Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship [1st ed. 2024] 3031461282, 9783031461286

Table of contents :
Acknowledgment
About the Book
Contents
About the Author
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Introduction
The Biharis of Bangladesh
Methodology
Law and Society Approach
Methods of Data Collection
Samples and Interviews
Ethical Issues
Interviewing the Biharis
Interviewing the Bengalis
Positionality of the Interviewer and the Interviewees
Translation of Notes from Bangla to English Text
Challenges and Opportunities
Significance of the Study
Organization of the Book
References
Chapter 2: Theoretical and Legal Framework: Statelessness, Citizenship, and Rights Associated with Citizenship
Introduction
Understanding Statelessness
Defining Statelessness
Why Statelessness Matters
Debates Over De jure and De facto Statelessness
Global Legal Instruments for the Protection of Stateless Persons
Human Rights Instruments in Addressing the Statelessness3
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966
The Convention on the Rights of the Children (CRC), 1989
Other Human Rights Instruments in Addressing Statelessness
Understanding Citizenship
The Evolution and Development of Citizenship
Ancient Citizenship
The Emergence of Modern Citizenship
Linkages and Differences between Nationality and Citizenship
Ways of Obtaining Citizenship
Why Does Citizenship Matter?
Citizenship and Rights Associated with Citizenship
Citizenship and Citizenship Rights in This Book
The Constitution of Bangladesh and the Rights Associated with Citizenship
Citizenship Laws in Bangladesh
Fundamental Principles of State Policy
Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of Bangladesh
Rights Granted to Citizens Only
Equality before the Law
Non-discrimination
Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment
Prohibition of Foreign Title
Right to Protection of Law
Freedom of Movement
Freedom of Assembly
Freedom of Association
Freedom of Thought
Freedom of Profession and Occupation
Freedom of Religion
Right to Property
Right to Protection of Home and Correspondence
Rights Granted to All Person
Right to Life and Liberty
Safeguards to Arrest and Detention
Prohibition of Forced Labor
Protection with Respect to Trial and Punishment
The Enforcement of Fundamental Rights
Conclusions
References
Chapter 3: The Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship
Introduction
Who Are the Biharis in Bangladesh?
Historical Background of the Biharis in Bangladesh
The Bihari’s Assimilation with the Bengalis in East Pakistan
The Biharis in the Liberation War of Bangladesh
Repatriation of the Biharis Stranded in Bangladesh
Problems of the Bihari Repatriation to Pakistan
The Legal Status of the Biharis in Bangladesh
Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: Fieldwork and Findings
Introduction
The Social and Economic Conditions of the Bihari Respondents
The Birthplace of the Biharis
Age Structure and Gender Distribution
Principal Languages Spoken
Educational Background
Employment/Occupation
Nationality of the Biharis
The Biharis’ Views Regarding Repatriation to Pakistan
The Biharis’ Views Regarding Their Bangladeshi Citizenship
The Biharis’ Migration to East Bengal
The Role of the Biharis in Politics Before 1971
The Role of the Biharis in the Bangladesh Liberation War
The Biharis and Property
The Birth of Bangladesh and the Plight of the Biharis
Living Conditions of the Biharis in the Camp
Education
The Biharis’ Access to Healthcare
Who Helps the Biharis?
Access to Other Rights
Social Exclusion and Problems of Integration
The Bengalis’ Perceptions of the Biharis
The Bengali Respondents’ Views Regarding the Biharis’ Repatriation
Challenges of the Biharis’ Integration in Bangladesh
Citizenship Rights and Human Rights of the Biharis
Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: The Biharis’ Access to Citizenship Rights: Theory, Law, and Realities
Introduction
Right to a Decent Life
Right to Shelter
Right to Education
Right to Healthcare
Right to Employment and Income Generation
Right to Have Other Rights
Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: Conclusion
Recommendations
References
Appendices
Appendix A: Bihari Settlements in Bangladesh
Appendix B: Population of Annual Unregistered Births by Region
Appendix C: Number of Countries Reporting and Number of Stateless Persons, 2004–2012
Appendix D: Stateless Persons in Different Regions in the World, 2012
Appendix E: Worldwide Statelessness, 2012
Appendix F: Agreement on Bilateral Relations between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan
Appendix G: Text of the 1973 Agreement Between the Government of India and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan regarding the Repatriation of Persons
Appendix H: Text of the Tri-patriate Agreement of Bangladesh-Pakistan-India
Index

Citation preview

Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship Zaglul Haider

Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship “Depicting the Biharis of Bangladesh as a product of the 1947 Partition, Haider shows how, despite legal entitlements to citizenship, they continue to experience deliberate denial of full citizenship rights. This rich ethnographic study updates us and identifies the difference between theory and lived reality. Since punishing the younger generation for conflicts of the past is unacceptable, detailed recommendations advise Bangladesh how to implement better governance.” —Werner Menski, Emeritus Professor, SOAS, University of London, UK “An important study of the plight of stateless people focusing on the little examined issue of Biharis in Bangladesh, many of whom are awaiting repatriation to Pakistan for more than half a century. Using a socio-legal approach, Haider disentangles the problems stemming from Biharis remaining citizens of Bangladesh without full citizenship rights while Pakistan has refused to entertain their repatriation for domestic political reasons. A set of worthy policy recommendations are offered to strengthen Biharis’rights of Bangladeshi citizenship in addition to advancing the possibility of Pakistan taking responsibility for citizens it has abandoned since 1971.” —Ayesha Jalal, Mary Richardson Professor of History, Tufts University “Haider’s important study is a reminder of the deplorable fate of the ‘Biharis’. 52 years after Bangladesh was founded, part of this minority still lives in overcrowded, unsanitary camps, victims of mutual violence long past and Bangladesh’s foundational myths. The book advocates integration through rights, but, as it shows, arrogant authorities in practice deny most ‘Biharis’ schooling and passports (and, thus, labor emigration), and ostracization relegates them to bad jobs and poverty.” —Christian Gerlach, Professor of Modern History at the University of Bern

Zaglul Haider

Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship

Zaglul Haider Political Science University of Rajshahi Rajshahi, Bangladesh

ISBN 978-3-031-46128-6    ISBN 978-3-031-46129-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46129-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

To the memory of my beloved sister, Dilruba Akhter who supported me with her unreserved love and affection to build my life

Acknowledgment

This book is the product of extensive empirical research conducted in Bangladesh. The research process initially started when I began researching Bihari issues in Bangladesh in 2002 for a scholarly paper. I then presented the findings of that research in 2003 at the Speaker’s Program of Saint Mary’s University and at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association for the Study of International Development (CASID) held at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada. The insightful comments from these two presentations inspired me to write a book on this issue. I conducted fieldwork in Bangladesh in 2011 and interviewed 75 Biharis from three Bihari camps as well as 25 Bengalis who were familiar with the problems of the Biharis in Bangladesh in different capacities. Bengali research participants included researchers, civil society members, policymakers, politicians, and long-time neighbors of Biharis living inside Bihari camps. I am very grateful to all of my research participants, both Biharis and Bengalis. Without their time, support, and cooperation this book would not have been possible. I had the opportunity to present my research at different scholarly meetings, such as the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Law and Society Association held at the University of Ottawa in 2015 and the Annual Graduate Student Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, in 2016. I am very grateful to everyone at the meetings for their thoughtful comments, which helped enrich my research. I am grateful to the editors of Muslim Minority Affairs, South Asia Research, and the European Journal of Social Sciences Studies for allowing me to use some of the content from my published articles in this book. I want to vii

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

thank Werner Menski, Emeritus Professor, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; Ayesha Jalal, Mary Richardson Professor of History, Tufts University, USA; and Christian Gerlach, Professor of Modern History at the University of Bern, Germany, for painstakingly going through my book manuscript and for endorsing this book. I am also thankful to Isobel Cowper Cole, Commissioning Editor for International Studies at Palgrave Macmillan, for her very encouraging initial comments on the book manuscript. Thanks are also due to all members of the board of editors for their hard work in publishing this book and special thanks are also due to Divya Suresh who always communicated with me on the part of the publisher for every single component of the book manuscript and ensured my compliance with publishing requirements. I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my wife Dr. Farah Deeba Chowdhury for all her hard work and support throughout the entire research process from data collection to editorial support for this book. Her dedication to helping me with this research and providing me with critical and insightful comments was instrumental in bringing this book to completion. I am also grateful to my three daughters who provided me with unwavering support and inspired me to write this book. Without them, this book would not have been possible. Finally, I am grateful to my parents, whose love, affection, sacrifices, and encouragement made my academic career possible. Toronto, ON, Canada October 2023

Zaglul Haider

About the Book

This book deals with the citizenship status of the Biharis in Bangladesh and their ability to access rights associated with citizenship. The main argument of the book is that although legally the Biharis are citizens of Bangladesh, they do not have access to many important rights of citizenship that can make their citizenship meaningful. Their inability to access several important citizenship rights made them de facto stateless, although they are de jure citizens. Taking a law and society approach, this book examines both legal and non-legal factors behind the deplorable condition of the Biharis in Bangladesh. Based on fieldwork, this book analyzes that the Biharis’ inability to access citizenship rights is inconsistent with citizenship theory, citizenship laws, and the Constitution of Bangladesh. To make the Biharis’ citizenship effective or meaningful, the author suggests some recommendations for policy changes that would enable Biharis to access rights associated with citizenship.

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Contents

1 Introduction  1 The Biharis of Bangladesh   2 Methodology   5 Law and Society Approach   5 Methods of Data Collection   7 Samples and Interviews   7 Ethical Issues   9 Interviewing the Biharis  10 Interviewing the Bengalis  11 Positionality of the Interviewer and the Interviewees  12 Translation of Notes from Bangla to English Text  14 Challenges and Opportunities  15 Significance of the Study  18 Organization of the Book  18 References  20 2 Theoretical  and Legal Framework: Statelessness, Citizenship, and Rights Associated with Citizenship 25 Introduction  25 Understanding Statelessness  25 Defining Statelessness  27 Why Statelessness Matters  28 Debates Over De jure and De facto Statelessness  29 Global Legal Instruments for the Protection of Stateless Persons  34 xi

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Contents

Human Rights Instruments in Addressing the Statelessness  35 Understanding Citizenship  38 Ways of Obtaining Citizenship  45 Why Does Citizenship Matter?  50 Citizenship and Rights Associated with Citizenship  54 Citizenship and Citizenship Rights in This Book  60 The Constitution of Bangladesh and the Rights Associated with Citizenship  61 Citizenship Laws in Bangladesh  62 Fundamental Principles of State Policy  65 Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of Bangladesh  67 Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment  69 Right to Protection of Law  70 Protection with Respect to Trial and Punishment  75 The Enforcement of Fundamental Rights  75 Conclusions  76 References  81 3 The  Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship 91 Introduction  91 Who Are the Biharis in Bangladesh?  92 Historical Background of the Biharis in Bangladesh  94 The Bihari’s Assimilation with the Bengalis in East Pakistan  97 The Biharis in the Liberation War of Bangladesh 103 Repatriation of the Biharis Stranded in Bangladesh 107 Problems of the Bihari Repatriation to Pakistan 116 The Legal Status of the Biharis in Bangladesh 121 Conclusion 126 References 135 4 Fieldwork and Findings145 Introduction 145 The Social and Economic Conditions of the Bihari Respondents 146 The Birthplace of the Biharis 146 Age Structure and Gender Distribution 147 Principal Languages Spoken 147

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Educational Background 149 Employment/Occupation 151 Nationality of the Biharis 155 The Biharis’ Views Regarding Repatriation to Pakistan 159 The Biharis’ Views Regarding Their Bangladeshi Citizenship 161 The Biharis’ Migration to East Bengal 165 The Role of the Biharis in Politics Before 1971 167 The Role of the Biharis in the Bangladesh Liberation War 169 The Biharis and Property 171 The Birth of Bangladesh and the Plight of the Biharis 172 Living Conditions of the Biharis in the Camp 174 Education 177 The Biharis’ Access to Healthcare 180 Who Helps the Biharis? 182 Access to Other Rights 184 Social Exclusion and Problems of Integration 187 The Bengalis’ Perceptions of the Biharis 192 The Bengali Respondents’ Views Regarding the Biharis’ Repatriation 193 Challenges of the Biharis’ Integration in Bangladesh 196 Citizenship Rights and Human Rights of the Biharis 202 Conclusion 205 References 209 5 The  Biharis’ Access to Citizenship Rights: Theory, Law, and Realities215 Introduction 215 Right to a Decent Life 219 Right to Shelter 220 Right to Education 222 Right to Healthcare 224 Right to Employment and Income Generation 225 Right to Have Other Rights 228 Conclusion 231 References 233

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6 Conclusion239 Recommendations 248 References 253 Appendices257 Index279

About the Author

Zaglul Haider  is a political scientist. He was a Ford fellow and earned his PhD in Political Science from Clark Atlanta University, USA.  He also earned an LLM from Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada. Dr. Haider has extensively published in North American, European, and South Asian prestigious scholarly journals. He has authored other two books: The Changing Pattern of Bangladesh Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Mujib and Zia Regimes (2006) and Bilateralism Between the Strong and Weak States in an International System: Unfolding CanadaBangladesh Relations (2018). He is a full professor of Political Science at the University of Rajshahi. He was also a research fellow at the York Centre for International and Security Studies (YCISS), at York University. His areas of interest include foreign policy, comparative politics, citizenship, statelessness, and international law.

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 4.7 Table 4.8 Table 4.9 Table 4.10 Table 4.11 Table 4.12

Total number of Biharis in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, 1972108 Concentration of Biharis in Bangladesh, 1998 109 Estimated number of Bihari repatriation 1972–1999 116 Places of birth 147 Age structure 148 Gender distribution 148 Languages spoken by Bihari interview subjects 149 Educational background of Bihari interview subjects 150 Occupational background of Bihari interview subjects 153 Annual income of the Bihari interview subjects (in thousand BDT & US$) 154 Residence of Bihari interview subjects in Bangladesh 155 Identification of nationality by the respondents 159 Reasons for migration to East Bengal 166 The Biharis’ support for political parties in the 1970 general elections168 Property Owned by the Biharis in the Pre-­liberation period 171

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This book deals with the citizenship status of the Biharis in Bangladesh and their ability to access rights associated with citizenship. The Biharis living in Bangladesh fled their homeland and migrated to former East Pakistan at the time of the partition of British India.1 Their culture and way of life were different from the mainstream Bengalis. The Biharis shared cultural and political interests with the West Pakistani ruling elites and the West Pakistani rulers distributed patronage among them and made them a vested interest group in East Pakistan who often served as the agents of the West Pakistani ruling class. The central government’s policy of favoritism of the Bihari minority over the Bengali majority led the Biharis to side with the West Pakistani ruling elites (Ziring 1994, 51).2 From the beginning to the end of the Pakistani rule, the Biharis, with very few exceptions, never supported the Bengalis’ causes. They were used by the Pakistani power elites, who fuelled conflicts between the Bengalis and Biharis to suppress the freedom struggle of the Bengalis and secure their absolute domination over the Bengalis (Murshid 1998, 4; Mehdi 2007, 62). Most Biharis’ unfriendly attitudes towards the Bengalis soon made them undesirable elements in East Bengal in the eyes of many Bengalis (Hashmi 1998, 391). Most Biharis, with very few exceptions, sided with the Pakistani rulers and collaborated with the Pakistan Army during the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. Immediately after the liberation of Bangladesh, most of the West Pakistani civilians along with the defeated army were © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 Z. Haider, Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46129-3_1

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transferred to India, but the Biharis were left behind. They were left in a hostile environment without any protection. The Biharis in general became unwanted and were targeted for revenge by the local Bengalis. Violence against Biharis came in the form of looting of their properties, chastising and killing their men, and raping their women (Ahmed 1995, 5). Under Bangladeshi citizenship laws, the Biharis are in principle entitled to formal Bangladeshi citizenship (The Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order, 1972).3 However, in practice, most are not able to access many important rights accorded to citizens and are victims of discrimination and deprivation. My book demonstrates that while most Biharis in Bangladesh have been recognized as being legally entitled to citizenship in Bangladesh, they do not have access to a few important rights associated with citizenship rights that make citizenship meaningful. Based on my findings, I set out several recommendations for policy changes that would enable Biharis to access rights associated with citizenship, thereby making their legal right to citizenship in Bangladesh meaningful.

The Biharis of Bangladesh The Biharis in Bangladesh are non-Bengali Muslims who originally lived in British India before its partition in in 1947. The violence and massacres before and after partition in 1947, especially the Great Calcutta Killings and the communal violence in the Indian state of Bihar (Azad 1988, 20; Weiner 1996, 20; Hamid 1967, 238), forced many Biharis to flee for safety to East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in 1971. The Biharis of India fled to East Pakistan because their leaders convinced them that hijrat (migration) was the only way to get rid of the perpetual miseries of life in Hindu India. In order to escape from the oppression of the non-Muslims, the holy religion Islam encouraged its followers to take part in hijrat (Tajuddin 1994). Among the Bihari migrants, the less affluent section moved to densely populated East Pakistan because it was closer to Bihar and easier to enter and the rich entrepreneurs moved to West Pakistan where the country’s capital was located (Huque 1990, 276). Both geographical proximity and employment opportunities in urban and industrial areas attracted the poor and less educated Bihari refugees to East Pakistan. The majority of the Biharis in Bangladesh came from the Indian state of Bihar and other parts of India such as Calcutta, northern India, Bombay

1 INTRODUCTION 

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and Madras. The common language of the Biharis is Urdu, which is also the national language of Pakistan. In Bangladesh, the Biharis are well known by their generic name “Bihari,” although they are also referred to by other names, such as “muhajir,” “non-locals,” “non-Bangladeshis,” “stranded Pakistanis,” or “Urdu-speaking people” (Choudhury 1992, 296). All these names are used to distinguish them from the mainstream Bengalis. The International Convention on Biharis held in Geneva in 1982 referred to them as non-­ Bangladeshis or stranded Pakistanis (Choudhury 1992, 296). In Pakistan, the Biharis are called muhajir, a term derived from the Arabic word hijra, which was used to describe the flight of the Prophet Mohammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina, to avoid persecution by the enemies of Islam. In its contemporary sense, the term is used to mean those who migrate for the cause of Islam (Ahmed 1988, 33). Most Biharis sided with Pakistan (which comprised West and East Pakistan), fought against the Liberation War of the Bengalis, and branded the war as a secessionist movement in East Pakistan. They collaborated with the Pakistani Army during the war and opposed the independence of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). Immediately after the emergence of Bangladesh, there were reprisals against the Biharis, and some studies claim that between 70,000 and 100,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis were murdered in the months after the establishment of the state of Bangladesh (Kelley 2010, 349–371; Sen 2000, 41–70). In 1972, about one million Biharis were given the option by the Government of Bangladesh to choose between citizenship of either Pakistan or Bangladesh. About 500 thousand wanted to stay in Bangladesh and were immediately given citizenship in Bangladesh, while the remaining 500 thousand requested repatriation to Pakistan and were registered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Government of Bangladesh 1998). Those who opted for repatriation called themselves Pakistanis. According to the provisions of the Delhi Agreement of 1974 (Tripartite Agreement Between India, Bangladesh and Pakistan for Normalization of Relations in the Sub-Continent 1974), at the initial stage, 170,000 Biharis were repatriated to Pakistan in 1974 under the auspices of the ICRC. Between 1973 and 1993, a total of 178,069 Biharis were repatriated (UNHCR 2009). An estimated 100,000 Biharis spontaneously and unofficially moved to Pakistan according to the 2009 report of the UNHCR and between 250,000 and 300,000 remained in Bangladesh (UNHCR 2009). The number of Biharis who wanted

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repatriation to Pakistan has grown significantly over the years and many Biharis today reside in different refugee camps in Bangladesh,4 without being fully integrated into mainstream Bangladeshi society. Despite the Biharis living in camps in Bangladesh, they are not recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as refugees because they are ineligible for refugee status under Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 28 July 1951). To be eligible for refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the Convention, a person needs to demonstrate not only that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership in a particular social group but also that he or she is outside his or her country of origin or habitual residence and is unwilling or unable to return to it. The Biharis cannot be said to be outside their country of origin or habitual residence because the territory of their residence (East Pakistan) seceded from the mother country (Pakistan comprising both West and East Pakistan) and became a separate sovereign and independent state on 16 December 1971. Thus, the status of the Biharis in Bangladesh remains precarious. They are not refugees as understood in international refugee law. Some still claim Pakistani nationality and owe their allegiance to Pakistan but Pakistan is not willing to accept them back as its nationals. Others have accepted Bangladeshi citizenship. This book examines the status of the Biharis in Bangladesh today. The central question of this book is: Do the Biharis have access to important rights associated with citizenship rights that make citizenship meaningful? Related research questions are: If they are legal citizens but do not enjoy some important citizenship rights, then how should it be ensured that the Biharis are able to access rights accorded to citizens of Bangladesh and how should they be integrated into mainstream society, polity, and the economy of Bangladesh? If any of them are not or do not want to be Bangladeshi citizens and claim to be Pakistani citizens, then how should they be repatriated to Pakistan? This book demonstrates that the Biharis are entitled to Bangladeshi citizenship under the citizenship law of Bangladesh. However, my fieldwork demonstrates that many of them do not have access to some of the important rights associated with citizenship rights that can make their citizenship meaningful.

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Methodology Methodological sophistication is an essential part of a systematic inquiry. It guides a researcher toward a comparatively credible and scientific study. Hashim T. Gibrill argues: Methodology shapes our understanding of reality; It lies at the heart of the analysis; it is fundamental to the systematic effort to describe and explain. Methodology has philosophical and empirical, ideological, and scientific dimensions. Premises, theories, concepts, designs, and methods together actualize the methodology of social inquiry. (Gibrill 2014, 159)

Law and Society Approach This study adopts a law and society or socio-legal approach. This approach recognizes both legal and non-legal factors (Friedman 1986, 763). This approach narrates “legal phenomena in social terms” (Friedman 1986, 763). It is a scholarly way of examining the relationship between legal and non-legal types of social phenomena (Friedman 1986, 763). The law and society tradition discovers law everywhere (Sarat 1990, 343–379). This approach suggests that law can be understood by analyzing it within social contexts (Silbey 2002, 860). The law and society approach provides opportunities for undertaking interdisciplinary empirical studies, thereby transcending the confines of traditional legal scholarship (Silbey 2002, 861). It recognizes diverse methods and methodologies for researching and understanding social problems, including social research methods such as qualitative and quantitative methods (Chua 2013). The law and society approach emphasizes behavior or attitudes as it affects or reflects behavior (Friedman 1986, 774). Most importantly, the law and society approach is not concerned merely with what the law is but also with what the law does in practice (Trubek 1984, 575; Silbey and Sarat 1987, 165) or the impact of law on society. From this perspective, explaining the status of the Biharis in Bangladesh, in particular, the question of whether Biharis who hold citizenship are in practice able to access the rights accorded to citizens or whether they confront insurmountable barriers to accessing these rights requires data beyond sources of legal documents such as citizenship legislation and cases. A combination of primary and secondary data is needed to be able to integrate the practical realities

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encountered by the Biharis in Bangladesh on a daily basis with the abstract injunctions and promise of the law on rights and citizenship. Taking a socio-legal approach and based on the interviews, my book demonstrates that while most Biharis in Bangladesh have been recognized as being legally entitled to citizenship in Bangladesh, they do not have access to a few important rights associated with citizenship rights that make citizenship meaningful. Based on my fieldwork, I argue in this book that Biharis’ access to citizenship rights is inconsistent with citizenship theory (i.e., the right to have rights), citizenship laws in Bangladesh, and the Constitution of Bangladesh, including fundamental principles and fundamental rights. The Biharis, while legally Bangladeshi citizens, are in practice unable to access some of the most important citizenship rights. Aside from legal factors, I have also examined social factors responsible for the ineffective citizenship of Biharis in Bangladesh. I relied on two sources of information. One source is the views or perspectives of Biharis. The lived experiences of the Biharis and their feelings about citizenship are important to this study because these provide useful insights both into their plight in Bangladesh and in the search for durable solutions. It is essential to know what they think about their citizenship rights, whether they have access to those rights, and what measures they believe would enhance their prospects of accessing important citizenship rights in Bangladesh. In addition to the views of the Biharis, the views of a few actors, predominantly Bengalis, in Bangladesh who directly or indirectly have a bearing on the situation of the Biharis are considered critical to the analysis of the status of the Biharis in Bangladesh. Alongside Biharis, I interviewed government officials involved in policymaking, academics, and civil society groups or NGOs that have been involved with the plight of the Biharis. Their views provide useful perspectives on how the Bengalis feel about the citizenship rights of the Biharis and what they believe is the best way to make the Biharis meaningful citizens of Bangladesh. The second source of information came from a review of national and international documents—policy documents, reports, legislation, cases, scholarly books and articles, and unpublished work related to the citizenship rights of the Biharis in Bangladesh.

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Methods of Data Collection Both the views of the Biharis and key Bengali actors are collected through qualitative research methods. I chose to collect qualitative data because of the advantages associated with fieldwork and in-depth interviews. Fieldwork, whether short-term or ethnographic, and interviews remove the gap between the researcher and participants, and this, in turn, allows the researcher to grasp an insider view of the issues. Fieldwork bridges the gap between what researchers think and what really exists in the field (Epstein and Martin 2014, 25). In addition, interviewing, unlike survey questionnaires where an informant has only one option of a “yes” or “no” answer, may shed light on complex relationships, effects, and other dynamic processes. I undertook fieldwork in Bangladesh and interviewed a number of Biharis and key Bengali actors. I spent four months in the field, from May to August 2011. I justify my arguments with empirical evidence collected through fieldwork and other scholarly sources. In my fieldwork, I am primarily concerned with whether the Biharis can access their citizenship rights, and if they do not have access to important rights, what strategy should be adopted to facilitate their access to citizenship rights. It is important to conduct fieldwork to document how much the Biharis are benefiting from their citizenship in Bangladesh.

Samples and Interviews My fieldwork has two components: (1) interviews of Biharis living in camps in Bangladesh to comprehend their problems and (2) interviews of Bengalis to understand their views about the Biharis. In both cases, I conducted one-on-one interviews. I used open-ended questionnaires and took written notes. In both cases, I followed an in-depth interview method. In-depth qualitative interviews involve intensive individual interviews with a few respondents to investigate their perspectives on a particular issue (Boyce 2006, 3). It is an “open-ended, discovery-oriented method” that provides an opportunity for the interviewer to uncover the emotions and perspectives of the respondents (Guion et al. 2011). I followed a convenience sampling method in selecting the Bihari interviewees because convenience sampling is “non-random sampling” where the respondents are chosen on the basis of “accessibility, geographical proximity, availability at a given time, or the willingness to participate as a

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subject” (Etikan et al. 2016, 2). Convenience sampling is also called availability sampling (Knapp 2014, 23). Although convenience sampling is based on self-selection and is non-random, it is difficult to generalize claims through this method. However, I used this method for my research because it is affordable and easier. I had very limited resources to conduct my fieldwork in Bangladesh and the three camps I selected for interviewing the Biharis were in Dhaka and Rajshahi as I was familiar with these two cities, and it was easy for me to travel there. Moreover, when choosing the Bihari interviewees, I opted for the convenience sampling method because of the lack of availability of a list of camp residents. As a result, I could not select the interviewees through a blind lottery system. In this research, I selected 75 residents from three Bihari camps who agreed to be interviewed after fully knowing the purpose of my research. In selecting interviewees amongst the Bengalis, I followed a purposive sampling method.5 The purposive method is a form of non-probability sampling and is a strategic choice of the researcher in sample selection. Usually, the size is small in purposive sampling. Each sample is selected to address a particular set of questions. The main goal of purposive sampling is to obtain maximum insight into the problem being investigated by looking at it from all angles. It therefore allows the researcher to identify common themes from the sample. Participants are selected across the population because of their unique knowledge of the problem being investigated. It serves a specific purpose and normally targets a particular group of people. Here, the researcher consciously selects the sample for inclusion in a study to ensure that the sample has certain characteristics required for the study. Paul and Victor have described the characteristics as “specialist knowledge of the research issue or capacity and willingness to participate in the research” (Oliver 2006, 244–245). In this method, the researcher picks individual participants who are suitable for the study or who are able to provide appropriate data both in terms of relevance and depth (Oliver 2006, 244–245). I chose 25 Bengalis with specialist knowledge who were willing to participate in the interviews with reliable, relevant, and in-depth knowledge. These Bengalis were familiar with the problems of the Biharis in Bangladesh in different capacities as researchers, civil society members, policymakers, politicians, and as neighbors of the Bihari camps for a long time. In my interviews with the Biharis, my questions were on the socio-­ economic background of Bihari respondents, their nationality, commitment to politics, access to citizenship rights, camp life, problems of

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integration, remedies, their status in society as well as their expectations. On the other hand, in the case of the Bengali respondents, my questions were on their perceptions regarding the Biharis’ problems, challenges of Bihari integration, and finally the Biharis’ access to citizenship rights in the eyes of the Bengalis. The main limitation of this research is that I interviewed only 75 Biharis from three camps in a total population of almost 300,000 Biharis living in 116 camps across Bangladesh and 25 Bengalis due to funding and time constraints.

Ethical Issues In total, I interviewed 1006 respondents, including both Biharis and Bengalis, and in both cases, the interviews were conducted in Bangla, the official language of Bangladesh. While explaining the research project, I followed standard ethics guidelines. I introduced myself to the respondents and explained the goals and the rationale for the research and the probable impact of the research on the interviewees. I discussed in detail that any information provided by the respondents will be kept confidential and not be shared with anyone else. I explained that the interviews would have no harmful effect on the respondents. I answered all their questions, and the respondents were allowed to see the notes that I had taken. Furthermore, I tried to build confidence through the written consent forms. I assured respondents that the contents of the interviews will be used for academic purposes only and pseudonyms will be assigned in the results of the interviews and may be published. Before the start of each interview, I not only informed the respondent about the subject of the interview but also explained the purpose of the interview. I gave them an idea about how long the interview would take and what would happen during the interview. In addition, I told the informants that I would be taking notes of the conversations. I did not use tape recordings during the interviews. Biharis did not consent to me using a tape recorder. They were concerned that their voices in the recordings might be used for different purposes. Therefore, I abandoned the idea of using a tape recorder. I also assured participants that all information provided by them would be kept confidential and none of their names would be used in my research; pseudonyms would be used instead. Almost all respondents demanded that guaranteeing their anonymity was a pre-condition for their participation in the interviews. In addition, I informed participants that all

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interview materials and data would be safely stored in a locked facility and later shredded upon publication of the research or after five years or the time allowed by the law. I also left my contact address, and my university information, including mailing address, email address, and telephone numbers, with the participants so that they could get in contact in case they had any questions regarding the interviews. I further assured participants that their participation in the interviews was voluntary and that they could stop at any time during the interviews or abstain from answering any questions. I also made it clear that for any reason, if they withdraw from the study, all associated data collected would be immediately destroyed. All recorded documents, including the filled-out questionnaires and recorded notes, would remain in handwritten form and not be entered into a computer. Only summarized facts would be used for the analysis of the research problem. Some respondents asked me about the benefits of my study to them and their community. I explained, while being careful not to raise expectations, that the findings of the study would help policymakers understand the scope of the situation of the Biharis in Bangladesh and the measures that should be put in place to either promote the integration of the Biharis in Bangladesh or facilitate their repatriation to Pakistan. In addition, I explained that the findings of this study may be published in the form of journal article(s) or in a book form and this may be one way of continuing to raise awareness about the plight of Biharis in Bangladesh. After all these clarifications, only those who voluntarily wanted to participate in the interviews were asked to sign the consent form. Each participant was then interviewed separately in a place that they found safe and felt comfortable in. The interviews were based on structured and open-­ ended questions. At the end of each interview, I expressed my gratitude and thanked each participant for their time, thoughtful responses, and patience.

Interviewing the Biharis Out of the 100 informants I interviewed, 75 were from the Bihari community living in camps in Dhaka and Rajshahi Divisions—the two largest concentrations of Biharis in Bangladesh. There are 116 Bihari camps in Bangladesh, of which 32 are in Dhaka (26  in Mirpur and 6  in Mohammadpur), but I conducted the interviews in Geneva, Town Hall, and Rajshahi Sagor Para camps. I chose the Geneva camp because it is the

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largest camp in Bangladesh with approximately 30,000 residents (UNHCR 2015). Moreover, the Geneva camp is in the heart of Dhaka, and it is the first camp established by the ICRC in 1972 and therefore is of critical historical importance to the status of the Biharis in Bangladesh. The Geneva camp has an area of 235,000 square feet of land and is divided into nine residential sectors (Sholder 2011, 2). In this camp, I conveniently selected 50 respondents for interviews based on their availability. I conducted interviews in the Town hall camp, which has a population of 3115 people and covers an area of 38,000 square feet (Sholder 2011, 45). I selected 15 respondents from this camp. I also conducted interviews in the Rajshahi Sagor Para camp, which is comparatively a smaller camp with a population of only 1600 Biharis. This camp is located on 900 decimals of land (Sholder 2011, 49). I picked 10 respondents from this camp. Similar to the two other camps, I chose this camp because of its location (Shah Makhdum Road in Rajshahi), which is in the heart of the city. I did not have to worry much about transportation and other related costs in searching for participants. I knew the city well as I worked in the city for many years as a faculty member in the Political Science department at the University of Rajshahi.

Interviewing the Bengalis Twenty-five interviews were conducted with Bengalis who were policy makers/bureaucrats, politicians, academics/researchers, civil society leaders, and ordinary people from the Bengali-speaking community. I interviewed five people from each category. The same in-depth interviewing technique I used with the Biharis was applied. I used this technique because I wanted to capture the views of Bengalis about the status of Biharis, starting from ordinary people to the elite. My respondents consisted of civil society activists engaged with the plight of the Biharis through their aid operations, social work, and research; politicians; bureaucrats; and academics, in particular university professors and members of think tanks who undertook research about the Biharis in Bangladesh. After each interview, I checked and reviewed the notes that I had taken, filled up any gaps, and summarized key information. I maintained the confidentiality of the respondents by using pseudonyms throughout the study instead of real names.

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Positionality of the Interviewer and the Interviewees In any interview, the researcher’s class, ethnic, and religious factors position him or her in different ways to the interviewees (Bano 2005, 107). Through the multiple roles of positionality, the researcher establishes a relationship with the interviewees. Therefore, positionality plays different roles like a camera that can be used to take pictures in different ways, such as “from distant to close-up and from ground level to overhead shots” (Engel 1999, 10). The positionality of researchers and interviewees may affect the interview process (Bano 2005, 107). The interviewees may conceal or disclose important facts based on the positionality of the interviewers. Scholars influenced by standpoint theory argue that structural constraints or uneven power relationships create disadvantages for the weaker community when negotiating or bargaining with the stronger community (Choi and Holroyd 2007, 491). This theory unfolds that “researcher’s positionality shapes the structure and substance of the research study” (Bano 2005, 110). In my view, such structural constraints or socio-economic contexts influence interviews, especially interview results when the researcher and respondents belong to different socio-­ economic and cultural classes or groups. This affects the interview process in qualitative research (Holtan et  al. 2014, 110). The respondents may conceal or disclose facts because of their perceptions of the researcher (Bano 2005, 107). Here the question of rapport or trust between the researcher and respondents arises. Although complete elimination of the gap between the researcher and respondents is impossible, reducing the gap through rapport building is possible. In order to gather reliable data, “rapport of adequate intensity” is required (Newman 1958, 129–130). Establishing rapport with respondents helps to gain their trust and encourages respondents to participate in the research (Bano 2005, 101–102). Some scholars call this a “participatory model” of research with the goal of conducting “non-hierarchical, non-authoritarian, and non-manipulative research relationships” (Reinhatz 1992 as cited in Bano 2005, 102). Although mutual trust and confidence come slowly, the researcher can familiarize the respondents with the study by explaining the goals of the study and providing them with adequate information so that they are able to understand and extend their cooperation. Explaining the study to respondents can also prevent “misconceptions and damaging yard rumors” (Newman 1958, 129–130).

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My wife, who was my colleague and an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Rajshahi, accompanied me during my fieldwork in the Bihari camps. Her presence made the female respondents comfortable while talking to me. Sometimes, she explained the questions and asked follow-up questions to the female respondents. In this research, we (my wife and I) had different positionalities compared to the Bihari interviewees. Our Bengali ethnic identities as well as our socio-economic and educational backgrounds are different from the Bihari interviewees. During the interviews, I took into consideration all of these differences. I recognize the importance of a plural society where differences exist (Engel 1999, 14). In spite of all of these differences, I tried to establish richer connections with the interviewees. I wanted to build an equitable relationship with the interviewees. I tried to incorporate diverse perspectives based on age, gender, class, and occupation. I tried to reduce gaps between me and the interviewees through rapport building (Blauner and Wellman 1982, 104). Most importantly, I was aware of my position of power. Keeping these in mind, I tried to build a connection and mutual trust between me and my interviewees. I also tried to reduce gaps between myself and the interviewees through dress, language, and behavior (Schlosser 2008, 1509). I used the Bangla language as the medium of communication for the interviews as it is the most common language spoken among the Biharis and Bengalis in Bangladesh. In addition, I wore plain clothes and shoes. During the interviews, I respected their feelings and asked questions in a very simple and understanding way. All these efforts helped to establish a good rapport with the interviewees. Hiring a Bihari research assistant may have helped establish a better rapport with Bihari respondents; however, this still does not necessarily guarantee better-quality interview results. This is because Bihari respondents may not have disclosed important information about their lives in front of someone belonging to the same ethnic group. In many cases, it is easier to share personal information and life experiences with strangers as it ensures confidentiality. It is possible that fears of lowering their position and prestige in their own community may have prevented many Biharis from giving an accurate picture of their lives to a Bihari research assistant. Moreover, I did not have sufficient funding to hire a Bihari research assistant. Although I tried my best to reduce differences and establish a good rapport with the interviewees, differences still existed. Engel rightly points out, “The differences in our connections to our research subjects are the

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differences that connect us to one another, and they ensure the vitality of the field of law and society” (Engel 1999, 15).

Translation of Notes from Bangla to English Text In qualitative research, it is important to maintain accuracy when a researcher is presenting respondents’ views and perspectives. However, it is often very challenging when interviews are conducted in one language and translated, analyzed, and presented in another language. Therefore, the understanding of local language and culture is fundamental (Regmi et al. 2010, 19). Experts suggest that researchers are required to have sufficient knowledge about local languages, cultures, and societies to conduct research anywhere in any community. It is important because it gives an advantage to researchers in understanding the interviewees and communicating with them (Filep 2009, 59). Apart from this, the researcher should also have enough knowledge about the geographical location of the field (Squires 2009, 281) because “geographical space and place carry language or culture-specific meaning and messages” (Filep 2009, 60). This is the reason the background of the researcher/translator is so important. In this study, I translated, analyzed, and presented the qualitative data I collected in Bangladesh. I asked questions to the respondents in Bangla. The Bihari respondents speak in both Bangla and Urdu. Although they are bilingual, they can speak and understand Bangla like Bengalis because as a community they have been living in Bangladesh for almost 70 years (1947–2016). A majority of them were born in Bangladesh. They understand formal and informal Bangla and other dialects in Bangladesh.7 I was born and raised in Bangladesh, attended school, college, and university in Bangladesh, and I belong to the mainstream Bengali population. Bangla is my first language. It was easy for me to communicate with the Bihari respondents in Bangla. As a native Bangla speaker, I was able to translate their words, feelings, and expressions into English. In this regard, I share the same view with Temple and Young that “researchers who can translate are automatically best situated to do cross-language data analysis” (Temple and Young 2004, 187).

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Challenges and Opportunities During my fieldwork and interviews, I encountered three main challenges. The first challenge was overcoming suspicion from Bihari leaders in the Geneva camp in Dhaka. The Stranded Pakistanis General Repatriation Committee (SPGRC) is a pioneer Bihari organization that has been struggling with the repatriation of the Biharis since 1977. Although the organization is divided, it has some influence over some people in the Bihari camp who still want repatriation to Pakistan. The role of the SPGRC can be compared with the role of “gatekeepers” in fieldwork. For researchers, accessing potential respondents or research subjects depends on making connections with “gatekeepers” or those with authority who regulate access to research subjects/respondents. Thus, establishing connections with individuals who can allow or deny access to the Research subjects is very important (Schlosser 2008, 1510). Accessing respondents is a challenging task for researchers without gatekeepers’ cooperation. Gatekeepers are the deciding authority, allowing researchers to undertake their research, and they have the power to accept or reject access to a field or research setting (McFadyen and Rankin 2016, 82). Gatekeepers can play both positive and negative roles in any research. They can either be very effective by cooperating with researchers or problematic by creating obstacles, such as imposing difficult conditions to gain access to respondents, limiting access to data, regulating the scope of data analysis, and so on (McFadyen and Rankin 2016, 83). Gatekeepers’ power in allowing or denying access creates an unequal relationship with the researcher, which forces the researcher to bargain with the gatekeepers in the access situation (Bano 2005, 99). Such mistrust and misunderstanding can be removed by researchers building rapport with gatekeepers (Bano 2005, 99). In my field research, SPGRC played the role of gatekeeper. The SPGRC has an office inside the Geneva camp, but they do not have regular staff and telephone facilities in their office. This is why, without making an appointment, I went to the SPGRC office and met some of the leaders of the SPGRC. At the beginning, I went to the SPGRC office, introduced myself, and very briefly tried to explain the purpose of my research to the people inside the office and sought their cooperation to conduct the interviews. They were reluctant to listen to me and refused to give me permission to take the interviews as they thought that I was a journalist. They were concerned that my research could be used against the interests of the

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Biharis. My attempts to explain myself and my research were dismissed, and I was not even able to explain the goal of the study to them properly. To prevent further problems, I sought the help of the Secretary General of the SPGRC, who was willing to listen to me. I introduced myself and explained the goals and objectives of my study. I told him that this is an academic project trying to understand the situation of the Biharis in Bangladesh, including the extent to which they can access their rights of citizenship and are able to enjoy benefits from the state. He understood and convinced his colleagues to cooperate with me and to allow me to conduct the interviews. After gaining access, the SPGRC did not want to view my questionnaire and did not restrict me from asking questions. The SPGRC did not watch or monitor the interviews. I asked questions based on my questionnaire and conducted in-depth interviews through discussions. The respondents talked to me freely during the interviews and nobody else was present during the interviews. To my surprise, nobody from SPGRC interfered with the interviews and were not eager to stay with the respondents during the interviews. The SPGRC also did not look through my recorded notes. After the interviews, I read out my recorded notes to the respondents. The respondents were not concerned about the SPGRC and did not ask me anything concerning the SPGRC or gaining permission from the SPGRC. I was able to explain my research clearly to the respondents and I believe that I developed a good rapport with the respondents. I only proceeded to do the interviews after gaining permission from the SPGRC. The SPGRC provided me with easy access to the Biharis in the camp and I felt comfortable in taking the interviews. This also gave me a type of legitimacy when conducting the interviews. Although I did not specifically ask any questions about the SPGRC to the interviewees, some of them spontaneously talked to me about the negative role of the organization. They accused the SPGRC of the appropriation of relief materials sanctioned for them and extortion in the name of their welfare.8 Other than these concerns, I found that the respondents had very little or no interest in the SPGRC. My second challenge related to dealing with the emotions of the Biharis I interviewed. Emotion is a type of human condition. Human thoughts, behaviors, and social interactions are influenced by emotions (Van Kleef et al. 2016, 6). Traditionally, it has been viewed as an individual phenomenon. In modern times, it has been identified as a social phenomenon (Van Kleef et  al. 2016, 6). Today, “emotionally sensed knowledge” is

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receiving recognition in social research and it is acknowledged that what people feel is socially constructed (Weller 2009, 43). Throughout interviews, it is not surprising for respondents to express their emotions. These emotions can help researchers understand and contextualize the problem better (Holtan et al. 2014, 100). Sometimes asking questions from different angles can become challenging when a respondent becomes emotional. Some experts suggest that researchers can accommodate such a challenge through “bailout protocol” by allowing respondents to cry or move on to another issue and further explore their feelings through a direct approach and discuss their emotional or painful experiences (Melville and Hincks 2016, 10). Other scholars suggest the “reflexivity of researchers” to tackle emotional situations in field research. Reflexivity is researchers’ own way of responding to the challenges of qualitative research and helps researchers maintain self-awareness (Holtan et al. 2014, 100). While interviewing people in “problematic, disadvantaged and vulnerable situations” can evoke emotional situations, these situations demand “reflexivity and self-awareness of the researchers” (Holtan et al. 2014, 100). During interviews, some respondents were very emotional while describing their past, present, and future situations. Some broke down and cried. Sometimes it was very challenging for me to continue the conversations. I observed their state of mind and listened to their stories keenly. In order to overcome the difficulty and make the atmosphere lighter and more comfortable for respondents, I sometimes changed the subject matter and discussed some other issues of common interest like local movies, cricket matches, and so on. When I felt that the situation was favorable, I came back to questions relating to the research. Above all, I patiently listened to their stories and allowed them to fully express their feelings and emotions. The third challenge concerned the difficulties of accessing some of the Bengali politicians and high-ranking civil servants for interviews. It was harder to book appointments with them than I had initially anticipated. For example, I made several attempts to secure appointments with the Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary of the Bangladeshi government without success. In all cases, the staff of the officials I wanted to interview assured me that they would arrange these appointments with them. However, after several hours of waiting in the waiting room, they eventually informed me that it was not possible to get appointments fixed with these officials. I then decided to revise my interview plan. Instead, I

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interviewed entry-level and mid-level officers in South Asian Affairs in the Bangladeshi government responsible for Bihari Affairs.

Significance of the Study This empirical study offers a significant contribution to meeting the gaps between the existing literature and the existing reality of the Biharis in Bangladesh. In this study, I explore the issue of meaningful citizenship of the Biharis in Bangladesh, which remains unexamined in other literature on the issue. My fieldwork demonstrates that although most Biharis are legally Bangladeshi citizens, they are denied many important rights. They do not enjoy rights like other citizens of Bangladesh. My fieldwork has uncovered the root causes of the inability of the Biharis to access some important rights, which gives them a degraded form of citizenship. Based on my fieldwork, I recommend that the Biharis should have equal access to citizenship rights to enjoy full citizenship and make their citizenship meaningful. This study is based on empirical data about the lived experiences of the Biharis in Bangladesh. Currently, most literature on the citizenship of Biharis in Bangladesh is not theoretically linked; they are simply descriptive reports. Inadequate empirical studies about the ethnic Biharis in Bangladesh make this project important, and my study aims to fill the gaps in the existing literature on the Biharis.

Organization of the Book In Chap. 1, I already introduced the research problem and methodology. I also reviewed the literature about the Biharis in Bangladesh. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical and legal framework to analyze the situation of the Biharis in Bangladesh. It focuses on existing concepts and theories of statelessness, citizenship, and citizenship rights. It addresses the concepts of statelessness, nationality, and citizenship, focusing on articulating why statelessness matters, why citizenship is important, and why in thinking about citizenship one must look beyond only formal or legal citizenship. I argue that citizenship should not be limited to legal status only. It should encompass all rights, including social, political, economic, cultural, and legal rights. Along with the theoretical framework, this chapter also focuses on the legal framework, which includes existing citizenship laws in Bangladesh, fundamental principles of state policy, and fundamental rights

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contained in the Constitution of Bangladesh. My fieldwork helps me understand the extent to which Bihari citizens of Bangladesh have access to constitutional rights. It helps locate the gap between theory, law, and reality. Chapter 3 provides further details about the Biharis in Bangladesh and outlines the process through which many Biharis became stateless and deprived of their rights. It defines the Biharis, focuses on their historical background, their problems of integration with the Bengalis in former East Pakistan, and their role in the Liberation War of Bangladesh. It also describes various legal, political, and diplomatic battles to redress statelessness, including repatriation to Pakistan for a certain number of Biharis and developments leading Bangladesh to formally accord citizenship to a certain number of Biharis. Chapter 4 reports the results of my fieldwork in Bangladesh. It illustrates the extent to which Biharis can access rights associated with citizenship. Specifically, the chapter draws on interviews with Biharis in camps in Bangladesh as well as with policymakers, politicians, bureaucrats, and academics familiar with the lived experiences of Bangladeshi Biharis. This chapter focuses on living conditions in the Bihari camps, access to education, employment, healthcare, economic activities, social integration, and access to other rights. This chapter further highlights the Bengali respondents’ views regarding the Biharis in Bangladesh, especially on their rehabilitation, integration, and repatriation. Chapter 5 reveals how Biharis’ restricted access to citizenship rights is inconsistent with citizenship theory, which includes the right to have rights; citizenship laws in Bangladesh; and the Constitution of Bangladesh, including fundamental principles and fundamental rights. On the basis of my fieldwork, I examine whether the living conditions of the Biharis; their lack of access to employment, education, healthcare, and legal documents; and the discrimination that the Biharis are experiencing are consistent with the concept of citizenship, citizenship law, and the constitutional rights of Bangladeshi citizens. The conclusion (Chap. 6) brings together the issues that I analyze and makes recommendations for policy changes that would enable Biharis to access rights associated with citizenship, thereby making their right to citizenship in Bangladesh meaningful.

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Notes 1. The Biharis who are living in Bangladesh fled to former East Pakistan from India because their leaders convinced them that Hijrat (migration) was the only way to get rid of the perpetual miseries of life in Hindu India. To escape from the oppression of the non-Muslims, the holy religion, Islam encouraged its followers for Hijrat (Tajuddin 1994). 2. One analyst argues that the Biharis’ identity crisis originated from a lack of ethnic roots in former East Pakistan and their intrinsic superiority complex, leading to their resettlement in compact areas that contributed to their refusal to integrate and assimilate themselves with the local Bengalis (Sabur 1990, 496). 3. This order was passed to recognize the citizenship of residents in the newly created state. This order did not discriminate between the Bengali and non-­ Bengali population in Bangladesh and therefore was equally applicable to all residents who fell within its provisions. Utilizing this provision, more than half a million Biharis in Bangladesh opted to be integrated with the mainstream Bengalis and recognized as Bangladeshi citizens (Government of Bangladesh 1998). 4. Although no up-to-date survey is available, the UNHCR report is the most recent. 5. Based on the objectives of the study, the strategic selection of “where, when and from whom data will be collected” are determined in the purposive sampling method (Maxwell 2012, 94; For purposive sampling, see Chua 2012, 723–725). 6. Regarding sample size, there is no hard and fast rule in empirical legal research. However, the general rule is that researchers should collect as much data as time and resources allow because inferences based on more data are always preferable (For details, see, Epstein and Martin 2014, 85–86). 7. In my view, apart from some of the Biharis’ formal education, their long association and interactions with Bengalis, access to Bangla radio and television channels, and Bangla movies help them understand both formal and informal Bangla. 8. Some interviewees spontaneously expressed their opinion about the SPGRC.

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Sholder, Hannah. 2011. Housing and Land Rights The Camp Dwelling Urdu-­ Speaking Community in Bangladesh. Dhaka: RMMRU. Silbey, Susan S. 2002. Law and Society Movement. In Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social and Cultural Encyclopedia, ed. Johann J. Hagen and Herbert M. Krittzer, vol. 2, 860–863. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. Silbey, Susan S., and Austin Sarat. 1987. Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research. Law and Society Review 21 (1): 165–174. Squires, Allison. 2009. Methodological Challenges in Cross-language Qualitative Research: A Research Review. International Journal of Nursing Studies 46 (2): 277–287. Tajuddin, Muhammad. 1994. The Stateless People in Bangladesh: A Study. Paper presented to a seminar at the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute, Kolkata [Unpublished]. Temple, Bogusia, and Alys Young. 2004. Qualitative Research and Translation Dilemmas. Qualitative Research 4 (2): 161–178. Tripartite Agreement Between India, Bangladesh and Pakistan for Normalization of Relations in the Sub-Continent. 1974. 9 April, 13 I. L. M. 501. Trubek, David. 1984. Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism. Stanford Law Review 36: 575–622. UNHCR. 2009. Note on the Nationality Status of the Urdu-speaking Community in Bangladesh. Online: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/4b2b90c32.html. ———. 2015. How a Bangladeshi Court Ruling Changed the Lives of More than 300,000 Stateless People. 23 February. Online: https://www.unhcr.org/ news/stories/how-­b angladesh-­court-­r uling-­changed-­l ives-­more-­300000-­ stateless-­people. Van Kleef, Gerben A., et al. 2016. The Social Nature of Emotions. Frontiers in Psychology 7: 896–900. Weiner, Myron. 1996. Bad Neighbours, Bad Neighborhoods. International Security 21: 5–42. Weller, Susie. 2009. Mapping Emotions in Different Spaces of Research and Dissemination. In Up Close and Personal: Relationships and Emotions Within and Through Research, ed. Susie Weller and Chamion Caballero, 43–55. London: London South Bank University. Ziring, Lawrence. 1994. Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad: An Interpretive Study. Dhaka: The University Press Limited.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical and Legal Framework: Statelessness, Citizenship, and Rights Associated with Citizenship

Introduction This chapter has twin goals. I begin by outlining the concept of statelessness and then explore the distinction between de jure statelessness and de facto statelessness. I also look at how international law and international human rights law address the issue of statelessness. In this section, I argue that stateless people are unable to access citizenship rights and their exclusion is tantamount to domination, exploitation, and marginalization. Next, I conceptualize nationality and citizenship and discuss the evolution and development of citizenship. I also analyze the differences and similarities between nationality and citizenship and discuss the rights associated with citizenship. I also examine the constitutional laws of Bangladesh and the citizenship rights that exist in the Constitution of Bangladesh. I argue that citizenship should be understood not just as a legal status or membership of a country. Rather, citizenship should be understood as a transaction of rights and responsibilities between a state and its members.

Understanding Statelessness Although nationality does not always secure a good life, statelessness makes individuals disqualified to make claims on the state and “it disrupts the state’s ability to plan and provide resources and services to the individual” (Bhabha 2011, 1). Stateless people suffer from ineffective © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 Z. Haider, Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46129-3_2

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governance and become victims of discrimination by the state where they live (Blitz and Lynch 2011, 4). Comparing the citizens with the noncitizens, Jacqueline Bhabha explains how adversely statelessness affects an individual: Citizens have a privileged claim to public concern and expenditure where noncitizens do not; citizens exemplify the norm, the standard, the instantiation of national interest where noncitizens do not. In short, through their vote, their agency in public office, their civic participation, their clout as primary addresses of politicians, citizens have a role in shaping the society they live in that is radically different from noncitizens. (Bhabha 2014, 66)

Statelessness does not match with just international order. On the contrary, nationality or citizenship is the only criterion for creating an international affiliation between an individual and a state, and citizenship is the only qualified status of nationality designed to confer rights (Stiller 2012, 95). An individual relies on nationality to appear on the international stage too. Nationals abroad have access to the benefits of international law called the diplomatic and consular protection of his/her state (Stiller 2012, 95). The country conferring nationality to individuals has the right to extend its diplomatic protection involving intervention on behalf of its own nationals if their rights are violated by another state (Stiller 2012, 95). Unfortunately, no state provides diplomatic protection to a stateless person. Today, a large number of people lack “secure citizenship” due to the “evaporation” of state protection (Kerber 2005, 728). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) globally recorded approximately 3.3 million stateless people in 2012 (UNHCR Global Trends 2012). The increasing number of statelessness creates the necessity for a wider understanding of statelessness (Haider 2022, 175). I address the following questions: What is statelessness? Why does stateless matter? What are the debates over de jure and de facto statelessness? How do international law and international human rights law address the issue of statelessness? In this section, I argue that stateless people are unable to access citizenship rights and their exclusion is tantamount to domination, exploitation, and marginalization.

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Defining Statelessness Statelessness is an old issue, and it existed in different phases of history under different names. Thomas J. Thompson claims that ancient civilizations were stateless, for example, the Harappans were stateless people, although they owned a great Harappa Civilization (Thompson 2005, 366). To refer to stateless persons, The Helvetic Federal Constitution of 1848 used the term heimatlos (Seckler-Hudson 1934, 14). Stateless people are also identified as Staatlos in Germany, apolide in Italy, apatride in France, and stateless, and without a country in England and America (Seckler-Hudson 1934, 14). Stateless people did not always exist as a distinct group. Before the twentieth century, refugees and stateless persons were considered as the same group of people (Batchelor 1995b, 239). Statelessness has emerged as a separate entity in the twentieth century. UNHCR describes stateless persons as: Often they are excluded from the cradle to grave being denied a legal identity when they are born, access to education, health-care, marriage, and job opportunities during their lifetime, and even the dignity of an official burial and death certificate when they die. (UNHCR November 2010)

To Michael Walzer, statelessness is a denial of membership (of the community) which causes not only exclusion from that community’s network of power but also from international recognition (Staples 2012, 35–36). Chief Justice Earl Warren of the U.S. Supreme Court posits that they lost the “right to have rights” (Trop v. Dulles 1958). Being stateless is perhaps the most vulnerable position for an individual in which he or she finds him or herself under international law (Doebbler 2002, 528). Caroline Sawyer identifies statelessness as a position of detachment, exclusion, and abandonment” (Sawyer 2011, 69). L. Oppenheim is of the opinion that “since stateless individuals do not own a nationality, the principal link by which they could derive benefits from international law is missing, and thus they lack protection as far as this law is concerned” (Oppenheim 1955, 551 as cited in McDougal et al. 74, 961). Excluded from citizenship rights, stateless people are victims of oppression, domination, and marginalization. If citizenship means the “right to have rights,” statelessness is the denial of rights. Generally, a stateless person is “destitute of nationality intentionally or unintentionally, knowingly or unknowingly” (Seckler-Hudson 1934, 12). The political process does

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not include a stateless person. Their exclusion means they do not have access to equal citizenship rights or they are victims of oppression, domination, or marginalization (Allen 2005). Statelessness is classified as de jure and de facto statelessness in the literature; however, international law protects de jure stateless people only. International law directly does not protect the de facto stateless persons (Batchelor 1995b, 258). De jure stateless persons are those who are not considered as nationals by any state “under the operation of its law” (Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954). On the other hand, according to UNHCR, “de facto stateless persons are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or, for valid reasons are unwilling to avail themselves of protection of that country” (UNHCR 27–28 May 2010). In the above definition, the UNHCR explains that persons who are de facto stateless cannot be inside the country of their nationality, they must be outside the country. The definition of UNHCR is exclusive. It does not consider de facto stateless to those persons who are discriminated against, deprived, and excluded from the rights and duties within the countries of their nationality. Therefore, the definition of UNHCR is inadequate to address the actual picture of de facto stateless persons. To understand de facto statelessness truly, we need an inclusive definition, and we should go beyond the UNHCR’s definition. This inclusive definition includes those persons who within the country of nationality are unable to access equal rights and duties like other citizens. Outside the country of nationality, they are unable to establish their nationality. They are unprotected by any binding recommendations of international treaty regimes like the de jure stateless persons (The Equal Rights Trust 2010). Mark Manly and Laura Van Waas describe this situation (de facto statelessness) as persons who formally possess a nationality but who cannot formally exercise the rights that flow from it (Manly and Van Waas 2010). They lead a life like second-­ class citizens in their country of birth, although, modern citizenship rules out the concept of second-class citizens (Blank 2007, 417). Robin Cohen calls them “Helots” because the international conventions do not protect them.1

Why Statelessness Matters Francis M. Deng writes, “If citizenship is nothing less than the ‘right to have rights,’ stateless people are stripped of the right to have rights” (Deng 2001). Paul Weis describes the stateless person as a “vessel on the open

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sea, not sailing under any flag” (Weis 1962, 1078). A stateless person also looks like “a bird that flies alone” or “an international vagabond” (McDougal et al. 1974, 961). Statelessness causes human insecurity. The right to life, liberty, and equality are the fundamental elements of human rights. Stateless people are often denied most of these fundamental rights such as liberty and equality. Stateless persons or aliens, as Linda Bosniak points out, “are formally ineligible for many aspects of social citizenship or the public provisions of basic needs; and they are always subject to the possibility of deportation from the territory” (Bosniak 2006, 10). Despite having the legal qualifications for security, that is, protection and empowerment, the stateless peoples intrinsically suffer from civil, political, and social security, which automatically transforms them into disempowered persons. Caroline Sawyer identifies statelessness as “a position of detachment, exclusion, and abandonment” (Sawyer 2011, 69). Statelessness violates human rights. Without documents, it becomes difficult for stateless persons to receive social services. Their applications for identity documents often receive a rejection. Lack of proper identification often keeps them away from acquiring jobs, receiving medical facilities, enjoying legal protection, getting birth, marriage, and death registration, and owning property. Their feelings as expressed are: “We can’t get regular jobs, we cannot move, we are like boats without ports” (Manly and Van Waas 2010, 51). Without legal documents, if a stateless person travels beyond the border of her country of residence, she might not get her readmission there. Non-availability of identity documents prevents her from considering a person before the law, and as such, she is a legal ghost (Manly and Van Waas 2010, 52).

Debates Over De jure and De facto Statelessness Stateless persons are recognized as de jure stateless and de facto stateless. De jure statelessness refers to persons who lack legal status as a member of any state (Lee 2005, 15). The 1949 UN study defined that “Stateless persons de jure are persons who are not nationals of any State, either because at birth or subsequently they were not given any nationality, or because during their lifetime they lost their own nationality and did not acquire a new one” (UN Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, August 1949). The 1954 Convention’s definition applies to the de jure statelessness, that is, a de jure stateless person is one “who is not considered as a national by any State under operation of its law” (Convention

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Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954). De jure stateless persons are identified as people with some protection of international law. In the legal sense, stateless means de jure stateless persons; they are legally protected at the minimum level. International statelessness conventions either offered practical rights or a path to nationality to the de jure stateless persons. The 1954 Convention’s definition of de jure statelessness is seriously questioned by some legal scholars. They believe that the concept of statelessness should encompass more than de jure statelessness (Weissbrodt and Collins 2006, 251). To them, this definition is too narrow and limiting because it excludes de facto stateless persons or ineffective citizens’ nationality (Weissbrodt and Collins 2006, 251). Carol A. Batchelor conceives that “it is a technical, legal definition which can address only technical, legal problems. …The definition is not one of quality, simply one of fact” (Batchelor 1995b, 232). A study of the United Nations defined de facto statelessness in 1949 as: Persons who, having left the country of which they were nationals, no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of their national authorities, either because these authorities refuse to grant them assistance and protection, or because they themselves renounce the assistance and protection of the countries of which they are nationals. (UN Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, August 1949)

While the Equal Rights Trust has developed its own definition identifying different scenarios that mount to de facto statelessness: The de facto statelessness would range from those who have been deprived of effective nationality and state protection by administrative mistake, to those targeted for discrimination, persecution, and abuse by the state. In between these two extremes would be those within their home countries who face undue administrative and bureaucratic indifference, delays, and corruption; those who lack documentation; those who are in a foreign land and find themselves without consular protection; and those who are nationals of a “collapsed” or “failing” state. (The Equal Rights Trust 2010, 65)

A nationality formally exists in the case of de facto stateless persons, but at the national level, they are the victims of discrimination and at the international level, they no longer enjoy the protection or assistance of the country of nationality (Stiller 2012, 94). Cohen called them “helots”

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because they remain unrecognized under international conventions (Cohen 1989, 162). De facto stateless persons lead a life like second-class citizens in their country of birth, although, modern citizenship rules out the concept of second-class citizens. P. Weis understands that persons who possess a nationality but do not possess the protection of their state of nationality and who reside outside the territory of that state are de facto stateless persons (Weis 1962, 1086). They are practically stateless, although not legally. Their position is between citizenship and de jure statelessness who are denied effective protection (Goris et al. 2009, 4). De facto stateless persons are not protected by the provisions of the 1954 Convention even though the Final Act of the Convention includes a non-binding recommendation that calls upon states to consider sympathetically the possibility of providing protection to de facto stateless persons which the Convention offers to de jure stateless. The Final Act of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness also incorporates a provision covering de facto stateless persons. It recommends that “persons who are stateless de facto should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an effective nationality” (Final Act of the United Nations Conference 1961). It is, therefore, evident that the de facto stateless persons are not covered by the non-binding provisions of the Conventions on statelessness whereas the de jure stateless persons are guaranteed a minimum level of protection through the Convention. Due to the non-binding nature of the principle of the Final Act, it is unlikely that the de facto stateless persons shall receive an equal level of protection as the de jure stateless persons. If a stateless person is to receive protection under international law, it is essential that he or she be able to prove de jure statelessness. The distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness causes unfair discrimination to the de facto stateless persons. They are subject to discrimination and lose protection under international law because of their exclusion from the Convention (Wakelin 2012, 3). It is difficult to determine the distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness indeed. Legally, de facto statelessness differs from de jure statelessness appreciably, but practically it is similar (Staples 2012, 19). Hannah Arendt rules out the distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness; she virtually forms identical views regarding both groups of stateless persons. She links the two concepts because practically she finds no effective state to offer any state protection or support to either de facto or de jure stateless

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persons (Arendt 1951 as cited in Blitz and Sawyer 2011, 4–6). Similarly, Laura Van Waas does not recognize the distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness, which she claims to be a false dichotomy since none of those can access their human rights (Waas 2008, 23). Jasson E. Tucker (Tucker 2014) refuses to recognize the concept of de facto statelessness within the discourse of statelessness. To him, de facto statelessness is a “vague concept”. De facto or ineffective citizenship does not make a person stateless on the grounds that still she/he possesses a legal bond of citizenship. Similarly, a de jure stateless person who is enjoying certain citizenship rights even if these are as effective as citizens still does not acquire a legal bond of citizenship. In Tucker’s opinion, the advocates of de facto statelessness ignore the importance of the legal bond of citizenship and therefore the designation of de facto statelessness is illogical since nationality is a legal concept. Therefore, he suggests prohibiting the inclusion of de facto statelessness within the statelessness discourse. By statelessness, he means only de jure statelessness. According to Tucker by trying to manipulate space for the vague concept of ineffective citizenship, the potency, and even purpose, of the protection regime surrounding statelessness will be greatly diminished. If the protection regime fails to define who it is meant for, which would happen with the inclusion of de facto statelessness, no protection could realistically be offered to people with ineffective citizenship and even more worryingly to those who are de jure stateless. (Tucker 2014, 282)

Although Tucker’s argument seems legally valid, it is practically unacceptable. His argument is questionable. What is the use of legal but ineffective or dysfunctional citizenship or nationality if it does not deliver anything to citizens but abuses, exploits, and sufferings? What is the meaning of worthless citizenship where governments fail to provide the accompanying benefits of citizenship to peoples, like protection or assistance, or “when persons relinquish the services, benefits, and protection of their country” (Weissbrodt and Collins 2006, 252). The de facto stateless persons suffer more than de jure stateless persons. Tucker’s claim of de facto statelessness as a “vague concept” does not stand since the legal regimes like the 1951 Refugee Convention, 1954 Convention on Stateless People, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness recognize the concept of de facto statelessness. Therefore, the question of

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non-recognition of the de facto statelessness is irrelevant. Besides, all important scholars within the discourse of statelessness have clearly underlined de facto statelessness. Weissbrodt and Collins consider: Persons who are de facto stateless often have a nationality according to the law, but this nationality is not effective, or they cannot prove or verify their nationality. De facto statelessness can occur when governments withhold the usual benefits of citizens, such as protection and assistance, or when persons relinquish the services, benefits, and protection of their country. Put another way, persons who are de facto stateless might have legal claim to the benefits of nationality but are not, for a variety of reasons, able to enjoy these benefits. They are effectively without nationality. (Weissbrodt and Collins 2006, 251–252)

Like Tucker, The UNHCR, in its Expert Meeting in Prato, Italy 2010, also refused to recognize the concept of de facto stateless (UNHCR, Expert meeting 2010). UNHCR rejects the concept of de facto stateless persons on the grounds that de facto stateless is doctrinally questionable. In some cases, the de facto stateless persons are de jure stateless, “in other cases, they fit the traditional conception of de facto statelessness, and in yet other cases they should not be considered de facto stateless at all” (UNHCR 2010). UNHCR’s rejection of the concept of de facto statelessness not only frustrates the de facto stateless persons and scholars on the subject but also contravenes the 1954 Convention Relating the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Both conventions have recognized de facto stateless persons and both conventions are sponsored by the UN. These international conventions2 by now have become rules of Customary International law. Therefore, UNHCR’s position on de facto stateless persons (non-recognition of the concept of de facto stateless persons) is untenable or does not stand unless the Final Acts of 1954 and 1961 Conventions are repelled or revised. UNHCR’s definition might have reflected the statist approach because UNHCR represents the views of the member states and cannot go beyond the political and economic interests of the member countries. Thus, UNHCR ignores the human rights of the de facto stateless persons by not recognizing them as a separate entity as the established scholars on statelessness discourse have disagreements with the UNHCR’s claim that de facto statelessness is not statelessness.

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After a careful review of the above literature and debates, I have come to the conclusion that de facto statelessness does exist, and it is a reality. By de facto stateless persons, I understand that people who technically have a nationality and who are living within or outside the country of their nationality, but practically are denied the benefits of effective nationality due to administrative discrimination or mistake or their citizenship is ineffective. They are de jure citizens, but de facto stateless. For example, within the country of nationality, they are unable to access equal rights and responsibilities like other citizens, and outside the country of nationality, they are denied consular protections, refused passports, or denied the rights to return and reside in that country. Now the question may arise, where is the end of de facto statelessness? Or what is the bottom line of de facto statelessness? The answer lies in the equal constitutional protection of all citizens. If any state violates, denies, encroaches, or ignores the rights and responsibilities (granted by the constitution) of any citizen or group of citizens at home or abroad on any discriminatory or unlawful grounds, or fails to restore these rights and duties, the victims may be considered as de facto stateless persons. Therefore, de facto statelessness is limited to the denial or violation of the rights of any citizen provided by the constitution of the country of nationality or citizenship.

Global Legal Instruments for the Protection of Stateless Persons The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of the Refugees (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951) protects some of the de facto stateless persons, but this protection is limited to stateless refugees only. Consequently, the non-refugee stateless persons remain unprotected under the 1951 Refugee Convention. International specialized legal instruments like the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of the Stateless People (hereinafter 1954 Convention) and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961) deal with the de jure stateless persons only. The de jure stateless persons are protected under these two legal regimes. These conventions do not directly deal with the de facto stateless persons. These two conventions have non-binding recommendations on the contracting states for the protection of the de facto stateless persons like the de jure stateless. Since the final acts are non-binding recommendations, these soft laws cannot

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provide any effective protection to de facto stateless persons. Therefore, the de facto stateless persons remain virtually unprotected under these two conventions’ (The Equal Rights Trust 2010, 43).

Human Rights Instruments in Addressing the Statelessness3 The law regarding the prevention and reduction of statelessness, incorporated in the International Bill of Human Rights,4 consists of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR 1966), the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948). Besides, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1989), the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW 1979), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD 1965), and the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (CNMW 1957) also prohibit all forms of statelessness. In addition, the Convention for the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families (ICPRMW 1990) also deals with both de jure and de facto stateless people. Regional conventions like the European Convention on Nationality (1997), the Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in relation to State Succession (2006), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981) are also concerned with the reduction and prevention of statelessness. Furthermore, several advocacy groups within the UN system, Western NGOs, local NGOs, and individual efforts are also devoted to deal with global statelessness (Blitz 2009, 25–33). All these treaties have a common feature of universality and non-­discrimination (Brouwer 2003, 13). Here, I will deal with some major human rights instruments that provide protection to de facto as well as de jure stateless persons. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948 Statelessness is obviously a violation of the UDHR. “Right to a nationality” is arguably the principal norm for the reduction of statelessness, found

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in the UDHR (Manly and Van Waas 2010, 60). Article 15 of the UDHR recognizes that nationality provides access to human rights and prevents the arbitrary deprivation of human rights. Article 15(1) clearly declares that every body has the right to nationality and Article 15(2) further states that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality” (UDHR). Similarly, Article 25(1) states that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing, and Medicare and necessary social services” (UDHR). Despite its universality, it is important to keep in mind that UDHR is a non-binding inspirational document. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966 It focuses on the rights of people rather than persons to self-determination and the pursuit of economic, social, and cultural development (Sawyer 2011, 82). Article 1(1) says: “All peoples have the right of self-­ determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development” (ICESCR 1966). The ICESCR prevents any distinction between citizens and non-citizens regarding economic, social, and cultural rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 It provides the principle of universal protection, which obviously involves the problem of both de facto and de jure statelessness. The norm enshrined in the ICCPR is applicable to everyone, irrespective of nationality or statelessness (Manly and Van Waas 2010, 66). Article 16 of the ICCPR has recognized that “Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law” (ICCPR 1966). Article 27 acknowledges the rights of minorities, including the rights on the grounds of ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural backgrounds (ICCPR; Blitz 2011, 44). By everyone, the ICCPR presumably includes stateless persons and all members of the human community that deserve inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights (Conklin 2014, 151).

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The Convention on the Rights of the Children (CRC), 1989 The CRC provides universal protection on matters of nationality. The CRC is the first legally binding international document to incorporate complete human rights, including civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights (Shackel 2003, 23). The CRC enshrines four key principles which include: (1) non-discrimination (Articles 2.1 and 2.2, CRC 1989); (2) the best interest of the child (Article 3.1, CRC 1989); (3) the right to life, survival, and development (Articles 6.1 and 6.2, CRC 1989); and (4) respect for the views of the child (Articles12.1 and 12.2, CRC 1989). Other Human Rights Instruments in Addressing Statelessness The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Article 9(1) provides that state parties should ensure that “neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless” (CEDAW 1979). Article 9(2) recognizes equal rights of women with men “with respect to the nationality of their children” (CEDAW 1979). International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Article 2(1) provides that all state parties to the treaty will take appropriate measures to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination (ICERD 1965). Article 5(d) (iii) clearly stresses the protection of nationality on the grounds of race, color, or national or ethnic origin (ICERD 1965). The ICERD recognizes that differential treatment between groups of non-citizens may cause racial discrimination, and Article 5 reaffirms the universal provision that state parties are obliged to ensure equality for all in the enjoyment of political, economic, social, and cultural rights according to international law (Blitz 2011, 46). The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (CNMW 1957) protects women from automatically losing their nationality upon marriage or divorce or from being rendered stateless by changes in a husband’s nationality. Married women habitually would lose their nationality upon marriage and would take that of their husband. This could cause de facto statelessness in case of the death of their husband, leaving them unable to return to their original home (Kerber 2009 as cited in Sawyer 2011, 86). International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families (ICPRMW 1990), Articles 25(3) and 29 also deal with stateless people. Article 25 (3) provides that “States Parties shall

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take all appropriate measures to ensure that migrant workers are not deprived of any rights derived from [the principle of equality] by reason of any irregularity in their stay or employment” (ICPRMW 1990). Article 29 provides that “Each child of a migrant worker shall have the right to a name, to registration of birth and to a nationality” (ICPRMW 1990). Some legal scholars argue that it reiterates the principle of universal protection and is directly relevant to de facto stateless persons (Blitz 2011, 46). The Convention follows the principle of equality of treatment for all migrant workers regardless of their regular or irregular legal status (Hune 1991, 810).

Understanding Citizenship Citizenship rights are human rights. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, every individual has the right to nationality and the right to change his/her nationality (UDHR 1948). Hannah Arendt has defined citizenship as an ultimate right or the “right to have the rights” (Arendt 1958, 296). Some scholars believe that citizenship rights include the unrestricted right to enter and reside permanently in a territory and return to that territory from abroad (Edward and Ferstman 2010, 5). Citizenship rights also involve the right to receive protection from the state within and outside state territory, including access to consular assistance and diplomatic protection. Furthermore, citizenship rights cover different political rights, including full membership in the state and accompanying rights to economic, social, and cultural protection. Citizens enjoy all rights and obligations in full equality and without discrimination (Edward and Ferstman 2010, 5). Daniel Gorman argues: Citizenship is a primary means through which societies assert, construct, and consecrate their sense of identity. It is about who belongs to the nation, who does not, and why. Citizenship thus connotes a sense of civic belonging, comprising both social and legal-political identities. (Gorman 2006, 1)

For many centuries, citizenship was considered a privileged status. Property ownership and other conditions were prerequisites for obtaining citizenship. Today, citizenship rights are extended to all members of society as an aspect of nationality (Jackson 2003, 2). By virtue of citizenship, every individual has the right to leave any country, including his/her own, and to return to his/her country (Turack 1972, 1).

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This section conceptualizes nationality and citizenship and discusses the rights associated with citizenship. In this section, I argue that citizenship should be understood not just as a legal status or membership of a country. Rather, citizenship should be understood as a transaction of rights and responsibilities between a state and its members. Responsibilities are considered conditions for rights because rights are not viable without responsibilities (Kerber 2005, 17). The reciprocity of rights and responsibilities and individual participation in the process of exercising such rights and duties create a kind of attachment or link between an individual and his/her country of nationality. Citizenship should require moral bonds or effective nationality, which involves a set of relations, ties, rights, and duties between a person and a state. Habitual residence, interest, participation in public life, attachment to the country, and so on are examples of such moral or effective bonds. In my view, citizenship should not only be seen through a legal lens, which provides a partial picture of citizenship rights. Rather, it should be seen in a substantive way, encompassing social, political, economic, cultural, and legal rights. These rights should be attained through the process of participation in certain responsibilities or duties which create a moral bond or attachment between a person and a state. Such rights, responsibilities, and attachments can contribute to the development of effective or meaningful citizenship. M. L. Harrison argues: Citizenship is very much about relationships between individuals, groups, rights, duties and state institutions; it is also about relative degrees of incorporation and empowerment…In any event amongst its possible attributes effective citizenship certainly means being included in the systems of rights and welfare provisions that are mediated or managed by state agencies and having one’s needs met through mainstream political intermediation. (Harrison 1995, 20–21)

How did the concept of citizenship evolve and develop? How should it be understood in our present time? How is citizenship obtained? Do citizenship and nationality have the same meaning? Why is nationality or citizenship important? What is citizenship and what are the rights associated with citizenship? Do these rights exist in the Constitution of Bangladesh? This section will deal with these questions.

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The Evolution and Development of Citizenship Citizenship is the product of a century-long struggle. The struggle for citizenship is the struggle against exclusion and inequalities produced by exclusion. Through the stages of struggle and development, national citizenship takes its contemporary form with the establishment of the passport regime. The concepts of transnational citizenship, global or world citizenship are still at the conceptual levels. In this section, I critically analyze the development of citizenship in ancient and modern times. Ancient Citizenship The term citizenship is derived from the Latin word civitas which means “a body of people constituting a politically organized community” (Merriam-Webster). Nelson translated civitas as a state (Nelson 2015, 84). The idea of citizen was developed in the polis, the Greek city-states in about 600–700 BC (Clarke 1994, 4). Greece is called the birthplace of citizenship because it introduced the first self-government based on the participation of citizens. The first legislation and theory of social and political organizations also originated in Greece (Riesenberg 1992, xxii). War among the city-states caused the emergence of citizenship in Greece. As a reward for their services in war, warriors were granted certain benefits that were denied to other segments of the population. Thus, citizenship became significant in Greek political life (Riesenberg 1992, 4). Although Greek political thinkers Plato and Aristotle contributed significantly to the development of citizenship, the Romans developed citizenship as a legal and political institution and modified and incorporated the Greek conceptions or ideas of citizenship into their system (Riesenberg 1992, 47). Plato emphasizes education to make an individual a citizen so that the individual can play a proper role in public services. To him, “virtue is knowledge,” and it is required to make the perfect citizen. He understands that virtue should be acquired so that a person can “desire and love to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice” (Plato, translated by Saunders 1975, 73). Like Plato, Aristotle also gives importance to education for citizens. However, he argues that citizenship should be limited to freemen because freemen do not need to work for their livelihood and therefore have the time to work for the government. They are well educated, and their virtues make them qualified to govern as well as to be governed (Loomis 1943, 292).

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Aristotle excludes women from citizenship on the grounds that they are inferior to men. He also does not count craftsmen, laborers, aliens, children, tradesmen, farmers, and slaves because they do not have the proper qualifications. These qualifications essentially include education and experience in holding governmental positions. Children are denied complete citizenship due to immaturity. For Aristotle, citizenship is the privileged status for the ruling class of the Greek city-state (Barbalet 1988, 3). According to Aristotle, “He who enjoys the right of sharing in deliberative or judicial office [for any period, fixed or unfixed] attains thereby the status of a citizen of his state and a state, in its simplest terms is a body of such persons adequate in number for achieving a self-sufficient existence” (Aristotle, trans. by Barker 1962, 92). For Aristotle, citizens (politon) constitute the civic body (politteuma), and in any state the civic body is sovereign (kyrios) over the state (Johnson 1990, 128–131). Therefore, in Aristotle’s view, citizens are those who deserve to rule (Johnson 1990, 123). The concept of ancient citizenship, unlike modern and contemporary citizenship ideas, was not universal. In its ancient form, citizenship was based on class and gender and excluded the non-governing classes and females. Therefore, the platonic and Aristotelian concepts of citizenship do not have any relevance today. Citizenship is a universal idea in our contemporary world. Modern citizenship, however, owes its birth to the ancient ideas of citizenship. The Emergence of Modern Citizenship The concept of modern citizenship obtained prominence in the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712 to 1778). Rousseau’s concept of the social contract between the state and citizens proposes a government of “free citizens living in harmony under the ‘general will’” (Riesenberg 1992, 17). According to Rousseau, individuals in the polity are both citizens and subjects. Rousseau argues that the constant will of members of the state is the general will and by virtue of it, members are citizens and free because the general will is their will (Rousseau, trans. by Cole 1993, 175). In the late eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant introduced the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship.5 Kant argued that only the creation of “political and moral cosmopolitanism—a universal citizenship can prevent war” (Kant, trans. by Fredrich, 1949 as cited in Gorman 2006, 18). He suggested, “cosmopolitan law,” where “both states and individuals have rights, and

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where individuals have these rights as ‘citizens of the earth’ rather than as citizens of particular states” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2002). The period between the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1775 and the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 is considered the turning point for the development of modern citizenship (Fahrmeir 2007, 27). The United States Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 ended the monarchical government and introduced democratic governance or citizen rule (Fahrmeir 2007, 27). A comprehensive passport regime introduced documented modern citizenship in France in the early 1790s and soon was adopted across Europe (Spencer 1992, 19 as cited in Fahrmeir 2007, 27). The laws on the acquisition of formal citizenship, naturalization, and political rights were passed by the States and the United States between 1776 and 1789 against the growing demands for a North American federation (Fahrmeir 2007, 29). After the end of the American Civil War (1861–1865), with the adoption of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in 1868, the primacy of national citizenship was established (Fahrmeir 2007, 29). The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution extended citizenship to black people (Matteo 1997, 20) while the 15th Amendment guaranteed their right to vote, further consolidating citizenship for black people. Through the 15th Amendment, Congress and states were prohibited from denying or abridging the right to vote on the grounds of race, color, or previous slavery (Matteo 1997, 20). Against the backdrop of the civil rights movement in the United States, the struggle for citizenship gained momentum in the early 1920s through the 19th Amendment of the US Constitution, which extended voting rights to women. This amendment barred the federal and state governments from limiting the right to vote based on gender (Matteo 1997, 21). The civil rights movement and constitutional reforms in the United States have changed the lives of people throughout the world. It provided a clear roadmap for social justice movements and a model to challenge any form of repression and deprivation anywhere in the world (Gaston 2015). It was a milestone in the struggle against inequality and discrimination (Rosenberg 2005, 1153; Jones 2002, 6). In South Africa, the civil rights movement influenced the anti-apartheid movement, and in South Asia, it influenced the Indian nationalist movement, especially the non-violent movement of Mohandas K. Gandhi (Harvey 2016). Again, in postcolonial South Asia, the newly emerged nation-states used excessive power over their citizens and weakened the

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capacity of citizens to resist state powers. Therefore, ordinary citizens have failed to gain the full protection of states (Chatterji 2012, 1070). Minorities in South Asia have especially possessed a form of citizenship that is profoundly inflexible, making them immobile and vulnerable (Chatterji 2012, 1070). The civil rights movements and civil rights acts inspired these oppressed minorities to fight for their rights. The civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. significantly influenced the Bengalis’ fight for equal rights against the internal colonialism6 of Pakistan during the 1950s–1970s.7 Therefore, the struggle for citizenship rights is the struggle against exclusion and inequalities (Barbalet 1988, 44). Citizenship rights have been established substantially by political struggles throughout the world. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the idea of imperial citizenship was developed by intellectuals in Britain.8 Such a concept of citizenship derived from the previous dictum that “Great Britain presided over an Empire upon which the sun never sets” (Gorman 2006, 1). The imperial ideologues presented the idea of imperial citizenship as “a means of fostering imperial unity and cementing Britain’s status as a leading imperial power in an increasingly competitive geo-political world” (Gorman 2006, 2). The institution of imperial citizenship provided a window through which the political ideology of the Empire was viewed (Gorman 2006, 2). The growth of the European Union has created new challenges regarding the status of citizenship not only for minorities but also for transient and migrant labor (Weiller 1999, 328). The introduction of European citizenship in the name of European integration is challenged by many Europeans on the grounds that it has changed the existing understanding of national membership or citizenship. It is seen by some European scholars as the fragmentation of sovereignty (Weiller 1999, 328). In my opinion, the United Kingdom’s recent decision to quit the European Union is a challenge to European citizenship. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, some scholars argued that citizenship was increasingly being denationalized and favored the transformation from national to global or world citizenship. They argued that transnational, global, or world citizenship would confer rights and benefits on human beings regardless of their citizenship status (Kapur 2007, 562). Contemporary human rights instruments guarantee rights to persons as human beings, not as nationals (Brudner 1985, 219). In fact, human rights movements and economic globalization tend to inspire

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nation-states to adopt the new model of globalized citizenship (Fernandez-­ Kelly 2002, 349; Hernandez-Truyol 2005, 1023). Linkages and Differences between Nationality and Citizenship The concepts of citizenship and nationality are interlinked and used interchangeably. Conceptually and linguistically, both nationality and citizenship connote state membership (Weis 1979, 4) or belonging (Hartnell 2006, 342). Legally, citizenship and nationality are used synonymously to refer to the formal link between a state and individuals and this link amounts to “a bundle of privileges, powers and immunities” (Lavi 2011, 790). Traditionally, nationality is the international legal term that includes a number of rights and responsibilities for individuals, such as obeying domestic laws, paying taxes to the government, mandatory participation in the army if necessary, and the right to receive state protection even outside the country of citizenship (Hartnell 2006, 343; Forcese 2014, 555). In the Westphalia system, citizenship means membership in a particular state (Hartnell 2006, 344). It is a sociological, political, and legal concept (Hartnell 2006, p. 344). Looking at citizenship only through a legal lens denies the “functional significance of the relevant polity for individual citizens” (Jones 2005, 145). Although it is easy to understand the legal contents of citizenship through a legal lens, it is difficult to comprehend its political and social meanings (Everson 1995, 76). Some legal scholars recognize that the legal definition is important, but it only explains a small picture of substantive citizenship (Hartnell 2006, 344). Therefore, some prominent legal scholars also emphasize an interdisciplinary approach to the study of citizenship (Shaw 1998, 295–296). In some languages, nationality is an ambiguous term that denotes membership in an ethnocultural community or national citizenship (Maatsch 2011, 3). In a political sense, nationality refers to the status of a person determined by their allegiance to a state and in return entitles the person protection of the state (Joyner 2005, 63). Alfonsi distinguishes between citizenship and nationality. To him, citizenship belongs to a political collectivity and nationality includes a cultural community. These two are not co-terminus (Alfonsi 1997, 53). National identity, as Oyelaran and Adediran understand, combines a conscious orientation and loyalty to a nation. They contend that national identity and citizenship are neither mutually exclusive nor does one presuppose the other. National identity is a socio-psychological disposition, while citizenship is both a legal status

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and existential experience of individuals regardless of their de facto national identity (Oyelaran and Adediran 1997, 176). Citizenship is narrowly understood as a legal status, while in a broad sense, it is a set of rights and duties (Maatsch 2011, 3). The term nationality also distinguishes between a multi-nation and one nation-state (Maatsch 2011, 3). Citizenship is a broader concept than nationality because it encompasses various types of nationalities (Maatsch 2011, 3). For example, in a multicultural state such as Canada, many national citizenship holders are simultaneously members of different nationalities. Similarly, in a multinational state such as the United States of America, many national citizenship holders simultaneously hold membership of different nationalities. To differentiate between nationality and citizenship, P. Weis argues that all citizens are nationals, but all nationals are not necessarily citizens of the state (Weis 1979, 5–6). Elizabeth Hartnell believes that citizenship, in terms of content, is having a greater quantity of rights and duties than those attached to nationality. Citizenship, like nationality, is still seen with reference to the state (Hartnell 2006, 347). In practice, however, the terms nationality and citizenship are used interchangeably. Although the term citizenship is mostly used in Bangladesh, in some cases, the term nationality has been used interchangeably with citizenship (Hoque 2016, 2). Hoque argues: In Bangladesh, however, the term “citizenship” is of predominant usage. It is used in the Constitution and the citizenship laws of the country, although in some policy documents and legal instruments, the terms nationality or national have been used interchangeably with “citizenship” or “citizens.” (Hoque 2016, 2)

In my view, the real meaning of nationality (ethnic nationality/identity or broader national membership) depends on its use. I have used the concepts of nationality and citizenship interchangeably in this book.

Ways of Obtaining Citizenship Generally, whether an individual is a citizen or not is a decision taken by the government of a particular country by national standards, not international standards. The right to grant citizenship is an important attribute of national sovereignty (Edward and Ferstman 2010, 7). It is considered an important constitutional jurisdiction of the government, regulated by the

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laws of the land. According to international law, nationality is the status of a person bound by the tie of allegiance to a state and entitled to the protection of that state (Tung 1968, 205). International law leaves it to each state to define who its nationals are and who are not, but a state’s power is limited by international treaties (Malanczuk 1997, 263). The state’s possession of the exclusive competence to determine rules for the acquisition and loss of nationality is called the doctrine of the freedom of states in matters of nationality (Brownlie 1963, 285–286). This wide discretion is not unlimited because it is constrained by the duties arising through agreements with other states and by the general principles of international law (Preuss 1934, 254). Nationality/citizenship can be obtained in different ways: (1) by birth (Preuss 1934, 254); (2) by marriage; (3) by adoption or legitimization; (4) by naturalization;9 and (5) by transfer of territory from one state to another (Preuss 1934, 254). Traditionally, citizenship or nationality is determined by birth, which includes the legal principles of jus sanguinis (by descent)10 and jus soli11 (by birth within a territory). The jus sanguinis principle makes citizenship contingent upon a blood relationship or “citizenship flows with the blood” (Lister 2010, 198–210). Under this principle, children inherit their parents’ citizenship. Germany and Japan follow this principle (Lister 2010, 198–210). Under the principle of jus soli, birthplace determines citizenship. The practice of jus soli is evident in the USA. According to the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, anyone born in the United States automatically gains US citizenship, regardless of the status of their parents.12 Defending the traditional nomenclature of citizenship, Matthew Lister argues that the liberal state must combine both approaches for the construction of citizenship. Both jus soli and jus sanguinis approaches are pertinent for citizenship on the grounds that these principles are not arbitrary but rather rational. Lister asserts that if children do not inherit their parents’ citizenship and, in a situation, where birth in the state does not confer citizenship, the result would be that the children would be stateless, and every state has a duty to prevent statelessness (Lister 2010, 182). Lister further argues that children should inherit the citizenship of their parents because it is essential to orderly life. Otherwise, the right of children and parents to live together will be in jeopardy. Regarding the jus soli principle, Lister contends that the principle of jus soli is very pertinent to establish social justice (Lister 2010, 182). Peter Spiro is very critical of the civic notion of citizenship as he perceives that it cannot work. In his view, liberal political values are held by

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many people in many parts of the world. He raises the question that if adherence to liberal values requires a civic notion of citizenship, then why should the state exclude non-citizens or discriminate between citizens and non-citizens (Spiro 2008, 52)? Further criticism against citizenship by birth has come from Ayelet Shachar. Shachar argues that although most countries determine citizenship rights following the principle of birthright (jus soli or law of the soil and jus sanguinis or law of the blood), such principles are unjust (Shachar 2009, 1–18). According to Shachar, birthright citizenship perpetuates global inequality. Jus soli countries such as the US grant citizenship to anyone born on the state’s territory and jus sanguinis countries such as Germany follow the criteria that one’s parent must be a citizen. Shachar criticizes jus soli and jus sanguinis principles on the grounds that birth is totally an accidental circumstance. Therefore, birthright rules for membership or citizenship are totally arbitrary (Higgins 2009). Against the background of the prevailing principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis which create global inequality, Shachar suggests a way out, which she calls jus nexi (Higgins 2009, 165), meaning real and effective link to one’s polity (Higgins 2009, 165). Jus nexi limits the automatic transmission of membership by birth. However, jus nexi assists long-term undocumented residents who intend to obtain citizenship by virtue of de facto participation in the life of the society (Higgins 2009, 165). Shachar argues that since jus solis (place of birth) and jus sanguinis (parentage) determine an individual’s citizenship in today’s world, these rules construct and transfer citizenship entitlement as a form of inherited wealth. This birthright lottery largely determines the allocation of membership/citizenship entitlement itself (Shachar and Hirschl 2007, 154–255). Shachar draws an analogy between birthright citizenship and inherited property. She argues: This institution (citizenship) provides a State-sponsored apparatus for handing down from generation to generation the invaluable security and opportunity that attach to membership in a stable affluent and rule-of-law society. It also allows members of well-off polities an enclave in which to preserve their accumulated wealth and power through time… birthright citizenship operates not merely as if it were any other kind of property; rather it moves down the generations like an entail form of untaxed inherited property. (Shachar 2009, 2–3)

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Shachar unveils the role of citizenship rules in maintaining severe inequalities of wealth and opportunities throughout the world. She points out that producing inequalities seriously hinders opportunities for billions of people. Once citizenship is considered a form of property, it is then unethical, inequitable, and illegal to distribute it based on “mere accident of birth” (Baglay 2009, 153). She argues that birthright citizenship provides “access to resources, benefits, protections, processes, and institutions that can impact one’s life, which is now distributed inequitably and arbitrarily” (Harmon 2010, 131). Shachar’s concept of jus nexi means real and effective link to one’s polity. This principle proposes that citizenship is not an automatic transmission of entitlement but more than this (Shachar 2009, 165). The principle of jus nexi obligates states to extend citizenship to everyone who has a real and effective link to the polity and a proper share in rights and obligations (Shachar 2009, 165). Shachar argues: In its fullest application, jus nexi requires a shift away from present ascriptive principles of birthright membership to a genuine connection principle of citizenship acquisition. In its softer variants, this principle is seen as supplementary to them. I call this genuine connection jus nexi, because like jus soli and jus sanguinis, it conveys the core meaning of the method through which political membership is conveyed: by connection, union, or linkage. (Shachar 2009, 165)13

Sachar’s argument that citizenship should not only be conceived as a birthright but also an effective link between individuals and the state is not new. Both legal scholars and judicial decisions have established the principle of the effective or real link between an individual claiming the citizenship of a particular state and that state to be a necessary condition for citizenship. The effective link principle is well established in international law and is often referred to as the doctrine of effective nationality. The International Court of Justices (ICJ) discussed this doctrine in the Nottebohm Case in 1955. In this case, the ICJ defines nationality as “a legal bond having its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests, and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties” (Nottebohm Case 1955, 23). Nottebohm establishes the concept of a genuine and effective link between the citizen and the state (Brouwer 2003, 5–6). The Nottebohm case endorses the effective link principle as a

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rule of international law (Donner 1994, 87). It is now applied as an established norm of citizenship globally. I. Brownlie argues: The effective link doctrine is an inevitable product of the process whereby nationality is placed in proper relation to international law as a general system … Nottebohm as well as the logical force of other principles of international law justify the conclusion that the principle of effective nationality is a general principle of international law and should be recognized as such. (Brownlie 1963, 364)

The Nottebohm case establishes the fact that effective nationality not only requires habitual residence of an individual but also involves his/her interests, family ties, participation in public life, attachment to a given country and the indoctrination of his/her children (Blackman 1998, 1156). The UNHCR also supports the doctrine of effective nationality by issuing a legal opinion that residence and genuine effective link are the key elements in deciding whether an individual is eligible for nationality of the country in which he or she resides (Batchelor 1995a, 91). The committee of experts on nationality in the Council of Europe has incorporated the principle of effective nationality into the European Convention on Nationality (Blackman 1998, 1164). Robert D.  Sloane (Sloane 2009, 59–61), a critic of the real link or genuine link principle, argues that Nottebohm’s dicta describes one plausible vision of nationality. The genuine link is not the only and most appropriate rule. This criticism is a misreading of the Nottebohm decision and unwarranted because the ICJ does not claim that the genuine link is the only criterion for determining or ascertaining nationality. The ICJ decision and scholarship on the subject may only establish the genuine or real link as one of the principles of nationality. Therefore, such a criticism appears to be irrelevant. Whether the genuine or real link is the most appropriate standard for determining nationality depends on the circumstances of individual cases. Kristine Kruma (Kruma 2014, 48) criticizes the real link principle for its limited applicability, but she acknowledges the importance of the principle. She argues that the appeal of the real link is instrumental only in cases of naturalization and state succession (Kruma 2014, 48). Although such an interpretation has arguably tried to limit the importance of the real link or genuine link norm of nationality, it could not ignore its significance.

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Sarah Song argues that the jus nexi principle is based on a genuine link or genuine connections of the individual with the polity. She is, however, not sure who decides whether genuine connections to the polity have been established. In addition, the potential abuses of genuine connections are of concern to her. While her doubts and concerns are valid, they do not invalidate the rationale of jus nexi, because, in cases of legal immigrants, the immigration authorities monitor the length of residence and therefore can determine with certainty whether a particular individual’s economic and social ties sufficiently meet the genuine link or connection requirement for granting citizenship. Since the government determines citizenship criteria, it can also determine the criteria for genuine connections to the polity. Jus nexi or real link citizenship also has a cultural element, such as the capacity of individuals “to participate effectively, creatively, and successfully within a national culture” (Turner 2001 as cited in Couldry 2006, 322). In cultural citizenship, whether a citizen can effectively exercise a voice is crucial for acting as a citizen and genuine link or jus nexi is based on the same assertion (Couldry 2006, 326). Aleinikoff T. Alexander uses the term “community ties” to denote jus nexi. By “community ties” he means “actual relationship the individual has developed with a society: a family, friends, a job, association, membership, professional acquaintances, and opportunities” (Aleinikoff 1983, 244). Therefore, from the perspectives of the supporters and detractors of the real link or genuine link or jus nexi principle,14 it appears that jus nexi is based on a solid logical foundation. It establishes a nexus between individuals and the state. Jus nexi, as a new legal principle, is derived from the rootedness of individuals within the state and could operate alongside the established principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis (Shachar 2012, 127).

Why Does Citizenship Matter? Citizenship still exists as an institution and it distributes membership to people with all rights and obligations in a given society, including participation in the political process, unlike non-citizens (Kerber 2005, 25). Matthew J. Gibney argues that citizenship in a modern state is two-faced. One is the unifier and the other is the divider (Gibney 2011, 41). As a unifier, citizenship offers a common identity and integrates residents consisting of varied backgrounds, social situations, or ethnic identities. It provides an equal status irrespective of class, status, or other identity. It also

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provides shared rights, privileges, entitlement, and obligations under law that connect them to the state (Gibney 2011, 41). Again, as divider, citizenship excludes non-citizens from citizens and prevents non-citizens from its benefits because of different parentage, a different birthplace, or possession of another citizenship (Gibney 2011, 41). Citizenship encompasses both rights and obligations (Grabska and Mehta 2008, 16). It is key to a host of other rights, including education, healthcare, employment, and equality before the law (Goris et al. 2009, 4). It provides not only rights but also respect and dignity. It empowers people to act as “agents” of change (Kabeer 2006, 91). Rights-based citizenship upholds the principle of democracy, including the right to participate in governance, equality, identity, and a sense of self-confidence for actions as a citizen (Mahmud 2002, 31). The interest in citizenship is gradually growing because it provides a status and a tradition that “can unite members of a polity under challenge from above and below” (Mathews 2001, viii). It also fosters social cooperation and identification that protects the state from ethno-religious and racial division and destabilization (Mathews 2001, viii). Thus, citizenship or nationality is considered the prime identity by which people are classified and distributed in politics across the world (Klusmeyer 2001, 1). As opposed to statelessness, historically, citizenship has been known as a key difference-making device. Citizenship provides the right to have other rights. With the loss of these rights or without these rights, lots of people faced catastrophic human suffering in the post-World War I and II periods. The suffering includes both physical dangers and discrimination associated with exclusion from citizenship. This happened in the case of Asians in the United States before the naturalization law was amended in the 1940s (Lister 2010, 182). T. H. Marshall notes that “citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (Marshall 1964, 84). Marshall’s thesis establishes the fact that citizenship provides full membership and establishes equality among members of the community. Caroline Sawyer identifies statelessness as a “position of detachment, exclusion and abandonment” (Sawyer 2011, 69). Compared to statelessness, citizenship clearly makes a difference in the context of rights and benefits. Citizenship provides a formal status of membership in a state, which is referred to as nationality in international law. This legal identity accords the opportunity of unrestricted rights to enter and reside

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permanently in the country and to return to it from abroad. Citizenship simultaneously extends the right to receive protection from the state of nationality both within and outside the country of nationality. These protections involve access to consular and diplomatic protection, various political rights associated with citizenship, and the right to economic, social, and cultural protection (Edward and Ferstman 2010, 5). The right to diplomatic protection is based on the notion that “whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures a state” (Van Waas 2008, 219–220). States have the obligation to protect their citizens in the face of injury committed by another state. Diplomatic protection is the right of the state and can be exercised at the discretion of the state (Van Waas 2008, 219–220). Citizenship also provides human security. Today, human security is an all-encompassing concept. In 2003, the UN Commission on Human Security defined human security as: Human security means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Human security connects different type of freedoms—freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf. To achieve human security, it offers two general strategies; protection and empowerment. (Commission on Human Security 2003)

The right to life, liberty, and equality are the fundamental elements of human rights. Stateless people are often denied the most fundamental rights, such as liberty and equality. Although some states comply with the legal instruments of international law and provide protection to stateless people, the level of protection is minimal. Minimum protections allow those who are stateless to only survive, but these are not sufficient for their natural human development. Natural human development requires the enjoyment of civil, political, and economic rights. Without access to these rights, the situation of stateless people, especially those in developing countries where governments cannot fulfill the human needs of their citizens, is deplorable. Stateless people or aliens, as Linda Bosniak points out, “are formally ineligible for many aspects of social citizenship or the public provisions of basic needs; and they are always subject to the possibility of deportation from the territory” (Bosniak 2006, 10). Amartya Sen claims that the lack of citizenship prevents the growth of human capabilities and

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granting citizenship can remove some of the “unfreedoms” and can help people live at least without some risks and fears (Sen 2001 as cited in Blitz and Lynch 2011, 10). Non-citizens live like guests and are not entitled to social benefits or social welfare, such as subsidized housing, free or subsidized daycare, childcare benefits, healthcare benefits, unemployment benefits, and so on.15 They are ineligible for appointment at the state and federal levels and are excluded from opportunities in the private sphere too (Aleinkoff 2000, 161). Historically, citizenship has been considered key to ending statelessness. The importance of citizenship as the gateway to membership in each community or country and the benefits accruing from that membership is underscored, for example, by the experiences of thousands of Hill Tamils in Sri Lanka, who for decades lived in a state of de facto statelessness. In 2003, the Sri Lankan government took the bold decision to enact legislation. The Grant of Citizenship to Persons of Indian Origin Act extended Sri Lankan citizenship to the Hill Tamils and signaled an end to decades of marginalization and discrimination against them. One of the Hill Tamils who was granted Sri Lankan citizenship and obtained a national identity card said: “I was really thankful when the national Identity Card arrived because it allowed me to travel to Colombo and find work here. I am earning much more than I would have if I stayed on the estate” (Van Waas 2009, 20). In addition to rights, citizenship obligates certain duties, including allegiance to the country of nationality and duties imposed upon the citizens by law. Citizenship provides full membership to individuals of the community. Through citizenship, individuals have the right to political participation. Political participation includes the right to vote, the right to be voted, and the right to have access to public services. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly points out, “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through a freely chosen representative,” and “Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country” (UDHR 1948). Due to political rights, citizenship creates the core membership of the community or body of people entrusted with the responsibility of state power and the state acts on their behalf. Aleinkoff describes this relationship as “government of the citizenry, by the citizenry, and for the citizenry” (Aleinkoff 2000, 160). Non-citizens are not qualified to vote in state or federal elections in any country. Speaking for citizens’ political rights, the US Supreme Court

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Judge, Justice Byron White, justified the exclusion of aliens in the political process: The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency but a necessary consequence of a community’s process of political self-­ definition. Self-Government, whether direct or through representatives, begins by defining the scope of the community of the governed and thus of the governors as well; aliens are by definition outside this community. (Cabell v. Chaves-Salido 1982)

The significance of the verdict of Justice Byron is not only limited to the US context but also can be used as a precedent case in the global context of citizenship law. Citizenship and political rights are linked and Justice Hugo Black in an important denationalization case even stated, “Citizenship in this nation is part of the cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the country, and the country is its citizenry” (Afroyim v. Rusk 1967). Justice Black’s decision is important in US case law and establishes the importance of citizens and citizenship rights and the rootedness of relations between the citizens and the country. Thus, citizenship is exceedingly worthy, and its value cannot be measured only by means of rights and duties.

Citizenship and Rights Associated with Citizenship Citizenship, while an old concept in Western political theory, is not very easy to define. Peter Riesenberg articulates this difficulty as follows: Citizenship is not as clear. There is no single office in which its essence is defined. It has no central mission, nor is it clearly an office, a theory, or a legal contract. We know where Monarch sits on a throne in a palace. But we cannot place citizenship that easily. It functions on the battlefield, in the law court, in an assembly, at the tax collector’s office. Nor is citizenship complete in any single or simple person, place, or more abstractly, situation, for history has witnessed a great variety of citizenships, each with its defining goals and powers. And if it resides in no definite place, political and legal theory, moral training, even inspirational heroic poetry, and song, but it is not produced by any one of these. (Riesenberg 1992, xvi)

There is no consensus on the definition of citizenship because it is defined in different ways in different contexts (Dwyer 2004, 3; Lister

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1998, 46–60). It varies from discipline to discipline. Normally, citizenship is understood as having two aspects; one is formal and the other is substantive. The formal sense of citizenship is the relationship between the individual and the state, which legally provides identity documents, such as passports or other forms of identity documentation for citizens. Citizenship in the substantive sense refers to the bundle of civil, political, legal, and cultural rights extended to an individual for his/her belonging to the national community. It also encourages an individual to partake in the management of the public affairs of a given national and political community (Martiniello 2000, 345). I argue that citizenship/nationality is not merely a legal right. Rather, citizenship rights include civil, political, social, and legal rights and its obligations involve allegiance to the state and compliance with the duties imposed by laws upon citizens. The process of exercising these rights and compliance with these duties ensures citizens’ effective participation in public affairs. Two groups of scholars are dominant in the citizenship discourse: non-­ legal and legal. Among the non-legal scholars on citizenship, T. H. Marshall, Hannah Arendt, Joseph H.  Carens, and Rainer Baubock are prominent (Marshall 1964, 84; Arendt 1958, 296; Carens 2000, 161; Baubock 1994, 23). Their shared view about citizenship is that citizenship is a transaction of rights and duties. They believe that citizenship rights provide access to other rights and certain duties. This implies that citizenship provides social, political, and economic rights to individuals, and in return individuals extend their loyalties or allegiance to the state, pay taxes, and comply with the law and order of the state. Marshall’s philosophy about citizenship is: Citizenship is a status bestowed upon those who are full members of a community. All those who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which that status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal of citizenship against which achievement can be measured and toward which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed. (Marshall 1964, 84)

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Marshall defines citizenship as a “status” given to full members of a community. Such status provides equal rights and responsibilities to all citizens (Marshall 1964, 84). He argues that citizenship is the combination of civil, political, and social rights. Civil rights are composed of the “rights necessary for individual freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts and the right to justice” (Marshall 1964, 71). Political rights, by contrast, are defined as the “right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body” (Marshall 1964, 72). Social rights, in Marshall’s view, include “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1964, 72). In his view, the right of the citizen is equality of opportunity and its aim is to eliminate hereditary privileges. Through equality, he indicates equal rights to display and develop differences (Marshall 1964, 84). His assertion is that every citizen enjoys a shared equality of status with others as a member of a shared community, although they belong to a different class and position (Dwyer 2004, 4). Social rights help reduce inequalities in society because they provide benefits that raise the real income of the citizens “to be much greater than money income” (Barbalet 1993, 39–40). Marshall believes that social rights increase the status of citizens. Social rights help provide civilized life and reduce the risks of insecurity and inequalities between the rich and poor in society (Barbalet 1993, 40). His theory of citizenship includes the full participation of citizens and certain responsibilities and rights entitled to citizens (Morris 1998, 215–58). Marshall’s theory is important for this study because it connects civil, political, and social rights. According to this theory, every citizen irrespective of class, race, and ethnicity has a common equality of rights and status with other members of a shared community (Dwyer 2004, 4). This theory suggests inclusive citizenship with full participation of every person in society (Morris 1998, 215–58). This theory supports the argument that citizenship should not be seen in just one way but rather in different ways (civil, political, and social ways). Marshall’s theory of citizenship will help me in analyzing the citizenship rights of the Biharis in Bangladesh in this book. Hannah Arendt, one of the modern thinkers whose definition of citizenship is widely used, defines nationality or citizenship as the ultimate

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right or “right to have the rights” (Arendt 1958, 296). The phrase “right to have the rights” signifies a couple of things. First, by “right” Arendt asserts an individual’s moral claim to membership in a human community, and as such that individual deserves protection as a human being. The possession of rights by the individual implies recognition of his or her membership in the human community in which he or she lives or belongs. Arendt writes, “The rights of men, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable even in the countries whose constitutions were based upon them—whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state” (Arendt 1958, 293). Second, the use of the term “right” in the phrase “right to have rights” suggests that there is a prior claim to membership. When one is already a member of an organized political and legal community, he or she is automatically entitled to certain rights and obligations. Rights and obligations are correlated. These involve the duty to recognize who is protected as a member of the community by legal and political authorities and who is entitled to enjoy rights (Benhabib 2004, 58). I will use the inherent message of Hannah Arendt’s concept of the “right to have rights” in my research to show how the lack of access to important citizenship rights deprives the Biharis in Bangladesh of other rights that are enjoyed by mainstream Bengalis. Joseph Carens challenges the conventional theory that citizenship is a legal status or membership in a nation-state (Carens 2000). He argues that this definition is inadequate conceptually because it ignores the multiple dimensions of citizenship and the complex relationship among these dimensions. Empirically, it is inadequate as it fails to recognize the multiple forms of belonging and overlapping of citizenship. It is also theoretically flawed because it discounts the differences essential for maintaining equality, which is the fundamental element of citizenship (Carens 2000, 161). As opposed to the conventional theories of citizenship, Carens offers a three-dimensional theory of citizenship comprising legal, psychological, and political dimensions or elements (Carens 2000, 162). The legal dimension refers to formal rights and duties that one possesses as a member of a political community. Legal citizenship is closely linked to a norm of equality. It means all citizens are equal before the law and there can be no second-class citizens. It also recognizes distinct legal rights for cultural minorities. The psychological dimension is one’s sense of identification with the political community or communities to which he or she belongs.

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It indicates a person’s sense of emotional attachment, identification, and loyalty. In his later work, Carens refers to these linkages as an attachment to the native land and to the language, culture, and community in which people grow and in which they feel comfortable (Carens 1987, 270). The political dimension is the legitimacy of representatives or authorities who act on behalf of the political community. Carens argues that these three dimensions interact with each other, and through these interactions, a new form of citizenship finally takes shape, which is different from the conventional form. For Carens, “the conventional conception of citizenship is an intellectual and moral prison from which we should escape” (Carens 2000, 176). Caren’s definition makes a significant contribution to the study of citizenship because it transcends the legal and political dimensions by integrating these with a psychological dimension or sense of emotional attachment, integration, and allegiance. Caren’s theory is based on an integrated approach to citizenship. Following Carens, I use an interdisciplinary approach to analyze the situation of the Biharis in Bangladesh. Rainer Baubock conceives citizenship as a relation between the individual and the state. He describes this relation as transactions of rights and obligations (Baubock 1994, 23). Baubock classifies citizenship into nominal and substantial citizenship. In nominal citizenship, all individuals are completely related to a state and there is no stateless person. No one is related to more than one state. This is the complete and discrete order of citizenship. Substantial citizenship, by contrast, is membership in a polity instead of society. Membership in a polity is defined by the rights and obligations of individuals. For Baubock, the absence of substantial citizenship means either the polity is not based on equal rights, or a class of people does not have any rights (Baubock 1994, 27). Baubock’s substantial citizenship is useful to demonstrate that many Biharis in Bangladesh are not enjoying many important citizenship rights. Among legal philosophers/scholars, Hans Kelsen, P.  W. Weis, Carol A. Batchelor, Peter H. Schuck, Hernandez–Truyol, Jo Shaw, and Linda Bosniak are important (Kelsen 1961; Weis 1979; Batchelor 1998; Shaw 1998; Bosniak 2000; Schuck 2000; Hernandez-Truyol 2005). Hans Kelsen believes that citizenship or nationality is a personal status, the gain and loss of which is regulated by both national and international law (Kelsen 1961). The national legal order makes this status contingent upon certain duties and rights. The fundamental duty of citizens is to show allegiance to the state they belong to, and the principal right of citizens is the

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right to be protected by the state in exchange for their allegiance to the state. Therefore, allegiance and protection are reciprocal responsibilities. A citizen’s right to protection is meaningless without the duties that the law imposes upon the state through citizens (Kelsen 1961, 235). Allegiance does not have any legal significance, but it has moral and political importance. Legally, allegiance means the general obligation of obeying the law which is not created by the oath of allegiance (Kelsen 1961, 235). According to P. Weis, nationality emphasizes international, and citizenship stresses the national or municipal aspect (Weis 1979, 4–5). He defines nationality as a status and legal relationship and rights and duties of an individual arising from the status of nationalities, such as international protection and admission of persons into a state of nationality (Weis 1979, 29–49). P. Weis argues that international law does not confer nationality on individuals, only a state could do this. However, this does not mean that states are entirely free to do this. A state’s arbitrary actions in deciding nationality are restricted by customary international law. These are primarily indirect rules derived from the rules that regulate relations among states (Weis 1979, 67–70). Although P. Weis sees nationality through a legal lens, he unfolds that a state’s action in determining nationality must be consistent with international norms. Carol A. Batchelor argues that nationality is the individual’s basic right. It establishes the legal connection between an individual and a state, which serves as a basis for certain rights and obligations for both individuals and the state (Batchelor 1998, 159). This connection is the primary means by which an individual takes an identity under the law (Batchelor 1995b, 235). According to Batchelor, the sources of international law regarding nationality have developed over time as new conventions, customs, case law, and principles. Therefore, the nationality of a state is the primary link between an individual and international law (Batchelor 1995b, 235). C. Batchelor also suggests a domestic policy consistent with international law in deciding nationality. Kelsen, Weis, and Batchelor’s conceptualization of citizenship is grounded only in law, which makes the definition narrow and mechanical. Peter H. Schuck sees citizenship not only through a legal lens but also in a normative way. He defines citizenship through four different dimensions (Schuck 2000). The social dimension looks at the integration of individual citizens into society; the political dimension shows citizens’ public participation; the legal dimension focuses on the distinctive status of the citizen either in the Constitution or in the Charter of Rights, which

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includes particular rights and responsibilities attached with citizenship; and the psychological dimension represents the political identity of citizens (Schuck 2000). Jo Shaw also understands that citizenship is a multifaceted set of lenses through which different aspects of the human condition can be observed. In his view, the formal legal concept of citizenship is not enough to understand the meaning of citizenship. Shaw suggests an interdisciplinary approach to citizenship (Shaw 1998). Similarly, contemporary legal scholar Linda Bosniak does not consider citizenship from a legal perspective only. She uses an interdisciplinary approach to see the total picture of nationality or citizenship. Bosniak classifies citizenship into four different discourses: citizenship as formal legal status; citizenship as rights; citizenship as political activity; and citizenship as identity/solidarity (Bosniak 2000). Formal citizenship refers to the required qualifications to possess the legal status of a citizen as stipulated in the Constitution. Citizenship as rights implies the necessary rights to achieve and enjoy equal and full membership in a society. This includes civil, political, and social rights. Citizenship as political activity posits political engagement in the community as the basis for citizenship. Finally, citizenship as identity or citizenship as solidarity refers to people’s collective experiences of themselves and their effective ties of identification and solidarity (Bosniak 2000, 456–488; Volpp 2007, 571). Bosniak in her classification of citizenship not only emphasizes legal status, social rights, or political activities but also stresses people’s effective ties and identification of solidarity for being citizens. Bosniak believes that citizenship is not complete by legal status only, instead, it goes beyond formal nationality (Bosniak 2002, 506). Like Peter H. Schuck, Jo Shaw, and Linda Bosniak, I follow an interdisciplinary approach to citizenship in this book.

Citizenship and Citizenship Rights in This Book From the above discussion, two types of citizenship are evident, formalistic or legal and substantive or normative citizenship. Formalistic citizenship is how the law defines citizenship and the substantive or normative conception of citizenship is what citizenship should be (Schuck 2000, 195). The tension between formalistic and substantive citizenship exists among legal rules, political realities, and civic aspirations (Schuck 2000, 196). In a legal sense, nationality or citizenship is an identity or formal link between an individual and a state that provides hosts of rights and obligations to the individual. Legal rights include equal rights, unrestricted right

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to reside, leave and return to the country of nationality, as well as protection both inside and outside the country of nationality, including consular assistance and diplomatic protection. Although the legal definition is important, some legal scholars prefer the substantive definition of citizenship, that is, legal, sociological, political, cultural, and other dimensions of citizenship. Other aspects of citizenship are unfathomable only through the lens of law. Given this reality, some legal scholars recognize the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of citizenship.16 Similarly, social scientists who conceive citizenship as the “right to have rights” (Arendt 1958) or a bundle of rights (civil, political, social, cultural, and legal rights) and duties also do not ignore the importance of the legal aspect of citizenship. Therefore, among legal and non-legal scholars, there is a shared view of an interdisciplinary/ normative or substantive definition of citizenship. In this book, I use the interdisciplinary or substantive/normative definition of citizenship instead of a legal or formalistic definition. In my view, law is not always the only standard that deserves consideration. Social, political, cultural, legal, and psychological dimensions of citizenship should be considered for understanding citizenship. Citizenship rights give individuals access to important rights, including social, political economic, legal, and cultural rights. Social rights include the right to healthy living conditions, the right to education and healthcare, and social integration. Political rights include the right to vote and the right to be voted and effective participation in public life and political integration. Economic rights include access to employment and occupation. Legal rights include equality and non-discrimination and cultural rights give everybody the right to uphold his/her own culture. These rights are associated with citizenship rights because these are essential rights for making citizenship meaningful. I examine whether the Bihari citizens of Bangladesh can access the above rights or not.

The Constitution of Bangladesh and the Rights Associated with Citizenship The legal framework of this book is based on the existing citizenship laws of Bangladesh and the fundamental principles and fundamental rights contained in the Constitution of Bangladesh. Existing citizenship laws regulate citizenship in Bangladesh and determine the qualifications and

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disqualifications for citizenship. Fundamental principles are the governing principles of public policies and guidelines for making laws and interpreting the Constitution (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Article 8.2). Fundamental rights are the indications of the rights associated with citizenship rights in Bangladesh. These constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights are judicially enforceable and the state cannot enact any laws inconsistent with any provisions of the fundamental rights (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Article 26). In the following sections, I will discuss the existing citizenship laws in Bangladesh, fundamental principles of state policy, and the fundamental rights of citizens contained in the Constitution.

Citizenship Laws in Bangladesh During British rule, present-day Bangladeshi citizens enjoyed the status of British subjects (Hoque 2016, 1). Under British India, the institution of citizenship was known as Commonwealth citizenship or British nationality.17 The new states of South Asia developed their citizenship laws following the traditions of their imperial rulers (Chatterji 2012, 1050). After the end of British rule in 1947 in the South Asian subcontinent, the people of Bangladesh (which was then the eastern wing of Pakistan) enjoyed Commonwealth citizenship status until the enactment of the 1951 National Citizenship Act of Pakistan.18 The people of Bangladesh were known as citizens of Pakistan until 26 March 1971. Bangladesh declared its independence on 26 March 1971.19 Soon after the birth of Bangladesh on 16 December 1971, its Constituent Assembly adopted the Constitution on 4 November 1972, which became effective from 18 December of the same year (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Article 6 (1) of the Constitution states that “the citizenship of Bangladesh shall be determined and regulated by law” and Article 152(1) of the Constitution defines a citizen as “a person who is a citizen of Bangladesh according to the law relating to citizenship” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Article 6(2) provides that the citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshi and the Constitution also provides a participatory role to citizens of Bangladesh in the governance of state affairs. Article 11 states: “The Republic shall be a democracy … and in which effective participation by the people through their elected representative in administration at all levels shall be ensured.” Article 59 provides: Local government in every administrative unit of the Republic

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shall be entrusted to bodies, composed of persons elected in accordance with law (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Bangladeshi citizenship law is based on the Citizenship Act 1951 and the Rules of 1952, the 1972 Citizenship Order and Rules of 1978, the Naturalization Act 1926 and the Rules of 1961, and relevant judicial decisions (Hoque 2016, 3–4). Upon independence, Bangladesh adopted the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 along with the Citizenship Rules 1952, which was framed by the Pakistan Government (Hoque 2016, 3–4). Immediately after independence, the president promulgated a new citizenship law, the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order 1972 (The Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order 1972). The 1972 Order was later supplemented by the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Rules 1978 (Bangladesh Gazette, 1978 as cited in Hoque 2016, 4). In addition to these, the Naturalization Act 1926, a British law enacted as the Indian Naturalization Act in 1926, was inherited by Pakistan in 1947 and adopted by Bangladesh on 26 March 1971 (Hoque 2016, 4). Article 3(d) of the Bangladesh Citizenship Act, 195120 provides citizenship to those “who before the commencement of this Act migrated to the territories now included in Bangladesh from any territory in the Indo-­ Pakistan subcontinent outside those territories with the intention of residing permanently in those territories.” Article 2 of the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order 1972 (President’s Order 149 of 1972) was passed to recognize the citizenship of residents in the newly created state. It stipulates: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, on the commencement of this order, every person shall be deemed to be a citizen of Bangladesh,

i. Who or whose father or grandfather was born in the territories now comprised in Bangladesh and who was a permanent resident of the territories now comprised in Bangladesh on the 25th March, 1971, and continued to be so resident; or ii. Who was a permanent resident of the territories now comprised in Bangladesh on the 25th day of March 1971 and continues to be so resident and is not otherwise disqualified for being a citizen by or under any law, for the time being in force. (The Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order 1972)

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Article 2 of the 1972 order recognizes both the jus soli and jus sanguinis principles (The Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order 1972). In practice, Bangladesh seldom accords citizenship to a person born in Bangladesh if at least one of his or her parents is not a citizen of Bangladesh. In fact, Bangladesh follows the jus sanguinis principle (Hoque 2016, 13). Although Bangladesh practically shifted from the jus soli to jus sanguinis principle of citizenship, the law has not yet abolished the jus soli principle (Islam 1990, 8–9). Initially, Bangladesh followed a gender-biased jus sanguinis citizenship policy. A child could only acquire citizenship through his or her father.21 In 1997, Sayeeda Rahman Malkani challenged section 5 of the 1951 Act and filed a writ petition (Writ Petition No. 3192 of 1997) to the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court on the ground that the law was preventing only women from passing their citizenship to their children, which was discriminatory and unconstitutional. In Sayeeda Rahman Malkani V.  Bangladesh (1997),22 the Court rejected her writ petition and she was unsuccessful in repealing the discriminatory law. However, in 2005, a new reform was made about citizenship by descent. Section 5 of the 1951 Act was amended and citizenship was accorded to children born outside to either a Bangladeshi father or mother (The Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2009 (Act XVII of 2009) as cited in Hoque 2016). Article 2B (1) of the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Amendment Ordinance 1978 includes a disqualification clause, which states that a person shall not be qualified to be a citizen of Bangladesh if he or she owes, affirms, or acknowledges, expressly or by conduct, allegiance to a foreign state. It provides: Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 2 or in any other law for the time being in force, a person shall not, except as provided in clause (2), qualify himself to be a citizen of Bangladesh if he—(i) owes, affirms, or acknowledges, expressly or by conduct, allegiance to a foreign state. (The Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) (amendment) Ordinance 1978)

This provision of the 1978 Amendment has been used by the authority of Bangladesh for a long time to deny citizenship to the Biharis on the ground that they are stranded Pakistanis because they opted for repatriation to Pakistan in 1972 (Hoque 2016). Despite the 2008 High Court verdict recognizing the citizenship status of the Biharis in the Sadakat Khan Case, the Biharis are still facing serious problems in obtaining legal

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documents like birth certificates and passports (Hoque 2016). The 1978 Amendment also introduced dual citizenship, the acquisition of which was not permitted by the 1951 Act (The Bangladesh Code Vol. X1 (The Citizenship Act 1951, Sec14). Under this amendment, Article 2B (2) of the 1972 order now provides the government the power to grant Bangladeshi citizenship to any person who is a citizen of any state in Europe or North America or of any other state approved by the government.23

Fundamental Principles of State Policy Bangladesh is deeply committed to the promotion and protection of the human rights of all of its citizens, which emanates from its constitutional obligations. It has pledged to “further integrate the promotion and protection of human rights into its national development plan” (Briefing of the Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the United Nations 2006). The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh is based on the fundamental principles of human rights and democracy (The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh). Although judicially fundamental principles are unenforceable, these principles have special importance as these are mentioned in Article 8(2) as a guide for the Constitution and the laws of Bangladesh (Islam 2002, 54). Article 8(2) stipulates: The principles set out in this part shall be fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, shall be applied by the State in the making of laws, shall be a guide to the interpretation of the Constitution and of the other laws of Bangladesh, and shall form the basis of the work of the State and of its citizens, but shall not be judicially enforceable. (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh)

One of the fundamental principles of state policy, as indicated in Article 11 of the Constitution states, “The Republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human persons shall be guaranteed” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). This principle implies that the highest law of the land is committed to protecting the fundamental human rights of all human beings in the country, including citizens and non-citizens. Another fundamental state principle of Bangladesh is to secure the basic necessities of its citizens. Article 15(a) states that it shall be the

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fundamental responsibility of the state to secure the basic necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, education, and healthcare, and Article 15(b) emphasizes the right to work, which means the right to guaranteed employment with a reasonable wage (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Similarly, another fundamental state policy of Bangladesh emphasizes compulsory education for all children. Article 17(a) of the Bangladesh Constitution calls for “establishing a uniform, mass oriented and universal system of education and extending free and compulsory education to children to such stage as may be determined by law.” This fundamental principle of the Constitution guarantees universal, compulsory, and free education for all children (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Article 17(2) gives importance to producing properly trained and motivated citizens to meet the needs of society and Article 17(3) stresses the eradication of illiteracy within a period of time determined by the law (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Article 18 (1) provides that the improvement of public health is the responsibility of the state. It states that “The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties…” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Another state principle of Bangladesh is equality before the law. Article 19(1) states, “The State shall endeavour to ensure equality of opportunity to all citizens” and Article 19 (2) states that “The state shall adopt effective measures to remove all social and economic inequality between man and man and to ensure the equitable distribution of wealth among citizens, and of opportunities in order to attain a uniform level of economic development throughout the republic” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). These principles of the Constitution signify that the state is committed to ensuring equal rights for all citizens and it takes responsibility to remove all barriers to ensure social, political, and economic equality. Similarly, Article 20(1) of the Constitution declares work as a right and a duty of every citizen. It states that “Work is a right, a duty and a matter of honor for every citizen” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). This principle establishes the fact that work is a right associated with citizenship rights. Moreover, it is reaffirmed in Article 20(2) that the state shall create conditions to avoid unearned income. It states, “The State shall endeavour to create conditions as a general principle, person

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shall not be able to enjoy unearned incomes” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Therefore, rights to work and income are undeniable rights of any citizen in Bangladesh. Article 23 focuses on national culture and stipulates, “The state shall adopt measures to conserve the cultural traditions and heritage of the people, and so to foster and improve the national language, literature and the arts that all sections of the people are afforded the opportunity to contribute towards and to participate in the enrichment of the national culture” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Therefore, citizens’ cultural rights and effective participation and contribution to the development of national culture are protected by the Constitution. Although judicially unenforceable, these principles are considered guidelines for interpreting the Constitution and laws. It implies that the legal provisions are required to be explained consistently considering the principles of the Constitution (Islam 2002, 56).

Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of Bangladesh Two types of fundamental rights are listed in the Constitution of Bangladesh, fundamental rights for only citizens and fundamental rights for all persons, including citizens and non-citizens. Articles 26 to 47 of the Bangladesh Constitution confer a few substantive fundamental rights on every citizen of Bangladesh. These rights are enshrined in the Constitution as supreme law and protected by constitutional guarantees. On the other hand, there are some fundamental principles relating to social, economic, and cultural rights which should be followed in governing the country. Fundamental rights are enforceable in a court of law. The Court can declare any law void if it is inconsistent with any of the fundamental rights. However, the Court cannot force the government to enforce any fundamental principles. Article 26 of the Constitution states that “all existing laws inconsistent with the fundamental rights shall to the extent of inconsistency become void and the state cannot make any law inconsistent with fundamental rights” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). A few fundamental rights have been listed in the Constitution. Among these, most rights are granted to citizens only and some rights are granted to all persons, including citizens and non-citizens.

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Rights Granted to Citizens Only The following fundamental rights have been granted only to citizens under the Constitution of Bangladesh:  quality before the Law E Equality can be best understood as “freedom from adverse discrimination” (Abella 1984, 1). Equality was one of the three basic principles listed in the Proclamation of Independence of Bangladesh.24 The other two basic principles contained in the Proclamation of Independence of Bangladesh were human dignity and social justice (Proclamation of Independence). In the aftermath of the birth of Bangladesh, equality before the law is enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh as a fundamental right of citizens of Bangladesh. Article 27 of the Constitution of Bangladesh states, “All citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). This fundamental right of the Constitution guarantees all citizens the right to equality before the law and equal protection under the law. Equality is an anti-thesis to discrimination and enables citizens equal access to all rights and responsibilities guaranteed by the law. Equal protection refers to all citizens being treated equally in similar circumstances and no discrimination existing in the conferment of rights, responsibilities, or opportunities and benefits (Cavanagh 2002, 90). Equal protection under the law protects citizens from any form of state discrimination. Bangladesh was founded with the aspiration of creating an exploitation-­ free state, where fundamental human rights, economic, social, and political equality, and justice are ensured for all citizens without any discrimination.25 The Bangladesh Constitution upholds such commitment to establishing equality in all walks of life to create an egalitarian society and worthy citizens. Non-discrimination Social justice was declared as one of the three fundamental principles contained in the Proclamation of Independence of Bangladesh (Proclamation of Independence). To ensure social justice in all walks of life, non-­ discrimination is accepted as a fundamental right in the Constitution of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Constitution prohibits all forms of discrimination (Chowdhury 2009, 4–5). Article 28 (1) of the constitution states, “The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of

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religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Again Article 28 (3) stipulates, “No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to any place of public entertainment or resort, or admission to any educational institution” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). For non-discrimination, Article 27 (equality before law) and Article 29 (equality of opportunity of all citizens in respect to employment or office in the service of the Republic) are very important (Chowdhury 2009, 4–5). Other important constitutional provisions concerning non-­ discrimination are Articles 39 and 41. Article 39 guarantees (a) freedom of thought and conscience and (b) the right of every citizen to freedom of speech and expression. Article 41 protects equal rights for all people, irrespective of race, caste, creed, and religion, and Article 41(1) (a) states “every citizen has the right to profess, practice or propagate any religion” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh).

Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment Equality of employment means “identical and fair treatment of all equally qualified individuals in the access to, and the enjoyment of, all rights in public office” (Begum 2005, 326). The Constitution of Bangladesh upholds equality of opportunity as a fundamental right of citizens of Bangladesh. Article 29 (1) of the Bangladesh Constitution states, “There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in respect of employment or office in the service of the Republic” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Similarly, Article 29 (2) says, “No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office in the service of the Republic” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). If any aggrieved person thinks that his/her fundamental right has been violated through discrimination, he/she may file a writ petition before the High Court Division of the Supreme Court under Article 102 (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). In Carew and Company v. Labour Court (Carew and Company v. Labour Court), the High Court Division held that the failure of the nationalized company in providing the benefits of an agreement to some of its employees would violate Article 29.

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Prohibition of Foreign Title Article 30 of the Constitution of Bangladesh states, “No citizen shall, without the prior approval of the President, accept any title, honor, award or decoration from any foreign state” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). In an independent and democratic country, there is no room for artificial division within a society. Foreign titles were prevalent during colonial rule in British India. The colonial rulers created artificial classes among citizens by awarding titles such as Raj Bahadur, Khan Bahadur, and so on. In independent and democratic Bangladesh, acceptance of such titles (without formal approval of the President of Bangladesh) has been prohibited under Article 30 to create a unified society.

Right to Protection of Law Right to protection of law means all citizens equally deserve the right to be protected by the law. All are equal in the eyes of the law. Nobody is above the law, and nobody is subordinate to the law. Article 31 of the Constitution of Bangladesh states: To enjoy the protection of the law, and to be treated in accordance with law, and only in accordance with law, is the inalienable right of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being within Bangladesh, and in particular no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation, or property of any person shall be taken. (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh)

Freedom of Movement Freedom of movement means each lawful resident should have the right to move freely within the country, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter the country. This right is guaranteed in the Constitution of Bangladesh as a fundamental right. Article 36 of the Constitution of Bangladesh states, “Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout Bangladesh, to reside and settle in any place therein and to leave and re-enter Bangladesh” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh).

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Freedom of Assembly Freedom of expression is the right of individuals to assemble peacefully and collectively express, justify, and pursue their demands to the government for the redressal of grievances. It is not only a human right, but also a civil and political right. Article 37 of the Bangladesh Constitution states, “Every citizen shall have the right to assemble and to participate in public meetings and processions peacefully and without arms, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of public order or public health” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Freedom of Association Freedom of association is an individual’s right to join others without interference for a common cause which is legal. It is the right to express and defend common interests in a collective setting. Freedom of association is a fundamental right in the Constitution of Bangladesh. Article 38 of the Constitution of Bangladesh states, “Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of morality or public order” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Freedom of Thought Freedom of thought is a right that allows an individual to hold or to have an independent viewpoint or thought different from or opposed to others’ viewpoints. Freedom of thought and conscience are prerequisites for flourishing personhood and the growth of democracy. The Constitution of Bangladesh upholds this right as one of the fundamental rights of citizens. Article 39(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees freedom of thought and conscience (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Article 39(2) states: Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency, or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence– (a) the right of every citizen to freedom of speech and expression; and (b) freedom of the press is guaranteed. (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh)

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 reedom of Profession and Occupation F Freedom of profession implies that every citizen has a right to practice any profession or the right to have any occupation, trade, or business. However, this right is governed by the legal order. Practising any particular profession enables a person to attain power, prestige, dignity, and livelihood. It also helps achieve everyone’s professional efficiency. The Constitution of Bangladesh has guaranteed a fundamental right to all citizens of the country under Article 40 to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business. This right aims at promoting the welfare of the citizens as well as the development of the nation. Article 40 of the Bangladesh Constitution states: Subject to any restrictions imposed by law, every citizen possessing such qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law in relation to his profession, occupation, trade, or business shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any lawful trade or business. (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh)

Freedom of Religion The Oxford English Dictionary defines freedom of religion as “the right to choose which religion to belong to, or to belong to no religion” (Oxford English Dictionary). It can also be interpreted as the right to follow or practice any religion or no religion without the interference of the government. However, constitutionally all citizens of Bangladesh have a right to practice and promote their religion peacefully. Article 41 (1) of the Constitution states: Subject to law, public order, and morality—(a) Every citizen has the right to profess, practice or propagate any religion. (b) Every religious community or denomination has the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions. (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh)

Right to Property Property rights can be defined as the “theoretical and legal ownership of resources” and how to use those resources. Exercising private property by individuals includes rights such as accumulating, holding, delegating, renting, or selling their property (Investopedia). Bangladesh considers the right to property as a fundamental right that is judicially enforceable. Article 42 (1) of the Constitution states, “Subject to any restrictions

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imposed by law, every citizen shall have the right to acquire, hold, transfer or otherwise dispose of property, and no property shall be compulsorily acquired, nationalized or requisitioned save by authority of law” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh).  ight to Protection of Home and Correspondence R The right to protection of the home is the oldest conception of individual liberty. It means that every citizen has the right to lead a secure life against entry and seizure and has the right to privacy of his correspondence and other sources of communication. The Bangladesh Constitution guarantees the protection of the home and correspondence. Article 43 states: Every citizen shall have the right, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the security of the State, public order, public morality, or public health—(a) to be secured in his home against entry, search, and seizure; and (b) to the privacy of his correspondence and other means of communication. (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh)

 ights Granted to All Person R The following rights have been granted to all persons under the Constitution of Bangladesh:  ight to Life and Liberty R The right to life is the most fundamental and comes before all rights. Without this right, the question of other rights cannot even be thought of. The enjoyment of all other rights depends on the existence of the right to life and individual liberty (Islam 2002, 193). It emphasizes the protection of physical integrity and the freedom of every person. The right to life and liberty is not only the mere existence of life, like any other species. It involves the right to live consistently with human dignity, the right to access basic human needs like nutrition, clothing, shelter, education, healthcare, freedom of thinking, freedom of movement and everything necessary for a meaningful life including tradition, culture, and heritage (Islam 2002, 187–189). Article 31 of the Bangladesh Constitution protected the “life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Mahmudul Islam argues, “‘Life’ within the meaning of article 31 means something more than mere animal

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existence. It includes the right to live consistently with human dignity and decency” (Islam 2002, 187–188). The right to education flows from the right to liberty protected by Article 31 of the Bangladesh Constitution (Islam 2002, 156). The Bangladesh Constitution considers the right to education as a fundamental responsibility of the state and a necessity of life (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Article 32 of the Bangladesh Constitution recognizes the right to life and personal liberty of an individual as a fundamental right. The Constitution upholds, “No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty save in accordance with law” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Safeguards to Arrest and Detention Historically arbitrary arrests by governments in many countries were recognized as a matter of deep concern throughout the world. The right against arbitrary arrest, detention, and punishment has been a long-felt need in the democratic world. Against the backdrop of the consequences of arbitrary arrest, punishment, and detention, many democratic countries including Bangladesh recognized the right against arbitrary arrest, detention, and punishment in their constitutions (Akkas 2011, 3). Article 33 (1) of the Bangladesh Constitution stipulates, “No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Again, Article 33(2) states, “Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the Magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Prohibition of Forced Labor The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines forced labor as “situations in which persons are coerced to work through the use of violence or intimidation, or by more subtle means such as accumulated debt, retention of identity papers or threats of denunciation to immigration

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authorities” (International Labor Organization 2014). Contemporary situations of slavery or human trafficking are also considered as forced labor by the ILO definition (International Labor Organization 2014). In Bangladesh, all forms of paid or unpaid labor supplied under compulsion are considered forced labor (Islam 2002, 206). Bangladesh does not recognize any form of forced labor. Article 34 (1) of the constitution of Bangladesh stipulates, “All forms of forced labor are prohibited, and any contravention of this provision shall be an offense punishable in accordance with law” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh).

Protection with Respect to Trial and Punishment The Bangladesh Constitution guarantees a few rights regarding trial and punishment. Article 35 of the Bangladesh Constitution (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh) states: (1) No person shall be convicted of any offense except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offense, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than, or different from, that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offense more than once. (3) Every person accused of a criminal offense shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an independent and impartial court or tribunal established by law. (4) No person accused of any offense shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (5) No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. (6) Nothing in clause (3) or clause (5) shall affect the operation of any existing law which prescribes any punishment or procedure for trial.

The Enforcement of Fundamental Rights The enforcement of fundamental rights is also a fundamental right. It is guaranteed by the Constitution of Bangladesh. Article 44(1) empowers the High Court Division of the Supreme Court to enforce any of the fundamental rights. Article 44 (1) states, “The Right to move the High Court

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Division in accordance with [Clause (1)] of Article 102, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this part is guaranteed” and under Article 102(1), the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court on the application of any aggrieved person may give a direction or order to any appropriate person or authority of the country for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution of Bangladesh (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). The above-mentioned fundamental rights of group one are recognized in the Constitution for citizens only and group two of the fundamental rights are granted to both citizens and non-citizens in Bangladesh. In this book, I will compare the rights entitled to citizens and the rights conferred to the Biharis in Bangladesh. On the basis of my fieldwork, I will examine whether the Biharis can access these rights. My field investigation includes the living conditions in the Bihari camps, their access to education, employment, healthcare, privacy in their family lives, economic activities, social integration, and access to other rights that are important for making their citizenship meaningful.

Conclusions It is unfolded from the above discourse that statelessness is a twentieth-­ century phenomenon although it existed in different phases of history under different names. In the past, stateless people had not been categorized as a distinct group. Refugees and stateless people belonged to the same group. Stateless people emerged as a separate group in the twentieth century right after World War I, particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet Socialist Revolution, when massive flights of stateless people started to grow as a result of the arbitrary denial of Soviet citizenship by the radical Soviet authority. With the end of World War II, the issue of protecting the stateless people came to the forefront together with the refugee issue. Now, the estimated number of stateless people throughout the globe is approximately 12–15 million. They are classified as de facto and de jure stateless persons. The de jure stateless persons are those who are legally not considered nationals of any country under the operation of its law, while de facto stateless persons are those who have a formal nationality that is ineffective or they are unable to prove their nationality with documents. Global legal regimes like the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of the Stateless People and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are specialized international treaties that deal with stateless persons, but

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the scope of these UN treaties is limited to de jure stateless persons only. Although these two treaties have recognized the existence of de facto stateless persons, they do not have any provision to directly provide protection to the de facto stateless persons. The final act of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions have non-binding recommendations on the Contracting Parties to deal with the de facto stateless like the de jure stateless persons. Since the recommendations are non-binding, their appeals are very insignificant to the Contracting States because the application of these recommendations depends on the sweet will of the Contracting States. Although the global legal regimes on statelessness have avoided the protection of the de facto stateless people, international human rights laws, particularly the Bill of Human Rights comprised of the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and other human rights instruments, provide protections to the de facto as well as de jure stateless persons. These instruments cover every person under the jurisdiction of a state regardless of their nationality (Doebbler 2002, 550). The human rights instruments that the states have ratified are legally binding on the states concerned. In addition, international law as well as human rights law cannot be enforced on any state, unless the state itself complies with these instruments. The global community cannot do anything against the breaches of international law. The only visible punishment for non-compliance or contravention of international law or international human rights law is embarrassment. The enforcement of international law/international human rights law is possible only through ratification and the translation of these laws into domestic law through acts of concerned state parliaments. Indeed, international law and international human rights law are still considered civilized people’s laws. The application of these laws depends upon the sweet will of the civilized nations. Therefore, the rights of both de facto and de jure stateless persons might be protected through the ratification of international law by every state and the transformation of these laws into domestic laws through the acts of parliaments. The above discourse also reveals that the concepts of nationality and citizenship are broadly used interchangeably or synonymously. Legal scholars believe that citizenship implies a legal status or identity of an individual. Citizenship or nationality establishes the formal link between a state and individuals and the link amounts to a host of rights and responsibilities. Citizenship includes several rights and responsibilities for individuals legally. These legal rights include equal rights; unrestricted right to reside, leave, and return to the country of nationality; and protection both

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inside and outside the country of nationality, including consular assistance and diplomatic protection. On the other hand, non-legal scholars contend that the right to citizenship gives access to other rights, including social, political, legal, and cultural rights, which make citizenship meaningful. Non-legal scholars who conceive citizenship as a right to have the rights do not ignore the importance of the legal aspect of citizenship. They consider the legal aspect as an essential dimension of citizenship, along with other non-legal dimensions. Similarly, some legal scholars also believe that a total picture of citizenship cannot be seen through the legal lens only. An interdisciplinary or substantive definition of citizenship is important to understand the concept of citizenship. Therefore, there is a shared view of interdisciplinary/normative or substantive definitions of citizenship among legal and non-legal scholars. Citizenship is not only a legal status; rather it encompasses civil, political, social, legal, and cultural rights as well as responsibilities. The legal framework of this book is built on existing citizenship laws, the fundamental principles of state policy, and fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution of Bangladesh. This legal framework helps analyze the situation of the Biharis in Bangladesh. It also helps compare the rights entitled to citizens and the rights conferred to the Biharis in Bangladesh. I argue that citizenship should not be limited to legal status only. It should encompass all other rights, including social, political, economic, cultural, and legal rights. In other words, citizenship should be understood in a normative or substantive way. In this book, based on my fieldwork, I examine whether the Bihari citizens of Bangladesh could access rights associated with many important citizenship rights, including the right to have healthy living conditions, privacy in their family lives, education, employment, healthcare, economic activities, social integration, and access to other rights. I analyze this through citizenship theory, citizenship laws, fundamental principles, and fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh.

Notes 1. According to Robin Cohen, “Helot” means “people who have illegally entered the country, people who have overstayed the period granted on their entry visas, asylum seekers who have not been recognized under the international conventions, those who are working illegally, and those who have been granted only limited rights” (Cohen 1989, 162).

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2. As of November 2014, there are 83 state parties to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless People and 61 to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (UNHCR Press Release). 3. By statelessness, I mean both de facto and de jure statelessness. 4. The ICESCR, ICCPR, and UDHR constitute the International Bill of Human Rights (Weissbrodt and Vega 2007). 5. Immanuel Kant’s original work Eternal Peace was also translated as Perpetual Peace or on Perpetual Peace. For this explanation see, Gorman (2006). 6. Here, internal colonialism means the domination and exploitation of the West Pakistani ruling elites over the Bengali masses of East Pakistan. See Jahan (1980). 7. The significant movements of the Bengalis include the Language Movement of 1952, the Autonomy Movement of 1966, and the Liberation War of 1971. See Jahan (1972). 8. The idea of imperial citizenship was promoted between 1895 and 1920. Most of the ideologues were Oxbridge educated and they influenced the political and intellectual worlds of late Victorian and Edwardian Britain. For details, see Gorman (2006). 9. Naturalization means a situation where a foreigner is offered the nationality of another state upon request. See Preuss (1934). 10. Jus Sanguinis is also called the right of blood. See Lister (2010). 11. Jus soli is also referred to as right of land or ground. See Lister (2010). 12. The 14th amendment states, “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subjects to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the state wherein they reside.” See US Constitution, Amendment XIV. 13. For the analysis of jus nexi, see also Shachar (2011). 14. Real link, genuine link, effective nationality or Jus nexi have been used synonymously in this book. 15. Justice Stevens wrote in Mathews v. Diaz, “Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident, diplomat, nor the illegal entrants, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its guests” (Matthew v. Diaz 1976). 16. Shaw writes that lawyers were the first group of people who applied the concepts of citizenship out of the legal materials. See, Shaw (1998, 297); Hartnell (2006, 335). 17. “Commonwealth citizen” means a person who has the status of a Commonwealth citizen under the British Nationality Act, 1948 (The Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951).

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18. The British Act of 1948 provided that independent commonwealth countries should determine their own nationality law. See Hoque (2016, 3). 19. The Proclamation of Independence Order 1971, promulgated by the Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh on 10 April 1971 (with effect from 26 March 1971). See, Hoque (2016, 1). 20. Article 3(d) of the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951. Adopted under the Bangladesh (adaptation of existing Bangladesh law) Order, 1972 (The Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951). 21. A person born after the commencement of this of act shall be a citizen of Bangladesh by descent if his father is a citizen at the time of his birth (The Bangladesh Code Vol X1 [The Citizenship Act 1951 sect. 5]). 22. In Sayeeda Rahman Malkani V.  Bangladesh (1997), the discriminatory rule of citizenship by descent was unsuccessfully challenged in 1997 by Sayeeda Rahman Malkani, a Bangladeshi citizen in France, who married an Indian citizen and had two sons. When her sons were denied Bangladeshi citizenship, Malkani challenged section 5 of the 1951 Act before the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court on the ground that the law was discriminatory and only preventing women from passing citizenship to children of a marriage between such women and foreign citizens. However, the High Court Division turned down her writ petition and ruled that the statutory provisions were unambiguous in using the words father or grandfather in the citizenship Act of 1951 (Sayeeda Rahman Malkani and others v. The Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, and others 1997). 23. Article 2(B) of the 1978 amendment states: The Government may grant citizenship of Bangladesh to any person who is a citizen of any state of Europe or North America or of any other state which the Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf (Hoque 2016). 24. “We … in order to ensure for the people of Bangladesh equality, human dignity and social justice, declare and constitute Bangladesh to be sovereign Peoples’ Republic…” (Proclamation of Independence). 25. The Preamble of The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh states: “It shall be a fundamental aim of the State to realize through the democratic process a socialist society, free from exploitation a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, economic and social, will be secured for all citizens” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh).

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Jones, R.J.  Barry. 2005. The Political Economy of European Citizenship. In Citizenship and Governance in the European Union, ed. Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh, 143–162. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Joyner, Christopher C. 2005. International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Kabeer, Naila. 2006. Citizenship, Affiliation and Exclusion: Perspectives from the South. IDS Bulletin 37 (4): 91–101. Kant, Immanuel. 1949. Eternal Peace. In The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant’s Moral and Political Writings, trans. Carl J. Fredrich. New York: Modern Library. Kapur, Ratna. 2007. The Citizen and the Migrant: Postcolonial Anxieties, Law, and the Politics of Exclusion/Inclusion. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8 (2): 537–570. Kelsen, Hans. 1961. General Theory of Law and State. Translated by Andrew Wedberg. New York: Russell & Russell. Kerber, Linda K. 2005. Toward a History of Statelessness in America. America Quarterly 57 (3): 727–749. ———. 2009. The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A View from the United States. In Migration and Mobilities, ed. S.  Benhabib and J.  Resnik, 1–34. New York: New York University Press. Kerber, Naila. 2005. The Search for Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions in an Inter-connected World. In Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions, ed. Naila Kabeer, 1–27. London: Zed Books. Klusmeyer, Douglas. 2001. Introduction. In Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, ed. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Kruma, Kristine. 2014. EU Citizenship, Nationality and Migrant Status: An Ongoing Challenge. Leiden: Martinis Nijhoff Publishers. Lavi, S. 2011. Citizenship Revocation as Punishment: On the Modern Duties of Citizens and Their Criminal Breach. University of Toronto Law Journal 61 (4): 783–810. Lee, Tang Lay. 2005. Statelessness, Human Rights, and Gender: Irregular Migrant Workers from Burma in Thailand. Leiden: Martinus NijHoff Publishers. Lister, Ruth. 1998. New Conceptions of Citizenship. In Developments in British Social Policy, ed. N.  Ellison and C.  Pierson, 46–60. London: Macmillan Press Limited. Lister, Matthew. 2010. Citizenship in the Immigration Context. Maryland Law Review 70 (1): 175–233. Loomis, Louise Ropes. 1943. Aristotle: On Man in the Universe. Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black Inc. Maatsch, Aleksandra. 2011. Ethnic Citizenship Regimes: Europeanization, Post-­ war Migration and Redressing Past Wrongs. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Mahmud, Simeen. 2002. Making Rights Real in Bangladesh Through Collective Citizen Action. IDS Bulletin 33 (2): 1–12. Malanczuk, Peter. 1997. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. 7th ed. New York: Routledge. Manly, Mark, and Laura Van Waas. 2010. The Value of Human Security Framework in Addressing Statelessness. In Human Security and Non-citizens, ed. Alice Edward and Carla Ferstman, 49–81. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marshall, T.H. 1964. Class, Citizenship and Social Development. New  York: Doubleday & Company. Martiniello, Marco. 2000. Citizenship in the European Union. In From Migrant to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World, ed. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, 342–382. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mathews, Jassica T. 2001. Foreword. In Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, ed. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, viii. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Matteo, Henry S. 1997. Denationalization V. ‘The Right to Have Right’ The Standard of Intent in Citizenship Loss. New  York: University Press of America, Inc. Matthew v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 1976. McDougal, Myres S., et al. 1974. Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas. The Yale Law Journal 83 (5): 900–998. Merriam-Webster. n.d. Online: https://www.merriam-­webster.com/dictionary/civitas. Morris, L. 1998. Legitimate Membership of the Welfare Community. In Welfare, Needs, Rights and Risks, ed. M. Langan, 215–257. London: Routledge. Nelson, Brian R. 2015. Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of Ideology. 2nd ed. Long Grove: Waveland Press. Nottebohm Case. 1955. ICJ Rep. 4. Oppenheim, L. 1955. International Law. UK: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. Oxford English Dictionary. n.d. Online: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries. com/definition/english/freedom-­of-­religion?q=freedom+of+religion. Oyelaran, O. Olasope, and Michael Olu Adediran. 1997. Colonialism, Citizenship and Fractured National Identity: The African Case. In Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalization, ed. T.K.  Oommen, 173–197. California: Sage. Plato. 1975. The Laws. Translated by Trevor J. Saunders. New York: Penguin Books. Preuss, Lawrence. 1934. International Law and Deprivation of Nationality. Georgetown Law Journal 23: 250–276. Proclamation of Independence, Banglapedia, National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh. n.d. Online: http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title= Proclamation_of_Independence.

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CHAPTER 3

The Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship

Introduction This chapter sets out the historical background of the Biharis and their position in contemporary Bangladesh. Who are the Biharis? What is their historical background? How does their repatriation process work? What are the problems of their repatriation? What is their legal status in Bangladesh? What kinds of problems do they face? This chapter will deal with these questions. I argue in this chapter that the Biharis in Bangladesh are the products of the partition of India in the 1940s. They migrated to the former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) to avoid communal violence in India as well as to have a better future in Pakistan. Here I also argue that the Biharis remain unintegrated with the local Bengalis because of their separate culture and way of life. They opposed the freedom struggles of the Bengalis in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and supported the ruling elites of Pakistan to serve their own political and economic interests. After the birth of Bangladesh, virtually the Biharis became stateless, unwanted, and the targets of assaults. However, in 2008, the Bangladesh Supreme Court declared them citizens of Bangladesh which led to their transition from statelessness to citizenship.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 Z. Haider, Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46129-3_3

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Who Are the Biharis in Bangladesh? Although traditionally the population of Bihar is called Bihari, the term “Bihari” does not necessarily refer to the population of Bihar. Instead, the term is used to identify the variety of Urdu-speaking people who migrated from India to the then East Pakistan after the division of India to distinguish them from the local Bengalis (Yasmin 2011, 243). The Biharis1 migrated to the former East Bengal, a Muslim-majority province of India before partition2 which later became East Pakistan after partition,3 and then Bangladesh, after the 1971 war. They fled because of the communal violence in India as well as to have a better future in Pakistan. While the partition was one of the causes of the Biharis migrating to East Pakistan, there were other causes such as the Great Calcutta Killings and in particular the communal violence of Bihar during the 1940s.4 At the time of partition, of the 95  million Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, about 60 million became citizens of Pakistan, and the other 35 million were left in India; a huge number of Muslims in a non-Muslim country. As the Muslim-majority provinces created Pakistan, the Muslim minorities in other provinces of British India became insecure. Ayesha Jalal notes that “at a stroke, partition stripped them of their convenient cohorts and dropped the shield that the Muslim majority provinces might have raised in their defense inside undivided India” (Jalal 1985). The 1946 riots in Bihar, which killed reportedly 50,000 Muslims, forced the exodus of the Muslim community from Bihar to East Bengal (Ghosh 1998, 233–34). Many of them, of course, migrated to East Pakistan to avoid communal holocaust in India and preserve their Islamic identity. Above all, the Biharis, like many other Muslim masses, followed their leaders whom they considered the “protectors of the Moslem interests.”5 The situation of the Muslims in British India in general was very miserable following the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 which disempowered the Muslims.6 In the aftermath of the mutiny, the British Raj concluded that religious factors were responsible for it and singled out the Muslims as the prime elements of rebellion, and branded the mutiny as an insidious plot by Muslim fanatics (Bose and Jalal 2004). The suppression of the 1857 mutiny not only destroyed Muslim sovereignty but also caused the loss of the established Muslim way of life in India (Jalal 2000, 27). The divide-and-rule policy of the British Raj and continuous Muslim resentments against Hindu money lenders and Hindu domination in government services became clearly communal in India and exacerbated the

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Hindu-Muslim relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For instance, the ever-growing threat of Hindu domination over land ownership and government services endangered the existence of the Muslim elites in Sindh, led to Muslim resentment, and united the Muslim aristocrats and the emergent Muslim middle class who found their positions most vulnerable (Ansari 1992, 112). The Muslim leaders, such as Mr. M.A.  Jinnah, convinced the Indian Muslims that without Pakistan all Muslims would be under Hindu rule which would jeopardize the situation of the Muslim community in India.7 Mr. Jinnah’s principal argument was that Pakistan would only offer protection for Muslim interests in British India. Based on this line of argument, he urged upon the “Indian Muslims to unite under his leadership to force the British and the congress to concede Pakistan” (Jalal 1985). Mr. Jinnah appealed to the Muslims of both Muslim majority and Muslim minority provinces to unite under the demand of Pakistan. He used the slogan of Muslim nationalism not as an ideology to which he was devoted, but as a political device to achieve unity and solidarity among the divided Indian Muslims (Jalal 2008, 17). By making Pakistan Mr. Jinnah wanted to reconcile the interests of the Muslim majority and minority provinces on the ground that the Muslims were a nation (Jalal 1985). The making of Pakistan8 on the basis of strong Islamic romanticism soon created an ideological vagueness and the gifted leaders who encouraged the Muslims including the Biharis in India to join Pakistan ultimately failed to translate the Islamic ideology9 of the Pakistan movement into a reality (Maniruzzaman 1970, 24; Smith 1959, 226–31). The Biharis served the central government of Pakistan in former East Pakistan in the same way that the Eurasians and the immigrant minorities had served the European rulers of Asian and African countries (Feith 1972). Most Biharis sided with the Pakistani rulers and collaborated with the Pakistan army during the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 (Hashmi 1998, 385). Some of them particularly joined the paramilitary forces like Razakar, Al-Badar, and Al-Shams, who were accused of crimes against humanity like killing, raping, looting, and burning public properties.10 Immediately after the birth of Bangladesh, the Biharis became unwanted and were targets for revenge by the local Bengalis.11 They are often seen by the Bengalis as the enemies of Bangladesh (Saika 2011, 263). Some Bangladeshi politicians, civil society, and the masses also consider the Biharis nothing but war criminals (Hashmi 1998, 385). They opposed the Bengali nationalist movement against the discriminatory

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socio-economic policies of the central government of Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Biharis were abandoned by Pakistan after the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 (Murshid 1998, 4; Mehdi 2007).

Historical Background of the Biharis in Bangladesh The Biharis represent an ethnic group originating from the current Indian states of Bihar, Jharkhand, and eastern Uttar Pradesh with a history going back three millennia (Basher 2006, 90.) They speak different languages. Urdu and Hindi are their formal languages and informally they speak in three local dialects, that is, Magahi, Bhojpuri, and Maithili (Basher 2006, 90). Although Bihar is the heartland of the Biharis, they are also concentrated in North India, West Bengal, Assam, and Maharashtra within India and in neighbouring Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal outside India (Basher 2006, 90). India was partitioned into two successor states, India and Pakistan in 1947 on the basis of the “Two Nation Theory.”12 The Partition of India caused the worst communal violence in the history of India in 1946, including the “great Calcutta killing” leaving thousands of Muslims and Hindus dead in retaliation, senseless deadly communal riots occurred in Noakhali and Tipper districts, which re-produced the worst violence against the Muslim minority in Bihar (Bose and Jalal 2004). The death toll in Bihar alone was between 5000 to 20,000 Biharis.13 The Viceroy Lord Wavell declared that the Bihar killings were “far beyond anything that I think has yet happened in India since British rule began” (Talbot and Singh 2009). Some historians claimed that Bihar produced the largest “butcher’s bill” where some 20,000 Muslims were estimated killed (Singh 2006, 67–68). On the eve of the partition of India in 1947, following the Hindu-­ Muslim communal violence (well known as Civil War in Calcutta, East Bengal, and Bihar), these Urdu-speaking Muslim people migrated to former East Pakistan from the riot-centric areas, mainly from bloodshed (Sayeed 1967, 48). Many of them moved to Pakistan in order to have better opportunities in the new nation where the need for skilled and semi-skilled people like the Biharis was enormous (Hashmi 1998, 386). Among the Bihari migrants, the less affluent section moved to densely populated East Pakistan, because it was closer to Bihar and easier to enter and the rich entrepreneurs moved to West Pakistan where the country’s capital was located (Huque 1990, 276). Not only geographical proximity

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but employment opportunities in urban and industrial areas also attracted the poor and less educated Bihari refugees in East Pakistan. Among the educated and upper-class Biharis who came to East Pakistan, gradually moved to West Pakistan by utilizing their social capital and connections (Siddiqi 2013, 162). Apart from the causes noted above, the other factors involved in the Biharis’ migration to Pakistan included the Pakistan government encouraging them to migrate to Pakistan with incentives and arranging their rehabilitations. Prior to partition, many Biharis were working in the railway sector and factories in East Bengal. After partition, naturally, these railway workers and technicians wanted to move to East Pakistan and eventually, they opted to serve the then East Pakistan and became the central government’s employees in East Pakistan. In addition, many Muslim Biharis employed in East Bengal were serving the British government and also wanted to stay in East Pakistan after the partition of India in 1947 for their own interests (Tania et al. 2003, 52–54). A total number of 7.2  million Muslim refugees moved from India to Pakistan and the numbers of Muslims who moved to East Pakistan were approximately 699,079 of them, the vast majority came from Bihar, and the rest from its neighborhood or other Muslim minority provinces where the Muslims were a potent force, while about 6.5 million migrated to West Pakistan.14 According to the Census of 1951, the percentage of Urdu-speaking refugees in United Pakistan was 9.4 percent, and only 1.7 percent in East Pakistan (Census of Pakistan 1951). The Pakistan government not only rehabilitated them but also provided them with citizenship status through the Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951.15 These refugees are called Muhajir in Pakistan (Ahmed 1988, 33).16 Similarly, some 5500,000 Hindu refugees migrated from East Bengal to India (Wright Jr 1974, 189). Although population transfer from India to Pakistan was expected, millions of refugees fleeing, especially the forced exodus from Muslim minority provinces to Pakistan, were viewed alarmingly by the leaders of Pakistan. In September 1947, Mr. Jinnah urged the Indian leaders to give minorities a fair deal (Zamindar 2007, 41–42). In order to stop forced migration from India to Pakistan, the government of Pakistan appealed to Indian Muslims to look to the Indian government for their safety and security as Indian nationals. Further migration of Muslim minorities to Pakistan was not even considered an option. This was the official position of the Pakistani government on the matter (Zamindar 2007). Eventually, the Liaquat-Nehru Pact of 8 April 195017 prevented

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the migration of another 35  million Muslims from India to Pakistan (Binder 1963, 218). Under the Liaquat-Nehru Pact, the religious minorities of both sides of Bengal were reassured of their protection and reversed displacement there. The agreement provided protection to the minorities in Pakistan and India. It allowed freedom of movement to minorities as well as total equality of citizenship and equal opportunity to participate in public life. This pact particularly allowed the displaced persons across divided Bengal to return to their homes. Minority properties were restored, and they were rehabilitated under the pact (Zamindar 2007). The partition caused so much bloodshed that it was called a genocidal partition (Ahmad 2002). It was so traumatizing, violent, and daunting (Mehdi 2007, 56)18 that it not only “tore a human population into two and now three distinct political entities, but also tore many human lives into halves” (Mohsin 2002, 19). Consequently, families were divided into two halves, settled lives became unsettled which required remaking throughout the ages (Datta 2013, 1). Historians unveil that the migration was accompanied by a horrific massacre that killed approximately 2 million people by any conservative estimate during the period of partition because of communal violence and retaliation (Talbot 2010, 101). Women were the worst victims of the partition. Yasmin Khan narrates the story of women’s sufferings: Rather than being raped and abandoned, tens of thousands of women were kept in the ‘other’ country, as permanent hostages, captives, or forced wives; they become generically known simply as ‘the abducted women.’ … why did man keep the women they had attacked? Some became servants, forced into unpaid labour, and converted and were assimilated into a new family; others replaced sisters and wives, who had themselves been taken away. Others became wives and started a new life with their abductor or captor, with the full knowledge of others, who were complicit or who at least turned a blind eye to the new arrivals in the family. In all these different ways, the driving force was the impulse to consume, transform, or eradicate the remnants of the other community. (Khan 2007, 135)

Unfortunately, this was not the end of such worst suffering. Datta depicts the bleak occurrences: If the citizens of the sub-continent believed that such pain and suffering on such a gargantuan scale had climaxed in 1947 and would not be repeated, they were mistaken. Just over a quarter of a century after the partition of the

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subcontinent, the distress of population upheavals, mass killings, and rape was to revisit the region again. The events of 1971 while creating the new nation of Bangladesh, severely questioned the raison detre of Pakistani nationalism … (Datta 2013)

During the Bangladesh War of 1971 again, the Bengalis in East Pakistan experienced genocide,19 torture, and rape by the Pakistani colonial army which ultimately led to the destruction of a united Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.

The Bihari’s Assimilation with the Bengalis in East Pakistan The Biharis never wanted to integrate with the local Bengalis. Their culture and way of life are different from the Bengalis. They distanced themselves from the local people through their ‘language, culture, and social attitudes’ (Sobhan and Muzaffar 1980, 74). Their shared cultural and political interests with the West Pakistani ruling elites and the distribution of patronage among the Biharis by the West Pakistani governing elites made them a vested interest group in East Pakistan who often served as the agents of the ruling class. Many Biharis considered themselves upper class and treated the local Bengalis as lower-class people. Therefore, they remained alienated during the whole period when Pakistan was still a unified state comprising East and West Pakistan. When the Biharis fled or migrated to East Pakistan, they settled in the urban or suburban areas (Haider 2016, 428). They lived in some neighborhoods by isolating themselves from the local Bengalis with their own institutions such as schools, hospitals, and other community service organizations (Franda 1982, 17). During their quarter-century long residence in East Pakistan, they could not integrate into mainstream Bengali communities and embrace the local culture. The Biharis, as Urdu- speaking people, use the Persian script, while the Bengali-speaking local Muslim use the Sanskrit script20 which the Biharis like other Indian Muslims never accepted.21 They had nothing in common culturally and linguistically other than their religion. Culturally, the Biharis were distinct from the Bengalis. Not only their language but also their poets, their heroes, their festivals, their music, their traditions, customs, and their etiquettes were different from the local Bengalis. Even the medium of instruction for their children in the school was different.22

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Despite their quarter century of residence with the Bengalis, intermarriage between the Biharis and Bengalis generally did not happen because of cultural differences (although there is no religious bar for intermarriage among the Muslims (Haider 2003, 528). The Biharis’ distinct culture, tradition, and customs demarcated the ethnic boundary between them and Bengalis. The Biharis’ obsession with their culture allowed them to retain their language and way of life but prevented their integration with the Bengalis (Rahman 1986, 344). T. P. Wrights aptly points out that the Biharis were “a small linguistically conspicuous and vulnerable group which identified with the dominant north Indian culture of the West Pakistani governing elite” (Wright Jr 1974, 194). Indeed, the Biharis and the West Pakistanis trusted each other more than the Bengalis (Huque 1990, 277). The Biharis associated and identified themselves with West Pakistani society mainly because of their shared linguistic heritage. They extended their support to the ruling elites to access economic and political power in East Pakistan. The Biharis’ common perception was that as Urdu speakers they were better Pakistanis and better Muslims and thus better than Bengalis. This conviction strengthens their resolve to associate with the West Pakistani civil-military bureaucratic oligarchy and this is why the Biharis considered the West Pakistani ruling elites as their sole patrons and protectors (Hashmi 1998, 390). Thus, the Biharis served as the junior partners of the West Pakistani ruling elites. In addition, the central government’s policy of favoritism of the Bihari minority from the Bengali majority further alienated the Biharis from the Bengalis and made them cast their fate with the West Pakistani ruling elites (Ziring 1994).23 The Biharis’ superiority complex was reinforced through the blessings they received from the central government and their perceived superior Urdu language, skills, and education (Ilias 2010, 277). As a result, the Biharis never made any effort to learn Bengali, although they lived in a predominantly Bengali-speaking society (99 percent) (Ilias 2010, xiv). Interestingly, Urdu was not unfamiliar among many Bengalis.24 Nonetheless, the Biharis preferred to live in separate enclaves and considered themselves a minority in East Pakistan. Initially, the host Bengali-speaking people had great respect for the Biharis because of their shared religion and sacrifices for the cause of Muslim Pakistan. The Biharis, however, never reciprocated the hospitality of the Bengalis. Instead, the Biharis, just like the West Pakistani ruling elites, considered themselves Ashraf, meaning cultured, noble, and gentle and regarded the ethnic Bengalis as Atraf or Ajlaf, meaning low-born

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rustics. Gerlach succinctly captures the situation of the Biharis and their attitude toward the Bengalis: And so-called Biharis, Urdu-speaking Muslim émigrés from India who had migrated to East Pakistan during or after Pakistan in 1947 (often from Bihar), mostly living in separate settlements in urban areas and holding jobs in the bureaucracy, in business and forming much of the industrial workforce. Biharis tended to harbor prejudices against Bengalis as backward and rustic. (Gerlach 2010, 148)

The Biharis’ sense of superiority was further driven by other reasons, in particular their views. A common view shared by their West Pakistani patrons was that they were superiors, as Urdu speakers, to the Bengali Muslims because the Bengalis were converted from lower-caste Hindus (Choudhury 1972, 243). Talbot explain the Bihari situation as a linguistically distinct and weaker group that was keen to tie themselves with the North Indian culture of the governing elites of West Pakistan (Talbot 2010, 102). Politically, the Biharis in East Pakistan were mostly hostile to the local Bengalis and as already noted, they allied themselves with the West Pakistani ruling elites. Only a handful of Biharis supported the principal opposition party, the Awami League (AL) in East Pakistan which led the Liberation War of Bangladesh (Tajuddin 1994).25 Indeed, during the liberation struggle of Bangladesh26 (from the Language Movement of 1952 to the War of Independence 1971), most of the Biharis never supported the causes of the Bengalis but sided with the West Pakistani rulers and assisted the West Pakistani civil-military bureaucratic oligarchy (Hashmi 1998, 390). The majority of Biharis opposed the Bengali language movement in the 1950s, a bloody struggle for making the Bengali language (the language of the majority of people) one of the state languages of Pakistan. On the contrary, the Biharis stood for the central government’s policy of making Urdu as the only national language of Pakistan. Moreover, the Biharis, like their patron ruling Urdu-speaking elites also criticized the movement for the Bengali language as a Hindu plot aimed at the undoing of Pakistan (Ziring 1994, 6; Khan 1984, 90). They endorsed the central government’s single Urdu language policy because Urdu was also the language of the Biharis and this would ensure their employment

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opportunities and economic benefits, while the Bengalis saw Urdu as the language of aliens and oppressors.27 The decision to make Urdu the state language of Pakistan, as Jalal points out, was a deliberate move to undermine the cultural autonomy of the Bengalis (Jalal 2000). Although Urdu was reduced to a subaltern language in its own cultural setting (West Pakistan), it came as an instrument of neo-imperialist domination in East Pakistan (Jalal 2000). Indeed, the Bengalis found themselves in the position of colonial subjects. The Bengalis were excluded from the decision-making processes. Therefore, in any important national matter as G.  W. Choudhury points out, “They could only react; they could never act” (Choudhury 1972, 244). Similarly, the Sindhis demand for making the Sindhi language “the official language and the language of internal correspondence” caused language riots between the Sindhi-speaking locals and the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs in Sindh in 1972. The pro-Urdu press criticized the Sindhi-language supporters as leftists, anti-Islamic, and anti-Pakistanis (Rahman 1995, 1009). This was nothing new but the old policy of Pakistan’s power elite, which they unsuccessfully adopted in East Pakistan against the language movement of the Bengalis during 1948–1952. In the 1954 provincial elections, the Biharis allied with the ruling Muslim League, a defeated party against the victorious United Front, an alliance of the anti-government political parties, and thus acted against the aspirations of the masses of Bengalis (Ilias 2010; Ahmed 1979). Similarly, they sided with the central government against the Bengalis Autonomy Movement of 1966 and the Mass Upsurge of 1969 (Ahmed 1967, 176). The Biharis chose to support the ideology of Pakistan which meant a strong central government against regional autonomy. The Biharis and the association to promote and protect their interests, the Anjuman-e-­ Muhajirin (Muhajir Society), saw the Bengali nationalist movements as provincialism, racism, and arrogant nationalism. Thus, through the Anjuman-e-Muhajirin, the Biharis carried out broader campaigns against the Bengali autonomy movements. The Biharis believed that as a community they could only survive in a politically troubled East Pakistan by dint of their support to the pro-­ Pakistani forces against the Bengali nationalist forces (Khan et al. 2003, 99–100). The Biharis were aware that greater regional autonomy to the Bengalis would deprive them of the patronages distributed among them by the power elites who represented similar North Indian Urdu culture. But their allegiance to the West Pakistani power elite ultimately led to

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increasing conflict with the Bengalis (Talbot 2010, 102). In addition, the Biharis frequently took part in anti-Bengali ethnic and communal riots in East Pakistan and impressed their Pakistani masters throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Ahmed 1970, 335). The first Bengali-Bihari ethnic conflict occurred in 1952 at the Adamjee Jute Mill, Narayan Ganj, which was followed by a series of ethnic and communal riots in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Khulna; the central government throughout the 1950s and 1960s was complicit in fuelling some of these riots (Ahmed 1970). Since the creation of Pakistan, the Biharis never supported any of the causes and struggles for freedom by the Bengalis (Haider 2006, 75). In fact, they were used by the power elites to fuel conflicts between the Bengalis and them as a pretext to suppress the freedom struggle of the Bengalis and to secure their absolute domination over the Bengalis (Murshid 1998; Mehdi 2007, 62). The Biharis’ unfriendly attitude toward the Bengalis soon made them undesirable elements in East Bengal in the eyes of many Bengalis (Hashmi 1998, 391). Their persistent opposition to the Bengalis’ national aspiration culminated with the growth of anti-Bihari sentiments among the Bengalis. The vast majority of Biharis did not join any opposition party for “fear of changing the status quo” (Jahan 1972). In the national and provincial elections of 1970, no Bihari candidate could win in East Pakistan and the AL’s landslide victory in the national and provincial elections28 disappointed the Bihari community. Although the Biharis were supporters of the ML and the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), the Jamaat-i Islami (JI) also had support among the Biharis, because the JI devoted relief work and welfare activities in the Bihar camps (Wright Jr 1974, 198).29 Economically, at the time of their migration in 1947, the Biharis were “have-nots,” and homeless refugees in East Pakistan. They soon received patronage from the central government which included jobs, low-interest bank loans for investment, support for trading and industrial enterprises, opportunities for training, and later technical and managerial positions in business and industrial sectors. Apart from this, by the early 1960s most Biharis were rehabilitated under the soft housing schemes in the suburbs of Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, and other district towns (Khan 1984). Another example of the central government’s favoritism to the Biharis was that the abandoned properties of the Hindus, who migrated to India during the time of partition in 1947, were distributed among the Biharis, who had left their properties in India.30 In East Pakistan, although they were socially and politically different from the Bengalis as Urdu speakers, they obtained advantages over the Bengalis in managerial

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positions which required the knowledge of Urdu, the official national language of Pakistan (Weiner 1993, 1739). Although the central government’s supportive policy impressed the Biharis, the Bengalis of East Pakistan perceived it as a payoff to interlopers and they feared another intrusion (Ziring 1994). The Bengalis found that the Bihari refugees of central India with the help of West Pakistani rulers replaced the Hindus of erstwhile Bengal as wielders of economic and political power (Khan 1985, 843). The Bengali’s main grievances were not only against the Biharis but also against the Urdu-speaking West Pakistani power elites who were expropriating economic surplus from East Pakistan and appropriating that surplus for their own development. Although there was very little industrialization in former East Pakistan, only six non-Bengalis controlled over 40 percent of the total assets.31 The system of governance in Pakistan following independence was regarded as the “viceregal system”32 of governance and the process of domination and exploitation of the East Pakistani masses by the West Pakistani ruling elites was seen by some scholars as “internal colonialism.”33 The central government, as noted already, is complicit in facilitating this process of exploitation (Haq 1963, 113). Even though the central government distributed favors among the Biharis because of their identical cultural and political interests, other factors contributed to the success of the Biharis in taking advantage of the situations and opportunities in which they found themselves in. Many of them had technical skills, which helped them easily find self-employment, business facilities, and access to jobs in the private and public sectors. A significant number of Biharis used to work in the service sector as artisans for handicrafts, tailors, barbers, electricians, leather technicians, dyers, railway technicians, drivers, and washermen (Haider 2003, 530). Apart from this, many of them had firm determination and worked hard to change their economic status which helped improve their situations faster than the host Bengalis. Because of the combined efforts of the central government and the Bihari themselves, over the years they captured important positions in trade, commerce, and industrial sectors as well as in the administration which shifted their positions from poor refugees to powerful elites (Haider 2003, 530). The hosts’ Bengalis have seen the Biharis as a “privileged comprador class” (Siddiqi 2013, 154). The Biharis because of these reasons remain unintegrated with the Bengalis both vertically and horizontally.34 At the vertical level, they separated themselves from the Bengalis by considering them as upper class,

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rich, and noble, and at the horizontal level, they were different from the local people ethnically, linguistically, and culturally.

The Biharis in the Liberation War of Bangladesh The Biharis continuously opposed the freedom struggles of the Bengalis in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and supported the ruling elites of Pakistan to obtain and protect their own political and economic interests. They believed in a strong central government and opposed the regional autonomy of the Bengalis because that would deprive them of the advantages that they were already receiving from the central government and put them under the domination of the Bengalis. The Biharis opposed the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 for a couple of other reasons. First, ideologically they wanted to defend the integrity of the so-called “Islamic state—Pakistan” where they migrated in 1947 to avoid the communal violence in India as well as to maintain their religious sanctity. Secondly, the Biharis were certain that the failure of the national integration in Pakistan would also seriously jeopardize the socio-economic positions that they enjoyed in Pakistan as the favorites of the West Pakistani ruling authority. In the aftermath of the refusal of the Pakistan government to respect the results of the 1970s election and failure to transfer power to the duly elected majority party AL leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), the Bengalis impatiently revolted against the Pakistani authority. In the first phase of the Bangladesh Liberation War, initially, during the non-­ cooperation movement in East Pakistan in March 1971, the Biharis became the target of assaults of the uncontrolled Bengalis for their unqualified support to the West Pakistani civil-military power elites. This led to bloody rioting in different urban areas and many innocent Biharis became victims of cruel assaults inflicted upon them including killings, burnings, and rape.35 This indiscriminate assault on the non-Bengalis mainly on the Biharis was used as a justification for the mass murder of the Bengalis by the Pakistan army (Rashiduzzaman 1972, 185; Government of Pakistan, White Paper 1971). Most attacks on the Biharis occurred in places where the Biharis and Bengalis worked and lived side by side as neighbors before the violence erupted. In some places, the Bengalis allegedly attacked Bihari industrialists and businessmen with the aim of capturing their properties (Yasmin 2011).36 On 25 March 1971 against the wanton genocide and

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massacre by the Pakistan army of Bengalis in Dhaka, the Bengalis unleashed reprisal against the Biharis as the local agent of the Pakistan government (Haq 1986, 569). Bass writes: When the crackdown began on March 25, the Biharis were in a terrible situation, seen as a fifth column by many Bengalis. Some Biharis helped the Pakistani authorities in their repression, looting, or killing of Bengalis. … The most violent elements on both sides now had a chance to do their worst. (Bass 2013, 85)

The Bengalis’ hatred against the Biharis was so deep-rooted that violence against the Biharis was irresistible in the midst of total disorder.37 A section of Bengali crowd raised slogans such as “Ekta duta mowra dhoro shokal bikal nashta koro” (Catch a Bihari every morning and evening and have your breakfast); “Mawrader hotta koro Bangladesh shadhin koro” (Kill the Biharis to liberate Bangladesh) (Ilias 2010).38 Most Biharis and non-­ Bengalis were massacred in the industrial areas of Joydevpur-Ghazipur, Chittagong and Khalispur-Khulna and at the largest Bihari concentration of Santahar-Naogong, a northern district of Bangladesh (Bose 2011, 77–86). The insensible and inhuman crimes of the Pakistan army against the Bengalis and the retaliations of the Bengalis against the Biharis and other non-Bengalis are collectively called by Sarmila Bose as an “uncivil war” fraught with “mob, mutinies and madness” (Bose 2011). Against this backdrop, the Pakistan army equipped the Biharis with firearms for self-defense. The army deliberately encouraged the deterioration of the law-and-order situations and confrontations between the Bengalis and the Biharis in order to justify their pre-planned genocide of the Bengalis under the guise of combating the confrontation (Ahmed 1979, 225–226). The Biharis supported the Pakistan army, took part in the killings of the Bengalis, captured their properties and they were more interested in military operations to stop Bengalis’ violence (Maniruzzaman 1980, 82–83; Siddiqi 2004, 77). They were widely recruited to the police forces and security guards. Aside from this, the Pakistan army also built Civil Armed Forces (CAF) like Peace Committees, Razakars, Al-Badar, Al-Shams, irregular Mujahid forces, and East Pakistan Civil and Armed Police (EPCAP)39 consisting of Biharis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis who aided the Pakistan army in the annihilation of the pro-Bangladesh elements (Choudhury 1999). The Biharis’ direct involvement in state-­ sponsored terrorism eventually completed the civil, political, and cultural

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divide between the majority Bengalis and the minority Biharis (Talbot 2010). Although most Biharis do not concede their collaboration40 with the Pakistan army, some of them justify their actions as patriotic responsibility (Mehdi 2007, 63)41 They wanted to keep their country integrated and sided with the Pakistan army during the “civil war of 1971” (Mahmood et al. 2015, 69). They further argue that Indian support to the Bangladesh Liberation War was a ploy to dismember Pakistan (Haider 2009, 537–551), which they thought once again would jeopardize their lives and property and increase their suffering under the rule of the majority Bengalis. Although most Biharis are believed to have aided the Pakistan army, there is some evidence that some of them, albeit insignificant in number, actively served as freedom fighters with their Bengali friends in the struggle for freedom and independence for Bangladesh. These Biharis acted against the position taken by their own ethnic community leaders.42 Indeed, some of them, such as Zaheer Uddin Ahamed, who was a member of the AL, held positions of leadership, including being appointed as the first High Commissioner of Bangladesh to Pakistan (Ilias 2010, 187). In the second phase of the Bangladesh Liberation War, the Bangladesh government-in-exile attempted to prevent the Biharis from collaborating with the Pakistan army against the Bengalis. Swadin Bangla Betar Kendra (Radio Free Bangladesh) started broadcasting an Urdu program for the Biharis and urged them to join the Liberation War which they had disregarded. Many Biharis claim they had not joined the war of liberation because of the past memories of the horrendous actions of the Hindus against Muslims in the wake of the partition of India in the late 1940s and India’s support to the Bengalis war of independence which they saw as an attempt by India to destroy Muslim Pakistan (Sisson and Rose 1990, 9). The Biharis were so devoted to General Tikka Khan (famous for war crimes) and the defeated Pakistan army that they left their homes and moved to the Dhaka Cantonment to share the fate of the defeated Pakistani soldiers when the Pakistan army decided to surrender to the joint commands of the Indian army and the Bangladesh freedom fighters.43 They became demoralized, panicked, and devastated. In the last phase of the Bangladesh Liberation War when the whole of Bangladesh was liberated from the Pakistani occupation, most of the West Pakistani civilians along with the defeated Pakistani army were transferred to India, but the Biharis remained in Bangladesh. They were left in a hostile environment without any protection. They were unwanted and insecure just after the dismemberment of Pakistan. The violence occurred

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against them in the form of looting their properties, chastising, and killing their men, and raping their women (Ahmed 1995, 5). One analyst describes the situation as atrocities committed by pro-liberation civil-­ military Bengali nationalists that killed many nonlocals and the locals who did not support the creation of Bangladesh (Bose 2011a, 398). Although there is no census on the exact number of Biharis who were killed, international analysts and observers provide different estimates, but none claimed less than 20,000 and more than 200,000.44 Violence against the Biharis was a backlash of the mass murder of about 3  million Bengalis (Jahan 2013, 257) at the hands of the Pakistan army and their collaborators during the Liberation War of 1971. Violence against the Biharis could not be stopped despite strong instruction from the highest political authority in a situation of total lawlessness.45 In this milieu, the Biharis moved into enclaves in different parts of Bangladesh where they formed communities that allowed them to easily defend themselves as a group than when scattered in individual homes (Huque 1990, 278). Others fled their homes and sought sanctuary in some 66 Red Cross camps where they were waiting for repatriation to Pakistan (Kelley 2010, 349). By the end of 1972, approximately 1 million Biharis were living in the squalid Red Cross camps in Bangladesh (Kelley 2010, 349). Although thousands of Biharis were killed mercilessly, the further massacre was thwarted initially by the Indian army who guarded the Bihari colonies, and in some cases, the government sent the Biharis into prisons or camps to ensure their protection (Franda 1982, 18). After the withdrawal of the Indian army from the Bihari-occupied areas, the regular Bangladesh army disarmed the heavily armed Biharis at Mirpur and Mohammadpur Bihari concentrations in Dhaka. Surprisingly, the Bihari resistance was so strong that the tough actions of the Bangladesh army forced them to surrender. In the clashes between the armed Biharis and the troops, many Biharis were killed (Khan 2007, 90). Some estimates show that a total of 70,000 to 100,000 Biharis were killed prior to liberation, during liberation, and post-liberation periods (Neeld 1971). Describing the horror of the killing of Biharis, journalist Anthony Mascarenhas writes: Thousands of families of unfortunate Muslims, many of them refugees from Bihar who chose Pakistan at the time of partition riots in 1947, were mercilessly wiped out. Women were raped or had their breasts torn out with specially fashioned knives, children did not escape the horror; the lucky ones

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were killed with their parents; but many thousands of others must go through what life remains for them with eyes gouged out and limbs amputated. More than 20,000 bodies of non-Bengalis have been found in the main towns, such as Chittagong, Khulna, and Jessore. The real toll, I was told everywhere in East Bengal, may have been as high 100, 000, for thousands of non-Bengalis have vanished without a trace. (Mascarenhas 1971)

Thus, the Biharis became the targets of widespread political persecution preceding and during the liberation war as well as in the aftermath of the liberation war because of their inimical role during the Liberation Struggle of Bangladesh in general and their atrocities in the Liberation War in 1971. Although most Biharis collaborated with the Pakistan army out of their insecurity and desperation, others acted out of greed or their unqualified allegiance to Pakistan. The entire Bihari population, however, is often stigmatized as active collaborators with the Pakistan army in their war crimes and this caused the Bihari suffering including “mental agony and stress” (Huque 1990, 278). This implies that Bangladesh is revenging those people who opposed its freedom movement (Farzana 2009, 231).

Repatriation of the Biharis Stranded in Bangladesh After the birth of Bangladesh, the government of Bangladesh gave the Biharis an option in 1972 either to stay in Bangladesh as citizens or to return to Pakistan through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).46 Accordingly, of the 1 million Biharis in all (Table 3.1), half a million opted to return to Pakistan and the remaining half a million wanted to stay in Bangladesh, and the latter was immediately granted Bangladeshi citizenship.47 They have been assimilated into mainstream Bangladesh society. A total of about 270,000 Biharis were repatriated to Pakistan and the remaining could not return to Pakistan because of the unwillingness of the Pakistan government. Their number has further increased because of the natural rise. Now approximately 250,000–300,000 of the Biharis are living in 116 camps in different parts of Bangladesh. After the independence of Bangladesh, about 1  million Biharis faced difficulties in survival, because their “properties were confiscated, services terminated, rights abrogated and working places burnt” (Huque 1990, 282). The government of Bangladesh claimed that by 1972 more than a million Biharis were residing in Bangladesh (Government of Bangladesh

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Table 3.1  Total number of Biharis in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, 1972

Places in Bangladesh Dhaka (outskirts) Dhaka (Mirpur) Dhaka (Mohammadpur) Dhaka (Adamjee) Dhaka (Ispahani) Dhaka (Murapara) Saidpur Rangpur Chittagong Khulna Ishurdy Bogra Rajshahi Mymensingh Comilla Sylhet Jessore Dinajpur Total

Number of Bihari 278,500 150,000 95,000 16,000 3000 9500 275,000 7000 60,000 60,000 30,000 14,000 4500 3100 1200 1000 700 180 1,008,680

Source: Sen, Sumit. 1999. Stateless Refugees and Right to Return: The Bihari Refugees of South Asia—Part 1. International Journal of Refugee Law, 11(4), 635

1998). According to the ICRC, the total number of Biharis in 1972 was 682,000 (Muhith 1978, 236). In the aftermath of the Simla Accord of 197248 which normalized the Indo-Pakistan relationship, India used a great deal of persuasion on Bangladesh to settle the trilateral problems among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. This effort produced an Indo-Bangladesh joint declaration on 17 April 1973 which called for the repatriation of the non-Bengalis from Bangladesh who owes allegiance to Pakistan. This led to the signing of the Delhi Agreement on 28 August 1973 (Ayub 1975, 113–114) and the tripartite agreement among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh during 5–9 April 1974 (Ilias 2010, 171). The Delhi Agreement provided for simultaneous three-way repatriation: Pakistani prisoners of war from India, Bengali detainees from Pakistan, and Biharis opted for Pakistan from Bangladesh (Bokhari and Thornton 1988, 38).49 The Delhi Agreement reads in part:

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Without prejudice to the respective positions of Bangladesh and Pakistan on the question of non-Bengalis who are stated to have opted “for repatriation to Pakistan,” the government of Pakistan, guided by considerations of humanity, agrees initially, to receive a substantial number of such non-­ Bengalis from Bangladesh. It is further agreed that the prime ministers of Bangladesh and Pakistan or their designated representatives will thereafter meet to decide what additional number of persons who may wish to migrate to Pakistan may be permitted to do so. Bangladesh has made it clear that it will participate in such a meeting only on the basis of sovereign equality. (Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973)

The accompanying memorandum further states that the government of Pakistan “agrees that initially it will receive: 1. persons who are domiciled in what was West Pakistan. 2. employees of the central government of Pakistan and their families; and 3. members of the divided families irrespective of their original domicile and thereafter 25000 others who constitute hardship cases.50

Although Bangladesh was not a signatory to the Delhi Agreement of 28 August 1973, Bangladesh gave consent to this agreement.51 The Delhi Agreement not only ensured three-way repatriation but also peacefully settled five significant regional issues: (1) the return of Bengalis from Pakistan to Bangladesh; (2) the return of non-Bengalis from Bangladesh to Pakistan; (3) the return of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians under protective custody (CUPC) from India to Pakistan; (4) the return of the 195 POWs charged with war crimes; and (v) the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan (Datta 2011, 68). Under the Delhi Agreement, the government of Pakistan agreed to receive a substantial number of non-Bengalis who opted for repatriation to Pakistan from Bangladesh (Haider 2006, 75). Pakistan did not accept the repatriation of the Biharis as a legal obligation, but as humanitarian consideration and allowed the repatriation of a substantial number of Biharis (Ahmed 1983, 239). Therefore, the Pakistan government did not make any commitments to take back the remaining Biharis who do not fall within the three categories of people under the Delhi Agreement. This is considered a diplomatic failure on the part of the Bangladesh government to obtain any concrete commitment from Pakistan that it would take back all Biharis who wanted repatriation to Pakistan (Ahmed 1983, 241).

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Massive three-way repatriation started in 1973 in accordance with the Delhi Agreement and continued till April 1974 under the auspices of the ICRC. According to the provision of the Delhi Agreement, the return of the Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees was conducted bilaterally between India and Pakistan. UNHCR was to assist other categories of people in their repatriation (UNHCR 2000, 73). A total number of 170,000 Biharis were repatriated (Islam 1984, 54; Weiner 1993, 1739) to Pakistan under the three criteria mentioned in the accompanying memorandum of the Delhi Agreement of 1973 (Hafiz 1985, 369). Following Pakistan’s recognition of Bangladesh in February 1974, a tripartite agreement among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh was signed on 9 April 1974 (Bangladesh-India-Pakistan: Agreement 1974) and Pakistan agreed to receive all non-Bengalis who fall under the three said categories. The Delhi Agreement and the categorization of Biharis into different classes was seen by the Bihari community as a bureaucratic ploy of the Pakistan government to avoid the responsibility of taking back all Urdu-speaking Biharis from Bangladesh. The Association of the Biharis, The Stranded Pakistanis General Repatriation Committee (SPGRC) aptly points out: It has created artificial and untenable ‘categories’ such as ‘central government’s employee’, ‘divided family’, ‘distressed person’, and ‘West Pakistan origin’, as qualifications for repatriation, conveniently forgetting that in 1971, when it gave a call to these non-Bengalese come out and join the war for Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, there was no mention of any kind of category that could serve as qualification for the said war. (Quoted in Ghosh 2007, 59)

Since 1974, after the initial repatriation of a substantial number of the Biharis, Pakistan was reluctant to accept the large number of the remaining Biharis. Bangladesh has been trying to settle the issue through bilateral and multilateral means, but only little progress has been achieved. When Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Bhutto) visited Bangladesh in June 1974, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) first demanded the repatriation of all Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan, but Bhutto declined. In response to a question from a journalist, Bhutto said, “I have not come to Bangladesh with a blank cheque” (Bird and Goldmark 1974). The government of Bangladesh, against this backdrop, became interested in a third-party settlement of the Bihari issue. Prime Minister

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Mujib requested the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, to use his good offices to ensure the repatriation of the stranded Biharis in 1973. Werner Adam writes: Mujib complains, Bhutto is not even willing to accept repatriation of non-­ Bengalis in Bangladesh who have expressed a desire to return to their motherland, as far as Mujib is concerned the only conclusion is to be drawn is that Bhutto wants to maintain a fifth column in Bangladesh; as long as these Pakistanis remain in this country, the hostility must technically be in force. (Adam 1974)

Bangladesh raised the Bihari issue to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in December 1974 and the Commonwealth Leaders’ Conference in Jamaica in May 1975 (Choudhury 1992, 299). The goal of this diplomacy was to create pressure on Pakistan to take back its citizens, but the diplomacy of Bangladesh could not make any headway. In 1977, after long inaction, the government of Ziaur Rahman (Zia) initiated further diplomatic endeavors to settle the Bihari problem with Pakistan bilaterally and put pressure on Pakistan to complete the process of repatriation of the Biharis in Bangladesh.52 This resulted in the repatriation of 4790 Biharis to Pakistan by sea in 1977 (Hafiz 1985, 369). In the aftermath of the normalization of the relationship between Bangladesh and Pakistan, 2800 Biharis were further repatriated to Pakistan in 1979 and the UNHCR very briefly made travel arrangements for their repatriation which was financed by Saudi Arabia and Libya (Far Eastern Economic Review 1979). The UK-based campaign organization Save Bihari Action Committee was formed in 1971 to save the Biharis against the backdrop of extrajudicial killings of the Biharis in Bangladesh. The British Labour Party MP Mr. Lord Ennals joined the campaign and received wide media coverage and drew the attention of the Red Cross and other relief agencies which headed for Bangladesh to provide aid to the Biharis. Lord Ennals was also the chairman of the Asian Committee of the British Refugee Council and made several trips to Pakistan and Bangladesh and several other Muslim countries to mobilize support for the repatriation of the Biharis (Ghosh 2007, 69–70). The meeting of Lord Ennals with President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh and President Zia-ul Haque of Pakistan resulted in the transfer

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Table 3.2 Estimated number of Bihari repatriation 1972–1999

Year

Number of Biharis Repatriated

1973–1974 1979 1982 1993 Total

163,072 9872 4800 325 178,069

Source: Sen, Sumit 2000. Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return: The Bihari Refugees of South Asia— Part 2. International Journal of Refugee Law, 12(1), 62

Table 3.3  Concentration of Biharis in Bangladesh, 1998 Location

Number of Number of Families Persons

Location

Number of Families

Number of Persons

Dhaka Narayan Ganj Sayedpur

12,918 1452

69,767 7289

Faridpur Rajbari

104 53

557 287

9017

69,234

271

1632

Rangpur

2538

15,879

1207

7763

Chittagong Dinajpur Khalispur Jessore Mymensingh Total

2652 1542 2382 985 435 –

17,302 9906 12,394 5539 2583 –

Thakurgaon & Nilfamari Dhaka (outside camp) Dewanganj Rajshahi Khulna Bogra Gaibandha –

109 1185 1029 898 129 40,357

578 6829 5864 5319 788 238,093

Source: Government of Bangladesh (1998). Brief on Stranded Biharis in Bangladesh [Unpublished]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Asia Desk, Dhaka

of 7000 Biharis to Pakistan in 1981 (Ennals 1987, 243). Between 1973 and 1993, a total of 178,069 Biharis were formally repatriated to Pakistan out of 534,792 who opted for repatriation through the ICRC (Table 3.2) (Sen 2000, 62). An estimated 100,000 Biharis moved to Pakistan informally through India, Nepal, and Burma, and between 250,000 and 300,000 still remain in Bangladesh (UNHCR 2009 and Table 3.3). These Biharis in Bangladesh were in limbo until 2008 because of their undecided citizenship status (Statelessness: It’s Tough to Live in Limbo 2007). They live in 116 camps in different parts of Bangladesh and have been

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struggling to repatriate to Pakistan over the last five decades. They used to claim that they were the true Pakistanis on the ground that without the sacrifices of the Muhajirs including the Biharis of the Muslim minority provinces, the creation of Pakistan was impossible (Government of Bangladesh 1998; D’Costa and Chakma 2008, 11; Datta 2011, 71). Some console themselves by claiming that “they did not leave their country; their country left them” (Bearak 2000). In 1977, the Stranded Pakistanis General Repatriation Committee (SPGRC) was founded under the leadership of Mohammad Nasim Khan, aimed at obtaining the repatriation of the Biharis. It was formed in December 1977 as an interest group in order to create pressure on Pakistan for the repatriation of the Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan. The SPGRC claims that the Biharis are Pakistanis in emotion, thought, language, and culture (Ghosh 2007, 59). Since 1977, the SPGRC has continuously organized demonstrations, hunger strikes, and long marches. The SPGRC has also been meeting the high officials of Pakistan and Bangladesh including Heads of State, Foreign Ministers, and High Commissioners to put pressure on Pakistan for the repatriation of the Biharis, but these efforts did not result in a breakthrough. The SPGRC has a rationale for repatriation. The SPGRC Chief Nasim Khan describes the direct link between the Biharis and the creation of Pakistan: Had their mother’s breasts not been chopped off, their sisters not [been] widowed and ravaged, their tiny, innocent children not been impaled on bayonets, it is my belief that Pakistan would never have come into existence … The Quaid had said that the tragedy of Bihar became the reason for the existence of Pakistan. But alas! Even today lakhs of Muslims continue to languish inside sixty-six camps in an alien land. (Ghosh 2007, 59)

The SPGRC generally characterize the Biharis as the most oppressed, suppressed, depressed, and tortured Pakistanis who are stranded and languishing in squalid camps, who made extreme sacrifices in 1946, 1947, and 1971 for their dreamland Pakistan and in Bangladesh, they live in the camps that are under threat of demolition and destruction and then eviction (Ghosh 2007, 60). The SPGRC Chief Nasim Khan wondered: “Are we supposed to suffer because we are a defeated nation? Do we have a right of existence, or we shall be liquidated from the Earth?” (Ghosh 2007, 60). The SPGRC believes that Bangladesh cannot take the responsibility of maintaining the Biharis simply because it is a Muslim country.

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The problems for the Biharis in Bangladesh are that the Bengalis do not consider the Biharis as their own people who have a different language and culture. The Bihari leader Nasim Khan argues that it is the responsibility of a better-placed Muslim brother to reduce the pressure from his less prosperous brother and comparatively Pakistan is in a better economic position with its five times bigger territory and much better socio-­ economic conditions (Ghosh 2007, 60). In 1981, at a Conference of the UNHCR convened in Geneva, twelve national and international organizations wanted to form a working group to assist the resettlement program of the Biharis in collaboration with Pakistan and Bangladesh governments. Several Muslim countries also expressed interest in funding this project, but ultimately it did not work (Biharis in Bangladesh). Meanwhile, the UK-based Biharis organization the Anjuman-e-Nau in collaboration with the Bihari organization the Chicago-Based Committee for Stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh (CSP) undertook a Stranded Pakistanis Resettlement Project (SPRP) headed by Lord Ennals. He organized a conference of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies held in Geneva from 13 to 15 December 1982, and the declaration of the conference asked for an immediate solution to the problem of repatriation. The conference endorsed the stranded Pakistanis resettlement project (SPRP) undertaken earlier (Ghosh 2007, 72–73). Apart from repatriation to Pakistan, the SPRP also had an international approach for the Bihari settlement. According to the SPRP, Pakistan would be the country of citizenship, but it also considered the possibility of immigration for some of the Biharis to other countries including Australia, Malaysia, and USA as well as temporary employment opportunities in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. However, for this to happen Pakistan citizenship was a necessary first step (Ghosh 2007, 73). All these attempts of the SPRP remained at the proposal stage and were never implemented and thus the Biharis remained stranded. Given the situation, the government of Pakistan and the Rabita Trust53 signed an agreement on 9 July 1986 and founded a trust to mobilize funds for the repatriation of estimated 250,000 stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh to Pakistan. President Zia-ul Haq was nominated as the chairman of the Trust. The Pakistan government donated Rs. 250 million to the fund as an initial contribution and Rabita donated Rs. 50 million. It was expected that the remaining fund would be collected in three years.54 The process of Bihari repatriation became frozen after the death of President Zia-ul Haq in 1988. Benazir Bhutto, the successive prime

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minister of Pakistan, did not respect the plan of Bihari repatriation to Pakistan. The possibility of the Bihari repatriation further came to the limelight when Mr. Nawaz Sharif was elected to power with an electoral pledge to repatriate the stranded Pakistanis. During an official visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia to Pakistan, from 9 to 11 August 1992, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who came to power with an alliance with the MQM55 agreed to repatriate all 238,000 Biharis and assured that repatriation would take place in phases as funds become available (The Daily Ittefaq 1992). A batch of 323 Biharis was repatriated in January 1993 as a token of this commitment (Hindustan Times 1993; Haider 2001, 427). Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan reiterated his commitment to take all 238,000 Biharis to Pakistan in January 1998 after a three-nation Dhaka Summit.56 In 1999, following the military coup in Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf did not respect the commitment of his predecessor. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) returned to power in Pakistan in 2008, but with the government of Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani pursuing the old policy of “no to reparation,” the stranded Pakistanis were living in a limbo. Moreover, the association of the Biharis, the SPGRC, is sharply divided over its earlier policy of repatriation. In December 1996, one group of the Biharis shifted from their old position on repatriation. They formed a new organization called the Bangladesh Mohajir Welfare and Development Committee (BMWDC) headed by Mr. Ezaj Ahmed Siddiqi. The goal of this new organization was to obtain Bangladeshi citizenship for the Biharis and to change their mindset from the old policy of repatriation to the new goal of integration in Bangladesh. Most members of this organization are young Biharis who were born and raised in Bangladesh. They want rehabilitation in Bangladesh, not repatriation, they prefer employment in Bangladesh which is their Motherland. They think that repatriation is a closed chapter with no prospect (Ghosh 2007, 89). Now SPGRC has virtually become the association for the old-­generation Biharis. The SPGRC leader Nasim Khan died in 2005 and left disappointments for the old-generation Biharis who are still awaiting repatriation (Ghosh 2007, 90). Ezaj Ahamed Siddiqi, leader of those agitating for Bangladesh citizenship under BMWDC, died on 3 October 2011 (The Daily Star 2011b, 5 October) and has been replaced by Ayaj Ahamed Siddiqi (The Daily Star 2011a, 12 October). The new generation of Biharis is determined to rehabilitate themselves in Bangladesh because Bangladesh is their homeland. They are reluctant to move to Pakistan, an

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alien land that they have never seen before. The findings of a study carried out in 1997 by the Refugee and Migratory Movement Research Unit (RMMRU) show that 62.74 percent wanted to be integrated into Bangladesh and 33.3 percent wanted to go to Pakistan (RMMRU 1997; Abrar 1998). Similarly, a RMMRU 2010 survey on the Geneva camp, the largest Bihari camp in Dhaka, demonstrates that 97.78 percent wanted to live in Bangladesh (Sholder 2011, 33).57 Prior to the 2008 national election, 70–80 percent Biharis reportedly registered as voters (Kelley 2010, 364). This is an indication of a change in their mindset. In 2001, a group of young men founded the Association of Young Generation of Urdu-Speaking Community (AYGUSC) led by Mr. Khalid Hussein who claim that they are already Bangladeshi citizens based on the 1972 Citizenship Law of Bangladesh. They filed a writ petition challenging their ineligibility for voting rights. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High Court Division) ruled in their favor in May 2008. The Court directed the Election Commission to enroll the petitioners and other Urdu-speaking people who want to be enrolled in the electoral rolls and accordingly give them National Identity Cards without any further delay (Stranded Biharis now Bangladesh Citizens 2008; UNHCR 2009). The young generation Biharis contends that “by virtue of birth we are Bangladeshi citizens, and we want to live in this country with equal status enjoyed by Bengali-speaking Bangladeshis. For us, Bangladesh is our motherhood … we are not willing to remain stateless and jobless anymore” (Heffernan 2002, 17–18) (Table 3.3).

Problems of the Bihari Repatriation to Pakistan Pakistan is reluctant to accept the Biharis primarily for economic reasons. It will be very expensive to repatriate and rehabilitate the Biharis in Pakistan. Pakistani policymakers are convinced that the repatriation of the Biharis will destabilize the internal situation of Pakistan because of the prolonged ethnic conflict in Sindh (the main concentration of the Biharis). The local Sindh people also believe that the Biharis return to Pakistan will make them a minority in their home province. They put pressure on the government against further repatriation. The SPGRC Chief Nasim Khan has expressed the community’s utmost concern and desire for repatriation to Pakistan:

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Had we the wings of doves, we would have flown and landed crossing the barriers, but not lamented for long 22 years. These ill-fated are residing in sixty-six camps all over Bangladesh in sub-human conditions and are made the pawn of political treachery. Is there no Mohammad Bin Qasim to rescue these ill-fated, who are equally Muslims, and their fault is patriotism for Pakistan. (Ghosh 2007, 85)

Pakistan certainly does have political and moral responsibilities to repatriate and rehabilitate the Biharis, because most Biharis migrated to Pakistan in 1947 as an ideologically Muslim state. In return, says Whitaker, “Pakistan used the Biharis as a spearhead of their policy in Bengal, deliberately encouraging them to continue as a separate community, rather than to integrate, by heavy government expenditure in areas such as Mirpur” (Whitaker 1982, 19). The Biharis were used as an instrument in the hands of the ruling clique who used them only to perpetuate their political and economic domination over erstwhile East Pakistan (Ilias 2010, xvii). While recognizing Pakistan’s moral obligation, Mehdi argues: There are the stranded Pakistanis whom Pakistan doesn’t want to accept. Clearly, their virtual statelessness has its root in Pakistan’s failure to resolve peacefully the conflict between East and West Pakistan and integrate these Biharis with the Bengali population in former East Pakistan. Again, their continued-up rootedness and statelessness is because of Pakistan’s policy of dispossession, a policy which cannot ensure a good image of the country abroad. (Mehdi 2007, 62)

Unfortunately, under the present constitution of Pakistan, the Biharis are not qualified to be citizens of Pakistan. President Zia-ul Haq denied Pakistani citizenship to the Biharis who were residing in Bangladesh by an Ordinance promulgated in 1978 (Shah and Chachar 1991, 65).58 Politically, the ethnically trouble-ridden Pakistani province of Sindh is more concerned with the Bihari issue. There are two opposite views regarding the Biharis or the Muhajir communities of Sindh who belong to the same ethnicity, represented by Muhajir Quomi Movement (MQM). The MQM consider the Biharis as genuine Pakistanis, and they want their repatriation to Pakistan. They argue that the Pakistan government is responsible for their miserable plight and that the drops of blood of the Bihari martyrs which laid down the foundation stone of Pakistan had been callously forgotten (Ghosh 1998, 239). In the post-1971 period, a movement for establishing Sindhi as the sole official language of Sindh province

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was launched in Pakistan. The Muhajirs resented this move, and a serious linguistic riot broke down over the issue in 1972. The Muhajirs proposed to set up Muhajiristan separating Karachi from Sindh. This idea received endorsement from the Biharis brought from Bangladesh (Wright Jr 1974, 199). The native Sindhis on the other hand seriously oppose such an idea of Muhajirstan as well as they oppose the repatriation of the Biharis to Pakistan. They argue that if the Biharis are repatriated to Pakistan, they would prefer to settle with their kith and kin in the big cities of the Sindh province. That will make the indigenous Sindh population a minority in their ancestral home. The Sindhis express their grievances by complaining that the Muhajirs who migrated from the Muslim minority provinces of India and were given refuge by the Sindhis, are now appropriating the lands of Sindh and are making the Sindhis minority in their own territory (Rahman 1995, 1009).59 The Muhajirs with a 23.4 percent literary rate compared with the 13.2 percent literary rate of local Sindhis captured the technical, bureaucratic, and professional jobs in the province (Rahman 1995, 1008). Mohammad Waseem understands that the Sindhis’ grievances against the Muhajirs have widened for several counts: The central government moved to separate Karachi from Sindh to become a federal capital and in 1948, pushed the Sindh government to Hyderabad instead. The Sindhi language was banned or discouraged at various levels as a medium of instruction. The Sindh University at Karachi was relocated to Jamshoro near Hyderabad. The assets of the provincial government in Karachi were arbitrarily transferred to the central government. … Muhajirs were accused of assuming an attitude of cultural arrogance towards Sindhis, almost bordering on racism. Karachi overnight became a Mohajir city, where Sindhis were reduced to 3.5 percent of the population. Mohajirs occupied government jobs in numbers grossly disproportionate to their population while representation of Sindhis in jobs in both public and private sectors was negligible. (Waseem 2010, 281–282)

The Sindh people are also afraid that if the Biharis are repatriated to Pakistan along with the local Muhajirs, they will divide the Sindh and create their own province or separate state called Muhajiristan (Homeland of the Muhajirs) either within or outside the federation of Pakistan (Shah 1997, 74–77). The rise of Muhajir Quomi Movement (MQM), their stronghold in Karachi, and the experience of 1971 which dismembered the only country in South Asia on the ground of ethnicity further reminded

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them of their old wounds (Ahmar 1998, 112–117). The Sindhis believe that the rising influences of the Muhajirs in the business and politics of Pakistan have constantly remained a threat to their existence (Wright Jr 1974, 199).60 Projecting the Muhajir (consisting of Biharis and other immigrants) and the local Sindhi’s rivalry and conflict, Bose and Jalal note: Rural Sindh was transformed during the 1980s into a cauldron of discontent. In Urban Sindh where Sindhi speakers were heavily outnumbered by the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs (refugees) and other linguistic groups, the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) made a meteoric entry into Pakistan’s political landscape. During the latter half of 1980 the urban centers of Sindh particularly Karachi and Hyderabad became battle zones or ferocious conflicts between well-armed rival linguistic communities. (Bose and Jalal 2004, 196)

The PPP, which is the immediate past ruling party in Pakistan, is also against the settlement of the Biharis in Pakistan. The PPP leadership including the Late Z. A. Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto opposed the idea of the Biharis’ repatriation to Pakistan. The PPP’s support base is rural Sindh and quite naturally the PPP realized the emotions of the Sindhis that the Biharis ultimately will settle into the urban centres of Sindh, thereby making them a minority in their home province. This eventually would lead to the erosion of the PPP’s power base in Sindh and exacerbate the prevailing ethnic conflict between the native Sindhis and the Muhajirs (Biharis). The PPP rejected the repatriation proposal on the ground that it would threaten the national unity and security of Pakistan. As an alternative proposal, the PPP called upon the Islamic countries to accept the stranded Biharis and called for a pan-Islamic solution to the problem (Khan 2001). However, this proposal was never accepted by any Islamic country. The Pakistan government also does not accept the rehabilitation and repatriation of the Biharis, because it would be an economically expensive project for Pakistan. It would involve huge amount of financial expenditure which Pakistan cannot afford because of its weak economy. Pakistan feared that the rehabilitation of the Biharis with employment would create further chaos and conflict in Pakistan, where employment problems already exist (The New York Times 1973 as cited in Khan 1976). The Pakistani government is also worried that any further influx of the Bihari population would not only create resentment among the Sindhis but also transfer the Biharis

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problems from Dhaka to Karachi where they might again face the same problems of unemployment and ethnic hostility (Whitaker 1982, 19). Pakistani intellectuals who support the cause of the Biharis, by contrast, argue that the Pakistan resolution of 1940 envisaged the idea of the creation of Muslim homeland—Pakistan in north, West, and East India— which entitled Muslims from all over India to settle in these provinces (Shah and Chachar 1991, 65). Any opposition to such settlement in the existing boundaries of Pakistan questions the very philosophy of Pakistan (Shah and Chachar 1991, 65). The recorded history of Pakistan indeed endorses this thesis. Historian Stephens writes: Pakistan is an independent sovereign country in South Asia of about 95 million people, which was brought into being in 1947, to fulfill a religious or cultural aspiration. The idea was to provide a homeland for the Indian subcontinent’s Muslims, or most of them; a place where, after the British Imperial power had gone, they could freely develop their way of life in an Islamic environment apart from the Hindus, who outnumbered them by about three to one. (Stephens 1963, 13)

The critics of this interpretation, however, argue that the Lahore Resolution of 1940, the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and the erosion of its eastern wing in 1971 do not entitle the Biharis to repatriation to Pakistan. To critics, repatriation means sending people back to their native land. The present Indian state of Bihar is obviously the native land of the Biharis. Of course, the Biharis may be repatriated to the place of their origin, that is, Indian state of Bihar, but by no means to any unit of present Pakistan (Shah and Chachar 1991, 61). The Sindhi nationalists formed the Bihari Roko (Stop Biharis) committee in Hyderabad and protested the Biharis’ repatriation (Ghosh 2007, 83). The PPP’s Sindh chapter also lodged a protest campaign opposing the repatriation of the Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan (Ghosh 2007, 83). The repatriation plan was also opposed by the Awami National Party, the Jey Sind Tehrik, World Sindhi Congress, and the Lok Sewa Pakistan. The leaders of these ultra-nationalists and their activists branded the repatriation plan as a conspiracy to convert the Sindhis into a minority group in their own land (Ghosh 2007, 83). The Sindh nationalists dubbed the Bihari repatriation plan as Islamabad’s great design to convert the local Sindhis into a minority in their native land and referred to the settlement of Biharis in Pakistan as an international crime against the Indus

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civilization of 5000  years and proposed their settlement in any other Muslim country like Saudi Arabia or Bangladesh (Ghosh 2007, 109). Lok Sewa Pakistan President Chaudhury Nazir Kahot opposed the repatriation of the Biharis even in Punjab on the ground that once the Biharis would move there, they would call them Mohajir and then start fighting with the local people as they did in other parts of the country (Ghosh 2007, 111). For these reasons, Pakistan is reluctant to accept the Biharis in order to avoid exacerbating conflict between the locals and non-locals which again threatens the national integrity of Pakistan (Chowdhury 1980).

The Legal Status of the Biharis in Bangladesh In the strict legal sense, the Biharis are not refugees under the Convention of 1951 (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951). According to Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who: owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951)

The Biharis not only fail to qualify as Convention refugees but also are not considered stateless persons under the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of the Stateless People. Article 1 of the 1954 convention states: “For the purpose of this convention, the term stateless person means a person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law” (Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954). Under this definition, the Biharis are not stateless people. Statelessness refers to persons who lack the legal status as a member of any state (Lee 2005, 15). The 1954 Convention definition applies to stateless persons only. The Biharis are qualified to be de jure citizens, because they are entitled to citizenship under Bangladeshi law. However, they are unable to access many important citizenship rights or do not enjoy important national protection. The UNHCR has defined a de facto stateless person as one who is “unable to demonstrate that he is a de jure stateless,

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yet he has no effective nationality and does not enjoy national protection” (UNHCR 2006, 11). Article 3(d) of the Bangladesh Citizenship Act, 1951,61 provides citizenship to those: Who before the commencement of this Act, migrated to the territories now included in Bangladesh from any territory in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent outside those territories with the intention of residing permanently in those territories. Article 2 of the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order 1972 (President’s Order 149 of 1972), was passed to recognize the citizenship of residents in the newly created state. It stipulates: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, on the commencement of this order, every person shall be deemed to be a citizen of Bangladesh, 1. Who or whose father or grandfather was born in the territories now comprised in Bangladesh and who was a permanent resident of the territories now comprised in Bangladesh on the 25th of March 1971, and continued to be so resident; or 2. Who was a permanent resident of the territories now comprised in Bangladesh on the 25th day of March 1971 and continues to be so resident and is not otherwise disqualified for being a citizen by or under any law, for the time being in force. (Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order 1972)

This order does not discriminate between the Bengali and non-Bengali population in Bangladesh. It is, therefore, equally applicable to all residents who fall within its provisions. Utilizing the advantage of this provision more than half a million Biharis accepted Bangladesh citizenship in 1973 (Government of Bangladesh 1998). Article 2B (1) of the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Amendment Ordinance 1978 includes a disqualification clause which states that a person shall not be qualified to be a citizen of Bangladesh if he or she owes, affirms, or acknowledges expressly or by conduct, allegiance to a foreign state (The Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) (amendment) Ordinance 1978). Apparently, it seems that those who opted to go to Pakistan are disqualified for Bangladeshi citizenship. In fact, this law does not disqualify the Biharis for Bangladesh citizenship simply because they wanted to repatriate to Pakistan. Everybody understands that the Biharis wanted to go to Pakistan under tremendously insecure conditions in 1973 when they were

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considered as enemies of Bangladesh and the targets of assaults. Many of their men were killed, women were raped, their properties were confiscated, and their houses were captured. Given the situation, they registered for repatriation through the ICRC simply to save themselves. The consequences of opting for repatriation were not clear to them. The acknowledgment receipt for the application of this option clearly states that registration with the ICRC does not mean that the registered persons will be automatically repatriated. Registration with the ICRC does not give a right to repatriation. The final acceptance of the applicants lies with Pakistan and Bangladesh governments.62 If the Biharis are considered to have lost their Bangladesh citizenship because of their opting for repatriation to Pakistan, then millions of Bangladeshis who applied for OP-1 or DV-1 Immigration Visa (Lottery Visa) of the United States or those who applied for Canadian Immigration Visa or who applied for immigration to any other country indicating their intentions to immigrate and to receive the citizenship of a foreign country if selected should also lose their Bangladeshi citizenship. Since they do not, in fact, lose their citizenship, then by comparison the Biharis who expressed their interest in repatriation to Pakistan similarly should not lose their citizenship. In addition, the President’s Order 149/1972 did not also authorize any power to disqualify a citizen on the ground of alleged collaboration with the Pakistan army (Malik 1996, 11). Indeed, any remaining uncertainty regarding the Biharis’ citizenship was removed by a Bangladesh Supreme Court judgment, which invalidates the argument that the option given by the traumatized Biharis to voice their desire to return to Pakistan through the ICRC immediately after the birth of Bangladesh is sufficient ground to terminate their Bangladesh citizenship. In the Mukhtar Ahamed Case, the Division Bench of the High Court, presided over by Justice Shahabuddin Ahamed declares: The mere fact that he filed an application for going over to Pakistan cannot take away his citizenship. The Bangladesh Citizenship Order, P.O.149/72 has enumerated different situations in which a person shall be deemed to be a citizen of Bangladesh, but it has not discriminated among its citizens no matter in which way they have become citizens of this country. So, the petitioner is on the same footing as any other citizen, His citizenship, therefore, clings to him. He could voluntarily renounce it or he could be deprived of it if he had incurred any disqualification. Though he filed the application, he

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did not even pursue it. He filed an affidavit affirming his allegiance to Bangladesh in 1972. The petitioner has not acquired the citizenship of any other country, his citizenship of Bangladesh which he acquired long before cannot evaporate and he continues to be a citizen of this country. (Mukhtar Ahmed 1982)

The legal recognition of the Biharis in Bangladesh is reflected even more clearly in the landmark verdict of Bangladesh vs. Professor Golam Azam Case. In this case, the Court examined whether the respondent was a citizen of Bangladesh or not. The Court concluded that there was nothing in the law that could deny the citizenship of Professor Golam Azam on the grounds of his collaboration with the Pakistan army (Kelley 2010, 362). In this case, the Appellate Division Judgment gives some important observations. In providing a restrictive interpretation of the executive’s power under Article 3 of the Citizenship Order, Justice Mustafa Kamal holds: Professor Golam Azam was admittedly in the territory now comprised in Bangladesh on the 26th of March 1971. So how can there be any doubt about his citizenship? […] What, then, is the scope of Article 3? It is not a power in the hand of the Government to ‘cancel’ a person’s citizenship or to make a ‘declaration’ of any sort or to ‘disqualify’ any person from citizenship or to “review” one’s citizenship under Article 2. In Article 2 citizenship is conferred on a body of persons by the legislature itself by a legal fiction. It is an act of the legislature, not of the executive. The occasion to exercise power under Article 3 arises only when a ‘doubt’ arises as to whether a person fulfills all or any of the conditions of ‘deeming citizenship’ under Article 2. (Bangladesh v. Professor Golam Azam 1994 as cited in Paulsen 2006, 63–64)

The above judgment establishes the fact that under the Bangladesh citizenship law the Biharis are entitled to Bangladesh nationality. Their option to go to Pakistan, collaboration with the Pakistani occupation army, and their persistent demand for repatriation to Pakistan are not sufficient grounds for denying their right to Bangladesh citizenship (Abrar 1998). In 2003, the High Court landmark decision in Abid Khan vs. Government of Bangladesh (Abid Khan and Others vs. Govt. of Bangladesh and Others 2003) makes a significant breakthrough toward securing Bangladeshi citizenship for the Biharis. In this case, the petitioners, ten of Bihari descent asked the Court to recognize their voting rights after they

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were not registered by the Election Commission on the grounds that they were residents of Bihari settlement known as Geneva Camp in Dhaka. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High Court Division) held that the ten Urdu-speaking petitioners born both before and after 1971 were Bangladesh citizens according to the Citizenship Act of 1951 and the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order of 1972, and thereby directing the government to register them as voters. The Supreme Court further stated that residents of the camps and settlements had not “attained any special status so as to be excluded from the operation of the laws of the land” and hence “mere residence” in the camps could not be deemed as allegiance to another State (Abid Khan and Others vs. Govt. of Bangladesh and Others 2003). The effect of the Abid khan vs. Government of Bangladesh decision was limited to the ten petitioners only. In another case, Md. Sadaqat Khan (Fakku) and others vs. Chief Election Commissioner 2008, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High court Division) declared that everyone in the Urdu-speaking community who was born after the birth of Bangladesh and who was a minor during the Liberation War of Bangladesh is a national of Bangladesh in accordance with the laws of Bangladesh. The Court directed the Election Commission to enroll the petitioners and other Urdu-speaking people who want to be included in the voters’ lists and give them National Identity Cards without any further delay. In its verdict, the Court says: [The] Question of citizenship of Urdu-speaking has got another aspect, which is very important from the constitutional perspective. The miseries and sufferings of such people due to statelessness were from time to time reported in the national media—electronic and print. Besides the reasons mentioned in the letter of the Election Commission, they are constantly denied constitutional rights to jobs, education, accommodation, health, and decent life like other citizens of the country. By keeping the question of citizenship unresolved on wrong assumption over the decades, this nation has not gained anything but rather was deprived of the contribution it could have made in nation-building. The sooner the Urdu-speaking people are brought to the mainstream of the nation is the better. (Md. Sadaqat Khan (Fakku) and others vs. Chief Election Commissioner 2008)

According to the verdict of the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court, the Biharis who were minors at the time of Bangladesh’s War of Independence in 1971 and who were born after 1971 are have been declared as citizens of Bangladesh.63 Although this judgment does

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not cover those who were adults in 1971, it does not disqualify them either (BBC News 2008). Those who were adults in 1971 are automatically covered by the existing citizenship law, namely the P.O.149/1972 on which the Supreme Court has clearly pronounced itself on the question of the Bihari citizens in the Mukhter Ahmed Case of 1993 referred to above. Since 1971, all Biharis retained their Bangladesh citizenship because they never lost their citizenship status on the ground of their intention to repatriate to Pakistan. Moreover, they were not denationalized or disqualified by the government of Bangladesh. Indeed, they neither explicitly renounced their Bangladesh citizenship nor obtained it in any other country. Therefore, the Bangladesh citizenship of all Biharis is still valid. During their seventy-­ four citizenship years of residence in Bangladesh (1947–2023), they not only sacrificed their lives, but their human dignity has also been severely compromised. Due to a lack of awareness of their citizenship status, they were disenfranchised for thirty years (from 1972 to 2008). They were denied their citizenship rights on the wrong assumption that they are not Bangladeshi citizens and are not entitled to citizenship rights (Abrar 2011).

Conclusion It can be concluded from the foregoing discussion that the Biharis are Urdu-speaking people in Bangladesh who migrated to the former East Pakistan (which is now Bangladesh) during the partition of India in the 1940s to avoid communal violence as well as to have a better life in East Pakistan. Most of them came from the Indian state of Bihar and others from different parts of India. Commonly they are called the Biharis in Bangladesh. During the twenty-four years of Pakistan before it split into two States, Bangladesh and Pakistan, the Biharis resided in East Pakistan and never tried to integrate with the Bengalis. They always maintained their linguistic and cultural distinction from the Bengali people. They were always concentrated in certain industrial and urban areas. Their separate living arrangements, livelihood, and culture made them to be seen by the Bengali nationalists as a separate outcast group (Yasmin 2011, 40). The Bihari’s shared cultural and political interests with the West Pakistani ruling elites and the distribution of patronage among the Biharis from the ruling class made the Biharis a vested interest group or coterie in former East Pakistan, who served as local agents of the ruling West Pakistani elites for subjugating the Bengali population. The Biharis opposed the liberation struggle of the Bengalis all along. They thought

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that the liberation of the Bengalis would establish the supremacy of the Bengalis and reduce Bihari’s economic power as well as social and political influences in society. Most Biharis sided with the Pakistan army in the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. The Biharis became unwanted, insecure, and the targets of Bengali’s revenge after the birth of Bangladesh. As a result, half of the one million Biharis in Bangladesh wanted to go to Pakistan and registered their names for repatriation through the ICRC. The other half a million wanted to stay in Bangladesh and were right away granted Bangladeshi citizenship. Of the half a million Biharis that wanted to go to Pakistan, almost 270,000 have been repatriated to Pakistan officially and unofficially and the remainder are denied their repatriation. Their number is 250,000–300,000. They are deprived of their rights to return home and of the right to nationality by Pakistan. The government of Pakistan refused their repatriation on the grounds that politically the mass influx of the Biharis could destabilize the internal politics of Pakistan and economically Pakistan does not want to take the responsibility of huge economic expenditure for the repatriation and rehabilitation of the Biharis stranded in Bangladesh. The Biharis are neither refugees as defined by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention nor stateless persons in a strictly legal sense under the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of the Stateless People. Under the 1954 Convention, only de jure stateless persons are considered stateless. The Biharis are citizens of Bangladesh under the citizenship laws of the country, but they do not have the ability to access some important fundamental rights included in the constitution. In a broader sense, they are unable to enjoy some important civil, political, social, and cultural rights in Bangladesh required for making their citizenship meaningful or worthy.

Notes 1. The Biharis in Bangladesh are often referred to as Muhajirs, non-locals, non-Bangladeshis, stranded Pakistanis, or Urdu-speaking peoples. International Convention on the Biharis held in Geneva in 1982 referred to them as non-Bangladeshis, or stranded Pakistanis (Choudhury 1992, 296); In Bangladesh, the Biharis are also called Linguistic Minority, Camp based Urdu-speaking Minority or even Displaced persons (Basher 2006, 87; Haider 2018, 25S–42S). 2. The Muslim majority provinces are referred to as those five provinces of India where the Muslim population was the majority in number. These

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provinces were Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.), and Baluchistan. In British-India, most Muslims lived in the two provinces of Bengal and Punjab. Statistics show that about 33 million Muslims lived in Bengal which was 55 percent of the population and, 16  million lived in Punjab which was 57 percent of the population. In Sindh, the Muslim population was over 3 million which was about threequarters of the population; in the N.W. F.P., less than three-quarters of a million or about 92 percent was Muslim population and in Baluchistan, the Muslim population was less than a million or about 88 percent of the population (Census of India 1941; Jalal 1985). 3. The Biharis fled to East Pakistan because their leaders convinced them that Hijrat (migration) was the only way to get rid of the perpetual miseries of life in Hindu India. To escape from the oppression of the non-Muslims, the holy religion Islam encouraged its followers to Hijrat (Tajuddin 1994). 4. Regarding the communal riots of 1946, Maulana Azad writes, “The Great Calcutta killing in 1946 had been followed by trouble in Noakhali and Bihar. Riots had started in Punjab in March. Originally confined to Lahore, the disturbances spread and soon large areas in and around Rawalpindi were torn in strife. Lahore in fact became the battleground for which the communalists among Hindus and Muslims fought” (Azad 1988; Weiner 1996; Hamid 1967). 5. Jawaharlal Nehru writes, “But it was nonetheless true that the Moslem masses as a whole were reverting vaguely to their old local and feudal leadership, which came to them in the guise of protectors of Moslem interests as against Hindus and others” (Nehru 1989, 381). 6. The immediate impact of the mutiny was to downgrade the Muslim community of north-central India. The new British-Indian administration dropped Urdu and Persian [principal languages of the Indian Muslims] as official languages and replaced them with English. While the Muslims shown their reluctance to learn English and suddenly found themselves illiterate and unemployed (Burki 1991, 12); Bose and Jalal write: The aim of Western education was to form a class who may be interpreters between us and millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian in blood and color but English in taste” (Bose and Jalal 2004, 74); W. W. Hunter writes, “There is no Government office in which a Muslim could hope for any help above the rank of porter, messenger, filer of inkpots, and a mender of pens” (Hunter 1871, 179–180). 7. Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Osmani supported the demand for Pakistan by citing the Prophet Muhammad’s flight to Medina and argued that 30 million Indian Muslims should not stand in the way of the welfare of 70 million who would be in Pakistan; if there were no Pakistan then all would be under Hindu rule (Wright Jr 1974, 191).

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8. A group of students based at the university of Cambridge proposed the concept of Pakistan in 1934 in a pamphlet. They explained Pakistan as an anagram made up of ‘P’ from Punjab, ‘A’ from Afghanistan, ‘K’ from Kashmir, ‘S’ from Sindh and ‘TAN’ from Baluchistan (Gupta 1971, 18). 9. Sir Mohammad Iqbal who is considered as one of the founding fathers of Pakistan argued, “It is in this sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy not in the sense that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility …As the prophet so beautifully puts it “the whole of this earth is a mosque.” The state according to Islam is only an effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization (Iqbal 1962, 154–155 as quoted in Ganguly 1986, 25–26). 10. Murder, extermination, torture, rape, political, racial, or religious persecution, and other inhumane acts are recognized as crimes against humanity (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). 11. Some studies claim that between 70,000 and 100,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis were murdered within months just after the birth of Bangladesh (Kelley 2010, 356; Sen 2000, 41). 12. All India Muslim League leaders Mr. M. A. Jinnah propounded the “Two Nation Theory” arguing that the Hindus constitute one nation, and the Muslims constitute another nation. According to Mr. Jinnah, “the Hindus and Muslims belong to two religious’ philosophies, social customs, and literature; they belong to different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Musselman’s are a nation according to any definition of nation and they must have their homeland, their territory, and their state….” (Ahmed 1942, 177–178; Bolitho 1954; Ahmad 1979, 76; Nehru 1989, 392). 13. Muslim League claimed the death toll between 10 to 20 thousand and the Congress conservatively estimated the casualties five thousand (Talbot and Singh 2009, 71). 14. The 1951 Census of Pakistan reported that 699,079 Muhajirs migrated to East Pakistan. According to their previous place of origin their numbers were: North India: 20,773, East India: 670,000,735, South India: 982, West India: 1855, Central India: 2687, North-West India: 2009, Other places: 28. In former East Pakistan the places of their residence were: Chittagong Division: 41,935, Dhaka Division: 16,285, Rajshahi Division: 4,94,289 (Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan 1951). 15. The Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 was passed on 13 April 1951 and came into force on the same day. Section 3(d) of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 provides: At the commencement of this act, every person shall be deemed to be a citizen of Pakistan who before the commencement of this act, migrated to the territories now included in Pakistan from any territory

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in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent outside those territories with the intention of residing permanently in those territories (The Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951). 16. The term Muhajir is derived from the Arabic “hijra” which was used to describe the migration of the Prophet Mohammad and his followers from Mecca to Madina and to avoid persecution by the enemies of Islam. Later it is used to mean migration for the cause of Islam (Ahmed 1988, 33). 17. The Liaquat-Nehru Pact of 8 April 1950 opened with a solemn undertaking by the government of India and Pakistan that “each state shall ensure to the minorities throughout its territory, complete equality of citizenship irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honor, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech, and worship subject to law and morality” (Ali 1967, 274). 18. Syed Sikander Mehdi writes: The refugees who came to Pakistan came from almost every part of India including United Province (UP), Central Province (CP), Bihar, West Bengal, East Punjab, Maharashtra, and the former princely states of Hyderabad, Deccan, Junagarh and Kashmir. Hundreds of thousands of these partition refugees came on foot or on bull carts, or by jeeps, trucks, buses, and trains. On the way, they were attacked by the Hindu and Sikh armed communal gangs, and many were mercilessly butchered. The migrating women and children were abducted and raped and often murdered. Likewise, the Hindus and Sikhs migrating from Pakistan were attacked and butchered by Muslim armed gangs (Mehdi 2007, 56). 19. According to the 1948 Genocide Convention, ‘Killing members of the group’ or ‘Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’ with the intention to destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group in whole or in part are considered genocide (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, Article 2); Genocide committed during the liberation war in Bangladesh is a contested issue. The world response to the genocide in Bangladesh was determined by the geo-­political interests of the super and regional powers. India, the former Soviet Union, and the socialist countries recognized the atrocities committed by the Pakistan army as genocide while Pakistan and her allies’ Islamic countries, China and the United States did not recognize it as genocide. According to Bangladesh authority, about 3 million people were killed, 200,000 girls and women were raped, 10 million Bengali refugees took shelter in India and 30 million were displaced within the territory of Bangladesh (Jahan 2013, 264).

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20. Prior to the advent of the Aryans in Gauda, the population of the Bengal used to speak a language that was one of the Austric groups of languages. During the Gupta rule, Bengal came entirely under the Aryans and as a result, the Bengali language and literature were Sanscritized (Aryanized). The Buddhist scholars were the first who developed Bengali language by writing Charyapads in  local Buddhist and Sanskrit (Anisuzzaman 1980, 79–80). 21. According to Richard Symonds, the Bengali language created by Bengali literary movement was highly Sanskritized (Symonds 1949, 144). 22. Rabindra Nath Tagore, Kazi Nazrul Islam, and Jasim Uddin were the principal poets of the Bengalis. On the other hand, poets Allama Iqbal, Mirza Ghalib, and Altaf Hossain Hali were the celebrated poets of the Biharis. Pohela Baishak (the first day of the Bengali New Year) and Nobanno Utshob (festival for new paddy harvesting) were the main festivals of the Bengalis. On the contrary, for the Biharis, the first Maharram (the first day of the Arabic New Year) was a great festival. Rabindra Sangeet (Tagore song), Polli Geeti (Folk song), Nazrul Geeti (Nazrul Song) etc. were the favorite music of the Bengalis, while the Biharis used to enjoy the Kawali music (Chorus song), Gazal, and Hindi and Urdu music. The Biharis would read the Urdu newspapers: the daily Jung, the daily Wataan, and the daily Mashriq. Conversely, the Bengalis’ popular newspapers were the daily Ittefaq and the daily Azad. The Bengali children used to attend the Bengali medium schools, while the Bihari children used to attend the Urdu medium schools (Haider 2003, 527). 23. One analyst argues that the Biharis identity crisis originated out of the lack of ethnic roots in former East Pakistan and their intrinsic superiority complex led their resettlement in compact areas contributed to their refusal of integrating and assimilating themselves with the local Bengalis (Sabur 1990, 496). 24. Many Bengali leaders and intellectuals were very fluent in Urdu language. H. S. Suharwardi, Khwaja Nazimuddin, A. K. Fazlul Haque, and Moulana Bhasani were very powerful orators in Urdu language. The Madrasa students in East Pakistan learned Urdu as course requirements under obligation (Ilias 2010, 198). 25. Among the Biharis, Alauddin and Golam Dastagir were two junior leaders of the AL (Tajuddin 1994). 26. The Liberation Struggle of Bangladesh includes all movements of the Bengalis from 1947 to 1971 toward independence. On the other hand, the Liberation War of Bangladesh continued nine months armed struggle which led to the independence of Bangladesh.

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27. In Pakistan, Bengali was the principal spoken language of 54 percent and Urdu was the language of 3.36 percent population only (Jahan 1972, 12–14; Haider 2006, 64). 28. The AL won an absolute majority in the National Assembly Elections in 1970 (160 out of 300 seats). In East Pakistan, the AL received 160 out of 162 seats which was a landslide victory for the AL.  In the Provincial Assembly elections, the AL obtained another resounding victory by receiving 288 out of 300 seats (Jahan 1972). 29. In the 1970 elections, JI Leader Professor Golam Azam did not win, but he contested from the Mirpur-Mohammadpur constituency of Dhaka city which was the largest Bihari populated area. 30. Apart from distribution of abandoned Hindu properties among the Biharis, subsidized government housing facilities were also provided to poor Biharis (Ziring 1994, 12). 31. Six non-Bengali industrialists were Adamjee, Dawood, Bawani, Ispahani, Amin, and Karim. They controlled 32 percent of the production of the large manufacturing sector and 81.5 percent of the jute industry in the country (Zaheer 1994, 144). 32. Khalid Bin Sayeed used the concept “Viceregal System” to describe the political philosophy of the country during the formative phase of Pakistan (Sayeed 1968, 270–300). 33. Internal colonialism can be defined as the process of domination and exploitation of one ethnic group by another within a country (Jahan 1980, 65). 34. Vertical integration requires the reduction of differences between the rich and poor or the elite and masses and horizontal integration requires closing the gaps between different ethnic, linguistic, and regional groups (Maniruzzaman 1967, 876). 35. Maulana Bhashani condemned this senseless crime against humanity (Siddiqui 1972, 152). 36. In some places, although some Bengalis allegedly attacked the Biharis to capture their properties, these incidents are not well documented by authentic authorities. 37. The chief architect of the Bangladesh Movement Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called upon the countrymen: “the non-Bengalis living in Bengal are sons of the soil, it is our sacred duty to afford protection to the life and properties of every citizen whether Bengali or non-Bengali, Hindu or Muslim” (Ahmed 1979, 225–226). 38. Mawra is slang for the Biharis (Ilias 2010). 39. Razakar and Al-Badar were known as the armed cadres of the Jamaat-i-­ Islami, while Al-Shams was the armed cadres of the Muslim league and the Mujahid force and the East Pakistan Civil and Armed Police (EPCAP)

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were recruited exclusively from the Bihari youths (Ilias 2010, 137); in the aftermath of the military crackdown in Dhaka on 25 March 1971, Mr. Diwan Warasat Hossain, President of East Pakistan Anjuman-e-Muhajereen started collaboration with the army and through Diwan the army recruited Bihari youths in the EPCAP and the Mujahid force (Ilias 2010, 138). 40. Most Biharis argue that they were not responsible for collaboration with the army and the Bengali persecutions. They want to face trial if they are guilty, but they are not ready to suffer for the misdeeds of some criminals who should be identified and tried (Shagor 2010). 41. This claim cannot be credible to the victorious Bengalis because the Biharis belong to the defeated side. In victory, they would have been patriots, in defeat, they became traitors (Bearak, Barry 2000. Stranded Pakistanis Dreaming of Deliverance. The New York Times. 13 May). 42. The prominent Bihari freedom fighters as claimed by Ahmed Ilias were Labour leader Mohammad Ibrahim, Aziz Nomani, and Nesar Ahmd in Syedpur, Md. Akbar in Dinajpur, journalist Ali Ahmad Khan, Sahood Alam and Amanullah, student leader Afaque Saheed (Menon group), and Riaz Shakir (underground activist of Siraj Sikder’s Party). For the list of the Bihari freedom fighters (Ilias 2010,142). 43. Salik writes, “The non-Bengalis, particularly the Biharis, however, felt insecure after General Tikkah khan’s departure. They thought that with a weak Governor in Dacca, the rebels could disrupt life more often and cause incalculable damage to property. On 4 September [1971] a Bihari journalist phoned me for help in the private matter and I advised him to contact the civil government. He said sorrowfully, ‘For us, there is no civil government; our governor has flown to West Pakistan [sic]” (Salik 1977, 109–212). 44. Bengali sources admitted that the death of the non-Bengalis was 30,000–40,000. International observers claimed that it was between 20,000–200,000 and the U.S.  Consul estimated about 66,000 (Gerlach 2010). 45. President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman made an appeal to the nation: “Forgive them. Today, I do not want revenge from anybody. There should not be any more killing. The Bengal that will eat, smile, sing, and be happy is my Bengal. Everyone in Bengal is now a Bengali and we must live together” (Quoted in Butterfield 1972). 46. The ICRC distributed forms in the Bihari camps and asked four questions to the Biharis. These were: (1) Do you have relatives in Pakistan? (2) Do you have property in Pakistan? (3) Were you formerly employed by the Pakistan Government or Armed services or by West Pakistani company? (4) Any other reason for repatriation to Pakistan? (Datta 2011, 69).

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47. The government of Bangladesh disclosed that in 1972, 600,000 Biharis opted to stay in Bangladesh and 539,669 opted to go to Pakistan under the auspices of the ICRC (Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh 1982 as cited in Basher 2006, 94; khan and Rahman 2011, 101). 48. Article 1(ii) of the Simla Accord states: “That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral ­negotiation or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them” (Simla Agreement 1972). 49. Under the terms of the Delhi Agreement, the return of the Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees was to be conducted bilaterally between India and Pakistan. UNHCR was to assist other categories of people in their repatriation (UNHCR 2000, 73). 50. The 25,000 hardship cases were those who were insecure for their active collaboration with the Pakistan Army (Hafiz 1985, 359–365; Shakoor 1989, 112). 51. Bangladesh was not a signatory to the Delhi Agreement, because Pakistan still did not recognize Bangladesh (Haider 2006, 75). 52. President Ziaur Rahman paid an official visit to Pakistan in 1977 during his South Asia tour and discussed the Bihari issue with his Pakistani counterpart. This was followed up by Pakistan foreign secretary’s visit to Bangladesh and he agreed to take back 25,000 hardship cases through the international agencies (Hafiz 1985, 369). 53. The Rabita is a Mecca-based NGO founded in 1962 with an aim of protecting the Muslim Ummah from all sorts of sufferings by its social cultural and religious organization. 54. Initially it was estimated that about US$ 300 million would be required to complete the repatriation process but subsequently this figure rose to US$ 500 million (Government of Bangladesh 1998). 55. In the elections of 1991, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had an alliance with the MQM which was mainly supported by the Biharis in Pakistan (Weiner 1993, 1739). 56. The statement of the Pakistan government reads: The present government has firmly renewed its pledge to do all it can to bring and rehabilitate these stranded Pakistanis (who) number over 238,000 according to the census carried out jointly in 1991–1992. It is clearly the responsibility of all of us as ordained in the Glorious Quran to attend to the needs of these destitute brethren in Islam who are denied the freedom of movement even to earn their daily bread (The Daily Star 1998). 57. Many Biharis who repatriated to Pakistan after 1971 are living in a very miserable condition. Knowing the poor and deplorable situation of them, most Biharis in Bangladesh lost their interests for repatriation. Only a small

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number of Biharis still want to return to Pakistan out of their illusion. They think that if they can go to the Urdu-speaking Pakistan it will be easier for them to rehabilitate culturally, socially, economically, and politically, because they speak the same language. Additionally, some of them have family members there, who they think will assist them. 58. According to the law as reported in the newspaper, “… under clause (i) of subsection (1) of section 16-A of the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951, all those persons in those territories, which before December 16, 1971, constituted the province of East Pakistan, residing since that day, voluntarily or otherwise, shall cease to be citizens of Pakistan. However, those who have not been repatriated before March 18, 1978, and whose repatriation has been agreed by the federal government, shall continue to be citizens of Pakistan as provided under provision to clause (iv) of subsection 1 of section 16-A of the Citizenship Act 1951.” For details, see Malik (2015). 59. According to the 1951 census, 57.55 percent Muhajirs are in Karachi, 66.08 percent in Hyderabad, 54.09 percent in Sukkur, 68.42 percent, in Mirpurkhas, and 35.39 percent in Larkana. All these locations are the urban areas of Sindh province (Rahman 1995, 1008). 60. Historically, the Muhajir business community including Adamjee, H. Dawood, Mohammad Ali Habib, Habib I. Rahimatoolallah, claims to have financed the Pakistan Movement under the leadership of Mr. Jinnah. In the formative phase of Pakistan, Muhajirs enjoyed their greatest power in the political scene of Pakistan (Wright Jr 1974, 199). 61. Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951, adopted under the Bangladesh (Adaptation of Existing laws) order 1972. After the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 an order was adopted by the government of Bangladesh that all existing laws in operation before the 26 March 1971 will remain in force in Bangladesh until amended or repealed by the competent legislative body (Bangladesh (Adaptation of Existing laws) order 1972). 62. Receipt of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Photocopy provided in Abrar (2011). 63. According to the Bangladesh High Court decision of 2008, approximately 80 percent of all adult Urdu speakers or 184,000 Biharis were registered (U. S. Department of State 2009).

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———. 2008. The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kelley, Ninetee. 2010. Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Conceding Citizenship in Bangladesh. University of Toronto Law Journal 60 (2): 349–371. Khan, Ataur R. 1976. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh: Conflict or Cooperation? Dhaka: Amader Bangla Press. Khan, Zillur Rahma. 1984. Martial Law to Martial law: Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh. Dhaka: The University Press Limited. ———. 1985. Islam and Bengali Nationalism. Asian Survey 25: 834–851. Khan, Gerrard. 2001. Citizenship and Statelessness in South Asia. New Issues in Refugee Research. No. 47. Working Paper. Khan, Yasmin. 2007. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan. New Haven: Yale University Press. Khan, Borhan Uddin, and Mahbubur Rahman. 2011. Human and Minority Rights in Bangladesh. In Minority Rights in South Asia, ed. Rainer Hofmann and Ugo Caruso, 86–106. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Khan, Syful Akbar, et al. 2003. National Liberation Movement in East Pakistan and the Biharis. In A Community in Transition: The Biharis in Bangladesh, ed. Mizanur Rahman, 90–107. Dhaka: ELCOP. Lee, Tang Lay. 2005. Statelessness, Human Rights, and Gender: Irregular Migrant Workers from Burma in Thailand. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Mahmood, Amna, et  al. 2015. Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations: A Hostage to History. American International Journal of Contemporary Research 5: 66–77. Malik, Shahdeen. 1996. Refugees and Migratory Movements: An Overview of and Situation Analysis on Bangladesh. New Delhi: Regional Consultation Refugee and Migratory Movements. Malik, Hasnat. 2015. Stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh Not Pakistan’s Responsibility. The Express Tribune [Pakistan], March 30. Maniruzzaman, Talukder. 1967. National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan. Asian Survey 7: 876–885. ———. 1970. The Politics of Development: The Case of Pakistan 1947–1958. Dhaka: Green Book House Limited. ———. 1980. The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath. Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International Limited. Mascarenhas, Anthony. 1971. Genocide. The Sunday Times. London, June 13. Md. Sadaqat Khan (Fakku) and others v. Chief Election Commissioner. 2008. 60 DLR (AD) 407. Mehdi, Syed Sikander. 2007. Pakistan: Conflict, Migration and Peace. Asteriskos: Journal of International and Peace Studies 3–4: 55–85. Mohsin, Amena. 2002. Partitioned lives, Partitioned Lands. In Memories of a Genocidal Partition: The Haunting Tales of Victims, Witnesses, and Perspectives, ed. Imtiaz Ahmed, 19–42. Regional Centre for strategic studies: Colombo.

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CHAPTER 4

Fieldwork and Findings

Introduction This chapter presents and discusses the findings of my fieldwork in Bangladesh. The central question of this study is to investigate whether the Biharis have access to important rights associated with citizenship rights that make citizenship meaningful. I interviewed 75 Biharis and twenty-five Bengalis. The interviews were conducted in the Bengali language and on a one-on-one basis. I present and discuss my research findings in two main sections. Section “Introduction” deals with the socio-economic background of the Bihari respondents, their nationality, political involvement during the pre-liberation period, the role of the Biharis in the Bangladesh Liberation War, the Biharis’ views regarding repatriation to Pakistan, camp life, impediments to integration and remedies as well as their views regarding their status in Bangladesh. Section “The Social and Economic Conditions of the Bihari Respondents” deals with the composition of the Bengali respondents and their attitudes toward the Biharis. It will look at the Bengalis’ views regarding the repatriation of the Biharis, perspectives of the Bengalis regarding the challenges of Bihari integration, and finally Bengalis’ perceptions on how to ensure human rights and citizenship rights of the Biharis.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 Z. Haider, Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46129-3_4

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The Social and Economic Conditions of the Bihari Respondents One important dimension of my fieldwork is to explore the socio-­economic background of the Bihari respondents in Bangladesh to understand the situation of the Biharis, especially their camp lives. Among the 75 Bihari respondents, the largest number were born in independent Bangladesh, who are the new-generation (third generation) Biharis. They belong to the age group 1–40 years. They are citizens of Bangladesh by birth. The second largest group was born in former East Pakistan and automatically gained citizenship in Bangladesh after 1971. There are only a handful of first-generation Biharis who were born in former British India and never lost or renounced their Bangladeshi citizenship. Most Bihari respondents are bilingual. They speak Urdu at home because they want to protect and preserve their own culture. However, they speak Bengali outside the home because they want to integrate with the greater Bengali society. Due to the hostile role played by a section of the Biharis toward the Bangladesh Liberation War, the Biharis in general became rejected and subject to revenge by the Bengalis (Hashmi 1998, 385; Huque 1990, 278). As a result, they remained marginalized in education and employment which led to them living in extremely poor conditions.

The Birthplace of the Biharis Out of the 75 Biharis interviewed, 39 were born in Bangladesh, who are new-generation Biharis and citizens of Bangladesh by birth. A total of 28 interviewees were born in former East Pakistan which is now Bangladesh, thus their birthplace has transformed from former East Pakistan to present-­ day Bangladesh. This does not disqualify them from obtaining Bangladeshi citizenship unless such citizenship is revoked by the Bangladeshi government or if they willingly renounced their Bangladeshi citizenship. The remaining eight interviewees of the 75 interviewed were born in former British India; they migrated to former East Pakistan in 1947 and later obtained Pakistani citizenship under the Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951.1 They are the old-generation Biharis in Bangladesh who never lost their citizenship or gave up their Bangladeshi citizenship, which they received automatically after the transformation of their country of nationality from East Pakistan to Bangladesh. The finding on the birthplaces of the Biharis is summarized in Table 4.1.

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Table 4.1 Places of birth

Places of birth Bangladesh Former East Pakistan British-India Total

147

Number 39 28 08 75

Source: Fieldwork

Age Structure and Gender Distribution I find that among the 75 respondents, most of the population are new-­ generation Biharis, who were born in Bangladesh and belong to the age group 1–40 years. This means that many of them are citizens of Bangladesh by birth. Thirty-nine or more than half of the 75 Biharis interviewed belong to the age groups 1–20 years and 21–40 years. Of these, 11 respondents represent the age group 1–20 years, and 28 respondents belong to the age group 21–40 years. Twenty-two are in the age group 41–60 years, while 12 respondents represent the age group 61–80  years. Only two respondents represent the 81 years and above age group. Of the 75 Biharis interviewed, 39 people are new-generation Biharis who were born after the birth of Bangladesh. They are also known as the third-generation Biharis. The second-generation Biharis are those in the age group 41–60 years, who are 22 in number. Fourteen respondents belong to the first generation and represent the age groups 61–80 years and 81 years and above. The various age groups are summarized in Table 4.2. Of the 75 respondents, 40 are male and 35 are female (Table 4.3).

Principal Languages Spoken Seventy-four of the 75 Bihari respondents are bilingual (Table 4.4). They speak Urdu at home and Bengali outside to communicate with outsiders. They said that they speak in Urdu at home or among the Bihari community because Urdu is the common language of their community. It is the language of their forefathers and they have been speaking Urdu for ages. They want to nurture and protect it. In addition, they speak Bengali outside, because it is the working language and medium of instruction in schools in Bangladesh. The Bihari respondents understand that for access to education and employment and for securing a position in mainstream

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Table 4.2  Age structure

Age group 1–20a 21–40 41–60 61–80 81 and abovea Total

Number 11 28 22 12 2 75

Source: Fieldwork a The youngest respondent was 18  years, and the oldest respondent was 85 years old

Table 4.3 Gender distribution

Gender Number Male Female Total

40 35 75

Source: Fieldwork

Bangladeshi society, there is no alternative to learning Bengali. One of the respondents, Ayesha from the Geneva Camp, aged 30, says, “If we do not speak Bengali, we will not get any jobs. But if we do not speak Urdu, we will lose our identity.” Sabina from the Town Hall Camp, aged 30, mentions, “We need to know Bengali for employment.” Arefa, aged 37, a mother of three children and a resident of the Geneva Camp, claims that she only speaks in Bengali because she does not want to be identified as a Bihari. She wants to hide her Bihari identity. She consciously wants to integrate with the mainstream Bengalis and Bangladeshi society to avoid any discrimination and harassment due to her Bihari ethnicity. Arefa thinks that her Urdu language is the root cause of her suffering. She does not want to be identified as an Urdu-speaking person. She believes that her identity as a member of the Urdu-speaking community might invite further trouble for her children. She does not want to transfer her own suffering to her children. She knows that her ability to speak both Urdu and Bengali may not remove the “Bihari stigma.” Perhaps that is the reason why she intends to get rid of the Urdu language and speaks only Bengali.

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Table 4.4 Languages spoken by Bihari interview subjects

Languages Only Bengali Bengali and Urdu Only Urdu Total

149

Number 1 74 0 75

Source: Fieldwork

Again, as there are no Urdu schools in Bangladesh2 to educate her children in Urdu, she thinks that learning only Bangla is a good alternative to Urdu for her children. Arefa expresses: We are in a dilemma. If we don’t speak Urdu, our children will not learn that language. They will be rootless. If we don’t speak Bangla, we will have no work. We will be fruitless. We will have no future. Our children will remain illiterate. There is no Urdu-medium school in Bangladesh.

Educational Background Out of the 75 Biharis interviewed, 60 (80 percent) are illiterate (Table 4.5) and cannot read or write, and do not have the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. The national adult 15+ illiteracy rate in Bangladesh was 38.5 percent in 2015 (World Data Atlas n.d.). Discrimination, maltreatment, and denial of access to many important citizenship rights are the reasons for the low levels of educational attainment among the Biharis. It is at the root of systemic poverty, unemployment, inequality, and underdevelopment of the Bihari community in Bangladesh. Table 4.5 demonstrates that among the 75 Bihari respondents, 60 respondents are illiterate. Only six respondents have elementary-level education, four have junior high school-level education, three have high school-level education, and two have attained a college degree. My interviews with the 75 respondents reveal that the Biharis used to attend Urdu-­ language schools before the disintegration of Pakistan into two states. However, these schools were closed forever after the dismemberment of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh. Therefore, educational prospects for many of the second- and third-generation Biharis were shattered. Bihari children were very seldom admitted to Bangla schools because their parents were allegedly involved in treason and crimes against humanity

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Table 4.5 Educational background of Bihari interview subjects

Level of education Elementary/Primary School Junior High School High School Colleges and above Illiterate Total

Number 6 4 3 2 60 75

Source: Fieldwork

during the liberation war in Bangladesh. A 50-year-old Sharif from the Geneva Camp says: I was a 10-year-old boy in 1972, just completed primary school. My parents went into hiding. I went to Dhanmondi Boys School for admission into class six but was denied admission on the ground that I was an Urdu-­ speaking boy and my parents supported Pakistan. Then I went to a local Madrasa (religious school). The Madrasa authority had sympathy for me. The Head Maulana (principal) told me, “I understand your situation, but I am unable to do anything for you. Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters) are all around. If I accept you as a student of this Madrasa, they will kill us. So, you better hide, and save your life and our lives as well. This was the situation.”

In my study, I found that among those who were accepted to public schools, some dropped out because of bullying and maltreatment by their Bengali classmates and teachers. This unfriendly and hostile environment prevented the Biharis from attending school. The Biharis’ lack of required knowledge of the Bengali language further discouraged them in school. Aziza, aged 59, from the Sagor Para Camp, Rajshahi, recounts the plight of the Biharis in accessing education in Bangladesh: Our children attended Urdu-medium schools until 1971. We did not require Bengali literacy during the Pakistan period. After the fall of Pakistan in 1971, all Urdu schools were closed forever. A lack of Bengali literacy discouraged our children from learning Bengali. We did not have any guarantee of a normal life. Looting, raping, and killing of the Bihari people was were common matters. We were busy protecting ourselves. During the daytime, they (freedom fighters) watched us. At night, they came and picked up our young men. Many of them never returned home, some returned with

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­ isabilities. Most of us went into hiding. Sending our children to schools did d not even come to our minds. Our main concern was to save our lives. Therefore, our children remained illiterate. We still did not forget those terrible days.

Among those who attended schools, their low level of education still disqualified them to obtain jobs in a competitive and hostile job market, where Bengali college and university graduates are also unemployed.3

Employment/Occupation Employment secures economic freedom, future planning, and restores self-confidence. It hastens the integration of citizens with the state. A Rwandan female refugee in France said, “To me integration is work, if we work, we are integrated” (European Council on Refugees and Exiles [ECRE] n.d.; Ager and Strang 2008, 170). My fieldwork on the Biharis in Bangladesh indicates that most of the interview subjects engaged in labor-­ intensive occupations for survival. Because of illiteracy, poor educational attainment, and manifest and hidden discrimination against them, they could not compete for professional jobs or were unsuccessful and as a result, they were only able to find employment in low-paid menial jobs. Of the 75 respondents, 26 are self-employed (Table 4.6). They started running micro-enterprises or small businesses, such as supplying and delivering tea and cigarettes for small corner shop retailers, running their own tiny grocery stores, selling vegetables at retail prices, and running tiny convenience stores inside the camps. These are all temporary businesses; they change their professions when they get better opportunities. Of the 75 respondents, 12 are rickshaw pullers (Table 4.6). They work very hard day and night and carry passengers from one place to another. This is physically hard work and only physically fit individuals can continue this work. Among the 75 respondents, 12 are housewives who have no formal or informal occupations and instead focus on childbearing, child rearing, cooking, and home management. They depend on the very poor income of their husbands or sons and daughters. Housewives remain unemployed for many reasons, including illiteracy, scarcity of jobs, and their reluctance to unveil themselves before their male counterparts for work which they think can bring dishonor to their Muslim identity.4 In addition, some of them have no free choice in matters of work and are dependent on their husbands who do not allow them to work outside the home, where they

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Table 4.6 Occupational background of Bihari interview subjects

Occupation Teachers Service holders (private) Technicians Day Laborers Rickshaw Pullers Small Businessmen/women Housewives Drivers Others Total

Number 2 9 5 5 12 26 12 2 2a 75

Source: Fieldwork a Of the two respondents, one was a paramedic, the other one was as an NGO worker. They were unemployed when interviewed

may be exposed to the risks of sexual harassment.5 One respondent, Basir from the Geneva Camp, aged 54, states, “As long as I have my soul in my body I will not let my wife work outside. There is no dignity in it. It ruins peace at home.” It is evident from interviews with the respondents that in a number of cases girls have become the victims of child marriage and polygamy because of women’s unemployment and economic insecurity. Another study discloses that polygamy is a very common practice in the Bihari camps because marriage is regarded as a means of “social security” for women. They are not concerned about polygamy, because it removes their headache about the insecurity of unmarried girls (Haider et al. 2003, 179). In some cases, poor parents force their daughters into polygamous marriages to get rid of their economic burdens. Asia, a 57-year-old woman and a resident of the Geneva Camp, says: Local (Bengali) rickshaw puller Hashem married my daughter Rupa. Hashem has another wife in his village home. I am a widow. I have no son, but two daughters. I have no ability to give food and clothes to my daughters. I convinced my daughter to marry Hashem and she agreed. I had no option. I just ignore that Hashem has another wife. He is a young man. He works hard and can give food and clothes to my daughter. That’s enough for my daughter.

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Among the 75 respondents, 9 are service holders,6 5 are technicians,7 5 are day laborers, 2 are drivers, 2 are unemployed, and 2 teach at primary and junior high schools run by the Bihari community. Although approximately 1 million or 1.8 percent of the total labor force is employed in the public sector (Mukherjee et al. 2001),8 none of the 75 respondents have government jobs. Matin from the Geneva Camp, aged 21, says: I passed the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination in 2009. I applied for a position as Police Constable in 2010. I had the requisite qualification to apply. My mailing address was my camp address. I did not receive an interview card. This is how things happen. The camp address is our main disqualification.

Begum, aged 53, a mother of two children and a resident of Sagor Para Camp states: My children love government jobs because these jobs are permanent. Everyone gets a salary at the end of the month. Our children were not able to apply for these jobs, because applications for government jobs require birth certificates, character certificates, home addresses, etc. Who will give us these documents? No one. It’s not easy for us to collect these papers. They gave up their hopes.

A lack of adequate education with impoverished economic conditions provides limited opportunities for Biharis for employment. Sharif, who is a resident of the Geneva Camp, says, “Many Biharis are left with the option of menial labor; in some cases, many poor men and women start begging, young boys engage in child labor, and young girls go for early marriage or child prostitution to earn a living.” Joynab from the Geneva Camp, aged 30, says: Look at my 12-year-old son. Does his age permit him to work? But he is making paper bags for groceries. If he makes these bags, we get food, otherwise, we starve. If he can make one thousand bags, he gets paid only 30 Taka [approximately $ 0.38 USD]. It takes the whole day to make one thousand. He can make 500 to 1000 in a day. My son works hard, so he had to quit school.

Heffernan also finds in his study that earning a living is very tough for the Biharis. If they manage to get a job they are paid less, because they are

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discriminated by employers. They cannot challenge this discriminatory policy because of their vulnerability (Heffernan 2002, 17). An informal restriction on the Biharis for living outside the camps limited their access to employment, education, and healthcare which automatically threatened their physical integrity, and young Bihari women have also reportedly become the targets of sex traffickers (Heffernan 2002, 17). Table 4.7 indicates that of the 75 respondents, 26 Biharis’ annual family income9 ranges from 51,000 to 99,000 Bangladeshi Taka (BDT), the national currency of Bangladesh, or between US$ 645 and US$ 1278. This translates into a daily family income of US$ 1.77–US$ 3.50 shared by eight dependent family members (Table  4.7). Another 26 Biharis’ annual income is between 100,000–150,000 BDT or between US$ 1291 and US$ 1936. The daily income of this group is US$ 3.56–US$ 5.30 shared by seven family members. Only three Biharis’ annual family income ranges from 151,000 to 200,000 BDT or between US$ 1949 and US$ 2581. The per-day family income of this group is between US$ 5.34 and US$ 7.07, shared by eight family members. Among the 75 Bihari respondents, 18 have a daily family earning between less than one dollar and just above one dollar. In other words, 18 respondents’ family income is only between 1000 and 50,000 BDT annually or only between US$ 13 and US$ 645, which translates to US$ 0.36–US$ 1.77 daily and is shared by six members (Table 4.7), while two Table 4.7  Annual income of the Bihari interview subjects (in thousand BDT & US$) Annual income in BD Taka, and US$ 1000–50,000 TK. ($13–645) 51,00–99,000 TK. ($645–1278) 100,000–150,000 TK. ($1291–1936) 151,000,200,000 TK. ($1949–2581) 200,001–500,000 TK. ($2582–6454). 0 TK. ($0)

Number Average dependentsa on the total family income 18 26 26

6 8 7

3

8

0

Nil

2

7

One US$ = 77.47 TK. Amounts in the Brackets () indicate US$ Source: Fieldwork Dependent refers to children, parents, and spouses who have no income and live on the earning member(s) of the family a

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respondents have no family income at all. In all cases, the daily family income of the Biharis is shared by six to eight family members (Table 4.7), pointing out that all seventy-five Bihari respondents live in extreme poverty (Table 4.7). If a person lives on less than $1.90 per day, he or she is considered to be in extreme poverty (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2017). Even a member of the highest income group, who earns US$ 7.07 per day, is also not able to overcome the extreme poverty line, because this amount is shared by a family of an average of eight members (Table 4.7). Raihan from the Geneva Camp, a 24-year-old day laborer, says about the economic situation of the Biharis: When natural calamities like excessive rainfall, floods, and cyclones occur, we cannot go to work. We make no money and starve at home. Again, during political turmoil like uninterrupted hartal (shutdown), we cannot work. We make nothing. We sleep hungry. This is our life.

Nationality of the Biharis All of my respondents have been residing in Bangladesh for a long time with most now being third-generation Biharis. Among the 75 respondents, 39 were born in independent Bangladesh, 28 Biharis were born in former East Pakistan, and 8 Biharis were born in British-India. As Table 4.8 demonstrates, of the 75 Bihari respondents, 39 respondents have claimed that Bangladesh is the land of their birth. They have never seen any other country but Bangladesh. They have grown up here, work here, and live here. Secondly, 28 respondents were born in East Pakistan (currently Bangladesh) from 1947 to 1971. Only eight Bihari respondents were born in former British India, migrated to East Pakistan in the 1940s,

Table 4.8  Residence of Bihari interview subjects in Bangladesh Biharis Born in Bangladesh and residing in Bangladesh since birth Born in East Pakistan and residing in Bangladesh since 1971 Born in British-India (migrated from India to East Pakistan in the 1940s) and residing in Bangladesh since 1971 Total Source: Fieldwork

Number 39 28 8 75

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accepted former Pakistani citizenship and have been residing in Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) since 1947. Of the 75 respondents, 65 identified themselves as Bangladeshi nationals. Some of my respondents were born in former East Pakistan. Many respondents believe that they are Bangladeshi because they have been living in the same place since their birth. They were born, brought up, and worked in Bangladesh. Ibrahim, a resident of the Town Hall Camp and a 35-year-old motor mechanic, echoed similar sentiments when he said, “Let us serve the Bangladesh Army, Police, and the Border Guards; we want to fight for Bangladesh. Let us show our courage and commitment to Bangladesh.” Selim from the Geneva Camp, aged 52, states, “My grandparents are buried in this land. We are deeply rooted in the soil of this land (bhumi/desh).10 We will die for Bangladesh.” Most of my Bihari respondents are ready to transform their “ethnic spirit into civil sentiments,” a vital prerequisite for securing national identity (Ahmed 2003, 38). Many respondents who identify themselves as Bangladeshi say that they have never seen or known any other country but Bangladesh. Sharifa from the Geneva Camp is a 38-year-old housewife who articulates this sentiment: “We live in Bangladesh, eat in Bangladesh, sleep in Bangladesh, we love Bangladesh, and we are ready to die for Bangladesh.” Another respondent, Kuddus, a 35-year-old rickshaw puller and a resident of the Geneva Camp points out, “We call us Bangladeshi because we have been living in this land for a long 40 years. Our nerves are linked to this land. Bangladesh beckons us.” The comments of the respondents show their allegiance and emotional attachment to Bangladesh. Hasan, a 29-year-old laborer who is a resident of the Geneva Camp, says: We have been living in this country since our birth. Despite this, here the people call us Bihari refugees. We still do not receive fair and equal treatment. Why should we go to Pakistan? Who knows us there? No one. If we go to Pakistan, we will again suffer there like Biharis in Bangladesh. We do not want that situation. We do not want to be Pakistani Biharis. We no longer want to see the suffering of our children. We want to see our children grow up and get educated here properly. We want to see them getting good jobs and serving this country. (Bangladesh)

Kabir, a 20-year-old man who is a resident of the Sagor Para Camp, says, “All our family members are living in Bangladesh. The graves of my

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parents are in Bangladesh. We will never leave this country; we will stay here at any cost. We have no place to go.” Among the respondents, young Biharis under 50  years believe that repatriation is not a viable option, which has convinced them to settle in Bangladesh. Among the 75 respondents, only 10 Biharis identify themselves as Pakistani nationals and think that Pakistan is their ideological state.11 They want to go back to Pakistan. Junaid from the Geneva Camp, aged 85, says, “I came to Pakistan, fought for Pakistan, and want to die in Pakistan.” They claim that they wanted to defend Pakistan in 1971 for patriotic reasons when the security of Pakistan was threatened. The creation of Bangladesh by dismembering the Islamic state of Pakistan had shattered their hopes. Therefore, they do not want to stay in Bangladesh which is not the country of their own choice, and they want repatriation to their dreamland, Pakistan. Azim, aged 68, a resident of the Geneva Camp, says, “Pakistan is our ideological homeland, not Bangladesh.” Shabana, aged 39 who is also from the Geneva Camp, says, “We are Pakistanis, that’s why we are interned in the camp. The camp is a prison. We speak Urdu. We have no food, no rights.” The Biharis who want repatriation to Pakistan have further justified their arguments by stating that they have the same Urdu language as the Pakistanis, and this will help them in jobs and businesses in Pakistan. They also believe that they have cultural similarities with Pakistanis. In their view, this cultural affinity will integrate them easily with mainstream Pakistanis. Some Biharis are deeply rooted in Bangladesh through social relations, especially through intermarriage and intermingling. Among the 75 respondents, I find that one has a local (Bengali) spouse and children, which made it too difficult for her to leave Bangladesh. Some Biharis have also shown their reluctance to repatriation because they think that in Pakistan there is “no free lunch” for them. When I asked my respondents whether they want to go back to Pakistan or stay in Bangladesh, Rabeya from the Sagor Para Camp, aged 36 answered: We must work harder even if we go to Pakistan because it will be a new place and a new environment for us. So, what’s wrong with staying in Bangladesh and accepting the old suffering that we have been experiencing for almost half a century?

Many respondents discloses that they lost interest in repatriation to Pakistan, because as Urdu speakers the Biharis had to shoulder the

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responsibilities for the misdeeds of the Pakistan Army in 1971, especially killing, raping, and torturing unarmed Bengalis. Akbar from the Geneva Camp, aged 59, says: Pakistanis are worse than dogs. The Pakistan Army did not come here to fight. They came here for enjoyment. If they had noble intentions to fight for Pakistan, they could have won the war. They lost because they killed innocent civilians and raped Bengali mothers and sisters, but we had to suffer for their evil deeds. We will not go to Pakistan even if we starve in Bangladesh.

Those who identify themselves as Pakistani nationals have been waiting for repatriation since the dismemberment of Pakistan. Although the government of Bangladesh formally or legally never revoked their Bangladeshi citizenship, they are reluctant to accept Bangladeshi citizenship, because they think that their forefathers came to the Islamic state of Pakistan to secure their religion Islam as well as their Muslim culture against the backdrop of Hindu-Muslim communal riots in India and the persecution of Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces.12 Ali Asgar, aged 68 of the Geneva Camp, states: “Our parents came to East Pakistan at the call of Quaid-i-Azam (founder of Pakistan) to make a Muslim nation and to secure our lives and Muslim culture in the midst of Hindu-Muslim communal riots in India.” Some respondents also argue that in the 1940s they came to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) viewing it as a holy land for the Muslims. They sacrificed their lives for the cause of Pakistan in 1947 and 1971. Mohsin, aged 67, a resident of the Geneva Camp, says: “Pakistan was built on the flesh and blood of the Biharis in 1947.” Another advantage of repatriation to Pakistan as mentioned by the respondents is that many of them have family and friends in Pakistan. They think their repatriation will give them a chance to be reunited with their family members. They feel that as the ones closest to them are living in Pakistan, they will be better integrated into Pakistan and will be able to settle in Pakistan as a community. They express that they not only sacrificed their lives but also generation after generation suffered throughout their lives for the cause of Pakistan. Yusuf from the Town Hall Camp, aged 40, states, “We have been waiting 41 years with the hope that the plane is coming.” Furthermore, they are reluctant to stay in Bangladesh, because they are victims of discrimination, maltreatment, and mistrust by Bengalis. Raihan from the Geneva Camp, aged 24, states, “The Bengalis do not

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Table 4.9  Identification of nationality by the respondents Nationality

Number Reasons for identification

Bihari respondents who identify themselves as Bangladeshi and want to stay in Bangladesh

65

Bihari respondents who identify themselves as Pakistani and want repatriation to Pakistan

10

Total

75

Bangladesh is their birthplace Long-time residence in Bangladesh For the cause of Islam Urdu language Identical culture with the Pakistanis Close relatives in Pakistan Higher prospects for jobs in Pakistan Love for Pakistan

Source: Fieldwork

trust us. They do not respect us, they demean us. They call us Maura (slang for Biharis)” (Ilias 2003, 129). The Bihari respondents’ perceptions about their national identity are summarized in Table 4.9.

The Biharis’ Views Regarding Repatriation to Pakistan In 1972, the government of Bangladesh, with the help of the International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC), gave an option to the Biharis. They were asked whether they would move to Pakistan or stay in Bangladesh. Of the total number of Biharis then in Bangladesh, almost half wanted repatriation to Pakistan and listed their names through the ICRC and the remaining half wanted to stay in Bangladesh. The latter was granted citizenship.13 For those who opted for repatriation to Pakistan, their options were not their free choices. Rather, they gave options under duress. Unfortunately, they have been waiting for repatriation for 42  years and still, the repatriation process is not complete. Raihan from the Geneva Camp claims that those who had assets and businesses wanted to stay in Bangladesh, but those who were poor and did not have any assets in Bangladesh opted for Pakistan.

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This research finds that among the 75 respondents, 74 concede that either they personally or their parents opted for repatriation and listed their names through ICRC.  Only one respondent denied his choice of repatriation to Pakistan. The most interesting finding is that among the 75 respondents, 70 respondents who opted for repatriation do not believe that Pakistan will accept them and only 5 respondents still expect Pakistan to accept them. My interviews with 75 respondents show the perception of the Biharis about repatriation to Pakistan. Most of them (70) believe that Pakistan will not take them, because they have enlisted their names but have been waiting for 42  years for repatriation. The Pakistani government’s long delay and inaction eroded their confidence, and they no longer believe that Pakistan will take them back. Hashem who is a resident of the Sagor Para Camp, aged 60, says, “Pakistan did not take us in the last 42 years. How can I believe that it will happen in the future? We are living in an inhuman situation, but Pakistan does not care about us.” Al-Amin who is residing in the Geneva Camp, aged 81, said, “Pakistan itself is in many crises. They have no scope to look after us.” Regarding the frequent pledges from the Pakistani government and deviations from those pledges, Aziz from the Geneva Camp, aged 57, states, “The Pakistani government is a betrayer. The Pakistani government is worse than Satan. When they needed us in 1971, the Pakistan Army came to our doors and recruited our children to the Razakar Bahini.14 They used us like tissue paper. Today, they do not need us, so they threw us to the dustbin.” Jamal, a resident of the Town Hall Camp, aged 70, says, “Pakistan will never accept the Biharis, but it is their moral responsibility to repatriate us.” One respondent Ali from the Town Hall Camp, aged 80, said that Biharis have organized demonstrations, observed hunger strikes, led protest marches in front of the Pakistani High Commission in Dhaka, and met the visiting leaders of Pakistan, including the heads of government. The Pakistani authority pledged to expedite their repatriation, but no action was taken by the Pakistani government. The stranded Biharis demanded their repatriation to the government of Pakistan through the diplomatic channels of the government of Bangladesh, the UNHCR, and other international humanitarian and human rights organizations. However, none of them were able to resolve the problem. Ali expresses his doubt by saying, “Pakistan will take us, only if Allah (God) wishes.” Some respondents still believe that Pakistan will take them back because they cannot accept Bangladesh as their own country as they fought for the

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creation of Pakistan in 1947 and again tried to defend Pakistan in 1971. Moreover, they are not accepted as Bangladeshi nationals, but rather as traitors, collaborators, or culprits. They are denied benefits in Bangladesh enjoyed by mainstream Bengalis and the respondents believe that they are discriminated against in Bangladesh. Munira from the Sagor Para Camp, aged 58, says, “Some Biharis want to go to Pakistan because their educated children want to serve in the army and police, but the Government of Bangladesh does not allow them. Their dreams can come true only in Pakistan.” The Biharis’ language, literature, history, and culture are identical to the Pakistanis. They came to Pakistan and never opted for Bangladesh. Some of the Biharis are worried about their alleged involvement in crimes against humanity in 1971. Amir who is a resident of the Sagor Para Camp, aged 80, states, “The present Awami League (AL) government often blames us for committing war crimes. We are afraid that the AL government might catch us and force us to face trial for those alleged war crimes of 1971, which will further victimize us. We cannot, therefore, stay here. We want repatriation to Pakistan.” Mohsin from the Geneva Camp who is deliberately seeking repatriation says, “I will go to Pakistan even if I have to eat half a piece of bread.” Some of the Biharis expect that considering their dedication to and sacrifices for Pakistan and their inhuman conditions in Bangladesh, the government of Pakistan should repatriate them. They like to live with the hope that their repatriation will happen one day.

The Biharis’ Views Regarding Their Bangladeshi Citizenship From the responses of the 75 Bihari respondents, it appears that the government of Bangladesh never revoked the citizenship of the Biharis and the Biharis themselves never renounced their Bangladeshi citizenship. Therefore, they are citizens of Bangladesh in a strict legal sense. Despite having legal citizenship status, however, the Biharis are not enjoying some of these important rights associated with citizenship. The respondents believe that although there is no legal bar to them accessing and enjoying civil, political, and economic rights, there are unofficial bars that limit their access to these rights.15 As a consequence, they are unable to access some important citizenship rights which could make their citizenship meaningful.

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Out of the 75 Bihari respondents, 59 express their feelings about deprivation and discrimination by the state and society, 9 did not give any opinions and 7 identified themselves as stranded Pakistanis. One respondent, Ali Asgar of the Geneva Camp, aged 68, states, “Although the Court granted us citizenship in 2008, our children do not get any jobs. Nothing has changed since 2008. Our children do not get passports and visas for going abroad. What type of citizenship is this?” From the interviews, it is evident that among the 75 respondents, nobody thinks that Bangladeshi Biharis have access to important citizenship rights, which can make their lives easier and more meaningful. Many of them cannot afford to live outside the camp.16 Even those who can afford it cannot rent a home outside the camp, because they face discrimination when they want to rent. When homeowners know that the prospective tenants are Biharis and Urdu-speaking people, they refuse to rent out their homes. The Biharis generally face discrimination from the Bengalis, because of their doubts and unclear ideas about the citizenship status of the Biharis, but there are some exceptions. Raihan who is a resident of the Geneva Camp, aged 24, claims: I have married recently and wanted to rent a tin shed house as a house17 in Mohammadpur. The rent was one thousand taka. The Bengali landlord wanted to know my present address and source of income. I replied that I am a garment worker and I earn three thousand five hundred taka and my wife is a domestic worker and makes fifteen hundred taka per month. Our family income is five thousand Taka per month. When the landlord learned that we are non-Bengali, he became upset and exclaimed in a harsh way, Bihari! Then he asked me to call him later. His expression clearly reflected that he wanted to ignore me. However, the week after I called him every day and night because I needed an affordable home. He never received any of my phone calls. Every time his wife or son received my phone calls and said that the landlord was not at home. On the last day, the landlord received my phone call and told me that the home was already rented out. It frustrated me. Finding no alternatives, I returned to the Geneva Camp and am now living with my parents in a tiny room. This is how Bengalis discriminate against us.

The Bihari respondents share the view that they do not have any addresses, because their camp is not considered an address by the authority. They are considered by many Bengalis as floating men and women. As camp dwellers, they receive maltreatment from some people in society.

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Some respondents claim that some Biharis even hide their ethnic identity and use fake Bengali names and addresses when they apply for admission to public schools and important public documents, such as passports or driving licenses. If they disclose their true Bihari identity in public, they risk being disqualified for jobs or risk losing anything they obtained under a false Bengali identity. Ali Asgar from the Geneva Camp, aged 68, says: Now we have become clever. We use Bengali names for our grandchildren. We also use different addresses of our Bengali neighbors. They are our well-­ wishers, they help us. Even though it is a matter of shame and an insult for us, what else can we do? Some Bengalis allow us to use their addresses to help us. They are sympathetic toward us. My wife and daughter-in-law work in their home as domestic workers. We help each other.

All the respondents said they do not enjoy any state protection. If a Bihari goes to the police station with a complaint, he or she is treated badly by the police who often blatantly show their disrespect and reluctance to investigate the complaint. Sometimes the police harass the Bihari complainants by detaining them. Mir-Zafar, a 71-year-old Bihari rickshaw puller who is from the Geneva Camp, sums up the sense of rejection amongst the respondents: “We feel like a fallen stone on the road. Anybody can throw us in any direction.” The emerging consensus amongst the respondents is that the government of Bangladesh discriminates against the Biharis as citizens of Bangladesh. The Biharis are ignored in public employment, they do not have any representatives in any political parties, and they cannot serve in the police or in the army. Although legally the Biharis were granted citizenship in 2008, they are discriminated everywhere. They do not have access to some important citizenship rights under the constitution and citizenship laws in Bangladesh. Javed, a 52-year-old motor mechanic from the Geneva Camp, laments in his own language, “Dhubi ka jat, na ghat ka, na ghar ka,” which implies that they are rootless and that neither Bangladesh nor Pakistan wants them. My fieldwork uncovers that the Biharis are being deprived and discriminated against by the state just because of most of their support for Pakistan in 1971. They are alienated from national holidays in Bangladesh, such as Independence Day (16 December) and Victory Day (26 March), because of some of their forefathers’ negative roles during the Liberation War of 1971. A section of Bengalis’ negative attitudes toward them further

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aggravates their feelings. The Biharis’ feelings are captured by 23-year-old Babu from the Town Hall Camp: In my school days, my peers used to sing the national anthem, ‘My golden Bengal I love you’ … but I could not. On Victory Day and Independence Day in Bangladesh, my friends enjoyed a lot, but I could not. I do not know what my Independence Day is. What is our nationality? Are we Pakistani or Bangladeshi? Where is our destination?

Amena who is a resident of the Geneva Camp, aged 37, states, “Among us, some people have money, but they do not invest in Bangladesh. They suffer from uncertainty and insecurity because the Bangladesh government does not recognize them. It wants to send us back to Pakistan and the Pakistani government says wait, wait and wait.” Of the 75 Bihari respondents, 59 respondents not only identify the nature of their discrimination and suffering but also suggest possible remedies to address their deplorable conditions. For example, they suggest that the government of Bangladesh ensure that as citizens the Biharis have unimpeded access to all citizenship rights. The government should end discrimination against the Biharis and ensure that they have equal rights and opportunities in all walks of life, especially in education and employment. Selim, aged 52 who is from the Geneva Camp, says, “We want nothing but equal rights. We have no rights. Equal rights will strengthen us and strengthen the country.” In addition, they believe that the government should introduce affirmative action programs, such as allocating land for the Biharis so that they can settle with their families and end their encampment. This will also facilitate their integration with the Bengalis and will help in making one Bangladeshi citizenry. Amena, from the Geneva Camp, says: We heard that we are now citizens of Bangladesh. My husband is sick and cannot work and our children are illiterate. I work as a domestic worker. We sometimes eat one meal and sometimes half a meal. We need help. The government can give us some benefits, such as free or low-cost residence, a free school for our children, and work to survive. We want to live like human beings.

The respondents also addressed the mindset of their Bengali counterparts vis-à-vis their sense of discrimination. The respondents express the view that if the Bengalis changed their mindset and stopped treating the

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Biharis like their enemies and treated them as fellow citizens instead, then that may have helped to integrate the Biharis with the Bengalis. This would open the doors for further social interaction between the Bengalis and the Biharis, including intermarriage between the two ethnic communities. This, the respondents believe, would bridge the gap between the Bihari and Bengali communities and enhance social integration and cohesion. Selim from the Geneva Camp believes: Bengali-Bihari intermarriage and other social interaction can heal old wounds. Such an interaction can bring each group together and can help create understanding. We are brothers. Such social relations can cement existing differences. It can help make us part of the country and society.

In addition, the respondents pointed out that proper representation of the Biharis in public services, including the police and the army, and participation in political parties’ activities and decision-making will further help integrate them into mainstream Bangladeshi society. Basir from the Geneva Camp, aged 54, says, “Give us jobs in the police, army, and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). We want to serve the nation. We will show what patriotism is. If we do not get a chance to work, how can we show our worth?” He further says: “We believe in the same God, same Prophet, same religion, and we live in the same country. Why should we be so alienated?” Seven out of 75 respondents consider themselves stranded Pakistanis and are waiting for repatriation to Pakistan. For this group, Pakistan is their country. Aqleema, aged 75 who is a resident of the Geneva Camp, says: Many years have passed. Even today, I have been waiting impatiently, when will I go to Pakistan? I am almost a dead person. During the daytime, I enjoy the spring in Bangladesh, at night I dream about Pakistan. But it’s a pity that I do not have a place on earth. Could you tell me where my country is?

The Biharis’ Migration to East Bengal It is discerned from conversations with 75 respondents that the ancestors of the Biharis moved from Bihar, West Bengal, and other parts of India to East Bengal, the then eastern part of undivided Bengal.18 Most Biharis came to Bangladesh by choice. Table 4.10 shows that of the 75 respondents, 37 believe that the Biharis migrated to East Bengal because they

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Table 4.10  Reasons for migration to East Bengal Reasons for migration Poverty East Bengal was close to Bihar and West Bengal Easiest and cheapest place to migrate Invitation by the founding leaders of Pakistan to operate the machines and industries East Bengal, a Muslim-majority area Opportunities for job and business in East Bengal Incentives provided by the Pakistan government Total

Number 37

2 21 7 8 75

Source: Fieldwork

were very poor and it was easier and cheaper to enter than any other part of Pakistan either by walking or with cheaper transportation, such as jeeps, buses, trucks, trains, bullock carts, or horse carts. Among the respondents, 21 believe that their ancestors came to East Bengal with the understanding that it would be convenient for them to settle in a Muslim province. The rich, especially businesspeople, chose to go to West Pakistan because they wanted to invest their resources in Karachi, which was then the capital and port city of Pakistan. Their intention was to capture big markets for their businesses and industries. The third largest group of respondents (eight respondents) believe that their ancestors chose to come to East Bengal, because the former Pakistani government offered lucrative incentives to attract Bihari Muslims to East Bengal. The then Pakistani government granted them Pakistani citizenship, provided them with soft loans for businesses, cheaper land, or low-­ cost housing, and showed them honor by calling them Muhajirs.19 Azim from the Geneva Camp says: We came to East Pakistan at the invitation of Jinnah. He wanted to make a Muslim nation. We helped him. Jinnah glorified us with the title of Muhajir. It was a great honor for us. As Muslims, it was our duty to build a separate country for the Muslims. It helped us get rid of the atrocities of the Hindus in India. Jinnah gave us jobs, loans, housing facilities, and other benefits which attracted us to migrate and live in East Pakistan.

Through these incentives, the government of Pakistan attracted the Biharis to settle in East Pakistan. Through this strategy, the new

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government of Pakistan wanted to reduce the pressures of refugees on West Pakistan, where millions of Muslim refugees migrated in the 1940s. Jamal from the Town Hall Camp, aged 70, states, “After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the government of Pakistan recruited many Biharis to replace educated Hindus in administrative jobs and in the mills.” On the other hand, seven respondents believe that their ancestors chose East Bengal, because they thought that they would get more opportunities for jobs and businesses here. As a brand new state, the opportunities for jobs and businesses were naturally higher in Pakistan, especially in East Pakistan where the scarcity of technical people was noticeable. Jamal says: My father came to East Pakistan because we were very poor in India. My grandfather was a peasant. We had limited land. It was very hard to live on insufficient agricultural land. When Pakistan was born, they thought the Muslims would get better opportunities for jobs and businesses here. My parent’s hope for a brighter future forced us to migrate to East Pakistan.

Only a small number of respondents (two respondents) state that they were inspired to come to East Bengal at the call of the founding father of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who regarded them as “technical persons” who could migrate to East Bengal to operate the railways, mills, and industries. Akbar from the Geneva Camp claims: We, the Biharis, were technically sound people. My father was a railway operator in British-India. As a Muslim, he thought that he would use his skills in building the new nation of Pakistan, the new home of the Muslims. He came to East Pakistan and joined the East Pakistan Railway Department. He trained new people in East Pakistan Railway and helped build Pakistan. Building Pakistan was his only obsession.

The Role of the Biharis in Politics Before 1971 It is unfolded from conversations with the 75 respondents that the Biharis’ involvement in politics, especially their leaning toward the pro-Pakistani political parties was against the interests of the Bengalis. In the political history of Pakistan, the 1970 general election was a landmark event. It was a deciding factor for the creation of Bangladesh and tied the fate of the Biharis with the West Pakistanis. Table 4.11 shows that in the 1970 general elections, 62 of the respondents or their ancestors were supporters of

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Table 4.11  The Biharis’ support for political parties in the 1970 general elections

Support to the political parties Number of respondents Awami League (AL) Muslim League (ML) Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) No Party No Idea Total

5 62 1 5 2 75

Source: Fieldwork

the Muslim League (ML), which supported the atrocities of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan in 1971. The vast majority of the Biharis supported the ML, on the ground that it led the freedom movement of Pakistan in the 1940s. They saw Muslim League as the symbol of Pakistan. By supporting the ML, they firmly supported the existence of Pakistan and showed that they would support the ML for the sake of Pakistan. Data provided by the respondents further shows that they opposed the secular Awami League (AL) on the ground that it was a pro-Indian political party. They predicted that if voted to power, the AL, with the help of India, would separate East Pakistan from West Pakistan. They blamed the AL, as an anti-Pakistani party. They never wanted the AL to win the elections in 1970, which they thought would jeopardize the unity of Pakistan. They also understood that the existence of the Biharis was tied to the existence of Pakistan. They believed that if Pakistan lost its eastern wing, the Biharis would pay a heavy price. Therefore, a majority of the Biharis extended their unqualified support to the ML, in the 1970’s general election. Amir from the Sagor Para Camp says: We honestly supported Pakistan. We voted for the Muslim League in the 1970 elections to keep the unity of Pakistan. We thought if Pakistan does not exist, we will not exist. We came to Pakistan to forget the oppression by the Hindus in India. Initially, the Pakistani government helped us in settling and growing in East Pakistan. We did not want to betray Pakistan. They helped us and we returned their help.

On the contrary, five respondents claim that they or their parents supported the AL, a party that led Bangladesh’s War of Independence in 1971. This implies that among the Biharis not all were anti-Bengali. There

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was a group of Biharis who supported the Bengalis’ cause in the 1970 election. This group was more secular and more attached to the Bengalis. Mir-Zafar of the Geneva Camp says, “My father was an activist of the AL. We voted for the boat (symbol of the AL).” Only one respondent was a Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) supporter who advocated for the integration of Pakistan. The JI was an ideologically oriented party in Pakistan, which tried to convince the Bihari voters by propagating its Islamic ideology. However, they failed to capture the Bihari vote bank. Jubair from the Geneva Camp, aged 70, maintains: In the general election of 1970, we did not vote for the JI or ML. In Mirpur (a Bihari-populated area), the AL, candidate advocate Zahir Uddin was elected as a Member of the National Assembly. The JI candidate, Professor Golam Azam, who was chief of the party failed. The Biharis did not only vote for the JI or ML, many Biharis voted for the AL too.

The Role of the Biharis in the Bangladesh Liberation War Based on conversations with 75 respondents, I find that the vast majority of the Biharis supported Pakistan and a section of them collaborated with the atrocities of the Pakistan Army in the persecution of the Bengalis. They thought that the existence of the Biharis would depend on the existence of a united Pakistan. Javed from the Geneva Camp says: Across East Pakistan, the Bihari massacre by the Bengalis in early March 1971 gave us a clear message that if East Pakistan separated from West Pakistan, then the non-Bengalis in East Pakistan would become extinct. The situation forced us to side with Pakistan.

In response to a question regarding the role of the Biharis in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, of the 75 respondents, 63 said that they supported Pakistan on the ground that they sacrificed their lives for the cause of Pakistan in the 1940s. They established Pakistan in 1947, as a separate homeland for the Muslims. Therefore, they did not want the destruction of Pakistan. Amir from the Sagor Para Camp argues: “We created Pakistan in 1947. The creator cannot destroy its own creation. To prevent its destruction, we defended Pakistan. We considered it our moral responsibility to defend Pakistan.” The most important factor that

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contributed to their support for Pakistan was their vested interests. As an Urdu-speaking community, the Biharis received blessings and favors from the ruling elites, because of their identical language and culture. They thought that siding with the Bengalis and opposing Pakistan was suicidal for them. Jamal from the Town Hall Camp argues, “We looked at our own interests. We did not think whether it was right or wrong.” Furthermore, the Biharis considered supporting Pakistan as a demonstration of their patriotism. Jamal continues, “As a Muslim defending my homeland Pakistan was part of my iman (faith). We did it faithfully, but we were unsuccessful. We did our part. In 1971 that was our principle.” In the end, they could not support the cause of Bangladesh. In the Bangladesh Liberation War, India not only extended its moral support but also material support. India provided training, supplied arms and ammunition, and sheltered Bengali refugees (Sisson and Rose 1990, 142–143). Given the situation, the Biharis were certain that the Bangladesh Liberation War was an Indian ploy to dismember Pakistan, which was India’s rival. Among the respondents, none claimed their support for or participation in the Bangladesh Liberation War. Gafur from the Geneva Camp, aged 65, says: We supported Pakistan as a Muslim state. India’s support for creating Bangladesh made us skeptical about its intention and honesty. We were treated well by the Pakistani government. Many of us were railway employees and central government employees. We enjoyed the facilities and Pakistan honored us with a title called Muhajir.

Although no respondent supported the liberation war, Ali Asgar who is a resident of the Geneva Camp apologized for the role of the Bihari community in 1971. He says, “In 1947 the Bengalis warmly received us. They sheltered us and extended their cooperation. In return, we created distance, enmity and we opposed them. I am ashamed of this. I apologize for our activities.” Although most respondents claim that they or their families extended their support to Pakistan, 12 respondents state that they were either too young or were not born. They are totally unaware of the Liberation War of 1971.

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The Biharis and Property The Biharis were in an advantageous position in different sectors of the East Pakistani economy before the independence of Bangladesh. The government of Pakistan provided support to the Biharis in the public sector where they were given more opportunities than the Bengali majority population. Sumit Sen argues: when the West Pakistani Feudal elite began to capture economic and political power in East Pakistan, the Biharis who shared the same language with the elite, began a covert identification with them. Their ethnicity gave them access to preferential treatment in various sectors of the East Pakistani economy and a relatively privileged position in terms of official patronage. (Sen 1999, 626–627)

Table 4.12 illustrates that among the 75 respondents, 31 of the Bihari respondents claim that they or their families were the owners of private houses and land before the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, and 14 say that they or their families owned private houses and the necessary furniture. On the other hand, 12 of the respondents claim that they or their families were the owners of private houses and businesses, 10 claim that they or their families had private houses and jobs, and 8 admit that they did not have any properties. It is unfolded from interviews that at the dawn of the independence of Bangladesh, the properties of most Biharis were seized by the government of Bangladesh by the executive order of the interim president of Bangladesh in 1972 and some were confiscated by local Bengalis or the Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters). Some Biharis even sold their valuable properties at a token price to local Bengalis. In those days of deep crisis and despair, they had no bargaining power in setting the Table 4.12 Property Owned by the Biharis in the Pre-­liberation period

List of properties House, furniture, and necessary goods House and land property House and business House and jobs Nothing Total Source: Fieldwork

Number of owners 14 31 12 10 8 75

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prices for their properties. At that point, saving lives was their only option. Murad from the Geneva Camp, aged 49, states: Whatever amount of money we got in exchange for our house, land, and furniture at that critical time, we spent to buy our groceries, like rice, lentils, oil, salt, chili, soap, cigarettes, and baby food. We also helped some of our brothers who had nothing to eat.

Among the 75 respondents, 54 claim that their properties were captured either by the government or by local Bengalis through force or intimidation and three respondents claim that they were able to sell their properties to Bengalis at a token price. On the other hand, 13 respondents admit that nobody took their properties and only 5 respondents do not have any idea about what happened to their properties. Raju, a 54-year-­ old electrician from the Geneva Camp, claims, “We had a two-story house at Humayun Road. We owned the famous company, Burma Eastern Ltd. The Bengalis captured our business and properties. We lost everything!” Indicating an adjacent two-story new house to his business, Suruz, aged 55, a motor mechanic who is a resident of the Geneva Camp, says: Look at that house. We owned that house. The new resident occupied this house forcibly and renovated this house. Every day I look at that house and shed tears. Last month, a girl from that house went to England for higher studies. I wish my child could go to England for a foreign degree.

The Birth of Bangladesh and the Plight of the Biharis Based on my interviews with 75 respondents, I find that the Biharis in general are accused of collaboration with the Pakistani Army. Just after the birth of Bangladesh, most Biharis became the targets of retaliation.20 In this research when I asked Bihari respondents about the torture or crimes committed against them in the post-liberation period, the respondents narrated their own stories. Jakia from the Sagor Para Camp, aged 52, says, “I heard that the freedom fighters killed many Biharis. They kicked the abdomen of my pregnant aunt. Consequently, her premature child came out of her belly and was brutally killed too.” This study shows that of the 75 Bihari respondents, 5 respondents directly accused the freedom fighters or Bengalis of killing their family

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members, including fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, grandfathers, and grandmothers. They believe that the killings occurred simply because they were Urdu-speaking people. By labeling them as Razakars or collaborators (dalal), the freedom fighters or Bengalis captured their properties. Although only 5 respondents claim that their family members were killed, 42 respondents admit that they did not see it themselves but heard that they were killed by freedom fighters. Only two respondents directly confess that freedom fighters or Bengalis raped their female family members.21 However, 27 Bihari respondents claim that they heard that freedom fighters or Bengalis raped Bihari girls and women. Through these heinous crimes, they wanted to traumatize the Biharis and force them out of their homes and properties, which would allow them to capture abandoned properties. Gaffar from the Geneva Camp, aged 65, says: We heard that the Bengalis killed thousands of Biharis in Shantahar and Mymensingh. The water of the Punar Bhava River flowing under the Kanchan Bridge of Dinajpur ran red with the blood of the Biharis. The Bengalis separated the breasts of the Bihari girls from their bodies and using those cut pieces of their bodies wrote Joy Bangla (Victory of Bengal), a slogan that inspired the Bengalis during their liberation struggle.

Hashmi states that “some Bengali extremists killed many Biharis after the Bangladesh Liberation War with the motive of occupying their properties” (Hashmi 1998, 400). Fourteen respondents accused the freedom fighters of abducting and torturing Biharis. Such criminal offenses occurred to display their muscle power and to drive the Biharis out of their homes and properties. They further followed these tactics for ransom. Eight respondents complained that freedom fighters or Bengalis forcibly looted their jewelry, money, and other valuable items and two respondents admitted that they suffered imprisonment for their alleged collaboration with the Pakistani Army. Twenty-two respondents also experienced going into hiding to escape from torture and imprisonment. Most importantly, 74 respondents claimed that the Bihari children were barred from attending schools. According to them, this happened for a couple of reasons. First, in the wake of independence when the assaults started, the Bihari community was dislodged and sheltered in refugee camps. Secondly, there was an unofficial embargo on Bihari children for attending public schools.

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Living Conditions of the Biharis in the Camp In Bangladesh, the Bihari population constitutes 0.25 percent of the total population. Currently, an estimated 250,000–30,000 Biharis reside in 116 camps in different parts of the country (World Dictionary of Minorities n.d.). Initially, the Bihari camps were temporarily established under the supervision of the ICRC. In 1973 when ICRC left, the Bangladeshi government took over the managerial responsibilities of the camps and since then, the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation has been maintaining the managerial responsibilities (Sholder 2011, 6). However, despite their Bangladeshi citizenship, many Biharis still do not have access to many important rights including employment, education, and healthcare. Khan and Rahman write: Biharis in Bangladesh, particularly those living in camps, are facing social exclusion and severe discrimination in every aspect of life—education, employment, health services, business, access to justice, development, etc. Their living condition in the camp is not sub-standards, but also inhuman. (Khan and Rahman 2011, 101)

Based on detailed interviews with 75 respondents, I find that the Bihari camp dwellers live in terrible conditions and suffer from gross human rights violations. An average of six to eight people live in 8/10-feet room and in many cases, 12–15 people live in the same space. A lack of privacy is a huge problem that they face in the camps. Furthermore, inadequate bathrooms and toilets, power as well as water supplies make camp life miserable and unbearable. In an unhealthy environment, contagious and life-­ threatening diseases can also contribute to making camp life horrific. Extreme poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment further suppress the human rights of camp dwellers. Initially, the building materials used for the construction of houses in the camps were plastic sheets and bamboo for making walls and mud for the plinth. Later on, people paved the floors and changed the walls and roofs with C.I. sheets (Ara 2008, 40). However, these houses in the camps do not even fulfill the minimum requirements for the security of the inhabitants in the summer, during monsoons or in the winter (Ara 2008, 40). As a consequence, their “physical, emotional well-being and ability” are presumably affected by such low-quality and unhygienic housing (Ager and Strang 2008, 171). Kaberi from the Geneva Camp, aged 35, says, “Your (Bengalis) bathroom is bigger than our entire living space.” A study conducted at Khalispur Bihari Camp in Khulna

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reveals that the living space inside a house for each individual is 1.4 sq. meters or only 15.07  feet (Ahsan and Hussain 1990, 285). The camp dwellers identified many problems which undermine their basic human needs and human rights. Among these, privacy is the number one problem. They do not have the minimum level of privacy, even when changing their clothes. In a small room where six family members live together, privacy for intimate relations between couples is also completely absent. Given this situation, they must wait for a room to be free to meet their physical needs. In most cases, this does not happen very often and occurs only if they are lucky enough to have free time and a free room. Aziz, a Geneva Camp dweller, says, “I have two children and my parents live with me. My wife is young. I have forgotten when we had physical relations. I believe it’s a curse. In front of my parents and two young children, how can we do that? We are fed up with this horrible life.” The issue of privacy is especially evident when people get married. To give privacy to newly married couples, male members of the family usually go to the mosque and female family members go to neighboring houses to spend the night. Apart from this, generally older members of the family, especially parents sleep in the yard under the open sky. Young couples sleep on the bed inside the home and children sleep under the bed. This demonstrates how miserable camp life truly is. Another study finds that to maintain conjugal privacy, some Biharis also partition their room with sarees (Haider et al. 2003, 179). In their empirical study, Mustafa Haider et al. find: Rasulan Bibi, aged eighty years is an inhabitant of Balures Camp, Saidpur … she is living with her son and four daughters with their husbands in a single room of 8 feet by 8 feet. Rasulan Bibi makes a desperate effort to guarantee the conjugal privacy of her daughters by making partitions with sarees. She condemns herself as she thinks that her mere presence in that tiny room is an intrusion into her daughters’ private life. (Haider et al. 2003, 179)

The second biggest challenge for camp dwellers is the toilets. In the Geneva Camp, my field investigation shows that approximately 30,000 people use 272 toilets, many of which are out of order. My findings show that one toilet is used by approximately 110 people. In some other camps, 800–1000 people reportedly use a toilet. Big queues and competition always exist when using toilets. The use of insufficient toilet facilities by such a huge population makes it a very unhygienic and polluted

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environment. Most alarmingly, the use of the same toilet by both male and female dwellers often causes very unpleasant situations. At night, the use of toilets appears to be very dangerous for women and children, with incidents of sexual assault happening very often. To avoid such incidents at night, female toilet users are guarded by other family members, such as mothers, fathers, or brothers. Since there are no lights in the toilets, everyone often uses a candle at night. Another study also shows that a lack of privacy for females adds to their insecurity (Farzana 2008, 7). In addition, only 36 bathrooms exist for 30,000 users in the Geneva Camp. This means that each bathroom is used by 833 people every day, allowing each person only 1.72 seconds to take a bath. This is much worse as some bathrooms are often out of order. Given this situation, many males, females, and children take baths together in open spaces using ground water (from the tube well). To avoid this, some make a small bathing space within their tiny homes and young women and girls in the family take their baths there. Due to a scarcity of water in the bath space, they carry buckets filled with water and use that water for bathing and washing clothes. Partitioning an 8/10-feet room with a separate space for bathing and washing clothes creates very appalling conditions for Bihari families. Another corner of the tiny room is also used for cooking. Cooking, washing, bathing, sleeping, and living together in the same room gives a terrible picture of the inhuman conditions faced by Bihari families. In addition, domestic animals, such as goats and sheep also stay with the families in the same room. To make conditions worse, there is also frequent disruption of water supplies in the squalid camps mainly due to power outages, causing further problems with cooking, washing, and bathing. Apart from this, a poor drainage system often causes waterlogging in the camp compound. Most houses get flooded even with light rain. During the monsoon, dirty and smelly water from the drainage and sewerage lines flood the camp complex and enters bedrooms, making the whole environment polluted and unbearable. Flies and mosquito bites also seem so common that they do not concern camp dwellers. The Municipal and City Corporation’s inaction to improve poor sanitation further increases health and safety concerns. Furthermore, frequent disruption of the power supply negatively affects the overcrowded tiny houses in the camps, where weather conditions are hot and humid most of the year. The situation further deteriorates with the unbearable smell of rotten garbage stored in

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the camp area. To sum up, the Biharis live in abysmal and degrading living conditions. An ever-growing population suffers from limited resources, poor sanitation, and a lack of clean water which cause communicable diseases, such as fevers, dysentery, skin diseases, waterborne diseases as well as life-­ threatening diseases, such as cholera, typhoid, malaria, dengue fever, heart disease, asthma, tuberculosis, and cancer. In short, Bihari camp dwellers suffer from a horrific environment where minimum civic amenities are absent. Overall, a dingy and stinky atmosphere prevails in the camps. Inadequate water and sewerage as well as a shortage of latrines and clean water are constant threats to public health. Describing the deplorable conditions of the Bihari camps, Nahar also writes: Most of the Biharis including those living outside the camps are passing their days in agony and anger. There is abject poverty, disease, and deprivation. There is no facility for health care, sanitation, or education. The dingy houses inside the camps are the breeding grounds of disease. The young ones remain uneducated and unemployed and are tempted to take to crimes easily. A sizable number of old people have turned to begging and some to rickshaw pulling. Young girls have been forced to take prostitution for a living; the old and newborn babies are dying of a lack of medical care. The anti-social elements from the Bengali community have found the camps as safe havens whenever they are pursued by the members of law enforcement agencies. The wretched Biharis are now abandoned by all. (Nahar 2000, 180–181)

Education Education is the most effective tool for empowerment. Education provides individuals with skills and abilities and supports employment to make them competent members of society (Ager and Strang 2008, 171). Access to education is a human right because it enhances human dignity through its ‘fruits of knowledge, wisdom, and understanding’ (Claude 2006, 211). However, Bihari children hardly have access to any education, with most school-age children being deprived of an education. The schools in the camps are private, run by NGOs or communities through charities or donations. These schools receive no funding from the Bangladeshi government and poor Biharis who reside in the camps can hardly afford to send their children to these private schools. One report shows that among the school-age children living in the camps, only 10 percent go to primary

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schools and only 2 percent attend secondary schools (Kalsoom. 2010). A 1985 study on the Khalispur Bihari Camp shows that overall, 65 percent of Bihari camp children do not attend schools. Among the 5–10 age group, 83 percent of Bihari children remain out of school, and among the 11–15 age group, 78 percent of Bihari children are out of school (Ahsan and Hussain 1990, 289). Bihari children are often refused access to public schools (Stateless in Bangladesh & Pakistan 2006). Admission requirements in public schools include nationality documents, home addresses, and parents’ occupations, which the Biharis do not have. Their camp address is the main obstacle to their admission into public schools. Some Bihari students register as Bengalis to obtain admission into public schools (Haider et al. 2003, 166). Apart from discrimination within mainstream society, continuous bullying from teachers and classmates discourages Bihari children from attending schools (Hussain 2009b). Khalid Hossain, president of the Young Generation of the Biharis, shares his personal experience of social discrimination against the Biharis: The camp where I live is called Geneva Camp. I remember that when my friends and I, some of the young students living in the camps, completed our primary education at the Geneva camp school, we needed to get admission to go to high school. The high schools are located outside of the camp and so 15 of us Bihari students went together to the public school to get admission for the first time. However, the school administration said that “You guys are Bihari, non-Bengali. you are just stranded Pakistanis here. This is a government school, and our budget is only for Bengali students, so you can’t get admission to this school.” After that rejection from the government school, we had no option but to go to a private school, which was very costly for us, and we could hardly afford it. Due to the cost of a private school at that time half of the Bihari students had to drop out of their education. Then when we got admission to private school we suffered from discrimination. Still, I remember my first day of school. All the Bengali students were looking at us as if we were strangers and they were whispering to each other that we are Bihari and that we live in dirty camps. They even said that Biharis are war criminals and said that we are extremely dangerous people. Not only that, but other students also did not want to sit with us. We were marginalized in the classroom, and we had to sit in separate rows. When we tried to speak Bangla, which is not our native language and we read the textbook they were making fun of us due to the way we speak and our difficulty. They called us “sons of Bihari” and we had to face constant intolerant attitudes. Due to the intolerance of the Bengali students and the cost of attending the school, again some of our friends were forced to drop out of

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their education. Now they have no proper education and are only able to work as day laborers living under the poverty line. (Hussain 2009b)

The children of the Biharis do not have access to education in the language spoken at home, Urdu, but they aspire to retain their culture and community values (Haider et al. 2003, 164–166). The Biharis in general want their children to learn Urdu and seek religious education in addition to regular subjects taught at school. As this is not possible in Bengali schools, this makes even those Biharis with access to public schools dissatisfied with the academic program offered. A lack of opportunities to learn their own language and culture prevents the Bihari community from protecting their own traditional and cultural identity (Haider et al. 2003, 164–166). Even Bengali civil society groups support the Biharis’ demand for Urdu schools because it not only protects the language and culture of the Biharis in Bangladesh but also enriches Bangladeshi society through healthy interactions among different groups of people (Urdu School for the Linguistic Minority Urged. 2011). Based on the opinions of the 75 respondents, I find that 50 respondents have school-age children and among them, 35 cannot send their children to any schools, although primary education is compulsory and free for everyone in Bangladesh. Access to education is a fundamental human right. To make the Biharis effective citizens, their right to access education is undeniable. In this study, all 75 respondents identified that a lack of education is the number one problem in their development. It is evident that of the 50 respondents who have school-age children, 35 still cannot send their children to any schools, which means that most of the Bihari children in this study are illiterate. The irony is that Bangladesh has a system of compulsory and free primary schools. Although 72 percent (13.389  million) of students attend government primary schools in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Education Statistics 2016), of the 50 respondents who have school-age children only 10 Bihari respondents’ children attend public schools. This implies that because of many unofficial restrictions, the remaining Bihari children are denied admission into public schools. Hafiz, aged 54 who is a resident of the Geneva Camp, claims that Urdu-­ speaking students are denied admission into public schools when the authorities find out that they live in the camps. Among those who are enrolled in public schools, many identify themselves as ethnic Bengalis. They hide their Bihari identity to avoid discrimination that exists against them. They chose to take on a fake national identity to enjoy some

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important rights. It is easier for Biharis to hide their ethnic identity as they are “physically indistinguishable from the ethnic Bengalis and many of them, especially the younger generation, speak the Bengali language well” (Paulsen 2006, 56). On the other hand, among the 50 respondents, only 5 respondents were able to send their children to private schools. My field investigation uncovers the fact that in the Geneva Camp, where 30,000 Biharis currently reside, only one private school is in operation which is regulated by the Biharis. The school labeled as a “non-local junior high school” has a capacity of only 150 students. Although private schools are expensive, poor Biharis still want to send their kids to private schools, because their children are not admitted into public schools due to discrimination against them and the human rights of Bihari children are not properly respected.

The Biharis’ Access to Healthcare Health is crucial for individuals to actively engage in the activities of society. Access to healthcare is also seen as an important citizenship right, which helps integrate an individual into society (Ager and Strang 2008, 173). It provides a sense of ownership of citizens over the state. My fieldwork demonstrates that some of the camp dwellers suffer from a lack of access to healthcare facilities. In some camps, there are hardly any medical clinics, and even existing clinics in some other camps are not well equipped. Due to inadequate Medicare facilities, there are high-infant mortality rates among the Biharis living in the camps. Three out of five children die before the age of five (Stateless in Bangladesh & Pakistan 2006). According to the Refugee International Report: Lack of water and co-habitation with animals, combined with poor drainage and sanitation systems, contribute to a variety of medical problems, including skin disease, water-borne illness, upper respiratory infections, and gastrointestinal disorders. In one camp, ten wells were damaged leaving only two working wells to supply water to 650 families. In Mirpur’s Millat Camp, there was only one latrine for 6,000 people. Few medical clinics exist, and several camps have no healthcare at all, leaving entire families susceptible to both medical and financial hardship. (Refugees International 2004)

Inadequate medical facilities make women and children very vulnerable. Women are victims of unsafe deliveries, sexually transmitted diseases

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(STDs), and other health issues. Moreover, because of hunger and a lack of education, Biharis are ignorant about the immunization of their children, and in effect, lethal and debilitating diseases, such as measles, smallpox, GPT, and poliomyelitis, frequently occur in the camps (Farzana 2008, 7–8). Washing facilities and garbage disposal are completely inadequate and irregular in the camps (Kelley 2010, 360). Poverty across generations, inadequate nutrition, and poor medical facilities cause many of the above illnesses and diseases. This long-term restricted life in the camps not only affects physical health but also disturbs the Biharis ‘collective mental health (Heffernan, 2002, 12). The Biharis often claim that in public hospitals they face discrimination, often needing to pay bribes to the middleman to get hospital services. Given this situation, most Biharis rely on inadequate and underfunded NGO services. Based on my interviews with 75 respondents, I find that although the respondents are unable to access many important citizenship rights as well as human rights in Bangladesh, surprisingly 57 respondents admitted that they have access to public healthcare. However, almost one-quarter of the respondents are denied public healthcare. Access to healthcare is another factor in terms of citizenship rights. Although camp residents do not enjoy many important citizenship rights, public health is an exception, where 57 out of the 75 respondents admitted that they receive free hospital services from government hospitals and health centers. This is a positive contribution of the government of Bangladesh to the Bihari community. On the contrary, 18 respondents complain that they do not receive care from public hospitals or health centers. They identify intentional negligence by nurses and physicians, bribe-seeking by middlemen between patients and doctors as well as bad conditions in public hospitals as factors forcing them to seek private care. This implies that they are unwelcome due to their ethnic identity in public hospitals, which compels them to seek private care. Although coverage for all Biharis in terms of public hospital services and doctors is necessary, the coverage of more than two-thirds of Biharis is still commendable. More efforts still need to extend public healthcare to all individuals in the Bihari community. My interviews with Bihari respondents reveal that the reason why many Biharis have access to healthcare is that providing healthcare is seen as a humanitarian service; it is practically inhuman on the part of physicians and nurses to discriminate against patients in public hospitals when they need care. Therefore, in the case of healthcare, humanitarian consideration is given greater priority over the ethnic and linguistic identities of the Biharis. The common reasons most

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respondents narrate for their higher access to public health care are that public hospitals are open to all. It does not require any charges, but a very nominal entry fee. Hospital authorities generally provide all available and free services to all patients. Nadim, aged 39, a schoolteacher and a resident of the Geneva Camp, says, “In hospitals, the doctors do not look at ethnic identity. They provide us with services regardless of ethnolinguistic differences. They provide care as a moral obligation. Politics doesn’t matter here.”

Who Helps the Biharis? Based on my conversations with 75 respondents, it is evident that initially, the government of Bangladesh, the ICRC, and the UNHCR helped the Biharis with relief, rehabilitation, and repatriation. However, gradually all of them stopped assisting the Biharis. Now Mecca-based NGO, the Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami (Rabita), and some local NGOs provide them with very little assistance. Given the situation of the Biharis, one filled with extreme poverty, unemployment, and the inability to meet basic needs, the question then arises as to how the Biharis survive. In my interviews, I asked them who supports them and how they survive. The respondents reveal that three different types of organizations mainly assist them in living in the camp. These include the government of Bangladesh, NGOs, and some rich individuals from home and abroad. Within the government of Bangladesh, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and the local government agencies, especially city corporations, aid them. The government of Bangladesh under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief used to provide 3 kilograms of wheat to every person with a meager amount of subsistence allowance per month. The government continued such relief operations until 2004. Now on behalf of the government of Bangladesh, the Power Development Board (PDB) provides free electricity to the Bihari camps, and the Dhaka Water Supply Authority (WASA) and other water supply authorities provide free water supply to Bihari camps throughout the country.22 In addition to this, city corporations provide garbage management services to Bihari camps all over the country. In this research, my field investigation finds that the existence of the government of Bangladesh is not visible in the Bihari camps at all. Out of the 75 respondents, only 4 respondents said that the government helps with some relief and some civic facilities in the camps.

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The most important aid providers are the NGOs. Different local and international NGOs are working in the Bihari camps. Out of the 75 respondents, 53 are familiar with the assistance provided by NGOs. Right after the Liberation War, when the Biharis were the most insecure and when their life was under threat, ICRC came forward as a pioneer international organization and undertook the necessary steps to transfer them into different camps to ensure their safety and security. The ICRC not only built camps for the Biharis with its own resources but also listed the names of the Biharis who wanted repatriation to Pakistan. The ICRC was the main NGO that provided food and shelter to camp dwellers until 1973 (Sholder 2011, 5–6). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) initially worked with the governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh regarding the repatriation of the Biharis. It provided logistics support, especially transport facilities for transferring 107,000 Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan. It also facilitated three-way repatriation from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan (The State of The World’s Refugees 2000, 74). However, the UNHCR does not provide any direct assistance to the Biharis, because the Biharis are not qualified for refugee status under its UNHCR definition.23 Since 1978, Rabita has become the only NGO that provides relief to the Biharis. In 1992, Rabita conducted a survey in refugee camps in Bangladesh and found that 238,000 Biharis were living in the refugee camps (Government of Bangladesh 1998). Rabita has a double goal of assisting the Biharis with repatriation as well as helping the Biharis under the auspices of the Pakistani government. Apart from this, Rabita assisted in the supply of drinking water by providing sinking tube wells as well as providing medical facilities and assisted the Biharis in their education. Rabita also helped the Biharis rebuild their houses when needed. Currently, Rabita is providing the Biharis with vocational training and extending its cooperation to help the Biharis find suitable employment in Bangladesh. My field investigation further reveals that Marie Stopes, another international NGO, also aids to improve sexual and reproductive health (SRH) in the camps. Through maternity centers, it provides affordable and good quality delivery services for camp dwellers. Its primary objective is to reduce mortality and morbidity, especially among women and children, and to improve the health of camp dwellers by improving access to quality healthcare services. Marie Stopes maternity centers provide obstetric services, including normal delivery, assisted delivery, and cesarian sections.

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Aside from international NGOs, some local NGOs also aid camp dwellers. Al-Falah is a local NGO founded in 1981, which pledged to improve the situation of the Biharis in Bangladesh (Al-Falah Bangladesh n.d.). It aims to rehabilitate the Biharis socially and economically by increasing their access to education, healthcare, and job opportunities and improving their quality of life. Since its beginning, Al-Falah has been delivering healthcare services in the Geneva Camp through its Al-Falah medical clinic (Al-Falah Bangladesh). Al Falah’s main project is the Community Development Centre (CDC), which established 40 foundation schools all over Bangladesh and sponsored poor Urdu-speaking students to continue their education from pre-primary to higher levels. It also undertook a project for the skills development of the Biharis. Under this project, students are trained in basic computer literacy (30 Years of AL-FALAH BANGLADESH 1981–2011). Like Al-Falah, Suravi is another local NGO helping destitute Bihari children through education and preparing them as assets so that they can contribute to society.24 In addition, other local NGOs, such as the Islamia Eye Hospital, provide eye-care services to camp dwellers. The Association of Social Advancement (ASA) also provides microcredit to empower the Biharis. The Social and Economic Enhancement Program (SEEP) provides free education for up to three years for Bihari children in the camps. NGOs like Surjer Hashi and Shabuj Chata also extend healthcare services to mothers and children. Both clinics provide services to pregnant women for safe delivery. Furthermore, the rich people in Bangladesh as well as outside Bangladesh help Bihari camp dwellers either directly or indirectly through different NGOs. However, only one of the respondents recognized individual donations from rich people from home and abroad in improving their situation in the camps. This type of help usually comes in cash.

Access to Other Rights Based on my interviews with 75 respondents, I find that the Biharis in general are denied passports to travel abroad or driver’s licenses and it is also difficult for them to rent a house as they are considered stranded Pakistanis and landlords do not seem to trust them. My field investigation reveals that among the 75 Bihari respondents, 72 of them were registered as voters and they received voter identity cards. Only three respondents did not have voter identity cards, because they did not want to be enlisted

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as voters in Bangladesh on the grounds that their Bangladeshi voter identity cards would disqualify them for repatriation to Pakistan. One of them also believes that the voter identity cards would disqualify them to reside in the Bihari camps and deprive them of free rations and other facilities, including free housing in the camps and free electricity and water. Muti from the Geneva Camp, aged 65, says, “We want to apply for our voting rights after repatriation to Pakistan.” Although the voter identity cards signify that they are citizens of Bangladesh, they are still denied other rights associated with citizenship. My interviews show that among the 75 respondents, none of them have a passport. Seven respondents applied for passports but were denied passports on the ground that they were stranded Pakistanis. The remaining 68 respondents did not apply and said that they know that they would not get passports as they heard that the government does not issue passports to the Biharis. Rahman, aged 48, a Town Hall Camp dweller says: Like Bengalis, we want to go abroad for work and get better wages, but when we apply for passports, we receive rejections in police verification required for passports. Since we are Urdu speaking and we live in the camp, we are considered stranded Pakistanis, not Bangladeshi citizens. We are not lucky enough to go abroad.

Ahmed, aged 38, another Town Hall Camp dweller says, “Many of us want to go and work overseas, but cannot even get a passport. The authorities will not give us passports, especially when our addresses are in the Bihari camps.” In order to help the Bihari camp dwellers, the Council of Minorities and NAMATI, an international NGO, jointly worked to help obtain passports and other essential public documents. However, even after the joint efforts of these two organizations, they were only successful in obtaining passports for only two Biharis. Although they tried to help other interested Biharis in the camps with their passport applications, they were unsuccessful (Council of Minorities and NAMATI 2018). In their report, the Council of Minorities and NAMATI stated: in 2015, we assisted this Geneva Camp client to re-apply an additional 5 times. Each time the investigation officer rejected the application due to the applicant’s camp address and not having gas, water, and electricity bills, which afflicts all camp residents. These rejections occurred despite showing a positive order from the Home Ministry. After that, we submitted a

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c­omplaint to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) on 5th April 2015. Since April 2015 the NHRC has issued seven letters to the Home Ministry and copied Khalid Hussain of the Council of Minorities. However, until now there is still no response from Home Ministry to resolve the passport issues. Camp residents have national ID cards and their names enlisted in the voter rolls, but they do not enjoy their fundamental rights in Bangladesh. (Council of Minorities and NAMATI 2018)

Sadaqat Khan, the president of the Urdu-Speaking Peoples Youth Rehabilitation Movement (USPYRM), said that even after getting his passport he was harassed by law enforcement agencies as they believed that he received his passport illegally (Hasan 2016). The reason behind this discrimination, as expressed by the respondents, is that socially and politically the Biharis are still not treated as citizens of Bangladesh. Despite having the court verdict in favor of their citizenship, the government of Bangladesh still calls them stranded Pakistanis.25 Clearly, a lack of “political will” of the government of Bangladesh to recognize them as citizens of Bangladesh is evident.26 Even civil society and rights groups are not that concerned about the rights of the Biharis. In fact, the role of civil society in integrating the Biharis is very insignificant. Bangladesh is a country where almost 2500 NGOs work.27 Mainstream local NGOs, such as BRAC and Grameen Bank, the business community, Ain O Shalish Kedra, civil society, and the media cannot avoid their responsibilities to integrate the Biharis into Bangladeshi society and they should work to extend their activities to the Bihari camps (Bashar 2006, 107). The Biharis’ support for Pakistan in the Liberation War of Bangladesh is still seen unfavorably in Bangladesh and seems to be a cause for the inaction of these larger NGOs within the Bihari community. It is possible that they believe that efforts to support the Bihari community may give them a bad image in the public eye. Although all 75 Bihari camp dwellers claim that purchasing a piece of land or owning a piece of a land is not a problem for them (if they have money), they are hesitant to purchase land outside the camp for several reasons. First, they do not have security outside the camps. Second, most of them do not have the ability to purchase land, and third, some of them do not want to invest their money given their uncertain future in Bangladesh. Kayser, aged 55, who is an electrician and a resident of the Geneva Camp states, “We lost our properties in 1947 and 1971. We do not want to lose our properties again. We are not secure in Bangladesh.

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We are subject to hate crimes, harassment, and discrimination.” Jabbar, aged 55, a Geneva Camp dweller and a motor mechanic states: I purchased a piece of land and built a house in Savar. When I moved there with my family, our neighbors started to suspect that we were Bihari, Pakistani or Urdu-speaking people, because our Bengali language was not like the Bengalis. We had our own accents. They used to demean our children by calling us “Maura”. Psychologically, we were under pressure. We felt tortured. We were very scared, and we felt very insecure. We thought we would be attacked by our neighbors anytime. Soon after we sold our house; we left Savar and once again returned to the Geneva Camp.

Social Exclusion and Problems of Integration There is no consensus on the definition of integration. The concept is “individualized, contested, and contextual” (Robinson 1998 as cited in Ager and Strang 2008, 170). Generally, national integration is the process of creating a unified nation through unity, cohesion, and stability (Hussain 2009, 43). It depends on the successful accommodation of various ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups within a national system (Jahan 1972, 3). It occurs when diverse groups and discrete elements of societies come together and co-exist in a national system for the purpose of making a nation (Wriggins 1966, 181–191). It provides a common sense of nationality to citizens. National integration and development are inseparable or “bound phenomena” and the slow progress of one hinders the movement of the other (Binder 1964, 622; Shelley 1986, 183–84). The main challenge to national integration occurs in developing countries when different interest groups hardly interact with each other and seek separate demands from the government and the government then either becomes unable to cope with their demands or barely meets them (Pye 1966, 65–66). Different interests create different ideologies and challenge national integration (Sayeed, 1966, 408). Failure of the government to accommodate divergent interests in the national system may cause disintegration. Such a dismal failure was seen in Pakistan during 1947–1971 (Choudhury 1995, 13–14). Given this reality, many developing countries still cannot achieve national integration. Rupert Emerson characterizes them as not “nations in being but only in hope” (Emerson 1960, 94). My fieldwork shows that many Biharis in Bangladesh are still not integrated with the national system. Although they are citizens of Bangladesh

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in the legal sense, many of them do not have access to some important legal and social rights. For example, legal rights such as owning a passport, driver’s license, birth certificate, and social rights such as education, employment, and healthcare. In other words, many Biharis in Bangladesh do not have full citizenship rights. Among the 75 Bihari respondents, all of them feel that they are excluded from mainstream Bangladeshi society. The respondents express their feelings of exclusion by pointing out that they never get selected for public employment, are denied passports and driver’s licenses, and their children are not able to access public schools. Aleem, a Geneva Camp dweller aged 32, says, “When private employers figure out that we are Urdu speaking, they think that we are just temporary people in Bangladesh, and we will leave this country anytime for Pakistan. This is why they do not proceed further.” The most common feeling of the respondents is that socially the Biharis are suppressed. Bengalis in general disrespect the Biharis by calling them “Maura” (slang), Razakar, traitor, refugee, agents of Pakistan, rootless as well as other insulting words. Not surprisingly, intermarriage between the Biharis and the Bengalis happens very seldom. Marium, aged 58 from the Geneva Camp, says, “We have the same faith, same Prophet, and the same religion. Why can’t we have social interactions? Why can’t we live together? Why are we living apart?” Rahela from the Geneva Camp, aged 42, a mother of two young daughters, is worried about her daughters’ marriages because of their ethnicity, camp life, poverty, and a lack of social networks: We have serious problems with social relationships like marriages. I have two educated young girls. One passed the SSC examinations and the other one will take her SSC examinations next year. I am now looking for qualified grooms. Among the Biharis, I do not see enough educated boys to marry them off. They are not eligible enough for my daughters. Bengali boys are qualified and my daughters like Bengali boys. But when Bengalis find out that we live in the camp, they do not proceed further. They want a real address, status, and money.

It appears from discussions with the respondents that the Biharis and the Bengalis do not interact in the same social gatherings and generally intermarriage does not occur. Even today, Bengali children do not play together with Bihari children. The Bengalis and the Biharis do not celebrate national holidays, such as Independence Day or Victory Day

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together. The Bengalis are suspicious of the patriotism of the Biharis. When there are Bangladesh versus Pakistan cricket matches, the Bengalis suspect that the Biharis support Pakistan, because in the camps some Biharis still fly the Pakistani national flag instead of the Bangladeshi one. Based on the qualitative data from 75 respondents, I find that the Biharis believe that their history, culture, Urdu language, and poor economic conditions excluded them from Bangladeshi society and caused problems in their integration in Bangladesh. Although integration is used widely, Myron Weiner defines integration primarily as a “process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity” (Weiner 1965, 53). Problems of integration may arise both vertically and horizontally. The rich-poor gap causes the problem of vertical integration and ethnic and linguistic differences cause the problem of horizontal integration (Maniruzzaman 1982, 63–64). The Biharis in Bangladesh still face problems in integrating with the Bengalis both vertically and horizontally. The main problems in integrating the Biharis with the mainstream Bengalis as identified by the respondents include their controversial past record. The Biharis widely opposed the emergence of Bangladesh, which appears to them as the main barrier to their integration with the Bengalis. Celebrations for Independence Day (25 March), Victory Day (16 December), Language Martyrs Day (21 February), still remind Bengalis about the cruelty and atrocities committed by the Pakistanis, many times with the assistance of the Biharis. As a result, the new generation of the Biharis could not get rid of the stigma associated with the old generation. In addition, the respondents mention that the Biharis’ lack of adequate education makes them ineligible for better employment. They are denied education in their mother tongue, Urdu. Their very poor economic conditions and camp life detach them from mainstream Bangladeshis. Furthermore, since the Biharis are marginalized in society, they struggle for their existence in a hostile environment. They do not have control over the media to refute any propaganda against them. A section of the media sometimes publishes or circulates false or incorrect information about the Biharis. The positive aspects of the Biharis are rarely shown in the media. The Biharis are not able to challenge the propaganda against them and those who spread the propaganda. Baten from the Sagor Para Camp, aged 40, says, “Capitalizing on our weak position in society, some Bengalis make fake stories about us and present it to the media. This is how they

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create a negative image of us. We don’t have the ability to challenge them. This is how they become the hero and make us the villain.” Many Biharis also suggest their own solutions toward integration with greater Bangladeshi society. It is evident from the interviews that the Bihari respondents in general want an end to discrimination and emphasize equal treatment and affirmative action in all walks of life, especially in education and employment. This is essential for bridging the gap between the Bengalis and Biharis. Socially, the Biharis want to be equal with the Bengalis in schools, colleges, mosques, madrasas (religious schools), and all other social institutions. Collective social isolation hinders a community or group from entry into the social institutions of a nation, such as schools, clubs, and teams (Caccioppo and Caccioppo 2012, 450). The Biharis are living in an “unaccepting” society and living with “social stigma,” which produces social isolation (Weiss 1973, 146). On the other hand, social networking provides support to individuals, such as information, advice, and exchange of favors (Weiss 1973, 150). The Biharis also suggest promoting intermarriage between the two communities, which will help tie them together, creating strong bonds. Such social relationships may hasten social integration. Understanding the reality, the respondents also demand rehabilitation with housing facilities in urban areas so that they can work. Proper rehabilitation will only end their camp life and give them effective citizenship. Most importantly, most Biharis call upon Bengalis to change their mindsets. They should not accuse and blame the new generation of Biharis for the actions of the older generations. They expect love and respect from Bengalis and want to be treated like brothers and sisters. They want the Bengalis to come forward to help them. They argue that it is the duty of the Bengalis to rescue their troubled Bihari brothers from drowning. A Bihari intellectual and a senior journalist complains, “The social stigma continues and as a result, the Urdu-speaking people face difficulties in integrating into mainstream society. It seems that the government is not concerned about us. We do not see any effective plans to properly rehabilitate the Bihari community.” The respondents further believe that the existing government’s policy of exclusion of the Biharis should be replaced by a policy of integration. The respondents think that the greater Bengali community should take initiatives so that the children of the Biharis and the Bengalis can go to the same schools and play together. Finally, the respondents are keen on educating their children in Urdu in public schools. This is what they think will

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restore their cultural identity. Zafar, a Geneva Camp dweller, aged 25, expresses his feelings about his language and culture with the following poem in Urdu: Zameen kya hai? Mera asman bhi ley lo, Mera gharoor, meri anban bhi ley lo. Agar hai jaan ki zaroorat, to jaan bhi ley lo, Mere ghamo ko ni choro, khushi bhi ley jao Magar khayal rahe, har ek shay meri ley lo, Zabaan mat chino … Meri zabaan meri tahzib ki amanat hai, Meri zabaan meri ajdad ki virasat hai … Meri zabaan meri qaumiat ki hai pehchan. (Translation in English) [What is my land? Take my sky as well, My pride, my reputation, my standing—take those too. If you require my life—then take it as well, Wring every drop of my pain. Remember though, take everything of mine, But do not seize my language … My language is the trust of my culture, My language is the inheritance of my forefathers … My language is the sign of my people.]

The Biharis emphasize the need for an end to their discrimination. They want equal treatment just like Bengalis, especially in education and employment. The Biharis should have equal access to all social institutions, such as schools, colleges, mosques, and madrasas. Social relationships, especially intermarriage between the Biharis and Bengalis, should be encouraged. The Bihari respondents suggested that the government of Bangladesh should help provide the Biharis with proper employment and housing for sustenance. They also expect Bengalis to change their mindsets regarding the Bihari community, treating Biharis like brothers and sisters. Each community should be in the right mindset to help each other and show mutual love and respect to each other. The Biharis should also be relocated to different urban areas of the country from the camps. Bengalis should be friendly with the Biharis so that Bihari and Bengali

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children can go to the same school and play together. In addition, the Biharis gaining access to proper education will automatically integrate them with mainstream Bangladeshis. The Biharis want to stop transferring their suffering to their children. They want an end to discrimination. They dream of overcoming camp life and want to see Bihari and Bengali children attending the same schools and playing together in the same parks. All of them want to get rid of the appalling conditions of camp life. Momena, aged 40, a housewife and a resident of the Geneva Camp, says: We want a decent life and to live like human beings. We want to be able to eat two meals. We want to wear decent clothes and send our children to school. We want to go abroad and make money. We also want respect. Why should our children bear the burdens of our older generation? When locals call us “Maura” we feel insulted. We realize that we are illiterate, we are unemployed, but whose fault is that? We want to get rid of these stigmas. Our children should grow up without fear.

The Bengalis’ Perceptions of the Biharis This section will deal with the composition of the Bengali respondents and their attitudes toward the Biharis. It will look at the Bengalis’ views regarding the repatriation of the Biharis, perspectives of the Bengalis regarding the challenges of Bihari integration, and finally Bengalis’ perceptions on how to ensure human rights and citizenship rights of the Biharis. Of the 25 Bengali respondents interviewed, 5 are researchers who conducted research on the Bihari issue and are deeply engaged with the Biharis in Bangladesh. Another five of the Bengali respondents consist of individuals in civil society organizations comprising various NGOs, journalists, professors, intellectuals, and are concerned about the Bihari issue. Among the 25 Bengali respondents, ordinary people, who have closely observed the situation of the Biharis as neighbors just outside the camps, make up five respondents. They have practical knowledge about the lifestyle, culture, history, and traditions of the Biharis and bear witness to the pain and resilience of the Biharis. Among the respondents, five are policymakers familiar with policy issues surrounding the Bihari question. In addition, politicians who are familiar with and concerned with the Bihari issue make up five of the Bengali respondents.

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Only 1 out of the 25 respondents identifies the Bihari issue as a social problem. The respondent argues that the Bihari issue is a social problem, because of ethnic differences. Since 99 percent of people in Bangladesh are ethnic Bengalis, the Bihari issue is apparent, because they constitute only 0.25 percent of the total population and speak in Urdu. He continues, “It’s like a black dot on a white paper.” Out of the 25 Bengali respondents, 19 respondents brand the Bihari problem as a clear-cut political problem. According to them, this problem is the product of the conflicting politics in South Asia. The Biharis are trapped between the conflicting histories and ideologies of the South Asian subcontinent. Out of the 25 Bengali respondents, 5 respondents consider the Bihari problem as a humanitarian problem. This group argues that the Biharis are not responsible for the present inhuman conditions inflicted on them. They are victims of the political dismemberment of Pakistan. They sided with their ideological state Pakistan in 1971, but Pakistan betrayed them, and the successor state Bangladesh did not accept them for their pro-­ Pakistani stance. In this context, they argue that it is not logical to describe the situation as only a social or political problem. Rather, the situation should be addressed as a humanitarian problem.

The Bengali Respondents’ Views Regarding the Biharis’ Repatriation Among the 25 Bengali respondents, 5 believe that the repatriation of the Biharis still waiting to return to Pakistan could not be accomplished, because of the inherent diplomatic weakness of the government of Bangladesh. They argue that the rapid rapprochements between Bangladesh and Pakistan during 1972–1975 and in the post-1975 Zia, Ershad, and Khaleda regimes shifted policy toward Pakistan and compelled the government of Bangladesh to settle the issue bilaterally. A bilateral settlement was believed to prevent the deterioration of bilateral relations between the two countries. The respondents further argue that the government of Bangladesh failed to internationalize the Bihari issue by not raising it in regional and international forums and, consequently, failed to put pressure on the government of Pakistan. A former chief of the Bangladesh Human Rights Commission suggests that Bangladesh was mostly ruled by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and they did not settle the issue bilaterally and did not raise the issue in international forums

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on the ground that it would affect the warm relations between the two countries. On the other hand, among the 25 Bengali respondents, 20 believe that the repatriation of the Biharis could not be accomplished because of Pakistan’s denial. They argue that politically the Biharis would join the local Muhajir’s (migrants) separatist movement and would further destabilize the internal political situation of Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan is also going through a serious economic crisis and cannot afford to rehabilitate the Biharis awaiting repatriation. Pakistan deliberately avoids the Bihari issue, because Bangladesh is the successor state of former East Pakistan and naturally the burden of the Bihari residents of East Pakistan rests with Bangladesh. The Biharis’ desire for repatriation to Pakistan does not obligate the Pakistani authority to repatriate them. Finally, Pakistan’s unwillingness is also rooted in the harsh reality that thousands of ethnic Bengalis migrated to Pakistan and are now living there illegally. This greatly suppressed the question of repatriation of the Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan. As Bangladesh is not ready to accept those Bengalis living in Pakistan, on similar grounds, Pakistan is also not prepared to accept the Biharis from Bangladesh. One Bengali civil society leader says, “Let’s not talk about Bihari repatriation. We have already over-­ flooded Pakistan with Bengalis. We are ahead of them.” Among the 25 respondents, 15 assume that the government of Bangladesh made enough efforts to repatriate the stranded Biharis, who still want repatriation to Pakistan. The respondents who assume that Bangladesh has done enough to push for the repatriation of the Biharis rely on steps undertaken by Bangladeshi authorities. For instance, Bangladesh raised this issue in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) meeting with foreign ministers. Bangladesh also brought the issue to the attention of the UN Secretary-General. In addition, the government of Bangladesh considers the Biharis as stranded Pakistanis and occasionally calls upon the government of Pakistan to take their citizens back home. While answering a question asked by a member of parliament on 27 June 2012, the then foreign minister of Bangladesh informed the House that the government of Bangladesh urged the Pakistani government to take all the stranded Pakistanis and that Bangladesh has been raising the issue in different forums but could not come to an amicable settlement due to a lack of interest shown by Pakistan.28

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Of the 25 Bengali respondents, 10 believe that Bangladesh never did enough to ensure the repatriation of stranded Pakistanis. Many of them argue that Bangladesh’s policy convergence with Pakistan in regional and international forums encourages the government of Bangladesh not to table the Bihari issue in bilateral discussions. Bangladesh adopted such a strategy to avoid diplomatic embarrassment. Other respondents argue that Bangladesh raised the Bihari repatriation issue in bilateral meetings with Pakistan only as a bargaining chip for other strategic interests. If Bangladesh was in fact serious about the Bihari issue, they contend that the government of Bangladesh would have taken the issue to the United Nations or the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In response to the question of how Bangladesh should ensure the repatriation of the remaining Biharis in Bangladesh, 14 out of the 25 Bengali respondents suggest that the government of Bangladesh should focus on a bilateral diplomatic settlement. They believe that through bilateral discussion, Bangladesh can slowly but steadily push forward the Bihari issue for settlement. They understand that being a regional neighbor and a Muslim country, Bangladesh should not embarrass Pakistan with this issue. Rather, through state-to-state negotiations, Bangladesh should persuade Pakistan and settle this diplomatically. Bangladesh succeeded substantially by pursuing such a policy in the past. Five respondents suggest that the government of Bangladesh should politicize the issue and take it to various regional and international forums to put pressure on the Pakistani government to settle the issue immediately. These respondents believe that through multi-lateral diplomacy, Bangladesh can obtain support from other countries on this issue and force Pakistan to resolve the Bihari problem. They argue that the government of Bangladesh could not settle the issue bilaterally with Pakistan in the last 42 years, because Bangladesh was clearly an underdog in bilateral diplomacy with Pakistan. Bangladesh, therefore, should abandon traditional bilateralism and adopt multilateral diplomacy to settle the long-­ standing Bihari issue. By contrast, six Bengali respondents believe that the government of Bangladesh should not take any measures at all for the repatriation of the Biharis. They argue that the Biharis have been residing in Bangladesh since 1947. They are qualified to be Bangladeshi citizens. They have never given up their Bangladeshi citizenship formally and the government of Bangladesh never revoked their citizenship. Their option to go back to Pakistan or their desire to go to Pakistan does not mean anything.

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Therefore, making any effort to repatriate the Biharis by the government of Bangladesh is immoral. One of the respondents, an eminent researcher on the Bihari issue and chief executive of the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) says: The government of Bangladesh’s effort to repatriate the Biharis to Pakistan is inconsistent with the decision of the High Court division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court which declares that the Biharis are citizens of Bangladesh (who were born after the birth of Bangladesh and who were minors in 1971). Since the government did not appeal against the High Court verdict, we can assume that the government of Bangladesh recognizes the Biharis as citizens of Bangladesh.

The Court verdict, indeed, obligates the government of Bangladesh not to take any measures to repatriate the Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan.

Challenges of the Biharis’ Integration in Bangladesh Out of the 25 Bengali respondents, 18 suggest that integrating the Biharis into Bangladeshi society is a great challenge for the government of Bangladesh. The challenge lies in how the Bengalis would accept the Biharis against the backdrop of their perceived continued allegiance to Pakistan. The most critical question for respondents is that if the Biharis could not be integrated with the Bengalis during 25 years of Pakistan’s existence before breaking into two separate states, then how can integration occur after years of mutual suspicion since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971? Economic integration and the rehabilitation of the Biharis pose greater challenges for the government of Bangladesh because there are already millions of Bengalis living in poverty.29 Cultural integration is even harder to achieve considering the Biharis’ desire to preserve their own identity and culture by isolating themselves from most Bengalis. Moreover, the Biharis’ Urdu language, literature, music, and heroes are different from Bengalis. This cultural heterogeneity further hinders their integration with Bengalis. One of my respondents, a retired senior civil servant, argues that the Biharis committed three mistakes that obstructed their integration into Bangladesh. First is the Urdu-speaking Biharis’ mass-scale migration to a Bengali-speaking country in the 1940s. Second,

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despite having opportunities, they did not move to West Pakistan which was identical to their culture. Finally, they were hostile to the host Bengalis during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. The issue of language remains a thorny one and is critical to integration. It sometimes evokes resentment toward the Biharis by the Bengalis. One respondent, for example, says about the Biharis and their Urdu language: “Their Urdu still sounds like the colonial language. Utilizing Urdu, the Biharis captured key bureaucratic and private sector positions in former East Pakistan and served their (ruling elite’s) vested interests.” Among the 25 Bengali respondents, 7, however, think that the integration of the Biharis is not a problem at all, because they have been living in Bangladesh since independence. They are familiar with the people and culture in Bangladesh. They do not need any further adaptation to Bangladeshi society. What they need is proper rehabilitation through employment and education. In other words, they need citizenship rights or equal rights like their Bengali counterparts as citizens of Bangladesh. Equal rights will end all sorts of discrimination against them in society and gradually integrate the Biharis into mainstream society. A top-ranking policymaker in the government of Bangladesh comments: “The Biharis should be recognized as citizens of the country. They do not need any special empowerment. Their problems should be addressed like any other poor Bengali. They should be protected under the regular poverty alleviation program of the government. Gradually and automatically, they will be integrated with the mainstream. Any preferential treatment toward them will not integrate them, it will rather separate and stigmatize them.” To address the Biharis’ integration problem,16 respondents support their social integration. In their view, social integration, such as through intermarriage between the Biharis and the Bengalis, will cement the cultural differences between the two communities. A university professor who has a long association with the Biharis, says, “Social relations such as marriage between the Bengali and Bihari community and other social interaction in the workplace, educational institutions, clubs and religious institutions like mosques can integrate the Biharis with the Bengalis faster than anything else.” The respondents suggest that through social integration the Biharis would be allowed to build up their careers like any other citizen in Bangladeshi society. To build a healthy and balanced society, each community should interact with the other with mutual respect. They suggest that in a multicultural society, the Biharis should be able to enjoy

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equal rights and opportunities to practice their own language, literature, history, and culture. This will help achieve harmony in diversity. Among the 25 Bengali respondents, 8 argue that the Biharis should be transferred from their existing camps to different parts of the country, which will give them more chances of interacting with Bengalis and will help integrate them easily. The respondents further maintain that keeping the Biharis alienated from the mainstream and treating them like aliens will hinder the integration process. Integration means bridging the gaps between the two communities, not exacerbating them. Since the Biharis do not own any land, including agricultural land to work on, they should be relocated to different cities and towns so that they can work and maintain their livelihood. Some respondents suggest that the government of Bangladesh should explore the possibility of distributing land among the Biharis at a subsidized rate for their resettlement. A Bengali businessman and a neighbor to the Geneva Camp, suggests: The government has many projects, such as Guchcchogram (Cluster village), for the rehabilitation of poor people. The government should find some Khas land30 in different cities and towns and should allocate some land to the Biharis living in the camps. The Bihari settlers should be allowed to build small houses like the Guchcchogram project led by the government. In order to build houses on Khas land, commercial banks or other microfinance agencies should come forward to give them soft loans. The Bihari borrowers can return those loans from their earnings slowly on a long-­ term basis.

Some respondents also express concerns about the implications of the failure to resettle the Biharis in the camps. A neighbor to the Bihari community, feels that the Biharis should be relocated from Dhaka to different urban and suburban areas. He feels that potential conflict and clashes with the Bengalis may be ignited by the most trivial reasons. For example, in a place like Geneva Camp, where approximately 30,000 Biharis live together, the slightest misunderstanding or clash of competing interests with ethnic Bengalis can easily ignite ethnic and communal violence. The possibility of such an unexpected incident cannot be ruled out, because many Bengalis do not trust the Biharis and have not yet forgotten the past activities of the Biharis against them. He categorically says, Taderke Amader Gaan Gaite Hobe, Onnothai, Mukh may Seikh Farid, Bogol may iit, which translates

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into English as “The Biharis will have to sing our songs, otherwise they will talk like saints and act like devils.” Out of the 25 Bengali respondents, only 1 respondent believes that the Biharis need nothing. The respondent does not see the value of affirmative action by the government of Bangladesh and calls for equal rights and opportunities for the Biharis as citizens of Bangladesh. This implies that if they enjoy citizenship rights properly, they will be integrated by utilizing the rights associated with citizenship. An additional secretary of the government of Bangladesh, says: We do not need to give anything to the Biharis, but citizenship rights. They can be rehabilitated and integrated with the mainstream by using their citizenship status. Treat them like Bengalis, they should not be discriminated against by the state. They will find their own place. If you want to do more than that it will backfire on them. Many people will come forward and open their old records. It will destroy Bengalis’ current sympathy toward Biharis.

Among the 25 Bengali respondents, 19 believe that the government of Bangladesh can afford to rehabilitate the Biharis and facilitate their economic integration. Many of the respondents suggest that if the government decides to undertake special projects for the rehabilitation and integration of the Biharis, the government may seek foreign aid or loans and many donors might be interested in funding such projects. Some respondents are of the view that the government can include the rehabilitation and integration of the Biharis in its regular national poverty alleviation programs; this could be accomplished in a phase-by-phase process. By contrast, 6 respondents believe that integrating the Biharis in Bangladesh, which is a very densely populated country with 1329 people per square kilometer, is a bad idea (Worldometer n.d.). As many Bangladeshis are living under the poverty line, these respondents argue that the idea of settlement of the Biharis is simply impossible. For these respondents, the priority of the government of Bangladesh should be its own population, not the Biharis whom they consider Pakistani citizens. They believe that it is the responsibility of the Pakistani government to take care of its nationals. A political leader, says: Send these collaborators to Pakistan. I do not have any sympathy for them. They slaughtered our people in 1971. They have no right to stay in Bangladesh. They are agents of Pakistan. As a nation, our main problem is

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that we are very generous. We easily forget history and forgive our killers and we do not take any lessons from history. Do you think they believe in Bangladesh? They will never accept Bangladesh in their hearts. Their love for Bangladesh is like “crocodile tears.” If you go to the Geneva Camp, you will still see the Pakistani flag. Accepting them in Bangladesh will be another careless mistake. They believe in the old slogans “We shall fight and win Pakistan” and “Our beloved Pakistan.”

Among the 25 Bengali respondents, 24 believe that bilateral and multilateral donors (development partners) may help rehabilitate the Biharis. The main task of the government of Bangladesh is to request and present credible proposals to the development partners of Bangladesh that are willing to rehabilitate the Biharis. Respondents suggest that probable donors that the government of Bangladesh may engage with include some of the major development partners of Bangladesh, such as the US, Japan, the UK, Canada, and Scandinavian countries. In addition to bilateral development partners, respondents suggest that the government of Bangladesh should approach international and multilateral development partners, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JAICA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Union (EU), Islamic Development Bank (IDB), and Rabitai-­ Alam-­Al Islami (Rabita). Only one respondent believes that neither the government of Bangladesh nor NGOs should interfere in the rehabilitation of the Biharis. Nizam, an anthropologist, believes that the Biharis are very hardworking and technically very skilled people and all that is needed is to grant them full citizenship with equal rights and opportunities as other Bangladeshi citizens. Through access to all citizenship rights, the Biharis can fend for themselves in all areas of life, because they could create self-employment and rehabilitate themselves. Any special treatment for the Biharis will create more hurdles in the way of their integration. One of the respondents, warned of the potential risks of affirmative action for the Biharis, “Any favor or special treatment to the Biharis will provoke aggrieved Bengalis to politicize the issue and highlight their questionable role in the Liberation War of Bangladesh. Such politicization will not help them, it will further erode their credibility.”

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With regards to the integration of the Biharis, 11 out of 25 respondents believe that both the government of Bangladesh and NGOs should play a role. As suggested by these respondents, this may include providing the Biharis with minimum basic facilities, such as soft loans for business, low-­ cost housing, and so on. The government of Bangladesh and NGOs can do this either through collaboration or separately. Through this initial help, the Biharis can stand on their own feet and can gradually become integrated with mainstream Bangladeshi society. Other respondents, however, oppose this approach. Of the 25 respondents, 14 believe that the government of Bangladesh or NGOs should not undertake any rehabilitation programs for the Biharis. Rather, they should be awarded citizenship rights so that they can enjoy equal rights and obligations as other citizens, and this will automatically integrate them. Of the 25 Bengali respondents, 6 believe the Biharis are an underprivileged community that requires constitutional protection. They believe that such a constitutional guarantee will help them improve their situation. As citizens of Bangladesh, they deserve such constitutional protection under Article 28(4) of the Bangladeshi Constitution.31 In practice, however, the Biharis are denied such constitutional protection, because they are not generally valued as Bangladeshi citizens. The Bangladeshi Human Rights Commission Chairperson states that “There is no need for constitutional protection for the Biharis. They are already protected by article 28(4) of the Bangladeshi Constitution.” Of the 25 Respondents, 19 oppose the idea of special protection. Some of the respondents believe that such special constitutional protection will insult the millions of Bengali martyrs who fought against the Pakistani Army and their collaborators including the Biharis in 1971. Others believe that such constitutional protection will set a bad precedence and open Pandora’s box for other ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities who might be interested to avail of such opportunities. In their view, equal treatment for the Biharis and extending citizenship rights to them is the best solution. Should the Biharis be given equal opportunities in education and employment? Of the 25 respondents, 24 answered this question in the affirmative. They believed that the Biharis as citizens of Bangladesh should be trained and employed properly to effectively participate in nation-­ building activities. But only one respondent answered the question in the negative because the Biharis in his view are stranded Pakistanis who should go back to Pakistan. He believes that Bangladesh does not have any

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obligations toward educating the Biharis and securing the employment of foreign nationals. Among the 25 respondents, 7 answered in the affirmative when asked whether the Biharis should be given quotas in the field of education and employment. They believe that quotas could help the Biharis catch up and reduce the gap in educational attainment and employment, which in turn will facilitate their integration into Bangladeshi society. The quotas, this group of respondents maintains, should be temporary and introduced to help the Biharis consolidate their position in society. By contrast, 18 respondents responded negatively to the same question. This group of respondents believes that affirmative action programs for the Biharis will bring back to the limelight their role in 1971 in subverting Bangladesh’s independence and will again disgrace them and ruin the rehabilitation process. With regards to the property of the Biharis seized after Bangladeshi independence, 20 out of the 25 Bengali respondents believe that the confiscated properties should be returned to the actual Bihari owners through a legal process. While acknowledging the difficulties inherent in such a process, they believe that making this happen will make the Biharis more confident and devoted to the country. Only 5 out of 25 Bengali respondents were, however, opposed to the idea of returning to the Biharis their property confiscated after the Liberation War of Bangladesh. This group of respondents believes that during the last 42 years, a group of beneficiaries has emerged and has the properties under their possession. Any attempts to evict them or take the properties away from them will not be easy and might even further complicate the situation and cause new enmity between the old and new owners. Moreover, vested interest groups may politicize the issue and bring the old seeds of the conflict to the surface, which is very dangerous.

Citizenship Rights and Human Rights of the Biharis The ability to access citizenship rights or the “right to have rights” is the best way to end the current “degraded citizenship” of the Biharis in Bangladesh. In response to the question on how to ensure the human rights of the Biharis in Bangladesh, 22 respondents say that the human rights of the Biharis, such as through education, healthcare, and employment, can be realized only when they are guaranteed equal rights through the restoration and implementation of their citizenship rights. Under the

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protection of citizenship rights, the Biharis will have access to other rights equally with the Bengalis. Only three respondents, however, believe that the human rights of the Biharis can be protected by a quota system that allocates a certain number of places for them in areas such as education and employment. They believe that this is necessary because the Biharis in the camps are denied the most basic human rights, especially the right to education, employment, and healthcare. Therefore, a quota system that gives priority to underprivileged sections of society would go a long way in uplifting the social and economic conditions of the Biharis in Bangladesh. The Bengali respondents were asked which schools Bihari children should attend, either Bengali or Urdu schools. Among the 25 Bengali respondents, 24 suggest that Bihari children should attend Bengali-­ medium schools because Bengali is the national language of the country and the medium of instruction in mainstream schools and colleges. Attending Bengali schools will enable Bihari children to overcome language barriers to access employment, higher education, trade, and business opportunities. If Bihari children do not learn proper Bengali, they will have to accept the same fate as their ancestors in Bangladeshi society, where the medium of communication is primarily Bangla. The same respondents also suggest that Bihari children should learn Urdu as a second language so that they can learn their mother tongue. A retired top civil servant in Bangladesh states: In the school curriculum, Urdu should be incorporated as an additional language for the Biharis who want to learn it. In West Bengal (India), if the Bengalis can learn Urdu, then what’s wrong with it in Bangladesh? We should accept diversity in language. Urdu should be accepted as their language. This will be an asset, not a liability. The Urdu-speaking Biharis can be used as conduits of peace between Bangladesh-India and Bangladesh-­ Pakistan relations.

Only 1 out of 25 Bengali respondents approve of the idea of Urdu-­ medium schools for Bihari children. The respondent believes that to preserve the language, literature, and culture of the Biharis, it is imperative that their children attend Urdu-medium schools and learn their mother tongue as the primary language. In addition, learning and nurturing their mother tongue is a human right. Of the 25 Bengali respondents, 6 believe that the government and NGOs should undertake special programs for healthcare, education, and employment of the Biharis to ensure their

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meaningful citizenship. Such programs have the potential of deepening the Biharis’ sense of attachment to Bangladesh. By contrast, 19 Bengali respondents do not support the idea of undertaking any special projects for the Biharis to ensure their effective citizenship. These respondents believe that the government should extend equal rights to the Biharis just as it does to other groups of citizens in Bangladesh. This will automatically confer upon the Biharis the rights and obligations of citizenship, which in turn will ultimately transform them into effective citizens of the country. The Bengali respondents were asked whether some socialization is required for the Biharis to attain meaningful Bangladeshi citizenship. Among the 25 respondents, 10 answered in the affirmative. They suggest that certain socialization programs should be undertaken to socialize and educate the Biharis on the history, culture, traditions, laws, and society of Bangladesh. They further suggest that Urdu language broadcasting and telecasting programs, which address some socio-economic and cultural issues in Bangladesh, should be launched or introduced so that the Biharis can directly participate in the life of the country as equal citizens. These respondents emphasize the need to highlight the significance of special national commemorative days—Independence Day, Martyrs Day, and Victory Day—in the Urdu language and literature. In addition, they propose that Bangladeshi radio and television should include programs on Bihari culture, music, and literature. These programs and processes will facilitate the integration of the Biharis into mainstream Bangladeshi society and enrich the cultural diversity of Bangladesh. This in turn will make their citizenship meaningful. A senior researcher believes that “to qualify for Bangladeshi citizenship, the Biharis should take the citizenship oath.” Of the 25 respondents, 15 however believe that a socialization process for the Biharis is unnecessary because any ceremonial or formal socialization will only further alienate the Biharis from the rest of the population. Spontaneous or informal socialization by the Biharis through their observations, interactions, and practices will make their citizenship meaningful. Rejecting the idea of socialization, the chief executive of the RAMMRU believes that there should be no yardstick for measuring the patriotism of the Biharis. The Bengali respondents were also asked whether the Biharis pose any threat to the security of Bangladesh. Among the 25 respondents, only 3 believe that the Biharis may pose a threat to the security of Bangladesh, possibly causing ethnic conflict in Bangladesh. One of the respondents believes that although the Biharis live in Bangladesh, their souls exist in

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Pakistan. Pakistan is their dreamland. He also mentions, “Under the influence and dictation of the Pakistani Intelligence Agency (ISI), they try to destabilize Bangladesh.” A retired flight sergeant who owns a pharmacy in the Geneva Camp says: The Biharis are very undisciplined people. Many of them are addicted to alcohol, women, drugs, illegal arms, extortion, and visiting shrines and celebrations. Criminals from within and outside Bangladesh, i.e., India and Pakistan, take shelter in the camps. Child marriage and polygamy are common matters in the camp. Ten to twelve-year-old girls are becoming mothers. There is no birth control. There is often fighting in the camps. The government of Bangladesh should transfer the Biharis to different places. Otherwise, the government will have to face a security threat like the Chittagong Hill Tracts. They can organize themselves and threaten the security of the capital city—Dhaka.32

In contrast to those Bengali respondents who believe that the Biharis pose a security threat to Bangladesh, 22 respondents think that the Biharis are not a security threat, because they only represent 0.25 percent of the entire Bangladeshi population of over 163 million people. Instead, they believe that the Biharis and the majority of Bengalis share a common religious identity, namely Islam, which will further consolidate the security of the nation.

Conclusion From my field-level research, it reveals that most of the Bihari respondents were born in Bangladesh and are, therefore, citizens by birth. There are some Biharis who were born before the birth of Bangladesh and whose Bangladeshi citizenship was not revoked by the government, they are also citizens of Bangladesh. However, I find that Bihari respondents do not enjoy the full gamut of citizenship rights that citizens ordinarily enjoy. They are discriminated against and marginalized and live on the fringes of Bangladeshi society. They have very low levels of educational attainment, limited access to formal employment, and live in abject poverty. The government of Bangladesh has failed in its obligation to guarantee equal citizenship to all Bangladeshi ethnic groups. Although equality demands no discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, language, and ethnicity, the Bangladeshi Biharis are discriminated

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based on their language and ethnicity. In this context, I argue that the Biharis in Bangladesh do not have access to many important citizenship rights, which can make their citizenship meaningful. The prospects for the integration of the Biharis into Bangladeshi society and guaranteeing their citizenship are promising. Most of the Bengali respondents interviewed for this study believe that the Biharis are Bangladeshi citizens and can be integrated into mainstream Bangladeshi society by guaranteeing their access to all important citizenship rights, making their citizenship meaningful. While there are competing views amongst the respondents as to how this may be realized in practice, most want to see a visible government policy to rehabilitate the Biharis by undertaking special projects with the help of bilateral and multilateral donors. Such affirmative action by the government will deepen the Biharis’ sense of belonging in Bangladesh, help eliminate discrimination against them, and encourage them to claim their rights as citizens and perform the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.

Notes 1. The Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951, Article 6(1) stipulates: “The Federal Government may, upon his obtaining a certificate of domicile under this Act, register as a citizen of Pakistan by migration any person who after the commencement of this Act and before the first day of January, 1952, has migrated to the territories now included in Pakistan from any territory in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent outside those territories, with the intention of residing permanently in those territories; Provided that the Federal Government may, by general or special order, except any person or class persons from obtaining a certificate of domicile required under this sub-­ section” (The Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951). 2. After the independence, Urdu became the language of the insignificant minority in Bangladesh. Urdu sections in schools were closed (Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh). 3. Unemployment rate in Bangladesh was 5 percent and the underemployment rate was 40 percent by 2012 (Bangladesh Unemployment Rate n.d.). 4. This information has been provided by the housewives during their interviews with me. 5. This information has been provided by some female Bihari respondents in all three camps. 6. Service holders mean employed in different private offices like security guards, drivers, or any other office employee, and so on.

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7. Technicians are either employed by some authority or self-employed in technical works like fixing the electrical lines, repairing fridges, television, fan, or automobile and types of machinery. 8. Expenditure for approximately 1 million public employees in Bangladesh is 2.6 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Mukherjee et al. 2001). 9. Family income means the total income of the family. In some cases, the earning member of the family is only one person and in some other cases, other members are also contributing something to the family income. The respondents did not disclose who earns what amount of money. 10. Some respondents have used the word bhumi and some have used the word desh. Bhumi means “land” and desh means “country.” Both words are used interchangeably to refer to “country” or “homeland” in Bangladesh. 11. Mr. M. A. Jinnah, the principal leader of the Pakistan Movement, appealed to the Muslims of British India to unite under the demand of Pakistan. He used the slogan of Muslim nationalism as an ideology to achieve unity and solidarity among the divided Indian Muslims (Jalal 2008, 17). 12. This is the common feeling of the old-generation Biharis. 13. Data provided by the government of Bangladesh is that about 1 million Biharis resided in Bangladesh in 1971. Of them, half a million wanted repatriation to Pakistan and the remaining half a million wanted to live in Bangladesh and were granted citizenship. On the other hand, Dr. Kamal Hossain, a former minister for foreign affairs and petroleum and minerals mentioned that the total number of non-Bengalis in Bangladesh was about half a million in 1971, and based on the ICRC report he wrote that 394,000 opted for Pakistan and about 150,00 wanted to stay in Bangladesh (Government of Bangladesh 1998; Hossain 2013, 237). 14. Razakar is an Urdu word that literally means volunteer. Razakar Bahini is a paramilitary force that was formed by the Pakistan Army during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. 15. By unofficial bars they mean that officially although they are entitled all important rights protected by law, practically they are denied many rights with the knowledge of the government and the government is not interested to ensure their rights. 16. Although many Bangladeshis are living under the poverty line, the Bihari situation is worse. The situation of Biharis is not comparable with the local Bengalis, because until 2008 the Biharis are not considered as free citizens. Their properties were confiscated, and their rights were ceased. They are still intensely discriminated. On the contrary, poor Bengalis are free citizens and they belong to the mainstream Bengalis. 17. Tin shed kacha houses are built with mud floors and tin roofs. Their walls are made of bamboo mats. These are very poor-quality houses.

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18. East Bengal was the Muslim-majority area of the undivided Bengal Province of British-India and West Bengal was the Hindu-majority area of the Undivided Bengal Province. East Bengal became a province of Pakistan after the partition of India in 1947 and later in 1956, East Bengal was renamed as East Pakistan. West Bengal became a province of India after the Partition of India. 19. Muhajir is a term used to mean those companions of Prophet Muhammad who migrated from Mecca to Medina for the great cause of Islam. For this reason, the term Muhajir carries significant respect and dignity among Muslims in the world. 20. Apart from the Bihari collaborators, some of the Bengalis who were called collaborators of the Pakistan army and allegedly joined the civil and paramilitary forces including Peace committee, Razakar, AL-Badr, AL-Shams and AL Mujahid Bahini were also targeted, assaulted, abducted, and killed by the freedom fighters just after the independence of Bangladesh (Ahmed 1983, 51). 21. Women’s family members include mother, sister, and sister-in-law, daughter, and daughter-in-law. 22. Based on my interviews with the Bihari respondents. 23. The Biharis are not refugees under the Convention of 1951. According to the Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, “Owing to well-­ founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” According to this definition, the Biharis are not refugees, because they have not fled but the territory of their residence has seceded from the mother country and became a separate sovereign and independent state (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951). 24. Based on my interviews with the respondents. 25. Although the Biharis citizenship status was settled in 2008 by the High Court verdict in the Sadakat Khan, the government of Bangladesh still call them stranded Pakistanis. Dr. Dipu Moni, former foreign minister of Bangladesh in response to a question of a Member of the Parliament said in the Parliament: Bangladesh government is determined to settle the issue of the stranded Pakistanis diplomatically (Amadershomoy.com [Bangladesh] 2012). 26. Most respondents make this remark about the lack of “political will” of the government of Bangladesh.

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27. Until January 2009, the number of NGOs registered with NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) reached at 2484 (BanglaPedia National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh n.d.). 28. Former foreign minister of Bangladesh, Dipu Moni’s response to a question asked by Mr. Habibur Rahman Mollah MP in the Jatyo Sangsad (Parliament) on 27 June 2012 (Amadershomoy.com [Bangladesh] 2012). 29. The World Bank uses US$ 1.90 purchasing power a day for measuring the extreme poverty in Bangladesh and in 2010 the proportion of the extreme poor in Bangladesh was 18.5 percent (Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016). 30. Khas land means government-owned fallow land, where nobody has property rights. It is a land that is deemed to be owned by the government and available for allocation according to government priorities [(S. 2(15) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act 1950 (E. B. Act XXII of 1951)]. 31. Article 28(4) of the Constitution states, “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making special provision in favor of women or children or for the advancement of any backward section of citizens” (The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh n.d.). 32. Chittagong Hill Tracts is the Hilly District of Bangladesh where armed insurgency continued for 25 years.

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Heffernan, John W. 2002. Being Recognized as Citizens: A Human Security Dilemma in South Asia and South-east Asia. Commission on Human security. Hossain, Kamal. 2013. Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Huque, Ahmad Shafiqul. 1990. Stranded Pakistanis and Burmese Muslims in Bangladesh: Historical and Contemporary Dimensions. Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. Journal 11 (2): 273–294. Hussain, Ijaj. 2009a. The Dilemma of National Integration in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects. ISSRA Papers 1: 43–60. Online. http://111.68.99.125/ website-­merge/issra-­papers/doc/ISSRA-­Papers-­2009.pdf. Hussain, Khalid. 2009b. Khalid Hussain’s Voice. Online. http://www.un.org/ en/durbanreview2009/pdf/Khallid%20Hussain.pdf. Ilias, Ahmed. 2003. Biharis: The Indian Emigres in Bangladesh: An Objective Analysis. Syedpur: Shamsul Haq Foundation. Jahan, Rounaq. 1972. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New  York: Columbia University Press. Jalal, Ayesha. 2008. The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kalsoom. 2010. The 1971 Chronicles: The State of the Stateless Biharis. March 3. Online. https://changinguppakistan.wordpress.com/2010/03/03/ the-­1971-­chronicles-­the-­state-­of-­the-­stateless-­biharis/. Kelley, Ninetee. 2010. Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Conceding Citizenship in Bangladesh. University of Toronto Law Journal 60 (2): 349–371. Khan, Borhan Uddin, and Mahbubur Rahman. 2011. Human and Minority Rights in Bangladesh. In Minority Rights in South Asia, ed. Rainer Hofmann and Ugo Caruso, 86–106. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Maniruzzaman, Talukder. 1982. Group Interests and Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh. New Delhi: South Asia Publishers. Mukherjee, Ranjana, et  al. 2001. Bangladesh: The Experience and Perceptions of Public Officials. World Bank Technical Paper No. 507. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Online. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/467761468767987035/pdf/multi0page.pdf. Nahar, Sultana. 2000. Biharis in Bangladesh: Present Status, Legal Impediments and Solutions. In On the Margin: Refugee, Migrants and Minorities, ed. Chowdhury R.  Abrar, 173–183. Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movement Research Unit. Paulsen, Eric. 2006. The Citizenship Status of the Urdu-Speakers/Biharis in Bangladesh. Refugee Survey Quarterly 25 (3): 54–69. Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016 Taking on Inequality. 2016. World Bank Group. Online. https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/10587/poverty-­and-­ shared-­prosperity-­2016-­taking-­on-­inequality-­world-­bank.pdf.

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Pye, Lucian W. 1966. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Refugees International. 2004. Stateless Biharis in Bangladesh: A Humanitarian Nightmare. December 13. Online. https://www.refworld.org/docid/ 47a6eeacd.html. Robinson, V. 1998. Defining and Measuring Successful Refugee Integration. In: Proceedings of ECRE International Conference on Integration and Refugees in Europe, Antwerp. Brussels: ECRE. Roser, Max, and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina. 2017. Global Extreme Poverty. Online. https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-­poverty/. Sayeed, K.B. 1966. Islam and National Integration in Pakistan. In South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald Eugene Smith, 398–413. Princeton: Princeton University Pres. Sen, Sumit. 1999. Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return: The Bihari Refugees of South Asia—Part 1. International Journal of Refugee Law 11 (4): 625–645. Shelley, Mizanur Rahman. 1986. Political Development and Nation Building in Bangladesh. In Nation Building in Bangladesh: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. M. Abdul Hafiz and M.A. Rob Khan, 188–196. Dhaka: BIISS. Sholder, Hannah. 2011. Housing, and Land Rights: The Camp-Dwelling Urdu-­ Speaking Community in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU). Sisson, Richard, and Leo E. Rose. 1990. War and Secession Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. Berkeley: University of California Press. Stateless in Bangladesh & Pakistan: Generations of Oppressed. 2006. Online. https://www.scribd.com/document/80276737/StatelessinBangladesh-­Gene rationsofOppressedV1-­1. The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. n.d. The Pakistan Citizenship Act. 1951. (Act No. I1 of 1951). Online: Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951. http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b4ffa.pdf. The State Acquisition and Tenancy Act. 1950. (E. B. Act XXII of 1951)]. Online. http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-­details-­241.html. The State of The World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action. 2000. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Urdu School for the Linguistic Minority Urged. 2011. The New Nation (Bangladesh), May 19. Weiner, Myron. 1965. Political Integration and Political Development. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 358 (1): 52–64. Weiss, Robert S. 1973. The Experience of Emotional and Social Isolation. Cambridge: The MIT Press. World Data Atlas. n.d. Online. https://knoema.com/atlas/Bangladesh/topics/ Education/Literacy/Adult-­literacy-­rate.

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World Dictionary of Minorities. Biharis in Bangladesh. n.d. Online. http://www. faqs.org/minorities/South-­Asia/Biharis-­of-­Bangladesh.html. Worldometer. n.d. Online. https://www.worldometers.info/world-­population/ bangladesh-­population/. Wriggins, Howard. 1966. National Integration. In Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, ed. Myron Weiner, 181–191. New York: Basic Books.

CHAPTER 5

The Biharis’ Access to Citizenship Rights: Theory, Law, and Realities

Introduction On the basis of my fieldwork, I argue in this chapter that the Biharis’ access to citizenship rights is inconsistent with citizenship theory (i.e., right to have rights), citizenship laws in Bangladesh, and the Constitution of Bangladesh, that is, fundamental principles and fundamental rights. The Biharis, while legally Bangladeshi citizens, are in practice unable to access some important citizenship rights. Most Biharis in Bangladesh have been recognized as legally entitled to citizenship in Bangladesh. However, there are a few important rights that are associated with citizenship, and it is the ability to access these rights in practice that makes citizenship meaningful. My field research shows that many Biharis in Bangladesh are unable to access these rights. Today, citizenship is not limited to only legal rights. Both legal and non-legal scholars have the shared view that citizenship can best be understood not only through the legal lens but also through interdisciplinary lenses. In other words, a normative or substantive way of understanding citizenship is taken into consideration by both legal and non-legal scholars. Prominent non-legal scholars, such as T. H. Marshall, Hannah Arendt, Joseph H. Carens, and Rainer Baubock recognize legal rights with civil, political, and social rights (Marshall 1964, 84; Arendt 1958, 296; Carens 2000, 161; Baubock 1994, 23). Similarly, important legal scholars, that is, Peter H.  Schuck, Hernandez-Truyol, Jo Shaw, and Linda Bosniak have © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 Z. Haider, Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46129-3_5

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seen citizenship not only through a legal lens but also in a normative way (Schuck, 2000, 207–208; Hernandez-Truyol, 2005, 1023; Shaw, 1998, 295–296; Bosniak, 2000, 456–488). Legal citizenship shows only the legal aspects of citizenship. In their view, a formal legal concept of citizenship is not enough to understand the meaning of citizenship. They suggest an interdisciplinary approach to citizenship. In their view, an interdisciplinary approach is important to see the larger picture of citizenship (Schuck, 2000, 207–208; Hernandez-Truyol, 2005, 1023; Shaw, 1998, 295–296; Bosniak, 2000, 456–488). Citizens enjoy all rights and obligations in full equality and without discrimination (Edward and Ferstman 2010, 5). Citizenship not only allows an individual to receive the protections of the state but also protections from the state (Edward and Ferstman 2010, 5). Citizenship rights include the unrestricted right to enter and reside permanently in a territory and return to that territory from abroad. These rights also include the right to receive protection from the state within and outside state territory, including access to consular assistance and diplomatic protection. Furthermore, they cover different political rights, including full membership in the state and accompanying rights to economic, social, and cultural protection. In certain places, some people live with unequal status, where the authorities of those countries discriminate against individuals or groups of people based on ethnicity, race, and religion and regulate their lives (Dwyer 2003, 130–131). In some countries where illegal immigration is prevalent, states sometimes accept illegal immigrants socially instead of deporting or excluding them physically and forcing them to work “under imposed conditions or protracted vulnerability” (Genova 2002, 429). The relationship between people of non-status and their access to rights, services, and responsibilities remains uncertain (Nyers 2008, 165). Individuals or groups without citizenship are subject to the abuse of rights and remain outside legal protection. Regarding individuals without citizenship rights, Arendt argues that “their plight is not that they are not equal before the law but that no law exists for them” (Arendt 1958, 295–296). Without citizenship rights, an individual becomes a stateless person, who is “destitute of nationality intentionally or unintentionally, knowingly or unknowingly” (Seckler-Hudson 1934, 12). People who have lost their original nationality without acquiring another are called stateless or without a country (Seckler-Hudson 1934, 13). In international law, a stateless person means “a person who is not considered a national by any state

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under the operation of its law” (Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954). Statelessness matters because a stateless person does not have the right to access the rights attached to citizenship. Such persons left outside state protections, as Hannah Arendt points out, are subject to exploitation, deprivation, and marginalization in all forms (Arendt 1958, 296). Citizenship makes a qualitative difference. An individual’s personhood is determined by citizenship, it provides rights and responsibilities and gives individuals a sense of confidence or belief that he or she can act (Mahmud 2002, 31). It gives respect and dignity along with rights. It distributes membership to individuals with the accompanying rights and responsibilities in each society, where duties are a “condition for rights” (Kabeer 2008, 17). After all, citizenship builds the ability or capacity of an individual. In other words, it is a belief in one’s right to have rights. In short, citizenship is key to a host of other rights, including education, healthcare, employment, liberty, and equality before the law (Goris et al. 2009, 4). Rights-based citizenship also recognizes citizen participation and engagement in the “identification and articulation of rights,” not as mere rights holders. A rights-based approach includes citizens’ participation in governance, equality, a sense of identity, and a sense of the belief that one can act as a citizen (Mahmud 2002, 31), while citizenship based on racial and ethnic bonds often leads to exclusion of minority groups instead of civic norms (Blitz and Lynch 2011, 7). In Bangladesh, the ethnic Bihari citizens are excluded from many citizenship rights and they do not have the ability to access some important rights attached with citizenship that are essential for making their citizenship meaningful.1 Baubock argues that substantial citizenship is membership of a polity instead of a society and the membership of a polity is defined by rights and obligations of individuals (Baubock 1994, 23). For Baubock, the absence of substantial citizenship means either the polity is not based on equal rights, or a class of people is without any rights (Baubock 1994, 27). Since Biharis never lost their citizenship formally, they always held Bangladeshi citizenship. However, they have been treated like stateless people in Bangladesh and excluded from most important rights until 2008, when the highest court of Bangladesh declared them citizens (Md. Sadaqat Khan [Fakku] and Others vs. Chief Election Commissioner 2008). However, the government still fails to implement some of their important rights attached with citizenship. As a consequence, they still do not have access to many important rights.

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The Constitution of Bangladesh pledges to uphold some universal human rights, such as the right to life, liberty, equality, and non-­ discrimination, and the fundamental principles of state policy stress the need for the state to ensure basic needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, education, employment, and health for all its citizens (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). The reality, however, is different from these constitutional provisions. The World Bank uses US$ 1.90 purchasing power a day for measuring the extreme poverty in Bangladesh and in 2010 the proportion of the extreme poor in Bangladesh was 18.5 percent (Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016). The proportion of the urban population living in extreme poverty was 7.7 percent in 2010 (Bangladesh Continues to Reduce Poverty but at Slower Pace 2017). Although there are no national statistics on the poverty rate of the Bihari population, my interviews with 75 Biharis show that all of them are under the extreme poverty line (Chap. 4, Table 4.7). Naila Kabeer points out that “the state not only fails to protect the rights and interests of citizens, it actively takes part in their violation” (Kabeer 2003a, 1–2). Poor and marginalized do not have independent voices and agency in governance (Kabeer 2003a, 3). While citizen participation in governance is globally recognized as an expression of citizen rights (Mahmud 2004, 11), access to resources or rights is determined in Bangladesh by “position within an unequal social order” (Kabeer and Kabir 2009, 3). Like many other countries, the Constitution of Bangladesh enshrines the rights of citizens, but the reluctance of the state to ensure the “basic security of life and livelihood” of its poor citizens and its tilt toward powerful elites demonstrates state discrimination toward powerless people (Kabeer and Kabir 2009, 7). Legally the Constitution of Bangladesh protects the equal rights of all citizens. In practice, however, in the name of national security, the Constitution allows the government to withhold or suspend certain rights for certain groups of people, including ethnic or religious minorities and creates inequalities within the framework of formal citizenship. These inequalities exist because of the existence of various laws which conflict with constitutional rights, particularly those related to national security (Dunn et  al. 2000). In some cases, some laws are just not enforced to secure the rights of all citizens. This indicates the reluctance of the state or failure of state mechanisms to implement the rights of all citizens (Kabeer 2003b). At the formal level, rights exist in Bangladesh. The reality for its citizens is “one of the violations as much as the observance of rights”

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(Kabeer 2003b). For the poor masses that are dependent on more powerful elites, the prospect for social justice is little or nil (Kabeer 2003b). For the ethnic Biharis, who are marginalized and have no access to many important rights, their actual situation goes beyond imagination. In this book, I use the interdisciplinary or substantive/normative approach to citizenship instead of a legal or formalistic definition. In my view, the law is not always the only standard that deserves consideration. Social, political, cultural, legal, and psychological dimensions of citizenship should be considered together to understand citizenship. Citizenship rights give individuals access to other rights, including social, economic, legal, and cultural rights. Social rights include the right to family and healthy living conditions, the right to education, healthcare, social integration, and so on. Political rights include the right to vote and the right to be voted for and effective participation in public life and political integration. Economic rights include access to employment and occupation. Legal rights include equality and non-discrimination, and cultural rights give everybody the right to uphold his/her own culture. These rights are associated with citizenship rights because these are essential rights for making citizenship meaningful. I examine whether the Bihari citizens of Bangladesh can access the above rights or not. My fieldwork shows that the Biharis living in the camps remain unprotected in Bangladesh. Currently, they are living in the camps in extreme poverty and without access to basic human rights. Most of them are illiterate, engaged in menial labor, and suffering from malnutrition, unemployment, and discrimination. Their deplorable living conditions are not only inconsistent with citizenship theory (i.e., right to have rights) but also incompatible with the Constitution of Bangladesh, that is, fundamental principles and fundamental rights. Some important rights are listed below, which the Bihari respondents are unable to access, or they have limited access to these rights. However, access to these rights is important to make their citizenship meaningful.

Right to a Decent Life Article 31 of the Bangladesh Constitution protects the “life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Mahmudul Islam argues, “ ‘Life’ within the meaning of article 31 means something more than mere animal existence. It includes the right to live consistently with human dignity and decency”

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(Islam 2002, 187–188). The absence of a decent life also violates social rights. Although judicially unenforceable, social rights are included in the fundamental principles, under part II, Articles 8–11 of the Constitution of Bangladesh (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). In my interviews with 75 respondents, I find that the Bihari camp dwellers live in subhuman conditions. They suffer from gross human rights violations. An average of 6–8 people live in 8/10-feet room and in many cases, 12–15 people live in the same space. Privacy is the most vital problem that they face in the camps. My fieldwork reflects the fact that the respondents living in the camps do not have privacy for sleeping or changing clothes. Apart from this, generally, older people (especially parents) sleep in yards under the open sky. Young couples sleep on the bed at home and the children sleep under the bed. Such a situation demonstrates how miserable life is in the camps. Unsecured and insufficient washrooms and bathing facilities also pose serious privacy and security threats. This degraded form of citizenship status is not consistent with the concept of citizenship or the “right to have the rights.” Theoretically, citizens are entitled to enjoy civil rights, such as privacy and security, which are absent in the Bihari camps. My field investigation shows that approximately 30,000 people use 272 toilets and many of those are out of order. My findings show that 1 toilet is used by 110 people approximately. Most alarmingly, the use of the same toilet by both male and female dwellers often causes very unpleasant situations. At night, the use of toilets appears to be very dangerous and scary for women and children. Incidents of sexual assault happen very often. This deplorable living condition without privacy and security is not consistent with citizenship theory constructed on the “right to have rights,” where rights like privacy and security are important civil rights. It is further incompatible with the “right to life and personal liberty,” one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Bangladesh (Article 32). The right to life means a meaningful life with dignity, but the Biharis do not have the ability to access some important rights to make the transition from a degraded to a meaningful citizenship.

Right to Shelter Housing or adequate shelter is one of the basic human needs for the existence of human beings. It provides security to people. Shelter or housing “is a place of their own, an identity, a place to come back to a place to call

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home and a place to have a family life” (Nawaz 2004). This is a fundamental human right essential for the life, security, and dignity of a citizen. It provides a sense of belonging to its owner. The minimum requirements for adequate shelter or housing include the security of tenure, capacity to protect from nature, utility services like safe drinking water, sanitation, and other essential services, and finally, it should be affordable and accessible (Nawaz 2004). Hannah Sholder finds in her study that “the majority of the Bihari camp dwellers aspire to live in a single-family apartment with a private bath, kitchen, and facilities, such as running water, gas connection, and electricity” (Sholder 2011, 34). The Bihari camp dwellers’ aspiration is consistent with the United Nations declaration. The 2003 UN Habitat Agenda states: Adequate shelter means more than a roof over one’s head. It also means adequate privacy; adequate space; physical accessibility; adequate security; security of tenure; structural stability and durability; adequate lighting, heating, and ventilation; basic infrastructure, such as water supply, sanitation, and waste-management facilities; suitable environmental quality and health-­ related factors; and adequate and accessible location with regard to work and basic facilities: all of which should be available at an affordable cost. (The Habitat Agenda 2003)

The national housing policy of the Bangladeshi government also adopts the principle of affordable housing for all (Nawaz 2004). But the housing situation of the Bihari interview subjects is deplorable. My fieldwork on 75 Bihari camp dwellers demonstrates that they are living in inhuman conditions. An average of six to eight people live in an 8/10 feet room without civic amenities. Sometimes more people live in this tiny space in the case of a joint family. It not only contradicts the civil rights of a citizen, an essential component of citizenship theory but also contradicts with the right to life and liberty, a fundamental right of citizens of Bangladesh. Furthermore, it is opposed to a few social rights incorporated in the fundamental principle of state policy regarding the necessities of life, that is, food, clothing, shelter, education, and healthcare. In short, the deplorable living conditions of the Biharis in the camps are inconsistent with citizenship theory (social and civil rights), fundamental state principles which include necessities (Article 15a), and fundamental rights, that is, the right to life and liberty (Article 32) of the Bangladesh Constitution (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh).

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Right to Education The right to education is a fundamental human right recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Article 26 of the UDHR proclaims: “Everyone has the right to education” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). The right to education obligates the state to ensure non-discriminatory and quality education to meet the challenges of time. Among South Asian countries, the right to education has been accepted as a fundamental right in Nepal, the Maldives, India, and Pakistan.2 In Sri Lanka, the right to education is not a fundamental right, but the fundamental principle of state policy is to eradicate illiteracy completely and to ensure the right to universal and equal access to education at all levels (The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka). However, free education is not stipulated. The right to education is not recognized as a fundamental right in the Constitution of Bangladesh. It appears in Part II of the Constitution as a fundamental principle of state policy and emphasizes compulsory education for all children. It incorporates the provision of universal education as a directive principle of state policy under Article 17 and pledges to establish a uniform, mass-oriented, and universal system of education which extends free and compulsory education to all children in Bangladesh. It also aims to relate education to the needs of society and produce trained and motivated citizens to meet those needs and remove illiteracy within such time as determined by law (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). The state is obligated to ensure the right to education according to the provision of Article 8(2) of the Constitution, which urges the state to follow the fundamental state principles as fundamental to governance (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). The National Education Policy provides that primary education is free and compulsory for all up to grade eight (Hossain 2011). Although the right to education is an unenforceable social right, it is rooted in the fundamental rights or legal rights of the Constitution of Bangladesh. The right to education flows from the right to liberty protected by Article 31 of the Constitution of Bangladesh (Islam 2002, 156). Access to education is a human right because it enhances human dignity through its “fruits of knowledge, wisdom, and understanding” (Claude 2006, 211). Bihari children have hardly any access to education. Most school-age children are deprived of an education. My fieldwork

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shows that out of the 75 respondents, 60 are illiterate. It is also evident that of the 75 respondents, 50 respondents have school-age children and among them, the children of 35 respondents still do not attend any schools, which means that most of the Bihari children are illiterate. The right to education is recognized as a necessity of life and a fundamental responsibility of the state in the fundamental principles of state policy (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Household income determines access to education in Bangladesh. Although primary education is free and compulsory, additional private costs for education, including examination fees, private tuition, paying for notebooks, are very high (Hossain and Zeitlyn 2010, 4). It is difficult for Bihari parents, even those who could send their children to public schools, to bear the educational expenses in Bangladesh. Although Bangladesh has a system of compulsory and free primary education, this is not true in the case of Bihari children. My findings show that among the 50 respondents who have school-age children, only 10 Bihari respondents can send their children to public schools. This implies that due to many formal and informal barriers, the remaining Bihari children are denied admission into public schools. Admission requirements in public schools include nationality documents, home addresses, parents’ occupations, and so on, which the Biharis do not have. Their camp address is the main obstacle to their admission into public schools. Discrimination toward the Biharis is so high that some Bihari students even register as Bengalis to obtain admission into public schools (Haider et al. 2003, 166). Apart from discrimination within mainstream society, continuous bullying from teachers and classmates discourages Bihari children from attending schools (Council of Minorities and NAMATI 2018). Discrimination toward Bihari children in their admission to public schools ignores the right to education, which is an important social right of a citizen as Marshall states, “The right to education is a genuine social right of citizenship” (Marshall 1950, 25). Discrimination toward Bihari children in education is also inconsistent with the fundamental rights of “equality” and “non-discrimination” incorporated in Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Article 27 guarantees that all citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law and Article 28 prohibits discrimination against any citizen on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth for access to any place of public entertainment or resort, or admission to any educational institution (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh).

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Right to Healthcare The right to life and liberty means living a healthy and hygienic life. The responsibility of the state is to provide affordable and accessible health services to all (Mahmud 2004, 11). Mahmud and Mahmud argue: The commitment to welfare goals is embedded in Bangladesh’s Constitution which includes “socialism meaning economic and social justice” as one of its fundamental principles and also pledges to realize a democratic, secular, and exploitation-free society that will ensure “fundamental human rights and freedom—political, economic and social” for all citizens. (Mahmud and Mahmud 2014)

Extending health services to all, including poor and marginalized people, increases health benefits and reduces health inequities. This helps with capacity building of the health system of the state and secures the right to health. My fieldwork shows that although the Bihari camp dwellers do not enjoy many important citizenship rights, public health is an exception, where 57 out of the 75 respondents have admitted that they receive free hospital services from government hospitals and health centers. This is a positive contribution of the government of Bangladesh to the Bihari community. On the other hand, 18 respondents complain that they do not receive care from public hospitals or health centers, and it is a fact that the Biharis live in abysmal and degrading living conditions in the camps. An ever-growing Bihari population suffers from meager resources, poor sanitation, and a lack of clean water which also causes communicable diseases. Camp dwellers experience daily an appalling environment where even the minimum civic amenities are absent. For example, in Geneva Camp, my field investigation shows that 30,000 people use 272 toilets and many of those toilets are out of order (Chap. 4). The merger of both water and sewerage, an acute shortage of latrines, and clean water all pose a constant threat to public health. The right to health is a social right in Bangladesh and the improvement of public health is recognized as one of the primary duties of the state in the fundamental principles of state policy.3 Article 18 (1) provides that improvement of the public health is the responsibility of the state. It states: “The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). Although the right to health is not a fundamental right directly, it is implicit in the right

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to life (Article 31), a recognized fundamental right in the Constitution of Bangladesh. The right to life means living a healthy life. Unfortunately, some Bihari citizens of Bangladesh are unable to access health rights properly. This is inconsistent with citizenship rights or citizenship theory based on the “right to have rights,” where health is the most essential social right. The Biharis’ unhealthy and unhygienic living conditions are not even compatible with the fundamental state principle under Article 18 (improvement of public health) and fundamental rights under Articles 31 and 32 (protection of law & right to life and liberty).4 In Dr. Mahiuddin Farooq et al. vs. Government of Bangladesh, the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court observes that the right to life includes the right to decent and healthy living in hygienic conditions (Dr. Mohiuddin Farooq and Another vs. Government of Bangladesh 1997). Explaining the right to life enshrined in Article 32, the Court says, “It includes everything which is necessary to make it meaningful and worth living” (Dr. Mohiuddin Farooq and Another vs. Government of Bangladesh 1997). The Court categorically mentions that “among others, maintenance of health is of utmost importance and preservation of the environment and hygienic condition are of paramount importance for such maintenance of health, lack of which may put the life of the citizen at naught” (Dr. Mohiuddin Farooq and Another vs. Government of Bangladesh 1997). Following the same line of argument in Giasuddin vs. Dhaka Municipal Corporation, the Court interprets article 31 of the Bangladesh Constitution stating that the “protection of life means that one’s life cannot be endangered by any action which is illegal, but it doesn’t mean protection of an illegal act of any person” (Giasuddin vs. Dhaka Municipal Corporation 1997). Articles 31 and 32 guarantee a right to life which does not merely mean a life but a decent and meaningful life in a healthy environment (Byrne and Hossain 2008, 135).

Right to Employment and Income Generation Employment means “the state of working for an employer, esp. in return for wages” (Oxford English Dictionary). Equality of employment means “identical and fair treatment of all equally qualified individuals in the access to, and the enjoyment of, all rights in public office” (Begum 2005, 326). Employment or a profession enables a person to attain power, prestige, dignity, and livelihood. It also helps achieve everyone’s professional efficiency. On the contrary, unemployment is a socio-economic and

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political condition that produces “income inequality, poverty, crime, and other disparities” (Gray et al. 2015, 110). The right to employment is an important social right of an individual according to Marshall’s social element of citizenship: By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. (Marshall 1950, 11)

Through employment, an individual who works for the country creates an attachment to the country and pays taxes to the country. These transactions of rights and responsibilities create meaningful citizenship. The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees a fundamental right to all citizens of the country under Article 40 to practice any profession or to engage in any occupation, trade, or business (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). A fundamental state principle of the Bangladesh Constitution is to secure the basic necessities of its citizens. Article 15(a) states that it shall be the fundamental responsibility of the state to secure the necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, education, and healthcare and Article 15(b) emphasizes the right to work, which means the right to guaranteed employment with a reasonable wage (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). The Constitution of Bangladesh upholds equality of opportunity as a fundamental right of the citizens of Bangladesh. Article 29(1) of the Bangladesh Constitution states, “There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in respect of employment or office in the service of the Republic.” Similarly, Article 29(2) says, “No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office in the service of the Republic” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). If any aggrieved person thinks that his or her fundamental right has been violated through discrimination, he or she may file a writ petition before the High Court Division of the Supreme Court under Article 102 (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). In Carew and Company vs. Labour Court, the High Court Division observes that the failure of the nationalized company in providing the benefits of an agreement to some of its employees violates Article 29 (Carew and Company vs. Labour Court

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1998). Freedom of profession gives every citizen the right to practice any profession or the right to have any occupation, trade, or business. However, my fieldwork demonstrates that the Bihari citizens of Bangladesh suffer the most in the areas of employment and occupation. Although 1 million people which constitute around one-third of the formal sector employment are working in the public sector (Lewis 2011, 742), none of the 75 respondents have government jobs. A lack of adequate education with impoverished economic conditions provides limited opportunities to the Biharis for employment. Consequently, many are left only with the option of menial labor, and in some cases, helpless men and women start begging, young boys engage in child labor, and young girls opt for early marriage or other illegal forms of work to earn a living. My fieldwork suggests that all 75 Bihari respondents live in extreme poverty (Chap. 4, Table 4.7). If a person lives on less than $1.90 per day, he or she is in extreme poverty (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2017). Even the member of the highest income group who earns US$ 7.07 per day could not overcome the extreme poverty line, because this amount is shared by a family of an average of eight members (Chap. 4, Table 4.7). My fieldwork shows that although legally the Biharis are citizens of Bangladesh, they have no ability to access all rights associated with citizenship. They are subjected to discrimination in the job market. In some cases, they get a job usually doing manual labor. Respondents report that they do not get equal pay for equal work done. They have very little or no bargaining power because the common perception about the Biharis is that they are not Bangladeshi citizens (which is wrong) and given the situation no option remains for them but to accept any job offer at any rate just to survive. Such discrimination and maltreatment toward the Biharis in workplaces go against the spirit of the concept of citizenship. Indeed, participation in work represents democratic citizenship (Bosniak 2002, 506). On the contrary, inequality and discrimination toward the Biharis in employment are not consistent with the fundamental rights of equality in employment, Article 29(1), and non-discrimination, Article 29(2), protection of the law, Article (31), right to life and liberty, Article (32), and right to profession/occupation, Article (40) are guaranteed in the Constitution of Bangladesh. It is further incoherent with the fundamental principle of state policy, that is, improving the standard of living of people, Article (15), meeting the basic needs of life including food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care, Article 15(a), and the right to guaranteed

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employment, Article 15(b) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Although the fundamental principles are non-enforceable, these are fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, especially in making laws and legal interpretations, Article 8(2). These fundamental principles morally obligate the state to take effective measures to improve the quality of life of its citizens (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh).

Right to Have Other Rights Most of the respondents are unable to enjoy the benefits of meaningful citizenship rights because they do not have the ability to access some important rights associated with citizenship rights or the “right to have rights.” Based on my interviews with the 75 respondents, I find that the Biharis in general are denied passports to travel abroad or driver’s licenses and it is difficult for them to rent a house because they are considered stranded Pakistanis. My field investigation reveals that among the 75 Bihari respondents, 72 of them are registered as voters and they receive voter ID cards. They are still denied other rights associated with citizenship. All 75 respondents also claim that those who applied for passports are denied on the ground that they are stranded Pakistanis.5 One recent example shows that a person born to Bihari parents in Bangladesh in 1978 was denied a passport by the Bangladesh High Commissioner in London in 2015 on the ground that the applicant was a stranded Pakistani national (Hoque 2016, 24). Application for a passport in Bangladesh requires a valid address, which the Bihari camp dwellers are unable to provide. Bihari camps are not considered valid addresses by the authorities. Hence, many Biharis do not meet the requirements for obtaining passports. Although living in the camp should not be a disqualification for obtaining a passport, they are still discriminated against in the name of being “stranded Pakistanis,” which is totally wrong and unlawful. In the Muktar Ahamed case, the Court clearly states that the Biharis did not attain any special status simply by being confined in camps and the camp is not a place where Bangladeshi law is not in operation.6 Although all 75 Bihari camp dwellers claim that purchasing a piece of land or owning a piece of land is not a problem (if they have money), they still do not want to purchase land outside the camp due to their uncertain future, insecurity, and lack of economic ability. Among the 75 Bihari respondents, all of them feel that they are excluded from mainstream Bangladeshi society. The reason behind discrimination

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and insecurity as identified by the Bihari respondents is that socially and politically the Biharis are still not treated like citizens of Bangladesh. They are not integrated but rather alienated from mainstream society. In the Sadakat Khan case, the Court directed the government to integrate the Biharis with the mainstream, but that Court verdict remains unimplemented (Md. Sadaqat Khan [Fakku] and Others vs. Chief Election Commissioner 2008). The government did not take any initiatives to make any laws in parliament. On the contrary, despite having the Court verdict in favor of their citizenship, the government of Bangladesh still calls them stranded Pakistanis.7 A lack of political will from the government of Bangladesh to recognize them as citizens of Bangladesh is clear.8 Even civil society and human rights groups are not very concerned about the Biharis’ rights. Social hatred against the Biharis is prevalent in society and is being utilized by the government politically. In my view, the government’s reluctance to provide full protection to the Biharis arises from the fear that the government will lose the support of many Bengalis in elections who still cannot accept the Biharis for their pro-Pakistani stance and support to the Pakistan army in the Liberation War of Bangladesh. Discrimination sponsored by state and non-state actors go against the legal rights stated in citizenship theory, that is, equality, non-­discrimination, legal protection, and so on. These are also contradictory with the fundamental principle of state policy of Bangladesh, that is, emancipation of toiling masses from all sorts of exploitation, Article (14), basic needs of life, Article 15(a), the right to work, Article 15(b), and also contradictory with fundamental rights such as equality before law, Article (27), discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, and so on, Article 28(1), equality of opportunity, Article 29(1), non-discrimination in public employment, Article 29(2), and also conflicting with fundamental rights such as the right to protection of law, Article (31), right to life and liberty, Article (32) and the right to mobility or freedom of movement, Article (36). The Biharis are citizens of Bangladesh under Article 6 of the Bangladesh Constitution.9 Under Article 6, there are two laws dealing with the citizenship of Bangladesh, namely the Citizenship Act, 1951, and the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provision) Order, 1972 (The Citizenship Act, 1951; The Bangladesh Citizenship [Temporary Provision] Order, 1972). The evidence from my fieldwork demonstrates that of the 75 respondents, a majority (67) are citizens of Bangladesh by birth. Among them 39 were born in Bangladesh after the Liberation War and 28

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were born in former East Pakistan. Others are also entitled to Bangladeshi citizenship, because their citizenship has never been revoked by the state or they have never renounced their citizenship voluntarily. Their wishes to go to Pakistan in 1972–1973 do not ipso facto disqualify them for Bangladeshi citizenship according to the verdict of the Bangladesh Supreme Court (Mukhtar Ahmed vs. Govt. of Bangladesh et al. 1982). Most Bihari respondents do not enjoy citizenship rights, because the government of Bangladesh failed in its obligation to ensure that they enjoy equal citizenship as the Bengalis. Three generations of the Biharis have been the worst victims of political and ideological conflicts in South Asia. Despite having several judicial decisions from the highest court to grant access to citizenship rights to the Biharis, it has been deliberately deterred by the government of Bangladesh. In addition to legal obligations, Bangladesh is also morally obliged to respect the human rights of the Biharis, particularly basic human rights such as housing, education, health, and employment. The situation of the Biharis suggests that their rights have been violated by the state. By declaring the Biharis as citizens in 2008, the apex court of Bangladesh proved that the state’s actions of deliberate discrimination toward and the deprivation of rights and responsibilities of the Biharis for 37 years (1972–2008) were wrong. The verdict of the 2008 Dhaka High Court reads: [The] Question of citizenship of Urdu-speaking has got another aspect, … By keeping the question of citizenship unresolved on wrong assumption over the decades, this nation has not gained anything rather, was deprived of the contribution it could have made in the nation-building. The sooner the Urdu-speaking people are brought to the mainstream of the nation the better. (Md. Sadaqat Khan [Fakku] and Others vs. Chief Election Commissioner 2008)

From my fieldwork with 75 respondents, it appears that most Bihari respondents identify themselves as Bangladeshi nationals and they want to stay in Bangladesh (Chap. 4, Table 4.9). In the 1940s, the Biharis migrated to former East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, by choice, not accidentally or by birth. Considering the geo-political and cultural environment, they moved to East Bengal as they developed love and respect for this land. They migrated to East Pakistan for their love toward the Bengalis (Muslims) and expected shelter from the same religious community in the

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aftermath of violence against them by the Hindus in India. Some of them also came to former East Pakistan for better opportunities. They worked hard and helped to develop East Pakistan from 1947 to 1971. Although they defended Pakistan in 1971 for ideological reasons, since independence they have been living in Bangladesh. Their former country East Pakistan has become Bangladesh, but the land and people remain unchanged. They suffered a lot for their support of Pakistan. My interviews with the Bihari respondents reveal that the new generation of Biharis wants a new beginning and they are interested to live in Bangladesh with dignity and respect. They have deep affection and strong sentiments for Bangladesh. They are deeply rooted in Bangladesh. Legally, they are citizens of Bangladesh; however, they do not have the ability to access some important citizenship rights. They are victims of discrimination and live with a degraded form of citizenship with no access to the accompanied rights of citizenship.

Conclusion From the above discussion, it is evident that the Biharis’ inability to access to citizenship rights is inconsistent with citizenship theory (i.e., the right to have rights—civil, political, and social rights), citizenship laws in Bangladesh and the Constitution of Bangladesh, that is, fundamental principles and fundamental rights. Although the Biharis are citizens of Bangladesh, their citizenship is not meaningful or effective. They are still unable to access many important rights needed to make their citizenship meaningful. My fieldwork suggests that the Biharis living in the camps remain unprotected in Bangladesh. Currently, they are living in the camps in extreme poverty and without access to basic human rights. The Biharis are still unintegrated with the mainstream. The integration of a nation depends on the successful accommodation of various ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups within a national system (Jahan 1972, 3). It may occur when diverse groups and discrete elements of societies can come together and co-exist in a national system for the purpose of making a nation (Wriggins 1966, 181–191). It provides a common sense of nationality to citizens. Although legally the Biharis are citizens of Bangladesh, discrimination against them or their inability to access important citizenship rights excludes them from the mainstream and they remain as disintegrated elements of society.

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Their deplorable living conditions and lack of access to many important rights is not only inconsistent with citizenship theory (i.e., the right to have other rights), but also incompatible with the Constitution of Bangladesh, that is, fundamental principles and fundamental rights. Their poverty, chronic unemployment, low level of education, inadequate legal protection, social exclusion, and deplorable living conditions demonstrate that they are deprived of many important legal and non-legal or social rights that they deserve to enjoy according to citizenship theory, citizenship law, and the Constitution of Bangladesh. Their citizenship can be meaningful if they enjoy full citizenship rights. It is the responsibility of the government of Bangladesh to implement the decision of the highest court of Bangladesh which states that the Biharis are citizens of Bangladesh. Such an implementation of Biharis’ citizenship rights without any discrimination can establish rule of law in the country and help strengthen the national integration of Bangladesh.

Notes 1. My interviews with 75 Biharis in three camps of Dhaka and Rajshahi divisions confirm that the Bihari respondents do not have due access to some very important citizenship rights such as education, employment, housing, medical care, and other rights. 2. Article 21A of the Constitution of India states that “The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years” (The Constitution of India). Article 31 of the Constitution of Nepal provides that every citizen shall have the right to free education from the state up to secondary level (The Constitution of Nepal); according to Article 36 of the Constitution of Maldives (i) everyone has the right to education without discrimination of any kind; (ii) primary and secondary education shall be freely provided by the state (Constitution of the Republic of the Maldives); Article 25A of the Constitution of Pakistan stipulates that state shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan). 3. Article 31 states, “no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh). 4. Article 31 states, “no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law” (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh).

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5. The passport authorities require proof of citizenship for issuing a passport because the passport law states that they “may refuse to issue a passport,” if the applicant is not a citizen of Bangladesh. The regular documents, which are accepted as proof of citizenship are certificates from the head of the concerned local government unit, City Corporation/Union Parishad/ Municipality Corporation/Cantonment Board, a national I.D.  Card, or birth certificate (Article 6(1) of the Bangladesh Passport Rules 1974). 6. The verdict of Mukter Ahmed case states, “The mere fact that he filed an application for going over to Pakistan cannot take away his citizenship. … The petitioner having not acquired the citizenship of any other country, his citizenship of Bangladesh which he acquired long before cannot evaporate and he continues to be a citizen of this country” (Mukhtar Ahmed v. Govt. of Bangladesh et al. 1982). 7. The state minister for foreign affairs Mr. S. Alam comments that Bangladesh continues diplomatic efforts for the repatriation of the stranded Biharis to Pakistan (Geneva Camper Biharira 2014). 8. Most respondents made this remark about the political will of the government of Bangladesh. 9. Article 6 of the Bangladesh Constitution provides that the citizenship of Bangladesh shall be determined and regulated by law and the citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshi (The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Article 6.1 & 6.2).

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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

The aim of this study is to investigate whether the Biharis have access to important rights associated with citizenship rights that make citizenship meaningful. I interviewed 75 Bihari camp dwellers and 25 Bengalis. Taking a socio-legal approach, and based on the interviews, my book demonstrates that while most Biharis in Bangladesh have been recognized as being legally entitled to citizenship in Bangladesh, they do not have access to many important rights associated with citizenship rights that make citizenship meaningful. I used a socio-legal approach in this book as this approach recognizes both legal and non-legal factors and it narrates “legal phenomena in social terms” (Friedman 1986, 763). It is a scholarly way of examining the relationship between legal and non-legal types of social phenomena (Friedman 1986, 763). This approach suggests that law can be understood by seeing and experiencing it within the social context (Silbey 2002, 860–863). The law and society approach also provides opportunities for undertaking interdisciplinary empirical studies, thereby transcending the limitations of traditional positivist legal scholarship (Silbey 2002, 861). It recognizes diverse methods and methodologies for researching and understanding social problems, including social science research methods such as qualitative and quantitative methods (Chua 2013). The law and society emphasize behavior or attitudes as they affect or reflect behavior (Friedman 1986, 774). Moreover, this tradition is not concerned merely with what the law is but also with what the law does in

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practice or the impact of law on society (Trubek 1984, 575; Silbey and Sarat 1987, 165). I argue in this book that while most Biharis have been recognized as being legally entitled to citizenship in Bangladesh, they do not have access to many important rights associated with citizenship rights that make citizenship meaningful. Due to their inability to access important citizenship rights, despite enjoying the status of de jure citizenship, Biharis are de facto stateless people. This book asserts that today citizenship is not limited to legal rights only. Both legal and non-legal scholars have the shared view that citizenship can best be understood not only through the legal lens but also through interdisciplinary lenses. In other words, a normative or substantive way of understanding citizenship is considered by both legal and non-legal scholars. Non-legal scholars recognize legal rights along with civil, political, and social rights. Similarly, some legal scholars do not rule out the importance of other rights along with legal rights (Schuck 2000, 196). In a legal sense, nationality or citizenship is an identity or formal link between an individual and a state that provides hosts of rights and obligations to the individual. Legal rights include equal rights, unrestricted right to reside, leave and return to the country of nationality, and protection both inside and outside the country of nationality, including consular assistance and diplomatic protection. Although the legal definition is important, some legal scholars even prefer the substantive definition of citizenship, that is, legal, sociological, political, cultural, and other dimensions of citizenship. Other aspects of citizenship cannot be understood only through the lens of law. Given this reality, some legal scholars recognize the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of citizenship (Shaw 1998, 297; Hartnell 2006, 335). Similarly, social scientists who conceive citizenship as the “right to have rights” or a bundle of rights (civil, political, social, cultural, and legal rights) and duties also do not ignore the importance of the legal aspect of citizenship (Arendt 1958, 296). Therefore, among the legal and non-legal scholars, there is a shared view of interdisciplinary/normative or substantive definition of citizenship. In this book, I use the interdisciplinary or substantive/normative definition of citizenship instead of a legal or formalistic definition. In my view, law is not always the only standard that deserves consideration. Social, political, cultural, legal, and psychological dimensions of citizenship should also be considered for understanding citizenship. Citizenship

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rights give individuals access to other rights, including social, economic, legal, and cultural rights. This book argues that the Biharis in Bangladesh are the products of the partition of India in the 1940s. They migrated to the former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) to avoid communal violence in India as well as to have a better future in Pakistan. I also find that the Biharis remain unintegrated with the local Bengalis in former East Pakistan because of their separate culture and way of life. The Biharis opposed the freedom struggle of the Bengalis in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s and supported the ruling elites of Pakistan to obtain and protect their own political and economic interests. They believed in a strong central government and opposed the regional autonomy of the Bengalis because that would deprive them of the advantages that they were already receiving from the central government and put them under the domination of the Bengalis. The Biharis became the targets of widespread political persecution preceding and during the liberation war as well as in the aftermath of the liberation war because of their inimical role during the liberation struggle of Bangladesh in general and their atrocities in the Liberation War in 1971. The entire Bihari population is often stigmatized as active collaborators with the Pakistan army in their war crimes and this caused the Bihari suffering, including “mental agony and stress” (Huque 1990, 278). After the birth of Bangladesh, virtually the Biharis became stateless, unwanted, and the targets of assaults. However, in 2008, the Bangladesh Supreme Court declared them citizens of Bangladesh which led to their transition from statelessness to citizenship. Based on the fieldwork, it has been uncovered that the Biharis, while legally Bangladeshi citizens, are in practice unable to access some of the important citizenship rights that make citizenship meaningful. Since the Biharis never lost their citizenship formally, they always held Bangladeshi citizenship. However, they have been treated like stateless people in Bangladesh and excluded from all rights until 2008, when the highest Court of Bangladesh declared them citizens (Sadakat Khan v. Chief Election Commissioner 2008). The government still fails to implement some of the important rights attached to citizenship. Therefore, many of their rights are still inaccessible to them. My fieldwork shows that the Biharis living in the camps remain unprotected in Bangladesh. Currently, they are living in the camps in extreme poverty and without access to basic human rights. Most of them are illiterate, engaged in menial labor, and suffering from malnutrition,

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unemployment, and discrimination. Their deplorable living conditions are not only inconsistent with citizenship theory (i.e., the right to have rights) but also incompatible with the Constitution of Bangladesh, that is, fundamental principles and fundamental rights. Bihari respondents are unable to access or have limited access to these rights. However, access to these rights is important to make their citizenship meaningful. My field study finds extremely crowded and unsanitary conditions, with many joint families of 12–15 members sharing tiny living spaces. The camp dwellers identified many problems, mainly privacy, even for changing clothes, and obvious difficulties regarding the privacy of intimate relations. Initially, building materials for constructing houses of the Biharis were merely plastic sheets and bamboo. Even today, these houses do not fulfill the minimum requirements for the security of inhabitants (Ara 2008, 40). Acute problems with drinking water, poor drainage, and sanitation systems still constitute health hazards. I found that Bihari children were still often refused access to public schools as admission requirements include nationality documents, home addresses, and details of parental occupations, which many Biharis do not have. Their camp address is an instant giveaway, facilitating direct discrimination in a system with a marked obsession with paper (Chhotray and McConnell 2018, 114). Some Bihari students are known to register as Bengalis to obtain admission to public schools, but then face continuous bullying from teachers and classmates, discouraging these children from attending schools (Haider et  al. 2003, 166). Many camp dwellers still reported a lack of access to medical facilities. Very high infant mortality rates among the Biharis in camps have been recorded, with three out of five children dying before the age of five (Stateless in Bangladesh & Pakistan 2006). Lack of access to healthcare also results in lethal and debilitating diseases such as measles, smallpox, and polio in the camps (Farzana 2008, 7). There may have been some improvements by now in public health provisions because out of 75 respondents, 57 in my field research indicated that they received free services from government hospitals and health centers. The findings of my fieldwork indicate that the Biharis’ lack of education or poor education makes them ineligible for better employment. Their very poor economic condition and camp life detach them from the mainstream Bangladeshis. In addition, as the Biharis are marginalized in society, they are struggling for their existence in a hostile environment. They have no media to refute any propaganda against them. Impoverished Biharis often undertake menial labor. Some helpless men and women are

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begging, young boys are engaged in child labor, and young girls are forced into early marriage or child prostitution to earn a living. In all cases, any daily income needed to be shared by six to eight family members and most Biharis remain poor and dependent on relief provided by the government and NGOs. They often face discrimination simply because of their camp residence, and particularly lack of documentation such as birth and character certificates or lack of other legal documents. Many Biharis want to work overseas but cannot even get a passport. The authorities do not generally give them passports, particularly when their addresses are located at the Bihari camps. The reason behind this discrimination, clearly spelled out by the respondents, is that still, socially and politically, the Biharis are not accepted as citizens of Bangladesh and are not allowed entry to an equal playing field with Bengalis, so none of them can obtain the necessary documents for overseas travel and other proposes. Despite various court judgments in their favor regarding citizenship, public service providers still treat them as stranded Pakistanis, significantly at this crucial moment of trying to obtain passports and travel documents. Clearly, the lack of political will of the government to grant them their rights as full citizens of Bangladesh is evident here. Even civil societies and rights groups are not that concerned about the Biharis’ rights, reflecting that widespread social hatred against the Biharis remains prevalent in Bangladeshi society today. Frontline public service providers systematically deny them access to key facilities that would improve their chances of socio-economic mobility. My fieldwork demonstrates that of the 75 respondents, a majority (67) are citizens of Bangladesh by birth. Among them, 39 were born in Bangladesh after the Liberation War and 28 were born in former East Pakistan. Others are also entitled to Bangladeshi citizenship because their citizenship has never been revoked by the state or they have never renounced their citizenship voluntarily. Their wishes to go to Pakistan in 1972–1973 do not ipso facto disqualify them for Bangladeshi citizenship according to the verdict of the Bangladesh Supreme Court (Mukhtar Ahmed v. Govt. of Bangladesh et  al. 1982). The number of Biharis who remained in Bangladesh, and their offspring, has meanwhile grown significantly. Many first- and second-generation Biharis today still reside in more than 100 refugee camps across Bangladesh and are not integrated into mainstream Bangladeshi society. This indicates that the reverberations of the community’s disloyalty to the nation in 1971 may still explain why public service delivery in Bangladesh continues to victimize the Biharis. Apparently, the

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earlier act of disloyalty by their elders is now being used to punish the younger generation of Biharis in Bangladesh. Three generations of the Biharis have been the worst victims of political and ideological conflicts in South Asia. Despite several judicial decisions from the highest court giving the Biharis access to citizenship rights, it has not been implemented by the government of Bangladesh. In addition to legal obligations, Bangladesh is also morally obliged to respect the human rights of the Biharis, particularly basic human rights like housing, education, health, and employment. The situation of the Biharis suggests that their rights have been violated by the state. My empirical findings uncover the fact that the Biharis in Bangladesh are still un-integrated with the national system. Generally, national integration is the process of creating a unified nation through unity, cohesion, and stability (Hussain 2009a, 43). The national integration of a nation depends on the successful accommodation of various ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups within a national system (Jahan 1972). It occurs when diverse groups and discrete elements of societies come together and co-exist in a national system for making a nation (Wriggins 1966, 182). It provides a common sense of nationality to citizens. The situation of the Biharis reveals that they are alienated from mainstream Bangladesh society. They are the “un-integrated elements within an integrated nation,” says, T. Maniruzzaman, an eminent political scientist of Bangladesh.1 Formally, although they are citizens of Bangladesh, practically, many of them still do not have access to important legal and social rights. For example, legal rights such as owning a passport, driver’s license, birth certificate, and so on, and social rights such as shelter, education, employment, and healthcare, and so on. Although the integration of the Biharis is difficult in a politically underdeveloped Bangladesh,2 it is not impossible for the government of Bangladesh. The government has both domestic and international obligations to create necessary conditions for the integration of the Biharis into Bangladeshi society. The Biharis are alienated and disintegrated in Bangladesh both vertically and horizontally. Unemployment, poverty, and lack of education have created a sharp contrast between the local Bengalis and the Biharis. They are rolling within the vicious circle of poverty, which disintegrated them vertically, while their linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences have disintegrated them horizontally. My fieldwork suggests that their access to full citizenship rights, including legal and social rights, can help integrate them with the mainstream of Bangladesh society.

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245

The Bihari respondents demand proper rehabilitation to end their camp life and give them effective citizenship. It is also clear from the interviews that the Bihari respondents in general want the end of discrimination and emphasize equal treatment or affirmative action in all walks of life, especially in health, education, and employment, which are essential for bridging the gap between the Bengalis and Biharis. However, many of the Bengali respondents believe that granting equal rights to the Biharis will facilitate their integration into Bangladesh. They think that if the Biharis possess equal rights, they can automatically be integrated into mainstream Bangladeshi society. Regarding the rehabilitation and economic integration of the Biharis, many Bengali respondents believe that the government of Bangladesh can afford to rehabilitate them economically. They want the government to adopt policies that will form the basis for undertaking special projects in collaboration with bilateral and multilateral donors. The Bengali respondents support the integration of the Biharis with the mainstream population. But most of the respondents oppose the idea of special protection to the Biharis. Some of them think that such special constitutional protection will insult the millions of Bengali martyrs who fought against the Pakistan army in 1971 and their Bihari collaborators. Others believe that such constitutional protection will set a bad precedence and open Pandora’s box for other ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities who might be interested to avail of such opportunities. They recommend equal treatment for the Biharis, which enhances their ability to access the important rights that are necessary to make their citizenship meaningful. Despite this overwhelming majority in support of equal opportunities for the Biharis, most Bengali respondents believe that no quota system or affirmative action program should be introduced for them. With regard to the question of the return of the confiscated properties of the Biharis, many of the Bengali respondents believe that their property should be returned through a legal process. While acknowledging that the return of the properties to the Bihari owners is not going to be an easy process, they also believe that taking this step will allow the Biharis to feel more integrated and devoted to Bangladesh as their own country. Regarding integration, the government of Bangladesh has some domestic obligations, such as implementing the court verdicts, especially the 2008 Court rule which declared that the Biharis are citizens of Bangladesh. Implementing the Court decision is now the responsibility of the executive branch of the government. This means that it is the obligation of the

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government to rehabilitate and integrate them with the full rights and responsibilities of citizens. The government also has some international obligations to integrate the Biharis into Bangladeshi society.3 For example, Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living, adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medicinal care and necessary social services” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). Similarly, Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes everyone’s right to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions (ICESCR 1966). The right to housing towards achieving a standard of living is totally a dream in the life of the stranded Biharis in Bangladesh. Article 26 of the UDHR provides the right to education for everyone and Article 23 of the UDHR and Article 6 of the ICESCR recognize the right to work (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; ICESCR 1966). Indeed, the ruling authorities require framing a political formula based on the sentiments of the social groups, which Leonard Binder points out as a key factor in integrating any ethnolinguistic elements like the Biharis within the political system. Such a plan by the government might contribute to effectively integrating the Biharis in Bangladesh. The Biharis in Bangladesh who are still waiting for repatriation could not return home, because of Pakistan’s reluctance or lack of goodwill. My fieldwork on the Bengalis demonstrates that many Bengali respondents believe that repatriation of the Biharis could not be accomplished because of Pakistan’s refusal. Pakistan’s refusal has made these stranded Pakistanis virtually stateless. Reduction of statelessness is a customary international law, and every state has the legal and moral obligations to comply with that law. Therefore, it is the obligation of Pakistan to repatriate the stranded Biharis, awaiting repatriation to Pakistan. Article 15(1) of the UDHR states, “Everyone has the right to a nationality” and 15(2) further provides that “No state can arbitrarily deny the nationality of an individual” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). Again Article 13(2) of the UDHR provides, “everyone has the right to leave any country including his own and to return to his country” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country” (ICCPR 1966).

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247

Pakistan is a signatory to the International Bill of Human Rights (UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR). However, Pakistan refuses to recognize the Biharis who are stranded in Bangladesh as its own citizens and has amended its constitution to exclude them from Pakistan, which is a clear violation of international law. Given this reality, Pakistan needs to recognize and accommodate its own citizens in the constitution and expedite the repatriation of those stranded Pakistanis who sacrificed their lives generation after generation for the cause of Pakistan. Although the government of Pakistan has abandoned the Biharis’ legal Pakistani nationality by amending the constitution, some of them still did not give up their hope for repatriation to Pakistan and refused to accept Bangladeshi citizenship despite having severe hardships in Bangladesh. Even when the apex Court declared them citizens of Bangladesh, some of them expressed their reactions to the press and stated that they wanted to remain as Pakistanis and would wait independently to go there (Majumder 2008). Shaukat Ali said, “We have full respect for the Court, but we reject its ruling. Pakistan is our home, and we want to exercise our citizenship rights only after going there” (Majumder 2008). The Biharis in Bangladesh share significant elements of common heritage with Pakistan (Emerson 1960, 95). The Biharis who do not want to accept Bangladeshi citizenship are not more than 10% of the camp residents or about 25–30,000 in total (RMMRU, Policy Brief 2. 2007). It is inconceivable why the repatriation and rehabilitation of such a small number of people is a difficult task for Pakistan. Although repatriation and resettlement are challenging for the government of Pakistan against the will of many Pakistanis, especially the Sindhis, Pakistani leaders need to display courage, political will, and statesmanship to resolve such a longstanding dispute. The Pakistani government should immediately respond to the ardent desires of the stranded Biharis, who still regard themselves as Pakistanis and whose settled life was disrupted for the cause of Pakistan in 1971. They are still waiting for repatriation to Pakistan and waiting for the “airplane” for 50 long years to land in their most desired homeland, Pakistan. Although these Biharis do not want Bangladeshi citizenship, they still retain their Bangladeshi citizenship because they did not formally renounce their Bangladeshi citizenship. They did not ask the Bangladeshi government to officially revoke their Bangladeshi citizenship. Even if they ask for revocation, the Bangladeshi government cannot cancel their citizenship unless they are granted citizenship by another country. In international law, a person can lose his/her nationality by a voluntary act by which an

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individual renounces his/her original nationality and acquires the nationality of a new state (Joyner 2005, 64). Although these Biharis are living in Bangladesh against their will, respecting international law, the Pakistani government should repatriate them.

Recommendations Based on my findings, I make several recommendations for policy changes that could enable the Biharis to access the rights associated with citizenship, thereby making their right to citizenship in Bangladesh meaningful: 1. It is evident that the Bihari problem in Bangladesh is first a political problem and then a humanitarian problem. Therefore, a political decision is required to resolve this problem. To ensure their access to citizenship rights like other citizens and make their citizenship meaningful, the government of Bangladesh should undertake all necessary steps to implement the decision of the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court in 2008, which declared the Biharis as citizens of Bangladesh. My fieldwork reveals that most Bengali respondents believe that under the protection of citizenship rights, the Biharis will have access to other rights on equal footing with the Bengalis. Similarly, many Bengali respondents believe that the rights of the Biharis like education, healthcare, and employment can be realized only when they are guaranteed equal rights through the implementation of their citizenship rights. In addition, I suggest that the government should reform the existing constitutional law of Bangladesh and incorporate some important social rights as fundamental rights and judicially enforceable rights to guarantee rights such as education, health, employment and housing, privacy, etc., required for a decent life for every citizen including the Biharis. 2. The government should make a public announcement to create awareness about the citizenship status of the Biharis in Bangladesh. This may help to change the wrong public perception that Biharis are stranded Pakistanis, not Bangladeshi citizens. My field investigation reveals that many of the Bengalis still believe that the Biharis are Pakistani citizens. Furthermore, many Bihari camp residents are still not aware of their citizenship status. They still believe that they are stranded Pakistanis. On the other hand, many local employers still think that the Biharis are foreigners and not qualified for local

6 CONCLUSION 

249

employment. This wrong public perception makes their position fragile and vulnerable in society and reduces their bargaining power with employers. Consequently, the Bihari laborers get victimized by employers and become targets for cheaper labor. This misperception about Biharis also creates an obstruction for renting a house, opening a bank account, having a trade license, and so on. A public announcement declaring the Biharis as citizens of Bangladesh is the demand of the Bihari community and the civil society associations, especially the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU).4 This public announcement may reduce the current discrimination in public and private employment (including the formal and informal sectors),5 education, healthcare, and so on. This public announcement may be made in parliament by the Prime Minister or Minister of Home Affairs or by issuing an order from the government through a press note which can be publicized in print and electronic media. This may help increase the credibility and legitimacy of the Bihari citizens in the greater Bangladeshi society. It may contribute to making the Biharis a part of society and help them integrate with the mainstream population. 3. The government should ensure the Biharis’ right to education and employment. The government should make sure that the Biharis are no longer discriminated against in public schools and public employment. Education is the key to success and proper education and training to the Biharis will automatically improve their ability to access rights such as employment and healthcare and other rights inherent in the fundamental rights and fundamental principles of the constitution of Bangladesh. First, the government is required to ensure a free and compulsory primary education for the Bihari children like other children of the country, considering the provision of the current education policy that a “free and compulsory primary education for all children of the country.” This will simply meet the legal obligation of the government. In the case of secondary, higher secondary, and university education, merit should be the prime consideration for admission. Discrimination against Bihari children in educational institutions should be stopped through the proper application of anti-discriminatory laws in the country. All sorts of discrimination are required to be eliminated in the case of employment in both the public and private sectors. Merit should be the main criterion for employment.

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4. In the case of education and employment, the Biharis are lagging. The government may follow an affirmative action plan or introduce a quota system to increase their entry into higher education institutions and employment. To help secure the Biharis’ access to important citizenship rights, the Bangladesh government should protect them under the provisions of Articles 28 and 29 of the constitution.6 They should be considered for similar quota benefits to the tribal peoples of the Chittagong Hill tracts (CHT). This quota can enhance their entry into public and private education and employment. The private sector is also part of the state, and employment opportunities are wider in the private sector than in the public sector. Such protections for the Biharis will establish equity in accessing rights. 5. The national political parties should recruit Bihari activists to ensure their political participation. Political parties should work actively among the Bihari population and recruit them as party members through the process of political socialization and recruitment. They should bring the Biharis’ interest to the national political agenda like other minority issues. Political parties should consider nominating Bihari candidates at the local and municipal-level elections in the Bihari-populated areas so that they can be integrated into the political system and participate in the decision-making process. The political parties may constitute local committees among the Bihari population and engage them in implementing the party agenda and political activities like processions, meetings, elections, other campaigns, and so on. This will give them ownership over the political process and may help them integrate into the national political system. 6. Bangladeshi society should also shoulder the responsibility for the marginalization of the Biharis. The Bangladeshi business community, civil society, media, and mainstream local NGOs, such as BRAC, Grameen Bank, Proshika, Asha, and Nijera Kori, and other NGOs should extend their support to rehabilitate and integrate the Biharis into Bangladeshi society. They, along with the government, should raise consciousness among the Bengalis about the importance and necessity of treating the Biharis as citizens of the country with equal rights and responsibilities as other citizens. Civil societies and human rights activists should focus more on the education, employment, housing, and healthcare of the Bihari citizens.

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251

7. Social mobilization within the Bihari community is also very important. In particular, the Biharis also need to be aware of the ways in which they can be integrated into mainstream Bangladeshi society. In this regard, Bihari leadership should play a very important role in raising consciousness about their own rehabilitation and integration process. At the social level, the promotion of inter-ethnic connectivity/social networking between the Biharis and Bengalis is important. In this regard, intermarriage between the Biharis and Bengalis will decrease the cultural differences between the two communities. Social networking may help to remove their isolation, build trust and confidence, and benefit them in accessing education, employment, and other rights that citizenship extends to individuals. 8. The government and non-government financial intuitions should come forward with soft loan schemes for housing or small businesses for the economic empowerment of the Biharis. The government should extend all administrative assistance to the Biharis who wish to obtain a driver’s license, passport, and citizenship certificate so that they can find self-employment or other employment at home and abroad. The existing hidden barriers to the Biharis’ employment in the public and private sectors should be removed so that they can compete for job slots in the public and private sectors with other groups. Economic integration can empower them and establish their allegiance to the state. 9. The government of Bangladesh should immediately undertake action plans to integrate the Biharis. The government should address the Biharis’ economic problems under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)7 of Bangladesh. Under specific rehabilitation projects for the Biharis, the government should approach bilateral and multilateral donors to support such projects. The government should suggest specific financial allocations in the annual national budget of the country under specific projects to rehabilitate and integrate Bihari citizens. 10. Culturally, the Biharis should be allowed to live as a vibrant cultural community by the state. The Bihari children are keen to learn Urdu at public schools to preserve their cultural identity. The government should take the necessary steps to promote and protect their culture. The government should launch several language institutes in different Bihari-concentrated areas where the Bihari

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children can learn Urdu under the sponsorship of the government. In addition, both public and private television channels should telecast programs for the Biharis in Urdu at least once a week, if not possibly every day. It will help Bangladesh emerge as a truly multicultural society and help achieve harmony in diversity. 11. The government should recognize the Bihari camps as valid mailing addresses so that the camp dwellers can use the addresses for official purposes. Unless the camp dwellers are relocated to other locations, the Bihari camps should be recognized by the government as a valid mailing address. This will help them overcome the existing barriers that mailing addresses pose to receiving public documents such as passports, driver’s licenses, birth certificates, and so on. 12. Regarding the Biharis still awaiting repatriation, the government of Bangladesh should try to make an amicable settlement with Pakistan through bilateral diplomacy. If bilateralism fails, the Bangladesh government should go for a third-party settlement through the mediation of an international organization such as the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth), or the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Both countries have shared membership in these international organizations and are approved and accepted by both countries. If approaching the issue through international organizations does not work, an alternative is to seek out other acceptable mediators, such as the USA, the UK, or Saudi Arabia. These may help settle the longstanding problem and mark an end to the tragedy of the Biharis.

Notes 1. Based on my interview with Professor Talukder Maniruzzaman on August 10, 2011, in Dhaka, Bangladesh. 2. Generally, political development leads society towards political integration and political underdevelopment hinders political integration. Like many Third World countries, Bangladesh suffers from political underdevelopment, which widened the gap between the ethnic Biharis and Bengalis and left the Biharis unintegrated from the Bengalis (Haider 1989, 252).

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253

3. Constitutional law of Bangladesh is the legal framework of this book. However, some references of international law and international human rights law have been mentioned here to support my argument because the government of Bangladesh has ratified those international treaties and incorporated relevant provisions into domestic laws. Bangladesh is also obligated to comply with international treaties under Article 25 of its Constitution, which pledges to respect international law (The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh). 4. RMMRU, Policy Brief 2 2007. Accessing Rights as Citizens: The Camp-­ based Urdu Speaking Community in Bangladesh. Online: http://www. rmmru.org/newsite/wp-­content/uploads/2013/07/2-­Biharis.pdf. 5. Formal employment sector is recognized, regulated, and monitored by the government. Formal sector workers work regular hours and their income is taxable, while the informal sector is not always regulated and monitored by the government. It includes casual workers, seasonal workers, part-time workers, temporary workers, agency workers, home workers, domestic workers, and unpaid family workers, and so on (Fredman, The Role of Equality and Non-Discrimination Laws…). 6. Article 28 (4) stipulates: Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making special provision in favour of women or children or for the advancement of any backward section of citizens. Article 29(3) (a) and (b) state: (a) making special provision in favour of any backward section of citizens for the purpose of securing their adequate representation in the service of the Republic; (b) giving effect to any law which makes provision for reserving appointments relating to any religious or denominational institution to persons of that religion or denomination; reserving for members of one sex any class of employment or office on the ground that it is considered by its nature to be unsuited to members of the opposite sex (The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh). 7. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are the documents of the Government of Bangladesh that “describe the country’s macroeconomic, structural, and social policies in support of growth and poverty reduction, as well as associated external financing needs and major sources of financing” (Bangladesh: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2013).

References Ara, Yasmin. 2008. Living Beyond the Bound: A Human Rights Perspective Towards Habitat of a Refugee Camp. Journal of Architecture 12 (2): 37–45. Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Origin of Totalitarianism. New  York: Meridian Books Inc.

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Bangladesh: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. 2013. IMF Country Report No. 13/63 (International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC). Online: https:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1363.pdf. Binder, Leonard. 1964. National Integration and Political Development. American Political Science Review 58 (3): 622–631. Chhotray, Vasudha, and Fiona McConnell. 2018. Certifications of Citizenship: The History, Politics and Materiality of Identity Documents in South Asian States and Diasporas. Contemporary South Asia 26 (2): 111–126. Chua, Lynette J. 2013. Law & Society Research on Southeast Asia: A Preliminary Survey of Themes and Proposed Directions. Paper presented to the East Asian Law & Society Conference, Shanghai, China [Unpublished]. Emerson, Rupert. 1960. From Empire to Nation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Farzana, Kazi Fahmida. 2008. The Neglected Stateless Bihari Community in Bangladesh: Victims of Political and Diplomatic Onslaught. Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 2 (1): 1–19. Friedman, Lawrence M. 1986. The Law and Society Movement. Stanford Law Review 38 (3): 763–780. Haider, Zaglul. 1989. Disintegration in Developing Countries: The Case of South Asia. The Rajshahi University Studies 17: 251–280. Haider, Md. Mustafa et al. 2003. The Bihari Community from a Human Rights Perspective. In Mizanur Rahman, ed., A Community in Transition: The Biharis in Bangladesh. Dhaka: ELCOP, pp. 133–207. Hartnell, Helen Elizabeth. 2006. Belonging: Citizenship and Migration in the European Union and in Germany. Issues in Legal Scholarship 6 (2): 330–400. Huque, Ahmad Shafiqul. 1990. Stranded Pakistanis and Burmese Muslims in Bangladesh: Historical and Contemporary Dimensions. Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal 11 (2): 273–294. Hussain, Ijaj. 2009a.The Dilemma of National Integration in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects. ISSRA Papers, 1: 43–60. Online: http://111.68.99.125/ website-­merge/issra-­papers/doc/ISSRA-­Papers-­2009.pdf. ICCPR. 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December. ICESCR. 1966. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. UNITED NATIONS. Jahan, Rounaq. 1972. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New  York: Columbia University Press. Joyner, Christopher C. 2005. International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Majumder, Azad. 2008. Bangladesh Citizenship Right Divides Biharis. May 20. Online: https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-­33670320080520. Mukhtar Ahmed v. Govt. of Bangladesh et al. 1982. 34 DLR (HCD) 29.

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RMMRU, Policy Brief 2. 2007. Accessing Rights as Citizens: The Camp-based Urdu Speaking Community in Bangladesh. Online: http://www.rmmru.org/ newsite/wp-­content/uploads/2013/07/2-­Biharis.pdf. Sadakat Khan v. Chief Election Commissioner. 2008. 60 DLR HCB, 407. Schuck, Peter H. 2000. Citizenship in Federal Systems. The American Journal of Comparative Law 48 (2): 195–226. Shaw, Jo. 1998. The Interpretation of European Union Citizenship. The Modern Law Review 61 (3): 293–317. Silbey, Susan S. 2002. Law and Society Movement. In Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social and Cultural Encyclopedia, ed. Johann J. Hagen and Herbert M. Krittzer, vol. 2, 860–863. ABC-CLIO: Santa Barbara, CA. Silbey, Susan S., and Austin Sarat. 1987. Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research. Law and Society Review 21 (1): 165–174. Stateless in Bangladesh & Pakistan: Generations of Oppressed. 2006. Online: https://www.scribd.com/document/80276737/StatelessinBangladesh-­Gene rationsofOppressedV1-­1. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2011. Trubek, David. 1984. Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism. Stanford Law Review 36: 575–622. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948. Adopted and Prepared by the UN General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 1948. Wriggins, Howard. 1966. National Integration. In Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, ed. Myron Weiner, 181–191. New York: Basic Books.



Appendices

Appendix A: Bihari Settlements in Bangladesh No. Name of Settlement

Location/Address

Population

1

Geneva Camp

18,000(30,000)a 235,000 sq. ft.

2

Shah Jahan Road Camp

3

Market Camp Ward

4

Community Centre Camp Mohammadpur, Dhaka Staff Quarter Camp Mohammadpur, Dhaka

Ward # 45, Babar Road, Mohammadpur, Dhaka Ward # 44, 14/27, Shah Jahan Road, Mohammadpur, Dhaka Ward # 42, Taj Mahal Road, Mohammadpur, Dhaka 3680 Ward # 42, Taj Mahal Road

5

Ward # 42, # 30, 31 & 32, Staff Quarter, Zohori Mohalla,

385

Area of settlement

8400 sq. ft.

3680

42,000 sq. ft.

1484

1484 22,000 sq. ft.

1100

19,000 sq. ft.

(continued)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 Z. Haider, Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46129-3

257

258 

APPENDICES

(continued) No. Name of Settlement 6

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Town Hall Relief Camp

Location/Address

Ward # 44, Asad Avenue, Mohammadpur, Dhaka Talab Camp Ward # 3, Section # 10, Mirpur, Dhaka Tejgaon Relief Ward # 3, WAPDA Camp Building, Section # 10, Mirpur, Dhaka Shaheed Millat Road # 6, 7 & 8, Camp Block A, Section # 10, Mirpur, Dhaka Madrasah Camp Ward # 3, Block A, Section # 10, Mirpur, Dhaka Muslim Camp Ward # 3, Block A, Section # 10, Mirpur, Dhaka Non-Local Relief Ward # 3, Road # Camp 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17, Block C, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka MCC Camp Ward # 3, Avenue 5, Block C, Section 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Mirpur Shaheen Ward # 3, Road # School Camp 13, Avenue 5, Block C, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Al-Falah Relief Ward # 3, Avenue Camp 5, Block C, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Irani Camp Ward # 3, Road # 16, Avenue 3, Block B, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Millat School Camp Ward # 3, Block B, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Football Ground Ward # 3, Road # Camp 10, Block C, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka

Population

Area of settlement

3115

38,000 sq. ft.

500

42,000 sq. ft.

3250

57,000 sq. ft.

950

18,000 sq. ft.

500

10,000 sq. ft.

2500

45,000 sq. ft.

800

15,000 sq. ft.

2250

40,000 sq. ft.

1750

33,000 sq. ft.

600

8000 sq. ft.

750

16,000 sq. ft.

3000

55,000 sq. ft.

2250

41,000 sq. ft.

(continued)

 APPENDICES 

259

(continued) No. Name of Settlement

Location/Address

Population

Area of settlement

19

Heed Society Camp

2250

40,000 sq. ft.

20

Post Office Camp

625

15,000 sq. ft.

21

Millat Camp

1500

29,000 sq. ft.

22

Talab Camp

1250

25,000 sq. ft.

23

CONCERN/ WAPDA Building Camp

3250

57,000 sq. ft.

24

Rahmat Camp

3250

57,000 sq. ft.

25

Mirpur BC (ADC Camp)

615

21,000 sq. ft.

26

Kurmitola Relief Camp

8000

133,000 sq. ft.

27

Irani Relief Camp #2

500

10,000 sq. ft.

28

Medical Camp

1000

20,000 sq. ft.

29

School Camp

Avenue 1, Section 11, Mirpur Ward # 3, Road # 10, Block C, Mirpur Bazar, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Ward # 3, Main Road, Block D, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Ward # 3, Block B, Near Jame Masjid, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Ward # 3, Kalshi Road, Block B, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Ward # 3, Road # 7, Block B, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Ward # 3, Avenue 1 & 3, Block A, Section # 11, Mirpur, Dhaka Ward # 8, Block E, Section # 12, Mirpur, Dhaka Ward # 8, Block E, Near Kalshi Road, Section # 12, Mirpur, Dhaka Ward # 8, Block C, Section # 12, Mirpur, Dhaka Ward # 8, Block D, Kala Pani, Near Eid Gah Maidan, Section # 12, Mirpur, Dhaka

1250

25,000 sq. ft.

(continued)

260 

APPENDICES

(continued) No. Name of Settlement

Location/Address

Population

Area of settlement

30

Maura Para Camp

2250

40,000 sq. ft.

31

Adamjee Nagar Camp

6500

114,000 sq. ft.

32

Rally Bagan Camp

33

David Bagan Camp

34

Dewan Ganj Railway Colony Camp

35

Jamalpur Bihari Camp

36

Patgodam Camp

37

TIPA Khola Gowal Chamat Camp Kalipatti New Colony Camp

Road # 5, Block C, D & E, Near Kalshi Road, Section # 12, Mirpur, Dhaka Adamjee New EPZ, PS Siddherganj, Narayanganj Rally Bagan, Kumodini Trust, Narayanganj Kumodini Trust, Narayanganj Dewan Ganj Railway Colony, Dewan Ganj Bazar, Dist. Jamalpur Dhakaya Patti Bazar, Bokoltola, Jamalpur Ward # 10, Kalibari Road, Mymensingh TIPA Khola Gowal Chamat, Faridpur New Colony, College Road, Rajbari Jahanabad, Matom Danga, Colony # 2, PS Khan Jahan Ali, Khulna Ward # 10, New Colony, Khalispur, Khulna Ward # 12, Old Colony, Khalispur, Khulna Ward # 12, Old Colony, Khalispur, Khulna Ward # 12, Old Colony, Khalispur, Khulna Ward # 12, Old Colony, Khalispur, Khulna

38

39

Matom Danga Colony Camp # 2

40

Camp # 8

41

Baitul Falah Camp

42

Camp # 7

43

Camp # 3

44

Camp # 1

315

6500 sq. ft.

325

7000 sq. ft.

1000

20,500 sq. ft.

250

30,000 sq. ft.

7500

17,000 sq. ft.

675

80,000 sq. ft.

730

88,000 sq. ft.

1036

24,309 sq. m.

109

1512 sq. m.

197

1829 sq. m.

617

12,272 sq. m.

664

3894 sq. m.

494

8469 sq. m.

(continued)

 APPENDICES 

261

(continued) No. Name of Settlement

Location/Address

Population

45

West Banandi Para, Kathaltola Camp

46

Sardar Bahadur School Camp

47

Segun Bagan Camp

48

Diesel Colony Camp

49

New Jhawtala Colony Camp

50

Jhawtala Colony Camp

51

TPP Colony Camp

52

Wireless Colony Camp

53

XEN Colony Camp

54

Islamia School Camp

55

Sardar Bahadur Nagar Camp

Ward # 1, Colony # 174 2, West Banandi Para, Kathaltola, Jessore Ward # 13, 2598 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 13, 1155 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 13, 236 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 13, 105 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 13, 997 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 13, 105 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 13, 3134 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 13, 116 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 13, 577 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 13, 472 Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong

Area of settlement 912 sq. m.

62,400 sq. ft.

48,604 sq. ft.

5026 sq. ft.

2604 sq. ft.

21,684 sq. ft.

5443 sq. ft.

117,672 sq. ft.

3260 sq. ft.

12,264 sq. ft.

16,272 sq. ft.

(continued)

262 

APPENDICES

(continued) No. Name of Settlement

Location/Address

56

Khulshi Colony Camp

57

Hali Shahar Non-­Local Camp

58

Sher Shah NonLocal Camp

59

Raufabad NonLocal Camp

60

Feroz Shah Non-­Local Camp

61

Hamzarbagh Non-Local Camp

62

Shuluk Bahar Non-Local Camp

63

Khair Bari Camp

64

Babu Para Camp

65 66

Muslim Para Railway Ispahani Camp # 3

67

Ispahani Camp # 2

68

New Relief Camp

Ward # 13, Pahartali, PO & PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 26, PO & PS Hali Shahar, Chittagong Ward # 7, PO Amin Jute Mills, PS Bayazid Bosta Ward # 7, PO Amin Jute Mills, PS Bayazid Bostami, Chittagong Ward # 9, West Feroz Shah, PS Khulshi, Chittagong Ward # 7, West Shola Shahar, PO Amin Jute Mills, PS Panchsila, Chittagong Ward # 8, Shuluk Bahar, PO Chawk Bazar, PS Panchsalia, Chittagong Ward # 11, Khair Bari, Rangpur Ward # 12, Babu Para, Rangpur Ward # 11, Muslim Para, Rangpur Ward # 11, Robsonganj, Alam Nagar, Rangpur RDCC Tajhat Road, Alam Nagar, Rangpur Ward # 11, Robsonganj, Rangpur

Population

Area of settlement

787

187,450 sq. ft.

997

111,900 sq. ft.

265

52,500 sq. ft.

1837

448,500 sq. ft.

1077

247,500 sq. ft.

315

45,000 sq. ft.

178

2880 sq. ft.

760

13,500 sq. ft.

760

13,500 sq. ft.

1050

18,000 sq. ft.

2620

46,960 sq. ft.

1400

25,350 sq. ft.

780

13,500 sq. ft.

(continued)

 APPENDICES 

263

(continued) No. Name of Settlement 69 70 71

72

73

74 75 76

77 78

79

80 81 82 83 84

85

Sulphate Camp

Location/Address

Population

Ward # 11, Muslim 750 Para, Rangpur Kalam Godown Ward # 11, Station 175 Road, Rangpu Alam Nagar Colony Ward # 12, Alam 210 Camp (Colony A) Nagar Colony, Rangpur Alam Nagar Colony Ward # 12, Alam 210 Camp (Colony B) Nagar Colony, Rangpur Alam Nagar Colony Ward # 12, Alam 210 Camp (Colony C) Nagar Colony, Rangpur Murgi Farm Camp Ward # 11, Murgi 263 Farm, Rangpur Railway Farm Camp Ward # 11, Railway 847 Colony, Rangpur Machhua Patti Ward # 11, 165 Camp Machhua Patti, Rangpur Latif Pur Colony Ward # 11, Latif 550 Camp (Zone A) Pur Colony, Bogra Latif Pur Colony Ward # 12, Latif 850 Camp Pur Colony, Chawk Farid, Bogra Chawk Lokman Ward # 13, Chawk 1450 Malti Nagar Camp Lokman Malti (Zone C) Nagar, Bogra Latif Pur Colony Ward # 11, Latif 880 (Zone D) Pur Colony, Bogra Latif Pur Colony Ward # 12, Latif 560 (Zone E) Pur Colony, Bogra Latif Pur Colony Ward # 12, Latif P 490 (Zone F) Sherpur Shantahar Sherpur Shantahar, 160 Bogra Fateh Mohammadp Ward # 5, Railway 850 ur School Camp Colony, Ishwardi, (Zone A) Pabna Fateh Mohammadp Ward # 5, Railway 650 ur School Camp Colony, Ishwardi, (Zone B) Pabna

Area of settlement 13,500 sq. ft. 3150 sq. ft. 3260 sq. ft.

3280 sq. ft.

3250 sq. ft.

4850 sq. ft. 9500 sq. ft. 2000 sq. ft.

8800 sq. ft. 13,600 sq. ft.

24,600 sq. ft.

13,800 sq. ft. 9200 sq. ft. 6500 sq. ft. 2600 sq. ft. 14,000 sq. ft.

12,000 sq. ft.

(continued)

264 

APPENDICES

(continued) No. Name of Settlement 86

Fateh Mohammadp ur School Camp (Zone C) Fateh Mohammadp ur School Camp (Zone D) Siroil Colony Camp (Railway area)

Location/Address

Ward # 5, Loco Colony, Ishwardi, Pabna 87 Ward # 5, Loco Colony, Ishwardi, Pabna 88 Ward # 19, Station Road, Near Railway Station, Ishwardi, Pabna 89 Sagor Para Camp Shah Makhdoom (Old town area) Road, Rajshahi 90 Munshi Para Camp Ward # 11, Munshi Para, Gaibandha 91 David Cong Para Ward # 11, Munshi Camp Para, Gaibandha 92 Railway Colony Ward # 11, Railway Colony, Gaibandha 93 Bridge Road Colony Ward # 11, Bridge Camp Road, Gaibandha 94 Mohri Para Camp Ward # 11, Mohri Para, Gaibandha 95 Cinema Hall Camp Ward # 2, Golahat, Syedpur, Nilphamari 96 Golahat Camp Ward # 2, Golahat, Syedpur, Nilphamari 97 Islam Bag Camp Ward # 3, Islam Bag, Syedpur, Nilphamari 98 Burma Shell Camp Ward # 3, Atiar Colony, Syedpur, Nilphamari 99 Rasul Pur Ward # 3, Rasul Pur, Syedpur, Nilphamar 100 Balu Race Camp Ward # 4, Near Thana, Atiar Colony, Syedpur, Nilphamari 101 Godown Camp # 5 Ward # 6, Rangpur Road, Syedpur, Nilphamari

Population

Area of settlement

1960

26,000 sq. ft.

1550

22,500 sq. ft.

2700

42,000 sq. ft.

1600

900 decimal

520

85,000 sq. ft.

250

45,000 sq. ft.

220

4000 sq. ft.

135

13,500 sq. ft.

260

4400 sq. ft.

915

8056 sq. ft.

2750

23,634 sq. ft.

200

1620 sq. ft.

285

2909 sq. ft.

330

6810 sq. ft.

430

6262 sq. ft.

260

1417 sq. ft.

(continued)

 APPENDICES 

265

(continued) No. Name of Settlement 102 Chamra Godown Camp 103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

Location/Address

Ward # 6, Rangpur Road, Syedpur, Nilphamari Mustafa Godown Ward # 6, Rangpur Camp Road, Syedpur, Nilphamari Godown Camp # 7 Ward # 6, Rangpur Road, Syedpur, Nilphamari Muslim Para Camp Ward # 6, Muslim Para, Syedpur, Nilphamari Bangali Nijpara Ward # 7, Bangali Camp Para (Azad Khan Godown), Syedpur, Nilphamari Out House Camp Ward # 7, Officers Colony, Syedpur, Nilphamari Hati Khana Camp Ward # 8, Cantonment Road, Syedpur, Nilphamari Railway Mess Camp Ward # 9, Cantonment Road, Syedpur, Nilphamari Durga Mill Camp Ward # 11, Bichali Hat Road, Syedpur, Nilphamari Dharmsala Camp Ward # 11, Naya Bazar, Syedpur, Nilphamari Kuli Para Camp Ward # 11, New Babu Para, Syedpur, Nilphamari Shaheed Ajmal Ward # 12, Zahurul Camp Haque Road, Syedpur, Nilphamari Bansbari Camp Ward # 13 & 14, Bansbari, Syedpur, Nilphamari

Population

Area of settlement

2400

42,558 sq. ft.

160

800 sq. ft.

230

1499 sq. ft.

564

2963 sq. ft.

184

2400 sq. ft.t

1060

4521 sq. ft.t

3100

28,800 sq. ft.t

270

1250 sq. ft.t

340

14,602 sq. ft.t

1200

3617 sq. ft.t

435

4480 sq. ft.t

380

17,748 sq. ft.

1080

21,960 sq. ft.

(continued)

266 

APPENDICES

(continued) No. Name of Settlement

Location/Address

Population

Area of settlement

115 Mistry Para Camp

Ward # 15, Mistry Para, Syedpur, Nilphamari Ward # 15, Mistry Para, Syedpur, Nilphamari

384

4096 sq. ft.

435

4480 sq. ft.

116 American Camp

Source: Sholder, Hannah. 2011. Housing, and Land Rights: The Camp-Dwelling Urdu-Speaking Community in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), pp. 44–50 a According to a 2015 UNHCR estimate, 30,000 Bihari population are residing in the Geneva Camp alone. According to the UNHCR report, by 2006, approximately 151,000 Biharis were living in 116 camps and settlements and another 100,000 were living outside camps (Shadman Onchita and Roland Schönbauer. 2015. How a Bangladesh Court Ruling Changed the Lives of More than 300,000 Stateless People. UNHCR, 23 February. Online, http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/2/54ec22869/ bangladesh-­court-­ruling-­changed-­lives-­300000-­stateless-­people.html)

Appendix B: Population of Annual Unregistered Births by Region Region

Births (2003)

% of unregistered children

Number of unregistered children

Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East &North Africa South Asia East Asia & Pacific Latin America &Caribbean CEE/ CIS & Baltic States Industrialized countries Deve4loping Countries Least Developing Countries World

26,879 9790

55 16

14,751 1543

37,099 31,614 11,567

63 19 15

23,395 5901 1787

5250

23

1218

10,827 119,973 27,819

2 40 71

218 48,147 19,682

133,28

36

48,276

Source: UNICEF. 2005. The ‘Rights’ Start to Life: A Statistical Analysis of Birth Registration. Table A: Extent of Problem: Population of Annual Unregistered Births, by Region, p. 3. Online: http://www. albacharia.ma/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/30710/0467The%20%27Rights%27%20Start%20 %20to%20Life%20%20A%20statistical%20analysis%20of%20birth%20registration.pdf?sequence=1

 APPENDICES 

267

Appendix C: Number of Countries Reporting and Number of Stateless Persons, 2004–2012 Year

Number of countries Reporting Statistics on Stateless Persons

Total number of Stateless persons (millions)

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

30 48 49 54 58 60 65 64 72

1.5 2.4 5.8 3 0.0 6.6 6.6 6.5 3.5 3

Source: Compiled from the UNHCR, 2008, 2009 & 2012 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons, Online:; ; , and for the statistics of 2010, see, Statistics Stateless Persons, 2010, online:

Appendix D: Stateless Persons in Different Regions in the World, 2012 States

Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate

Africa Asia Europe Latin America & Caribbean North Americas Oceania

721,362 1938,722 675,669 24 0 0

Source: Data used from Table 1, Refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (Refugees and IDPs, stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum /end-2012). Online:

268 

APPENDICES

Appendix E: Worldwide Statelessness, 2012 State

Persons under State UNHCR’s statelessness mandate

Albania Armenia Austria Azerbaijan Belarus Belgium Bosnia & Herzegovina Brazil Brunei Darussalam Burundi Hong Kong/Sar, China Columbia Côte d’Ivoire

12 700,000

Iraq Serbia Slovakia Slovenia

120,000 8500 1523 4

Spain Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Thailand Turkey Malaysia Mexico Mongolia Montenegro Myanmar Netherlands Nicaragua Norway

7443 35 542 3585 6996 3898 4500 1 21,009 1302 1

Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate

Ireland Israel Italy Japan Kazakhstan Kenya Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lichtenstein Lithuania

73 14 470 1100 6935 20,000 93,000 15,473 280,759 5 4130 177 178,000

9596 69 221,000 2300 905

Luxembourg Russian Federation Saudi Arabia Portugal Qatar Republic of Korea Republic of Moldova Romania Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Egypt

506,179 780 40,001 7 220 3383 808,075 2005 1 2313

Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Honduras Hungary Iceland Turkmenistan

36

70,000 553 1200 179 1998 248 2886 1502 1623 60 94,325 2017 1210 1156 5683 154 1 111 119 8947 (continued)

 APPENDICES 

269

(continued) State

Persons under State UNHCR’s statelessness mandate

Philippines Poland

6015 10,825

Vietnam

11,500

Ukraine United Kingdom Total

Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate 35,000 205 3,335,777

Source: UNHCR, Global Trends, 2012. Data used from Table  1, Refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (Refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum /end-2012. See online: < http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013/UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V08_web.pdf>

Appendix F: Agreement on Bilateral Relations between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan (Simla Agreement) Simla, 2 July 1972. 1. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing talk of advancing the welfare of their peoples. In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:

(i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries; (ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations;

270 

APPENDICES



(iii) That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit; (iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means; (v) That they shall always respect each other’s national unity, territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereign equality;



That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other. 2. Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them. 3. In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that;

(i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts, and air links including overflights. (ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country. (iii) Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible. (iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.

In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details. 4. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that:

(i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.

 APPENDICES 





271

(ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line. (iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof. 5. This Agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged. 6. Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Sd/− (Indira Gandhi) Prime Minister Republic of India Sd/− (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) President Islamic Republic of Pakistan Source: Indian Ministry of External Affairs (Official Website).

272 

APPENDICES

Appendix G: Text of the 1973 Agreement Between the Government of India and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan regarding the Repatriation of Persons Desirous of solving the humanitarian problems resulting from the conflict of 1971 and thus enabling the vast majority of human beings referred to in the Joint Indo-Bangladesh Declaration to go to their respective countries, India and Pakistan have reached the following agreement: 1. The immediate implementation of the solution of these humanitarian problems is without prejudice to the respective positions of the Parties concerned relating to the case of 195 prisoners of war referred to in clauses (vi) and (vii) of this paragraph; 2. Subject to clause (i) repatriation of all Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees will commence from the utmost despatch as soon as logistic arrangements are completed and from a date to be settled by mutual agreement; 3. Simultaneously, the repatriation of all Bangalees in Pakistan, and all Pakistanis in Bangladesh referred to in clause (v) below, to their respective countries will commence; 4. In the matter of reparticiation of all categories of persons the principle of simultaneity will be observed throughout as far as possible; 5. Without prejudice to the respective positions of Bangladesh and Pakistan on the question of non-Bangalees, who are stated to have “opted for repatriation to Pakistan”, the Government of Pakistan guided by considerations of humanity, agrees, initially, to receive a substantial number of such non-Bangalees from Bangladesh. It is further agreed that the Prime Ministers of Bangladesh and Pakistan or their designated representatives will thereafter meet to decide what additional number of persons, who may wish to migrate to Pakistan, may be permitted to do so. Bangladesh has made it clear that it will participate in such a meeting only on the basis of sovereign equality; 6. Bangladesh agrees that no trials of the 195 prisoners of war shall take place during the entire period of repatriation and that pending the settlement envisaged in clause (vii) below these prisoners of war shall remain in India;

 APPENDICES 

273

7. On completion of repatriation of Pakistan prisoners of war and civilian internees in India; Bangalees in Pakistan and Pakistanis in Bangladesh referred to in clause (v) above, or earlier, if they so agree, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan will discuss and settle the question of 195 prisoners of war. Bangladesh has made it clear that it can participate in such a meeting only on the basis of sovereign equality. The Special representatives are confident that the completion of repatriation provided for in this Agreement would make a signal contribution to the promotion of reconciliation in the sub-­ continent and create an atmosphere favorable to a constructive outcome of the meeting of the three countries; 8. The time schedule for the completion of repatriation of the Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees from India, the Bangalees from Pakistan and the Pakistanis referred to in clause (v) above from Bangladesh, will be worked out by India in consultation with Bangladesh and Pakistan, as the case may be. The Government of India will make the logistic arrangements for the Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees who are to be repatriated to Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan will make logistic arrangements within its territory upto agreed points of exit for the repatriation of Bangladesh nationals to Bangladesh. The Government of Bangladesh will make necessary arrangements for the transport of these persons from such agreed points of exit to Bangladesh. The Government of Bangladesh will make logistic arrangements within its territory upto agreed points of exit for the movement of the Pakistanis referred to in clause (v) above who will go to Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan will make necessary arrangements for the transport of these persons from such agreed points of exit to Pakistan. In making logistic arrangements the Governments concerned may seek the assistance of international humanitarian organisations and others; 9. For the purpose of facilitating the repatriation provided for in this Agreement, the representatives of the Swiss Federal Government and any international humanitarian organisation entrusted with this task shall have unrestricted access at all times to Bangalees in Pakistan and to Pakistanis in Bangladesh referred to in clause (v) above. The Government of Bangladesh and the Government of Pakistan will provide all assistance and facilities to such representatives in this regard including facilities for adequate publicity for

274 

APPENDICES

the benefit of the persons entitled to repatriation under this Agreement; 10. All persons to be repatriated in accordance with this Agreement will be treated with humanity and consideration. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have concurred in this Agreement. The Special Representative of the Prime Minister of India, having consulted the Government of Bangladesh has also conveyed the concurrence of Bangladesh Government in this Agreement. DONE in New Delhi on August 28, 1973  in three originals, all of which are equally authentic. Sd/− P.N.HAKSAR Special Representativeof the Prime Minister of India

Sd/− AZIZAHMED Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan

Source: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India< http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-­documents. htm?dtl/5868/Agreement+on+Repatriation+of+Persons>

Appendix H: Text of the Tri-patriate Agreement of Bangladesh-Pakistan-India Following is the full text of the tripartite agreement signed in New Delhi on 9 April 1974. 1. On 2 July 1972, the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India signed an historic agreement at Simla under which they resolved that “the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent.” The agreement also provided for the settlement of “their differences by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon”. 2. Bangladesh welcomed the Simla Agreement. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh strongly supported its objective of reconciliation, good neighborliness and establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent.

 APPENDICES 

275

3. The humanitarian problems arising in the wake of the tragic event of 1971 constituted a major obstacle in the way of reconciliation and normalization among the countries of the subcontinent. In the absence of recognition, it was not possible to have tripartite talks to settle the humanitarian problems, as Bangladesh could not participate in such a meeting except on the basis of sovereign equality. 4. On 17 April 1973, India and Bangladesh took a major step forward to break the deadlock on the humanitarian issues by setting aside the political problem of recognition. In a declaration issued on that date, they said that they “are resolved to continue their efforts to reduce tension, promote friendly and harmonious relationship in the sub-continent and work together towards the establishment of a durable peace.” Inspired by this vision and “in the larger interest of reconciliation, peace and stability in the subcontinent”, they jointly proposed that the problem of the detained and stranded persons should be resolved on humanitarian considerations through simultaneous repatriation of all such persons except those Pakistani prisoners of war who might be required by the Government of Bangladesh for trial on certain charges. 5. Following the declaration, there were a series of talks between India and Bangladesh and India and Pakistan. These talks resulted in an agreement at Delhi on 28 august 1973, between India and Pakistan with the concurrence of Bangladesh, which provided for a solution of the outstanding humanitarian problems. 6. In pursuance of this agreement, the process of three-way repatriation commenced on 19 September 1973. So far nearly three lakh persons have been repatriated which has generated an atmosphere of reconciliation and paved the way for normalization of relations in the sub-continent. 7. In February 1974, recognition took place thus facilitating the participation of Bangladesh in the tripartite meeting envisaged in the Delhi Agreement, on the basis of sovereign equality. Accordingly, Dr. Kamal Hossain, Foreign Minister of Government of Bangladesh, Mr. Swaran Singh, Minister of External affairs, Government of India, and Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, met in New Delhi from 5 April to 9 April 1974 and discussed the various issues men-

276 

APPENDICES

tioned in the Delhi Agreement, in particular the question of the 195 prisoners of war and the completion of the three-way process of repatriation involving Bangladesh and Pakistani prisoners of war in India. 8. The Ministers reviewed the progress of the three-way repatriation under the Delhi Agreement of 28 August 1973. They were gratified that such a large number of persons detained or stranded in the three countries had since reached their destinations. 9. The Ministers also considered steps that needed to be taken in order expeditiously to bring the process of three-way repatriation to a satisfactory conclusion. 10. The Indian side stated that the remaining Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees in India to be repatriated under the Delhi Agreement, numbering approximately 6500, would be repatriated at the usual pace of a train on alternate days and the likely shortfall due to suspension of trains from 10 April to 19 April 1974, on account of the Kumbh mela, would be made up by running ­additional trains after April 19. It was thus hoped that the repatriation of prisoners of war would be completed by the end of April 1974. 11. The Pakistan side stated that the repatriation of Bangladesh nationals from Pakistan was approaching completion. The remaining Bangladesh nationals in Pakistan would also be repatriated without let or hindrance. 12. In respect of non-Bengalis in Bangladesh, the Pakistan side stated that the Government of Pakistan had already issued clearances for movement of Pakistanis in favour of those non-Bengalis who were either domiciled in former West Pakistan, were employees of the Central Government and their families or were members of the divided families, irrespective of their original domicile. The issuance of clearances to 25,000 persons who constitute hardship cases was also in progress. The Pakistan side also reiterated that all those who fall under the first three categories would be received by Pakistan without any limit to numbers. In respect of persons whose applications had been rejected, the Government of Pakistan would, upon request, provide reasons why any particular case was rejected. Any aggrieved applicant could at a time, seek

 Appendices 

277

a review of his application provided he was able to supply new facts or further information to the Government of Pakistan in support of his contention that he qualified in one or other of the three categories. The claim of such persons would not be time-barred. In the event of the decision of review of a case being adverse, the Government of Pakistan and Bangladesh might seek to resolve it by mutual consultation. 13. The question of 195 Pakistani prisoners of war was discussed by the three Ministers in the context of the earnest desire of the Governments for reconciliation, peace and friendship in the sub-­ continent. The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh stated that the excesses and manifold crimes committed by those prisoners of war constituted, according to the relevant provisions of the UN General Assembly resolutions and international law, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and that there was universal consensus that persons charged with such crimes as 195 Pakistani prisons of war should be held to account and subjected to the due process of law. The Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan said that his Government condemned and deeply regretted any crimes that may have been committed. 14. In this connection, the three Ministers noted that the matter should be viewed in the context of the determination of the three countries to continue resolutely to work for reconciliation. The Ministers further noted that following recognition, the Prime Minister of Pakistan had declared that he would visit Bangladesh in response to the invitation of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and appealed to the people of Bangladesh to forgive and forget the mistakes of the past in order to promote reconciliation. Similarly, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh had declared with regard to the atrocities and destruction committed in Bangladesh in 1971, that he wanted the people to forget the past and to make a fresh start, stating that the people of Bangladesh knew how to forgive. 15. In the light of the foregoing and, in particular, having regard to the appeal of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the people of Bangladesh to forgive and forget the mistakes of the past, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh stated that the Government of Bangladesh had decided not to proceed with the trials as an act of clemency. It was agreed that the 195 prisoners of war might be

278 

Appendices

repatriated to Pakistan along with the other prisoners of war now in the process of repatriation under the Delhi Agreement. 16. The Ministers expressed their conviction that the above agreements provide a firm basis for the resolution of the humanitarian problems arising out of the conflict of 1971. They reaffirmed the vital stake the 700 million people of the three countries have in peace and progress and reiterated the resolve of their Governments to work for the promotion of normalization of relations and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent. Signed in New Delhi on 9 April 1974, in three originals, each of which is equally authentic. (Kamal Hossain) Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh(Swaran Singh) Minister of External Affairs, Government of India (Aziz Ahmed) Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. Source: Bangladesh Genocide Archive. https://www.genocidebangladesh.org/text-­o f-­t he-­t ri-­p atriate-­a greement-­o f-­b angladesh-­p akistan-­ india/

Index1

A Abella, R. S., 68 Abrar, C.R., 116, 124, 126 Access to a few important rights, 2, 6 Adam, Werner, 111 Afroyim v. Rusk, 54 Age, gender, class, and occupation, 13 Ager, Alastair, 151, 174, 177, 180, 187 Agreement, 46, 69, 96, 108–110, 114, 226, 269–278 Ahmad, Imtiaz, 96 Ahmad, Manjoor Uddin, 129n12 Ahmad, Muzaffar, 97 Ahmar, Moonis, 119 Ahmed, Abul Mansur, 101 Ahmed, Aftab, 156 Ahmed, Aziz, 275 Ahmed, Feroz, 3, 95, 130n16 Ahmed, Jamil-ud-din, 129n12 Ahmed, Kamruddin, 100 Ahmed, Moudud, 2, 100, 104, 106, 109, 132n37, 208n20

Ahsan, Rosie Majid, 175, 178 Aid operations, 11 Akkas, Sarker Ali, 74 Aleinikoff, Alexander T., 50 Alfonsi, Alfonso, 44 Ali, Choudhury Mohammad, 130n17 Allegiance, 4, 44, 46, 53, 55, 58, 59, 64, 100, 107, 108, 122, 124, 125, 156, 196, 251 Allen, Danielle, 28 American Convention on Human Rights (1969), 35 Anisuzzaman, M., 131n20 Anonymity, 9 Ansari, Sarah F. D., 93 Appropriation of relief, 16 Ara, Yasmin, 174, 242 Arendt, Hannah, 31, 32, 38, 55–57, 61, 215–217, 240 Aristotle, 40, 41 Asylum seekers, 78n1 Availability, 7, 8, 11

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 Z. Haider, Biharis in Bangladesh: Transition from Statelessness to Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46129-3

279

280 

INDEX

Ayub, Muhammad, 108 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 2, 128n4 B Baglay, Sasha, 48 Bailout protocol, 17 Bangla, 9, 13, 14, 20n7, 149, 178, 203 Bangladesh, 1, 25, 91–127, 145, 215, 240, 257–266 The Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order, 1972 (President’s Order No.149 of 1972), 2, 63, 64, 122, 123 The Bangladesh Code Vol. X1 (The Citizenship Act 1951), 65, 80n21 Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary, 63 Bangladeshi citizenship, 2, 4, 63, 65, 80n22, 107, 115, 122–124, 127, 146, 158, 161–165, 174, 195, 204, 205, 217, 230, 241, 243, 247 Bangladeshi society, 4, 148, 165, 179, 186, 188–190, 196, 197, 201–206, 228, 243–246, 249–251 Bano, Samia, 12, 15 Barbalet, J. M, 41, 43, 56 Basher, Iftekharul, 94, 127n1, 134n47 Bass, Gary J., 104 Batchelor, Carol A, 27, 28, 30, 49, 58, 59 Baubock, Rainer, 55, 58, 215, 217 Begum, Afroza, 69, 153, 225 Bengalis, 1–3, 6–9, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20n2, 20n3, 20n7, 43, 57, 79n6, 79n7, 91–93, 97–106, 108, 109, 114, 117, 122, 126, 127, 130n19, 131n20, 131n21, 131n22, 131n23, 131n24, 131n26, 132n27, 132n36,

132n37, 133n40, 133n41, 133n44, 133n45, 145–148, 150–152, 157, 158, 161–165, 167, 169–174, 177–180, 185, 187–194, 196–201, 203, 205, 207n16, 208n20, 223, 229, 230, 239, 241–246, 248, 250, 251, 252n2 majority, 1, 171 politicians, 17 respondent, 9, 19, 145, 192–206, 245, 246, 248 Benhabib, Seyla, 57 Bhabha, Jacqueline, 25, 26 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 110, 111, 119 Bihari, 1, 56, 91–127, 145, 215–232, 239 community, 10, 101, 110, 147, 149, 153, 170, 173, 179, 181, 186, 190, 191, 197, 198, 224, 249, 251 migrants, 2, 94 minority, 1, 98 respondents, 8, 13, 14, 145–147, 149, 154–156, 159, 161, 162, 164, 171–173, 179, 181, 184, 188, 190, 191, 205, 208n22, 219, 223, 227–231, 232n1, 242, 245 Bihari Settlements in Bangladesh, 257–266 Bilingual, 14, 146, 147 Binder, Leonard, 96, 187, 246 Bird, Kai, 110 Birth registration, 29, 38 Blackman, Jeffrey L., 49 Blank, Yishai, 28 Blauner, Bob, 13 Blitz, Brad K., 26, 32, 35–38, 53, 217 Bolitho, Hector, 129n12 Bose, Sarmila, 104, 106 Bose, Sugato, 92, 94, 119, 128n6

 INDEX 

Bosniak, Linda, 29, 52, 58, 60, 215, 216, 227 Boyce, Carolyn, 7 Brouwer, Andrew, 35, 48 Brownlie, Ian, 46, 49 Brudner, Alan, 43 Burki, Shahid Javed, 128n6 Butterfield, Fox, 133n45 Byrne, Lain, 225 C Cabell v. Chaves-Salido, 1982, 54 Caccioppo, John T., 190 Caccioppo, Stephanie, 190 Calcutta, 2, 94 Camp life, 8, 145, 174, 175, 188–190, 192, 242, 245 Camps, 4, 7–11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 76, 101, 106–108, 112, 113, 116, 117, 125, 133n46, 146, 151–154, 157, 162, 173–186, 188, 189, 191, 192, 198, 203, 205, 219–221, 223, 224, 228, 231, 232n1, 239, 241–243, 247, 248, 252 Carens, Joseph H., 55, 57, 58, 215 Carew and Company v. Labour Court, 69 Cases, 5, 6, 48–50, 54, 59, 109, 124, 125, 134n50, 134n52, 152, 181, 233n6, 272, 273, 276, 277 Cavanagh, M., 68 Central government, 1, 93–95, 98–103, 109, 110, 118, 170, 241, 276 Central question, 4, 145 Chachar, Abdul Khaleque, 117, 120 Chakma, Kabita, 113 Chatterji, Joya, 43, 62 Chhotray, Vasudha, 242 Choi, Susanne Y. P., 12

281

Choudhury, Dilara, 3, 99, 111, 127n1, 187 Choudhury, G.W., 100 Choudhury, Moinul Hossein, 104 Chowdhury, Iftekhar A., 121 Chowdhury, Iftekhar Uddin, 68, 69 Chua, Lynette J., 5, 239 The Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2009 (Act XVII of 2009), 64 Citizenship theory, 6, 19, 78, 215, 219–221, 225, 229, 231, 232, 242 Clarke, Paul Barry, 40 Claude, Richard Pierre, 177, 222 Cohen, Robin, 28, 30, 31, 78n1 Collins, Clay, 30, 32, 33 Commission on Human Security, 52 Conklin, William E., 36 Constitution of Bangladesh, 6, 19, 25, 39, 61–62, 67–73, 75, 76, 78, 215, 218–220, 222, 223, 225–228, 231, 232, 242, 249 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 62, 63, 65–76, 80n25, 218–224, 226, 228, 232n3, 232n4 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979-United Nations), 35, 37 The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (CNMW, 1957), 35, 37 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 31–34, 76, 79n2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 4, 34, 121, 208n23 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 28, 29, 121, 217 Couldry, N., 50

282 

INDEX

D Datta, Antara, 96, 97, 109, 113, 133n46 D'Costa, B., 113 De La Vega, Connie, 79n4 Deng, Francis M., 28 Donner, Ruth, 49 Dunn, J., 218 Dwyer, Peter, 54, 56, 216 E Economy of Bangladesh, 4 Edward, Alice, 38, 45, 52, 216 Emerson, Rupert, 187, 247 Engel, David M., 12–14 Ennals, Lord, 111, 112, 114 Epstein, Lee, 7, 20n6 The Equal Rights Trust (ERT), 28, 30, 35 Ethnic roots, 20n2, 131n23 Etikan, Ilker, 8 European Convention on Nationality (1997-Council of Europe), 35, 49 Everson, Michelle, 44 F Fahrmeir, Andreas, 42 Farzana, Kazi Fahmida, 107, 176, 181, 242 Feith, Herbert, 93 Fernandez-Kelly, M. Patricia, 44 Ferstman, Carla, 38, 45, 52, 216 Filep, Bela, 14 Final Act, 31, 33 Forcese, Craig, 44 Franda, Marcus, 97, 106 Freedom struggle of the Bengalis, 1, 101, 241 Friedman, Lawrence M., 5, 239

G Gandhi, Indira, 271 Ganguly, Summit, 129n9 Gaston, Herron Keyon, 42 Geneva camp, 10, 11, 15, 116, 125, 148, 150, 152, 153, 155–167, 169, 170, 172–176, 178–180, 182, 184–188, 191, 192, 198, 200, 205, 224, 266 Genova, N. De, 216 Geographical proximity, 2, 7, 94 Gerlach, Christian, 99, 133n44 Ghosh, Papiya, 92, 110, 111, 113–115, 117, 120, 121 Gibney, Matthew J., 50, 51 Gibrill, Hashim T., 5 Goldmark, Sue, 110 Goris, Indira, 31, 51, 217 Gorman, Daniel, 38, 41, 43 Government of Bangladesh, 3, 20n3, 107, 110, 113, 122, 126, 134n47, 134n54, 135n61, 158–161, 163, 164, 171, 181–183, 186, 191, 193–201, 205, 207n13, 208n25, 208n26, 224, 229, 230, 232, 233n8, 244, 245, 248, 251, 252, 253n3, 253n7, 273–275, 277, 278 Government officials, 6 Government of India, 130n17, 269–275 Government of Pakistan, 93–95, 103, 109, 114, 127, 160, 161, 166, 167, 171, 193, 194, 247, 269–277 Grabska, Katarzyana, 51 Gray, Vance, 226 Great Calcutta killings, 2, 92, 94, 128n4 Guion, Lisa A., 7 Gupta, Sisir, 129n8, 131n20

 INDEX 

H Habitual residence, 4, 39, 49, 121, 208n23 Hafiz, M. Abdul, 110, 111, 134n50, 134n52, 179 Haider, Md. Mustafa, 152, 175, 178, 179, 223, 242 Haider, Zaglul, 26, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 109, 115, 127n1, 131n22, 132n27, 134n51, 252n2 Half a million, 20n3, 107, 122, 127, 207n13 Hamid, Abdul, 2, 128n4 Haq, Kazi Anwarul, 104 Haq, Mahbub-ul, 102 Harmon, Shawan, 48 Harrison, M. L., 39 Hartnell, Helen Elizabeth, 44, 45, 240 Harvey, P., 42 Hasan, Kamrul, 186 Hashmi, Taj Ul-Islam, 1, 93, 94, 98, 99, 101, 146, 173 Health care, 27, 177, 182 Heffernan, John W., 116, 153, 154, 181 Hernandez-Truyol, Berta Esperanza, 44, 58, 215, 216 Higgins, Peter, 47 High-ranking civil servants, 17 Hijra, 3, 130n16 Hijrat (migration), 2, 20n1, 128n3 Hincks, Darren, 17 Hirschl, Ran, 47 Historical background, 19, 91, 94–97 Holroyd, Eleanor, 12 Holtan, Amy, 12, 17 Hoque, Ridwanul, 45, 62–65, 80n23, 228 Hossain, Altaf, 131n22, 223 Hossain, Kamal, 207n13, 275, 278 Hossain, Sarah, 225 Hossain, S. M. Zakir, 222 Hune, Shirley, 38

283

Hunter, W. W., 128n6 Huque, Ahmad Shafiqul, 2, 94, 98, 106, 107, 146, 241 Hussain, Ijaj, 178, 179, 187, 244 Hussain, Khalid, 186 Hussain, Shahnaz Huq, 175, 178 I Identity crisis, 20n2, 131n23 Ilias, Ahmed, 98, 100, 104, 105, 108, 117, 131n24, 132n38, 133n39, 133n42, 159 Important rights, 2, 4, 6, 7, 18, 61, 145, 161, 174, 180, 207n15, 215, 217, 219, 220, 228, 231, 232, 239–241, 245 In-depth interviews, 7, 16 India, 2, 20n1, 91–96, 99, 101–103, 105, 108–110, 112, 118, 120, 126, 127n2, 128n6, 130n18, 130n19, 134n49, 158, 165–168, 170, 183, 203, 205, 208n18, 222, 231, 241, 269–274 Indian state of Bihar, 2, 120, 126 Integration, 9, 10, 19, 43, 58, 59, 61, 98, 103, 115, 132n34, 145, 151, 164, 169, 187–192, 196–202, 204, 206, 219, 231, 232, 244, 245, 251, 252n2 Interdisciplinary, 5, 44, 58, 60, 61, 78, 215, 216, 219, 239, 240 International Convention on Biharis, 3 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD, 1965-United Nations), 35, 37 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICPRMW, 1990-United Nations), 35, 37, 38

284 

INDEX

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966-United Nations), 35, 36, 77, 246, 247 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966-United Nations), 35, 36, 77, 79n4, 246, 247 International Labor Organization (ILO, 2014), 74, 75 Interviewer, 7, 12–14 Interview of Bengalis, 7 Investopedia, 72 Iqbal, Mohammad (Sir), 129n9 Islam, Mahmudul, 65, 67, 73–75, 219, 222 Islam, M. Rafiqul, 64 Islam, Syed Serajul, 110 J Jackson, Robert, 38 Jahan, Rounaq, 101, 106, 130n19, 132n27, 132n28, 132n33, 187, 231, 244 Jalal, Ayesha, 92–94, 100, 119, 128n2, 128n6 Johnson, Curtis N., 41 Jones, R. J. Barry, 44 Joyner, Christopher C., 44, 248 K Kabeer, Naila, 26, 39, 50, 51, 217–219 Kabir, Ariful Haq, 156, 218 Kant, Immanuel, 41 Kapur, Ratna, 43 Kelsen, Hans, 58, 59 Kerber, Linda K., 37 Khan, Ataur R., 119 Khan, Borhan Uddin, 134n47, 174

Khan, Gerrard, 119 Khan, Syful Akbar, 100 Khan, Yasmin, 96, 106 Khan, Zillur Rahma, 99, 101, 102 Klusmeyer, Douglas, 51 Knapp, Herschel, 8 Kruma, Kristine, 49 L Lavi, S., 44 Law and society, 5–6, 14, 239 Lee, Tang Lay, 29, 121 Legal phenomena, 5, 239 Legal, political and diplomatic battles, 19 Legal rights, 2, 18, 39, 55, 57, 60, 61, 77, 78, 188, 215, 219, 222, 229, 240, 244 Legislation, 5, 6, 40, 53 Lewis, David, 227 Liberation War of Bangladesh, 1, 19, 93, 99, 103–107, 125, 127, 131n26, 169, 186, 200, 202, 229 Life experiences, 13 Limited resources, 8, 177 Lister, Matthew, 46, 51 Lister, Ruth, 54 Lived experiences, 6, 18, 19 Local Bengalis, 2, 20n2, 91–93, 97, 99, 131n23, 171, 172, 207n16, 241, 244 Local language and culture, 14 Loomis, Louise Ropes, 40 Lynch, Maureen, 26, 53, 217 M Maatsch, Aleksandra, 44, 45 Mahmood, Amna, 105 Mahmud, Simeen, 51, 217, 218, 224 Mahmud, Wahid Uddin, 224

 INDEX 

Mainstream society, 4, 178, 190, 197, 223, 229 Majumder, Azad, 247 Malanczuk, Peter, 46 Malik, Shahdeen, 123 Maniruzzaman, Talukder, 93, 104, 132n34, 189, 244, 252n1 Manly, Mark, 28, 29, 36 Marshall, T. H., 51, 55, 56, 215, 223, 226 Martin, Andrew D., 7 Martiniello, Marco, 55 Mascarenhas, Anthony, 106, 107 Mathews, Jassica T., 51 Matteo, Hanry S., 42 Matthew v. Diaz, 79n15 Maxwell, Joseph A., 20n5 McConnell, Fiona, 242 McDougal, Myres S., 27, 29 McFadyen, Jackie, 15 Mecca, 3, 130n16, 208n19 Medina, 3, 128n7, 208n19 Medium of communication, 13, 203 Mehdi, Syed Sikander, 1, 94, 96, 101, 105, 117, 130n18 Mehta, Lyla, 51 Melville, Angela, 17 Membership, 4, 25, 27, 38, 39, 43–45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 57, 58, 60, 121, 208n23, 216, 217, 252 Members of think tanks, 11 Merriam-Webster, 40 Methodology, 5, 18 Migration, 2, 20n1, 95, 96, 101, 128n3, 130n16, 165–166, 206n1 Mirpur, 10, 106, 117, 169 Mohammadpur, 10, 106, 162 Mohsin, Amena, 96, 158, 161 Morris, L., 56 Muhajir, 3, 95, 100, 113, 117–119, 127n1, 129n14, 130n16, 135n59, 135n60, 166, 170, 194, 208n19

285

Muhith, A. M. A., 108 Mukherjee, Ranjana, 153, 207n8 Murshid, Tazeen, 1, 94, 101 N Nahar, Sultana, 177 National and international documents, 6 Nationality, 4, 8, 18, 25–34, 36–39, 44–46, 48, 49, 51–53, 55, 56, 58–62, 76–78, 79n9, 79n14, 80n18, 121, 122, 124, 127, 145, 146, 155–159, 164, 178, 187, 208n23, 216, 223, 231, 240, 242, 244, 246–248 National language of Pakistan, 3, 99, 102 Native Bangla speaker, 14 Nawaz, Rasheda, 221 Neeld, Dennis, 106 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 128n5, 129n12 Neighbors, 8, 103, 163, 187, 192, 195, 198 Nelson, Brian R, 40 Newman, Donald J, 12 NGOs, 6, 35, 134n53, 152, 177, 181–186, 192, 200, 201, 203, 209n27, 243, 250 Non-Bangladeshis, 3, 127n1 Non-Bengali Muslims, 2 Non-legal, 5, 55, 61, 78, 215, 232, 239, 240 Non-locals, 3, 121, 127n1, 180 Northern India, 2 Nottebohm Case (1955) ICJ, 48, 49 Nyers, Peter, 216 O Oliver, Paul, 8 Oppenheim, L., 27

286 

INDEX

Option, 3, 7, 95, 107, 123, 124, 152, 153, 157, 159, 172, 178, 195, 227 Ordinary people, 11, 192 Organization, 15, 16, 18–19, 40, 97, 111, 114, 115, 129n9, 134n53, 160, 182, 183, 185, 192, 252, 269, 273 Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban, 155, 227 Other rights, 19, 51, 55, 57, 73, 76, 78, 184–187, 203, 217, 219, 228–232, 232n1, 240, 241, 248, 249, 251 Oxford English Dictionary, 72, 225 Oyelaran, O. Olasope, 44, 45 P Pakistan, 2–4, 10, 15, 19, 43, 62–64, 91–97, 99–124, 126, 127, 128n7, 129n8, 129n9, 129n14, 129n15, 130n17, 130n18, 130n19, 132n27, 132n32, 133n46, 134n47, 134n49, 134n51, 134n52, 134n55, 134n56, 134–135n57, 135n58, 135n60, 145, 149, 150, 156–161, 163–171, 183, 185–189, 193–196, 199, 201, 205, 206n1, 207n13, 208n18, 208n20, 222, 229–231, 233n6, 233n7, 241, 243, 245–247, 252, 269–278 The Pakistan Citizenship Act (1951), 63, 79n17, 80n20, 95, 129–130n15, 135n58, 135n61, 146, 206n1 Pakistani Army, 3, 105, 168, 172, 173, 201 Participation, 9, 10, 26, 39, 40, 44, 47, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 67, 165, 170, 217–219, 227, 250, 275

Participatory model, 12 Particular social group, 4, 121, 208n23 Partition of British India, 1 Paulsen, Eric, 124, 180 Persecution, 3, 4, 30, 107, 129n10, 130n16, 133n40, 158, 169, 241 Personal information, 13 Perspectives of Biharis, 6 Plato, 40, 41 Policy documents, 6, 45 Policy makers/bureaucrats, 8, 10, 11, 19, 116, 192, 197 Policy of favoritism, 1, 98 Political opinion, 4, 121, 208n23 Political Science, 11, 13 Politicians, 8, 11, 17, 19, 26, 93, 192 Polity, 4, 41, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 58, 217 Positionality, 12–14 Preuss, Lawrence, 46 Primary and secondary data, 5 Proclamation of Independence, 68, 80n24 Properties, 2, 29, 38, 47, 48, 56, 70, 72–73, 93, 96, 101, 103–107, 123, 130n17, 132n30, 132n36, 132n37, 133n43, 133n46, 171–173, 186, 202, 207n16, 209n30, 219, 232n3, 232n4, 245 Prophet Mohammad, 3, 130n16 Pseudonyms, 9, 11 Purposive sampling, 8, 20n5 Pye, Lucian W., 187 Q Qualitative and quantitative methods, 5, 239 Qualitative data, 7, 14, 189 Qualitative research, 7, 12, 14, 17 Questionnaires, 7, 10, 16

 INDEX 

R Race, 4, 37, 42, 56, 69, 121, 205, 208n23, 216, 223, 226, 229 Radio and television channels, 20n7 Rahman, Mahbubur, 174 Rahman, Shah Muhammad Habibur, 98 Rahman, Tariq, 100, 118, 135n59 Rajshahi, 8, 11, 101, 150, 232n1 Rankin, Jean, 15 Rapport, 12, 13, 15, 16 Rashiduzzaman, M., 103 Recorded notes, 10, 16 Reflexivity of researchers, 17 Refugees, 2, 4, 27, 34, 76, 95, 101, 102, 106, 108, 119, 121, 127, 130n18, 130n19, 151, 156, 167, 170, 173, 183, 188, 208n23, 243 Regmi, Krishna, 14 Rehabilitation, 19, 95, 115, 119, 127, 182, 190, 196–202, 245, 247, 251 Reinhatz, S., 12 Religion, 2, 4, 20n1, 69, 72, 97, 98, 121, 128n3, 130n17, 158, 165, 188, 208n23, 216, 223, 226, 229, 253n6 Repatriation, 3, 4, 10, 15, 19, 64, 91, 106–121, 123, 124, 127, 133n46, 134n49, 134n54, 134n57, 135n58, 145, 157–161, 165, 182, 183, 185, 192–196, 233n7, 246, 247, 252, 271–276, 278 Reports, 3, 6, 18, 19, 20n4, 177, 185, 207n13, 227 Reprisals, 3, 104 Researcher, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 192, 196, 204 Residence, 4, 29, 39, 49, 50, 97, 98, 121, 126, 129n14, 164, 208n23, 243

287

Respondents, 7–17, 19, 124, 145–149, 151–174, 179–186, 188–206, 219, 220, 223, 224, 227–231, 242, 243, 245, 246, 248 Richer connections, 13 Riesenberg, Peter, 40, 41, 54 Rights, 1, 25–78, 145, 215–232, 239 Right to have rights, 6, 19, 27, 28, 57, 61, 202, 215, 217, 219, 220, 225, 228, 231, 240, 242 Rose, Leo E., 170 Rosenberg, Gerald N, 42 Roser, Max, 155, 227 Rousseau, Jean Jack, 41 Ruling elites, 1, 79n6, 91, 97–99, 102, 103, 126, 170, 197, 241 S Sabur, A. K. M. Abdus, 20n2, 131n23 Sagor Para Camp, 150, 153, 156, 157, 160, 161, 168, 169, 172, 189 Sample size, 20n6 Sarat, Austin, 5, 240 Sawyer, Caroline, 27, 29, 32, 36, 37, 51 Sayeed, Khalid Bin, 94, 132n32, 187 Sayeeda Rahman Malkani and others v. The Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, 80n22 Schlosser, Jennifer, 13, 15 Schuck, Peter H., 58–60, 215, 216, 240 Seckler-Hudson, Catherine, 27, 216 Secretary General, 16 Sen, Amartya, 3, 52, 53 Sen, Sumit, 112, 129n11, 171 Shachar, Ayelet, 47, 48, 50 Shackel, Rita, 37 Shagor, Ashifur Rahman, 133n40 Shah, Mahtab Ali, 117, 118, 120

288 

INDEX

Shakoor, Farzana, 134n50 Shared cultural and political interests, 1, 97, 126 Shaw, Jo, 44, 58, 60, 79n16, 215, 216, 240 Shelley, Mizanur Rahman, 187 Sholder, Hannah, 11, 116, 174, 183, 221 Siddiqi, A. R., 104 Siddiqi, Dina M., 95, 102 Siddiqui, Kalim, 132n35 Silbey, Susan S., 5, 239, 240 Simla Agreement, 134n48, 274 Singh, Anita Inder, 94 Singh, Gurharpal, 94, 129n13 Singh, Swaran, 275, 278 Sisson, Richard, 105 Sloane, Robert D., 49 Smith, Wilfred C., 93 Sobhan, Rehman, 97 Social factors, 6 Social integration, 19, 61, 76, 78, 165, 190, 197, 219 Social phenomena, 5, 239 Social problems, 5, 193, 239 Social terms, 5, 239 Social work, 11 Socio-economic background, 8, 145, 146 Socio-legal approach, 5, 6, 239 Spencer, Elaine Glovka, 42 Spiro, Peter J., 46, 47 Squires, Allison, 14 Standpoint theory, 12 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 42 Staples, Kelly, 27, 31 Statelessness, 18, 19, 25–78, 79n3, 91–127, 217, 241, 246 Stateless persons, 26–36, 38, 58, 76, 77, 121, 127, 216, 217, 267 Status of the Biharis, 1, 4–6, 11, 64, 121–126, 248

Stephens, Ian, 120 Stiller, Martin, 26, 30 Stranded Pakistanis, 3, 64, 114, 115, 117, 127n1, 134n56, 162, 165, 178, 184–186, 194, 195, 201, 208n25, 228, 229, 243, 246–248 Stranded Pakistanis General Repatriation Committee (SPGRC), 15, 16, 20n8, 110, 113, 115 Strang, Alison, 151, 174, 177, 180, 187 Strangers, 13, 178 Strategic selection, 20n5 Structured and open-ended questions, 10 Symonds, Richard, 131n21 Systematic inquiry, 5 T Tajuddin, Muhammad, 2, 20n1, 99, 128n3, 131n25 Talbot, Ian, 94, 96, 99, 101, 105, 129n13 Tania, Sharmin Jahan, 95 Temple, Bogusia, 14 Thompson, Thomas J., 27 Town hall camp, 11, 148, 156, 158, 160, 164, 167, 170, 185 Translation, 14, 77 Tri-patriate Agreement, 274–278 Trop v. Dulles, 27 Trubek, David, 5, 240 Tucker, J., 32, 33 Turack, Daniel C., 38 Turner, B. S, 50 U The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989), 35, 37 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 3, 4, 11,

 INDEX 

20n4, 26–28, 33, 49, 110–112, 114, 116, 121, 122, 134n49, 160, 182, 183, 266 University professors, 11, 197 Unpublished work, 6 Unregistered Births, 266 Urdu, 3, 14, 94, 98–102, 105, 128n6, 131n22, 131n24, 132n27, 135n63, 146–150, 157, 170, 173, 179, 184, 185, 187–191, 193, 196, 197, 203, 204, 206n2, 207n14, 230, 251, 252 Urdu-speaking Biharis, 3, 110, 129n11, 196, 203 V Van Kleef, Gerben A., 16 Vested interest group, 1, 97, 126, 202 Victims of discrimination, 2, 26, 30, 158, 231 Violence against Biharis, 2 Volpp, L., 60 Voluntary, 10, 247 Vulnerable situations, 17 W Waas, Laura Van, 28, 29, 32, 36, 52, 53 Wakelin, Elyse, 31 Walzer, Michael, 27 Waseem, M., 118 Weiller, J. H. H., 43 Weiner, Myron, 2, 102, 110, 128n4, 134n55, 189 Weis, Paul, 28, 29, 31, 44, 45, 58, 59

289

Weiss, Robert S., 190 Weissbrodt, David, 30, 32, 33, 79n4 Weller, Susie, 17 Well-founded fear of persecution, 4 Wellman, David, 13 West Pakistan, 2, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100, 109, 110, 117, 133n43, 166–169, 197, 276 West Pakistani, 1, 97–100, 102, 103, 105, 126, 133n46, 167 West Pakistani rulers, 1, 99, 102 West Pakistani ruling elites, 1, 79n6, 97–99, 102, 126 Whitaker, Ben, 117, 120 Women, 2, 37, 41, 42, 64, 80n22, 96, 106, 123, 130n18, 130n19, 152–154, 162, 173, 176, 180, 183, 184, 205, 208n21, 209n31, 220, 227, 242, 253n6 Worldwide Statelessness, 268–269 Wriggins, Howard, 187, 231, 244 Wright, Theodre P. (Jr.), 95, 98, 101, 118, 119, 128n7, 135n60 Y Yasmin, Saikia, 103, 126 Young, Alys, 14 Z Zaheer, Hasan, 132n31 Zamindar, Vazira Fazila-­ Yacobadi, 95, 96 Zeitlyn, Benjamin, 223 Ziring, Lawrence, 1, 98, 99, 102, 132n30