Muslims, Minorities, and the Media: Discourses on Islam in the West 1032462663, 9781032462660

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Abstract
List of figures
Introduction
PART I: Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities
1. The workings of a media outlet
2. Media and communication mechanisms
Media logic, form, and content
Media and public communication
3. Media as a discursive institution of influence
Media, construction, and reality
The media and its commercial and economic implications
Media, ideology, and the political
4. Minority discourses and the media
PART II: Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images
5. Symbolic representations of minorities
6. The consumption of media reports
Psycho-biological factors in media consumption and outgroup members
7. Hermeneutics and the negotiation of meaning in media reports
PART III: Avenues for change
8. Changing psychological processes
9. Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere
Organisational socialisation
Media businesses vs media corporations
Threat of new entrants
Bargaining power of suppliers
Bargaining power of buyers
Threat of substitutes
Rivalry among competitors
Government intervention
Strategic considerations for change
Concluding remarks
10. Discursive change
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Muslims, Minorities, and the Media

Inspired by overtly negative coverage by the Western mainstream press of Muslims in particular, and minorities in general, this book asks: Why are negative narratives and depictions of Muslims and other minorities so hard to change? News reports about Islam and Muslims commonly relate stories that discuss terrorism, violence or other unwelcome or irrational behaviour, or the lack of integration and compatibility of Muslims and Islam with Western values and society. Yet, there is little research done on how studies on media reports about minorities seemingly fail to improve the situation. Combining empirical research with a structural analysis of the media industry, this volume presents evidence for the maligned representation of minorities by media corporations, analysing why negative narratives persist and outlining how these can be effectively transformed. It is an outstanding resource for students and scholars of media, religion, culture, sociology, and Islamic studies, and is also of benefit for journalists, media representatives, and activists looking to effect change for minority representation in the media industry specifically or in society at large. Laurens de Rooij is currently based at Toulouse School of Management. His research examines how people interact with media in relation to religion and culture and how that affects their interpretation and conceptualization of a variety of contemporary issues.

Routledge Research in Religion, Media and Culture Series editors: Jolyon Mitchell, Stewart Hoover and Jenna Supp-Montgomerie

Religion, Media, and Social Change Edited by Kennet Granholm, Marcus Moberg and Sofia Sjö Media and New Religions in Japan Erica Baffelli Religion and Media in China Insights and Case Studies from the Mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong Edited by Stefania Travagnin Creating Church Online Ritual, Community and New Media Tim Hutchings Digital Spirits in Religion and Media Possession and Performance Alvin Eng Hui Lim The Thirdspaces of Digital Religion Edited by Nabil Echchaibi and Stewart M. Hoover Religion, Media and Conversion in Iran Mediated Christianity in an Islamic Context Sara Afshari Muslims, Minorities and the Media Discourses on Islam in the West Laurens de Rooij For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/religion/series/RRRMC

Muslims, Minorities, and the Media Discourses on Islam in the West Laurens de Rooij

BK-TandF-ROOIJ_9781032462660-220982-FM.indd 3

03/03/23 12:32 PM

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Laurens de Rooij The right of Laurens de Rooij to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-46266-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-38745-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-34655-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555 Typeset in Bembo Std by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

Contents

Abstractvii List of figures ix Introduction x

PART I

Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities

1

1 The workings of a media outlet

3

2 Media and communication mechanisms Media logic, form, and content Media and public communication 3 Media as a discursive institution of inf luence Media, construction, and reality The media and its commercial and economic implications Media, ideology, and the political 4 Minority discourses and the media

13 14 17 21 23 26 29 40

PART II

Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images

59

5 Symbolic representations of minorities

61

6 The consumption of media reports

71

Psycho-biological factors in media consumption and outgroup members

75

vi  Contents 7 Hermeneutics and the negotiation of meaning in media reports

91

PART III

Avenues for change

105

8 Changing psychological processes

107

9 Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere

114

Organisational socialisation Media businesses vs media corporations Threat of new entrants Bargaining power of suppliers Bargaining power of buyers Threat of substitutes Rivalry among competitors Government intervention Strategic considerations for change Concluding remarks

114 119 121 121 121 122 122 123 124 129

10 Discursive change135 Conclusion141

Bibliography Index

143 171

Abstract

Inspired by the apparent overtly negative coverage of minorities1 by the mainstream press, this book asks the question: Why are negative narratives and depictions of minorities so hard to change? As the media plays an important role in society, understanding why change is so difficult to achieve is important because the influences of the media on a person’s ideas and conceptualisations of people of another ethnicity, culture, or religious persuasion is an important social issue. News reports about Islam and Muslims commonly relate stories that discuss terrorism, violence or other unwelcome or irrational behaviour, or the lack of integration and compatibility of Muslims and Islam with western values and society.2 Yet, there is little research done on how all the research and activism on media reports about minorities, seems to make such little inroads into improving the situation. To address this gap of knowledge, this book builds on previous empirical research and combines that with a structural analysis of the media industry to then offer suggested reasons for why certain narratives are so persistent and what steps could be undertaken in order to make more effective changes to the industry. Whilst there exists a normativity of news stories and any reception patterns are negotiated by the consumer, individual orientations towards the media are a significant factor behind the importance of news reports and the meaning-­making process that flows from its consumption. Consumers negotiate media reports to fit their existing outlooks on an issue. However, since this outlook is constructed through, and simultaneously supported by, media, a co-dependency and co-productivity exists between media narratives and their consumers. As this book will show: The structure and business interests of media corporations, and the plurality of players in the industry, limits the efficacy of different advocacy movements. In turn, this leaves the (re) productions of local and personal contextuality of consumers subject to a plurality of forces, difficult to make sense of by the everyday consumer. These conclusions point to a need for further research and advocacy into the consequences of socially constructed depictions their influence on human thoughts and actions, and how to make them salient among the everyday population.

viii  Abstract

Notes 1. For the purpose of this book minorities is to be understood broadly. It is to not only focus on ethnic and religious minorities, but also sexual minorities, and other groups of people who may not identify with or be considered part of the dominant groups in society. 2. Laurens de Rooij, Islam in British Media Discourses: Understanding Perceptions of Muslims in the News (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 09 May. 2020, 2020). https://www.manchesterhive.com/view/9781526135230/9781526135230.xml.

List of figures

7.1 9.1

The never-ending process of interpretation94 Overview of media conglomerate’s portfolio makeup120

Introduction

In the age of globalisation, an increasing number of people are uncertain as to what the makeup of a nation really is. In many countries, the presence of ‘others’ is used as a marker to gauge to what extent one belongs in the local context. Despite ethnic and religious differences and varieties in social status, the presence of others raises doubts about a nation’s value system, and it brings into question that what is seen as symbols of the nation are also somehow contained in these ‘others’.1 One avenue for exploring and discussing this is in the media. Edward Said has suggested that in order to understand the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain, the discourse of Orientalism needs to be accounted for.2 Whilst the relationship that Said was exploring was between non-Muslim imperials, and their Muslim subjects, this relationship is the result of nationalist sympathies, tied up in the imperial project. Over the course of the 20th century, the Empires of old, gave way to the nation states. As the new nation states formed, they defined themselves in terms taken from their imperial masters, and the other nation states. As such, in defining the new nation state, the relationship between autochtenous and allochtenous people becomes a fundamental part in the definition of the new state. As such, we see definitions of “people of the state” defined by citizens and non-citizens, and all those with external origins treated with suspicion following the colonial period. These definitions of statehood affect the understandings of the relationship between the dominant groups and minorities.3 This is because of how that relationship fits into the national discourse. Michel Foucault described discourse as several statements formed into a system, consisting of objects, types of statements, concepts, themes. A structure is brought to this system through the ordering of the statements according to the correlations and functioning’s of these statements.4 In turn, these statements constitute an object, and can transform it, based on the corpus of knowledge that underpins the way of looking at this object in accordance with the presupposed system of knowledge.5 Edward Said implements this as follows: I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse … to identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the

Introduction xi enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-­ Enlightenment period.6 This is because the relationship between minorities and society is defined by the dominant groups in society and as such can be analysed in the same manner. The media is one method for managing and producing the image of Minorities, in a political, sociological, ideological, and imaginative manner. Because of the heterogeneity of discourse, “what may appear to be the unifying categories of a discursive field—categories such as ‘madness’ or ‘biology’,7 or, in this study ‘minority religions and ethnic groups’—in fact receive divergent interpretations and thus determine ‘spaces of dissension’.8 From this perspective there is no unifying schema or field that synoptically captures divergent discourses”.9 Therefore, using this conception of discourse, the way that for example Muslims and Islam in Europe are discussed in the media is through a collection of statements formed by a system, through the ordering of those statements, per the rules that categorise those statements. The discourse of Muslims in Europe as a result is the consequence of political, sociological, military, ideological, scientific, and imaginative orientations. In turn, these are produced by the dominant group(s) in society. As a consequence, these statements constitute how Muslims and Islam are perceived and can transform their understanding based upon the way of looking at Muslims and Islam in accordance with the presupposed system(s) of knowledge. L.R. Tucker defines and notes the importance of the analysis of media frames because, “through the analysis of media frames, researchers can gain a better understanding of how media discourse, as a set of organizational voices, works to promote specific interests that support the dominance of particular groups and ideas in society”.10 However, one has to bear in mind that there may exist a plurality of voices and groups that are dominant, each with their own agenda and strategic interests, and therefore a plurality of dominant discourses. Public discussions of ‘others’ such as Muslims in Europe are often superficial at best because many are unable to grasp the complexity of the issue in an open and critical manner. The predictable narrative of moderates versus conservatives reinforces a narrow (Orientalist) framework for discussing Islam and Muslims in Europe. The notion that more government intervention can solve the ‘problem’ is deficient because it reduces Muslims to subjects of government suspicion, control, and in need of management. As a result this demands that what is needed is a change in the ‘moral behaviour’ of Muslims, especially poor disenfranchised men, who, the government says, are either radicalised or in danger of being radicalised, highlights the actions of a few while ignoring the possible government responsibility for the circumstances that created the conditions for radicalisation in the first place. This closely resembles what William Cavanaugh describes in the myth of religious violence:

xii  Introduction The myth of religious violence serves on the domestic scene to marginalize discourses and practices labelled religious. The myth helps to reinforce adherence to a secular social order and the nation state that guarantees it. In foreign affairs, the myth of religious violence contributes to the presentation of non-western and non-secular social orders as inherently irrational and prone to violence. In doing so, it helps to create a blind spot in Western thinking about Westerners’ own complicity with violence. The myth of religious violence is also useful, therefore, for justifying secular violence against religious actors; their irrational violence must be met with rational violence.11 By and large, the presentation of Muslims and the Islamic faith in the British12 and European13 news adheres to Cavanaugh’s description. But the foreign origins of Islam have meant that actions are implemented domestically against Muslims in Britain. For example, in 2001, there were violent riots in Oldham, Bradford, Leeds, and Burnley. The riots were short but intense and were the worst ethnically motivated riots in Britain since 1985. They were apparently a culmination of ethnic tensions between South Asian-Muslim communities and a variety of other local community groups. According to one author the consequences of the riots were that: …[there] was a declaration of the end of multiculturalism and an assertion that Asians, Muslims in particular, would have to develop ‘a greater acceptance of the principal national institutions’ and assimilate to ‘core British values’ … [Government had also] mistakenly presented this fragmentation as the result of an over-tolerance of diversity which allowed non-white communities to ‘self-segregate’.14 Public discussions of Muslims in Britain are often engaging with if not asserting the notion that Asians, Muslims in particular, need to develop ‘a greater acceptance of the principal national institutions’ and assimilate to ‘core British values’. The above quote also highlights the demand for further regulation and surveillance of Muslims in order to manage non-white communities. This is similar to what happens in other countries.15 Where within this paradigm, minorities are seen as a ‘problem’, rather than as fellow inhabitants with problems. Discussions about minorities is relegated to the ‘problems’ posed for the majority of people rather than what the treatment of minorities says about the nation as a whole and how minorities are affected by these dynamics. This is a direct consequence of identity politics, where the different groups compete for dominance and recognition.16 This framework encourages support to government initiatives directed at dealing with ‘problems’. This paradigm simultaneously denies minorities the freedom to be different or even fail and blames the ‘problems’ on those minorities themselves. In this way, public discussion of the social injustices’ minorities may

Introduction xiii be subject to, is avoided. Minorities are to be ‘integrated’ into ‘our’ society and culture; they are to behave like us. This fails to recognise, however, that the presence, trials, and tribulations of minorities are constitutive elements of society. This also turns the nationalist ideal that underpinned empire building from an outward action into an internal one. Thereby channelling the imperial zeal on the domestic population, in order to sanitise and equalise the population by making everyone the same. This leads Talal Asad to argue that “Muslims are included within and excluded from Europe at one and the same time in a special way, and that this has less to do with the “absolutist Faith” of Muslims living in a secular environment and more with European notions of “culture” and “civilization” and “the secular state”, “majority”, and “minority””.17 As a consequence, in order to engage in a serious discussion of minority-majority relations, we must begin not with the problems of minorities, but with the problems of society at large. What is considered problematic is a direct result of these particular notions and definitions. These problems are also located in flaws which are rooted in historic inequalities such as imperialism and have produced longstanding stereotypes. Media discourse sets up the parameters and terms for discussing minorities. It shapes the perceptions and the responses to the issues presented as associated with different minority groups. Within this framework, the burden falls on the ‘other’ to do all the work necessary for integration, and ideally assimilation. The emergence of Islamist sentiments among young Muslims can be seen as a resistance against complying with this vision of what modern society should be. An example of such sentiments can be found in what Innes Bowen describes as follows: “Deobandi18 seminary graduates returning to their community were at least as conservative and anti-integration as their foreign educated predecessors: ‘Many of them advocate a 100 per cent Deobandi lifestyle’”.19 Resistance identities emerge on the basis of values and ideas that are different or even opposed to the dominant discourse(s).20 Other examples of subversions of compliance with dominant discourses are highlighted by a variety of research works. Some examples of such research looked at minority identity formation.21 Other studies looked at Muslim identity formation in children,22 young adults,23 and adults.24 Other examples include sexual minorities25 and studies conducted in diverse countries such as the USA,26 Romania,27 Germany,28 Indonesia,29 South Africa,30 Brazil,31 China,32 and Japan.33 In most contexts, media should be considered a disseminator and facilitator of public discussion. It sets the boundaries for public discussion. Even in states where media is strictly controlled and regulated, the press that is published or broadcasts defines what is considered acceptable to discuss, and what is the preferred perspective. The images and narratives they broadcast “incarnate the ideal of a large part of society”.34 Yet until public and media discourse fully accept the equality of minorities, minority groups will continue to challenge the existing paradigm of what society is, and their demands for recognition and equality challenges the hegemony of the dominant group(s).

xiv  Introduction In this context, what is the role of the media? How do news reports that underpin actions and conceptualisations, which are subject to much commentary and analysis, resist change? What would be a more effective strategy? This project addresses two themes: Firstly, minorities and their representation in the media. Secondly, it examines how media constructions take shape and function within the greater media structure. Lastly, how to perhaps guide further change in a way that alters the structure of the media environment and can aid the important work done by colleagues in order to achieve more meaningful change and make society more inclusive. In turn, this research will make a significant contribution to the field of media, religion, and culture, and like John R. Bowen, “my focus is on the field of debate and discussion in which participants construct discursive linkages to texts, phrases, and ideas”.35 As a signifier and source of information for an increasing percentage of the population, the manner by which minorities are portrayed in the media, affects the way they are perceived, and understood by those receiving the media. This is because the media creates, reflects, and enforces social representations. However, relatively few people feel unfavourable towards any other religious or ethnic group on its own or come to feel negatively about ‘others’ in general.36 So the question that begs asking, why does so much negative content get produced? Given that relatively few media producers themselves feel unfavourable towards minorities,37 why are negative stories so prevalent? Newspapers and television news networks address minorities in several ways.38 It is important to understand how they are described and the effect that is brought about among the English public, as the interpretation of reality in news stories is done in light of the outlook held by people, whose views and behaviour toward others are to a large extent informed by their perception and interpretation of reality. This is informed by media discourse. My aim is to analyse the news media’s representations of minorities and the relationship that has with the structure of the media sphere. With that in mind my primary objectives are: (1) to analyse the structure of the media sphere; (2) to analyse how that structure relates to the construction of meaning(s) and understanding(s) for the viewer/consumer; (3) to consider that structure to gauge the extent that media structure is receptive to change and inhibits change in the reporting process. In turn, I am to ask the general research question: In what ways is the media industry able to adapt and change its reporting in light of research and advocacy from activists? I am going to answer this question through addressing the following related questions: (1) What is the role and structure of the (news) media? (2) What images, narratives and representations of are memorable and authoritative? (3) How amenable to change is an industry that chases consumers? The aim is to analyse how (news) media information is utilised in the interpretation and conceptualisation of news reports. Since interpretation is not

Introduction xv neutral, an agent is constantly re-appropriating certain pieces of information he or she receives. The information is interpreted according to the structures of (media) values and thoughts held by him or her. It is here that the difference between my proposed research and possible alternatives is clearest. I am not cataloguing what journalists think of minorities, but trying to ascertain what journalistic practices in England, coupled with local and global media practices affect the reporting on minorities. This will then be put into conversation with wider social issues and practices in order to analyse and suggest further avenues for making changes in the media sphere. First, we must focus our attention on the media and how it functions in the public square, by examining the way in which news media disseminates national and global interests. This media discourse serves as a backdrop for the acts of local agents. The vitality of any public discourse ultimately depends on the quality of the debate. The absence of debate with regards to local social structures, for example, is a result at least in part of the media’s focus on policy announcement and sensationalism. This further highlights the low priority on substantial improvements in society as extensions of the demands placed by society on the accountability of government. This will be discussed in Part 1. Second, the essential step is to clarify the role that news reports have for individuals and how they generate meaning among their audience(s). By placing media reports in context, we can analyse the responses to narratives defined by media elites and voiced by spokespersons that fit within the dominant framework(s). By exploring these effects, we can develop suggestions for improving media coverage of minorities. Why are these images, narratives, and representations of Muslims and Islam memorable and authoritative? This will be discussed in Part 2. Third, as is the aim of this book, we must contextualise the relationship of media with history. The most valuable sources for the current paradigm reside in history, dominant frameworks, and public discourse. The analysis of this material offers a way to understand our multi-layered question and situate the research, and subsequently offer suggestions for how advocates can engage media institutions more effectively in order to improve the quality of reporting. This will be discussed in Part 3. Scholars have been studying the effects of media. Some researchers suggest that media can be considered agents of socialization. Media has the ability to elicit a response and to shape and influence people’s identities and identity formations. Because media is often the “gateway” to first witness what happens outside of our direct daily experience, it becomes the lens through which we view the world. Following this, scholars have studied the effects of media as well as the impact of the media framing on stories, news, and events.39 Framing is “the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributions for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is discussed”.40 Most importantly for the cases presented in this book

xvi  Introduction are the news coverage of minorities around the world. News media corporations rely on an increase in ratings and larger viewership following the airing and covering of what are considered shocking stories.41 News media corporations play a key role in the production of ideological frames. The foci of stories have the potential to scare people into acting and believing a crisis exists. The viewers in turn demand action to end the crisis in turn restore calm among the public. The interlocking scripts of violence and irrational or abnormal behaviour perpetuated by the media, coupled with fallacies about minorities, further marginalizes those minorities.42 This study is grounded in an approach to social theory that seeks to connect historical, social, and (economic) production contexts.43 Disproportionate amounts of television and newspaper news coverage is devoted to minorities and the threat they present to the rest of society.44 The aim of this book is to analyse why those representations are what they are, and offer some suggestions for change moving forward.

Notes 1. For examples, see: Laurens de Rooij, “Many in One: Malaysia’s Religious Pluralism Behind Growth and Development on Economic and Political Levels,” in Religious Transformation in Modern Asia: A Transnational Movement, ed. David Kim (Leiden, The Netherlands – Boston, MA: Brill, 2015), 233–49.; Laurens De Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion,” Journal of Religion in Europe 10, no. 1–2 (2017): 172–217. 2. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995), 3. https:// books.google.co.uk/books?id=npF5BAAAQBAJ. 3. Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Migration, and Statehood in Post-Cold War Europe,” in The Fate of the Nation-State, ed. Michel Seymour (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 357–74. Günther Schlee, “Territorializing Ethnicity: The Imposition of a Model of Statehood on Pastoralists in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 5 (2013): 857–74. Laurens de Rooij, “Islamic Identity in the Secular Environment of Post-Colonial Indonesia,” in Religious Transformation in Modern Asia, ed. David Kim (Leiden, The Netherlands Boston, MA: Brill, 2015), 193–213. Laurens de Rooij, “Many in One: Malaysia’s Religious Pluralism Behind Growth and Development on Economic and Political Levels,” in Religious Transformation in Modern Asia: A Transnational Movement, ed. David Kim (Leiden, The Netherlands – Boston, MA: Brill, 2015), 233–49. 4. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 41–43. 5. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 35–36. 6. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995), 3. 7. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 40–49. 8. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 152. 9. John Richard Bowen, Muslims Through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society (Princeton University Press, 1993), 10–11.

Introduction xvii 10. L. R. Tucker, “The Framing of Calvin Klein: A Frame Analysis of Media Discourse About the August 1995 Calvin Klein Jeans Advertising Campaign,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 15 (1998): 141–57. 11. William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 225–26. 12. de Rooij, Islam in British Media Discourses: Understanding Perceptions of Muslims in the News; Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims ­( London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002); Elizabeth Poole, “The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage,” in Muslims and the News Media, ed. Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson (London, UK – New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Gabriel Faimau, “Naming Muslims as Partners: The Discursive Representation of Islam and Muslims in a British Catholic newspaper,” Journalism Studies 12, no. 4 (2011); John E. Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004). 13. David Abadi, Leen d’Haenens, and Joyce Koeman, “Recent Trends in German ­Integration Discourse: From the Sarrazin Controversies to the Decline of Political Correctness,” in Representations of Islam in the News: A Cross-Cultural Analysis, ed. Stefan Mertens and Hedwig de Smaele (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 37–58. Titus Hjelm, “Introduction: Islam and Muslims in European News Media,” ­Journal of Religion in Europe 5, no. 2 (2012): 137–39. Stefan Mertens, “European Media ­Coverage of Islam in a Globalizing World,” in Representations of Islam in the News: A Cross-Cultural Analysis, ed. Stefan Mertens and Hedwig de Smaele (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 59–73. 14. Arun Kundnani, Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism (London, UK: Institute of Race Relations, 2009), 23. 15. Benjamin M. Han, “Melodramatizing Racialized Korea: The Impasse of Black Representation in Itaewon Class,” Journal of Japanese and Korean Cinema (2022); Caitlin Ryan and Ian Rivers, “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth: Victimization and Its Correlates in the USA and UK,” Culture, Health & Sexuality 5, no. 2 (2003); Saifuddin Ahmed and Jörg Matthes, “Media Representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A Meta-Analysis,” International Communication Gazette 79, no. 3 (2017). 16. Linda Alcoff, Michael Hames-García, Satya Mohanty, Michael Hames-García, and Paula ML Moya. Identity Politics Reconsidered (New York, NY: Palgrave-­ Macmillan, 2006). Susan Hekman, “Identity Crises: Identity, Identity Politics, and Beyond,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2, no. 1 (1999): 3–26. Mary ­Bernstein, “Identity Politics,” Annual Review of Sociology (2005): 47–74. 17. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 159; Saleh Hussain Al-Aayed, The Rights of Non-Muslims in the Islamic World (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Dar Eshbelia, 2002). 18. The Deobandi movement is a revivalist movement within Hanafi Islam. It ­originated in 1867 in Deoband, India, where the Deobandi Dar Al-Uloom is situated. The movement was started by Shah Waliullah Dehlawi amjd was a reaction to British colonialism in India. For more information, please see: Dietrich Reetz, “The Deoband Universe: What Makes a Transcultural and Transnational Educational Movement of Islam?,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 1 (2007). 19. Innes Bowen, Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam (London, UK: Hurst, 2014), 28. 20. Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (Cambridge, MA – Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1997), 8. http://books.google.ca/ books?id=l9asXV40MegC.

xviii  Introduction 21. Srividya Ramasubramanian, Marissa Joanna Doshi, and Muniba Saleem, “Mainstream Versus Ethnic Media: How They Shape Ethnic Pride and Self-Esteem among Ethnic Minority Audiences.” International Journal of Communication 11 (2017): 1879–99. Benjamin D. Singer, “Mass Society, Mass Media and the Transformation of Minority Identity.” The British Journal of Sociology 24, no. 2 (1973): 140–50. 22. Jonathan Scourfield et al., Muslim Childhood: Religious Nurture in a European Context (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 23. Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, “Elastic Orthodoxy: The Tactics of Young Muslim Identity in the East End of London,” in Everyday Lived Islam in Europe, eds. Nathal M. Dessing, Nadia Jeldtoft, Jørgen S. Nielsen and Linda Woodhead (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 69–84. Jonas Otterbeck, “Experiencing Islam: Narratives About Faith by Young Adult Muslims in Malmö and Copenhagen,” in Everyday Lived Islam in Europe, ed. Nathal M. Dessing, Nadia Jeldtoft, Jørgen S. Nielsen and Linda Woodhead (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 115–34. 24. Samina Yasmeen and Nina Markovic, Muslim Citizens in the West: Spaces and Agents of Inclusion and Exclusion (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2014). 25. Caitlin Ryan and Ian Rivers, “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth: Victimization and Its Correlates in the USA and Uk,” Culture, Health & Sexuality 5, no. 2 (2003): 103–19. 26. Muniba Saleem and Srividya Ramasubramanian, “Muslim Americans’ Responses to Social Identity Threats: Effects of Media Representations and Experiences of Discrimination,” Media Psychology 22, no. 3 (2019): 373–93. 27. Creţu, Gabriela, “Roma Minority in Romania and Its Media Representation,” Sfera Politicii 22, no. 180–181 (2014): 112–20. 28. Kathrin Bower, “Minority Identity as German Identity in Conscious Rap and Gangsta Rap: Pushing the Margins, Redefining the Center,” German Studies Review (2011): 377–98. 29. Laurens de Rooij, “Islamic Identity in the Secular Environment of Post-Colonial Indonesia,” in Religious Transformation in Modern Asia: A Transnational Movement, ed. David Kim (Leiden, The Netherlands – Boston MA: Brill 2015), 195–213. 30. Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Racism Ethnicity and the Media in Africa: Reflections Inspired by Studies of Xenophobia in Cameroon and South Africa,” Africa Spectrum 45, no. 1 (2010): 57–93. Sonnekus Theo and Jeanne Van Eeden, “Visual Representation, Editorial Power, and the Dual ‘Othering’of Black Men in the South African Gay Press: The Case of Gay Pages,” Communicatio: South African Journal for Communication Theory and Research 35, no. 1 (2009): 81–100. 31. Juliana Henriques de Luna Freire, “Ethnic Minorities in Brazil and Spain: Erasure and Stigmatization, Gender, and Self-Representation of Indigenous and Roma Communities,” The University of Arizona, 2012. Hasan Shahid, “Forging a ­Brazilian Islam: Muslim Converts Negotiating Identity in São Paulo,” Journal of Muslim M ­ inority Affairs 39, no. 2 (2019): 231–45. 32. Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/­ Minority Identities.,” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): 92–123. 33. Takeyuki Tsuda, Media Images, Immigrant Reality: Ethnic Prejudice and Tradition in Japanese Media Representations of Japanese-Brazilian Return Migrants (La Jolla, California: UC San Diego: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2004). https://­ escholarship.org/uc/item/7p04v7kx. 34. Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998), 185. 35. John Richard Bowen, Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 8. 36. David Voas and Rodney Ling, “Religion in Britain and the United States,” in British Social Attitudes: The 26th Report, eds. Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson and Miranda Phillips (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 2010), 65–86.

Introduction xix 37. Michael B. Munnik, “Reaching out in a Climate of Negativity: Perceptions and Persistence among Muslim Sources Engaging with News Media,” Contemporary Islam 12, no. 3 (2018): 211–27. 38. Laurens de Rooij, Islam in British Media Discourses: Understanding Perceptions of Muslims in the News (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2020). doi:10.7765/9781526135230. Nataša Visočnik, “Self-and Other-Representations of the Korean Minority in Japan,” Dve Domovini/Two Homelands 37 (2013): 113–22. Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): 92–123. Gabriela Creţu, “Roma Minority in Romania and Its Media Representation,” Sfera Politicii 22, no. 180–181 (2014): 112–20. Tahir Abbas, “Media Capital and the Representation of South Asian Muslims in the British Press: An Ideological Analysis,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 21, no. 2 (2001): 245–57. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002). 39. R. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43 (1993): 41–58. 40. M. E. McCombs, “New Frontiers in Agenda Setting: Agendas of Attributes and Frames,” Mass Communication Review 24 (1997): 4–24. 41. C. Elmelund-Præstekjær and C. Wien, “Mediestormens Politiske Indflydelse Og Anatomi’ [the Political Influence and Anatomy of the Media Storm],” Nordicom Information 30, no. 1 (2008): 19–28. 42. W. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, “The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in the West: Causes and Solutions,” in Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union, ed. W. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2002), 174–96. Marco Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice,” in Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. M. Helbling (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 193–203. T. L. Dixon, C. L. Azocar, and M. Casas, “The Portrayal of Race and Crime on Network News,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 47 (2003): 498–523. T. L. Dixon and D. Linz, “Television News, Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity and the Depiction of Race,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 46 (2002): 112–36. Peter Mandaville, “Reimagining Islam in Diaspora: The Politics of Mediated Community,” International Communication Gazette 63, no. 2–3 (2001): 169–86. 43. “The Frankfurt school thinkers, neglected, or excluded, history, so also they largely ignored economic analysis.” Thomas Burton Bottomore, The Frankfurt School and Its Critics (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 72–73. 44. AI IRA and Rist Mt, “Representing Minorities: Canadian Media and Minority Identities,” Canadian Ethnic Studies/Etudes Ethniques au Canada 33, no. 3 (2001); Larry Gross, “Out of the Mainstream: Sexual Minorities and the Mass Media,” Journal of Homosexuality 21, no. 1–2 (1991); Bradley S. Greenberg, Dana Mastro, and Jeffrey E. Brand, “Minorities and the Mass Media: Television into the 21st Century,” in Media Effects (Routledge, 2002); Erik Bleich, Irene Bloemraad, and Els De Graauw, “Migrants, Minorities and the Media: Information, Representations and Participation in the Public Sphere,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41, no. 6 (2015); Laura Jacobs, “Patterns of Criminal Threat in Television News Coverage of Ethnic Minorities in Flanders (2003–2013),” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43, no. 5 (2017); Valerie Alia, Media and Ethnic Minorities (Edinburgh University Press, 2005); Larry Gross, “Minorities, Majorities and the Media,” in Media, Ritual and Identity (Routledge, 2002); Andreea A. Constantin and Isabel Cuadrado, “Perceived Intergroup Competition and Adolescents’ Behavioural Intentions Toward Minorities: The Role of Threat, Stereotypes and Emotions,” Current Psychology 40, no. 7 (2021);

xx  Introduction Cecil Meeusen, Koen Abts, and Bart Meuleman, “Between Solidarity and Competitive Threat?: The Ambivalence of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Minorities,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 71 (2019); Agnieszka Kanas, Peer Scheepers, and Carl Sterkens, “Interreligious Contact, Perceived Group Threat, and Perceived Discrimination: Predicting Negative Attitudes Among Religious Minorities and Majorities in Indonesia,” Social Psychology Quarterly 78, no. 2 (2015); Ryan D. King and Darren Wheelock, “Group Threat and Social Control: Race, Perceptions of Minorities and the Desire to Punish,” Social Forces 85, no. 3 (2007).

Part I

Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities

1

The workings of a media outlet

It would do a disservice to all media practitioners to speak of ‘The Media’ as a homogenous group and to treat all journalists the same. Klaus Bruhn Jensen defines communication as: “the relaying of categorical information that can be recognised as information, and which can be recategorised—restated, responded to, or reprogrammed—in the course of communication”.1 The relayed information is then received and negotiated by the receiver. Biocca describes this process as follows: [Receivers] read into a message. … The word ‘read’ implies an active engagement with the message. The meaning of a message is not ‘received’, it is extracted, inferred, worked on, and constructed. The audience member always ‘reads into’ the message. … The viewers contain within them a range of possible decoding’s. To say this another way, a viewer’s interpretation of the message is not fixed, it will vary with mood, the viewer’s situation, and the programming context of the message.2 Where communication refers to the act of transmitting information, media is broadly defined as the method used to store and transmit information or data. However, in this work, ‘media’ is the term used for the mechanisms used to store and transmit information or data to large audiences simultaneously. Peter Horsfield further elaborates: The most common use of the term media today is as a collective term for the constellation of institutions, practices, economic structures, and aesthetic styles of social utilities such as newspapers, movies, radio, book publishers, television, and the related creative industries (such as advertising, marketing, and graphic design) that service them.3 For the purpose of this book, the term ‘media’ is commonly used synonymously with mass media in general or news media in particular. Even though in reality it may refer to a single medium used to communicate any data for any purpose, I will not be using that definition unless specified. Alternative examples of media may include advertising media (billboards), broadcast DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-2

4  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities media (television soaps), digital media (podcasts), new media (YouTube video), print media (newspapers), published media (government reports), and social media (twitter, Facebook, and Myspace). To consider the current functioning of media in contemporary societies, one must examine the position media has taken up. The following aspects are characteristic for media: for example, media are both simultaneously constructed and the constructor of reality, yet this is subjected to commercial and economic factors and has ideological and political implications. Form and content are related in each medium, each of which has a unique aesthetic, codes, and conventions, and the receivers of media apply them to negotiate their meaning.4 As an increasingly central actor in the realm of public life, its value and importance rely upon the ability of a media institution to utilise a variety of methods to communicate its message(s). Its ability to navigate these methodological factors is the main avenue down which media institutions exert their influence, albeit in a variety of ways. As there is always a personal aspect involved too, we must look at how agents position themselves in relation to social processes and public institutions. In this regard, it is important to recognise Vincent Mosco’s description of the following: Media systems in place today are the result of a deeply contested history, involving not just duelling capitalists and their allies in government, but labour unions, citizens’ groups, consumer cooperatives, religious enthusiasts, and social justice organisations of all stripes.5 When analysing the news, we need to look at how media outlets work, how a receiving agent ‘consumes’ their stories and products, and examine the central role that the media occupies in the functioning of contemporary societies and personal lives. The ritual behaviour of media consumption among audiences and the imputed reliability of news among consumers mean that the information put across by the news media is often implicitly believed to be true. By positioning itself in such a way that it offers us an apparently unmediated access to reality, the media affects and defines how the individual approaches his immediate environment. At the same time, its agenda-­building processes as well as the way events are deemed newsworthy or not shows that not only is the media a great influence in the social sphere, but it is also aware of the power it possesses and uses it to its own advantage to further its economic and political goals. The news does not tell you how the seed is germinating in the ground, but it may tell you when the first sprout breaks the surface. It may even tell you what somebody says is happening to the seed underground. It may tell you that the sprout did not come up at the time it was expected. The more points, then, at which any happening can be fixed, objectified, measured, named, the more points there are at which news can occur.6

The workings of a media outlet 5 As the above quote by Walter Lippmann shows, news is not going to tell you how the events that are unseen are affecting things, but reports will occur when news breaks and becomes visible. The context given may be limited, and may take the form of a debate, especially if the timing was unexpected. The news relies upon visible events that can be relayed to an audience, and the more points that can be deemed visible, the more often the news can refer to an event. Henrik Bødker7 cites a work by Elmelund-Præstekjær and Wien8 that list of four main necessary criteria, for something to become a media event: 1 The event must be appropriate for public debate, i.e., there must exist a range of legitimate positions as well as people willing to air and debate these. 2 The issues at stake must be, and this is linked to the first point, something that can be interpreted within a number of contexts or frames. 3 The event must also, at least in their study of a limited number of events, contain some deviation from, a break of, norms. 4 The event must be able to condense a complex problem into a striking image and or draw upon a number of existing stereotypes. The above-listed criteria highlight the ways media producers may judge the value of the information or event based on criteria in order to decide whether it is newsworthy or not. Thus, several judgements are made in the production of a news piece, even if it is something as simple as choosing to run a certain story and not another or the angle from which to approach it. But in these criteria, the expected reaction is also considered. The media report must not only adhere to certain values instilled in the reporting agent but also elicit a certain response or set of responses from the prospective audience. It must also not be forgotten that most the media outlets are commercial institutions and therefore their commercial goals will undoubtedly influence their decision-­making process. It highlights that in media reports, the subjectivity of the producer crucially affects the way in which the media report is being presented. This creates a discrepancy between what media institutions want their audiences to believe about their role and, as Stuart Hall points out, what their actual productions are: Press reports cannot be simply a straight reflection of what happened because there always intervenes a whole process of selection—which events to report, which to leave out; which aspects of an event to report, which to omit; and a whole process of presentation—choosing which sort of headline, language, imagery, photograph, typography to use in translating what happened.9 If the event is deemed appropriate for public debate, a choice is made that signifies a range of legitimate positions and the media institutions select the

6  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities individuals that best fit their criteria and show a willingness to appear on air and debate and represent these positions. Although the issues must be something that can be related to by as many different people as possible, the possibility to interpret a news story from a number of contexts or frames and get a multiplicity of viewers makes the news report commercially viable. In this regard, the fact that BBC News was accused of both anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and misrepresentation of the Gaza crisis in 201410 suggests that they probably did as good a job as possible in the way the news was broadcast and made it successful viewing, as people with very different if not opposite values watched the same broadcast and interpreted totally different things from it. However, it symbolises a larger aspect of the way news functions in society and the way it reinforces certain discourses. Contemporary media narratives are framed in ways that represent the ideals of a large part of society,11, and this is what makes them intelligible.12 However, due to the fact that they are framed from the perspective of these ideals, the reports, institutions, and content can take on mythological properties.13 This means that any change to their regular ‘typical’ conduct or content will bring about a crisis amongst their audience, which will result in complaints.14 Partly because it challenges the narratives of self, and the symbiotic relationship between audience and content, but also partly because it renders the information transmitted as unintelligible and therefore not able to achieve the intended result for the broadcaster. An example of this can be seen in the response to the Gaza coverage. However, the paradox that stems from all of this is that rather than creating an environment whereby these events are placed in a context that allows for novelty, innovation, creativity, and truly ‘new’ stories, frames, and perspectives to emerge, society demands that the producer of images and narratives conforms to existing paradigms.15 Therefore removing the tension between producers and consumers.16 Therefore, for example, if we explore why there are protests and why there exists a public outcry over the reporting of a story by the BBC, but not its rivals ITV, Channel 4, or Sky news. The reasons I suggest, manifest themselves along three lines that are inextricably linked: (1) it is because the consumer holds the BBC to a higher standard of quality, than the other commercial outlets; (2) it has a different status to a purely commercial institution and should therefore be treated differently too; and (3) the tradition of television watching and broadcasting that the BBC has created results in the fact that any deviation from that tradition is viewed with suspicion and contempt. These consequences will be explored further in the discussion on authority and authenticity. Fundamentally, broadcasting is meant to illicit a response to the material, and successful broadcasts reinforce consumption, but all broadcasts risk alienating viewers. An event (in this case, a news story) must also contain some deviation from the regular state of affairs. The way that journalists cover a story is up to them. The Netherlands’ most famous contemporary philosopher17 Johan Cruijff once said: “Als ik zou willen dat je het begreep, had ik

The workings of a media outlet 7 het wel beter uitgelegd! (If I wanted you to understand, I would have done a better job explaining it)”. To me, this encapsulates the tension in journalism. Reporters are professionals, communicating their messages to their lay audiences. Often, journalists communicate the information to the best of their ability. However, at the same time, they possess the skills and know-how to obfuscate and confuse audiences, as well as spread disinformation (knowingly and unknowingly), and so the relationship between journalists and consumers is one that requires both to uphold the other to higher standards. However, in the contemporary societal context, where attention spans can be measured in nanoseconds, and journalism is about capturing audiences and not quality content, those standards are negotiated based on social values held at the time. Reports generate an image, “an image is a sight which has been recreated or reproduced. It is an appearance, or a set of appearances, which has been detached from the place and time in which it first made its appearance and preserved”.18 Using catchy sound bites or pictures that catches people’s attention, people understand media reports because “they already have learned cultural codes to understand what is presented to them”.19 These social representations are coded and decoded by people and form the basis for the construction of opinion. These are then preserved and repeated. In this way, these oversimplified explanations and stereotypes remain prominent in the social imagination of the majority of people. Stories such as those about Muslims or Islam in the news follow this same pattern when they are created. In the UK, only around five per cent of the population observes this religion according to the census, and this means that any Muslim is a deviation as they differ from 95% of Britain. This makes Muslims newsworthy, according to the third criteria above. In addition, it’s relatively easy to select one or two individuals, such as Anjem Choudhry or Abu Hamza, for a broadcast that deviate strongly from the majority of Muslims. In and of itself, this may not be an issue; however, a problem arises when these are the only images or stories broadcast, because then it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to envisage Islam or Muslims existing outside these frames of reference. It also shapes the narrative because the event portrayed must be able to condense a complex issue into a problem which is then discussed using a striking image and drawing upon several existing stereotypes. It then becomes a vicious circle, because any future narratives or reports need to account for these stereotypes and therefore keep bringing them up, not allowing for any real reporting to move on and radically change. But the above-mentioned criteria by Elmelund-Præstekjær and Wien 20 highlight the need for sensation and controversy, both of positive and negative stories. Cinnirella points out that: It has been noted many times that individuals often hold stereotypical beliefs about members of social groups with whom they have little or no contact. One way in which they are able to do this is because they are exposed to social representations of the target group in question,

8  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities and … that these are endorsed less critically if the individual has little direct knowledge of, or contact with, members of the group in question.21 The nature of stories suggests that news reporting defines issues and presents them to the public as needing to reach consensus or challenging the consensus. As pointed out by stating that a newsworthy story must contain some deviation from the socially accepted norms of the target audience, it is important to consider in this regard that whatever actions a media producer undertakes, there are commercial implications as well as ideological and political implications, whether they are aware of them or not. Positive news stories are rarely mentioned in the press, but when they are mentioned, they also adhere to the abovementioned criteria. Therefore, media representations end up re-enforcing certain ideas, as people with little or no direct contact, are only exposed to these types of representation. Yet if the newsworthy items rely upon existing stereotypes in their communication mechanisms in order to be understood and newsworthy, it will be much more difficult to challenge media portrayals of reality and enforce a change in perception. Poulton,22 Denham,23 and Lang and Lang,24 have analysed the ‘agenda building process’ that they argue is common in media circles. They suggest that in practice media agents highlight certain events and issues, but these issues require different levels of news coverage depending on the type of issue and the desired reaction of the consumer. As a result, issues are generally described in such a way so as to be understood by the average news consumer. Yet the language used to describe an event or issue may affect public perception and could be used in order to elicit a specific response. But crucial to a successful transfer of information is the ability of a media producer to link the issues and events to ‘secondary symbols’ that are accessible to the desired audience.25 They also argue that this process of agenda-building accelerates when well-known or authoritative individuals speak out. In short, when an event happens, this receives a specific set of coverage, and the manner in which it is covered (i.e., the language used, symbols involved, etc.) determines how the public perceives this issue or event. This process is then accelerated and or increases in importance if a person who is well-known takes a public stance on the issue. This can be because it is an important issue if the prime minister is addressing it, but simultaneously if a celebrity raises awareness for an issue because they deem it a worthy cause. This enables that cause to receive airtime because it is mentioned by someone with access to media discourse, or able to capture media attention.26 This is also why so many agents struggle for airtime and exposure because it is a place where one can increase notoriety and rally support for a cause. Some have argued that the airtime spent on the EDL or Islamic Jihadism has increased support for the groups at a much faster rate than if the issue did not receive any airtime.27 An example of such a media case can be seen in Emma Thompson’s comments about the refugee crisis.28 Despite Thompson being an ambassador

The workings of a media outlet 9 for the charity ActionAid, an activist for Palestinians and a member of the British-based ENOUGH! Coalition, the Elton John AIDS Foundation, the Refugee Council, and an Ambassador for the Galapagos Conservation Trust, none of this was mentioned in the reporting. This would suggest that the reason she was able to command airtime had little to do with any of these functions but rather that she is a famous Hollywood actress. The fact that Thompson is a famous Hollywood actress has made her an authority figure, which noble as it is for her to speak up and show solidarity with the refugees, it does beg the question as to why there is not more airtime given to discussions with the prime minister, home or foreign secretary, academics with specialities on this issue, spokespeople for different activist groups (even ones that are against the letting in of refugees such as the BNP, EDL, or Britain First, etc.) One could ask: What ‘authority’ does Emma Thompson have in order to speak on the issue? From a consumer perspective, why should I listen to her? The media is a very powerful entity in the public domain of modern society. Its influence on the public opinion is considerable, especially when we consider controversial or sensational topics in relation to agenda building. This idea lead W. Shadid to conclude that “the media adds both in a direct and indirect manner to the dissemination of negative imagery concerning allochthonous29 people and might even play a role in their discrimination by society”.30 The media is a source for the spreading of information, and disinformation; in turn, it can be the source of producing and enforcing stereotypes and misrepresentation. This is often a result of the under-representation of specialised people in the sector and the short-sighted presentation of the issues at hand.31 If media producers are ill-equipped to deal with the issues at hand, for whatever reason that may be, then the media report is going to reflect that.32 However, at the same time, the various media-producing institutions are in a position of power where the effects of their productions can have far-reaching consequences, especially if it concerns a structural problem rather than a one-off oversight. In the world of media, one can refer to the interactions of media productions as frames of meaning, which can interact, develop, and conflict with each other. Media not only affects society through its ability to broadcast various frames of meaning to large audiences simultaneously, but it also has the ability to shape the audience’s perception. However, the form of a news report is not entirely separate from the content. Form and content are related in each medium, each of which has a unique aesthetic, codes, and conventions.33 Teleevangelism is an example. It can reach a wide audience with a message that can be found elsewhere, but the form does put some people off while others are touched by it in a way that they are not by other methods. Thus, the form and message though separate are intrinsically linked and they do affect one another. However, news media is not a local production or consumed locally, the newsthat is reported in local contexts, that affects local people, also is

10  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities available to people beyond that local context. In the age of global information technology, the news that is reported in one location can also be transmitted around the globe. It might be meant to show something different, as what is seen as positive in one location can be reported to show a negative in another or vice-versa.34 Increasingly what is reported in the media in the various instances affect not only the local receiver and the perception he has of the item described in the report, but an increasingly information-literate global populace has access to information that transcends their local production. In turn, this affects the mode of production, with large institutions investing in media outlets that can cater to foreign or global markets. Kraidy adds to this: Post-Fordist practices and systemic forces account for the fact that hybrid media texts reflect industry imperatives for targeting several markets at once with the same program or, alternatively, are symptoms of commercially motivated “borrowing”. … [This is seen in] the present global structure where interlocking regulatory, financial, political, and cultural forces drive a race to reach the highest number of people for the lowest cost and the minimum amount of risk.35 As the quote above highlights, mass production mechanisms have led to a homogenisation of media reports. This means that whilst reception practices are diverse and plural, the goal of production is a singular report with universal marketability. The marketability is what drives the form and content, and this will be discussed in the next section.

Notes 1. Klaus Bruhn Jensen, Media Convergence: The Three Degrees of Network, Mass, and Interpersonal Communication (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 57. http:// books.google.nl/books?id=97A7hl8pNBoC. 2. F. Biocca, “Viewers’ Mental Models of Political Messages: Toward a Theory of Semantic Processing of Television,” in Television and Political Advertising: Volume I: Psychological Processes, ed. F. Biocca (New York, NY – London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 29. 3. Peter Horsfield, “Media as Culture, Media as Industries, Media as Text, Media as Technologies,” in Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture, ed. David Morgan (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 116. 4. S. Ashley, M. Poepsel, and E. Willis, “Media Literacy and News Credibility: Does Knowledge of Media Ownership Increase Skepticism in News Consumers?,” The Journal of Media Literacy Education 2, no. 1 (2010): 38. 5. Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 2009), 110. http://books.google.co.uk/books? id=V57yrDMaO9oC. 6. Walter Lippmann, “Newspapers,” in Media Power in Politics, ed. Doris A. Graber (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1990), 37–38. 7. Henrik Bødker, “Muslims in Print, or Media Events as Nodes of Cultural Conflict,” in Media, Religion and Conflict, eds. Lee Marsden and Heather Savigny (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 83.

The workings of a media outlet 11 8. C. Elmelund-Præstekjær and C. Wien, “Mediestormens Politiske Indflydelse Og Anatomi’ [The Political Influence and Anatomy of the Media Storm],” Nordicom Information 30, no. 1 (2008): 19–28. 9. Stuart Hall, “The Treatment of Football Hooliganism in the Press,” in Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context, ed. Roger Ingham (London, UK: Inter-Action Imprint, 1978), 34. 10. For example: “ENAR Shadow Report 2010-11: Racism in the United Kingdom,” UK Race and Europe Network, accessed 26-01-2017. http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/ MediaArchive/publications/shadow%20report%202010-11/26.%20UK.pdf and http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.607049. 11. Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality (Long Grove, IL – Waveland Press, 1998). (First Published 1962), 185. 12. Stanley E. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 354–55. 13. Eliade, Myth and Reality, 185. 14. Eliade, Myth and Reality, 185. 15. Eliade, Myth and Reality, 188. 16. Eliade, Myth and Reality, 188. 17. Milo Lambers, “‘Cruijffiaans kun je niet leren’. Taalwetenschapper en schrijver Rob Siekmann uit Oegstgeest ordent uitspraken legendarische voetballer,” Leidsch Dagblad (Leiden, The Netherlands), 21st May 2020. https://www.leidschdagblad.nl/cnt/ dmf20200521_82977097?utm_source=google&utm_medium=organic. 18. John Berger, Ways of Seeing (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2008), 10. 19. J. Staiger, Media Reception Studies (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2005), 63. http://books.google.com.bh/books?id=T7uvbm66jJkC. 20. Elmelund-Præstekjær and Wien, “Mediestormens politiske indflydelse og anatomi’ [The Political Influence and Anatomy of the Media Storm].” 21. Marco Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice,” in Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. Helbling. (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 180. 22. Emma Poulton, “English Media Representation of Football-related Disorder: ‘Brutal, Short-hand and Simplifying’?,” Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 8, no. 1 (2005). 23. B.E. Denham, “Building the Agenda and Adjusting the Frame: How the Dramatic Revelations of Lyle Alzado Impacted Mainstream Press Coverage of Anabolic Steroid Use,” Sociology of Sport Journal 16, no. 1 (1999). 24. G.E. Lang and K. Lang, The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press and the Polls During Watergate (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983). 25. For one analysis of these secondary symbols, please see: Laurens de Rooij, “Believing and Belonging. The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion,” Journal of Religion in Europe 10, no. 1/2 (2017). 26. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 107. 27. Paul Jackson and Matthew Feldman, The EDL: Britain’s ‘New Far Right’ Social Movement (Northampton, UK: The University of Northampton, 2011). http://nectar. northampton.ac.uk/6015/7/Jackson20116015.pdf. 28. For the interview, see: Emily Maitlis, “Emma Thompson: If refugees were white, we would feel differently,” Newsnight, 3 September. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ entertainment-arts-34135679, and an example of the reporting of her comments can be seen at: Chris Mandle, “Refugee crisis: Emma Thompson claims Britain is ‘racist’ for not taking in more refugees,” The Independent, 4 September. http://www. independent.co.uk/news/people/refugee-crisis-emma-thompson-claims-britain-is-

12  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities racist-for-not-taking-in-more-refugees-10485966.html. Or Tom McTague, “Britain is RACIST for not taking in more refugees, claims Hollywood star Emma Thompson,” Daily Mail, 04 September. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3221243/ Britain-RACIST-not-taking-refugees-claims-Hollywood-star-Emma-Thompson. html. 29. The definition of allochthonous is nonindigenous. It is accepted as the antonym of autochthonous. 30. Stewart M. Hoover, “Reception of Religion and Media,” in Religion in the Media Age (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 330. 31. Hoover, “Reception of Religion and Media,” 330. 32. Examples of why this may occur could be found in the ideology, prejudice, bigotry, or ignorance of the producing agent(s). 33. Ashley, Poepsel, and Willis, “Media Literacy and News Credibility: Does Knowledge of Media Ownership Increase Skepticism in News Consumers?,” 38. 34. Katherine Pratt Ewing, “Living Islam in the Diaspora: Between Turkey and Germany,” South Atlantic Quaterly 102, no. 2/3, Spring/Summer (2003): 405–6; Shadid and van Koningsveld, “The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in the West: Causes and Solutions,” 188–90. 35. Marwan Kraidy, Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2005), 114.

2

Media and communication mechanisms

Austin argues that there are areas of spoken expression that are an action and not merely a reporting or describing of some kind of state of affairs.1 For example, when people say ‘I do’ in getting married or, ‘I christen this vessel, the Queen Elizabeth II’.2 In that vein, contemporary media is a highly modern and efficient communication mechanism for undertaking such actions. Media reports not only report a state of affairs but to the audience they bring it into being, ‘Tonight the [news corporation] brings to you … ’, it has reduced time and space and people are becoming increasingly reliant on those mechanisms that can reach across vast distances instantaneously to exchange opinion and information for an increasing number of reasons. These can be for social, economic, or educational purposes to name but a few. Global corporations rely on media as an information source and method of communicating with staff around the globe. People use media for social interactions with relatives or friends across vast distances and increasingly e-­learning is being implemented in educational institutions. The media has a vast number of uses and huge potential with social networking sites, YouTube, or applications such as Skype etc. that potentially democratise media access and bring the world closer together. These tools allow for people to connect with one another in almost a direct fashion although they are miles away and may never ever meet face to face.3 Examples of media affecting communication mechanisms are in many ways seen as a recent phenomenon, yet the origins can be traced back to examples such as Ella Cheever Thayer’s book Wired Love4 from 1880. It deals with the issue of meeting people and eventually falling in love ‘online’ via telegraph. This is something that is repeated throughout history as technology affects human interaction. There are also recent examples such as the acronyms YOLO5 (carpe diem of the 2010’s) and lol6 entering the dictionary and challenging what is considered acceptable vernacular for communicating. The online is affecting the offline too when we consider Leetspeak7 (or leet), an alternate representation of text that replaces letters with numbers or character combinations and is increasingly prominent among digital natives that communicate online in a variety of settings. However, communication mechanisms also affect the media, an example of this is how newspapers now all have online editions and twitter feeds. DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-3

14  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities

Media logic, form, and content So, as for media form and content, they have always been driven by an internal logic. Media logic consists of a form of communication; the process through which media present and transmit information. Elements of this form include the various media and the formats used by these media. Format consists, in part, of how material is organised, the style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis on particular characteristics of behaviour, and the grammar of media communication.8 It is important to recognise that the media logic, understood as the process through which media present and transmit information, affects reception. “Format becomes a framework or a perspective that is used to present as well as interpret phenomena”.9 The way material is organised, the presentation style, and the focus or emphasis, shape public perception of an issue through the framework or perspective that is put forward. This logic coincides with the ability of media to set the agenda, to signify what is important, and to illicit a response from the viewer. Therefore, the aim of media productions is not only to inform but also to transform, as the information that is broadcast not only offers the viewer the ability to see things in a new light, but simultaneously looks to align viewers to its particular perspective. The form of the symbolic content that is typically disseminated through mass media practices is generally the result of technological advances and institutional production mechanisms that are controlled and regulated.10 This in turn leads to the cultivation of symbolic power as Thompson argues: Cultural or symbolic power stems from the activity of producing, transmitting, and receiving meaningful symbolic forms. Symbolic activity is a fundamental feature of social life, on a par with productive activity, the coordination of individuals, and coercion. Individuals are constantly engaging in the activity of expressing themselves and in interpreting expressions of others; they are constantly involved in communicating with one another and exchanging information and symbolic content.11 In wielding symbolic power, media has always had a political and economic element to it. The earliest forms of writing were used primarily for the purposes of recording information relevant to trade and to defining the owners of property, and later it was used to control of the dissemination of information, through scribes or state media institutions, by regulating society through the collecting of official statistics, these are now produced by the ONS. Thompson notes that historically: Many of the major innovations in the media industries … were directly concerned with increasing reproductive capacity for commercial purposes. But the commercial viability of media organisations also depends

Media and communication mechanisms 15 on the fact that they are able to exercise some degree of control over the reproducibility of a work, hence the protection of copyright.12 Jensen has suggested that “Different media offer different degrees of programmability with respect to the information, communication, and action that they mediate”.13 But as the programmability and reproductive capacity of news stories increases, the hybridity of media reports increases. But as it’s marketability increases, the necessity for control over dissemination increases in order to maximise financial gain. As a consequence, the commercial demands of the media institutions decrease the diversity of images and reports. A media organisation’s ability to exercise control over its broadcasts, has implications for stories that are less likely or less able to be produced, as these stories are unlikely to be broadcast. Simultaneously, there might be a reproducible story available but if there is not enough consumer demand then it still might not be broadcast. With access to production of news reports highly concentrated and the demand to produce reproducible material high, the opportunity for alternative voices to utilise traditional media as a place to voice their concerns and opinions is greatly reduced. Thus, as research on media representations of Muslims and Islam has shown, stories are often repeated and similar in outlook.14 What I argue here is that this is a direct consequence of the media logic, and the social, political, and commercial concerns of the media institution. In the past, the economic value of media used to be regulated on much more unequal terms, as it used to be the case that television broadcasts had to be seen at the time of broadcasting in order to be viewed. This made it distinct from video or cinema broadcasting because they can be watched at times that are in negotiation with the consumer, generally for a fee. Newspapers differ from television news, in the sense that, news on “broadcast TV offers relatively discrete segments: small sequential unities of images and sounds whose maximum duration seems to be about five minutes. These segments are organised into groups, which are … simply cumulative”.15 News in the written press offers discrete segments but they are not meant to be cumulative. The stories in the newspaper can be read sequentially and cumulatively but one can read only the stories that are interesting based on the headline or read the stories in an alternative order or from back to front. This is not possible with broadcast news. Despite being able to access the footage online or through services such as BBC IPlayer, the recording of news would seem unnecessary due its repetitive nature in broadcasting. Yet, even the on-demand services do not allow the user to consume one news story at a time. One must watch the entire broadcast or read the text version. On terrestrial television, the News is broadcast on BBC 1 at 6.00, 13.00, 18.00, and 22.00. It is broadcast on BBC 2 at 11.00, and on ITV at 6.00, 10.30, 13.30, 18.00, and 22.00. Channel 4 offers its news services at 12.00 and 19.00 and Channel 5 at 12.10, 17.00, 18.30, 19.55, and 20.55. In addition to 24-hour news networks on satellite television, the necessity to record news is not really there.

16  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities Most television broadcasts are made for consumption in the home, although this is increasingly changing to accommodate mobile and online platforms. Broadcast TV is a profoundly domestic phenomenon. The TV set has to be acquired by a person or persons before TV signals can be received, and the manufacture of TV sets has long assumed that its market is the domestic unit.16 But this broadcasting does rely on some form of consent, as the viewer needs to purchase a television and pay a license fee or subscription to receive broadcasts. There are a few exceptions, such as sports events or films that are broadcast for domestic settings and viewed in public spaces such as pubs or cinemas to attract large crowds for events such as world cups, local professional teams, or blockbuster film releases. Newspapers, with some exceptions such as the metro, like televisions need to be purchased, unless one reads it online. This has commercial implications for the newspaper, but they have a separate business model for online and offline news that takes this into account, and so only those willing to purchase the product are exposed to it. However, in today’s media-saturated world, it is becoming increasingly difficult to participate in society without the necessary media available. This is one aspect why the elderly are often overlooked or excluded because they are not ‘online’.17 Yet by broadcasting into the home, TV images have the effect of immediacy. The immediacy is not just a result of the idea that it is live, but by addressing the viewers in such a way that it simulates eye contact and everyday conversation, television gives the impression that the broadcast is personal and directed at the viewer. Some broadcasts go further and provide images, quotes, statements, or references that can only be understood by an audience sharing the same frame of reference.18 This frame of reference is inherently determined by the formation of audiences and is therefore exclusionary in nature towards those who are not in the intended audience. As K.B. Jensen points out: “Media are, at once, material vehicles, discursive or modal forms of expression, and socially regulated institutions that facilitate and frame interaction”.19 Media material consists of text, sound, and images. And it is through the modal aspects, i.e., the forms of expression that are programmable and experiential, that these material vehicles are able to be interpreted. Vattimo adds to this, that, “the ‘sense’ in which technology moves is not so much the mechanical domination of nature as the development specifically of information and the construction of the world as ‘images’”.20 Although reception of these images is grounded in our biological senses, the experiential conditions along with our historical and cultural conditioning affect our interpretations. Another characteristic of mass media products is the separation between production and consumption. I.e., the location where news media is produced is separated and different from the space in which it is received.21 The consequence is that whilst the producer may take this into account by

Media and communication mechanisms 17 employing certain methods for disseminating their message; the receiver is often left to decipher the message on their own. This means that the process of the exchange of symbolic content is necessarily uneven, as professionals in the production process are partnered with amateurs in the reception process. And whilst media is available to a plurality of people simultaneously, it is constructed in such a way as to appear direct and personal. This is because what the consumers demand is a reduction of information to infotainment.22 Increasingly however, the “patterns of behaviour that traditionally existed offline … are increasingly mixed with social and social technical norms created in an online environment, taking on a new dimensionality”.23 In turn, we think about our lived experiences through the experiences of the media sphere. The outputs of the institutions reflect upon experiences, societies, and the world at large. In doing so, cultures and frames of reference are broadcast, engaging with publics and audiences in order to hook them into their narrative. Through this process of engaging publics, media affect communication patterns. Public communication is becoming more and more a reflection of the way in which media reports are produced and circulated. The following sub-section will highlight this. It will argue that as public communication mechanisms become normative modes of communications, their presence as definers and shapers of discourse, forms how the subject of that discourse is discussed and approached in everyday contexts.

Media and public communication The increase in a reliance on technology and long-distance communication has as a consequence that the processes that traditional hermeneutics described, in relation to how the understanding of texts and oral messages functioned, are now a requirement for social life in general. As internet, email, video, and radio broadcasting increase its global availability and importance, there is a strong need for information and technological literacy. The codes and conventions of these technological advances are affecting society and social praxis. In turn, where traditional hermeneutics discusses the negotiation of meaning between a written text and its reader, contemporary society requires its application to both text and images. A consequence is that an increased number of communications are monological as opposed to dialogical. In this sense, information is broadcast to the recipient but not communicated back to the receiver. Any responses that are returned are often not in equal measure due to the inequality of power between the original sender and receiver. This imbalance also reflects the communication among people in Britain. Communication becomes more and more the assertion of a right to speak and to voice one’s opinion rather than to consider the responses of others. The responses of others to assertions and contestations are secondary to the primary right to assert one’s opinions and express one’s feelings. Although supported by the right to freedom of speech, this particular characteristic of

18  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities media is influencing public communication on a daily basis. The asymmetry of media communication also reinforces the mutual dependence of producer and receiver in communication mechanisms and media logic. It is not the primary aim to provide a voice or to engage the receiver but rather to create an audience. The producer is as successful as their ability to generate and audience, the audience needs media content but must also be willing to watch something that is chosen from a plurality of possibilities. But as Bourdieu points out, something to remain aware of is that “the probability that an isolated agent, in the absence of any delegation, will form an explicit, coherent opinion on [x] … depends on the extent to which he depends on it for his reproduction and is objectively and subjectively interested in its functioning”.24 Institutional communication is increasingly a generation of audiences. Its primary goal is not to engage the viewer in a dialogue as that is not possible through the logic of its communication. Rather, the goal is to create audiences that are willing to receive a production. An example of this is the press release. Consumer focus groups are another example where corporations meet with consumers to gather opinions on their product. The aim is to tailor the product in such a way that consumers would consume it, it is not a survey looking at what product the corporation should produce. This logic reduces all media communication to some form of entertainment. As highlighted above, even news is not able to avoid the demand for entertainment, thereby becoming infotainment.25 There exists a mutual dependence because the audience requires content and the producer requires an audience, the commodity that is negotiated is a person’s attention span. Hereby is not the content up for debate, nor the opinion or values of the consumer, but rather whether the consumer is willing to submit his or her attention to the product on offer. In turn, this affects inter-personal communication as people’s attention spans are the commodity that is traded. The engagement with others is only available in as much as it hooks their attention. If it does not become worthy of audience attention, then it is not worth spending time (and often money) on. In the same way, it would be easy to show how much newspapers owe, even in an age of market research, to the logic of competition for advertisers and for readers. Like political parties, newspapers must endlessly work to maximise their clientele, at the expense of their closest competitors in the field of production, through more or less disguised borrowings of themes, formulae, and even journalists, without losing the core readership which defines them and gives them their distributional value.26 The commodification of subjects in media reports has reinforced that perspective amongst viewing audiences. Subjects are either worthy of one’s attention or they are not, and one should not waste time offering one’s attention to it. It also reduces the ability of someone to be seen and heard to the

Media and communication mechanisms 19 ability to command someone’s attention. Unfortunately, this very often is coupled with one’s ability to “attract a television camera”.27 This explains the lengths some people will go to in order to be on television or in the newspaper and celebrity endorsements. Whilst social media has the possibility for dialogue, it is very often a succession of monologues. Tweeting, Facebook posts, Pinterest, etc. are often used for monological expressions of opinions. A statement on Facebook has more often than not the primary goal of collecting likes, rather than start a meaningful dialogue about the nature of the statement. This is also reinforced by ‘official’ Facebook or twitter pages by authority figures such as the prime minister or the pope, or institutions such as the BBC or the New York Times. Most social media posts are press releases, in shorter form, or links to the official statement. This is a further example of monological c­ ommunication as commentary and engagement on the posts are of secondary importance. The aim is to get the information out there and if it is commented upon then that will be reacted to if necessary. This is very different in nature than creating a post asking for feedback or commentary where the primary aim is commentary, and feedback and not to voice one’s opinion or broadcast information. The separation between producer and receiver has created a need for audiences rather than a need for engagement on topics and issues. It is here that one can see examples of the influences on communication by individualism,28 neoliberal economics,29 and media logic.30 This means that people who have or want an opinion on Muslims and Islam do so in as much as that it is perceived relevant to their immediate lived experience, as Bourdieu points out earlier. These opinions are informed by a plurality of potential sources, but media may be one of them, and is becoming increasingly the mechanism for accessing all other potential sources. The effects of communication have two major consequences: (1) in engaging audiences about newsworthy subjects (Muslims and Islam for example), they must convince them of its relevance to their lives; (2) those that have the opinion that it is immediately relevant will feel the need to share and discuss it. This contributes to the high volume of media material produced and on its lasting presence in public discourse.

Notes 1. John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1975). 2. John Langshaw Austin, “Performative Utterances,” in The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy, eds. M. Ezcurdia and R.J. Stainton (Toronto, ON: Broadview Press, 2013), 21. 3. For an analysis of the manner by which new media have been incorporated into the traditional media framework, please see: R.W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times (New York, NY: New Press, 2015). 4. E.C. Thayer, Wired Love: A Romance of Dots and Dashes (New York, NY: W.J. Johnston, 1880).

20  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities 5. You Only Live Once. 6. Laugh Out Loud. 7. The term leet comes from the word elite and the leet alphabet is a form of symbolic writing. The term leet is also used as an adjective to describe formidable prowess or accomplishment, especially in online gaming and derives its original usage from computer hackers. An example of leet spellings of the word leet include 1337 and l33t. 8. David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow, Media Logic (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), 10. 9. David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow, Media Logic (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), 10. 10. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 27. 11. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 16. 12. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995) 20. 13. Klaus Bruhn Jensen, Media Convergence: The Three Degrees of Network, Mass, and Interpersonal Communication (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 57. 14. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002). 15. John Ellis, Visible Fictions: Cinema: Television: Video (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 112. 16. John Ellis, Visible Fictions: Cinema: Television: Video (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 113. 17. José Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 19. 18. John Ellis, Visible Fictions: Cinema: Television: Video (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 133–34. 19. Klaus Bruhn Jensen, Media Convergence: The Three Degrees of Network, Mass, and Interpersonal Communication (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 57. 20. Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society, trans. David Webb (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 1992), 16. 21. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 29. 22. Daya Kishan Thussu, News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment (London: Sage, 2008). 23. José Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 19. 24. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 1984), 412. 25. Daya Kishan Thussu, News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment (London: Sage, 2008). 26. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 1984), 231. 27. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 107. 28. S.W. Littlejohn and K.A. Foss, Theories of Human Communication, 10th Edition. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010), 203–4. 29. D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 30. David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow, Media Logic (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979).

3

Media as a discursive institution of influence

Media discourse(s) exert its influence on the public, simultaneously affecting everyday people and everyday contexts. Increasingly people are subjected to this influence. This renders our experience of reality mediated and therefore interpretative and requiring constant (re)interpretation. “The activity of reception takes place within structured contexts and depends on the power and resources available to the potential receivers”.1 For example, one needs to have a television to have access to television news. One might only have access to a certain type of newspaper because another type is too expensive. Similarly, media reception is often routine or ritual, in the sense that it is a repetitive action that takes place under similar circumstances on a regular basis, such as reading the newspaper on the train to work or whilst waiting at the hairdresser, or listening to the news on the radio during the commute to work in order to receive the traffic report. Whatever the reason may be, media reception takes place in a structured environment and requires certain prerequisite elements. In doing so, the media has power and influence over human action and interaction. In order to stay in touch, one must be in possession of certain products and information. Which products and information one needs to be in possession of is also strongly influenced by media, otherwise marketing and product placement etc. would not function the way it does. The power of a media institution is not solely based on what it broadcasts but also in its ability to almost guarantee a set number of viewers at a given time. Different social agents increasingly struggle to get access to or take control of media discourse as part of their own (strategic) goals because the institutions that govern the media have developed a stranglehold on its production and dissemination. Consequently, the life of organisations and everyday people in everyday contexts have become subjected to a more and more mediacratic2 regime. “In this conception, the media assert influence on both politics and public and are in that way most powerful in shaping political decision-making processes and public opinion”.3 This means that experiences of reality are mediated due to outside influences beyond our control affecting our positioning in a social context. The dissemination of technological and cultural symbols through the media also affects the power struggle between media, producer, and receiver. The media DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-4

22  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities triangulates through its presence as technical and socio-cultural factor, thus mediating interpretation between concepts, ideas, pictures, symbols, and concrete, singular agents. The symbolic power of the producer is enforced upon the receiver during transmission. Some scholars have argued that the information received from a broadcast is not only ‘triangulated’ by media but also the product of the will to power by the person in possession of the information for dissemination. The dissemination is product of the intent of maintaining power or increasing influence over others.4 Public communication is becoming more and more a reflection of the way in which media reports are produced and circulated. News workers are predisposed to treat bureaucratic accounts as factual because news personnel participate in upholding a normative order of authorised knowers in the society. Reporters operate with the attitude that officials ought to know what it is their job to know. … In particular, a news worker will recognise an official’s claim to knowledge not merely as a claim, but as a credible, competent piece of knowledge. This amounts to a moral division of labour: officials have and give the facts; reporters merely get them.5 This is then transferred to audiences who have access to the media. However, by utilising “the journalistic practices of favouring official sources and employing ‘active agents with specific purposes”.6 The corporations then in turn “promote elite social discourses as the public discourse, or the common sense of society”.7 This is reliant upon the trust or believability of the source. The ability of the media institution to command its audience’s attention as an authority is the key to a successful transfer of these elite social discourses. Thus, although there usually is more than one perspective operating within a given discourse about a specific issue, the dominant frame is usually used to define the preferred reading of an issue, event or character. This suppresses alternative readings and limits the scope and ability for minority opinions to be heard. It also renders the perspective of the dominant institutions or social actors to speak and define the legitimate opinions, set the status quo, and retain the existing order and structure. The mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest. The media need a steady, reliable flow of the raw material of news. They have daily news demands and imperative news schedules that they must meet. They cannot afford to have reporters and cameras at all places where important stories may break. Economics dictates that they concentrate their resources where significant news often occurs, where important rumours and leaks abound, and where regular press conferences are held.8 The disparities in financial power, however, render groups unable to access media equally, especially as a socio-political resource. This lack of resources

Media as a discursive institution of influence 23 translates into how minorities are unable to “advance their definitions of political issues through the news media” because of the financial resources “available to those who hold institutional power contribute to their sponsorship of frames and to their ability to have these frames influence public discourse”.9 Different social agents increasingly struggle to get access to or take control of media discourse as part of their own (strategic) goals because the institutions that govern the media have developed a stranglehold on its production and dissemination. As a consequence, the life of organisations and everyday people in everyday contexts, have become subjected to a more and more mediacratic regime. This means that experiences of reality are mediated due to outside influences beyond our control affecting our positioning in a social context. But following the concentration of power, and monotony of images, people are exposed to engagements with minorities from a limited number of possible ways. Due to the disparity in power, representatives of various minority groups do not have access to the power to change the narrative and therefore images remain monotonous. From this vantage point, framing allows us to explore how and why media present or ignore “competing explanations of what factors are causing a problem and what solutions might be possible”.10 In turn, frames are strong discursive tools that can help social actors define and solve problems and shape public opinion. They serve as the foundation of public discourse. However, this does not seem to include the emotional nature of the terminology that surrounds stories related to minorities. This may cause audiences to respond differently to a story. For this reason, the next section will discuss how news stories relate to the construction and perception of reality.

Media, construction, and reality Several authors have written eloquently on media, construction, and reality. Society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic. This process is characterised by a duality in that the media have become integrated into the operations of other social institutions, while they also have acquired the status social institutions in their own right. As a consequence, social interaction—within the respective institutions, between institutions, and in society at large— takes place via the media.11 As shown by Hjarvard above, the media is increasingly influential as a signifier12 and source of information for an increasing percentage of the population.13 These resources for social interaction and cultural expression are not myriad in form and substance, but narrowed parameters (and restricted codes) of media form and content that channel imaginary possibilities in repetitive patterns.14

24  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities As a consequence, how minorities are treated in the media affects the way they are perceived and understood by those receiving the media. This is because the media creates, reflects, and enforces social representations. “Social representations are socially shared and constructed representations that act as a fundamental backdrop for the construction of individual attitudes and beliefs”.15 As McQuail elaborates: Here what matters is less the monopoly of ownership and control than the monopoly of attention and the homogeneity of content. Uniformity and repetition establish the important result of monopoly without the necessity for the structural causes to be present, the more consistent the picture presented, and the more exclusively this picture gains wide attention, then the more likely the predicted effect to occur. We can suppose, too, that matters outside the immediate experience and on which there are not strongly formed, alternative views, will also be most susceptible to the level of influence spoken of. Further, we can think that here, as with media campaigns, the trust in the source and an attribution of authority will be an important factor in the greater extension of media derived opinions and values.16 The reports that are broadcast or published in the newspapers influence the audience through the agenda setting effect of media producers.17 In addition, if all the perspectives are repetitive and homogenous, it is much more likely for an individual to take on that information and hold that outlook for oneself. For example: The media are associated with a view of immigrants as likely to be a cause of trouble or to be associated with conflict. It also seems that impressions attributed to the media as source show a rather higher degree of internal similarity and to be in general less evaluative than those derived from personal contact. The main contribution of the mass media is not, according to this study, to encourage prejudice (often the reverse) but in defining the presence of immigrants as an ‘objective’ problem or the society.18 But what is the role of journalists and media institutions in spreading these frames of reference and sharing their information with their audiences? Lippmann describes the role of journalists as follows: Journalists point a flashlight rather than a mirror at the world. Accordingly, the audience does not receive a complete image … it gets a highly selective series of glimpses instead. … They cannot tell the truth objectively because the truth is subjective and entails more probing and explanation than the hectic pace of news production allows.19 The consequence is that the mass media does not tell you how to think about reality, but it does encourage you to consider what it broadcasts as something

Media as a discursive institution of influence 25 important to think about. It does so in the following manifest ways according to McQuail: First, the media can attract and direct attention to problems, solutions, or people in ways which can favour those with power and correlatively divert attention from rival individuals and groups. Second, the mass media can confer status and confirm legitimacy. Third, in some circumstances, the media can be a channel for persuasion and mobilisation. Fourth, the mass media can help to bring certain kinds of publics into being and maintain them. Fifth, the media are a vehicle for offering psychic rewards and gratifications. They can divert and amuse, and they can flatter. In general, mass media are very cost-effective as means of communication in society; they are also fast, flexible, and relatively easy to plan and control.20 Contemporary media’s portrayal of reality is often perceived as being reality. Nick Couldry makes an important point when he states that “Media institutions claim to speak for, or to be our privileged access to ‘the social’”.21 The idea is that what is conveyed in the media is not a portrait of the social reality but actually the reality itself. Yet, “there are no such things as ‘pure’ facts. A pure fact is simply something that is taken for granted and not put into question. … [however, it is easy] to insist upon its factual status, its ‘neutrality’, so as to reassert, with even greater authority, a still prevalent cultural convention”.22 All media reports are affected by this and the subjective influences of the reporting agent. This can be one reporter on location via live feed, but it can also be a piece edited by a multitude of people before it is broadcast months after the fact. However, the ‘discourse’ of the news is that it presents only pure facts and neutral information. This is a part of the social contract upon which it is built. The authority of the news is predicated upon its presence, availability, and its ability to generate information that is not put into question. Therefore, it reports on events made understandable through cultural conventions with increasing authority as the material it puts out is not questioned. Simultaneously it defines, signifies, and reinforces those conventions through the information it puts out. Contemporary journalism does this by taking events and arranging them within frames that are relatable to the viewer.23 Largely unspoken and unacknowledged, [frames] organise the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports. Frames enable journalists to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely: to recognise it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences. Thus, for organisational reasons alone, frames are unavoidable, and journalism is organised to regulate their production.24 Through the use of mass media, social actors, including various publics, define what is, and what is not relevant to an issue by framing their concerns

26  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities in particular ways.25 “Frames organize discourse, including news stories, by their patterns of selection, emphasis and exclusion”.26 Thus, by “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and make[ing] them more salient in a communicating text”,27 mass media coverage of politics and political issues often contain frames that define current political controversies.28 Therefore, we can see that participants who do not have any meaningful engagement with people belonging to minority groups outside of media reports. Adopt these frames and are unable to discuss members of those minority groups in another manner. This further highlights the role of media as a signifier, a producer, and a disseminator of discourse.

The media and its commercial and economic implications Media institutions have commercial goals and are driven by their primary objective to sell newspapers or attract viewers, in order to build revenue through the selling of advertisement space. However, these commercial implications have a number of consequences. Namely as Kevin Williams points out: The relentless search to maximise profits is not only driving out information at the expense of more entertainment but also is a direct threat to literary culture and reading. The extension of visual communication is changing the nature of public discourse, contributing to a reduction in educational standards, diminishing the attention span, and encouraging apathy, isolation, and passivity. But perhaps more crucial is the view that commercialisation is changing the relationship between the mass media and their audiences: no longer are we seen as citizens but as consumers.29 This is increasingly the case following developments in the production mechanisms of media. For example, television media gives us the opportunity to witness things that normally pass us by. The recording of images enables people to see and analyse things that normally happen so fast that our consciousness cannot record them; in video recordings, things can be seen and analysed through the power to pause.30 Images that pass by too fast to see in reality can be slowed down and examined in film but simultaneously the focus can be placed on an object and its every move examined. It also increases the power of those behind the camera who have the option to include or exclude something. Through the lens of a camera, first through photography and now accompanied by video, the director is master of the domain with the ability to instantly capture life, signify it and through the production mechanisms, it can be endlessly reproduced and broadcast the world over. This is something which separates it with ‘analogue’ art which needs to be reproduced by the artist, but contemporary media, and

Media as a discursive institution of influence 27 some art as well, can be endlessly reproduced because of its digital nature. This is to the advantage of media institutions because it fits into their commercial structure. It seeks out easily reproduced material to be broadcast to a mass audience. Where art is valued based on the uniqueness of the product and the demand for it, a commercial value is the result of low amount of product coupled with a high demand. Media value however is based on the cost of the production of a product and the ability to broadcast it to satisfy demand. Here a high commercial value is based upon low production cost, high demand, and an ability to broadcast in such a way as to meet that demand. David Morgan points out: [The] value of a commodity is determined entirely in terms of the marketplace, which operates with a history and competitive range of options. Value is determined in part by the use-value of a thing and certainly by consumer demand for a particular commodity. But the dominant basis of value is established by the degree to which producer, merchant, and consumer collectively determine desirability.31 However, the power of the participants in the marketplace is not equal. The desirability of a commodity may be the result of all participants’ evaluations but the producer and the merchant in the case of contemporary media are often the same conglomerate and therefore there is no power of influence on the part of the consumer because if they want a particular product, they will need to get it from a particular merchant, not all products are available from all merchants, and the restriction of availability inhibits consumer power. European media systems [are moving] away from the world of politics and towards the world of commerce. This changes the social function of journalism, as the journalist’s main objective is no longer to disseminate ideas and create social consensus around them, but to produce entertainment and information that can be sold to individual consumers.32 The consequence of this paradigm is that news reporting is also determined by these factors. Whilst it is also subjected to the earlier characteristics, the consumer demand is arguably the largest factor. Whilst audience demand can be constructed as seen earlier, i.e., what they want to consume, the bottom line is that news media is broadcast to a certain extent on the basis of what people will give their attention to. This may be a certain style of reporting (for example, the Telegraph vs. the Daily Mail), rather than content or it may be content driven as well (the FOX news vs. CNN news). However, the stories that survive the cutting room floor are those that are deemed interesting for the viewer to watch and that are able to meet the financial constraints of the institutions. In short, the value of the commodity produced by a media institution is increased by undermining the use or non-commodity values of alternative products or modes of production. In turn, this increase in value

28  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities is used to further enhance its own attraction and, in the process, increase its exchange values.33 If the managers fail to pursue actions that favour shareholder returns, institutional investors will be inclined to sell the stock (depressing its price) or to listen sympathetically to outsiders contemplating takeovers. These investors are a force helping press media companies toward strictly market (profitability) objectives.34 In the UK, the BBC and the television license are an exception, as the public funds the BBC out of their TV license payments. But there are debates as to whether the TV license and public funding for the BBC should be cut and if that is the case then the BBC also becomes a fully commercial institution that answers to shareholders rather than the public or government officials for media and culture. Because of the financial implications, it is less of a risk to import the premiere season of a new ‘foreign’ show on local television that has proven successful in other countries to fill a slot rather than create new programming. The same goes for game show formats. It is even the case that to rerun a programme that may be old but still popular is easier to defend to shareholders than it is to broadcast a programme that is both radically new in content and format. To counteract that to some extent, BBC 3 was created to give rise to new programming and Channel 4 has also been involved in the development of new programmes as well. However, in a recent controversy with regards to the axing of certain shows on the BBC that were critical of the Government, the neutrality of the BBC has come into question.35 Thus whilst commercial media companies are subjected to the demands of shareholders, organisations like the BBC need to negotiate their relationship with governance carefully, and therefore have a different outlook on the items they seek to broadcast. This was done in part to capture new and younger audiences because not having those demographics watching their network affects their bottom line. As a result of “the proliferation of channels and the portability of new computing and telecommunications technologies, we are entering an era where media will be everywhere, and we will use all kinds of media in relation to each other”.36 Cultural imperialism is a concern that is mentioned in relation to this. For example, as some products produced abroad, largely in the USA, become successful they are in turn broadcast on British television. This has led to discussions such as “by the mid-1980s [when] Dallas had become the privileged hate symbol for all those who saw the worldwide popularity of the programme as an indication of the growing threat to the variety of world cultures that was posed by American dominance over the world’s media industries”.37 However, as Thompson points out: The globalisation of communication through electronic media is only the most recent of a series of cultural encounters, in some cases, stretching back many centuries, through which the values, beliefs, and symbolic forms of different groups have been superimposed on one another, often

Media as a discursive institution of influence 29 in conjunction with the use of coercive, political, and economic power. Most forms of culture in the world today are, to varying extents, hybrid cultures in which different values, beliefs, and practices have become deeply entwined. This does not imply, of course, that the globalisation of communication through the electronic media may not give rise to new forms of cultural domination and dependency.38 In addition, media convergence has created a situation whereby newsrooms, journalists, and other media producers are working together on productions across disciplines as it were. As a consequence, contemporary journalists have to be multi-skilled, but as Cottle suggests this may have led to a reduction of quality journalists by creating a jack of all trades master of none consequence for journalists.39 Media institutions are a source of wealth and capital, not to mention social capital, it becomes desirable to own, and a struggle for ownership ensues. But as the ownership of media institutions becomes more concentrated, there is a reduction in differentiation among outlets as the production mechanisms are streamlined. In turn, journalism and news institutions start to resemble “assembly-­line production with little room for professional initiative. Furthermore, the commercialisation of the media has introduced various marketing tools into the newsroom”.40 And as news rooms are working on a 24/7 deadline, the pressures of the journalistic field take their toll on quality productions and output.41 Yet among some journalists, it is seen that despite the access of the consumer to news, the role of the journalist is there to filter all the information and provide the information. This further re-enforces the ‘power and identity’ of journalists as individuals possessing particular skills, abilities, and knowledge that are used to transfer an ‘avalanche of information’ in concise consumable reports to an audience.42 The economics and media logic of an institution are the foundations on which the report is built. Yet as I have argued, this forces journalists to employ certain techniques that do not lend themselves to delving deep into issues. When this is coupled with a context of partisan press and little press regulation, the manner in which issues are discussed will rely on internal decision-making. This increases the importance of diversity and specialists in the editing room in order to do justice to the various subjects reported on. Media logic and financial constraints mean that one-sided reporting on minorities may be as much a product of journalistic bias and discrimination as a pragmatic need to provide information within a set timeframe. The ideological reasons for this will be discussed in the next subsection before looking at the consequences for consumption.

Media, ideology, and the political The process of information production and information that is designated for dissemination through text, images, and symbols is always subject to certain conditions. The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas;

30  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities i.e., the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time of the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of production are subject to it.43 Through the financial and capital capabilities of those higher up in society, they are able to purchase airtime, finance studies, and invest in ventures and projects that they deem worthy, important, or financially profitable. In turn, becoming an actor in public discourse is difficult if not impossible without the necessary financial means or modes of production available. This explains why people jump at the chance to appear in the media as it is a moment to either become or act as a force in public discourse and it signifies a legitimacy or position of authority for the agent in question. Whilst in ordinary life every person is able to distinguish between what people profess to be versus what they really are, our media practitioners have not yet come to this seemingly trivial conclusion, for often they appear to take every person at their word and believe that everything they say and imagine about themselves is true, coherent, and ideal in form. The production of narratives be they autobiographical or about others is always subject to structural conditions. These conditions place restrictions upon the conceivability of certain narratives. With media airtime at a premium, those appearing in media spaces take full advantage of the exposure. However, the media machine has constructed a narrative surrounding itself that everything it disseminates is true, unmediated, and an insight into things as they really are. Couple that with the notion of access to subjects in objective form and problems of representation start to emerge. In most countries, a person positions themselves in relation to that mediascape because it is so saturated in society, be that as a follower, consumer, resistor, or producer. In society, “representation in the mediated reality of our mass culture is in itself power”.44 Minorities, alternative cultures, and subaltern classes, which stray from the mainstream become subjected to the ideologies of representation. But it would be wrong and naive to think that this distinction has a simply juridical and political function; the organic nature of these relationships means that their effect can be felt throughout civil society. Although the minorities and alternative classes are by definition not unified or united, their ability to exercise self-determination is subject to their ability to engage the state and to be actors in the socio-political domain. But as this affects the distribution of wealth and power within the mainstream and majority classes, real engagement is often met with resistance. Castells argues that: We should, then, add another layer to the social dynamics of the network society. Together with state apparatuses, global networks, and self-­ centred individuals, there are also communes formed around resistance identity. However, all these elements do not glue together, their logic excludes each other, and their coexistence is unlikely to be peaceful.45

Media as a discursive institution of influence 31 Castells points out that there are a number of people whose identity construct is simply based on not being what the rest is or wants them to be. He adds this to the various state institutions, global (private) institutions, as well as the self-indulging nature of human beings, and he argues that the individual rationale of all those entities necessarily excludes some of them. He contends that this is necessary from the perspective of a network society.46 Therefore in a society such as Britain, Castells argues that it is a necessary element that there will be groups who are unlikely to be able to coexist. In the public marketplace of social dynamics, the media plays an important role in the spreading of identity and ideological frameworks. The media productions one has access to, as frames of meaning, are always interacting, developing and necessarily conflicting.47 Where the media may refer and give access to a variety of cultures, it only does so in the manner that it fits into its overarching identity logic. In Britain, these dynamics of exclusion and incompatibility with reference to Muslims and Islam is dominating the public discourse. This can also be the case for other minority and fringe groups. The identities people identify with and attribute to others are also subject to the same interaction as the cultures that are spread through the media. It is the way the media affects the process not only in its ability to broadcast the frames of meaning to large audiences simultaneously, but also by shaping them into news is of interest. Locating the discourses about minority groups within global-technological processes is important because global-­ technological capitalism has transformed and transgressed the geopolitical structures, particularly the nation state and civil society, and affected the logics of cultural production and political hegemony.48 We must first situate the effect and position of ideology. Ideology is here understood as a historical, socio-psychological, and power-laden force that affects the way people organise themselves, define the environment around them, and develop a consciousness of their place in society. The ruling class and mainstream society are naturally geared towards protecting its ideological structure. The structure of society is organised to maintain, defend, and develop the theoretical, material, and ideological concerns of the dominant class(es). Antonio Gramsci refers to this when he describes ideology’s relationship to the media: Its most prominent and dynamic part is the press in general: publishing houses (which have an implicit and explicit programme and are attached to a particular tendency), political newspapers, the articles of every kind, scientific, literary, philological, popular, et cetera, various tree articles down to parish bulletins. … The press is the most dynamic part of this ideological structure but not the only one. Everything which influences or is able to influence public opinion, directly or indirectly, belongs to it: libraries, schools, associations, and clubs of various kinds, even architecture and the layout and names of streets. … All this requires a complex ideological labour.49

32  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities This labour is provided by the organised masses, and the populace that make this up mass are organised according to the structure provided by the dominant ideology. David Dwan has noted that, “The revolutionary potential of ­newspapers was also acknowledged by governmental efforts to suppress them. These involved direct legal restrictions on writers, publishers and printers, but taxes also provided a covert means of curtailing the growth of a radical press”.50 The media in contemporary society is an actor in the formation of society. In mediacratic societies, it can be perceived as a disciplinary power in society. Through mediacratic practices, this power is exercised. As Foucault points out, the purpose of exercising this power is to ‘train’ individuals in order to use them. It delineates subjects by disciplining individuals as both objects and instruments.51 This formation creates audiences in relation to what is being broadcast. This is the media logic. The radio announcer does not need to talk in an affected voice; indeed, he would be impossible to understand if his tone differed from that of his designated listeners. This means, however, that the language and gestures of listeners and spectators are more deeply permeated by the patterns of the culture industry than ever before.52 The majority of persons in a news media audience identify with or belong to the dominant cultural discourse as it is reported in the media. This is further reinforced in perceived times of crisis.53 Therefore, minorities and subaltern classes are not only excluded by conscious practices of discrimination but also because they do not belong to majority of the designated audiences. This is why alternative television networks have risen up (for example, Black Entertainment Television or British Muslim TV). With increased diversity and multiculturalism perceived as a potential threat to British national identity, the dominant/majority discourse is promulgated. This supports the claims that media claims to cater to the will of its audience, giving the audience what they want. This suggests that to be entertained or to be consuming implies one agrees. Although the amusement factor of different sources relies upon the subjective responses from individual viewers, amusement is always an escape, a forgetting of the daily struggles even when presented with the suffering of others. Therefore, as the desires of the audience are met, the audience submits its time, it’s will, and it is wealth to the media machine. It seems that the ordinary person is captivated by developments in the mediascape, such as the rise in celebrity culture described by Horkheimer and Adorno as follows: Ideology hides itself in probability calculations. Fortune will not smile on all—just on the one who draws the winning ticket or, rather, the one designated to do so by a higher power—usually in the entertainment industry itself, which presents itself as ceaselessly in search of talent. Those discovered by the talent scouts and then built up by the studios are ideal types of the new, dependent middle classes.54

Media as a discursive institution of influence 33 Duhamel describes the situation of film as “a fast time for helots, a diversion for uneducated, …, a spectacle which requires no concentration and presupposes no intelligence …, which kindles no light in the heart and awakens no hope other than the ridiculous one of someday becoming a ‘star’ in Los Angeles”.55 It is important to recognise the effect that ideology has on people. As Althusser explains, ideology acts or functions in such a way that it recruits people, and in doing so transforms them into subjects.56 Furthermore, the ideological apparatus organises the ideas, actions, and practices of that subject. One key actor in the ideological apparatus is the media, and by imposing essential characteristics on characters, features, and storylines, the overarching ideology makes reception initially easier for the audience. Castells argues that although media does not have direct power itself, its power stems from its ability to act as a conduit for the powerful.57 Media also serves to strengthen ideological goals in that it comforts people and reinforces the idea that life is the way people expect it to be and that they do not need to change or adapt in order to survive, or even to succeed, and flourish. Contemporary media functions as photological and ‘minimalogical’58 definitions of what is deemed acceptable and held to be true. Through using standardised modes of production, the industries of contemporary media, create an illusion of diversity, and freedom of identity using their products. But in reality, all that exists is pseudo-individuality,59 through calculations and meticulously constructed personalities. The personalities are constructed in such a way as to be conceivably fragmented. The illusion of a personal identity remains in place and in turn the character and narrative ‘must’ be real. A minimalogical proof has been provided through the constructed narrative or overarching media ideology. “The peculiarity of the self is a socially conditioned monopoly commodity misrepresented as natural”.60 It is reduced to pseudo-­ individuality, whereby difference and similarity are constructed within the margins of the mainstream. Within this context, real difference and alternative modes of being are feared, resisted, and shunned, forced to remain on the periphery of society. Media discourse constitutes an area of public communication where norms are shaped and rules get contested. But these contestations are not conducted by ordinary people; these debates are conducted by elites and selected public figures. As Habermas notes: The communicative network of a public made up of rationally debating private citizens has collapsed; the public opinion once emergent from it has partly decomposed into the informal opinions of private citizens without a public, and partly become concentrated into formal opinions of publicistically effective institutions. Caught in the vortex of publicity that is staged for show or manipulation, the public of nonorganized private people is laid claim to-not by public communication but by the communication of publicly manifested opinions.61

34  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities Yet, these norms constitute the social and cultural grounding for legal regulations. The power of these norms is much more influential than the power of law and order. This is because contemporary methods of power use methods whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalisation, not like punishment but by control.62 As the economic ­influence grows, and the technology develops, the surveillance of consumer habits further fuels what Mark Deuze describes as the process of mediated panopticism.63 Consumers are encouraged to participate in certain media practices and punished if they do not participate in a certain way. When participating, the consumer provides labour for the services monitoring our media consumption. Through developments in technological monitoring services, monitoring and collecting the consumption habits have become automated. This data is then provided to corporations and governments as a commodity to help them progress towards their strategic goals. Some manufacturers refuse to advertise their products during certain programs because they do not want their product associated with the content of the program. … Manufacturers, through their advertising agencies, are increasingly interested not only in how many viewers or listeners will receive their advert but whether program content will “prime” this audience to be more receptive to positive messages about their products. This interest in the content of the program is particularly strong in instances of “product placement”, where the program itself acts as a vehicle for advertising certain commodities.64 However, this does not mean the media is a free entity available to all. The logic behind advertising is that there is a consumer you are looking to reach that is going to purchase your product. Potential advertisers will not purchase advertising space if they cannot reach the potential consumers they desire. As a consequence, class targeting has a strong presence within media advertising and newspaper audience creation. It also rules out the economic disadvantaged because as Chomsky states: the poor are “not purchasers, and any money thrown upon them is so much thrown away”.65 This is why the selection of spokespeople and representatives is important not only for organisations but also for media institutions that select who to interview or who gets to participate in these contestations. From the viewpoint of the producers, it [the use of spokespeople or representatives] enables them to determine the course and content of the quasi-interaction without having to take account of recipient response. This gives the producers much more liberty than they would typically have in face-to-face interaction. They do not have to pay attention to the recipients and try to determine whether they are following what is being said, and they do not have to respond to the interventions of others.66

Media as a discursive institution of influence 35 The media plays an active part in the creation of a public sphere Jurgen Habermas states that the public sphere was originally a place to have people or issues subjugated to public reason and critique and to have public opinion influence political decision-making.67 Now the public sphere serves as an arena where organised groups struggle whilst trying to meet their strategic goals. Jürgen Habermas states that “Only these organised individuals could participate effectively in the process of public communication; only they could use the channels of the public sphere which exist within parties and associations and the process of making proceedings public”.68 But within this context, Couldry highlights an emerging paradox: “A broader paradox then emerges: that, as more and more fields of social competition become open to the dynamics of media visibility, and so in a sense ‘democratised’, the force of media power increases”.69 The paradox is that as the parties and associations of the public sphere become more and more reliant on media in their struggle that struggle is in some sense democratised; however, as this progresses, the power of media institutions is consolidated. In practice, this means that whilst the democratic forms of debate and discussion increase, the sources and modes for access to this debate and discussion are reduced. As a consequence, institutional power promotes one particular logic and eliminates alternatives. This process is central to the construction of a dominant view or the creation of hegemony.70 This process is further exacerbated by media convergence where convergence means the relationship between existing technologies, industries, markets, genres, and audiences which is subjected to a small concentration of owners of multinational media conglomerates that dominate all sectors of the media and entertainment industry.71 Therefore as advocacy groups and representative bodies organise, and engage media in their political struggle, their ability to get their message across decreases as the avenues for media representation are limited. This limits the representation of diversity and favours hegemonic processes.

Notes 1. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 39. 2. Mediacratic societies are ones where a fusion of political power and media has taken place. That is, the power holding institutions carry out their duties via media institutions. Mediacracy is, then, a definition of political engagement whereby political activity is carried out via mediation. Governance is heavily involved in media and utilises mass communication mechanisms as a strategic element in its political activity. One can see that in the struggle for power, policymaking, and public debate media is increasingly used. Examples include but are not exclusively reduced to, investigative journalists, spin doctors, and press releases. For more information, see: R. Vliegenthart, Framing Immigration and Integration: Facts, Parliament, Media and Anti-Immigrant Party Support in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2007). 3. Stijn Verbeek, Han Entzinger, and Peter Scholten, “Research-Policy Dialogues in the Netherlands,” in Integrating Immigrants in Europe, ed. Peter Scholten, Han Entzinger, Rinus Penninx and Stijn Verbeek (Cham – Heidelberg – New York, NY – Dordrecht – London: Springer, 2015), 213–31.

36  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities 4. Noam Chomsky, Media Control the Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda, 2nd Edition (New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2002); B.L. Ott and R.L. Mack, Critical Media Studies: An Introduction (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley – Blackwell, 2009). 5. Mark Fishman, Manufacturing the News (Austin, TX: University of texas Press, 2014), 144–45. 6. Waymer, Damion, “Walking in Fear: An Autoethnographic Account of Media Framing of Inner-City Crime,” Journal of Communication Inquiry 33, no. 2 (2009): 169–84. 7. Waymer, Damion, “Walking in Fear: An Autoethnographic Account of Media Framing of Inner-City Crime,” Journal of Communication Inquiry 33, no. 2 (2009): 169–84. 8. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2010), 18–19. 9. C. Ryan, K.M. Carragee, and W. Meinhofer, “Theory into Practice: Framing, the News Media, and Collective Action,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 45 (2001): 175–82. 10. T.M. Maher, “Framing: An Emerging Paradigm or a Phase of Agenda Setting?,” in Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World, ed. S.D. Reese, O.H. Gandy Jr., and A.E. Grant (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001), 88. 11. Stig Hjarvard, “The Mediatization of Society. Atheory of the Media as Agents of Social and Cultural Change,” Nordicom Review 29, no. 2 (2008): 113. 12. “The Symbols Used to Create a Representation” in G. Langlois, “Meaning, Semiotechnologies and Participatory Media,” Culture Machine 12 (2011): 5. 13. W.P. Cassidy, “Variations on a Theme: The Professional Role Conceptions of Print and Online Newspaper Journalists,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 82, no. 2 (2005). 14. Griffin, Michael, “From Cultural Imperialism to Transnational Commercialization: Shifting Paradigms in International Media Studies,” Global Media Journal 1, no. 1 (2002): 1–27. 15. Cinnirella, Marco, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice,” in Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. M. Helbling (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 193–203. 16. Denis McQuail, “The Influence and Effects of Mass Media,” in Mass Communication and Society, eds. James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woolacott (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), 79–80. 17. Donald Lewis Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs, The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press (Eagan, MN: West Publishing, 1977). 18. Denis McQuail, “The Influence and Effects of Mass Media,” in Mass Communication and Society, eds. James Curran, Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woolacott (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), 70–93. 19. Walter Lippmann, “Newspapers,” in Media Power in Politics, ed. Doris A. Graber (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1990), 37–44. 20. Denis McQuail, “The Influence and Effects of Mass Media,” in Mass Communication and Society, ed. James Curran, Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woolacott (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), 70–93. 21. Nick Couldry, “Media Rituals: From Durkheim on Religion to Jade Goody,” in Exploring Religion and the Sacred in a Media Age, ed. C. Deacy and E. Arweck (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 45–55. 22. Jason Glynos, “Sex and the Limits of Discourse,” in Discourse Theory and Political Analysis Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, ed. David R. Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester, UK  –  New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 2000), 209–10.

Media as a discursive institution of influence 37 23. David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow. Media Logic (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979); Claes H. de Vreese, “News Framing: Theory and Typology,” Information Design Journal & Document Design 13, no. 1 (2005): 51–62. 24. Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 7. 25. T.M. Maher, “Framing: An Emerging Paradigm or a Phase of Agenda Setting?,” in Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World, eds. S.D. Reese, O.H. Gandy Jr., and A.E. Grant (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001), 83–94; C. Elmelund-Præstekjær and C. Wien, “Mediestormens Politiske Indflydelse Og Anatomi’ [the Political Influence and Anatomy of the Media Storm],” Nordicom Information 30, no. 1 (2008): 19–28. 26. C. Ryan, K.M. Carragee, and W. Meinhofer, “Theory into Practice: Framing, the News Media, and Collective Action,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 45 (2001): 175–82. 27. R. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43 (1993): 41–58. 28. P.R. Brewer, “Framing, Value Words, and Citizens’ Explanations of Their Issue Opinions,” Political Communication 19 (2002): 303–16; C. ElmelundPræstekjær and C. Wien, “Mediestormens Politiske Indflydelse Og Anatomi’ [the Political Influence and Anatomy of the Media Storm],” Nordicom Information 30, no. 1 (2008): 19–28. 29. Kevin Williams, Get Me a Murder a Day!: A History of Media and Communication in Britain (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010). 30. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” trans. Harry Zohn, in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1969), 217–51. 31. David Morgan, The Lure of Images: A History of Religion and Visual Media in America (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 73. 32. D. Hallin and P. Manciini, Comparing Media Systems (Cambridge, UK – New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 277. 33. Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 2009), 144. 34. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2010), 12. 35. Vanessa Thorpe, “Nish Kumar: BBC Must Be Clear—Did It Axe The Mash Report in a ‘War on Woke’?,” The Guardian, 16th May 2021. https://www.theguardian. com/media/2021/may/16/nish-kumar-bbc-must-be-clear-did-it-axe-the-mashreport-in-a-war-on-woke; Ellie Harrison, “Nish Kumar Says BBC Must Be Clear on Reasons It Axed The Mash Report,” The Independent, 16th May 2021. https:// www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/news/nish-kumar-mash-reportwoke-b1848379.html; Harry Clarke-Ezzidio, “The BBC Won’t Survive Another Tory government: Nish Kumar on the British Comedy Culture Wars,” The New Statesman, 26th March 2022. https://www.newstatesman.com/the-cultureinterview/2022/03/the-bbc-wont-survive-another-tory-government-nish-kumaron-the-british-comedy-culture-wars. 36. Henry Jenkins, “The Cultural Logic of Media Convergence,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 7, no. 1 (2004): 33–34. 37. David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 126. 38. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 170. 39. Simon Cottle and Mark Ashton, “From BBC Newsroom to BBC Newscentre: On Changing Technology and Journalist Practices,” Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 5, no. 3 (1999): 22–43.

38  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities 40. Stig Hjarvard, The Mediatization of Culture and Society (London, UK  –  New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 54. 41. Stig Hjarvard, The Mediatization of Culture and Society (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 54. 42. Andrew Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 165. 43. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The Ruling Class and the Ruling Ideas,” in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1976), 59. 44. Larry Gross, “Out of the Mainstream: Sexual Minorities and the Mass Media,” in Remote Control: Television, Audiences, and Cultural Power, ed. E. Seiter et al. (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 131; Larry Gross, John Stewart Katz, and Jay Ruby, Image Ethics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991), 190. 45. Castells, Manuel, The Power of Identity. The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (Cambridge, MA – Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1997), 421–22. 46. A network society is a society where the key social structures and activities are organized around electronically processed information networks in Manuel Castells, “Informationalism, Networks, and the Network Society: A Theoretical Blueprint,” in The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. Manuel Castells (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004). 47. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, “Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research,” in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 2005), 23–24; Elizabeth S. Bird, “Are We All Producers Now?,” Cultural Studies 25, no. 4–5 (2011): 502–3; Claes H. de Vreese, “News Framing: Theory and Typology,” Information Design Journal & Document Design 13, no. 1 (2005): 51–62. 48. Ross Abbinnett, Culture and Identity: Critical Theories (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), 202. 49. Antonio Gramsci, “(I) History of the Subaltern Classes; (II) The Concept of ‘Ideology’; (III) Cultural Themes: Ideological Material,” in Media and Cultural Studies Key Works, ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner (Malden, MA – Oxford, UK – Carlton, Australia: Blackwell, 2001), 16. 50. David Dwan, The Great Community: Culture and Nationalism in Ireland (Dublin: University of Notre Dame Press & Field Day Publications, 2008), 144. 51. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1977), 170. 52. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 124. 53. Ignace de Haes, Ute Husken, and Paul van der Velde, “Media on the Ritual Battlefield,” in Ritual, Media, and Conflict, ed. Ronald L. Grimes et al. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 209. 54. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” trans. Edmund Jephcott, in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 94–136. 55. Georges Duhamel, Scènes De La Vie Future (Paris, France: Mercure de France, 1930), 58. 56. L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1972). 57. Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (Cambridge, MA – Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996), 312–17. 58. Taken from the Greek: μήνυμα to mean message or communication.

Media as a discursive institution of influence 39 59. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” trans. Edmund Jephcott, in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 94–136. 60. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” trans. Edmund Jephcott, in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 94–136. 61. Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. T. Burger and F. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). 62. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York, NY: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1990), 89. 63. Mark Deuze, Media Life (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 2012), 113. 64. G. Lynch, Understanding Theology and Popular Culture (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley – Blackwell, 2005), 66. 65. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2010), 15. 66. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 97. 67. Jurgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article,” in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, ed. S.E. Bronner and D. Kellner (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), 136. 68. Jurgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article,” New German Critique 3 (1974): 49–55. 69. Nick Couldry, Media, Society, World: Social Theory and Digital Media Practice (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 2012), 155. 70. Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 2009), 144. 71. Henry Jenkins, “The Cultural Logic of Media Convergence,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 7, no. 1 (2004): 33–43.

4

Minority discourses and the media

Media reports with religion or religious issues at the forefront are a small percentage of the media reports that are released overall. Most the news that is covered in the newspapers or on television is of a political or social nature and for that reason it is deemed relevant to the majority of the public. However, that does not mean that religious issues are not covered; it just means they are of secondary nature, implied, or not present. There are other stories that are deemed of a religious nature when one can argue that they are political, social, or …. The relationship is established in the reception of the media report by the receiver although it is guided by the elements that make up the media report. But very few reports are focussed on religious aspects alone. There are issues or news stories where the lines between the political, social, religious, etc. become blurred. This is related to the earlier mentioned criteria of what is deemed news but also the product of the agenda building process. For example, the new election of the president of Iran receives news coverage in Britain as does the election of president for the United States of America, yet the place religion takes in the media reports covering both events is very different. As Bowen points out: “this distinction allows us to recognise that events that do not establish distinctly religious ‘moods and motivations’1 may nonetheless be construed in a religious framework”2 because of discourse(s). As such, one can see a development where religion has bridged the divide into the secular media space.3 There is a “complex and nuanced nature of the relationship between religious and social values and viewing practices of the media sphere. It is not really possible to see a clear line of demarcation between religion ‘religion’ and ‘television’ here”.4 The media both reflect and construct social and cultural understandings of the interest in and the place of religion within them. In recent years, sociologists, media scholars, philosophers, theologians, and religious studies scholars have produced research of theoretical and cultural significance on the changing relationship between religion and the media and the impact of (new) media on religion.5 Yet as there seems to be a lack of sustained equally meaningful interaction between people in Britain, as a consequence, the media remains a large source of information. If this media is largely unrepresentative, biased, ideological, and unable to deal with the complexities accurately, it can be argued DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-5

Minority discourses and the media 41 that these qualities are taken into the realm of public discourse and interaction. These same weaknesses of the media could conceivably be one of the reasons for a lack of sustained mutual engagement with minorities. As it has been pointed out earlier, the media informs the primary understandings and interpretations of the issues it discusses. But if the media reports are the sole source of information on religious minorities, it is not surprising that the public reflects what is portrayed in the media. This means that to the wider public, the media seems to be successful at informing them. If media portrayals are as impactful as some would suggest, then that raises questions about the impact of education, politics, and other arenas of public and private life that are unable to inform people about minorities on such an authoritative level as what the media purports to do. It must be stressed at this point that the perspective from which media discusses religious minorities in a western context it is largely from the perspective of the media reporting on Islam and Muslims.6 There is little mention of the perspective of the ‘ulama’ or Muslim individuals in relation to communication and media technology. An observation by Larsson that would be helpful to keep in mind from this point on is that “from a general point of view, the debates over the information and communication technologies [ for Muslims] encompass larger questions about colonialism, western influences, modernity, freedom of expression, democracy, the rise of the secular society and the position of Islam in the modern world”.7 This further echoes my earlier point that feminist and post-colonial critiques ask questions that challenge the existing ideals of what constitutes our society. Newspapers and television news networks that address Islam and Muslims in a number of ways, but “that the media focus lies basically on representing a single monolithic Islam”.8 It is important to understand the plurality of descriptions and the effect that is brought about among the different publics, particularly as an increasing number of European news outlets describe Islam and Muslims as violent, unreasonable, and incompatible with society.9 It is then conceivable that an increasing number of persons in Britain grow to believe that message, and hold that as their outlook on Islam and Muslims. The increasing association of Islam with violence and unwelcome or irrational behaviour raises questions about the extent to which the media is able to steer public opinion and foster attitudes towards Muslims and Islam. The interpretation of reality and news stories is done in light of the outlook held by people, whose views and behaviour toward others are to a large extent informed by their perception and interpretation of reality through media discourse.10 Therefore, by looking at the way people understand and construct meaning from media, we can begin to understand how people’s conceptualisation of minorities is being shaped and influenced by the media. Since most of the news content about minority religion in Europe is focused on Islam and Muslims, I will first look at how that content is consumed as an illustration of the process and then I will conclude this section by showing the similarities and differences between the coverage of Islam and

42  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities Muslims and other minority groups. It has been argued that the manner in which Islam is covered is narrow and that many stories cover the same aspects repetitively.11 However, what was first argued by Edward Said in ‘Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World’,12 the starting point for most scholars looking at the media coverage of Islam is that the media determines the legitimate viewpoints regarding Islam. The Muslims that appear in the press are identified as either terrorists at war with the West or as apologists defending Islam as a peaceful religion.13 A contributor to this dynamic is what Mahmoud Eid describes as follows: Despite the fact that the media are seen as major drivers of social cohesion in multicultural Western societies [by the majority of the population] because they construct and define communities, the majority of mainstream media tend to ignore Islam and Muslims until the occurrence of negative circumstances.14 E. Elgamri’s book ‘Islam in the British Broadsheets’15 is a work that departs exactly from this premise and argues, among other things, that orientalism in the British press is one of the causes of Islamophobia as well as the wider social impact on the integration of Islam in British society. It is important to consider is that in a survey conducted in 2002, 74% of the British population claimed they knew nothing or next to nothing about Islam and 64% of the population stated that what they did know came from the media.16 Allen and Nielsen discuss these findings in greater detail and state that “the role and impact of the media is contentious and debatable, … the media continue to play a major role in the formulation and establishment of popular perceptions in the public sphere”.17 Whilst it is difficult to put a number on this aspect, what is understandable in modern societies, is that what people know about minorities often comes from authoritative third parties (school, media, parents, etc.), and not direct interaction. Allport argues that contact with members of another group can, albeit with certain restrictions, reduces prejudice towards that other group.18 In particular, Allport proposed that attitudes will improve when members from opposing groups engage one another in environments that allow for them to interact as equals, working together, and with support of relevant third parties that set up boundaries for acceptable behaviour.19 However, a more reliable predictor of attitudes is contact quality, as frequency of contact can mean divergent things. The contact with a member of an outgroup is not always positive, and therefore, frequent negative contact would reinforce negative attitudes. As a consequence, contact quality is a better predictor of positive attitudes.20 Pettigrew and Tropp argue, following a large meta-analysis of more than 500 studies, that under optimal conditions, the prejudice-reducing effects of contact were stronger.21 Thus, if the attitudes of the press is dominated by negative stereotypes and racist assumptions, one would assume these

Minority discourses and the media 43 assumptions to be held by journalists themselves.22 In turn, these attitudes should correlate with low levels of contact between journalists and minorities as suggested in previous research that tested hypotheses derived from contact theory.23 Islam and Hewstone found that intergroup contact was associated with more positive attitudes toward Muslims.24 Ogan, Willnat, Pennington, and Bashir found that their participants who knew Muslims personally reported more positive attitudes towards Islam and Muslims.25 In addition, Khan and Bruschke report that contact with Muslims correlated negatively with considering Muslims a threat.26 In other words, these three studies suggest that as contact increases so do positive evaluations of Muslims and Islam. This is in keeping with what Hutchison and Rosenthal found.27 This could be a reason why some journalists have a better relationship with sources from minority groups. As they have more positive attitudes, they could be more sympathetic to any issues facing the communities or be able to be more empathetic. However, there are a variety of reasons the relationship between journalist and source is successful.28 Yet, the fostering of that relationship by journalists and the communities they report on is important for both parties. Building on this research, Ata, Bastian, and Lusher report that having Muslim friends reduced participants engaging in avoidant behaviours29 and that contact with colleagues had a greater effect on anti-Muslim attitudes30 than friendship relationships.31 However, prejudice can only be reduced if individuals are willing to make contact with members of another group.32 However, since a willingness to interact with colleagues and have friends across group boundaries, is a characteristic of individuals. Thus, the findings may be affected by characteristics present in a type of person, rather than contact quality or frequency. This could suggest that the reason journalists who choose to engage with contacts or present stories about people from other ethnic groups do so more on the basis of the type of person they are (extravert vs. introvert for example) rather than any implicit bias for or against outgroup members. John E. Richardson found that “the Muslim-ness of certain countries [was] persistently backgrounded or absent from reporting”, as was the case with Indonesia, for example, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, whereas “the Muslim-ness of certain other countries was persistently foregrounded”.33 He also contends that “the more ‘ordinary’ political decisions of Muslim nations are … not understood in relation to their Islamic-ness”.34 Therefore, the identifying marker (muslimness) is selected as a key characteristic in events when the author of a story deems it to be relevant and excluded when it is not. Subsequently, Richardson found that many portrayals of British Muslims “are based on a ‘White fantasy’ regarding the rights and abilities of ‘White’ society to regulate the parameters of British society—to include or exclude”.35 Elizabeth Poole subsequently argues that “press coverage of British Islam represents a project intent on ‘cultural closure’’36 and that such “patterns of representation … legitimise current social relations of dominance, power structures and therefore continuing

44  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities patterns of discrimination”.37 It is within this context that Chris Allen defined Islamophobia as follows: Islamophobia is no longer restricted to understanding and defining it in terms of highly questionable and sometimes unreasonable unfounded hostilities and widely interpretable misconceptions, both of which remain relevant and important but not as pre-requisites for definition or identification. Instead Islamophobia must now be conceptualised in terms of it being about the way in which Muslims and Islam are thought about, spoken about and written about; perceived, conceived, and subsequently referred to; included and also ultimately excluded: Islamophobia can now be Islam, whether true or untrue, fact or fiction, real or imaginary.38 This is further exacerbated by the fact that there is a proliferation of negative imagery, a large number of “Muslim monsters found across numerous fields of cultural production and the disparate locations in which they function as social, literary, artistic, and filmic characters”.39 Whilst a lot of activism is done against such proliferation of negative imagery of Muslims.40 There is also activism against the portrayals of African-American people,41 and this has become part of the continued activist movement Black Lives Matter, following its initial protests against police violence against people of colour in the United States of America.42 It is also important to bear in mind that whilst negative imagery is pervasive, even the positive stories that are broadcast can be used to legitimise a negative image of Muslims. One such example is the tv show character Ms Marvel.43 The positive stories that are broadcast about Muslims and Islam contrast greatly with reports of terrorism and unwelcome behaviour. However, because of the pervasive nature of the negative stories, it can be argued that those depictions have become the norm and that the positive stories or stories that depict Muslims as regular people are the exception. It is within this paradigm that the ‘Islamophobia Industry’44 operates in order to generate support for its ideological outlook. However, whilst it would be foolish to assume the entire media industry operates as one cohesive body (as pointed out earlier), there is a concerted effort in some parts to dispense Islamophobic material throughout the media sphere. As a whole, the negative imagery, whatever the reasons for its existence, drowns out the positive imagery because of the plurality of negative images. This makes it hard for positive images to stand out and become a dominant narrative. We can see this by the fact that certain images that at face value couldn’t be deemed negative, the idea of Muslims being more religious or praying a lot, black people being more athletic, or homosexual men being more sensitive, somehow become symbols of negativity. This is due to the way the iconography fits into the dominant discourses that are inherently negative with regards to how certain minorities relate to the dominant social order. As Karim Karim points out: “One of the most significant barriers facing the development of informed reportage about Islam is the lack of knowledge and unease among many Northern journalists about

Minority discourses and the media 45 religion in general”.45 Subsequent change is deemed as a threat and that threat must be neutralised and discredited. The press and media are the vehicle for doing so, not necessarily by design as the Islamophobia industry would have you think but rather because it challenges the self-­understanding of people and society. Things that people generally are unaware of their position in as well as being unwilling or unable to change. Indeed, many scholars have noted that in Britain, ‘Britishness’ often tends to be tacitly associated with ‘Whiteness’, meaning that some British Muslims, as well as other British citizens from ethnic minority backgrounds, have perhaps found it hard to maintain a strong sense of British identity. W. Breed adds that: “A key problem facing any society is the maintenance of order and social cohesion, … [and this] has been the thesis of Durkheim, Weber, and many sociologists, especially the functionalists. Not only is the division of labour and of roles necessary (“functional integration”), but also “normative integration”-consensus over a value system”.46 With a divisive rhetoric being used with regards to the values represented by minorities in relation to the dominant discourse, it is a problem to maintain social cohesion. The role of social cohesion is important when we look at how people act in social contexts. As discussed earlier, people often consume media in communal ways. We watch tv as a family, watch social media on trains, and we get shown an increasing number of YouTube clips in schools. Whilst there are individual aspects to that consumption, it is also a communal act. In one of the earliest social psychological studies, Norman Triplett investigated how bicycle racers were influenced by the social situation in which they raced.47 Triplett found that the racers who were competing with other cyclists on the same track rode significantly faster than those who were racing alone or against the clock. This led Triplett to hypothesize that people perform tasks better when competing against other people than when they do the tasks alone. Floyd Alport argued that Triplett’s results, and other experiments showed that the presence of others can increase performance on many types of tasks because of co-action rather than competition alone.48 The tendency to perform tasks better or faster in the presence of others is known as social facilitation. The tendency to perform tasks more poorly or slower in the presence of others is known as social inhibition. Subsequent studies showed that social facilitation can occur not only when people perform tasks with a “co-actor” who works with them but also when people perform the task with an “observer” who does not work with them.49 Researchers have classified social facilitation into two subcategories on the basis of the context of other individuals’ presence: “the co-action effect”, in which task performance is facilitated by concurrent action of other individuals, and “the audience effect”, in which it is facilitated by the presence of an evaluative observer.50 To study social facilitation and social inhibition, Hazel Markus gave research participants both an easy task (putting on and tying their shoes) and an unfamiliar and thus more difficult task (putting on and tying a lab coat that tied in the back).51 The research participants were asked to perform

46  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities both tasks in one of three social situations: (a) alone, (b) with a confederate present who was watching them, or (c) with a confederate present who sat in the corner of the room repairing a piece of equipment without watching. Markus found first that the difficult task was performed more slowly overall. But she also found an interaction effect, where the participants performed the easy task faster but the more difficult task slower when a confederate was present in the room. Furthermore, it did not matter whether the other person was paying attention to the performance or whether the other person just happened to be in the room working on another task—the mere presence of another person nearby influenced performance. What this minor detour via early 20th century social psychology intimates is that people perform an easy task faster but the more difficult task slower when others are present in the room. Whilst it did not matter whether the other person was paying attention to them or not, the mere presence of another person nearby influenced performance. This, when we engage and interact with media in a communal space or environment, suggests that what we take from that media or how easy we use media technology is affected. This would suggest that people are not as conscientious when they consume media in a communal space because they are distracted by others, but also, that they can be influenced by the presence of others in other ways. One explanation of the influence of others on task performance was proposed by Robert Zajonc.52 Zajonc argued that when we are with others, we experience more arousal than we do when we are alone, and that this arousal increases the likelihood that we will perform the dominant response (the action that we are most likely to emit in any given situation). According to the social facilitation model of Zajonc, the mere presence of others produces arousal, which increases the probability that the dominant response will occur. If the dominant response is correct, the task is performed better, whereas if the dominant response is incorrect, the task is performed more poorly. The important aspect of Zajonc’s theory in this case was that the dominant response could be used to predict whether the presence of others would produce social facilitation or social inhibition. Zajonc argued that if the task to be performed was relatively easy, or if the individual had learned to perform the task very well (a task such as pedalling a bicycle or tying one’s shoes), the dominant response was likely to be the correct response, and the increase in arousal caused by the presence of others would improve performance. On the other hand, if the task was difficult or not well learned (e.g., solving a complex problem, giving a speech in front of others, tying a lab apron behind one’s back), the dominant response was likely to be the incorrect one; and because the increase in arousal would increase the occurrence of the (incorrect) dominant response, performance would be hindered. This can also be seen with the interpretation of media materials. When they are in keeping with our biases, they are easier to adopt and to speak out. However, when they are challenging our biases, or its complicated information, it becomes harder to adopt or to discuss. If there are others around, this makes

Minority discourses and the media 47 that even more difficult, and thus easier to adopt the dominant discourse of the group. If that group is the dominant social group or the dominant discourse in society, it will be easier to conform or adopt that perspective, and harder if that is a minority opinion. This is in keeping with what Cottrell argued for when he found that the presence of others influences behaviour when people are concerned about how others evaluate them.53 The presence of others triggers an acquired (learned) arousal based on the worry of being judged. We are particularly influenced by others when we perceive that the others are evaluating us or competing with us.54 This relates media practises to wider social-psychological aspects around Conformity. Since journalists and consumers are people, their actions involve changing their behaviours in order to “fit in” or “go along” with the people around you. In some cases, this social influence might involve agreeing with or acting like the majority of people in a specific group, or it might involve behaving in a particular way in order to be perceived as “normal” by the group. This heightens the importance of the dominant discourse and self-­ understanding for media portrayals of minorities. Because sometimes it is not only real people and peer-pressure that forces people to conform but also the symbolic or intangible sense of belonging to the nation state55 or social ideals one aspires to. However, this means people are susceptible to Informational influence and Normative influence. Informational influence happens when people change their behaviour in order to be correct. In situations where we are unsure of the correct response, we often look to others who are better informed and more knowledgeable and use their lead as a guide for our own behaviours. In a classroom setting, for example, this might involve agreeing with the judgments of another classmate who you perceive as being highly intelligent. Normative influence stems from a desire to avoid punishments (such as going along with the rules in class even though you don’t agree with them) and gain rewards (such as behaving in a certain way in order to get people to like you). This makes John E. Richardson’s finding that minorities are very much under-represented as producing members of the press56 all the more important, because it increases the implicit demand for conformity. Solomon Asch studied conformity in great detail.57 According to his results, participants were very accurate in their line judgments, choosing the correct answer 98 percent of the time. However, they eventually began providing incorrect answers based on how they had been instructed by the experimenters. Nearly 75 percent of the participants in the conformity experiments went along with the rest of the group at least one time. After combining the trials, the results indicated that participants conformed to the incorrect group answer approximately one-third of the time. This finding suggests that having social support is an important tool in combating conformity. At the conclusion of the experiments, participants were asked why they had gone along with the rest of the group. In most cases, the students stated that while they knew the rest of the group was wrong, they did not want to risk facing ridicule. A few of the participants suggested that they actually believed the

48  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities other members of the group were correct in their answers. These results suggest that conformity can be influenced both by a need to fit in and a belief that other people are smarter or better informed. Given the level of conformity seen in Asch’s experiments, conformity can be even stronger in real-life situations where stimuli are more ambiguous or more difficult to judge. While participants change their answer and conformed to the group in order to fit in and avoid standing out, there are different factors that influence conformity. Difficult tasks can lead to both increased and decreased conformity. Not knowing how to perform a difficult task makes people more likely to conform, but increased difficulty can also make people more accepting of different responses, leading to less conformity.58 Personal characteristics such as motivation to achieve and strong leadership abilities are linked with a decreased tendency to conform.59 People are more likely to conform in situations that involve between three and five other people.60 However, there is little change once the group size goes beyond four or five people. People are more likely to conform in ambiguous situations where they are unclear about how they should respond. Researchers have found that people from collectivist cultures are more likely to conform and conformity increases when other members of the group are of a higher social status.61 When people view the others in the group as more powerful, influential, or knowledgeable than themselves, they are more likely to go along with the group. Conformity tends to decrease, however, when people are able to respond privately. Research has also shown that conformity decreases if they have support from at least one other individual in a group. One of the major criticisms of Asch’s conformity experiments centres on the reasons why participants choose to conform.62 According to some critics, individuals may have actually been motivated to avoid conflict, rather than an actual desire to conform to the rest of the group. Another criticism is that the results of the experiment in the lab may not generalize to real-world situations. However, many social psychology experts believe that while realworld situations may not be as clear cut as they are in the lab, the actual social pressure to conform is probably much greater, which can dramatically increase conformist behaviours.63 According to Milgram, often it is not so much the kind of person someone is, as the kind of situation in which he or she finds himself in that determines how he will act.64 Like his professor Asch, Milgram’s interest in social influence stemmed in part from his desire to understand how the presence of a powerful person—particularly the German dictator Adolf Hitler who ordered the killing of millions of people during World War II—could produce obedience. It was predicted that no more than 3 out of 100 participants would deliver the maximum shock, in Milgram’s famous shock study.65 In reality, 65 percent of the participants in Milgram’s study delivered the maximum shocks.66 Of the 40 participants in the study, 26 delivered the maximum shocks while 14 stopped before reaching the highest levels. It is important to note that many of the subjects became extremely agitated, distraught, and

Minority discourses and the media 49 angry at the experimenter, but they continued to follow orders all the way to the end. Perhaps most telling were the studies in which Milgram allowed the participants to choose their own shock levels or in which one of the experimenters suggested that they should not actually use the shock machine. In these situations, there was virtually no shocking. These conditions show that people do not like to harm others and when given a choice they will not. On the other hand, the social situation can create powerful, and potentially deadly, social influence. In the initial study, the authority’s status and power was maximized—the experimenter had been introduced as a respected scientist at a respected university. However, in replications of the study in which the experimenter’s authority was decreased, obedience also declined. According to Milgram,67 this meant there are some situational factors that can explain the levels of obedience: 1 The physical presence of an authority figure dramatically increased compliance. 2 The fact that Yale (a trusted and authoritative academic institution) sponsored the study led many participants to believe that the experiment must be safe. 3 The selection of teacher and learner status seemed random. 4 Participants assumed that the experimenter was a competent expert. 5 The shocks were said to be painful, not dangerous. Later experiments conducted by Milgram indicated that the presence of rebellious peers dramatically reduced obedience levels. Yet, “ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process. Moreover, even when the destructive effects of their work become patently clear, and they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to resist authority” Milgram explained.68 Alex Haslam and Stephen Reicher69 suggested the degree to which people are willing to obey the questionable orders of an authority figure depends largely on two key factors: 1 How much the individual agrees with the orders 2 How much they identify with the person giving the orders While it is clear that people are often far more susceptible to influence, persuasion, and obedience than they would often like to be, they are far from mindless machines just taking orders. Milgram explicitly focused on the situational factors that led to greater obedience, yet these have been found to interact with certain personality characteristics (yet another example of a person-situation interaction). Specifically, authoritarianism (a tendency to prefer things to be simple rather than complex and to hold traditional values), conscientiousness (a tendency to be responsible, orderly, and dependable), and

50  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities agreeableness (a tendency to be good natured, cooperative, and trusting) are all related to higher levels of obedience whereas higher moral reasoning (the manner in which one makes ethical judgments) and social intelligence (an ability to develop a clear perception of the situation using situational cues) both predict resistance to the demands of the authority figure. It is worth noting that although this highlights both conformity and obedience, they are not the same thing. While both are forms of social influence, we most often tend to conform to our peers, whereas we obey those in positions of authority. Furthermore, the pressure to conform tends to be implicit, whereas the order to obey is typically rather explicit. In addition, people don’t like admitting to having conformed (especially via normative social influence), they will more readily point to the authority figure as the source of their actions (especially when they have done something they are embarrassed or ashamed of ). It is within this context that the role of the media becomes apparent. People are more ready to admit to holding a view, in particular, if it is controversial if it relates to media stories or everyday narratives.70 However, the acceptance of conformity with peer pressure or the normative social discourse, is something that people find harder to do. Accepting that one is less able to make up their own mind and people orientate themselves according to social values and peers is harder to do. With a common understanding of upbringing being “it takes a village”, there is a common understanding that human identity and everyday actions are constituted by a plurality of sources.71 The media informs those as well and legitimizes and de-legitimises some over others. Marco Cinnirella’s publication, ‘Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? SocialPsychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice’,72 departs from the context highlighted above and looks at how a person is affected by social dynamics and the consequences it has, specifically on the strong association made between terrorism and Islam and vice-versa in British social environments. The “disproportionate attention to Islam is triggered largely by current national and international tensions as they have risen to the top of political agendas rather than by a sudden interest in spirituality. … Problematic “Muslim issues” are endlessly recycled, often in sensationalist tones”.73 If we take a look at a specific suggestion, as pointed out by Shadid and van Koningsveld, one can notice that the effect of colonisation, philosophical and religious differences, political debates, uncritical and undifferentiated media coverage, and immigration are held as the core arguments for the negative press that surrounds Muslims in Europe.74 Arguing that most of the press does not take into account the subtleties of the situation at hand and does not look further than absolutely necessary, these authors feel that as a consequence the Muslim communities of Europe are affected by the way in which the various stories are reported.75 Most Muslims who appear and speak on television are Muslim men.76 These often become targets for controversy and ‘juicy’ coverage, Anjem Choudary appearing on the BBC for example, and further enforces the liberal media (us) versus ultra-conservative

Minority discourses and the media 51 Muslim (them) perspective. Other actors who appear to speak on behalf of Muslims or in relation to issues faced by Muslims serve a distinct purpose, according to the framing of the programme, and the media logic involved. For example, “Many British Muslims have divided loyalties” 77 according to a BBC Panorama episode, which then broadcasted footage of “police in riot gear confront[ing] an angry mob of Muslim protesters, radical preachers speak[ing] out against democracy, and [how] a troubled White Muslim convert attempts to bomb a restaurant in Exeter”.78 However, as in France, the most effective advocates were ‘moderates’ who would embody a secular, private, and sanitised form of Islam; and the Women who could speak authentically about the oppression they have suffered.79 S. Vetovec’s work entitled ‘Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain’80 highlights the close relationship between a desire for recognition, acceptance, and tolerance, by the Muslim community in Britain and the resulting countermovement broadly described as Islamophobia. Yet the examples that reach the news further reinforce the orientalist discourse, as the issues faced by Muslims, are used as examples to highlight ‘problems’. The demands for recognition, claims for equality, choices, and responses, given by Muslims are examples, and these need to be explained by “experts”.81 These experts are determined by media values, media logic, public opinion, and dominant discourses. As a consequence, we can conclude with Said that, “the irony is that Western views of Islam on the whole prefer to associate “Islam” with what many Muslims themselves are opposed to in the current scene: punishment, autocracy, medieval modes of logic, theocracy”.82 Something that is often recycled and repeated in discussions of Islam and Muslims in Europe.83 What we see is that minority discourses circulate alongside other discourses.84 These discourses are subject to competition for audiences, financing, and stories/issues. What happens is that as these discourses compete with other narratives, they are simultaneously subjected to the forces of competition from those other discourses (such as discreditation), and in this environment, people are trying to orientate themselves both as consumers of these discourses and as subjects of those discourses. In doing so, they are exposed to not only mediacratic forces, but also to social-psychological forces that interact in the consumption process. Those social environments in which people find themselves while they are consuming media, are affecting not only the information they take from those reports, but also the way that they orientate themselves towards the reports and their content. This means, that when activists are demanding change, or highlighting important issues that may come to the fore in different minority discourses, the pervasiveness of the dominant discourse, the internal desire to conform or reproduce socially acceptable opinions and values, means that widespread dissent that may lead to change is very unlikely. Thus, suggesting a reason why despite many years of activism and demands for equal rights, change has been so slow to materialise, or gain any widespread support from people not immediately affected by the problems that are demanded to be changed.

52  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities

Notes 1. Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, ed. Michael Banton (London: Tavistock, 1966), 8. 2. John Richard Bowen, Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 10. 3. Stewart M. Hoover, “Religion, Media and Identity: Theory and Method in Audience Research on Religion and Media,” in Mediating Religion: Studies in Media, Religion, and Culture, ed. J.P. Mitchell and S. Marriage (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2003), 9–19. 4. Stewart M. Hoover, “Religion, Media and Identity: Theory and Method in Audience Research on Religion and Media,” in Mediating Religion: Studies in Media, Religion, and Culture, ed. J.P. Mitchell and S. Marriage (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2003), 9–19. 5. For examples of such works, please see: G. Lynch, Understanding Theology and Popular Culture (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley – Blackwell, 2005); Hent De Vries and Samuel Weber, Religion and Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Stewart M. Hoover, Religion in the Media Age (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2006); Heidi Campbell, When Religion Meets New Media (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2010); Jolyon P. Mitchell and Sophia Marriage. Mediating Religion: Studies in Media, Religion, and Culture (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2003). 6. Saifuddin Ahmed and Jörg Matthes, “Media Representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A Meta-Analysis,” International Communication Gazette 79, no. 3 (2017): 219–44; Stefan Mertens, “European Media Coverage of Islam in a Globalizing World,” in Representations of Islam in the News: A Cross-Cultural Analysis, eds. Stefan Mertens and Hedwig de Smaele (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 59–73; Laurens de Rooij, Islam in British Media Discourses: Understanding Perceptions of Muslims in the News (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2020). doi:10.7765/9781526135230; Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002); W. Shadid, “Berichtgeving over Moslims En De Islam in De Westerse Media: Beeldvorming, Oorzaken En Alternatieve Strategieën,” Tijdschrift voor Communicatiewetenschap 33, no. 4 (2005): 330–46. 7. Goran Larsson, Muslims and the New Media (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011), 193. 8. E. Elgamri, Islam in the British Broadsheets: The Impact of Orientalism on Representations of Islam in the British Press (Ithaca, NY: Ithaca Press, 2008). 9. Laurens De Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion,” Journal of Religion in Europe 10, no. 1–2 (2017): 172–217; P. Morey and A. Yaqin, Framing Muslims (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 10. Klaus Bruhn Jensen, “News as Social Resource: A Qualitative Empirical Study of the Reception of Danish Television News,” European Journal of Communication 3 (1988): 275–76. 11. Paul Baker, Costas Gabrielatos, and Tony McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press (Cambridge, UK – New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 12. Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1997). 13. Ziauddin Sardar, “The Excluded Minority: British Muslim Identity after 11 September,” in Reclaiming Britishness, ed. Phoebe Griffith and Mark Leonard (London, UK: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 86. 14. Mahmoud Eid, “Perceptions about Muslims in Western Societies,” in Engaging the Other: Public Policy and Western-Muslim Intersections, ed. Karim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 111.

Minority discourses and the media 53 15. E. Elgamri, Islam in the British Broadsheets: The Impact of Orientalism on Representations of Islam in the British Press (Ithaca, NY: Ithaca Press, 2008). 16. Chris Allen, Islamophobia (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), 96. 17. Chris Allen and Jorgen Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001 (Vienna, Austria: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2002), 46–48. 18. Gordon Willard Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954). 19. Gordon Willard Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954). 20. Catherine Bousfield and Paul Hutchison, “Contact, Anxiety, and Young People’s Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions Towards the Elderly,” Educational Gerontology 36, no. 6 (2010): 451–66; Lisbeth Drury, Paul Hutchison, and Dominic Abrams. “Direct and Extended Intergenerational Contact and Young People’s Attitudes Towards Older Adults.” British Journal of Social Psychology 55, no. 3 (2016): 522–43. 21. Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp, “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90, no. 5 (2006): 751–83. 22. John E. Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004). 23. Miles Hewstone, Abigail Clare, Anna-Kaisa Newheiser, and Alberto Voci, “Individual and Situational Predictors of Religious Prejudice: Impact of Religion, Social Dominance Orientation, Intergroup Contact, and Mortality Salience,” TPM–­Testing, Psychometrics, Methodology in Applied Psychology 18 (2011): 143–55. 24. Mir Rabiul Islam and Miles Hewstone, “Dimensions of Contact as Predictors of Intergroup Anxiety, Perceived out-Group Variability, and out-Group Attitude: An Integrative Model,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19, no. 6 (1993): 700–10. 25. Christine Ogan, Lars Willnat, Rosemary Pennington, and Manaf Bashir, “The Rise of Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States,” International Communication Gazette 76, no. 1 (2014): 27–46. 26. Z. Khan and J. Bruschke, “Media Coverage of Muslims, Perceived Threats, Ethnocentrism, and Intercultural Contact: Applying Cultivation Theory, Integrated Threat Theory, and the Contact Hypothesis,” Northwest Journal of Communication 44, no. 1 (2016): 7–34. 27. Paul Hutchison and Harriet E. S. Rosenthal, “Prejudice against Muslims: Anxiety as a Mediator between Intergroup Contact and Attitudes, Perceived Group Variability and Behavioural Intentions,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34, no. 1 (2011): 40–61. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01419871003763312. 28. Michael Brady Munnik, “From Voice to Voices: Identifying a Plurality of Muslim Sources in the News Media,” Media, Culture & Society 39, no. 2 (2017): 270–81; Michael Brady Munnik, Points of Contact: A Qualitative Fieldwork Study of Relationships between Journalists and Muslim Sources in Glasgow (Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh, 2015). http://hdl.handle.net/1842/10591. 29. Abe Ata, Brock Bastian, and Dean Lusher, “Intergroup Contact in Context: The Mediating Role of Social Norms and Group-Based Perceptions on the Contact–­ Prejudice Link,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33, no. 6 (2009): 498–506. 30. Michael Savelkoul, Peer Scheepers, Jochem Tolsma, and Louk Hagendoorn, “Anti-Muslim Attitudes in the Netherlands: Tests of Contradictory Hypotheses Derived from Ethnic Competition Theory and Intergroup Contact Theory,” European Sociological Review 27, no. 6 (2010): 741–58. 31. Jessica R. Abrams, Karen J. McGaughey, and Hannah Haghighat. “Attitudes toward Muslims: A Test of the Parasocial Contact Hypothesis and Contact Theory,” Journal of Intercultural Communication Research 47, no. 4 (2018): 276–92. https://doi.org/10. 1080/17475759.2018.1443968.

54  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities 32. Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp, “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90, no. 5 (2006): 751–83. 33. John E. Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004), xvii. 34. John E. Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004), 230; Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 99. 35. John E. Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004), 152–53. 36. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 186. 37. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 259. 38. Chris Allen, Islamophobia (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010). 39. Sophia Rose Arjana, Muslims in the Western Imagination (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). 40. Stuart Chambers, “Islamophobia in Western Media is Based on False Premises,” The Conversation, January 21, 2021. https://theconversation.com/islamophobia-inwestern-media-is-based-on-false-premises-151443; Mariam Khan, “From Mute to Menacing: Why TV’s Portrayal of Muslims Still Falls Short,” The Guardian, October 15, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2020/oct/15/ why-tvs-portrayal-of-muslims-still-falls-short-ramy-bodyguard. 41. “Improving Media Coverage and Public Perceptions of African-American Men and Boys,” The Opportunity Agenda, 2011. https://www.opportunityagenda.org/explore/ resources-publications/improving-media-coverage-and-public-perceptions-­ african-american-men; Olivier Maheo, “The Enemy Within: The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Enemy Pictures,” Angles no. 10 (2020). https://doi.org/10.4000/ angles.471, https://dx.doi.org/10.4000/angles.471; Brooke Auxier, “Social Media Continue to be Important Political Outlets for Black Americans,” The Pew Research Center, December 11, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/11/ social-media-continue-to-be-important-political-outlets-for-black-americans/; E. Tammy Kim, “The Perils of “People of Color,” The New Yorker, July 29, 2020. https:// www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-activism/the-perils-of-people-of-color. 42. Megan Ming Francis and Leah Wright-Rigueur, “Black Lives Matter in Historical Perspective,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 17 (2021): 441–58; Adam Szetela, “Black Lives Matter at Five: Limits and Possibilities,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 43, no. 8 (2020): 1358–83; Christopher J. Lebron, The Making of Black Lives Matter: A Brief History of an Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 43. Anika Steffen, “‘Ms. Marvel’ Treats Being Muslim as Ordinary—and That Makes it Extraordinary,” NPR, June 17, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/06/17/ 1105512370/ms-marvel-muslim-islam-how-represented; Tariq Raouf, “What Ms. Marvel Gets Right (And Wrong) About Muslim and South Asian Representation,” IGN, July 16, 2022. https://www.ign.com/articles/what-ms-marvel-­getsright-and-wrong-about-muslim-and-south-asian-representation; Safiyya Hosein, “Why Ms. Marvel Matters So Much to Muslim, South Asian Fans,” The Conversation, June 30, 2022. https://theconversation.com/why-ms-marvel-mattersso-much-to-muslim-south-asian-fans-184613. 44. N. Lean, The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims ­( London, UK: Pluto Press, 2012). 45. Karim H. Karim, Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence (Montreal, Canada – New York, NY – London, UK: Black Rose Books, 2003).

Minority discourses and the media 55 46. Warren Breed, “Mass Communication and Socio-Cultural Integration,” Social Forces 37, no. 2 (1958): 109–16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2572792. 47. Norman Triplett, “The Dynamogenic Factors in Pacemaking and Competition,” The American Journal of Psychology 9, no. 4 (1898): 507–33. 48. Floyd H. Allport, “The Influence of the Group Upon Association and Thought,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 3, no. 3 (1920): 159. 49. John F. Dashiell, “An Experimental Analysis of Some Group Effects,” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25, no. 2 (1930): 190. 50. Charles F. Bond and Linda J Titus, “Social Facilitation: A Meta-Analysis of 241 Studies,” Psychological Bulletin 94, no. 2 (1983): 265. 51. Hazel Markus, “The Effect of Mere Presence on Social Facilitation: An Unobtrusive Test.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 14, no. 4 (1978): 389–97. 52. Robert B. Zajonc, and Stephen M Sales, “Social Facilitation of Dominant and Subordinate Responses,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 2, no. 2 (1966): 160–68. 53. Nickolas B. Cottrell, Dennis L. Wack, Gary J. Sekerak, and Robert H. Rittle, “Social Facilitation of Dominant Responses by the Presence of an Audience and the Mere Presence of Others,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9, no. 3 (1968): 245–50. 54. Kate Szymanski and Stephen G. Harkins, “Social Loafing and Self-Evaluation with a Social Standard,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53, no. 5 (1987): 891–97. 55. Laurens De Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion,” Journal of Religion in Europe 10, no. 1–2 (2017): 172–217. 56. John E. Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004). 57. Solomon E. Asch, “Opinions and Social Pressure,” Scientific American 193, no. 5 (1955): 31–35; Solomon E. Asch, “Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One against a Unanimous Majority,” Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 70, no. 9 (1956): 1–70. 58. Janet Fagan Coleman, Robert R. Blake, and Jane Srygley Mouton, “Task Difficulty and Conformity Pressures,” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 57, no. 1 (1958): 120–22; Ronald L. Klein, “Age, Sex, and Task Difficulty as Predictors of Social Conformity,” Journal of Gerontology 27, no. 2 (1972): 229–36. 59. Salley Cullinane Huertas and Larry Powell, “Effect of Appointed Leadership on Conformity,” Psychological Reports 59, no. 2 (1986): 679–82; Howard Baumgartel, “Leadership, Motivations, and Attitudes in Research Laboratories,” Journal of Social Issues 12, no. 2 (1956): 24–31. 60. Chester A. Insko, Richard H. Smith, Mark D. Alicke, Joel Wade, and Sylvester ­Taylor, “Conformity and Group Size: The Concern with Being Right and the Concern with Being Liked,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 11, no. 1 (1985): 41–50; Leon Rosenberg, “Group Size, Prior Experience, and Conformity,” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 63, no. 2 (1961): 436–37; Harold B. Gerard, Roland A. Wilhelmy, and Edward S. Conolley, “Conformity and Group Size,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8, no. 1 part 1 (1968): 79–82; Rod Bond, “Group Size and Conformity,” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8, no. 4 (2005): 331–54. 61. Patricia Faison Hewlin, Tracy L. Dumas, and Meredith Flowers Burnett, “To Thine Own Self Be True? Facades of Conformity, Values Incongruence, and the Moderating Impact of Leader Integrity,” Academy of Management Journal 60, no. 1 (2017): 178–99. Hollander, Edwin P. “Conformity, Status, and Idiosyncrasy Credit.” Psychological review 65, no. 2 (1958): 117–27. 62. Chester A. Insko, Richard H. Smith, Mark D. Alicke, Joel Wade, and Sylvester Taylor, “Conformity and Group Size: The Concern with Being Right and the Concern with Being Liked,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 11, no. 1 (1985): 41–50.

56  Media as a discursive system and how we see minorities 63. Barbara J. Costello and Trina L. Hope, Peer Pressure, Peer Prevention: The Role of Friends in Crime and Conformity (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016); Daniel B.M. Haun and Michael Tomasello, “Conformity to Peer Pressure in Preschool Children,” Child Development 82, no. 6 (2011): 1759–67; B. Bradford Brown, Donna R. Clasen, and Sue A. Eicher, “Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity Dispositions, and Self-Reported Behavior among Adolescents,” Developmental Psychology 22, no. 4 (1986): 521–30. 64. Mel Slater, Angus Antley, Adam Davison, David Swapp, Christoph Guger, Chris Barker, Nancy Pistrang, and Maria V. Sanchez-Vives, “A Virtual Reprise of the Stanley Milgram Obedience Experiments,” PloS One 1, no. 1 (2006): e39–49. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000039; Stanley Milgram, “Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority,” Human Relations 18, no. 1 (1965): 57–76. Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience,” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1963): 371–78; Stanley Milgram, “The Dilemma of Obedience,” The Phi Delta Kappan 55, no. 9 (1974): 603–6. 65. Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience,” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1963): 371–78. 66. Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience,” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1963): 371–78. 67. Stanley Milgram, “Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority,” Human Relations 18, no. 1 (1965): 57–76; Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience,” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1963): 371–78. 68. Stanley Milgram and Christian Gudehus, Obedience to Authority (New York, NY: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, 1978). 69. S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. Reicher, and Michael J. Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, Influence and Power (London: Routledge, 2020); S­ tephen D. Reicher, S. Alexander Haslam, and Joanne R. Smith, “Working toward the Experimenter: Reconceptualizing Obedience within the Milgram Paradigm as Identification-Based Followership.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 7, no. 4 (2012): 315–24; Stephen Reicher and S Alexander Haslam, “Rethinking the Psychology of ­Tyranny: The BBC Prison Study,” British Journal of Social Psychology 45, no. 1 (2006): 1–40. 70. Larry D. Rosen, L. Mark Carrier, and Nancy A. Cheever, “Facebook and Texting Made Me Do It: Media-Induced Task-Switching While Studying,” Computers in Human Behavior 29, no. 3 (2013): 948–58. 71. Fabio Giglietto, Nicola Righetti, Luca Rossi, and Giada Marino, “It Takes a Village to Manipulate the Media: Coordinated Link Sharing Behavior During 2018 and 2019 Italian Elections,” Information, Communication & Society 23, no. 6 (2020): 867–91; Michele Hoyman and Christopher Faricy, “It Takes a Village: A Test of the Creative Class, Social Capital, and Human Capital Theories,” Urban Affairs Review 44, no. 3 (2009): 311–33; Jane Cowen-Fletcher and Judy Melia, It Takes a Village (New York, NY: Scholastic 1994); Hillary Rodham Clinton, It Takes a Village (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006). 72. Marco Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice,” in Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. M. Helbling (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 193–203. 73. P. Morey and A. Yaqin, Framing Muslims (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 57. 74. W. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, “The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in the West: Causes and Solutions,” in Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union, ed. W. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2002), 174–96.

Minority discourses and the media 57 75. W. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, “The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in the West: Causes and Solutions,” in Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union, ed. W. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2002), 174–96. 76. John Richard Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 232. 77. Jeremy Vine and Richard Watson, Muslim First, British Second. BBC: Panorama, 16-02-2009. 78. Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, London Youth, Religion, and Politics: Engagement and Activism from Brixton to Brick Lane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 54. 79. John Richard Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 233. 80. Steven Vetovec, “Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain,” in Muslims in the West, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 19–35. 81. John Richard Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 240. 82. Edward W. Said. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1997), 68. 83. John Richard Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 240. 84. Cornel West, “Minority Discourse and the Pitfalls of Canon Formation,” Yale Journal of Criticism 1, no. 1 (1987): 193–201; Yingjin Zhang, “From “Minority Film” to “Minority Discourse”: Questions of Nationhood and Ethnicity in Chinese Cinema,” Cinema Journal 36, no. 3 (1997): 73–90; Abdul JanMohamed and David Lloyd, “Toward a Theory of Minority Discourse: What Is to Be Done?,” in Postcolonial Criticism, eds. Bart Moore-Gilbert, Gareth Stanton and Willy Maley (London: Routledge, 2014), 234–47.

Part II

Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images

5

Symbolic representations of minorities

Researching metaphors and similes about minorities gives insight into the symbols used and linked to describe them. This is because a metaphor can be a linguistic tool for understanding symbols; metaphors unite experience and symbols.1 “The most salient characteristic of metaphor consists in an apparent violation of linguistic rules that results in the expression of a proposition that is either logically false”.2 For example, “Do not be scared of the filthy kuffar [non-believers]. They are pigs”.3 The key to understanding a metaphor is to interpret it as a comparative proposition (unbelievers are like pigs), rather than a declarative proposition (unbelievers are pigs).4 This allows for the same metaphor to be interpreted in multiple ways (which is beneficial to reporting as we will see later). Herbert Read wrote that: “A metaphor is the synthesis of several units of observation into one commanding image; it is an expression of a complex idea, not by analysis, or by abstract statement, but by a sudden perception of an objective relation”.5 Therefore its meaning and understanding is constituted by the system of discourse to which it is associated. Compare this with a simile, for example, the sheep was white as snow. Experiential evidence provides understanding and gives meaning to the symbol (the sheep), and it gives insight into reality by telling the receiver what it is like (snow). The key difference between a simile and a metaphor for their meaning is for the receiver to be able to focus on what similar thing they ‘do’ (metaphor) and how they look similar (simile).6 For example, “Stop acting like a baby!” versus “He has a babyface”. Metaphors and similes give some insight into what the authors think the subject they are writing about is like in reality. A metaphor has different possible interpretations, and so whilst it might be the author’s intent to be ambiguous about the nature of the metaphor, the understanding consumers take from it is important for the subject of this thesis. By examining this aspect of the discourse about minorities, it is possible to ascertain not only what discursive symbols are used, in regard to them, but also give some insight into how discourse affects interpretation, through the interpretation of metaphors. In articles about British Muslims for example, events abroad are frequently cited to link ideas about a worldwide Islam, and this has a homogenising effect. DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-7

62  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images The Guardian, ‘a liberal newspaper that champions the rights of minority groups’,7 was more likely to feature Muslims in Britain than the conservative press with almost twice as much coverage. This can affect an audience by heightening awareness and making issues related to Islam and Muslims seem more important. However, Islam was largely discussed in global terms of representation (which comprised of 76 percent of coverage not related to the killing of Lee Rigby in Woolwich) rather than local, i.e., British coverage. The frameworks utilised in general were narrow and themes associated with British Muslims were mostly about conflict, but these frameworks were still wider than the representations of Muslims abroad which were only about conflict and mostly violent.8 It is important to examine the use of metaphors, their discursive descriptions, and their relative level of acceptance. In many senses, a sedimented type of metaphor is the most common, because it is so deeply internalised by speakers that it appears as natural and common sense within the speech community.9 The justification is often discursively rooted in local factors and personal experiences. This is the explained away because the metaphor offers up a situation that entitles, obliges, or even demands projection of its own model onto other actors, regions, or international institutions. When it comes to news coverage, the desire to place familiar structures and approaches over new information or challenges as the solution, is frequently justified in terms of the rightness of values and historical successes. This in turn creates an a-historical narrative that is common in “episodic” news reporting. However, rightness, progress, or uniqueness do not hide the instrumental or protective logic behind the ideas represented or projected in the media. This is often a result of an individual’s strategic aims and interests that are pursued to extend their influence. The construction of the subject of news has increasingly emanated from this type of approach. Here then, the framing could be seen as resonating with the already dominant approach with its focus on problem(s), rather than furthering a new and broader understanding of the situation and its sociocultural underpinnings in the contemporary local or global community. This allows for the structuring of the discourse around minority groups while generally considering the interplay between the elements that make up the discourse, such as the extent to which the dominant tropes are reflected in the discourse and then put into practice. For example, one of the most common metaphors in American sports is that black quarterbacks succeed because of their athleticism and white quarterback succeed because of their hard-work or intelligence.10 In most cases, their athleticism is emphasized, and any other motivations are ignored. Natural or physical characteristics is the central explanation for success and is subsequently compared to the expected behaviour of a successful quarterback. Failure is the result of inadequate preparation, hard-work, and intelligence. These racialised tropes play out in common reporting on African-American quarterbacks, much of this played out very publicly in the news surrounding Kyler Murray’s new NFL

Symbolic representations of minorities 63 contract.11 This contract demanded that Murray would spend a minimum number of hours a week doing independent study or be sanctioned (financially) by his employers. The media response suggests that the metaphor of athletic quarterback as naturally gifted but not willing to study or work hard has a large salience in the press as well as NFL board rooms. Journalism in the mass-mediated communications age promulgates discourses by taking events and arranging them within frames that are relatable to the viewer.12 Largely unspoken and unacknowledged, [frames] organise the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports. Frames enable journalists to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely: to recognise it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences. Thus, for organisational reasons alone, frames are unavoidable, and journalism is organised to regulate their production.13 However, this choice has the boundaries set by the producer and not the consumer, moreover, such programmes usually prefer one vision of reality over another and invite the viewer to engage the message in a particular way, despite such a ‘reading’ not being guaranteed.14 However, the ‘active’ in ‘active viewer’ should not be seen as an individual that is continuously struggling against the structures of textual power.15 But rather that in their own way, audiences are in certain aspects “active in their choice, consumption and interpretation of media texts, with recognition of how that activity is framed and limited, in its different modalities and varieties, by the dynamics of cultural power”.16 Images of British Muslims, for example, may be more diverse than perhaps in other nations because of the social relations within Britain,17 however, western discourses surrounding Muslims are firstly divided into the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims. In describing this division, Said has noted: “in practice this notion has meant that when Orientals struggle against colonial occupation, … oppose racial discrimination, … and class interest, political circumstances, economic factors are [deemed] totally irrelevant”.18 The actors in this discourse are the moderate Muslim and the lapsed Muslim, the antithesis of the misguided protagonist and his teacher, in short practical terms, the terrorist and the one who radicalised him. These are standard characters in the all too familiar ideology of terror. The construction of the evil mentor departs from the Orientalist discourse of the migrants polluting Europe with their barbaric and antiquated values, rituals, and actions. This is often engaged through the lenses of (national) security. The central thesis is that the most fervent practitioners of Islamic faith are also the central source of extremist rhetoric. However, as others have suggested, we can see complexities in the construction of this pattern if we consider the characteristics of the other parties involved.19 The narrative consists of a regular, often not seemingly religious, individual (usually male), who has

64  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images become brainwashed by ‘extremist ideology’.20 The discourse makes a point of painting the individual in a good light, mentioning previously positive, or everyday characteristics. For example, his place in the community, school, and being one of the lads and having nothing much about him etc. Then his subsequent change is dramatic, the framing as a person who has made an irrational choice. The above-described process primarily divorces the individual from the context and creates an a-contextual narrative. It also creates a separation between the individual and the rest of their community. It relies on the promulgation of individualism, irrationality, and psychosis. This fits into the western narrative of itself, greater individualism, greater choices, but the minority or “immigrant” cannot cope and then succumbs to the irrational choice to follow, in the example, Islam as a safety blanket in response to the developed western society. Despite contrary evidence that suggests that Muslims are not all immigrants, and asylum seekers or refugees, but many are born and bred in European and American societies, participate in common social spaces such as schools, healthcare services, and community spaces, it is the immigrant aspect that makes them fail to take advantage of their situation and see the light that is the benefits of western society. The choice to live an alternative lifestyle is met with suspicion and further need of control due to an inability to relativise the power of the dominant discourse. This way of characterising Islam and Muslims has been described as “cheering fictions and useful lies” by Hanif Kureishi.21 This way of portraying Muslims and minorities more general, provides further examples of the superiority of the dominant group over the minority. The fiction it reinforces is twofold for the dominant group’s audience. First, that minority groups such as Muslims are a threat because of their religion and culture; and second, that the dominant group, i.e., non-Muslim people are not able to succumb to those irrational or psychological ills because they are superior in culture and status. Something that is not a uniquely Western phenomenon but also something seen in the treatment of the Uighur Muslim Minority in China.22 However, public and private identity is a struggle of a sexual, religious, cultural, and political nature. Nobody is perfect by any means and relatability is needed, but it can only be achieved through a reporting of a minority group’s lived realities. Unfortunately, those who aim to bring these realities to the foreground are often either obscured, forgotten, or ignored by simultaneous forces of hardline orthodoxy, public opinion, and media logic. Seaton suggests that in order to improve the media, accountability needs to return, as it has all but disappeared from the press and has been replaced by market success.23 What is required, according to Seaton, is a new relationship between the media and the state.24 Williams and Delli Carpini suggest that what is needed is verisimilitude: “Verisimilitude in the media [is needed], [here] we mean the assumption that sources of political communications [need to] take responsibility for the truth claims they explicitly and implicitly make, even if these claims are not strictly verifiable in any formal sense”.25 What the data suggests is that not only

Symbolic representations of minorities 65 do the media institutions need to be held accountable for their output, but the output needs to be clearer in distinguishing what is comment, conjecture, and fact. Often a negative appraisal of another ideology is not represented as a rational political ideology, but as an irrational or religious ideology which could potentially render any person susceptible to radicalization and therefore terrorism. This is what Foucault referred to in Madness and Civilisation 26 and Discipline and Punish 27 as the need to establish what are legitimate positions and punish anything not acceptable as either mental illness or a perversion in need of punishment. Foucault refers to the ‘dangerous individual’ and argues how social structures seek out individual actors to secure wider social cohesion.28 In turn, these deviant individuals become the reason for far-reaching and ideologically motivated changes. The political authorities are able to utilise certain tropes to undermine any legitimate criticism of the state and in turn put in place restrictions that affect the freedoms of all inhabitants.29 Ethnic minorities are often associated with if not synonym for asylum seekers. Kundnani has discussed the construction of asylum seekers as scroungers, dependent on handouts, and charity with nothing to contribute.30 This viewpoint ignores the causes of asylum seekers in which a nation could be implicated. In addition, the asylum seekers are categorised based on the characteristics of the countries they come from, and this allows the government to use quotas to limit their freedom and treat them as scapegoats rather than as individuals suffering from the injustices of a globalised world. For example, this way of thinking allows the government to legitimize welfare changes and extend them to other groups.31 However, due to the prevalence of stories that deviate from the prevalent norms in the media, it has the effect of making the subject of those stories seem like a rational decision. This phenomenon is much like when during 2014 election debates, Nigel Farage of UKIP, and a number of other smaller political parties participated. It gives the impression that voting for Farage or UKIP is equally rational and viable as it is to vote Labour, Scottish National Party, or Green Party. In turn, if you have a debate on the place of religion in Britain and you invite Anjem Choudary (which the BBC and Channel 4 have done in the past) then you give the viewer the impression that their version of religion is equally rational or viable as that of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Richard Dawkins, or Kemi Badenoch MP, the Minister of State (Minister for Local Government, Faith, and Communities). This is often the result of the journalistic logic to always show two sides of a story, no matter how extreme the two sides of the story are. The journalistic logic works in binaries and seeks to oppose mainstream views with a counter perspective, but in doing so it legitimates the alternative view and makes it seem equal, even if it is a fringe or marginalised view that is held by a sincere minority of people. Constructing and participating in the discourse with a lack of complexity and diversity means that external settings are amplified as media coverage focuses on the juxtaposition of binary extremes. For example, the conflict

66  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images between freedom of speech constructed as a liberal value versus censorship as a product of a demand to receive equal recognition and removal of racial stereotyping from media reports. This results in a ‘clash of cultures’.32 This way of thinking serves to marginalize minority groups and reinforce adherence to a particular social order. The thought, “if they are not sufficiently rational to be open to persuasion, we must regrettably punish them for their unwillingness to comply”, is an important part of the folklore of modern neo-liberal society and contributes to the presentation of alternative world views as they relate to the dominant social order. Even reporting and discussion of socialism as an ideal for greater equality is met with examples from cold-war propaganda and suggestions that increased financial equality and greater solidarity among people is irrational, undesirable, and leads to violence as happened in the former soviet union.33 In doing so, it helps to distract audiences from any complicity in creating this context. This highlights the conflict between a nation’s belief as a tolerant, inclusive society and the level of dissatisfaction exhibited by some members of this society. It also shows a separation between the political elites and the media machine. As political elites try to engage in promoting cohesion, some more successful that others, the press are keen to follow the described narrative above. The internet has been described as the most influential source for most negative things among young people at the moment; not only radicalisation is seen as being achieved online but also cyberbullying and a host of other social ills are believed to stem from the internet and are widely discussed.34 The internet provides authors the ability to engage in wider (social) networks, linking people to any number of individuals, activities, groups, and countries. In turn, it allows for a simplistic reduction of populations as being associated with and under the influence of any item under investigation both home and abroad. It is both the reason for the pervasiveness of movements such as Black Lives Matter, and subsequently also the suspicion of any followers of the movement. It is an ideal that is not homegrown, not organic because it was not produced by the dominant group or discourse, but rather a reaction to it. This challenging of the dominant discourse has meant that it is in need of repression or co-optation if it can find a way to integrate into the narrative of the dominant discourse. In an analysis of President Barack Obama’s 2004 Democratic Convention Speech, by among others Charlton McIlwain, Professor of Communication, New York University,35 it was highlighted how his ability to place himself in the fabric of the American Dream, as a key to winning his election. His ability to stitch himself into the fabric of society is what made him successful. For a variety of reasons, lack of power being one, and often resistance or critical ideology being another, many minority discourses are not able to do so. Nor do they all want to be part of the existing dominant discourse, sometimes the purpose is to bring down the dominant discourse, and so the very existence of two competing discourses is that are opposed to the other’s existence means that a stitching together of the two narratives into a new unified discourse for progress is not possible.

Symbolic representations of minorities 67 A dominant narrative often implies that the cause for problems is located outside of the mainstream. Moreover, this narrative suggests that the mainstream or dominant groups do not need to think about their conduct as it is the minority who needs to adjust his or her behaviour to meet mainstream demands, as if it also assumes that what most people do or want in society is always correct, in line with a democratic ideal. In this narrative, minorities are always represented as a deviant. Community cohesion would result once minorities were able to meet the demands placed upon them by rest of society and thus the ‘problem’ will be solved. As the discourse that surrounds such demands never mention neo-colonial aspirations or actions, let alone the colonial ones, for example, the context being discussed is always a-historical and directed towards a future ideal. Some have questioned whether these kinds of discursive representations are reflective of a racist core of contemporary democratic politics. As Sivanandan states, “White racial superiority is back on the agenda—in the guise, this time, not of a super-race but of a super-nation, a super-people, a chosen people on a mission to liberate the world”.36 Whilst I would not go as far as to say democratic politics are inherently racist, the contemporary focus on identity politics as a mobilisation for political action has created that dilemma. People are now expected to align themselves with others based on ethnicity, sexuality, geography, sporting interest, etc. and so a differentiation along those lines will only increase racial tensions. What is needed is a new form of communitarian politics that has a greater solidarity among its adherents. However, since this is against the political logic of how to consolidate power in a democracy (divide most and conquer, with the rest), I doubt this will be realised in the short term. However, what I hope to suggest in the later chapters of this book, is how the media as an industry, as well as those who participate in it, can contribute to moving that project a little further forward. Minorites, i.e., those who identify as deviating from the mainstream, who achieve a voice in the media and are said to represent the ‘real’ face of the group they represent, are those that exhibit characteristics such as being liberal, tolerant, peaceful, and critical of issues that are widely accepted. In other words, they are “safe” representatives that contribute and support the dominant ideological discourse, this practice separates into different categories the good and bad minorities. Featherstone, Hollohan, and Poole note that, The British and American political elites are keen to escape from political debate through the construction of a discourse which presents their cause as ‘beyond discourse’, driven by right, goodness, justice, and the care for humanity. By contrast, the others’ cause is not legitimate. They are evil. They want wickedness and injustice and have no interest in the lives of other humans. Although there is a lot of talk about the nature of asymmetrical war, it is clear from countless studies that that we must also contend with the asymmetrical nature of discourse. … The law is upheld by the British and American ‘neo-liberal capitalist’ states. Those who oppose these regimes are therefore criminal.37

68  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images

Notes 1. Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976). 2. Keith H. Basso, Western Apache Language and Culture: Essays in Linguistic Anthropology (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1992), 65. 3. Arthur Martin and Mario Ledwith, “These Filthy Unbelievers Are Pigs, He Rants at Rally to In-Cite Youngsters,” Daily Mail, May 30, 2013. http://www. dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2333039/Woolwich-ter ror-suspect-Michael-­ Adebolajos-rant-rally-incite-youngsters.html. 4. Keith H. Basso, Western Apache Language and Culture: Essays in Linguistic Anthropology (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1992), 65. 5. Herbert. Read, English Prose Style (London: Bell and Sons, 1952), 23. 6. Keith H. Basso, Western Apache Language and Culture: Essays in Linguistic Anthropology (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1992), 65. 7. Elizabeth Poole, “Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims Before and After 9/11: The UK Context,” Global Media Journal—Canadian Edition 4, no. 2 (2011): 52. 8. Laurens de Rooij, Islam in British Media Discourses: Understanding Perceptions of Muslims in the News (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2020). doi:10.7765/9781526135230. 9. P. Drulak, “Motion, Container and Equilibrium: Metaphors in the Discourse About European Integration,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 4 (2006): 507–8. 10. Patrick Ferrucci and Edson C. Tandoc, “Race and the Deep Ball: Applying Stereotypes to Nfl Quarterbacks,” International Journal of Sport Communication 10, no. 1 (2017): 41–57. 11. Matt Bonesteel, “Cardinals Drop Kyler Murray’s Homework Clause from Contract Extension,” The Washington Post, July 29, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost. com/sports/2022/07/29/kyler-murray-homework-clause/; Cody Benjamin, “Kyler ­Murray Contract Clause Nixed After Taking on Critics, Plus Bucs Lose Star OL and DK Metcalf Gets Paid,” CBS, July 29, 2022. https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/ kyler-murray-contract-clause-nixed-after-taking-on-critics-plus-bucs-lose- ­starol-and-dk-metcalf-gets-paid/; Grant Gordon, “Cardinals Remove ‘­ Independent Study’ Clause from Kyler Murray’s Contract,” NFL.com, July 28, 2022. https:// www.nf l.com/news/cardinals-remove-independent-study-clause-from-kylermurray-s-contract; Cale Clinton, “Warren Moon Calls Kyler Murray’s Film Study Clause a ‘Slap in the Face’ to Black Quarterbacks,” USA Today, July 31, 2022. https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nf l/cards/2022/07/31/kyler-murraycardinals-contract-clause-slap-face-warren-moon/10196869002/. 12. David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow, Media Logic (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979); Claes H. de Vreese, “News Framing: Theory and Typology,” Information Design Journal & Document Design 13, no. 1 (2005): 51–62. 13. Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 7. 14. Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding in Tv Discourse,” in Culture, Media, Language, eds. S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe and P. Willis (London, UK: Hutchinson, 1981), 128–38. 15. James Curran, “The “New Revisionism” in Mass Communications Research,” European Journal of Communication 5, no. 2–3 (1990): 135–64. 16. David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 127. 17. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002).

Symbolic representations of minorities 69 1 8. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995), 107. 19. M. Featherstone, S. Holohan, and E. Poole, “Discourses of the War on Terror: Constructions of the Islamic Other after 7/7,” International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics 6, no. 2 (2010): 169–86. 20. This is similar to the discourse surrounding cults or new religious movements. One classic example of a similar discourse that was levelled at a new religious movement is that of Eileen Barker and her study of the Unification Church. Eileen Barker, The Making of a Moonie (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1984). 21. Bart Moore-Gilbert, Hanif Kureishi, Contemporary World Writers (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 45. 22. Blaine Kaltman, Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2014). Brent Hierman, “The Pacification of Xinjiang: Uighur Protest and the Chinese State, 1988–2002,” Problems of Post-Communism 54, no. 3 (2007): 48–62. Martin Purbrick, “Maintaining a Unitary State: Counter-Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism in Xinjiang and China,” Asian Affairs 48, no. 2 (2017): 236–56. Eric Hyer, “China’s Policy Towards Uighur Nationalism,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): 75–86. Michael Clarke, “China’s “War on Terror” in ­X injiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (2008): 271–301. 23. Jean Seaton, “Broadcasting and the Theory of Public Service,” in Power Without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain, ed. James Curran and Jean Seaton (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 347. 24. Jean Seaton, “Broadcasting and the Theory of Public Service,” in Power Without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain, ed. James Curran and Jean Seaton (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 353. 25. Bruce A. Williams and Michael X. Delli Carpini, “Media Regimes and Democracy,” in Media and Society, ed. James Curran (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), 290–305. 26. Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2001). 27. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1977). 28. Michel Foucault, “The Dangerous Individual,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984, ed. L. D. Kritzman (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 1988), 125–52. 29. Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2001). 30. Arun Kundnani, The End of Tolerance (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2007). 31. Arun Kundnani, The End of Tolerance (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2007), 88. 32. The clash of civilisations paradigm famously put forth by Samuel Huntingdon is a theory that posits that people’s cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. It has become a dominant frame for conceiving, perceiving, and addressing issues of cultural difference as well as Muslims in Britain and abroad. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London, UK – Sydney, Australia: Simon & Schuster, 1997). 33. Hans Maier, “Political Religions and Their Images: Soviet Communism, Italian Fascism and German National Socialism,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 7, no. 3 (2006): 267–81. Paul Haridakis, “Fear of Communism in the Twentieth-Century United States and the Vietnam War,” in Media and the Dissemination of Fear: Pandemics, Wars and Political Intimidation, ed. Nelson Ribeiro and Christian Schwarzenegger (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022), 199–220.

70  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images Colin Sparks and Anna Reading. Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media (London: Sage, 1997). 34. For more, see: Bex Lewis, Raising Children in a Digital Age: Enjoying the Best, Avoiding the Worst (Oxford, UK: Lion Hudson PLC, 2014). Lynn Schofield Clark, The Parent App: Understanding Families in the Digital Age (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 35. THNKR, “The Speech that Made Obama President,” @radical.media, August 31, 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFPwDe22CoY. 36. A. Sivanandan, “Race, Terror and Civil Society,” Race and Class 47, no. 3 (2006): 1–8. 37. M. Featherstone, S. Holohan, and E. Poole. “Discourses of the War on Terror: Constructions of the Islamic Other after 7/7,” International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics 6, no. 2 (2010): 169–86.

6

The consumption of media reports

Consumption is a form of exchange in which consumers take little or no role in the production of the goods they acquire by money, credit, or barter. Commodities are things produced for the purpose of exchange in a marketplace by those who possess knowledge, skill, and locale that consumers generally do not have. … Consumption consists of the practice of relying on the marketplace for the acquisition of commodities.1 The choice of materials up for consumption is limited to the sample constructed and disseminated by media institutions, resulting in asymmetrical power relations in the marketplace. However, there is space for an active choosing by the viewer because of the consumption of commodities requires consumer participation in the marketplace. So, whilst the power balance is in favour of media institutions, they are unable to have everything their way because if they alienate their consumers then the institution dies. With the wide range of electronic communication now available, it is not uncommon for families to be in the same physical space but inhabiting separate communicative cocoons. … The result is that, even from within the same family, different people can put different media to different uses. … Digitization has contributed to exponentially increased choice for listeners, viewers, and surfers. If you have access to the net, the choice is literally endless.2 Nevertheless, this choice has the boundaries set by the producer and not the consumer, in that, such programmes usually prefer one vision of reality over another and invite the viewer to engage the message in a particular way, despite such a ‘reading’ not being guaranteed.3 Yet, this ‘active viewer’ should not be seen as an individual that is continuously struggling against the structures of textual power.4 Rather, in their own way, audiences are in certain aspects “active in their choice, consumption and interpretation of media texts, with recognition of how that activity is framed and limited, in its different modalities and varieties, by the dynamics of cultural power”.5 DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-8

72  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images Simultaneously, during the reading of a text or the viewing of a broadcast, audiences are constituted into a community and socialised into a group that is bound by the shared experiences of media.6 This influences the consumer because as Zygmunt Bauman argues, we increasingly find ourselves in a position in which we can trust only ourselves. Global business practices demand fluid and unstable modes of organisation, and the government is seemingly powerless to control or alleviate this problem. Families, communities, and relationships all seem vulnerable, jobs are temporary, skills are becoming obsolete, and there are demands for change from all perspectives. The nation state, he argues, is becoming incapable of providing the economic and social support demanded and individuals are left to their own devices as a result.7 As a consequence, individuals are increasingly unable to buy into the image of society as a “common property” where its members buy into and to some extent run and manage it together.8 As private life has become something for individuals to deal with rather than something that the state organises, it has created a feeling that society is in flux as no one is managing it.9 In contemporary societies, the structures and stabilities which historically sustained the idea of society are under siege, and critiques from fields such as feminism and post-colonial studies, pose problems for the individuals who have their identity based on the now challenged ideal of what constitutes a socially cohesive world. Thus, the act of witnessing the events in the news takes on even greater value for the consumer as it constitutes their understanding of what is going on. The individualising effects of society re-enforce this perspective, and personal narrative constructions become and remain ‘canonical’ as Benjamin has put it.10 Additionally, as de Haes, Husken, and van der Velde mention: “Regardless of whether a political system is democratic or despotic, in times of crisis the dominant discourse is ritualised and broadcast by a country’s mainline media and, consequently, embraced by the majority of the population”.11 Elizabeth Poole has argued that following a crisis of British identity and what Britishness is, and meant to be, has led to “a defensive construction of a common national culture to provide stability and certainty … excludes Muslims from Britishness”.12 This has resulted in media institutions employing the technique de Haes, Husken, and van der Velde mention in its coverage of Islam and Muslims in Britain.13 We can see similar processes take place around the world in contexts as disparate as Rwanda,14 Nigeria,15 South Africa,16 Turkey,17 New Zealand,18 Kenya,19 USA,20 and UK.21 The consumer negotiates an opinion out of the plurality of images, stories, reports, opinions, and information broadcast 24/7. However, as Mitchell states: “The symbolic resources that film, television and other media offer are often appropriated and recycled as people attempt to define their own identities, narrate their own life stories and understand the traditions and communities of interpretation to which they belong”.22 In addition to this, emotional identification with these materials is achieved not only through the stories that elicit a positive response, based on the ‘positive’ message in the eyes of the consumer, but also through ‘negative’ stories and images which imply the positive aspects by

The consumption of media reports 73 reinforcing the binary between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’. Through mediated identification, the images and stories bind the viewers to the stories and the information the media broadcast.23 Whilst the media engage and subject their audience to their own agenda building process, the relationship between a person and the media still requires some participation from the receiving agent. This active participation may vary from person to person and across time and space; however, the direct influence of media reports is only possible if you are an audience member. From a hermeneutic perspective, members of an audience themselves share a status and role as readers of a text. In attempting to understand a programme, they exercise this common position in active and rule-­ governed ‘projections’ of meaning: ‘the meaning of a literary text is not a definable entity, but if anything, a dynamic happening’.24 As a consequence, the consumption of media products and the appropriation of the information that it provides is always contextual. Active audiences fill gaps in the narrative that appear between scenes, stories, and images. This filling of gaps is based on the pre-knowledge they possess of a given story, the context of its production, and the context of its reception. These are a function of the similarities between the consumer’s own experiences and those available in the text.25 Although it can occur that you are not a key demographic for certain outlets, this is because they cater to a different target audience. However, the repeated targeting of issues can “make” a problem. The news must be sensational, but at the same time, it must stay within the norms and expectations of what news is, i.e., something out of the ordinary. As Armstrong points out above, that which is newsworthy and out of the ordinary is something that is constructed through media rhetoric. With a lack of access and control over media outlets for the average person, the access to media and news is reliant upon third parties. The power and control of what is newsworthy is handed over from the consumer to the media institutions, who in turn create things which are in keeping with the ideal of that which is considered newsworthy and what is considered normal and ordinary everyday business. “The media thus provide the news that fulfils the expectations they create, whether or not they actually elicit fulfilling behaviour”.26 Within the discipline of media studies, general discussions of media representation have continued to focus on misrepresentation and re-presentation rather than any discoveries of unfiltered, non-distorted representations of reality. For example, Walter Benjamin 27 and later Jean Baudrillard 28 point toward the inability to maintain authenticity in the wake of mass production, for objects are infused with power dynamics that directly influence mediated symbols or representations, and thus complicate intentions of transparency or realism. This necessarily complicates the reception of news reports because

74  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images not only are the reports themselves infused with ideological content, but the communication process between producer and receiver is necessarily mediated because of the power dynamics implicit in that relationship. As Deuze below shows, in his discussion of the internet, the internet as a medium is becoming increasingly important as a tool in managing that power dynamic. Both deliberately and unintentionally, people generate more information about themselves, what they do, and what they care about than any social institution or agency at any time in history. In the process, people collectively create a vast repository of their lives in media—a living archive that gets continuously updated and, unlike our brains, always remembers information in the same way it was originally recorded and stored.29 Indeed, people depend on the media to receive information and opinion. Studies of the influence of mass-mediated coverage of subjects have found a correlation between increased coverage of a subject and public perceptions of that subject.30 Manuel Castells has noted that: “For citizens to have an informed opinion, they need information and counter-frames to exercise a choice in interpretation”.31 What happens is that three aspects of media production affect mediated information reception: the deliberate spreading of biased information by media professionals; the consistent promoting of one perspective over others; and the decisions made by media producers prior to broadcasting or publishing their material. What also needs to be considered is that the information that is broadcast is increasingly of a hybrid nature. This means that, “media texts have the intertextual traces of an increasingly standardised global media industry where successful formats are adapted ad infinitum, hybridized to cater to the proclivities of one audience after another, but always remaining firmly grounded in the same commercial logic where hybrid texts are instruments finely tuned in pursuit of profit”.32 It is often assumed, however, that the relationship between the viewer and the media is one where the media is in the middle, i.e., it mediates between the realities of, object, and the receiver. The event is flowing to the receiver like water through a tube. The image on the screen (or the text) is not real but the events it describes and portray are.33 Consumption is only of the images and narratives but not the event themselves.34 This means that reception differs from the production of media which is ‘fixed’; because once a media report is created it is a ‘fixed’ piece of physical material with a historical creation process. Reception implies that this ‘fixed’ nature is undone because interpretation and reception is left to the freedom of the receiver and his or her historical context. This process can be gradual and thus is not even limited to a fixed moment in time.35 As a result, it is mediated; the viewer is being offered a glimpse at reality via a mediated form. Reception should be seen as an activity: not as something passive, but as a kind of practice in which individuals take hold of and work over the symbolic materials they receive. In the process of reception, individuals

The consumption of media reports 75 make use of symbolic materials for their own purposes, in ways that may be extremely varied but also relatively hidden, since these practises are not confined to a particular locale.36 But a media report is not reality itself, although the differences could be almost non-existent, but as the individual is experiencing it in a different form, the reality received is always different from the one providing the access and those having the direct experience. That is why seeing a natural wonder on television does not really do it justice. One can watch all the documentaries, collect all the news footage, and cut out and read all the articles on the Taj Mahal but it is still an entirely different experience to when visiting it. Yet the visit itself would also be experienced differently if one knew everything there is to know about what one is experiencing, compared to not knowing anything about it. The consequence for media consumption is that due to its saturation it affects intersubjective relations in an offline context. This means that people are not only affected by media in an abstract, ideological sense; but that based on an individual’s engagement with media, that individual’s desire and ability to meet, engage, and form social relations with people is affected by media in all aspects as highlighted before.

Psycho-biological factors in media consumption and outgroup members A feature of everyday life is recognising other people, and crucial to this process is facial or person memory.37 Facial memory has direct relevance to a wide range of psychological topics from how infants learn to recognise their parents to how accurate eyewitness testimony is. As a result, the topic of facial recognition has been extensively researched.38 One of the more commonly researched aspects within this field is the physical appearance of the facial features of members of other ethnic groups.39 Several theories have been proposed to explain the “other-­race effect”,40 a phenomenon whereby people have greater difficulty recognising faces of people belonging to different ethnic groups than themselves. The face is crucial for understanding other people, their identities, intentions, emotions, and personalities.41 As a result, we read faces to make sense of interpersonal interactions.42 In turn, during social interaction, the attentional focus of people is typically directed toward the face over other objects.43 The way our attention is directed is a consequence of the groups both the subject doing the interpreting and the object of interpretation are part of Nicola Jean Gregory et al.44 argue that: Human face-processing developed phylogenetically, over the course of millennia, to enable perceivers to distinguish between ethnic, tribal, and family-based groups living in close proximity—groups that all belonged to the same race. For example, it may have been adaptive for the ancestors of the Tswana and Kalanga people in modern Botswana, or the

76  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images Celtic Cotini and Germanic Quadi people in what is now Slovakia, to distinguish members of the outgroup from members of the ingroup. A perceptual system capable of detecting subtle inter-tribal differences—a kind of family resemblance—would presumably respond powerfully to the pronounced phenotypic differences between racial groups (e.g., if a member of the Black Tswana suddenly encountered a member of the White Cotini). In modern multi-racial societies, race may therefore exert profound effects on interpersonal perception, giving the incorrect impression that race is a natural way to parse the social environment.45 Fiske and Neuberg, argue in their ‘continuum model’ that the way we focus on the features that make us distinct, affect how we engage with people.46 This is because according to Fiske and Neuberg, individuals categorise impressions into a framework. After categorisation, future impressions elicit emotional and cognitive responses that they associate with categories that make up that framework. However, individuals can overcome these stereotypes and judge impressions using learned behaviour. Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, and Sacco argue in their ‘categorisation-individuation model’ that identity marking features as opposed to category-defining facial features determine biases in facial recognition.47 The root of this model is a different understanding of processing faces during impression processing, in particular, the cognitive processes of categorisation and individuation. Individuation is understood as distinguishing between different objects belonging to a category (e.g., identifying different numbers in a sequence).48 Categorisation, on the other hand, is placing different objects into a set based on shared characteristics (e.g., classifying symbols as letters).49 Recognizing faces is affected by real-world conditions.50 Thus the same face appears to us in different ways because of contextual factors such as indoors or outdoors, hairstyle, and facial expressions. This means that cues for identity are affected by contextual information. In one study, Caucasian and East Asian participants were asked to sort images and group them according to which faces belonged to the same person. Participants created more groups for other-race faces than own-race faces. Their conclusion is that “in the real world they all look different to me”.51 This led Laurence et al. to conclude: When recognizing identities across changes in pose, expression, lighting, age, or hairstyle, perceivers cannot rely on pictorial cues; rather, they must extract structural information that allows identity matching despite changes in appearance. Our findings are consistent with evidence that adults’ ability to extract such structural information from unfamiliar other-race faces is impaired relative to own-race faces.52 As the studies highlighted above show, there exists and own race bias that leads to limiting the ability of people to distinguish faces belonging to the

The consumption of media reports 77 same person as suggested by natural variations in appearance. This is resultant of people being ignorant of how individual faces belonging to other groups differ.53 Therefore our ability to recognize unfamiliar faces relies upon a familiarity with multiple outgroup members because that is how we learn that people can vary. In other words, experience with members of other ethnicities, makes it easier to recognise and distinguish them and not fall into the fallacy that all members of one ethnic group look the same. This is because facial processing requires distinguishing individual faces within a racial group.54 The own race bias creeps in when individuation is unable to transcend categorisation. This is because individuation requires identifying characteristics that are identity dependent, as opposed to characteristics that highlight a category. However, because categorising impressions according to general characteristics (e.g., ethnicity or gender) requires attention to that shared characteristic, it reduces the subsequent ability to distinguish individual faces, lowering recognition ability. Therefore, because of this selective attention to category affirming characteristics, the identity-defining characteristics tend to be processed worse.55 This has led Freeman and Ambady56 and Kawakami, Amodio, and Hugenberg57 to conclude that attention to defining information such as gender and ethnicity interact with a subject’s prejudices and the stereotypes they hold, ultimately influencing the information people use to engage with others. What this suggests is that not only do the discourses that people are exposed to ultimately affect how people interact on a day to day basis (facial recognition) but also how the circular nature of the relationship informs future actions when the psycho-biological aspects of facial recognition affect a person’s willingness and ability to meaningfully engage with people belonging to other ethnic groups. This also means that when people are watching media reports their ability to recognise characters and meaningfully engage with characters belonging to another ethnic group is compromised. As a result of the own race bias, divergent theories rest upon different interpretations of the phenomenon.58 Leading them to conclude that the own-race bias or other-race effect happens for two possible reasons. One is that the other-race effect is driven by superior face-specific processing; i.e., since face processing is in some way distinct from object processing, those faces that we recognize best should show the strongest face-specific (e.g., holistic) processing. In this view, the advantage in recognizing own-race over other-race faces should be due to face-specific processing, with fewer (if any) differences in more generic processing. The other possibility is that all aspects of face processing are superior for own-race faces, so that more generic processing, such as featural processing of face components, might also show the same own-race advantage as holistic processing. In this latter view, the advantage for own-race faces is due to a more general expertise with a particular class of faces, and is not specific to any one type of processing.59

78  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images Infants develop a preference for the mother’s face over a stranger’s face and that this preference is correlated to the exposure time of the infant to the mother’s face.60 Infants typically demonstrate a looking preference for own over other-race faces at around 3 months old.61 This preference appears to be experience-driven as infants living in a diverse environment do not exhibit a preference.62 Adult facial processing shows evidence of a focus primarily on central facial features in static images.63 This narrowing of processing onto specific perceptual cues is tuned to faces familiar to the individual’s environment.64 6- to 10-month-old children increasingly focus on the eyes over the mouths of preferred faces as they get older, with no change in their viewing of outgroup faces.65 This development in viewing preference from babies to toddlers suggests that the cognitive development of this process is early in a person’s development and that the own-race bias is an inherent biological process rather than socially acquired behaviour. However, there may be cultural differences in viewing practices.66 Comparative studies have shown a unique processing pattern for people who grew up in different cultures and/or geographical areas.67 For example, Caucasian participants, when recognising faces, had a pattern distinct from Asian people.68 They show that Caucasian people from western cultures were more focused on the eyes and mouths of Caucasian and Asian targets, while Asian people from eastern cultures were more fixated on the nose and middle of the face. Further research has shown that participants have more extended periods of fixation when looking at ingroup faces.69 People focus on the eyes, nose, and mouth while processing facial markers, attending more to those features when processing outgroup faces than ingroup faces.70 Because the eyes play a crucial role in impression formation,71 attention to them may be independent from any prejudices or inherent biases.72 However, for other facial features, it may depend on whether the facial marker is considered defining of a particular group. Therefore, when processing outgroup faces, some may pay more attention to specific stereotypical characteristics.73 For example, the curly hair of black people or the slanted eyes of some Asian people.74 However, this suggests that people engage with facial material as characteristics belonging to a collective rather than individuals and that the responses are more reliant on previous information stored collectively rather than newly interpreted impressions. The focus on outgroup traits is an effect that will occur only with groups one is somewhat familiar with. This is because when one encounters new groups, the information collected cannot be attributed to specific known groups and so faces need to be processed individually.75 In other words, when we have some exposure to people belonging to other groups, either experientially or via the media, we make split second interpretations of the type of people they are often based on facial expressions but they are inherently laced with the prejudices one has gathered before. When someone encounters someone for the first time, they have to go through a slower and more manual process because all the information needs to be stored and evaluated rather than trigger existing prejudices.

The consumption of media reports 79 Righi, Peissig, and Tarr found that disguises were detrimental to face identification.76 Their study showed that participants were “worse at recognizing faces that had been disguised in some manner, and, moreover, that the impact of this manipulation is dependent on the type of disguises used”.77 In addition, they found that in some cases, the modification of a face interacts with the implicit viewing attention of a participant and any inherent biases to create a new holistic interpretation. This was particularly the case with disguises on unfamiliar faces as they “become part of the encoded face representation”.78 Thus, any individual who has an unusual appearance, or is wearing a disguise, gets encoded into the group as a member of that group, not as a new group by themselves.79 This suggests that meta-features such as ethnicity or gender are still defining of ingroup or outgroup members, and individual features such as eyeglasses, scars, or facial hair are processed after the ingroup versus outgroup distinction has been made. The effect of visual perception and the subsequent categorisation of that information can have profound consequences on the engagement one has with other people. Subsequently mediating our social relations and interactions with the people around us. A broad range of visual cues from the face and body shape the way we initially perceive a person and bias the way in which we categorize them and form impressions. At the same time, a host of top-down effects, driven by our goals, expectancies, attitudes, and contextual cues, shape these bottom-up processes. The wealth of evidence for these bottom-up and top-down person perception processes reveals that ingroup advantages are not merely a product of categorization, but they also shape the categorization process itself. Once we categorize a person as a member of a social group, a broad set of influences—prejudices, stereotypes, and associations with the self—further shape the manner in which we respond to outgroup members.80 In previous studies, it has been suggested that individuals with prejudiced attitudes towards outgroup members,81 or familiarity with same-ethnic group people,82 are drawn to specific areas of the face, notably the mouth. In other words, those with prejudiced attitudes will be drawn to same areas of the face as the group they have a high familiarity with and thus mistakenly identify outgroup faces because of difficulties in distinguishing the faces using individuating characteristics. The attention we give to facial cues is crucial to how we interact with people. It has been argued that what we process in faces or of facial features affects follow-up processes and interpersonal judgements.83 Facial recognition is often influenced by the age, sex, and ethnicity of the stimulus;84 the general uniqueness of the face,85 i.e., the presence or absence of specific markers, such as attractiveness, cosmetics, facial hair, blemishes, scars or birthmarks, jewellery, and framed eyeglasses.86

80  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images There is an advantage for recognition of own-race faces compared to other-race faces.87 However, preferential viewing is seemingly mediated by the movement of the stimuli.88 In such a context, the dynamic faces reduce response time to all targets. Participants view and process moving images differently to static ones. The reasons for this are multi-faceted and could be the result of visual information such as emotional expressions, threat perception, and other reasons that result in the need to distinguish and engage with outgroup members. This may be the consequence of primal biological functions related to visual processing and threat perception. As fight or flight is required for people to survive, it should not be surprising that threatening stimuli attract visual attention.89 Thus whilst it may have an effect on the own-race bias, it may be a consequence of neurological processes related to determining if the movement is a threat or not. Thus, whilst it may be perceived as a subjective threat because of the individual prejudices in the subject, it initially is neutral while the brain processes the initial source of the movement. The underlying cognitive explanation for reduced prejudice amongst familiar faces, whereby observed levels of prejudice90 are the result of familiarisation with certain facial features, and this can only be gained in the physical experience of meeting someone. These findings show that whilst fear may be one thing affecting facial processing, other processes and subject familiarity also impact visual focus. Individual differences can also explain the difference in visual attention, as one’s interest in getting to know others as individuals can guide perception and engagement.91 However, in the perception of outgroup members, visual preference may in part be affecting how outgroup faces are processed because one needs to consider more data in order to individuate faces due to a lack of experience with outgroup faces. This is an important issue because in-group members are often more common in a person’s interactions.92 In doing so, classifying someone as a member of the in-group may affect patterns of face processing.93 This is where the importance of discourse and inter-personal identification can have real impacts. The identification of people who are considered belonging to the same group is defined by a person’s understanding of self and those who belong to their group. Thus, the strength of the biological effect can be mitigated or enhanced based on the way a person sees themselves and others in their immediate environment, something that is fundamentally shaped by the discourses an individual is exposed to. Studies into the own-race bias have shown that misidentifying outgroup members can lead to embarrassment, shame, fear, and even affect convictions and ultimately incarcerations.94 The literature on the relationship between visual attention and threat perception, state that the initial visual response is driven by a state of vigilance. Here an individual’s stereotypes and motivations affect their visual perception. Thus, the different response times measured would be the result of vigilance and stereotypical expectations. This could mean that participants may be vigilant of outgroup members because of negative stereotypes that surround those groups.95 Therefore, participants

The consumption of media reports 81 may perceive certain faces as threatening or scary, and it has been shown that threatening stimuli get attended to or looked at more often.96 This effect would be stronger in people from contexts where people live in less diverse areas.97 Hills and Lewis have argued that specific patterns for processing facial features may be underpinning the own-race bias.98 This is because where some features may be more suited to differentiating between people over time. The recognition of these feature patterns may contribute to the development of an own-race bias. This would then result in people forming their usual routine and then need to find additional or alternative points to help distinguish the faces from one another. Therefore, as eye colour is helpful in distinguishing between Caucasian faces, different features would be required in distinguishing between Black faces. As individuals are usually more exposed to ingroup members than outgroup members, they become conditioned to attend to features that are most helpful in individuating ingroup members. However, as this is less effective to distinguish between outgroup members, they need to incorporate different data points, which results in a longer reaction time in the processing of outgroup faces. It is known that people process outgroup faces differently to ingroup faces, and babies as old as 3 months can do this. However, it’s not necessarily a conscious thing, but since this phenomenon is a biological process (so not taught or learned), it indicates an effect of the shortcuts that a brain takes if it’s not exposed to diversity early enough and often enough. As the brain develops, it seemingly takes shortcuts in its facial processing. This is possibly driven by neurological pruning, and so in a drive for efficiency, the brain is unable to tell the difference in people until you teach it to. But for people who are exposed to diversity as infants, they seem not to have this problem as they have the ability to incorporate facial characteristics that are more individuating more efficiently than those who are not exposed to diversity often. This underpinning combined with individual stereotyping and prejudice reinforces the idea that all outgroup members look alike. However, dynamic facial cues which are unique to each individual99 draw the attention of all participants, and thus people are able to distinguish people based on that individuating characteristic, rather than their usual processing pattern, and thus the own-race bias is reduced. Individual facial data is possible to be remembered, but in order to compensate for their own race bias, it has to be intentional.100 As greater influence of the own-race bias was associated with a lower engagement with outgroup members. This may also underpin other types of actions toward members of other groups, and biases in facial processing may ultimately lead to dehumanization.101 Processing faces in pieces (a processing bias) instead of holistically influences the way in which people perceive people, a style of face processing that focusses on features rather than the face as a whole is related to the dehumanization of people.102 The patterns of piecemeal visual attention have been found to impact upon the extent to which we perceive others as

82  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images equals103 and suggests that the dehumanization of outgroup members, may be related to biased visual processes.104 As a consequence, visual attention is a mechanism for division other than uniting people.105 As suggested earlier, the brain seemingly takes shortcuts in its facial processing. This means that certain facial features are prioritised according to familiarity and misrecognition occurs when people are encountered who cannot be distinguished using those same facial features. The willingness to incorporate facial characteristics that are more individuating would suggest seeing the other as an equal as well as being more familiar with, the requirement. This combined with individual stereotyping and prejudice can explain the link to dehumanisation. As the own-race bias was observed less in the dynamic contexts, it may indicate that the visual underpinnings of dehumanisation are co-produced by attention and visual stimuli. Therefore, it is not solely driven by conscious prejudices but can also be the result of neurological shortcuts taken in the processing of visual information. These shortcuts are interrupted by drawing the attention to moving objects, and that may require different or additional neurological processing in addition to the focus being drawn to points that are more distinct on outgroup members. Yet as people attend differently to ingroup members to outgroup members, facial recognition can hinder the recognition of emotions, prevent mutual engagement, and even increase prejudice and discrimination.106 The increased prejudice towards outgroup members as suggested by Haslam107 and Kawakami et al.108 is likely a multi-faceted consequence of the individual differences in people, pre-existing prejudices, as well as learned neurological shortcuts. Different definitions of outgroups, for example: ethnicity,109 elderly,110 and arbitrary minority groups.111 All these studies have found that participants have an ingroup preference for preferential attention and subsequent recognition. This suggests that as pointed out earlier, definitions of ingroup, and outgroup affect the way people are able to recognise faces. That ability to recognise then affects the prejudices people hold and the way they may act or dehumanise people belonging to outgroups. This means that whilst discourses surrounding outgroups (vigilance and threat perception) affects not only the implicit association through symbolic material as mentioned in the previous chapter, but it also affects the very way individuals approach new encounters on an everyday basis. It would also affect the way that media reports are consumed by its audience. Not only are the audience subject to the discourses that get broadcast, the section above suggests the discourses people are able to engage with through their viewing practices are also affected. People would be able to recognise, identify, and engage, with characters and stories easier when they share in-group characteristics. Thus, this biological process is a fundamental element of the audience creation process, as viewers are subjected to discourses defining them as belonging to a certain group, this then makes it harder to identify with out-groups and further enhances the chances a person remains an audience member, reinforcing the discourse, reinforcing the identification, and so forth.

The consumption of media reports 83

Notes 1. David Morgan, The Lure of Images: A History of Religion and Visual Media in America (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 73. 2. Kim Knott and Jolyon P. Mitchell, “The Changing Faces of Media and Religion,” in Religion and Change in Modern Britain, ed. Linda Woodhead and Rebecca Catto (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 243–64. 3. Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding in Tv Discourse,” in Culture, Media, Language, ed. S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe and P. Willis (London, UK: Hutchinson, 1981), 128–38. 4. James Curran, “The “New Revisionism” in Mass Communications Research,” European Journal of Communication 5, no. 2–3 (1990): 135–64. 5. David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 127. 6. Claus-Dieter Rath, “Live Television and Its Audiences: Challenges of Media Reality,” in Remote Control: Television, Audiences, and Cultural Power, eds. Ellen Seiter, Hans Borchers, Gabriele Kreutzner and Eva-Maria Warth (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 1991), 79–95. 7. Z. Bauman, Society under Siege (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 36. 8. Z. Bauman, Society under Siege (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 49. 9. Z. Bauman, Society under Siege (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 18. 10. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” trans. Harry Zohn, in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1969), 217–51. 11. Ignace de Haes, Ute Husken, and Paul van der Velde, “Media on the Ritual Battlefield,” in Ritual, Media, and Conflict, ed. Ronald L. Grimes, Ute Husken, Udo Simon and Eric Venbrux (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 189–222. 12. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 22. 13. Ignace de Haes, Ute Husken, and Paul van der Velde, “Media on the Ritual Battlefield,” in Ritual, Media, and Conflict, ed. Ronald L. Grimes, Ute Husken, Udo Simon and Eric Venbrux (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 189–222. 14. Zenebe Beyene, The Role of Media in Ethnic Violence During Political Transition in Africa: The Case of Rwanda and Kenya (Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska, 2012). Jolyon Mitchell, “Remembering the Rwandan Genocide: Reconsidering the Role of Local and Global Media,” Global Media Journal 6, no. 11 (2007): 1–22. 15. Ishaya Gajere, Religious/Ethnic Violence in Northern Nigeria: A Product of Both Contemporary Religious Media and the Religious History of Northern Nigeria (Chicago, IL: Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, 2012). 16. Brilliant Mhlanga, The Politics of Ethnic Minority Radio in South Africa (London: University of Westminster, 2010). 17. H. Esra Arcan, “Ethnic Conflicts and the Role of the Media: The Case of Turkish Media,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 4, no. 10 (2013): 338–38. 18. Elena Maydell, “‘It Just Seemed Like Your Normal Domestic Violence’: Ethnic Stereotypes in Print Media Coverage of Child Abuse in New Zealand,” Media, Culture & Society 40, no. 5 (2018): 707–24. 19. Zenebe Beyene, The Role of Media in Ethnic Violence During Political Transition in Africa: The Case of Rwanda and Kenya (Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska, 2012). 20. Stuart J. Foster, “The Struggle for American Identity: Treatment of Ethnic Groups in United States History Textbooks,” History of Education 28, no. 3 (1999): 251–78.

84  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images Phillip Brian Harper, Are We Not Men?: Masculine Anxiety and the Problem of ­African-American Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Pilar Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, “Impoliteness and Identity in the American News Media: The “Culture Wars”,” Journal of Politeness Research 5, no. 2 (2009): 273–303. 21. Tariq Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2005). Christina Julios, Contemporary British Identity: English Language, Migrants and Public Discourse (London: Routledge, 2017). Meg Barker, Helen Bowes-Catton, Alessandra Iantaffi, Angela Cassidy, and Laurence Brewer. “British Bisexuality: A Snapshot of Bisexual Representations and Identities in the United Kingdom,” Journal of Bisexuality 8, no. 1–2 (2008): 141–62. Benjamin Hawkins, “Nation, Separation and Threat: An Analysis of British Media Discourses on the European Union Treaty Reform Process,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50, no. 4 (2012): 561–77. Alexandria J. Innes, “When the Threatened Become the Threat: The Construction of Asylum Seekers in British Media Narratives.” International Relations 24, no. 4 (2010): 456–77. 22. Jolyon P. Mitchell, “Emerging Conversations in the Study of Media, Religion and Culture,” in Mediating Religion: Studies in Media, Religion, and Culture, ed. Jolyon Mitchell and Sophia Marriage (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2003), 337–50. 23. Gordon Lynch, The Sacred in the Modern World: A Cultural Sociological Approach (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 103–4. 24. Tony Wilson, Watching Television: Hermeneutics, Reception, and Popular Culture (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 1993). 25. Tony Wilson, Watching Television: Hermeneutics, Reception, and Popular Culture (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 1993), 64–65. 26. Emma Poulton, “English Media Representation of Football-Related Disorder: ‘Brutal, Short-Hand and Simplifying’?,” Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 8, no. 1 (2005): 27–47. 27. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” trans. Harry Zohn, in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1969), 217–51. 28. J. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 29. Mark Deuze, Media Life (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 2012), 72. 30. Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 31. Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 160. 32. Marwan Kraidy, Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2005), 115. 33. Ronald L. Grimes, “Ritual and the Media,” in Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media: Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture, ed. S.M. Hoover and L.S. Clark (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), 219–34. 34. Ronald L. Grimes, “Ritual and the Media,” in Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media: Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture, ed S.M. Hoover and L.S. Clark (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), 219–34. 35. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 39. 36. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 39.

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86  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images 49. Kurt Hugenberg, Steven G. Young, Michael J. Bernstein, and Donald F. Sacco, “The Categorization-Individuation Model: An Integrative Account of the Other-Race Recognition Deficit,” Psychological Review 117, no. 4 (2010): 1168–87. 50. Sarah Laurence, Xiaomei Zhou, and Catherine J. Mondloch, “The Flip Side of the Other-Race Coin: They All Look Different to Me,” British Journal of Psychology 107, no. 2 (2016): 374–88. 51. Sarah Laurence, Xiaomei Zhou, and Catherine J. Mondloch, “The Flip Side of the Other-Race Coin: They All Look Different to Me,” British Journal of Psychology 107, no. 2 (2016): 374–88. 52. Sarah Laurence, Xiaomei Zhou, and Catherine J. Mondloch, “The Flip Side of the Other-Race Coin: They All Look Different to Me,” British Journal of Psychology 107, no. 2 (2016): 374–88. 53. Sarah Laurence, Xiaomei Zhou, and Catherine J. Mondloch, “The Flip Side of the Other-Race Coin: They All Look Different to Me,” British Journal of Psychology 107, no. 2 (2016): 374–88. 54. Kurt Hugenberg and Donald F. Sacco, “Social Categorization and Stereotyping: How Social Categorization Biases Person Perception and Face Memory,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2, no. 2 (2008): 1052–72. 55. Kurt Hugenberg, Steven G. Young, Michael J. Bernstein, and Donald F Sacco, “The Categorization-Individuation Model: An Integrative Account of the Other-Race Recognition Deficit,” Psychological Review 117, no. 4 (2010): 1168–87. 56. Jonathan B Freeman and Nalini Ambady, “A Dynamic Interactive Theory of Person Construal,” Psychological Review 118, no. 2 (2011): 247–79. 57. Kerry Kawakami, David M. Amodio, and Kurt Hugenberg, “Intergroup Perception and Cognition: An Integrative Framework for Understanding the Causes and Consequences of Social Categorization,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 55 (2017): 1–80. 58. William G. Hayward, Simone K. Favelle, Matt Oxner, Ming Hon Chu, and Sze Man Lam, “The Other-Race Effect in Face Learning: Using Naturalistic Images to Investigate Face Ethnicity Effects in a Learning Paradigm,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70, no. 5 (2017): 890–96. 59. William G. Hayward, Simone K. Favelle, Matt Oxner, Ming Hon Chu, and Sze Man Lam, “The Other-Race Effect in Face Learning: Using Naturalistic Images to Investigate Face Ethnicity Effects in a Learning Paradigm,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70, no. 5 (2017): 890–96. 60. IWR Bushnell, “Mother’s Face Recognition in Newborn Infants: Learning and Memory,” Infant and Child Development: An International Journal of Research and Practice 10, no. 1–2 (2001): 67–74. 61. Yair Bar-Haim, Talee Ziv, Dominique Lamy, and Richard M Hodes, “Nature and Nurture in Own-Race Face Processing,” Psychological Science 17, no. 2 (2006): 159–63. 62. Yair Bar-Haim, Talee Ziv, Dominique Lamy, and Richard M. Hodes, “Nature and Nurture in Own-Race Face Processing,” Psychological Science 17, no. 2 (2006): 159–63. 63. Marshall M. Haith, Terry Bergman, and Michael J. Moore. “Eye Contact and Face Scanning in Early Infancy,” Science 198, no. 4319 (1977): 853–55. 64. Kerry Kawakami, Justin Friesen, and Larissa Vingilis-Jaremko, “Visual Attention to Members of Own and Other Groups: Preferences, Determinants, and Consequences,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 12, no. 4 (2018): e12380. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12380. 65. Wen S. Xiao, Naiqi G. Xiao, Paul C. Quinn, Gizelle Anzures, and Kang Lee, “Development of Face Scanning for Own-and Other-Race Faces in Infancy,” International Journal of Behavioral Development 37, no. 2 (2013): 100–5.

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88  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images 78. Giulia Righi, Jessie J. Peissig, and Michael J. Tarr. “Recognizing Disguised Faces.” Visual Cognition 20, no. 2 (2012): 143–69. 79. Kyle G. Ratner, Ron Dotsch, Daniel H.J. Wigboldus, Ad van Knippenberg, and David M Amodio, “Visualizing Minimal Ingroup and Outgroup Faces: Implications for Impressions, Attitudes, and Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 106, no. 6 (2014): 897–911. 80. Kerry Kawakami, David M. Amodio, and Kurt Hugenberg, “Intergroup Perception and Cognition: An Integrative Framework for Understanding the Causes and Consequences of Social Categorization,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 55 (2017): 1–80. 81. Bruce C. Hansen, Pamela J. Rakhshan, Arnold K. Ho, and Sebastian Pannasch, “Looking at Others through Implicitly or Explicitly Prejudiced Eyes,” Visual Cognition 23, no. 5 (2015): 612–42. 82. Joshua Correll, Sean M. Hudson, Steffanie Guillermo, and Holly A. Earls, “Of Kith and Kin: Perceptual Enrichment, Expectancy, and Reciprocity in Face Perception,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 21, no. 4 (2017): 336–60. 83. Peter J. Hills, Rachel E. Cooper, and J. Michael Pake, “Removing the Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition by Attentional Shift Using Fixation Crosses to Diagnostic Features: An Eye-Tracking Study,” Visual Cognition 21, no. 7 (2013): 876–98. Chaz Firestone and Brian J. Scholl, “Cognition Does Not Affect Perception: Evaluating the Evidence for “Top-Down” Effects,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39 (2016): e229. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X15000965. Kerry Kawakami, Amanda Williams, David Sidhu, Becky L Choma, Rosa Rodriguez-Bailón, Elena Cañadas, Derek Chung, and Kurt Hugenberg, “An Eye for the I: Preferential Attention to the Eyes of Ingroup Members,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 107, no. 1 (2014): 1–20. 84. Kamran Etemad and Rama Chellappa, “Discriminant Analysis for Recognition of Human Face Images,” Journal of the Optical Society of America A 14, no. 8 (1997): 1724–33. James W. Tanaka, Bonnie Heptonstall, and Simen Hagen, “Perceptual Expertise and the Plasticity of Other-Race Face Recognition,” Visual Cognition 21, no. 9–10 (2013): 1183–201. 85. Michelle E. Cohen and W. J. Carr, “Facial Recognition and the Von Restorff Effect,” Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 6, no. 4 (1975): 383–84. 86. Robin S. S. Kramer and Kay L. Ritchie, “Disguising Superman: How Glasses Affect Unfamiliar Face Matching,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 30, no. 6 (2016): 841–45. Helmut Leder, Michael Forster, and Gernot Gerger, “The Glasses Stereotype Revisited,” Swiss Journal of Psychology 70, no. 4 (2011): 211–22. Roger L. Terry, “How Wearing Eyeglasses Affects Facial Recognition,” Current Psychology 12, no. 2 (1993): 151–62. Roger L. Terry, “Effects of Facial Transformations on Accuracy of Recognition,” The Journal of Social Psychology 134, no. 4 (1994): 483–92. 87. Jacquie D. Vorauer, Kelley J. Main, and Gordon B. O’Connell, “How Do Individuals Expect to Be Viewed by Members of Lower Status Groups? Content and Implications of Meta-Stereotypes,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75, no. 4 (1998): 917–37. John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami, and Samuel L. Gaertner, “Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 82, no. 1 (2002): 62–68. 88. Katharina Dobs, Isabelle Bülthoff, and Johannes Schultz, “Use and Usefulness of Dynamic Face Stimuli for Face Perception Studies—A Review of Behavioral Findings and Methodology,” Frontiers in Psychology 9 (2018): 1355–62. https://doi. org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01355.

The consumption of media reports 89 Laurens de Rooij, “Are Dynamic Faces Processed Similarly to Still Faces?” (Masters MA, London Metropolitan University, 2021). Simone Favelle, Alanna Tobin, Daniel Piepers, Darren Burke, and Rachel A. Robbins, “Dynamic Composite Faces Are Processed Holistically,” Vision Research 112 (2015): 26–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2015.05.002. 89. Mike Rinck and Eni S Becker, “Spider Fearful Individuals Attend to Threat, Then Quickly Avoid It: Evidence from Eye Movements,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 115, no. 2 (2006): 231–38. Arne Öhman, Anders Flykt, and Francisco Esteves, “Emotion Drives Attention: Detecting the Snake in the Grass,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 130, no. 3 (2001): 466–78. 90. Joshua Correll, Sean M. Hudson, Steffanie Guillermo, and Holly A. Earls, “Of Kith and Kin: Perceptual Enrichment, Expectancy, and Reciprocity in Face Perception,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 21, no. 4 (2017): 336–60. 91. Kurt Hugenberg, John Paul Wilson, Pirita E See, and Steven G Young, “Towards a Synthetic Model of Own Group Biases in Face Memory,” Visual Cognition 21, no. 9–10 (2013): 1392–417. 92. S. T. Fiske and S. L. Neuberg, “A Continuum of Impression Formation, from Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and Interpretation,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. M. P. Zanna (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1990), 1–67. 93. Jay J. Van Bavel and William A. Cunningham, “A Social Identity Approach to Person Memory: Group Membership, Collective Identification, and Social Role Shape Attention and Memory,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38, no. 12 (2012): 1566–78. 94. J. E. Chance and A. G. Goldstein, “The Other-Race Effect and Eyewitness Identification,” in Psychological Issues in Eyewitness Identification, ed. S. L. Sporer, R. S. Malpass and G. Koehnken (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1996), 153–76. John C. Brigham and Roy S. Malpass, “The Role of Experience and Contact in the Recognition of Faces of Own-and Other-Race Persons,” Journal of Social Issues 41, no. 3 (1985): 139–55. Christian A. Meissner, and John C. Brigham, “Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 7, no. 1 (2001): 3–35. Kurt Hugenberg, Steven G. Young, Michael J. Bernstein, and Donald F. Sacco, “The Categorization-Individuation Model: An Integrative Account of the Other-­ Race Recognition Deficit,” Psychological Review 117, no. 4 (2010): 1168–87. 95. Patricia G. Devine, “Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56, no. 1 (1989): 5–18. 96. Mike Rinck and Eni S. Becker, “Spider Fearful Individuals Attend to Threat, Then Quickly Avoid It: Evidence from Eye Movements,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 115, no. 2 (2006): 231–38. Arne Öhman, Anders Flykt, and Francisco Esteves, “Emotion Drives Attention: Detecting the Snake in the Grass,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 130, no. 3 (2001): 466–78. 97. Marco Cinnirella, “Think ‘Terrorist’, Think ‘Muslim’? Social-Psychological Mechanisms Explaining Anti-Islamic Prejudice,” in Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. M. Helbling (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 193–203. Laurens De Rooij, “Believing and Belonging: The Aesthetics of Media Representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain and Its Relationship to British Civil Religion,” Journal of Religion in Europe 10, no. 1–2 (2017): 172–217. Jan Willem Duyvendak and Menno Hurenkamp. Kiezen Voor De Kudde. Lichte Gemeenschappen En De Nieuwe Meerderheid (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 2004).

90  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images 98. Peter J. Hills and Michael B. Lewis, “Short Article: Reducing the Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition by Shifting Attention,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 59, no. 6 (2006): 996–1002. 99. Chris Davis, Jeesun Kim, Vincent Aubanel, Greg Zelic, and Yatin Mahajan, “The Stability of Mouth Movements for Multiple Talkers over Multiple Sessions,” FAAVSP – The 1st Joint Conference on Facial Analysis, Animation, and AuditoryVisual Speech Processing (2015). https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02068848/ file/av15_099.pdf. Avinash Kumar Singh, Piyush Joshi, and Gora Chand Nandi, “Face Recognition with Liveness Detection Using Eye and Mouth Movement,” International Conference on Signal Propagation and Computer Technology (ICSPCT) (2014): 592–97. 100. Kerry Kawakami, Justin Friesen, and Larissa Vingilis-Jaremko, “Visual Attention to Members of Own and Other Groups: Preferences, Determinants, and Consequences,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 12, no. 4 (2018): e12380. https:// doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12380. 101. Juan M. Madera and Michelle R. Hebl, “Discrimination against Facially Stigmatized Applicants in Interviews: An Eye-Tracking and Face-to-Face Investigation,” Journal of Applied Psychology 97, no. 2 (2012): 317–30. Nick Haslam, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, no. 3 (2006): 252–64. 102. Katrina M. Fincher, Philip E. Tetlock, and Michael W. Morris. “Interfacing with Faces: Perceptual Humanization and Dehumanization,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 26, no. 3 (2017): 288–93. Katrina M. Fincher, and Philip E. Tetlock, “Perceptual Dehumanization of Faces Is Activated by Norm Violations and Facilitates Norm Enforcement,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 145, no. 2 (2016): 131–46. 103. Kurt Hugenberg and Olivier Corneille, “Holistic Processing Is Tuned for in-Group Faces,” Cognitive Science 33, no. 6 (2009): 1173–81. 104. Nour Kteily, Emile Bruneau, Adam Waytz, and Sarah Cotterill, “The Ascent of Man: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for Blatant Dehumanization,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 109, no. 5 (2015): 901–31. 105. Yael Granot, Emily Balcetis, Kristin E. Schneider, and Tom R. Tyler, “Justice Is Not Blind: Visual Attention Exaggerates Effects of Group Identification on Legal Punishment,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 143, no. 6 (2014): 2196–208. 106. Kerry Kawakami, Justin Friesen, and Larissa Vingilis-Jaremko., “Visual Attention to Members of Own and Other Groups: Preferences, Determinants, and Consequences,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 12, no. 4 (2018): e12380. https:// doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12380. 107. Nick Haslam, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, no. 3 (2006): 252–64. 108. Kerry Kawakami, Justin Friesen, and Larissa Vingilis-Jaremko, “Visual Attention to Members of Own and Other Groups: Preferences, Determinants, and Consequences,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 12, no. 4 (2018): e12380. https:// doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12380. 109. Johanna Lovén, Jenny Rehnman, Stefan Wiens, Torun Lindholm, Nathalie Peira, and Agneta Herlitz, “Who Are You Looking At? The Influence of Face Gender on Visual Attention and Memory for Own-and Other-Race Faces,” Memory 20, no. 4 (2012): 321–31. 110. Yi He, Natalie C. Ebner, and Marcia K. Johnson, “What Predicts the Own-Age Bias in Face Recognition Memory?,” Social Cognition 29, no. 1 (2011): 97–109. 111. Jay J. Van Bavel and William A. Cunningham, “A Social Identity Approach to Person Memory: Group Membership, Collective Identification, and Social Role Shape Attention and Memory,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38, no. 12 (2012): 1566–78.

7

Hermeneutics and the negotiation of meaning in media reports

According to the trope of media as text, the only way we can make sense of the world is through the use of language, and language can operate only through texts of mediation. A major approach to thinking about media, therefore, has been through the theorization and study of texts and textual practice. In a discursive approach, this involves more than just deciphering overt content. In its broadest use, a media text is any signifying structure that uses cultural signs and codes to convey or evoke shared meaning.1 Meaning is not determined by media products or messages; rather, it is the consequence of their appropriation by the consumer. This appropriation may lead to the creation of what Hepp calls media cultures which are constituted by media products as resources of meaning.2 Media producers may tend to use well-known formulas and symbols so that the text will be intelligible to a mass audience without great difficulty, interpretations vary a great deal because each member of the audience is a complex composite of cultural identities and can call on very diverse repertoires of interpretative codes.3 Yet in the age of global information technology, events that are reported in one location are potentially available in other locations around the globe. This is a product of what Kraidy calls the hybridity of media texts.4 This greatly increases the diversity of interpretative frameworks for a given product, but it reduces the diversity of the products. The various events reported in different instances in the media, affect not only the receiver and the perception he or she has of the item described in the report, this receiver also has been affected by the existence of that medium in the first place. As a result of the coverage an item has received an opinion is formed, but simultaneously that opinion is formed in conjunction with how an audience interacts with the institution of media. Kraidy also suggests that the product that is broadcast is the result of its ability to be broadcast in a number of different contexts without requiring alteration. Therefore, with the increase of satellite television and 24/7 news DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-9

92  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images networks, what is important is not only their mechanical reproduction (as we saw earlier), but the fact that the same media report can generate meaning in a host of different contexts. This means that Armstrong’s observation, “the media have their own agenda, and by their targeting of issues can “make” a problem”,5 is not only the case in the local context of the broadcast but increasingly in the global context. There is a need for clarifying the relationship between the processing, developing, and transferring of information and knowledge at this point. This relates to the previous by trying to establish the manner by which minorities portrayed in the media are understood. Therefore, it is important to define how the information shared by the media is transferred to the receiving agent. In doing so, the work of Michael Polanyi is elucidating. Karl-Erik Sveiby states that Michael Polanyi’s concept of knowledge rested on the following three principles.6 1 True discovery cannot be accounted for by a set of articulated rules or algorithms. 2 Knowledge is public and also to a very great extent personal (i.e., it is constructed by humans and therefore contains emotions, ‘passion’). 3 The knowledge that underlies the explicit knowledge is more fundamental; all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge. With these three criteria, I will approach the research question. Because ultimately how reports on different minority groups (focal knowledge7) is constituted by (news) media reports (as tacit knowledge8). If we follow the logic of Michael Polanyi’s thought on the issue, the following elements will need to be considered: the media report, the representation it offers, and the experiences involved. In following Michael Polanyi, we can see that a receiving agent in trying to balance those three elements is required to make judgements. The outcome cannot be predicted from the previous use of language, for it may involve a decision to correct, or otherwise to modify, the use of language. On the other hand, we may decide instead to persist in our previous usage and to reinterpret experience in terms of some novel conception suggested by our text, or at least to envisage new problems leading on to a reinterpretation of experience. And in the third place, we may decide to dismiss the text as altogether meaningless.9 Thus, if an individual were to be confronted with a media report (video footage or newspaper article, for example), the agent will make judgements based on the relationship between his subjectivity and the object of his focus. If we see personal subjectivity as structures of meaning or tacit knowledge, they act as a means to deal with and act on new information or experiences. This is often a split-second interpretation of information, which incorporates

Hermeneutics and the negotiation of meaning in media reports 93 a person’s biases and prejudices, into the interpreting process. Couldry adds to this as follows: Media work, and must work, not merely by transmitting discrete textual units for discrete moments of reception, but through a process of environmental transformation which, in turn, transforms the conditions under which any future media can be produced and understood.10 However, Krippendorff notes that “Common linguistic habits render information as an attribute of messages or data, or as the purpose of human communication—as if information were an objective entity that could be carried from one place to another, purchased, or owned. This conception is seriously misleading”.11 Audiences and media producers have done and are continuing to … [add] new materials onto or between the original stories. This is a rapid and ever-changing process. … Narratives do not remain still and are never owned by only one individual, community, or institution. They are iterated and amplified in many different forms for numerous ends. … There are times when amplification can both bring a narrative close to audiences and yet distance them from the original story. Narratives are also creatively elaborated on, becoming sites of devotion, celebration, commemoration, persuasion, and contest. Narratives are transformed as they are adapted or translated into a new media.12 Klaus Bruhn Jensen argues, “Societies come before media as generators of meaning. Meaning flows from existing social institutions and everyday contexts, via media professionals and audiences, to the mass media, not vice versa”.13 “Hermeneutics in this manner forms an interrogation into the deepest conditions for symbolic interaction and culture in general”.14 The human being is a being in language and culture.15 It is through language that the world is opened up for us. We learn to know the world by learning to master a language. Hence, we cannot really understand an object or a subject unless we understand how it is situated in a linguistically mediated, historical culture. Therefore, we need to engage with the discourse. Interpretations of something reflects our ‘prejudices’, and as we engage further, our understandings lead to a ‘fusion of horizons’. Here, our ‘prejudices’ engage with new information in the production of a more encompassing context of meaning. We gain a deeper understanding of the object we seek to understand as well as ourselves. However, in order to obtain this fusion of horizons, it requires us to engage in an open and productive way. But freedom in a liberal democracy entails that one can choose to be closed and potentially unproductive; this may have a variety of reasons or causes and could even be a mode or characteristic of resistance. Yet, a subject may be willing to understand and inform themselves about something, but the material they are using to constitute their understandings (media reports) are deficient.

94  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images

Subject

• Interpretation • Internalisation of information • (Re) Constitution of ...

Text

• (Re) Interpretation • Internalisation of information • (Re) Constitution of ...

Text

• (Re) Interpretation • Internalisation of information • (Re) Constitution of ...

Figure 7.1  The never-ending process of interpretation

Gadamer developed a method involving a hermeneutic circle where the circularity of all understanding is linked to the presence of flawed (pre) knowledge that enables us to interact with a text, for example, in a way that the reading of the text is always more than can be anticipated. In the process of gaining knowledge, it is forever linked with knowing ourselves and both are on-going acts of human nature. This process will continue for a lifetime and be an everlasting requirement of the human condition. With a subject being historically conditioned, he is always living in a permanently evolving context. It is in this situation that the subject creates meaning from the world around him. A word does not have a fixed meaning; it is largely dependent on the context. But by approaching an object for interpretation, we start by looking at a specific object. This is interpreted in light of the pre-knowledge one has. In turn, this definition is placed within the context of all the other elements one has collected. This in turn leads to a personal understanding as the interpretation starts to take shape and form in relation to other items. This process is repeated infinitely, always with additional foreknowledge and new elements to include in the process of interpretation, as Figure 7.1 illustrates. Gadamer16 and Heidegger17 state that the hermeneutical circle has ontological significance, in that it tells us something about the structure of reality as it is. Thus, with the historical nature of humankind and Gadamer’s understanding of the hermeneutical circle, it is crucial that our temporal existence is taken into account. No interpretation is the finished article. Interpretation is a never-ending requirement of life and whilst the interpretation might change, the act of interpreting is something humans will do, and are required to do for all time, in order to construct meaning into their existence. However, as Charles Taylor adds: Ultimately good explanation is one which makes sense of the behaviour; but then to appreciate a good explanation, one has to agree what makes good sense; what makes good sense is a function of one’s readings; and these in turn are based on the kind of sense one understands.18 What seems to be a good explanation of things or what makes sense is often a spoon-fed reproduction of mediacratic values. This raises questions about

Hermeneutics and the negotiation of meaning in media reports 95 the ability and or willingness of people to be critical, and agents of their own norms and values. Subjective meanings are constructed personally, socially, and increasingly mediacratically. This is constituted by what Rosenberg describes as three forms of affective experience: affective traits, moods, and emotions.19 Rosenberg defined affective traits as a stable predisposition towards certain types of emotional responses.20 In turn, these predispositions determine the threshold for particular emotional states. For example, the pre-­ disposition of hostility is thought to lower one’s threshold for experiencing anger.21 Emotions on the other hand, are “acute, intense, and typically brief psychophysiological changes that result from a response to a meaningful situation in one’s environment”.22 Emotions typically motivate a particular course of action.23 In the words of Emmons, emotions are: Discrete states that involve the appraisal of the personal meaning of a circumstance in a person’s environment. Both the type of emotion experienced, and its intensity depend on cognitive interpretation or appraisal of the situation. Such appraisal involves not only assessing the nature of the external situation or event that might cause the emotional response, but also the responses of other people exposed to that same situation or event.24 This is important to consider with regards to the ‘social’ element of media reception and the place where reception is conducted. Rosenberg described moods as fluctuations of subtle emotions. Despite being less likely to be part of one’s conscious awareness, moods are important because they define the parameters of consciousness in a way that emotions cannot because of their relatively short duration.25 This is important for the analysis for three reasons: Firstly, as media reports influence the predisposition towards people and groups, this will result in defining the threshold for certain types of (emotional) responses towards them. Secondly, when emotional responses are elicited by media reports, as their logic entails, then those emotions will typically motivate a particular course of action. Thirdly, the mentioning of moods is important because media is in a position to set the mood through its pervasiveness in contemporary society. As Davies argues, “the way a particular society or group names its feelings offers an important means of understanding how it views the world and directs its members in their approach to their environment”.26 Therefore, the way that media informs individuals or groups in their descriptions of one another, offers an important means of understanding how the world is viewed in a given society, and how media directs its audience members in their approach to society as a whole or for a particular group in their immediate environment. The overuse of shocking images facilitates emotional responses. According to Gabriele Marranci, it does so for two reasons: (1) emotional responses are “translated in feelings of frustration, oppression, and

96  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images anger” and (2) individuals are “exposed to processes of systematic desensitization to suffering and compassion”.27 As “every morning, millions of us wake up waiting for the next suicide bomber, war, extradition, kidnapping, Guantanamo bay, Abu Ghraib torture, shoot-to-kill (the wrong man) policies, unjustified arrests, Islamophobic attitudes and terrorist threats. [The issues that are] inflaming our cities and countries are beyond Islam but part of one of the many ‘circles of panic’ into which people are sucked”.28 This in turn affects people’s responses to media reports. Interpretation is personal, i.e., a valid interpretation for a specific agent in a particular context. A person is built up by internalised knowledge as stated before, and this knowledge influences interpretations. J. Grondin points out in the following quote that for Gadamer we have to try to understand and find meaning in a way that relates to us and is understandable within existing the discourses we are a part of. What I seek to translate (understand, apply) is always something that is at first foreign to me, but that is in some way binding for my interpretation. … I cannot say whatever I want, but I can only unfold my understanding in terms that I can follow and hope to communicate. … Even the sheer otherness of the foreign meaning, I am striving to understand must be rendered in terms that are present and give me a sense of this otherness.29 Interpretations taken from media reports are constituted by their context and also by their subsequent interpretations. The original interpretation, the occasion where the object that is the focus of the agent is unknown, is constituted by the nebulous construct that is the identity of the agent and his context, and it is founded in the agent that is constructing the meaning of the object. As a consequence, the hermeneutical circle that is formed in such a way that every future interpretation of the object is constituted by the previous interpretation. This circle is grounded in the context that surrounds the agent and the object of his or her focus. This is what can be seen as the all-encompassing function of discourse. The individual seeks understanding, tries to make sense and to construct the meaning of the object for herself or himself, and does so only in the manner by which it relates to himself. “Our interpretation of ourselves and our experience is constitutive of what we are, and therefore cannot be considered as merely a view on reality, separable from reality, nor as an epiphenomenon, which can be by-passed in our understanding of reality”.30 Whereas an object may be available to others, it is only ever interpreted in relation to the agent that is doing the interpreting. The presence of others during the process can affect the interpretation, much in the same way as observed behaviour can be elicited purely because the behaviour is observed, rather than a natural occurring process. Charles Taylor describes this process as follows: We have to think of man as a self-interpreting animal. He is necessarily so, for there is no such thing as the structure of meanings for him

Hermeneutics and the negotiation of meaning in media reports 97 independently of his interpretation of them; for one is woven into the other. But then the text of our interpretation is not that of heterogeneous from what is interpreted; for what is interpreted is itself an interpretation; a self-interpretation which is embedded in a stream of action. It is an interpretation of experiential meaning which contributes to the constitution of this meaning. Or to put it in another way; that of which we are trying to find the coherence is itself partly constituted by self-interpretation.31 The originally elusive object is no longer unclear, our understanding of that which is expressed has become clear in the language in which it is rooted, not in the universal, but in the particular paradigm which seems relevant to us. This means that media reports in need of interpretation are understood in the context in which it is received. The agent has constructed a relationship between himself or herself and the media report. This relationship relies upon a context that will allow for this construction, i.e., (media) discourse. The interpretation is governed by the meaning the agent constructs out of the media report in need of interpretation. The meaning is located in the relationship, i.e., between the report and his or her interpreter. This interpretation takes place according to a set of rules constituted by the agent.32 One can see the construction of an interpretation as taking place within a context that is determined by the language used in or by the object in need of interpretation, and the way in which the agent understands it. Thus, the originally unclear has become clear within the context (c.f. language game) that it is situated in Ludwig Wittgenstein.33 “Truth does not consist in the correspondence between propositions and things. Even when we speak of correspondence, we have in mind propositions verified in the context of paradigms, the truth of which consists above all in their being shared by a community”.34 This truth is defined within the parameters set by the dominant discourse(s) and is shared by the majority and enforced upon minorities and subaltern groups. As a result, we can discern a difference in treatment regarding a statement in two different contexts. Not only does the agent affect the interpretation of an object, but the context in which the object in need of interpretation is situated also affects the interpretation. Hermeneutics, as such, is oriented towards the world, and allows for meaning to be deduced and interpreted from it, through the language that constitutes the experiences and offers them significance.35 Contemporary mediacratic societies, demand that political engagement is carried out via mediating technological tools. This is apparent when governance is heavily involved in media and utilises mass communication mechanisms as a strategic element in its political activity. One can see that in the struggle for power, policymaking, and public debate, media is increasingly used by the public in order to be part of that political activity. “But reading and writing texts are never neutral activities: there are interests, powers, passions, pleasures entailed no matter how aesthetic or entertaining the work. Media, political economy, mass institutions—in fine, the tracings of secular power and the influence of the

98  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images state”.36 Furthermore, when individuals react to the perceptions they garner from the media within their social context, they take their understandings and interpretations into the realm of human action and inter-action. What is discussed and considered newsworthy is a product of the values that link the producer and the intended audience. These values are then shared or opposed by people as they are broadcast and shared, but in doing so they shape the way that stories are selected, presented, and broadcast. In turn, as the media plays an active part in shaping the discussion points of people in society, who in turn act upon the views held by them, that have been constructed in relation to the media they have accessed, subsequently being shaped by the parameters of public discourse, actions, and interactions, based on the values underpinning the media report. As previously mentioned, the conceptualisation of someone is built upon the kinds and quality of information a person holds. This suggests that people with little or no direct contact with outgroup members have an understanding that relies largely on education, media reports, and social conventions.37 Or they have to make their own conceptualisations when they first encounter someone. This is, however, increasingly difficult in today’s interconnected and globalised world. However, it can be assumed that without direct contact with outgroup members, assumptions supported by media reports are uncontested and continue to ground uncritical beliefs about them. This then underpins everyday interactions and may increase the dehumanisation of these outgroup members. The education process and social conventions are not a source for alternative perspectives or critical38 beliefs about outgroup members for people with no interpersonal contact with minority groups. Therefore, if the media product that is received by audiences, contains inherent assumptions, then that will be reflected in the report. In practice, this further entrenches the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ narrative surrounding minorities because of the reports that position the dominant discursive values against subaltern group members as objects of the report. S. Fish states, “the thoughts an individual can think and the mental operations he can perform have their source in some or other interpretive community; he is as much a product of that community (acting as an extension of it) as the meanings it enables him to produce”.39 Therefore, with media acting as a means of spreading frames of meaning within and throughout a community, it re-enforces and in turn reflects the meanings a person is able to construct for him-or her-self. The media might be the only access to minority groups for some people, and this access is only made possible by the media outputs being received. Any report under consideration for the interpretation is not only an interpretation made by the receiving agent but also how the concepts shared relate to the receiving agent and his overall environment. This process is extended when a person expresses his understanding to those around him as that understanding is produced within the community he belongs to and coded in such a way that it is understandable within that specific context. This is one method by which specific news items affect a person’s understanding of an object in need

Hermeneutics and the negotiation of meaning in media reports 99 of interpretation as a consequence their conditioning by socio-cultural factors enable him or her to produce meaning as well as code and decode media reports to make sense to him or her. As H.G. Gadamer points out, A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, some initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is true.40 In Charles Taylor’s work, meaning and interpretation are seen as a continuation of language. Grammar (the rules of the language involved, cf. meaning, universals, and formulas) cannot understand for us. One must have an ear for it, developing experience in the relevant discourse, relating to what Gadamer called practical knowledge.41 This skill is the ability to designate meaning onto reality appropriately, choosing the correct interpretation dependent on the context in which the agent is situated. Taylor continues and develops a theory of understanding favouring the particular over the universal. He uses a pragmatic approach that situates meaning in the construction of accurate representations. The designation of meaning takes place by linking the words to the concepts or ideas they represent. Therefore, meaning is intrinsically linked to the identity of the agent and the relation they form to reality, for it is the agent that designates concept a, and links it to meaning a.42 But what if someone, in their own paradigm, does not agree with our interpretation? The agent has attributed meaning a to concept a, but for an alternative agent, it will be meaning a’ that represents concept a. In this instance, we argue the case for our paradigm view, claiming that it satisfies our needs more than an alternative cultural view. But for him to truly understand, he must read the original language as we do; however, this is not realistically possible. And even if it were, Where is the authority? Why should he convert to your view? Why not the opposite? Assuming that there is a pattern of coherence and that this pattern has meaning for the performer or subject, they are evaluated using our own hermeneutic circle. But in order to come to some understanding concerning their behaviour, we must seek to enter their hermeneutic circle or to be temporarily and partially initiated into the paradigm that produced the behaviour. Cognitive dissonance43 can offer an explanation. Cognitive dissonance refers to the discomfort experienced by an individual when confronted by new information that conflicts with his or her existing ideas or values; it can be exacerbated by the mood or predisposition of that individual which might increase the emotional experience of that person. As humans strive for internal consistency, an individual who experiences that dissonance tends to feel uncomfortable in those situations. In turn, he or she is

100  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images motivated to try to reduce this dissonance as well as actively avoid situations and information likely to increase it. This feeling would likely increase if the existing status quo were challenged by different minority groups. Even if their claim for freedom or from discrimination is legitimate, that would still be perceived as an intrusion on the domain of the majority; as a consequence, this could increase feelings of cognitive dissonance amongst those being challenged. One can speak of the act of ‘making sense of things’ here which combines both the rational-cognitive-philosophic-doctrinal way of making sense and the more emotional-affective ‘sensing’ of things. “Meaning is taken ­primarily as a condition under which a person’s life, or significant events in it, ‘make sense’ (i.e., have worth and relate to the subject’s feelings of integrity, wholeness, and self-­mastery)”.44 Making sense of an environment requires both thought and feeling because they do affect each other in deep and profound ways. A constitutional element of humanity is the capability to make meaning.45 The entire organization, both at the level of personal psychology and society, seems to require making some sense of the world in order to survive. This could be both the result of humans adapting to the world or by adjusting it to fit our needs. A baby and infant strive to make sense of their environment, but their social environment enters into that process. This is most visible through the language and relationships that our social environment gives to its new members. A new-born is not a blank slate when entering this world, it comes with built-in systems capable of learning and already geared to the development of language and relationships; this is all in conjunction with the capacity to perceive an active and ever-changing environment. As the section on visual and facial processing demonstrates. Susan Haack explains that there are things we humans hold as true that in actual fact are not truths at all.46 We therefore must reason to determine what is true (making it temporal and particular), removing it’s a priori universal character.47 We can only hold true what is accepted as a consensus at this moment in time. As times change, we hold different values as True. This marks evolution in thought and the changing of self-understanding. It is also possible that in interacting with other agents, frames of meaning are exchanged and partially understood by the agents involved. Charles Taylor suggests that if the interpretation has meaning for the receiving subject, then the subject would alter in some way its behaviour if it became internalised.48 The temporal nature of interpretation coincides with the media logic of episodic news. It requires constant viewing in order to (re)constitute the everyday experiences. This increases the power and responsibility of media reports from a content aspect. Simultaneously it challenges the institutional logic, its role in society, and the social contract on which media functions, because its interpretations are flawed and temporary. Therefore, it demands the foregrounding of the rationale of media reports, as well as a curtailing of its power and authority.

Hermeneutics and the negotiation of meaning in media reports 101

Notes 1. Peter Horsfield, “Media as Culture, Media as Industries, Media as Text, Media as Technologies,” in Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture, edited by David Morgan (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 118. 2. Andreas Hepp, Cultures of Mediatization (Cambridge, UK – Oxford, UK – Boston, MA: Polity Press, 2013), 70. 3. Robert A. White, “Religion and Media in the Construction of Cultures,” in Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture, ed. Stewart M. Hoover and Knut Lundby (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), 49. 4. Marwan Kraidy, Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2005), 4–14. 5. Emma Poulton, “English Media Representation of Football-Related Disorder: ‘Brutal, Short-Hand and Simplifying’?,” Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 8, no. 1 (2005): 27–47. 6. Karl-Erik Sveiby, “Transfer of Knowledge and the Information Processing Professions,” European Management Journal 14, no. 4 (1996): 379–88. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/0263-2373(96)00025-4. 7. Knowledge about the Object or Phenomenon that Is in Focus. Karl-Erik Sveiby, “Transfer of Knowledge and the Information Processing Professions,” European Management Journal 14, no. 4 (1996): 379–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/0263-2373(96)00025-4. 8. Knowledge That Is Used as a Tool to Handle or Improve What Is in Focus. KarlErik Sveiby, “Transfer of Knowledge and the Information Processing Professions,” European Management Journal 14, no. 4 (1996): 379–88. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/0263-2373(96)00025-4. 9. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London, UK  –  New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 95. 10. Nick Couldry, “Mediatization or Mediation? Alternative Understandings of the Emergent Space of Digital Storytelling,” New Media & Society 10, no. 3 (2008): 380. 11. Klaus Krippendorff, “Information,” in International Encyclopedia of Communication, ed. W. Donsbach (Malden, MA – Oxford, UK – Carlton, Australia: Blackwell, 2008), 2213–21. Klaus Bruhn Jensen, Media Convergence: The Three Degrees of Network, Mass, and Interpersonal Communication (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 41. 12. Jolyon P. Mitchell, “Narrative,” in Keywords in Religion, Media and Culture, ed. M. David (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 134–35. 13. Klaus Bruhn Jensen, The Social Semiotics of Mass Communication (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), 61. 14. Bjørn Ramberg and Kristin Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, Summer 2009). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/hermeneutics. 15. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd Edition (London, UK – New York, NY: Continuum, 1975). 16. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd Edition (London, UK – New York, NY: Continuum, 1975). 17. Martin Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity (Bloomington, ID: Indiana University Press, 1999). 18. Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,” The Review of Metaphysics 25, no. 1 (1971): 3–51. 19. E. L. Rosenberg, “Levels of Analysis and the Organization of Affect,” Review of General Psychology 2 (1998): 247–70. 20. E. L. Rosenberg, “Levels of Analysis and the Organization of Affect,” Review of General Psychology 2 (1998): 247–70.

102  Symbolic representations of minorities and how we interact with those images 21. Robert A. Emmons, “Emotion and Religion,” in Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, ed. R.F. Paloutzian and C.L. Park (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2005), 235–52. 22. E. L. Rosenberg, “Levels of Analysis and the Organization of Affect,” Review of General Psychology 2 (1998): 247–70. 23. B. L. Fredrickson, “The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology: The Broaden and Build Theory of Positive Emotions,” American Psychologist 56 (2001): 218–26. 24. Robert A. Emmons, “Emotion and Religion,” in Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, ed. R.F. Paloutzian and C.L. Park (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2005), 235–52. 25. E. L. Rosenberg, “Levels of Analysis and the Organization of Affect,” Review of General Psychology 2 (1998): 247–70. 26. Douglas J. Davies, Emotion, Identity, and Religion: Hope, Reciprocity, and Otherness (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 16. 27. Gabriele Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006), 94. 28. Gabriele Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam. (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006), 159. 29. Jean Grondin, “Gadamer’s Basic Understanding of Understanding,” in The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, ed. Robert J. Dostal (Cambridge, UK – New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 30. Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Human Agency and Language (Cambridge, UK – New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 47. 31. Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,” The review of Metaphysics 25, no. 1 (1971): 3–51. 32. Many of such rules are routinized through social protocols or convention. The agent is positioned as a member of certain communities or traditions. The agent lives in a certain culture and time, belongs to a certain institutional setting. All these aspects govern the agent’s relationship with the object of his focus in need of interpretation. 33. One can see the construction of an interpretation as taking place within a context that is determined by the language used in/by the object in need of interpretation. This is similar to the concept of language games offered up in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Malden, MA – Oxford, UK – Carlton, Australia: Blackwell, 1953), 1–10. 34. Gianni Vattimo, “The Age of Interpretation,” in The Future of Religion, ed. Santiago Zabala (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), 51. 35. Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 15. 36. Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1994), 385. 37. A finding that is similar to what was found in Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 236–39. 38. Critical thinking is skilled and active interpretation and evaluation of observations and communications, information and argumentation. Alec Fisher and Michael Scriven, Critical Thinking. Its Definition and Assessment (Inverness, CA: Edgepress, 1997), 21. 39. Stanley E. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 14. 40. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd Edition (London, UK – New York, NY: Continuum, 1975), 267. 41. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd Edition (London, UK - New York, NY: Continuum, 1975). 42. Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Human Agency and Language (Cambridge, UK – New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 249–50. 43. L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).

Hermeneutics and the negotiation of meaning in media reports 103 44. R. Wuthnow, Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1987), 35. 45. M. Weber, H.H. Gerth, and C.W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Routledge, 2009), 26–27. 46. ‘The rhetoric of truth, moreover, can be used in nefarious ways. Hence an important source of the idea that truth is a merely rhetorical or political concept: the seductive but crashingly invalid argument I call the “Passes-for Fallacy.” What passes for truth, the argument goes, is often no such thing, but only what the powerful have managed to get accepted as such; therefore, the concept of truth is nothing but ideological humbug. Stated plainly, this is not only obviously invalid, but also in obvious danger of self-undermining. If, however, you don’t distinguish truth from scare-quotes “truth,” or truths from scare-quotes “truths,” it can seem irresistible’. Susan Haack, “Truth, Truths, “Truth”, and “Truths” in the Law,” The Journal of Philosophy, Science & Law 3, no. 7 (2003): 1–5. ‘The effect of scare quotes is to turn an expression meaning “X” into an expression meaning “so-called ‘X’.” So, scare-quotes “truth”, as distinct from truth, is what is taken to be truth; and scare-quotes “truths”, as distinct from truths, are claims, propositions, beliefs, etc., which are taken to be truths—many of which are not really truths at all. We humans, after all, are thoroughly fallible creatures: even with the best will in the world, finding out the truth can be hard work; and we are often willing, even eager, to take pains to avoid discovering, or to cover up, unpalatable truths’. Susan Haack, “Truth, Truths, “Truth”, and “Truths” in the Law,” The Journal of Philosophy, Science & Law 3, no. 7 (2003): 1–5. 47. ‘Commitments are capable of strict and literal truth; they describe the world; they answer to or represent (independent) facts of a particular kind; there is a way in which the world is that makes them true or false. These facts are discovered, not created, and they have their own “ontological” and “metaphysical” natures, about which reflection can inform us’. Simon Blackburn, Truth, a Guide for the Perplexed (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2006), 117. 48. Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,” The Review of Metaphysics 25, no. 1 (1971): 3–51.

Part III

Avenues for change

This book has thus far offered up a discussion of the way discourses function in media spheres and how audiences engage with media. Emerging clearly are a number of issues related to current media practices, including the importance of media on daily lived experiences, and the negotiation of meaning by participants in their media practices. Often, the dominant issues in the news are of immediate relevance and requiring a greater diversity of images. News media engages when it makes connections to the peoples’ everyday lives. Yet, the success of certain images must rest on information production(s) that create meaning through immediate, transparent, and unquestionable mechanisms. The emphasis on certain aspects over others in media discourse is akin to introducing a game but only sharing some of the rules before playing. From the audience’s perspective, it is essential to construct a thread between the news and the ‘real’ world, endowing the subject with the relevant information. The unintended consequence of television news in particular is the elimination of anything extraneous or of a time-consuming nature such as placing news in an historical context or offering opportunities for discussion. Yet, it is exactly these components that are necessary for audiences. In such circumstances, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the imposition of such mediacratic practices is simply harming the long-term image of minority groups in different countries. Moreover, in an age where society increasingly places a premium on the cognitive abilities of a person to retrieve, sort, and sift information, it is problematic that media practices continue to place an emphasis on lower order abilities or simply the absorption of information rather than critically assessing the information and its source. The asymmetry of power between media institutions and individual actors and the nature of media means that many topics will be revisited. What is demanded by many are enriched media narratives in a more complex and sophisticated form. What I aim to do in this final part of the book is to highlight three avenues for change that need to be addressed in order for meaningful and sustained change to be able to take place. DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-10

106  Avenues for change Firstly, there is the psychological, in any interpretation of media and production of media, the individual plays a role. Through an analysis of the psychological processes involved and suggested avenues for changes and improvements to the psychology involved, we can make some headway into improving the way minority groups are reported on, engaged with, and treated in the societies. Secondly, the organisational, Gramsci1 and Habermas,2 describe the importance of media institutions in the fabric of the public sphere. Not only as an organisation of control but also as a pillar along which society orientates itself. If one wants to change the way media organisations operate, then it is important to understand how large corporations operate, organise themselves, and process change. This section will offer up an analysis of such commercial institutions to highlight areas that can be open to change whilst simultaneously meeting their commercial logic. Thirdly, discursive change, the thesis of this book is that discourses are ever present, and people are subjected to a multitude of discourses at any given point. In order to change aspects of the dominant discourse, one needs to change the structure of the overarching discourse. The third and final section will offer up some strategies that may support that endeavour.

8

Changing psychological processes

O’Halloran states, “that most dependable research so far available has not supported the thesis of a general association between any form of media use and crime, delinquency or violence”.3 Cumberbatch goes even further in stating, “Research which has examined audiences is rarely able to demonstrate clear effects to the mass media”.4 Therefore, the way that people use the media to inform themselves about an issue is based on a triangulation of three things, rather than a direct adoption of narratives.5 (1) The role that the media source take in an individual’s life; (2) the opinion a person has of the subject based on their pre-existent knowledge; and (3) the experiences and contact a person has with said subject. But all this is framed with a personal narrative of the self, i.e., the discourse a person holds about the type of person they are and want to be. The narratives we tell about ourselves define our identity. People place new information taken from media into their body of knowledge by negotiating these three elements and their discourses. If one is to change the way minorities are perceived in contemporary societies, then not only will the portrayals have to change, the role those portrayals play in a person’s life will have to change, and the knowledge and experience a person has will have to change too. In order to facilitate, this one has to change the perception of self; one reason alternative lifestyles are deemed threatening is because they challenge existing narratives of self. Media reports have become a valuable source of information for people, and their authority is rarely questioned. Through the repeated iteration of a narrative, the narrative is preserved, revivified, and disseminated.6 As Garnham’s offers up the following: One can establish a clear, long-lasting, and commonly held relation between a given media message and the interpretations made. The fact that it is long-lasting, that is, to say a consistent interpretation can be reconstructed by audience members from memory, means that it is derived from a consistent interpretive framework and is not simply the random response to given media stimuli; the fact that it is shared by others means that it is likely to be motivated in the same way by the same message.7 DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-11

108  Avenues for change Additionally, stories or events that play on emotions or are emotionally charged for the viewer are more memorable, and that affects the reception process, giving the stories an increased impact. This impact is intensified through the use of an amplifier, such as television. “When an amplifier works well, the central story is not simply repeated but enlarged, isolated, clarified, or underscored. It is possible to hear or see the story more clearly as a result of effective amplification”.8 In addition to amplification, narratives are subject to elaborations. These elaborations give “greater significance by association”9 and build upon the existing narrative. Narratives are often contested, however, as different actors try to define or strive to take control over the authentic narrative. Narratives are “produced and elaborated where particular conjunctures of processes and relations, specific local contingencies and events in everyday practice, render them meaningful. In other words, collective histories flourish where they have a meaningful, signifying use in the present”.10 It also highlights “their beliefs about media technology, their views and engagement with both media and secular culture”,11 including their understanding of religion, media, and culture. The notion of the reverberation of narratives is “the echoing or forming of stories that refer to the core narrative, serving both to draw meaning from it and to infuse it with thematic relevance. Reverberation is a very important cultural operation because it forms the new on the old but also refreshes the old, changing it however slightly or dramatically in the process”.12 The validity of personal narratives rests upon the reverberation of the personal narrative with the core (public discourse) narrative. The core narrative is most commonly found within media discourse, hence its importance as a resource for the development of personal opinion and in meaning making. Cockroaches, rats, and worms can make behaviour, so behaviour obviously does not require much intelligence or cultural learning.13 In order for human beings to be cultural animals, however, nature had to change the behaviour-producing system so as to make it receptive to meanings. Meaning is the vehicle by which culture influences behaviour. People use meaning to allow their behaviour to benefit from culture.14 Since this process invariably involves different neurological patterns, it is important for people to be aware of how their own internal psychology affects the way they engage with the world and other people in it. Those neurological patterns can be overridden by new patterns. The neural activities of old behaviours do not disappear, but those impulses are drowned out by new and more dominant ones. By focusing on one habit—what is known as a “keystone habit”—you can reprogram not only that habit but the accompanying routines as well.15 Therefore, in order to change the way people, engage with minorities and their representation in the media, new neurological patterns need to be developed. Change will result in people feeling awkward, change means doing something different and, as such, people will almost always react with some degree of discomfort. In fact, if you don’t feel awkward when you’re trying something new, you’re probably not really doing anything differently. The initial

Changing psychological processes 109 focus is often on what people have to give up. A human’s first reaction to a suggested change is to make it about themselves and to feel a sense of loss. This leads to a “Why me?” attitude about change, so for the change to be successful, it is crucial for people to feel connected and understood. People have a limit to how much change they can handle. This is partly due to people having different levels of openness to and readiness for change. Almost everyone will have some level of resistance to change in general, some people will look forward and advocate for change, while others will dread and resist doing anything differently for as long as possible. People generally revert to their old habits if change is not sustained. If the focus on a change is shortlived, people do not sustain the behaviour that is demanded of them. Though this behaviour is natural, efforts must be made to counteract it. This is why efforts on the internal psychology of people must be supported by organisational and discursive change to avoid people reverting to old behaviours, the products of centuries of social conditioning and history. The saturation of the threat of minorities brings out “deep-seated psychological fears of difference and sameness that constitute contemporary racisms and their historical mutations”.16 In other words, the outdated way of thinking about or conceiving the differences between people, underpins the perception of others. The dominant discourses define the acceptability of that way of thinking and legitimates the actions that those discourses underpin. Contact alone is not sufficient to mitigate negative beliefs and assumptions. This is because interaction and engagement can be negative experiences. Not all contact is positive and therefore it depends on the presence of other conditions.17 It also means, as discussed earlier, we need to have a new way of looking and thinking about difference. Not one that generates a state of vigilance and heightened emotion, but rather one where difference is acceptable. Whilst fight or flight is a biological process that is vital in the survival of the human race, we need to acknowledge the areas of society where it hinders more than it helps. As people are exposed to media reports or social situation that are uncomfortable, the fight or flight response is elicited that subsequently triggers negative feelings and behaviour towards outgroup members. People project meaning, this is made possible due to the pre-existing information and values a person holds which are used to make sense of the information while engaging the text. The text is engaged through the person’s particular expectations in regard to the meaning of the text. Therefore, by continuing to engage the text, the consumer gathers what he or she understands as the meaning of the text, and in turn, penetrates into the text and defines its meaning and his or her understanding of the information broadcast. A wholesale challenge would be impossible because there would be no terms in which it could be made; that is, in order to be wholesale, it would have to be made in terms wholly outside the institution [discourse]; but if that were the case, it would be unintelligible because it is only within the institution [discourse] that the facts of literary study—texts, authors,

110  Avenues for change periods, genres—become available. In short, the price intelligibility exacts … is implication in the very structure of assumptions and goals from which one desires to be free.18 It is important to note that, it is impossible to interpret media reports beyond the meaning that they produce for a given individual. To make radical changes to representations and interpretations, the meaning of a report would be made in terms outside the realm of possible interpretations for most individuals, and if that were the case, it would be unintelligible to the individual in question because it is only within their own hermeneutical circle—consisting of texts, experiences, memories, etc.—that the report(s) become intelligible. The meaning a consumer takes from the text is reliant on the very structure of their personal assumptions and goals, the product of the discourses that surround an individual. Whether one desires to be free from these structures or alter them in some way is irrelevant. These structures influence media consumption and are the only way in which a report can make sense to an individual. Language itself plays an important role in the production of meaning. A good example of this is found in the work of Elizabeth F. Loftus who conducted experiments in the mid to late seventies on the reconstruction of car accidents. Her findings led her to conclude that there is direct link between the way a witness is questioned and the response he or she gave.19 In this case, it was geared at certain types of verbs describing the collision and at what speed the respondents thought the collision took place. This suggests that when an event is reported in a news item, a similar transfer of values can take place between the audience and the report. What is important here is that there is a correlation between language and the transfer of meaning. As Hall points out, the media are the sources of both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ definitions and ‘both have a bearing on how the problem will be seen and understood by the public’.20 Therefore, we can state that the language and discourse used, as well as the issues chosen for discussion, influences the interpretation and understanding by the receivers of that media report. The images, narratives, and representations that people find memorable and authoritative, are based on the way a person is able to engage with the information that the media provide. Therefore, someone who finds their personal experiences and ideological outlook reflected in the images, will considered them authoritative, and more likely to act upon them. Someone with a different ideological outlook, who doesn’t find their personal experiences reflected in the media depictions, is more likely to question those depictions and not see them as a source of information. The role of media as an information source differs depending on, the immediate strategic goals, and the role that media plays for that particular person. Therefore, the way those images, narratives, and representations are utilised by the people differs as well depending on those strategic goals and personal ideological outlook.

Changing psychological processes 111 Research that has proposed a mitigating factor is called the tend and befriend theory.21 Tending suggests a nurturing relationship that is designed to protect the self and others to promote safety and reduce the risk of danger. Befriending is involved, because the creation and maintaining of social relationships builds up resilience to the stressor in individuals. The fightor-flight response is reduced if a person is having positive social interactions before being exposed to acute stressors.22 Positive social interactions play a role in helping people manage their stress response, and these people will subsequently engage in prosocial behaviour. In other words, if people are not in a fight or flight situation, but rather in a safe space, then after receiving a stressful trigger people will manage the situation better. However, if they are constantly in a vigilant or even hyper-vigilant state because that is what media demands, either because it is easier to sell a product, or because the logic demands that dominant groups are under threat by minorities, the response people have is less likely to be positive. As stress triggers social behaviour, the underlying feeling of safety in numbers, in response to stress, tend-and-befriend, offers a protective pattern in the immediate social responses following stress in humans. People who experience acute social stress, engaged in substantially more prosocial behaviour (trust, trustworthiness, and sharing), when tend-and-befriend was used as a stress buffering strategy in humans.23 What this suggests is that if the media information people encounter is stressing or triggering, but they are engaging in positive behaviour, or their immediate need for safety and comfort after a stressing episode is met by either being in a safe space, or by being comforted among peers, these stressors are less impactful. Thus, we need to create a safer space in order for people to be able to cope with the stressors of diversity, as well as being able to be receptive to change. In addition, when people communicate being triggered and challenged by diversity, we need to be accommodating and compassionate in order to mitigate the negative feelings, any negative response towards someone being in a state of agitation likely reinforces that negative feeling and risks creating more-and-more negative sentiments. It is also worth noting, that in the immediate aftermath of stressful triggers, if the only groups people are able to feel safe with are those whose existence is predicated on the eradication of the threat, rather than living alongside it, then the risk for joining extremist groups increases. This is because managing one’s own safety is a core biological and psychological process, the future of humanity rests upon our ability to survive, and when we feel under threat, the human brain focusses on survival.24 This has fundamental implications for how people react when presented with members of outgroups, because it symbolises a conflict between our need for self-­ preservation and our complex social relations of very diverse contemporary societies. As a result, if the presence of people of colour makes you uncomfortable, or seeing reports about crimes committed by people of colour makes you feel scared that you might be victim of a crime, it is important to comfort them in that situation rather than drive them away (as anti-thetical as that

112  Avenues for change may seem), because if subsequently the only groups that provide comfort, safety, and make one feel welcome, then the risk of a person joining a neoNazi group increases. As this section has shown, in order to effectively manage change as well as managing the stresses of living in diverse societies, we need to create a situation where awkwardness and discomfort are ok. Humans are not an ideal but rather a process of becoming at any given time and acknowledging that we are “in process” would be a good place to start. By identifying people’s shortcomings and putting them in positions that they can learn and overcome them will be more successful than by challenging and rebuking people for having them in the first place. One is more likely to get buy in if the interpersonal experience and relationship is positive, even if the process is hard, rather than one based on conflict and mutual destruction.

Notes 1. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1971). 2. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 3. James Dermot. Halloran, The Effects of Television (London, UK: Paladin, 1970). 4. Guy Cumberbatch, “Overview of the Effects of the Mass Media,” in A Measure of Uncertainty: The Effects of Mass Media, ed. Guy Cumberbatch and Dennis Howitt (London, UK: J. Libbey, 1989), 1. 5. Laurens de Rooij, Islam in British Media Discourses: Understanding Perceptions of Muslims in the News (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2020). doi:10.7765/9781526135230. 6. Jolyon P. Mitchell, “Repetition of Narratives, Amplification of Narratives, Elaboration of Narratives, Reverberations of Narratives,” in Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture, ed. David Morgan (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 124–25. 7. N. Garnham, Emancipation, the Media, and Modernity : Arguments About the Media and Social Theory: Arguments About the Media and Social Theory (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000). 8. Jolyon P. Mitchell, “Repetition of Narratives, Amplification of Narratives, Elaboration of Narratives, Reverberations of Narratives,” i Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture, ed. David Morgan (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 125–26. 9. Jolyon P. Mitchell, “Repetition of Narratives, Amplification of Narratives, Elaboration of Narratives, Reverberations of Narratives,” in Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture, ed. David Morgan (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 130. 10. Liisa Malkki, “Context and Consciousness: Local Conditions for the Production of Historical and National Thought among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania,” in Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures, ed. Richard G. Fox (Arlington, VA: American Ethnological Society, 1990, 32–62. 11. Heidi Campbell, When Religion Meets New Media (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 40. 12. Jolyon P. Mitchell, “Repetition of Narratives, Amplification of Narratives, Elaboration of Narratives, Reverberations of Narratives,” in Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture, ed. David Morgan (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 133. 13. Roy F. Baumeister, “How People Act and React,” in The Cultural Animal: Human Nature, Meaning, and Social Life (Oxford University Press, 2005).

Changing psychological processes 113 14. Roy F. Baumeister, “How People Act and React,” in The Cultural Animal: Human Nature, Meaning, and Social Life (Oxford University Press, 2005). 15. Charles Duhigg, The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and Business (New York, NY: Random House, 2012). 16. Pnina Werbner, “Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism: Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism in the Twenty-First Century,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 450–67. 17. For example, see: Gordon Willard Allport, The Nature of Prejudice. Reading (MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954), 537. Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Intergroup Contact Theory,” Annual Review of Psychology 49, no. 1 (1998): 65–85. 18. Stanley E. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 354–55. 19. Elizabeth F. Loftus, “Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report,” Cognitive Psychology 7 (1975): 560–72. 20. Stuart Hall, “The Treatment of Football Hooliganism in the Press,” in Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context, ed. Roger Ingham (London, UK: Inter-Action Imprint, 1978), 15–36. 21. Shelley E. Taylor, “Tend and Befriend Theory,” in Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, ed. Paul A. M. Van Lange, E. Tory Higgins and Arie W. Kruglanski (London: SAGE Publications, 2012), 32–49. 22. Bernadette Von Dawans, Urs Fischbacher, Clemens Kirschbaum, Ernst Fehr, and Markus Heinrichs, “The Social Dimension of Stress Reactivity: Acute Stress Increases Prosocial Behavior in Humans,” Psychological Science 23, no. 6 (2012): 651–60. 23. Bernadette Von Dawans, Urs Fischbacher, Clemens Kirschbaum, Ernst Fehr, and Markus Heinrichs, “The Social Dimension of Stress Reactivity: Acute Stress Increases Prosocial Behavior in Humans,” Psychological Science 23, no. 6 (2012): 651–60. 24. Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, and Sheldon Solomon, “The Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management Theory,” in Public Self and Private Self, ed. Roy F. Baumeister (New York, NY: Springer New York, 1986), 189–212. Jeff Greenberg, and Jamie Arndt, “Terror Management Theory,” in Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, ed. Paul A. M. Van Lange, E. Tory Higgins and Arie W. Kruglanski (London: SAGE Publications, 2011), 398–415.

9

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere

In order to effectively challenge the way media reports about minorities are generated and circulated, one needs to support the demand for change in the individual with changes at the organisational level. The most common intersection between the two is in the domain of work. When people who work in media companies change their individual outlook (as would the audience), then in turn that would need to be able to be utilised or adopted on the organisational level. The way people integrate into organisations at work is called organisational socialisation.

Organisational socialisation The emergence of organisational socialisation as a research phenomenon has led to many studies about the subject which has subsequently created theories about this concept. One of the significant works on the matter comes from Talya Bauer, she gives us her four C’s Theory that highlights four important components that are believed to be the core aspects of organisational socialisation.1 The four core aspects are explained below: •

•

•

Compliance refers to the on-the-job basics, such as tax forms, employment paperwork, badges, email accounts, computers, and workstations as needed for a given job. Organisations have effective compliance practices to make these aspects less onerous. Clarification refers to the details and context of one’s job, including an understanding of the job requirements, the norms for accomplishing tasks, and how things are described internally and externally (acronyms, for example). The sooner new employees understand their jobs, the sooner they become more productive. Culture refers to learning the unique organisational culture of a new organisation. Much as individuals have different personalities, patterns, and expectations, so do organisations. The more quickly and accurately new employees can interpret and understand the overall culture and the subcultures within an organisation, the better their chances for longterm success.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-12

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 115 •

Connection refers to the key interpersonal relationships, support mechanisms, and information networks that new employees need to establish upon entering a new organisation.

Following Bauer’s theory, we can see that these four aspects are known to significantly impact the motivation of employees and their commitment to the company. Bauer states that effective socialisation of employees has shortand long-term benefits for both employees and the organisation. This means that it could be practical, an employee doesn’t have any direction and that they are kind of lost in their job, but it could also show that if there is a difference in values a person could be unmotivated by their job and might have apprehension of coming to work. An employee that is led and helped to start their function, to understand the overall organisation and culture, as well as every aspect of their new job might feel more confident in that job. An employee that is sure of where they are going and for who they are doing it through onboarding is more productive than one that has been left aside without onboarding to integrate them into the company. As seen in the previous section, the success of a person in their employment lies in their ability to see themselves as an extension of the company and their ability to align themselves with the role that they are asked to execute. This phenomenon is called the psychological contract.2 These contracts bind the employees and their company. Employers who create relationships with employees based upon high level trust create an organisational culture in which employees exhibit increased extra-role behaviour, are more creative and innovative, and more profitable than employees in comparable organisations.3 Therefore, it is important from an organisational perspective to integrate people into the company culture quickly and effectively (and all organisations try this), because it makes them happier, qualitatively better, and in turn, more productive employees. The strength of an organisational culture that integrates newcomers into that culture, makes this easier or more difficult to do. Certain organisations have very strong cultures, like the military, police, healthcare, or priesthood. The people who take up these professions are not only assimilated into their employers’ ways of doing things but also taught about a way of seeing the world and engaging with it.4 There are very fixed roles and how people are expected to behave is defined in very strong terms and job descriptions. They will also be upheld by a variety of company policies. Effective journalism training relies upon creating an awareness of a person’s position in the world, and a sensitivity of how to report on it. This heightens the importance of journalistic discourse in the field itself, as well as the role of that discourse in the decision to include or exclude prospective journalists. After prospective journalists have passed their training, they will try to cut their teeth at various institutions and use their skills to earn a living. The company will look to onboard new recruits into an existing web of staff and corporate relations. The aspect of socialisation in organisational

116  Avenues for change culture is important because we know that the quicker and more efficiently an employee is socialised, the faster an employee is productive and efficient, and the more satisfaction they get from their work. We must remember though that this can have positive and negative effects on employees, this might also impact the organisation in a way in which staff won’t feel attached to the company so their work might be less efficient and less productive and probably only pecuniary. If we focus on what Bauer says, we know that employees effectively assimilated into an organisation have greater job satisfaction and organisational commitment, higher retention rates, lower time to productivity, and have greater success in achieving customer satisfaction with their work. In contrast, poor affiliation with the company leads to lower employee satisfaction, higher turnover, increased costs, lower productivity, and decreased customer satisfaction. This dynamic aspect of the psychological contract is particularly apparent in newcomers’ psychological contracts since the accelerated learning that occurs early on during organisational socialisation informs and influences the psychological contract leading to its elaboration and adjustment over time.5 Karambelkar and Bhattacharya found that it would improve performance if “HR professionals can plan a customised, systematic, and holistic onboarding program covering technical and non-technical aspects in terms of knowledge, skills, abilities, and behaviour”.6 In creating such a programme, one of the primary aspects of onboarding is the “welcome”. This is most effective when planned and executed in line with a strategic outlook for the integration of each staff member into their new role.7 When this is not done well, it is not effective in conveying any semblance of welcome, or that the new starter is valued, or that the company has thought about how this person is actually going to function as a part of their new team, and people are not encouraged to see themselves as part of the company at large. It also means that the psychological aspects that are deemed important in the previous chapter are at play here as well. Starting a new job, or being at work can be stressful, especially if one is expected to be creative all the time or working in stressful situations (e.g., on the front line of a war) because that is what is seen as newsworthy. In such situations, the context in which people are able to react and allowed to act upon their stress is important. Since we spend most of our time at work,8 how we handle work stress is important. Especially given that in a survey of staff recently hired, that almost 60% reported that it took them 6 months, and a further 20% reporting that it took almost 9 months before they felt they were fully settled and comfortable in their new roles.9 Within that study, up to 20% of staff turnover occurred within the first 45 days of employment. Moreover, 4% of new employees quit after the first day, 50% of new employees leave their job within 4 months.10 Therefore, it is important to be effective for the company to implement its culture among employees to reduce turn-over costs of hiring and create a higher average performance per employee. This will ideally be a win-win situation where both employees and the firm will profit. However, if the

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 117 work situation induces vigilance among the employees, and then they are welcomed and made to feel safe and welcomed the relationship is strengthened. However, when the vigilance and heightened emotion is rebuked then people are turned off and leave. If the stress is induced not by the stories or the work, but by organisational behaviour, workplace racism,11 sexism,12 and other unpalatable situations it is not surprising people leave, because fighting the system is very difficult because inherently it becomes an “us” vs “them” situation and the person raising the complaint is scapegoated as being a bad apple because that is how organisations maintain order and productivity.13 Relational contracts are built more over the emotional side of an individual which often leads to subjectivity due that each side of the parties involved makes their own terms and conditions in their head and they are not discussed in detail. The result of not being clear and precise from the beginning, stating exactly what both parties are meant to do, will eventually lead to a relational contract violation. As Rousseau and McLean Parks state: Violations in relational contracts are due to non-mutuality in communication, multiple behavioural episodes, and several agents conveying promises, as well as the limited number of issues addressable at the time a relationship is established. It is not mutuality that creates a psychological contract but the belief in mutuality.14 That’s why employers must be as clear as possible from the beginning, in order to avoid violations of psychological contracts, which consequently lead employees to leave the company. However, with an overly structured focus on the organisation’s needs and perspectives, the employees’ needs and wants are often overlooked. This is why people leave, but also why the organisational discourse is so hard to change. Corporations and businesses implicitly understand that people need employment, failure to adopt the company outlook, and toe the company line leads to dismissal, HR has all sorts of practices to manage performance. Therefore, in order to change corporate practice, the tone needs to be set from the top, but it also needs to be managed all the way through the organisation. It is all well and good trying to influence the heart and minds of people in the board room, but they are only answerable to shareholders. Any changes to company culture needs to then be managed by HR and various layers of middle management. In companies that have strong hierarchical ties, essentially run like the military, it may be possible to enforce everyone to comply. However, most companies are more democratic and have a differentiation of power, but all employees should align in the pursuit of profit. Therefore, any changes need to be made with the economic and financial implications in mind. Modern media companies do not operate under a mantra for sharing and finding the truth, but rather the pursuit of profit. It is one of the largest complaints from journalists.15 Starting with a new company provides people with the opportunity to engage with colleagues. By allowing staff to share their signature strengths from the very beginning, and sharing them with their new colleagues, and

118  Avenues for change subsequently allowing them to apply them to the job, employees often respond positively.16 This then leads to a greater connection with colleagues, a more positive evaluation of the position, and in turn, better employee retention for the organisation. This is because when people are working to their strengths and feel valued for their unique abilities and perspectives, many employees experience higher rates of job satisfaction. Organisations often benefit as well, not only will there be a reduction in staff turnover, and hopefully an improved performance, by making personal-identity socialisation a key part of the onboarding process it can help organisations remain adaptable to changing labour contexts. By having people integrate into businesses on the basis of a “personal-­ identity socialisation”,17 staff can use their unique perspectives to incorporate into journalistic practices and change the dynamics of broadcast discourse. The literature that suggests that employees as well as companies profit most by supporting the newcomers’ in expressing their authentic identity by pointing out the correlation of the importance of living one’s own authentic values and the resulting increased self-worth which in the end closes the circle by increasing the employee’s motivation and engagement. Thus, the importance of diversity in boardrooms, newsrooms, and other layers of companies, is not in identity markers, but rather in allowing those unique aspects to shine through. Therefore, what is also needed is a company integration process that allows for the personal psychology of minority group members to be part of the overarching fabric of the company discourse. Therefore, rather than requiring assimilation by employees, diversity of thought and skill should lead to greater creativity and the integration of diverse teams will lead to even greater windfalls rather than leaner and more efficient business operations. In turn, what this highlights is that the battlelines are not only for recognising and representation at all levels of corporate society, but rather about the self-understanding or discourse about what it means to be a business today. By building the teams around a person’s identity and not only the company’s one, but people will also feel more valued, can build stronger relationships, and will even be more likely to change the companies’ values for the better by integrating them with their own unique perspectives. Moreover, an adaptation of tasks to their unique capabilities increases their self-esteem which leads to a more positive attitude and resilience during stressful periods—also because it causes less emotional exhaustion than acting in a non-authentic way which enables them to channel their energy for their actual work and personal life. The enhanced satisfaction will therefore lead to a higher commitment while simultaneously reducing burn-out which in the long-run decreases turnover rates. It also makes it easier to identify what roles need to be replaced within a team should an employee leave, making the next person easier to integrate, and enduring the long-term success of the team or unit. Much like Cruyff’s view of total football, whereby when a player who moves out of his position, they are replaced by another from his team, thus retaining the team’s intended organisational structure. In this more fluid system, no person

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 119 is fixed in a predetermined role; rather the output of the team is fulfilled by a more fluid makeup. This makes it easier to cover for absences and for employees leaving. By organising team tasks according to strengths productivity increases, it will be easier to integrate new team members because they will be leading with their natural strengths and skills rather than fixed job descriptions. If implemented in a new more diverse newsroom, the voices of expertise and understanding would be leading rather than those of hierarchy and job title. This requires a certain level of humility, but the trade-off is an improved engagement with staff and subjects of reporting. In an environment where the reduction of costs, staff, and subject experts is desired, it is important to employ people as diverse as possible so that as many tasks as possible can be covered effectively. Unfortunately, due to issues covered above, those being asked to report on very diverse topics do not have the skills to match.

Media businesses vs media corporations Modern media companies are more than just news outlets. Take Tencent as an example of a modern media company. “Enriching the lives of internet users through Technology” is the slogan of China’s largest and premier company, the first to surpass the $500 billion stock valuation mark which boasts of a diversified portfolio. Tencent, consists largely of communication and social platforms Weixin (We Chat) and QQ, its major stake in the gaming industry as the largest mobile gaming franchise. It also has other sources of revenue geared at innovative app inventions to improve the digital lives of its large customer base. It offers high performance advertising platforms to help brands and marketers reach out to hundreds of millions of consumers in China as well as offering financial technology and business services support for business growth to small enterprises and businesses. Wan et al.18 give a detailed overview of WeChat products, however, the business model of the firm is to provide an interconnected ecosystem for all users (customers and businesses) for all aspects of life, everywhere, and all the time. It integrates entertainment, communication, and consumption into one user environment. The value the firm creates for users is that in the simplicity and convenience of usage, the customers are able to communicate with others, buy airline tickets, and pay for their shopping all in one location. This data is then mined and sold to the government or other entities in order to create value for them. For example, if I am an airline company, I would be able to find out what users were interested in traveling to, as well as offering them the option to travel and purchase tickets for that location all in one place. This means I am offering my service to users who would actively want it, capturing the attention of users in a more effective manner. However, in such a large ecosystem where everything is known about people everywhere all the time, being able to identify information to individual users is an issue of privacy. The way people share information and how much information they would be willing to share and what gets done with that information will

120  Avenues for change be of importance to customers and businesses alike. This will also present a greater opportunity and risk, if a situation arises where the firm is the dominant player in the market as the consumers will be limited in their choices and thus need to rely on the ecosystem without the option to opt out for privacy concerns. This is an entirely different concept to the contemporary media approach on the business level of different companies such as The New York Times, The Guardian, Sky News, Discovery Channel, etc. Thus, in the modern context, do we need to understand how individual businesses operate, but what is increasingly happening is that the market is consolidating where different businesses are actually different products in a consolidated portfolio (see figure 3). For example, News Corp, primarily owned by Rupert Murdoch, owns the following prominent media companies and many more as part of its portfolio: Fox Corporation, History, Nickelodeon (35%; joint venture with Paramount Global), Sky News, TalkTV, talkSPORT, Virgin Radio, Times Radio, The Sun, The Times, The Sunday Times, New York Post, The Wall Street Journal, Investor’s, etc. Business Daily, Dow Jones & Company, The Wall Street Journal, HarperCollins.19 Marks and Mirvis argue that post-merger culture management is often a lower priority for managers because the focus is on the operational aspects of integrating the two businesses.20 However, mergers and acquisitions often cause low morale, job satisfaction, and unproductive behaviour rather than increased performance of the employees.21 As a result, the benefit of mergers is usually on shareholders, in particular, the stockholders of the target firm, with the bulk of the gains being acquired by their stockholders during the acquisition as they are being bought out by the acquiring company.22 This is different if there is a joint venture, for example, whereby the value is generated through the value of the venture to the partners in the holding. The main strategic aim of a merger is to generate value through establishing a competitive advantage through the performance of the combined firms.23 These combined firms often consist of a parent company directing the business interests of the company it holds in the form of subsidiaries. As shown in Figure 9.1, the parent company leads the strategic thinking of the subsidiaries, and ideally the purpose and outlook of the subsidiaries will align with Parent company

Subsidiary

Subsidiary

Subsidiary

Subsidiary

Figure 9.1  Overview of media conglomerate’s portfolio makeup

Subsidiary

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 121 the purpose the parent company has for them. This is because by doing that efficiently it will generate the most value for the parent company. This is most often the result of greater economies of scale and other efficiency and cost improvements. We will use the five forces of Michael Porter24 to highlight how these mergers affect media operations. Threat of new entrants The threat of new entrants increases the necessity of a company to compete for market share by adjusting the pricing, costing, and capital investment. Barriers to entering an industry prevent rivals from entering your market.25 Mergers and acquisitions change the landscape of the market. Specifically access to distribution channels and the supply and demand aspects of the industry. Hereby, the merger provides value due to even larger economies of scale. Industries with large firms such as those created through mergers are more difficult to enter, thus the acquisitions of more media companies create value for a company due to an increase in supply and demand economies of scale, and having higher production volumes (a larger share of the audience market), an even larger product portfolio, with a unified global distribution network. However, the value for individual products is lost, as it loses its competitive edge as highlighted in the value chain, and has to now follow the strategy and direction of its parent company, being unable to freely choose its products, suppliers, and thus run the risk of decreasing the known quality of its brand that its customers are used to and loyal to. Bargaining power of suppliers Powerful suppliers capture more value for themselves because they can demand greater prices. These suppliers are able to reduce the profitability of an industry.26 The power of suppliers can be highly dependent on buyer concentration.27 When two companies merge, the power of suppliers can be increased or decreased depending on the relationship between buyers and sellers in a market post-merger. Thus, consolidating media outlets means that a company such as News Corp will be able to negotiate better deals from its paper suppliers or web hosting services (if it doesn’t own them already), but also might affect the role of suppliers if the resource is scarce or hard to scale. Hence a lot of big network requirements being delivered by big companies such as TATA communication because they are one of the few companies who can deliver the product at such scale. This further consolidates the market because only big players can do business with big players. Bargaining power of buyers Larger economies of scale of production also mean an increase in requirements for raw materials. Acquisitions often result in a buyer’s loss of power

122  Avenues for change because it removes their ability to choose suppliers because they need suppliers who can supply large amounts and to their specific network of production centres.28 Quality reductions following acquisitions are also possible because different production policies need to be integrated and that will negatively affect customers, on top of the large conglomerate being able to set the price where they want due to reduced competition. Horizontal mergers also reduce the power of the competition in a market because they reduce the bargaining power of alternative buyers in the industry. This further adds value for the acquisition because their competitors will find it even harder to compete with the new larger conglomerate. The new product after the merger may be required to use supplies or follow guidelines from the parent company, which may result in the use of different or inferior products in the brands, due to greater cost saving measures following the takeover and this can affect how a company generated their success in the past as their brands who were premium, might reduce in quality. As such, their brands may lose their appeal and then people will switch to the competition rather than sticking with their usual brand consumption. Threat of substitutes The threat of substitutes by competitors depends on the cost of switching, the price difference of different products, the quality difference, and the characteristics of the product. The threat of substitutes is reduced because the conglomerate is more resilient to them.29 This is where an independent company threatens a larger player in the market specially when entering new markets because it could offer differentiated products, often at a better price. Following the acquisition, this threat no longer exists, and the new company will be more resilient to new entries in other markets as well as its own entering new markets due to the adopted expertise of the company taken over and integrated within the company. This is the way News Corp operated and expanded its business, expanding into a new market by acquiring a company and growing it through their methodology and ultimately reducing the threat of substitutes because it had the expertise, market share, and infrastructure to overcome the difficulties offered by competitors. Rivalry among competitors Competition can be on pricing, innovation, advertising, and service improvements. High competition reduces the profit margins in an industry. Porter suggests that mergers occur in markets where competition has stagnated. Schumann argues that in the newly established market mergers lead to lower production costs which mean a company can compete more effectively by using the price or quality more effectively as a value mechanism. 30

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 123 Government intervention Government involvement can also be seen in the market, a process of issuing licenses and/or tendering is common,31 and many countries requires visas for journalists or foreign correspondents, and governments have different options available it can choose to regulate their markets.32 It is argued, however, that the need for licensing and subsequent associated regulations improve consumer safety, improve representation and access as authors of stories for minorities, and other related benefits such as service quality. Hence, many countries have a media regulator. However, what often happens is that government regulation in general “reduce the efficiency of the economy, raise costs for consumers, and lead to a misallocation of resources”.33 This is one of the primary arguments for less government intervention in markets, for proponents of a neo-liberal economy.34 The role of a media regulator is often centred on what the power of a regulator is, and how it relates to free speech and censorship.35 But the primary aim of the government is to regulate the digital markets in such a way that it provides consumers with a product at a reasonable cost and with high accessibility.36 But there are also examples of how companies use their methods to undermine the regulator. For example, this is the result of the methodology of how Uber established itself in new countries, “Uber’s whole style was go to market, break the law, cause a big ruckus […] and the law gets changed”.37 However, it doesn’t always work, because in South Korea for example, the very powerful lobbying strength of the taxi association prevented them from getting a license to operate.38 The debate around the presence of smart hailing services is further complicated by South Korea’s desire to raise its image as a tech power in the world. With South Korea priding itself on being a forward thinking technologically leading country, the home of Samsung, ultra-fast broadband speeds, 5G networks everywhere, and everyone on smartphones.39 Therefore, it would be seen as problematic if it didn’t allow for consumers to make use of the latest technological development with regards to transport. South Korea has some of the world’s strictest privacy laws according to the International Association of Privacy Professionals.40 This means that the legal compliance aspects of global media companies will need to meet very stringent checks by local government, and it will have to amend its delivery and dissemination according to locality. So, when it comes to operating as a global media power (like News Corp), the choice is to merge different local brands (US, UK, Australian), into a global portfolio of media products. This allows the local companies to manage their local legal frameworks, but to centralise as much as possible. Hence cutting cost through for example increasing exposure of certain stories in more than 1 geographic location for the same price. As a result, what is often focused on when one looks at the representation of minorities by the media are so-called socio-­political factors. These include aspects such as demographics (age, gender, race, family size); consumer attitudes, opinions, and buying patterns; population

124  Avenues for change growth rate and employment patterns; socio-cultural changes; ethnic and religious trends; and living standards. Important to note is that public sentiment (i.e., discourse) of how the industry should operate leads the way in discussions of reform, and in such a context we must consider that the image of the new technology and the associated product, including its appearance, production origin, or producer, can be a factor affecting resistance. Yet, media companies have to contend with economic factors that often include current and projected economic growth; inflation and interest rates; job growth and unemployment; labour costs; impact of globalisation; disposable income of consumers and businesses; and likely changes in the economic environment.

Strategic considerations for change So, when a media company decides on what new approach to take, and asking it to change the fundamental structures of the way it engages with and reports on minorities, would be one, as it involves more than changing its editorial lines, but affects HR practices, how it perceives customers, produces products, etc. A common technique would be to conduct a SWOT analysis. SWOT stands for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats, and so a SWOT analysis is a technique for assessing these four aspects of your business.41 Therefore, any new venture or strategy adopted by the business will need to meet the evaluation of the business as to whether it is worth it. Another way companies evaluate how they stack up in comparison to their rivals is through a value chain analysis. The idea of the value chain is to take a process view of companies.42 The idea is to see it as a system, made up of subsystems each with inputs, transformation processes, and outputs. How value chain activities are carried out determines costs and affects profits. The value chain consists of the following aspects: • • • • • • •

Inbound logistics is the inbound inventory from suppliers. Operations is managing the process that converts inputs into outputs. Outbound logistics is the process related to the storage and movement of the final product or services to the end user. Marketing and sales is selling products and processes for creating value for customers. Service includes all the activities required to keep the product or service working effectively for the customer. Infrastructure consists of activities such as accounting, legal, finance, control, public relations, quality assurance, and general (strategic) management. Technological development pertains to the equipment, hardware, software, procedures, and technical knowledge brought to bear in the firm’s production mechanisms.

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 125 • •

Human resources management consists of all activities involved in managing staff. Procurement is the acquisition of goods, services, or works from an outside external source.

Companies can generate a competitive advantage over their rivals in any one of the five primary activities in the value chain. For example, by creating a broadcasting service that is highly efficient or by reducing the cost of printing paper newspapers. In turn, it allows companies to analyse where their strengths are and how to either realise more profits or pass the savings to the consumer by way of lower prices. Another way of improving the business is to use the support activities to make the primary activities more effective. Increasing any of the four support activities helps at least one primary activity to work more efficiently. For example, employing specialist marketing staff to improve sales numbers. The strategic process consists of having overall goals and taking steps to achieve these goals.43 The role of the board is to plan effectively into the medium and long term.44 The task of the CEO is to continually evaluate the strategy of the organisation.45 Long-term planning is essential to long term success.46 Effective strategy implementation should increase the efficacy of the operations deployed.47 Driving execution and top down leadership is something staff benefit from Raili Pollanen et al.48 However, at the very least, the organisation has a financial ‘survival’ goal in mind.49 However, since many media outlets are for-profit businesses, they are not defined by its corporate social responsibility or ethics as service, but rather its financial survival.50 As such, the companies are under increased pressure to adopt cost cutting measures and money saving initiatives.51 However, one of the problems with increasing the quality of reporting, and demander better representations is that the beneficiary is not as clear-cut as the consumer of the product. Much like in a hospital setting, individuals who are healed benefit from the services, but so do their families, the community, government, and businesses. As a result, the common ‘user pays cost’ type pricing schemes used in media are virtually incompatible because the recipient of the benefits cannot be directly linked to one individual. If the service is effective, then we all benefit in different ways. Which is the demand from activists but is not in keeping with contemporary pricing systems and economic logics of media. More and more media organisations adopt strategies that make their organisations leaner and more efficient.52 In neo-liberal economies,53 corporations are structured in a specific way because that helps them operate, and more importantly, compete effectively in the public sphere.54 Success (or failure) for media companies is often being measured in viewer numbers or services provided, as opposed to a business’ financial result. Businesses have a particular set of influences that shapes their decision-making process.55 However, that begs the question, what are the decision-making processes involved in organisations that are part of a larger corporate portfolio and have their strategy set

126  Avenues for change by the parent company and do they differ from other companies for example. With people feeling squeezed in every direction, and money needing to be used as efficiently as possible, does the way a media conglomerate is run, and how decisions are made, follow similar patterns to independent companies? I would argue that instead of reporting to independent shareholders and paying out dividend, the ownership structure dictates that companies that are part of a portfolio adopt strategies in order to save money, rather than strategies that create value for their audiences. Whilst all organisations would endeavour to operate at maximum efficiency, whether through the managing of budgets as efficiently as possible or by doing more with less,56 when it is all about the bottom line, then you need to adapt to exploit financial opportunities, however, for some businesses due to their size, the process can be slow and bureaucratic, making their structure inflexible. This is because consistency in business is what companies want, sustained growth, and consistent revenue. However, mature businesses are consistent, and consistent environments produce rigid structures, despite being able to respond to change was a key to ongoing success.57 Therefore, in business contexts, it is important to define who from Senior Management Teams makes the final decision, for efficiency purposes.58 But what is decided at C-level needs to be communicated in an appropriate manner, the way that it is done, sets the tone for the rest of the organisation. Successful businesses have a collaborative culture that allows for decisions to be transmitted effectively throughout the organisation.59 Despite a demand for increasing profits and reducing costs in a business. Modern media companies do not operate in vacuums, they operate in local, national, and increasingly trans-national environments. These are governed by a nation’s economic aspirations and ability to command attention in the global economic environment. Not only affecting media companies but all other industries as well. One such example is Japanese economic policy in the global marketplace. Japanese economic policy has its main focus on longterm growth for all, rather than being the sole dominant power.60 As a result, Japanese corporations’ approach ‘strategy’, not as a means to a competitive master plan, but rather as “adaptive persistence”, Japanese government support is provided, in the form of government subsidies; but it also contains cultural values, and a mindset that underscores their belief that corporate direction evolves from an incremental adjustment to unfolding events.61 The determinants of the business’ direction are generally seen as inputs from below. Therefore, the ability of a company to act upon information and ideas from the bottom layers of its organisation in continuous dialogue with steering from the top is how they perceive ‘strategy’ within the organisation to evolve. Therefore, it is seen as “all the things necessary for the successful functioning of organisation as an adaptive mechanism”.62 By trying to avoid a single “strategy”, or any idea that over-focuses their attention, does so at the expense of peripheral vision. In order to recognise changes in the customer, the technology or the competition, being able to

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 127 maintain an overview is key to the survival of your business in the long term. Single-minded strategies are perceived as a weakness.63 Aspects that have been successful in other industries that would benefit the media industry if not already applied could be as follows: • • • •

Buildings with little-to-no private offices and fewer desks than executives, forcing senior managers to get out and literally share desks with lower-ranking employees. A contention management protocol used in meetings that legitimises straight talk regardless of hierarchy and rank. Maintained distinct stand-alone parts to the company to ensure that the different parts of the company will not be overwhelmed by the sheer size of the corporation and any deadlines imposed by Sales/Marketing. The CEO must come from the journalistic community to ensure that the company’s commitment to journalism and that effective/practical industry knowledge will not be lost from its leadership.

The capacity to respond to changing conditions is critical to success. In today’s globalised industry, markets are dynamically changing, and the global labour market needs to adapt and respond to the changing market conditions. By weaving that into the company’s DNA, it offers the company the best chance to succeed. In order to do so, a company needs to consider the following: • • • • • •

Understand core products and services. Understand long- and short-term market trends. Be flexible and understand how you can meet those trends. Focus on the right competitors. Focus on the purpose of your competitive analysis. Look after existing customers.

By addressing each of these issues, a company can position itself well in the market and leverage its competitive advantage for added value and financial gain. This can subsequently be turned into brand equity. On a basic level, brand equity refers to the value a company by being recognisable for something.64 This can be both positive and negative to the consumer but being famous is worth something. Hence, the brands known for being controversial or outspoken (e.g., Fox News) generates income for its shareholders. Hence, the resistance to changing the brand because it will have repercussions for the shareholders. Plus, due to its sheer size, a company like that will have repercussions in the global economy. Companies can create brand equity for their products in different ways, common strategies are: by making them memorable, easily recognisable, superior in quality, and reliable. Effectively, making the consumer know what they are buying when they consume your product. Hence why the association between certain ideological outlooks and newspapers is so important. A company achieves that in the following ways:

128  Avenues for change • • • • • •

Set the brand’s image and have a model to match the values it promotes. Communicating the brand’s meaning and effectively share what it stands for. Fostering positive customer experiences. Building a strong bond with loyal customers. The company meets a specific need that no-one else is currently satisfying. Consistency and transparency. Consumers know what they will be getting and how it has been produced.

Most big media companies around the world employ specialists to understand the market they operate in, and to communicate that effectively to consumers in a consistent and engaging manner. Products, pricing, brand name, social media activity, every part that comes into contact with customers and potential customers is consistent. This is because most companies understand their core products (newspapers, tv broadcasts, etc.) and the services they provide. Due to the pervasiveness and historical presence of the industry not only do they understand long- and short-term market trends, they control them. Which means that big corporations are not required to adapt to market trends because the market is stagnant. Only when there was the technological change in the advent of social media did they have to be flexible and understand how you to meet those trends. Following the learning curve, we see that most major news networks have an active social media presence and have adapted their product delivery to operate in this new market environment. They have done so by focus on the right competitors the Wall Street Journal does not compete with the Sun in the UK. The competition between the broadsheet press in the UK can even be subdivided along political lines for example the Times vs Telegraph, Guardian vs Independent. By focussing a companies’ competitive analysis, on how it engages its existing customers, it may not look at new ways of working. Changing the representation of minorities is not important to the companies, because it is not important to their audience. Changing the reporting standards risks alienating their customers more than it will provide them new customers. Hence, in order to generate meaningful change, it is not only important to change the producers of the materials but also its consumers simultaneously. This is because the brand’s image has a model and set of values it promotes, and is known for, it will be very difficult to change that, even with involvement of a regulator, because there exists a discourse of the brand, and that is the method for communicating the brand’s meaning and effectively share what it stands for. This can be a negative experience if you are the one being mis-represented or discriminated against, but simultaneously it is also the way that companies foster positive customer experiences and build a strong bond with loyal customers. This again is in the best interest of the company because building a loyal customer base is how one generates stable incomes. Therefore, it is vital to the survival of a media company that they capture

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 129 audiences and create that relationship that captures the market. Hence outlets such as Fox News have become synonymous with a certain part of the market. This is also because the company meets a specific need that no-one else is (currently) satisfying effectively, and ultimately consumers know what they will be getting and where it is coming from. Corporations that have a portfolio of brands might do so because they are trying to pursue a line extension brand growth strategy.65 This would involve creating additional products in response to consumer needs, for example, products it develops could be a print newspaper, then a website, then a phone app, and a television channel. All products would be branded by the same company. By using a brand extension strategy, the company could use its experience in the print media industry, to introduce a new brand.66 For example, News Corp prints the wall street journal, as well as the Dow Jones newswires. A flanker brand strategy could also be adopted for the development of a new brand or a sub-brand, at the lower end of the spectrum that captures new market segments.67 For example, News Corp owning both The Sun and The Times in the UK. Therefore, News Corp can sell new products but without compromising on the values of each of the businesses because they represent different parts of the market in price, content, and quality.

Concluding remarks What this chapter has shown is that different news outlets often operate at different parts of the market in service of larger conglomerates. If one is to make effective changes to the reporting, that change needs to happen not only at the business level, but also increasingly at the conglomerate level because they control the strategy of the subsequent businesses. Due to owning a portfolio of companies, the corporations reduce risk because any changes in one business through bad sales or reputational damage is mitigated by the other companies is the portfolio. This becomes even more valuable if you own multiple companies in the same market because a loss of customers from one business will be picked up by the other (such as News Corp’s Sun and Times in the UK). This again, means there is less pressure on the business to make actual changes, because the risk of losing all its customers is not worth taking. Therefore, what is driving media companies’ decisions is not only a logic based on exclusion, that is part of the market and certain outlets cater to it, but the other corners of the market are contested as well, but due to the stagnant side of the media market, with its battle-lines largely fixed, it means that change is less likely to occur unless you can convince the holding companies to see the added value. What I have aimed to show, is that there is added value from a human resources and creativity perspective that can be harnessed to improve product quality and value. In addition, to provide readers insight into the way, C-level executives make decisions on running the business, which can help to understand why the state of affairs is what it is. However, the final change that will need to

130  Avenues for change happen, is to change the understanding of business from one of domination into one where growth in the industry will lead to improved prospects for all, much like Japanese economic policy since World War II. Whilst in an ideal situation all people would agree with the demand for change, it still requires the mechanisms to be in place to be able to enact that change. This means the necessary support structures, HR policies, and corporate culture being amenable to change, and open to adaptation and input from a variety of levels. Being a more inclusive and flexible organisation is what will drive the business forward, in its absence the businesses will remain stagnant and be susceptible to a takeover or being led to their downfall such as Kodak68 and Blockbuster.69 Hopefully, there is some comfort into knowing that unless companies fail to adapt to these demands that in time, they are more likely to be in trouble, however, that it is a slow process unless the market changes quickly. Therefore, in order to affect meaningful change, one needs to combine the change on the individual level with that at the organisational level. If we improve the quality of viewer, and subsequently demand better quality programming, then the companies will be forced to adapt, not because of the ideological, but rather because of the effect it has on their bottom line. But in order to make that change real, we also need to make changes to the overarching discourses that affect the self-understandings of the individual and the organisational through the ordering of social relations. This will be addressed in the next chapter.

Notes 1. Talya N. Bauer, “Onboarding: The Power of Connection,” Success Factors Onboarding White Paper Series (2013). https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.4980.6163 2. Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Human Equation: Building Profits by Putting People First (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 1998). 3. Michael Beer, High Commitment High Performance: How to Build a Resilient Organization for Sustained Advantage (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 4. Lee S. Shulman, “Signature Pedagogies in the Professions,” Daedalus 134, no. 3 (2005): 52–59. 5. Blake K. Ashforth and Alan M. Saks, “Socialization Tactics: Longitudinal Effects on Newcomer Adjustment,” Academy of Management Journal 39, no. 1 (1996): 149–78. Talya N. Bauer and Stephen G. Green, “Effect of Newcomer Involvement in Work-Related Activities: A Longitudinal Study of Socialization,” Journal of Applied Psychology 79, no. 2 (1994): 211. 6. Mohan Karambelkar and Shubhasheesh Bhattacharya, “Onboarding Is a Change,” Human Resource Management International Digest 25, no. 7 (2017): 5–8. https://doi. org/10.1108/HRMID-04-2017-0073. 7. Howard J. Klein and Beth Polin, “Are Organizations on Board with Best Practices Onboarding,” The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Socialization 54 (2012): 267–87. 8. Jonathan Gershuny, Changing Times: Work and Leisure in Postindustrial Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 9. Ron Carucci, “To Retain New Hires, Spend More Time Onboarding Them,” Harvard Business Review (2018): 1–5. 10. Gregg Lindberg, Have a Plan, Commit and Use a Checklist. 2017. https://thinkwise. cloud/insights/employee-onboarding-experts. Accessed 12/11/2021.

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 131 11. David Weil and Amanda Pyles, “Why Complain-Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the Us Workplace,” Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal 27, no. 1 (2005): 59–92. 12. Benjamin J. Drury and Cheryl R. Kaiser, “Allies against Sexism: The Role of Men in Confronting Sexism,” Journal of Social Issues 70, no. 4 (2014): 637–52. Penny Dick, “The Politics of Experience: A Discursive Psychology Approach to Understanding Different Accounts of Sexism in the Workplace,” Human Relations 66, no. 5 (2013): 645–69. Cailin S. Stamarski and Leanne S. Son Hing, “Gender Inequalities in the Workplace: The Effects of Organizational Structures, Processes, Practices, and Decision Makers’ Sexism,” Frontiers in Psychology 6 (2015): 1400–20. 13. David Weil and Amanda Pyles, “Why Complain-Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the Us Workplace,” Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal 27, no. 1 (2005): 59–92. Catherine Burr and Anne Wyatt, “Investigation of Workplace Bullying and Harassment Complaints,” in Dignity and Inclusion at Work, ed. Premilla D’Cruz, Ernesto Noronha, Carlo Caponecchia, Jordi Escartín, Denise Salin and Michelle Rae Tuckey (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021), 147–80. Annabelle M. Neall, Yiqiong Li, and Michelle R Tuckey, “Organizational Justice and Workplace Bullying: Lessons Learned from Externally Referred Complaints and Investigations,” Societies 11, no. 4 (2021): 143. 14. Denise M. Rousseau and Judi McLean Parks, “The Contracts of Individuals and Organizations,” Research in Organizational Behavior 15 (1993): 1–1. 15. Joshua A. Braun and Jessica L. Eklund, “Fake News, Real Money: Ad Tech Platforms, Profit-Driven Hoaxes, and the Business of Journalism,” Digital Journalism 7, no. 1 (2019): 1–21. 16. Daniel M. Cable, Francesca Gino, and Bradley R. Staats, “Reinventing Employee Onboarding,” MIT Sloan Management Review 54, no. 3 (2013): 23–28. 17. Daniel M. Cable, Francesca Gino, and Bradley R. Staats, “Reinventing Employee Onboarding.” MIT Sloan Management Review 54, no. 3 (2013): 23–28. 18. Wong Sze Wan, Omkar Dastane, Nurhizam Safie Mohd Satar, and Muhamad Yusnorizam Ma’arif, “What Wechat Can Learn from Whatsapp? Customer Value Proposition Development for Mobile Social Networking (MSN) Apps: A Case Study Approach,” Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 97, no. 4 (2019): 1091–117. 19. News Corp. Businesses and Brands. 2022. https://newscorp.com/news-corp businesses-and-brands/. 20. Mitchell Lee Marks and Philip H. Mirvis, “A Framework for the Human Resources Role in Managing Culture in Mergers and Acquisitions,” Human Resource Management 50, no. 6 (2011): 859–77. 21. Moran V. Pablo and Christine Panasian, “The Human Side of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Look at the Evidence.” FACE WPS 1, no. 3 (2005): 1–22. 22. Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics 11, no. 1–4 (1983): 5–50. Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley, and Jeffry M Netter, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence since 1980,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, no. 1 (1988): 49–68. Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell, and Erik Stafford, “New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, no. 2 (2001): 103–20. 23. Moran V. Pablo and Christine Panasian, “The Human Side of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Look at the Evidence,” FACE WPS 1, no. 3 (2005): 1–22. 24. Michael E. Porter, “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy,” Harvard Business Review 86, no. 1 (2008): 23–41. 25. Porter, Michael E, “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy,” Harvard Business Review 86, no. 1 (2008): 23–41.

132  Avenues for change 26. Porter, Michael E, “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy,” Harvard Business Review 86, no. 1 (2008): 23–41. 27. Timothy J. Wilkinso and Vijay R. Kannan, eds. Strategic Management in the 21st Century (Santa Barbara, CA – Denver, CO – Oxford, UK: ABC-CLIO, 2013). 28. Bradley Middleton and Melanie Hudson Smith, The Anheuser-Busch Inbev-Sabmiller Merger: An Analysis of Motives and the Internal and External Impacts of the Merger (University of Plymouth, UK: Plymouth Business School). https://web.archive.org/web/ 20180421112938id_/http://www.jrsbm.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/JRSBM-Vol-2-Middleton.pdf. Accessed 19/11/2021. 29. Richard M. Cyert, Sok-Hyon Kang, and Praveen Kumar, “Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence,” Management Science 48, no. 4 (2002): 453–69. 30. Laurence Schumann, “Patterns of Abnormal Returns and the Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers,” Review of Industrial Organization 8, no. 6 (1993): 679–96. 31. Eli Avraham and Anat First, “Can a Regulator Change Representation of Minority Groups and Fair Reflection of Cultural Diversity in National Media Programs? Lessons from Israel,” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 54, no. 1 (2010): 136–48. 32. Francis Fukuyama and Andrew Grotto, “Comparative Media Regulation in the United States and Europe,” in Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field, Prospects for Reform, ed. Nathaniel Persily and Joshua A. Tucker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 199–219. 33. Judd Cramer and Alan B. Krueger, “Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber,” American Economic Review 106, no. 5 (2016): 177–82. 34. D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 35. Eli Avraham and Anat First, “Can a Regulator Change Representation of Minority Groups and Fair Reflection of Cultural Diversity in National Media Programs? Lessons from Israel,” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 54, no. 1 (2010): 136–48. Paul Smith, “The Politics of UK Television Policy: The Making of Ofcom,” Media, Culture & Society 28, no. 6 (2006): 929–40. Irene Wu, “Who Regulates Phones, Television, and the Internet? What Makes a Communications Regulator Independent and Why It Matters,” Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 4 (2008): 769–83. 36. Sungwon Kim, Hwansoo Lee, and Seung-Woo Son, “Emerging Diffusion Barriers of Shared Mobility Services in Korea,” Sustainability 13, no. 14 (2021): 7707–93. 37. Elaine Ramirez, After Getting Forced out of South Korea, Uber Prepares to Fight Back. Tech In Asia 2015. https://www.techinasia.com/uber-relaunch-south-korea. Accessed 13/12/2021. 38. Sohee Kim, “Uber Revives South Korea Push with Help from Sk Telecom’s Tmap.” (2021). https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-26/uber-revives-pushinto-south-korea-with-help-from-local-partner. Accessed 13/12/2021. Elaine Ramirez, After Getting Forced out of South Korea, Uber Prepares to Fight Back. Tech In Asia 2015. https://www.techinasia.com/uber-relaunch-south-korea. Accessed 13/12/2021. 39. Elaine Ramirez, After Getting Forced out of South Korea, Uber Prepares to Fight Back. Tech In Asia 2015. https://www.techinasia.com/uber-relaunch-south-korea. Accessed 13/12/2021. 40. Paul Sutton, Data Protection in South Korea: Why You Need to Pay Attention. ­Vistra 2018. https://www.vistra.com/insights/data-protection-south-korea-whyyou-need-pay-attention. Accessed 13/12/2021. 41. Craig S. Fleisher and Babette E. Bensoussan, Business and Competitive Analysis: Effective Application of New and Classic Methods (London, UK: Financial Times Press, 2015). 42. Michael E. Porter, “The Value Chain and Competitive Advantage,” Understanding Business Processes 2 (2001): 50–66.

Considerations for organisational change in the media sphere 133 43. Hugo Uyterhoeven, Robert Ackerman, and John Rosenblum. Strategy and Organization, ed. Richard D. Irwin (Homewood: Illinois, 1977). R. F. Vancil and P. Lorange, “Strategic Planning in Diversified Companies,” in Strategische Unternehmungsplanung / Strategische Unternehmungsführung: Stand Und Entwicklungstendenzen, eds. Dietger Hahn and Bernard Taylor (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1997), 788–801. 44. Nicolas A. Valcik, Strategic Planning and Decision-Making for Public and Non-Profit Organizations (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016). 45. Mary Louise Hatten, “Strategic Management in Not-for-Profit Organizations,” Strategic Management Journal 3, no. 2 (1982): 89–104. 46. John M. Bryson, “A Strategic Planning Process for Public and Non-Profit Organizations,” Long Range Planning 21, no. 1 (1988): 73–81. 47. Bernd Helmig, Stefan Ingerfurth, and Alexander Pinz, “Success and Failure of Nonprofit Organizations: Theoretical Foundations, Empirical Evidence, and Future Research.” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 25, no. 6 (2014): 1509–38. 48. Raili Pollanen, Ahmed Abdel-Maksoud, Said Elbanna, and Habib Mahama, “Relationships between Strategic Performance Measures, Strategic DecisionMaking, and Organizational Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canadian Public Organizations,” Public Management Review 19, no. 5 (2017): 725–46. Hongjin Zhu, Pengji Wang, and Chris Bart, “Board Processes, Board Strategic Involvement, and Organizational Performance in for-Profit and Non-Profit Organizations,” Journal of Business Ethics 136, no. 2 (2016): 311–28. 49. Mary Louise Hatten, “Strategic Management in Not-for-Profit Organizations,” Strategic Management Journal 3, no. 2 (1982): 89–104. 50. John M. Stevens, H. Kevin Steensma, David A. Harrison, and Philip L Cochran, “Symbolic or Substantive Document? The Influence of Ethics Codes on Financial Executives’ Decisions,” Strategic Management Journal 26, no. 2 (2005): 181–95. 51. Omar Al-Tabbaa, Desmond Leach, and John March, “Collaboration between Nonprofit and Business Sectors: A Framework to Guide Strategy Development for Nonprofit Organizations,” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 25, no. 3 (2014): 657–78. 52. Izunildo Cabral, Antonio Grilo, and Virgílio Cruz-Machado, “A Decision Making Model for Lean, Agile, Resilient and Green Supply Chain Management,” International Journal of Production Research 50, no. 17 (2012): 4830–45. 53. Dag Einar Thorsen, “The Neoliberal Challenge. What Is Neoliberalism?,” Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 2, no. 2 (2010): 188–214. 54. Joan MacLeod Heminway, “Let’s Not Give up on Traditional for-Profit Corporations for Sustainable Social Enterprise,” University of Tenessee-Knoxville Law Review 86, no. 4 (2018): 779–803. 55. Fabio Musso and Barbara Francioni, “The Decision-Making Process in International Business Strategies: Factors of Influence on Small and Medium Enterprises,” International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE) 2, no. 2 (2013): 1–22. 56. Jeanne Bell, Jan Masaoka, and Steve Zimmerman, Nonprofit Sustainability: Making Strategic Decisions for Financial Viability (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2010). 57. Mary Lee Rhodes and Justin F Keogan, “Strategic Choice in the Non-Profit Sector: Modelling the Dimensions of Strategy,” Irish Journal of Management 26, no. 1 (2005): 122–35. Paul F. Salipante and Karen Golden-Biddle, “Managing Traditionality and Strategic Change in Nonprofit Organizations,” Nonprofit Management and Leadership 6, no. 1 (1995): 3–20. 58. Zhaohui Wu and Mark Pagell, “Balancing Priorities: Decision-Making in Sustainable Supply Chain Management,” Journal of Operations Management 29, no. 6 (2011): 577–90.

134  Avenues for change 59. Theresa Eriksson, Jeandri Robertson, and Anna Näppä, “Functional Top Management Teams and Marketing Organization: Exploring Strategic Decision-Making,” Journal of Strategic Marketing (2020): 1–18. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/ 0965254X.2020.1765410. 60. Kenichi Ohno, The Role of Government in Promoting Industrialization under Globalization: The East Asian Experience (Tokyo, Japan: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), 2003). 61. Henry Mintzberg, Richard T Pascale, Michael Goold, and Richard P Rumelt, “CMR Forum: The “Honda Effect” Revisited,” California Management Review 38, no. 4 (1996): 77–117. 62. Henry Mintzberg, Richard T. Pascale, Michael Goold, and Richard P Rumelt. “CMR Forum: The “Honda Effect” Revisited,” California Management Review 38, no. 4 (1996): 77–117. 63. Henry Mintzberg, Richard T. Pascale, Michael Goold, and Richard P. Rumelt. “CMR Forum: The “Honda Effect” Revisited,” California Management Review 38, no. 4 (1996): 77–117. 64. Lisa Wood, “Brands and Brand Equity: Definition and Management,” Management Decision 38, no. 9 (2000): 662–69. 65. Jean Boisvert and Nicholas J. Ashill, “The Impact of Branding Strategies on Horizontal and Downward Line Extension of Luxury Brands: A Cross-National Study,” International Marketing Review 35, no. 6 (2018): 1033–52. 66. Eva Martinez and Leslie De Chernatony, “The Effect of Brand Extension Strategies Upon Brand Image,” Journal of Consumer Marketing 21, no. 1 (2004): 39–50. 67. Youngseon Kim and Tina M. Lowrey, “Brand Extensions and Flanker Brands,” in Wiley International Encyclopedia of Marketing, ed. J. Sheth and N. Malhotra (New York, NY: Wiley, 2010), 44–47. 68. Deborah Prenatt, James Ondracek, M Saeed, and Andy Bertsch, “How Underdeveloped Decision Making and Poor Leadership Choices Led Kodak into Bankruptcy,” Inspira: Journal of Modern Management & Entrepreneurship 5, no. 1 (2015): 1–12. Richard A. Gershon, “A Case Study Analysis of Eastman Kodak and Blockbuster Inc,” in Media Management and Economics Research in a Transmedia Environment, ed. Alan B. Albarran (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 46–68. Henry C. Lucas Jr and Jie Mein Goh, “Disruptive Technology: How Kodak Missed the Digital Photography Revolution,” The Journal of Strategic Information Systems 18, no. 1 (2009): 46–55. 69. James D. Dana. “Blockbuster Video,” in Kellogg School of Management Cases (Evanston, IL: Kellogg School of Management, 2017), 1–19. Todd Davis and John Higgins, “Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case Studies,” in A Blockbuster Failure: How an Outdated Business Model Destroyed a Giant, Vol. 11 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee, 2013). https://ir.law.utk.edu/utk_studlawbankruptcy/11. Richard A. Gershon, “A Case Study Analysis of Eastman Kodak and Blockbuster Inc,” in Media Management and Economics Research in a Transmedia Environment, ed. Alan B. Albarran (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 46–68.

10 Discursive change

The persistence of narratives describing minorities as a threat or as deviants from acceptable norms and values legitimises the systematic use of surveillance and security procedures, as well as further ostracising from society. In doing so, the media contributes to “training their bodies, coding their continuous behaviour, maintaining them in perfect visibility, forming around them an apparatus of observation, registration and recording, constituting on them a body of knowledge that is accumulated and centralised”.1 Following this course would render minorities perceived as deviant, subject to investigation, suspicion, and potential punishment until such time as they are considered reformed to fit the image of the society. Some individuals consider this not only acceptable, but a necessary course of action and they feel the media does its best to inform the public and demonstrate its necessity.2 This supports Foucault’s argument that ­certain forms of delinquency are specified and then produced in order to satisfy political and economic aims.3 McQuail noted that, “the groups receiving this form of polarising treatment tend to be small, rather powerless and already subject to social disapproval. They are relatively ‘safe’ targets, but the process of hitting them tends to reaffirm the boundaries around what is acceptable in a free society”.4 Minority groups, often presented as ‘they’ only appear as a problem or an object of concern, and are therefore constructed as such for the audience. Even when they are not portrayed negatively, it is still a construction within this context that renders any alternative narrative an exception and therefore also not a reflection of the so-called ‘mainstream’. The pervasive nature of media today renders it capable of excluding or stereotyping any group or community it might label as ‘other’. In turn, media representations suggest that people are representatives of a perfect identity, speaking exclusively as public relations agents of their communities, and that they are the living expressions of their ideals (and that was why it’s problematic). This has greatly narrowed the spectrum of what it means to be a citizen in a nation, not to mention reducing the ‘problem’ to a minority issue. Problems are portrayed as the problem because of the minority, rather than because of societal issues, such as inadequate housing, education, or healthcare. Minorities become a scapegoat to draw attention away from the circumstances in which humans have the tendency to become DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-13

136  Avenues for change violent because of their powerlessness. If it was not a ‘minority’ problem, then it suggests that all people are susceptible to violent outbursts and ‘irrational’ behaviour given the right circumstances. This is incommensurable with the notion of the civilised person that is ever-present in the dominant narratives. It also avoids needing to address the situations or individuals responsible for creating those circumstances. What the discourses have done is to reduce every act a minority undertakes to an expression of the part of them that makes them a minority, i.e., sexuality, ethnicity, religion, etc. This excludes them from undertaking actions or making decisions based on other things. In addition to this, the news prescribes normative practices, and informs its viewers of standard practices. This ignores the fact that many people at home and abroad have a diversity of practices and therefore do not undertake such practices in the way as is stereotypically portrayed. For example, “He performed wudhu, the ritual cleansing before the last prayers of the night, washing the right, and then the left hand three times. Then he rolled out his rug and bent himself towards Mecca”.5 Whilst this is prescribed by the Quran, not all Muslims perform this ritual regularly, nor with the same manner. Debates about citizenship, identity, and a sense of belonging can be analysed using what Ricoeur calls collective memory. “Collective memory simply consists of the set of traces left by events that have shaped the course of history of those social groups that, in later times, have the capacity to stage these shared ­recollections through holidays, rituals, and public celebrations”.6 What is interesting is that the current dominant social group, not only defines their identity based on their collective memories, but demands that minority groups share their values based on collective memories that they do not share. This is important, because as Jelin points out: “Identities and memories are not things we think about, but things we think with. As such they have no existence beyond our politics, our social relations, and our histories”.7 Therefore if media shapes identity, experiences, and then in turn memories, then it is not surprising that those resources are used to constitute interactions with minorities, both in real and digital engagements. Whilst representative bodies who denounce violent groups and acts by minority or separatist movements are doing important work, it is naïve to assume that positive images of minorities alone are the remedy for any negative associations, and that the solution to all the problems lies in celebrating the diversity of human beings. As Nietzsche said, “There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’, and the more affects we allow to speak of this thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’, be”.8 Stories that reflect the complexities of life really are a good place to start since lives are not stable, one-dimensional or perfectly harmonious. Like everyone else’s, minority identities are dynamic and complex. Presenting the lives of minorities as anything other than that is misleading. In a situation described by Cornel West in his discussion of people of colour in the United States, the idea is that minorities are uniting against a hostile power, in order

Discursive change 137 to reinforce their own power. This power is then exercised over weaker members with minority communities (i.e., to protect, regulate, subordinate, and in some cases, use, and abuse women) in order to preserve their own existence under circumstances that threaten physical violence or discursively attack their heritage, icons, symbols, and institutions.9 What is also evident from the orientalist discourse, is that orientalism is the product of a particular state-citizen construction. This has a strong identification with nationalist politics to the detriment of alternative political identities.10 This is mostly aimed at people perceived with transnational ties but has historically also been used against people of Celtic (Welsh and Scottish) heritage, for example. In addition, there is a sentiment within orientalist discourse that citizens are not only subjects of the state but rather servants of the state.11 This perspective is driven by an ignorant media audience seeking to be informed. Unfortunately, the media’s priority is not to educate people, but rather to make money and increase viewership. The tendency of the media to ignore diversity is also partially formed by the desire of people to conceal their imperfections and to appear unified and harmonious in the public eye. But by ignoring or regulating lived diversities, the values, joy, and elements of connection with reality are reduced and removed of all nuanced and real content by the mediacratic practices of society. Diversity when mentioned is not celebrated; it may be used as the stick to beat minorities with, because of their perceived criticism of pluralism and diversity, which is often borne out following their lack of (perceived) power. The core narrative can be considered a core element of what Laclau calls discourse12 or what Glynos and Howarth call social logic.13 As a consequence, the core narrative, spread through mass media, triangulates the system of objects in society, i.e., acts as a grammar or cluster of rules, which allows for some combinations of objects to take shape and simultaneously excludes others. It acquires its meaning in conjuncture with and in relation to other narratives. Within this context, their meaning and spread is limited by the ‘other’ contradicting narratives.14 The representation of minorities in the press therefore is not limited because of the absence of alternative or contradicting ­narratives, rather, it is symptomatic of the struggle for hegemony. But what do we do with contradicting or even mutually exclusive narratives?15 Zizek suggests that the essence should be transposed into an unattainable beyond that we are unable to fully grasp.16 By doing so, when we “resume the fundamental principle of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, there is more truth in the later efficacy of a text, in the series of its subsequent readings, than in its supposedly ‘original’ meaning”.17 C. Flood et al. found that whilst the BBC was trying to avoid making automatic assumptions of Muslim involvement in terrorist incidents by using more generalised terminology, members of the public still saw these incidences as examples of violent Muslim extremism.18 This is further supports the conclusion that overall discourse influences reception. That the truth and content of a media report is only able to be understood by the context in which it is read and received.

138  Avenues for change This can be understood, in Foucauldian terms, when the media are perceived as authors of discursivity. Their texts are constitutive for all subsequent participants in the discourse. Foucault explains that founders of discursivity, “are unique in that they are not just the founders of their own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules of the formation of other texts. In this sense, they are very different, for example, from a novelist, who is, in fact, nothing more than the author of his own text”.19 Authors of discursivity establish “an endless possibility of discourse”.20 This endless possibility of discourse defines the production of policy and methods of engagement with minorities. But how should people respond to media reports about minorities? Especially when media reports are the product of such negative logic. A demand for change and recognition is often a source of conflict and in some cases leads to violence. John Richardson argued that many reports possess a fantasy about the rights and abilities of dominant groups in society to regulate the boundaries of society—to include or exclude.21 Elizabeth Poole has argued that the response to the resulting crisis of national identity is a construction of national culture that provides stability and certainty. Yet this is constructed in such a way as to exclude minorities.22 The “atavistic nature of the differential social imaginaries and deep-seated psychological fears of difference and sameness that constitute contemporary racisms and their historical mutations”.23 In other words, the outdated way of thinking about, or conceiving the differences between people, underpins the perception of others. The increasing dominance of discourse defines the acceptability of that way of thinking, and legitimates the actions that those discourses underpin. The systemic discourse(s) broadcast by media engages with the societal consequences of globalisation, loss of empire, changing social values, to name a few. In doing so, it combines two processes. (1) Offering an explanation of the current situation, and (2) highlighting a cause. Thus, these processes are affected by systematic constraints on media. The views and outlooks subsequently held by people are a product and reflection of a systemic discourse, the only way to change the current state of affairs, the system of discourse will have to change, and this will require more than simply a change in media portrayals. This will require an amendment of the content of media as an information source, the structure of media organisations, informing the public beyond media discourse, and creating an environment for engagement with minorities that is on a more equal footing and without a state of vigilance. Fish describes the process of persuading people to hold other opinions as follows: “We try to persuade others to our beliefs because if they believe what we believe, they will, as a consequence of those beliefs, see what we see; and the facts to which we point in order to support our interpretations will be as obvious to them as they are to us”.24 However, much evidence suggests that erroneous beliefs are not easily overturned, and when they are tinged with emotion, this becomes even more difficult. Yet, explaining the context and helping people understand are the first steps in turning erroneous beliefs around. If you want someone to

Discursive change 139 accept information that contradicts what he or she already knows, you have to find a story they can accept and buy into. That requires bridging the narrative they have already constructed to a new one that is both true and allows them to remain the kind of person they believe themselves to be, negotiating, and recreating the information from the perspective of their personal and cultural identities.25 This reinforces the sense of independence and power in creating meaning for themselves from a text.26

Notes 1. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1977), 231. 2. Laurens de Rooij, Islam in British Media Discourses: Understanding Perceptions of Muslims in the News (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2020). doi:10.7765/9781526135230. 3. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1977), 277. 4. Denis McQuail, “The Influence and Effects of Mass Media,” in Mass Communication and Society, ed. James Curran, Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woolacott (London, UK – Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), 70–93. 5. Michael Burleigh, “Inside the Twisted Mind of a Jihadist,” The Daily Mail (London, UK), 24 May 2013. 6. Paul Ricoeur, La lectura del tiempo pasado: memoria y olvido (Madrid, Spain: Arrecife Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, 1999), 19. 7. Elizabeth Jelin, Judy Rein, and Marcial Godoy-Anativia, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 8. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York, NY: Random House, 1967), 119. 9. Cornel West, Race Matters (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1993), 37. 10. Bryan S. Turner and Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir, The Sociology of Islam: Collected Essays of Bryan S. Turner (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 143–44. 11. Bryan S. Turner and Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir. The Sociology of Islam: Collected Essays of Bryan S. Turner (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 144. 12. Ernesto Laclau, “Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of Political Logics,” in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, ed. Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek (London, UK: Verso, 2000), 44–89. 13. Jason Glynos and David Howarth, Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory (London, UK – New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 135. 14. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London, UK: Verso, 1985), 142. 15. Manuel Castells argues that some identities will always be mutually exclusive because of their relationary and reactionary nature. Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity. The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (Cambridge, MA – Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1997), 421–22. 16. Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London, UK: Verso, 1989), 242. And Laclau argues that heterogeneity is constitutive of contemporary society. Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London, UK – New York, NY: Verso, 2005), 223. 17. Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London, UK: Verso, 1989), 242. 18. Christopher Flood, Stephen Hutchings, Galina Miazhevich, and Henri Nickels, Islam, Security and Television News (Basingstoke, UK – New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 244–45.

140  Avenues for change 19. Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), 114. 20. Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author?” trans. Jouse Harari, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), 101–20. 21. John E. Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004), 152–53. 22. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 22. 23. Pnina Werbner, “Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism: Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism in the Twenty-First Century,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 450–67. 24. Stanley E. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1980), 365. 25. Robert A. White, “Religion and Media in the Construction of Cultures,” in Rethinking Media Religion, and Culture, ed. Stewart M. Hoover and Knut Lundby (London, UK – Beverly Hills CA: Sage Publications 1997), 37–64. 26. J. Fiske, Television Culture (London UK – New York NY: Routledge, 1987), 95–99.

Conclusion

In today’s increasingly globalised world with large ethnic and religious differences and varieties in social status, the presence of others around the globe raises questions about one’s value system. In this context, the role of the media is one that broadcasts discourses into different contexts. As described in this book, the media discourses that surround different minorities form systems that people are subjected to and subscribe to. These systems consist of objects, different types of statements, concepts, and themes. In turn, people use these structure to bring order to the statements made by the media they consume. This is done using the correlations and functioning’s of these statements, in historical and contemporary contexts. In turn, these statements constitute how people, based on the corpus of knowledge that they have, underpin the way they look at minorities, engage with minorities, and consume media discourses about minorities. In doing so, the media is one method for managing and producing the image of minorities, in a political, sociological, ideological, and imaginative manner. However, these are produced and re-produced by the dominant group(s) in societies. As media are a disseminator and facilitator of public discussion, different groups compete in the media to define the dominant discourse as they struggle for hegemony. The presence of minorities and their increasingly vocal demands for recognition and equality challenges the hegemony of the dominant group(s) in a society. In order to affect change and to challenge the dominant discourses that divide and oppress more effectively, I suggested three avenues to be tackled simultaneously. Firstly, there is the psychological, in any interpretation of media and production of media the individual plays a role. Through an analysis of the psychological processes involved and suggested avenues for changes and improvements to the psychology involved, we can make some headway into improving the way minority groups are reported on, engaged with, and treated in the societies. Secondly, the organisational, Gramsci1 and Habermas,2 describe the importance of media institutions in the fabric of the public sphere. Not only as an organisation of control, but also as a pillar along which society orientates itself. If one wants to change the way media organisations operate, then it is important to understand how large corporations DOI: 10.4324/9781003346555-14

142  Conclusion operate, organise themselves, and process change. This section will offer up an analysis of such commercial institutions to highlight areas that can be open to change whilst simultaneously meeting their commercial logic. Thirdly, discursive change, to change aspects of the dominant discourse one needs to change the structure of the overarching discourse. One does that, by focussing not on domination of differentiation, but rather competition among diversity. Unfortunately, the largest barrier to changing a discourse is what Cruijff said, you only really see it, when you truly understand. Whilst seeing may lead to understanding, the difficulty is that it requires a sensitivity to the plight of others to see how discourses affect and structure society. The fact that this is not self-evident means that for many it will be an uncomfortable process to adapt to a change in social relations. But if that change is made so that the internal response to minorities is not one of fear or vigilance in need of management, that we can act with compassion and understanding, to lead large corporations as the bodies of change we need them to be, then hopefully in time, the world will be a better place.

Notes 1. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1971). 2. Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. T. Burger and F. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).

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Index

Abu Hamza 7 Adorno, T. 32 Agenda Building 8–9, 40, 73 Agents xv, 4, 8, 21–23, 49, 95, 100, 117, 135 Allen, C. 42, 44 Allport, F. 45 Allport, G. 42 Anjem Choudary 50, 65 Asad, T. xiii Asch, S. 47–48 Austin, J. L. 13

Elgamri, E. 42 Emotions 75, 82, 92, 95, 108 English Defence League (EDL) 8–9

BBC 6, 15, 19, 28, 50–51, 65, 137 Blockbuster 16, 130 Bødker, H. 5 Bourdieu, P. 18–19 Bowen, J.R. 40 Broadcast News 15

Gadamer, H.G. 94–99, 137 Gaza Crisis 2014 6 Globalisation 28–29, 124, 138 Government Policy xi–xv, 4, 28, 32–34, 65, 72, 119, 123–127 Gramsci, A. 31, 106, 141

Capital, Cultural 18–19 Capital, Economic 29–30, 121 Capital, Social 18–19 Castells, M. 30–33, 74 Channel 4 6, 15, 28, 65 Cinnirella, M. 7, 50 Commodification 18 Corportations 13, 18, 22, 34, 106, 117–119, 125–129, 141–142 Couldry, N. 25, 35, 93 Counter Identity 51, 74 Cruijff, J. 6, 118, 142 Cultural Codes 7 Cultural Conventions 25 Cultural Imperialism 28

Haack, S. 100 Habermas, J. 33–35, 106, 141 Hall, S. 5, 110 Haslam, A. 49, 82 Hegemony xiii, 31–35, 137, 141 Hepp, A. 91 Hermeneutics 17, 93–101, 137 Hjarvard, S. 23 Hybridity 15, 91

Dehuminisation 81–82, 98 Digitization 71 Discrimination 9, 29, 32, 44, 63, 82, 100

Jensen, K. B. 3, 15, 16, 93 Journalism 7, 25–29, 63, 115, 127

Facebook 4, 19 Facial Processing 77–82, 100 Fish, S. E. 98, 138 Five Forces Model 121 Foucault, M. x, 32, 65, 135–138 Four C’s Theory 114–115 Framing See Media Framing

Immigration 50 Infotainment 17–18 Integration xiii, 42–45, 116–118 Islamophobia 6, 42–45, 51 Itv 6, 15

172  Index Karim, K. 44 Kodak 130 Kraidy, M. 10, 91 Krippendorff, K. 93 Kundnani, A. 65 Laclau, E. 137 Language 5, 8, 32, 91–93, 97–100, 110 Lippmann, W. 5, 24 Loftus, E. F. 110 Marranci, G. 95 Mass Production 10, 73 Mcquail, D. 24–25, 135 Media Consumption 4, 34, 75, 110 Media Event 5 Media Framing xi, xv, 23–25, 51, 62–64 Media Logic 14–19, 29–32, 51, 64, 100 Media Power 35, 123 Media Representation 8, 15, 35, 73, 135 Media Systems 4, 27 Mediacratic 21–23, 32, 51, 94–97, 105, 137 Mediation 91 Metaphor(s) 61–63 Milgram, S. 48–49 Mitchell, J. P. 72 Morgan, D. 27 Mosco, V. 4 Ms Marvel 44 Multiculturalism xi, 32 Network Society 30 News Frames See Media Framing Newspapers xiv, 3–4, 13–18, 24–26, 31–32, 40–41, 125, 127–128 Nietzsche, F. 136 Other-Race Effect 75–77 Own Race Bias 76–81

Personal-Identity Socialisation 118 Polanyi, M. 92 Poole, E. 43, 67, 72, 138 Porter, M. 121–122 Quran 136 Resistance Identity 30 Richardson, J. 43, 47, 138 Said, E. x, 42, 51, 63 Shadid, W. 9, 50 Sivanandan, A. 67 Sky News 6, 120 Social Class 29–34, 45–47, 63 Social Media 4, 19, 45, 128; See Also Facebook, Twitter, And Wechat. Stereotyping 66, 81–82, 135 Stress 111–112, 116–118 Sveiby, K.E. 92 Swot Analysis 124 Symbolic Power 14, 22 Taylor, C. 94–100 Television News 15, 21, 41, 105 Tend And Befriend Theory 111 The Daily Mail 27 The Guardian 62, 120 Thompson, B. J. 14, 28 Triplett, N. 45 TV Licensing 28 Twitter 4, 13, 19 UKIP 65 Van Koningsveld, P.S. 50 Visual Perception 79–80 WeChat 119 Wittgenstein, L. 97