Central Asia and Southeast Asia: Exploring the Dynamics of Greater Engagement 3031101111, 9783031101113

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
About the Author
1 Introduction
Literature Review and Research Aims
The Foreign Policy of Small and Medium States and Their Hedging Strategy
Omnidirectional Hedging
Economic Hedging
Hedging Regionalism
Research Methodology, Terminology and Scope
Research Methodology
Terminology and Scope
Chapter Outline
2 Southeast Asia in Central Asia’s Foreign Relations
The Multi-vector Foreign Policies of Central Asian States
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
The Hedging Imperative
The “Southeast Asian Vector”
New Beginnings and Partnerships
Revitalising Economic Diplomacy and Diversifying Economic Partners
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan
Obstacles to Greater Trade and Economic Links
Southeast Asia as Political and Economic Role Models
Economy Before Politics
Limitations to Emulations
Personal Ties and Socio-Economic Opportunities
Central Asia’s Engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-Led Fora
Engagement by Other Means
A C5+ ASEAN Dialogue?
Conclusion
3 The Key Drivers of Greater Engagement
The Russian-Led EAEU
The EAEU and ASEAN
Future Possibilities
China’s BRI
Kazakhstan’s Central Role in the BRI
Selling the New Silk Road
Fears of the Dragon
Economic Dependency on China
Growing Backlash Against China
China’s Expanding Security Presence
COVID-19 and the Limits of Chinese Soft Power
The Southeast Asian Vector as an Economic Counterweight?
Alternative Central Asia-Southeast Asia Routes
Conclusion
4 The ASEAN Model for Central Asian Regionalism
Central Asian Regionalism
Past Failures
A Growing Momentum Towards Regional Cooperation
The ASEAN Model
ASEAN’s Appeal and Normative Convergence
Hedging Regionalism
Conclusion
5 Conclusion
Key Findings and Arguments
Further Areas for Research
Policy Recommendations
Reflections on the Challenges and Likely Directions of Relations
Index

Citation preview

Central Asia and Southeast Asia Exploring the Dynamics of Greater Engagement

Central Asia and Southeast Asia

Paradorn Rangsimaporn

Central Asia and Southeast Asia Exploring the Dynamics of Greater Engagement

Paradorn Rangsimaporn Bangkok, Thailand

ISBN 978-3-031-10111-3 ISBN 978-3-031-10112-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10112-0 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without all those people, both within Central Asia and also outside the region, who generously gave their time to talk with me and to share their views on Central Asia–Southeast Asia relations, some of whom have become my friends. I thank in particular Assel Bitabarova, Nigel Gould-Davies, Jittipat Poonkham and Kemel Toktomushev for helping read through my manuscript and giving valuable feedback. Any omissions or errors that remain are of course my own. I also thank the OSCE Academy in Bishkek for providing me access to their invaluable library database while I was an Associate Research Fellow. While I would say that my work as a Thai diplomat in Central Asia and my research conducted for this book are complementary, it would be remiss of me not to express appreciation to my Embassy colleagues, Ambassador Chatchawan Sakornsin, Wongsakorn Chaichana and Saifon Faijit, for their understanding, support and indulgence for my writing this book. All views expressed in this book, however, are my own and not that of the Thai foreign ministry or government. I am also grateful to the editorial team at Palgrave Macmillan, particularly Alina Yurova, Ashwini Elango and Anne Birchley-Brun for their professional assistance and guidance throughout the publication process. Last but not least, I have been very fortunate to have by my side my wife, Sirinapa, who has always supported me in all my endeavours and has made sacrifices so that I am able to follow my dreams. She has been and will continue to be the bedrock and the utmost love and Joy of my life. v

Contents

1

Introduction Literature Review and Research Aims The Foreign Policy of Small and Medium States and Their Hedging Strategy Research Methodology, Terminology and Scope Chapter Outline

1 4 8 20 26

Southeast Asia in Central Asia’s Foreign Relations The Multi-vector Foreign Policies of Central Asian States The “Southeast Asian Vector” Southeast Asia as Political and Economic Role Models Central Asia’s Engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-Led Fora Conclusion

27 28 38 57

3

The Key Drivers of Greater Engagement The Russian-Led EAEU China’s BRI Fears of the Dragon The Southeast Asian Vector as an Economic Counterweight? Conclusion

81 82 91 101 114 123

4

The ASEAN Model for Central Asian Regionalism Central Asian Regionalism The ASEAN Model

127 128 135

2

72 78

vii

viii

5

CONTENTS

Hedging Regionalism Conclusion

142 146

Conclusion Key Findings and Arguments Further Areas for Research Policy Recommendations Reflections on the Challenges and Likely Directions of Relations

151 152 154 156

Index

158 163

About the Author

Paradorn Rangsimaporn is a Thai diplomat and independent researcher. He was Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission at the Royal Thai Embassy in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan. He has written a book and several articles on Russian foreign policy towards Asia and Central Asia’s relations with Southeast Asia. He holds a D.Phil. in International Relations from the University of Oxford.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract This introductory chapter firstly reviews the relevant literature and outlines the research aims, primarily to explore the nature and dynamics of Central Asia–Southeast Asia relations, focusing on the driving forces and motivations in this relationship. It then examines the foreign policy of small and medium states, particularly their hedging strategy and behaviour. This provides the analytical framework for this research, namely through three key concepts—omnidirectional hedging, economic hedging and hedging regionalism. It then outlines the research methodology, defines key terms and determines the scope of the book. Lastly, it provides the book’s chapter outline. Keywords Hedging · ASEAN · EAEU · BRI · Regionalism

It has been commonly acknowledged that the twenty-first century is an Asian century, and it has also been increasingly and convincingly put forward that the “heartland” of Eurasia, where Asia meets Europe and East meets West, is where the crux of the world’s future lies.1 The 1 See, for instance, such popular works as Peter Frankopan, The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018); and Bruno Maçães, The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order (London: Penguin Books, 2019).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Rangsimaporn, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10112-0_1

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centrepiece of the emerging strategically important Eurasian landscape is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which not only runs through Asia’s two dynamic and strategically important regions of Central Asia and Southeast Asia, but also potentially connects them. However, the relations between Central Asia and Southeast Asia, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have been an underexplored research area, despite the two regions’ rising global importance and potential greater connectedness and engagement. This book seeks to address this research gap by examining the nature of relations and the driving factors of greater engagement between the two regions, notably the aims and attempts of Central Asian states to diversify their relations as part of their hedging strategy. Southeast Asia and its regional organisation—ASEAN-has risen steadily in importance in world affairs. In the post-Cold War period, ASEAN expanded to include Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999), and now encompasses all of the Southeast Asian countries except for Timor-Leste. ASEAN is also a large growing market with a population of approximately 656 million, a combined GDP of US$ 3166 billion in 2020 and a steady GDP growth of around 5 percent annually, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.2 Moreover, ASEAN is evolving into a regional community and has played a leading role in Asia–Pacific regionalism and the construction of the regional order, through the establishment of dialogue mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the East Asia Summit (EAS).3 In recent years, however, ASEAN’s centrality, significance, and relevance have been increasingly challenged by intensifying US–China rivalry, the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, and the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.4

2 “ASEAN: Selected Basic Indicators,” https://data.aseanstats.org/ (accessed 31 October 2021). 3 Robert Yates, “ASEAN as the ‘Regional Conductor’: Understanding ASEAN’s Role in Asia–Pacific Order,” The Pacific Review 30, no. 4 (2017): 443–461; and Quang Minh Pham, “ASEAN’s Indispensable Role in Regional Construction,” Asia–Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (2015): 82–101. 4 Amitav Acharya, “The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 39, no. 2 (2017): 273–279; and Mark Valencia, “Brave Words Not Enough to Affirm ASEAN Centrality,” Asia Times, 21 September 2020.

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Although Central Asia has not yet formed a regional institution that comprises only the five Central Asian states, there have been greater momentum and prospects towards regionalism in recent years.5 Located at the heart of Eurasia and possessing vast energy and natural resources, Central Asia has long been a strategically important region for the great powers. This geostrategic importance has been enhanced by the region’s proximity to Afghanistan and its vulnerability to related security concerns such as terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking, all of which could have potential spillover effects upon the surrounding countries and worldwide. With a combined population of about 75 million and a combined GDP of about US$ 288.7 billion, Central Asia also represents a relatively large untapped market, including for ASEAN countries.6 Likewise, Central Asian countries view ASEAN as a potentially large market for its goods and alternative investor and economic partner. Enhanced relations with ASEAN could also help facilitate Central Asian states’ integration into the dynamically growing Asia–Pacific region. There is also increasing momentum towards greater economic engagement with Southeast Asia not only through China’s BRI but also Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Both regions also share geopolitical similarities as they consist of small and medium states that have to contend with great-power dynamics and rivalry, including shared concerns over China’s increasing dominance in their respective regions. While regionalism in Southeast Asia has been a relative success story and an ASEAN community is steadily forming, Central Asian regionalism has only recently gained momentum. Due to Central Asia sharing the abovementioned geopolitical similarities with Southeast Asia, the Central Asian states could also learn from the ASEAN experience. This could prove to be another area for further engagement between the two regions.

5 Regionalism is defined as a policy whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region. Its aim is to pursue and promote common goals in one or more issue areas. It is different from regionalisation which is a process whereby the concentration of activity at a regional level may lead to the formation or shaping of regions that may in turn give rise to the emergence of regional groups, actors and organisations. Regionalisation may thus both precede and flow from regionalism. Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 433. 6 “World Bank Data for the Five Central Asian Countries (2020)”, https://data.wor ldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=KZ-KG-UZ-TJ-TM (accessed 31 October 2021).

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This chapter firstly reviews the relevant literature and sets out the research aims. It then examines the foreign policy of small and medium states, particularly their hedging strategy and behaviour. This provides the analytical framework for the book, namely through three key concepts— omnidirectional hedging, economic hedging and hedging regionalism. It then outlines the research methodology employed, defines key terms and determines the scope of the book. Lastly, it provides a chapter outline.

Literature Review and Research Aims The academic literature on Central Asia’s relations with Southeast Asia and ASEAN is scarce. Much has understandably been written on the two region’s relations with major powers—the US, China, Russia and the European Union (EU).7 Within Asia, apart from China, focus has been on Central Asia’s relations with Japan, South Korea, India and

7 For instance, Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Ilya Levine, US Policies in Central Asia: Democracy, Energy, and the War on Terror (Oxford: Routledge, 2016); Marlene Laruelle, ed., China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Impact in Central Asia (Washington, DC: George Washington University, Central Asia Program, 2018); Nadine Godehardt, The Chinese Constitution of Central Asia: Regions and Intertwined Actors in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Alexey Malashenko, The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013); Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Olga Alinda Spaiser, The European Union’s Influence in Central Asia: Geopolitical Challenges and Response (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018); Georgiy Voloshin, The European Union’s Normative Power in Central Asia: Promoting Values and Defending Interests (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ed., ASEAN-US Relations: What are the Talking Points? (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2011); Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun and Chin Kin Wah, eds., ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2005); Sebastian Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century (Croydon: Yale University Press, 2020); Victor Sumsky, Mark Hong and Amy Lugg, eds., ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2012); Daniel Novotny and Clara Portela, eds., EU-ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century: Strategic Partnership in the Making (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

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Iran.8 Likewise, ASEAN’s relations with its other key Asian dialogue partners—Japan, South Korea and India—have been focused upon.9 The few academic works on relations between Central Asia and Southeast Asia or ASEAN have mainly focused on bilateral relations or a particular country’s relations with Central Asia or ASEAN.10 Some examine Southeast

8 For example, Timur Dadabaev, Japan in Central Asia: Strategies, Initiatives, and

Neighboring Powers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Nikolay Murashkin, Japan and the New Silk Road: Diplomacy, Development and Connectivity (London: Routledge, 2020); Matteo Fumagalli, “Growing Inter-Asian Relations: Links, Rivalries and Challenges in South Korean-Central Asian Relations,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, no. 7 (2016): 39– 48; “Dialogue Summary: Japan and South Korea in Central Asia,” The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs and Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies Report, 28 July 2021, https://oxussociety.org/japan-and-south-korea/ (accessed 3 October 2021); Emilian Kavalski, India and Central Asia: The Mythmaking and International Relations of a Rising Power (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010); Marlene Laruelle, et al. eds., China and India in Central Asia: A New “Great Game”? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Central Asia: paradigm and policy,” Central Asian Survey 23, no. 2 (2004): 109–139; Anna Gussarova and M¯aris Andž¯ans, eds., “Political and Security Relations—Mapping Central Asia’s Relations with Other Asian States”, SEnECA Policy Paper, no. 2 (September 2018): 1–16. 9 For example, Sueo Sudo, Japan’s ASEAN Policy: In Search of Proactive Multilateralism (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2015); Takashi Shiraishi and Takaaki Kojima, eds., ASEAN-Japan Relations (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2013); Ho Khai Leong, ed., ASEAN-Korea Relations: Security, Trade and Community Building (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2007); David I. Steinberg, ed., Korea’s Changing Roles in Southeast Asia: Expanding Influence and Relations (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2010); Sudhir Devare, India & Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2005). 10 For example, Rakhat T. Akhmet, Chew Chee Khiang and Chang Peng Kee, “Framing the Diplomatic Ties Between Kazakhstan and Malaysia,” Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, no. 2 (2015): 162–177; Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Kazakhstan-Thailand Relations: Past Ties and Future Prospects”, Public Administration and Civil Service Journal (Nur-Sultan) 72, no. 1 (2020): 32–37; Jan Stark, “‘Snow Leopard’ meets ‘Asian Tiger’: Shaping Malaysia’s Relations with Central Asia,” The Round Table 95, no. 385 (2006): 455–471; Fatima Paizullaevna Urazaeva, “The Role of ASEAN in the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Results and Prospects for Cooperation,” KazNU Bulletin, International Relations and International Law Series 56, no. 6 (2011): 74–79; Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Kazakhstan and ASEAN: The Unexplored Vector in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy”, Asian Affairs 51, no. 1 (2020): 126–145; and Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Southeast Asia in Kazakhstan’s Omnidirectional Hedging Strategy,” Problems of Post-Communism, https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2021.1969250 (published online 7 October 2021).

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Asia’s relations with Central Asia as part of the wider context of its relations with Russia and other post-Soviet states.11 They do not examine relations between the two regions or groups of countries as a whole or analyse the factors driving that relationship. However, due to both regions’ growing global importance and potential greater connectedness, their relationship deserves examination. In particular, how Southeast Asia is part of Central Asia’s attempts to diversify their economic relations and avoid overdependence on China, which is expanding its presence in Central Asia.12 The primary aim of this book is to fill this gap and explore the nature and dynamics of Central Asia–Southeast Asia relations, focusing on the driving forces and motivations in this relationship, particularly from the Central Asian perspective. Firstly, it examines how Southeast Asia or ASEAN is viewed by Central Asian countries, how it fits in their multi-vector foreign policies, and what has been their engagement with the region and ASEAN thus far. Secondly, it analyses the key drivers of their greater engagement, namely through (1) increasing mutual interest in developing relations between the EAEU and ASEAN; (2) growing interest in utilising China’s BRI to connect the two regions in order to access each other’s markets as well as the use of Central Asia as a landbridge to the European market for Southeast Asian goods; and (3) Central Asian countries’ growing concern over the expansion of Chinese economic influence, which could provide further impetus for enhanced relations with ASEAN and some of its member countries as alternative partners and a counterweight. Thirdly, it looks at Central Asian views of ASEAN as a potential model for Central Asian regionalism, how the regions have shared principles and challenges as both consist of small and medium states that have to contend with great-power dynamics, primarily the rise of China and the response to this of other regional powers. Lastly, it examines the prospects for greater Central Asia–Southeast Asia engagement and provides some recommendations for strengthening this as well as reflects on the challenges.

11 For example, Pushpa Thambipillai, “Southeast Asia, Russia and the Ex-Soviet Republics: Expanding the Links,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 1 (June 1994): 93–107. 12 Temur Umarov, “China Looms Large in Central Asia,” 30 March 2020, https://car negie.ru/commentary/81402 (accessed 7 April 2020).

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This book argues that a more substantive and significant relationship between Central Asia and Southeast Asia or ASEAN is emerging due to the abovementioned three key driving factors. By utilising the foreign policy analysis literature of small and medium states, especially the foreign policy strategy of “hedging” by ASEAN countries, it argues that ASEAN and some of its member countries are seen as viable alternative partners for Central Asian states, particularly in the economic realm. Central Asian states’ views and policies towards ASEAN and Southeast Asian countries are part of their hedging strategy—to diversify their foreign relations and economic partners as much as possible in order to avoid overdependence on one particular power, namely Russia and China. This is particularly the case at a time when the US’s focus on, and influence in, Central Asia is fading after fully withdrawing from Afghanistan in August 2021. This is in sharp contrast to the US’s attention on Central Asia during the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when Central Asian states held strategic value for US operations in Afghanistan. However, this is not to say that Southeast Asian countries present the most important alternative partner for Central Asia. They are only one amongst several alternative partners such as the EU and its member states, Japan, India, South Korea, and some Middle Eastern countries, within the Central Asian states’ broadly multivector foreign policies. Moreover, somewhat paradoxically, two of the driving factors of greater engagement between Central Asia and Southeast Asia—the EAEU and BRI—are projects led by the very regional powers—Russia and China—that Central Asian states are trying to avoid overdependence on by seeking diversification of their relations with other partners, including ASEAN and its members.13 But it is because of these projects and the role Central Asian states play in them to varying degrees that have attracted the greater interest of ASEAN and its members, who have thus stepped up their engagement with Central Asia. As the author is a Thai diplomat who worked in Central Asia, the book provides a practitioner’s perspective on this topic through the analytical lens of the “hedging” behaviour of the Central Asian states.

13 On the EAEU and BRI as different means for Russia and China to exert influence over Central Asia see Marcin Kaczmarski, “Two ways of influence-building: The Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt, One Road Initiative,” Europe-Asia Studies 69, no. 7 (2017): 1027–1046.

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The Foreign Policy of Small and Medium States and Their Hedging Strategy The academic literature on the foreign policy behaviour of small and medium states or secondary and tertiary powers, especially their hedging behaviour, have useful bearings on the foreign policy behaviour of both Central Asian and Southeast Asian states. Both regions consist of states that vary from small states like Laos and Kyrgyzstan and medium states or secondary powers like Indonesia and Kazakhstan. Both regions’ states are also in asymmetrical relationships with their respective region’s great powers—Russia and China in Central Asia, and China and the US in Southeast Asia. The foreign policies of countries in Central Asia and Southeast Asia have, therefore, similar characteristics, but employ different terms. Central Asian states, as well as some other post-Soviet states, pursue a multi-vector foreign policy to varying degrees, while Southeast Asian countries’ foreign policies have often been described as omnidirectional or multidirectional. In aim and practice, they are essentially the same as they seek to diversify their foreign relations to secure as many security, political and economic benefits as they can. They also seek to enhance their bargaining position whilst minimising potential threats and challenges. Such a policy enables the successful implementation of a hedging strategy, neither balancing nor bandwagoning, which helps preserve their autonomy and creates a stable environment for their economic development in an increasingly multipolar world.14 Researchers have used different terminology and conceptual approaches to explain the Central Asian states’ multi-vector diplomacy, but which essentially

14 For instance, Nicholas Chapman, “Mechanisms of Vietnam’s Multidirectional Foreign Policy,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 36, no. 2 (2017): 31–69; Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “New Omnidirectional Overtures in Thai Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey 26, no. 7 (July 1986): 745–758; Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian Strategies toward the Great Powers: Still Hedging after All These Years?” ASAN Forum, Special Forum, 22 February 2016, http://www.theasanforum.org/southeast-asian-strategies-toward-thegreat-powers-still-hedging-after-all-these-years/ (accessed 27 July 2020); Elena Gnedina, “‘Multi-vector’ Foreign Policies in Europe: Balancing, Bandwagoning or Bargaining?” Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 7 (2015): 1007–1029; Jason E. Strakes, “Situating the ‘Balanced Foreign Policy’: The Role of System Structure in Azerbaijan’s Multi-vector Diplomacy, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 15, no. 1 (2013): 37–67; and Maximillian Ohle, Richard J. Cook, and Zhaoying Han, “China’s Engagement with Kazakhstan and Russia’s Zugzwang: Why Is Nur-Sultan Incurring Regional Power Hedging?” Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 86–103.

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described the same characteristics of hedging behaviour. For instance, it has been argued that the Central Asian states’ multi-vector diplomacy implied the simultaneous “co-alignment” with different great powers, to diversify its partners in order to avoid one great power’s dominance and to pursue a policy of “issue splitting,” whereby no one great power can completely capture a given policy area, market sector or portion of sovereignty of the smaller state. Multi-vectorism, therefore, represented a form of relational power allowing a weaker state to mitigate the dilemmas of dependence while engaging with more powerful actors.15 Some research has also applied analysis of the foreign policy strategies of Southeast Asian states in managing their relations with great powers, namely omni-enmeshment and a complex balance of influence,16 to the multi-vector foreign policy implementation of a secondary power like Kazakhstan, particularly with regard to its neighbouring powers— Russia and China.17 The pursuance of a multi-vector foreign policy by Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, was also argued as giving them “the capacity to develop and employ strategies which have allowed them to overcome many of the handicaps of their lesser power status,” and providing them greater agency in managing their relations with the great powers. Multi-vectorism increases a smaller state’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the greater powers “by means of tactical manoeuvring” and thus resembles a hedging strategy but is not necessarily limited to it.18 Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, were seen as trying to enhance relations with Japan and South Korea, for example, in their multi-vector foreign policies as a way to hedge against China and Russia

15 Nicola P. Contessi, “Foreign and Security Policy Diversification in Eurasia: Issue

Splitting, Co-alignment, and Relational Power,” Problems of Post-Communism 62, no. 5 (2015): 299–311. 16 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omnienmeshment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order,” IDSS Working Paper, no. 84 (July 2005) and Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 113– 157. 17 Rachel Vanderhill, Sandra F. Joireman and Roza Tulepbayeva, “Between the Bear and the Dragon: Multivectorism in Kazakhstan as a Model Strategy for Secondary Powers,” International Affairs 96, no. 4 (July 2020): 975–993. 18 Mariya Y. Omelicheva and Ruoxi Du, “Kazakhstan’s Multi-vectorism and SinoRussian Relations,” Insight Turkey 20, no. 4 (Fall 2018): 100.

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by diversifying their relations.19 Therefore, there is increasing recognition of the utility of applying the analytical framework of the foreign policies of Southeast Asian states to those of Central Asia, particularly their hedging behaviour. The concept of hedging has gained prominence in the post-Cold War period and has become one of the most influential concepts in international relations discourse on the Asia–Pacific region in the twenty-first century. Hedging is often contrasted with balancing or bandwagoning, concepts that were developed during the Cold War to explain the strategies of resisting or accommodating a rising or threatening great power. But the behaviour of small and medium states in the Asia–Pacific in the post-Cold War world often belied this dichotomy. In response to China’s rise, Southeast Asian states did not take clear sides to balance against the rising power or align with it but instead focused on efforts to mitigate risk amidst an uncertain and fluid strategic environment.20 They essentially practised a hedging strategy that features a mix of cooperative and confrontational behaviour with regard to the great power in order to minimise risk in a highly uncertain international environment. Importantly, hedging strategies seek to manage and address risk in the form of “potential security-related threats,” but not when states are already faced with a clear and present threat, and thereby must choose to either resist or accommodate the source of that threat.21 In Central Asia, neither of the two regional powers, Russia and China, are yet seen as actual threats, but due to the past history of Russian expansionism and China’s increasing influence in the region, both powers are often viewed with apprehension and concern by Central Asian states. Therefore, one can argue that the Central Asian states, to varying degrees, have tried to pursue a hedging strategy by engaging and accommodating 19 “Dialogue Summary: Japan and South Korea in Central Asia;” and Gussarova and Andž¯ans, eds., “Political and Security Relations,” 13. 20 On hedging strategies as the central tendency in Asian international relations due to its uncertain and complex nature see Van Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” International Relations of the Asia–Pacific 14 (2014): 331–356. On balancing and bandwagoning see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979) and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987). 21 John D. Ciorciari and Jürgen Haacke, “Hedging in International Relations: An Introduction,” International Relations of the Asia–Pacific 19 (2019): 367–374.

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both Russia and China while pursuing engagement and cooperation with alternative powers to minimise their risk exposure. Furthermore, the recent escalation in diplomatic tensions between the US, EU, China and Russia, might spill over into Central Asia and external powers might start insisting regional states to choose sides, “scuppering current efforts at multi-vectorism” and “heightening the risk of destabilisation.”22 This book takes the definition of hedging as “insurance-seeking behaviour under high-stakes and high-uncertainty condition.” It has three attributes: firstly, is the insistence on not taking sides or avoiding rigid alignment; secondly, is attempting to pursue opposing measures to offset different risks, or preserving ambiguity as a self-help mechanism; and thirdly, is the diversification of relations to cultivate a fall-back position, which is the book’s focus.23 The analytical framework draws upon the utility of three concepts, two of which are from the literature on Southeast Asian states’ foreign policies, while the other is on Central Asian regionalism. They are “omnidirectional hedging,” “economic hedging” and “balancing regionalism” or what is adapted and termed herein as “hedging regionalism.” By applying these concepts, the book examines the multi-vector foreign policy of Central Asian states with regards to Southeast Asia and the driving factors of this burgeoning relationship. It argues that the Central Asian states aim to diversify their foreign relations and economic partners, especially amidst China’s expanding influence, and see some key Southeast Asian countries as possible partners as part of their hedging strategy. Whether they have been successful in implementing this hedging strategy or not is beyond the book’s scope. Omnidirectional Hedging The hedging literature usually focuses on the behaviour of small and medium states vis-à-vis two competing great powers such as Southeast Asia vis-à-vis China and the US. However, Southeast Asian states do not necessarily practise hedging only two-dimensionally with regards to 22 Akram Umarov, “How Rising Great Power Tensions Will Affect Central Asia,” The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, 8 April 2021, https://oxussociety.org/how-risinggreat-power-tensions-will-affect-central-asia/ (accessed 10 April 2021). 23 Hedging definition from Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia: What, How, and Why? The ASAN Forum, 6 June 2020, http://www.theasanforum.org/hed ging-in-post-pandemic-asia-what-how-and-why/ (accessed 3 August 2020): 4.

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just the US and China, but rather multi-dimensionally. This has been termed “omnidirectional hedging” which involves the diversification of economic, diplomatic and security relations with other secondary and tertiary powers to enhance the Southeast Asian states’ strategic space and sovereignty in the regional system and to ease tension in the regional strategic environment. Omnidirectional hedging, therefore, “helps small and medium powers to avoid being entrapped in an ensuing great power rivalry in which the more straightforward strategic alignment choices would render them pawns of that power contestation.”24 Cheng-Chwee Kuik likewise argued that, “hedging is not about targeting a single risk or a specific power; rather, hedging is about offsetting a wide range of risks stemming from high-uncertainty.” Furthermore, when the perceived risks are so numerous, such as challenges to territorial integrity, power entrapment, economic security and regime survival, and when power relations are so uncertain, “no rational actor – especially smaller states which are vulnerable to a broad array of challenges in an anarchic world – would place its bet on a single power.”25 The former Singaporean diplomat, Bilahari Kausikan, similarly argued that Asia is a particularly complex and diverse region where the US and China are the major players, but “consequential powers” like Japan, India, Russia, South Korea and Australia can also play a role. Therefore, none of the Southeast Asian countries “will put all their eggs in one basket and everyone will hedge and balance simultaneously, always trying to maintain the best possible relationship with all major powers.” He argued that no country, however sympathetic or dependent they might be towards the US or China, would accept an exclusive relationship with either.26

24 Olli Suorsa, “Maintaining a Small State’s Strategic Space: Omnidirectional Hedging,” International Studies Association Hong Kong, 10 June 2017, http://web.isanet.org/ Web/Conferences/HKU2017-s/Archive/f40db849-cb90-4826-9b7a-e449b602f398.pdf (accessed 1 August 2020) (italics in original). See also, Olli Suorsa, “Hedging Against Over-Dependence on US Security: Thailand and Philippines,” RSIS Commentary, no. 317, 29 December 2016; and Olli Suorsa and Mark R. Thompson, “Choosing Sides? Illiberalism and Hedging in the Philippines and Thailand,” Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs, no. 02/2017 (2018): 63–76. 25 Kuik, “Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia,” 6 (italics in original). 26 Iskander Akylbaev, “Asymmetrical Dynamic Multipolarity. An Interview with Ambas-

sador Bilahari Kausikan,” Central Asia Analytical Network Article, 6 July 2020, https:// caa-network.org/archives/2004 (accessed 9 July 2020).

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Such an analytical framework could also be applied to the case of Central Asia. Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and its declining role in the region, Central Asia is now faced with primarily two great powers—Russia and China—while other players sometimes have a walk-on part. Instead of choosing sides, whether to balance or bandwagon, it can be argued that the Central Asian states have tried to pursue a strategy of omnidirectional hedging by diversifying their foreign partners, notably with, inter alia, the US, the EU, India, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN and its members, and by attempting to draw them towards greater engagement with the region. Such a policy is also a manifestation of their multi-vector foreign policies. As one prominent Kazakh analyst has argued, Kazakhstan’s successful multi-vector foreign policy strategy had been based on its “‘hedging’ of foreign policy risks through the balanced development of external relations in all strategic areas…and the desire ‘not to put all eggs in one basket’.”27 However, it should be noted that Central Asia’s strategic landscape is somewhat different from Southeast Asia’s. In Southeast Asia, the US and China are intensifying their geostrategic competition and rivalry, while no other comparable great power is on the scene.28 But in Central Asia, the two major powers— Russia and China—have strategic convergence and shared interests in resisting US global predominance, while the US is playing a much lesser role in the region.29 Nonetheless, China’s expanding economic influence and its steadily growing security role in Central Asia arguably sets the stage for the potential geostrategic rivalry between Russia and China in

27 Yerzhan Saltybaev, “30 Years of Nazarbayev’s Foreign Policy: What Kazakhstan Can Teach the World in the New Era,” Modern Diplomacy, 3 July 2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/03/30-years-of-nazarbayevs-foreignpolicy-what-kazakhstan-can-teach-the-world-in-the-new-era/ (accessed 13 August 2020). 28 Even in such a situation of greater US–China rivalry, short of direct military confrontation, Southeast Asian states will still arguably continue to pursue hedging strategies rather than choosing to take sides with one power against another. See Kuik, “Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia.” 29 On

the factors limiting US influence and leverage in Central Asia see Charles J. Sullivan, “The Superpower and the ‘Stans’: Why Central Asia Is Not ‘Central’ to the United States,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 27 March 2019, https://saisreview.org/the-superpower-and-the-stans-why-central-asia-is-notcentral-to-the-united-states/ (accessed 19 October 2020). The US 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan has exacerbated this declining influence and role.

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the region.30 China’s influence in the region is also set to rise in the postpandemic era as no other regional or global power could match China’s economic capacity in Central Asia, making the region’s states even more dependent on China.31 According to Rafaello Pantucci, this “new reality in Central Asia that is more lopsided in China’s favour” has meant that the Central Asian states’ ability to balance between the great powers has become more difficult to maintain. In his view, the region is also increasingly seen by Beijing through the lens of US–China global rivalry thereby placing the Central Asian states in a difficult position. Although they would never want to choose sides, it would be hard for them to “hedge in a world divided by the two” powers and they would “always bend more to the Chinese perspective.”32 Moreover, the degree to which Central Asian states can pursue such an omnidirectional hedging strategy vary according to each state’s capability and geostrategic environment. As Suorsa noted, the scope and depth of each state utilising a specific foreign policy tool in their hedging strategy in order to broaden its freedom of action is restricted through domestic or external pressures.33 For instance, in the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, due to their limited economic capabilities and resources, geographical proximity to China, as well as overwhelming dependence on Chinese investment and loans, they have less room for manoeuvre

30 See Ohle, Cook, and Han, “China’s Engagement with Kazakhstan and Russia’s Zugzwang.” On China’s expanding presence in Central Asia see, Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon, “In Russia’s Shadow: China’s Rising Security Presence in Central Asia,” Kennan Cable, no. 52 (May 2020), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennancable-no-52-russias-shadow-chinas-rising-security-presence-central-asia (accessed 10 June 2020) and Niva Yau Tsz Yan, “Russia and China’s Quiet Rivalry in Central Asia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute Report, 17 September 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/ 09/russia-and-chinas-quiet-rivalry-in-central-asia/ (accessed 19 September 2020). On a different view that confrontation is not inevitable see Alexander Korolev, “Systematic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia Relations,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 4 (2016): 375–397 and Marcin Kaczmarski, “Russia-China Relations in Central Asia: Why is There a Surprising Absence of Rivalry?,” The ASAN Forum, 19 August 2019, http://www.theasanforum.org/russia-china-relations-in-centralasia-why-is-there-a-surprising-absence-of-rivalry/#2 (accessed 28 August 2019). 31 Aleksey Asiryan, “Post-COVID, China Set to Gain in Central Asia,” The Diplomat, 29 July 2020. 32 Cited in Reid Standish, “Coronavirus Crisis Accelerates China’s Grab for Power, Influence in Central Asia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 26 July 2020. 33 Suorsa, “Maintaining a Small State’s Strategic Space.”

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vis-à-vis China except for moving back closer to Russia—the traditional hegemon. The same can be said for Turkmenistan, which has become predominantly reliant on China as its main gas consumer, while before that it was dependent on Russia. Due to these internal and external limitations, these three states are more restricted in their pursuance of an omnidirectional hedging strategy and in their development of relations with Southeast Asia, compared with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Another factor that constrains the Central Asian states’ strategic and foreign policy manoeuvrability is their geographic position as landlocked states that forces them to be dependent on their neighbours as transit states to access the global market and they are thus “doomed to live in the shadow of the great powers of Russia and China.” This is in sharp contrast to the countries of Southeast Asia where all, except Laos, are coastal states and strategically positioned along the important maritime routes of the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits, thereby with greater access to the world market and less constrained than the landlocked Central Asian states in terms of both geography and strategic flexibility.34 Moreover, while their landlocked condition has forced the Central Asian states to try to pursue a “multidirectional strategic orientation” and to forge good relations with their neighbouring transits states, those who are major energy exporters such as Kazakhstan have succeeded more than their “energy-poor landlocked counterparts,” namely Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy by courting various foreign partners and investors and establishing multiple gas and oil pipeline routes to different markets in order to reduce their vulnerability.35 Economic Hedging Due to ASEAN’s and its member states’ limited political-security role and influence beyond their region, their hedging utility for Central Asia lies more in the economic field. Central Asian states see some key Southeast Asian countries as playing a potentially greater role in their “balance of influence” calculations in terms of their “diversification of portfolios and

34 Author’s interview with Farkhod Tolipov, Tashkent, 21 November 2021. 35 Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, “The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked

States,” Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 3 (2011): 241–268.

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risks,” through engagement with alternative trade and investment partners to lessen their overdependence on a particular power.36 This has also been termed as “economic hedging” behaviour, which encompasses “economic pragmatism” with regard to the rising power to maximise economic benefits through the forging of direct economic links, and “economic diversification” with regard to other powers to minimise economic risks of dependence by diversifying economic links.37 By applying this analytical framework, it can be argued that the Central Asian states have followed a policy of “economic pragmatism” with regards to China and Russia, the two main regional powers. They have tried to extract the maximum economic benefits through trade and investment, their export of energy and natural resources, infrastructure development and investment from China’s BRI, as well as regional economic integration and development from the Russian-led EAEU, in which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members, and Uzbekistan is an observer. They have simultaneously tried to pursue a policy of “economic diversification” by forging economic links with other actors, including ASEAN and its member states. However, the means by which the Central Asian states can pursue greater economic engagement with ASEAN and its members are also through the EAEU and BRI. Furthermore, the need for economic diversification can also be seen in Central Asian concerns regarding expanding Chinese economic influence, which has propelled them to seek alternative economic partners, such as those in ASEAN, to lessen their dependence on China. Taken together, these two policy approaches of economic pragmatism and economic diversification exhibit economic hedging behaviour by the Central Asian states.

36 Goh, “Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies,” 10–11. 37 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states’

alignment behavior towards China,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (2016): 500–514. Kuik identifies multiple policy options for a state to practice hedging behaviour, ranging from risk-contingency options that include (1) indirect balancing and (2) dominance denial, the neutrality point of (3) economic pragmatism, to the returns-maximising options that include (4) binding engagement and (5) limited bandwagoning. These range of hedging policy options lie on a continuum between pure balancing and pure bandwagoning. See also, Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (August 2008): 159–185.

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Hedging Regionalism The hedging analytical framework can also be applied to the Central Asian states’ attempts to forge greater Central Asian cooperation and regionalism. It has been argued that Asia has witnessed “institutional hedging” strategies pursued by regional powers in advancing their various regional institutions or concepts for regionalism in Asia’s uncertain strategic landscape, while small and medium states have undertaken a hedging strategy by diversifying their participation in the various proposed regional projects.38 Such “institutional hedging” is also applicable to Central Asia today, where both Russia and China have advanced their regional institutions and projects in the security and economic spheres—Moscow’s Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the EAEU and Beijing’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRI. Likewise, the small and medium states of Central Asia have been practising what has been termed “balancing regionalism” whereby “by joining different regional groups, voicing different regional identities, creating multiple regional narratives, and linking different regional platforms together, the Central Asian states are trying to engage Russia in a complex scheme of norms, identities, membership, incentives, and costs that make revisionism more difficult to pursue and, more importantly, to legitimise.”39 Moreover, the region’s five states are cooperating with each other more and there is discernible momentum towards an exclusive Central Asian regionalism, in which neither Russia nor China, are part of. For example, three “consultative” summits were held in then Astana (2018), Tashkent (2019) and Awaza in Turkmenistan (2021) which seems set to be a regular dialogue platform. While the focus of “balancing regionalism” was directed against Russia’s revisionist policies, it can be similarly applied to China’s rising influence. Although whether China is a revisionist power or not remains open to debate,40 concerns over expanding Chinese influence are variably growing amongst the Central Asian states.

38 Mie Oba, “Further Development of Asian Regionalism: Institutional Hedging in an Uncertain Era,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 8, no. 2 (2019): 125–140. 39 Aliya Tskhay and Filippo Costa Buranelli, “Accommodating Revisionism Through Balancing Regionalism: The Case of Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies 72, no. 16 (2020): 1033–1052. 40 Oba, “Further Development of Asian Regionalism,” 131, 136.

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In this respect, similar to the hedging strategies of Southeast Asian states that are reluctant to choose between the US and China and have used ASEAN as a platform to manage relations with the great powers, the Central Asian states’ approach towards Russia and China might be seen as pursuing a “hedging regionalism” strategy as well, namely the use of regional cooperation or regional platforms as a hedging mechanism. Rather than choosing a particular power to balance against or bandwagon with, the Central Asian states, except for Turkmenistan, have joined various regional projects led by both Russia and China while also trying to form their own exclusive regional cooperation platform as a way to hedge against those powers. The mechanisms of “balancing regionalism”—bridging, dovetailing and branding—are also on display with regard to Central Asia’s engagement with ASEAN as a regional organisation. Kazakhstan, in particular, has tried to “bridge” cooperation between ASEAN and Central Asian organisations, particularly the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the SCO. Central Asian states’ engagement with ASEAN is also part of their “dovetailing” mechanism by diversifying their relationship with several other countries and organisations. “Branding” is evident in the latest momentum towards intra-Central Asian cooperation in which a new Central Asian identity is being forged.41 ASEAN has often been described as a possible model for this Central Asian regionalism due to its “soft regionalism” nature which holds greater appeal for the Central Asian states.42 ASEAN itself is seen as a “hedging platform” for its member states amidst the uncertain post-Cold War era, not least due to China’s rise. ASEAN and the ASEAN Plus multilateral mechanisms have provided additional space and platforms for the Southeast Asian states to hedge against the risks associated with the rise of China. The ASEAN states’ “converging efforts” within ASEAN fora, which are not necessarily collective nor coordinated actions, occur alongside traditional

41 Tskhay and Costa Buranelli, “Accommodating Revisionism Through Balancing Regionalism,” 1044–1047. 42 Ikboljon Qoraboyev, “Tsentral’noaziatskii regionalizm v kontekste globalizatsii i

regionalizatsii” [Central Asian Regionalism in the Context of Globalisation and Regionalism] in Regionalizatsiia v Tsentral’noi Azii: Strategiia Kazakhstana [Regionalism in Central Asia: Strategy of Kazakhstan] (Almaty: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Fund, 2019), 85–91, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332604966_Centralnoaziatskij_region alizm_v_kontekste_globalizacii_i_regionalizacii (accessed 10 March 2020).

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unilateral and bilateral channels for hedging and allow them to simultaneously pursue policies that engage and constrain China in the region.43 The ASEAN experience is often seen as a useful model for Central Asian regionalism that is not centred on or dominated by great powers and that can provide a hedging platform for the Central Asian states. Nonetheless, the ongoing power transitions from the rise of China and US retrenchment in Southeast Asia are increasingly challenging ASEAN unity and centrality, particularly over the South China Sea issue, as well as the utility of ASEAN being a platform for hedging.44 Rising US–China rivalry and tensions, Myanmar’s military coup in 2021, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 pose further challenges to ASEAN’s unity, centrality and hedging ability. These three “hedging” conceptual approaches will be used as the analytical framework for the book’s examination of Central Asia’s relations with Southeast Asia, arguing that the hedging strategy is the underlying factor driving Central Asia towards greater engagement with Southeast Asia. “Omnidirectional hedging” behaviour is evident in how Central Asian countries see the utility of ASEAN and its member countries as part of their broadly multi-vector foreign policies‚ in which relations with diverse partners are pursued in order to enhance their strategic space, reap the most benefits and ensure they have greater flexibility in their foreign policy. The “economic hedging” behaviour of Central Asian states is argued to be driving their greater engagement with ASEAN and its member states. The EAEU and BRI are both means by which Central Asian states pursue economic pragmatism with regards to Russia and China, but also economic diversification with ASEAN and its member countries who are themselves attracted by the economic benefits that greater engagement with the EAEU and BRI can bring. The need for Central Asian states to counterbalance expanding Chinese economic influence is another driving force for economic diversification with ASEAN and its members. Central Asian states have also pursued “hedging regionalism” whereby they have joined various regional projects led by both Russia and China, while also trying to move towards an exclusive Central Asian regionalism without the inclusion of those powers and to use

43 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Keeping the Balance: Power Transitions Threaten ASEAN’s Hedging Role,” East Asia Forum Quarterly (January–March 2018): 22. 44 Ibid., 23.

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greater regional cooperation as a hedging mechanism against them. To this end, the relative success of Southeast Asian regionalism in the form of ASEAN is seen as an attractive model for Central Asian states to emulate and presents a further area for interregional engagement.

Research Methodology, Terminology and Scope Research Methodology This research takes an “inside out” approach, focusing on the roles and views of the Central Asian states and the “agency” they exercise as opposed to an “outside in” perspective which focuses on the role and impact of external powers on the region, especially that of the great powers—Russia, China and the US.45 As Alexander Cooley argues, the Central Asian states “are not passive pawns in the strategic manoeuvrings of the great powers, but important actors in their own right” and they demonstrate “considerable agency” in dealing with their geopolitical suitors.”46 Even “small states” like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are not necessarily powerless and can wield “foreign policy power.”47 Cooley well illustrated this in his analysis of Kyrgyzstan’s diplomatic manoeuvrings between Washington and Moscow regarding Bishkek’s “base bidding war.”48 Susan A. Thornton has similarly argued that Central Asian states do have agency and bargaining power vis-à-vis China to safeguard and promote their interests and are adept at major power balancing and quick to exploit the advantages of being the object of multiple major power

45 Emilbek Dzhuraev, “‘Multi-vectoral’ Central Asia: On the Other Side of Major Power Agendas,” in Carlo Frappi and Fabio Indeo, eds., Monitoring Central Asia and the Caspian Area: Development Policies, Regional Trends and Italian Interests (Venice: Venezia Edizioni Ca’ Foscari—Digital Publishing, 2019), http://www.osce-academy.net/ upload/file/978-88-6969-377-9.pdf (accessed 10 July 2020), 15–16. 46 Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, 8–9. 47 On the foreign policy power of “small states,” see the articles in “The Foreign

Policy Power of Small States,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23, no. 3 (2010): 381–453; and Fanar Haddad, ed., “The Statecraft of Small States: Foreign Policy and Survival Strategies,” Insights (NUS-MEI) (January 2020): 1–52. 48 Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules (Chapter 7). See also Kemel Toktomushev, Kyrgyzstan—Regime Security and Foreign Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).

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suitors.49 A nuanced analysis of Russia’s influence on Kazakhstan has also shown that despite their asymmetrical relationship, Kazakhstan is far from being a passive object of Russian actions, but is in fact a full-fledged actor in the relationship in its own right, and that “Russia-favourable behaviour” such as military cooperation and economic ties and integration with Russia, are themselves desired by Kazakhstan.50 As Filippo Costa Buranelli has argued, Central Asia is not merely “a passive object” in the broader competition between the great powers and other states vying for influence in the region, or the notion of the (new) Great Game, which has been the “popular conceptual straitjacket” regarding analysis of power and international relations in Central Asia.51 Experts from the region likewise argue that “Central Asian states should not be perceived as passive recipients of the external influence projected on them.” Often the local leaders set the agenda of priorities, both at bilateral and multilateral levels, vis-à-vis the great powers and there is “constant diplomatic bargaining and search for consensus,” which is always a “two-way movement.”52 In addition, the role, motivations and views of ASEAN and some key Southeast Asian countries towards Central Asia would also be examined to provide greater context and insight. The research methodology employed is descriptive inference—the process of understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations. Inference is the process of using the known facts— our quantitative or qualitative data or observations—to learn about the

49 Susan A. Thornton, “China in Central Asia: Is China Winning the ‘New Great Game’”? Global China Report, Brookings Institution (June 2020), https://www.brooki ngs.edu/research/china-in-central-asia-is-china-winning-the-new-great-game/ (accessed 10 October 2021). 50 Marlene Laruelle, Dylan Royce, and Serik Beyssembayev, “Untangling the Puzzle of ‘Russia’s Influence’ in Kazakhstan,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 60, no. 2 (2019): 211–243. 51 Filippo Costa Buranelli, “The Pervasive Nature of Power in Central Asia,” Problems of Post-Communism 68, no. 2 (2021): 92–93. For a contending view that Central Asia is a permissive environment for external actors see Emilian Kavalski, “Uncovering the ‘New’ Central Asia: The Dynamics of External Agency in a Turbulent Region,” in Emilian Kavalski, ed., The New Central Asia: The Regional Impact of International Actors (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2010), 1–23. 52 Jamshed Safarov’s views in “Geopolitics of Central Asia,” Dynamic Uzbekistan, no. 3 (2020): 24.

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unknown facts, which are the subjects of our research questions, theories and hypotheses. Descriptive inference is distinguished from causal inference which seeks to provide causal explanations of the studied phenomenon.53 Descriptive inference aims to answer what questions while causal inference attempts to answer why questions.54 Both are closely related and are essential in social science research because meaningful causal explanations cannot be constructed without good description, while description loses most of its interest unless linked to some causal relationships.55 The focus of this book is on descriptive rather than causal inference—to infer and analyse from the empirical data what is the nature of relations and the driving factors of greater engagement between Central Asia and Southeast Asia, in particular, the aims and attempts of Central Asian states to diversify their relations as part of their hedging strategy. It also employs content analysis in studying the collected empirical data.56 These include official documents of both Central Asian and Southeast Asian states, statements and views expressed by their leaders and foreign policy elite, relevant articles and opinion pieces in academic journals, newspapers and online media, and the author’s more than 50 semi-structured interviews, conversations and meetings with diplomats, government officials and experts from Central Asia, Southeast Asia and other relevant countries during 2019–2022.57 This is conducted with the aim to infer and identify how Central Asian states view Southeast Asia and ASEAN in their foreign policies, as well as what are the key drivers of this burgeoning relationship, particularly the hedging rationale.

53 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 46, 55, 75.

Social

54 John Gerring, “Mere Description,” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (October 2012): 722–723. 55 Ibid., 722, and King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 34. 56 Content analysis is defined as “any technique for making inferences by objectively

and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages,” Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 14. 57 As has been noted, “Anything that is intended to communicate a message is usable as material for content analysis.” Margaret G. Hermann, “Content Analysis” in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, eds., Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 152.

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However, as Cheng-Chwee Kuik has pointed out, “hedging, by design, is a policy without pronouncement ” as this would attract unwanted attention and suspicion from the contending great powers, thereby “defeating the purpose of this deliberately ambiguous act.”58 Therefore, the Central Asian states are unlikely to explicitly state that they are pursuing a hedging strategy. Instead, specific parameters are needed to support the argument that the Central Asian states are exhibiting hedging behaviour, and these parameters are in line with the three attributes of hedging as already defined above. Firstly, states exhibit efforts to avoid taking sides or express statements to stress non-alignment. Secondly, states show signs of both deference, or pleasing, as well as defiance, or displeasing, the two main regional powers—Russia and China. Thirdly, states exhibit efforts to diversify relations and partners, preserve policy independence and keep options open. “Hedging behaviour is evident when all three parameters are observable: the stronger the observable attributes, the heavier the hedging.”59 While this book argues that hedging is the strategy broadly taken, or attempted to be taken, by the Central Asian states, it also illustrates that the intensity of hedging varies. How “heavy” the hedging varies in each state, depending on the extent to which each state manages to behave in accordance with these three parameters. For instance, Turkmenistan’s proclaimed policy of “positive neutrality” accords well with the first parameter of non-alignment but in practice it was very much dependent on Russia and now on China for its gas exports. Uzbekistan has more successfully followed a careful balancing policy of non-alignment between the great powers, although it has been under increasing pressure to join the Russian-led EAEU and has managed to bide its time as an observer for now. Kazakhstan has likewise managed to pursue an explicitly multi-vector foreign policy that, in theory, assigns importance to all its relations with major players, but which, in practice, has often meant that Russia, and increasingly so China, are primus inter pares. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are both beholden in security terms to Moscow, with Russia having military bases in both countries, as well as economically through remittances from their migrant workers in Russia. Both countries are also increasingly economically dependent on China, having received large amounts of loans that they are struggling to repay. Beijing is also making security

58 Kuik, “Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia,” 6 (italics in original). 59 Ibid., 7 (italics in original).

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inroads into Tajikistan, with reports of a Chinese military base there. But the parameter that all five Central Asian states have often exhibited is the attempt to diversify its relations, and this is where ASEAN and its member countries can play a potential role. Terminology and Scope The foreign policy elite refers to the key individuals and groups that are involved in their country’s foreign policymaking, including those participating directly and continuously in the policymaking process and those who influence discourse and/or policy occasionally concerning specific issues.60 The expressed views and perceptions of the foreign policy elite are distinctive from others in that it has a greater potential impact on foreign policy making and holds a higher level of informed opinion due to their expertise and greater access to information.61 The foreign policy elite examined here would thus include, country leaders, their foreign ministers and diplomats, other ministers or heads of government agencies concerning a specific issue, businesses and other economic actors, and the epistemic community, such as experts on foreign policy and international relations, and other relevant fields. The term “ASEAN” refers to the regional organisation and also its member countries. As ASEAN encompasses nearly all Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of Timor-Leste, the term “Southeast Asia” is used interchangeably when the context indicates focus on the region rather than on the organisation.62 “Central Asia” refers to the five Central Asian states that were redefined as forming this region in 1993—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.63 While the research examines relations between Central Asia and Southeast Asia, not all the countries in these regions have played an active part or significant role in the relationship. It is, therefore, inevitable that more 60 Mark Webber and Michael Smith, eds., Foreign Policy in a Transformed World (Essex: Prentice Hall, 2002), 39. 61 William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 21. 62 Timor-Leste formally applied for membership in 2011 but at the time of writing is still under ASEAN’s consideration. 63 Sally N. Cummings, Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations (Oxford: Routledge, 2012), 13.

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focus would be on those countries which have played a prominent role or have significant potential, and that not all countries would be given equal coverage. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan is the most active towards ASEAN and its members. It is also the largest economy and country in Central Asia, plays a key role in China’s BRI, and is the second-largest economy in the EAEU after Russia. Uzbekistan also features prominently due to it having the largest population in Central Asia and thus being the largest potential market.64 It has also been opening up under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, being more prepared to engage and forge relations with other countries, compared to the somewhat isolationist stance under President Islam Karimov. Within Southeast Asia, the key countries are the leading economies—Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam.65 Malaysia and Singapore, in particular, have been active in forging relations with Central Asian states since they gained independence in late 1991,66 while the others have become more active recently. The timeframe under examination is from the beginning of independence of the Central Asian states in late 1991 up to 2021. But the focus is from 2013 onwards when the BRI was first announced and when the EAEU was formed in 2014, as these are two of the key driving factors of possible greater engagement between the two regions. The book was mostly written during 2019–2021, prior to the tragic and seismic events in early 2022, namely the political upheavals in Kazakhstan in early January and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February that threatens not only European security but also has political, security and economic repercussions in Central Asia and wider Eurasia. The concluding chapter will reflect on the likely impact of these events on future Central Asia–Southeast Asia relations.

64 “World Bank data for the five Central Asian countries (2018),” https://data.worldb

ank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=KZ-KG-UZ-TJ-TM (accessed 15 May 2020); and “Key Indicators: EAEU Member States,” http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#aboutcountries (accessed 15 September 2020). 65 “ASEAN Member States: Selected Basic Indicators, 2018,” https://data.aseanstats. org/ (accessed 15 September 2020). 66 Thambipillai, “Southeast Asia, Russia and the Ex-Soviet Republics,” 95–97.

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Chapter Outline Chapter 2 looks at Southeast Asia’s place in Central Asia’s foreign policy. It examines how key Southeast Asian countries are seen by Central Asian states as part of their “omnidirectional hedging” and “economic hedging” strategy. It looks at the “Southeast Asian vector” in their multi-vector foreign policies, especially how some key countries and ASEAN as a whole are viewed as alternative economic partners for Central Asian states. It then examines how some Southeast Asian countries are also seen as alternative economic and political models due to their successful coupling of stable authoritarian political rule with advanced economic development which resonates well with Central Asia’s authoritarian rulers. It lastly traces Central Asia’s engagement and interaction with ASEAN and ASEAN-led fora. Chapter 3 analyses the key drivers of the burgeoning relationship: Russia’s EAEU; China’s BRI; and Central Asia’s concerns over China’s expanding economic influence. All these factors are motivated by the Central Asian states’ aim to pursue an “economic hedging” strategy, to lessen economic overdependence on a particular power by diversifying partners, whilst also gaining economic benefits from engaging with that power. Chapter 4 looks at how Central Asian states have pursued “hedging regionalism” by joining various regional projects led by both Russia and China while also trying to move towards an exclusive Central Asian regionalism without the inclusion of those powers and to use such regionalism as a hedging platform against them. ASEAN’s success in forging Southeast Asian regionalism is seen as an attractive model for Central Asian states to emulate, and a possible driving factor for greater engagement between the two regions. Chapter 5 summarises the main research outcomes and examines the prospects for greater Central Asia– Southeast Asia engagement. It also provides some recommendations for strengthening that relationship and exploring areas for further research. It lastly reflects on possible challenges to the relationship in light of the abovementioned events in early 2022. The American Library of Association and Library of Congress (ALALC) transliteration system but without diacritics is employed. However, the common spelling of words like Nazarbayev, instead of Nazarbaev, is used unless it is a direct citation from the Russian language. The citation of Russian/Central Asian words or names from English-language material is kept in their original form.

CHAPTER 2

Southeast Asia in Central Asia’s Foreign Relations

Abstract This chapter examines the nature of Central Asia’s relations with Southeast Asia. Firstly, it analyses the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian states. Secondly, it examines the “Southeast Asian vector” within their foreign policies. Thirdly, it looks at how some Southeast Asian countries are seen as political and economic role models for Central Asian leaders to emulate. Lastly, it examines Central Asia’s engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-led fora. It primarily argues that key Southeast Asia countries, and ASEAN as a grouping, are seen as alternative economic partners for Central Asian states as part of their “omnidirectional hedging” and “economic hedging” strategy. Keywords Multi-vector foreign policy · Hedging · Political and economic models · ASEAN

This chapter examines Central Asia’s relations with Southeast Asia since the Central Asian countries gained independence in late 1991. It firstly analyses the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian states and, secondly, examines the “Southeast Asian vector” within them. Thirdly, it looks at how some key Southeast Asian countries are seen as political and economic role models for Central Asian leaders, particularly in the initial period of independence. Lastly, it examines Central Asia’s © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Rangsimaporn, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10112-0_2

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engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-led fora. The chapter demonstrates that key Southeast Asia countries, and ASEAN as a whole, are seen as alternative economic partners for Central Asian states as part of their “omnidirectional hedging” and “economic hedging” strategy. Some Southeast Asian countries are also seen as possible alternative economic and political models to follow due to their successful coupling of authoritarian political rule with advanced economic development which resonates well with Central Asia’s authoritarian rulers. Central Asian engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-led fora are also important for Central Asia to have another entry point to the dynamically growing Asia–Pacific region, although success has been elusive, even in Kazakhstan’s case which has been the most active proponent for greater ties with ASEAN.

The Multi-vector Foreign Policies of Central Asian States The Central Asian states are committed to pursuing some variant of a multi-vector foreign policy, especially in energy politics and security, by seeking multiple partners and pipeline routes in order to provide some strategic balancing and leverage with regards to the great powers.1 This was seen as an “instinctive drive” to avoid domination by any single larger state.2 For example, Kazakhstan has pursued a policy of intentional diversification of its energy and transport partners and routes.3 Even on security issues in which Russia has played a predominant role, the Central Asian states have tried to diversify their links to avoid overdependence on one power. Although Russia still retains a significant military presence in the region, with bases and facilities in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and remains the leading exporter of arms to the region, Russia’s 1 Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 68. 2 Emilbek Dzhuraev, “‘Multi-vectoral’ Central Asia: On the Other Side of Major Power Agendas,” in Carlo Frappi and Fabio Indeo, eds., Monitoring Central Asia and the Caspian Area: Development Policies, Regional Trends and Italian Interests (Venice: Venezia Edizioni Ca’ Foscari—Digital Publishing, 2019), http://www.osce-academy.net/upload/ file/978-88-6969-377-9.pdf (accessed 10 July 2020), 20. 3 Pinar Ipek, ˙ “The Role of Oil and Gas in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Looking East or West?” Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 7 (2007): 1179–1199 and Nicola P. Contessi, “Foreign Policy Diversification and Intercontinental Transport Corridors: The Case of Kazakhstan’s Railways Diplomacy,” Europe-Asia Studies 70, no. 5 (2018): 759–790.

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role is slowly declining. Meanwhile, China is making increasing security inroads while the US is exiting the region as a security partner.4 Amidst this changing strategic landscape, each of the Central Asian states has been trying to conduct its own version, insofar as possible, of a multivector policy, by attempting to balance all the multiple external sources of benefits to them to enhance their domestic stability.5 However, the practice of “multi-vectorism” operates at different levels in each country, ranging from the proclaimed multi-vector policy of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, to the self-isolated equidistancing policy of Uzbekistan and neutrality policy of Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have explicitly mentioned the pursuance of a multi-vector policy in their foreign policy concepts.6 Uzbekistan, on the other hand, stressed “self-reliance” (mustaqillik) while Turkmenistan pursued a policy of “positive neutrality,” both of which emphasised a foreign policy that ensured regime survival and independence by maintaining “equi-distance” from all the great powers and avoiding dependency on them.7 This, arguably, often meant in practice the implementation of a multi-vector policy to varying degrees and success. Each state’s multi-vectorism was a reflection of that state’s interests, capacities and circumstances, and of the broader world from that state’s perspective.

4 Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon, “Avoiding Dependence? Central Asian Security in a Multipolar World,” The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, 28 September 2020, https://oxussociety.org/avoiding-dependence-central-asian-security-in-a-multipolarworld/ (accessed 29 September 2020). 5 Stephen Blank, “Whither the New Great Game in Central Asia?” Journal of Eurasian Studies, no. 3 (2012): 155. 6 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020– 2030,” http://www.akorda.kz/en/legal_acts/decrees/on-the-concept-of-the-foreign-pol icy-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-for-2020-2030 (accessed 12 May 2020); “Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki” [The Foreign Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic], Appendix to the Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, no. 37, 11 March 2019, http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/430045 (accessed 25 April 2020); and “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Tajikistan,” Approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, no. 332, 27 January 2015, https://www.tajikemb.kg/files/2016/concept-of-the-foreign-policy-of-therepublic-of-tajikistan.pdf (accessed 10 March 2020). 7 Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy: The Struggle for Recognition and Self-Reliance under Karimov (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018) and Luca Anceschi, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the consolidation of the Turkmen regime (London: Routledge, 2008).

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The multi-vectorism of each state evolved in accordance with changing circumstances.8 Indeed, a multi-vector policy appeared to be the best strategy for Central Asian states in an emerging multipolar world.9 A multi-vector foreign policy imperative was also behind their relations with other Asian countries such as Japan, India, and South Korea, to help balance or hedge against China and Russia, their dominant neighbours.10 Moreover, the degree to which a multi-vector foreign policy has been successfully implemented by the Central Asian countries is also subject to debate and varies overtime according to the circumstances. As Chapter 1 mentioned, the ability of each state to pursue an effective multi-vector foreign policy or hedging strategy differs in accordance with their internal and external conditions. It is argued that multi-vectorism predominates in Kazakhstan due to its vast energy resources, geographical size, and political influence. It exists to a lesser extent in Kyrgyzstan due to its specific geopolitics and deployment of US (2001–2014) and Russian military bases there.11 Some Central Asian countries also remain dependent on remittances and transfers from their expatriates in Russia, which hosts about 4 million migrant workers from Central Asia. Such remittances contribute significantly to the GDP of Tajikistan (36 percent), Kyrgyzstan (37 percent) and Uzbekistan (13 percent) in 2018, and provides Russia with important economic leverage. Despite some diversification towards Turkey, Kazakhstan and Southeast Asia, Russia remains the main destination for Central Asian migrant workers.12 However, the initial period of the COVID-19 pandemic inevitably led to a fall in Central Asian migrant workers in Russia and a significant drop in their remittances.13

8 Dzhuraev, “‘Multi-vectoral’ Central Asia,” 31–32. 9 Maxim Mikheev, “Central Asia: Multivectorness as a Foreign Policy Imperative,” DOC

Research Institute Expert Comment (2019): 6. 10 Anna Gussarova and M¯ aris Andž¯ans, eds., “Political and Security Relations—Mapping Central Asia’s Relations with Other Asian States,” SEnECA Policy Paper, no. 2 (September 2018): 13. 11 Sergey Minasyan, “Multi-vectorism in the Foreign Policy of Post-Soviet Eurasian

States,” Demokratizatsiya 20, no. 3 (2012): 272. 12 Dominique Fruchter, “Central Asia: Is the Ménage à Trois with China and Russia Sustainable?” BRICS Business Magazine 23, no. 2 (2019): 62–63. 13 “Tajikistan: Even Russia Feels Pain as Pandemic Wreaks Havoc on Migration Lifeline,” Eurasianet, 17 December 2020, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-even-russia-feelspain-as-pandemic-wreaks-havoc-on-migration-lifeline (accessed 17 December 2020).

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Kazakhstan The pursuance of a multi-vector foreign policy is most associated with Kazakhstan, which nearly always refers to this policy approach in its official documents and statements. It is also often seen as the country most successful in implementing this policy. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy is seen as important because “an exclusive foreign policy orientation towards only one country ultimately does not meet Kazakhstan’s national interests, critically limiting the freedom for strategic manoeuvring.” This policy is being continued by President Tokayev, who emphasised “the invariability of the course chosen by Kazakhstan’s First President, within which multi-vector has been and remains a priority principle of Kazakh diplomacy.”14 But there have been increasing doubts regarding the future relevance of such a policy due to increasing restrictions on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy manoeuvrability by the roles and influences of Russia and China.15 As one Russian diplomat observed, despite Kazakhstan’s attempts to pursue a multi-vector and balanced foreign policy with several powers, Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia remains the most important.16 One Kazakh expert similarly opined that due to historical and geographical reasons, Russia is still seen as the “natural major partner” and while multi-vectorism entails maintaining good relations with all great powers, there are indeed preferred ones—most notably Russia.17 It is also telling that Uzbek experts are also sceptical of Kazakhstan’s ability to pursue a truly multi-vector foreign policy, arguing that due to its location Kazakhstan is “squeezed by the Russian and Chinese crocodiles,” and that 14 Aiman Zhussupova, “Peace Through Engagement: The Multi-vector Direction of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy,” Astana Times, 9 March 2021. 15 Michael Clarke, “Kazakhstan’s Multi-vector Foreign Policy: Diminishing Returns in an Era of Great Power ‘Pivots’?” ASAN Forum, Special Forum, 9 April 2015, http://www.theasanforum.org/kazakhstans-multi-vector-foreign-policy-dimini shing-returns-in-an-era-of-great-power-pivots/ (accessed 22 April 2019); Luca Anceschi, Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Regime Neo-Eurasianism in the Nazarbaev Era (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), 108–109, 119, and 167; Luca Anceschi, “Kazakhstan’s Eurasian Illusions,” ODR Opinion, 1 July 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ odr/kazakhstans-eurasian-illusions/ (accessed 7 July 2020); and Charles J. Sullivan, “End of an Era? Kazakhstan and the Fate of Multivectorism,” in Jean-Francois Caron, ed., Kazakhstan and the Soviet Legacy: Between Continuity and Rupture (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 31–50. 16 Conversation, 30 January 2019, Nur-Sultan. 17 Email interview with Assel Bitabarova, 19 August 2020.

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Kazakhstan is “doomed” to remain in Russia’s sphere of influence.18 Russia’s importance was indeed underlined during Kazakhstan’s January 2022 upheavals in which President Tokayev asked the Russian-led CSTO to send a peacekeeping force, which was seen by some experts as spelling the end of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy.19 Uzbekistan While multi-vectorism is not often explicitly mentioned in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy documents and statements, in practice it has arguably followed such a policy. President Karimov made independence the cornerstone of Uzbek national ideology and steered the country clear of any relations that might compromise Uzbekistan’s and his own freedom. Uzbekistan’s version of a multi-vectoral foreign policy under Karimov can be described as a policy of “equidistant” relations and entailed the pursuance of a “non-committal adaptive foreign policy” that strived to maintain balanced relations with competing powers.20 Karimov sought to maximise the benefits from a particular alignment while minimising the loss that relationship may incur, while safeguarding its independence and freedom of manoeuvre.21 As Karimov himself explained, “rapprochement with one state does not imply moving away from another. Strengthening a partnership with one country should not take place at the expense of weakening a partnership with another. So the integration of Uzbekistan into the world community is a multi-vectoral process.”22 One Uzbek expert cryptically described such an equidistant policy as “no one is far from us and no one is close to us.”23

18 Interviews, 16 and 21 November 2021, Tashkent. 19 Luca Anceschi, “The Week That Changed Kazakhstan Forever,” ODR Opinion,

6 January 2022, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/the-week-that-changed-kazakh stan-forever/ (accessed 24 February 2022). 20 Dzhuraev, “‘Multi-vectoral’ Central Asia,” 23–24 and Aleksey Asiryan, “New Faces, Old Patterns in Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy,” The Diplomat, 21 August 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/new-faces-old-patterns-in-uzbekistans-foreignpolicy/ (accessed 6 March 2020). 21 Aleksandr Pikalov, “Uzbekistan Between the Great Powers: A Balancing Act or a Multi-vectorial Approach?” Central Asian Survey 33, no. 3 (2014): 297–311. 22 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century: Challenges to Stability and Progress (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 181 (italics in original). 23 Interview, 16 November 2021, Tashkent.

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President Mirziyoyev, however, has pursued a foreign policy of greater openness and active engagement with a wide range of partners, particularly improving long-strained relations with its Central Asian neighbours. This approach is arguably akin to Kazakhstan’s more open and engaging model of multi-vectorism.24 As one Uzbek expert explained, the main change is that Karimov kept distance from all other countries equally while Mirziyoyev is trying to close that distance and establish good relations, giving priority to the Central Asian neighbours and then the great powers. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s diversification of its foreign partners is seen as the number one priority as it is vital to its development and survival due to the country’s geography and history.25 However, Moscow continued to perceive Uzbekistan as within its zone of influence and tried to keep Uzbekistan within it. Tashkent well recognises this and, since Karimov, has tried to equalise relations with all external players to obtain the maximum benefit from each. Mirziyoyev has continued this foreign policy approach and a multi-vector foreign policy is seen as still evident in Uzbekistan.26 Indeed, some Uzbek experts see Uzbekistan as having a better chance in implementing a multi-vector foreign policy than Kazakhstan as it does not border any of the great powers, hence having more room for strategic manoeuvrability. However, Uzbekistan’s strategic space is nonetheless restricted by its double-landlocked position with no access to the sea and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.27 Tajikistan Although Tajikistan has promulgated multi-vector diplomacy as the foundation stone of its foreign policy,28 it realises that this is not synonymous with neutralism or equal treatment of its foreign partners but ultimately 24 Dzhuraev, “‘Multi-vectoral’ Central Asia,” 23–24. 25 Online interview with Temur Umarov, 15 June 2021. 26 Galiya Ibragimova, “Stanet li Uzbekistan prorossiiskim? Itogi vizita Putina v Uzbekistan” [Will Uzbekistan Become Pro-Russian? The Results of Putin’s Visit to Uzbekistan], Central Asian Analytical Network Article, 23 October 2018, https://caa-network.org/ archives/14455 (accessed 9 July 2020). 27 Interviews, 16 and 21 November 2021, Tashkent. 28 See the collection of official interviews, articles and speeches in Khamrokhon

Zarifi, Mnogovektornaia diplomatiia Tadzhikistana [Multi-vector Diplomacy of Tajikistan] (Dushanbe: Ofset, 2010).

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about choosing the right side for its survival amidst great-power rivalry.29 Early in its independence, Tajikistan had limited foreign policy choices due to its civil war and the war in Afghanistan which borders with its south, thereby making Tajikistan accept “Russia’s protection almost by fiat,” which was represented by a large military presence and economic support, including significant remittances from the large number of Tajik migrant workers in Russia. Recently, Tajikistan’s foreign policy has been a steady but slow movement towards diversification of its relations to lessen its dependence on Russia, such as with India, Turkey and renewed relations with Iran since 2019. But most significantly has been its rapidly growing political, economic and even security ties with China. However, with its limited strategic space, Tajikistan has great difficulty in fully implementing a multi-vector foreign policy.30 As one Tajik expert noted, Tajikistan finds it difficult to find a balance in its relations with the great powers, and to pursue a truly independent and multi-vector foreign policy, due to its geographical position.31 Kyrgyzstan Similarly to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan faces many limitations in its foreign policy manoeuvres, despite being one of the more vocal advocates of a multi-vector foreign policy. Kyrgyzstan’s first president—Askar Akaev— proposed a multi-vector foreign policy so that the country could utilise opportunities provided by its geopolitical location to combine the interests of Russia, China and the US for Kyrgyzstan’s benefit.32 Bishkek has tried to maintain a balance between its relations with the West and Russia, and hosted military bases of both Russia and the US. While it was considered the most open Central Asian country to democratisation and market economy principles and received the most Western support to those ends, Kyrgyzstan grew staunchly pro-Russian in its postcolour revolution foreign policy since 2005 after the ouster of President 29 Kirill Nourzhanov, “Omnibalancing in Tajikistan’s Foreign Policy: Security-Driven Discourses of Alignment with Iran,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14, no. 3 (2012): 366. 30 Dzhuraev, “‘Multi-vectoral’ Central Asia,” 24–25. 31 Interview, 8 July 2021, Dushanbe. 32 Kemel Toktomushev, Kyrgyzstan—Regime Security and Foreign Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 79.

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Akaev. President Atambaev took Kyrgyzstan possibly to the highest level of alignment with Russia in its post-Soviet history, to the detriment of its multi-vectoral principle. President Zheenbekov later sought to pursue a more balanced foreign policy, and its new foreign policy concept adopted in 2019 clearly stressed multi-vectorism.33 But given Kyrgyzstan’s political and economic weaknesses and instability, it is very dependent on its powerful neighbours, with Russian influence still strong. Indeed, in the view of some Kyrgyz experts, Bishkek’s multi-vector foreign policy is mere “wishful thinking.” Unlike its stronger and more independent neighbours—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—a multi-vector policy is unachievable in Kyrgyzstan’s context.34 Moreover, Kyrgyzstan’s international behaviour under the guise of a multi-vector foreign policy was often used by its leadership to justify their own rent-seeking behaviour and to preserve regime security.35 Nonetheless, officially, Kyrgyzstan under President Zhaparov, will continue trying to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, maintaining good ties with Russia, China and its Central Asian neighbours, as well as developing better relations with other countries, including in Southeast Asia.36 Turkmenistan Turkmenistan’s “positive neutrality” has become an essential part of Turkmenistan’s formative national ideology and was first conceived as a way of relieving the country of the need to choose sides, but later became even more importantly “a shield from foreign influences and interferences in domestic affairs of the country” and a means for regime consolidation and survival. Turkmenistan’s foreign relations have been restricted primarily to economic ones, heavily focused on exports of natural gas, first to Russia and later to China which became a de facto monopsonist. But by the end of the 2010s, Turkmenistan began experiencing difficulties with China at a time of decreasing gas prices and when both Russia and Iran, the other two significant buyers, stopped buying. President Berdymukhamedov sought to renew broken relations, noticeably with Moscow,

33 Dzhuraev, “‘Multi-vectoral’ Central Asia,” 25–26. 34 Interviews, 15–16 July 2021, Bishkek. 35 Toktomushev, Kyrgyzstan, 161. 36 Conversation with a Kyrgyz diplomat, 27 January 2021, Nur-Sultan.

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and to develop new ones, including more active engagement with its Central Asian neighbours.37 According to one Turkmen expert, Turkmenistan’s “neutrality is a mask that the country positions itself for the outside world,” which could be compromised whenever there is a risk to the leadership or there are significant economic gains. Turkmenistan’s foreign policy may be called multi-vector in the literal sense but in practice this changes in response to perceived political threats or economic benefits. This behaviour is evident in Ashgabat’s cautious relations with Moscow and, to a lesser extent, Beijing.38 The Hedging Imperative While the geopolitical and geoeconomic position of the Central Asian states may have variably affected their ability to implement an effective multi-vector foreign policy, it does not mean that they will stop trying. Even the smallest states—Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—that have come closest to forfeiting multi-vectorism in favour of strong alignment with Russia, have still continued to resist overdependence on Moscow and “consistently tried to diversify their basket.”39 While Russia remains the region’s dominant political and security actor,40 even one prominent Russian expert has argued that all Central Asian states have been trying to pursue multi-vector foreign policies and that there is actually no Russian sphere of influence in Central Asia, but “just vestiges of Russian historical presence.” Although Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are members of the Russian-led CSTO, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have joined the Russian-led EAEU, these states “value their ties to China, the US, Europe and others,” and back Moscow only selectively during UN votes. On the other hand, China is seen as “the most dynamic and

37 Dzhuraev, “‘Multi-vectoral’ Central Asia,” 26 and Anceschi, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy. 38 Online communication, 1 February 2022. 39 Dzhuraev, “‘Multi-vectoral’ Central Asia,” 27. 40 On Russia’s security and defence dominance see Ça˘ glar Kurç, “The puzzle: Multi-

vector foreign policy and defense industrialization in Central Asia,” Comparative Strategy 37, no. 4 (2018): 316–330.

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often the principal economic actor in the region, while Russia continues as a security guard of sorts.”41 Nonetheless, this prevailing “dual role” of Russia and China in Central Asia has meant it even more imperative for the region’s states to try to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy and hedging strategy by diversifying their relations with other external players to enhance their strategic space and manoeuvrability. Indeed, there is a certain negative and fatalistic connotation in how multi-vectorism is perceived from the region. Being in the shadow of the great powers, the Central Asian states often feel as having no choice but to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy to avoid overdependence on one great power.42 There is an “assumption” in Central Asian states that they will be the “object of foreign competition,” which leads to the necessity of pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy.43 President Tokayev shared this sense of inevitability, writing that Kazakhstan’s pursuance of a multi-vector foreign policy was determined by “fate itself” due to its central position in Eurasia.44 As one Kazakh expert further noted, Central Asian states’ multi-vector foreign policy can be regarded as hedging rather than balancing against or bandwagoning with the perceived threatening power.45 Moreover, in one Uzbek expert’s view, while the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected all the Central Asian states, this has not weakened their multi-vector policy and some countries like Uzbekistan have even stepped up their interaction with other countries as an alternative to the regional powers.46 Another 41 Dmitri Trenin and Jongsoo Lee, “Russia, China, and the Indo-Pacific: An Interview with Dmitri Trenin,” 21 September 2020, https://carnegie.ru/2020/09/21/rus sia-china-and-indo-pacific-interview-with-dmitri-trenin-pub-82756 (accessed 29 September 2020). 42 Farkhod Tolipov, “Eklektichnost’ mnogovektornost’ kak faktor sboia piatistoronnosti v Tsentral’noi Azii” [The Eclecticism of Multi-vectorism as a Factor in the Failure of the Five-Sided System in Central Asia], Central Asia Analytical Network Article, 8 September 2020, https://www.caa-network.org/archives/20446 (accessed 9 September 2020). 43 “The Politics of Decision-Making in Central Asia,” Chatham House REP Seminar Summary, 11 June 2009, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Res earch/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/110609summary.pdf (accessed 18 December 2021), 13. 44 Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Svet i Ten’ [Light and Shadow] (Almaty: Meloman Publishing, 2019), 147. 45 Email interview with Assel Bitabarova, 19 August 2020. 46 Jamshed Safarov’s views in “Geopolitics of Central Asia,” Dynamic Uzbekistan, no.

3 (2020): 25.

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Kazakh expert further argued that while some have criticised Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy as “unrealistic,” the very fact that Kazakhstan borders with Russia and China have made it even more essential for it to try to pursue such a policy and to diversify its relations with other countries, including those in Southeast Asia.47 Therefore, in light of China’s expanding economic influence and the effects of Western sanctions on Russia that have forced the Russian-led EAEU, as well as other Central Asian states whose economies are intertwined with Russia’s, to seek new economic opportunities eastwards, this book argues that the Central Asian states have recognised the increasing need to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy and to diversify their foreign partners as much as possible. They, to varying degrees, have recognised the growing potential of Southeast Asia and have identified the need to strengthen engagement with it as part of their multi-vector policy and “omnidirectional hedging” strategy to diversify their partners and lessen their dependence on Russia and China, particularly by “economic hedging.”

The “Southeast Asian Vector” New Beginnings and Partnerships In the initial aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the post-Soviet countries, including the Central Asian states, did not give Southeast Asia or ASEAN much consideration. More attention was given to their immediate neighbourhood and the West. Nonetheless, ties between the countries of Central Asia and Southeast Asia did appear promising during the early 1990s as both sides were keen to establish new relationships. Central Asian countries were also seen as fellow Asians and Muslims for some Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Amongst the former Soviet states, Southeast Asian countries naturally focused greatest attention on Russia, the largest and most important state and “inheritor” of the Soviet Union. But they were also interested in the Central Asian states due to their sizeable Asian and Muslim population which may represent a new market. Malaysia and Singapore took the lead in establishing formal ties with the new Central Asian states. However, those ties quickly stagnated due to internal political and economic instability within most of these states which obstructed 47 Interview, 18 February 2021, Nur-Sultan.

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the earlier promise of new economic opportunities for Southeast Asia.48 Among the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan held the most promise as they are the largest in terms of size (Kazakhstan) and population (Uzbekistan). They were also then relatively more outwardly looking than the other Central Asian states. Nonetheless, political, economic or cultural interests were not substantial enough to ensure that the geographical distances between Central and Southeast Asia could be effectively bridged. Moreover, the “Asian factor” as a common link did not really materialise due to their large cultural gap as the Central Asian states were heavily influenced by their Russian and Soviet experiences. Even the “Muslim link” was not promising, with countries of Southwest Asia and the Middle East having an edge over Southeast Asian Muslim countries. Pakistan, Iran and Turkey are geographically closer to Central Asia and have had prior cultural and commercial contacts with them.49 Indeed, in the early years of independence, the Central Asian elites identified themselves with Asia only to a very limited extent, and preferred to distinguish their identity from Asia. They considered their region as a link between East and West, between the Asia–Pacific and Europe, and continually promoted the concept of the “Eurasian bridge” or the “Great Silk Road.” The paradox was that while most of the Central Asian elites often associated themselves with Europe and the CIS rather than Asia, due to their Soviet legacy of having been part of the so-called “second world,” between the West and the Third World, the success of the “Asian economic tigers,” including in Southeast Asia, attracted these elites to try to follow the success of the so-called Asian models of development. This gradually narrowed down the gap in their self-identification and increased their recognition of their own “Asianess.”50

48 Pushpa Thambipillai, “Southeast Asia, the Links,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Thambipillai, “Southeast Asia,” in Ramesh Regional Relations: Asia–Pacific and the 2019 reissued), 231–232.

Russia and the Ex-Soviet Republics: Expanding 16, no. 1 (June 1994): 95–97 and Pushpa Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., Reshaping Former Soviet Union (Abingdon: Routledge,

49 Thambipillai, “Southeast Asia,” 234, 237. In Turkmenistan’s Case, the First Foreign Minister, Avdy Kuliev, Was an Arabic Expert and Thus Favoured Ties with Arab Countries over the Muslim States of Southeast Asia. Anceschi, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy, 17–18. 50 Rafis Abazov, “Practice of Foreign Policy Making: Formation of Post-Soviet Politics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan,” Final Report (1998), https://www.nato.int/ acad/fellow/96-98/abasov.pdf (accessed 8 February 2019), 10, 22, 36.

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By the mid-1990s, the Asia–Pacific region’s economic dynamism increasingly attracted the attention of Central Asia. Greater engagement with the region and regional structures such as APEC and ASEAN was stressed in order to access and benefit from the growing Asia– Pacific market. For example, in June 1997, Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry proposed that greater efforts be directed towards Kazakhstan’s participation in the Asia–Pacific integration processes so that it can gain “access to the rapidly developing markets of new technologies and industrial products.”51 Kazakhstan subsequently established dialogue with new Asian partners such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, in addition to “old partners” like South Korea, Japan, and China.52 This “Asian vector” became one of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy priorities due to its geographical location and the region’s growing importance in global economy and politics. Moreover, Southeast Asian countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, which had become highly industrialised and increasingly producing and exporting high-tech goods, were seen as attractive new economic partners.53 The late 1990s saw a revitalisation of economic ties between Central Asia and Southeast Asia due to the privatisation processes undertaken in the countries of both regions. Following the 1997–1998 financial crisis, Southeast Asian states made great efforts to reduce state control over the economy and boost the private sector’s role, which opened up new opportunities for economic links with Central Asia. The Central Asian states themselves had largely revamped and privatised their previously state-owned Soviet economy by 2000. Dynamic business relations between these newly privatised companies led to a fast resurgence of Central Asia–Southeast Asia relations.54 The strengthening of relations with Southeast Asia and ASEAN are mentioned in Kazakhstan’s new foreign policy concept, but unlike the

51 Fatima Paizullaevna Urazaeva, “The Role of ASEAN in the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Results and Prospects for Cooperation,” KazNU Bulletin, International Relations and International Law Series 56, no. 6 (2011): 76. 52 Sadyk Akizhanov, “APEC Summit Results: Importance for Kazakhstan,” Diplomatic Herald 4, no. 47 (2014): 40. 53 Aidarbek Tumatov, “Kazakhstan and Asia: State and Features of Cooperation,” Diplomatic Herald 5, no. 38 (2012): 220. 54 Jan Stark, Malaysia and the Developing World: The Asian Tiger on the Cinnamon Road (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 107.

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previous concept no Southeast Asian country was highlighted.55 Tajikistan’s foreign policy concept also stressed the need to strengthen relations with Southeast Asia “in order to penetrate into emerging markets of capital, technology, raw materials and industrial products,” mentioning Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.56 Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy Concept for 2017–2023 outlined strengthening relations with Asia–Pacific countries in general,57 but President Berdymukhamedov did note that one of the “important vectors” of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy was to “boost mutually beneficial partnership with the Southeast Asian countries and the Asia–Pacific region.”58 Kyrgyzstan’s 2019 foreign policy concept, on the other hand, merely noted the development of cooperation with countries of the near and far abroad and, unlike the previous 2007 concept, did not mention any specific countries.59 Uzbekistan is drafting a new foreign policy concept so meanwhile the Strategy of Actions on five priority directions of development of Uzbekistan in 2017–2021 defines its foreign policy priorities and tasks. One such task is to enhance cooperation with partner countries in Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.60 These countries are seen as having demonstrated impressive economic growth with the potential to become one pole in a multipolar world. Uzbekistan views the importance of Southeast Asian countries threefold. Firstly, as strategic investors in Uzbekistan’s economy. Secondly, their role in strengthening security

55 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020–2030.” Kazakhstan’s previous Foreign Policy Concept for 2014–2020 singled out five Southeast Asian countries—Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. “Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2014–2020,” Diplomatic Herald 44, no. 1 (2014): 8–11. 56 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Tajikistan.” 57 “President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov: Foreign Policy of Turkmenistan is aimed

at creating favourable conditions for internal development and promotion of national interests in the global arena,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, 18 February 2017, https://www.mfa.gov.tm/en/articles/118 (accessed 10 March 2020). The text of the Foreign Policy Concept is not publicly accessible. 58 “Thai Delegation Visited the Central Asia Countries to tie Bilateral Relations,” Thai Tribune, 29 April 2016, http://thaitribune.org/contents/detail/346?content_id=19563& rand=1461940087 (accessed 14 February 2021). 59 “Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki.” 60 “Foreign Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://

mfa.uz/en/cooperation/ (accessed 9 March 2020).

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in Asia through such fora as the ARF and EAS. Thirdly, their experience in striving to become the world’s most economically competitive countries, which could serve as a model for Uzbekistan’s own development.61 Uzbek experts also noted the “huge untapped potential of cooperation” between Uzbekistan and ASEAN countries, particularly in trade, finance and investment, tourism, and education.62 Central Asian states, therefore, see Southeast Asian countries as potential alternative partners in trade and investment, as well as technological know-how and expertise in such areas as agriculture, halal food industry, smart cities, education and training, hospitality and tourism, information and communication technologies and the medical industry. Revitalising Economic Diplomacy and Diversifying Economic Partners In recent years, the foreign ministries of Central Asian states have placed greater focus on economic diplomacy, seeking more foreign investment and new markets for their products. Some key Southeast Asian countries are identified as having the potential to become alternative economic partners as part of the Central Asian states’ attempts to diversify their foreign economic relations as part of their “economic hedging” policy. Kazakhstan At the end of 2018, Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry had been tasked with implementing state policy for attracting investment and coordinating activities in export promotion. Both the Investment Committee and Kazakh Invest were transferred to the foreign ministry’s purview.63 Even after the creation of a Ministry of Trade and Integration in Kazakhstan in June 2019 that became responsible for coordinating export promotion, the foreign ministry, through its foreign missions, remains

61 Gul’rukh Dzhuraeva, “Singapur v sisteme sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii,” [Singapore in the System of Contemporary International Relations], Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia [International Relations] (Tashkent), no. 2 (2017): 78. 62 “O kruglom stole v Universitete mirovoi ekonomiki i diplomatii” [On the Roundtable at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy], 21 February 2018, https://isrs.uz/yangiliklar/o-kruglom-stole-v-universitete-mirovoj-ekonomiki-i-dip lomatii (accessed 3 July 2020) and interviews, 16 November 2021, Tashkent. 63 Beibut Atamkulov, “Foreign Ministry in a New Phase,” Diplomatic Herald, no. 1 (2019): 5–6.

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active in arranging expert negotiations, searching for business partners, establishing long-term contacts and monitoring the implementation of priority projects. Within Southeast Asia, the Kazakh Foreign Minister, Mukhtar Tileuberdi, identified greater economic cooperation with Vietnam on agricultural and livestock products, and learning from the experiences of Singapore and Indonesia on diversifying and modernizing the economy through the development of the non-commodity sector, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in the processing industry, introducing innovative technologies, and the development and effective use of special economic zones.64 Kazakhstan also tapped Malaysia’s expertise in developing and standardizing Kazakhstan’s halal food service industry, particularly in its tourism sector.65 Many Malaysian companies have established themselves in Kazakhstan in halal food production and Kazakhstan has chosen to define their halal standards according to those of Malaysia since 2005.66 Kazakhstan is also keen to attract greater FDI of nearly US$ 12 billion in its agricultural sector, which it is trying to develop as part of its plan to diversify its economy.67 Several Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia, have leading expertise in agribusiness which Kazakhstan is interested to cooperate with. Kazakhstan also recognised the need to improve its investment climate to boost foreign investors’ confidence and attract their investment, particularly amidst the COVID-19 pandemic that had adversely affected its economy. For instance, Kazakhstan introduced new instruments that help cement the agreements between the Kazakh government and foreign investors. This includes investment preferences, concessional financing, partial guarantees, export support mechanisms, reimbursement by offset against tax liabilities as well as guaranteed procurement by the state, quasi-state sectors and subsoil users.68 Another example of 64 Mukhtar Tileuberdi, “Kazakhstan’s Economic Diplomacy: On Solid Footing and With Clear Goals in Mind,” Astana Times, 26 November 2019. 65 John Gilbert, “Kazakhstan Keen to Tap Malaysia’s Expertise,” New Straits Times, 10 September 2019. 66 Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, Globalising Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2013), 112. 67 Assel Satubaldina, “Kazakhstan Seeks to Attract Nearly $12 Billion in Agribusiness Investment in Next Five Years,” Astana Times, 9 October 2020. 68 “Kazakh Government Changes Up Investment Policy Approaches to Attract New Investors Amid Pandemic,” Astana Times, 5 October 2020.

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improving the investment climate and boosting foreign investors’ confidence is the establishment of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) in 2018 where English common law is used with its own court and an independent regulatory body—the Astana Financial Services Authority (AFSA)—for the settlement of disputes. According to the AIFC Governor, Kairat Kelimbetov, in the unpredictable post-pandemic environment, previously unlikely partnerships such as that with ASEAN countries are now possible. Central Asia offers a wealth of opportunities for ASEAN countries to do business and invest in, particularly in Kazakhstan where more than 70 percent of FDI in the region goes to and which can be the entry point for ASEAN businesses and investors into the larger Central Asian market of 70 million people. Through the AIFC, Kazakhstan aims to become a global financial centre, where foreign partners can do business with greater trust and confidence.69 The establishment of the AIFC is particularly important to improve foreign investors’ confidence as Kazakhstan’s banking and financial system has been unstable and does not meet international standards which has proved an obstacle to more economic interaction between Kazakhstan and Southeast Asia. Indonesian businesses trading with Kazakhstan, for example, have had to conduct their financial transactions via Turkish banks instead. The AIFC would thus help boost some confidence.70 The use of English common law to settle disputes is also attractive for Southeast Asian countries that also have an English common law background like Singapore and Malaysia.71 It is not a coincidence that Singaporean and Malaysian companies have already registered and invested through the AIFC such as Meinhardt engineering and project development consultancy company, the Ascott Group in property management, and Paladigm Capital asset and wealth management company. Malaysia also cooperates with the AIFC in Islamic finance and banking.72

69 Kairat Kelimbetov, “Central Asia Offers a Vast Ocean of Possibilities for Asean,” Astana Times, 21 August 2020. 70 Meeting with the Indonesian Ambassador to Kazakhstan, 28 January 2019, NurSultan. 71 AIFC official’s views expressed at the online forum “Central Asia-ASEAN: Opportunities in Trade, Investment and Education,” National University of Singapore, 13 April 2021. 72 Interview with senior AIFC official, 18 January 2021, Nur-Sultan.

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Indeed, Singapore and Malaysia are Kazakhstan’s largest investors from Southeast Asia. As of January 2019, Singapore invested nearly US$ 200 million in 124 enterprises while Malaysia invested around US$ 5 million in 36 enterprises.73 In November 2019, Singapore’s WestGasOil Company made an investment of US$ 1.8 billion in a gas-chemical plant in Aktau.74 In October 2021, Kazakhstan and Singapore agreed to develop the G4 City project of 4 smart cities in the Almaty region.75 According to one Singaporean trade official, Kazakhstan is seen as the “springboard” to other Central Asian states, while Uzbekistan is seen as a “frontier country with a large market.” Singapore sees these countries as a first step for its companies to access the Central Asian market.76 Kazakhstan’s then Ambassador to Singapore similarly emphasised Kazakhstan’s central role in the BRI as a great opportunity to attract investments from Singapore and other ASEAN countries. Singapore’s position as a key maritime hub and ASEAN economic leader makes it interested in the BRI as an additional corridor to expand export networks and access new markets. Moreover, Singapore’s developed infrastructure and expertise in city planning and transport and logistics means that it can contribute to Kazakhstan’s infrastructure, transport and logistics, and financial services within the BRI framework.77 Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic has spurred the growth of e-commerce and logistics. Seeing opportunities in the Southeast Asian market, one Kazakh transport and logistics company set up a base in Singapore in 2019, and opened up another office in Malaysia, to provide freight forwarding services between

73 Vneshniaia Torgovlia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2014–2018 [Foreign Trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2014–2018] (Nur-Sultan: Committee on Statistics of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2019), 276. 74 “Kazakhstan: Singapore’s company invests $1.8 billion to build a methanol and olefin plant in Aktau,” The Times of Central Asia, 22 November 2019. 75 Zhanna Shayakhmetova, “Kazakhstan and Singapore Agreed to Develop Smart Cities in Almaty Region,” Astana Times, 1 October 2021. 76 Views expressed at the online forum on “Central Asia-ASEAN.” 77 Karlygash Ezhenova, “Suleimen: BRI can help Kazakhstan Attract Investments Not

Only from Singapore, but also from Other Countries in South-East Asia,” Astana Times, 20 November 2018 and Usen Suleimen, “Central Asia and ASEAN: Perspectives for Interaction in Implementing the Belt and Road Initiative,” ISAS Insights (NUS), no. 496 (19 June 2018): 24.

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Asia and Kazakhstan and CIS countries.78 Kazakh Invest, Kazakhstan’s investment agency, also established its Southeast Asia representative office in Singapore. Kazakhstan-Singapore relations are, therefore, seen as the “new bridge” between Central Asia and Southeast Asia.79 Malaysia is seen as another important economic partner for Kazakhstan. Malaysian-controlled Steppe Cement, a leading cement producer in Kazakhstan, has a plant in Karaganda, and in March 2016 Malaysia’s Reach Energy purchased a 60-percent stake in Emir Oil Fields, the company that controls the oil and gas producing blocks in Kazakhstan’s Mangistau region.80 Steppe Cement has been particularly successful due to the construction boom in Kazakhstan since gaining independence.81 President Nazarbayev’s “Plan of the Nation” had identified several potential areas for economic cooperation with Malaysia—Islamic finance, halal food industry, oil and gas sector, tourism, infrastructure and construction, technology, and information and communication technologies.82 Kazakhstan had expected to attract greater Malaysian investments but Malaysia’s economic downturn had made this difficult.83 Nonetheless, in April 2021, Kazakh Invest reached an agreement to establish a joint venture between Malaysian company Elektro Serve (M) SDN BHD and Kazakhstan’s LLP Alshin-West with investment worth US$ 3 million to provide services for the maintenance and repair of equipment to large oil and gas companies in Kazakhstan.84 Malaysia’s Hadid Group also plans to provide similar maintenance services to oil and gas projects in Kazakhstan, and is considering investing in Kazakhstan’s renewable energy sector. The company has been working in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector

78 Bilqis Bahari, “Singapore-Based Company Advances Logistics Solutions Between Central Asia and Southeast Asia,” Astana Times, 18 October 2021. 79 Kazakh diplomat’s views expressed at the online forum on “Central Asia-ASEAN.” 80 Assel Satubaldina, “Kazakh-Malaysian Relations are Strong after 25 Years, Says

Malaysian Ambassador,” Astana Times, 12 February 2018. 81 Meeting with the Malaysian Ambassador to Kazakhstan, 1 February 2019, NurSultan. 82 “Kazakhstan-Malaysia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 11 May 2014,

http://mfa.gov.kz/en/content-view/sotrudnichestvo-respubliki-kazakhstan-c-malajziej (accessed 31 January 2019). 83 Meeting with the Malaysian Ambassador. 84 “Kazakhstan and Malaysia Strengthen Cooperation in the Oilfield Industry,” 3

April 2021, https://invest.gov.kz/media-center/press-releases/kazakhstan-i-malayziya-ukr eplyayut-sotrudnichestvo-v-nefteservisnoy-otrasli/ (accessed 6 April 2021).

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since 2014 and has had full support of Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad who is highly regarded by Kazakhstan’s elite.85 Kazakhstan’s economic cooperation with other major Southeast Asian countries remains limited. Thailand has made some investments in Kazakhstan but not to the level of Singapore and Malaysia. In 2016, Thailand’s major agribusiness conglomerate Charoen Pokphand invested US$ 700,000 in Almaty by opening a subsidiary company that distributes pet food with hopes to expand to other Central Asian markets. In June 2019, Thailand’s major energy company, PTT, acquired Partex Holding B.V., a Portuguese energy company, which owned a 20 percent stake in the Dunga oil field project in Kazakhstan’s Mangistau region. The transaction was worth US$ 622 million.86 Thailand’s first Ambassador to Kazakhstan opined that there remains room for further Thai investments in Kazakhstan’s food production and food processing industry, and construction and construction materials industry.87 In September 2019, a Thai delegation came to explore such opportunities but the pandemic prevented further follow-up.88 The Thai company Wyncoast Industrial Park also expressed interest in investing in alternative energy in Kazakhstan, which it had already done in Uzbekistan.89 Other areas of potential cooperation include tourism, hospitality and medical sectors, areas in which Thailand has expertise and Kazakhstan is trying to develop. The AIFC is also interested in establishing cooperation with Thailand’s Central Bank.90 Thailand is also interested in exploring the markets of Kazakhstan and 85 Bilqis Bahari, “Malaysia’s Hadid Group Brings High-End Engineering Services to Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas Industry,” Astana Times, 19 January 2022. 86 “Thai PTT Energy Mega-Group’s Subdivision Will Produce Oil in Kazakhstan”, 18 November 2019, www.mfa.gov.kz/en/thailand/content-viewptt# (accessed 7 February 2020). 87 Charn Jullamon, Fan klai pai hai tueng: Akeakrachathood Thai [Dare to Dream and to Follow Them: Ambassador of Thailand] (Bangkok: Wish Publishing, 2016), 433. 88 Final Report: The Republic of Kazakhstan (Bangkok: Fiscal Policy Research Institute Foundation, 2019), Chapter 5 (in Thai), https://toi.boi.go.th/information/worldw ide/54 (accessed 29 October 2020). 89 “Thailand is Interested in Deepening Investment Cooperation,” 22 July 2021, https://invest.gov.kz/media-center/press-releases/tailand-zainteresovan-v-uglublenii-inv estitsionnogo-sotrudnichestva/ (accessed 23 July 2021). 90 Interview with Kazakh expert, 16 September 2019, Almaty; meeting with Kazakh Foreign Ministry Official, 16 October 2020, Nur-Sultan; and conversation with AIFC official, 4 February 2020, Nur-Sultan.

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Central Asia for its halal products. Thailand is in the top ten of world exporters of halal products and is the top exporter among the ASEAN countries. However, Thailand’s halal products are relatively unknown in Central Asia compared to Malaysia’s. The Thai Embassy, therefore, organised a seminar to explore halal trade cooperation and the potential of using Kazakhstan as a distribution hub to other Central Asian markets.91 Despite their historical closeness since Soviet times, Vietnam’s economic presence in Kazakhstan is relatively small. One notable investment is an instant noodle production plant near Almaty by a company called Mareven Food Holdings, which is a joint venture between Vietnam, Kazakhstan and Japan, with a combined investment of around US$ 50 million.92 While Kazakhstan has close political relations with Indonesia, their economic cooperation is also small largely due to the lack of developed transport-logistics routes.93 As Indonesia is similar to Kazakhstan in terms of both being large countries endowed with abundant natural resources, they can explore strengthening their cooperation on natural resources management.94 After becoming president, Tokayev made plans to visit some Southeast Asian countries, like Thailand and Malaysia, to rejuvenate Kazakhstan’s relations with the region, but had to indefinitely postpone due to the pandemic.95 Uzbekistan In the 1990s, Karimov singled out Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia as Southeast Asian countries that Uzbekistan had successfully strengthened relations with.96 The fact that all three countries had embassies in Tashkent most likely helped, though Vietnam later closed its embassy and 91 Hybrid Seminar on “Exploring Cooperation and Trade of Thai Halal Products with

Kazakhstan and Central Asia,” organised by the author, 16 September 2021. 92 Author’s participation in a meeting with the Vietnamese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, 25 January 2019, Nur-Sultan. 93 “Kazakhstan-Indonesia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 31 May 2017, http://mfa.gov.kz/en/content-view/sotrudnichestvo-respubliki-kazakhstan-srespublikoj-indonezii (accessed 25 January 2019). 94 Interview with Kazakh expert, 18 February 2021, Nur-Sultan. 95 Meetings with Malaysian diplomat, 24 August 2020, Nur-Sultan, and Kazakh foreign

ministry official, 16 October 2020, Nur-Sultan. 96 Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold, 187.

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transferred responsibility to its embassy in Moscow. But it was Singapore that played the greatest economic role in Uzbekistan, despite not having an embassy. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Singapore was Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner from Southeast Asia, with trade amounting to US$ 76.1 million in 2005 and US$ 86.2 million in 2006. Since July 2003, the two countries also have an Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation which served as an important legal document for expanding economic relations and mutual investment.97 The potential of strengthening economic relations between Uzbekistan and Southeast Asia markedly increase under President Mirziyoyev, who has stressed economic diplomacy to attract greater foreign investment. As one Uzbek expert observed, Mirziyoyev has “de-securitized foreign policy,” especially with its neighbours, and focused instead on economic diplomacy.98 In his speech to the Uzbek diplomatic corps in 2018, Mirziyoyev instructed that the development of foreign economic ties, increasing exports, attraction of investment and technology, and promoting tourism in Uzbekistan would become a primary task for its diplomats.99 He proposed the creation of a specific department in the foreign ministry responsible for foreign economic relations, including tourism and export promotion. Moreover, Mirziyoyev himself often took the leading role in forging economic ties with foreign partners.100 His aim is to pursue a “more equal and balanced multi-vectored foreign economic policy” in order to advance Uzbekistan’s economic development. Tashkent well recognised the fact that depending on only Russia and China will limit this progress, and thus it needed to “diversify its trading partners and

97 F. Shoqulov, “Singapur Davlatining O ‘zbekiston bilan o ‘zaro hamkorlik aloqalari” [Cooperation of Singapore with Uzbekistan], “Oriental Art and Culture” ScientificMethodical Journal, no. 2 (2020): 131–132. 98 Online interview, 13 January 2022. 99 Shavkat Mirziyoyev, “Effektivnaia

Vneshniaia Politika - Vazhneishee Uslovie Uspeshnoi realizatsii kursa reform i preobrazovanii” [An Effective Foreign Policy Is the Most Important Condition for the Successful Realisation of the Course of Reforms and Transformations], Pravda Vostoka, 13 January 2018, http://press.natlib.uz/ru/edition/ download?id=4558 (accessed 6 May 2020). 100 Galiya Ibragimova, “Uzbekistan’s Investment Sphere—Dynamics and General Situation,” CABAR Article, 12 March 2018, https://cabar.asia/en/galiya-ibragimova-uzbeki stan-s-investment-sphere-dynamics-and-general-situation-3/ (accessed 9 July 2020).

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keep all its options open.”101 Some key Southeast Asian countries were seen as potential new and alternative economic partners and investors for Uzbekistan as part of the latter’s attempt to diversify its foreign relations and modernise the country. Uzbekistan stressed the necessity of establishing greater economic and political ties with the “newly-industrialised countries” of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, whose economic role was growing.102 On their part, Southeast Asian countries have shown increasing interest in expanding economic links with Uzbekistan due to Mirziyoyev’s significant development reforms. These reforms, particularly economic liberalization and currency convertibility, noticeably improved the business and investment climate. These reforms compounded with his more open and engaging foreign policy has made Uzbekistan a more attractive partner to do business with compared to the Karimov era.103 As ASEAN SecretaryGeneral Dato Lim Jock Hoi remarked‚ Mirziyoyev’s reforms have opened up prospects for the expansion of transport, trade and investment relations between Uzbekistan and ASEAN countries.104 The latest trade figures show that Singapore remains Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner from Southeast Asia with total trade at US$ 71.4 million during the first six months of 2021.105 Singapore is also a major investor in Uzbekistan. As of 2017, it jointly financed more than 20 enterprises in Uzbekistan in the fields of electrical engineering, food industry, wood-processing industry and trade. The two countries also have more than 20 major joint projects in the sphere of finance, oil and gas and light industry, and have held 101 Oybek Madiyev, Uzbekistan’s International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), 94 and 130. 102 Gul’rukh Dzhuraeva, “K istoriografii issledovaniia roli ASEAN v mirovoi politike (obzor literatury)” [Towards a Historiography of Research on the Role of ASEAN in World Politics (A Literature Review)], Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia [International Relations] (Tashkent), no. 1 (2016): 57–58. 103 Roger Kangas, ed., “Reform and Change in Uzbekistan,” Policy Paper 2 (November 2018), https://osce-academy.net/upload/file/Reform-and-Change-in-Uzbeki stan.pdf (accessed 7 November 2021), and Madiyev, Uzbekistan’s International Relations, 52–54. 104 “Ambassador of Uzbekistan presented credentials to ASEAN Secretary-General”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, 27 February 2019, https://mfa.uz/en/press/ news/2019/02/17944/ (accessed 9 March 2020). 105 “Merchandise Trade: Export and Import of goods and services of the Republic of Uzbekistan by country for 2021,” State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics, https://stat.uz/en/official-statistics/merchandise-trade (accessed 3 November 2021).

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regular business forums. In 2017, an agreement was signed to create a joint enterprise to produce fertilisers called Indorama Kokand Fertilizers with the participation of Singapore’s Indorama Corporation with a value of more than US$ 80 million.106 Uzbekistan’s relations with Vietnam is also gaining prominence due to historical close ties from the Soviet period. Uzbekistan’s foreign minister Abdulaziz Kamilov called Vietnam an “important partner” and a “bridge” for Uzbekistan to build relations with other Southeast Asian countries.107 Indeed, Vietnam has become the second-largest trading partner for Uzbekistan from Southeast Asia with trade totalling US$ 45.6 million during the first half of 2021.108 Malaysia is another major Southeast Asian investor in Uzbekistan. As of 2020, Malaysia had invested in 31 enterprises, 21 of which are with 100 percent Malaysian funding, in such areas as oil and gas, textile, furniture, electric products and financial and tourism services.109 Seeing the successful economic inroads made by other Southeast Asian countries, Thailand sent a foreign ministry delegation in 2015 to explore economic opportunities. Uzbekistan expressed interest in Thai investments in agricultural and food-processing fields and in tourism, areas of which Thailand has expertise. However, no significant progress was made as Uzbekistan’s investment climate was then seen as unstable.110 But with the improvement in Uzbekistan’s business climate and financial system under Mirziyoyev, Thai businesses became more interested in investing there. For example, Thailand’s Wyncoast Industrial Park company signed an MoU with Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Innovative Development in June 2019 to initiate a project to develop solar energy.

106 Dzhuraeva, “Singapur v sisteme,” 78–81. 107 “Uzbekistan Looks to Boost Ties with Vietnam,” People’s Army Newspaper, 22

December 2020, https://en.qdnd.vn/foreign-affairs/bilateral-relations/uzbekistan-looksto-boost-ties-with-vietnam-525344 (accessed 3 November 2021). 108 “Merchandise Trade.” 109 Aziz Karimov and Abror Madimarov, “Malaysia as Uzbekistan’s Key Partner in

Southeast Asia,” 9 March 2021, Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://isrs.uz/en/maqolalar/malajzia-klucevojpartner-uzbekistana-v-regione-ugo-vostocnoj-azii (accessed 1 November 2021). 110 Kanokphan Chinsawananon and Chotikorn Limratana, “Uzbekistan: jarg u arayatham sen thang sai mai su talad garn kar samai mai” [Uzbekistan: From the Cradle of Civilization on the Silk Road to a New Trade Market], Witthayu Saranrom (Thai Foreign Ministry Journal) 18, no. 71 (April–June 2016): 32–38.

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The company invested US$ 1.2 million to help establish a solar carport in Tashkent and solar farms in Nukus city and the Khorezm region.111 Turkmenistan Turkmenistan’s President Berdymukhamedov also placed increasing emphasis on economic diplomacy, stating that foreign policy must pursue the main goal of creating an “enabling international environment for domestic development of Turkmenistan” and to help ensure the legitimate interests of its neutral state.112 The development of relations with Southeast Asian countries was seen as one of the priorities of Ashgabat’s foreign policy.113 In President Berdymukhamedov’s speech to the Cabinet of Ministers in 2021, he stated that Turkmenistan should aim at progressively building up political and economic dialogue with countries in the Asia–Pacific, mentioning Malaysia specifically likely due to Petronas’s investments in Turkmenistan. He stressed that Turkmenistan was ready to search for new forms and vectors of cooperation with Asia– Pacific countries, primarily in the field of transport and communications, energy, investment, high technologies, and the creation of modern urban agglomerations.114 Indeed, the expansion of economic ties and attraction of foreign investment was high on the agenda of the Turkmenistan President’s first State Visit to Singapore in August 2019, during which the first business forum was held. President Berdymukhamedov proposed to his Singaporean counterpart priority cooperation in the fuel and energy sector, chemical and textile industries and transport and communications. He also told Singaporean business leaders that Singapore was considered as one of Turkmenistan’s promising trade and economic partners, and as of July 2019, six investment projects with the participation of Singaporean companies and five enterprises with the participation of Singaporean

111 Conversation with Wyncoast’s Chairman and CEO, 19 July 2021, Nur-Sultan. 112 “President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov.” 113 “Turkmenistan Develops Cooperation with ASEAN Countries,” 6 November 2013, http://www.turkmenistan.ru/en/articles/17462.html (accessed 10 March 2020). 114 “Vystuplenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedova na rasshirennom zasedanii Kabineta Ministrov” [Speech of the President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov at an Expanded Meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers] Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan [Neutral Turkmenistan], no. 322, 11 December 2021, https:// metbugat.gov.tm/newspaper?id=7573 (accessed 14 December 2021).

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capital have been registered in Turkmenistan.115 Indeed, the pursuit of economic advantages is an important factor that shapes Turkmenistan’s foreign policy, no matter the size of the partner country. Turkmenistan behaves like a “small trader in the market,” forming strategic partnerships with only those countries that can provide economic benefits. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Singapore are assigned particular importance due to this rationale. However, while the “diversification of foreign economic partners to reduce dependence on big regional players” is the “ideal dream” for Turkmenistan, Russia’s influence is still very much prevalent and extensive with the Kremlin constantly reminding who the “patron” of the region really is.116 Tajikistan President Rahmon likewise prioritised economic cooperation in Tajikistan’s foreign policy, including with Southeast Asian countries, focusing not only on trade and investment links but also on enhancing political dialogue and people-to-people links through tourism and cultural cooperation.117 According to one Tajik expert, for the past 20 years, Tajikistan’s foreign and trade ministries have all thought about how to diversify the country’s trade and economic cooperation by finding new economic partners such as those in Southeast Asia. But the logistics problem remains a major hurdle, not only interregionally but also within Tajikistan itself where the transport and logistics system is still underdeveloped.118 Moreover, despite Dushanbe’s attempts to diversify economic relations, the very poor investment climate and Chinese dominance in Tajikistan’s economy have deterred other potential investors, including the US and EU. China’s primacy in economic development and aid is to such an extent that even the US acknowledges it cannot compete in

115 “Turkmenistan President Completes State Visit to Singapore,” The Times of Central Asia, 28 August 2019. 116 Online communication with a Turkmen expert, 1 February 2022. 117 Speech at the Thai Ambassador’s presentation of credentials to President Emomali

Rahmon, 20 November 2019, Dushanbe. 118 Interview, 8 July 2021, Dushanbe.

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these areas.119 Recognising itself as an unattractive small market, Tajikistan is also trying to position itself as a hub for Southeast Asia to access the larger markets of Central Asia and Afghanistan. Tajikistan believes that the Taliban understands that international trade is necessary and will not obstruct Central Asia–South Asia connectivity projects that can allow Tajikistan to access the sea and markets beyond (see Chapter 3).120 Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyz President Zheenbekov similarly stressed economic diplomacy in his speech to Kyrgyz diplomats in 2019.121 After the political upheavals following the protests against the results of the Kyrgyz parliamentary elections in October 2020, the then Acting President Sadyr Zhaparov addressed the diplomatic corps to reassure them that foreign investments were protected under the rule of law and to request economic assistance and investment to improve the country’s socio-economic situation.122 In the country’s National Development Program until 2026, it was stressed that the country will continue to pursue a “multifaceted foreign policy” and that there will be an emphasis on foreign trade cooperation, attracting grants, foreign investments and tourists, and that economic diplomacy would be enhanced to improve and provide access of Kyrgyz producers to foreign markets.123 According to one Thai diplomat before Kyrgyzstan’s EAEU membership in 2015, Kyrgyzstan’s attractiveness lay in its location as not only a “landlocked country” but also a “land-linked” one

119 Conversation with US diplomat, 8 July 2021, Dushanbe. Japanese investors are similarly risk averse and there are almost no Japanese investments in Tajikistan. Conversation with Japanese diplomat, 9 July 2021, Dushanbe. 120 Meeting with Tajik trade official, 9 July 2021, Dushanbe. 121 “Speech by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic S. Zheenbekov at the forum

75th Anniversary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic. Results and prospects of cooperation of the Kyrgyz Republic with the United Nations,” 12 November 2019, https://mfa.gov.kg/en/dm/Embassy-of-the-Kyrgyz-Republic-tothe-Republic-of-Kazakhstan/news/4175 (accessed 10 March 2020). 122 “Sadyr Japarov Asks Heads of Foreign Embassies for Assistance,” 13 November 2020, https://24.kg/english/172905_Sadyr_Japarov_asks_heads_of_foreign_e mbassies_for_assistance/ (accessed 13 November 2020). 123 Baktygul Osmonalieva, “Kyrgyzstan’s Authorities Define Foreign Policy Priorities,” 17 January 2022, https://24.kg/english/220663_Kyrgyzstans_authorities_define_ foreign_policy_priorities_____/ (accessed 17 January 2022).

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connecting China to the Central Asian market and Russia, and potentially becoming an important distribution hub for Thai goods. Its two major markets—Dordoi near Bishkek, and Osh—served as key distribution hubs northwards to Kazakhstan and Russia, and southwards to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, respectively.124 However, Kyrgyzstan’s EAEU membership led to an increase in customs tariffs and reduced border trade with China, and its role as such a distribution hub decreased. While Thailand has sent delegations to explore trade and economic opportunities in Kyrgyzstan, not much progress has been achieved due to the often unstable political situation and the relative smallness of the Kyrgyz market.125 Such factors have deterred Southeast Asian investors in general, and there have been no major Southeast Asian investments in Kyrgyzstan yet. Recognising this fact, an official from Kyrgyzstan’s short-lived Ministry of Investment proposed that potential investors take insurance against political risk in the country.126 Indeed, one Kyrgyz expert was sceptical whether Southeast Asia could play any economic role in Kyrgyzstan due to the latter’s instability and underdevelopment. Investors need to be patient and think long term but even the Chinese were getting tired and frustrated with Kyrgyzstan’s instability.127 The main problem for both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is that they are small states and small markets, with undeveloped transport and logistics links with Southeast Asia as well as unfavourable business and investment conditions that deter Southeast Asian businesses that are relatively riskaverse. While Kyrgyz and Tajik officials do see economic potential in relations with Southeast Asia, transport and logistical problems, such as

124 Wattana Kungwongse, “Sakyaparp khong pumipak asia klang yoo thee withi kid”

[Central Asia’s Potential Lies in the Way of Thinking], Saranrom Journal 68, no. 2 (2011–2014): 176–185. 125 For instance, a Thai foreign ministry delegation visited Bishkek in 2014. See the Annual Report 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand: Bangkok, 2015), 30. The author also visited Bishkek in 2021 but was struck by the unstable political situation and unfavourable business climate. The smallness of the Kyrgyz market, as well as of Tajikistan, was also the view of the Thai Ministry of Commerce official overseeing Central Asia. Email conversation, 22 June 2021. 126 Meeting, 15 July 2021, Bishkek. The Ministry was established in May 2021 but was soon dissolved with responsibilities for foreign investment attraction transferred to the foreign ministry in October 2021. 127 Interview, 15 July 2021, Bishkek.

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the vast distance and lack of direct flights, remain the main obstacles to greater economic interaction.128 Obstacles to Greater Trade and Economic Links Despite the potential for greater trade and economic relations between the two regions, this remains negligible due to their physical distance and transport and logistical problems.129 Also, as one Kyrgyz diplomat noted, not only is Southeast Asia physically distant from Central Asia, but also culturally distant as both sides do not know each other very well. This “information gap” has meant that relations have been relatively weak and not yet reached its full potential.130 The same view was expressed by a Singaporean trade official who noted not only the lack of physical connectivity but also the lack of mutual awareness between the two regions, which required strengthening people-to-people relations through tourism and educational links.131 Moreover, as another Kyrgyz diplomat candidly admitted, a major problem was the challenging business environment in Central Asia due to corruption, legal instability and lack of reliability of business partners, while ASEAN countries are risk-averse and follow a pragmatic foreign economic policy based on achieving high economic benefits with minimum risks.132 For instance, during Thailand’s campaign for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the term 2017–2018 in competition with Kazakhstan, a Thai foreign ministry delegation made a rare Central Asian tour in which trade and investment opportunities was high on the agenda in order to attract the support of the other Central Asian states. However, there was ultimately no discernible outcome due to the aforementioned transport and logistical hurdles and challenging business climate.133 Other Southeast Asian 128 Conversations with Kyrgyz diplomats, Nur-Sultan, 27 January 2021, and Bishkek, 15 July 2021, and Tajik diplomats, trade and investment officials, Dushanbe, 8–9 July 2021. 129 Suleimen, “Central Asia and ASEAN,” 3. 130 Conversation, 30 May 2019, Nur-Sultan. 131 Views expressed at the online forum “Central Asia-ASEAN.” 132 B. Syrgabaev, “Kyrgyzstan i ASEAN – vozmozhnye puti

sotrudnichestva” [Kyrgyzstan and ASEAN—Possible Ways of Cooperation], 24 October 2016, http:// old.kabar.kg/rus/MID/full/112878 (accessed 22 June 2020). 133 The author was part of this Thai delegation in April 2016.

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countries face the same challenges and this is reflected in ASEAN-Central Asia trade statistics. While trade figures have been steadily increasing since 2015 (US$ 554 million) reaching US$ 1.5 billion in 2019 or nearly a threefold increase, this still represents a minuscule 0.068 percent of ASEAN’s total trade with the rest of the world in 2019 (US$ 2184 billion). Moreover, trade dropped by 37 percent to US$ 947 million in 2020 due to the pandemic (see Table 2.1). However, as illustrated earlier, despite facing the same obstacles, Singapore and Malaysia have been the leading economic partners for Central Asia. This is because they have the extra advantage of being seen as political and economic role models for Central Asia’s authoritarian leaders to follow. Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohammad are also highly regarded by the Central Asian elite. These factors provide further impetus for the relatively stronger relations between Central Asia and these two Southeast Asian countries.

Southeast Asia as Political and Economic Role Models In the early years of independence, Central Asian leaders, in particular in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, often made positive references to the socalled “Asian model” of political and socio-economic development, in which some countries of Southeast Asia and East Asia, or the “Asian Tigers,” enjoyed strong economic growth while maintaining strong political regimes that had a non-Westernized cultural identity. Their aim was to foster alternative partnerships with countries that do not apply geopolitical pressure and can serve as models for economic development. Such “valorization” of those Asian countries was common in the first half of the 1990s, but gradually dissipated with the return of Russian influence and the rise of China. It made a comeback at the turn of the twentyfirst century, with Kazakhstan, in particular, trying to emulate the political and socio-economic models of Singapore and Malaysia.134 Such attraction gave the leaders and businesses of these countries the advantage of gaining better access to Central Asian leaders and business elites to advance their economic roles and interests in the region.

134 Laruelle and Peyrouse, Globalising Central Asia, 96, 146.

Total

Import

Total

Export

2016

2015

ASEAN-Central Asia Trade, 2015–2020 (US$)

Export

Import

ExtraASEAN Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

Export

Import

353,583,198 6,110,142 14,558,113 38,447,317 99,777,696 512,476,466

578,893,769 6,712,220 15,460,040 46,756,313

169,542,603 817,364,944

69,764,907 304,888,478

225,310,571 602,078 901,927 8,308,996

217,246,818 1,090,791,739

784,198,277 25,185,381 15,179,721 48,981,542

113,672,235 585,260,242

406,359,502 8,062,631 13,051,242 44,114,633

103,574,582 505,531,497

377,838,775 17,122,750 2,128,479 4,866,910

1,982,183,547,412 1,012,969,962,831 969,213,584,580 2,163,451,597,148 1,091,543,408,615 1,071,908,188,533

Total

Import

Total

Export

2018

2017

Extra-ASEAN 1,737,481,429,728 884,627,153,935 852,854,275,793 1,721,943,032,367 875,712,380,219 846,230,652,147 Kazakhstan 331,489,392 262,118,588 69,370,805 338,677,009 244,474,486 94,202,522 Kyrgyzstan 9,485,214 7,962,225 1,522,989 6,676,238 5,526,731 1,149,507 Tajikistan 3,915,861 3,898,109 17,752 3,951,583 3,841,910 109,673 Turkmenistan 56,317,018 43,723,323 12,593,694 55,262,207 47,371,355 7,890,852 Uzbekistan 153,025,236 133,442,349 19,582,887 169,049,745 131,096,126 37,953,618 554,232,722 451,144,594 103,088,128 573,616,781 432,310,609 141,306,173

Table 2.1

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Export

Import

624,250,846 8,786,444 3,626,681 14,634,186 181,889,269 833,187,426

1,205,578,271 9,259,816 4,780,104 46,733,805

238,237,085 1,504,589,080

56,347,815 671,401,655

581,327,425 473,372 1,153,423 32,099,619 234,530,151 946,962,826

689,230,456 6,143,833 3,919,580 13,138,806 183,778,322 638,704,720

436,039,219 4,896,219 3,651,016 10,339,944

50,751,828 308,258,106

253,191,238 1,247,614 268,564 2,798,862

2,183,827,755,097 1,091,518,320,936 1,092,309,434,162 2,096,728,800,929 1,096,597,142,877 1,000,131,658,052

Trade figures from “ASEAN Statistics Data Portal,” https://data.aseanstats.org/ (accessed 25 May 2020)

ExtraASEAN Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

Total

Import

Total

Export

2020

2019

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Economy Before Politics During the early 1990s, the Central Asian elites often discussed possible models of development to follow which also shaped their foreign policy. After independence, the Central Asian leaders discovered that the world was not divided simply into two competing camps of socialism and capitalism, but there were in fact alternative models of political and socioeconomic development, particularly the successful economic development of East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Such discussions were intensive in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during the first stage of independence, while Turkmenistan was focused on its isolationist “positive neutrality” policy and Tajikistan was torn by civil war. A number of developmental models were considered, ranging from the Turkish secular political model as opposed to the Iranian theocratic model, to the Chinese model of gradual economic reforms as opposed to Russia’s shock therapy and political and economic liberalisation. The economic miracles of the so-called “Asian Tigers” was also particularly admired by Central Asian leaders, some of whom like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan took fact-finding trips to those regions early after independence.135 President Nazarbayev mentioned Japan, South Korea, and Singapore as the models in one of the first comprehensive outlooks for the postindependence “strategy of rapid development.” In 1997, a group of high-ranked administrators and experts from Kazakhstan visited Malaysia to study the so-called “Malaysian economic miracle” as well. This study finally came out as Kazakhstan’s long-term strategic vision “Kazakhstan: 2030: Prosperity, Security and Welfare improvements for all Kazakhstanis” in October 1997.136 Indeed, a survey conducted in 1997 in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, showed that the “Newly Industrialised States’ model of development,” such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, was chosen as the most attractive economic development model in Kyrgyzstan (48.6 percent) and Uzbekistan (37.5 percent), while coming in second place in Kazakhstan (28.3 percent) which preferred the Turkish model as its first option (34.8 percent).137

135 Abazov, “Practice of Foreign Policy Making,” 17–18. 136 Ibid., 19. 137 The survey covered 1,669 foreign ministry officials, members of parliament, political parties and media with expertise and interest in foreign affairs, and foreign policy and

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The key attraction of the Southeast Asian development model was their successful experience in economic dynamism under stable semiauthoritarian political systems. In an analysis of 18 presidential addresses given by Nazarbayev during 1997–2014, both Singapore and Malaysia (as well as South Korea) were in the list of highest ten country references, ranking at 5th and 8th place, respectively. They were referred to as countries that Kazakhstan could emulate due to their rapid economic development and stable political systems.138 Nazarbayev also played up Kazakhstan’s “Asian content of ethnicity” in his argument on why the “East Asian model of development” might be more appropriate for Kazakhstan to follow due to the authoritarian nature of its state and political culture of its people.139 Nazarbayev and his advisors have repeatedly expressed their admiration for political systems in Southeast Asia, often dubbed “guided democracy.” Such a political system has enabled countries like Malaysia and Singapore to achieve high economic growth. Moreover, in both countries, the leaders and their parties reigned for many decades and implemented their long-term vision for economic and political development.140 Nazarbayev often met with Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad to hear about how their reforms were carried out, the challenges and problems they faced, and how these were overcome. Like those countries, Nazarbayev chose to focus on economic development first, believing that “only a society with a high standard of living is capable of adopting democratic values” or to put it succinctly “economy first, politics second.”141 As Nazarbayev remarked regarding Singapore, “the middle class will not emerge without

international relations experts in academic institutes and think tanks. Ibid., 19–21, 51 (fn. 29), 57, 72. 138 Thomas Ambrosio and William A. Lange, “Mapping Kazakhstan’s Geopolitical Code: an Analysis of Nazarbayev’s Presidential Addresses, 1997–2014,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 55, no. 5 (2014): 542–543, 554. 139 Sally N. Cummings, “Eurasian Bridge or Murky Waters between East and West?

Ideas, Identity and Output in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19, no. 3 (2003): 147. 140 Rafis Abazov, “Why Kazakhstan’s presidential elections matter,” The Times of Central Asia, 4 June 2019. 141 Makhmud Kassymbekov, “Nazarbayev in Perspective. The Presidency—Nazarbayev begins Constructing his Legacy and Kazakhstan Reborn,” Astana Times, 26 June 2020.

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a sustainable economy which cannot exist without a sufficiently strong and wise leadership capable of getting the country out of free-fall.”142 Uzbekistan’s President Karimov held the same view that economic development should precede political liberalisation and such development required political stability. Karimov declared that “First people seek a full stomach, to be fed and well clothed. First the economy, then politics…”143 He often responded to his critics that there was a need for “stability at any cost” and occasionally referred to the Chinese and other experiences of limited political freedom. He called for the “study and apply” approach for Uzbekistan’s successful transition to prosperity and strong development after his trips to South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia in 1992. He supplemented Uzbekistan’s “own way of renovation and progress” by a call to learn from the Chinese experience of “gradual reforms” and to study and apply the Indonesian model of “guided democracy” amongst others. During his visit to Indonesia in 1992, Karimov was interested in Indonesia’s political experience, particularly its concept of “guided democracy” and state ideology called “panchasila,” and called to study and apply the Indonesian experience. Eventually, however, Karimov came up with the formula “Uzbekistan follows the Uzbek model,”144 in which the “political ideology and traditional values” of the Uzbek people are stressed, based on “orientalist traits” that were different from Western values and models.145 This so-called “Uzbek road” proposed gradual reform to preserve stability and national unity, a centralised state role in guiding and financing investment, self-sufficiency in food and energy, a legal basis for private sector and social development, and social protection of the more vulnerable sections of society. In essence, Karimov sought to avoid the “shock therapy” of Yeltsin’s Russia and advocated a more gradual economic transition and state-guided developmental approach, often citing the experiences of the newly industrialising countries of Southeast Asia.146 142 Cited in Casey Michel, “Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore as a Model for Kazakhstan,” The Diplomat, 30 March 2015. 143 Cited from Teles Fazendeiro, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy, 31. 144 Abazov, “Practice of Foreign Policy Making,” 20–21, 51–52 (fn. 38). 145 Madiyev, Uzbekistan’s International Relations, 31. 146 Martin C. Spechler, The Political Economy of Reform in Central Asia: Uzbekistan under authoritarianism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 33–34. This “Uzbek path” is also termed the “structuralist approach” in which reforms are implemented incrementally with

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Karimov also admired the Singaporean model. During his interview with journalists before making a state visit to Singapore in 2007, he expressed admiration for the “Singaporean miracle” that managed to transform a poor country into a highly developed state within a short time. Singapore’s experience in successfully developing its country based on its own cultural values and specifics without necessarily copying the “Western Anglo-Saxon model” was seen as particularly useful for Uzbekistan, which was trying to follow its own modernization path based on its own cultural and civilizational identity.147 Similarly, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s Vision 2020, which outlined the “Asian” approach towards development, resonated well with Central Asian leaders as it entailed “modernisation without democratisation” and that a strong authoritarian government “would go unquestioned as long as it delivered continued prosperity.”148 Central Asian leaders held Mahathir in high esteem as a leader who transformed Malaysia from “an average agriculture state into one of Asia’s economic tigers.”149 Karimov was also particularly attracted to Malaysia’s model of “authoritarian developmentalism” as he, like Mahathir, had used state-controlled Islamization policies to counter the opposition that had expressed its criticisms in increasingly Islamic terms.150 Limitations to Emulations While the “economy first, politics second” developmental approach of these Southeast Asian countries may have resonated well with Kazakhstan’s elites, it was unclear whether they had the requisite “will for self-discipline” that the “Asian Tigers” had often demonstrated.151

government guidance throughout the process. Gregory Gleason, “Foreign Policy and Domestic Reform in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 20, no. 2 (2001): 167–168, 177–178. 147 Dzhuraeva, “Singapur v sisteme,” 72–73 and 81. 148 Jan Stark, “‘Snow Leopard’ meets ‘Asian Tiger’: Shaping Malaysia’s Relations with

Central Asia,” The Round Table 95, no. 385 (2006): 457–458. 149 Hashim Ismail, A Jigit without His Horse (Singapore: Partridge Publishing, 2014), Amazon Kindle Edition, chapter 27, paragraph 2. 150 Stark, Malaysia and the Developing World, 102, 108. 151 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, DC: Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 21.

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Indeed, Kazakhstan’s emulation of Singapore, which is seen as the benchmark, has been a mixed success. Nazarbayev had “built a political system that combines Singaporean-style technocratic governance with feudal loyalty…But, unlike Lee, Nazarbayev has not built strong institutions, such as a competitive political-party system, or an independent judiciary.”152 Moreover, while ensuring stability amongst the elite for a long time, Nazarbayev failed to create strong political institutions that could participate in a stable transition of power and serve as collective successors.153 There are also limitations to Kazakhstan’s emulation of Singapore’s economic model. Unlike Singapore’s diversified economy, Kazakhstan’s reliance on its energy sector makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in energy prices. Singapore also benefits from an established culture of entrepreneurship and business while Kazakhstan’s communist legacy remains entrenched.154 Another issue is that Kazakhstan’s emulation of Singapore ignores the “sharply differing levels of corruption” in the two countries.155 The same could be said for other Central Asian states. Karimov’s Uzbekistan was fraught with challenges due to the prevalence of state capture and a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy. Uzbekistan initially benefited from its Soviet legacy with an economy that was more diversified than other Central Asian states and which was insulated from much of the economic decline that affected other former Soviet states. However, a series of economic policies implemented under Karimov, most notably restrictions placed on currency convertibility in 1996 to address the shortfall in foreign reserves, hampered economic development and worsened the foreign investment and business climate.156 Indeed, Singapore’s experience was very difficult for Central Asian countries to follow. Unlike that in Central Asia, Lee Kuan Yew’s authoritarianism was a “soft” and “enlightened” form in which he strictly enforced the rule of law and 152 Nargis Kassenova, “What’s Next for Kazakhstan?” 21 March 2019, www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/kazakhstan-nazarbayev-resignation-impact-by-nargis-kassen ova-2019-03 (accessed 25 March 2019). 153 Dossym Satpayev, “Political and Economic Trends in Kazakhstan,” in Marlene Laruelle, ed., Kazakhstan: Nation-Branding, Economic Trials, and Cultural Changes (Washington, DC: The George Washington University, 2017), 7. 154 Boh Ze Kai, “Why Kazakhstan Learns from Singapore,” Mantraya Special Report, no. 7, 10 October 2016. 155 “The Politics of Decision-Making in Central Asia,” 15. 156 Gleason, “Foreign policy and domestic reform,” 177–178.

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emphasised economic development based on fair competition and equal rules of the game.157 Thus, while Singapore is an ideal model to follow for Central Asian leaders, due to the notion of a strong leader who brings development and prosperity to the nation, they could not really implement it as rule of law is lacking and corruption is pervasive in their countries.158 Personal Ties and Socio-Economic Opportunities The strong personal ties between the leaders of Singapore and Malaysia with their Central Asian counterparts, compounded with the Central Asian leaders’ abovementioned admiration for the leaders and development models of those countries, have helped them gain better access to economic opportunities in the region. Singapore’s economic role in the region has been relatively extensive despite the fact it has no embassies in any Central Asian country. Lee Kuan Yew was also a far-sighted statesman who recognised the potential importance of Central Asia since his first visit to Kazakhstan in 1991, and believed that Singapore should form early linkages with the region. Nazarbayev had much admiration for Lee and often spoke of him as a model. He even invited Lee to advise Kazakhstan on its transition to a free market economy during Lee’s 1991 visit when he was Senior Minister and no longer Prime Minister.159 The admiration was mutual. In the early 1990s, Lee Kuan Yew called Nazarbayev a “rising star” and predicted that “if Nazarbayev will be at the helm of the Republic, Kazakhstan will have a much higher chance of success.”160 As Tokayev remarked to Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 2019, the close relationship between Lee and Nazarbayev formed the

157 Yuliy Yusupov, “The Democratization Prospects of Central Asian Countries or How to Wake up the Sleeping Institutions?” CABAR Article, 7 May 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/the-democratization-prospects-of-central-asian-countries-orhow-to-wake-up-the-sleeping-institutions/ (accessed 9 July 2020). 158 Interview with Kyrgyz expert, 16 July 2021, Bishkek. 159 Zulkifli Baharudin, “What’s There in Kazakhstan? Plenty for Singapore Businesses

in a Post-COVID World,” Astana Times, 4 June 2020. 160 Cited in B. M. Kanap’ianova, ed., Kasym-Zhomart Tokaev: On delaet istoriiu, ocherki kazakhstanskogo politika [Kasym-Zhomart Tokaev: He Makes History, Essays of a Kazakhstani Politician] (Almaty: Zhibek Zholy, 2018), 175.

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background for very close relations between the two countries.161 Moreover, Lee Kuan Yew’s continued role as Senior Minister and then Minister Mentor after being Prime Minister for more than 30 years was seen by many observers as the model taken by Nazarbayev to secure his legacy after stepping down as President in March 2019.162 However, it was not just Southeast Asia’s political model that appealed to Central Asian leaders, but also their socio-economic model, including in education and human resource development. As Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov noted during his 2014 visit to Singapore, Kazakhstan actively adapted from Singapore’s socio-economic development model.163 Furthermore, Southeast Asian countries, such as Singapore, was seen as attractive as it offered a “strategic, no nonsense investment model” that appealed to the Central Asian elites.164 Even Turkmenistan’s Berdymukhamedov praised the “Singaporean economic miracle” and emphasised the development of trade and economic ties as his main goals in his 2019 visit to Singapore.165 Kazakhstan tried to follow Singapore in areas of socio-economic reform and development since 1991 when Lee visited Almaty and delivered a lecture to Kazakhstan’s Council of Ministers. Nazarbayev was impressed enough to use Lee’s advice as a basis for Kazakhstan’s nation-building blueprint.166 As former Prime Minister Karim Massimov observed, “Of course, we are a Central Asian country, but taking Singapore as our model

161 “President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met with Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong,” 1 October 2019, http://www.akorda.kz/en/events/president-kassym-jomart-tok ayev-met-with-prime-minister-of-singapore-lee-hsien-loong (accessed 10 October 2019). 162 Bruce Pannier, “Nazarbayev’s Decision to Leave Office Just Might Be His Greatest Legacy,” RFE/RL, 19 March 2019; Kate Mallinson, “Kazakhstan: Real Power Transition Still to Come,” 22 March 2019, www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/ kazakhstan-real-power-transition-still-come (accessed 25 March 2019); Dosym Satpaev, “God polutranzita. Kazakhstan-2019 glazami Dosyma Satpaeva” [A semi-transit year. Kazakhstan-2019 Through the Eyes of Dosym Satpaev], Forbes Kazakhstan, 25 December 2019, https://forbes.kz//process/expertise/god_polutranzita_kazahstan-2019_glazami_ dosyima_satpaeva/ (accessed 7 July 2020); and Kassenova, “What’s Next for Kazakhstan?”. 163 Alan Azhibaev, “Pacific Boundary,” Diplomatic Herald 3, no. 46 (2014): 54–55. 164 “The Politics of Decision-Making in Central Asia,” 21. 165 “Turkmenistan President Completes State visit to Singapore.” 166 Boh, “Why Kazakhstan learns from Singapore,” and Sergey

Tereschenko, “Kazakhstan-Singapore Friendship: A Test of Time,” in Kazakhstan-Singapore Connectivity, 23 December 2020, https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa-singapore/doc uments/details/106553?lang=en (accessed 9 January 2021).

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we are aiming for best international practice in healthcare, ecology and criminal justice reform.”167 Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna wealth management fund was created based on Singapore’s Temasek holding company. Singapore’s success in education and human resources development impressed Nazarbayev who came up with the idea of providing Bolashak (the future) scholarships for thousands of gifted Kazakh students to study abroad when he visited Singapore in 1993.168 Kazakh-Singaporean collaboration in the field of education and training has been particularly extensive such as that between Singapore’s Civil Service College and Kazakhstan’s Academy of Public Administration and between the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Nazarbayev University. Importantly, Kazakhstan’s attraction to Singapore’s high standards in education and human capital development has provided opportunities for Singaporean companies to invest in this field in Kazakhstan. During 2019, Singaporean companies planned to build a network of international educational centres, from kindergartens to universities, in major Kazakh cities.169 Singapore’s leading role and high standards in education have also attracted Uzbekistan’s interest. Following President Karimov’s state visit to Singapore in January 2007, the Management Development Institute of Singapore (MDIS) in Tashkent was established in September, offering programmes in business, management and finance.170 Since 2019, a Singaporean company has assisted in the introduction of new educational software products and interactive digital learning platforms into Uzbekistan’s education system.171 Moreover, Singapore’s MDIS is expanding its operations in Central Asia with plans

167 Cited in Jonathan Aitken, Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes After 20 Years of Independence (London: Continuum, 2012), 29. 168 Ibid., 182. 169 Laura Tusupbekova, “Singapore Company to Build Educational Center for Ongoing

Training in Kazakhstan,” 14 March 2019, www.kazpravda.kz/en/news/society/singap ore-company-to-build-educational-center-for-ongoing-training-in-kazakhstan (accessed 14 March 2019) and Dilshat Zhussupova, “Singaporean Investors Hope to Invest $200 Million in Constructing Nur-Sultan Educational Institutes,” Astana Times, 28 August 2019. 170 “About MDIS Tashkent,” http://www.mdis.uz/about (accessed 3 June 2021). 171 Shoqulov, “Singapur davlatining O‘zbekiston,” 133.

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to open a branch in Dushanbe in 2021.172 Singapore also provides education and training opportunities for Central Asia through the Singapore Cooperation Programme, with more than 1,200 participants from the region.173 Malaysia is also an attractive partner in education for Central Asian states. In 2019, an Uzbek-Malaysian joint faculty was established on the basis of the Tashkent Financial Institute and, in 2020, the International University “Binary” was founded in the city of Urgench in cooperation with the Malaysian University of Management and Entrepreneurship “Binary.”174 Malaysia is also a popular destination for Uzbek students in Southeast Asia with approximately 200 students enrolled in Malaysia’s universities and educational institutions.175 Around 1,500 Kazakh students are also studying in Malaysian universities, with more than 8,000 graduates. Malaysia is popular due to its high-quality Englishlanguage education system that is cheaper than studying in the US or UK.176 Malaysia has further “soft power” attributes that have helped raised its profile and influence in Central Asia. Malaysia is a country with a Muslim majority that is also multi-ethnic and multi-religious, similar to Kazakhstan, and thus seen as a model to follow. Malaysia, like the Central Asian states, is also a moderate Muslim country that shares common positions in the multilateral arena such as the fight against international terrorism and extremism, dialogue between civilisations, and between

172 Interview with Tajik Ministry of Economic Development and Trade official, 9 July 2021, Dushanbe. 173 “Central Asia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/ SINGAPORES-FOREIGN-POLICY/Countries-and-Regions/Central-Asia (accessed 21 May 2020). 174 Aziz Karimov and Abror Madimarov, “Malaysia as Uzbekistan’s Key Partner in Southeast Asia,” 9 March 2021, https://isrs.uz/en/maqolalar/malajzia-klucevoj-partneruzbekistana-v-regione-ugo-vostocnoj-azii (accessed 1 November 2021). 175 Herizal Hazri, “Malaysia-Uzbekistan: Upon the 29th Anniversary of Bilateral Relations and Diplomatic Ties between Malaysia and Uzbekistan,” 9 March 2021, https://isrs.uz/en/xalqaro-hamkorlik/malaysia-uzbekistan-upon-the-29th-anniversary-ofbilateral-relations-and-diplomatic-ties-between-malaysia-uzbekistan (accessed 1 November 2021). 176 “Kazakhstan-Malaysia,” and Satubaldina, “Kazakh-Malaysian Relations Are Strong.”

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the Muslim world and the West.177 Kazakhstan, in particular, collaborates closely with Malaysia within the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF), seeing these as platforms to promote balanced relations between the Muslim world and the West.178 Kyrgyzstan also recognises the successful experience of Muslim ASEAN countries like Malaysia and Indonesia in following the principles of moderate Islam, harmonizing the values of democracy and Islam, and forming intercultural and interfaith relations. Cooperation in education with both countries is seen as important, especially by sending Kyrgyz students to study in Indonesian and Malaysian Islamic educational establishments, which would help minimise their exposure to Islamic extremist teachings. Kyrgyzstan is also interested in learning from these countries’ experiences in creating a positive business and investment climate, supporting small-and-medium-sized enterprises and introducing halal standards and Islamic banking.179 Importantly, Malaysia under Mahathir was also a keen advocate of the Muslim cause in international affairs who championed development projects in the newly independent Muslim Central Asian states. This elevated both Mahathir’s and Malaysia’s profiles and reaped goodwill and material benefits in the region.180 The largest economic benefits reaped are in the energy sector. Malaysia’s energy company Petronas, which is involved in Turkmenistan

177 N. B. Ermekbaev, G. T. Koishybaev, and K. K. Lama Sharif, Kazakhstan i strany mira [Kazakhstan and the Countries of the World] (Almaty: Oner, 2006), 90–91 and “Kazakhstan-Malaysia.” 178 Rakhat T. Akhmet, Chew Chee Khiang, and Chang Peng Kee, “Framing the Diplomatic Ties Between Kazakhstan and Malaysia,” Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, no. 2 (2015): 164. 179 Syrgabaev, “Kyrgyzstan i ASEAN” and interview with a Kyrgyz expert, 16 July 2021, Bishkek. 180 Khadijah MD. Khalid, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy under Najib: A Comparison with Mahathir,” Asian Survey 51, no. 3 (2011): 434–435. On Malaysia’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world see David Delfolie, “Malaysian Extraversion Towards the Muslim World: Ideological Positioning for a ‘Mirror Effect’,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 4 (2012): 3–29 and Prashant Waikar, Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman and Rashaad Ali, “Dancing with the Ummah: Islam in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy under Najib Razak,” The Pacific Review 34, no. 2 (2021): 230–258.

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and previously in Uzbekistan, is symbolic of Malaysia’s economic presence in Central Asia. It was the first foreign company to obtain an onshore Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) in Turkmenistan and has operated the Diyarbekir oil deposit since the 1990s. Petronas also won rights to participate in the exploration and exploitation of gas deposits on the Ust-Yurt Plateau in Uzbekistan, for which Gazprom had its licenses revoked in 2009.181 Tashkent’s decision arguably led to Russian President Medvedev’s decision to downgrade Uzbekistan by visiting Kazakhstan first upon assuming the presidency as a reprisal, in clear contrast to Putin who visited Uzbekistan first in 2000.182 However, in 2013, Petronas decided to withdraw from all of its Uzbekistan exploration and production projects for commercial reasons, which include PSAs on the Ust-Yurt Plateau, the Surkhanski gas field, and the Baisun oil and gas field in southern Uzbekistan.183 In 2018, it was reported that Petronas might re-enter Uzbekistan’s energy market following Mirziyoyev’s reforms that improved the investment climate, though this has yet to transpire.184 Malaysia has fared better in Turkmenistan where Petronas has been operating since 1996 when it was given a 32-year production sharing contract until 2028 to produce natural gas in the Block 1 offshore area in the Caspian Sea. Malaysia is also the only ASEAN country with an embassy based in Ashgabat, which was opened in December 2011, and Turkmenistan also opened its only embassy in an ASEAN country in Kuala Lumpur in 2013. According to a Malaysian diplomat who was involved with the opening of the Malaysian embassy, the decision was taken to protect and assist the interests of Petronas as well as due to the personal closeness between the leaders.185 This closeness was evident during Prime Minister Mahathir’s visit to Turkmenistan in October 2019, when the Turkmen President expressed intention to grant a 10-year extension to the PSA with Petronas until 2038 and expressed gratitude for Mahathir’s

181 Laruelle and Peyrouse, Globalising Central Asia, 110. 182 Teles Fazendeiro, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy, 81. 183 “Petronas Withdraws from All of Its Hydrocarbon Investments in Uzbekistan,” The Times of Central Asia, 26 July 2013. 184 “Petronas Talks Possible Re-entering Uzbek Oil & Gas Sector,” AzerNews, 14 November 2018, https://www.azernews.az/region/140918.html (accessed 18 June 2020). 185 Conversation, 29 January 2020, Nur-Sultan.

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“enormous” contribution to bilateral ties.186 Indeed, in the view of one Turkmen expert, Turkmenistan’s overall relations with Southeast Asia have been insubstantial, with emphasis placed on Malaysia only due to Petronas’s investments. Ashgabat’s foreign policy is essentially pragmatic and does not widen its horizons unless there are significant benefits to gain.187 The role of personal connections between leaders, therefore, plays an important part in both Singapore’s and Malaysia’s relative economic success in the region. The leaders of Malaysia and Kazakhstan are also close and have often met. In 1996 alone, Nazarbayev met with Mahathir three times. Nazarbayev visited Malaysia again in 2006 and 2012, while the then Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) of Malaysia paid a state visit to Kazakhstan in 2003. The frequent exchanges of high-level visits demonstrate their close political and economic relations.188 Indeed, Kazakhstan hoped that a “leading role for Malaysia” as one of the “ASEAN tiger economies” would enable the Kazakh private sector to make successful inroads into the Southeast Asian markets, as well as boost tourism and find new customers for Kazakhstan’s oil and gas.189 Mahathir’s relations with Karimov was perhaps less close. According to one Malaysian diplomat, during Mahathir’s 1993 visit to Uzbekistan, Mahathir’s speech on how Uzbekistan could learn from Malaysia in order to achieve strong economic growth was cut short by Karimov who suddenly presented him with gifts. This act was interpreted by the diplomat as the prickly Karimov’s way of telling Mahathir not to “preach” on how he should run his country. Kyrgyzstan’s President Akaev, on the other hand, was more receptive and flattered Mahathir throughout their discussion during a

186 “Malaysia, Turkmenistan Share Similarities in Policies and Approaches—Dr Mahathir,” 27 October 2019, Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia News, https://www. pmo.gov.my/2019/10/malaysia-turkmenistan-share-similarities-in-policies-and-approa ches-dr-mahathir/; “Dr Mahathir Looks Forward to Greater Cooperation with Turkmenistan,” 27 October 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.my/2019/10/dr-mahathir-looksforward-to-greater-cooperation-with-turkmenistan/; “Turkmenistan Wants to Extend Petronas PSC to 2038—Dr Mahathir,” 28 October 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.my/ 2019/10/turkmenistan-wants-to-extend-petronas-psc-to-2038-dr-mahathir/ (all accessed 30 October 2019). 187 Communication with the expert, 16 November 2021. 188 Ermekbaev et al., Kazakhstan i strany mira, 90–91, and “Kazakhstan-Malaysia.” 189 Stark, “‘Snow Leopard’ meets ‘Asian Tiger’,” 467.

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later visit. This resulted in Mahathir pledging numerous financial and technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan.190

Central Asia’s Engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-Led Fora Of all the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan has been the keenest and most active to engage with ASEAN and participate in ASEAN-led fora, primarily the ARF, in order to gain access to the dynamically growing Asia–Pacific economy as well as participate in regional integration processes. Kazakhstan recognised that ASEAN had become “a centre of Asian integration” and a basic structure for multilateral regional cooperation that plays an important role in Asia–Pacific cooperation.191 Kazakhstan sought to enhance cooperation with ASEAN and its member countries as part of its multi-vector foreign policy. On ASEAN’s part, Kazakhstan is seen as the most promising strategic partner in Central Asia.192 ASEAN’s gradual formation of an ASEAN Community with the potential to become one “pole” in a multipolar world also accorded well with Kazakhstan’s conviction that “multi-polarity is the fairest and most rational form of world order that alone can ensure a balance of forces and a secure world.”193 Kazakhstan had, therefore, often expressed its intention to strengthen relations with ASEAN and to become a member of the ARF since 1995.194 But it has been unsuccessful due to the moratorium in place on new members since 1996, which was imposed because of concern about the Forum expanding too rapidly to the detriment of its consolidation. However, this moratorium was not strictly complied with and the de facto moratorium was often lifted when it suited ASEAN’s

190 Ismail, A Jigit Without His Horse, Chapter 27, paragraphs 3–6. The author mistakenly cites 2000 as the year of Mahathir’s visit to Kyrgyzstan, but Mahathir visited in 1996 and 1997. 191 Anuar Kalmykov, “ASEAN Committee opened in Astana,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 6 May 2014. 192 Dmitry V. Shkurkin, et al., “The Republic of Kazakhstan in the System of International Regional Integration Associations,” International Review of Management and Marketing 6, Special Issue (S6) (2016): 175–176. 193 Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, “Kazakhstan in the Contemporary World,” International Affairs (Moscow) 53, no. 1 (2007): 101. 194 Email correspondence with ASEAN Secretariat, 24 October 2019.

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interests.195 Nonetheless, since the admission of Sri Lanka in 2007, the ARF has not yet set a precedent on how to address outstanding applications such as Kazakhstan’s. Furthermore, the issue of Kazakhstan’s application has not yet been discussed in detail in the ARF.196 Some Kazakh experts also believed it necessary for Kazakhstan to first develop a comprehensive and structured vision of participation, with clear aims and expected results, and a plan of action. This should be gradual, beginning with the status of ASEAN dialogue partner so that Kazakhstan can enlist the support of the majority of member states.197 While Kazakhstan had also applied for dialogue partner status, a moratorium on applications has been in place since 1999. However, this can again be conveniently lifted such as in the UK’s case in 2021. In January 2014, Kazakhstan appointed its Ambassador to Indonesia as its first Ambassador to ASEAN. Nonetheless, there has been no further substantive cooperation between ASEAN and Kazakhstan.198 In addition to Kazakhstan, only Uzbekistan (2011) and Turkmenistan (2015) have accredited their Ambassadors to Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively, as their Ambassadors to ASEAN. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have yet to do so.199 Uzbekistan was in fact the first Central Asian state to accredit its Ambassador to ASEAN, which reflected Tashkent’s initial high interest to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN.200 Tashkent recognised that ASEAN has been forming one of the “backbones” of the emerging security and cooperation architecture in the Asia–Pacific region as well as having growing potential in trade, economic, financial

195 Rodolfo Severino, The ASEAN Regional Forum (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 23–29. 196 Email correspondence with ASEAN Secretariat. 197 Zh. M. Amanzholov and E. B. Akhmetov, “Regional’nyi forum ASEAN po voprosam bezopasnosti i perspektivy ego razvitiia v kontekste pozitsii kazakhstana na integratsiiu” [The ASEAN Regional Forum on security issues and the prospects for its development in the context of Kazakhstan’s position on integration], KazNU Bulletin, International Relations and International Law Series 70, no. 2 (2015): 8–9. 198 Email correspondence with ASEAN Secretariat. 199 Email correspondence with ASEAN Secretariat, 28 April 2020. 200 “First Central Asian State Ambassador to ASEAN Presents Credentials,” 10 March

2011, https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/13448 (accessed 16 May 2020).

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and investment potential for Uzbekistan.201 Ashgabat likewise recognised ASEAN’s growing importance and expressed its desire to explore and develop closer relations with ASEAN and its member states.202 Nonetheless, apart from accrediting their respective Ambassadors to ASEAN, there has been no further substantive cooperation between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and ASEAN. Both also have not expressed interest to have formal partnership status with ASEAN or becoming a participant of the ARF.203 Engagement by Other Means Kazakhstan has tried other avenues to engage with ASEAN. It is keen to establish cooperation between ASEAN and organisations that Kazakhstan is a member or initiated. After the establishment of the SCO in June 2001, President Nazarbayev declared that the SCO should strengthen its cooperation with other regional organisations such as ASEAN.204 SCO-ASEAN cooperation was seen as promising due to their similar positions on several regional and global issues and their cooperation could provide an important link for a “security belt” between Europe and Asia. In April 2005, the SCO signed a MoU on cooperation with the ASEAN Secretariat in the areas of economics, finance, tourism, environmental protection, natural resources, social development, energy and the fight against transnational crime, but actual implementation has been largely weak.205 Nonetheless, since the MoU was signed, there have been regular meetings between senior officials from the two organisations. For example, the ASEAN Secretary-General attended the SCO 201 Fazilathon Abdullaeva, “Uzbekistan-ASEAN: perspektivy sotrudnichestva” [Uzbekistan-ASEAN: Prospects for Cooperation], 26 December 2018, https://isrs.uz/ maqolalar/uzbekistan-asean-perspektivy-sotrudnicestva (accessed 3 July 2020). 202 “Turkmenistan Seeks Closer Relations and Cooperation with ASEAN,” 9 June 2015, https://asean.org/turkmenistan-seeks-closer-relations-and-cooperation-with-asean/ (accessed 10 March 2020). 203 Email correspondence with ASEAN Secretariat. 204 Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Kazakhstan and Central Asia: Regional Perspectives,”

Central Asian Survey 21, no. 2 (2002): 181. 205 Gul’rukh Dzhuraeva, “Perspektivy sotrudnichestva ShOS i ASEAN v novom stoletii” [Prospects for Cooperation between SCO and ASEAN in the New Century], Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia [International Relations] (Tashkent), no. 3 (2015): 14–15 and 17.

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Summit in Tashkent in June 2016 as Guest of the Chair.206 Moreover, one ASEAN member—Cambodia—became a SCO dialogue partner in 2015. Nonetheless, it was still felt by both sides that more could be done to strengthen cooperation. Then ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan expressed hope to Uzbekistan’s first Ambassador to ASEAN that Uzbekistan could help forge closer ties between the two organisations.207 The then SCO Secretary-General, Vladimir Norov, who is now Uzbekistan’s foreign minister, also stressed the importance of furthering close partnerships with ASEAN and visited the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta in 2019 to discuss common positions on countering new challenges and threats, ensuring regional stability and security, and promoting and deepening trade and economic interaction. Increasing cooperation with ASEAN is also part of the SCO’s Development Strategy until 2025.208 Norov also stressed the role of youths in strengthening SCO-ASEAN relations and the need for educational cooperation and joint efforts to create better economic opportunities for young people to help counter the radicalisation of youths in the two regions.209 Kazakhstan has also been pushing for a MoU between CICA, which was initiated by Nazarbayev in 1992, and ASEAN.210 It was felt by Kazakh diplomats that CICA-ASEAN cooperation was too low and more could be done.211 Nazarbayev further proposed the transformation of CICA into a full-fledged organisation, the first step of which would be a Joint Consultative Meeting between the secretariats or chairs of CICA, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

206 Email correspondence with ASEAN Secretariat. 207 “Uzbekistan pervym iz stran Tsentral’noi Azii akkreditoval svoego posla v ASEAN”

[Uzbekistan is the first Central Asian country to accredit its ambassador to ASEAN], 10 March 2011, https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1381871.html (accessed 17 June 2020). 208 Vladimir Norov, “SCO Space has Become Even More Attractive,” Diplomatic Herald, no. 2 (2019): 23–25. 209 Online speech by Vladimir Norov, “SCO: An Important Factor in Ensuring Stability and Sustainable Development in Eurasia,” 27 October 2020, National University of Singapore. 210 “Kazakhstan and ASEAN Eager to Strengthen Cooperation,” 18 August 2014, https://strategy2050.kz/en/news/12138/ (accessed 30 September 2019). 211 Author’s meeting, 6 March 2019, Nur-Sultan.

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and ASEAN.212 But ASEAN was not so receptive to the idea which was seemingly dropped after Nazarbayev’s resignation in March 2019. Only cooperation between CICA and the OSCE was referred to after that.213 Nonetheless, ASEAN was mentioned as part of the “Third Dialogue” in First President Nazarbayev’s speech at the Second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in April 2019, in which economic dialogue between the EAEU, the EU, SCO and ASEAN was proposed.214 Moreover, in December 2021, CICA, under Kazakhstan’s chairmanship, agreed to build formal partnerships with ASEAN.215 A C5+ ASEAN Dialogue? In his speech at the ministerial meeting of the 63rd session of ESCAP in Almaty in May 2007, Nazarbayev proposed the establishment of an “ASEAN plus Central Asia political and economic dialogue” to further develop interregional cooperation between Central Asia and ASEAN countries.216 This followed the establishment of the first C5+1 dialogue 212 “Statement by President Nazarbayev at the Fourth Astana Club Meeting,” 13 November 2018, http://www.akorda.kz/en/speeches/internal_political_affairs/in_spe eches_and_addresses/statement-by-president-nazarbayev-at-the-fourth-astana-club-meeting (accessed 17 November 2019). The idea of transforming CICA into an international organisation akin to the OSCE was not new and was first proposed by Nazarbayev at the 2014 CICA Summit in Shanghai. It was stressed that its functions would not overlap with that of existing organisations such as the SCO, ASEAN and Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO). However, this was viewed with scepticism from some ASEAN member countries who, while not objecting to the idea in principle, believed that its functions would eventually overlap with the ARF’s. The ARF also included more countries that are important for Asia–Pacific security than CICA, such as the US, Japan and all ASEAN member countries. From the author’s recollections when working on this issue in the foreign ministry, October–November 2015. 213 For instance, President Tokayev’s statement at the Fifth CICA Summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 15 June 2019, www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=17261&lang=1 (accessed 9 October 2019). Kazakh diplomats also confirmed this in conversations with the author, 13 June 2019, Dushanbe. 214 The First Dialogue is between the US, Russia, China and the EU. The Second

Dialogue is between CICA and the OSCE. “First President Nazarbayev Proposes ‘Three Dialogues’ at Belt & Road Forum,” 27 April 2019, https://abaicenter.com/2019-04-27nazarbayev-proposes-three-dialogues (accessed 9 October 2019). 215 Author’s participation in CICA meeting, 8 December 2021, Nur-Sultan. 216 “Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan N. A. Nazarbaeva na otkrytii minis-

terskoi vstrechi 63-i sessii ESKATO” [Speech of the President of the Republic of

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format by Japan in 2004, which was itself modelled on the ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea, and China) format and reapplied to Central Asia.217 ASEAN is therefore well familiar with such a format. The C5+1 dialogue format has become a popular platform for external actors to engage with Central Asian states collectively. South Korea, the EU, the US, India, and recently even Russia and China who had previously preferred bilateral dealings have adopted this format for engaging with the region. It is thus not surprising that some Kazakh experts have also proposed such a C5+1 dialogue with ASEAN.218 Some Kyrgyz diplomats and experts likewise saw the establishment of an ASEAN+Central Asia dialogue platform as a good way to facilitate greater cooperation.219 Uzbek experts also found the idea interesting but believed that there should be a concrete agenda set first. Stronger ties between Central Asia and ASEAN could also be explored through existing cooperation mechanism such as that between the SCO and ASEAN.220 Tajik experts were more divided, some supporting the idea while others were sceptical, arguing that Tajikistan did not benefit much from the C5+1 format as the stronger countries and economies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan tend to dominate. Also, some ASEAN countries are seen as having competing interests in Central Asia such as Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia, whose similar products compete for the same market, making such a format perhaps impracticable.221 On its part, the ASEAN secretariat had also expressed interest in such a dialogue forum. During a 2006 meeting between the then ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong and Kazakhstan’s then Ambassador to Indonesia, both sides agreed to make joint efforts to promote regional cooperation and establish an ASEAN+Central Asia dialogue.222 However,

Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev at the opening of the ministerial meeting of the 63rd session of ESCAP], 21 May 2007, https://uchet.kz/news/vystuplenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kaz akhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-na-otkrytii-ministerskoy-vstrechi-63-y-s/ (accessed 22 June 2020). 217 Timur Dadabaev, Japan in Central Asia: Strategies, Initiatives, and Neighboring Powers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 15 and 146. 218 Interview with Askar Nursha, 17 September 2019, Almaty and Amanzholov and Akhmetov, “Regional’nyi forum ASEAN,” 8. 219 Syrgabaev, “Kyrgyzstan i ASEAN”; and Interviews with Experts, 15 July 2021, Bishkek. 220 Interviews, 21 November 2021, Tashkent, and Online, 13 January 2022. 221 Interviews, 8–9 July 2021, Dushanbe. 222 Urazaeva, “The Role of ASEAN,” 76.

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this initiative has not materialised and remains an idea simply floated that is yet to be picked up or pushed by the political elite, particularly from ASEAN member countries.

Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated that the “Southeast Asian vector” in the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian states is largely driven by the need to forge relations with alternative economic partners as part of the Central Asian countries’ “omnidirectional hedging” and “economic hedging” strategy to enhance their strategic space and manoeuvrability by diversifying their foreign partners. Given Southeast Asia’s limited ability to project political and security influence beyond their region, their focus has very much been on expanding their economic interests and presence in Central Asia. Trade and investment cooperation, however, has been negligible primarily due to the vast distance and weak transport and logistics links between the two regions. Only Singapore and Malaysia have been successful in making substantive economic inroads in the region, largely due to the Central Asian leaders’ and elites’ admiration of their political and socio-economic models and their attempts to emulate them. Their successful combination of stable semi-authoritarian political rule with advanced economic development resonates well with Central Asia’s authoritarian rulers and is a factor for their closer engagement. Moreover, the close personal ties between the Singaporean and Malaysian leaders with their Central Asian counterparts have given added impetus to their relations, providing them with greater socio-economic opportunities in the region, such as Malaysia’s energy presence, and an advantage over other Southeast Asian countries. Singapore’s and Malaysia’s “soft power” or “nation branding” in highquality education and human capital development as well as Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s shared moderate Muslim identity with Central Asia are additional factors that help drive their relatively strong relations with the region. Central Asia’s engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-led fora is also seen as important for Central Asian states to access the dynamically growing Asia–Pacific economy and to participate and gain from the regional integration processes in order to enhance their strategic space and diversify their economic partners. However, they have been unsuccessful primarily due to not having enough substantial economic links

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required for ASEAN to establish formal relations. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two most promising partners for ASEAN, have explored engagement with ASEAN through other avenues such as CICA and the SCO, though this remains limited. The idea of a C5+1 dialogue with ASEAN has also long been floated but yet to be picked up and promoted by leaders, particularly from the ASEAN side. The next chapter will explore three key driving factors and developments that may help advance greater engagement between the two regions.

CHAPTER 3

The Key Drivers of Greater Engagement

Abstract This chapter examines the key drivers of potential greater engagement between Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Firstly, the EAEU and ASEAN have both shown increasing interest in developing relations, including the possibility of a FTA. Secondly, Southeast Asian countries have demonstrated growing interest in using China’s BRI to connect with Central Asia, to access this market as well as use it as a transit bridge to the European market. Central Asian countries have also highlighted their role in the BRI to attract Southeast Asia’s interest. Thirdly, Central Asian states are increasingly concerned about the expansion of Chinese economic influence and have sought to diversify their foreign relations, including with ASEAN and its members, to lessen their dependence on China and to help counterbalance Chinese influence. Keywords EAEU · BRI · ASEAN · FTA · Hedging

This chapter examines the key drivers of potential greater engagement between Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Firstly, there have been increasing interest from both the EAEU and ASEAN in developing relations, including the possibility of having a FTA. Some ASEAN member countries like Vietnam and Singapore have already concluded FTAs with the EAEU. Secondly, Southeast Asian countries have exhibited growing © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Rangsimaporn, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10112-0_3

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interest in using China’s BRI to connect with Central Asia, to access its market and to use it as a transit bridge to the European market. Central Asian countries themselves have tried to use their role in the BRI as a “selling point” to attract interest. Thirdly, there is growing concern among Central Asian states over the expansion of Chinese economic influence, and they have therefore sought to diversify their foreign relations to lessen their dependence on China. ASEAN and its members are seen as one potential alternative economic partner and counterweight, and this could act as an impetus for stronger relations between the two regions.

The Russian-Led EAEU The EAEU is a regional organisation for economic integration that was established in May 2014 by the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union signed by the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which came into force on 1 January 2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan formally acceded to the Union not long after. The idea for the creation of a Eurasian Union as a regional trading bloc was first proposed by then President Nazarbayev in Moscow in 1994, but to no avail. A Eurasian Economic Community was later created in 2000 for trade and economic cooperation, consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, but was formally terminated in 2014 being displaced by the EAEU. A Customs Union was formed between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in 2010, which integrated further into a Single Economic Space in 2012 that ultimately led to the creation of the EAEU.1 The Union came about primarily due to Russia’s leading role. In 2011, Putin, who was then Prime Minister, revived Nazarbayev’s idea and proposed the creation of a Eurasian Union, building on the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.2 The EAEU provides for free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. It also follows a coordinated, harmonized and single policy in the sectors determined by the Treaty and international agreements within the Union.

1 Golam Mostafa and Monowar Mahmood, “Eurasian Economic Union: Evolution, Challenges and Possible Future Directions,” Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 9 (2018): 163–166. See also, Evgeny Vinokurov, Introduction to the Eurasian Economic Union (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 2 Gleb Bryanski, “Russia’s Putin Says Wants to Build ‘Eurasian Union’,” Reuters, 4 October 2011.

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The aim of the EAEU is to raise its member states’ economic competitiveness and to enhance cooperation among them. It also seeks to promote their economic development in order to raise their populations’ living standards. The Union has a combined population of nearly 184 million people and a combined GDP of approximately US$ 1.9 trillion. Russia is by far the dominant economy in the Union with a GDP of around US$ 1.66 trillion in 2018, or approximately 87 percent of the Union’s total GDP. It also has the largest population at around 146.3 million, or nearly 80 percent of the Union’s total population. Kazakhstan, the Union’s second-largest economy, lags far behind with a GDP of US$ 180 billion, while the smallest, Kyrgyzstan, has a GDP of US$ 8 billion.3 Russia, therefore, has an overwhelming dominance in all areas of the Union, causing concerns among other members that Russia would act primarily in its own interests.4 However, to say that Russia has sole control over the Union would be misleading. In fact, the decision-making structure of the EAEU, which combines consensus-based decision-making and simple majority voting, actually means that Russia is somewhat constrained and can be outvoted by smaller members such as when Russia wanted to impose customs duties on Ukraine but was blocked by Belarus and Kazakhstan.5 Nonetheless, the underlying incentive for Russia’s EAEU was to use it as a vehicle to achieve Moscow’s political goals, rather than genuine economic integration, in order to expand Russia’s political and economic control over the post-Soviet space, limit the presence of other actors and bolster its great-power status.6 The EAEU and ASEAN Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the West imposed sanctions on Russia which severely affected its economy. As Russia is the dominant economy of the EAEU, the sanctions on Russia affected other 3 “Figures From the EAEU Website,” https://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about (accessed 17 May 2020). 4 Mostafa and Mahmood, “Eurasian Economic Union,” 169. 5 Alexander Libman and Anastassia V. Obydenkova, “Regional International Organi-

sations as a Strategy of Autocracy: The Eurasian Economic Union and Russian Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 94, no. 5 (2018): 1041. 6 Marcin Kaczmarski, “Two Ways of Influence-Building: The Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt, One Road Initiative,” Europe-Asia Studies 69, no. 7 (2017): 1041.

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members as well, including its two Central Asian members Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who were all forced to look to Asia, particularly China, for alternative economic opportunities to mitigate the sanctions impact.7 ASEAN was also seen as a potential partner for EAEU member states. Russia saw the establishment of EAEU-ASEAN relations important in increasing the attractiveness of Russia’s Eurasian integration project. As President Putin stressed to the Federal Assembly in February 2019, deepening cooperation with ASEAN was important for the promotion of his Greater Eurasian Partnership.8 Putin first announced this concept at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2016 as a response to Russia’s increasing isolation from the West and the need to re-orient its integration goals in the post-Soviet space. The Greater Eurasian Partnership had two broad economic goals. Firstly, it primarily aimed to connect Russia and the EAEU to China’s BRI. Secondly, it also aimed to move beyond China and connect the EAEU with other Asian countries and regional associations like ASEAN and APEC, in order “to keep China in check.”9 Moscow also viewed the development of EAEU-ASEAN relations as a way to help “restart” Russian-ASEAN relations, which have remained lacklustre despite the establishment of a strategic partnership in 2018.10 At the 2016 EAEU summit in Astana, President Nazarbayev likewise proposed that cooperation with other international associations, including ASEAN, be pursued. The Union’s desire to enhance cooperation with ASEAN countries was also seen as serious due to their need to balance China’s growing influence in their region.11 Moreover, due to Western

7 Maria Shagina, “Drifting East: Russia’s Import Substitution and Its Pivot to Asia,” CEES Working Paper no. 3 (April 2020), https://www.cees.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ab647675d360-4e05-bf96-1bce74dcb725/CEES%20Working%20Paper%203.pdf (accessed 17 May 2020). At time of writing, the West has imposed even stronger sanctions on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. 8 Alexander S. Korolev and Hryhorii M. Kalachyhin, “The Eurasian Dimension: Does EAEU-ASEAN Format Have a Future?” National Research University, Higher School of Economic (Moscow), Working Papers, (2019), 3–4. 9 Seçkin Köstem, “Russia’s Search for a Greater Eurasia: Origins, Promises, and Prospects,” Kennan Cable no. 40 (February 2019). 10 Korolev and Kalachyhin, “The Eurasian Dimension,” 4. 11 Aidar Amrebayev, “Eurasia’s Economic Union and ASEAN: Why Interaction is

Important,” RSIS Commentary no. 233 (21 September 2016).

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sanctions on Russia, there has been pent-up demand for produce, especially in Russia, and ASEAN is seen as a logical alternative supplier.12 The possibilities for closer EAEU-ASEAN cooperation were first discussed in July 2014 in Moscow during the first ever meeting between the Chairman of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the EAEU’s regulatory body and the ASEAN Secretary-General, with the hope of forming a “new architecture of the global economy – a multipolar one.”13 In May 2016, at the ASEAN-Russia Summit in Sochi, Putin further proposed the creation of a “common free trade zone between the EAEU and ASEAN.” Russia also proposed the launch of a joint feasibility study of such a FTA.14 ASEAN and its members have generally been receptive to the idea due to growing interest in the EAEU as a relatively large and untapped market. However, ASEAN member countries at the ASEAN Economic Ministers-Russia Consultations in Manila in September 2017 decided not to pursue the joint feasibility study yet as ASEAN was in the process of negotiating several other FTAs. ASEAN felt it was better to enhance familiarity with the EAEU first through the conclusion of a MoU on cooperation between the EEC and the ASEAN Secretariat, which was signed in November 2018. This MoU affirms their intent to cooperate in such areas as customs procedures, trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical regulations, e-commerce, trade in services and investment, and business development. EAEU-ASEAN trade had also been rising, reaching US$ 35.7 billion in 2017, a 40 percent increase from 2016.15 Investment, however, has been small. Russia and Kazakhstan have been the two principal EAEU investors in ASEAN, mainly in the energy and tourism sectors with a combined worth of around US$

12 Chris Devonshire-Ellis, “ASEAN & the Eurasian Economic Union: Room for Growth in Bilateral Trade & Supply Chain Developments,” ASEAN Briefing, 14 June 2019, https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2019/06/14/asean-eurasian-eco nomic-union-room-growth-bilateral-trade-supply-chain-developments.html (accessed 30 September 2019). 13 Tat’iana Valovaia, “Formirovanie novoi arkhitektury mirovoi ekonomiki: EAES i

ASEAN,” [The Formation of a New Architecture of the World Economy: EAEU and ASEAN], Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn’ [International Affairs] (May 2016): 24–25. 14 Yongquan Li, “The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Can the Two Be Linked?” Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 9 (2018): 96. 15 Seow Bei Yi, “ASEAN, Eurasian Economic Commission Sign Agreement to Promote Further Collaboration,” The Straits Times, 14 November 2018.

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15.4 billion. Among the ASEAN countries, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have invested the most in the EAEU, approximately US$ 9.3 billion, mainly in agriculture, food and tobacco.16 Vietnam and Singapore have concluded bilateral FTAs with the EAEU in 2015 and 2019, respectively. Since then, Vietnam’s trade with EAEU member countries noticeably increased by 1.5 times reaching US$ 6.7 billion in 2018.17 For example, Vietnam’s trade with Kazakhstan grew significantly by 48 percent in 2017, amounting to US$ 542 million. Kazakhstan’s exports to Vietnam grew by 63 percent due to the increase in supplies of food, agricultural products, particularly wheat, and metals.18 It was also expected that the FTA with Vietnam would benefit the EAEU’s industrial sector, such as automobiles, transport infrastructure and energy, as these companies would be able to conduct business in Vietnam on the same terms as local companies. The EAEU’s producers and suppliers can also access Vietnam’s established supply chains in the Asia–Pacific region.19 It is not yet clear how the FTA with Singapore will benefit EAEU countries, but it is more likely to boost Singaporean exports as it reduces or eliminates tariffs on 90 percent of products that Singapore currently exports to EAEU markets, such as mineral fuels, oils and their distillates, prepared foodstuffs, machinery, chemical and pharmaceutical products and precision instruments.20 This was also the first comprehensive FTA negotiated between the EAEU and an external party, covering areas beyond traditional trade in goods and includes services, investment, e-commerce, competition policy and intellectual property rights.21 The benefits for Singapore may be even more one-sided than the FTA with Vietnam. In fact, smaller and resource-poor countries such as Kyrgyzstan

16 Devonshire-Ellis, “ASEAN & The Eurasian Economic Union”. 17 Korolev and Kalachyhin, “The Eurasian Dimension,” 6. 18 Maria Levina, “Eurasian Economic Union: Achievements, Problems and Forecasts,” The Times of Central Asia, 6 January 2019. 19 Vinokurov, Introduction to the Eurasian Economic Union, 115. 20 Chris Devonshire-Ellis, “Opportunities for Singaporean Businesses in Eurasian

Economic Union,” ASEAN Briefing, 4 December 2019, https://www.aseanbriefing.com/ news/opportunities-singaporean-businesses-eurasian-economic-union/ (accessed 10 March 2020). 21 “EAEU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement signed in Yerevan,” 1 October 2019, https://www.inform.kz/en/eaeu-singapore-free-trade-agreement-signed-in-yerevan_a357 1153 (accessed 2 October 2019).

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and Armenia did not gain substantively from the EAEU’s FTA with Vietnam, which mainly favoured its larger economies—Russia and Kazakhstan. Due to Russia being the dominant EAEU economy, Moscow has a greater say in tariff negotiations with potential partners. In the FTA with Vietnam, for example, alcohol was excluded while tobacco remained subjected to high tariffs in Vietnam. Both products are Armenia’s important exports. Tellingly, under the FTA, Vietnam is obliged to reduce its tariffs on liquefied natural gas, a resource that Russia has ample supply, to zero percent by 2020.22 This disproportionate effect on the smaller EAEU economies may explain why they have been more reluctant to conclude FTAs with other ASEAN countries such as Thailand.23 But from Moscow’s viewpoint, the institutionalisation of EAEU-ASEAN relations would actually help enhance the negotiating power of smaller EAEU members like Kyrgyzstan and Armenia when dealing with larger partners.24 Moreover, for Kyrgyzstan, its decision to accede to the EAEU was seen as “the lesser of two evils.” While Bishkek realised the potentially large economic losses, not least the effective end of its profitable re-export of Chinese goods particularly to Russia and Kazakhstan due to the higher EAEU customs tariffs, Kyrgyzstan’s EAEU membership was also seen as a “shelter” against excessive Chinese influence.25 Kyrgyz government officials are further determined to make the best out of its disadvantageous situation by positioning itself as a potential “hub” for Southeast Asian companies to access the EAEU market with special investment privileges and conditions.26 Kyrgyz experts also view Vietnam as being the most attractive market in Southeast Asia due to its FTA with the EAEU and its large market size of nearly 100 million people.27 Another EAEU concern was that so far trade relations with ASEAN have been “asymmetric” with 22 Sam Bhutia, “As the Eurasian Union Looks East, Its Deals Do Not Benefit all

Members Equally,” Eurasianet, 19 November 2019. 23 From author’s experience working in Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to Thailand’s Ministry of Commerce, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia were reluctant to conclude a FTA with Thailand due to their concerns regarding the negative effects on the competitiveness of their businesses. 24 Korolev and Kalachyhin, “The Eurasian Dimension,” 4. 25 Ann-Sophie Gast, “Kyrgyzstan and the Eurasian Economic Union: A Partnership

with Obstacles,” OSCE Academy Policy Brief no. 45 (January 2018): 5–7. 26 Meetings with Kyrgyz government officials, 15–16 July 2021, Bishkek. 27 Interviews, 16 July 2021, Bishkek.

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ASEAN being more important for the EAEU than vice versa. The share of the EAEU in ASEAN’s total external trade was only 0.8 percent in 2018, while ASEAN’s share in the EAEU’s total external trade exceeded 3 percent that same year. The structure of trade has also not been well diversified, with EAEU countries mainly exporting raw materials and energy products and ASEAN countries exporting machinery and equipment and food products.28 Nonetheless, even small economies like Kyrgyzstan recognise the potential benefits from establishing an ASEAN-EAEU FTA which would facilitate the mutual growth of trade.29 Future Possibilities Following Vietnam’s success and Singapore’s example, other ASEAN countries have expressed interest to conclude a FTA with the EAEU. As a first step, Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand have all signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the EEC, with the hope of concluding a FTA later. Thailand sees this as an opportunity to enhance economic ties with the Union’s members as well as an entry point into the Central Asian market for Thai goods. Recognising Russia’s dominant role in the EAEU, Thailand has often focused on and asked for Russia’s support in expediting the process at several high-level meetings. Although Russian officials would often express support for Thailand, they would also point out that Russia was just one member of the Union and that due to several countries having expressed interest in concluding a FTA with the EAEU, the resources and manpower of the EEC were stretched thin and it would thus take time. Thailand is therefore changing its strategy to approach all EAEU members equally to garner their support.30 Thailand is particularly concerned with the disadvantage from lagging behind Vietnam, Thailand’s main trade competitor, as Vietnamese exports are now more competitively priced in the EAEU market. As noted by the

28 Korolev and Kalachyhin, “The Eurasian Dimension,” 9–10. 29 B. Syrgabaev, “Kyrgyzstan i ASEAN—vozmozhnye puti sotrudnichestva” [Kyrgyzstan

and ASEAN—Possible Ways of Cooperation], 24 October 2016, http://old.kabar.kg/ rus/MID/full/112878 (accessed 22 June 2020). 30 From author’s experiences working in Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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then Thai Ambassador to Kazakhstan, “… the slower we are in negotiating, the more losses we will incur.”31 For Kazakhstan, Indonesia as the largest market in ASEAN with 270 million people is particularly attractive.32 Indeed, according to Kazakhstan’s Minister of Trade and Integration, a feasibility study shows that the conclusion of an FTA between the EAEU and Indonesia is estimated to increase KazakhstanIndonesia trade by US$ 525 million.33 Indonesia is thus poised to be the next ASEAN country that will conclude an FTA with the EAEU. Although in December 2020 Uzbekistan became an EAEU observer and not yet a member, the possibility of Uzbekistan joining in the future adds to the attraction of the EAEU market for ASEAN countries.34 Uzbekistan’s population of around 34 million means that it could potentially become the second-largest market in the EAEU after Russia. A poll conducted in 2020 by the Centre for Economic Research and Reforms, a think tank under Uzbekistan’s presidential administration, which polled 1,300 Uzbek college students and representatives from the public and private sectors, showed that respondents’ views were nearly equally favourable regarding Uzbekistan joining the WTO (78 percent) as well as the EAEU (74 percent). The same think tank had also earlier delivered a study on the favourable economic consequences of EAEU membership. Given the Centre’s close ties to President Mirziyoyev, such conclusions may well lead to Uzbekistan’s EAEU membership in the

31 Kanokwan Kerdplanant, ‘“‘Kazakhstan’ sen thang suu talad Europe” [‘Kazakhstan’ the Pathway to the European Market], Krungthep Turakit, 12 September 2019, https:// www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/846977 (accessed 26 September 2019). 32 Interview with Iskander Akylbaev, 8 October 2020, Nur-Sultan. 33 “Kazakhstan to Chair Eurasian Economic Union in 2021,” The Times of Central

Asia, 4 January 2021. 34 President Karimov was adamantly opposed to joining, especially in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and tried to keep Russia at arm’s length. Karimov was sceptical that the EAEU would remain an economic union and believed it would eventually become a political one, with the aim of Russia’s re-integration and dominance of the former Soviet space. Oybek Madiyev, Uzbekistan’s International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), 90, 162, and Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy: The Struggle for Recognition and Self-Reliance Under Karimov (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 82.

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future.35 The post-pandemic economic downturn is also argued as potentially accelerating Uzbekistan’s accession to the EAEU as it would offer full access to any of the Union’s post-pandemic plans to revitalise trade across the EAEU economic zone as well as legalise the residency status of more than 2 million Uzbeks working in the EAEU zone, mostly in Russia. Indeed, Uzbekistan’s trade and economic cooperation with the EAEU countries had already significantly increased since Mirziyoyev came into power in 2016.36 Nonetheless, the issue of Uzbekistan’s EAEU membership remains open to extensive debate and subject to much Russian pressure. Tashkent has to tread carefully and to study the other EAEU members’ experiences before making a decision. But should Tashkent decide to join, Southeast Asian countries that already have an FTA with the EAEU, like Vietnam, could become more important trading partners for Uzbekistan.37 Moreover, how the EAEU failed to adequately respond to the crises of plummeting oil prices and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, may intensify their individual members’ need for alternative trade and economic partners like ASEAN. It is argued that these dual challenges have shown that, in times of crises, Russia cannot be fully relied upon. At the onset of the pandemic, Moscow acted in a way that disregarded the interests of its EAEU partners, particularly in Central Asia, by unilaterally waging an oil price war with Saudi Arabia, by closing its borders to Central Asian migrants and by providing relatively little COVID-19 assistance to other EAEU members. All of this without prior consultations with fellow EAEU members that have to bear the consequences. As Central Asia’s needs for economic recovery will grow significantly, there is greater opportunity for other players to increase their economic presence in the region.38 ASEAN can be one of them. For example, Singapore’s non-resident Ambassador to Kazakhstan has proposed that Kazakhstan and Singapore work together

35 Umida Hashimova, “Seventy-Four Percent of Uzbeks Support Joining Moscow-Led Eurasian Union,” The Times of Central Asia, 4 June 2020. 36 Luca Anceschi and Vladimir Paramonov, “The Pursuit of an Uneasy Balance: Post-

Karimov Uzbekistan and the Great Powers,” in Mark Hug, ed., Spotlight on Uzbekistan (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2020), 150–151, https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2020/07/Spotlight-on-Uzbekistan.pdf (accessed 7 January 2021). 37 Interviews with Uzbek experts, 16 and 21 November 2021, 28 April 2022, Tashkent. 38 Stephen Blank, “The Eurasian Union Flunks Its Stress Test,” The Times of Central

Asia, 2 May 2020.

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in the post-COVID environment on digital economy and a strong healthcare system, as part of China’s “Health Silk Road,” where Kazakhstan’s accessibility to the Chinese and Eurasian markets offers a strong advantage for Singapore. Indeed, one Singaporean company, CrimsonLogic, an e-government solutions provider, is already exploring opportunities along the BRI’s “Digital Silk Road” and had earlier helped Kazakhstan launch its eJustice system as part of its drive towards digital transformation.39 The EAEU’s “turn to the East” also continued under Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in 2021. As President Tokayev remarked at the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2020, Asia is becoming the region of the twenty-first century and a centre of global economic gravity where 28 percent of the world’s GDP is concentrated. The economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected intra-Union trade, declining by 13 percent to US$ 39 billion, and the Union’s overall external trade, which decreased by 19 percent to US$ 447 billion in the first nine months of 2020. To remedy this, Tokayev sees the EAEU’s post-pandemic economic future in Asia whereby the EAEU’s “turn to the East” would also offer new opportunities for transport and logistics cooperation, in which the Eurasian countries should fully avail themselves of their transit potential.40 However, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has further worsened the EAEU’s economic situation and prospects, and it remains to be seen how this could be effectively remedied.

China’s BRI In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” (SREB) in Astana and its “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” in Jakarta. The land and maritime components together form China’s ambitious BRI, which integrates economic, financial, intellectual and cultural

39 Zulkifli Baharudin, “What’s There in Kazakhstan? Plenty for Singapore Businesses in a Post-COVID world,” Astana Times, 4 June 2020. 40 “Asia Becomes a Region of XXI Century—Tokayev at SEEC Session,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 11 December 2020, https://www.kazpravda.kz/en/news/president/asiabecomes-a-region-of-xxi-century---tokayev-at-seec-session (accessed 14 December 2020).

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resources to promote greater connectivity and transnational politicoeconomic links between China and its wider Eurasian neighbourhood.41 Five main routes were broadly envisaged. The SREB focuses on (1) linking China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia; (2) connecting China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean through the Middle East and Central Asia; and (3) connecting together China and Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road focuses on using Chinese coastal ports to (4) link China with Europe through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean; and (5) connect China with the South Pacific Ocean through the South China Sea.42 China’s BRI involves infrastructure development and investments in nearly 70 countries, and was driven by a mixture of internal and external factors, namely strengthening the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China via maintaining economic development and restoring China’s national greatness (the “China dream”), securing Xinjiang, and countering US hegemony and constructing a viable alternative to the USled world order.43 Geopolitically, the BRI is aimed at mitigating China’s risk exposure should there be heightened tension or conflict with the US in the “Indo-Pacific” arena where US naval power remains preponderant. The BRI, therefore, also serves to provide a “Eurasian safety valve” by establishing overland infrastructure and economic linkages across Eurasia to connect with markets further afield.44 It is also seen as China’s soft-power strategy aimed at showcasing Beijing’s peaceful model of growth and development and to project China’s image as a reliable and pragmatic economic alternative to the West and Russia. By promoting China’s emphasis on infrastructure development and economic growth 41 Moritz Pieper, “The Linchpin of Eurasia: Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Economic

Union Between Russia’s Defensive Regionalism and China’s New Silk Roads,” International Politics, published open access online, 11 May 2020, https://link.springer.com/art icle/10.1057/s41311-020-00244-6 (11 June 2020): 1. 42 Zhao Hong, “China’s One Belt One Road: An Overview of the Debate,” Trends in Southeast Asia no. 6 (2016): 5–6. 43 Michael Clarke, “Beijing’s Pivot West: The Convergence of Innenpolitik and Aussenpolitik on China’s ‘Belt and Road’?” Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 123 (2020): 336–353. See also Peter Ferdinand, “Westward ho—The China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016): 941–957. 44 Michael Clarke, “The Neglected Eurasian Dimension of the ‘Indo-Pacific’,” Security Challenges 16, no. 3 (2020): 33.

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as prerequisites for security and political reforms, Beijing is seeking support and legitimisation for its development strategy through obtaining wider international support.45 The SREB component was also Xi Jinping “stamping his branding” on a policy that has already been taking place earlier to develop and stabilise China’s westernmost province of Xinjiang. This required the development of the Central Asian region adjacent to Xinjiang, opening up their markets and building easier access for Chinese goods and services.46 Kazakhstan’s Central Role in the BRI China’s BRI also opened up opportunities for Southeast Asian countries to explore ways to connect their region with Central Asia in a single economic corridor.47 Kazakhstan, as the largest country in Central Asia and centrally located, plays a pivotal role in China’s BRI connecting Europe and Asia, and has therefore attracted the greatest attention of ASEAN countries. The implementation of Kazakhstan’s “Nurly Zhol” (Bright Path) infrastructure programme, which was launched in 2014 and is interlinked with the BRI, helps position Kazakhstan as a transit and trade bridge between Europe and Asia and was promoted by Kazakhstan to ASEAN countries as an opportunity to develop closer economic relations.48 As Nazarbayev noted in 2014, Kazakhstan would benefit from the estimated ten-fold increase of commercial transit through Kazakhstan by 2050, and also from the modernisation of transportation logistics to streamline the delivery of goods via any channel throughout Kazakhstan.49 Therefore, China’s BRI corresponds well with Kazakhstan’s self-perception of being a linchpin of the modern Silk Road and fits well

45 Ahmed Bux Jamali, “China’s Silk Road Diplomacy in Kazakhstan,” Asia Times, 5 June 2020. 46 Raffaello Pantucci, “China in Central Asia: The First Strand of the Silk Road Economic Belt,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 2 (2019): 202–205. 47 Nicola P. Contessi, “Central Asia in Asia: Charting Growing Trans-Regional Linkages,” Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 7 (2016): 3. 48 Malika Orazgaliyeva, “48th Anniversary of ASEAN Celebrated in Astana,” Astana Times, 10 August 2015. 49 Sadyk Akizhanov, “APEC Summit Results: Importance for Kazakhstan,” Diplomatic Herald 4, no. 47 (2014): 40.

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with Kazakhstan’s Nurly Zhol programme to develop its domestic transport infrastructure and effectively integrate it into international transport systems.50 China’s SREB was seen by one Kazakh sinologist as “almost perfectly aligned” with Kazakhstan’s Nurly Zhol programme as China had an interest in developing Kazakhstan’s transport and logistics infrastructure to enable the transit of Chinese goods through Kazakhstan’s territory.51 Kazakh diplomats further viewed Kazakhstan’s active participation in the BRI as natural and logical that would transform the landlocked country into a land-linked one. Moreover, the Nurly Zhol programme’s synergy with the BRI can potentially boost Kazakhstan’s economic and infrastructural development and transform Kazakhstan into a regional transit hub, linking Central Asia with other trade hubs in Eurasia as well as the development of new trade routes, including to Southeast Asia.52 Kazakhstan’s attraction is further due to it having the most developed economy and infrastructure than any other Central Asian country. The use of its Khorgos transport and logistics hub on the border with China, which is connected by railway to its logistics terminal in China’s Lianyungang port that can transport goods by sea to ASEAN countries, has meant that the transportation of goods between Europe and ASEAN is at least twice as fast as via the Indian Ocean.53 This is particularly advantageous for the transport of foodstuff and other perishable goods that are the main exports of some ASEAN countries. Kazakhstan has long been interested in connecting with Southeast Asia through China. Since the early 1990s, Kazakhstan had tried to reduce its dependency on Russian transportation routes for its goods to the Pacific and Southeast Asia, 50 Assel Bitabarova, “Unpacking Sino-Central Asian Engagement Along the New Silk

Road: A Case Study of Kazakhstan,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 7, no. 2 (2018): 161. 51 Konstantin Syroyezhkin, “Kazakhstan and China—An Analysis of Recent Agreements,” CABAR Editorial, 10 November 2016, https://cabar.asia/en/konstantin-syr oyezhkin-kazakhstan-and-china-an-analysis-of-recent-agreements (accessed 10 November 2019). 52 Bolat Nurgaliyev, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Kazakhstan and Geopolitics,” Astana Times, 3 June 2020 and Usen Suleimen, “Central Asia and ASEAN: Perspectives for Interaction in Implementing the Belt and Road Initiative,” ISAS Insights (NUS) no. 496 (19 June 2018): 2. 53 Usen Suleimen, “Central Asia and ASEAN: Convergence Through Belt and Road,” Diplomatic Herald no. 2 (2018): 22–25.

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viewing transport through China as one of the most feasible and profitable alternatives. During President Nazarbayev’s visit to China in 1995, an agreement was signed that allowed Kazakhstan’s trade exchanges with Pacific and Southeast Asian countries to be conducted via the Chinese port of Lianyungang, which would save approximately 5,000 km in transport as the distance between Kazakhstan and Lianyungang port is around 3,500 km while that between Kazakhstan and the nearest Russian Far Eastern port is about 8,500 km.54 Since March 2019, Vietnam had started to use the railway route through China and Kazakhstan to transport its goods to Europe. Starting from Hanoi and ending in Duisberg, Germany, the journey took 22 days, including two days of transhipment at the Vietnamese railway terminal of Dong Dang at the border with China. This is in addition to the route already in use for Kazakhstan-Vietnam trade through Khorgos by railway to Kazakhstan’s logistics terminal in Lianyungang port and onwards by sea to Vietnam.55 Moreover, China initially subsidised Kazakh companies exporting wheat to Vietnam so that they could help fill up the empty rail containers returning from Europe by this route.56 Thailand has also explored using the Lianyungang-Khorgos route to overcome the logistical problems facing its main exports that are perishable goods such as food products and fruits.57 A study by Thailand’s Ministry of Commerce using information from the Thai Embassy in Kazakhstan concluded that, in comparison with the other routes, air and sea, the route with most potential in terms of both time and relative cost is the abovementioned combined route of by sea from Thailand to Lianyungang port and then by railway to Kazakhstan, which takes approximately 24 days, including customs clearance. This route has already been used to export Thai goods such as car tyres and canned fruits.58 Moreover, the opening of the railway 54 Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Kazakhstan and Central Asia: Regional Perspectives,” Central Asian Survey 21, no. 2 (2002): 176. 55 “Vietnam-China-Kazakhstan-Europe Rail Route Launched,” 6 March 2019, https://www.inform.kz/en/vietnam-china-kazakhstan-europe-rail-route-launched_a35 05064 (accessed 30 September 2019). 56 Conversation with a Kazakh diplomat, 30 December 2020, Nur-Sultan. 57 Meeting with Thai Ministry of Commerce official, 13 March 2019, Nur-Sultan and

see Kerdplanant, “‘Kazakhstan’”. 58 “Sen thang kon song sinka thai pai yang Kazakhstan nai pajjupan sen thang nai bang rue pang” [Current Transport Routes of Thai Goods to Kazakhstan: Which is Best or

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connection between Laos and China in December 2021 would mean a potentially even faster route to Kazakhstan via railway should Thailand be able to connect the approximately 10 km railway gap between Thailand and Laos. But the differences in railway gauge—Thailand’s being 1,000 mm while the China-Lao railway is 1,435 mm—is another obstacle for connectivity.59 Nonetheless, the Thai Foreign Ministry’s Strategy for Central Asia (2018–2022) emphasises the region’s importance as the landbridge connecting Asia and Europe, and aims for Thailand to promote connectivity and play the linking role between Southeast Asia and Central Asia.60 Thailand’s central location in mainland Southeast Asia allows it to play a key role in “connecting the connectivities.” As ASEAN chair in 2019, Thailand promoted the linking of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 with all connectivity initiatives in the region, including China’s BRI.61 Singaporean businesses were also encouraged by Kazakhstan’s initiative to set up its terminal at Lianyungang port which reduced the distance between Kazakhstan and Southeast Asia, and provided an alternative route to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port for the export of Southeast Asian goods to Central Asia.62 The Philippines under President Duterte also saw the potential for enhanced relations with Central Asia through the BRI. Unlike his predecessor, Duterte pursued a foreign policy that moved closer to China, while distancing itself from the US, in order to avoid losing out from the economic gains of China’s emergence as an economic

Worse?] 6 September 2019, https://www.ditp.go.th/ditp_web61/article_sub_view.php?fil ename=contents_attach/562824/562824.pdf&title=562824&cate=704&d=0 (accessed 2 October 2021). 59 Online conversation with Thai experts studying the potential connectedness, logistics system and benefits of China’s BRI, 13 September 2021. See also Bertil Lintner, “Belt and Road Starts and Stops in China’s Backyard,” Asia Times, 3 October 2021. 60 “Strategy for Central Asia (2018–2022),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand (Author’s copy). 61 Sihasak Phuangketkeow and Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “Thailand’s Chairmanship of ASEAN: Unshackling Thai Diplomacy and Charting the Association’s Way Forward,” ISEAS Perspective no. 2 (7 January 2020): 4. 62 “Business Cooperation of Central Asian Countries and ASEAN in Transit,” 15 May 2018, https://kazakh-tv.kz/en/view/business/page_193507_cooperation-of-centralasian-countries-and-asean-in-transit (accessed 8 February 2019).

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power and of its BRI.63 Duterte believed that the Philippines would benefit from the BRI as it corresponded with the Philippine government’s “Build, Build, Build” infrastructure programme. Through links with the BRI and China, the Philippines will gain access to the Central Asia market and beyond that Europe.64 One Filipino expert further proposed that Duterte deepen ties with resource-rich and non-aligned Kazakhstan in pursuit of alternative ways to boost the Philippine economy and pursue an independent foreign policy.65 Kazakhstan, on its part, is also considering opening an embassy in Manila, seeing the Philippines as a large promising market.66 Selling the New Silk Road Kazakhstan’s central position in China’s BRI and more developed infrastructure has unsurprisingly attracted most of ASEAN’s attention, giving Kazakhstan an advantage over other Central Asian states. Nonetheless, other Central Asian states have also been involved in the BRI to varying degrees and have similarly used this as their “selling point.” Post-Karimov Uzbekistan, for instance, appears poised to return to a central role in this New Silk Road. Mirziyoyev’s “relinquishment of Karimov’s isolationism unlocked the potential intrinsic to Uzbekistan’s geography, re-opening trans-regional transport routes that were closed before the establishment of a new regime in Tashkent.”67 But President Karimov had also recognised the geostrategic importance of Uzbekistan’s central location

63 Renato Cruz de Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016): 152. 64 Renato Cruz de Castro, “Explaining the Duterte Administration’s Appeasement Policy on China: The Power of Fear,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 45, no. 3–4 (2018): 169 and 183. 65 Lloyd Alexander M. Adducul, “Kazakhstan’s Role in the Community of Nations,” CIRSS Commentaries 4, no. 5 (March 2017). 66 Conversations with a Kazakh foreign ministry official, 30 December 2020, and Kazakh expert, 18 February 2021, Nur-Sultan. 67 Luca Anceschi, “Mirziyoyev’s Foreign Policy: Globalising Uzbekistan in the Asian Century,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2 April 2019, https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2019/4/ 1/mirziyoyevs-foreign-policy-globalizing-uzbekistan-in-the-asian-century (accessed 3 April 2019).

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in Central Asia, linking up East and West since the ancient times of the “Great Silk Road,” and advocated the full utilisation of the country’s potential in this regard.68 Karimov responded positively to the SREB when President Xi Jinping visited Uzbekistan in 2013, stating that the “revival of the Silk Road is our common historical mission.”69 Nonetheless, Karimov was more wary of Chinese loans and of being beholden to Beijing. This fear was the main reason for Tashkent to initially distance itself from China’s BRI. The situation is different under Mirziyoyev who is more willing to consider Chinese-funded transport corridor projects through Uzbekistan.70 Indeed, Uzbekistan’s unique central position means that it has potential to play a greater role in the BRI. Located at the heart of Central Asia, it is the region’s most populous country and the only one that shares borders with all the other Central Asian states. It has the greatest potential for industrial development due to its Soviet industrial legacy and a large and young labour force. Its newfound openness will benefit China’s BRI directly by making it easier and more secure for China and others to invest in transport infrastructure, and indirectly by facilitating economic growth in Central Asia, thereby “rendering the Belt and Road less of a road to nowhere, and more economically meaningful for the Chinese.”71 In May 2017, Uzbekistan signed with China an agreement to facilitate road transportation and increase the transport of goods via rail and road. The project aimed to connect the Uzbek city of Andijan and the Chinese city of Kashgar via Osh and Irkeshtam in Kyrgyzstan. This is the shortest route between them and would allow Uzbekistan to avoid the use of Kazakh railroads, which take longer and cost more.72 According to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade, this route is 68 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century: Challenges to Stability and Progress (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 137–138. 69 Cited in Zhao Hong, “China’s One Belt, One Road,” 24. 70 Galiya Ibragimova, “Stanet li Uzbekistan prorossiiskim? Itogi vizita Putina v Uzbek-

istan” [Will Uzbekistan Become Pro-Russian? The Results of Putin’s Visit to Uzbekistan], Central Asian Analytical Network Article, 23 October 2018, https://caa-network.org/ archives/14455 (accessed 9 July 2020). 71 Indra Overland and Roman Vakulchuk, “China’s Belt and Road Gets a Central Asian Boost,” The Diplomat, 3 May 2018. 72 Timur Dadabaev, “The Chinese Economic Pivot in Central Asia and Its Implications for the Post-Karimov Re-emergence of Uzbekistan,” Asian Survey 58, no. 4 (2018): 761–762.

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295 km shorter than the route through Kazakhstan’s Khorgos and Dostyk border crossing points with China, thereby reducing delivery time and making it more attractive and competitive for businesses. Tashkent also believes that this new corridor “complements rather than competes” with the established trans-Eurasian routes via Kazakhstan and Russia.73 While Uzbekistan has long been pushing for the acceleration of this railway project, the gauge and route as well as the financial aspects of the project remain unresolved and an intergovernmental agreement on its construction has yet to be signed.74 Bishkek reportedly also feared that the railway construction would lead to greater expansion of Chinese influence.75 The route was officially opened in October 2017 and started functioning in February 2018, but only the segments in China and Uzbekistan are operated by railway, while the cargo is transported by trucks in Kyrgyzstan. No rail connection yet exists to directly link China and Uzbekistan via Kyrgyzstan, and financing the Kyrgyzstan section remains a problem.76 Russia and Kazakhstan were also reportedly against the project as it would compete with their own railway routes.77 However, the route would be in Beijing’s interests as it would be the shortest route for China to trade with Europe and the Middle East, if extended. Moreover, it would open a line to the Mingbulak oil field in Uzbekistan, which is less than 500 km from China’s border.78 But Beijing has increasingly been reluctant to

73 Fozil Mashrab, “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Road-Rail Connection Launched Amid Violent Border Clashes,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, no. 97 (6 July 2020). 74 “Mintrans prizval yskorit proekt zheleznoi dorogi ‘Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-Kitai’” [Ministry of Transport Called for Accelerating the ‘Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China’ Railway Project], Gazeta, 20 May 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/05/20/project/ (accessed 10 June 2020). 75 Sheradil Baktygulov, “China and Kyrgyzstan: Main Challenges and Trends of Cooperation,” CABAR Article, 5 April 2016, https://cabar.asia/en/2358-2-2/ (accessed 9 July 2020). 76 Umida Hashimova, “The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Transport Corridor Stretches

Further Into China,” The Diplomat, 22 June 2020. 77 Ibid.; Hongzhou Zhang, “Building the Silk Road Economic Belt: Challenges in Central Asia,” Cambridge Journal of China Studies 10, no. 3 (2015): 29; and interview with Kyrgyz expert, 16 July 2021, Bishkek. 78 Bruce Pannier, “Kyrgyzstan the Missing Link in China’s Railway to Uzbekistan…and Beyond,” RFE/RL, 29 June 2020.

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finance grand Central Asian infrastructure projects, tending to seek cofinancing where possible.79 Moreover, China will consider financing this Kyrgyz segment only if it uses the smaller Chinese railway gauge instead of the wider Russian gauge used in Central Asia.80 According to some Kyrgyz experts, Beijing’s reluctance to finance this segment was also due to its preference for a shorter route that would run through the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, while Bishkek demanded the longer route connecting the country’s northern and southern parts, which would significantly improve transport links within the country. Bishkek is also wary of China’s preferred southern route helping to better connect the significant Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan’s south with Uzbekistan.81 Despite Bishkek’s misgivings about China and its BRI, its previous 2007 foreign policy concept recognised Central Asia’s role as a connecting bridge for “transcontinental cooperation between the dynamically developing centers of the European Union and South-East Asia.” The concept also stressed the need to utilize such “national brands” as the “Great Silk Road” to increase the country’s international recognition.82 It would therefore be difficult for Kyrgyzstan to not participate in China’s BRI if it aimed to reap the economic benefits of greater connectivity between Europe and Asia through Central Asia. Indeed, Bishkek has tried to use the BRI to leverage its geopolitical position and potential but has not been successful. The BRI was also seen as primarily benefiting large infrastructure projects rather than SMEs and the grassroots level, thereby meeting more resistance from ordinary Kyrgyz.83 Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have also tried to enhance their attractiveness to foreign partners by promoting their potential connectivity role. Tajikistan well recognised its disadvantaged position in China’s BRI and emphasised instead the southern route through Afghanistan and South

79 Chris Rickleton, “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway: Who is Going to Pay?” Eurasianet, 17 May 2021. 80 Meetings with Kyrgyz diplomat and expert, 15–16 July 2021, Bishkek. 81 Interviews, 15–16 July 2021, Bishkek. 82 “Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki” [The Foreign Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic] Approved by Presidential decree no. 2, 10 January 2007, http:// cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/4569?cl=ru-ru (accessed 10 April 2021). 83 Online interview with Kyrgyz expert and former governmental advisor on the BRI, 25 April 2021.

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Asia. As President Rahmon remarked, the transport and logistical difficulties that Tajikistan was facing impeded its economic growth, citing the example of Thai rice being sold in Tajikistan at double the price of that sold in Poland. Therefore, peace and stability in Afghanistan was essential for Central Asia’s economic growth as the southern route would be the shortest distance to access the warm-water ports of South Asia.84 During President Berdymukhammedov’s visit to Singapore, he also stressed Turkmenistan’s historical central location at “the heart of the Silk Road” and invited Singapore to use the Turkmenbashi international port on the Caspian Sea and assist in developing Turkmenistan’s transport system.85

Fears of the Dragon Concerns about the expansion of Chinese economic influence may be another impetus for the Central Asian states to strengthen relations with Southeast Asian countries to diversify their economic partners as part of their multi-vector foreign policy and hedging strategy. Central Asians’ fear of China has long and deep roots ranging from centuries-old oral epics that presented “China as a distant but recurrent enemy of Turkic peoples and as an historical opponent of Islam,” to negative images of China from Soviet propaganda during the decades of Sino-Soviet tension. The establishment of direct bilateral relations between China and the Central Asian states after they gained independence, therefore, required the Central Asians to overcome “several extremely negative clichés of China.”86 However, China’s growing economic and political clout in Central Asia have stirred up again these centuries-old apprehensions. Such concerns are particularly marked in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that shares a border of 1,783 km and 1,063 km with China, respectively. In recent years, there have been several anti-China protests in both countries, with fears ranging from an influx of Chinese migrants that would take away local jobs, land and women, Chinese demands for readjustments to 84 Thai Ambassador’s presentation of credentials to President Rahmon, 20 November

2019, Dushanbe. 85 “The State Visit of the President of Turkmenistan to Singapore: New Turn of Cooperation,” 27 August 2019, http://tdh.gov.tm/news/en/articles.aspx&article19 338&cat26 (accessed 28 August 2019). 86 Sebastien Peyrouse, “Discussing China: Sinophilia and Sinophobia in Central Asia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 7 (2016): 14.

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existing borders, the perceived lack of transparency and alleged corruption in Chinese business dealings and investments, and China’s massive repression and detention of its Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, mainly Uighurs but also Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. However, elite perceptions of China are generally more favourable than the general public’s due to the benefits from Chinese investment and business. Central Asian governments have also been more reluctant to raise contentious issues, such as on Xinjiang, with their Chinese counterparts.87 But the Central Asian governments’ continued disregard for their peoples’ growing anti-Chinese sentiments could lead to the “politicisation of nationalist grievances” and could force governments to become more transparent and accountable in their dealings with China, including listening more to the demands of their people and giving them space to air their grievances.88 The Chinese leadership is also well aware of this distinction between good relations at the elite level and the general public’s more wary or hostile view of China as reflected in the Chinese expression “warm politics, cold public.”89 Economic Dependency on China In terms of trade, China has gradually overtaken Russia which used to account for 80 percent of Central Asia’s total trade in the early 1990s but lost this leading position during the 2008 financial crisis. In 2019,

87 Philippe Le Corre, “Kazakhs Wary of Chinese Embrace as BRI Gathers Steam,” 28 February 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/28/kazakhs-wary-of-chineseembrace-as-bri-gathers-steam-pub-78545 (accessed 11 October 2019); Aziz Burkhanov and Yu-Wen Chen, “Kazakh Perspective on China, the Chinese, and Chinese Migration,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39, no. 12 (2016): 2129–2148; Temur Umarov, “China Looms Large in Central Asia,” Carnegie Moscow Center Commentary, 30 March 2020, https:// carnegie.ru/commentary/81402 (accessed April 7, 2020); and interviews with Kazakh experts, 16 September 2019, Almaty, 1 November 2019, Nur-Sultan, and online, 19 August 2020. 88 Nurseit Niyazbekov, “Potential Democratizing Effects of Central Asian Anti-Chinese Sentiments,” OSCE Academy Policy Brief no. 55 (January 2020): 3–5; and author’s interview, 16 September 2019, Almaty. 89 Bhavna Dave, “Silk Road Economic Belt: Effects of China’s Soft Power Diplomacy in Kazakhstan,” in Marlene Laruelle, ed., China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Impact in Central Asia (Washington, DC: George Washington University, Central Asia Program, 2018), 97–98. See also, Kemel Toktomushev, “China and Central Asia: Warm Politics, Cold Public,” CAP Paper no. 261, 1 September 2021.

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China’s trade with Central Asia was nearly US$ 30 billion, which is onethird higher than Russia.90 Chinese investments in the region is also growing. According to Chinese Ministry of Commerce data, Chinese investment in Central Asia reached US$ 14.7 billion in 2018, which is a 40 percent growth from 2013. However, this increase could not entirely be attributed to the BRI as there was already interest in major investment projects focused on energy and other sectors before the BRI. Expansion of Chinese economic influence has posed another concern regarding the risk of the Central Asian states being caught in a “debt trap.” Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are most at risk as 45 percent of Bishkek’s external borrowing (US$ 1.7 billion) is from China and 52 percent of Dushanbe’s foreign debt (US$ 1.2 billion) is to China. Both countries’ debt to China are greater than 20 percent of their GDP. The situation is better in other Central Asian countries and Sinophobia is not yet “universal” in the region.91 In Kazakhstan, for instance, the majority of BRI projects implemented were planned and financed by Kazakhstan itself, mostly through its sovereign wealth fund or in cooperation with multilateral development banks. Moreover, foreign direct investments from and debts held by China have never amounted to more than 10 percent of total stock.92 Nonetheless, the BRI is often seen as a strategy to increase Chinese influence by deploying BRI projects in such a way to increase beneficiary countries’ economic dependence on China in order to gain political leverage.93 While Chinese aid is often presented as being free of political conditionality, Beijing expects recipient countries, particularly Central Asian states, to be loyal to the “One China” policy, ranging from refraining from supporting the Uighur cause, limited relations with 90 Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon, “Avoiding Dependence? Central Asian Secu-

rity in a Multipolar World,” The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, 28 September 2020, https://oxussociety.org/avoiding-dependence-central-asian-security-in-a-multipolarworld/ (accessed 29 September 2020), 1. 91 Umarov, “China Looms Large in Central Asia.” See also, Sherzod Shamiev, “China’s Policy of Political and Lending Conditionality: Is There a “Debt-Trap Diplomacy” in Central Asia?” in Aigoul Abdoubaetova, ed., China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia: Ambitions, Risks, and Realities, Special Issue 2 (Bishkek: OSCE Academy, 2020), 68–82. 92 Jamali, “China’s Silk Road Diplomacy”. 93 Bonnie Glaser, “China as a Selective Revisionist Power in the International Order,”

Report of a seminar presentation at ISEAS, January 2019, ISEAS Perspective no. 21 (5 April 2019): 7.

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Taiwan, and silence on Tibet.94 China has objected to this criticism, stressing instead the “co-managed” and “inclusive” nature of the BRI and that it was not a “strategy” or “plan” that China claims ownership. Beijing also emphasised the BRI’s “win–win” nature that would contribute to the development of low-income states. China, being a developing country itself, claimed to better understand their needs.95 But as one expert noted, Chinese official discourse on its engagement with Central Asian states based on non-interference, peaceful coexistence and unwillingness to pursue expansionist aims “is certainly a form of rhetoric that is not always accepted at face value by the Central Asian states.”96 Central Asia’s economic dependence on China lies also in the energy sphere where China is the main buyer and nearly a monopsonist for Turkmen gas. China has two major energy pipelines with Central Asia. The first is the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, inaugurated in December 2009, which connects China to the main production fields in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This 1,800 km long pipeline is projected to carry 40 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas annually. The second is the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline completed in 2009 with a length of 2,228 km. For Kazakhstan, this new outlet provided a much-needed diversification of its export routes while diminishing its heavy dependence on the existing pipelines. For China, the pipeline became its first direct import route, which eased Beijing’s concerns about its dependence on imports from the Middle East through the Malacca Straits. The oil supplies through the China-Kazakhstan pipeline route represents a relatively stable source of energy for China.97 Another gas line (Line D) of the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-China pipeline is in the works, which was supposed to have been launched by late 2016 but was postponed with the pandemic causing further delays. Turkmenistan would benefit most from this pipeline as China is practically the only

94 Marlene Laruelle, “Introduction: China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Quo Vadis?” in Laruelle, ed., China’s Belt and Road Initiative, x–xi. 95 Pieper, “The linchpin of Eurasia,” 9 and Kaczmarski, “Two Ways of InfluenceBuilding,” 1034. 96 Timur Dadabaev, “Engagement and Contestation: The Entangled Imagery of the Silk Road,” Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies, no. 2 (2018): 12. 97 Serik Orazgaliyev, “From Conflict to Consensus: Energy Geopolitics in the Caspian Region,” Middle East Insights, no. 204 (9 April 2019), 5.

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source of gas revenues for Ashgabat. The transit countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are also interested in the resumption of construction of this pipeline as it will be an additional source of much-needed revenue.98 Turkmenistan has become highly dependent on exporting its gas to the Chinese market. Almost all of its gas exports go to China, shipping around 30 bcm annually. Therefore, when it was reported in March 2020 that PetroChina had issued a force majeure notice on its gas imports due to the COVID-19 pandemic which caused a severe downturn in China’s and the global economy, Turkmenistan was the worst affected compared to the other two Central Asian gas exporters to China— Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The three countries together had provided around 17 percent of Chinese natural gas or approximately 50 bcm in 2019. Should China’s economy continue to worsen, cutting more Central Asian gas would risk undermining Beijing’s standing and influence in Central Asia further.99 Even in Kazakhstan, the richest Central Asian country, experts felt that economic cooperation with China is “completely subordinate to the development of the Chinese economy.” Moreover, China’s growing energy demands are seen as consolidating Kazakhstan’s transformation into a “raw materials appendage” to China. As Kazakhstan does not have a single serious political and economic lever for pressure on China, which weakens its initial negotiating position, it is important for Kazakhstan to “not put all economic eggs in one basket” by expanding trade diversification with other countries. Indeed, Central Asia’s abundant natural resources and China’s insatiable appetite for them might lead to Central Asian integration with the Chinese economy and the region becoming merely a “resource appendage” to China.100 98 Sergei Kapitonov and Temur Umarov, “Does China Need More Gas from Russia and Central Asia?” Carnegie Moscow Center Commentary, 12 January 2021, https://car negiemoscow.org/commentary/83593 (accessed 9 June 2021). 99 Maximilian Hess, “Central Asia’s Force Majeure Fears: Impact of COVID-19 Outbreak on China’s Natural Gas Supply Demands,” FPRI Analysis, 16 March 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/03/central-asias-force-majeure-fears-impact-ofcovid-19-outbreak-on-chinas-natural-gas-supply-demands/ (accessed 18 May 2020). 100 Dosym Satpaev, “Shest’ prichin antikitaiskikh nastroenii v Kazakhstane” [Six Reasons for Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Kazakhstan], Forbes Kazakhstan, 4 November 2019, https://forbes.kz/process/expertise/shest_prichin_antikitayskih_nastroeniy_v_kaz ahstane/?utm_source=forbes&utm_medium=incut&utm_campaign=211869 (accessed 7 July 2020) and online interview with Kazakh expert, 4 October 2020.

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Growing Backlash Against China China’s expanding economic influence and Central Asia’s growing economic dependency on China has prompted increasing backlash from the region. For example, in February 2020, protests against a Chinese investment project worth US$ 275 million to construct a logistics centre in the At-Bashi district in eastern Kyrgyzstan forced the Kyrgyz government to cancel the project.101 Sinophobia is particularly marked in Kyrgyzstan where, according to a former Kyrgyz foreign minister and sinologist, there is still not a single project under the BRI and current Kyrgyz relations with China are the “worst” since independence and the “poorest” relations with China among the Central Asian republics.102 A former Kyrgyz Prime Minister warned against “artificial tensions” stoked up by various nationalist and populist groups protesting against China due to the lack of readily available and reliable information on Chinese projects. He urged the Kyrgyz government to be more transparent, organise public–private dialogues and greater public engagement. He further called on Beijing to view the BRI as a demand-driven initiative from the Central Asian states themselves and work with them for a win–win outcome.103 During 2019–2021, several anti-government and anti-Chinese protests were also held in Kazakhstan’s major cities, demanding the halt of China’s economic expansion and repressive policies in Xinjiang.104 Reflecting the rather pervasive belief that Central Asia is an area of great-power competition, it is particularly telling that in one Chinese diplomat’s view, the CIA was to blame for these protests, while some Kazakh experts themselves believed the protests might have been

101 “Kyrgyz Government Cancels $275 Million Chinese Project Amid Protests,”

RFE/RL, 24 February 2020. 102 Muratbek Imanaliev, “Drawbacks of China-Kyrgyzstan relations,” CABAR Article, 27 April 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/drawbacks-of-china-kyrgyzstan-relations/ (accessed 7 July 2020). 103 Djoomart Otorbaev, “Central Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative,” Baku Dialogues 4, no. 2 (Winter 2020–2021): 162–173 and his views expressed at the Astana Club meeting, 12 November 2019, Nur-Sultan. 104 Darkhan Umirbekov, “Kazakhstan: Sinophobic Sentiments Trigger Fresh Rallies,” Eurasianet, 4 September 2019); “Kazakh Police Break Up Opposition Rallies, Detain Over 50,” RFE/RL, 21 September 2019; and Serik Rymbetov, “Anti-China Sentiments Grows in Kazakhstan as Economic Cooperation Stalls,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 18, no. 118 (26 July 2021).

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incited by US or Russian intelligence services to counterbalance Chinese influence in Central Asia.105 There was some backlash against China in Tajikistan as well in 2011 when Tajikistan was “induced” to cede about 1,000 square km in the Pamir Mountains to China, or about 1 percent of Tajikistan’s territory, in order to settle their border issue. Moreover, the natural resources in the land ceded to China allegedly amounted to China’s entire investment in Tajikistan then, allowing China to recover its investments and maintain its penetration of Tajikistan.106 However, Tajikistan maintains a relatively positive stance towards China. As one Tajik diplomat noted, while both Russia and China were important investors in Tajikistan, China was preferred more due to its tendency to keep its word. Tajikistan has also not experienced as many problems with Chinese migrant workers as Kyrgyzstan as it implements a strict 10 percent quota for skilled foreign workers in each project and actively monitors this.107 One Tajik expert maintains that Tajiks at all levels understand the fact that China is the main economic partner and that economic development is due to Chinese investment. Tajiks, therefore, have a generally positive attitude to China or, at the least, an indifferent one.108 However, anti-Chinese sentiment may not be so noticeable due to Tajikistan’s very restricted political space to air grievances, while Tajik government officials privately complain that Chinese investments do not create local jobs and do not involve technology transfers.109 On debt traps, the Chinese believe that it is the responsibility of local governments themselves to make judgements regarding loans since they should have better understanding than China of their own domestic economy and capacity.110 Recently, in an attempt to avoid such criticism, Beijing stopped issuing large infrastructure loans and offered grants instead such as the US$ 125 million to upgrade a key highway segment 105 Conversation with Chinese diplomat, 4 October 2019, Nur-Sultan, and interviews of Kazakh experts, 16–17 September 2019, Almaty. 106 Stephen Blank, “Whither the New Great Game in Central Asia?” Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 3 (2012): 155. 107 Conversation, 2 April 2019, Nur-Sultan. 108 Interview, 8 July 2021, Dushanbe. 109 Conversation with US diplomat, 8 July 2021, Dushanbe. 110 Niva Yau Tsz Yan, “Making Sense of the Belt and Road Initiative,” OSCE Academy

Policy Brief no. 52 (February 2019): 6.

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along the Afghan border in the Pamir mountains, which is the only road connecting Dushanbe with China. But in return, a Chinese company is contracted to oversee the work, and construction and equipment will be exempted from import duties. The grant thus essentially amounts to a subsidy to Chinese companies. The same is true regarding other Chinese grants where China gets special tax breaks and access to Tajik gold and silver mines in return.111 Despite the lesser backlash against China in Tajikistan, it was still felt that China should pay more heed to local demands and needs in implementing its New Silk Road project. As one Tajik expert puts it, “Silk is a product of China but the Silk Road is not the product of China only. Central Asian people have their own contribution to the Silk Road.”112 Uzbekistan’s economic dependence on China is lesser than that of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan so concerns regarding China are less. Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan does not share a border with China and has therefore been less exposed to concerns over border disputes, Chinese demographic expansion and land grabs. Uzbekistan under Karimov also proved adept at manoeuvring and balancing between the great powers to ensure its independence, while staying aloof from its Central Asian neighbours. While Mirziyoyev has moved away from his predecessor’s isolationist course, he has maintained Uzbekistan’s foreign policy of balancing relations with the great powers to preserve its independence. Mirziyoyev sought to strengthen Sino-Uzbek ties by maintaining economic closeness with China, while avoiding getting into a debt trap by getting loans and credits from other sources as well such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.113 For instance, the railway line connecting Tashkent with Namangan in the northern edge of the Fergana Valley, which includes the Qamchiq tunnel, the longest in Central Asia (19.2 km), was co-funded by Uzbekistan, China and the World Bank to avoid sole dependency on China.114 Uzbekistan has therefore managed to maintain its relations with China without sacrificing its own interests by diversifying its development partners, pushing its own interests 111 Kamila Ibragimova, “Tajikistan Accepts $125m from China for Road, Less Than Expected,” Eurasianet, 22 October 2021. 112 Interview, 9 July 2021, Dushanbe. 113 Anceschi, “Mirziyoyev’s Foreign Policy,” and interview with Farkhod Tolipov, 21

November 2021, Tashkent. 114 Online interview with Uzbek expert, 13 January 2022.

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and agenda when negotiating deals with China, and establishing a good working relationship between their concerned government agencies in a way that met the interests of both sides. This has helped dampen possible Chinese economic pressure on Uzbekistan.115 Sinophobia in Uzbekistan is therefore less than in other Central Asian states, who provide a buffer zone between China and Uzbekistan, and no clear attitude towards China has been formed yet as it is still a vague, unfamiliar and less-known country.116 China’s Expanding Security Presence The expansion of China’s overseas interests through its BRI has also meant the expansion of China’s military and security role, including that of its private security companies, to protect those Chinese interests, investments, projects and citizens worldwide.117 China has therefore been making significant security inroads in Central Asia as well, though this has so far been less of a concern for the Central Asian states than for other powers, notably Russia. The security sector has traditionally been viewed as an area of Russia’s dominant influence in Central Asia, while China has focused more on expanding its economic influence. However, China has recently expanded its security presence, especially in Tajikistan where China has reportedly established a small military outpost near the mouth of Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor.118 Tajikistan’s 1,357 km long border with Afghanistan and the potential spillover of threats is a source of concern for both Russia and China. Beijing sees Tajikistan as an important barrier against such spillover from Afghanistan into China’s westernmost province of Xinjiang.119 Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan 115 Dadabaev, “The Chinese Economic Pivot,” 769. 116 Interviews with Uzbek experts, 16 and 21 November 2021, and 28 April 2022,

Tashkent. 117 Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report No. 80, September 2019) and Alessandro Arduino, China’s Private Army: Protecting the New Silk Road (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan Pivot, 2018). 118 Gerry Shih, “In Central Asia’s Forbidding Highlands, a Quiet Newcomer: Chinese Troops,” The Washington Post, 18 February 2018. 119 Edward Lemon and Bradley Jardine, “How is Russia Responding to China’s Creeping Security Presence in Tajikistan?” Russian Analytical Digest no. 248, 6 March 2020, 7.

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in August 2021, Beijing’s security footprint in Tajikistan significantly grew with Dushanbe approving construction of a new Chinese-funded base in Vakhon near Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan, which would be handed over to Tajikistan’s rapid-reaction paramilitary police forces. Dushanbe reportedly offered to transfer ownership of the pre-existing base to China and to waive any future basing fees in exchange for funding to build Tajik military points along the border with Afghanistan.120 China has also stepped up its military and paramilitary training exercises in the region, while Chinese arms sales to Central Asia are also rising. Beijing has accounted for 18 percent of the region’s military hardware over the past five years, which is a significant increase from the 1.5 percent it provided during 2010–2014. As the share of Russian arms sales to the region have remained constant at around 60 percent for the past ten years, this means that China’s growth in arms sales has not yet come at the expense of Russia’s market share. However, given the trend of an enhanced Chinese security and military presence in the region, it is likely that frictions between Beijing and Moscow may arise in the future.121 Beijing has also increasingly put pressure on Central Asian governments to protect the interests of Chinese nationals and companies, particularly after these were targeted during the Kyrgyz political upheavals in October 2020, as well as to accept the presence of the growing number of Chinese private security firms.122 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s July 2021 visit to Central Asia also highlighted the fact that Beijing will increase the presence of its private military companies to provide

120 At time of writing, it was not reported whether Beijing had agreed to the proposal. Reid Standish, “Tajikistan Approves Construction of New Chinese Base as Beijing’s Security Presence in Central Asia Grows,” RFE/RL, 27 October 2021 and Kamila Ibragimova, “China to build Tajik police base on Afghan border,” Eurasianet, 27 October 2021. 121 Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon, “In Russia’s Shadow: China’s Rising Security Presence in Central Asia,” Kennan Cable no. 52 (May 2020). 122 Raffaello Pantucci, “Not-So-Hidden Dragon: China Reveals Its Claws in Central Asian Security,” Carnegie Moscow Center Commentary, 25 February 2021, https://carneg iemoscow.org/commentary/83934 (accessed 25 February 2021). See also, Niva Yau and Dirk Van Der Kley, “The Growth, Adaptation and Limitations of Chinese Private Security Companies in Central Asia,” The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs Report, 13 October 2020, https://oxussociety.org/the-growth-adaptation-and-limitations-of-chineseprivate-security-companies-in-central-asia/ (accessed 14 October 2020).

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security assistance to the region and to protect Chinese interests.123 The August 2021 collapse of the Western-backed Afghan government, the complete withdrawal of US and allied troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s takeover of the country would likely prompt an expanded Chinese security presence in Central Asia, seeing the region’s security as integral to Beijing’s own, in parallel with Beijing’s policy of engagement with the Taliban government. Such developments are likely to cause further friction and tension between China and Central Asian countries, not necessarily at the governmental level but at the people level where there are already several sources of concern and fear regarding China’s expanding presence. COVID-19 and the Limits of Chinese Soft Power The Chinese origin of the COVID-19 pandemic has also affected ordinary Central Asians’ perceptions of China to varying degrees, despite Beijing’s active efforts in pursuing “face-mask” and “vaccine” diplomacy under its promotion of a “Health Silk Road” in the region, which has met with limited success and seen as “empty rhetoric.”124 According to one survey conducted in Kazakhstan in February 2020 before the virus reached the country, China was already one of the “unwanted partners,” with 55 percent asking for less Chinese presence. Although the US fared worse at 64.5 percent, Russia’s presence was most welcomed at nearly 49 percent, with 25.5 percent welcoming more. The researchers concluded that “China’s charm offensive has had few results in Kazakhstan” so far and that “even during a pandemic, China’s soft power diplomacy has proven to be a hard sell in Kazakhstan.”125 This has also been the case in other Central Asian states. An analysis of Central Asian countries’ public opinion of Russia, China and the US demonstrated Russia’s predominance in enjoying favourable opinion, while China was in a relatively well-regarded second place, and the US decidedly last. Favourable views of China, 123 Paul Goble, “Beijing Expanding Size and Role of Its ‘Private’ Military Companies

in Central Asia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 18, no. 115 (20 July 2021). 124 Aruzhan Meirkhanova, “Perspectives: Beijing’s ‘Health Silk Road’ Abandons Central Asia,” Eurasianet, 30 March 2021. 125 Marlene Laruelle, et. al., “Kazakhs are Wary of Neighbours Bearing Gifts,” Open Democracy Report, 30 April 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/kazakhs-arewary-neighbours-bearing-gifts/ (accessed 18 May 2020).

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however, were much less in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while faring better in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The authors further pointed out that China’s soft power was “quite weak across Central Asia.”126 A former Kyrgyz foreign minister likewise viewed that China should pursue a more active “soft power” diplomacy in accompaniment with its economic diplomacy to mitigate the anti-Chinese sentiments and to create greater awareness and understanding of China in Kyrgyzstan such as through its Confucius Institutes.127 China is also seen as culturally disconnected from Central Asia and lacks any commonalities. Its developmental aid role is also much lesser than that of Japan, Germany, Turkey and the US.128 Beijing’s soft-power policy in Central Asia is also “negatively perceived as a temporary tool, concealing a hard power policy designed to impose political and economic influence for the sole benefit of China,” and potentially undermines Central Asia’s development and autonomy.129 Moreover, one study has found that China’s BRI has not yet become a “game changer” for Central Asian views of China. While the broader public expects more economic opportunities from the BRI, it remains under-informed about ongoing projects with China and their associated benefits, as well as remaining concerned about the consequences of Chinese economic expansion.130 The negative economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, with reduced net investment flows from China into Central Asia and stalled the implementation of BRI projects, 126 The analysis was based on surveys conducted in Central Asia by the Central Asia Barometer (June 2017–November 2019) and by the 2017 Integration Barometer survey of the Eurasian Development Bank. Marlene Laruelle and Dylan Royce, “No Great Game: Central Asia’s Public Opinions on Russia, China, and the US,” Kennan Cable no. 56 (August 2020). 127 Imanaliev, “Drawbacks of China-Kyrgyzstan relations,” and Ermek Baisalov, “Murat Imanaliev: China is a University That is Impossible to Graduate From,” CABAR Article, 28 January 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/muratbek-imanaliev-china-is-a-university-that-isimpossible-to-graduate-from/ (accessed 8 July 2020). 128 Online interview with Kyrgyz expert, 25 April 2021. 129 Sebastien Peyrouse, “On the (Belt &) Road to Failure? The Challenges of China’s

Soft Power Policy in Central Asia (and beyond),” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 613 (September 2019): 5. 130 Roman Vakulchuk and Indra Overland, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Through the Lens of Central Asia,” in Fanny M. Cheung and Ying-yi Hong, eds., Regional Cooperation Under the Belt and Road Initiative: The Prospects for Economic and Financial Cooperation (London: Routledge, 2019), 127.

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have also fuelled further discontent and protests against China.131 The pandemic also slashed government revenues in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan reducing their ability to make debt repayments to China, forcing both to ask Beijing for debt relief.132 In addition, China’s closed or partially open borders with Central Asian neighbours due to its strict COVID-19 restrictions have been a further source of tension, leading to trade bottlenecks and significantly increased transportation costs. Chinese trade data for 2020 showed that imports from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan fell by more than 45 percent compared to 2019.133 The daily number of trains transporting goods from Kazakhstan into China was also restricted and fell by one-third due to China’s strict COVID-19 measures imposed since November 2020.134 But, as one Uzbek expert noted, among the great powers, it is the Chinese economy which has already been recovering after the economic shock of the pandemic and the Central Asian states do not have many options at their disposal to overcome the economic crisis apart from China while other powers remain disengaged from the region and concerned with their own internal pandemic-induced problems.135 Central Asian governments often refuted such concerns, stressing instead the benefits from closer economic cooperation with China.136 Beijing’s growing ties with the Central Asian elites have become an increasingly important means of self-enrichment for many of the region’s elites and their families, thereby making them more reluctant to criticise or enter into conflict with Beijing. It has also become a means for Beijing

131 Rymbetov, “Anti-China Sentiments Grows in Kazakhstan.” A June 2020 survey by the Chinese Foreign Ministry found that 20 percent of BRI projects had been “seriously affected” by the pandemic and a further 30–40 percent “somewhat affected,” though none had been cancelled. “China Says One-Fifth of Belt and Road Projects ‘Seriously Affected’ by Pandemic,” Reuters, 19 June 2020. 132 Dirk van der Kley, “COVID and the New Debt Dynamics of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,” Eurasianet, 2 October 2020. 133 Reid Standish, “China Prepares New Era of ‘Belt and Road’ Amid Pandemic Pressures,” RFE/RL, 14 March 2021. 134 Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan: Exporters Lose Money to China Anti-Coronavirus Regime,” Eurasianet, 4 March 2021. 135 Bakhrom Radjabov’s comments in “Geopolitics of Central Asia,” Dynamic Uzbekistan, no. 3 (2020): 23. 136 For example, Bolat Nurgaliyev, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Kazakhstan and Geopolitics,” Astana Times, 3 June 2020.

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to “bolster its regional influence,” potentially to Moscow’s chagrin.137 But as one Chinese diplomat frankly admitted, people-to-people relations between Kazakhstan and China were not yet good enough and that ordinary Kazakhs had the misperception that only China was benefiting from the relationship. They were unaware of the immense economic benefits that the Kazakh government was getting from trade with China as this did not sufficiently trickle down to ordinary Kazakhs. He also admitted that China had to step up its soft-power diplomacy, especially through culture and education, to create better understanding and positive views of China.138 Realising the growing “pushback” against the BRI, Beijing has aimed to shape foreign perceptions towards it in a more favourable way. Indeed, at the August 2018 symposium to mark the fifth anniversary of the BRI’s launch, Xi Jinping made winning hearts and minds of the local population one of the priorities of China’s diplomacy and propaganda campaign.139 Beijing has also adopted a new investment approach to the region. Instead of funding major infrastructure projects, it has shifted to manufacturing, preferably with joint funding from local partners or other countries. This is due to the fact that Central Asian states are demanding projects that provide jobs, exports and industrial capacity while Chinese banks that used to fund large-scale infrastructure projects are now wanting to spread their risk.140

The Southeast Asian Vector as an Economic Counterweight? These concerns over China’s expanding economic presence and influence has led some Central Asian experts to look towards ASEAN and its members as one possible economic counterweight to China. Such a view also accords with Central Asian governments’ pursuance of a multivector foreign policy that aims to diversify economic partners and lessen 137 Temur Umarov, “Dangerous Liaisons: How China is Taming Central Asia’s Elites,” Carnegie Moscow Center Commentary, 29 January 2021, https://carnegiemoscow.org/ commentary/83756 (accessed 3 February 2021). 138 Conversation, 19 February 2019, Nur-Sultan. 139 Nadège Rolland, “Beijing’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative’s “Pushback”:

A Story of Assessment and Adaptation,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 2 (2019): 228. 140 Dirk van der Kley, “China Diversifies in Central Asia,” Eurasianet, 23 November

2020.

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dependence on individual great powers as part of their economic hedging strategy. While governments are unlikely to state so publicly, the epistemic community has less reservations. According to one Kazakh sinologist, concerns regarding China has prompted the EAEU countries to look towards the ASEAN countries as one potential partner to counterbalance Beijing’s growing economic influence. He proposed that the development of a FTA between Central Asia and ASEAN could become “one alternative to Chinese domination in Central Asia.”141 He further observed that while most Kazakhs do not know ASEAN countries very well, those who do tend to hold favourable views.142 Other Kazakh experts similarly noted that ASEAN countries would be more welcomed in Central Asia due to their more positive image than China.143 Another supported the view that the Central Asian states would welcome a deeper engagement with ASEAN countries due to their potential balancing role, particularly in the economic sphere.144 One Kazakh expert suggested that Kazakhstan could benefit from the economic “rivalry” between China and Southeast Asian countries to “penetrate” Kazakhstan’s market. In this respect, “ASEAN could serve as a useful tool” for more active participation in Kazakhstan’s economy.145 Another expert is more sceptical of ASEAN’s role as each ASEAN state has their own political interests vis-à-vis China and other great powers. But ASEAN countries can be a “complementary player in Central Asia,” providing an alternative market and economic partner for the region. While ASEAN countries are viewed positively, focus is on particular countries and not ASEAN as a grouping.146 Uzbek experts likewise noted that Southeast Asian countries could be alternative economic partners. Tashkent’s foreign policy is becoming more multi-vector as it is trying to avoid overdependence on Russia and China by diversifying its economic partners, including those in Southeast

141 Amrebayev, “Eurasia’s Economic Union and ASEAN”. 142 Interview, 16 September 2019, Almaty. 143 Interviews, 1 November 2019, Nur-Sultan, and online, 4 October 2020. 144 Email interview with Assel Bitabarova, 19 August 2020. 145 Fatima Paizullaevna Urazaeva, “The Role of ASEAN in the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Results and Prospects for Cooperation,” KazNU Bulletin, International Relations and International Law Series 56, no. 6 (2011): 77. 146 Interview with Iskander Akylbayev, 8 October 2020, Nur-Sultan.

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Asia. Southeast Asian countries are seen as having strong economic potential with well-developed manufacturing, technological, agricultural and tourism industries that can help lessen Uzbekistan’s economic reliance on China.147 Greater engagement between Central Asia and ASEAN countries can help lower China’s economic dominance and Russia’s political dominance in Central Asia.148 Uzbekistan under Mirziyoyev also aims to create an export-oriented industrial base by attracting technology transfer from Asian countries such as China, Japan and South Korea, which reflects the evolving nature of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy that displays flexibility in choosing international partners depending on the country’s needs to support economic restructuring.149 Key Southeast Asian countries thus have an opportunity to assist Uzbekistan in its less-advanced technological needs and to develop its industries in areas such as textiles, agriculture, halal food and tourism, in which Southeast Asian countries have leading expertise in (see Chapter 2). But for smaller states like Kyrgyzstan, which recognises its own economic limitations, the view is more sceptical. While Southeast Asian countries could theoretically become alternative economic partners, in practice they still have a long way to go compared with the role of great powers, as well as of medium powers like Turkey and some Middle Eastern states. Apart from the major logistical challenges, Kyrgyzstan is too small a market for Southeast Asian countries to be interested in. Nonetheless, the COVID-19 pandemic has opened up opportunities for digital trade, e-commerce and services that can help make economic engagement between the two regions more possible despite the physical logistical obstacles.150 Another Kyrgyz expert opined that Southeast Asia can be alternative economic partners in Kyrgyzstan’s attempts to diversify its foreign economic relations to lessen its dependence on Russia and China, but transport and logistics remain the key obstacle.151 Tajik experts similarly lamented that Southeast Asian countries were too far away to diversify relations with and are thus not yet a priority vector. China’s proximity makes it inevitable to play a prevalent role, despite 147 Interviews, Tashkent, 16 November 2021. 148 Online interview with Temur Umarov, 15 June 2021. 149 Dadabaev, “The Chinese Economic Pivot,” 751–752. 150 Online interview with a Kyrgyz expert, 25 April 2021. 151 Interview, 16 July 2021, Bishkek.

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Dushanbe’s attempts to diversify partners and lessen its dependence on China.152 Turkmenistan also unrealistically looked to ASEAN as an alternative market for its gas supplies. Having recognised its overdependence on China, Turkmenistan has tried to diversify its export market, by promoting the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline project (TAPI), though this has been fraught with many problems, not least the security situation in Afghanistan, the tensions between Pakistan and India, and finding financing for the planned US$ 10 billion project amidst such unstable conditions.153 Nonetheless, during President Berdymukhamedov’s visit to Singapore in August 2019, he raised the possibility of TAPI providing gas onwards to the Southeast Asian market in his meeting with Singaporean business leaders. But it was not made clear how this would proceed and is highly infeasible.154 Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Finance and Economy likewise set high hopes on TAPI as giving the possibility for Central Asian states to access other growing markets in the Asia–Pacific region, as well as the Middle East.155 Despite the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Ashgabat remained determined to push TAPI forwards by engaging with the new Taliban regime and securing the latter’s promise to provide security for the project. Nonetheless, even if Afghanistan’s security situation under the Taliban becomes more stable, significant problems with financing the project would likely remain.156 152 Interviews, 8–9 July 2021, Dushanbe. 153 Khalid Mustafa, “$10 bn TAPI Gas Pipeline Projects Fails to Achieve Financial

Closure,” The News, 22 June 2020, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/675995-10-bntapi-gas-pipeline-project-fails-to-achieve-financial-closure (accessed 25 June 2020). 154 “Prezident Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov vstretilsia s predstaviteliami krupnogo biznesa Singapura” [President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov Met with Representatives of Big Business in Singapore], 27 August 2019, http://tdh.gov.tm/news/en/articles. aspx&article19316&cat11 (accessed 28 August 2019). 155 A. Rakhimov and A. Mirzaliev, “K itogam Tashkentskoi Mezhdunarodnoi Ekspertnoi Konferentsii ‘Vzaimosviazannost’ v Tsentral’noi Azii: Vyzovy i novye vozmozhnosti’: Problemy regional’noi bezopasnosti i razvitiia v Tsentral’noi Azii v otsenkakh zarubezhnykh ekspertov,” [Towards the Outcomes of the Tashkent International Expert Conference ‘Central Asian Connectivity: Challenges and New Opportunities’: Problems of Regional Security and Development in Central Asia in the Assessment of Foreign Experts], Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, no. 4 (2018): 8. 156 Bruce Pannier, “Turkmenistan Talks TAPI Pipeline With Taliban, But Should Ashgabat Instead Be Looking To Send Gas To Europe?” RFE/RL, 2 November 2021.

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Another limitation to Southeast Asia’s economic role is that, while the region’s profile is steadily rising, it is still lower than other Asian countries, particularly China, South Korea and Japan.157 It is therefore important to promote greater awareness, knowledge and understanding between the countries of the two regions, through people-to-people exchanges, tourism and cultural diplomacy or, in other words, to enhance their respective soft power. Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry is in talks for Kazakhstan’s Khabar News Agency to open up offices in two Southeast Asian countries to make Kazakhstan better known in the region. Malaysia has a Malay news reporter working at Khabar News Agency that often reports on Malaysia’s relations with Kazakhstan, thereby helping to promote Malaysia’s image in the country.158 Other conduits for soft power is Central Asia’s shared Muslim religion with some Southeast Asian states, and through education such as dual-degree programmes between Kazakhstan and Malaysia and Singapore.159 The high-level skills of Uzbek craftsmen are also well recognised in Indonesia and Malaysia where they work on detailed ornaments in mosques.160 Alternative Central Asia-Southeast Asia Routes S. Frederick Starr, a prominent US expert on Central Asia, opined that, as Central Asia’s ties with India grow through the reopening of the “Southern Corridor” between the Indian sub-continent and Europe and these links extend onwards to Southeast Asia, the Central Asians would have a “fourth element that they can bring to bear as they balance external forces affecting them.”161 Although it is likely that he had primarily India in mind, the Southeast Asian countries could also potentially play a greater economic role in Central Asia via South Asia as an alternative to the route through China, which has lately often been subjected to Chinese 157 Interview with Farkhod Tolipov, 21 November 2021, Tashkent. 158 Conversations with Kazakh foreign ministry official and Malaysian diplomat, 30

December 2020, Nur-Sultan. 159 Interview with Kazakh expert, 18 February 2021, Nur-Sultan. 160 Interview with Ikboljon Qoraboyev, 6 October 2020, Nur-Sultan. 161 S. Frederick Starr, “Why Central Asia Counts,” Middle East Insights, no. 175,

6 November 2017, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/insight-175-why-central-asia-cou nts/ (accessed 24 June 2020).

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restrictions. For example, Thai exporters who used the LianyungangKhorgos route have often experienced problems with Chinese paperwork irregularities at the border with Kazakhstan that caused delays in their shipment, affecting Thai exports which are often perishable goods like fruits and vegetables.162 According to the Indonesian Ambassador to Kazakhstan, another problem is that the distance from Lianyungang to Khorgos is too vast and the different railway gauge between China and Kazakhstan means that containers have to be transferred to the different railway track, thereby taking up more time.163 Moreover, according to logistics experts, the costs of transporting a standard container by rail between Shanghai and Duisberg is approximately 2–3 times higher than by ship from Shanghai to Hamburg, which makes railway transport much less competitive than by sea, despite the fact that it is about two times faster. China also ceased to subsidise railway transport in 2021, thereby increasing costs and eroding competitiveness further. Shippers who need a quicker delivery often opt for air freight, though this costs around 80 percent more than rail. Railway transport is, therefore, caught between the most economical option—by sea—and the fastest option—by air.164 Alternative routes have thus been explored, particularly by connecting South Asia with Central Asia via Afghanistan. India is promoting its International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) project, agreed upon by India, Iran and Russia in 2000. The aim is to connect India to the markets of Central Asia, Russia and Europe via Iran and Afghanistan and to provide an alternative route to China’s BRI, especially to the development of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, a key part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The project would link Gwadar Port to China’s Xinjiang Province through the Karakorum Highway, providing Chinese access to the Indian Ocean via Pakistan and circumventing the traditional route through the Malacca Straits that is vulnerable to blockade by China’s rivals. The development of the Chabahar Port in Iran is therefore seen by India as not only central to the completion of the INSTC, but also of strategic importance in the context of regional 162 Kerdplanant, “‘Kazakhstan’” and meeting with Thai Ministry of Commerce official, 13 March 2019, Nur-Sultan. 163 Meeting, 28 January 2019, Nur-Sultan. 164 Bernhard-Simon, “Can the New Silk Road compete with the Maritime Silk Road,”

The Maritime Executive, 1 January 2020, https://www.maritime-executive.com/editor ials/can-the-new-silk-road-compete-with-the-maritime-silk-road (accessed 6 June 2021).

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geopolitical contestation between India and China, as well as Pakistan.165 Chabahar port is seen as the “fulcrum of connectivity” for India to Central Asia that helps overcome India’s lack of overland routes to Central Asia given Pakistan’s denial of India using its territory to get through to Afghanistan. It is an integral part of India’s Central Asia policy and was highlighted at the inaugural India-Central Asia Dialogue hosted by Uzbekistan in January 2019.166 Among the Central Asian states, Uzbekistan has been the most active in strengthening ties and connectivity with South Asia. Since Karimov’s time, Uzbekistan, as a doubly landlocked country, has a strong interest in improving connectivity with South Asia and gaining access to the sea. This “southern road” would grant Central Asian countries access to world markets and simultaneously be a “northern road” for the countries of South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East to access the Central Asian markets.167 Therefore, Tashkent fully supported India’s INSTC project, and India involved Uzbekistan in Chabahar’s development, which would give Uzbekistan access to a deep-water port.168 Indian and Uzbek experts have long espoused greater connectivity between them through the INSTC.169 The INSTC is also seen as potentially connecting Southeast Asia to Central Asia, should the India-Myanmar-Thailand transport corridor become operational. Southeast Asia would then have cheaper and faster access to Central Asia and northern Europe, while providing Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus with new connections to South and Southeast Asia.170 But Uzbekistan is also hedging its bets and promoting the route through Afghanistan and Pakistan to connect with CPEC. In February 2021, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed on a joint

165 Harsh V. Pant and Ketan Mehta, “India in Chabahar: A Regional Imperative,” Asian Survey 58, no. 4 (2018): 660–678. 166 Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, “Connectivity and Chabahar: The Eurasian Future of India’s Iran Policy,” Middle East Insights, no. 236 (16 June 2020), 4–6. 167 Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold, 165–166. 168 Niranjan Marjani, “Uzbekistan’s Significance in India’s Central Asia Policy”, CACI

Analyst, 27 February 2020. 169 Rakhimov and Mirzaliev, “K itogam Tashkentskoi Mezhdunarodnoi Ekspertnoi Konferentsii,” 18. 170 Mohsen Shariatinia, “Sanctions Threaten Iran’s Dream of Becoming Eurasian Transport Hub,” 20 July 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2018/07/iran-instcnorth-south-transport-corridor-chabahar-astara.html (accessed 24 July 2020).

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action plan to construct the 573 km long Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railroad, which would connect with the existing Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif cross-border line that opened in January 2012. This project would help ensure Central Asian access to the Indian Ocean by linking up the two regions’ railroad systems. The project is aimed to facilitate growth in interregional trade, including with Southeast Asia, as well as substantially reduce delivery times.171 Uzbekistan also expressed interest to accede to the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement, which includes Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, in order to be able to utilize Pakistan’s Karachi and Gwadar ports. This is also related to CPEC and is potentially lucrative for Central Asian exporters wishing for easier access to Southeast Asian and other markets.172 There was also hope among Uzbek experts that the network of roads and railways from Southeast Asia to India, which New Delhi was trying to develop as an alternative to China’s BRI, could be extended through the territory of Pakistan and Afghanistan and onwards to Central Asia.173 However, such an “extension” is very unlikely to happen given the continued tensions between India and Pakistan and security concerns in Afghanistan.174 The deteriorating security situation in Myanmar is another obstacle. Even the development of the INSTC and the Chabahar Port is fraught with challenges due to US renewed economic sanctions on Iran, continued instability in Afghanistan, Iran’s own unfavourable business climate and protectionist trade policies, and divergent foreign policy interests and priorities between New Delhi and Tehran.175 Although Southeast Asian countries recognised the need to find alternative shorter routes to the sea/land route via China to Central Asia, US sanctions 171 “Interconnectivity of Central and South Asia,” The Japan Times, 24 June 2021 and Oliver Cuenca, “Strategic Plan Signed for 573 km Trans-Afghan Railway,” International Railway Journal, 9 February 2021, https://www.railjournal.com/infrastructure/strategicplan-signed-for-573km-trans-afghan-railway/ (accessed 5 November 2021). 172 Chris Devonshire-Ellis, “Uzbekistan Looks To China’s Belt & Road and Pakistan’s

CPEC to Connect Through to Gwadar & Karachi Ports,” Silk Road Briefing, 12 May 2020, https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/05/12/uzbekistan-looks-chi nas-belt-road-pakistans-cpec-connect-gwadar-karachi-ports/ (accessed 24 May 2020). 173 Ildar Yakubov, “India and Central Asia: The Thorny Path of Cooperation,” CABAR Article, 6 February 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/india-and-central-asia-the-thorny-pathof-cooperation/ (accessed 9 July 2020). 174 Conversation with a South Asian diplomat, 12 January 2021, Nur-Sultan. 175 Pant and Mehta, “India in Chabahar,” 673–678 and Shariatinia, “Sanctions

Threaten Iran’s Dream”.

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on Iran and the security situation in Afghanistan adversely affected the willingness of Southeast Asian countries to use routes to Central Asia through Iran’s Bandar Abbas and Chabahar ports, and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.176 The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan further poses a significant challenge to Central Asia-South Asia connectivity. Uzbekistan, however, is determined to push forwards connectivity projects. Tashkent hosted a major conference on promoting Central Asia-South Asia connectivity and trade in July 2021, a month before the Taliban’s takeover, and Tashkent is now actively engaging with the Taliban regime. Uzbekistan still aims to be a conduit for greater Central Asian trade with South Asia, and with other regions such as Southeast Asia.177 Uzbekistan’s access to the sea and onwards to the Southeast Asian market would help lessen its dependence on China. To this end, Uzbekistan needs a stable Afghanistan.178 Central Asia-South Asia connectivity is seen as the shorter route for Central Asia to reach Southeast Asian markets, and vice versa, than via China.179 Greater Central Asia-South Asia connectivity would also create an alternative to Russia’s northern transport corridor for the Central Asian states thereby lessening their dependence on Russia as well, and helping contribute to the maintenance of their multi-vector foreign policies.180 At the first Central Asia-India summit in January 2022, Chabahar Port was again stressed as the “lynchpin” for Central Asia-India connectivity. Turkmen President Berdymukhamedov also expressed support for the INSTC and stressed the potential role of Turkmenistan’s Turkmenbashi port on the Caspian Sea as part of this connectivity chain.181 176 Meetings with Thai Ministry of Commerce official, 13 March 2019, Nur-Sultan and with the Indonesian Ambassador to Kazakhstan, 28 January 2019, Nur-Sultan. Also, from views expressed at an online seminar on trade and investment opportunities for Thai businesses in Central Asia, 10 August 2021. 177 Bruce Pannier, “Despite Taliban Advances, Central Asia Eyes Trade Ties With South Asia,” RFE/RL, 22 July 2021; Bruce Pannier, “Uzbekistan Has Good Reasons To Be On Good Terms With The Taliban,” RFE/RL, 23 September 2021; and “Uzbekistan Holds Talks With Taliban On Trade, Energy, Railway Projects,” RFE/RL, 17 October 2021. 178 Interviews with Uzbek experts, 16 November 2021, Tashkent. 179 Online interview with Uzbek expert, 13 January 2022, and conversation with exec-

utive of a major Thai company with experience in Russia and Central Asia, 3 March 2022, Nur-Sultan. 180 Akram Umarov, “The ‘Afghan Factor’ in Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy: Evolution and the Contemporary Situation,” Asian Affairs 52, no. 3 (2021): 549. 181 “Turkmenistan: The Golden Road to Chabahar,” Eurasianet, 1 February 2022.

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Conclusion In recent years, greater engagement between Central Asia and Southeast Asia has been driven by three main factors. Firstly, the interest of ASEAN and its members to strengthen economic relations with the EAEU and vice versa. Secondly, the interest of Southeast Asian countries to utilise the BRI to gain access to the Central Asian and European markets. Thirdly, the interest of Central Asian states to engage with Southeast Asian countries to provide a counterweight to Chinese economic influence. These key drivers are informed by Central Asian states’ “economic hedging” strategy. This includes a policy of “economic pragmatism” whereby they have tried to extract the maximum economic benefits from engaging with China’s BRI and the Russian-led EAEU, while simultaneously pursuing a policy of “economic diversification,” forging economic links with, inter alia, ASEAN and its member states to lessen economic dependence on China. Central Asian states’ engagement with the BRI and EAEU also facilitates their greater economic engagement with ASEAN and its members. The EAEU and BRI are not mutually exclusive and Central AsiaSoutheast Asia engagement through those platforms can potentially be complementary. Despite initial Russian concerns regarding China’s BRI displacing its own landbridge role, Beijing managed to convince Moscow that these two projects can be connected and developed in mutual cooperation. Russia subsequently viewed the BRI as complementary to its Greater Eurasian Partnership. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia in May 2015, a Joint Declaration on Cooperation on Linking Construction of the SREB and the EAEU was signed, and both sides started to explore the possibility of linking the two initiatives as the “Eurasian Economic Partnership.”182 Moscow does not regard the BRI as a project that is “pulling apart” the post-Soviet space due to the fact that both

182 Yongquan Li, “The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Can the Two Be Linked?” Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 9 (2018): 94–99. See also, Zhao Hong, “China’s One Belt One Road,” 25–26 and Fabio Indeo, “China and Russia: Cooperation or Rivalry Along the Belt and Road Initiative?” in Abdoubaetova, ed., China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia, 2–13. It is argued that due to the different nature of influence-building via the EAEU and BRI, Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia is less plausible. See Kaczmarski, “Two Ways of Influence-Building,” 1027–1046.

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sides managed to sign the abovementioned agreement.183 A Russian diplomat also confirmed this view that Moscow was not concerned with China’s BRI as Russia also participates in the BRI while the northern route to Europe through Russia is in fact still cheaper than the alternative route from China to Europe through Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea.184 Central Asian elites and experts, particularly in Kazakhstan, are also generally supportive of greater links between the EAEU and BRI, as well as Kazakhstan’s own Nurly Zhol project, seeing it as a means for Central Asia to become a trade, transport and logistics bridge between Europe and Asia.185 Such complementarity between the two regional integration projects opens up the opportunity for greater engagement between Central Asia and Southeast Asia. For Central Asia, it provides the possibility of Southeast Asian countries not only providing an alternative export market and source of investment and technology, but also helping to provide some counterweight to expanding Chinese economic influence. Some Southeast Asian countries share similar concerns of the Central Asian countries, if not more, regarding Chinese influence and pressure, including through the BRI and the influx of Chinese workers.186 183 Yulia Nikitina, “Does Russia Have a Strategy for Central Asia?” Crossroads Policy Brief , no. 6–2020 (September 2020), 4. In practice, however, not much collaboration has been achieved. As Bobo Lo noted, the EAEU proposed around 40 infrastructure projects to China since the signing, but they were all “binned” by the Chinese. See his lecture “Russia and Asia – once again with feeling,” Royal Society for Asian Affairs, 26 September 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zKA S1fk-_HM (accessed 17 June 2020). Other experts similarly noted that “virtually no concrete cooperation projects exist between the EAEU and BRI in Kazakhstan or elsewhere,” and due to their “different aims and realities, actual cooperation results are unlikely.” Michael Clarke and Dana Rice, “Kazakhstan in Sino-Russian Relations: Cooperation and Competition between the EEU and BRI,” The Asan Forum, 19 October 2020, https://theasanforum.org/kazakhstan-in-sino-russian-relations-cooper ation-and-competition-between-the-eeu-and-bri/#a66 (accessed 21 October 2020). 184 Conversation, 30 January 2019, Nur-Sultan. 185 For example, Bulat Sultanov, ed., Initsiativa “odin poias i odin put’”: vazhneishii

faktor vystraivaniia sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii [The “One Belt One Road” Initiative: The Most Important Factor in Forming Modern International Relations] (Almaty: Research Institute for International and Regional Cooperation, Kazakh-German University, 2019). 186 Nyi Nyi Kaw, “Sinophobia in Myanmar and the Belt and Road Initiative,” ISEAS Perspective no. 9, 13 February 2020 and Gong Xue, “Why Some in SouthEast Asia Still Have Reservations About China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” 20

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They also fear that China would use economic incentives with ASEAN countries in a manner that would undermine ASEAN centrality and unity.187 Indeed, China has deployed more assertive and aggressive rhetoric towards its traditional rivals in East and Southeast Asia, becoming embroiled in maritime disputes, while it has tried to build close relationships with Central Asian states and Russia through securitization, investments and popular diplomacy.188 Like the Central Asian states, the authoritarian governments of some Southeast Asian states have so far managed to keep under control Sinophobic sentiments but with regime change and more openness, anti-Chinese demonstrations can grow such as the case of post-Suharto Indonesia. This could also happen in Central Asia and it is noticeable that the majority of anti-Chinese protests have occurred in Kyrgyzstan, the region’s least authoritarian country.189 Moreover, the establishment of Chinese diaspora and their subsequent economic and political influence in Southeast Asian countries was seen by Central Asian countries as a situation to avoid and that it was important to maintain the “civilizational barrier” between Central Asia and China because “falling into the Chinese sphere of cultural influence would mean the ethnic disappearance of Central Asian societies.”190 Some Southeast Asian backlash to Chinese BRI investments in Cambodia and Malaysia was also raised by one Kazakh expert as examples for Central Asia.191 It is also argued that while current Central Asian leaders and elite are still essentially pragmatic and not yet overly nationalistic, future generation of Central Asian leaders might become so and share a “post-colonial view” similar to Southeast Asian leaders. They might then move closer to

March 2018, https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/why-some-south-east-asia-stillhave-reservations-about-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative (accessed 22 August 2019). See also Sebastian Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century (Croydon: Yale University Press, 2020). 187 Zhao Hong, “China’s One Belt One Road,” 26–27. 188 Dave, “Silk Road Economic Belt,” 107. 189 Peyrouse, “On the (Belt &) Road to Failure?,” 5. 190 Peyrouse, “Discussing China,” 21–22. 191 Kairat Moldashev, “Risks in the Implementation of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ in Central Asia,” CABAR Article, 11 January 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/risksin-the-implementation-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-in-central-asia/#_ftnref6 (accessed 9 July 2020).

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Southeast Asian countries to help balance against China.192 As former Kyrgyz foreign minister and ambassador to China Muratbek Imanaliev once noted, to understand China’s relations with Central Asia, one should study China’s relations with Southeast Asia.193 Southeast Asian countries are therefore in a very good position to understand and share experience with Central Asian countries who are fellow “small and medium states” that share the same concerns of having China as an increasingly dominant and assertive neighbour. This may prove to be another strong impetus for greater engagement between Central Asia and ASEAN. The next Chapter examines this aspect in which ASEAN is seen as an attractive model for Central Asian regionalism, particularly as a hedging platform for regional countries to collectively engage and deal with external powers, not least China.

192 Online interview with Kazakh expert, 4 October 2020. 193 As conveyed by a Kyrgyz expert acquainted with him, 16 July 2021, Bishkek.

CHAPTER 4

The ASEAN Model for Central Asian Regionalism

Abstract This chapter examines the Central Asian states’ interest in the ASEAN model for their renewed movement towards potential Central Asian regionalism. Firstly, it examines developments in Central Asian regionalism since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the recent growing momentum towards greater Central Asian cooperation that may lead to an exclusive Central Asian regionalism without the involvement of external actors. Secondly, it looks at how ASEAN is seen as a possible model due to the convergence of norms and principles shared by ASEAN and Central Asian countries such as non-interference in internal affairs, consensus, pragmatism and flexibility. Thirdly, ASEAN’s appeal for Central Asia is its “hedging regionalism” role or the use of regional cooperation or platforms as a hedging mechanism to manage relations with the great powers in a way that avoids overdependence on either of them. Keywords Regionalism · ASEAN model · Hedging

This chapter examines the attractiveness of the ASEAN model for the burgeoning movement towards greater Central Asian regionalism, in terms of enhanced cooperation and coordination if not yet the formation of regional institutions. Firstly, it traces the history of Central Asian regionalism since the collapse of the Soviet Union, demonstrating the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Rangsimaporn, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10112-0_4

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failures of the five Central Asian states to achieve an exclusive regionalism, without the involvement of external powers. However, there has recently been growing momentum towards greater Central Asian cooperation that may lead to such exclusive Central Asian regionalism. Secondly, it looks at how ASEAN is seen as a possible model for such Central Asian regionalism due to the convergence of norms and principles upheld by ASEAN that appeals to Central Asian leaders such as the non-interference in internal affairs and consensus-based decision making. Furthermore, ASEAN’s “soft regionalism” approach, with a focus on consensus, pragmatism, flexibility and consultation, is more attractive than the EU’s “hard regionalism” with formal integration and institutionalisation. Thirdly, ASEAN’s attractiveness also lies in its ability to use ASEAN-led or ASEAN-centred platforms, such as the EAS, ARF and ASEAN plus dialogues, to engage and manage relations with several great powers in a way that avoids overdependence on either of them, and to avoid either balancing against or bandwagoning with a particular power in situations of tensions short of an outbreak of war between the great powers. In this respect, ASEAN’s appeal for Central Asia is its “hedging regionalism” role or the use of regional cooperation or platforms as a hedging mechanism vis-à-vis the great powers, though this has been increasingly put under strain due to recent seismic events and challenges.

Central Asian Regionalism Past Failures In January 1993, the five leaders of the Central Asian states met in Tashkent and agreed to redefine the region as “Central Asia” instead of the Soviet term “Middle Asia” (Srednaia Aziia).1 Since then, there have been several attempts at an exclusive Central Asian regionalism, although this was not successful. What emerged instead was more of a “virtual regionalism” in which the Central Asian states focused on preserving their regime security and strengthening their sovereignty against external pressures that threaten them by “bandwagoning” with Russia and China,

1 Sally N. Cummings, Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 13.

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for instance, in the CSTO and SCO respectively.2 As similarly noted, the Central Asian states’ “foreign policy is seen by clan elites (the President and the vested clan interests that surround him) in terms of self-preservation,” which “leads to strong opposition to economic regionalism…but support for security regionalism if it bolsters the regime/clans in power.”3 The Central Asian Union was created in 1994 by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with Tajikistan joining later in 1998. This then became the Central Asian Economic Union in 1998, which later transformed into the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) in 2001. Turkmenistan consistently declined to join, citing its non-aligned status. Russia joined CACO in 2004 and a year later a decision was taken to merge this with Moscow’s own Eurasian integration project, the Eurasian Economic Community, effectively displacing CACO and thereby making “certain the ultimate failure of Central Asian regionalism”4 and even threatening “the self-value and independent existence of Central Asia.”5 In the view of some Central Asian experts, Russia effectively “destroyed” CACO and all Central Asian regionalism initiatives.6 The Eurasian Economic Community was itself replaced by the EAEU in 2015. Although the Central Asian states had many things in common, namely a shared history and culture, ties with the Russian empire and later the Soviet Union, problems of independent state-building, and a perceived threat from Russia, China and extremist religious groups, an exclusive Central Asian regionalism never successfully took off due to

2 Roy Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central

Asia,” Central Asian Survey 27, no. 2 (2008): 185–202. Russia’s regional hegemon role has also often constrained security-related regionalism in Central Asia unless it is the dominant state such as in the CSTO. Roy Allison, “Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 463–483. 3 “The Politics of Decision-Making in Central Asia,” Chatham House REP Seminar Summary, 11 June 2009, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Res earch/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/110609summary.pdf (accessed 18 December 2021), 3. 4 Luca Anceschi, Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Regime Neo-Eurasianism in the Nazarbaev Era (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), 56. 5 Farkhod Tolipov, “The Foreign Policy Orientations of Central Asian States: Positive and Negative Diversification,” in Akihiro Iwashita, ed., Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Russia and Its Neighbours in Crisis (Vol. 1) (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), 29. 6 Interviews with Farkhod Tolipov, 16 November 2021, Tashkent, and a Tajik expert, 8 July 2021, Dushanbe.

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the focus on national consolidation, the turbulent regional environment, and the prominent role of external powers and geopolitical competition. Intraregional suspicion and rivalry, especially between the two regional leaders—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—further weakened efforts at regionalism.7 This personal rivalry between Nazarbayev and Karimov “evolved into a peculiar form of state competition that, when played out at regional level, saw Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan jockeying for positions of influence within the supposedly integrating Central Asian regional landscape.” The two countries also had “disparate visions of regional leadership” that “remained in opposition throughout the post-Soviet era.” While Karimov saw regionalism as a project centred on Uzbekistan’s geopolitical potential as the “core of Central Asia,” Nazarbayev’s “regionalist discourse” focused on a foreign policy that legitimised his rule. Nazarbayev also focused on integrating Central Asia within a wider Eurasia while Karimov aimed to reunite the Central Asian states in a “modern version of Turkestan.”8 According to a prominent Uzbek expert, this “over-personification of political processes in Central Asia cannot but distort and suspend natural regional identification, regional integration and regional democracy in this part of the world. Due to over-personification of policy in all these countries, democracy has failed, nationalism has been exaggerated and regionalism suspended.”9 Moreover, as Uzbekistan has the most developed nation-state identity in all of Central Asia, it has felt itself entitled to play a leading regional role, which prompted fear and suspicion among other Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan’s potential domination, thereby inhibiting closer regional cooperation,10 or prompting the other states to join regional groupings that included Russia to provide a built-in counterweight to

7 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia, 133–134; Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Kazakhstan and Central Asia: Regional Perspectives”, Central Asian Survey 21, no. 2 (2002): 167–169; and Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, “Modernisation and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: A New Spring?” Silk Road Paper (November 2018): 21–33. 8 Anceschi, Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy, 82–83 (italics in original). 9 Tolipov, “The Foreign Policy Orientations of Central Asian States,” 38. 10 Sergey V. Biryukov, “Uzbekistan as a Mirror of Change in Central Asia,” Asian Survey 59, no. 2 (2019): 346–347. On Uzbekistan’s perceived sense of self-importance and greatness, see Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy: The Struggle for Recognition and Self-Reliance Under Karimov (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 45–48.

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Uzbekistan.11 In addition, “the failure of most regional initiatives in Central Asia is rooted in local rules,” namely patronage politics and rentseeking. Their governments “maintain high barriers to integration, not because they lack the necessary technical expertise or capacity, but because elites privately benefit from the region’s enduring system of national regulations and border restrictions.”12 Kazakhstan’s supposed leading role in promoting regionalism in the post-Soviet space under Nazarbayev’s “neoEurasianist” foreign policy was also questionable, at least regarding the construction of an integrated Central Asia. As Luca Anceschi argues, since 1992, there have been several instances when the Nazarbayev regime disengaged with its Central Asian neighbours in pursuance of multilateral initiatives with more distant partners instead, often including Russia. He further argued that Mirziyoyev, during a shorter time, “may be said to have contributed more significantly to the advancement of Central Asian regionalism than Nursultan Nazarbayev did in almost 30 years at the helm.”13 A Growing Momentum Towards Regional Cooperation There has been a recent movement towards the re-emergence of Central Asian regionalism due to the drop in oil prices in late 2014 which led to serious political and economic reforms being taken in the two leading Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, the greater openness of Uzbekistan under Mirziyoyev, who pursued a foreign policy of greater engagement and dialogue with its neighbours, seeking to resolve previously contentious issues as border delimitation and use of water resources, helped remove impediments to regionalism.14 Indeed, the death of President Karimov in 2016 “proved a catalyst for

11 Annette Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 494–495. 12 Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in

Central Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 153–156 and 160. 13 Luca Anceschi, “Kazakhstan’s Eurasian Illusions,” ODR Opinion, 1 July 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/kazakhstans-eurasian-illusions/ (accessed 7 July 2020). See also Chapter 3 in Anceschi, Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy. 14 Cornell and Starr, “Modernisation and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia,” 32–

36.

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improving regional relations.”15 Under Mirziyoyev, “Tashkent is trying to emerge from the isolation imposed by the late president Islam Karimov in regard to its closest neighbours, and to create a new, more open economic order in Central Asia.”16 As one Uzbek diplomat stated, Mirziyoyev focused on pursuing “a zero-problem policy with its neighbours,” giving primary importance to Central Asia, and then good relations with all the great powers as well as other extra-regional countries.17 One Tajik diplomat also noted that Tajikistan’s relations with Uzbekistan had noticeably improved under Mirziyoyev.18 But most importantly, Uzbekistan’s relations with Kazakhstan improved markedly since Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016, with a significant intensification of bilateral relations and a marked increase in their mutual trade.19 Moreover, despite the previous poor record of regional cooperation and regionalism, the Central Asian states do share a “normative convergence” in their positions and strategies at the international level, particularly in the UN, favouring a Westphalian world order where sovereignty and territorial integrity is upheld, the peaceful resolution of conflict based on international law and diplomacy, the promotion of an equitable global economic order, and common security concerns regarding the environment, ethnic conflict and greatpower(s) domination.20 Indeed, it has been further argued that while Central Asia has not yet reached the stage of regionalism, one could assert that there is a “Central Asian order” that refers to a relatively stable and predictable set of relations underpinned by shared “institutions” of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, authoritarianism and great-power management.21 Therefore, there is a basis for regional cooperation should there be the requisite political will from all the region’s leaders, which increasingly appears to be the case in recent years. 15 Bruce Pannier, “Central Asian States See Better Ties After 30 Years of Independence,” RFE/RL, 30 August 2021. 16 Rafael Sattarov, “ASEAN, Uzbek-Style: Tashkent’s New Ambitions in Central Asia,” Carnegie Moscow Center Commentary, 19 January 2018. 17 Conversation, 1 April 2019, Nur-Sultan. 18 Conversation, 2 April 2019, Nur-Sultan. 19 Anceschi, Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy, 85. 20 Filippo Costa-Buranelli, “May We Have a Say? Central Asian States in the UN

General Assembly,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014): 131–144. 21 Filippo Costa-Buranelli, “Central Asian Regionalism or Central Asian Order? Some Reflections,” Central Asian Affairs 8 (2021): 1–26.

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In March 2018, a Central Asian “Consultative Meeting” of heads of states was held for the first time in Astana (now Nur-Sultan) at Nazarbayev’s invitation but by the initiative of Mirziyoyev. All heads of states attended except for Turkmenistan which was represented by the speaker of parliament. At the meeting, Mirziyoyev declared it was necessary to search for “efficient mechanisms of expansion of effective regional cooperation…in Central Asia.”22 In June 2018, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Central Asia-initiated resolution on “Strengthening regional and international cooperation to ensure peace, stability and sustainable development in the Central Asian Region” that acknowledged Central Asia as a region with its own interests and objectives and the right to organise itself to advance them. A second Central Asian summit was held in November 2019 in Tashkent where the leaders pledged to develop “forms and mechanisms for the development of cooperation” in such areas as trade, economy, investments, transport, agriculture, industry, energy, tourism, environment and water resources. They also agreed to meet annually and to launch a process of discussion to determine the most suitable institutional structures for cooperation.23 The Tashkent summit also stressed the common challenges of climate change and the development of renewable energy resources, particularly given the region’s high potential in hydropower, solar and wind energy. Climate change and the management of water resources is a particular concern for countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that are worried about the impact of global warming on their relatively abundant water resources.24 Prior to the summit, in his address to ambassadors presenting their credentials, Rahmon stressed the need to enhance regional cooperation to address the problem of maintaining sufficient water resources in

22 I. R. Mavlanov, “Problemy regional’nogo sotrudnichestva v Tsentral’noi Azii i mirovoi opyt: teoreticheskie aspekty,” [Problems of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia and World Experience: Theoretical Aspects] Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia no. 1 (2019): 26–27. 23 S. Frederick Starr, “Is this Central Asia’s ASEAN Moment?” The Diplomat, 5 December 2019. 24 “Istoricheskii sammit glav gosudarstv Tsentral’noi Azii v Tashkente,” [The Historic Summit of the Heads of States of Central Asia in Tashkent], 2 December 2019, http://isrs.uz/ozbekiston-va-mo-oav-nigohida/istoriceskij-sammit-glav-gosudarstvcentralnoj-azii-v-taskente (accessed 3 July 2020).

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light of the challenges posed by climate change and population growth.25 As noted by a former Kyrgyz Prime Minister, enhanced regional cooperation should be practical, based more on geoeconomics than geopolitics.26 A third summit meeting planned in Bishkek in 2020 was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the unstable political situation following Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections in October.27 The third summit meeting was instead held in Awaza, Turkmenistan, in August 2021. It was attended by all five Central Asian leaders, during which the pandemic and the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan were high on the agenda. Both challenges have meant greater urgency for regional cooperation, despite Tajikistan’s different and stronger stance taken towards the Taliban.28 Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted the need for greater regional cooperation and coordination. Mirziyoyev led efforts to coordinate Central Asia’s response to the pandemic by keeping in contact with other regional leaders. There have also been intraregional assistance in terms of providing personal protective equipment and test kits.29 Such cooperation was seen as “hope” that the Central Asian capitals would “rally together against the background of common hardships” and possibly “try to build a common position in relation to external actors, either bilaterally or multilaterally.”30 It has also been argued that the pandemic has laid bare the limitations of the EAEU and that Russia had initially acted in a way that showed its “callous disregard” for Central Asian interests (see Chapter 3). Moscow’s actions are thus a spur towards greater regional cooperation. “Since Russia cannot be relied upon and Chinese help, though necessary, comes with too many strings attached, Central Asian states need not only to continue diversifying their foreign

25 Thai Ambassador’s presentation of credentials to President Emomali Rahmon, 20 November 2019, Dushanbe. 26 Djoomart Otorbaev’s views expressed at the Astana Club meeting, 12 November 2019, Nur-Sultan. 27 Akram Umarov, “Third Central Asian Leaders’ Meeting Postponed to 2021: Why it Matters,” The Diplomat, 14 December 2020. 28 Bruce Pannier, “Afghanistan, Coronavirus Lend Extra Weight to Central Asian Leaders’ Summit,” RFE/RL, 9 August 2021. 29 Bruce Pannier, “Mirziyoev Steps Up As COVID-19 Crisis Increases Contact Among Central Asian Leaders,” RFE/RL, 1 April 2020. 30 Jamshed Safarov’s views in “Geopolitics of Central Asia,” Dynamic Uzbekistan no. 3 (2020): 24.

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affairs portfolios, they must find ever increasing ways to work together to confront common challenges” and deepen their regional cooperation.31 One Uzbek expert likewise argued that the pandemic and its impact on the region’s socio-economic development has meant a greater urgency for regional cooperation and that it “is time to think about the future of deepening regional cooperation” and the “institutionalisation of some areas of cooperation like water distribution and connectivity.”32 However, the significant challenges to economic development and reforms across the region arising from the pandemic might instead in the longer term “deal a tangible blow to improving regional cooperation with a rise in protectionism.”33 Border disputes also remain another obstacle as the 2021 border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have shown.34 Nonetheless, the fact that all Central Asian leaders attended the third summit after the border conflict indicates that they still attach value to this consultative process and there is a “progressive institutionalism of Central Asian multilateralism, however slow and informal,” despite the underlying tensions and disagreements that remain between some states.35

The ASEAN Model Due to the growing momentum towards greater Central Asian cooperation and potential regionalism, there have been renewed discussions particularly in the epistemic community, not only within but also outside the region, about the possibility of Central Asia following other successful models of regional cooperation such as the Nordic Council, Mercosur and ASEAN, while continent-wide supranational structures like the EU hold

31 Stephen Blank, “The Eurasian Union Flunks Its Stress Test,” The Times of Central Asia, 2 May 2020. 32 Umarov, “Third Central Asian Leaders’ Meeting”. 33 Kate Mallinson, “COVID-19 Presents Fresh Challenges to a Struggling Central

Asia,” Chatham House Expert Comment, 5 June 2020, https://www.chathamhouse. org/expert/comment/covid-19-presents-fresh-challenges-struggling-central-asia (accessed 10 June 2020). 34 Charles J. Sullivan, “Battle at the Border: An Analysis of the 2021 KyrgyzstanTajikistan Conflict,” Asian Affairs 52, no. 3 (2021): 529–535. 35 Filippo Costa Buranelli, “3rd Meeting of Central Asian Leaders: A Small Step Toward the Formation of a Regional Order?” The Diplomat, 12 August 2021.

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lesser appeal for Central Asian leaders.36 In February 2019, experts from Central Asia as well as from outside the region gathered in Tashkent to discuss such international experiences of regional cooperation and their possible application to Central Asia. Experts from Japan and Thailand highlighted ASEAN as a good example of successful regional cooperation that Central Asia can study from and apply its experiences to the region.37 The consideration of Central Asian countries learning from the ASEAN experience and from other Southeast Asian cooperation formats, however, is not new. At the 1993 Tashkent summit when it was decided to use the term Central Asia, Nazarbayev proposed that the Central Asian states form an economic union like ASEAN, but the abovementioned obstacles prevented this.38 A 1999 study also recommended that the ECO, which includes all the five Central Asian states since 1992, should look to ASEAN as a successful model for “cooperative regional development.” But as the ECO economies were handicapped by several problems it could best expect to achieve only “modest potential by drawing inspiration from

36 For example, Cornell and Starr, “Modernisation and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia;” Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, “Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Relevance of World Models”, CACI Analyst, 4 December 2018, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13547-regionalcooperation-in-central-asia-relevance-of-world-models.html (accessed 8 February 2019); Bilahari Kausikan, S. Frederick Starr, and Yang Cheng, “Central Asia: All Together Now,” The American Interest, 16 June 2017; Sattarov, “ASEAN, Uzbek-Style;” Mavlanov, “Problemy regional’nogo sotrudnichestva,” 19–28; “Istoricheskii sammit;” Juheon Lee, Aleksey Asiryan and Michael Butler, “Integration of the Central Asian Republics: The ASEAN Example,” 17 September 2020, https://www.e-ir.info/2020/09/17/integrationof-the-central-asian-republics-the-asean-example/ (accessed 9 January 2021); and Dante Schulz, “ASEAN Serves as Ideal Model for a Central Asian Regional Organization,” 18 August 2021, https://www.caspianpolicy.org/asean-serves-as-ideal-model-for-a-centralasian-regional-organization/ (accessed 13 September 2021). 37 A. Rakhimov and A. Mirzaliev, “K itogam Tashkentskoi Mezhdunarodnoi Ekspertnoi Konferentsii ‘Vzaimosviazannost’ v Tsentral’noi Azii: Vyzovy i novye vozmozhnosti’: Problemy regional’noi bezopasnosti i razvitiia v Tsentral’noi Azii v otsenkakh zarubezhnykh ekspertov,” [Towards the Outcomes of the Tashkent International Expert Conference ‘Central Asian Connectivity: Challenges and New Opportunities’: Problems of Regional Security and Development in Central Asia in the Assessment of Foreign Experts], Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia [International Relations] (Tashkent) no. 4 (2018): 5–30. 38 Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (New York: The New York Review of Books, 2017), 226–228.

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ASEAN.”39 A 2006 survey conducted by one Uzbek expert on more than 50 experts from Central Asian republics, Russia, and the UK found that the majority (95 percent) consider the EU and ASEAN as good models for regional integration in Central Asia “but with local peculiarities.”40 Later in 2014, Kazakh Foreign Minister Idrissov renewed Kazakhstan’s interest in the ASEAN experience and mechanisms to strengthen and develop regional cooperation in Central Asia.41 This renewed interest in ASEAN was picked up by Central Asian experts as well. Kazakhstan is interested in “using the ASEAN experience and mechanism of work in the process of strengthening and developing regional cooperation in Central Asia.”42 One Uzbek expert and former presidential advisor noted that ASEAN was a good model to study, especially ASEAN’s emphasis on development as a means to ensure security.43 Central Asian experts are also interested in studying other formats of interstate cooperation in Southeast Asia such as the Mekong River Commission, which works with the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam to jointly manage shared water resources and the sustainable development of the Mekong River. Central Asian states face similar challenges regarding the management of scarce water resources and how to deal with China’s growing water demand. Kazakhstan, being a downstream country and sharing river borders with China, is particularly interested in boosting regional cooperation as water resources are reaching the critical stage.44

39 Ben Partridge, “Central Asia: Economist Says ASEAN Bloc a ‘Good Model,’” RFE/RL, 1 January 2000. The other ECO members are Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan. 40 Mirzokhid Rakhimov, “Internal and External Dynamics of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 1 (2010): 97. 41 Anuar Kalmykov, “ASEAN Committee Opened in Astana,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 6 May 2014. 42 Zhainara Iskakova, ASEAN v regional’nykh integratsionnykh protsessakh [ASEAN in

Regional Integration Processes] Ph.D. Thesis, Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2019, 109. 43 Interview, 16 November 2021, Tashkent. 44 Interview with official from Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Ecology, Geology and Natural

Resources, 17 November 2020, Nur-Sultan. See also, David Trilling, “China’s Water Use Threatens Kazakhstan’s Other Big Lake,” Eurasianet, 17 March 2021.

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ASEAN’s Appeal and Normative Convergence ASEAN’s appeal has been highlighted due to Southeast Asia’s similarities to Central Asia; both regions consisting of small and medium states who have to preserve their sovereignty and survive amidst great-power competition and rivalry. Central Asia is also more homogenous than Southeast Asia and is seen as having a good chance for greater regional cooperation. Central Asian leaders also subscribe to the ASEAN principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and the peaceful resolution of disputes.45 Such a “low-impact arrangement like ASEAN, which works by consensus and eschews interference in members’ internal affairs will likely appeal to local sensibilities.”46 Indeed, the SCO’s Charter, in which four of the Central Asian states are members, outlines such norms and principles as mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of states, and non-interference in internal affairs, or the so-called “Shanghai spirit,”47 which converges with the norms and principles outlined in ASEAN’s Charter. The SCO’s model of cooperation is also in large part a copy of ASEAN’s and the two organisations share very similar underlying principles (consensus, flexibility, informality, sovereign enhancing cooperation) as well as focus (regime security, economic development and stability over promotion of democracy).48 According to Vitaly Vorobiev, the Russian President’s former special representative for SCO affairs, the SCO was created with the example of ASEAN in mind. In its turn, when ASEAN began to work on its Charter, it looked at the SCO Charter as an example.49 But while the SCO offers a flexible

45 Loro Horta, “ASEAN as a Model for Central Asia,” RSIS Commentaries no. 108 (6 June 2014). 46 James Durso, “Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy is a Regional Policy,” The Hill, 22 November 2017, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/361449-uzbekistans-for eign-policy-is-a-regional-policy (accessed 9 March 2020). 47 Nadine Godehardt, The Chinese Constitution of Central Asia: Regions and Intertwined Actors in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 125. 48 Stephen Aris, “A New Model of Asian Regionalism: Does the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Have More Potential Than ASEAN?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3 (2009): 464. 49 Gul’rukh Dzhuraeva, “Perspektivy sotrudnichestva ShOS i ASEAN v novom stoletii,” [Prospects for Cooperation Between SCO and ASEAN in the New Century], Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia [International Relations] (Tashkent) no. 3 (2015): 15.

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model based on the principles of non-interference, diversity and mutual respect, just like ASEAN, it is heavily dependent on China and lesser so Russia. ASEAN-style regionalism, on the other hand, is more conducive to embracing members’ diversity on a relatively equal footing before reaching out to or relying on other partners.50 ASEAN’s attractiveness for Central Asian leaders and experts is also due to its “soft regionalism” approach, focusing on consensus, consultation, flexibility and weak institutions that do not override national sovereignty, as opposed to the EU’s “hard regionalism,” with formal integration and institutionalisation, leading to a supranational organisation.51 For example, Karimov, in his critique of applying the EU model to the post-Soviet space due to their different regional circumstances and experiences, pointed out the existence of other regional cooperation models such as ASEAN that was not a supranational organisation and not a model of “deep integration” like the EU; implying ASEAN’s probable greater suitability for Central Asia with its own specific features.52 ASEAN’s more “flexible” approach to regionalism is therefore more attractive for Central Asian regimes that are “jealous of their sovereignty” than the Western type of regionalism such as the EU.53 It is seen as a “better fit” for Central Asia than the EU’s “deep integration” model.54 Some Central Asian experts have thus proposed that the lessons from ASEAN’s successful experience of “soft regionalism” be applied to Central Asia.55 While Central Asia can learn from both ASEAN and the EU, 50 Lee et al., “Integration of the Central Asian Republics,” 4. 51 Louis Fawcett defines “soft regionalism” as promoting a sense of regional awareness

or community, through consolidating regional groups and networks, while “hard regionalism” is the formalisation of regional groups by interstate arrangements and organisations. “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 433. 52 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century: Challenges to Stability and Progress (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 191–192. 53 Email interview with Assel Bitabarova, 19 August 2020. 54 Online interview with Uzbek expert, 13 January 2022. 55 Ikboljon Qoraboyev, “Tsentral’noaziatskii regionalizm v kontekste globalizatsii i

regionalizatsii” [Central Asian Regionalism in the Context of Globalisation and Regionalism], in Regionalizatsiia v Tsentral’noi Azii: Strategiia Kazakhstana [Regionalism in Central Asia: Strategy of Kazakhstan] (Almaty: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Fund, 2019), 85–91, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332604966_Centralnoaziatskij_region alizm_v_kontekste_globalizacii_i_regionalizacii (accessed 10 March 2020). The same

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which had their own unique paths to regionalism, the successful “soft regionalism” of ASEAN had greater appeal than the EU’s “hard institutionalisation.”56 Kyrgyz experts also viewed ASEAN as an “applicable” model for Central Asian regionalism as it is more “informal” with an “Asian” style.57 Tajik experts likewise noted that ASEAN with its “Asian values and consensus decision making” is a model worth studying and more “culturally” applicable to Central Asia than the EU model.58 However, not all Central Asian experts concur. One Uzbek expert observed that while some believe that the ASEAN model to be the most applicable to Central Asia, he proposed that Central Asia set the bar higher from the outset and follow the EU model.59 Nonetheless, he did suggest that the ASEAN model might be a good first step for Central Asia and that ASEAN should share its experience on how to develop regionalism and to deal with the great powers, which could also be done within the context of a Central Asia + ASEAN dialogue.60 Another factor is that for Central Asian regionalism to be successful and inclusive of all the five Central Asian states, there must be a positive and constructive relationship between the regional leaders—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—while the voices and concerns of the other states must also be taken fully on board. Turkmenistan’s historical aloofness from regional initiatives due to its non-aligned status is another factor that must be managed.61 ASEAN’s gradual, flexible and consensual approach can, therefore, prove to be a useful model for Central Asian cooperation in this regard. Concerns over how Russia might view future Central Asian regionalism is another factor that makes ASEAN’s “soft regionalism” approach attractive. Russia does not favourably view the potential establishment of an exclusively Central Asian regional cooperation structure, preferring instead to subsume Central Asian unity under its own Eurasian expert reaffirmed this view at an ASEAN Ambassadors’ joint talk at KAZGUU University, 28 November 2019, Nur-Sultan. 56 Interview with Ikboljon Qoraboyev, 6 October 2020, Nur-Sultan. 57 Interviews, 15–16 July 2021, Bishkek. 58 Interview, 9 July 2021, Dushanbe. 59 Farkhod Tolipov, “Central Asia: The Integration Theory,” in Marlene Laruelle

and Aitolkyn Kourmanova, eds., Central Asia at 25: Looking Back, Moving Forward (Washington DC: Central Asia Program, George Washington University, 2017), 27. 60 Interview with Farkhod Tolipov, 21 November 2021, Tashkent. 61 Cornell and Starr, “Modernisation and Regional Cooperation,” 60–61.

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integration project such as the EAEU. Due to ASEAN’s more “informal” or “soft” regionalism, with a focus on consensus and consultation, rather than on formal integration and institutionalisation, this would allow the development of Central Asian cooperation in a low-key and informal manner, “lest any efforts be hijacked or thwarted by Russia.” At the same time, it would not prevent Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states to participate in the process of Russian-led Eurasian integration. “China, on the other hand, would likely only gain from closer cooperation among the Central Asian states, as this would facilitate the realisation of its own infrastructure and investment projects under the BRI.”62 China’s relatively positive view of Central Asian regionalism was expressed by one Chinese diplomat who noted that greater regional cooperation and stability would be a good outcome and that the two main economies—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—would be the key drivers of regionalism, despite their lingering “friendly competition.”63 Japan and the EU have also long supported greater Central Asian cooperation, while the US is seen as relatively “passive.”64 However, according to US diplomats, it is US policy to support greater Central Asian regional cooperation, particularly on border issues and regarding Afghanistan, and that Central Asian countries might study and emulate the ASEAN model.65 Japanese diplomats and experts have also suggested that Central Asia create an ASEAN-like organisation and proposed a role for Japan in supporting Central Asian regional cooperation as it did with ASEAN.66

62 Annette Bohr, “Relations with Other Central Asian States,” in Annette Bohr, Birgit Brauer, Nigel-Gould-Davies et al., eds., Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition (London: Chatham House, 2019), 84–85. 63 Conversation, 19 February 2019, Nur-Sultan. 64 Starr, “Is This Central Asia’s ASEAN Moment?”. 65 Conversations, 8 July 2021, Dushanbe, and 4 February 2019, Nur-Sultan. 66 Timur Dadabaev, “Engagement and Contestation: The Entangled Imagery of the Silk

Road,” Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 2 (2018), 11; Richard Weitz, “Japan Promotes Multilateralism in Central Asia”, Eurasianet, 4 May 2007; and Akio Kawato, “Japan’s Role in Regional Cooperation in Central Asia—in the Light of the ASEAN’s Example,” 18 November 2017, http://www.japan-world-trends.com/en/civilization/a_c all_for_unity_in_central_as.php (accessed 21 April 2020).

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Japan supports greater Central Asian cooperation and economic integration as this will present a larger and more attractive market for Japanese businesses.67

Hedging Regionalism ASEAN and Central Asia both consists of “small states” in terms of relative power. Their regions are beset by great-power rivalry and must contend with China’s growing influence.68 ASEAN’s relative success in engaging with and managing relations with several great powers thus holds particular appeal for Central Asian states. The small and medium states of Southeast Asia have been reluctant to choose sides during periods of great-power rivalry from the Cold War to current US-China tensions and have each tried to pursue a hedging strategy to varying degrees. As Chapter One noted, ASEAN has often been used as a “hedging platform” for its member states amidst the uncertainty of the post-Cold War era. ASEAN and its ASEAN Plus multilateral mechanisms have helped provide additional space and platforms for the Southeast Asian states to hedge against the risks associated with the shifting geostrategic landscape, not least the rise of China.69 The Southeast Asian states have tried not to balance nor bandwagon with the great powers but rather engage them through ASEAN and other ASEAN-centred platforms such as the ARF, ASEAN + 3, and EAS. By doing so, the ASEAN states “foster their diplomatic linkages and economic activities with two or more competing major powers to a level at which they are able to influence the major powers’ policies but still insulate themselves from undue external influence.”70 ASEAN’s “hedging regionalism” role—the use of regional cooperation or regional platforms as a hedging mechanism—can thus be applied to

67 Madiyev, Uzbekistan’s International Relations, 183. This view was also expressed by a Japanese diplomat to the author, 9 July 2021, Dushanbe. 68 Sebastian Krapohl and Alexandra Vasileva-Dienes, “The Region That Isn’t: China, Russia and the Failure of Regional Integration in Central Asia,” Asia Europe Journal 18 (2020): 362. 69 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Keeping the Balance: Power Transitions Threaten ASEAN’s Hedging Role,” East Asia Forum Quarterly (January–March 2018): 22. 70 Renato Cruz de Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016): 141.

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the small and medium Central Asian states as well. Rather than choosing a particular power to balance against or bandwagon with, the Central Asian states, except for Turkmenistan, have joined various regional initiatives led by Russia and China while trying to strengthen their own regional cooperation as a way to hedge against those powers. The ASEAN experience is therefore seen as a useful model for Central Asian regionalism that is not centred on or dominated by great powers, which can provide a platform for hedging for the Central Asian states. Specifically, Central Asia can benefit from ASEAN’s experience in the development of a core of solidarity among its members to prevent foreign powers from playing ASEAN members against each other, particularly in the face of a rising China and the involvement of other great powers, which is a situation shared by Central Asia.71 ASEAN provided its members a platform to safeguard their economic and political sovereignty against great powers like China, which Central Asian states could learn from and create a similar regional platform to counterbalance their powerful neighbours.72 Central Asian states need greater coordination to effectively respond to external powers which should be based on five principles: (1) voluntarism and consensus; (2) cooperation and coordination, not integration; (3) no need to “reinvent the wheel” by looking at other examples such as ASEAN; (4) have concrete forms of cooperation; and (5) grow organically, and sanctioned by the political leadership.73 Central Asian regionalism based on ASEAN could allow for the region’s states to develop their own internal trade connections and support each other’s development while providing a more unified policy to negotiate with major powers more effectively. An ASEAN-style partnership would allow Central Asian states to support each other’s development and gradually present a cohesive foreign policy towards the outside world in ways that reassure major powers.74 As one former Singaporean diplomat opined, while conditions in the two regions are different and Central Asia “cannot just copy ASEAN,” it can “take inspiration from ASEAN’s flexible and adaptive structure” and to define Central Asia in its own interests rather

71 Cornell and Starr, “Modernisation and Regional Cooperation,” 47–48. 72 Schulz, “ASEAN Serves as Ideal Model”. 73 Svante Cornell’s comments at the Astana Club meeting, 12 November 2019, NurSultan. 74 Lee et al., “Integration of the Central Asian Republics,” 4.

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than just be “passive” and “let the region be defined by external great powers.” Moreover, the key lesson from ASEAN that Central Asia can take is that “smaller countries are never entirely without agency when dealing with big powers.”75 One expert on China’s role in Central Asia believes that Central Asia can learn from ASEAN countries on how to deal with China, in particular, as a regional grouping.76 A US expert has also called for Central Asian states to “take their future into their own hands” by learning from ASEAN’s experience to form a united front and cooperate to balance between great powers, particularly in the aftermath of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and intensifying great-power competition.77 Central Asian experts also see the need for greater coordination among the regional states to effectively manage relations with the great powers. One Uzbek expert called for Central Asian states to pursue a foreign policy of “positive diversification” whereby there is a more coordinated policy among the Central Asian states and external powers are engaged with equally and inclusively. This avoids the zero-sum approach of “negative diversification” in which the foreign policy and strategic orientation of Central Asian states are conditioned by realist balance of power thinking and great-power politics and competition that usually comes at the expense of the Central Asian states themselves.78 He further argued that the “eclectic” nature of their multi-vector foreign policies as well as the different ways this policy had been interpreted and pursued by each of the five Central Asian states had caused the failure of the “five-sided system” in Central Asia where their multi-vector policies should instead be more concerted and coordinated in order to achieve successful regional

75 Iskander Akylbaev, “Asymmetrical Dynamic Multipolarity: An Interview with Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan,” Central Asia Analytical Network Article, 6 July 2020, https:// caa-network.org/archives/20041 (accessed 9 July 2020). 76 Online conversation, 6 June 2021. 77 Moez Hayat, “Afghanistan and Central Asia’s ASEAN Moment,” The Diplomat, 10

August 2021. 78 Tolipov, “The Foreign Policy Orientations of Central Asian States,” 23–40.

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cooperation.79 He called for greater Central Asian integration and cooperation to overcome the “small-country complex of being afraid and incapable in front of the great powers.”80 Another Uzbek expert similarly proposed that amidst rising tensions between the great powers that might force states to choose sides, Central Asian states need to boost their cooperation to maintain their resilience in the face of contemporary challenges and threats, not least great-power competition. The establishment of effective intraregional cooperation mechanisms would not only potentially counteract “great power efforts to lock regional states into relations of dependence,” but also allow them to develop a strong, unified voice in promoting their interests “while avoiding being drawn into the zerosum games of great powers.” “The further deepening of Central Asian cooperation, foreign policy coordination, and trust-building measures can act as a bulwark against great power destabilisation.”81 Other Uzbek experts likewise stressed the need for Central Asian states to strengthen their cooperation and have a consolidated position when dealing with external powers in order to be able to withstand their pressure.82 Such views were also expressed at the highest level. President Nazarbayev, in particular, repeatedly called for greater integration of the Central Asian countries in his presidential addresses in order to stabilise the region and to provide them with more regional weight which would better help preserve their independence amidst potential “superpower rivalry for economic dominance” in Central Asia.83 In this light, some Central Asian experts have proposed learning from the ASEAN experience in dealing with great powers as a regional grouping. Kazakh experts see the tasks facing ASEAN at its beginning similar to those facing Central Asian states today namely, economic 79 Farkhod Tolipov, “Eklektichnost’ mnogovektornost’ kak faktor sboia piatistoronnosti v Tsentral’noi Azii” [The Eclecticism of Multi-Vectorism as a Factor in the Failure of the Five-Sided System in Central Asia], Central Asia Analytical Network Article, 8 September 2020, https://www.caa-network.org/archives/20446 (accessed 9 September 2020). 80 Interview with Farkhod Tolipov. 81 Akram Umarov, “How Rising Great Power Tensions Will Affect Central Asia,” The

Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, 8 April 2021, https://oxussociety.org/how-risinggreat-power-tensions-will-affect-central-asia/ (accessed 10 April 2021). 82 Interviews, 16 November 2021, Tashkent. 83 Cited from Thomas Ambrosio and William A. Lange, “Mapping Kazakhstan’s

Geopolitical Code: An Analysis of Nazarbayev’s Presidential Addresses, 1997–2014,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 55, no. 5 (2014): 550.

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depression, unresolved interethnic and territorial problems, and greatpower rivalry in the region. In their view, ASEAN’s success in uniting small states to withstand pressure from larger states is also attractive for Central Asian states who are currently facing an even more precarious balance of power.84 Another Kazakh expert noted that “Central Asian states could possibly create their own regional platform similar to ASEAN to resist the expansion of China, Russia or America.”85 Another proposed that Central Asia can draw upon ASEAN’s experience as a “central platform for great-power interaction,” as this is an area where there are commonalities between the two regions.86 Similarly, one Uzbek expert proposed that Central Asia learn from ASEAN’s dialogue partner mechanisms as a means to cooperate with external powers as well as balancing their influence in the region.87

Conclusion The recent renewed momentum towards forging an exclusive Central Asian regionalism has prompted renewed discussion and exploration of possible regionalism models to follow and learn from. ASEAN is one such model that is particularly attractive due to the convergence of its norms and principles of non-interference in internal affairs and consensus decision-making with those held in Central Asia, including in the SCO in which four Central Asian countries are members. ASEAN’s “soft regionalism” approach also holds greater appeal for Central Asian elites who value their sovereignty, while “hard regionalism” projects such as the EU, in which there is deep integration and institutionalisation, is anathema to them. The relative success of ASEAN’s “hedging regionalism” role or the use of regional cooperation or regional platforms as a hedging mechanism is also attractive for Central Asian states that are facing similar geostrategic circumstances of being small and medium states in the midst of greatpower competition and expanding influence. An ASEAN-style platform for greater regional cooperation and coordination of policy towards the 84 Zhainara Iskakova, Marat Sarsembayev, and Zarina Kakenova, “Can Central Asia be integrated as ASEAN?” Opción 34, no. 85 (2018). 85 Aidar Amrebayev, “Eurasia’s Economic Union and ASEAN: Why Interaction is Important,” RSIS Commentary no. 233 (21 September 2016). 86 Interview with Iskander Akylbayev, 8 October 2020, Nur-Sultan. 87 Interview, 28 April 2022, Tashkent.

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great powers is an attractive model for Central Asian states to emulate. The increasing acceptance of the C5+1 dialogue platform by external powers, including Russia and China, bodes well not only for enhancing regional cooperation but also for the Central Asian states to use this mechanism to pursue their multi-vector foreign policies and to balance the influence of great powers.88 Indeed, Central Asian cooperation and regionalism is complementary to their pursuance of a multi-vector foreign policy as they are both grounded on flexibility, pragmatism and informality in order to ensure that no single great power dominates the region.89 The Central Asian states can even build upon their C5+1 dialogue platforms with various powers by expanding to C5+2 or 3 etc. This is similar to the ASEAN+3 platform that is used to engage with China, Japan and South Korea collectively, and it can later be expanded to a forum akin to the EAS. Some progress in studying the ASEAN model, among others, have begun at the expert level with analytical papers published and discussions held. For example, a paper drafted by one research institute under Uzbekistan’s Cabinet of Ministers studied ASEAN’s positive economic development and concluded that the ASEAN experience could serve as a model for Central Asian regional integration.90 Furthermore, a study visit of young Central Asian leaders to Singapore to learn about the ASEAN experience was held in February 2019 and hosted by the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore. The “Understanding ASEAN” seminar was attended by 13 participants from all five Central Asian states and from Afghanistan and Mongolia with talks on ASEAN

88 Farrukh Hakimov, “Dynamics of Regional Development in Central Asia and the Format of Multilateral Cooperation ‘5 + 1’,” 25 June 2021, https://cabar.asia/en/dyn amics-of-regional-development-in-central-asia-and-the-new-format-of-multilateral-cooper ation-5-1 (accessed 25 June 2021). 89 “Regionalism and Regional Order in Central Asia: An Interview with Filippo Costa Buranelli,” 9 September 2021, https://voicesoncentralasia.org/regionalism-and-regionalorder-in-central-asia-an-interview-with-filippo-costa-buranelli/ (accessed 10 September 2021). 90 Dilafruz Mukhsimova, “Perspektivy razvitiia regional’noi integratsii Tsentral’noi Azii na primere assotsiatsii stran Iugo-Vostochnoi Azii (ASEAN)” [The Prospects of the Development of Regional Integration of Central Asia as Exemplified by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)], Ekonomika, Predprinimatel’stvo i Pravo [Journal of Economics, Entrepreneurship and Law] 5, no. 4 (2015): 273–282.

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delivered by former foreign ministers from Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore.91 One Kyrgyz participant later wrote that the ASEAN experience shows how small countries like Brunei and Laos could benefit from regional integration, with the associated access to the markets of ASEAN dialogue partners, and also have equal rights and voting power with other members as decisions taken in ASEAN are only with consensus. Kyrgyzstan, as a small state, could therefore benefit from Central Asian integration that takes after the ASEAN model.92 A roundtable discussion on “Lessons of ASEAN: formation of a regional economic union model” was later held in May 2019 in Bishkek that was attended mainly by experts from Central Asia, including some participants of the study visit to Singapore, to share views and get acquainted with the ASEAN experience.93 However, one Kazakh participant of the Singapore visit was more sceptical, viewing the ASEAN experience as an example that such regional cooperation is possible, but a model that Central Asia cannot immediately draw upon, especially regarding the formation of its bureaucratic structures and institutions. Given that Central Asian countries are relatively young and are still in a process of establishing their own national identity politics and choosing development paths, more time, discussion, funding, and political will are needed for Central Asia to reach the same level of regional cooperation as ASEAN. He warned against “over-romanticising” Central Asian regionalism which is a long-term development that requires a gradual approach.94 However, it should be stressed that discussions on the ASEAN model have mostly been held at the expert level so far

91 The author thanks Ms. Lim Wei Chean, Middle East Institute, National University

of Singapore, for sharing information about the seminar by email, 29 June 2020. 92 “Kak Kyrgyzstanu otkryt’ okean na primere ASEAN?” [How Can the Ocean Open Up for Kyrgyzstan as in the ASEAN example?], 24 June 2019, https://stanradar.com/ news/full/35082-kak-kyrgyzstanu-otkryt-okean-na-primere-asean.html (accessed 22 June 2020). 93 “ASEAN as a model of regional integration discussed in Bishkek,” 21 May 2019, http://www.ibc.kg/en/news/members/4386_asean_as_a_model_of_regional_ integration_discussed_in_bishkek (accessed 10 March 2020) and “Uroki ASEAN: Stanovlenie modeli ekonomicheskogo regional’nogo soiuza” [Lessons of ASEAN: Formation of a Model of an Economic Regional Union], 19 May 2019, https://auca.kg/ru/ auca_news/3745/ (accessed 22 June 2020). 94 Interview with Iskander Akylbayev.

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and none of the Central Asian governments has contacted the ASEAN Secretariat regarding this issue.95 Nonetheless, the trend towards a new Central Asian regionalism where the region’s countries jointly work together independent from outside influence appears promising and gaining strength. The region’s two leading players—Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—have both championed this process and expressed political will. As remarked by Nazarbayev, after meeting with Mirziyoyev in 2018, Central Asians are capable of managing the challenges in the region by themselves without interference from outsiders. Moreover, Tokayev, as the architect of the multi-vector foreign policy of balancing the great powers through positive relations that were “widely copied” by other Central Asian states, should well understand that it would be far easier for Central Asian states to achieve such a balance through coordination and cooperation with one another rather than by acting alone.96 The ASEAN experience of developing dialogues as a unit with other powers is therefore useful for Central Asia in demonstrating that regional states with primary loyalty to each other first can then jointly develop fruitful relations with external powers.97 ASEAN too should encourage and support such greater Central Asian cooperation and regionalism as it would mean a larger market for their goods as well as help ensure regional security and prosperity. This could prove to be another area for enhancing Central Asia–Southeast Asia engagement. However, ASEAN itself is facing several challenges to its unity, centrality and relevance. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Central Asia too is likely being increasingly forced to choose sides. Reflections on the future developments of Central Asia–Southeast Asia relations will be made in light of these developments in the Conclusion.

95 Email correspondence with ASEAN Secretariat, 28 April 2020. 96 Starr, “Is This Central Asia’s ASEAN Moment?”. 97 Cornell and Starr, “Modernisation and Regional Cooperation,” 63.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

Abstract The concluding chapter firstly outlines the book’s key findings and arguments. It then suggests further areas for research, provides policy recommendations to enhance Central Asia–Southeast Asia engagement, and lastly reflects on the challenges and likely directions of the relationship in light of the seismic events of early 2022, namely Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Keywords Key findings · Policy recommendations · Future challenges

This book has examined Central Asia–Southeast Asia relations by utilising the international relations literature of small and medium states, namely their hedging strategy. It has applied three concepts—omnidirectional hedging, economic hedging and hedging regionalism—to explore the nature of Central Asia–Southeast Asia relations. It argued that some key Southeast Asian countries, as well as ASEAN as a regional body, are seen as viable alternative partners for Central Asian states, particularly in the economic sphere. Central Asian states’ views and policies towards Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN are informed by their hedging strategy—to diversify their foreign relations and economic partners as much as possible in order to avoid overdependence on one power, namely Russia and China. As part of this hedging strategy, it was further argued © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Rangsimaporn, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10112-0_5

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that a more substantive and significant relationship between Central Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as ASEAN, was emerging due to three key driving factors: Russia’s EAEU; China’s BRI; and Central Asia’s concerns over China’s expanding economic influence. It lastly examined ASEAN as a possible model for the burgeoning movement towards exclusive Central Asian regionalism, in which ASEAN’s norms and principles, soft regionalism approach as well as hedging regionalism role hold particular appeal for Central Asian leaders and elites. This could prove to be another area for greater interregional engagement in the future. The chapter will outline the key findings and arguments, suggest further areas for research, provide policy recommendations to enhance interregional engagement, and reflect on the challenges and likely directions of the relationship in light of the recent seismic events of early 2022, namely Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Key Findings and Arguments Firstly, Central Asian countries have tried to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy to varying degrees and success. The aim is to diversify their foreign partners as much as possible to avoid overdependence on one power and to enhance their strategic space and room for manoeuvre. The countries of Central Asia and Southeast Asia have increasingly recognised the growing importance of each other’s respective regions, in terms of being potentially large and relatively untapped markets for their goods and for greater economic cooperation. Both sides have thus stepped up their engagement and began to explore avenues for further cooperation. The Southeast Asian vector is seen as part of the omnidirectional hedging and economic hedging strategy of the Central Asian states. As Southeast Asia’s ability to project political and security influence beyond their immediate region is very limited, their focus has very much been on expanding their economic interests and presence in Central Asia. Leading Southeast Asian economies such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam are viewed as attractive alternative economic partners for Central Asia. However, the vast physical distance between the two regions and weak transport and logistics links have been the main obstacles to more significant trade and economic ties. The poor business and investment climate and relatively small markets, especially in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, have presented further obstacles to stronger economic links,

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despite the recent renewed focus on economic diplomacy by the Central Asian states. Secondly, some Southeast Asian countries, particularly Singapore and Malaysia, are seen as alternative socio-economic and political models for the Central Asian states to emulate, particularly in their early years of independence. Their successful coupling of stable authoritarian political rule with advanced economic development resonates well with Central Asia’s authoritarian rulers. The close personal ties between the leaders of Singapore and Malaysia with their Central Asian counterparts have also helped give those countries an edge over their Southeast Asian competitors, providing them with greater socio-economic opportunities in the region and making them the leading Southeast Asian investors and economic partners in Central Asia. Malaysia has a relatively strong energy presence, particularly in Turkmenistan, while Singapore has a strong brand recognition in Central Asia in the field of education and human resources development as well as digital economy and technology, and logistics. Thirdly, Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, see engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-led fora as an important entry point to the dynamically growing Asia–Pacific economy. They aim to participate and benefit from the regional integration processes which would also help enhance their strategic space and diversify their economic partners. However, their formal engagement and interaction with ASEAN remain limited primarily due to not having enough substantial economic links required for ASEAN to establish formal relations with. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two most promising partners for ASEAN, have explored engagement with ASEAN through other avenues such as CICA and the SCO, though these are also limited. The idea of a C5+1 dialogue with ASEAN to promote further engagement has also been floated, but yet to be picked up and promoted by leaders, particularly from the ASEAN side. Fourthly, in recent years there have been further drivers of greater interregional engagement. Firstly, the interest of ASEAN and its members to strengthen economic relations with the Russian-led EAEU and vice versa. Secondly, the interest of Southeast Asian countries to utilise China’s BRI to gain access to the Central Asian and European markets. Thirdly, amidst Central Asia’s concerns over China’s expanding economic influence, the Central Asian states are seeking to engage with alternative partners, including those in Southeast Asia, to provide a counterweight to China. These key drivers are informed by Central Asian states’

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economic hedging behaviour. This includes a policy of economic pragmatism whereby they seek to extract the maximum economic benefits from engaging with the Russian-led EAEU and China’s BRI, while simultaneously pursuing a policy of economic diversification, by forging economic links with ASEAN and its member states to lessen economic dependence on China. Central Asian states’ engagement with, and participation in, the BRI and EAEU also facilitates their greater economic engagement with ASEAN and its members. Fifthly, Central Asian states have pursued a hedging regionalism strategy by joining various regional projects led by both Russia and China while also trying to move towards an exclusive Central Asian regionalism without the inclusion of those powers, aiming to use such regionalism as a hedging platform. ASEAN’s relative success in forging Southeast Asian regionalism is seen as a particularly attractive model for Central Asian states to follow, and a possible driving factor for greater engagement between the two regions. This is because of the convergence of ASEAN norms and principles of non-interference in internal affairs and consensusbased decision-making with those held in Central Asia, including in the SCO, in which four Central Asian countries are members. ASEAN’s soft regionalism approach also holds greater appeal for Central Asian elites who value their sovereignty, while hard regionalism projects such as the EU, in which there is deep integration and institutionalisation, is less attractive. The relative success of ASEAN’s hedging regionalism role or the use of regional cooperation or regional dialogue platforms as a hedging mechanism is also attractive for Central Asian states that are facing similar geostrategic circumstances of being small and medium states in the midst of great-power competition and expanding influence. An ASEAN-style platform for greater regional cooperation and coordination of policy towards the great powers is viewed as an attractive model for Central Asian states to emulate and could prove to be another area for interregional engagement.

Further Areas for Research Firstly, in the Introductory Chapter, a caveat was made that the book only argues that Central Asian states have tried to pursue a hedging strategy in their multi-vector foreign policies, but whether they have been successful in implementing such a strategy is beyond this book’s scope. The book does not pass judgement on whether they have been successful in hedging

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or not but rather examines the motivations and driving factors for Central Asian relations with Southeast Asia i.e. as part of their attempt to pursue a hedging strategy by diversifying their partners. As one Western expert on Central Asia opined, hedging is often mere rhetoric used as a legitimising device by the ruling regime for its domestic audience. Central Asian states are too small and weak to really be able to implement a hedging strategy and they remain in the shadow of Russia’s influence. For Central Asian states to successfully hedge, it requires them to fix their economies, really follow the rule of law, and significantly improve their business and investment climate in order to successfully attract alternative partners.1 Therefore, there is scope for further research to assess whether Central Asian states have been successful in implementing a hedging strategy. This would require analysis of each Central Asian state’s overall foreign policy, and not just towards a particular power or region because hedging entails omnidirectionality and the diversification of as many partners as possible. It also requires further analysis of the Central Asian state’s strengths and capabilities that would enable it to successfully hedge. Secondly, further research on the “soft power” of Central Asia and Southeast Asia should be explored; to examine the power to attract countries in both regions with regard to each other. Elements of this was touched upon in Chapters 2 and 3, in which some Southeast Asian states are seen as political and socio-economic models for Central Asian states and leaders to emulate. Singapore’s brand recognition in the education and human capital development field has also attracted Central Asia’s interest and desire to collaborate with Singapore in this area. The moderate Muslim identity of Malaysia and Indonesia also appeals to similarly moderate Muslim Central Asian states and helped provide the impetus for more engagement. Chapter 3 also mentions the more positive image of Southeast Asia compared to China’s in Central Asia, although there has yet to be any poll or survey conducted on this. It would be interesting to see whether this is really the case and what the surveyed views of Central Asians are towards Southeast Asian countries in relation to other Asian countries.

1 Author’s conversation, 19 October 2020, Nur-Sultan.

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Policy Recommendations Firstly, for Central Asian states, greater engagement with Southeast Asia and ASEAN could help provide more balance in their foreign relations and some counterweight to Chinese economic influence as well as lessen their economic dependence on a particular power. The Southeast Asian vector should, therefore, be given greater weight in the Central Asian states’ multi-vector foreign policy. As the Central Asian states are seeking to diversify their exports and attract new foreign investors and technology, key Southeast Asian countries could become such partners, especially in the fields of agriculture and food processing, the halal industry, digital economy and smart cities, education and training, hospitality and tourism, information and communication technologies, logistics management and the medical industry. Such greater engagement with Southeast Asian states would assist Central Asian states’ attempts to pursue a hedging strategy as well as their economic development. Secondly, Southeast Asian countries should also step up their engagement with Central Asia as this would mean greater access to the potential benefits arising from Russia’s EAEU and China’s BRI. The EAEU zone represents a relatively large and untapped market for Southeast Asia, and they can use Kazakhstan, which is the second-largest EAEU economy after Russia, as another springboard into the EAEU zone as well as to other Central Asian markets. Uzbekistan’s potential membership of the EAEU would also add about 34 million people to the EAEU market. Moreover, as the countries of Central Asia lie at the heart of China’s New Silk Road, they are the key link for Southeast Asian countries to deliver goods from Asia to Europe faster and potentially cheaper than via the maritime route. Economic ties, which have so far been the weakest link due to transport and logistical problems, may be strengthened through enhanced connectivity between the two components of China’s BRI (land and sea) as well as between the BRI and the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity 2025.2 Other routes such as those connecting Central Asia with South Asia should also be explored to provide alternatives to China’s East–West route. Prior to 2022, the increasing interest of Southeast Asian

2 “ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Synergising the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” adopted in Bangkok on 3 November 2019, https://asean.org/asean-china-joint-statement-synergising-masterplan-asean-connectivity-mpac-2025-belt-road-initiative-bri/ (accessed 11 June 2020).

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countries to strengthen relations with the EAEU and to use the BRI to gain access to the Central Asia market and onwards to Europe, bode well for the enhancement of economic ties between Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Thirdly, a dialogue mechanism to facilitate greater Central Asia–Southeast Asia engagement should be established to explore avenues for further cooperation. This would also help strengthen cooperation between the Central Asian states and ASEAN as a regional organisation. Such a dialogue mechanism could follow the C5+1 dialogue format, which has already been well established between the five Central Asian states with several powers. The first C5+1 meeting between the Central Asian states and the secretariat of the League of Arab States and some of its member countries was also held on the side-lines of the CICA foreign ministers’ meeting in Nur-Sultan in October 2021.3 Therefore, precedence has already been set for such a C5+1 dialogue format between the Central Asian states and regional organisations, including the secretariat and member states. As noted in Chapter 2, ASEAN itself has similar formats with its dialogue partners, and the first C5+1 dialogue with Japan was based on ASEAN’s format. Both sides are thus well familiar with such a dialogue mechanism. A C5+1 meeting with ASEAN could start at the senior officials’ level to work on the agenda and test its feasibility, and perhaps later upgrade to the ministerial level and even leaders’ level. In the view of one Uzbek expert, such a dialogue should have concrete ideas, plans and projects that distinguishes itself from other C5+1 formats because “Central Asia is now exposed to so many geopolitical injections.” One concrete agenda could be the sharing of ASEAN’s experience in developing regionalism and in managing relations with the great powers.4 Fourthly, Central Asia and ASEAN should engage with each other more to explore the idea of using ASEAN as a model for Central Asian regionalism. ASEAN has, since the Cold War, been relatively successful in navigating through the murky waters of great-power competition, and could share its experience and advice on how to engage and manage relations with several external powers. ASEAN’s gradual, flexible, informal and consensual development process also holds greater appeal for the

3 Author’s conversation with a Kazakh foreign ministry official, 3 November 2021, Nur-Sultan. 4 Interview with Farkhod Tolipov, 21 November 2021, Tashkent.

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Central Asian countries and is a model that their leaders are perhaps more comfortable with. Indeed, the Central Asian states can build upon their C5+1 dialogue platforms with various powers by expanding to C5+2 or 3, etc. This is similar to the ASEAN+3 platform that is used to engage with China, Japan and South Korea collectively, and it can later be expanded to a forum akin to the EAS. However, as one Uzbek expert noted, while Central Asia can learn from the ASEAN experience as a platform for regional states to interact with external powers, ASEAN itself is growing weak due to being too diverse with too many members.5 This is particularly true recently with ASEAN centrality and unity being increasingly challenged by the growing US–China rivalry, the deteriorating security situation in Myanmar, and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Reflections on the Challenges and Likely Directions of Relations Firstly, the challenge of weak transport and logistics links between the two regions remain, despite China’s BRI and Central Asian states’ attempts to use their participation in the project as a selling point to attract Southeast Asian states among others. As Bruno Maçães pointed out, the vast majority of trade between Europe and Asia remains by sea and not by rail, as it is more economically competitive albeit taking longer. Moreover, “hard infrastructure” such as roads and railways by itself is not enough. Central Asian governments should also focus on building “soft infrastructure,” particularly an enabling environment for investment and trade such as favourable tax regimes and incentives.6 This would help build confidence among Southeast Asian investors and businesses to engage more with Central Asia. A similar view was expressed by the former Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan who noted that the maritime component of the BRI remains more viable than the land component due to, among other reasons, the higher unit cost of rail transport than by sea. He further expressed doubts regarding the increasing strategic significance of Eurasia, and of Central Asia as its heartland. This is due to the “many latent rivalries in a complex region of not yet entirely stable Central Asian states,”

5 Online interview, 13 January 2022. 6 Views expressed at the Astana Club meeting, 12 November 2019, Nur-Sultan.

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the uncertainty of whether Russia’s EAEU and China’s BRI are complementary, as Moscow and Beijing claims, or really competitors, and how Sino-Russian relations in the region will develop in the future. Furthermore, he sees the BRI as “still a motley collection of projects undertaken for a diversity of reasons, not all of which are commercial, wrapped up in a slogan, and presented as a strategy.” In his view, “Central Asia is still largely terra incognita to much of Southeast Asia whose ‘Eurasian’ connections are primarily to China with Russia a distant second.”7 This notion is related to the second challenge to greater interregional engagement. Apart from the vast physical distance and weak connectivity links, there is also a vast cultural gap between the two regions. More than a hundred years of Russian and Soviet domination of Central Asia has separated Central Asia from Asia in so many ways. Even though 30 years of Central Asian independence has passed, such barriers have yet to be fully overcome. As one expert succinctly observed, “Central Asia is still neither Central nor Asia: it is still a post-Soviet periphery.”8 To overcome these cultural differences and mutual lack of knowledge, people-to-people relations, socio-cultural and educational cooperation should be enhanced. Southeast Asian “soft power” diplomacy in Central Asia through cultural events and exchanges should be actively promoted, and vice versa. Indonesia’s cultural centre in Nur-Sultan is a good step in this direction. Centres of studies and language training of the two regions should be established and academic exchanges promoted. Tourism both ways has great potential and could be expanded through visa-free regimes and direct flights. All of this would facilitate people-to-people relations and greater mutual understanding, interest and trust. Thirdly, both regions are facing greater geostrategic uncertainty than ever before since the end of the Cold War that may severely undermine the driving factors of greater engagement put forward in this book. Putin’s war in Ukraine has shaken the foundations of European security and world order with serious repercussions far and wide in both Central Asia and Southeast Asia. The strongest ever Western sanctions on Russia have without doubt negatively affected the economies of Central

7 Bilahari Kausikan, “Is Southeast Asia ‘Eurasian’?” in Glenn Diesen and Alexander Lukin, eds., The Return of Eurasia: Continuity and Change (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 279–280 (italics in original). 8 Interview with Ikboljon Qoraboyev, 6 October 2020, Nur-Sultan.

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Asia who are intrinsically linked with the Russian economy.9 The future of the EAEU is also in doubt as Russia, the largest economy, is being hit hard by sanctions and increasingly isolated economically and politically. The Central Asian states are scrambling to limit the damage but it is unlikely that their economies would be able to effectively weather this storm in light of their strong economic links to Russia as well as the economic problems they are already enduring from the COVID19 pandemic. Politically, the Central Asian states have to walk a diplomatic tightrope, refraining from statements that appear to support Russia or to criticise it. Their voting on the UNGA resolution on Ukraine on 2 March 2022 reflects this attempt at neutrality with three abstentions (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and two absents (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Nonetheless, it is highly likely that Russia would continue to apply pressure on the Central Asian states to support its position. Kazakhstan is the most likely target given its large economy as well as Tokayev being seen as arguably beholden to Putin for sending Russian-led CSTO peacekeepers to help shore up his power amidst the political unrest in early January 2022. Seeing Russia’s economic weakness, China might also step up its economic and political presence in the region, although its BRI project and economy are also negatively affected by the Ukraine war.10 Given such pressure and potential threats from both powers, it is even more imperative for Central Asian states to try to hedge as much as they can and reach out to other external powers amidst a rapidly shrinking strategic space. As for Southeast Asia, the region was already being torn apart by the intensifying US–China rivalry as well as the divided and lacklustre response to the 2021 Myanmar military coup. The lack of ASEAN unity was already undermining ASEAN centrality, and hedging was increasingly seen as a luxury that ASEAN states cannot afford for long.11 Putin’s war on Ukraine has also led to a “characteristically bland” response from ASEAN that had to adopt a “lowest common denominator” position that 9 “Central Asia Currencies Feeling Heavy Pressure from Ruble’s Tumble,” Eurasianet,

28 February 2022. 10 Andreea Brinza, “Putin’s War Has Killed China’s Eurasian Railway Dreams,” Foreign Policy, 1 March 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/01/belt-road-initiative-neweurasian-land-bridge-china-russia-poland/ (accessed 7 March 2022). 11 David Hutt, “Shifting SE Asia Sentiment Amid US-China Rivalry,” Asia Times, 22 February 2022.

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best reflected the different views held by the member states.12 The way ASEAN states voted on the UNGA resolution also reflects their different positions, with most in favour and two abstentions (Laos and Vietnam). The Ukraine war has also negatively affected Southeast Asia’s economy due to rising oil and food prices, and disruption to the global supply chain. These impacts on the global economy will undoubtedly limit or even reduce Central Asia–Southeast Asia trade and economic ties even more. Russia’s economic decline would surely undermine the EAEU’s attractiveness for ASEAN countries and lessen their interest in concluding FTAs. ASEAN countries’ interest in Central Asia is likely to subsequently decrease as well. Putin’s hopes for Russia’s Turn to the East and Greater Eurasian Partnership initiatives to better connect and engage with Asia, including ASEAN, are likely to be dashed, with Russia becoming even more dependent on China. Even China has maintained a careful position, not supporting Putin’s invasion outright and repeatedly abstaining in UNSC and UNGA votes on Ukraine.13 Unless Russia ends its aggression in Ukraine, it remains unclear where Russia’s fate lies as it is increasingly isolated from Europe and some parts of Asia. Russia’s fate will undoubtedly affect Eurasia’s fate. This book started with a reference to Bruno Maçães’s book “The Dawn of Eurasia,” but Putin’s actions may well spell the “End of Eurasia” and with it the driving factors and prospects for greater Central Asia–Southeast Asia engagement for the foreseeable future.

12 Bill Hayton, “ASEAN Is Slowly Finding Its Voice over Ukraine,” Chatham House Expert Comment, 4 March 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/03/asean-slo wly-finding-its-voice-over-ukraine (accessed 6 March 2022). 13 Richard Javad Heydarian and Shawn W. Crispin, “Putin Torpedoes Russia’s ‘Third Force’ Vision for Asia,” Asia Times, 4 March 2022.

Index

A Afghanistan, 3, 7, 13, 33, 34, 100, 109–111, 117, 119–122, 134, 141, 144, 147 agency, 9, 20 agribusiness, 43, 47 agriculture (industry, products), 42, 116, 133, 156 Akaev, Askar, 34, 35 Anceschi, Luca, 131 Armenia, 82, 87 arms sales, 110 ASEAN+3, 142, 147, 158 ASEAN Charter, 138 ASEAN dialogue partner, 146, 148 ASEAN model, 135 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 2, 128, 142 ASEAN Secretary-General, 75 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 108 Asian Tigers, 57, 60, 63 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 2, 40, 84

Asia-Pacific region, 2, 3, 10, 28, 40, 73, 86, 117, 153 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 2–7, 13, 15, 16, 18–22, 24–26, 28, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 56, 57, 69, 70, 72–79, 81, 82, 84–90, 93, 94, 96, 97, 114–117, 123, 125–128, 135–149, 151–154, 156–158, 160, 161 Astana Financial Services Authority (AFSA), 44 Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), 44, 47 Atambaev, Almazbek, 35 Australia, 12 authoritarian, 26, 28, 57, 61, 63, 78 B balance of power/influence, 9, 15, 144, 146 balancing, 8, 10, 11, 20, 23, 28, 37, 108, 115, 128, 146 balancing regionalism, 11, 17, 18

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Rangsimaporn, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10112-0

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INDEX

Bandar Abbas port, 96 bandwagoning, 8, 10, 37, 128 Belarus, 82, 83 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 2, 3, 6, 7, 16, 17, 19, 25, 26, 82, 84, 91–94, 96–98, 100, 103, 104, 106, 109, 112, 114, 119, 121, 123–125 Berdymukhamedov, Gurbanguly, 35, 41, 52, 66, 117, 122 border(s) (trade, disputes), 55, 135 Brunei, 148 C C5+1 dialogue, 76, 77, 79, 147, 153, 157, 158 Cambodia, 2, 88, 125, 137 Caspian Sea, 101, 122, 124 Caucasus, 120 Central Asia, 27, 28, 30, 36–38, 40, 44, 46, 48, 54, 56, 57, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 72, 76, 78, 81, 90, 92–94, 96, 98, 100–102, 104–106, 108–110, 112, 115, 116, 118–121, 123, 125, 128, 130, 134, 135, 138–144, 146, 148, 149, 152–159 Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO), 129 Central Asian Economic Union, 129 Central Asian regionalism, 3, 6, 11, 17–19, 26, 127–129, 131, 140, 141, 143, 146, 148, 149, 152, 154, 157 Central Asian summit (Consultative Meeting), 17, 133 Central Asian Union, 129 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 106 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, 91, 92 Chabahar Port, 119, 121, 122

China, 3, 4, 6–20, 23, 25, 26, 29–31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 49, 53, 55, 57, 77, 82, 84, 91–98, 100–109, 111, 113–119, 121, 123, 125, 128, 129, 137, 139, 141–144, 146, 147, 151, 153–156, 158–161 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 119 climate change, 133, 134 Cold War, 10, 142, 157, 159 Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), 17, 32, 36, 129, 160 colour revolution, 34 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 39, 46 Communist Party of China, 92 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), 18, 75, 76, 79, 153, 157 Confucius Institutes, 112 connectivity, 54, 56, 92, 96, 100, 120, 122, 156, 159 consensus, 21, 83 content analysis, 22 COVID-19 pandemic, 2, 30, 37, 43, 45, 90, 91, 105, 111, 112, 116, 134 Crimea (annexation), 83 Customs Union, 82

D debt trap, 103, 107, 108 diversification of relations/partners, 11, 28, 33, 34, 155 Duterte, Rodrigo, 96, 97

INDEX

E East Asia Summit (EAS), 2, 42, 128, 142, 147, 158 Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), 136 economic diplomacy, 42, 49, 52, 54, 153 economic diversification, 16, 19, 123, 154 economic hedging, 4, 11, 16, 19, 26, 28, 38, 42, 78, 115, 123, 151, 152, 154 economic pragmatism, 16, 19, 123, 154 education, 42, 66–68, 78, 153, 155, 156 elite(s), 22, 24, 39, 47, 57, 63, 64, 66, 78, 102, 113, 124, 125, 152, 154 energy, 3, 15, 16, 28, 30, 46, 47, 51, 52, 62, 64, 69, 74, 78, 85, 86, 103–105, 133 English common law, 44 equidistant/equidistancing policy, 32 Eurasia/Eurasian, 1–3, 25, 37, 82, 84, 85, 91, 92, 99, 123, 130, 158, 159, 161 Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), 85, 88 Eurasian Economic Community, 129 Eurasian Economic Partnership, 123 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 3, 36, 38, 54, 76, 81–91, 115, 123, 124, 129, 134, 141, 152–154, 156, 157, 159–161 Europe, 1, 39, 74, 92–95, 97, 99, 100, 118–120, 124, 156–158, 161 European Union (EU), 4, 53, 76, 77, 128, 135, 137, 139–141, 146

165

F Fergana Valley, 108 financial crisis (1997–1998), 40 food (industry, processing, products), 42, 50, 88, 95, 156 foreign direct investment (FDI), 43 foreign policy concept, 35, 40, 41 foreign policy(ies)/relations, 4, 7–9, 11, 13–15, 19, 23, 24, 26, 28–38, 40, 41, 50, 52, 53, 60, 71, 72 Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 81, 85–90, 115, 161 G gas (resources, exports, pipelines), 23, 104, 105 Germany, 95, 112 Greater Eurasian Partnership, 84, 123, 161 Great Game, 21 great power(s), 3, 8–11, 13, 14, 18–21, 23, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 37, 108, 113, 115, 116, 128, 132, 140, 142–145, 147, 149, 154, 157 Gross domestic product (GDP), 2, 3, 30, 83, 91, 103 guided democracy, 61, 62 Gwadar Port, 119, 121, 122 H halal, 43, 48, 69, 116, 156 hard regionalism, 128, 139, 146, 154 hedging/hedge, 9, 12, 18–20, 22, 23, 26, 30, 37, 101, 120, 126, 128, 142, 143, 146, 151, 152, 154–156, 160 hedging platform, 18, 19, 142, 154 hedging regionalism, 4, 11, 18, 19, 26, 128, 142, 146

166

INDEX

I Idrissov, Erlan, 66, 137 Imanaliev, Muratbek, 126 independence, 23, 25, 27, 29, 32, 34, 39, 57, 60, 153, 159 India, 4, 7, 12, 13, 30, 34, 77, 117–121 Indian Ocean, 92, 94, 119, 121 Indonesia, 8, 25, 38, 40, 41, 43, 48, 50, 60, 62, 69, 73, 77, 78, 88, 89, 118, 125, 152, 155, 159 Indo-Pacific, 92 infrastructure (development, projects), 16, 92, 100, 114 institutional hedging, 17 International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) project, 119–122 investment, 14, 16, 42–56, 62, 64, 69, 70, 74, 78, 85, 86, 92, 102, 103, 106, 107, 112, 114, 124, 125, 133, 141, 152, 155, 158 Iran, 5, 34, 35, 39, 96, 119, 121, 122 Islamic finance/banking, 44, 46 J Japan, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 30, 40, 48, 60, 77, 112, 116, 118, 136, 141, 142, 147, 157, 158 K Kamilov, Abdulaziz, 51 Karachi Port, 121 Karimov, Islam, 25, 32, 33, 48, 50, 62–64, 67, 71, 89, 97, 98, 108, 120, 130–132, 139 Kausikan, Bilahari, 12, 158 Kazakhstan, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, 23–25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35–40, 42–48, 55–57, 60, 61, 64–75, 77, 79, 82–87, 89–91, 93–97,

99, 101, 103–106, 108, 111, 113–115, 118, 119, 121, 124, 129–131, 137, 140, 141, 149, 153, 156, 160 Kelimbetov, Kairat, 44 Khorgos dry port, 94, 95, 99, 119 Kuik, Cheng-Chwee, 12, 13, 16, 19, 23 Kyrgyzstan/Kyrgyz Republic, 8, 14–16, 20, 23, 24, 28–30, 34–36, 41, 54, 55, 60, 69, 71, 73, 82–84, 86–88, 98–101, 103, 105–108, 112, 113, 116, 121, 125, 129, 133–135, 148, 152, 160 L landbridge, 6, 96, 123 land-linked, 54 landlocked, 15, 33, 94, 120 Laos, 2, 8, 15, 96, 137, 148 League of Arab States, 157 Lee Hsien Loong, 65 Lee Kuan Yew, 57, 61, 64–67 Lianyungang port, 94–96 M Maçães, Bruno, 158, 161 Malacca Straits, 15, 104, 119 Malaysia, 25, 38, 40, 41, 43–48, 51, 52, 57, 60–63, 65, 68, 69, 71, 73, 77, 78, 86, 118, 125, 152, 153, 155 Massimov, Karim, 66 Mediterranean Sea, 92 Medvedev, Dmitry, 70 Mekong River Commission, 137 Mercosur, 135 Middle East, 7, 39, 92, 99, 104, 117, 120, 147 migrant workers, 23, 30, 34, 107

INDEX

military base(s), 23, 24, 30, 34 Mirziyoyev, Shavkat, 25, 33, 49–51, 70, 89, 90, 97, 98, 108, 116, 131–134, 149 model (economic, political), 26, 28, 60, 64, 66 Mohamad, Mahathir, 47, 61, 63 multipolar world/multipolarity, 8, 30, 41, 72 multi-vector foreign policy/multi-vectorism, 9, 15, 23, 28–38, 101, 114, 147, 149, 152, 156 Muslim, 38, 39, 68, 69, 78, 102, 118, 155 Myanmar, 2, 19, 121, 158, 160 N Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 26, 46, 60, 61, 64–67, 71, 74–76, 82, 84, 93, 95, 130, 131, 133, 136, 145, 149 neo-Eurasianist foreign policy, 131 Nordic Council, 135 normative convergence, 132 norms and principles, 128, 138, 146, 152, 154 Norov, Vladimir, 75 Nurly Zhol (Bright Path) infrastructure programme, 93, 94 O oil (resources, exports, pipelines), 15, 46, 70, 104 omnidirectional hedging, 4, 11–15, 19, 26, 28, 38, 78, 151, 152 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 75, 76 Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), 69

167

P Pakistan, 39, 117, 119–122 Pamir Mountains, 107, 108 Persian Gulf, 92 PetroChina, 105 Petronas, 52, 69–71 Philippines, 25, 96, 97 policy recommendations, 152 population size, 2, 25, 83 positive neutrality, 23, 29, 35, 60 post-Cold War, 2, 10, 18, 142 post-Soviet states, 6, 8 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA), 70 Putin, Vladimir, 70, 82, 84, 85, 91, 159–161

R Rahmon, Emomali, 53, 101, 133 railway (routes, gauge), 95, 96, 99, 100, 119 regionalism, 3, 17, 20, 26, 127–132, 135, 139–141, 146, 147, 149, 151, 154, 157 remittances, 23, 30, 34 research methodology, 4, 21 Russia, 3, 4, 6–10, 12, 13, 15–21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30–32, 34–38, 49, 53, 55, 60, 62, 77, 82–85, 87–90, 92, 99, 102, 103, 107, 109, 111, 115, 116, 119, 120, 122–125, 128–131, 134, 137, 139, 140, 143, 146, 147, 151, 154–156, 158–161

S Samruk-Kazyna fund, 67 sanctions, 38, 83–85, 121, 159, 160 Saudi Arabia, 90 SCO Charter, 138

168

INDEX

security, 3, 8, 12, 13, 17, 23, 25, 28, 29, 34–37, 41, 73, 75, 78 self-reliance (mustaqillik), 29 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 17, 18, 74–77, 79, 129, 138, 146, 153, 154 Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), 91–94, 98, 123 Silk Road (New, Great, Digital, Health), 39, 91, 97, 98, 100, 108, 111, 156 Singapore, 25, 38, 40, 41, 43–45, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 57, 60, 61, 63–68, 71, 78, 81, 86, 88, 90, 101, 117, 118, 147, 148, 152, 153, 155 Sinophobia/anti-Chinese sentiments, 102, 103, 106, 107, 109, 112 small and medium states, 3, 4, 6–8, 10, 11, 17, 126, 138, 142, 146, 151, 154 soft power, 68, 111, 112, 118, 155, 159 soft regionalism, 18, 128, 139, 140, 146, 152, 154 South Asia, 54, 92, 101, 118–120, 122, 156 South China Sea, 15, 92 Southeast Asia, 2–8, 11, 13, 15, 19, 22, 24, 26–28, 30, 35, 38–41, 43–45, 49–51, 53–57, 61, 62, 66, 68, 71, 78, 81, 87, 92, 94, 96, 116, 118, 120, 121, 123, 125, 137, 138, 142, 152, 153, 155–157, 159–161 Southeast Asian vector, 27, 78, 152, 156 South Korea, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 30, 40, 60–62, 77, 116, 118, 147, 158 South Pacific Ocean, 92 sovereignty, 9, 12, 128, 132, 138, 139, 143, 146

Soviet Union, 38, 127, 129 Sri Lanka, 73 Starr, S. Frederick, 118 T Taiwan, 104 Tajikistan, 14, 15, 20, 23, 24, 28–30, 33, 34, 36, 41, 53–55, 60, 73, 77, 82, 100, 101, 103–105, 107–109, 112, 113, 129, 132–135, 152, 160 Tajikistan civil war, 34, 60 Taliban, 54, 109, 111, 117, 122, 134, 144 technology (cooperation, transfers), 107, 116 Temasek, 67 Thailand, 25, 41, 43, 47, 48, 51, 55, 56, 60, 77, 86–88, 95, 96, 152 Tibet, 104 Tileuberdi, Mukhtar, 43 Timor-Leste, 2, 24 Tokayev, Kassym-Jomart, 31, 32, 37, 48, 65, 72, 91, 149, 160 tourism, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 51, 53, 56, 71, 74, 85, 116, 118, 133, 156, 159 trade, 16, 42, 45, 48–54, 56, 66, 73, 75, 82, 85, 86, 88, 90, 93–95, 98, 99, 102, 105, 113, 114, 116, 121, 122, 124, 132, 133, 143, 152, 158, 161 transport/logistics, 45, 48, 53, 55, 78, 91, 94, 95, 116, 124, 152, 158 Turkey, 30, 34, 39, 112, 116 Turkmenbashi port, 122 Turkmenistan, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24, 29, 35, 41, 52, 53, 60, 66, 69, 70, 73, 74, 100, 101, 104, 105, 108, 112, 117, 122, 129, 133, 134, 140, 143, 152, 153, 160

INDEX

Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan– India pipeline project (TAPI), 117 Turn to the East policy, 91, 161

U Uighurs, 102 Ukraine, 2, 19, 25, 83, 91, 149, 152, 158–161 United Kingdom (UK), 68, 73, 137 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 133, 160, 161 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 56, 161 United Nations (UN), 133 United States (US), 4, 7, 8, 11–13, 18–20, 29, 30, 33, 34, 53, 68, 77, 92, 96, 107, 111, 112, 118, 121, 141, 144 US-China rivalry, 2, 19, 158 Uzbekistan, 9, 15, 16, 23–25, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 45, 47–51, 55, 57, 60, 62–64, 67, 70, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 89, 90, 97–100, 104, 105, 108, 109, 112, 116, 120–122, 129–132, 140, 141, 147, 149, 153, 156, 160

169

V Vietnam, 2, 25, 40, 41, 43, 48, 51, 77, 81, 86–88, 90, 95, 137, 152, 161 virtual regionalism, 128 Vorobiev, Vitaly, 138 W Wang Yi, 110 water resources, 131, 133, 137 Westphalian world order, 132 World Bank, 108 World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF), 69 World Trade Organization (WTO), 89 Wyncoast Industrial Park company, 51 X Xi Jinping, 91, 93, 98, 114, 123 Xinjiang, 92, 93, 102, 106, 109, 119 Y Yeltsin, Boris, 62 Z Zhaparov, Sadyr, 35, 54 Zheenbekov, Sooronbay, 35, 54