Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia 9789812307712

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
CONTRIBUTORS
A LEGACY OF ENGAGEMENT: Transformations in Southeast Asia
1 INTRODUCTION
A REGION TRANSFORMED: Development, Democracy and Reform in Southeast Asia
2 UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORIES AND CONNECTIONS: REGIME CHANGE, DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
3 VIETNAM’S TRANSFORMATIONS: WAR, DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM
4 THE PHILIPPINES’ UNDERPERFORMANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PAST DIVERGENCE … FUTURE CONVERGENCE?
5 DEVELOPMENTAL SUCCESS? ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS IN INDONESIA
TRANSFORMING RELATIONSHIPS: International Aid, NGOs and Actors in Southeast Asia
6 THE FORD FOUNDATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
7 THE TRANSFORMATIVE ROLE OF JAPAN’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: AN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA
8 INTERNATIONAL AID AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
RELATIONSHIPS TRANSFORMED
9 UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE LEGACY OF POLICY CHANGES
10 THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
11 THE UNITED STATES AND INDONESIA: PERSONAL REFLECTIONS
12 ASEAN’S IDENTITY CRISIS
13 ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1957–2007
INDEX

Citation preview

Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 1,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publications works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

00 Legacy prelims.indd 2

8/28/08 4:45:11 PM

Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia EDITED BY

Ann Marie Murphy Bridget Welsh

I5ER5 INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Singapor e

First published in Singapore in 2008 by ISEAS Publications Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected]

• Website: bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2008 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Legacy of Engagement / edited by Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh. 1. Southeast Asia—Economic conditions—19452. Economic assistance—Southeast Asia. 3. Southeast Asia—Politics and government—19454. Southeast Asia—Foreign relations. I. Murphy, Ann Marie. II. Welsh, Bridget. HC441 L49 2008 ISBN 9978-981-230-770-5 (soft cover) ISBN 9978-981-230-772-9 (hard cover) ISBN 9978-981-230-771-2 (PDF) Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd

00 Legacy prelims.indd 4

8/28/08 4:45:12 PM

For Jack May his legacy live on

00 Legacy prelims.indd 5

8/28/08 4:45:12 PM

00 Legacy prelims.indd 6

8/28/08 4:45:12 PM

CONTENTS

Foreword Juwono Sudarsono

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

Contributors

xiii A LEGACY OF ENGAGEMENT: TRANSFORMATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1

Introduction Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

3

A REGION TRANSFORMED: DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND REFORM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 2

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections: Regime Change, Democratization and Development in Southeast Asia Bridget Welsh

29

3

Vietnam’s Transformations: War, Development and Reform Frederick Z. Brown

72

4

The Philippines’ Underperformance in Comparative Perspective: Past Divergence … Future Convergence? David G. Timberman

00 Legacy prelims.indd 7

113

8/28/08 4:45:12 PM

viii

5

Contents

Developmental Success? Economic Transformations in Indonesia Hadi Soesastro

151

TRANSFORMING RELATIONSHIPS: INTERNATIONAL AID, NGOs AND ACTORS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 6

The Ford Foundation in Southeast Asia: Continuity and Change Peter F. Geithner

181

7

The Transformative Role of Japan’s Official Development Assistance: An Economic Partnership with Southeast Asia Hugh Patrick

195

8

International Aid and Political Change in Southeast Asia Annette Clear

216

RELATIONSHIPS TRANSFORMED 9

United States Relations with Southeast Asia: The Legacy of Policy Changes Ann Marie Murphy

249

10

The Evolving Relationship Between China and Southeast Asia Michael R. Chambers

281

11

The United States and Indonesia: Personal Reflections Edward Masters

311

12

ASEAN’s Identity Crisis Donald E. Weatherbee

350

13

Encounters in Southeast Asia: 1957–2007 Theodore Friend

373

Index

00 Legacy prelims.indd 8

387

8/28/08 4:45:12 PM

FOREWORD

In this volume dedicated to John “Jack” Bresnan, some of his former colleagues, friends, and students continue his legacy of engagement with Southeast Asia. In a career that spanned over half a century, Jack engaged the region in a number of capacities: as an executive with the Ford Foundation, including two tours in Indonesia, the last as Representative; as a consultant to the Asia Society; and as Director of the Pacific Basin Programme at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Throughout his career, Jack promoted the economic, social, and political development of the region as well as mutual understanding between Southeast Asian countries and the United States. The authors of this volume chronicle the transformations that have occurred both within Southeast Asia as well as between the region and the rest of the world over the last six decades. As with Jack, all of the contributors to this volume strived to balance “rational” analysis of each of the Southeast Asian country concerned with the more “emotive” understanding of the cultural context, thus meshing the “outsider’s” view with the “insider’s” innate impulses of meaning. Jack believed in the power of ideas, and the power of people to bring about positive changes in the world around them. He spent much of his life bringing people and ideas together. At Ford, Jack worked to empower people by promoting new scientific discoveries, managerial techniques, and academic training in Southeast Asia. Later in his career, he facilitated dialogues and exchanges between the U.S. and Southeast Asia in order to promote understanding and reduce misperceptions. At Columbia, he introduced a new generation of American graduate students to Southeast Asia. Jack’s greatest involvement was with Indonesia, where he had firm faith in the future of Indonesia’s most valuable resource — its diverse human talent from across the islands, from Aceh in the far west to Papua in the far east. The Social Sciences Development Programme of the Ford Foundation, ix

00 Legacy prelims.indd 9

8/28/08 4:45:12 PM

x

Foreword

which he helped launched in 1973 brought together economists, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, educationists, public administration specialists, historians, language experts, demographers, and gender specialists from all across Indonesia. It became a veritable forum of constant “nationbuilding” for the more than 1,700 Indonesian social scientists who shared knowledge, skills, and personal experiences in trying to gain understanding and meaning of Indonesia and of being Indonesian. To this day, all of those who took part in the programme owe Jack a debt of personal as well as professional gratitude. For those Indonesians and Americans who appreciate the value and enduring relevance of understanding Southeast Asia and its relations with the outside world, Jack Bresnan was, and will always remain, an inspiration. JUWONO SUDARSONO Professor, University of Indonesia and Minister for Defence, Indonesia 2007

00 Legacy prelims.indd 10

8/28/08 4:45:13 PM

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book would not have been possible without the commitment of one man to Southeast Asia, John “Jack” Bresnan, and his efforts to build a community and foster mutual understanding between the United States and Southeast Asia. Each essay was written by a person connected to Jack, whether it was his contemporary or his student. The collection came together immediately after his tragic passing in May 2006, although the festschrift has its roots in a conference sponsored by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute (WEAI) of Columbia University in November 2005. We would like to begin by thanking Columbia University for its support of this project. At Columbia, WEAI provided critical funding for the conference that brought over two hundred people to campus to discuss and reflect on the changes in the region. We are grateful for the support of Xiaobo Lu, then WEAI Director, and the professors at WEAI who chose to honour Jack’s contribution to the Institute by agreeing to sponsor the conference, including Andrew Nathan, Gerry Curtis, Madeleine Zelin, Greg Pflugfelder, and Carol Gluck. Professor Hugh Patrick of the APEC Centre based at Columbia Business School and one of the co-Directors of the Southeast Asia Seminar (a forum initially organized by Jack in 1982 to provide public dialogue on the region) was also instrumental in assuring adequate financing for the conference and was unfailing in his support for the festschrift. The conference itself came together due to the commitment of the WEAI staff at Columbia, notably Waichi Ho, Greg Alcock, Nissam Schaul, Madge Huntington, Heidi Johnson, Elizabeth Demissie, and the volunteer efforts of countless graduate students. The conference included presentations not in the festschrift by Donald Emmerson, Sidney Jones, and Vince Boudreau, as well as comments from the floor from his contemporaries and long-time colleagues Evelyn Colbert, Susan Siskel, David Denoon, John McAuliff, Bob Immerman, Jim Morley, Dick Betts, Sheridan Prasso, Allene Masters, Jayne xi

00 Legacy prelims.indd 11

8/28/08 4:45:13 PM

xii

Acknowledgements

Werner, Robin Martin, Bob Hornick, and Wayne Forrest. A roasting dinner with friends and family followed the conference and was a lovely tribute to a man whose devotion to others continues to inspire. Many who could not make it to the dinner sent in their best wishes, including Juwono Sudarsono, Hal Hill, Surachart Bamrungsuk, Scott Harold, Jonathan Stromseth, and Dave Timberman. The festschrift itself is a collective effort. Each contributor — Frederick Brown, Michael Chambers, Annette Clear, Theodore Friend, Peter Geithner, Edward Masters, Hugh Patrick, Hadi Soesastro, David Timberman, and Donald Weatherbee — prioritized writing and revising their essays, in some cases after or on long flights from the region, in recovery from bouts with dengue, avoiding the distractions of summer relaxation, and over the demands of family and other editors. To each we are extremely grateful. We recognize that Jack’s community spirit brought us together and know that he would be delighted that our efforts have yielded a collection. We are all saddened that he is not here to argue the merits of our arguments with us personally. In getting the book to print, we are thankful for the support of ISEAS, in particular Triena Ong. We are also grateful to the assistance of Chong WuLing and Desiree Hwang who assisted with the fact-checking and formatting of the essays. On personal notes, putting this collection together was very important to us. We are each deeply appreciative of Jack for his support of our careers. As graduate students we arrived at Columbia where we found a true gentleman and mentor in our corner. He was always urging us to write more, and we are following his call. We thank each of our families for their patience and understanding as we took time away from them to get this book to press. We share with Jack and our fellow contributors a deep affection for Southeast Asia, and would be remiss without acknowledging the continued inspiration the region provides and the critical need for mutual engagement and further understanding. Jack’s career was in this spirit and this volume in his honour follows the same commitment.

00 Legacy prelims.indd 12

8/28/08 4:45:13 PM

CONTRIBUTORS

Frederick Z. Brown is a Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University. He started the SAIS Southeast Asia Studies Programme in 1991 and was Associate Director until September 2005. As a Department of State foreign service officer, he served in France, Thailand, the Soviet Union, Vietnam (twice), Cyprus, as well as in Washington. Michael R. Chambers is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair at Indiana State University. He has taught previously at St. Olaf College, and was a visiting scholar at the John K. Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University during 2003–04. He is an Editor of the journal Asian Security, and previously served as Managing Editor. Dr Chambers has published articles and book chapters on China’s relations with its East Asian neighbours and on China’s alliance behaviour, including in Strategic Asia 2006–2007 (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006), and in the Journal of East Asian Studies and the Journal of Contemporary China. He is also the Editor of South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (2002). Dr Chambers received his Ph.D. from Columbia University. Annette Clear is an Assistant Professor of Politics at University of California, Santa Cruz. Her Ph.D. in Political Science was awarded by Columbia University, and her B.A. in East Asian Studies is from Yale University. She is currently completing Democracy and Donors in Indonesia, which analyses the effects of donor strategies of three primary donors — the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands — on the process of democratization in Indonesia since 1967, with an emphasis on the transition from Soeharto’s regime. Her new research project explores local dynamics of strengthening civil society and decentralization in Indonesia. xiii

00 Legacy prelims.indd 13

8/28/08 4:45:13 PM

xiv

Contributors

Theodore Friend is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia. He is also simultaneously President Emeritus and Trustee, Eisenhower Fellowships, and a member of the Board of Advisors for the United States-Indonesia Society. Previous positions include President, Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships (1984–96); Fellow, Rockefeller Center for Artists and Scholars, Bellagio (1988); Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1983–84); President, Swarthmore College (1973–82); and Professor of History, State University of New York-Buffalo (1966–73). Dr Friend received his Ph.D. in History from Yale University. His most recent publications are Indonesian Destinies (2003), and Religion and Religiosity in the Philippines and Indonesia (2006). Peter F. Geithner spent twenty-eight years with the Ford Foundation where he held programme management positions mainly concerned with Asia, including as Director, Asia Programs (New York, 1990–96), the Foundation’s first Representative for China (Beijing, 1988–90), Program Officer in Charge, Developing Country Programs (New York, 1981–88), Representative for Southeast Asia (Bangkok, 1976–81), Deputy Head, Office for Asia Pacific (New York, 1968–73), and Assistant/Deputy Representative for India, Nepal and Sri Lanka (New Delhi, 1968–73). Currently, Mr Geithner is an advisor to the Asia Center, Harvard University, and serves as a consultant to the China Medical Board, MacArthur Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, and other non-profit organizations. He also serves on the boards of the Harvard-Yenching Institute (Chair), National Committee on United States-China Relations, China Center for Economic Research (Peking University), Center for the Advanced Study of India (University of Pennsylvania), Japan Center for International Exchange/USA, Cairncross Memorial Foundation, and Institute of Current World Affairs. Edward Masters is the Co-chairman of the Board of Trustees of the U.S.Indonesia Society. He formerly served as President of the U.S.-Indonesia Society, U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, President of the National Policy Association, and Senior Vice President for International Affairs of the Natomas Company. Masters also previously served as Adjunct Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies (Johns Hopkins University) and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University). Ann Marie Murphy is an Assistant Professor at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University,

00 Legacy prelims.indd 14

8/28/08 4:45:14 PM

xv

Contributors

an adjunct research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University and an Associate Fellow of the Asia Society. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Her research interests include the politics and international relations of Southeast Asia. Dr Murphy has been a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand and the Centre of Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia. She was a member of the Carter Center delegation that monitored Indonesia’s July 2004 Presidential election and served on the 2005 Freedom House rating team. Hugh Patrick is the Director of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business at Columbia Business School, Co-director of Columbia’s APEC Study Center, and R.D. Calkins Professor of International Business Emeritus. He was previously Professor of Economics and Director of the Economic Growth Center at Yale University. He has been a Visiting Professor at Hitotsubashi University, University of Tokyo, and University of Bombay. Professor Patrick has been awarded Guggenheim and Fulbright fellowships and the Ohira Prize. His professional publications include sixteen books and some sixty articles and essays. His most recent book, co-authored and co-edited with Takatoshi Ito and David Weinstein, is Reviving Japan’s Economy: Problems and Prescriptions (2005). He is on the Board of Directors of the United States National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the U.S. Asia Pacific Council. Hadi Soesastro is Executive Director, as well as Senior Economist of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He was a member of the National Economic Council, an advisory council to President Abdurrahman Wahid from December 1999 to September 2000. Dr Soesastro has been a Visiting Professor at Columbia University and the Australian National University. He serves on the international advisory boards of a number of international institutions including the Asia Society. He received his Ph.D. from the Rand Graduate School in Santa Monica, California. David G. Timberman is a consultant and independent scholar specializing in politics and governance in Southeast and South Asia. He is co-author (with Soren Davidsen and Vishnu Juwono) of Curbing Corruption in Indonesia 2004–2006: A Survey of National Policies and Approaches and A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics. He has worked for the Asia Society, Asia Foundation, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

00 Legacy prelims.indd 15

8/28/08 4:45:14 PM

Contributors

xvi

Donald E. Weatherbee is the Donald S. Russell Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of South Carolina where he specializes in the politics and international relations of Southeast Asia. In addition to South Carolina, Professor Weatherbee has taught or carried out research at major academic centres in Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand as well as the Netherlands, Germany, and Great Britain. He received his Bachelors degree from Bates College and MA and Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His most recent publications include International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (2005); “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, in Strategic Asia: Trade, Interdependence, and Security (2006); and “Southeast Asia in 2006: Déjà vu All Over Again” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (2007). Bridget Welsh is an Assistant Professor in the Southeast Asia Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University-SAIS in Washington D.C. where she teaches courses on contemporary Southeast Asian politics. In 2004 she was a Henry R. Luce Southeast Asian Fellow at the Australian National University. She received her doctorate from the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, her MA from Columbia University, language training (FALCON) from Cornell University and BA from Colgate University. She edited a volume entitled Reflections: The Mahathir Years in 2004 and co-edited Impressions: The Goh Chok Tong Years (forthcoming). Additional manuscripts on Malaysian electoral behaviour and the Habibie period are in process/under review. In 2006 she received a grant from the USIP to study Islamic political parties in Southeast Asia. Bridget Welsh is the former Chair of the Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Studies Group, a member of the Southeast Asia policy survey team at Georgetown University, the Director of the Malaysia East Asia Barometer project and a consultant to Freedom House.

00 Legacy prelims.indd 16

8/28/08 4:45:14 PM

A LEGACY OF ENGAGEMENT Transformations in Southeast Asia

01 Legacy.indd 1

8/28/08 3:38:48 PM

01 Legacy.indd 2

8/28/08 3:38:48 PM

1 INTRODUCTION Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh In 1946, arguably “Southeast Asia” did not exist. None of the 11 countries that now make up the region of 585 million people were independent, although two, Vietnam and Indonesia, were already embroiled in struggles against their colonial masters. There was no regional Southeast Asian identity to speak of; it would take the Cold War and labelling from outside to shape the region’s identity and not until the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 that regional cooperation deepened and identity congealed.1 Yet, the region came out of the shadows of colonialism and Japanese occupation to emerge as one of the world’s most vibrant and economically successful. Today, over half of international trade flows through the waters of Southeast Asia, much of it originating from the area, and many of the economies in the region are lauded as successful ‘tigers’, achieving high growth with equity. The region has bounced back after the 1997 Asian financial crisis which debilitated the countries. Ten years on, the region remains stable, with strong regional ties at the elite level in ASEAN and has experienced a broadening of civil society and greater prosperity, including the largest Muslim democracy in the world, Indonesia. Despite the success of Southeast Asian countries and their achievements, the region as a region has remained under-analysed. Southeast Asia has often been studied through the lens of others. Initially, Southeast Asian history was largely told as an extension to that of India and China. It would take a generation of historians in the late 1970s to change this approach, and 3

01 Legacy.indd 3

8/28/08 3:38:48 PM

4

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

draw attention to the pivotal role that the region played as an economic thoroughfare and its selective and unique adoption of outside cultural and political currents.2 Their work emphasized the commonalities in the region, defined to include both maritime and mainland Southeast Asia. The contemporary period, from 1946 onwards, remains less studied, despite a generally broad appreciation of region-wide changes. There is a rich body of scholarship on individual countries, especially Vietnam and Indonesia, but studies of transformations in the region as a region over the last sixty years are rare.3 Focus has centred on the immediate “problems” of the moment; during the Cold War with attention concentrated on Vietnam War and a possible spread of communist “dominoes”. In the 1990s (before 1997), scholars (and practitioners) examined the economic boom of rapid economic expansion and the accompanying changes in modernity and consumerism. Today, the security concerns of terrorism and China’s rising power take centre stage. These regional phenomena were and are the dominant paradigms of their times, yet the studies often lack historical breadth. This volume attempts to step back, to take stock and examine broader changes in the region over time, and to look at the region’s contemporary history diachronically. Adopting a broad sweep, this collection of essays examines how the region has changed since World War II, highlighting trends in domestic politics, the impact of international engagement and shifts in international relations. It touches on many of the key debates within the scholarship of Southeast Asia, but rather than directly addressing theoretical concerns or incorporating new scholarship, this volume draws attention to macro-historical trends in order to make changes in the region accessible to a general audience. Through its synthesis of developments in the region, it offers a lens to understand contemporary Southeast Asia, a region that not only has transformed significantly, but continues to change rapidly.

SOUTHEAST ASIA 1946 TO 2006: FROM COLONIAL OUTPOSTS TO GLOBALIZED WORLD ECONOMIC SUPERCORRIDOR The starting point of the book is 1946, the end of the Japanese occupation. Southeast Asia had been one of many arenas in this international struggle, with heavy fighting especially in the Philippines and Burma, and extensive extraction of natural resources to feed Japan’s war effort.4 Even before independence, the region showcased its diversity. Geography had shaped a divide between maritime and mainland Southeast Asia that had

01 Legacy.indd 4

8/28/08 3:38:48 PM

5

Introduction

affected state formation and inter-regional relations. The countries varied considerably in size, with Indonesia’s 18,000 islands taking centre stage, largely from the breadth of the area it covers. Many of the specific territorial markings between countries would change marginally over the sixty years since World War II, yet most of the colonial boundaries consolidated in the early part of the twentieth century would continue to define Southeast Asian states. The number of people within these states would change radically, however. All of the Southeast Asian countries experienced rapid population growth. Even with effective family planning programmes in Indonesia and Vietnam, the region nearly quadrupled in number, from 145 million in 1950 to 585 million in 2006. Not surprisingly, as shown in Figure 1.1,5 the most populated countries grew the most, with Indonesia once again leading the pack, although population growth as a share of overall population would be largest in the three former Indo-China states — Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia — whose recovery from warfare would transform their numbers. The small coastal sultanate of Brunei remains the least populated, moving from 224,000 people in 1950 to 383,000 in 2006. Within the region, the demographic structure of populations varies considerably. Overall, the region is ageing, due in large part to longer life spans arising from improvements in health care and sanitation. Life expectancy in the region as a whole has Figure 1.1 Southeast Asian Societies Transformed

Brunei Philippines Thailand Malaysia* Singapore Vietnam Laos Myanmar Indonesia Cambodia

2005 1950

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

Population

Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003).

01 Legacy.indd 5

8/28/08 3:38:49 PM

6

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

increased sharply across the board, as shown in Table 1.1. Ageing is occurring at a varied pace, however, with Singapore leading the way. In 2000, 7.2 per cent of its population was over 65, and this is expected to grow to 28.6 per cent by 2050.6 In contrast, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, with higher fertility rates, are more youthful and face the obstacle of providing jobs for their relatively young populations. Size and geography underscore many of the differences in the economies. All of the economies of the region in 1946 were primarily agricultural, with robust exports of primary products such as rice and rubber. Yet, different colonial regimes had carved out different economic foundations, including oil productions in Brunei, tin mining in Malaysia, and services in Singapore. The sizes of the regional economies varied considerably, with Indonesia’s economy largest in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) terms in the region then and now. The smaller countries in terms of size — Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia — remain the smallest economies, although Singapore, lauded for its economic achievements, has moved beyond its size to become one of the largest economies in the region. Yet, with no exceptions, all of the economies in the region have expanded profoundly in GDP terms since 1950 as shown Table 1.1 Life Expectancy in Southeast Asia Country Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Timor-Leste Vietnam

1965

2005

63 43 42 41 56 46 55 66 54 n/a 46

77 54 67 59 72 59 68 80 70 58 71

Source: 1965 Figures: United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), State of the World Population 2002: People, Poverty and Possibilities (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 2002). 2005 Figures: World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2005: Make Every Mother and Child Count. World Health Organization website (accessed 27 July 2007).

01 Legacy.indd 6

8/28/08 3:38:49 PM

7

Introduction

Figure 1.2 Southeast Asian Economies Transformed

Philippines Thailand Malaysia* Singapore Vietnam Laos Myanmar Indonesia Cambodia

2000 1950

0

2000000

4000000

6000000

8000000

GDP in US$ (billion)

Sources: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2005: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World (New York: UNDP, 2005), pp. 188–91, available at .

in Figure 1.2.7 Even Myanmar, which underperforms economically due to its political leadership, has seen considerable economic expansion, moving its GDP from $19.4 billion in 1950 to an estimated $50.6 billion in 2000. This will only expand further as projected oil and gas revenues come on line not only in Myanmar but also throughout mainland Southeast Asia. The economic growth of Southeast Asia is one of its distinctive features, as countries in other developing regions have turned to the successful examples in the region for lessons. Growth alone, however, is not the defining feature of the success of Southeast Asian economies. Most of the growth has been accompanied by increasing equality. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are often cited as examples, and through the 1990s, especially before 1997, would indeed qualify.8 Yet, the 1997 Asian financial crisis had a significant impact, especially in Indonesia and Thailand, where the former economy contracted by over 18.5 per cent in a year. Poverty levels skyrocketed, and it was only in 2003 that the country managed to recover. Thailand’s recovery was faster, but the impact was equally severe on poverty. It is an attention to poverty and

01 Legacy.indd 7

8/28/08 3:38:49 PM

8

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

standards of living that highlights the continued diversity within the region. Disparities in GDP per capita, as shown in Figure 1.3, are stark. The quality of life in some countries in the region is seen to be better than others; Singapore and Brunei’s economic prosperity, for example, is well above their regional neighbours, and countries such as Laos, Timor L’este, Cambodia, and Myanmar (which does not even publish reliable data) are far behind. In the shadows of magnificent Angkor in Siem Reap Cambodia, lies one of the poorest regions of the country, where nutrition levels are appalling. Similarly, in another corner of the region, in still war-torn Dili, thousands continue to live in Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps, surviving from day to day. Even in the more prosperous countries as noted in Table 1.2, such as Malaysia or Thailand, inequality remains high, and since 1997, growing. The same trend is also occurring in Singapore.9 Yet, the overall growth in the economies, accompanied by improvements in health care and infrastructure, has transformed the quality of life of most people in the region. It is the changes in everyday life in Southeast Asia that have been redefined the most over the last sixty years. Southeast Asians are less involved in agriculture, focusing more on industrialization, and of late,

Figure 1.3 Southeast Asia GDP Per Capita Transformed

Timor Leste Philippines Thailand Malaysia* Singapore Vietnam Laos Myanmar Indonesia Cambodia

2005 1950

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

US Dollars

Sources: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003) and World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005 (New York: World Bank, 2006), available at .

01 Legacy.indd 8

8/28/08 3:38:50 PM

9

Introduction

Table 1.2 Income Inequality in Southeast Asian Countries, 200510

Country Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Timor-Leste Vietnam

Income Share Richest 10%

HDI Rank

HPI Index (Value)

Poorest 10%

GNI Coefficient

33 130 110 135 61 129 84 25 73 140 108

— 81 (41.3) 41 (17.8) 72 (38.2) 16 (8.9) 50 (21.9) 35 (16.3) 6 (6.3) 28 (17.8) — 47 (21.2)

— 11.6 7.8 9.7 22.1 — 16.5 17.7 13.4 — 8.4

— 0.404 0.343 0.370 0.492 — 0.461 0.425 0.432 — 0.361

services. The share of agriculture in the GDP of Southeast Asian countries, as shown in Table 1.3, has dropped significantly, especially in the more developed countries in the region. The structure of agricultural economy has radically changed, from subsistence crops to commercial production, bringing greater dependence on wage labour and capital endowments.11 Yields in food production have risen sharply, directly as a by-product of the Green Revolution that has its origins in the region. Production of the region’s staple rice has tripled in production in some countries, such as Thailand and Vietnam, and doubled in others, such as Myanmar.12 Rural areas are no longer exclusively focused on farming, as off-farm incomes in cottage industries have become increasingly common in areas as diverse as Lombok in Indonesia and Hoi Ann in Vietnam. With these changes in livelihoods have come greater variations in land use and pressure on resources. The rise of serious environmental challenges from deforestation, air and water pollution, depletion of marine stocks, and destruction of coastal and inland habitats have already impacted biodiversity, migration, health and consumption patterns, and will continue to do so as they intensify. The current move away from the export of electronics and manufactured goods to the United States (U.S.) towards greater sale of commodities to

01 Legacy.indd 9

8/28/08 3:38:50 PM

10

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

Table 1.3 Sectors of the Economy in Southeast Asian Countries 2006 Country Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Timor-Leste (2001) Vietnam

Agriculture (% of GDP)

Industry (% of GDP)

Services (% of GDP)

— 36 13 43 8 50 20 0 10 26 20

— 28 46 31 48 15 32 34 45 18 42

— 37 41 26 44 35 48 66 45 56 38

China will only deepen the environmental pressures in a region where, like the rest of the world, the average temperature and water levels are rising. More Southeast Asians now live in urban areas. Industrialization has brought about rapid migration from the rural areas and put at least three Southeast Asian cities — Manila, Jakarta and Bangkok — on the list of fastest growing “megacities” (over ten million people) in the world. Traffic problems have become endemic in the region, not only in the larger cities, but in fast growing cities such as Hanoi and Phnom Penh. Singapore, although much smaller in population, ranks as the most important city in the region due to the central role that it has played as the anchor for global trade, and of late, services. Mobility in the region has also changed. In 1950, it would take over half a day to travel from Jakarta to Bandung. While the pace can still be slow during rush hour traffic, improvements in road infrastructure have more than halved the time. And more people are travelling on the roads, either as commuters or migrants. Transportation has moved up the technology ladder from Indonesian becaks and Thai tututs to motorcycles and national cars, such as Malaysia’s Proton. Perhaps the place where mobility has increased the most is regional air travel. With budget airlines such as Air Asia operating, their motto “now everyone can fly” is becoming a reality as the number of people travelling within Southeast Asia has skyrocketed in the last ten years. Most often it is for work. It is

01 Legacy.indd 10

8/28/08 3:38:51 PM

11

Introduction

estimated that there are over eight million Southeast Asian migrants working in the region, most notably from the Philippines and Indonesia. Travel within Southeast Asia has intensified since 11 September 2001, which has made long distance travel less attractive, particularly to the U.S. The changes in lifestyles have created new challenges for political leaders, from sewage and water supply to pollution control. It has also brought about new pastimes and consumption patterns. Consumerism is widespread,13 with “shopping” defined in some Southeast Asian countries as a national pastime. Displays of wealth continue to showcase individual status in the region, as they did in earlier empires. As they have always done in the past, the region’s consumers have closely adapted to modern technology. Cellphone sales in Singapore and Malaysia are higher per capita than those in the U.S. and now outstrip landlines. This is true in some underdeveloped parts of the region as well, notably Timor L’este and Cambodia. Text messaging has become an art form, a new pattern of communication and social exchange. Internet use has also expanded, although as noted in Table 1.4, there are varied patterns of use across the region. Many more Singaporeans and Malaysians use the Internet than Cambodians and Laotians. Yet, even in Myanmar cyber cafes have become fixtures in Yangon and Mandalay, with users fighting everyday

Table 1.4 Internet and Telephone Use in Southeast Asia14

Country Singapore Malaysia Brunei Thailand Philippines Indonesia Vietnam Laos Cambodia Timor L’este Myanmar

Internet Use % Population (2005)

Use Growth 2000–05 %

Telephones % Population (2002)

60.2 35.9 9.1 12.8 9.3 7.0 6.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1

77.9 157.1 16.7 266.1 291 665 2571 216.7 483.3 NA 2,700

98 66 NA 28 13 11 8 3 1 NA NA

Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2002 and .

01 Legacy.indd 11

8/28/08 3:38:51 PM

12

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

battles with government censors to gain access to international websites and loved ones abroad. The country’s new capital Naypyidaw is interestingly more Internet accessible than its leading tourist attraction of Pagan. These uniquely Southeast Asian adaptations to modernity are global in scope. Southeast Asia has traditionally been an international entrepôt and remains one today. Al-Jazeera has opened a regional television station in Kuala Lumpur, with reporters stationed throughout the region. Jerry Falwell’s 700 Club plays in Indonesian homes. The conflicts in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan are regularly discussed at local mosques or on radio. The ties to students who study abroad — in the Middle East or Australia — remain robust. Even links to émigrés outside of the region — in the Malay kampung in Perth, the Vietnamese diaspora in Orange County or the Lao community in northern Minnesota — have remained strong. There is now a steady stream of investment from émigré communities back into Southeast Asia, notably into Vietnam. These investment flows take place in a context of growing regional integration. Under the rubric of ASEAN, Southeast Asian countries have become closer together. Most of the ties have been at the elite level, reflecting the statist orientation of ASEAN. The number of meetings among officials has increased ten-fold in the last decade, especially after the integration of the poorer countries into ASEAN from the mid-1990s onwards. Although trade continues to flow primarily outside of the region, clusters of regional trade have developed, notably around Singapore, and heavy border trade of goods, sometimes of key staples, from Thailand to Myanmar or from Vietnam to Cambodia persists.15 Although linguistic obstacles remain, Southeast Asians are learning and engaging more with one another. At Chulalongkorn University in Thailand or the National University of Singapore, regional study programmes have evolved, becoming centres not only for Southeast Asian scholarship but also communities for shared learning about and among people of the region. ASEAN leaders are trying to deepen interaction in their efforts to build an ASEAN community and develop an ASEAN Charter. The strong ties among the countries in the region were brought home with the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic and the threat of avian influenza since 2004, pointing to the depth of travel among countries and the region’s shared vulnerability in a globalized era. ASEAN provided an effective framework to manage the former health epidemic, although it remains less effective in managing the latter, showing that even with integration there are limits to the ability of Southeast Asian countries to influence the developments in another. It is not only a matter

01 Legacy.indd 12

8/28/08 3:38:52 PM

Introduction

13

of avian flu, but also the haze or even limited political reform in Myanmar. Despite integration, nation-state boundaries dominate. This could not be said for the region in 1946. No doubt, Southeast Asian countries have come a long way since their disarray after the Japanese occupation. The navigation of the political environment is often credited for the successes and shortcomings. In the 1950s, the main focus of the political elites was on winning independence and forging new states. The paths to independence varied significantly, with countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia winning wars against colonial powers and others such as the Philippines and Malaysia negotiating self-rule. The 1950s and 1960s were difficult years for the new states in the region. Many, such as Vietnam, continued to be engaged in struggles with colonial powers. The decisive victory in Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was one of many victories that the Vietnamese won before the country turned attention away from warfare to economic development. Leaders in new states worked to forge national identities, and to create functioning independent states. Managing ethnic diversity was one of the many challenges of early Southeast Asian countries, underscoring the separation of Malaysia and Singapore in 1965 and the difficult relationships of minorities within states, whether they were in Myanmar, Indonesia or Brunei. The region struggled with consolidating democracy in those early years, with authoritarianism winning out. Democracy in Indonesia and Myanmar could not survive the fragmentation of its elites and failures in managing the economy, and by the mid-1960s the military had taken over. The military continued to play a critical role in Thailand, returning to power in eighteen different coups, the most recent in 2006 after over ten years of democratic civilian government. In Malaysia and Singapore, conservative political parties won power after independence, displacing leftist alternatives in the context of the Cold War, and limited the space for effective political opposition, consolidating “semi-democracies” dominated by single parties. Democratic governance has survived the longest in the Philippines but grew more authoritarian after Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law in 1972. It would take a mass people power movement in 1986, following the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino three years earlier, to trigger a new wave of democratization in the region. It was an uneven one that would bring about an opening of political space initially in the Philippines and Thailand, later after a historic peace agreement in 1991 in Cambodia and, more recently, profound changes in Indonesia and Timor-Leste after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Even Myanmar was

01 Legacy.indd 13

8/28/08 3:38:52 PM

14

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

affected as mass protests led to elections in 1990, which were rejected by the military junta which remains in power. Vietnam and Laos would become more open, introducing economic reforms, although communist parties in these countries continue to rule exclusively. Yet, the region remains a diverse set of regimes, with open democratic countries such as Indonesia alongside closed authoritarian governments such as Burma, now renamed Myanmar.

AN ENGAGEMENT ADVOCATE’S LENS: BRESNAN’S CONTRIBUTION TO UNDERSTANDING SOUTHEAST ASIA What brought about these profound regional transformations? The usual answer focused on the critical role of Southeast Asian leaders — Lee Kuan Yew, Soeharto, Mahathir to name a few. Leadership has played a pivotal role in the success and failures of specific countries. Yet the process of modernity and depth of transformations in the region is broader than the actions of key individuals. We argue collectively that in order to understand the changes in Southeast Asia, one has to look at how individuals engaged not only with one another in the region, but also with institutions within their countries, their societies, and the outside world. The scope and depth of these interactions extend well beyond this collection, but the lens of engagement provides a means to understand how the region has evolved. The perspective of engagement in this collection is two-fold. On the one hand, authors examine how specific agents — leaders, technocrats, diplomats, and so forth — engaged with the challenges before them. This provides a lens to interpret tranformations within Southeast Asia. Some essays develop arguments about the role of particular actors, while others focus on actors to describe developments over the past sixty years. The essays that follow all discuss transformations, yet the common thread is that they point to how relationships shifted, sometimes through overt actions of leaders and in other cases through unobtrusive actions of non-governmental actors. There is another element of engagement in this collection. All of the contributors are engaged with the region, either as practitioners or scholars who specialize in the region. They all have a strong commitment to understanding developments in Southeast Asia and working with Southeast Asians to improve the well-being of the region, often in modest ways. This collection is written largely by American scholars, and as such, reflects a bias that comes with this perspective, be it in the theoretical questions that are asked,

01 Legacy.indd 14

8/28/08 3:38:52 PM

Introduction

15

for example, democratization, or in the ideological values that underscore interpretations of events. On one level, this collection points to how Americans who are engaged with Southeast Asia interpret the developments in the region since 1946. Throughout, whether it is in the assessment of actors or in the lens that contributors adopt, the collection highlights both the strengths and limitations of engagement with and engagement within Southeast Asia. The focus on engagement reflects a shared desire by the contributors to honour John “Jack” Bresnan. In a career that spanned the same years of the volume, Jack Bresnan was both an agent of change and a chronicler of the transformations he helped bring about. As an executive with the Ford Foundation, he worked to build human capital and transfer scientific knowledge to the region. As an academic, Bresnan wrote and edited books that documented some of the political and economic changes he had been instrumental in fostering. Throughout his career, Bresnan worked to promote the exchange of people and ideas between the U.S. and Southeast Asia, in the hopes of improving relations between them. Bresnan first came to Indonesia in November 1961 as the Assistant Representative of the Ford Foundation. Sukarno’s militant anti-Westernism, however, meant that the Foundation and its work were often viewed with suspicion, making it difficult to embark upon the type of capacity building programmes that are at the heart of the Foundation’s mission. One of the few things that the Ford Foundation could do during that period was to send Indonesian students abroad for advanced graduate work. Even this became more difficult in 1965 when the leftist Foreign Minister Subandrio decreed that no Indonesian students would receive government permission to travel to the U.S. At the time, Ford had thirteen students who were scheduled to leave Indonesia to begin their studies. The only way to override Subandrio’s regulation was to obtain Sukarno’s signature. Bresnan and his boss made repeated visits to the Palace and finally secured permission for all thirteen students to leave Indonesia. Among the scholarship recipients was Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, who would later become Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia, Ambassador to the U.S., and Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. The Ford Foundation closed its Jakarta office in 1965, reopened it in 1967 and Bresnan returned to Indonesia as Representative in 1969. By then, Soeharto had taken power from Sukarno. Lacking Sukarno’s nationalist credentials, Soeharto was determined to legitimate his regime through economic development. Many of those who had received economic degrees on Ford Foundation fellowships, such as Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardana,

01 Legacy.indd 15

8/28/08 3:38:53 PM

16

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

Emil Salim, and Mohamad Sadli, now assumed roles as economic advisors to the President, and would later serve in top economic cabinet positions. At the time Ford funded their studies, the Foundation thought it was helping to create an independent university faculty, but it ended up assisting in the creation of something more powerful — a group of economic technocrats that would steer Indonesian development for the next three decades. Many members of what would become known as the “Berkeley mafia” viewed Ford as its prime benefactor. The context in which the Ford Foundation and Bresnan operated during his second tour of duty was radically different from his first. There was a group of policy-makers that trusted Ford and welcomed the Foundation’s support for their efforts. Ford provided technical assistance on numerous poverty reduction programmes. In Java, it worked with the Ministry of Agriculture to transfer new technologies that replaced the hand-pounding of rice with machinery, freeing women who had traditionally performed this task for other economic activities. To facilitate this transition, Indonesia developed one of the world’s first micro-finance programmes with Ford’s assistance. To help strengthen Indonesian social sciences, Bresnan hired renowned anthropologist Clifford Geertz to travel throughout Indonesia, survey the current state of university faculties, and recommend how best to improve the training of Indonesian social scientists in areas other than economics. Based on Geertz’s recommendations, Ford created a series of research stations throughout Indonesia headed jointly by a team of Indonesian and foreign social scientists that would eventually train over three hundred local university professors. In addition, during Bresnan’s term as Representative Ford sent over seventy social scientists abroad for doctorate degrees in fields such as political science, psychology, and anthropology. Ford, which had helped create the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, funded a major project to have the IRRI train Indonesian scientists and create institutions to conduct research on the diseases and insects that affected rice production in the country. Aware of the very different growing conditions throughout the archipelago, Bresnan made sure that the IRRI conducted its research in numerous sites throughout Indonesia. The pioneering work performed by IRRI with Ford funding was eventually supported by foreign aid from the U.S., Australian and Dutch governments and helped bring the Green Revolution to Indonesia, increasing rice production. Bresnan considered his work with the IRRI, which helped a country long subject to periodic famine to achieve rice self-sufficiency in the 1980s, his most significant contribution to Indonesia.

01 Legacy.indd 16

8/28/08 3:38:53 PM

Introduction

17

Bresnan returned to New York City in 1973 to become head of Ford’s Asia-Pacific Division. Over the next decade, he continued to work on the issues of economic and social development in Asia. He also used this position to integrate Southeast Asians more closely into the Foundation. Upon his recommendation, the prominent intellectual Soedjatmoko became the first Indonesian to serve on the Board of Directors of the Ford Foundation. Upon retiring from the Ford Foundation in 1982, Bresnan became a consultant to the Asia Society and a Senior Research Fellow at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute of Columbia University. From both of these platforms, Bresnan worked tirelessly to improve U.S. understanding of, and relations with, Southeast Asia. At the Asia Society, Bresnan worked with former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, for eight years to organize the annual Williamsburg conferences, which brought U.S. and Asian policymakers, intellectuals, and businessmen together to discuss issues of common concern to the region. Seeking to redress the U.S. ignorance of Indonesia, which is often referred to as the most important country Americans know nothing about, Bresnan was an early and enthusiastic supporter of the U.S.Indonesia Society (USINDO). He hosted the first meeting of USINDO’s advisory board at Columbia in 1993, was an active participant in its activities and served on its board until his death. At Columbia, Bresnan became Director of the Pacific Basin Studies Programme, and worked to broaden the study of Asia beyond that of Japan or China. Bresnan introduced the first courses on contemporary Southeast Asia and invited scholars from the region to teach them. Bresnan used his connections to ensure that Southeast Asian visitors to New York came to speak at Columbia, providing an opportunity for students and visitors alike to exchange ideas and develop new networks. Through these efforts, Bresnan helped train a new generation of American scholars and policy-makers committed to Southeast Asia. During his years at Columbia, Bresnan became a scholar himself. His best-known work is his 1993 book, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy.16 In what many consider the most comprehensive account of the political economy of development under Soeharto, Bresnan drew upon his first-hand knowledge gained from the role he played in promoting the country’s growth. By bringing the story of Indonesia’s dramatic economic transformation to an American audience, Bresnan’s career had come full circle. Many of Bresnan’s writings were designed to educate Americans about critical Southeast Asian issues in the hopes of influencing U.S. policy towards them. In his 1986 edited volume, Crisis in the Philippines: The

01 Legacy.indd 17

8/28/08 3:38:53 PM

18

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

Marcos Era and Beyond, Bresnan brought together a group of five American and five Filipino authors to address the political, social, and economic crisis of the late Marcos era and the challenges facing the new Aquino administration. In the forward to this book he made a passionate plea for a deeper understanding of Southeast Asia in the U.S., “There is nothing like the wider constituency of interested and informed citizens who thicken the American relationship with some other societies and who provide a balance to the rise and fall of official relations.”17 When the Council on Foreign Relations wanted someone to chronicle Southeast Asia’s dramatic political, social, and economic transformation in the hope of influencing U.S. policy towards the region in the post-Cold War era, it turned to Bresnan. He published From Dominoes to Dynamos in 1994.18 Here too, he called for greater engagement and understanding, “The capacity for misjudgment will always be there, built in to the structure of power relationships. But the state of our knowledge of Southeast Asia is remediable, and improvement is already under way in some areas.”19 In the same spirit, Bresnan worked with other Columbia scholars, James Morley and Richard Betts, to promote normalization of relations with Vietnam, producing essays which became part of a collection Vietnam Joins the World.20 When the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia and brought an end to the Soeharto era, Bresnan spearheaded what became known as the Transition Indonesia project. The project was a joint U.S.-Japanese-Australian effort to determine how these three key external supporters of Indonesia could help promote the country’s economic recovery and transition to democracy. From 1999 to 2002, Bresnan helped lead four study tours to Indonesia, convene five conferences, and draft five policy briefing reports that were widely distributed to American policy-makers and opinion-makers. Throughout, he continued to put Indonesia on the U.S. map through editorials and scholarly work, writing a strong Washington Post editorial in 1998 to call for greater democracy in Indonesia.21 Bresnan’s last academic work, an edited volume entitled Indonesia: The Great Transition grew out of this project and was published in 2005.22 This collection, like his earlier work on Indonesia, brings together different threads of research on the country and provides an accessible account of the challenges facing contemporary Indonesia. In conclusion, Bresnan spent a lifetime working to promote social and economic transformations in Southeast Asia and to enhance U.S. understanding of the region through his teaching, writing, and mentoring. In 1989, he participated in a training programme on Southeast Asia for

01 Legacy.indd 18

8/28/08 3:38:54 PM

19

Introduction

American high school teachers, extending public outreach into the American heartland.23 In 2003, President Megawati Sukarnoputri recognized Bresnan’s many contributions to Indonesia by awarding him one of the country’s most distinguished civilian honours, the Bintang Jasa Pratama. In November 2005, Bresnan’s American students and colleagues celebrated his many contributions to Southeast Asian studies at a conference at Columbia. This volume honours this remarkable man by creating a more permanent legacy of those discussions and continues Bresnan’s engagement mission of promoting mutual understanding and better relations between the U.S. and Southeast Asia.

THE PATH AHEAD This collection builds on the varied themes in Bresnan’s work and the extensive networks he forged. Twelve essays trace three themes — transformations within countries in the region, actors and processes that contributed to the transformations, and the transformations of relations among countries in the region from 1946 onwards. These essays, which vary from personal reflections to analytical pieces, capture some of the important changes the region has undergone and illustrate the diversity of experience in the region and the imprint of engagement within Southeast Asia and between the region and the outside world. These essays are written to be accessible to a general audience and synthesize key developments, rather than bring in new scholarship or significantly extend existing theoretical debates. Bridget Welsh’s essay (see chapter 2) provides a broad overview of regime change in the region in her examination of the interrelationships among regime transitions, democracy, and development. She assesses the impact of regime change on democratization and development and argues that Southeast Asia has had distinctive periods of change. Unlike other regions in the world, however, the region has not had sweeping regime change. Diversity has been the norm, with limited democratization over time. This diversity has spilled over into development. While the region as a whole is an economic powerhouse, Southeast Asia remains a region of wide variation, with high levels of poverty and concentrated pockets of wealth, despite sixty years of progress. Frederick Z. Brown’s essay (see chapter 3) on transformations in Vietnam raises provocative and thoughtful questions about the country’s trajectory since 1945, through warfare, unification, and economic recovery. As a first-hand observer of the changes in Indo-China, Brown engages with concerns of both practitioners and scholars and illustrates that Vietnam has

01 Legacy.indd 19

8/28/08 3:38:54 PM

20

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

significantly reconfigured its economic and political landscape and redefined its relationships abroad, especially with the U.S. The changes have been profound and with high cost, especially for the over two million people that died in warfare and persistent legacies of war. Brown’s analysis highlights the major steps since doi moi or economic reforms that were introduced in 1986, and along the lines of Bresnan’s scholarship, draws attention to the critical role of leaders and their pragmatic choices within difficult institutional and international contexts. Vietnam was the country that defined Southeast Asia for most Americans who engaged with the region from the 1950s, and remains one of its most important countries. Perhaps more than any other, the changes in Vietnam demonstrate how far the region has come in managing challenges and obstacles in engagement. On the other side of the spectrum is the Philippines, seen as the region’s laggard and underachiever. David G. Timberman (see chapter 4) assesses the economic and political changes in the Philippines and argues — in contrast to his book with this title — that the country has not been “changeless”.24 In fact, political volatility and erratic economic performance have limited options in the Philippines. He explores the underlying causes and consequences of the limited ability of the Philippines to bring out a more stable democracy and sustained economic growth, delving into the political economy, state capacity, and the impact of leadership. He compares the performance of the Philippines with that of Thailand and Indonesia. Through this comparative historical lens, he finds that the Philippines has shown surprisingly resilience, despite its obstacles. Hadi Soesastro’s essay (see chapter 5) — the sole non-American voice in this collection — anchors the discussion of development in the region. Through an economist’s eyes, Soesastro assesses Indonesia’s economic challenges and progress since 1946, distinguishing the different periods in economic policy-making, identifying the key challenges and assessing the response of leaders in Indonesia’s history, the engagement of leaders is one of Indonesia’s most difficult challenges. His analysis describes the highs and lows of Indonesian economic policy-making and points to specific obstacles facing Indonesia’s current democratically elected leadership team of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. More than any other essay, Soesastro touches on the themes of Bresnan’s scholarship. They shared an avid interest in searching for solutions to promote development in the largest, and now in 2008, most democratic country in Southeast Asia. It is this attention to the critical actions and actors that shape development that define the second set of essays. Peter Geithner (see chapter 6), formerly of the Ford Foundation, begins the discussion with a reflective piece

01 Legacy.indd 20

8/28/08 3:38:55 PM

Introduction

21

on the Foundation’s role in Southeast Asia. He describes the history of the Foundation’s expansion internationally and its engagement with Southeast Asia, which has consistently remained one of the regions of the Foundation’s focus. His description outlines how the priorities and engagement with Southeast Asia changed, reflecting both changes in the region and shifting international development priorities. The picture painted by this established practitioner is one of robust engagement, with the Ford Foundation both pioneering new areas of concern and working closely with the region to promote development. Hugh Patrick (see chapter 7) delves into the role of Japanese aid or Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in Southeast Asia and argues that Japan provided by far the largest share of its developmental assistance to the region. Japan, more than any country, has engaged financially with Southeast Asia since its occupation of the region. He shows that ODA was closely related to the robust economic ties that Japan forged with Southeast Asia from the 1960s onwards, and paralleled patterns of foreign direct investment. He distinguishes the different forms of aid, and illustrates that the JapanIndonesia relationship was especially strong. Annette Clear (see chapter 8) picks up on the role of Japanese aid, but uses a comparative lens to examine the effectiveness of donor strategies in Southeast Asia. Using the experience of East Timor as her foundation, she compares the donor strategies of three countries — the U.S., Japan, and the Netherlands — and reveals that these strategies took on different characters and had different effects. Her rich comparison describes the interplay of actors around the end of the 24-year Indonesian occupation of East Timor and points to the limits of international engagement to effectively promote domestic reform within Indonesia. The final set of essays broaches the dynamic transformations in international relations. Ann Marie Murphy’s essay (see chapter 9) traces the dramatic shifts in U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia, from Cold War containment to the Washington Consensus to the region’s designation as the second front in the war on terror. Murphy contends that because U.S. interests in the region are indirect, U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia is driven by its overarching grand strategy, rather than a direct concern with the stability and prosperity of local states. Murphy’s analysis shows how the creation of ASEAN and the developmental success of pivotal states have altered the dynamics of U.S.-Southeast Asian relations over time. Michael Chambers (see chapter 10) addresses the other great power, China. His analysis identifies tectonic shifts in the People’s Republic of China

01 Legacy.indd 21

8/28/08 3:38:55 PM

22

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

(PRC)’s relationship with the region and points to the biggest contemporary challenge for Southeast Asian countries, the management of China as a global power. Chamber’s analysis provides a thoughtful review of key changes and careful analysis of the difficulties of Southeast Asian countries to maintain a strong relationship with the PRC. Edward Masters (see chapter 11), former Ambassador to Indonesia, examines the tumultuous ups and downs in the relationship between Indonesia and the U.S. since 1946. His account traces his personal relationship with Indonesia beginning in the 1960s and shows first-hand how a practitioner balances competing demands and the limits of engagement. Whether it was the tragic killings in 1965 or the contemporary promise of stronger relations with a democratic Indonesia, Master’s account reflects the complexity of bilateral ties between two multifaceted and diverse countries. Donald Weatherbee’s essay (see chapter 12) takes a different tack and looks at the region as a whole. He examines the challenges that ASEAN faces in establishing a contemporary regional identity. As a devoted scholar to the region, Weatherbee assesses how ASEAN has evolved from its founding in 1967, highlighting how its identity changed through the decades, and points to the challenges ahead in building a regional community and forging a stronger framework for inter-relationships within the region. Engagement among ASEAN partners is not always smooth, and Weatherbee argues, will remain a serious challenge. The collection ends with Theodore Friend’s personal reflections (see chapter 13) on transformations in Southeast Asia and the challenges of U.S. international engagement. A historian by training, Friend studied closely two of the countries that Bresnan was devoted to — the Philippines and Indonesia. In many ways their careers took two different paths, with Friend moving from academia to practical engagement and Bresnan moving away from the field into academia. Despite their different experiences, both men shared a longterm connection with the region. In his provocative essay, Friend highlights the limits of engagement by U.S. scholars, practitioners, and officials not only in Southeast Asia, but globally. He highlights that any legacy of engagement — American or otherwise — is in nature, imperfect and flawed.

Notes 1

2

01 Legacy.indd 22

Donald Emmerson, “Southeast Asia: What’s in a Name?”, Journal of Southeast Asia Studies 14, no. 1 (1984): 1–21. The pioneering book in this regard was David Joel Steinberg, ed., In Search of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). See also, Anthony

8/28/08 3:38:55 PM

Introduction

3

4

5

6

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

01 Legacy.indd 23

23

Reid, ed., Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680, Volume One: The Land Below the Winds (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) and his Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). There are some important recent examples: Chia Lin Sen, ed., Southeast Asia Transformed (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); Victor R. Savage and May Tan-Mullins, eds., The Naga Challenged: Southeast Asia in the Winds of Change (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005). For a good broad historical discussion of the region in this period, see Norman G. Owen, ed., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005). Nicholas Tarling, The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (London: C. Hurst, 2001). Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003). Graeme Hugo, “Demographic Change and Implications”, in Southeast Asia Transformed, edited by Chia Lin Sen (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 114. Maddison, The World Economy. K.S. Jomo, Southeast Asia’s Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy and Economic Development in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997). Chua H.B., “Singapore Economy: The New and the Dual”, in Singapore Perspectives 2007: A New Singapore, edited by Tan T.H. (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 2007), pp. 7–23. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World (New York: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2004), pp. 188–91, available at . Jonathan Rigg, “Evolving Rural-Urban Relations and Livelihoods”, in Southeast Asia Transformed, edited by Chia Lin Sen (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 231–56. Takamasa Akiyama and Donald F. Larson, eds., Rural Development and Agricultural Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004). Rodolphe De Koninck, “Southeast Asian Agriculture Post-1960: Economic and Territorial Expansion”, in Southeast Asia Transformed, edited by Chia Lin Sen (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 198–200. Chua Beng Huat, Consumerism in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities (London: Routledge, 2000). Kenneth E. Corey and Mark I. Wilson, “The Naga Matures: From IT to Intelligent Development Policies in Southeast Asia”, in The Naga Challenged: Southeast Asia in the Winds of Change, edited by Victor R. Savage and May TanMullins (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), pp. 301–45.

8/28/08 3:38:56 PM

24 15

16

17

18

19 20

21 22

23

24

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

Jessie P.H. Poon, “Trade Networks in Southeast Asia and Emerging Patterns”, in Southeast Asia Transformed, edited by Chia Lin Sen (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 395–408. John Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). John Bresnan, Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. xii. John Bresnan, From Dominoes to Dynamos: The Transformation of Southeast Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994). Ibid., p. 14. James Morley and Masashi Nishihara, eds., Vietnam Joins the World (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). John Bresnan, “Act Now On Indonesia”, Washington Post, 5 July 1998. John Bresnan, ed., Indonesia: The Great Transition (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). John Bresnan, Approaches to Teaching about Southeast Asia: [in a world cultures social studies curriculum] (Publications series/East Asian Curriculum Project) (New York: East Asian Curriculum Project (EACP), Columbia University, 1989). David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

References Akiyama, Takamasa and Donald F. Larson, eds. Rural Development and Agricultural Growth. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004. Bresnan, John. Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. ———. Approaches to Teaching about Southeast Asia: [in a world cultures social studies curriculum] (Publications series/East Asian Curriculum Project). New York: East Asian Curriculum Project (EACP), Columbia University, 1989. ———. Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. ———. From Dominoes to Dynamos: The Transformation of Southeast Asia. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. ———. “Act Now On Indonesia”. Washington Post, 5 July 1998. ———, ed. Indonesia: The Great Transition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005. Chia Lin Sen, ed. Southeast Asia Transformed. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. Chua Beng Huat. Consumerism in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities. London: Routledge, 2000.

01 Legacy.indd 24

8/28/08 3:38:56 PM

Introduction

25

Chua H.B. “Singapore Economy: The New and the Dual”. In Singapore Perspectives 2007: A New Singapore, edited by Tan T.H. Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 2007, pp. 7–23. Corey, Kenneth E. and Mark I. Wilson. “The Naga Matures: From IT to Intelligent Development Policies in Southeast Asia”. In The Naga Challenged: Southeast Asia in the Winds of Change, edited by Victor R. Savage and May Tan-Mullins. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005, pp. 301–45. Emmerson, Donald. “Southeast Asia: What’s in a Name?” Journal of Southeast Asia Studies 14, no. 1 (1984): 1–21. Hugo, Graeme. “Demographic Change and Implications”. In Southeast Asia Transformed, edited by Chia Lin Sen. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 95–142. Jomo, K.S. Southeast Asia’s Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy and Economic Development in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997. Koninck, Rodolphe De. “Southeast Asian Agriculture Post-1960: Economic and Territorial Expansion”. In Southeast Asia Transformed, edited by Chia Lin Sen. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 191– 230. Maddison, Angus. The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003. Morley, James and Masashi Nishihara, eds. Vietnam Joins the World. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. Owen, Norman G., ed. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005. Poon, Jessie P.H. “Trade Networks in Southeast Asia and Emerging Patterns”. In Southeast Asia Transformed, edited by Chia Lin Sen. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 395–408. Reid, Anthony. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680, Volume One: The Land Below the Winds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. ———. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. Rigg, Jonathan. “Evolving Rural-Urban Relations and Livelihoods”. In Southeast Asia Transformed, edited by Chia Lin Sen. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 231–56. Savage, Victor R. and May Tan-Mullins, eds. The Naga Challenged: Southeast Asia in the Winds of Change. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005. Steinberg, David Joel, ed. In Search of Southeast Asia. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Tarling, Nicholas. The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia. London: C. Hurst, 2001. Timberman, David G. A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.

01 Legacy.indd 25

8/28/08 3:38:57 PM

26

Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. New York: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2004, pp. 188–91. Available at . United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). State of the World Population 2002: People, Poverty and Possibilities. New York: United Nations Population Fund, 2002. World Bank. World Development Indicators 2005. New York: World Bank, 2005. Also available at . World Health Organization. “The World Health Report 2005 — Make Every Mother and Child Count”. World Health Organization website (accessed 27 July 2007).

01 Legacy.indd 26

8/28/08 3:38:57 PM

A REGION TRANSFORMED Development, Democracy and Reform in Southeast Asia

02 Legacy.indd 27

8/28/08 3:43:11 PM

02 Legacy.indd 28

8/28/08 3:43:11 PM

2 UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORIES AND CONNECTIONS: REGIME CHANGE, DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Bridget Welsh In the sixty years since the Japanese occupation, Southeast Asia has achieved impressive economic growth, stability, and developed a strong regional identity. Its record on democracy is less impressive. Of the eleven countries in the region, only one, Indonesia, is currently listed in the “free” categorization established by Freedom House.1 That Indonesia is listed as “free” is quite an achievement, since for the overwhelming majority of years since 1945 it has been an authoritarian regime, with over thirty-two years under the one-man rule of Soeharto. Why after sixty years since the horrors of the Japanese occupation have so few countries in the region become open democratic regimes? The question is particularly puzzling, since the region as a whole stands out for its achievements in development. Admittedly with diversity and continued inequality, Southeast Asia has been heralded as a model for the developing world to a much greater degree than Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, even after the debilitating 1997 Asian financial crisis.2 Development has traditionally been seen to set conditions for greater democracy, not only in the West, but also in Latin America; rising incomes 29

02 Legacy.indd 29

8/28/08 3:43:11 PM

30

Bridget Welsh

and the emergence of a middle class have seen to put pressure both for greater representation and greater democratic governance. Southeast Asia does not fit this mould. Many countries in the region have robust middle classes and comparatively high per capita incomes. Singapore in particular stands out as the most developed country in the region and is arguably among the least democratic. Brunei follows suit. Why then has Southeast Asia pursued a different path, the path of development without democracy? This chapter attempts to answer this question. It examines the patterns of regime change in Southeast Asia, focusing on the record in the region since 1945. In the process, the chapter explores the relationships among regime change, democracy, and development. The findings suggest that the answer is not as simple as the question. Southeast Asia does have a record of democracy, although not a robust and region-wide one. There were three important periods of regime change in the region as a whole: (1) decolonialization, (2) authoritarian rule, and (3) disparate democratization. These periods are inconsistent temporally and uneven across the region, yet capture distinct periods of democratization or lack thereof in Southeast Asia. The relationships among regime change, democracy, and development are not clear-cut. More often that not, the experience of regime change did not correspond directly to more democratization or development, nor did democracy emerge directly out of the distinct “waves” of regime change as it did in regions such as Latin America. Rather, the tie between development and democracy in Southeast Asia is complex. The record shows that authoritarian rule did bring about economic growth and increases in economic rights through greater political stability, yet it also deepened inequality and increased a dependence on the state. This pattern is not consistent throughout the region, however; the most repressive regimes brought little economic gains to their citizens. On the other side of the coin, democracy in Southeast Asia did not bring about the same level of economic growth as authoritarian rule, yet it brought about some checks on inequality, although limited in scope, and allowed for more political rights. Although here, too, the pattern is uneven, with the longest democratic regimes such as the Philippines having comparatively only modest success. The inconsistencies suggest that a focus exclusively on regime type in understanding development in Southeast Asia is inherently limited. What, then, does an analysis of the interrelationships among regime change, democracy, and development suggest? Are there lessons for understanding why there is development without democracy? The analysis points to the need to re-examine the factors that tie development with democracy, namely the middle class, per capita income, and market-driven capitalism. Southeast

02 Legacy.indd 30

8/28/08 3:43:12 PM

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

31

Asia’s experience suggests that not all middle classes promote democracy, gains in per capita income alone is not as important as the distribution of wealth and the prominence of patrimonial states in market economies that individually and collectively foster conditions for greater acceptance of centralized political authority. Another key ingredient also needs to be brought into the picture — the support of elites for democratic rule. The region of development “success” is not a democratic “success” because of the nature of how development occurred and the lack of elite support for democratic rule.

DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT — A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW Before delving into the record of Southeast Asia, it is important to step back and look briefly at the theoretical frameworks that examine the causal relationships between democracy and development and vice versa. This is one of the most robust areas of discussion in comparative politics, especially in the United States (U.S.), whose focus on democracy is well-known. The experience in Southeast Asia as a region, however, has comparatively not entered systematically into the theoretical discussion.3 This is in part, as the discussion below suggests, due to the region’s inherent diversity and more gradual and disparate pattern of regime change. The rich theoretical discussion can be simplified heuristically into three different approaches — economic, social, and political explanatory factors explaining two causal relationships: (1) the link between development and democracy, and the (2) link between democracy and development. In examining the first major theoretical question, how development affects democracy, the approaches have been extensive and covered the gamut from economic and social explanations to political factors. Scholars using economic data have examined whether there is a relationship between levels of economic development, usually measured in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita terms and democracy, and whether patterns of expansion and/or contraction in the economy, usually measured in GDP per annum terms, affects the advent and persistence of democracy. Scholars in the modernization school in the 1950s began with the work of Walter Rostow among others.4 The work of Adam Przeworksi5 has led the field on the first question. He and his fellow authors argued that it is necessary to have a threshold level of income of $6,000 for a democracy to endure. The debate on whether there needs to be a threshold level for democracy to come about is less clear, although many scholars point to a decline in economic conditions,6 notable a crisis, such as that which occurred in Asia in 1997, as a trigger

02 Legacy.indd 31

8/28/08 3:43:12 PM

32

Bridget Welsh

for democratization and regime change.7 These economic approaches have included Southeast Asia case studies, but the region has included the outlier cases such as Singapore and Brunei that do not fit the norm. A second group of approaches focuses on the social structure of a country in contributing to democracy, with the focus resting squarely on the importance of a middle class. Here, Barrington Moore’s8 famous “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” refrain has underscored the perspective that a middle class — seen to be comprised of individual entrepreneurs often separate from the state (as Moore’s example of England described) and individuals with vested interest in securing rights, civil liberties, and property rights, curb the centralization of state power, and work to promote broader political space. In this vein, a robust and large middle class is seen to contribute to both bringing about and sustaining democratic governance. Closely related to this argument is the role of a civil society, comprising of organizations and activists that distinguish their identities from the state. A strong civil society is similarly seen to push for greater space, contributing to democratization and it is argued to be a key ingredient in promoting and maintaining democracy.9 The vibrant civil societies in places such as the Philippines and Thailand have been consistently incorporated into discussions of democratization in these countries, although on the whole, Southeast Asia has not captured the attention of political science theorists to the same degree as South Korea, for example.10 A third factor that is connected to democracy is the level of social inequality, with high levels of inequality seen as undermining democratic governance,11 although the data is inconsistent, with India the main outlier. A final issue that is brought into the equation is the ethnic diversity of a society, with sharp ethnic divisions seen as creating instability and potentially undermining democracy, or any regime for that matter. As such, theorists call for special arrangements, such as multi-ethnic coalitions like that in Malaysia as necessary to maintain stability and assure cooperation among races.12 With each of the causal factors noted above, there is a range of debate and scholarship. The discussion below will show that Southeast Asia also speaks of the importance of social structure, but more as a limit on democracy rather than as a conduit. Political factors also range widely in how they are used to explain the link between development and democracy. More often than not, however, the political factors impact democracy or development directly, but are not the direct relationship between the two. For example, the role of individual leaders, the prominence of specific institutions such as the military and effectiveness of governance are all seen to shape whether democracy comes about and at the same time affect the pattern of development. Lee

02 Legacy.indd 32

8/28/08 3:43:13 PM

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

33

Kuan Yew, for example, has been typically associated with both opposing democracy and shaping the development success of Singapore.13 Similarly, the prominence of Indonesia and Thailand’s military has been seen to negatively impact the prospects of democracy. Leaders have not been fully incorporated into the analysis of democracy in Southeast Asia, unlike the rich body of scholarship in Latin America on issues such as political learning,14 yet they have been tied to development to a greater extent, in part due to the wishes of regional leaders themselves. The pattern of state formation and strength of political institutions have both been tied to democracy, with historians of Southeast more recently pointing to the limited rights of Southeast Asian citizens and weak state capacity as factors contributing to the persistence of military rule.15 The focus among Southeast Asian scholars has been on the patrimonial state,16 a state that is captured by elites but simultaneously distributes patronage to assure its leaders power. Using the examples of Soeharto and the Philippines initially, and more recently Cambodia and Malaysia, the pattern established in state structures creates limited space for democratic practices to operate. With all these explanations, studies have centred on specific case studies, rather than examining the region as a whole. The second question, the relationship between democracy and development, is equally theoretically robust. Here, the focus is on political criteria to a greater extent than economic or social features, since democracy is inherently seen as a political variable. The main factor that ties democracy with development is greater accountability and implicitly more effective political representation. Greater political space is seen to create checks on abuses of power and call for more representative policies, forcing elites to look out for broader political interests and create conditions in which institutions operate more effectively through transparency and stronger governance.17 The practice of elections reinforces these measures. While one perspective treats democracy as a positive impact on development, others point to negative effects. Although many research frameworks have moved beyond this simplification,18 scholars point to the negative impact of gridlock in decision-making on development and the constraints posed by broad decision-making on matters involving interest trade-offs, especially those involving wages, subsidies, and resource distribution. Most of the arguments on development focus on specific causal explanations that do not involve democracy specifically. For example, political criteria focused on the state, with scholars pointing to the developmental orientation of the state as essential for stronger economic performance.19 This has been accompanied by thoughtful discussion of specific policies, such as

02 Legacy.indd 33

8/28/08 3:43:13 PM

34

Bridget Welsh

the adoption of export-oriented growth, protection of property rights or a selective industry approach.20 Economically, scholars have highlighted the role of the market,21 as a main conduit for development, and pointed to the importance (and potential curse) of natural resources.22 Socially, conflict is seen as a major obstacle to development,23 and ethnic diversity implicitly is seen as contributing to conflict. The presence of prominent business networks, such as Chinese business groups,24 is also seen to be beneficial, although with varied degree of emphasis. The range of explanations are extensive, and the list above is only illustrative, but it shows that most scholars argue that development is not necessarily tied explicitly to regime type. In fact, this is the main finding below, that democracy is not directly linked to development in Southeast Asia. To illustrate this, I step back and look at the pattern of democracy in the region.

SOUTHEAST ASIA REGIME CHANGE — THREE PERIODS OF CHANGE Decolonialization: Limited Development and Elitist Democracies Southeast Asia has experienced three distinct periods of regime change. The first most powerful change occurred with decolonialization, as the British, Americans, Dutch, and French retreated from the region starting right after the Japanese surrender through the early 1960s. This coincided with Samuel Huntingon’s famous second wave of democratization.25 The majority of countries in the region — the Philippines, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia — won independence during this period, in some cases fighting against their former colonial powers. Decolonialization, or rather the struggle for independence, took three distinct forms (see Table 2.1): (1) violent conflicts — Vietnam (1954, 1975), Laos (1954, 1976), Cambodia (1954–91), Indonesia (1945/1949), (2) negotiated independence — (Malaya (1957), Singapore (1965), Philippines (1945), Brunei (1983), and (3) arguably colonial disinterest — Burma (1948) and Timor L’este (2001).26 It is important to acknowledge that the timing of these experiences varied across the region, from 1945 to 2001. Maritime countries in the region were more successful in winning independence comparatively earlier, with the important exception of Thailand, which was never colonized. The experience of decolonialization profoundly shaped development in the region. Countries that experienced wars, notably Indo-China and

02 Legacy.indd 34

8/28/08 3:43:13 PM

35

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

Table 2.1 Decolonialization in Southeast Asia Country

Year of Independence

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia

1983 1954/1991 1949

Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Timor L’este Vietnam

1954/1976 1957 1948 1946 1959/1965 — 2001 1954/1976

1946–65 Main Form Government British Colonial Protectorate Civil War/Monarchy Parliamentary Democracy/Authoritarian Guided Democracy Civil War Parliamentary Democracy Parliamentary Democracy Parliamentary Democracy Parliamentary Democracy Military Rule/Parliamentary Democracy Portuguese Colony French Colony/Divided State

Indonesia, were disadvantaged as energized and legitimized militaries or communist parties emerged as the dominant institutions and the damage of warfare took years away from improving the lives of everyday people. War is a serious impediment for development. In the mainland countries of Southeast Asia, after the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the fighting continued, as Indo-China became a critical arena for a Cold War struggle against communism. The fighting effectively limited any substantive development gains through the 1970s. Even in Indonesia, the debt saddled by the Dutch as a condition for independence after the war or independence severely limited financial spending. Slowly-negotiated independence in places such as Malaya provided a stronger starting point. There and in Singapore, the British interest in these economies had rebuilt much of the infrastructure damaged during World War II and absorbed some of the costs of the insurgency struggle against the communist parties in these countries.27 Similarly, in the Philippines that won independence immediately after the Japanese occupation, the Americans invested in the fight against the Huks in central Luzon, absorbing some of the financial costs of warfare and providing a stronger foundation for anti-communist leaders to assert control and implement development initiatives.28 Not all leaders in the region, however, took advantage of their fortunate inherited foundations. The most notable cases in point were the Philippines and Myanmar where in the former,

02 Legacy.indd 35

8/28/08 3:43:14 PM

36

Bridget Welsh

personal interests of oligarchs hampered growth and in the latter, infighting among leaders squandered opportunities.29 Broadly, the first form of regime change — the defining pattern of winning independence — sketched the parameters of opportunity for leaders and affected the institutional legacies of Southeast Asian states, but was not in itself determinant of outcomes. The decolonialization period also brought greater democracy in the region. The spirit of self-determination encouraged the adoption of democratic constitutions, usually modelled after a country’s colonial ruler. The Philippines, for example, adopted a presidential system and bicameral legislature, similar to the American system, while Myanmar and Malaya adopted the British parliamentary framework. All five Southeast Asian countries that won independence through the 1960s adopted democratic frameworks — the Philippines, Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaya and after its separation from Malaya in 1965, Singapore. Thailand set the pattern, having adopted a parliamentary system after establishing a constitutional monarchy in 1932. Yet in the case of Thailand, the dominance of the military in politics limited the space for democratic institutions through the 1970s, as constitutions were rewritten after regular coups.30 Southeast Asia’s maritime countries were incorporated into the anti-communist umbrella, as the region took on greater significance in the international Cold War struggle. This ideological orientation limited the scope of issues and parties allowed to participate in politics during this early period.31 It was only in Indonesia, which adopted a non-aligned position under Sukarno, that a communist party was allowed to organize and operate in those early years. Democratic institutions during this early period were inherently weak. Elites dominated political parties, which more often than not primarily reflected the personal character of the leaders. This was true of the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI) where Sukarno overshadowed other nationalist leaders and in Myanmar where U Nu dominated the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) coalition. Most political parties in these early democracies did not have a mass membership base and lacked strong grass roots organization, limiting broad participation. Parliaments and legislatures, while important arenas for debate, were in some cases such as Malaya and Singapore, overshadowed by independence leaders or party coalitions, whose legitimacy remained paramount and limited the space for alternative voices, and in others, such as Myanmar and Indonesia, became arenas to perpetuate elite infighting. As such, Southeast Asian democracies in the early years were predominantly elitist. The main form of participation was elections, which became the major vehicle for democratic participation in the region even before independence. The Americans had introduced elections to Southeast Asia in the Philippines

02 Legacy.indd 36

8/28/08 3:43:14 PM

37

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

in 1907 and the Dutch had done the same in Indonesia in 1918.32 But it was not until 1933, however, that the first independent country held elections when Thailand introduced elections in the wake of the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy by the military. After gaining independence from World War II, Southeast Asia followed this pattern of tying power to electoral legitimacy. As Table 2.2 shows, all five of the region’s early democracies held regular elections, which served as the key tool to legitimize governments. Elections and nationalism combined to support early Southeast Asian democracies. The Philippines set in place regular elections from 1946, which would continue through 1971. Similarly Table 2.2 Elections in Southeast Asia33 Country

Election Years

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia

None 1955, 1972, 1993, 1998, 2003 1949, 1955, 1999, 2004 (pa/pr)

Laos Malaysia

None 1955, 1959, 1964, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2004 1947, 1951, 1956, 1960, 1988

Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Timor L’este Vietnam

1946, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1981, 1986, 1992, 1998 (pr), 2001 (pa), 2004 (pr/pa) 1963, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1991, 1997, 2001, 2006 1957, 1969, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2007 2001 (pa), 2002 (pr), 2007 (pa/pr) 1967 (pr), 1971 (pa/pr)

Notable Issues

Excludes unfair elections during New Order Limits on opposition Results of 1988 Rejected

Limits on opposition

Elections only for part of the country

Note: Bolded dates are free elections. “pr” signifies presidential elections, while “pa” signifies legislative elections.

02 Legacy.indd 37

8/28/08 3:43:15 PM

38

Bridget Welsh

in Malaysia and Singapore, elections before independence established the pattern of regular polls, which would place limits on the opposition yet would be held without interruption (with the exception of an eighteenmonth period of emergency rule in Malaysia after the May 1969 racial riots). Elections would be less regular in the other two independent democracies, as authoritarian pressures threatened fragile democracies. Myanmar held elections three times before the military took over in 1962.34 Even before the military centralized control of power for an extended period, there was a short period of military intervention in 1958, in order to reduce infighting among elites. Indonesia held the 1955 election, which would be the only democratic election in the country’s history for over forty years. Yet, here too, the elections did not reduce the infighting and produce clear policies for development.

CREEPING AUTHORITARIANISM: STABILITY BUT UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT Southeast Asia’s first wave of regime change did not bring about long-lasting democratic governance in the region. By the early 1960s, at least two of the democracies in the region had succumbed to authoritarian rule. The process began in 1957, when Sukarno introduced Guided Democracy, in which he limited political participation within Indonesian society to set groups and began a process of playing off the main actors — Muslim political parties, Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), PNI (nationalists headed by Sukarno), and Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) — against each other.35 Myanmar would be the next country to follow, as the military took over power in 1962. These events reflected the beginnings of a new wave of regime transition. If the struggle for independence was the first broad wave of regime change in the region, one could argue that the height of the Cold War brought increasing authoritarian rule to the region, a second period of regime change. Southeast Asia, unlike Latin America, did not experience a clear contagion of military coups, but gradually along different trajectories, a creeping of political closure and exclusion set in. Whether it was the move from Guided Democracy to the 1965 tumultuous transition that brought Soeharto to power in Indonesia, or the 1962 military coup and subsequent 1964 consolidation in Myanmar, or more subtle forms of exclusion, such as the 1963 Operation Cold Storage in Singapore which removed the left wing as a viable alternative to the People’s Action Party (PAP),36 emergency rule in Malaysia after the 1969 racial riots, Sarit’s consolidation of power in military hands in Thailand during the 1950s, or martial law in 1972 in the Philippines, a gradual but real cloud of authoritarian rule took shape.37

02 Legacy.indd 38

8/28/08 3:43:15 PM

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

39

The institution that gained the most ground was the army, which received an inflow of funds in the Cold War struggle in places such as Thailand, or maintained its dominant position won during independence struggles as in Indonesia. The change took place from 1960s through 1975, at a time when the region was one of the centres of attention in the international arena. Under the rubric of stability, whether regional or within national boundaries, power became more concentrated. Even the regional victors in the Cold War not allied to the West — Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia — would bring a more stable, yet authoritarian rule. These countries did not have the luxury of experiencing the post-independence wave of democratization, as warfare and continued colonial rule persisted in this Cold War arena. It was only with the victory against the U.S. in 1975 that stability gradually set in. These countries became one-party communist states, which divided the region ideologically. The transition set in place the dominance of authoritarian rule on mainland Southeast Asia. Yet in Cambodia, stability would remain elusive as fighting within the country continued initially with the Khmer Rouge occupation, and subsequently with the 1979 Vietnamese occupation.38 War continued to ravage this former French colony through most of the 1980s, with peace finally coming in 1991 after a protracted peace process. The elitist fragmented electoral democracies of the post-World War II environment made way for more stable centralized polities, either in the form of one-party states or dictatorships. Some, such as Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP, melded the two, although the leadership on this island state set in place some accountability measures and maintained electoral choice. Institutions strengthened generally across the board, although not consistently across the region or within polities. Political parties, in particular, became more robust. The dominant Malaysian political party, United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), for example, expanded its branches in local areas and membership, garnering support through distribution of state funds at the local level to its Malay base of constituents.39 Leadership continued to stamp its brand on the region, as figures such as Lee Kuan Yew and Soeharto became almost synonymous with the successes and failures of their countries.40 A second generation of leaders emerged, including not only the names just mentioned, but also Dr Mahathir and Ferdinand Marcos, who continued to centralize power and brand their countries as “successes” or “failures”. For the authoritarian period in Southeast Asia, the key issue was the quality of governance and leadership. As the regimes closed politically, many leaders in the region moved to rely on economic performance to legitimize their tenures, and in some cases such as Singapore and Malaysia this involved

02 Legacy.indd 39

8/28/08 3:43:15 PM

40

Bridget Welsh

strengthening institutions for more effective delivery of state goods and economic performance.41 For other countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, it was more effective to garner the support of key allies, later labelled “cronies”, to maintain power and promote growth.42 Like the earlier period, this second period of regime change of increasing authoritarian rule was uneven. In the early 1970s, Thailand experienced an opening, driven by social mobilization among students. From 1973 through 1976, democracy flowered in Thailand, only to be brought to an end with a bloody coup.43 The scope of increasing authoritarian rule varied. In Myanmar, the regime became increasingly isolated as internal struggles within the military brought leaders such as Ne Win with a “self-reliant” vision to power and displaced internationally-oriented leaders such as U Thant in the early 1970s.44 The country entered a dark period that would not even end with the bloody massacre of students in 1988. In Vietnam, the early years of communist rule brought hardship for many, especially minorities and those with ties to the former regime in the south.45 In Indonesia, power became increasingly concentrated, with the military gaining influence buttressed by a small Chinese business elite or cukongs, as the masses were left with little political alternatives.46 The East Timorese perhaps faced the brunt of increasing militarization in Indonesia, when the country was invaded in December 1975 in the name of nationalism.47 Comparatively, the increasing authoritarian rule in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines was minimal.48 Singapore used the dominance of the PAP, the country’s small size, and credibility of Lee Kuan Yew to consolidate power, legitimizing centralization of power through stability and economic growth. Malaysia and Indonesia embarked on an increased state distribution, patrimonial rule, in the form of an affirmative action policy known as the New Economic Policy in Malaysia, and sheer patronage through personal relationships towards ethnic Indonesians or pribumis in the case of Indonesia. In Malaysia, ethnic clashes in 1969 legitimized a closure of political space, yet elections continued after an eighteen-month interregnum, although without the same level of openness. In the Philippines, Marcos used state funds to buttress his power, yet elections became a sham, as they did in Indonesia.49 The variation in quality of life between the economic hardships of rural Vietnam and urban Singapore were stark, even in the 1970s. The differences across countries, extended within countries. By definition, authoritarianism and democracy are contradictory. Yet, for many in Southeast Asia, the contradictions one sees here on issues of press freedom, limits on assembly, and other civil liberties, were not evident. Authoritarianism would bring the prioritization of different rights to the fore of many Southeast Asian

02 Legacy.indd 40

8/28/08 3:43:16 PM

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

41

regimes, although admittedly with great variation. For Malaysia, political closure fostered empowerment for the Malays at the expense of the other races, but in the process created a new social contract for the social rights of education and employment for the country’s majority. In Vietnam, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) introduced broad-sweeping measures to empower women, bringing their voices over concerns of health care and education into institutions previously deafened to these interests.50 Even in Indonesia, which was to become increasingly closed as the Soeharto regime unfolded, authoritarianism brought a reality to the right to public primary education. One should not go too far in suggesting that authoritarianism brought new broad social and economic rights into these regimes, especially when one considers the debacle of the Marcos regime, the horrifying one longgi impoverishment of the Burmese people or the 1976 massacre of students in Bangkok, yet, the idea that authoritarianism and democracy were fundamentally at odds in terms of rights on the ground needs to be rethought. There were some areas of gray and even some areas of expansion of rights, if one conceptualizes democracy outside of the realm of purely competitive elections.51 It is in this second period of regime change that Southeast Asia came into its own, forging the beginnings of a regional identity through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). On the issue of democracy it forged an appreciation of economic rights over political and cultural rights. The focus on delivering education, basic health care, and shelter preceded the civil liberties of free speech, assembly, freedom of religion, and rights of ethnic minorities. When one looks at the record of international agreements that Southeast Asian countries have signed, as illustrated in Table 2.3, the pattern of relying on economic legitimacy rather than political contestation emerges. Few countries signed the conventions on torture or civil and political rights, for example. Besides signing the framing and symbolic 1948 Human Rights Declaration, Southeast Asia countries generally agreed on the protection of rights of women and children. The signing of agreements points to the underlying beliefs of leaders, where in regimes such as Brunei there is resistance to entering international human rights protection agreements and even pro-multilateralist Singapore is careful about its position, resisting the protection of migrant workers, for example. It is also important to acknowledge that the signing of agreements does not signify real protection of rights. Many of the signatories on political rights agreements, such as Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, do not protect the rights they have signed, and in some cases, violate them. Yet, the pattern of signatures points to an underlying caution in embracing political and civil liberties. Lee Kuan Yew perhaps illustrated this attitude best

02 Legacy.indd 41

8/28/08 3:43:16 PM

42

Bridget Welsh

Table 2.3 Southeast Asian Parties to International Human Rights Instruments Country Brunei

Political Rights United Nations (UN) Declaration 1948

Economic Rights —

Convention Rights of Child 1990 Cambodia

UN Declaration 1948 Racial Discrimination Covenant 1969 Covenant Civil and Political Rights 1976 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981 Convention Against Torture 1987 Convention Rights of Child 1990

Covenant Economic, Social, Cultural Rights 1976 Convention Protection Migrant Workers 2003

Indonesia

UN Declaration 1948 Racial Discrimination Covenant 1969 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981 Convention Against Torture 1987 Convention Rights of Child 1990

Convention Protection Migrant Workers 2003

Laos

UN Declaration 1948 Racial Discrimination Covenant 1969 Covenant Civil and Political Rights 1976 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981 Convention Rights of Child 1990

Covenant Economic, Social Cultural Rights 1976

Malaysia

UN Declaration 1948 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981 Convention Rights of Child 1990

—

02 Legacy.indd 42

8/28/08 3:43:17 PM

43

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

Table 2.3 Country Myanmar

(continued )

Political Rights UN Declaration 1948 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981

Economic Rights —

Convention Rights of Child 1990 Philippines

UN Declaration 1948 Racial Discrimination Covenant 1969 Covenant Civil and Political Rights 1976 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981 Convention Against Torture 1987 Convention Rights of Child 1990

Covenant Economic, Social Cultural Rights 1976 Convention Protection Migrant Workers 2003

Singapore

UN Declaration 1948 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981 Convention Rights of Child 1990

—

Thailand

UN Declaration 1948 Racial Discrimination Covenant 1969 Covenant Civil and Political Rights 1976 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981 Convention Rights of Child 1990

Covenant Economic, Social Cultural Rights 1976

Timor L’este

UN Declaration 1948 Racial Discrimination Covenant 1969 Covenant Civil and Political Rights 1976 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981

Covenant Economic, Social Cultural Rights 1976 Convention Protection Migrant Workers 2003

02 Legacy.indd 43

8/28/08 3:43:17 PM

44

Bridget Welsh

Table 2.3 Country

(continued )

Political Rights

Economic Rights

Convention Against Torture 1987 Convention Rights of Child 1990 Vietnam

UN Declaration 1948 Racial Discrimination Covenant 1969 Covenant Civil and Political Rights 1976 Convention Discrimination Against Women 1981 Convention Rights of Child 1990

Covenant Economic, Social Cultural Rights 1976

when he described the best political system as “[a] form of government that will be comfortable, because it meets our needs”.52 An emphasis on economic rights among Southeast Asian leaders underscored the Asian values debate that would emerge in the 1990s, when more authoritarian regimes challenged the need to also have political and civil liberties.53 Democratic governance reached a low point in the region in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the region’s most consistent democracy, the Philippines, becoming more authoritarian. As the results from Freedom House in Figure 2.1 show, very few countries entered the “free” category, under five combined ratings on political rights and civil liberties during this period. The late 1970s and 1980s marked the regional low point for democratic governance, when no country was listed below seven, or “partly free”.

DISPARATE DEMOCRATIZATION: OPENINGS WITH DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT PATHS The mid 1980s–90s would mark another decade of regime change in Southeast Asia — one that would divide the region further — disparate democratization. Coinciding with Huntington’s third wave, some Southeast Asian countries began to open up.54 Starting with the Philippines in 1986 and followed by Thailand two years later, Indonesia and East Timor (now Timor-L’este) after 1998, broader democratic governance would take root as militaries withdrew back into the barracks and free and fair

02 Legacy.indd 44

8/28/08 3:43:18 PM

45

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1982/1983

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

Figure 2.1 Freedom House Ratings, Southeast Asian Countries, 1971–2006

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Brunei Myanmar Cambodia East Timor

Indonesia Laos Malaysia Philippines

Singapore Thailand Vietnam

elections would legitimize rulers to a much greater extent than economic legitimacy had done so earlier. The Freedom House ratings in Figure 2.1 show an increase, greater democratization, that gradually and unevenly took place. The catalysts and pattern of democratization in each country varied, but by the end of the 1990s, four of the eleven countries in the region would have some form of competitive elections to select its government — the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Timor L’este. Three other countries slated elections — Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia (after a historic peace agreement in 1991), but these contests have not operated on fair terrain. These three countries are the gray area of democratic electrons

02 Legacy.indd 45

8/28/08 3:43:19 PM

46

Bridget Welsh

without significant political liberalization.55 Reportedly, this represented a substantive change from earlier regional dynamics, as democracy took stronger hold at the end of the Cold War. The new international environment buttressed new openings. Authoritarianism, however, would continue to structure power in the rest of the region, even in the face of failed opposition movements in Myanmar in 1988. The military junta now known as the SPDC and operating from their new remote capital of Naypyidaw held onto power, squashing dissent, and living off the country’s rich natural resources. The dominant parties in Vietnam and Laos held onto power, similarly limiting open political challenges. Some sort of openings, however, did occur in all the three authoritarian mainland countries; Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar began to implement economic market reforms, liberalizing economies and bringing about more choices for citizens at the market place. These changes, however, have yet to bring about greater political freedoms. Southeast Asia’s “third wave” democracies are fragile and faced significant obstacles — massive social protests in Manila, coups in 1991 and 2006 in Thailand, and personalized riots in Timor L’este in 2006, to name a few. Thailand’s democracy succumbed to a return to military rule in September 2006.56 Indonesia’s democracy has emerged the strongest with successful democratic elections, but has also been traumatized by instability and violence.57 The same weaknesses of the 1950s — inadequate institutions, personal factionalism, and infighting — remain, although the current period lacks the ideological division of the Cold War period. The protection of political and economic rights persists as a problem in all the countries in the region, including the democracies. Nevertheless, this third wave of regime change in Southeast Asia has collectively opened political space, providing more choices for citizens in the region, who have become more empowered through greater access to information, stronger civil societies, and increased regional integration.58 Similar to earlier periods of regime change, today’s democratic transformation is riddled with inconsistencies and unevenness, both within countries and in the region as a whole. In democratic countries such as the Philippines, regions such as Mindanao remain in warfare, with extreme poverty. Papua similarly remains a serious problem in Indonesia. Regionally, Southeast Asia became two poles — one closely exemplified by Burma, renamed Myanmar in the 1990s, and the other open stewarded by Indonesia and the Philippines. Ironically, sixty years after World War II, Southeast Asia remains as divided as it was after 1945, although without the ideological

02 Legacy.indd 46

8/28/08 3:43:20 PM

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

47

schism. These divisions would hamper cohesive regional identity and be further strained as a new third and fourth generation of leaders take power. Today’s region leaders were socialized in the 1970s, the decade of dominant authoritarian rule and have moved cautiously and unevenly to open up the region. It is important to note that Southeast Asia, when compared to Latin America, has less democracy in the region as a whole, despite the gains that have been made.

DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: SUCCESS WITH DIVERSITY The move from limited democracy to greater authoritarianism back to limited democracy has coincided with profound changes in the development of Southeast Asian countries. Contemporary Southeast Asia at a glance has a diverse record in developmental performance. Macroeconomic indicators, including gross national income (GNI) per capita and GDP growth, point to the robust, yet diverse record of regional developmental performance. The region’s two smallest states, Brunei and Singapore, have the strongest overall indicators, due to the blessing of resources in the case of Brunei and sound management for both countries. Singapore joined the ranks of the newly-industrialized countries in the 1980s, and its policies and record serve as an example for other developing countries.59 Thailand, Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Indonesia have also been grouped among the “success stories”, having rapidly increased growth, greater industrialization with increased equality.60 The performance of these countries was called into question after the debilitating impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, but even the negative turnaround, for which the economies have since rebounded, does not take away their achievements.61 Vietnam’s recent economic expansion, especially in the last five years, has allowed it to enter into the ranks of recent successful industrializing economies.62 Five Southeast Asia countries, however, still have had limited economic achievements, namely Myanmar, Timor L’este, Cambodia, Laos, and to a lesser extent, the Philippines. All the GNI per capita are less than $1,000 annually. The differences are starkly shown in Table 2.4, where the HDI rankings for these countries are far lower than that of their regional neighbours. To appreciate the current economic landscape in Southeast Asia it is important to acknowledge how far regional economies have come since the Japanese occupation. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the progress in GNI per capita since 1950 has been significant over time, especially in the strong regional performers. Singapore stands out with the most consistent growth.

02 Legacy.indd 47

8/28/08 3:43:20 PM

48

Bridget Welsh

Table 2.4 Southeast Asia’s Macroeconomic Indicators Economic Performance Country Singapore Brunei Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia Vietnam Cambodia Myanmar Laos Timor L’este

Population (millions)

GDP (billions)

GNI/ capita

GDP PPP

HDI Value

Rank

4.4 0.4 25.8 64.9 84.5 225.5 85.2 14.4 51.0 6.1 1.0

116.8 — 130.1 176.6 98.3 287.2 52.4 5.4 — 2.9 0.3

27,490 — 4,960 2,750 1,300 1,280 620 380 — 440 750

28,077 19,210 10,276 8,090 4,614 3,609 2,745 2,423 1,027 1,954 —

0.916 0.871 0.805 0.784 0.763 0.711 0.709 0.583 0.581 0.553 0.512

25 34 61 74 84 108 109 129 130 133 142

Sources: GNI per capita annual growth rate (%) 1990–2006. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), State of World Population 2006: A Passage to Hope, Women and International Migration, available at (accessed 7 August 2007); World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006. Aggregates calculated for the Human Development Report Office by the World Bank. (accessed 7 August 2007).

The process, however, was not a linear one, and all of the countries have faced obstacles, not just the most recent Asian financial crisis. The recession of the 1980s, for example, left an imprint in economies such as Thailand and Malaysia. Resource depletion has affected Brunei, reducing GDP per capita rates. The progress among the weaker performers, however, has been considerably lower, especially in countries such as Myanmar where the bounty of resources and stronger inherited infrastructure offered more promise. Development in the region has never just been about per capita income levels. In this economic performance framework, there are clearly demarcated developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries in Southeast Asia, three different spheres of performance. Development has meant much more, however. For some, it is measured through visuals, large buildings such as the Twin Towers and efficient subway services such as the SkyTrain in Bangkok, or the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) in Singapore; modern amenities

02 Legacy.indd 48

8/28/08 3:43:21 PM

49

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections

Figure 2.2 GDP/Capita in Southeast Asian Countries, 1950–200363 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000

Cambodia Indonesia

Myanmar Brunei

Laos Vietnam

Singapore Malaysia*

2001

1998

1995

1992

1989

1986

1983

1980

1977

1974

1971

1968

1965

1962

1959

1956

1953

1950

0

Thailand Philippines

and infrastructure become indicators of success. Perhaps the measure in this lens is as simple as the ability to face minimal traffic when crossing today’s bustling regional cities. For the most part, the assessment of development in Southeast Asia has usually been made by elites, who have defined democracy the same way they have defined developmental achievements.64 These assessments have moved beyond macroeconomic indicators. Since the 1980s, the focus on developmental assessment has been on socio-economic performance, captured in the Human Development Index (HDI). Of these, the most powerful social indicator of developmental transformations in Southeast Asia is education. As C.L. Sharma, among others, have noted, governments in the region heavily invested in education, and as shown in Table 2.5, this yielded rewards with higher adult literacy, widespread primary education and gains in secondary and tertiary education as well.65 While there are important differences in education rates, across countries and within populations (such as females), the differences are not as stark as the overall macroeconomic indicators in Table 2.4. Well over half of Southeast Asia countries have an overwhelming majority of literate adults, and the enrolment ratios in school reach over half of the populations, except in Myanmar.

02 Legacy.indd 49

8/28/08 3:43:22 PM

02 Legacy.indd 50

Philippines

Myanmar

Malaysia

Laos

Indonesia

Cambodia

Brunei

Country

93.9 (96.3, 91.4) 69.4 (80.8, 59.3) 87.9 (92.5, 83.4) 66.4 (77.4, 55.5) 88.7 (92.0, 85.4) 85.3 (89.2, 81.4) 92.6 (92.5, 92.7)

Adult Literacy Rate % ages 15 and above (% male, % female)

81

47

69

82

48

72

53

64

66 65

53

64

Combined Gross Enrolment Ratio (all levels) % of male % of female

93

82

95

83

92

86

94

82

56

35

69

31

79 95

47

21

62

34

73

28

46

15

Secondary Net Enrolment Ratio total % of female

92

83

Primary Net Enrolment Ratio total % of female

Table 2.5 Education Achievements in Southeast Asia

35

15

28

3

14

2

17

Tertiary Net Enrolment Ratio % of female

50 Bridget Welsh

8/28/08 3:43:24 PM

02 Legacy.indd 51

92.5 (96.6, 88.6) 92.6 (94.9, 90.5) — 90.3 (93.9, 86.9) 72 — 61

— 67

75

74

76

Combined Gross Enrolment Ratio (all levels) % of male % of female

— 94

86

—

— 92

85

—

Primary Net Enrolment Ratio total % of female

(continued )

20 65

—

—

— —

—

—

Secondary Net Enrolment Ratio total % of female

15 9

38

—

Tertiary Net Enrolment Ratio % of female

Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006 (New York: World Bank, 2006), pp. 182–84, available at and (accessed 7 August 2007).

Timor L’este Vietnam

Thailand

Singapore

Country

Adult Literacy Rate % ages 15 and above (% male, % female)

Table 2.5

Unexpected Trajectories and Connections 51

8/28/08 3:43:24 PM

02 Legacy.indd 52

— 34.1 7.5 26.3