Maynooth University, 13 July 2021.

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organisation of a country rather than simply its material attributes. For this reason, whether a navy is small or large should not necessarily have a bearing on flexibility. However, there is also an important material component to broader considerations of organisational flexibility. Flexible navies require a balance of military capabilities.25 Having a larger force allows a navy to incorporate a range of different technologies and weapons and builds in more redundancy. In essence, while smaller navies are not necessarily cognitively less flexible, they are almost certainly likely to have fewer tools and capabilities available hence less flexibility to address a wide and varied range of naval tasks. An additional challenge facing small navies is that flexibility is also affected by a navy’s technological versatility and changeability, in essence not only its technological development but also its ability to imaginatively use this technology.26 So while there is no automatic link between the size of the navy and cognitive or doctrinal flexibility, tangibles do matter which is why some smaller navies are looking at increasing the quantitative elements of their maritime power, while others have adopted more innovative technological solutions which act as “force multipliers” to offset their limited capability and increase flexibility and agility. In terms of augmenting its maritime power and increasing its military flexibility, the Irish Naval Service will receive a new Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) by 2025 replacing its ageing flagship LÉ Eithne. This new multipurpose ship is designed to allow the Navy to carry out different types of missions, not just fishery patrols. The MRV is also capable of carrying troops and helicopters for amphibious and airborne landings, increasing the navy’s ability to project power and protect Irish interests in the maritime domain.27 Other small navies have also looked at increasing the quantitative elements of their maritime power to increase their flexibility. The Romanian government, for instance, has announced ambitious plans to buy three new submarines and four new Gowind multi-mission corvettes, modernise its Type 22 frigates and create new maintenance and maritime training centre.28 The Bulgarian government, has more modest 25 Chris Tuck, Understanding Land Warfare (Routledge, 2014). 26 Ibid., 224. 27 Sean O’Riordan, “Department of Defence Targets New E200, Multi-purpose Naval Ship”, Irish Examiner, 21 November 2021. 28 Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Romania to Buy 3 Subs and 4 Ships to Bolster Black Sea Ops”, Defence News, 9 February 2018.

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goals, but has also been looking at options to increase the capacity of its small navy for underwater interventions in light of the increased hybrid and conventional maritime threats posed by the Russian Federation.29 The Ukrainian government also has plans to dramatically increase the number of its maritime platforms to address the range of maritime challenges it faces from the sea, and at sea, from Moscow. As part of their “mosquito fleet” concept, the Ukrainian government plans to develop a navy that will be made up of more than a dozen small high-speed ships armed with cannons and missiles that can operate in the shallow waters of the Sea of Azov, as well as in the Black Sea, and can deter conventional and hybrid threats.30 Adopting an alternative solution, the Georgian Government has chosen instead to increase the qualitative elements of its maritime power with a view to increasing its flexibility and adaptability, but at a much lower cost. Working closely with NATO, Tbilisi has developed a small but increasingly well-trained and professional Coast Guard. In essence, the Georgian Government has developed a process of ongoing training and retraining of personnel to increase their operational effectiveness. While increasing their flexibility either qualitatively or quantitatively remains a viable option for some states, the concept of a “force multiplier” has also been used by small navies to augment their maritime power. The implications of a force multiplier are that a small navy can legitimately aspire to develop the effect of a much larger navy by targeting measures that synergistically amplify the impact that is already available.31 Two key force multipliers have been widely used by small navies as an effective means of bridging the gap between aspirations and the hard reality of operating a navy with limited capabilities: technological innovation and engaging in maritime exercises and operations.32 The former offers some easy and relatively inexpensive wins, while the latter offers a potentially optimum way of developing the skills, experience and morale of service 29 “Bulgaria Government Sees Russia Dominant in the Black Sea Region”, Bulgarian Newspaper 24 CHASA, 6 April 2021, as reported in BBC Monitoring Online. 30 Deborah Sanders, “Rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy”, in McCabe et al., Europe, Small Navies and Maritime Security (Routledge, 2020), 167–184. 31 Andrew Mallia and Chris Xuereb, “Special Effects: Force Multipliers and Small Navies”, in McCabe et al., Europe, Small Navies and Maritime Security (Routledge, 2020), 36–47. 32 Malia and Xuereb, 42.

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personnel, in many ways the intangibles of a flexible and adaptable small navy. Unmanned systems have been widely recognised as the most contemporary manifestation of maritime force multipliers as they are often viewed as transformative in nature. While the maritime range and reach have traditionally been dependent on a ship’s organic sensors and weapons, the use of Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAVs) has changed this calculus. UAVs can play an important role for small navies in the maritime domain in terms of providing surveillance and intelligence, as decoys and as weapon platforms both over, on and under the sea. In recognition of the utility of UAVs as important force multipliers for small navies, the Romanian ministry of defence has adopted plans for five new Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) programmes, including the acquisition of a UAV system.33 Within this programme, plans to purchase six medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs as well as a number of smaller tactical UAV’s will give Romania the capacity to dramatically increase its maritime surveillance.34 The Swedish Navy has been looking at the option of purchasing UAVs to provide surveillance of its undersea domain in ports and in important parts of the archipelagos to search for mines and minisubs.35 Small navies unable to purchase their own UAS programmes have also benefited from donated UAV for use in the maritime domain. In November 2020, the United States donated a P710million ScanEagle UAS to the Philippine Navy to augment the Armed Forces of the Philippines” maritime domain awareness and border security capabilities.36 Considering the threats that they face in the maritime environment, the head of the Ukrainian Navy has confirmed that Ukraine has taken this innovation a step further and procured unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Under these plans, Ukraine will purchase Turkish Bayraktar unmanned aerial systems for use in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The Bayraktar, 33 UAS is an all-encompassing term for everything that makes a UAV operate: the ground control station with pilot, communications, and support equipment. 34 Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Eastern European NATO Allies Ramp Up Drone Buys to Protect Their Borders”, Defense News, 20 August 2020. 35 Lars Wedin, “Sweden and the Blue Society: New Challenges for a Small Navy”, Center for International Maritime Security, 17 September 2020. 36 Pia Lee-Brago, “US Delivers Unmanned Aerial System to Philippine Navy”, The Philippine Star, 26 November 2020.

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with an increased flight range, will be used for maritime intelligence and to support the actions of Ukrainian forces both on the shore and at sea.37 This advanced technological solution to the maritime challenges facing the small Ukrainian navy is, however, clearly not an option for all governments. Ireland currently does not possess armed drones, “nor [are] there any plans to procure such equipment”, said the Irish Minister of Defence Alan Shatter in 2015 in response to a questionnaire by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) on European positions on armed drones and targeted killings.38 Ireland’s Defence Forces have, however, operated UAVs as an information-gathering asset since 2007 something that could be expanded to the maritime domain.39 There are also ambitious plans to augment further their UAV capability with the planned purchase of four specialist UAVs capable of carrying thermal and visual cameras from a UK commercial drone supplier; although these are to be used primarily on land.40 Other innovative solutions to addressing maritime challenges have been adopted commercially rather than by small navies and include the use of Unmanned Surface Vehicles to provide comprehensive port security. The Port of Los Angeles, which is the busiest port in the US, has been exploring the possibility of procuring Unmanned Surface Vehicles to address a large number of shallow areas throughout its forty-three miles of waterfront which are beyond the reach of any of its manned vessels. The MANTAS system has been considered. This is a high-performance unmanned surface vehicle built on a catamaran-style hull and comes in several variants ranging from six to fifty feet in size. The modularity of the

37 Xavier Vanasseur, “Ukrainian Navy Commander Confirms Future Procurement Including Ada-Class Corvettes”, Naval News, 5 January 2021. 38 Christophe Paulussen, Jessica Dorsey, and Bérénice Boutin, “Towards a European Position on the Use of Armed Drones? A Human Rights Approach”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism—The Hague (October 2016) 26, https://www.icct.nl/dow nload/file/ICCT-Dorsey-Paulussen-Towards-A-European-Position-On-Armed-DronesAnd-TargetedKilling-Surveying-EU-Counterterrorism-Perspectives.pdf. 39 Marie O’Halloran, “Defence Forces Operate Drones, but They Are Unarmed, Minister Tells Dáil”, The Irish Times, 12 December 2013, https://www.irishtimes.com/ news/politics/oireachtas/defence-forces-operate-drones-but-they-are-unarmedministertells-d%C3%A1il-1.1624708. 40 “UK Drone Supplier Partners with Irish Defence Forces”, Emergency Services Ireland, 3 June 2018, https://emergency-services.ie/uk-drone-supplier-partners-withirish-defence-forces/.

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MANTAS allows it to be equipped with a wide variety of above-surface and below-surface sensors and water quality monitors.41 These innovative military and commercial solutions to security issues offer some real alternatives to purely increasing the number of ships a small navy might operate. Small navies can also benefit enormously from organisational innovation. Together with 24 other EU member states, Ireland joined PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence) on 7 December 2017 and its participation in one of the projects could provide some innovative solutions to the challenge of ensuring effective maritime surveillance in its EEZ. The aim of PESCO is to jointly develop defence capabilities and out of the 17 projects that were initiated, Ireland joined two: the EU Training Mission Competence Centre and the Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance (UMS). The latter is a surveillance project that will integrate land, air, and sea systems to provide real-time information to member states. Its emphasis is on “new and old threats”; in addition to security and defence matters, energy security, an issue very important to the Irish Government, is a central component of the UMS’s remit. Engaging in maritime exercises and working closely with allies in maritime security operations can also provide potential solutions for many of the intangible elements of small navies maritime power and ultimately enhance its flexibility. These include issues relating to career development, morale, and the challenges of attracting and retaining quality personnel. Maritime exercises and participation in maritime missions provide small navies with the ability to practise and develop their skills and capabilities across a variety of maritime tasks as well as work through tactical interoperability challenges with allies.42 In essence, they allow small navies to address some of the more intangible challenges to building a flexible and adaptable small navy. In the Black Sea, both Georgia and Ukraine are avid consumers of maritime exercises with NATO and NATO member states, as they demonstrate their commitment to the alliance and allow them to develop

41 Jack Rowley, “Worldwide Ocean Governance: Protecting the Most Vulnerable Assets—Ports and Harbors”, Center for International Maritime Security, 12 April 2021. 42 Jason Lancaster, “Don’t Forget Our Allies! Interoperable Maritime Operations in a Combined Environment”, Center for International Maritime Security, 27 March 2019.

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and train their service personnel giving them a strong sense of professionalism and enhancing morale. Georgia’s Coast Guard has benefited enormously from regular maritime training exercises. In April 2019 the Georgian Coast Guard participated in scheduled sea manoeuvres with NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) aimed at improving interoperability between NATO forces and Georgian Coast Guard crews.43 And more recently, in February 2021, the USS Donald Cook, a US Navy destroyer, conducted joint naval exercises with the Georgian Coast Guard to improve readiness, strengthen maritime domain awareness, and refine bilateral interoperability.44 The Irish Navy has also recognised the importance of maritime training exercises, although these do not seem to be held regularly. In 2020 it took part in a PASSEX45 training exercise with a Belgian Naval frigate. This exercise allowed the Naval Service to practise core naval skills and ensure interoperability with a key EU ally.46 More recently it has also completed two days of training with the Royal Navy to test its ability to communicate and to enhance navigational skills.47 In addition, participation in combined maritime security operations with allies is also widely recognised by many small navies as an important means of developing some of the intangibles of effectiveness. For example, Ireland is a founding member of the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre—Narcotics (MAOC-N), based in Lisbon which provides a forum for multilateral cooperation to suppress illicit drug trafficking by sea and air, addressing, with allies, what is widely recognised as a serious maritime threat.48 Other small navies have also looked to enhance their maritime effectiveness by actively participating in MSO. 43 “NATO Fleet Visits Georgia’s Port of Poti”, Xinhua, 3 April 2019. 44 “US Navy Destroyer Makes Port Call in Batumi”, civil.ge, 5 February 2021. 45 A PASSEX exercise is done between two navies to ensure that the navies can

communicate and cooperate in times of war or humanitarian relief. 46 Jehan Ashmore, “Belgian Navy Conduct Exercises with Naval Service on Irish Sea in the Run Up to Brexit Deal”, Afloat, 19 October 2019. 47 George Allison, “Royal Navy and Irish Navy Train Together in Celtic Sea”, Royal Navy Website, 17 June 2020, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/ news/2020/june/17/200617-tyne-irish-ship. 48 Carsten Weerth, “What Is the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center of the EU? EU’s Answer in the War on Drugs!”, Zentrum für Zollrecht und Zollforschung, Center for Customs Law and Customs, 27 September 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/344396703_What_is_the_Maritime_Analysis_and_Operations_Center_of_the_ EU_EU”s_Answer_in_the_War_on_Drugs.

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Ukraine has long recognised the benefits to its small navy of participating in maritime operations—working alongside NATO navies in the Mediterranean and EU counter-piracy patrols off the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. From 2008–2013 the Ukrainian navy participated in NATO’s Anti-Terror Operation Active Endeavour. The aim of Active Endeavour, which began in October 2001, was to prevent the smuggling of weapons and drugs, deter terrorist activity and human trafficking as well as to monitor shipping in the Mediterranean. In 2013 the Ternopil , a Ukrainian anti-submarine corvette, joined Active Endeavour to monitor civil shipping, collect and register information on suspect vessels, track and inspect them, escort vessels with important cargo and ensure countermine protection of civilian shipping.49 Ukraine’s annual deployment to this operation demonstrated its commitment to Euro-Atlantic security, but perhaps as importantly it also facilitated the training and development of Ukrainian personnel in a range of challenging maritime tasks enhancing their flexibility.50 A year later in 2014 the Ukrainian navy also completed an operational tour with EU naval forces as part of the EU counter-piracy operations, Operation Atalanta. During this mission, the Ukrainian frigate, the Hetman Sagaidachniy, undertook a successful joint piracy exercise with a South Korean warship.51 For the Ukrainian navy therefore there were widely recognised to be huge benefits from operating alongside other navies in these maritime theatres. The Irish Navy has also benefited enormously from participating in EU-led maritime missions, both in terms of professionalism and, at least in the short term, in allowing it to address two key challenges facing all small navies—recruitment and retention. Ireland’s participation in Operation Pontus and Operation Sophia gave Irish naval personnel the opportunity to use the skill sets they had learned, and the operations also

49 “Corvette Ternopil Began Patrolling in the NATO Operation Active Endeavour”, Mission of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 8 October 2013, https://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/news/15483-korvet-ternopily-pochav-patrulyuvannyav-ramkah-operaciji-nato-aktivni-zusillya. 50 “Third Ukrainian Ship Supports Operation Active Endeavour”, UNIAN Information Agency, 2 June 2008, https://www.unian.info/society/123906-third-ukrainian-ship-sup ports-operation-active-endeavour.html. 51 “Ukrainian Frigate Hetman Sagaidachniy Heads for Home after Completing EU Counter Piracy Operations”, EUNAVFOR, 26 February 2014.

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allowed them to work with other navies further building their capabilities.52 Operation Pontus was initiated in 2015 by the Irish government to assist the Italian Marine Rescue Coordinating Centre with search and rescue operations in light of the humanitarian crisis caused by people trafficking across the Mediterranean and North Africa. Established in 2015 Operation Sophia was the European Union’s military mission to rescue migrants in the southern Mediterranean Sea and disrupt the activities of traffickers.53 As a result of its participation in these operations, the Irish Navy demonstrated its capacity to do more than offshore interdiction, fishery protection and search and rescue in its EEZ. Moreover, the positive publicity surrounding its role in saving trafficked migrants from drowning in the Mediterranean Sea was not only responsible for an increase in people joining the Naval Service, but also helped retain quality personnel.54 Retention is a particular challenge for smaller navies where naval personnel face issues such as a limited opportunity for career progression, an imbalance in sea and shore-based activities (particularly in light of the pandemic) and the draw of higher paying opportunities in the commercial sector.55 The Irish Navy’s participation in future maritime operations could therefore play a role in addressing the high turnover rate among personnel—which before the pandemic stood at nearly 15%.56 The Naval Service’s participation in maritime security operations would not only allow naval service personnel the ability to serve overseas, something generally confined almost exclusive to members of the Army, but also serve to augment their take home pay.57 The Naval

52 “Irish Navy to Join EU Migrant Search-and-Rescue Operations”, The Irish Times, 10 July 2017. 53 EU NAVFOR Med: Operation Sophia, European Union External Action, https:// www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/. 54 Sean O’Riordan, “Migrant Rescue Helps Naval Recruiting”, Irish Examiner, 20 July 2019. 55 Lettah Mapule Mathebekase, “Critical Analysis of the Attraction and Retention of Seafarers: A Case Study of South Africa”, World Maritime University, 4 November 2018; also see Jacob Borresen, “The Seapower of the Coastal State”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 17, 1994, 148–195. 56 Conor Gallagher, “Concern as Staff Shortages Threaten Naval Service Missions at Sea”, The Irish Times, 28 October 2020. 57 Peter Murtagh, “Naval Service and Sailors Lament Ending of Operation Sophia”, The Irish Times, 2 April 2019.

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Service in common with many small navies continues to face the difficult task of how to effectively retain quality staff in an age of austerity where defence and procurement budgets are likely to be hit further by the pandemic—participation in maritime operations could be a way of addressing these issues. However, without a significant increase in its very limited maritime assets and capabilities, the Irish Navy will struggle to reap the intangible, but, clearly, very important benefits of participating in overseas MSO. Given the limits on its maritime power, the Irish Navy clearly has no spare capacity for overseas maritime operations in the short to medium term. Instead, it could be argued that, given the increasingly challenging maritime security environment that Ireland faces, as discussed in section one, the navy will struggle to effectively perform its core roles of addressing maritime challenges up to and including its EEZ.

Conclusion Ireland has ambitious goals to develop its blue economy and its maritime infrastructure. These goals are, however, likely to be impacted significantly by changes in its maritime operating environment. An examination of the multifaceted challenges facing other small navies has revealed that a state’s maritime domain can change rapidly and significantly putting a premium on developing a flexible and adaptable naval force. This chapter has explored some of the traditional and less traditional solutions adopted by other small navies to address the conventional, hybrid and new security challenges they face at and from the sea. Section two has argued that as well as increasing the size and strength of a small navy there are also innovative and relatively low-cost lessons that Ireland could potentially look to explore; obviously, some are likely to be more in fitting with Irish strategic and organisational culture than others. Potential lessons include the development of force multipliers such as UAV’s and even automated maritime platforms to protect its EEZ and enhance maritime surveillance and intelligence. Other solutions could involve increasing maritime exercises with EU allies as well as considering future engagement in EU or NATO maritime security operations.58 Participation in maritime exercises enhances key skills addressing some of the intangibles of maritime power and flexibility. In addition, Ireland could look at 58 Ireland is a NATO partner and a member of NATO’s Partnership Interoperability Initiative.

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increasing its participation in maritime security operations: with NATO under the Partnership Interoperability Initiative. Ireland’s participation in maritime security operations has previously secured rich rewards; benefits that in many ways outweigh or at least offset the costs involved. Ireland’s previous participation in EU-led maritime missions had a positive effect on two enduring problems facing all small navies; how to recruit and retain quality service personnel.

Irish Air Corps: Towards 2052 Niall Buckley and Raymond Martin

The Past Drives the Present into the Future The Irish Air Corps has a long and proud tradition of pioneering Irish aviation. Since its foundation in 1922, it has been at the forefront of every major aviation development in the State. From the dawn of a newly independent Ireland, the Irish Air Corps (IAC) has led the way in everything from transatlantic firsts with Colonel Fitzmaurice and the crew of the Bremen, in 1928, to jet aircraft and ejection seats in the 1950s. The IAC then pioneered helicopter operations known as Air Ambulance & Search and Rescue (SAR) in the 1960s, followed by the first glass cockpits and naval helicopter operations in the 1980s, and night vision operations in the new millennium. IAC aeroplanes and helicopters airlifted thousands of

N. Buckley · R. Martin (B) Irish Air Corps, Air Corps HQ, Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] N. Buckley e-mail: [email protected]

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people, many in dire need, while also ensuring the apparatus of the State1 continued to function during countless crises, particularly in relation to the marked deterioration in internal security from the early 1970s. Throughout its first century, the IAC self-sustained both its aircraft technician training and pilot training in IAC schools, which became national centres of excellence. This pioneering spirit echoes the bold steps taken at the foundation of the State and ensured Ireland remained at the forefront of new technological developments for future generations of Irish military and civilian aviation to follow. In so doing, the IAC created the fertile ground for Aer Lingus, Ryanair and others to grow as well as many of the world’s largest aircraft lessors. It has contributed to both the physical and economic well-being of the State and has saved thousands of lives in the process. In its centenary year, the IAC can look back with pride on its collective achievements and the sacrifices of many who paid the ultimate price in its service. In keeping with its pioneering tradition, it also looks forward to its future roles and the technologies that will help enable it, in its second century of operations. Policy Context During the early decades of the State, poor economic conditions provided limited policy options in terms of expenditure on national defence. Spending on defence was of a limited nature save for “The Emergency” and the Defence Forces’ response to Northern Ireland’s deteriorating security situation in the early 1970s. Post-WWII, IAC Hurricanes and Spitfires were followed by the introduction of the very capable Vampire jet fighters in 1956 and the Alouette III helicopters in 1963. Arguably, the decision not to replace the Vampire fighter jets with a modern high-performance operational jet when they went out of service in 1976, represents the start of a long and unplanned pause in maintaining credible Irish Air Defence capabilities. Since then, the IAC has had limited Air Policing platforms. Investment from the late 1980s has been of a limited nature with aircraft often serving into their fifth decade before they were replaced with (fewer) modern aircraft. Further defence 1 Following the accession of Ireland into the EEC in 1973, the IAC took on the additional role of airlifting Presidents and Governments around Europe—and the world— as Ireland built towards economic prosperity.

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cuts and military base closures from the late 1990s saw the withdrawal of all helicopter security, SAR detachments and the closure of the IAC’s only other permanent airbase at Gormanston Camp. In 2022, the IAC operates from a sole airbase at Baldonnel supporting a single helicopter detachment in Athlone. The policy vectors guiding Ireland’s defence investment decisions from the 1960s were attributed to TK Whitaker as “a gamble on peace.”2 It is widely recorded that Ireland has, up to now, spent minimally on national defence. Many argue that the defence estate (physically and technologically) is consequently in need of substantial modernisation.3 Given the reliance on technology as a key enabler for military air operations, and the IAC’s relatively small size, ongoing resourcing and investment are critical to maintaining a credible presence (and deterrence) in Ireland’s economically important sovereign Air Space. As a small open island economy, Ireland’s economic activity and wellbeing are inherently linked to free trade and the free movement of people. This perspective is supported by the Irish Government’s ‘Global Ireland 2025’ strategic initiative, which represents the “most ambitious renewal and expansion of Ireland’s international presence ever undertaken in terms of diplomacy, culture, business, overseas aid, tourism and trade.”4 Maintaining an assured air bridge into, and out of, the State’s jurisdiction is a critical requirement of such ambitions. The loss of such an air bridge during the recent pandemic highlighted the importance of this connection. While it is difficult to predict where future strategic shocks will emanate from, recent events reinforce the perspective that maintaining a well-trained and equipped Defence Forces provides Ireland with multi-domain resilience in an ever-changing global security order.

2 Ireland opted for a policy of military non-alignment following World War II and followed a human rights centred multi-lateral approach to foreign policy. Reduced defence spending allowed for limited economic capacity to be re-directed to education and infrastructure as well as and the development of the modern FDI supported knowledge economy. 3 gov.ie—Report of the Commission on Defence Forces (www.gov.ie). 4 www.gov.ie/en/campaigns/09371607-taoiseach-launches-global-ireland-irelands-glo

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The Only Constant Is Change It has long been the experience of military leadership that while equipment is undoubtedly important, it is the quality and leadership of the women and men in uniform that really matters. The Irish Volunteers and Cumann na mBan who helped found the modern nation and set up the IAC were not paid, and most had no formal military training to begin with; however, they evaluated the problem and used asymmetric tactics in dealing with a conventional problem. In the end, size and convention were subdued with asymmetry and unconventional tactics. Arguably the same types of complex problems will exist in the future with larger interests and forces seeking to exert their influence and power to the detriment of Irish interests and a rules-based international order. In order to prepare for these and other possible strategic shocks, the IAC will need to maximise the advantages of maintaining a small size while exploiting a pioneering mindset married to ever-evolving technologies. Conventional Needs Ireland is home to many of the world’s leading aircraft lessors and one of the largest commercial passenger carrying airlines in the world—Ryanair. As an island nation, Ireland is dependent on open skies to ensure tourism, trade and economic activity continue to flourish. While the Irish Aviation Authority continues to handle civil air traffic on behalf of the State, the lack of military Primary Radar from both a national security and defence perspective, as well as civil aviation safety and back up, is notable. Ireland is one of the only countries in the Western world that does not yet possess a military Primary Radar network and response capacity. As a sovereign nation, Ireland is reliant on all aircraft transiting our sovereign skies to self-certify their adherence to aviation rules and procedures as well as Air Policing requirements.5 It is analogous to all boats and ships that transit

5 Nefarious actors, State supported or otherwise, are aware that Ireland currently has no capacity to detect the presence of non-compliant aircraft, nor does it have the airborne capability to enforce compliance with its national laws, nor those rules and laws to which it has internationally agreed to, in its Air Space. As one international colleague observed it is akin to having rules and laws on weapons transportation, terrorist support activities, illicit drugs and the movement of vulnerable people while preventing the Police from ever enforcing them, and then assuming that the rules are always followed.

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Irish waters, doing so without ever being inspected by Naval or Customs authorities and assuming all are operating legally, all the time. In order to address this well-publicised gap, there is a clear aviation safety and security need to establish a fully integrated military Primary Radar network. Such a network would require three to four radar units on mostly existing sites, which will be networked into a secure Irish military command and control centre. It is currently estimated that the costs associated with such a basic requirement are in the region of one per cent of current annual defence spending to keep it fully operational and constantly monitored. Over the years, it has been suggested that a military Primary Radar network has been resisted on the grounds that once you see something, you are obligated to respond to it and that such costs would limit defence options elsewhere. While there is no evidence to support such a contention, it is worth considering many of the misconceptions associated with an Air Policing capability. Cost Misconceptions The Cold War supported many major defence contractors, with national defence spending having a direct impact on national economic activity. Defence equipment costs and ongoing running costs therefore helped support jobs and wider defence industrial bases. Controlling costs was observed to be subservient to ensuring the speedy production of capability. The peace dividend following the end of the Cold War created the environment for significant defence rationalisation. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the North Atlantic military equipment development focus shifted from ‘peer to peer’ war fighting towards addressing the (cost-effective) needs of unconventional military operations. The effect of this saw the production of advanced training aircraft and ‘lead in’ jet aircraft that have the significant conventional fast jet capability at a fraction of their procurement costs. Consequently, the costs of maintaining a credible Irish Air Policing capability are not fully understood by many. As will be discussed later, a paradigm shift in Space costs has also taken place. Procuring a Squadron of modern ‘lead in / advanced trainer’ jet aircraft, supported by modern aircraft maintenance practices and increased maintenance intervals, will provide the State with a relatively low-cost and credible Air Policing capability. Amortised over the full 20-year life of such

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an aircraft, the costs to the State are estimated to be in the region of five per cent of current Defence spending. In keeping with international best practice in terms of equitable budgetary allocation between Services, and the well-publicised security and defence gap that exists, a Primary Radar network supported by a credible Air Policing capability will likely cost six to seven per cent of overall current Defence spending. In terms of the wider positive economic impact of air travel and the free movement of high-value goods, coupled with the negative impact of the movement of illicit drugs and weapons by air, the case supporting the procurement of Primary Radars and a credible Air Policing capability is now about Defence prioritisation, not cost. Many Services, One Defence Forces The IAC has rarely operated by itself. Since its establishment in 1922, it has worked closely with the Army and subsequently with the Naval Service from its foundation in 1946. As such, joint training and operations are the norms between the Services. On Overseas Service, IAC members have served within Defence Forces formations as opposed to bespoke IAC elements and an IAC Officer was on the first Irish UN mission in 1958. The advent of helicopter operations in the 1960s morphed into specific IAC ‘Army Support’ and ‘Naval Support’ Squadrons by the 1980s. The development of Naval Service helicopter operations with a Dauphin helicopter embarked on the LE Éithne in the 1980s heralded a new capability; however, this capability lapsed due to resource limitations and is being re-established with the development of the Naval Service’s Multi-Role Vessel. A joint platform will not alone help protect Irish coastal waters and international interests, but it will also act as a floating SAR platform, representing the value for money and the importance of making contingent military capabilities available to the State and the wider community. The current helicopter fleet is not compatible with the needs of future Special Operations Forces or future Naval Service operations. This capability gap has been identified by the Commission on Defence, which has recommended the procurement of eight ‘super medium’ helicopters. Merging this new capability with existing CASA 295 procurement plans and existing PC12NG aircraft will give Ireland relatively credible aviation capabilities in terms of littoral surveillance and all-weather military responses. Given the complexity of these military capabilities,

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the Commission on Defence has also recommended that a whole of Government approach should be taken to service provisions to prevent fragmentation and duplication.6 Space and Time For many, the idea of Space-based capabilities is either too expensive or does not appear—initially—to be relevant to IAC or Irish Defence Forces’ needs. Future trends in military aircraft navigation as well as terrestrial communications and surveillance are pointing towards increasing dependence on Space-based platforms. When this is merged with evolving quantum computing capabilities, the use of Space-based capabilities becomes possible for a much wider cohort of users. The costs of satellite technologies in the 1980s were prohibitive to all but a few nations. There are currently 2500 satellites in orbit. This number is estimated to grow to about 50,000 within 10 years (McKinsey, 2020).7 The advances in civil Space exploration and delivery platforms mean that some Irish higher education institutions are now involved in the development of research satellites. The delivery cost to orbit continues to drop to the point where satellite development opportunities and capabilities are possible for smaller States. The leap for some may be too great; however, this same ‘developmental latency’ perspective did not prevent previous IAC developments in the 1920s and beyond, and it shouldn’t do so now. There is a range of partnering opportunities with both private industry and European partners to explore these capabilities. Given the extraordinary capabilities that exist in Ireland’s technological community and higher education institutions, it is possible to move into this domain in a careful and controlled manner that both minimises risk and ensures future technological and capability resilience.

6 The US Coast Guard provides an obvious comparison where military platforms and personnel provide rescue and coordination while coming under US Naval authority during armed hostilities. Such ‘joined up’ thinking frees up resources for investment elsewhere and underscores the ability of IAC to support national outputs while maintaining contingent Defence capabilities. 7 Large LEO satellite constellations: Will it be different this time? | McKinsey.

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Given the expansive size of Ireland’s maritime Exclusive Economic Zone and the fact that the Northeast Atlantic is a very harsh operational environment, a mix of surface ships, coastal radars, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft and space-based platforms becomes an attainable mix to ensure Ireland has a resilient presence, and deterrence, throughout its jurisdictions. Space Vulnerability, New Entrants and Drones Even today, space vehicles are key enablers for both military operations and modern civil society. It is probably impossible to imagine a civil society without space.8 The civil–military duality of space technologies provides synergies but also introduces vulnerabilities.9 The jamming of satellite signals to prevent military use has implications for the safe navigation of aircraft and surface vessels, potentially making civil air operations unviable in some areas. This effect is seen daily in European airspace.10 Protecting against exploitation of these vulnerabilities will also be a key element in national resilience.11 A key development during this century will be the emergence and growth of Higher Altitude Operations (HAO), with increased volumes of craft operating in the airspace above the levels traditionally used by civil aviation or travelling to or from orbit. HAO is one category of new entrants in the airspace involving vehicles such as airships and balloons, long-endurance drones acting in roles similar to satellites, air-launched

8 In addition to communication and navigation applications, the time signals provided by satellites are critical for a wide variety of civil uses from enabling financial transactions to the synchronisation of electrical grids. 9 European Commission (2022). “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Roadmap on Critical Technologies for Security and Defence”. Strasbourg. 10 N. Nicolaou (2021). “Can Aviation Continue to Rely on Satellite Navigation? The Air Traffic Management Perspective”, in Eurocontrol Stakeholder Forum Technical webinar on GNSS, March 4, 2021. Accessed July 30, 2021. https://www.eurocontrol. int/event/eurocontrol-stakeholder-forum-gnss. 11 R. Martin (2022). “The Challenge of Resilience in Future Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) Systems Supporting Air Traffic Management (ATM)”, Defence Forces Review 2021, pp. 72–82.

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space vehicles and hypersonic aircraft. HAO are also introducing challenges to freedom of military operation in airspace previously free from civil operations, while also challenging traditional regulatory and legal concepts of airspace operations.12 Another category of new entrants is that of drones or Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). UAS refers to the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV— the flying bit or drone) and the ground station (controlling equipment). The term Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) is also used. RPAS and UAS are not necessarily the same. An RPAS has human control but a UAS may be autonomous. Just as the invention of the aeroplane in the last century opened up military opportunities and threats, drones are providing challenges and opportunities in the twenty-first century. A critical difference is the level of miniaturisation in modern general technology. While the carrying capacity of drones is improving, the parallel improvements in miniaturisation of potential payloads increase the use cases of drones. Drones provide the essential characteristics of speed, reach and height that are associated with military air power. While their speed is not comparable with fast jet, drones have a characteristic that eludes the unsupported manned aircraft—endurance. This translates into persistence which provides benefits in terms of time on mission and also the flexibility in time and location of launch and recovery. Furthermore, drones also provide force protection. Since the pilot is remote, only the drone need be exposed, allowing greater usage in more hostile environments. The IAC and the Drone When considering drones in the State service, three significant use cases arise, which could be in operation by 2052. The first is in support of ground operations—primarily where surveillance and communications/coordination of ground units is required—a role not dissimilar to police helicopter flights. Remotely piloted or autonomous drones would be capable of surveillance with communications through a network of transmitters/receivers. Indeed, supported by artificial intelligence and expert systems there will be an ability to identify threats, allocate scarce 12 The project—European Concept for Higher airspace Operations (ECHO) is currently working on the challenges posed by HAO. See: https://www.eurocontrol.int/project/eur opean-concept-higher-airspace-operation.

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resources and reduce decision times. This could be used in diverse areas as supporting crowd or riot control13 to aerial firefighting. A second case considers the use of drones for aeromedical mobility. Military roles of casevac and medevac also have analogues in civil society. Using drones for battlefield casevac has been studied.14 Patient outcomes could be similar to those for manned casevac in the event the patient does not require a lifesaving intervention enroute. Flying at speeds of the order of 100 knots, drones for medical evacuation could be a positive dual use case. If lifesaving intervention is unlikely, no crew nor medical personnel need be tasked or risked. If medical personnel are required, these may be located with drones at the medical facilities. The remote pilots could be centrally located elsewhere allowing better availability of pilots and more launch locations, reducing response time. Such a model could also support Irish overseas contingents.15 A third use case is that of Maritime Defence and Security Operations (MDSO). These operations are often defined by a requirement for long endurance, which relies on the fuel capacity of the aircraft and the endurance of the aircrew. UAVs provide this endurance but may not have the flexibility of manned aircraft to respond and change tasks. Within MDSO the use of multiple layers of information could increasingly hone the operation. Satellite data may indicate areas of interest. Drones could provide closer and adaptable surveillance. This then allows the manned resources to be targeted and routed directly to areas where they will be most useful. However, drones also provide challenges to the military. Drones have democratised access to airspace.16 Aerial photography and sensing, once the purview of the State or operators approved by the State, are now 13 Ali Al-Sheary & Ali Almagbile (2017). “Crowd Monitoring System Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)”, Journal of Civil Engineering and Architecture, 11. https://doi. org/10.17265/1934-7359/2017.11.004. 14 J.K. Maddry, A.A. Arana, A.G. Mora, et al. (2021). “Advancing Prehospital Combat Casualty Evacuation: Patients Amenable to Aeromedical Evacuation via Unmanned Aerial Vehicles”, Military Medicine, 186(3–4): e366–e372. https://doi.org/10.1093/milmed/ usaa438. 15 It should be recalled that the use of drones in contested areas may depend on the resilience of navigation in the event that satellite navigation is denied. 16 World Economic Forum (2018). “We Must Regulate Drones, to Democratize the Sky for Humanity”, available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/drone-reg ulation-is-necessary-to-democratize-the-sky-for-humanity/.

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generally available. This poses a security threat to installations. Drones can be weaponised and can enter areas inaccessible to surface transport. As weapons, many drones in civil use would not have the capacity to be anything other than of nuisance value. However, this is not to say that they are trivial. Drones are capable of causing wholesale disruption at airports if used maliciously. Thirdly the operation of drones at lower levels in the airspace (c. 400 feet) affects airspace used regularly by the military. This poses a threat to the safety of manned aviation and will require close coordination to ensure that there is not an unacceptable risk of collision.17 Of course, there is the potential that by reducing the risk for manned aviation through advising drone operators of military activity, operational security may be compromised. It is possible that, as drones become more capable, the lower airspace may become almost the sole arena of drones—with many military flights in the region becoming unmanned. Accommodating New Entrants While the accommodation of drones in medium and high altitudes is progressing and will probably be similar to the handling of manned aircraft. Drones at a low level will squeeze manned aviation at those altitudes typically used by helicopters and light aircraft. Within that airspace, drones will have primacy. Information services will allow manned flights, provided that the flights are known to the system. This challenges shortnotice emergency flights and those where operational security prevents prior notification. Achieving a solution to this conundrum could be contentious. The increasing commercialisation of space launches is challenging traditional concepts. Traditional vertical launch methods are frequent. New horizontal launches use more lateral airspace and pose a risk to both civil and military traffic as well as potentially disrupting traffic flows in areas where there may be air-launched space vehicles. The recovery of 17 EU regulations on civil drones (EU 2019/945 and EU 2019/947) recognise that manned State aircraft may operate in that airspace regulated for use by drones but does not deal with reducing this risk. Guidance material for the operation of civil drones in this regard appears to be difficult to agree.

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satellites similarly introduces challenges. Space Traffic Management will become increasingly important over the next century. The IAC, whose area of operations includes large areas of the Atlantic will have to adjust to this new reality and perhaps take a significant role in this developing area. Accessing the Airspace Airspace is often not seen as an asset by the military. For most of the first century of aviation military access to the airspace was taken for granted. This has changed largely due to the near-simultaneous thawing of the cold war and the explosive expansion of civil aviation in response to deregulation of the aviation industry. Two lasting results arose—flow management or ‘slot times’ and secondly Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA).18 The FUA regulation reinforced the principle that airspace is neither civil nor military but a continuum that should be used for the benefit of all airspace users. The military are restricted in how they access airspace in order to improve the capacity of the civil system. In future versions of FUA, aircraft will plan and fly trajectory-based operations (TBO)19 which rely on excellent knowledge of what the airspace situation will be to ensure that aircraft receive the most effective routeing for its trajectory. This will pose three main challenges to the military. Firstly, military aircraft in training and operations will have the (dynamic) airspace needed for the exercise being associated, and moving, with the aircraft, rather than current static training areas. This will require both on-board and ground-based equipment which may be costly or indeed not feasible for some military aircraft types. Secondly, the system will require detailed knowledge of the intentions of all flights. Again this will require ground and airborne equipment— much of which is yet to be developed. While information sharing is

18 European Commission (2005). “Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2150/2005 of 23 December 2005 laying Down Common Rules for the Flexible Use of Airspace”, Brussels. 19 Oleg Ivashchuk, Ivan Ostroumov, Nataliia Kuzmenko, Olha Sushchenko, Yuliya Averyanova, Oleksandr Solomentsev, Maksym Zaliskyi, Felix Yanovsky, & Olga Shcherbyna (2021). “A Configuration Analysis of Ukrainian Flight Routes Network”, Experience of Designing and Application of CAD Systems (CADSM) 2021 IEEE 16th International Conference on the, pp. 6–10.

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essential, operational security20 is also essential. There will have to be a balance struck between the type and quantity of information that can be shared by the military and the need for operational security against the need for data by the civil ATM system. The third challenge will be a divergence between the civil and military air traffic control and communications and navigation systems. The civil system is tending towards automation and strategic deconfliction of flights. However, the military ATS system will probably always need to be able to deal with waves of simultaneous flights and the ability to recover aircraft with multiple system failures. This could mean that there will be a requirement for interoperability between two increasingly different paradigms. Enabling Change These issues are important for the military since, without civil military interoperability, there will be serious challenges in using the full capacity of European (and hence national) airspace.21 This poses the risk that the military may not have the necessary freedom to access airspace for training and, possibly, some operations. It also means that the cost of military aviation will increase. No longer is it sufficient to equip for the military role, there will be increased costs associated with entry to, or operation within, the airspace in the presence of traditional users of airspace and new entrants. An Irish military aviation authority22 is in prospect and its successful implementation will have a key, and perhaps defining, input to the development of Irish military aviation. A vital enabler of future military training and operations will include the ability of the military aviation system to interface with the civil system. The military regulator

20 Operational security is often required for training flights also, from which useful information on tactics, doctrine and systems may be gleaned. 21 Requirements for interoperability are included in the EASA New Basic Regulation (EU 2018/1139). 22 S. Tutty (2021). “Government to Set Up Air Corps Regulator to Bring Ireland into Line with EU States”, Sunday Times (online), available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/government-to-set-up-air-corps-regulator-tobring-ireland-into-line-with-eu-states-rv5vkmtwq?t=ie.

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will be central to this interface through the safety assurance it will give to its military and civil counterparts. Successfully and safely navigating through these challenges and exploiting the opportunities will be central to the maintenance and development of capabilities and readiness. Conclusion Key technological and conceptual changes will likely impact how the IAC addresses the problems and challenges that its second century of operations will bring. One hundred years ago, Ireland was at the forefront of aviation advances and the new State rapidly adopted the latest aviation developments. The pioneering spirit inculcated then, remains to this day. Given the pace of external technological developments, it will likely be possible to move directly to newer capabilities and bypass some of the evolutionary stages that other air arms had to go through. While geography changes at a glacial pace, aviation does not. Ireland will be dependent on aviation and its strategic position in the Atlantic will remain important for both civil and military purposes for many years to come. Future developments in Airspace, Space, RPAS, Drones, Air Policing, Aerodromes and computing all provide avenues for development for the IAC. However, the strength of a military air organisation is its personnel and cohesion, which allows it to respond to changes in the environment with purpose and control. Whatever the next century brings, the history of the IAC suggests that it will meet Ireland’s military aviation challenges and opportunities with the same pioneering spirit that its founders did 100 years ago.

The Reserve Defence Forces

Revitalizing the Irish Army Reserve Post-Commission on the Defence Forces: Moving from the Single Force Concept to a Total Force Policy Jonathan Carroll

Introduction In 2013, the Defence Forces reorganized the Army Reserve under the Single Force Concept ; all Reserve units were integrated into the force structure of the regular Army, the land component of the Permanent Defence Forces (PDF).1 After decades of poor investment, no utilization, and failing to address the legacy issues that plagued the force from its inception, the ambitious goal was a more efficient fit for purpose Army Reserve. In 2020, my evaluation of the Single Force Concept was that it had failed. The Reserve was at a historic low of 38 percent effective strength, the legacy issues remained unaddressed, and none of the promised Department of Defence revitalization projects had 1 Irish Defence Forces, Administrative Order 01/2013: Implementation of the Defence Forces Reorganisation Plan Reserve Defence Forces. Defence Forces Administrative Document, 2013.

J. Carroll (B) Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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commenced.2 The Single Force Concept remained unrealized. It was arguably unattainable to begin with. The Army Reserve needed fundamental change; the Single Force Concept heralded nothing more than a rebranding. Even worse, the Army Reserve was disintegrating during an unprecedented PDF personnel retention crisis. In June 2021, the PDF, with an establishment of 9500, had just 8070 trained personnel.3 Several vessels were tied up at Haulbowline Naval Base for lack of crewmembers, and the Naval Service launched dockside accelerated recruitment drives to tackle the shortfall. Worse still, employment contracts from the 1990s mandated that nearly 700 members of the 1067-strong Naval Service had to leave the Defence Forces by late 2022.4 An Air Corps pilot shortage meant maintaining flight operations and pilot training was becoming unsustainable.5 Amidst this wider crisis, the Army Reserve was a “peripheral concern” for a resource-stretched Defence Forces and Department of Defence, dwindling to 1400 personnel by early 2021; approximately 33 percent of established strength.6 Thus, where conceptually a reserve force should be positioned to alleviate the PDF retention crisis by furnishing reservists to fill the gaps, the Army Reserve was in no position to do so.

The Argument As set out by my colleagues in this volume, Ireland and the Defence Forces face unprecedented challenges now and in the future. Both the Army and Army Reserve are at their lowest strengths in the

2 Jonathan Carroll, “Conceptually Ambitious, Hardly Novel, and Currently Failing: The Irish Army Reserve in the Single Force Concept,” The Journal of Military History and Defence Studies 1, no. 1 (2020), 232–233. 3 Sean O’Riordan, “Damning Results from Defence Forces Exit Survey,” Irish Examiner, June 13, 2021. 4 Niall O’Connor, “Pop Up Recruitment Centre in Dublin Tomorrow for Naval Service to find 200 Recruits so ships can go to Sea,” thejournal.ie, June 25, 2021. 5 Ken Foxe, “Not Enough Military Pilots to Maintain Airborne Security,” The Times, January 4, 2021. 6 Reserve Defence Forces Representative Association (RDFRA) Opening Statement to the Commission on Defence Forces, February 16, 2021, 1.

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history of the Irish State.7 In early 2022 the long-awaited Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces was released. Amounting to the most in-depth introspective analysis of Irish defence since the foundation of the State, the Commission’s Report advocated sweeping reforms across the Defence Forces, including the tripling of defence spending, reforming command and control arrangements, additional naval vessels, the purchase of modern fighter interceptors, and “the revitalisation of the Reserve Defence Force as part of a genuine single Defence Force across the domains of land, air and sea, and in the newer domains of cyber and space.”8 The Report made the creation of a Reserve “that can seamlessly train, operate and deploy with the Permanent Defence Force, nationally and internationally,” one of its five core recommendations.9 The publication of the Commission’s Report was timely. Due to the recently passed Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (COVID-19) Act the Army Reserve could be called up domestically in an emergency.10 But is it worth calling up? Does the Reserve have capabilities the Defence Forces needs in a contingency? Does it bring anything meaningful or unique to the Irish defence framework? The answer is, no, not in its current form. Historically, the Army Reserve force structure has mirrored that of the Army, and thus, the current Army Reserve can only replicate what the Army already has, not provide what the Army needs; the specialist skills and professional experience that reservists have. These skills, requiring significant time to master or investment to develop, are either non-organic to the Defence Forces or are too expensive to maintain full-time. While at a historic low, this current situation presents a truly unique opportunity to use the skeletal remains of the Army Reserve to revitalize the force with a role and capabilities that fulfil the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces recommendations. This chapter proposes a detailed and novel revitalization, a reimagined Army Reserve. Instead of mirroring the Army force structure, perpetuating a culture 7 See the chapters within this volume by Vice Admiral Mark Mellett, Dr. Tom Clonan, and Eoin McNamara. 8 Commission on the Defence Forces, Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces (Dublin, Government Printing Office, 2022), v. 9 Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, xiii. 10 Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (COVID-19) Act 2020

Section 27.

(Ireland),

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where the Army and Army Reserve are seen as competing for relevance and resources, where the Reserve has had little or no utilization, the reimagined Reserve proposed herein aims to deliver a robust operationally focused force tailored specifically to “seamlessly train, operate and deploy with the Permanent Defence Force, nationally and internationally.” This chapter argues for an Irish equivalent to the American and British “Total Force,” or “Whole Force” policies. What the Commission Report infers as a “genuine single Defence Force,” where the Defence Forces cannot conduct operations without the Army Reserve. The key is decoupling the Reserve force structure from the Army for the first time in history, to deliver what the Army needs, not emulate what it already has. This chapter proposes a solution to a legacy Irish defence problem, a reimagined Army Reserve tailored to counter real-world threats and challenges, the reasoning underpinning it, the contribution it could make to the Defence Forces, and the policy and legal requirements required to transition to it. The Commission on the Defence Forces argues for revitalizing the Army Reserve, herein lies one iteration of what that could look like.

The Role of the Army Reserve in Irish Defence Carl von Clausewitz wrote that reserve forces exist to “counter unforeseen threats.”11 Another definition holds that “a national reserve force is normally designed to maintain a large pool of previously trained personnel…to augment and fill out a standing armed force, which may be rather small in some nations.”12 In Ireland, both definitions should be the guiding light for the Army Reserve. However, the role of the Army Reserve in Ireland has been consistently vague until recently. In Ireland’s 2000 White Paper on Defence, the role of An Forsa Cosainta Aitiul (FCA) as the Reserve was then called, was simply augmenting the PDF in a “crisis.” What constituted a crisis was unclear, nor how the FCA was supposed to mitigate one. The 2000 White Paper advocated for reservists serving overseas on peace support operations, a role very different to crisis mitigation. Yet, no legal mechanisms existed to protect reservists’ civilian employment if mobilized for a domestic crisis, nor overseas 11 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 210. 12 Franklin D. Margiotta (ed.), Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare (Washington, DC: Brassey’s—MacMillan Publishing, 1996), 882.

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service.13 The 2015 White Paper better articulated that roles of the Army Reserve included conventional military operations in defence of the State, armed Aid to the Civil Power (ATCP) support, unarmed Aid to the Civil Authority (ATCA) during weather or non-defence related contingencies, barracks security, and facilitating the release of members of the PDF for operational duties through replacement. The Army Reserve was also specifically slated for state ceremonial events. The 2015 White Paper reiterated the possibility of reservists serving overseas, the exploration of which became a Department of Defence implementation project.14 For the last twenty years, beyond augmentation, the Army Reserve had no reason to exist, no unique role in the Irish defence framework. There were aspirations on paper for overseas service but no meaningful progress made to explore or support such a move. There was also a disconnect between what the Reserve was expected to do, and what it was training to do. In many service corps, reserve units were neither trained nor capable of augmenting or supporting their PDF counterparts.15 Trapped in a cycle of “training for training’s sake,” often contrary to the assigned roles of the force, legislatively prevented from being utilized with no employment protection, and with an emphasis on voluntary unpaid service, the Army Reserve dwindled from 14000 reservists in 2000, to just 1463 in 2021.16 Reservists left out of boredom, disillusionment, or the lack of any meaningful output to their service.

Consistently Doing the Same Thing (Poorly) The decline of the Reserve is due to the mindset applied to managing the force. The British Ministry of Defence recently found that historical issues confronting the British Army Reserve continued to plague the force because “the Reserve is managed by the regulars in the same way

13 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 2000 (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2000), 52–53. 14 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 2015 (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2015), 97–100. 15 See Carroll, “Conceptually Ambitious.” 16 White Paper on Defence 2000, 52; RDFRA Opening Statement to the Commission

on Defence Forces, 1.

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that they manage themselves.”17 This is also true for the management of the Irish Army Reserve. Historically, the Reserve has been consistently reorganized to reflect the Army force structure, duplicating existing capabilities that the Defence Forces could easily quantify, organize, and harness. In 1959, the FCA was reorganized to directly mirror the force structure of the regular Army. In 2005, the same thing happened again when the FCA was reorganized into the “Army Reserve.” In both 1959 and 2005, these reorganizations yielded a three-brigade regular, and threebrigade reserve force structure of almost identical capabilities in principle. In 2012, the Army was downsized into a two-brigade force, and a concurrent Value for Money Review questioned the utility of maintaining the Reserve at all. Two options were considered; disbanding the Reserve or carrying out another reorganization.18 Reserve strength was too low to create a mirroring force structure, so the “Single Force Concept” was implemented. Reserve sub-units were dispersed amongst the regular Army, reserve companies and batteries were assigned to regular battalions and regiments, and reserve platoons joined regular companies. The Army Reserve has thus never experienced a true “reorganization.” Instead, as the table below shows, as strength has fallen the Reserve has been repeatedly downsized to reflect the force’s contemporary strength at any given time, always conforming to the principle of matching reserve units with existing regular capabilities. The Defence Forces shaped the Reserve based on regular Army mindsets. No new capabilities have ever been assigned. In fact over time many have been taken away. Consequently, on paper, the Army Reserve has had nothing unique to contribute to Irish defence, no capability that it alone can provide. For this reason, the Reserve has never been operationally utilized, every role it is assigned can already be fulfilled by the PDF. This unimaginative reductive cycle with consistently diminishing returns meant no rationale existed to rely on, or invest in, the Army Reserve (Table 1). This mindset has ignored the unique capability the Reserve does have; attracting reservists with skills not available or organic to the PDF, 17 Emphasis added. Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, The United Kingdom Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team Annual Report 2020 (London: The Council of RFCA’s, 2020), 7–8. 18 Lieutenant General Sean McCann, Defence Forces Chief of Staff, Briefing to Irish General Staff, 20 November 2012.

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Table 1

129

Historical Reserve Force Structures

Corps

FCA 1979–2005

Army Reserve 2005–2013

Single Force Concept 2013–present

Infantry Cavalry Artillery

15 Battalions 3 Squadrons 6 Regiments

9 Battalions 3 Squadrons 3 Regiments

Military Police Medical Transport Engineers Air Defence CIS

6 4 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3

23.5 Companies 6 Troops (Platoons) 4 Batteries (Companies) 2 Platoons 2 Detachments 4 Platoons 2 Platoons No reserve element 2 Platoons

Companies Companies Companies Companies Batteries Companies

Companies Companies Companies Companies Batteries Companies

skills developed by reservists’ professional experience and qualifications. The Director of the Reserve wrote that reservists have a “wealth of private sector expertise in IT, legal, HR, medical, transport and logistical areas.”19 Yet the Army Reserve was never structured to efficiently capitalize upon these skills. No positions exist for reservists with legal, HR or logistics skills, and very few positions exist even for IT, medical, and transport-oriented reservists. As the following charts illustrate, the structure of the Reserve has remained tied to that of the Army, an infantry heavy force unsuited to harnessing specialist skills the Defence Forces needs. Consequently the existing Reserve is largely useless in bolstering Ireland’s defence framework—but it doesn’t have to remain so (Fig. 1).

19 Colonel Dermot Hanifin, Defence Forces Director of Reserve Forces, “Directorate of Reserve Forces, Commission of Defence Review,” January 27, 2021.

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Army Reserve Force Structure: Single Force Concept 2013-Present 2%

2% 4% 1%

1% Infantry

5%

Artillery Cavalry

10%

CIS Engineers

75%

Transport Military Police Air Defence Medical

Fig. 1 Pie chart of the Army Reserve Force Structure: Single Force Concept 2013–Present

Fulfilling the Commission’s Aspirations: De-coupling the Reserve from the Regular Army Force Structure For the Army Reserve to become capable, robust, and able to meaningfully contribute to the Irish defence framework it must no longer mirror what the Army already has, it must focus instead on what the Army needs. This requires a new approach, already vindicated in several other militaries; de-coupling the Reserve force structure from the regular Army.20 The proposed Reserve force structure which follows is based on three principles. Firstly, adequately fulfilling the roles of the Reserve as set out by the Irish government. Second, furnishing the Defence Forces with skilled reservists in areas of operational utility that can be trained quickly. Thirdly, that recent research has shown specialized Reserve units, where skilled reservists bring existing civilian qualifications into the military, have greater retention levels than reserve-combat unit-focused units,

20 See approach to reserve land components in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Britain, and the United States.

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and that specialized units have greater operational utility in the Irish context.21 Historically, the Army Reserve and FCA have always been infantry dominated. The force structure proposed herein would see an end to that dominance in favour of a skills-focused Reserve. The Commission on the Defence Forces recommended an Army Reserve 3900 strong, that encompassed a 50:50 split between Combat and Combat Support units, and Combat Service Support units.22 Using this recommendation as a baseline aspiration, what follows is a potential force structure for a de-coupled specialist skills-focused Army Reserve based on 4469 all ranks that meets this 50:50 ratio in four distinct groups: a reserve Surge Brigade, a Combat Support Brigade, a Combat Service Support Brigade, and an Integrated Reserve.

The Army Reserve Surge Brigade This brigade is designed to provide surge capacity to the Army based on a three-battalion structure, where personnel and not specialist skills are required. The brigade comprises two reserve light infantry battalions and a joint Regular/Reserve ATCP/ATCA battalion. The rationale underpinning the Surge Brigade is fulfilling domestic contingencies with bespoke reserve units specifically trained for tasks assigned to the Army Reserve under the 2015 White Paper. Reserve infantry still has utility for surge capability, but maintaining the current dominance of infantry in the Reserve is inefficient when resources could be devoted elsewhere. As such, the retention of two light infantry battalions, manned, staffed, and commanded by reservists, would train to support the PDF in the conventional defence of the state (Table 2). The ATCA/ATCP battalion is a task-oriented unit under a PDF battalion commander structured to meet the various Defence Forces ATCA/ATCP tasks. In its submission to the Commission on Defence the Representative Association of Commissioned Officers (RACO) suggested the Defence Forces’ longest ATCP commitment, the Security Company guarding Portlaoise Prison, be formally established in the Army force

21 See Carroll, “Conceptually Ambitious,” and Jonathan Carroll, “Relying on the Goodwill of the Individual, and Luck: The Problematic Nature of Utilising the Army Reserve Skills Base in the Single Force Concept,” Defence Forces Review 16 (2019), 30–41. 22 Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, xxv.

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Table 2

The Army Reserve “Surge” Brigade

Unit Brigade Headquarters (PDF/AR) ATCP/ATCA Battalion Headquarters (PDF/AR) Portlaoise Security Company (PDF) ATCP/ATCA Ceremonial Company (AR) ATCP/ATCA Ceremonial Company (AR) 10th Infantry Battalion (AR) Headquarters and Headquarters Company A Company (Rifle) B Company (Rifle) C Company (Rifle) 11th Infantry Battalion (AR) Headquarters and Headquarters Company A Company (Rifle) B Company (Rifle) C Company (Rifle) Total

Establishment

Tier

50 25 PDF 133 133 102

3 3 3 3 3 3

133 133 133 102

3 3 3 3

133 133 133 1343

3 3 3

structure in recognition of the constant personnel commitment.23 PDF personnel are currently drawn from infantry units across the country to meet this commitment. This Security Company, if established, would be the first company in the ATCA/ATCP Battalion manned by the PDF. The second and third companies would be reserve companies trained for three tasks in keeping with the 2015 White Paper; ATCA and ATCP support to the Army, to include Crowd Riot Control to augment the Garda Public Order Unit when necessary, and state ceremonial commitments. Including a brigade headquarters the Surge Brigade would have a strength of 1343 reservists trained for domestic contingencies.

23 Representative Association of Commissioned Officers (RACO), Commission on the Defence Forces Briefing Document, February 16, 2021, 8.

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The Army Reserve Combat Support Brigade The Combat Support Brigade would comprise a task-oriented threebattalion structure designed to harness specialist skills the Defence Forces needs which reservists can provide that are otherwise too costly to maintain on a full-time basis. The Combat Support Brigade comprises a reserve Communications Information Systems (CIS) Battalion, a Field Engineer Battalion, and a Field Medical Battalion. The Combat Support Brigade would dramatically increase positions for reservists with specialist skillsets. The various “reorganizations” of the Army Reserve have yielded grievous reductions in the number of reserve IT specialists, medical specialists, and engineers. Under the current Single Force Concept as an example, within the CIS Corps, the Medical Corps, and the Engineering Corps, there are only 98, 32, and 68 positions for reservists, respectively. This represents an almost non-existent specialist contingent capability for the Defence Forces (Table 3). The proposed Combat Support Brigade would increase the reserve CIS element to 238, providing ample billets to attract a larger cohort of IT and cyber security specialists and software and electronic engineers; of immense value given the recent cyberattacks against the HSE. Similarly, the Engineer Battalion increases the reserve engineer establishment of 68 Table 3

The Army Reserve Combat Support Brigade

Unit Brigade Headquarters (PDF/AR) CIS Battalion (AR) Headquarters CIS Company (AR) CIS Company (AR) CIS Company (AR) Engineer Battalion (AR) Headquarters Field Engineering Company (AR) Vertical Construction Company (AR) Horizontal Construction Company (AR) Mixed Trades Pool Company (AR) Field Medical Battalion (AR) Headquarters Field Medical Company (AR) Field Medical Company (AR) Field Medical Company (AR) Total

Establishment

Tier

50 25 71 71 71 25 117 117 117 117 25 75 75 75 1031

3 3 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 3

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to 493 with task-specific companies and a company of civilian tradesmen as a resource pool for the Defence Forces for barracks maintenance or construction. The Medical Battalion would expand the current reserve medical establishment of just 32 to 250. The Combat Support Brigade is specifically designed to harness civilian experience and qualifications in units that are typically quite expensive for regular militaries to maintain on a full-time basis.

The Army Reserve Combat Service Support Brigade Like the Combat Support Brigade, the Combat Service Support Brigade comprises reserve task-specific units based on specialized skills or outputs in an operational or contingency setting, or for limited overseas deployments (Table 4). Within the Combat Service Support Brigade, the Logistics Support and Military Police battalions increase the allotment of reservists in these corps-specific areas. The Transport Battalion would be staffed with Table 4

The Army Reserve Combat Service Support Brigade

Unit Brigade Headquarters (PDF/AR) Logistics Support Battalion (AR) Headquarters Transport Company (AR) Transport Company (AR) Logistical Operations Company (AR) Repair, Service and Supply Company (AR) Military Police Battalion (AR) Headquarters Military Police Company (AR) Military Police Company (AR) Military Police Company (AR) 1st (AR) Field Hospital 2nd (AR) Field Hospital Army Reserve Training Battalion Headquarters Military College CPD Instructors (AR) PNCO, SNCO, PO & YO Instructors (AR) Basic Training Instructors (AR) Corps Specific Training Instructors (AR) Peace Support Operations Holding Unit Total

Establishment

Tier

50 25 111 111 111 102 25 69 69 69 300 300 25 40 47 47 47 N/A 1548

3 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1

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civilian drivers already possessing advanced vehicle licences, requiring only conversion training to military qualifications. It would also include civilian mechanics, an in-demand skillset in the PDF which has never been opened to qualified reservists, and qualified logisticians. Additionally, the Combat Service Support Brigade would have a field hospital capability. With the onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic, Ireland’s lack of field hospitals within the Defence Forces was highlighted as a critical shortfall.24 Field hospitals are expensive, so too are the personnel to operate them. As such, the cost-efficient option is for the Reserve to be responsible for this capability when required. Recognizing this, the British Army maintains twelve field hospitals, ten of which are reserve units. The remaining two battalions in the Combat Service Support Brigade are training units. RACO recently argued for the creation of a formal training battalion and an overseas battalion within the Army force structure. There is currently a false economy on paper where Army unit strengths do not reflect the reality that overseas service and basic training saps significant numbers of unit personnel.25 This is also an issue for the Reserve. Training new entrants or providing professional development training has always represented a significant personnel commitment within the Reserve. Reservists commit two to four weeks of full-time service annually to the Army Reserve. Yet for many units this valuable time is spent training new recruits instead of focusing on operational outputs or progressive training/professional development. Moreover, with the reduced strength of the Reserve the responsibility for this training has fallen on an ever-shrinking cohort of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO’s) and Officers. The creation of a dedicated Training Battalion, structured to train a battalion’s worth of personnel at any given time, represents a new approach within the Army Reserve. Such a unit would remove the basic training burden from operational Reserve units, allowing them to focus on training to task or to stand ready and available for use.26

24 David Lynch, “Helping to Defend the Nation from COVID-19,” The Medical Independent, March 30, 2020. 25 (RACO), Commission Briefing Document, 8. 26 The Training Battalion structure absorbs the reservists already assigned to the

constituent training schools in the Military College, with additional companies designed to provide basic training, corps-specific training, or career progression courses, with the staffing levels based on the Officer’s and NCOs required to staff a four-platoon infantry company. In principle, this Training Battalion could train twelve platoons, with a staggered

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Table 5

The Integrated Army Reserve

Unit 1 Brigade Artillery Regiment (AR) Battery 2 Brigade Artillery Regiment (AR)Battery 1 Armoured Cavalry Squadron (AR) Troops 2 Cavalry Squadron (AR) Troops 1 Cavalry Squadron (AR) Troops 1 Mechanised Infantry (AR) Platoons J Directorates and DFHQ Staff (AR) AR Recruiting Command (AR/PDF) Total

Establishment

Tier

98 98 61 61 61 68 50 50 547

3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3

The final unit, the Peace Support Operations Holding Unit, reflects the repeated policy statements from the Irish Government of utilizing limited numbers of reservists overseas. The Holding Unit would facilitate the assignment of PDF personnel and reservists chosen for overseas duty to form up and train as a unit.

Integrated Reservists The final cohort within the proposed reimagined Army Reserve are reserve sub-units that remain integrated within the existing Army force structure in a limited retention of the Single Force Concept. In previous iterations the Army Reserve included artillery regiments and cavalry squadrons, a pool of reservists experienced in gunnery and the use of armoured vehicles. Resurrecting all-reserve units of this kind would require significant financial investment in terms of weaponry and vehicles, a level of investment which is unlikely. Even the utility of having such reserve units is operationally questionable; where and when would they ever be used? However, retaining a cohort of reservists that can augment their Army counterparts in these units is prudent.27 (Table 5). In addition to these integrated operational sub-units, fifty reserve staff officers and NCOs would serve in the various J-level directorates

schedule throughout the year to cater for instructor availability and to reduce interference with reservist’s civilian employment. 27 1st and 2nd Cavalry, and 1st Armoured Cavalry Squadrons, along with 1st Mechanised Infantry Company would retain reservists trained in utilizing the Mowag Piranha APCs, and both the 1st and 2nd Brigade Artillery Regiments, would reduce their reserve component to one reserve battery in each regiment.

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Table 6 Tier 3

Tier 2 Tier 1

137

Army Reserve Unit Tiering System Headquarters Staff, Training Units and Units only called up in rare occurrences of a domestic contingency or emergency. Least commitment in service/disruption to civilian careers. Units and personnel with the potential to be called up if Tier 1 volunteers are not sufficient, or an operational requirement exceeds Tier 1 resources. Specialist Units staffed by reservists with skills likely to be selected in small numbers for overseas deployments, or to serve for extended periods of time with the Defence Forces. Most commitment in service/ disruption to civilian careers.

in Defence Forces Headquarters, and the newly established Office of Reserve Affairs that replaces the Directorate of Reserve (D.RES) office, to provide a reserve presence in all Defence Forces administrative cells. The final element of this integrated cohort would see the formal establishment of an Army Reserve recruiting command to identify and recruit reservists with desired civilian qualifications and professional experience and to provide a centralized and dedicated reserve staff to oversee the highly problematic reserve induction process recently highlighted as taking up to 18 months to complete, causing significant attrition amongst the applicant pool.28

Unit Tiering The British Ministry of Defence recently highlighted that reservists cannot always contribute the same amount of commitment due to personal or employment circumstances. To maximize the potential and efficiency of reserve forces, the recommendation was made to divide the British Army Reserve into a Reinforcement Reserve, an Operational Reserve, and a Strategic Reserve based on expected levels of service commitment.29 This tiering provided clarity to reservists and their employers and facilitated differing levels of commitment. A reimagined Army Reserve could incorporate a system described in the table below, also applied to the previous force structure tables (Table 6).

28 “Directorate of Reserve Forces, Commission of Defence Review,” 3. 29 Ministry of Defence, Reserve Forces Review 2030 (London: Ministry of Defence,

2021), 43–47.

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Reimagined Army Reserve Force Structure 5% 19%

Infantry/Staff Artillery

41% 10%

Cavalry Engineer

CIS Transport Medical

5% 11%

4%

5%

Military Police

Fig. 2 Pie chart on the Reimagined Army Reserve Force Structure

For example, the proposal herein details the Surge Brigade comprising Tier 3 units only, with reserve units only serving in a domestic setting for a specified task or called up in an emergency. Reserve headquarters elements and training units would also be Tier 3 to ensure continuity of administration and command of non-deploying units. In contrast, specialist units in the Combat Support and Combat Service Support Brigades are primarily Tier 1 and Tier 2 units, recognizing that specialist skills in the PDF are often in short supply. Reservists volunteering for these units accept the potential to be deployed operationally. To cater for specialists who cannot give an extended commitment each specialist battalion has a Tier 3 company, enabling qualified reservists to serve in a domestic setting only, and allowing the Defence Forces to benefit from their skills nonetheless. Unit tiering enables the Defence Forces to quantify Reserve resources for planning purposes, augmentation, and for operational requirements. It also facilitates the movement of reservists within the force. As personal circumstances change, reservists can opt for a more or less active unit, or a greater or lesser service commitment (Fig. 2). The total establishment of this reimagined Army Reserve is 4469 all ranks, an increase of 600 on the current 3869 strong Army Reserve under the Single Force Concept. However, as the chart above shows, the current dominance of reserve infantry is reduced from 75 percent to 41 percent.

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There is also an increased focus on specialist units across the corps spectrum to harness skillsets that are non-organic to the Defence Forces as a whole. Also, the Commission’s recommendation of a 50:50 ratio between Combat and Combat Support units (Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery), versus Combat Service Support units—is achieved. Fundamentally, a decoupled reserve force structure would represent a new direction, and several opportunities, for the Army Reserve to meaningfully contribute to the Irish defence framework.

Benefits of the New Force Structure: A Genuine “Single Defence Force” International best-practice concerning reserve forces shows that the bulk of Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities are frequently vested in the reserve land component. This practice is variously referred to as a Total Force Policy, or in the Commission’s Report, a “genuine single Defence Force.” In the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand the regular army holds the bulk of the combat units, whilst many units designed to support them in the field are often composed of reservists. With most reserve units being combat-focused Ireland is an outlier in this regard. A Total Force Policy means that any standing military cannot conduct operations without relying on reserve forces to deliver key capabilities. Operationally, and financially, the regular-combat reserve-combat service support model makes practical sense. Combat units require significant training to develop and maintain combat capabilities, often more time than reservists can commit given their civilian careers. Thus, it is more efficient for the majority of combat units to be in the regular military land component. More importantly, like many militaries, the Defence Forces is a hostage to the economy and private sector. Skilled military personnel leave for more lucrative civilian careers. Likewise, specialist units in the areas of logistics, communications, and field hospitals are expensive to maintain on a full-time basis. Reserve forces are not as vulnerable to this, as reservists can enjoy a civilian career whilst simultaneously giving a limited commitment to the military. From a budgetary standpoint and for skills retention it makes sense to develop and vest specialist capabilities within the Reserve where Specialist skills are constantly being developed in civilian careers and only brought to the military when needed. For Ireland, with competing financial priorities, adopting a Total Force Policy

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along the force structure proposed herein, or something similar, makes eminent sense for several key reasons.

Command and Staff Arrangements In terms of command arrangements, the three reserve brigades would each be commanded by a PDF brigadier general with a reserve colonel acting as brigade executive officer and a mixed Reserve/PDF headquarters staff. Currently, the Reserve has no direct representation with the Defence Forces General Staff. The highest rank attainable in the Reserve is lieutenant colonel, and under the Single Force Concept most reservists report to field-grade PDF officers and unit commanders. This creates a significant disconnect between the General Staff and the Reserve at ground level. Having Reserve brigades commanded by PDF General Officers would alleviate this disconnect by creating a reserve-focused constituency at the highest echelon of Defence Forces leadership. Historically, reserve battalions have always been commanded by a PDF officer, but the reimagined Reserve proposed herein would see reserve battalions commanded by reservists themselves—excepting the ATCP/ATCA battalion. Whilst reservists can attain the rank of lieutenant colonel they currently serve as staff officers only, with no command responsibilities. Prior to the 2013 Single Force Concept reservists served in battalion and brigade staff positions for decades, company command was normal, as were battalion executive officers. There were company level command positions for reservists across the entire corps spectrum, from infantry to military police. Reserve battalions had billets for reserve sergeant-major and battalion quartermaster sergeant appointments. However, the Single Force Concept removed nearly all reserve staff appointments at the battalion level. Company-level command is only available in the infantry and artillery, and the Army Reserve was limited to only one sergeant-major for the entire force. Consequently, reservists’ exposure to staff positions, vital to all militaries, has largely ended with experience gained previously lost to the Defence Forces. No other modern military imposes this experiential glass ceiling. In 2020, the British Army deployed a Reserve battalion to fulfil its UN peacekeeping deployment in Cyprus. The battalion was composed,

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staffed, and commanded by reservists.30 Given the makeup of other nations reserve forces this glass ceiling really makes no sense. An internal survey recently showed that the increased burden of staff work due to the retention crisis directly contributed to PDF personnel leaving the Defence Forces.31 Bringing back battalion-level positions, senior NCO ranks, and introducing battalion-level command opportunities allows reservists to meaningfully serve in staff positions from company up to brigade that contributes to professional development in critical administrative and leadership areas, but also enables reservists to augment or replace PDF personnel in staff positions during a crisis. Furthermore, since the launch of the Single Force Concept in 2013, the elimination of most reservist staff appointments means the burden of administering the Reserve itself has fallen on Army unit commanders and administrative staff. Often, reserve administrative issues are given low priority as they are seen as unimportant relative to other matters Army personnel must focus on, or they are yet another commitment imposed on an already overtaxed force. With the recreation of reserve headquarters staffs, and the expansion of reserve staff appointments across Defence Forces Headquarters the administration of reservists could be handled by reservists themselves. Thus, the reimagined Reserve could alleviate significant Army operational and administrative pressures by structuring the Reserve for its expected output.

Operational Benefits The Defence Forces are overtaxed operationally, domestically, and overseas. With nearly 1000 vacancies, the current personnel turnover rate in the PDF is 7.5 per cent. Estimates suggest that it will be 2026 before the authorized establishment of 9500 is reached.32 Consequently, the high operational tempo is falling on a shrinking number of personnel. A reimagined Reserve can alleviate this problem. In one of the most significant legislative reforms in the history of the Army Reserve, the recently

30 British Army, “Reservists Mobilize for Operational Tour,” February 2, 2020, available from https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2020/02/reservists-mob ilise-for-operational-tour/. 31 O’Riordan, “Damning Results from Defence Forces Exit Survey.” 32 (RACO), Commission Briefing Document, 3.

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commenced Defence Forces (Amendment) Act 2021 legally facilitates overseas service for reservists.33 As such, this reimagined Reserve would create a large pool of reserve specialist personnel usable for overseas deployments. This is important as the Defence Forces is struggling to fill units deploying overseas.34 Domestically, with An Garda Síochána largely unarmed, the Army carries out ATCP operations guarding Government Buildings and the Central Bank, escorting cash-in-transit, explosives shipments, prisoner transfers, providing armed patrols of sensitive infrastructure, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) callouts. Between 2005 and 2014, the Defence Forces carried out 57,765 such domestic ATCP operations, requiring a significant commitment of personnel.35 ATCP duties are rarely carried out by reservists, despite no administrative or legal obstacles to doing so. The proposed creation of a reserve unit specifically catering to ATCP operations would alleviate pressure on the Defence Forces to provide personnel for domestic operations.

Strategic Benefits The Director of Reserve Forces recently stated the roles of the Army Reserve were conventional defence, ATCA/ATCP operations, participation in peace support operations, augmentation, replacement, and reinforcement of the PDF, and to provide logistics support.36 Yet, reservists predominantly don’t participate in ATCP duties, and are insufficiently trained in Defence Forces staff and administrative functions to enable them to replace or augment their Army counterparts. There are also no reserve logistics units. However, the reimagined Reserve would provide all of these requirements. Conventional defence would be catered to by the Surge Brigade infantry battalions and Integrated Reserve, with ATCP/ATCA operations fulfilled by the ATCP/ATCA Battalion. The

33 Defence (Amendment) Bill 2020 (Ireland), Sections 14, 15, and 17. This Amendment to the existing Defence Acts has passed in the Dail and is currently awaiting debate in the Seanad. The amendments, if adopted, will allow reservists to serve on overseas deployments on UN peacekeeping operations, or with the EU Battlegroups. 34 Conor Gallagher, “Defence Forces struggling to find Volunteers for Peacekeeping Missions,” Irish Times, July 5, 2021. 35 Department of Defence, Defence Forces Annual Reports 2005–2014 (Newbridge: Department of Defence, 2005–2014). 36 “Directorate of Reserve Forces, Commission of Defence Review,” 2.

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recreation of staff positions within the Reserve would enable reservists to develop the administrative skills to augment or replace PDF personnel. The specialist focus of the Reserve would create a pool of personnel for overseas service, and the Logistics Support Battalion would fulfil logistics support requirements. Currently, the Reserve force structure is based on the two-combined arms brigades’ framework of the regular Army. If the Army deployed in brigade strength this might make sense, but it does not, this structure only serves in the case of a conventional defence role. Let’s break the mould, especially as all overseas units, even battalion-sized, are composite task forces. Adopting a Total Force Policy as proposed herein would create a Reserve not based on traditional geographic commands, but on what the Reserve can contribute to the Irish defence framework, designed to fill out tailored force packages with reserve units, sub-units, or individuals, bolted onto domestic and overseas Defence Forces operations.

Skills Retention Benefits A tertiary benefit to this new Reserve is skills retention. In the current Single Force Concept reservist career progression in the specialist corps’ is limited due to the infantry heavy focus of the Reserve. There are few billets for reserve field-grade officers or senior NCOs in specialist units. What this means in practical terms is that the partial remuneration reservists do receive, based on rank, has a glass ceiling for reservists with specialist skills. In the infantry, artillery, and cavalry corps’, progression to Commandant or Company Sergeant is common and predictable. For the smaller Transport, CIS, Medical and Engineer Corps it is extremely limited. This makes reserve service less attractive to experienced specialists due to the low remuneration ceiling, unless they transfer to the infantry corps where their skills do not contribute where the Defence Forces arguably need them the most. The reimagined Reserve would provide career progression for reserve specialists potentially up to the rank of Colonel and Battalion Sergeant Major/Battalion Quartermaster Sergeant in battalion-sized units, brigade headquarters, and Defence Forces Headquarters staffs, ensuring career progression for qualified personnel at all rungs in the Defence Forces chain of command. Secondly, for the same reason set out above, the Total Force Reserve would create positions for specialists currently serving in the Army or elsewhere in the Defence

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Forces to transfer into the Reserve upon ending their service or retirement. An Army Lieutenant Colonel in the Engineering Corps or CIS Corps, instead of retiring completely could become a Reserve Engineering or CIS Battalion commander or a staff officer on a part-time basis, thus reducing the net loss of skills to the Defence Forces.

Policy Recommendations: Transitioning to a Total Force Policy Reserve A Total Force Policy Army Reserve would require a significant reorientation and reorganization of Ireland’s reserve land component, and a key question to be answered is how to do it. The challenges are sizable, though not insurmountable. There has never been a better time to make such a transition. In December 2020, the Army Reserve, with an establishment of 3869, had just 1476 personnel.37 This historical low strength provides a unique opportunity as it is much easier to reorganize when personnel numbers are low. The Reserve currently has more officers and NCOs than privates. Properly reorganized, these personnel can provide an experienced nucleus around which a new Reserve can be built.38 But there are other practical steps to take. 1. Geographic Spread of Reserve Units Under the Single Force Concept, the bulk of Army Reserve infantry companies are not based inside Defence Forces facilities but in rural “outposts” with little or no access to military equipment or weaponry for training purposes. This amounts to significant rental costs for infrastructure that does not contribute to the Irish defence framework. The Director of Reserve argued for more Reserve units to move to cities, pointing out that only 700 reservists are stationed in Dublin, despite its population of 1.3 million.39 The dispersal of Reserve units to non-military outposts across Ireland was ostensibly to maintain a local defence link with rural Ireland. This local link comes at the expense of Reserve operational output and efficiency,

37 Department of Defence, “Tabular Statement: Substantive Strength of the Second Line Reserve,” December 31, 2020. 38 “Directorate of Reserve Forces, Commission of Defence Review,” 6. 39 “Directorate of Reserve Forces, Commission of Defence Review,” 6–7.

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and there is no evidence suggesting recruitment is influenced by the presence, or lack thereof, of the Defence Forces in rural areas. For any new Reserve to be viable and to contribute to the defence framework units must be geographically stationed where recruitment, training, and harnessing of specialist skills can be maximized. In Ireland this can only be achieved in cities and near third-level educational institutions. This is why most Defence Forces facilities are in cities, the Army Reserve should be no different. All outposts should be shut down, and reserve units relocated to existing (or new) Defence Forces facilities based on factors that contribute to their operational output. For a Total Force Policy Reserve proposed herein the geographic dispersion could arguably be as follows: the Logistics Support Battalion, Engineering Battalion, CIS Battalion and Medical units should be in Dublin, Cork, Limerick, and Galway, cities with significant populations and educational institutes that offer qualifications that enable targeted recruitment of specialists in these areas. The Training Battalion and ATCP/ATCA Battalion should be in the Defence Forces Training Centre located in the Curragh. One reserve Infantry Battalion each should be allocated to Dublin and Cork, Ireland’s most populace cities. Reserve military police companies should be distributed across all Defence Forces facilities in keeping with their role in the maintenance and enforcement of military law. The local defence link has been a historical hallmark of the Irish reserve land component, but it is simply unsustainable in a modern defence context to deliberately dedicate entire reserve units and financial resources for no tangible (or quantifiable) defence return. 2. Legislative Requirements With the Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (COVID19) Act 2020, reservists can now be called up and their civilian employment is legally protected during their service period. This was prompted by the absence of legislation enabling the use of reservists during Operation FORTITUDE; the Defence Forces response to COVID-19.40 However, job protection only exists under a declaration of national emergency. No less acute contingency is catered for. This is an issue as the Defence Forces (Amendment) Act 2021

40 “Directorate of Reserve Forces, Commission of Defence Review,” 3.

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now enables reservists to serve overseas on peace support operations. As overseas operations do not fall under a national emergency, reservists, currently, will be unable to participate as their civilian employment will be put at risk if they are absent for a months-long deployment. Thus, legislation is needed to provide job protection for reservists if called up for any operational commitment, whether for peace support operations abroad or if individual reservists by nature of their skills are required for a domestic contingency, such as the recent HSE cyberattacks. Furthermore, legislation is also needed to guarantee reservists’ employment during periods of training. The ability to call-up reservists is meaningless unless they are trained, and no such legislative protections exist currently. The Permanent Defence Forces Other Ranks Representative Association (PDFORRA) has expressed concerns that reservists deploying overseas will reduce opportunities for PDF personnel who are contractually obliged to complete periodic deployments.41 One concern is an urban legend that a limit exists of no more than 850 Defence Forces personnel overseas at any given time. Therefore, allowing reservists to deploy means depriving PDF personnel. This is a misperception. This “limit” is a commitment by the Irish Government under the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) to provide up to 850 personnel for UN operations. This is not a legally binding limitation, it is merely a policy commitment.42 There are no legal limitations regarding how many Defence Forces personnel can be deployed overseas at any given time, UNSAS has no bearing on EU deployments, NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) operations, or unliteral missions undertaken by Ireland. As such, overseas deployments are not a “Reserve vs PDF” either or binary; reservists can serve overseas in addition to PDF personnel, not instead of . 3. Recruitment and Training

41 PDFORRA, “Initial Submission of PDFORRA to the Commission on the Future of Defence, February 2021,” 23. Available from https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/0029cpublic-consultation-commission-on-the-defence-forces/#representative-associations-andtrade-unions. 42 Commandant John Durnin, “The Irish Defence Forces: Options for Future Humanitarian Operations,” 1 June 2001. Unpublished master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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With no legislation protecting a reservists’ civilian employment during training periods, the Defence Forces time to train reservists is quite limited. Even if there were, it would take years to train every reservist first to be an infantry soldier and then to deliver jobspecific training, especially in specialist areas such as engineering, medicine, and communications systems on a part-time basis. The Defence Forces should therefore adopt a policy of targeted recruitment of qualified individuals with specialist skills in Reserve service that can be efficiently converted for military applicability, a train-totask approach. Reservists should train specifically for their expected output, not train for every job. Currently, before a reservist can learn to drive a truck, they must complete infantry basic training, which on a part-time basis can take 12–18 months. They must then complete progressive driving courses, again taking perhaps another 12–18 months, if their employer releases them for periods of training of course, before being eligible to complete the Defence Forces truck course. Better to simply recruit a trained professional truck driver and convert them to operate in the military. The Army has the time and financial resources to train all personnel in a vast array of military specialities; a small force necessitates cross-training. The same thinking has been applied to the Reserve, and it has not worked. The Reserve should focus on militarizing existing civilian skill sets. The Defence Forces already do this. Qualified doctors and engineers are regularly offered directentry commissions as Army officers as their specialist skills are already developed. Direct-entry officers complete induction training, colloquially termed a “shoot and salute” course for its spartan syllabus that simply introduces would-be specialist officers to the bare minimum needed to bring their skills to the Defence Forces. Put simply, if it can work for doctors and engineers in the Army, it can work for truck drivers, paramedics, mechanics, and cyber security professionals in the Reserve. Specialist reservists who seek promotion can choose to complete the necessary career courses, but this time commitment is lessened by the candidates existing skillset in their chosen field of expertise. All that needs to be developed is leadership and administrative skills to operate within the Defence Forces, most of the specialist skills are already there. Furthermore, given the post-Covid paradigm of distance learning such mediums

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should be capitalized upon to train and develop reservists’ familiarization and competency with Defence Forces administration and bureaucracy. Another worthwhile proposal for consideration is the Reserve Officer and Enlisted Training Program which advocates for the targeted recruitment of Irish university students with desirable skills who are recruited to the Reserve for a term of service in return for the Defence Forces financing their Third-Level education.43 4. Permanently Fold the First Line Reserve into the Army Reserve What is often forgotten regarding the Army Reserve is that it is officially classified as the Second Line Reserve. The reason for this is that some ex-regular personnel, for contractual reasons, are required to be willing to re-enter the Defence Forces for a period after they retire from active service, remaining in what is called the First Line Reserve (FLR). As Neil Richardson’s chapter explains, the Irish Government has consistently avoided the amalgamation of reservists and ex-regular personnel into one entity, despite the obvious cross-pollination of skills and experience that would result.44 The FLR is ostensibly supposed to provide the initial surge capacity to the Defence Forces in time of emergency solely with former PDF personnel. However, the FLR ceased regular training in 1988, the contractual requirement to serve within it has been inconsistently applied or enforced, and even more problematic, in 2020, the FLR strength was just 274 personnel, 236 of whom were privates. Only 3 were officers.45 Furthermore, most were former Air Corps personnel. The FLR has dwindled into non-existence, is largely irrelevant for the Army and Naval Service, and thus the Army Reserve is the de facto First Line Reserve by virtue of numbers and regular training. In a damning indictment the Commission on the Defence Forces Report concluded that no members of the FLR were operationally effective.46

43 See Jonathan Carroll and Neil Richardson, “Training for the Expected, Educating for the Unknown: The Defence Forces Reserve Officer Training Program, a Proposal,” Defence Forces Review 18 (2021), 55–61. 44 See Neil Richardson’s chapter on the Army Reserve within this volume. 45 Department of Defence, “Tabular Statement: Substantive Strength of the Second

Line Reserve,” December 31, 2020. 46 Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, 127.

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Prior to the Commission’s Report the Director of the Reserve stated that “the capture of ex-PDF members into the First Line Reserve through legal and regulatory means remains a priority.”47 This would be a misstep. Within this volume, Neil Richardson makes a valid argument that the FLR should be abolished and exregular personnel should be contractually obligated to serve in the Army Reserve instead. However, no current mechanism exists for PDF personnel to transfer to Reserve upon retirement or end of active service.48 This mechanism should be established as ex-regular personnel would be invaluable in any rejuvenated Reserve, along the lines I have proposed herein or Neil Richardson’s tripartite model—or any combination of both. 5. Remuneration and Investment Will a reimagined Reserve require investment? Yes. But it should be recognized that in relative terms the investment required would not be prohibitive. In real terms, the largest cost would be obtaining the specialist equipment and vehicles to outfit the Logistics, Engineering and Medical reserve units. There are already enough small arms for the nearly 4000 reservists of the existing Single Force Concept and those remaining integrated reservists in the Cavalry and Artillery Corps already have the heavy weapons and armoured vehicles of their parent Army units so no additional investment would be required in these areas. Another key issue, as highlighted by Richardson, and Rodgers and O’Murchu, is the lack of remuneration for serving reservists who are expected to contribute significant amounts of unpaid voluntary service. With the Defence Forces in crisis due to claims of suboptimal remuneration for PDF personnel, the idea of expecting skilled civilian professionals to support the Defence Forces for free is frankly, ludicrous. The Director of the Reserve highlighted that Reserve strength is falling due to this expectation of non-remunerated volunteerism “that is out of step with society and is failing to achieve target.”49 Ireland is the only country in Europe where military reservists are expected to serve in an unpaid capacity; we are an outlier for all the wrong reasons. The

47 “Directorate of Reserve Forces, Commission of Defence Review,” 1. 48 “Directorate of Reserve Forces, Commission of Defence Review,” 6. 49 “Directorate of Reserve Forces, Commission of Defence Review,” 3.

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inescapable reality is that defence costs money. You get what you pay for, and the coalface is that if you invest in a Reserve it is there on the side-lines when needed, if personnel are adequately remunerated then they will serve, and if the Irish Government wants the wealth of specialist skills that reservists have through their hard-earned civilian qualifications and experience, the antiquated approach of volunteerism needs to end.

Conclusion: Why Bother Revitalizing the Reserve? In November 2012, Defence Forces Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sean McCann briefed the Defence Forces General Staff on the Single Force Concept reorganization of the Army Reserve. McCann highlighted that “serious consideration” was given to abolishing the Reserve altogether.50 Ten years later, with the Reserve currently at 30 percent strength and falling, a decision needs to be made. Do we continue nearly a century of doing the same thing, whilst magically expecting different results? If so, just abolish the Reserve now, it has almost ceased to exist anyway. Or, should we finally, as the Commission’s Report highlights, join most other countries in recognizing the utility and efficiency of investing in a Reserve that can meaningfully contribute to Irish defence? The choice rests on answering one central question; does Ireland need the Army Reserve? My answer is an emphatic yes! Despite romantic claims of neutrality, Ireland exists in a world replete with current and emerging threats. Tom Clonan and Admiral Mellett’s chapters on Ireland’s security environment should sober even the most uninitiated reader. Apart from Covid, Ireland must deal with Brexit, Climate Change, international terrorism, cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and mass migration. Defence strategy is all about choices and the acceptance of risk. A small nation like Ireland does not enjoy the resources and military power of larger nations, which means our decisions need to be smart, informed, and prudent. Resources are limited, as are personnel and equipment. Currently, the Defence Forces comprises what many claim is an increasingly inexperienced and unskilled Army, an Air Corps that is incapable of defending Irish sovereign airspace or interdicting intruders,

50 Lieutenant General Sean McCann, Defence Forces Chief of Staff, Briefing to Irish General Staff, 20 November 2012. Slides in possession of the author.

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whilst the Naval Service fleet has no ability to detect let alone counter submarines in one of the largest maritime exclusion zones in the European Union. The Defence Forces are simply not large enough to be all things to all people, a reality clearly exemplified by the various and continuing crises the force finds itself struggling to confront. Several naval vessels are tied up for want of sailors, half the Defence Forces medical and CIS officer’s positions are vacant, as are one-third of engineering officer appointments.51 Volunteers for overseas missions are falling, necessitating mandatory selection to ensure missions are fully staffed at a time when the new overseas focus for the Defence Forces is robust peace enforcement missions in Africa.52 Solving these problems will take time and significant investment. But a quick win, that can yield results and alleviate some of the issues, is the Army Reserve. It has been languishing for nearly a century without a meaningful role, with personnel eager to contribute to the Irish defence framework, and with vital skills to do so. Peace enforcement missions will only increase the demand for Defence Forces engineers, doctors, and skilled specialists, and fundamentally a reimagined and resourced Army Reserve is uniquely suited to supply such qualified and experienced personnel into the future. Defence Minister Simon Coveney acknowledged this reality, arguing for the Reserve “to attract cybersecurity and communications experts, chefs, medics and engineers, [we] have pinch points in terms of skillsets and I think the role of the reserve would be really useful in that regard.”53 To maximize this utility the Army Reserve force structure should reflect informed decisions about what defence priorities are. A revitalized and reimagined Reserve could alleviate several issues facing the Defence Forces, and a forward-thinking reorganization could reduce or prevent many of these institutional crises from occurring again.

51 (RACO), Commission Briefing Document, 3. 52 Conor Gallagher, “Irish Peacekeeping Future: More Specialized, Complex, and

Dangerous,” Irish Times, July 5, 2021; Conor Gallagher, “Defence Forces Struggling to Find Volunteers for Peacekeeping Missions,” Irish Times, July 5, 2021. 53 Hannah McCarthy, “Army Numbers on Peacekeeping Missions Will Not Be Cut, Coveney Says,” Irish Times, July 7, 2021.

The Army Reserve: The Force-Multiplier for Irish Defence Neil Richardson

Introduction This chapter examines the status of the Irish Army Reserve and regular Army, along with the contemporary issues facing both. It will be argued that rejuvenating the Army Reserve would not just save this force but would enable the Reserve to alleviate some of the issues faced by the regular Army. This chapter will also highlight the recent ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ developments—positive legislative changes in support of a future Army Reserve that are in train. Primarily, this chapter argues and proposes how a future Army Reserve could be restructured to meaningfully support the State and the regular Army in a cost-effective way, beneficial to all parties, namely by reorganising the Reserve into ‘Integrated’, ‘Support’ and ‘Specialist’ elements—each comprising reservists with unique qualifications and service commitments—commanded by regular Army officers. This chapter demonstrates how a restructured Army Reserve as proposed can resolve the legacy problems that have

N. Richardson (B) Irish Army Reserve and Reserve Defence Forces Representative Association, Co. Roscommon, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_8

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plagued the force throughout its history, thereby making the Army Reserve the force-multiplier for the Irish defence. Ultimately, the Army Reserve’s history has been one of perpetual trial and error and organisational amnesia resulting in a failure to learn from the past, and ambitious intentions that were never paired with necessary supports. However, by identifying these issues, and deriving the inherent lessons therein, a revitalized, repurposed, and rejuvenated Army Reserve can become a vital part of the Irish defence framework.

Understanding the Present The Army Reserve currently operates as part of the ‘Single Force Concept’. This came about following a reorganisation in 2013, whereby all unique reserve units were disestablished, and reserve elements were absorbed into previously regular-only units. Consequently, regular and reserve soldiers now serve together as part of the same integrated command structure; the Single Force Concept. Prior to the implementation of this reorganisation, two restructuring options were fielded. Option one was restructuring the Reserve into a force of 4000 personnel, removing the annual financial gratuity that members received at the time for attaining certain annual service requirements, but increasing the number of paid training ‘mandays’ to 41,000 per annum. Option two was a reduced force of 2500–2600 while retaining the payment of a gratuity and keeping the number of paid training ‘mandays’ static at 30,000. Option one stemmed from the Value for Money Review of the Reserve Defence Forces concluding that ‘the abolition of the current Reserve gratuity and re-assignment of these funds to paid training for members of the Reserve could boost available mandays by approximately 36% to 41,000 and support a level of recruitment sufficient to sustain a revised strength level of 4,000 personnel’.1 Option one was ultimately implemented; however, despite the Value for Money Review conclusions, within one year of the 2013 reorganisation, the annual training ‘manday’ budget plummeted from 41,000 to 28,000, before rising in 2016 to 30,000, where it has remained since.2

1 Department of Defence, Value for Money Review of the Reserve Defence Force (Newbridge: Department of Defence, 2012), 82–89. 2 Department of Defence, Value for Money Review, 86.

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Furthermore, because of the 2008 financial crisis, Reserve recruitment was suspended until 2014. Since that date, despite thousands of applications per year, the processing and administration of reserve recruitment can only be described as extremely poor. Inordinate delays of months, or even years, between applicants progressing through the various recruitment testing stages are not unusual, with a lack of resourcing, particularly in medical testing, being a significant issue, and maladministration of various kinds adding further delays. For example, out of 4870 aspiring reserve applicants in 2014, only 157 successfully enlisted; 1624 applicants in 2020 resulted in just 63 recruits. In 2021, one reserve unit analysed the total number of applications they received since 2014 versus the numbers who had successfully enlisted. The review revealed a cripplingly low 2.8% applicant-to-recruit conversion rate. Given the issues that reserve recruitment is currently faced with, it is no wonder that so many applicants choose to discontinue the recruitment process rather than seek to join an organisation in such apparent administrative disarray. Since 2013, Reserve strength peaked at 2280 in 2015.3 At the time of writing, the Army Reserve is at its lowest point in the force’s history, with just 1524 effective personnel.4 Ultimately, the Reserve did not get the Value for Money Review’s Option one; it received the lack of gratuity from Option one along with the lower ‘manday’ budget and lower strength figure from Option two. The Reserve received the worst of both worlds. The ‘Single Force Concept’ introduced in the 2013 reorganisation, while positive insofar as it incorporated the concept of integrating reserve and regular personnel, only saw a continuation of the old issues. Reserve service incentives were removed, the 2015 White Paper on Defence did nothing to give the Reserve a new purpose, and, at the time of writing, no Reserve-specific implementation projects arising from that White Paper have been initiated. Funding matters remained unresolved and issues surrounding potential conflict with civilian employment unaddressed. The Single Force Concept itself was expected to succeed without resourcing and supporting the leaders and staff of previously regular-only units to handle the extra workload of now having reservists on strength.

3 Department of Defence, ‘Tabular Statement: Substantive Strength of the Second Line Reserve’, December 31, 2015. 4 Department of Defence, ‘Tabular Statement: Substantive Strength of the Second Line Reserve’, September 30, 2022.

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Nevertheless, there is significant scope for a rejuvenated Army Reserve to support and assist the regular Army. The Permanent Defence Forces (PDF), comprising the regular Army, Air Corps and Naval Service, has an establishment of 9500 personnel. But as of June 2021, the PDF strength is only 8570, with 500 being new personnel in training.5 This has resulted in skills shortages in several key areas. As of February 2021, 50% of officer appointments in both the Medical and Marine Engineering branches are vacant, while 33% of Engineering, 44% of Communications and Information Services, and 28% of Ordnance officer appointments are also unfilled.6 The problem is not limited to officer-specific appointments, and it was recently reported that the Naval Service is experiencing a 33% deficiency in chefs, along with other shortages in non-commissioned roles such as engine room artificers and medics.7 Similarly, the Army Nursing Service currently stands at only 3–4% establishment.8 Due to the current low-strength figure, the PDF is now experiencing difficulties in filling overseas missions without resorting to the mandatory detailing of personnel.9 However, changes in support of greater Reserve utilisation are underway. The Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (COVID-19) Act 2020 granted reservists employment protection in the event of an emergency call-up. A Commission on the Defence Forces recently issued its final report, and while one of its seven terms of reference focusses exclusively on the reserve, the Commission has also identified ‘the need for all sub-groups to address issues concerning the Reserve … particularly as a separate RDF sub-group is likely to be established later in the

5 Sean O’Riordan, ‘Damning Results from Defence Forces Exit Survey’, Irish Examiner, June 13, 2021. 6 Representative Association of Commissioned Officers, ‘Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces, 16 February 2021’, 10, available from https://www.gov.ie/en/ collection/0029c-public-consultation-commission-on-the-defence-forces/#representativeassociations-and-trade-unions. 7 O’Riordan, ‘Damning’. 8 Marie O’Halloran, ‘“Defence Forces” Nursing Service Down from 100 to Just “Three

or Four”’, Irish Times, June 30, 2021. 9 Conor Gallagher, ‘Defence Forces Struggling to Find Volunteers for Peacekeeping Missions’, Irish Times, July 5, 2021.

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year to give full consideration to all Reserve issues’.10 Finally, at the time of writing, the Defence (Amendment) Act 2021—which provides reservists with the legal underpinning to engage in domestic and overseas operational service—has recently been signed into law by the President.11

Developing a Future Reserve While the Reserve is suffering several issues, the Commission on the Defence Forces and legislative change indicates a sea-change in attitudes towards the Army Reserve. The next question is, how should this new attitude be capitalised upon? One avenue, as mentioned, is to restructure the Reserve using the lessons of the past to make the Army Reserve the force-multiplier for Irish defence in the future. To do this, this proposal contends that all Army Reserve elements, both ex-regular and volunteer reservists, should be restructured into three new groups; the Army Reserve (Integrated), the Army Reserve (Support), and the Army Reserve (Specialists). The subsequent sections of this chapter will explain each group, the logic underpinning their design and administration, and how this ‘new’ Reserve not only alleviates the issues facing the PDF but is a product of the lessons learned from the past century of the Reserve’s history.

Army Reserve (Integrated) The Army Reserve (Integrated) should comprise suitable ex-regular nonspecialist personnel, along with reservists who have volunteered for potential operational utilisation in conventional military roles, additional training commitments such as integrated training with the regular Army, enhanced corps-specific training, and the annual attainment of operational readiness standards; the passing of medical, physical fitness, and weapons proficiency tests. The Integrated element should be structured as per the current Single Force Concept model; reserve sub-elements of regular

10 Commission on the Defence Forces, ‘5th Meeting of the Commission on the Defence Forces: Minutes’, April 13, 2021, available from https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/ 36d90-commission-on-the-defence-forces-minutes-of-fifth-meeting/. 11 ‘Defence (Amendment) Act 2021’, Houses of the Oireachtas, available from https:// www.oireachtas.ie/en/bills/bill/2020/2/.

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Army units with formal rank establishments. However, careful consideration would have to be given to integrating ex-regular and volunteer reservists in these units. If ex-regulars secure most of the appointments, are allowed to train separately, or receive opportunities denied to the reservists they serve alongside, or if reservists have no chance of promotion against an ex-regular, then a cultural divide will be perpetuated with limited, if any, buy-in from reservists for the Army Reserve (Integrated). The proposed Integrated reserve group would result in unit commanders of currently existing units remaining in command of reserve elements in addition to their regular Army personnel, and would ensure that reservists serving in these otherwise regular-only units would be fit for purpose from an operational perspective. Such an arrangement would require all current Army units to possess dedicated personnel tasked with supporting each unit’s integrated reservists in terms of administration, logistics and training. These appointments should be filled by suitably qualified reservists from each unit’s integrated pool; there is no reason why the reserve cannot support itself in this capacity. There may be a requirement for larger reservist staffs in these areas compared to a unit’s regular Army administration, logistics or training staff to reflect the parttime nature of reserve service by facilitating ‘job share’ roles. But, with the right training, reservists could easily support Army unit commanders in these areas. Additionally, as per the current Single Force Concept, all Army Reserve appointments in Defence Forces/Army/Formation/Unit headquarters, and in various Defence Forces schools and training centres, should be exclusively retained for personnel of the Army Reserve (Integrated). Such appointments, particularly in the schools and training centres, should be significantly expanded beyond the current establishment. However, as noted previously, for proper integration to occur it is vital that service opportunities for ex-regulars and volunteer reservists exist at all levels. Ultimately, the aim of this Integrated element of the future Army Reserve is to provide an operationally utilisable pool of skilled part-time non-specialist personnel comprised of seamlessly integrated ex-regulars and reservists, each bringing their own experiential benefits to the table. Ex-regulars possess their various qualifications obtained during regular service, but there are plenty of key qualifications that reservists could obtain, thereby making them operationally utilisable. Reservists could qualify as Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) personnel, an area where reservists are likely to excel give their dual military-civilian lives. They

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could also train as recruitment staff, intelligence analysts, as administrative or logistics staff, as drivers, weapons system operators, medical personnel, or as instructors for a broad range of military skills courses. None of these qualifications are beyond the reach of reservists. Reflecting the enhanced nature of the Army Reserve (Integrated), personnel should have greater service expectations placed upon them, the annual attainment of operational readiness standards along with a mandatory number of courses, training events, or operational days to be completed per annum where appropriate. For reservists to be a part of an enhanced element of the Army Reserve they should expect to deliver corresponding levels of output. To support this, it is necessary for reservists to be properly remunerated with appropriate pay rates, allowances, and an annual gratuity. Furthermore, appointments for the full range of Army Reserve ranks, both commissioned and noncommissioned, should be available within the Army Reserve (Integrated), for ex-regulars and reservists. Career progression up the rank structure is a significant retention measure.

Army Reserve (Support) Where members of the Army Reserve (Integrated)—either ex-regulars or reservists—are unable to maintain the commitment levels required of service in this element of the Army Reserve, perhaps due to a shift in personal circumstances, they should be permitted to transfer into the second group of proposed new reservists, the Army Reserve (Support).12 This allows reservists, whose personal circumstances do not permit the time/commitment necessary to serve in the Army Reserve (Integrated) to still render valuable service. Arguably, all ‘non-specialist’ reservists should be recruited as Support reservists in the first instance, and then—if their personal circumstances allow, if a vacancy is available, and if they meet the necessary criteria—they should be permitted to transfer to the Army Reserve (Integrated). Unlike the Integrated group, the Army Reserve (Support) units should be established as separate entities to currently existing Defence Forces units, i.e. not integrated with regular Army units. At least one 12 Similarly, if individual ex-regulars are deemed inappropriate for inclusion in the Army Reserve (Integrated) immediately after concluding their regular service, they should instead be posted to the Army Reserve (Support).

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Army Reserve (Support) ‘Group’ should be headquartered in each permanently occupied barracks nationwide, with the various sub-elements of each Group based in the barracks and locally associated outposts. Each Group headquarters should be commanded by a regular Army officer, supported by combined regular/reserve staffs responsible for administration, logistics, and training. Furthermore, each Group should comprise combat (infantry), combat support (artillery/cavalry), and combat service support (communications and information services/medical/military police/transport) elements; in essence, elements representing all Army corps specialities. It is envisioned that service as a Support reservist would be of a more moderate nature—with lower annual training commitments—compared to the Army Reserve (Integrated). Therefore, once new members have completed their new inductee training and have been assigned to a combat/combat support/combat service support corps within their Group, their subsequent training should be necessarily focussed and centred on two primary areas; generic ‘Support’ qualifications and a corps ‘key skill’. In terms of general Support qualifications, all Support reservists should be trained in security duties, as drivers to minibus level, as medical military first responders, and in communications as regimental signallers. These qualifications represent the ‘first rung on the ladder’ in each area and are attainable by reservists with limited time to commit. Yet, if all Support reservists possessed these skillsets, this would produce a pool of suitability trained personnel who could be meaningfully utilised in a surge capacity in various Aid to the Civil Authority roles. For example, in an extreme weather event or perhaps in support of a HSE operation, Support reservists would be qualified to transport passengers and patients, render medical assistance, maintain communications, and secure any areas they were operating in. Meanwhile, in a military training environment, such reservists could support the regular Army via the provision of security duties, driving details, as exercise troops for tactical exercises, or the provision of basic medical or communications support. This cross-pollinating skills training could then be followed by an advanced corps-specific key skill, depending on which corps a member of the Army Reserve (Support) is serving in. For example, infantry reservists in each Support Group could additionally train on infantry support weapons, cavalry reservists could train as ground surveillance radar operators, and transport reservists could train on heavy lift military vehicles.

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The intent is to create an intermediate-level body of reservists trained in generic military support roles and at least one corps-specific advanced speciality.

Army Reserve (Specialists) The final new group of the proposed rejuvenated Army Reserve is the Army Reserve (Specialists). This Specialist element should comprise all suitable ex-regular technical/specialist personnel, and reservists who possess specialist civilian or professional qualifications who are seeking to serve the Defence Forces in an exclusively specialist capacity. Like the Army Reserve (Integrated), Specialists should have the potential to be operationally utilised, in this case in specialist military roles. Also, in keeping with the ‘you get what you pay for’ maxim, and reflecting their specialist nature, they should be properly remunerated to ensure retention. Ex-regular and reserve specialists should be recruited directly into the Army Reserve (Specialists). On application, each applicant should be individually reviewed, with successful applicants assigned a direct-entry rank—officer or NCO—commensurate with their individual qualifications. Once an appropriate rank has been identified, personnel can then be assigned to the specific corps or branch relevant to their skill set, or, if their qualifications are of value but do not obviously fit in a particular corps or branch, placement in a centralised specialist pool would be more appropriate. Direct-entry familiarisation training will be required, but the primary purpose for the Army Reserve (Specialists) is the utilisation of members’ already-present individual skills. Thus, any additional military training should focus on military conversion training—the application of their qualifications in a military environment. By remaining flexible—instead of drafting an overly-specific list of preapproved qualifications that outlines, and therefore restricts, what is and is not a ‘specialist’—this would allow all applications for the Army Reserve (Specialists) to be assessed on individual merit, thereby ensuring that the Defence Forces obtains all personnel of potential military value. Persons may apply with qualifications that do not obviously ‘fit’ into any military corps or branch, but their specialist skills may still provide a valuable capability in other key areas. Medical and legal professionals, engineers, cybersecurity experts, academics in military-relevant disciplines, chefs, logisticians, fitness/nutrition professionals and physiotherapists may all

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have obvious specialist military application, but there are other specialist qualifications that should not be dismissed. For example, veterinarians or dog handlers may not, at first glance, appear as obviously useful specialist qualifications. However, veterinarians can be invaluable in a CIMIC role when it comes to interacting with agricultural communities overseas, while military working dogs can be used to provide security or to detect mines, hidden weapons, or illegal substances. The wider the net is cast, the greater the variety of skills that the Defence Forces may obtain.

The Army Reserve as a Force-Multiplier In terms of numerical composition, the Army Reserve (Integrated) should be 50% the size of the regular Army, with the Army Reserve (Support) equalling the size of the regular Army. Based on the current regular Army establishment, the Army Reserve (Integrated) would stand at approximately 3800 and the Army Reserve (Support) approximately 7500 personnel respectively. Such establishment numbers are required to provide for a degree of built-in redundancy via duplication of critical components with the intention of increasing reliability, thereby providing meaningful support to the PDF. Finally, the size of the Army Reserve (Specialists), in keeping with the flexible nature of this element of the Army Reserve, should be permitted to expand and contract as specific specialist requirements develop over time. In terms of restructuring to this rejuvenated Army Reserve, a key issue that needs to be addressed, for the Army Reserve (Integrated) and Army Reserve (Support), is the dominance of the Infantry Corps which currently comprises 77% of Army Reserve appointments. While the regular Army is infantry-centric, and while future changes may introduce greater numbers of armoured-, mechanised-, motorised-, specialist-, electronic warfare- or amphibious-infantry, they will still be infantry nonetheless and so a sizeable proportion, arguably 30%, of the future Army Reserve should still be comprised of this corps. However, an opportunity will be lost if the future Army Reserve remains top-heavy with infantry; the availability of the qualifications developed in the combat support and combat service support corps could be significantly increased within the Army Reserve if they comprised a combined 70% of the force’s future establishment.

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By way of a comparison, the British Army’s Future Reserve 2020 initiative arguably delivered a similarly improved and evolved Army Reserve. One article on the subject is worth quoting at length: Reserve soldiers now use equipment more closely aligned to their regular counterparts and are subject to almost identical training standards. The reservists of 2020 are no longer part of a “drinking club with a gun fetish” (as one Captain once described the [Reserve]) or forced to deploy on exercise with Land Rovers made up to be Challenger [tanks]. Courses that were once an attendance exercise have been turned into condensed versions of those completed by regular soldiers and judged by the same criteria – with the ability to “return to unit” soldiers that fail to meet the grade. Rank is now awarded on the basis of competence and professional qualification rather than time served or popularity within a unit, and, as of 2019, were introduced to better measure a soldiers’ ability. The financial incentives offered to regular service leavers led to an influx of experience. Not only in terms of trade knowledge, but also of army systems more widely. Experience gained by regular soldiers in recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan is now more readily available to new reserve recruits. The “weekend warriors” of old have morphed into a more capable and therefore deployable asset.13

With the right support and enablers, the same could be achieved for the Army Reserve of the Irish Defence Forces. However, one key pitfall in relation to Future Reserve 2020 was identified by another author; the Army Reserve is not the regular Army, and a lack of awareness of this fact coupled with a ‘one size fits all’ mentality, such as reservists being required to complete unrealistically long 9–5 Monday-Friday courses designed for regular Army students, instead of modularising these for delivery over longer timeframes to parttime soldiers, can undermine the best-laid plans.14 It is necessary to remain cognisant of this issue to prevent it from becoming a problem

13 Jeremy Barton and Ewen Dymott, ‘Mutual Support: Maximising the Army Reserve’, Wavell Room, February 3, 2021, available at https://wavellroom.com/2021/02/03/mut ual-support-maximising-the-army-reserve/. 14 Anthony Crocker, ‘A Reserve Force That Is an Integral Element of the Whole Force’, Wavell Room, April 23, 2021, available at https://wavellroom.com/2021/04/23/a-res erve-force-that-is-an-integral-element-of-the-whole-force/.

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for the future Irish Army Reserve; there cannot be an inflexible emphasis on the ‘Single’ in Single Force Concept.

Learning from the Past Much of the proposal outlined above draws its inspiration from the ninety-six-year history of the Army Reserve; lessons derived from what worked well in the past and what did not. Unfortunately, this institutional history can be summarised as perpetual trial and error, an absence of a coherent ‘lessons learned’ policy in terms of what did or did not work well with various iterations of the force, and ambitious intentions consistently paired with under-funding and under-resourcing. However, a study of the past provides vital direction for the future.

The Need for Incentives The first reserve force comprised exclusively of part-time volunteers with no previous regular military service was the ‘Volunteer Reserve’ formed in 1929.15 Within this force, retention was addressed to some degree with a financial incentive in return for attendance, namely an end-of-year bounty or gratuity for meeting annual training requirements.16 Despite its obvious utility, the end-of-year bounty was not provided to the next iteration of the reserve, the ‘Volunteer Force’ of 1934. In the space of less than a decade, iterations of the reserve went from receiving a bounty to incentivise training attendance to no bounty whatsoever. As a result, by 1939, 50% of the Volunteer Force’s 16,000 reservists enlisted since 1934 had been discharged for poor attendance.17 The end-of-year payment returned with the formation of An Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil (FCÁ) in the post-Emergency (Second World War) period but was withdrawn again from reservists in 2013. Undoubtedly, the high rate of discharges from the Volunteer Force in the 1930s presaged a similar decline in strength experienced post-2013 when the end-of-year gratuity was discontinued for reservists. With requirements to complete an element of unpaid 15 Labhrás Joye, ‘The Reserves of Óglaigh na hÉireann 1927–1939’, 1994. Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University College Dublin, 21. 16 Liam Campbell, ‘A Historical Analysis of Reserves in the Irish Defence Forces’, An Cosantóir Review (1997): 26. 17 Campbell, ‘A Historical Analysis of Reserves’, 29–30.

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service being a historical feature of the reserve, coupled with ever-present individual ancillary costs such as travel expenses or the purchase of necessary non-issue items or equipment, the lack of an end-of-year gratuity, designed to offset these ancillary costs, often made reserve service a net financial loss for individual reservists. Therefore, any future Army Reserve will require proper financial incentivisation to guarantee service.

The Need for Adequate Funding Funding and resource allocation has historically been insufficient to support the stated goals of past iterations of the Reserve, giving credence to claims that the force has been continually ‘set up to fail’.18 Moreover, the proportion of the annual defence budget allotted to the Reserve has been consistently decreasing. In 1933, the cabinet allotted the Volunteer Force a substantial 20% of the contemporary defence budget of £1,318,458. Adjusted for inflation, this equates to e17,252,490 in 2021.19 The current budget allocation for the Reserve stands at e2,150,000 per annum, or 0.25% of the total 2022 Vote 36 defence budget allocation. Put simply, it is impossible to provide a meaningful Reserve on one-quarter of a per cent of the budget. Additionally, under-funding has also historically stood in the way of regular-reserve integration. Referencing the reserve of the 1930s, Prendergast writes that; The creation of an active reserve, in order to better integrate the army with other citizens of the state, was implemented but never adequately funded … In my own experience professional soldiers are wary of reserves unless they are properly funded; the fear being that an under-resourced and under-trained reserve would hinder rather than help the regular force. From the documents analysed I am making an assumption that this sentiment was relevant in the regular army of the 1920s and 1930s. This assumption is reinforced by the reluctance of the government to adequately fund a reserve force. The government appeared to have been fearful that a large reserve would lead to the militarisation of the state. As a result of these misgivings the state was arguably left with a standing army that was

18 Campbell, 34. 19 ‘CPI Inflation Calculator’, Central Statistics Office, accessed December 22, 2021,

https://www.cso.ie/en/interactivezone/visualisationtools/cpiinflationcalculator/.

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too small and underequipped to defend the state, supported by a reserve force that lacked the training and resources to augment the regular force.20

‘Volunteer’ Status and Civilian Employment Two interconnected issues, which have remained unaddressed over the decades, are the issues relating to reservists’ civilian employment and reservists’ status within the Defence Forces as ‘volunteers’ (as opposed to employees). The first reservists in the 1920s quickly found that employers were reluctant to hire employees who had to leave for one month of reserve training each year (as was the contemporary requirement).21 This issue also affected reservists in employment; their ability to attend training often rested exclusively on the support of their employers. No serious measures were ever taken by the Irish Government to remedy this issue, no general employment protection legislation or anti-discrimination legislation was introduced, and the problem never went away. Throughout every historical iteration of the reserve, as well as currently, it remains a significant issue. The consideration of reservists as ‘volunteers’ within the Defence Forces has also meant that reservists could not be compelled to attend military activities; attendance was, and is, still dependent on the willingness of the individual to actually turn up. This has created issues in terms of command-and-control, which has contributed significantly to the regular Army’s perception of the reserve as unreliable, by nature of inconsistent attendance. A change in status for reservists from ‘volunteers’ to ‘part-time employees’ with the mandatory service obligations (outside of emergency mobilisation) that the latter would necessitate would remedy this issue, but only if this status change were paired with the introduction of employment protection legislation to support such an arrangement. This would guarantee the availability of reserve personnel as and when required.

20 John Prendergast, ‘The Past Is Never Dead, It’s Not Even Past: Defining the Purpose of the Military in Newly Independent States’, 2012. Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Maynooth University, 30–31. 21 Campbell, ‘A Historical Analysis of Reserves’, 25–26.

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The Benefits of Proper Integration In 1927, the Reserve of Men was created. Unlike the various reserve forces that followed, this force was exclusively for ex-regular enlisted soldiers. It was divided into two classes; Class ‘A’, for ex-regulars with more than six months service, and Class ‘B’, for ex-regulars with less than six months of service. A corresponding Reserve of Officers was also formed in 1928.22 The Reserve of Men existed until 1945, but one significant positive arising from this iteration of the reserve was the integration of ex-regular soldiers in an active reserve capacity; members engaged in annual recurrency training. This was a policy that should have continued indefinitely. However, in the post-Emergency period, the Reserve of Men was disbanded, and a new ex-regular group was formed, the First Line Reserve (FLR). The FLR was created with an establishment of 45,000 but its initial strength was just 5758. The FLR was never organised into units, and no rank establishment was ever created. In 1988 FLR training was ‘suspended indefinitely’ when only 800 members remained on strength.23 By May 2022, the FLR comprised just 274 personnel.24 Consistently segregating ex-regular personnel from all iterations of the Reserve in an active capacity was, and still is, a gross underutilisation of qualifications, experience, and resources invested. This consistent failing partially influenced the proposed composition of the Army Reserve (Integrated) discussed earlier. Another influence on the proposed composition of the Army Reserve (Integrated) is the FCÁ period of 1959–1979. In 1959, a reorganisation of the FCÁ introduced the concept of ‘integration’.25 Regular officers were appointed to command FCÁ battalions, which were incorporated into a new brigade organisation mirroring that of the regular Army. Campbell notes that ‘infantry support weapons were introduced into FCÁ Battalions and proper unit staff structures were provided. The 1959 Integration Scheme was reasonably successful. A higher standard of proficiency was attained throughout the force and the closer association 22 Campbell, ‘A Historical Analysis of Reserves’, 25. 23 Campbell, 32. 24 Department of Defence, ‘Tabular Statement: Substantive Strength of the First Line Reserve’, May 31, 2022. 25 Jim Dukes, ‘An FCÁ: The Real Reservists’, An Cosantóir 44, no. 10 (October 1984): 357.

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with regular units and Corps Schools helped to foster a more professional approach to training’.26 It was during this integration that the reserve saw actual operational utilisation during The Troubles. From 1969, FCÁ personnel regularly undertook border security duties in support of their regular comrades, and in 1984 one regular officer wrote that; The 8th Battalion [FCÁ] members were relieving their regular comrades on guards on vital installations and in Barracks, as well as for patrols and escorts … So much relief was supplied to the hard-pressed Permanent Force in the border area that a very senior officer…was heard to say that if it were not for the wholehearted participation of the 8th Battalion the Border operation would not have been possible … Until 1973 and the founding of the 27th Battalion the Regular troops on the Border were very much a floating population … the only permanent element being the 8th Battalion personnel who were regularly attending for duties.27

This period of integration showed that, when the Reserve was meaningfully integrated, it was firmly capable of being utilised and of sustaining service delivery over the course of several years. Possessing such a meaningful purpose also acted as an incentive towards enlistment, a professionalising motivator for serving personnel, and a valuable retention tool.

Targeted and Reasonable Goals The primary source of inspiration for the Army Reserve (Support) comes from the Local Defence Force (LDF) of the Emergency period. Having started out as an armed auxiliary police force, the LDF was transferred from An Garda Síochána to the Army in early 1941. LDF battalions were formed to undertake ‘garrison duties to free regular units for operational tasks’. They were, in essence, support units designed to relieve the pressure of day-to-day taskings on the regular Army. Training focussed on ‘combat duties, garrison and local defence duties, collection and distribution of impressed vehicles for essential services, assisting in the provision of military communications, first aid, military intelligence, military traffic duties and field security duties’. LDF strength peaked at 103,530 in 1943. 26 Campbell, ‘A Historical Analysis of Reserves’, 33. 27 J. Ronayne, ‘Another Border Battalion’, An Cosantóir (March 1984): 95.

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Campbell claims ‘it was officially estimated that far from being mere paper strengths these could be accepted as being 90% effective’.28 In addition to having a meaningful purpose—in this case, supporting the State throughout the Emergency period—arguably the LDF’s greatest strength was the fact that its members were tasked with reasonably achievable goals, namely combat duties, garrison/local/field security duties, military driving/communications/intelligence, and first aid, all of which contributed to the success of the LDF. In brief, its aims and objectives were realistic for such a large cohort of personnel.

Acknowledging Reserve Specialists as Specialists Reserve Officer Training Corps were established in 1929 at Trinity College Dublin, University College Cork, University College Galway, the Royal College of Surgeons, and the largest at University College Dublin.29 Reserve Cadets joined up for three years, received a bounty for attending annual training, and after two years training were commissioned into the Reserve of Officers. These institutions were short-lived, but most Cadets were studying for professional qualifications; for example, medical students made up the bulk of the UCD corps’ membership. Separately, the Volunteer Force of 1934 was divided into three sub-groups, the ‘Third Line’ of which was comprised of personnel with specialist qualifications who had no obligation to undergo military training upon joining. The logic was that such personnel were only needed for their specialist qualifications and standard military training would be largely superfluous. Both historical reserve entities have influenced the concept of the Army Reserve (Specialists), where it is proposed to employ specialists solely in roles commensurate to their qualifications; civilian doctors and scientists are wasted as reserve infantry.

Leadership Finally, the key to unlocking the force-multiplying potential of the Army Reserve has been glimpsed at points throughout the reserve’s history. This is the command and oversight provided by regular Army officers.

28 Campbell, ‘A Historical Analysis of Reserves’, 30–31. 29 J. O’Connell, ‘The OTC’, An tÓglách (December 1931): 53.

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When the LDF was formed, ‘Regular Area Officers were appointed who were responsible for the training, co-ordination and control of all LDF units in their areas’.30 Under these officers, the LDF flourished. PostEmergency, FCÁ territorial areas were created across the State, but while each was overseen by a regular officer, these officers did not command the FCÁ units within it. This stood in stark contrast to the responsibilities of the regular area officers previously assigned to the LDF. What followed was thirteen years of the FCÁ acting, in effect, as independent company-sized units with significantly varying levels of ability dispersed across the State.31 Regular officers began commanding FCÁ battalions following integration in 1959.32 As previously discussed, this was considered as a period of reserve professionalisation and general success.33 Following de-integration in 1980, regular officers remained in command of reserve units and, to date, they still are—since reserve elements are now part of previously regular-only units. However, the latest ‘Single Force Concept’ arrangement has revealed a key weakness of the modern integration system, namely that reserve matters are now in competition with regular Army issues when it comes to unit commanders’ time, focus, and attention, or when it comes to unit resources. Prior to 2013, such unit commanders only had their regular elements to be concerned with; since that date, they now have reserve elements under their command, but with little or no corresponding increase in resources. The key lesson is that the reserve has historically functioned best when under regular Army leadership, with regular Army officers placed in command-and-control roles over reserve elements. When this is done via ‘integration’, when regular and reserve elements are combined in the same unit, the only pitfall is potential resource competition between the two groups. Without this permanent, dedicated interface between the reserve and the regular Army, the full potential of the former can never be realised. However, there must be rigorous oversight to ensure that standards are achieved and maintained, both by the regular personnel leading the reserve and by reservists themselves; accountability is key. Regular command of the Army Reserve is also an often-overlooked

30 Campbell, ‘A Historical Analysis of Reserves’, 30. 31 Campbell, 32. 32 Dukes, ‘An FCÁ: The Real Reservists’, 357. 33 Campbell, ‘A Historical Analysis of Reserves’, 33.

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significant benefit to members of the regular Army, not just to the reserve. A reserve led by regulars necessarily results in a greater number of command, instructor, and staff appointments for regular personnel, thereby benefiting their career development and progression.

Conclusion Ultimately, the new tripartite Army Reserve structure as proposed would make the Army Reserve the force-multiplier for Irish defence. The members of the Army Reserve (Integrated) would provide the regular Army with a highly qualified reservoir of line personnel, operationally utilisable and obligated to deliver increased service commitments and outputs. The Army Reserve (Support) could provide a surge capacity to the Defence Forces in the areas of Aid to the Civil Authority taskings, security duties, driving details, support to exercises and training, and basic medical and communications skills, while also possessing useful corps-specific key-skills. Finally, the sky really could be the limit with the Army Reserve (Specialists). The Defence Forces, with the provision of the right incentives and service opportunities, could secure reservists with qualifications that would be too costly to obtain internally or outright impossible to obtain, due to the prohibitive cost or the duration of the training involved. There are several key enablers required to make this proposal work. The Army Reserve must be provided with a meaningful purpose, and its members must be meaningfully utilised. There is a requirement for regular Army leadership and support, with accountability and oversight forming an essential element; there must be proper training and co-ordination. Employment protection and corresponding employer engagement and employer supports are vital to secure the availability of reservists, to educate employers as to the benefits of their employees’ reserve service, and to assist employers through periods of reserve employee absence. There must be a significant focus on Professional Military Education; the ability to secure promotion based on time served rather than military qualifications obtained, training undertaken, or possessing the ability to deliver on the roles and responsibilities of higher rank is grossly inappropriate. Acknowledgement that reservists have competing time-demands from both the State and their civilian employer must exist, and the regular Army must come to understand the strange creature that is the reservist. A flexible approach is vital. Last, but certainly not least, is the requirement

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for appropriate financial resourcing, which encapsulates appropriate renumeration, and the provision of dedicated equipment, facilities, vehicles, etc. Implementing this proposal would be simultaneously relatively costly in the near-term, whilst also being extremely cost-effective in the longterm in delivering capacity at enhanced ‘line’, intermediate ‘line’, and specialist when required, thereby addressing the skills gaps and/or numerical deficits currently being experienced in the regular Army, but without the cost of day-to-day maintenance. This should not be seen as a potential threat to the regular Army, or as a liability to the State, since the former would benefit from the career or service opportunities created by a new Army Reserve and the latter would enjoy a significant boost to its defence framework. For example, a Medical Corps containing reserve medical professionals could enable the establishment of a field hospital of a certain role or tier overseas, something which is not currently achievable using regular Army personnel alone.34 This would therefore allow a regular Army team of officers and NCOs the experience of operating such an asset. As the fulltime professionals, the regular Army should remain the primary personnel to be tasked with all roles, but when additional personnel are needed, suitability trained reservists, fully capable of delivering operational outputs in a broad range of key areas to the same standard as regular Army counterparts, would be available. The Army Reserve would, after nearly a century, finally be incorporated into Irish defence.

34 Brian Mahon, ‘Coronavirus in Ireland: Pandemic Showed Up Our Weaknesses, Says General’, The Times, August 12, 2020.

Ireland’s Naval Service Reserve: An Analysis of Current Capabilities and Role for the Future David Rodgers and Gavin Murphy

The third of September 1939 will always stand out in Irish maritime history not as the day on which the Second World War was declared … but as the day the realisation dawned in Ireland that the country was surrounded by water and that the sea was of vital importance to her. Neutrality was declared with just nothing whatever to defend it within the internationally vital area of territorial sea.—Commadore. T. McKenna, Commanding Officer of the Naval Service 1956–1973.1

1 Aidan McIvor, A History of the Irish Naval Service (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994), 71.

D. Rodgers Irish Naval Service Reserve, Douglas, Cork, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] G. Murphy (B) Irish Naval Service Reserve, Carrigaline, Cork, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_9

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Introduction Upon the outbreak of war in September 1939, the State’s regular military force relied heavily on the support of more than 5000 reservists and 7000 volunteers.2 The Maritime Inscription, the naval equivalent to the Local Defence Force, was founded a year later to protect the nation’s coastline and interests at sea. The new service, attached to and administered by the Marine and Coast Watching Service, was organised into twelve local companies and filled its ranks with local fishermen, day sailors, and local maritime and port experts. This organisation kept watch over Ireland’s territorial waters and Atlantic approaches providing complete coastal coverage from Dundalk to Sligo.3 By 1943 the number of trained personnel reached 1400 who were tasked with carrying out harbour and bay patrols, quayside security duties, and ensuring the security of the strategic harbours and coastal waters. With the end of hostilities in Europe and the disbanding of the Coast Watching Service, the number of reserve personnel deteriorated. In 1947 following a reorganisation of the Maritime Inscription, companies of the newly formed An Slua Muirí were established in the strategic ports of Dublin, Cork, Waterford, and Limerick. In 2005 An Slua Muirí was reorganised further into the modern Naval Service Reserve (“NSR ”). Comprising seven units in total, four based in the strategic ports listed above, two Cadre units (responsible for unit administration and acting as intermediary between the NSR and the Naval Service, and a Technical Support Unit, the NSR today is genealogically rooted in both the State’s sense of volunteerism and maritime necessity. The organisation is currently tasked with supporting and augmenting the Naval Service both ashore and afloat. The proclivity for volunteerism in the Irish psyche has therefore had both a pronounced and significant cultural and historical impact throughout the course of the last century. The establishment of the Irish Volunteers in 1913, the record of Irish NGOs overseas, and most recently the domestic effort against COVID-19 with over 105,000 volunteers registered on the National Volunteering database, is emblematic of

2 These figures are given as 5066 and 7233 respectively in McIvor, History of Irish Naval Service, 70. 3 McIvor, History of Irish Naval Service, 81.

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a population’s subsistence and willingness to engage in volunteerism.4 Facing a century of uncertainty, the founding volunteer element of the State and all its varied successive incarnations, have proved vital in the defence of the State and its interests. Yet despite being an island nation, the NSR remains historically overlooked and currently underutilised. Due to the modern complexities and continuous challenges in security and trade, borne most notably by Ireland’s high exposure to Brexit and growing foreign incursions in sea, air and cyber spaces, the need for an active, fully equipped and utilised NSR is of paramount importance in combating contemporary and future threats.5 The NSR, whilst experiencing the same inescapable and interlinked difficulties in recruitment, retention, and morale experienced by most national and international military units, is teeming with highly skilled and dedicated personnel. What follows hereafter is a non-exhaustive analysis of the organisation’s current capabilities and potential future roles considering current and future threats faced by the State in the local maritime domain.

Legislative Basis Any organisation will only be as effective as the laws which govern it. Where the law is agile and responsive, it allows that organisation to adapt rapidly to a change in circumstances. Conversely, outdated legislation and a lethargic legislature sees modern issues being governed by laws which are no longer fit for purpose. The current legal framework underpinning the NSR is set out in the Defence Act, 1954, as amended. Remarkably, since the commencement of the 1954 Act until 2020, no primary legislation concerning the Reserve Defence Forces, which comprise the NSR and the Army Reserve, was enacted. Instead, successive Irish governments have treated reservists as an afterthought, with amendments only introduced to affect the Defence Forces as a whole and the definition

4 Department of Rural and Community Development, “Volunteer Ireland Storybook,” 2020. Available at: https://www.volunteer.ie/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/VolunteerIreland-Storybook-Online-FINAL.pdf. 5 Copenhagen Economics, “Ireland and the Impacts of Brexit Report,” The Department of Business, Enterprise & Innovation (DBEI) 2018. Available at: https://enterprise. gov.ie/en/Publications/Publication-files/Ireland-and-the-Impacts-of-Brexit.pdf.

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of “Permanent Defence Force” being used to separate the role, obligations, and rights of the Permanent Defence Force from that of the Reserve Defence Forces (RDF).6 The need for updated legislation is clear. Under the 1954 Act, the NSR has certain obligations, some more onerous than others. Sections 87 and 89 of the Act enables the Government to call out any reservist either on permanent service or in aid to the civil power in times of emergency.7 Any such call-out would result in the volunteer members of the NSR serving the State for as long a period as the Government deems necessary, without any guarantee of civilian re-employment following the end of their service. To refuse to heed the call-out would arguably result in the reservist having committed an offence under the Defence Acts, and being liable to prosecution.8 Recent developments in the area of employment protection for mobilised reservists only include some time-limited legislation surrounding a call-out in respect of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the publication of a non-binding information booklet by the Department of Defence in 2019 which emphasised to employers the benefits of employing RDF members within their organisations.9 The position in which the State has placed its naval reservists is unenviable. This is in stark contrast to reservists in the United Kingdom. In that jurisdiction, the Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act, 1985 provides for the “reinstatement in civil employment of members of the reserve and auxiliary forces who have been called into whole-time service in the armed forces of the Crown.”10 Sections 1 through 7 of that

6 A good example of this may be found in the Defence (Amendment) Act 2006, Section 3 of which provides that the Permanent Defence Force may be liable to serve overseas. Legislation extending overseas service to members of the RDF is currently being examined by the Irish legislature. 7 Defence Act 1954 (as amended). Irish Statute Book. Available at: http://www.irishs tatutebook.ie/eli/1954/act/18/enacted/en/print.html. 8 See Sections 135, 137, 87 and 89 of the Defence Act, 1954 (as amended). 9 Section 27 of the Covid (Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (COVID-

19)) Act, 2020 provides that the employment of reservists will only be protected where reservists are called out for permanent service under Sections 88 and 89 of the 1954 Act. These provisions form part of wider legislation enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and may be repealed once the pandemic subsides. 10 Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act 1985, Chapter 17. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/17.

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Act provide that the employer of a UK reservist is obliged to offer reemployment to that reservist on completion of their service and the same terms. The legislation also provides that an employer may not dismiss a reservist due to the potential that that reservist may be required for duty in the course of their employment. Whilst seen as the “gold standard” in terms of protecting reservist employment, the role such legislation plays in maintaining an effective reserve force in the UK cannot be overstated. Yet, such legislative protection has existed before in Ireland. Following the outbreak of the Second World War, provisions were introduced by the Irish government to ensure that any reservist called upon to protect the State would be afforded the opportunity to return to the employment they held immediately prior to mobilisation.11 Arguably, given the Second World War was so close in time to the independence of the State, government and public opinion was devoid of the “seablindness” that has pervaded Irish military policy ever since.12 Following the end of the Second World War, these employment protection provisions were quietly removed as the 1954 Act was enacted. It should be noted that provisions pertaining to overseas service by members of the RDF have only just recently been signed into law in November 2021 by the Irish Government.13 Under the Defence Amendment Act 2021, the RDF are permitted to volunteer for overseas service, though the consent of the Minister for Defence is required for each proposed deployment. However, this legislation does not yet have the benefit of employment protection, which remains only a temporary protection for “emergency” service for the duration of the Pandemic. Notwithstanding the realities of the current operating environment, regulatory gaps continue to arise in respect of RDF activities, highlighted during the COVID-19 pandemic response. There continues to be no express legal mechanism allowing reservists to be called upon as an aid

11 Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) (No. 2) Act 1940, Section 57. Irish Statute Book. Available at: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1940/act/11/section/ 57/enacted/en/html#sec57. 12 Dáil debates from 1954 reveal the underprovision of the Naval Service by the Irish government, despite recognition of the State’s dependency on her territorial seas for supply lines: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1954-02-24/22/. 13 Defence (Amendment) Act 2021, Irish Statute Book. Available at: https://data.oir eachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/act/2021/33/eng/enacted/a3321.pdf.

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to the civil authorities—despite this role being expressly championed by the Defence Forces. As a result of this oversight, NSR activities are classified as training, whilst in reality their role is operational in all but name. Reservists would arguably be at their most effective in executing such a tasking given their local knowledge, military training, and links to their communities.14 Finally, due to the failure to date of military legislation to keep pace with the changing landscape of Irish society, coupled with the innate realities and practicalities of reserve service, personnel in the NSR now lack clarity on the extent to which they are subject to military law in the civilian aspects of their lives.15 For example, a reservist officer who conducts all his reservist business by email is arguably not subject to military law under the terms of the 1954 Act, provided that he is not in uniform or on a military installation in the course of carrying out these actions.16 Whilst the recent legislative initiatives are to be welcomed, the law in the context of reservists will require frequent proactive review to ensure it is fit for purpose in a Defence Forces where adaptability and responsiveness are of fundamental importance.17

14 Irish

Defence Forces, “Roles of the Naval Service Reserve,” Available at: https://www.military.ie/en/who-we-are/reserve-defence-forces/naval-service-reserve/ roles-of-the-naval-service-reserve/. 15 For an additional examination of this point see; Jonathon Carroll, “Relying on the Goodwill of the Individual, and Luck: The Problematic Nature of Utilising the Army Reserve Skills Base in The Single Force Concept,” in Defence Forces Review, ed. Paul Hegarty, Ben Tonra, and Eugenio Lilli (Dublin: Defence Forces Printing Press, 2019). Available at: https://www.military.ie/en/public-information/publications/defence-forcesreview/df-review-2019.pdf. 16 Defence Act 1954, Section 119. Irish Statute Book. Available at: http://www.irishs tatutebook.ie/eli/1954/act/18/enacted/en/print.html. 17 Defence Forces Ireland, Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine DFDM-J2 (Dublin: Defence Forces Printing Press, 2016), 9.

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Weathering the Storm: Current Capabilities and Challenges Following a reorganisation of the RDF in 2005, An Slua Mhuirí was disbanded and replaced with the newly formed NSR having a total formation strength capped at just 200 personnel.18 The NSR was divided into four port-based units of 49 members in Cork, Dublin, Waterford, and Limerick, and a Technical Skills Unit with four dedicated officer appointments for qualified watchkeepers and medical personnel. As of February 2021, the NSR had an effective strength of 125 personnel, representing 62.5% of its establishment, and is currently tasked with augmenting the Naval Service and protecting the State both ashore and afloat.19 To achieve this the NSR delivers and supports maritime defence and security operations in Irish waters and in the four strategic ports, providing vital intelligence and information to the Naval Service. These outputs are achieved primarily by training personnel in a range of maritime skills including seamanship, coastal navigation, weapons handling, and smallcraft handling. Reserve units are tasked with operating and training on several shallow-draught Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) allowing the NSR to patrol narrow channels, areas of restricted manoeuvrability and concentrated marine traffic. The NSR employs these skill sets and limited equipment to garner indispensable maritime knowledge within their local areas of operation. Instances of such knowledge and skills in use are numerous; from safety management during the local regatta and international events such as Cork Week, to overseeing on-the-water security for visiting foreign-flagged Naval Vessels. Traditionally, interoperability is considered one of several key performance indicators when analysing the effectiveness of a military unit. The NSR has in the past been an active and dependable contributor in joint training exercises and operations that have allowed a cross-pollination of valuable skills and knowledge. In 2007, the Waterford NSR participated in a joint operation with the Naval Service to maintain a security boundary

18 The new strength of the NSR was less than half of the 403 personnel reported in November 2004. https://debatesarchive.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswe bpack.nsf/takes/dail2004110400155?opendocument. 19 Minister for Defence, Mr. Simon Coveney TD, Response to Parliamentary Question on the Effective Strength of the Reserve Defence Force, March 24, 2021. Available at: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2021-03-24/791/.

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when a mine was discovered in Waterford harbour. In 2018 the Limerick NSR facilitated underwater archaeological operations in conjunction with diving personnel from the National Monuments Service.20 Intelligence gathered by NSR patrols on an ongoing basis affords the Naval Service with a greater situational awareness of Irish ports. Reserve personnel also supplement Naval Service ships with competent and qualified personnel, carrying out roles on board such as RHIB crew during boarding operations, helmsmen, lookout, and quartermaster when at anchor and in port. In practical terms, NSR personnel are attached to a ship for the duration of a patrol and form part of the Seaman’s Division onboard. The NSR prides itself on the fact that in the past, NS ships would depart with a significant number of reserve personnel on board. Today, despite difficulties in recruitment and retention, reserve personnel continue to offer a fully trained and able asset to supplement NS crewing requirements. In recent years, due to the chronic staff shortages experienced by the Naval Service, the NSR has been increasingly relied on to augment vessel crews for everything from regular patrols to “black swan events” such as the COVID-19 pandemic.21 In terms of equipment, whilst RHIBs are vital for shallow water taskings, they alone are insufficient to guarantee the NSR mandate. Previously, each NSR unit had access to a dedicated motor launch (“ML”) to provide a platform for its port security taskings and seamanship training, with onboard berths allowing NSR members to overnight when necessary for extended exercises. Between 2013 and 2017, the MLs were removed from active service before ultimately being decommissioned in August of 2018.22 This removal of its larger vessels severely curtailed the operational effectiveness of the NSR from 2013 to the present. Whilst steps have been taken in recent months to procure replacement craft for the MLs, the loss of agency and capability in operating vessels of the ML class has negatively impacted the total force output of the NSR. In addition,

20 Irish Naval Service Social Media Post, November 23, 2018. Available at: www.twi tter.com/naval_service/status/1062314205959864321. 21 Peter Murtagh, “Crew Shortage prevents Naval Service vessels setting sail,” Irish Times, October 2, 2018. 22 Sean O’Riordan, “Navy reserve loses all four motor launches,” Irish Examiner, August 18, 2018.

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personnel joining the organisation since 2013 have not had the opportunity to learn from or reap the benefits of operating a variety of craft traditionally offered by the NSR. A Reserve Defence Forces Representative Association (RDFRA) report to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence found that the RDF as a whole was “a vital asset at the State’s disposal,” stating further that it was; comprised of hardworking, enthusiastic and patriotic volunteers who undertake their reserve duties in a predominantly unpaid capacity. Crucially, this makes the Reserve a very inexpensive force to maintain. To put it in context, the 2014 Reserve pay bill equated to only 75% of the annual cost of private cleaners to clean Defence Forces buildings that year.23

The NSR is therefore a tried, tested, and cost-effective resource that offers practical surge capacity. However, any further deterioration in the goodwill or general “buy-in” of its remaining personnel will result in the organisation failing to meet the threats arising from the contemporary operating environment. The 2015 White Paper on Defence found that at the time of writing, these threats included; a significant deterioration in the international security environment resulting in a conventional military attack on this State, a large-scale security event at home, certain civil contingencies that could require large scale Defence Forces’ support, e.g., a major pandemic, events that require a sustained effort over an extended period or events that require specialist capabilities beyond those retained within the PDF.24

The prescient note of the White Paper, particularly with regards to the need for specialist capabilities, accentuates the potential of NSR involvement in times of crisis. Of particular note is the surge capacity available 23 RDFRA, “Opening Statement to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence,” February 9, 2017. Available at: https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/ caighdeanOifigiul/2017/2017-02-09_opening-statement-reserve-defence-forces-represent ative-association_en.pdf. 24 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2015), 95.

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for pandemic response, a point which will not be lost on today’s readers. These challenges persist at the time of writing yet the ability and agency of the NSR is still curtailed by restrictive and outdated mechanisms. A significant increase in the level of employer engagement and protection, akin to the support available to Royal Naval Reservists in the UK, is required if the organisation is to act as a meaningful force multiplier. As aforementioned, not only will meaningful employer protection benefit NSR personnel, it would also greatly improve engagement between the public and private sectors and the RDF. The degradation of the image and visibility of naval reserve units over the last number of years has proved detrimental to recruitment, public awareness, and esprit de corps. According to the latest Defence Forces Annual Report the NSR gained only 7 new recruits nationwide in 2020.25 Whilst it remains difficult to ascertain the exact cause or causes of a poor recruitment yield, the old adage, “out of sight, out of mind” holds some truth. With a reduction in recruitment, engagement, and a lack of publicised aid to the civil authority operations, the physical and psychological footprint of the State’s naval reserve has deteriorated to a point of relative obscurity. If the decline in community awareness and engagement continues, it will threaten to further damage an often-unspoken role of the NSR; to act as the link between the public, Ireland’s maritime community, the Naval Service and the Defence Forces as a whole.26 It is therefore of paramount importance that the NSR adopt an active role in any initiative aimed at tailoring the relationship between the Naval Service and the wider community in the future.27 This is in addition to the organisation’s core responsibilities of providing a critical surge capacity for and alleviating retention and staffing issues within the Naval Service.

25 Department of Defence and Defence Forces, Annual Report 2020

(Kildare:

Department of Defence and Defence Forces 2020), 41. 26 Department of Defence, Annual Report 2020, 95. 27 This mirrors the approach taken by the UK reserve forces. See Ministry of Defence,

Reserves in the Future Force 2020 (London: Stationery Office, 2013), 40. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/210470/Cm8655-web_FINAL.pdf.

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The Horizon: Future Threats and Potential Roles One of the most subtle but damaging effects that had traditionally pervaded the NSR was the degradation borne from both inattention and the passage of time. An NSR of the future therefore requires active and consistent management. A European Strategy and Analysis System Report found that foresight, “is much more about shaping the future than predicting it.”28 Foresight in this instance compels senior NSR and Naval Service personnel to employ the Single Force Concept for in-force development and capability building.29 The NSR must also match the pace of its permanent counterpart into the medium to long-term future if it is to be an effective force multiplier and dependable agent in achieving national policy. To accomplish this, key reservist skills representing the innate diversity of the civilian talent pool must not only be utilised but subjected to and facilitated by a strong and dynamic mechanism that streamlines reservist involvement in Defence Force operations. In the context of the NSR, appointment to the Technical Skills Unit (“TSU”) represents the only mechanism by which an individual reservist may utilise their civilian qualifications in the course of their military service. The TSU currently consists of four positions, two reserved for qualified watchkeepers, with the remaining two positions available only to qualified medical personnel. This represents just 2% of the NSR’s established strength being readily utilised by the Naval Service. To date, only one watchkeeping position has been filled within the TSU despite the availability of watchkeepers, marine engineering officers, and medical doctors within the ranks of the NSR. The cause of this slow uptake is multifaceted; firstly, the lack of awareness around the role and potential of the TSU (at a unit level, within the Naval Service and within the civilian sphere in general) results in the potential of a vital unit going unrealised. In addition, the independence of the TSU from the locations and activities of the four main NSR units creates a disconnect between the ordinary NSR members and

28 Florence Gaub, Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe (European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, ESPAS, 2019), 5. Available at: https://www.iss.eur opa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/ESPAS_Report.pdf. 29 The Single Force Concept was a principle introduced in the 2013 Reorganisation of the Reserve Defence Force whereby RDF and PDF units should be treated equally and have the same access to training opportunities.

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those serving in specialist capacity, a fact exacerbated by the officer-only membership of the TSU and the de facto choice its members make to leave behind their home NSR unit on joining the specialist ranks. Failure to integrate established skill sets of the TSU (together with the multitude of other valuable qualifications held by NSR personnel) in a meaningful way will negatively impact the current and future potential of the NSR and could dissuade potential recruits from highly skilled sectors. The NSR can also fill knowledge gaps and specialist roles in the future that would be immediately beneficial and discernible. The 2015 White Paper on Defence provided scope for the procurement of a Multi-Role Vessel to replace the Naval Service’s current flagship, LE Eithne, where technical and specialist skills within the NSR could be readily utilised.30 Where the foregoing points are adopted, additional measures are needed for the NSR to fully augment the Naval Service. Presently, naval reserve personnel can only serve in one of the Naval Services’ branches, negating the potential to use reservists’ civilian skills in the engineering, logistics, or communications divisions. To shape the future, the NSR must make itself attractive to the potential talent that exists within the civilian sphere, a task that is not unique to the Irish Defence Forces. Notably, a British government report titled Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, found that improving reservist experience and developing and publicising employer benefits would return positive civilian engagement.31 For the NSR, the initial challenge centres on generating further employment protection for reservists in training and on exercises. Whilst personnel have in the past worked in conjunction with other state and civil organisations, they have done so in a “training” capacity. The most recent example of which occurred during the first wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic where NSR personnel participated in Operation FORTITUDE.32 FORTITUDE, the Defence Forces’ operation to support the Health Service Executive (HSE) exhibited the potential of the NSR surge capacity. However, restrictive regulations and legislation, often due to outdated wording as referenced above, inhibited the

30 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2015), 67. 31 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force; Valuable and Valued (London: Ministry of Defence, 2013), 43. 32 Department of Defence, Annual Report 2020, 85.

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full integration of qualified and highly skilled reservists into operational service. It is also worth noting that NSR officers and senior NCOs currently lack a dedicated role onboard Naval Service vessels, despite these individuals often having received extensive training and education within the Defence Forces. This is due to the absence of mechanisms whereby such reservists can attain certifications appropriate to their rank allowing them to carry out a greater range of duties onboard Naval Service vessels such as watchkeeping tickets or weapon specialisms. These oversights could be rectified by further capitalising on the facilities and resources offered by the National Maritime College of Ireland (NMCI), a global leader in maritime training and development located near Haulbowline Naval Base. The continuing professional development of NSR NCOs and officers could be augmented by the inclusion of professionally accredited NMCIbased training. In tandem with NMCI-provided training, the recognition of NSR personnel’s civilian qualifications by the Naval Service would further empower senior NSR members to leverage their civilian expertise throughout the course of their military careers, to the benefit of the Defence Forces generally. Finally, given that we cannot precisely know what is unknowable— the future—the NSR must be continuously reviewed, equipped, and supported not only in line with the Naval Service but ideally in line with other effective international naval reserve organisations. In recent years the NSR has lacked the ability to conduct large-scale joint operations and training exercises within major ports following the loss of units’ aged MLs. At the time of writing, new NSR motor training launches are being tendered by the Naval Service, with a supposed delivery date for the first vessel in Q1 2023.33 With a specification for 260 nautical miles in range and an operational envelope of up to 40 nautical miles offshore, these crafts present a gilt-edged opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the NSR, with both extended deployment capabilities along the coastline of the State and a suitable training platform for existing and future personnel. This opportunity will only be realised by identifying and addressing gaps in the operational experience of experienced NSR 33 Irish Naval Service, “Request for Tenders for the Supply of Four 12 m to 15 m Multi Purpose Motor Launches for the Irish Naval Service,” April 15, 2021. Available at: https://irl.eu-supply.com/ctm/Supplier/PublicPurchase/186823/0/ 0?returnUrl=&b=ETENDERS_SIMPLE.

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personnel ahead of these new vessels being delivered. In the medium to long term, these acquisitions may serve as the pendulum that will grant the NSR the same level of coastal coverage that was once enjoyed by its predecessors.34 A similar platform, the Archer-Class Fast Inshore Patrol Craft, was introduced by the Royal Navy for their naval reserve. These vessels are tasked with training University Royal Naval Unit personnel whilst providing force protection and maritime security across the UK and overseas from the Baltic to Gibraltar.35 A similar role could form a feasible and valuable NSR output in the future whereby junior Naval Service personnel are trained in coastal navigation on vessels operated and maintained by the NSR and return to the fleet with the benefits of a broader and more diverse training experience. These potential benefits would include fostering a symbiotic relationship in staff training and development ensuring standards are not only met but exceeded across the services. In practice, subjecting the NSR to the same rigorous FORST (Fleet Operations Readiness and Standards of Training) reviews and WUPE (Work Up Preparatory Exercises) scenarios would build towards the standardisation of training between NSR and Naval Service units and establish a tradition of reciprocity required for an effective naval reserve. Given the organisation’s experience in small-craft operations and coastal navigation, the NSR could be further utilised to simulate hostile agents in Naval Service training exercises and strengthen the State’s offering in sea-space security. A disruption or delay in vital intelligence and information is an inescapable albeit manageable threat to any military organisation. As the armed agent of the State within the strategic ports, the NSR will need to modernise its method of information and intelligence sharing. Implementing modern IT and communication systems to quickly furnish collected data in real time will be required. Regular and consistent briefings for senior leadership regarding the NSR must also take place to instil a tradition of capability development and to ensure effective maritime security operations. It must be noted that the literature on the role of reserve navies in maritime security and strategy is dominated by large

34 Sean O’Riordan, “Navy Reserve Loses All Four Motor Launches.” 35 Royal Navy. “Archer Class Fast Patrol Boat.” Available at: https://www.royalnavy.

mod.uk/the-equipment/ships/patrol-and-minehunters/archer-class.

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navies facing traditional threats. It therefore remains difficult to apply a tried and tested model suited to the challenges faced by the Irish Naval Service. This isn’t to say that other navies haven’t successfully imbued a fully manned and equipped naval reserve with purpose and responsibility.36 Since the decline of the Cold War, constabulary navies have become more commonplace and the nature of geopolitics and global warfare has altered to bestow upon these smaller navies non-traditional roles that a modern naval reserve will need to embrace in order to fully augment and support their respective permanent forces. Creating a clear picture of the operating environment (locally, in terms of the NSR’s area of operation and globally in terms of the evolution of international best practices for reserve forces) is critical in affording the NSR the flexibility required to adapt to changes and respond to threats as they emerge in the maritime domain in the future.37

Threat Environment Threats to the State’s maritime defence are diverse and multifaceted. The growing problem of pollution at sea, terrorism, the smuggling of narcotics, attacks on merchant shipping, illegal incursions into Irish territorial waters and the unregulated exploitation of Irish marine resources are just some of the evolving challenges. The maritime domain is of central importance to the State’s security and will remain central for decades to come. The NSR must be ready to meet these challenges in support of the Naval Service. Critical to this, the NSR of the future both immediate and long term, must be able to act as a dependable force multiplier for the Naval Service whilst increasing both its presence and intelligence in the State’s strategic ports, inlets and waterways. Continuous ongoing development of effective inter-agency briefings, increased communication and strategic planning in the local maritime domain, and

36 The United Kingdom, Norway and Canada all incorporate naval reserves into their full-time counterpart units. A full analysis of the Canadian Naval Reserve can be found in Richard H. Gimblett and Michael J. Hadley’s, Citizen Sailors Chronicles of Canada’s Naval Reserve 1910–2010 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010). 37 A comparison between Ireland’s Naval Service and other small navies can be found in Andrew Mallia and Chris Xeureb, “Force Multipliers and Small Navies,” in Europe, Small Navies and Maritime Security, ed. Robert McCabe, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).

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the introduction of enhanced platforms from which the NSR may operate will all assist in achieving these aims. In the wake of Brexit, Irish ports have seen a significant increase in maritime traffic with the Port of Cork recording a 500% increase in the volume of exports, and 100% increase in the volume of imports from, the United States.38 With a renewed focus on the development of Irish ports and infrastructure to facilitate the growing maritime industry and resultant dependency, an expansion in both the number of Naval Service Reserve onshore units and the operational reach of the organisation as a whole is clearly needed.39 Arguably, NSR units are not effectively geographically dispersed, there is no NSR presence at the Port of Galway, nor Killybegs, one of the largest fishing hubs in Ireland. This is emblematic of the shortcomings of the communal and cognitive chasm between the Defence Forces and the public on the northwest coast.40 The continuing lack of a shore-based naval presence in these areas constitutes a major oversight in the potential local support available to fisheries protection, the defence of valuable maritime assets in Irish territorial waters and sea-space security in general. The submissions to the Commission on the Defence Forces highlight that the lack of a NSR presence in the northwest is a point of continued interest by community organisations and State bodies alike.41 The ongoing development and utilisation of these ports are also of significant interest, particularly when considering environmental impacts and security threats of the future. Whether the number of strategic ports in a nation is four or forty, a dedicated local reserve asset can be tasked with developing port security strategies in the light of subjective threat analyses. A successful example of this doctrine can be seen in the Canadian Naval Reserve, which developed their Harbour Defence system to safeguard key ports across the country and ultimately deployed a full port security unit to protect a

38 Alan Healy, “New Cork to US Sea Route Records Five-Fold Increase in Exports,” Irish Examiner, June 29, 2021. 39 Cormac O’Keeffe, “State ‘Must Protect’ Hi-Tech Sea Cables,” Irish Examiner, December 10, 2019. 40 David Linkie, “Killybegs Port Profile,” Fishing News, March 7, 2016. 41 Submissions from the public consultation process to the Commission on Defence.

Available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/0029c-public-consultation-commissionon-the-defence-forces/.

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French Carrier Group.42 Despite the imbalance between Canadian and Irish reserve forces with regards to equipment, manpower and budget, the Canadian Naval Reserve framework, with its focus both on reservists attaining seagoing command qualifications to support the Canadian Navy and the development of harbour defence as an ongoing reservist role, could be readily adopted.43 The United Nations has called climate change a “crisis multiplier” and in order to “blunt its acute effects on food security, natural resources and migration patterns fuelling tensions across countries and regions” a more robust and intense system of inter-agency cooperation is required from the local up to the international level.44 As marine pollution becomes ever more pervasive in a world where growth in trade, tourism, technology, and connectivity is almost predestined, universally accepted, and encouraged, the NSR could find a role in responding to environmental stress and potential disasters when and where they occur. In the first instance, the NSR as local maritime experts should be utilised in conjunction with other State bodies to track the environmental effects and impacts increased maritime activity has in Irish ports. Additionally, in the context of environmental disasters, the NSR will need to possess a rapid response capability to mitigate any event with the potential to negatively affect the security and defence landscape within Irish ports and surrounding areas. Adverse weather effects, which have become all too familiar in recent years, bring not only the threat of damage to the local maritime infrastructure and environment but they can also weaken our economic and social systems. Such marine disasters have occurred in the past and have required substantial military response.45 In November 2002, the MV Prestige carrying over 77,000 tonnes of oil sank off the coast of Galicia damaging hundreds of kilometres of Spanish, Portuguese, and French 42 Gimblett and Hadley, Citizen Sailors Chronicles of Canada’s Naval Reserve 1910– 2010, 118. 43 Citizen Sailors, 117. 44 United Nations Security Council, “Climate Change ‘Biggest Threat Modern

Humans Have Ever Faced,” Press Release, February 23, 2021. Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14445.doc.htm#:~:text=Climate%20change% 20is%20a%20%E2%80%9Ccrisis,on%20food%20security%2C%20natural%20resources. 45 United Nations Security Council, “Climate Change Biggest Threat Modern Humans Have Ever Faced,” Press Release, February 23, 2021. Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14445.doc.htm#:~:text=Climate%20change% 20is%20a%20%E2%80%9Ccrisis,on%20food%20security%2C%20natural%20resources.

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coastline.46 If such a disaster were to occur off the Irish coast the ecological, environmental, and financial fallout would be severe and long-lasting. An extensive and coherent strategic plan incorporating the NSR and other regional organisations, State agencies, and government departments will be required if the Defence Forces are to combat the innumerable threats deriving from the contemporary maritime operating environment. Other non-traditional threats, like those highlighted in the EU Maritime Security Strategy and Action Plan, will require the Naval Service to respond to a multitude of dynamic challenges.47 As previously outlined, to make available the widest possible spectrum of assets, the State must fully harness and integrate the technical expertise and maritime knowledge on offer in reserve units to counter these threats. Currently, the NSR has qualified personnel from legal, medical, maritime, educational, and engineering backgrounds that could address the threats raised and help mitigate the effects felt by the ongoing loss of highly skilled and technically trained Naval Service personnel. This, together with the adoption of international best practices, could see the NSR go from a periphery in the “total force package” to an integral and expedient component both in day-to-day operations and potential “black swan events.”

Conclusion: Forecasting or Foreboding? The Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine states that one “must have a plan or contingency for leading change, or it might lead you.”48 Therefore in order to lead change, a greater portfolio of threat and capability analysis needs to be maintained and consulted when issues pertaining to the development of the NSR are addressed. It is only by assessing the nature of current and future challenges in their entirety that a strategy to maximise the effectiveness of the NSR can succeed in the future. 46 Castanedo, Sonia, Raúl Medina, Iñigo J. Losada, César Vidal, Fernando J. Méndez, Andrés Osorio, José A. Juanes, and Araceli Puente, “The Prestige Oil Spill in Cantabria (Bay of Biscay). Part I: Operational Forecasting System for Quick Response, Risk Assessment, and Protection of Natural Resources,” Journal of Coastal Research 22, no. 6 (2006): 1474–1489. 47 Publications Office of the European Union, European Maritime Security Strategy (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), 4. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/pub lication-detail/-/publication/02ab6cfa-b735-4b56-a6e1-587e4b3e4882/language-en. 48 Defence Forces Ireland, Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine DFDM-J2 (Dublin: Defence Forces Printing Press, 2016), 6–12.

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Failure to make these necessary and ongoing assessments will blur the “big picture” and will diminish the ability and agency of the NSR to react to change over time. In parallel to a tradition and culture of threat analysis being established, it is imperative that the appropriate legislative and organisational mechanisms are introduced allowing Ireland’s naval reserve to fulfil its primary roles; to augment the effectiveness of the Naval Service and to meaningfully contribute to Ireland’s maritime security framework. The Naval Service of tomorrow will undoubtedly encounter a host of unknown, varied, and complex challenges as it seeks to safeguard the interests of the State at and from the sea. In the absence of an effective NSR the State would be devoid of a meaningful surge capacity to alleviate current and future staffing issues in its chief guarantor of maritime security. Failing to address the issues posed, both externally and within the NSR’s local areas of operation, would result in the vital maritime arteries of this island being unprotected. Simply put, a total force package without an equipped and utilised NSR is not total. To effectively secure the State’s strategic lines of communication and alleviate potential personnel shortages, further integration, training and interoperability between State agencies and the NSR must form part of the organisation’s future. This can only be achieved with increased recognition and utilisation by the Defence Forces of the civilian qualifications held by NSR personnel. The expansion of the NSR’s role, including overseas service, must include a viable operational role for senior personnel within the organisation, stepping away from the adage of “training for training’s sake.” From a legal perspective, ensuring the necessary statutory mechanisms and employment protections are put in place will be significant for both the future role of the NSR and by extension the Defence Forces as a whole. Finally, whilst the comparative analysis shows key learning points from other international reserve units and jurisdictions that could act as scaffolding for the future of Ireland’s naval reserve, the surest form of operational readiness will derive from continuous self-examination in combination with international best practice.

Peacekeeping Operations

Decolonisation, Conflict and Independence: The Impact of History on Ireland’s Approach to Peacekeeping Neil Dee

Introduction “As a nation that has experienced colonisation, conflict, famine and mass migration, Ireland’s lived history finds resonance in the aims and objectives of the UN Charter”, in this statement, Ireland’s successful campaign to join the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for 2021–2022 made direct reference to its complicated history.1 The campaign brochure featured numerous references to both Irish history and the role of the Irish Defence Forces as United Nations peacekeepers, with images of smiling, blue-bereted Irish troops juxtaposed with the haunting, gaunt figures of the Irish Famine Memorial on Dublin’s quays. Membership of the UN has been a core tenet of Irish foreign policy since the State joined the organisation in 1955 and Ireland has been a consistent contributor to 1 Department of Foreign Affairs, “An introduction to Ireland’s candidature for the United Nations Security Council 2021–2022,” 4. Available from https://www.dfa.ie/ media/dfa/ourrolepolicies/unitednations/Campaign-Brochure-July-2018.pdf.

N. Dee (B) The Azure Forum for Contemporary Security Strategy, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_10

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UN peacekeeping operations since 1958.2 Studies of Ireland’s contribution to UN operations have often cited Ireland’s history as a key element underpinning its participation and acceptability as a peacekeeper. As the opening quote shows, this history is also actively invoked by the Irish Government at the UN. Yet, comprehensive exploration of the impact of this history has been limited, with most studies simply taking it at face value. In light of Ireland’s joining of the UNSC, it is pertinent to examine this impact in greater detail and to understand how history influences Ireland’s behaviour on the world stage. This chapter explores how history has informed Ireland’s approach to peacekeeping through the lens of strategic culture. In so doing, it examines three different aspects of Irish history that have been widely cited as informing this approach: decolonisation, independence and conflict. Weaving these surrounding elements together is the development of a peacekeeping tradition, and the role of the Irish Defence Forces. How Ireland’s history will exert an influence on peacekeeping in the future is also discussed before concluding remarks.

Irish History and Peacekeeping Literature Why should we seek to understand how history has impacted Ireland’s approach to peacekeeping operations? Studies of Ireland’s peacekeeping history have often focussed only on specific cases, for example in Congo, Cyprus, Lebanon and Macedonia.3 These studies and others have noted that Ireland’s history as a colony of Britain has contributed to its role as a UN peacekeeper, in particular arguing that this has resulted in acceptability of Irish peacekeepers in developing countries.4 Others have noted 2 Oliver A.K. MacDonald, “Peacekeeping lessons learned: An Irish perspective,” International Peacekeeping 4, no. 3 (1997), 94–103; Ray Murphy, “Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping? Opportunities, challenges and ways ahead—Ireland,” International Peacekeeping 23, no. 5 (2016), 721–740. 3 J.T. O’Neill, “EYEWITNESS—The Irish company at Jadotville,” International Peacekeeping Congo, 1961: Soldiers or Symbols? 9, no. 4 (2002), 127–144; Norman MacQueen, “Ireland and the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus,” Review of International Studies 9 (1983), 95–108; Murphy, “Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping?”; Rory Miller, “From At Tiri to Qana: The impact of peacekeeping in Lebanon on Israeli–Irish bilateral relations, 1978–2000,” Israel Affairs 16, no. 3 (2010), 386–405; Ray Murphy, “Ireland withdraws from participation in EU peacekeeping mission to Macedonia,” International Peacekeeping 9 (2004), 123–138. 4 Roisin Doherty, “Partnership for peace: The sine qua non for Irish participation in regional peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping 7, no. 2 (2000), 63–82; Ray Murphy,

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that Ireland’s support for self-determination has been a distinguishing feature of Irish foreign policy.5 Moreover, as noted in the introduction, these elements have been combined with Ireland’s history of conflict to provide an explanation of Ireland’s peacekeeping acceptability. However, whilst these studies have noted the three elements of decolonisation, independence and conflict, they have mostly taken them at face value instead of exploring the extent of their impact. It is important to explore these assumptions, not only as a way to understand Ireland’s behaviour on the world stage and challenge any potential unconscious bias that they cause, but to also learn from Irish history. Strategic culture provides a useful lens through which to do this.

Strategic Culture History forms one element of strategic culture, which, following the original definition from Jack Snyder’s 1977 RAND report on Soviet strategic culture, “can be defined as the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to… strategy.”6 Unique historical experiences contribute to such behaviour and, according to strategist Colin Gray, “strategic culture in part is a celebration of community beliefs about historical strategic experience.”7 Differences in strategic culture mean that, for example, “a battle-hardened US marine’s approach, cultural indoctrination and mindset will be completely different to an Irish infantry soldier in South Lebanon.”8 Indeed, some have gone so

“Ireland, the United Nations and peacekeeping operations,” International Peacekeeping 5, no. 1 (1998), 22–45. 5 Murphy, “Ireland, the United Nations and peacekeeping operations,” 27. 6 Rashed Uz Zaman, “Strategic culture: A ‘cultural’ understanding of war,” Compar-

ative Strategy 28, no. 1 (2009), 82; Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977), 8. 7 Colin S. Gray, “Strategic culture as context: The first generation of theory strikes back,” Review of International Studies 25 (1999), 66. 8 John F. Quinn, “Dreaming of things that never were: Irish soft power and peacekeeping in the 21st century,” Defence Forces Review 15 (2018), 98.

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far as to describe Ireland as possessing “a strategic culture of humanitarian, consent based peace support operations.”9 Thus, to understand Ireland’s strategic behaviour, including peacekeeping, we must understand its history. To do so, we may apply Gray’s argument that “strategic culture provides context for understanding, rather than explanatory causality for behaviour,” in the Irish case, history provides context for Ireland’s decisions and behaviour but does not cause it to necessarily act in certain ways.10 This context, following Gray, can be both “that which surrounds,” and that which “weaves together.”11 In relation to Ireland’s history and peacekeeping, elements such as decolonisation, independence and conflict provide the former, whilst the peacekeeping tradition provides the latter.

That Which Surrounds Decolonisation Ireland’s status as a former colony has often been cited as of particular importance to its UN peacekeeping contributions, with decolonisation playing a key role for Ireland at the UN.12 The Irish State has often invoked its status as a former colony as making it an acceptable peacekeeper due to Ireland’s lack of imperial baggage.13 This was demonstrated in 1960 when Ireland applied to join the UN Mission to Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo or ONUC) as the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) believed at the time that UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld had specifically chosen Irish participation on the basis of its history and status as a former colony.14 Taoiseach Seán Lemass directly addressed this question in the Dáil on 20 July 1960 speaking of the UN’s decision being related to Ireland’s: 9 Quinn, “Dreaming of things that never were,” 105. 10 Gray, “Strategic culture as context,” 49. 11 Gray, 68. 12 Doherty, “Partnership for peace”; Kevin O’Sullivan, Ireland, Africa and the End of

Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War 1955–75 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 1. 13 Murphy, “Ireland withdraws from participation in EU peacekeeping mission to Macedonia,” 124. 14 O’Sullivan, “Ireland, Africa and the end of empire,” 35–40.

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“special position we occupy in relation to world affairs” and efforts “to deal with world problems and issues on their merits and to arrive at fair and impartial conclusions with regard to them, in the light of our obligations under the Charter and of our own national traditions and outlook”.15

Perhaps the most notable linking of Ireland’s history of decolonisation to its present-day peacekeeping is through Roger Casement. Casement, a humanitarian and Irish nationalist, was a vocal critic of colonial abuses, most notably in Congo and Putamayo in the Amazon.16 Executed for his role in the 1916 Easter Rising, Casement’s remains were finally repatriated to Ireland in 1965. That same year the Irish Air Corps’ base at Baldonnel was renamed Casement Aerodrome.17 Upon the centenary of his death in 2016, the Irish Government drew a line from Casement to today’s peacekeepers with then Minister for Foreign Affairs Charles Flanagan stating that “his commitment is reflected in Ireland’s long standing involvement with UN peacekeeping missions and our strong commitment to overseas development.”18 Defence Forces’ Archivist Stephen MacEoin echoed this sentiment, noting Ireland’s experience of colonialism as contributing to the Defence Forces’ work on UN missions in former colonies.19 However, the question must be asked as to how these principles were reflected on the ground on UN operations. Irish troops were not necessarily well-received in Congo, as Kevin O’Sullivan has noted,

15 Houses of the Oireachtas, Dail Debate July 20, 1960, “Defence (Amendment) Bill, 1960—Second and subsequent stages,” Available from https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/ debates/debate/dail/1960-07-20/38/?highlight%5B0%5D=congo&highlight%5B1%5D= congo&highlight%5B2%5D=congo&highlight%5B3%5D=congo&highlight%5B4%5D= congo#spk_253. 16 Michael Laffan, “Casement, Sir Roger David,” Dictionary of Irish Biography, Available from https://www.dib.ie/biography/casement-sir-roger-david-a1532. 17 Laffan, “Casement, Sir Roger David”; Sean Heffernan, “Rewind—Baldonnel Aero-

drome—Home of the Irish Aer Corps,” Echo.ie, Available from https://www.echo.ie/ rewind-baldonnel-aerodrome-home-of-the-irish-aer-corps/. 18 Department of Foreign Affairs, “Roger Casement (1864–1916),” Available from https://www.dfa.ie/commemorations/roger-casement/. 19 Hugh Linehan, “Ireland’s role in peacekeeping in focus on ‘Casement Humanitarian Day’,” The Irish Times, August 3, 2016.

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Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba criticised the use of white peacekeepers in secessionist Katanga.20 The Congolese (unsurprisingly) did not know about Ireland’s history, believing them to be British troops from Uganda.21 Moreover, Ireland’s rush to contribute led to deficiencies in linguistics, logistics, cultural understanding, and knowledge of the colonial nuances in Congo amongst the Defence Forces contingent.22 Thus, whilst the Irish history of colonisation was no doubt important in Irish perceptions of their contribution, it is clear that colonisation was not a universally similar experience. Nevertheless, rejection of imperialism remains a hallmark of Irish foreign policy over fifty years later with President Michael D. Higgins remarking that “we view the United Nations as that special institution where newly free nations have found a home after their struggles for independence, their emergence from shadows, legacies and distortions of imperialism.”23 Independence Intimately related to the decolonisation agenda is the Irish struggle for independence from Britain. Kevin O’Sullivan opens his work, Ireland, Africa and the end of empire, with Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah’s visit to Dublin in 1960 and Nkrumah’s remarks on Ireland’s struggle for freedom and the parallels to then contemporary African struggles.24 Sympathy with people seeking self-determination has been a distinguishing feature of Irish foreign policy and the Government’s decision to join the ONUC deployment was also based on support for selfdetermination alongside decolonisation.25 However, this idealism took a severe blow when the Defence Forces sustained fatalities on the ONUC

20 O’Sullivan, “Ireland, Africa and the end of empire,” 42. 21 O’Sullivan, 41. 22 John Minihan, “Is there a future for United Nations peacekeeping as presently constituted?” Defence Forces Review 15 (2018), 123. 23 Department of Foreign Affairs, “Speech by President Michael D. Higgins to the UN General Assembly,” Available from https://www.dfa.ie/pmun/newyork/news-andspeeches/speeches/2019/address-by-president-michael-d-higgins-to-the-un-general-ass embly.html. 24 O’Sullivan, “Ireland, Africa and the end of empire,” 1. 25 Murphy, “Ireland, the United Nations and peacekeeping operations,” 27.

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deployment.26 The Niemba Ambush saw the Defence Forces suffer nine killed, its worst single loss of life on a peacekeeping operation, whilst in the aftermath of the Siege of Jadotville, where Irish forces were captured, the army and general public felt a sense of embarrassment, as survivors “described being the subject of… derision.”27 Whilst these shocks led to a more cautious subsequent Government approach, the ONUC also served as a baptism of fire, establishing the Defence Forces’ peacekeeping reputation.28 The Greek Cypriot community also attracted Irish self-determination sympathies in 1964, leading to the dispatch of a contingent of peacekeepers to Cyprus as part of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) deployment.29 Palestinian self-determination has also played a role in Irish participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) which has been the most significant deployment in Defence Forces’ history. During the early years of UNIFIL, Defence Forces’ clashes with the Israeli-backed Lebanese militia at At Tiri in 1980 and the 1982 Israeli invasion soured Ireland-Israel relations.30 On 16 June 1982 the Irish Government reiterated its support for Palestine (albeit also for Israeli sovereignty) with Taoiseach Charlie Haughey noting the 1980 Venice Declaration and the “recognition of the right of all States in the area, including Israel, to a secure and peaceful

26 O’Sullivan, “Ireland, Africa and the end of empire,” 35–36 and 43–44. 27 O’Sullivan, “Ireland, Africa and the end of empire,” 35–36; O’Neill, “EYEWIT-

NESS—The Irish Company at Jadotville,”; Tony O’Brien, “Niemba ambush 60 years on,” An Cosantóir 80, no. 8 (2020), 18–21; Linda Hickey, “Jadotville—60 years on,” An Cosantóir 81, no. 5 (2021), 21. 28 O’Sullivan, “Ireland, Africa and the end of empire,” 50; James McCafferty, “The Irish Army in the Congo, 1960–64: The foundation for permanent defence forces peacekeeping missions,” Defence Forces Review 13 (2016), 123. 29 MacQueen, “Ireland and the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus,” 96. 30 Miller, “From At Tiri to Qana,” 386.

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existence and recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to full self-determination.”31 Conflict Inextricably linked to independence is Ireland’s own history of conflict and partition. As the 2018 UNSC campaign noted; “as a small country with our own troubled history we understand the complexities of conflict and the struggle for States to be heard at the UN. Approaching the centenary of our national independence, we can share our own experience of resolving conflict on our shared island.”32 This reiterated the DFA’s 2015 review of Irish Foreign Policy; ‘The Global Island: Ireland’s Foreign Policy for a Changing World’ which highlighted that “we can contribute to international conflict resolution drawing on our own history and experience.”33 The lived experience of partition played a notable role in debates regarding Irish participation in UNFICYP in 1964.34 In the Dáil, Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken emphasised that the Irish Government would oppose any “attempt by outsiders to intervene, or to impose by force or by threat of force, a solution of the problem— and particularly one by partition.”35 Lemass highlighted the differences between the Irish and Cypriot situations but nevertheless remarked that “if anybody wants to solve an international problem anywhere by means of partition, he must not come to us for a recommendation for it.”36 Both Lemass and Aiken had been prominent leaders of the Anti-Treaty 31 Houses of the Oireachtas, Dail Debate, June 16, 1982, “Situation in Lebanon: Statement by Taoiseach,” Available from https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/ dail/1982-06-16/19/?highlight%5B0%5D=lebanon&highlight%5B1%5D=lebanon&highli ght%5B2%5D=lebanon#spk_266. 32 Department of Foreign Affairs, “An introduction to Ireland’s candidature for the United Nations Security Council,” 5. 33 Department of Foreign Affairs, The Global Island: Ireland’s Foreign Policy for a Changing World (Dublin: Government of Ireland, 2015), 30. 34 MacQueen, “Ireland and the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus,” 95–96. 35 Houses of the Oireachtas, 1964. “Despatch of army contingent to Cyprus: Motion

of approval,” April 7. Accessed December 14, 2020. https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/deb ates/debate/dail/1964-04-07/46/?highlight%5B0%5D=cyprus&highlight%5B1%5D=cyp rus#spk_267. 36 Ibid.

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IRA, and their lived history influenced their tenure in Government in the crucial era for Irish peacekeeping of the 1960s.37 MacQueen’s study of the Irish contribution to UNFICYP notes however that the Irish fears of the UN imposing partition in Cyprus, whilst understandable, proved unfounded.38 Nevertheless, the very real lived history of partition and conflict continued to influence the Irish calculus for UNFICYP. In 1971 some of the Irish UNFICYP contingent returned due to the deteriorating situation on the Northern Ireland border, as the historical impact of partition directly affected contemporary commitments.39 More recently, the Irish Embassy in Cyprus has sought to share lessons from the Northern Ireland peace process with local groups on the divided island.40 This “lesson-sharing approach” is one that is somewhat unique in the Irish case as direct experience of peacebuilding is uncommon in international partners.41 Partition, however, remains contentious, as events in 2021 marking the centenary of the foundation of Northern Ireland proved as President Higgins turned down offers to attend the commemorations.42 Ireland’s non-military aligned status, which stemmed from partition, has also been referenced as making it a suitable contributor for peacekeeping.43 Referencing the decision to send troops to Congo, Aiken remarked of Ireland’s unique position “where combat troops of nations belonging to NATO and other military blocs are not acceptable.”44 Alongside countries such as Finland, neutrality was particularly advantageous during the Cold War as Ireland, despite ideologically favouring 37 Tim Pat Coogan, The I.R.A. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), 42. 38 MacQueen, “Ireland and the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus,” 98. 39 MacQueen, 100. 40 Marcella Smyth and Aoife Lyons, “Building and sustaining peace: Ireland’s approach,” Defence Forces Review 17 (2020), 242. 41 Smyth and Lyons. “Building and sustaining peace,” 242. 42 Samantha Libreri, “President will not attend NI centenary service with Queen Eliz-

abeth,” RTE.ie, September 15, 2021. Available from https://www.rte.ie/news/ireland/ 2021/0915/1246949-centenary-partition-service/. 43 Karen Devine, “Values and identities in Ireland’s peace policy,” Swiss Political Science Review 19, no.3 (2013), 386, Doherty, “Partnership for peace,” 69. 44 Houses of the Oireachtas, Dail Debate, May 17, 1961, “Ceisteanna—Questions. Oral answers—Membership of NATO,” Available from https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/ debate/dail/1961-05-17/9/?highlight%5B0%5D=nato#spk_25.

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the West, did not have vested interests in NATO or the Warsaw Pact.45 But the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union arguably ended the perceived utility of neutrality whilst increased engagement with the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) and with EU defence integration have presented new challenges.46 In this regard, Ireland’s consistent engagement with UN operations was challenged by the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s. Constitutional constraints regarding neutrality forced Ireland to withdraw its commitment to EU peacekeeping operations in Macedonia in 2003.47 Risk aversion also played a role in the decision not to participate in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia.48 Nevertheless, the Defence Forces and others still highlight Irish impartiality and acceptability as post-Cold War peacekeepers.49 The trinity of decolonisation, independence and conflict provide context as “that which surrounds.” Each are related and exert impact, albeit impact that is often tempered by the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, applying Gray’s understanding that strategic culture “can be conceived as a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behaviour,” it is clear that each of these elements “gives meaning” to Ireland’s peacekeeping, providing justification for Irish participation. However, Gray also noted that context can be “that which weaves together,” “the total warp and woof of matters strategic that are thoroughly woven together.”50 Weaving these and other elements together is Ireland’s more recent peacekeeping tradition, practised by the Defence Forces on the ground.

45 Katsumi Ishizuka, Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960–2000 (London: Routledge, 2004), 5. 46 Doherty, “Partnership for peace,” 189; Murphy, “Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping,” 723; Devine, “Values and identities in Ireland’s peace policy.” 47 Murphy, “Ireland withdraws from participation in EU peacekeeping mission to Macedonia,” 123. 48 Murphy, “Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping,” 725. 49 MacDonald, “Peacekeeping lessons learned: An Irish perspective,”96; Irish Defence

Forces, Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine (Dublin: Irish Defence Forces, 2016), 40. 50 Gray, “Strategic culture as context,” 51.

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That Which Weaves Together The Peacekeeping Tradition Given Ireland’s small size and limited military strength, UN Peacekeeping deployments constitute the central operational commitment of Irish forces abroad.51 The UNSC campaign proudly stated that Ireland is the highest per capita troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations.52 The 2015 White Paper on Defence noted that the Government would explore the development of a New Institute for Peace Support and Leadership Training at the Defence Forces’ Curragh Camp, noting that such an establishment “particularly in the context of 2016 commemorations, draws inspiration from Ireland’s unique historical experience.”53 This “unique historical experience” is also manifest in the history of the Defence Forces. The role of history is bound into the fabric of the Defence Forces and its engagement on peacekeeping missions and the ONUC mission as previously discussed “had a dramatic effect on the [service].”54 Continuity of service has helped to weave Ireland’s peacekeeping strategic culture together. Lessons learned from ONUC were applied on UNFICYP duty and future operations by Congo veterans.55 A recent report into the Siege of Jadotville noted that “Jadotville blended into the narrative of the Defence Force’s deployment to UNIFIL in Lebanon which began in 1978. There was continuity in overseas service.”56 Moreover, long-term engagements, for example in Lebanon, have strengthened Ireland’s reputation. Commemorating 60 years of Irish Peacekeeping in 2018, then Defence Forces Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Mark Mellett, noted that “our reputation as fair and impartial brokers, dedicated to the common purpose of supporting peace in South

51 Ishizuka, Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations, 14. 52 Department of Foreign Affairs, “An introduction to Ireland’s candidature for the

United Nations Security Council,” 10. 53 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 2015 (Dublin: Government of Ireland, 2015), 32. 54 Irish Defence Forces, Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine, 18. 55 McCafferty, “The Irish Army in the Congo, 1960–64,” 129. 56 William Campbell, Michael Dillon, Linda Hickey, Michael Kennedy, John Spierin,

and Paul Pakenham, Independent Review Group Report on Jadotville (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2021), 38.

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Lebanon is built upon the work, dedication and sacrifices of successive Irish contingents since 1978.”57 Moreover, as the Defence Forces was originally constituted to focus on internal threats such as the IRA as opposed to external invasion, this resulted in some comparisons to a “gendarmerie” more than a traditional military.58 The 2015 White Paper noted that “given our particular history, the threat of internal subversion of the State was also a key national security focus.”59 This historical internal security focus, combined with their light equipment for such a role has made the Defence Forces highly effective peacekeepers.60 This has also combined with the consistent participation of the Defence Forces on UN operations. In 2016, some 70% of Irish troops had served on more than one UN Operation.61 This is particularly of note given the small size of the Defence Forces at 8847 total personnel as of 2019.62 This small size has been cited as a strength of the Defence Forces in relation to “traditional” peacekeeping.63 Such missions are focussed more on general observational tasks, which fit well with the Defence Forces’ small size and lack of heavy support weapons.64 Consistency has also been of benefit to the Defence Forces, through improved morale and training.65 Overseas deployments are also relatively popular with serving personnel.66 Niemba veteran John Joyce referred to overseas service as “the best thing that ever happened to the Irish Army.”67 Peacekeeping has become a central, if not the central, role of the

57 Mark Mellett, “Message from the CoS,” An Cosantóir 78, no. 5 (2018), 4. 58 Murphy, “Ireland, the United Nations and peacekeeping operations,” 30. 59 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 2015, 1–2. 60 Murphy, “Ireland, the United Nations and peacekeeping operations,” 30. 61 Murphy, “Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping,” 725–726. 62 Houses of the Oireachtas, Dail Debate, April 18, 2019, “Defence forces strength,” Available from https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-04-18/37/. 63 Murphy, “Ireland withdraws from participation in EU peacekeeping mission to Macedonia,” 131. 64 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, “Our history,” Available from https:// peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history; Murphy, “Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping,” 723. 65 Murphy, “Ireland, the United Nations and peacekeeping operations,” 38. 66 Murphy, “Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping,” 728. 67 O’Brien, “Niemba Ambush 60 years on,” 21.

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Irish Defence Forces and has, in at least one case, led to the recruitment of personnel from abroad.68 This peacekeeping tradition, honed over many years of dedicated service, thus exerts its own influence but also “weaves together” the elements of decolonisation, independence and conflict with the experiences and history of the practitioners who put these ideas into action on the ground.

The History of the Future As the past stretches further away and contemporary challenges take precedence, how will this historical experience impact Ireland’s future peacekeeping efforts? The UN has identified several challenges to peacekeeping in the future, including by “potentially lethal and disruptive technologies; by climate-related crises and population dislocation; by increasing urbanization and extreme poverty; by political discord and polarization; and by the continued evolution of non-state armed groups.”69 These and other issues have been presented as scenarios in a series of position papers in relation to UN peacekeeping which outline a number of uncomfortable potential situations for Ireland’s future peacekeepers. Such scenarios, whilst not predictive or forecasting, are none the less plausible based on current trends.70 In one scenario, an autonomous logistics convoy on UNIFIL duty crashes into a civilian bus.71 Others depict the hacking of UNIFIL systems and the release of sensitive data on local civilians who had supplied information to peacekeepers.72 Others

68 Sorcha Pollak, “I’m proud to be in the Irish Defence Forces—I’d like that to be matched up with citizenship”. November 10, 2021. Accessed January 31, 2022. https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/people/i-m-proud-to-be-in-the-irish-def ence-forces-i-d-like-that-to-be-matched-up-with-citizenship-1.4723568. 69 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, “Future of Peacekeeping,” Available from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/future-of-peacekeeping. 70 Paul D. Williams, “The future of peace operations: A scenario analysis, 2020–2030,” United Nations Peacekeeping, 13, Available from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/def ault/files/fopo_scenarios_paul_williams_final.pdf. 71 Williams, “The future of peace operations,” 5. 72 Williams, 8.

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noted the potential for the UN to be sucked into counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, even in a supporting role.73 Melting ice-caps and increased access to the Arctic were also noted as having the potential for maritime peacekeeping operations.74 How Ireland will respond to these challenges will be dictated to a degree by its history. All of these issues will pose challenges to Ireland’s peacekeeping tradition and the reputation this service has forged. For example, Ireland’s proud position as a non-colonial power may count for little in climaterelated conflicts if Ireland is not doing enough on the world stage to tackle climate change, causing reputational damage.75 Moreover, the rapid spread of misinformation may undermine Ireland’s reputation, and such deliberate targeting of peacekeepers has already been noted in Lebanon and elsewhere.76 However, Ireland’s peacekeeping history in the region has made it a prime potential leader in developing cyber peacekeeping concepts, providing the potential to maintain its peacekeeping record and strategic influence into the future.77 In the naval domain, the Irish Naval Service will likely be influenced by its participation in EU operations in the Mediterranean from 2015, participation that some have felt is as momentous as the Army’s deployment with ONUC.78 In relation to the potential for UN involvement in counterterrorism, Ireland’s experience with the Troubles may come to the fore. The more recent history of Ireland’s counterterrorism force, the Army Ranger Wing (ARW), is inherently bound to events in Northern Ireland, with the completion of the first Ranger course in 1969 being coterminous with the developing Civil Rights campaign in Northern Ireland, moreover, the ARW’s first operation was domestic, responding to the kidnapping of

73 Ilhan Dahir, Agathe Sarfati, and Jake Sherman, “The future of UN peacekeeping and parallel operations,” United Nations Peacekeeping, 3–5, Available from https://peacekeep ing.un.org/sites/default/files/the_future_of_peacekeeping_and_parallel_operations.pdf. 74 Dahir, Sarfati, and Sherman, “The future of UN peacekeeping and parallel operations,” 8. 75 Smyth and Lyons, “Building and sustaining peace: Ireland’s approach,” 246. 76 Mark Williams, and Matthew G. O’Neill, “Ireland’s role within United Nations

information operations during peacekeeping,” Defence Forces Review 17 (2020). 77 Williams and O’Neill, “Ireland’s role within United Nations information operations during peacekeeping,” 198, 201. 78 Timothy O’Brien, “The origins and evolution of defence forces peacekeeping,” An Cosantóir 78, no. 5 (2018), 14.

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businessman Don Tidy in 1983, whilst its first overseas deployment was post-Cold War in 1993 to Somalia.79 Any Defence Forces’ involvement in counterterrorism will likely be influenced by the Troubles through this organisational legacy, however, the extent and benefit of this impact is debatable. With the passage of time, the Defence Forces will no longer be able to rely on the lived memory of personnel who served during the Troubles as those experienced veterans have increasingly moved on from the service. Nor should the Defence Forces seek to over-rely on the experience of the Troubles. Such lessons are not universally applicable in every case, as the British Army, confident in its counterinsurgency experience in Northern Ireland, found it to be of little practical benefit in different circumstances in Iraq.80 As such, the Defence Forces should not solely rely on past experience; continuing to develop its knowledge base should be an ongoing priority. The ability to adapt to these changes will be important, not just in peacekeeping but, as some have argued, in organisational terms. Whilst the Defence Forces’ history will have to play a role in creating its future, “at present its future is being constrained by the hand of history that refuses to allow the organisation to evolve,” limiting its adaptability.81 Nevertheless, a key element in the position papers discussed previously is the importance of knowledge transfer through lessons learned, reports and staff exchanges.82 Ireland’s experience and history in peacekeeping still counts, but it will need to be adapted and updated with a new experience to not only maintain the peacekeeping tradition but to ensure that the tradition will be of use in responding to new challenges from climate change, counterterrorism, and cyber operations. It must also consider the experiences and history of Defence Forces personnel from abroad, for whom Irish history as embodied in decolonisation, conflict and independence may not exert as great an influence, but who can also assist the force

79 Paul O’Brien, “Forging a special operations force,” An Cosantóir 77, no. 5 (2017), 12–13. 80 Amble, John, “MWI Podcast: The British Army in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Modern

War Institute. March 3, 2021. Accessed November 29, 2021. https://mwi.usma.edu/ mwi-podcast-the-british-army-in-iraq-and-afghanistan/ 81 Paul Hegarty, “Joint force command: The need for change,” Defence Forces Review 16 (2019), 105. 82 Ilhan, Sarfati, and Sherman, “The future of UN peacekeeping and parallel operations,” 9.

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through their own diverse experiences.83 Avoiding the pitfalls experienced by the British Army in Iraq of assuming the applicability of previous experience is also necessary. The Defence Forces should learn from its history, but should be careful when and where to apply it.

Conclusion Colin Gray noted that strategic culture provides context as that which surrounds and that which weaves together.84 As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, in the case of Ireland’s approach to peacekeeping, Ireland’s long history of decolonisation, conflict and independence provides the former, whilst Ireland’s peacekeeping tradition provides the latter. It is of course a coincidence that Ireland’s accession to the UNSC took place during the centenary of its independence from Britain and the outbreak of the Irish Civil War, yet it is not coincidental that this was referenced in the official campaign to join the UNSC.85 As Ireland continues its “Decade of Centenaries” and wrestles with the challenges of a complicated history, the experiences of decolonisation, independence and conflict continue to provide strategic context to Irish peacekeeping efforts. All have been infused and woven together by the tradition of peacekeeping in the Defence Forces. Whilst it is not possible to predict the future with certainty, Irish history will continue to exert influence on how Ireland responds to such new challenges for peacekeeping as cyber operations, climate change and counterterrorism well into the future, and Ireland should continue to replenish its knowledge base with new experience to maintain its reputation and effectiveness as a peacekeeper. Members of the Defence Forces, policymakers, and researchers will, knowingly or otherwise, be influenced by Irish history in the decisions they make. History also provides useful learnings to help avoid past mistakes. However, recognising this influence and avoiding the pitfalls of generalising Ireland’s experience of decolonisation, conflict and the fight for independence to those of other states and regions is necessary for Ireland to continue its reputation as an effective peacekeeper.

83 Pollak, 2021. 84 Gray, “Strategic culture as context,” 51. 85 Department of Foreign Affairs, “An introduction to Ireland’s candidature for the

United Nations Security Council,” 10.

Ireland’s Largest Peacekeeping Mission—The Irish Defence Forces in UNIFIL Natalia Agnieszka Hapek

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been one of the longest UN missions in history, with the Irish Defence Forces participating for most of its duration (excepting 2001–2006 and 2007– 2011), thus exposing several generations of Irish soldiers to peacekeeping. The case of Lebanon shows how Irish peacekeeping has evolved in terms of policy and practice over many decades. UNIFIL is currently Ireland’s largest overseas peacekeeping mission, with 355 Irish personnel deployed as of January 2022.1 Together with Poland, Hungary and Malta, Ireland forms a joint Irish-Polish Battalion. Since 1978, 47 Irish peacekeepers have given their lives in the cause of peace in Southern Lebanon.

1 60% of the total number of Defence Forces personnel serving overseas; see: House of the Oireachtas, Written Answer by the Minister for Defence Simon Coveney, Wednesday— January 26, 2022, Accessed January 28, 2022, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/ question/2022-01-26/101/.

N. A. Hapek (B) University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_11

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The Origins of UNIFIL After the beginning of the civil war in Lebanon (1975), the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) maintained its strong presence in Southern Lebanon and continued attacks on Israel. On 11 March 1978 the PLO conducted a raid into Israel, hijacking a bus and opening fire at passing vehicles (the Coastal Road massacre). Israel responded by invading Lebanon on 14 March with the objective of defeating the PLO, thus securing northern Israel, and supporting Lebanese Christian militias involved in the civil war. The Lebanese government protested the invasion at the UN Security Council. On 19 March the UN Security Council passed Resolutions 425 and 426, calling on Israel to immediately withdraw, and establishing the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the withdrawal, restore peace and security, and assist the Lebanese government in re-establishing its effective authority. Four days later, the first UNIFIL troops arrived in Lebanon, having been reassigned from other UN operations in the region to start up the force. By June 1978 6100 troops were serving in UNIFIL.2 Although the speedy deployment of UNIFIL peacekeepers was praiseworthy, it should be noted that the UN mandate was not entirely clear. The area of operations was not precisely defined, none of the armed groups was directly named in the mandate and many parties concerned did not cooperate with UNIFIL. It was also not clear when (or whether) Israel would withdraw its forces, or how to assist the Lebanese government. UNIFIL was not authorised to use force, except in self-defence. However, that included “resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent [UNIFIL] from discharging its duties.”3 An unclear mandate, combined with the lack of support from the Security Council, hampered the mission from its very beginning. In March 1978 a tentative ceasefire was agreed, Israel decided to withdraw. The area left by Israel was claimed by the PLO, while Israeli-backed Lebanese Christian militia, the “De Facto Forces” (DFF, as they were called in UN parlance; or South 2 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 425, S/RES/425 (19 March 1978), Available from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/71622?ln=en; United Nations, Security Council Resolution 426, S/RES/426 (19 March 1978), Available from https://dig itallibrary.un.org/record/71623?ln=en. 3 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the Period 19 March to 13 September 1978, S/12845 (13 September 1978), Available from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/224442?ln=en.

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Lebanon Army as they were known in Arabic) tried to consolidate power. UNIFIL was caught in the middle of the conflict, constantly and deliberately harassed, attacked, shelled, or prevented from carrying out its mandate. This uneasy position grew only more complex over time, as Israel invaded Lebanon again in 1982, reaching Beirut, and Hezbollah, soon to be the most important actor in Southern Lebanon, was founded. Until 1985 UNIFIL was actually operating behind Israeli lines, while its troop levels were raised. UNIFIL was constantly criticised by the international community for its inability to prevent the Israeli invasion, even though such action was not permitted under its mandate. As the population in the Southern Lebanon grew due to the influx of refugees, UNIFIL focussed on providing aid and humanitarian assistance. It also monitored Israeli military activities, simultaneously being accused by Israel of disrupting its operations, and by the Lebanese of not providing sufficient protection. Israeli forces withdrew to Southern Lebanon in 1985, giving Hezbollah raison d’être and opportunities for continuous attacks on the DFF, Israeli forces, and at times Israeli territory. Israel eventually withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and the DFF was disbanded. Since no peace agreement had been achieved, the Lebanese government did not deploy the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to the south, thus enabling Hezbollah to grow in power, and to create “a state within a state.” UNIFIL was tasked with verifying the Israeli withdrawal and identifying the unofficial border (the Blue Line).4 Many unresolved questions and tensions as well as the growing influence of Hezbollah led to the resumption of conflict in 2006. During the July War, or Israel-Hezbollah War, Israel’s goals included removing armed elements of Hezbollah and inducing deployment of the LAF to the south as implied by UN Security Council Resolution 1559 in 2004 which called for disbanding and disarming all militias and extending the control of the Lebanese government to the full Lebanese territory. The 34-day long war ended in a military stalemate since Israel had not destroyed the military capabilities of Hezbollah. The ongoing military presence of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon led to the enhancement and enlargement of UNIFIL to 15,000 peacekeepers, including an expanded mandate under Resolution 1701 in 2006 that emphasised the role of UNIFIL in helping ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary, safe 4 Alexander Mattelaer, The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations: Planning, Friction, Strategy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 82.

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return of displaced persons. Another role assigned in the mandate was assistance to the LAF in their deployment to Southern Lebanon to mark the sovereignty of the Lebanese government over that area. New rules of engagement were established to allow UNIFIL personnel not only the right to use force in self-defence but also to protect civilians and “to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities.”5 Since 2006, UNIFIL has remained deployed in Southern Lebanon. The Irish Defence Forces in UNIFIL: Traditional Peacekeeping, 1978–2001 Lebanon holds a special place in Ireland’s UN experience—it was in 1958 in Lebanon that Ireland began its involvement in UN missions by sending an observer team to the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). This contribution was highly appreciated. Even though UNOGIL was not a long experience—in December 1958 the mission was completed— “the fact that it had occurred at all was heartening to an army for whom the chance of foreign service had for long seemed impossibly remote.”6 The Irish government decided to continue its involvement in the region, transferring some observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), where, since 1958, the Irish presence has been unbroken. Ireland joined UNIFIL in 1978. In May of that year the 43rd Irish Battalion arrived in Lebanon. The Irish contribution of approximately 750 troops comprised an infantry battalion, a communications section, an administrative company, and staff officers at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura.7 Despite the 43rd Irish Battalion being “by far the bestequipped all Irish units ever sent abroad, and, as it turned out, the best-equipped in the force,” from the beginning it found itself in a complicated situation.8 For many Irish troops UNIFIL was the first experience of serving overseas. Many were unaware that the vague mandate 5 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1701, S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006), Available from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/581053?ln=en. 6 Donal O’Carroll, “Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Experience 1958–1995,” in Peacekeeping, 1815 to Today: Proceedings of the XXIst Colloquium of the International Commission of Military History (Québec City: National Defence, 1995), 528. 7 James Parker, “UNIFIL and Peacekeeping the Defence Forces Experience,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 2, no. 2 (1986): 63. 8 O’Carroll, “Ireland’s Experience,” 535.

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of the mission was, in fact, not feasible and any robust actions would be deemed “aggressive,” since parties of the conflict did not intend to comply with the decisions of the Security Council. The 43rd Irish Battalion established its headquarters in Tibnin, while rifle companies occupied nearby towns assuming that these deployments were temporary, that they would move to the border once Israel withdrew. Over time, as the DFF grew stronger and the LAF did not deploy to Southern Lebanon, it became clear to the 43rd that their temporary positions were permanent and new arrangements for long-term accommodation and force protection were needed.9 For the 43rd Irish Battalion, the main challenge was the DFF, which regularly harassed Irish troops. Until September 1978 the DFF was considered by the Lebanese government a part of the Lebanese Army, and the Irish, though provoked, managed to avoid direct confrontation, and focussed instead on patrolling, manning checkpoints, observing, monitoring, and reporting. Irish troops also provided humanitarian assistance for local communities, including medical aid, and, for example, support to the hospital and to the orphanage in Tibnin.10 At times, the Irish were criticised for “not doing as much as they should,” for not using force or for giving the DFF the freedom to gain control over new territory. However, it was the UN that did not authorise more robust actions. Irish troops were caught between a rock and a hard place, “If they prevented PLO or Lebanese resistance fighters from entering the UNIFIL area and attacking the Israelis or their allies, the Irish risked being branded as pro-Israel. And if they blocked IDF and SLA attempts to extend the ‘security zone’ and depopulate the area, they were accused of having PLO sympathies.”11 The 43rd Irish Battalion paved the way for its successors, as the next Irish battalions were now more aware of the difficulties awaiting them.

9 Eamonn Colclough, “The Evolution of Irish Peacekeeping 1978–2016” (PhD diss., University of Limerick, 2016), 139, 142. 10 As recalled by John Moriarty regarding years 1978–2001: “I think it would be reasonable to say that during our time there, we treated in excess of 150,000 people— some 6000 or so every year”, see: John Moriarty, “‘Bullets, Bacteria and Boredom’. A Peacekeeping Memory of Lebanon—November 1978–November 2001,” in Irish Defence Forces Review 5 (Dublin: Defence Forces Printing Press, 2008), 52. 11 Henry McDonald, Irishbatt. The Story of Ireland’s Blue Berets in the Lebanon (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1993), 44.

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Indeed, it was not only shelling or direct confrontations that could be perilous for the troops, some Irish observation posts were inside the enclave taken by the DFF, making it possible for Irish troops to be taken hostage in case of any deterioration of relations with Israeli proxy forces. Also, the constant fighting between the PLO and Israel led to growing tensions between Israel and Ireland. In February 1980 the Foreign Ministers of Ireland and Bahrain issued “The Bahrain Declaration”—a joint communiqué which emphasised the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent State in Palestine. Ireland also recognised the role of the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people. To both the DFF and Israel the Bahrain Declaration meant Ireland had now formally picked a side. On 6 April 1980, the DFF was denied access to the village of At-Tiri by Irish troops. At-Tiri straddled the only road leading to the strategically important Hill 880. The confrontation resulted in the six-day long “Battle of At-Tiri.” While a clash of unprecedented intensity for UNIFIL, it was not a typical battle, interspersed with “periods of calm after short fire fights” when each side could resupply, and their commanders negotiate.12 Despite being attacked by tanks, mortars, and relentless small arms fire, Irish troops held their ground, eventually being reinforced by Dutch (with TOW anti-tank missiles) and Fijian peacekeepers from the UNIFIL Force Mobile Reserve. During the battle Private Stephen Griffin was mortally wounded, he died in an Israeli hospital on 16 April. A Fijian peacekeeper and at least two DFF militiamen were also killed, and nine Irish troops were taken hostage but eventually released. In the next days the DFF led to further escalation, having warned UNIFIL Force Commander Lieutenant General Emmanuel Erskine of potential reprisals for the DFF’s loses in At-Tiri; a small UNIFIL party was ambushed while resupplying an isolated UN outpost on 18 April 1980. It consisted of three Irish soldiers from UNIFIL, Privates John O’Mahoney, Thomas Barrett, and Derek Smallhorne, two officers from UNTSO, Major Harry Klein of the U.S. Army and French Captain Patrick Vincent, and two journalists. The group was kidnapped by the DFF. Subsequent investigations concluded that several mistakes had been made. Major Klein decided to proceed with the resupply mission despite

12 McDonald, Irishbatt, 49.

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their prearranged DFF escort not showing up. The hostages were interrogated, and the three Irishmen were selected for execution. O’Mahoney, though shot, managed to survive. The bodies of Barrett and Smallhorne were found nearby the same day. It emerged later that an Israeli officer from Shin Bet, Israel’s Security Agency, was present during the executions, and that the killer of Barrett and Smallhorne was Mahmoud Bazzi, the brother of a DFF militiaman killed during the Battle of At-Tiri. It was only in 2015 that Bazzi’s trial before a Military Court in Beirut started, and in December 2020 he was found guilty of killing Smallhorne and Barrett and sentenced to life in prison—reduced to 15 years, as Bazzi was 76 at that time.13 Despite the shock induced by the murders of Barrett and Smallhorne, the Irish Government limited its reaction to calling for more political pressure to cease hostilities without asking for a stronger mandate— due to its attachment to the idea of traditional peacekeeping. The Irish Government organised a summit in Dublin in 1980, for UNIFIL Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), to draw attention to the inadequate protection of UN forces in Southern Lebanon. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 467 (1980) condemning Israeli military intervention as well as hostility against UNIFIL, and reiterated the provisions allowing UNIFIL to use force in self-defence. However, the situation on the ground remained unchanged, and UNIFIL continued to be vulnerable and subjected to constant attacks.14 Relations between Ireland and Israel hit an all-time low. Israel accused Irish peacekeepers of being partial, biassed, and unfit for UN service in the region, and the 47th Irish Battalion was prohibited from entering the DFF enclave and was thus cut off from the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura. All the supplies to the Irish had to be provided by other contingents. However, it was not only the DFF that was hostile towards the Irish. On 27 April 1981 the PLO killed Private Hugh Doherty and abducted Private Kevin Joyce, who “was shot a few weeks later as a retaliation following a gun battle between Palestinians and Fijian peacekeepers in which several Palestinians were killed.”15 13 Katsumi Ishizuka, Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960–2000 (London: Routledge, 2004), 113. 14 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 467, S/RES/467 (24 April 1980), Available from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/12378?ln=en. 15 Colclough, “The Evolution,” 154.

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In 1982–1985 Irish peacekeepers gained a new experience when Israel started its invasion and then occupation of Lebanon. Indiscriminate Israeli attacks were met with civil resistance and UNIFIL was instructed to report and observe, without attempting to block the Israeli invasion. Despite these instructions, many UNIFIL peacekeepers often tried to intervene to protect the Lebanese civilian population, and Irish troops focussed on providing aid to local communities because of the influx of refugees and restraining the DFF, eventually managing to restrict their freedom of movement. On 27 October 1982 while four Irish troops were manning a checkpoint at Tibnin Bridge, one of them, Private Michael McAleavey, killed his three colleagues later claiming he had “snapped” because of the weather, dehydration, and exhaustion. His case became the longest court martial in Irish history, and he received a life sentence. McAleavey was released in 2010, having served 27 years in prison. Between 1985 and 2000, UNIFIL found itself in an especially difficult environment. Even though the PLO had been driven from Lebanon, the Israelis and the DFF were occupying the south, and the Shia resistance movement (Amal, Hezbollah) was growing stronger, attacking Israeli and DFF positions. Caught in the middle, the Irish were frequently targeted by both sides. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Shia become more common, threatening both the DFF and Israelis, and also UNIFIL. In September 1986 four French troops were killed by remotecontrolled explosive devices and in 1987 France withdrew its Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit from UNIFIL. UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar asked Troop Contributing Countries to replace it, and when no Member State volunteered, he requested all UNIFIL participants to provide their contingents with adequate EOD capabilities. However, then Irish Defence Forces Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Tadhg O’Neill decided to make no changes in the composition of the Irish UNIFIL Battalion, despite the increasing threat, and despite some IEDs specifically targeting Irish troops.16 It was only after an IED killed three Irish troops on 21 March 1989 that O’Neill added an EOD team and an Engineer Special Search Team tasked with searching the area for mines, to the 65th Irish Battalion serving with UNIFIL.17 16 Colclough, “The Evolution,” 160–161. 17 In 2011, an independent review was conducted into the deaths of the three soldiers,

and it was found that the level of IED threat to the Irish personnel was not assessed correctly.

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In 1997 Israel declared its readiness to withdraw from Lebanon, leading to further escalation between Hezbollah and other militias. With the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the DFF disbanded, the Irish Government announced that participation in UNIFIL would end, especially as many other UN peacekeeping opportunities became available and UNIFIL itself was being downsized. The last Irish units and the Irish component of the UNIFIL headquarters withdrew in 2001. During Ireland’s 23 years of unbroken service with UNIFIL from 1978 to 2001 two Irish Army officers served as Force Commander, Lieutenant General William O’Callaghan (1981–1986) and Lieutenant General James Sreenan (1999) who subsequently became Defence Force Chief of Staff in 2004. The Irish Defence Forces in UNIFIL: Expeditionary Peacekeeping, 2006–Present The Irish withdrawal from UNIFIL in 2001 was ultimately short-lived. With the onset of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, and Security Council Resolution 1701 expanding UNIFIL to 15,000 peacekeepers, Ireland, by UN request and under international pressure, recommitted the Defence Forces to Lebanon for one year to implement the new mandate. An Irish mechanised infantry company of 165 personnel joined a Finnish engineering company to form the 1st joint Finnish-Irish Battalion. The Irish Defence Forces returned to UNIFIL once again in 2011, operating very differently compared to their previous deployments in Lebanon from 1978–2001. This different experience was part of a larger strategic shift in peacekeeping witnessed by the international community after the end of the Cold War, as inter-state conflict was replaced in the main by intra-state instability. The concept of traditional peacekeeping was no longer suitable for these conflicts—the need for typical ground-holding forces, or static inter-positional deployments between belligerents diminished in favour of mobile forces with self-sustainment and rapid expeditionary capabilities. The Brahimi Report, published by the UN in 2000 emphasised the need for strengthening the UN’s capacity to conduct missions of other types.18 Also, many regional organisations started playing roles in peacekeeping, 18 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, S/2000/809 (21 August 2000), Available from https://digitallibrary.un.org/ record/420963?ln=en.

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with the UN “outsourcing” many components of missions to NATO, the EU, or the African Union. This conceptual shift and the preference for peace enforcement coincided with the downsizing and modernisation of the Irish Defence Forces, as well as an Irish realignment away from internal security, owing to the end of The Troubles in Northern Ireland, and in favour of international peacekeeping.19 However, this Irish realignment towards peacekeeping operations took a hit during the 2008 financial crisis, and ultimately motivated the Irish Government to re-join UNIFIL. In 2010, the Irish mechanised infantry battalion serving in Chad was withdrawn at the end of the MINURCAT deployment, the number of Irish personnel with the NATO mission in Kosovo, KFOR, was significantly reduced. It became clear, due to the financial crisis in Ireland, that Irish troops would not have other possibilities to serve overseas. However, to continue a decades long history of multilateralism, and as troops contributing countries are reimbursed for UN deployments, but not for EU equivalents, the Irish government, with the approval of Dáil Éireann, decided to re-join UNIFIL in 2011, replacing an Italian battalion. UNIFIL welcomed the return of the Irish, aware that their presence would be acceptable for local communities, who seemed concerned about the new mandate. In May 2011, 480 Irish troops were deployed to UNIFIL Sector West, to UN Post 2-45 (Camp Shamrock), as a mechanised infantry battalion conducting mobile patrols, often alongside the LAF, also manning two critical UN posts (6-50 and 6-52) directly on the Blue Line. That Irish troops were put in charge of places deeply linked to Hezbollah (like Bint Jubayl) as well as deployed directly on the Blue Line, was a sign of trust and a token of appreciation for Irish service in UNIFIL. In April 2012 the number of Irish troops was reduced as the joint FinnishIrish Battalion was established based on the experiences from 2006–2007. This joint battalion existed until November 2018, when Finland withdrew from UNIFIL. Ireland then increased its troop numbers to a full battalion-strength assuming full duties and responsibilities for the area of operations in Sector West. In November 2019, Ireland entered a partnership with Poland, which returned to UNIFIL having been previously deployed to Lebanon in 1992–2009, to create a new joint battalion. This allowed Ireland to reduce its contribution since Poland agreed to

19 Colclough, “The Evolution,” 19.

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deploy up to 250 troops for the battalion. This new battalion has been truly multinational. Under bilateral agreements, Hungarian troops have deployed as part of the Polish contingent, while several Maltese troops have deployed with the Irish contingent. The new Irish-Polish Battalion has engaged in extensive mobile patrolling, monitoring the Blue Line, reconnaissance and ground-holding, and cooperation with the LAF, as well as humanitarian operations. Yet again, during this phase of participation, Ireland took a leadership role in UNIFIL, with Major General Michael Beary serving as Force Commander from 2016 to 2018. The Impact and Significance of the Irish Defence Forces Service with UNIFIL Ireland’s participation in UNIFIL must be seen in the context of its relationship with the Middle East, which started with contributions to UNOGIL and UNTSO and was followed in the early 1960s with recognition granted to Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria, and with support for the Palestinian cause. Even though the Arab world’s perception of Ireland has been positive due to its neutrality, commitment to decolonisation and non-involvement in inter-Arab affairs, this positive image was strengthened by Ireland’s contribution to UNIFIL.20 Widespread international appreciation for the Irish contribution to UNIFIL did not, however, exclude Ireland from the general criticism, mainly by the U.S. and Israel, of UNIFIL’s shortcomings. Though Southern Lebanon remains safer than in past decades and the LAF is cooperating with UNIFIL, Hezbollah maintains its military presence in the area, providing social services for local communities and acting like a government. The Trump Administration tried to solve this issue in the Security Council, yet without success. In 2020, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft told the Security Council that Hezbollah was still dictating where and when UNIFIL could patrol.21 On the implementation of Resolution 1701 Secretary-General

20 Ireland’s history of regaining freedom has been especially admired in the Arab world “at a time of growing anti-British sentiment”—see: Rory Miller, “The Politics of Trade and Diplomacy: Ireland’s Evolving Relationship with the Muslim Middle East,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 15 (2004): 125. 21 Kelly Craft, “Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Lebanon,” May 4, 2020, Accessed December 7, 2021, https://usun.usmission.gov/rem arks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-situation-in-lebanon-via-vtc/.

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António Guterres admitted that Hezbollah “continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains military capabilities … While taking allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.”22 Guterres reported ongoing security regression and noted that the freedom of movement of peacekeepers was sometimes restricted by the LAF, (implicitly) preventing UNIFIL from entering areas occupied by Hezbollah, thus making it impossible to implement Resolution 1559 which called for all military forces on Lebanese soil to disarm and disband.23 Yet, UNIFIL was not authorised to use force to disarm Hezbollah and Resolution 1559 did not state explicitly that disarming Hezbollah constituted part of UNIFIL’s mandate. Accusations of UNIFIL turning a blind eye to Hezbollah’s activities have been constantly raised by the U.S. and Israel. In 2017, the U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley, added a personal dimension, calling UNIFIL Force Commander Major General Michael Beary of Ireland “blind,” with “an embarrassing lack of understanding of what’s going on.” Beary replied that “if there was a large cache of weapons, we would know about it.” Beary was also defended by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, which underlined his leadership in numerous peacekeeping roles.24 In UNIFIL the Irish Defence Forces learned lessons crucial for its peacekeeping policy and practice. As Colclough put it, Irish domestic commitments to internal security effectively dictated that the role of the garrison army in Ireland was that of a gendarmerie. It was the UNIFIL experience that actually gave generations of Irish soldiers’ exposure to military deployment and enabled them to call themselves soldiers. Hence, the UNIFIL experience has had a formative influence on the doctrine, tactics, and logistical configuration of the Irish Defence Forces.25

22 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the period 20 February to 18 June 2021, S/2021/685 (13 July 2021), Available from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3932459?ln=en. 23 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1559, S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004), Available from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/529421?ln=en. 24 Peter Murtagh, “Irish chief of Unifil backed after attack by US ambassador to UN,” Irish Times, August 31, 2017, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irishnews/irish-chief-of-unifil-backed-after-attack-by-us-ambassador-to-un-1.3205258. 25 Colclough, “The Evolution,” 138.

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Participation in UNIFIL also helped develop an understanding of the region and of war and peace, maturing Irish troops “on both military and cultural levels,” especially that—as pointed out by Sakr—UN missions under Chapter VI (Peacekeeping) such as UNIFIL may be more nuanced than those under Chapter VII (Peace Enforcement).26 Compared to most EU countries, Ireland has an unusual insight into policies and practices of the UN, yet over time, many Irish officers started favouring NATO/EU-led operations, while also acknowledging that the UN has been progressing in its approach to modern operations.27 Many Irish officers praised the “enhanced” UNIFIL for operating “like a NATO mission,” especially in terms of command and control, logistics and operational capabilities—even though many of these changes were not introduced by the UN but rather by unilateral decisions of some NATO members. For instance, the Force Chief of Staff position has been redesigned and significantly strengthened by the French.28 More attention has also been paid by the Irish Government to peacekeepers’ security since some European states had previously articulated their dissatisfaction with the UN approach to force protection. Compared to pre-2001 deployments, and due to experiences from other missions in Liberia, Chad, and Kosovo, the Irish started showing growing expectations concerning force protection. Irish officers were deeply concerned to arrive in Tibnin in south Lebanon in 2011 to find that “camp protection was rubbish, HESCO was missing, and the protection fence was like chicken wire.”29 Despite these criticisms, the “culture of force”—obligatory body armour and helmets, restrictions on spontaneous interactions with the local population—shown by some European states surprised Irish UNIFIL veterans due to their memories of “foot patrols who called into

26 Rita Sakr, UN in the Arab World. Irish Peacekeeping in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, A Historical, Political and Socio-Cultural Study (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 2013), 6, 22, 24. 27 Edward Burke, and Jonathan Marley, Walking Point for Peace: An Irish view on the state of UN peacekeeping (New York: New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2015), 2–3. 28 Burke, Walking Point, 13. 29 Ibid., 15.

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locals houses to drink chai and coffee,” in a more dangerous environment.30 Risk reduction was not imposed on the Irish but came from within as, over time, the safety of Irish troops has been coming to the fore. The deaths of the three Irish soldiers in 1989 showed shortcomings in threat analysis and capabilities to counter such threats, as no preventive measures were taken until after the incident occured. However, these hard lessons helped build up Irish EOD capabilities, previously developed during The Troubles, which were later used to help organise ISAF’s Counter-IED programme in Afghanistan. Before Ireland’s return to UNIFIL in 2006, the Irish Government expressed concerns regarding the safety of peacekeepers, and, only after France and Italy pledged their large well-equipped contingents was Irish participation confirmed. As noted by Burke and Marley, Irish experiences from the UNDOF mission in Syria from 2014 intensified this transition towards a conditions-based approach for an Irish presence in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East.31 Another valuable experience from UNIFIL is enhancement of the Irish capabilities in terms of operational partnerships. Ireland established a partnership with Finland for a year in 2006–2007 and later, from 2012 until 2018 since neither country could deploy a battalion alone. During this second period, independent units operated as part of an integrated Finnish-Irish command structure, with rotational command which allowed officers from both countries to gain experience commanding a battalion deployed on a mission while also sharing the financial costs. In 2015 Estonia joined the Irish-Finnish Battalion.32 As observed by O’Neill, compatibility, and suitability for particular theatres of operation are key features in assembling forces, and UNIFIL has witnessed friction between contingents.33 However, fruitful cooperation between Ireland, 30 For instance Italy or France, used to serving in Afghanistan. Colclough, “The Evolution,” 170–171. 31 Damien Cole, “‘Pragmatic Evolution?’ Reflections on the foreign policy motivations, implications and impact of Ireland’s experience of peacekeeping in the Middle East,” in Irish Defence Forces Review 15 (Dublin: Defence Forces Printing Press, 2018), 56; Burke, Walking Point, 4. 32 Donald C.F. Daniel, Paul D. Williams, and Adam C. Smith, Deploying Combined Teams: Lessons Learned from Operational Partnerships in UN Peacekeeping (New York: International Peace Institute, 2015), 6, 16. 33 Terence O’Neill, “UN Peacekeeping: Expectations and Reality,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 13 (2002): 210.

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Finland, and Estonia was facilitated by several factors: Ireland and Finland had cooperated militarily in the past, and the details of their cooperation in UNIFIL, command and control, logistics, procedures, training and financial arrangements, were codified in bilateral Memorandums of Understanding between both nations, and the UN, as well as a Technical Agreement. Moreover, both countries are neutral, in partnership with NATO, and share similar experiences of peacekeeping. In the cases of Ireland, Finland, and Estonia—all three are members of the EU, militarily compatible, able to communicate in English, and share similar values. Yet there were also some national differences, such as Estonia being a NATO member, and that Finland and Estonia have retained conscription while the Irish Defence Forces are all volunteer professionals.34 However, these differences made the contingents complement each other. The obvious benefits of cost and risk-sharing, as well as sharing best practices, contributed to Ireland partnering with Poland after Finland withdrew from UNIFIL in 2018. For Poland, this is the first experience of forming an operational partnership with Ireland (and Hungary), and despite differences, such as Poland and Hungary’s NATO membership and highly kinetic experiences Poland has gained in Iraq and Afghanistan which required shifting towards softer skills for peacekeeping doctrine and training, the IrishPolish Battalion constitutes yet another positive example of benefits from forming a partnership thanks to comprehensive agreements between Ireland and Poland. Mutual trust, high level of like-mindedness and a spirit of cooperation allow them not only to fulfil the mandate of UNIFIL but also to learn from each other. As pointed out by Murphy, Irish peacekeeping has evolved “from stand-alone exclusively Irish battalions, to joint battalions.”35 Another sphere influenced by UNIFIL is the understanding of the growing importance of information operations (IO), which have greater implications for peacekeeping, creating both risks and opportunities. The UN has been seeking to use IO for advancing operational goals— easing public mood or reducing tensions between conflicting parties, 34 Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalaviˇcius, and Anna Bulakh, Soldiers of Peace. Estonia, Finland and Ireland in UNIFIL (Tallin: International Centre for Defence and Security, 2016), 4. 35 Ray Murphy, “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping? Opportunities, Challenges and Ways Ahead—Ireland,” International Peacekeeping 23, no. 5 (2016): 729.

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educating local communities, confirming positive developments, or countering disinformation, thus increasing the safety of peacekeepers and support for UN actions.36 IO, however, may be also employed against the UN. In the past in Lebanon, Israel used its media for campaigns against Irish peacekeepers, depicting them as anti-Semitic, disorderly, and abusing alcohol.37 Hezbollah, which influences public opinion not only in Lebanon, has been using social media for disinformation, weakening adversaries morale and, for UNIFIL, restricting freedom of movement by portraying UN actions as trespassing on private properties or causing infrastructural and environmental damage.38 The growing impact of the digital sphere on peacekeeping cannot be overlooked as it brings opportunities and challenges for peacekeeping. Ireland, with its understanding of the Middle East and long experience in peacekeeping, “could take the lead on developing a concept of Cyber Peacekeeping that better reflects the realities of 21st conflict and post conflict, and to create resilience techniques that lessen the impact of IO in Lebanon and on the mission mandate.”39 The growing emphasis on civil-military coordination (CIMIC) and cultural awareness during pre-deployment training can also be attributed partially to Irish participation in UNIFIL.40 As observed by Esler, the international CIMIC course run by the UN Training School Ireland (UNTSI), although generally based on NATO CIMIC doctrine, focuses on the CIMIC function in UNIFIL. However, neither the syllabi for UNIFIL pre-deployment training nor for the general Overseas Qualification Course include a tactical CIMIC course.41 While UNIFIL has given Irish troops opportunities to develop their skills in negotiation at a

36 Mark Williams, and Matthew G. O’Neill, “Ireland’s Role within United Nations Information Operations during Peacekeeping,” in Irish Defence Forces Review 17 (Dublin: Defence Forces Printing Press, 2020): 193–194. 37 Robert Fisk, “At-Tiri, or Bosnia Avoided: The Irish in UNIFIL 1978–95,” in Irish Defence Forces Review 5 (Dublin: Defence Forces Printing Press, 2008): 40. 38 Williams, “Ireland’s Role,” 197–198. 39 Ibid., 199. 40 Sakr, UN in the Arab World, 6, 24. 41 Rory Esler, “Is the Irish Defence Forces Developing the Necessary Capability to Meet

the Operational Requirements of its UN CIMIC Roles? A Case Study of CIMIC Operations in Lebanon,” Journal of Military History and Defence Studies 1, no. 2 (November 2020): 165.

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tactical level, including negotiating with the DFF to reduce peacekeepers’ vulnerability, since the UN has been advocating for negotiations whenever possible, Ireland does not offer formal negotiation training for its CIMIC teams before, or during deployments.42 Esler concludes that “in the absence of formal training in the softer military skills” the success of Irish peacekeepers may be a result of soldiers’ collective attitudes and behaviour.43 As observed by MacDonald, Irish soldiers enjoy “a high level of acceptability among all the parties” due to their neutrality, fairness, and impartiality as well as professionalism and natural friendliness. These features help defuse tensions and facilitate negotiations, making Irish troops successful peacekeepers.44 Ireland remained committed to the principles of traditional peacekeeping even after events which took place in Lebanon in 1980. However, having returned to UNIFIL in 2011, Irish soldiers found themselves in a different environment, and changes in international peacekeeping policies and practices contributed to the evolution of the Irish perception of peacekeeping. Through the application of Ishizuka’s realist/idealist approach to Irish motivation for peacekeeping it can be seen how these both aspects have been intermingled in case of UNIFIL and that “while idealism remains the primary motivation for Ireland’s involvement in peacekeeping … events in South Lebanon and the Golan reveal an evolution towards a more ‘realist’ assessment of the foreign policy costs and benefits of participation” in peacekeeping operations.45 Acknowledgements I would like to thank H.L. for invaluable support and advice.

42 David Manus Curran, “More than Fighting for Peace? An Examination of the Role of Conflict Resolution in Training Programmes for Military Peacekeepers” (PhD diss., University of Bradford, 2010), 347–350. 43 Esler, “Developing Capability,” 166–168. 44 Oliver A.K. MacDonald, “Peacekeeping Lessons Learned: An Irish Perspective,”

International Peacekeeping 4, no. 3 (1997): 96. 45 Cole, “Pragmatic Evolution,” 58.

Peacekeeping in the Digital Age: Future Threats and Capability Requirements Annika S. Hansen

Introduction The changing conflict environment requires all parties involved in peace operations to continuously adapt their approaches, tools and capabilities. This is especially true when it comes to the evolving role of technology in conflict settings on and over the horizon. Emerging hybrid (and kinetic) threats, including those tied to information disorders and the application of dual-use technologies for sinister purposes but also to automated weapons systems, pose complex challenges in the pursuit of peace and stability. At the same time, the digital environment with its widespread mobile communications technologies and webs of networked actors and influencers offers opportunities for more inclusive and participatory peacebuilding and engagement. Data plays an increasingly important role in this context. The possibilities that a growing focus on data opens up

A. S. Hansen (B) Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_12

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for military and civilian actors must be matched with an understanding of and safeguards against associated data risks. International organisations that deploy crisis management operations, primarily the UN, but also the EU, OSCE, AU and NATO, have begun to grapple with policy and operational implications of the role of new technologies in a changing conflict environment, including capability requirements. It is critical for troopand police-contributing countries to grasp which capabilities are needed and which can best support peace operations, as well as the normative framework for the deployment of new technologies.1 The world is changing: Digital technologies, especially information and communications technologies, are accelerating a transformation of how we communicate, how we fight wars and how we wage peace. At the UN Security Council Open Debate on 18 August 2021, Secretary-General António Guterres underlined that digital technology “represents one of the greatest opportunities, but also one of the greatest challenges, of our time.”2 Member states contributing personnel to multinational peace operations under the aegis of international organisations, first and foremost the United Nations (UN), but also the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have to understand how this transformation affects conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and what this entails for the personnel they provide. This chapter focuses on developments in peace operations under the aegis of the UN, as the largest player by far.

The Changing Conflict Environment and the Evolving Role of Technology Some of the comprehensive changes that characterise today’s conflict environment are magnified by digital technologies; others result directly

1 This chapter draws on previous publications by this author, including Hansen, Annika S. (2020), Digital Technologies in Peace Operations. https://tech-blog.zif-berlin.org/dig ital-technologies-peace-operations and Hansen, Annika S. & Naomi Miyashita (2021), UN Peacekeeping Embraces the Digital World. https://tech-blog.zif-berlin.org/un-peacek eeping-embraces-digital-world. 2 “Secretary-General Outlines Elements of Digital Transformation Strategy for Peacekeeping, at High-Level Security Council Debate,” 18 August 2021. https://www.un.org/ press/en/2021/sgsm20856.doc.htm.

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from the introduction of digital technologies into a conflict setting.3 The convergence of AI and dual-use technologies has become a key feature in the recent evolution of digital technologies. “Dual-use” entails that technologies are designed and developed for beneficial uses but can be weaponised or used with other malicious intent. This can be particularly dangerous where AI is used to “upgrade” the possibility of subverting, manipulating or abusing social media platforms.4 Across the board and linked to all these types of technologies, the use of data, data management and protection are central elements. Conflicts today take a variety of forms from the simmering tensions in the Balkans, to internal conflicts among armed groups, such as in Mali, South Sudan or the Central African Republic, and to larger-scale military encounters, as witnessed within Ethiopia or around Nagorno-Karabakh. In its look ahead at 2022, the International Crisis Group points out that battle deaths had declined since 2014, indicating that “[m]ore local conflicts rage than ever, but they tend to be of lower intensity.”5 The Russian Federation’s invasion in neighbouring Ukraine is an aberration in that interstate war had in fact become rare. At the same time, multilateralism and the willingness of states to find collective security solutions and their ability to take effective decisions in the face of threats to international peace and security had been steadily undermined not least due to rising tensions between major powers. The landscape of actors has grown increasingly complex and features diverse affiliations and networks at the sub-national or non-state level, the national, regional and global level. Together they form an intricate web of overlapping interests, fears, grievances and ambitions in the political, security, criminal and other realms. Low thresholds of access have led

3 The predominant types of digital technology in conflict contexts are information and communication technologies ranging from mobile phones and internet connectivity to social media applications, (automated) weapons systems, such as uncrewed aerial vehicles, and artificial intelligence (AI) applications, for instance for natural language processing or facial recognition. 4 Pauwels, Eleonore (2021), Peacekeeping in an Era of Converging Technological & Security Threats, Research Paper published by the UN. https://peacekeeping.un.org/ sites/default/files/06_24_final_pauwels_converging_ai_cyberthreats_digital_peacekeeping_ strategy_1.pdf, 6f. 5 International Crisis Group (2021), 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022, 29 December 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2022.

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to a proliferation of actors that in the extreme, wield weaponised technology on par with states.6 Violent extremist and transnational organised crime groups are increasingly technology-empowered using technologies to recruit members and access weapons and funds, and reinforcing the transnational dimensions of conflict. In parallel, there is a growing trend towards overt third-party interventions in internal conflicts. The multitude of foreign countries actively engaged in the conflict in Libya, not least through technological support such as drones or disinformation campaigns, is just one case in point.7 Information was always a powerful asset, and its power has heightened in today’s digital media and information space, a state commonly described as ‘information disorder.’8 In conflict areas, too, the media landscape is a growing factor in conflict dynamics. The manipulation of information whether it is to intentionally dis inform, unintentionally mis inform or spread hate poses a significant threat in conflict environments with high stakes and competing narratives.9 Social networks are proving to be an effective instrument for manipulating emotions, reinforcing existing political and ethnic divisions, influencing elections or undermining peace processes. In the worst case, hate speech, disinformation and misinformation prepare the ground for physical attacks.10 The near universal use of mobile and especially smart

6 Hansen (2020), For more on conflict trends, see also Day, Adam, Gorur, Aditi, Hunt, Charles T. and Victoria K. Holt (2020), The Political Practice of Peacekeeping: How Strategies for Peace Operations are Developed and Implemented, United Nations University, New York, USA. 7 See for ground.

example

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/libyas-war-becomes-a-tech-battle

8 The term ‘information disorder’ denotes “a structural phenomenon, including an agent, message and interpreter that ‘contaminates public discourse, working as a pollutant in the information ecosystem’.” Wardle and Derakhshan (2017), quoted in Pauwels, Eleonore (2020a) The Anatomy of Information Disorders in Africa. Geostrategic Positioning & Multipolar Competition over Converging Technologies, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, July 2020. https://www.kas.de/en/web/newyork/single-title/-/content/theanatomy-of-information-disorders-in-africa, 78. 9 For definitions of disinformation and misinformation, see Wardle, Claire and Hossein Derakhshan (2017), Information Disorder. Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making, Council of Europe report DGI (2017). https://rm.coe.int/ information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c. 10 Morrison, Maude and Adam Cooper (2021), In War Zones, Social Media Disinformation is Costing Lives, Wired UK, 20 April 2021. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/dis information-war-zones; Bunse, Simone (2021), Social Media: A Tool for Peace or Conflict,

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phones, which facilitate content creation and accelerate its distribution, has reinforced this development. The spread of extremist ideologies and narratives fortified through echo chambers and distribution networks is a case in point.11 At the same time, digital technologies have empowered community leaders and groups, whether they be civil society organisations with particular interests or non-state armed groups, such as terrorist, criminal or civil defence militias. In many conflict areas, social media are a central source of information for large parts of the population, allowing easy, realtime communication with a large number of individuals/groups across borders. This offers the civilian population new opportunities for action and influence by giving marginalised groups voice, allowing them to mobilise and offering the chance of more inclusive and participatory peacebuilding and engagement. The mobilisation of protests during the Arab Spring in 2011 were considered one of the earliest examples and were described as a “Twitter Revolution.”12 In this sense, digital technologies can have a democratising effect, but also add to the complexity of the conflict environment due to the increasing number of actors that can exercise some form of political influence. Government authorities have also recognised the value of digital technologies for heightening their political influence through communication and outreach. On the flipside, the huge amounts of population data generated—more or less voluntarily—through the widespread use of social media, with the help of data-capture technologies, such as CCTV, and their convergence with AI also provides governments with a far greater capacity for behavioural monitoring, surveillance and ultimately suppression.13

SIPRI Topical Backgrounder, 20 August 2021. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/top ical-backgrounder/2021/social-media-tool-peace-or-conflict. 11 Walter, Barbara F. (2017a) “The New New Civil Wars,” Annual Review of Political Science 2017, 20: 469–86; Esberg, Jane and Christoph Mikulaschek (2021), Digital Technologies, peace and Security: Challenges and Opportunities for United Nations Peace Operations, Research Paper published by the UN. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/esberg_and_mikulaschek_-_conflict_ peace_and_digital_technologies_-_v3_210825.pdf. 12 Esberg and Mikulaschek (2021), 3; Bunse (2021). 13 Pauwels (2020a).

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Threats and Opportunities for Peace Operations Peace operations must navigate these complex conflict environments and adapt their approaches, tools and capabilities to evolving constellations of actors and technologies in order to effectively implement their mandates and move a peace process forward. To do so, they require a foundation in policy and strategy, which can guide them through threats, opportunities and—not least—data challenges. Policy Developments International organisations that deploy crisis management operations, primarily the UN, but also the EU, OSCE, AU and NATO, have begun to grapple with policy and operational implications of the role of new technologies in a changing conflict environment, including capability requirements. At the UN, a series of significant policy developments reflects this recognition.14 For peace operations, the first milestone was the 2015 “Performance Peacekeeping Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping.”15 It was followed by UN system-wide strategies, issued by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, namely the “SG Strategy on New Technologies” (2018), the “Roadmap for Digital Cooperation” (2020), and the “SG’s Data Strategy” (2020). Through the data strategy, in particular, the SecretaryGeneral provides his organisation with a framework for bundling and implementing multiple initiatives in different parts of the organisation in a targeted manner. Most recently, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the Department of Operational Support (DOS) and the Department of Management, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC) jointly released their “Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping” (2021).16 14 For an overview over technology-related initiatives at the UN, see Siminichina, Irina (2021), The Forest and the Trees: Mapping UN Digital Technology Initiatives. https:// tech-blog.zif-berlin.org/forest-and-trees-mapping-un-digital-technology-initiatives. 15 Performance Peacekeeping. Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping (December 2014). https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/ default/files/performance-peacekeeping_expert-panel-on-technology-and-innovation_r eport_2015.pdf. 16 United Nations (2021), Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping.

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The digital transformation strategy outlines four key goals and priorities for promoting the use of digital technologies in and for peace operations: (1) to drive innovation; (2) to maximise the potential of current and new technology; (3) to understand threats to the safety and security of peacekeepers and to mandate implementation; and (4) to ensure the responsible use of technology, in particular data. At the operational level, digital technologies impact peace operations, the safety of peacekeepers and their ability to implement the mandate in different ways: . As threats, especially when it comes to direct attacks on peacekeepers and their ability to implement their mandates; . As opportunities, in particular for more sophisticated conflict analysis, greater potential for earlier and targeted action, as well as for more inclusive political and other dialogue processes; and . As challenges, first and foremost with regard to the need for data literate staff and for responsible management of data. Threats In the last 20 years, malicious acts cost the lives of 477 UN uniformed personnel. In fact, the share of fatalities caused by malicious acts—as opposed to accidents or illness—has doubled from 13.5% on average in 2002–2011 to 27% on average in 2012–2021.17 The most significant threats to peacekeeping forces are still mortar or rocket attacks, as well as ever-evolving improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Digital technologies are being deployed to assist in deterring, detecting and countering attacks, for instance through satellite data, sensors, CCTV or ground-penetrating or aerial surveillance radar.18 This will continue to be a technology-race of matching threat and offensive capabilities with effective countermeasures.

17 See for UN fatality data: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities. 18 Druet, Dirk (2021), Enhancing the use of digital technology for integrated situ-

ational awareness and peacekeeping-intelligence, Research Paper published by the UN, 5–13. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/20210430_-_sa-pki_technologies_ research_brief_final_clean.pdf; Dorn, Walter (2016), Smart Peacekeeping: Toward TechEnabled UN Operations, International Peace Institute, July 2016. https://www.ipinst. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1607_Smart-Peacekeeping.pdf, 6; Esberg and Mikulaschek (2021), 16.

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Next in line appears to be the threat of drone attacks—whether supplied by a third-party or home-made—which have already featured in the operating environment of peace operations, such as in Yemen or Libya, often small drones wielded by non-state actors.19 Although missions are not generally the target of these attacks, this is likely to be a matter of time, as the threshold to access continues to drop and drones spread to conflict areas with peace operations that include larger military components. A very different but growing threat to peace operations arises with the above-mentioned information disorders and the spread of disinformation and hate speech in conflict areas. They can have a destabilising effect on the conflict dynamics, disrupt political processes or trigger violent incidents, but can also target mission personnel and activities directly. For instance, in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) “military contingents from majority Muslim countries were particularly targeted by disinformation and incitement campaigns, including allegations of collusion with armed groups.”20 The growing use of deep fakes poses a particular challenge, not least for a mission’s strategic communications. Similarly, then acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General Stephanie Williams described social media as “another theatre of the Libyan conflict” in her briefing to the UN Security Council in May 2020.21 For peace operations this also means that the information and technology environment, including key stakeholders, their tools and intent, has to be a central element of a mission’s conflict analysis, which in turn informs efforts to support political processes and to protect civilians.22 Finally, the more peace operations employ digital technologies for running the mission, implementing the mandate and being accountable, and the more they integrate data into their planning and decision-making, the more vulnerable they become to cyber attacks.23 The UN Secretariat 19 Esberg and Mikulaschek (2021), 6, 7. 20 United Nations (2021), Central African Republic. Report of the Secretary-General,

S/2021/867, 12 October 2021. 21 https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/acting_srsg_briefing_to_the_sec urity_council_-_19_may_2020.pdf. 22 Pauwels (2021), 5, 11. 23 Pauwels, Eleonore (2020b), Artificial Intelligence and Data Capture Technologies

in Violence and Conflict Prevention, Global Center on Cooperative Security Policy Brief, September 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep27551.pdf, 15.

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is taking cyber threats extremely seriously and is working with peace operations to strengthen their resilience. Still, grasping what is required of each staff member to ensure the responsible use and handling of data remains a challenge and is explored further below. Opportunities There are two major opportunities for digital technologies in peace operations: First, digital technologies have opened up significant venues for enhancing peace operations’ conflict analysis, planning and decisionmaking. Second, digital technologies offer—as yet largely untapped— opportunities for more inclusive approaches to mandate implementation, in particular when it comes to political and dialogue processes. While the multilateral system of peace operations and conflict management is intergovernmental, peace operations have to grapple with the fact that the predominance of state-to-state interaction is at odds with the way that digital technologies transcend borders and that agency today lies with a multiplicity of actors. Digital technologies can help peace operations navigate this landscape by enhancing their understanding of the conflict context, by explaining their role and by expanding the conversation to new partners as well as challengers.24 A peace operation’s need for information and analysis is three-fold: (1) it requires a coherent, real-time, operational understanding of the mission area, a so-called common operational picture; (2) it also needs early warning of imminent threats, such as to life, property, and movement; and (3) it should have sufficient information and analysis to identify risks and opportunities over the horizon.25 Situational awareness is essential for self-protection, but also for mandate implementation, especially when it comes to a peace operation’s remit to protect civilian populations. Digital technologies allow more systematic capture and processing of large amounts of data. In the best case, data can help to fill information gaps on the peace operation’s environment and identify patterns or trends related to the conflict dynamics. In that way, digital technologies can enhance several existing processes from better-informed, more timely decision-making to improved monitoring, evaluation, and reporting.

24 Hansen (2020). 25 See for instance UN Policy on Peacekeeping-intelligence (2019).

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Data-capture technologies collate information from a variety of sources, including from human intelligence to open source data, signals intelligence or geospatial intelligence.26 Technological solutions have varied from mission to mission, but at least some have been rolled out in most UN missions. When UAVs were introduced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the first time in 2013, this signalled a sea change towards a more systematic approach and a harmonisation of tools across missions. A number of peace operations now deploy UAVs, such as the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali, as well as the OSCE and the EU in support of their monitoring missions in the Ukraine and Georgia.27 In addition, satellite imagery has been used to help map conflicts and perception surveys have reached out in order to better understand both the conflict dynamics and the impact of peace operations, including unintended negative consequences. When it comes to the information space, peace operations are using a host of different tools for (social) media analysis and (media) network analyses. As has happened in a number of areas of innovation, missions initially sought and introduced their own tools, such as the social media analytics and monitoring tool TalkWalker to name just one, driven by the needs that were quickly emerging on the ground. More recently, UN DPPA has developed the scanning tool Sparrow, which can “rapidly analyse Twitter data and separate ‘noise’ created by bots on social media from authentic political speech [and] aims to strengthen internal capacities on early warning and live monitoring of unfolding crises.”28 It is important to note that while some tools make it look easy, the analysis requires the skill to discern what can and cannot be devised about 26 Spink, Lauren (2018), Data-Driven Protection. Linking Threat Analysis to Planning in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Center for Civilians in Conflict, November 2018. https:// civiliansinconflict.org/publications/research/data-driven-protection/, 25f. 27 Wittkowsky, Andreas (2021), Human or Machine? Lessons from the Use of Technology in the Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, IPI Global Observatory, 12 April 2021. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/04/lessons-from-use-of-technologyin-monitoring-mission-ukraine/ and Dorn, Walter and Giardullo Cono (2020), Technology Investments Paying Off in Peace Operations, Security and Human Rights Monitor, June 2020; Dorn (2016), 7. https://www.shrmonitor.org/technology-investments-paying-offin-peace-operations/. 28 https://dppa.medium.com/we-use-technology-not-the-other-way-around-socialmedia-and-political-analysis-e97706ba0465.

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a conflict context from social media.29 Also, in many conflict areas, rural communities still rely on traditional media. In Mali, where 80% of the population relies on talk radio as a main source of information, the MINUSMA Big Data Radio Mining and Analysis project uses speech and voice recognition technology to scan public broadcasts for keywords that have been pre-determined to warrant further analysis.30 Arguably, the move towards ‘data-driven peacekeeping’ is most closely linked to UN peace operations’ efforts to protect civilians. As of September 2021, six peacekeeping and two special political missions have been furnished with the protection of civilians (POC) as one of their mandated tasks. Data has the potential to enrich conflict analysis and transform operational planning and ideally produce early warning that can lead to early action. Conflict analysis, i.e. accurately identifying who might attack whom, where and when, is essential for a mission’s ability to protect civilians. In more fractured conflict environments with localised outbursts of violence, this means understanding conflict dynamics at a granular level. But despite the fact that the importance of data has been recognised, it is only beginning to be systematically used to support situational awareness and early warning.31 Some progress has been made through the introduction of analysis tools, such as the Spatio-Temporal Incident Mapping (STIM) tool in MINUSMA, which overlays patrol tracking and incident mapping data. Another major step has been the rollout of the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE) event database to most peacekeeping missions. SAGE merges different data streams and systematises data collation through a crowdsourcing methodology. There has been a strong push to go a step further and ‘predict’ violence to enable more proactive and effective protection. But while these tools allow missions to identify trends and correlations between their activities and past incidents,

29 Druet (2021), 10; Mawla, El Mira and Krystel Tabet (2021), Take Back the Analysis: Five Things You Can Actually Learn about a Conflict Context from Social Media. https://tech-blog.zif-berlin.org/take-back-analysis-five-things-you-can-act ually-learn-about-conflict-context-social-media. 30 See for example https://unite.un.org/blog/data-privacy-and-protection-assessmentsradio-mining. 31 Duursma, Allard (2021), Mapping Data-Driven Tools and Systems for Early Warning, Situational Awareness, and Early Action, PAX, 7–8, April 2021. https://paxforpeace.nl/what-we-do/publications/mapping-data-driven-tools-andsystems-for-early-warning-situational-awareness-and-early-action.

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they fall short of any kind of ‘predictive’ peacekeeping.32 The difficulties of linking early warning to early action and the possible application of AI to more fully realise the predictive potential of data are discussed more fully below. The second opportunity arises within the fast-growing field of ‘Peacetech’ defined as technology that contributes to peacebuilding and ‘digital peacebuilding’ more broadly.33 Peacetech is mostly driven by nongovernmental organisations looking to support peacebuilding processes with the help of digital technologies. BuildUp, one of the pioneering organisations in this field, offers a useful categorisation of the purposes of Peacetech, which resemble the ways that peace operations might apply digital technologies in support of mandate implementation: (1) Data management, i.e. gathering, analysing and visualising data about peace and conflict; (2) Dialogue and mobilisation, i.e. creating new spaces for people to connect and organise more or different actions; and (3) Strategic communications, i.e. engaging more or different people in conversations and stories about peace.34 For peace operations, the ‘primacy of politics’ is considered the most pivotal lever for sustaining peace and gives priority to the missions’ political mandate for conflict resolution. And yet, peace operations have only just begun to explore the use of digital technologies for political and dialogue processes which can take place at regional, national and local levels. A particularly innovative approach—and an attempt to turn the challenging information space into an opportunity—was trialled by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), where “[i]n late 2020 32 Duursma (2021), 7–8; Duursma, Allard and John Karlsrud (2019), “Predictive Peacekeeping: Strengthening Predictive Analysis in UN Peace Operations”, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 8 no. 1. https://www.stabilityjournal.org/ articles/10.5334/sta.663/. 33 For an excellent overview, see Schirch, Lisa (2020), 25 Spheres of Digital Peacebuilding and Peacetech, Policy Brief No. 93, Toda Peace Institute/Alliance for Peacebuilding, September 2020. https://toda.org/assets/files/resources/policy-briefs/tpb-93_lisa-schirch.pdf. 34 For overviews over the very rich spectrum of peacetech initiatives and activities, see Panic, Branca (2020), Data for Peacebuilding and Prevention. Ecosystem Mapping. The State of Play and the Path to Creating a Community of Practice, NYU Center in International Cooperation, October 2020. https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/data_for_pea cebuilding_and_prevention_-_ecosystem_mapping_-_october_2020.pdf and Peace Direct (2020), Digital Pathways for Peace, Insights and Lessons from a Global Online Consultation. https://www.peacedirect.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/PD-LVP-Tech-Report.pdf.

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and early 2021, Ms. Williams engaged around one thousand political, societal, youth and women leaders virtually via Zoom and Facebook in preparation for the LPDF [Libyan Political Dialogue Forum].”35 Here, digital communications technologies enabled the participation of a far wider group than would have been possible at an in-person meeting and gave voice to groups and individuals, who are otherwise frequently marginalised and seldomly heard. During these popular consultations content was analysed and consensus generated among thousands of participants with the support of AI, specifically natural language processing applications. A related field to peace operations in which the UN, together with practitioners and civil society has invested much thought and developed guidance on how to utilise digital technologies is that of mediation.36 Further to the two opportunities, Adam Day argues that data, if gathered, processed and analysed more systematically, can serve as evidence for assessing the performance and the effectiveness of peace operations and for changing the narrative around the success and failure of peacekeeping efforts.37 In the past, data collected has tended to portray activities and output, such as the number of patrols or meetings, rather than the impact of the mission’s efforts, that is an improvement in the security situation 35 UN DPPA/Swisspeace (2021), Social Media in Peace Mediation. A Practical Framework. https://www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/downloads/PeaceMediationSocialM edia_SwissPeace_UNO_Web_v1.pdf; Esberg and Mikulaschek (2021), 8. 36 See for instance, UN DPPA/Swisspeace (2021); Jenny, Joëlle, Rosi Greenberg, Vincent Lowney and Guy Banim (2018), Peacemaking and New Technologies. Dilemmas & Options for Mediators (Mediation Practice Series), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, December 2018. https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/MPS-8Peacemaking-and-New-Technologies.pdf, Morrison, Maude (2021), Beyond Likes and Shares: Why Peace Mediation Has to be More (Pro)Active on Social Media. https:// tech-blog.zif-berlin.org/beyond-likes-and-shares-why-peace-mediation-has-be-more-pro active-social-media; Harlander, Jonathan (2021), Debunking Myths Around Digital Peacemaking. https://tech-blog.zif-berlin.org/debunking-myths-around-digital-peacem aking; UN Toolkit for Digital Technologies and Mediation in Armed Conflict (March 2019). https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/DigitalToolkitReport. pdf; E-Analytics Guide: Using Data and New Technology for Peacemaking, Preventive Diplomacy and Peacebuilding (January 2019). https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ files/resources/E-analytics%20Guide.%20Using%20data%20and%20new%20technology% 20for%20peacemaking%20and%20peacebuilding.pdf. 37 Day, Adam (2019), “Can Data Save U.N. Peacekeeping?”, World Politics Review, February 2019. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27479/can-data-save-u-npeacekeeping.

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or progress towards reconciliation. The introduction of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS)—a tool to link the context of a country with peacekeeping planning, data, results, and reporting to assess performance and inform future plans—in a number of missions has helped to channel data and make it usable as evidence. It has also compelled missions to identify clearer priorities among mission goals and direct activities towards those factors in the conflict dynamics most likely to deliver impact. Challenges While these mechanisms and tools are a major step forward towards a fuller understanding of the conflict environment and more targeted mandate implementation, they remain dependent on technical and analytical capacities and on the input provided. Significant challenges arise, in particular, with regard to the increased use of data. They emerge with regard to structural issues, including the fragmentation in how data is collected, stored and shared, to the quality of data and (the awareness of) potential bias, and to the sheer volume of data and the capacity to analyse and prioritise data. These challenges impact a mission’s ability to link analysis to prediction, decision-making and early action and give rise to the tempting conclusion that AI offers the sought-after remedy. Critically, the possibilities that a growing focus on data opens up for military and civilian actors must be matched with an understanding of—and safeguards against—associated data risks. Peace operations often struggle with information sharing and have staff that rotates frequently and has little expertise in the area of digital technology and data handling. The Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping identifies fragmentation as a key inhibitor for using technologies to their full potential. Fragmentation pertains to the technical infrastructure that does not link up, to information being gathered and held in siloes by different offices, and to a lack of trust in secure communications and data handling that prevents information sharing.38 SAGE has helped to bring data together, but challenges remain. 38 Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping (2021), 18; MartinBrulé, Sarah-Myriam (2020), Finding the UN Way on Peacekeeping-intelligence, International Peace Institute, April 2020. https://www.ipinst.org/2020/04/finding-the-un-wayon-peackeeping-intelligence.

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Concerns over the weak rules, protocols and procedures that regulate who has access when and for how long, that would ensure due diligence and secure the integrity of data throughout its lifecycle are warranted.39 Peace operations are accruing a large volume of data including on hoststate populations that require stringent safeguards. In part due to a lack of analytical capacity but in part simply due to too much information, peace operations also struggle to analyse the increasing flow of data from a growing number and type of sources, to identify priorities and decide on who needs what. While the analysis of trends and incidents has improved, the ability to forecast or predict events and the ability to feed analysis into decision-making in a way that enables early action remains elusive.40 The lure of AI is that it can address a number of these challenges through algorithms that bring data together, review large amounts of data and generate action options or predict behaviour.41 The quality of data, bias and consistency in data collection, coding and entry into databases are problematic in and of themselves but also indicate that any introduction of AI should be undertaken with care.42 For instance, SAGE relies on designated staff members to enter incidents into the database, which can be influenced by a whole range of factors, such as language skills, subjective reading of an incident or personal experience. The danger of misinterpretation is heightened when automated processes are applied to unreliable or poor-quality data. Eleonore Pauwels warns of the risks involved in the application of AI which can result in “automation biases and predictive failures.”43 This is especially true, when the goal is to make predictions, which entails analysing patterns of behaviour and classifying what is ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ with the help of AI.44 In this way, highly sensitive population data sets are generated that can lead to segments of a population

39 Pauwels (2020b), 15, 18; Pauwels (2021), 3, 5, 8, 15f.; Duursma and Karlsrud (2019). 40 Druet (2021), 15. 41 Dorn (2016), 12; Dorn and Giardullo (2020), 4; Esberg and Mikulaschek (2021),

17, Pauwels (2021), 12–14. 42 Duursma (2021), 26, 30–39, 61; Druet (2021), 10; Spink (2018), 46. 43 Pauwels (2020b), 16; Pauwels (2021), 20f.; Esberg and Mikulaschek (2021), 9, 11,

13. 44 Pauwels (2021), 12; Pauwels (2020b), 7; Esberg and Mikulaschek (2021), 18.

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being targeted and that require strong protection against misuse or “collective data harms.”45 So while there is potential for applying more AI for prediction, the enthusiasm has to be tempered by a realistic assessment of the data input and the resulting validity of conclusions drawn and, most importantly, must be guided by the principle of do-no-harm. The challenges reinforce the need to move forward with comprehensive approaches that address the individual capacity of staff members, the technology infrastructure, the framework of rules and procedures and the organisational culture. Ultimately, it is the human capacity that is decisive. The capacity for asking the right questions, for understanding the conflict dynamics, for developing theories of change that can place data into a meaningful context and for using this understanding as the basis for thoughtful and responsible decision-making.46

Implications for Troopand Police-Contributing Countries Beyond addressing operational challenges, the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping can serve as a platform for Member State engagement. In fact, the strategy underlines throughout that innovation and progress must be multidisciplinary and that partnerships within the UN system, with and among member states and with external actors in the private sector, academia, civil society or other international organisations are vital.47 The strategy itself was well-received by member states, who had pushed back against earlier efforts to infuse peace operations with technology and heighten technology-requirements from troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs).48 In fact, T/PCCs and UN member states more broadly will be critical partners in two main clusters of support: (1) capabilities, training and organisational culture and (2) technology and equipment. Several forums have been established, in which partnerships in support of the technological advancement of UN peace operations takes concrete

45 Much has been written about “collective data harms,” see for instance Pauwels (2021), 2–3. 46 Pauwels (2021), 17, 21; Duursma and Karlsrud (2019). 47 Strategy on the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping (2021). 48 Dorn (2016), 24.

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shape. Each year since 2015, the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping brings together military, police and civilian personnel from UN member states and UN partner entities. The most recent annual symposium in South Africa in June 2022 focussed on ‘information-driven peace operations’ and ‘technology training and capacity building’ among other topics.49 Since their inception in 2014, the Peacekeeping Ministerial Conferences have evolved into one of the key policy forums for Member State discussions on peacekeeping.50 Their added value is that they focus on concrete operational support measures, including through troop- and police contributions, political support for reform, financial contributions or training cooperation. At the latest iteration of the Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference in Seoul, South Korea, in early December 2021, technology was one of two-cross-cutting themes. These forums are important venues to bring together the T/PCCs with widespread digital access and skills, and the majority of TCCs where digital access and skills are limited, and to ensure that the serious gap which exists between the two does not widen. In short, this means levelling the playing field through capacity building and training support, as well as technology sharing and removing barriers to sharing critical information among peacekeepers.51 Capabilities, Training and Organisational Culture The issues of capabilities, training and organisational culture are clearly linked. Peace operations already require personnel with specialised skills and must ensure that all personnel possess a minimum of technology and data literacy. It is incumbent upon the UN to instil a degree of data literacy in UN staff—and efforts to include this as a requirement for certain job profiles are ongoing—but many applications and technology tools will require more in-depth and specialised skills.52 And 49 https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/6th-PTP-international-symposium. 50 On the evolution of the Peacekeeping Ministerial Conferences and the specific

preparations for the Seoul meeting, see Forti, Daniel (2021) The Road to Seoul: Previeweing the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, International Peace Institute, November 2021. https://www.ipinst.org/2021/11/the-road-to-seoul-previewingthe-2021-un-peacekeeping-ministerial. 51 Hansen and Miyashita (2021). 52 Duursma (2021), 58; Esberg and Mikulaschek (2021), 10; Spink (2018), 4.

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while some specialists, such as information analysts, data analysts and data scientists, might exist in the armed forces and police services of T/PCCs or in the open job market, bringing the masses up to speed will require training. In the run-up to the Peacekeeping Ministerial, Daniel Forti underlined the need for “sustained, multi-year pledges to build the capacity of troops in unit-level intelligence, analysis, coordination, strategic planning, and evaluation.”53 He goes on to advocate that member states “provide secondments or conduct training to support command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), particularly civil-military coordination, geospatial information systems, and the operation of unarmed UAVs.”54 Due to the way in which the information space is evolving, strategic communications are becoming increasingly important and should be regarded as a core mission capacity and a whole-of-mission task that cannot be left to public information officers only, as has been the case for many years. Jake Sherman and Albert Trithart point to an untapped potential in that “Military public information officers, who are actual communications specialists are a scarce resource, not often provided by TCCs.”55 Aside from the capabilities which can best support peace operations, it is critical for T/PCCs to grasp the specifics of peace operations under the UN flag, including organisational structures, technological tools and approaches. In recent years, a number of UN military unit manuals and trainings have been issued that cover recent advancements including on peacekeeping-intelligence, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), use of UAVs and related topics. Innovation requires people and processes in addition to technology.56 At present, (management) staff have limited awareness of the opportunities and the necessity of digital solutions as well as the knowledge 53 Forti (2021), 11, 14–15. 54 Forti (2021), 11. 55 Sherman, Jake and Albert Trithart (2021), Strategic Communications in UN Peace

Operations: From an Afterthough to an Operational Necessity, International Peace Institute, August 2021. https://www.ipinst.org/2021/08/strategic-communications-in-unpeace-operations, 4, 11. 56 Dorn (2016), 1.

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of available and innovative tools. Most importantly, both UN staff and member state-provided personnel must be familiar with the normative framework for the deployment of new technologies and the use of data.57 Where data-capture technologies are provided by T/PCCs, this adds another actor into the system for responsible handling of data and throws up questions about who owns the data and the resulting analysis, and who is responsible for data throughout its life cycle. Technology and Equipment The Strategy on the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping stresses the fact that a range of technologies already exist in peace operations that are not used to their full potential. In part, this is a challenge of capabilities among the users of a particular technology, but often it has to do with interoperability or lack thereof. The technologies deployed into peace operations arrive there along different routes: some is contingency-owned equipment supplied by T/PCCs, some is UN-owned equipment acquired by the organisation, and some is contracted or leased from a private company. It is therefore not surprising that different parts are of varying quality or fit together poorly, e.g. with defensive technology around camps jamming communication equipment of a military contingent.58 A particular area of concern for T/PCCs will always be the safety and security of their personnel during deployment in UN peace operations. Drawn from UN documents, including DPO’s capability study, its pledging guide and the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, Forti lists “Technological systems, for air-to-ground targeting and UAVs, which could enhance missions’ intelligence collection and reconnaissance activities,” “dedicated equipment (both high-tech and low-tech) and specialized expertise to mitigate these [IED] threats,” and “advanced IED-detection technologies that can link to other mission intelligence systems and mine-resistant vehicles” as capacities needed in peace operations.59 Most armed forces began their own journeys towards digital transformation some years ago. The German armed forces, for example, boast

57 Dorn (2016), 5. 58 Spink (2018), 26. 59 Forti (2021), 13.

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almost 15,000 personnel working on cyber and information issues.60 Surely, T/PCCs could be providing more cutting edge technology to peace operations not least for data collection and analysis, and could share more knowledge on the use of technology and particularly AIapplications, as well as experience with classifying data and crafting effective models.61 But ultimately the UN has to determine the best possible combination that renders a multinational force interoperable and effective, that ensures the technology and its application in support of the mission and its mandate is sustainable, and simultaneously manages to stay abreast of technological developments. Beside the possible expansion of AI technology, the strategy places particular emphasis on flexible deployments and increased mobility and explores how technology can help make this happen. In 2016, Walter Dorn had outlined how a “digital peacekeeper” might be equipped, underlining the potential for increased mobility through hand-held, mobile devices and “network-enabled” peacekeeping approaches.62 This remains a goal, especially in light of shrinking peacekeeping budgets and fewer peacekeepers to cover large territories in which the protection of civilians calls for agile and flexible responses.63

The Road Ahead When implementing the strategy, it will be critical to pay heed to the very different stages, in which different missions find themselves in their respective digital transformation processes, and to pursue mission-specific priorities. In the fast-moving world of technology, anchoring innovation and foresight throughout peacekeeping and cultivating partnerships with troop- and police-contributing countries as well as with the private technology sector is essential. It is promising then that at the Peacekeeping Ministerial “[m]any countries embraced this challenge to incorporate technology systematically into their pledges, particularly through training initiatives, funding, and donating technological enablers,” including the

60 https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ueber-die-bundeswehr/zahlen-daten-fakten/person alzahlen-bundeswehr. 61 Esberg and Mikulaschek (2021), 18. 62 Dorn (2016), 12f.; Spink (2018), 40; Duursma and Karlsrud. 63 Druet (2021), 2; Hansen and Miyashita (2021).

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implementation of the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping.64 Finally, the transformation of the UN as a whole—in line with the SG’s Data Strategy and its apt but ambitious subtitle “For Action by Everyone Everywhere with Insight, Impact and Integrity”—requires a shift in the organisational culture towards more information sharing, a minimum of data literacy and greater awareness around the responsible use of digital tools.65

64 Forti, Daniel and Mark J. Wood (2022) Analyzing Member State Pledges from the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, 09 February 2022, IPI Global Observatory. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/02/analyzing-member-state-pledges-fromthe-2021-un-peacekeeping-ministerial/. 65 Hansen and Miyashita (2021).

Cyber Security in the Digital Age

The Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping and the Role of the Irish Defence Forces Mark Williams and Matthew G. O’Neill

Introduction The transformative effect of digital technologies has rapidly changed the nature of conflict; the distance, speed and scale with which conflict can unfold has been accelerated, allowing a wide range of actors to become party to violent conflict. The weaponization of artificial intelligence (AI), with its ability to collect and catalogue information more effectively and efficiently than human cognition, increases the risk of escalation through, amongst other things, large-scale cyberattacks on infrastructure, and the manipulation of societies through sophisticated algorithms.1 Increasingly questions of responsibility and accountability are raised through the use 1 Pauwels, Eleonore. “The New Geopolitics of Converging Risks: The UN and Prevention in the Era of AI,” United Nations University (2019).

M. Williams · M. G. O’Neill (B) The Senator George J Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK e-mail: [email protected] M. Williams e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_13

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of autonomous weapons2 and anonymous cyberattacks.3 Disinformation and hate speech, and moreover, the related human and political costs, are amplified by social media platforms, as already witnessed across UN peace operation settings.4 Understanding the evolution and impact of these developments and responding to or protecting against them in a hyperconnected global society, will be a key challenge for peace operations in the coming years.5 UN Blue Helmets in their current guise lack the capacity, training, organisational culture and digital tools necessary to address these challenges.6 While the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping 7 offers a much-needed framework and guiding principles to pursue and facilitate an evolution of Peacekeeping for twenty-first-century conflict, individual troop contributing countries, like Ireland, need to lead on the development and implementation of a workable Peacekeeping model that addresses the capability gap, raises capacity and harnesses innovation to enhance mission effectiveness and foster sustainable peace.

2 Walsh, James Igoe. “Political Accountability and Autonomous Weapons,” Research & Politics 2, no. 4 (2015): 1–6. 3 Shackelford, Scott J., and Richard B. Andres. “State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 42 (2010): 971. 4 Williams, Mark, and Matthew G. O’Neill. “Ireland’s Role within United Nations Information Operations during Peacekeeping,” Defence Forces Review (2020): 192–203. 5 This chapter draws on previous publications by the authors, including Williams, Mark and Matthew G. O’Neill. “Ireland’s Role within United Nations Information Operations during Peacekeeping,” Defence Forces Review (2020): 192–203; and O’Neill, Matthew and Mark Williams. “Ireland’s Role in the Development of Cyber Peace Operations,” Signal 19, no. 1 (Summer 2021): 61–64. 6 https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/future_of_peacekeeping_operat ions_in_a_changing_conflict_environment.pdf. 7 United Nations. (2021). Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping.

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Digital Technologies and the Changing Conflict Environment The last decade has witnessed the rapid evolution of the digital landscape, which has opened up new possibilities for global communication, business, education and politics. However, this comes at a cost; technology’s openness, global accessibility, and capacity for disruptive change make it vulnerable to major abuse,8 as evidenced by hostile actors’ use of it to inflame political and intercommunal tensions, amplify extremist voices, undermine democracy, and restrict fundamental human rights such as freedom of speech and privacy.9 These trends are unsurprisingly, increasingly impacting conflict and post-conflict landscapes. As with cyber-crime, the use of digital technologies in conflict environments can be categorised as “cyber-enabled”, that is, the weaponization of digital technologies to amplify traditional instruments of conflict such as disinformation, misinformation, incitement to violence, surveillance etc., or “cyber dependent,” that is the introduction of novel and emerging digital technologies to conflict zones, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), malware, artificial intelligence (AI), lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) etc. As the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping 10 notes, the convergence of digital technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and dual-use technologies, has been a crucial component in the recent evolution of conflict. Specifically, technology developed for benign and beneficial use, can and is being weaponized and utilised for harmful intent. Violent non-state actors (VNSA), non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and other hostile actors are equipping themselves not only with new and advanced technologies11 but also utilising common dual-use technologies like social media, mobile phones and internet platforms to

8 Wainwright, Rob. “Fighting Crime and Terrorism in the Age of Technology,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 24 (2017): 191. 9 Esberg, Jane and Christoph Mikulaschek. (2021). Digital Technologies, Peace and Security: Challenges and Opportunities for United Nations Peace Operations, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/esberg_and_ mikulaschek_-_conflict_peace_and_digital_technologies_-_v3_210825.pdf. 10 United Nations. (2021). Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping. 11 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/15/the-key-trendsto-watch-this-year-on-nonstate-armed-actors/.

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incite violence, radicalise and recruit members, sow distrust, undertake cyberattacks and commit other crimes.12 ,13 The use of new and powerful methodologies and techniques to not only analyse enormous swathes of data, but also influence the integrity of datasets and the working of algorithms, is at the heart of this technological convergence.14 As a result, according to Pauwels, future peacekeeping missions will not only have to grapple with how to best safeguard civilian populations from collective AI and data harms that could infringe on human rights, degrade social cohesion and resilience, and influence future conflicts but also to build internal capacity and seek cross-sector collaboration to counter a challenge that threatens the integrity of peacekeeping data and undermines trust in UN mandates and operations.15 In a number of current UN operations, hostile actors have already attempted to subvert the situational awareness and strategic intelligence of peacekeepers, as well as undermine trust and legitimacy in mission mandates, by weaponizing the ability to gather, control, and determine the veracity and integrity of data. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, social media campaigns have claimed that UN peacekeepers are working with rebel groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), to plunder the region’s natural resources and material wealth.16 These campaigns have also exacerbated existing criticism of the UN peacekeeping mission, including claims of ineffectiveness in protecting civilians, allegations of the sexual abuse of women and children by peacekeepers in the region and UN support for the Armed

12 https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/future_of_peacekeeping_operat ions_in_a_changing_conflict_environment.pdf. 13 Wainwright, Rob. “Fighting Crime and Terrorism in the Age of Technology,” The

Brown Journal of World Affairs 24 (2017): 191. 14 Pauwels, Eleonore. (2021). Peacekeeping in an Era of Converging Technological & Security Threats, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/ sites/default/files/06_24_final_pauwels_converging_ai_cyberthreats_digital_peacekeeping_ strategy_1.pdf, 6f. 15 Pauwels, Eleonore. (2021). Peacekeeping in an Era of Converging Technological & Security Threats, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/ sites/default/files/06_24_final_pauwels_converging_ai_cyberthreats_digital_peacekeeping_ strategy_1.pdf, 6f. 16 Fahey, Daniel. “ADF Rebels in the DRC: Why are Locals Protesting against the UN, Again?” African Arguments, 11 December 2019, https://africanarguments.org/2019/ 12/11/adf-rebels-in-the-drc-why-are-locals-protesting-against-the-un-again/.

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Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) despite their history of gross human rights violations.17 The Islamist group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and other hostile actors in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) have similarly used social media campaigns to target UN Peacekeepers and foment anti-French sentiment.18 ,19 Disinformation and incitement efforts have also targeted military contingents from mainly Muslim countries participating in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), alleging complicity with armed groups20 . These examples demonstrate how the digital sphere is becoming increasingly important for peacekeeping missions in terms of situational awareness, strategic, and tactical intelligence. Traditional approaches used by Peacekeepers to develop a common operational picture (COP), such as interactions with local populations and an awareness of political, social, and economic networks, must increasingly be carried out in the digital arena.21 By exploiting grievances, spreading fear, and mobilising local populations to engage in violence, digital information campaigns are increasingly defining power, revealing competing influence networks, and weakening peacekeeping operations. As a result, it’s critical to have a better awareness of the information and technology environment, particularly in light of the hybrid threats that Peacekeepers face in complex situations, and to factor it into threat, conflict, and stakeholder analysis.22 17 Vogel, Christoph. “Congo: Why UN Peacekeepers Have a Credibility Problem,” The Guardian, 30 August 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/ congo-un-peacekeepers-problem. 18 Hess, Maj Ryan C. K. “Lassoing the Haboob: Countering Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin in Mali,” Journal of European, Middle Eastern and African Affairs 2, no. 3 (2020), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JEMEAA/. 19 https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220114-in-mali-france-is-paying-the-pricefor-its-own-ambiguity-expert-says. 20 United Nations. (2021). Central African Republic. Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/867, 12 October 2021. 21 Spak, Ulrik. “The Common Operational Picture: A Powerful Enabler or a Cause of Severe Misunderstanding?,” Swedish Defence University, https://www.diva-portal.org/ smash/get/diva2:1171677/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 22 Spak, Ulrik, “The Common Operational Picture: A Powerful Enabler or a Cause of Severe Misunderstanding?” Swedish Defence University, https://www.diva-portal.org/ smash/get/diva2:1171677/FULLTEXT01.pdf.

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Equally, when it comes to protection of civilian mandates (POC), Pauwels asserts that UN peacekeepers need to adapt to protect populations from rising collective digital harms, as well as develop a conflict-sensitive, operational understanding of how data pervades the socio-technical systems of conflict and post-conflict zones.23 This change will, however, necessitate a policy and strategic basis that can steer peacekeepers through these threats, opportunities and problems.

UN Policy Developments When it comes to the role played by new technologies in a changing conflict environment, the United Nations is cognizant of the implications for policy and operations. The organisation is also conscious of the changes, including the need for new capability requirements that are required to address this issue. The recent “Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping” (2021) seeks to integrate the use of digital technology in and across peacekeeping operations, with a focus on improving operational effectiveness in peacekeeping and sustaining peace. The Strategy incorporates both the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative (2018)24 and the seven Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+) priorities (2021),25 namely, the need for innovative, data-driven, and technology-enabled peacekeeping. The Strategy’s overarching aim is to enable missions to carry out their mandates more effectively and to improve peacekeeper safety and security by leveraging the potential of digital technologies while also mitigating risks, all while positioning peacekeeping to continue to evolve in its use of technology. The digital transformation strategy outlines four key goals and priorities to enable this26 :

23 Pauwels, Eleonore. (2021). Peacekeeping in an Era of Converging Technological & Security Threats, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/ sites/default/files/06_24_final_pauwels_converging_ai_cyberthreats_digital_peacekeeping_ strategy_1.pdf, 6f. 24 United Nations. (2018). Action for Peacekeeping (A4P), 28 March 2018. 25 United Nations. (2021). Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P +), 29 March 2021. 26 United Nations. (2021). Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping,

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping.

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1. Drive innovation—this goal aims to promote innovation in order to ensure that mandates are implemented effectively and to enhance mission safety and security. This is to be accomplished by sourcing collaborative technology solutions to mandate implementation challenges, promoting cultural change by, for example, establishing an innovation and digital transformation space at Headquarters to assess and champion innovation in support of mandate implementation, and streamlining acquisition and procurement procedures to promote innovation and the uptake of new technologies. Similarly, a capability for foresight analysis is proposed to track, examine, and provide advice on emerging technology issues as they relate to peace operations. 2. Maximise the potential of current and new technology—this goal seeks to augment missions with technical solutions and to equip Peacekeepers and other staff with the requisite training, capacity and digital skills necessary to carry out their duties more efficiently and effectively. 3. Understand threats to the safety and security of peacekeepers and to mandate implementation—this goal aims to utilise digital technologies for situational awareness and to gain a comprehensive understanding of threats to civilians, peacekeepers, political processes, and missions in a timely and integrated manner, as well as to identify opportunities to promote mandate implementation and raise awareness and support. This includes, introducing measures to reduce the likelihood and impact of cyberattacks, attacks enabled/enhanced by digital technologies, and digital harms, such as misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech 4. Ensure the responsible use of technology, in particular data— this goal aims to ensure responsible use by establishing clear principles for the ethical use of digital technology, particularly data, along with guidelines for their application, as well as regular reviews and a complaints mechanism, in accordance with UN system standards and in cooperation with other efforts in this area.

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The Challenge Digital Technologies Pose for Peace Operations These four goals succinctly capture the operational risks, threats, opportunities, and challenges that digital technology poses for peace operations. Digital technologies are used, as previously stated, to weaken faith and legitimacy in mission mandates, as well as to compromise the situational awareness and strategic intelligence of peacekeepers. Similarly, digital technologies raise the risk of, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and remotely activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) being used against peacekeepers.27 Additionally, peace operations paradoxically are more vulnerable to cyberattacks as they seek to implement the digital transformation strategy and increase the use of digital technology in planning and decision-making processes, and in the management of missions and implementation of mandates. In addition to these current threats and future risks, significant barriers also exist for the digital transformation of UN Peacekeeping in terms of capabilities, training and organisational culture. As the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping strategy states, “the assessment of cyberthreats is not routinely included in situational awareness or peacekeeping intelligence, in part because the skills required to identify cyberthreats and implement protection measures are limited and unevenly distributed…(and) some missions still lack up-to-date data governance or operational resilience plans that identify critical data and systems, and countermeasures for managing breaches and threats.”28 Despite the fact that current peace operations require personnel to have a minimum level of digital and data literacy and may include personnel with specialised digital skills, digital skills and data literacy remain a challenge due to current force generation and recruitment practises and insufficient predeployment and in-mission training. As a result, peace operations are

27 United Nations. (2021). Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-pea cekeeping, p. 24. 28 United Nations. (2021). Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-pea cekeeping, p. 21.

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often staffed by personnel without the necessary digital skills.29 ,30 This problem is not unique to peacekeeping, militaries globally are experiencing problems recruiting and retaining trained and experienced cyber professionals.31 Innovation, according to Dorn, “is not just about technology but also about people and processes,”32 so in addition to the need for specialist personnel, it is crucial to note that general capacity also needs to be increased to ensure that peacekeeping missions are staffed with people who have the necessary skill sets to carry out their mission mandate. Currently, digital capacity building is fragmented, lacking contextualization and organisational commitment. While some peacekeeping technologies have been introduced, this has been done in a piecemeal manner, leaving peacekeeping personnel without knowledge of the potential and necessity of digital solutions as well as awareness of readily available technologies.33 To better harness digital and dual-use technologies to maintain peace and safeguard vulnerable populations from cyber and hybrid threats in crisis regions, a cultural shift in peacekeeping is necessary. This cultural change, as stated in the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, must go beyond training and ensure that personnel are familiar with current technologies and the potential use of other digital tools in the field.34 In order to facilitate knowledge sharing, learning and analysis across missions, UN peacekeepers must also integrate convergent technologies to digitise, share, and secure the information they gather from training, open sources, human informants, and data-capture techniques. To facilitate this, at the ground level, the siloed, 29 Spink, Lauren. “Data-Driven Protection: Linking Threat Analysis to Planning in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Washington: Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2018, 8, 9 (2018). 30 Laurence, Marion. “What Are the Benefits and Pitfalls of ‘Data-Driven ‘Peacekeeping?,” Centre for International Policy Studies Policy Brief No. 35 (2019). 31 Understanding—and Fixing—the Army’s Challenge in Keeping Cyber Talent, https://mwi.usma.edu/understanding-and-fixing-the-armys-challenge-in-keeping-cyber-tal ent/. 32 Dorn, A. “Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations.” Dorn,

A. Walter. “Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations,” New York: International Peace Institute (2016). 33 United Nations. (2021). Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping. 34 United Nations. (2021). Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping.

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fragmented and opaque nature of information sharing, and integrated analysis needs to be overcome.35 Similarly, normative frameworks for the deployment of new technologies and the collection, curation, processing, use, analysis, storage and ownership of data must be deployed.36 While these challenges highlight the importance of cultural change that addresses staff capacity, organisational culture, digital infrastructure, the importance of normative governance frameworks, it is important to note that a peacekeeping mission’s capacity to maintain a strong understanding of its operating environment and the threats that civilians face is paramount.37 Peacekeeping missions can only fulfil their mandated objectives, including the protection of civilians, if they have a clear and complete picture of the threats they face. Therefore, it is crucial that cultural change and an increase in the use of digital tools support this function and facilitate deliberate and responsible decision-making.38

The Opportunities Digital Technologies Present for Peace Operations The key potential opportunity digital technologies present for peace operations is in augmenting peacekeeping intelligence, situational awareness, conflict analysis, planning and decision-making. According to Hansen, a peace operation requires information and analysis on three different levels: (1) it needs a clear, operational understanding of the mission area in real time, or what is known as a “common operational picture”; (2) it also needs early warning of impending threats to life, property, and movement; and (3) it needs enough data and analysis to identify risks and opportunities in the future. When it comes to a peace operation’s responsibility to safeguard civilian populations, situational awareness is crucial for both

35 Spink, Lauren. “Data-Driven Protection: Linking Threat Analysis to Planning in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Washington: Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2018, 8, 9 (2018). 36 Dorn, A. “Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations.” Dorn, A. Walter. “Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations,” New York: International Peace Institute (2016). 37 United Nations Economic and Social Council. (2020). Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals: Report of the Secretary-General, https://sustainabledevelopment. un.org/content/documents/26158Final_SG_SDG_Progress_Report_14052020.pdf. 38 Spink, Lauren. “Data-Driven Protection: Linking Threat Analysis to Planning in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Washington: Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2018, 8, 9 (2018).

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self-protection and mandate implementation. Digital technology allows for large volumes of data can be captured and processed more methodically, highlighting potential information gaps and unveiling trends. In this way, digital technology can improve a number of already-existing processes, from better monitoring, evaluation, and reporting to quicker, and more informed decision-making.39 In a similar vein, Adam Day contends that, if data is collected, processed, and analysed in a more systemic fashion, it has the potential to improve evaluations of the success of peace operations and allow for a move away from traditional barometers of success, such as activities and outputs, to a more holistic view of the impact of a mission’s efforts, such as improvements in security conditions and progress made towards conflict resolution.40 This could also encourage missions to identify clearer priorities among mission aims and target actions towards those aspects of the conflict dynamics that are most likely to deliver an impact.41 It could also aid clear, well-articulated and informationled strategic communications that could convey mission mandates more clearly, influence and gain support for peacekeeping missions domestically and internationally, and counter sophisticated and competing narratives propagated by conflict actors.42 However, as technology is increasingly used to improve situational awareness and mission evaluations, there is a greater need for analytical capabilities to transform this intelligence into planned strategies and bridge the warning-response gap. Some elements of the UN peacekeeping system appear to be experiencing “sensory overload”. They lack the ability to sift through massive amounts of data generated by social media

39 Hansen, Annika S. (2020). Digital Technologies in Peace Operations, https://techblog.zif-berlin.org/digital-technologies-peace-operations. 40 Day, Adam. (2019). “Can Data Save U.N. Peacekeeping?,” World Politics Review,

February 2019, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27479/can-data-save-u-npeacekeeping. 41 Samuel Bazzi et al. “The Promise and Pitfalls of Conflict Prediction: Evidence From Colombia and Indonesia,” NBER Working Paper, No. 25980 (June 2019). 42 Williams, Mark and O’Neill, Matthew G. “Ireland’s Role within United Nations Information Operations during Peacekeeping,” Defence Forces Review (2020): 192–203.

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analysis, intelligence gathering, and data-capture technologies.43 In this context, the UN and member states, particularly Troop Contributing Countries, must assess to what extent they can support the implementation of the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping in terms of capabilities, training and organisational culture, expertise, technology and equipment, and the development of technical, management, policy, and operational strategies required to ensure that current and new technologies are used as effectively, efficiently, and responsibly as possible.44

The Opportunities Digital Technologies Present for the Defence Forces The four key goals and priorities of the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping offers the Irish Defence Forces an opportunity to address some of the capability gaps identified in the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, specifically in terms of addressing the current limited capacity of the Communications and Information Services (CIS) Corps to support Ireland’s overseas policy objectives including participation in multi-national peace support operations.45 The emphasis in the Strategy on the need for multidisciplinary partnerships with the UN, member states, and external actors in the private sector, academia, civil society, and international organisations46 can act as a catalyst for the implementation of a number of the Commission’s recommendations that would develop the Defence Forces’ cyber capabilities while also contributing to Irish research, innovation, and enterprise development.

43 Pauwels, Eleonore. (2021). Peacekeeping in an Era of Converging Technological & Security Threats, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/ sites/default/files/06_24_final_pauwels_converging_ai_cyberthreats_digital_peacekeeping_ strategy_1.pdf, 6f. 44 Druet, Dirk (2021), Enhancing the Use of Digital Technology for Integrated

Situational Awareness and Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/20210430_-_sa-pki_technolog ies_research_brief_final_clean.pdf, pp. 5–13. 45 Irish Commission on the Defence Forces. (2022). Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. 46 Strategy on the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping (2021).

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The first goal of the Strategy, Drive Innovation, in order to position peacekeeping to continue to evolve and capitalise on technological innovation for effective mandate implementation and safety and security, offers the following opportunities for the Defence Forces. At the outset, the Strategy outlines the need for dedicated and flexible funding to foster and facilitate innovative projects and support the digital transformation of UN Peacekeeping. This funding offers a potential revenue source for the Defence Forces to enhance its capabilities while contributing to the digital transformation of Peacekeeping. This goal also offers the Defence Forces the potential to develop key strategic relationships and increase collaboration and coordination with international agencies and partners. Specifically, partnerships with militaries with experience of digital transformation and mature cyber capabilities could facilitate the Defence Forces gaining access to cutting edge technology and training.47 Similarly cooperating and pooling information with academia, the private sector and other partners, could facilitate the creation of an epistemic community that would see Ireland become the primary repository of expertise in the application/impact of digital technologies in peacekeeping, and thus offer an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge and practice within this domain. As noted in the Strategy, “how digital technologies can support mandate implementation remains underexplored and the potential of digital technologies remains unfulfilled throughout most of the substantive work of missions.”48 The opportunity that this goal provides in terms of creating dedicated spaces for leadership to elevate, propagate and promote innovation in support of mandate implementation and safety and security by peacekeeping missions, reflects in many ways the goals of the proposed joint Defence Organisation Unit to provide data and insight for evidencebased decision-making in the Defence Forces and to augment the work of the existing Defence Enterprise Committee (DEC) to align with any

47 Esberg, Jane, and Christoph Mikulaschek. (2021). Digital Technologies, Peace and Security: Challenges and Opportunities for United Nations Peace Operations, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/esberg_and_ mikulaschek_-_conflict_peace_and_digital_technologies_-_v3_210825.pdf. 48 United Nations. (2021). Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping.

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emerging capability development process.49 As such, this UN goal should be utilised fully to inform future Defence Forces procurement cycles and support the capability development process. This is related to Goal 2, which seeks to maximise the potential of both new and existing technologies. In order to empower missions and increase their capacity to carry out their mandates more efficiently and effectively, this goal seeks to enable the use of existing digital technologies to the best of their ability and take these considerations into account when exploring and acquiring/deploying new digital technologies. This resonates with the triple helix approach of innovation relying on government, industry and academic involvement, especially in the development of dual-use technologies as outlined in the RTI Feasibility Study50 and the failure of the Irish State and the Defence Forces to take full advantage of research and innovation taking place in Ireland which could be linked to defence capability requirements, as it is in other EU member states. For example, the recently established research, technology and innovation (RTI) unit could connect domestic defence requirements with national needs and greater peacekeeping needs while supporting broader innovation and mutually reinforcing relationships between industry, government, and academia. A number of potential projects are outlined in the Strategy which could facilitate this and build on current Irish expertise, in areas such as text/audio/video capture and analysis, artificial intelligence, machine learning, secure communications, and medical innovation to name but a few. This goal also highlights the need to strengthen skills, literacy and awareness on use of digital technologies, including data, across peacekeeping missions. The recent Commission on the Defence Forces report recommends that the Defence Forces would need to radically alter the way it sources personnel to work in this domain and envisaged large numbers of personnel directly recruited to work in this area would be civilian Information and Communications Technology (ICT) employees and contractors, as well as members of Reserve, and CIS personnel from 49 Irish Government. (2020). Feasibility Study: Establishment of a Research, Technology and Innovation Capability for the Irish Defence Organisation, https://assets.gov.ie/123 760/f091d8ff-fd61-4e71-84ff-9fd4e9a41391.pdf. 50 Department of Defence; Irish Defence Forces; Vedette. “Feasibility Study: Establishment of A Research, Technology & Innovation Capability for The Irish Defence Organisation,” Dublin (2020).

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across all services. As platforms to facilitate training, knowledge sharing and learning are common in most organisations, could this goal not be used to implement the recommendation of the Commission on the Defence Forces and second highly qualified/experienced experts from the private sector into the Defence Forces, to test the validity of this recommendation and to aid the creation of a common training and learning platform for peacekeeping. The third goal of the Strategy, namely the use of digital technologies to aid understanding of threats against civilians, peacekeepers, political processes, or missions in a timely and integrated manner, as well as the ability to identify opportunities to promote mandate implementation and build awareness and support, represents, in the authors’ opinion, the most significant opportunity for the Irish Defence Forces to implement some of the Commission’s recommendations. Specifically, the recommendation that the Defence Forces enhance cyber-related Military Intelligence to provide support for military operations, situational awareness, Information operations and strategic communications.51 As previously stated, digital technology and the data it generates have the potential to transform conflict analysis, operational planning, situational awareness, and strategic communications in peacekeeping operations, as well as generate early warnings that could lead to more timely and effective interventions. While some tools are being used, such as the Spatio-Temporal Incident Mapping (STIM) tool, which overlays patrol tracking and incident mapping data, and the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE) event database, the systemic use of digital technologies and data to support situational awareness and intelligence in peace operations is still in its infancy.52 As a first step, Ireland could lead on the development of an interoperable dismounted situational awareness tool for peace operations. This could be similar to the Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK) developed by the UK Armed Forces. ATAK is a mission, intelligence and mapping app installed on Android devices, that allows users to share and post information to other troops, such as images and location. With this 51 Irish Commission on the Defence Forces. (2022). Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, https://www.military.ie/en/public-information/publications/reportof-the-commission-on-defence-forces/report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces.pdf. 52 Irish Commission on the Defence Forces. (2022). Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, https://www.military.ie/en/public-information/publications/reportof-the-commission-on-defence-forces/report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces.pdf.

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tool, personnel on the ground can upload new operational information which can be seen by other team members, units and command. For example, the location of combatants, IEDs etc.53 Personnel can also take a photograph and upload it, linking it to a physical location which others can see. The development of a socio-technical system like this, which combines on the ground information with digital technology, could be further augmented with AI in the development of predictive models, especially if it is also used for Civil-Military (CIMIC) engagement, to record and understand the will and needs of populations in conflict zones. The increased weaponization of the ability to gather, control, and determine the veracity and integrity of data in peacekeeping operations could also be mitigated by introducing a dismounted situational awareness tool. Ireland is well-positioned, thanks to its extensive Peacekeeping experience, to develop best practises in managing, mitigating, and countering non-conventional hybrid threats in conflict zones. The recent White Paper on Defence Update highlights the potential impact of non-conventional hybrid threats to Ireland’s, the EU’s, and the European region’s perceived stability caused by conflict and uncertainty in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. The inability to pursue consistent multilateral approaches, according to the White Paper on Defence Update, “generates additional uncertainty and enhances a context that is more permissive to aggressive behaviour in the security environment”.54 Ireland can contribute to coherent international efforts to reduce the uncertainty caused by non-conventional hybrid threats by developing and exporting best practises for managing, mitigating, and countering non-conventional hybrid threats in conflict zones. Domestic political support, however, will be required, as will coordination among various agencies such as the National Cyber Security Centre, An Garda Sochána, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Defence, and others to ensure an adequate infrastructure is developed and best practises are shared. This change would encourage decision-makers to consider hybrid threats holistically and create a unified understanding of the concept in order to respond effectively to adversaries seeking 53 Irish Commission on the Defence Forces. (2022). Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, https://www.military.ie/en/public-information/publications/reportof-the-commission-on-defence-forces/report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces.pdf. 54 Department of Defence. (2019). White Paper on Defence: Update 2019, https://ass ets.gov.ie/43904/ff0ac8067fd44a7f9f1c3922d3297c8b.pdf.

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to undermine both the peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts of Irish Peacekeepers as well as the stability of Ireland and her international partners. Finally, Ireland, building on her international reputation on encouraging and securing human rights must take the lead on goal 4, that is, ensuring the responsible use of technology, in particular data by establishing clear principles for the ethical use of digital technology, particularly data, along with guidelines for their application, as well as regular reviews and a complaints mechanism, in accordance with UN system standards and in cooperation with other efforts in this area. Transparency is a crucial element when it comes to collecting and retaining data sets about conflict and post-conflict zones. Trust and community networks underpin the building and maintenance of peace. Any policy that relates to data and technology employed in peacebuilding must be built upon solid foundations of transparency and accountability.55 Additional to this, cross-border factors need to be more adequately considered. For this to work, there needs to be more integration across borders. On the tech side, it will be important to protect not only the data infrastructure but also the data capture, storage, and validation processes. This includes mobile phones, webcams, full-motion video capture, ground-based sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and geographic information systems. Thus, returning to the international aspect, questions arising from the visibility of the software pipeline are well-founded. This is in relation to several organisations or within an organisation that uses various software programmes from different locations. The UN’s biggest concern regarding tech governance is ensuring everyone becomes aware of how data collected or processed through a third-party service provider may have been handled on cloud servers (including foreign servers), which could be a threat to the integrity of the data.56 Maintaining the integrity of both data-in-motion and data-at-rest and, as a result, keeping the integrity of datasets throughout their entire life 55 5 Massimo, Marelli, “Hacking Humanitarians: Defining the Cyber Perimeter and Developing a Cyber Security Strategy for International Humanitarian Organizations in Digital Transformation (icrc.org),” International Review of the Red Cross 102, no. 913 (2020): 367–387. Digital Technologies and War, p. 387. 56 JustPeace Labs, Technology in Conflict: Conflict Sensitivity for the Tech Industry (2020), p. 2.

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cycle, from collection to curation, processing, analysis, and long-term storage is essential to mission operations and multi-stakeholder transparency.57 There are a lot of ways to protect the integrity of data, however, it’s valuable to realise that cyber and data ecosystems that are broken up, cannot always be used at the same time. For example, dataat-rest can be kept safe with the help of encryption. Data-in-motion can be kept safe with the help of secure multiparty computation. Therefore, protocols are needed to make multiparty computation safe. Protocols further allow groups of people to collaborate and compute a function using their private data inputs without revealing anything but the result.58 Aside from using digital technologies to enhance peacekeeping intelligence, situational awareness, conflict analysis, planning, and decisionmaking, Ireland, drawing on its years of experience and international reputation building peace and transforming conflict, could also take the lead in the emerging field of ‘Peacetech,’59 that is digital technology that contributes to peacebuilding. This could include gathering, analysing and visualising data about peace and conflict, providing digital mediation tools and creating new digital spaces for people to connect and organise while allowing for more people to engage in peacebuilding efforts.60

Conclusion The implementation of this Strategy and the greater use of digital technologies in peace operations has untapped potential both for the

57 Pauwels, Eleonore. (2021). Peacekeeping in an Era of Converging Technological & Security Threats, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/ sites/default/files/06_24_final_pauwels_converging_ai_cyberthreats_digital_peacekeeping_ strategy_1.pdf. 58 Pauwels, Eleonore. (2021). Peacekeeping in an Era of Converging Technological & Security Threats, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/ sites/default/files/06_24_final_pauwels_converging_ai_cyberthreats_digital_peacekeeping_ strategy_1.pdf. 59 Schirch, Lisa. (2020). 25 Spheres of Digital Peacebuilding and Peacetech, Policy Brief No.93, Toda Peace Institute/Alliance for Peacebuilding, September 2020, https://toda. org/assets/files/resources/policy-briefs/t-pb-93_lisa-schirch.pdf. 60 Panic, Branca. (2020). Data for Peacebuilding and Prevention. Ecosystem Mapping. The State of Play and the Path to Creating a Community of Practice, NYU Center in International Cooperation, October 2020, https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/data_for_ peacebuilding_and_prevention_-_ecosystem_mapping_-_october_2020.pdf.

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furtherance of peace and security, and for the Defence Forces in terms of innovation and legacy. However, to meaningfully apply digital technologies in the field, the Defence Forces must foster a culture of cyber capacity and raise awareness of the possible tools and partnerships that need to be utilised and/or developed for future peace operations. Similarly, Ireland, should seek to establish oversight and accountability frameworks from the onset governing the mandating of the use of digital technologies in peace operations. Utilising the potential of digital technologies in peace operations can be a game changer for the Defence Forces and would position Ireland as the primary repository of expertise in cyber peacekeeping, and thus offer an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge and practice within this domain. The benefits of this are manifest and would only serve to strengthen the Defence Forces proud peacekeeping legacy and act as an enduring testimony of Ireland’s commitment to global peace and security. The enhanced use of technology empowers peacekeeping forces by better equipping them to deter threats against both civilians and UN staff. As trust in the safety and skills of peacekeeping forces grows, more countries will be motivated to send troops to help keep the peace. While the potential for technology to be remotely deployed in peacekeeping scenarios also opens up the potential for easier rotation of personnel, different lengths of “tours,” constant and uninterrupted operations, and safer conditions for personnel who do not face risks on the ground. Technology offers the potential to improve how peacekeeping missions are led and run. For example, we are witnessing the development of aerial data, visualisations from above, satellite imagery, information about where people are, and as such sensor inputs must be coordinated, compiled, and filtered so that data can be transformed into information that can be used.61 Combining technologies for basic needs, mobility, communications, security, command and control, and robots could make peacekeeping operations increasingly effective and safer for both the troops and the communities they serve.

61 Pauwels, Eleonore. (2021). Peacekeeping in an Era of Converging Technological & Security Threats, Research Paper published by the UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/ sites/default/files/06_24_final_pauwels_converging_ai_cyberthreats_digital_peacekeeping_ strategy_1.pdf.

Cyber Resilience for Europe’s Armed Forces in the Twenty-First Century: A German Perspective Michael Vetter

Introduction The scene of modern international conflicts has changed drastically. They are more global, more complex and can be carried out with minimal resources. The use of hybrid methods allows such conflicts to increasingly occur below the threshold of an armed attack. “Liminal warfare”,1 the deliberate exploitation of grey areas by state actors for the purpose of advancing their own interests and objectives, even blurs the lines of our traditional understanding of peace, crises, war, the state of tension and the state of defence. A multitude of partially interdependent crises and conflicts that exist simultaneously has become the new normal. In the process, military and non-military activities targeting much more than just opposing forces or a national territory are combined in hybrid warfare. Their first and most important objective is advancing self-interest without 1 David Kilcullen, Dragons and the snakes—how the rest learned to fight the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

M. Vetter (B) German Ministry of Defence, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_14

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having to carry out a full-scale military conflict. The principal target is the stability of a state, a society or an alliance. Its many facets and a constantly changing appearance are inherent to the hybrid paradigm. The hybrid paradigm can be considered part of a global competition between political systems. Germany, Ireland, the EU and international allies are facing a non-cooperative, sometimes hostile environment that is characterised by a competition between states and social systems: It seems that the time of systemic competition has returned after the end of the Cold War in 1989. The increase in systemic competition is alarming because our system of shared values and rules is increasingly being called into question by adversarial actors. Hybrid methods are predominantly used in the cyber and information domain (CID) and are generally accompanied by additional activities, such as espionage, deception or sabotage. This presents a new quality of threat to the security of a state or its citizens. The increasing digitalisation of all aspects of life increases vulnerability to cyber-attacks. Any area of political, social and economic life can become a target and the effects can be both physical and virtual in nature. Owing to the low threshold of using the relevant means of warfare, attackers often focus on civilians. At the same time, cyber-attacks can cause effects similar to those of a traditional military force. Establishing resilience of the state and its citizens against hybrid threats therefore requires close cooperation between civilians and the military, embedded in a whole-of-government security architecture.

Digitalisation in the Context of Security Policy The radical technological change accompanying digitalisation as well as the increasing geopolitical rivalries over technological leadership, supply chains and trade routes have become a security challenge. An example of this is the debate on the security of 5G networks. In 2019, several states including the USA decided to ban from their network infrastructures the use of components manufactured by the Chinese company and 5G technology leader, Huawei, as it was impossible to ensure that data wouldn’t be tapped by the Chinese government. This decision was made at the highest political levels and brought about a conflict between the USA and China that lasts to this day. However, not only technical aspects but also the understanding, management and application of digitalisation by states have become part

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of the international competition between systems. While digital transformation is intended to support open and liberal societies in democracies, it is often abused for the surveillance of citizens and censoring of the media in centralised autocracies. Additionally, the CID is used for offensive or destabilising activities by state actors or their proxies, which might jeopardise peace and stability. Not one, but two actors—Russia and China—are currently putting pressure on the rules-based international order, albeit in different ways. China has openly established itself as a counter-model to the liberal social system of the West and, with its far-reaching power politics, also aims to redesign the rules-based international order. China is acting increasingly confidently and strives to become a world power—including militarily— by 2049. In doing so, it follows a networked approach—civilian, military and hybrid—with a focus on economy and high technology. For Europe, however, China is not only a competitor and system rival but at the same time also a partner. Balancing economic and security interests is a difficult task for Europe. Russia also strives to be perceived as an independent centre of power—at eye level with the West. It uses the CID for disinformation campaigns as well as for cyber operations. NATO and its Allies have already attributed several large-scale cyber-attacks to Russia, for example, the targeting of the offices of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague2 as well as the cyber-attack on the German Bundestag.3 These activities present a new challenge. On their own, neither Germany nor Ireland can defend the model of an open society, of democracy and the rule of law. This is why we need determined cooperation that is embedded in the multilateral order. The EU plays a particular role as its strength lies in its networked analysis and action capability across many policy areas. The broad range of civilian and military capabilities of the EU in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is unique and can produce a special

2 NATO, Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Russian cyberattacks, last modified 4 October 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_1 58911.htm. 3 Federal Foreign Office, Auswärtiges Amt zum Hackerangriff auf den Deutschen Bundestag (Federal Foreign Office on the attack on the German Bundestag), last modified 28 May 2021, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/hackerangriff-bun destag/2345542.

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effect through the careful orchestration and implementation of diplomatic, economic, financial, energy and development policy measures.4 This also applies to other familiar challenges, such as the fragility of states in parts of Africa and the Middle East, international terrorism, challenges related to space as well as to the implications of climate change. The EU must live up to its claim of being an anchor of international stability and a global player by demonstrating its capability to act and react. Germany has adapted to the new reality of this security situation. By refocusing the Bundeswehr on national and collective defence, Germany fulfils its responsibility of contributing to the preservation of peace in Europe. To that end, it is necessary to have a credible military deterrence and defence capability that is highly responsive and robust throughout the entire spectrum up to high-intensity warfare across all operational domains. This includes homeland security tasks as well as the increased importance of Germany as a hub for the operational freedom of allied forces, which both already exist in peacetime. Germany’s diplomatic and military capabilities are a crucial contribution to a free, independent and secure Europe.

Opportunities of Digitalisation Digitalisation is the driving force behind the transformation of modern societies. The networking of all aspects of life through information and communication technology changes political, social and economic interaction in an entirely new manner. These changes also affect the armed forces as a part of society. For the armed forces, digitalisation is the key to achieving information, command and control as well as effects superiority. It increases the robustness of armed forces on the battlefield across all domains (land, air, sea, CID and space). Growing digitalisation is accompanied by the constant increase in the armed forces’ dependence5 on robust and secure digital solutions, which lends the aspect of cyber security a particular 4 The Federal Government, White Paper on German security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: The Federal Government, 2016), 72. 5 This dependence is increasingly demonstrated by the fact that non-digital alternatives simply no longer exist because they will no longer be or already no longer are competitive, or that such solutions are neglected and no longer trained because doing so is bothersome and highly time-consuming.

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significance. Today, digital processes are an indispensable prerequisite for effective administrative practice. Moreover, the use of digital technologies promises an increase in efficiency and agility and thereby allows resources to be freed up for the core mission of the armed forces. This is the reason why digitalisation is crucial in making the armed forces fit for the future. The Bundeswehr understands digitalisation as the “targeted identification and the consistent exploitation of the potential that results from digital technologies”.6 However, these potentials go far beyond mere technical aspects. In order to be able to use them across the entire spectrum, a fundamental paradigm shift and cultural change are needed. Digitalisation must be understood and lived at all levels and for the overall organisation—from the political leadership and all levels of military command and civilian management to every serviceman and -woman and civilian employee. The EU Commission has defined digitalisation as one of its six priorities for the current legislative period and proclaimed the next decade to be “Europe’s Digital Decade”. A multitude of strategic documents (e.g. Digital Strategy, Digital Compass) and legislative proposals (e.g. Data Governance Act, Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive 2.0) as well as financial support (including 9.2 billion euros for the Digital Europe Programme) help shape the digital transformation of EU member states. By establishing the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS), the European Commission now has a political instrument that explicitly addresses defence matters. This is a positive change because the next years also will be the digital decade of Europe’s armed forces. Estimates predict a required investment of 100 billion euros for the modernisation and digitalisation of armed forces in Europe.7 We must now use existing instruments in order to support the armed forces in their digital transformation. The European Defence Fund (EDF), which has been anchored in the EU budget since 2021, is intended to support the

6 Federal Ministry of Defence, Erster Bericht zur Digitalen Transformation des Geschäftsbereichs des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung (First report on the digital transformation of the area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence) (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2019), 2. 7 Munich Security Conference, More European, more connected and more capable (Berlin: Munich Security Conference, McKinsey & Company, Hertie School of Governance, 2017), 23.

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industrial development of projects that close the capability gaps identified in the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). However, digital technologies in particular often do not have to be developed by the military itself but can be procured off-the-shelf from civilian manufacturers. Beyond the use of defence policy instruments, we therefore need a fundamental adjustment of the procurement system in the defence sector.8 The introduction of CGM9 products needs to be facilitated and accelerated through the modification of existing planning and procurement processes. It is recommended to use a development model iterating between specification and implementation, which is the hallmark of an agile organisation. To this end, processes, products and services must be planned in an integrative fashion instead of following a traditional “V-model” or “waterfall model”. The action plan published by the European Commission in February 2021 takes into account the necessity for civil-military cooperation in research and development of digital technologies and promotes synergies between relevant EU-financed instruments as well as the use of civil research results by the defence industry.10 This is intended to increase economic growth in Europe, to further develop the internal market and to improve security for European citizens. At the European level, the security dimension of digitalisation is not currently adequately covered. The EU Global Strategy calls for investments in digital capabilities and cyber technologies to enhance resilience.11 We are, however, still missing a strategy that explains how the armed forces of EU member states can tap into new technologies or how they can respond when adversaries use those technologies. Digitalisation as an opportunity and a challenge must be more firmly embedded as a task within the framework of the CSDP. Moreover, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) must

8 Daniel Fiott, Protecting Europe in the age of quantum computing and the cloud (Brussels: European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020), 6. 9 CGM: COTS, GOTS, MOTS (commercial off-the-shelf; governmental off-the-shelf; military off-the-shelf). 10 European Commission, Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries (Brussels: European Commission, 2021), 1. 11 European External Action Service, A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and security policy (Brussels: European External Action Service, 2016), 45.

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assume a more active role in order to support member states in this process. New and Disruptive Technologies Ever shorter technological development and innovation cycles are increasing the speed of digital transformation. Disruptive technologies have the potential to dramatically increase digital transformation, as the change they create is radical and swift rather than continuous. The development of such technologies entails great potential benefits but also risks. While the military used to be one of the drivers of technological development in the past, industry, science and the private sector currently are the primary drivers. The state often struggles to keep up with the exponential acceleration of technological progress and to develop technology assessments in advance. This results in an increasing discrepancy between technological development and implementation and utilisation for its own purposes. This means that the state must become quicker and more agile. For this reason, civil-military cooperation regarding the research and utilisation of dual-use technologies plays a significant role. For the armed forces, new and disruptive technologies present promising opportunities. They can assist in swift decision-making processes based on larger and more valid amounts of data from the most diverse sources and thereby facilitate more objective, more comprehensive and consequently better decisions. They can also contribute to the improved protection of both military personnel and civilians by increasing precision and scalability. At the same time, all of this must be in accordance with international law and national moral values. For example, systems that use algorithms based on artificial intelligence (AI) offer great potential for military applications in a number of areas and at all levels. They can serve to optimise logistic processes, detect patterns in the fields of cyber defence or analyse image, voice or text data in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. In the same way, AI applications can be used to support decision-making in the command and control process as well as in operations planning.12 The Bundeswehr 12 Jan-Wilhelm Brendecke, Der Führungsprozess von morgen—Wie Künstliche Intelligenz den Führungsprozess beschleunigen kann (The military command and control process of the future–how artificial intelligence could speed up the command and control process)

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follows developments in the field of AI technology especially with regard to its potential for achieving information, decision and effects superiority as well as for improving the basis and speed of decision-making. Beyond that, AI has the potential to improve compliance with political, legal and operational constraints in international operations (e.g. international humanitarian law and rules of engagement) through higher levels of precision with regard to effects and to provide a targeted contribution to the identification of hybrid threats within the framework of a wholeof-government approach to security. Overall, AI can serve to protect the citizens as well as to maintain national security and sovereignty. However, new and disruptive technologies also present challenges. For example, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict showed that the use of unmanned weapon systems already has the potential to affect the outcome of conflicts.13 Moreover, new forms of vulnerability must be considered and mitigated in weapon systems that are based on digital technologies. Ultimately, we must find answers to ethical and legal questions arising from the use of AI and autonomous systems in the defence sector. It is therefore necessary to find a holistic approach to the integration of new and disruptive technologies in the area of defence, which seizes opportunities and mitigates risks. A good example for this is the use of “serious games”14 and simulations in combination with virtual reality in the training of tactical procedures. Prior to practical training in the field, this approach facilitates the realistic imparting of training contents in a virtual environment as well as the training of sophisticated procedures. This is an ideal complement to practical training and contributes to increased effectiveness and efficiency.

(Bonn: Europäische Sicherheit und Technik [European Security and Technology], 2020), 68. 13 Franz-Stefan Gady, Krieg um Berg-Karabach 2020: Implikationen für Streitkräftestruktur und Fähigkeiten der Bundeswehr (The war in Nagorno-Karabakh 2020: implications for the defence forces structure and capabilities of the Bundeswehr) (Berlin: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik [Federal Academy for Security Policy], 2020), 2. 14 Serious games is a genre of computer games which impart or train knowledge or practices about the real world through gameplay. They primarily do not serve entertainment purposes but simulate part of the real world with the aim of working on solving a specific problem.

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Digitalisation in the Bundeswehr In order to strengthen resilience against crises of the twenty-first century, armed forces must actively address digitalisation. For the Bundeswehr, digitalisation is not entirely new. However, a lot remains to be done in order to keep up with the digital evolution. Many people—including decision-makers—still view digitalisation from the conventional perspective and mainly consider it the mere provision of IT, i.e. a support service to conventional warfare with traditional weapon systems. However, today it is much more important to recognise cyberspace as a domain in its own right, as an independent battlefield. Increasing digitalisation will cause more and more people and things to be inevitably dragged into this space, where they will turn into players but also into potential victims. It is therefore important to explore cyberspace at the intellectual level, but at the same time also with the help of the Bundeswehr’s own reconnaissance assets and weapon systems, irrespective of conventional reconnaissance assets and weapon systems. For this reason, the senior leadership of the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMoD) has not only identified the digital transformation of the area of responsibility of the FMoD as the central topic of the next decade for the Bundeswehr and one of the main areas of activity but also declared it an executive task for the highest leadership.15 Digitalisation goes far beyond the introduction of technical innovations. It impacts the overall action and thought process of the organisation. The measures related to digital transformation therefore range from adjustments in the areas of command and control, training and organisation or the consistent utilisation of digital technologies in armament projects and the digitalisation of workflows to the establishment of innovation elements, including the connections to the start-up scene. In the process, strategic principles, organisational structures, procedures, personnel development, procurement but also digital identity as the Bundeswehr’s new cultural foundation are addressed in a comprehensive, gradual approach. All of this is done according to the overarching principle of centralised control with decentralised implementation.16 15 Federal Ministry of Defence, Digitalisierung der Bundeswehr: Tempo machen!, (Digitalisation of the Bundeswehr: Pick up the pace!), last modified 12 November 2018, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/digitalisierung-der-bundeswehrtempo-machen--28986. 16 Federal Ministry of Defence, Erster Bericht zur Digitalen Transformation des Geschäftsbereichs des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung, 3.

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Since 2018, in addition to establishing the Executive-Level Board for Digital Transformation headed by the Federal Minister of Defence, coordinators who promote digital transformation in their respective area of responsibility were appointed in all directorates-general in the ministry as well as in all major organisational elements. Furthermore, an FMoD Digital Council with external and internal experts and decisionmakers was initiated as an advisory body to the Federal Minister of Defence. To systematically promote innovation, various additional innovation elements, such as the Bundeswehr Cyber Innovation Hub—the first digital innovation unit at the Federal government level—were established.17 These efforts also paid off during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was both driver and litmus test of digitalisation for the Bundeswehr. Previously implemented digitalisation measures significantly contributed to resilience and thereby to maintaining command and control capability. This made it possible to quickly utilise existing opportunities for remote working and tools for secure communication as well as to offer digitalised processes such as online training courses, all with the option of swift augmentation in response to the situation. In many cases, the importance of digitalisation measures that had been planned without a connection to the pandemic only became obvious over the course of the said pandemic. Only then were they prioritised accordingly and, based on existing planning, given preferential treatment and swiftly implemented or initiated. The pandemic worked as a catalyst in this regard. We are determined to learn from the experience and to maintain and develop the achievements beyond the pandemic. An important step in the right direction in this respect is the consideration of Bundeswehr initiatives within the framework of the EU-funded national plan for recovery and resilience, e.g. in research concerning key digital technologies and in the digitalisation of the training landscape. The digital transformation is far from complete—if it ever will be. Because of this, this challenge remains a top priority in order to make the Bundeswehr resilient and fit for the future and attract the best brains as an attractive employer.

17 See Chapter 5.4.

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The Challenge of Cyber Security The digitalisation of modern societies leads to an increase in both their vulnerability and the potential for misuse in cyberspace. Reports on cyberattacks, data leaks and compromises are daily fares. The implications can be substantial. The “Emotet” malware, for example, infected numerous networks over the past years, which caused production losses and, in consequence, severe damage to the global economy. For this reason, security authorities achieved a major success when the malware and its background network were finally destroyed in 2021. The disclosure of the “SolarWinds hack”, in which malware was installed unnoticed onto users’ computers via software updates, also highlighted global dependencies and vulnerabilities of the supply chain. The facets of current cyber-attacks are diverse and cover espionage in social, political and economic areas, attacks on critical infrastructure control systems, influencing opinions and manipulating information in social networks. The actors responsible for those attacks vary just as much. In addition to criminals and ideologically motivated groups, they more and more often include states or state-funded actors. Risks for the attackers are manageable, as identifying them is difficult. The anonymity of attacks and the low cost compared to traditional military operations have turned cyber-attacks and malicious actions in the information environment into a powerful tool, which is often used to achieve objectives without the need to cross the threshold of a direct military attack. Conventional instruments of deterrence therefore face unprecedented challenges.18 This means that security challenges and conflicts between nations are no longer only carried out the traditional way, i.e. on land, in the air and at sea, but to an increasing extent also in and through the CID. Both NATO and the EU have recognised cyber as a domain of operations in its own right. Germany, too, has developed this domain and is also including the information space in its considerations. The CID is the virtual, physical and cognitive space which can be developed as a military domain and that consists of cyberspace, the electromagnetic environment and the information environment. The significance of the CID is twofold: It is both an enabler for the traditional domains, as IT permeates all modern 18 The Federal Government, White Paper on German security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr, 37.

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systems including weapon and command and control systems, as well as a separate domain for military operations. In this domain, domestic and foreign security can no longer be clearly distinguished from each other and the territory from which attacks are launched can no longer be unambiguously determined. This problem can be illustrated with the help of an example: an actor in country A utilises server capacities in country B to attack the civilian-operated power supply in country C that is used by the military. This means that the state must position its institutions in a way that they remain able to fulfil their task to protect society even in the era of digitalisation and ensure that state’s own resilience against cyber-attacks. Against this backdrop, a modern cyber security architecture considers cyber security as an ongoing national task.19 In Germany, the National Cyber Response Centre serves as a platform for government agencies to share strategic and operational information, while the National Cyber Security Council is a high-level body for strategic initiatives at the interface between government and industry. Within the government, the Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible for civilian cyber defence, measures for the protection of information and civilian IT systems, fighting and prosecuting cybercrime and counterintelligence in the cyberspace. German cyber security interests are represented in international organisations by the Federal Foreign Office as part of cyber foreign policy with a focus on agreeing on norms for responsible state behaviour and developing confidence-building measures for a higher level of cyber security. The FMoD is responsible for military cyber defence. This includes all defensive and offensive capabilities to achieve an effect in cyberspace that the Bundeswehr has within the scope of its constitutional mission and the framework of international law and that are conducive to conducting missions or operations or to countering (military) cyber-attacks and thus to protecting friendly information, IT and weapon systems. This also includes the use of and participation in the development of structures, processes and reporting systems of cyber defence with regard to defence-relevant aspects and situations. The business sector also plays a central role in the protection of critical infrastructures and companies and is supported by the state to achieve the necessary level of IT security. Germany considers IT security the fact that

19 Federal Ministry of Interior, Cyber Security Strategy for Germany 2016 (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Interior, 2016), 20.

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the authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and availability of an information technology system and the data processed and stored in it are intact and cyber security IT is the security of all information technology systems which are and could be interconnected at data level in cyberspace.20 For the Bundeswehr, ensuring cyber security is about prevention, i.e. measures taken prior to a potential cyber-attack, but also about damage limitation during or after an attack. Cyber resilience is the key factor in this regard, as it determines the technical and procedural ability of systems, organisations and operations to withstand or recover from cyberattacks and to continue operation or ensure mission accomplishment despite the limitations caused by an attack. In order to achieve resilience through digitalisation, these three factors must be shaped proactively: resistance, regeneration and reconfiguration capacity. Due to difficulties in distinguishing between domestic and foreign security in cyberspace and the dependence of armed forces on civilian and critical infrastructure, resilient armed forces also require a resilient state and a resilient society as a whole. This challenge not only affects individual nations but also the EU. This means that the EU’s resilience and ability to take action must also be consolidated in the digital space and through digital solutions. With its framework for sanctions against cyber-attacks, the EU has already created an effective civilian mechanism to sanction cyber-attacks against companies, individuals and governments. Within the scope of the development of the Strategic Compass, the intention is to develop a military contribution to strengthening the EU’s resilience that provides effective and efficient responses to complex crisis situations as well as to hybrid threats, cyber-attacks and disinformation in close cooperation with NATO. It is important in this context that cyberspace is being fully implemented as an operations domain in its own right within the framework of CSDP operations and missions. This is the only way to ensure sufficient protection and defence capabilities in cyberspace. The PESCO21 project “Cyber Information Domain Coordination Centre” (CIDCC), initiated and coordinated by Germany, aims to establish a cyber coordination agency to improve the exchange of information within EU operations and missions in cyber matters as well as their

20 Federal Ministry of Interior, Cyber Security Strategy for Germany 2016, 36. 21 Permanent Structured Cooperation.

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planning, command and control. In its initial capability, the CIDCC is intended to act as information provider for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and, where necessary, for the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) that exercise command and control of EU training missions and operations. In further steps tasks will include the assessment of information in the context of an EU training mission or operation for the MPCC, OHQ and, where necessary, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and subsequently also the planning and command and control of the CID elements. Responsible Use of New and Disruptive Technologies It must be emphasised in this context that reconnaissance and effects in and through cyberspace are subject to the same framework of international and constitutional law as the deployment of any other military capabilities. This is why Germany promotes the strengthening of rules-based state behaviour in cyberspace within the scope of various multilateral formats.22 Germany, for example, supports the differentiation, strengthening and implementation of the confidence- and securitybuilding measures agreed upon within the OSCE. Within the existing UN formats (Open-Ended Working Group and Group of Governmental Experts), Germany also advocates for strengthening and consolidating international law in cyberspace and voluntary norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and emphasises the importance of confidencebuilding measures, capacity building and common responsibility for cyber security as part of a multi-stakeholder approach. As part of the “Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Roadmap”, which was adopted by the heads of state and government at their summit meeting in December 2019, NATO also explicitly addresses the ethical and legal challenges of the military use of new and disruptive technologies. Specific strategies are being developed for individual fields of technology such as data, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, which all include principles for responsible use. In this regard, it is crucial to include all actors, like-minded and opponents, by advocating for and embedding these principles in a multilateral framework. The EU is also

22 See: The Federal Government, On the application of international law in cyberspace (Berlin: The Federal Government, 2021).

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currently reviewing its civilian and military toolbox on disruptive technologies, particularly with regard to promoting innovation, cooperation with the private sector and the development of common standards for responsible use. This means there is considerable overlap in both organisations. Germany promotes close coordination between the two processes to avoid friction and losses in effectiveness. The Cyber and Information Domain in the Bundeswehr Cyber operations are activities that are conducted as part of armed forces operations with the intention of maintaining the ability to act in the cyber domain, to reconnoitre or to achieve effects in and through cyberspace for a specific military purpose for the sake of the conduct of operations. The necessary military effects can generally be achieved through actions in all military domains. Due to their precise, scalable and usually non-lethal or reversible effects, cyber operations complement the existing engagement spectrum. They always serve military mission accomplishment and therefore a specific purpose. Reconnaissance serves to gain information, e.g. for the purpose of force protection as part of protection and warning functions. Action in cyberspace, also in combination with action in the other domains, seeks to achieve specific effects in order to impair the adversary’s freedom to act. In order to implement the well-founded consideration of the CID as a military domain in its own right, the Directorate-General for Cyber/Information Technology was established at the Federal Ministry of Defence in 2016. The Director-General performs the function of Chief Information Officer for the area of responsibility of the FMoD (ministerial CIO). This structural change was followed in 2017 by the establishment of the Cyber and Information Domain Service as a new major military organisational element in which the Bundeswehr’s cyber capabilities are concentrated and further developed. Comprehensive capabilities for the operation and protection of the Bundeswehr’s IT system as well as for reconnaissance and effects in the CID are pooled there. In addition, geospatial information is centrally provided for the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr Cyber Security Centre is the core element for ensuring the Bundeswehr’s cyber security. Its centrepiece is the Cyber Security Operation Centre. Here, the Bundeswehr’s systems and networks are monitored around the clock and all situation-relevant data is compiled and evaluated. In addition, incident response and forensics teams are

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available to investigate and handle cyber incidents. However, in order to prevent such incidents as far as possible, the Bundeswehr’s systems are regularly tested down to the bit level by means of vulnerability analyses. The Bundeswehr Centre for Digitalisation is a central competence authority for innovation and further development of the software environment and also supports the development and integration of digitised and resilient IT services for the Bundeswehr IT system. The Strategic Reconnaissance Command’s task is responsible for providing reconnaissance and effects capabilities in the CID. In this area, the Bundeswehr has capabilities to conduct electromagnetic and cyber operations as well as to achieve effects in the information environment. With its Cyber Operations Centre, the Bundeswehr categorically has the capabilities to penetrate foreign networks and achieve effects there if necessary. In this respect it should be noted that purely preventive measures impede attacks but are not sufficient to ensure an appropriate level of protection in the CID in the event of high-value attacks. Sophisticated attacks can remain under the radar for quite some time and the systems may already contain unseen backdoors that were established through attacks on the complex, global supply chains. In addition to continuous monitoring of the networks and systems, this requires new analysis procedures as well as capabilities to be able to quickly react and achieve effects in the CID at all times. In order to develop the information environment as a military field of action, the Bundeswehr Operational Communication Centre uses print, audio, video and other media products to reach target groups, for example, via the internet. Within the scope of direct communication, the Bundeswehr Operational Communication Centre uses planned and target-oriented conversations with the population in the theatre of operation to achieve the desired effect. All of the information from the different areas is compiled at the Joint Situation Centre for the CID. The information is analysed, combined into a holistic situation picture and individual information products are created for the Bundeswehr or the National Cyber Response Centre. To this end, both big data methods and AI are used. The situation picture for the CID will also be included in the military intelligence situation that was established in July 2020. In the joint Intelligence Centre (JIC), the domains’ individual situation pictures are merged into the military intelligence situation at the operational level and evaluated. This includes

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processing of information from joint sensor technology such as spacebased, global imagery reconnaissance, signals intelligence and open source intelligence, in order to ensure contributions to early crisis detection and intelligence in support of operations. In order to have access to the most recent knowledge and expertise in the field of cyber and improve the capabilities of the CID, a dedicated “cyber-reserve” was developed. This programme attracts personnel on all levels, from senior leadership and professors, to former soldiers and IT experts. Members of the cyber-reserve train together and exchange knowledge through community education. This structural change and the associated increase in competence have created new potential for international partnerships. Capability cooperation is purposefully expanded both bilaterally and multilaterally. Within the EU, this is implemented through the Capability Development Mechanism, which ensures a coherent interaction between—among others—the defence initiatives PESCO and CARD. It is complemented by the EDF as the industry promotion tool in cooperation with the EDA and DG DEFIS. Within NATO, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) defines specifications aimed at achieving the greatest possible degree of interoperability between NATO members. In the area of cyber defence, both NATO and its member states have committed to improve cyber security of their infrastructures and networks as part of the Cyber Defence Pledge adopted in 2016. In general, it is essential that the EU’s capability planning processes are coherent with those of NATO.

Resilience Through Digital Sovereignty The threat situation in the CID as described above shows that the Bundeswehr must rely on its increasingly digitalised processes and the IT employs for this purpose in order to be able to fulfil its constitutional mission. Hostile actors can gain access to data and information and take control of IT-based systems by deliberately manipulating hardware, firmware or software but also through supply chains or by manipulating those supply chains or taking advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The manipulation or outflow of data and information on military decisionmaking processes and orders, or third parties compromising and controlling weapon systems can, however, have serious consequences. It would no longer be possible to guarantee the robustness of the armed forces,

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which is the aim of digitalisation. “Digital sovereignty” is absolutely essential to meeting challenges of this kind. In democracies, the concept of sovereignty is understood as sovereignty of the people. According to the FMoD’s understanding, digital sovereignty is thus about ensuring that each individual has complete control of their stored, processed and transmitted data and the ability to independently further develop and control the technical systems necessary for this purpose. This is in accordance with the right to informational self-determination. Accordingly, digital sovereignty not only includes technical aspects but also requires users, developers and decision-makers to be digitally competent. For the armed forces, this poses the fundamental challenge of maintaining the ability to act in and control the CID to the extent that is required to fulfil their constitutional mission securely, independently and without unwanted third-party influence. Within the FMoD’s area of responsibility, five fields of action have been identified for consistently safeguarding digital sovereignty.23 Trustworthy IT Currently, standard hardware and software are primarily produced outside of Europe and by only a few companies that dominate the market. The security and trustworthiness of the IT systems used can only be verified if the providers subject their products to suitable and recognised security evaluation and certification procedures, e.g. in accordance with the “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation”.24 As this is not always the case, security measures in the environment are needed in order to contain possible threats. As the use of public cloud services continues to increase, it is becoming more and more difficult to control the handling of data and thus also to ensure data and information security. The aim must therefore be to consider the security of the IT hardware and software used such that—if possible—the entire product life cycle and the product dependencies are taken into account 23 Federal Ministry of Defence, Strengthening digital sovereignty in the area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2020), 5. 24 As defined by the members of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, see https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/index.cfm?.

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and to at least establish corresponding requirements regarding suitable certificates (e.g. certification in accordance with the Common Criteria). To the extent that they are available and feasible, open and internationally recognised standards, interfaces and protocols should consistently be taken into account or required as part of IT architecture management. Within NATO, alliance interoperability must be observed. Developing own industrial value chains in the EU is also part of risk minimisation and can contribute to strengthening trustworthiness. Key Technologies Essential hardware and software components should be defined as key security and defence industry technologies for which—depending on the technology—selected manufacturers should be systematically chosen in coordination and cooperation within the EU and NATO. This is the only way to sufficiently exclude the possibility of systems being compromised. Control mechanisms such as certification frameworks or liability regimes will fail if manufacturers are not subject to European jurisdiction. In areas where European products are not available, development and production abilities and capacities must be established in Europe by specifically promoting the performance of Europe’s own industry. Core Command Capability Digital sovereignty must also always be considered from the perspective of the armed forces’ core mission—operations. The requirements for the provision of IT services are very high, especially with regard to national and collective defence. It is absolutely necessary to always ensure the armed forces’ command and control capability in this scenario. The armed forces must therefore always be able to ensure the core IT capabilities defined at the necessary level in the event of a crisis or mission or in a state of defence, even and especially when critical infrastructures are no longer functioning adequately. This results in special requirements for the confidentiality, availability, integrity, resilience, interoperability and sustainability of IT. To develop and strengthen digital sovereignty, (geo)redundant systems and processes are indispensable for selected IT applications, IT products and IT infrastructures on the basis of a second-source strategy.

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Capacity for Innovation Another element for expanding digital sovereignty and for targeted further technological development is increasing investments in research and innovation as the basis for future-oriented procurement and implementation of IT services. The implementation of new technologies within the framework of “top-down” control must be addressed at an early stage, and a standardised technological base must be developed. This goes along with a strategic orientation towards standardised and universally employable products and IT services. As a result, a product portfolio is being developed that serves as a standardised basis for further developments carried out within individual projects. Creating a secure private cloud environment for the Bundeswehr that is based on an open technology standard is one example of this approach. In combination with a cloudfirst approach, this ensures cloud-based implementation of new software and therefore also establishes a standardised and interoperable data basis. Moreover, all standardised measures to ensure cyber security will take effect in the entire private cloud environment and no longer have to be developed for each individual project. The top-down approach and standardisation lay the groundwork for a significant reduction in implementation times for hardware and software solutions, based on current technologies. The Bundeswehr’s IT innovation management aims at ensuring the necessary flexibility and agility in the introduction of innovative IT services and products, taking into account the existing processes effectively and in line with requirements. This approach is supplemented by the instrument of “strategic industry dialogues” and other innovation elements such as the CODE research institute at the Bundeswehr University Munich. The latter is one of the Federal Government’s central research and development facilities for IT security research. The Bundeswehr Centre for Digitalisation and Technology Research should also be mentioned in this context. It links university-level research conducted at the Bundeswehr universities in the areas of digitalisation, key and future technologies in a secure environment, strategically focusses on areas of innovation and tests new (research) cooperation opportunities between the Bundeswehr and science as well as between industry and society. Additionally, the Bundeswehr Cyber Innovation Hub functions as an interface and “marketplace” between the Bundeswehr and the ecosystem of national and international start-ups, and the Agency

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for Innovation in Cyber Security (Cyber Agency) initiates and promotes ground-breaking and forward-looking innovations in the field of cyber security and corresponding key technologies. As domestic and foreign security are particularly closely interlinked in this area, the Cyber Agency was jointly founded by the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Digital Competence The concept of digital sovereignty not only encompasses technical aspects but also largely depends on developing and maintaining the necessary digital competence for all members of the organisation. Promoting the sovereignty of each individual in using digital technologies is an integral part of digital sovereignty. As the individual is at the centre of all technological change, developing a digital culture and strengthening a responsible security culture in the use of digital technologies are of particular importance in the context of digital sovereignty.

Conclusion The security challenges of the twenty-first century, characterised by hybrid threats particularly in the CID, require Europe and its partners and allies to step up their resilience mechanisms. Cyber-attacks are no longer an abstract threat of the future—they are happening now and target our political, social and economic life. They have the potential to destruct critical infrastructure, manipulate public opinion and ultimately lead to the loss of life. Hence, cyber-attacks can lead to a state of defence. Due to the increasingly blurred line between domestic and foreign security, the resilience of the state and its citizens against hybrid threats can only be achieved through a whole-of-government approach. This approach requires capable armed forces and credible military deterrence and defence capability. Digitalisation will play a decisive role in enabling this, as it is the key to achieving information, command and control as well as effects superiority. By increasing efficiency and agility, it frees up resources for the core mission, which is essential given the limited financial and personnel resources in most countries. Europe’s armed forces therefore must make use of the enormous potential digitalisation offers.

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Based on our own experiences in the area of responsibility of the FMoD, the following measures to strengthen cyber resilience can be recommended: As explained above, profound resilience can only be attained by close cooperation between public authorities as well as the private sector. Establishing a whole-of-government approach towards cyber threats with a national cyber security council and/or a cyber response centre as focal point can serve as a basis. Another prerequisite for resilience is digital sovereignty. The requirements for digital sovereignty should therefore be considered throughout all processes. Digital sovereignty, however, does not mean digital autarky; hence, measures to enhance digital sovereignty should be embarked on in cooperation with EU partners. In order to exploit fully the chances that the digital transformation offers, organisations should prioritise digitalisation on all leadership levels, “think” digitalisation throughout all processes, structures and principles and facilitate a cultural change towards a true digital culture. Top leadership engagement, a robust governance and a dense network of Points of Contacts throughout the whole organisation to facilitate decentralised implementation and best practices are paramount. Defence organisations should consider establishing the function of a CIO to consolidate potentially fragmented responsibilities and to streamline the measures necessary to improve the cyber defence posture (including CIS). Governments and military are frequently struggling to introduce new technologies into their organisations in a timely manner. Hence, civilmilitary cooperation in research should be encouraged. In addition, the utilisation of dual-use technologies as well as the procurement of CGM products should become an integral part of the individual tool set. The EU framework of PESCO, CARD and the EDF offers opportunities especially for smaller nations to acquire needed capabilities in cooperation with partners. Cyber has become the fifth operational domain and malicious activities in the CID are the new normality. The military needs to understand cyber as an enabler and as a domain of operations at the same time. In order to create a safe CID, responsible behaviour in the CID needs to be promoted through multilateral institutions, in particular, the EU and the UN. Overall, we must all contribute if we want to continue to live in a peaceful Europe, embedded in a peaceful, rules-based multilateral world order—in both real and virtual spaces.

The Irish Defence Forces in the Drone Age Andy Scollick

Introduction We are currently experiencing a technological expansion in the development of uncrewed aerial, ground, underwater and surface vehicle, or ‘drone’ systems for military use by state actors and their proxies. These uncrewed vehicles (UVs) have different modes of operation, ranging from full control by a remote human operator to full autonomy without human intervention.1 Military drones are either unarmed or armed. For example, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) used for intelligence, surveillance, target 1 Remote control involves a human operator controlling the UV on a continuous or near-continuous basis guided by direct observation; the UV takes no initiative. Teleoperation involves a remote human operator guided by feedback from sensors onboard the UV. A semi-autonomous mode involves inputs from a human operator plus onboard sensors and computer processing; the UV is capable of autonomous operation in between human interactions. A fully autonomous mode is when the UV determines its own course of movement and actions, and accomplishes its assigned mission without human intervention while adapting to operational and environmental conditions. Hui-Min Huang, ed., Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework, Volume I: Terminology, Version 2.0 (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2008), 22–23.

A. Scollick (B) Independent Consultant, County Cork, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] URL: https://andyscollick.com/ © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_15

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acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) are generally unarmed. UAVs armed with lethal weapons, such as air-to-surface missiles, are referred to as uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). However, UAVs may also be armed with less-lethal or non-lethal weapons that are designed to incapacitate rather than kill, including laser, microwave and other directed-energy weapons. There is also a distinct category of UAVs armed with an integral explosive warhead: loitering munitions (LMs) or ‘suicide drones’, which resemble cruise missiles and other guided missiles. The character of warfare is already changing due to the efficiency and availability of large numbers of UAVs. From September to November 2020, the most recent iteration of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region bore witness to the effectiveness of UAV and LM systems as a force multiplier.2 Violent non-state actors continue to adopt the use of UAV systems to facilitate asymmetric attacks against state adversaries. Drone technology is not limited to the air domain. A new generation of uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) is on the verge of entering military service in logistics, tactical, medevac, counter-drone and other roles. The technologies of uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) and uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) continue to evolve. If the Irish Defence Forces are to successfully cope with and adapt to the ‘Drone Age’, then they must keep abreast of developments and embrace the utility of UVs and UV countermeasure systems.3 This chapter explores the implications of the Drone Age for the Irish Defence Forces. It is organised as follows. The next section outlines an emerging defence landscape involving technological innovations and increasing levels of use of UVs. The subsequent section discusses the challenges and opportunities as well as dilemmas this poses for the Defence Forces, given their current capabilities. It concludes with a summary and some reflections regarding the situation facing decision-makers in the future and some practical steps that can be taken.

2 Douglas Barrie and Niklas Ebert, “Armed UAVs: An Asset, But Not Alone AllConquering,” Military Balance Blog, July 5, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/militarybalance/2021/07/nagorno-karabakh-armed-uavs. 3 A term that has been in increasingly popular use over the last decade. It features in the title of a recent book: Michael J. Boyle, The Drone Age: How Drone Technology Will Change War and Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

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The Drone Age Landscape Space precludes a detailed history of the development of UAVs for military use. However, a brief overview of key recent developments is useful to illustrate the technological change in this field. The 1991 Gulf War stimulated the development of numerous types of UAV platforms designed to accomplish different tasks in different operational and tactical environments. The wars in the Balkans during the 1990s led the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency to fund the development of longendurance UAVs that could be used in orbit over contested regions.4 One particular programme to emerge from this was the General Atomics RQ-1 Predator medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) reconnaissance UAV. Later armed and designated as the multirole MQ-1, this evolved into the larger and higher-altitude MQ-9 Reaper UCAV. In the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Predator and (since 2007) Reaper UCAVs armed with Hellfire air-to-surface missiles became the iconic ‘drones’ of the United States-led Global War on Terror. The Predator/Reaper UCAV design has since been copied by China, Iran and others. Advances in UAV technology continue to facilitate the development of a number of dedicated UCAV systems by countries competing with the United States and Israel for UAV global market share. One example is the Turkish Bayraktar Tactical Block 2 or TB2 MALE UCAV produced by Baykar, which entered service in 2014. It has since been used in counterinsurgency operations against Kurdish militants and to strike Syrian Army targets. In May 2020, Bayraktar TB2s helped turn the tide for the United Nations (UN) recognised Tripoli-based government in Libya against General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army. TB2s also contributed to Azerbaijan’s overwhelming defeat of Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020.5 The miniaturisation of UAV components has facilitated the development of lightweight (25 kg or less) military UAVs with smaller airframes. The AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven (weighing 1.9 kg) is an example of

4 Steven J. Zaloga, illustrated by Ian Palmer, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Robotic Air Warfare 1917–2007 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 33. 5 James Marson and Brett Forrest, “Armed Low-Cost Drones, Made by Turkey, Reshape Battlefields and Geopolitics,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/armed-low-cost-drones-made-by-turkey-reshape-bat tlefields-and-geopolitics-11622727370.

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a soldier-portable, hand-launched, fixed-wing small UAV widely used by the US Armed Forces and many other militaries worldwide. Other designs include folding-catapult or tube-launched, ‘flying wing’ and multirotor VTOL small UAVs. Nano UAVs are a separate class of small UAVs under 200–250 g in weight. For example, the Teledyne FLIR Black Hornet miniature helicopter UAV, which weighs 33 g and is used by at least nineteen NATO militaries. British troops in Mali have also tested the Australian DefendTex Drone40 UAV with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), explosive and other payloads that can be fired from a standard 40 mm grenade launcher.6

Loitering Munitions The Drone40 can be used as an autonomous loitering grenade against enemy targets. However, most LMs are larger. Such ‘flying artillery’ blurs the boundaries between UAVs and cruise missiles. A loitering munition is a type of expendable UAV designed to engage beyond line-of-sight ground targets with an integral explosive warhead.7 Weighing from less than 1 kg to over 200 kg, LMs range from soldier-portable single- to multi-canister launcher systems mounted on ground vehicles, ships or aircraft. The defining feature of an LM is its ability to loiter in the air for an extended period of time, gathering intelligence and tracking potential targets, before switching function to that of a terminal guidance missile locked on to its target for either a precision strike or mid-flight abort (‘wave off’) and potential recommit or ditch without detonation, depending on the operator’s decision. Provided, of course, that there is a ‘human-in-the-loop’ to retain control and make the final decisions. A fully autonomous terminal guidance mode relies on artificial intelligence (AI) to make the decisions. In theory, LMs have an increased capacity to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants compared to equivalent weapon systems such as mortars, rockets and missiles.8 6 Joseph

Trevithick, “British Troops Get Small Swarming Drones They Can Fire From 40 mm Grenade Launchers,” The Warzone, The Drive, February 3, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/38909/british-troops-get-small-swa rming-drones-they-can-fire-from-40mm-grenade-launchers. 7 Dan Gettinger and Arthur Holland Michel, Loitering Munitions (Annandale-onHudson, NY: Center for the Study of the Drone, Bard College, 2017), 1. 8 Gettinger and Holland Michel, Loitering Munitions, 4.

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Loitering munitions are sometimes described as a game-changer. A growing number of countries have domestic LM development programmes, including Israel (since 1990), the US (1998), Germany (2004), UK (2007), South Korea (2012), China (2014), Poland (2016), Iran (2016), Turkey (2016), Armenia (2018), Taiwan (2019), Ukraine (2020) and Armenia (2021). Other countries have acquired LMs. For example, the Israeli IAI Harop LM has been purchased by Azerbaijan and used in combat against Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh in both 2016 and 2020.9

Swarming Uncrewed vehicles, including LMs, can be designed to act in swarms. Complex, collective swarm behaviour emerges from a simple set of rules governing self-organisation (separation, alignment and cohesion) among a group of individual entities, without any central control or coordination. In practical terms, a human operator directs the UV swarm to the general mission area and then the largely autonomous swarm takes over and accomplishes the mission. Swarms can incorporate different types of UV with specialised roles: unarmed information gatherers and communicators that inform attack UVs about target locations, as well as sacrificial decoy UVs to draw enemy fire. Constant communication between attack UVs allows them to coordinate target selection and approach for maximum efficiency. Different types of attack UV equipped with different payloads allow flexibility against a range of target types. When one UV is disrupted or destroyed, the swarm can adapt its behaviour and continue toward its objective. In January 2021, the Indian Army staged a demonstration involving a swarm of 75 multirotor UAVs of different sizes and roles working autonomously to identify and attack a variety of simulated targets. Quadcopter scout UAVs reconnoitred and acquired targets while reusable hexacopter ‘mothership’ UAVs released explosive-laden, expendable quadcopter ‘child’ UAVs, or rather LMs, which executed ‘kamikaze’ attacks

9 Seth J. Frantzman, “Israeli Drones in Azerbaijan Raise Questions on Use in the Battlefield,” Jerusalem Post, October 1, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/israelidrones-in-azerbaijan-raise-questions-on-use-in-the-battlefied-644161.

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on targets.10 India’s goal is to eventually field a one-thousand-UAV swarm capable of hitting a large number of targets.11 In April 2021, the US Navy used a drone swarm of undisclosed size, type and number to destroy a target surface vessel for the first time.12 In the same month, the Iranian Army unveiled an AI-driven network control system that enables a group of 10 UAVs to work together as a swarm.13 How well such swarming complexes perform in a real operational environment has yet to be demonstrated. However, ‘proliferation of basic swarming technology is inevitable’, warns Zak Kallenborn, a researcher at the University of Maryland. ‘The likelihood of U.S. forces encountering swarms is 100%. The question is not if, but when and where’, he added.14

Violent Non-State Actors The threat posed by the proliferation of UAV technology to state proxies and illegal armed groups, including violent extremist groups, terrorist organisations and organised crime groups, is obviously of deep concern to the international security and defence community. In the Middle East, Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthi insurgents are the main actors regarding proliferation. Lebanese militant group Hezbollah began using UAVs for reconnaissance in 2004. By August 2006 Hezbollah was mounting operations against Israel using UAVs with 40–50 kg explosive warheads.15 Palestinian militants Hamas acquired UAVs in 10 “For the First Time Drone Operations Demonstration at Annual Army Day Parade 2021,” Doordarshan National, January 15, 2021, YouTube video, https://youtu.be/5hM wW9nt-Tc. 11 David Hambling, “Indian Army Shows Off Drone Swarm of Mass Destruction,” Forbes, January 19, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/01/19/ indian-army-shows-off-drone-swarm-of-mass-destruction/. 12 David Hambling, “U.S. Navy Destroys Target with Drone Swarm—And Sends A Message To China,” Forbes, April 30, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhamb ling/2021/04/30/us-navy-destroys-target-with-drone-swarm---and-sends-a-message-tochina/. 13 David Hambling, “U.S. And Israel Concerned Over Growing Drone Threat From Iran,” Forbes, April 28, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/04/ 28/us-and-israel-concerned-over-growing-drone-threat-from-iran/. 14 Hambling, “Indian Army Shows Off Drone Swarm Of Mass Destruction.” 15 Milton Hoenig, “Hezbollah and the Use of Drones as a Weapon of Terrorism,”

Public Interest Report 67, no. 2 (2014): 1–2.

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2010. In 2012, the Israel Defense Forces claimed to have disrupted a Hamas UAV development programme in the Gaza Strip.16 In May 2020, Hamas launched locally produced Shebab LMs against Israel from Gaza. However, the Shebab resembles the Iranian Ababil series UAV/LMs and variants used by Houthi insurgents.17 In 2017, Houthis began using Qasef series UAVs and LMs, based on Iran’s Ababil-2 airframe.18 They continue to use them in attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia.19 Iraniansupplied UAVs and UAV technology will almost certainly continue to arm Iran’s proxies.20 Commercial quadcopter type UAVs first appeared on the retail market in the late 1990s. It is unsurprising that illegal armed groups have weaponised them. In addition to using UAVs for ISTAR and attacks, the terrorist organisation, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also uses UAVs to film its attacks as an integral part of its propaganda machine.21 In Syria in late 2015, ISIS began using small fixed-wing UAVs packed with explosives as improvised LMs.22 By January 2017 the group had formed its own UAV unit and increased its rate of UAV attacks.23 In addition

16 “Israel Says it Knocked out Hamas Drone Program,” CBS, November 16, 2012, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-says-it-knocked-out-hamas-drone-program/. 17 Joseph Trevithick, “Palestinian Militants are Now Launching Suicide Drones at Israel,” The Warzone, The Drive, May 13, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-warzone/40601/palestinian-militants-are-now-launching-suicide-drones-at-israel. 18 Tyler Rogoway, “Suicide Drones Have Migrated to the Conflict In Yemen,” The Warzone, The Drive, March 24, 2017, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/8586/ suicide-drones-have-migrated-to-the-conflict-in-yemen. 19 “Saudi air Defences Intercept 17 Houthi Armed Drones—State TV,” Reuters, June 19, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-air-defences-intercept-hou thi-armed-drone-says-state-tv-2021-06-19/. 20 Hambling, “U.S. And Israel Concerned Over Growing Drone Threat From Iran.” 21 Emil Archambault and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “Drone Imagery in Islamic State

Propaganda: Flying Like a State,” International Affairs 96, no. 4 (2020): 956, https:// doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa014. 22 David Hambling, “ISIS Is Reportedly Packing Drones With Explosives Now,” Popular Mechanics, December 16, 2015, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/ weapons/a18577/isis-packing-drones-with-explosives/. 23 Joby Warrick, “Use of Weaponized Drones by ISIS Spurs Terrorism Fears,” Washington Post, February 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/use-of-weaponized-drones-by-isis-spurs-terrorism-fears/2017/02/21/9d83d51ef382-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html.

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to the fixed-wing LMs, ISIS rely on small quadcopter and other multirotor UAVs to drop small munitions on targets using UAVs and parts purchased from commercial websites and other sources in China, India and Turkey.24

Uncrewed Ground Vehicles The contemporary defence landscape is also characterised by the emergence of uncrewed ground, underwater and water surface vehicles. In general, the state of development of military UGV technology is less advanced than that of UAV technology but more advanced than that of UUVs and USVs. UGVs have existed since the 1920s. UGV platforms have a wheeled or tracked chassis to facilitate movement and support payloads. Remotely operated UGVs are designed for particularly dangerous tasks, such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), without direct risk to human operators. Autonomous UGVs are typically designed on the basis of AI technology for longer duration missions without operator intervention. Over time, the roles of UGVs have been extended to include ISTAR, direct fire support, logistics and medevac missions.25 In 2018, the US Army initiated a robotic combat vehicle (RCV) programme to develop light, medium and heavy versions of RCVs to perform a variety of tasks.26 By May 2021, the US Army had received four hybrid electric 7-tonne RCV Light and four 10-tonne RCV Medium prototypes for evaluation.27 The RCV Medium platforms have greater firepower and are more heavily armoured, as they are intended to accompany the second wave following the RCV Light scouts and other first-wave vehicles. The 30-tonne RCV Heavy variant is intended to

24 W.J. Hennigan, “Islamic State’s Deadly Drone Operation is Faltering, But U.S. Commanders See Broader Danger Ahead,” Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-isis-drones-20170928-story.html. 25 Gary Martinic, “The Proliferation, Diversity and Utility of Ground-based Robotic Technologies,” Canadian Military Journal 14, no. 4 (Autumn 2014): 49–50. 26 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Meet the Army’s Future Family of Robot Tanks: RCV,” Breaking Defense, November 9, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/meet-thearmys-future-family-of-robot-tanks-rcv/. 27 Dan Heaton, “Army Takes Delivery of RCV Prototypes,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), Department of Defense, May 26, 2021, https://www.dvi dshub.net/news/397427/army-takes-delivery-rcv-prototypes.

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perform the same functions as a crewed 70-tonne M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, to which it will act as a ‘wingman.’28 Estonian company Milrem Robotics has designed its modular multimission Type-X RCV to meet the requirements of various armed forces, including the US Army’s RCV Medium programme. The airtransportable Type-X is intended to support crewed infantry fighting vehicles, particularly as a means of breaching enemy defences while minimising the risk to own troops.29 The company also builds the smaller multirole THeMIS UGV, which is intended to support dismounted troops. Its open architecture allows it to be configured for transport, especially for ‘last mile resupply’ to front-line troops, as well as for ISR, as a remote weapons platform, improvised explosive device (IED) detection and disposal and other functions. The THeMIS was deployed to Mali with the Estonian Defence Forces between April 2019 and April 2020 during the French-led Operation Barkhane.30 The THeMIS system has already been acquired by eleven countries, including seven NATO members (Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Germany, UK and US, as before).31

Uncrewed Underwater and Surface Vehicles There are two classes of UUV: remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). ROVs have a human operator located onboard a vessel, floating platform or on land and are controlled via an umbilical cable. AUVs are highly automated and capable of operating independently. Both technologies have been in development since 28 Freedberg Jr., “Meet the Army’s Future Family Of Robot Tanks: RCV,” https://

breakingdefense.com/2020/11/meet-the-armys-future-family-of-robot-tanks-rcv/. 29 Paolo Valpolini, “Type-X: An Unmanned Direct Fire Support Solution (and more) by Milrem Robotics,” European Defence Review, June 8, 2020, https://www.edrmagazine. eu/type-x-an-unmanned-direct-fire-support-solution-and-more-by-milrem-robotics. 30 “Milrem Robotics’ THeMIS UGV Completes First Deployment in Mali Proving its Effectiveness and Reliability,” European Defence Review, May 5, 2020, https://www.edr magazine.eu/milrem-robotics-themis-ugv-completes-first-deployment-in-mali-proving-itseffectiveness-and-reliability. 31 “Milrem Robotics Presents the Robotic Combat Vehicle Candidate for US Army’s RCV-M Program at Military RAS USA Conference,” Milrem Robotics, June 18, 2021, https://milremrobotics.com/milrem-robotics-presents-the-robotic-combat-vehiclecandidate-for-us-armys-rcv-m-program-at-military-ras-usa-conference/.

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the 1950s. Currently, both China and the US are putting significant effort into the development of AUV platforms for naval surveillance, minelaying and attack missions.32 The proliferation of UUVs poses new challenges for states. In future, naval forces will likely use a mix of conventional crewed and uncrewed vessels.33 Swarms of expendable AI-driven marine platforms and weapon systems would make possible an increase in lethality. Consider, swarms of LMs launched from USVs and UUVs, or swarms of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems designed to locate submarines or maybe even swarms designed to sabotage subsea communications and electricity transmission cables.

Challenges and Opportunities Facing the Irish Defence Forces Uncrewed vehicles in all their forms pose a contemporary and future threat to the Irish Defence Forces. The pervasiveness of UAV systems and the pace of technological change enable states to rapidly modernise their military UAV capabilities and proliferate them to proxies. Export of UAV systems by both established and emerging producer countries is creating new UAV-equipped countries. Meanwhile, violent non-state actors have access to large numbers of increasingly sophisticated UAV platforms and weapon systems. Future conflict zones in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and elsewhere will likely involve adversaries fielding a mix of crewed and uncrewed systems, many of which will be capable of operating in autonomous modes. Military forces, including peacekeepers, will become increasingly vulnerable to swarming UCAVs and LMs. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war demonstrated that superiority on the battlefield can be achieved through a combination of unarmed ISTAR

32 J.R. Wilson, “Unmanned Submarines Seen as Key to Dominating the World’s Oceans,” Military & Aerospace Electronics, October 15, 2019, https://www.militaryaero space.com/unmanned/article/14068665/unmanned-underwater-vehicles-uuv-artificial-int elligence. 33 Malcolm Davis, “Robots at War: The Future for Autonomous Systems at Sea in the Indo-Pacific,” Observer Research Foundation, March 24, 2021, https://www.orfonl ine.org/expert-speak/robots-war-future-autonomous-systems-sea-indo-pacific/.

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UAVs, UCAVs and LMs.34 Furthermore, very few countries currently have the capability to counter this type of military-grade UAV combination threat. French, German, British and other European armed forces are acquiring anti-UAV systems or counter uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) from various manufacturers. However, these tend to comprise short-range detection radars and jammer guns suitable for intervention in countering single small UAVs.35 Without even this basic level of C-UAS capability, the Defence Forces would likely be outmatched and quickly defeated if such a combination was used against them. Ireland cannot afford to ignore these challenges. Overseas peacekeeping deployments by the Defence Forces will become increasingly exposed to situations in which belligerent state and non-state actors are using UCAVs and LMs and, eventually, armed UGVs. In addition to being caught in the crossfire, there is always the risk that a belligerent might target peacekeepers directly. Likewise, there is a risk of Defence Forces personnel and materiel coming under fire during possible future participation in EU Battlegroups reconfigured for rapid response situations.36 Therefore, the Defence Forces have a need for advanced anti-UAV countermeasures. The pace of development of C-UAS systems is accelerating. A comprehensive defence against UAVs and LMs involves a multi-layered C-UAS system with the functionality to detect, identify and track a single target, multiple targets or even an entire swarm before mitigating or neutralising the potential threat through non-kinetic or kinetic solutions. Drone monitoring equipment enables 360-degree ‘full-sky’ coverage using four main types of equipment: radio frequency analysers, radar, acoustic sensors and optical, electro-optical or infrared cameras. Early detection

34 Robyn Dixon, “Azerbaijan’s Drones Owned the Battlefield in NagornoKarabakh—and Showed Future of Warfare,” Washington Post, November 11, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nagorno-karabkah-drones-azerba ijan-aremenia/2020/11/11/441bcbd2-193d-11eb-8bda-814ca56e138b_story.html. 35 Simone Rinaldi, “Countering Drones: How European Land Forces Are Organising Their Anti-UAV Capabilities For Homeland Security,” Finabel—European Army Interoperability Centre, February 16, 2021, https://finabel.org/countering-drones-how-europeanland-forces-are-organising-their-anti-uav-capabilities-for-homeland-security/. 36 “European Union Military Committee (EUMC), EU chiefs of defence, 19 May 2021,” Council of the EU (Meeting n°CHOD19052021), May 19, 2021, https://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2021/05/19/.

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and identification prepare the C-UAS system for an efficient response, including engagement of the UAV target or targets by methods including: . Electronic jamming to disrupt a UAV’s Global Positioning System (GPS) radio navigation or radio control signals, or signal ‘spoofing’ to take over navigation and control of the UAV. . Cyber operations interrupt communications links between a control centre and the UAV. . Physically capturing a UAV mid-flight using a net either fired from a gun or deployed from an attack UAV to entangle the target’s propellers and immobilise it. . Physically disrupting or destroying a UAV using either directedenergy (high-power microwave and laser) beams or a projectile such as ground fire, missile or smart airburst munition.37 Countering large numbers of concurrently deployed reconnaissance UAVs, UCAVs and LMs on the battlefield is a difficult challenge, as evidenced by Armenia’s lack of success against Azerbaijan’s UAV warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh.38 Countering swarms of potentially thousands of lethal UAVs takes the challenge to another level.39 Recently, General John ‘Mike’ Murray, Commanding General of the US Army Futures Command warned that UAV swarms are becoming too fast for humans to fight and, therefore, the Pentagon’s rules governing human control over lethal AI-driven autonomous systems may need to be relaxed: from ‘human-inthe-loop’ in which human control and decision making is exercised over

37 Arthur Holland Michel, Counter-Drone Systems (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Center for the Study of the Drone, Bard College, 2018); and “10 Counter-Drone Technologies to Detect and Stop Drones Today,” Robin Radar Systems, March 22, 2020, https://www.rob inradar.com/press/blog/10-counter-drone-technologies-to-detect-and-stop-drones-today. 38 A challenge that also requires the integration of legacy air defence systems, which are intended to detect, identify and track fast-moving aircraft, with new and experimental CUAS technology for dealing with small slow-moving UAVs. Armenian air defence systems were designed to counter aircraft, not UAVs. 39 David Hambling, “What Are Drone Swarms and Why Does Every Military Suddenly Want One?,” Forbes, March 1, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/ 2021/03/01/what-are-drone-swarms-and-why-does-everyone-suddenly-want-one/.

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a lethal system, to ‘human-on-the-loop’ in which a human has supervisory oversight rather than direct control.40 Of course, less democratic and ethically responsible actors may not have the same scruples about using fully autonomous ‘fire-and-forget’ UAV platforms and weapon systems.

Defence Forces’ Uncrewed Vehicles Before considering the opportunities that UVs present, it is worth mentioning the Defence Forces’ current UAV and UGV capabilities. Between 2007 and 2009, the Defence Forces acquired four soldierportable Orbiter 1 and Orbiter 2 mini-UAV systems from Aeronautics Defence Systems in Israel. There are three airframes in each system. According to Paul Kehoe TD, then Minister of State at the Department of Defence, they were acquired for ‘peace support operations and provide a low-cost, low-risk means to increase capabilities and enhance force protection.’41 The four systems were upgraded to Orbiter 2B standard by the manufacturer in 2016, giving a current inventory of 12 airframes. They are operated by the Artillery Corps M-UAV Section.42 In 2018, the Defences Forces purchased four Chinese DJI Matrice quadcopter UAVs capable of carrying both thermal and visual cameras simultaneously. These are used by the Engineer Corps for supporting peacekeeping operations, search and rescue, disaster relief and other tasks.43 The Army Ranger Wing operates a number of small and micro-UAV systems.44 Since 2018,

40 David Hambling, “Drone Swarms Are Getting Too Fast for Humans to Fight, U.S. General Warns,” Forbes, January 27, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhamb ling/2021/01/27/drone-swarms-are-getting-too-fast-for-humans-too-fight-us-generalwarns/. 41 Paul Kehoe, “Defence Forces Equipment, Dáil Éireann Debate, Thursday—10 May 2018,” Houses of the Oireachtas, May 10, 2018, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/ question/2018-05-10/6/. 42 Justin A. Barry, “Eye in the Sky: Orbiter 2B Mini UAV,” An Cosantóir, April 2020,

25. 43 “Defence Forces Ireland Choose COPTRZ as UAV partner,” SUAS News, May 4, 2018, https://www.suasnews.com/2018/05/defence-forces-ireland-choose-coptrz-asuav-partner/. 44 Justin A. Barry, “Eye in the Sky: Orbiter 2B Mini UAV.”

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the Naval Service has acquired nine DJI Phantom Pro 4 quadcopter UAVS plus one DJI Mavic 2 UAV.45 The Defence Forces also have some UGVs. In addition to Cyclops Mk4 ROVs, the Ordnance Corps operate Irish company Reamda HOBO and Reacher remote-controlled bomb disposal robots for EOD and IED disposal tasks.46 The Engineer Corps operates two DOK-ING MV-4 remote-controlled mine clearance UGVs.47 A MV-4 has been used on UN Disengagement Observer Force or UNDOF duties in the Golan Heights.48 Furthermore, the Department of Defence’s June 2020 Equipment Development Plan for the Defence Forces 2020–2024 lists an ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)/Drone Defence System’ project (2021–2022) involving a new development of anti-UAV capability.49 The Defence Forces’ current UV capabilities are limited to aerial ISTAR, bomb disposal and mine clearance. This is in keeping with its functions as defender of the state and participant in multinational peace support, crisis management and humanitarian relief operations. Orbiter 2Bs are a versatile UAV for providing situational awareness and intelligence gathering. However, operational environments both at home and overseas are becoming increasingly complex due to irregular warfare, climate change and other factors. Therefore, the Defence Forces need UAV and other UV-related capabilities that allow for greater flexibility, agility and adaptability in reacting to a wide range of potential scenarios. Future Defence Forces’ missions may involve high-intensity conflicts, which require armed UAVs for combat support and force protection. Decisions regarding the acquisition of lethal UV capabilities will almost certainly be influenced by domestic political considerations. Less controversially, the current UGV capability could be expanded with the addition 45 Ken Foxe, “Department of Defence Spent Over e1m on Drones in Past Four Years,” Irish Examiner, April 30, 2021, https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-40278464. html. 46 “Irish Defence Forces Get to Grips with New Tech for Nuclear Attack Response,” Silicon Republic, November 4, 2019, YouTube video, https://youtu.be/LGFvQd2d_HE. 47 “MV-4 Digital Upgrade,” Reamda, June 17, 2021, https://reamda.com/project/

minesweeper-digital-upgrade/. 48 “Irish Counter Improvised Explosive Device Equipment arrives in Camp Faouar,” UNDOF , July 18, 2014, https://undof.unmissions.org/irish-counter-improvised-explos ive-device-equipment-arrives-camp-faouar. 49 Department of Defence—Defence Forces—Equipment Development Plan 2020–2024 (Newbridge, Co. Kildare: Department of Defence and Defence Forces, 2020), 12.

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of multirole platforms such as THeMIS. This would provide the Defence Forces with additional and more effective logistic capabilities to sustain forces on overseas deployments in remote areas such as southern Lebanon and Mali. Existing UGV capabilities will require updating and replacement with new generations of equipment as UGV technologies continue to advance. The most obvious capability gap at present concerns the absence of C-UAS systems across the Defence Forces. This is an area that warrants immediate attention. The research, development and acquisition of CUAS capabilities is a long-term venture. It is already recognised that Ireland’s participation in the European Defence Agency is essential to staying informed about best practice in relation to technology and the development of capabilities that can assist the Defence Forces in its crisis management and peacekeeping roles.50 The first practical step that can be taken to prepare the Defence Forces for the Drone Age is the development of a comprehensive forwardlooking UV doctrine: a set of fundamental principles to guide the Defence Forces’ uncrewed and autonomous vehicles-related actions. This would help focus defence planners, analysts and commanders on specific tasks. The Drone Age is simply too complex and dynamic an area for ad hoc planning to succeed in developing adequate UV capabilities. Moreover, there is no need for the Defence Forces to ‘reinvent the wheel’. Other militaries across Europe and elsewhere already have advanced UV capabilities; given the limited resources, the Defence Forces would benefit from a detailed and iterative examination of existing capabilities and capability development programmes.

Opportunities for All Services of the Defence Forces Uncrewed vehicle capabilities represent an opportunity for the Defence Forces. Military applications of UV technology serve a wide range of functions across the air, land and sea domains. UVs enable remote deployment of personnel, weapons and equipment. UVs increase the probability of successful mission completion. In the decades toward mid-century,

50 Department of Defence and Defence Forces: Annual Report 2020 (Newbridge, Co. Kildare: Department of Defence and Defence Forces, 2021), 15.

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UVs may become the dominant component of a mixed crewed-uncrewed future force. Until then, UVs will remain a force multiplier because they significantly enhance the capabilities of a force without increasing the size of the force. The successful use of UAVs in the recent civil war in Libya and the war in Nagorno-Karabakh suggests that UAVs will continue to be force multipliers in future conflicts. They are more economically feasible to develop and sustain compared to conventional crewed aircraft, and they reduce the risk to the lives of aircrew. In addition, UAVs have the potential to augment existing combat capabilities through teaming arrangements involving one or more uncrewed fighter aircraft, often referred to as a ‘loyal wingman’, which fly alongside crewed fighter aircraft and other UAVs.51 Likewise, UGV, UUV and USV ‘wingmen’ all have the potential for force multiplication, especially when combined with swarming technology.52 Trials of UGVs under simulated battlefield conditions by the US, as before British, French and other armies continue to demonstrate the utility and benefits of UGVs for a wide range of tasks, not least of which are force protection, combat support and base security. More mundane UGV tasks, such as providing logistics on-base as well as between supply depots and front-line units, frees up troops from the rear for other duties. Platforms such as THeMIS and Type-X are adaptable force multipliers. Based on existing use of UAVs, including the Orbiter 2B, there is every reason to suppose that the Defence Forces will avail of UGVs for international peacekeeping operations as part of routine modernisation and force development efforts. The different Army Corps will have different needs but, overall, we can expect them to increase their reliance on UGV and UAV systems across the spectrum of missions, including in the areas of disaster response and humanitarian aid. The primary role of the Air Corps is to support the Army with tasks including aerial reconnaissance, fire support, command and control, logistic support and medevac. In support of the Naval Service, the Air

51 Harry Lye, “Future RAF Will Mix Crewed Fighters, UAVs and Swarming Drones: CDS,” Airforce Technology, March 31, 2021 (updated April 14, 2021), https://www.air force-technology.com/features/future-raf-will-mix-crewed-fighters-uavs-and-swarming-dro nes-cds/. 52 Daniel H. Stolfi, Matthias R. Brust, Grégoire Danoy and Pascal Bouvry, “UAVUGV-UMV Multi-Swarms for Cooperative Surveillance,” Frontiers in Robotics and AI , February 19, 2021, https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2021.616950.

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Corps provides maritime surveillance of Ireland’s territorial waters and extensive exclusive economic zone (EEZ). For all these tasks and more, the Air Corps would certainly benefit from augmentation with a range of UAV platforms, not only with ISTAR but also with communications relay, electronic warfare, cargo transport and search and rescue capabilities. Iceland, for example, uses the Hermes 900 MALE UAV for maritime patrol of its EEZ.53 Likewise, UAVs, UUVs and USVs have the potential to augment the various roles of the Naval Service. The current fleet comprises just nine vessels. Yet, the Naval Service is expected to contribute to EU Naval Force operations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere in addition to patrolling Ireland’s EEZ. Ideally, the Naval Service would also contribute vessels to support UN peacekeeping operations and various ad hoc humanitarian operations, including disaster relief operations. Clearly, a Naval Service that operates a fleet of UVs in teams with crewed vessels is a force multiplier. One potential future application for Naval Service UUVs would be as mobile autonomous monitoring platforms for Ireland’s growing offshore renewable energy infrastructure and the undersea communications cables that cross Ireland’s EEZ. Another potential application of UUVs is for ASW in terms of submarine detection and tracking.54

Dilemmas The use of UVs poses dilemmas for the state. The Defence Forces would certainly benefit from increased adoption and use of UVs in general. In order to modernise capabilities and operate in an integrated manner with partner militaries, the Defence Forces will likely need to field a variety of UV systems in the coming decades. These could include UCAVs equipped with lethal weapon systems; LMs to augment or replace field artillery systems; armed RCVs as ‘wingmen’ to crewed armoured fighting vehicles; and even UUVs and USVs designed for naval interdiction. The shape of future conflicts will change as adversaries arm themselves with greater 53 Ami Rojkes Dombe, “Iceland Uses Hermes 900 UAV to Monitor its EEZ,” Israel Defense, May 30, 2019, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/38742. 54 Andrew Reddie and Bethany Goldblum, “Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) Systems for Submarine Detection,” On The Radar, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 29, 2019, https://ontheradar.csis.org/issue-briefs/unmanned-underw ater-vehicle-uuv-systems-for-submarine-detection-a-technology-primer/.

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numbers of LMs. In order to counter such increased lethality and upgrade force protection, the Defence Forces will likely need to adopt laser and other directed-energy weapons as part of C-UAS suites. The tempo of battlefield interactions will continue to increase above and beyond the ability of humans to make decisions and react. There will inevitably be a shift toward fully autonomous modes of UV operation. The human operator will, at best, be reduced to a supervisor of lethal UV warfare if, indeed, they are included at all. Naturally, there are ethical, legal and political implications involved in employing increasingly lethal autonomous technologies in defensive operations, especially for a militarily neutral country such as Ireland. The greatest challenge lies in the use of AI-driven UVs that autonomously detect and select targets when making decisions leading to lethal actions. It is a subject too complex to do justice to here. However, ethical and moral considerations are reflected in rules of engagement, military conduct and operational decision processes, making commanders accountable not only for their own actions but also for the actions of others. If the Defence Forces are to maintain authority and legitimacy in the Drone Age, then these issues must be comprehensively addressed now, not in 2030 when such lethal autonomous systems are already in place.

Conclusion Uncrewed vehicle technology with military application has evolved over the last 100 or so years, with periods of war stimulating experimentation and advances. The post 9/11 War on Terror and Iraq War demonstrated the utility of UAV systems for modern conventional and irregular warfare. There now exists a plethora of UAV types, sizes and capabilities in military inventories and in the global market. Furthermore, there is an increasing focus by states such as Turkey on developing UAVs and UGVs to compete with those produced by the US, Israel, China and Russia. It is highly probable that UAV proliferation will continue to gather pace globally, including as a consequence of the ready availability, relatively low-cost and simplicity of commercial platforms.55 Proxy 55 Kerry Chávez and Ori Swed, “The Proliferation of Drones to Violent Nonstate Actors,” Defence Studies 21, no. 1 (2021): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020. 1848426.

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and non-state actor adversaries, including violent extremists, will almost certainly continue to develop increasingly sophisticated UAV capabilities based on technologies available on the white, grey and black markets and on the reverse-engineering of captured military-grade UAVs. In combination with advances in LM technology, the result is a step change in threat and lethality. Presently, there is no indication of any slowdown in the rate of development of UVs. Indeed, quite the opposite. The rapid evolution of uncrewed and autonomous systems is driving transformation across the realm of security and defence. This will likely be reinforced by developments in novel UCAV weapon technologies, including micro-munitions, electromagnetic bombs and directed-energy weapons,56 as well as military applications of AI and other emerging technologies (machine learning, big data, cloud computing, quantum computing, advanced materials, 3D printing, robotics, hypersonic weapon systems and so forth). We may still be several decades away from state and non-state actors fielding armies of autonomous swarming UVs on the battlefield. However, if we extrapolate current trends, it seems plausible that the defence landscape of 2030 out to mid-century will witness increasing degrees of technological sophistication, lethality, proliferation, levels of use and, ultimately, dependence on UVs. The Defence Forces simply must adapt to the Drone Age and learn to cope successfully with its challenges and avail of the opportunities it presents. Planning for the Drone Age is an urgent priority. It cannot be put off until 2030. In a decade from now, Defence Forces personnel will likely undertake overseas deployments on peacekeeping and rapid response missions in operational environments where the risk of lethality from UCAV and LM use by potential adversaries is exponentially greater than at present. Politicians and civil servants as well as military commanders will be faced with making crucial decisions regarding such questions as can the Defence Forces’ overseas deployments proceed without air cover provided by armed UCAVs? Can deployments fulfil mission objectives without fire support from mobile LM systems? Should ground operations proceed without a team of UGV wingmen to reduce Defence Forces’ casualties? Will existing and planned replacement C-UAS systems

56 Michael Franklin, Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles: Opportunities for the Guided Weapons Industry (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2008), 8–13.

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be sufficient to provide force protection against newer generations and greater numbers of UCAV and LM threats? The Defence Forces must ensure that they have the necessary flexibility to meet the challenges of the future operating environment. When it comes to UVs, we must acknowledge that force design and development will always require continual adaptation and upgrading of capabilities in order to meet strategic, operational and tactical demands. Defence planning and procurement must factor in the need for swift replacement of older UV systems and acquisition of new capabilities in order to keep the Defence Forces ‘in the game’. The challenge for government and policymakers is to implement a procurement system that not only keeps up with the rapid pace of UV technology development but also keeps ahead of it in terms of foresight. There is little point, after a long procurement process, in acquiring yesterday’s outdated UV and counter-UV systems. Especially when potential adversaries are acquiring state-of-the-art systems today. Therefore, the Defence Forces would benefit from establishing some form of branch or office within its organisational structure to address uncrewed and autonomous systems development. Its role would be to continually monitor technological advances and uses and make recommendations regarding planning, research, development and acquisition. Such a branch would liaise closely with other militaries, the private sector and academia. Furthermore, such a branch could more broadly be responsible for emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) in general. It could be developed along the lines of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, which has an Advisory Group on EDTs composed of specialists and practitioners from academia and industry.57 An EDT Branch would determine the practical steps needed not only to prepare the Defence Forces for the Drone Age but also to sustain its participation over the long term. By 2030 we will have witnessed further significant advances, particularly in uncrewed ground, underwater and surface vehicles. It is time to imagine the changes that another 20 or 30 years of innovation will bring. Offensive lethal autonomy is just around the corner. Mid-century will be a very different technological environment for the Defence Forces to operate in. 57 “New Focus on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Helps Prepare NATO for the Future,” NATO, March 3, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_181901. htm.

Defence Forces Institutional Innovation and Civil-Military Relations

A Research, Technology and Innovation Capability for the Defence Organisation Sharon McManus and Sharon Breen

Introduction In September 2019 a project team from the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces was established to conduct a feasibility study examining the establishment of a research, technology and innovation (RTI) capability for the Defence Organisation.1 On 17 February 2021 the study report was released to the public. The study concluded that a Defence RTI capability was feasible and would deliver a range of benefits

1 Defence Organisation (DefOrg) refers to the Department of Defence, the Defence Forces & the Civil Defence. For the purposes of this article is refers to just the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces.

S. McManus Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] S. Breen (B) Department of Defence, County Kildare, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_16

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for Defence including capability planning efficiencies; economic prosperity; and stimulating the national technological and industrial base.2 This article does not intend to address all the substantive elements of the study, but discusses the wider issues around Defence RTI, including its benefits and challenges, the benefits of joint working between the Defence Forces and Department of Defence and next steps.

Threat Environment The international security environment is changing rapidly. The Defence Organisation as a whole needs to adapt to this change. It needs to be sufficiently agile to address new security challenges, (such as cyberattacks on government IT infrastructure as recently witnessed during the pandemic on the HSE and the Department of Health3 or deliberate misinformation campaigns attempting to subvert normal democratic processes), and to integrate technology with the capabilities necessary to operate effectively in this changing environment. While new technology provides opportunities, it also presents challenges. For adversaries, the barriers to entry to exploit new technologies in support of their operations are reducing. Unlike traditional defence industries who underuse civilian firms who wish to innovate on their behalf, adversaries have no qualms about using non-traditional firms and technologies. This results in a rapid innovation model, pursuing rapid prototyping and deployment of new technologies in short increments using “software-as-a-service” models rather than investing heavily in infrastructure. This reduction in barriers to entry provides both state and non-state adversaries with enhanced capability to exploit such capabilities designed to undermine state institutions. Traditional military systems will not defeat threats availing of a growing spectrum of technologies including cyber and hybrid warfare, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous systems, the adverse exploitation of social media, bioscience, materials technology, the internet 2 Department of Defence; Irish Defence Forces; Vedette. “Feasibility Study: Establishment of a Research, Technology & Innovation Capability for The Irish Defence Organisation”. Dublin, 2020. Available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/d8cabfeasibility-study-for-the-establishment-of-a-research-technologyinnovation-rti-capabilityfor-the-defence-organisation/ [Accessed 10 December 2021]. 3 “Department of Health Hit by Cyberattack Similar to That on HSE”. The Irish Times, 2021. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/health/department-of-health-hit-by-cyb erattack-similar-to-that-on-hse-1.4566541.

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of things, ICT and networks. To maintain the necessary defence capability to counter the adverse effects of new technology, we need to harness the knowledge, capacity, and skills necessary to exploit these technologies in support of the State. Developments at EU level are also placing defence capability development on a new footing with European funding now available for research and capability development in support of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The evolving policy on defence at European level has included the launch of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence) and European Defence Fund initiatives; and the formation of the Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) is a game changer for RTI in defence. This will mean that the EU Commission will become the third largest investor in Defence R&D programmes in Europe having previously not invested in any Defence R&D. It will also mean that, in time, EU reliance on US military technology is reduced. Finally, it will create new supply chains for SMEs and cross border cooperation for defence R&D. While the EDTIB (European Defence Technological and Industrial base) plays a key role in supporting EU Member States in generating present and future capabilities, it is also necessary to reach out to innovation holders beyond the traditional scope of defence industry and to provide a research fund and framework to support this. The UK Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) is a good example of this. This is particularly relevant for Ireland which has little to no indigenous PRIME or tier 1 companies (a PRIME is an international company or contractor with a market lead on a particular product or service and a Tier 1 company is the main supplier to the PRIME in the supply chain e.g. Intel would be a PRIME semi-conductor manufacturing company with multiple Tier 1 suppliers providing materials and components.) However, Ireland has a strong small-and-medium-enterprise (SME) base which has skills in these capability areas, albeit not specifically targeted at the security/defence domain. Exploiting these new opportunities requires an appropriately resourced unit which can support and mentor research, development, and innovation to drive design thinking and capability development through the Defence Organisation and into the wider research, innovation and enterprise community.

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What is RTI for Defence? Defence organisations around the world have long recognised the importance of leveraging technology and innovation into operational service. The scope of national and supranational RTI capabilities has now broadened to leverage investments from the civil sector and adopt a range of models and approaches. One particular change in recent years has been the increasing speed of the technology cycle and the need for defence organisations to be innovative in terms of processes, people and information in order to utilise the benefits that advancements in technology can bring. The vision for RTI in the Irish Defence Organisation is. to leverage the benefits of research and technology to support current and future Defence capability needs and further develop a culture of innovation across the Defence Organisation by creating a joint unit that embeds evidence-based decision making and accesses the national and international innovation network across defence, government, academia and the private sector.4

This will be achieved through the creation of a joint Defence Organisation Unit that provides data and insight for evidence-based decision making in the Defence Organisation and can access existing innovation networks across defence, government, academia and the private sector. This will augment the work of the existing Defence Enterprise Committee (DEC) and align with any emerging capability development process. The unit will also strengthen the ability of the Defence Organisation to support the Department of Enterprise, Trade & Employment (DETE), the Department of Further & Higher Education, Research, Innovation & Science (DEFHERIS) and Enterprise Ireland (EI) in gaining access to international collaborative RTI investment, including the European Defence Fund (EDF) for Irish research institutes and industry. More specifically, the RTI capability would support academia and industry in terms of exploiting technology developments, which can support defence capability development. It would enable engagement of the Defence 4 Department of Defence; Irish Defence Forces; Vedette. “Feasibility Study: Establishment of a Research, Technology & Innovation Capability for The Irish Defence Organisation”. Dublin, 2020. Available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/d8cabfeasibility-study-for-the-establishment-of-a-research-technologyinnovation-rti-capabilityfor-the-defence-organisation/

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Organisation with academia and industry to examine how to exploit technology developments to support security and defence capabilities. It would help to inform future procurement cycles and support the capability development process and in turn help to fulfil or complete specific PESCO and CARD requirements.

Defence Research, Technology & Innovation Capability Theory and practice point to a range of benefits associated with investment in Defence RTI, while noting the evolving landscape. These benefits include capability planning efficiencies, assisting with longer term strategic procurement; economic prosperity; job creation; exports; international influence; technological spill-overs into adjacent fields; enabling research in academia; and stimulating the national technological and industrial base—in Ireland’s case by facilitating access to EU and European Defence Agency (EDA) funding.5 One particular change in recent years has been the increasing speed of the technology cycle and the need for defence organisations to be innovative in terms of processes, people, and information in order to utilise the benefits that advancements in technology can bring. The proposed model resulting from the study is based on the concept of an innovation ecosystem that emphasises the importance of connections between a range of actors and agents, rather than a transactional customer–supplier approach to research, innovation & procurement. There are clear linkages between RTI and capability development, but these linkages must be defined and co-evolved to ensure coherence between RTI and any future Defence Organisation capability development planning process. Further discussions surrounding the types of defence capabilities that should initially be prioritised by an RTI capability is required. The study further identifies the need for horizon scanning activities and a Defence Technology Strategy to identify and prioritise technology sectors in the long term. In the short term, mapping the National Research Priorities with EU Capability Development Priorities (including the EDA strategic context cases roadmaps, the overarching

5 See, for example, Ecorys and Vedette Consulting. Impact Assessment Study on EU Funding for Collaborative Defence R&D Funding. Prepared for DG GROW, 2018.

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strategic research agenda technology building blocks and the key strategic activities), and the EDF themes is required in order to down-select key areas of interest. This resonates with the triple helix model of innovation, which focuses on the nature of the interaction between three different groups: government, industry and academia. In the Irish context, university representatives previously expressed concern that there has been little investment to establish such collaborations, particularly in relation to dual-use6 technological capabilities. This means that researchers working in some of these fields are said to be doing so in adjacent ways and the Irish state is not taking full advantage of research being conducted in the country. This is especially problematic where Irish research, perceived to be among the best in class in fields such as ICT and artificial intelligence and machine learning is not linked to defence capability requirements and not leveraged by industry unlike other EU member states such as Finland and Estonia where there are strong links between national industry and research strategies and their Ministries of Defence. It was recognised that these are important underlying aspects relevant to the development of a Defence Organisation RTI capability. As a result, the study connects the Irish Defence RTI needs with other national RTI stakeholders. It develops a model that supports the future development of a mutually reinforcing the relationships between industry, government, and academia. This model facilitates the best approach to engagement with industry, academia, government, other EU Member States and European Institutions (the European Commission and the European Defence Agency) on defence innovation.

The RTI Capability Structure The full RTI capability will require the creation of a joint civil-military unit that provides data and insight for evidence-based decision making in the Defence Organisation. It should also access existing innovation networks across defence, government, academia, and the private sector. RTI and capability development are clearly linked, and they must be coevolved to maximise effectiveness for the Irish Defence Forces. The RTI

6 Dual use refers to technologies that can be used for civilian and military purposes.

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Unit will also provide decision making for the future Capability Development Plan. The primary output of this White Paper project is the development of a Capability Development Plan that addresses doctrine, human resources, regulatory reform, equipment, infrastructure, organisation, education, and training. (This project is near completion and will include recommendations for further actions to develop and embed the capability and development process within the Defence Organisation.) As previously mentioned, the approach proposed in the feasibility study report emphasises the importance of connections between a range of actors and agents (e.g. other government departments, enterprise and research institutions nationally), rather than a traditional transactional customer–supplier approach. This is very much in keeping with the policy contained in the White Paper on Defence 2015,7 which promotes innovation as a force multiplier. The White Paper noted that; As the rate of generation of information, knowledge and understanding grows, it is ever more likely that answers to complex challenges will lie outside organisational boundaries. ….. In pursuing its overall goal and consistent with capability requirements, the Department of Defence will be alive to the potential of such [innovation] networks and give appropriate stimulation to these which may include state actors, institutes of higher education, research centres and progressive entrepreneurial companies.8

The Project Team considered work that has been done to date in this area, specifically under the Defence Enterprise Committee (DEC) and the Defence Enterprise Strategy (DES). The DEC initiative catalysed relationships between government, academia, and industry, with several successful collaborations both nationally and internationally. From an international perspective, the Defence Forces have been involved in several successful Horizon 2020 projects related to virtual-reality training; CBRN; border and pollution surveillance; and maritime security. In respect of national collaborative projects, areas such as training; climate/environment; navigation; CBRN; and artificial intelligence have all been explored.

7 Gov.ie. White Paper on Defence 2015, 2021. [online] Available at: https://www.gov. ie/en/publication/1b0dc6-white-paper-on-defence/ [Accessed 10 December 2021]. 8 Gov.ie. White Paper on Defence 2015, 2021. [online] Available at: https://www.gov. ie/en/publication/1b0dc6-white-paper-on-defence/ [Accessed 10 December 2021].

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This work continues through partaking in Horizon 2020/Horizon Europe projects, collaborations at a national level with industry and research partners, Our Public Service 2020 (OPS2020) Innovation Strategy & Fund and the Chief of Staff Innovation awards. The RTI Unit in the Defence Organisation, a joint civil-military unit, will aim to build on this experience and focus on R&D and Innovation collaboration as proactive research partners addressing the capability needs of the Defence Forces. The role of the RTI capability in the Defence Organisation will be to facilitate, enable and fund technology and innovation that supports Defence Forces missions and capabilities. It will focus on technologies, typically at lower technology readiness levels (TRL9 ), that have broader potential utilisation and on leveraging innovations from the civilian sector (at more advanced/higher stages of technology development). In the lower TRL case, the focus is on strengthening the technology sector (e.g. advanced materials, biotechnology, data science). For investments in innovation, the aspiration is to be part of an innovation ecosystem across academia, industry, and SMEs. This means investing in early-stage R&D and looking to a long-term research timeline. This will also allow investment in higher TRL technologies or innovations, which can be adapted from civil to defence use in shorter timeframes. DASA UK, as an example, finds, funds, and supports industry, SMEs, and academia to develop their innovative ideas, products and services for defence and security customers. It is important to point out that the formation of a national defence industry focussed on the production and export of arms and munitions is categorically not an aim of the RTI initiative in Defence. Defence requirements in terms of capability must be the driver of engagement with industry and RTI enterprise. To that end, the key considerations underlying our approach to this initiative are two-fold: firstly, from an economics perspective—the focus on enabling technologies means that the Defence Organisation will not be the dominant customer. Second, in terms of policy—focussing on national defence policy to drive capability requirements means that a national defence industrial sectoral strategy will not drive policy and military capabilities decisions.

9 The TRL spectrum starts at the lower end with disruptive or fundamental research and moves into applied research, pilot projects, lab and field demonstrations and finally into production or manufacturing.

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Developing the RTI Capability The joint unit will comprise both military and civilian staff (and seconded experts when required) and will build upon the joint approach adopted throughout the feasibility study and will be hosted within the Defence Organisation. The operating model for the RTI unit is based on threestages, with a progressive level of ambition at each stage. Each stage will conclude with a formal review measuring achievements against preagreed metrics and KPIs and to capture lessons learned, which will be used to refine the design of the next stage of the RTI capability. In broad terms, the target operating model is focussed on delivering clearly defined outcomes such as contribution to national prosperity; outputs directly in support of the Defence Organisation across Lines of Development; and the building of a Defence R&D and innovation capability. Benefits associated with the target operating model include a financial return for the Irish state, and industry, as well as benefits for Defence in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and economy. In addition, this model aims to leverage financial inputs from other national public bodies (e.g. Science Foundation Ireland, Irish Research Council, Enterprise Ireland) and co-funding from the private sector. It would also seek to leverage international funding through the EDF and EDA and to leverage expertise through networks such as the EDA Capability Technology Groups (CapTechs) and NATO Science & Technology Organisation (STO) (Fig. 1). Stage One focuses on Developing the Ecosystem and Fostering Innovation, building networks and partnerships, catalysed through a challengeled innovation campaign to address identified capability requirements. Stage One is a “test” stage where details on Governance and resourcing will be further refined. The formal RTI unit will not be established for Stage one. The recently launched Science Foundation Ireland/Defence Organisation innovation challenge worth e2.4m is the first tangible output of Stage One. Stage Two will take a more comprehensive approach, introducing applied Research and Development activities for Capability Development as well as accessing international funding opportunities, which can deliver strategic, longer-term benefit. Stage Two will require the establishment of the formal RTI unit. Stage Three will augment Stage Two with decision support and analysis functions by allowing for greater focus on evidenced-based decision making, economics and cost engineering and internal innovation.

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Fig. 1 The building blocks of the proposed RTI Capability Model

Benefits of RTI The RTI unit will be uniquely positioned to deliver several benefits that will differentiate it from other national research entities and support national RTI capability. Our ambition is, through stimulating innovation, that the RTI unit will support the wider national aspiration—articulated in Innovation 202010 —to improve Ireland’s ranking in the European Innovation Index. The main benefits currently identified are as follows: 1. Economic: There is significant evidence demonstrating that RTI investment delivers economic benefit through several positive socioeconomic impacts including knowledge creation; highly skilled jobs; tax revenues; GDP multiplier; and wider technology spill-over effects. A GDP multiplier of a factor of two would be a prudent and cautious estimate of the macroeconomic benefit of Defence 10 Department of Defence; Irish Defence Forces; Vedette. “Feasibility Study: Establishment of a Research, Technology & Innovation Capability for The Irish Defence Organisation”. Dublin, 2020. Available at: https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/Publications/Pub lication-files/Innovation-2020.pdf/ [Accessed 10 December 2021].

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RTI investment.11 However, evaluations of the economic multiplier effect of R&D are much higher. For reference, the EU Framework Research Programme estimates a GDP multiplier of between 6.0 and 8.5 on the initial investment for Defence R&D.12 2. Operational: The operational benefits for the Defence Organisation can accrue through leveraging the benefits of RTI in terms of increased defence capability. Specific pathways include recruitment and retention of talent in the Defence Organisation through career opportunities in RTI, development of new products and services to directly improve capability, provision of test bed opportunities and facilities and the addition of end-user, practical insight into research activities to improve exploitation. 3. National Prosperity and Wider Social Benefits: The experience of the UK Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) is that SMEs across the UK (and also in Ireland) have benefited from the scheme, with jobs and intellectual property created and sustained in all regions. We envisage the RTI unit working with the state enterprise promotion bodies advising and mentoring SMEs and researchers on end-user requirements during R&D phases, incentivising multinational companies with interest in dual-use research to provide Foreign Direct Investment in Ireland and/or locate research activity onshore, catalysing the development of dual-use technologies with the potential to access a broad market given the range of commercial exploitation routes. 4. Wider Return on Investment: Through an increasing focus on wider defence collaboration with partners, in particular other EU member States; including on joint development projects, national investment in RTI projects will provide a mechanism/means for collaboration and to help develop greater influence with international counterparts in the defence capability, research and technology spheres. It

11 “Economic and Enterprise Impacts From Public Investment In R&D In Ireland— DETE”. dbei.gov.ie, 2021. https://dbei.gov.ie/en/Publications/Economic-and-Enterp rise-Impacts-from-Public-Investment-RD-Ireland.html. 12 “R&D Pays: Economists Suggest 20% Return On Public Investment for Research and Innovation”. Science|Business, 2021. https://sciencebusiness.net/news/80354/R% 26D-pays%3A-Economists-suggest-20%25-return-on-public-investment-for-research-andinnovation.

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may also increase Ireland’s soft power with international partners through defence research collaboration. 5. Creating an innovation ecosystem through “pump-priming” the dual-use sector to help access future European Defence Fund (EDF) projects. The value of the EDF is e8 billion over the EU budget period 2021–2027. Supporting Irish research and enterprise through the development of a defence RTI ecosystem, so national industry will be better able to access the EDF, is a key objective of the RTI initiative. It is intended that the unit could provide unique subject matter expertise for EDF and EDA research activities particularly in areas where the Irish Defence Forces has a strong track record e.g. engineer specialist search & clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, energy management & CBRN research activities, among other areas. The creation of an innovation ecosystem can also generate revenue outside of the exchequer through leading EU-funded projects. We can also generate revenue through intellectual property (IP) where the academic institutes dealing with defence specific research may require subject matter/domain expertise and/or test bed facilities. And we can also provide project coordination as an end-user—this is an opportunity currently not capitalised upon and is a mechanism for research funding for academic institutions.

Challenges Ahead for RTI Developing RTI and an innovation ecosystem will not be without its challenges. There are four strategic challenges that could impact progress and must be addressed from the outset including; 1. Concerns among Irish stakeholders about fragmented responsibilities and the need for a one-stop-shop at national level in relation to RTI capability. While stakeholders see value in collaboration between military, industry and academia/research institutes, there has been past uncertainty surrounding how such a collaboration could be sustainable and achieve the best competitive advantage. The study model consequently proposes the “triple helix” approach to address how the Defence Organisation could engage with these

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stakeholders, but much work is needed to identify the gaps in responsibility between partners and how to bridge those gaps. 2. Further national discussions are required on the types of defence capabilities that should initially be prioritised by an RTI unit. The prioritisation of capabilities should go beyond current capabilities’ needs and focus on other long-term defence capability requirements. The study further identifies the need for horizon scanning activities and a Defence Technology Strategy to identify and prioritise technology sectors of defence interest. There are clear linkages between RTI and the future capability development (CapDev) process, which must be coherent. RTI and CapDev are mutually exclusive but inextricably linked and operate in a type of symbiotic relationship. CapDev priorities will shape the focus of RTI activities whilst RTI horizon scanning activities will shape the focus of CapDev. 3. The Defence Organisation should align its role alongside other organisations such as Science Foundation Ireland, Enterprise Ireland, the IDA, Higher Education Authority, Irish Research Council, and government departments such as DETE nationally in relation to RTI. It must also integrate the appropriate aspects of related efforts in international organisations such as the EU Commission’s DG DEFIS, the EDA, NATO, and programmes such as PESCO and the EDF. The intent is not to duplicate existing mechanisms, agencies, or their roles but rather to focus on enabling and support activities and accessing existing mechanisms. This also links back to the need for the “one-stop-shop” approach. One key objective of establishing the RTI capability is to connect with an innovation network across government, academia and private sector that supports the delivery of agreed national defence policy and capability requirements. Specifically, the creation of a defence innovation ecosystem that fosters new connections and encourages fruitful collaboration between stakeholders in government, academia and other research institutions, and the private sector. 4. It needs to be recognised that there are national concerns around defence in the round, and defence industry and it is important to be clear that the formation of a national defence industry that is focussed on the production and export of arms is not an aim of the initiative. Rather the focus will be almost certainly in enabling technologies and dual-use technologies. The implication of this is the requirement for a Defence Technology Strategy document that

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identifies and prioritises technology sectors. This will have a range of benefits and not exclusively for defence. Buy in from across several Government Departments is essential. This whole of Government approach will ensure issues outside of the control of the Department of Defence for example export controls for dual-use items are addressed and supported by the relevant Departments and Agencies.

Joint Working Opportunities There was broad agreement from all the study participants/interviewees that wider cultural change is needed and a joint, integrated approach to research, technology & innovation is required to fully exploit the benefits of RTI in the Defence Organisation. In other words, this is about far more than the creation of a new unit but rather a cultural and mind-set change. A key enabler of success of the proposed RTI unit is the joint working aspect. The nature of the work in RTI requires an intergovernmental approach and the issues concerned span a wide spectrum including education, science, research, military capabilities, national and foreign policy, enterprise, future skills development, and international relations. Therefore, blending the skills of both civil servants and military personnel as well as academic experts in a collaborative and collegiate way is essential. The civil-military working relationship during the feasibility study was very positive and mutually beneficial. There are key benefits and efficiencies gained from working together in the same location and space and blending the array of technical and administrative experience within governance structures internally and externally.

The Road Ahead Stage One of establishing the RTI in the Defence Organisation has already commenced. As outlined earlier Stage One will involve a collaborative Challenge-led innovation call. To reach the wider scientific community and to get the success we expect from the Challenge, the Defence Organisation are collaborating with Science Foundation Ireland. This collaboration builds on the premise that the RTI Unit needs to align itself to the work of other Government Department and State bodies. The RTI Team have engaged all Corps, Formations and Services to develop the key themes and problems to inform the Innovation Challenge in partnership with Science Foundation Ireland (SFI). This has been a unique

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exercise, looking internally and proactively at challenges and issues that can be supported by, and solved by research. The “Calls for Proposals” in response to the Challenge was launched in July 2021. The call will take a Phased approach with a Concept, Seed, and Prize journey. Phases 1 and 2 will run during 2021 and 2022, Phase 3 will take place in 2023. The Challenge will involve not only the RTI Team but also the subject matter experts from within the Defence Forces. The RTI unit cannot lead on research-led capabilities alone; it will need the support of both its military and civilian colleagues. The Challenge will demand time and focus from subject matter experts in the Defence Forces; those who have proposed a challenge or identified a capability gap will be encouraged to assist researchers and stakeholders in understanding the issue and ultimately the value that will be gained by resolving it. Once the Challenge has commenced there will be an opportunity for the team to look at how the RTI Unit can then move to Stage Two. This transition to Stage Two will be dependent on the success of the Challenge-led innovation call and any transition will be subject to senior management approval. Questions that will arise include how will it be staffed from both a civil, military and “other” perspective? What will be the focus of the work initially? How can it leverage what is already happening in the European Defence Agency and the European Defence Fund to its advantage? How can the work of the RTI unit align with the proposed Capability Development Unit? This is undoubtedly a very exciting time for the Defence Organisation, Stage One of the RTI Unit is only the beginning, with much potential. As an organisation we need to plan carefully and be brave in our decisions, with the ultimate gain of enhancing Defence Forces capabilities and building for the future.

Shared Norms but Policy Incoherence: Analysing the Irish Defence Forces’ Marketplace Aspirations Michael Mulqueen

Introduction This chapter is a contribution to wider civil–military scholarship focussed upon how organisational norms seemingly common to military and civil organisations of government can result in opposing policy positions. Under primary empirical scrutiny is a high-profile disagreement concerning sensitive intelligence implications of a tender for aviation Search and Rescue (SAR) services, which erupted between the Defence Forces and Ireland’s Department of Transport. Serious wider implications of the normative underpinning for that controversy are also explored: in this regard, the chapter will analyse risks to the performance of and partner satisfaction with a landmark Research, Technology and Innovation (RTI) capability within “the Defence Organisation,” a collective term for Ireland’s military and civil components. The chapter thus broadens scholarly scrutiny of civil–military relations in Ireland from a focus, mainly, upon relations between the Defence Forces, on the one hand,

M. Mulqueen (B) School of Justice, University of Central Lancashire, Lancashire, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_17

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and the Departments of Defence and Finance on the other. Herein is a study of interaction between a department and its public and private sector partners having neither responsibility for defence nor its financing. For scholars of fields including civil-military relations, organisational culture and institutional approaches, the chapter advances how historical institutionalism can be usefully deployed to study norms within and between organisations. For practitioners, it is, in this context, noteworthy that to ensure robust, coherent analysis of its empirical evidence, the chapter is built upon a scaffold of conceptual approaches. These are drawn, broadly, from organisational behavioural and foreign policy research. Particular use is made of “institutional” approaches. Institutionalism will be further discussed, below, as will how the scaffolding will support the study of a key question. That question is as follows: how is an organisational norm of facilitating market forces, one which is common to government agencies in their business dealings with other organisations, implicated in their resulting policy differences? Broadly, the scaffold, as set up, offers a modified way to use institutionalism as an approach to analyse cultural features of organisations in civil–military relations. Institutional enquiry readily accounts for norms as shapers of intra-organisational outcomes—especially “safe pathways” that organisations tend to stick with, and drivers of actual, as opposed to declaratory, change. The contribution for scholarship here is conceptual refinement in how we account for norms interacting with pre-existing others and from both inter- and intra-organisational perspectives. The value is in enabling better understanding of how seemingly common norms between organisations can, as a consequence of interaction within and without, drive policy plays in differing and even opposing directions.1 Some further terminology ought to be clarified. When referring to norms, the study has in mind Farrell’s use of the term in his study of the early Irish army:

1 Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel R. Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory,

Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (April 2007): 341–369; Orfeo Fioretos, “Historical Institutionalism in International Relations,” International Organization 65, no. 2 (April 2011): 367–399; André Lecours, New Institutionalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

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Norms are intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world which define actors, their situations and the possibilities of action. Norms are intersubjective in that they are beliefs rooted in, and reproduced through, social practice. In this sense, norms are both shared beliefs and social practice (or, more precisely, beliefs embodied in practice).2

Social practice denotes norms as a function of culture, which institutionalism is designed to help analyse.3 Emphasis on intersubjectivity is especially useful. Norms may appear common, but this is not to assume they stay stable in how they are imagined or lived out in pursuance of organisational objectives and mission. Thus, it is assumed here that norms may evolve in organisationally distinctive ways. The use of the term market, here, has two contexts. The first is that of the market as an economic relationship between each of those whose actions mediate the supply or demand of things. In a free market, every actor is free to decide on what, where and how to produce.4 The second context is how military or other governmental managers seek to utilise market for state ends? Of interest is how differences among Irish actors about how far market forces should be allowed to go in the service of Governmental ends—that is, their respective norms of market facilitation—impact upon coherence in the State’s defence. The chapter will proceed as follows: firstly, it will comprehensively overview the controversy surrounding a tender for search and rescue services, highlighting apparently contradictory policy positions between governmental actors, despite a shared commitment to market. Secondly, it will build the aforementioned scaffold. Thirdly, it will use institutional approaches to investigate what lay underneath the SAR controversy. Seemingly complex and profound contradictions in how the Irish Defence Organisation and other State actors perceive market will be assessed. Those same contradictions, relating, at least in part, to the practice of

2 Theo Farrell, “Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army,” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1: 63–102. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066101007001003, 71. 3 Simon Bulmer and Martin Burch, The Europeanisation of Whitehall: UK central government and the European Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). 4 Hermann Sautter, “‘Social Justice’—Its Meaning and Its Implementation in a Market Economy,” in Social Justice in a Market Economy, eds. Hermann Sautter and Rolf Schinke (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 2001), 12.

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Irish neutrality, will feature prominently when, fourthly, the chapter analyses the risks they may pose to the prospects for a successful RTI capability within the Defence Organisation. Finally, the chapter will review, for scholars more broadly, effectiveness of its own conceptual scaffold. For defence policy owners, in particular, it will suggest necessary adjustments to how market—its risks and benefits—is managed in future practice.

The Problem of Top-Cover In October 2020, a row erupted concerning the terms of a tender to contract for Ireland’s aviation SAR service. The tender would, by July 2023, lead to a replacement service to that which, since July 2012, the Irish Coastguard (ICG) and private company CHC Ireland had principally provided with limited Air Corps support. ICG had lead responsibility. The new contract was valued at approximately e60 million a year.5 To manage the tender, the Irish Government established what was termed a next-generation SAR aviation steering group, hosted by the Department of Transport but with ICG as the lead agency. Department of Defence and Air Corps personnel were “key stakeholder members” and “played an active role in the group’s discussions.”6 In July 2020, the group, supported by the Department of Defence’s Strategic Research and Analysis Division, completed a 49-page strategic assessment and preliminary appraisal of service delivery options.7 Options included one in which the State assumed full responsibility for the service, either through the Air Corps or through a dedicated ICG aviation branch. Both State-only routes were discounted for reasons including the potential to build within the timeframe a service comprehensive enough to meet Irish service need.8 In August 2020, the draft tender specifying requirements for SAR “top-cover” missions (i.e. higher altitude monitoring and surveillance), which emerged from the steering group was, reportedly, of particular 5 Conor Gallagher, “Military Officers Raise Concerns Over Potential Use of UK-Based Aircraft for Rescue Missions,” Irish Times, November 6, 2020. 6 Ireland, Dáil Éireann Debates 1000, no. 7, November 17, 2020, https://www.oireac htas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2020-11-17. 7 Dáil Éireann Debates 1000, no. 7; Ireland, Dáil Éireann Debates 1001, no. 2, November 19, 2020, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2020-11-19. 8 Dáil Éireann Debates, 1000, no. 7.

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concern to Air Corps leadership. Heretofore, the Air Corps provided top-cover by utilising either of its two CASA CN-235 Maritime Patrol Aircraft, when available. The tender set out how, alongside four SAR helicopters, the winning bidder would be required to provide a fixed wing aircraft, or drone, for top-cover purposes. To appeal to a broader market, it proposed allowing the bidder to base this latter capability in a lower-cost location; reports suggested the UK.9 Military unease at this centred on the risk of another state gathering intelligence over sovereign Irish airspace while providing top-cover. At least one expected bidder held pre-existing contractual arrangements to supply clandestine services to the UK’s Ministry of Defence (UK MOD). According to an unnamed military source quoted in The Irish Times: It’s not that we wouldn’t necessarily give this data to the UK if they asked for it. But if the planes are flying out of an English airfield, we have zero control over it.10

Although these intelligence concerns were raised in subsequent parliamentary questioning of Ireland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence, preoccupying deputies was why the Government would go to open market when it could invest in the sorely under-resourced Air Corps.11 Minister Simon Coveney, in turn, expressed support for “some form of carve-out within the overall provision” of the contract to help enable the Air Corps grow its capability.12 In December, and in the face of further sustained political pressure led by a campaign group—Save Irish Search and Rescue (SISAR) under the vocal leadership of former soldier Senator Gerard Craughwell—the Taoiseach, Mícheál Martin, confirmed that the Departments of the Taoiseach and Transport, together, would review what role the Air Corps could play. A 400-page Air Corpsauthored proposal completed the following April (2021) advocated Air Corps delivery of the helicopter SAR service for southeast Ireland and

9 Gallagher, “Military Officers.” 10 Gallagher, “Military Officers.” 11 Dáil Éireann Debates, 1000, no. 7; Ireland, Dáil Éireann Debates 1001, no. 2; Ireland, Dáil Éireann Debates 1002, no, 2, December 8, 2020, https://www.oireachtas. ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2020-12-08. 12 Dáil Éireann Debates 1000, no. 7.

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a “fixed wing component.”13 This document was fed into a “detailed appraisal and business case stage,” in which consultants KPMG, with input from the Department of Transport-hosted team and “external aviation expertise” prepared a business case.14 Their analysis demonstrated “inherent cost implications” in splitting helicopter services between two providers. But they found in favour of “flexibility” in relation to how the “fixed wing element” of the service might be provisioned.15 In July, the Cabinet agreed that the Department of Defence would work in conjunction with ICG to examine whether the Air Corps could, after all, provide that element. At the time of writing, the parties were under deadline of October 2021 to submit a costed proposal to the Department of Transport.16 This achievement of securing greater scrutiny of Air Corps potential can be read in two ways. The affair arguably demonstrates the utility of political lobbying to more detailed consideration of defence capabilities in Ireland. It can also be read as further underlining a significant question: how, in the first place, did two arms of state, Transport and the Defence Forces, both working on the same procurement so seriously misread each other? At this point it is worth focussing upon Department of Transport decision-making regarding top-cover SAR. Transport, like all Irish public service bodies, is bound by the Public Spending Code, which details rules and procedures for spending public monies.17 Thus is set a common structural framework to spending across the public service. That is not to say the code overrides how norms towards market utilisation evolve distinctively within organisations. Transport, in its presentation for potential aviation SAR bidders, in August 2020, chose an “outcome-based” approach that would avoid “over-prescribing inputs or outputs which could inhibit innovation or drive up costs unintentionally.”18 As such, 13 Arthur Beesley, “Air Corps Could Provide Maritime Search-and-Rescue Service for East Coast”, Irish Times, April 7, 2021; Ireland: Government of Ireland, “Information Note on Business Case and Government Decision July 2021, https://www.gov.ie/en/ campaigns/ed653-irish-coast-guard-search-and-rescue-sar-aviation-project. 14 Government of Ireland, “Information Note.” 15 Government of Ireland, “Information Note.” 16 Government of Ireland, “Information Note.” 17 Ireland: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, “The Public Spending Code”, https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/public-spending-code. 18 Gallagher, “Military Officers.”

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officials sought to stimulate market forces to drive the best value offer. Insisting that the supplier would base itself in Ireland could, conversely, distort market incentives by increasing the supplier’s cost and, therefore, price to the State. Transport’s decision to offer the tender transnationally where this could meet tender criteria chimed with longstanding public service practice in one of the EU’s most globalised states.19 Transport’s strategy for the delivery of its high-level Aviation Goal is instructive in this regard: Outcomes, it states, must be “competitive, cost-effective and sustainable.”20 Market competition is its mechanism to operationalise the goal of an efficient, sustainable service. Thus, facilitating market forces is a core norm for doing business within the Department of Transport. Strategic planning of other Irish government departments is peppered with similar examples, although not within that of the Department of Defence, discussed below. While pursuing the national interest, Transport officials, from within the culture in which they worked, did not seem to see the national security implications of how they framed the tender for market. Equally, the Defence Forces did not seem, prior to tender publication, to have anticipated how Transport’s utilisation of market could impinge upon the national security responsibilities the Air Corps held. Yet, military leadership had embraced market logic. Indeed, since 2014, the Defence Forces had, notably under one of its most prominent senior officers the then Rear-Admiral Mark Mellett, altered its strategic framework to incorporate market as a core defence principle alongside more familiar Clausewitzian pillars. Mellett argued as follows: to protect Ireland from global volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA), a context which, within Ireland, had manifested as soaring unemployment following economic collapse between 2008 and 2010, an “interesting new paradigm for defence strategy” was required.21 Expansion of Clausewitz’s “Amazing Trinity” would place, alongside its perspectives of government, civil

19 European Data Journalism Network, “Ireland and Switzerland, the European ‘Globalisation Champions’,” June 8, 2018, https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/ News/Data-news/Ireland-and-Switzerland-the-European-globalisation-champions. 20 Ireland, Department of Transport, Strategy Statement 2016–2019, 12. 21 Mark Mellett, “Adaptive Dynamic Capabilities and Innovation: The Key for Small

Navies Protecting National Interests at and from the Sea,” in Small Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace, eds. Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller (Surrey and Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2014), 75.

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society and military, the market. By so amending a framework guiding Irish defence planning for decades the Defence Forces could achieve an objective termed “Adaptive Dynamic Capability in a postmodern setting.” ADC referred to harnessing the potency of research, data and learning to create military-enabled innovation ecosystems. Entering reciprocal relationships with industry and academe, the Defence Forces would nourish innovation to curtail unemployment and create wealth. Innovation would centre on dual-use capability development essential to defence and it would reduce its cost. Mellett, in a series of questions, set out a transformative rationale for ADC hallmarked by globalised business values: …how can it change from being a consumer of resources to a producer of resources and an enabler of enterprise and wealth? In short the Defence Forces is asking the question how does it institutionalise an understanding that rather than being seen as a cost centre it is seen as an investment centre with the potential in certain instances to be a profit centre… [This will require] a market dimension suggesting the military will need to consider practices that echo civilian business models, such as contracting out functions and restructuring their hierarchies.22

In 2010, the Naval Service, with Mellett as a “co-founder”23 entered into partnership with University College Cork and Cork Institute of Technology to form the Irish Maritime Energy Resource Cluster (IMERC), a civil–military collaboration to “leverage their skills and expertise to drive investment into and grow Ireland’s maritime sector.”24 By 2012, the Department of Defence was institutionalised into the market model, launching a joint entity with Enterprise Ireland, the “Defence Enterprise Initiative.” The Defence Forces would support companies and research institutions spawning research and innovation and, in return, would get early exposure to evolving technologies otherwise beyond reach. Military personnel could influence and inform the direction of particular

22 Mellett, “Adaptive Dynamic Capabilities,” 75. 23 Ireland, Defence Forces, “The General Staff.” Accessed April 27, 2021. https://

www.military.ie/en/the-general-staff/chief-of-staff). 24 Tethys, “Irish Maritime Energy Resources Cluster (IMERC).” Accessed April 27, 2021. https://tethys.pnnl.gov/organization/irish-maritime-energy-resource-cluster-imerc.

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innovations to support defence capabilities.25 Shortly thereafter, the Irish Government promoted Mellett into the role of Chief of Staff, with the rank of Vice-Admiral, passing new legislation to appoint a Naval Service officer to Ireland’s most senior military appointment. Clearly, in doctrine, structure and leadership, market was purposefully integrated and positioned as a norm in the Defence Forces’ approach to fulfilling its missions. All this being so, the dichotomy between the Defence Forces and Transport on aviation SAR appears more remarkable still. Explored conceptually in the next section is a framework through which the puzzle can be addressed. The objective is to extract insights applicable to civil–military scholarship, more broadly, and an Irish case, in particular.

Common Norms, Competing Standpoints By what conceptual means is this seemingly counter-intuitive phenomena—a shared norm of utilising market forces resulting in opposing policy positions—to be analysed? At issue for institutional theorists are priorities or behaviours that act as “safe pathways” for organisations to follow.26 Historical institutionalism enables focus on why facilitating market forces has, over time, proved a reliable strategy for the Department of Transport to follow: in this context reliability may be defined in terms including delivering value for money, securing budget, staff advancement and related business gains. Similarly, it supports analysis of how critical moments, when lasting change might occur, can prove to be junctures at which an organisation sustains, over a prolonged period, new pathways comprising new priorities and directions. Operationalising institutionalism in this study, however, must be carefully done for the following reasons. That market, as a norm, was a critical moment at some point in both Transport and the Defence Forces is not at issue. An analytical tool to discern simply between moments and junctures

25 Ireland, Department of Defence and Defence Forces, White Paper on Defence 2015 (Dublin: Department of Defence and Defence Forces), 54. 26 B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science, Fourth Edition: The New Institutionalism, 4th Edn. (Cheltenham, Camberley and Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019); Giovanni Capoccia, “When Do Institutions ‘Bite’? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional Change,” Comparative Political Studies 49, no. 8 (2016): 1095–1127. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015626449.

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is important but insufficient. Of issue also to this chapter is the interaction of norms that both reflect and lead to reliable pathways within both State organisations. This moves beyond institutionalism’s concern with whether, or not, a “jump” to a new pathway is achieved in one organisation or another and how this pathway channels organisational behaviour. Needed as well is the conceptual capability to analyse norm interaction within but also across organisations. Casumano identified a similar challenge in his analysis of why differences in US and UK military outsourcing decisions were contingent upon underlying norms, mission and objectives.27 Consequently, the scaffold must support investigation of how pre-existing norms, mission and objectives underpinning institutional pathways interact with the norm under review and the pathway it sustains. It must account for how this interaction within one organisation can create policy alignment, or discord, with another organisation. In this regard, its focus must be intra- and inter-organisational.

The Interaction of Norms and Institutions Ireland’s Defence Organisation serves to deliver a common civil–military high-level goal: “to provide for the military defence of the State, contribute to national and international peace and security and fulfil all other roles assigned by government.”28 Viewed institutionally, goal attainment should provide the Defence Forces a safe pathway in terms of its financial well-being, rank advancement of its leaders and so forth. Its formulation as a goal within the Defence Organisation (assuming formulation is also achieved in tandem with other state entities, e.g. Departments of Foreign Affairs) confirms its standing as a desired pathway. It reflects a continuum with, or outgrowth from, previous or other safe pathways which, unless evidence suggests otherwise, themselves have developed incrementally. Unsurprisingly, the goal as a reliable pathway is reflected in other official expressions of what the Defence Forces considers its mission and objectives to be. Where these are—in the manner of a workflow—concerned with implementing the key goal, it is possible to discern an implied order of institutional priorities whereby 27 Eugenio Cusumano, “The Scope of Military Privatisation: Military Role Conceptions and Contractor Support in the United States and the United Kingdom,” International Relations 29, no. 2: 219–241. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814552142. 28 Ireland, Department of Defence, “High Level Goal at the Department of Defence.”

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ordering reflects the norms of what is core to the pathway and what is less so. In this regard, the Defence White Paper (2015) prioritises as “fundamental” for the Defence Organisation as a whole the defence of the State’s territory.29 Its characterisation of defence as “the ultimate guarantee of freedom” can be seen as placing an emotive onus on existential threat to the State and, simultaneously, furthering territorial defence as a safe organisational pathway. It also underlines another key organisational norm—that of military identity having, as its central purpose, upholding sovereign freedom. Within that normative rubric of core purpose and identity, “defence inputs to domestic security,” and, in particular, support to An Garda Síochána fits comfortably.30 Aid to the Civil Power (ATCP) in Ireland’s context stems from moments of existential threat to the State, most notably associated with joint Garda/Defence Forces efforts to contain the Provisional IRA’s “armed struggle.”31 In contrast, use of defence resources for “non-security tasks” is provided for within the White Paper but only “In addition.” It, thus, can be reasonably read as peripheral to territorial security tasks. This is not to say “non-security tasks” are considered as unsafe pathways. However, in Ireland’s military organisational culture they are secondary to norms of territorial defence. Observable, then, is a centre-periphery dynamic. It is visible too in the White Paper’s casting of Defence Forces’ roles to achieve the high-level goal.32 The paper defines eleven roles, ten of which are classifiable as territorial or other traditional military (including ceremonial). Only one commits to Ireland’s economic well-being through engagement with industry and academe in research, development and associated wealth creation. Unprecedented as this one is in the history of the Defence Forces, when allied to the White Paper’s defence prioritisations, the numerical imbalance suggests a normative order: defence leadership viewing the world through a prism whereby central to purpose and identity must be sovereign defence, be that on land, sea, air or cyber. This aligns comfortably with Clausewitz’s trinity concerning the nature of

29 Defence, “White Paper 2015,” 1. 30 Defence, “White Paper 2015,” 1. 31 Michael Mulqueen, Re-Evaluating Irish National Security Policy: Affordable Threats?

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). 32 Defence, “White Paper 2015,” 59.

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military force before the model’s amendment, under Mellett, to include market for Irish purposes. However, upholding the State’s security can only be a safe pathway, regardless of its centrality as a norm of organisational behaviour, if tied into sufficient resources to enable its realistic delivery. Since the State’s foundation, the Exchequer has systematically capped defence spending at meagre levels and defence has rarely occupied a central place in public policy programmes otherwise dominated by the economy, Northern Ireland, education, healthcare, social welfare and environment.33 In this context, Mellett conceptualised Adaptive Dynamic Capability. Reciprocity among Irish military, industrial and academic interests, focussed upon delivering innovation to the commercial market, would create innovation supportive of a sustainable economic future and, in time, would, for the Defence Forces, deliver an otherwise unaffordable capability harvest. Conceptually modifying the Amazing Trinity appeared to foundationally alter Clausewitz’s explanation for the nature of military force.34 Certainly, it was an audacious move. However, no evidence suggests Mellett’s primary intention was anything other than to maintain the military focus of the Defence Forces: his scheme—introducing market as a principle—translated as an external facing entrepreneurial model to deliver next-generation innovation for an under-resourced military. It would position the Defence Forces’ resources as relevant to a wider range of public policy priorities. It would align the Defence Forces’ adherence to the Clausewitzian trinity with contemporary market economy realities. Hence, being responsive to market forces as a norm would correspond with, but not displace, the pre-existing norm of upholding security and, indeed, would strengthen its standing as a safe pathway. Put institutionally, incorporation of the market principle was, thus, a critical moment. While billed as “game-changing,” it represented more of an evolution. It was by no means a jump to place the Defence Forces on a fundamentally different path of direction. But herein lies the problem. Introduction of market agility as a behavioural norm for military personnel was done to serve, not overlay, core pre-existing norms of security. Yet the new norm most naturally enunciated the absence of geographical boundaries, while the pre-existing

33 Mulqueen, “Re-Evaluating Irish National Security.” 34 Mellett, “Adaptive Dynamic Capabilities,” 76.

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dominant ones concerning territorial defence and security centred on the existence and protection of them. Ireland’s policy of neutrality—institutionalised wariness of supra-national military entities—evidently further complicates. However, market as a principle, a goal and a norm cannot typically diverge from core objectives of security because the Defence Organisational subordinates the former to the latter. Significantly, the aviation SAR procurement process, led, as it was, by the Department of Transport operating to different market norms, uncapped that subordination, resulting in the remarkable controversy under scrutiny here. Failing to anticipate such a future contradiction between market and security suggests either Defence Organisation leadership did not spot it or assumed that other arms of government would align alongside the military’s conceptualisation of how market utilisation could go. For policy planners the key question should have been how, or if, their market norm could be rendered compatible with behavioural norms of market conceived in altogether more transnational terms? At this point, it is worth briefly considering why it is that norms of market within the Defence Forces had not clashed with those in the Department of Defence before the SAR controversy? Again, mission and objectives as shapers of market norms are important. Its role within the Defence Enterprise Initiative signals how the Department of Defence seeks, alongside the Defence Forces, to utilise the market to achieve Adaptive Dynamic Capabilities. Important too is the department’s approach to procurement: this is discernible from its vision for a joint procurement framework involving the “security departments” of Defence and Justice alongside their respective agencies including An Garda Síochána and the Irish Prison Service. As a framework, it conceives of market utilisation infused with national security considerations.35 In this context stability in the Defence Organisation’s internal relationship towards the market can be better understood: while the two organisations have harboured opposing ambitions for defence funding, the department, in common with the Defence Forces, readily juxtaposes the defence of sovereign boundaries with transnational market forces. Norms seem well aligned. Turning, then, to the Department of Transport which has, as its mission, “an accessible, efficient, safe and sustainable transport system 35 Ireland: Department of Defence and Defence Forces, Department of Defence and Defence Forces Strategy Statement 2017–2020 (Dublin: Department of Defence and Defence Forces), 5.

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that supports communities, households and businesses.”36 Arguably this too is an expression of concern with security, especially in its economic, societal and environmental forms.37 Indeed, Transport, in its considerable maritime responsibilities, demonstrates a similarly contradictory logic towards market: it faces globally by aspiring to facilitate maritime connectivity and trade. Simultaneously, it seeks to protect sovereignty through safeguarding Ireland’s environment from ship-sourced pollution.38 As with the Defence Organisation, Transport’s mission can be seen to reaffirm a framework of safe organisational pathways, evolved over time. Its expression of mission, to be delivered through measurable objectives concerning market and security, suggests what its norms both shape and have been shaped to be. There are some key differences, however. Delivering infrastructure is a core Transport norm, as important to the State’s prospering as defence is to its survival. Delivering infrastructure on time, to quality and within budget is a key pathway for the department’s well-being, the progression of its officials and so on. In this regard, transnational market utilisation as the norm for infrastructure delivery has been a pathway within Irish transport and industrialisation policies since the late 1960s. The market norm within Transport is, consequently and more comfortably, conceptualised in non-territorial, globalised terms. To do otherwise by, for example, constricting the market solely to Irish suppliers—the issue at the root of the SAR controversy—would be to disincentivise competition on cost, time and quality. This, in turn, would jeopardise a core norm and principal institutional pathway—efficient and effective infrastructure delivery. Here, again, the market is a secondary norm but its interaction with the department’s wider normative fabric prompts very different behaviours from those in the Defence Forces.

Corroborating Norm and Institutional Influence The previous section identified how market and territorial defence and security priorities within the Defence Organisation could problematically diverge at moments when the former was not subordinated to the other. 36 Ireland: Department of Transport, Statement of Strategy, 2. 37 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies

in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd Edn. (Colchester: ECPR, 2007). 38 Ireland: Department of Transport. “Development of a Strategy for the Irish Maritime Directorate.”

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If the study is accurate in this and in its wider characterisation of the norms and institutional pathways at play within the Defence Forces, the issue should appear whenever market forces enabled by the military’s principle of market impinge upon security “red lines.” Design of a Research, Technology and Innovation (RTI) capability for the Defence Organisation provides a contemporary high-profile example, deserving of analysis. Conceived by senior Defence Organisation personnel, the RTI unit is intended to further Adaptive Dynamic Capability by supporting collaboration with entrepreneurs and research agencies to develop dualuse technology. Such innovation is to be “at lower technology readiness levels” meaning it will, ideally, carry a higher likelihood of commercialisation into civil-use markets.39 The RTI feasibility study frames the unit in terms of interests and opportunities, including significant EU-level funding, for Irish defence, research and innovation stakeholders. Notably, however, the study studiously eschews the unit providing stimuli for a globalised Irish defence industry. Thus inbuilt is an undertaking that the updated White Paper on Defence (2019) makes in the context of Irish neutrality: “regarding concern about seeking to develop an Irish defence industry, the position is that there are no plans to change Ireland’s approach in that regard.”40 Conversely, the RTI blueprint is for an Irish “ecosystem” of dual-use technologies that derive from or lead to civilian market demand. Simultaneously, it seeks “a Government-wide” export controls policy to prevent dual-use technologies being used in ways repulsive to Irish defence policy.41 How Ireland’s market-prohibitive national defence policy priorities and globalised defence market dynamics are to be reconciled with each other is unclear. Curtailing market access and, thus, additional unit sales is, arguably, to inhibit entrepreneurs’ ability to reduce, as a percentage of overall profit, the development/production costs of innovating civilian technologies. Profitable returns on innovation may turn on how far civilian market pricing will absorb development cost outlay which cannot otherwise be recouped through sales into the micro-market that Ireland’s 39 Ireland: Department of Defence, Defence Forces, Vedette. “Feasibility Study: Establishment of a Research, Technology and Innovation Capability for the Irish DefenceOrganisation” (Dublin: Department of Defence and Defence Forces), 6. 40 Ireland: Department of Defence and Defence Forces, White Paper on Defence (update 2019) (Dublin: Department of Defence and Defence Forces), 54. 41 Defence, “Feasibility,” 17.

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defence capability budget can sustain. No suggestion is made here that Defence Organisation is, through RTI, intentionally trying to inflate equipment costs. However, Irish defence policy, predicated as it is upon Irish neutrality, engineers a highly constrained if not unattractive environment for innovators seeking to maximise return on investment. This is not to say that some Irish producers may achieve desired profits via sales both to the Irish defence organisation and international civil-market customers. But whether this can occur at scale is debatable. Other distortions appear similarly problematic. Seemingly left outside the RTI rationale are those producers who are not Irish (or not part of collaborations including Irish entities) but capable of innovating the best products at the best price. Where such producers would remit wealth and jobs outside Ireland or, indeed, the EU, the disincentive to market entry appears greater still. The RTI unit’s work may trigger some tension within Irish governmental crosscutting arrangements which, via multi-agency collaboration, strive for more effective, efficient public service delivery. The space between how the Defence Organisation’s norms accentuate national security and how norms of market behaviour play out in other government agencies (e.g. Enterprise Ireland) is worth considering. Will a dilemma arise for state agency employees operating to norms of supporting entrepreneurs in achieving profit maximisation? Will officials be able to sell to entrepreneurs as credible a trade-off between Irish interests as articulated in Irish defence policy and Irish interests as expressed in high-profit economic growth? Will occasions arise when it is appropriate to discourage client companies from a focus on the military endeavour on grounds of profit relative to cost implied within the constraints of Irish defence policy? In the competition of inter-departmental interests, it should be remembered that few will share the Defence Organisation’s norms on market most of the time.

Conclusion For Ireland’s defence managers the chapter suggests the need for further reflection leading to adjustment of thinking and approach. By aiming to constrain global market forces within national defence policy boundaries in the manner it does, the Defence Organisation is vulnerable to confusion within itself, among its partners and in relations with its

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customers. Officials of the Department of Transport, operating to norms of market facilitation tuned to protecting Ireland’s interests through global competition for the delivery of infrastructure, failed to anticipate Defence Forces’ alarm at their aviation SAR proposals. The Defence Forces framed itself as a military organisation transformed towards market facilitation in the interests of Ireland’s economic growth. Critically, its market norm interacted with (and was overshadowed by) an overriding goal for armed defence, a series of related objectives and tapestry of norms therein. Together, mission, objectives and norms set up a contradiction between the promise of a re-drawn “Amazing Trinity” and the realities of entrepreneurship in a global market. The subsequent analysis of the RTI project provided fuller insight into the practical impacts of current incompatibilities for future marketfocussed innovation among military, entrepreneurial and academic collaborations. Principal among such impacts is a paradoxical pathway by which an RTI unit is to harness market forces but designed in such a way as to place severe constraints upon who can participate, what they can innovate and to where as well as to whom they can sell. Hence, market competition is structurally deflated and with it the potential spectrum of dual-use capabilities advantageous to the Defence Forces. Workarounds to overcome these impacts ought to be the focus for further research. The RTI proposal, while laudable, skims over contradictions in sovereignty and globalised market logic. Risks include unravelled partnerships with entrepreneurial and research collaborators. Notably, IMERC, the earliest manifestation of the market norm, was wound up in 2017 following a business review that concluded “IMERC’s mission and aims were too broad and vague.”42 Similarly, while the White Paper (2019 update) highlighted new opportunities for Defence Forces’ engagement with market occurring under the aegis of the Defence Enterprise Initiative, the feasibility study found these efforts were only “moderately successful (and) in some areas—Ordnance Corps and Naval capability development.”43 The envisioned “systemic organisational drive to

42 Seán McCarthaigh, “Colleges’ Research Partnership with Navy ‘Disbanded’,” The Irish Examiner, August 14, 2017. 43 Defence, “White Paper 2019,” 55; Defence, “Feasibility,” 11, 12.

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support cross organisational innovation and the adoption of new technology within defence,” has not yet materialised at scale.44 Notable too is how the RTI feasibility study warned that “sustained stakeholder engagement” would be challenging.45 How this challenge will be overcome is unclear yet the Department of Defence has committed to establishing the RTI unit. In July 2021, the Defence Organisation and Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) launched a joint small-scale (e2.4m) challenge-based research programme concurrent with its aims.46 Norms of market facilitation have a place within a Defence Forces bedevilled by financial starvation. Intellectual energy invested in Adaptive Dynamic Capability was an intelligent response to military, economic and societal recovery. Yet military embrace of market is implicated here in an avoidable disagreement between two important arms of the State and a potentially serious design flaw in an evolving innovation initiative. As to lessons learned, Defence Forces’ leadership would do well to proactively pre-empt misunderstandings of how far market agility can go within an Irish defence context defined by neutrality and, so, manage expectations as to its transformative capability. The study’s conceptual underpinning is one with potentially beneficial implications for military as well as wider social sciences scholarship, so further application is called for. It suggests a way by which researchers using historical institutionalism can better study norms interacting with pre-existing others and from both inter- and intra-organisational perspectives. It is key to conclude on the importance of incorporating into analysis how, intra-organisationally, norms interact with mission and objectives. Doing so can unlock coherence when addressing why preexisting norms (e.g. of defence) resist or cede to newer norms (e.g. of market) and, inter-organisationally, unexpected outcomes arise. Transport and Defence Forces host market facilitation norms seemingly similar and subordinated to others. These evolved within each organisation’s architecture in different ways—with structural influence over norms seemingly 44 Defence, “Feasibility,” 12. 45 Defence, “Feasibility,” 9. 46 Ireland, Department of Defence, “Ministers Harris and Coveney Launch Ground-

Breaking e2.4 m SFI-Defence Organisation Innovation Challenge,” Press Release, July 6, 2021.

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pronounced. Understanding the practical outflows of such evolutions by close study of the organisations’ structural and its normative fabrics may help other researchers, as it has done here, to better understand why, despite similar norms, significant inter-organisational disagreement can occur. From this point, analysis of wider implications arising from either organisation’s institutional fabric may be feasible.

Ireland and the Citizens in Uniform The Future of Civil-Military Industrial Relations in Ireland

Ruairí de Barra

Introduction “As ‘citizens in uniform’, armed forces personnel, whether they be conscripts or volunteers, are entitled to the same human rights and fundamental freedoms as any other citizen” —Ambassador Christian Strohal.1

Ireland’s security is rooted in the service of the members of Óglaigh na hÉireann, who have helped make the Defence Forces (DF) one of the most trusted organisations in the country.2 There is growing public

1 Christian Strohal, “Citizens in Uniform: Protecting Human Rights in the Armed Forces,” 2006, OSCE. 2 Richard Boyle, Public Sector Trends 2018 (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2018), 78.

R. de Barra (B) Irish Naval Service, and Permanent Defence Force Other Ranks Representative Association (PDFORRA), Cork, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_18

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commentary that the DF is in crisis.3 The strength of the DF in July 2021 stood at 8550, significantly short of its maximum permitted strength of 9500.4 The current difficulties are rooted in ever-increasing levels of discontent with remuneration and conditions of service, particularly since the 2008 global financial crisis. The often praised work the DF completes on behalf of the Irish nation, at home and overseas, has continued throughout this challenging period, despite the ever-present spectre of a wide variety of complaints surrounding core pay, allowances, technical pay, and adjustments to pension arrangements since 1994.5 Also, questions relating to retention, and the unclear future of those who joined post-1994, a cohort whose contractual requirements could see up to 700 discharged between 2022 and 2023, are just some of the myriad of issues having a negative effect on the current numbers of DF personnel.6 The DF has undergone multiple reviews and commissions since 1989, and since 2015 several reports have demonstrated extreme dissatisfaction with many of the issues outlined above.7 The personnel of the DF are extraordinarily committed to their profession, yet it is apparent that many are becoming disillusioned and demoralised in this seemly endless cycle of reviews, reports, and commissions.8 The solutions proposed by 3 Representative Association of Commissioned Officers (RACO), “Opening Statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence,” 2021. 4 Dáil Éireann Debates Vol. 1101, No. 17, Written Answers to Questions 97 and 99, 30 September 2021. 5 Michael D. Higgins, “Speech at a Ceremony Presenting the Defence Force Values Awards | President of Ireland”. President.ie. available from https://president.ie/en/ media-library/speeches/speech-at-a-ceremony-presenting-the-defence-force-values-awards; Barrack Obama, “Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Enda Kenny of Ireland,” available from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201600150/ html/DCPD-201600150.htm. 6 Sean O’Riordan, “Simon Coveney to Clarify Future of ‘Post-94’ Cohort of ShortStaffed Defence Forces,” The Irish Examiner, July 20, 2021; Sean O’Riordan, “Defence Forces Lose 338 Personnel in Just Seven Months,” The Irish Examiner, September 5, 2021. 7 RACO, “Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces, 16 February 2021,” available from https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/0029c-public-consultation-commissionon-the-defence-forces/#representative-associations-and-trade-unions. 8 Department of Defence, “Wellbeing in The Defence Forces.” Report On the Defence Forces ‘Have Your Say’ Climate Survey 2015 (Newbridge: Department of Defence, 2015), 16; Department of Defence, Workplace Climate in the Defence Forces Phase 2: Results of the Focus Group Research (Newbridge: Department of Defence, 2015), 3.

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government to provide a mechanism to resolve these problems have now brought the DF representative bodies to a point of divergence unlike any seen since their creation. The ongoing Commission on the Defence Forces (CODF), under its Chairman, Aidan O’Driscoll, shall deliver its eagerly anticipated report in December 2021. The CODF is seeking to develop a long-term vision for the DF beyond 2030, by examining the funding, structure, size, and capabilities as well as the high-level command and control.9 It also has in its remit an examination of all remuneration systems and structures of the DF; however, it will not consider the currently most contentious issue of rates of pay and allowances. This crucial issue shall fall to a Permanent Pay Review Body (PPRB), which the programme for Government states shall be established to reflect “the unique nature of military service in the context of the public service.”10 The programme also states that all the Commissions’ recommendations or those of any successor body must be consistent with the national public sector wage policy.11 It is this PPRB that brings the point of divergence, and which could represent a major obstacle as the representative bodies have strongly opposing views. The Permanent Defence Forces Other Ranks Representative Association (PDFORRA) calls for permission to affiliate with the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), and the Representative Association for Commissioned Officers (RACO) see their future in the PPRB. One is a step closer towards military trade unionism, albeit with an avowed stance against the withdrawal of labour, and the other is more in keeping with current arrangements and future proposals.12 The imposition of a PPRB, which PDFORRA strongly feels will not satisfactorily address their concerns, could be the catalyst for further deepening of the levels of discontent within the enlisted ranks, meaning current elevated rates of discharges may continue or even accelerate.

9 Aidan O’Driscoll, Update to Members of The Defence Forces (Dublin: Commission of the Defence Forces, 2021). 10 Rialtas na hÉireann, Programme for Government: Our Shared Future (Dublin: Rialtas

na hÉireann, 2020). 11 Rialtas na hÉireann, Programme for Government: Our Shared Future. 12 PDFORRA, “Initial Submission of PDFORRA to the Commission on the Future of

Defence, February 2021,” available from https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/0029c-pub lic-consultation-commission-on-the-defence-forces/#representative-associations-and-tradeunions.

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The lack of experienced personnel has already demonstrably weakened elements of our security response. The Naval Service (NS) sought European Union (EU) assistance in order to complete some sea fisheries protection duties in 2021 due to lack of ships crews, the Air Corps (AC) was unable to respond for eight hours to an unexpected aid to the civil authority request in 2019, and the elite Army Ranger Wing is struggling to maintain the strength of the unit.13 In many ways we have been here before, so before the future is examined it would be useful to consider the past. Not the past how of the formation of Irish military representation, but the past why?

The Genesis for Military Representation in Ireland The genesis for military representation in Ireland was rooted in the “army pay crisis” of the late 1980s.14 Soldiers’ families took to the streets; the National Army Spouses Association (NASA) was formed and stood as candidates in local and general elections.15 At the time NASA described, “appalling levels in pay in the army and a general crisis in morale, which has been sapped by the virtual embargo on promotion and recruitment.”16 This led the enlisted personnel themselves to clandestinely organise and agitate.17 These actions, which were widely recognised as having potentially grave consequences for the personnel involved, led to the formation of the military representation associations.18 Throughout 13 Conor Gallagher, “Ireland Had to Rely on EU Ship to Patrol Fishing Waters Due to Naval Shortages,” The Irish Times, May 28, 2021; Kevin Doyle, “Air Corps Took Eight Hours to Respond Over Staff Shortage,” The Irish Independent, May 18, 2019; Conor Gallagher, “Rangers Are the Elite of the Irish Defence Forces, So Why Are So Many Quitting?” The Irish Times, September 11, 2021. 14 Ireland. Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann Debate, Wednesday, 25 January 1989, Vol. 386, No. 1, accessed at; https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1989-01-25/19. 15 June Kiernan, founding member of NASA in Mullingar was for example an electoral candidate in the 1989 General Election. In the Longford-Westmeath constituency Kiernan polled 3207 1st preference votes or 7.6%. The quota for a seat was 8460 votes. 16 S. Flynn, The Irish Times, October 29, 1988, 9. 17 Michael Martin, Breaking Ranks: The Shaping of Civil-Military Relations in Ireland

(Dublin: The History Press, 2016). 18 Jean Callaghan, “Unions in the Irish Defence Forces: From Struggle for Representation to Mutually Beneficial Cooperation,” in Richard Bartle and Lindy Heinecken (eds.)

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the thirty-year period since, PDFORRA, RACO, and since 1992 the Reserve Defence Forces Representative association (RDFRA) have represented the commissioned and enlisted ranks across the vast range of issues which fall under Defence Force Regulation’s (DFRs) S.6 and S.7.19 There had been significant changes in both Irish society and the Irish armed forces in the period preceding the advent of military representation, and indeed one can find a strong parallel in the tumultuous changes which have occurred in Ireland since 2008. If one examines NASA’s aims and the PDFORRA constitution which has maintained approximately the same aims since their first publication in 1989, it is possible to appreciate the two groups were in the majority seeking to achieve the same ends.20 Unlike in 1988, there is no current DF promotion embargo, and recruitment is continuous. However, NASA’s 1988 beliefs on pay and morale continue to echo as the primary concern today remains, “Pay, Allowances, Superannuation and Conditions of Service.”21 During the “army pay crisis” many questions were raised throughout the media and in the Dáil on poor morale, excessive retirements, manning levels, lower numbers impacting morale by increasing duties on those that remain, questions on how many personnel were in receipt of Family Income Supplement (FIS) and other similar themes.22 Many are identical to the questions posed in the current era.23 In fact the repetition of events is truly striking and could be viewed as history repeating itself; a period of significant social change, a period of extended recession, discontent in the DF, rising public and political comment on this discontent, a simultaneous DF crisis while dealing with a domestic crisis, the families of the DF

Military Unionism in the Post-Cold War Era: A Future Reality? (New York: Routledge, 2006), 131–143. 19 Defence Force Regulation S.6 is the Statutory Instrument that gives effect to the Act and governs, inter alia, the establishment, funding, and operation of Representative Associations in the Permanent Defence Force, while S.7 governs the operation of Representative Associations in the Reserve Defence Force. 20 National Army Spouses Association, Constitution and Rules (Mullingar: NASA, 1988); PDFORRA, “PDFORRA Constitution,” available from http://pdforra.ie/docs/ PDFORRA_Constitution_2015.pdf. 21 “PDFORRA Constitution.” 22 Ireland. Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann Debate, Wednesday, 25 January 1989; Ireland.

Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann. Dáil debates, Vol. 377, No. 7, 10 February 1988. 23 Ireland. Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann. Dáil debates, Vol. 999, No. 7, 8 October 2020.

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politically advocating and taking to the streets to protest, general election candidates making DF pay and conditions platform issues, criticisms of the remuneration disparity between DF personnel and other public servants who enjoy better pay and conditions, and finally towards the end of this crescendo of discontent loud calls for radical action. The solution in the 1980s and 1990s was the establishment of an independent commission to specifically examine and make recommendations on pay and conditions of service within the DF, chaired by Dermot Gleeson, Senior Counsel. This is the key difference between the past and the present, the issues of pay and conditions of service were specifically excluded from the CODF terms of reference. Therefore, it is not hyperbolic to consider the possibility that the CODF will not deliver a solution to these most contentious of issues. Indeed, RACO General Secretary Conor King stated in extraordinarily strong terms that RACO would view the omission of “strong recommendations on pay structures such as payment of overtime and the national minimum wage,” by the CODF as “another wasted year in terms of the valuing and retention of our loyal and skilled personnel.”24 The fear expressed here is that the CODF might join the many past reviews conducted on the DF, which, while likely to bring some positive changes, will also continue the trend of reducing personnel numbers.25 While this fear may be grounded in cynicism, there is a growing body of evidence that this fear is warranted. A much-lauded Public Service Pay Commission (PSPC) reported in July 2019 only made a negligible impact on conditions, and a subsequent High-Level Implementation Plan titled “Strengthening Our Defence Forces” was drafted, yet despite government assurance, has yet to be implemented.26 The study conducted as part of the PSPC was stark in its conclusions:

24 Conor Lally, “Warning of ‘Wasted Year’ If Defence Forces Commission Does Not Consider Pay,” The Irish Times, April 20, 2021. 25 RACO, “Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces, 16 February 2021.” The Defence Forces re-organisation in 2012 resulted in the reduction of the army from three brigades to two, capped the armed forces at 9500 personnel. In the preceding decade the PDF had been reduced by 2000 personnel and the number of installations had reduced from twenty to fourteen. 26 Cathal Berry T.D., “Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces,” available from https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/0029c-public-consultation-commission-onthe-defence-forces/#political-parties-and-public-representatives.

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This study [suggests] that the Defence Forces is at a critical juncture. The findings presented intimate that without immediate and substantial intervention, particularly in respect of pay, allowances and pension entitlements, the organisation may, within a short time, face major difficulties in maintaining its personnel and in carrying out its mandate.

Such a warning should be treated with the utmost seriousness and solutions should be applied with alacrity.

Frustration, Negotiation, and Representation The almost palpable frustration expressed by the representative bodies today would be recognisable by the pioneers of NASA and PDFORRA in the 1980s. A common thread of tension, dissatisfaction, and disaffection presents itself throughout the history of the DF. Eunan O’Halpin’s Defending Ireland: The Irish state and its enemies since 1922 described an uneasy tension and adversarial culture between the armed forces and the Irish civil authorities, which he concludes has its origin in the Irish army mutiny of 1924.27 O’Halpin describes the “dead hand” of the Department of Defence (DOD) seeking to ensure the subservience of the military to civil authority. In the mutiny’s aftermath Minister for Home Affairs, Kevin O’Higgins T.D., is cited by Diarmuid Ferriter as stating, “that neither he nor the institutions of State would ever again take their stride from a soldier’s boot.”28 This hugely controversial series of events effectively set the tone for civil-military relations in Ireland for the next century. To an outsider, this may seem like ancient history, however, given the historic underfunding and lack of vision that dogged the DF in the years preceding the Second World War, and which took hold again in the doldrum post-war years preceding the dreadful conflict in Northern Ireland, it is difficult to ignore the reality that the DF has experienced 27 Eunan O’Halpin, Defending Ireland: The Irish State and Its Enemies Since 1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). The Irish Republican Army Organisation, a group representing the views of disgruntled Army officers felt that that ex-British army and post-Truce officers were being given preferential treatment, while pre-Truce IRA volunteers were being demoted. More than 60 officers stationed at the Curragh refused to accept their demobilisation papers. They were removed and discharged without pay. 28 Diarmuid Ferriter, The Transformation of Ireland, 1900–2000 (London: Profile Books, 2005), 302.

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long-term neglect. Arguably, the DF has been strategically managed to ensure continued subservience to the DOD in all areas, especially industrial/labour relations. This adversarial culture continues beyond DOD/DF relations and permeates the relationship between military management and civil service and the various representative bodies.29 This has been consistently highlighted by the representative bodies, academics, and even serving DF officers.30 Ireland has come a long way since the 1924 army mutiny; however, even in the late 1980s, during the earliest days of the campaign to win the right to representation in Ireland the prospects of this form of military trade unionism, even such a limited format, were dismissed as a threat to national security, incompatible with military command.31 In 2021, a similar narrative is repeated that PDFORRA’s goal of affiliation to the ICTU has “security implications.”32 The Supreme Commander of the DF, Irish President Michael D. Higgins, has expressed a view on the representative bodies which is entirely at odds with any such concerns. Addressing the PDFORRA Annual Delegates Conference in October 2021, Higgins praised the assembled delegates as “tireless advocates,” stating that theirs “is a powerful voice and one I know you will use wisely as you continue to fight for, and achieve, the further benefits of solidarity yet to come.”33

29 Simon Cahill, “Can the Use of Mediation as a Dispute Prevention Tool Contribute to the Maintenance of a Positive Relationship Between PDFORRA and Management During the Operation of Public Sector Collective Agreements Within the Defence Forces?” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, 2013. National College of Ireland. Available at http:// trap.ncirl.ie/900/1/simoncahill.pdf; Conor Gallagher, “Time to Trust Defence Forces to Command Itself, Suggests Study,” The Irish Times, December 3, 2020. 30 Sean O’Riordan, “PDFORRA: Anger as Some Naval Service Delegates Refused Permission to Attend Conference,” Irish Examiner, October 1, 2019; Brian Clarke, “An Examination of Civilian Governance of The Armed Forces in Ireland and Other Neutral EU States,” Defence Forces Review 17 (December 2020), 47–54; Martin, Breaking Ranks; Ireland. Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann. Minister of Defence. Noonan, Michael, TD. Dáil debates, Vol. 377, No. 7, 10 February 1988. 31 Ireland. Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann. Minister of Defence. Noonan, Michael, TD. Dáil debates, Vol. 377, No. 7, 10 February 1988. 32 Martin Wall. “ICTU Link to Army Representative Body ‘Has Security Implications’,” The Irish Times, September 14, 2019. 33 Michael D. Higgins, “Address to the PDFORRA Annual Delegate Conference Banquet, Killarney,” October 2021.

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Military Representation as a Threat to National Security Many claims have been made in the past that military unions will subvert military discipline and obedience, undermine the chain of command, and degrade unit esprit de corps.34 These claims are also not some relics of the distant past. In 2006, General Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff of the United Kingdom, stated during questioning before a House of Commons Select Committee (HCSC) that he viewed a British Armed Forces Federation as “something that would weaken the chain of command,”35 and went on to make this further extraordinary claim: When I was commanding in Bosnia, one of the battalions of one of the nations, and I will not tell you which one, laid down its arms because, it said, the pay deal was not right, so they put their arms down. Do you really see British Armed Services doing that? That is the sort of trouble you get into when there is a representative body who are fighting back at home, your soldiers are at the front, and they do not appear to be achieving.36

While General Walker’s anecdote cannot be confirmed or refuted, his statement is indicative of the attitudes of some senior officers to the organisation of military representation. Given Walker’s extensive military experience, his opinion was undoubtedly given much weight by politicians not well-versed in military affairs. The incident Walker described would, if it occurred, be the exemplar of a threat presented to military command and operations, which is at the core of official resistance to full and unlimited military trade unions. The claim laid before the HCSC is also of relevance in the context of Irish foreign policy. Irish troops have

34 R. Hallenbeck, “Civil Supremacy and the Military Union: The Systemic Implications,” in W. Taylor, R. Arango & R. Lockwood (eds.) Military Unions: U.S. Trends and Issues (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977), 233–244; Jennifer Mittelstadt, “The Army Is a Service, Not a Job: Unionization, Employment, and the Meaning of Military Service in the Late-twentieth Century United States,” International Labor and Working Class History 80 (2011), 29–52; D. Perselay, “The Realities of Military Unions,” in Military Unionism in the post-Cold War Era: A Future Reality? 172–180. 35 House of Commons (UK), Armed Forces Bill: Special Report of Session 2005–06, Volume 2 (London: House of Commons, 2006), 70. 36 Armed Forces Bill: Special Report of Session 2005–06, 70.

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served continuously for over 60 years with United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces. Many have made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of peace. The goodwill, respect, and soft power which this generates cannot be underestimated, especially when coupled with the extremely effective Irish Overseas Development Programme, Irish Aid. Any action by Irish troops, similar to Walker’s anecdote, where Irish troops could potentially withdraw labour while serving as part of a multinational UN force, would undo decades of hard work, bravery, and sacrifice, and result in severe reputational damage to the Defence Forces. It is almost unimaginable, and the damage would be incalculable. While rare, the claims of military representation resulting in disobedience and cases of civil disorder are not without merit. In Belgium in 2016, armed forces personnel demonstrating to protest pension reforms resulted in violent clashes with Belgian police.37 Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that PDFORRA’s proposed affiliation with ICTU meets such resistance. There are negative examples of militant military trade unionism, and it is in keeping with historical official Irish Government reactions to any further increase in DF trade unionisation. Yet, episodes like Belgium in 2016 are the exception, not the rule. In 2017 Lindy Heinecken, researching military trade unionism in South Africa, concluded that it was “a fallacy to claim that [military trade unions] pose a threat to national security.”38 Likewise, in Ireland, trade union officials have publicly stated that they found the suggestion that ICTU affiliation could be a threat to national security “laughable.”39 Yet, the debate continues. PDFORRA General Secretary Gerard Guinan has repeatedly stated that PDFORRA is not seeking the right to withdraw labour nor would they ever agitate for strike action.40 PDFORRA’s position is that such a disavowal of a fundamental tenant of trade unionism, the right of the

37 Helen Healy, “Military Personnel in Clashes with Police in Belgium,” The Financial Times, November 15, 2016. 38 Lindy Heinecken, “Military Trade Unions: A Threat to National Security… Really?” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 45, no. 2 (2017), 140–148. 39 Liam Berney, “ICTU Industrial Officer Address,” Speech delivered to the PDFORRA Annual Delegates Conference, 2019. 40 Gerard Guinan, “General Secretary’s Address,” Speech delivered to the PDFORRA Annual Delegates Conference 2021; Ingrid Miley, “Body Representing Soldiers Applies For ICTU Affiliation,” RTE.ie, available from https://www.rte.ie/news/ireland/2019/ 0902/1073377-soldiers/.

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worker to withdraw labour, is a good faith gesture that should be the catalyst for meaningful access to national pay talks to directly affect pay and conditions of service of their members. RACO has also stated their belief that forgoing some rights traditionally associated with trade unionism should be rewarded with the reciprocation of a better system of decisions regarding DF renumeration.41

Changing Lives, and the Future The central question must be asked, if after being established to advocate for better pay and conditions, there has not been successful deliverance of satisfactory levels of remuneration and conditions of service in the past thirty years, have the various DF representative bodies failed in their aims? The answer is an emphatic no. The representative associations are not just a body for complaint; they are a vital and integral part of the industrial relations machinery of the DF. The representative bodies have, and are, changing lives. Many of their key goals were accomplished in the early 1990s, such as the creation of Personnel Support Services (PSS), which provides a vast range of mental health and referral supports for serving personnel and their families. The creation of the ANSAC credit union was another ground-breaking achievement to assist DF personnel in access to credit and with financial savings.42 Another output of military representation is the recently created PDFORRA Medical Assistance Scheme (PMAS). PMAS is truly a life-changing service, which has received huge praise from all sides, due to positive results in returning injured PDFORRA members to full duty. Thus, while the representatives’ associations long battle for pay has certainly yielded frustration, there has been marked progress in conditions of service and with the creation of PSS, ANSAC, and PMAS. Furthermore, both PDFORRA and RACO would consider that any failure regarding pay and remuneration comes not from a lack of advocacy or determination, but lies with the current pay determination mechanism itself . Both bodies want a fundamentally better system for their members; PDFORRA through affiliation to ICTU, and RACO through a PPRB.

41 RACO, “Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces, 16 February 2021.” 42 ANSAC: Army, Naval Service, Air Corps.

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Affiliation to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions ICTU is the representative body for forty-four affiliated unions, and it is the largest civil society organisation on the island of Ireland, representing the interests of over 700,000 workers and their families in all sectors. They are a cross-border institution with member bodies in both the Republic and Northern Ireland. As the pay determination model in the Irish public sector is primarily focussed on a trade union membership and collective bargaining method, with negotiations yielding centralised pay awards and sectoral agreements, and with ICTU’s major trade union members being some of the key drivers, it is felt by RACO and PDFORRA that their limited access to this model does not meet their needs. They feel left outside the door at the critical juncture.43 The Irish Government’s position on affiliation to ICTU has moved from prohibition, to acceptance, and back to prohibition, while the public record states that the senior military management position has remained consistently in the realm of prohibition. While Taoiseach in 2020, Leo Varadkar T.D. stated that he “would like [The Defence Forces] to be able to affiliate to ICTU.”44 PDFORRA General Secretary Gerard Guinan speaking to an Oireachtas Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Defence (OJCFATD) over a year later in May 2021, stated that “Our association and membership were extremely pleased by his remarks,” and that given his comments they, “believed our hard fought case for affiliation would finally be recognised.” The fact that it has yet to be implemented therefore is source of extreme frustration.45 The primary reason for PDFORRA to seek affiliation is to achieve levels of renumeration and conditions of service which their members deem appropriate and acceptable. The Council of Europe (COE) European Committee on Social Rights has found that PDFORRA should be able to affiliate with ICTU, and through that mechanism realise the

43 Martin Wall, “Military Officers’ Group Says It Cannot Recommend New Pay Deal,”

The Irish Times, June 16, 2017. 44 Sean O’Riordan and Daniel McConnell, “44 Personnel Have Left Naval Service Since Vessels Tied Up,” The Irish Examiner, February 1, 2020. 45 Ireland. Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Defence debate, May 25, 2021. Available from https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/deb ates/debate/joint_committee_on_foreign_affairs_and_defence/2021-05-25/2.

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rights to free association and collective bargaining.46 The Government has not permitted this affiliation, and PDFORRA describes this action towards their members “as an unjustified denial of their human rights—it is seen as disrespectful towards them.”47 ICTU General Secretary Patricia King stated during a 2019 interview that she disagreed that trade union membership was incompatible with military service.48 ICTU’s submission to the CODF states that: The men and women in the Defence Forces should be respected and should enjoy the same employment rights as every other worker in the country; that the representative organisations within the Defence Forces should be free to associate with Congress and, through our Public Services Committee (PSC), to fully participate in the established pay determination mechanisms in the public sector.49

Further to this, ICTU, in their submission, assured the CODF that the Congress had amended its rules and constitution to provide the representative bodies with the means to associate with ICTU, while ensuring that the unique mandate of the DF is respected.50 It also clarified that the associate membership available to PDFORRA and RACO, while short of full membership, would still allow full and active participation by both bodies in the work of the Public Services Committee of Congress.51 PDFORRA in their initial submission to the CODF proposed that the CODF should “recommend to the Minister for Defence that he should

46 European Committee of Social Rights, No. 112/2014 European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL) v. Ireland, 2017. 47 PDFORRA, “Initial Submission of PDFORRA to the Commission on the Future of Defence, February 2021.” 48 Ingrid Miley, “ICTU Agrees in Principle to PDFORRA Membership,” RTE.ie, available from https://www.rte.ie/news/ireland/2019/0918/1076747-pdforra-soldiersdefence/. 49 Irish Congress of Trade Unions, “ICTU Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces, March 2021,” available from https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/0029cpublic-consultation-commission-on-the-defence-forces/#representative-associations-andtrade-unions. 50 “ICTU Submission to The Commission on The Defence Forces.” 51 “ICTU Submission to The Commission on The Defence Forces.”

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permit PDFORRA to affiliate to ICTU as full members with no right to strike.”52 PDFORRA, by adopting a position with an avowed stance against the right to strike, and ICTU by adjusting their constitution and rules to enable this associate membership status, were actions which one might consider would abrogate the resistance to affiliation. However, this has not occurred. Speaking in 2019 on how deeply the personnel of the DF take their oath of allegiance, PDFORRA President Mark Keane said, “We would never go down that path…We don’t want the right to strike.”53 It must also be stated that other common forms of industrial action, such as “work to rule” or “go slow” are also not possible for PDFORRA members. They are sworn to obey military law, and any form of industrial action, or agitation, or inducement of others for such industrial action could see members face disciplinary measures under already existing Defence Forces regulations. Another common industrial action of an overtime ban, where union members refuse to complete any work which falls outside normal working hours, is also not applicable as the DF does not have an overtime system.

Permanent Pay Review Body On the other side of the current impasse then is the Government’s position of PPRB, which at this moment is RACO’s preferred option for the future. The Government feels a PPRB would reflect “the unique nature of military service in the context of the public service” and RACO stated very clearly, their belief that through a PPRB “pay can be determined fairly and directly by government based on retention data routinely presented to it by an independent Pay Review Body.”54 The Government proposes that when the CODF has reported, the Minister of Defence shall “consult with the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform on the

52 PDFORRA, “Initial Submission of PDFORRA to the Commission on the Future of

Defence, February 2021.” 53 Sean O’Riordan, “Defence Forces Body Seeks to Join ICTU,” The Irish Examiner, September 3, 2019. 54 Ireland. Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann. Dáil debates, Vol. 1000, No. 7, 17 November 2020; RACO, “Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces, 16 February 2021.”

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establishment of a permanent pay review body for the Defence Forces.”55 Minister of Defence Simon Coveney has repeatedly noted in the Dáil that while he views the work of the CODF as important to the future of the remuneration system; It is important that the Commission does not become about pay only. In its terms of reference, it has been asked to examine pay structures and allowances, how they developed and are structured, and whether they are appropriate in terms of international best practice and so on. It will certainly consider pay structures and allowances, how they work within the Defence Forces and whether those structures can be improved.56

However, it is surprising that the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform has adopted a relatively strong position against any such pay review body being created. Citing the need to be “fully cognisant of the wider public service pay landscape”57 in their submission to the CODF, the Department of Public Expenditure articulated their belief that existing mechanisms of collective centralised pay agreements in the Irish public sector “have served members of the Defence Forces well and can continue to do so.”58 ICTU have also advanced their strong opinion that any such body, created outside the established pay agreement formats, would undermine the wider public sector pay agreements process.59 Even RACO, which supports the formation of the body takes pains to highlight in the strongest possible terms in their submission to the CODF that they, “fail to understand how such a body can recognise the unique nature of military service, while still remaining within national wage structures.”60

55 Ireland. Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann. Dáil debates, Vol. 1007, No. 7, 13 May 2021. 56 Simon Coveney T.D. Statement in Ireland. Oireachtas. Dáil Éireann. Dáil debates,

Vol. 1007, No. 7, 13 May 2021. 57 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, “Submission by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform to the Commission on the Defence Forces,” available from https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/0029c-public-consultation-commission-onthe-defence-forces/#government-departments-and-agencies. 58 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, “Submission by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform to the Commission on the Defence Forces.” 59 Martin Wall, “ICTU Opposes Plan for Separate Pay Review for Defence Forces Personnel,” The Irish Times, May 31, 2021. 60 RACO, “Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces, 16 February 2021.”

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Currently, the British Government operates the British Armed Forces Pay Review Body (BAFPRB), and it has been held up as an example of what could potentially be implemented in Ireland. However, there is growing dissatisfaction amongst British service personnel with the BAFPRB. The 2020 Annual Report of the BAFPRB found that only 35% of respondents were satisfied with their basic pay, having fallen from a peak of 52% in 2010.61 PDFORRA General Secretary Gerard Guinan has highlighted these facts and stated that “While a permanent pay review body is being mooted for the Defence Forces the question has to be asked, if this model were so effective why are the BAFPRB still reporting significant levels of dissatisfaction with pay amongst their personnel?”62 Given that the only unequivocal support for a PPRB is from the DOD itself, it would be legitimate to consider if such a body could find itself immediately mired in controversy and possible legal challenges before it even began to consider the challenges of DF remuneration and conditions of service, which need to be addressed urgently, in order to prevent a complete collapse of DF personnel numbers.

Conclusion The Defence Forces stand on the edge of a precipice. Failure to adequately resource Ireland’s military has led to years of discontent with remuneration and conditions of service. The inability of the current industrial relations mechanisms to deliver solutions deemed equitable by personnel sees a strength crisis unfolding. Ironically, while military trade unionism has been seen in the past as a threat to national security, the lack of Government engagement with the various representative association has resulted in Ireland’s national security being diminished by a military that is disintegrating, slowly, but surely. Having endured an endless cycle of reviews and reports, the Defence Forces again wait on the Commission on Defence in the hopes of meaningful reforms. The proposed PPRB is a key element of the promised brighter tomorrows, however only the DOD unreservedly supports it. PDFORRA and RACO have significantly different visions of the future. This divergence 61 Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body, AFPRB: Forty-Ninth Report 2020 (London: Secretary of State for Defence, 2021). 62 Sean O’Riordan, “PDFORRA Not Backing Independent Pay Review Model for Military,” The Irish Examiner, July 2, 2020.

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between the interests of officers and enlisted personnel presents a serious obstacle to the delivery of urgently needed reforms. For any reforms to be effective, they need to have the approval and confidence of the very personnel which they affect. Significant investment and tangible improvements are required if the current crisis is to be contained and ultimately reversed. For while those personnel who remain in service will continue to deliver on their commitment to their oaths, as Irish service personnel have for generations before them, it is equally obvious that those who are dissatisfied with remuneration levels and their conditions of service shall choose to continue to exit the service early. The Defence Forces cannot recruit their way out of this crisis. Without tangible, visible improvements it will not be possible to persuade the next generation to enter the service. The growing absence of sufficient personnel to discharge the duties of the Defence Forces presents a growing threat to the security of the nation. To ensure sufficient recruitment, and to ensure that experienced and skilled personnel are retained, the mantra that personnel are our most important asset, must be fulfilled. Therefore, it is vital that the multigenerational issues of remuneration, contracts, and conditions of service are addressed in a radical and transformative manner. Ireland faces a challenging future; the ever-deepening effects of climate change, an evergrowing scourge of international narcotics trafficking, the challenges of fisheries protection in the new post-Brexit era, the very real prospect of the imposition of a hard border with Northern Ireland, dark clouds of potential conflict gather as Russian aggression and Chinese strength grows, and the current pandemic which has affected every facet of our lives. The resilience of the nation shall be sorely tested in the years to come. Ireland must be able to credibly defend its skies, seas, land, cyberspace, and most of all its people. The security of Ireland rests in the citizens in uniform of Óglaigh na hÉireann.

The Principle of Irish Neutrality

Ireland, NATO and “the Return of Geopolitics” in Europe Eoin Micheál McNamara

Introduction The 2008 Russia–Georgia war; the Ukraine crisis since 2014; and Russian hybrid interference against European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members all signal what Walter Russell Mead terms as the “return of geopolitics” in Europe.1 Despite this regressive strategic change, Ireland’s security policy continues to be defined by a problematic paradox: while many advocating for continued neutrality maintain that Ireland’s sovereignty and independence be protected, recent Irish governments have still been reluctant to develop a defence policy to better safeguard both. This paradox is ever more curious because Ireland’s strategic geography has become increasingly de-territorialised, making its

1 Sections in this chapter that discuss airspace violations and maritime security in the north Atlantic draw and develop arguments that the author has previously published in Eoin Micheál McNamara, “Ireland, Atlantic Order and Military Burden-Sharing: Is the Global Island Pulling Its Weight?” Defence Forces Review 17 (2020), 122–132.

E. M. McNamara (B) Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_19

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society, economy and political system more vulnerable to hybrid interference. Ireland’s newfound centrality in the transnational interdependence that underpins Western order heightens its profile as a target for revisionist powers—primarily Russia and China. With Ireland an important link in many vital transnational supply chains—both kinetic and cyber—any targeted disruption affecting these creates security risks for other Western democracies, risks magnified by Ireland’s defensive vulnerabilities. This chapter examines Ireland’s problematic relations with NATO with a focus on how inadequate defence preparation and limited security cooperation can allow hybrid interference to aggravate vulnerabilities in cyber, airspace and maritime security. It is concluded that a stronger NATO partnership offers Ireland some incremental defence benefits, but as long as Dublin remains formally outside the alliance, it is the Irish government’s exclusive responsibility to develop stronger military capabilities to effectively adapt to a deteriorating security environment.

Ireland and NATO: Complicated Relations Neutrality with military non-alignment as the main tenet has been the primary guide for Ireland’s security policy since WWII. The three parties dominating Irish politics since independence in 1922—Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Labour Party—have all adopted pragmatic policies to balance neutrality with the necessity for some military cooperation with the EU and NATO over time. United Nations (UN) peacekeeping was largely (although not exclusively) the preserve of neutral states during the Cold War. However, with seismic change in the international system during the 1990s, expeditionary stabilisation capabilities increased in demand. East–West competition had ended, but violent conflict still flared on the world periphery. Since the 1950s, UN peacekeeping has been a mainstay in Ireland’s international engagement, but, from the 1990s, regional security organisations (e.g. the EU, NATO, and the African Union [AU]) have all taken up more peacekeeping responsibilities. Responding to this change, the “triple-lock” concept entered Ireland’s security discourse in 2001 during the Nice Treaty referendum debates, emphasising that Dublin can only contribute to expeditionary operations with more than 12 personnel when missions receive a UN

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Security Council (UNSC) mandate together with the formal consent of the executive and legislature in the Oireachtas.2 While Ireland’s dominant political parties have directed security policy along a pragmatic path, factions on the far-left have had a loud and arguably disproportionately large influence on neutrality discourse, despite wielding only marginal electoral support over recent decades. These factions discourage stronger military cooperation between Ireland and its EU and NATO partners, while sometimes even expressing sympathy with states competing with the West. For example, soon after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, an op-ed in the Irish Times by left-wing commentator Eamonn McCann blamed NATO for provoking Russian aggression.3 According to McCann, President Vladimir Putin was “right that the main motivation of the US and NATO has been to encircle and enfeeble his country.”4 NATO was also singled out for stinging criticism from representatives of the Irish left at a prominent public debate on Irish neutrality in Dublin in 2013. Sinn Féin’s Justice and Defence spokesperson, Donegal TD Pádraig Mac Lochlainn, opined that “NATO is a relic of the Cold War and should be shut down.”5 Then Socialist Party TD for Dublin West, Joe Higgins, explained that “NATO and similar organisations just divide the world into militaristic blocs,” while Roger Cole from the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA), colourfully concluded that “NATO needs war like Dracula needs blood.”6 While not uncommon in the Irish security policy debate, these claims distort the reality of NATO’s post-Cold War transformation. Contrary to “enfeeblement and encirclement” of Russia, NATO enlargement during the 1990s and 2000s finally relieved many smaller states in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) from imperial strife historically suffered from larger European powers. Precious security guarantees 2 Ben Tonra, “Unpicking the ‘Triple-Lock’ of Ireland’s Defence Green Paper,” Politicalscience.ie, July 17, 2013, http://politicalscience.ie/?p=451. 3 Eamonn McCann, “If We Have to Pick a Side Over Crimea, Let It Be Russia,” The Irish Times, March 20, 2014, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/if-we-haveto-pick-a-side-over-crimea-let-it-be-russia-1.1731105. 4 McCann, “If We Have to Pick a Side Over Crimea”. 5 Mark Moloney, “Neutrality Debate: ‘Cold War Relic NATO Should Be Shut Down’,”

An Phoblacht, May 15, 2013, https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/23049. 6 Moloney, “Neutrality Debate”.

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under NATO’s Article 5 were offered in return for liberal military, political and economic reform.7 NATO critics argue that the alliance’s “open door” accession policy has caused unnecessary tensions with Russia, but these arguments omit the post-Cold War confidence-building principles that all governments in the pan-European security system have consented to. With military aggression in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine since 2014, Russia has violated multiple Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreements, fundamentally the 1990 Charter of Paris that enshrined “the freedom of [all OSCE] states to choose their own security arrangements.”8 For international security beyond Europe, contrary to “needing war”, the broader international community has repeatedly called on the post-Cold War NATO to lead with peacesupport operations to halt bloodshed and restore stability in war-torn Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Transforming beyond its narrow origins as a military alliance, NATO has become a “general-purpose international security organisation” since 1991; this was belatedly benchmarked in its 2010 Strategic Concept with three primary objectives: collective defence; cooperation security and crisis management.9 From an Irish perspective, rather than being chastised, NATO needs to be praised for its contribution towards the aspiration of a post-Cold War Europe “whole, free and at peace.”10 Ireland has benefited considerably from EU membership since 1973, while NATO has been the background security organisation providing the military protection that allows the EU’s political, social and economic institutions to prosper.

7 Wallace J. Thies, Dorle Hellmuth and Ray Millen, “Does NATO Enlargement Spread Democracy? Evidence from Three Cases,” Democracy and Security 2, no. 2 (2006), 201– 230. 8 OSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe (Paris, 1990), 6, https://www.osce.org/ files/f/documents/0/6/39516.pdf. The Russian Federation became party to the Charter of Paris when it assumed the status of legal successor state to the Soviet Union. 9 Anthony Forster and William Wallace, “What Is NATO for?” Survival 43, no. 4 (2001), 117. And NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon,” November 19, 2010, https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm. 10 Robert E. Hunter, “A ‘Europe Whole and Free and at Peace’,” RAND Corporation, September 9, 2008, https://www.rand.org/blog/2008/09/a-europe-whole-andfree-and-at-peace.html.

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With a state-centric Westphalian order dominating earlier diplomacy in Europe until 1991, Neal Jesse argues that this allowed Ireland to “freeride” on NATO’s collective deterrence.11 Unlike other neutral states at Europe’s Cold War frontline, Ireland was “safety tucked away behind Britain” and could thus afford allocating less to defence.12 Even when the 9/11 attacks triggered a strategic shock, Michael Mulqueen argues that Irish complacency continued, with Dublin still gambling on “affordable threats.”13 However, by 2022, this complacency is increasingly perilous, as Ireland’s centrality to many vital transnational supply chains underpinning Western order heighten its strategic profile. As global tensions increase, geo-economics and geopolitics are becoming ever more intertwined, removing the Westphalian insularity that once allowed Ireland to safely “free-ride” on NATO’s collective action.14

Hybrid Interference and Transnational Security The early post-Cold War era held optimism for an expanded liberal peace, a trend that has reversed over recent years. Contrary to EU and NATO led democratic expansion, “creeping imperialism” is gaining momentum at Europe’s peripheries.15 Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014; its support for proxy war and then invasion in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022; its military reinforcements for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in 2015 and its support for authoritarian consolidation in Belarus after 2020 have all severely undermined confidence-building in Europe. Many commentators explain Russian strategy as “hybrid warfare,” often accepting that this is neither “new” nor unique to Russia. Different

11 Neal G. Jesse, “Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective,” International Political Science Review 27, no. 1 (2006), 17. 12 Jesse, “Choosing to Go It Alone”, 17. 13 Michael Mulqueen, Re-Evaluating Irish National Security Policy: Affordable Threats?

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). 14 See Mikael Wigell, Sören Scholvin and Mika Aaltola, eds., Geo-Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century: The Revival of Economic Statecraft (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018). 15 Gabrielius Landsbergis, “Europe Must Confront Russia’s Imperialist Creep,” Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), June 23, 2021, https://cepa.org/europe-must-con front-russias-imperialist-creep/.

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powers have utilised similar tactics in the past.16 Russia is the most military-focused competitor for the EU and NATO, but it is not the only challenger for Western security interests. China, Iran and possibly Turkey—an increasingly estranged NATO member under Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s authoritarian rule—have all signalled similar intent with either military or non-military means.17 A term in plentiful policy circulation, “hybrid war” is still logically problematic. Combining military and nonmilitary power to subvert an adversary, “hybrid” approaches probably still conform to the classic Clausewitzian maxim that “war” is “the continuation of politics by other means.” Nevertheless, other scholars have backed away from “war” connotations, and have instead referred to this as “full-spectrum conflict.”18 When Ireland’s strategic position—not at the frontline, but still vulnerable as collective security deteriorates—is considered, Mikael Wigell’s conceptualisation, “hybrid interference” becomes the most appropriate description for the risks that Dublin faces.19 Hybrid interference thrives on security problems emanating from closer transnational interdependence. During the 1990s, China perceived the US as a competitor with a near-insurmountable conventional military advantage, Beijing thus attempted to claw back some strategic leeway by developing “asymmetric responses” by malevolently redirecting transnational forces such as “terrorism, drug-trafficking, environmental degradation, and computer virus propagation” to undermine its competitors.20 According to Sean Kay, as early as three decades ago, Chinese strategists saw this as “righting an imbalance of military capabilities,” an outlook that is uncannily similar to recent hybrid interference.21 Mead

16 Nicu Popescu, “Hybrid Tactics: Neither New Nor Only Russian,” EUISS Issue Alert 4 (2015), 1–2, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_ 4_hybrid_warfare.pdf. 17 Daniel Fiott, “Naval Gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s Maritime Presence,” EUISS Brief 16 (2021), 1, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSF iles/Brief_16_2021.pdf. 18 Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After Ukraine,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 28, no. 1 (2015), 1–22. 19 Mikael Wigell, “Hybrid Interference as a Wedge Strategy: A Theory of External Interference in Liberal Democracy,” International Affairs 95, no. 2 (2019), 255–275. 20 Sean Kay, “Globalization, Power, and Security,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 1 (2004),

16. 21 Kay, “Globalization, Power, and Security,” 16.

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refers to the rise of revisionist powers against Western interests as “the return of geopolitics” where closer international integration has regressed and “old-fashioned power plays” involving military force, coercion and intimidation increase.22 However, this “return” is not based on strictly territorialised Westphalian geopolitics, hybrid interference is often (although not always) less concerned with territorial conquest, it instead undermines security in more subtle and unpredictable ways, when “first mover advantage” is perceived as beneficial by a weaker instigator. 23 Hybrid subversion or coercion takes advantage of the problematically rigid binary where Western strategic intuition differentiates war from peace.24 NATO and the EU are both multinational actors that depend on consensus decision-making to remain effective. As a primary goal in what Mark Galeotti calls “political warfare,” hybrid interference magnifies routine political divides aiming to paralyse consensus for both collective defence and diplomacy.25

Transnational Geopolitics and Cyber Security For David McWilliams, “few societies in the world have been so positively transformed by the economic opportunities arising from globalisation as Ireland,” but this has also altered Ireland’s standing in international security, a change that is still under-discussed.26 Contrasting sharply with a long post-independence history as a peripheral Western economy, the July 2017 cover of Time extolled Ireland as “an island at the centre of the world.”27 However, when these economic-led perspectives are re-joined 22 Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014), 69. 23 Edward A. McLellan, “Russia’s Strategic Beliefs Today; the Risk of War in the Future,” Orbis 61, no.2 (2017), 258. 24 Chiara Libiseller and Lukas Milevski, “War and Peace: Reaffirming the Distinction,” Survival 63, no. 1 (2021), 101. 25 Mark Galeotti, Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019). 26 David McWilliams, “Ireland Has a Lot to Lose from ‘Slowbalisation’,” The Irish Times, February 2, 2019, https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/david-mcwilliams-irelandhas-a-lot-to-lose-from-slowbalisation. 27 Jennifer Duggan, “Q&A: Ireland’s Leo Varadkar on Brexit, Trump and Keeping Ireland ‘At the Center of the World’,” Time, July 13, 2017, https://time.com/485 6193/ireland-leo-varadkar-interview-brexit-trump/.

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with a security focus, questions arise as to whether Dublin is actually prepared for the additional security risks that its transformed global status create. Allegations that the Russian Embassy in Ireland is seeking building upgrades to expand espionage activities are a headline example of how Ireland is now perceived by hostile powers as a “weak-link” in a longer transnational Western security chain. For Galeotti, Ireland has been a “permissive environment” for foreign intelligence services because it is not a NATO member and it is therefore not bound by the alliance’s stricter counter-intelligence procedures.28 According to one source, “What marks the Russian embassy in Dublin apart is that it is used as a collection point for intelligence collected from across Europe…Ireland plays that role [intelligence gathering] for Russian espionage in Britain and countries like France and Holland.”29 In 2018, the Irish government introduced emergency legislation to curtail an ambitious expansion plan for the Russian Embassy, but concerns persist that further extension attempts could include hidden plans for signals intelligence facilities.30 Many technology multinationals serving the data-driven global economy have operations in Ireland. This adds a further layer of attraction for non-Western powers that seek a strong intelligence foothold in the country. The May 2021 ransomware attack that temporarily devastated the Health Service Executive (HSE) is a further indicator of Ireland’s vulnerability to transnational security risks. The Wizard-Spider cybercrime syndicate, based in St. Petersburg in Russia, is suspected to have conducted the attack.31 At first glance, Wizard-Spider carries all indications of commercial criminality. New generation ransomware illicitly infiltrated HSE computer systems with the motive to blackmail the Irish government: if a ransom worth $20 million in crypto currency was not paid, stolen HSE medical records would be released on the dark

28 Mark Galeotti cited in John Mooney, “Intelligence Officers Search Russian Embassy for Spy Base,” The Times, February 12, 2021, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/intell igence-officers-search-russian-embassy-for-spy-base-5xdj68xd9. 29 Mooney, “Intelligence Officers Search Russian Embassy”. 30 Mooney, “Intelligence Officers Search Russian Embassy”. 31 Conor Lally, “Wizard Spider Profile: Suspected Gang Behind HSE Attack Is Part

of World’s First Cyber-Cartel,” The Irish Times, May 18, 2021, https://www.irishtimes. com/news/crime-and-law/wizard-spider-profile-suspected-gang-behind-hse-attack-is-partof-world-s-first-cyber-cartel-1.4568806.

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web.32 Ireland is a wealthy economy with a health system under pressure; it was an attractive target for this attack. While refusing to pay any ransom, but in having to safely repair and re-secure HSE systems because of original weaknesses in cyber defences, the Irish government will still incur some serious costs. Understanding this attack solely as the product of cybercrime is naïve, there are strong indications that WizardSpider receives clandestine sponsorship from Russia’s intelligence services. Russian strategists perceive sophisticated cyber criminals as an instrument to be leveraged for hybrid interference against competitors.33 Cyber criminals enter a trade-off with Moscow where their transnational “hacking” networks gain refuge from law-enforcement authorities, but while agreeing to mount attacks on Russia’s political adversaries. Collaboration with state institutions assists these networks in continually developing next generation malware. Commercial criminality might have been the main motive behind the HSE attack, but the same networks also serve geopolitical aims. For example, having tense political relations with Russia, both Ukraine (since 2014) and Estonia (2007) have suffered serious criminally-enabled cyber-attacks.34 Confounding claims that NATO is an obsolete “relic,” its preservation as an organisation that makes decisions purely through intergovernmental consultations gives it more internal stability to effectively respond to transnational security problems, especially when compared to more “complex” EU decision-making institutions.35 According to Leo Michel, the alliance’s intergovernmental “consensus rule” has repeatedly “helped NATO navigate difficult political and military situations” enabling “allies

32 Conor Gallagher and Cormac McQuinn, “Dark Web ‘Dump Sites’ Being Monitored for HSE Data After Hack,” The Irish Times, May 18, 2021, https://www.irishtimes. com/news/crime-and-law/dark-web-dump-sites-being-monitored-for-hse-data-after-hack1.4567731. 33 Frank Bajak, “How the Kremlin Provides a Safe Harbor for Ransomware,” Associated Press, April 17, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/business-technology-general-news-gov ernment-and-politics-c9dab7eb3841be45dff2d93ed3102999. 34 For Ukraine, see Christian Borys, “The Day a Mysterious Cyber-Attack Crippled Ukraine,” BBC Future, July 4, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170704the-day-a-mysterious-cyber-attack-crippled-ukraine. For Estonia, see Ian Traynor, “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,” The Guardian, May 17, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia. 35 Sten Rynning, “The European Union: Towards A Strategic Culture,” Security Dialogue 34, no. 4 (2003), 488.

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to undertake the widest possible consultations to build support for their ideas.”36 This paradox of being intergovernmental and thus better able to manage transnational security problems provides NATO with a “strong institutional foundation” for cyber security provision.37 NATO’s cyber security posture has developed from a primary focus on “defending its own [institutional] digital networks” to a role in “defending NATO members against cyber espionage, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare.”38 Ireland has significant room to improve in boosting its security against these threats.39 A stronger partnership between Ireland and NATO as an indispensable Western cyber security organisation could provide Dublin with opportunities to make up some lost ground.

Airspace Violations and Insecurity While recently experiencing a serious cyber security breach, Ireland also remains vulnerable to hybrid interference from different kinetic military instruments. Russia’s strategic competition with the EU and NATO is an asymmetric conflict that, in raw terms, favours Western actors, but where Moscow can still threaten security when its interference targets the “cracks” in their institutional design.40 The end of the Troubles, the peace process, and the 1998 Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland were followed by a complacent atmosphere of military de-securitisation in Ireland.41 Significant cuts to the defence budget during Ireland’s financial crisis between 2008 and 2012 further weakened security infrastructure. Vice-Admiral Mark Mellett, Defence Forces (DF) Chief-of-Staff between 36 Leo G. Michel, “NATO Decision-Making: The ‘Consensus Rule’ Endures Despite Challenge,” in NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security, ed. Sebastian Mayer (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 110. 37 Joe Burton, “NATO’s Cyber Defence: Strategic Challenges and Institutional Adaptation,” Defence Studies 15, no. 4 (2015), 297. 38 Burton “NATO’s Cyber Defence,” 298. 39 Sandra Hurley, “Committee Hears Ireland Should Spend ‘10 Times More’ on Cyber

Security,” Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ), May 25, 2021, https://www.rte.ie/news/2021/ 0525/1223759-hse-cyber-attack/. 40 Matthew Kaminski, “Putin Has Exposed Europe’s Cracks,” The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-has-exposed-europes-cracks-140295 0676. 41 Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86.

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2015 and 2021, has acknowledged that a growing civil-military disconnect in Ireland is “frustrating,” arguing that it is “a simple reality [for the Irish government] whereby the Defence Forces is seen as a cost centre, that it consumes resources, that may well be allocated better elsewhere.”42 Ireland is meanwhile without the military capabilities to monitor and police its sovereign and controlled airspace. Tom Clonan remarks, “That function – remarkably – is carried out for us [Ireland] by the [UK’s] RAF [Royal Air Force].”43 This is a reference to an ambiguous and secretive agreement between UK and Irish government agencies “to allow RAF fighter jets to operate in Irish sovereign airspace” made soon after the 9/11 attacks that has been partially disclosed and discussed in the media with headline reports appearing as early as 2003 as well as in recent years.44 Russia’s “full-spectrum” repertoire regularly utilises military operations below the emergency threshold to allow plausible deniability, aggression that aims to confuse Western decision-making.45 There has been a serious rise in Russian military aircraft violating the sovereign and controlled airspace of EU and NATO member states since 2014.46 Failing to file route plans with civilian aviation authorities, Russian fighter jets do not communicate transponder code, they “fly dark,” dangerously

42 Mark Mellett cited in Niall O’Connor, “Outgoing Head of Defence Forces Says Government Cuts to Military Have Caused ‘Frustration’,” The Journal.ie, August 1, 2021, https://www.thejournal.ie/chief-of-staff-of-the-defence-forces-mark-mellett-ret irement-interview-funding-challenges-and-future-5507013-Aug2021/. 43 Tom Clonan, “Our Defence Forces Are Effectively on Life-Support,” The Journal.ie, September 27, 2020, https://www.thejournal.ie/readme/defence-forces-in-cri sis-5213752-Sep2020/. 44 See Don Lavery, “Government’s Secret Plan to Ask Britain for Help if Attacked,” Irish Independent, March 2, 2003, https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/governmentssecret-plan-to-ask-britain-for-help-if-attacked-26229191.html. And Paul Williams, “Secret Defence Pact Allowing RAF Jets in Irish Airspace ‘Undermines our Neutrality’, Says TD Berry,” Irish Independent, June 11, 2021, https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/sec ret-defence-pact-allowing-raf-jets-inirish-airspace-undermines-our-neutrality-says-td-berry40526069.html. 45 Jonsson and Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict,” 1–22. 46 Alberto Nardelli and George Arnett, “NATO Reports Surge in Jet Interceptions as

Russia Tensions Increase,” The Guardian, August 3, 2015, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2015/aug/03/military-aircraft-interventions-have-surged-top-gun-but-forreal.

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undetectable to civilian air traffic control.47 Ireland remains exposed to this low-intensity military intimidation that gradually seeks to heighten insecurity in northern Europe, with Gustav Gressel arguing that “Russia doesn’t really recognise neutrality [including Ireland’s]. The Kremlin still has a Soviet mindset. They see neutrality as tactical. Ireland is viewed as a weak spot for the enemy and nothing more.”48 Interviewed by RTÉ Radio in January 2021, Mellett argued that “in the last ten years, there has been a general decline in terms of security worldwide” and that Ireland needed to maintain an effective defence posture not least because of “three wars on Europe’s borders.”49 Mellett was referring to conflicts in Ukraine, Libya and Syria, but this was still understating the situation, serious military conflict also occurred between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020 while other post-Soviet “frozen conflicts” smoulder on the verge of further hostilities.50 These comments inspire more thinking on how this deterioration precisely affects Ireland’s security. Hybrid strategies have various layers extending from one conflict to impact security further afield. The Baltic states, Poland and Finland immediately and vocally opposed Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, each supported strong EU economic sanctions against Moscow. Russia soon responded with hybrid interference. When an immigration crisis hit Europe in 2015 and 2016; Finland suffered the unexpected problem of many undocumented migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) crossing from Russia into its northern regions where limited processing infrastructure existed. Putting this and other events connected to Russian hybrid interference into context, then chairman of the Finnish parliament’s committee for defence policy, Ilkka Kanerva, explained that “They [Russian authorities] are very skilful at sending signals. They want to show that Finland should be very 47 “NATO Intercepts Russian Planes ‘10 Times in a Day’,” BBC News, March 30, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56577865. 48 Gustav Gressel cited in John Mooney, “Blocking of Irish Embassy Expan-

sion Only Puts Russian Spooks on Hold,” The Sunday Times, August 23, 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/past-six-days/2020-08-23/ireland/blocking-of-irishembassy-expansion-only-puts-russian-spooks-on-hold-3p8kfqgl2. 49 Interview with Vice-Admiral Mark Mellet, “Defence Forces Step Up Role in Covid Battle,” RTÉ Radio News at One, January 8, 2021, https://www.rte.ie/radio/radio1/ clips/21891754/. 50 Eoin Micheál McNamara, “Failing to Defrost the Frozen Conflicts,” New Eastern Europe 4, no. 5 (2012), 86–91.

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careful when it makes its own decisions on things like military exercises, our partnership with NATO and European Union sanctions.”51 Belarus adopted similar tactics in 2021 when large numbers of MENA migrants were encouraged to travel through its territory to its border with the EU, pressurizing authorities in the Baltic states and Poland.52 This was retaliation for Polish and Baltic influence in the EU when the bloc applied sanctions on Minsk for serious electoral fraud and the subsequent authoritarian crackdown by Alexander Lukashenko after the 2020 Presidential Election in Belarus.53 Airspace violations are an area where Ireland is particularly vulnerable to similar Russian “signalling,” most notably as intimidation for taking anti-Russian positions in the EU. Staying politically “neutral” will be untenable for Dublin, especially if one of Ireland’s closer Western partners suffers an episode of Russian aggression. In 2018, former Russian intelligence official Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia were attacked with military-grade novichok in Salisbury in a suspected GRU—Russia’s military intelligence agency—operation in the UK.54 Ireland backed EU solidarity with the UK, expelling one Russian diplomat in protest. Russia promised to retaliate diplomatically, but with airspace violations as the most obvious option, there is still little to deter Moscow from responding with military signalling in response to Irish influence on EU policy in the future. Beyond political coercion, Russian strategists have a wider interest in Ireland’s air policing vulnerabilities. Despite the hazy presence of the UK RAF, Dublin’s inability to monitor and police its controlled airspace allows Russian military aircraft greater freedom of action to conduct manoeuvres. This holds repercussions for NATO as there is more leeway 51 Ilkka Kanerva cited

in Andrew Higgins, “EU Suspects Russian Agenda in Migrants’ Shifting Arctic Route,” The New York Times, April 2, 2016, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/world/europe/for-migrants-into-eur ope-a-road-less-traveled.html. 52 “Belarus: EU ‘Not Intimidated’ By Lukashenko’s Migrant Threat,” Deutsche Welle, July 6, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-eu-not-intimidated-by-lukashenkos-mig rant-threat/a-58177975. 53 James Shotter and Max Seddon, “EU Sees Retaliation By Lukashenko in Belarus Migrant Crisis,” The Financial Times, November 10, 2021, https://www.ft.com/con tent/3f3f0439-7a08-4c4d-b2b4-7e53c3c454ba. 54 David Bond, Henry Mance and Henry Foy, “UK Blames Russian Military Intelligence Agents for Skripal Attack,” The Financial Times, September 5, 2018, https://www. ft.com/content/44169b4e-b0f3-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132.

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for Russian reconnaissance to survey RAF reaction times and those of other NATO air forces over the north Atlantic.55 Intelligence gathered from this could be transferred to advantage Russia’s military elsewhere when Moscow competes with Western actors. The aircraft types deployed by Russia for some operations in the north Atlantic give further indications of increasing military activity in Ireland’s strategic hinterland. For example, use of the Tu-142, a maritime surveillance aircraft, hints at Russian submarine manoeuvres taking place in the sea below.56 The Irish Aviation Authority’s (IAA) submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces (henceforth “the Commission”) published in 2021 recommended that: “The Defence Forces should have full capability to detect potential aircraft infringements into our [Ireland’s] national airspace.”57 Ireland does not currently possess “the radar, air defence, and air interdiction capability necessary to deter and monitor Russian or other aircraft entering Irish airspace without permission.”58 A further submission to the Commission prepared by a former member of the Air Corps estimated that Ireland would need to procure 40 fighter jets to gain “full [air defence] capability.”59 However, as limited airspace interference is the risk most likely to be encountered by Ireland in this area, it is important that air policing is emphasised as the primary priority and not full air defence currently. Interviewed on Newstalk in June 2021, retired Air Corps Lieutenant Colonel and aviation expert Kevin Byrne claimed that NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission is “to protect them [the Baltic states] from potential

55 Ray Murphy, “Why Are Russian Military Aircraft Flying in Irish Controlled Airspace?” RTÉ Brainstorm, June 8, 2020, https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2020/0318/1123836russian-military-aircraft-bombers-ireland/. 56 Brian Hutton, “Russian Bombers in Irish Airspace for Second Time in Days,” The Irish Times, March 11, 2020, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/rus sian-bombers-in-irish-airspace-for-second-time-in-days-1.4200213. 57 “Published Submission From Irish Aviation Authority,” Commission on Defence Forces, 2021, https://assets.gov.ie/136319/214528c9-95ac-4d4b-b331-efda8f6fdcdb. pdf. 58 Derek McGourty, “Irish Defence Planning and Its Guiding Strategy in a Changing Strategic Environment,” Defence Forces Review 17 (2020), 15. 59 Martin Wall and Conor Gallagher, “The ‘Gaping Gap’ in Ireland’s Airspace Defence,” The Irish Times, June 19, 2021, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/ irish-news/the-gaping-gap-in-ireland-s-airspace-defence-1.4597124.

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invasion, we [Ireland] don’t have that problem.”60 This perspective is mistaken. The phrase “protect from potential invasion” gives the flawed impression that Baltic Air Policing is actually an air defence mission, which it is not. Rotations have rarely exceeded sixteen fighter jets, NATO does not currently perceive the need to switch to an air defence footing, this mission instead monitors and, if necessary, escorts non-NATO military aircraft from the Baltic states’ airspace. The number of NATO aircraft on Baltic Air Policing duty has fluctuated since the mission’s creation in 2004, but it has never been at levels that could implement air defence vis-à-vis Russian military capabilities in the same region.61 Ireland is more peripheral to Russia force projection, but Dublin still has the same airspace violation risk that the Baltic states and other EU and NATO members have. Finding an effective response becomes a complex task once Ireland’s domestic political sensitivities are considered alongside this strategic vulnerability. With air policing (as differentiated from air defence) frequencies elsewhere in Europe as a reference point, it is probably possible to police Ireland’s sovereign and controlled airspace with a minimum fleet of 4– 10 fighter jets, once equipped with the correct military radar system. As a “unilateral” or independent solution, when ground infrastructure and additional military recruitment are included, this option still has significant financial costs.62 According to Viktoriya Fedorchak, further “bilateral” and “international” options to ease these costs are theoretically available to Ireland, but will be less politically attractive.63 An agreement between Ireland and NATO for an air policing mission similar to Baltic Air Policing does offer an “international” solution.64 However, as Fedorchak concedes, much “political complexity” would need to be overcome

60 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Kevin Byrne cited in “Do We Have the Capacity to Police Our Own Skies?” Newstalk, June 17, 2021, 00.06.20, https://www.newstalk. com/podcasts/highlights-from-the-pat-kenny-show/do-have-we-the-capacity-to-policeour-own-skies. 61 Eoin Micheál McNamara, “Securing the Nordic-Baltic Region,” NATO Review, March 17, 2016, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/17/securingthe-nordic-baltic-region/index.html. 62 Viktoriya Fedorchak, “Ireland in the Contemporary Strategic Environment: The Case in Favour of Air Policing,” Defence Forces Review 17 (2020), 43–44. 63 Fedorchak, “Ireland in the Contemporary Strategic Environment,” 43–44. 64 Fedorchak, “Ireland in the Contemporary Strategic Environment,” 43–44.

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for such an arrangement to function.65 Due to collective defence under Article 5, NATO is unlikely to sanction such assistance for Ireland as a non-alliance member. To gain this assistance; Ireland would probably have to negotiate NATO membership; a difficult event to foresee as long as sceptical domestic public opinion persists.

Maritime Security in the North Atlantic Russian intelligence gathering focused on undersea telecommunications cables facilitating transatlantic telephone, internet and financial exchanges has recently been reported. It is claimed that 75 per cent of the northern hemisphere’s undersea connections “pass through or near Irish waters.”66 It has long been anticipated that undersea cables will be phased out and replaced by satellite communications, but this is a slow transition.67 US intelligence sources assert that Russia’s GRU is mapping weak points in undersea cable networks, with information gathered giving an advantage for espionage or to cut “communications at a time of conflict.”68 Attracting FDI from major technology companies places a responsibility on Ireland to prevent serious infrastructure breaches that risk economic activity. Density defines this undersea cable network, connectivity outages from routine damage or disruption normally occur, but these are alleviated by rerouting data through functioning cables.69 Complex cable density combined with the harsh maritime logistics can obstruct intelligence gathering expeditions. However, beyond this coincidental protection, further Irish naval monitoring is required as maritime security deteriorates, this can help to deter espionage activity on vital transatlantic telecommunications infrastructure. If not, Sébastien 65 Fedorchak, “Ireland in the Contemporary Strategic Environment,” 43–44. 66 Shane Mulcahy, “Patrolling Below the Horizon: Addressing Ireland’s Awareness of

Our Maritime Geospatial Domain,” Defence Forces Review 16 (2019), 117. 67 Mulcahy, “Patrolling Below the Horizon,” 117. 68 John Mooney, “Russian Agents Plunge to New Ocean Depths in Ireland to Crack

Transatlantic Cables,” The Sunday Times, February 16, 2020, https://www.thetimes.co. uk/article/russian-agents-plunge-to-new-ocean-depths-in-ireland-to-crack-transatlantic-cab les-fnqsmgncz. 69 Sébastien Roblin, “Russian Spy Submarines Are Tampering with Undersea Cables that Make the Internet Work. Should We Be Worried?” The National Interest, August 19, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-spy-submarines-are-tamperingundersea-cables-make-internet-work-should-we-be.

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Roblin argues that improved situational awareness gives hostile powers the “capacity to launch a more targeted attack against selected cables” that could “cause significant disruptions.”70 The COVID-19 pandemic has further heightened these stakes, as the labour force has been advised to work remotely where possible, this increases stress on telecommunications systems. In its post-pandemic social development plan, the Irish government intends to incentivise greater “remote working” as a digitally driven form of de-centralisation.71 While the government has avoided security discourse when discussing these plans, they come with a heightened economic risk from targeted disruption. Recent increases in Russian submarine activity proximate to Ireland’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have renewed conventional naval competition in the north Atlantic, with Magnus Nordenman arguing that this centres on the “maritime choke point at the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap.”72 Most prominently indicated by China’s “One Belt, One Road” ambition in Eurasia, great power politics is now increasingly focused on the control of major global trade routes. Climate change and melting polar ice sheets will facilitate the emergence of a lucrative Arctic shipping lane. Current Russian submarine activity in the north Atlantic has been claimed as equivalent to “the level last seen shortly after the Cold War”; this supports Moscow’s effort to militarily dominate the wider access points leading to the Arctic as a trade route emerges.73 Russia’s naval posture in the north Atlantic has a range of economic, political and strategic implications for both Ireland and NATO. Should Europe’s security situation deteriorate further, NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) supporting deterrence for the Baltic states and Poland will depend on a further mobilisation of military assets. The supply chains that vitally support military reinforcements for eFP are both amphibious through the “North and Baltic seas” and land-based.74 Should the 70 Roblin, “Russian Spy Submarines are Tampering with Undersea Cables”. 71 Government of Ireland, Making Remote Work: National Remote Work Strategy

(Dublin, January 2021), https://assets.gov.ie/119312/299c21e9-9ec6-4dab-a7fe-71b d0da3e1d0.pdf. 72 Magnus Nordenman, “Back to the Gap. The Re-Emerging Maritime Contest in the North Atlantic,” The RUSI Journal 162, no. 1 (2017), 24. 73 Nordenman, “Back to the Gap,” 26. 74 Luis Simón, “Assessing NATO’s Eastern European ‘Flank’,” Parameters 44, no. 3

(2014), 70.

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Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet strengthen its north Atlantic posture, this could be converted into Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) to obstruct naval transport of US military eFP reinforcements to Europe.75 The US Navy responded to this deterioration by re-establishing its 2nd Fleet in 2018 having previously disbanded it in 2011.76 As these serious strategic developments occur, collective military action will be required to protect EU and NATO interests, Ireland therefore has the responsibility to ensure that its maritime zones are not easily violated by the submarines of hostile powers conducting covert exercises or drills to obstruct NATO’s military mobility. Recent reports that Ireland’s “Defence Forces are effectively on life-support” with capacity in the Naval Service suffering significantly are thus a profound concern.77 According to 2020 reports, the Naval Service was operating without “one fifth” of the personnel required for even routine tasks such as patrols against illicit narcotics and the monitoring of fisheries.78 Further controversy was revealed in May 2021 with reports that the Irish Sea-Fisheries Protection Authority (SFCA) “requested and received” support from the EU’s European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) to cover patrols for Irish waters “on four occasions between January and March in 2021.”79 Dublin requested EU assistance because its Naval Service was unable to undertake enough patrol hours.80 Indicating Ireland’s weakness to independently undertake even these less-strenuous naval operations, reinforcement from an EFCA vessel is supposed to be an option of last resort for EU member states. Focusing on conventional naval manoeuvres, Derek McGourty explains that “The Irish Naval service has no anti-submarine capability

75 Nordenman, “Back to the Gap,” 27. 76 Mark D. Faram, “Back to the Future with 2nd Fleet,” Navy Times, August

24, 2018, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2018/08/25/back-to-the-fut ure-with-2nd-fleet/. 77 Clonan, “Our Defence Forces Are Effectively on Life-Support”. 78 Sean O’Riordan, “Special Report: Massive Underfunding ‘Severely Constricts’ Ability

of Naval Service to Carry Out Operations,” Irish Examiner, August 14, 2020, https:// www.irishexaminer.com/news/spotlight/arid-40032200.html. 79 Conor Gallagher, “Ireland Had to Rely on EU Ship to Patrol Fishing Waters Due to Naval Shortages,” The Irish Times, May 28, 2021, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ ireland/irish-news/ireland-had-to-rely-on-eu-ship-to-patrol-fishing-waters-due-to-navalshortages-1.4578225. 80 Gallagher “Ireland Had to Rely on EU Ship”.

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and its ability to deter or even detect such maritime intelligence gathering is exceptionally limited.”81 Beyond Ireland alone, serious transnational security issues (undersea cables, narcotics transit, and naval manoeuvres) in the north Atlantic, also make this a security concern for the EU and NATO. Discreetly availing of tacit security assistance from the UK (airspace) and the EU (naval) highlights considerable hypocrisy in Ireland’s neutrality. Albeit in a disorganised manner, Dublin accepts that it needs to “pool” its sovereignty with partners, but where domestic political scepticism still inhibits transparent and more effective security cooperation.82

Conclusion In its published submission to the Commission, Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) highlighted that: “The engagement of the Defence Forces with the EU, NATO, through Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the OSCE will become increasingly important as regional organisations continue to take on more responsibilities.”83 This DFAT document gives the impression that expeditionary peacekeeping will remain the main focus in Ireland’s cooperation with NATO; there is no elaboration on how cooperation could assist with national defence.84 Returning “back to basics” with collective defence in Europe, expeditionary peacekeeping has become less important for NATO since the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ended in 2014. Dublin is therefore unlikely to gain much more added value from cooperation with NATO in peacekeeping, but there are still a number of other areas where stronger links with NATO could enhance Ireland’s security. In Ireland’s problematic security paradox, neutrality’s domestic supporters will insist that sovereignty and independence continue to be protected by military non-alignment, but, over recent 81 McGourty, “Irish Defence Planning,” 15. 82 Andrew Moravscik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal

Intergovernmentalist Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4 (1993), 507. 83 “Published Submission From the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT),” Commission on Defence Forces, 2021, https://assets.gov.ie/136318/f80afe5d-11f4436b-9b6b-ce2a1d539b4d.pdf. 84 “Published Submission From the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)”.

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decades, government complacency has then undermined the independent defence capacities that safeguard Ireland’s sovereignty and independence. This is even more curious because Ireland’s strategic geography is increasingly de-territorialised, thus creating a larger number of vulnerabilities. While beneficial for its economy, Ireland’s recent centrality in many vital networks connecting Western states heightens its profile as a target for hybrid interference. With some Irish vulnerabilities heightening security risks for other transatlantic democracies, Dublin must focus on reversing its “weak-link” status in the West’s transnational security chain. While some Irish policymakers might prefer to undertake security cooperation through the EU, this is unlikely to create major benefits. In responding to Europe’s current security problems, the majority of Ireland’s transatlantic partners still prioritise security cooperation through NATO, while EU initiatives are largely supplementary. Nevertheless, while likely to generate some added value for Ireland’s security, a stronger partnership with NATO will still not dramatically resolve Dublin’s problems. Through the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII), NATO agreed Enhanced Opportunity Partnerships (EOPs) with six non-members: Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden and Ukraine since 2014.85 EOP offers “More tailor-made cooperation” with “regular, political consultations on security matters, including possibly at ministerial level”; “enhanced access to interoperability programmes and exercises”; “sharing information, including on lessons learned” and “closer association of such partners in times of crisis and the preparation of operations.”86 An EOP would provide Ireland with cooperative benefits beyond what is now modestly available through PfP, but while this might strengthen some of Ireland’s existing military capabilities, it will not offer the additional capabilities required to respond to Ireland’s serious military deficits. As long as Dublin remains outside NATO, it is the Irish government’s exclusive responsibility to develop stronger military capabilities to resolve multiple vulnerabilities as new tensions emerge between the great powers.

85 NATO, “Partnership Interoperability Initiative,” last modified November 3, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_132726.htm. 86 NATO, “Partnership Interoperability Initiative”.

Irish Military Neutrality: A Historical Perspective for Modern Consideration Daniel Ayiotis

Introduction The question is often asked: “why does Ireland, a neutral country, need a military?” This commonly held non-sequitur belies a critical misconception in popular understanding.1 Maintaining a policy of neutrality and 1 This recurs regularly in Irish public discourse, both literally (Irish Independent, So should we fire the army?, https://www.independent.ie/lifestyle/so-should-we-fire-thearmy-26605397.html, 11 December 2010) and rhetorically (Irish Examiner, Ireland’s Defence Forces in the last chance saloon, https://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/com mentanalysis/arid-40304219.html, 3 June 2021). In the latter article, Colonel Dorcha Lee (retired) described the current political leadership as ‘all products of an educational system that does not explain to our children why we need defence forces, and what the consequences of loss of independence mean for nations that neglect their national defence.’

D. Ayiotis (B) Irish Defence Forces, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_20

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having a military are not mutually exclusive; in fact, the opposite is true.2 The stronger the military, the more “neutral” a state can afford to be. For informed opinions and debates about contemporary Irish neutrality and its future direction, it is essential to look at its history and understand what neutrality has really meant in the Irish experience and the reasons for its adoption. The question of neutrality has, in turn, formed the kernel of the politically driven, public debate on the necessity and appropriate contribution of the Defence Forces to Irish security, society, and foreign policy. Irish neutrality has been erroneously presented in various ways for rhetorical purposes: an ostentatious display of post-colonial virtue; independent defiance of the great world powers and their neo-colonial ambitions; and even moral deficiency. The real origins of Irish neutrality lie in realpolitik and the pragmatism of a small, newly independent, and often cash-strapped state. This pragmatism can be broadly traced through three phases: neutrality as necessity from the end of the Civil War in 1923 until 1939, driven by the obligations of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and Commonwealth membership; neutrality as expediency, from the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 until joining the United Nations in 1955, as a small nation navigating dire straits as great world powers and ideologies fought for dominance; and neutrality as convenience from 1955 until the present, as a means of exercising an influence on the international stage, espousing multilateralism and enjoying its benefits while retaining a get out of jail free card should the state feel overly committed by multilateralism’s requirements. In examining these three phases, an overall picture emerges of neutrality which has always meant whatever Ireland needed it to at the time.

2 The Law of Armed Conflict, which is drawn from customary international law, places obligations on neutral states that are de facto assumptions of their having a military force. The extent to which such obligations can be implemented is directly proportional to the strength of the military of the neutral state. Such obligations include that a neutral state must take measures to ensure and enforce the protection of its neutrality within the neutral space for which it is responsible and, if necessary, use force to repel any violation of its territory. For example, Hague Convention (V), Article 5: “A neutral power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory. It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its neutrality unless the said acts have been committed on its own territory.”

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Neutrality as Necessity (1923–1939) Origins and Policy In late 1923 the Irish Government was attempting to establish the functions and remit of a democratic state.3 As part of this, the post-Civil War National Army (The Defence Forces from 1 October 1924) was attempting to remodel itself based on other modern European armies, and the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923 was the primary statutory instrument used to professionalise the Army and to subordinate it to the primacy of politics.4 The National Army had been hastily assembled in 1922 following the split in the IRA over the Anglo-Irish Treaty.5 The force, while necessary to secure the fledgling democratic institutions of the new state, lacked training, administration, cohesion, and discipline. It was bloated and unsustainably expensive to run. The Minister for Defence, General Richard Mulcahy, planned to reduce the size of the Army from approximately 50,000 to 28,000 by 1 April 1924.6 The problem was that there existed no proper defence policy for guidance.

3 The Irish Free State has only existed since 1922 and the Civil War had only ended in 1923. The fledgling government was still getting to grips with running a peacetime country. In relation to Defence, this was most evident in the transition of responsibility for internal security from the Army to the Garda (police force). See: Eunan O’Halpin, Defending Ireland: The Irish State and Its Enemies Since 1922 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), 45. 4 The Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923 was intended only to continue in force until other provisions had been made by law for the defence of Saorstát Éireann, and to only continue in force for a period of one year. For this reason, it was followed by the Defence Forces (Continuance and Amendment) Act 1924, the Defence Act 1937, and 8 more Temporary Provisions Acts up until 1949. This act facilitated what were termed “transitory provisions.” These meant that, for this transitory period while the state was getting established, its armed forces remained as they were constituted at that time, i.e., the National Army, which itself came about following the split in the IRA over the AngloIrish Treaty. Section 22 of the Act stated that the Forces were to be established from a date to be fixed by proclamation of the Executive Council in Iris Oifigiúil (the Irish State gazette). This was 1 October 1924, the date taken as the official establishment of the Defence Forces as exists today. 5 The first uniformed National Army soldiers appeared in public on 1 February 1922 at the handover by the British of Beggars Bush Barracks, Dublin. 6 General Richard Mulcahy, Memo on Demobilisation and Reorganisation of the Army, 1923, Military Archives.

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Aggravating this situation was the Army Mutiny. This episode took place in 1924 when a group within the Army known as the IRA Organisation (IRAO), with support from a faction within the government led by the Minister for Labour, Joe McGrath, issued an ultimatum to the government “to suspend, and establish an enquiry into, demobilisation and reorganisation and to give the IRAO a say in it.”7 1924 was also the year that Ireland sent its first representative to the League of Nations, and out of this milieu came a pressing need to get the Army operating professionally, as well as a preoccupation with civilian control that has lasted until the present and arguably a reluctance to allow the formation of an Army with a full war-fighting capability. Since 1922, the Army had been in a state of flux with no stated policy to maintain it, so in May 1925 the Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant General Peadar MacMahon, established the Army Organisation Board. The Board’s role was “to examine into, and report on, the necessary modifications in the organisation of the Defence Forces to enable them to fulfil the functions of a modern army in relation to National Defence.”8 The Board members noted when they first convened that “we were seriously handicapped by the fact that we had no clear definition of Government Policy regarding National Defence.”9 On 22 July 1925, just after the Board began its work, the Chief-of-Staff submitted a memo to the government stressing urgent need for the Army to have an outline of its intended defence policy for the state. MacMahon’s memo and the subsequent correspondence with the government highlighted the tension between economic and political factors on one hand, and military factors on the other. The memo described the Army as being generally orientated towards dealing with internal security, namely, a serious disturbance in the north-east, an outbreak by the IRA, and serious riots or disturbances by ex-Army men or Communists. The Army was still the internally focused, counter-insurgency force that it had been during the Civil War. The

7 Major General Liam Tobin and Colonel C.F. Dalton to President W.T. Cosgrave, 6 March 1924, The Army Inquiry Committee (1924) Papers. 8 Report of the Army Organisation Board, July 1926, Department of Defence Introduction. 9 Report of the Army Organisation Board, 2 July 1926.

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Chief-of-Staff now needed to know from the government the nature of aggression that they anticipated and the identity of potential aggressors.10 MacMahon’s memo asked important questions regarding Ireland’s defence policy and the role of the Army within it. It suggested three broad options for consideration. The first was total independence in the defence of Irish territory; the second was defence as part of the wider defence scheme of the British Empire; and the third option was abandoning the defence of the country to British forces entirely. The relationship with Britain, particularly in relation to defence, was not negotiable. It was implicit in the Anglo-Irish Treaty that “Ireland would rely on Britain to defend the surrounding seas and skies, and that Ireland would never allow her territory to be used by a foreign country to harm Britain’s defence interests.”11 In light of this, it is apparent that Ireland’s early adoption of neutrality was a default position as much as anything else, not least an ideological one. On 14 November 1925, the Irish Government approved a kind of ad hoc defence policy. Ireland required its Army to be an independent force capable of defending the country against internal and external threats.12 It would be a standing Army of 10–12,000 all ranks in peacetime, capable of rapid expansion when required. The week following this announcement the President of the Army Organisation Board noted that; We must keep in mind that the ordinary public opinion, official and unofficial, is leaning towards a reduction of the Standing Army. The President himself, speaking on behalf of the Executive Council, I believe, has expressed the opinion that our strength should not exceed 10,000 all ranks.13

10 JP Duggan, A History of the Irish Army (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1991), Ch. 5: Fluctuations and Adjustments, 138–177. 11 O’Halpin (1999), 15. 12 In November 1925 the Boundary Commission Report, examining the border

between the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland, was leaked. The Border issue was highly sensitive, and this conservative report recommended only minor alterations. The reignition of the hostilities that had led to the Civil War (1922–1923) was a very real possibility. 13 Chairman of the Army Organisation Board to Deputy Quartermaster General, 25 November 1925, Army Organisation Board (1926) working papers.

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The government also decreed that the Army must be organised in such a way as to be capable of full and complete coordination with British forces in the defence of Free State territory or violation of neutrality on the part of a common enemy. The resulting neutrality was therefore not an ideology in spite of Britain, but a practicality in support of both Britain and Ireland.

The Report of the Army Organisation Board The Army Organisation Board’s report, presented in mid-1926, was cognisant of both economic realities and public opinion. It proposed a force based on three interdependent components: A Regular Army, consisting of a permanent force and 1st line reserve; a Volunteer Force, comprising the 2nd line reserve; and a Reserve Officers’ Corps. In its broadest sense, this was a plan of organisation which proposed a military designed to safeguard the country against both invasion and internal disturbance. This, the Board noted, was in accordance with the views of the Executive Council (Government cabinet).14 It was generally agreed by Army and Government that the types of national emergency the Army could be called upon to face in the future fell into three classes: (a) Domestic—Civil War in the Twenty-six counties. (b) Semi-Domestic—Civil War in NE Ulster. (c) International—(1) Armed Neutrality in future Great War, or, (2) Intervention, involving in either case the defence of Ireland against an enemy of vast strength and resources.15 The Board stated that what was required was the Army be converted from its “present semi-immobile basis designed to deal with internal disorder, to a mobile basis” and that “provision must be made for rapid and orderly expansion in times of a major National Emergency.”16 The Board’s report laid out a proposal for the Army which was a balance

14 Report of the Army Organisation Board, 2 July 1926. 15 Adjutant General to Chief of Staff, Notes on Scheme for National Defence, 14 April

1925, Army Organisation Board (1926) working papers. 16 Report of the Army Organisation Board (1926).

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of national security and national economy and one which they proposed would be implemented over ten years. Regarding the size and strength of the Army, the Board’s recommendations are telling. Primarily, it was pragmatic and cognisant of—even hamstrung by—the country’s financial situation at that time, noting “the necessity of reducing the costs of National Defence.” The force it proposed was based on gradually reducing the number of permanent soldiers and, as it reduced, increasing the number of reservists. Starting from its then present position of approximately 11,000 all ranks with about 550 other ranks posted to the Reserve, the envisaged end-state was that by 1940 the Standing Army was to have reached its absolute minimum of approximately 5000 all ranks, with a Regular Army Reserve of 25,000 and a Volunteer Reserve of 20,000. The Board’s logic was that: A formidable fighting force will thus be evolved, numbering 50,000, and the cost of maintaining this should be comparatively small, leaving the remainder of the Army Vote available for the purchase of Warlike Stores required to equip our Defence Forces on the same basis as other modern Armies...The Standing Army is the skeleton or scaffolding from which the main body of the Defence Forces is built in War, and the principal peacetime function is the training of all its component parts for War.

The resulting policy of Irish neutrality which was in place by the outbreak of the Second World War had shaped the Defence Forces as it stood at that time. This neutrality in turn had been shaped by a combination of both military and fiscal necessity tempered with a predilection to keep the potency of the peacetime Army to an absolute minimum, arguably a neurosis from the Army Mutiny. This neutrality was neither virtuous nor defiant, but necessary. It was also the beginning of the ongoing Irish policy of looking after the defence portfolio “on the cheap.”17 Neither, however, did neutrality fall within the third, previously mentioned descriptor of moral deficiency. The Anglo-Irish writer Elizabeth Bowen said of Ireland’s neutrality that “it is typical of her intense and 17 Irish GDP spending on Defence has fallen from 0.33% in 2016 to 0.27% in 2020. This puts Ireland 164th in the world ranking of percentage GDP expenditure on defence and 3rd lowest in the world. CIA World Factbook: Ireland, https://www. cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/military-expenditures/country-comparison, accessed 19 August 2021.

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narrow view of herself that she cannot see that her attitude must appear to England as an affair of blindness, egotism, escapism or sheer funk.”18 However, the best case study to contradict this is the Irish Army’s participation in the 18th Military Mission, which saw Irish Army officers posted to British Army Headquarters to coordinate joint operations in the event of German invasion of Ireland. This, in turn, was part of the most misunderstood and defining chapters of Defence Forces’ history and one key to understanding the reality of Irish neutrality—The Emergency.

Neutrality as Expediency (1939–1955) The Emergency The Second World War period was known in Ireland as The Emergency. This name derived from the introduction of the Emergency Powers Act 1939. While sometimes misunderstood as a twee euphemism, it represented, for neutral Ireland, the penultimate preparatory stage prior to the invasion and full warfare. By 1937, as war in Europe was becoming more likely, it was estimated that a military of 100,000 across all arms would be needed to defend Ireland from external attack. This figure had originally been referenced in the 1926 Army Organisation Board. By 1938 Irish defence spending finally started to increase but it was too late. By the outbreak of war, the Defence Forces stood at a mere 19,100 on paper (11,500 of these were made up of the Reserve and the Volunteer Force). This was significantly below the Defence Force’s own war establishment of 37,000, which by its own reckoning was insufficient for wartime anyway. A policy of neutrality was the “principal strategy for avoiding the horrors of war” for a country that had “crippling deficiencies in equipment, weapons and organisation.”19 For Taoiseach Éamon de Valera, as both the head of the government and a prominent independence struggle leader, involvement in a war between the major European powers not only put Irish independence at risk, but also risked enhancing

18 Elizabeth Bowen, in Robert Fisk, In Time of War (London, André Deutsch, 1983),

352. 19 John Gibney, Kate O’Malley, Michael Kennedy, A Voice Among the Nations (Dublin, RIA, 2019), 77.

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IRA support and even a second Civil War by joining a war at Britain’s instigation.20 As late as 1939, the government decided that, as Ireland was not directly involved in the War, it could not afford to expand the Army to full wartime establishment. This, arguably, shows that the previous decade’s defence policy of spend as little as possible and scale up in an emergency was useless and little more than wishful thinking as far as planning was concerned. Driven by necessity, numerical expansion continued, centred on the Army and despite the shortage of weapons and equipment. As part of this expansion, General Headquarters (GHQ) was restructured into forward and rear echelons. Provision was made for the Minister for Defence to appoint a General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Forces.21 The Chief-of-Staff (COS) was to be given this position in the event of invasion and command the forward echelon, while the Assistant COS would command the rear echelon.22 This was a peculiar situation, in which unified command was to be withheld until the last necessary moment. While not conclusive, it is reasonable to infer a mistrust of the formation of a military with full war-fighting capability, and that this was a contributing factor in Ireland’s policy of neutrality. The partiality of Irish neutrality was not a secret at the time (though the actual extent of the partiality was). For the government, “neutrality was deemed a flexible policy that took into account geopolitical realities as well as Ireland’s international interests.”23 Nor was it the overwhelming position of the population. Over 50,000 Irish citizens volunteered for service in the British Armed Forces, and there was a notable minority Anglo-Irish community who viewed neutrality as a particularly dishonourable moral deficit of the Irish state. Considering this, the often-proposed concept of neutrality as a matter of national honour, some transcendent eminence from the spirit of Éire displaying “an almost religious fervour” does not hold up under scrutiny.24 It 20 Ibid., 89. 21 The last time there had been a ‘General Officer Commanding the Forces’ was

in 1924. The appointment was created following the Army Mutiny and filled by Eoin O’Duffy, who was also Garda Commissioner at the time. 22 Daniel Ayiotis, John Gibney, Michael Kennedy, The Emergency: A Visual History of the Irish Defence Forces 1939–1945 (Dublin, Wordwell, 2019), 21. 23 Gibney, O’Malley, Kennedy (2019), 95. 24 Harold Nicholson, Diaries and Letters 1939–1945 (London, Collins, 1967), 217.

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may have been what the de Valera cult of personality presented to the masses, but this was to create the necessary façade to navigate treacherous diplomatic straits. As Terrence Brown opined in relation to Professor Michael Tierney’s assertion that “neutrality afforded Ireland the nightmarish satisfaction of having to look on in comparative safety at horrors we can do nothing about,” most Irish people would have “seen little reason to forsake that comparative safety for the overwhelming risks of their young state that political and military partisanship would involve.”25 Brown believed that the Emergency period had been in reality “scarcely more of an experience of cultural isolation and deprivation than had any of the years that had preceded” independence.26 This analysis is partially accurate, and wholly insufficient. While Brown’s Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 1922–1985 was influential in its time, it typified the kind of thinking that coloured, and continues to colour, Irish conceptions of neutrality. It is only in relatively recent times, with the work of scholars like Dr. Michael Kennedy, that the military aspects of the Emergency period have been properly examined, with historians for a long time concentrating on its diplomatic, economic, and political aspects.

18th Military Mission The Emergency provides an excellent case study of the practical realities of Ireland’s policy of neutrality in the form of the 18th Military Mission. On 3 July 1940, Colonel Liam Archer, the Director of Intelligence, wrote to the Minister for Defence, Oscar Traynor. In his letter, Archer reported on a recent meeting with a member of Sir John Maffey’s (the UK’s representative to Ireland) staff, at Maffey’s request. Archer reported of his meeting that: [Maffey’s representative] told me that he had that day attended a Staff Conference at the Headquarters of the GOC-in-Chief (General Huddleston), Northern Ireland in Belfast. The GOC explained to his staff that 25 Terrence Brown, Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 1922–1985 (Glasgow, Fontana, 1985), 173. 26 Brown, Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 1922–1985, 175.

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they must understand British Forces were not going to the help of Eire forces in the event of a German invasion of Eire unless and until such aid was requested by the Eire Government. He indicated that General Huddleston had a complete and sympathetic understanding for the reasons for any delay that would ensue in the giving of British aid subsequent to the actual landing of German forces in Eire. My informant further stated that all the members of the staff were exceedingly keen to co-operate with our forces.

This letter paints a picture of a country with extremely limited resources, which found itself involved in an international game that it could not win but could not afford to lose either. Neutrality, therefore, was about playing Ireland’s cards close to its chest, hedging its bets, and waiting to see how the game played out before playing its own hand. This is evident in a letter from the Chief-of-Staff, Major General Dan McKenna, to Traynor, dated 6 July 1940, in which he discussed the disposition of the Defence Forces in the event of invasion. He acknowledged that “as a neutral State we may be attacked by Germany or England.” Accordingly, McKenna planned for possible British aggression as well as cooperation. It was against this backdrop that the 18th Military Mission was established. Its role was “to ensure that proper cooperation exists between British and Eire Forces” and its stated aim was that “the Mission will have an Officer at British GHQ, at British Operational HQ and at Irish Operational HQ.”27 Another memo gives further insight into the pragmatism and understanding of the common military interests behind this cooperation: If we deal intelligently with the British Questionnaire it gives us the opportunity to solve the whole question of command for Operations in Ireland in a way completely satisfactory to ourselves and, at the same time, calculated to further the common military interests to the fullest extent possible.28

It may seem from this that both sides, while appearing to cooperate, were doing so while playing their own cards close to their chests; the British making pretence that they would honour Irish neutrality, possibly to ensure that Ireland maintained its covert support and heavily biased 27 Memo: Formation of the 18th Military Mission, 1940, 18th Military Mission Papers. 28 Questionnaire submitted to the Defence Forces by the British ascertaining certain

information in relation to military capabilities and intentions, as part of the formation of the 18th Military Mission.

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form of neutrality, as well as keep on top of IRA elements using “England’s difficulty as Ireland’s opportunity.”29 This biased neutrality should be no surprise—as previously demonstrated it can be traced back to the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the formation of the state itself. In one letter, for example, British Forces requested that should they have to cross the border in the event of a German invasion that the Irish Army prevent “roads crossing the border being blocked by civilian traffic and ill-disposed persons being free to cross the Border and report on British concentrations, and also being free to move parallel with our columns and send out information as to their progress.”30 Similarly, this demonstrates Ireland facing the greatest challenge to its fledgling independence, outnumbered and out-gunned by Britain, trying to make sure that if the British were to act in Ireland, that Ireland would have some hand in directing those actions to its advantage. Arguably, there is no such thing as an entirely altruistic gesture from a foreign power, no matter how close the bonds of cooperation. That said, what the records of the 18th Military Mission demonstrate is, that while de Valera and Churchill were engaged in the political arena, their respective militaries got on with their job without fear of favour, and with a definite depth of cooperation beyond just providing each side with the bare minimum to keep the other on-side. The records of the 18th Military Mission contain many practical and detailed examples of this, including joint planning for refugee reception areas in the event of German invasion; Irish plans for the provision of forward dumps and the carrying out of works to facilitate the British Army’s move South, including the survey of suitable areas for aerodromes and the construction of movable runways; and complimentary Irish plans to extend our own fixed defences as part of joint operations.

29 This nationalist slogan, linked to the Irish Volunteers, dates to 1914, the outbreak of the First World War and the suspension by the British Government of the Third Home Rule Bill, which would have given a limited amount of independence to Ireland, specifically over home affairs. 30 British Representative to Éire to the Chief-of-Staff, 27 May 1941, 18th Military Mission Papers.

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After the War By 1945 Ireland was still a country finding its feet, pursuing an end to partition and full independence from Britain. Because of its neutrality during the War, Ireland found itself isolated. The League of Nations was dissolved in 1946 and Irish membership of the newly formed United Nations (1945) was vetoed four times between 1946 and 1955 by the Soviet Union, ostensibly due to its wartime neutrality, but also as it was considered a country whose natural sympathies lay with the Western bloc.31 Ireland’s links to the Commonwealth were severed in 1949 when it was declared a republic. Ireland refused to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as such a collective defence pact was a tacit acceptance of British forces in the North and partition.32 However, Ireland was not averse to multilateralism as its previous enthusiastic involvement in the League of Nations demonstrated. In 1949 it was one of the founding members of the Council of Europe and was, from the beginning, a supporter of European integration. During the Cold War, while Ireland was neutral in a practical sense, ideologically it was Western bloc and anti-Communist. Again, as described previously, this neutrality was about self-interest. As well as the national position on partition, the Defence Forces had again suffered post-Emergency due to budgetary cutbacks, just as it had following the Civil War.

Neutrality as Convenience (1955–Present) The impasse over Ireland’s UN membership was overcome when it joined the UN in 1955. In 1958 the Defence Forces first contribution to UN peacekeeping began with a call from the UN Secretary-General for an Irish contingent to serve with the UN Observer Force in Lebanon (UNOGIL). With this, “Peacekeeping” became a central tenet of Irish participation in the UN and the Defence Forces became the physical manifestation of Irish foreign policy. Inextricably linked to this came to a reinterpretation of Irish neutrality. Through “peacekeeping” the military now embodied Ireland Inc. on the world stage as “a peacemaker, a neutral

31 Gibney, O’Malley, Kennedy (2019), 113. 32 Ibid., 133.

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mediator seeking international justice and peace” with Ireland becoming “among the staunchest supporters of multilateralism” in the world.33

Irish Neutrality in the Modern Era Perhaps the biggest problem with neutrality is that, while it has various legal definitions, it has never been officially or fully defined in the Irish sense. MEP Luke “Ming” Flanagan has defined neutrality as meaning that “you don’t invade other countries and you don’t take sides in other people’s wars.”34 Regarding the former, it is a logical non-sequitur to imply that participating in UN led, EU led, NATO Partnership-for-Peace led, or OSCE led operations, imply participation in invasions. Regarding the latter, if allowing U.S. military aircraft enroute to the Middle East to refuel at Shannon constitutes “taking sides” then so did the Irish diplomatic and military cooperation during the Emergency described previously. Even still, this single example cannot be considered as generally representative. Finally, who exactly we consider to be “other” people, and under what circumstances we consider it acceptable to sit back and watch should they be faced with armed aggression, needs to be seriously considered if Ireland is to take its multilateralist and European credentials seriously. Another prominent commentator is Dr. Karen Devine.35 She has stated, for example, in relation to the effectiveness of neutrality during the Second World War, that “the deterrence of 100,000 combatants ready to resist by all means possible any land invasion, rendered the

33 Gibney, O’Malley, Kennedy (2019), 162; António Guterres, UN Secretary-General’s Video Remarks to Global Ireland Conference, 15 September 2020. 34 Luke ‘Ming’ Flanagan, What’s the Story with Irish Neutrality? (video), https://fb. watch/5LIRgFp61q/, 28 March 2019. 35 Publications include: Neutrality and the Development of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Compatible or Competing? Cooperation and Conflict, 2011, Vol. 46, No. 3, 334–369; Irish Political Parties’ Attitudes Towards Neutrality and the Evolution of the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policies, Irish Political Studies, 2009, Vol. 24, No. 4, 467–490; Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework, International Political Science Review, 2008, Vol. 29, No. 4, 461–488.

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British unwilling to launch the military campaign of ‘Gallipoli proportions’ necessary to take Ireland.”36 The evidence previously presented does not support this. Suggestions from both Flanagan and Devine, echoing those of writers from previous decades such as Patrick Comerford for example, that Irish neutrality can be traced as a continuous ideology from the foundation of the state and as having been inherited from people like Wolfe Tone and Daniel O’Connell, and later through people like James Connolly, Maud Gonne, Countess Markiewicz, Major John MacBride, and Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, are naïve.37 For one thing, it is peculiar that such an alleged central tenet of the struggle for independence would not make it into the Constitution. As the evidence previously presented shows, Irish neutrality evolved initially from fiscal necessity and lack of options in the 1920s and 1930s, to a precarious balancing act to ensure the survival of fledgling Irish independence during the 1940s, to a necessary position to maintain our stance on Irish unification with Northern Ireland following the formation of NATO and the start of the Cold War. It was only upon becoming a republic and joining the UN that neutrality finally became a synonymous and defining feature of our national character and aspirations as we finally became “a voice among the nations.” Flanagan, Divine, and others have presented arguments based on a distinction between “neutrality” and “military neutrality,” but this is obfuscation, given the lack of a clear, working definition of both terms in the Irish context. In the contemporary strategic environment, diplomacy and the employment of military forces are inseparable. Nations determine and achieve national or multinational security objectives using the four instruments of diplomatic power, i.e., diplomatic, information, educational and military (DIME). For its part, the military will identify the necessary objectives and assign the necessary resources to achieve them. The “spectrum of conflict” which provides the backdrop for all military operations, covers not only combat/war but peacetime military engagement, peace support and security operations. Thus, if one takes the Department of Foreign Affairs definition of neutrality as meaning “nonmembership of military alliances,” there is still plenty of scope for Irish

36 Karen Devine, The NATO-EU War Against Neutrality, https://www.pai.ie/201711 irish-neutrality/, 8 November 2017. 37 Patrick Comerford, Do you want to die for NATO? (Dublin, Mercier, 1984), 50.

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participation in multilateral military deployments beyond UN service, as well as cooperative frameworks like PESCO.38 Unfortunately, in 2021 Ireland has experienced the results of ideological aversion to defence cooperation misrepresented as neutrality. For example, Deputy Bríd Smith has, without irony, opposed Irish participation in PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation in security and defence) while criticising the lack of government spending on national cyber defence following the 2021 cyber-attack on the Irish health service.39 Even more recently, Deputy Cathal Berry has publicly raised the issue of the lack of an independent Irish military heavy-lift air transport capability to deploy members of the Army Ranger Wing to Kabul Airport to assist in the extraction of Irish citizens from Afghanistan.40 Ireland, Berry observed, did not send a single helicopter to assist with the recent wildfires suffered by Ireland’s EU neighbour, Greece, while expecting others to evacuate Irish citizens from Kabul.41 In the end the team of Irish soldiers and diplomats were transported by the French military, and even then their role was “short, targeted and confined solely to the airport canvass.”42

Conclusion This chapter posed the question of why does Ireland, a neutral country, need a military? It has demonstrated that Irish neutrality has always been contingent on having a military in the first place. At the state’s foundation, a professional military was essential to ensuring the rule-oflaw and the success of the Free State government. Had the government failed, likely, Britain would have taken these matters out of Irish hands once again. During the Emergency, having a military—albeit an inadequate one—allowed Ireland to remain nominally neutral. The capacity to maintain control of Irish terrain against Axis spies, gather and share 38 Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland’s Policy of Neutrality, https://www.dfa.ie/ our-role-policies/international-priorities/peace-and-security/neutrality/. 39 Dáil Éireann debate, 7 December 2017, Vol. 962, No. 8; Deputy Bríd Smith on Claire Byrne Live, RTE 1, 17 May 2021. 40 Deputy Cathal Berry with Clem Ryan, KFM Radio, 20 August 2021. 41 Deputy Cathal Berry, Facebook, 19 August 2021. 42 Irish Times, Ranger Wing to Be Sent to Kabul to Aid in Evacuation of Irish citizens,

23 August 2021.

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intelligence, and conduct joint planning with the British to be ready to deploy forces bilaterally in the event of German invasion, prevented the otherwise necessity of Irish terrain being occupied by British forces. Just three years after joining the UN, Ireland began a proud legacy of unbroken contribution of troops to observer, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement missions around the world. From the “baptism of fire” that was Ireland’s first troop-contributing mission with ONUC (Congo) 1960–1964, during which 26 Irish soldiers lost their lives, Ireland has continuously contributed troops not only to UN missions but to nonUN missions including the NATO-led ISAF (Afghanistan) and KFOR (Kosovo) missions, and the EU-led Operation: Artemis (Congo) and EU Training Missions (Somalia and Mali). Ireland’s neutral status and military combined to allow Ireland to extend its influence in foreign policy well beyond the limitations of size or geography. Nurturing this proud legacy, as the mistakes of the past have demonstrated, requires a willingness to invest in the military. A strong military is essential for Ireland to be able to exercise discernment in its multilateral military cooperation and to remain neutral on its own terms. Ireland is now in a completely different international relations environment than it was 100, 80, or 60 years ago. New allegiances, new influences, and new threats (including cyber) mean that Ireland must have a military fit for contemporary strategic purpose and, as ever, be pragmatic in its definition and expression of neutrality. Neutrality has always meant whatever Ireland needed it to mean, and this is as it should be.

Generating More Heat Than Light? The Debate Over Ireland’s Neutrality and the “European Army” John Mulqueen

Joe Lee notes that “few states have made so heavy an emotional investment in the rhetoric of neutrality,” while paying so little attention to it as a policy. Ireland’s “military neutrality” has been poorly understood by the public and therefore, the question of the state making a military commitment to the defence of the European Union (EU) has been a sensitive issue since its first application for membership sixty years ago. When Ireland joined in 1973, as a non-NATO member state, the British ambassador in Dublin wrote that neutrality was not “a considered policy” but “a desire to make a virtue out of a lack of necessity.”1 For some, neutrality became a sacred cow associated with high moral purpose—particularly the participation of the Defence Forces in UN peacekeeping missions—as

1 J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912–1985: Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 464, 605; ‘Ireland and the EEC’, 3 January 1973, in TNA, FCO 87/193.

J. Mulqueen (B) Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5_21

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successive governments supported the progressive integration of European foreign and security policy.2 Irish participation in a “European army” became topical twenty years ago when the EU expanded eastwards and new defence and security structures were developed.3 Another complication in recent years for the state’s “military neutrality” has been the contracting out by the UN of peacekeeping operations to regional organisations such as NATO or the EU.4 This chapter will explore the dominant questions in the “Irish neutrality” debate during landmark moments in Ireland’s engagement with the EU: is the state “neutral” or “militarily neutral,” and does “military neutrality” merely mean that Ireland is not a member of a military alliance? In relation to the EU, does the question of “defending Europe” necessitate the Defence Forces having a relationship with NATO? This chapter will focus on Ireland’s “military neutrality” and how this term has been interpreted in a malleable, and pragmatic, fashion to allow Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael-led governments room for manoeuvre on the role of the Defence Forces in foreign missions. I will illustrate how the upholders of “Irish neutrality”—greatly outnumbered in the debate until recently—have made plausible arguments about the possibility of the Defence Forces having a military relationship with NATO, or some form of European military alliance, given the willingness of various governments to ensure Ireland does what is required to be fully part of the ongoing EU project.

EEC and NATO Just after the Cuba Missile Crisis peaked, in October 1962, opposition deputies in the Dáil questioned the Taoiseach, Seán Lemass, on how far he might alter Ireland’s neutrality to join the European Economic Community (EEC, later EU). Would he allow NATO bases in Ireland?

2 Eunan O’Halpin, Defending Ireland: The Irish State and Its Enemies Since 1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, paperback edn., 2000), 344–8; Patrick Keatinge, Foreword, in Ben Tonra, Michael Kennedy, John Doyle, Noel Dorr (eds.), Irish Foreign Policy (Dublin: Gill, 2012), xii–iii. 3 Gary Murphy, Electoral Competition in Ireland Since 1987: The Politics of Triumph and Despair (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 108–10. 4 Ray Murphy, ‘International Security and United Nations Peacekeeping: The Irish Experience’, in Tonra, Kennedy, Doyle, Dorr (eds.), Foreign Policy, 182–3.

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Lemass responded sharply to his interlocutor, Noël Browne: “Neither here nor in Cuba … Go back to Khrushchev and tell him…”. Browne had accused Lemass, following his visit to West Germany seeking support for Irish EEC membership, of attempting to involve the state in the Cold War by abandoning its neutrality. The Taoiseach stated that “99% of the [Irish] people” opposed the Soviet Union’s “communist empire”— Ireland was not “politically neutral” and aligned itself with the West. Lemass added that no EEC member state had asked Ireland to drop its “military neutrality.”5 However, the government’s position in 1962 was less than clear. In Bonn, during his visit to an EEC capital, the Taoiseach stated that Ireland’s reasons for joining Europe were political. “We have made it quite clear that our desire is to participate in whatever political union may ultimately be developed in Europe. We are making no reservations of any sort, including defence.” Earlier that year, one of his junior cabinet colleagues hinted that the government’s opposition to joining NATO had softened. With the EEC in mind, Lemass changed his interpretation of the policy which made NATO membership impossible because it entailed recognising the partition of Ireland. The Irish Times asked whether a referendum should be held to allow the people to decide the implications of this significant development. “If we are committed to the European defence programme – Mr Lemass says we are – let the people know that means in certain circumstances we will have to fight.”6 5 No byline, “Nation to Remain Anti-communist,” Irish Times, 31 October 1962, 6. (News items in Irish newspapers often appeared without a byline until the emergence of online editions.) Ireland applied for full membership of the EEC along with the UK in 1961. John Horgan, Seán Lemass: The Enigmatic Patriot (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1997, paperback edn., 1999), 190, 221–6. 6 Editorial, “Our Former Neutrality,” Irish Times, 31 October 1962, 7. The minister for external affairs, Seán MacBride, rejected the Americans’ invitation to join the alliance in 1949. John Gibney, Michael Kennedy and Kate O’Malley, Ireland: A Voice Among the Nations (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2019), 122–3, 133–5; O’Halpin, Defending Ireland, 260–1. Some commentators thought the creation of a Western defence alliance implied that Ireland should join it. The Irish Times described the political consensus on NATO membership as “childish.” The persecution of the Church in Eastern Europe, according to one archbishop, highlighted the necessity of framing a foreign policy that went beyond “colourless neutrality.” A university president opposed Ireland remaining neutral in the event of a war between “communism” and “democracy.” Editorial, “Atlantic Pact,” Irish Times, 29 January 1949, 7; No byline, “Mass Attack on Faith Foreseen,” Irish Independent, 28 February 1949, 5; No byline, “Not Time for Neutrality,” Irish Press, 28 February 1949, 1; Editorial, “Italy and Ireland,” Irish Times, 16 March 1949, 5.

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A military relationship with NATO members, of course, involved links to nuclear powers. And the possibility of nuclear war—very real during the Cuba crisis—galvanised tens of thousands in neighbouring Britain to campaign for nuclear disarmament. At its 1962 peak, 150,000 supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) marched to the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston.7 Browne, called a “Red” by the Taoiseach’s colleagues in the government party, Fianna Fáil, made headlines in October following a “Hands Off Cuba” demonstration at the US embassy, where Irish CND supporters carried “Keep our neutrality” placards.8 The nuclear disarmament lobby in Ireland claimed that CND demands in general were compatible with “Irish neutrality” and Ireland’s initiative at the UN to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.9 Various peace groups, including CND, highlighted the neutrality issue; speakers at a well-attended event in 1962 included a former minister for external affairs, Seán MacBride. An independent senator, WB Stanford, said the indications that Seán Lemass might bring Ireland into a military alliance had caused indignation, and those who opposed this possibility should “stand up and be counted.” Browne contended that it had been “impossible” to obtain “any categorical statement on the political and military implications” of joining the Common Market (EEC). He called for a referendum to protect Ireland’s “traditional policy of neutrality.” But MacBride argued there was nothing in the Treaty of Rome that would “in

7 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: William Heinemann, 2005, Pimlico edn., 2007), 255–6. The Irish army’s intelligence directorate, G2, and the Department of External Affairs provided information to the Americans and British on nuclear disarmament campaigners, who were seen as working to a Moscow-directed agenda. John Mulqueen, ‘An Alien Ideology’: Cold War Perceptions of the Irish Republican Left (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2019), 40–4. 8 No byline, “Police Dogs Attack Demonstrators,” Irish Times, 24 October 1962, 1; Noël Browne, Against the Tide (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1986), 254. 9 No byline, “An Irishwoman’s Diary,” Irish Times, 18 September 1959, 6; No byline,

“Anti-nuclear Move in Ireland,” 20 October 1961, 6. Scientists working with Irish CND included Ernest Walton, the distinguished physicist at Trinity College, Dublin. No byline, “Irish Campaign Opened,” Irish Independent, 16 December 1958, 10; No byline, “Meeting Condemns Nuclear Blasts,” Irish Press, 16 December 1958, 3; No byline, “Nuclear Test Dangers to Populations,” Irish Times, 16 December 1958, 7.

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any way” affect Ireland’s neutrality.10 Later in the year, The Cork Examiner pointed out that the treaty visualised a united Europe—economically, and politically—involving common foreign and defence policies. “If the shedding of neutrality, in the fullest sense of the term, is the price to be paid for [economic] survival – and that is the factor which the opponents of EEC membership seem strangely loath to take into account – then, it would appear, we have no alternative but to accept.”11 Ireland’s application to join the bloc fell along with Britain’s, in January 1963, when France’s Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s joining.12 In relation to neutrality, a heightened public awareness of Ireland as a neutral state emerged in the 1960s as Irish troops served in UN peacekeeping missions in Congo and then Cyprus.13

Defending Europe? The question of making a military commitment to the EEC resurfaced in 1968 when the government renewed its effort to join the European Community. Jack Lynch, Lemass’s successor as Taoiseach, stated that the circumstances of such a commitment would have to be approved by the Dáil. In other words, the policy of “military neutrality” could be altered if necessary. Lynch later declared that in “a war between atheistic communism” and “our Christian way of life” then “we in this parliament would not be neutral, nor would the people of Ireland permit us to be neutral.” Lynch, The Irish Times stated, had taken the state further towards some form of commitment to European defence than even Lemass.14 With the onset of the Northern Ireland Troubles, ten weeks after British soldiers were deployed north of the border, one powerful member 10 No byline, “Meeting Decides Ireland Should Keep Neutral,” Irish Times, 15 May 1962, 7; WB Stanford, letter to the editor, “Ireland and NATO,” Irish Times, 8 February 1962, 7. 11 Editorial, “Neutrality and the Common Market,” Cork Examiner, 20 November 1962, 23. 12 Horgan, Lemass, 226–7. 13 O’Halpin, Defending Ireland, 270–3. 14 No byline, “Policy on Neutrality Unchanged,” Irish Times, 10 May 1968, 6; No

byline, “Lynch’s Declaration on Neutrality,” 17 July 1969, 1. Ireland renewed its application in 1967 and became a member state on 1 January 1973. Mahon Hayes and James Kingston, “Ireland in International Law: The Pursuit of Sovereignty and Independence,” in Tonra, Kennedy, Doyle, Dorr (eds.), Foreign Policy, 80–1.

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of Lynch’s cabinet, Charles Haughey, took it upon himself to make an audacious offer on Ireland’s “military neutrality.” Haughey met the British ambassador, privately, in October 1969, in the relatively unusual setting of Haughey’s home in Dublin. The proposals made by Haughey for a solution to the crisis in Northern Ireland, a north–south federal republic, included having a close military relationship with NATO whereby it could have bases in Ireland. The ambassador believed that Haughey’s ideas were representative of a wider viewpoint in Dublin and should be seriously considered by Britain: “The Irish claim for reunification, by some form of federal approach, lies on the table and will not be withdrawn; it will be critical for our future relationship with the Republic.” Haughey, however, had made this bold move in private, independently of Lynch and his cabinet. As the Troubles rumbled on for the next twenty-five years, this argument that a united Ireland could have a relationship with NATO remained private.15 In the public arena, meanwhile, as he prepared the ground for EEC entry, the Fianna Fáil external affairs minister, Patrick Hillery, asserted more than once that Ireland would play its part in defending Western Europe.16 Ireland’s Labour Party and trade unions, joined by the left fringe, opposed the dominant centre-right parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, on EEC membership. The Common Market Defence Campaign emphasised the adverse economic consequences of joining the bloc, but also made contentions about the maintenance of “Irish neutrality.” The anti-EEC camp claimed that a stronger Western European political entity strengthened NATO; Lynch appeared to be willing to accept whatever military obligations were required. Within the EEC, the need to develop a political relationship alongside the economic had been emphasised. Therefore, in this argument, a NATO commitment arose: “Ireland would soon be forced to join” and allow bases to be established “at Shannon, Cork and elsewhere.”17

15 Gilchrist to FCO, 30 October, 1969, in CAC, GILC/14A, and Gilchrist draft, in

CAC, GILC/14B; Anthony Craig, Crisis of Confidence: Anglo-Irish Relations in the Early Troubles (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2010), pp. 68–9. 16 No byline, “Neutral Status Defended,” Irish Times, 12 September 1970, 11; Editorial, “Towards a Definition,” Irish Times, 12 September 1970, 9. 17 Sinn Féin (Official), Why Sinn Féin Says No to the Common Market (Dublin: Republican Educational Department, 1971), 12–13. The republican movement split in

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More than 1000 protesters marched to the US embassy during Richard Nixon’s visit to Ireland, in October 1970, and were told the Irish government did not have a neutral position on the war in Vietnam: the invitation to the president and Lynch’s “silence” on the issue could be taken to mean the government had aligned itself with the American “oppressors” in that country. Lynch effectively supported Nixon on Vietnam by eulogising his foreign policy as a mission “of peace.” Nixon, in turn, praised the “significant and helpful” international role of Ireland—described in his brief as “a constructive and reliable neutral”—and the record of the Defence Forces in UN peacekeeping missions.18

EEC Membership Following Ireland’s signing of the treaty of accession to the EEC, in January 1972, the Common Market Defence Campaign staged several demonstrations to mobilise a No vote in the forthcoming referendum. The theme of Ireland’s sovereignty dominated the speeches at these protests, and the trade unions, alarmed over prospective job losses in Ireland’s “underdeveloped” and “weak” economy, were vocal on the consequences of membership. In Dublin, protesters heard that market forces within the enlarged EEC would hit the industry hard and “decimate” the farming population. Demonstrators in Cork were warned that EEC membership entailed “control of our economy and ultimately of our political life” passing “into the hands of others.”19 In relation to EEC defence, however, the government stated that no military commitments had been entered into.20 The No lobby’s warnings of the calamities

1969–1970 and the leftist Sinn Féin (Official) and the traditionalist Sinn Féin (Provisional) emerged. Both parties opposed EEC membership. Mulqueen, ‘Alien Ideology’, 81–3. 18 No byline, “Demonstrators Burn Effigy at Embassy,” Irish Times, 5 October 1970, 1; Michael Finlan, “Nixon, Lynch Speak at State Luncheon in Dublin Castle,” Irish Times, 6 October 1970, 9; Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), 935. 19 No byline, “Big Dublin Rally Opposes Entry,” Irish Times, 24 January 1972, 7; No byline, “Cork Rally in Protest at EEC Entry,” Irish Times, 24 January 1972, 7; No byline, “ITGWU to Oppose Market Entry,” Irish Times, 24 January 1972, 1; No byline, “Sligo Council of Trade Unions Opposes Entry,” Irish Times, 24 January 1972, 13. 20 No byline, “No Military or Defence Commitments in EEC,” Irish Times, 26 January 1972, 8.

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to come were not heeded by the electorate in the referendum, and 83 per cent voted in favour of joining.21 Ireland became a member of the Community, along with Britain and Denmark, in January 1973. The American and British ambassadors both agreed that the Irish state remained firmly in the Western camp.22 Joining the EEC marked a modernisation moment for the Irish state, as did establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union one year later. The Cold War in Ireland had entered a new phase: a “who’s who” of dignitaries in Dublin, including cabinet ministers and the Papal Nuncio, attended a lavish party hosted by the Soviet embassy.23

“New Cold War” In the 1980s the US president, Ronald Reagan, stepped up the rhetoric against what he termed the “evil empire” of the Soviet Union. American military spending increased dramatically on bomber aircraft and missile systems, and CND contended the advances in NATO’s missile technology were designed to allow the US to fight a nuclear war in Europe.24 Ironically, in Ireland, the pro-Soviet Workers’ Party promoted “Ireland’s neutrality” as its TDs heavily criticised Reagan’s foreign policy. Irish CND, in common with CND internationally, experienced a revival at this time.25 In 1981, Charles Haughey, now Taoiseach, stated that 21 Henry Patterson, The Politics of Illusion: A Political History of the IRA (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989, new edn., Serif, 1997), 154–5. Labour ran a half-hearted campaign because the leadership opposed cooperation with militant republicans and the Common Market Defence Campaign. Niamh Puirséil, The Irish Labour Party: 1922–73 (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2007), 300–1. 22 “Ireland and the EEC,” 3 January 1973, in TNA, FCO 87/193; Moore (US

embassy, Dublin) to State Dept., 9 January 1973, in NARA, RG 59, box 2384, Pol 17-1 Ire-US. 23 Christina Murphy, “Left, Middle and Right Mingle at Soviet Ambassador’s Reception,” Irish Times, 8 November 1974, 5. Ireland alone among the EEC members in 1973 did not have an embassy in Moscow. Dennis Kennedy, “Ireland May Open Embassy in Moscow,” Irish Times, 23 October 1971, 1. 24 Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009, paperback edn., 2012), 291–2, 311–8; Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (London: Allen Lane, 2017, Penguin, 2018), 498–9. 25 Mulqueen, ‘Alien Ideology’, 212–7, 224–5; O’Halpin, Defending Ireland, 316–7; Westad, Cold War, 521–2.

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Fianna Fáil in government would “maintain [Ireland’s] policy of military neutrality” and would “not become involved in military alliances.” His government had earlier closed the door on NATO membership while holding it open to defending Europe in the context of European political union.26 In 1982, the Workers’ Party warned of the dangers to “Irish neutrality” if Ireland’s foreign policy was aligned with that of the European Community—whose member states, except for Ireland, were NATO members. The party supported the Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, as he pursued an independent course at the UN Security Council during the Falklands War. When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands (British sovereign territory), in April, Haughey followed Brussels in supporting Britain. However, he later called for the withdrawal of European sanctions against Argentina and the immediate cessation of hostilities.27 The Workers’ Party employed the “Irish neutrality” argument to criticise US foreign policy. Reagan’s ambassador in Dublin had a second job: to promote the situating of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, and the party, naturally, accused him of leading a campaign against “the peace movement” and compromising Ireland’s “neutral status.”28 The Workers’ Party also accused Garret FitzGerald’s, Fine Gael-led, the coalition government of taking sides in the Cold War by favouring Washington and its allies over Moscow. In September 1983 the party protested the expulsion of three Dublin-based Soviet diplomats; the media reported that the trio had been spying on NATO countries rather than the Republic.29 Had the Soviet diplomats, the Workers’ Party asked, been treated differently? When a British spy had been convicted in 1972, the party pointed out, no measures were taken against the British embassy.30

26 No byline, “Neutrality Guarantee Backed by Candidates,” Irish Times, 9 June 1981, 8; Denis Coghlan, “The Defence of Europe: We’ll Not Stand Idly By,” Irish Times, 11 December 1980, 5. 27 O’Halpin, Defending Ireland, 344–5. 28 Workers’ Party press statement, 25 January, 1983, in Tony Heffernan papers, UCDA,

P180/114. 29 Garret FitzGerald, All in a Life: An Autobiography (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1991), 603–4. 30 Dick Walsh, “Taoiseach Invites Haughey to Meet Him on Expulsions,” Irish Times, 13 September 1983, 1; Dick Walsh, “Haughey Invited to Talks Today,” Irish Times, 13 September 1983, 6.

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Neutrality was central to arguments in the Dáil when the Workers’ Party opposed Ronald Reagan’s 1984 visit to Ireland. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael queried how neutral the party could be given its pro-Moscow stance and accused it of being “anti-American” and “silent” on the Soviets’ invasion of Afghanistan and intervention in Poland. FitzGerald said the party lacked “credibility” because of its “selective pro-Soviet stand.” Three TDs, including the two Workers’ Party deputies, walked out of the Dáil chamber as Reagan began an address to the assembled parliamentarians, while twenty others stayed away.31 Three senators also expressed opposition to aspects of Reagan’s foreign policy, as representatives of “a neutral state.”32

European Integration The question of Ireland’s neutrality became contentious again during the debate on the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The Act facilitated integration into the European Community and went to a vote by referendum in May of that year. The Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, led the campaign for approval, backed by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Haughey said he wanted the Irish electorate to vote Yes to secure Ireland’s economic future. However, he argued, there were some who, “for ideological reasons,” had never wanted Ireland to be a member of the EEC. “They are simply using the Single European Act and misrepresenting its contents and its purposes to try to ensure that we are eventually forced out.” In advocating a Yes vote in the referendum, Haughey was “committed to Ireland’s policy of military neutrality and to the concept of Ireland as an independent sovereign nation maintaining its own position on international affairs.”33 On this occasion, Fine Gael dismissed the left-wing No lobby as “the same people” who campaigned against EEC entry in 1972, who

31 FitzGerald, All in a Life, 578–9; No byline,“Mac Giolla Under Fire for Opposing Reagan Visit,” Irish Times, 16 May 1984, 9; No byline, “Reagan Was Forewarned about Walkout by TDs,” Irish Times, 5 June 1984, 1. 32 No byline, “Reagan Forewarned about TDs’ Walkout,” Irish Times, 5 June 1984,

10. 33 John Cooney, “Haughey Tells Party to Step Up Campaign,” Irish Times, 21 May 1987, 8; Joe Carroll, “Lynch Denies That SEA Is a Threat to Neutrality,” Irish Times, 21 May 1987, 8.

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advanced “the same phoney arguments” made then. Fine Gael argued that Ireland’s neutrality had as little relevance in the 1987 referendum as in the accession poll fifteen years earlier. One Fine Gael backbencher dismissed Ireland’s “traditional neutrality” as “a comfortable, contemptible fraud”—the No campaigners would make Ireland “impoverished and friendless.” As it happened, he argued, the Act contained no reference to “military co-operation.”34 In this heated debate, Garret FitzGerald asked how neutral could the leader of the Workers’ Party be on his visits to Moscow? It was “nonsense,” he continued, to suggest that Ireland was neutral between East and West, notwithstanding the fact that the state was neutral “in a military sense.”35 The Workers’ Party, in turn, accused the proponents of a Yes vote of conducting a “fraudulent” campaign in that they had tried to turn the referendum issues into an argument on membership of the European Community rather than on the provisions of the Single European Act. According to the Workers’ Party, all references to NATO and the Western European Union should be removed from the Act, and a clause included guaranteeing “Ireland’s right to pursue a policy of neutrality and nonalignment.”36 The voters rejected this argument; the referendum passed by a majority of more than two to one, 69.9 per cent to 30.1 per cent, with a turnout of just 44 per cent of the total electorate.37 During the referendum campaign The Cork Examiner summarised the neutrality debate, since 1972, and highlighted the fact that nobody, with European integration in mind, had “redefined” Ireland’s neutrality. In deciding to join the EEC, the Examiner pointed out, the electorate had agreed to negotiate that neutrality. While the centre-right parties had affirmed the state did not have an “ideologically neutral” position, in office they had shied away from defining “Irish neutrality.” Successive 34 No byline, “Speaker’s Corner,” Cork Examiner, 22 May 1987, 8; William Dillon, “Neutrality Stance Is Fraudulent, Says Kelly,” Irish Independent, 24 April 1987, 11. 35 No byline, “FitzGerald Says UN Role at Risk,” Irish Times, 23 April 1987, 9. 36 No byline, “Workers’ Party States Changes Sought in Act,” Irish Times, 25 May

1987, 8. 37 Chris Glennon, “SEA Passed but Future Tests Loom,” Irish Independent, 28 May 1987, 1.

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governments could rely on an escape clause: in the context of Europe, neutrality had not been an issue because there was no likelihood in the near future of full European integration.38

Partnership for Peace The end of the Cold War, and its polarised ideological certainties, did not mean the NATO issue went away. On the contrary, the EU’s response to different security challenges in Europe saw the creation of arrangements between the EU and NATO, and these questions as they related to Ireland and European enlargement were debated during the referendum on the Nice Treaty in June 2001. Ireland’s neutrality featured in the debate, with No lobbyists claiming the Nice Treaty formalised moves towards a common EU security policy. NATO, specifically, became a controversial question, arising from Ireland’s involvement in the new EU defence structure and the Rapid Reaction Force provided for in the treaty. Both Sinn Féin and the Greens opposed the main parties in the referendum. Sinn Féin’s sole TD called for a No vote to allow time for a “real debate” on realising a “democratic and demilitarised Europe.” “How could the government,” he asked, “maintain that our neutrality is unaffected by this new partnership with NATO?” On this occasion the dissenters—in different and often mutually exclusive left and right-wing camps—won the day. Bertie Ahern’s Fianna Fáil-led coalition government lost the referendum, with 54 per cent voting against. Gary Murphy notes that the debate on the Nice Treaty had been dominated by issues that were “at best tangential” to the treaty.39 Commenting on the “bloody nose” for “the establishment,” Fintan O’Toole concluded that Ahern’s government had paid a price for dodging the issues and refusing to debate Ireland’s future in the enlarged EU. The Taoiseach, O’Toole wrote, had broken his promise, made four years previously, to hold a referendum on the state’s entry into the NATO-led Partnership for Peace (PfP). Ahern had “wriggled out” of debating “the current meaning of Irish neutrality” only to find the debate took place

38 Editorial, “Ireland—Neutral or Not?” Cork Examiner, 15 May 1987, 10. 39 Caoimhghín Ó Caoláin, “Only a No Vote Can Allow Time for a True Debate,”

Irish Times, 6 June 2001, 8; Murphy, Electoral Competition, pp. 109–10.

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in the less appropriate context of the Nice Treaty. O’Toole wrote that “pro-Nice campaigners might insist that the treaty has no real implications for Irish neutrality,” but “avoiding the issue was never going to be enough” to assuage the genuine sceptics.40 The government was unable to politically accept this defeat and began to prepare for a re-run. During the debate on the second Nice Treaty referendum, in October 2002, Ahern’s government accused the No side of “trying to use neutrality as a weapon to defeat the referendum,” and secured the Seville Declaration, which stated that Ireland’s “traditional policy of military neutrality” would not be prejudiced by participation in the EU’s common foreign and security policy. The Taoiseach assured sceptics that a referendum would be held to decide whether the Defence Forces participated in any European defence commitment. This did not rule out Irish involvement in the Rapid Reaction Force, Tom Clonan explained, whose tasks included humanitarian missions and peacekeeping operations, under the control of the EU institutions. Noting that the end of the Cold War made the term “neutrality” ambiguous and ill-defined, The Irish Times argued that the debate on Ireland’s neutrality had not been rooted in the “real world” of the state’s actual international relations with its European neighbours. Ireland’s neutrality was “not at stake” in Europe, the newspaper stated, but a military capacity under EU control had become necessary following the Balkan wars and humanitarian crises of the 1990s.41 The Yes side won an emphatic victory on the Nice Treaty in the second referendum, winning just under 63 per cent of the vote.42

40 Fintan O’Toole, “Uneasy Electorate Gives the Establishment Bloody Nose,” Irish Times, 9 June 2001, 6. 41 Miriam Donohoe, “No Side Accused on Neutrality,” Irish Times, 16 October 2002, 7; Tom Clonan, “Strictly Speaking, Nice Is No Threat to Neutrality,” Irish Times, 18 October, 2002, 16; Editorial, “Neutrality and the Nice Treaty,” Irish Times, 16 October 2002, 15. Katy Hayward, “The European Union: National and Supranational Dimensions to Foreign Policy,” in Tonra, Kennedy, Doyle, Dorr (eds.), Foreign Policy, 146. 42 https://www.rte.ie/news/2002/1020/31092-nice/. Accessed 13 August 2021.

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“European army”? The June 2008 referendum on the Lisbon Treaty—designed to enhance the efficiency of the EU and boost the power of the European Parliament—was fought over different issues. These included, as usual, Ireland’s sovereignty and neutral status, but also claims of a conscription threat into “an EU army.” Sinn Féin was the only party in the Dáil to oppose the treaty.43 Supporting the Yes campaign of the Fianna Fáil-led coalition government, the Labour Party leader, Eamon Gilmore, dismissed the neutrality arguments of campaigners against the Lisbon Treaty as “groundless”—Ireland would not be brought into NATO via “a European army.” “Every single development in the history of the EU since 1973,” he pointed out, had been “depicted by some group or another in the most alarmist terms as a threat to Irish neutrality.” Gilmore rejected Sinn Féin’s contention that European integration compromised the Irish state’s neutrality. The Lisbon Treaty, he argued, also safeguarded the status of other neutral EU states—Austria, Sweden, Finland, Malta and Cyprus. “Nothing in this treaty provides for conscription,” Gilmore stated, “or for Ireland being forced into wars or imperialist adventures.”44 But the June 2008 Lisbon Treaty referendum was rejected by the electorate, with 53.4 per cent voting against it.45 When the Lisbon Treaty referendum in its turn was re-run, the government sought to reassure voters about Ireland’s EU defence obligations. One minister said the guarantees Ireland had received on “retaining its neutrality” were “cast iron” and could not be altered by the treaty. He dismissed claims that Irish citizens could be “conscripted into a European army,” and asserted that the Lisbon Treaty did not require Ireland to increase its military spending. The Defence Forces, he explained, would only participate in EU operations that had a UN mandate and were approved by the Irish government.46 Sinn Féin, however, argued that

43 Murphy, Electoral Competition, 135–6. 44 Mark Hennessey, “Gilmore Says Claims Over Loss of Neutrality ‘Groundless, Base-

less’,” Irish Times, 9 June 2008, 8–9. Gilmore was one of seven Workers’ Party TDs elected in 1989. Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers’ Party (Dublin: Penguin, 2009), 547. 45 Murphy, Electoral Competition, 135–6. 46 Harry McGee, “Gormley Dismisses Conscription Claim,” Irish Times, 1 October

2009, 10.

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the changes to the EU’s common defence and security policies—in its view “detrimental” to the state’s neutrality—remained in place under the Lisbon Treaty. If the Irish electorate voted No, Sinn Féin contended there would be an opportunity to secure “a protocol on neutrality.”47 In the context of “troubled economic times,” when the message “vote Yes for jobs” hit home, the voters this time approved the Lisbon Treaty, with more than two out of three voting in favour.48

Europe “worth defending” Eight years later, in 2017, Ireland joined a new EU defence co-operation framework, Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO). PESCO is designed to allow its twenty-two member states to pool resources and better equip their armed forces under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. Supporting Ireland’s participation in PESCO, which is not a military alliance, Leo Varadkar, the Fine Gael Taoiseach, declared that “a Europe worth building is a Europe worth defending.” Sinn Féin and left-wing TDs objected to PESCO on the grounds that it would inevitably lead to the creation of a “European army” and “the end of Irish neutrality.” Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil rejected this argument— both parties insisted the state remained “militarily neutral.” Varadkar said Ireland would take a “non-aligned and neutral” approach to PESCO, along with PESCO’s three other neutral members, Austria, Finland and Sweden.49 Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael continue to adhere to a narrow definition of “military neutrality.” However, since the Dáil decided to permit the Defence Forces to participate in this latest EU defence initiative, Sinn Féin has become the biggest opposition party in the state. And Sinn Féin wants a referendum to enshrine “Irish neutrality” in the constitution, defining

47 Gerry Adams, “Government Has Secured No Changes to Original Treaty,” Irish Times, 28 September 2009, 13; Michael O’Regan, “Ireland’s Interests Best Served by No Vote—Adams,” Irish Times, 30 September 2009, 10. 48 Murphy, Electoral Competition, 142–3. 49 Patrick Smyth, “Government Hopes to Engage Ireland in New EU Military Frame-

work,” Irish Times, 9 November 2017, 10; Marie O’Halloran, “Varadkar Believes Ireland Should Join New EU Military Structure,” Irish Times, 6 December 2017; Pat Leahy, “Ireland Joins Pesco Defence Pact After Dáil Vote,” Irish Times, 15 December 2017, 11.

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how, and when, Defence Forces personnel can serve outside the jurisdiction.50 The balance of forces in the sixty-year debate over Ireland’s neutral status within Europe has significantly changed.

Neutrality---A Considered Policy? Seán Lemass made it clear in 1962 that he would take an axe to Ireland’s “traditional neutrality” to strengthen his application to join the EEC. When a few independent voices objected that Fianna Fáil would link the state with nuclear powers, by accepting the conditions for a European “political union,” Lemass, and Jack Lynch, stated that Ireland aligned itself with the Western powers. The Irish state was not “politically neutral” in the Cold War. Ireland joined the EEC in 1973 as a “militarily neutral” member. But did this mean the state was simply not a member of a military alliance? Could Ireland continue to “make a virtue out of a lack of necessity?” Towards the end of the Cold War, in 1987, the Taoiseach, Charles J. Haughey, restated Fianna Fáil’s position: Ireland was “militarily neutral.” Haughey, however, had previously stated that his government would participate in the defence of Europe, in the context of “political union.” How could this be done without some form of military alliance? During the 1987 referendum on European integration Fine Gael, supporting the Fianna Fáil government, questioned the bona fides of the Workers’ Party, which warned that “Irish neutrality” would be eroded if Ireland’s governments continued to align their foreign policy with that of the EU. The Cork Examiner pointed out that both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in government had failed to properly debate Ireland’s neutral status because they did not feel compelled to do so. The Examiner’s editorial writer made a telling point about the malleable approach of Ireland’s dominant parties to the question of Ireland’s neutral status. But the end of the Cold War created new security challenges for the EU. With European integration and the development of a common EU defence policy, the upholders of “Irish neutrality” have a stronger argument about the relationship between the Defence Forces and NATO. The contention that Ireland will be taken into NATO—or some other European military alliance—can no longer be dismissed as the “baseless” claim of unrepresentative “Reds,” as it was during the Cold War. The debate 50 https://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2018/AOS_Neutrality_Doc_Final.pdf. June 2021.

Accessed

15

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over Ireland and a “European army” is still heated, and the failure of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael to hold a referendum on neutrality means the public remains unenlightened about the issue. But the emergence of Sinn Féin as a major party, possibly a leading partner in a coalition government, makes any future debate less unbalanced. Ireland’s centre-right parties may have to finally explain their approach to “military neutrality” in the EU—outlining a considered policy for the public—whether they like it or not.

Conclusion

This volume has sought to address the historical paucity of real, meaningful and public discussion on the role of the Irish Defence Forces both domestically and internationally in the context of contemporary EU security. However, the complex, evolving and interdependent threat environment in which Ireland currently finds itself, especially in the light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has propelled the issue of defence into greater public and political consciousness. This was highlighted by the publication of the widely anticipated Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, which alarmingly noted that the under-resourced state of the Defence Forces currently “leave(s) the state without credible protection”.1 The report is comprehensive and argues for a fundamental review of the Irish defence strategy. It proposes a variety of approaches for key stakeholders to consider when determining the course of Irish defence policy. Furthermore, the report calls for a radical change in the organisational and operational nature of the Defence Forces, arguing for significant increases in capabilities and resources, as well as a thorough reform of existing command structures.

1 Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces (Dublin: Government of Ireland, 2022) available at https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/eb4c0-report-of-the-commissionon-defence-forces/.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5

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CONCLUSION

The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security provides a detailed exploration of Irish defence and the Defence Forces at the strategic, operational and historical levels across six central themes and aims to compliment the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces by providing critical analysis of key issues of Irish defence in order to begin to address some of the tough issues raised by the Commission and specifically to guide the vision outlined by the Commission for the Defence Forces as a “joint military force capable of providing the people of Ireland with a safe and secure environment and enforcing and protecting Ireland’s sovereignty”. One of the key findings to emerge from this volume has been the necessity for greater co-operation and integration of the Department of Defence, the Defence Forces and the Department of Foreign Affairs to achieve greater impact not only in terms of the defence and security of the State but also in representing the interests and values of the Irish people abroad. Our domestic foundations, in particular, our security, resilience and the strength of our economy are increasingly intertwined with our foreign policy. As such, any review of Irish defence policy should also be cognisant of the fact that as we become more politically and economically integrated with the EU and globally, Ireland is also responsible for the defence of critical infrastructure upon which our European and international partners rely. It is thus vital that Ireland can engage and contribute bilaterally and multilaterally inside the EU and beyond in terms of defence in pursuit of the national and common interest.2 As such, Ireland must decide her place, if any, in collective European defence, in terms of NATO, PESCO, the European Peace Facility, the European Defence Fund and CARD.3 Such decisions will no doubt require vigorous public, political and academic discourse, with broad participation. What is certain, is that we cannot continue to bury our heads in the sand. 2 Doyle, J. (2019). ‘100 years of Irish Foreign Policy’. In Irish Studies in International Affairs, 100 years of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 1–5. 3 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO. The EPF is an off-budget instrument aimed at enhancing the Union’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security, by enabling the financing of operational actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that have military or defence implications. The European Defence Fund (EDF) is the Commission’s initiative to support collaborative defence research and development, and to foster an innovative and competitive defence industrial base. Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) provides a picture of the existing defence capability landscape in Europe and to identify potential cooperation areas.

CONCLUSION

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In both the public and private sectors, it is critical that we continue to develop and invest in defence and security research, so that public discussion is evidence-based and not shaped by the media and political biases of the day. If Ireland is to seriously address the defence concerns raised by the Commission and in this book then we will require public consensus, bipartisanship and political will. What has also become evident from this volume, is the necessity to decouple debates surrounding Irish defence and defence spending from the often-contentious issue of neutrality. Ben-Ari’s seminal essay entitled Theory Building in Research on the Military noted that research relating to defence is a “never-ending process” (p 309).4 As such, Ireland must not fail to embrace and develop a more robust research community around the issues of security and defence, to not only inform and contribute to serious and profound conversations about what Irish security and defence is, and what it should be, but also the implications of this not only domestically but also internationally in terms of foreign policy aims and international obligations. Only then, will we be able to ensure a well-informed and healthy discussion on neutrality. Irish defence must become more focussed and dynamic in order to adapt to a more competitive and fluid international environment in which key elements of international architecture are under assault, and open societies and democratic principles are increasingly undermined. The global system is only as robust, resilient and legitimate as the states that comprise it. Ireland, like other liberal democracies, needs to do more to demonstrate the benefits of transparency, accountability, and human rights and equally accept the risk that comes with a commitment to global peace and stability. This cannot occur without a stronger commitment to security and defence, as well as the development of the ability to protect Ireland’s people, territory, critical national infrastructure, democratic institutions and way of life more adequately from international threats, terrorism and serious and organised crime. This edited collection is merely a first step towards a larger and more important conversation that is forming and taking place not only in Ireland but across the EU. This discussion is based on an understanding of the EU member states’ common and complementary interests, values and traditions, as well as the recognition that our individual and collective 4 Ben-Ari, E. (2014). ‘Theory Building in Research on the Military’. In Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies. London: Routledge.

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CONCLUSION

sovereignty, security and prosperity necessitates a world in which democratic societies thrive and fundamental human rights are protected. This knowledge, along with the values that are fundamental to our identity, way of life and international reputation, must act as a guide for all future discussions and debates on Ireland’s national defence.

Index

A Aer Lingus, 108 Afghanistan, 12, 36, 43, 47, 49, 64, 163, 224, 225, 376, 391, 408, 409, 420 African Union (AU), 230, 234, 374 Ahern, Bertie, 422 Aid to Civil Powers (ATCP), 33, 59, 127, 131, 132, 140, 142, 145, 343 Aiken, Frank, 202 Air India disaster, 74 Air Policing, 108, 110, 111, 120, 386, 387 Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), 256 Allison, Graham, 24 Amazon, 53, 199 Andersson, Kent, 22, 23 Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK), 267 An Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil (FCÁ), 32, 33, 35, 126, 128, 131, 164, 167, 168, 170

An Garda Síochána, 6, 8, 30, 33, 59, 60, 70, 79, 142, 168, 268, 343, 345 An Slua Mhuirí, 179 Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD), 91, 390 Anti-Treaty IRA, 203 Archer-Class Fast Inshore Patrol Craft, 186 Archer, Liam, 402 Arms Crisis (1969), 18, 21 Army Ranger Wing (ARW), 33, 208 Ayiotis, Dan, xv, xvi, 16, 393 Azure Forum for Contemporary Security Strategy, xiii B Bahrain Declaration, 216 Bali Bombing, 49 Balkan Wars, 9 Barrett, Thomas, 216, 217 Bataclan Theatre attack, 49 Bazzi, Mahmoud, 217 Beary, Michael, 221, 222

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Carroll et al. (eds.), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07812-5

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434

INDEX

Beesley, Alan, 6 Beirut, Lebanon, 213, 217, 223 Belfast Agreement, 382 Berry, Cathal, 358, 408 Big Data Radio Mining and Analysis project, 239 Bigley, Ken, 49 Border Fox. See O’Hare, Dessie Borrell, Josep, 38 Bowen, Elizabeth, 399 Brahimi Report, 219 Breen, Sharon, xiv, 317 Bremen, 107 Brexit, ix, 13, 14, 16, 28, 35, 36, 50–52, 64, 75, 77, 83, 150, 175, 188, 369 Brown, Terrence, 402 Brussels effect, 14 Buckley, Niall, xii, 107 Bulgarian government, 96 Bundeswehr, 276, 277, 279, 281–285, 287–289, 292 Byrne, David, 50 Byrne, Kevin, 386

C Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), 414 Capability Development (CapDev), 329 Carroll, Jonathan, v, ix, xii, 123, 429 Casement Aerodrome, 199 Casement, Roger, 199 Chad, xiii, 34, 42, 220, 223 Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC), 158, 162, 226, 227, 268 Clausewitz’s trinity, 343 Clausewitzian definition of war, 378 Clausewitzian pillars, 339 Cleary, Brian, xi, 29

Climate change, 44, 150 Clonan, Tom, xi, 47, 150, 383, 423 Coast Watching Service, 174 CODF Report, 32, 40, 44, 45 Combat Service Support Brigade, 131, 134, 135 Comerford, Patrick, 407 Commission on the Defence Forces, 16 Common Operational Picture (COP), 257 Communications and Information Services (CIS) Corps, 53, 264, 266 Communications Information Systems (CIS), 53, 133, 143–145, 151, 264, 294 Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS), 242 Connolly, James, 407 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), 16, 278 Cork Institute of Technology, 340 Coveney, Simon, v, 40, 44, 151, 337, 367 COVID-19, ix, 13, 28, 30, 36, 41, 44, 56, 61, 89, 125, 135, 145, 151, 156, 174, 176, 177, 180, 184, 282, 389 Craft, Kelly, 221 Craughwell, Gerard, 337 Crisis Management Operations (CMO), 39 Cuban Missile Crisis, 24, 412 Cumann na mBan, 110 Cyber and Information Domain (CID), 274–276, 283, 286–290, 293, 294 Cyber attacks, 236 Cyber Peacekeeping, 226

INDEX

D Data Governance Act, 277 Day, Adam, 241, 263 DeBarra, Ruari, xv, 353 Dee, Neil, xiii, 195 DeFacto Force (DFF), 212, 213, 215–219, 227 Defence Act, 22, 31, 62, 63, 175, 395 Defence Amendment Act , 177 Defence Enterprise Committee (DEC), 265, 320, 323 Defence Force Regulation’s (DFRs), 357 Defence Forces, 18, 19, 53, 55, 82, 108, 113, 123, 124, 128, 135, 138, 145, 150, 159, 171, 178, 182, 188, 200, 204, 211, 219, 222, 266, 271, 303–305, 307, 309, 311, 313, 314, 322, 328, 331, 333, 340–344, 347, 349, 350, 362, 365–368, 382, 390, 391, 394–396, 399, 400, 411, 412, 417, 424–426, 429 Commission on (CODF), 30, 32, 40, 44, 45, 266, 355, 358, 365–367 Concept of Operations (CONOPS), 30 Curragh Camp, 205 Headquarters, 22, 71, 75, 83, 141, 143 Leadership Doctrine, 178, 190 Naval Service, xi, xii, 20, 22, 31, 33, 34, 58, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76–85, 88, 89, 94–96, 101, 103, 112, 124, 148, 151, 156, 174, 179, 182–188, 190, 191, 208, 308, 310, 311, 340, 356, 390 PDFORRA, 146, 355, 357, 359, 360, 362–366, 368

435

OJCFATD, 364 PMAS, 363 Permanent (PDF), 32 65th Irish Battalion, 218 Defence Forces Structure and Command & Control (C2), 31 DEFHERIS, 320 De Gaulle, Charles, 415 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 238, 256 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 238 FARDC, 257 Department of Defence, xiv, 9, 11, 14, 18–20, 23, 35, 38, 51, 54–56, 59, 61–64, 123, 124, 127, 176, 307, 308, 317, 323, 330, 336, 338–340, 345, 350, 359 Strategic Research and Analysis Division, 336 Department of Enterprise, Trade & Employment (DETE), 320, 329 Department of the Taoiseach, 9 Department of Transport, 7, 333, 336, 338, 341, 345, 349 De Valera, Éamon, 400, 402 Devine, Karen, 406, 407 Digital Services Act, 277 DIME, 407 Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS), 277, 289, 319, 329 Disinformation, 226, 232, 236, 255, 259, 275, 285 Donne, John, 13 Dorn, Walter, 248 E ECAT, 43 effect, 288 Efficiency Audit Groups, 56

436

INDEX

Enterprise Ireland (EI), 320 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 378 EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 37, 275 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), 16, 278, 289, 294, 319, 321, 430 Cyber Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC), 285, 286 European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), 319 Global Strategy, 14, 15, 278 Maritime Security Strategy, 77, 190 Narcotics (MAOC-N), 78, 79, 101 Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), 286 Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), 78 Naval Force Mission (ENFM), 79 Permanent Structured Co-Operation (PESCO), 16, 44, 100, 285, 289, 294, 319, 321, 329, 408, 425, 430 Permanent Structured Co-operation framework (PESCO), 38 Special Operations Forces, 34 Strategic Autonomy, 7, 14, 15 Strategic Compass, 15, 285 Training Mission Competence Centre, 100 Treaty of, 15 Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance (UMS), 100 EUFOR Chad/RCA, 42 European Committee on Social Rights, 364 European Defence Agency (EDA), 278, 289, 321, 325, 328, 329

European Defence Fund (EDF), 16, 20, 277, 320, 328 European External Action Service (EEAS), 14, 278 European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), 58, 390 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 6, 37, 73–75, 87, 100, 103, 104, 114, 311, 389 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), 142, 218, 224, 302, 308 F Family Income Supplement (FIS), 357 Federal Ministry of Defence (FMoD), 281, 282, 284, 287, 290, 294 Ferriter, Diarmuid, 359 Fianna Fáil, 374, 412, 414, 416, 419, 420, 422, 424–427 Fine Gael, 374, 412, 416, 419, 420, 425–427 Finnish Institute of International Affairs, xv Fisheries Monitoring Centre (FMC), 79 Fitzgerald, Brian, xi, xii, 67 Flanagan, Charles, 199 Flanagan, Luke “Ming”, 406, 407 Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA), 118 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 38, 53, 388 Forti, Daniel, 246 G Galeotti, Mark, 379 Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau (GNCCB), 53 Georgian Coast Guard, 101 Gleeson, Dermot, 358 Global Ireland 2025, 109 Gonne, Maud, 407

INDEX

Good Friday Agreement, 37, 48, 56 Google, 53 Gormanston Camp, 109 Gray, Colin, 197, 198, 210 Gray Zone, 47 Griffin, Stephen, 216 Guinan, Gerard, 362, 364, 368 Guitierrez, Antonio, 41 Gulf War, 297

H Hamas, 300 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 198 Hansen, Annika S., xiii, 229 Hapek, Natalia, xiii, 211 Hassan, Margaret, 49 Hate speech, 232, 236, 254, 259 Haughey, Charles, 201, 416, 418–420, 426 Haulbowline Island Cork harbour, 68, 81 Haulbowline Naval Base, 58, 124, 185 Health Service Executive (HSE), 55, 184, 380 Heinecken, Lindy, 362 HESCO, 223 Hetman Sagaidachniy, 102 Hezbollah, 213, 218–222, 226, 300 Higgins, Joe, 375 Higgins, Michael D., 200, 203, 360 Higher Altitude Operations (HAO), 114, 115 Hillery, Patrick, 416 HMS Defender, 91 Hutch criminal gang, 50 Hutch-Kinahan feud, 51 Hybrid Defence, 26

437

I Illegal Inreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, 89 Information and Communications Technology (ICT), 266 Infrastructure, 6–9, 12, 25, 26, 50, 52, 54, 56–58, 69, 84, 88, 93, 94, 104, 142, 144, 188, 189, 242, 244, 253, 262, 268, 269, 283, 285, 293, 311, 318, 323, 346, 349, 382, 384, 387–389, 430, 431 International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 99 International Crisis Group, 11, 231 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 391 Irish Air Corps (IAC), xii, 107–110, 112, 113, 115, 118, 120 Irish Aviation Authority (IAA), 7, 110, 386 Irish Central Bank, 30 Irish Coastguard (ICG), 336, 338 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), 355, 360, 362–367 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), 198, 202 Irish Embassy in Cyprus, 203 Irish Health Service Executive, 32 Irish Maritime Energy Resource Cluster (IMERC), 340, 349 Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), 33 Irish Naval Service Multi-Role Vessel (MRV), 96 Irish Overseas Development Programme, 362 Irish Peace Process, 48, 51 Irish Prison Service, 345 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 37 Irish Sea-Fisheries Protection Authority, 58, 390

438

INDEX

ISIS, 11, 301 ISTAR, 296, 301, 302, 304, 308, 311

J Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), 257 Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC), 288 Joyce, James, 69 Joyce, Kevin, 217

K Kagan, Robert, 26 Kallenborn, Zak, 300 Kanerva, Ilkka, 384 Keane, Mark, 366 Kennedy, Michael, 3, 205, 400, 402 Kerch Straits, 90, 92 King, Patricia, 365 King’s College, London, xii Klein, Harry, 216

L Labour Party, 374, 416, 424 Landscape of actors, 231 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), 213 Lee, Dorcha, 24 LE Eithne, 184 Lemass, Seán, 198, 202, 412–415, 426 Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs), 255 Level of Ambition (LOA), 45 LOA 2, 46 Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), 241 Lisbon Treaty, 424 London 7/7 attacks, 49 Lumumba, Patrice, 200 Lynch, Jack, 415, 426

M MacBride, John, 407 MacBride, Seán, 413, 414 MacEoin, Stephen, 199 Mac Lochlainn, Pádraig, 375 MacMillan, Harold, 44 Madrid bombing, 49 Maffey, John, 402 Malone, Michael, 90 MANTAS system, 99 Marita Ann, 74 Maritime Area Regulatory Authority (MARA), 7 Maritime Defence and Security Operations (MDSO), 116 Maritime Security Act (2004), 6 Markiewicz, Countess, 407 Marshall Plan, 10 Martin, Mícheál, 337 Martin, Raymond, xii, 107 McAleavey, Michael, 218 McCann, Eamonn, 375 McCann, Sean, 150 McDowell, Michael, 40 McGourty, Derek, 54, 390 McGrath, Joe, 396 McKenna, Dan, 3, 403 McKenna, T., 174 McMahon, Peadar, 396 McManus, Sharon, xiv, 317 McNamara, Eoin, xv, 373 McWilliams, David, 379 Media landscape, 232 Mellett, Mark, xi, 3, 46, 151, 205, 339, 340, 344, 382 Microsoft, 53 MINUSMA, 34, 239, 257 MSO, 101, 104 Mulcahy, Richard, 29, 395 Mulqueen, John, xvi, 16 Mulqueen, Michael, xiv, 333, 377, 411

INDEX

Munster Technical University (MTU), 81 Murphy, Gary, 412, 422 Murphy, Gavin, xii, 174 N National Army Spouses Association (NASA), 356, 357, 359 National Contingency Plan (NCP), 6 National Cyber Response Centre, 284, 288 National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), 8, 26, 52, 53, 268 National Cyber Security Council, 284 National Emergency Co-ordination Centre, 26 National Health Service (HSE), 50 National Maritime College of Ireland (NMCI), 81, 185 National Security Analysis Centre (NSAC), 9, 14, 21, 26 NATO, xv, 14, 15, 26, 37, 39, 40, 79, 80, 97, 100, 102, 104, 146, 203, 220, 223, 225, 226, 230, 234, 275, 283, 285, 286, 289, 291, 298, 303, 325, 329, 373–375, 377, 379–383, 385–387, 389–392, 405–407, 409, 411–414, 416, 418, 419, 421, 422, 424, 426, 430 Emerging Security Challenges Division, 314 Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), 389 Operation Active Endeavour, 102 Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII), 105, 392 Standing Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), 101 Naval Service Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP), 79

439

Remote Operations Vehicle (ROV), 81 Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive 2.0, 277 Nice Treaty, 374, 422, 423 Niemba Ambush, 201 Nixon, Richard, 417 Nkrumah, Kwame, 200 Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), 255 Nordenman, Magnus, 389 Northern Oceanic Transition Area (NOTA), 7

O O’Brien, Dan, 41 O’Callaghan, William, 219 O’Connell, Daniel, 407 O’Driscoll, Aidan, 355 Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), 9 Offshore Renewable Energy (ORE), 7 Óglaigh na hÉireann, 4, 29, 30, 37, 353, 369 Ogra Shinn Fein, 36 O’Halpin, Eunan, 18–20, 359 O’Hare, Dessie, 33 O’Higgins, Kevin, 359 Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC), 6 OJCFATD, 364 O’Mahoney, John, 216 O’Neill, Matthew G., v, xiii, 253 O’Neill, Tadhg, 218 ONUC deployment, 198, 200, 201, 205, 208, 409 Operation ATALANTA, 78 Operation Barkhane, 303 Operation Fortitude, 145, 184 JTF, 30, 31 Operation IRINI, 78–81, 83

440

INDEX

Operation Mallard, 33 Operation Pontus, 102 Operation Sophia, 102 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 38 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 230, 234, 238, 286, 376, 391, 406 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 275 O’Sullivan, Kevin, 199, 200 O’Toole, Fintan, 422 Our Public Service 2020 (OPS2020), 324

P P710-million ScanEagle UAS, 98 Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), 212, 215–218 Partnership for Peace (PfP), xv, 79, 80, 146, 204, 391, 392, 422 PASSEX, 101 Pauwels, Eleonore, 243, 256 Peacetech, 240, 270 Permanent Pay Review Body (PPRB), 355, 363, 366, 368 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 16 Personnel Support Services (PSS), 363 Philippine Navy, 98 Port Berehaven, 71 Portlaoise Prison, 30, 131 Port Lough Swilly, 71 Price Waterhouse, 34 Protection Of Civilian mandates (POC), 239, 258 Public Service Pay Commission (PSPC), 57, 358 Putin, Vladimir, 29, 375

Q Queen’s University Belfast, xiii Quick Reaction Force (QRF), 34 R RAND, 197 RCVs, 302, 311 Reagan, Ronald, 418, 420 Reamda HOBO, 308 Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), 115, 120 Representative Association for Commissioned Officers (RACO), 95, 131, 135, 355, 357, 358, 363–368 Representative Organisation of Commissioned Officers (RACO), 95 Research, Technology, and Innovation (RTI), xiv, 266, 317–322, 324–331, 333, 336, 347–350 Capability Development Plan, 322 Reserve Defence Forces, x, xii, 18, 26, 35, 40, 154, 175, 176 Army, xii, 33, 39, 40, 123–131, 133–140, 142, 144, 145, 148–151, 153–165, 167, 169–172, 175, 399 Local Defence Force (LDF), 168, 170 First Line Reserve (FLR), 148, 149, 167 Naval, xii, 33, 174–176, 178–191 Representative Association (RDFRA), 181, 357 Technical Skills Unit (TSU), 179, 183, 184 Volunteer Force, 164 Reserve Forces Act, 176 Reserve of Men, 167 Richardson, Neil, xii, 148, 149, 153 Right-wing political ideologies, 12

INDEX

Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs), 179 Roblin, Sébastien, 389 Rogers, David, xii, 174 Romanian government, 96 Royal College of Surgeons, 169 Royal Naval Reservists, 182 Russian Federation, xv, 8, 10, 11, 28, 91–93, 97, 231 Russian naval exercises, ix Ryanair, 108, 110

S Sanders, Deborah, xii, 87 Save Irish Search and Rescue (SISAR), 337 Schuman, Robert, 10 Science Foundation Ireland (SFI), 330, 350 Scollick, Andy, xiv, 295 Sea Fishery Protection Authority, 70 Sea Lines Of Communications (SLOCS), 91, 92 Sea of Azov, 97 Search And Rescue (SAR), 7, 107, 109, 112, 333, 335–338, 341, 345, 346, 349 Service Level Agreements (SLA), 70 Shannon Oceanic Transition Area (SOTA), 7 Shatter, Alan, 99 Sheehy-Skeffington, Francis, 407 Sherman, Jake, 246 Single European Act, 420, 421 Single Force Concept, xii, 123, 128, 131, 133, 136, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 149, 150, 154, 155, 157, 158, 164, 170, 183 Sinn Féin, 37, 375, 422, 424, 425, 427

441

Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE), 239, 242, 243, 267 Skripal, Sergei, 385 Skripal, Yulia, 385 Smallhorne, Derek, 216, 217 Smith, Bríd, 408 Space international law, 8 Sparrow, 238 Spatio-Temporal Incident Mapping (STIM), 239, 267 Spear Phishing attack, 50 Special Criminal Court, 36 Special Operations Force (SOF), 42 Sreenan, James, 219 Strohal, Christian, 353 Surge Brigade, 131, 132, 138, 142

T TalkWalker, 238 Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), 324 Ternopil , 102 Texas A&M University, v, xii Tidy, Don, 209 Tierney, Michael, 402 Tone, Wolfe, 407 Total Force Policy, xii, 139, 143–145 Traynor, Oscar, 402 Trinity College Dublin, 169 Trithart, Albert, 246 Truck attack Bastille Day, 50 Christmas Market, 50 Trump, Donald J., 47, 221 Tunisia attack, 49 Turkish Bayraktar, 98, 297

442

INDEX

U UAVs, 81, 98, 99, 104, 115, 116, 238, 246, 247, 255, 260, 295–308, 310–313 MALE, 297 Orbiter 2Bs, 308 UCAVs, 296, 304–306, 311, 313 Reaper, 297 UGVs, 296, 302, 305, 308, 310, 312 THeMIS, 303, 309, 310 UK BAFPRB, 368 Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), 319, 324, 327 House of Commons Select Committee (HCSC), 361 Royal Air Force, 54, 58, 310, 383, 385, 386 Ukraine invasion of, ix, 10–12, 29, 37, 46, 49, 429 Ukrainian government, 97 UN Action for Peacekeeping (A4P), 258 Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+), 258 C4ISR, 246 Camp Shamrock, 220 Chapter VI, 43, 223 Chapter VII, 43, 223 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 74 Common Security and Defence Policy, 37, 45, 275, 319, 425 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty, 87 Department of Management, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC), 234 Department of Operational Support (DOS), 234

Departments of Peace Operations (DPO), 234, 247 DOF, 34, 224, 308 Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, 51 Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), xiii, 201, 205, 207, 211–227 KFOR (Kosovo) missions, 409 Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), 236, 257 Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 214 Observer Force in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 214, 221, 405 Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 204 Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), 146 Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), 240 T/PCCs, 244–248 Training School Ireland (UNTSI), 226 Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), 214 UN Charter Chapter VII, 45 UNFICYP, 201–203, 205 University College Cork, 169, 340 University College Dublin, 20, 169 University College Galway, 169 University of Central Lancashire, xiv University of Tartu, xv University of Warsaw, xiii Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), 115 Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAVs), 98

INDEX

UN Security Council, ix, xiii, 9, 35, 195, 210, 212, 213, 217, 230, 236, 375, 419 UUVs, 296, 302, 304, 311 AUVs, 303 ROVs, 303, 308 V Varadkar, Leo, 364, 425 Venice Declaration, 201 Vetter, Michael, xiv, 273 Vincent, Patrick, 216 Violent non-state actors (VNSA), 255

443

W Walker, Michael, 361 Warsaw Pact, 204 Waterford harbour, 180 Whitaker, T.K., 25, 109 Wigell, Mikael, 378 Williams, Mark, v, ix, xiii, 253, 429 Williams, Stephanie, 236 Wizard Spider, 11, 55, 61 Workers’ Party, 418–421, 426 World Trade Centre attacks, 49