British Muslims and Their Discourses [1st ed. 2024] 3031450124, 9783031450129

Table of contents :
Introduction
Contents
Contributors
List of Figure
List of Tables
Part I: Engagement in Social Dynamics
Chapter 1: Muslim Political Agency in British Politics
1 The Concept of Misrecognition
2 Misrecognising Muslim Agency
3 The Politics of Muslim Representation
4 Conceiving of the ‘Muslim Vote’
5 Limits of Neutrality and Partisanship
6 Muslim Organisational Politics
7 Conclusion
Chapter 2: Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion
1 Civil Religion, Representations and the Media
2 News Values and the Imagery Decisions of the Media
3 Images, Subjectivity, and Meaning Making
4 Muslims in the Media
5 Methodology
6 ‘Britishness’ as Civil Religion in Media Reports
7 News Reporting on Islam and Muslims
8 News Reporting on Islam and Muslims
9 Conclusion
Chapter 3: Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere
1 Current Literature About Islam and the News Media
2 Islam and Politics
3 Mediatisation of Politics
4 Public Relations and Politics
5 Methodology
6 Fieldwork Among Public Relations Practitioners
7 Interviews with Representatives of Muslim Groups
8 Conclusion
Chapter 4: Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological Perspective on Islamophobia
1 Terror Management Theory
2 An Integrative Terror Management Approach
3 Social Representations
4 Essentialism
5 The Psychology of Terrorism as a Mortality Reminder
6 The Nation as Way of Immortalising the Self
7 Derogation of the ‘Other’ and Support for the In-group
8 Stereotyping of Muslims
9 False-Consensus Effect Legitimising Prejudice
10 The Symbolic Threat to British Values
11 Putting It All Together: The Role of Self-Esteem and Meaning
12 Escalation of Islamophobic Prejudice and Group Conflict
13 Reducing Prejudice and Conflict
14 Conclusion
Chapter 5: Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia Networks in North-West London
1 (Diaspora) Religion and Space
2 The Locative: Twelver Shia Networks in Brent
3 The Trans-locative: The Transnational Reach of Clerical Authorities and ‘Long-Distance Nationalism’
4 The Supra-locative: The Discursive Creation of a Shia Religious imaginaire
5 Conclusion
Part II: Expressions of Personal Identity
Chapter 6: British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground of Discourse and Praxis
1 Islam and Music: A Contested Tradition
2 British Muslims and the Religious Permissibility of Music
3 Religious Authority and Muslim Musicians
4 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 7: Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social Orders in the UK
1 Introduction: Context and Research Question
2 Theoretical Framework: Civilising Attempts and Emancipatory Shifts
3 Research Methodology
4 Empirical Findings: Categories of Cultural Orientations
5 Orientations: Civilising Attempts
6 Orientations: Social Critique and Civilising Attempts
7 Discussion
8 Conclusion
Chapter 8: Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education
1 The Power-Knowledge Dynamics of Terrorism
2 Academic Arena: Defining ‘Terrorism’
3 The ‘Waves’ of Terrorism
The State Arena: Political Power-Knowledge
The Media Arena: The ‘Out-of-Class Curriculum’
The Education Arena: Some Challenging Discussions
4 Conclusion
Chapter 9: The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered
1 Methodology
2 Mother as Daughter, Daughter as Mother
3 Her Decision, Her Strategy
4 Her Choice as Resistance
5 Solidarity and Democracy
6 Achievement and Self-Realisation
7 Conclusion
Chapter 10: Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities
1 Theoretical Framework and Research Question
2 Methodology
3 Marriage in the Islamic Tradition
4 Marriage Within the British Muslim Community
5 Muslim Online Dating Apps
6 Online Dating by Muslims
7 Conclusion
Bibliography

Citation preview

Laurens de Rooij   Editor

British Muslims and Their Discourses

British Muslims and Their Discourses

Laurens de Rooij Editor

British Muslims and Their Discourses

Editor Laurens de Rooij Université Toulouse 1, Capitole Toulouse, France

ISBN 978-3-031-45012-9    ISBN 978-3-031-45013-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Introduction

Historically, Muslims were not identified on the basis of religion in the same way as they are now. They were discriminated against on the basis of ethnicity rather than religion. Yet, in a post-9/11 world, discrimination against Muslims still places them at a disadvantage even if it is for different reasons than it was historically. A number of events of the last 50 years or so have had a lasting impact on race relations within Britain’s multi-ethnic, multicultural and religious pluralist society. None had a more intense public impact on Muslims in Britain as the Rushdie affair. It has been suggested that it was this event that saw the first coming to a head of the questioning of the place of Islam and Muslims in Britain. It created the conditions for a critique of public culture.1 This is not to suggest that the race riots of 1958 and 1981, or Enoch Powell’s famous ‘rivers of blood’ speech in 1968, were insignificant events; rather, the Rushdie affair was a milestone in the evolution of multicultural relations in Britain and, more specifically, the place of Islam within Britain. The controversy led to many Muslims being isolated from the broader collective (minority) alliances, and it simultaneously meant many sought to assert their identity as Muslims. Where Muslims previously had been considered ‘Black’, ‘Asian’ or ‘ethnic minority’, the affair meant they were no longer recognised as belonging to those categories by other members of those categories. However, it was not only a move by other minority groups to distance themselves from others; some Muslims were moving out of those categories and demanding recognition as Muslims: ‘When you no longer see any pride or value in being Senegalese, African, Black or immigrant, but the people around you still won’t accept you as Belgian, British, or European, almost the only welcoming cultural identity that remains – at least for one prominent group of second generation kids – is religious.’2

 For one example, see: Tariq Modood, “British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair,” The Poltical Quarterly 61, no. 2 (1990). 2  Doug Saunders, The Myth of the Muslim Tide: Do Immigrants Threaten the West? (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2012). 1

v

vi

Introduction

Until that point, mainly members of the majority population had led the debate about how multiculturalism was best to be achieved, while minorities were deemed mainly passive. ‘Integration’ had been seen to mean, in effect, ‘assimilation’ (that is, the adjustment of minorities to the dominant society). After the Rushdie affair, however, it came to be seen more as a mutual process, where the majority population would also have to adapt to a certain extent. However, the origins of organised attempts at interfaith dialogue must also be situated within this context, as, in ‘the early 1980s, Christian leaders were making attempts to meet with Muslim communities to establish interfaith dialogue, but others still viewed non-Christian communities as targets for evangelism’.3 Kenan Malik has stated: ‘When most people say that multiculturalism is a good thing, “they mean the experience of living in a society that is less insular, less homogeneous, more vibrant and cosmopolitan than before”.4 However, we need to “separate the idea of diversity as lived experience from that of multiculturalism as a political process, because the latter amounts to a political project that will seal people into ethnic boxes and . . . police the boundaries.”’5 In other words, the further management of minorities by the dominant group(s). However, Beckett and Macey suggest that, instead of dominant groups managing minority spaces, it will be dominant groups within the marginalised spaces doing so. In turn, this would further marginalise and silence certain voices.6 For example: ‘Multiculturalism does not cause domestic violence, but it does facilitate its continuation through its creed of respect for cultural differences, its emphasis on non-­ interference in minority lifestyles and its insistence on community consultation (with male self-defined community leaders). This has resulted in women being rendered invisible, their needs ignored, and their voices silenced.’7 Historically, this approach to multiculturalism, as a public policy in Britain, was heavily localised, often made voluntary and linked essentially to issues of managing diversity in areas of immigrant settlement. The legislative framework on which this policy is based, for example, the Race Relations Acts (1965[1968] and 1976[2000]), recognised this contingency. This provided additional resources, as well as new powers, to local authorities to better promote racial and ethnic equality. With these powers, most local authorities with large ethnic minority populations have transformed themselves from initially being the bastions of official racism to being

 Mathew Guest, Elizabeth Olson, and John Wolffe, “Christianity: Loss of Monopoly,” in Religion and Change in Modern Britain, ed. L. Woodhead and R. Catto (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012). 4  Cited in Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “The Multicultural State We’re In: Muslims, ‘Multiculture’ and the ‘Civic Re-Balancing’ of British Multiculturalism,” Political Studies 57 (2009). 5  Cited in ibid. 6  Clare Beckett and Marie Macey, “Race, Gender and Sexuality: The Oppression of Multiculturalism” (paper presented at the Women’s Studies International Forum, 2001). 7  Ibid. 3

Introduction

vii

promoters of anti-racism and multiculturalism, and the strength of local ethnic communities and coalitions has played a pivotal role in this change.8 In the last two decades, there has been an increase in coverage of religion in the UK news media, and reports about Islam have been the single most significant determining factor in this increase.9 While there was some literature exploring the relationship between Islam and Britain before the attacks of the 11th of September, 2001,10 more academic interest followed, which was compounded by the attacks in London on the 7th of July, 2005. Despite a large body of literature, British Muslim studies remain a growing area of scholarly investigation. As Gilliat-Ray and others suggest, the heterogeneity of the British Muslim community warrants further study.11 Sociologists of religion have conducted considerable research on how many dimensions of personal identity have shaped, and are shaped by, religion. This includes how a generation,12 ethnicity,13 gender,14 economic behaviour15 and sexual

 G. Singh, “British Multiculturalism and Sikhs,” Sikhs Formations 1, no. 2 (2005).  Coverage of British Muslims in the British press has increased year on year from 352 articles in 2000 to 2185 articles a year later. Coverage reached a peak of 4196 articles in 2006. By 2008, coverage had reduced to 3466 articles. Kerry Moore, Paul Mason, and Justin Lewis, “Images of Islam in the Uk: The Representation of British Muslims in the Nmational Press, 2000–2008,” Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, http://www.channel4.com/news/media/ pdfs/Cardiff%20Final%20Report.pdf; Paul Baker, Costas Gabrielatos, and Tony McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B.  Tauris, 2002); E.  Bleich et  al., Media Portrays of Minorities: Muslims in British Newspaper Headlines, 2001–2012 (Chicago, IL: American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 2013); Laurens de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion,” Journal of Religion in Europe 10, no. 1–2 (2017). 10  Elizabeth Poole, “Framing Islam: An Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of Islam in the British Press,” in Islam and the West in the Mass Media, ed. Kai Hafez (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2000); Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1997); Humayun Ansari, The ‘Infidel’ Within: Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present (London, UK: Hurst, 2004); N. Matar, Islam in Britain 1558–1685 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995). 11  S. Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Claire Dwyer, “Contradictions of Community: Questions of Identity for Young British Muslim Women,” Environment and Planning A 31, no. 1 (1999). 12  Richard W Flory and Donald Earl Miller, Genx Religion (Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press, 2000). 13  For examples, see: Tariq Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain, vol. 22 (U of Minnesota Press, 2005). 14  For examples, see: Jane Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi, Globalization, Gender, and Religion: The Politics of Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing, 2001); Ursula King, Religion and Gender (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995). 15  Rodney Wilson, Economics, Ethics and Religion: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Economic Thought (Berlin, Germany: Springer, 1997); Callum G Brown, Religion and Society in Twentieth-­ Century Britain (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2014). 8 9

viii

Introduction

orientation16 are informed by religious life. Within Islamic studies, the effects of generational differences,17 race,18 gender19 and sexual orientation20 on religious life have been examined. More recent analyses have begun to address specific questions about those different aspects of Muslim lives and their religion. Examples include: a discussion of Muslim participation in media debates,21 fashion,22 a study of

 Religion and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain; David AJ Richards, Identity and the Case for Gay Rights: Race, Gender, Religion as Analogies (University of Chicago Press, 1999); Marlene Arndt and Gideon De Bruin, “Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men: Relations with Gender, Race and Religion among University Students,” Psychology in Society 33 (2006). 17  Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tyler Golson, “Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and Cooption of Moderate Islam in Western Europe,” J. Church & St. 49, no. 1 (2007); Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Adair T Lummis, Islamic Values in the United States: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press, 1987). 18  Mei-Po Kwan, Peter Hopkins, and Cara Aitchison, Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender and Belonging (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012); Peter Hopkins, Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities: Race, Place and Identities (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 19  Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Karin van Nieuwkerk, Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West (University of Texas press, 2009); Claire Dwyer, Bindi Shah, and Gurchathen Sanghera, “‘From Cricket Lover to Terror Suspect’–Challenging Representations of Young British Muslim Men,” Gender, Place & Culture 15, no. 2 (2008); Amanullah De Sondy, The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). 20  Arno Schmitt and Jehoeda Sofer, Sexuality and Eroticism among Males in Moslem Societies (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 1992); Samar Habib, Islam and Homosexuality (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009); Louise Archer, “‘Muslim Brothers, Black Lads, Traditional Asians’: British Muslim Young Men’s Constructions of Race, Religion and Masculinity,” Feminism & Psychology 11, no. 1 (2001). 21  Riem Spielhaus, “Media Making Muslims: The Construction of a Muslim Community in Germany through Media Debate,” Contemporary Islam 4, no. 1 (2010). 22  Emma Tarlo, Visibly Muslim: Fashion, Politics, Faith (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010); Eva F Amrullah, “Indonesian Muslim Fashion Styles & Designs,” ISIM Review 22 (2008); Reina Lewis, Muslim Fashion: Contemporary Style Cultures (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); Fajer Saleh Al-Mutawa, “Consumer-Generated Representations: Muslim Women Recreating Western Luxury Fashion Brand Meaning through Consumption,” Psychology & Marketing 30, no. 3 (2013). 16

Introduction

ix

Muslim participation in contemporary governance,23 problems related to integration or assimilation,24 Islamophobia,25 education26 and recognition.27  Therese O’Toole et al., Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance, (Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship: University of Bristol, 2013), http://www.bristol.ac.uk/ ethnicity/projects/muslimparticipation/documents/mpcgreport.pdf; Matthias Koenig, “Europeanising the Governance of Religious Diversity: An Institutionalist Account of Muslim Struggles for Public Recognition,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33, no. 6 (2007). 24  Jonathan Birt, “Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in Post 9/11 Britain,” The Muslim World 96 (2006); Tahir Abbas, “Muslim Minorities in Britain: Integration, Multiculturalism and Radicalism in the Post-7/7 Period,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 28, no. 3 (2007). 25  Chris Allen, Islamophobia (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010); Chris Allen and Jorgen Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the Eu after 11 September 2001 (Vienna, Austria: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2002); G.R.  Conway and Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (London, UK: Runnymede Trust, 1997); John L Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin, Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011); R. Lambert and J. Githens-Mazer, Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Uk Case Studies 2010 (Exeter, UK: European Muslim Research Centre, University of Exeter, 2010); Tahir Abbas, “Islamophobia in the United Kingdom: Historical and Contemporary Political and Media Discourses in the Framing of a 21st-Century Anti-Muslim Racism,” in Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, ed. John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001); Marco Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-­ Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice,” in Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. M. Helbling (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012); “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory,” in Identity Process Theory: Identity, Social Action and Social Change, ed. Rusi Jaspal and G. M. Breakwell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Ayhan Kaya, “Islamophobia: A History of the Term,” in The Oxford Handbook of European Islam, ed. Jocelyne Cesari (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014). 26  Tariq Modood, “Ethnicity, Muslims and Higher Education Entry in Britain,” Teaching in Higher Education 11 (2006); Alison Scott-Baumann, “Collaborative Partnerships as Sustainable Pedagogy: Working with British Muslims in Collaborative Partnerships,” in Greener by Degrees In: Exploring Sustainability through Higher Education Curricula, ed. Carolyn Roberts and Jane Roberts (Cheltenham, UK: Geography Discipline Network, 2007); Alison Scott-Baumann, “Developing Islamic Higher Education for a Secular University Sector: Orientalism in Reverse?,” in Muslim Schools and Education in Europe and South Africa, ed. A Tayob, I Niehaus, and W Weisse (Munster, Germany – New York, NY: Waxmann, 2011); M. Shiner and T. Modood, “Help or Hindrance? Higher Education and the Route to Ethnic Equality,” British Journal of Sociology of Education 23, no. 2 (2002); David Tyrer and Fauzia Ahmad, Muslim Women and Higher Education: Identities, Experiences and Prospects: A Summary Report (Liverpool, UK: John Moores University European Social Fund, 2006), http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Education/documents/2006/08/02/muslimwomen.pdf; Angela Quartermaine, “Discussing Terrorism: A Pupil-­ Inspired Guide to Uk Counter-Terrorism Policy Implementation in Religious Education Classrooms in England,” British journal of religious education 38, no. 1 (2016). 27  Steven Vetovec, “Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain,” in Muslims in the West, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002); Marcel Maussen, “Pillarization and Islam: Church-State Traditions and Muslim Claims for Recognition in the Netherlands,” Comparative European Politics 10, no. 3 (2012); Nasar Meer, Wendy Martineau, and Simon Thompson, “Misrecognition and Ethno-Religious Diversity,” Ethnicities 12, no. 2 (2012). 23

x

Introduction

This project addresses two themes: first, Islam in discursive fields that go beyond the narratives of integration and terrorism. Second, it examines how those other discourses are engaged with by Muslims in ways that operationalise their individual religious and non-religious identities. The project will draw on empirical methodologies and theoretical approaches from a range of cultural studies to highlight how individual meaning and social practices come together in this particular area of investigation. In turn, this research will make a significant contribution to the fields of Islamic studies, socio-political studies and cultural studies, and, like in John R. Bowen’s work, the ‘focus is on the field of debate and discussion in which participants construct discursive linkages to texts, phrases, and ideas held to be part of the universal tradition of Islam’.28 This is important because discourse creates, reflects and enforces social representations and practices. David Voas and Rodney Ling describe the feelings towards Muslims in Britain as follows: Firstly, some of the antipathy towards Muslims comes from people with a generalised dislike of anyone different. Secondly, a larger subset of the population, about a fifth, responds negatively only to Muslims. Finally, relatively few people feel unfavourable towards any other religious or ethnic group on its own . . . conceivably there is a spill-over effect, so that people who are worried about Muslims come to feel negatively about ‘others’ in general. In any case, the adverse reaction to religion in Britain and the United States towards Muslims deserves to be the focus of policy on social cohesion, because no other group elicits so much disquiet.29

For the scholars whose ideas are the focus of this volume, studying the lives of Muslims is an interdisciplinary endeavour. Thus, this book contains different methodological and theoretical perspectives that all inform the field of British Muslim studies. In the case studies of this volume, the actual process of relating those interdisciplinary perspectives takes place. As a result, the contents of the book have been divided into two sections. These two sections can be broadly categorised as two sides of the same coin but offering viewpoints from opposite sides. The chapters in Part I focus more on the macrolevel and discuss aspects on the social or collective level. It is on this macrolevel that specific and general discourses that affect Muslims in Britain today are discussed. Part II takes as its vantage point the opposite side, starting from the individual. As a consequence, these chapters are more focused on the microlevel, that is, how macro discourses play out on the microlevel of everyday life. These chapters are substantiated by the individual actions of Muslims in Britain and seek to highlight how, on a personal level, Muslims in Britain may act and interact with the discourses they are subjected to.

 John Richard Bowen, Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 29  David Voas and Rodney Ling, “Religion in Britain and the United States,” in British Social Attitudes: The 26th Report, ed. Alison Park, et al. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010). 28

Introduction

xi

Despite previous scholarship focusing on Muslim lives in Britain as a whole,30 more recent works have focused on Muslims in regions of the UK.31 With that in mind, this volume seeks to contribute to that understanding by analysing specific discourses present in the English socio-political discourse and the way they relate to Muslims subjected to those discourses. The most authoritative accounts of contemporary scholarship related to Islam and Muslims in Britain continue to be expressed from ideological perspectives stressing integration or assimilation, media representation and problems pertaining to national security. Yet, there are other discourses that affect Muslim lives and from which Muslims in the UK speak, often in a realm beyond the immediate concerns of those three perspectives. As a number of contributions to this volume demonstrate, it is often in these different forums that the rich and diverse lived experiences of Muslims are allowed to speak. In preparation for the content of this volume, we must contextualise the position of Muslims and Islam in Britain. This volume on Muslims in England and the contemporary discourses that surround them can thus be seen as a window into a world reflecting not only the participants’ own lives but also the world of those they seek to inform. This piece of literature discussing Islam in England adds to a growing body of literature aimed at policymakers or others in positions of influence. This material, typically produced by Muslim representative bodies and organisations, includes material such as recommendations for changing the relationship between Islam and media32 and better approaches for engaging Muslim groups.33 The impetus for the production of such material and the engagement in such activities may stem from

 For example: Ansari, The ‘Infidel’ Within: Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present; A.M. Bari, Race, Religion &Muslim Identity in Britain (Swansea, UK: Renaissance Press, 2005); Innes Bowen, Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam (London, UK: Hurst, 2014); J.S. Fetzer and J.C. Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain; P. Lewis, Islamic Britain, Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 1994); Matar, Islam in Britain 1558–1685. 31  For example: Peter E Hopkins, Scotland’s Muslims: Society, Politics and Identity (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2017). 32  For example, see: Conway and Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All; Inayat Bunglawala, “British Muslims and the Media,” in The Quest for Sanity: Reflections on September 11th and the Aftermath, ed. Muslim Council of Britain (Middlesex: Muslim Council of Britain, 2002); British Council and University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies, Building a Shared Future: Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere (London, UK – Cambridge, UK: British Council – University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies, 2012); Greater London Authority, The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the Uk Media (London: Greater London Authority, 2007); Rt Hon Baroness Elizabeth Butler-Sloss GBE, Living with Difference: Community, Diversity and the Common Good (Cambridge: The Woolf Institute, 2015). 33  For example, see: British Council and University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies, Building a Shared Future: Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere; Rt Hon Baroness Elizabeth Butler-Sloss GBE, Living with Difference: Community, Diversity and the Common Good. 30

xii

Introduction

social concerns about Islamophobia,34 a response to the increased securitisation of brown bodies35 or a subsequent response to the increased public gaze on Islam and Muslims.36 The significance of this is not to be underestimated, as media coverage often expresses concerns about Muslim participation in public life37 and Muslim exclusion from society,38 with some even suggesting that negative media coverage may result in physical attacks on Muslims.39 To add to the debate on Muslim participation in public life, Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood explore the role of Muslim political agency in British politics in Chap. 1. They argue that it is a common complaint among Muslim civil society organisations that their presence in British politics is misconstrued. They provide an overview of how an increasing number of activists and groups are engaging with what they perceive to be the misperception of their political agency. This chapter explores how a number of organisations have positioned themselves in response to experiences of ‘misrecognition’ in the context of general elections. The chapter draws on a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of advocacy organisations that mobilised Muslim constituents and highlights how actors respond to perceived pressures, make claims and project identities in opposition to alleged misperceptions or the refusal to recognise their desired self-descriptions. In Chap. 2, Laurens de Rooij argues that media narratives are used to conceptualise Islam in Britain and define its place and role in society. The existing protocols of religion, media and public space of a given context characterise that environment as well as dictate the participation of members in that space. The aesthetic elements

 Conway and Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. 35  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, The Representation of Muslims in Public Discourse (Warsaw, Poland: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2006). 36  UNESCO, Media, Violence and Terrorism (Unesco, 2003); British Council and University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies, Building a Shared Future: Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere; Greater London Authority, The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the Uk Media. 37  O’Toole et al., Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. 38  Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims; de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.”; Elizabeth Poole, “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context,” Global Media Journal – Canadian Edition 4, no. 2 (2011); Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, eds., Muslims and the News Media (London, UK  – New  York, NY: I.B.  Tauris, 2006); C.  D. Field, “Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 18, no. 4 (2007); Allen, Islamophobia; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, Islamophobia and Anti-­ Muslim Hate Crime Uk Case Studies 2010. 39  Allen and Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the Eu after 11 September 2001; Allen, Islamophobia; Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice.”; “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory.” 34

Introduction

xiii

(media representations of Islam and Muslims) regulate Islam and Muslims through the codes and conventions – civil religion – of British society. In turn, Claire Forbes, outlines an alternative approach to understanding the representation of Islam in media discourses by exploring the processes and practices that can be used to challenge or change what makes news. To do this, it recasts the way Islam is viewed from a religious or media studies perspective to a political one, exploring the positioning of Muslim groups within the UK political field. It examines how public relations practices are used by Muslim representative groups and spokespeople. Ludi Simpson, among others, has questioned the common assumption that Muslims living in Britain choose to ‘cluster together’ and self-segregate.40 Deborah Phillips argues that ‘segregated patterns of living have not necessarily arisen through the minority ethnic choice implicit in discourses of self-segregation. Given ethnic inequalities in access to power and resources, the sustained patterns of settlement in deprived inner-city living are more likely to reflect the choices of white, non-Muslim people and institutions’.41 In an earlier article, Phillips suggested that ‘[t]he fear of racial attack remains a pervasive force for clustering’.42 When considering the relevance of this idea to the current subject under discussion, we must remember that, while considerable ethnic variation exists among Muslims living in Britain, many consider Islamophobia to be on the increase.43 This leads to Samuel Fairlamb and Marco Cinnirella presenting their socio-psychological perspective on the potential exclusion of Muslims from society and potential physical attacks on Muslims. In Chap. 4, ‘Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-Psychological Perspective on Islamophobia’, they provide a sophisticated and sincere analysis of the problem of Islamophobic prejudice. By critically evaluating existing literature on prejudice, the purpose of this chapter is to consider the advantages of an integrative and eclectic theoretical approach drawing upon social identity theory (SIT),44 intergroup threat theory (ITT),45 essentialism,46 social repre Allen and Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the Eu after 11 September 2001; Allen, Islamophobia; Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice.”; “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory.” Ludi Simpson, “Statistics of Racial Segregation: Measures, Evidence and Policy “Occasional Paper, Urban Studies, no. 24 (2003), http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/publications/occasion/Occ24.pdf 41  D.  Phillips, “Parallel Lives? Challenging Discourses of British Muslim Self-Segregation,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 24 (2006). 42  “Black Minority Ethnic Concentration, Segregation and Dispersal in Britain,” Urban Studies 35, no. 10 (1998). 43  Muslim Council of Britain, “Islamophobia,” http://www.mcb.org.uk/islamophobia/ 44  H. Tajfel and J. C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Inter Group Behavior,” in Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. S. Worchel and W. Austin (Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall, 1986). 45  Walter G Stephan, Cookie White Stephan, and Stuart Oskamp, “An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice,” Reducing prejudice and discrimination (2000). 46  Nick Haslam, Louis Rothschild, and Donald Ernst, “Essentialist Beliefs About Social Categories,” British Journal of Social Psychology 39, no. 1 (2000). 40

xiv

Introduction

sentations theory (SRT)47 and terror management theory (TMT)48 to explore the antecedents of Islamophobia and its rising prevalence in England. In doing so, they argue that TMT offers a unique insight into motivational responses underpinning prejudice and conflict, such as Islamophobia. In order to go beyond a Sunni-normative account of Muslim lives in England, Oliver Scharbrodt has provided his account of Shia Muslims in Brent in Chap. 5. While often being labelled as ‘a minority within a minority’49 or as ‘the other within the other’,50 Shia identity is often overlooked in terms of both communal activities and practices and public perception and recognition. This chapter highlights the notion of a double marginalisation of Shia minorities in the West by investigating the dynamics around transnational Shia communal spaces in Northwest London and the creation of Shia spaces by networks and organisations based there. Scharbrodt articulates how the double marginalisation that affects Shia Muslims in the UK also opens up certain opportunity structures in the context of the post-9/11 securitisation of Islam51 following the discursive dichotomy between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’ or ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ Islam.52 This discursive environment has led a number of Shia Muslims to present themselves as ‘moderate’ Muslims who are victimised by the same ‘radical’ forces that are responsible for the rise of global terrorism.53 In turn, this chapter examines how the agency of 12 Shia networks unfolds at different spatial scales and contributes to a ‘utopian’ Shia religious imaginaire. As the final chapter of Part I, it also brings the part to a fitting conclusion.

 Serge Moscovici, “On Social Representations,” in Social Cognition: Perspectives on Everyday Understanding, ed. J. P. Forgas (London, UK: Academic Press, 1981). 48  Jeff Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon, and Tom Pyszczynski, “Terror Management Theory of SelfEsteem and Cultural Worldviews: Empirical Assessments and Conceptual Refinements,” Advances in experimental social psychology 29 (1997). 49  Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “A Minority within a Minority: The Case of the Shi’a in North America,” in Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne Idleman Smith, Jane, ed. Muslim Communities in North America (New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 3. 50  Liyakat Takim, Shi‘Ism in America (New York, NY: NYU Press, 2009), 143. 51  Jocelyne Cesari, The Securitisation of Islam in Europe, (CEPS Challenge Programme: Research Paper No. 15, 2009), http://aei.pitt.edu/10763/1/1826.pdf 52  See: Birt, “Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in Post 9/11 Britain.”; Katherine Brown, “The Promise and Perils of Women’s Participation in Uk Mosques: The Impact of Securitisation Agendas on Identity, Gender and Community,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10, no. 3 (2008/); Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Michael J Balz, “Taming the Imams: European Governments and Islamic Preachers since 9/11,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 19, no. 2 (2008); Frédéric Volpi, “Constructing the ‘Ummah’in European Security: Between Exit, Voice and Loyalty,” Government and Opposition 42, no. 3 (2007); Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies:‘Islamic Terrorism’in Political and Academic Discourse,” ibid. On this discourse and its historical roots see: Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York, NY: Three Leaves Press, 2005), 15–16, 22–24, 260. 53  Oliver Scharbrodt, “Shaping the Public Image of Islam: The Shiis of Ireland as “Moderate” Muslims,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31, no. 4 (2011); Susanne Olsson, “Shia as Internal Others: A Salafi Rejection of the ‘Rejecters’,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 28 (2017). 47

Introduction

xv

Where Part I started out by presenting issues being faced by Muslim community organisations in relation to the non-Muslim societal majority, it travelled, via exploring that conflict, to further examining its contours by situating a minority Muslim community within that larger discourse that is often excluded from socio-political participation by both larger and more powerful Muslim and non-Muslim groups. While much previous scholarship is devoted to history, political activism and integration, Part II, on individual expressions of identity, aims to explore how identity is operationalised by Muslims living in England. This part starts off with a discussion of how art produced by Muslim artists expresses the identity of those artists. In Chap. 6, Carl Morris draws on his original fieldwork to consider the contested nature of religious discourse and musical practice for Muslims in Britain. Although often divergent in terms of musical practice, style and cultural background, these musicians nonetheless share a religious platform and act as vocal advocates for their faith. While engaging larger discourses about Islam and Muslims, these artists also have to address debates concerning the Islamic views on the permissibility of music. Despite a long tradition of music and spoken word performance in the Islamic world, there have been long-standing religious tensions concerning the use of instrumentation and the moral content of music. These discourses are additionally inflected with wider concerns relating to minority status, cultural distinctiveness and the complex weave of authority among religiously diverse Muslim communities. It explores the specific religious debates regarding music and wider views concerning the permissibility of instrumentation, including the role of Muslim ‘ulama, and focuses in particular on how these discourses interact with (musical) practice. While this chapter suggests that Muslim musicians exhibit strong tendencies towards strategic negotiations in relation to their musical practice, there is a critical and reciprocal relationship with religious authority that is buttressed by an emphasis on personal pedagogy. In Chap. 7, Yolanda van Tilborgh builds on this by discussing how British Muslim performing artists relate art to Islam in their perceptions of (the Western ideal of autonomous) art in combination with those of Islamic norms and values by addressing in which way the artists take account of the views of established Islamic teachers and Muslim intellectuals. In this chapter, Van Tilborgh looks at how Muslim artists more broadly use their art and social position to influence Muslim and nonMuslim audiences. Here, the emphasis is not on personal pedagogy but on socialising pedagogical strategies by various Muslim artists. The relationship with religious authority is explored through the various strategies employed by artists to showcase their work and negotiate the religious sentiments of potential audience members. The artists in the previous two chapters engage with long-standing political debates about notions of ‘Islamist extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ and about the influence of Muslim groups on wider British society. In Chap. 8, which typifies the ideological contestations about the oppositional relationship between ‘Muslim’ and ‘British’ identities, Angela Quartermaine explores current British counterterrorism discourses in schools. In particular, she analyses how education policy, also known as the Prevent Strategy, ensures that children do not engage in or become subject to ‘terrorist’ or extreme ideologies and activities. This chapter concludes by

xvi

Introduction

exploring some of the central issues surrounding this controversial aspect of the Prevent Strategy and makes some speculative suggestions on appropriate, or alternative, approaches to challenging terrorist ideologies. In Chap. 9, Hengameh Ashraf-Emami and Laurens de Rooij build on the previous works by exploring how Muslim women’s religious identities are passed down from mother to daughter, as there is hardly any research that explores questions pertaining to intergenerational identities of British Muslim women. In this chapter, Ashraf-Emami and De Rooij discuss women’s agency and the construction of their identities in an intergenerational context, substantially adding to our understanding of the identity of British Muslim women and its connection to their agency in motherhood. This is of heightened importance in light of events such as the Brexit vote, as these events often portray Muslim women as passive and lacking in agency.54 This chapter explores the influence of gender roles and relationships on the transmission of cultural beliefs and practices from one generation to the next, and the hijab is used as a focal point for analysing that process. In Chap. 10, Laurens de Rooij seeks to bring to the fore how young Muslims are using online dating options available to them to suit their needs. For many, online dating offers a low-stress solution to the daunting challenge of finding a partner for marriage in countries where few share their faith and in communities where matchmaking is considered a family affair. This chapter discusses the relationship between Muslim online matchmaking for British Muslims and their Islamic identities with regard to marriage and romantic relationships. The research presented in this volume offers an important discussion of a number of discourses Muslims in England experience. From these scholarly analyses, a number of problems emerge pertaining to current media practices, including the importance of media on daily lived experiences; the negotiation of meaning by people in their practices; and how the actions undertaken by Muslims, whether religious or non-religious, are often misunderstood by non-Muslims. Often, the dominant discourses are securitisation, Muslim terrorism and conflict. The chapters on terror management theory, politics, public relations and Islam in the UK public sphere and challenging terrorist ideologies through education all address this. Yet, what binds all Muslims is not necessarily a political identity55 but rather what Ansari describes as follows: ‘Islam serves as a frame of reference – a pattern of thought and communication  – and gives meaning to their condition and behaviour. These Muslims may also have very diverse attitudes towards Islam and its practice. But what they do have in common is knowledge of Islam, on which they draw while engaging in a discourse so that they can communicate meaningfully and with

 Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press; de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.” 55  For more, see: Salman Sayyid, “Muslims in Britain: Towards a Political Agenda,” in British Muslims: Loyalty and Belonging, ed. Mohammad Siddique Seddon, Dilwar Hussain, and Nadeem Malik (Markfield: The Islamic Foundation, 2003). 54

Introduction

xvii

relevance.’56 Therefore, many of the chapters introduce new discourses that Muslims are engaging with on a daily basis that are worthy of scholarly attention. From the participants’ perspective, such an element is essential to constructing a thread between the ‘real’ world and Muslims and Islam, endowing the subject with the relevant information. The chapters here suggest that current discourses are both insufficiently varied and, in turn, offer legitimacy to certain harmful normative practices. In such circumstances, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the imposition of such practices is simply harming the long-term image of Muslims in Britain and abroad. The asymmetry of power between institutions and individual actors and the nature of this contested subject means that many topics will need to be revisited, as relations and values change in times to come. In addition, there is good evidence that existing discourses are still failing to recognise the diversity of Muslims and Islam. What this book seeks to provide are enriched narratives of a complex and sophisticated form that analyse how different discourses about Muslims and Islam in England are lived and experienced. While this book does not seek to provide an authorised history of Islam and Muslims in England, it provides important contextual information to under-represented elements of Muslim life in Britain. It seeks to emphasise, however, that, while living in mixed communities makes ethnic minorities feel more British,57 Muslims have relatively lower rates of social mobility, and improving education does not appear to lead to more job opportunities in the British labour market.58 Yet, despite the negative perception of Islam in the British press59 and the increase in Islamophobic attacks, Muslims participate and are increasingly able to participate in British society. Muslims form a diverse group that exhibits the same behaviours, conflicts, dilemmas and values as non-Muslims. The situation on a local and representative level has enabled the Muslim community to increasingly mobilise itself and demand recognition and act as an agent for change in British society. This book also seeks to raise the profile of alternative domains in which Muslims are active, and other parts of their lives that are vibrant, and negotiate meaningful experiences daily.

 Ansari, The ‘Infidel’ Within: Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present.  Tony Trueman, Living in Mixed Communities Makes Ethnic Minorities Feel British (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2014). 58  Institute of Social and Economic Research, Immigrant Minorities Suffer Low Rates of Social Mobility, (Colchester, UK: University of Essex, 2014), https://www.understandingsociety.ac. uk/2014/06/13/immigrant-minorities-suffer-low-rates-of-social-mobility 59  For more on this, see: Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims., John E. Richardson, “British Muslims in the Broadsheert Press: A Challenge to Cultural Hegemony?,” Journalism Studies 2, no. 2 (2001). & (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004). 56 57

Contents

Part I Engagement in Social Dynamics 1 Muslim  Political Agency in British Politics��������������������������������������������    3 Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer, and Tariq Modood 2 Believing  and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������   23 Laurens de Rooij 3 Politics,  Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere������������   55 Claire Forbes 4 Social  Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological Perspective on Islamophobia����������������������������   77 Samuel Fairlamb and Marco Cinnirella 5 Creating  Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia Networks in North-West London����������������������������������������������������������������������������  101 Oliver Scharbrodt Part II Expressions of Personal Identity 6 British  Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground of Discourse and Praxis ����������������������������������  123 Carl Morris 7 Civilising  Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social Orders in the UK ��������������������������������������  141 Yolanda van Tilborgh

xix

xx

Contents

8 Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education��������������������������  183 Angela Quartermaine 9 The  Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered������������������  201 Hengameh Ashraf-Emami and Laurens de Rooij 10 Online  Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities ������������������������������������������������������������������  221 Laurens de Rooij Bibliography ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  247

Contributors

Hengameh Ashraf-Emami  University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK Marco  Cinnirella  Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK Laurens de Rooij  Université Toulouse 1, Capitole, Toulouse, France Jan Dobbernack  University of Lincoln, Lincoln, UK Samuel  Fairlamb  Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK Claire Forbes  University of Kent, Canterbury, UK Nasar Meer  University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK Tariq Modood  Bristol University, Bristol, UK Carl Morris  Central Lancashire University, Preston, UK Angela Quartermaine  University of Warwick, Coventry, UK Oliver Scharbrodt  Lund University, Lund, Sweden Yolanda van Tilborgh  University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

xxi

List of Figure

Fig. 7.1 Pattern of cultural orientations in the field of Muslim performing artists������������������������������������������������������������  177

xxiii

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Five modes of misrecognition��������������������������������������������������������    8 Table 2.1 The percentage of stories that mention Muslim(s) and how often that word is mentioned�������������������������������������������   45 Table 2.2 How often does the word Muslim appear in the newspapers?��������������������������������������������������������������������������   45 Table 2.3 The percentage of stories that mention Islam and how often that word is mentioned�������������������������������������������   46 Table 2.4 How often does the word Islam appear in the newspapers?����������   46 Table 6.1 Muslim music fans on music consumption������������������������������������  128 Table 6.2 Muslim music fans on instrumentation in Islam����������������������������  128

xxv

Part I

Engagement in Social Dynamics

Chapter 1

Muslim Political Agency in British Politics Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer, and Tariq Modood

It is a common complaint among Muslim civil society organisations and activists that their presence in British politics is misconceived. For example, and notwithstanding a broader commitment to pluralism in British politics, activists who mobilize on the basis of Muslim religious identities often encounter the charge that they foster sectarian divisions.1 Hence, following his victory in the Bradford West by-­ election, the salient charge was that George Galloway’s success was the outcome of a homogeneous Muslim voting bloc. What was less immediately noted was the role of young voters and disenchantment with Labour’s alleged exploitation of kinship

 Iris Young distinguishes between ‘identity politics’, understood as “solidarity-producing cultural politics”, and the ‘politics of difference’, in which claims for “fairness, opportunity, and political inclusion” emphasize, but are not reducible to, specific cultural markers. It is not the point here to argue this type of nuance in political rhetoric, yet it is clear that the popular critique of ‘identity politics’ is often simplistic and confused. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 103–07. 1

This chapter is a slightly expanded version of work that has been published in Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer, and Tariq Modood, “Misrecognition and Political Agency. The Case of Muslim Organisations in a General Election,” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 17, no. 2 (2015), and is presented here with permission of the journal. J. Dobbernack Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK e-mail: [email protected] N. Meer University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK e-mail: [email protected] T. Modood (*) Bristol University, Bristol, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_1

3

4

J. Dobbernack et al.

networks (biraderi), factors largely passed over by commentators generally supportive of Muslim identity politics.2 Right-wing commentators meanwhile converged on the view that Galloway’s success showed ‘that sectarian politics are now alive and well in Britain’3 and that British Muslims eagerly responded when they were addressed ‘not as primarily British citizens but solely as Muslims’.4 As an example for the ‘ugly alliance between the far left and Islamists’, Abhijit Pandya5 pointed to ‘groups like Operation Black Vote and the Muslim Public Affairs Committee [that] are busy encouraging such communities to vote along racial and religious lines’. There is of course a prevailing political context here. Organisations that attempt to mobilize minority citizens by appealing, in one way or another, to collective concerns, interests and identities, find themselves in situations where they have to respond to representations that they believe do not adequately characterize their objectives, subjectivities and the reality of Muslim participation in British politics more generally. In response, an increasing number of advocacy groups are concerned to repudiate what they perceive to be misperceptions of Muslim agency as exceptional and impossible to accommodate. Frequently, these organisations and initiatives desire to project and practice civic identities, to demonstrate their normality and a commitment to the ‘common good’. This chapter focuses on such efforts in the context of the general election 2010. It draws on qualitative research into campaigns of the most active mobilizing actors: the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), ENGAGE, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC), the Youelect initiative, and, as a non-Muslim group, the aforementioned Operation Black Vote (OBV). It explores how organisations positioned themselves in response to experiences of ‘misrecognition’.6 This conceptual focus allows us to explore one of the most pertinent characteristics of Muslim political agency in Britain today: how actors respond to perceived pressures, make claims and project identities in opposition to alleged misperceptions or the refusal to

2  Mehdi Hasan, “British Muslims Must Step Outside This Anti-War Comfort Zone,” The Guardian, 2 April 2012. 3  Douglas Murray, “When Will the Tories Stop Trawling for the “Muslim” Vote?,” The Telegraph, 3 May 2010. 4  Stephen Pollard, “Galloway Victory Is a Disaster for British Democracy,” Daily Express, 31 March 2012. 5  Abhijit Pandya, “Galloway’s Victory Is the Last Thing Britain Needs,” The Daily Mail, 30 March 2012. 6  The article focuses on political agency in response to the experience of misrecognition. It deliberately chooses not to review in significant detail the socio-political and demographic context of British Muslim electoral politics see, however, Maria Sobolewska et al., “Religion and Minority Political Participation: Evidence from Great Britain,” European Consortium for Political Research, http://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/5d20b96a-9898-4f91-ac2c-e177750c0bb7.pdf. It equally does not address the reality of anti-Muslim bias, such as in the British press, see, Moore, Mason, and Lewis, “Images of Islam in the Uk: The Representation of British Muslims in the Nmational Press, 2000–2008”; Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press.

1  Muslim Political Agency in British Politics

5

acknowledge their desired self-descriptions. We employ the concept of misrecognition to help theorise these processes. More precisely, this chapter draws on a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of the organisations listed above that were conducted in early 2012; it supplements the accounts of these activists with a study of campaign materials published by these organisations in the run-up to the general election. It begins by locating the concept of misrecognition within normative and political theory (1). It then outlines fives ‘modes’ that are characteristic for how Muslim political actors conceive of misrecognition (2). In the following section, the chapter works through three significantly contested issues that are highlighted by and require a response from all organisations under investigation: minority representation (3), the character of ‘the Muslim Vote’ (4) and political neutrality (5). It concludes by suggesting that misrecognition represents a meaningful perspective on Muslim politics that needs be expanded in order to conceive of creative and productive, not just reactive, modes of political agency.

1 The Concept of Misrecognition Beginning with our theoretical concern, misrecognition is a term that is obviously relational to recognition, and the two most prominent proponents of the latter concept began their dialogues with the same source. Charles Taylor’s essay on ‘The Politics of Recognition’7 and Axel Honneth’s book Kampf um Anerkennung8 engage with, both appropriating and departing from, Hegel’s philosophical system. For example, shadowing Hegel’s account of the three arenas of recognition (family, civil society, and the state), Honneth argues that there are three modes of recognition, which he refers to as love, respect, and esteem. Love is the mode of recognition which, all being well, we receive from our small circle of significant others. Respect is that mode which we experience when our fellow citizens regard us as rights-­ bearing individuals. Esteem is the sort of recognition we enjoy when we are valued for our distinct contributions to society’s collective goals. Taylor, meanwhile, offers a philosophical and historical account of how recognition reflects ‘a vital human need’,9 one crucial to our ability to become full human agents. This claim stems from the Hegelian premise of the fundamentally dialogical character of human identity which Taylor elaborated on in Sources of the Self. That is, one can become

  Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism and ‘the Politics of Recognition’: An Essay, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 8  Alex Honneth, Kampf Um Anerkennung: Zur Moralischen Grammatik Sozialer Konflikte (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994). 9  Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 26. 7

6

J. Dobbernack et al.

a self, capable of self-understanding and achieving ‘self-definition’, only in relation to other conversation partners, within ‘webs of interlocution’.10 The two leading authors on recognition spend relatively little time elaborating on the circumstances of misrecognition.11 For Taylor, the concept is a relatively taken-­ for-­granted inversion of recognition. To those affected, he argues, misrecognition inflicts “real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves”.12 Honneth offers a marginally more sustained elaboration of misrecognition, regarding it as “the withdrawal of social recognition, in the phenomena of humiliation and disrespect”.13 Yet in both cases the specifically political conditions for this harm to occur, or how those that are misrecognized act in response, is left largely unexplored. Taking issue with, among other things, the lack of concern for political agency in such theorizations of recognition, Saba Mahmood highlights the “capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable”.14 Misrecognition, following her, is an unhelpful device if it is (solely) concerned with the assertion of pre-existing and stable identities that are articulated against social stigma. Instead, we should explore the subjectivities that emerge within social environments of subordination and misrecognition. Regardless of the philosophical implications of Mahmood’s position, this would require us to be contextually specific about the types of self-understandings that emerge in the case of minority politics, and so not to prejudge modalities of agency on the basis of uniform or detached conceptions of ‘the’ minority experience. It also means paying attention to how political identities and claims are adapted in conjunction with, rather than just asserted against, social biases. Yet it still remains the case that a significant number of political actors that engage with such biases do conceive of their social contexts as characterized by misrecognition and of themselves as misrecognized. Our discussion of their experience serves as a starting point for contextual inquiries into the struggle for recognition. More recently, there has been a political turn in understanding misrecognition, as a means to understand and contextualize political mobilizations that span different categories of political recognition: from seeking statehood15 to pursing participation

 Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 32–36. 11  cf. Nasar Meer, “Misrecognising Muslim Consciousness in Europe,” Ethnicities 12, no. 2 (2012); Wendy Martineau, “Misrecognition and Cross-Cultural Understanding: Shaping the Space for a ‘Fusion of Horizons’,” ibid. 12  Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 25. 13  Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London, UK: Verso, 2003), 134. 14  Emphasis in original in Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 18. 15  Kelly Staples, “Statelessness and the Politics of Misrecognition,” Res Publica 18, no. 1 (2012); Michel Seymour, “Peoples, Political Liberalism and Religious Diversity,” Ethnicities 12, no. 2 (2012). 10

1  Muslim Political Agency in British Politics

7

in the public sphere as co-citizens.16 Indeed, we suggest that this is what makes it helpful to our interest in strands and processes that make up Muslim political mobilizations. Rather than being a ‘master concept’ to conceive of justice and human self-realization, it can be an empirically sensitive instrument in analysing debates about formal participation and representation. As Honneth17 himself suggests, it can deliver a ‘critical, interpretive framework’ to identify social conditions and discourses employed by actors that participate in concrete social struggles. As such, misrecognition can provide for an empirically sensitive perspective. What actors, or groups of actors, do in response to the experience of misrecognition will depend on the type of bias they encounter and the discursive and material opportunities that are available to them. Unless they acquiesce or resign, misrecognized actors will seek redress and propose alternative truths that they wish to see socially acknowledged. Significantly, this might entail a challenge not only to individual biases or misperceptions but to social rules and conventions. Thus, James Tully suggests that when, a group puts forward a demand for recognition they seek to disclose the misrecognition or non-recognition in the existing rule of mutual recognition of themselves and others, to persuade others it is unjust and intolerable, and to display a preferred alternative.18

Tully points to acts of ‘disclosure’ in which actors seek to defeat misrecognition not just by articulating alternative narratives but by embodying alternative selves. Such alternatives may then be registered (or not) by majority actors that revise their understanding of the minority in question. Ideally, it may lead to the revision of social conventions and established perceptual frameworks of misrecognition, such as those that account for the sensationalizing coverage in parts of the British press. Yet, even when the desired form of recognition is not forthcoming, the proposition of alternatives might be empowering in its own right, and there are numerous examples for how the assertion of oppositional identities, such as that of Black Power beginning in the 1960s, against the social mainstream has been experienced as profoundly positive by minority groups in question. Drawing on these suggestions about reciprocal relationships in the struggle for recognition, there are three moments that we wish to highlight and that are open to contextually sensitive inquiry: (i) initial experiences of misrecognition motivate (ii) the disclosure of alternative truths or the embodiment of alternative identities that are then (iii) socially acknowledged, or not. In the following, we focus on the first two of these moments. We wish to specifically address dilemmas of political agency and civic positioning in a difficult environment and thus examine how Muslim civic

 Sune Lægaard, “Unequal Recognition, Misrecognition and Injustice: The Case of Religious Minorities in Denmark,” ibid.; Meer, “Misrecognising Muslim Consciousness in Europe.”; Martineau, “Misrecognition and Cross-Cultural Understanding: Shaping the Space for a “Fusion of Horizons”.” 17  Honneth, Kampf Um Anerkennung: Zur Moralischen Grammatik Sozialer Konflikte, 274. 18  James Tully, “Struggles over Recognition and Distribution,” Constellations 7, no. 4 (2000): 479. 16

8

J. Dobbernack et al.

organisations respond to, are bound by, and seek to transcend socio-political misrecognition.

2 Misrecognising Muslim Agency Here, we discuss some of the constraints that characterize negative responses to the Muslim presence in British politics and outline on that basis five ‘modalities’ of misrecognition (see Table 1.1 below). In a first step, these modalities are loosely delineated, drawing on previous cases and discursive possibilities. We will then, in the following sections, apply and develop these modalities in a discussion of three contested cases. As a general proposition, an equitable place for ethnic minority populations in British politics is relatively undisputed. However, progressives as well as conservatives frequently disavow political expressions that emphasise specific minority markers or that prioritize minority requests (at the expense, for example, of overarching ideas or ideologies that are said to ‘cover’ or ‘subsume’ such requests). As already suggested, it is in particular the critique of ‘identity politics’ around which left- and right-wing commentators coalesce. For example, Douglas Murray,19 the former director of the neo-conservative Centre for Social Cohesion, chastised in particular the Tories for appealing to Muslim voters and remarked that all three of the major parties continue to think that the identity-group era of politics is still alive and well; that as part of the multiculti [sic] mindset it is inevitable that you say different things to different ‘communities’; and that therefore you can say anything at all to get the alleged ‘Muslim community’ to vote for you.20

On the Left, critics of ‘identity politics’ see disempowering effects of the political appeal to ethnic or religious identities for the communities in question and to how this emphasis reinforces hierarchies and strengthens conservative forces. In a

Table 1.1  Five modes of misrecognition M1 Misrecognising Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to other identity politics M2 Misrecognising the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim identities and concerns M3 Misrecognising Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based or ‘pariah politics’ M4 Misrecognising Muslim concerns as ‘sectarian’, not compatible with an orientation towards the common good M5 Misrecognising Muslim political actors as ‘toxic’ and refusing political association

19 20

 Murray, “When Will the Tories Stop Trawling for the “Muslim” Vote?.”  Ibid.

1  Muslim Political Agency in British Politics

9

manifesto, the New Generation Network,21 for example, argued that in ‘a throwback to the colonial era, our politicians have chosen to appoint and work with a select band of representatives and by doing so treat minority groups as monolithic blocks, only interested in race or faith-based issues rather than issues that concern us all’. This critique, and the request to ‘end communal politics’, is particularly directed towards political operations that mobilizes kinship ties, biraderi in the case of Pakistani communities,22 which have recently been identified as one reason for the wide-­ spread disenchantment leading to George Galloway’s victory in Bradford West.23 While specific features of minority mobilizations, for example on the basis of informal relationships between community leaders and the Labour Party, are perhaps particularly deserving of critique, the attack on identity politics has an unfortunate tendency to conflate different phenomena and stigmatize minority participation altogether. Race- or faith-based mobilizations that happen to be bottom-­up do not perpetuate communal hierarchies and aren’t manipulated by vested interests, at least not more than any other type of political assertiveness on the basis of shared concerns, are seen as an anomaly or ruled out as impossible. Identity politics tends to be identified with ‘monolithic’ groups, and there is, hence, a risk that this line of critique is selectively used to marginalise and silence some groups, especially new entrants. In fact, a type of misrecognition (M1a) that is identified by some of our respondents in this research is characterized by the rejection, often selectively, of group- or identity-based mobilizations in the case of Muslim political actors. Such imbalances, in the rejection of ethnic minority claims, apply in debates about formal representation, too. Commentators criticize the concern with heightening ethnic minority representation for its single-minded pursuit of superficial similarity. Yet the meaning of political representation, and in particular the balance between is largely open.24 As Hannah Pitkin suggests, the act of representation can be conceived in an abstract and disconnected way, akin to the Burkean ‘representation of unattached interests’, or as a particular and intimate connection where close ties between representatives and represented are necessary because ‘interest, wants, and the like [are] definable only by the person who feels or has them’.25 It is not the  New Generation Network, “Race and Faith: A New Agenda,” The Guardian, 20 November 2006.  see Kingsley Purdam, “Democracy in Practice: Muslims and the Labour Party at the Local Level,” Politics 21, no. 3 (2001); Pnina Werbner, The Migration Process: Capital, Gifts, and Offerings among British Pakistanis (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1990); Muhammed Anwar, “Social Networks of Pakistanis in the Uk: A Re-Evaluation,” in The Urban Context: Ethnicity, Social Networks and Situational Analysis, ed. Alisdair Rogers and Steven Vertovec (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1995). 23  Parveen Akthar, “British Muslims Have Given David Cameron an Object Lesson in Democracy,” The Guardian, 13 April 2012. 24  Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley, CA  – Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995); Young, Inclusion and Democracy. 25  Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 210. 21 22

10

J. Dobbernack et al.

case that in British parliamentary democracy, or more generally, the role of elected representatives is clearly conceived to follow either of these models; different expectations exist and claims can be modelled according to divergent understandings of what representatives are for and what representation is about. The ­suggestion that a Muslim ‘politics of presence’ or any other concern to increase the formal representation of specific minority groups is either exceptional or exceptionally problematic constitutes a related type of the same kind of misrecognition (M1b). The conditions for the civic self-constitution of post-immigration groups are usually fragile and the request that they, sometimes even above all others, approximate idealized understandings of citizenship and democratic agency can be, and historically has been, an exclusionary device. British Muslims are clearly some way beyond exclusion, and in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair distinct patterns of their political agency became more widely acknowledged.26 Yet it has been suggested that the experience of stigmatization, in the aftermath of the Satanic Verses and exacerbated after 9/11, has led to political orientations that are primarily reactive and articulate grievances. There is a risk of reductionism in such accounts. British Muslim politics is characterized by diversity and, although the concern to defeat stigmas may be widely shared, political objectives differ in line with different religious, strategic, and ideological commitments and follow distinct grammars of political agency.27 While ideological or religious commitments are clearly significant, they are not the only predictors of political activism among British Muslims. Some organisations, such as the MCB, liaise with decision makers and lobby behind the scenes. Others seek to effect political change through public engagement and awareness-raising (e.g., ENGAGE). Others, again, operate and mobilize predominantly locally, on the ground and through social networking sites (MPAC). The diversity of approaches, political sensibilities, and the different ways in which religious identities are emphasized or merely play a background role reflects heterogeneity. The reluctance to acknowledge this diversity and the dynamism of political agency among British Muslims constitutes a second type of misrecognition (M2). In a similar manner, the emphasis on grievances means that the proliferation of alternative sites of Muslim civil society, in terms of media production and consumption, community and religious activism, and arenas for Muslim dissent, risks being ignored. This proliferation is considered as evidence of withdrawal rather than political pluralisation of the public sphere. Accounts that treat Muslim agency as purely reactive face a related objection. It is hardly the case that outside pressures always determine the political agency of marginalised groups; at least they usually do not give a good account of motivations and purposes that exist beyond the concern to overcome pressures. ‘Excluded groups’, Modood suggests, ‘seek respect for themselves as they are or aspire to be, not simply a solidarity on the basis of a recognition

 Modood, “British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair.”  Therese O’Toole and Richard Gale, “Contemporary Grammars of Political Action among Ethnic Minority Young Activists,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 33, no. 1 (2010). 26 27

1  Muslim Political Agency in British Politics

11

of themselves as victims; they resist being defined by their mode of oppression and seek space and dignity for their mode of being’.28 As such we have to be sensitive to the emergence of Muslim identities that are adopted and deployed in various permutations by many Muslims themselves. A key issue is how this ‘Muslim-consciousness’ connects to the sorts of ‘civic status’ that Muslims are seeking. The types of civic status being referred to include those that have prevailed for other minorities under the terms of a peculiarly British multiculturalism, and which has sought to promote equality of access and opportunity, and has led to some significant recognition of particular minority ‘differences’. In this domain and in arenas of political participation more generally, the concern to project political identities is as evident as the desire to overcome pressures. Its portrayal as driven by and reducible to grievances, purely reactive to outside pressures and devoid of positive political objectives, indicates a third type of misrecognition (M3). There has been a tendency, moreover, to reject mobilisations on the basis of minority identities for its alleged incompatibility with a political orientation towards the ‘common good’ (M4). A historical account of this position within the Labour Party has been vividly brought out by Les Back and John Solomos.29 In Birmingham Small Heath, the contender for the 1992 Labour candidacy, current incumbent Roger Godsiff, was challenged at selection meetings by minority candidates. Godsiff enjoyed support from trade unions and the national party; his eventual selection, however, was marred by allegations of vote-rigging. Godsiff defended his position and suggested that the trouble with people trying to become MPs now, they’re trying to become MPs because they’re members of an ethnic community, they’re not trying to become MPs because they concern the whole of the community and they represent a philosophy. They don’t understand that, they need to stop to think about it. I have to tell my councillors, some of whom aspire to become MPs, that their job is to represent all the constituents they’ve got, and often they’re not very successful at it. And that’s sad, so they still are not fully integrated into the Labour party, never mind the community.30

The suggestion appears to be that in order to be representative, to embody, for example, the ‘Labour philosophy’, minority concerns have to be abandoned. It is moreover the responsibility of minority politicians to prove their ability to represent: a burden that does not usually apply to white politicians, not even in constituencies with significant post-immigrant populations, such as Small Heath (43% in 1992). The suspicion, and a related type of misrecognition (M4), is that Muslim agency reflects ‘sectarian’ interests, a suspicion that can only be appeased through continuous demonstrations of a commitment to the ‘common good’. A final obstacle, frequently encountered by Muslim political actors, is the difficulty to forge alliances as a result of the perceived toxicity of Muslim concerns. It is  Emphasis in original in Tariq Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 159. 29  Les Back and John Solomos, “Who Represents Us? Racialised Politics and Candidate Selection,” Birkbeck College, University of London, Research Papers, no. No. 3 (May) (1992). 30  Interview with Roger Godsiff MP, quoted in ibid., 11. 28

12

J. Dobbernack et al.

clear that different organisations deal differently with such difficulties. The MCB, for example, has sought to establish collaborative relationships across the party-­ political spectrum. MPAC, on the other hand, adopts a more combative posture: while it endorses candidates, it maintains distance since the association could potentially be damaging to its endorsees. Chapter 3: Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere investigates this aspect, and how the PR aspect is navigated within the British political sphere. Considerations about the due proximity and distance, as well as neutrality and partisanship, are widely evident in the strategic thinking of the mobilizing actors that we have interviewed. The toxicity of the Muslim association constitutes a final experience of misrecognition that we investigate in the following (M5).

3 The Politics of Muslim Representation It is worth registering at the outset that Muslim activists, particularly those operating with a view to the national level, often seem strongly attuned to their political environment and thus show considerable reflexivity about dilemmas of formal representation. For example, a respondent for The Cordoba Foundation who was involved in the Youelect initiative to mobilize Muslim voters highlighted in fairly stark terms one of the problems entailed in a mere focus on increasing the parliamentary minority presence: We have one or two Muslim MPs that are absolutely dreadful. They happen to be Muslims but actually, they’re dreadful, and most of their positions, you know, vis-à-vis the Muslim community, are totally negative. It doesn’t really matter that they’re Muslim. (Interview, 9 January 2012)

The ability to judge candidates on the basis of their policy record rather than their faith, this respondent suggested, proved that ‘the Muslim community is issue-based, and not religion-based’ (Interview, 9 January 2012). Indeed, in the debate about political representation activists frequently appear to disavow the concern to heighten the Muslim presence in public institutions and highlight sophisticated, issue-based deliberations that they either see at work or want to promote among Muslim citizens. It is likely that frequent portrayals of Muslim political agency as ‘tribal’ or ‘sectarian’, and thus pre-modern and unenlightened, account for the vehemence with which this sophistication among Muslim voters is highlighted. This is particularly evident in the reference to Muslim mobilizations against Muslim candidates, which were positively highlighted for how ‘ideas’ trumped ‘religion’: MPAC, for example, lobbied against Khalid Mahmood’s re-election in Birmingham’s Perry Bar constituency and claimed that, while Mahmood had “relied on the Muslim vote to keep him in power”, we “are asking what did he do to stop the illegal wars abroad against Muslims and what did he do to stop the demonisation of Muslims in the UK” (MPAC 2010). A similar line of attack was adopted in the Bradford West by-election where MPAC endorsed Galloway and campaigned

1  Muslim Political Agency in British Politics

13

against Labour’s Imran Hussein: “to sweep aside the tired old pattern of voting in lack lustre candidates, just because they wear a red rosette” (MPAC 2012). Non-­ Muslims were favoured over Muslim candidates, and this was noticed and indeed highlighted as a rejection of the unthinking support for Labour and co-religionists that was seen to have plagued a previous era of Muslim politics. Elaborating on this type of strategic thinking, a respondent for MPAC suggested that “we’re not just saying: more Muslim MPs. What we’re saying is that non-­ Muslims MPs also need to address the concerns of their Muslim constituents, which we feel in a large extent are being ignored” (Interview, 28 January 2012). For the MCB, a respondent agreed that certain types of community politics, which he labelled as the ‘politics of representation’, were detrimental to Muslim interests: “unity is dissipating where you have vested interests competing for that patronage for government access”. This, he suggested, was “damaging to the community itself and damaging especially to the younger people” (Interview, 12 January 2012). There is some concern, moreover, that an increased Muslim or minority presence in institutions might not further the cause of equality but serve to conceal the lack of serious, issue-based commitment to racial or religious justice. Commenting on the policy record of the current government, a respondent suggested that “we have a party that’s beginning to look like the people it serves and yet […] race equality [is] going further and further away. Multiculturalism [is] being trashed” (OBV, Interview, 2 February 2012). The concern is that a ‘politics of presence’31 achieves little if it is not accompanied by a critical concern with policy-making after elections. While the representative for OBV highlighted the value of increased ethnic minority representation, it is striking that Muslim mobilizing organisations often appear to accord only secondary, if any, significance to this objective. A representative of Youelect highlighted a different set of problems. He pointed to persistent doubts about the Britishness of British Muslim, reflecting a situation where Muslim political agency was considered sectarian by default and thus incompatible with the ‘common good’: “at the moment, unfortunately, any Muslim, either public figure or otherwise, is first a Muslim, then British and therefore his views are first pinned down to his Islamic identity rather than the British identity” (Interview, 25 January 2012). This leads to a situation where British Muslims “are asked to make choices that no other groups are asked to make, their identity of being Muslim or British first”. A different respondent pointed to his own political activism, which included a candidacy for Respect, as an example for a similar experience of misrecognition: “One of the most common questions that came my way was, you know, if you decided to do this, why don’t you go and establish a Muslim party?” (Interview, 9 January 2012). His response would be that “we don’t need a Muslim party, we’re calling for Muslims to be part of society, I don’t want them to stand on one side”. Among those involved in the 2010 mobilization there was thus a measure of concern about dilemmas of representation and in particular about the way Muslim

31

 Phillips, The Politics of Presence.

14

J. Dobbernack et al.

political actors were forced to abjure their Muslimness in order to claim a more encompassing political identity. At the same time, the notion that increased representation would provide a remedy to inequality that could be achieved without serious and issue-based commitments was widely denounced. Arguably, one of the background conditions for this rejection of the ‘politics of presence’ was the concern to counter simplistic, but pervasive, representations of Muslim politics as pre-­ modern. There clearly is a strong concern to dispute accounts that equate Muslim agency with sectarianism and patronage politics and to emphasize and embody an alternative ideal of political sophistication and maturity.

4 Conceiving of the ‘Muslim Vote’ The ‘Muslim Vote’, and how actors of the mobilization conceive of its significance and coherence, points in a different direction for our concern with the type of political positioning that emerges in contexts of misrecognition. As with formal representation, there are ambiguities to consider that are, to some extent, the reflection of a difficult environment. The aspiration to ‘normalize’ the participation of British Muslim, to emphasize that a ‘bloc vote’ does not exist or to argue that bloc-like voting instincts need to be overcome, is an evident concern among all of the respondents in our research. To some extent, this position implies a disavowal of ‘groupness’ and leads to strategic contradictions, such as when an emphasis on group coherence, such as on the potential for Muslim constituents to ‘swing’ elections, is considered strategically advantageous. Highlighting diversity within the ‘Muslim Vote’, organisations involved in the 2010 mobilization are also identifying features of the political environment that tend to negatively affect all British Muslims. An MPAC respondent, for example, suggested that although ‘there’s a great deal of diversity amongst Muslim communities, always in the plural rather than singular [...] we can potentially be all victims of anti-terror legislation, stop and search, lengthy detention without charge, these sorts of cases’ (Interview, 28 January 2012). MPAC, however, appears to be an outlier among organisations that operate on a national level as it tends to frame its activism with reference to the global community of Muslims, the ummah. Other organisations, as indicated by a respondent from the British Muslim Initiative, appear more cautious in highlighting their encompassing concerns: ‘oppression, we don’t accept it whether it is against Muslims or against any human being’ (Interview, 11 January 2012). Whether injustices that were seen to be impacting in particular on British Muslims or Muslims globally should be addressed as Muslim-specific, maybe even Muslim-exclusive, is thus somewhat contested. The reference to universal concerns, as it is evident in the MCB’s public commitment to ‘working towards the common good’ appears to contrast with MPAC’s emphasis. Since a broad commitment to justice can be inferred from Islamic scripture and is evidently shared among the organisations in question, these different emphases are not necessarily the result of theological disagreement but of differences about how to address

1  Muslim Political Agency in British Politics

15

target audiences, such as in relation to sensitive foreign policy issues, and how to access mainstream political channels. Asked about the extent to which it was possible to speak of a ‘Muslim vote’, a representative for Youelect suggested that this was difficult to pinpoint “whether the Muslim identity itself can determine which way they’re going to vote or their personal factors, like any economic profession and country of origin” (Interview, 25 January 2012). Equally, the Muslim Council of Britain’s mobilisations reflect this uncertainty: “the needs and aspirations of Britain’s Muslim community are no different from those of our fellow citizens, whatever their beliefs or backgrounds”.32 In 2010, the MCB suggested that “the Muslim voter, like any other Briton, may well make discerning choices of which their ‘Muslim identity’, if ever there was one, is only a part of a menu of considerations”.33 Highlighting the issue of apathy among young voters, an MCB representative emphasized the importance of social trends: “We cannot just use Muslim factors when asking ourselves why there are low numbers” (Interview, 12 January 2012). In order to explain patterns of political behaviour amongst Muslim voters, the suggestion is that religious identities are one aspect, and not necessarily the most important one, that needs to be considered. Other activists carefully distinguished between the problematic nature of the ‘Muslim vote’ and the legitimate concern to mobilize on the basis of shared Muslim interests. A representative of ENGAGE, for example, indicated her uneasiness about the idea of a ‘Muslim Vote’, “because it kind of condenses and generalises and homogenises something that I think is a much more complex phenomenon” (Interview, 3 February 2012). At the same time, the respondent indicated that the rejection of this concept placed disproportional on Muslims that, too, collectively “have the freedom to associate, and by virtue of association [to] create organisations” (Interview, 3 February 2012). Doubts about the coherence of the Muslim Vote and necessary awareness into the complexity of British Muslim populations should not be used to discredit the mobilization on the basis of shared interests and identities, in particular not where similar associational freedoms are selectively withheld while being unproblematically granted in the case of non-Muslim social identity groups. With regard to the basis on which Muslims should mobilize, another respondent argued along similar lines: “I’m not someone who favours religious politics, but I believe that there is a call for religious politics at a time when a particular religion is being targeted” (The Cordoba Foundation, Interview, 9 January 2012). The experience of stigmatization, he suggested, had forged a politically salient identity. Yet the respondent equally argued that this political salience should be embraced for its positive potentials, rather than being rejected as abnormal or exceptional.

32  Muslim Council of Britain, “Electing to Deliver,” Muslim Council of Britain, www.mcb.org.uk/ vote2005/ELECTINGTODELIVER.pdf 33  “The “Muslim Vote”  – Does It Exist?,” Muslim Council of Britain, www.muslimvote.org.uk/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=97&Itemid=159

16

J. Dobbernack et al. If religion becomes a catalyst towards people taking part in a democratic process, I’m happy with that. If football becomes the catalyst for people to take part in something that is, you know, a democratic process, I’m happy for that. […] We have, you know, communities or groups with interests, you know, whether based on ethnicity, race, religion, colour, creed, hobbies, leisure, entertainment, we have that. But we’re talking about it as sort of an issue or a problem even simply because of the type, of the context, because we’re operating within a context that is defined by 9/11, it’s defined by 7/7, it’s defined by terrorism, it’s defined by extremism, it’s defined by wars, it’s defined by, you know, all these issues. (Interview, 9 January 2012)

The stigmatization of Muslim identity in the public sphere, however, meant that some organisations treaded more carefully in the framing of their political messages. Youelect, for example, chose not to prominently highlight Muslim-specific issues or even identify Muslims as its target group on its website. The concern, as the person in charge of the initiative suggested, was that anything with “the pre-fix of Islam or Muslim has a negative connotation immediately and I think there’s a counterproductive element there” (Interview, 25 January 2012). In contrast to such concerns about the risk of being dismissed or negatively perceived, other organisations appeared to see a certain strategic benefit in highlighting a Muslim agenda: an “acknowledgement that this is a constituency that they [politicians] cannot ignore” (Interview, 2 February 2012). Despite difficulties in identifying a ‘Muslim Vote’, the appeal to this concept could help to increase the public visibility of important issues that would elicit a response from campaigning politicians. Yet the concern remains an emphasis on the ‘Muslim Vote’ might encourage a certain intellectual laziness that was characteristic for how ethnic minority groups had been engaged in the past. The benefit of rejecting simplistic categories and of highlighting the multiplicity within groups would be, a respondent for ENGAGE argued, that: you’re able to populate that space and give voice to all the different perspectives that exist in the Muslim community, and it to me can only be a very good thing. Because it means that when politicians are looking around for a Muslim voice, they’re all automatically confronted with Muslim voices, and they have to get over this idea that, you know, a Muslim voice will suffice, because they’re confronted with a cacophony of voices and you have to deal with that cacophony. And annoying as it is, you have to deal with it, because that’s the reality of the British Muslim community. (Interview, 3 February 2012)

The diversity among representative organisations would thus reflect the complexity of Muslims as a social group and make it more difficult, it is hoped, to apply simplistic categories when accounting for British Muslim politics. At the same time, this emphasis on multiplicity might constitute a constraint if it hampers, associational freedoms, the articulation of shared concern and the use of Muslim electoral significance as a bargaining chip. In this case, a context of misrecognition appears to account for a choice between unsatisfactory alternatives.

1  Muslim Political Agency in British Politics

17

5 Limits of Neutrality and Partisanship As in debates about conceptions of the ‘Muslim Vote’ and representation, Muslim activists have discussed the issue of neutrality in a way that reflects difficult choices. In particular the 2008 election for London Mayor appears to constitute a crucial case. Widely considered sympathetic to their concerns, Labour’s Ken Livingstone benefited from Muslim support, such as of a number of well-known activists within the Muslims4Ken initiative. Yet Livingstone lost the election and there were some concerns that Boris Johnson had been portrayed in a way that would make it more difficult for Muslims to engage in London politics. During the campaign, MPAC had urged its supporters to “help save us from a Zionist Islamophobe becoming Mayor of London”.34 Responding to controversial statements by Boris Johnson, Muslims4Ken portrayed the Conservative candidate as an “Islamophobe who has insulted and condemned Islam and Muslims”.35 In the Guardian, Asim Siddiqui attributed Livingstone’s defeat to the backlash that these allegedly inapt efforts had triggered in particular among the capital’s predominantly right-wing press. Siddiqui pointed to the ‘kiss of death’ that the association with Muslims4Ken had meant for Livingstone and to “the radioactive affect [sic] of reactionary Islam in a post-7/7 London. [...] If the very candidate you are endorsing is being damaged by your endorsement, then surely it’s time for a rethink”.36 Disputing this account, Anas Altikriti took particular issue with the assumption that led Siddiqui to the conclusion that it was time to stop “mobiliz[ing] the ‘Muslim vote’”.37 Altikriti argued that “[t]o suggest that while Muslims can come under collective attack, suspicion and scrutiny as a result of crimes committed by a few, but can only defend themselves and fight for their rights as individuals, is nothing short of absurd  – discriminatory, even”.38 Siddiqui’s call for caution, Altikriti argued, merely reflected the stigmatization of British Muslims as a ‘special case’ and mainstream attempts to discredit any collective articulation of Muslim political concerns. Strategic considerations about how to mobilize voters in the run-up to the general election, 2 years after Livingstone’s first defeat, seemed to take account of this experience. The MCB, for example, which had not endorsed Livingstone, felt encouraged in its position of neutrality. An MCB respondent pointed to the significance of the mayoral campaign and argued that ‘it wasn’t for MCB to endorse’, but rather just to “do everything in terms of [..] raising issues, but stop short of saying who to

 Muslim Public Affairs Committee, “How You Can Help Save Us from a Zionist Mayor,” Muslim Public Affairs Committee, www.mpacuk.org/content/view/4572 35  This condemnation was later rephrased in somewhat less drastic terms, suggesting that “Boris Johnson […] has insulted women, blacks, Muslims and many other groups” (http://muslimsforken. blogspot.com/). 36  Asim Siddiqui, “The Kiss of Death?,” The Guardian, 3 May 2008. 37  Ibid. 38  Anas Altikriti, “We Got out the Vote,” ibid., 4 May. 34

18

J. Dobbernack et al.

put in their ballot box. It’s more of service facilitation. You make your own mind up” (Interview, 12 January 2012). The same MCB respondent suggested that the fact that a political campaign had used the notion of a ‘Muslim Vote’ in support of a specific candidate constituted an anomaly, similar to Siddiqui39 who observed that there had been no ‘JewsforBoris’ or ‘GaysforBrian’ campaigns: “You don’t have a chief rabbi supporting a campaign for Boris” (MCB, Interview, 12 January 2012). As a representative umbrella body, the MCB saw it necessary to maintain neutrality – despite clear affinities with Ken Livingstone and the Labour party, in order to be able to engage with elected representatives regardless of their party background. In the campaigns to mobilize Muslim voters in 2010, there were related differences of strategic positioning. Youelect, similar to the MCB’s objective, primarily intended to familiarize Muslim voters with issues and candidates’ policy record. Just before the election, however, it published links to two lists of recommended candidates.40 A respondent introduced the rationale for this departure from a more neutral position as follows: up until, I think it was the final week or the final two weeks, we didn’t favour one over the other. We just said this is the information, these are the priorities, here’s how it works, you go and decide, and you go and decide by meeting in your mosques and your community centres, in your homes, by talking, by discussing, by holding people accountable, asking them questions. […] it was only towards, I think, the last week or 10 days of the elections that we started to come up with the idea of the lists, that, okay, fine […] we feel that now is the time when we should say well, listen, there are some really very bad candidates and regardless of where they stand on the playing fields, they are really, really bad candidates. (Interview, 9 January 2012)

Another respondent similarly suggested that “people appreciated the fact that we [Youelect] weren’t spoon-feeding them or we’re not dictating on what they should be doing, we were simply directing them” and that “people did feel empowered through Youelect but making sure we didn’t encroach on their personal political space” (Interview, 25 January 2012). Accordingly, the reason why the initiative eventually offered voting recommendations was in response to “a lot of push coming from the community itself”. By contrast, ENGAGE provided background information without offering recommendations and it was suggested that it “would never advocate that you vote for this particular candidate, because it would be irresponsible, to be fair, but also because it’s the local communities that determine which candidates they want to elect” (Interview, 3 February 2012). MPAC, on the other hand, was directly targeting in particular those candidates that rejected, for example, for their support of the war on Iraq and alleged anti-Muslim positions. Without aiming for neutrality in its local interventions, MPAC nonetheless did not endorse any party. It was suggested for MPAC that:

 Siddiqui, “The Kiss of Death?.”  One by the British Muslim Initiative, an organisation closely connected to Youelect, the other by Salaam.co.uk 39 40

1  Muslim Political Agency in British Politics

19

we have to be careful about how we position ourselves. So, when we campaign, we campaign as an independent group, we are not in the pockets of anyone that we are trying to promote because what happens is, that can be used against them. So, we’re backing a candidate, for example from a party, his opposition will simply try to portray us as extremists and that this candidate is in the pocket of that group. So deliberately what we do is we keep distance from any candidate that we endorse. We’re not asking for their endorsement. We’re endorsing them. (Interview, 28 January 2012)

For MPAC, the portrayal as ‘extremist’ was a malign, but given the political climate perhaps unavoidable, aspect of their political work: “accusing people who are pro-­ democracy of having some kind of violent, extremist agenda. It’s nonsense” (MPAC, Interview, 28 January 2012). Accordingly, while being opinionated and often less moderate in their messaging than other campaigning actors, MPAC sought to tread carefully in its relationship with the politicians that it endorsed and thus to avoid the ‘radioactive effects’ that (allegedly) had damaged Ken Livingstone.

6 Muslim Organisational Politics The discussion of Muslim electoral politics as a case for the study of misrecognition raises relevant issues in the context of this volume’s wider concerns. In circumstances of competitive politics, which entails the negotiation of collective interests, the concept of misrecognition may not easily apply. Arguably, misrecognition is the norm, not an exception, as disputes over the framing of collective identities forms part of the manoeuvring that constitutes political normality. As discussed, the links of equivalence that any organisation puts forward publicly in support of its claim to represent complex sections in society will be open to dispute. It is therefore unsurprising that understanding of a ‘Muslim vote’, proposed by groups that we have considered in this chapter, are also contested. Arguably, exempting Muslim organisations from contestation of their collective claims cements a special status, rather than making space for them in a pluralized domain of interestand identity-based politics. From this perspective, the meaning of misrecognition as it pertains to Muslim organisations would seem to be an open question. But our discussion in this chapter also points towards a response. Claims by particular organisations, such as the MCB, about Muslim-specific issues that are not at stake, but the general response to group-based articulations of any Muslim concern. The manoeuvring in response to misrecognition that we have discussed in this chapter is different from contestations about particular claims and identity positions: the legitimacy of the Muslim position itself is in doubt. The similarity of pressures that organisations experience despite distinct agendas and concerns underscores this observation: where Muslim identity is expressed collectively, in a way that is not reducible to individual faith commitments, it encounters a significant pushback. To be sure (as we argue in the conclusion), such pressures on collective expressions are not merely constraining, but also constitutive of positions: they enable a type of politics that proves itself by

20

J. Dobbernack et al.

showcasing maturity and a commitment towards ‘the common good’. But the interview material that we have presented here also shows that the weight of a particular Muslim burden is widely registered among our respondents and leads to disenchantment among them. Much before Muslims and Islam became the questions in European debates about citizenship and integration, Soysal41 registered the normality how Muslim organisations were acting like other interest groups. In her terms, Muslim organisations “claimed for their members not only religious, but also political, social, and economic rights. Like their secular counterparts, they take stands on such issues as racism, discrimination and integration”. In the intervening period, the ‘special status’ of Muslim organisational politics has been reinforced and cemented. Even in country cases, such as Britain, that are often considered hospitable to group-based expression of identity, there is little evidence of normality. There is a wider question to address in how to envisage a plural political environment where religious minority groups, in this case Muslims, can have a standing on par with other collective actors. This is not the place to consider this challenge and, instead, we draw attention to a number of more recent developments in British politics that highlight challenges of Muslim organisational life. The General Election 2010 returned a hung parliament and a Coalition government between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Sharif et  al. suggest that a “general feeling within the Muslim community towards the end of 2009 was that such an outcome was one worth striving for” as it could be expected to bolster the significance of minority constituencies.42 Retrospectively, such hopes would seem to have been frustrated. Beyond short-lived moments of electoral outreach in 2010 and 2015, UK governments have not sought to establish a more collaborative relationship with Muslim interest groups or shown interest in amplifying a Muslim voice.43 Despite rhetorical commitments to civil society empowerment, envisaging a ‘return to small units’ and a place for faith groups in society, the election of a Conservative majority government in 2015 means that this course is likely to stay. Where Muslim collective actors have been registered and invited a response, this has been predominantly negative. A much-delayed report into British affiliations of the Muslim Brotherhood adopted a harsh tone towards the movement, which it linked to some of the most prominent Muslim organisations in Britain,44 concluding that its impact was “contrary to our values and have been contrary to our national

  Y.  Soysal, “Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organised Islam in European Public Spheres,” Theory and Society 26, no. 4 (1997): 509. 42  Jamil Sharif, Ismail Patel, and Anas Altikriti, “Muslim Electoral Participation in British General Elections,” in Muslims and Political Participation in Britain, ed. Timothy Peace (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 43. 43  O’Toole et al., Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. 44  Paragraph 23 of House of Commons, “Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings,” House of Commons, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ muslim-brotherhood-review-main-findings 41

1  Muslim Political Agency in British Politics

21

interests and our national security”.4546 In the context of the so-called Trojan Horse Affair (Chap. 9), where Muslim educationalists have been accused of ‘infiltrating’ state schools in Birmingham, collective attempts to enhance Muslim representation in the running of schools have received a similar treatment. There is also continuing evidence where prominent Muslims, even where their religious identity is not the most prominent feature of their public appearance, are tarnished as extremists. The election of Sadiq Khan as Mayor of London presents itself as a case study for a political campaign waged by his opponent that relied nearly exclusively on the fact that Khan was Muslim and therefore unfit to serve in office.

7 Conclusion Traversing debates about the Muslim presence in British electoral politics, the chapter has examined ways in which Muslim organisations respond to, are bound by, and transcend the experience of misrecognition. Through empirical studies of activist organizations, we draw attention to the different ways in which these organisations speak about Muslim identities and seek to address Muslim concerns. This occurs within, and so is not immune from, a wider political landscape in which questions of minority agency are unsettled. The speech acts and positions investigated in this chapter reflect the attempt to respond to features of this landscape and to challenge experiences of misrecognition. Although misrecognition is not an untroubled concept (insofar as it subscribes to a unitary conception of the ‘authentic self’, etc.), it corresponds to how activists that we have interviewed perceive the mainstream response to their political presence. We have highlighted the need to be contextually sensitive in examining their civic and political claims; these are not merely asserted against, but modulated and defined in relation to the experience of misrecognition. We contend that this accounts for specific dilemmas such as in relation to the recurrent emphasis on maturity and sophistication, which is perhaps the most widely shared point of reference in the rhetoric of the various initiatives that we have explored. Although this emphasis appears to offer a strong challenge to portrayals of Muslim agency as ‘sectarian’ and ‘exceptional’, along the modalities of misrecognition outlined above, it also reflects some ambiguities. While the definition of the ‘Muslim Vote’ as the sum of mature, discerning and ideas-based choices may hold strategic benefit, it may also limit the room for political manoeuvre, cement a special status and thus impede a normalization of the Muslim presence in British political life. The need to counter misrecognition through constant reiterations of political maturity constitutes an additional burden for Muslim political agency.

 Paragraph 39 of ibid.  The report received considerable criticism as its commissioning appeared to be a concession to pressure from autocratic Gulf regimes. 45 46

22

J. Dobbernack et al.

Yet, although misrecognition has been our focus, we do not suggest that it provides a complete account. Indeed, experiences of misrecognition are not adequately understood if they are seen to be merely oppressive, limiting spaces for agency and being met by coping strategies and a posture of defensiveness. The political positioning that is evident among the organisations examined in this chapter shows that constraints are often creatively negotiated and that perceived pressures invite a significant degree of reflexivity and strategic awareness. Although these are challenging times for confident expressions of Muslim identities in British politics, there are some indications that political actors succeed in projecting political subjectivies that are not simply determined by the experience of misrecognition. The diversity of attempts to delineate such identities, as is evident among the mobilizations examined in this chapter, might indeed make it more difficult for Muslim political claims to be stigmatized as ‘exceptional’ or brushed off and rejected.

Chapter 2

Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion Laurens de Rooij

1 Civil Religion, Representations and the Media Media representations of Islam and Muslims, often contrast the existing codes and conventions of British society, with Muslim religious practices. These societal codes and conventions have been referred to as civil religion. Robert Bellah describes civil religion as, something that comes to represent common knowledge and values. Bellah argues for the existence of an “elaborate and well-­institutionalized civil religion in America”, this being exemplified by a collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals which are institutionalized.1 This institutionalisation serves as a genuine vehicle of national (religious) self-understanding.2 In other words, in a highly complex, rationalized, and universal national legal system, the social interactions among people who are otherwise religiously different, are defined in relation to each other through their relation to the civil. This civil is outlined as “the legal order [that] in some significant measure becomes a substitute for the religious order – the order that supplies meaning – and thus sets the stage for the emergence of civil religion”.3 John Coleman described civil religion as:

 Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96 (1967): 11.  Ibid., 12. 3  Robert N. Bellah and Phillip E. Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion (London, UK – New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1980), 121. 1  2

This chapter is a slightly revised version of work that has been published in de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion”, and is presented here with permission of the journal. L. de Rooij (*) Université Toulouse 1, Capitole, Toulouse, France © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_2

23

24

L. de Rooij A special case of the religious symbol system, designed to perform a differentiated function, which is the unique provenance of neither church nor state. It is a set of symbolic forms and acts, which relate man as citizen and his society in world history to the ultimate conditions of his existence.4

Yet Bellah and Coleman’s descriptions of civil religion do not reflect some cultural differences between America and Europe which Muller describes as: The key difference between Europe and the United States in this regard is twofold: nothing comparable to the American religious right is in evidence in Europe nowadays; and the liberal orthodoxy is institutionalized far deeper in the structures of the welfare state – and even inside the churches  – in Europe than it is in America. This lay orthodoxy is under attack in America; in Europe, with the partial exception of Britain, it really is not.5

Whilst in Britain there is an active (and increasingly influential) political right wing, that may invoke religious language or symbols in their political rhetoric, there is no comparable political force as the religious right, in Britain. If we apply this definition to Britain, then civil religion refers to a context, where the socio-cultural structures take on meaningful and meaning creating properties. The social interaction between the religiously plural populous, is oriented along lines defined by civil religion. This is commonly understood as good manners. Civil religion goes beyond mere civility and therefore Bellah and Phillip Hammond suggest that “if it is to contain diverse religious, ethnic, or party groups … it also requires an orientation that locates these manners in the moral order. The democratic citizen must be partisan if politics is to function at all, but partisanship must be pursued under rules so important, so sacred, they apply to oneself as well as to one’s opponents”.6 As Meredith McGuire points out: Civil religion is the expression of the cohesion of the nation. It transcends denominational, ethnic, and religious boundaries. It includes rituals by which members commemorate significant national events and renew their commitment to the society. Such rituals and representations are religious in that they often represent the nation – the people – as a higher and more valuable reality that mere (i.e. human) social contract and convention.7

From the perspective of this chapter, civil religion is the untouchable representation of the nation.8 This follows Ira Chernus’ reading of Bellah, whereby it is the sacralising of the nation’s ideals, and holding up what people want it to be, rather than what it is or was.9 However, these ideals are often designated by the original factions in a cultural context, and as globalisation and the multi-cultural nature of Britain

 John A. Coleman, “Civil Religion,” Sociological Analysis 31, no. 1 (1970): 69.  Steven Muller, “Time to Kill: Europe and the Politics of Leisure,” The National Interest 48 (1997): 35. 6  Bellah and Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion, 188. 7  Meredith B. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1997), 191. 8  Annika Hvithamar, Margit Warburg, and Brian Arly Jacobsen, Holy Nations and Global Identities: Civil Religion, Nationalism, and Globalisation (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 1–2. 9  Ira Chernus, “Civil Religion,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religion in America, ed. Philip Goff (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley – Blackwell, 2010), 58. 4 5

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

25

increases, the contents of civil religion are being challenged by different groups of people. This chapter examines how conceptualisations of civil religion are used to exclude Muslims from British society. For example, for some people, participating in or watching the ceremonies and events involving the monarch and the royal family constitute a central part of participating in the civil religion in Britain. The term ‘civil religion’ shares some overlap with the term ‘secular sacred’. The ‘secular sacred’ is defined as “those beliefs, values, practices, places, symbols, and objects that are formally speaking ‘non-religious’ but are nevertheless prioritized by people, deemed to be inviolable and non-negotiable, and often referred to as ‘sacred’”.10 One of the main differences in the use of these terms, is that the ‘secular sacred’ formally refers to ‘non-religious’ aspects whilst the term ‘civil religion’ may also refer to items that are of a religious nature and deemed to be inherent to society. Another difference is that the ‘secular sacred’ can refer to objects as they relate to individual people; whereas ‘civil religion’ denotes items as they relate to society at large. This is why one of the largest criticisms of the term civil religion is that the language is inherently Christian.11 Hammond and colleagues noted that civil religion is not well equipped to include diversity.12 Whilst the term ‘secular sacred’ refers to the non-religious, and may therefore be better placed to relate to an increase in diversity, the choice of the words ‘secular’ and ‘sacred’ still positions it as a product of western understandings of religion. Robert Wuthnow states that civil religion often “promotes acceptance of the status quo”.13 I therefore have followed the criticism of Bellah’s work by Nicholas Demerath and Rhys Williams, and “focussed on the contexts and uses of civil-­ religious language and symbols”,14 particularly when it is used to promote the status quo and used to demand assimilation from non-Christian religious traditions, and limit diversity. Yet conceptualisations of civil religion are, a “sui generis hybrid of religion and national communality … where the nation or its people are linked to something transcendental. This is why the concept is intrinsically intertwined with nationalism”.15 It is this nationalistic aspect of civil religion that will be explored further. Namely, how the concept of civil religion as understood by media outlets, is used to regulate the religious practices of Muslims in Britain. These regulation practices are used to determine what can be included or excluded as acceptable religious  Kim Knott, Elizabeth Poole, and Teemu Taira, Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred: Representation and Change (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 11. 11  Nicholas Jay Demerath and Rhys H.  Williams, “Civil Religion in an Uncivil Society,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (1985): 160. 12  Phillip E. Hammond et al., “Forum: American Civil Religion Revisited,” Religion and American Culture (1994): 4. 13  Robert Wuthnow, “Civil Religion,” in The Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion, ed. Robert Wuthnow (Washington, DC: Congressional Quaterly, 1998). 14  Demerath and Williams, “Civil Religion in an Uncivil Society,” 166. 15  Hvithamar, Warburg, and Jacobsen, Holy Nations and Global Identities: Civil Religion, Nationalism, and Globalisation, 5. 10

26

L. de Rooij

practice, and this can be used to explore various undertones among media discussions of practices such as veiling. Despite Demerath and Williams arguing that there has always existed a dissensus with regards to civil religion,16 differing conceptualisations of civil religion can still be used in similar ways to exclude Islam and Muslims from British society.

2 News Values and the Imagery Decisions of the Media Media reports reflect and construct social and cultural life. How reports frame religion, and the place of religion within socio-political discourse, is connected to the coverage received. Consequently, media acts as product and shaper of public discourse.17 Henrik Bødker cites a work by Elmelund-Præstekjær and Wien which describes criteria which a story needs to meet in order to be deemed a media event18: 1. The event must be appropriate for public debate, i.e., there must exist a range of legitimate positions as well as people willing to air and debate these. 2. The issues at stake must be, and this is linked to the first point, something that can be interpreted within a number of contexts or frames. 3. The event must also, at least in their study of a limited number of events, contain some deviation from, a break of, norms. 4. The event must be able to condense a complex problem into a striking image and/or draw upon a number of existing stereotypes. The above listed criteria highlight the need for the media producing subject(s) to judge the value of the information/experience based on these criteria in order to decide whether it is newsworthy or not. These criteria build on the research by Galtung and Ruge which states that: News will have to refer to people, preferably top elite, and be preferably negative and unexpected but nevertheless according to a pattern that is consonant with the ‘mental pre-image’. It will have to be simple, and it should, if possible, provide the reader with some kind of identification – it should refer to him or his nation or group of nations. This will, in turn, facilitate an image of these countries as dangerous, ruled by capricious elites, as unchanging in their basic characteristics, as existing for the benefit of the top dog nations, and in terms of their links to those nations. Events occur, they are sudden, like flashes of lightning, with no build-up and with no let-down after their occurrence – they just occur and more often than not as a part of the machinations of the ruling or opposition elites.19

 Demerath and Williams, “Civil Religion in an Uncivil Society,” 154.  Stewart M. Hoover, ed. Religion in the Media Age (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2006). 18  Henrik Bødker, “Muslims in Print, or Media Events as Nodes of Cultural Conflict,” in Media, Religion and Conflict, ed. Lee Marsden and Heather Savigny (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 83. 19  Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News the Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers,” Journal of peace research 2, no. 1 (1965): 84. 16 17

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

27

This means that judgements have already been made in the production, even if it is something as simple as choosing to run a certain story and not another, or the angle at which to approach it from. This highlights, the subjectivity involved in producing media reports. This crucially affects the way in which a media report is visually presented. Journalism in the Mass-mediated communications age, is understood to be the act of taking events and arranging them within frames that are relatable to the viewer.20 Through the use of mass media, social actors, including various publics, define what is and what is not relevant to a political issue by framing their concerns in particular ways.21 “Frames organize discourse, including news stories, by their patterns of selection, emphasis and exclusion”.22 Thus, by “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and make[ing] them more salient in a communicating text”,23 mass media coverage of politics and political issues often contain frames about and define current political controversies.24 The media’s portrayal of reality is often claimed as being reality.25 Stuart Hall adds that: Journalists speak of ‘the news’ as if events select themselves. … Yet of the millions of events which occur daily in the world, only a tiny proportion ever become visible as “potential news stories”. … We appear to be dealing, then, with a ‘deep structure’ whose function as a selective device is untransparent even to those who professionally most know how to operate it.26

And he later points out that: Press reports cannot be simply a straight reflection of what happened because there always intervenes a whole process of selection – which events to report, which to leave out; which aspects of an event to report, which to omit; and a whole process of presentation – choosing  David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow, Media Logic (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1979); Claes H. de Vreese, “News Framing: Theory and Typology,” Information Design Journal + Document Design 13, no. 1 (2005). 21  T. Michael Maher, “Framing: An Emerging Paradigm or a Phase of Agenda Setting?,” in Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World, ed. Stephen D.  Reese, Oscar H.  Gandy Jr., and August E.  Grant (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001); Christian Elmelund-Præstekjær and Charlotte Wien, “Mediestormens Politiske Indflydelse Og Anatomi’ [the Political Influence and Anatomy of the Media Storm],” [The Political Influence and Anatomy of the Media Storm.] Nordicom Information (2008). 22  Charlotte Ryan, Kevin M. Carragee, and William Meinhofer, “Theory into Practice: Framing, the News Media, and Collective Action,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 45 (2001): 175. 23   Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43 (1993): 52. 24  Paul R. Brewer, “Framing, Value Words, and Citizens’ Explanations of Their Issue Opinions,” Political Communication 19 (2002); Elmelund-Præstekjær and Wien, “Mediestormens Politiske Indflydelse Og Anatomi’ [the Political Influence and Anatomy of the Media Storm].” 25  Nick Couldry, “Media Rituals: From Durkheim on Religion to Jade Goody” in Exploring Religion and the Sacred in a Media Age, ed. C. Deacy and E. Arweck (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 46. 26  Stuart Hall, “The Determinations of News Photographs,” in The Manufacture of News: Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media, ed. Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (London, UK: Constable, 1973). 20

28

L. de Rooij which sort of headline, language, imagery, photograph, typography to use in translating what happened.27

News media represent the world, rather than reflect upon it, this leads to an over usage of stereotyped frames, as media representations “reduce, shrink, condense, and select/repeat, aspects of intricate social relations in order to represent them as fixed, natural, obvious and ready to consume”.28 News values allow journalists to “translate untidy reality into neat stories with beginnings, middles, and denouements,” and to “reinforce conventional opinions and established authority”.29 Media creates, reflects and enforces social representations. “Social representations are socially shared and constructed representations that act as a fundamental backdrop for the construction of individual attitudes and beliefs”.30 This is then transferred to audiences who have access to the media. However by utilising “the journalistic practices of favouring official sources and employing ‘active agents with specific purposes”.31 The corporations then in turn “promote elite social discourses as the public discourse, or the common sense of society”.32 Thus, although there usually is more than one perspective operating within a given discourse about a specific issue, the dominant frame is usually used to define the preferred reading of an issue, event or character. This suppresses alternative readings, and limits the scope and ability for minority opinions to be heard. It also places the perspective of the dominant institutions or social actors in positions to define the legitimate opinions, set the status quo, and retain the existing order and structure. Any organization has characteristics that shape and reinforce the attitudes of those who are art of it and thereby influence the content of decisions made. Despite, or because of, the hierarchical structure of organizations that gives particular individuals key roles in decision making, these decisions are made within an organisational context. The totality of an objective situation is never perceived by any individual. Since reality is so complex, only a limited part of it can be observed and assimilated. Organizations in their divisions of labour and responsibility inherently specify a set of limits on a member’s definition of reality.33

 “The Treatment of Football Hooliganism in the Press,” in Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context, ed. Roger Ingham (London, UK: Inter-Action Imprint, 1978), 34. 28  Martin Nkosi Ndlela, “The African Paradigm: The Coverage of the Zimbabwean Crisis in the Norwegian Media,” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 2, no. Special Issue November 2005 (2005). 29  James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2009). 30  Marco Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice,” in Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. Marc Helbling (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 180. 31  Damion Waymer, “Walking in Fear: An Autoethnographic Account of Media Framing of InnerCity Crime,” Journal of Communication Inquiry (2009). 32  Ibid. 33  Susan Welch, “The American Press and Indochina, 1950–56,” in Communication in International Politics, ed. Richard L. Merrit (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1972). 27

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

29

It is important to note, that whatever actions a media producer undertakes there are commercial implications as well as ideological and political implications, whether they are aware of them or not. Studies of gatekeeping have shown that the production of press reports are the result of multiple peer, and power relations, whereby the social context of each ‘gate’ affects the production process.34 This is further evidenced by Galtung & Ruge,35 in that if all ‘gates’ share the same interpretation of events, the more likely it was to be selected as a news story. But as later studies of the British press found that many news stories wrote “unambiguously about events and issues that were likely to have been highly ambiguous”.36 The effects of social, cultural, and organisational forces are felt upon those in ‘gatekeeping’ positions in such a way that the stories that progress to production are those which all can agree on. The choice of materials up for consumption,37 is limited to the sample constructed and disseminated by media institutions, resulting in asymmetrical power relations in the marketplace. However, there is space for an active choosing by the viewer because of the consumption of commodities requires consumer participation in the marketplace.38 Whilst the power balance is in favour of media institutions, they are unable to have everything their way because if they alienate their consumers then the institution dies. This choice often has the boundaries set by the producer and not the consumer, in that, such programmes usually prefer one vision of reality over another, and invite the viewer to engage the message in a particular way, despite such a ‘reading’ not being guaranteed.39 Yet this ‘active viewer’ should not be seen as an individual that is continuously struggling against the structures of textual power.40 Rather, in their own way, audiences are in certain aspects “active in their choice, consumption and interpretation of media texts, with recognition of how that activity is framed and

 George A. Bailey and Lawrence W. Lichty, “Rough Justice on a Saigon Street: A Gatekeeper Study of Nbc’s Tet Execution Film,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 49, no. 2 (1972); Kurt Lewin, “Frontiers in Group Dynamics Ii. Channels of Group Life; Social Planning and Action Research,” Human relations 1, no. 2 (1947); David Manning White, “The Gate Keeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News,” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 27, no. 4 (1950). 35  “The Structure of Foreign News the Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers.” 36  Tony Harcup and Deirdre O’Neill, “What Is News? Galtung and Ruge Revisited,” Journalism Studies 2, no. 2 (2001): 270. 37  David Morgan, The Lure of Images: A History of Religion and Visual Media in America (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 73. 38  Kim Knott and Jolyon P. Mitchell, “The Changing Faces of Media and Religion,” in Religion and Change in Modern Britain, ed. Linda Woodhead and Rebecca Catto (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 244. 39  Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding in Tv Discourse,” in Culture, Media, Language, ed. S. Hall, et al. (London, UK: Hutchinson, 1981). 40  James Curran, “The “New Revisionism” in Mass Communications Research,” European Journal of Communication 5, no. 2–3 (1990). 34

30

L. de Rooij

limited, in its different modalities and varieties, by the dynamics of cultural power”.41 Joachim Staab suggests this is the consequence of “how a recognizing subject relates to a recognized object”.42 and that: Events do not exist per se but are the result of subjective perceptions and definitions [...] Most events do not exist in isolation, they are interrelated and annexed to larger sequences. Employing different definitions of an event and placing it in a different context, news stories in different media dealing with the same event are likely to cover different aspects of the event and therefore put emphasis on different news factors.43

Increasingly people are subjected to media influence. This renders our experience of reality necessarily mediated, and therefore interpretative and requiring constant (re) interpretation. “The activity of reception takes place within structured contexts and depends on the power and resources available to the potential receivers”.44 The disparities in financial power render groups unable to access media equally, especially as a socio-political resource. This lack of resources translates into the how minorities are able to “advance their definitions of political issues through the news media” as opposed to the financial resources “available to those who hold institutional power, contribute to their sponsorship of frames and [contribute] to their ability to have these frames influence public discourse”.45 Different social agents increasingly struggle to get access to or take control of media discourse as part of their own (strategic) goals because the institutions that govern the media have developed a stranglehold on its production and dissemination. During the reading of a text or the viewing of a broadcast, audiences are constituted into a community, and socialised into a group that is bound by the shared experiences of media.46 As majority of the media outlets are commercial institutions, it must not be overlooked that their commercial goals will undoubtedly influence their decision-making process. Although positive news stories are very rarely mentioned in the press, they do exist, but always in adherence with aforementioned criteria.

 David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 127. 42  Joachim Friedrich Staab, “The Role of News Factors in News Selection: A Theoretical Reconsideration,” European Journal of Communication 5 (1990): 430–31. 43  Ibid., 439. 44  J.B. Thompson, “The” Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford Univeristy Press, 1995), 39. 45  Ryan, Charlotte, Kevin M. Carragee, and William Meinhofer. “Theory into Practice: Framing, the News Media, and Collective Action.” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 45, no. 1 (2001): 175–82 p. 179. 46  Claus-Dieter Rath, “Live Television and Its Audiences,” in Remote Control: Television, Audiences, and Cultural Power, ed. Ellen Seiter, et al. (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 1991), 89. 41

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

31

3 Images, Subjectivity, and Meaning Making In the public marketplace that is society, one can refer to the interactions of media productions as frames of meaning which interact, develop, and conflict. It should be noted, however, that the form is not entirely separate from the content. Form and content are related in each medium, each of which has a unique aesthetic, codes, and conventions.47 The aesthetics of media representations of Islam and Muslims, are understood through the codes and conventions (civil religion) of British society. The media influence on public opinion is considerable, especially when we consider controversial or topics of a sensational nature in relation to agenda building.48 This leads to W. Shadid concluding that “the media adds both in a direct and indirect manner to the dissemination of negative imagery concerning allochthonous people and might even play a role in their discrimination by society”.49 The media is a source for the spreading of information (and disinformation); in turn it can be the source of producing and enforcing stereotypes and misrepresentation, especially if the method for understanding the media reports is through stereotypes, and these stereotypes are never critiqued or contextualised in their presentation or discussion. This is a consequence of the cultural contexts of journalists and news organisations, whereby their cultural embeddedness affects the production of news reports.50 This is exacerbated by the under-representation of specialised people in the sector, and the short-sighted presentation of the issues at hand.51 When an event is deemed appropriate for public debate, a choice is made that signifies a range of legitimate positions. The media institutions select the individuals that best fit their criteria, show a willingness to appear on air, to debate and represent these positions. Although the issues must be something that can be related to by as many different people as possible, the possibility to interpret a news story from a number of contexts or frames, and get a multiplicity of viewers makes it  Seth Ashley, Mark Poepsel, and Erin Willis, “Media Literacy and News Credibility: Does Knowledge of Media Ownership Increase Skepticism in News Consumers?,” The Journal of Media Literacy Education 2, no. 1 (2010): 38. 48  Emma Poulton, “English Media Representation of Football-Related Disorder: ‘Brutal, ShortHand and Simplifying’?,” Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 8, no. 1 (2005); Bryan E. Denham, “Building the Agenda and Adjusting the Frame: How the Dramatic Revelations of Lyle Alzado Impacted Mainstream Press Coverage of Anabolic Steroid Use,” Sociology of Sport Journal 16, no. 1 (1999); Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang, The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press and the Polls During Watergate (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983). 49  Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd van Koningsveld, “The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in the West: Causes and Solutions,” in Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union, ed. Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd van Koningsveld (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2002). 50  Jaan Grünberg and Josef Pallas, “Beyond the News Desk  – the Embeddedness of Business News,” Media, Culture & Society 35, no. 2 (2013). 51  Stewart M.  Hoover, “Reception of Religion and Media,” in Religion in the Media Age, ed. Stewart M. Hoover (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 330. 47

32

L. de Rooij

commercially successful. In this regard the fact that BBC news was accused of both anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and misrepresentation of the Gaza crisis simultaneously,52 hints at the fact that they probably did as good a job as possible in the way the news was broadcast; this made it commercially successful, as people with very different if not opposite values watched the same broadcast, and interpreted totally different things from that broadcast. [Because] at a certain point, however, the broadcasting structures must yield encoded messages in the form of a meaningful discourse. The institution-societal relations of production must pass under the discursive rules of language for its product to be “realized”. This initiates a further differentiated moment, in which the formal rules of discourse and language are in dominance. Before this message can have an “effect” (however defined), satisfy a “need” or be put to a “use”, it must first be appropriated as a meaningful discourse and be meaningfully decoded. It is this set of decoded meanings which “have an effect”, influence, entertain, instruct, or persuade, with very complex perceptual, cognitive, emotional, ideological or behavioural consequences.53

As the media structure implements a code that produces a news report, this “message” is interpreted, via its decoding’s, and placed in the individual’s structure of social practices. As these structures are individuated, interpretations can vary. However, a news story must also contain some deviation from the mainstream state of affairs. In this case Muslims or Islam in the news adheres exactly to that ideal. Five percent of the population observes this religion according to the census and the active practitioners will be less than that, which means that it is relatively easy to parade one or two individuals, such as Anjem Choudhry or Abu Hamza, on screen that deviate strongly from the mainstream. The problem arises when these are the only images or stories one is familiar with that it becomes very difficult if not impossible to envisage Islam or Muslims outside these frames of reference. As the event portrayed must be able to “condense a complex problem into a striking image and/or draw upon a number of existing stereotypes”,54 it is not difficult to see how oversimplification and stereotypes remain so active in the cognitive imagination of the majority of British society, promulgated through a catchy sound bite or a picture that catches people’s attention. The abovementioned criteria highlight the need for sensation and controversy in media reporting. For example: The event must be appropriate for public debate, people must be willing to participate in the debate, and there must be a difference of opinion about something that either needs to reach consensus or challenges consensus. A newsworthy story contains some deviation from the socially accepted norms of the target audience. This is where the importance of civil religion comes into play.

 Meer and Modood, “The Multicultural State We’re In: Muslims, ‘Multiculture’ and the ‘Civic Re-Balancing’ of British Multiculturalism.”; Stephen Games, “Compromised Coverage: Can the Bbc Really Report from Gaza?,” Haaretz, 24-07-2014. 53  Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in Culture, Media, Language, ed. Stuart Hall, et al. (London, UK: Hutchinson, 1980). 54  Bødker, “Muslims in Print, or Media Events as Nodes of Cultural Conflict,” 83. 52

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

33

Civil religion is understood as the overarching collection of symbols, structures and idiosyncrasies that are seen to define the British socio-political context. One example of civil religion is the definition of Britishness which transcends individual acts, but is rather a collection of beliefs as to what the nation is and should be. One example could be the wearing of a red poppy to commemorate those lost in the war, wearing a white poppy (a symbol of peace rather than a commemoration of war) is considered by some as inappropriate, however, for those who feel their country of heritage or background was colonised and may continue to be ravaged by war, the image of the poppy can evoke strong emotions, and be seen as a promotion of British imperialism. But civil religion as understood by this chapter, also refers to other longstanding traditions that are unquestioned and seen as core elements of the idea of Britishness, such as etiquette. The role of religion, and the way it functions (or should function) in society, the relationship between church and state – these are elements of civil religion. It is through these conceptions of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, religious and secular, that reports about Islam and Muslims are understood. In what Poulton,55 Denham,56 and Lang and Lang,57 describe as the ‘agenda building process’, crucial to a successful transfer of information, is the ability of a media producer to link the issues and events to ‘secondary symbols’ that are accessible to the desired audience. These secondary symbols are the understandings or conceptualisations of civil religion. In contemporary society, identity formation is the product of understandings of history, religion, economics and individuals are confronted by high levels of choice in defining themselves and matters related to meaning making.58 Subjective meanings are constructed personally, socially, and increasingly mediacratically. Therefore, the way that media informs individuals or groups in their descriptions of one another, offers an important means of understanding how the world is viewed in a given society, and how media directs its audience members in their approach to society as a whole, or for a particular group in their immediate environment. Meaning is inherent in the ritual practices involved in media consumption. “[These] help to sustain an identity that is replete with emotion”.59

  “English Media Representation of Football-Related Disorder: ‘Brutal, Short-Hand and Simplifying’?.” 56  “Building the Agenda and Adjusting the Frame: How the Dramatic Revelations of Lyle Alzado Impacted Mainstream Press Coverage of Anabolic Steroid Use.” 57  The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press and the Polls During Watergate. 58  James E.  Cote and Charles G.  Levine, Identity, Formation, Agency, and Culture: A Social Psychological Synthesis (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002); Blake E.  Ashforth and Fred Mael, “Social Identity Theory and the Organization,” The Academy of Management Review 14, no. 1 (1989). 59  Douglas J. Davies, Emotion, Identity, and Religion: Hope, Reciprocity, and Otherness (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 66. 55

34

L. de Rooij

It helps the consumer to make sense of the world around them.60 It also allows the audience to participate, maintain, and sustain, social practices that can be considered as traditional practices in Britain.61 In Foucauldian terms, when the media are perceived as authors of discursivity. Their texts are constitutive for all subsequent participants in the discourse. Foucault explains that founders of discursivity, “are unique in that they are not just the founders of their own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules of the formation of other texts. In this sense, they are very different, for example, from a novelist, who is, in fact, nothing more than the author of his own text”.62 Authors of discursivity establish “an endless possibility of discourse”.63 This endless possibility of discourse is evident in contemporary discussions on Muslims and Islam with civil religion. As S. Fish states that “the thoughts an individual can think and the mental operations he can perform have their source in some or other interpretive community, he is as much a product of that community (acting as an extension of it) as the meanings it enables him to produce”.64 Therefore, with media acting as a means of spreading frames of meaning within and throughout a community, it is logical to assume that the media affects and in some way enforces, and in turn reflects, the meanings a person is able to construct for himself. This process is extended when a person expresses his understanding to those around him, as that understanding is produced within the community he belongs to and coded in such a way that it is understandable within that specific context. In this way specific news items affect a person’s understanding of Islam and Muslims, as a consequence of their conditioning by socio-cultural factors that enable him or her to produce meaning, as well as code and decode the news reports to make sense to him or her. This process is facilitated by the discussion of Islam and Muslims in relation to civil religion. Because by discussion Islam and Muslims in conjunction with civil religion, media reports make those elements of Islam and Muslims used in comparisons, intelligible. In short, an event happens, this receives a specific set of coverage and the manner by which it is covered (i.e., the language used, symbols involved etc.) determines the ability of the public to understand this issue or event.

 Robert Wuthnow, Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 35. 61  Davies, Emotion, Identity, and Religion: Hope, Reciprocity, and Otherness, 66–67. 62  Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author?,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), 114. 63  Ibid. 64  Stanley E.  Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 14. 60

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

35

4 Muslims in the Media This chapter suggests that media reports are evaluating the compatibility of Muslims with Britain, by contrasting Islam or Muslims with conceptualisations of civil religion. As a consequence, a demand is made that what is needed is a change in the ‘moral behaviour’ of Muslims (especially poor disenfranchised men, who, the British government says, are either radicalised or in danger of being radicalised), highlights the actions of a few while ignoring the possible government responsibility for the circumstances that created the conditions for radicalisation in the first place. This is a demand based on the understanding of Britishness as civil religion. This closely resembles what William Cavanaugh describes in The Myth of Religious Violence: The myth of religious violence serves on the domestic scene to marginalize discourses and practices labelled religious. The myth helps to reinforce adherence to a secular social order and the nation state that guarantees it. In foreign affairs, the myth of religious violence contributes to the presentation of non-western and non-secular social orders as inherently irrational and prone to violence. In doing so, it helps to create a blind spot in Western thinking about Westerners’ own complicity with violence. The myth of religious violence is also useful, therefore, for justifying secular violence against religious actors; their irrational violence must be met with rational violence.65

The presentation of Muslims and the Islamic faith in the news, is similar to Cavanaugh’s description. But the foreign origins of Islam have meant that his comment about foreign affairs describes actions that are implemented domestically against Muslims in Britain. For example, in 2001 there were violent riots in Oldham, Bradford, Leeds and Burnley. The riots were short but intense and were the worst ethnically motivated riots in Britain since 1985. They were apparently a culmination of ethnic tensions between South Asian-Muslim communities and a variety of other local community groups. According to one author the consequences of the riots were as follows: [it] was a declaration of the end of multiculturalism and an assertion that Asians, Muslims in particular, would have to develop ‘a greater acceptance of the principal national institutions’ and assimilate to ‘core British values’ . . . [the media coverage has] presented this fragmentation as the result of an over-tolerance of diversity which allowed non-white communities to ‘self-segregate’.66

Within this paradigm Muslims are seen as a ‘problem’, rather than as fellow inhabitants of Britain with problems. The above quote also highlights the demand for further regulation and surveillance of Muslims, in order to manage non-white communities. Consequently, discussions about Muslim minorities or Islam in Britain, is relegated to the ‘problems’ posed for the majority of people rather than

 William T.  Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 225–26. 66  Arun Kundnani, Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism (London, UK: Institute of Race Relations, 2009), 23. 65

36

L. de Rooij

what the treatment of Muslims says about Britain as a whole, and how Muslims are affected by these dynamics. This framework encourages support to government initiatives directed at dealing with ‘problems’. This paradigm simultaneously denies Muslims the freedom to fail, and blames the ‘problems’ on Islam or Muslims themselves. In this way public discussion of the social injustices Muslims may be subject to is avoided. Muslims are to be ‘integrated’ into ‘our’ society and culture; they are to behave like us. This fails to recognise, however, that the presence, trials and tribulations of Muslims are constitutive elements of British society. British newspapers and television news networks address Islam and Muslims in a number of ways, but “that the media focus lies basically on representing a single monolithic Islam”.67 It is important to understand the plurality of descriptions and the effect that is brought about among the British publics, particularly as an increasing number of news outlets describe Islam and Muslims as violent, unreasonable and incompatible with British society.68 It is then conceivable that an increasing number of persons in Britain grow to believe that message, and hold that as their outlook on Islam and Muslims. The increasing association of Islam with violence and unwelcome or irrational behaviour raises questions about the extent to which the media is able to steer public opinion and foster attitudes towards Muslims and Islam. The interpretation of reality and news stories is done in light of the outlook held by people, whose views and behaviour toward others are to a large extent informed by their perception and interpretation of reality through media discourse.69 Therefore, by looking at the way people understand and construct meaning from media we can begin to understand how people’s conceptualisation of Islam and Muslims is being shaped and influenced by the media. It has been argued that the manner in which Islam is covered is narrow and that many stories cover the same aspects repetitively.70 However, what was first argued by Edward Said in ‘Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World’,71 the starting point for most scholars looking at the media coverage of Islam, is that the media determines the legitimate viewpoints regarding Islam. The Muslims that appear in the press, are identified as either

 Elzain Elgamri, Islam in the British Broadsheets: The Impact of Orientalism on Representations of Islam in the British Press (Ithaca, NY: Ithaca Press, 2008), 214. 68  Michael Pickering, Research Methods for Cultural Studies (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 59–60; P.  Morey and A.  Yaqin, Framing Muslims (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 69  Klaus Bruhn Jensen, “News as Social Resource: A Qualitative Empirical Study of the Reception of Danish Television News,” European Journal of Communication 3 (1988): 275–76. 70  Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press. 71  Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. 67

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

37

terrorists at war with the West, or as apologists defending Islam as a peaceful religion.72 A contributor to this dynamic is what Mahmoud Eid describes as follows: Despite the fact that the media are seen as major drivers of social cohesion in multicultural Western societies [by the majority of the population] because they construct and define communities, the majority of mainstream media tend to ignore Islam and Muslims until the occurrence of negative circumstances.73

E. Elgamri’s book ‘Islam in the British Broadsheets’74 is a work that departs exactly from this premise and argues, among other things, that orientalism in the British press is one of the causes of Islamophobia as well as the wider social impact on the integration of Islam in British society. This thesis examines that argument as one of its primary research aims, and critiques the validity of that assumption. It is important to consider is that in a survey conducted in 2002, 74% of the British population claimed they knew nothing or next to nothing about Islam and 64% of the population stated that what they did know came from the media.75 Allen and Nielsen discuss these findings in greater detail and state that “the role and impact of the media is contentious and debatable, … the media continue to play a major role in the formulation and establishment of popular perceptions in the public sphere”.76 Talal Asad argues that “Muslims are included within and excluded from Europe at one and the same time in a special way, and that this has less to do with the ‘absolutist Faith’ of Muslims living in a secular environment and more with European notions of ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ and ‘the secular state’, ‘majority’, and ‘minority’”.77 In order to engage in a serious discussion of Muslims in Britain, we must begin not with the problems of Muslims alone, but with the problems of Muslims and the problems of British society. This is because what is considered problematic, is a direct result of longstanding notions and definitions, i.e. civil religion. These problems are also located in flaws, which are rooted in historic inequalities, and are the consequence of imperialism. These have produced longstanding stereotypes. Media discourse sets up the parameters and terms for discussing Muslims and Islam. It shapes the perceptions and the responses to the issues presented as associated with Islam and Muslims. Within this framework, the burden falls on the ‘other’ to do all the work necessary for integration.

 Ziauddin Sardar, “The Excluded Minority: British Muslim Identity after 11 September,” in Reclaiming Britishness, ed. Phoebe Griffith and Mark Leonard (London, UK: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 86. 73  Mahmoud Eid, “Perceptions About Muslims in Western Societies,” in Engaging the Other: Public Policy and Western-Muslim Intersections, ed. Karim H Karim and Mahmoud Eid (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 111. 74  Islam in the British Broadsheets: The Impact of Orientalism on Representations of Islam in the British Press. 75  Allen, Islamophobia, 96. 76  Allen and Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the Eu after 11 September 2001, 46–48. 77  Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 159. 72

38

L. de Rooij

An examination of how media plays a role in meaning formation can be helpful at this point. Subjective meanings are constructed personally, socially and increasingly ‘mediacratically’. Meaning is constituted by what Rosenberg describes as three forms of affective experience: affective traits, moods, and emotions.78 Rosenberg defined affective traits as a stable predisposition towards certain types of emotional responses.79 In turn, these predispositions determine the threshold for particular emotional states. For example, the pre-disposition of hostility is thought to lower one’s threshold for experiencing anger.80 Emotions on the other hand are “acute, intense, and typically brief psychophysiological changes that result from a response to a meaningful situation in one’s environment”.81 Emotions typically motivate a particular course of action.82 Rosenberg described moods, as fluctuations of subtle emotions. Despite being less likely to be part of one’s conscious awareness, moods are important because they define the parameters of consciousness in a way that emotions cannot because of their relatively short duration.83 This focus on meaning is important for the current discussion for three reasons: Firstly, if media reports create a stable predisposition towards Muslims and Islam, it will result in defining the threshold for certain types of (emotional) responses towards them. Secondly, if emotional responses are elicited by media reports (as their logic entails), then those emotions will typically motivate a particular course of action. Thirdly, the mentioning of moods is important because media is in a position to set the mood through its pervasiveness in contemporary society. As Douglas Davies argues, “the way a particular society or group names its feelings offers an important means of understanding how it views the world and directs its members in their approach to their environment”.84 Therefore, the way that media informs individuals or groups in their descriptions of one another, offers an important means of understanding how the world is viewed in a given society, and how media directs its audience members in their approach to society as a whole or for a particular group in their immediate environment.

 Erika L.  Rosenberg, “Levels of Analysis and the Organization of Affect,” Review of General Psychology 2 (1998). 79  Ibid. 80  Robert A. Emmons, “Emotion and Religion,” in Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, ed. Raymond F.  Paloutzian and Chrystal L.  Park (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2005), 236. 81  Rosenberg, “Levels of Analysis and the Organization of Affect,” 250. 82  Barbara L. Fredrickson, “The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology: The Broaden and Build Theory of Positive Emotions,” American Psychologist 56 (2001). 83  Rosenberg, “Levels of Analysis and the Organization of Affect.” 84  Davies, Emotion, Identity, and Religion: Hope, Reciprocity, and Otherness, 16. 78

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

39

5 Methodology Britain has a national press which does not need to demonstrate neutrality. Following the dominance of the market model, the national press tends to lean towards a conservative perspective. This study proceeded from a qualitative content analysis of the frames used in articles discussing Islam or Muslims appearing in three newspapers over a selected period (The Guardian, The Independent and the Daily Mail, as well as their sister publications on Sunday, The Mail on Sunday, The Observer and The Sunday Independent were used). These newspapers were also chosen for their ideological perspectives: a conservative tabloid, a left-leaning broadsheet and a centrist broadsheet. This approach is methodologically similar to the study of newspapers by Elizabeth Poole,85 but adds new data and perspectives because it includes a tabloid rather than all broadsheet newspapers.86 Internet editions were used in order to maximise data manipulation and to ensure coverage of all content available to a British audience. The sampling frame selected for the newspaper content analysis was for four, 1-week periods from 22nd April 2013 through 7th July 2013 (75 days). The 22nd–28th April, 20th–26th May, 3rd–9th June, 1st–7th July. The study involved a descriptive analysis of every news article (no commentaries or letters, etc.) that made an explicit mention of Islam or Muslim(s). The study clarified which stories were prominent and how such news related to other news on similar topics. The press clippings were coded. First, all stories mentioning Islam and Muslims were recorded. Second, the stories themselves were then coded according to ‘frames’ devised by Semetko and Valkenburg.87 The conflict frame received its name from the coding questions used for the analysis. The examples used in this section are excerpts from news stories published in 2013. A control sample was retrieved from the LexisNexis online archives using the search terms: “Islam” and “Muslims”. One of these terms was required to appear in either the title or the body of the text at least once. This was to make sure that any data which could not be retrieved ‘real time’ was still included later in the data gathering phase. In total 1179 newspaper items mentioned Islam or Muslims in this timeframe. However, as only news stories were analysed, the revised total came to 332 (The Guardian and the Observer (n = 178), The Independent and Independent on Sunday (n = 80) and Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday (n = 74)) during the aforementioned period. In a comparable study conducted by Knott, Poole and Taira, in 1 month in 2008 there would be 306 mentioning’s of Islam as compared to 33 in

 Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims; “The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage,” in Muslims and the News Media, ed. Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson (London, UK – New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 89. 86  Other examples of similar studies include Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. and Elgamri, Islam in the British Broadsheets: The Impact of Orientalism on Representations of Islam in the British Press. 87  “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News,” Journal of communication 50, no. 2 (2000). 85

40

L. de Rooij

1982.88 3.1% of references on television and 9.5% of newspaper references related to Islam in this period.89

6 ‘Britishness’ as Civil Religion in Media Reports Many scholars have noted that in Britain, ‘Britishness’ often tends to be tacitly associated with ‘Whiteness’, meaning that some British Muslims (as well as other British citizens from ethnic minority backgrounds) have perhaps found it hard to maintain a strong sense of British identity. However, as Elizabeth Poole notes, a crisis of national identity has led to a defensive construction of a common national culture (civil religion) to provide stability and certainty.90 This definition of national identity excludes Muslims from being considered British.91 In turn the positioning of ‘Britishness’ as a civil religion has meant that its conceptualisations are used to critique Muslims and in some cases devalue their position in society. This is quite the contrast with Bellah’s original concept where it forms a bridge between different religious groups in order to live together and increase cohesion. In practice it is used as a barrier on the basis that Muslims can’t buy into the civil religion on the basis of their own religious identity. With a divisive rhetoric being used with regards to the values represented by Muslims in relation non-Muslims in Britain, it is a problem to maintain social cohesion. Nonetheless according to the latest British Value Survey, Muslims are more likely to identify with traditional British values.92 Poole also stresses the tendency to homogenize Muslims in Britain, arguing that the “mainstream press displays a high degree of homogeneity in themes associated with Islam”.93 She notes the “absence of diversity in media images of Islam”.94 She argues that “press coverage of British Islam represents a project intent on ‘cultural closure’”95 and that such “patterns of representation…legitimise current social relations of dominance, power structures and therefore continuing patterns of discrimination”.96 Islam challenges the conceptualisation of British civil religion, especially within media discourse. The ambivalence of the media with Islam, civil religion and  Knott, Poole, and Taira, Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred: Representation and Change, 80. 89  Ibid. 90  Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims, 22. 91  Ibid. 92  University of Essex, “Ethnic Minorities Living in the Uk Feel More British Than White Britons,” https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/2012/06/30/ethnic-minorities-living-in-the-uk-feel-more-britishthan-white-britons 93  Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims, 99. 94  Ibid., 54. 95  Ibid., 186. 96  Ibid., 259. 88

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

41

religion in general is played out along several lines. What also must be recognised is that ‘citizenship’ has become an integral part of the debate on religious practice in Britain. With non-Christian religious practices considered as foreign and excluded on the basis of conceptualisations of civil religion. Social rights and social identities engage, conflict and challenge normative conceptions of ‘acceptable’ religious practice. The relationship between citizenship and appropriate ‘moral’ behaviour, is played out in the interaction between civil religion and Islam in Britain. One such practice that is often mentioned as emblematic of Islam is the burning of the book Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie. As a symbol of unwelcome behaviour this act is seen as irrational, violent, and unconceivable within the conceptualisations of civil religion.97 Whilst the book burning itself was staged for the cameras in order to garner media coverage,98 the nature of the images and their understanding is reliant upon an overarching view of the acceptable way to act upon one’s religious convictions. The form of the symbolic content that is typically disseminated through mass media practices is generally the result of technological advances and institutional production mechanisms that are controlled, regulated and disseminated for financial profit.99 In turn the symbolic content that is transmitted through media and reaches the audience builds symbolic power. The symbolic content is easier to engage with by the audience if the object that is transmitted adheres to the abovementioned criteria and if it focuses on visual elements. Aspects that are accessible on an experiential level are easier to communicate. By this I mean, that it is easier to discuss veiling as a practice where one is familiar with what a hijab, burqa, or niqab looks like, rather than as an abstract notion. In turn the cultural or symbolic power is the result of symbolic content being transmitted and received as meaningful.100 Cultural symbols, and religious practices are disseminated through the medium of media. However, News reporting is a social construct, and so are rituals, yet both are considered reliable. News is considered reliable because of its imputed objectivity. Ritual is reliable because of its imputed longevity or sacrality. Both are grounded in a social agreement that their messages are true, beyond strategic manipulation.101

By positioning itself in such a way that it offers us unmediated access to reality, the media affects and defines how the individual approaches his immediate environment. At the same time its agenda building processes as well as the manner in which events are deemed newsworthy or not shows that not only is the media a great  Robin Lustig et al., “War of the Word,” The Observer, 19-02-1989.  Nicole Falkenhayner, Making the British Muslim: Representations of the Rushdie Affair and Figures of the War-on-Terror Decade (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 84. 99  John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 27–28. 100  Ibid., 16. 101  Ignace de Haes, Ute Husken, and Paul van der Velde, “Media on the Ritual Battlefield,” in Ritual, Media, and Conflict, ed. Ronald L. Grimes, et al. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 210. 97 98

42

L. de Rooij

influence over the social sphere, but it is also aware of the power it possesses and uses it to its own advantage to further its economic and political goals. Whilst the repetition of standard terminology and symbols enable the audience to grasp the material, the interpretation of that material is still the product of a diverse body of interpretative codes.102 However, it can be argued that individuals “often hold stereotypical beliefs about members of social groups with whom they have little or no contact because they are exposed to social representations of the target group in question, and … that these are endorsed less critically if the individual has little direct knowledge of, or contact with, members of the group in question”.103 The consequence is that for many individuals living in Britain outside the five conurbations where Muslims are generally to be found, then the media is one of the sources people seek out to receive their information. Yet if the newsworthy items rely upon existing stereotypes in order to be understood and newsworthy, it will be much more difficult to challenge and enforce a change in perception. This is something that is closely linked to the media’s communication mechanisms and its influence on the portrayal of reality.

7 News Reporting on Islam and Muslims How the images of Islam and Muslims are treated by the mass media can offer insight into the invocation of Britishness as civil religion in the discussion about Islam and Muslims. The frames and framing effects used to discuss Muslims and Islam have a focus on the relationship between Islam and Muslims in the news, and the public perceptions of Islam and Muslims. This is achieved by examining what “people talk or think about by examining how they think and talk about issues in the news”.104 “Some aspects of a perceived reality” are used “in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”.105 In turn media discourse(s) “locate, perceive, identify, and label” phenomena106 and “narrow the available political alternatives” for the audience.107 This is important to consider because audience studies have shown that for example the opinion with regards to the European Union and various  Robert A. White, “Religion and Media in the Construction of Cultures,” in Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture, ed. Stewart M. Hoover and Knut Lundby (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), 49. 103  Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice,” 180. 104  Zhongdang Pan and Gerald M. Kosicki, “Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse,” Political Communication 10, no. 1 (1993): 70. 105  Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” 53. 106  Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1974), 21. 107  Gaye Tuchman, Making News (New York, NY: Free Press, 1978), 156. 102

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

43

EU-related issues can be affected depending on how the issue is framed in the survey question.108 The current study complements other studies that have examined the consequences of the public’s interpretation of events and issues.109 These resources for social interaction and cultural expression are not myriad in form and substance, but narrowed parameters (and restricted codes) of media form and content that channel imaginary possibilities in repetitive patterns.110 In other words, by focussing on particular visual elements of Islam, such as the burqa, media discourse narrows the parameters through which Islam and Muslims can be discussed and engaged with. The possibilities of discussion are set in repetitive vocabulary and follow pre-existing patterns. The images of Islam and Muslims in the mass media can be analysed hegemonically.111 Hegemonic understandings of media, culture, and religion, means that Muslims are unable to act as equal partners in their media representation. The structures of mass media have created a situation where their biased coverage of Muslims and Islam, through under-representative and stereotyped coverage, collectively, uphold hegemonic understandings of religion and culture. This is because, out of all the influences that may shape people, the mass media are one of the most prevalent and powerful.112 The media are in a position to create and maintain societal perspectives.113 They give access to reality through the coverage they give, and influence people by their choices in coverage.114

 Willem E.  Saris, “The Public Opinion About the Eu Can Easily Be Swayed in Different Directions,” Acta Politica 32 (1997). 109  Doris A. Graber, Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide (New York, NY: Longman, 1988); Shanto Iyengar, “Television News and Citizens’ Explanations of National Affairs,” American Political Science Review 81 (1987); Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, “News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing,” Communication Research 20 (1993); Pippa Norris, “The Restless Searchlight: Network News Framing of the Post-Cold War World,” Political Communication 12 (1995). 110  Michael Griffin, “From Cultural Imperialism to Transnational Commercialization: Shifting Paradigms in International Media Studies,” Global Media Journal 1, no. 1 (2002): 17. 111  Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1971); “(I) History of the Subaltern Classes; (II) the Concept of ‘Ideology’; (III) Cultural Themes: Ideological Material,” in Media and Cultural Studies Keyworks, ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2001). 112  Angela Lumpkin and Linda D. Williams, “An Analysis of Sports Illustrated Feature Articles, 1954–1987,” Sociology of Sport Journal 8 (1991); Paul Mark Pedersen, “Examining Equity in Newspaper Photographs a Content Analysis of the Print Media Photographic Coverage of Interscholastic Athletics,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 37, no. 3–4 (2002). 113  Janet S. Fink, “Female Athletes and the Media: Strides and Stalemates,” Journal of Physical Education, Recreation & Dance 69, no. 6 (1998); Pedersen, “Examining Equity in Newspaper Photographs a Content Analysis of the Print Media Photographic Coverage of Interscholastic Athletics.” 114  Pamela J.  Creedon, “Women, Media, and Sport: Creating and Reflecting Gender Values,” in Women, Media, and Sport: Challenging Gender Values, ed. Pamela J. Creedon (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994); Mary .Jo Kane and Susan L. Greendorfer, “The Media’s Role in Accommodating and Resisting Stereotyped Images of Women in Sport,” ibid. (Sage publications); 108

44

L. de Rooij

The way stories are presented, stereotyped, trivialized, and under-represented, through the mass media, is one way that the dominant ideology is articulated, constituted, and reproduced.115 Paul Pedersen states in his discussion of sportswomen, that “the mass media is a hegemonic social institution and through much of their representations hegemonically sanction the power and privilege that is found in society. The media thus help to integrate and homogenize society”.116 The mass media coverage of Muslims and Islam promotes mainstream societal interests over Muslim interests.117 As a consequence, the representations of Muslims and Islam are the result of the power and privilege that is found in British society. British media also act as a force that seeks to integrate and homogenize society, as is seen in the under-represented and stereotyped media coverage of Muslims and Islam that construct their position in British society as one of otherness. This serves to reinforce certain beliefs about Islam and Muslims. What this study shows (as will be discussed in more detail later) is that the dominant paradigm covering Muslims in the news is conflict. Islam as a term or concept is much less present as a term than Muslim(s) in the news (Table 2.1). In the stories that were analysed from the British press, the word Muslim appears 72% of the time, but 29% of the time it appears only once which is about the same amount as the times it does not appear at all (Table 2.2). This compares starkly with the word Islam used in the British press, because as the table below shows, almost half the stories do not even mention Islam (Table 2.3).118 This is further supported by the fact that 96% of the stories did not mention conflicts between Islam and something or someone, and 97% of the stories did not mention conflicts between something or someone, and Islam. Yet before proceeding one has to consider that a disadvantage present in binary data is that they are measured with more measurement error, with the inevitable risk that correlations between variables are lower than correlations between ordinal or interval variables.

Pedersen, “Examining Equity in Newspaper Photographs a Content Analysis of the Print Media Photographic Coverage of Interscholastic Athletics.” 115  John Hargreaves, Sport, Power and Culture. A Social and Historical Analysis of Popular Sports in Britain (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1986); Edward McGregor, “Mass Media and Sport: Influences on the Public,” Physical Educator 46, no. 1 (1989); Pedersen, “Examining Equity in Newspaper Photographs a Content Analysis of the Print Media Photographic Coverage of Interscholastic Athletics.” 116  “Examining Equity in Newspaper Photographs a Content Analysis of the Print Media Photographic Coverage of Interscholastic Athletics,” 304. 117  Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press; Elgamri, Islam in the British Broadsheets: The Impact of Orientalism on Representations of Islam in the British Press; Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims. 118  There were 29 stories that made no mention of either Islam or Muslims but did include another identifying term, most common was Islamist (occurring 25 times) and then 2 times it was Shia and once the identifying term was jihadist. Jihadist was considered here because in the article it refers to Islamic terrorism.

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain… Table 2.1  The percentage of stories that mention Muslim(s) and how often that word is mentioned

How often does the word Muslim appear? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 14 17 21 33 Total

45

Percent of stories 28.3 28.9 13.9 8.4 6.6 2.4 1.2 3.0 .6 1.2 1.8 .6 1.2 .6 .6 .6 100.0

Table 2.2  How often does the word Muslim appear in the newspapers? Name of newspaper Daily Mail

The Guardian

The Independent

How often does the word Muslim appear? None Once Multiple times None Once Multiple times None Once Multiple times

Percent of stories 16.1 25.8 58.1 31.6 25.9 42.5 39.5 34.2 26.3

Since the aim of the study was to establish what topics are most expressed and representative rather than the interrelation of the stories in the news themselves, this was accepted as it did not form the primary focus of this study (Table 2.4). As mentioned earlier, I coded all stories that mentioned Islam or Muslims, to assess differences in the use of news frames among different types of outlets. To do this, I used 14 framing questions to empirically assess the presence of the conflict frame as it appeared in the various outlets. The values of each framing scale ranged

46

L. de Rooij

Table 2.3  The percentage of stories that mention Islam and how often that word is mentioned

How often does the word Islam appear? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10

Percent of stories 46.4 28.9 10.2 5.4 4.8 1.8 .6 .6 .6 .6

Table 2.4  How often does the word Islam appear in the newspapers? Name of newspaper Daily Mail

The Guardian

The Independent

How often does the word Islam appear? None Once Multiple times None Once Multiple times None Once Multiple times

Percent of stories 35.5 34.3 30.2 48.2 27.1 24.7 55.3 26.3 18.4

from 0% (frame never present) to 100% (frame ever present). The prevalence of these frames in the three national newspapers outlets could lead to the normalisation and acceptability of these frames in public and private discourses. The coding of these variables was done in such a way that a high score meant that these frames dominated these national media outlets. It also could suggest the importance and potential influence of news culture and the news outlet’s context on the framing of problems and topics in the news. This is fuelled by the bottom line of a company whereby consumer numbers translate to advertising income. The financial constraints might mean that more pages, means higher printing costs, and not necessarily enough advertisers to cover the extra space. In addition, the news is supposed to be short and to the point. This means that even though it could go into further detail and contextualise every aspect of a story, it often does not, because additional context is deemed superfluous. For further information, debate and discussion the reader should read other sections of the newspaper. The conflict frame reflects the stories that discuss conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions and Islam or Muslims as a means of capturing audience interest. The coding questions brought out the following results:

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

47

1. Does the story reflect conflict between Muslims and parties, individuals, groups, or countries? Yes, 81% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 90%, The Guardian 85%, the Independent 71%. 2. Does the story reflect conflict between Islam and parties, individuals, groups, or countries? No, 96% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 98%, The Guardian 95%, the Independent 95%. 3. Does the story reflect conflict between parties, individuals, groups, or countries and Muslims? No, 66% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 83%, The Guardian 64%, the Independent 61%. 4. Does the story reflect conflict between parties, individuals, groups, or countries and Islam? No, 98% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 99%, The Guardian 99%, the Independent 94%. 5. Does the story reflect disagreement between Muslims and/or within Islam? No, 75% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 88%, The Guardian 74%, the Independent 68%. 6. Do Muslims or Islam criticise parties, individuals, groups, or countries? No, 75% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 75%, The Guardian 73%, the Independent 76%. 7. Does the story refer to two sides, or to more than two sides, of the problem or issue? No, 82% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 93%, The Guardian 78%, the Independent 79%. 8. Does the story refer to violence committed by the parties, individuals, groups, or countries involved? Yes, 81% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 88%, The Guardian 80%, the Independent 81%. 9. Does the story refer to winners and losers? No, 76% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 51%, The Guardian 80%, the Independent 79%. In this regard we can speak of a one-sided and very dominant narrative. The ever-­ present stories are those of conflict between Muslims and other parties or the state. In 81% of the cases these conflicts are violent. The lack of criticism and disagreement among Muslims in the press further highlights the perception that Muslims are a homogenous monolithic entity that act entirely based on their faith and are only able to show and express their disagreement and discontent in violent action. The acts are mostly un-contextualised and not discussed as options but usually from the one perspective, that violent action is the only recourse Muslims seek. This is further supported by the fact that only 18% of the stories show more than one side of the issue and that Muslims are rarely at conflict with each other or Islam as an ideology119 and that on very few occasions are Muslims mentioned as agents of criticism (either of other Muslims or policy etc.). Twenty-six per cent of the stories have Muslims (or their representative groups) quoted as agents of their own views and

 25% of the stories mention conflict between Muslims themselves or Muslims and Islam. Again, in this regard most of these stories refer to sectarian violence abroad, for example Iraq, Afghanistan or Syria which received relatively high percentages of mentioning in the content analysis appearing in 2.1%, 2.7% & 1.6% of the total stories respectively. 119

48

L. de Rooij

actions. What is striking is that the five most commonly mentioned “authorities” in news stories in order of percentage of stories that make a mention of them are Anjem Choudary (10.8%), Al-Muhajiroun (10.8%), Omar Bakri Mohammed (10%), Abu Qatada (8.3%) and the Taliban, Al-Shabaab and the MCB, all with 7.6%. To put this in context, the most common terms are terrorist or terrorism appearing as a word in 30.6% of the stories. The EDL are mentioned 15% of the time and the most common Muslim representative body in Britain that is mentioned is the Muslim Council of Britain, and they only are mentioned 7.6% of the time. This is additionally problematic because it suggests that either Muslims or Muslim organisations are unable, unwilling, or ignored in press stories, or because the avenues of communication for Muslims or Muslims organisations and the press are not as accessible as those with other communities. As within the conflict paradigm there is little reference to previous events or future developments, further highlighting the episodic nature of news reporting, the only voices that are currently being heard are people and organisations that can mobilise quickly to engage with instantaneous events. The responsibility frame discusses an issue or problem to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group (in this case Islam or Muslims). The coding questions brought out the following results: 1. Does the story make a mention of how government has the ability to address the problem? Yes, 51% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 71% (Yes), The Guardian 55% (No), the Independent 55% (No). 2. Does the story suggest that the government is responsible for the issue or problem? No, 58% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 71%, The Guardian 57%, the Independent 50%. 3. Does the story suggest potential solution(s) to the problem or issue? No, 92% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 95%, The Guardian 95%, the Independent 90%. 4. Does the story suggest that an individual (or group of people in society), is responsible for the issue-problem? Yes, 68% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 83%, The Guardian 64%, the Independent 55%. 5. Does the story suggest the problem requires (immediate) action? No, 57% overall. This can be split up by source as follows: Daily Mail 71%, The Guardian 56%, the Independent 52%. The existence of the responsibility frame may again shape the public understanding of who is responsible for causing (or solving) social issues.120 In this case we can see that in the majority of cases individuals (or groups) are responsible for the story. This is generally framed as Muslims inciting conflict. What is interesting is that in 58% the government (be it policy, politicians, local government, etc.) is not deemed responsible.

120

 Iyengar, “Television News and Citizens’ Explanations of National Affairs.”

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

49

The actions and issues that are deemed newsworthy are not discussed in connection to others. Even though terrorism (whatever its form) is a reaction to something, the antecedence is most often overlooked. Terrorists wake up 1 day and commit to a violent action. This lack of contextualisation is a glaring problem as when we consider that this is the way people will then understand and create meaning out of the situation for themselves and their everyday lives. Thus, news encourages people to explain social problems simplistically because the issue or problem is covered in terms of an event, instance, or individual (episodically) rather than in terms of the larger historical social context (thematically).121 Important to consider is that although individuals or groups are considered a problem 92% of the time there is no solution given and mostly the problem is not deemed large enough to warrant immediate action. Despite no solution being given, the Daily Mail does feel the government is in a position to do something about the problems it sees related to Muslims and Islam. In this regard we can see that although it may be symptomatic of news coverage, to avoid pleading a case to the audience, but rather to provide factual information, the Daily Mail presents its news as a problem and demands the government do something about it. The cause and the solution of an issue is absent in most cases. This means, that what are most often disseminated are simply statements of issues, without context, grounding or potential solutions, which are left entirely up to the imagination of the audience. With news’ ability to set the agenda it can make the issues it discusses seem like much bigger issues than they are, especially if more than 80% of the stories are regarding Muslims being in conflict with something or someone.

8 News Reporting on Islam and Muslims The ‘conflict frame’ reflects the stories that discuss conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions and Islam and Muslims as a means of capturing audience interest. Some suggest that the media draw on conflict as one of a few central frames for reporting a range of issues, and it is a common frame in reporting.122 Some research has observed that the news reports concerning political elites are oversimplifying complex political debates into overly simplistic conflict without going into the ideological substance. Patterson shows that Presidential election campaign news is often framed in terms of conflict.123 The emphasis on conflict may mean that the news media legitimates the conflict frame as a legitimate frame of reference for the public when viewing or conceiving Muslims and Islam. For example:

 Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 122  Ann N. Crigler, Marion R. Just, and Neuman W. Russell, Common Knowledge (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 61–62. 123  Thomas E. Patterson, Out of Order (New York, NY: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1993). 121

50

L. de Rooij We love death more than you love life . . . What we did today was a direct retaliation of your insulting of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) and also in retaliation of your crusade against Islam/Muslims on a global scale. It is of the greatest honour for us to do what we did.124

That paradigm needs to be broken and for that there need to be other voices heard that offer an alternative narrative. This is an issue that has been established in detail by Elizabeth Poole with regards to the media coverage between 1994 and 2003 and that now over a decade later it is still the case.125 Terrorism, Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and other news abroad is what defines the relationship and place of Muslims in/with Britain. Strong ideological rhetoric and framing, defines and questions the loyalty of Muslims to the British state, and in turn the ability of Islam to be compatible with the British understanding of civil religion. This is additionally problematic because Muslims or Muslim organisations are unable to access the avenues of communication unless they fit into the conflict frame. Yet when they do, they are often seen as the source of the conflict. With the Daily Mail reporting Muslims as having a problem with something 90% of the time, The Guardian 85%, and the Independent 71%. Often journalists will reference morality or religion by using the views of a group to raise questions about an issue or story. Here civil religion plays an even greater part. Whilst most news stories do not include a moral message, there are implicit descriptions present that bear out the prominence of an implicit understanding of civil religion. In this regard we can see prescriptions being made about violent action, and about Muslim behaviour that is deemed incompatible even though it is not explicitly stated. There are a few stories that go into the specific practices of Muslims or Islam. When it does occur this is very limited, not only in scope (what practices it describes etc.) but also in depth (the type of analysis of those practices itself). In turn a report may offer a moral message or engage specific social prescriptions about how to behave, but in most cases, this is an implicit message of “don’t be a terrorist”. Some suggest that the moral frame is more common in the minds of audiences than in the actual content of the news.126 For example: “But in this case obviously the covenant of security did not apply,” he said. “Beheading is how criminals were executed under the laws; but that must happen with a sharia court and decision by judges with criminals. On this occasion he was taking military action, not a legal one”.127

The responsibility frame discusses an issue or problem to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group (in this case Islam or Muslims). The existence of the responsibility frame may again shape

 Matthew Taylor, “Six Plead Guilty to Plotting Attack on Edl Rally,” The Guardian, 30-04-2013.  Poole, “The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage,” 93–100. 126  Crigler, Just, and W. Russell, Common Knowledge, 75. 127  Kim Sengupta, “Woolwich Suspect Inspired by Banned Hate Imam; Omar Bakri Mohammed Applauds the ‘Courage’ of Michael Adebolajo Banned Imam Had Called on Followers to Behead Westerners,” The Independent, 24-05-2013. 124 125

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

51

the public understanding of who is responsible for causing (or solving) social issues.128 In this case we can see that in majority of cases individuals (or groups) are responsible for the story. This is generally framed as Muslims inciting conflict. What is interesting that in 58% the government (be it policy, politicians, local government etc.) is not deemed responsible, i.e., the party inciting the event or action, but it may be deemed responsible for doing something about it. This again reconfirms the episodic nature of news and lack of contextualisation. The actions and issues that are deemed newsworthy are not discussed in connection to others. Even though terrorism (whatever its form) is a reaction to something, that the antecedence is most often overlooked, it would seem that terrorists wake up 1 day and commit to a violent action. Therefore, news encourages people to explain social problems simplistically because the issue or problem is covered in terms of an event, instance, or individual (episodically) rather than in terms of the larger historical social context (thematically).129 It is important to consider, that although individuals or groups are considered a problem, 92% of the time, there is no solution given, and mostly the problem is not deemed large enough to warrant immediate action. Although these might be symptomatic of news coverage as it is not trying to convince the audience but rather provide factual information about something it does consider a problem. The cause and the solution of an issue is absent in most cases. This means that what are most often disseminated are simply statements of issues. Without context, grounding or potential solutions, despite it not demanding immediate action, it does leave the cause, solution and immediacy of action entirely up to the imagination of the audience. With news’ ability to set the agenda it can make the issues it discusses seem like much bigger issues than they are. Especially if more than 80% of the stories are regarding Muslims being in conflict with something or someone. For example: An Iraqi drug dealer who claimed his life would be in danger at home because of his Western’ tattoos has been granted a human right’ to stay in Britain. In the latest outrage under Labour’s Human Rights Act, Hesham Mohammed Ali won a tribunal appeal against moves to kick him out. The 36-year-old former wrestling promoter based his case on his tattoos and the fact he is in a genuine’ relationship with a British woman – despite having two children by different women with whom he now has no contact.130

As these terms indicate the most commonly mentioned terms are of violence (terrorism and Al-Qaeda) or unwelcome behaviour (Fundamentalist). An example of the implementation might be something like Muslim Fundamentalist does x. The Mosque is an interesting term to appear often, as a site of religious worship it is often associated with piety and authority in the media discourses. It also situates a lot of the issues surrounding Muslims with Mosques. Examples are not limited to Mosque as a site of problems with Islam, but it also appears in stories about protests

 Iyengar, “Television News and Citizens’ Explanations of National Affairs.”  Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. 130  James Slack, “Drug Dealer Who Says Tattoos Would Endanger His Life in Iraq Is Given Human Right to Stay in Uk,” Daily Mail, 29-04-2013. 128 129

52

L. de Rooij

outside Mosque, protest about building of Mosque or Mosque leader provides statement about an event. This gives the impression that the Mosque is central to Muslim social and religious practice. Whilst this certainly is the case for some individuals it certainly is not the case for all. The use of Mosque as a frequent term suggests its qualities as an authority something that is not necessarily given. Therefore, I suggest that the appearance of Mosque as such a central term is a reflection of Western understandings of religion and the role of the Church in both the historical and contemporary British context. Whilst some of these findings add a new dimension to the study of Muslims and Islam in the media, it also suggests that there is a development along similar lines laid out in the analysis of Poole131 and Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery from 1998 to 2009.132 Imagery is one way of informing the public. Yet in media discourse particular visual elements are introduced and engaged with (whilst others are left silent). Take for example the following mentioning’s of clothing in newspaper articles: Miss Al Amoudi – once nicknamed the vamp in the veil.133 Sisi is said to be a religious man, and his wife, unusually, wears the full niqab (face veil.).134 Students wear salwar kameez and skull caps, typical of Pakistan, and study a mixture of the national curriculum and Islamic studies.135

A number of cultural biases are seen in the above quotes. Firstly, ignored in the mentioning’s of the veil, niqab, or hijab, is a concrete context. Secondly, as in the example above mentioning Sisi the reasons for his wife wearing a veil are attributed to him being a religious man, and therefore implicitly demanding it from his wife. It shows how particular visual elements are selected in order to fit one or more overarching narratives. In this case that Muslim men oppress women. The agency of the women involved is not mentioned. It is assumed that a Muslim woman covers her hair, the reasons for doing so are often not mentioned. Other clothing choices (wearing a chador for example), choice of footwear (high heels, no heels, trainers etc.), accessories such as handbags or sunglasses which may or may not come from a designer brand, etc., are not described. Thirdly, whilst mentioning’s of male clothing is less than women’s clothing, the male clothing is placed in a context ‘typical for Pakistan’ despite the school being in the UK.  Yet here the motivation of the actors involved (students, teachers, school board etc.) is not mentioned in

 Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims.  Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press, 35–66. 133  Neil Sears, “The Saudi Princess’ Accused of £14 m Swindle,” Daily Mail, 6–7-2013. 134  Ian Black, “General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi: Top Brass Ready to Defend the People,” The Guardian, 02-07-2013. 135  Kunal Dutta, “Met Chief Calls for Calm after Islamic School Attack,” The Independent, 10-06-2013. 131 132

2  Believing and Belonging: Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain…

53

conjunction with the clothing. Nor how traditional garments in South Asia may differ with clothing worn in North Africa or Southeast Asia. Media makes the decision to wear certain clothing a matter-of-fact decision that is universally accepted in all of the Muslim world and by all Muslims. This media portrayal greatly reduces the agency and individuality of Muslims, and by focussing on outward appearances it narrows the discussion to such a point that discussion of doctrine and social mores are overlooked. Other examples can be found in the passages below which focus on indicators of piousness. After checking the boy had memorised various prayers to get him through the day, including a special blessing for exiting and entering the toilet, he got down to business, helping the boy read aloud the classical Arabic of a few verses of the Qur’an.136 Bonma, 20, and Tanzina, 18, lived next door, at 60B. They were serious, pious girls who said their prayers and worked hard.137

As the examples highlight, the standard portrayal for Muslims is to be serious and pious, to memorise the Quran, and to be able to read it in classical Arabic. This again greatly reduces the agency of Muslims in their religious practices, as they are seen to be required to memorise formulas in order to complete everyday tasks (such as going to the toilet) and that there is no room for personal negotiation. The student is seen as memorising from the teacher, creating the image of reduced freedom and personal agency, as well as highlighting the role of the teacher as an authority figure and influence over others. Islam here is portrayed as memorisation, placing the legalistic approach to Islamic spirituality in contrast with civil religious, understandings of secularity, and more spiritual approaches to religious devotion. This again follows stereotypical narratives of the influence of Muslim ‘authorities’ on Muslim’s religiosity and highlights the threat of extremist preachers, as well as the chance that all Muslims can be subjected to their influence because of the way the religion is taught. The second passage also suggests a reduction in sense of humour or fun, which can be linked to the events surrounding the Danish cartoon controversies. But this also is an indictment of Islam on the basis of civil religion. But the context in which these girls lived is left out. It may be that these women were living in such a context that if they didn’t work, they didn’t eat, and therefore their working hard allowed them to feed themselves and maybe their families. The reporting frames it as if it may have been a free choice to work hard or not, but living in Bangladesh the choices these girls faced are very different from the British context, not to mention to what extent those choices may have been free or not. In other words, journalists employ a notion of civil religion, that is either implicitly or explicitly mentioned, in order to determine the acceptability of certain religious practices undertaken by Muslims. For example:  Jon Boone, “Pakistan: Hardcore Islamist Spreads Message to Britain through Qur’an ‘Call Centres’: Outsourcing Boom Creates Hundreds of Online Firms to Coach Young Muslims,” The Guardian, 18-06-2013. 137  Jason Burke, “Bangladesh Factory Collapse Casts Heavy Shadow over Nearby Community,” ibid., 06-06-2013. 136

54

L. de Rooij Tens of thousands of Islamists living in Britain not merely reject our society and its values, but even dare to despise them, supposing their own violent and intolerant creed superior. British Christians do not seek confrontation with Islam yet some of its adherents are bent on confrontation with us.138

The above passage also highlights the focus of the news on violent action as an expression of Muslim religious practice. Violent action against non-believers is portrayed as much of a part of Islam as prayer, the hijab, and resulting from reading the Quran. Yet for all the discussion of conflict one of the biggest differences between the newspaper outlets was in its mentioning of winners and losers. Whilst it was a resounding no overall (76%). The Daily Mail had almost as many stories that had a winner or a loser as stories that did not. 51–49%, Whilst The Guardian (80%) and the Independent (79%) mentioned this a lot less. The reason for this may be linked to the nature of the newspapers in question. That as most stories in the Daily Mail are sensationalist in nature, and looking to elicit an emotional response, they are more likely to have discussions of winners and losers than the broadsheet outlets.

9 Conclusion The aspects discussed in this chapter allow for new insights to emerge by exploring how media discourses of Muslims in Britain and civil religion engage with one another. In this chapter argues that affecting emotions through imagery, and using a notion of civil religion, is one way of informing the public. As a result, this chapter concludes that in media productions about Islam and Muslims, particular elements related to conflict are introduced, then engaged with by using the concept civil religion, in order to engage the consumer. As this chapter has shown news reports’ examination of Islam and Muslims is a direct result of longstanding biases, notions, and definitions. These problems are also located in flaws, which are rooted in historic contexts that news as a genre is unable to address because of its internal logic. The consequences of the repetition of longstanding stereotypes are that media output sets up the parameters and terms for discussing Muslims and Islam. It shapes the perceptions, and the responses, to the issues presented, as associated with Islam and Muslims. Within this framework, Islam and Muslims, are understood and simultaneously rejected, through the implementation of understandings of civil religion.

138

 Max Hastings, “Enemy within That Hates Our Tolerance,” Daily Mail, 24-05-2013.

Chapter 3

Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere Claire Forbes

In 2001, the ‘war on terror’ was launched by US President George Bush, and, as a consequence, Islam and Muslims have rarely been out of the UK news headlines since. This intense media exposure has been accompanied by a plethora of academic studies seeking to understand the relationship between Islam and the UK press. These studies provide a useful understanding of how Islam and Muslims are represented in the national press and how media narratives are framed within a primarily political rather than religious context.1 Yet, within this literature, explanations of why critical media coverage of Islam recurs focus on broader cultural notions such as Islamophobia, Orientalism or the clash of civilisations rather than demonstrating a clear understanding of the social and professional processes through which the news media operate. This limits the critiques offered in existing literature, as it fails to demonstrate an understanding of structures and processes that would need to be successfully negotiated for press coverage to be changed. This chapter outlines an alternative approach to understanding the representation of Islam in media discourses by exploring the processes and practices that can be used to challenge or change what makes news. To do this, it recasts the way Islam is viewed from a religious or media studies perspective to a political one, exploring the positioning of Muslim groups within the UK political field. It examines to what  Tahir Abbas, “Media Capital and the Representation of South Asian Muslims in the British Press: An Ideological Analysis,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 21, no. 2 (2001); Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press; Knott, Poole, and Taira, Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred: Representation and Change; Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims; John E. Richardson, “Who Gets to Speak? A Study of Sources in the Broadsheet Press,” in Muslims and the News Media, ed. Elizabeth Poole and John E.  Richardson (London, UK  – New  York, NY: I.B.  Tauris, 2006); Elgamri, Islam in the British Broadsheets: The Impact of Orientalism on Representations of Islam in the British Press; Morey and Yaqin, Framing Muslims. 1

C. Forbes (*) University of Kent, Canterbury, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_3

55

56

C. Forbes

extent Muslim groups and the individuals who represent them make use of practices common within the political field to influence media narratives, specifically public relations (PR) practice. PR practice is prevalent within the political field, where it is used to enable politicians to communicate with the public via the news media. The chapter begins by reviewing the existing literature about Islam and the news media and goes on to outline the theoretical basis for the research cited here, namely the theory of mediatisation. Using fieldwork conducted among PR practitioners, the chapter continues by summarising the nature of PR practice in the political field and concludes with the results of original research conducted among representatives of Muslim organisations seeking to challenge or change the representation of Islam in the UK news media. This reveals the potential for PR practice to change existing media narratives about Islam and the extent to which this is being utilised by Muslim groups.

1 Current Literature About Islam and the News Media Newspaper headlines, shouting out from the front pages, grab public attention and sell newspapers. Examples include: ‘MUSLIMS TELL BRITISH: GO TO HELL!’,2 ‘MUSLIM THUGS BURN POPPIES Sickening scenes on British streets’3 and ‘Hot Cross Buns Banned for Fear of Offence’.4 A plethora of studies on Islam and media since the attacks on the United States of America on the 11th of September, 2001 and on London on the 7th of July, 2005, suggest that headlines such as these have become common currency in the UK press in the last two decades. Much of the literature in this area is focused on the political consequences of particular events, from the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses to the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and London in 2005.5 An example of similar studies might be those focusing on the controversial publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in Jyllands-Posten, Denmark’s best-selling newspaper, in 2006.6

 “Muslims Tell British: Go to Hell!,” Daily Express, 4 November 2010, 1. (their capitalisation).  “Muslim Thugs Burn Poppies Sickening Scenes on British Streets,” Daily Star, 12 November 2010, 1. (Their capitalisation). 4  “Hot Cross Buns Banned for Fear of Offence,” The Times, 17 March 2003, 1. The article is about hot cross buns supposedly causing offence to Muslims. 5  B. Fowler, “A Sociological Analysis of the Satanic Verses Affair,” Theory, Culture and Society 17 (2000); M. Ruthen, A Satanic Affair (London: Chatto and Windus, 1991); D. Pipes, The Rushdie Affair (London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 2003); Poole, “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context.” 6  A.  J. Hussain, “The Media’s Role in a Clash of Misconceptions: The Case of the Danish Muhammad Cartoons,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 12, no. 4 (20007); D. Keane, “Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression,” Human Rights Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2008); Dan Berkowitz and Lyombe Eko, “Blasphemy as Sacred Rite/Right: “The Mohammed Cartoons Affair” and Maintenance of Journalistic Ideology,” Journalism Studies 8, no. 5 (2007); Nasar Meer and Per 2 3

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

57

In the majority, these evaluations of press coverage have, although not universally, reached a common conclusion: there is an overwhelmingly negative narrative about Islam that predominates in the UK news media. The significance of this is not underestimated, with concerns expressed about Muslim participation in public life,7 Muslim exclusion from society8 and suggestions that negative media coverage may result in physical attacks on Muslims.9 In the last two decades, there has been an increase in coverage of religion in the UK news media and reports about Islam have been the single most significant determining factor in this increase.10 This growing pool of newspaper reports provides a rich seam of material for academic analysis. Alongside the news headlines, there is an increasing volume of scholarly literature exploring Islam and the news.11 While there was some literature exploring the relationship between Islam and the press

Mouritsen, “Political Cultures Compared: The Muhammad Cartoons in the Danish and British Press,” Ethnicities 9, no. 3 (2009). 7  O’Toole et al., Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. 8  Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims; “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context.”; Poole and Richardson, Muslims and the News Media; Allen, Islamophobia; Field, “Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls.”; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Uk Case Studies 2010; Laurens de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging. The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion,” Journal of Religion in Europe 10, no. 1–2 (2017). 9  Allen and Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the Eu after 11 September 2001. 10  Coverage of British Muslims in the British press increased year on year from 352 articles in 2000 to 2185 articles a year later. Coverage reached a peak of 4196 articles in 2006. By 2008, coverage had reduced to 3466 articles. Moore, Mason, and Lewis, “Images of Islam in the Uk: The Representation of British Muslims in the Nmational Press, 2000–2008”; Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press; Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims; Bleich et  al., Media Portrays of Minorities: Muslims in British Newspaper Headlines, 2001–2012. 11  Said, Orientalism; Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World; Poole, “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context.”; Poole and Richardson, Muslims and the News Media; ibid.; Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers; Field, “Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls.”; Moore, Mason, and Lewis, “Images of Islam in the Uk: The Representation of British Muslims in the Nmational Press, 2000–2008”; Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press; Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims; Kai Hafez, ed. Islam and the West in the Mass Media (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2000); A.  Saaed, “Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media,” Sociology Compass (2007); de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging. The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.”; Arthur Farouqui, Muslims and Media Images (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009); Tareq Y. Ismael and Andrew Rippin, eds., Islam in the Eyes of the West (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2010); Rusi Jaspal and Marco Cinnirella, “Coping with Potentially Incompatible Identities: Accounts of Religious, Ethnic, and Sexual Identities from British Pakistani Men Who Identify as Muslim and Gay,” British Journal of Social Psychology 49, no. 4 (2010).

58

C. Forbes

before the attacks of the 11th of September 2001,12 more academic interest followed media coverage appearing after the attacks on the USA and the subsequent attacks in London on the 7th of July 2005. Despite this sizeable canon of literature, Islam and the news media remains an emerging area of study,13 and, to date, much of the interest in this area has come from researchers primarily working within journalism or media studies. It is only more recent analyses that have begun to address specific quantitative or qualitative questions about different aspects of the representation of Muslims, or their religion, in the UK news media. These include a focus on the relationship between opinion polls, media reporting and Islamophobia,14 a discussion of Muslim participation in media debates15 and a study of Muslim participation in contemporary governance.16 While some of these discussions diverge from a media studies perspective, the focus remains overwhelmingly on the representation of Islam, with the associated challenges that this brings. The tendency to explore the relationship between Islam and media from a journalistic or media studies perspective means that some form of content analysis is a popular starting point, with such studies drawing similar conclusions about negative misrepresentations of Islam and Muslims in the UK media.17 Content analysis is conducted through an examination of a series of news reports published over a defined period of time with a critique of the overall depiction or representation of Islam that the copy, headline and accompanying images convey. The way in which the journalist has framed the news article may be categorised by the researcher in positive, negative or neutral terms, sometimes using

 Poole, “Framing Islam: An Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of Islam in the British Press”; Hafez, Islam and the West in the Mass Media; Said, Orientalism; Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. 13  C.  Aydin and J.  Hammer, “Muslims and Media: Perceptions, Participation and Change,” Contemporary Islam 4 (2010); Jaspal and Cinnirella, “Coping with Potentially Incompatible Identities: Accounts of Religious, Ethnic, and Sexual Identities from British Pakistani Men Who Identify as Muslim and Gay.”; Poole, “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context.”; de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging. The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.” 14  Field, “Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls.” 15  R. Spielhaus, “Media Making Muslims: The Construction of a Muslim Community in Germany through Media Debate,” Contemporary Islam 4 (2010). 16  O’Toole et al., Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. 17  Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press; Bleich et  al., Media Portrays of Minorities: Muslims in British Newspaper Headlines, 2001–2012; de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging. The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.”; Greater London Authority, The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the Uk Media; Moore, Mason, and Lewis, “Images of Islam in the Uk: The Representation of British Muslims in the Nmational Press, 2000–2008”; Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims; Poole and Richardson, Muslims and the News Media. 12

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

59

discourse analysis to associate Islam or Muslims with particular keywords or phrases.18 Using this method, Moore, Mason and Lewis19 conclude that just over one-third (36%) of stories in the British press about British Muslims overall are about terrorism, while two-thirds of articles present Islam as a threat to British society. Even coverage not specifically linked to an event such as a terrorist attack or act of conflict nevertheless depicts Islam as a problem or at odds with societal norms.20 This is illustrated by front page headlines such as ‘Muslims Force [Swimming] Pool Cover Up,’21 ‘Britain Has 85 Sharia Courts’22 or ‘Christmas Is Banned: It Offends Muslims,’23 all of which imply that Islam is in conflict with British traditions and values. Through his study of opinion polls exploring public attitudes towards Islam and Muslims,24 Field observes that public knowledge about Islam has increased over the years and that much of this knowledge has been gleaned from the media.25 Poole26 also identifies this as a theme emerging from media coverage. Prior to the 11th of September 2001, she describes ‘cultures of ignorance’ among media audiences but observes that Muslims are increasingly making their presence felt in the public sphere.27 Yet knowledge derived from media reporting is likely to conflate an association of Islam with threat, terror and conflict. There are conflicting outcomes here: while media coverage contributes to an increasing recognition and knowledge of Islam, the media’s cumulative message influences individuals’ actions and responses to Muslims, not necessarily in a positive

 Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press; Bleich et  al., Media Portrays of Minorities: Muslims in British Newspaper Headlines, 2001–2012; de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging. The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.”; Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers. 19  Moore, Mason, and Lewis, “Images of Islam in the Uk: The Representation of British Muslims in the Nmational Press, 2000–2008”. 20  de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging. The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.” 21  “(Muslims Force [Swimming] Pool Cover Up,” Daily Express, 26 July 2010, 1. 22  “Britain Has 85 Sharia Courts,” Daily Mail, 29 June 2009, 1. (their underlining) 23  “Christmas Is Banned: It Offends Muslims,” Daily Express, 2 November 2005, 1. 24  Field, “Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls.” 25  Sixty-four per cent of the population stated that what they know about Islam comes from the media. Allen, Islamophobia, 96. 26  Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims; “The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage.”; “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context.” 27  Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims, 84. 18

60

C. Forbes

way.28 Allen and Nielsen29 suggest a tangible impact, arguing that the media’s definition of what Muslims look like has led to acts of aggression or physical violence towards Muslims.30 The burgeoning academic literature discussing Islam and the media is accompanied by a growing canon of material with more practical intent, aimed at policymakers or others in positions of influence within the media. This material typically includes recommendations for ways of challenging or changing the representation of Islam in the press. This more practical approach, often based on analysis of existing media coverage, has preoccupied non-governmental organisations, political institutions and think tanks, all of which have an interest in the relationship between Islam and media,31 as well as Muslim groups.32 For some of these groups, their interest stems from social concerns about Islamophobia33 or is in response to the

 Focus groups on religion and the media described in Elizabeth Poole, Kim Knott, and Teemu Taira, “Religion in the British Media Today,” in Religion and the News (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012) indicated that viewers and readers were aware of Islamophobic representations and the fact that Islamic extremists were written about a great deal, but people found it difficult not to be influenced by such stories because there were so few positive ones that offered a different perspective. However, they also recognised that bad news stories tended to be viewed as having a higher news value than good news stories. 29  Allen and Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the Eu after 11 September 2001. 30  The Runnymede Trust coined the phrase ‘Islamophobia’ to describe the impact that this type of negative media narrative might have on the way Muslims and their faith are perceived more widely. The Trust identifies what it describes as ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views of Islam within the media and public discourse more widely, Conway and Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, 5. An open view sees Islam as diverse and dynamic with internal debates, interdependent with the West and different but equal. In contrast, a closed perspective is hostile, seeing Islam as monolithic, static, authoritarian, inferior and aggressive or as the enemy. 31  For example, see: ibid.; Bunglawala, “British Muslims and the Media.”; UNESCO, Media, Violence and Terrorism; Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, The Representation of Muslims in Public Discourse; British Council and University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies, Building a Shared Future: Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere; Greater London Authority, The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the Uk Media; The Pew Research Forum on Religion & Public Life, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population,” (2009), http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/Mapping-the-Global-­ Muslim-Population.aspx 32  For example, see: British Council and University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies, Building a Shared Future: Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere; SR Armeli et al., The British Media and Muslim Representation: The Ideology of Demonisation (London, UK: Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2007). 33  Conway and Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All; Bunglawala, “British Muslims and the Media.” 28

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

61

challenges of security,34 while others are responding to the increased focus on Islam and Muslims in the media and broader public sphere.35 Typically, the problem of negative or stereotypical media coverage of Islam is set out in these reports with recommendations for future change, which can include action by journalists or the creation of ‘media events’, such as roadshows or exhibitions about Islam. Thus, a working group convened by the Centre of Islamic Studies at Cambridge University concluded that ‘[g]reater efforts should be deployed [by journalists] to highlight the positive contributions of Muslims to the societies they live in, including in the areas of arts, entertainment, science and politics’,36 while the report commissioned by the mayor of London37 recommended that news organisations should review their coverage of issues and events relating to Muslims and Islam and should consider drawing up codes of professional conduct and style guides of terminology.38 Similarly, the British Muslim Media Guide, published jointly by the British Council and the Association of Muslim Social Scientists,39 focuses on addressing journalistic ignorance and misunderstandings about Islam. The guide, which contains sections on Muslim finance, sharia law, mosques and the place of women in Islam, states it is responding to the need for a clear, dispassionate explanation of who British Muslims are, what they care about and what they do. A short section on Muslim public relations activity cites the launch of the Muslim Parliament 14 years prior as an example of good PR by a Muslim group.40 In the same way, non-profit organisation Soliya, which works with the United National Alliance of Civilisations, collaborated with representatives of Muslim organisations to address the question of how the media specifically can be used to promote better Muslim–non-Muslim relations. The conclusion was that developing a new discourse on Islam and Muslims requires the joint efforts of politicians, policymakers and scholars as well as thought and religious leaders, civil society organisations, business representatives and the media.

 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, The Representation of Muslims in Public Discourse. 35  UNESCO, Media, Violence and Terrorism; British Council and University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies, Building a Shared Future: Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere; Greater London Authority, The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the Uk Media. 36  British Council and University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies, Building a Shared Future: Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere, 3. 37  Greater London Authority, The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the Uk Media. 38  Ibid., 133. 39  E Masood, “British Muslims: Media Guide London: The British Council,” (2006). 40  Ibid., 58. This publication also contains a section on Muslim media which details Muslim newspapers, magazines and websites active in the UK. Ibid., 48. 34

62

C. Forbes

2 Islam and Politics If the increased coverage of Muslims in the UK press has generated greater awareness of Islam among the public,41 it has also served to highlight Muslims' political as well as religious identity. As media coverage of Islam has increased following the events of the 11th of September 2001, the literature that analyses it has begun to recognise the political implications of a continuous and negative narrative for Muslims in the UK.42 As outlined above, political and other public agencies have also begun to consider the implications for Muslims and for society. These are social and political analyses, not theological ones. Alongside the ongoing association of Muslims with terror, conflict and violence, other issues pertinent to religious identity, such as the hijab43 or mosque building, have also become political issues. Poole44 points out that a continual association of Muslims with immigration, sometimes as illegal immigrants or those seeking unwarranted asylum, positions them as a drain on resources, as importing alien values and practices to the UK and, therefore, as a threat to mainstream British values. The prominence of the keyword ‘counterterrorism’ in relation to the words ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’ in press coverage45 also serves to associate religion with political issues of national security. Currently, Islam and politics are irreparably intertwined: the ongoing framing of

 Field, “Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls.”  Allen, Islamophobia; Poole, “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context.”; Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2013); British Council and University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies, Building a Shared Future: Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere; de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging. The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.” 43  For example, in a column for the newspaper local to his constituency, The Lancashire Telegraph, Home Secretary Jack Straw described how he asked a Muslim constituent to lift her veil during a conversation in his surgery. He wrote that he told the woman: ‘in particular about my concern that wearing the full veil was bound to make better, positive relations between the two communities more difficult. It was such a visible statement of separation and of difference.’ Jack Straw, “I Felt Uneasy Talking to Someone I Couldn’t See,” The Guardian, 6 October. Although the piece, which was reproduced in several national newspapers, went on to say that the woman lifted her veil without demur and a constructive conversation was had, the concerns expressed within it triggered a series of aggressive and outraged headlines about Muslims that appeared under the aegis of reflecting the country’s mood with regard to the presence of Muslim communities. “Straw’s Veil Comments Spark Anger”, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5410472.stm. In a study commissioned by the mayor of London, researchers found that, following Jack Straw’s comments, a woman wearing a full-face veil became a symbol in the media for Islam generally, and, at one stage, even for all people from ethnic minority backgrounds. Greater London Authority, The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the Uk Media, 12. 44  Poole, “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context.” 45  Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press. 41 42

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

63

Islam within politics in the UK media sets the conditions in which Islam has to be thought about in political, rather than social or theological, terms by media audiences. The political nature of media coverage about Islam opens up research exploring the broader relationship between the news media and the political field and the processes and interactions that characterise that relationship. This research goes on to examine the nature of PR practice as a tool for managing the relationship between political institutions and the press and the characteristics and expertise that PR practitioners bring to the role. It concludes by examining the political positioning of Islam and Muslims in the UK to reveal how effectively Muslim groups are positioned to be able to use PR to challenge or change news coverage. The starting point for the research is the theory of mediatisation: the emerging theory of the process of social change and the capacity of the media to effect that change. Mediatisation provides a way of exploring media power and the process of its interaction with society and culture.46 Mediatisation refers to the long-term process of changing social institutions and modes of interactions in culture and society due to the growing importance of media in all strands of society.47 Mediatisation is the process whereby society is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic to an increasing degree. This process is characterised by a duality in that the media have become integrated into the operations of other social institutions while they have also acquired the status of social institutions in their own right. As a consequence, social interaction, within the respective institutions, between institutions and in society at large, takes place via the media.48 Lundby49 defines mediatisation as the process of social change that, to some extent, subsumes entire social or cultural fields into the logic of the media. Like Hjarvard, Lundby suggests that, as a result of mediatisation, media are not only an independent institution but also become an integrated part of other institutions, such as politics, religion or the family. Media logic has been described as a crucial driving mechanism behind and within the processes of mediatisation and central to understanding both the emergence of independent media institutions and the adaptation of society to the

 Stig Hjarvard, “The Mediatization of Religion: A Theory of the Media as Agents of Religious Change,” Northern Lights: Film & Media Studies Yearbook 6, no. 1 (2008); The Mediatization of Culture and Society (London, UK  – New  York, NY: Routledge, 2013); Knut Lundby, ed. Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2009); Jesper Strömbäck and Frank Esser, “Shaping Politics: Mediatization and Media Interventionism,” in Mediatization Concepts, Changes, Consequences ed. Knut Lundby (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2009); F Krotz, “Mediatization: Aconcept with Which to Grasp Media and Societal Change in the Uk,” in Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences, ed. Knut Lundby (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2009); Andreas Hepp, Cultures of Mediatization (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013). 47  Krotz, “Mediatization: Aconcept with Which to Grasp Media and Societal Change in the Uk.” 48  Stig Hjarvard, “The Mediatization of Society. Atheory of the Media as Agents of Social and Cultural Change,” Nordicom review 29, no. 2 (2008): 113. (his italics). 49  Lundby, Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences. 46

64

C. Forbes

changing media environment.50 Altheide and Snow51 were the first to use the term media logic to identify a particular form of communication  – a process through which media present and transmit information. Altheide and Snow’s concept of media logic has evolved into a broader set of definitions, all of which articulate how the media’s own format and needs, rather than that of other social subsystems, take precedence and guide the media and their coverage. Included within the scope of media logic are the practical and tangible matters of form and presentation, including technological and production requirements and less palpable filters and rules about interpreting social, cultural and political phenomena.52 These interpretations include criteria for newsworthiness, novelty, immediacy and conflict as well as commercial appeal and viability. Media logic can be identified in the various media formats, production processes and routines that the media adhere to as well as in the need for compelling stories that shape how the media interpret and cover public affairs. It covers both the structural environment that journalists work in and cultural factors, such as journalistic attitudes and their repertoire of media formats and grammar, professional norms and values and commercial incentives and motives. For Hjarvard, these are formal and informal rules, for Schrott they are filters and Strömbäck and Esser describe media logic as the component parts that contribute to media presentation. However, as defined by Asp, media logic acts as a constraint by providing an overall structure that shapes the behaviour of those who come into contact with it.53 Conversely, it also provides certainty, enabling the efficient production of news suitable for a particular audience.

3 Mediatisation of Politics The concept of media logic first and foremost occurred in studies of the mediatisation of politics,54 suggesting that the media exercise a level of control over the public political agenda through the operation of media logic. Politics is not independent of  Altheide and Snow, Media Logic; Hjarvard, “The Mediatization of Religion: A Theory of the Media as Agents of Religious Change.”; Andrea Schrott, “Dimensions: Catch-All Label or Technical Term,” in Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences, ed. Knut Lundby (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2009); Strömbäck and Esser, “Shaping Politics: Mediatization and Media Interventionism.”; Kent Asp, “News Media Logic in a New Institutional Perspective,” Journalism Studies 15, no. 3 (2014). 51  Altheide and Snow, Media Logic. 52  Hjarvard, “The Mediatization of Religion: A Theory of the Media as Agents of Religious Change.”; Schrott, “Dimensions: Catch-All Label or Technical Term.”; Strömbäck and Esser, “Shaping Politics: Mediatization and Media Interventionism.” 53  Asp, “News Media Logic in a New Institutional Perspective.” 54  For example, see: Gianpietro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz, “‘Mediatization’ of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?,” Political communication 16, no. 3 (1999); Winfried Schulz, “Reconstructing Mediatization as an Analytical Concept,” European journal of communication 19, no. 1 (2004); Hjarvard, “The Mediatization of Religion: A Theory of the Media as Agents of 50

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

65

media coverage; in fact, what the media present as politics is partly the consequence of the conditions set by mass media. The political system itself is mediatised, that is, highly influenced by and adjusted to the demands of mass media and the way the media report on politics.55 One way in which media logic operates is through the adaptation of political communication to meet the production demands of the media, for example, through the use of soundbites and other techniques that make politics televisual. Here, mediatisation is not just about communicating political performance or aspirations but about the incorporation of media-based logics and norms into political action. At the extreme, media have the potential to change the nature of what politics is because of the requirement for policy to be explainable and defensible within the constraints of media formats.56 The media can change how politics operates, for example, by changing the timing, format or arrangement of political events or how politicians speak and express their views.57 Kepplinger’s study58 of the interdependencies between politics and mass media in Germany over five decades demonstrates how politics has not only adapted to the media but, in some respects, has become subservient to it. Kepplinger concludes that the mediatisation of the German Parliament’s work had remarkable consequences for the size and activities of the government apparatus. He identifies feedback loops in which media coverage changed the way in which events were arranged or statements were constructed by politicians. The increasing importance of media has both established politicians and journalists as dominating forces in the process of political communication.59 Yet, the media hold the upper hand, with the political system forced to accept the media’s criteria of success largely because of the media’s ability to sway the formation of public opinion. These findings are supported by Van Noije, Kleinnijenhuis and Oegema’s study of media and parliamentary agendas in

Religious Change.”; Strömbäck and Esser, “Shaping Politics: Mediatization and Media Interventionism.”; Schrott, “Dimensions: Catch-All Label or Technical Term.”; Jesper Strömbäck and Daniela V Dimitrova, “Mediatization and Media Interventionism: A Comparative Analysis of Sweden and the United States,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 16, no. 1 (2011). 55  Mazzoleni and Schulz, “‘Mediatization’ of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?.”; Schulz, “Reconstructing Mediatization as an Analytical Concept.”; Hans Mathias Kepplinger, “Mediatization of Politics: Theory and Data,” Journal of communication 52, no. 4 (2002); Schulz, “Reconstructing Mediatization as an Analytical Concept.”; Strömbäck and Esser, “Shaping Politics: Mediatization and Media Interventionism.”; Schrott, “Dimensions: Catch-All Label or Technical Term.”; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, “Mediatization and Media Interventionism: A Comparative Analysis of Sweden and the United States.” 56  Kepplinger, “Mediatization of Politics: Theory and Data.” 57  A. Davis, “Public Relations, News Production and the Changing Patterns of Access in the British National Media,” Media Culture Society 22, no. 1 (2000); Public Relations Democracy: Public Relations, Politics and the Mass Media in Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); Strömbäck and Dimitrova, “Mediatization and Media Interventionism: A Comparative Analysis of Sweden and the United States.” 58  Kepplinger, “Mediatization of Politics: Theory and Data.” 59  Ibid., 983.

66

C. Forbes

both the Netherlands and the UK.60 The results of their longitudinal study of newspaper coverage of parliamentary debates in both countries show that media and parliamentary agendas influence each other but that the balance of power has shifted in favour of the media agenda.

4 Public Relations and Politics One response to the increasing mediatisation of politics has been a parallel growth in public relations, the practice by which institutions seek to use the media to shape their reputation and influence public opinion and behaviour.61 The associations between public relations and politics are very strong and the growth of PR as a profession is linked with recent political history, such as Bill Clinton’s 1992 US presidential campaign or the Labour Party’s 1997 general election campaign in the UK. These events, supported by the prominence of political communicators such as Alistair Campbell or Bernard Ingham, have helped to establish PR as a profession, albeit one that has now grown far beyond the political field. Despite this, the role of PR practitioners has often been dismissed or skirted over by literature exploring the relationship between politics and the media, with PR practitioners categorised merely as ‘government officials’62 and their work described as ‘public information’.63 One exception to this is Edwards,64 who centres her research on a practice that is explicitly identified as public relations and, in doing so, explores the availability of social and cultural capital to PR agents. PR practitioners seek to use the media to shape the reputation of the institutions they represent and to influence public opinion and behaviour. For the PR practitioner, media logic provides the opportunity to shape messages and content in a way that conforms to the media’s requirements exactly, increasing the likelihood of favourable journalistic attention. Conversely, it also offers a route for avoiding, or  Lonneke Van Noije, Jan Kleinnijenhuis, and Dirk Oegema, “Loss of Parliamentary Control Due to Mediatization and Europeanization: A Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Analysis of Agenda Building in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,” British Journal of Political Science 38, no. 3 (2008). 61  Research by the Cardiff School of Journalism shows that 41% of news stories in four British broadsheets contained PR materials that played an agenda-setting role or made up the bulk of the story. Justin Matthew Wren Lewis et  al., The Quality and Independence of British Journalism (Cardiff, UK: Cardiff School of Journalism, Media, and Cultural Studies, 2008). 62  Kepplinger, “Mediatization of Politics: Theory and Data.”; Michael Schudson, The Sociology of News (Contemporary Sociology) (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2003). 63  The Power of News (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 64  Lee Edwards, “Rethinking Power in Public Relations,” Public relations review 32, no. 3 (2006); “Pr Practitioners’ Cultural Capital: An Initial Study and Implications for Research and Practice,” Public relations review 34, no. 4 (2008); “Symbolic Power and Public Relations Practice: Locating Individual Practitioners in Their Social Context,” Journal of Public Relations Research 21, no. 3 (2009). 60

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

67

minimising, the likelihood of media attention. By acting counter to the media’s logic, often in practical ways that make it difficult for the media to receive or replicate information, PR practitioners can seek to keep information out of the headlines.65 The concept of media logic opens the possibility of a parallel PR logic, which acts as a bridge between the political field and the media, enabling political institutions to approach and communicate with the media on the media’s own terms. Such a logic could assist the process of mediatisation by enabling institutions that sponsor PR practice to accommodate the logic of the media without being subsumed by it. This logic operates through the activity of the PR practitioner who applies filters to potential media content before entering into the media space and negotiating directly with the journalist. Such filtering can have a significant effect on the PR institution and the way in which it operates. It is not a practice that occurs outside the sponsoring institution but within it. Thus, the PR practitioner can change the way in which their sponsor institution operates, shaping their activity as well as their presentation of that activity in accordance with the logic of the media. The power of the media to construct and perpetuate narratives justifies the need for such a practitioner: without the filters provided by public relations, such content risks falling short of the demands of media logic. This failure to conform with the demands of the media could apply to the nature of the content – not newsworthy enough – or the production of it. In fulfilling this role, the PR agent does not replicate media logic but substitutes it. While they have a role to play in filtering potential content according to the demands of media logic, they are also required to accommodate the logic of their sponsor institution and represent this in negotiations with the journalist. The interaction is a negotiation whereby the practitioner is required to conform to the logic of the media while maintaining the meaning of the message from their sponsor.

5 Methodology Using this theoretical basis, the fieldwork for this research sought to achieve two things: first, to examine the relationship between public relations and the political field and, second, to explore how Muslim groups and the individuals representing them are positioned within the political field and the extent to which they are using PR practice to challenge or change types of media coverage. The fieldwork took place in two parts and, in total, comprised 31 interviews with PR practitioners – most of whom worked or had experience working in the political field – and individuals representing Muslim groups or undertaking public relations on behalf of Muslim groups or organisations in the UK. The research began with  For example, the phrase ‘a good day to bury bad news’ is now shorthand for the way in which PR practitioners time their announcements to reduce the likelihood of media coverage. By releasing information to the press after deadline or when another story is dominating news coverage, PR practitioners can hope to circumvent media logic and avoid negative publicity. 65

68

C. Forbes

interviews with PR practitioners in order to build an understanding of how PR operates within the political field, followed by interviews with representatives of Muslim groups. All the interviews were generated by snowball sampling and comprised a minimum of a 45-minute semi-structured discussion. The research used field theory66 as a methodology for examining the nature and characteristics of the political field and the positioning of different agents within it. Field theory views society as a number of structured spaces, known as fields, with their own rules and laws of functioning. Bourdieu describes a field as a social universe (e.g., politics, economics, education or journalism), usually forgotten or ignored, in which social agents, as well as the institutions that support them, exist.67 Fields are semi-autonomous from the wider social space and it is the connection and struggle between fields, and between the individual agents within fields, that influence dynamics of power and change within society. The study of a field involves an examination of the relationships within the field, both between individual agents and between agents and the structures that exist within the field. In particular, field theory provides a route to examine the role of individuals within the context of a particular social space and understand their actions within that space and in relation to other spaces. To achieve this, the theory looks at the access to capital for individuals and how they utilise that capital to establish their respective positions within that space.

6 Fieldwork Among Public Relations Practitioners The fieldwork among PR practitioners was designed to generate an understanding of how public relations works within the political field. To attain this, the interviews sought to ascertain practitioners’ positioning within the political field, the nature of their PR practice and the skills and characteristics they brought to their role. This was achieved by examining the power and capital that PR practitioners possess and the relationships they utilise as a demonstration of that power. The fieldwork revealed that PR practitioners were situated throughout the political field and that their position was contingent on who they were working for or representing. Those who were working on behalf of political institutions or politicians nearer to the centre of the political field were positioned correspondingly and the authority held at the centre of the field was conferred on the PR practitioner.

 H. K. Anheier, J. Gerhards, and F. P. Romo, “Forms of Capital and Social Structure in Cultural Fields: Examining Bourdieu’s Social Topography,” American Journal of Sociology 100, no. 4 (1995); Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 1984); “The Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. J. Richardson (Greenword Press, 1986); The Logic of Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); The Field of Cultural Production (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1993). 67  The Field of Cultural Production. 66

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

69

According to the narratives that they themselves have developed, PR practitioners successfully exerted power and control over the news media and within their institutions. This, they suggested, largely worked to everyone’s benefit and reinforced the need for their endeavours. Thus, a PR practitioner working at the centre of the political field, No 10 Downing Street, would be able to use authority not only to influence press officers across Whitehall but exert control over other officials through them. The results of the fieldwork demonstrated the high levels of social and cultural capital and the power that practitioners possess. Those interviewed were highly educated, articulate and able to converse about a range of subjects. Education was deemed important but having the ability to manage relationships through good interpersonal skills and good contacts was more important than particular educational credentials. The importance of managing relationships included the capability to relate to senior people, including government ministers, and being the ‘right fit’ was considered particularly important. Practitioners brought a confidence and assurance to their role, borne out of their high level of education and a keen interest and curiosity in the world around them. This enabled them to exert their relationship-building skills, and the scope of their professional networks extended both to the very heart of the political field and to the very top ranks of the institutions they worked for. Even those practitioners not situated at the very centre of the field were well positioned in comparison with other agents as a result of their access to the most senior decision-makers in their sponsor institutions. At the same time, the nature of their role provided them with unrivalled opportunity to speak on behalf of government ministers or senior executives, often putting words into their mouths. PR practitioners’ confidence and self-assurance meant that they were often more practised at articulating their institution’s points of view than more senior executives, and part of their role was to control and script the latter’s media exposure. Practitioners positioned themselves as their institution’s best player in the game between politics and the media. Without the benefit of their direction, and the logic that shaped their influence, their institution would flounder in its attempts to manage relationships with journalists and the press. As such, PR practitioners act as a gateway, controlling access to information and sources and communicating data in a way that conforms with the logic of the media. The PR practitioner sits at the hub of a multiplicity of relationships, translating, persuading and corralling others to act in certain ways. These relationships came from networks within and outside their sponsor institutions and inevitably revolved around the practitioner’s role. For example, networks were based around other professionals who could contribute to the practitioner’s success, either through the provision of information or funding or by providing access to people in more senior positions. Networks outside the sponsor organisations included journalists, and, again, these were seen as useful contacts who could be persuaded or influenced to write positive press articles or features. More difficult relationships, such as with individuals or groups critical of the sponsor organisation, had to be minimised, with the influence of these critics diminished and, as far as possible, the critics themselves pushed towards the far edges of the field.

70

C. Forbes

The interviews revealed the different skills, characteristics and networks that PR practitioners used to manage the press by creating new media narratives and challenging existing ones. Power, often conferred by the relationships and networks that the practitioners hold, was central to them performing their role effectively, as PR practitioners sought not only to influence the news media but also the very institutions they represented. It is through this that PR logic is utilised: positive media narratives will not emerge from an institution that does not adapt to the demands of the media, and, conversely, journalists may be reliant on the access to information that the PR practitioner provides.

7 Interviews with Representatives of Muslim Groups With this understanding of the nature of PR practice within the political field, the research went on to establish to what extent this practice is being used by those seeking to challenge or change existing media narratives about Islam. Fieldwork took place among representatives of Muslim groups and organisations that seek to advocate, represent or progress the interests of the Muslim community(ies) or the Muslim faith within the UK and, in some instances, internationally. These groups include think tanks, broadcasters, commercial businesses, academic organisations and membership bodies. Most of those interviewed did not define their role as doing public relations, nor was this their job title. None had a big team or department behind them, and several worked alone in their particular role. However, they acknowledged that their responsibilities included representing the particular group they worked for, or their faith more broadly, to different audiences, including the government, other politicians and the media. With one exception, all interviewees positioned themselves directly within the political field through their description of the work that they undertook.68 This positioning frequently came from experience working with the government on issues relating to security and counterterrorism, and these were familiar topics to all interviewees. For some, their experience of security and counterterrorism was secondary, but related to, issues such as Islamophobia, immigration or equality. Others had played a central role in advising government ministers on policy or engagement with Muslim communities as part of the government’s counterterrorism strategy. Many of the interviewees’ involvement in the political field began after the attacks that took place on the 11th of September 2001, and the 7th of July 2005. These events, as well as the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in South London in May

 This level of political engagement is growing across the Muslim community according to a report on Muslim participation in governance, which argues that Muslim activism has successfully provided opportunities for Muslims to enter and engage with the political field. O’Toole et  al., Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. 68

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

71

2013,69 provided a common frame of reference that all interviewees referred to. While the perspective of interviewees varied, all approached the discussion through the lens of the prevention of terrorism (known in the government of the day as the Prevent Strategy) and the response of the Muslim community(ies) to various central or local government initiatives. This was the case even when the interviewee’s expertise was not directly connected to the Prevent Strategy; inevitably, they approached a discussion of their specialist area through a Prevent lens. Interviewees’ familiarity with the political field was evident as they were able to describe in detail their engagement with government ministers and civil servants through taking part in meetings or work on particular projects and initiatives. Often, the level of engagement and experience of the political field that was described was significant, as interviewees related stories about disagreements between different personalities in government or errors that had been made in decision-making or in the implementation of government policy. These anecdotes, sometimes retold with a degree of astonishment on the interviewee’s part, suggested a level of personal participation in the political field but also a sense that the interviewee was an observer within the field, and, on occasion, an involuntary victim of the mistake or disagreement rather than a direct participant. While nearly all interviewees had experience of operating within the political field, they were not fully embedded in that field; they were often seen as outsiders, reliant on the cooperation of other political agents to be able to participate. The isolation that some interviewees experienced within the political field stemmed, in part, from diminished levels of capital in comparison to other agents within the same field. Identified as ‘different’ and with different priorities and ways of operating, the networks that other agents in the political field utilised successfully were not as available, or were less relevant, to those working for Muslim groups. In contrast, interviewees suggested that they had greater networks among the Muslim communities in the UK. The interviews revealed characteristics that seemed to sit at odds with the dominant characteristics of the UK political field. Their focus was as much on experiences of Muslims outside the political field as on other agents within the political field. One or more interviewees spoke of the drive for publicity and self-promotion within the political field, aligning themselves instead with a preference to get the job done properly and find solutions rather than soundbites. The interviews revealed a motivation among interviewees to change the current situation and often a strong personal drive to do so. At the same time, they were realistic about the scale of the task, describing the outsider status that was prevalent within the Muslim community(ies). This outsider status was not necessarily something that they appeared to relate to as individuals, and they sometimes expressed confusion or bemusement at the behaviour of media or political agents who they came into contact with. Interviewees expressed a strong sense of awareness of diversity, not only in their own community(ies) but in others too, and they stated a willingness to work  Tony McEnery, Mark McGlashan, and Robbie Love, “Press and Social Media Reaction to Ideologically Inspired Murder: The Case of Lee Rigby,” Discourse & Communication 9, no. 2 (2015). 69

72

C. Forbes

with others to achieve joint goals. This contrasted with their sense of frustration at working within the political field, where their collaboration was not reciprocated in the way that they might have hoped for. Despite having stated aims of driving engagement and understanding about Islam, several interviewees suggested that Muslim organisations had not been wholly effective at bringing this forward. Partly, this was because of the huge diversity within the Muslim community(ies), but it was also due to grassroots activism and the work and lifestyle of individual Muslims being seen as more effective. Some suggested that the way forward was to encourage civic and political participation, engagement and debate among ordinary Muslims. Others talked about the need to develop young leaders within the Muslim community(ies) who are adept at negotiating their way through the structures of civic and political life. Such leaders would need adequate political, cultural and social capital, with the right networks and contacts to enable them to be positioned as new entrants to the political field. Without such leaders entering the political field, it would be difficult for others to follow. The fieldwork revealed three main responses to questions about the extent to which PR practice was or could be used to challenge existing media narratives about Islam and Muslims. While all interviewees acknowledged that existing media narratives were often negative, attitudes to PR activity varied considerably. The first response was a lack of familiarity about the nature of public relations practice. Some interviewees sought clarification, asking what was meant by the term or conflating it with paid for advertising. This reaction may not be unusual among people who are not PR practitioners, but all of the interviewees were active in representing their group or organisation to the media. Even those interviewees who were unfamiliar with the term public relations were involved in managing relationships with the press. The lack of familiarity with PR sits in contrast with the wider political field, where PR is recognised as a necessary enabler for politicians to communicate with the public. A second response to PR was to dismiss it as irrelevant to Islam and narratives about it. While some interviewees revealed a lack of familiarity with PR practice, the language and concepts of narrative and discourse were very familiar to all. Interviewees spoke at length about media narrative and framing, suggesting that certain themes about security, equality or cohesion originated from within the political field. Interviewees demonstrated an in-depth knowledge of the Prevent Strategy and the government’s position and activity around it but did not identify the mechanisms by which Prevent policies and activity had been communicated. The role of PR in developing or promoting these narratives was not acknowledged, even when interviewees acknowledged the existence of media interviews, speeches or press announcements about Prevent. Similarly, the process for developing new narratives about Islam was discussed in several interviews, but, when challenged, interviewees were less clear about how such narratives should be disseminated, suggesting that this was a role for someone else to fulfil. This suggests a reluctance to engage with PR within the political field at all  – perhaps ironically, because it is seen as too political. The interviewees implied a preference for staying at the edge of the political field, responding to events that occur within it from the side-lines rather than moving closer to the centre of the field.

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

73

The third response recognised the role of PR but suggested that its role was limited because the actions of individual Muslims could be more important. Here, interviewees acknowledged the importance of ensuring that journalists checked their facts before writing a story about Islam or the Muslim community(ies) but emphasised that community engagement was more essential. Interviewees did not name PR activity or engagement with the media as a useful means of demonstrating credibility or authenticity and, instead, felt that activity to change or improve the perception of Islam was best approached in other fields, through engagement of individuals in local communities rather than political activity. The interviews revealed that, while Muslim groups and organisations are drawn into the political field, the techniques and tactics of PR  were not being widely adopted to influence or change their positioning within it. Those interviewed were not using PR techniques, or PR logic, to engage with the political field and, in some cases, did not acknowledge a need for it. Some interviewees explicitly rejected the need for PR practice in this context. The need to change the prevailing media narratives about Islam was widely shared among interviewees, some of whom suggested that the best way to tackle it was to have a debate within the Muslim community itself rather than within other fields. The interviewees were clear about the scale of the challenge in front of them and identified different ways forward within the Muslim community itself. Rather than pinpoint solutions specific to the political field, interviewees suggested that it would be more effective for Muslims to affect change within their own professional or other fields through their everyday lives and actions. While acknowledging that individual Muslims should become more politically active, interviewees did not go so far as to suggest that they needed to access the types of social and cultural capital necessary to become powerful agents within the political field. The people who took part in the fieldwork did not identify PR as a useful way forward.  From the perspective of PR logic, this diminishes the opportunity to use PR practice to drive change within Muslim institutions or to cross between fields. While there are other ways to build greater understanding and empathy between fields than through public relations alone, the overwhelming concern about media narratives around Islam and the significance of PR within the political field suggests that, without effective PR practice and logic, this may be harder to achieve.

8 Conclusion Bourdieu uses the phrase ‘playing the game’ to describe the behaviours demanded of actors within specific social fields: an actor needs to compete according to the rules of the particular field in order to succeed.70 The game played between media

 Pierre Bourdieu, “Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field,” Comparative Social Research 12, no. 1 (1994). 70

74

C. Forbes

and politics is one where power is exchanged; the media seek to report that which is most novel, contentious or significant, and the politicians seek to influence media reporting that will enhance their reputation with the electorate. For the game to take place, the news media must play by the rules of the political field by acknowledging its symbolic power and authority within society. At the same time, politicians must play by the rules of the news media, adapting their presentation of policy and decision-­making to conform to the media’s criteria for compelling and commercially viable news. According to the theory of mediatisation, while both sides are powerful, the upper hand in the game is with the media. The media’s dominance over the political field submits politics to its rules to a greater extent than politicians are reciprocally able to control the press. Yet, while both sides publicly assert their independence and autonomy, the real secret to the game is that, behind the scenes, the two sides are interdependent. The media rely on accurate briefings and reliable information sources for a steady stream of news, and politicians are dependent on the oxygen of good publicity to maintain their visibility and credibility with the wider public. In this, the media logic inherent in mediatisation is translated and extended into a logic contained within PR practice. Media logic cannot provide a steady stream of reliable news to feed a 24/7 news cycle. In this, the news media rely on the way PR works within institutions and, more widely, within fields, which construct and disseminate their own narratives to conform to the logic of the media. However, not everyone involved in politics chooses to play the game. The fieldwork conducted among representatives of Muslim groups operating within the political field demonstrates how, despite their presence within this field, many are observers rather than participants. Yet, even though they may be situated at the edge of the game, they are not invisible as observers. Instead, they are drawn ever closer into the field through an increasingly embedded media narrative associating Islam with the politics of central government in the UK. PR practitioners have shown themselves to be some of the most expert players of the game between politics and the news media. Their presence on the playing field makes for a smoother and more equally matched encounter; they counter the dominance of the media; assert the value of the institutions they represent and ensure effective communication between the two. Their role is to manage the relationships between the different players on the field for the ultimate benefit of all. By supplying a steady stream of news and information, PR practitioners help to assuage the media’s demands while helping to shape and build the reputation of their sponsor organisation. PR practitioners are able to achieve this because their skill as expert players rests not only on their ability to develop tangible resources for the media to use but also on the scope and breadth of their relationships across the area of play. Their intervention makes the game more complex and more nuanced, but, without their presence on the field, those relationships would fracture, and the media would return to dominance. The fieldwork with representatives of Muslim groups suggests that PR is not yet being used to the full in relationships with the press. The results of the interviews suggest that this is because they are not 'playing the game' characteristic of the political field. Instead, their focus is divided between the demands of the media and

3  Politics, Public Relations and Islam in the UK Public Sphere

75

politics and those of the communities they represent. These separate interests rarely appear to coincide, operating in different social spheres, with diverse priorities, networks and sources of power and capital available to them. Some remain unconvinced of the merits of playing the political game at all, arguing that their community(ies) are better represented by individual Muslims engaging with other fields as part of everyday life. However, whether Muslim groups take part or not, the game goes on, and, according to the theory of mediatisation, it is becoming ever more intense.

Chapter 4

Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological Perspective on Islamophobia Samuel Fairlamb and Marco Cinnirella

Within Social Psychology, considerable attention has been dedicated to the subject of prejudice, with a smaller literature exploring Islamophobic prejudice. Social psychologists have looked towards producing several general models of prejudice, all of which have garnered their own critics and supporters. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the advantages of an integrative theoretical approach drawing upon Social Identity Theory (SIT),1 Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT),2 Essentialism,3 Social Representations Theory (SRT),4 and Terror Management Theory (TMT)5 to explore the antecedents of Islamophobia and its rising prevalence in many Western nations. We believe that using an approach that extorts the benefits of multiple perspectives will provide a more comprehensive overview to prejudice than any single approach could offer.6 Placed at the heart of this approach is the role of existential motivation outlined by TMT. The decision to place TMT at the centre may not be met with universal acceptance by Social Psychologists. Other competing theories address the issue of similar epistemic and existential motives such as uncertainty and need for meaning,

 Tajfel and Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Inter Group Behavior.”  Stephan, Stephan, and Oskamp, “An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice.” 3  Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst, “Essentialist Beliefs About Social Categories.” 4  Moscovici, “On Social Representations.” 5  Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski, “Terror Management Theory of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews: Empirical Assessments and Conceptual Refinements.” 6  Cinnirella, “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory.” 1 2

S. Fairlamb (*) · M. Cinnirella Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_4

77

78

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

although TMT may well be equipped to address these motives too.7 However, TMT is deployed here above those theories for a few reasons. First, TMT emphasises the importance of death awareness, which can directly address the impact of terrorism on Islamophobia. Second, TMT may be particularly equipped to explore special cases of social identity, such as the nation, where one’s group is eternal. Third, TMT offers understanding as to how conflict and prejudice can escalate (and how therefore it might be de-escalated). As such it is our belief that TMT offers unique insight into prejudices such as Islamophobia. We will first briefly outline the central claims to TMT and how other socio-psychological theories may complement TMT’s theorising.

1 Terror Management Theory TMT is derived from the works of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker8 and starts with two simple observations. Firstly, humans are similar to animals in that there is an innate drive for self-preservation. Secondly, humans differ from animals by having presumably unique cognitive abilities such as self-awareness. Whilst these capacities have been advantageous to humans, they also present a conflict since they permit knowledge about the inevitability of death. This juxtaposition between the human-animal and the unique-human creates the potential for paralyzing terror in the knowledge that self-preservation cannot be achieved. TMT proposes that humans manage this terror by developing and maintaining a dual-component anxiety buffer: (a) faith in a cultural worldview that permits a sense of meaning, order and permanence to the nature of reality and (b) a set of morals and standards within this worldview that individuals should live up to in order to achieve a sense of personal value. By doing so, individuals can believe that some aspect of themselves will continue after death, either literally (e.g., religious beliefs promise an afterlife) or symbolically (e.g., children, achievements, affiliation to causes and groups). In other words, TMT proposes that motives of meaning and self-esteem (as well as other motives), at least in part, derive from and defend against this potential death anxiety.9

 For alternative views on the subject see: Kees Van den Bos, “Making Sense of Life: The Existential Self Trying to Deal with Personal Uncertainty,” Psychological Inquiry 20, no. 4 (2009); Steven J Heine, Travis Proulx, and Kathleen D Vohs, “The Meaning Maintenance Model: On the Coherence of Social Motivations,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, no. 2 (2006). 8  Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1973). 9  for a thorough overview see: Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski, “Terror Management Theory of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews: Empirical Assessments and Conceptual Refinements.” 7

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

79

2 An Integrative Terror Management Approach SIT proposes that knowledge of group membership becomes an important aspect of one’s self-concept, which can be an important basis for self-esteem. Thus, individuals are motivated to enhance and maintain self-esteem by making favourable comparisons about one’s own group in comparison to other groups (e.g., in-group biases10). Studies have supported this, showing that making favourable intergroup comparisons can enhance self-esteem, whilst lower self-esteem is reported when this opportunity is denied.11 Moreover, when self-esteem has been threatened, derogating out-groups can re-affirm a positive self-image.12 These SIT processes have even been observed in settings where group membership has been determined on trivial criteria.13 Thus, the tendency to favour one’s own group over another seems endemic. Extending SIT, Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT)14 suggests that categorisation of the self (as well as others) into groups produces context-dependent cognitive representations of individuals based on their salient group membership that is defined by the group prototype. These prototypes form a set of attributes that characterise group members predicating an understanding of group member behaviour, beliefs, values, and attitudes. As such, prototypes maximise the intra-group similarities and inter-group differences, promoting SIT phenomena. Of course, all groups vary by the amount to which they can offer a clear, unambiguous prototype and the extent to which this may determine group behaviour. This is not only likely to differ from group to group, but also from individual to individual. We would suggest that this may vary both as a function of the degree to which one’s lay beliefs about the nature of social categories differs (e.g., Essentialism), as well as the degree to which one endorses the social representations of a particular group.

 Tajfel and Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Inter Group Behavior.”  Louise Lemyre and Philip M. Smith, “Intergroup Discrimination and Self-Esteem in the Minimal Group Paradigm,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49, no. 3 (1985); Penelope J Oakes and John C Turner, “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour: Does Minimal Intergroup Discrimination Make Social Identity More Positive?,” European Journal of Social Psychology 10, no. 3 (1980). 12  Steven Fein and Steven J Spencer, “Prejudice as Self-Image Maintenance: Affirming the Self through Derogating Others,” Journal of personality and Social Psychology 73, no. 1 (1997). 13  For a review see: Marilynn B Brewer, “In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis,” Psychological bulletin 86, no. 2 (1979). 14  John C. Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1987). 10 11

80

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

3 Social Representations It is well established that even with little to no contact, individuals tend to have some understanding of social groups.15 One way in which individuals can do this is because of the dominant social representations of a group. These are socially constructed representations of common-sense thinking that allow for a meaningful sense of reality via two basic processes. The first, objectification, where new abstract information can be concretised into something tangible. For example, the idea of Islam can be rendered concrete by thinking about the veil.16 The second process is anchoring, where unfamiliar information is integrated into something that is already known. For example, current Islam-West conflict may be anchored into previous known historical conflict, or into common-sense dyads of (im-) morality, (ab-) normality and so forth.17 When an individual has little knowledge or contact with a specific group, social representations may be endorsed less critically to fill in the gaps in one’s knowledge,18 thus establishing a well-defined group prototype. In contrast, when one has more knowledge or contact about a specific group, individuals may rely less on these social representations in favour of their own experiences leading to a less well-­ defined group prototype. As such, quantity of contact is often found to be related to decreased stereotype endorsement and more generally appears to have a positive influence on prejudice.19

4 Essentialism The clarity of group prototypes may also be delineated by one’s lay beliefs about the nature of social categories. Specifically, we deploy essentialism here as a two-factor structure to refer to the degree to which one believes that social groups can be considered to have a natural basis, are historically stable and have clear-cut boundaries (natural kind beliefs), and to which groups can be considered to constitute a homogenous, informative entity with a meaningful essence (entitativity beliefs).20  Belkeis Y.  Altareb, “Attitudes toward Muslims: Initial Scale Development,” Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: the Sciences and Engineering, 58, no. 7-B (1998). 16  Rusi Jaspal and Marco Cinnirella, “Media Representations of British Muslims and Hybridised Threats to Identity,” Contemporary Islam 4, no. 3 (2010). 17  Ibid.; James H Liu and Denis J Hilton, “How the Past Weighs on the Present: Social Representations of History and Their Role in Identity Politics,” British Journal of Social Psychology 44, no. 4 (2005). 18  Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice.” 19  Thomas F Pettigrew and Linda R Tropp, “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory,” Journal of personality and social psychology 90, no. 5 (2006). 20  Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst, “Essentialist Beliefs About Social Categories.” 15

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

81

Essentialist beliefs therefore elucidate on the idea of who is a group member, what constitutes a group member, and how a group member should behave. Thus, they have descriptive and normative functions to lay group perception.21 Particularly, essentialist beliefs may serve SIT and SCT processes in that they offer clearly defined group prototypes,22 as they address the idea that groups have an immutable, potentially quasi-biological, basis with clear, rigid boundaries and a meaningful underlying reality that is richly informative. As such, for the in-group, essentialism can function to increase identification to specific groups.23 Conversely, in respect to out-groups, essentialist beliefs have been associated with increased stereotype endorsement24 and prejudice.25 We would like to suggest that these processes outlined in SIT, SRT and Essentialism operate in relation to TMT processes. In other words, they offer a complex inter-web of functions in the development and maintenance of a cultural worldview. All these theories are compatible with TMT in that they offer a meaning framework in which to interpret a stable, orderly conception of reality. For example, they allow for the behaviour of others to be understood with predictability and certainty, as well as offering ways to assimilate abstract (or new) information into one’s existing meaning framework and render it concrete. Moreover, categorisation processes that depersonalises the self into groups can assuage fears of death, particularly if these groups are highly essentialised, providing a clear, unambiguous set of culturally valued- and consensually validated- norms to live up to26 (see Hogg27 for similar ideas). By doing so, identifying with specific causes and groups can allow oneself to endure symbolically or literally beyond personal death.28 Put simply, whilst “I” will die, “we” will endure.29

 Hanna Zagefka et  al., “Why Does Ingroup Essentialism Increase Prejudice against Minority Members?,” International Journal of Psychology 48, no. 1 (2013). 22  Michael A Hogg, “Subjective Uncertainty Reduction through Self-Categorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes,” European review of social psychology 11, no. 1 (2000). 23  Emanuele Castano, “On the Advantages of Reifying the Ingroup,” in The Psychology of Group Perception: Contributions to the Study of Homogeneity, Entitativity, and Essentialism, ed. Vincent Yzerbyt, Charles M. Judd, and Carey S. Ryan (Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press, 2004). 24  Brock Bastian and Nick Haslam, “Psychological Essentialism and Stereotype Endorsement,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42, no. 2 (2006). 25  Nick Haslam, Louis Rothschild, and Donald Ernst, “Are Essentialist Beliefs Associated with Prejudice?,” British Journal of Social Psychology 41, no. 1 (2002). 26  Emanuele Castano and Mark Dechesne, “On Defeating Death: Group Reification and Social Identification as Immortality Strategies,” European review of social psychology 16, no. 1 (2005). 27  Hogg, “Subjective Uncertainty Reduction through Self-Categorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes.” 28  Castano and Dechesne, “On Defeating Death: Group Reification and Social Identification as Immortality Strategies.” 29  Eva Jonas and Immo Fritsche, “Destined to Die but Not to Wage War: How Existential Threat Can Contribute to Escalation or De-Escalation of Violent Intergroup Conflict,” American Psychologist 68, no. 7 (2013). 21

82

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

5 The Psychology of Terrorism as a Mortality Reminder It is generally accepted that terrorism has intensified anti-Islamic attitudes in the West. For example, British-Muslims have reported increased levels of discrimination after 9/11,30 matching data suggesting an increase in anti-Islamic sentiment across the EU and the USA after 9/11.31 Similar findings have also been reported after other acts of terrorism such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris.32 Why has terrorism intensified negative attitudes towards Muslims? The Mortality Salience (MS) hypothesis derived from TMT suggests that as individuals have deep-rooted fear of death, events that remind individuals of their own transience causes an increased need to affirm structures that most effectively buffer from this existential concern. In general, this can lead to favourable responses to those who are regarded to uphold or validate one’s own worldview, and unfavourable responses towards those who are perceived to conflict or violate one’s worldview. Empirical evidence using an MS paradigm has been supportive of the assertion, that death reminders produce a worldview defence, and findings are consistent across a range of MS manipulations including open-ended questions about one’s own mortality, natural reminders such as being interviewed outside of a funeral home, and even subliminal primes. Similarly, subtle or overt reminders of past terrorist events, such as 9/11,33 or exposure to terrorist news reports,34 have been shown to produce similar effects. These findings also appear to be specific to reminders of death rather than any other negative or aversive topic.35 Importantly, studies have identified that for MS to elicit worldview defence, thoughts of death need to be outside of focal awareness (e.g., occur after a brief delay, or immediately after a subtle or subliminal reminder) supporting the assertion that worldview defence operates as a distal unconscious defence to the terror caused by death awareness. Moreover, MS has repeatedly been found not to increase physiological arousal or negative affect, but it has been

 Lorraine P Sheridan, “Islamophobia Pre–and Post–September 11th, 2001,” Journal of interpersonal violence 21, no. 3 (2006). 31  Allen and Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the Eu after 11 September 2001. 32  Skaiste Liepyte and Kareena McAloney-Kocaman, “Discrimination and Religiosity among Muslim Women in the Uk before and after the Charlie Hebdo Attacks,” Mental Health, Religion & Culture 18, no. 9 (2015). 33  Mark J Landau et al., “Deliver Us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30, no. 9 (2004); Chandra Y Osborn, Blair T Johnson, and Jeffrey D Fisher, “After 9/11 at Ground Zero: The Anxiety-Buffering Effects of Worldview Support on the First Anniversary of 9/11,” Basic and applied social psychology 28, no. 4 (2006). 34  Enny Das et al., “How Terrorism News Reports Increase Prejudice against Outgroups: A Terror Management Account,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45, no. 3 (2009). 35  For alternative interpretations of MS see: Van den Bos, “Making Sense of Life: The Existential Self Trying to Deal with Personal Uncertainty.”; Heine, Proulx, and Vohs, “The Meaning Maintenance Model: On the Coherence of Social Motivations.” 30

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

83

a­ ssociated with changes in nonconscious death-thought accessibility. Thus, these effects appear to be attributable specifically to the increase of death-related thought.36 From a TMT perspective then, terrorism constitutes a powerful reminder of the transient nature of humans, engendering a need to affirm, and if necessary, defend, one’s worldview. This can lead to several outcomes that may be important to understanding Islamophobia. We will discuss these in relation to TMT, bolstered with contributions from SRT, SIT and Essentialism.

6 The Nation as Way of Immortalising the Self As TMT proposes that we have a need to assuage the fear of death by literally or symbolically transcending death itself, the nation may hold a special place in one’s worldview. Numerous scholars have speculated about one’s nation being a symbolic entity that affiliating to may offer a sense of symbolic immortality. For example, Smith37 argues that as one’s nation is eternal, identifying with the nation may act as a means to become part of a collective that will out-live the individual. Similarly, other scholars have suggested that the security and survival of an individual is inexorably linked to the nation,38 therefore offering basic assurance to one’s immediate life. Thus, MS may foster a shift from personal to a collective level of self-categorisation.39 The nation is also an example of an ascribed social identity,40 and this may make it particularly prone to essentialist definitions that appeal to ideas of a common fate and ancestry.41 Similarly, Castano42 has argued that perceiving the nation with high entitativity may offer it “celestial” value in that it transforms the nation into a meaningful real entity that operates on a different level of existence to the self. Essentialism can also offer a clear group prototype that prescribes a clear set of values to achieve

 For a full review of MS studies see: Brian L Burke, Andy Martens, and Erik H Faucher, “Two Decades of Terror Management Theory: A Meta-Analysis of Mortality Salience Research,” ibid.14 (2010). 37  Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity,” (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1991). 38  Daniel Druckman, “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective,” Mershon International Studies Review 38, no. 1 (1994); Montserrat Guibernau, “Anthony D.  Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment,” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 1–2 (2004). 39  Castano and Dechesne, “On Defeating Death: Group Reification and Social Identification as Immortality Strategies.” 40  Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice.” 41  Walker Connor, Ethno-Nationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Smith, “National Identity.” 42  Castano, “On the Advantages of Reifying the Ingroup.” 36

84

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

immortalisation (cf. Hogg43). Consequently, as the nation is easily reified, identification strategies may be deployed in managing death awareness.44 As such, terrorism should lead to increased national identification and endorsement of essentialist definitions of the nation. Research seems to support this idea. For example, retrospective research exploring American reactions to 9/11 showed increased nationalistic and patriotic sentiment,45 which matches laboratory data of increased national identification and its perceived entitativity after one’s mortality has been made salient.46 More dramatically, research has also demonstrated the willingness to self-sacrifice for England when being reminded of its immortal properties after an MS induction.47 The desire to immortalise the self thus appears powerful enough that individuals are willing to give up their own life for an eternal cause or group. Indeed, history is dotted with numerous cases of self-sacrifice for national or ideological causes,48 as well as discussions of morality and ethics.49

7 Derogation of the ‘Other’ and Support for the In-group As we previously outlined, TMT predicts that heightened death awareness leads to distal defences of affirming worldview structures and if necessary, the need to defend this worldview from other worldviews that are existentially threatening (we discuss this point more in depth later). This is because worldviews are a meaning framework for understanding reality, and thus need to be continually validated to affirm their ‘correctness’, whilst alternative worldviews put into question the validity of these beliefs. As such, MS should engender increased support for those who affirm one’s worldview, and rejection of those who threaten one’s worldview.

 Hogg, “Subjective Uncertainty Reduction through Self-Categorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes.” 44  Castano and Dechesne, “On Defeating Death: Group Reification and Social Identification as Immortality Strategies.” 45  Young-ok Yum and William Schenck-Hamlin, “Reactions to 9/11 as a Function of Terror Management and Perspective Taking,” The Journal of social psychology 145, no. 3 (2005). 46  Emanuele Castano et  al., “I Belong, Therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and Ingroup Bias,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28, no. 2 (2002). 47  Clay Routledge and Jamie Arndt, “Self-Sacrifice as Self-Defence: Mortality Salience Increases Efforts to Affirm a Symbolic Immortal Self at the Expense of the Physical Self,” European Journal of Social Psychology 38, no. 3 (2008). 48  For examples see: Paul Middleton, “What Is Martyrdom?,” Mortality 19, no. 2 (2014); Mark Carl Overvold, “Self-Interest and the Concept of Self-Sacrifice,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10, no. 1 (1980); David Cook, Martyrdom in Islam, vol. 4 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 49  For examples see: Ezio Di Nucci, “Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem,” Philosophical Psychology 26, no. 5 (2013); William B Swann Jr. et al., “What Makes a Group Worth Dying For? Identity Fusion Fosters Perception of Familial Ties, Promoting Self-Sacrifice,” Journal of personality and social psychology 106, no. 6 (2014). 43

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

85

Findings from TMT have identified a litany of negative outcomes associated with MS.  For example, MS can lead to increased negative attitudes and aggression towards those who criticise one’s worldview,50 and more specifically, increase prejudice towards Muslims.51 Additionally, MS may also promote the tendency to infra-­ humanise out-groups.52 That is, individuals are likely to reserve the attribution of uniquely human qualities for their own group and view other groups as having less humanistic qualities. As a result, the alternative worldview (e.g., Islam) can be easily dismissed as being built on inferior values. Whilst MS may incite increased aggression, hostility, and prejudice towards worldview threatening targets, MS also promotes increased in-group biases.53 Importantly, this relationship was mediated by national identification and perceived entitativity. This therefore supports our assertion that essentialist beliefs and identification strategies may serve as important existential anxiety buffers, which in turn can promote hostility and prejudice. Moreover, Greenberg and colleagues54 present similar findings that show after MS, White participants can become more sympathetic to White targets expressing racial pride. Whilst it is unlikely that participants were supportive of a racist ideology, MS may promote less derogation towards an in-group member supporting one’s own cultural worldview. As such, terrorism may lead to increased prejudice and hostility towards Islam and Muslims, but also increased sympathy towards in-group members who espouse such attitudes. From a SIT perspective, increased national identification as a result of terrorism should enhance favourability towards the in-group. It should also increase threat perception and prejudice towards out-groups. A common finding in SIT literature is that the level of in-group identification moderates threat perception and responses to out-groups. In other words, strong national identifiers are more likely to perceive a threat to the in-group and respond with increased hostility towards the source of threat.55 SIT proposes that this is because as individuals increasingly identify with

 Holly A McGregor et  al., “Terror Management and Aggression: Evidence That Mortality Salience Motivates Aggression against Worldview-Threatening Others,” ibid.74, no. 3 (1998); Brandon J Schmeichel and Andy Martens, “Self-Affirmation and Mortality Salience: Affirming Values Reduces Worldview Defense and Death-Thought Accessibility,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31, no. 5 (2005). 51  Das et  al., “How Terrorism News Reports Increase Prejudice against Outgroups: A Terror Management Account.” 52  Jeroen Vaes, Nathan A.  Heflick, and Jamie L.  Goldenberg, ““We Are People”: Ingroup Humanization as an Existential Defense,” Journal of personality and social psychology 98, no. 5 (2010). 53  Castano et  al., “I Belong, Therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and Ingroup Bias.” 54  Jeff Greenberg et  al., “Sympathy for the Devil: Evidence That Reminding Whites of Their Mortality Promotes More Favorable Reactions to White Racists,” Motivation and Emotion 25, no. 2 (2001). 55  Nyla R Branscombe and Daniel L Wann, “Collective Self-Esteem Consequences of Outgroup Derogation When a Valued Social Identity Is on Trial,” European Journal of Social Psychology 24, no. 6 (1994). 50

86

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

the in-group, the more subjectively important it becomes to the self-concept. This fosters a stronger need to maintain a sense of a positive social identity that can result in prejudice and hostility towards threatening others. Likewise, increased essentialist definitions of the nation should also lead to increased threat perception. As essentialism of a natural kind addresses thinking of group boundaries as rigid, stable, and impermeable with membership determined on a quasi-biological basis, individuals thinking in this way should be increasingly concerned with those that infringe upon these beliefs about the nation.56 As such, immigrants (including British-Muslims) could be rejected on the basis of not meeting the criteria to be ‘British’. Furthermore, the perceived entitativity of the nation that offers a meaningful essence with clear values, norms, and beliefs should also lead to increased desire to protect this symbolic system.57 Moreover, in-group essentialism also addresses the (im)permeability of group boundaries that may make dis-­ identification strategies difficult at times of perceived threat. Thus, with no option to ‘exit’ the threatened group, individuals may be more likely to respond with derogation towards the source of threat. Dechesne, Janssen and van Knippenberg58 support this idea, finding increased hostility towards a worldview critic after manipulating the permeability of the in-group boundaries after an MS induction. Whilst British-Muslims do constitute as being part of the in-group, they are nonetheless not exempt from this discrimination and hostility. SIT also predicts that those who are perceived to violate in-group norms should yield extreme negative reactions as a strategy to maintain a positive social identity (the black-sheep effect).59 This may particularly be the case when the group is highly essentialised as it offers a clear group prototype for expectancy of in-group behaviour. As a result, black-­ sheep in-groupers are potentially vilified in order to maintain positive in-group identity. This reflects some of the themes noted by scholars who have mapped the social representations of Muslims in the British media.60 TMT is compatible with this notion in that it predicts that outcomes are contingent upon whether one’s worldview is perceived to be validated or violated. Taken together, British-Muslims may be derogated to maintain a positive in-group identity, or similarly rejected as in-group members altogether because of being perceived to not meet the relevant criteria for membership.

 Zagefka et al., “Why Does Ingroup Essentialism Increase Prejudice against Minority Members?.”  Ibid. 58  Mark Dechesne, Jacques Janssen, and Ad van Knippenberg, “Derogation and Distancing as Terror Management Strategies: The Moderating Role of Need for Closure and Permeability of Group Boundaries,” Journal of personality and social psychology 79, no. 6 (2000). 59  José M Marques and Dario Paez, “The ‘Black Sheep Effect’: Social Categorization, Rejection of Ingroup Deviates, and Perception of Group Variability,” European review of social psychology 5, no. 1 (1994). 60  Jaspal and Cinnirella, “Media Representations of British Muslims and Hybridised Threats to Identity.”; Poole, “The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage.”; Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers. 56 57

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

87

8 Stereotyping of Muslims If terrorism serves as a mortality reminder, leading to a need to affirm worldview structures that buffer against thoughts of death, then there is also an increased need to view group members in prototypical ways. As we have previously outlined, MS should engender increased essentialist and social categorisation processes that lead to an increased rigidity of thought. Consequently, individuals are likely to display stereotypic thinking and preferences61 as they function to imbue the world with a sense of meaning and order. Stereotyping of out-group members in line with the group prototype is likely to be increased after MS. As contact with a specific group may be limited or infrequent, social representations may be an important feature when generating the group prototype. One way in which individuals can learn about other groups is through media representations. The media can be considered as “gatekeepers” of knowledge, thus media messages concerning Muslims may be processed less critically by non-Muslims who have little to no contact with Muslims and can come to be the source of stereotypes and individual attitudes.62 Sociological analyses of British media reporting present a bleak picture of the portrayal of Islam and Muslims. Since 9/11, media reporting surrounding Islam and Muslims has escalated, focusing on issues both at home and abroad.63 Over one-­ third of these reports have focused on themes of terrorism, resorting frequently to a lexicon of adjectives that homogenise British-Muslims with ideas of radicalism, extremism, and fundamentalism.64 Moreover, terrorism reporting is often decontextualized, emphasising Islamic traits as the sole reason for this behaviour.65 Within this discourse, Islamic beliefs have been presented vis-à-vis the dominant British values, positing them as inferior or regressive.66 Given the overwhelmingly negative picture of Muslims in the British media, terrorism likely increases endorsement of social representations of Muslims as a threat to British culture and with a propensity for violent or extremist behaviour. As

 Jeff Schimel et  al., “Stereotypes and Terror Management: Evidence That Mortality Salience Enhances Stereotypic Thinking and Preferences,” Journal of personality and social psychology 77, no. 5 (1999). 62  Cinnirella, “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory.” 63  Moore, Mason, and Lewis, “Images of Islam in the Uk: The Representation of British Muslims in the Nmational Press, 2000–2008”; Poole, “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context.” 64  Moore, Mason, and Lewis, “Images of Islam in the Uk: The Representation of British Muslims in the Nmational Press, 2000–2008”. 65  Poole, “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context.” 66  Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers. 61

88

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

essentialism can invoke dispositional explanations of behaviour,67 reports that decontextualize events and proposes Islamic beliefs as the reason for this behaviour, may reinforce the idea that the propensity for violence is a common feature in all Muslims. Not only might Muslims be viewed as a threatening and violent group, but essentialist beliefs may also increase the perception of being collectively responsible for these actions.68 This may particularly be the case for non-Muslim individuals who strongly identify with the victim group. For example, Doosje et al.69 found that national identification was positively associated with perceptions of attributing the Islamic world as responsible for terrorist attacks. This was importantly mediated by the perception of terrorists as typical of the group (cf. highly essentialised). Thus, even if one does not necessarily attribute violent acts to all Muslims, they may nonetheless feel that all Muslims share responsibility for acts of terrorism. MS should not just increase the need to think in stereotypic ways, but also a preference for stereotypic-consistent information. Muslims who do not conform to the prevailing social representations may therefore be subject to negative evaluations after heightened death awareness. Fritsche et al.70 explored this idea by asking participants to evaluate descriptions of Muslims who espoused support for terrorism (“hawks”) or opposition to terrorism (“doves”). Their findings showed that, surprisingly, doves were evaluated less positively after MS than in the control group. This finding may seem peculiar in that MS would engender fewer positive evaluations of Muslims even if they did not support terrorism, but the findings support the idea that stereotyping, and the need for stereotypic information, may provide important functions in managing death awareness. Taken together, it may seem that Muslims are stuck in a difficult predicament. Conforming to the dominant social representations may confirm one’s stereotypic view but reinforces the perception of Muslims as a homogeneous violent, threatening enemy to Western or British worldview. However, being confronted with Muslims who challenge Islamophobic representations, such as Muslim “doves”, could be met by hostility due to the desire to maintain the stereotype and Islamophobic worldview. This presents a considerable challenge when considering potential mechanisms for reducing Islamophobia.

 Vincent Y Yzerbyt, Anouk Rogier, and Susan T Fiske, “Group Entitativity and Social Attribution: On Translating Situational Constraints into Stereotypes,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24, no. 10 (1998). 68  Brian Lickel, Toni Schmader, and David L Hamilton, “A Case of Collective Responsibility: Who Else Was to Blame for the Columbine High School Shootings?,” ibid.29, no. 2 (2003). 69  Bertjan Doosje et al., “Attributions of Responsibility for Terrorist Attacks: The Role of Group Membership and Identification,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV) 1, no. 2 (2007). 70  Immo Fritsche et al., “Enemies Welcome: Personal Threat and Reactions to Outgroup Doves and Hawks,” Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 22, no. 3 (2009). 67

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

89

9 False-Consensus Effect Legitimising Prejudice Whilst thinking in stereotypic ways may increase prejudice towards Muslims, terrorism may also lead to increased attribution of prototypical qualities to in-group members as well as the self. Particularly, MS may lead to increased perception of in-group homogeneity that is a particular aspect of essentialist thinking. This increased perception of in-group homogeneity may be vital in feeling that one’s worldview is consensually validated.71 From a TMT perspective, as worldviews offer basic psychological assurances of one’s understanding of reality and continued existence, perceiving that other group members share similar values affirms both the correctness of one’s worldview and the possibility of a valued aspect of the self symbolically enduring. Research has highlighted that exposure to mortality reminders can lead to an inflation of social consensus estimates.72 That is, after MS, individuals have a heightened need to feel they belong to the majority view to effectively manage death awareness. Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski73 have suggested that this false-­ consensus effect operates as a self-serving bias that attempts to validate one’s attitudes and beliefs. Importantly, perceiving a false (majority) consensus for one’s beliefs and attitudes may provide a normative basis that is believed to be an important feature of expressing prejudicial attitudes.74 Whilst inflating social consensus estimates may be an effective way of validating certain behaviours and attitudes, these may also be encouraged by authoritative figures who have the power to legitimise and delegitimise certain practices.75 Particularly, if authority is perceived to endorse social representations, they may be more likely to be internalised into one’s worldview. For example, Guimelli, Monaco and Deschamps76 utilised a novel way to explore endorsement of social representations. French participants were asked about their own opinions and the “public” opinion of Muslims before and after the highly publicised court ruling surrounding

 Hogg, “Subjective Uncertainty Reduction through Self-Categorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes.” 72  Tom Pyszczynski et al., “Whistling in the Dark: Exaggerated Consensus Estimates in Response to Incidental Reminders of Mortality,” Psychological Science 7, no. 6 (1996). 73  Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski, “A Terror Management Theory of Social Behavior: The Psychological Functions of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews,” Advances in experimental social psychology 24 (1991). 74  Roel W Meertens and Thomas F Pettigrew, “Is Subtle Prejudice Really Prejudice?,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 61, no. 1 (1997). 75  Herbert C Kelman, “Reflections on Social and Psychological Processes of Legitimization and Delegitimization,” in The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations, ed. J. T. Jost and Brenda Major (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 76  Christian Guimelli, Grégory Lo Monaco, and Jean-Claude Deschamps, “The Lawsuit against “Charlie Hebdo” and Its Effects on the Social Representations of the Muslim Community,” Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 23, no. 4 (2010). 71

90

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

the Charlie Hebdo lawsuit of defamation of the Prophet Muhammed. Before the court ruling, individuals expressed more favourable attitudes towards Muslims than the public. After the court ruling, they found no difference between the individual and public opinion. Thus, the ruling had legitimised the social representation unmasking individual opinions. Similarly, such decisions in the UK as to join the so-called war on terror, as well as the positioning of Muslims in the media as an enemy, have been previously argued to anchor Muslims into existing social representations of war and conflict providing a legitimate basis for intolerance and prejudice.77

10 The Symbolic Threat to British Values Whilst TMT suggests that MS should engender a need to affirm worldview structures, defensive reactions should only occur when a threat to worldview is perceived. In that regard, TMT is compatible with SIT and ITT on the notion of threat being an important antecedent of prejudice. Whilst SIT lacks nuance in outlining what constitutes a threat,78 we believe that ITT may be well equipped here to elucidate more clearly on types of worldview threat that is central to TMT. ITT79 defines threat as a subjective experience that threatens the group or individual. The approach outlines two basic types of threat: (1) symbolic threats that are the perceived differences between the groups meaning systems such as the norms and values, or challenges to personal identity at an individual level; (2) realistic threats that are the perceived threat to the in-group (or individual) of physical harm or loss of resources. Social representations of Muslims disseminated by the media have been argued to pose Muslims as a so-called hybridised threat to the British majority.80 Muslims are posed as a both a symbolic threat to British values and a realistic threat to British security via terrorism. These can also be subjectively threatening at a personal level, in that terrorism poses a threat to personal safety and the symbolic threat poses challenges to personal identity.81 Typically, ITT research has found symbolic threats as the strongest predictor of Islamophobia,82 although these studies can be questioned as missing the point about  Jaspal and Cinnirella, “Media Representations of British Muslims and Hybridised Threats to Identity.” 78  Cinnirella, “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory.” 79  Stephan, Stephan, and Oskamp, “An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice.” 80  Jaspal and Cinnirella, “Media Representations of British Muslims and Hybridised Threats to Identity.” 81  Cinnirella, “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory.” 82  Robert T Hitlan et  al., “Attitudes toward Immigrant Groups and the September 11 Terrorist Attacks,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 13, no. 2 (2007); Karina Velasco 77

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

91

Islamophobia by operationalising realistic threat as a threat to resources, rather than the security threat from terrorism.83 In one study that has explored the realistic threat associated with terrorism, both types of threat were similarly strong predictors of tolerance amongst prejudiced participants.84 TMT may be well equipped to explain why these threats outlined in ITT are important in predicting prejudice towards Muslims. As we have previously outlined, terrorism serves as a mortality reminder thereby temporarily weakening the meaning structures that buffer from existential concern. Terrorism also constitutes a symbolic threat in that it questions the validity of British values85 to such an extreme that it seeks to annihilate it. Terrorism therefore may be a particularly special type of mortality reminder that is more likely to be responded to with increased prejudice and hostility. Similarly, even in the absence of terrorism, the social representations of Islamic beliefs as conflicting with the dominant British values constitutes a symbolic threat to the group. As such, these threats speak to similar issues of TMT’s worldview threats, as worldviews that differ in values, norms and beliefs challenge the validity of one’s own worldview thus motivating a need to cope with the existential threat posed. Can TMT explain threats that occur in absentia of reminders of one’s own death? One hypothesis that can be derived from TMT that can speak to the threats outlined in ITT is the Death Thought Accessibility (DTA) hypothesis. This suggests that exposure to alternative worldviews with conflicting values (e.g., symbolic threats) challenges the ‘correctness’ of one’s own worldview, thus undermining the meaning system that acts as an existential anxiety buffer. As such, when a threat is perceived, this temporarily increases DTA and activates a subsequent need to defend and affirm one’s worldview. Typically, DTA is measured in an ostensible filler task of completing word-fragments. Some of these words can be completed in a neutral or death-­ related manner (e.g., ki _ _ ed. could be completed as killed or kissed). Supporting this assertion, research has demonstrated increased DTA when exposed to threatening worldview information concerning the nation; just world; or creationist or evolutionary beliefs.86 Like MS studies, the increased accessibility appears specific to death-related thoughts and not negative ones.87 González et  al., “Prejudice Towards Muslims in the Netherlands: Testing Integrated Threat Theory,” British Journal of Social Psychology 47, no. 4 (2008). 83  Cinnirella, “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory.” 84  Jolanda van der Noll, Edwin Poppe, and Maykel Verkuyten, “Political Tolerance and Prejudice: Differential Reactions toward Muslims in the Netherlands,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 32, no. 1 (2010). 85  Cinnirella, “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory.” 86  For a full review of DTA studies see: Joseph Hayes et al., “A Theoretical and Empirical Review of the Death-Thought Accessibility Concept in Terror Management Research,” Psychological bulletin 136, no. 5 (2010). 87  Joseph Hayes et  al., “Evidence for the Dta Hypothesis Ii: Threatening Self-Esteem Increases Death-Thought Accessibility,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44, no. 3 (2008).

92

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

As the media often positions Islam and Muslims to hold contradictory beliefs to majority British values, reminders of this symbolic threat should lead to increased accessibility of death-related thoughts and the subsequent need to defend. Cohen et al.88 found increased DTA in American participants when ruminating on a mosque being built in their neighbourhood in comparison to an aversive topic (study 2), and that this finding was specific to an Islamic, but not any other religious, place of worship (study 3). Importantly, their findings also showed that reading about a desecration of a Quran eliminated increased DTA after an MS induction. This provides strong convergent support for the role of DTA in prejudice responses. DTA increases in response to threat but decreases once participants have been given the opportunity to defend their worldview (e.g., derogate an out-group), but remains salient if denied the opportunity. This suggests that prejudice may reflect an adaptive coping response as a result of increased DTA. However, prejudice should not be considered an automatic response to threat or increased DTA and we return to this subject later in the chapter.

11 Putting It All Together: The Role of Self-Esteem and Meaning We have so far presented how terrorism, as a visceral death reminder, can lead to a cascading effect of several outcomes that would cause increased prejudice and hostility towards Muslims. Specifically, we have posited that aspects of SIT, SRT and Essentialism operate as processes to one’s worldview system and buffering from the fear of death. At the same time, these processes increase the perception of Muslims as posing a symbolic threat to worldview. Thus, terrorism and symbolic threats increase DTA, producing reactions such as prejudice and hostility that serve to decrease DTA. What may unite all these theoretical approaches is how they may operate in relation to the human motivations of the need for self-esteem and meaning. TMT directly speaks to how worldviews offer a stable and orderly construction of reality that can provide a sense of meaning, but also how offering a clear set of values to live up to can be an important basis of self-esteem. Moreover, TMT proposes that these motivations’ function, at least in part, as a buffer from the anxiety that is associated with the awareness of death. Several studies support the role of self-esteem and meaning processes in TMT.  For example, MS manipulations have been found to increase the need for meaning,89 as well as behaviours that are viewed to be a source of self-esteem to the  Florette Cohen et  al., “Evidence for a Role of Death Thought in American Attitudes toward Symbols of Islam,” ibid.49, no. 2 (2013). 89  Matthew Vess et  al., “The Dynamics of Death and Meaning: The Effects of Death-Relevant Cognitions and Personal Need for Structure on Perceptions of Meaning in Life,” Journal of personality and social psychology 97, no. 4 (2009). 88

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

93

individual.90 Moreover, these effects are particularly pronounced in those who are high in personal need for structure.91 Similarly, assessing the inverse with the DTA hypothesis also supports the role of self-esteem and meaning. That is, when self-­ esteem or meaning are threatened, DTA is increased.92 SIT posits that self-esteem can be derived from membership to social groups.93 As we have outlined, the nation may be a special case of social identity as it can offer a sense of symbolic immortality that is central to TMT claims. Moreover, categorisation processes provide a clearly structured reality that is meaningful, and particularly this may be enhanced to the extent that social groups are essentialised. The extent to which one’s own group is essentialised may offer a clear, unambiguous group prototype that provides a clear set of norms and values to which self-­ esteem can be derived. Similarly, SRT processes of objectification and anchoring can contribute towards rendering abstract information as relatively less ambiguous thus maintaining a clear, meaningful sense of reality. Cinnirella94 has recently argued that ITT claims of symbolic threats can be considered to directly threaten the motivational principles of meaning and self-esteem. That is, as symbolic values, traditions, attitudes, and beliefs contribute towards the meaning system of a group, so perceived threats that challenge these (such as how the media position Islam and Muslims) act as a direct threat to meaning, but also the extent to which they can be used for self-esteem purposes. Consequently, prejudicial responses may operate to maintain or restore self-esteem and meaning. For example, by infra-humanising or derogating Islam and Muslims, one can position the opposing worldview as being inferior or incorrect, thereby restoring meaning and self-esteem. Similarly, by increasing the perceived in-group consensus for one’s own beliefs and attitudes, one can contribute towards maintaining the validity of one’s worldview.

12 Escalation of Islamophobic Prejudice and Group Conflict As terrorism has held a consistent place in the media agenda for over a decade, these reminders are likely to keep reinvigorating processes of meaning and self-esteem maintenance. The media agenda may also contribute towards perceiving acts of  Orit Taubman Ben-Ari, Victor Florian, and Mario Mikulincer, “The Impact of Mortality Salience on Reckless Driving: A Test of Terror Management Mechanisms,” ibid.76, no. 1 (1999). 91  Vess et al., “The Dynamics of Death and Meaning: The Effects of Death-Relevant Cognitions and Personal Need for Structure on Perceptions of Meaning in Life.” 92  Hayes et  al., “Evidence for the Dta Hypothesis Ii: Threatening Self-Esteem Increases Death-­ Thought Accessibility.” 93  Lemyre and Smith, “Intergroup Discrimination and Self-Esteem in the Minimal Group Paradigm.” 94  Cinnirella, “Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory.” 90

94

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

terrorism as disproportionately associated with Islam, producing ‘think Muslim, think terrorist’ effects.95 This could lead to potential problems for combating Islamophobia, since Muslims and Islamic symbols may become associated with reminders of mortality, engendering worldview defence. Whilst we are at least not aware of any study so far directly testing this possibility, there is some evidence suggesting that terrorism and violence does frequently come to mind when asked to think about Muslims,96 and evidence from TMT that individuals and objects that are associated with death may produce effects similar to MS.97 The possibility that Islam or Muslims may become semantically associated with terrorism to produce similar effects is therefore a worrying concern. Indeed, TMT can be used to predict long-term escalating effects of a perpetuating cycle of intergroup conflict and prejudice. Jonas and Fritsche98 outline a four-stage cyclical model of intergroup hostility and conflict. They suggest that a mortality reminder (e.g., terrorism) or perceived threat (e.g., symbolic worldview threat) undermines the anxiety-buffering system eliciting increased DTA (stage 1). This engenders increased support for the in-group and cultural norms (stage 2) and leads to increased intolerance, hostility, and prejudice towards the source of threat (stage 3). As an outcome, this may provoke reciprocal responses by these out-groups (stage 4) that elevate levels of threat and DTA resulting in the cycle repeating. As we have outlined above, the hypervisibility of Muslims in the media concerning terrorism and threats to dominant in-group values have kept DTA levels in the British public in a high-rate of fluctuation. These have likely heightened identification, essentialism and social representations processes that lead to (a) increased stereotyping of Muslims; (b) heightened support for worldviews associated with British identity; and (c) false-consensus effects that can foster increased negativity and hostility towards Muslims. Given also that the dominant media social representations of Muslims are anchored into ideas of war and conflict,99 this may provide a legitimate basis for retribution in the eyes of some citizens, leading to increased endorsement of violent solutions that serve to escalate and perpetuate the current conflict. So how have Britain and the West typically responded after terrorist events? The aftermath of 9/11 led to President Bush declaring “war on terror”, with American

 “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice.” 96  Jaihyun Park, Karla Felix, and Grace Lee, “Implicit Attitudes toward Arab-Muslims and the Moderating Effects of Social Information,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 29, no. 1 (2007). 97  Andy Martens et al., “Ageism and Death: Effects of Mortality Salience and Perceived Similarity to Elders on Reactions to Elderly People,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30, no. 12 (2004). and for a review of death association studies see: Hayes et  al., “A Theoretical and Empirical Review of the Death-Thought Accessibility Concept in Terror Management Research.” 98  Jonas and Fritsche, “Destined to Die but Not to Wage War: How Existential Threat Can Contribute to Escalation or De-Escalation of Violent Intergroup Conflict.” 99  Jaspal and Cinnirella, “Media Representations of British Muslims and Hybridised Threats to Identity.” 95

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

95

and British forces beginning aerial bombings of Taliban and al-Qaeda camps, before a ground invasion of Afghanistan and later Iraq. Since these events, some scholars have highlighted that the number of deadly attacks of terrorism has increased sevenfold,100 and it is believed that these wars have increased the radicalisation of Muslims.101 TMT would predict this quite well because Western responses to terrorist attacks have included death and destruction thus likely engendering worldview defence by some Muslims. Thus, TMT would predict the possibility of a cycle of escalating violence of terrorism and counterterrorism.102 That is not to suggest that the number of radicalised Muslims or attacks of Islamic-related terrorism remains anything other than a very small percentage. Indeed, it is likely that the vast majority of Muslims respond to perceived discrimination by rejecting the idea of prejudice altogether as most findings show that members of marginalised social groups do not report lower levels of self-esteem.103 However, this cycle of conflict has kept the issue of terrorism and Islam-British compatibility in the media agenda, thus reinforcing “us-them” distinctions and perceptions of symbolic worldview threat. Experimental evidence however does converge on the possibility of perpetuating cycles of increased support for violent solutions to Islam-West conflict. For example, American participants who were reminded of 9/11 showed increased support for President Bush and anti-terror policies.104 Pyszczynski et al.105 also demonstrate how mortality reminders can influence support for extreme measures on both sides of the conflict. For Iranian participants, MS led to increased support for pro-­ martyrdom causes against the West. Those in the control condition showed a reversal of this finding, with more positive evaluations of peaceful co-operation. For American participants, MS led to increased support for extreme military force in the Middle East despite knowledge that thousands of innocent civilians would die in the process. Particularly, use of extreme force can be highly effective in combating threat. When faced with threat, derogating alternative worldviews (e.g., prejudice and rejection) can be somewhat effective at dismissing the alternative worldview. However, the issue with derogation is that individuals very rarely choose to reduce

 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Iraq Effect: War Has Increased Terrorism Sevenfold Worldwide,” Mother Jones 1 (2007). 101  Peter Bergen, “Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008). 102  Matt Motyl and Tom Pyszczynski, “The Existential Underpinnings of the Cycle of Terrorist and Counterterrorist Violence and Pathways to Peaceful Resolutions,” Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 22, no. 3 (2009). 103  Jennifer Crocker and Brenda Major, “Social Stigma and Self-Esteem: The Self-Protective Properties of Stigma,” Psychological review 96, no. 4 (1989). 104  Landau et al., “Deliver Us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush.” 105  Tom Pyszczynski et al., “Mortality Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might: The Great Satan Versus the Axis of Evil,” Personality and social psychology bulletin 32, no. 4 (2006). 100

96

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

their level of conviction in their own beliefs. Thus, derogation may only act as a brief panacea to existential terror. Instead, annihilation of the alternative worldview may ironically be the best form of defence. Annihilation does not only effectively eliminate the threat, but also affirms the belief that the worldview that “survives and thrives can be viewed as the right one”.106 Hayes, Schimel and Williams107 neatly demonstrate the effect that knowledge of annihilation can have on existential concerns. Christian participants were exposed to an article about the Islamisation of Nazareth (some participants read a filler article about the aurora borealis). They found that those exposed to the threatening article demonstrated increased DTA and prejudice towards Muslims. However, this effect was not observed when participants were given added information that over one hundred Muslims were killed in a plane crash. The researchers therefore conclude that this knowledge seemingly affirmed Christian worldviews, thus mitigating the need for further defence.

13 Reducing Prejudice and Conflict Thus far, we have outlined a TMT approach bolstered by contributions from SIT, ITT, SRT and Essentialism to explore some antecedents to Islamophobic prejudice and the bleak possibility of a continued escalation of Islamophobia. Fortunately, escalating intergroup conflict and prejudice should not be considered as automatic response to coping with existential terror. Fundamentally, TMT merely proposes that individuals tend to affirm cultural values and strive to achieve self-esteem by adhering to these values. In that sense, MS can produce harmful or positive intergroup behaviours, depending on the values promoted in one’s cultural worldview or which values are salient at the time. Researchers have offered several possibilities to break this cycle and reduce prejudice.108 Some of these efforts have been directed towards promoting pro-social norms that are embedded in one’s worldview. For example, Rothschild, Abdollahi & Pyszczynski109 found that when American Christians were exposed to compassionate Biblical texts, MS led to decreased support for extreme military interventions. Similarly, Iranian Muslims exposed to compassionate Koranic verses, MS

 Jeff Greenberg and Spee Kosloff, “Terror Management Theory: Implications for Understanding Prejudice, Stereotyping, Intergroup Conflict, and Political Attitudes,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2, no. 5 (2008). 107  Joseph Hayes, Jeff Schimel, and Todd J Williams, “Fighting Death with Death: The Buffering Effects of Learning That Worldview Violators Have Died,” Psychological Science 19, no. 5 (2008). 108  For a thorough overview see: Jonas and Fritsche, “Destined to Die but Not to Wage War: How Existential Threat Can Contribute to Escalation or De-Escalation of Violent Intergroup Conflict.” 109  Zachary K Rothschild, Abdolhossein Abdollahi, and Tom Pyszczynski, “Does Peace Have a Prayer? The Effect of Mortality Salience, Compassionate Values, and Religious Fundamentalism on Hostility toward out-Groups,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45, no. 4 (2009). 106

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

97

reduced anti-Western attitudes. Similarly, perceived social consensus estimates also may legitimise certain practices, as such informing participants about the social consensus for particular behaviours appears to reduce support for them.110 Other researchers have suggested that infra-humanising certain norms should reduce desires to support them, as the desire to distance oneself from animals is central to TMT claims. In line with this, emphasising the animalistic (versus humanistic) qualities of violence and aggression after an MS manipulation lead to decreased support for war.111 Consequently, the political and media rhetoric surrounding the recent decision to join the Syria bombings that involved technological terms such as “pin-point precision” and “laser-guided accuracy” may have served to distance the in-group from these animalistic qualities and anchor them into more humanistic values that may legitimise the concept of retaliation to the British public. Avoiding such discourse may be an appropriate preventative strategy in the future. Moreover, the idea that culturally salient or normative values are likely to be adhered to after terrorist events may have particular implications for world leaders in their response to these violent acts of terrorism. Communicating a sense of tolerance and compassion to the British public and highlighting them as core British values may result in reduced prejudice and discrimination.112 However, it is also important for world leaders to counter social media representations of Muslims and emphasise that they do not threaten these values. Otherwise, this could potentially lead to a paradoxical effect of defending these norms by behaving belligerently towards those that are perceived to threaten them. Another potential way to reduce prejudice is by emphasising similarities between groups that provoke re-categorisation processes that may facilitate the internalisation of superordinate identities.113 Thus, promoting common identities between Muslims and the British majority may redirect MS effects in TMT.114 One way to achieve this is through emphasising a sense of common humanity. For example,

  Abdolhossein Abdollahi, Carl Henthorn, and Tom Pyszczynski, “Experimental Peace Psychology: Priming Consensus Mitigates Aggression against Outgroups under Mortality Salience,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 2, no. 1 (2010). 111  Matt Motyl, Joshua Hart, and Tom Pyszczynski, “When Animals Attack: The Effects of Mortality Salience, Infrahumanization of Violence, and Authoritarianism on Support for War,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46, no. 1 (2010). 112  J.  Greenberg et  al., “Terror Management and Tolerance: Does Mortality Salience Always Intensify Negative Reactions to Others Who Threaten One’s Worldview?,” Journal of personality and social psychology 63, no. 2 (1992). 113  Samuel L.  Gaertner and John F.  Dovidio, Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model (Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press, 2014). 114  Jonas and Fritsche, “Destined to Die but Not to Wage War: How Existential Threat Can Contribute to Escalation or De-Escalation of Violent Intergroup Conflict.” 110

98

S. Fairlamb and M. Cinnirella

reminding individuals of shared human experiences115 or global consequences116 appears to reduce implicit biases and facilitate more peaceful resolutions to conflict. An issue that may hinder the effectiveness of the common-identity approach is the extent to which it can be easily accommodated into one’s worldview. We mentioned earlier that derogation and annihilation were particular responses to threat perception in managing existential concerns. Threats however can also be diffused by accommodating them into one’s worldview.117 By selectively modifying one’s own belief system in the face of threat, the anxiety (e.g., increased DTA) produced by the threat can be dissipated, and findings seem to support this assertion.118 Furthermore, these findings also seem to indicate that derogation may operate as a response to when accommodation is difficult. As such, intervention strategies should consider how easily information can be accommodated, particularly if it requires cutting into central aspects of one’s belief system.119 For example, a problem for the common-identity approach is that it may not be easily accommodated into one’s worldview because it may not be viewed as particularly entitative.120 Whilst future research needs to investigate what factors may promote (or disrupt) the accommodation process, we would like to suggest that an approach that attempts to extort the benefits of a multitude of lenses may be a particularly effective one. If the processes we have outlined in this chapter constitute important anxiety buffers, then perhaps satisfying these relative aspects may facilitate the use of the accommodation process. For example, emphasising a superordinate identity with a sense of having clear boundaries, with a common fate and goals, and an unambiguous prototype of culturally valued pro-social norms may contribute towards a meaningful common identity between Islam and the West. It should also be recognised that any intervention strategies operate within the wider context of social representations disseminated by the media. If media representations of Muslims and Islam remain negative, then interventions should also include attempts to de-legitimise such media representations and encourage a critical reading of media content.121  Matt Motyl et al., “Subtle Priming of Shared Human Experiences Eliminates Threat-Induced Negativity toward Arabs, Immigrants, and Peace-Making,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47, no. 6 (2011). 116  T. Pyszczynski et al., “A Collateral Advantage of Drawing Attention to the Problem of Global Warming: Increased Support for Peace-Making and Decreased Support for War,” Journal of Peace Psychology 18, no. 4 (2012). 117  Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, “A Terror Management Theory of Social Behavior: The Psychological Functions of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews.” 118  Joseph Hayes et al., “Worldview Accommodation: Selectively Modifying Committed Beliefs Provides Defense against Worldview Threat,” Self and Identity 14, no. 5 (2015). 119  Ibid. 120  For similar ideas surrounding European identity see: Emanuele Castano, “European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective,” Transnational identities: Becoming European in the EU 1 (2004). 121  Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice.” 115

4  Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-psychological…

99

14 Conclusion TMT posits a powerful yet simple explanation that may drive motivational responses underpinning prejudice and conflict. We have presented an approach that explores the interface of TMT with several socio-psychological theories positing that the motives of self-esteem and meaning may be pivotal in explaining Islamophobia, as well as potential future paths of escalating and de-escalating conflict between Islam and the West. Specifically, aspects of essentialism, social representations, and identity may serve as important anxiety-buffering functions from existential terror. We believe that using an approach that attempts to extort the benefits of multiple theories may prove to be the most effective path to reducing prejudice towards Muslims.

Chapter 5

Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia Networks in North-West London Oliver Scharbrodt

Academic scholarship on Shia Muslim minorities in the West has described them as ‘a minority within a minority’1 or as ‘the other within the other’,2 referring to a certain sense of double-marginalization of Shia Muslim minorities in non-Muslim societal contexts. They need to undertake particular efforts to maintain both an Islamic as well as particular Shia identity in terms of both communal activities and practices and public perception and recognition, responding to the rise of Islamophobia more generally and anti-Shia sectarianism more specifically. This paper will problematize this notion of a double-marginalization of Shia minorities in the West by investigating the dynamics around transnational Shia communal spaces in north-west London and the creation of Shia spaces by networks and organizations based there. Being ‘the other within other’, while meant to articulate this double-­ marginalization, also contains certain opportunity structures for Shia Muslim communities in the context of the post-9/11 securitization of Islam3 and the discursive dichotomy between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’ or ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ Islam.4 This discursive securitization of Islam and of Muslim minorities living in the

 Sachedina, “A Minority within a Minority: The Case of the Shi’a in North America,” 3.  Takim, Shi‘Ism in America, 143. 3  Cesari, The Securitisation of Islam in Europe. 4  See: Birt, “Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in Post 9/11 Britain.”; Brown, “The Promise and Perils of Women’s Participation in Uk Mosques: The Impact of Securitisation Agendas on Identity, Gender and Community.”; Yazbeck Haddad and Balz, “Taming the Imams: European Governments and Islamic Preachers since 9/11.”; Volpi, “Constructing the ‘Ummah’in European Security: Between Exit, Voice and Loyalty.”; Jackson, “Constructing 1 2

O. Scharbrodt (*) Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_5

101

102

O. Scharbrodt

West tends to target militant and violent expressions of Sunni Islam in particular. Twelver Shia Muslims can thereby seize the opportunity to present themselves in the public arena, as a consequence of being othered by militant Sunni groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, as ‘moderate’ Muslims that are victimized by the same ‘radical’ forces in contemporary Islam that are responsible for the rise of global terrorism in the last two decades.5 This article will use the example of transnational Twelver Shia networks located in the London borough of Brent, in the north-west of the city, that operate between Britain and the Middle East.6 Using recent contributions on the relationship between religion and space, this article examines how the agency of theses Twelver Shia networks unfolds at different spatial scales  – locally, nationally and transnationally  – and also transcends the physical parameters of these spaces by creating a ‘utopian’ space of a Shia religious imaginaire.

1 (Diaspora) Religion and Space Based on reconceptualization of space and place by Michel Foucault and Henri Lefebvre and their reception within human geography7 and the study of religions,8 Kim Knott, Manuel A. Vasquez and Thomas Tweed conceive a spatial methodology as analytical framework to study diasporic religious communities. Knott makes the

Enemies:‘Islamic Terrorism’in Political and Academic Discourse.”. On this discourse and its historical roots see: Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, 15–16, 22–24, 260. 5  Scharbrodt, “Shaping the Public Image of Islam: The Shiis of Ireland as “Moderate” Muslims.”; Olsson, “Shia as Internal Others: A Salafi Rejection of the ‘Rejecters’.” 6  The article is based on research in the borough of Brent, northwest London, between September 2014 and November 2016 as a part of a larger research project investigating transnational Twelver Shia networks operating between Britain and the Middle East. Ethnographic research was undertaken in Arabic, Persian and English and included participant observation at numerous religious gatherings in twelve community centres and five private homes, mostly located in Brent. As part of the research, 32 semi- and unstructured interviews and seven focus group discussions were conducted, primarily with the male elites within these networks and community centres. The research for this article was funded by a research grant of the Gerda Henkel Foundation for the project ‘Karbala in London’: Transnational Shia Networks between Britain and the Middle East. 7  Michel Foucault, “‘Des Espaces Autres’,” in Dits et écrits: 1954–1988 (Paris, France: Éditions Gallimard, 1994); Henri Lefebvre, La production de l’espace (Paris, France: Anthropos, 1974); Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1977). 8  Jonathan Z.  Smith, Map Is Not a Territory: Studies in the History of Religions (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1993); Kim Knott, The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis (London, UK: Equinox, 2005); Thomas A. Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion (Cambridge, MA - London, UK: Harvard University Press, 2006); Manuel A. Vásquez, More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion (Oxford, UK  - New  York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011).

5  Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia…

103

observation that diaspora and migration are themselves spatial terms describing the dispersal or movement of people from one place to another in order to propose a spatial methodology for the study of the history and politics of diaspora and migration.9 The particular challenge of studying diasporic communities in a globalized world of ‘time-space compression’10 or ‘distanciation’11 lies in their very multi-­ locality: they exist in a particular locality but are not restricted to a location because of their transnational connections. Based on postmodern theorists in human geography, Knott conceives place neither as mere local context or ‘passive container’12 which hosts particular religious communities nor as static locality demarcated by fixed boundaries of nation or community. To overcome the impression of a static and localised approach to the study of religious communities in a particular place, Knott prefers an understanding of space that is dynamic and multi-dimensional, containing, following Lefebvre - physical, social and discursive dimensions. Knott’s primary interest is in the spatial strategies religious communities adopt to enter the secular space of British society and in the spaces that religious communities create themselves in particular locations and the dynamics processes involved therein.13 Vasquez’ and Tweed’s foci lie in the global-local nexus and in the transnational connections of diasporic religious communities. Based on his study of a Marian shrine built by Catholic Cubans in Miami,14 Tweed distinguishes between three levels in which diasporic religions operate: 1. The locative: the actual shrine that Catholic Cubans built in Miami to maintain their Catholic-Cuban identity in the diasporic context of primarily Protestant America. 2. The trans-locative: the shrine faces Cuba and its murals depict the history of the country, thereby symbolising the horizontal connection of the diaspora to a real and imagined homeland. 3. The supra-locative: as the shrine is discursively construed as a space to connect vertically with God, it acts as a spatial representation of the soteriological and redemptive meanings the Cubans assign to their enforced exile. Nostalgic of pre-­ Communist Cuba, they conceive their exile as part of a wider cosmic struggle between good and evil. Despite its benefits, Tweed’s dimensions do not sufficiently pay attention to the power relations inherent to the formation of diasporic communities. Vasquez suggests an approach that introduces the notion of networks to illustrate both the locative, trans-locative and supra-locative dimensions of transnational diasporic  Knott, The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis, 3.  Vásquez, More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion, 280. 11  Ibid. 12  Knott, The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis, 7. 13  Ibid., 3. see also Kim Knott, “From Locality to Location and Back Again: A Spatial Journey in the Study of Religion,” Religion 39, no. 2 (2009). 14  Thomas A. Tweed, Our Lady of Exile: Diasporic Religion at a Catholic Shrine in Miami (Oxford, UK - New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997). 9

10

104

O. Scharbrodt

communities and the importance and persistence of power relations in their de-­ territorializing and re-territorializing dynamics. Vasquez defines networks as ‘social fields’15 to which individual actors have different access and entertain a diverse range of relations. Networks can be characterized by a high degree of institutionalization with clear hierarchies and membership criteria or be highly amorphous with permeable boundaries and decentralized patterns of authority. Despite their structural differences, networks delimitate trajectories of actions and discourses and serve as spaces that provide meaning to their members through shared practices, discourses, symbols, rituals etc. Their power relations manifest in conflicting claims to authority and status within these networks and in competition with other networks. They can also serve as alternative social spheres outside of state and society challenging ‘dominant secular readings of civil society and citizenship.’16 This article utilises Tweed’s distinction between the locative, trans-locative and supra-locative levels of diasporic religions and combines it with Knott’s and Vasquez’ contributions to investigate the role of transnational Shia networks in the creation of Shia spaces that are located in British society and engage in the British public sphere but also inhabit ‘a global public space’17 that transcends national boundaries. A number of Shia community centres of Iraqi and Iranian provenience will be introduced, and their locative, trans-locative and supra-locative dimensions discussed.

2 The Locative: Twelver Shia Networks in Brent The local context in which the Shia communities and networks are based is the London borough of Brent, in the north-west of the city. Brent, including the areas of Willesden Green, Kilburn, Cricklewood, Wembley, Neasdon, Kingsbury and Brondesbury, is one of the most multicultural areas in London with a long history of immigration, initially of Jews and Irish in the late nineteenth century; Kilburn has been referred to as ‘County Kilburn’, an extraterritorial county of Ireland in the spatial imaginaire of the Irish diaspora in London.18 Due to the later arrival of Afro-­ Caribbean, South Asian and Eastern European immigrants the majority of the population in Brent come from ethnic minority groups (64%, according to the 2011 Census).19 Brent together with Ealing and Kingston-upon-Thames is also the main area in London where Iraqis have settled since the 1970s and have continued to do

 Vásquez, More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion, 299.  Ibid., 302. 17  John Richard Bowen, “Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, no. 5 (2004): 880. 18  M.  C. Barrès-Baker, “A Brief History of the London Borough of Brent,” Brent Museum and Archives Occasional Publications 5 (2007): 14. 19  London Borough of Brent, The 2011 Census: A Profile of Brent (London, UK: Borough of Brent, 2013), 19. 15 16

5  Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia…

105

so as a result of their oppression under the regime of Saddam Hussein and also following the most recent sectarian violence post-2003.20 As a consequence of Iraqi settlement in the borough, Brent has become not just the European but one of the global hubs of transnational Shia Islam in the last 30 years. There at least 20 Shia community centres located in Brent representing different national backgrounds but also different religious and political factions within contemporary Shia Islam. These community centres, referred to in Arabic and Persian as husayniyya or imambarga in the South Asian context, are not mosques but congregational halls used for Shia commemoration ceremonies, in particular those associated with ‘Ashura’, the first ten days of the Islamic month of Muharram when Shias worldwide remember and mourn the death of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and third Imam Husayn on the plains of Karbala, in southern Iraq, in 680 CE. The particular uniqueness of Brent as a diasporic space is its concentration of a variety of Shia networks and communities. While Iraqi centres constitute the majority of networks present in Brent, other centres and initiatives are run by Iranians, Afghans, Gulf Arabs and South Asians. Given the history of migration and diverse environment of Brent, the strong presence of Shia institutions, centres and networks blends into the normality of the wider multicultural and multi-religious urban landscape of Brent. One does not notice the prominence of Shia religious institutions in Brent in particular as they are not necessarily visible as Shia institutions, but as Islamic centres located next to Sunni mosques, Buddhist and Hindu temples or synagogues. Within the spatial imaginaire of Shias living in London, however, Brent is known as the ‘Shia mile of London’, or as a pun on Brent’s designation as ‘People’s Republic of Brent’ due to its history of leftist politics in the 1970s and 80s, as the ‘Islamic Republic of Brent’. One of the oldest and most prominent organisations is the Al-Khoie Foundation which was established in 1989. It runs the Al-Sadiq and Al-Zahra schools which are independent boy and girl schools. In addition, it also hosts an academic outreach centre, the Centre for Academic Shi’a Studies which invites academics to its seminar series and is involved in publication activities of an academic nature. However, it is most notably known for its various outreach activities to the wider public having become in the eyes of the British public and government officials the quasi-­ official representation of Twelver Shia communities in Britain. The Al-Khoei Foundation is usually approached by the British government and its various departments for advise on issues affecting Shia Muslims in Britain and is also one of the founding member and only Shia organisation of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), an organisation founded after the London 7/7 bombings in 2005 in order to provide advice to mosque communities on how to meet professional standards in providing religious, pastoral and educational services to their

 It is not possible to provide reliable estimates of the number of Iraqis living in London as a whole or in the different boroughs where they are concentrated. Estimates suggest a total of around 250,000 Iraqis living in the whole of the UK. See: Monica Davey, “Iraqis from Far Home Sign up to Vote,” The New York Times, 19th January 2005. 20

106

O. Scharbrodt

congregations.21 On a local level, the Al-Khoei Foundation is involved in various interfaith initiatives such as the London Interfaith Centre, the Three Faiths Forum, the Faiths Forum London or the Brent Interfaith Network and other civic society actors such as the North London branch of Citizens UK.22 In representing Shia Islam in the British public arena, the Al-Khoei Foundation has been extremely successful and conceives itself as an organisation that seeks to achieve ‘community cohesion’23 and to represent Shia Muslims as an integrated part of British society. It thereby is also willing to push the boundaries of inter-­communal relations locally. In October 2016, under the umbrella of the Faiths Forum London, the Al-Khoei Foundation hosted the Jewish sukkot festival in partnership with the neighbouring Brondesbury Park United Synagogue, with volunteers from both communities building a wooden booth on the premises of the Al-Khoei Foundation. The event was presented in the media as ‘an historic first in the UK’,24 an ‘unprecedented partnership between a British mosque and synagogue’,25 as ‘a London Mosque has played host for a local synagogue’s succah’.26 This highly symbolic gesture to articulate the commitment of the Al-Khoei Foundation to break down barriers between Jews and Muslims in the UK was partially inspired by the rise of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic hate crimes following the Brexit referendum in June 2016. It was also meant to further buttress the moderate credentials of the Al-Khoei Foundation in a multicultural context in which ‘faith is projected as “bridging” capital, a common denominator of the universal signifiers of respect for difference and spirituality.’27 Activities as these also buttress the reputation and perception of the Al-Khoie Foundation as a ‘moderate’ voice within British Islam. The various outreach activities of the Al-Khoei Foundation illustrate its progressive and outward-looking character. The foundation also runs a religious congregation and community centre that holds religious events central to the Shia calendar. These events, held in the main hall of the community centre in Arabic, primarily attract middle-aged middle- and upper-class Iraqis. These quite traditional religious gatherings show that the Al-Khoei Foundation also caters to a significant extent for the religious and spiritual needs of a specific segment of the Iraqi Shia diaspora in London, upwardly mobile Iraqi Shias. In this respect, the Al-Khoie Foundation is a good example of the multivocality of diasporic religions being quite diasporic in  See its website, [accessed 28 September 2017].  Al-Khoie Foundation, Al-Sadiq and Al-Zahra Schools: Experience of Community Cohesion (London, UK: Al-Khoie Foundation), 8. 23  Ibid. 24  Justin Cohen, “London Mosque Hosts Jewish Community for Succot,” Jewish News Online, 24th October 2016. 25  “Constructing Cohesion: Sukkah Built at Mosque as Communities Come Together,” Asian Express Newspaper, 24th October 2016. 26  Cohen, “London Mosque Hosts Jewish Community for Succot.” 27  Seán McLoughlin and John Zavos, “Writing Religion in British Asian Diasporas,” in Writing the City in British Asian Diaspora, ed. Seán McLoughlin, et  al. (London, UK  - New  York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 175. 21 22

5  Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia…

107

terms of its religious activities directed towards a particular segment of their own community while appearing as a progressive and outward-looking voice in its public representation. These two sides of the foundation are also visible in the spatial separation between the offices of the foundation on one side of its compound and the actual congregation hall located on the other side in a former synagogue. Another community centre attracting a similar socio-economic group of the Iraqi Shia diaspora in London is Dar Al-Islam which is also the official representation of the Da’wa Party (hizb al-da’wa) in Britain, the most important Shia Islamist party in Iraq which was in government from 2005 until 2018.28 Having Iraqi Shia Islamists as its main constituency, Dar Al-Islam primarily attracts middle- and upper-class educated professionals. The particular connection between social status and the Dar al-Islam is evident in its interior decors. The main hall of the community centre is decorated with twelve granite blocks with the names of the twelve Imams inscribed on them in gold in English and Arabic. Unlike the Al-Khoie Foundation, Dar Al-Islam’s religious, political, educational and cultural activities primarily possess a diasporic character; engagement with the wider British public in the form of interfaith dialogue or local civic activism are not visible, as Dar Al-Islam has served as a local centre for politically active Iraqi Shias forced into exile during the regime of Saddam Hussein. Other Iraqi Shia centres in Brent similarly focus on catering for the spiritual and religious needs of their diasporic communities in an attempt to re-create the homeland abroad. The community centre Rasool Al-Adham thereby represents a different social segment and religious faction of the Iraqi Shia diaspora. When examining the demographics of the Rasool Al-Adham congregation social class and regional identity markers are clearly visible separating this congregation from other Iraqi Shia centres. Rasool Al-Adham primarily attracts a lower middle-class and working-­ class congregation. This is also visible in the space that the congregation used until 2016, Rasool Al-Adham was based in an old warehouse without the sophisticated and representative decors of other centres. Regional identity markers are equally important. Members of this congregation primarily come from Karbala, the Iraqi shrine city in which the third Shia Imam Husayn is buried. Being the followers of a prominent clerical family that originally hailed from Karbala, Muhammad Al-Shirazi (1928–2001) and his younger brother Sadiq Al-Shirazi (b. 1942), attendees of Rasool Al-Adham are also referred to as Shiraziyyin.29 The aforementioned community centres cater for the different social and regional segments of the Iraqi Shia diaspora in London providing religious services that initially aimed at re-creating religious life of Iraqi Shias in a diasporic context. Some of these centres have also begun to cater for the needs of the so-called second and third generation of Iraqi Shias whose main language is English and for whom

 Faleh A.  Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq (London, UK: Saqi, 2003), 77–142; Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008), 82–88. 29  Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, 88–99; Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq, 216–24. 28

108

O. Scharbrodt

the ritual activities conducted in Arabic and aimed at recreating the Shia religious life of Iraq are not appealing. The Al-Khoie Foundation runs activities in English and also a group of young Iraqi-British Shias associated with Rasool Al-Adham have organised religious activities in English since 2015 under the umbrella of the Al-Akbar Foundation. Other more established centres with a stronger diasporic identity have not provided such services. The diversity of Shia community centres requires new entrees into the Shia religious field of Brent to carve out a particular niche. New religious activists cannot rely on a particular religious constituency held together by political or clerical allegiances or regional backgrounds as the more established Iraqi Shia centres. Established in 2012, the Imam Al-Jawad Centre or Alsalam Foundation targets young British Shia in particular by offering programmes in English. The name of the centre after the ninth Imam Muhammad Al-Jawad (ca. 811–835) reflects the target audience of the centre: Muhammad Al-Jawad became Imam as an infant upon his father’s death at the age of seven or nine and also died very young, at the age of 25, having been poisoned by his wife, according to the Shia tradition. The age span of Imam Muhammad Al-Jawad’s term as Imam mirrors the target group of this centre. The centre also provides a more informal and interactive setting of religious instruction; rather than just listening to a religious lecture as in more traditional congregational Shia gatherings, members of the congregation can ask questions on issues that pertain their interests and reflect issues relevant to their lives as young Shia Muslims living in Britain. The Imam Al-Jawad Centre has also been engaged in academic outreach activities with its Centre for Shi’a Islamic Studies (established in 2007) that has run a seminar series with lectures by prominent academics in the field of Shia Islamic Studies and has intermittently published a magazine and also a number of research publications. As such, the Imam Al-Jawad Centre has not only reached out to young British Shias whose language needs were not sufficiently catered for by other centres at the time of its foundation but also to the academic world with the aim to link traditional religious scholarship in Shia Islam with academic research at Western universities. The majority of Shia centres in Brent have an Iraqi background. Although the majority of the Iranian diaspora in Britain tends to be secular or even explicitly anti-­ Islamic,30 having arrived after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Iranian networks equally play an important role in the ‘Shia mile of London’. The first Iranian Shia community centre established in London is, however, located outside of Brent. The Islamic Universal Association of London (majma’-i islami-yi jahani), also known the Holland Park Mosque, was opened in 1974 in the affluent area of Holland Park in the Royal Borough of Chelsea and Kensington to provide religious and educational services for Iranian Shias living in this upscale part of west London. The Holland Park Mosque was founded by a son of Mohammad Reza Golpaygani

 Reza Gholami, Secularism and Identity: Non-Islamiosity in the Iranian Diaspora (London, UK New York, NY: Routledge, 2015). 30

5  Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia…

109

(1899–1993), a senior Iranian clerical figure at the time of the Islamic Revolution.31 Given its central London location, the Holland Park Mosque caters for Shias of a variety of backgrounds: Persian- and Arabic-speaking but also other nationalities and therefore runs its programmes in Persian, Arabic and English. As one of the few mosques in the area, its Friday midday prayers and sermons are also attended by Sunni Muslims; this is markedly different to the Shia centres discussed above which only cater for Shia Muslims. The Holland Park Mosque is an ‘independent’ organisation without official links to the Iranian government, though it is not opposed to the Islamic Republic either. The Islamic Centre of England, located in Maida Vale not far from the main Iraqi Shia centres in Brent, is the official representation of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Khamenei, with its clerical leader being his representative in the country. The Islamic Centre of England is one of the largest Shia centres in London providing a number of educational, religious, pastoral and charitable services, publishing various magazines and running conferences and interfaith and intra-faith meetings. Financial resources provided by the office of the Iranian Supreme Leader makes this centre one of the financially most robust in the UK. As the actual number of practising Iranian Shia Muslims would not warrant such a centre, the Islamic Centre of England, as the name suggests as well, has a much wider appeal catering for Shia Muslims of a variety of backgrounds and projecting itself as the main reference point for the Shia if not the wider Muslim population in the country. Religious activities are provided in Persian and also in Arabic and Urdu on religious occasions. Lectures and activities in English are held at the nearby Iranian school which is run by the Iranian embassy for the Iranian expatriate community. A particular focus of the centre’s activities is Shia-Catholic dialogue, initiated through personal contacts of the resident imam leading to a number of high-profile interfaith meetings and publications in London and Qom in Iran.32 Furthermore, the Islamic Centre of England is the only Shia centre providing sustained and systematic support services for converts to Shia Islam, running training courses and other activities for them. A particular focus is thereby support for converts to Shia Islam of an African background who often feel most marginalized in the Shia religious field of London which is dominated by community centres catering for particular ethnic groups and serving their linguistic needs. Apart from Iranian centres with official links to clerical authorities or the government in Iran, there are also private initiatives of Iranian Shia Muslims who organise religious activities and gatherings on certain occasions outside of official centres. One of such an initiative is run by Iranian Shias living in the Brent and surrounding areas who have organised religious events and gatherings with lectures and ritual practices performed in Persian since 2012. Not having a centre of their own, this groups uses different venues for its activities. The group usually invites a prominent speaker from

 On the history see: [accessed 28 September 2017].   See personal profile of Ali Shomali [accessed 28 September 2017]. 31 32

110

O. Scharbrodt

Iran to deliver a lecture, in 2015 and 2016 Sheikh Manaqebi, from a prominent clerical family. While attendees of gatherings organised by this group are not opposed to the Islamic Republic, it is quite clear they intend to create a ‘non-­political’ space for Iranian Shias outside of the major government-sponsored Islamic Centre of England, among other reasons also to attract members of the Iranian diaspora who are not entirely irreligious or are interested in re-discovering their Shia identity but would only do so outside of an organisational context sponsored by the Iranian government. The sample of Iranian and Iraqi centres presented above engage and position themselves in various ways in their local context. In terms of public engagement at both local and national level, the Al-Khoei Foundation is rather exceptional in the surveyed sample as being the most successful in representing Shia communities to the wider public, the media and the government and being involved in various local and national interfaith and civic engagement platforms. In this sense, the Al-Khoie Foundation has acquired a certain monopoly over the representation of Shia Islam in the British public sphere. The other more established Iraqi centres tend to cater similarly for particular segments of the Iraqi Shia diaspora located in Brent of different political orientations, socio-economic status or regional backgrounds. Nevertheless, the established centres had to realise the necessity to broaden the scope of their activities by offering English language programmes to address the specific needs of the so-called second generation whose primary language is English. Many centres, often after some internal opposition within the ‘old guard’, have branched out and provided programmes in English. The Islamic Centre of England has been quite unique in its deliberate effort to cater for a very broad spectrum of the local Shia community offering services in four different languages and providing support and training and programmes for communal inclusion of converts, in particular of an African background. Hence, locative agency of the Twelver Shia community centres surveyed differs and ranges from a purely diasporic recreation of the homeland to programmes tailored for a wider range of members of the local communities outside specific ethnic groups and inclusive of young British Shias to engagement with the wider public, government officials and academic researchers.

3 The Trans-locative: The Transnational Reach of Clerical Authorities and ‘Long-Distance Nationalism’ Trans-locative agency unfolds in two variants: the transnational and global reach of senior clerical authorities based in Iraq and Iran33 and ‘long-distance nationalism’.34 Unlike Sunni Islam, Shia Islam possesses fairly formalised structures of religious

 Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, 69–82.; see also Elvire Corboz, Guardians of Shi’ism: Sacred Authority and Transnational Family Networks (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 34  Benedict Anderson and Gail Kligman, Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics (Berkeley, CA: Centre for German and European Studies, University of 33

5  Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia…

111

authority including a hierarchy based on scholarly seniority and experience. On top of the clerical hierarchy stands the ultimate ‘sources of emulation’ (maraji’, sing. marja’ al-taqlid), the most senior Shia clerics, referred to as grand ayatollah (ayat allah al- ‘uzma), most of whom are based in the shrine cities of Najaf in southern Iraq and Qom in Iran. Lay Shias have to choose one recognised senior cleric as their source of emulation, follow his religious and legal interpretations and are expected to pay special religious tithes (khums) to them.35 The most prominent senior clerics run offices (bayt in Arabic, daftar in Persian) which include a network of representatives (wukala’) that communicate the views and legal injunctions of senior clerics to their followers in different parts of the world and are also entitled to collect the religious tithes on their behalves. Personal representatives usually possess an agreement with the senior clerics allowing them to retain a certain percentage of these tithes for their own religious activities and personal upkeep. Brent hosts a number of offices representing different Shia clerics. The most influential senior Shia cleric, Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani (b. 1930) has two offices in Brent that are run by two of his sons in law, the Imam Ali Foundation by London-based Murtadha Kashmiri and the Al Al-Bayt Foundation by Jawad Shahrestani who heads Sistani’s office in Qom, Iran. The Islamic Centre of England acts of the official representation of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, in the UK. Other senior clerical offices run offices representing them in the area as well. The Najaf-­ based senior cleric Muhammad Al-Fayyad (b. 1930) has an office in the Al-Khoei Foundation. Apart from offices and centres representing senior clerical figures based in Iran and Iraq in London and the UK, connections to and current and past links with senior clerics also fulfils the role of emboldening the reputation and communal standing of a centre, in particular in the process of establishing a new one. For instance, the resident imam of the Al-Jawad Centre follows Sistani and emphasises its allegiance to him to buttress its religious legitimacy within the communities in London. Ensuring clerical approval is particularly important for new centres or for those targeting or involving young Shias. Shabab Al-Sibtayn, a Shia youth organisation running religious events and gatherings at different centres in Brent, similar seeks support from local clerical figures representing religious authorities in the Middle East. In October 2016, leaders of the organisation visited Mohammad Ali Shomali, the  then UK representative of the Supreme Leader of Iran, and Fadhil Milani, one of the most senior clerics in the UK and representative of Sistani, based in the Al-Khoie Foundation, and posted photos of their visit on their social media outlets to illustrate the support they have from ‘two of the most prominent scholars & leader of the Shia community in London.’36 More established centres equally refer to their links to senior clerical figures to underscore their religious credentials.

California, 1992). 35  Linda S. Walbridge, The Most Learned of the Shi‘a: The Institution of the Marja‘ Taqlid (New York, NY - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3–16. 36  See [accessed 28 September 2017].

112

O. Scharbrodt

The Holland Park Mosque, for example, emphasises its historical connection to Mohammad Reza Golpaygani whose son founded the community centre, given his scholarly standing that has outlasted his death.37 The transnational reach of clerical figures can also change, in particular with a death of a senior cleric. The Al-Khoie Foundation is a particularly good example of this transformation. Established in 1989 to manage the two independent schools on its premises, it turned into the global headquarters of Abu Al-Qasim Al-Khoie (1899–1992), the most senior Shia cleric based in Najaf in the latter half of the twentieth century and teacher of many prominent contemporary Shia clerics such as Sistani and Fayyad. Given the oppression of Iraqi Shias following their uprising in southern Iraq in 1991, the assets of Al-Khoie’s clerical network were moved to London to the foundation established under his name. Until his death in 1992, the Al-Khoie Foundation in London acted as the global headquarters and official representation of himself and his clerical network. With his demise, however, the foundation had to re-invent itself. While the connection of the foundation to the Al-Khoie family is secured by its statutes’ stipulation that its director had to be a patrilineal male descendent of Al-Khoie, currently, the foundation is run by one of his sons -,38 as an organisation it had re-invented itself as a transnational NGO with various branches across the globe running community centres, schools and orphanages in Paris, New  York, Montreal, Mumbai, Islamabad, Bangkok, Najaf, Mashhad and Qom.39 In addition to its prominent local and national role, internationally, it is well-­ connected to organizations such as the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, making regular interventions in its sessions, the Jordanian Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, established by Hasan ibn Talal, and Ali Al-Hashimi, the judicial and religious advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates. These two latter relations have resulted in the Al-Khoei Foundation being involved in high-profile international interfaith and Sunni-Shia intra-faith dialogue events in the past.40 In addition to their past and present connections to transnational clerical networks, the Shia community centres in Brent are likewise engaged in ‘long-distance nationalism’ in their activities of which Dar Al-Islam is a particularly good example. As the London and UK headquarters of the Da’wa Party, it has been one of the main sites of diasporic politics of Iraqi Shia Islamists in exile and still retains an important role as conduit between the Iraqi governing party and Iraqis living in London. Many members and attendees of Dar Al-Islam have returned to Iraq and assumed important political, economic or cultural roles. Iraqis refer these exiles who have returned to their country after 2003 as ‘the people of London’ (ahl

 The current homepage of the association is flanked by photographs of Golpaygani and the current resident imam on each side. See [accessed 28 September 2017]. 38  Elvire Corboz, “The Al-Khoie Foundation and the Transnational Institutionalisation of Ayatollah Al-Khui’i’s Marja’iyya’,” in Shi’i Islam and Identity: Religion, Politics and Change in the Global Muslim Community, ed. Lloyd Ridgeon (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 93–112. 39  Al-Khoie Foundation, Mu’assasat Al-Imam Al-Khu’i Al-Khayriyya (London, UK: Al-Khoie Foundation, 2015), 99–149. 40  Ibid., 86–88. 37

5  Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia…

113

london) or more generally as ‘Iraqis from abroad’ (‘iraqiyyin min barra). The former prime minister of Iraq Haider Al-Abadi (b. 1952) lived many decades in Brent and was affiliated to the centre, its former resident scholar and imam returned to Iraq to establish a private university, and other members now hold positions in government departments in Iraq. From the setup of the centre, it is not really visible that this congregation is affiliated to the Da’wa Party; it does not exhibit any Iraqi flags or other symbols of Iraqi national identity nor any images, slogans or logos of the party as such. One can only observe indirect signs suggesting a connection to the main Iraqi Shia Islamist party. On the office walls of the director of the congregation are photographs of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr (1935–1980) who was the founder of the party and of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935–2010) who acted as the clerical authority for many members of Da’wa Party.41 When entering the main hall of the centre a sign containing the slogan hayhat minna dhilla (‘we will never succumb’) is exhibited. This slogan has been attributed to Imam Husayn and his followers, expressing their refusal to surrender to the ruling dynasty, and is an important rallying cry for contemporary Shia Islamist movements, articulating their resistance to oppression Shia Muslims experience today. While the affiliation with the Da’wa Party is not very apparent and the Dar Al-Islam serves as a conventional congregational hall, differences to other centres can be observed. It is noticeable that during major Shia events and their celebration or commemoration in the centre, that actual commemorative gathering with a sermon and devotional practices is not that well attended. The majority of male attendees roam around in the lobby or move from the main hall to the lobby to engage in conversations and socializing. For many attendees, the role of Dar Al-Islam as the London base for Iraq’s governing party makes it an important site for political, business-related or cultural networking. On certain occasions, the affiliation of Dar al-Islam to the Da’wa Party becomes more apparent. When Sheikh Mohammad Mehdi Al-Asefi (1937/38–2015), former spokesperson of the party and representative of the Supreme Leader of Iran in Iraq, passed away on 4 June 2015, a memorial gathering was held in the community centre. Standing posters with the logo of the Da’wa Party were erected while a speaker gave an outline of his biography and political achievements for the party and for ‘the Islamic movement (al-haraka al-­ islamiyya)’ more generally. The transnational networking of diasporic communities can entail and articulate various modes of ‘religious resistance to globalized modernity.’42 As an Islamist party (albeit of Shia provenance), the Da’wa Party shares similar ideological roots with Sunni Islamist movements and retains the pan-Islamic appeal of political Islam to a certain extent. This also becomes manifest in the more political activities held at Dar Al-Islam. In June 2015, the centre hosted a conference organized by the Islamic Unity Forum (muntada al-wahda al-islamiyya), a London-based

 Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, 85, 200; Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq, 288–89. 42  McLoughlin and Zavos, “Writing Religion in British Asian Diasporas,” 170. 41

114

O. Scharbrodt

organization bringing Shia and Sunni Islamist activists together. A recurring theme of the conference was the need for unified Muslim resistance against Western imperialism and its ‘politics of division (siyasat al-taqsim)’, evident historically in the division of the Middle East following the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the creation of Israel and the current Saudi-led war against Yemen. In an effort to overcome sectarian fault lines so prominent in the Middle East post-Arab Spring, speakers of Sunni and Shia backgrounds repudiated the rise of sectarianism on either side and promoted Islamic unity to counter Western geopolitical hegemony. Zionism, in particular, was blamed as ‘the reason for the divisions among Muslims (sabab ikhtilaf bayna al-muslimin) and among the Shia in particular (wa-bayna al-shi’a khassatan)’. Dar Al-Islam exhibits a strong sense of ‘long-distance nationalism’ among the Brent Shia congregations and oscillates in its activities between the promotion of sectarian discourses and politics within an Iraqi context and a sense of pan-Islamic anti-imperialist resistance to Western hegemony. Other congregations engage in other less political forms of ‘long-distance nationalism’, promoting an Iraqi Shia diasporic consciousness with more religio-cultural overtones. Regional identity markers and the desire to re-create the homeland in the diaspora are evident in the activities of the Al-Husseini Association (al-majlis al-husayni), referred to as ‘Balaghiyyeh’, which is run by the Balaghi family from southern Iraq. In the past, the family rented a tent (khayma husayniyya) to hold gatherings, but since 2014 it has used an old warehouse as the location for its activities. The Balaghiyyeh is a good example of the spatial extension43 religious diasporas undertake. In its religious gatherings, the Balaghiyyeh connects Brent with southern Iraq by recreating the rituals, discourses and overall atmosphere of a commemorative gathering in the homeland; speakers are invited from either Iraq or other countries in the Gulf and there is a strong emphasis on the role Shia rituals play in maintaining the emotional and imagined link with the homeland. The Balaghiyyeh attracts first generation émigrés from Iraq but also a significant young audience consisting of recent arrivals that have fled Iraq after 2003.

4 The Supra-locative: The Discursive Creation of a Shia Religious imaginaire For Tweed, the supra-locative is understood as a reference to discursive and ideational conceptions of ‘home’ as a space that transcends both the locative and the trans-locative. In this context, home entails both ‘a realm of concrete locality and everyday experience’ and ‘a more ideational, symbolic or discursive realm.’44

 Knott, “From Locality to Location and Back Again: A Spatial Journey in the Study of Religion,” 156. 44  Femke Stock, “Home and Memory,” in Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities, ed. Kim Knott and Seán McLoughlin (London, UK: Zed Books, 2010), 26. 43

5  Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia…

115

Vertovec defines diaspora as ‘an imagined connection’45 with the place of origin or a wider community which can be real but is also imagined in the sense that it purports strong emotive connotations and is based on collective memory.46 The Shia historical experience of marginalization and of being a minority within Islam has created distinctive collective mnemonic dynamics in the supra-locative religious imaginaire of Shias. To investigate how supra-locative agency unfolds among Twelver Shia networks based in Brent, the discourses of lectures given during ‘Ashura’ in the examined community centres will be discussed. The first ten days of the Islamic month of Muharram, known as ‘Ashura’, constitute the peak of the Shia religious calendar. During these days, Shias across the world remember the martyrdom of Imam Husayn on the plains of Karbala, in southern Iraq, in 680 CE when he and his family and entourage were killed by the forces of the Umayyad caliph Yazid. ‘Ashura’ memorial gatherings (majlis al- ‘aza) are usually held in the evening and include a fairly fixed format with some cultural variations among different ethnic groups. Five major rituals constitute the set of events during ‘Ashura’ memorial gatherings: a memorial lecture re-narrates the events on each of the ten days culminating in the re-narration of the killing of Imam Husayn (maqtal) on the tenth day of ‘Ashura. The lecture is followed by rhythmic self-beating of the congregation (latmiyya) to articulate grief while devotional poetry is recited in praise of Imam Husayn, his entourage and other members of the family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt). Certain groups engage in self-flagellation (tatbir) on the tenth day of ‘Ashura’ to commemorate the actual killing of Imam Husayn. Passion plays, whether in the form of the more elaborate and professionalized Iranian ta’ziyeh performances or the more rudimentary and amateurish tashabih of Iraqi and other Gulf Arab Shias, re-enact scenes of the battlefield in Karbala and its aftermath. Finally, mourning processions on the day of ‘Ashura’ and visiting the tomb of Imam Husayn in Karbala, preferably 40  days after his death (arba’in), conclude the mourning period in the Shia religious calendar.47 The concentration of different Shia centres in Brent leads to a vast array of activities in the 20 or so permanent community centres with certain groups hiring venues for the occasion, and many memorial gatherings are held in private homes as well. Memorial gatherings in the different centres are often scheduled at slightly different times allowing local Shias to attend events at two to three centres in one evening. While the numerical and organisational strength of the Shia presence is usually not visible in Brent, during the evenings of ‘Ashura’ a stream of Shias can be observed moving from one centre to another. Private gatherings are usually held in the mornings. The ‘Ashura’ commemorations have historically played a central role in  Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism (London, UK - New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 136.  Mihran Dabag and Kristin Platt, “Diaspora und das kollektive Gedächtnis: Zur Konstruktion kollektiver Identitäten in der Diaspora,” in Identität in der Fremde, ed. Mihran Dabag and Kristin Platt (Bochum, Germany: Universitätsverlag Dr. Norbert Brockmeyer, 1993), 125–31. 47  Itzhak Nakash, “The Muharram Rituals and the Cult of Saints among Iraqi Shiites,” in The Other Shiites: From the Mediterranean to Central Asia, ed. Alessandro Monsutti, et al. (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2007), 115–37. 45 46

116

O. Scharbrodt

forging and maintaining a distinct Shia identity. For the Iraqi Shias in the diaspora in particular these gatherings have gained further significance as most these rituals and their public performance were banned during the regime of Saddam Hussein. The diaspora provided many Iraqi Shias with the opportunity to practice their particular religious identity freely and openly.48 Observing the memorial lectures provides a good opportunity to observe locative, trans-locative and supra-locative discourses in different community centres which usually invite external speakers and poetry reciters (radud, mulla) during ‘Ashura’ and compete among another to attract the most popular speakers and reciters. The actual memorial lecture is given by a scholar with some formal religious training. The lecture re-narrates or refers to particular events of Karbala and can deduce a general moral and spiritual message out of this which is further supported by references to the Qur’an and Shia hadith collections. Very often, the lecture applies specific Karbala events to current local, national and transnational contexts and circumstances and may have overt or implicit political connotations. This technique of applying the ‘Karbala paradigm’,49 a narrative of a righteous and innocent man, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, making a futile stand against an oppressive and illegitimate ruler and the ultimate sacrifice, is referred as nuzul (lit. ‘descent’) in Arabic and goriz (lit. ‘projection’) in Persian.50 The centre and its political orientation, the ethnic and socio-economic demographics of its congregation and concomitant expectations and the style and ideological orientation of the speaker determine to what extent and in which way nuzul or goriz is applied. The following examples observed during fieldwork from 2014 and 2016 give an idea of the different ways the Karbala narrative is framed by speakers at the major community centres introduced above. In 2014, the Al-Khoie Foundation invited an Iraqi speaker, based in Denmark, who, addressing a well-educated middle−/upper-­ class congregation, gave an eloquent and intellectualized account of the early days of the events leading up to the martyrdom of Imam Husayn. The speaker discussed the notion of ‘emigration’ (hijra) in Islamic history as well as in the history of other religions. The initiation of Imam Husayn’s campaign, leaving Medina to Karbala, was likened to the hijra of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, the exodus of Abraham from his hometown, of Moses and the Israelites from Egypt to the Holy Land, or the emigration of Imam ‘Ali from Medina to take up his residence in Kufa. According to the speaker, love for the homeland is encouraged and leaving it discouraged (makruh), when proper Islamic institutions such as mosques and seminaries exist, and it is possible to practise Islam. However, emigration (hijra) is required when it is not possible to practise Islam anymore in a particular location and the very existence of Islam depends on emigrating to another location, as was

 Yafa Shanneik, “Remembering Karbala in the Diaspora: Religious Rituals among Iraqi Shii Women in Ireland,” Religion 45, no. 1 (2015): 90. 49  Michael Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 19–26. 50  On goriz see: Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2014), 47. 48

5  Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia…

117

the case with the early Muslims’ emigration from Mecca to Medina and also with Imam Husayn when he had to leave Medina as he refused to pay allegiance to the illegitimate authority of the Umayyad caliph. As such, Imam Husayn fulfilled a trans-historical prophetic and soteriological paradigm with his own exodus ensuring the survival of ‘authentic’ Islam, its spiritual purification and the salvation of his followers. The speaker thereby moulded his presentation around different discursive layers; Imam Husayn’s own actions are likened with an interreligious prophetic paradigm, while at the same time mirroring the specific migratory experiences of the congregation, he was addressing who had to leave Iraq and to move abroad as they could not practice their religion in their country of origin freely at the time of Saddam Hussein. The ‘Ashura’ commemorations from 2014 and 2016 were situated in the context of the post-Arab Spring sectarianizing of Middle Eastern geopolitics, the rise of ISIS, the governmental crackdown of Shia dissent in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and the European migrant and refugee crisis of the summer of 2015. Hence, many lectures responded explicitly or implicitly to these events and their repercussions on Shias in the Middle East and Europe. Some speakers framed their interpretation of unfolding events by relating them to the events of Karbala. The extent to which they read events through a sectarian lens or politicized the Karbala narrative differed. The speaker in Dar Al-Islam of 2014, for instance, enumerated the motifs for Imam Husayn’s campaign; he fulfilled the will of God by sacrificing himself and intended to make a stand against the Umayyad dynasty whose rules was marked by corruption (fasa’id) and terror (irhab). While the speaker did not make any overt references to current events and the rise of ISIS, his choice of words characterizing the Umayyads presents ISIS as their latter-day manifestation. The analogy between the Umayyad dynasty and ISIS became more apparent when he referred to the first Umayyad caliph Mu’awiya who killed his opponents and then engaged in sexual intercourse with their widows - an anecdote that resonates with the actions of ISIS fighters who enslaved the daughters and wives of Yezidis after having killed their fathers and husbands. A much more explicit sectarian tone was adopted by the speaker at Rasool Al-Adham, the community centre of the Shiraziyyin. His series of memorial lectures was entitled ‘school of terror (madrasat al-irhab)’ of which ISIS is but one of the latest manifestations. However, for the speaker ISIS is not just a contemporary product of the perversion of the Umayyad dynasty, which also holds an ambivalent position in Sunni historiography. The ‘school of terror’ is a veiled reference to Sunni Islam more generally and its inherent deficiency resulting from its rejection of the infallible guidance of the family of the Prophet and the Shia Imams. As a consequence, Sunni Islam is bound to degenerate as ISIS most plainly illustrates. The rise of ISIS is used to underscore the supra-locative contestation that only Shias as adherents to the school of the family of the Prophet follow true Islam. A young speaker addressing young Shias in an English-language gathering linked different discursive layers in his memorial lecture, oscillating between salient doctrinal points and political polemics. He began with an attack on Sufism and the metaphorical reading of heaven and hell in some of its expressions. For him,

118

O. Scharbrodt

considering heaven and hell as mere metaphors equals the negation of the eschatological promise of reward and punishment. It would be impossible to assume that brutal dictators like Hitler, Stalin, Saddam Hussein, the Al-Saud dynasty in Saudi Arabia or the Khalifa family ruling Bahrain would not be punished in hell for their sins. In addition, heaven and hell are real physical places and the delights or suffering felt are real and concrete. The speaker compared the pain felt in hell with the pain Shia activists in Bahrain felt while being tortured in prison. He detailed how during their torture sessions a medical doctor was present to induce as much pain to the detainees as possible just stopping short of killing them. What began as a general discourse on eschatology and turned into a denunciation of Sufism, concluded in an attack on the ruling dynasties of the Gulf monarchies and their anti-Shia policies. The Islamic Centre of England runs three different memorial gatherings on its premises each evening during ‘Ashura’, in Persian, Arabic and Urdu. The speaker at the Arabic gathering in 2014 switched in his lecture between Arabic and English. His English interventions addressed young Shias in the audience urging them to integrate into European societies and to become civic actors. In Arabic, he engaged in a defence of wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent), the underlying ideological foundation developed by Ayatollah Khomeini and undergirding the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.51 Responding to those Shias who deny or question the ‘blessings (barakat)’ of wilayat al-faqih and consider Iran, its ideological reading of Shia Islam and its policies as harming Shia communities across the world, the speaker presented Iran as the regional and global guardian of Shia communities. In the regional context of the Middle East, he suggested that Shia communities in Bahrain, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon should form a loose political and military union under the leadership of Iran in order to ensure their survival against the onslaught of radical militant Sunni movements such as ISIS.  The discursive shifting between the trans-locative and supra-locative, responding to events in the Middle East, articulated a sense of a supra-locative unity of the Shia ummah and suggested the political formation of a ‘Shia international’.52 The speaker navigated between the local context of British society and the need to integrate therein, the transnational impact of regional events in the Middle East while also appealing to a supra-locative imaginaire of Shia unity which requires at present its articulation in a political formation. Moving between different spatial and temporal contexts can also yield tensions in the discursive formation of memorial lectures. The organisers of the Balaghiyyeh follow the clerical leadership of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, and his London representative and son-in-law Murtadha Kashmiri regularly attends and speaks at

 Khomeini developed the argument that the most learned Shia cleric is not only the ultimate source of religious guidance but ought to become the head of an Islamic state. On his concept see: Norman Calder, “Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi’i Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the Classical Tradition,” Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 1 (1982): 3–20. 52  Chibli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi‘I International, second ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 51

5  Creating Shia Spaces in British Society: The Role of Transnational Twelver Shia…

119

the gatherings and also uses the facilities of Balaghiyyeh for events of his own Imam Ali Foundation. In one of his talks, given during ‘Ashura’ in 2015, he was critical of young Iraqis leaving their country, ‘the country of the Commander of the Faithful [Imam Ali] (balad amir al-mu’minin).’ This statement was motivated by the migrant and refugee crisis Europe experienced in the summer of 2015 which also included the influx of Iraqis fleeing so-called Islamic State. At the same time, Kashmiri also acknowledged the particular challenges of raising Shias in the diaspora, stressing the importance of learning Arabic as ‘the language of our creed (lughat ‘aqidatuna).’ In 2016, in one of first nights of ‘Ashura’ of that season, Kashmiri emphasised the role young Shias in the West play as representatives of Islam and as role-models for Shia Islam who should aspire to the highest moral standards and follow the laws of Islam while at the same time adhering to the laws of the country in which they reside. In these statements, the locative and trans-­ locative orientation of diasporic communities and subsequent tensions come to the fore: the Balaghiyyeh recreates an Iraqi Shia ritual universe in the diaspora and invites representatives of clerical authorities in Iraq to communicate its views on current affairs (such as a reprimand to young Iraqis leaving their country). At the same time, it is also used as a space to remind young Shias living in London of the core elements of their religion and their responsibilities as a minority community in the West. As these examples illustrate the discourses during ‘Ashura’ memorial lectures oscillate between the locative, trans-locative and supra-locative, reveal different levels of politicization and contain covert or overt sectarian undertones. Multiple spatial and temporal reference points are simultaneously utilised; the past, mythico-historical events of Karbala, is re-narrated and re-framed to deliver a more generic spiritual or moral lesson or to respond to current events and challenges. Spatially, the discourses address the particular responsibilities enjoined on Shia minorities in the West to represent their religion to a public sceptical of if not hostile to Islam, events in the Middle East and their global repercussions and the construction of a supra-locative Shia ummah that is mythically anchored around the Karbala paradigm and manifest in an imagined ‘Shia international’.

5 Conclusion Pnina Werbner develops the notion of ‘complex diasporas’ to articulate their ‘social heterogeneity’,53 the convergence and co-existence of different, often mutually exclusive, discourses in diasporic communities, the dynamic and chaordic processes involved in their formations, and their ‘dual orientation’54: their efforts to represent

 Pnina Werbner, “Complex Diasporas,” in Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities, ed. Kim Knott and Seán McLoughlin (London, UK: Zed Books, 2010), 74. 54  Ibid. 53

120

O. Scharbrodt

their communities and to be recognised as such in the new diasporic context while at the same time maintaining transnational links and the community’s diasporic identity. The examples of transnational Twelver Shia networks, located in Brent, London, and operating between Britain and the Middle East, illustrate the multi-­ spatial and multi-temporal formation of diasporic communities. The religious field in the ‘Shia mile of London’ contains locative, trans-locative and supra-locative elements; communities engage with the local environment either by becoming an active civic actor in the local and national field or by providing religious and educational services for a young generation of English-speaking British Shias. Their transnational connections become visible in their often-crucial links to clerical authorities, based in the Middle East, which might have a purely nominal character but are still seen as essential to ensure communal religious legitimacy. Networks are also involved in ‘long-distance nationalism’ as active sites of diasporic politics, as spaces that re-create the ‘homeland’ in the diaspora or as organizations that engage with and respond to events in the Middle East. Finally, the discursive creation of an appeal to a global Shia ummah, a supra-locative imaginaire of a global unity of Shias, further illustrates how these networks transcend the local, national and transnational limitations of the spaces they inhabit. As such, Twelver Shia networks in Brent are ‘both ethnic-parochial and cosmopolitan.’

Part II

Expressions of Personal Identity

Chapter 6

British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground of Discourse and Praxis Carl Morris

During the early part of the last decade, there was a sudden increase in the cultural output of a number of young Muslim musicians in Britain. Since the late 1990s, these musicians had been producing Islamically informed popular music, from hip-­ hop to pop-syncretism, that reached a zenith of critical success in 2005 with Sami Yusuf’s globally successful multimillion selling album My Ummah. With the support of a developing business and media infrastructure, including Islamic recording companies,1 they have continued to develop a Muslim musical subculture in the UK.2 While often divergent in terms of musical practice, style and cultural background, these musicians nonetheless share a religious platform and act as vocal advocates for their faith. This public position has brought with it an inevitable debate concerning Islamic views on the permissibility of music. Despite a long tradition of music and spoken word performance in the Islamic world, there have been long-standing religious tensions concerning the use of instrumentation and the moral content of music. These debates in Britain are additionally inflected with wider concerns relating to minority status, cultural distinctiveness and the complex understandings of authority among religiously diverse Muslim communities. In this chapter, I draw on original fieldwork to consider the contested nature of religious discourse and musical practice for Muslims in Britain. While I explore the

 Carl Morris, “Music and Materialism: The Emergence of Alternative Muslim Lifestyle Cultures in Britain,” in Material Religion, ed. Tim Hutchings and Jo McKenzie (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). 2  “‘Look into the Book of Life’: Muslim Musicians, Sufism and Postmodern Spirituality in Britain,” Social Compass 63, no. 3 (2016); “Finding a Voice: Young Muslims, Music and Cultural Change in Britain,” in Young British Muslims: Rhetoric and Realities, ed. S.  Hamid (London, UK  – New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). 1

C. Morris (*) University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_6

123

124

C. Morris

specific religious debates regarding music and wider views concerning the permissibility of instrumentation, including the role of Muslim ‘ulama, I focus in particular on how these discourses interact with practice. I suggest that Muslim musicians exhibit strong tendencies of strategic activity in relation to their musical practice. This includes a critical and reciprocal relationship with religious authority that is buttressed by an emphasis on personal pedagogy. The ethnographic work for this chapter was conducted across the UK between 2010 and 2013, with an emphasis on the accounts and worldviews of those who participated. Methods included 22 semi-structured interviews (with musicians and other participants), participant observation at music and performance events across the country and an online survey that was distributed through social media to British Muslims in this cultural milieu (there were 83 responses to this survey). The musicians discussed in this chapter are stylistically diverse, from hip-hop to nasheeds (religious songs), but are all public figures who have, in some way, penetrated the Muslim media market (magazines, television, etc.). They are therefore analytically significant in terms of their wider social and cultural influence. In the first section, I offer a brief overview of Islamic debates relating to music to provide necessary context for later discussions. In the second section, I discuss empirical findings concerning the views of British Muslims on music, instrumentation and performance. While by no means conclusive or quantitatively extensive, this material suggests that there is a spectrum of opinion rather than a clear divide over the permissibility of music. In the third and final section, I consider the ways through which Muslim musicians engage with religious authority. I suggest that these musicians draw from Islamic scholasticism while filtering this learning through their own critical faculties. This pedagogical process, when coupled with the evident public profile possessed by musicians, can result in their de facto elevation to an important position of lay religious authority.

1 Islam and Music: A Contested Tradition On the whole, debates concerning Islam and the permissibility of music have been adequately covered by a range of scholars.3 Here, I only attempt to very briefly summarise this wider discourse and merely as an introduction to original material concerning British Muslim views on music. It is worth considering that, while the  For example: Isma‘il al Faruqi, R. and Lois Lamya al Faruqi, The Cultural Atlas of Islam (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing, 1986); Lois Ibsen Al Faruqi, Islam and Art (Islamabad: National Hijra Council, 1985); Kristina Nelson, The Art of Reciting the Qur’an (Cairo, Egypt: American University in Cairo Press, 2001); Anne Rasmussen, Women, the Recited Qur’an, and Islamic Music in Indonesia (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 2010); Amnon Shiloah, Music in the World of Islam: A Socio-Cultural Study (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1995); “Music and Religion in Islam,” Acta Musicologica 69, no. 2 (1997); Jonas Otterbeck, “Battling over the Public Sphere: Islamic Reactions to the Music of Today,” Contemporary Islam 2, no. 3 (2008). 3

6  British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground…

125

discourses of ‘high Islam’ are influential, in religious, scholastic and political spheres of power and authority, they perhaps also overshadow practice and interpretation ‘on the ground’, a claim that has distinct resonance when Muslim-minority communities in Europe and elsewhere are considered. The arguments against music stretch back at least as far as Ibn al-Dunya (823–894), the author of the first major critique of music and the progenitor for a subsequent historical discourse on this thorny issue.4 Ibn al-Dunya’s treatise is based on 68 alhadith and, very interestingly, places morality and decency at the heart of this ongoing debate: ‘Almost all his references to musical instruments, music, and music making are interwoven with statements concerning other forbidden pleasures and misbehaviour that are incompatible with the performance of religious duties, or moral conduct, and that will bring perdition to their perpetrators. The last 30 hadīths do not touch upon music but are entirely devoted to the interdiction of divination, games and gambling (backgammon and chess) as well as male and female sodomy.’5 The notion that music is inseparably linked with prohibited acts and sensuality has therefore long been at the heart of such critiques. While Wahhabi and Salafi arguments have been advanced in some conservative quarters, claiming that the early Muslim community did not engage with music except in a fairly limited sense (e.g., drumming during war and weddings), arguments against music have tended to focus on the association of music with activities that are deemed incompatible with correct Islamic practice.6 The central thrust of this discourse continues in much the same way today. It is apparent that attempts to proscribe music in Muslim-majority countries often occur on a platform of public morality. As Otterbeck has observed, contemporary religious conservatives largely oppose music because it is perceived to be a distraction from religious practice, competing with Allah for the soul of an individual, and as an inevitable inciter of sinful living.7 According to Otterbeck, moderates are generally more circumspect and tend to assess music on a case-by-case basis: ‘If it has slanderous or crude language or if it is sexually exciting (through rhythms or through dance) it is generally haram. Further, if the listening is done to excess it is haram as Islam is against taking things to extremes. But there is a personal dimension to it; if you are not aroused by the songs and you keep your spirituality then there is no problem.’8 While Otterbeck refers specifically to scholars based in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, such concerns act as essential parameters for current debates in Britain and elsewhere. As I shall make clear, even the most ardent defenders of music feel obliged to conduct something of an apologia, claiming that

 Shiloah, “Music and Religion in Islam.”  Ibid., 146. 6  Khalid Baig, Slippery Stone: An Inquiry into Islam’s Stance on Music (Garden Grove: Open Mind Press, 2008). 7  Otterbeck, “Battling over the Public Sphere: Islamic Reactions to the Music of Today.” 8  Ibid., 220. 4 5

126

C. Morris

music is not inherently bound together with incompatible Islamic practices and justifying it on the grounds of religious or moral utility. Parallel to these orthodox religious debates are of course alternative teachings and practices relating to Sufi mysticism. Sufism has long emphasised the important role that sound and music can play in encouraging spirituality and closeness to God, particularly when deployed through specific practices such as dhikr and hadra. Different sounds have therefore been classified by Sufi scholars and placed into a spiritual hierarchy, such as by al-Maqdisi (thirteenth century), who wrote about forbidden, permitted, estimable and laudable sounds.9 Indeed, when referring to the act of sama (listening), the early Sufi mystic al-Makki wrote: ‘The [singing] voice is an instrument said to carry and communicate meaningful ideas; when the listener perceives the meaning of the message without being distracted by the melody, his samā is lawful; otherwise, and when the content expresses physical love, simple desire and simple futilities, the samā is pure diversion and must be banished.’10 While Sufism has often been portrayed as inherently sympathetic towards music and the role that it can play for spiritual development, it is apparent that traditional Sufi teachings nonetheless emphasise correct sound and musical practice. This echoes concerns among Islamic religious discourses outside of Sufi practice, providing a common theme that can be found running through contemporary debates in Britain. While Muslim musicians in Britain generally tend to fall under the aegis of Sufism, whether consciously or through an inherited Barelvi tradition, a central concern with the religious merit of music remains constant and consistent with deep historical currents of Islamic scholasticism.11 In addition to worries about the semantic or sonic content of music, debates and traditions within Islam have additionally concerned themselves with the permissibility of different styles of music. At the root, this has often come down to a concern with the permissibility of specific musical instruments. The range of opinions on this matter are too complicated to consider here, although Shiloah does neatly summarise the form that this contested debate takes: ‘In the interminable debate about the samā’, legalists, theologians, spiritual leaders, custodians of morality in the cities, the literati and Sufi leaders all participated. The debate elicited views that varied from complete negation to full admittance of all musical forms and means, even dance. Between these two extremes we can find all possible nuances – some, for instance, tolerate a rudimentary form of cantillation and functional song, but ban all instruments; others permit cantillation and add the frame-drum but without discs, of course forbidding all other instruments and all forms of dance, and so on.’12 Music and instrumentation are therefore clearly at the heart of complex and diverse traditions within Islam. The following section considers how these discourses have become manifest within the contemporary debates among Muslims in Britain.

 Shiloah, “Music and Religion in Islam.”  al-Makki, Food of Hearts, quoted in ibid., 149. 11  Lewis, Islamic Britain. 12  Shiloah, Music in the World of Islam: A Socio-Cultural Study, 31. 9

10

6  British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground…

127

2 British Muslims and the Religious Permissibility of Music While there are notable exceptions, such as South Asian Qawwali, instrumentation tends to be avoided in Islamic performance contexts across the UK. Muslim musicians usually perform a voice-only set, perhaps with a recorded backing track or light percussion instrumentation, relying on the power of their voice and supporting backing harmonies. It is possible to find the occasional exception, such as the Sufi folk rock band Silk Road, known for performing long, instrumental guitar pieces, but the absence of significant live instrumentation is rather striking. Recorded backing tracks might incorporate a range of instrumental sounds (real recordings or simulated), but live instrumental performances are quite rare in the mainstream Islamic context. The forms of music that are commonly practised within the Muslim performance context are indicative of this instrumental absence – neither hip-hop nor nasheed place emphasis on live instrumental performance. In contrast, the utilisation of microphones and other forms of electronic amplification and/or sound support appear to be common. The decision whether or not to use these technologies appears to be largely based on musical style, context and the nature/size of an audience. I found no evidence of a religious or cultural proscription concerning the electronic mediation of voice (i.e., microphones or voice recordings). It is clear, then, that bound together with the dynamics of performance and music are complicated views relating to the permissibility of music and instrumentation in Islam. One Muslim musician, Faraz, Silk Road’s guitarist and passionate advocate of instrumental music, commented on the wider Muslim community and his perception of a generally inconsistent approach: the vast majority of Muslims listen to music, and they actually don’t have any problem with it. They’ll listen to music on the radio, and they’ll listen to music in a Bollywood film, but suddenly sitting in front of a band that’s playing meaningful music live, it suddenly becomes haram. Its cognitive dissonance gone crazy. (Faraz, October 2011, Birmingham)

Faraz suggests that views on music, in particular regarding the use of instrumentation, are not always consistent or rigorously observed. Indeed, there often may well be a divergence between public behaviour (e.g., live performance) and private practice (e.g., film, television and radio consumption). During the fieldwork, a prominent and influential Muslim musician claimed that Muslims in Britain are divided into two camps: those influenced by Sufi teachings, who accept all styles of music and instrumentation, and those influenced by Salafism, who completely reject music. While this picture is overly simplistic, there is nonetheless a kernel of truth in the suggestion that British Muslims are somewhat riven down the middle over the permissibility and role of music. Research participants often generalised that around 50% of Muslims in the UK either reject or remain uncomfortable with music. This does appear to reflect observations that I made throughout the course of the research. Yet, this generalisation is hugely reductive, since opinions on music cannot easily be divided into a ‘for or against’ typology, and there is instead a more complicated middle ground of mainstream opinion.

128

C. Morris

Table 6.1  Muslim music fans on music consumption Select the following statement as appropriate: I listen to any type or genre of music, regardless of lyrical content. I choose to listen to music that I like the sound of I will listen to any type of music, as long as it does not have negative lyrics (such as swearing or the promotion of violence) I believe that I should only listen to music that has an Islamic message I believe that music is either forbidden or strongly discouraged by Islam. I only listen to singing, not music I neither listen to singing nor music Other

Total responses 16

% of total 29.8

18

22.2

22 15

27.2 18.5

1 9

1.2 11.1

Table 6.2  Muslim music fans on instrumentation in Islam Select the following statement as appropriate: Total responses I believe that Islam permits the use of all musical instruments 14 I believe that Islam only permits the use of percussion instruments 30 I believe that Islam forbids the use of all musical instruments 14 I don’t know what musical instruments are permitted in Islam 9 Other 16

% of total 16.9 36.1 16.9 10.8 19.3

The survey conducted as part of the fieldwork supports this claim (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). The survey targeted groups with a specific interest in music and/or non-­ instrumental nasheeds, so it registers the views of those who already engage with a Muslim sound culture rather than those of a broader (and perhaps disinterested) demographic. Respondents were asked about the type of music that they listen to and their stance on instrumentation. On each end of the spectrum, there appears to be a group, roughly comparable in size (17–20%), that either accepts music or entirely rejects it. Between these two polar positions, a sizeable majority can be found who expresses a more conditional opinion on music and instrumentation. This group (approximately 49% of the total sample) tends to believe that only percussion instruments are permissible, often including just the daf (frame drum), and that lyrical content must either be compatible or directly linked with an Islamic worldview. While the survey manages to establish a set of sweeping contours, it does raise many additional questions. For example: What constitutes an ‘Islamic message’? How do Muslims define ‘percussion instrumentation’? What about synthesised sounds and the electronic replication of instrumentation? Individuals often arrive at different conclusions to these and similar questions, making broader generalisations a little problematic. One particular area of contestation is the very notion of combining music and Islam in any form. It was suggested by some participants that music is permissible, but that it should be confined to a secular realm and fundamentally divorced from

6  British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground…

129

Muslim practice. According to such a view, one might listen to music on the radio while driving a car, or when watching television, but religious practice should be separate, primary and inviolable.13 The notion of using music to express Islamic thought or Muslim experiences is considered unwise and potentially dangerous. Usman, the drummer of the popular nasheed group Aashiq Al Rasul, explained to me that this tended to be the overwhelming opinion among his parents’ generation during the 1970s and 1980s: Some people believe that you can’t mix music and Islam together, that it’s not allowed, and I was one of those people, who didn’t believe. I was led to believe this way in terms of my upbringing … there weren’t the avenues, the creative avenues. (Usman, October 2010, Birmingham)

The experiences that Usman had during his formative teenage years, listening to rock and funk for pleasure but believing that Islam should be a distinct and rigidly traditional practice, highlight a view that perhaps used to be held in common by many British Muslims before the more recent rise of popularised Islamic music in Britain. It is a distinct mark of change in the UK that many Muslims now consider music to be an acceptable mode of religious expression and particularly appropriate as a means to reach out to a younger and potentially disaffected generation. According to those holding this opinion, there is nothing inherently wrong with music as such, and it should be judged solely on its religious merit. This is further complicated by varying degrees of understanding in relation to the very definition of music. It is not uncommon for nasheed artists to interpret their sound as a form of religious poetry rather than prohibited or undesirable music. That being said, whether or not they incorporate it within their own work, the overwhelming majority of nasheed artists appear to be relatively accepting of the cultural status possessed by music. These are partly generational issues, with younger, British-born Muslims more likely to acknowledge the accessible and religiously emotive character of music, but there has undoubtedly been something of a shift in opinion over the last two decades. Older Muslims are increasingly being persuaded that music can and should play a role in their religious and cultural lives. Amran, founding member and lead singer of Aashiq Al Rasul, recounted a story about being approached by a member of the audience at a concert: The man from the audience, an elderly gentleman, a scholar and a leader amongst our local Muslim community, said, ‘I’ve never been to a concert in my life’ … and he’d never listened to Islamic music either because he thought it was wrong … He said, ‘this is the first time ever I’ve heard you guys perform or heard any Islamic music’, and continued ‘I closed my eyes and listened, and I thought, is this haram or halal? Is this taking me towards God

 For an example of a contemporary discussion surrounding the issue, see the controversy around the release of Youssou Ndour’s album Africa as discussed in: FIONA McLAUGHLIN, “Youssou N′dour’s Sant Yalla/Egypt: A Musical Experiment in Sufi Modernity,” Popular Music 30, no. 1 (2011); Kenneth Wilburn, “Youssou N’dour: I Bring What I Love Dir. By Elizabeth Chai Vasarhelyi,” African Studies Review 60, no. 1 (2017); Fiona McLaughlin, “Islam and Popular Music in Senegal: The Emergence of a ‘New Tradition’,” Africa 67, no. 4 (1997). 13

130

C. Morris

or is this taking me away from God?’ And he said, I have to share this with you, ‘that it brought me closer to God, so I smiled, opened my eyes and enjoyed the evening’. (Amran, October 2010, Birmingham)

The religious utility of music is therefore often held as an overriding concern, although this notion is extended to encompass the role that music can play regarding broader social and political concerns. According to such a view, unalloyed entertainment can be a seductive distraction from correct religious observance or moral behaviour. Music therefore becomes the vehicle for a higher purpose, although definitions over what constitutes such a purpose are contested. While the combination of music and Islam might be considered acceptable in the abstract, there are nonetheless variations of opinion over the appropriateness or even permissibility of different forms of music. At the heart of this disagreement is an ongoing and fractious debate concerning the permissibility of musical instrumentation. Furthermore, these discourses are complicated by pragmatic or seemingly contradictory choices concerning the praxis of instrumental music. Many Muslims in Britain are either opposed to most instrumental music (especially in a religious context) or at the very least uncertain enough to adopt a type of Pascalian wager, that is, confining themselves to percussion instrumentation ‘just in case’. This claim is backed by the results of the survey, in which 49.1% of respondents stated that they believe only percussion instruments are permissible (see Table 6.2). In some respects, Muslims in Britain have arrived at this view because of the fierce debates relating to music and instrumentation within wider Islamic discourse. It is quite common for an individual to assess different religious and scholastic voices on opposing sides of the debate and then to adopt a position of compromise somewhere between the two extremes. Percussion instrumentation and vocal performance are considered by many to be an appropriate ‘middle ground’ of mainstream Islamic teaching. This stance is further complicated when it is considered that some individuals will additionally distinguish between secular and Islamic music, arguing that Islamic music alone should be restricted to percussion instrumentation. Fifteen per cent of those in the survey who agreed with the proposition that Islam only permits the use of percussion instrumentation proceeded, in the later qualitative part of the survey, to name their favourite musicians, including, for example, Beyoncé, Coldplay, Lady Gaga, Eminem, Adele, Michael Jackson and Bob Marley, an eclectic range of popular musicians who all utilise extensive instrumentation in their music. Those who believe that Islam only permits the use of percussion instruments often suggest as well that voice-only performances are the preferred alternative to even the simplest of membranophones. This is partly due to religious concerns with the status of instrumentation but also in recognition of the fact that, notwithstanding one’s own views, there are others who reject any form of instrumentation. The preference for voice-only performance can be borne from a desire for inclusivity and to ensure that religious performances are acceptable to all. The power of this view is evidenced in part through a surge of interest in performance poetry among young Muslims, with suggestions that many are turning to this expressive art form as an

6  British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground…

131

alternative to instrumental music. Ayman, a London-born rapper with Sudanese roots and over a decade’s worth of experience as a founding member of the hip-hop group The Planets, explained this changing attitude: I mean, what you have now, you have a lot of young Muslims, like early teenagers, who have started writing poetry, for example. Never, like in the nineties, you never came across Muslims writing poetry, but now you can go to an event, some event full of teenagers, it’s no club, everyone’s just sitting quietly and well behaved, this is like on a Friday or Saturday night for example … it’s really, really interesting that Muslims want to be entertained but they want to express themselves as well. (Ayman, October 2011, London)

I was already familiar with the phenomenon that Ayman was attempting to highlight. Yet, the definition of such poetry is often stretched so that it more accurately refers to melodic rap and spoken word performance. This is a consequence of the desire that many young Muslims have to express themselves creatively, albeit within the boundaries provided through shared, or at least negotiated, ideas of correct Islamic practice. The notion of exploring and developing creative avenues, although without overstepping the mark and transgressing beyond Islamic strictures, is increasingly important for the practice of music by Muslims in Britain. Along with different modes of voice-only sound art, such as poetry, rap and spoken word, there has been a desire in some quarters, with artists such as the members of Aashiq Al Rasul and Amir Awan, to remain within a perceived Muslim consensus. Their art is shaped by an exploration of just how musically expressive they are able to be by restricting their sound to the human voice and membranophones. Amir Awan, who cites Michael Jackson as a major influence, explained exactly how he walks this line: So, I try to keep to the middle ground of things and use vocals and percussion only, that’s drum kits of different kinds, Arab drums, Asian drums, Oriental drums. A lot of it, the music that you’d have, like the piano, or your guitar or your woodwind, is done by myself. Or people who are with me will provide harmonies in the background. So it’s quite interesting, if someone listens to it they wouldn’t be able to tell the difference, but it’s a much fresher and more true sound than the actual instruments … there are a few people who come up to me and say, ‘Oh you’ve used those instruments there’ and I’m like, ‘No, I haven’t.’ [laughs]. (Amir Awan, May 2011, London)

The aim is to ensure that there are no limits to creative and artistic output while nonetheless remaining true to an ideal of correct Islamic practice. Such music often involves multiple membranophones, different styles of percussion as well as the imaginative use of synthesised sounds and recording equipment to make the most of the human voice and other permitted sounds. The overall picture among Muslim musicians regarding the use of instrumentation remains mixed. Of the 44 individual musicians I identified for this research, all of whom operate prominently in the Muslim public sphere, 12 performed with nothing but their own voice, eight would use live percussion instrumentation, 17 would use a recorded backing track but no live instrumentation and seven would play a range of instruments during a live performance. The justification that musicians provide for their decisions regarding instrumentation can be based on stylistic, religious and pragmatic grounds. Musicians, furthermore, remain flexible and are often

132

C. Morris

willing to alter their usual performance repertoire in order to better reflect the vagaries of the audience. The thread that runs through this spectrum of opinion appears to be a perceived place of compromise. This can involve distinguishing between ‘secular’ and ‘Islamic’ music (in order to keep the sacred pure from inappropriate musical practice) or, as has been discussed, pursuing creative outlets that work around self-­ imposed restrictions on instrumentation. I argue that the nature of this perceived ‘middle ground’ and the motivations for allowing it to shape musical practice can take two forms. First, there is often a desire for inclusivity and unity. It is recognised by many people, including musicians, that to hold an event involving instrumental music is to necessitate the exclusion of other Muslims on specific religious grounds. If the purpose of music is to transmit a message or to celebrate a shared faith, then it is often more effective to forgo instrumentation in order to reach a greater number of people. Musicians are therefore regularly asked to perform without instruments, even if such music is a normal part of their repertoire. Several musicians, including those involved in the hip-hop scene, explained to me (often with self-deprecating, ironic humour) that they prepare voice-only material for the growing number of Islamic events that request that instrumentation to be left out of the performance. I also found that this extends beyond live performance into the process of recording and producing music. Several artists have produced specific albums using percussion instrumentation only, or, in some cases, no instrumentation at all. Sami Yusuf, for example, has produced two versions of his album My Ummah: a ‘Music Version’ and a ‘Percussion Version’. Amran, the lead member of Aashiq Al Rasul, explained his motivation for producing an album without instrumentation: We respect everybody and their views and opinions, we have to understand that we all, even within our own band, have our own views on certain things … we are reactive to that in the sense that the band has created an album which is all a cappella, there is no music whatsoever, it’s totally voice. This is to cater for those people that may be in a dilemma about listening to devotional sounds accompanied with music. We try to support as many communities and beliefs as we possibly can but still stay strong to what we believe in. (Amran, October 2010, Birmingham)

While there are no doubt pragmatic reasons for this flexible approach, especially when the benefit of accessing an additional market for the sale of such music is considered, these attempts at conciliation recognise the internal religious diversity of Muslims in Britain. More importantly, there is an acceptance of this diversity rather than a challenge or dismissal. In this sense, such a compromise represents an attempt to create a common cultural space: sectarian and diverse but unified around a shared religion and vision of belonging to a wider Muslim community. Beyond this flexible approach to music production, there is a second and extremely widespread way through which Muslims seek a ‘middle ground’ on this fractious issue. That is, with a complex yet divided range of scholarship to draw upon, many Muslims, including some Muslim musicians, choose to adopt a position somewhere within the perceived centre of this debate. Decisively unwilling to adhere to one polar position or another, individuals choose to compromise on a

6  British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground…

133

religious and practical level. As I argued earlier, this might involve a simple restriction to the use of membranophones or perhaps through making a distinction between ‘secular’ and ‘Islamic’ music. Yet, central to this approach is a desire to avoid an outlier position; instead, they cautiously negotiate a rational position and negotiated musical practice somewhere in the middle of these febrile discourses.

3 Religious Authority and Muslim Musicians In some respects, the contentious issues surrounding music and instrumentation rest at the very crux of wider changes within the milieu of Islamic religious authority. As Robinson has claimed, the traditional authority of the Muslim ‘ulama has long been on the decline,14 largely since the imposition of European colonialism but more recently through new media and the supposed democratisation of knowledge.15 According to such a view, lay interpretations of Islamic thought have become influential and ‘the Muslim world has returned to the interpretive anarchy which marked its early years’.16 With the weight of cultural pressure on Muslims in a minority context through global flows of popular entertainment and rooted national culture, and parallel attempts within some Muslim cultural and religious spheres at resisting or redefining Western impositions, it is unsurprising that music should become a site of dynamic interpretive interplay.17 While Muslims in Britain tend to steer towards a middle ground of compromise and pragmatism, there is nonetheless a vibrant process of religious interpretation at work, along with an interesting pattern of engagement with traditional and hegemonic Muslim ‘ulama. In some respects, Muslim musicians in Britain are at the very heart of this process. First, individual musicians tend to be well educated and self-confident, with a real desire to engage in critical and reflective religious practice. Second, these musicians also operate in cultural and religious spheres of knowledge, often mediated through new forms of technology and concordant social relationships, both as producers and recipients of information and ideology. This matches with Turner’s observation that there has been a corrosion of those ‘traditional forms of authority’ that are ‘linear, hierarchical, imitative and repetitive’.18 Yet, I would caution against the belief that religious authority has disintegrated into  Francis Robinson, “Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam?,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 19, no. 03 (2009). 15  Jon W Anderson, “The Internet and Islam’s New Interpreters,” in New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, ed. D. F. Eickelman and J. W. Anderson (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003). 16  Robinson, “Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam?,” 353. 17  Karin Van Nieuwkerk, “Creating an Islamic Cultural Sphere: Contested Notions of Art, Leisure and Entertainment. An Introduction,” Contemporary Islam 2, no. 3 (2008). 18  Bryan S Turner, “Religious Authority and the New Media,” Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 (2007): 118. 14

134

C. Morris

the ‘interpretive anarchy’ suggested by Robinson,19 arguing rather that the nature of authority and the pedagogical processes involved in the transmission of religious knowledge are in a state of flux. Before I examine the changing nature of religious authority for Muslims in Britain, including for many Muslim musicians, it is worth reflecting on the fact that these changes are far from being a normative British Muslim experience. Religious leadership among Muslim communities in Britain has historically tended to be dominated by a succession of local scholars and imams imported from South Asia. With limited English language skills, and uncomprehending of the social context faced, in particular, by young British Muslims, this religious elite is often criticised for failing to offer the kind of leadership required by Muslim communities in Britain.20 While changing, this is overwhelmingly still the case, with only 8.1% of British imams actually having been born in the UK.21 Indeed, a report by the Muslim Council of Britain highlighted the challenge that imams face in addressing the many pastoral needs of their communities.22 It is therefore perhaps unsurprising when foreign-born, ‘imported’ imams attempt to sustain more traditional relationships of iterative religious authority, reinforcing hierarchies of pedagogy based on ethnic solidarity, with clear implications for opinions on music and Islam. Broadly speaking, the thriving amateur and semi-professional na’at23 scene in Britain tends to identify with a Pakistani diaspora, a connection that remains partially rooted in a cultural homeland. This carries with it assumptions of language (primarily Urdu), gender segregation, familial structure and the underlying purpose of na’at performance, a purpose that extends beyond na’at as ‘just’ a form of paraliturgical worship. In a sense, na’at becomes a means through which communal belonging, based on ethnic solidarity and diasporic culture, can be upheld. Reciters within this context therefore tend to identify more strongly with religious leadership as traditionally conceived within the local South Asian Muslim community, where religious authority for the individual and for the community become tightly bound together. During informal conversation, na’at performers in places such as Leeds and Bradford would often refer to ‘our scholars’, referencing local muftis or imams in the area, and show a greater sense of connection to the religious teachings provided by these religious leaders. Ameena (not her real name), a second-generation Pakistani na’at poet from Bradford, explained that her book of Urdu na’at poetry was vetted by two respected scholars from Bradford and Birmingham:

 Robinson, “Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam?.”  Jonathan Birt, “Lobbying and Marching: British Muslims and the State,” in Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure, ed. Tahir Abbas (London: Zed Books, 2005). 21  Ron Geaves, “Drawing on the Past to Transform the Present: Contemporary Challenges for Training and Preparing British Imams,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28, no. 1 (2008). 22  Shafiur Rahman, S. Ahmed, and Shaynul Khan, “Voices from the Minarets – Mcb Study of Uk Imams and Mosques,” (2006), http://www.mcb.org.uk/uploads/vfm.pdf 23  Na’at is a form of South Asian religious poetry that is usually written in praise of the Prophet Muhammad. 19 20

6  British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground…

135

Once my book was published, I gave my book draft to two scholars and they both said it’s just fine, there’s nothing wrong in it, nothing wrong in it. So, you can just publish it… They actually look at the language and the words we use, how we use words for, like, the Prophet. I think the best scholars, they check not only the wording but the balance as well. The poetry balance. They can check that as well. (Ameena, September 2011, Bradford)

By uttering statements like these throughout our interview, Ameena revealed that local scholars have an important and assumed role of authority over na’at composition, and it would be unthinkable to publish anything without the direct application of scholastic expertise. The implications of this for music making are that it subsequently extends to the shaping of the rules that are guiding performance. This includes, for example, religious proscriptions against women performing before a mixed audience and the use of instrumentation by both men and women. Na’at poets and reciters might well disagree on the guidance and rulings issued by these religious leaders. Ameena herself expressed disapproval with scholastic rulings regarding her performance in public, but she and others nonetheless acknowledge the final ruling of an expert religious elite. In contrast, when popular styles of nasheed, hip-hop and syncretic music within British Muslim public spheres are considered, as well as the musicians at the heart of these musical genres, there is a sense that religious authority has become less of an assumed relationship. Indeed, critical and autonomous subjectivities are applied to religious pedagogy instead. I am not suggesting that musicians fail to show deference to religious authority – those who dedicate their time to religious learning are, of course, highly regarded  – but these musicians are far more likely to seek out knowledge and religious scholarship on their own terms. Such attitudes are part of a general movement in Britain, particularly among younger and more educated Muslims, towards a globalised consumer model of religious authority. Rather than static or inherited modes of religious learning, many British Muslims appraise a range of scholars and authority figures, listening, assessing, comparing and then applying their own moral framework and critical faculties to these diverse forms of knowledge. This argument differs somewhat to Anderson’s claim regarding Islam’s ‘new interpreters’.24 Anderson suggests that lay interpretations of Islam are emerging through the internet as a challenge to the traditional authority of the ‘ulama. This is certainly true, and I would argue that numerous Muslim musicians can be slotted into Anderson’s category of new interpreters. Nonetheless, as Larsson has highlighted, Muslim ‘ulama play an increasingly important role on the internet and through other forms of global knowledge exchange (including print media and lecture tours).25 With a plurality of scholastic voices in this dynamic global environment, musicians and other Muslim individuals are able to be especially discerning in their engagement with the sources of knowledge that they find most credible and relevant. This has attracted Muslims in Britain towards English-speaking Islamic

24 25

 Anderson, “The Internet and Islam’s New Interpreters,” 47.  Goran Larsson, Muslims and the New Media (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011).

136

C. Morris

scholars from across Europe and North America, scholars perceived to be of particular relevance for Muslims living within these societies. Evidence for a real eagerness to adopt this approach is apparent in the tremendous supply of online lectures, audio tapes, books and pamphlets and the vibrant Islamic lecture and event circuit in the UK.  Furthermore, musicians use their position as public figures to stimulate debate and share scholastic material; it is routine for musicians to post quotes, recommend Islamic scholars and share online lectures through the internet (in particular through social networking media). I found it quite striking that Muslim musicians in Britain are often immersed within this pedagogical environment, not least because they are routinely asked to perform at Islamic conference events alongside Muslim ‘ulama or indeed actually work with some of these scholars to organise events across London and the UK. Particularly influential Muslim scholars include Sheikh Abdul Hakim Quick, Sheikh Babikir Ahmed,26 Sheikh Hamza Yusuf, Professor Tariq Ramadan, Sheikh Michael Mumisa and Sheikh Abdul Hakim Murad. These figures of religious authority are all marked by their desire to promote a vision of Islam that sits comfortably alongside life in the cosmopolitan regions of Western Europe and North America. They dismiss claims that Islam forbids music or instrumentation, arguing that music is an appropriate and particularly powerful way to reach people. Indeed, the guidance offered by these religious figures has been important for providing many Muslim musicians with the confidence and drive to utilise their talent to promote Islam. It is the charisma, inclusivity and context-sensitive approach of these particular scholars that resonates with young British Muslims, a leadership approach that is replicated by many Muslim musicians themselves. The respect given to these figures, and the security drawn from their support, is extremely important for some musicians, especially considering the extreme hostility that can be generated by Muslims who consider music irredeemably haram. Sukina, from Poetic Pilgrimage, discussed her experiences as a Muslim convert/ revert and female performer as well as the compounded difficulties that are raised through the issues of gender and music. Despite receiving regular and hurtful comments or criticism, she suggested that the support provided by Muslim scholars was extremely comforting and a source of confidence: as women it’s just important to keep on and to just be strong in that. When we came into Islam and when we performed, you know, our first three performances were with scholars and people who are learned in Islam, who are respected. So, we always came in with blessings of what we were doing. If they’re giving us their blessing, then for me that’s a sign that it’s okay. (Sukina, February 2011, Cardiff)

Indeed, beyond suggesting that music and art are merely permissible, many of these scholars take an active interest in promoting music as a natural and expressive way for engagement with Islam. Sheikh Babikir Ahmed is well known for having originally advised Rakin Niass, at the time a new convert to Islam and former member of the hip-hop group Cash Crew, to form the Muslim hip-hop group Mecca2Medina 26

 Sheikh Babikir Ahmed is also sometimes known as Sheikh Ahmed Abubakr.

6  British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground…

137

and use music to spread the message of Islam. As well as running an educational organisation, Sheikh Babikir Ahmed continues to play an important role for Muslims and hip-hop in London, helping to provide ongoing religious justification for the connection between Islam and hip-hop, as rapper Ayman testifies: I was at a talk recently where something he said, this was a talk on, actually it was a study of a famous poem, called the Qasida al-Burda, it’s probably the most famous Islamic poem, written by Imam Busiri, from Egypt. And during this talk he spoke about how the poem is centred around the love of our Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him. Sheikh Abubakr said something quite interesting, he said, look, there’s no one, ok this is just to paraphrase, he said, if you love the Prophet you’ll write a poem about him, you’ll definitely write a poem about him, okay, this is really the only way to express how you feel, so poetry being a language and an art form itself, hip-hop, rap, is really just an extension of it. (Ayman, October 2011, London)

By defending the status of music through such an argument, and by linking music (particularly lyricism) to an authentic and authorised history of Muslim practice, hip-hop becomes the innovative vanguard of an ancient tradition in Islamic poetry. While it is clear that religious scholars are a critical touchstone for religious knowledge among Muslim musicians in Britain, there is nonetheless an underlying process of critical and independent learning along with a willingness by musicians to act as influential lay interpreters in a public environment. As educated and devout Muslims, there is a clear desire to voraciously consume books and pamphlets, to watch or listen to lectures online and to engage in debates and other forms of religious knowledge exchange. Such behaviour is quite simply a natural extension of faith for Muslim musicians. Many of their ideas are no doubt informed by the sources of religious authority that underpin much of the educational material made available through particular modes of dissemination (such as bookshops, internet websites, Islamic educational networks, etc.). Yet, there is additionally a parallel practice of individual intellectual reasoning, a form of engagement that is often applied to the root sources of Islamic knowledge (including the Qur’an and alhadith) or utilised to critique alternative and mediated religious opinions. One central religious issue often subjected to this kind of independent reasoning is indeed the practice of music, perhaps an inevitable consequence of the ongoing and unresolved debate regarding its permissibility. Surrounded by a clamour of competing and contradictory religious voices, musicians understandably feel justified in turning to primary Islamic sources or in criticising opinions they hold to be irrational and inconsistent. This reflects a similar situation among Muslims in Britain, particularly those with greater educational attainment, who similarly take a view on music that is independently reached, contextually and pragmatically, without direct or unmitigated reference to a particular source of mediated religious authority. Rabiah is a young female musician of Caribbean heritage from the group Pearls of Islam, who sings soft, spiritual songs over gentle acoustic guitar music or light hand percussion. As I sat with both members of Pearls of Islam, Rabiah and Sakinah, in Russell Square, she explained exactly how she and Sakinah dealt with the controversy of music at the beginning of their artistic careers:

138

C. Morris

people were heading in our direction saying, you know, music is haram. And so it made us, it brought us to question it ourselves, you know, when people are coming up to us and saying you’re wrong, you’re wrong, we had to do our own research and understand our religion, understand where we are as Muslims, to be able to come back to them and say, well actually… I understand what I’m doing, and I’m happy with what I’m doing, I don’t have to justify myself to you … as long as we are doing this for the love of Allah, I only need to justify myself to Him, and Him alone. (Rabiah, November 2011, London)

The conclusion of such reasoning might be to accept all styles of music, as Rabiah does, or (as many do) to highlight a preference for avoiding certain types, or indeed all types, of instrumental music. Crucially, I argue that this independent process does not jettison the influence of Islamic scholarship. Indeed, I have already shown that traditional religious leadership is important for musicians, but that it additionally suggests that such leadership is a necessary albeit insufficient condition for the development of individual religious knowledge. Islamic scholarship is required by musicians to deepen their understanding of Islam, but such teachings are filtered through their own critical faculties and fashioned into a personally coherent vision of Islamic practice. Chatting over lunch with Yahya (not his real name), a photographer with an extensive background working in both the mainstream and Muslim music industries, in an Egyptian café tucked away near Regents Park Mosque, he explained to me how he formed his own views on music: the people who say it’s completely forbidden, they use what for me is quite an obscure interpretation of [the Maryam surah in the Qur’an], that mentions idle talk, it condemns idle talk, and then they interpret music within the boundaries of idle talk, although this seems to be obscure for me personally … the way I look at it is if you want to look at the Hadith, there were Hadiths concerning poets and poetry that condemn poets and the poetry, and there are Hadiths looking at poets and poetry, praising poets and poetry. And the difference seems to be the content of it, so I look at it in the same terms with music, and also with visual arts, so it depends entirely on the content, and that’s my only way of viewing it. (Yahya, February 2012, London)

While no doubt influenced by the views and teachings of religious scholars, and Yahya did indeed allude to connections with religious leaders such as Sheikh Abdul Hakim Murad, he nonetheless applied his own analogical reasoning to the contentious issue of music, opening the doors of ijtihad to a topic rife with sectarian struggle, and equating music with poetry. In our conversation, he continued to critique the contradictory view of scholars who opposed music, highlighting the somewhat convoluted practice that can result. Describing his time at an international arts competition in Abu Dhabi, Yahya recounted watching the Canadian Muslim group Sound of Reason perform: I had seen the Sound of Reason on television before, where they were singing and playing guitars, and when they were performing in Abu Dhabi, they sang without guitars but with recorded guitar accompaniments. And I asked about this and I was told, well it’s halal because they’re not playing guitars. But you had the sound of guitars! So, this for me is a ridiculous contradiction because they had to play their guitars to have the sound, to have the backing track. (Yahya, February 2012, London)

6  British Muslims, Music and Religious Authority: The Contested Ground…

139

Yahya directly continued to accuse the scholars authorising this particular form of musical practice in Abu Dhabi of inconsistency and faulty reasoning. His views are interesting in themselves, but they additionally highlight the confidence with which musicians, as lay interpreters, are able to criticise religious leadership on an informed and rational basis. The role that musicians can play as religious leaders in their own right is indeed significant and this theme was repeatedly raised by Muslim musicians themselves. In the same way that English-speaking scholars based in Europe and North America have greater relevance for many Muslims in Britain, so too are musicians better placed to communicate with young British Muslims, a generation that is perhaps otherwise disconnected from traditional forms of religious leadership. Rakin Niass, an influential rapper and founding member of the influential hip-hop group Mecca2Medina, explained to me the importance of musicians as religious role models: I think parents who have young children, they’re the ones that realise that, oh my God, these guys are a good influence on my kids because they love Islam and they’re thinking about Islam, and my kids, I want my kids to grow up Muslim, and they’re speaking a language that my kids understand so they grab on to that, you know. Sometimes artists have more influence over their kids than the local imam, sometimes the local imam might not even speak it in their language, or won’t have an idea about their experiences in school and what they go through, you know. (Rakin, July 2011, London)

Rakin’s criticism of local imams reaches down to the root cause of the popularity and accessibility of musicians for many Muslims in Britain. A ‘local imam’, perhaps foreign-born and ‘imported’ from abroad, will often be unable to relate to the experiences of a younger generation and the challenges they might face in contemporary Britain. Nor are they necessarily able to speak English with any real proficiency, making communication not just a metaphorical but indeed a linguistic problem. The ability of musicians to strike a deep emotive chord among young Muslims is often acknowledged by Islamic scholars themselves, as Mohammed Yahya, another successful London-based rapper, explained: you ask a Muslim teenager to attend a lecture by a scholar from Saudi Arabia and, unfortunately, they often won’t because it can be difficult to relate to their reality. However, if you ask them to recite the verse from their favourite rap album or the latest track and they’ll do that straight away. You know, so many times I’ve performed at an event and a speaker has spoken for half an hour, and then I’ll come and perform a few songs and the speaker afterwards will say, you know what, what I done in the half hour, you’ve done it in a song. The message is the same, you know, and you’ve done it in a way that they, the youth, can digest and relate to it. I don’t take any credit as I know it’s ultimately from God, not from me, but I’m very familiar with the impact words can have on the youth. (Mohammed, February 2011, London)

Muslim musicians, supported by their own interest and relative confidence in religious learning, are able to act as role models and sites of Islamic pedagogy because they literally and metaphorically, linguistically and culturally, speak the same language. This takes place through music itself, through lyricism and spiritually evocative imagery, but also through media contact, including interviews and unmediated

140

C. Morris

internet communication with their fans. This includes extended debates on social networking media, such as Facebook, on a range of religious issues, including, for example, the permissibility of music in Islam. They are able to popularise and rephrase the teachings of an elite  – and at times culturally dissonant  – Muslim ‘ulama, to repackage and (just as importantly) reinterpret teachings that they have internalised themselves through extended engagement with traditional sources of Muslim leadership and Islamic scholasticism.

4 Concluding Remarks It does appear that British Muslims have started to gradually move away from the more liberal attitudes towards music that were held prior to the early 2000s. This claim is ultimately impossible to verify without more extensive research, but the data does suggest a more cautious attitude to music. While such views are complex, they do tend to revolve around an increasing concern with the religious permissibility of instrumentation. Potential catalysts for this shift in opinion might be religious revivalism among the young, the influence of more conservative strands of religious thought and even perhaps the increasing availability of an Islamic alternative to mainstream instrumental music. Regardless, it seems apparent that developing religious discourses are centrally placed within the cultural activity of many British Muslims. In contrast, musicians themselves have formed fairly stable opinions on the status of music. They are, after all, practising musicians and have made a public decision about whether or not to include instrumentation in their repertoire. It has therefore been more relevant to consider exactly how musicians have arrived at their views on music and other issues of religious concern. I have argued that complex lines of religious authority are drawn in and refracted through the prism of these creative, independent and religiously observant individuals. It is at this juncture where decisions and strategies relating to the tension between discourse and practice are negotiated, with musicians demonstrating a high degree of individual agency within this religious and cultural milieu. The ultimate trajectory of these debates is unclear, but it does seem apparent that the controversy over music is unlikely to subside anytime soon.

Chapter 7

Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social Orders in the UK Yolanda van Tilborgh

Exploring the variations in how Muslim performing artists in the UK and the US synthesise their ideals around art and religion, my study aims to learn more about significant cultural orientations among Muslims in the decades following the Muslim-labelled terrorist attacks in the US and the UK in 2001 and 2005 respectively. Whereas, according to the current dominant Western understanding, art is considered relatively autonomous and free from social and religious pressures, the former UK government indirectly used Muslim performing arts in its strategies while art-restrictive Salafi notions gained popularity. Discerning between Muslims of different ethnicities and religious strands, relating these to national policies and Islamic authoritative voices, and comparing British with North American expressions, I will argue how a large number of artistic practices can be understood as contemporary civilising attempts by high-profile Muslims trying to change the patterns of cultural taste and behaviour, which reflect both the non-Muslim and Muslim social orders that British Muslims have to cope with.1

 ‘Performance’ refers both to staged cultural productions and the manner in which the contextualised interaction itself produces social realities, such as understandings of the problem at hand, knowledge and new power relations. www.maartenhajer.nl/?page_id=14 (accessed: 13 July 2020). 1

Y. van Tilborgh (*) University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_7

141

142

Y. van Tilborgh

1 Introduction: Context and Research Question Similar to discussions in Christianity about whether art can serve as praise of God and motivate ethical action, or, on the contrary, stirs immodest behaviour,2 there is an ongoing discussion among many Muslims on whether (popular) art in Islam is permissible or not, particularly regarding the use of musical wind and string instruments, which started among theologians in the time after the Prophet,3 and hip-hop music, singing Muslim women and stage behaviour in current times.4 Since many Muslims perceive the Middle East to be the centre of Islamic knowledge, views on the (il)legitimacy of music and entertainment in Islam among Arab authoritative voices influence debates globally.5 In Western Europe, since the Middle Ages, religious music and vernacular drama, such as mystery and morality plays, were considered a means by Christian orders, governments and guilds to morally educate who were considered spiritually immature people. Artistic constraints resulted from the dynamics in disputing the permissibility of art in authoritative circles.6 In the process of state formation, as Bram Kempers describes, producers of commissioned artistic works supported central powers through expressing the state’s civilising ideals and enabling the imagining of national identity.7 In the course of the nineteenth century, artists became less dependent on a single source of legitimation by church or state due to the growing middle class of spectators, listeners and buyers.8 The importance of moral criteria diminished in the production of art, while aesthetic standards became dominant.9

 Frank B. Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste: Aesthetics in Religious Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 55. 3  Amnon Shiloah, Music in the World of Islam: A Socio-Cultural Study (London: Scholar Press, 1995), 31–5. 4  See also: Hisham D. Aidi, Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture (New York: Pantheon Books, 2014), 44–70. And: Peter Mandaville, “Hip-hop, Nasheeds, and ‘Cool’ Sheikhs: Popular Culture and Muslim Youth in the United Kingdom”, in In-Between Spaces: Christian and Muslim Minorities in Transition in Europe and the Middle East, eds. Christiane Timmerman, et  al. (Leuven: Peter Lang, 2009): 149–68. And: Suad Abdul-Khabeer, “Rep that Islam1: The Rhyme and Reason of American Hip-Hop”, The Muslim World 97/1 (2007): 125–41. 5  Jonas Otterbeck, “Battling over the Public Sphere: Islamic Reactions to the Music of Today”, Contemporary Islam 2/3 (2008): 211–28. 6  Brown, Good Taste. 7  Bram Kempers, Painting, Power and Patronage: The Rise of the Professional Artist in the Italian Renaissance (London: The Penguin Press, 1992 [1987]), 21–77. 8   Abraham de Swaan, “Kwaliteit is klasse”, Perron Nederland (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1991): 59–92. 9  Warna Oosterbaan Martinius, Schoonheid, welzijn, kwaliteit. Kunstbeleid en verantwoording na 1945 (Den Haag: Gary Schwartz/SDU, 1990), (online) dbnl, 2005. dbnl.org/tekst/ oost054scho01_01/oost054scho01_01.pdf, 209. And: Brown, Good Taste. 2

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

143

Over time, Pierre Bourdieu argues, artists formed a relatively autonomous field of cultural production, in which artists intrinsically focused on art itself.10 Taking the perspective of relative artistic autonomy into account, the transnational (sub)field of Western European and North American Muslim performing artists forms an interesting case. Especially from the 1990s onward, the matter of autonomy became challenged due to the discourse on artistic expressions in the Muslim tradition, which was reinforced by the growing popularity of the tenet that – in striving to purify Islam from inauthentic practices – tends to severely restrict art and music: Salafi Islam.11 In the present study, several of the practising Muslims identify their artistic performances with the term ‘edutainment’, as entertainment that pursues an educational or spiritual transfer or a reform by means of pleasantry. Besides, a considerable part of Muslim artists has a background in teaching. Additionally, the art-oriented response of nation-states to the terrorist, Muslim-­ labelled attacks of 9/11  in New  York and 7/7  in London has made the notion of artistic autonomy of Muslims even more problematic. Explaining British policies, Kathryn L. Gardner argues that, by seeking Muslim partnerships to encourage state loyalty among Muslims,12 a liberal European Islam that values gender equality, respects homosexuals and contributes to civil society could be sustained.13 Moreover, to tackle radicalisation and terrorism, the former UK government indirectly used the performing arts in its strategies. By means of the Faith and Cohesion Unit and the Preventing Extremism Unit, religious buffers bolstered Muslim institutions through which the organisation of artistic productions for and by Muslims could take place.14 The external governmental civilising measures, the internal educational endeavours and the  strict religio-artistic pressures in between raise the question if and how civilising or educational and emancipating attempts are reflected in the field of Muslim performing artists in the UK and the US. If so, it would be interesting to know where these attempts derive from with regard to cultural tastes and ideas and in which ways they are expressed. Essentially, how can the aggregate of expressions of artists in terms of orientations regarding Muslim and non-Muslim communities, especially in the UK, be socially categorised and understood?

 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, ed. and intro. Randal Johnson (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009 [1993]), 52–4. And: Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, trans. Susan Emanuel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996 [1992]). 11  See also: Ira M. Lapidus,A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 131, 823–24. 12  Kathryn L. Gardner, Constructing and Deconstructing Islam in the Western State: A Comparative Look at the Politicization of Religion in France, Great Britain, and the United States, 1945–2008 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2010), 448–74. 13  The concept ‘Euro-Islam’ was introduced by Bassam Tibi. 14  Gardner, Constructing, 381–437. See also: Aidi, Rebel. 10

144

Y. van Tilborgh

2 Theoretical Framework: Civilising Attempts and Emancipatory Shifts The concept of civilising offensives refers to short-term and deliberately civilising projects. In civilising offensives and, less compulsory, civilising missions, certain elites are eager to control the behaviour of others that is presumed to be ‘immoral, irrational or uncivilised’.15 In terms of social, cultural and symbolic capital, as outlined by Ryan Powell and John Flint, more powerful people and institutions – for example, teachers, preachers or a paternalistic state – attempt to improve morals and inculcate what are considered civilised habits with regard to less powerful groups of citizens – for instance, the unprivileged, strangers or outsiders.16 Civilising offensives, missions and attempts refer to discipline along with the encouragement of self-control in regard to disadvantageous cultural conduct.17 Besides, it may also refer to the instigation of debate on this topic. Civilising missions can be traced back to Christianity. Although operating in tandem with colonialism, Osterhammel relativises, the Christian missions intended to civilise in a more inner-worldly way.18 They approached the idea of Bildung as the inner, cultural development of one’s knowledge and talents.19 Furthermore, from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution onward, Alice L. Conglin argues, the notion took hold that to be civilised was to be free of despotism over liberty, of instinct over reason and of ignorance over knowledge.20

 Piet de Rooy, Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding 1917–1940. Landelijk en Amsterdams beleid (Unemployment, care for the unemployed and the fight against unemployment, 1917–1940, in the Netherlands and in Amsterdam) (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1979). And: De Swaan, “Kwaliteit”. And: Arthur Mitzman, “The civilizing offensive: Mentalities, high culture and individual psyches”, Journal of Social History 20/4 (1987): 663–87. 16  Bernard Kruithof, Zonde en Deugd in Domineesland. Nederlandse Protestanten en Problemen van Opvoeding, zeventiende tot twintigste eeuw (Sin and Virtue in the Land of Ministers. Dutch Protestants and their Problems with Education, 17th to twentieth Century) (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1990). And: Robert van Krieken, “The barbarism of civilization: cultural genocide and the ‘stolen generations’”, British Journal of Sociology, 50/2 (1999): 297–315. And: Ryan Powell and John Flint, “(In)formalization and the civilizing process: Applying the work of Norbert Elias to housing-based anti-social behaviour interventions in the UK”, Housing, Theory and Society, 26/3 (2009): 159–78. 17  Ryan Powell, “The Theoretical Concept of the ‘Civilising Offensive’ (Beschavingsoffensief): Notes on its Origins and Uses”, Human Figurations 2/2 (2013). hdl.handle.net/2027/ spo.11217607.0002.203. And: Kitty Verrips, “Noblemen, Farmers and Labourers: A Civilizing Offensive in a Dutch Village”, Netherlands Journal of Sociology, 23/1 (1987), 3–17. And: Mitzman, “The civilizing”. 18  Jürgen Osterhammel, Europe, the “West” and the Civilising Mission (London: German Historical Institute London, 2006), 19. 19  Pieter Vos en Onno Zijlstra, The Law of God: Exploring God and Civilization. Studies in Reformed Theology (Leiden NL: Brill, 2014), 230. 20  Alice L.  Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 4–10. 15

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

145

To be able to interpret cultural shifts, Ryan Powell refers to the Dutch analyses of civic institutions aiming to upgrade the unprofitable habits of the less privileged.21 Bernard Kruithof describes how the main institution for public benefit, which was concerned about social disintegration and inspired by Enlightenment ideals, sought to improve their positions by means of education to disseminate knowledge and virtues among the population until the late nineteenth century.22 The vertical distribution of the arts and culture was expanded by social democratic initiatives from then on.23 Described by Marc Adang, Kunst aan het Volk (Art to the people) was initiated by engaged artists and those from the bourgeoisie who criticised the materialist mentality of the citizenry. These artists were inspired by the British Toynbee-­ work, which pursued a connection between the different social classes; the socialist Fabian Society, advocating social justice; and William Morris, who promoted the arts and crafts in his opposition to the capitalist mode of production. Meanwhile, the artists believed that high-grade cultural education would support active citizenship, which was required to improve civil society.24 At the turn of the twentieth century in the US, in a race-based manifestation of civilising campaigns, successful Black elites used to correct unprofitable habits of the Black poor through providing them with elevating examples.25 These idealist politics of respectability, Frederick C. Harris evaluates, have now been exploited by neoliberalist governments without considering socio-economic unequal conditions. Recently, in Europe, British scholars have employed the concept of civilising offensives to understand the contemporary, moralising attempts of the national social welfare policies at altering the conduct of problematic sections within society.26 The general tendency to explain social problems not as a result of structural inadequacies but as cultural insufficiencies of specific social groups has become stronger.27 Increasingly, the ideal society is defined by identifying civilised behaviour with civic behaviour and agency, which is related to duties concerning the local or national context.28 Immigrant populations are subjected to meet the standard of

 Powell, “The Theoretical”.  Bernard Kruithof, “De deugdzame natie. Het burgerlijk beschavingsoffensief van de Maatschappij tot Nut van ‘t Algemeen tussen 1784 en 1860″ (The virtuous nation. The bourgeois civilizing offensive of the Dutch Society for the Public Benefit, 1784–1860), Symposion 2/1 (1980): 22–37. 23  Marc Adang, Voor sociaal-democratie, smaakopvoeding en verheffend genot. De Amsterdamse vereniging Kunst aan het Volk (1903–1928) (Amsterdam: Doctoral dissertation at University of Amsterdam, 2007). 24  Adang, Voor sociaal-democratie. 25  Fredrick C. Harris, “The Rise of Respectability Politics”, Dissent 61/1 (2014): 33–7. 26  Powell, “The Theoretical”. 27  Ali de Regt, “Beschavingsoffensief (Civilising Offensive): From Sociological Concept to Moral Appeal”, Human Figurations 4/1 (2015). quod.lib.umich.edu/h/humfig/11217607.0004.103/−− beschavingsoffensief-civilising-offensive-from-sociological?rgn=main;view=fulltext. 28  See also: Marjo Lindroth, “Adapt or Die? The Biopolitics of Indigeneity — From the Civilising Mission to the Need for Adaptation”. Global Society 28/2 (2014): 180–94. 21 22

146

Y. van Tilborgh

the ‘responsible citizen’, Flint asserts.29 Discursively, civilising offensives are also proposed as a means to tackle the lack of discipline, aggression and criminality in the public domain. This moralisation of citizenship means a pressure to subscribe to national values that are considered progressive, such as the acceptance of gender equality and homosexuality.30 In this regard, the academics complain, ethnic minorities have become one of the target groups of contemporary civilisation offensives. However, from a more positive view on civilising attempts, Gabriël van den Brink points at the greater acceptance of gender inequality among migrants and, therefore, argues for a general reassessment of norms to, precisely, counter incivilities.31 Civilising offensives can be part of the civilising process, which pertains to the developments along with the monopolisation of power since the late Middle Ages in Western Europe. Starting among the upper strata, Norbert Elias describes the changing standards of successful behaviour to cope with the growing interdependences in tighter social networks.32 Social pressures arose among people to emulate the cultural manners and tastes of the higher classes, which triggered behavioural self-­ constraint or Selbstzwang.33 Discussing this formalisation with regard to more strict regimes of manners and emotions, the study of Elias sets out the long-term process of the vertical trickle-down dissemination of tastes and habits. In further elaboration, Cas Wouters relates the emancipation of social groups to how the attitude of behavioural formalisation, as a second nature, has become overruled by informalisation in order to express the perception of social equality between unequal groups, which is characterised both by self-control and permissiveness.34 Stephen Mennell points out that civilising offensives may become part of the unplanned civilising processes if they contribute to tilting the balance from social pressures by other

 John F. Flint, “Migrant information packs and the colonisation of civility”, Space and Polity 13/2 (2009): 127–40. 30  Willem Schinkel and Friso Van Houdt, “The Double Helix of Cultural Assimilationism and Neoliberalism: Citizenship in Contemporary Governmentality”, British Journal of Sociology 61/4 (2010): 696–715. And: Adang, Voor sociaal-democratie. And: Marguerite van den Berg and Jan Willem Duyvendak, “Paternalizing mothers: feminist repertoires in contemporary Dutch civilizing offensives”, Critical Social Policy, 32/4 (2012): 556–76. 31  Gabriël van den Brink, Schets van een beschavingsoffensief: over normen, normaliteit en normalisatie. (Den Haag: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), 2004), 111–2, 140–50. 32  Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, rev. eds. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom and Stephen Mennell, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2000 [1939]). And: Cas Wouters, Informalization: Manners and Emotions Since 1890 (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2007), 42–6. 33  Stephen Mennell, “Civilising offensives and decivilising processes: between the emic and the etic” Human Figurations 4/1 (2015). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0004.109 34  Wouters, Informalization. And: Cas Wouters, Van minnen en sterven: Informalisering rond seks en dood (About loving and dying: Informalization around sex and death) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1990), 96–117. 29

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

147

people to the self-constraint of manners and emotions.35 These incorporated pressures could also concern informalisation as the relaxation of formalised conduct.

3 Research Methodology The present chapter is based on an ethnographic study of Muslim performing artists on how Muslim artists synthesise their artistic identity with their religious conceptions in the UK and the US between 2009 and 2012.36 At the time of research, the artists were engaged in Anglophone textual cultural production in hip-hop and alternative music, spoken word and poetry, storytelling, theatre and acting, stand-up comedy, film performance and contemporary art on stage.37 The empirical findings are discussed from the concept of intersectionality through focusing, among others, on the significance of ethnic and religious backgrounds (besides gender, class and religion) and by considering the role of authoritative religious voices. While the vertical diffusion of cultural standards may nowadays compete with the horizontal diffusion of tastes in Western societies, as Giselinde Kuipers claims and why Ryan Powell urges for Elias-inspired research on relations both within and between groups related to civilising efforts,38 I will take both the internal and external, as well as vertical and horizontal (peer socialisation), processes into account. Besides drawing on secondary literature from academic sources as well as traditional and digital media, semi-structured in-depth interviews on art, culture and Islam were conducted with 65 Muslim performing artists and eight stakeholders, including art managers and Islamic teachers.39 In addition, 23 similar participants in art (artists and stakeholders) were studied through short interviews and/or secondary sources.40 The eventual focus group of the 70 artists whose ideas and practices have been studied includes religiously strictly practising, moderately practising and less strictly practising Muslims.41 Specifically, I attended 70 religio-artistic events, including biographical artistic performances, to collect additional ethnographic data

 Mennell, “Civilising”.  This study was partly funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research NWO and has taken place at Radboud University Nijmegen and the University of Amsterdam respectively. 37  The broader study has left out artists of productions in other (Urdu, Punjabi) languages. 38  Giselinde Kuipers, “Her Majesty’s Bicycle: On National Habitus and Sociological Comparison”, Newsletter of the Norbert Elias Foundation, Supplement 34 (2011): 1–15. Powell, “The Theoretical”. 39  For meeting respondents, I particularly used the method of online and offline snowball sampling. 40  Information about the artists derives predominantly from (a) in-depth interviews but also from combinations of (a), (b) short interviews, (c) content analysis of secondary sources and (d) content analysis of (biographical) performances and Q and A sessions. 41  Their individual ideas and occupations may have changed over the course of time. 35 36

148

Y. van Tilborgh

on the orientations of Muslim artists, who are mainly self-acclaimed Muslims, through participant observations and the analyses of their art videos.42 The artists include ‘born Muslims’ and ‘convert Muslims’. Born Muslims are first-generation immigrants and children of immigrants, predominantly raised in South Asian and Middle Eastern families. Convert Muslims range from African Americans and (White) natives to immigrants from the Caribbean and African countries, such as Jamaica and Mozambique. Although some Black artists are Muslims born into Islam from Nigerian and Somali Muslim families, more Black artists are found among convert Muslim artists in the present study.

4 Empirical Findings: Categories of Cultural Orientations43 In the present paragraph, I will discuss the most significant orientations in the field of Muslim performing artists and try to categorise these. Orientations – as views on the relation between individuals and communities, expressed by cultural tastes and acts44 – are often first explained by education and class backgrounds. In this respect, the field of Muslim artists in the UK and the US provides a diverse picture. Surpassing their parents in educational developments, more than 50% of the artists had obtained a bachelor’s degree, nearly 30% had obtained a master’s degree – of whom most can be found in the US – and 20% had a lower or no educational degree. With regard to class and occupational backgrounds, over 45%of the parents were (lower- and higher-grade) professionals, while 40% were self-employed, working class or unemployed.45 Cultural occupations were found in both categories.46 Orientations are also influenced by religiously inspired developments. Since the 1970s, the global phenomenon of Islamic revival in reaction to the modernisation of societies has manifested itself through an increase of religious piety and community feeling regarding Islamic culture and Muslim values.47 On the contrary, the tendency of post-Islamism, as Asef Bayat defines it, as a project is towards cultural

 Using MAXQDA software for mixed qualitative and quantitative methods of analysing, the interviews were deconstructed by the coding of over 5000 hits along sensitising sociological concepts deriving from process and relational sociological theories, symbolic interactionist theories and self-developed categories. 43  Information from interviews of the author with respondents between 2009 and 2012 is interwoven throughout the chapter. When secondary sources are used as well, these are referred to in separate notes. 44  Orientations are part of the habitus, the set of embodied dispositions. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (London: Routledge, 1984), 466–84. 45  By considering the jobs of the parents of the artists, the classification is based on: John Goldthorpe, Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 46  In between these categories, over 10% have lower-grade clerical jobs or work in social services. 47  Lapidus, A History, 823. 42

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

149

inclusiveness and tolerance instead of more restrictive faith obligations.48 Since the terrorist attacks came to be Islamically labelled, Muslim poets, comedians and musicians gained many commissions from secular and Islamic institutions to perform, speak up and provide alternative images of Islam, especially in the UK. Because I encountered a lot of different forms of social critique in the conversations with the artists and in their productions of art, which reflect and shape orientations, I will try to unravel the dimensions of this criticism first. 1. Social Critique Against Non-Muslims The passionate complaints of Muslim performing artists in interviews and (comedy) performances, uttered in the pre-Islamic State decade, in particular concern the foreign policies of the UK and US governments in relation to Muslim-majority countries in the (Greater) Middle East, which are deemed uncivilised. Grave complaints are directed towards administrative measures that degrade Muslims at international airports after 9/11 as well as biased media reports that lump all Muslims together. Furthermore, the complaints relate to racism and discrimination of Black as well as coloured (Muslim) citizens and, more specifically, Islamophobia in terms of marginalising Muslims and the religion of Islam  – which may be particularly relevant in the UK.49 As a matter of fact, Islamophobia is also discussed in social scientific research.50 Focusing on stigmatisation, the study The Established and Outsiders by Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson demonstrates that power inequalities are not immanently rooted in cultural differences of religion, race or class. Inequalities derive from figurations of people that are marked by an ‘established, coherent and dominant pole’ and a ‘less established, fragmented and dominated pole’.51 The former maintain their strategic positions in media and politics, while the stigmatised latter are limited in exercising effective counter-stigmatisations.52 However, a more balanced configuration of the established and outsiders, leading to recognition and social equality, is generally related to the rise of a shared self-respect and a correlated  Bayat, Asef (ed.) Post Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam (New York, NY: University Press, 2013). 49  Social hostility towards Muslims has grown especially in the UK – where Muslim concentration is much higher than in the US – since 2009. Pew Research Center, “Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion.” Pew Forum of Religion and Public Life (20 September 2020). http://www.pewforum. org/2012/09/20/rising-tide-of-restrictions-on-religion-finding 50  John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin, eds., Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). And: Ayhan Kaya, “Islamophobia: A History of the Term”, The Oxford Handbook of European Islam (online), ed. Jocelyne Cesari (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). And: Leon Moosavi, “The Racialization of Muslim Converts in Britain and Their Experiences of Islamophobia”, Critical Sociology 41/1 (2015), 41–56. And: George Morgan and Scott Poynting, eds., Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic in the West (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013). 51  Bowen Paulle, Bart van Heerikhuizen and Mustafa Emirbayer, “Elias and Bourdieu”, Journal of Classical Sociology 12/1 (2012), 69–93. 52  Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson, The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems (London: Sage Publications, 1994 [1965]), 147–73. 48

150

Y. van Tilborgh

group emancipation.53 These developments may occur in the context of changes in the social, political or economic realms, when newcomers can tap from new resources that enhance their social mobility. In the case of Muslim performers, both as artists and Muslims in the UK, it is obvious to consider that many of them experience the newcomer position frequently. Due to the many Muslim-identified terrorist attacks, and comparisons of the West and its Enlightenment to the Middle East and Islam, Muslims have to deal with degrading depictions deriving from the dichotomies of ‘civilisation’ versus ‘barbarity’, ‘reasonableness’ versus ‘irrationality’ and ‘good’ (secular, Westernised) Muslims versus ‘bad’ (pre-modern, fanatical) Muslims.54 Edward Said in particular claims to have uncovered the frames that degradingly categorise the culturally civilised (‘the West’) versus the uncivilised (‘the East’) as deliberate, with the purpose to dominate the Other.55 The battle of British Bangladeshi multimedia and graffiti performer Mohammed ‘Aerosol Arabic’ Ali, who has become known beyond national borders, is directed against those who are, according to the artist, ‘demonising Islam’. Initially, Mohammed Ali’s complaints were reflected in his Arabic-Islamic styled sprayings of texts and images in the Muslim-majority suburbs of Birmingham. The furious Free Gaza graffiti mural, for instance, replaces the launching of a hand grenade with the throwing of a (peaceful) shoe in a burning environment, which can be read as an accusation against the attitude of the Western (British and North American) world to Palestinians.56 Along with other murals entitled Peace, Unity and Brotherhood, in international public environments,57 Mohammed Ali has developed a conscious strategy to convey his messages to the non-Muslim established by engaging with the perceived opponent of Muslims, the media: I said: ‘I want to infiltrate all of the media, the big ones, not just the local press, but CNN, Al Jazeera, BBC, CBC Canada, the Australian TV.’ One by one, I was able to cross them off the list. So, actually, I had this strategy that I am going to use the press. They can use me and the Muslims for them to sell stories, misconstrue our words or warp some statement and then present it in a negative light – well, my mission was to try and use those same adverts to give further context to the words that I might introduce into society.

 Bram van Stolk, Eigenwaarde als groepsbelang: Sociologische studies naar de dynamiek van zelfwaardering (Houten: Bohn Stafleu Van Loghum, 1991). And: Wouters, Van minnen, 39–43. And: Wouters, Informalisation, 184–7. And: Hilda Verwey-Jonker, Emancipatiebewegingen in Nederland (Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1983). And: Elias, The Civilizing, 430. 54  Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York NY: Random House LLC, 2005). And: Peter Morey and Amina Yaqin, Framing Muslims. Stereotyping and Representation after 9/11 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). And: Jack G. Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People (New York, NY: Olive Branch Press, 2001). 55  Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul [1978] 2003). 56  The public mural Free Gaza, Birmingham, 2009, refers to the incident in which a shoe was thrown at President Bush during a press conference in Iraq in 2008. www.youtube.com/ watch?v=fxwnhrvpmsA (accessed: 14 July 2020). 57  Such as at Lite Site Festival, Westergas terrain, Amsterdam, NL, 21 August 2011. 53

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

151

Framing manifold rap songs, social critique among the artists is not only directed at ‘the Western attitude’ regarding international Muslim-related political causes. The critique is also directed at societal ills that harm many citizens in general, such as poverty, ghettoised communities, criminality and the rise of the penal state in British society, which can be understood as an accusation of inhumane internal policies aimed at the entire population. Additionally, many Muslim performing artists who are strict and moderately religiously practising demonstrate a serious distaste for certain mainstream artistic contents and styles. In their consideration of ‘cussing’, ‘swearing’, ‘with the intention to ridicule and mock’, these productions often lack human respect and decency, such as in comedy that is considered dirty and in gangsta hip-hop that is perceived as misogynous and violent. Their cultural disqualifications of consumerism, materialism and sexualised popular culture reflect a quite  different conception among Muslim artists of what has to be assessed as high-standing art and culture. In this perspective, the sense of superiority in cultural taste, as may be observed among Salafi Muslims,58 actually has a wider manifestation among Muslims. Pierre Bourdieu explains cultural taste as social judgement deriving from class distinctions to safeguard status.59 Elias, however, showed that, after the top-down development of behavioural tastes, a bottom-up (re)formalising tendency could occur among socially rising groups by morally correcting the upper strata (the established) in the sense of practising discipline, virtues and Bildung.60 Altogether, the passionate complaints of Muslim performing artists are found, to different degrees, among all artistic genres, from hip-hop to contemporary art, various religious tenets and levels of practising Islam. At first glance, they shape an impression that is unlike that of fragmented outsiders. Establishing one of the targets of the field of Muslim performing artists, their criticism discloses the goal – shared by many artists in my study as well as concluded in other studies  – to practically upgrade the image of Muslims.61 The utterances of negative social critique against non-Muslims might be understood as accusations derived from religious principles as well as socio-political resistance in the sense of counter-stigmatisations against the established in a social configuration that is perceived as imbalanced. I have categorised these utterances of disapproval in the transnational field of Muslim performing artists as an orientation of social critique against non-Muslims.

 Roel Meijer, ed., “Introduction”, in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 13. 59  Bourdieu, Distinction. 60  Elias, The Civilizing, 421–435. 61  See also: Amel Boubekeur, “Post Islamist Culture: A New Form of Mobilization?”, History of Religions 74/1 (2007): 75–94. And: Maruta Herding, Inventing the Muslim Cool: Islamic Youth Culture in Western Europe (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2013). 58

152

Y. van Tilborgh

2. Social Critique Against Muslims Besides encountering criticism against non-Muslims, the different forms of social critique in the conversations with the artists and in their performances also include criticism directed at Muslims, which overlapping kinds of critical notions I will try to unravel next. (a) Lack of Appreciation of Art and Music From the 1960s onward, the United Kingdom recruited many uneducated labourers for their growing industries. Informing a generational conflict, the well-schooled offspring of first-generation immigrants came to critically  perceive their parents’ religiosity as folk Islam or ‘cultural Islam’, ruled by ethnic customs.62 With different emphasis, British artistic directors Naz Koser and Conor Ibrahiem, of Pakistani backgrounds, profess that many immigrant Muslims of lower socio-­ economic layers know little of serious theatre, music and dance. In Birmingham, Koser explained: Muslim women, who had no music at all, are tone-deaf... They have not really had arts and culture in their upbringing… most of the Pakistani communities here are from the villages, working class. So, even when they hear, it is not something that they would encourage. Actually, it is discouraged. Because they are confused with religion and culture… they say: You can’t do this, you can’t do that because it is haram or it is not allowed in Islam, where actually they don’t really know that much about Islam.

Conor Ibrahiem noticed how many first-generation South Asian Muslims are familiar with the popular Indian (Hindi) Bollywood movies on the one hand but feel reluctance towards high-quality theatre and music on the other – even when produced by British Muslims. Naz Koser experienced that the preconceived taste of a segment of immigrant Muslims makes them panic at new art forms. With her ‘Sufi Punk’ prayer performance, by which she tried to reconcile the identities of Britishness and Sufi-Muslimness, she was accused of heresy in Muslim circles. At the same time, the relationship between beauty, art and remembrance of God has been a key element of Sufi philosophy for centuries.63 As such, critique by Sufi-­ minded artists of the limited appreciation of art among Muslims in broader social layers also involves the undervaluation of the artistic traditions in Islam. Especially those engaged in theatre productions, such as Pakistani American Wajahat Ali and British Luqman Ali, who is of African American descent, recall that refined art has always been present in Islam but that many Muslims of South Asian and Middle Eastern descent tend to ignore this. Their examples range from Islamic storytelling, Persian poetry and classical Muslim world literature to the origins of rap attributed  Janet Jacobson, Islam in Transition: Religion and Identity Among British Pakistani Youth (London: Routledge, 1998), 143–51. And: Peter Mandaville, “Hip-hop”. And: Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Colombia University Press, 2004), 138. And: Sadek Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists. The contested ground of British Islamic activism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016). 63  Jessica Winegar, “Purposeful Art: Between Television Preachers and the State”, ISIM Review 22 (autumn) (2008): 28–9. See also: Raymond W.  Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). 62

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

153

to the poets at the time of the Prophet Mohammed. As Muslims in the West, the artists justify their artistic creations since it is a religious plight to ‘use the talents that Allah gave you’,64 and because ‘Allah is beautiful and loves beauty.’65 The problem of the undervaluation of art among Muslim immigrants was also treated at the international seminar ‘Creativity and the Spiritual Path’ in the US, which was attended via Skype by British Azeri–Iranian singer Sami Yusuf, who has contributed to modernising the genre of Islamic nasheed.66 He strongly advocates that Muslims should not forget the history of art in the Golden Age of Islam. Filmmaker Mustafa Davis, who is of mixed African American and White descent, blames segments of Muslims to have put a taboo on art, photography and music. In his explanation, they interpret creativity as coming from innovation in Islam (bidah), which is negatively defined as heresy when following the dominant view of Arab Muslims.67 Attributed by the artists as a result of the cultural backgrounds of immigrant Muslims as well as to the hegemony of Arab authoritative voices, I have categorised these utterances as concerning the lack of appreciation of art and music among Muslims and contributing to an orientation of social critique against Muslims. (b) Intolerance Reflecting a common perspective among Black artists, British Nigerian rap artist Rakin Fetuga aka Rakin Niass has another perspective on why the arts are rejected: The Muslim [Pakistani] community does have a love for the arts when it’s in their own way and their own culture. What they haven’t got a love for is like Western culture, Western music. Especially rap that comes from the Black people in America. To them, this is the worst thing that could ever happen... They hate it.

These grave accusations, uttered in particular by Black artists to forms of intolerance among Muslims against Muslims, clearly concern racism. In one of his poems, African American Dasham Brookins aka Brother Dash, who is a respected invitee of British practising Muslims,68 translates the acknowledged experience that South Asian and Middle Eastern Muslim parents often hinder their daughters from engaging with Black Muslims: Can I Marry Your Daughter? / ‘cause we be lovers of God not the tone of Man’s flesh / Can I Marry Your Daughter? / If the Prophet was Bilal would you reject your deen? / Deny your

 Anas Canon recalled this notion at Deen Tight, The Drum, Birmingham, UK, 13 October 2009.  Source: al-Mu’jam al-Awsaṭ 6902 (graded Sahih by Al-Albani). 66  Songs of praise a cappella or accompanied by a frame drum. 67  Creativity and the Spiritual Path: Why is Creativity Relevant? San Francisco Bay Area, CA, 21 February 2010. 68  Especially of Muslim women, considering his discussion of Muslim stage manners at one of the women-only Hear Muslim Youth Voice meetings: An Audience with Brother Dash, The Custard Factory, Birmingham, UK, 13 June 2009. 64 65

154

Y. van Tilborgh

Rabb69 and still say your so fresh and so clean? / Can I Marry Your Daughter? / The colour of skin? Or the heart that’s within?70

In her stand-up comedy shows, British Pakistani Shazia Mirza puts it satirically: ‘For a Muslim girl, the worst thing is not wearing the veil but to go out with a Black man.’ Her dad had warned her: ‘If I ever catch you with a Black man, I will burn you!’71 Further accusations of Muslim artists aimed at other Muslims are made explicit by North American punk rock band The Kominas. With the song ‘Rumi Was a Homo (But Wahaj Was a Fag)’, they criticise African American Muslim imam Siraj Wahhaj for his alleged reaction to the upcoming opening of a gay mosque in Toronto, telling he would burn down the masjid – if he had the chance.72 Although many Muslims with immigrant backgrounds have chosen to pursue a stricter kind of Islam, as Peter Mandaville contends, there are also many who, in contrast, follow secularised, non-orthodox interpretations of Islam.73 The topic of Muslim homophobia in the present study is exclusively addressed by artists with immigrant (South Asian) parents, who practise Islam in a less orthodox way. I have categorised these utterances of racism and homophobia as concerning intolerance with regard to other Muslims and contributing to an orientation of social critique against Muslims. (c) Un-Islamic Behaviour The popularisation of British Salafism can be understood as a way for young Asian Muslims from the second generation of immigrants, as well as for Black and White convert Muslims, to cleanse Islam of perceived cultural misrepresentations, Sadek Hamid explains.74 Striving to purify Islam, Salafism provides a lot of disgruntled, humiliated young people the power to identify with being part of a special sect that has access to ‘the Truth’.75 These developments in distinguishing an authentic Islam, along with the terrorist attacks attributed to Muslims, seem to have contributed to their heightened engagement in the art and Islam debate in Europe.  Deen refers to judgement, custom and religion. Bilal was the Abyssinian slave and Companion of Prophet Muhammad. Rab is an Arabic word for lord and master. Ar-Rabb may refer to Allah. 70  Part of the poem ‘Can I Marry Your Daughter?’ brotherdash.com/can-i-marry-your-daughter/ (accessed: July 14, 2018). Poetry with Brother Dash, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, US, 13 April 2010. 71  https://www.shazia-mirza.com/shazias-week-59/ (accessed: 14 July 2020). 72  Omar Sacirbey, “The clash. Punk meets Islam in a local band that shreds stereotypes”. The Boston Globe, 18 April 2006. www.boston.com/ae/music/articles/2006/04/18/the_clash/?page=full (accessed: 14 July 2020). 73  Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (New York: Routledge, 2007). I will use his definition of “secularised” in the present text. 74  Sadek Hamid, “The Attraction of ‘Authentic Islam’: Salafism and British Muslim Youth”, in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, Roel Meijer, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 384–403. And: Hamid, Sufis. 75  Rüdiger Lohlker, New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism (Göttingen, GE: VandR unipress, 2012), 95. And: Meijer, Global, 13–15. 69

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

155

In the field of Muslim performing artists, especially the artists with a history in hip-hop who have ceased to make rap music in the course of time due to the alleged impermissibility of musical instruments in Islam76 externalise their critique concerning un-Islamic lifestyles. Around the time of his decision to perform without the usual instrumental accompaniment, British Caribbean Muslim convert Masikah Feesabillah aka Al Asadi aka Abu Siddiq77 is ambitious to ‘break the vices that destroy people’, including that of sexual promiscuity and drugs. Next to complaining about certain manners among Muslims related to his CD Iconoclast, he professed: Pakistani women, when they wear the hijab, they only cover half of their head. This is not from Islam. You’re supposed to cover your hair. If you’re not covering your hair, why wear it? It’s a cultural thing in Pakistan that the women cover only half their head. But it conflicts with what Allah says in the Qur’an. Allah says in the Qur’an: ‘Cover yourself.’ So that part of the Pakistani culture, you take it out the suitcase and you leave it there.

Next to arguing against incorrect hair covering, Masikah warns his Muslim sisters against being scantily clad and practising sexual intercourse before or outside of marriage (zina) in videos that are titled ‘Why We Burn’ and ‘Keep Your Hijabs High’.78 His complaints affect his Muslim brothers as well: ‘While we should implement sharia... they are smoking, drinking and using drugs’ and ‘Allah gave you the chance to earn Paradise – you jeopardised it!’79 These are concrete moral complaints proceeding from the stricter kinds of understandings of Islamic rules, which can be found more often among Salafi-disposed Muslims. They are dedicated to the reform of Islamic belief and practices,80 among others, by observing outward customs of special attire, gender segregation and entertaining distractions.81 Some of the criticisms are statements about non-Muslimness. British Nigerian stand-up comedian Nabil Abdulrashid, who performs jokes on hand amputation in relation to Islamic law, explained an accusation that also circulates among Black American artists: I think the entire Arabian royal family and politicians should have their hands cut off because they’re all thieves, they’re all stealing money. So obviously, they’re not practising the [Saudi] law properly. These guys come to the UK, drink and do all these things that are not Islamic. And then they’re supposed to be highlighted as the Muslims of the world.

 Generally, the hand drum on its own is not under discussion.  Masikah, who exchanged Feesabillah for Al Asadi and also for Abu Siddiq in using his surname, can be considered born-again and convert Muslim due to his non-Muslim mother. 78  www.youtube.com/watch?v=UrOtM3V3HPY. And: www.youtube.com/ watch?v=NbQsFPhZbKM. And: www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-GwndR1qeo. And: www.youtube.com/watch?v=40R-kHQrz3o (accessed: 7 May 2018). 79  www.youtube.com/watch?v=vghO17L0Grg (accessed: 21 December 2012). 80  Lapidus, A History, 823. And: Mandaville, Global, 246. And: Meijer, Global. 81  Meijer, Global. And: Ahmad Moussalli, Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is the Enemy? (Beirut: Conflicts Forum, 2009). 76 77

156

Y. van Tilborgh

That’s rubbish, that’s ridiculous! They’re not the pinnacle of Islam. They’re just Arabs, that’s all they are.

Non-Muslimness is also a label used on those Asian and Middle Eastern artists who profit from the sudden popularity of Muslim comedy but who are accused of lacking the socially conscious attitude of Muslim performing artists. According to Abdulrashid, they perform the White kind of comedy by spreading ‘embarrassing stereotypes of Muslims’, which hurts the Muslim cause and further degrades their image. Altogether, I have categorised these differentiated utterances about the definition of proper Islam as concerning un-Islamic behaviour among Muslims and contributing to an orientation of social critique against Muslims. (d) Lack of Introspection Not condemning embarrassing representations, British Pakistani comedian Isma Almas just complained about the conformity of typically Muslim cultural producers with moderate views, who release comfortable representations of Muslims without breaking boundaries by not going beyond these: We are not going to talk about anything that might upset you in any way... Because Muslims don’t do that, do you know what I mean? They are not going to do an article [or gag] about Muslims who drink alcohol. They are not going to do an article [or gag] about Muslims who have sex before marriage. It is about: ‘Our love marriage worked because we waited to have sex after marriage.’82

Several artists in film and entertainment perceive it as a social problem that Muslims are utterly afraid to explore what is considered socially polluted. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: Routledge [1966] 2002). Sri Lankan American M.  Hasna Maznavi, aspirant film and TV director at the time, articulated: That’s a big fear a lot of Muslims have, airing dirty laundry, talking about the problems we have. Through my film making, I’ve learned that accessing those things that trouble us makes us more human in the eyes of non-Muslims. And that fear of trying to look perfect deteriorates the value of our work. If we’re honest about who we are with our problems and our good things, I think we can appeal to more people, Muslim and non-Muslim.

Talking about the quality of communication with non-Muslims as well, British African American theatre director Luqman Ali argued that many Muslims, while structurally complaining about the media, themselves fail to properly explain their Islamic faith and Muslim identity. He defined this as a lack of ‘cultural maturity’ to communicate about serious issues in the community with other social groups. British Nigerian comedian Nabil Abdulrashid explained such complains simply from a lack of social activism among Muslims. While, Islamically, they should stand up: ‘Change it with your hands.’83

 Almas refers to Muslim magazine emel and the comedy trio Allah Made Me Funny.  ‘Whoever among you sees an evil action and can change it with his hand (by taking action), let him change it with his hand.’ Sunan Ibn Majah (4013), vol. 5, book 36, Hadith 4013. sunnah.com/ 82 83

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

157

Other accusations concern the level of artistic reflection. Maruta Herding observes how messages of Muslims in Western Europe concern identity-related issues.84 Often invoking their rich artistic tradition, Sufi-disposed Muslim artists in the present study feel ashamed about the quality level of performers who have just entered the field of art. The assumption of many new artists that being Muslim and distributing Islamic messages is religio-artistically distinctive enough in itself – for instance, through (modernised) traditional Islamic songs praising Allah, nasheed – demonstrates, according to those complaining, the painful lack of artistic quality among Muslims. In their view, these artists do not ‘take art to a higher level’ in the way ambitious non-Muslim professional artists are trained to do. However, from the Islamic conception Ihsan, Sufi-disposed Muslims understand the obligation to strive for excellence in all aspects of life, including the arts.85 African American music producer Anas Canon, who praised the productions of British Jamaican Poetic Pilgrimage, argued that several artists of South Asian or Middle Eastern immigrant backgrounds may confuse genuine art with their quest for a renewed identity in the US after the terrorist attacks of 2001: Really good art, there is a sincerity in it, it comes from the artist. And that is what people are attracted to... to that sincerity, that really rich self-expression. So, if it comes from a place of strict politics, then it really never catches on. Everything that I have seen that has come out post-9/11 for the specific purpose of creating a different identity and not coming of a place of real art, never sticks.

British Pakistani Naz Koser, who is eager to see the Muslim equivalent of Shakespeare nowadays, also blamed the cultural Prevent Extremism and Faith and Cohesion funding for having triggered low-quality ‘art with a message’ from Muslims in the UK. Altogether, the accusation that introspection falls short among certain groups of Muslims uncovers a deep embarrassment of several Muslim artists in comedy, film performance and theatre. I have categorised these differentiated utterances as concerning the lack of introspection among Muslims and contributing to an orientation of social critique against Muslims. (e) Backward Cultural Ideas In the poem ‘Masjid Marauders’,86 African American Dasham Brookins, who regularly performs in the UK, addresses the attitudes of immigrant Muslims who control mosques – masjids – in Britain and North America by depicting them as bandits based on their suppression, misogyny and hate for music: The house of prayer? A social club / For men who share a foreign tongue / Unruly kids spit disrespect and I do mean literal / This place was built on blood and sweat / And hopes and tears / And dreams deferred / The first house was built on the dirt of slaves / Not on the urn/1291130 (accessed: 14 July 2020) 84  Herding, Inventing, 165 85  17th Hadith – Prescription of Ihsan (Perfection) [Muslim: 1955]. 86  Part of the poem ‘Masjid Marauders’. brotherdash.com/masjid-marauders/ (accessed: 14 July 2020).

158

Y. van Tilborgh

fringes of outer whitelandia / We beat our words on their inner ear duffs / But they turned away ‘cause ‘music is haram’ / Islam like a bomb, napalm for native dwellers ‘Sisters go pray in a cellar’ / They are the masjid marauders.

The practices of ‘foreign imams’ and spokespersons of the Muslim community are perceived as extremely annoying by Muslim performing artists both with immigrant and indigenous African American and White Muslim backgrounds. Due to the ignorance among these imams of the non-Muslim-majority society and its customs, they are called ‘fake experts’.87 According to a significant number of artists, the affectionate ties of many religious teachers with the Islamic old world leave them inadequate to stay tuned in with young Muslims and their need for popular (hip-hop) culture. Their dominant, segregating and patriarchal views are considered a sad demonstration of cultural irrelevance, disregarding the socio-historical contexts of (Black and Brown) followers.88 With their simple-minded halal and haram interpretations, the imams are ­trying to control the visitors of the mosques to stay in power, complained the artists. Particularly, the problem of gatekeepers in the religion of Islam related to the issue of female rights is frequently addressed. During the interview, Iranian American comedian Tissa Hami explained the reason behind including the following joke in her show by saying: ‘I don’t go after the religion per se, I go after the aspects of it that I don’t like.’ In a mosque the men pray in the front and the women pray in the back. Americans look at that and they think: ‘Oh, that’s so sexist, those women are so oppressed’... But we’re not in the back because we’re oppressed – we just like the view! We’re praying for a piece of that. Oh, thank you, Allah!89

Altogether, hilarious comedy as well as serious, metaphoric poetry uttered by artists both in the UK and the US touch upon the rules for Muslim women, who have to take the backdoor entrance, sit behind a man’s back in the mosque and perform behind the stage because the physical (female) presence of the artist is prohibited. Not just female but also several male Muslim artists perceive female rights as undervalued in the ummah. Particularly less strict practising female Muslim artists of immigrant descent play a salient role in raising, moreover, the issues of incest, forced marriages and domestic violence in ethnic communities in comedy and poetry. The accusations of cultural irrelevance and female discrimination seem to relate to the kind of institutionalisation of Islam and male dominance in Islam in the UK and the US. I have categorised these utterances as concerning backward cultural ideas and contributing to an orientation of social critique against Muslims. (f) Unrestrained Emotions  See also: Sadek Hamid, Sufis.  See also: Yolanda van Tilborgh, “Islam, culture and authoritative voices in the UK and the US: Patterns of orientation and autonomy among Muslims in art”, Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik 2/1 (2018), 101–34. link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs41682-018-0017-y 89  Cited in Robin Wright, Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion across the Islamic World. (New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 2011), 197. 87 88

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

159

Ever since Salman Rushdie received death threats and angry Muslims burned copies of his book The Satanic Verses, the Muslim community has generated social anxiety among politicians and the general public. Kathryn L. Gardner argues that the association of Muslim piety with moral conservatism and cultural traditionalism has given rise to the rest of the population to understand Muslim identities by their inability or unwillingness to integrate in society, which creates a vulnerability to radicalisation.90 However, a serious complaint was also uttered by Muslim performing artists with regard to the unrestrained expressions of offence, which occur among Muslims who are considered unable to contain themselves in the UK, the US and globally. Luqman Ali addressed ‘the type of fanaticism and extremism that we have within certain parts of our community’ as resulting from the fact that Muslims are not educated to develop their imagination and communicate properly. But, ‘the pen is mightier than the sword’, warned Rakin Niass at the event Islam from Africa with Love.91 The Muslims concerned, often classified as ‘non-Western’, are blamed to constitute the corrupted Muslim image. In short, they are perceived as the cause of free speech and literature having become censured, books having been burned, embassies having been attacked and people having been killed. Less Islam related, the complaint about unrestrained expressions of offence concerns the use of criminality and violence of (Muslim) adolescents in response to experiences of social problems in the urban ghettos of the UK and the US as well. I have categorised these utterances as concerning unrestrained emotions among groups of Muslims and contributing to an orientation of social critique against Muslims. 3. Evaluation of Social Critique In sum, the field of Muslim performing artists reflects two orientations of social critique. Besides critique aimed against non-Muslims, many expressions of Muslim performing artists reflect an orientation that is shaped by divergent social critique against Muslims. Critique by Muslim artists, who hold a range of interpretations of Islam from strict to liberal, may not have been categorised this way in academic literature before. In these cases of negative peer group critique, the artists distinguish themselves from other Muslims nationally and globally. Similar to social critique against non-Muslims and state policies, criticism that faces Muslims is found among artists of all genres and spiritual tenets. Compared to the social critique against non-Muslims, the particular complaints about Muslims are less broadly shared but display a large differentiation, comprising a lack of appreciation of art

 Gardner, Constructing, 452. And: Pew Research Center, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 22 June 2006). www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/22/the-great-divide-how-westerners-and-muslims-view-each-other/ (accessed: 6 May 2018). 91  Islam from Africa with Love, Community Center, Frensham Street SE15, London, UK, 6 November 2010. 90

160

Y. van Tilborgh

and music, intolerance, un-Islamic behaviour, a lack of introspection, backward cultural ideas and unrestrained emotions.

5 Orientations: Civilising Attempts While focusing on how the social critique described above is processed in the field of Muslim performing artists, I encountered repeated endeavours in the conversations with Muslim artists and their productions of art that seemed aimed at educating and/or emancipating other people. I will try to unravel and categorise these next, and, subsequently, discuss why they can be called civilising attempts. As mentioned, civilising offensives, missions and attempts refer to interventions to discipline disadvantageous cultural conduct and to encourage self-control, which seems identical to behavioural ‘formalisation’ towards more strict regimes of manners and emotions.92 It refers to the inducing of debate on this topic as well. 1. Religiously Civilising Attempts In Christianity, moral warnings against hell and damnation, as well as recommendations on good conduct and communal spirit, are expressed by means of artistic productions.93 Moral warnings can also be found in the productions of Muslim artists. In the chorus of Masikah’s song ‘Keep Your Hijab High’, Muslim women are made aware of their dressing manners by repeatedly being told how to relate to the devil and to constrain their behaviour to Islamic proportions94: Sister, The Sun Is Out, I Know It’s Hot Outside / But Jahannam Is Way Hotter Than the Sun in the Sky95 / Don’t Be Fooled If Shaytaan Wants To Strip Of Your Pride / So, Keep Your Jilbaabs On And Your Hijaabs High!96

Masikah’s views on the correct kind of hair covering for Muslim women in terms of Islam are proclaimed on a much broader scale in the virtual lessons of American Iranian Muslim comedian Baba Ali.97 Through Ummah Films, the film company that releases ‘Islamically permissible entertainment’,98 Baba Ali produces educational video lectures in a comically laid-back and uplifting mode. His audience, consisting of hundreds of thousands of young Muslims worldwide, especially those of immigrant descent in the UK, are often in doubt about the halal and haram quality of their practices. Baba Ali defines the moral videos of the popular Reminder Series as ‘serious comedy’. In ‘That’s not Hijab’, which has been viewed over 700,000

 Mennell, “Civilising”.  Kempers, Painting, 21–77. 94  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-GwndR1qeo (accessed: 14 July 2020). 95  An afterlife place of punishment or hell. 96  Long and loose-fitting coat or outer garment for Muslim women. 97  Baba Ali considers himself a convert Muslim due to being raised irreligiously. 98  ummahfilms.blogspot.com/ (accessed: 14 July 2020). 92 93

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

161

times on YouTube, Baba Ali distinguishes Islamically proper and improper ways for a Muslim woman to hide her hair. Wearing, as he calls it, the Mickey Mouse kind of headscarf, ‘covering all her hair, except for her ears – which look like an earring fashion show  – that’s not hijab’, judges Baba Ali humorously as well as resolutely.99 To smaller audiences, although following the traditional social stratification in religion, British spoken word poet Abdullah Shariff, a born Muslim of Pakistani and Kenyan descent, critically combines the theme of honouring the Muslim woman – who is believed to have an esteemed position in Islam – with a behavioural lesson to his Muslim brothers on how to relate to women: She is an irreplaceable mother... and beautiful wife / A gift to man and a carrier to life... She is a mercy endowed by the Lord... You cry these women are no longer worthy to be wives / That flaunting their bodies has become the religion of their lives... You taught her little about respect, honour and dignity / Instead you taught her about make-up, materialism and greed / She goes where you go; she follows your lead... For a queen is only a queen when she is married to a king, you see / So be a king.100

Salafi-minded British Jamaican spoken word artist and actor Ashly Chin aka Muslim Belal has delivered over 500 biographical performances at universities and cultural centres, of which I have visited several. Chin was to some degree involved in street and gang culture before giving up instrumental music as a rap artist, similar to Masikah, who, eventually, became engaged in Roadside2Islam to change the views of British street youth who are vulnerable to gun and knife crimes in the UK. The withdrawal from music in a kind of second Islamic conversion by leading a more restrained kind of lifestyle may have reinforced a sense of the possibility to be spiritually elected among artists with double conversion narratives.101 Chin orates: Death is a reality and one day you will have to face the Day of Judgement. What is your purpose in life? To impress your Creator who you are going back to.102

Through telling his life story of Islamic conversion in a rhythmic (rap) sequence on stage, Ashly Chin spreads his moral message based on how he turned ‘from hell to heaven’, meanwhile ‘Allah took my life out of the darkness.’103 Chin’s audiences consist of Muslims who could potentially be rescued from a tough life of petty crimes, and, maybe more so, of newly converted or born-again Muslim students  www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4jQi0Gjy3M (accessed: 14 July 2020).  www.veengle.com/s/abdullah%20shariff.html (accessed: 18 December 2012). See also: www.youtube.com/user/abdullahshariff1/videos. And: www.youtube.com/ watch?v=FY6DUczPxDk (accessed: 7 May 2018). 101  Yolanda van Tilborgh, “Career Trajectories and (In)Formalization among Muslim Performing Artists in the UK and the U.S. Accommodationism or Fundamentalism?” Journal of Religion & Society 19 (2017), 1–25. dspace2.creighton.edu/xmlui/handle/10504/114372 102  Eid Celebration, University of Sussex, Sussex, UK, 12 December 2010. 103  Yolanda van Tilborgh, “From Hell to Heaven: the Malcolm X Narrative of Muslim Artists. The Meaning of El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz for American and British Muslim Performing Artists in the twenty-first Century”, Malcolm X: From Political Eschatology to Religious Revolutionary, Dustin J. Byrd and Seyed Javad Miri (eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 273–320. 99

100

162

Y. van Tilborgh

who seek advice from motivational convert Muslim speakers, such as Muslim Belal.104 In more or less humorous styles, these speakers educate their listeners on how to stop jeopardising their chance to get to Paradise through controlling their personal behaviour in the present. Generally, a number of Muslim artists who are Salafi-interested and, to a greater extent, Sufi-minded or Sunni-identified105 feel responsible for family-friendly entertainment at public cultural festivals and clubs, showing their audience and colleagues how art and music can be safe and appealing without having to sexualise their shows. Instead, the artists promote Islamic Bildung. For the more Salafi-­ minded artists, this may mean to literally seek Islamic information at whatever distance. For the Sufi-minded ones, it could mean to develop self-knowledge, however difficult this may seem, in order to know God.106 Whether in the theatre plays of British Pakistani Conor Ibrahiem (Arakan Creative) or the djembe rhythms of Fursan musicians Farid Hamrat, British Algerian, and Abdula Bustami Khir, British Sudanese, the artists are eager to recommend a balance in following Islam instead of imposing Islam on others by going to socio-religious extremes.107 To distinguish Islamic priorities, the religiously practising Muslims urge their listeners to be specifically prepared for the afterlife instead of being solely occupied with materialistic desires in the present-day world, the dunya.108 In sum, although several Muslim performing artists and their productions have characteristics of ‘proselytisers’ within the European context of Muslim youth culture,109 they seem to be reformers even more so by being focused on the behaviour of Muslim sisters and brothers. I call several of these attempts religiously civilising attempts because they are performed repetitively and canalise social critique into religio-cultural goals. These attempts relate to the regulations in Islam concerning manners and morals that ask for considerable self-constraint. As such, they can be considered to enhance the formalisation of conduct to act as a proper Muslim after the perceived example of the Prophet Muhammad, his Companions and their descendants, the Salaf. The attempts are exercised especially by convert and born-again and, in particular, male Muslim performing artists who are  – for instance, by sharing their experiences of living Islam – intent to seriously educate their audiences on their comportment with regard to the ego, daily temptations, the Shaytaan and the requirements to Paradise. 2. Culturally Civilising Attempts

 Eid Celebration, University of Sussex, Sussex, UK 12 December 2010.  The majority of the artists represent themselves as Sunni Muslims. Besides being Sunni Muslims, a number of the artists display certain Salafi or Sufi identifications or affiliations. 106  For instance, British Bangladeshi Mohammed Ali and African American Amir Sulaiman respectively. 107  Hijaab, by Arakan Creative, Bradford Playhouse, Bradford, UK, 1 November 2010. 108  Van Tilborgh, “From Hell”. 109  Maruta Herding, Inventing, 199. 104 105

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

163

While immersing myself into their productions of art, I also encountered, in the conversations with Muslim performing artists, repeated endeavours that seemed less specifically aimed at educating other people to religious formalisation. I will try to discuss and categorise these different efforts below to learn more about how the encountered social critique is processed so as to understand the kind of orientations that are present in the field of Muslim performing artists. (a) Efforts to Counter Potential Extremism among Muslims Affecting the UK, American politicians and diplomats employed musical productions overseas to support governments in promoting Sufism among Muslim youth at risk of radicalisation after 9/11. This Islamic tenet regards the arts as integral to its way of devotion and displays more nation-oriented loyalties than Salafism with its ‘ummah-centred outlook’.110 The debate about the perceived control of British Muslim cultural productions would almost divide the Muslim community. Nevertheless, the British counterterrorism strategy CONTEST, which challenged the restrictive Wahhabi interpretations of Islam from Saudi Arabia through supporting performances of Muslim hip-hop artists with (American) Sufi-inclined teachers, was partially praised and its measures could, in remodelled forms, continue to exist.111 In the play Hearts and Minds, the teenage boy Asif, ‘who is Pakistani by memory, British by culture and Muslim by sentiment’, as playwright and artistic director of the Khayaal Theatre Company Luqman Ali explained, feels completely torn between divergent loyalties.112 By balancing radical Muslim rap with Urdu poetry and the poems of British Shakespeare with those of the Sufi-inspired Persian Rumi, the different cultural, ethnic, spiritual and national identifications are addressed. With ‘the power of expressing art’, Luqman Ali, who migrated from the US to the UK, endeavours to demonstrate that, when one feels socio-religiously attacked, imagination can be stronger than what he calls ‘destructive ways of defending’. Luqman Ali is one of those artists who regard poetry and storytelling as a source of civilisation that is legitimated by the Qur’an and Hadiths. He visits hundreds of schools and community centres with his theatre-in-education and performs Question-and-Answer (Q and A) discussions with students and inhabitants of the less privileged areas to prevent and combat radicalism and racism. To Luqman Ali, Prevent Extremism’s state funding of Khayaal Theatre has meant an alternative kind of appreciation for his long-standing objective to serve the disparate Muslim communities by means of art, literature and theatre. ‘Prevent’ has compensated the lack of financial support from the established British cultural sector on account of Khayaal’s contrasting ideas to autonomous art as well as the lack of support from several Muslim institutions.  Aidi, Rebel, 70. And: Meijer, Global.  Amanda Parker and Murtaza Shibli, Beyond Prevent: Achieving Security and Challenging Extremism, Conference Report (Westminster, 16 November 2010). 112  Hearts and Minds, City of Wolverhampton College and Dunstall Hill Community Centre, Wolverhampton, UK, 26 March 2009. 110 111

164

Y. van Tilborgh

By excluding Salafi kinds of outlooks, the Cohesion and Prevent funding became highly contested among Muslims.113 However, I encountered exceptions enabled by the financing of Prevent Extremism at the Muslim Youth Voice project of the Hounslow Asian and African Youth Association (HAAYA), which intended to ‘divert vulnerable young Muslims away from extremist organisations’, in London.114 At the cultural event This Is How We Roll,115 which proclaimed to have ‘Only voices – No musical instruments’, the Muslim artists ranged from those with latent Salafi aspirations – for example, British Caribbean spoken word artists Masikah and Muslim Belal – to those who interpret Islam less literally, such as British Pakistani stand-up comedian Jeff Mirza. The artists, among whom those of the Mecca2Medina rap ‘Put down the knife, put down the gun!’, performed on stage for a British Somali and South Asian audience while being backed by the speeches of the invited imams. Imam Abdul Malik propagated: One aspect of the Prophet is forgotten: To stand up in confrontation with another Muslim is haram! To kill is haram!... Christians have a message: Love. We don’t know what our message is. [It is] the message of mercy the Prophet has taught us. Mercy for the world.

Less obviously treating extremism, British Pakistani actors and scriptwriters Alia Bano and Waleed Akthar are involved in artistically exploring friendship between two teenagers from opposite faith traditions in the Israel–Palestine controversy.116 Artists, such as Bano and Akthar, who indicate to have a liberal understanding of Islam, participate in the theatrical initiatives of the London-based The MUJU Crew. Operating from a more secular perspective, MUJU has brought Muslims and Jews together in creating theatre for over a decade, dissociating the image of Muslims from any anti-Semitic attitudes. In the field of Muslim performing artists, there are many efforts of trying to prevent extremism among adolescent Muslims. In the more explicit forms, the efforts of the artists are in tandem with or triggered by institutional ways through programmes with a theological base in order to conjointly show the audiences alternative, civilised ways to communicate the outrage caused by social stigmatisation and treatment of the ummah by the national states. I call these the efforts to counter potential extremism among Muslims. (b) Efforts to Enhance the Appreciation of Art among Muslims Due to struggles related to a negative cultural historical stance towards (forms of) art, theatre and music among Muslims in their families or their ethnic communities, many Muslims of immigrant and/or lower socio-economic backgrounds lack the  Michael Mumisa, “The civil war among Muslims in Britain”, The Independent, 2 December 2010. web.archive.org/web/20150914223337/http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2010/12/01/thecivil-war-among-muslims-in-britain/ (accessed: 14 July 2020). 114  r e s o u r c e s . c o h e s i o n i n s t i t u t e . o r g . u k / P u b l i c a t i o n s / D o c u m e n t s / D o c u m e n t / DownloadDocumentsFile.aspx?recordId=154&file=PDFversion (accessed: 21 July 2015). 115  At Richmond upon Thames College, Twickenham, UK, 28 March 2009. 116  Extreme Prevention Goes Global, and The Walls, Tricycle Theatre, London, UK, 7/8 November 2009. 113

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

165

possibility to fully enjoy art. Often related to the purposes described above, the subsidised artistic events organised for these audiences in the UK can be categorised into two types. The first kind of artistic event, such as This Is How We Roll, provides gender-­ segregated seating, prayer facilities, halal food and an alcohol-free environment that is considered safe where, importantly, the performances are kept ‘clean’ from musical instruments. The organising institutions tend to invite one or more Islamic teachers, who seem to legitimate the artistic occasion to Muslim families. Through goals that range between Islamic invitation, dawah, image renovation of Islam and world peace for both the ummah and non-Muslims, the audiences may learn to appreciate popular art productions of Muslim artists as Islamically justified artistic forms. The second kind are events organised by Muslim artistic directors who, by means of their creative enterprises, aim to make so-called high art more familiar among the audiences concerned. Artistic director Naz Koser of Ulfah Arts intends to disclose the disengaged ethnic communities and remove the religious, cultural and economic barriers that particularly refrain immigrant women and youth from expressing themselves. She connects famous Islamic stories with expressions of art and culture that are legitimate in the ‘Western’ field of art, such as by means of the theatre production The Mysteries in Our Own Words, in collaboration with Belgrade Theatre in Coventry.117 Also, for the international DAM Festival, Koser initiated the musical drama Hakawatiyyah the Storyteller.118 Mediated by Muslim storyteller Alia Alzougbi, classical musicians from Kosovo based their compositions on how hundred common British Muslim women – transmitters of cultural values – relate to epic stories in Islam. For instance, as drawn from Ulfah Arts’ research, they do not feel recognised by Muslim men in their roles of ‘queens of their homes’. Koser explained her overall strategy of integrating what is considered high-quality art, music and dance together with classical Islam as fighting the excesses of narrow interpretations: [We were] able to say: ‘Hang on a minute, it is from the Qur’an, what is the problem?’... Well, you have to fight religion with religion.

With Khayaal Theatre Company, Luqman Ali reworks the dramatic interpretation of classic Muslim world literature from the Middle East and South Asia into theatre plays that focus on the virtues of the prophets in relation to personal selves. By respecting Islamic sensitivities, meaning a controlled presentation of musical styles, visual images and physical interaction, he succeeds to attract Muslim audiences to his plays. Luqman Ali defined art as being necessary for the survival of ‘a healthy Muslim community’ and agitated against the manifestation of artistic misrecognition in several communities: We have a situation within Muslim communities in the West where young people are discouraged from going into creative industries and going into art, in preference for what are seen as more economically secure professions, law, engineering, medicine and banking. 117 118

 The Mysteries in Our Own Words, Belgrade Theatre, Coventry, UK, 31 July 2009.  Ulfah Arts and Dam Festival Kosovo, Hakawatiyyah the storyteller, Birmingham, 2010.

166

Y. van Tilborgh

This has resulted in a community being out of balance. As a community, we are unable to holistically harness human resources in a way that would bring it sustainable prosperity in the long term.

Regarding the purity and pollution beliefs among many immigrants, Luqman Ali tries to replace the traditional non-engagement in art and theatre with the modern understanding of active engagement in the domains of civilisation through recognising high art in Islam from Middle Eastern, Eastern European or Asian backgrounds. He teaches to esteem professions in the field of cultural production and media so (young South Asian) Muslims can become able to properly and strategically communicate their values. Continuously, he displays a lot of effort through his discussions with students and with reluctant Muslim (charity) organisations119 and cultural policymakers to invest in Muslim art and tales. He also endeavours to constitute adapted theatrical education for the offspring of the growing group of higher-­ educated prosperous immigrant Muslims. In the field of Muslim performing artists, there are several efforts to culturally raise the level of the low-educated or artistically biased segments of the Muslim population, which I call efforts to enhance the appreciation of art. These attempts to improve the taste for art of specific Muslim audiences and to reach cultural goals beyond predominantly play out in the UK. (c) Efforts to Mature Muslims through Playfulness In Western Europe, in relation to the emancipation of social groups, the attitude of behavioural formalisation towards more strict regimes of manners and emotions has become overruled by the attitude of informalisation120 as a controlled relaxation of internal behavioural regimes in the sense of the permissiveness of self. Transferring the concept to religio-artistic contexts, informalisation could mean becoming able to experience a controlled kind of enjoyment along with religious reservations as a way of maturing. In Bethnal Green in London, I visited the event Young Muslims Talent Search: Take the Stage, a competition between junior producers of spoken word poetry, modernised nasheed, hip-hop and comedy. Similar British events have aimed at canalising anger, caused by a negative discourse around Islam, through the encouragement of young people to blow off steam on stage.121 The project of Young Muslims UK (YMUK), as the youth wing of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), received governmental funding for its aim to make Islam more related to British society.122 Touring through the UK, the series has tried to empower young Muslims with a restricted upbringing by inviting them, accompanied by their South Asian

 www.facebook.com/groups/KhayaalTheatre/10153503779613578/?notif_t=group_activity (accessed: 14 July 2020). 120  Wouters, Informalization. Wouters, Van Minnen, 96–117. 121  Such as the grassroots institutions of British One-ness and American Calligraphy of Thought. 122   Source: DCLG, 2009. Available at: www.communities.gov.uk/corporate/ doc/communityleadershipfund.doc (accessed: 29 November 2009). 119

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

167

and Somalian families, to express themselves artistically.123 By predominantly rewarding the assumed Islamically legitimate forms of art – the non-instrumental art forms of nasheed and poetry, which cannot be misunderstood as imitations of Western expressions – the cautious choice of the Muslim juries seemed to anticipate the conservative tastes of the main board of the ISB as well as of the Muslim audience members from the segregated areas in London. However, while taking account of their possible adverse reactions, British Jamaican MC Ismael Lea South, of hip-­ hop and  nasheed duo Mecca2Medina, introduced young British Pakistani Eddy Khan and his ragga dance performance with Michael Jackson-like movements on music in an informalising way: Okay, parents, don’t call the art police to shoot me – We’re not going to dance today... Show some respect for the arts!... Who says Pakistani can’t dance?

According to Asef Bayat, fun, playfulness and laughter are seen as instances of immorality, laxity and waste in the Islamist view.124 Many Muslim performing artists go against this view, among whom rap artist Ismael South. While trying to create more familiarity with (popular) arts, he invited the audience members to loosen their restraint attitude and just enjoy the music and dance of Muslim performers. Triggered by the discourse on contested art forms and musical instruments in Islam,125 American filmmaker Mustafa Davis has portrayed around 15 Muslim performing artists on the convert Muslim identity and hip-hop in the documentary film Deen Tight126 by focusing on their compassionate discussions about producing music in accordance with having become Muslim not by birth but, controversially, through the culture of hip-hop. Besides screening Deen Tight, the programme included intensive Q  and  A sessions combined with DJ-ing, MC-ing and poetry performances of British and American artists to Muslim audiences at universities and cultural centres throughout the UK and the US in the course of 2009–2011. Occasionally, the meeting was joined by British Bangladeshi Mohammed ‘Aerosol Arabic’ Ali, who shared his personal quest in life. To introduce several screenings, African American DJ Anas Canon played the song ‘Love and Light’ of the American Muslim convert poet and rap artist Baraka Blue, which starts with wishing the present young students of South Asian and Somali descent: ‘May your days be filled with love and light’ and which ends by wishing them: ‘And as you travel down your personal path [to Allah], may you have always a reason to laugh.’127 Putting this

 Young Muslims Talent Search: Take the Stage, Oxford House Theatre, London, 2 August 2009.  Asef Bayat, Islamism and the Politics of Fun, Public Culture 19/3 (2007): 433–59. 125  Discourse, as the ways in which people think and talk about a subject, influences the ways they act in relation to that subject (Karlberg 2005). The construction of discourse involves both inclusion and exclusion of identity, linking discourse and power with each other (Howarth and Torfing 2005, 23). 126  Deen is used here in the meaning of worship by the believer regarding the Creator as well as a personal path to Islam, implying differentiation in ways of submission. 127  savoir-faire786.blogspot.nl/2010/12/latest-find-baraka-blue-from-remarkable.html (accessed: 14 July 2020). 123 124

168

Y. van Tilborgh

musical item at the start of the Muslim events seems a deliberate suggestion of the artists to those with strict Islamic upbringings that worship can be combined with some joy. American Indian Azhar Usman from the comedy trio Allah Made Me Funny frequently educates his European visitors in London and Amsterdam to communicate properly as well. In line with Luqman Ali, but more amusingly, Usman argues that Muslims cannot keep complaining about the misconceptions of Islam in the media and simultaneously burn embassies just to show that ‘Islam means peace’.128 They should make efforts to calmly clarify Islam, starting with providing their peers with the significance of the incomprehensible Islamic acronyms, such as pbuh, ybii and isha. I call the examples of repeated persuasion among groups of Muslims to relax and to communicate interculturally efforts to mature Muslims through playfulness. (d) Efforts to Make Islam Culturally Relevant Often being treated unequally by non-Muslims in several contexts, many Muslims also experience an in-group power imbalance between indigenous (African American) new Muslims, who developed Islam from the institutions of Black Religion and the Nation of Islam, and immigrant Muslims, who brought Islam from the Middle East and South Asia and possess notable positions in Muslim institutions in the West.129 The power balance is not only defined by the source of theological interpretations. In the UK, Leon Moosavi observes how convert Muslims regularly adapt their behaviour to gain approval of Muslims born into Islam, who judge their ‘authentic Muslimness’.130 Film director Mustafa Davis, DJ and music producer of Remarkable Current Anas Canon and performance poet of Def Poetry Jam Amir Sulaiman, three artists with African American identities, have been discussing Islam for Muslims in the US and the UK in the years of creating and screening Deen Tight.131 How does Islam resonate with the cultural contexts and cultural heritage of its manifold followers? The question of context relates to the perceived in-group power imbalance due to the dominance of Islamic knowledge from the considered old Muslim world. Davis, Canon and Sulaiman were familiar with the views of Islamic scholar Sherman Jackson on indigenous and immigrant Muslim relations and especially the research paper ‘Islam and the Cultural Imperative’ of Umar Faruq Abd-Allah.132 The latter  Allah Made Me Funny, Live in Concert, Meervaart Theater, Amsterdam, NL, 2 September 2008.  Abdul-Khabeer, “Rep”. And: Sherman A Jackson, Islam and the Blackamerican. Looking Toward the Third Resurrection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3–21. And: Aminah B. McCloud, Transnational Muslims in American Society (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), 123–37. 130  Leon Moosavi, “British Muslim Converts Performing ‘Authentic Muslimness’”, Performing Islam 1/1 (2012): 103–28. 131  Davis and Canon have a biracial background of Black and White parents but tend to emphasise their African American identities. 132  Umar F.  Abd-Allah, Islam and the Cultural Imperative, A Nawawi Foundation Paper (Burr Ridge, IL: Nawawi Foundation, 2004). And: Jackson, Islam. 128 129

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

169

describes that, in history, Islam showed to be culturally friendly by the ability to look Chinese in China and, while in Mali, to look African. Nowadays, this cultural friendliness tends to be increasingly disregarded by ever restrictive interpretations. Although the film exposes various stances of Muslim music makers and stakeholders in the art and Islam debate,133 filmmaker Davis, who has been trained thoroughly in Islamic knowledge in the Muslim old world, expressed his personal identification with the statement of musician Rasheed Ali: I don’t know of any culture that doesn’t have a music. It is almost as though if you don’t have a music, you are lacking something fundamental as a human being... Everybody has music, everybody has dance. Everybody has some ethnicity. So, when they become Muslims that should not necessarily feel as though: ‘Well, now I am something different.’ You are still an American, you are Muslim now, and Islam should bring you closer to your people. It shouldn’t divide you from your people.

This statement interprets Islam as inseparable of the cultures and arts of all Muslim human beings with varied ethnic backgrounds, including in countries of the geographical West. Several Black Muslim artists, however, such as British Jamaican Sukina Abdul Noor (Poetic Pilgrimage), Jamaican African American Aja Black (The Reminders) and Mustafa Davis, confided that, after embracing Islam, accepting the restricted view to art and music could lead to a kind of solitude by having to leave one’s original British, American or Caribbean culture behind. It could also lead to stronger consciousness that their actual cultural legacy has been erased in slave history. Rejecting music would moreover imply rejecting an essential part of their current society in the UK or the US.134 At the Q and A’s of the Deen Tight sessions, Mustafa Davis therefore asked his visitors: Do we as [American] Muslims have any sense of cultural relevance or are we supposed to just submit to what our Arab or Indo-Pak brothers tell us we should or shouldn’t be doing?

In order to make Islam relevant in present-day Western societies, Umar Abd-Allah contends that, in the UK and the US, Muslims should be producers of culture, developing humour and musical forms, film and theatre, instead of being consumers. They should be cultural leaders and contributors in society instead of creators of victimhood.135 During the campaign surrounding Deen Tight – which was primarily focused on Muslims with South Asian and Middle Eastern immigrant backgrounds, especially when raised in segregated communities – the artists distributed recommendations to reflect on the entanglement of Islamic values with ethnically inspired customs and tastes, also disapprovingly called ‘cultural baggage’. The trio stressed that Muslims are not obliged to follow the Arab culture from 400 years ago.

 Stakeholders in the field of Muslim performing artists include Islamic teachers and art managers, advising or controlling in issues of art. 134  See also: Van Tilborgh, “Career”. 135  Abd-Allah, Islam. And: Cultural Jihad: Making Islam Matter, SOAS University, London, November 17, 2006. www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTQtYNIaoTI (accessed: 14 July 2020). 133

170

Y. van Tilborgh

From their perspective, convert Muslims can only survive in Muslim-minority societies if their kind of Muslim identity – related to cultural contexts of the West – is reflected in and accepted by the religion of Islam.136 The artists emphasised the necessity to tolerate versatile views of human beings and to value art according to Islam’s cosmopolitan features.137 The artists seemed to educate other Muslims: ‘You can be Muslim and culturally broad-minded.’ At the same time, they related the Deen to the nationally relevant (e.g., British) culture instead of sticking to the interpretations of any overseas (e.g., Arabic) culture. In his writings and London lecture ‘Cultural Jihad: Making Islam Matter’, commissioned by grassroots organisation Radical Middle Way (RMW) for British South Asian youth,138 Umar Abd-Allah explains that many Muslims of immigrant backgrounds consider art and cultural expressions un-Islamic by regarding Islam and culture as mutually exclusive. He regards these Muslims as influenced by the ‘destructive impact of culturally predatory Islamist ideologies from abroad’ and by patriarchal Muslims with attitudes from the old Muslim world. In Abd-Allah’s view, due to the clash that young Muslims experience between the different realities in the British and North American societies, they use Islam as a ‘counter-cultural identity religion’ instead of understanding Islam as a universal religion. Reflecting these arguments, in the instruction video Reflections with Amir Sulaiman, the American poet teaches his convert Muslim listeners extensively to stop imitating what he considers ‘alien Muslim views’ of those born Muslims identifying Islam exclusively with cultural views from foreign Muslim-majority parts in the world, such as the Middle East: You don’t have to pretend that you are sick! We’re good! You are in a place where you can be free of the disease of... cultural baggage.... There is nothing inappropriate about that dress to me, but I have to pretend that it is a problem religiously... ‘Oh brother’, ‘you know’, ‘you should’.... In truth, you don’t care – you see people dress like that all the time and there is no moral problem with it!139

At one of the Muslim fundraising events accompanied by religious speeches and entertainment in Manchester in 2010, Ghana-born American Ahmed Tijani Ben Omar tried to spread his views on cultural relevance as well. As this renowned Sufi-­ disposed preacher and Islamic singer told me in the kitchen of the female activist rap duo Poetic Pilgrimage, he advised his predominantly young British Pakistani audience to seek ‘truth, religious and cultural values’ in the country that they are born in – Britain – instead of overseas. At the same time, Ahmed Tijani urged the organisers to put female Muslim visitors in the front row at the next event (and give women more rights). I define the repeated educational endeavours among groups of Muslims towards contributing to as well as respecting of the indigenous or

 See also: Van Tilborgh, “Islam”.  See also: Van Tilborgh, “Career”. 138  www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTQtYNIaoTI (accessed: 14 July 2020). 139  Directed by Mustafa Davis. vimeo.com/47644494 (accessed: 14 July 2020). 136 137

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

171

surrounding kind of Islamic culture efforts to make Islam culturally relevant in the UK and the US. (e) Efforts to Tackle Racism among Muslims Taught by a popular surah, the artists that raise the issue of race tend to refer to the Prophet Muhammad, who made his Abyssinian slave Bilal ibn Rabah al-Habashi his Companion. They also mention the imperative in Islam that ‘nations and tribes’ have to get along with each other despite their differences.140 Therefore, as a teacher, British Nigerian rap artist Rakin Fetuga discusses these salient issues at his performances: I think that us as performers, we probably talk about racism more than the imams do. A lot of the imams hide it under the carpet. A lot of the imams give lectures that are not relevant to the young people... to the people that they are serving.... But you bring him [the young person] to our concert, and he’ll be there. Taking it in, being inspired, listening.

After the Deen Tight screenings, the young Muslims with South Asian, Middle Eastern and Somalian backgrounds who have a desire for disciplinary rules to art and music in Islam, particularly in the UK, displayed their worries about emulating gang and ghetto culture when tolerating hip-hop. They were afraid of going along too far with the cultural habits of non-Muslims and becoming part of a slippery slope.141 When talking about the permissibility of music at the climax of the Q and A’s, the artists Davis, Canon and Sulaiman urged the students to leave out ethnocentricity and be aware of significant cultures and their forms of art. Essentially, the African American artists literally asked them if the aversion to (Black) hip-hop of their immigrant parents is a matter of religious dictate or – since they do not mind watching (Indian)  Bollywood movies  – a problem with Western (British and American) culture. Or is it actually a matter of racism? In 2008, Indian American Muslim comedian Azhar Usman published a letter called ‘An Apology’. Inspired by his collaboration with African American Preacher Moss in Allah Made Me Funny, and being troubled about Muslim race relations in the US and the UK, Usman apologises to his fellow Muslims for all of the ‘hurtful, insulting and degrading’ wrongdoings by immigrant Muslims.142 His apologies concern news media who constantly define all Black Muslims as foreigners; Arab speakers who raise money for Muslims abroad while disregarding the problems of Black Muslims in their ‘own’ inner cities; and parents of South Asian or Arab sisters who would ‘rather commit suicide’ than let their daughter marry a Black Muslim. He further apologises for:

 ‘O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other).’ Surah Al-Hujrat 49:13. corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=49&verse=13 (accessed: 14 July 2020). 141  Deen Tight, The Drum, Birmingham, UK, 26 September 2009; and Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, Long Island, NY, March 25, 2010. 142  https://www.patheos.com/blogs/altmuslim/2008/09/an_apology/ (accessed: 14 July 2020). 140

172

Y. van Tilborgh

Every time some Muslim has self-righteously told you that your hijab is not quite ‘sharia’ enough, or your beard is not quite ‘Sunna’ enough, or your outfit is not quite ‘Islamic’ enough, or your Quranic recitation is not quite ‘Arabic’ enough, or your family customs are not quite ‘traditional’ enough... – I’m sorry.

To heal the rifts between the communities, unify their aims and defeat communal enemies, Usman calls for a new mutual behaviour in Islam: ‘In good times and in bad, we have to be the brothers and sisters no one expects us to be.’ The repeated educational endeavours among groups of Muslims to debate against a sense of superiority from a racially based logic in the Muslim communities are called efforts to tackle racism among Muslims in the UK and the US. (f) Efforts to Emancipate and Spiritually and Civically Activate Muslims Similar to the North American artists promoting Deen Tight, British Canadian Abdul-Rehman Malik, of Pakistani descent, felt inspired by the writings of Abd-­ Allah as cultural manager of Radical Middle Way. Malik attempts to depict Islam as a transforming faith that deals with the dynamics of cultures. Through engaging British Black artists – including Nigerian Rakin Niass (Mecca2Medina), Jamaican Sukina Abdul Noor and Muneera Rashida (Poetic Pilgrimage) and Mozambican Mohammed Yahya – in cultural tours across Britain, RMW has shown how forms of (urban) music that are ‘grown out of the Western experience of Muslims’ relate to the religion of Islam. Malik has used the cultural imperative in organising events with contemporary local hip-hop and spoken word in combination with lectures of the moderate kind by legitimate Islamic scholars (for instance, British Sudanese Islamic scholar and imam Ahmed Babikir,143 who promotes music as long as its message is considered good) to empower identity-seeking and socially deprived young Muslims of (South Asian) immigrant backgrounds.144 People [who] take on an Islamic identity... not become more religious per se, but feel the way that they wish to actualise their faith is by becoming more active in their communities by becoming connected to other (young) people, doing work, by involving themselves in community-based activities.... encouraged by Islam. The message of RMW has consistently been: ‘Your faith isn’t static, it should influence the way you behave, it should enhance your humanity, it should encourage you to become engaged.’ We don’t want to merely present religion as rules... but we want to present faith as a means, as a gateway to positive social action.

Long before RMW received Prevent funding from the British government, its preoccupation with preventing extremism in cultural ways had been part of the targets of Abdul-Rehman Malik. His example is African American Muslim human rights activist Malcolm X, whose spiritual struggle led him to transform anger into action to combat racism and human inequality.145

 Ahmed Babikir, also known as Sheikh Babikir Ahmed Babikir or Abu Bakr As-Sudani, works as the imam of Islamia Schools Centre, which was founded by Cat Stevens aka Yusuf Islam. 144  See also: Herding, Inventing, 199, on “empowerers” in European Muslim youth culture. And: Mandaville, “Hip-hop”. 145  Van Tilborgh, “From Hell”. 143

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

173

Using ‘conscious lyrics’ to put across that rap does not need to be about women, money and violence – as is considered habitual in gangsta rap – Muslim artists in hip-hop have endorsed the policy of RMW. Giving workshops at schools to channel anger through rap, Mohamed Yahya defined this way of performing ‘activism in an artistic style’. Conjointly, with their performances in ‘I am Malcolm X’ and ‘Spitting Light, Healing the Hood; Muslim Voices for Urban Renewal’ throughout the UK, the artists were dedicated to positively empower Muslim adolescents, especially when they are involved in street gangs or live sheltered lives.146 Supported by Islamic, ethnic philanthropic and community organisations, the American non-profit grassroots organisation Inner-city Muslim Action Network (IMAN)147 promotes community-engaged art to invest in citizens who are struck by the symptoms of inner-city poverty, abandonment and crime.148 In line with a new élan to community building after a declining civic participation, as described by Robert D. Putnam and Lewis M. Feldstein,149 IMAN’s urban Takin’ it to the Streets festival in Chicago aims to revitalise the spirit of citizenship by joining together the performing arts, spirituality and social activism.150 At the 2010 edition of the large festival, British graffiti performer Mohammed Ali was one of the active artists. Native and African American MC Tasleem Jamila Firdausee used her passionate speech to make the visitors proud of the values of their spiritual origins. Jordanian American executive director Rami Nashashibi encouraged them  – as Malcolm X did  – to take ideals from the scriptures to the streets. Subsequently, local politicians honoured potential community leaders and ambassadors among the visitors. During lectures, recognised convert Muslim imams provided the audience with a behavioural example by recalling the kind of social activism of Prophet Muhammad. American Suhaib Webb, who became Muslim through the culture of hip-hop, proclaimed: Praying means action. Faith and action are two wings from a bird. One who fails to act is not a complete believer. [One has to] believe and do good deeds.151 I call these endeavours in the field of Muslim performing artists to cooperate in triggering active cultural citizenship among specific audiences based on Islam’s ethical principles efforts to emancipate and spiritually and civically activate Muslims.

(g) Efforts to Informalise Muslims Concerning Taboos As discussed by Wouters, changing cultural conditions may lead to diminishing differences between social groups causing formalised behaviour to be regarded as socially unsuitable. The reduction of expressing obvious distinction signifies the

 Buckinghamshire New University, High Wycombe, London, 26 April 2009.  Takin’ it to the Streets: Urban International Festival, 19 June 2010, Chicago, IL, US. 148  www.imancentral.org/ about/ (accessed 10 November 2011). 149  Robert D. Putnam, Lewis M. Feldstein and Don Cohen, Better Together: Restoring the American Community, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003). 150  Haroon Najam, ed., Takin’ It to the Streets. Urban International Festival, Chicago: IMAN, 2010. 151  https://www.islamawakened.com/quran/2/82/ 146 147

174

Y. van Tilborgh

informalisation of behaviour, by which people develop a moderate relaxation of their behavioural regimes with regard to sociability.152 As one of the changing conditions, Muslim artists have surpassed their parents in educational progress, such as teacher and playwright British Pakistani Alia Bano. She takes care of both the perspectives of first-generation Muslim immigrants and non-Muslims. At the time of research, Bano did not allow her personalities to kiss each other on stage, knowing that many British Muslims would not appreciate this. Nevertheless, while introducing ‘speed dating’ in the play Shades, she displayed a kind of strategy to loosen up by situating ‘a gay guy, dancing around’. She permitted actors to ‘act truthfully’ and hug each other – ‘like friends do in normal life’. Bano explained: If we want to show that Muslims are normal, peaceful people, we have to start doing it in a way that people understand... How do you get your message across?

Several artists tend to strive for a more relaxed kind of cultural interpretation of Islam instead of one that imposes taboos on sexualised language and homosexuality. They can be found more particularly among Muslim performing artists from immigrant families, who practise Islam, to varying degrees, in less strict or more secularised ways. Without receiving Prevent funding, British female comedians, among whom Isma Almas and Sajeela Kershi, have attracted gay audiences. Gay visitors also tend to identify with British Pakistani Shazia Mirza, female pioneer in what is considered Muslim comedy.153 Mirza symbolises the independent Muslim woman on stage by satirising the conservative first-generation immigrant family and their traditionalist ways of judging her (bachelor) position as deviant. As such, manifestations of counterviews simply by performing for alternative (gay) audiences, without losing control of personal emotions, could be identified as tendencies to loosen up the formalised tastes and attitudes of segments of the Muslim community. In his song ‘Rumi Was a Homo’, American Pakistani bass player and vocalist Basim Usmani invokes the widely admired thirteenth-century Sufi poet Jalal al-Din Rumi to legitimately take care of the issue of homophobia. Because Rumi felt a deep friendship for his spiritual teacher Shams-e Tabrizi, Basim Usmani openly identifies the ancient poet with gay love. The lyrics conveys a moral kind of cultural distinction to the young South Asian audiences: ‘Rumi was a genius. Siraj, you’re an ass. Rumi was a homo. Siraj, you’re a fag.’154 By making Rumi ‘a model of queer positive Islam’,155 as Usmani explained, he, with his punk-inspired songs, takes a stance against the intolerance of certain ingrained, formalised and sacralised interpretations of Islam. Instead of adapting by restraining his material to Muslim audiences as other artists do, Egyptian American stand-up comedian Ahmed Ahmed deliberates offstage,  Wouters, Informalization, 197–212.  For example: Comedy Camp, Comedy club, London, UK, 24 March 2009. 154  www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9i1abF-wRU (accessed: 1 July 2015). 155  Edward E. Curtis IV, ed., Encyclopedia of Muslim-American History, Facts on File (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2010), 547. 152 153

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

175

in the documentary film about the comedy tour Just Like Us, that he considers using a frequent expression of many Anglophone comedians: ‘Fuck you.’156 Coinciding with the quality of mainstream comedy to shock audiences, Ahmed Ahmed pushes the cultural boundaries of what is considered Islamically (in)decent, haram or polluted. He has done so especially when performing in the Muslim-majority settings of Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia – countries that are, to different degrees, familiar with the formal institution of moral police. According to Ahmed Ahmed’s experiences, by challenging views on what is (im)permissible in art and entertainment, his letting go of formerly tabooed topics encounters recognition among his audiences. His art ‘provides an outlet’ in the Middle East without resulting in instant sexual disorderliness.157 On various levels, the Muslim performing artists discussed above show endeavours to normalise certain views to sexuality and sexualised language among Muslims, which I call efforts to informalise Muslims concerning taboos. (h) Civilising Attempts to Non-Muslims Among socially rising groups, a bottom-up tendency could occur by correcting the behavioural tastes of the established, not just in the sense of discipline but also in the sense of Bildung.158 British Pakistani comedian Shaista Aziz became a starter in the field of Muslim performing artists after 9/11, after having been a successful BBC reporter abroad. Veiled, the religiously observant Aziz changes the ingrained views on Muslims among non-Muslims: When I go to these comedy clubs, people have never met a Muslim before. This country is full of diversity, but yet... I get a reaction of shock and awe. I’m very proud of who I am. I don’t have any problem being British, I don’t have a problem being Muslim, South Asian, Pakistani, I’m very cool with all these things.... I’m not ridiculing Muslims. I’m laughing at us, that is, some of our practices, ways of behaviour. But equally I’m laughing at the other side of me, the British side of me, where people make assumptions and observations about Muslims. They are very shocked because I’m an opiniated Muslim woman who’s not full of self-hate.

The case of American Iranian comedian Tissa Hami, who does not practise Islam strictly, is quite similar. After having performed at the multicultural cities of the North American coasts, Hami made a tour through Kansas, Kentucky and Tennessee in the middle of rural America. In these social environments, the organisers of the show often warned her that the White conservative Republican audience members had never seen a Muslim before. Least of all they knew Iranian Muslims – except for the persistent Iranian Islamist hostage taking in the American Embassy starting in Tehran in 1979. As she explained, her alternative representation as an easy-going and relaxed kind of Middle Eastern Muslim was occasionally rewarded with a standing ovation by audience members who were unfamiliar with the occurrence of intelligence and humour among Muslims.  Just Like Us by Ahmed Ahmed, Village East Cinema, NYC, US, 26 April 2010.  Q and A after Just Like Us, Village East Cinema, NYC, US, 26 April 2010. 158  Elias, The Civilizing, 421–435. 156 157

176

Y. van Tilborgh

Under the name ‘The Muslims Are Coming!’, comedians Negin Farsad, of American Iranian descent, and Dean Obdeillah, of Palestinian and Sicilian descent, have toured with other artists of Muslim lineage through Georgia, Mississippi and Alabama. Performing for free in cafes and community centres in the Deep South, they answered questions from non-Muslim citizens about the Muslim identity. ‘Why do you guys like terrorism so much?’ was one of them. Meanwhile exploring stigmatisation and Islamophobia, the comedians informed people about the variety within the Muslim community in ‘Western contexts’. Shaking rigid depictions, they demonstrated their relaxed manners by way of daring dress, informal speech and liberal ideas.159 The stand-up comedians who put the view of non-Muslim White citizens – judging Muslims based on their public image as alien, humourless and radical people – into perspective are mainly Muslim performing artists with immigrant backgrounds. These often religiously less strict practising or more secularised Muslims point at a couple of deficiencies with regard to the knowledge and civilised behaviour of White non-Muslims facing Muslims as co-citizens. Quite intentionally, they thus seem to oppose segments of British and American citizens with a static kind of identity by groups of Muslims with a dynamic, tolerant and cosmopolitan kind of identity. As such, correcting the established behavioural tastes does not only concern a reformalisation of what is considered indecent performance of non-Muslims, as previously discussed, but also an informalisation by showing a higher degree of controlled informalised behaviour. More or less intentional, Muslim performing artists also educate non-Muslims by showing them a broader spectrum of Muslims, which I call civilising attempts to non-Muslims. 3. Evaluating Civilising Attempts When understanding civilising attempts as repeated endeavours to elevate certain segments of social groups out of ignorance in order to enhance the common level of civilised behaviour, which, in the present study, may mean culturally broad-minded, engaged and emancipated behaviour, the field of Muslim performing artists has shown frequent efforts among Muslims to counter potential extremism; enhance the appreciation of art; mature through playfulness; make Islam culturally relevant; tackle racism; emancipate and spiritually and civically activate; and informalise Muslims regarding taboos. Besides, several artists have undertaken actions to civilise non-Muslims. Several of these efforts also instigated debate on the topic concerned.

 Tara Bahrampour, “Muslim American comic’s tour and documentary”, The Washington Post, 27 December 2011. www.washingtonpost.com/local/muslim-american-comics-tour-and-documentary/2011/12/27/gIQATKmULP_story.html (accessed: 14 July 2020). 159

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

177

6 Orientations: Social Critique and Civilising Attempts Altogether, the transnational field of Muslim performing artists of Anglophone productions in hip-hop, stand-up comedy, poetry, film performance, theatre and contemporary art seems to reflect a possible pattern of overlapping cultural orientations (Fig. 7.1). Outside the circle, the orientations found include social critique of artists against non-Muslims and against Muslims.160 Inside the circle, motivated by the various forms of social critique against Muslims, the two orientations comprise religiously and culturally civilising attempts. Although the notions of religion and culture partly overlap and the two orientations thus intersect as such, I have discerned them based on their formalising or informalising educational intentions. The pattern of cultural orientations in the field of Muslim performing artists of Anglophone productions can be represented visually as seen in Fig. 7.1.

O R I E N TAT I O N S

Social critique against non-Muslims

Social critique against Muslims

In f o r m ali s

&

ation alis rm Fo

Religiously civilising attempts

a ti

on

Culturally civilising attempts

Shared social critique O R I E N TAT I O N S

Fig. 7.1  Pattern of cultural orientations in the field of Muslim performing artists

 Due to the focus of this chapter, the section ‘Shared Social Critique’ was left out of the discussion. 160

178

Y. van Tilborgh

7 Discussion After having examined a salient number of artistic practices and discursive notions from the field of Muslim performing artists – a field of art as much as a field of discourse – I argue that the cultural orientations found seem to be significantly characterised by civilising intentions. In the tradition of the concept of civilising offensives and civilising attempts, these intentions could be interpreted as efforts of British and American Muslims to change the patterns of cultural taste and behaviour, which reflect both the non-Muslim and Muslim social orders that many British (and American) Muslims may cope with, such as deriving from national governments and Muslim old-world centres. From the data, roughly four types of civilising attempts can be discerned. Considering Muslims as one faith group, I have categorised these, along their position of criticism against Muslims and non-Muslims, as ‘in-group’ or ‘between groups’ attempts. Furthermore, I take their ‘formalising’ or ‘informalising’ goals into consideration, or a combination of these features. Subsequently, there are formalising attempts between groups; formalising in-group attempts; informalising in-­ group attempts; and informalising attempts between groups. Together, these attempts display (top-down but also bottom-up) vertical directions and horizontal (peer-to-peer) directions towards disseminating specific tastes and behavioural manners. Whereas formalising attempts aim for a stricter regime of manners, in contrast, the informalising attempts of many Sufi-minded, Sunni-identified and more secularised Muslims seem to be directed to a controlled deregulation of individual and social constraints with regard to interpreting Islam when related to restricted ideas and behaviours. First, formalising attempts between groups seem to reflect cultural distinction by religiously practising convert and born-again Muslims with regard to people outside of Muslim fellowship. They display decent moral manners and tastes to non-­Muslim groups or populations that may represent dominant and what is considered irresponsible behaviour. In this horizontal, as well as partially vertical, bottom-up relationship, the benefits of civilising attempts may lie in generating a sense of moral distinction and self-respect among Muslims. These efforts seem to be in line with the exercise of counter-stigmatisation in a social configuration out of balance. Second, there seem to be formalising in-group attempts of Muslims to generally raise the level of moral conduct concerning strict or responsible religious behaviour of other Muslims. These civilising attempts, which can be found among Salafi-­ disposed artists and, to a lesser extent, orthodox Sufi and Sunni artists, partly display a kind of direction that is, initially, horizontal. By advocating stricter behaviour, its purpose may strengthen Islam and reinforce the behaviour of taking care of each other in the ummah. There are also formalising in-group attempts that display, by means of mentoring or motivational talks by convert and born-again Muslims as experience experts, a more vertical kind of direction through the institutions and channels that aim to draw educated new Muslims towards the right track in the process of conversion or

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

179

reversion to Islam. These attempts also try to change the views and conduct of street youth considered vulnerable to gang culture, knife crimes and worse. Another kind of formalising attempts between groups actually seems to take place both in and between groups through teaching potentially ‘ungovernable’ Muslims and other youngsters to increase their emotional control. By endeavouring to interweave spirituality and civic engagement by means of the performing arts, the attempts have mixed formalising and informalising aspects. Because governmental policies have appeared to be in line with the interests of engaged high-profile Sufi Muslims but also (more differentiating than the anti-Prevent discourse suggests) latent Salafi Muslims, this rather top-down relationship represents civilising attempts with aspects of civilising offensives as well. Against radicalisation, the targets of teaching civic-ness seem to aim for national and urban security as well as internal group safety. Islamophobia could diminish by rebranding the image of Muslims as no longer a ‘perilous group’. Third, informalising in-group attempts cover the promotion of a controlled relaxation of emotional management among Muslims regarding the arts, poetry and other cultures. These are attempts by high-profile Muslims of various ethnic and race identities towards young and older Muslims with first-, second- and third-­generation (South Asian and Middle Eastern) immigrant backgrounds. Next to expanding ideas about the permissibility of the arts, these may include canalising anger and prostration through the encouragement of artistic expressions among young people. This slightly vertical relationship may also achieve a normalisation of the whole group of Muslims in countries of the West in order to be perceived as largely equal to the dominant group in society. The informalising civilising attempts are intended to establish a more emancipated position for Muslims in the field of culture, media and politics in order to spread their particular views. Other informalising in-group attempts aim for greater cultural relevance by contextualising Islam in the UK and the US. Although Black, often high-profile Sufi-­ oriented Muslims may experience a minor position in Islam, they have a dominant tradition in the culture of music. Having endured severe constraint from born Muslims to formalise their kind of Islamic behaviour during their conversion to Islam, in contrast, these Black convert Muslims (and supporting immigrant Muslims) rather educate groups of Muslims of immigrant descent to informalise and raise tolerance for the arts. Fighting the claim of Arab or South Asian superiority in Islam, they have passed the phase of adapting their manners to gain the blessings of fellow believers, who are perceived to relate to the traditional Muslim world. Through in-­ group distinction, by stressing their privileged lack of ‘cultural baggage’, unlike those of immigrant descent, the benefits of the civilising attempts may lie in raising self-esteem among Black and convert Muslims to improve their position in race as well as in their way of Islam in the West, hence restoring the internal race-based imbalance in the ummah. These kinds of civilising campaigns with a horizontal and vertical sense of direction between ethnic groups are sustained by several esteemed (American) Islamic scholars and teachers, who also focus, to some degree, on more equal treatment of women and artists in a similar vein.

180

Y. van Tilborgh

There are intensive informalising in-group attempts as well, coinciding with the requirements of the specific genres of art to push social boundaries. Contrary to the previous kinds of civilising efforts, they are not supported by Islamic teachers in their tackling of certain taboos. Mainly, these kinds of attempts can be understood from a horizontal relationship in that they have the purpose to cause a loosening of attitudes among Muslims of restrictive immigrant parentage and those in Muslim-­ majority countries. These intensive informalising efforts, which can be perceived as controversial to other Muslims, of less strictly practising or more secularised Muslims of Middle Eastern and South Asian backgrounds seem to aim for the introspection of segments of Muslims with regard to being identified as ‘conservatives’ as well as ‘anti-Semitists’, ‘homophobes’ and ‘racists’ and thus change the overall image of Muslims. Closely related to the previous description, fourth and finally, informalising attempts between groups represent more or less organised, bottom-up kinds of civilising efforts of high-profile Muslims of predominantly immigrant descent to engender relaxed attitudes and tolerance among conservative, established non-­ Muslim Whites, who are perceived as ignorant towards the diversity of cultural and religious identities among Muslims. This moderate kind of counter-stigmatisation may also be intended to influence the balance between Muslims and the dominant group by means of a complex interplay between distinctive as well as emulative behaviour.

8 Conclusion A number of efforts found in the field of Muslim performing artists can definitely be regarded as civilising efforts or even campaigns based on their often intentional and repetitive nature in uncertain times of growing social interdependence. These means are not quite as imposed as the traditional kind of civilising offensives. Nevertheless, from a sense of responsibility, various Muslim performing artists understand it as their role to boost the development of Muslim communities by reframing their scepticism towards certain attitudes with the efforts to uplift, empower, liberate as well as socially engage the isolated, disgruntled, ultra conservative or benighted Muslim groups. In doing so, a significant number feels supported by the views of convert Muslim scholars and teachers in Islam. British and American Muslims aim to change the internal and external patterns of cultural tastes of the non-Muslim and Muslim social orders they have to cope with. They seem particularly eager to restore the imbalanced social configuration in the British and American societies due to national policies and Muslim old-world distinctions. Supported by the conditions in the decades after the attacks of 2001 and 2005, the combined efforts may head for a reduction of status differences between internal and external social groups, which is displayed by showing more openness. By their normalising as well as equalising characteristics, the civilising attempts can be understood as attempts towards a greater autonomy of (the field of)

7  Civilising Attempts in Art and Islam: Muslim Artistic Performance Facing Social…

181

Muslim performing artists, and Muslims in the UK and the US generally, instead of the opposite. To ‘Black’ and ‘White’ artists and those on their side, Muslims from immigrant families, who are considered born Muslims, symbolise an important target. This leaves a picture of two kinds of Muslims of immigrant descent: as socially engaged artists with civilising goals and as subjects of the civilising project with what are considered cultural insufficiencies. In tandem, state policies and projects of civic and private institutions on the urban level seem to concur with the initiatives to spread art in the battle for progress. Altogether, the deliberate civilising attempts in the present study can be understood as endeavours to achieve group survival, particularly by contestations about how culture and religion are supposed to intersect to succeed in the desired normalising and equalising results. Whether by calling for Islamically constraint gentle manners or for accepting different views and equality in Islam, the attempts seem to aim for a moral purification in reaction to the contemporary crises. As such, in the present study, both the lack of formalised as well as informalised manners are considered to hold back the development of Muslims as a group in Western Europe, the US and globally. In particular, the informalised attempts draw attention because of their calling for less instead of more restrictive codes and morals. These predominantly convert and born-again Muslim artists, who are not exclusively but often Black artists, aim to raise the cultural level of segments of born Muslims with immigrant (South Asian or Middle Eastern) backgrounds particularly to interpret Islam and art in a more inclusive, tolerant, flexible and cosmopolitan manner. Along these lines, the civilising attempts correspond with the globalised trend of post-Islamism. At the same time, the attempts coincide with a critical public discourse on social equality in ‘Western’ media. That is, certain progressive values are not merely a condition of the dominant moral majority but possibly judged as being beneficial by many Muslims as well. Whether Salafi-inclined or Sunni- or Sufi-oriented, the formalising and informalising civilising efforts of these Muslims have at least one of the following traits in common with regard to social, cultural and symbolic capital: these are not exclusively related to education or class background. The Muslim performing artists may have developed a cosmopolitan background or a network in (inter)national media, the academic world, the field of art or the field of religion. They may have gained institutionalising powers and socio-economic success. They may have established profound Islamic knowledge or a considerable number of followers. They may receive support from recognised Islamic teachers or develop distinctive convictions of having access to ‘the Truth’. Although the civilising attempts in the field of Muslim performing artists can be understood as horizontal peer group socialisation at first sight, when focusing on these (possibly temporary) kinds of Muslim cultural elites, many attempts turn out to have vertical features in their transfer of tastes and manners. Moreover, from a transnational perspective, the transfers from values of (African American) Muslims in the US to the UK seem more regular and significant than the other way around.

182

Y. van Tilborgh

Altogether, further extensive research is needed to determine whether these formalising and, in particular, informalising attempts – as forms of self-civilisation on the group level – may become common part-processes within the larger unplanned civilising or perhaps de-civilising processes.

Chapter 8

Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education Angela Quartermaine

In recent years, counterterrorism measures have gradually become integrated into British education policy. With the publication of the Prevent Strategy in 2011, schools were required to play ‘an important role’1 in ensuring that children do not engage in terrorist activities.2 Then, in 2015, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act made it mandatory for schools to be actively involved with counterterrorism measures, stating that specified authorities (including schools) must ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (Clause 21).3 The accompanying guidelines clarified this further, stating that schools have a duty to prevent young people from becoming involved in violent and non-violent extremism and from participating in an ‘atmosphere conducive to terrorism’.4 Thus, schools are now not just expected to protect children from the effects of terrorism but to also prevent children from actually becoming involved in terrorist activities: a noticeable change in approach. To achieve this, schools should act as ‘safe spaces’5 for pupils to discuss and challenge these ideas. However, this is a complicated task due to the lack of a clear definition of terrorism. The 2015 guidelines simply state that terrorism is ‘an act

  Home Office, “Prevent Strategy,” https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf 2  Further details can be found in Quartermaine, “Discussing Terrorism: A Pupil-Inspired Guide to Uk Counter-Terrorism Policy Implementation in Religious Education Classrooms in England.” 3  HM Government, Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (London, UK: Crown Copyright, 2015), 18. 4  “Prevent Duty Guidance: Guidance for Specified Authorities in England and Wales on the Duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to Have Due Regard to the Need to Prevent People from Being Drawn into Terrorism,” http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/ pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf 5  Ibid. 1

A. Quartermaine (*) University of Warwick, Coventry, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_8

183

184

A. Quartermaine

performed for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause’:6 a broad definition that does not adequately explain the exact concepts teachers are supposed to prevent, except acts committed with perceived negative ideological foundations. Yet, for any ideology to be perceived as negative, the author(s) of such an association have a degree of authority and agency over this categorisation: something Foucault defines as power-knowledge.7 Thus, the ideologies under scrutiny can be identified by those documents and groups that (negatively) influence and affect the British education system, and it is these that require closer examination for teachers to clearly comprehend the expectations placed on them. This chapter will therefore begin by examining the word ‘terrorism’ in terms of the associated power-knowledge dynamics that influence the ideologies that teachers are supposed to ‘challenge’ within their classrooms. My research so far has demonstrated that Islam-inspired terrorism is a dominant feature of ‘terrorist ideologies’; thus, this dynamic will be highlighted and examined in detail herein. One particularly important, albeit problematic, aspect of this association is how to balance the requirement to challenge such thoughts when such discussions could give rise to other challenging ideas, including religious (or racial) prejudices.8 Additional considerations needs to be given to those voices who challenge the dominant powerknowledge discourses since this affects the scope and perceptions of possible classroom-based discussions. Once these ideas have been explored in detail, this chapter will conclude with some thoughts on how to engage in such dialogue, with the aim of achieving a positive outcome to future policy implementation.

1 The Power-Knowledge Dynamics of Terrorism Foucault’s insights into the nature of knowledge provide an explanation into how knowledge formation can impact and affect our comprehension of any idea or phenomenon.9 However, the sources for this knowledge are vast and thus some parameters need to be established to ensure that the power-knowledge dynamics can be explored in detail. Like Foucault, Schmid argues that definitions (of terrorism) can differ according to author and intended audience,10 thus one method to restrict the scope of information could be to use similar divisions, specifically within those texts that relate to the British education system. These could include the discourses found in the literature  Ibid., 27.  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002). 8  During my research, I found that many pupils associated Islam-inspired terrorism with specific racial groups rather than all followers of the faith. 9  Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 10  Alex P.  Schmid, “The Response Problem as a Definition Problem,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1992). 6 7

8  Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education

185

associated with the academic, political and school arenas. From these texts, a corpus of knowledge can be uncovered and an understanding of the ‘terrorist ideology’ can be formed. However, to comprehend the nature of authority and ownership over such ideas, it is necessary to apply a method that allows for these facets to be explored. Foucault argues that the effects of the exercised power-knowledge can be demonstrated by the ‘dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, [and] functioning’s’11 found within a corpus of knowledge. By interpreting these effects of domination as knowable facets of the power-knowledge dynamic, it is possible to produce a framework by which an understanding of the authority over ‘terrorist ideology’ can be established. For example, one ‘manoeuvre’ found within the political arena can be uncovered by examining the differences between the 2011 Prevent Strategy and the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act. Such changes demonstrate how the perceptions of terrorism have altered and thus been affected by the power-­ knowledge associated with this topic. Choosing an appropriate route through the knowledge discourses requires detailed consideration though, because any sources used will favour certain knowledge discourses above others. Using a historical-archaeological method, I will highlight the ideas that I deemed most useful or appropriate for this study.12 This bias does not detract from the relevance or usefulness of this work but rather highlights those avenues of investigation that provide a systematic approach to the field of study. With this in mind, I will now explore what knowledge and discourses are available on terrorism, as this will demonstrate the potential information available to teachers.13

2 Academic Arena: Defining ‘Terrorism’ One influential aspect of the power-knowledge dynamics associated with challenging terrorist ideologies is how to define ‘terrorism’. Unfortunately, the literature on this topic is fraught with problems because there is no single definition, no universal list of signs and synonyms that are used to describe the phenomenon (see Meggle14 for some philosophical insights into the terminological implications of terrorism, terrorist and terrorist acts). Perhaps this is due to the nature of terrorism itself or to the effects of power-knowledge dynamics at work when the term is used; either way, the definitions of terrorism have their own dynamics that require additional divisions to ensure comprehension.  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1977), 26. 12  The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, xxi. 13  This overview should be seen as a snapshot of the literature rather than a complete picture of all the available information on this topic. 14  G. Meggle, “What Is Terrorism?,” in Terrorism: Moral, Legal and Political Issues, ed. J. Babic (Beograd, Serbia: Filozofski Godisnjak, 2006). 11

186

A. Quartermaine

Exploring each individual definition is impractical within the scope of this chapter, but I have found a common feature: they all seem to be affected by dominant socially defined categories, or ‘arenas’,15 such as law, political meanings, media definitions and so on. Schmid’s collated data provides an interesting working definition of terrorism as: ‘An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action . . . for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons . . . The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.’16 Each word used in this definition has its own discourse, which feeds into our comprehension of terrorism, but it is their convergence on the table of terrorism discourses that provides our comprehension of terrorism.17 These terms should therefore be understood as representations of knowledge that form part of the knowledge cycle between representations and interpretations of those representations.18 According to Sartori, definitions of terrorism typically converge in terms of the motivations of the perpetrators or the views of their victims.19 This does not necessary mean that there is a definable perpetrator or victim of terrorism but rather that our understanding of terrorism has been shaped by the notion that such ideas are associated with it. Thus, if we are the ‘witnesses’ or ‘victims’ of terrorism, and ‘our’ public agents are those who ‘affix the label on acts of violence that makes them terrorism’,20 then terrorism is not defined by a specific event or group but rather from the perception of ourselves as the victims of terrorism. This idea demonstrates the ‘power-knowledge’ associated with terrorism:21 by perceiving ourselves as ‘victims’, we are engaging in those influential social-power discourses that use terrorism as a pejorative term. However, categorising an act as one of terrorism or violence is also dependent upon ‘the mechanism of attribution of violence to an act, a situation, an event [and thus] varies between cultures and approaches’.22 Therefore, our comprehension of violence and terrorism is confined to our normative cultural expectations of behaviour. Similarly, those who are categorised as ‘terrorists’ by ‘us’ would not use the word to describe themselves but see themselves within their own cultural norms and values, perhaps resulting in them defining themselves as the victims instead and  Schmid, “The Response Problem as a Definition Problem.”.  Ibid., 8. 17  Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 17. 18  Ibid., 230. 19  Giovanni Sartori, Guidelines for Concept Analysis, Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1984). 20  M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 5. 21  Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 28. 22  L.  Magnani, Understanding Violence. The Intertwining of Morality, Religion and Violence: A Philosophical Stance. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rationality (Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2011), 10. 15 16

8  Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education

187

thus justifying their behaviour using alternative understandings and normative evaluations of the situation. However, such considerations are overlooked in the policies and guidelines affecting the British education system: the expectation is to adhere to state normative discourses rather than critically engage with the issues surrounding the topic.

3 The ‘Waves’ of Terrorism The exercising of power-knowledge within terrorism discourses is most apparent in the historical ‘dispositions [and] manoeuvres’23 that affect how terrorism has been perceived in the UK. One interesting thesis by Rapoport suggests that there have been ‘four waves’24 of terrorism. He states that modern or global terrorism began in the 1880s in Russia with the ‘Anarchist wave’, closely followed by ‘three similar, consecutive and overlapping expressions’:25 the ‘anticolonial wave’, the ‘New Left wave’ and, finally, the ‘religious wave’. By comprehending the ‘dominant energy’26 (or power-knowledge dynamics) within each historical ‘wave’, we can begin to understand how terrorism has been affected by the converging ideas within a particular time period – not just converging in the sense of the motivations or activities of specific groups but also regarding how and why those groups were categorised or perceived as ‘terrorists’ during that time. On examination of recent terrorist attacks, there are noticeable dominant examples, such as 9/11 or 7/7, that are frequently described as ‘Islamic’ within the vast majority of academic literature and media outlets. Thus, this perception evidently has a function within the power-knowledge dynamics at play within terrorism discourses, which has implications for the implementation of recent British counterterrorism policy because it means that religion is a dominant feature of those ideologies that require ‘challenging’. As Foucault noted, the historical and current landscape for any object of representation (in this case terrorism) is subject to memory recollection, and the reasons why such memories are recalled provide certain insights or perceptions about the object being represented.27 There are certain power-dynamics at play within such recollections: the recaller of information divulges certain information, which feeds from existing knowledge discourses, and presents it to the audience in a manner they deem most suitable. However, to comprehend the nature of these knowledge recollections, a closer examination of the political and media discourses is required.

 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 26.  D.  Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. A. Cronin and J. Ludes (Georgetown, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004). 25  Ibid., 47. 26  Ibid. 27  Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 115. 23 24

188

A. Quartermaine

The State Arena: Political Power-Knowledge The state arena influences the perceptions of terrorism discussed in classrooms since the power-knowledge dynamics of government policy dictate the expectations placed on British schools. Any presentations of terrorism-knowledge made by the state not only shape the opinions expressed by policymakers and other government agencies but also affect the activities of those who are required to implement the suggestions made within such documents, including those within the education system. To comprehend the parameters of what the state categorises as ‘terrorism’, I initially investigated the legal definitions because these have shaped the understandings and responses used by governments.28 However, UK terrorism law is not only formed by the country’s requirements but also by international bodies, such as the UN, due to the transnational nature29 of some terrorist attacks. According to the UN, terrorism is: ‘criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror . . . [They are] in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them’.30 Cronin argues that current UK counterterrorism legal policies are influenced by these parameters since they are primarily linked to security issues, such as the criminality of certain offences and counterterrorism approaches.31 More recent UN documents, such as the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288), reaffirm this definition, adding that, in order to address the conditions conducive to the spreading of terrorism, the UN needs to ‘promote dialogue, tolerance and understanding among civilizations, cultures, people and religions . . . by establishing and encouraging, as appropriate, education and public awareness programmes involving all sectors of society’.32 Perhaps it is this that the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act is attempting to implement, particularly with respect to improving education and public awareness. However, there is a noticeable difference between this UN document and UK policy: namely, the necessity to ‘challenge’ ideologies rather than promote dialogue and tolerance. Thus, the power-knowledge exhibited by the British state arena demonstrates a disposition that differs slightly to international (UN) documentation. This disposition  “Society Must Be Defended,” in Lectures at the College De France, 1975–76, ed. M. Bertani and A. Fontana (New York, NY: Picador, 2003), 37. 29  C. Walter, “Defining Terrorism in National and International Law,” in Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security Versus Liberty?, ed. C.  Walter, et  al. (Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2004). 30  United Nations (UN), “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (a/Res/49/60),” http:// www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm 31   Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International security 27, no. 3 (2002). 32  United Nations (UN), “Un, Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (a/Res/60/288),” http://www. un.org/en/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml#plan 28

8  Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education

189

demonstrates how the definition is expected to function in practice: challenging the negative attributes associated with terrorism discourses is preferred to other approaches to counterterrorism, such as engaging in dialogue. This disposition is best exhibited by the definition(s) used within British policy documents. In addition to the definition outlined in the 2015 guidelines (see Section 1), the Terrorism Act 200033 states that ‘terrorism’ is when ‘the use or threat [of violence] is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause’. (Terrorism Act 2000, Section 1, Part 1, c). However, another legal definition of terrorism in the UK, The Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 Section 2(2), does not include ‘religion’ in its definition.34 Interestingly, Carlile’s influential report on the UK terrorism laws preferred the Terrorism Act 2000 over the earlier definition, despite noting that it may be too broad for criminal law, leaving it open for political bias or misuse.35 As legal scholar Brandon argues, it did not specify that the government should be democratically elected and it could be inferred that ‘the threat or use of action against an undemocratic or illegitimate government anywhere in the world for a political, ideological or religious purpose is therefore terrorism according to the Terrorism Act 2000’.36 Furthermore, this act could breach human rights law: it suggests that exceptional powers can be used when reprimanding potential terrorists, such as prolonging detention or criminalising those involved in the ‘encouragement of terrorism’. To condemn someone for ‘reckless speech’ could breach the human right to freedom of opinion (Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948),37 resulting in some analysts arguing that a distinction should be made between the spoken word and how others interpret them.38 Carlile’s report also clarified why a separate law for terrorism was required: ‘terrorism crime is different. Fanatics and others moved by a fervent ideological or similar purpose are less predictable than professional criminals’.39 However, some scholars disagree with this assessment about the psychology of a terrorist. For example, Post argued that they should not be considered ‘crazed fanatics’40 but  HM Government, The Terrorism Act 2000 (London, UK: The Stationary Office, 2000).  Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. (London, UK: The Stationary Office, 2007). 35  Ibid., 21. 36  Ben Brandon, “Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: 120  Years of the Uk’s Legal Response to Terrorism,” Criminal Law Review (2004): 988. 37  United Nations (UN), “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” http://www.un.org/en/ documents/udhr/index.shtml 38  Liberty (The National Council for Civil Liberties), “Liberty’s Response to Lord Carlile’s Review of the Definition of Terrorism, 2006,” http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy06/ response-to-carlile-review-of-terrorism-definition.pdf. Also see Imran Awan, “The Problem with Defining Terrorism and the Impact on Civil Liberties-Britain Is Beginning to Create a Monster with Large Claws, Sharp Teeth and a Fierce Temper,” Journal of Politics and Law 1, no. 2 (2008). 39  Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 24. 40  J. Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the Ira to Al-Qaeda (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 8. 33 34

190

A. Quartermaine

rather those who have become part of a collective identity: they subordinate their individual identity to the collective identity and behave in a manner that primarily serves the group. However, by this logic, the broader the associations made to a terrorist group, the broader the range of potential followers to the ‘cause’, which could generate problems when trying to ‘challenge’ any ideology associated with terrorism, but this discussion goes beyond the scope of this chapter. In addition to the perceptions of terrorists as ‘fanatics’, Carlile added that the most dangerous form of ideology comes from those ‘dedicated to violent and lethal jihad’,41 thereby highlighting Islamic forms of terrorism above others. However, there is no detailed explanation given for this bias and some have questioned whether this is correct.42 Carlile believed that it was necessary to include religious motivations in the definition of terrorism,43 but campaigners have raised concerns about the incorporation of religion in legal documents, believing that this may cause discrimination against certain groups.44 Carlile dismisses these complaints, stating that ‘it is just foolish to suggest that there is some form of discrimination against any religious group’.45 However, since he used specific groups to describe terrorism (namely Islamic ‘jihadists’), this concern was evidently a valid one and should have been addressed with more care. As Modood noted, the continuing focus on Islamic links to terrorism has produced negative views of Muslims, who are deemed a ‘key political minority identity’.46 Samad goes further, stating that Muslims have become ‘demonised’.47 Whether true or not, such perceptions in themselves highlight the deeper social issues surrounding the topic of terrorism, in particular, the rise of Islamophobia.48 Thus, it is debatable whether such ideas should be incorporated into legal definitions of terrorism. Despite these problems, the incorporation of religious motivation into legal definitions of terrorism can be considered a useful tactic by the state since it ensures that the phenomenon is definable and differentiated from ‘normal’ society (and other  Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 24. 42  D.  Miller and R.  Sabir, “Propaganda and Terrorism,” in Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives, ed. D. Freedom and D. Kishan Thussu (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012), 88. 43  Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 32. 44  K.  Khan, Preventing Violent Extremism (Pve) and Prevent: A Response from the Muslim Community (London, UK: An-Nisa Society, 2009). Also, Kundnani, Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism. 45  Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 32. 46  Tariq Modood, “Muslims, Religious Equality and Secularism,” in Secularism, Religious and Multicultural Citizenship, ed. G. Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42. 47  Y. Samad, “Ethnicization of Religion,” in Islam in the European Union: Transnationalism, Youth and the War on Terror, ed. Y.  Samad and K.  Sen (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2007), 17. 48  L. Levidow, “The Politics of Identity,” ibid. 41

8  Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education

191

criminal activities). As Foucault noted, observed differences, and the process of observing difference, is part of the power of normalisation49 that has become part of the surveillance machinery and state disciplinary techniques.50 Therefore, by highlighting (and differentiating) the Islamic links to terrorism in legal documentation, the state has been provided with a perceived higher level of legitimacy for the exhibition of its disciplinary powers (and surveillance) within the ‘associated’ Islamic community, as demonstrated by the initial implementation of the 2011 Prevent Strategy.51 Since the Prevent Strategy is considered important to current legislation,52 the historical impact of this policy requires some consideration since it will influence the forms of terrorism that require ‘challenging’ within the classroom. If the policy is closely adhered to, then al-Qaeda (or broader ‘Islamic’) associations with terrorism would take precedent above others. However, this policy has not been universally accepted because ‘the term Preventing Violent Extremism . . . was seen by many Muslim community members and some stakeholders as insulting [and] provocative’.53 Some scholars went further and questioned the validity of focusing on countering al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism above other terrorist groups and ideologies, suggesting that this threat was over-emphasised and that a more serious and sustained threat to the UK comes from armed groups in Northern Ireland rather than from ‘Islamist’54 groups. Due to the claims made in the research conducted by Miller and Sabir, it is difficult to conclusively decide on the truth of the situation. However, regardless of whether or not the focus on al-Qaeda is an accurate representation of the terrorist threat, I would argue that this presentation of terrorism is problematic because it affected (and will continue to affect) the wider Islamic community in the UK.55 As Awan noted, the language used in Prevent (2011) could promote the idea that Muslims are the key demographic for countering radicalisation, either through Islamic theological education or through surveillance measures within Islamic communities,56 which has the potential to ‘stigmatize the entire populations’.57 Allen similarly argued that the association of jihad with terrorism may intensify  Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 184.  Ibid., 177. 51  Khan, Preventing Violent Extremism (Pve) and Prevent: A Response from the Muslim Community, 4. 52  HM Government, “Prevent Duty Guidance: Guidance for Specified Authorities in England and Wales on the Duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to Have Due Regard to the Need to Prevent People from Being Drawn into Terrorism,” 5. 53  Waterhouse Consulting Group, Preventing Violent Extremism: An Independent Evaluation of the Birmingham Pathfinder (Birmingham, UK: Waterhouse Consulting Group, 2008), 42. 54  Miller and Sabir, “Propaganda and Terrorism,” 87. 55  Muslim Council of Britain, “Responding to Prevent 2011,” http://soundings.mcb.org.uk/?cat=3 56  Imran Awan, “‘I Am a Muslim Not an Extremist’: How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a ‘Suspect’ Community,” Politics & Policy 40, no. 6 (2012): 1170. 57  Ibid., 1166. 49 50

192

A. Quartermaine

Islamophobic reactions to Muslim communities.58 Therefore, relying on the Prevent Strategy could actually be counterproductive: focusing on a terrorist threat that is linked to a specific minority community in the UK could intensify those problems that it was attempting to subvert. Thus, despite the broader definition provided in the Counterterrorism and Security Act guidelines, the reliance on the 2011 Prevent Strategy has subjected the new policy to similar (and problematic) scrutiny. One positive outcome from the political definitions discussed above is that some clarity has been provided about the political (and legal) expectations concerning the boundaries of acceptable beliefs and behaviour. Thus, those individuals who choose to act outside these boundaries become categorised as terrorists – a categorisation that remains with them and is found within the other arenas as an accepted description for those individuals or groups under discussion. However, the negative implications of this categorisation cannot be underestimated because it not only affects those called ‘terrorists’ but also those groups or individuals who could (however loosely) be associated with them. Thus, the incorporation of religious associations with terrorism within political discourses is problematic because it could result in anyone associated with the religion becoming subject to anything from prejudices to physical restrictions in civil liberties (placed under the guise of counterterrorism measures) and raises further questions about how teachers are expected to handle such complex matters within a classroom situation.

The Media Arena: The ‘Out-of-Class Curriculum’ Media outlets, from printed materials to new media sources,59 are influential to our perceptions of terrorism because it is from here that we gather our general information and form opinions about the phenomenon. These sources form part of pupils’ ‘out-of-class curriculum’60 and are thus important in shaping their perceptions, consequently affecting classroom discussions. The retellings of terrorist attacks found within the UK media frequently incorporate descriptions of the perpetrators’ religious affiliation. However, current examples typically use religious descriptors when the perpetrator is associated with an Islamic heritage rather than other religions. For example, attacks associated with (or inspired by) al-Qaeda are frequently categorised as ‘Islamist’, whereas attacks in Northern Ireland are not defined ‘Catholic’ or ‘Protestant’ but rather ‘Republican’ or ‘Loyalist’, or by their organisation’s name, such as the Real IRA.61 These media representations of religion have implications for our general perceptions of religion  Allen, Islamophobia.  M.  Messenger Davies, Children, Media and Culture (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2010), 14. 60  Ladislaus Semali, “Ways with Visual Languages: Making the Case for Critical Media Literacy,” The Clearing House 76, no. 6 (2003): 271. 61  Miller and Sabir, “Propaganda and Terrorism.” 58 59

8  Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education

193

because the ‘media’s treatment of religion can be seen as a kind of indicator of the broader role and status of religion on the contemporary scene’.62 Thus, when religion is portrayed in a negative manner and associated with extreme acts of aggression, it reflects a wider social sentiment about the role of religion in modern society. Furthermore, when religious terms are used to define an individual or an act, there is ‘an assumption about what religion is, whether expressed explicitly in a definition or implicitly as media-bias . . . [which] can have the effect of directing our inquiries away from the actual religiousness of those who constitute the living reality of a faith and towards abstract formulations whose claims to be representative of such faiths is open to question’.63 This is particularly problematic for Islam because, as a minority faith within the UK, some people may not have had much contact with individuals from this religious heritage (or even know details about the religion). Thus, when religious terminology, such as jihad, is used in conjunction with terrorism, it is understandable why some may connect terrorist activities to the faith (even when such connections are incorrect). Furthermore, current media coverage of terrorism has increased due to the wider variety of media outlets and the faster pace by which information can be presented to a global audience via digital technologies. This, in turn, has intensified ‘the spectacular capacities of terrorism’,64 resulting in many scholars perceiving the relationship between terrorism and the media as a ‘communicative act’:65 it can be of mutual benefit to both the terrorists and the media sources distributing information about their activities.66 However, the complex power-dynamics involved in this symbiotic process extend beyond exploitative publicity and feed into wider issues of political propaganda, social representations and a metanarrative of terrorism, which, in turn, affects how the topic is handled within the education system and the perceptions of terrorism discussed by pupils. As Foucault explained,67 the representations and perceptions of something, in this case terrorism, are restricted by, and subjected to, the powerful recollection of similar examples. Thus, media sources tend to use previous examples, such as 9/11, to help readers comprehend how recent events could be considered similar. As the news articles surrounding the attacks on a soldier in Woolwich, UK (22 May 2013) demonstrated, using known terms and ideas helped explain the attackers’

 Stewart M. Hoover, Religion in the News: Faith and Journalism in American Public Discourse (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), 12. 63  C. Arther, “Media, Meaning and Method in Religious Studies,” in Rethinking Media, Religion and Culture, ed. Stewart M. Hoover and Knut Lundby (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), 187. 64  D. Freedom and D. Kishan Thussu, “Introduction,” in Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives, ed. D. Freedom and D. Kishan Thussu (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2012), 10. 65  A. Hoskins and B. O’Laughlin Television and Terror: Conflicting Times and the Crisis of News Discourse (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 9. 66  Ibid., 102. 67  Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 69. 62

194

A. Quartermaine

motivations and why the attack was categorised as one of terrorism.68 This example highlights a ‘bond of representation’:69 the categorisation of an event as one of ‘terrorism’ tends to rely on knowledge of previous examples while simultaneously reiterating the metanarrative that religion (specifically Islam) is somehow associated with terrorism. Even within the realm of electronic games, where stories are generally fabricated rather than based on real-life events, examples of this metanarrative can be found (for example, the Call of Duty series). According to Power,70 these types of games express state ideologies and promote them as forces of good against known enemies. That is not to say that groups such as al-Qaeda do not have their versions of similar games (one example released by the Islamic Media Front was Quest for Bush71) but that popular games found in the US and UK tend to express a bias towards those state objectives. An additional consideration that affects the power-knowledge associated with terrorism is the psychological effect that the portrayal of terrorism (and violence) in the media could have on the readership. As Slone stated, ‘media documentation of violence and brutality engenders feelings of fear even among individuals who have not been directly exposed to such violence and for whom it poses no immediate personal threat’.72 Thus, the fear of terrorism, as experienced by the pupils via a variety of media sources, could be greater than the actual risk to their personal safety, which, I would argue, is something that requires deeper consideration when engaging children with the current counterterrorism policy.

The Education Arena: Some Challenging Discussions The discourses explored within the previous arenas, in particular the state arena, have affected the terrorism-knowledge disseminated by schools, their staff and the pupils. The current overarching curriculum suggestions are influenced by these power-knowledge discourses and guide the expectations and topics taught in schools. However, they do not explicitly describe how teachers should deliver such ideas in lessons: according to Cole, the chain of information goes through multiple layers, from government to local authorities and so on,73 before finally being filtered  G. Rayner and S. Swinford “Woolwich Attack: Terrorist Proclaimed ‘an Eye for an Eye’ after Attack,” The Telegraph, 22nd May 2013. 69  Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 65. 70  Marcus Power, “Digitized Virtuosity: Video War Games and Post-9/11 Cyber-Deterrence,” Security Dialogue 38, no. 2 (2007): 272. 71  Ibid., 283. 72  Michelle Slone, “Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 4 (2000): 508. 73  K. Cole, “Where Reform and Interaction Meet: Spaces for Appropriation and Resistance,” in The Research Process in Classroom Discourse Analysis: Current Perspectives, ed. K.  Cole and J. Zuengler (New York, NY – London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2008). 68

8  Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education

195

to the classroom teacher, who devises a lesson around the topic, taking into account the pedagogical considerations for a specific class.74 Therefore, the task of ‘challenging’ terrorist ideologies is limited by the teacher’s comprehension of their role in current counterterrorism measures as well as the range of classroom and school dynamics that typically affect the learning environment. As the Prevent Strategy states, schools play ‘an important role’ in counterterrorism strategies.75 That is not to say that children are becoming ‘radicalised’76 but rather that schools can help ‘young people to challenge extremism and the ideology of terrorism’.77 However, the ability to challenge ideologies is a high order task: it requires students to be able to critically engage with the topic in an academic manner while simultaneously reaching the required negative conclusions about the nature of terrorism. The issue is confused further since many teachers are unclear about how they should explore the relationship between Islam and terrorism within the classroom (see study by DfE and Ipsos Mori78). This confusion is not aided by influential policy documents (and the implementation of counterterrorism measures) that focus on al-Qaeda as the main instigator of terrorism79 while stating that ‘it is vital to understand how, historically, terrorism has drawn recruits from all parts of societies and from many faith groups’.80 Thus, questions are raised about the exact ideas teachers are supposed to ‘challenge’. Indeed, some could argue that, due to these problems, the education system may not be the best forum for such discussions.81 Yet, the increased focus on counterterrorism measures has meant that such discussions are occurring. It is thus important to examine the nature of the complexities associated with this topic so that the implications for the education system can be

 Lee S Shulman, “Those Who Understand: Knowledge Growth in Teaching,” Educational researcher 15, no. 2 (1986). 75  Home Office, “Prevent Strategy,” 69. 76  One example of an event that has been categorised as radicalisation entering the school sphere is the ‘Trojan Horse’ case, where a number of schools in Birmingham, UK, came under scrutiny due to a few individuals being accused of trying to introduce an Islamist ideology into the schools. See Chap. 9 and Sean Coughlin, Trojan Horse Leaked Report Says Pupils “Not Protected from Extremism,” 5th June 2014. 77  Despite this document frequently using extremism and terrorism as synonyms (which brings into question what exactly is to be discussed by teachers; see Anthony Richards, “The Problem with ‘Radicalization’: The Remit of ‘Prevent’and the Need to Refocus on Terrorism in the Uk,” International Affairs 87, no. 1 (2011).), these definitional concerns were beyond the scope of this paper and I have interpreted these words as terms that highlight policy concerns about the ideologies that could promote, or lead to, violence. 78  Ipsos Mori et al., Community Cohesion and Prevent: How Have Schools Responded? (London, UK: Ipsos Mori and Department for Education, 2010). 79  See, for example, Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. 80  Home Office, “Prevent Strategy,” 26. 81  Liam Gearon, “The Counter Terrorist Classroom: Religion, Education, and Security,” Religious Education 108, no. 2 (2013). 74

196

A. Quartermaine

better understood. In Foucauldian terms, the difficulties outlined above demonstrate different forms of power-knowledge: namely, state discourses and hegemony versus free speech and the rejection of prejudice. By hegemony, Foucault meant the power associated with observed differences, and the process of observing difference, that ‘produce a reality’82 about the representations of criminality. Thus, examples of terrorism, such as 9/11, demonstrate how such events are perceived to be unique forms of criminal behaviour: something that requires additional surveillance to prevent their repetition. The 2015 Counter-­ Terrorism and Security Act associated both terrorist actions and motivations (such as religion) because ‘that [made] it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish’.83 Since the most prominent example of terrorism is 9/11, perceptions of terrorism will necessarily become associated with the acts and justifications linked to that attack, thus increasing the possible surveillance of those (loosely) associated with the widely accepted attributes. However, for this power of hegemony to function, it also requires a level of imagery associated with this perceived threat, but how can pupils identify a ‘Muslim’? Cesari has argued that ‘Western’ states’ inability to control ‘religion’ has contributed to some religions, in particular Islam, being increasingly associated with terrorism: it is frequently presented as an ‘alien’ faith, with a firm association with a ‘foreign’ land (i.e. Mecca) and noticeable different cultural expressions of identity, including clothing, buildings, rituals and so on, that could be considered threatening to ‘Western’ states.84 By associating terrorism with the faith, Islam appears more ‘alien’, even ‘evil’ (see Foucault85 for details about how morality is perceived and not an intrinsic quality), and something that requires a reinforced power of state-­ defined hegemony, as expressed through an increased state- and society-wide surveillance.86 However, it is not simply clothing and rituals that could be considered ‘distinctive features’ but also the association of a particular race. According to Webster, from the 1980s onward, there was a change in popular and police perceptions of Asian Muslim young people, from being law-abiding to lawless individuals.87 He argued that the divisions between white and Asian men during this time contributed to an increase in racially motivated crimes in certain areas of the UK, such as Bradford. However, he also noted that particular events, such as the Salman Rushdie

 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 194.  Ibid. 84  Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). 85  Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 336. 86  Jackson, “Constructing Enemies:‘Islamic Terrorism’in Political and Academic Discourse.” 87  C.  Webster, “The Construction of Criminality and Disorder among British Muslim Young People,” in Islam in the West: Key Issues in Multiculturalism, ed. M. Farrar, et al. (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 204. 82 83

8  Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education

197

case in 1989,88 were influential turning points in enforcing a perceived racial (primarily Asian) connection to Islam. Thus, such sentiments were already within the general perceptions of Islam prior to 9/11: this later event simply contributed to these hegemonic discourses and solidified those perceived associations of the ‘Asian Muslim’ to criminal activities. However, 9/11 was more memorable than the Rushdie affair because it was a surprise attack, with a significant global impact: the event was generally presented as something extreme, almost unique, and thus strengthened those stereotypes. As Foucault argued, observable differences are essential to the power of hegemony functioning within society.89 Therefore, connecting Muslims to a particular race provided a noticeable feature by which such individuals could become categorised and consequently fall under the ongoing power of society-wide surveillance. Many scholars have demonstrated wariness of the prominent discourses found in the state and media arenas because categorising a particular religious and/or racial group with terrorism essentially encourages prejudiced attitudes. This disposition of concern is important in any discussion on the topic because it highlights a possible instability within this power of hegemony: something that perhaps threatened the functionality of this form of state power. As Foucault suggested, the functionality of hegemonic power-knowledge is dependent upon its secrecy, its ability to remain ‘hidden’90 from society. If not, it could become unstable and form a basis by which resistance could emerge: a social counter-hegemonic strategy.91 This instability is demonstrated by the definitional issues raised in this chapter: namely, the perception that current state guidelines could simply result in the demonising of certain individuals, or an entire community perceived as having commonalities to terrorists. Although some policy documents advocate for a broad spectrum of terrorist ideologies to be discussed within the classroom, there are other (arguably more influential) legal and political discourses that specifically highlight the ‘Islamic’ terrorist above others. Yet, the power of anti-prejudiced discourses functions behind the scenes and causes tension and can supersede the power of hegemony associated with terrorism. According to Modood, any perceived tension could actually be the result of a lack of terminological verification: he considered the word ‘race’ as code for cultural racism and thus suggested that the hostility directed towards Muslims should

 The author Salman Rushdie was sentenced to death in a fatwa by Ayatollah Khomeini, which resulted in his novel, The Satanic Verses (1988), being publicly burned by a small group of Asian Muslims in Bradford. For more, see: Modood, “British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair.”; Pipes, The Rushdie Affair; Daniel Pipes, The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West (London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 1990); Malise Ruthven, A Satanic Affair: Salman Rushdie and the Rage of Islam (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1990). 89  Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 184. 90  Ibid., 105. 91  B. Smart, “The Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. D. Couzens Hoy (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1986), 170. 88

198

A. Quartermaine

actually be categorised as anti-Muslim racism.92 Thus, categorising such discussions as potentially racist (as opposed to the more specific term of cultural racism) contributed to the avoidance of such discussions, which in turn discouraged open debate and made Islam appear more alien, simply because speaking about it has almost become a fearful notion in itself. Kendall and Wickham similarly argued that power can only be exercised in relation to a resistance, thus any uncovered tension could be considered part of the operations of power rather than as something that seeks to promote or oppose it.93 In my opinion, these analyses only serve to minimalise the importance of struggle and power-resistance:94 namely, those power-knowledge discourses associated with a perceived freedom of expression, critical scepticism or free speech. Although it may be naivety on my part to hope that any free speech could exist beyond the socially confined power-knowledge dynamics associated with terrorism discourses, at the very least, a perceived freedom of expression may encourage others to question the normalised parameters by which such discussions currently take place: to really consider why terrorism is perceived in a particular manner and to question whether we are doing enough to help pupils comprehend the difficult issues associated with this topic. Perhaps it is here that ‘challenging terrorism and terrorist ideologies’ could actually begin: not by challenging any specific associated ideologies (such as Islam) in a negative manner but rather to encourage pupils to challenge the concept of “terrorism” and ‘terrorist ideology’. Although there will occasionally be the few isolated cases of individuals requiring more nuanced counter-terrorism approaches, the vast majority of pupils will not hold extremist beliefs, therefore it is more appropriate to use a philosophy-style academic approach within the average classroom. By critically examining the associated attributes and stereotypes, pupils can begin to comprehend the power-knowledge dynamics at play when such terminology is used, which in turn could be used in a positive manner to discuss the wider ethical issues highlighted by this topic, such as the use of violence and the effects of prejudice within society. In doing so, this topic could be used to promote greater understanding in young people and thus promote the peaceful outcomes that the government policy presumably aims to achieve.

4 Conclusion The perceptions of terrorism, in particular its relationship to religion, make it a sensitive and challenging topic for classroom discussions. Not only do teachers have to contend with those power-knowledge dynamics associated with political agendas,  Modood, “Muslims, Religious Equality and Secularism.”   G.  Kendall and G.  Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999), 50–51. 94  Edward W. Said, “Foucault and the Imagination of Power,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. D. Couzens Hoy (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1986), 154. 92 93

8  Challenging Terrorist Ideologies Through Education

199

media representations and whole school or parental concerns but also with attempting to deliver the topic in a manner that is both critical of the issues, yet respectful of the concerns raised by potentially prejudiced views. However, the level of power exhibited by the legal documents should not be underestimated: the categorisation of specific actions and motives as ones of ‘terrorism’ has a profound effect on the perceived criminality of particular offences and on current counterterrorism measures, thereby highlighting Islamic associations to terrorism above other ideological foundations. In my opinion, the violence associated with terrorism makes it condemnable, but if pupils are not given scope for critical or academic discussion, teachers may take a linear approach that adheres to the expectations (and bias) of state discourses rather than discussing the wider nuances of terrorism debates. On the other hand, if such discussions are allowed to take place, then questions arise about how such teaching protects children from terrorism-related violence. However, since schools are not just expected to protect children from the effects of terrorism but to also prevent children from actually becoming involved in terrorist activities, such discussions have become integrated into the education system. Yet, if teachers are expected to ‘challenge’ terrorist ideologies, are we then to assume that all children are capable of harbouring terrorist thoughts? The vast majority of children are not going to get involved in terrorism; it is thus ethically questionable to presume that it is necessary to ‘prevent’ them from doing so. Therefore, I suggest that, instead of focusing on those ideologies identified by the state literature as associated with terrorism (such as Islamist-inspired acts), teachers could instead ‘challenge’ the concept of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist ideologies’ because this allows for the important discussions about stereotypes and prejudices associated with this topic to take place. As highlighted above, it is the perceived freedom of expression that raises those difficult but important questions about the legitimacy of current hegemonic perceptions of terrorism, and I believe that such questions are necessary if we are to overcome the problems that cause terrorist attacks to occur in the first place (something noted within UN95 documents). At the very least, this chapter highlights the importance of carefully considering how teachers can discuss one of the most important, yet difficult, issues facing society today so that the ultimate aim of ‘preventing’ terrorism can be achieved.

95

 United Nations (UN), “Un, Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (a/Res/60/288),” 2–3.

Chapter 9

The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered Hengameh Ashraf-Emami and Laurens de Rooij

Several research projects explore the identity of Muslim women in Britain.1 Some of the research has studied how Muslim women practise Islam in ‘secular spaces’ and assert their religious identities in Britain.2 However, there is hardly any research that focuses on exploring the intergenerational identities of British Muslim women. As Gilliat-Ray and others suggest, the heterogeneity of the British Muslim community warrants further study.3 By focusing on women’s agency, family and education, we emphasise the diversity of British Muslim ethnicities and the heterogeneity of our Muslim participants. Women’s agency and the construction of their identities in an intergenerational context are presented in this chapter to add substantially to our understanding of the intergenerational identity of British Muslim women and its connection to their agency regarding veiling and education. This has

 Kim Knott and Sajda Khokher, “Religious and Ethnic Identity among Young Muslim Women in Bradford,” New Community 19, no. 4 (1993); Phillips, “Parallel Lives? Challenging Discourses of British Muslim Self-Segregation.”; Halima Begum, “Geographies of Inclusion/Exclusion: British Muslim Women in the East End of London,” Sociological Research Online 13, no. 5 (2008). 2  H.  Afshar, Women and Fluid Identities: Strategic and Practical Pathways Selected by Women (London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012); F.  Bhimji, British Asian Muslim Women, Multiple Spatialities and Cosmopolitanism (Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012); Tarlo, Visibly Muslim: Fashion, Politics, Faith; C. Dwyer and B. Shah, “Rethinking the Identities of Young British Pakistani Muslim Women,” in Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities., ed. Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 3  Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain; Dwyer and Shah, “Rethinking the Identities of Young British Pakistani Muslim Women.” 1

H. Ashraf-Emami (*) University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK L. de Rooij Université Toulouse 1, Capitole, Toulouse, France © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_9

201

202

H. Ashraf-Emami and L. de Rooij

become immensely important in light of the Brexit vote, since Muslim women are regularly represented in the media as passive and lacking in agency.4 In this chapter, we demonstrate that the fluidity of identity and agency are interlinked and that both influence the construction and reconstruction of the intergenerational identity of British Muslim women. In this chapter, we will also explore the influence of gender roles and relationships on the transmission of cultural beliefs and practices from one generation to the next. We analyse the debate about British citizenship, identity and a sense of belonging using what Ricoeur calls collective memory: ‘Collective memory simply consists of the set of traces left by events that have shaped the course of history of those social groups that, in later times, have the capacity to stage these shared recollections through holidays, rituals, and public celebrations.’5 What is interesting is that white UK natives not only define their identity based on their collective memories but demand that minority groups share their values based on collective memories that they do not share. This is important because, as Jelin points out: ‘Identities and memories are not things we think about, but things we think with. As such they have no existence beyond our politics, our social relations, and our histories.’6 Therefore, if British culture shapes identity, experiences and, in turn, (collective) memories, then those resources will be used to constitute Muslims’ interactions. Important for this study would be to examine whether these experiences and interactions are constituted differently between first- and second-­ generation Muslims. With that in mind, we explored the understanding of mothering and being mothered by Muslims in Northeast England using oral history (OH) interviews.7 ‘Mothers share, by definition and condition, a set of activities, even though they vary as individuals and across cultures.’8 Maternal practices can be

 Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press; de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.” 5  Paul Ricoeur, La Lectura Del Tiempo Pasado: Memoria Y Olvido (Madrid, Spain: Arrecife Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, 1999). 6  Elizabeth Jelin, Judy Rein, and Marcial Godoy-Anativia, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 7  Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (London, UK  - New  York, NY: Routledge, 2016); Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, The Oral History Reader (London, UK - New York, NY: Routledge, 2015); Sherna Berger Gluck and Daphne Patai, Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History (London, UK - New York, NY: Routledge, 2013); Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford university press, 2017); Donald A Ritchie, Doing Oral History (Oxford University Press, 2014); Valerie Raleigh Yow, Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sciences (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). 8  Terry Arendell, “Conceiving and Investigating Motherhood: The Decade’s Scholarship,” Journal of marriage and family 62, no. 4 (2000): 1194. 4

9  The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered

203

understood to point towards the nurturing, protecting and training of their children.9 In turn, ‘[m]others are identified not by what they feel but by what they try to do’.10 These relationships, while often intimate, also require the passing on of skills through dynamic interactions between parents and children. In turn, they lie at the basis of many a profound affectional relationship, providing a deep meaningful connection between two human beings.11 This relationship starts with the child’s physical needs and develops as the child places emotional and moral claims on the mother.12 Indeed, mothering13 is shaped by various ideologies, personal experiences, and individual agency, and motherhood is surrounded by societal ideologies and cultural expectations. As Glenn et al. (2016) emphasise it is important to understand motherhood not as a monolithic concept but as a complex and nuanced experience influenced by social, cultural, and political factors. By exploring the intersections of race, class, gender, and culture, Glenn et al. (2016) argue for recognizing the agency of mothers and acknowledging their diverse experiences, to gain valuable insights into the complexities of mothering in contemporary society. A woman’s mothering approach, and their beliefs about themselves and the nature of their role and the child’s, is the process of an active interpretation of cultural messages about children and the mother’s previous life history.14 Those experiences shape their parental roles.15 Within this framework, the term agency is located, referring to a dynamic, multi-layered action undertaken by mothers and daughters. Following McNay,16 this chapter will look at positive formulations of agency  – examples may include authority in decision-making, leadership in the family, community and society and advocacy – and highlight how these elements shift between generations in ways that are a powerful means of influence in the family context and

 M. Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare, and the State, 1890–1930 (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press., 1994); V.  W. Leonard, “Mothering as a Practice,” in Caregiving: Readings in Knowledge, Practice, Ethics, and Politics, ed. S. Gordon, P. Benner, and N Noddings (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). 10  S.  Ruddick, “Thinking Mothers/Conceiving Birth,” in Representations of Motherhood, ed. D. Bassin, M. Honey, and M. M. Kaplan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 34. 11  Y.  Oberman and R.  Josselson, “Matrix of Tensions: A Model of Mothering,” Psychology of Women Quarterly 20 (1996). 12  Leonard, “Mothering as a Practice.” 13   The word “mothering” refers to women’s experiences of mothering and is female defined and potentially empowering to women. O’REILLY (2019, p. 22). 14  J. Ribbens, Mothers and Their Children: A Feminist Sociology of Childrearing (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994). 15  C. Lightfoot and J. Valsiner, “Parental Belief Systems under the Influence: Social Guidance of the Construction of Personal Cultures.,” in Parental Belief Systems: The Psychological Consequences for Children, ed. I.  E. Sigel, A.  V. McGillicuddy-DeLisi, and J.  J. Goodnow (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992). 16  Lois McNay, Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley - Blackwell, 2013). 9

204

H. Ashraf-Emami and L. de Rooij

more than mere resistance. After all, ‘mothering is learned in the process of interaction with the individual[s] mothered’.17 The agency of British Muslim women is thus explored in an intergenerational context through mother–daughter attitudes towards, and practices of, veiling and non-veiling.18 Possibly, the simplest view of first, second and third generations would be as follows: a woman who immigrates to the UK from another country is first generation; her children, born in the UK, are second generation; and their children, again born in the UK, are third generation. The term intergenerational, in this chapter, offers a more complex approach. For example, mother and daughter, arriving in the UK together, and living here for the same length of time, are also an example of first and second generation. However, age is not the primary signifier here. Rather, it is the influence of, among other things, the social and educational environment. Therefore, what differentiates between generations is not their respective ages but their exposure to British social institutions such as schools. This access to certain social institutions provides different collective memories, which, we suggest, in turn provides a different approach to and understanding of the role of a Muslim mother. It is often assumed that second and third generations are younger than the first generation but that only holds in one familial line. Some middle-aged participants in this study were born in the UK and are therefore considered second generation, but they may be older than first-generation immigrants arriving in later years. This also does not account for the circumstances of immigrants, which may differ as well, or whether the first generation were refugees or asylum seekers. What is noticeable is that social, educational and ethnic influences, as well as the era of immigration to the UK, provide the parameters for considering members as first, second or third generation and illustrate the multi-layered complexity of this concept.19

 K.  E. Barnard and L.  K. Martell, “Mothering,” in Handbook of Parenting: Status and Social Conditions of Parenting, ed. M. H. Bornstein (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1995). 18  For more on the role of men in the mothering process, see: Andrea Doucet, Do Men Mother?: Fathering, Care, and Domestic Responsibility (University of Toronto Press, 2006). 19  P. E. Hopkins, “Youthful Muslim Masculinities: Gender and Generational Relations. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,” 31 3, no. 337–352 (2006); Hengameh Ashraf-Emami, “Gender and Generational Relations for Muslim Women in Scotland,” in Scotland’s Muslims: Society, Politics and Identity, ed. Peter Hopkins (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017). 17

9  The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered

205

1 Methodology The initial qualitative research used OH interviews,20 discussion groups21 and participant observation as an ethnographic approach,22 applying grounded theory.23 The study adopted an inductive approach to allow the recognition of theories that emerged from the data.24 By applying grounded theory, the research ‘aimed to develop rich conceptual analytics of lived experience’.25 Therefore, the coded categories were obtained from the participant data, simultaneously engaged with analysis,26 to overcome the shortcomings of descriptive research.27 OH interviews play a key role in collecting usable data, as it ‘is a special kind of intensive biography interview’.28 It is thought that OH interviews allow participants to speak about their lives more freely while covering any issues related to their cultures and identities. All interviews were transcribed, and NVivo software was employed for  Abrams, Oral History Theory; Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader; Gluck and Patai, Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History; Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History; Ritchie, Doing Oral History; Yow, Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sciences. 21  David W Stewart and Prem N Shamdasani, Focus Groups: Theory and Practice, vol. 20 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2014); Richard A Krueger and Mary Anne Casey, Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2014); George Kamberelis and Greg Dimitriadis, Focus Groups (London, UK - New York, NY: Routledge, 2013); Pranee Liamputtong, Focus Group Methodology: Principle and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2011); Jenny Kitzinger, “Qualitative Research: Introducing Focus Groups,” BMJ 311 (1995): 299; Jenny Kitzinger, “The Methodology of Focus Groups: The Importance of Interaction between Research Participants,” Sociology of Health and Illness 16, no. 1 (1994): 103; Jan Reed and Valerie Roskell Payton, “Focus Groups: Issues of Analysis and Interpretation,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 26 (1997): 766. 22  Danny L Jorgensen, “Participant Observation,” Emerging trends in the social and behavioral sciences: An interdisciplinary, searchable, and linkable resource (2015); James P Spradley, Participant Observation (Waveland Press, 2016); Kathleen Musante and Billie R DeWalt, Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Edward Schatz, Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power (University of Chicago Press, 2013); Annette Watson and Karen E Till, “Ethnography and Participant Observation,” The SAGE handbook of qualitative geography. London (2010); Martin Gerard Forsey, “Ethnography as Participant Listening,” Ethnography 11, no. 4 (2010). 23  A. Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research (London, UK - New York, NY: Routledge, 2003); Barney G Glaser and Anselm L Strauss, Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (London, UK - New York, NY: Routledge, 2017). 24  A. Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford, UK: Oxford university press, 2015). 25  Kathy Charmaz, “The Search for Meanings-Grounded Theory,” in Rethinking Methods in Psychology, ed. J.  A. Smith, R.  Harre, and L.  Van Langenhove (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996), 48. 26  Constructing Grounded Theory (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2014); Kathy Charmaz and Linda Liska Belgrave, “Grounded Theory,” The Blackwell encyclopedia of sociology (2007); Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research; Glaser and Strauss, Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. 27  Bryman, Social Research Methods. 28  Alessandro Portelli, Oral History, Oral Culture, and Italian Americans (Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2009), 151. 20

206

H. Ashraf-Emami and L. de Rooij

analysing the data. Face-to-face recorded interviews took place at locations of the participants’ choosing; as a consequence, interviews were conducted in various places. The differences indicate the importance of familiarity and practicality of place to the research participants. The research subsequently presents a personalised and grassroots account of Muslim women’s identities in Northeast England in an intergenerational context. The project builds on the established literature of ethnic minority communities in the UK, and Muslim women’s identities more generally. The use of oral history interviews was chosen specifically as ‘a feminist methodology, situated in women’s experiences and perspectives’.29 Building on previous research,30 participants from the Muslim communities of Newcastle-upon-Tyne were recruited using snowball sampling and a gatekeeper.31 Participants were selected according to the following criteria: they were women over the age of eighteen who had lived in the UK for over ten years and who self-identified as Muslim. This opened the research up to engaging with a wide range of individuals and to embrace Muslim women of any ethnicity, age or educational background. In turn, this allowed us to present a detailed analysis of women in Muslim communities in Northeast England. Hengameh Ashraf-Emami have contributed to several national and international conferences such as BSA, ESA and ISA on sociology of gender, religion, and culture. Prior to her academic she has worked as project manager delivered Islamic heritage projects in the North East. (funded by Heritage Lottery Fund (in footnote)). Furthermore, Hengameh Ashraf-Emami curated several well received exhibitions in the region. Some of the data were cooperated in research projects and eventually, completed substantial research field work by 2017. During this time, initial OH interviews were collected, and the transcribing and archive training was provided by the oral history society. De Rooij collected his data as part of his field research in Durham and Newcastle in 2014. This research was part of his doctoral research looking into the way media representations of Islam are received by Muslims and non-Muslims.32 In addition, data were collected from participating in a diverse range of community settings with Muslim women with diverse ages and ethnic backgrounds. The eventual interviewees – thirty in total – were of Iranian, Iraqi, Egyptian, Bengali, Pakistani, Afghani, Indian and Syrian heritage. The youngest interviewee was nineteen and the eldest was seventy-three. Their educational background ranged from GCSE level to PhD and included students, medical and academic professionals, businesswomen and housewives. The findings from this study are not only relevant to Newcastle-upon-Tyne but make a significant contribution to the role of women in the UK’s Muslim communities.  Kathryn Anderson et al., “Beginning Where We Are: Feminist Methodology in Oral History,” The Oral History Review 15, no. 1 (1987): 108. 30  Ashraf-Emami, “Gender and Generational Relations for Muslim Women in Scotland.”; de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion.” 31  Bryman, Social Research Methods. 32  Laurens de Rooij, “Non-Muslim Perceptions of Islam in the News” (Durham University, 2015). 29

9  The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered

207

The participants’ self-identification as Muslim was the key factor for inclusion, and the research participants’ ‘Muslimness’ was not defined by mosque attendance, wearing a hijab or the eating of only halal meat.33 Therefore, the research was not limited by a specific definition of ‘Muslimness’ and did not limit the participants to those who were perceived as practising or devout Muslim women. The intent behind this strategy was to avoid skewing the research towards a specific understanding of ‘Muslimness’ and remain open to a heterogenous group of female Muslims. Non-­ practising Muslim women were approached and encouraged to take part in the research; however, to some extent, this approach was not always successful. Some mothers were asked whether their daughters might be open to participating in the research, as a form of snowball sampling. In one instance, a request was made to an apparently devoutly religious mother to arrange an interview with her daughter, in the knowledge that the daughter was not a practising Muslim. The mother suggested that I did not interview her daughter but only young women who visibly practised Islam: that is, those who wore the hijab. It was evident that some women who did not wear a hijab were hesitant about being interviewed. For instance, one of the interviewees initially expressed her doubts by saying: ‘Sister, I do not wear the headscarf outside the Hussayneh,34 will you still interview me?’ (Zohreh, 34 years old, first generation, Pakistani heritage) It was explained that veiling or not veiling was not a criterion for participation in the study, but, due to the nature of the research, it may have been assumed that it was limited to women who also wore a hijab or to some extent practise their religion visibly. Oral history interviews provide a comprehensive reflection on life by the research participants. As a result, it can be considered a reflective tool for them. For instance, Khadijah, a young interviewee, said, ‘It [the interview] was good, I reflected on my life and noticed things that I did not think about before’ (Khadijah, 19 years old, second generation, Malaysian heritage). Her quote emphasises the importance of the impact of the research on the participants, which may have provided opportunities for them to reflect on their lives and empower themselves by this reflection. In addition, it shows that oral history interviews not only enrich the research but may also have an effect on the interviewee and provide them with the opportunity to reflect on aspects of their lives while sharing their voices with others. It must be remembered that, as a consequence, the material these oral histories provide are an interpretation of an individual historical process. Tracing the present everyday experiences through a series of anecdotes provided by the participant enable a reflection on both their practices and experiences. The method therefore acts as an archaeological method for engaging with individualised knowledge discourses, as presented to the researcher in participant memories. These memories then provide the basis for further reflection in our research. In particular, our work considers how

 Ashraf-Emami, “Gender and Generational Relations for Muslim Women in Scotland.”; Meer, “Misrecognising Muslim Consciousness in Europe.”; Katherine Bullock, Muslim Women Activists in North America: Speaking for Ourselves (University of Texas Press, 2005). 34  A term often used by Shii Muslim to refer to their mosques. 33

208

H. Ashraf-Emami and L. de Rooij

mother–daughter dynamics relate to how mothers transmit and instil cultural, religious and educational values in family life.

2 Mother as Daughter, Daughter as Mother Sima35 is a medical professional who was born and raised in the UK. Her parents, first-generation Bengali, were economic migrants who travelled to Britain from Bangladesh in the 1960s. While she mentioned being close to her sister, who is a legal professional, she also appreciated her parents, especially her mother, who, despite having received no formal education herself, encouraged Sima and her sisters to pursue their studies in various ways, such as confidence building as a powerful strategy. As Sima explained: ‘although [my mother] was not educated to any level, she always encouraged us … even if I had cooked a bad cake, she would say it was delicious’. Hence, the encouraging or motivating dynamic in the relationship between mother and daughter is evident in Sima’s anecdote. Even though Sima’s mother had died a few years earlier, she recalled observing her mother practising Islam. Sima discussed how she had conducted research into her religion and connected her own religious identity to her mother by stating: ‘And obviously the Islam was instilled by my mum although it was never forced on us.’ This illustrates how her mother functioned within the family as a leader. She would motivate her children to pursue excellence, but the transmission of Islam and Islamic values were transmitted to her children by example rather than by indoctrination. Sima commented on her mother’s level of English, explaining that her mother did not learn English beyond a very basic level, despite having lived much of her life in England. ‘She could barely speak English, and I don’t think she improved much over the next forty years that she was alive.’ Sima’s narrative clearly illustrates a dynamic between the first and second generations in the Bengali Muslim community: a mother who could barely speak English but whose daughter was inspired to achieve more and was able to do a PhD at a British university. Emile Durkheim and Friedrich Nietzsche have argued that religious observance has historically been stronger in periods and communities where education was limited.36On the contrary, Sima found that, as her level of education advanced, she observed her religion more strictly, which included her starting to wear a hijab. Sima responded as follows when asked whether she was transmitting her religious beliefs to her children: I do, I do, because from a very young age, I wanted everything to be natural for them. So, although prayer becomes compulsory at the age of puberty, I didn’t want to let them be free with no prayers, no religion in them and then at the age of twelve, thirteen, say to them,  All names have been changed to ensure participants’ anonymity.  For example: Emile Durkheim and Joseph Ward Swain, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Courier Corporation, 2008); Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. Untimely Meditations,” Trans. RJ Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1983). 35 36

9  The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered

209

right now you’ve got to pray five times a day. That’s a very hard thing to explain to your children: ‘Right from [this day forward] you’re going to pray.’ So, as they’ve grown up, from the age of seven I’ve introduced the prayers five times a day and God willing the first big four are now praying five times a day. And I’ve tried to make it more that we love doing it, we want to make God happy, rather than you have to do it. (Sima, forty-five years old, second generation, Newcastle)

From Sima’s account, we can see that not only has she been influenced by her mother’s practice of religion, but that she has transmitted her religious and cultural values to her children from an early age as well. However, her choice of actions on how to motivate her children demonstrate her agency in transmitting her religious beliefs and a continuity with her mother’s motivational tactics but a discontinuity with her methods for religious transmission. By instilling specifically Muslim practices, such as praying five times a day, in her children, Sima demonstrates the parental power in the children’s developing agency, subsequently influencing the construction of their own identities. From this example, we can see that the influence of Muslim women within their families is not limited to specifically women’s issues, such as veiling, but applies to general religious, family and social values as well, providing a good illustration of the generational dynamics and potential variations in this example.

3 Her Decision, Her Strategy The veil can be regarded as being representative of female Muslim identity, with some saying that it signifies a “good” Muslim woman while, for others, it has even become the most important aspect of practicing Islam for women. The concepts of modesty and, consequently, the veil, have evolved in different ways around the globe over time (Ahmed 1992, 2011; Mernissi 1987, p. 93). The concept of the veil has never been fixed; rather, it fluctuates from culture to culture and from individual to individual (Watson 1994). Such fluctuation has endured from the beginnings of Islam to the present, as the practice of veiling has spread throughout various societies in the East and West (Mernissi 1987), while its meaning can also vary according to different historical and geographical contexts (Bullock 2002). Indeed, the word “veil” itself is variously interpreted and used to refer to differing practices and forms (Mernissi 1987, p. 93). It is striking that Muslim women have been, and remain, compelled either to wear the veil or to remove it, depending on political, social, religious, or ethnic conflicts. Some argue that decision-making is an initial step towards empowerment for any marginalised group, in this case women, and may also lead to an increase in their power in other areas of life.37 Jo Rowlands argues that ‘women’s empowerment may  A. Friedman et al., “The Shift in Power with Age: Changes in Perception of the Power of Women and Men over the Life Cycle,” Psychology of women quarterly 16, no. 4 (1992); A. R. Friedman, “Rape and Domestic Violence: The Experience of Refugee Women.,” in Refugee Women and Their 37

210

H. Ashraf-Emami and L. de Rooij

be explored through personal, relational, and collective aspects’.38 The following interview illustrates how the participant explored her agency when making her decision to wear the hijab and indicates the trajectory of constructing and reconstructing identity through veiling. Sima stated that her starting point for wearing the hijab occurred while she was at university studying for a PhD. During this time, she felt it was important to wear a veil, which she articulated as follows: But throughout my life in terms of, you know when you hit just before eighteen, there was always something that I just felt it wasn’t enough and then I started thinking about covering my hair, but to be honest I didn’t do that properly until I was about twenty-nine. No, twenty-­ seven, twenty-seven, twenty-eight. And I can actually – specifically, it’s always been in my head, it’s just getting the courage to look different, for your friends to see you not with your hair out, and just vanity, all those things. But deep down I knew it was the right thing to do. And then I did make a decision in my head that, you know, if I was to marry, I do not want a man to marry me purely for the way I look or anything like that. I want him to marry me for what I am rather than [my appearance] . . . and I put the headscarf on as well because I did not want, in a later stage in my life, if I decided late, if I was about thirty-five and I put the headscarf on, I didn’t want my husband to prevent me from doing that. (Sima, forty-five years old, second generation, Newcastle)

Sima’s remarks show she chose to wear a hijab while she was single so that her future husband could not dispute her right to wear it when they first met. This demonstrates that Sima’s agency through self-actualisation was constructed deliberately and thoughtfully. She was conscious that patriarchal power might prevent her from wearing the hijab after marriage and therefore chose to empower herself through veiling before marriage. The reaction towards the vanity of not wearing a hijab is one of the many reasons that Muslims regularly give for wearing the hijab and shows Sami’s relationship with the religious tradition as one familiar with its norms and values. As Ansari puts it, ‘Islam serves as a frame of reference – a pattern of thought and communication – and gives meaning to their condition and behaviour. These Muslims may also have very diverse attitudes towards Islam and its practice. But what they do have in common is knowledge of Islam, on which they draw while engaging in a discourse so that they can communicate meaningfully and with relevance.’39 Self-esteem is central in the development of agency (as seen in ‘Chapter 4: Social Representations and the Threat to Worldview: A Socio-Psychological Perspective on Islamophobia’), and autonomy is a core component of that.40 Research participants demonstrated how they managed to negotiate their identities through their choice of wearing a veil. Consequently, making the decision to veil or unveil is one aspect of social and self-identification through which women may exercise self-­ development.41 For instance, Sima explained how she reached the decision to wear Mental Health: Shattered Societies, Shattered Lives, ed. E. Cole, O. Espin, and E. D. Rothblum (New York, NY: Harrington Park Press, 1992); N.  Kabeer, “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment,” Development and Change 30 (1999). 38  J. Rowlands, “Empowerment Examined,” Development in practice 5, no. 2 (1995): 103. 39  Ansari, The ‘Infidel’ Within: Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present. 40  P.  H. Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (London, UK - New York, NY: Routledge, 1999). 41  Ibid.

9  The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered

211

the hijab after she learned more about religious teachings and obligations. Her religious learning empowered her to make a conscious decision to wear the hijab, and this attentiveness to religious teachings was sparked by attending seminars and discussions during her late twenties while she was studying for a PhD. This awakened her awareness of her identity as a Muslim woman, and she then realised that, by not veiling, she was distancing herself from an important part of her identity. She explained how she embarked on this journey as follows: [referring to the sudden death of a relative] made me realise I’ve got to start learning about my faith. And I think it was more through friends, and then obviously you learn about your religion, you love it more and you just want to be better. For me, learning is lovely as well and, obviously, when you truly understand what your faith means and there is no other choice for me now. (Sima, forty-five years old, second generation, Newcastle)

As briefly discussed in Chap. 4, death plays a key psychological role in sparking the quest for religious knowledge. In this interview, Sima empowered herself through gaining knowledge of her religion, which was acquired through her subsequent dedication in expressing her agency. It is also necessary to recognise that agency and decision-making are interlinked.42 Thus, Sima connected her agency with the decision to observe the religious practice of veil wearing. Gender roles in Sima’s own family are in contrast with her parents as well as many traditional Bengali families. Having three sets of twins, Sima could not have pursued her profession if she had been unable to convince her husband to leave his career for childcare and housework duties. This, she mentioned, was certainly not an option for her mother. Consequently, a dynamic intergenerational identity is evident in terms of gender roles within the family. Sima used her agency to discuss their respective careers and family roles with her husband and persuaded him that it would benefit both them and their children if she pursued her career, thereby maintaining her professional life alongside her family life. She exemplifies British Muslim women utilising their authority in family decision-making to act with agency, which she might have been denied if she had been subjected to the restrictions imposed by a religious systemic patriarchy.

4 Her Choice as Resistance It is evident that Muslim identity attracts huge media attention in Britain, especially negative media interest in the veil. Muslim women, who are usually misrepresented, are perceived and depicted as being powerless victims of patriarchy or, at least, as being not positively integrated into British society (Barker et al. 2012; Bhimji 2012; Pool 2011). Muslim identity has also been a major concern for policy-makers (Runnymede Trust Report 1997) because Muslim identities were not regarded as an

 Kabeer, “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment.” 42

212

H. Ashraf-Emami and L. de Rooij

important feature in the discourses on ethnic minorities and multi-culturalism in Britain until 1990. The eruption of the Salman Rushdie affair alerted the public imagination through the widespread coverage and claims of the media, and thus began the “salient category of self-identification” (Meer et al. 2010, p. 85; Meer and Thomson 2012). Indeed, Muslim women have been responsible for some of the visibility of their identity through their clothing, when freely exercising their agency. However, somehow, it is perceived that the Hijab is not a choice but the result of patriarchal coercion, whether in domestic, professional, or cultural settings. It is thus assumed that Muslim women’s agency is devalued and undermined. Therefore, it is necessary to understand and examine how the identity of British Muslim women is constructed, unconstructed, reconstructed, and manifest in an inter-generational context in different geographical situations in everyday life. Controversial debates about the veil were initiated in October 2006 after Jack Straw, then Leader of the House of Commons, suggested that Muslim women remove their veils (niqabs) during consultations in his constituency office. Straw described the veil as “a visible statement of separation and difference”. The national press followed up the story and published it. Straw’s original statement illustrates the concept of the veil as a “contested signifier” of non-integration. This episode developed into an ongoing discourse of segregation and disempowerment, epitomised by the reported non-acquisition of English Language competencies by certain groups of immigrants (Meer et al. 2010, p. 105). Since then, veiling has become a signifier of the debate about Britain’s security and of national and cultural identity, which can be worked and reworked in different contexts (Meer et al. 2010, p. 89; Meer and Modood 2013). Thus, significant questions are raised concerning the roles of integration, recognition, respect, and equality regarding the veiling of British Muslim women. It is widely accepted that clothing in general is one of the basic ways people to identify themselves as being part of a particular social group, and also to demonstrate their position within that group (Dwyer 2008). However, it must be recognised that the veil is also multi-faceted. So, an understanding of the prevailing, current and historical, political and social contexts will facilitate understanding of the varied facets of veiling. The main points that render the veil dissimilar to other expressions of personal and social identity, and which can make the hijab a very contentious issue, are the external factors that influence and shape the behaviour of the veiled individual. For instance, a girl who is raised in a strictly traditional religious family, or even in a socio-religious context where the value of “modesty” has been prescribed both explicitly and implicitly, might possibly be pressurised to conform. Muslim women have become an allegory for Orientalism, and the clash of civilisations (Huntington 1996). The social circumstances of Muslim women vary from country to country in the West. Fortunately, unlike France, there is no legal issue regarding the wearing of the hijab, or any impending legislation to ban the burqa in Britain. Thus, Muslim women in Britain can appreciate the opportunity to practise their religious and gender identity without legal restriction, which highlights Britain’s tolerant attitude towards the veil. This is because of the ostensibly democratic values of British society, which

9  The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered

213

uphold respect for diversity and, consequently, are considerably more focused on the freedom and liberty to follow different cultures. According to the Pew Research Centre’s Global Attitude Project (2005), the percentage of Muslim women in Britain who wear headscarves in their daily lives is higher than in Germany and France. While there might be various reasons for this finding, it does seem to indicate that the level of tolerance towards other religions is greater in the UK than in those countries. Moreover, interestingly, the research reveals that support for banning headscarves is lower in Britain than in the afore-mentioned countries. Furthermore, evidence from a three-year research programme, named VEIL (Value, Equality and Differences) in Liberal Democracies, by Kiliç et al. (2008) showed that students in the UK felt a sense of freedom when making a decision about whether or not to wear a veil. It was notable that, despite the general media narrative that the veil is a patriarchy-­ enforced custom, some of the research participants wear veils despite their husbands’, fathers’ and sons’ objections to the practice. For example: I wear a hijab every day without fail, whether it is to university or to the shops, sport, whatever. It is a part of who I am, and I feel that, in a modern society, I should be able to be who I want to be and be respected. My mother doesn’t wear a hijab, and my parents say I shouldn’t wear it at times. In particular, my parents feel that it is not something a modern [meaning contemporary] British woman should wear. I remember my father saying once that it is out of date, a remnant of a different time. Sometimes, they say that, because of the Islamophobia in the UK, they are worried for my safety. (Najma, twenty-one years old, second generation, Durham)

The above quote not only reveals how some women struggle for their right to wear the veil but also how they sometimes struggle for individual autonomy in a family environment, with Najma’s parents arguing a veil should not be worn and pointing out safety concerns (not necessarily illegitimate in the Northeast England) when out wearing a hijab. In addition, it can be assumed that Muslim men in the UK are conscious of the way that society views Muslim women in a hijab. As a consequence, they may worry that society will assume that they themselves, or the community at large, are forcing their wives and daughters to wear the veil and may wish to dissociate themselves from this negative perception. It is also possible that some Muslim men have come to see the veil as anti-modern: a cultural, rather than a religious, tradition about which they may be embarrassed, much like Najma’s parents. In turn, some of the participants explored their agency through the veil, challenging and resisting patriarchal power. Not adopting the same relationship to the veil as their mothers highlights a self-emancipatory strategy, a subversion of power through gender empowerment, that was explored by several research participants. British Muslim women who adopted this strategy illustrated the importance of lived ‘authenticity’43 and highlighted their familial influences on their life history of veiling/unveiling to understand gender empowerment in this way. As such, the veil symbolises multiple qualities, such as the sharing of values and practices, gender

43

 Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment.

214

H. Ashraf-Emami and L. de Rooij

equality and freedom of choice.44 For example, in a women’s study circle, Firuzeh, a first-generation Iranian, related that: I had a dream that meant a lot to me, and I felt I should start wearing a headscarf because that is what I understand that is advised in my religion. But my husband and my sons do not like it. They are scared that something bad will happen to me when I wear the scarf, you know. Wearing a headscarf is not really easy for me. I took advice from a couple of people to see what my duty [i.e., religious duty] is now. (Firuzeh, forty-two years old, first generation, Newcastle)

The quotes above illustrate how Najma and Firuzeh use their autonomy and agency to disregard the patriarchal power in their families with regard to veiling.45 While it is not completely clear, even in this particular instance, how much the objections to the visibility of religion are actually based on fears for women’s safety or whether it could be masking other reasons for objection, it is not immediately important. When much of the media presents the veil as a symbol that all Muslim women are oppressed by patriarchal attitudes, it is evident from the above quotes that it means different things to different people, a floating signifier46 as it were. As a consequence, the quotes also symbolise the emancipatory drive by the women in question in response to their own patriarchal relationships (exhibited in their fathers’, husbands’, brothers’ and sons’ opinions) as well as the patronising media rhetoric about Muslim women’s passivity.47 In this instance, the complex motivations for agency are in conflict with the binary understanding of Muslim women’s passivity and freedom that can only be captured by veiling/ unveiling.48

 Floya Anthias, “Belongings in a Globalising and Unequal World: Rethinking Translocations,” in The Situated Politics of Belonging, ed. N. Yuval-Davis, K. Kannabiran, and U. Vieten (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), 21. 45  Hence, Firuzeh applied her autonomy to challenge the patriarchal power opposed to veiling in her family, which supported research by Islamic feminists, such as (Kabbani, 1989, p. 312), who suggested that hijabis are not under pressure from their parents or male elders to wear the hijab but, rather, they feel liberated from patriarchal pres­sure to unveil. Rather, they actually feel liberated from the unwanted sexual interest of men by devices such as the hijab. (Modood, and May, 2001 p.312). 46  Jeffrey Mehlman, “The” Floating Signifier”: From Lévi-Strauss to Lacan,” Yale French Studies (1972). 47  For comparison, see: Asal Mohamadi Johnson and Rebecca Miles, “Toward More Inclusive Public Spaces: Learning from the Everyday Experiences of Muslim Arab Women in New York City,” Environment and Planning A 46, no. 8 (2014). 48  For more, see: Sa’diyya Shaikh, “Transforming Feminisms: Islam, Women, and Gender Justice,” in Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism, ed. Omid Safi (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2003). 44

9  The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered

215

5 Solidarity and Democracy Muslim women without any visual expression of Muslimness are often no less religious than those who wear the veil, and the former frequently demonstrate their passion and knowledge of their religion in other ways.49 Homa, a 38-year-old Muslim woman with Iranian heritage, who has been married to an English man from Newcastle-upon-Tyne for fifteen years, explained that, when she married, she was not particularly strict in the observance of Islamic practices. However, this changed recently, as she became more conscious of being a Muslim. Through extensive reading and the attending of religious courses, she increased her knowledge of Islam and its practices. Homa then discussed the possibility of wearing a headscarf with her husband. She explained that her husband strongly opposed veiling by saying that this is his country, not hers, and that she would be on her own if she wore a headscarf; he even suggested that she might as well return to her homeland if she wanted to wear one. Homa decided to base her argument upon the right of freedom to practise one’s religion in a democratic society, saying, ‘So what about democracy?’ Significantly, she referred to democracy, as a basic British value, to defend her argument to wear the veil. The principle of democracy underpins much of the self-understanding of British society and its population. Homa’s belief that she had the democratic right to wear the veil emphasises her sense of belonging to Britain and its ostensibly democratic society. It seems that she feels she should be allowed to wear the veil as her democratic right as a British citizen. Yet, in dialogue with her husband, Homa has decided, for now, to wear the veil when she attends religious gatherings but not on a daily basis. This narrative illustrates how, in some cases, religious practices in relation to identity have a dialogical and structural character. This instance also illustrates gender dynamics within a relationship and the broader societal context. It brings forth themes of power, gender equality, and integration, highlighting the complexities of navigating identity and expression within diverse sociocultural landscapes. Hence, multiple identity was evident in some first-generation Iranians through inter-linking secular and religious practices. In this case, it also implied reconstruction of a sense of belonging and identity and illustrated that some firstgeneration participants intermingle social equality values with their religious values. The veil appears to signify multiple attachments and belongings, such as sharing values and practices.50 Some of the research participants explored both their individual agency and their relationship to others (possibly in solidarity) when making their decision to wear the veil. Unlike Homa, Jasmin, a 36-year-old nurse from Newcastle, had a different relationship to others that motivated her choice to wear a hijab:  C.  Dwyer, “Veiled Meanings: British Muslim Women and the Negotiation of Differences,” Gender, Place and Culture 6, no. 1 (1999); Dwyer, “Contradictions of Community: Questions of Identity for Young British Muslim Women.” 50  Anthias, “Belongings in a Globalising and Unequal World: Rethinking Translocations,” 21. 49

216

H. Ashraf-Emami and L. de Rooij I wear the hijab in solidarity with my Muslim sisters back in the Middle East. They don’t really have an option to take off the hijab like I do. If they do, then they will be disrespected, threatened with rape and assault, if they are allowed out at all. I am fortunately removed from all of that, but I want to show solidarity and support to those women who fight for the autonomy of women in places they don’t really have it. It makes me proud to be called a Muslim feminist in that sense and I don’t see it as a contradiction in terms. (Jasmin, thirty-­ six years old, third generation, Newcastle)

In the two examples mentioned above, both women highlighted the relational aspect of their decision to wear a hijab, with one choosing (not) to do so in discussion with her husband, and the other in order to stand with her fellow Muslim women. What these examples show is that, while the hijab is often worn because of certain religious values, those religious values are part of a religious social reality that can be as influential or important for motivating certain practices.51

6 Achievement and Self-Realisation In some Muslim contexts, the hijab provides access to public spaces that a non-­ hijabi woman would not be able to access, and the vice versa could be true in contemporary Britain.52 Therefore, the self-emancipatory strategies and gender empowerment through the decision-making by women should be viewed in that context. While some daughters acted opposite to their mothers in deciding to veil/ non-veil out of a desire for autonomy and freedom, some of the maternal participants saw the hijab as a symbol of empowerment while simultaneously signifying an inner spiritual quality.53 It is reasonable to assume that British Muslim women construct and reconstruct their identities through veiling/unveiling, which is formed and influenced by the political, religious and cultural identities created by their ‘past and present experiences’.54 Hence, self-consciousness and Muslim consciousness have also been heightened by some of the socio-political factors in the UK. Education was regarded as a significant part of Muslim women’s culture. It seems that education is deeply and widely ‘culturally embedded’ in Muslim families, also gaining knowledge is considered obligatorily for both gender. Research participants often mentioned a phrase from the Prophet Mohammad (Peace be upon him),which advises to ‘Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave.’ This phrase was often referred to by Iranian women in the form of the poem ‘Shahnameh’ by the

 Durkheim and Swain, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.  Shaikh, “Transforming Feminisms: Islam, Women, and Gender Justice.”; John Richard Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 53  Sara Ashencaen Crabtree and Fatima Husain, “Within, Without: Dialogical Perspectives on Feminism and Islam,” Religion & Gender 2, no. 1 (2012). 54  P. Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack (London, UK: Hutchinson, 1987). 51 52

9  The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered

217

Persian poet Firdowsi (d. ca. 1020).55 As one of the research participants (Faezeh, 26 years old) pointed out, the Qur’an seems to promote gender equality in the pursuit of knowledge: ‘our religion, over fourteen hundred years ago, advised seeking knowledge for both women and men, not only for men, you know’. However, not with standing this cultural emphasis on education, a disjuncture exists among firstgeneration Muslim women who immigrated to the UK decades ago, as they may not uniformly exhibit elevated educational attainment. This stands in stark contrast to contemporary first-generation Muslim women arriving in the UK, who frequently possess advanced professional degrees. Faezeh’s quote shows that many Muslim women refer to the Qur’an, which makes no distinction between the sexes regarding the importance of knowledge and education, and regard that religious belief as instrumental in the construction of their identity. As their opportunities for education, both formal and informal, increase, this concept of gender equality in education, even in a religious context, empowers women to use their agency for interpreting their religion and practices.56 In this regard, education became a form of social capital.57 A consequence is that, as Muslims arrived in the UK at different stages, with many of them belonging to different ethnicities than South Asian, some already had professional qualifications upon arrival. For instance, a considerable proportion of first-generation Muslim women originating from Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, who have immigrated within the past two decades, exhibit high levels of qualification and possess significant cultural capital upon arrival. Consequently, their enhanced access to advanced educational opportunities and the labour market is a direct outcome of heightened professionalization. This, in turn, manifests in a heightened propensity to actively contribute and share cultural experiences with the broader British society. We posit that such engagement facilitates substantive integration through educational and occupational avenues. It is this approach to education that is most evident in the role of mothers and daughters in their approach to education. While mothers who were less educated wished for their daughters to aspire to more and be educated, as Sima experienced in her relationship with her mother, it were the more educated mothers (holders of social capital) who encouraged their daughters to carve out their own paths. Thus, a transition took place from motivation for achievement to motivation for self-­ realisation. In the hijab/non-hijab discussion, it was evident that those daughters who met family resistance were those with an emphasis on female achievement

 Chenin goft peyghambar rastgoy za gahvareh ta goor danesh bejoy.  B.  Subedi, ed. Critical Global Perspectives: Rethinking Knowledge About Global Societies (IAP, 2010). 57  James S Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American journal of sociology 94 (1988); “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” Networks in the knowledge economy (2003); Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital.(1986),” Cultural theory: An anthology 1 (2011); Sandra L Dika and Kusum Singh, “Applications of Social Capital in Educational Literature: A Critical Synthesis,” Review of educational research 72, no. 1 (2002). 55 56

218

H. Ashraf-Emami and L. de Rooij

rather than self-realisation. As Nadia, a former student of Newcastle University from South Africa, put it: My mother always encouraged me to be myself. I find myself wearing my hijab on and off, depending on my mood or my fashion feeling for the day. It was more the fact that I was accepted as a person becoming myself, especially when I was young, that gave me the courage to explore my identity and decide who I was. I guess that is why I don’t really look like most Muslims, with tattoos and piercings and such, but my parents have now come to terms with that and are supportive. (Nadia, twenty-eight years old, first generation, Newcastle)

Thus, the parental practices Sima discussed, while different from her mother’s, were still driven by an achievement mentality. Similarly, Najma’s resistance to her parents’ comments was also situated along the lines of motivation for achievement. However, when Nadia moved to Newcastle to be a student, it was her parents’ wish that she not only achieved by completing her degree (which resulted in her staying for a subsequent job opportunity) but that she also realised her potential outside of the classroom and became all that she could be. Sadia said the same about her wishes for her young daughter: I want her to grow up and be a conscious Muslim. If that means she doesn’t wear a hijab, then that doesn’t matter. What is important is what is in your heart. Allah always knows what is inside you, so the outer appearance doesn’t matter. (Sadia, thirty years old, second generation, Newcastle)

Here, it is not as much an authoritarian parent–child relationship, whereby the parents are expected to know better, but a more horizontal relationship with complementary roles for parents and children. As such, the practice of wearing a hijab becomes more negotiable by the individual making the choice. Thus, unlike previous respondents, it is not part of resistant ideology but rather a more positive form of agency borne out of what McNay58 calls advocacy leadership and agency.

7 Conclusion In the examples discussed, the floating signifier that the hijab has become brought up a variety of issues, such as authenticity and agency, female solidarity, democratic and civil engagement and examples of womanhood and motherhood. It was argued at the beginning of this chapter that the dynamics of Muslim women’s agency is affected by intergenerational relationships. The findings presented suggest that mothers in Muslim families play significant roles as motivators and exemplars rather than merely ‘transmitting mechanisms’ when passing cultural and religious values on to their children. Thus, Muslim women’s agency has a dynamic relationship with the understanding of their intergenerational identity as British Muslim women.

58

 McNay, Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory.

9  The Agency of Muslim Women as Mothers and Mothered

219

The interview with Sima also shows that, in developing her identity and her longing for a sense of belonging, she tapped into the Muslim collective memory.59 What is interesting is that it differs significantly from her mother’s journey but resulted from being in a social state of flux, partly to do with the questioning nature of doing PhD research and a desire for religious knowledge, and partly with the death of a relative. As the interview progressed, Sima revealed how her identity had changed over time, and that the memories of her life before wearing the hijab actively influenced how she thought about life after deciding to wear the hijab. This shows how she used her own memories as resources to constitute her understanding of Islam and her future interactions. When Najma defied her family members to wear a hijab, it was because she had access to a different collective memory than her parents. To her, the hijab was not a symbol of oppression or anti-modernism but rather a symbol of liberation. It was the collective memory of solidarity that evoked such a strong response in Jasmin when she was asked about her hijab. Islam acts as a collective memory for the research participants, whereby the tradition becomes a repository of symbols and practices that they, in turn, actualise in the practice of their faith. Islam serves as a lens through which to view the world and gives meaning to their lived experiences. These Muslims may have very diverse attitudes towards Islam, mothering and society. What they share, however, is that they draw on the same tradition to communicate meaning to themselves and those around them.

59

 Ricoeur, La Lectura Del Tiempo Pasado: Memoria Y Olvido.

Chapter 10

Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities Laurens de Rooij

In Europe and the US, young Muslims are using online matchmaking in growing numbers. Online dating has increasingly become a mainstream activity, in Europe and North America at least. Western Muslims have adapted the idea to suit their needs. For many, online dating offers a low-stress solution to the daunting challenge of finding a partner for marriage in countries where few share their faith, and in communities where matchmaking is considered a family affair. This chapter will discuss the relationship between Muslim online matchmaking for British Muslims and their Islamic identities with regards to marriage and romantic relationships. Kecia Ali points out that within the Islamic tradition, Marriage was necessarily consensual. It required an agreement, expressed in terms of offer and acceptance, by the two contracting parties. But these were not necessarily the bride and groom. Guardians and proxies abound in the legal sources, especially for brides. As with the case of Musayyab and his new-born daughter, the agreement of the spouses was not always required. Marriage was very much a family matter, and involvement of kin in arranging and concluding women’s and girls’ marriages was assumed. But parental—usually paternal— involvement was not limited to the marriage of daughters.1

This chapter highlights the way modern technology interacts with traditional cultural values and shifts the authoritative matchmaking role from an offline actor to an online platform. This provides new insights into how in particular conservative and progressive Muslims use digital technology in order to maintain those identities. Following a large increase in internet usage, online dating is used for seeking romantic and sexual partners. Using a qualitative approach, 11 people who actively use online dating apps took part in in-depth, online chat interviews. The findings suggest that most of the participants had used multiple dating sites concurrently or  Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam (Harvard University Press, 2010), 31.

1

L. de Rooij (*) Université Toulouse 1, Capitole, Toulouse, France © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6_10

221

222

L. de Rooij

at some point in their quest for a partner and used a variety of strategies and mechanisms to engage with their potential romantic interests. In turn, the users employed various standard filter options, as well as some self-selected filters in order to navigate and select potential suitors. Users completed several steps that lead-up to potentially meeting their potential partner in person. The first public meeting was always in a public place, and for some women, it was seen as important that she was accompanied by another person (often a family member, but not necessarily a male). This is one of many examples where the modern meets the traditional. As a consequence, this suggests that the traditional-modern or conservative–progressive binaries are complicated and intersected through the affordances of modern technology. For this study of British Muslims, the categories of analysis,2 are fluid, meaning not everyone is conservative in every aspect or progressive in every aspect as this chapter will show. For many devout or conservative Muslims marriage is often deemed the cornerstone of not only a person’s life but also society as a whole. A variety of web-based services play to this and allow members to search for partners not only by sect, but also by the particular doctrine of Islam that they follow and the languages they speak. Others market themselves as a place to find a partner with whom they can “connect” but also of whom their parents approve. In this context, the internet makes meeting easier, culturally, as this group of Muslims would not seek out romantic partners in pubs and clubs. As a consequence, there are very few avenues, apart from family contact, for matchmaking to occur. In addition, using a dating site or phone app, makes it easier as the user knows the other users are looking for something similar. As one participant put it: It’s hard to meet someone you don’t know in a school or work setting, because you don’t know them and you don’t know if they are interested in you romantically. At least if you meet someone on a dating website you know they are looking for a relationship as well. This doesn’t guarantee you will find what you are looking for or that you are what they are looking for, but it increases your chances of success. (Rashid, 32)

As global Islam encompasses a variety of ethnic and geographic boundaries, the apps facilitate the making of connections more along ideological lines, rather than ethno-cultural ones, maybe, as a consequence it opens up and democratizes the process of meeting potential partners. It offers an avenue of agency to those seeking a partner by narrowing the search to potential partners based on self-selected parameters. This is of increasing interest as in most cases, conservative Islam is not considered empowering, especially for women. But as this chapter will show, the apps allow for young people in potentially conservative environments to choose potential matches with greater freedom, finding someone that satisfies all their potential wants and needs. As argue, “the consequences of this type of filtering, enabled by the search functionality of the website, included the tendency to shop for people

 Rogers Brubaker, “Categories of Analysis and Categories of Practice: A Note on the Study of Muslims in European Countries of Immigration,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 1 (2013). 2

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 223

with the perfect qualifications”,3 as a consequence it becomes a clinical exercise and removes a lot of the emotional content. However, others felt this was mitigated by the fact that they were seeking for potential love interests to meet in offline settings, rather than have a purely digital based relationship. For example: I want to pick someone who has similar values and outlook on life, because that is important for the future. But it can all change when we meet in person. I am looking for someone to hopefully spend the rest of my life with, but if they have a weird vibe or if you don’t like how he interacts with others then it won’t work you know. But you can never tell that just from chatting. But it’s important to feel things when you are together, and that makes a big difference between just chatting and actually spending time together. (Aisha, 25)

This research will examine how British Muslims use Muslim smartphone dating apps, and how this relates to their ideas about the nature of marriage, romantic relationships, and Islam. This project addresses the research question: To what extent does the use of Muslim smartphone dating apps by British Muslims reflect their opinion on matters of marriage and relationships, and its relationship to their religious beliefs? In order to answer this question, participants were sought out, and their personal narratives on how they use the apps were collected. This allows for the analysis of the construction of meaning (s) and understanding (s) for the consumer using participant responses. In turn, this will enable me to demonstrate the relationship between Islam and participants views of marriage and relationships through the lenses of how people choose to engage with Muslim dating apps. The apps are a method for managing and producing the image of the participants and their ideas about Islam and being Muslim (s). Whilst in a European context, Muslim is by no means a self-evident category,4 this category is used to identify oneself and to identify others,5 simultaneously implemented by both Muslims and non-Muslims as a category of inclusion and exclusion. This project advances beyond studies of the media and ethnicity6 because Muslims are a category based on ethnic, social, political, and religious characteristics, depending on what characteristics are highlighted by the person in question. One sees this shift in fields such as: politics, media, and everyday interaction.7 This project furthers that understanding  Rebecca D Heino, Nicole B Ellison, and Jennifer L Gibbs, “Relationshopping: Investigating the Market Metaphor in Online Dating,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 27, no. 4 (2010): 437. 4  Ralph Grillo, “Islam and Transnationalism,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, no. 5 (2004). 5  Richard Jenkins, Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations (Sage, 1997), 52–73. 6  Lisa Duke, “Black in a Blonde World: Race and Girls’ Interpretations of the Feminine Ideal in Teen Magazines,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 77, no. 2 (2000); Justin Lewis, Sut Jhally, and Michael Morgan, The Gulf War: A Study of the Media, Public Opinion and Public Knowledge (Center for the Study of Communication Research Archives, Department of Communication, University of Massachusetts, 1991); Radhika Parameswaran, “Western Romance Fiction as English-Language Media in Postcolonial India,” Journal of Communication 49, no. 3 (1999). 7  Brubaker, “Categories of Analysis and Categories of Practice: A Note on the Study of Muslims in European Countries of Immigration.”; Said, Orientalism, 3. 3

224

L. de Rooij

by showing how users highlight these characteristics in their presentation of themselves to potential matches, and how those categories shift through the actions users undertake. This chapter will show that Islamic categories that are used to define Muslims are present in the self-reflected presentations of online profiles, but that in producing those profiles Muslims are actually blurring the boundaries between those categories of analysis. For example, by using an increasingly mainstream method of romantic engagement, users contrast starkly with a desire to remain distinct and separate from the mainstream; and yet to find a partner with similar, potentially conservative, views this is one avenue for doing so. However, there are reservations and potential pitfalls with online dating. The virtual world is potentially a world removed from reality, full of lies and deception, as you just don’t know who you are talking to.8 Simultaneously, where Muslim online matchmaking is made to appeal to (young) people with a strong religious identity, traditional or conservative family environments could mean that those seeking partners face stigmatization and ridicule whilst looking to meet future partners online rather than in the traditional ways. For example, by having a family introduction, and consequently meeting a partner online is not deemed natural and therefore families can be suspicious and wary of matches made this way.

1 Theoretical Framework and Research Question Compared to the majority, European Muslims are relatively religious in both institutional affiliation and practice.9 Public discussions on Muslims often assert the notion that Muslims need to develop ‘a greater acceptance of the principal national institutions’ and assimilate.10 Perceived differences in attitudes and values between Muslim minorities and the British majority are regularly played out in politics and the media, who increasingly frame Islam as a threat.11 In the European context, a

 Catalina L Toma, Jeffrey T Hancock, and Nicole B Ellison, “Separating Fact from Fiction: An Examination of Deceptive Self-Presentation in Online Dating Profiles,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34, no. 8 (2008). 9  Hans Schmeets and Saskia te Riele, “Declining Social Cohesion in the Netherlands?,” Social Indicators Research 115, no. 2 (2014). 10  Wasif A Shadid, “Public Debates over Islam and the Awareness of Muslim Identity in the Netherlands,” European Education 38, no. 2 (2006); Thijl Sunier, “Interests, Identities, and the Public Sphere: Representing Islam in the Netherlands since the 1980s,” in European Muslims and the Secular State, ed. J. Cesari and S. McLoughlin (Ashgate, 2005); Marieke Van Herten, “Het Aantal Islamieten in Nederland,” in Religie Aan Het Begin Van De 21ste Eeuw (The Hague: Heerlem/Statistics Netherlands, 2009). 11  Conny Roggeband and Rens Vliegenthart, “Divergent Framing: The Public Debate on Migration in the Dutch Parliament and Media, 1995–2004,” West European Politics 30, no. 3 (2007); Rens Vliegenthart and Conny Roggeband, “Framing Immigration and Integration Relationships between Press and Parliament in the Netherlands,” International Communication Gazette 69, no. 3 (2007); W. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, “The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in the West: 8

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 225

perceived hostility is seemingly exemplified by media discourse.12 There is evidence to suggest that Islam-based identities are strengthened if one perceives the local environment as hostile. This would be reflected in user responses, in their desire for a Muslim partner, and in the type of partner desired. However, British Muslims are incredibly diverse, representing many different countries and all major branches of Islam; they are, in fact, not so much of a community as ‘joined-by-a-­ noun’ bedfellows.13 Kim and McKay-Semmler suggest that non-natives’ direct social engagement with members of the host society encourages the cross-cultural adaptation process.14 This would suggest that as dating apps have become more mainstream and used by an increasing number of non-Muslims, they, in turn, will be used increasingly by Muslims as a consequence of the cross-cultural adaptation process. However, in previous studies, it remains unclear whether Muslim users have specific motivations that can be identified, yet if Islamic identities are strengthened, then this should be the case. This study builds on the study by Lo and Aziz that found that “American Muslims are increasing their use of the Internet to overcome existing spatial and cultural barriers”,15 in that it looks at a UK context rather than US context, and that it explores the use of smartphone apps rather than websites, mailing lists, and forums. The main aim of the study is to explore whether there are specific religious motivations to use a dating app by Muslims living in the UK. Reflecting on what the primary motivations are to use a Muslim dating app, and if these motivations reflect other motivations and differences found in other studies, or if there is a specifically religious component that affects this process. This research question is related to whether Muslims are motivated by communication mechanisms that can allow them to develop relationships beyond spatial and social constraints. This would be in Causes and Solutions,” in Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union., ed. W.  Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2002); Peter Mandaville, “Reimagining Islam in Diaspora: The Politics of Mediated Community,” International Communication Gazette 63, no. 2–3 (2001); Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims; Abbas, “Media Capital and the Representation of South Asian Muslims in the British Press: An Ideological Analysis.”; Leen d’Haenens and Susan Bink, “Islam in De Nederlandse Media: Focus Op Het Algemeen Dagblad,” Tijdschrift voor Communicatiewetenschap 34, no. 4 (2006); “Islam in the Dutch Press: With Special Attention to the Algemeen Dagblad,” Media, Culture & Society 29, no. 1 (2007). 12  Fenella Fleischmann, Karen Phalet, and Olivier Klein, “Religious Identification and Politicization in the Face of Discrimination: Support for Political Islam and Political Action among the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Europe,” British Journal of Social Psychology 50, no. 4 (2011); F.  J. Buijs, F.  Demant, and A.  Hamdy, “Strijders Van Eigen Bodem. Radicale En Democratische Moslims in Nederland,” (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 13  P.  Dunleavy et  al., Developments in British Politics, vol. 8 (London, UK  – New  York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 197. 14  “Social Engagement and Cross-Cultural Adaptation: An Examination of Direct-and Mediated Interpersonal Communication Activities of Educated Non-Natives in the United States,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37, no. 1 (2013). 15  Mbaye Lo and Taimoor Aziz, “Muslim Marriage Goes Online: The Use of Internet Matchmaking by American Muslims,” Journal of Religion and Popular Culture 21, no. 3 (2009).

226

L. de Rooij

keeping with other research computer-mediated-communication,16 or rather if there is evidence to suggest that Islam-based identities are strengthened in the local environment, and therefore reflected in users choosing partners that reflect those same Islam-based identities. Dating apps are used most frequently by 25-to-34-year-olds.17 Katz suggests that individuals use certain types of mass media to fulfil specific needs and desires.18 The dating apps: muzmatch, Ummah Dating, and Single Muslims, will be explored here and satisfy certain specific needs and desires for its users. This is comparable to other research done as to why people use social media.19 The satisfaction sought from these apps relates to needs, such as establishing new friendships and finding a romantic partner.20 It has been suggested that online media are an aid to fulfil the need for a specific romantic partner.21 Although social media platforms may also validate one’s own appearance, sex appeal, and lead to an increase of self-worth. Lack of success in the online dating environment may of course also lead to it having the opposite effect, and with an environment that is still stigmatised as a place of those who cannot meet anyone in a ‘normal’ environment, the psychological effects should not be overlooked, even if they are beyond the scope of this chapter.22 Studies have found that gender and age affects users’ physical, social and psycho-­ social motivations to use online tools.23 Gender socialization literature has

 Danielle Couch and Pranee Liamputtong, “Online Dating and Mating: The Use of the Internet to Meet Sexual Partners,” Qualitative Health Research 18, no. 2 (2008); Patti M Valkenburg and Jochen Peter, “Who Visits Online Dating Sites? Exploring Some Characteristics of Online Daters,” CyberPsychology & Behavior 10, no. 6 (2007). 17  Sindy R Sumter, Laura Vandenbosch, and Loes Ligtenberg, “Love Me Tinder: Untangling Emerging Adults’ Motivations for Using the Dating Application Tinder,” Telematics and Informatics 34, no. 1 (2017). 18  Elihu Katz, Jay G Blumler, and Michael Gurevitch, “Uses and Gratifications Research,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1973). 19  Tracii Ryan et  al., “The Uses and Abuses of Facebook: A Review of Facebook Addiction,” Journal of behavioral addictions 3, no. 3 (2014); Guosong Shao, “Understanding the Appeal of User-Generated Media: A Uses and Gratification Perspective,” Internet Research 19, no. 1 (2009); Mark A Urista, Qingwen Dong, and Kenneth Day Day, “Explaining Why Young Adults Use Myspace and Facebook through Uses and Gratifications Theory,” Human Communication 12, no. 2 (2009). 20  Matt Hart, “Youth Intimacy on Tumblr a Pilot Study,” Young 23, no. 3 (2015). 21  David Gudelunas, “There’s an App for That: The Uses and Gratifications of Online Social Networks for Gay Men,” Sexuality & Culture 16, no. 4 (2012). 22  Jacqueline Nesi and Mitchell J Prinstein, “Using Social Media for Social Comparison and Feedback-Seeking: Gender and Popularity Moderate Associations with Depressive Symptoms,” Journal of abnormal child psychology 43, no. 8 (2015); Jennifer Yurchisin, Kittichai Watchravesringkan, and Deborah Brown McCabe, “An Exploration of Identity Re-Creation in the Context of Internet Dating,” Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 33, no. 8 (2005). 23  Valerie Barker, “Older Adolescents’ Motivations for Social Network Site Use: The Influence of Gender, Group Identity, and Collective Self-Esteem,” CyberPsychology & Behavior 12, no. 2 (2009). 16

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 227

emphasized that men and women are socialized toward different physical, social, and psycho-social needs.24 The developmental literature argues that physical, social, and psychosocial needs change as people grow older.25 Thus, a user’s needs may change when they grow older, and their motivations for using the application may also change. Research supports this reasoning as an influence of age on motivations to use online media has been found.26 Differences exist in relationships between different motivations to use online media and offline outcomes, such as arranging offline meetings with an online partner or engaging in casual sex adventures with online partners.27 Therefore, the body of research suggests that the motivations for using the application will result in different gratifications and may result in different offline outcomes.

2 Methodology The research presented here involved online ethnographic observation and in-depth interviews and follows other studies of religious practice.28 The members studied are mostly second or third generation economic migrants that spoke English and had little to no experience of living in their country of heritage. I sought out members who were willing to discuss their religious values as well as their views on marriage. An important factor to consider was the effect of extra-familial culture, as well as parents,29 because if the larger social structure strongly influences them this would be borne out in their religious values and the type of partner they desire, but  Nina Haferkamp et  al., “Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus? Examining Gender Differences in Self-Presentation on Social Networking Sites,” Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 15, no. 2 (2012). 25  Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, “Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens through the Twenties,” American psychologist 55, no. 5 (2000); Dan P McAdams and Bradley D Olson, “Personality Development: Continuity and Change over the Life Course,” Annual review of psychology 61 (2010). 26  Robert J Stephure et  al., “Internet Initiated Relationships: Associations between Age and Involvement in Online Dating,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 14, no. 3 (2009). 27  Gudelunas, “There’s an App for That: The Uses and Gratifications of Online Social Networks for Gay Men.” 28  Tarlo, Visibly Muslim: Fashion, Politics, Faith; S. Bectovic, “Studying Muslims and Constructing Islamic Identity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34, no. 7 (2011); M. Bolognani, “Islam, Ethnography and Politics: Methodological Issues in Researching Amongst West Yorkshire Pakistanis in 2005,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 10, no. 4 (2007); V. Kahani-Hopkins and N. Hopkins, “‘Representing’ British Muslims: The Strategic Dimension to Identity Construction,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 3 (2002); S.  McLoughlin, “Researching Muslim Minorities. Some Reflections on Fieldwork in Britain,” Journal of Semitic studies Supplement 12 (2000); Daniel Winchester, “Embodying the Faith: Religious Practice and the Making of a Muslim Moral Habitus,” Social Forces 86, no. 4 (2008). 29  Dean R Hoge, Gregory H Petrillo, and Ella I Smith, “Transmission of Religious and Social Values from Parents to Teenage Children,” Journal of Marriage and the Family (1982). 24

228

L. de Rooij

it might be hard to detect on understandings of marriage alone. In addition, Nelson et al., found that understandings of morality contribute to the sense of wellbeing and success in a marriage.30 Even expressing marital commitment for religious couples, is understood in moral terms. This builds on what Johnson et  al., defined as the sense that one is morally obligated to behave in a certain way when in a relationship.31 In such instances, the matching up of religious values is important for participants as it places the same moral implications on similar acts, as well as providing for compatibility in life outlook. For example, the importance of commitment is not understood by participants as commitment to one another and therefore if one breaks that commitment by having an affair, it not seen as solely an interpersonal problem, but rather due to understanding marriage in religious terms it is a commitment to Allah that would also be broken by having an affair and would have moral implications. The sample was recruited through asking for volunteers from users using the applications. A total of 11 adults, aged 18–30 years, took part in the study. Of the 11 people, 6 had used Ummah Dating at least once, and 2 had used Single Muslim at least once. Four were current users Ummah Dating users and seven were current Muzmatch Dating users. The gender distribution was six male users and five female users. On average, users were 25 years old, and most were students. The data was part of a larger study looking at Muslim media use in the UK, and its relationship with identity formation practices. The project received approval from the University of Durham Ethics Committee, in 2013. All participants are practising Muslims of varying ethnicities. Four participants were of Indian heritage, one Palestinian, five Pakistani, and one Iraqi. This chapter will describe specific data gathered during the winter of 2014 through the spring of 2015. The method further limits the scope of the study, to people who (1) consider themselves Muslim; (2) consider their religiosity as an important factor in their search for a partner; and (3) desire to find a partner using digital mechanisms. Therefore, the research focus is on a certain segment among young Muslims. This selection of Muslims cannot be easily identified as “devoted”, “traditional”, “conservative” or similar, because whilst they may hold values similar to others in these categories, they choose a mechanism for finding a partner that is not traditional, but modern, and potentially taboo. This suggests these individuals are challenging certain cultural norms and boundaries, despite desiring partners that may hold similar potentially conservative views on life. Thereby adding empirical data to what Kalliny and Hausman consider theoretically might be the case.32

 Judith A Nelson et  al., “Religious and Spiritual Values and Moral Commitment in Marriage: Untapped Resources in Couples Counseling?,” Counseling and Values 55, no. 2 (2011). 31  Michael P Johnson, John P Caughlin, and Ted L Huston, “The Tripartite Nature of Marital Commitment: Personal, Moral, and Structural Reasons to Stay Married,” Journal of Marriage and the Family (1999). 32  Morris Kalliny and Angela Hausman, “The Impact of Cultural and Religious Values on Consumer’s Adoption of Innovation,” Academy of Marketing Studies Journal 11, no. 1 (2007). 30

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 229

The participant responses are evaluated precisely in terms of their capacity to answer the main question, were participants using the apps to transcend spatial, religious, and social constraints, or to find a partner with similar attitudes in a social environment deemed not Islamic enough. As a consequence, profiles that expressed such sentiments were contacted, as well as an equal number of profiles who did not, so as to see whether people who don’t express these perspectives on their profile still share these sentiments. In total 47 users were contacted, and I engaged with people through the applications whereby the volunteers were selected based on their willingness to participate. This engagement was based on a series of semi-­structured interviews, whereby I had some set questions on the nature of relationships and their understanding of marriage, but also followed up on user responses and their narratives. The research looks at the links between different religious values and understandings of marriage in participants and use of mobile dating apps to satisfy their need for a partner. Their religious practices are understood to be ritualistic acts that are self-identified and described by the participants. In understanding what these practices are we can follow Rappaport’s highly condensed definition of ritual, namely “the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers”.33 Using this understanding of religious ritual, we can see later how the dating apps function as a mediator between the subjective, personal, and challenging of social constraints, as well as the enabling of certain (formal) acts and utterances to be conducted that are not entirely encoded by the users. In this particular case, the successful participation in the Islamic ritual of marriage that is largely encoded in religious terms. The research focus is therefore on how these acts that are committed by the participants that in their own lives (public or private) signify, symbolize and make present their faith in Islam with regards to marriage and finding a partner.34 This is important as it will represent an organic understanding of what religion is to the participants and how it is practised within their personal context. This is especially important as the analysis of religion through mosque attendance, or predetermined rituals, as relevant indicators of religious practice, are increasingly questioned.

3 Marriage in the Islamic Tradition For many Muslims marriage is an important milestone. Among the more traditional it is seen as a religious duty for Muslims to get married. The family is the cornerstone of relationships, and marriage is seen as the basis from which Muslim people, communities, and society engages with one another. The Qur’an reads:  R.A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 24. 34  Webb Keane, “The Evidence of the Senses and the Materiality of Religion,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 14 (2008): 120. 33

230

L. de Rooij

And marry those among you who are single . . . If they are needy, God will make them free from want out of His grace. (Qur’an 24:32) And He it is Who has created man from water; then He has made for him blood-relationship and marriage-relationship. And thy Lord is ever Powerful. (Qur’an 25:54)

As a result, some have described marriage “half the faith,” and even recommended it for those who cannot afford it. In such cases, marriage, for those who are financially or socially disadvantaged, is an Islamic ritual that can benefit all those who get married regardless of stature, but is extra important for those who might not be able to afford other ritual practices.35 The Qur’an provides the basis for Islamic law on marriage, and it is complemented by provisions in Sharia. Sharia provisions vary by region, legal school, or division of Islam, but fundamentally, marriage is a contract between a man and a woman over the age of consent (potentially with the consent of her wali, or guardian). Polygamy is permitted by the Qur’an, but restricted by rules of fairness and equality; this position has been incorporated into state law by some countries such as Tunisia.36 Some scholars argue for women to increase in status, political freedom, and autonomy and demand a reforming of the traditional Islamic marriage laws. Yet in dating apps these calls for progressive social needs/values can be met, but the conservative theology can remain intact, as will be shown later. Historical practices were sometimes incorporated into Sharıa during the history of Islam, contemporary developments are affecting marriage practices by Muslims as Muslims have incorporated both regional customs and Western practices. Shıa Islam has a temporary marriage called mut’ah, which is legally acceptable, and the marriage ends at a pre-set time according to the terms set at the start of the marriage, rather than by divorce. Aside from its social and religious benefits, the institution of marriage is also recognized for its personal and physical benefits of providing an outlet for sexual drive. This is of importance within the framework of this chapter because sexual satisfaction is seen as particularly important to men.37 And “men more often attach importance to the physical need of sexual gratification as an explanation for their social media use”.38 The Islamic tradition considers it permissible for a Muslim male to marry a female of any religious tradition, while for a Muslim female, it is only permissible to marry a Muslim male.39 Thus these apps potentially allow for women to operate with a greater sense of agency and with more potential matches available to them. Despite this difference, both Muslim males and females are encouraged to base  Muhammad Ibn Ali Ash-shawkani, Nail Al-Awtaar (Lahore, Pakistan (1967)), 24–32.  Jamal Badawi, Gender Equity in Islam (World Assembly of Muslim Youth, 1995). 37  Deborah L Tolman, Meg I Striepe, and Tricia Harmon, “Gender Matters: Constructing a Model of Adolescent Sexual Health,” Journal of sex research 40, no. 1 (2003). 38  Sumter, Vandenbosch, and Ligtenberg, “Love Me Tinder: Untangling Emerging Adults’ Motivations for Using the Dating Application Tinder.” 39  Alex B Leeman, “Interfaith Marriage in Islam: An Examination of the Legal Theory Behind the Traditional and Reformist Positions,” Ind. LJ 84 (2009). 35 36

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 231

their choice of partner on matching ideology (most important being piety). “Muzmatch is the app for anyone seeking a halal Muslim marriage.” The headline to the welcoming page containing a link to the app’s Terms and Conditions. Although the prophet is said to have said that partner selection is based on four qualities, beauty, noble lineage, wealth, and piety, it is piety that is the best quality upon which to base that decision.40

4 Marriage Within the British Muslim Community To speak of a British Muslim community is somewhat of a misnomer as Muslims in Britain are not monolithic in their sectarian or ethnic identities. The British Muslim community defies heterogeneity and transcends it whilst still claiming a core of individuals who confess to a single faith, but stem from a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Their diversity is borne out in their outlook, values, and attitudes, and further reflected in income and education levels. This diversity in backgrounds and economic status has challenged the unity within the community, and some find the challenges of reconciling their cultural heritage with their adopted land a problematic experience. Nyang has pointed out how Muslim immigrants’ self-identification and self-differentiation contribute significantly to shaping ethnic identities within the Muslim community.41 Because of this diversity, there is no universal mechanism for marital dating used by Muslims, either in Britain or elsewhere. Marriage as a social institution is constrained by the practices and customs that regulate it. Those regulations (whether religious or legal codes) affect how members react toward the available pool of potential spouses. An official registration gives tax benefits as well as the right to perform recognized marriage ceremonies. Up until 30 June 2012 there were 973 certified Muslim places of worship in England and Wales, and that up until the same date 213 of these premises were registered for the solemnization of marriages.42 It is estimated that at least those numbers of unregistered mosques exist as well. It is not possible to determine how many marriages took place at the 213 Muslim places of worship in England and Wales prior to 2011, as the data does not include a venue code. However, it is possible determine the number of marriages solemnized in England and Wales in 2015 (most recent data release) is 301.43 Marriage statistics by  Sahih Bukhari, vol. 7 (Cairo, Egypt: Dar Al-Fikr, 1966), 3.  Sulayman Nyang, “Convergence and Divergence in an Emergent Community: A Study of Challenges Facing U.S. Muslims,” in The Muslims of America, ed. Yvonne Z. Haddad (New York Oxford University Press, 1991), 238. 42  Office for National Statistics, “Number of Muslim Weddings,” http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/ about-ons/business-transparency/freedom-of-information/what-can-i-request/previous-foirequests/population/number-of-muslim-weddings/index.html 43  Office of National Statistics, “Number of Religious Marriages by Type of Ceremony: OppositeSex Couples Marrying, 2004 to 2015,” https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/ 40 41

232

L. de Rooij

denomination can be misleading though, as Muslim marriages can take place at unregistered premises. For that marriage to be recognized as legal, the couple have a further marriage ceremony in a registry office or approved building. Such weddings are coded as civil marriages because only the civil marriage certificate is received. Despite Islamic law not distinguishing between civil and religious marriages, the British state wishes to supervise the actual process of marriage in order to prevent abuse. Therefore, should a religious ceremony take place in England without fulfilling the preliminary civil requirements, the official law will not recognize this marriage as legally valid. In other words, the civil ceremony is the only marriage which English law recognizes. The Marriage (Registration of Buildings) Act 1990 and the Marriage Act 1994 are two amendments to the Marriage Act 1949 that allow buildings to become registered and allow for their own Muslim officials to perform a fully legalized marriage according to both Muslim law and English law. Only after a religious marriage is a marriage regarded as legitimate from a religious and cultural perspective. This further suggests that the religious marriage determines the nature of the relationship. Most Muslims in England register their marriage first because of concerns of izzat,44 knowing the couple are not actually fully married until the completion of nikah.45 In that way, they prevent the groom’s possible abuse of the socio-legal situation of the Muslim minority by just walking away after the first night or after a short while. As a result, Muslims, like other South Asians, developed innovative methods to counter these problems. The total picture is that, if a Muslim couple wants to marry, they will often marry twice. By doing so, they meet the requirements of both Muslim and English law. In addition, they fortify the strength of nikah by incorporating official legal rules into their unofficial laws.46 For some traditional Muslims ‘arranged’ marriages are relatively common and that marriages may be arranged by a family member, through a service, through friends or by a wali (guardian). For example: Despite the tensions surrounding arranged marriages, most researchers have found continued high rates of intercontinental and intra-caste marriages (over 50 percent) between British Pakistani spouses and brides or grooms in Pakistan. Transnational marriages renew connections with absent kin and express the diasporic yearning of migrants. But pressure is birthsdeathsandmarriages/marriagecohabitationandcivilpartnerships/adhocs/008310religiousmarr iagesinenglandandwales2004to2015 44  Izzat is commonly translated/understood as meaning honour. For more on how this can play out see: CHAKRABORTY, K. 2009. ‘The good Muslim girl’: Conducting qualitative participatory research to understand the lives of young Muslim women in the bustees of Kolkata. Children’s geographies, 7, 421–434. 45  The nikah is often compared to a pre-nuptial agreement. For more see: O’SULLIVAN, K. & JACKSON, L. 2017. Muslim marriage (non) recognition: implications and possible solutions. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 39, 22–41. 46  Ihsan Yilmaz, “Marriage Solemnization among Turks in Britain: The Emergence of a Hybrid Anglo-Muslim Turkish Law,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 24, no. 1 (2004): 61.

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 233 also apparently exerted by close relatives in Pakistan, who use marriage as a route for their children to migrate legally to Britain.47

Moors points out that women who actively desire an Islamic marriage often go through the following steps: Before the marriage contract is concluded, the man and the woman only meet each other a limited number of times, and always in public; that is, in the company of others or in a public setting. They use these meetings to exchange ideas about how they would like to organize their marital relations, what they expect from each other, and sometimes write this down in the form of marital conditions.48

Finding love in this traditional setting is a complex matter because the traditional methods often pre-suppose expectations, and opportunities for the couple in question to discuss marital views may be limited if restricted to a few meetings. Traditional practices also uphold the heteronormativity of the Islamic understanding of marriage. These existing structures and institutions dictate how people choose potential spouses. One example can be that Muslim women living in a mostly non-­ Muslim society are subject to the religious constraint that dictates that a Muslim woman can only marry a Muslim male, and therefore there are many women who are reliant on outside help in order to find an appropriate spouse.49 These mechanisms also provide participants with potentially more outside involvement for finding a spouse, such as needing to rely on a social network consisting of extended family members.

5 Muslim Online Dating Apps Online dating sites essentially offer personal ads. The three Muslim dating apps in question Muzmatch, Single Muslim, and Ummah Dating, are no different. These apps were selected because they are available for free, explicitly Muslim, the most popular (measured by number of downloads at the time of research), and accessible on both iPhone and Android platforms. In comparison to other dating apps, individuals post their own profile and then search and read profiles before contacting a person on the site to learn more about them and to gauge whether the other was also interested in them. The amount of information and detail people can add differs from site to site, but most will enable users to show at least one photograph of themselves and some enable you to add video and voice files to their profiles. Online daters can present information about themselves in a number of ways. They can either fill in little text boxes (OK Cupid, Single Muslim), rate themselves (­ Match.

 Pnina Werbner, “Veiled Interventions in Pure Space Honour, Shame and Embodied Struggles among Muslims in Britain and France,” Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 (2007): 169. 48  Annelies Moors, “Unregistered Islamic Marriages: Anxieties About Sexuality and Islam,” in The Application of Sharia in the West (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2013), 156. 49  Jemima Khan, “The Marriage Business,” New Statesman (2012). 47

234

L. de Rooij

com) or check boxes indicating attributes (Muzmatch) such as their age, gender, location, job and physique (e.g., a choice ranging from slim to overweight). Some questions are a compulsory requirement (for example age and gender). Users are usually given an opportunity and encouraged to expand upon this information by sharing their hobbies and interests. Finally, and probably most importantly there is a section where users can describe the type of person they are attempting to attract and what would be their ideal match. Some online dating sites do the matching for the client by claiming to be able to ‘scientifically’ match individuals. The assumption is that there is a formula to matching appropriate people. Usually generating a compatibility percentage based on overlapping responses to the questions answered on one’s profile. In addition to the general online dating sites such as, eHarmony, True.com, Match.com and so forth, there are also more specialized online dating sites which gather like-minded individuals together. For example, there are sites designed specifically for Christians, Jews, Vegans, Goths, and for the purpose of this study, Muslims. Such sites are similar to social groups which one might join in the hope of finding others that share the same values or interests. Moreover, it potentially cuts out some of the work associated with the search for the perfect other, and it puts a person in the position whereby every person whom they contact is also looking for a connection. This makes it different from other social encounters whereby individuals may not be available for the type of relationship that the online dater is looking for. Important to consider is that this stage is a liminal stage between a non-­sexualized and a sexualized interaction, flirtation is described as an interaction where practices relevant to a current role-set and a possible-future one is simultaneously presented. This allows users to potentially engage one another without concerns for chastity or the involvement of family members. Thus, elements such as bodily alignment, the tone of voice and even occasional touch of flirting interactions are borrowed from a possible future, in which they are already engaged in a sexualized or intimate encounter.50 Online dating in this regard facilitates the courting process, enabling the discussions and interactions, both in cyberspace and in planning a potential future offline context but not limited by traditional structures and mechanisms. However, one difference with ‘offline’ dating is the difficulty in getting across the tone of voice, body language and other subtle cues from face-to-face encounters into text-based interactions. One mitigating factor is the use of emoticons which help in getting across certain meanings in text form; the other is video chatting which gives users the ability to see each other across distances and still pick up visual cues from the body language of the correspondents. The desire for spousal specificity with regards to the ethnic or communal association may depend on different notions of tradition. For many Muslims, a potential spouse is not really about similarities in religious orthodoxy, but rather it is about religious homogeneity. As a consequence, Muslims with a less orthodox and more  Iddo Tavory, “The Structure of Flirtation: On the Construction of Interactional Ambiguity,” in Studies in Symbolic Interaction, ed. Norman K.  Denzin (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2009), 70. 50

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 235

traditionalist or ethnically tinted interpretation of Islam may be going back home to look for spouses who share in their religious practices, rather than searching for a partner within the British Muslim community that might have a different Muslim identity. However, Muzmatch one of the dating apps in question offers another opportunity. Whilst users can identify themselves and potential partners via nationality, ethnic background, and country of origin. It also requires every member to answer the following questions with regards to religion. Sect (Sunni, Shia, Other), How Religious (Not Practicing, Moderately Practicing, Fairly Practicing, Very Practicing), Praying (Never Pray, Sometimes Pray, Usually Pray, Always Pray), Eat only Halal (yes/no), Drink Alcohol (yes/no), Smoker (yes/no), Convert/Revert (yes/ no), and Marriage Plans (As soon as possible, 1–2 years, 3–4 years, 4+ years). Although the creation of Muslim Internet dating sites is the result of market opportunities following the technological and medialization advances and further commercialization of pre-existing methods of securing marital partners. In recent years, online romance, marriage and dating have become an increasingly popular if not a mainstream activity with regards to meeting potential love interests. The new modes of establishing relationships are an extension of new modes of social interaction (chat rooms, instant messaging and email) that have become so commonplace. The result is that they challenge the traditional methods of courting and selecting a spouse. The concept of courting and in turn love and marriage, whether initiated online or offline, is related to the postmodern discourse on freedom and agency. The increasingly mainstream and prevalence of online dating also challenges the assumption that anyone who would turn to a computer for love must be a desperate individual who is unable to find love in more traditional ways. In addition to this, the Muslim community often contains strict protocols for interaction between genders, especially in formal settings. In return, it makes it difficult for free interaction and socialization between genders. Some of these protocols extend themselves online, as Muzmatch has the option for women to not show their picture to men until they allow them to view it. This may have a religious underpinning but may be because it means a response comes from a user who likes the profile and sends the person in question a message, rather than basing their decision on physical appearance. Furthermore, if the context is more ethnic or language-based then it further decreases the potential partners and reduces the chances of finding love outside of that particular group. Something that the apps cater for by allowing users to restrict members based on their location, ethnicity, or linguistic background, but simultaneously it also helps users find members beyond their immediate location, ethnic or linguistic communities. One major difference between apps is that Muzmatch will not allow you to search for members of the same sex or gender, consequently there is an implied heteronormative understanding of (sexual) relationships that underpins the site. It also appears as a much more professional app, when compared to Single Muslim for example. Whilst both use the swipe function to indicate likes and dislikes, Muzmatch is a much more formal and serious app with questions to determine who is a match, rather than a list of likes and dislikes and a swipe function for users to show interest. This is comparable to the difference between Match.com and Tinder. This means

236

L. de Rooij

that some social constraints that users may be seeking to escape are perpetuated by the characteristic of the apps. So, if users were seeking to transcend certain potential social constraints as Lo and Aziz suggest,51 by seeking out a homosexual relationship for example, they would be unable to do so because they were unable to search profiles that would correspond to the characteristics they are looking for. This suggests that dating apps may be more attuned to individuals who are looking for Islamic identities that are strengthened by a local environment perceived as hostile. Although some specialized commercial sites have a number of sites under their umbrella that provide matchmaking services for specific groups, they differ in terms of target demographics, location, and the language they use. Their common denominator is that the target demographic is Muslim and single. The apps aim at Muslims of all types, and thus allow for users to self-identify according to sect. However, the fact that sect becomes a selection criterion, means that it will allow for users to screen out users belonging to sects they would not like to be partnered with. As such it can emphasise sectarian divisions within the Muslim community and restrict partner choices. Some apps allow for non-Muslim women who want to date or marry Muslim men, or non-Muslim males dating or marrying Muslim women to sign up (although the latter two may be highly unlikely). Although the sites are characterized by its Muslim orientation, its love cards, greetings, smiles and other dating criteria are tailored to meet Muslims, they follow mainstream trends. However, it allows users to apply their own ideas on love and relationships. Although there are many suggested motives for using Muslim dating sites, such as marrying someone in the Islamic tradition, physical appearance, the reasons that Muslims want to marry are diverse, and cannot easily be captured in these lenses.52 The language of love, caring, loneliness, etc., seems to be the main feature of online dating and dating sites. In addition, a desire to travel and see the world, ideally with a partner, is something most users expressed in their interviews and many state on their profiles. Whilst this may be characteristic of the user demographic, in this study 18–34-year-­ olds, mostly students, it is something that may reflect other factors present in society.53

 Lo and Aziz, “Muslim Marriage Goes Online: The Use of Internet Matchmaking by American Muslims.” 52  Ibid.; Smeeta Mishra, Mathukutty M Monippally, and Krishna P Jayakar, “Self Presentation in Online Environments: A Study of Indian Muslim Matrimonial Profiles,” Asian Journal of Communication 23, no. 1 (2013); Jiban K Pal, “Social Networks Enabling Matrimonial Information Services in India,” International Journal of Library and Information Science 2, no. 4 (2010); Detlev Zwick and Cristian Chelariu, “Mobilizing the Hijab: Islamic Identity Negotiation in the Context of a Matchmaking Website,” Journal of Consumer Behaviour 5, no. 4 (2006). 53  David T Ory and Patricia L Mokhtarian, “When Is Getting There Half the Fun? Modeling the Liking for Travel,” Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 39, no. 2 (2005); Gitte du Plessis, “Enjoy Your Vacation!,” Ephemera 15, no. 4 (2015); Jan Møller Jensen, “The Relationships between Socio-Demographic Variables, Travel Motivations and Subsequent Choice of Vacation” (paper presented at the 2nd International Conference on Economics, Business and Management, 2011); Jan Vidar Haukeland, “Motives for Holiday Travel,” The Tourist Review 47, no. 2 (1992). 51

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 237

6 Online Dating by Muslims Research suggests that the motivations for using the application will result in different gratifications and may result in different offline outcomes. Online dating can offer a space for people to meet others with those same values, and to also allow a user to change their search parameters as their values change and develop over time. In doing so, a service that caters specifically to Muslims simultaneously offers Muslims a space online if they seek to liberate themselves from potentially constricting boundaries and traditional values, as well as offering an alternative space for those seeking someone with those same traditional values. The services aim to accommodate people and their personal convictions.54 [Despite] a lot of conscious young Muslims refrain from romantic relationships altogether. They say it is not necessary for them to get to know their future spouse through a long-term romantic relationship. What is most important is assuring themselves that a potential partner has similar attitudes towards Islam.55

Therefore, online dating blurs the lines between the traditional family formation and modern practices. Historically, love and sexual attraction were potentially highly disruptive emotions. There is the potential for a tension to form between the emotive and what is considered proper. “Therefore love was absent from the family formation process, not because it was denied that this sentiment existed, but because it was considered a strong and unpredictable force that had to be contained”.56 It has sprung up out of a need to balance a highly-formalized modern marriage ritual, with a desire for emotive content and sentimental connections with a potential partner.57 We can analyse this phenomenon using Bhabha’s description of ‘Third Spaces’. Bhabha describes the space as follows: [An] in-between space which provides the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood, singular or communal - that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration and contestation ... it is in the emergence of these interstices - the overlap and displace-

 Scott Wright, “From “Third Place” to “Third Space”: Everyday Political Talk in Non-Political Online Spaces,” javnost-the public 19, no. 3 (2012); Teresa Davis, “Third Spaces or Heterotopias? Recreating and Negotiating Migrant Identity Using Online Spaces,” Sociology 44, no. 4 (2010); Constance A Steinkuehler and Dmitri Williams, “Where Everybody Knows Your (Screen) Name: Online Games as “Third Places”,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 11, no. 4 (2006); Lincoln Dahlberg, “The Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring the Prospects of Online Deliberative Forums Extending the Public Sphere,” Information, Communication & Society 4, no. 4 (2001). 55  Leen Sterckx, “The Self-Arranged Marriage: Modern Muslim Courtship Practices in the Netherlands,” in Everyday Life Practices of Muslims in Europe, ed. Erkan Toğuşlu (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2015), 118. 56  Ibid., 121. 57  Ibid., 121–22. 54

238

L. de Rooij

ment of domains of difference that the inter-subjective and collective experiences of nation-ness, community interest or cultural value are negotiated.58

The dating apps, provide an online third space for users to develop and present their own identities, negotiate and contest (cultural) values within a space that is outside the boundaries that may restrict such negotiation and contestation, and to form and belong to a community – the larger community of users, as well as the desire to form a partnership with other users. In doing so, users select characteristics that define their values, and in turn their Muslimness, in order to search along personalized criteria for potential mates online. By increasing the customization, these internet dating sites are able to attract more users. This is due to its ability to combine both Islamic marriage culture and modern aspirations of individual freedom and personal choices. It gives users, the ability and opportunity to express their personal views, values, concerns, ambitions, and feelings. Expressing this range of choices is not often available or allowed in the traditional marriage system, either through direct interpersonal contact, along with traditional Muslim dating values, or via the use of an intermediary. Lo and Aziz observed regionally or communally-based sites and mailing lists that catered to small “like-minded groups and local communities”, these community correspondences are reliant largely upon individual blogs, mailing lists and Internet correspondence.59 In these groups, marriage seekers often send emails to a mailing list or an affiliated community mosque where the imam matches that request with requests for similar needs.60 Eventually, candidates interested in pursuing an offline relationship will meet. Imams and community organizers may play a role in facilitating such dating efforts, by offering a safe neutral space or having a gathering where prospective couples can meet.61 They provide services in exchange for either small fees, or as a free public service within their socio-cultural mission. Most of these spaces are administered by advocacy groups and umbrella organizations. Their marital services are usually offered in conjunction with other services they provide, and demographic information is usually the main indicators of potential matches. The service is usually open to members only, and these spaces do not reflect the typical places open to everyone. Online dating spaces usually cater to a very specific user, and are largely oriented along professional and ethnic lines. Since the dominant Muslim ethnicity in the UK is South Asian, Muslims from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, have much in common, including primarily, religious ideology and practice. Traditional modes of supervised courtship characterize the potential meets of people, and these sites have

 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 2.  Lo and Aziz, “Muslim Marriage Goes Online: The Use of Internet Matchmaking by American Muslims.” 60  Ibid. 61  Adam B Ellick, “Speed-Dating, Muslim Style,” The New York Times 11 (2011). 58 59

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 239

become another avenue for parents to maintain continuity with their homeland’s traditions by reaching out back home to look for “ideal” marriage candidates for their British-born children. An alternative is using the internet to search for a prospective partner, and because to my participants it was presupposed that the partner was Muslim, and it was important for all the users interviewed that their partner was Muslim. It was seen as common-sense that if one was looking for a Muslim partner to use a Muslim dating app. Whilst participants understood there were alternatives out there that could provide a similar service, the ones that had used an alternative application or website felt that a Muslim app was better suited to meeting their needs. For example: I tried using other apps, but I only found people who were not serious or who I could not really connect with spiritually. Religion is important to me, and I would like to share that with my partner and share in the religious experience. I think this app has more chance helping me find that person. (Samira, 22)

The primary motivations for users to select using this app were related to meeting a potential partner in a respectful way, and for finding a user with similar cultural-­ religious values which were deemed important to the user. For example: A nice and cool way to respectfully contact the other gender. (Ali, 23) I would like both my partner and I to encourage each other to become the best versions of ourselves spiritually and intellectually. So, I think that an app that caters to people with a specific religious background will help me find someone that I can bond with spiritually. (Aisha, 25) I’m looking for a pious Salafi man, honest, kind, loyal and funny to build a family with. A man who will treat his wife like a princess. If I cannot find someone in my immediate network, then maybe online I can find that perfect someone. (Laila, 25)

Communication mechanisms in this regard allow users to develop relationships beyond spatial and social constraints. Something that Lo and Aziz say was one of the findings in their research.62 As fake profiles exist, users who portrayed unrealistic expectations, or too good to be true were approached with caution.63 In addition, users adopted several strategies to overcome such issues, such as “using their communication skills to study others carefully, doing “police work” to uncover any inconsistencies in their statements, ‘interrogating’ them using a pre-developed list of questions and involving their family members in their negotiations”.64 This is highlighted by Nazira who is happy with how the app allows her to connect with  Lo and Aziz, “Muslim Marriage Goes Online: The Use of Internet Matchmaking by American Muslims.” 63  Yeslam Al-Saggaf, “Males’ Trust and Mistrust of Females in Muslim Matrimonial Sites,” Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 11, no. 3 (2013). 64  Ibid. 62

240

L. de Rooij

someone and find out if they are compatible without needing to engage in the organized ritual of meeting a potential partner as described by Moors. The app allows for people to talk and potentially connect in a manner that is respectful but doesn’t need for a lot of complicated planning. You can message each other when it’s convenient and then only when you know the person is interesting and interested in you as a person can you meet them. You don’t need to worry about covering your hair or so when the message comes in, or what people may think. When you meet someone of the opposite sex in public things are always a bit awkward and complicated. This app lets you get straight to the point and find out if you are compatible. (Nazira, 24)

Online dating offers users the ability to find emotional adventures, potential casual relationships, and love and marriage in cyberspace. The flexibility of online dating lends itself to offering its product to all kinds of consumers and the non-committal nature of the websites or the correspondents, gives users the utmost feeling of agents of their own fate. Whilst the apps ‘host’ the activities, and act as an intermediary much like the imam or the mailing list, the apps now provide a much more direct service. In doing so, the media acts as the intermediator, but the users are given direct access to other users, possibly for a fee. This allows for greater freedom in the selection process by the individual seeking a partner, and it also allows for the person to present themselves in a way that suits their wishes. Living in Europe and people back in Egypt always assume you behave and act like a European. That is why we were raised very strict, but we are a very close family. (Semi, 20) For my study, I have to spend at least 6 months abroad. I love to travel and experience different cultures (as I am part of two different cultures). I am not in a rush and very patient and I believe that Allah has a plan for all of us. (Meryema, 20)

With it being reported that coerced and forced marriages are a reality for many young Muslims in Britain, the individual agency that these apps provide is important to consider. According to the MAT Report on Forced Marriages, 70% of marriages between a Muslim-British citizen and a foreign national from the Asian sub-continent entailed some level of coercion, the report concludes that, “Young Muslims in Britain are under siege from their elders and parents because of the generational and cultural gap”.65 This could be exacerbated before the internet, because the main methods of finding a spouse utilized for many Muslims in Britain, were by through personal contact, through an institution or through a social connection acting as an intermediary. Through personal contact, a person will meet a potential spouse that they eventually marry following a period of courtship. That someone may be someone with whom he or she interacts in their social or professional spheres, perhaps someone they know from work, a social club or sports organization or from their Muslim community who they propose marriage to directly. Muslims also use institutions as intermediaries in finding spouses, such as mosques or Islamic centres. Some Local imams and community leaders keep a list of those  Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, “Forced Marriages Intiative,” http://www.matribunal.com/forcedmarriages-intiative.php 65

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 241

who are interested in finding a spouse and use the social network of the mosque to introduce interested parties. Another possibility is the social network of friends and family back in one’s country of heritage. Using intermediaries within this type of network suggests a desire for a spouse having the same heritage. The intermediary, then, is the “middleman” between the individual looking for a spouse and a potential pool of spouses. This traditional system of ‘arranging’ marriage through a network of family and friends, usually the parents and their contacts, could include individuals from one’s native country and/or from the same (ethnic) community in Britain. In turn, the greater individualism in partner selection, gives the user greater freedom and liberties in seeking out the partner of their choice. This is evidenced by user responses such as: Someone simple, kind and funny, who likes to travel and doing sports. Someone in between Deen66 and Dunya67. (Aisha, 25) Looking for someone interesting, practising and easy going and someone who can hold a conversation, and who will be my Deen. (Samira, 22)

Although consisting primarily of Muslims the demography of consumers is larger and more diverse. It is designed to cater to the needs of Muslims that are searching for (marriage) partners. In addition to that, traditional parental inclusion has remained evident in online dating as well. Some had asked their parents or siblings to help with their self-presentation, or when they had met a potential match discussed this with their family to gauge their opinion on the potential match. When I wrote my profile, I wasn’t really sure what I should write or how to write it. I am not really good at that stuff. Plus, what do women want to know? So, I had asked my sisters to help me write it and put something together that is attractive but realistic too. (Mohammed, 23) I am here to find someone specific that will be good for me in the long-term. It is only natural I think that you then ask people around you that know you best. Especially if you want your parents to like them and think you made a good choice. So, when I get to the point that I want to meet someone I ask my mum and dad to see what they will think. (Nazira, 24)

 Often translated as “religion.” Deen (or Din) implies that living in obedience to God is an obligation owed to Him, for which people will be held account. It encompasses beliefs, thoughts, and deeds. From this perspective the peaceful submission to God, as demonstrated through belief in Islam and its rituals, is termed the “way of truth” (din al-haqq). The worship of Allah is termed the “straight path” and established for human life (al-din al-qayyim). ESPOSITO, J. L. 2004. The oxford dictionary of Islam, Oxford University Press. In this context the participants see their potential match as their true match and a way for serving God in the proper manner. Further suggesting that for these participants marriage is seen as a core part of their religious duties. 67  “In matters of religious belief and practice, refers to earthly concerns, contrasted with those of God or heavenly concerns (din)”. Ibid. 66

242

L. de Rooij

In the context of Muslim male users, the study finds comparable data with the study conducted by Lo and Aziz, in that they tend to be ambiguous in articulating their desired attributes beyond generalities and that their ideal matches would be more “traditional” in their views on marriage. Honest, practising Muslim. (Nabil, 28) Someone to talk, to travel with, to eat out, and watch movies. (Rashad 23) Someone who looks nice, is a true person to get married and spend my life with. (Ali, 23)

Al-Saggaf adds that males’ willingness to use online tools were reliant on their willingness to take risks, abilities, and confidence.68 Women, on the other hand, are motivated to marry but are much more specific in the type of person they are looking for. Also, even in such online settings, women are active users of the applications, but simultaneously pursued by potential suitors, much more than male users.69 As a consequence, female users reported that they spent significant time actively filtering out attention received in addition to actively searching themselves. Whether the need for being more specific in the person they are looking for is a result of filtering out the prompts from potential suitors, or a reflection of larger social aspects requires further research at this stage. However, female participants were better at articulating their desires, as compared to their male counterparts. For example: I’m looking for someone like minded, educated, down to earth and open minded with a good sense of humour. Someone that is a gentleman, whom is confident without being cocky and doesn’t take life too seriously. I am open to anyone from any walks of life as Long as they are Muslim. I’d like to meet someone that is wanting to travel to new places and to try different things. Although I am pretty independent, I’m looking for someone to be a provider and protector, someone to be the man in the relationship and look after me so if you are looking for a woman to sort your life out, in other words, a mother figure; I am not the lady for you. (Meryema, 20)

While seeking out users that share their aspirations and inspirations, the sites reflect the type of individuality and customization that enables almost every user to seek out their taste. For example, in questions related to visual appearance and the level of religiosity in the context of wearing hijab (religious dress/covering for female), participants are given the options of choosing: (1) always; (2) often; (3) occasionally; (4) rarely; (5) never; (6) prefer not to answer. Similar questions are asked with regards to personal interests, hobbies, political outlook, favourite music, films, books, entertainers, food, etc. This offers users the ability to present themselves and their desires in ways that people may not always have the opportunity to give such detailed answers, with regards to the choices they make, and their ability to express their preferences and desires. In other contexts, the imam is the most evident and most effective marital intermediary for individuals who consider religious affiliation or piety a predominant value and for those who lack any other kind of social network. Family (and 68 69

 Al-Saggaf, “Males’ Trust and Mistrust of Females in Muslim Matrimonial Sites.”  Based on participant self-reporting.

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 243

sometimes friends) is the most utilized marital intermediary for individuals who consider other values more important to religious affiliation and for those whose primary concern is not a practising Muslim but rather someone that shares a similar outlook and ideology whilst sharing their Muslim faith (albeit nominally). Based on informal surveys and observations, women seem to make use of an intermediary in facilitating a marriage more often than men do. This is most likely due to a conservative devout Muslim women’s role (as she sees herself and, in the community,), such as not being allowed to marry non-Muslims, and also restrictions placed on physical appearances and limits as a result of social protocol that affect women’s ability to use public space to meet, interact and engage with the opposite sex.70

7 Conclusion The use of Muslim smartphone dating apps by British Muslims reflects their opinion on matters of marriage and relationships, because rather than finding a spouse based solely on sectarian affiliation, the consumer is able to customize their searches to reflect a desire for a “Muslim” spouse based on compatibility of what they believe in and aspire to within a multicultural society. This is opposed to earlier attempts that would match people based a definition of what they are rather than their values. However, this research shows that this is only possible within the ‘acceptable’ doctrinal parameters as defined by the app, and users are unable to be radically free in their choices within the app. The success of a dating site is in its ability to cater to those who are searching for their partner according to their personal (religious) desires, that are not necessarily shared by the institutions they belong to, the authorities in their lives (imams, family, etc.), or other avenues through which they seek love and a spouse. However, the apps in question shift that authority from the offline authorities that may place spatial and cultural restrictions on them to the restrictions placed on them by the digital platform of choice, providing greater autonomy and freedom of choice, but often seen as providing total autonomy and freedom of choice. This research shows that Muslim users do not necessarily have specific motivations that can be identified as being different from non-Muslims, in that they seek someone with compatible values. The use of a ‘Muslim’ dating app is to guarantee that the potential partners are Muslim, which is important to the users as a religion-cultural resource. However, what Muslims are seeking to find using the app, may be expressed using cultural or religious language that would potentially look out of place in another space. This further supports the analysis of Muslim dating apps as a third space,71 and allows for  For more information on how that may play out among Salafi women see: INGE, A. 2016. The Making of a Salafi Muslim Woman: Paths to Conversion, Oxford University Press. 71  Comparable to the discussions in: BHABHA, H. K. 2009. In the cave of making: Thoughts on third space. Communicating in the third space, ix–xiv, DAVIS, T. 2010. Third spaces or heteroto70

244

L. de Rooij

users to develop relationships based on the criteria they negotiate and employ in their quest for love. The movement follows a mainstream trend where the internet is used to liberate people from the restrictions of traditional practices whilst still enabling adherence to traditional values, as well to explore new horizons for self-expression and freedom of choice. Therefore, online dating sites are a means of affirming personal desires whilst remaining true to personal religious values and finding someone who possesses those values too. Evidence suggests that individuals with common Islam-­ based identities are better served by the dating apps as their ability to seek out a partner who meets their religious values is easier satisfied. However, some seeking to transcend local restrictions, such as homosexuals, may not be served as well by the dating apps, because of the structures of the apps. Yet in this regard, what Boellstorff writes in his discussion of gays and lesbians in Indonesia may be of relevance too.72 He notes that their identity may be exercised intermittently, “first at one place and then at another, but not in the space between”,73 their subjectivity is not reliant on a “unified, unchanging identity in all situations”.74 Their structure is ‘archipelagic’, and this would be reflected in user responses, in their desire for a Muslim partner, and in the type of partner desired. As closeted gays and lesbians may still seek out heterosexual relationships for a variety of reasons. For example, in order to meet social norms, or fulfil their own desires for offspring. But those looking for gay or lesbian relationships would be excluded by the Muslims dating apps and are therefore still constrained online in their choice of partner. This challenges the findings by Lo and Aziz, and highlights the presupposed heteronormativity of Muslim relationships, but the internet does offer alternatives like ‘Grindr’, a dating app for homosexuals. Muslim dating sites are a product of the general trends; they are selective of what fits their religious beliefs and cater to a user’s specific desires. It is obvious in the findings that many sites are using the new technologies to maintain traditional methods of marriage. Thus, Muslim online dating networks serve as platforms through which users preserve their identity. However, these sites are also indicative of an existing problem as many Muslim users, who are a part of the sociocultural fabric of Britain, have often felt like they have exhausted the opportunities available offline. These opportunities may be through their social network, professional life, family members, and religious institutions. But it also limits the options to users, and therefore forces users seeking non-traditional relationships to use alternative mechanisms. In turn, this implicitly suggests that only the types of relationships or searchable characteristics are Islamic. This reinforces traditional gender roles and pias? Recreating and negotiating migrant identity using online spaces. Sociology, 44, 661–677, WRIGHT, S. 2012. From “third place” to “third space”: Everyday political talk in non-political online spaces. Javnost-the public, 19, 5–20. 72  Tom Boellstorff, “Between Religion and Desire: Being Muslim and Gay in Indonesia,” American Anthropologist 107, no. 4 (2005). 73  The Gay Archipelago: Sexuality and Nation in Indonesia (Princeton University Press, 2005), 172. 74  Ibid., 174.

10  Online Dating for British Muslims, and the Relationship with Their Islamic Identities 245

limits a user’s ability to find partners only according to the traditional rules of marriage. In previous studies it remains unclear whether Muslim users have specific motivations that can be identified. Yet in this study, people with Islamic identities, strengthened by the cross-cultural adaptation process, are increasingly using the Internet to overcome existing spatial and cultural barriers to develop relationships to better fit their religious outlook. This is in keeping with other research on computer-­ mediated-­communication,75 but I argue that Muslims with strong Islamic identities, that would be considered within the parameters of traditional Islam, are using the apps to find partners that possess the same Islam-based identities.

 Couch and Liamputtong, “Online Dating and Mating: The Use of the Internet to Meet Sexual Partners.”; Valkenburg and Peter, “Who Visits Online Dating Sites? Exploring Some Characteristics of Online Daters.” 75

Bibliography

Abbas, Tahir. 2001a. Islamophobia in the United Kingdom: Historical and Contemporary Political and Media Discourses in the Framing of a 21st-Century Anti-Muslim Racism. In Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, ed. John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin, 63–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2001b. Media Capital and the Representation of South Asian Muslims in the British Press: An Ideological Analysis. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 21 (2): 245–257. ———. 2007. Muslim Minorities in Britain: Integration, Multiculturalism and Radicalism in the Post-7/7 Period. Journal of Intercultural Studies 28 (3): 287–300. Abdollahi, Abdolhossein, Carl Henthorn, and Tom Pyszczynski. 2010. Experimental Peace Psychology: Priming Consensus Mitigates Aggression against Outgroups under Mortality Salience. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 2 (1): 30–37. Abrams, Lynn. 2016. Oral History Theory. London/New York: Routledge. Afary, Janet, and Kevin B. Anderson. 2014. Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Afshar, H. 2012. Women and Fluid Identities: Strategic and Practical Pathways Selected by Women. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Ahmed, Leila. 1992. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. New Haven: Yale University Press. ———. 2011. A quiet revolution: The veil’s resurgence, from the Middle East to America. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. Akthar, Parveen. British Muslims Have Given David Cameron an Object Lesson in Democracy. The Guardian, 13 April 2012. al Faruqi, Isma’il R., and Lois Lamya al Faruqi. 1986. The Cultural Atlas of Islam. New York: Macmillan. Ali, Kecia. 2010. Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam. Harvard University Press. Al-Khoie Foundation. 2015. Mu’assasat Al-Imam Al-Khu’i Al-Khayriyya. London: Al-Khoie Foundation. ———. Al-Sadiq and Al-Zahra Schools: Experience of Community Cohesion. London: Al-Khoie Foundation. Allen, Chris. 2010. Islamophobia. Farnham: Ashgate. Allen, Chris, and Jorgen Nielsen. 2002. Summary Report on Islamophobia in the Eu after 11 September 2001. Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Al‐Mutawa, Fajer Saleh. 2013. Consumer‐Generated Representations: Muslim Women Recreating Western Luxury Fashion Brand Meaning through Consumption. Psychology & Marketing 30 (3): 236–246. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 L. de Rooij (ed.), British Muslims and Their Discourses, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45013-6

247

248

Bibliography

Al-Saggaf, Yeslam. 2013. Males' Trust and Mistrust of Females in Muslim Matrimonial Sites. Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 11 (3): 174–192. Altareb, Belkeis Y. 1998. Attitudes Toward Muslims: Initial Scale Development. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering 58 (7B): 3960. Altheide, David L., and Robert P. Snow. 1979. Media Logic. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Altikriti, Anas. We Got Out the Vote. The Guardian, 4 May 2008. Amrullah, Eva F. 2008. Indonesian Muslim Fashion Styles & Designs. ISIM Review 22: 2. Anderson, Jon W. 2003. The Internet and Islam’s New Interpreters. In New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, ed. D.F. Eickelman and J.W. Anderson, 45–60. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Anderson, Benedict, and Gail Kligman. 1992. Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics. Berkeley: Centre for German and European Studies, University of California. Anderson, Kathryn, Susan Armitage, Dana Jack, and Judith Wittner. 1987. Beginning Where We Are: Feminist Methodology in Oral History. The Oral History Review 15 (1): 103–127. Anheier, H.K., J. Gerhards, and F.P. Romo. 1995. Forms of Capital and Social Structure in Cultural Fields: Examining Bourdieu’s Social Topography. American Journal of Sociology 100 (4): 859–903. Ansari, Humayun. 2004. The ‘Infidel’ Within: Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present. London: Hurst. Anthias, Floya. 2006. Belongings in a Globalising and Unequal World: Rethinking Translocations. In The Situated Politics of Belonging, ed. N.  Yuval-Davis, K.  Kannabiran, and U.  Vieten, 17–31. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Anwar, Muhammed. 1995. Social Networks of Pakistanis in the Uk: A Re-evaluation. In The Urban Context: Ethnicity, Social Networks and Situational Analysis, ed. Alisdair Rogers and Steven Vertovec, 237–257. Oxford: Berg. Archer, Louise. 2001. ‘Muslim Brothers, Black Lads, Traditional Asians’: British Muslim Young Men’s Constructions of Race, Religion and Masculinity. Feminism & Psychology 11 (1): 79–105. Arendell, Terry. 2000. Conceiving and Investigating Motherhood: The Decade’s Scholarship. Journal of Marriage and Family 62 (4): 1192–1207. Armeli, S.R., S.M. Marandi, S. Ahmed, K. Seyfeddin, and A. Merali. 2007. The British Media and Muslim Representation: The Ideology of Demonisation. London: Islamic Human Rights Commission. Arndt, Marlene, and Gideon De Bruin. 2006. Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men: Relations with Gender, Race and Religion among University Students. Psychology in Society 33: 16–30. Arnett, Jeffrey Jensen. 2000. Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties. American Psychologist 55 (5): 469. Arther, C. 1997. Media, Meaning and Method in Religious Studies. In Rethinking Media, Religion and Culture, ed. Stewart M. Hoover and Knut Lundby. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Asad, Talal. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ashforth, Blake E., and Fred Mael. 1989. Social Identity Theory and the Organization. The Academy of Management Review 14 (1): 20–39. Ashley, Seth, Mark Poepsel, and Erin Willis. 2010. Media Literacy and News Credibility: Does Knowledge of Media Ownership Increase Skepticism in News Consumers? The Journal of Media Literacy Education 2 (1). Ashraf-Emami, Hengameh. 2017. Gender and Generational Relations for Muslim Women in Scotland. In Scotland’s Muslims: Society, Politics and Identity, ed. Peter Hopkins. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Asp, Kent. 2014. News Media Logic in a New Institutional Perspective. Journalism Studies 15 (3): 256–270.

Bibliography

249

Awan, Imran. 2008. The Problem with Defining Terrorism and the Impact on Civil Liberties-­ Britain is Beginning to Create a Monster with Large Claws, Sharp Teeth and a Fierce Temper. Journal of Politics and Law 1 (2): 1–11. ———. 2012. “I am a Muslim not an Extremist”: How the Prevent Strategy has Constructed a “Suspect” Community. Politics & Policy 40 (6): 1158–1185. Aydin, C., and J.  Hammer. 2010. Muslims and Media: Perceptions, Participation and Change. Contemporary Islam 4: 1–9. Back, Les, and John Solomos. 1992. Who Represents us? Racialised Politics and Candidate Selection. Birkbeck College, University of London, Research Papers 3 (May). Badawi, Jamal. 1995. Gender Equity in Islam. World Assembly of Muslim Youth. Baig, Khalid. 2008. Slippery Stone: An Inquiry into Islam's Stance on Music. Garden Grove: Open Mind Press. Bailey, George A., and Lawrence W. Lichty. 1972. Rough Justice on a Saigon Street: A Gatekeeper Study of Nbc’s Tet Execution Film. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 49 (2): 221–238. Baker, Paul, Costas Gabrielatos, and Tony McEnery. 2013. Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barker, Renae. 2012. The full face covering debate: an Australian perspective, University of Western Australia. Law Review 36 (1): 143–157. Bari, A.M. 2005. Race, Religion &Muslim Identity in Britain. Swansea: Renaissance Press. Barker, Valerie. 2009. Older Adolescents’ Motivations for Social Network Site Use: The Influence of Gender, Group Identity, and Collective Self-Esteem. CyberPsychology & Behavior 12 (2): 209–213. Barnard, K.E., and L.K. Martell. 1995. Mothering. In Handbook of Parenting: Status and Social Conditions of Parenting, ed. M.H. Bornstein, 3–26. Mahwah: Erlbaum. Barrès-Baker, M.C. 2007. A Brief History of the London Borough of Brent. Brent Museum and Archives Occasional Publications 5. Bastian, Brock, and Nick Haslam. 2006. Psychological Essentialism and Stereotype Endorsement. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42 (2): 228–235. Bayes, Jane, and Nayereh Tohidi. 2001. Globalization, Gender, and Religion: The Politics of Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts. New York: Macmillan. Becker, Ernest. 1973. The Denial of Death. New York: The Free Press. Beckett, Clare, and Marie Macey. 2001. Race, Gender and Sexuality: The Oppression of Multiculturalism. Paper presented at the Women’s Studies International Forum. Bectovic, S. 2011. Studying Muslims and Constructing Islamic Identity. Ethnic and Racial Studies 34 (7): 1120–1133. Begum, Halima. 2008. Geographies of Inclusion/Exclusion: British Muslim Women in the East End of London. Sociological Research Online 13 (5): 1–11. Bellah, Robert N. 1967. Civil Religion in America. Daedalus 96: 1–21. Bellah, Robert N., and Phillip E. Hammond. 1980. Varieties of Civil Religion. London/New York: Harper & Row. Ben-Ari, Orit Taubman, Victor Florian, and Mario Mikulincer. 1999. The Impact of Mortality Salience on Reckless Driving: A Test of Terror Management Mechanisms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76 (1): 35–45. Bergen, Peter. 2008. Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (1): 14–30. Bergen, Peter, and Paul Cruickshank. 2007. The Iraq Effect: War has Increased Terrorism Sevenfold Worldwide. Mother Jones 1: 1–7. Berkowitz, Dan, and Lyombe Eko. 2007. Blasphemy as Sacred Rite/Right: “The Mohammed Cartoons Affair” and Maintenance of Journalistic Ideology. Journalism Studies 8 (5): 779–797. Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. Bhimji, F. 2012. British Asian Muslim Women, Multiple Spatialities and Cosmopolitanism. Houndmills/Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

250

Bibliography

Birt, Jonathan. 2005. Lobbying and Marching: British Muslims and the State. In Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure, ed. Tahir Abbas, 92–106. London: Zed Books. ———. 2006. Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in Post 9/11 Britain. The Muslim World 96: 687–705. Black, Ian. General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi: Top Brass Ready to Defend the People. The Guardian, 02-07-2013. Bleich, E., H. Stonebraker, H. Nishar, and R. Abdelhamid. 2013. Media Portrays of Minorities: Muslims in British Newspaper Headlines, 2001-2012. Chicago: American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Bødker, Henrik. 2009. Muslims in Print, or Media Events as Nodes of Cultural Conflict. In Media, Religion and Conflict, ed. Lee Marsden and Heather Savigny, 81–94. Farnham: Ashgate. Boellstorff, Tom. 2005a. Between Religion and Desire: Being Muslim and Gay in Indonesia. American Anthropologist 107 (4): 575–585. ———. 2005b. The Gay Archipelago: Sexuality and Nation in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bolognani, M. 2007. Islam, Ethnography and Politics: Methodological Issues in Researching Amongst West Yorkshire Pakistanis in 2005. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 10 (4): 279–293. Boone, Jon. 2013. Pakistan: Hardcore Islamist Spreads Message to Britain through Qur’an ‘Call Centres’: Outsourcing Boom Creates Hundreds of Online Firms to Coach Young Muslims. The Guardian, 18-06-2013. Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Translated by Richard Nice. London/New York: Routledge, 1984. ———. 1986. The Forms of Capital. In Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. J. Richardson, 241–258. Greenword Press. ———. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ———. 1993. The Field of Cultural Production. Cambridge: Polity Press. ———. 1994. Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field. Comparative Social Research 12 (1): 1–44. ———. 2011. The Forms of Capital. (1986). Cultural Theory: An Anthology 1: 81–93. Bowen, John Richard. 1993. Muslims Through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2004. Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30 (5): 879–894. ———. 2007. Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bowen, Innes. 2014. Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam. London: Hurst. Brandon, Ben. 2004. Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: 120 Years of the Uk’s Legal Response to Terrorism. Criminal Law Review: 981–997. Branscombe, Nyla R., and Daniel L.  Wann. 1994. Collective Self‐Esteem Consequences of Outgroup Derogation when a Valued Social Identity is on Trial. European Journal of Social Psychology 24 (6): 641–657. Brewer, Marilynn B. 1979. In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-­ Motivational Analysis. Psychological Bulletin 86 (2): 307–324. Brewer, Paul R. 2002. Framing, Value Words, and Citizens’ Explanations of Their Issue Opinions. Political Communication 19: 303–316. Britain has 85 Sharia Courts. Daily Mail, 29 June 2009. British Council, and University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies. 2012. Building a Shared Future: Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere. London/Cambridge: British Council  – University of Cambridge Centre for Islamic Studies. Brown, Katherine. 2008. The Promise and Perils of Women’s Participation in UK Mosques: The Impact of Securitisation Agendas on Identity, Gender and Community. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10 (3): 472–491.

Bibliography

251

Brown, Callum G. 2014. Religion and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain. London/New York: Routledge. Brubaker, Rogers. 2013. Categories of Analysis and Categories of Practice: A Note on the Study of Muslims in European Countries of Immigration. Ethnic and Racial Studies 36 (1): 1–8. Bryman, A. 2003. Quantity and Quality in Social Research. London/New York: Routledge. ———. 2015. Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buijs, F.J., F. Demant, and A. Hamdy. 2006. Strijders Van Eigen Bodem. Radicale En Democratische Moslims in Nederland. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Bukhari, Sahih. 1966. Vol. 7. Cairo: Dar Al-Fikr. Bullock, Katherine. 2002. Rethinking Muslim women and the veil: Challenging historical & modern stereotypes. Herndon, VA, IIIT. ———. 2005. Muslim Women Activists in North America: Speaking for Ourselves. University of Texas Press. Bunglawala, Inayat. 2002. British Muslims and the Media. In The Quest for Sanity: Reflections on September 11th and the Aftermath, ed. Muslim Council of Britain. Middlesex: Muslim Council of Britain. Burke, Jason. 2013. Bangladesh Factory Collapse Casts Heavy Shadow over Nearby Community. The Guardian, 06-06-2013. Burke, Brian L., Andy Martens, and Erik H. Faucher. 2010. Two Decades of Terror Management Theory: A Meta-analysis of Mortality Salience Research. Personality and Social Psychology Review 14 (2): 155–195. Calder, Norman. 1982. Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi’i Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the Classical Tradition. Middle Eastern Studies 18 (1): 3–20. Castano, Emanuele. 2004a. European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective. Transnational identities: Becoming European in the EU 1: 40–58. ———. 2004b. On the Advantages of Reifying the Ingroup. In The Psychology of Group Perception: Contributions to the Study of Homogeneity, Entitativity, and Essentialism, ed. Vincent Yzerbyt, Charles M. Judd, and Carey S. Ryan. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Castano, Emanuele, and Mark Dechesne. 2005. On Defeating Death: Group Reification and Social Identification as Immortality Strategies. European Review of Social Psychology 16 (1): 221–255. Castano, Emanuele, Vincent Yzerbyt, Maria-Paola Paladino, and Simona Sacchi. 2002. I Belong, Therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and Ingroup Bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28 (2): 135–143. Cavanaugh, William T. 2009. The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cesari, Jocelyne. 2009. The Securitisation of Islam in Europe. CEPS Challenge Programme: Research Paper No. 15. http://aei.pitt.edu/10763/1/1826.pdf. ———. 2013. Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Charmaz, Kathy. 1996. The Search for Meanings-Grounded Theory. In Rethinking Methods in Psychology, ed. J.A. Smith, R. Harre, and L. Van Langenhove, 27–49. Thousand Oaks: Sage. ———. 2014. Constructing Grounded Theory. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Charmaz, Kathy, and Linda Liska Belgrave. 2007. Grounded Theory. In The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Chernus, Ira. 2010. Civil Religion. In The Blackwell Companion to Religion in America, ed. Philip Goff, 57–70. Hoboken: Wiley – Blackwell. Christmas is Banned: It Offends Muslims. Daily Express, 2 November 2005. Cinnirella, Marco. 2012. Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-islamic Prejudice. In Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. M. Helbling, 179–189. London/New York: Routledge. ———. 2014. Understanding Islamophobic Prejudice: The Interface between Identity Process Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory. In Identity Process Theory: Identity, Social Action

252

Bibliography

and Social Change, ed. Rusi Jaspal and G.M.  Breakwell, 253–269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cohen, Justin. London Mosque Hosts Jewish Community for Succot. Jewish News Online, 24th October 2016. Cohen, Florette, Melissa Soenke, Sheldon Solomon, and Jeff Greenberg. 2013. Evidence for a Role of Death Thought in American Attitudes toward Symbols of Islam. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2): 189–194. Cole, K. 2008. Where Reform and Interaction Meet: Spaces for Appropriation and Resistance. In The Research Process in Classroom Discourse Analysis: Current Perspectives, ed. K. Cole and J. Zuengler. New York/London: Taylor & Francis. Coleman, John A. 1970. Civil Religion. Sociological Analysis 31 (1): 67–77. Coleman, James S. 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal of Sociology 94: S95–S120. ———. 2003. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. In Networks in the Knowledge Economy, 57–81. Collins, P.H. 1999. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. London/New York: Routledge. Connor, Walker. 1994. Ethno-Nationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Constructing Cohesion: Sukkah Built at Mosque as Communities Come Together. Asian Express Newspaper, 24th October 2016. Conway, G.R., and Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia. 1997. Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. London: Runnymede Trust. Cook, David. 2007. Martyrdom in Islam. Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Corboz, Elvire. 2012. The Al-Khoie Foundation and the Transnational Institutionalisation of Ayatollah Al-Khui’i’s Marja’iyya’. In Shi’i Islam and Identity: Religion, Politics and Change in the Global Muslim Community, ed. Lloyd Ridgeon, 93–112. London: I.B. Tauris. ———. 2015. Guardians of Shi’ism: Sacred Authority and Transnational Family Networks. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Cote, James E., and Charles G. Levine. 2002. Identity, Formation, Agency, and Culture: A Social Psychological Synthesis. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum. Couch, Danielle, and Pranee Liamputtong. 2008. Online Dating and Mating: The Use of the Internet to Meet Sexual Partners. Qualitative Health Research 18 (2): 268–279. Coughlin, Sean. Trojan Horse Leaked Report Says Pupils “Not Protected from Extremism”. 5th June 2014. Couldry, Nick. 2009. Media Rituals: From Durkheim on Religion to Jade Goody. In Exploring Religion and the Sacred in a Media Age, ed. C. Deacy and E. Arweck. Farnham: Ashgate. Crabtree, Sara Ashencaen, and Fatima Husain. 2012. Within, Without: Dialogical Perspectives on Feminism and Islam. Religion & Gender 2 (1): 128–149. Creedon, Pamela J. 1994. Women, Media, and Sport: Creating and Reflecting Gender Values. In Women, Media, and Sport: Challenging Gender Values, ed. Pamela J. Creedon. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Crigler, Ann N., Marion R. Just, and Neuman W. Russell. 1992. Common Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Crocker, Jennifer, and Brenda Major. 1989. Social Stigma and Self-Esteem: The Self-Protective Properties of Stigma. Psychological Review 96 (4): 608. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2002. Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism. International security 27 (3): 30–58. Curran, James. 1990. The “New Revisionism” in Mass Communications Research. European Journal of Communication 5 (2–3): 135–164. Curran, James, and Jean Seaton. 2009. Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain. London/New York: Routledge.

Bibliography

253

d’Haenens, Leen. 2007. Islam in the Dutch Press: With Special Attention to the Algemeen Dagblad. Media, Culture & Society 29 (1): 135–149. d’Haenens, Leen, and Susan Bink. 2006. Islam in De Nederlandse Media: Focus Op Het Algemeen Dagblad. Tijdschrift voor Communicatiewetenschap 34 (4): 351–367. Dabag, Mihran, and Kristin Platt. 1993. Diaspora Und Das Kollektive Gedächtnis: Zur Konstruktion Kollektiver Identitäten in Der Diaspora. In Identität in Der Fremde, ed. Mihran Dabag and Kristin Platt, 125–131. Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. Norbert Brockmeyer. Dahlberg, Lincoln. 2001. The Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring the Prospects of Online Deliberative Forums Extending the Public Sphere. Information, Communication & Society 4 (4): 615–633. Das, Enny, Brad J. Bushman, Marieke D. Bezemer, Peter Kerkhof, and Ivar E. Vermeulen. 2009. How Terrorism News Reports Increase Prejudice against Outgroups: A Terror Management Account. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (3): 453–459. Davey, Monica. Iraqis from Far Home Sign up to Vote. The New York Times, 19th January 2005. Davies, Douglas J. 2011. Emotion, Identity, and Religion: Hope, Reciprocity, and Otherness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davis, A. 2000. Public Relations, News Production and the Changing Patterns of Access in the British National Media. Media Culture Society 22 (1): 39–59. ———. 2002. Public Relations Democracy: Public Relations, Politics and the Mass Media in Britain. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Davis, Teresa. 2010. Third Spaces or Heterotopias? Recreating and Negotiating Migrant Identity Using Online Spaces. Sociology 44 (4): 661–677. de Haes, Ignace, Ute Husken, and Paul van der Velde. 2011. Media on the Ritual Battlefield. In Ritual, Media, and Conflict, ed. Ronald L. Grimes, Ute Husken, Udo Simon, and Eric Venbrux, 189–222. Oxford: Oxford University Press. de Rooij, Laurens. 2015. Non-Muslim Perceptions of Islam in the News. Durham University. ———. 2017. Believing and Belonging. The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion. Journal of Religion in Europe 10 (1–2): 172–217. De Sondy, Amanullah. 2015. The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities. London: Bloomsbury Academic. de Vreese, Claes H. 2005. News Framing: Theory and Typology. Information Design Journal +Document Design 13 (1): 51–62. Dechesne, Mark, Jacques Janssen, and Ad van Knippenberg. 2000. Derogation and Distancing as Terror Management Strategies: The Moderating Role of Need for Closure and Permeability of Group Boundaries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79 (6): 923. Demerath, Nicholas Jay, and Rhys H. Williams. 1985. Civil Religion in an Uncivil Society. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: 154–166. Denham, Bryan E. 1999. Building the Agenda and Adjusting the Frame: How the Dramatic Revelations of Lyle Alzado Impacted Mainstream Press Coverage of Anabolic Steroid Use. Sociology of Sport Journal 16 (1): 1–15. Di Nucci, Ezio. 2013. Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5): 662–672. Dika, Sandra L., and Kusum Singh. 2002. Applications of Social Capital in Educational Literature: A Critical Synthesis. Review of Educational Research 72 (1): 31–60. Dobbernack, Jan, Nasar Meer, and Tariq Modood. 2015. Misrecognition and Political Agency. The Case of Muslim Organisations in a General Election. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 17 (2): 189–206. Doosje, Bertjan, Sven Zebel, Marieke Scheermeijer, and Pauline Mathyi. 2007. Attributions of Responsibility for Terrorist Attacks: The Role of Group Membership and Identification. International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV) 1 (2): 127–141. Doucet, Andrea. 2006. Do Men Mother?: Fathering, Care, and Domestic Responsibility. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

254

Bibliography

Druckman, Daniel. 1994. Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective. Mershon International Studies Review 38 (1): 43–68. du Plessis, Gitte. 2015. Enjoy Your Vacation! Ephemera 15 (4): 755. Duke, Lisa. 2000. Black in a Blonde World: Race and Girls’ Interpretations of the Feminine Ideal in Teen Magazines. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 77 (2): 367–392. Dunleavy, P., R. Heffernan, P. Cowley, and C. Hay. 2006. Developments in British Politics. Vol. 8. London/New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Durkheim, Emile, and Joseph Ward Swain. 2008. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Courier Corporation. Dutta, Kunal. Met Chief Calls for Calm after Islamic School Attack. The Independent, 10-06-2013. Dwyer, Claire. 1999a. Veiled Meanings: British Muslim Women and the Negotiation of Differences. Gender, Place and Culture 6 (1): 5–26. ———. 1999b. Contradictions of Community: Questions of Identity for Young British Muslim Women. Environment and Planning A 31 (1): 53–68. ———. 2008. The geographies of veiling: Muslim women in Britain. Geography 93 (3): 140–147. Dwyer, C., and B.  Shah. 2009. Rethinking the Identities of Young British Pakistani Muslim Women. In Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities, ed. Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale, 55–73. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Dwyer, Claire, Bindi Shah, and Gurchathen Sanghera. 2008. ‘From Cricket Lover to Terror Suspect’–Challenging Representations of Young British Muslim Men. Gender, Place & Culture 15 (2): 117–136. Edwards, Lee. 2006. Rethinking Power in Public Relations. Public Relations Review 32 (3): 229–231. ———. 2008. Pr Practitioners’ Cultural Capital: An Initial Study and Implications for Research and Practice. Public Relations Review 34 (4): 367–372. ———. 2009. Symbolic Power and Public Relations Practice: Locating Individual Practitioners in Their Social Context. Journal of Public Relations Research 21 (3): 251–272. Eid, Mahmoud. 2014. Perceptions About Muslims in Western Societies. In Engaging the Other: Public Policy and Western-Muslim Intersections, ed. Karim H.  Karim and Mahmoud Eid. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Elgamri, Elzain. 2008. Islam in the British Broadsheets: The Impact of Orientalism on Representations of Islam in the British Press. Ithaca: Ithaca Press. Ellick, Adam B. 2011. Speed-Dating, Muslim Style. The New York Times, 11. Elmelund-Præstekjær, Christian, and Charlotte Wien. 2008. Mediestormens Politiske Indflydelse Og Anatomi’ [The Political Influence and Anatomy of the Media Storm]. Nordicom Information: 19–28. Emmons, Robert A. 2005. Emotion and Religion. In Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, ed. Raymond F.  Paloutzian and Chrystal L.  Park, 235–252. New  York: Guilford Press. Entman, Robert. 1993. Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication 43: 41–58. Esposito, John L., and Ibrahim Kalin. 2011. Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Falkenhayner, Nicole. 2014. Making the British Muslim: Representations of the Rushdie Affair and Figures of the War-on-Terror Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Farouqui, Arthur. 2009. Muslims and Media Images. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Faruqi, Al, and Lois Ibsen. 1985. Islam and Art. Islamabad: National Hijra Council. Fein, Steven, and Steven J. Spencer. 1997. Prejudice as Self-Image Maintenance: Affirming the Self through Derogating Others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73 (1): 31–44. Fetzer, J.S., and J.C.  Soper. 2005. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Field, C.D. 2007. Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 18 (4): 447–477.

Bibliography

255

Fink, Janet S. 1998. Female Athletes and the Media: Strides and Stalemates. Journal of Physical Education, Recreation & Dance 69 (6): 37–40. Fischer, Michael. 1980. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fish, Stanley E. 1980. Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fleischmann, Fenella, Karen Phalet, and Olivier Klein. 2011. Religious Identification and Politicization in the Face of Discrimination: Support for Political Islam and Political Action among the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Europe. British Journal of Social Psychology 50 (4): 628–648. Flory, Richard W., and Donald Earl Miller. 2000. Genx Religion. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan. London: Penguin Books. ———. 1984. What is an Author?. Translated by Jouse Harari. In The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books. ———. 1994. Des Espaces Autres. In Dits Et Écrits: 1954-1988, 752–762. Paris: Éditions Gallimard. ———. 2002. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London/New York: Routledge. ———. 2003. Society must be Defended. Translated by D. Macey. In Lectures at the College De France, 1975-76, ed. M. Bertani and A. Fontana. New York: Picador. Fowler, B. 2000. A Sociological Analysis of the Satanic Verses Affair. Theory, Culture and Society 17. Fraser, Nancy, and Axel Honneth. 2003. Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange. London: Verso. Fredrickson, Barbara L. 2001. The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology: The Broaden and Build Theory of Positive Emotions. American Psychologist 56: 218–226. Freedom, D., and D.  Kishan Thussu. 2012. Introduction. In Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives, ed. D. Freedom and D. Kishan Thussu. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Friedman, A.R. 1992. Rape and Domestic Violence: The Experience of Refugee Women. In Refugee Women and Their Mental Health: Shattered Societies, Shattered Lives, ed. E. Cole, O. Espin, and E.D. Rothblum, 65–78. New York: Harrington Park Press. Friedman, A., Y.  Tzukerman, H.  Wienberg, and J.  Todd. 1992. The Shift in Power with Age: Changes in Perception of the Power of Women and Men over the Life Cycle. Psychology of Women Quarterly 16 (4): 513–525. Fritsche, Immo, Nicolas Koranyi, Christiane Beyer, Eva Jonas, and Beatrice Fleischmann. 2009. Enemies Welcome: Personal Threat and Reactions to Outgroup Doves and Hawks. Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale 22 (3): 157–179. Gaertner, Samuel L., and John F. Dovidio. 2014. Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Galtung, Johan, and Mari Holmboe Ruge. 1965. The Structure of Foreign News the Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers. Journal of Peace Research 2 (1): 64–90. Games, Stephen. Compromised Coverage: Can the BBC Really Report from Gaza? Haaretz, 24-07-2014. Gearon, Liam. 2013. The Counter Terrorist Classroom: Religion, Education, and Security. Religious Education 108 (2): 129–147. Geaves, Ron. 2008. Drawing on the Past to Transform the Present: Contemporary Challenges for Training and Preparing British Imams. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28 (1): 99–112. Gerard Forsey, Martin. 2010. Ethnography as Participant Listening. Ethnography 11 (4): 558–572. Gholami, Reza. 2015. Secularism and Identity: Non-Islamiosity in the Iranian Diaspora. London/ New York: Routledge. Gilliat-Ray, S. 2010. Muslims in Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gilroy, P. 1987. There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. London: Hutchinson.

256

Bibliography

Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss. 2017. Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. London/New York: Routledge. Glenn, E.N., G. Chang, and L.R. Forcey, eds. 2016. Mothering: Ideology, Experience, and Agency. New York: Routledge. Gluck, Sherna Berger, and Daphne Patai. 2013. Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History. London/New York: Routledge. Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. New York: Harper & Row. González, Velasco, Maykel Verkuyten Karina, Jeroen Weesie, and Edwin Poppe. 2008. Prejudice Towards Muslims in the Netherlands: Testing Integrated Threat Theory. British Journal of Social Psychology 47 (4): 667–685. Graber, Doris A. 1988. Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide. New York: Longman. Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. ———. 2001. (I) History of the Subaltern Classes; (II) the Concept of “Ideology”; (III) Cultural Themes: Ideological Material. Translated by David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. In Media and Cultural Studies Keyworks, ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner. Oxford: Blackwell. Greater London Authority. 2007. The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the UK Media. London: Greater London Authority. Greenberg, Jeff, and Spee Kosloff. 2008. Terror Management Theory: Implications for Understanding Prejudice, Stereotyping, Intergroup Conflict, and Political Attitudes. Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2 (5): 1881–1894. Greenberg, J., L. Simon, T. Pyszczynski, S. Solomon, and D. Chatel. 1992. Terror Management and Tolerance: Does Mortality Salience Always Intensify Negative Reactions to Others Who Threaten One’s Worldview? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63 (2): 212–220. Greenberg, Jeff, Sheldon Solomon, and Tom Pyszczynski. 1997. Terror Management Theory of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews: Empirical Assessments and Conceptual Refinements. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 29: 61–139. Greenberg, Jeff, Jeff Schimel, Andy Martens, Sheldon Solomon, and Tom Pyszcznyski. 2001. Sympathy for the Devil: Evidence That Reminding Whites of Their Mortality Promotes More Favorable Reactions to White Racists. Motivation and Emotion 25 (2): 113–133. Griffin, Michael. 2002. From Cultural Imperialism to Transnational Commercialization: Shifting Paradigms in International Media Studies. Global Media Journal 1 (1). Grillo, Ralph. 2004. Islam and Transnationalism. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30 (5): 861–878. Grünberg, Jaan, and Josef Pallas. 2013. Beyond the News Desk–The Embeddedness of Business News. Media, Culture & Society 35 (2): 216–233. Gudelunas, David. 2012. There’s an App for That: The Uses and Gratifications of Online Social Networks for Gay Men. Sexuality & Culture 16 (4): 347–365. Guest, Mathew, Elizabeth Olson, and John Wolffe. 2012. Christianity: Loss of Monopoly. In Religion and Change in Modern Britain, ed. L. Woodhead and R. Catto. London/New York: Routledge. Guibernau, Montserrat. 2004. Anthony D.  Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment. Nations and Nationalism 10 (1–2): 125–141. Guimelli, Christian, Grégory Lo Monaco, and Jean-Claude Deschamps. 2010. The Lawsuit against “Charlie Hebdo” and Its Effects on the Social Representations of the Muslim Community. Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale 23 (4): 5–36. Habib, Samar. 2009. Islam and Homosexuality. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Tyler Golson. 2007. Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and Cooption of Moderate Islam in Western Europe. Journal of Church and State 49 (1): 487–516.

Bibliography

257

Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Adair T.  Lummis. 1987. Islamic Values in the United States: A Comparative Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haferkamp, Nina, Sabrina C.  Eimler, Anna-Margarita Papadakis, and Jana Vanessa Kruck. 2012. Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus? Examining Gender Differences in Self-­ Presentation on Social Networking Sites. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 15 (2): 91–98. Hafez, Kai, ed. 2000. Islam and the West in the Mass Media. Cresskill: Hampton Press. Hall, Stuart. 1973. The Determinations of News Photographs. In The Manufacture of News: Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media, ed. Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, 226–243. London: Constable. ———. 1978. The Treatment of Football Hooliganism in the Press. In Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context, ed. Roger Ingham. London: Inter-Action Imprint. ———. 1980. Encoding/Decoding. In Culture, Media, Language, ed. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Love, and Paul Willis, 128–138. London: Hutchinson. ———. 1981. Encoding/Decoding in TV Discourse. In Culture, Media, Language, ed. S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe, and P. Willis. London: Hutchinson. Hammond, Phillip E., Amanda Porterfield, James G.  Moseley, and Jonathan D.  Sarna. 1994. Forum: American Civil Religion Revisited. Religion and American Culture: 1–23. Harcup, Tony, and Deirdre O’Neill. 2001. What is News? Galtung and Ruge Revisited. Journalism Studies 2 (2): 261–268. Hargreaves, John. 1986. Sport, Power and Culture. A Social and Historical Analysis of Popular Sports in Britain. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hart, Matt. 2015. Youth Intimacy on Tumblr a Pilot Study. Young 23 (3): 193–208. Hasan, Mehdi. British Muslims Must Step Outside This Anti-War Comfort Zone. The Guardian, 2 April 2012. Haslam, Nick. 2000. Essentialist Beliefs About Social Categories. British Journal of Social Psychology 39 (1): 113–127. Haslam, Nick, Louis Rothschild, and Donald Ernst. 2002. Are Essentialist Beliefs Associated with Prejudice? British Journal of Social Psychology 41 (1): 87–100. Hastings, Max. Enemy within that Hates our Tolerance. Daily Mail, 24-05-2013. Hayes, Joseph, Jeff Schimel, Erik H.  Faucher, and Todd J.  Williams. 2008a. Evidence for the DTA Hypothesis II: Threatening Self-Esteem Increases Death-Thought Accessibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (3): 600–613. Hayes, Joseph, Jeff Schimel, and Todd J.  Williams. 2008b. Fighting Death with Death: The Buffering Effects of Learning that Worldview Violators have Died. Psychological Science 19 (5): 501–507. Hayes, Joseph, Jeff Schimel, Jamie Arndt, and Erik H. Faucher. 2010. A Theoretical and Empirical Review of the Death-Thought Accessibility Concept in Terror Management Research. Psychological Bulletin 136 (5): 699–739. Hayes, Joseph, Jeff Schimel, Todd J.  Williams, Andrea L.  Howard, David Webber, and Erik H.  Faucher. 2015. Worldview Accommodation: Selectively Modifying Committed Beliefs Provides Defense against Worldview Threat. Self and Identity 14 (5): 521–548. Heine, Steven J., Travis Proulx, and Kathleen D. Vohs. 2006. The Meaning Maintenance Model: On the Coherence of Social Motivations. Personality and Social Psychology Review 10 (2): 88–110. Heino, Rebecca D., Nicole B. Ellison, and Jennifer L. Gibbs. 2010. Relationshopping: Investigating the Market Metaphor in Online Dating. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 27 (4): 427–447. Hepp, Andreas. 2013. Cultures of Mediatization. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hitlan, Robert T., Kimberly Carrillo, Michael A. Zárate, and Shelley N. Aikman. 2007. Attitudes toward Immigrant Groups and the September 11 Terrorist Attacks. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 13 (2): 135–152.

258

Bibliography

Hjarvard, Stig. 2008a. The Mediatization of Religion: A Theory of the Media as Agents of Religious Change. Northern Lights: Film & Media Studies Yearbook 6 (1): 9–26. ———. 2008b. The Mediatization of Society. Atheory of the Media as Agents of Social and Cultural Change. Nordicom Review 29 (2): 105–134. ———. 2013. The Mediatization of Culture and Society. London/New York: Routledge. HM Government. 2000. The Terrorism Act 2000. London: The Stationary Office. ———. 2015. Counter-Terrorism and Security Act. London: Crown Copyright. ———. Prevent Duty Guidance: Guidance for Specified Authorities in England and Wales on the Duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due Regard to the need to Prevent People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf Hoge, Dean R., Gregory H. Petrillo, and Ella I. Smith. 1982. Transmission of Religious and Social Values from Parents to Teenage Children. Journal of Marriage and the Family: 569–580. Hogg, Michael A. 2000. Subjective Uncertainty Reduction through Self-Categorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes. European Review of Social Psychology 11 (1): 223–255. Home Office. Prevent Strategy. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-­strategy-­review.pdf Honneth, Alex. 1994. Kampf Um Anerkennung: Zur Moralischen Grammatik Sozialer Konflikte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Hoover, Stewart M., ed. 1998. Religion in the News: Faith and Journalism in American Public Discourse. Thousand Oaks: Sage. ———. 2006a. Reception of Religion and Media. In Religion in the Media Age, ed. Stewart M. Hoover, 113–146. London/New York: Routledge. ———., ed. 2006b. Religion in the Media Age. London/New York: Routledge. Hopkins, P.E. 2006. Youthful Muslim Masculinities: Gender and Generational Relations. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31 (3): 337–352. Hopkins, Peter. 2009. Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities: Race, Place and Identities. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hopkins, Peter E. 2017. Scotland’s Muslims: Society, Politics and Identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hoskins, A., and B. O’Laughlin. 2007. Television and Terror: Conflicting Times and the Crisis of News Discourse. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Hot Cross Buns Banned for Fear of Offence. The Times, 17 March 2003. House of Commons. Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings. House of Commons, https:// www.gov.uk/government/publications/muslim-brotherhood-review-main-findings Hussain, A.J. 2007. The Media’s Role in a Clash of Misconceptions: The Case of the Danish Muhammad Cartoons. The International Journal of Press/Politics 12 (4): 112–130. Hvithamar, Annika, Margit Warburg, and Brian Arly Jacobsen. 2009. Holy Nations and Global Identities: Civil Religion, Nationalism, and Globalisation. Leiden: Brill. Ibn Ali Ash-shawkani, Muhammad. 1967. Nail Al-Awtaar. Lahore. Institute of Social and Economic Research. 2014. Immigrant Minorities Suffer Low Rates of Social Mobility. Colchester: University of Essex. https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/2014/06/13/ immigrant-­minorities-­suffer-­low-­rates-­of-­social-­mobility. Ipsos Mori, Department for Education, C.  Phillips, D.  Tse, and F.  Johnson. 2010. Community Cohesion and Prevent: How have Schools Responded? London: Ipsos Mori and Department for Education. Ismael, Tareq Y., and Andrew Rippin, eds. 2010. Islam in the Eyes of the West. London/New York: Routledge. Iyengar, Shanto. 1987. Television News and Citizens’ Explanations of National Affairs. American Political Science Review 81: 815–831. ———. 1991. Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bibliography

259

Iyengar, Shanto, and Adam Simon. 1993. News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing. Communication Research 20: 365–383. Jabar, Faleh A. 2003. The Shi’Ite Movement in Iraq. London: Saqi. Jackson, Richard. 2007. Constructing Enemies:‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse. Government and Opposition 42 (3): 394–426. Jaspal, Rusi. 2010. Media Representations of British Muslims and Hybridised Threats to Identity. Contemporary Islam 4 (3): 289–310. Jaspal, Rusi, and Marco Cinnirella. 2010. Coping with Potentially Incompatible Identities: Accounts of Religious, Ethnic, and Sexual Identities from British Pakistani Men Who Identify as Muslim and Gay. British Journal of Social Psychology 49 (4): 849–870. Jelin, Elizabeth, Judy Rein, and Marcial Godoy-Anativia. 2003. State Repression and the Labors of Memory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Jenkins, Richard. 1997. Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations. Sage. Jensen, Klaus Bruhn. 1988. News as Social Resource: A Qualitative Empirical Study of the Reception of Danish Television News. European Journal of Communication 3: 275–300. Jensen, Jan Møller. 2011. The Relationships Between Socio-demographic Variables, Travel Motivations and Subsequent Choice of Vacation. Paper presented at the 2nd International Conference on Economics, Business and Management. Johnson, Asal Mohamadi, and Rebecca Miles. 2014. Toward More Inclusive Public Spaces: Learning from the Everyday Experiences of Muslim Arab Women in New  York City. Environment and Planning A 46 (8): 1892–1907. Johnson, Michael P., John P. Caughlin, and Ted L. Huston. 1999. The Tripartite Nature of Marital Commitment: Personal, Moral, and Structural Reasons to Stay Married. Journal of Marriage and the Family: 160–177. Jonas, Eva, and Immo Fritsche. 2013. Destined to Die but not to Wage War: How Existential Threat can Contribute to Escalation or De-escalation of Violent Intergroup Conflict. American Psychologist 68 (7): 543–558. Jorgensen, Danny L. 2015. Participant Observation. In Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource, 1–15. Juergensmeyer, M. 2000. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kabeer, N. 1999. Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment. Development and Change 30: 435–464. Kahani-Hopkins, V., and N.  Hopkins. 2002. 'Representing British Muslims: The Strategic Dimension to Identity Construction. Ethnic and Racial Studies 37 (3): 355–372. Kalliny, Morris, and Angela Hausman. 2007. The Impact of Cultural and Religious Values on Consumer’s Adoption of Innovation. Academy of Marketing Studies Journal 11 (1): 125. Kamberelis, George, and Greg Dimitriadis. 2013. Focus Groups. London/New York: Routledge. Kane, Mary Jo, and Susan L.  Greendorfer. 1994. The Media’s Role in Accommodating and Resisting Stereotyped Images of Women in Sport. In Women, Media, and Sport: Challenging Gender Values, ed. Pamela J. Creedon. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Katz, Elihu, Jay G. Blumler, and Michael Gurevitch. 1973. Uses and Gratifications Research. The Public Opinion Quarterly 37 (4): 509–523. Kaya, Ayhan. 2014. Islamophobia: A History of the Term. In The Oxford Handbook of European Islam, ed. Jocelyne Cesari. New York: Oxford University Press. Keane, D. 2008a. Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression. Human Rights Quarterly 30 (4): 845–875. Keane, Webb. 2008b. The Evidence of the Senses and the Materiality of Religion. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 14: S110–SS27. Kelman, Herbert C. 2001. Reflections on Social and Psychological Processes of Legitimization and Delegitimization. In The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations, ed. J.T.  Jost and Brenda Major, 54–73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

260

Bibliography

Kendall, G., and G. Wickham. 1999. Using Foucault’s Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Kepplinger, Hans Mathias. 2002. Mediatization of Politics: Theory and Data. Journal of Communication 52 (4): 972–986. Khan, K. 2009. Preventing Violent Extremism (Pve) and Prevent: A Response from the Muslim Community. London: An-Nisa Society. Khan, Jemima. 2012. The Marriage Business. New Statesman: 32–35. Kılıç, Sevgi., Sawitri Saharso, and Birgit Sauer. 2008. Introduction: the veil: debating citizenship, gender and religious diversity. Social Politics 15 (4): 397–410. Kim, Young Yun, and Kelly McKay-Semmler. 2013. Social Engagement and Cross-Cultural Adaptation: An Examination of Direct-and Mediated Interpersonal Communication Activities of Educated Non-natives in the United States. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (1): 99–112. King, Ursula. 1995. Religion and Gender. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. Kitzinger, Jenny. 1994. The Methodology of Focus Groups: The Importance of Interaction between Research Participants. Sociology of Health and Illness 16 (1): 103–121. ———. 1995. Qualitative Research: Introducing Focus Groups. BMJ 311: 299–315. Knott, Kim. The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis. London: Equinox, 2005. ———. 2009. From Locality to Location and Back Again: A Spatial Journey in the Study of Religion. Religion 39 (2): 154–169. Knott, Kim, and Sajda Khokher. 1993. Religious and Ethnic Identity among Young Muslim Women in Bradford. New Community 19 (4): 593–610. Knott, Kim, and Jolyon P. Mitchell. 2012. The Changing Faces of Media and Religion. In Religion and Change in Modern Britain, ed. Linda Woodhead and Rebecca Catto. London/New York: Routledge. Knott, Kim, Elizabeth Poole, and Teemu Taira. 2013. Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred: Representation and Change. Farnham: Ashgate. Koenig, Matthias. 2007. Europeanising the Governance of Religious Diversity: An Institutionalist Account of Muslim Struggles for Public Recognition. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33 (6): 911–932. Krotz, F. 2009. Mediatization: Aconcept with Which to Grasp Media and Societal Change in the Uk. In Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences, ed. Knut Lundby, 21–40. New York: Peter Lang. Krueger, Richard A., and Mary Anne Casey. 2014. Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Kundnani, Arun. 2009. Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism. London: Institute of Race Relations. Kwan, Mei-Po, Peter Hopkins, and Cara Aitchison. 2012. Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender and Belonging. Farnham: Ashgate. Ladd-Taylor, M. 1994. Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare, and the State, 1890–1930. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Lægaard, Sune. 2012. Unequal Recognition, Misrecognition and Injustice: The Case of Religious Minorities in Denmark. Ethnicities 12 (2): 197–214. Lambert, R., and J. Githens-Mazer. 2010. Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Uk Case Studies 2010. Exeter: European Muslim Research Centre, University of Exeter. Landau, Mark J., Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, Florette Cohen, Tom Pyszczynski, Jamie Arndt, Claude H. Miller, Daniel M. Ogilvie, and Alison Cook. 2004. Deliver Us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30 (9): 1136–1150. Lang, Gladys Engel, and Kurt Lang. 1983. The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press and the Polls During Watergate. New York: Columbia University Press. Larsson, Goran. 2011. Muslims and the New Media. Farnham: Ashgate. Leeman, Alex B. 2009. Interfaith Marriage in Islam: An Examination of the Legal Theory Behind the Traditional and Reformist Positions. Indiana Law Journal 84: 743.

Bibliography

261

Lefebvre, Henri. 1974. La Production De L’espace. Paris: Anthropos. Lemyre, Louise, and Philip M.  Smith. 1985. Intergroup Discrimination and Self-Esteem in the Minimal Group Paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49 (3): 660–670. Leonard, V.W. 1996. Mothering as a Practice. In Caregiving: Readings in Knowledge, Practice, Ethics, and Politics, ed. S.  Gordon, P.  Benner, and N.  Noddings, 124–140. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Levidow, L. 2007. The Politics of Identity. In Islam in the European Union: Transnationalism, Youth and the War on Terror, ed. Y. Samad and K. Sen. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Lewin, Kurt. 1947. Frontiers in Group Dynamics II. Channels of Group Life; Social Planning and Action Research. Human Relations 1 (2): 143–153. Lewis, Reina. 2015. Muslim Fashion: Contemporary Style Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press. Lewis, P.  Islamic, and Britain. 1994. Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims. London: I.B. Tauris. Lewis, Justin, Sut Jhally, and Michael Morgan. 1991. The Gulf War: A Study of the Media, Public Opinion and Public Knowledge. Center for the Study of Communication Research Archives, Department of Communication, University of Massachusetts. Lewis, Justin Matthew, Andy Williams Wren, Robert Arthur Franklin, James Thomas, and Nicholas Alexander Mosdell. 2008. The Quality and Independence of British Journalism. Cardiff: Cardiff School of Journalism, Media, and Cultural Studies. Liamputtong, Pranee. 2011. Focus Group Methodology: Principle and Practice. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Liberty (The National Council for Civil Liberties). 2006. Liberty’s Response to Lord Carlile’s Review of the Definition of Terrorism. http://www.liberty-­human-­rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy06/ response-­to-­carlile-­review-­of-­terrorism-­definition.pdf Lickel, Brian, Toni Schmader, and David L. Hamilton. 2003. A Case of Collective Responsibility: Who Else was to Blame for the Columbine High School Shootings? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29 (2): 194–204. Liepyte, Skaiste, and Kareena McAloney-Kocaman. 2015. Discrimination and Religiosity among Muslim Women in the UK before and after the Charlie Hebdo Attacks. Mental Health, Religion & Culture 18 (9): 789–794. Lightfoot, C., and J. Valsiner. 1992. Parental Belief Systems under the Influence: Social Guidance of the Construction of Personal Cultures. In Parental Belief Systems: The Psychological Consequences for Children, ed. I.E.  Sigel, A.V.  McGillicuddy-DeLisi, and J.J.  Goodnow, 393–414. Hillsdale: Erlbaum. Liu, James H., and Denis J. Hilton. 2005. How the Past Weighs on the Present: Social Representations of History and Their Role in Identity Politics. British Journal of Social Psychology 44 (4): 537–556. Lo, Mbaye, and Taimoor Aziz. 2009. Muslim Marriage Goes Online: The Use of Internet Matchmaking by American Muslims. Journal of Religion and Popular Culture 21 (3): 5–5. London Borough of Brent. 2013. The 2011 Census: A Profile of Brent. London: Borough of Brent. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. 2007. The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. London: The Stationary Office. Louër, Laurence. 2008. Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press. Lumpkin, Angela, and Linda D. Williams. 1991. An Analysis of Sports Illustrated Feature Articles, 1954-1987. Sociology of Sport Journal 8: 16–32. Lundby, Knut, ed. 2009. Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences. New York: Peter Lang. Lustig, Robin, Martin Bailey, Simon de Bruxelles, and Ian Mather. War of the Word. The Observer, 19-02-1989. Magnani, L. 2011. Understanding Violence. The Intertwining of Morality, Religion and Violence: A Philosophical Stance. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rationality. Berlin: Springer.

262

Bibliography

Maher, T.  Michael. 2001. Framing: An Emerging Paradigm or a Phase of Agenda Setting? In Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World, ed. Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy Jr, and August E. Grant, 83–94. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum. Mahmood, Saba. 2005. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mallat, Chibli. 1998. The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi‘I International. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mamdani, Mahmood. 2005. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Three Leaves Press. Mandaville, Peter. 2001. Reimagining Islam in Diaspora : The Politics of Mediated Community. International Communication Gazette 63 (2–3): 169–186. Marques, José M., and Dario Paez. 1994. The ‘Black Sheep Effect’: Social Categorization, Rejection of Ingroup Deviates, and Perception of Group Variability. European Review of Social Psychology 5 (1): 37–68. Martens, Andy, Jeff Greenberg, Jeff Schimel, and Mark J.  Landau. 2004. Ageism and Death: Effects of Mortality Salience and Perceived Similarity to Elders on Reactions to Elderly People. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30 (12): 1524–1536. Martineau, Wendy. 2012. Misrecognition and Cross-Cultural Understanding: Shaping the Space for a “Fusion of Horizons”. Ethnicities 12 (2): 161–177. Masood, E. 2006. British Muslims: Media Guide. London: The British Council. Matar, N. 1998. Islam in Britain 1558–1685. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maussen, Marcel. 2012. Pillarization and Islam: Church-State Traditions and Muslim Claims for Recognition in the Netherlands. Comparative European Politics 10 (3): 337–353. Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, and Winfried Schulz. 1999. “Mediatization” of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy? Political Communication 16 (3): 247–261. McAdams, Dan P., and Bradley D. Olson. 2010. Personality Development: Continuity and Change over the Life Course. Annual Review of Psychology 61: 517–542. McEnery, Tony, Mark McGlashan, and Robbie Love. 2015. Press and Social Media Reaction to Ideologically Inspired Murder: The Case of Lee Rigby. Discourse & Communication 9 (2): 237–259. McGregor, Edward. 1989. Mass Media and Sport: Influences on the Public. Physical Educator 46 (1): 52. McGregor, Holly A., Joel D. Lieberman, Jeff Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon, Jamie Arndt, Linda Simon, and Tom Pyszczynski. 1998. Terror Management and Aggression: Evidence That Mortality Salience Motivates Aggression against Worldview-Threatening Others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (3): 590–605. McGuire, Meredith B. 1997. Religion: The Social Context. Belmont: Wadsworth. McLaughlin, Fiona. 1997. Islam and Popular Music in Senegal: The Emergence of a ‘New Tradition’. Africa 67 (4): 560–581. ———. 2011. Youssou N’dour’s Sant Yalla/Egypt: A Musical Experiment in Sufi Modernity. Popular Music 30 (1): 71–87. McLoughlin, S. 2000. Researching Muslim Minorities. Some Reflections on Fieldwork in Britain. Journal of Semitic Studies Supplement 12: 175–191. McLoughlin, Seán, and John Zavos. 2014. Writing Religion in British Asian Diasporas. In Writing the City in British Asian Diaspora, ed. Seán McLoughlin, William Gould, Ananya Jahanara Kabir, and Emma Tomalin, 175. London/New York: Routledge. McNay, Lois. 2013. Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. Meer, Nasar. 2012. Misrecognising Muslim Consciousness in Europe. Ethnicities 12 (2): 178–196. Meer, Nasar, and Tariq Modood. 2009. The Multicultural State We’re in: Muslims, ‘Multiculture’ and the ‘Civic Re-balancing’ of British Multiculturalism. Political Studies 57: 473–497.

Bibliography

263

———. 2013. Refutations of racism in the ‘Muslim question’. in Anti-Muslim Prejudice. London, Routledge, 126–145. Meer, Nasar, and Per Mouritsen. 2009. Political Cultures Compared: The Muhammad Cartoons in the Danish and British Press. Ethnicities 9 (3): 334–360. Meer, Nasar., Claire Dwyer, and Tariq Modood. 2010. Embodying Nationhood? Conceptions of British national identity, citizenship, and Gender in the ‘Veil Affair’. The Sociological Review 58 (1): 84–111. Meer, Nasar, Wendy Martineau, and Simon Thompson. 2012. Misrecognition and Ethno-Religious Diversity. Ethnicities 12 (2): 131–141. Meertens, Roel W., and Thomas F.  Pettigrew. 1997. Is Subtle Prejudice Really Prejudice? The Public Opinion Quarterly 61 (1): 54–71. Meggle, G. 2006. What is Terrorism? In Terrorism: Moral, Legal and Political Issues, ed. J. Babic, 11–24. Beograd: Filozofski Godisnjak. Mehlman, Jeffrey. 1972. The “Floating Signifier”: From Lévi-Strauss to Lacan. Yale French Studies: 10–37. Mernissi, Fatima. 1987. Beyond the Veil, Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press. Messenger Davies, M. 2010. Children, Media and Culture. Berkshire: Open University Press. Middleton, Paul. 2014. What is Martyrdom? Mortality 19 (2): 117–133. Miller, D., and R.  Sabir. 2012. Propaganda and Terrorism. In Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives, ed. D. Freedom and D. Kishan Thussu. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Mishra, Smeeta, Mathukutty M.  Monippally, and Krishna P.  Jayakar. 2013. Self Presentation in Online Environments: A Study of Indian Muslim Matrimonial Profiles. Asian Journal of Communication 23 (1): 38–53. Modood, Tariq. 1990. British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair. The Poltical Quarterly 61 (2): 143–160. ———. 2005a. Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ———. 2005b. Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain. Vol. 22. University of Minnesota Press. ———. 2006. Ethnicity, Muslims and Higher Education Entry in Britain. Teaching in Higher Education 11. ———. 2009. Muslims, Religious Equality and Secularism. In Secularism, Religious and Multicultural Citizenship, ed. G.  Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Modood, T., and S. May. 2001. Multiculturalism and Education in Britain: An Internally Contested Debate. International Journal of Educational Research 35 (3): 305–317. Moore, Kerry, Paul Mason, and Justin Lewis. Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims in the Nmational Press, 2000-2008. Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. http://www.channel4.com/news/media/pdfs/Cardiff%20Final%20Report.pdf Moors, Annelies. 2013. Unregistered Islamic Marriages: Anxieties About Sexuality and Islam. In The Application of Sharia in the West. Leiden: Leiden University Press. Morey, P., and A. Yaqin. 2011. Framing Muslims. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Morgan, David. 2007. The Lure of Images: A History of Religion and Visual Media in America. London/New York: Routledge. Morley, David, and Kevin Robins. 2002. Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries. London/New York: Routledge. Morris, Carl. 2016a. Finding a Voice: Young Muslims, Music and Cultural Change in Britain. In Young British Muslims: Rhetoric and Realities, ed. S. Hamid. [in print]. London/New York: Routledge. ———. 2016b. ‘Look into the Book of Life’: Muslim Musicians, Sufism and Postmodern Spirituality in Britain. Social Compass 63 (3): 389–404.

264

Bibliography

———. 2016c. Music and Materialism: The Emergence of Alternative Muslim Lifestyle Cultures in Britain. In Material Religion, ed. Tim Hutchings and Jo McKenzie. [in print]. London/New York: Routledge. Moscovici, Serge. 1981. On Social Representations. In Social Cognition: Perspectives on Everyday Understanding, ed. J.P. Forgas, 181–209. London: Academic Press. Motyl, Matt, and Tom Pyszczynski. 2009. The Existential Underpinnings of the Cycle of Terrorist and Counterterrorist Violence and Pathways to Peaceful Resolutions. Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale 22 (3): 267–291. Motyl, Matt, Joshua Hart, and Tom Pyszczynski. 2010. When Animals Attack: The Effects of Mortality Salience, Infrahumanization of Violence, and Authoritarianism on Support for War. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46 (1): 200–203. Motyl, Matt, Joshua Hart, Tom Pyszczynski, David Weise, Molly Maxfield, and Angelika Siedel. 2011. Subtle Priming of Shared Human Experiences Eliminates Threat-Induced Negativity toward Arabs, Immigrants, and Peace-Making. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47 (6): 1179–1184. MPAC (2010) ‘MPACUK take on Muslim MP Khalid Mahmood’, Muslim Public Affairs Committee. Available online at: http://www.mpacuk.org MPAC (2012) ‘Will Labour steal the Bradford West by-election?’, Muslim Public Affairs Committee. Available online at: http://www.mpacuk.org/ Muller, Steven. 1997. Time to Kill: Europe and the Politics of Leisure. The National Interest 48: 26–36. Murray, Douglas. When Will the Tories Stop Trawling for the “Muslim” Vote? The Telegraph, 3 May 2010. Musante, Kathleen, and Billie R. DeWalt. 2010. Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers. Rowman & Littlefield. Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. Forced Marriages Intiative. http://www.matribunal.com/forced-­ marriages-­intiative.php Muslim Council of Britain. Electing to Deliver. Muslim Council of Britain. www.mcb.org.uk/ vote2005/ELECTINGTODELIVER.pdf ———. Islamophobia. http://www.mcb.org.uk/islamophobia/ ———. The “Muslim Vote” – Does it Exist? Muslim Council of Britain. www.muslimvote.org.uk/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=97&Itemid=159 ———. Responding to Prevent 2011. http://soundings.mcb.org.uk/?cat=3 Muslim Public Affairs Committee. How You Can Help Save Us from a Zionist Mayor. Muslim Public Affairs Committee. www.mpacuk.org/content/view/4572 Muslim Thugs Burn Poppies Sickening Scenes on British Streets. Daily Star, 12 November 2010. Muslims Force [Swimming] Pool Cover Up. Daily Express, 26 July 2010. Muslims Tell British: Go to Hell!. Daily Express, 4 November 2010. Nakash, Itzhak. 2007. The Muharram Rituals and the Cult of Saints among Iraqi Shiites. In The Other Shiites: From the Mediterranean to Central Asia, ed. Alessandro Monsutti, Silvia Naef, Farian Sabahi, Ulrich Rudolph, and Gregor Schoeler, 115–137. New York: Peter Lang. Ndlela, Martin Nkosi. 2005. The African Paradigm: The Coverage of the Zimbabwean Crisis in the Norwegian Media. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 2. Special Issue November 2005: 71–90. Nelson, Kristina. 2001. The Art of Reciting the Qur’an. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press. Nelson, Judith A., Amy Manning Kirk, Pedra Ane, and Sheryl A.  Serres. 2011. Religious and Spiritual Values and Moral Commitment in Marriage: Untapped Resources in Couples Counseling? Counseling and Values 55 (2): 228–246. Nesi, Jacqueline, and Mitchell J. Prinstein. 2015. Using Social Media for Social Comparison and Feedback-Seeking: Gender and Popularity Moderate Associations with Depressive Symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 43 (8): 1427–1438. New Generation Network. Race and Faith: A New Agenda. The Guardian, 20 November 2006.

Bibliography

265

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1983. On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. Untimely Meditations. Translated by RJ Hollingdale, 57–123. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Noije, Van, Jan Kleinnijenhuis Lonneke, and Dirk Oegema. 2008. Loss of Parliamentary Control Due to Mediatization and Europeanization: A Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Analysis of Agenda Building in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. British Journal of Political Science 38 (3): 455–478. Norris, Pippa. 1995. The Restless Searchlight: Network News Framing of the Post-Cold War World. Political Communication 12: 357–370. Nyang, Sulayman. 1991. Convergence and Divergence in an Emergent Community: A Study of Challenges Facing U.S.  Muslims. In The Muslims of America, ed. Yvonne Z.  Haddad. New York: Oxford University Press. O’Toole, Therese, and Richard Gale. 2010. Contemporary Grammars of Political Action among Ethnic Minority Young Activists. Ethnic and Racial Studies 33 (1): 126–143. O’Toole, Therese, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Tariq Modood, Nasar Meer, and Stephen Jones. 2013. Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship: University of Bristol. http://www.bristol.ac.uk/ethnicity/projects/ muslimparticipation/documents/mpcgreport.pdf. Oakes, Penelope J., and John C. Turner. 1980. Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour: Does Minimal Intergroup Discrimination Make Social Identity More Positive? European Journal of Social Psychology 10 (3): 295–301. Oberman, Y., and R. Josselson. 1996. Matrix of Tensions: A Model of Mothering. Psychology of Women Quarterly 20: 341–359. Office for National Statistics. Number of Muslim Weddings. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-­ ons/business-­transparency/freedom-­of-­information/what-­can-­i-­request/previous-­foi-­requests/ population/number-­of-­muslim-­weddings/index.html Office of National Statistics. Number of Religious Marriages by Type of Ceremony: Opposite-Sex Couples Marrying, 2004 to 2015. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/ birthsdeathsandmarriages/marriagecohabitationandcivilpartnerships/adhocs/008310religious marriagesinenglandandwales2004to2015 Olsson, Susanne. 2017. Shia as Internal Others: A Salafi Rejection of the ‘Rejecters’. Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 28: 409–430. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 2006. The Representation of Muslims in Public Discourse. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Ory, David T., and Patricia L. Mokhtarian. 2005. When Is Getting There Half the Fun? Modeling the Liking for Travel. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 39 (2): 97–123. O’Reilly, A. 2019. Matricentric Feminism: A Feminism for Mothers. In The Routledge Companion to Motherhood, 51–60. Routledge. Osborn, Chandra Y., Blair T. Johnson, and Jeffrey D. Fisher. 2006. After 9/11 at Ground Zero: The Anxiety-Buffering Effects of Worldview Support on the First Anniversary of 9/11. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 28 (4): 303–310. Otterbeck, Jonas. 2008. Battling over the Public Sphere: Islamic Reactions to the Music of Today. Contemporary Islam 2 (3): 211–228. Overvold, Mark Carl. 1980. Self-Interest and the Concept of Self-Sacrifice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1): 105–118. Pal, Jiban K. 2010. Social Networks Enabling Matrimonial Information Services in India. International Journal of Library and Information Science 2 (4): 54–64. Pan, Zhongdang, and Gerald M.  Kosicki. 1993. Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse. Political Communication 10 (1): 55–75. Pandya, Abhijit. Galloway’s Victory is the Last Thing Britain Needs. The Daily Mail, 30 March 2012. Parameswaran, Radhika. 1999. Western Romance Fiction as English‐Language Media in Postcolonial India. Journal of Communication 49 (3): 84–105.

266

Bibliography

Park, Jaihyun, Karla Felix, and Grace Lee. 2007. Implicit Attitudes toward Arab-Muslims and the Moderating Effects of Social Information. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 29 (1): 35–45. Patterson, Thomas E. 1993. Out of Order. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing. Pedersen, Paul Mark. 2002. Examining Equity in Newspaper Photographs a Content Analysis of the Print Media Photographic Coverage of Interscholastic Athletics. International Review for the Sociology of Sport 37 (3–4): 303–318. Perks, Robert, and Alistair Thomson. 2015. The Oral History Reader. London/New York: Routledge. Petley, Julian, and Robin Richardson. 2013. Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. Pettigrew, Thomas F., and Linda R.  Tropp. 2006. A Meta-analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90 (5): 751–783. Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Phillips, D. 1998. Black Minority Ethnic Concentration, Segregation and Dispersal in Britain. Urban Studies 35 (10): 1681–1702. ———. 2006. Parallel Lives? Challenging Discourses of British Muslim Self-Segregation. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 24. Pickering, Michael. 2008. Research Methods for Cultural Studies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Pipes, Daniel. 1990. The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West. London: Transaction Publishers. Pipes, D. 2003. The Rushdie Affair. London: Transaction Publishers. Pitkin, Hannah Fenichel. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press. Pollard, Stephen. Galloway Victory is a Disaster for British Democracy. Daily Express, 31 March 2012. Poole, Elizabeth. 2000. Framing Islam: An Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of Islam in the British Press. In Islam and the West in the Mass Media, ed. Kai Hafez. Cresskill: Hampton Press. ———. 2002. Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims. London/New York: I.B. Tauris. ———. 2011. Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims before and after 9/11: The Uk Context. Global Media Journal -- Canadian Edition 4 (2): 49–62. Poole, Elizabeth. "The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage." In Muslims and the News Media, edited by Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, 89-102. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Poole, Elizabeth, and John E. Richardson, eds. 2006. Muslims and the News Media. I.B. Tauris: London/New York. Poole, Elizabeth, Kim Knott, and Teemu Taira. 2012. Religion in the British Media Today. In Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate. Portelli, Alessandro. 2009. Oral History, Oral Culture, and Italian Americans. Berlin: Springer. Post, J. 2007. The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the Ira to Al-Qaeda. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Poulton, Emma. 2005. English Media Representation of Football-Related Disorder: ‘Brutal, Short-­ Hand and Simplifying’? Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 8 (1): 27–47. Power, Marcus. 2007. Digitized Virtuosity: Video War Games and Post-9/11 Cyber-Deterrence. Security Dialogue 38 (2): 271–288. Purdam, Kingsley. 2001. Democracy in Practice: Muslims and the Labour Party at the Local Level. Politics 21 (3): 147–157. Pyszczynski, Tom, Robert A. Wicklund, Stefan Floresku, Holgar Koch, Gerardine Gauch, Sheldon Solomon, and Jeff Greenberg. 1996. Whistling in the Dark: Exaggerated Consensus Estimates in Response to Incidental Reminders of Mortality. Psychological Science 7 (6): 332–336.

Bibliography

267

Pyszczynski, Tom, Abdolhossein Abdollahi, Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, Florette Cohen, and David Weise. 2006. Mortality Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might: The Great Satan Versus the Axis of Evil. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32 (4): 525–537. Pyszczynski, T., M.S.  Motyl, K.E.  Vail, G.  Hirschberger, J.  Arndt, and Pelin Kesebir. 2012. A Collateral Advantage of Drawing Attention to the Problem of Global Warming: Increased Support for Peace-Making and Decreased Support for War. Journal of Peace Psychology 18 (4): 354–368. Quartermaine, Angela. 2016. Discussing Terrorism: A Pupil-Inspired Guide to UK Counter-­ Terrorism Policy Implementation in Religious Education Classrooms in England. British Journal of Religious Education 38 (1): 13–29. Rahman, Shafiur, S. Ahmed, and Shaynul Khan. 2006. Voices from the Minarets – Mcb Study of Uk Imams and Mosques. http://www.mcb.org.uk/uploads/vfm.pdf Rapoport, D. 2004. The Four Waves of Terrorism. In Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. A. Cronin and J. Ludes. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press. Rappaport, R.A. 1999. Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rasmussen, Anne. 2010. Women, the Recited Qur’an, and Islamic Music in Indonesia. Berkely: University of California Press. Rath, Claus-Dieter. 1991. Live Television and Its Audiences. In Remote Control: Television, Audiences, and Cultural Power, ed. Ellen Seiter, Hans Borchers, Gabriele Kreutzner, and Eva-­ Maria Warth. London/New York: Routledge. Rayner, G., and S. Swinford. Woolwich Attack: Terrorist Proclaimed “an Eye for an Eye” after Attack”. The Telegraph, 22 May 2013. Reed, Jan, and Valerie Roskell Payton. 1997. Focus Groups: Issues of Analysis and Interpretation. Journal of Advanced Nursing 26: 765–771. Ribbens, J. 1994. Mothers and Their Children: A Feminist Sociology of Childrearing. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Richards, David A.J. 1999. Identity and the Case for Gay Rights: Race, Gender, Religion as Analogies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Richards, Anthony. 2011. The Problem with ‘Radicalization’: The Remit of ‘Prevent’and the Need to Refocus on Terrorism in the UK. International Affairs 87 (1): 143–152. Richardson, John E. 2001. British Muslims in the Broadsheert Press: A Challenge to Cultural Hegemony? Journalism Studies 2 (2): 221–242. ———. 2004. (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing. ———. 2006. Who Gets to Speak? A Study of Sources in the Broadsheet Press. In Muslims and the News Media, ed. Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, 103–115. London/New York: I.B. Tauris. Ricoeur, Paul. 1999. La Lectura Del Tiempo Pasado: Memoria Y Olvido. Madrid: Arrecife Universidad Autonoma de Madrid. Ritchie, Donald A. 2014. Doing Oral History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Robinson, Francis. 2009. Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam? Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 19 (03): 339–354. Roggeband, Conny, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2007. Divergent Framing: The Public Debate on Migration in the Dutch Parliament and Media, 1995–2004. West European Politics 30 (3): 524–548. Rosenberg, Erika L. 1998. Levels of Analysis and the Organization of Affect. Review of General Psychology 2: 247–270. Rothschild, Zachary K., Abdolhossein Abdollahi, and Tom Pyszczynski. 2009. Does Peace Have a Prayer? The Effect of Mortality Salience, Compassionate Values, and Religious Fundamentalism on Hostility toward out-Groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (4): 816–827.

268

Bibliography

Routledge, Clay, and Jamie Arndt. 2008. Self‐Sacrifice as Self‐Defence: Mortality Salience Increases Efforts to Affirm a Symbolic Immortal Self at the Expense of the Physical Self. European Journal of Social Psychology 38 (3): 531–541. Rowlands, J. 1995. Empowerment Examined. Development in practice 5 (2): 101–107. Rt Hon Baroness Elizabeth Butler-Sloss GBE. 2015. Living with Difference: Community, Diversity and the Common Good. Cambridge: The Woolf Institute. Ruddick, S. 1994. Thinking Mothers/Conceiving Birth. In Representations of Motherhood, ed. D. Bassin, M. Honey, and M.M. Kaplan, 29–46. New Haven: Yale University Press. Ruthen, M. 1991. A Satanic Affair. London: Chatto and Windus. Ruthven, Malise. 1990. A Satanic Affair: Salman Rushdie and the Rage of Islam. New  York: Vintage Books. Ryan, Charlotte, Kevin M. Carragee, and William Meinhofer. 2001. Theory into Practice: Framing, the News Media, and Collective Action. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 45: 175–182. Ryan, Tracii, Andrea Chester, John Reece, and Sophia Xenos. 2014. The Uses and Abuses of Facebook: A Review of Facebook Addiction. Journal of Behavioral Addictions 3 (3): 133–148. Saaed, A. 2007. Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media. Sociology Compass: 443–462. Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. 1994. A Minority within a Minority: The Case of the Shi’a in North America. In Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne Idleman Smith, Jane, ed. Muslim Communities in North America. New York: State University of New York Press. Said, Edward W. 1986. Foucault and the Imagination of Power. In Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. D. Couzens Hoy. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 1995. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. ———. 1997. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. New York: Vintage Books. Samad, Y. 2007. Ethnicization of Religion. In Islam in the European Union: Transnationalism, Youth and the War on Terror, ed. Y. Samad and K. Sen. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Samuel, Huntington. 1996. The clash of civilizations. New York, NY Simon & Schuster. Sardar, Ziauddin. 2004. The Excluded Minority: British Muslim Identity after 11 September. In Reclaiming Britishness, ed. Phoebe Griffith and Mark Leonard. London: Foreign Policy Centre. Saris, Willem E. 1997. The Public Opinion About the Eu Can Easily Be Swayed in Different Directions. Acta Politica 32: 406–435. Sartori, Giovanni. 1984. Guidelines for Concept Analysis. Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Saunders, Doug. 2012. The Myth of the Muslim Tide: Do Immigrants Threaten the West? New York: Vintage Books. Sayyid, Salman. 2003. Muslims in Britain: Towards a Political Agenda. In British Muslims: Loyalty and Belonging, ed. Mohammad Siddique Seddon, Dilwar Hussain, and Nadeem Malik. Markfield: The Islamic Foundation. Scharbrodt, Oliver. 2011. Shaping the Public Image of Islam: The Shiis of Ireland as “Moderate” Muslims. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31 (4): 518–533. Schatz, Edward. 2013. Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power. University of Chicago Press. Schimel, Jeff, Linda Simon, Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, Jeannette Waxmonsky, and Jamie Arndt. 1999. Stereotypes and Terror Management: Evidence That Mortality Salience Enhances Stereotypic Thinking and Preferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77 (5): 905–926. Schmeets, Hans, and Saskia te Riele. 2014. Declining Social Cohesion in the Netherlands? Social Indicators Research 115 (2): 791–812. Schmeichel, Brandon J., and Andy Martens. 2005. Self-Affirmation and Mortality Salience: Affirming Values Reduces Worldview Defense and Death-Thought Accessibility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31 (5): 658–667.

Bibliography

269

Schmid, Alex P. 1992. The Response Problem as a Definition Problem. Terrorism and Political Violence 4 (4): 7–13. Schmitt, Arno, and Jehoeda Sofer. 1992. Sexuality and Eroticism among Males in Moslem Societies. London/New York: Routledge. Schrott, Andrea. 2009. Dimensions: Catch-All Label or Technical Term. In Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences, ed. Knut Lundby, 41–61. New York: Peter Lang. Schudson, Michael. 1995. The Power of News. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2003. The Sociology of News (Contemporary Sociology). New York: W. W. Norton. Schulz, Winfried. 2004. Reconstructing Mediatization as an Analytical Concept. European Journal of Communication 19 (1): 87–101. Scott-Baumann, Alison. 2007. Collaborative Partnerships as Sustainable Pedagogy: Working with British Muslims in Collaborative Partnerships. In Greener by Degrees In : Exploring Sustainability through Higher Education Curricula, ed. Carolyn Roberts and Jane Roberts, 306–315. Cheltenham: Geography Discipline Network. ———. 2011. Developing Islamic Higher Education for a Secular University Sector: Orientalism in Reverse? In Muslim Schools and Education in Europe and South Africa, ed. A.  Tayob, I. Niehaus, and W. Weisse. Munster/New York: Waxmann. Sears, Neil. The Saudi Princess’ Accused of £14m Swindle. Daily Mail, 6-7-2013. Semali, Ladislaus. 2003. Ways with Visual Languages: Making the Case for Critical Media Literacy. The Clearing House 76 (6): 271–277. Semetko, Holli A., and Patti M. Valkenburg. 2000. Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News. Journal of Communication 50 (2): 93–109. Sengupta, Kim. Woolwich Suspect Inspired by Banned Hate Imam; Omar Bakri Mohammed Applauds the ‘Courage’ of Michael Adebolajo Banned Imam Had Called on Followers to Behead Westerners. The Independent, 24-05-2013. Seymour, Michel. 2012. Peoples, Political Liberalism and Religious Diversity. Ethnicities 12 (2): 142–160. Shadid, Wasif A. 2006. Public Debates over Islam and the Awareness of Muslim Identity in the Netherlands. European Education 38 (2): 10–22. Shadid, W., and P.S. van Koningsveld. 2002. The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in the West: Causes and Solutions. In Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union, ed. W. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, 174–196. Leuven: Peeters. Shaikh, Sa’diyya. 2003. Transforming Feminisms: Islam, Women, and Gender Justice. In Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism, ed. Omid Safi, 147–162. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. Shanneik, Yafa. 2015. Remembering Karbala in the Diaspora: Religious Rituals among Iraqi Shii Women in Ireland. Religion 45 (1): 89–102. Shao, Guosong. 2009. Understanding the Appeal of User‐Generated Media: A Uses and Gratification Perspective. Internet Research 19 (1): 7–25. Sharif, Jamil, Ismail Patel, and Anas Altikriti. 2015. Muslim Electoral Participation in British General Elections. In Muslims and Political Participation in Britain, ed. Timothy Peace, 32–52. London/New York: Routledge. Sheridan, Lorraine P. 2006. Islamophobia Pre–and Post–September 11th, 2001. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 21 (3): 317–336. Shiloah, Amnon. 1995. Music in the World of Islam: A Socio-Cultural Study. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. ———. 1997. Music and Religion in Islam. Acta Musicologica 69 (2): 143–155. Shiner, M., and T. Modood. 2002. Help or Hindrance? Higher Education and the Route to Ethnic Equality. British Journal of Sociology of Education 23 (2). Shulman, Lee S. 1986. Those Who Understand: Knowledge Growth in Teaching. Educational Researcher 15 (2): 4–14. Siddiqui, Asim. The Kiss of Death? The Guardian, 3 May 2008.

270

Bibliography

Singh, G. 2005. British Multiculturalism and Sikhs. Sikhs Formations 1 (2): 157–173. Slack, James. Drug Dealer Who Says Tattoos Would Endanger His Life in Iraq Is Given Human Right to Stay in Uk. Daily Mail, 29-04-2013. Slone, Michelle. 2000. Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (4): 508–522. Smart, B. 1986. The Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony. In Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. D. Couzens Hoy. Oxford: Blackwell. Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin Books. Smith, Jonathan Z. 1993. Map is not a Territory: Studies in the History of Religions. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Sobolewska, Maria, Anthony Heath, David Sanders, and Stephen Fisher. Religion and Minority Political Participation: Evidence from Great Britain. European Consortium for Political Research. http://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/5d20b96a-­9898-­4f91-­ac2c-­e177750c0bb7.pdf Solomon, Sheldon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski. 1991. A Terror Management Theory of Social Behavior: The Psychological Functions of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 24: 93–159. Soysal, Y. 1997. Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organised Islam in European Public Spheres. Theory and Society 26 (4): 509–527. Spielhaus, Riem. 2010. Media Making Muslims: The Construction of a Muslim Community in Germany through Media Debate. Contemporary Islam 4 (1): 11–27. Spradley, James P. 2016. Participant Observation. Waveland Press. Staab, Joachim Friedrich. 1990. The Role of News Factors in News Selection: A Theoretical Reconsideration. European Journal of Communication 5: 423–443. Staples, Kelly. 2012. Statelessness and the Politics of Misrecognition. Res Publica 18 (1): 1–14. Steinkuehler, Constance A., and Dmitri Williams. 2006. Where Everybody Knows Your (Screen) Name: Online Games as “Third Places”. Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication 11 (4): 885–909. Stephan, Walter G., Cookie White Stephan, and Stuart Oskamp. 2000. An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice. Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination: 23–45. Stephure, Robert J., Susan D. Boon, Stacey L. MacKinnon, and Vicki L. Deveau. 2009. Internet Initiated Relationships: Associations between Age and Involvement in Online Dating. Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication 14 (3): 658–681. Sterckx, Leen. 2015. The Self-Arranged Marriage: Modern Muslim Courtship Practices in the Netherlands. In Everyday Life Practices of Muslims in Europe, ed. Erkan Toğuşlu. Leuven: Leuven University Press. Stewart, David W., and Prem N. Shamdasani. 2014. Focus Groups: Theory and Practice. Vol. 20. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Stock, Femke. 2010. Home and Memory. In Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities, ed. Kim Knott and Seán McLoughlin. London: Zed Books. Straw, Jack. I Felt Uneasy Talking to Someone I Couldn’t See. The Guardian, 6 October. Straw’s Veil Comments Spark Anger. BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5410472.stm Strömbäck, Jesper, and Daniela V. Dimitrova. 2011. Mediatization and Media Interventionism: A Comparative Analysis of Sweden and the United States. The International Journal of Press/ Politics 16 (1): 30–49. Strömbäck, Jesper, and Frank Esser. 2009. Shaping Politics: Mediatization and Media Interventionism. In Mediatization Concepts, Changes, Consequences, ed. Knut Lundby, 205–224. New York: Peter Lang. Subedi, B., ed. 2010. Critical Global Perspectives: Rethinking Knowledge About Global Societies. IAP. Sumter, Sindy R., Laura Vandenbosch, and Loes Ligtenberg. 2017. Love Me Tinder: Untangling Emerging Adults’ Motivations for Using the Dating Application Tinder. Telematics and Informatics 34 (1): 67–78.

Bibliography

271

Sunier, Thijl. 2005. Interests, Identities, and the Public Sphere: Representing Islam in the Netherlands since the 1980s. In European Muslims and the Secular State, ed. J. Cesari and S. McLoughlin, 85–99. Ashgate. Swann Jr, William B., Michael D.  Buhrmester, Angel Gómez, Jolanda Jetten, Brock Bastian, Alexandra Vázquez, Amarina Ariyanto, et al. 2014. What Makes a Group Worth Dying For? Identity Fusion Fosters Perception of Familial Ties, Promoting Self-Sacrifice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 106 (6): 912. Tajfel, H., and J.C. Turner. 1986. The Social Identity Theory of Inter Group Behavior. In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. S. Worchel and W. Austin. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Takim, Liyakat. 2009. Shi‘Ism in America. New York: New York University Press. Tarlo, Emma. 2010. Visibly Muslim: Fashion, Politics, Faith. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Tavory, Iddo. 2009. The Structure of Flirtation: On the Construction of Interactional Ambiguity. In Studies in Symbolic Interaction, ed. Norman K. Denzin, 59–74. Emerald Group Publishing. Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1994. The Politics of Recognition. In Multiculturalism and ‘the Politics of Recognition’: An Essay, ed. Amy Gutmann, 25–73. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Taylor, Matthew. Six Plead Guilty to Plotting Attack on Edl Rally. The Guardian, 30-04-2013. The Pew Research Forum on Religion & Public Life. 2009. Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population. http:// www.pewforum.org/Muslim/Mapping-­the-­Global-­Muslim-­Population.aspx Thompson, John B. 1995. The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Thompson, Paul. 2017. The Voice of the Past: Oral History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tolman, Deborah L., Meg I. Striepe, and Tricia Harmon. 2003. Gender Matters: Constructing a Model of Adolescent Sexual Health. Journal of Sex Research 40 (1): 4–12. Toma, Catalina L., Jeffrey T. Hancock, and Nicole B. Ellison. 2008. Separating Fact from Fiction: An Examination of Deceptive Self-Presentation in Online Dating Profiles. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34 (8): 1023–1036. Trueman, Tony. 2014. Living in Mixed Communities Makes Ethnic Minorities Feel Britis. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Tuan, Yi-Fu. 1977. Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Tuchman, Gaye. 1978. Making News. New York: Free Press. Tully, James. 2000. Struggles over Recognition and Distribution. Constellations 7 (4): 469–482. Turner, Bryan S. 2007. Religious Authority and the New Media. Theory, Culture & Society 24 (2): 117–134. Turner, John C., Michael A.  Hogg, Penelope J.  Oakes, Stephen D.  Reicher, and Margaret S. Wetherell. 1987. Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. Tweed, Thomas A. 1997. Our Lady of Exile: Diasporic Religion at a Catholic Shrine in Miami. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2006. Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press. Tyrer, David, and Fauzia Ahmad. 2006. Muslim Women and Higher Education: Identities, Experiences and Prospects : A Summary Report. Liverpool: John Moores University European Social Fund. http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-­files/Education/documents/2006/08/02/muslimwomen.pdf. UNESCO. 2003. Media, Violence and Terrorism. UNESCO. United Nations (UN). Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (a/Res/49/60). http://www. un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm ———. Un, Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (a/Res/60/288). http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ strategy-­counter-­terrorism.shtml#plan

272

Bibliography

———. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ index.shtml University of Essex. Ethnic Minorities Living in the Uk Feel More British Than White Britons. https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/2012/06/30/ ethnic-­minorities-­living-­in-­the-­uk-­feel-­more-­british-­than-­white-­britons Urista, Mark A., Qingwen Dong, and Kenneth Day Day. 2009. Explaining Why Young Adults Use Myspace and Facebook through Uses and Gratifications Theory. Human Communication 12 (2): 215–229. Vaes, Jeroen, Nathan A.  Heflick, and Jamie L.  Goldenberg. 2010. “We Are People”: Ingroup Humanization as an Existential Defense. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 98 (5): 750–760. Valkenburg, Patti M., and Jochen Peter. 2007. Who Visits Online Dating Sites? Exploring Some Characteristics of Online Daters. CyberPsychology & Behavior 10 (6): 849–852. Van den Bos, Kees. 2009. Making Sense of Life: The Existential Self Trying to Deal with Personal Uncertainty. Psychological Inquiry 20 (4): 197–217. van der Noll, Jolanda, Edwin Poppe, and Maykel Verkuyten. 2010. Political Tolerance and Prejudice: Differential Reactions toward Muslims in the Netherlands. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 32 (1): 46–56. Van Herten, Marieke. 2009. Het Aantal Islamieten in Nederland. In Religie Aan Het Begin Van De 21ste Eeuw, vol. 35. The Hague: Heerlem/Statistics Netherlands. Van Nieuwkerk, Karin. 2008. Creating an Islamic Cultural Sphere: Contested Notions of Art, Leisure and Entertainment. An Introduction. Contemporary Islam 2 (3): 169–176. ———. 2009. Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West. University of Texas Press. Vásquez, Manuel A. 2011. More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Vertovec, Steven. 2009. Transnationalism. London/New York: Routledge. Vess, Matthew, Clay Routledge, Mark J. Landau, and Jamie Arndt. 2009. The Dynamics of Death and Meaning: The Effects of Death-Relevant Cognitions and Personal Need for Structure on Perceptions of Meaning in Life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 97 (4): 728–744. Vetovec, Steven. 2002. Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain. In Muslims in the West, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, 19–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vidar Haukeland, Jan. 1992. Motives for Holiday Travel. The Tourist Review 47 (2): 14–17. Vliegenthart, Rens, and Conny Roggeband. 2007. Framing Immigration and Integration Relationships between Press and Parliament in the Netherlands. International Communication Gazette 69 (3): 295–319. Voas, David, and Rodney Ling. 2010. Religion in Britain and the United States. In British Social Attitudes: The 26th Report, ed. Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, and Miranda Phillips, 65–86. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Volpi, Frédéric. 2007. Constructing the ‘Ummah’ in European Security: Between Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Government and Opposition 42 (3): 451–470. Walbridge, Linda S. 2001. The Most Learned of the Shi’A: The Institution of the Marja’ Taqlid. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walter, C. 2004. Defining Terrorism in National and International Law. In Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security Versus Liberty? ed. C.  Walter, S.  Vöneky, V. Röben, and F. Schorkopt. Berlin: Springer. Waterhouse Consulting Group. 2008. Preventing Violent Extremism: An Independent Evaluation of the Birmingham Pathfinder. Birmingham: Waterhouse Consulting Group. Watson, Annette, and Karen E. Till. 2010. Ethnography and Participant Observation. In The SAGE handbook of qualitative geography. London: Sage. Waymer, Damion. 2009. Walking in Fear: An Autoethnographic Account of Media Framing of Inner-City Crime. Journal of Communication Inquiry.

Bibliography

273

Webster, C. 2012. The Construction of Criminality and Disorder among British Muslim Young People. In Islam in the West: Key Issues in Multiculturalism, ed. M.  Farrar, S.  Robinson, Y. Valli, and P. Wetherly. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan. Welch, Susan. 1972. The American Press and Indochina, 1950-56. In Communication in International Politics, ed. Richard L. Merrit, 227–228. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Werbner, Pnina. 1990. The Migration Process: Capital, Gifts, and Offerings among British Pakistanis. Oxford: Berg. ———. 2007. Veiled Interventions in Pure Space Honour, Shame and Embodied Struggles among Muslims in Britain and France. Theory, Culture & Society 24 (2): 161–186. ———. 2010. Complex Diasporas. In Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities, ed. Kim Knott and Seán McLoughlin. London: Zed Books. White, David Manning. 1950. The Gate Keeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 27 (4): 383. White, Robert A. 1997. Religion and Media in the Construction of Cultures. In Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture, ed. Stewart M.  Hoover and Knut Lundby, 37–64. London/Beverly Hills: Sage. Wilburn, Kenneth. 2017. Youssou N’dour: I Bring What I Love Dir. By Elizabeth Chai Vasarhelyi. African Studies Review 60 (1): 251–253. Wilson, Rodney. 1997. Economics, Ethics and Religion: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Economic Thought. Berlin: Springer. Winchester, Daniel. 2008. Embodying the Faith: Religious Practice and the Making of a Muslim Moral Habitus. Social Forces 86 (4): 1753–1780. Wright, Scott. 2012. From “Third Place” to “Third Space”: Everyday Political Talk in Non-­ Political Online Spaces. javnost-the public 19 (3): 5–20. Wuthnow, Robert. 1987. Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press. ———. 1998. Civil Religion. In The Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion, ed. Robert Wuthnow. Washington, DC: Congressional Quaterly. Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne, and Michael J. Balz. 2008. Taming the Imams: European Governments and Islamic Preachers since 9/11. Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 19 (2): 215–235. Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2004. Marriage Solemnization among Turks in Britain: The Emergence of a Hybrid Anglo‐Muslim Turkish Law. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 24 (1): 57–66. Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yow, Valerie Raleigh. 2014. Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sciences. Rowman & Littlefield. Yum, Young-ok, and William Schenck-Hamlin. 2005. Reactions to 9/11 as a Function of Terror Management and Perspective Taking. The Journal of Social Psychology 145 (3): 265–286. Yurchisin, Jennifer, Kittichai Watchravesringkan, and Deborah Brown McCabe. 2005. An Exploration of Identity Re-creation in the Context of Internet Dating. Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal 33 (8): 735–750. Yzerbyt, Vincent Y., Anouk Rogier, and Susan T.  Fiske. 1998. Group Entitativity and Social Attribution: On Translating Situational Constraints into Stereotypes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24 (10): 1089–1103. Zagefka, Hanna, Dennis Nigbur, Roberto Gonzalez, and Linda Tip. 2013. Why Does Ingroup Essentialism Increase Prejudice against Minority Members? International Journal of Psychology 48 (1): 60–68. Zwick, Detlev, and Cristian Chelariu. 2006. Mobilizing the Hijab: Islamic Identity Negotiation in the Context of a Matchmaking Website. Journal of Consumer Behaviour 5 (4): 380–395.