Citizenship in Transition : New Perspectives on Transnational Migration from the Middle East to Europe [1 ed.] 9781443864121, 9781443849869

Citation preview

Citizenship in Transition

Citizenship in Transition: New Perspectives on Transnational Migration from the Middle East to Europe

Edited by

Annemarie Profanter and Francis Owtram

Citizenship in Transition: New Perspectives on Transnational Migration from the Middle East to Europe, Edited by Annemarie Profanter and Francis Owtram This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2013 by Annemarie Profanter, Francis Owtram and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4986-3, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4986-9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................................................... vii Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Celebrating Difference: In Search of Paradigms Addressing Barriers to Transnational Migration Annemarie Profanter and Francis Owtram Section One: Citizenship, Modernity and Cultural Identity Chapter One ............................................................................................... 21 The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA: Europe Migration in the Context of Globalization Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 45 Modernity and Islamic Immigration: Examining the Historical Roots of Identity and Difference Nigel M. Greaves Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 67 The Burgeoning of Transnationalism: Narrowing the Transitional Gap from Emigrant to Citizen Annemarie Profanter Section Two: Citizenship, Education and Law Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 85 Citizenship and Education: Economic Competitiveness, Social Cohesion, and Human Rights Christine Difato Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 109 Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship under the New Turkish Citizenship Act Necla Ozturk

vi

Table of Contents

Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 137 Xenophobia, Alienation, Heterotopias and Cultural Limits: Fictional Boundaries of the Athens Pakistani and Afghani Communities Sotirios S. Livas Section Three: Citizenship and Second Generation Networks Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 157 Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition? Khawlah Ahmed Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 177 Muslim Society Trondheim: The Dialectics of Islamic Doctrine, Integration Policy and Institutional Practices Ulrika Mårtensson Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 201 Yalla, Lombards! Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model Francesco Mazzucotelli Contributors ............................................................................................. 225

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Bringing this book together has been a true collaboration, far beyond our efforts. With the editors being placed periodically in the MENA region and in Europe—Annemarie being in Italy, Oman or Saudi Arabia, and Francis in Iraq and England—keeping track of each other and all the authors residing in diverse places, has been a logistical challenge. The impetus for this book was born in one of the distant Skype sessions when the feeling emerged that young scholars working in fields related to citizenship and migration should have an opportunity to come together and draw a new perspective on the issue. Many thanks go to the editor of Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Carol Koulikourdi, who had the vision to support this endeavour. Thanks as well to Monika Grassl for technical support in our darkest hours and Valentina Wieland for being a formatting guru. And last but not least we would like to thank each contributor for their thoughtful and rigorous contributions. Annemarie Profanter and Francis Owtram

INTRODUCTION CELEBRATING DIFFERENCE: IN SEARCH OF PARADIGMS ADDRESSING BARRIERS TO TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION ANNEMARIE PROFANTER AND FRANCIS OWTRAM

Two years ago millions of Arabs marched in the streets demanding reforms to meet the challenges of their economic and social situation which involved removing the repressive authoritarian regimes. At the same time a global financial and economic crisis impacted the West and the MENA region. This was in the context of 9/11 which gave the pretext to portray the entire Muslim world as an imminent threat to the West. As one consequence, Muslim integration was reframed in terms of security policies. In fact, a securitization of Muslim immigration took place across the globe. This reframing of Muslim integration as a security issue is only one facet of government policy initiatives towards Muslim communities. What has happened as a consequence of all these developments? Much is changing on the local, regional and global level impacting on the on-going processes of transnational migration. This turmoil has knocked dominant and essentialist modes of thinking about the Middle East while at the same time affecting European government policy on immigration. Previous policies had supported the authoritarian regimes such as Libya to constrain immigration and attention now turned to ways in which reform could assist the maintenance of social stability in the MENA region without recourse to the previously accepted authoritarian notions of stability in either the authoritarian republics or rentier monarchies. The revolutions of the Arab Spring challenged the notion of what citizens in these countries expected from their governments and, also potentially created a new wave of migration, once again showing how

2

Introduction

local and global are connected in the identity of citizens and the construction of citizenship. Simply stated a citizen “is a member of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership” (SEP 2011). Two broad developments—the change in internal composition of liberal democracies and the challenges of globalization on the state—have led the concept of citizenship to be rethought, particularly in a transnational sense. With reference to the European-MENA area, by deconstructing the processes that are shaping and reshaping issues of migration and integration we hope to unwrap in this volume the emerging patterns in such issues as a) Citizenship, Modernity and Cultural Identity; b) Citizenship, Education and Law; and c) Citizenship and 2nd Generation Networks. Such issues constitute the experience of many migrants in Europe. As the following interview quote illustrates on an individual level: “Mi chiamo Aisha. Sono marocchina di madre lingua berbera. Sono arrivata in Italia quasi dieci anni fa seguendo il marito, che aveva un’ offerta di lavoro, ma io sto ancora cercando lavoro e non son riuscita a far altro che volontariato. Sono qui perché mi devo trovare un mondo per vivere diverso, devo creare un futuro per mio figlio che frequenta l’elementare qui. Lui parla perfettamente il tedesco, l’italiano, l’arabo e il berbero. Lui si sente italiano, anch’io lo sono come passaporto, ma dentro il mio cuore rimarrò sempre marocchina. Mi manca la mia terra, ritorno quando posso a trovare la mia famiglia. Ho gli amici qui che anche hanno vissuto questo trauma della migrazione e ci incontriamo a festeggiare le nostre feste religiose, a cucinare insieme e così. Però tutta la mia famiglia è lì. Come posso vivere senza la mia famiglia?” (A. I. pseudonym, interview by A. Profanter, Brixen, October 20, 2012)1

Aisha’s experience reflects a shared experience of many immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. They take part in two societies and try to build their lives in their host countries whilst maintaining ties with their existing homelands. In recent years research on transnational migration has rapidly developed focusing on the economic, social, political and religious processes between host and sending countries (Levitt, Jaworsky 2007, pp. 129-156). Similarly, Aisha delineates the social spaces in which she is involved here and there, in other words, in Morocco and in Italy. Moreover she has to reorganize the social structures and the relationships that she builds on the basis of shared experience in transnational migration. These may be reflected in Aisha's experience and involvement in the labour force, social networks, political and cultural groups and the education system in the adopted homeland. What is it about Aisha’s experience that constitutes the distinctive social phenomenon which has

Celebrating Difference

3

been referred to as transnational migration? This book aims to add innovative scholarship to the current dialogue on the mass influx of Muslim immigrants with a highly prescriptive pre-existing culture and religion into democratic societies in an era of globalization. It aims to elicit research which combines investigation of the point of origin of emigrants in countries from the Middle East and North Africa region together with the final adopted homeland destination (e.g. Italy, Austria, and Germany) in order to analyse the diasporic nature of many of these groups. This diasporic nature has been analysed as part of the on-going dialog on the concept of the transnationalism. The concept of “transnational social spaces, transnational social fields or transnationalism …usually refer to sustained ties of persons, networks and organizations across the borders of multiple nation states, ranging from weakly to strongly institutionalized forms” (Faist 1999, p. 2).

Faist notes that the impacts of transnationalisation on citizenship have not been fully explored and the notion of cross-border social networks also aids understanding of immigrants’ experience. The relationship of transnational processes with the nation state is significant in that they acquire some of their uniqueness by transcending these nation states (Bailey 2001, pp. 413-428). These transnational processes can create transnational communities made up of social relationships taking place across the borders by which individuals take part in social lives in two or more countries (Levitt 2004). Furthermore, Levitt and Jaworsky (2007, p. 130) note that migration scholarship has “undergone a sea change in the last decade”. Reviewing the development of scholarship in this field they identify that in the 1990s (following the new assimilation theory and segmented assimilationism) a third perspective was added which observed the way in which some migrants continued to be involved in their homelands simultaneously as they participate in their receiving country. This is because, they argue, migration has never been simply a linear process of assimilationism or a mix into a “multi-cultural salad bowl”, but one in which migrants are embedded in many layers and sites of the transnational social arenas they inhabit. More precisely, they simultaneously become engaged through new technologies which facilitate movement and communication with greater frequency, speed and regularity. Different means of dynamic relationships between here and there, home and host, are according to Tsuda (2012) multi-faceted: engagement increases in one society and this may lead to less involvement in the other; the diverse engagement-levels

4

Introduction

are not directly impacting each other, increased engagement in the host country may lead to increased or respectively decreased engagement in the home country. Using a transnational approach to migration means abandoning the nation-state framework to understand migration and using instead the notion of a transnational social field consisting of institutions and organizations which creates identities to which migrants may choose to subscribe (Levitt 2004). By shifting the conceptualization to transnational social fields this enables the analysis to move beyond just those who migrate to include those who remain but stay connected with migrants through transnational social fields across borders. This is because people do not have to move to be affected by migration: remittances, benefits and ideas from a migrant can affect someone who has never stepped outside of their village in the ancestral homeland. This is so much the case that the role of transnational migrants in development is an increasing part of development discourse (Faist 2008, p. 21). A transnational social field approach also takes into account the multiple layers of transnational identity as well as the multiple sites. It is not sufficient to merely look at local to local connections; it is also important to see how these connections are placed into vertical to horizontal systems of connection. Placing migrants into a transnational social field specifies that integration into a new national state and maintenance of other attachments are not completely contradictory notions. Indeed, migrant experiences should not be viewed as linear or sequential but able to move from one point to another sometimes achieving “simultaneity of connection”. Analysis of this phenomenon should not expect to find either total host-nation assimilation or total transnational connection—rather some combination in which the task of analysis is to investigate how migrants swing between the two and how these two aspects mutually influence each other (Levitt 2004). A transnational perspective allows the moving away from a rigid framework in which migrants shift between incorporation between two impermeable nation states to a framework which places migrants as operating in a number of national territories and the task of analysis is to find out empirically in each case what host-home and other country factors are operating. Linking to this Painter (2008) finds that Europe’s emerging transnational citizenship should not be linked to the conventional nationstate model. For Martiniello (1995), however, European political identity is basically linked to a prior communitarian national belonging: one can be a European citizen only if one is first Italian, French, or a German citizen, for example. He defines European citizenship as a sort of supra-citizenship

Celebrating Difference

5

which confirms the existence of diverse cultural and political identities corresponding to the member states of the European Union; however, limited to the European spirit that he defines as follows: “This idea of the intangible existence of a natural ‘European culture’ and ‘European spirit’ based on the common Judaeo-Christian and humanist experience” (Martiniello 1995, p. 44).

If this were accepted then it could be asked what place in the EU is found for native born Muslims or immigrants from Muslim countries? The developing idea of transnational citizenship offers a more realistic basis for these citizens. Increasingly sending states are offering a range of rights and benefits to migrants living outside their country (Levitt 2001, pp. 195-216) in the form of dual citizenship or participatory citizenship drawing on transnational practices; this has raised the question as to whether a form of transnational citizenship is being created. Situating it in the context of “globalization from below” Fox (2005) outlines the conceptual problems of accurately defining transnational citizenship noting that notions of transnational citizenship engage with a little discussed interface between international relations, comparative politics and normative political theory. Further, he asks whether these developing processes of cross-border inclusion could be similar to the early stages of the building of national citizenship which took place over centuries. Similarly, Fitzgerald (2008) finds, what he terms a “citizenship à la carte” is being created, in which citizenship rights over obligations are emphasized, there is more voluntarism and where multiple affiliations are accepted—this is developing both as a response to globalization and as an expression of the way in which globalization is reconfiguring social relationships. Further, we need to be cognizant of notions of global citizenship and cosmopolitanism which are increasingly held up as offering the possibilities of new forms of citizenship reflecting the realities of migration and also second generation migrant networks. A transnational approach to migration whilst remaining controversial also has considerable explanatory potential (Levitt 2004). While some see a transnational identity among the first generation others see that such identities will not hold for the second generation as they will not have the same intensity of belonging. However, as they have been raised in homes full of the influences of the country of origin even if they have no interest in their ancestral homeland they are quickly able to reactivate these identities and values if they choose to do so. In some cases these identities have become securitized in public debate as in the suspicion of dual loyalties (Levitt

6

Introduction

2004) particularly after 9/11 and the Madrid and London train bombings which heightened the media scrutiny of immigration patterns and citizenship identity in Europe. Information on citizenship has often been used to study EU immigration flows. However, citizenship in the context of migration does change over time and statistics are thus often biased. Moreover, there is no EU-binding definition of who is considered a migrant; any statistical overview of migration issues in Europe is therefore biased due to nationally diverging definitions. Some member states base their classification on the reasons for migration, others on the length of stay in the host country, and others again distinguish if the applicant’s home country is a former colony (Haase, Jugl 2008). In 2010 there were 32.5 million foreigners in the 27 member states of the European Union, corresponding to 6.5% of the total population. The majority of them, 20.2 million, were third-country nationals (i.e. citizens of non-EU countries) (Vasileva 2011). In 2011 an immigration flow of 1,671,500 to the EU was reported (Eurostat 2013) and it is relevant for this book to probe how many of these came from the MENA region: According to the statistics Turkey and Morocco were the main contributing countries. After the Arab Spring of 2011 concern focused on the possibility of a large uncontrolled wave of migration; this crystallized in chaotic scenes in the immigrant holding centre on the Italian island of Lampedusa which had resources for 850 people and was overwhelmed with 15,000 Tunisian and Egyptians. However, in contrast with this picture the number of Tunisian asylum applications to the EU declined by 3,000 in 2012 compared with 2011. Although the number of Syrian applications for asylum increased in the same period the evidence from Tunisia suggests that these rates remain high only if the political situation remains dangerous. Of the citizenships with the highest application rate for asylum in the EU Arab countries make up 5th, 6th and 17th place (Iraq, Syria and Algeria). Furthermore, it should be noted that in humanitarian catastrophes the most affected are least mobile, so the link with mass migration is less clear than at first it seems. Whilst inter-regional migration between Europe and MENA is important a further point to note about Arab migration is that of the 13 million Arab migrants worldwide, 5.8 million inhabit Arab countries, representing intra-Arab region migration. Although the Arab revolutions did not lead to the massive increase in migration to the European Union that some had expected it has had consequences. Europe is the prime destination for first generation Arab migrants and they may move back to their country of origin as “returnees” if, following regime change, they perceive conditions have improved; once

Celebrating Difference

7

back in their countries of origin the ending of their remittances stops a major financial flow as they are higher than domestic salary levels. Regarding issues of migration and return, the perception and actions of some in Europe led to new concerns about migration and its relationship to security and domestic terrorism. The massacre in Norway committed by Anders Brevik claimed 77 people in 2012; he produced a manifesto in which he attributes perceived problems in Norway to immigration and “Islamisation” (ISN ETH Zurich 2012). However, no institution feels the impact of immigration more than the schools. Although there is substantial political controversy as the demography of elementary and secondary schools is changing rapidly specifically in high populated areas in Europe, there is no doubt about the fact that those very children will be a crucial component of their host countries’ economy in the near future. It is widely recognized that educational policy can assist integration of immigrants and that pedagogical practice has a role in supporting the children of immigrants achieve in school. Patterns of acculturation and achievement among both EU-born and immigrant students need to be studied more thoroughly and a critical analysis of educational policy and politics, particularly school restructuring reforms and efforts by public school systems to meet the needs of immigrant children needs to be addressed. The US has responded to this challenge with the NCLB Act (No Child Left Behind), “the landmark 2002 federal law that holds schools accountable for the academic performance of limited English speaking children and other groups that include many children of immigrants” (Capps et al. 2005).

Similar policies are aimed at in Europe; however, given the cultural and linguistic diversity of its components and the fact that educational affairs are under the responsibility of every single nation, things are not as straightforward. For example, the Eurydice network has analysed how communication between schools and immigrant families can be improved to assist the integration of immigrant children (Eurydice network 2009).

New perspectives on transnational migration between the Middle East and Europe In contributing to this debate the essays in this volume explore a range of issues: the economic context of migration between MENA; the abandonment of multiculturalism and the shift to integration or inclusion.

8

Introduction

The perceived illiberal values of Muslim communities; mechanisms to integrate Muslim communities; different approaches of Muslim communities to gender and sexuality; degree of identification with country of origin; the contrast between realist (perceiving immigrants as a security issue) and liberal (humanitarian approach); citizenship procedures. The chapters in this book reflect applied research of highly sensitive and pivotal issues relating to the complex and underestimated impact of cultural patterns occurring in the attempted integration of new-wave immigrants from MENA in for example, Italy, Germany, the UK, and Norway. In so doing they offer new perspectives on key themes impacting citizenship, namely: globalization and migration; change of residence and development of bicultural identities; adaption to host country societal structures whilst retaining cultural citizenship in one’s country of origin; and issues in developing innovative applied theory to facilitate immigrants integration into the adopted culture. Following this introductory chapter the book is organized into three sections: 1) Citizenship, Modernity and Cultural Identity; 2) Citizenship, Education and Law; 3) Citizenship and 2nd Generation Networks. In Citizenship, Modernity and Cultural Identity, firstly, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen places migration between MENA and the Europe region in the context of globalization, demographic trends and the Arab Spring, noting the way in which deficiencies in the educational and labour markets result in push factors for outward migration and how future trends could play out as the political and economic landscape of the region is transformed. Identifying the crucial importance of education to the production of knowledge-based economies Coates Ulrichsen outlines the challenges for Middle Eastern policy makers in comparative context with other regions such as South-East Asia; the challenges are compounded by the high birth rates and concomitant need to generate employment opportunities for a burgeoning youth population. The state’s ability to deliver on the social contract is increasingly in question and as such there is mismatch between the state’s capacity and social and economic demands on it. State deficiency in the Middle East, nowhere more acute than in Yemen, has led to an increase in attempted terrorist attacks against the West which resulted in a concerted effort by Western policy makers to address some of the issues in Yemen. However, as it did not address the access of Yemenis to Gulf States, closed off since 1991, it meant that little of substance was achieved. The securitization of migration since 9/11, he argues, needs to

Celebrating Difference

9

be replaced by an approach that takes into account the interlocking economic social and political dimensions. In the second contribution Nigel Greaves advances his approach that ways of thinking about the world are attuned to ways of acting upon the world, and are thus linked to historical and social contexts that condition their content and reciprocate back to strengthen and replicate those social and historical determinants. He assumes that the tension that is given to exist in western societies with high levels of Muslim immigration rests ultimately on organic differences of a developmental nature, as reflected in contrasting outlooks, or ideological attachments. A pattern of correspondence is sought between contrasting ideologies and dichotomous historical experiences of the economic and political pressures associated with modernity. Hence the ideological stand-off that is taken to exist can be shown to be subject to the specific context of contrasting historiological determinations. Ideological dichotomy in shared social spaces derives, it is argued, from alternative cultural sources which become in turn functional to the maintenance and replication of the culture in question. Here Antonio Gramsci’s insights and concepts, such as “hegemony”, “intellectuals” and “historical bloc”, help to illuminate the analysis. Gramsci enables the differentiation of modern and pre-modern ideas by virtue of historically determined function in justifying and facilitating a way of life. In this way, ideological difference is explained in the Islamic immigrant not so much as a voluntary act of awkwardness, defiance, contempt or disrespect, but as a structuralized derivation of profoundly different patterns of historical (i.e. “cultural”) development. In her chapter on possible approaches to narrow the transitional gap from emigrant to citizen Annemarie Profanter explores the process of cultural frame switching and the consequent development of bicultural identities. She highlights how immigrants manage to adapt to new societal structures while retaining cultural citizenship in their respective country of origin. Processes of cultural frame switching and the “persistence of source country effects” have been discussed in connection with the large influx of Muslim immigrant populations to Europe. With reference to Bassam Tibi’s theoretical model of socio-politically active European citizenry Profanter expands on widely discussed issues of inter-cultural dialogue, such as secular democracy versus Shari’a. Tibi promotes the development of responsible and productive immigrant members of a multi-cultural European Union that actively advocate for both their culturally mandated traditions as well as those of their adopted homelands. He argues that a true reading of Islam is in line with democracy and human rights, and he defines clear boundaries between Islam as a religion

10

Introduction

and the misuse of this religious system in the conceptualization of an ideological, political Islam. Profanter challenges his concept in the sense that she poses the question as to what contemporary Europe really means. Europe being created on strict economic and strategic principles and objectives to date seems fragmented. She argues that the problem is not that Muslims are too little European or that Islam in Europe is different to the Islam in the Arab world, rather the question more specifically is whether Islam is compatible with liberal democracy. The Arab Spring has posed questions for democracy in the Arab world and European Muslims should not isolate themselves from the debates going on the Arab world. The second section, Citizenship, Education and Law, starts off with Christine Difato’s chapter “Citizenship and education: economic competitiveness, social cohesion and human rights”. In her multi-layered analysis of citizenship and education in the EU with special reference to Germany and the UK, Difato identifies three key themes: economic competitiveness, social cohesion or security, and human rights. She notes how the European Union has moved from a project of creating an internal market to one of an internal security project which in a post-Cold War context has moved from traditional military and ideological issues to one concerned with society and individuals. Starting firstly with a review of EU policies as they impact education she traces how these have developed in Germany and the UK, finding that policies in the second half of the twentieth century have moved from assimilation to multiculturalism to inclusion or integration. The second part of the chapter examines the implementation of international and national trends in local education policies. At the same time as every individual has a right to an education, upheld in national and EU policies on human rights, the reality of access to equal education is not always present. From selective education systems to school competition and the marketization of education, the author explores the way that goals of economic competitiveness rival the ideals of human rights, while social cohesion reflects aspects of control and the standardizing expectations placed on individuals and groups for the purposes of security. In so saying, she argues that the tension between and transition from an internal market to an internal security project is explicitly reflected in the education systems on the local level, significantly affecting the integration and incorporation of third-country nationals, minorities and socio-economically disadvantaged groups. This leads to the next chapter dealing with a case study of recent developments in Turkey impacting on transnational citizenship. In her study Necla Ozturk surveys the methods and required conditions to

Celebrating Difference

11

acquire citizenship and under what provisions a person can lose their citizenship. The New Citizenship Act emphasizes many important changes between the Old and the New Act such as the introduction of dual citizenship in the New Act. The main distinction between the Old and the New Act highlights the difference between the amendment in the New Act which results in losing and acquiring citizenship status. The New Act as a matter of reformative measure does not recognize the expulsion of Turkish citizenship. Finally, there is no gender based distinction between men and women: they attain equal status, both in terms of equality in law and equality before the law. Using the Foucauldian notion of heterotopia Sotirios Livas explores the fictional boundaries of the Athens Pakistan and Afghani communities comprised of illegal immigrants and finds the need for a new citizenship code to remedy their parlous social situation. Furthermore, regarding asylum seekers he argues that, whilst allowing for security, new detention procedures must be created particularly concerning minors, and a mosque and cemetery be allowed so that usual practices of ritual life can take place in the community. As he argues, Greek society was caught totally unprepared for the huge waves of immigrants literally pouring through its ground and sea borders in the final years of the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. The acute financial crisis of the country, that shattered all dreams of wellbeing and success, created by the entry in the Eurozone and the 2004 Olympic Games, has led these new immigrants (mainly coming from Africa and Asia) to a zone of social non-existence. Destitution and lack of prospects for social mobility have been interwoven in a pattern, leading to their being targeted in racist neo-Nazi attacks and being isolated in slums and ghettoes, their only dream being to get out, towards Western Europe. Three chapters comprise the last section “Citizenship and Second Generation Networks”. A common theme in all these chapters is the way in which Muslim immigrants are integrating and the role of local, national and EU policy in assisting this, based on mutual accommodation and respect. As Khawlah Ahmed argues in her chapter on “Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition” Muslim communities in Europe, often seen as recent creations, have in fact older antecedents such as in the case of Yemeni communities the UK. Despite their being framed by politics and the media as the “other” and as “guests”, Arabs, especially Yemenis, in her study of recent immigration Yemeni females, she finds that they have both been able to integrate into UK society and maintain

12

Introduction

links and sense of identity with their Yemeni culture and homeland. In an age of mobile communication, the ease with which contacts can be maintained with homelands is a distinct difference to the experience of today’s generation compared with earlier immigrants. This ease seems to have led to new immigrants being able to maintain stronger ties to their country of origin and therefore they are more likely to maintain an affinity to their home country and less likely to feel the pressure to assimilate in their new societies. Today’s UK citizens of Yemeni origin, she argues, do not operate in a zero-sum game founded on a single place, rather multiple attachments are feasible and as such transnational associations are not achieved at the expense of a sense of integration. Ulrika Mårtensson’s chapter addresses civic integration policy and the concomitant emphasis on civic dialogue as its principal tool. Civic integration implies the cultural minorities should be integrated with the majority through mutual accommodation between the dialoguing parties, but within the boundaries of liberal democracy and human rights. The case study explores dialogues in the Norwegian city Trondheim between an Islamic mosque organization and the state Church; the child care authorities; the police; the municipality; and the state department of integration. Findings show that it is possible to achieve mutual accommodation between Muslims’ religious and cultural values and practices and the public authorities’ policies and practices. However, in order for this to happen the two parties need to communicate and understand each other’s positions clearly, which is what allows them to find a common ground where previously the positions appeared as mutually exclusive. The Church, based on its experiences of interfaith dialogue with the Islamic mosque organization, played a key role in achieving the kind of communication and understanding that was necessary for mutual accommodation to take place. This implies that civic dialogue risks becoming a top-down communication which only entrenches mutually exclusive positions, unless at least one of the dialoguing parties is trained in identifying common grounds. The method of the local interfaith dialogue group has proven highly suitable for this purpose. Finally, the study indicates that Islamic organisations that are committed to active citizenship are also the ones that are engaged in civic dialogue, which implies that it might be important to find ways to engage with other organisations as well, since civic dialogue has the potential to advance their members’ interests in relation to public authorities. Francesco Mazzucotelli finishes the book with his study of second generation networks in Lombardy, criticizing the “localist” approach and finding a mismatch between immigration policies in Italy at various levels.

Celebrating Difference

13

He argues that, in the absence of clear policy guidelines and benchmarks at a national level, the management of immigration-related issues in Italy is often devolved to a micro-level negotiation. This “localist” or “parochial” approach offers both margins of flexibility and pragmatic solutions, and risks of arbitrariness and haphazardness. Incongruities and inconsistencies occur both at a juridical level and in terms of political behaviour. His paper frames the evolution of this “localist” approach in the context of the political turmoil and processes of social transformation that have been occurring in Italy in the 1990s and 2000s, with a particular focus on the region of Lombardy. The paper also argues that the wide variety of “localist” patterns of management of immigration-related issues can lead to a wide variety of definitions of the self and identity processes, as well as idiosyncratic practices, and fragmented policy-oriented behaviours, in what has been called “a bricolage of layers of identity”. Using reliable statistical data (2001-2008), surveys (2010), and the 2011 national census, the paper shows how several factors account for a growing stabilization of the migratory process and some absorption into the local societal fabric. This is reflected in a wide range of association of immigrants. Most of these associations suffer from their limited scope, their fragmentation, their limited time span, and their different notions of identity and integration with the local societal fabric. The paper considers the example of three different associations of “second generations of the immigration process” within this context, highlighting their strong and weak points. Together these perspectives provide fresh insights to the issues of transnational migration which have been systematically explored in the literature by various authors (e.g. Levitt, Jaworsky 2007; Faist 2008). In conclusion, it can be noted that the concept of transnationalism as used in the social sciences suggests that national boundaries are in some respects of diminishing significance and yet in other ways they retain their importance and marginalizing character. Transnational processes are embedded in globalization and its associated patterns of migration increasingly challenge and question borders and boundaries. Given the cultural permeability of boundaries migrants are able to maintain a cultural identity which is linked to their homelands while at the same time creating new cultural modes and expressions in the receiving countries. Although there is increasingly talk of global citizenship it remains the case that it is states which allow rights to their citizens and so the notion of transnational citizenship in which people gain rights in two states maybe more significant than global notions. In this context issues of migration between

14

Introduction

MENA and Europe are becoming increasingly salient and the related debates over notions of integration and assimilation are hotly contested. In their different approaches and from their various perspectives all the contributions to this book shed new light on these key issues of transnational migration and citizenship. Many issues relating to transnational migration between the Middle East and Europe will depend, however, on developments in the Middle East following the Arab Spring revolutions. The Arab Spring supposedly should have given way to an Arab Summer but some commentators have rather talked about an Arab Winter in which the possibilities for human rights, freedom and democracy are lessened. That said, the development of transnational identities which has been explored in this book will retain its significance regardless of whether spring turns into summer or winter.

Celebrating Difference

15

Notes 1

My name is Aisha. I am from Morocco, my mother tongue is Berber. I arrived in Italy almost ten years ago following my husband who had found a job—I am still searching but couldn’t go beyond voluntary work. I am here because I need to find another world to live differently; I need to create a future for my son who is enrolled in primary school here. He is fluent in German, Italian, Arabic and Berber. He perceives himself as being Italian, I am Italian too, by passport, but inside my heart I will always remain Moroccan. I miss my homeland, I return home whenever I can to visit my family. I have friends there all of who also have lived the trauma of migration and we meet to celebrate our religious festivals, we cook together and so on. However, all my family is there. How can I live without my family?”(A. I. pseudonym, interview by A. Profanter, Brixen, October 20, 2012)

16

Introduction

Bibliography Bailey, Adrian. “Turning Transnational: Notes on the Theorization of International Migration.” International Journal of Population Geography 7 (2001): pp. 413-428. Capps, Randy et al. “The new Demography of America’s Schools: Immigration and the No Child Left Behind Act.” Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute, 2005. http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311230_new_demography.pdf (Retrieved March 20, 2013). Eurostat, 2013. “Migrants in Europe.” http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ nui/submitViewTableAction.do?dvsc=9 (Retrieved March 21, 2013). Eurydice network. “Integrating Immigrant Children into Schools in Europe.” Brussels: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, April 2009. http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/thematic_repo rts/101EN.pdf (Retrieved March 18, 2013). Faist, Thomas. “Transnationalization in International Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture.” Working Papers Series (99-08), Transnational Communities Programme. Bremen: Institute for Intercultural and International Studies, 1999. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/faist.pdf (Retrieved August 13, 2013). Faist, Thomas. “Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round of the Migration-Development Nexus.” Population, Space and Place 14 (2008): pp.21-42. Fitzgerald, David. Citizenship à la Carte. George Mason University, Global Migration and Transnational Politics, Working Paper No. 3, 2008. Fox, Jonathan. “Unpacking Transnational Citizenship.” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): pp. 171-201. Haase, Marianne and Jugl, Jan C. “Migration im europäischen Vergleich— Zahlen, Daten, Fakten?” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2008. http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-migration/56589/ migrationsdaten (Retrieved March 20, 2013). ISN ETH Zurich. “Securitizing Migration—Europe and the MENA Region.” International Relations and Security Network, 2012. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?lng=en&id=151446&contextid774=151446&contextid 775=151440 (Retrieved March 28, 2013).

Celebrating Difference

17

Levitt, Peggy. “Transnational Migration: Taking Stock and Future Directions.” Global Networks 1, 3 (2001): pp. 195-216. —. “Transnational Migration: When ‘Home’ means more than one Country.” Migration Information Source, October 2004. http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=261 (Retrieved April 26, 2013). Levitt, Peggy and Jaworsky, Nadya. “Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends.” Annual Review of Sociology 33 (2007): pp. 129-156. Leydet, Dominique. “Citizenship.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosohy, 2011. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/ (Retrieved March 20, 2013). Martiniello, Marco. “European Citizenship, European Identity and Migrants: Towards the Post-National State?” In: Robert Miles and Dietrich Thränhardt (eds.), Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion. London: Printer Publishers Ltd. & Associated University Presses (1995): pp. 37-52. Painter, Joe. “European citizenship and the regions.” European Urban and Regional Studies 15 (2008): pp. 5-19. Tsuda, Takeyuki. “Whatever happened to simultaneity? Transnational migration theory and dual engagement in sending and receiving countries.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38, 4 (2012): pp. 631-649. Vasileva, Katya. “6.5% of the EU Population are Foreigners and 9.4% are born abroad.” Eurostat, 2011. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11034/EN/KS-SF-11-034-EN.PDF (Retrieved February 3, 2013).

SECTION ONE: CITIZENSHIP, MODERNITY AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

CHAPTER ONE THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB SPRING ON ISSUES OF MENA: EUROPE MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION KRISTIAN COATES ULRICHSEN

Introduction This chapter assesses the contemporaneous impact of processes of globalization and the Arab Spring on issues of migration from the Middle East and North Africa. It begins by analysing the historical interconnectivity that contextualizes the powerful sets of trans-national flows. This leads into a second section that examines the MENA region’s uneven and patchy integration into the global economy and the intensifying pressures that resulted from the acceleration of globalizing interconnections. These are examined in the third and fourth sections, which focus respectively on educational and labour market deficiencies as drivers of inequality and disparity and push factors in outward migration. The final section maps the interaction of the global and regional trends onto the specific issue of migration from the MENA region to Europe and offers concluding observations for its likely evolution in the current phase of political and economic transformation across the area. The series of uprisings across the Arab world that commenced in December 2010 have highlighted the complex interconnections between globalizing forces and regional dynamics. The impact of new media and social networking, encrypted communication technologies and satellite television, has transformed state-society relations and redefined the politics and possibilities of protest. It enabled the intersection of the economic stagnation of the region and the failures of corrupt and repressive autocratic regimes with a disenchanted youthful population

22

Chapter One

wired together as never before, triggering a political struggle few anticipated. Moreover, their size and contagious overspill distinguished the civil uprisings from earlier expressions of discontent and demonstrated the magnitude of the socio-economic and political challenges facing the region. Globalization and the acceleration of global interconnectedness has dramatically transformed the global order and reconfigured notions of state power and political authority. At its heart has been a reconceptualization of the concept of political community into a distinctive form of “global politics”. This operates beyond the sphere of the individual nation-state and it involves multiple layers of global governance that stretch across the domestic, regional and international levels (Held, McGrew 2000, p. 11). Yet the globalization of political and security dynamics and global capitalism also profoundly affect regional and local pathways and trajectories of change. This produces tension in an international system caught between globalizing pressures and localized responses (Hurrell 2007, p. 128). In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), these tensions are magnified by the legacy of political authoritarianism, economic stagnation, and shifting patterns of social and intergenerational interaction. Underlying everything is the rapid increase in demographic growth and the growing youth bulge. Hence, the population of the Arabian Peninsula rose eightfold between 1950 and 2007 (from 8 to 58 million) while that of the Levant increased fourfold, while up to 75% of the population in North Africa is under the age of 30 (Spencer 2009, p. 924; Drysdale 2010, p. 124). According to the Population Reference Bureau in 2005, nearly 95 million people were between the ages of 15 and 24 alone, but were suffering from “political, social, and economic systems [that] have not evolved in a way that effectively meets the changing needs of its rapidly growing young population” (Assaad, Roudi-Fahimi 2007, p. 1).

These place great strain on struggling economies to generate sufficient jobs to absorb the generation of young people coming of age and entering regional labour markets. Estimates from the World Bank Institute that five million jobs will need to be created each year for the next two decades emphasize the scale of the challenge ahead (The World Bank 2009).

Historical connectivity and trans-national flows By virtue of its geographical location, the MENA region has been an interregional crossroads for centuries. Powerful processes of settlement and

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

23

exchange have given rise to overlapping polities co-inhabiting a shared macro-economic sphere. Whether these linkages were northward from North Africa and westward from the Levant to the Mediterranean, or south and eastward from the Arabian Peninsula to East Africa and India, the result has been a cosmopolitan intermixing of peoples, ideas, and goods. Cities such as Alexandria in Egypt and Beirut in Lebanon embodied the dynamism of intra-regional networks of people and capital. So, too, did the trading routes of dhows and booms that connected Basra and the coastal settlements on both sides of the Persian Gulf with the east coast of Africa and the west coast of India (Metcalf 2007, p. 1). An important case in point was the Sultanate of Oman. Territorial expansion during the nineteenth century peaked in the 1840s when its (short-lived) maritime empire extended across the Indian Ocean from Zanzibar to Baluchistan in modern-day Pakistan. Dynastic struggles led to the separation of Zanzibar in 1861, but the Omani enclave around Gwadur was only ceded to Pakistan in 1958 (Valeri 2009, pp. 18-19). Significantly, the acquisition of territory was accompanied by waves of migration in both directions, with particularly large numbers of Baluch from the Makran settling in the Sultanate. This led one recent academic study of Persian Gulf societies to comment that “when talking about globalization, one should bear in mind that this concept is not new […] The society of the Gulf has in fact been a ‘globalized’ community from time immemorial” (Nicolini 2007, p. 384).

Similarly, the case of Dubai demonstrates the fluidity and mobility that characterised regional movements of peoples and goods in the early twentieth century. This city-state had long competed with the Persian portcity of Lingah for regional trade in the lower Gulf. In 1903, the imposition of high taxes by a newly-centralising Persian state on the merchants of Lingah led many of them (both Arab and Persian) to migrate across the Gulf to Dubai. There, they formed the backbone of Dubai’s takeover as the key regional trading post role as they brought with them their businesses, shipping experience, and the Indian associates who formed the middlemen between the Gulf pearl merchants and their worldwide markets (AlSayegh 1998, p. 89). One contemporary businessman concluded that “this drain of expertise from Lingah was to be the foundation for Dubai’s strong growth after 1902… Persia’s loss was Dubai’s gain” (Davidson 2008, p. 73). This early experience of the beneficial acquisition of migrants’ skills fostered the outward-looking trading mentality that has seen Dubai develop into the most “cosmopolitan” city in the world, with a population of non-nationals that exceeds that of nationals by up to fifteen to one.

24

Chapter One

In addition to the intermixing of merchant elites and migrant labourers, tribal movements were also fluid as allegiances and relationships shifted over time, and in response to localised factors (Onley, Khalaf 2006, p. 191). Immediately before Kuwaiti independence in 1961, several tens of thousands of people from sixteen tribes moved across state borders and settled in the emirate; Ghabra calculates that two-thirds came from the deserts of Saudi Arabia, one-fifth from Iraq, and a small number from Syria. Their primary motivation was the search for employment. Most of the newcomers settled in shanty towns around Kuwait City or around the various oil facilities in Kuwait, and they accounted for the majority of the 220,000 naturalisations that occurred in the two decades following the adoption of the citizenship law upon independence in 1961 (Ghabra 2002, pp. 111-112). During the second half of the twentieth century, the imposition of political boundaries and the construction of national identities interrupted many of the processes of acculturation described above. Notable examples included the departure of Alexandria’s European communities after 1957, and the violent aftermath of the Zanzibar Revolution in 1964, when tens of thousands of people of Arab origin were either killed or forced to return to Oman (Sheriff 2009, pp. 183-184). Solidifying frontiers led to the emergence of well-defined migratory patterns, such as from labour-rich countries in North Africa to oil-rich states in the Arabian Peninsula. Another such flow was that of Yemeni labourers to Saudi Arabia; they benefited from preferential policies that exempted them from local sponsorship and even allowed them to own businesses within the Kingdom. By 1986, their numbers peaked at 1.2 million. By 1980, foreign remittances sent home by expatriate Yemenis constituted 40% of the gross national product (GNP) of North Yemen and 44% of the GNP of South Yemen (Okruhlik, Conge 1997, p. 556). As with the other instances described above, so, too were these interdependencies halted by geopolitical tremors. In August 1990, the newly-unified Republic of Yemen abstained from a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and calling for the withdrawal of its troops. This had immediate ramifications as the Saudi government revoked Yemenis’ preferential right to work and, over the coming months, expelled more than 800,000 from the Kingdom (Johnsen 2007). Their departure, along with Palestinian workers in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia who also paid dearly for their leadership’s support for Saddam Hussein—was part of a broader and longer-term re-composition of migrant labour forces in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.1 This involved the gradual replacement of Arab by south and east Asian

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

25

workers as the latter were less likely to become politicised or make demands for economic and social rights; from being “a part of an oppositional bloc” migration in the Gulf “became an adjunct rather than a challenge to the ruling order” (Chalcraft 2010, p. 1). There thus developed two broadly-defined poles of migration across the MENA region. One was the movement of labour migrants to the Gulf States. From the 1950s to the 1970s, this flow was predominantly Arab, with large numbers of Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians, and Yemenis in particular; during the 1980s and 1990s it became dominated by labourers from South and East Asia. To take the largest flow as an example, the number of Indian migrants in the Arabian Peninsula rose from 501,000 in 1979 to 1.65 million in 1991 and 2.8 million in 1996 (Willoughby 2006, p. 228). Overall figures for the number of non-nationals in Gulf workforces displayed a similar trajectory, rising from a little over one million in 1975 to more than nine million in 2002, when they constituted two-thirds of the regional labour force. Expatriate labourers provided the majority of the labour force in each of the six GCC states, ranging from 60% in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to 65.7% in Oman, 80% in Kuwait, 89.5% in Qatar and 90% in the UAE (Winckler 2009, pp. 69-70). In addition, nonnationals formed absolute majorities in Kuwait (66% of the total), Qatar (75%) and the UAE (83%), in addition to substantial minorities in Oman and Saudi Arabia (25%) and Bahrain (40%) (Shochat 2008, p. 34, table 4.3). The other was the outflow of migrants from, primarily, North Africa, but also from the more populous and less resource-endowed countries of the Levant. The reasons for this will be analysed in detail in the following sections on uneven economic integration and lack of opportunity, demographic pressures, and imbalanced labour markets. Their salience became clear in the 2002 Arab Human Development Report, which claimed that more than half of young Arabs saw their future in emigration to the West (Selvik, Stenslie 2011, p. 239). This has created migration dynamics that have dominated and largely overshadowed the thinking of European Union policy-makers in their dealings with the MENA region. Ex-Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi’s maverick attempt in 2010 to obtain payments of up to five billion euros each year in return for stopping illegal migration from Africa to Europe was symptomatic of this approach (BBC News, August 31, 2010). The securitisation of migration contributed in part to the marginalisation of the lofty cooperative ideals expressed at the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 (Kausch, Youngs 2009, p. 239).

26

Chapter One

Uneven integration into the global economy With the dynamics listed above in mind, this section analyses the patchy and uneven integration of the MENA region into the global economy. The possession of significant hydrocarbon reserves ensured that the region formed one of the pillars of the international economic system, since at least the 1930s. Moreover, flows of oil, rents, and labour created enduring interdependencies between regional oil-producers and the major industrialised economies, and between the resource-rich and labour-rich MENA countries, as described above. As Ehteshami notes, these mutual links “existed well before globalization had made an appearance as a new regulator of international trade and financial flows” (Ehteshami 2007, p. 110). These notwithstanding, the Cold War generated new pressures, that constrained (and defined) the relationships between local states and external powers and an international climate conducive to the entrenchment of authoritarian political, and patronage-based economic, structures (Sayigh, Shlaim 1997, pp. 290-291). These macro-trends facilitated a post-colonial transition in which the state maintained a firm grip on political and economic power. In the oilrich states of the Gulf, the flows of oil rents into simultaneously-emerging state institutions and structures provided the financial wherewithal to create redistributive or “rentier” states. Highly-stratified economies developed with layers of rent-seekers flowing downward from the state at the apex of the redistributive pyramid (Beblawi 1990, p. 89). Furthermore, the influx of wealth insulated the oil monarchies from many of the traditional constraints of development, and allowed them to postpone sensitive decisions that inevitably would involve confrontations with societal groups and individuals (Okhruhlik 1999, p. 297). Elsewhere, the dominant development model was based on a political economy of “etatism” and import-substitution industrialisation. This was in line with Gerschenkron’s observation that the more delayed a country is in its economic development, the larger the economic role that the state is likely to assume (Gerschenkron 1962, p. 28). These models of economic development created and reinforced structural weaknesses in the economies of both oil-rich and labour-rich states in MENA. On multiple indices of economic and social development, region remained largely outside the globalizing economy as the forces of globalization accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s. Indeed, between 1975 and 2005, less than 1% of global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows went into the region, which remains the second-lowest regional recipient of FDI, after Sub-Saharan Africa. Halliday noted that the region’s

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

27

marginalisation in the newly-global economy converged with two other longer-term challenges: the inexorable decline in state revenues on a percapita basis in the face of rapid demographic growth, and the inability of labour markets across the region to generate sufficient jobs to absorb or accommodate the emerging youth bulge (Halliday 2005, p. 298). These trends intersect in Saudi Arabia, where the revenues generated by the world’s largest oil producer are eroded by the significant increase in population since 1970. Thus, the level of income per capita more than halved, from $16,650 in 1980 to $7,239 in 2000, while the level of oil exports per capita declined more steeply (throughout the GCC as a whole) from an average of $15,000 in 1980 to $6000 in 2000 (Dresch 2005, p. 16). A report compiled by the United Nations at the end of the twentieth century illustrated the magnitude of the economic challenges facing the Arab world. It described the region as a “typical third-world economy” with huge balance of payments deficits, lack of adequate public services, inadequate institutional infrastructure or capacity, inadequate and unfair systems of taxation, and populist decision-making structures vulnerable to authoritarian manipulation (Pappe 2005, p. 291). These resulted in disappointing progress in human capital development and were acknowledged by the succession of Arab Human Development Reports prepared in the 2000s. The seminal first report, issued in 2002, summarised the situation facing the MENA region as one of stagnant growth with poor indices of development and an enormous task ahead of it: “Looking forward, much also needs to be done to empower the people of the Arab region to participate fully in the world of the twenty-first century. Globalization and accelerating technological advances have opened doors to unprecedented opportunities, but they have also posed a new risk: that of being left behind as the rate of change accelerates, often outpacing state capacity” (United Nations Development Programme 2002, p. 1).

As indicated by the report, the pressures listed above are magnified by the global forces and flows that are so profoundly reshaping the twenty-first century political and economic landscape. During the past three decades, the acceleration of the intensity and extensity of global flows and interconnections has firmly enmeshed states and societies in worldwide systems and opening new spaces for global politics and issues (Held, McGrew 2003, p. 3). Moreover, the globalization of information, and access to education, changed the environment within which MENA regimes had to operate, leading to heightened awareness both of alternative pathways to development, but, more importantly, reinforcing

28

Chapter One

the opportunity cost of standing still in a fast-paced world (Nonneman 2001, p. 159). For some of the Arabian oil monarchies with small populations and large resources (notably Qatar and the UAE) this presented an opportunity to engage in carefully-managed economic diversification and management of their integration into the global economy. However, for the majority of states, the impact of globalizing processes pushed them still further to the margins of the globalizing world as the gap in human development indices and economic performance continued to widen (Coates Ulrichsen 2009, p. 90). Global pressures therefore added to the strain on already weak state institutions and political and economic structures. Moreover, they helped to sustain a regional political settlement based on a precarious intermixing of coercion and patronage. Comparative political science has demonstrated that such regimes lack a wide support base and are more vulnerable to political violence and the loss of domestic legitimacy (Kaldor, Karl, Said 2007, p. 28). This has important implications for intra- and inter-regional dynamics as well as for the human security of individuals themselves. Flows of peoples and goods across state boundaries may create or exacerbate new and existing sources of human insecurity within and between states. The more than four million Iraqis internally displaced or living in neighbouring Syria and Jordan are a key case in point. So too is their vulnerability to manipulation by political and militant groups which increase the risk of cross-border conflict, regional instability and even inter-state war (Kenyon Lischer 2008, p. 95). These broader global linkages were mirrored by the revolution in information and communication technologies. This created new forms of private, public and increasingly virtual spaces in which to mobilise, organise and channel societal pressures upward. The “revolution” in information communications and technology (ICT) opened up a profound contrast between the openness of the new possibilities of communication and the previous efforts to keep these under tight state control. Moreover, rapid technological advances in wireless mobile devices equipped with cameras have further undercut official boundaries over the control of the flow of information. They have made it virtually impossible for officials to suppress public discussion of sensitive or proscribed issues, and— importantly—constituted a powerful new form of “globalization from below” (Murphy 2008, p. 183). New linkages are therefore emerging which bind the various forms of state vulnerability to the impact of global processes. These cross-border flows of peoples, money and ideas bypass state structures and erode governments’ ability to control developments within a bounded territorial

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

29

space. In an intensely interconnected world the older boundaries between the domestic and international spheres are breaking down. Indeed, a new focus on “complex systems of circulation” has emphasised the value of studying interdependencies and flows rather than making binary distinctions between internal and external affairs (Dillon 2005, p. 2). However, the globalization of economics and of finance has notably not been matched by the free movement of labour. The Global Civil Society yearbook captured the motivations behind these different forms of global flows: “Unlike flows of other resources, labour migration is not only about economics but encompasses human rights, issues of identity and concerns about security” (Desai, Holland, Kaldor 2006, p. 120).

There is therefore a divergence between “globalization from above” and “globalization from below”, as the reconfiguration of global connections and awareness of alternatives to the status quo has taken place at the individual as well as inter-state level.

Educational and labour market deficiencies In this section and the next, attention shifts to the push factors that generate outward migration from the MENA region. They focus on the challenges arising from the rapid demographic growth experienced in recent decades, namely labour market and educational deficiencies, and under- and unemployment. These act as potent drivers of inequality and disparity and fuelled a great deal of the anger that, in 2011, fused with political discontent to reshape the contours of protest in the Arab world. Yet, less spectacularly but just as important at the individual level, they also engendered a bewildering sense of “economic helplessness” particularly among young people lacking opportunities and who risked becoming a “lost generation”. Even in the comparatively better well-off Gulf States, growing levels of unemployment as public sectors become saturated and cannot absorb new labour market entrants, have been identified as the major domestic policy challenge, with political, economic, and social dimensions (Forstenlechner, Rutledge 2010, p. 38). Unemployment and demographic pressures are intertwined with shortcomings in regional education systems. The latter largely fails to prepare young people with the requisite skills to fully unlock their potential, but they, in turn, enter labour markets that simply cannot accommodate them all. Enormous pressures on labour-oversupply have also been magnified as increasing numbers of women enter the workforce

30

Chapter One

as full participants; female labour force participation increased from 25% in 1980 to 32% in 2000, although that rate still remains one of the lowest in the world, albeit one that is rising fast as females’ educational attainment increases and the average age of marriage rises. Together, these factors place already-strained labour markets under great additional strain; one study in 2005 found that while a total of 47 million entered the labour force across MENA during the four decades between 1950 and 1990, an estimated 43 million would enter in the decade between 2000 and 2010 alone (Assaad, Roudi-Fahimi 2007, p. 6). Building on the deficiencies identified above and in the previous section, an influential World Bank report, entitled The Road Not Travelled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa, was published in 2007. It focused on the provision and quality of education as the integral building-block to successful reform of political economy structures. It found that the entire region faced a misalignment between the educational standards and skills sets required in modern labour markets. Moreover, it highlighted the tenuous linkages between investment in education and economic and social development, as compared with similarly-placed countries in Latin America and East Asia (MENA Development Report 2007, p. 5). It also emphasised the importance of embracing knowledge economies, as well as the dangers of falling further behind, as it concluded that modern global competitiveness “depends on firms that employ a well-educated, technically skilled workforce and are capable of adopting new technologies and selling sophisticated goods and services” (MENA Development Report 2007, p. 8).

This built upon the second Arab Human Development Report, published in 2003, which also identified a fundamental mismatch between ineffectual demand for, and production and dissemination of, Arab knowledge, and the inadequacy of Arab human capital available. Consequently, it advocated “a pressing need for deep-seated reform in the organisational, social and political context of knowledge” in the MENA countries (United Nations Development Programme 2003, p. 4). At the macro-level, these reports identified common obstacles facing human capital development. These were described by the first (2002) Arab Human Development Report as amounting to a “crisis in education” caused by “education’s inability to provide the requirements for the development of Arab societies”. Moving to the micro-level, it disaggregated the failure of regional educational systems into its constituent parts; these included a lack of qualified (and motivated) teachers, a shortage of

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

31

suitable educational materials, a continuing emphasis on rote learning at the expense of critical thinking, and endemic overcrowding at every level of the educational system. Financial spending per capita has also dropped significantly in response to rapid growth in demand for education, and has resulted in bloated institutions that, at the crucial secondary and higher levels, do little to provide the training and expertise necessary for a competitive labour force (United Nations Development Programme 2002, p. 54). Education is the key to economic and social progress and development. This reflects the fact that education and the production of, and access to, knowledge are the great dividers in the modern information-based society. Yet educational systems and choices must be aligned to societal needs and labour market initiatives if they are to function properly. It is this link between education, human capital, and labour market reforms that has broken down over recent decades. This disconnect has ensured that such reforms as had been drawn up and implemented have largely been piecemeal rather than comprehensive (Gonzalez, Karoly, Constant, Salem, Goldman 2008, pp. 246-249). As a result, the region continues to score poorly in internationally comparative studies; particular weaknesses in the sciences, engineering and language skills manifest themselves in low scores in international benchmarks such as TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematical and Science Study). These translate into poor levels of knowledge generation and an emerging gap in value-added wealth creation between the developed and developing worlds (King 2004, p. 314). Lessons from East Asia provide valuable, if sobering, lessons for MENA policymakers. Starting from a similarly underdeveloped standpoint after the Second World War, sustained multi-decade investment in, and reforms to, education and higher education systems have formed critical elements of the complex enabling environment that has made possible the successful transition to knowledge-based economies. The experience of the East Asian “tigers” highlights the changing nature of the role of formal education as a source of growth and economic development. An intergenerational commitment to education at all its levels in South Korea, for example, was integral to its wider strategy of translating initial technology transfer into local competitiveness based on a comparative advantage in human capital (Bachellerie 2010, p. 10). Thus, the East Asian model demonstrates the importance of linking economic and technocratic reforms to the wider operation of the social and political system within which they operate.

32

Chapter One

Demographic pressures The other major obstacle to maximising human resource capabilities are the pressures of demographic growth and youth unemployment. Significantly, these are common to both oil- and labour-producing countries, although their higher levels of oil revenues and per capita GDP mean that the GCC states possess comparatively greater resources to begin the process of reform than resource-poorer states in the Maghreb or the Levant. A study conducted by the McKinsey consultancy group in November 2007 examined the scale of the challenge posed by mounting unemployment in the Gulf States. It estimated that, contrary to official claims of much lower rates, real unemployment in Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia exceeded 15%, and that the figure rose to 35% for those aged between 16 and 24. It also found that the saturated public sector was no longer able to guarantee employment to citizens entering the job market. Furthermore, it identified severe deficiencies in local education systems that meant that most entrants into GCC labour markets lacked the requisite qualifications to enter the private sector (Bahrain Tribune, November 24, 2007). In 2011, the West Asia North Africa (WANA) Forum created by Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan estimated that the region as a whole contained some 99 million unemployed people with a total of 150 million living below the poverty line. In addition to severely holding back social and human capital development, these indices strain social cohesion, community resilience, and prospects for sustainable economic growth. Moreover, they intersect with social trends such as rapid urbanisation and increasing pockets of urban poverty, and deprivation of resources from the rural communities left behind, which also are affected by ecological degradation and long-term climate change. Macro-factors, such as the impact of occupation in the Palestinian territories, and specific instances, such as the blockade of Gaza following the 2006 election, further restrict the economic opportunities available to all, but hit hardest among young people (WANA Forum 2011, pp. 33-35). Rising unemployment and low productivity per worker reflect structural institutional weaknesses as much as they do educational deficiencies. Rigid labour markets dominated by the public sector have crowded out private sector growth and created layers of “perverse incentives” that do not encourage productive entrepreneurship. Even before the cathartic political struggles of 2011, public sectors in both the oil- and labour-rich countries had largely reached the limit of their ability to take in new entrants; however, their suffocating embrace meant that

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

33

regional private sectors were unable to replace it as the engine of economic growth or job creation. Thus, at the moment that significantly greater numbers of male and females were coming of age and entering the labour market, its ability to generate sufficient jobs was faltering. Furthermore, and consistent with the demographic transition model, in which birth and death rates fall from high to low at different rates in four distinctive stages, it places great strain on future redistributive welfare mechanisms as well. This is because although the four decades of exceptionally rapid demographic growth is slowing down, the youth bulge will continue to work its way through the population structure for decades to come (Coates Ulrichsen 2011, p. 87). This has important derivative effects on the “social contract” as the state’s ability to offer its citizens even a minimally inclusive economic role has been severely affected. Attempts have undoubtedly been made in the last two decades to reverse the trajectory of decline, and to improve standards of, and access to, education and labour markets. Private sector development has become the mantra of economic diversification programmes and international development plans alike. However, the failure of the “economic stabilisation” programmes unveiled in countries like Tunisia and Egypt to better the lives of ordinary people magnified the legitimacy deficit. Privatisation programmes and economic opportunities were popularly perceived as disproportionately benefiting the networks of “crony capitalists” embedded around the national leaderships. They contributed greatly to the economic discontent that fused so rapidly with political anger following Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in December 2010. His act of desperation resonated among young people throughout the region facing similar despair with their economic situation and lack of prospects (Coates Ulrichsen, Held, Brahimi 2011). Yemen provides a microcosm of how the multiple challenges to human development challenge interlink with poor performance across myriad indices of development. These include low quality of, and access to, education and the fifth largest gender gap in the world, a continuing mismatch in the labour market and restrictions on entry into GCC labour markets, institutional blockages that hinder the development of the private sector and reduce employment opportunities for Yemeni youth, and broader macroeconomic and political problems that have steadily eroded governmental authority and legitimacy. The cumulative result is the exclusion of a large proportion of youth from a formative age, and who subsequently will lack the basic skills to compete in labour markets and face lifelong difficulties in accessing the resources and support they

34

Chapter One

require to productively participate in society (Assaad, Barsoum, Cupito, Egel 2009, p. 10). A widening disconnect has therefore opened up between the capacity of the state to govern and the socio-economic and demographic pressures facing it. An absence of credible and sustainable alternative sources of government revenue crucially diminishes the capacity of the central state to maintain political or economic legitimacy. It also contributes to a crunch whereby faltering distribution of revenues and government services diverge from the basic and humanitarian needs of an increasingly impoverished population (Boucek 2009, p. 1). Broader structural factors, such as the weak rule of law and limited political legitimacy of public institutions, exacerbate the social conflicts and systemic economic difficulties caused by rapid resource depletion. Yet Yemen has no obvious route of transition to a post-oil economy, leaving unresolved the demographic and socio-economic challenges arising from population growth of 3.7 per annum and poverty and unemployment rates of more than 40% (Day 2008, p. 431).

Global and regional interactions In 2010, the international community belatedly turned its attention to Yemen. The shock attempt to detonate a bomb on an airline bound for the United States on Christmas Day, 2009, was traced back to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This was formed out of the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi wings of Al-Qaeda in January 2009. It represented the reconstitution of a regional terror threat which had been vanquished from Saudi Arabia between 2004 and 2006. Yet the new AQAP demonstrated a repeated intent, and an alarmingly close capability, to move beyond its local and regional focus, and strike the United States. The Christmas Day plot may have failed, as did an effort in October 2010 to destroy two airlines by parcel bombs, but the Yemeni links to the Fort Hood shooting that killed thirteen American soldiers in November 2009 made clear its threat in a globally-interconnected world (Hill 2010, p. 107). The results were, seemingly, impressive. A conference in London in January 2010 established the Friends of Yemen group with two working groups focused on the economy and on governance, and a follow-up meeting in Riyadh in February resulted in substantial pledges of foreign aid and developmental assistance. After years of neglect, a concerted international approach to addressing Yemen’s interlocking political, economic, security, and ecological challenges appeared to be underway. In light of looming resource depletion and water shortages predicted to cause

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

35

mass economic destitution and environmental migration, this could not come soon enough. However, it notably did not address the deep-rooted socio-economic problems within Yemen, as the GCC states remained loathe to opening up their labour markets to substantial numbers of Yemeni economic migrants. Indeed, Yemeni re-entry into labour markets closed off to them since 1991 would run counter to GCC strategies to depoliticise and control their labour forces through replacing Arab with Southeast Asian workers. Fears for their own labour security tie into GCC policymakers’ concern that shared linguistic and cultural bonds might result in Yemeni labourers becoming conduits of unrest and domestic instability (Yemen Forum Roundtable Meeting, February 18, 2010). Yet the rapid emergence of Yemen as an issue of international engagement was just as quickly overtaken by the transformative changes to the MENA region’s political landscape as the Arab Spring unfolded. The waves of political upheaval that triggered the ousting of Tunisian President Zine el-Abidene Ben Ali in January 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak a month later, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in August 2011, and led Yemen’s long-serving President Ali Abdullah Saleh to finally announce his departure from power, monopolised international engagement with the MENA region throughout 2011. More seriously, they both diverted attention and finite resources away from the region’s pressing social and economic challenges, and contributed to a political crisis that hindered governments’ and aid agencies’ efforts to deal with those problems. The secondary and knock-on effects of the on-going political unrest had serious implications, ranging from loss of tourism receipts to falls in inward investment and severe disruption to economic activity. The events of the Arab Spring placed European governments, in particular, in a complicated position. Their decision in the 2000s to securitize the issue of demographic growth in North Africa and migratory flows to Europe hindered attempts to respond to the demands for political change and democratic participation. During that period, state responses to migration became increasingly militarised as the policy discussion of international flows of people was transformed from a social or a labour issue into a security matter, particularly after September 11, 2001. This reflected multiple concerns or perceptions that migrants might become a social or economic burden, a threat to cultural or national identity, or, after 9/11, even a potential agent or supporter of terrorism. The shock of the attacks on the United States prompted many developed countries, including the member-states of the European Union, to suspend plans to liberalise immigration policies, and adopt more vigorous measures to

36

Chapter One

ensure border (and “homeland”) security instead (Smith 2007, pp. 628629). Furthermore, a Mapping the Global Future exercised conducted in 2004 as part of the US National Intelligence Council’s “2020 Project” pessimistically painted a lurid assessment of overlapping threats to security connecting in new ways: “Weak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and youth bulges will align to create a perfect storm for internal conflict in certain regions” (Flynn 2004, p. 14).

All of these pathologies were on display in European policy reactions to the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The initial unrest in Tunisia and the subsequent violence in Libya resulted in thousands of Tunisians and Libyans fleeing their homeland and making their way to the small Italian island of Lampedusa. Their arrival was received with hostility by the Berlusconi government amid a febrile domestic political debate on immigration and asylum. Public and political discourse alike equated the arrivals with heightened fears for crime and insecurity, playing on alreadyexistent local and national concerns for economic security in the middle of the European debt crisis. The fact that the countries that are most affected by the economic turmoil are those on the southern rim of Europe is also a significant factor in guiding policy toward migration (McMahon 2011). The Arab Spring thus intersected with Europe’s alarming economic slowdown, creating diverging push and pull dimensions to migration from the MENA region. Both North Africa and southern Europe experienced simultaneous bouts of sustained political upheaval and economic dislocation during 2011 that look set to last for prolonged periods of time. While granting their very different causes rooted in fundamentally distinct socio-political and economic systems, they nevertheless represented systemic shocks to the system in each region. Yet their synchronicity has increased the incentives for emigration from MENA countries just as it has reduced public and political support for immigration into Europe. This has had, and will continue to have, political implications throughout Europe, as politicians fear being outflanked by the resurgence of populist, largely right-wing political groups, and consequently adopt tougher lines on immigration. As this chapter was being written, the bloodshed in Syria showed no sign of ending; on the contrary, the levels of violence appeared to be escalating, with no political settlement in sight. Syria’s proximity to Turkey and the overland routes into Europe means any humanitarian crisis there could generate new waves of refugees and displaced peoples. Its continuing instability indicates how the impact of the Arab Spring will

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

37

continue to reverberate for years, and possibly even decades to come. For the process of political change and transition of autocratic structures will be intergenerational, and will inevitably involve downs as well as ups. Multiple transitions need to occur simultaneously on the political, economic and social levels. Experiences from Eastern Europe and Latin America demonstrate how it is a long-term process of on-going change, but also that it can have serious social and economic consequences if reforms are badly managed or left incomplete. Yet the structural constraints that have held back MENA economies and hindered their integration into global markets need urgent attention, and cannot await the outcome of potentially protracted political struggles. This captures the conundrum facing regional policy-makers as the pace of technological change in other world regions continues to accelerate in the digitalised, knowledge-intensive age.

Conclusion This chapter has explored the broader parameters around issues of migration in the Middle East and North Africa. It has provided historical background for the flows of labour migrants over the past century, and contextualised the contemporary movements in an era of intense globalisation. Moreover, the sequence of uprisings collectively known as the Arab Spring have revealed how the economic stagnation of the region and the failures of corrupt and repressive autocratic regimes conjoined with a disenchanted youthful population wired together as never before. In an intensely interconnected era, in which statements and images “go global” in seconds, the uprisings have transformed the boundaries of protest, and highlighted MENA regimes’ perceived inability to deliver the prospect of a better future to the majority of their people. However, and as the final section made clear, the political upheaval runs the risk of further delaying actions to address the deep underlying root causes of socio-economic unrest. The sections above covering demographic pressures, high unemployment, and educational deficiencies, all feed into and reinforce these structural constraints. Further, they will likely worsen in the short-term, as the youth bulge moves its way through the demographic pyramid over the next four decades. The result—with or without political change—will be increased strain on services that already find it difficult to cope or keep up, as the population of young people soars. Consequently, the push factors that cause people to seek an alternative pathway may be expected to increase, at the same time that European resistance to immigration seemingly intensifies.

38

Chapter One

The result is a potential crunch, as two diverging trajectories intersect. It makes the call for new perspectives on trans-national migration more urgent, as developments both in Europe and in the Middle East and North Africa suggest that the status quo has become unsustainable. Instead, the winds of change blowing so forcefully in both regions now requires a new approach to policy, a reconsideration of the securitization of migration so evident over the past decade, and an approach rooted in recognition of its interlocking political, economic, and social dimensions. This is a lot to ask of policy-makers in the challenging environment they find themselves in, but the pressures of doing nothing, in an age of such rapid local, regional, and global change, are greater still.

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

39

Notes 1

The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in 1981 and comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

40

Chapter One

Bibliography Al-Sayegh, Fatma. “Merchants’ Role in a Changing Society: The Case of Dubai, 1900-90.” Middle Eastern Studies 34, 1 (1998): p. 89. Assaad, Ragui and Roudi-Fahimi, Farzaneh. Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity or Challenge? Washington D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, Policy Brief, April 2007. Assaad, Ragui; Barsoum, Ghada; Cupito, Emily and Egel, Daniel. Youth Exclusion in Yemen: Tackling the Twin Deficits of Human Development and Natural Resources. Wolfensohn Centre for Development, Dubai School of Government. Middle East Youth Initiative, Working Paper No. 9, November 2009. Bachellerie, Imen. Knowledge Creation and Diffusion. Dubai: Gulf Research Centre, 2010. Bahrain Tribune. “GCC Unemployment Rates Skyrocketing.” Bahrain Tribune, November 24, 2007. BBC News Europe. “Gaddafi Wants EU Cash to Stop African Migrants.” BBC News Europe, August 31, 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11139345 (Retrieved February 3, 2013). Beblawi, Hazem. “The Rentier State in the Arab World.” In: Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State. London: Routledge (1990), p. 89. Boucek Christopher. Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Middle East Program, Paper 102, 2009. Chalcraft, John. Monarchy, Migration and Hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf States, Working Paper 12. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010. Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian. “The Durability of Weak States in the Middle East.” In: Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic (eds.), Persistent State Weakness in the Global Age. Farnham: Ashgate (2009), p. 90. —. Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era. London: Hurst & Co., 2011. Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian; Held, David and Brahimi, Alia. “The Arab 1989?” Open Democracy, February 11, 2011. http://www.opendemocracy.net/kristian-coates-ulrichsen-david-heldalia-brahimi/arab-1989 (Retrieved January 18, 2013). Davidson, Christopher. Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success. London: Hurst & Co., 2008.

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

41

Day, Stephen. “Updating Yemeni National Unity: Could Lingering Regional Divisions Bring down the Regime?” Middle East Journal 62, 3 (2008): p. 431. Desai, Meghnad; Holland, Fiona and Kaldor, Mary. “The Movement of Labour and Global Civil Society.” In: Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor and Helmut Anheier (eds.), Global Civil Society 2005/6. London: SAGE Publishing (2006), p. 120. Dillon, Michael. “Global Security in the 21st Century: Circulation, Complexity and Contingency.” In: Christopher Browning and Paul Cornish (eds.), The Globalization of Security. London: Chatham House Briefing Paper 05/02 (2005), p. 2. Dresch, Paul. “Societies, Identities and Global Issues.” In: Paul Dresch and James Piscatori (eds.), Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris (2005), p. 16. Drysdale, Alasdair. “Population Dynamics and Birth Spacing in Oman.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 42, 1 (2010): p. 124. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. Globalization and Geopolitics in the Middle East: Old Games, New Rulers. London: Routledge, 2007. Flynn, Daniel. Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project. Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, Centre for Contemporary Conflict, 2004. Forstenlechner, Ingo and Rutledge, Emilie. “Unemployment in the Gulf: Time to Update the Social Contract.” Middle East Policy 17, 2 (2010): p. 38. Gerschenkron, Alexander. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962. Ghabra, Shafeeq. “Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change.” In: Barry Rubin (ed.), Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf. London: Routledge (2002), pp. 111-112. Gonzalez, Gabriella; Karoly, Lynn; Constant, Louay; Salem, Hanine and Goldman, Charles. Facing Human Capital Challenges of the 21st Century: Education and Labour Market Initiatives in Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008. Halliday, Fred. The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Held, David and McGrew, Anthony. The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

42

Chapter One

Held, David and McGrew, Anthony. The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. Hill, Ginny. “What is Happening in Yemen?” Survival 52, 5 (2010): p. 107. Hurrell, Andrew. “One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society.” International Affairs 83, 1 (2007): p. 128. Johnsen, Gregory. “Yemen: Empty Economic Reforms Slow Bid to Join the GCC.” Arab Reform Bulletin 5, 1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/johnsen_feb071.pdf (Retrieved February 20, 2013). Kaldor, Mary; Karl, Terry Lynn and Said, Yahia. Oil Wars. London: Pluto Press, 2007. Kausch, Kristina and Youngs, Richard. “The End of the EuroMediterranean Vision.” International Affairs 85, 5 (2009): p. 239. Kenyon Lischer, Sarah. “Security and Displacement in Iraq.” International Security 33, 2 (2008): p. 95. King, David A. “The Scientific Impact of Nations: What Countries Get for their Research Spending.” Nature 430 (July 15, 2004): p. 314. McMahon, Simon. “Italy is Failing North Africa’s Refugees.” The Guardian, April 6, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/06/italy-northafrica-refugees-lampedusa (Retrieved March 7, 2013). MENA Development Report. The Road not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2007. Metcalf, Thomas. Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. Murphy, Emma. “ICT and the Gulf Arab States: A Force for Democracy?” In: Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven Wright (eds.), Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies. Reading: Ithaca Press (2008), p. 183. Nicolini, Beatrice. “The Baluch Role in the Persian Gulf during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, 2 (2007): p. 384. Nonneman, Gerd. “State of the Art: Rentiers and Autocrats, Monarchs and Democrats, State and Society: The Middle East between Globalisation, Human ‘Agency’ and Europe.” International Affairs 77, 1 (2001): p. 159.

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Issues of MENA

43

Okruhlik, Gwenn. “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States.” Comparative Politics 31, 3 (1999): p. 297. Okruhlik, Gwenn and Conge, Patrick. “National Autonomy, Labor Migration and Political Crisis: Yemen and Saudi Arabia.” Middle East Journal 51, 4 (1997): p. 556. Onley, James and Khalaf, Sulayman. “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf: An Historical-Anthropological Study.” History and Anthropology 17, 3 (2006): p. 191. Pappe, Ilan. The Modern Middle East. Abingdon: Routledge, 2005. Sayigh, Yezid and Shlaim, Avi. “Conclusion.” In: Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds.), The Cold War and the Middle East. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1997), pp. 290-291. Selvik, Kjetil and Stenslie, Stig. Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011. Sheriff, Abdul. “The Persian Gulf and the Swahili Coast: A History of Acculturation over the Longue Duree.” In: Lawrence G. Potter (ed.), The Persian Gulf in History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2009), pp. 183-184. Shochat, Sharon. “The Gulf Cooperation Council Economies: Diversification and Reform.” LSE Kuwait Research Programme, Introductory paper (February 2008): p. 34, table 4.3. Smith, Paul. “Climate Change, Mass Migration and the Military Response.” Orbis 51, 4 (2007): pp. 628-629. Spencer, Claire. “Introduction: North Africa and Britain.” International Affairs 85, 5 (2009): p. 924. The World Bank. “Building 21st Century Knowledge Economies for Job Growth and Competitiveness in the Middle East.” World Bank Institute, Knowledge for Development, November 19, 2009. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRA MS/KFDLP/0,,contentMDK:22419941~menuPK:461215~pagePK:641 56158~piPK:64152884~theSitePK:461198~isCURL:Y~isCURL:Y~is CURL:Y,00.html (Retrieved February 20, 2013). United Nations Development Programme. “The Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations.” New York: United Nations Development Programme. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development/Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2002. http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2002e.pdf (Retrieved February 20, 2013).

44

Chapter One

United Nations Development Programme. “The Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society.” New York: United Nations Development Programme. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development/Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2003. http://arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2003e.pdf (Retrieved March 7, 2013). Valeri, Marc. Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State. London: Hurst & Co., 2009. WANA Forum. WANA Forum 2011: Region in Transition. Amman: WANA Forum, 2011. Willoughby, John. “Ambivalent Anxieties of the South Asian-Gulf Arab Labor Exchange.” In: John W. Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah and Mohammad al-Mutawa (eds.), Globalization and the Gulf. Abingdon: Routledge (2006), p. 228. Winckler, Onn. “Labor and Liberalization: The Decline of the GCC Rentier System.” In: Joshua Teitelbaum (ed.), Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf. London: Hurst & Co. (2009), pp. 69-70. Yemen Forum Roundtable Meeting. London, Chatham House, February 18, 2010.

CHAPTER TWO MODERNITY AND ISLAMIC IMMIGRATION: EXAMINING THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE NIGEL M. GREAVES

Introduction This chapter seeks out a macro explanation for the tensions that are given to exist in societies like Britain with sizeable Islamic immigrant minorities. Tensions and misunderstandings as such are traced to distinguishable lines of historical development and experience, which have given rise subsequently to contrasting moral values, outlooks and expectations between the indigenous and immigrant communities. To be clear from the outset, the “Islamic immigrant” is taken to refer to a member of a minority community whose background culture is either derived predominantly from their country of origin, which is assumed to be Islamic, or those of subsequent generations who were born and raised in non-Islamic countries but who nevertheless draw their identity from the Islamic cultural tradition of their forbearers. In either case, Islam offers a potential counter-cultural standpoint expressible to varying degrees from passive resistance to outright hostility to the mores of the indigenous community. This has been interpreted as threatening by western leaders. Elected politicians have an ear at least for the vox populi and both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron have expressed concern that Islamic immigration represents a challenge of some kind; although Cameron’s obfuscation that what is needed in response is a more “active, muscular liberalism” (Wintour 2011) rather betrays the theoretical dither in which such leading politicians find themselves on this question. One may suspect, of course, that mainstream politicians are attempting to give vent to the same popular anxiety toward “the other” as expressed with much less self-restraint by numerous neo-

46

Chapter Two

fascist movements in Europe today. There is it seems some political capital in it. However, politicking aside, immigration from the Islamic world does seem nonetheless to present a number of potential challenges to western societies, like Britain, and the inter-communal tension that arises, for example, over the treatment of women, cannot be written off as a symptom of a current economic downturn and the scapegoating that traditionally accompanies it. Nor is it attributable to the clichés and exaggerations of racism per se. In fact, we need to be precise about what constitutes actual “difference” as opposed to “perceived difference”. The former is in this case taken by the author to be bound to the “organic” conditions of society and is fundamental to the character of its development; the latter may be simply ephemeral and harnessed to passing political expediency and opportunism and/or media hype with no lasting significance beyond that which might be made of it by those seeking to exploit it. This chapter assumes there is an organic difference to be explored but seeks to explain it; thus perhaps in some limited way to disarm its potential for subversion. Difference manifests itself as an outgrowth of contrasting ideological traditions. We will pursue this theme by firstly applying Antonio Gramsci’s analytical methods and utilising concepts such as “hegemony”, “intellectuals” and “historical bloc” in order to demonstrate that the character and content of prevalent ideas in society is far from random and is actually intelligible by their attachment to specific historical forces and cultural developments. In this way, modern ideas can be readily distinguished from the pre-modern by virtue of their function in reflecting contrasting social and political realities, or, again, in what amounts to the same thing, “uneven development”. Thus briefed, we shall turn thereafter to consider the contrast in development levels between the two cultural communities and seek out some pattern of correspondence between contrasting ideologies and contrasting economic and political developments. In this way, ideological difference is explained in the Islamic immigrant not so much as a voluntary act of awkwardness, defiance, contempt or disrespect, but as a structuralised consequence of a profoundly different historical experience of the modern.

Modernity and uneven cultural development Amin encapsulates the essence of the term modernity in the following way:

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

47

“Modernity is the outcome of a break in human history that began in Europe in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries… Modernity was based upon the demand for the emancipation of human beings, starting with their liberation from the straightjacket of previous forms of social determination. This meant giving up the prevailing forms of power legitimization in families, in the communities where the modes of life and production were organised, and in the state—which had until then rested upon a general religious metaphysic” (Amin 2003, p. 184).

The outbreak of the modernist revolution in Europe, later spreading to America, represents a definitive cultural break with the preceding medieval period. The historical departure is marked, as Bottomore (1993) argues, by two mutually supportive revolutionary upheavals, the political and the economic. That is to say, modernity represents the expression of, and the grounds for, the initiation and development of two interrelated European historical currents: the liberal democratic revolution and the industrial capitalist revolution. The former emphasises the political upheavals, struggles and statist transformations which occurred from the 17th century onward—as represented by the analytical tradition of Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859)—and the other corresponding roughly to the same period to the transformed character of material production and class relations—as represented by the analytical tradition of Karl Marx (Bottomore 1993, p. 3). Modernity in different revolutionary combinations swept through the European Christian world and beyond, although, as Amin indicates above, it was spread over three centuries even in its birthplace and was thus even here the subject of uneven development. In some countries, the economic preceded the political revolution, for example, in Italy and most profoundly in Germany in the late 19th century. In France, Belgium and Holland the two revolutions occurred largely simultaneously in the 18th century, whilst political developments in the 17th century seem in some respects (i.e. the English Civil War) to have anticipated the economic revolution in Britain—which might help explain perhaps the phenomenal leading growth of capitalism in Britain from roughly 1780 until around 1900. In any case, it is reasonably safe to suggest that the twin aspects of the modernist revolution are currently at an advanced stage, at least with regard to those European countries mentioned above, although the liberal capitalist revolution is still unfolding here and elsewhere. The historical experience of the Islamic world is patently different, and of course there is much greater unevenness in modern-type development. To offer a snap shot, reforms have occurred in the political and economic sectors, most notably, but often uneasily, in Turkey and to some extent

48

Chapter Two

Lebanon (the latter being multidenominational). Meanwhile, the Gulf Countries, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, have embraced aspects of economic modernity in terms of handling finance capital, if not in terms of industrialisation, but are otherwise devoid of Tocquevillean-type reforms —i.e. economic liberalism without political liberalism (Murden 2002, pp. 110-113). Malaysia and Indonesia have undertaken some industrialisation but again corresponding political developments have not matched the economic (Hefner 1997, p. 113). Pakistan and Bangladesh have struggled to embrace either revolutionary tradition, alternating between tentative parliamentary government and periodic dictatorship, coupled to largely rural-feudal economies and social relations. Countries such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have recently undergone profound Tocquevillean-type uprisings, whose teleologies are as yet not wholly certain, but, with the exception of Libya which is dependent on oil production, have been struggling with their economic revolutions since independence (Murden 2002, pp. 106-107). Lagging behind in virtually intact pre-modern conditions are countries such as Sudan and Afghanistan, with hardly any substantive modern changes in political and economic culture at all (Kandiyoti 2009, p. 104). Finally, there are Islamic countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia which espouse Islam as a state ideology in absolutist terms and promote a rejection tacitly or otherwise of the perceived values of modernity, such as individual freedoms of various kinds and the notion of women’s equality. Both retain an oil-dominated rentier/feudal-type economy, supplemented today by more widespread state-sponsored industrialisation in Iran’s case to compensate for trade restrictions currently placed upon it. The picture of the condition of modernist development in the Islamic world is very varied but the general lag behind the cultural development of Europe is patently obvious. The occurrence of significant modernistic alterations to class formations comparable to Europe anywhere in the Islamic world is hard to detect. Certainly, where they exist in the Islamic world, the social character of the political parties is comparatively incoherent and ideological distinctions tend to coalesce around a nationalreligious divide or tribal affiliations. Even in a country like Turkey, which has recently been admitted to the G20 of the world’s most powerful economies, there is little in the way of direct hegemonic leadership provided by a recognisable urban-industrial bourgeoisie. Nor is there a well-defined dedicated working class opposition, or if there is it is certainly not yet distinctive and politically vociferous. [The] Turkish experience differs considerably from the historical development of parties and party systems in Western Europe. In the latter,

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

49

societal forces from below rather than the actions of the state elites from above have been the principal agents of continuity and change in party politics (Sayari 2002, p. 25). One might suggest a far-reaching redefinition of the political along modern class lines is imminent in Turkey. However, notwithstanding the possibility of a serious dislocation of the political and the economic, Turkey has been subject in its own way to a general reaffirmation of the religious in public life currently in ascendency throughout the Islamic world (Yavuz 2003, p. 81). This resurgence, held up by certain crucial levels of developmental advancement in Turkey in the economic and political spheres, is otherwise suggestive of the use of Islam as a focus for disengagement to some extent from the entire modern project, dominated as it is by the culture of a developed world with which it makes no immediate identification.

Ideas and socio-political stability Gramsci’s analytical method is sometimes referred to as “absolute historicism”. What this suggests is that there is no such thing as “pure being”, or indeed consciousness that transcends society and history. There can be no possibility of comprehending the reality of the human world by virtue of abstraction from its social (by which is meant historical) context. For Gramsci, it is not a question of what humans take reality to be as an ontological enquiry as much as how that notion of reality arises and what purpose it serves—consciousness is as consciousness does. One can only rationalise generally what individuals are and how they think in terms of the society to which they are attached, or that which provides their “education” in the broadest sense. Indeed, it would seem to border on the tautological to suggest that the individual receiving a social and political education predominantly from a western liberal democratic society will as a consequence exhibit the political and social values, mores and norms of that society. This is equally true of the Islamic immigrant viz. the background Islamic culture in which (s)he is socially rooted. That is not to discount the possibilities of complex social exchanges between communities in everyday life, of course, but it is nonetheless possible to draw out the historical grounds for a potential ideological stand-off where the modern and semi/pre-modern cultures confront one another, particularly acutely, of course, in shared spaces. The cultural dichotomy based on historical experience between an indigenous and an immigrant population becomes, of course, immediately

50

Chapter Two

political. Here the political in a Gramscian sense refers to a social arena where there exists, in a constant condition of amendment, an exchange of and attachment to ideas and values, or what it is more fashionable these days to call “discourses”. What makes them political is their function. Ideas foster a sense of common identification with (or departure from) the community in general, and its political and economic practices and institutions in particular. Gramsci states, ideas are: “historically necessary they have a validity which is ‘psychological’; they ‘organise’ human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” (Gramsci 1971, p. 377).

Ideas shape the political outlook and attitude and are environmentally received and exchanged over time. They have a function which is educative and directive towards certain social goals and solidarities. Such received and exchanged ideas do not necessarily lend themselves immediately to the “philosophical” in a scholastic sense since they are garnered from the social environment and retained often in a disorganised, vague, incoherent or even contradictory form (Gramsci 1971, p. 419). Nevertheless, these outlooks are philosophical in the sense that they perform a function which is to some extent truth-bearing in disseminating and explaining social reality. The point for Gramsci is that such discursivity is crucial for socio-political stability. Gramsci traces the popularisation of believable accounts of the attributes of a particular type of governance (which need not necessarily be true) to the insights of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). States and communities cannot function long-term by coercion alone. It is necessary for the ruler to engineer the consent of the polity as an essential element of statecraft (Machiavelli 1999, p. 57). Gramsci pursues this notion to reveal state dependency on a broader identification with the cultural mission the state is supporting. People derive a host of state/community-supporting ideas from their social environment and these tend to form patterns that function to legitimise and stabilise certain historical levels of social action or development. Gramsci attempts therefore to identify a process which serves to harmonise ways of living with ways of thinking that is deemed to be necessary to the stability and performance of the whole community at particular times. Gramsci was also influenced profoundly by Georg W. F. Hegel (17701831) and of course Karl Marx (1818-1883). For Hegel, society is akin to a living organism negotiating from within dialectically to make improvements to itself as it travels through time. Hegel was an idealist

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

51

(not to mention a religious one) and elevated ideas to the role of the motor of history (Hegel 1894, p. 13). Thus what we see in society, culture and the state at any time is merely the materialised mobilisation of the “idea” at that particular moment. To Hegel, as is arguably true of Islam today, the age must be therefore modified to the idea. That is to say, action is and should be conditioned or “determined” by thought. Gramsci accepted Marx’s inversion of Hegel’s dialectical method and accepted also that the idea is thus largely modified by the age rather than the reverse. Modes of thought reflect the actual life condition, but, for Gramsci, these also reciprocate supportively with those source conditions. Hence, differing life conditions will produce differing modes of thought which in turn reciprocate back and complement those conditions. In this way prevalent ideas in society are deemed conditioned by the age—the historical context in which they occur—but also interact dialectically to help reproduce the social dominance of the age. Naturally, where thought is anchored to the notion of universal, timeless (and perhaps in the case of Islam, unyielding) truths, thought becomes resistant to social change, or a conservative force in society, since it loses some capacity to explain and/or justify changes in values that flow inevitably from such social changes. Gramsci calls prevalent attitudes, and the moral compass that arises from them, “common sense” (Gramsci 1971, p. 419). Common sense is thus a mass interpretation of what Hegel labelled the zeitgeist (literally, “spirit of the age”). Gramsci identified the orchestrators and broadcasters of common sense ideas as “intellectuals”. There is no possibility of identifying the intellectuals as bearers of historically transcendent and eternal moral truths (Greaves 2009, pp. 181-184). Rather, intellectuals have the function of articulating the interests of the dominant group in society as though their historically particular practical and philosophical interests are universal truths for everyone at any time. Hence the intellectual content of society is historically specific but intellectuals tend to be regarded, and often project themselves, as historically transcendent in order to garner authority. It is within the space offered by civil-voluntary society that these ideas supportive of dominant social practices are generated and transmitted. The intellectuals operate in political parties, trade unions, newspapers and the media, the education system, and so on. All contribute to the construction of a world-view that is supportive of a particular cultural form. Essentially, cultural values, including the religious, are imparted and exchanged largely within voluntary civil spaces. Naturally, the “culture” that is transmitted via these multifarious modern social agencies that are supportive of western liberal democratic cultures may confront the Islamic

52

Chapter Two

immigrant as alien to his/her own cultural tradition because that culture evolved differently and involved different value-laden ideological attachments. What is received may be thus perceived as a continual bombardment of inappropriate, deviant, meaningless or contradictory moral directions. Thus there develops the potential for a confrontation of perceived cultural realities at a psychological level wherein, in Hegelian terms, the “rational becomes real”. It follows logically that, secured to distinctive and largely contradictory identity-affirming and replicating cultural mores, the Islamic immigrant community is potentially encouraged into ideological entrenchment or even intellectual ghettoization within its own discursive spaces. In a sense, one can feasibly speak of the existence of a largely differentiated ideological “superstructure”, one modelled on the requirements of the cultural life of the country of origin. The processes of Islamic intellectualisation and common-sense dissemination is sourced perhaps both at home and abroad to the exclusivity of the mosque, reading and social clubs, coffee shops or indeed any more or less exclusive public space capable of framing the cognitive horizon, or the public-process for the dissemination of what in Habermas’ theory of “Communicative Action” constitutes the Islamic “lifeworld” (Habermas 1985).

Immigration, class and hegemony Not surprisingly, Gramsci includes in his list of intellectual leaders the Catholic Church which he considered retained enormous cultural force in Italy during his time. The Church was a deeply conservative institution and such was its social power it successfully delayed Italy’s nationalsecular-liberal-capitalist revolution (Bobbio 1995, p. 16). In fact, it was only after receiving certain guarantees, and only following a great deal of internal machination, that the Vatican finally and begrudgingly gave the nod to both capitalism and liberal democracy at the end of the 19th century (Bobbio 1995, pp. 31-32). What this instance revealed is the extent to which religious ideas can impact on the social form to retard development. The modern revolution threatened disruption in Italy due to class transformations that would alter in its wake the entire social logic in which religion performed and maintained its social foothold. The religious intellectuals responded by defending the feudal elites in Italy but when faced with the inexorability of change forged new mutually advantageous partnerships with the emerging national-liberal revolutionaries. Gramsci regarded the struggles between the forces of modernity and that of the Church in Italy as a specific engagement in a “war of position”

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

53

between social forces for supremacy and control of the community and through it the state. The war of position is fought with ideas which are attached to specific classes because these ideas speak to a particular social reality or class experience—which is the ultimate basis of their appeal. The victor is the class with the world view that achieves some rough crossclass consensus by persuading the mass of society to adopt its moral content or, in short, its version of reality. Gramsci called this medium of manipulation “hegemony”. Hegemony explains, solicits attachment to, and, a Marxist might say, disguises social reality, and so on. The function of hegemony is thus to bind popular ways of thinking to levels of cultural development overall, or what Gramsci calls a “historical bloc”. To demystify the term, “culture” is a combination of social action (dominated by the economic) the formal regulatory or legal (the political-institutional) and the informal/voluntary reflective (the ideological/hegemonic). Hegemony directs the whole of society to an acceptance of a certain way of life, but Gramsci did not see it as naked imposition, it is more a question of negotiation. This suggests that hegemony can involve some limited trade-off in order that it might go some way towards explaining reality for the whole of society, even though that society comprises fractured social interests. Historically, hegemony develops dialectically through tentative class alliances, negotiation and compromises and its role is to provide a rationale to a level of cultural development that requires the co-operation of classes that are disadvantaged by it, in an objective economic sense. Its political function is thus to build consensus out of a socially fractured society. The maintenance of the social cohesion of the historical bloc is however always threatened by poor hegemonic attachment. In this context, the challenge posed by Islamic immigration in hegemonic terms would appear to be whether the liberal-capitalist consensus operating as the national common sense of the indigenous community is able to incorporate that of the Islamic immigrant minority. The adoption of liberal notions of freedom of choice and expression may be invoked but these do not appear to be sufficient, as we shall see. The possibility of creating a hegemonic enclosure capable of encompassing the Islamic minority community appears to be narrow to say the least. The appeal of so-called “multiculturalism” in this context is its potential for sidestepping the centripetal hegemonic problematic. Perhaps the best philosophical account of this idea occurs in the communitarian thinking of Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1984). Here, so the argument goes, a community that is fractured culturally and

54

Chapter Two

morally into pluralised spheres maintains consensus by virtue of little more than a mass acceptance of the moral autonomy of the spheres themselves—an “agreement to disagree”, as it were. The tapered minimal point of agreement becomes necessary to maintain the existence of much “thicker” cultural differences as the communal spheres back into themselves and away from the point of agreement. Issues such as veiling and the burqa thus lose their moral anchorage to largely zero-sum wars of position (the either “our way or yours”) and disperse into consensual cultural relativity. The arrangement is tentative because the minimal point of contact of the spheres is extremely load-bearing, but Walzer’s schema is nonetheless feasible and it is to some extent unconsciously practiced already. It is curious then that multiculturalism has been declared extinct by many European leaders recently (Weaver 2010), because at first glance it would appear to offer a way out of the domination-dissent impasse. Kymlicka (Kymlicka 2001, p. 173) is however sceptical since recognition, tolerance and acceptance from the indigenous community is a “right” that in reality appears to come, he argues, with an “obligation” to identify, to some minimal level, with the indigenous community’s values. Let us not equivocate. The obligation in question boils down to an acceptance of the dominant liberal-capitalist consensus. Kymlicka appears to have a point since the juxtaposition of the indigenous and immigrant cultural spheres is vastly disproportionate with the liberal-capitalist consensus otherwise enveloping all before it. Indeed, liberal-capitalist hegemony continues to intensify its grip on its own society and has already eradicated many of the nuances and cultural differences between the liberal-capitalist countries themselves, making it possible, for example, to bury old enmities and conceive of a unified culture sufficient to base institutions such as the European Union on. This process has tended to enlarge the hegemonic structure as much as the geo-political against which the cultural dissent of the Islamic immigrant becomes increasingly dwarfed. If an Islamic discourse cannot find space beyond its own “ghetto” then what are the prospects for its integration? A new threat emerges in that Islamic immigration might project itself discursively upon tentative interclass agreements already negotiated. What is arguably more at stake is the potential for the proliferation of ideas which may upset the delicate hegemonic fiat which symbolises roughly attained class consensus in the early twenty-first century liberal democracy. Indeed, more fundamentally still, we might argue that an Islamic discourse has the potential to weaken the very ideological supports necessary to sustain capitalist culture. This assumption appears in part to underpin the current nervousness of certain

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

55

European leaders, aggravated no doubt by the possibility that the radical political left might become the beneficiary of Islamic immigrant dissent. Certainly this is the tacit assumption of the leadership of the UK’s political party Respect. Respect has to some extent attempted to cocktail, albeit rather ambiguously, two alternative sources of liberal-capitalist rejectionism —those of the traditional working-class/socialist and the Islamic immigrant. Disillusionment with liberalism in particular is based perhaps on what might appear to be its failure to live up to its capacity for toleration. Of course, the possibility is there for subverting disillusionment into otherwise incongruous leftist strategies in the short term, but the prospect of such an ideological alliance beyond the level of anti-liberalcapitalist resistance is probably overstated. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 exposed a fundamental dichotomy between socialists and Islamists in the subsequent post-revolutionary situation. In a Gramscian sense this departure was inevitable because of the incongruity of the mix of social forces involved, polarised as they were on the question of the proliferation of modernity in Iran.

The liberalisation of Christianity In pre-modern times, both Christianity and Islam would have performed similar pivotal social and political roles in stabilising society. Religious duty and duty toward the political regime became inextricably linked. No possibility of contradiction arose because the conditions upon which politics operated and the actions of rulers were given to be predetermined by an omnipotent deity. Rulers were merely instrumental agents in the divine plan, and fostered a relaxed coexistence between the temporal and the sacred worlds (Akbarzadeh, Saeed 2003, p. 2). Not until Machiavelli’s Prince (first published in 1532) and the imminence of modernity in Europe was the act of faith questioned as the basis of political affiliation. Hitherto, there were no grounds for a political challenge that might be distinguishable from a religious challenge; the latter carrying with it the risk of social ostracism, even eternal damnation. The tensions that were indeed rife between the Christian and Muslim worlds in the pre-modern period were predicated largely on the veracity of the rival belief systems themselves and not the social and political virtues of the act of believing. The significance of the rise of Protestantism and its reforms in the Christian world was its congruity with the liberal revolution and the revolutionary ideas which flowed from it concerning the “rights of man”. Protestantism in Lutheran terms represents the eradication of the intermediary in the practice of religious devotion. The significance of the

56

Chapter Two

act of translating the Bible into German and soon after English was its breaking of the Catholic cultural monopoly. Believers were empowered to communicate directly with God through the text itself rather than to receive the message through the Latin-vernacular translation and filtration of the feudalist intellectual caste. This seriously weakened the doctrine of the divine right of kings partly because it was now possible to read into and justify the needs of society in different ways. This meant it created the possibility of uncoupling religion from politics also because religion need not be confined to feudalist interpretation (or any other). Indeed, the Bible was thus freed up for reinterpretation in the new conditions of changing social realities. John Locke (1632-1704) found it possible, for example, to imbue Christianity with a comprehensive liberal message. In turn, he endows the state with a change of mission. The state has no role in projecting virtue and opposing vice as the arbiter of some divine decree; it (the state) is merely made by “men” (his feminist credentials were dubious) to defend their rights. Chief among these is an inalienable right to “life, liberty, and estate [property]” (Locke 1988, p. 87). Locke inverts the theme of original sin in the parable of the Garden of Eden. He sees individual choice and those things proffered by nature as gifts. Original man, in Adam, exercised choice, and this he was entitled to do because the decision-maker is always in rightful possession of his mind. To choose one’s position on religion or any other matter therefore rests on the principle that the individual knows best his own mind, and indeed in matters concerning his body and soul also. Locke was certainly Christian but he sets out new and radical philosophical terms for its secularisation in his A Letter Concerning Toleration (originally published in 1689) in which he rejects the possibility of an objective standpoint from which to pass verdict on the merits and/or demerits of a particular faith. In such case, the state (or anything or anyone else) has no grounds to presume to achieve an objectivity that is quite beyond the capacity of any single individual. Choice, including choice in religious matters, is dependent on conditions of social and political freedoms of a liberal-humanist character, but freedoms to do what? Locke’s thinking takes a distinctly materialist turn. The free market system of production and exchange later to become overtly capitalist is for Locke actually driven by a choice principle, and this exploits God’s work again in the sense that nature has endowed humans with the faculty of reason. To allow this faculty to atrophy by denying choice, therefore, must go against nature, or more specifically God.

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

57

Capitalism, at least in its early phase, amounts largely to the materialisation of liberal morality. It is free in the sense that individuals freely produce commodities to be sold to free agents who wish to buy them. And as free agents, buyer and seller are free to negotiate a price and for the seller to make and keep a profit. This is legitimate all the way along because there is no coercion involved. Under the ethic of voluntary agreement, there could be no further justification either for the banning of usury in Christian societies—and usury of course greatly increased the possibilities of capital accumulation. The Biblical indictment of the “money-lenders” was thus abandoned altogether, but it is instructive to note here that usury remains officially haram (forbidden) in Islam. Of course, when set in motion, the advent of liberalism is nothing short of a cultural revolution. It casts the value of a human being in an entirely new light and demands all manner of institutional reforms to ensure this is upheld and not abused. We are now discussing a human creature that is sentient, self-aware, self-governed, self-interested. This is essentially “modern man”; an individual capable of reason, upon which no one has the right to impose opinions and views, including religious, political or any other. Generally speaking, nationalism was essential in the modern state building process in that no higher authority than the nation-state itself need be consulted on any new idea, technological innovation, or experimentation of any kind. The nationalist domino effect in Europe over several centuries moreover created competition between states undergoing similar process where little existed before. This in turn led to considerations of the “national interest” and its promotion, all of which strengthened the nationstatist political dynamic but also the development of the national economy, the national defence mechanisms, scientific research, eventually mass education, social reform, welfare systems, and so on. The connection between liberalism and nationalism in the west only emerges as one of scaling in linearity the ethic of self-determination. That is to say, the individual is given to be self-determined and there can be no logical reason to allow the community to be determined by anyone or anything other than the individuals in the community themselves. The next step is to ask: who are we? The only answer when discussing the concept of “we” that liberalism seems capable of tolerating is the nation and then only in the sense that the nation is the larger embodiment of the principle of self-determination, or the free individual “writ large”. Indeed, the task of forging social solidarity from disparate classes through war of position poses a tremendous challenge to the dominant social forces, but Gramsci understood here the importance of what he calls

58

Chapter Two

the “national-popular” will (Gramsci 1971, p. 123). England’s Queen Elizabeth I perceived a threat to the nation due to the presence of Catholic cosmopolitanism at the time, citing to Parliament the Biblical injunction “no one can serve two masters” (The Holy Bible 1984, Matthew 6, p. 24; 1984, p. 840). Religious cosmopolitanism sits very uneasily with national discourses of any kind. From the perspective of those seeking to secure a certain national consensus, the Islamic immigrant poses a similar problem. The would-be national-cultural identification on which consent is built is potentially deflected to the transcendent, global, cosmopolitan Islamic community, which in essence has no nation. Western society has certainly been here before. Although ridiculed by Marx, Hegel’s solution to poor social cohesion was to elevate the state to a position of social inscrutability in which all might identify but in which none in particular would be favoured. It was necessary for the state to transcend the—for Hegel—comparatively petty squabbling of civil life in order to effect mass affiliation to it. The basis of the affiliation was ultimately “national identity” and this Hegel thought will trump all sub-state class affiliations and religious divisions from a condition of differentiation into a necessary, although temporary, unity. The problem arises however when the state is identified with a cultural expression that is not recognised as wholly or in part legitimate. It could be suggested, that Cameron’s notion of projecting a more muscular liberalism, referred to in the Introduction, exposes a paradox here. Liberalism traditionally connotes state neutrality with regard to social diversity, which renders it capable of tolerating alternative social identities. The contradiction seems to be that the liberal state is not neutral as much as biased towards liberalism in the face of its detractors. In this sense Cameron makes it clear that the boundaries of liberal toleration cannot be extended, as we have seen above, to incorporate that which does not tolerate liberalism. Hence, the dominant national-hegemonic discourse on which the liberal democratic state is predicated is strained to its limits to tolerate outlooks which reject the liberal basis for such toleration. Liberalism might be perceived therefore as an over-arching dictatorship of sorts by people who do not share its values. Indeed MacIntyre makes the point that liberalism itself embodies an established “tradition” and displays similarities with religion in that its intellectuals might consult its classical texts in precisely the same dogmatic fashion as the theological intellectual (MacIntyre 1988, p. 345).

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

59

The illiberalism of Islam? Individual (irreligious or otherwise) self-rule as a virtue in itself appears to be comparatively far more difficult to justify epistemologically in Islam. The writings of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) offer an attempt to revise Islam in a modernist context by conceiving the Islamic believer as nonetheless, in a liberal sense, an “atomistic” autonomous individual (Haj 2009, p. 191). However, whilst his modernism attracted limited attention in Iran it did not take off in his native Indian sub-continent, or indeed in south-east Asia (Masud 2009, p. 250). Much easier to comprehend is the Koranic injunction on Muslims: “do not obey a creature against his creator” (Lambton 1981, p. 14). One must assume that this applies not only to the temporal ruler but ultimately to the human agents themselves whose will and individual initiative, as expressions of the ego, has to be considered inferior morally to the act of submission to a greater authority. Indeed, in this sense, the very idea of “agency” itself gives way to external orchestration and ultimate structuralisation of the individual will within God’s larger schema. Islam appears to be less potentially malleable than Christianity in meeting the requirements of altered social conditions in one key regard: contrary to the Christian Biblical parables and accounts of Jesus’ disciples which were composed by human hand, the Koran was/is deemed dictated directly and verbatim by God. This alters fundamentally the question of hermeneutics. It effectively refuses any possible role for the social in interpreting the ethical; only God’s meaning is relevant and interpretation demands the eradication of human subjectivity. The Christian Bible is moreover more allegorical and less directly instructional. Hence the hermeneutic question is capable of social relativity in the sense that one might interpret the moral of the allegories in different historical contexts. Marx notes in The Communist Manifesto how Christianity was “modified in the course of historical development” (Marx 1977, p. 236). An expectation or duty to religious observance was de rigueur in the pre-capitalist world, but transformed into a matter of individual choice with the arrival of liberal notions of freedom. Hence, the religious paradigm was never deliberately destroyed in the Christian world; its ethical content was modified to meet the questions and vicissitudes of new social conditions. Although it cannot be said so much of nationalism, liberalism has not taken root anywhere in the Islamic world by comparison with the experience of the western world. Indeed, the Islamic world underwent no Protestant-type reformation or serious challenge to religious dominance in

60

Chapter Two

terms of nationalist or secularist movements, that is, until the committed Europhile Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” (1881-1938) instigated a cultural revolution in Turkey in the 1920s. Here the secularist revolution was deployed to strengthen the new state against religious cosmopolitanism. Otherwise where nationalism appeared in the Islamic world in the 20th Century, such as in Egypt and Pakistan, it was moulded from an anticolonial struggle against an occupying power or it was a reaction against the political and social incongruity of imposed state boundaries, or indeed both (Halliday 2005, p. 236). Yet the logic of nation where it occurred was framed nonetheless in religious terms, that is, rather than liberal. The combination of religion and nationalism in much of the Islamic world appears to have been historically attuned to the preservation of prevailing culture against the external (modernist) threat. The religious characteristics of the culture remained essentially supra-national but the prevailing political-institutional logic in which nationalism took its form resulted, for example, throughout the Middle East, from the superimposed boundaries of the retreating imperial powers. Symbiotic rejection of “the other” is a prerequisite of nationalism. As such, it could be argued, the state in Islam and the question of sovereignty is a dialectical product of engagement with the modern world and one which has employed ipso facto a modernist countervail as the face of the “other” to be rejected. There has been therefore little in the way of modern secularism or indeed nationalism arising organically from within the Islamic states themselves. That is to say, nationalism arose due to different dynamics and was driven by external rather than internal causal factors. This produced different evaluations of the notion of sovereignty and confined the principle of self-determination to the right to maintain one’s own cultural traditions in a world increasingly carved up economically, politically and militarily by the dominant western powers. In this sense, self-possession in the Islamic world has been interpreted as one of being free of the incursion of modernist values so that development, if it is to be undertaken at all, might occur at a pace and embody content chosen by the Islamic world itself.

Conclusion The chapter has attempted to employ the analytical framework of Antonio Gramsci in order to locate the social origins of an ideological stand-off in modern liberal democratic societies with significant Islamic immigrant populations. It has also sought to explain how prevailing belief systems arise, are transmitted and what role they play in promoting social

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

61

cohesion. The indicated problem is that Islamic immigration in western liberal democratic states creates proximity of cultures that do not immediately relate to and identify with one another. It has been suggested that the roots of potential inter-communal tension derives from dichotomous historical experiences. The lynchpin has been shown to have been the advent of modernity which promoted wholesale social, economic and political changes in those countries in which it arose and developed when compared to those societies in which its effects were more limited. Along with such developments came alterations to human consciousness. Modernist pressures gave rise in the European Christian world to a reinterpretation of the role of religion, particularly with regard to politics, and its subsequent marginalisation from the formal political and increasingly social processes. Fresh conceptions of the human condition emerged to supplant the role of religion as the binding ideological precursor of statist consent such that it is now possible to regard the political role of religion, from a Gramscian standpoint, as an artefact of pre-modern European superstructures. The modern state has certainly been relieved of its pre-modern dependency on religious hegemony, but has therefore had to evolve new grounds for consent which more reasonably appeal to the changed realities of capitalist social relations which required the establishment of fundamental liberties, the possibility of social mobility, and self-determination both of the individual and the new state. Liberalism and nationalism emerged as essential ideological components of the modern revolution and became the basis of a modern hegemonic consensus necessary to bind the community to cultural practices secured in legality by the state. At every stage, the modernist revolution was confronted by the conservative impulses of religion, and the early revolutionaries first sought to reinterpret the religious texts and secondly to confine the act of belief to voluntary choice. On the one hand, these developmental pressures have not occurred to the same extent in Islamic societies and, on the other hand, there may be elements to the Islamic religion itself which may have been more resistant to modern pressure than its Christian equivalent. With notable exceptions, such as Turkey, Islamic societies have not seriously fostered modernity in the form it occurred in western countries and thus such pressures as modernity has caused are largely perceived by its “victims” as an external imposition. This has contributed to some extent to the symbiotic necessities of a modern national discourse in the Islamic world, as has anti-colonialism, but in combination often with a renewed religious dynamic rather than liberalism, for which the Islamic societies in general appear to have little taste because the social necessity for it is weak.

62

Chapter Two

The ideological distinction between indigenous and immigrant communities is predicated on diverse historiologies but the dominant discourse is maintained and replicated by an array of intellectual agencies which, when seen from the minority standpoint, combine to engulf the immigrant in an alien cultural dictatorship. Logically the immigrant population must go either native, so to speak, embrace a culture at times bizarrely at odds with its traditions or seek refuge in intellectual isolation from the dominant community, or as is probably equally common, find an ad hoc compromise between these polar positions. Cultural disenfranchisement is worrying because although liberalism contains expansionary scope for toleration it can logically only make this available through subscription to its main tenets. One such tenet, if not the most important, would be individual freedom, but this value might be resisted because it is possible it will slide into a license to behave in ways that violate the moral code of the Muslim community, such as dress codes, the frowning on the consumption of alcohol and loose sexual mores, etc. The anxiety expressed by politicians on Islamic immigration derives from a recognition that a sizeable portion of the community is effectively cut-adrift from the value system of the dominant culture. This is potentially subversive and may temporarily combine with other traditional criticisms of capitalism and liberal culture and thus destabilise any erstwhile hegemonic agreement between extant classes on which capitalism depends. A more immediate danger is perhaps that a failure to adopt the prevailing culture will symbolise for the indigenous community a desire on the part of the immigrant to share some physical, but not cultural, space, which might turn the indigenous community against the immigrant and fuel further tension, as a classic reaction to rejection. One might ask: what has happened to so-called multiculturalism? In some limited sense it is a fait accompli in western liberal democracies, but on closer scrutiny the massive imbalance between the dominant and dissenting cultures is far from the envisaged polyarchy Walzer had in mind in “Spheres of Justice”, as the necessary precondition for multiculturalism to function. Hence, the “death of multiculturalism” ironically assumes that it was indeed once alive and well, which hardly seems to be the case. The advent of modernity has thus altered the notion of belief and the context in which religious practice per se is apprehended. The current clash of ideology however is not one in which we can identify a renewed instalment of medieval crusading and a Christian-Islamic enmity as much an Islamic-liberal one. The only source of identifiable difference is thus ultimately the nature of the social world the ideologies seek to articulate

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

63

and promote. As such, there is no foreseeable solution, particularly if the response is simply to step up the war of position against possible dissenters, as Cameron’s “muscular liberalism” argument implies. The pressure remains on the Islamic community to conform to the dominant hegemonic form, or, alternatively that is, to dissent quietly and demurely and keep a low profile. The latter would appear to be far from satisfactory and indeed something of an indictment of a western liberal democratic culture that ultimately claims moral superiority over its rival forms.

64

Chapter Two

Bibliography Akbarzadeh, Shahram and Saeed, Abdullah. Islam and Political Legitimacy. New York: Routledge, 2003. Amin, Samir. Obsolescent Capitalism: Contemporary Politics of Global Disorder. London: Zed, 2003. Bobbio, Norberto. Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy (translated L. G. Cochrane). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1995. Bottomore, Tom. Political Sociology, 2nd ed. London: Pluto, 1993. Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith). London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971. Greaves, Nigel M. Gramsci’s Marxism: Reclaiming a Philosophy of History and Politics. Leicester: Matador, 2009. Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston MA: Beacon, 1985. Haj, Samira. Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity. Stanford CA: Stanford University, 2009. Halliday, Fred. The Middle East in International Relations—Power, Politics, and Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005. Hefner, Robert W. “Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia.” In: Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (eds.), Islam in an Era of Nation-States. Honolulu: University of Hawaii (1997), pp. 75-128. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind (ed. W. Wallace). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894. Kandiyoti, Deniz. “Islam, Modernity and the Politics of Gender.” In: Muhammad K. Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van Bruinessen (eds.), Islam and Modernity—Key Issue and Debates. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University (2009), pp. 91-124. Kymlicka, Will. Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University, 2001. Lambton, Ann K. S. State and Government in Medieval Islam. Oxford: Oxford University, 1981. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government (ed. P. Laslett). Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1988 (1689). Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince (translated G. Bull). London: Penguin, 1999. MacIntyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: Notre Dame University, 1988.

Modernity and Islamic Immigration

65

Marx, Karl. Selected Writings (ed. D. McLellan,). Oxford: Oxford University, 1977. Masud, Muhammad K. “Islamic Modernism.” In: Muhammad K. Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van Bruinessen (eds.), Islam and Modernity—Key Issue and Debates. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University (2009), pp. 237-260. Murden, Simon. Islam, the Middle East, and the New Global Hegemony. London: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Sayari, Sabri. “The Changing Party System.” In: Sabri Sayari and Yilmaz Esmer (eds.), Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner (2002), pp. 9-32. The Holy Bible (New International Version). Colorado CO: International Bible Society, 1984. Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic, 1984. Weaver, Matthew. “Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism has 'Utterly Failed'.” The Guardian, October 17, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-germanmulticulturalism-failed (Retrieved April 14, 2013). Wintour, Patrick. “David Cameron tells Muslim Britain: Stop tolerating Extremists.” The Guardian, February 5, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/feb/05/david-cameronmuslim-extremism (Retrieved April 10, 2013). Yavuz, Hakan. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University, 2003.

CHAPTER THREE THE BURGEONING OF TRANSNATIONALISM: NARROWING THE TRANSITIONAL GAP FROM EMIGRANT TO CITIZEN ANNEMARIE PROFANTER

Introduction As the impetus of globalization continues to gather energy, more and more emigrants leave home pursuing dreams of a better life for themselves and their families. The impact of such geographic migration is often underestimated by both the immigrants and social, political, and educational institutions in the adopted homeland. This change of residence location leads to a cultural frame switching entailing the development of bicultural identities flexible enough to adapt to new societal structures while retaining cultural citizenship in one’s country of origin. This process calls for a re-conceptualization and application of new paradigms for designing ways in which aspects of acculturation might be reinforced, while marginalizing barriers are minimized. The definition of a cultural socio-spatial safety zone is one which can function as both a support and also at times a barrier to integration. The Islamic concept of reform (islah) and rejuvenation (tajdid) could be synthesized with existing European civic frameworks in order to help facilitate the ever growing numbers of Muslim immigrants into active socio-political citizens of the European Union. Consequently, one of the aims of this paper is to identify the key players actively searching for positive cultural socio-spatial elements from within this immigrant group that can be overlapped with existing European conceptualizations into richer more vibrant cross cultural plurality. Another aim of this paper is to highlight the ongoing impact of Islamic societal imperative on European population synthesis by building on Van Tubergen’s (2006, p. 1) “specific migration” framework that hypothesizes immigrants’ religiosity as relevant to, and an outcome of,

68

Chapter Three

both individual and contextual factors relating to both point of origin and destination cultures, or combinations thereof (i.e. communities). This is regardless of geographic placement and incorporates an understanding of those Qur’anic prescriptions into secular protocols developed to address both immigrants’ civic needs and that of the native, majority culture.

Globalization in-situ Sociologically, the ebb and flow of groups of people trans-nationally has had a strong impact on the formation and development of contemporary nation states. The permeability of cultural and physical borders has made it possible that “people may cross borders voluntarily, in search of economic opportunities and social alternative, or forcibly displaced because of conflict, natural resource degradation, disaster, or human trafficking. In the 21st century, one out of every 35 people worldwide is an international migrant, and half of them are women” (Hille, Päivi 2005, p. 359).

Cultural and migration issues have existed worldwide since the dawn of recorded time: the Mesopotamians in Samaria, the Sumerians in Dilmun, the Shem’s in Upper Egypt, the Moors in Spain, and the Jews in medieval Europe, for example. With the advent of the Nation State in the late 18th century the lines of demarcation between culturally “othered” individuals and land-raised nationals became clearer. Historically, most North American and European countries have been a crossroad of cultural interaction for the last three thousand years. In the past and in contemporary times Europe and the USA have embraced numerous populations, thus making immigration an area of significance. In 1950 there were only 800,000 Muslims in Western Europe, today there are 20 million. Even in a small region of Northern Italy, for example, the South Tyrol, a Northern Italian province of approximately 488.877 people, 5.2% of the population has an immigrant background (Autonome Provinz Bozen, Landesbeobachtungsstelle zur Einwanderung 2006). The territorial lines, both cultural and physical, hardened into true borders to be crossed in the re-defining of us or culturally “othered” individuals. According to Bassam Tibi, the influential Syrian-German political scientist, we must change the concept of culture and the idea that only those born in a place and having parents of that land’s ethnicity are seen as citizens (Tibi in an interview with Meyer and Schmidt 2006). Cultural frame switching in this instance is vital to Tibi and other moderates' conception of developing pro-active models for socio-

The Burgeoning of Transnationalism

69

politically active European citizenry. In a broader sense, first culture awareness and first culture structure is key to fostering integration and modeling societal systems within the destination culture's eco-system, without threatening culture of origin. In order for successful contemporary theoretical models to be developed, an awareness of how “[n]ewly arrived individuals and families are often marginalized, as they have yet to integrate into the social networks that can help them meet basic requirements” (Hille, Päivi 2005, p. 359) must be developed. As societies become multilingual and multicultural, the educational system has to go with that change and cannot stay predominantly monolingual and uni-cultural. However, studies show that “experiences in the country of origin that lead to emigration receive limited attention. Knowledge of the latter ultimately provides a context for understanding the immigration experience” (Drachman, Paulino 2004, p. 1).

Native culture is reacting to the host culture's educational and political framework as a threat. Political integration as affected by the “persistence of source country effects” is one example of the complexity of the interrelation of multi-ethnic societies (Bueker 2005, p. 103).

Migration paradigms ex-situ Beginning as far back as the advent of Islam outside the Arabian Peninsula, Western civilization and Islam have functioned both as threat and agent of enrichment for one another over the centuries. This unique symbiotic association is one that is seldom seen as such, and is often misinterpreted to be oppositional and exclusive; however, Tibi coined a concept reflecting this symbiotic relationship in 1992 in Paris that has become an influential political theoretical paradigm called Euro-Islam. This model proposes strategies for building bridges between the two civilizations. Whilst investigating the efficacy of existing strategies and acculturation the necessity of re-conceptualizing these strategies was revealed and it was deemed vital to consider this historic mutually challenging and enriching relationship in this analysis. Tibi’s response to the data analysis was to define a concept and then clarify his commentary with the statement “Euro-Islam is impossible without cultural change involving religious reforms” (Tibi 2007, para. 11). His personal experience of living as a Muslim in the Middle East, Europe and America lead him to the belief that interfaith dialogue, while increasingly perceived as the best process for mutual understanding, can in

70

Chapter Three

itself be misleading and non-productive as there is a risk of this dialogue being characterized by deceit on the part of the Muslims and wishful thinking on the part of the Christians due to the foundations of the two faiths: for Christianity lauds meekness, humility, sacrifice and self-denial, whereas Islam stresses power and honor (Tibi 2002a, p. 9). Linguistic conceptualization is an arena that should not be disregarded in this intercultural dialogue, as certain concepts that are important in Islamic theology carry different connotations and weight than in the common western milieu. For instance, in Islam the word peace reflects a concept more similar to “pax Romana” than the more common denotation of lack of strife, as it reflects shades of establishing peace and order by promoting Islamic law and authority across the world (Sookhdeo 2003, pp. 103-116). Tibi’s writings reflect an on-going investment in the stabilization of dialogue between the majority and minority populations of Western Europe and a liberal investigation of the foundations of his own Islamic heritage that leads him to say: “In the context of religious tolerance—and I write this as a Muslim—there can be no place in Europe for Shari’a […] Shari’a is at odds with the secular identity of Europe and is diametrically opposed to secular European constitutions formulated by the people […] secular democracy based on the separation of religion from politics; a universally accepted pluralism; and a mutually accepted secular tolerance. The acceptance of these values is the foundation of a civil society” (Tibi 2002b, p. 240).

Shari’a is the system of law based on Qur’anic interpretations by one of the four schools of the judiciary that have been in existence since the tenth century A.D. and used throughout the Islamic governed world and negates the need for a civil system such as that present in contemporary European nations. Tibi’s assertion builds upon and reevaluates some of the thought that has gone into societal conflict in the last century as shown by Samuel P. Huntington. In his groundbreaking and controversial treatise on the clash of civilizations Huntington proposed the universalistic aspirations of Western civilization as being the primary stimulus of global conflicts. He reflects that religious divisions form the basis of cultural differences that stimulate discord (Huntington 1998, p. 14). “[…] he thus contributed to strengthening the stereotype that the danger comes solely from Islam, and that—as far as fundamentalism is concerned—that is the direction we should be looking towards with anxiety […]” (Pace 2002, p. 157).

The Burgeoning of Transnationalism

71

In perusing the discourse on fundamentalism versus religiosity it is shown that “the conflict between civilizations becomes a struggle between various sorts of religious fundamentalisms, while it should be noted that it is not a struggle between religions” (Tibi 1997, p. 16).

Other political scientists and researchers soon embraced his theory. Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of Hassan Al Banna the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928—one of the most influential sociopolitical Islamic movements recently linked to radicalism—who has been referred to by Donolly as the “Muslim Martin Luther” of his times, has at times been linked with Tibi but most recently seen at odds with Tibi’s version of Euro-Islam. Ramadan’s version is one that co-opts the tenets of a more fundamentalist Islamic approach by urging utilization of the more permissive atmosphere of the European States towards religion in general (Ramadan 1999). Ramadan’s “To be a European Muslim” calls for a new practicality especially for Muslim immigrant behavior and governance, particularly in the West. He specifically focuses on developing the cultural strength and identity of young Muslims in non-Muslim states. He observes that in many Muslim majority countries (e.g. Turkey and Iraq), the state is actually more militantly secular than in the West—hence the position of diaspora becomes one that allows for greater freedom in the practice of religion. His latest works have placed him more at odds with the moderate European Muslim scholars even leading to cross dialogues between himself and Bassam Tibi on public television. Tariq Ramadan never followed the concept of Bassam Tibi regarding Euro-Islam but he argued to look at the contradiction or antagonism between political and secular Islam rather than at the contradiction between political and Euro-Islam (Ghadaban 2006).

Exempli gratia In a recent meeting of EU commissioners questions were asked regarding what historical lessons could be used to assess Turkey’s probable admittance into the EU. One problem that must be taken into consideration is the already large influx of Muslim immigrants projected to inflate to 83 million Muslim Turks if Turkey is admitted (Caldwell 2004). This highlights the immediacy of the need for effective acculturation strategies which may involve models such as Berry’s (1992) explanation of the process of transformation as well as Bassam Tibi’s concept of Euro-Islam. Berry delineates his understanding of the process of cultural transformation

72

Chapter Three

by describing assimilation, segregation, separation, and marginalization and focusing on acculturation as the key to successful integration. The integration of immigrants into European society is one of the leading topics affecting the political, educational, economic, cultural, and religious elements of our entire society. This concern permeates a broad spectrum of our society and is visible at all social levels as demonstrated in ongoing legal disputes and publicly held discussion over outlawing the wearing of headscarves in public places, such as schools, along with the evocative call of the muezzin over the roofs of catholic and protestant churches, and the reports of terror warnings. This theme is reflected also in the halls of academia as well as through the deluge of media coverage through daily news reports, special issues or talk shows, as well as political commentaries in tabloids, or daily and weekly magazines. In March of 2008 a special issue of Der Spiegel, which is one of the most influential weekly publication in Germany due to its influence on shaping of public opinion, appeared entitled “Allah in the Occident. The Islam and the Germans”. A broad range of issues were covered including: assimilation; the Muslim dichotomy of adjustment and marginalization towards Western society (Pötzl 2008, pp. 9-13); a critique of models of integration solely focusing on Islam (Kermani 2008, pp. 1421); religion between church and state (Leggewie 2008, pp. 28-29); Islam’s path to Germany (Spuler-Stegemann 2008, pp. 34-37); Euro-Islam as a variation of Islam (Bednarz, Steinvorth 2008, pp. 38-43); tolerance as cowardice (Traufetter 2008, pp. 62-64); and the headscarf referred to as religious sexy underwear (Darnstädt 2008, pp. 80-84).

Political Islam and Euro-Islam Political Islam, often directly transposed as Islamic fundamentalism, radical Islam, Islamism and Islamic revivalism, has been in the public eye of both government and media as well as a focus of academic research (Husain 2003, pp. 4-7). In general, Muslims in Germany are often portrayed by right wing parties as being inextricably linked to fundamentalism, fanaticism, violence, and pre-modern patriarchal traditions (Spiegel Special 2008, p. 3). These across-the-board judgmental statements do not do justice to the diversity of the more than 3 million believers in Allah in Germany. The spectrum of diversity ranges from Islamist bigots to cosmopolitans, liberal Muslims, who have meshed with and adapted to Western society. This diversity leads us to ferret out the conditions providing for a religiously determined Muslim life-style in Europe along with the obstacles those Muslims encounter. This issue is at the forefront of numerous projects

The Burgeoning of Transnationalism

73

being conducted by such august institutes as the Center of Modern Orient in Berlin (ibidem). Muslim emigrants to North America and Europe have typically experienced cultural displacement, whether through migration to a largely non-Muslim area or, in the case of many African-American Muslims, through conversion, that places them in the kind of borderland likely to illuminate cultural processes (Metcalf 1996). Bassam Tibi is but one example of a 20th century émigré who has become a European citizen and active participant for political and socio-cultural growth in his adopted homeland. He has extensively investigated the ways and means of peaceful integrative strategies regarding one specific group of immigrants, which is actually subdivided into multitudinous factions: Muslims. Tibi is as Syrian born German citizen and academic who has taken time to develop his ideas and theology regarding the socio-political parameters of his own new home and the challenges of integrating new immigrants into the new European civil societies they are moving into. Muslims in Europe are strong minorities that have often enclaved to such an extent that civic participation among the new émigrés was practically non-existent. This occurrence has been a result of numerous factors both from within the immigrant groups themselves and the cultures into which they have settled. Tibi’s ideology which goes under the name of Euro-Islam promotes the development of responsible and productive immigrant members of a multi-cultural European Union that actively advocate for both their culturally mandated traditions as well as those of their adopted homelands. Often the focus of research is on cultural transmission and cultural traits as if they were isolated from cultural evolution as it relates to cultures in geographic transition. “The tendency today is to devote considerable attention to modern studies of the pathways of cultural transmission […] and to ignore the deep history of studies of cultural transmission mechanisms, modes, and processes […]. Hence, many researchers seem unaware of the historical conceptualization of a unit of cultural transmission […]” (Lyman 2006, p. 358).

Since the turbulent happenings of 9/11 in the United States, Islam has more often than not been associated with radical acts and fanatical fundamentalism. Tibi argues that, “Islamic fundamentalism is simply one variety of a new global phenomenon in world politics” (Tibi 2000, p. 2). The Islamic immigrants converging on Europe come from widely divergent communities scattered throughout, primarily, North Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia. The Islamic “Weltanschauung” is the

74

Chapter Three

basis of the holistic Islamic civilization of the past, a civilization that continues to prevail in Islam today in the midst of a world of modern nation-states. In other words, we are dealing with a great variety of local cultures more or less embedded in a single great civilization. This is also found in other civilizations. The West, for example, is uniquely Western on the one hand, but culturally multi-faceted on the other (Tibi 2000, p. 6). Newly arrived residents of the European Union are met with a plethora of languages, norms, and taboos that are confusing at best and often unfathomable thus encouraging an embrasure of the known in the tenets of Islam. Cross cultural pluralism on the part of the Nation States comprising the European Union is one avenue for moving the dialogue between the two cultural frameworks into a more compatible form. Islam has always professed a desire for renewal and reform. The concepts of Tajdid (renewal) and islah (reform) are fundamental concepts within Islam, based on the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet. The preaching of Islam itself is presented in the Qur’an as, first of all, the revival of the true religion of God and reform of corrupt practices that were present in religious practices of earlier communities. Islam defines itself as both the corroboration and the purification of the original Abrahamic faith, not a new religion but a reaffirmation of the ancient tradition and its regeneration. Islah comes from the Qur’an (occurring in Sura 7: 170; 11: 117, 28: 19) and refers to the reformist activities of all the prophets throughout time, who were sent by God to warn their communities of their sinful ways, and calling on them to return to God’s path. Modernists are, therefore, reformers. Although Rahman (1985), whose works stated his position of a need for moving away from the prescriptive inherited Islamic tradition towards more general ethical principles extracted from the Qur’an and applied to modern society, considered himself neither modernist, reformer nor fundamentalist. He nonetheless believed that the Qur’an “is not a book of abstract ethics, neither is it the legal document that Muslim lawyers made it out to be. It is a work of moral admonition through and through” (Rahman 1985, p. 8).

He emphasized that by correctly interpreting the Qur’an in particular, and not simply by accepting the views of the medieval commentators, modern Muslims could derive an authentically Islamic response to modern life quandaries. Muhammad Arkoun, who teaches at the University of Sorbonne in Paris, is also a liberal, modernist Islamic thinker who

The Burgeoning of Transnationalism

75

advocates wholesale rethinking and reinterpretation of much of the traditional religious thought and structure. Tibi argues that a true reading of Islam is in line with democracy and human rights, and he defines clear boundaries between Islam as a religion and the misuse of this religious system in the conceptualization of “alislam al-siyasi”(an ideology called political Islam) (Tibi 2000). Politicization of religion is a worldwide phenomenon that extends through both rural and urban regions and threatens the stability of established governmental structures and cultural stanchions. A number of studies show the effects of various socio-educational legislative measures on bicultural identity integration and cultural frame switching throughout Europe (Rossitti 2006, pp. 987-998; Chef et al. 2006, pp. 742-760; Creese et al. 2006, pp. 23-43). A dearth of suitable Western policies and the extreme separatist loyalties of some Western politicians have been underwriting the Islamic world’s sense of being threatened, which thus strengthened radical political Islam reformists’ positions. Thus, Rossitti’s and Tibi’s conclusions regarding more cultural pluralistic legislative actions as regards immigrant citizenship and action is hopeful. With activists such as Tibi maintaining a strong public presence and providing a balance to more radical reformists’ pleas there is a strong probability that this explosive social issue will find a new synthesized paradigm helping to embrace the growth and stabilization of the European Union and the wider world through a politically active citizenry focused on compromise rather than conquest. This holds out the prospect that it will help to mitigate some of the largest issues surrounding immigration such as alienation and disempowerment.

Conclusion This chapter has reviewed the potential of Bassam Tibi’s concept of EuroIslam but what does the concept really offer for European Muslims? As conceived by Tibi, Euro-Islam would be both a theoretical and pragmatic concept that would aim at integrating Muslim immigrants in Europe. Probably the first question to ask is: What does contemporary Europe mean? Is it possible to speak about shared and common systems of values or principles? What does a European political and social project entail? And probably more important, where does the political project aiming basically at gathering consensus and manipulating public opinion end and where does the social program start? What we know now as the EU was created following strict economic and strategic principles and objectives. Principles and objectives that were redesigned after World War II and were rooted in the post-Westphalian

76

Chapter Three

tradition: a long-standing tradition that defended the features and characteristics of the nation-state as something indivisible. A nation-state is characterized by physical boundaries—a geographical container—as its utmost and most representative essence. This essence is composed of unitary elements which constitute the national non-mutable identity: religion, language, systems of beliefs, symbols and institutional fabric. A tradition based on a defensive attitude following realism; basically realism is based on defence, lack of trust, competitiveness, territorial expansion and cultural hegemony. Therefore, and as a preliminary conclusion, it would be possible to say that it was the creation and re-creation of boundaries. However, the strongest walls and palisades were not physical ones, but mental and psychological ones: symbolic obstacles and boundaries. They remain today. These characteristics seem to clash against the very essential concepts that define globalization including migration and mobility. Europe wanted free markets, economic competitiveness and that implied labour. A fundamental force that could not be provided by nationals due to the ever curbing fertility rates on one hand, and due to class-prejudices on the other. In order to shore up that economic and industrial development and growth Europe needed to summon migrants. But as Max Frisch would have said, we did not realise that we did not summon workers, we summoned persons, individuals carrying invisible or visible cultural baggage. As long as the economic situation was acceptable nobody looked at those apparent differences. They were even softened because those individuals were working or fleshing out activities that we did not want to develop. They contributed. Those migration forces were part of our economic success. But migration, as boundaries, is not a mere physical movement from A to B. It is a psychical and imaginary trip across physical boundaries. That is why migration is unstoppable even if we apply restrictive policies. That is why migration related issues become very sensitive and emotional. As a consequence, Muslim migrants have been arriving to this fragmented Europe and they have been colouring the tiles of a heterogeneous mosaic. According to PEW Research Centre, the forecast from 2010 to 2030 with regards to Muslim believers should grow from 44 to 58 million, whereas non-Muslim population would decrease from 693 to 669 million. Number, facts and figures are important. In accepting this scenario, it would be exaggerated to think about the feared Islamization of Europe. What are the risks? And what are the possibilities and opportunities? What are the conceptual risks and generalizations that should be avoided? I think that the point is not whether Muslims living in Europe will become European, if becoming European would be something possible. For many

The Burgeoning of Transnationalism

77

centuries Islam has also been coexisting in that geographical boundary if one thinks of Albania, Bosnia, and Bulgaria for example, not to mention the 500 years of Muslim presence in the Al-Andalus from 711 to 1492. The problem is not that Muslims are too little European, rather the question more specifically is whether Islam is compatible with liberal democracy. In other words, the question is not whether Islam in Europe is a cultural problem and that here it is different to Islam in the Arab world: all that goes without saying. Also the African Islam is territorially African and the Indonesian Islam is territorially Indonesian, with consideration of all their regional or national peculiarities. They are all part of the Islamic community and one cannot say to European Muslims that they no longer should be part of the Ummah. The theological debate in the Middle East is often much wider than in European Islamic discourse. I am thinking of the pronouncements of the Republican Brothers in Sudan, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid in Egypt or the Ankara school in Turkey which have been implemented in society. If these pronouncements become well known amongst Muslims in Europe then much will have been achieved. This is because Muslims here will not have become Europeanised but will be discussing the basic questions as they are also being discussed in Islamic societies. The Arab Spring has posed questions for democracy in the Arab world and European Muslims cannot isolate themselves from the debates going on the Arab world. Furthermore, European Muslims should also distance themselves from generalizations and simplifications such as politically manipulated visions and approaches that incite Muslim youth to believe in those missionary activities to save the honour of Islam. It is essential to avoid the construction of more ideological walls. As Iversflaten has pointed out in speaking about political communication and anti-immigration discourse in Europe, only right-wing successful parties from 2002 have been using anti-immigration discourse as the most effective means for gathering political consensus. Anti-Islam perceptions come into this category as well and as Van Spanje has stressed these attitudes are contagious and spread across the entire political system even if they do not access government. These European political strategies are designed to gather consensus by exploiting social and cultural divides and grievances by following very precise political marketing strategies without thinking about the aftermath. These consequences can materialise in the rise of those radical Islamic movements that exploit minorities, segregation, misery and unemployment. At the end these political attitudes would create a lose-lose scenario where neither the prospect for a Europe for Europeans nor a Europe for Muslims would be promising.

78

Chapter Three

Bibliography Autonome Provinz Bozen, Landesbeobachtungsstelle zur Einwanderung. “Migranten in Südtirol: Migrationsgeschichten, Erwerbstätigkeit, Familie und Integrationsmuster. Social Survey”, 2006. http://www.einwanderung-suedtirol.net/pdfnews/Survey%20Teil% 201%20per%20sito.pdf (Retrieved January 9, 2007). Bednarz, Dieter and Steinvorth, Daniel. “Feuer und Wasser.” Spiegel Special 2 (2008): pp. 38-43. Belardi, Nando and Wallnöfer, Gerwald. La supervisione nelle professioni educative: potenzialità e risorse. Gordolo: Centro Studi Erickson, 2007. Bock-Schappelwein, Juli. “Ungleiche Ausbildungsstruktur unter der ausländischen Wohnbevölkerung in Österreich: Herausforderung für den Aus- und Weiterbildungsmarkt.” WIFO Vienna, Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter 53, 2 (2006): pp. 191-204. Bueker, Catherine Simpson. “Political Incorporation among Immigrants from ten Areas of Origin: The Persistence of Source Country Effects.” International Migration Review 39, 1 (2005): pp. 103-140. Caldwell, Christopher. “Islamic Europe?” The Weekly Standard 10, 4 (2004). http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/ 685ozxcq.asp (Retrieved March 20, 2013). Cate, Stephanie Ryan and Profanter, Annemarie. “Manifestations of Traditional and Contemporary Cultural Processes of Marital Systems in Dhofar, Oman.” In: Markus Gottwald, Matthias Klemm and Birgit Schulte (eds.), KreisLäufe-Circular Flows. Kapillaren der WeltkulturCapillaries of World Culture. Diskursive Produktionen, Band 9. Berlin: Lit. Verlag Dr. W. Hopf (2007), pp. 171-184. Chef, Cheng Ying; Lee, Fiona and Benet-Martínez, Veronica. “Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Cultural Frame Switching: Bicultural Identity Integration and Valence of Cultural Cues.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 37, 6 (2006): pp. 742-760. Creese, Angela; Bhatt, Arvind; Bhojani, Nirmala and Martin, Peter. “Multicultural, Heritage and Learner Identities in Complementary Schools.” Language and Education 20, 1 (2006): pp. 23-43. Darnstädt, Thomas. “Religiöse Reizwäsche: Der Glaubenskrieg um das Kopftuch.” Spiegel Special 2 (2008): pp. 80-84. Donnelly, Paul. “Tariq Ramadan: The Muslim Martin Luther?” Salon.com, p. 42, 2002.

The Burgeoning of Transnationalism

79

http://www.salon.com/people/feature/2002/02/15/ramadan/index_np.ht ml (Retrieved March 30, 2013). Drachman, Diane and Paulino, Ana. “Introduction: Thinking beyond United States' borders.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Services 2, 12 (2004): pp. 1-9. Gallagher, Kathleen and Rivière, Dominique. “Pink [...] with Shades of Grey: Mediating Moments of Diversity in Urban Secondary Classrooms.” Westminster Studies in Education 27, 2 (2004): pp. 127141. Ghadaban, Ralph. Tariq Ramadan and the Islamisation of Europe. Berlin: Schiller Verlag, 2006. Hille, Janhonen Abruquah and Päivi, Palojoki. “Good Practice in Multicultural Integration Work in Finland: Collaborative Learning in Culturally Sensitive Projects.” International Journal of Consumer Studies 29, 4 (July 2005): pp. 359-370. Huntington, Samuel Philips. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Husain, Mir Zohair. Global Islamic Politics. Longman: New York, 2003. Kermani, Navid. “Der fundamentale Irrtum.” Spiegel Special 2 (2008): pp. 14-21. Kuran, Timur and Sandholm, William H. Cultural Integration and its Discontents. Working Paper No. 20. Wisconsin-Madison: University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute, 2002. Leggewie, Claus. “Religion zwischen Staat und Kirche: Das Problem der muslimischen Repräsentanz in Deutschland.” Spiegel Special 2 (2008): pp. 28-29. Lyman, R. Lee. “Cultural Traits and Cultural Integration.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29, 4 (2006): pp. 357-358. Martinovic, Borja. “Social Integration of Immigrants in Western Countries: A dynamic Perspective”, July 2006. http://www.sociol.unimi.it/altrisiti/esa_registration/documenti/File/wor king%20papers/MARTINOVIC.doc (Retrieved April 9, 2007). Metcalf, Barbara Daly. Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. Meyer, Cordula and Schmidt, Caroline. “Europeans have Stopped Defending their Values.” Interview with German Islam Expert Bassam Tibi. Spiegel Online International, 2006. http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,440340,00.html (Retrieved March 20, 2013).

80

Chapter Three

Olwig, Karen Fog. “Migrant’s Visions and Practices of Home: Perspectives from a Caribbean Family Network.” Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society 28, 2 (2003): pp. 2-14. Pace, Enzo and Stefani, Piero. Wspóáczesny fundamentalizm religijny. Kraków: WAM, 2002. Pötzl, Norbert F. “Schatten über Almanya.” Spiegel Special 2 (2008): pp. 9-13. Profanter, Annemarie. “Corporal Punishment as Cultural and Educational Process in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” Proceedings of the International Education Conference 2007 “Redesigning Pedagogy: Culture, Knowledge and Understanding.” National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2007. http://conference.nie.edu.sg/2007/paper/papers/ANT188.pdf (Retrieved March 12, 2013). Profanter, Annemarie and Ryan, Cate Stephanie. “These are the Ties that bind: Bonds of Intellectual and Emotional Intimacy within Polygyny in Southern Oman. A pilot study.” Proceedings of the 6th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Social Sciences. Honolulu, Hawaii, 2007. Rahman, Fazlur. “Law and Ethics in Islam.” In: Raffi Hovannisian (ed.), Ethics in Islam: Ninth Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference, 1983, in Honour of Fazlur Rahman. Malibu, Calif: Undena Publications (1985), pp. 3-15. Ramadan, Tariq. To Be A European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1999. —. “Muslims, the Pope and European Identity.” New Perspectives Quarterly 23, 4 (2006): pp. 14-18. —. “Muslims, the Pope and European Identity”, 2007. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.15405842.2006.00838.x (Retrieved January 15, 2013). Rossitti, Chiara. “Seconde generazioni: Differenze culturali in alcune scuole di Roma.” Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies, XLIII 164 (2006): pp. 987-998. Sookhdeo, Patrick. “Cross and Crown: The Impact of Islam on Britain, Church and Society”, 2003. http://churchsociety.org/churchman/documents/Cman_117_2_Sookhde o.pdf man/documents/Cman_117_2_Sookhdeo.pdf (Retrieved March 20, 2013). Spiegel Special. “Allah im Abendland: Der Islam und die Deutschen, Hausmitteilung.” Spiegel Special 2 (2008): p. 3. Spuler-Stegemann, Ursula. “Der Elefant des Kalifen: Wie der Islam nach Deutschland kam.” Spiegel Special 2 (2008): pp. 34-37.

The Burgeoning of Transnationalism

81

Tibi, Bassam. Fundamentalizm religijny. Warszawa: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1997. —. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the new World Disorder. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000. http://zer.es/Cisco-Press-ebooks/Islam/Books/The%20Challenge %20of%20Fundamentalism%20Tibi.pdf (Retrieved March 30, 2013). —. “Christian-Muslim Dialogue rests on Deceit—and furthers Westernwishful thinking.” Die Zeit (May 29, 2002a): p. 9. —. “A Plea for a Reform Islam.” In: Susan Stern and Elisabeth Seligmann (eds.), The End of Tolerance? London, Nicholas Brealey (2002b), pp. 238-245. —. “Europeanisation, not Islamisation. Bassam Tibi argues for Euro-Islam as a bridge between Civilisations”, 2007. http://www.signandsight.com/features/1258.html (Retrieved March 20, 2013). Traufetter, Gerald. “Toleranz ist Feigheit.” Spiegel Special 2 (2008): pp. 62-64. Van Tubergen, Frank. “Religious Affiliation and Attendance among Immigrants in eight Western Countries: Individual and Contextual Effects.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 45, 1 (2006): pp. 1-22. Wallnöfer, Gerwald. Pedagogia interculturale: Scienze dell’educazione e diversità. Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 2000. Zagefka, Hanna; Brown, Rupert; Broquard, Murielle and Martin, Sibel Leventoglu. “Predictors and Consequences of Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants in Belgium and Turkey: The Role of Acculturation Preferences and Economic Competition.” British Journal of Social Psychology 46, 1 (2007): pp. 153-169.

SECTION TWO: CITIZENSHIP, EDUCATION AND LAW

CHAPTER FOUR CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION: ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, SOCIAL COHESION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS CHRISTINE DIFATO

Introduction In the current era of globalization, multinational corporations, and the movement of labour—from unskilled to very highly skilled—from one country to another, high emphasis is put on the components that make such mobility possible. Education and skills are generally associated with mobility (Tannock 2009, p. 243). This includes both socio-economic mobility and geographic mobility, for there are presumably employers in multiple locations who desire a particular expertise. In such a light, it is understandable that the emphasis on education in EU policies has developed alongside the increased free movement of persons. However, this goal of free movement is not intended for or granted to all members of society equally. This guarantee reflects a person’s citizenship, rights, and opportunities. Moreover, while a person may experience mobility based on a set of skills or asylum status, it does not follow that the emotional and cultural ties or our ability to negotiate a new set of institutions are as easily changed as our location. Other factors such as culture, memory, race, and prejudice act as added handicaps in foreign circumstances. At a German Social Democratic (SPD) party conference concerning the financing of education, Dr Jutta Almendinger, President of the Berlin Social Science Research Centre, depicted Germany’s education in these terms: a cat, a monkey, a dog, and an elephant are all supposed to climb to one branch on the tree of knowledge. The cat and the monkey quickly reach the top; the dog and the elephant struggle, but have no success. They all had the same chance, so why didn’t they use it? comments the task overseer (Allmendinger 2010). Using this picture, the speaker continued to

86

Chapter Four

outline the various challenges that different groups might face in Germany’s educational context, including aspects of gender, socioeconomic status, regional variation, and background (ethnic or otherwise). A teacher in Berlin offered a similar and more thought-provoking analogy, saying: “When there are problems, then, the problems will be personalized [blamed on the person]. The system is very, very bad; it is like when you drive a car but the brakes don’t work properly. The car still works, and they say ‘Now, drive with this car’, and when there is an accident, it is not the car or the system that is at fault or whoever said to drive the car, but rather, you as a person” (EL116, Author’s translation).

By this assessment, he agrees with Jutta Allmendinger in that the system itself is flawed, and by the nature of this flaw, the person is blamed for not having succeeded, rather than the system itself. While Jutta Allmendinger referred to Germany only, and the teacher’s comments were primarily about Berlin, this chapter will show how various obstacles, motivations, and structural issues inhibit equal access and equality of treatment in the context of EU and member state intercultural dialogue and education policies. In terms of education itself, the new emphasis on diversity indicates the acknowledgement of difference, ostensibly in learning styles and backgrounds, and yet purports to offer equal opportunities and qualifications to all (Reynolds 2008). The increasing presence of EU institutions has shaped both intercultural dialogue and citizenship policies on the domestic level, giving member states more control over their borders and more ability to regulate the entry and stay of new immigrants. The policies of the supranational structure have also fed down into the education system, since a key feature of EU policy is to develop a knowledge-based society. In some respects, this could be interpreted as the continuation of the process of regulation and standardization that is present in immigration and integration policies (Phillimore, Goodson 2008, p. 10). Across the multiple layers of this chapter, three distinct themes can be traced: economic competitiveness, social cohesion or security, and human rights through protection of people and cultures. As may be apparent, the aspect of protection is often in tension with economic competitiveness and even at times, social cohesion. With these three factors in mind, the EU and member states have justified and implemented a wide range of policy decisions and reforms with sometimes contradictory and exclusionary logic. We will see that the internal management of people echoes external

Citizenship and Education

87

relations, in this case, of the EU and its neighbours, effectively replicating the international arena on a national stage.

External relations, internal replication The fundamental role of migration in the design and logic of the European Union, formerly European Community (EC) and European Economic Community (EEC), dates back to the early years of the European project. With the goal of developing a competitive economy of scale, the EEC defined the goals of the free movement of goods, capital, and services (including labour) as intrinsically part of integration (Schierup, Hansen, Castles 2006, p. 48). In the 1980s, a discussion of the meaning of the “free movement of persons” emerged, debating whether this should apply to EU citizens only (i.e. citizens of fully acceded member states) or should apply to everyone (Phillimore, Goodson 2008, p. 10). In practice, free movement for only EU citizens would mean that border checks would have to be in place to control the movement of non-EU nationals. Since a consensus could not be reached, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands opted to create a territory without internal borders in 1985, which would be known as the Schengen area. While 13 countries joined the Schengen area after the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the UK has remained opposed to open borders unless the other countries impose the same restrictions. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty signed into effect the political and social union of the member states (White 1997, p. 754). While member states were deepening economic relationships, sharing resources, and realizing the goals of the Single European Act and the removal of internal borders, the policies toward immigration soon revealed incoherency and questions of security. While bilateral agreements had been signed for the exchange of workers with many non-EU countries, the prospect of how to manage their presence on a long-term basis was not clear. The questions surrounding immigrant integration only increased in the 1990s when issues of second and third generation migrant workers were compounded by the arrival of asylum-seekers from Eastern Europe. Lavenex (2001, p. 24) argues that EU policies towards asylum and immigration can be divided into a realist and liberal strand of thinking. The realist strand focuses on issues of security, while the liberal strand encompasses the humanitarian protection offered to refugees. However, based on the underlying logic of immigration and the primary basis upon which it was first controlled in countries like Germany, I add to these the aspect of economic competitiveness. On the state level, the issues of

88

Chapter Four

market demands, security, and the presence of refugees (draining the welfare system) are often conflated in issues of race and ethnicity playing a large role in popular and political rhetoric. In the following sections, we will see how these three strands are entwined and echoed in EU policies for free movement as well as efforts for intercultural dialogue and education. A. Asylum and Immigration in the EU The nationalist movements of the nineteenth century combined with industrialization instituted the exchange of strong centres with porous borders for a more horizontal consciousness and distinct state controls of territory. Yet, given the development of immigration policies, the Schengen area, and the mistrust of the borders of newly acceded member states, the European Union asylum and immigration policy is a distant echo of the multi-national and porous-bordered regional unions of the past. Even as post-war economies acknowledged the need for workers, issues of security paralleled the increasing presence of migrants and asylumseekers. This left the nation-states to maintain and re-assert their sovereignty through border controls and their own sets of immigration restrictions (Caviedes 2004, p. 289). With the introduction of Schengen and the increasingly restrictive policies on Europe’s borders, the term “fortress Europe” began to be used to describe the external controls (Phillimore, Goodson 2008, p. 11). Thus, at the same time as workers were being invited to fill the gaps in labour throughout northern and central Europe, the borders of countries, and moreover, the social boundaries within them, were increasingly closed with the justification of increased security. Huysmans (2000, p. 752) calls this process the “spillover of the economic project of the internal market into an internal security project”. The security discourse has enabled states to govern their citizenry and maintain the sovereignty of the state (Kaya, Kentel 2005, pp. 4-5). During the Cold War, security referred to traditional instruments of the state such as the military and ideological threats. Yet, as immigration and related issues of identity are cast as a disruptive and possibly violent phenomenon, the focus of security measures has shifted from the state and its borders to society and individuals. In the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, asylum and immigration was moved from the third pillar to the community pillar (Kostakopoulou 2000, p. 498). This shift stemmed from the increasing concerns of host countries as relations extended eastward with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. EU member states saw increasing convergence on asylum and immigration

Citizenship and Education

89

policy, aligning more and more with those countries who were known for restrictive policies (Phillimore, Goodson 2008, p. 11). Moving asylum and immigration policy to the first pillar did not resolve all the problems. Rather than formulating a coherent and integrated policy with consideration for the future of European citizenship and identity, national executives uploaded national policies, building on domestic experiences and national restrictive laws to design international policy (Kostakopoulou 2000, p. 498). In this respect, the EU adopted some of the DNA of member states. In a bid to regulate the movement of migrants, particularly asylumseekers, the EU increased its emphasis on protection against discrimination and the integration of third-country nationals through the development and better regulation of issues relating to asylum. The Dublin Convention attempted to limit asylum-shopping by stating that asylum must be sought in the first EU country that a person enters. Based on the “first host country principle”, the examination of the asylum application or return of illegal immigrants is the responsibility of the first state that allowed entry (Lavenex 2001, p. 29). It is also aimed to stop the application for asylum in more than one country at once. While these policies are framed as protection for asylum-seekers, they often are a re-packaging of border controls and regulation of third-country nationals. Where integration used to be concerned with citizenship, it is now more closely aligned with the idea of restricting and discouraging further migration (Kostakopoulou 2008). The cooperative framework of EU policies does not tend to empower the individual or transnational communities, but rather, it is a way of “returning arbitrary powers over individuals and populations back to the nation state” (Favell, Geddes 1999, pp. 26-27). Not unlike other member states, the EU assisted Germany in regaining some state control that was taken away by court rulings (Guiraudon 2003, p. 264). Yet, this reassertion of state rights was accompanied by an enhanced cooperation on immigration policies, evidenced in the application and involvement of EU integration policies. The amendment of Article 16 in the Asylum Compromise of 1993 brought German practices and law into line with other governments of EU member states and with the Dublin Convention of 1990 (later replaced by the Dublin Regulation of 2003) (Geddes 2003, p. 87). The buffer zone, that was constructed around the EU by designating some countries like Poland and the Czech Republic as safe third countries, and the signing of bilateral ties with Germany’s eastern neighbours helped to reassert governmental control over its borders. In attempting to combat organized

90

Chapter Four

crime and terrorism, coordination across the police, judiciary and customs was improved alongside the development of the Schengen Information System to exchange data on people’s identities (Phillimore, Goodson 2008, p. 11). The UK, on the other hand, has always insisted on protecting and maintaining its border, monitoring all entries to the UK in spite of the goal of no internal barriers within the EU (Joppke 1999, p. 135). Even as security concerns heralded the closing of borders, the Amsterdam Treaty included a new article 13 that gave the Commission power to “introduce proposals to combat discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability and sexual orientation”; while this did not directly forbid certain forms of discrimination as previous treaty articles had done, the legal basis at the EU level raised the possibility for action toward the social inclusion of migrants (Geddes 2000, p. 220). In 2000, the EU passed anti-discrimination laws to protect EU citizens of immigrant and ethnic minority origin as well as third-country nationals. In 1999, the European Council in Tampere, Finland laid the framework for a common EU immigration policy. The framework, adopted in 2004 with the Hague Programmed on Strengthening the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, emphasized objectives including the fair treatment of legal third-country nationals, the implementation of a more “vigorous” programme for integration that gives third-country nationals the rights and obligations comparable to citizens, and the enhancement of measures against social, economic, or cultural discrimination (Carrera 2006, p. 3). At this point, EU member states also agreed to coordinate best practices in the area of integration and incorporate these eleven common best practices [CBPs] into their national integration plans (Leise 2007). In September 2005, the European Commission adopted the communication “A Common Agenda for Integration—Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union”, which encouraged the member states to develop comprehensive integration strategies (COM 2005, p. 389). Among the good practices to promote integration, it explicitly suggests education as well as various forms of intercultural dialogue, including dialogue with religious minorities. Between 2004 and 2007, the EU supported these national developments with three annual reports that provided overviews of migration trends along with an analysis of changes and actions taken in the area of admission and integration of immigrants at the national and EU level. The European Commission also published two editions of the “Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners”, which was supposed to facilitate the exchange of information and good practice by detailing national integration programs in different member states. These policies

Citizenship and Education

91

evolved into a noticeable emphasis on integration of peoples and communities in order to enhance the social cohesion and identity of Europe. Most recently, the focus has centred on intercultural dialogue as a means to encourage third-country nationals to integrate and become citizens of Europe. The INTI projects, for example, serve to develop citizenship and integration on a local level. Over the fifty years since the EU has been involved in immigration (in different ways and under different names), we can observe discourses of competitiveness, regulation, and humanitarian protection. These inevitably feed into one another and reinforce the other, in some cases leading to the securitization of migration by emphasizing its destabilizing effects. The “political construction of migration as a security issue” resembles broader trends of defining belonging in Western Europe (Huysmans 2000, pp. 751752). This conclusion is reinforced by the trajectory of EU relations with the Mediterranean. The first member states were aware of the potential for economic migration from developing countries of North Africa and hoped to combat any issues through cooperation and association agreements. In the early 1990s, however, with the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and increasing caution about these relationships, normative rhetoric concerning human rights and transformation of governance entered the equation. Since the turn of the century, these policies have been overshadowed by concerns of transnational terrorism, though former EU terminology and normative goals of democratization have not changed (Joffe 2008, p. 148). In the following section, we will see how education and intercultural dialogue are, more often than not, serving as a mirror of underlying motivations of EU asylum and immigration policy. B. Education and Intercultural Dialogue Following closely on the heels of EU immigration and asylum policy, the way that education has been mobilized and highlighted in EU discourse has a very similar underpinning logic to the regulation of borders and control of foreigners. For European member states, the increasing emphasis on education and intercultural dialogue as a tool for integration has a three-fold purpose: (1) to increase the economic advancement of Europe as a region, (2) to act as a security measure within and across national borders through enhancing social cohesion, and (3) to fulfil the liberal aim of equality of opportunity. In other words, the logic of the earlier strands of policy (competitiveness, control, and protection) still underpins these policies.

92

Chapter Four

In 2000, in response to increasing globalisation, heads of state and government at the Lisbon Council declared education to be fundamental to creating a socially cohesive, knowledge-based economy (Fredriksson 2003, p. 521). The Lisbon Council, “Towards a Europe of Innovation and Knowledge”, marks the moment when “education and training” are identified as major strategic tools of EU policy to enhance cohesion and competitiveness, though education remains in the intergovernmental pillar as outlined in articles 126-127 (formerly articles pp. 149-150) of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (Fredriksson 2003, p. 522). The Lisbon Strategy was complemented by the Bologna Process, a commitment of EU member states to restructure higher education, reaching beyond the geographical boundaries of the EU (Keeling 2006, p. 203). Exemplifying the goals of creating a knowledge-based, mobile society, the efforts to restructure and align EU education through to the university level built on long-established programmes including the ERASMUS mobility programme (launched in 1987), which allows students to spend periods of their study at another EU member state university. The expanding role of the European Commission in higher education allowed for the development of the SOCRATES framework, followed by language programmes (LINGUA), distance and e-learning (MINERVA), adult education (GRUNDTVIG) as well as new arrangements with non-EU states through TEMPUS and Asia-Link (Keeling 2006, p. 204). Thus, we see the policies to develop a competitive society through the exchange of skills and mobility of students. Cohesion, the other goal of the Lisbon Strategy is not as easily achieved. Social cohesion develops out of the idea of equality and identity, formulated on the basis of those who belong in contrast to those who do not. A European identity is a difficult concept to accurately unpack as the concept often receives support without consensus on the underlying content of such an identity (Strath 2002, p. 388). As such, European identity purports to meld together the “preservation of cultural difference with the surge for synthesis” (Baraldi 2006, p. 53). However, in the context of EU enlargement and relations with the Mediterranean in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, concerns of terrorism and migration, a gap exists between the “political reality” of needs for security in the face of European expansion on the one hand and hopes for cultural understanding on the other (Schäfer 2007, p. 333). This duality of approach and tension of goals became increasingly evident after the turn of the century. After 9/11, according to one report, foreigner and Muslim began to be synonymous in people’s perception (Mühe 2007). Religion was subject to

Citizenship and Education

93

the overflow of the war on terror, placing anyone related with Islam under suspicion. Islam, in this light, began to be equated with threats to freedom and democracy, European and Christian values, and the civil order established in the West (Fekete 2004, p. 4). This extended to migrant communities that had been living in Europe for decades, naturalized or not. In Germany, support for these concerns lies in that Germany was nationally affected when it was discovered that the cell in Hamburg had been directly involved in the September eleventh attacks. Other occurrences within Germany and Europe have alerted German government and society to the presence of its Muslim minority and the possibilities of extremism developing in so-called parallel communities. Likewise, the July 7th bombing in London raised the threat, and indeed, presence of radicalism to the government’s attention. Out of this context arose the measures to actively approach Muslim communities to establish good relations and implement education strategies that meet their needs to help integration prospects on both sides. Education is seen to have the capacity to partially correct for some of the security concerns of the free movement of people. It is also hoped to confront growing fears of the development of “parallel communities”. Apart from the concerns of social cohesion and rising xenophobia in many European states, these parallel communities are seen as the breeding ground for terrorism. Thus, the educational initiatives that help to increase the chances of disadvantaged populations and re-establish a sense of identity, even if it is framed in European terms, could be a counterterrorism practice. Educational initiatives are also proposed to resolve the tension between rights and cohesion in language policy, both on the national and supranational level. The linguistic diversity of the EU is upheld and prized as one of the key features of cultural identity. As cultural identity, the EU upholds the right of all to speak and write their own language, extending this right to minority and migrant languages as well. In 2002, the Council meeting in Barcelona set the target for mother tongue plus two for European citizens to have the tools to compete and communicate in an integrated market, fitting into the Lisbon strategy framework. In 2008, the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, language was again highlighted as an instrument to enhance mutual understanding and integration. According to a report, entitled “Towards a comprehensive strategy for multilingualism in the European Union” (2007), language can be understood in two ways: a means of communication or an important aspect of “personal, social, and cultural identity”. At the same time, fluency in the language of the host country has been

94

Chapter Four

promoted as the route to integration. Language proficiency has been increasingly linked to rights of residency and citizenship, not to mention unofficial social acceptance. In Germany, the extreme emphasis on language acquisition for integration dates approximately to the turn of the century. Along with the integration courses on German laws, culture, and history that were part of the new naturalization requirements, extensive language courses were initiated to help the immigrant to have the tools for active citizenship (Schily, Myers 2005). Germany offered a quicker track to an unlimited residence or work permanent to those who passed a German language test or added delays to family reunification to those who did not learn German (Geddes 2003, p. 89). Language acquisition in this light was seen as a way to help the minority become integrated and active citizens. Many are wary of such strategies for integration, however. Some call it assimilationist. Others call it protectionist. Some see it as a reaction to the loosening citizenship regulations. For example, when the citizenship law of 1999 lowered the residency requirement from fifteen to eight years, it was accompanied by a tightening language requirement, and in some states like Bavaria, it became extremely difficult to pass the language tests (Joppke, Morawska 2003, p. 19). Kostakopoulou (2008) notes similar trends in other European countries including the adding of language proficiency requirements to British naturalization policy in 2002, leading, as she writes, to integration being a “means of filtering the flow of population, restricting the entry of migrants and of promoting an official mono-culturalism”. While the place of language in the integration or protection of minorities is yet unclear, it is apparent that equity in education has become a cornerstone of EU strategy. In 2006, the Commission presented proposals within the Lisbon general framework entitled “Efficiency and equity in European education and training systems” to the Council and Parliament, promoting the education and training of the most disadvantaged, stating that: “While contributing to the objectives of competitiveness and social cohesion, the integration of these principles will also make it possible to reduce long-term costs caused by inequalities in education and training and address challenges both inside and outside the EU” (COM 2006, p. 481).

In this communication, we see the intertwined nature of social cohesion, economic competitiveness, and external relations, acknowledged even at the international level.

Citizenship and Education

95

In 2007, under the German Council presidency, the Potsdam Conference “Equal Opportunities—a Challenge for Education Legislation and Education Policy in Europe” targeted the role of governments in equalizing educational opportunities for disadvantaged populations in order to foster socio-economic integration. The conference brought together experts on educational law, political leaders, government officials, and civil society representatives with the emphasis being on sharing integration practices. Germany’s then Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, said: “Integration policy must ensure that the diversity which migration brings with it does not lead to a splintering of society” (Press Release of May 11, 2007). In July 2008, the Commission produced a green paper, “Migration and mobility: challenges and opportunities for EU education systems” (COM 2008, p. 423), which addresses the presence of large numbers of migrant children in schools from a weak socio-economic position. It stated that schools must play a leading role in creating a socially inclusive society since they are the primary venue where children of different ethnic backgrounds can become aware of others’ way of life. It identified that new methods of outreach to migrant communities and families will need to be implemented to ensure the equalization of opportunities, and by including migrant youth in education, the chances of perpetuating the pattern of low-level education and segregation in the next generation would be decreased. In addition to adding to Europe’s competitiveness as a regional economy, educational measures may reduce costs in other areas such as unemployment and crime. The cooperation on education is part of a response to the increasingly open borders between EU countries, not only for goods and services but also for people. While the green paper addressed similar themes to other EU policy activities, it is the first to identify the location of the school as a key factor in the process, beyond the curriculum or general skills. According to a report for the European Commission, “Sharing Diversity: National Approaches to Intercultural Dialogue in Europe” (2008), the new emphasis on integration, cohesion, and intercultural dialogue can be seen in many areas, such as education, sports, and other youth activities in countries that have experienced the inflow of migrant workers and the establishment of semi-integrated, ethnically-bounded communities. Intercultural dialogue strategies can be divided into the social cohesion and the cultural diversity approach (European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research 2008). The social cohesion approach aims at a more unified society to promote political stability, security, and equal opportunities for everyone. The second approach has to do with the

96

Chapter Four

recognition of distinct nations or minority groups, often regionally bounded, that are provided with particular economic, cultural, or political rights. While the social cohesion approach is more relevant to this topic in general, it is important to keep in mind the cultural and political rights extended to minority groups under the auspices of multiculturalism and how these interact with the new emphasis on engagement. From the examination of various EU policies and documents, we can see the persistent strands of economic competitiveness, security and cohesion, and protection coming through at each turn. These intersect with and elucidate goals of intercultural dialogue and education on the international level. In the following section, we will explore these patterns on the national level, regarding the accommodation of minority youth in education in general and how the structures shape this experience more specifically.

Member state accommodation and education structures The new developments regarding the lowering of internal barriers, a desire to build a European citizenry, and increased concerns about terrorism have encouraged soft power tools such as education and intercultural dialogue to rise to the forefront in EU and member state policy. As SPD Chairperson for the Working Group on Education, Eva-Maria Stange (2010), stated: “Education will bring the country forward”. This new emphasis has increasingly highlighted education as a medium to support all these aims. By and large, compulsory education was instituted as a response to the international context of an increasingly competitive 19th century Europe. Instituted to revitalize or to reinforce the nation, education systems were intended to establish the nation as the foremost facet of identity in citizens’ lives (Ramirez, Boli 1987, p. 3). While we will not explore preWorld War II structures in great detail, it is important to note that in both Germany and the UK, mass education was not intended to entirely flatten or undo the hierarchies of power and wealth. In the case of Germany, compulsory education was instituted to provide basic knowledge to everyone through village schools, while the richer strata of society could afford private tutors or attended Gymnasium or grammar school. In England, the best schools remained in private or Church hands until late in the 19th century, when compulsory education was instituted as a ploy to maintain national cohesion and increase Britain’s competitiveness in the face of rising contestants on the world stage including Germany and the United States (Ramirez, Boli 1987, p. 9). Both countries also experienced

Citizenship and Education

97

a localized management of education, still evident in Germany where education is handled on the state level, and in the UK, where local authorities play a role in the function of district schools. The following analysis will also show how the tension between liberal inclusion and equality of opportunity remains at odds with the goal of control, social cohesion, and national competitiveness. In Germany between 1955 and 1973, the pedagogical framework extended to foreign youth was not very different from that extended to youth with disabilities. Their foreignness, in some ways, was equated with other possible difficulties. Essentially, this was an assimilationist model where the inability to speak German was viewed almost as a handicap alongside physical or mental challenges (Faas 2008, p. 110). Entering in this context, children of immigrants found themselves at a great disadvantage. Their performance suffered because of inadequate language skills and insufficient support. Lack of awareness of the education system and lack of fluency in German left them in an uncompetitive position at the point of receiving teacher recommendations for their secondary education. In addition, Turkish youth, in particular, had to cope with low expectations within the schools and administration (Bommes 2000, p. 108). In 1978, the German parliament was confronted with rising social unease regarding problems with housing, medical services, and school education. This unrest led Parliament to approve the establishment of a “Commissioner for the Promotion of Integration of Foreign Employees and their Families” affiliated with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Borkert, Bosswick 2007, p. 5). It became obvious in the next few years that something had to be instituted to assist foreigners, especially in the area of education. The 1979 guidelines promoted second generation integration into social and economic life (excluding political life) (Geddes 2003, p. 91). Shortly after, the first Commissioner for Matters Relating to Aliens, Heinz Kühn, published a report, demanding policy-makers to admit that immigration had taken place. However, the federal government reacted by passing a resolution on foreigner policy that placed emphasis on conformation to the “German way of life” or “Leitkultur” (Behrens, Tost, Jager 2002, p. 105). The following two decades of restrictive immigration policy and social backlash against foreigners managed to quell these fresh attempts at the integration of foreign youth through education, and the plans to devise a comprehensive integration programme stagnated by 1983 (Borkert, Bosswick 2007, p. 5). Here, we see the emphasis on an ethnically-based social cohesion and even homogeneity at the explicit exclusion of ethnically defined foreigners.

98

Chapter Four

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a distinct shift in the framing of foreigner rights and education in spite of the persistent restrictionist domestic politics. In education, the language of “foreigner pedagogy” shifted to that of “multicultural” or “intercultural” education (Faas 2008, p. 110). Policies were implemented within Germany with the goal of promoting foreigner involvement in the “economic, social, and cultural life in the Federal Republic of Germany”, which included accepting the fundamental values of the German constitution such as women’s rights and religious tolerance (Behrens, Tost, Jager 2002, p. 106). This shift laid the foundation for later policies and the raising of education as a tool for integration onto the national level. Yet, the selective school system (discussed shortly) continued to act as a barrier to equality of opportunity. Since the 1990s, there has been increased discussion in Germany on new “aims” and “instruments” of cultural policy including emphasis on dialogue (Sievers, Wagner 2008). In October 1996, the KMK released a policy paper, “Cross-cultural Education in School”, highlighting the complex and pluralistic nature of modern societies. In response to rising social tensions and violence, the paper affirmed that all students should receive a common cross-cultural education that is directed both at the majority and minority groups in the society with the goal of cooperation (Behrens, Tost, Jager 2002, p. 115). Similarly, in the 2000 report, the German commissioner for Foreigner Affairs made the statement that “there is no German monolithic culture” or “Leitkultur” that immigrants will be asked to share, for German society consists of a “multiplicity of coexisting lifestyles” (Joppke, Morawska 2003, p. 5). The issues and responses seem to reach UK policy before arriving on centre stage in Germany. The Swann Report of 1985 explored ethnic disadvantage, focusing on immigrants from the Caribbean and Asian population. More importantly, in the same report, we find an awareness that, in order to foster a pluralist society in a multiracial Britain, different modes of attachment to the conception of Britishness must be acknowledged and accepted (Favell 1998, p. 129). This move to a multicultural and antiracist model represents a distinct shift from the 1960s when assimilation and integration dominated education policy (Reynolds 2008). Along with anti-racist measures, the 1980s also raised other concerns in the British education system as a whole, since the number of those leaving secondary education without any qualification were not good, and those going on to further education were not increasing, thereby limiting the UK’s national competitiveness (Machin,

Citizenship and Education

99

Vignoles 2005). In response, successive conservative governments introduced various market mechanisms to compel schools to improve. In the Education Reform Act of 1988, the market-oriented reforms were introduced alongside a national curriculum. The national curriculum emphasized the longstanding traditions of Englishness in terms of literature and history, proposing unity primarily based on a simplistic and “traditional” (possibly invented) national conception (Donald, Rattansi 1992, p. 7). The market-oriented approach centred on the role of parents to choose their child’s education and thus force schools to increase their performance. Parents could participate as members of school governing bodies, and school funding became more closely linked to numbers of pupils, thus raising the incentive to admit more students. The process of school scoring was also initiated and adapted to league-tables by the media. The persistence of these trends to the present is exemplified in the following communication. On September 13, 2011, an email with the subject “Find and compare schools’ performance” was sent to the mailing list of the Department for Education, which read: “The Department for Education has launched a new web tool helping parents find and compare local schools’ performance. It significantly improves parents’ ability to choose the right school for their child. The ‘compare schools’ tool brings together a wide range of performance data in a single place. Parents can find schools by name, keyword or location or browse via an interactive map. Each school has its own mini-site with a range of useful information such as spend per pupil and test and exam results. Parents can also compare their school with others nearby—or with any other school in England.”

As can be seen from this communication, parents are encouraged to take an active role in choosing their child’s school, putting increased pressure on the school to perform and maximize available funding. On the one hand, the increased role of the parents has been shown to lead to inequalities for socially disadvantaged groups, including minorities. Wealthier parents may have the knowledge and awareness to capitalize on a market-oriented approach and choose the best schools for their child. Moreover, the role of peer groups could contribute to the improvement of equality of opportunity (where an even mix of socio-economically defined pupils occurs or a lower number from lower socio-economic backgrounds in a majority higher socio-economic background school). In the context of increasingly socio-economically segregated schools, this would be difficult to achieve (Machin, Vignoles 2005). Preliminary research conducted over

100

Chapter Four

the years after the 1988 reform shows, however, that the potential for inequality has not taken place to such an extreme as might be expected. Certain inequities clearly remain, however. The other outcome of increased parental involvement was the ability of parents to make certain demands on the political system through the sphere of education. Education has historically acted as the intersection between politics and minority communities, since the relationship between public and private is not maintained as a distinct line as in France, for example. The sphere of education has a good deal of freedom to make allowances for non-participation, special uniforms, or special dietary requirements, demanded from organized parents of pupils of a minority background (Favell 1998, pp. 126-127). This is all the more obvious as another shift from multiculturalism to inclusion dominates the UK educational environment. With goals of cohesion replicated from the EU’s external relations down to local education policy, schools are intended to promote and foster strong positive relations among pupils of different cultural backgrounds (Reynolds 2008). In 2007, efforts at community cohesion became the legal duty of British schools. In recent years, both German and UK governments have instituted various policies to ensure that community cohesion is taking place as well as supporting disadvantaged pupils. Programmes like “Every Child Matters” and “Kein Kind darf zurückgelassen werden” (no child left behind) were initiated to provide a range of support possibilities. Following from the Children Act 2004, Every Child Matters is a set of reforms to provide for all children, no matter their background or circumstances (e.g. ethnic background, disability, etc.) to be healthy, safe, and successful. In fact, three of the five goals stated on the Department for Education’s web site refer to the ability of a child to achieve, contribute, and attain economic well-being (Every Child Matters—Department for Education 2011). In practice, Every Child Matters reinforces two main themes of education more generally and the British system, more particularly. In the first place, it emphasizes to some extent the goal of the child to produce and achieve. While this will help the child individually, it will also help the economic and social needs on a broader scale, as illustrated by EU and member state policies. The implementation of the reforms falls primarily to the Local Authority to work with families and young people in the district to find reasonable and successful means of fulfilling these goals. In Germany, characteristic of the regional structure of education, programmes associated with this motto have been implemented on the state level, calling for an end to the selective education structure that

Citizenship and Education

101

generally favours privileged youth. The selective education dates back to before World War II but was implemented more universally after the end of the war. Throughout primary school, all students remain together, at the end of which, they will receive a recommendation for one of three tracks. The three tracks include Gymnasium (grammar school), Realschule (technical school), or Hauptschule (vocational school). This school form has been contested by political parties and introduced in variant forms throughout Germany since shortly after its initial implementation. Yet, the basic structure of the three-track system still underlies most of the country’s compulsory schooling. It remains foremost in the legitimization of social and cultural boundaries, perpetuating low expectations and reinforcing underachievement. Germany is not alone in its education structure, although the European Commission affirms that the “streaming” of pupils after so little time into different programs ought to be avoided since it can act as a “source of inequity” particularly in the case of disadvantaged and migrant youth (COM 2006, p. 481). In the UK, many of the issues relating to school status and structure involve the financial management and funding of the school, linking back to the market-oriented approach and the role of economic competitiveness in the education system. As the Chair of Governors for a primary school in Devon, England, puts it: “It comes down to funding […] I do feel that the types and organization of schools is largely down to money, at least here in Devon with a very rural area and often smaller schools at Primary level”.

While this was a broad generalization, as the interview partner acknowledged, it does help to understand the different categories of school in England. The schools themselves can be divided into two main categories: state and public. State schools are funded by the state, including sixth form colleges. There are small minorities of faith-schools, generally run by the Church of England or the Roman Catholic Church. The public schools charge tuition, while state schools are free. Most of the state schools are encouraged to specialize in a particular area in order to gain extra funding. Within these, there are a number of different categories including “free schools” (run and administered by parents or an organization), federations (where a number of schools come together to share administrative and financial resources, particularly beneficial for small, rural schools), and academies (where the school is free from the management and support of the local authority). Among these, there are still other schools where a church or organization may support and direct a school. More often than

102

Chapter Four

not, funding plays a distinctive role in how the school defines itself and who can obtain access to it. Unlike the German system, an extensive series of nationwide tests are administered, the results of which are published and affect the school’s reputation. In Germany, all qualifications are administered on the regional level and will have different criteria and standards for both teachers and students. German regions may even opt to have thirteen grades or twelve. English schools are allocated a certain amount of funding per student, and where a student is determined to be socially disadvantaged (usually based on the criterion of qualifying for free lunches according to household income), a premium of funding is attached to that pupil. In 2010, the government proposed to invite all schools, including primary schools, the option to become academies. Previously, only schools who received outstanding assessments from Ofsted had the option to apply. This would mean more freedom from local authorities and ability to make choices regarding the curriculum, staff, and management of the school (Harrison 2010). In other words, this would encourage an even greater decentralization. The danger of such a programme would be the relocation of better teachers and well-to do pupils joining academies where there are more freedom and autonomy from the local authority and the state, while disadvantaged youth would not benefit as much. This could occur as parental choice plays a role in school preference. This point, however, is highly debated. Schools in rural areas and generally smaller schools would also struggle to meet the financial requirements of the academy, whereas larger schools would be able to manage without the protection of the local authority. In essence, there is the fear of a further tiered system developing between academies and the schools that cannot survive as such.

Conclusion This chapter began with the discussion of EU policies towards immigration, following through to its influence on education and how these educational trends and structures have developed in Germany and the UK. The juxtaposition of these aspects was intentional, as it shows very clearly how themes of cohesion, competitiveness, control, and protection can be traced throughout these policies from the supranational to the local level. Over the second half of the twentieth century through to the present, both the British and German education systems have experienced the trajectory of assimilation to multiculturalism to inclusion or integration.

Citizenship and Education

103

The English system seemed to arrive at these shifts at an earlier time; however, this would logically parallel the changing race relations and immigration policies that were not covered here but are an important facet of British immigration and integration efforts. While the education structures are generally more decentralized in the UK with more room for parental involvement, the recent changes are no less controversial. In contrast, the role of funding and a market-oriented approach is not foremost in the German education system, but the persistence of the selective system perpetuates clear disadvantages for minority and socioeconomically disadvantaged youth, feeding into the national and international concerns of cohesion and integration. Throughout the chapter, comments from interview partners were used to highlight the changing nature of these policies and how they affect the institutions and daily lives of people under their jurisdiction. In both countries, education is rather a moving target of analysis, demonstrating both its complexity and relevance as a national institution, which is both a policy measure and a reflection of the communities that it influences.

104

Chapter Four

Bibliography Allmendiger, Jutta. Bildungsfinanzierung in der Krise. Speech delivered by the president of the Berlin, Centre for Social Science Research or Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin (WZB). Organized by the SPD Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Bildung (AfB) (Working group on Education). Willy-Brandt-Haus, Berlin, Germany, April 16, 2010. Baraldi, Claudio. “New Forms of Intercultural Communication in a Globalized World.” International Communication Gazette 68, 1 (2006): pp. 53-69. Behrens, Ulrike; Tost, Sabine and Jager, Reinhold. “German Policy on Foreigners and the Education of Immigrants in the Federal Republic of Germany.” In: Pirkko Pitkänen, Devorah Kalekin-Fishman and Gajendra K. Verma (eds), Education and Immigration: Settlement Policies and Current Challenges. London: Routledge (2002), pp. 96123. Bommes, Michael. “National Welfare State, Biography and Migration: Labour Migrants, Ethnic Germans and the Re-ascription of Welfare State Membership.” In: Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes (eds.), Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State. London: Routledge (2000), pp. 90-108. Borkert, Maren and Bosswick, Wolfgang. “Migration Policy-Making in Germany—Between National Reluctance and Local Pragmatism?” IMISCOE, Working Paper No. 20, 2007. http://www.imiscoe.org/publications/workingpapers/documents/No20Mi grationpolicymakinginGermany.pdf (Retrieved November 13, 2012). Carrera, Sergio. “Towards an EU Framework on the Integration of Immigrants.” In: Sergio Carrera (ed.), The Nexus between Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in the EU. Brussels: CEPS (2006), pp. 1-6. Caviedes, Alexander. “The open Method of Co-ordination in Immigration Policy: A Tool for Prying open Fortress Europe?” Journal of European Public Policy 11, 2 (2004): pp. 289-310. Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament. A Common Agenda for Integration—A Framework for the Integration of Third Country Nationals in the European Union. Brussels: COM (September 1, 2005), pp. 389-final. —. Efficiency and Equity in European Education and Training Systems. Brussels: COM (September 8, 2006), pp. 481-final. —. Migration & Mobility: Challenges and Opportunities for EU Education Systems. Brussels: COM (July 3, 2008), p. 423 final.

Citizenship and Education

105

Donald, James and Rattansi, Ali. Race, Culture, and Difference. London: Sage, 1992. European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research. “Sharing Diversity: National Approaches to Intercultural Dialogue in Europe, Study for the European Commission.” Bonn and Helsinki: Council of Europe/ ERICarts, 2008. http://www.interculturaldialogue.eu/web/files/14/en/Sharing_Diversity _Final_Report.pdf (Retrieved January 20, 2013). Every Child Matters—The Department for Education, 2011. http://www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/sen/earlysupport/ esinpractice/a0067409/every-child-matters (Retrieved January 22, 2013). Faas, Daniel. “From Foreigner Pedagogy to Intercultural Education: An Analysis of the German Responses to Diversity and its Impact on Schools and Students.” European Educational Research Journal 7, 1 (2008): pp. 108-123. Favell, Adrian. Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain. Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick, 1998. Favell, Adrian and Geddes, Andrew. “European Integration, Immigration and the Nation State: Institutionalizing Transnational Political Action?” EUI Working Paper RSC 99, 32 (1999): pp. 26-27. Fekete, Liz. “Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State.” Race and Class 46, 3 (2004): pp. 3-29. Fredriksson, Ulf. “Changes of Education Policies within the European Union in the Light of Globalization.” European Educational Research Journal 2, 4 (2003): pp. 521-546. Geddes, Andrew. “Denying Access: Asylum Seekers and Welfare Benefits in the UK.” In: Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes (eds.), Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State. London: Routledge (2000), pp. 134-220. —. The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London: Sage, 2003. Guiraudon, Virgmie. “The Constitution of an European Immigration Policy Domain a Political Sociology Approach.” Journal of European Public Policy 102 (2003): pp. 263-282. Harrison, Angela. “Schools are Promised an Academies ‘Revolution’.” BBC News, May 26, 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10159448 (Retrieved March 7, 2013). High Level Group on Multilingualism. “Final Report.” Brief version, 2007.

106

Chapter Four

http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/doc/multishort_en.pdf (Retrieved March 8, 2013). Huysmans, Jeff. “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, 5 (2000): pp. 751-777. Joffe, George. “The European Union: Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in the Maghreb.” Journal of Common Market Studies 46, 1 (2008): pp. 147-171. Joppke, Christian. Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Joppke, Christian and Morawska, Ewa. Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat. Euro-Turks: A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union? A Comparative Study of German-Turks and French-Turks. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2005. Keeling, Ruth. “The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Research Agenda: The European Commission’s Expanding Role in Higher Education.” European Journal of Education 41, 6 (2006): pp. 203-223. Kostakopoulou, Theodora. “The ‘Protective Union’: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe.” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, 3 (2000): pp. 497-518. —. Matters of Control: Integration Tests and Naturalization Reform in Western Europe. Cambridge: Paper presented at Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, May 9, 2008. Lavenex, Sandra. “Migration and the EU’s New Eastern Border: Between Realism and Liberalism.” Journal of European Public Policy 8, 1 (2001): pp. 24-42. Leise, Eric. “Germany Strives to Integrate Immigrants with New Policies.” Migration Information Source, 2007. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=610 (Retrieved February 9, 2013). Machin, Stephen and Vignoles, Anna. Education Policy in the UK. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, The Centre for the Economics of Education, 2005. Mühe, Nina. “Muslims in the EU—Cities Report: EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program Germany.” Open Society Institute, 2007. http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/eumuslims/background_ reports/download/germany/germany.pdf (Retrieved January 20, 2013). Phillimore, Jenny and Goodson, Lisa. New Migrants in the UK: Education, Training and Employment. Stoke on Trent: Trentham

Citizenship and Education

107

Books, 2008. Press release of May 11, 2007. EU 2007 News. http://www.eu2007.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_1059824/EU2007/EN/Ser viceNavigation/PressReleases/content__Pressemitteilungen/Integration sminister__Verstaerkte__Zusammenarbeit__der__EU__en.html (Retrieved March 7, 2013). Ramirez, Francisco O. and Boli, John. “The Political Construction of Mass Schooling: European Origins and Worldwide Institutionalization.” Sociology of Education 60 (1987): pp. 2-17. Reynolds, Grace. The Impact and Experiences of Migrant Children in UK Secondary Schools. Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex, Working Paper No. 47, 2008. Schäfer, Isabel. “The Cultural Dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A Critical Review of the First Decade of Intercultural Cooperation.” History and Anthropology 18, 3 (2007): pp. 333-352. Schierup, Carl-Ulrik; Hansen, Peo and Castles, Stephen. Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: A European Dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Schily, Otto and Myers, Joanne J. “German Immigration Issues.” Transcript of speech at event hosted by Carnegie Council, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, November 21, 2005. http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5280.html (Retrieved May 6, 2013). Sievers, Norbert and Wagner, Bernd. “Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe: Germany”, 9th edition. Bonn: Council of Europe/ERICarts, 2008. http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/germany.php (Retrieved May 3, 2013). Stange, Eva Maria. Chairperson of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Bildung. Speech delivered at conference “Bildungsfinanzierung in der Krise” (The financing of Education during the Crisis). Organized by the SPD Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Bildung (AfB) (Working group on Education). Willy-Brandt-Haus, Berlin, April 16, 2010. Strath, Bo. “A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept.” European Journal of Social Theory 5, 4 (2002): pp. 387-401. Tannock, Stuart. “Immigration, Education and the New Caste Society in Britain.” Critical Social Policy 29 (2009): p. 243. White, Jenny. “Turks in the New Germany.” American Anthropologist New Series 99, 4 (1997): pp. 754-769.

CHAPTER FIVE ACQUIRING AND LOSING TURKISH CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE NEW TURKISH CITIZENSHIP ACT NECLA OZTURK

Introduction The Turkish Citizenship Act No. 403 has been in effect for a long time (since 1964)1 and was amended to ascertain the issues dealing with the loss of Turkish citizenship, the required proof and the related judicial process. This Statute was in effect for approximately forty-five years, until the New Turkish Citizenship Act came into force on July 12, 20092. Why did the government need to amend this law? The general justification for the New Act gives the answer. As described in the general justification of the New Act, the Old Act had deteriorated over the years, and needed changes to ensure it complied with the concepts of the European Convention on Nationality (European Convention on Nationality 1997; Güngör 1997-98, pp. 229-250; Tanrbilir 2002, pp. 791-818) and to harmonize it with European Union regulations. The objective of this article is to survey the reasons, the conditions and results of acquiring and losing Turkish citizenship under the provisions of the New Act. It highlights the main differences between the Old and the New Citizenship Acts, as well as discussing constructive and reforming solutions.

The history of Turkish citizenship law A. Before Turkey became a Republic The first reference of The Turkish Citizenship Law encompasses the previous period of the Turkish Republic, the 1869 Ottoman Citizenship Act (Tabiiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesi3). In fact, this structure was made

110

Chapter Five

due to a serious need for a rule of law under the Ottoman Empire (Nomer 2010, p. 52; Aybay 2006, p. 68; Do÷an 2010, p. 43; Erdem 2010, p. 31). TOK was remarkable as the first citizenship arrangement which was distinct from religious principles. Some European states’ citizenship Acts which were incorporated and implemented during that period and particularly the French Act of 1851 were referred to, in the preparation of this Act (Aybay 2006, p. 69). As a rule, TOK accepted the “jus sanguinis” principle for acquiring Ottoman citizenship. Accordingly, a child whose mother or father had Ottoman citizenship could acquire Ottoman citizenship. TOK exceptionally accepted the “jus soli” principle. The children who were born in the state would demand citizenship within three years after reaching the stage of puberty (Nomer 2010, p. 52; Aybay 2006, p. 69; Do÷an 2010, pp. 43-44; Erdem 2010, pp. 31-32). The first Ottoman constitutution, Kanuni Esasi 1876, came into force after TOK was adopted, which accepted the principle of “no discrimination between religions and different sects” (Aybay 2006, p. 70). Furthermore, arbitrary treatments and conduct connected with acquiring and losing citizenship were terminated and procedures were required for the code. However, there was no article of the code which was about judicial review on this particular issue. B. After Turkey became a Republic The first Turkish Citizenship Act of the Turkish Republic was the “Turkish Citizenship Law No: 1312” which came into force in 1928. In this Act, as a rule the “jus sanguinis” principle and exceptionally the “jus soli” principle were accepted for acquiring Turkish citizensip as well (Nomer 2010, p. 52; Aybay 2006, pp. 72-76; Do÷an 2010, p. 44; Erdem 2010, p. 32). The second Turkish Citizenship Act was the “Turkish Citizenship Law No: 403” which came into force in 1964. The Act dealt with the same principles which were adopted from the Swiss Federal Law on Citizenship Act of 1952 (Gö÷er 1972, p. 16; Turkish version of this Act: Fiúek 1953, pp. 755-769). Six important amendments had been made in this Act by 20094. These amendments affected the nature of the Act and led to its replacement when on June 12, 2009, the New Act came into existence and force.

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

111

The constitutional principles of Turkish nationality law The constitutional principles of Turkish Citizenship Law are regulated under the title of “Political Rights and Duties” as mentioned in Article 66 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution5. A. The Principle of Objectivity in Citizenship As per article 66/1, “Everyone bound in the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk”. In this article, the law makers admitted that citizenship is an objective term, it differs from nationality and nationhood. For the purpose of this definition, Turkish citizenship is wholly a legal term. Religion, race, language, sex or ethnicity of a person do not have any importance for the status of a person’s Turkish citizenship. This article discourages any discrimination among Turkish citizenship (Tiryakio÷lu 2006, p. 4). B. The Principle of Descent As per article 66/2, “The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk”. This article accepted the principle of “jus sanguinis”. Thus this principle lead to a constitutional principle of acquiring citizenship. Even though the “jus soli” principles is not in existence in the Constitution, it does not mean that it can not be a part of the Turkish Citizenship Act, which has exceptionally accepted this principle. C. The Principle of Legality As per article 66/3, “Citizenship can be acquired under the conditions stipulated by law, and shall be forfeited only in cases determined by law”. Thus, the principle of legislation is admitted in the Constitution. D. The Principle of not Losing Citizenship through Arbitrary Action As per article 66/4, “No Turk shall be deprived of citizenship, unless he commits an act incompatible with the loyalty to the motherland”. In the regulations of the New Act reasons of revocation can be found. However, a person’s citizenship can not be revoked unless an act is committed, which demonstrates lack of loyalty. E. The Principle of Judicial Enforcement As per article 66/5, “Recourse to the courts in appeal against the decisions and proceedings related to the deprivation of citizenship, shall not be denied”. There is a similar regulation in the Turkish Constitution in article 125 which directs that “Recourse to judicial review shall be available

112

Chapter Five

against all actions and acts of administration”. Constitution makers felt the need to regulate the provision of citizenship law separately and clearly, because of the high threshold importance of it.

The methods of acquiring Turkish citizenship under the New Act As per article 5, “Turkish citizenship is acquired by birth or after birth”. Therefore, there are two methods of acquiring citizenship, one is by birth and the other is after birth. A. Citizenship Acquired by Birth As per article 6, “Turkish citizenship by birth shall be automatically acquired on the basis of descent or place of birth. Citizenship acquired by birth shall be effective from the time of birth.”

1. Descent (jus sanguinis) Article 7 defines eligibility of acquiring citizenship by descent: - A child born to a Turkish mother or through a Turkish father within the unity of marriage either in Turkey or abroad is a Turkish citizen. - A child born to a Turkish mother and through an alien father out of wedlock is a Turkish citizen. - A child born through a Turkish father and to an alien mother out of wedlock acquires Turkish citizenship if the principles and procedures ensuring the establishment of descent are met6. 2. Birth Place (jus soli) The principle of birth is an exceptional method to acquire Turkish citizenship under Turkish Law. The purpose of this regulation is to prevent a person from being without a State. A child born in Turkey, but acquring no citizenship of any State by birth through his or her alien mother or father is a Turkish citizen from the time of birth. A child found in Turkey is deemed born in Turkey unless proven and established otherwise (article 8)7. B. Citizenship Acquired after Birth Article 9 describes the procedures for acquring citizenship after birth. According to this, Turkish citizenship shall be acquired after birth either

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

113

through a decision of the competent authority or by adoption or by using the right to choice. These situations of acquring citizenship after birth are not limited by article 9, in the fifth part of the Act which is titled “Miscellaneous Provisions” acquring Turkish citizenship for the citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus were regulated as well. 1. The Acquisition of Turkish Citizenship by Decision of Competent Authority The acquisition of Turkish citizenship by decision of competent authority are as follows: a) The acquisition of Turkish Citizenship in general states (Naturalization), b) The acquisition of Turkish Citizenship in exceptional states (Exceptional naturalization), c) The re-acquisition of Turkish citizenship, - The re-acquisition of Turkish citizenship without stipulating the condition of residence, - The re-acquisition of Turkish citizenship by residency, d) The acquisition of Turkish Citizenship through marriage, e) The acquisition of Turkish Citizenship through adoption. a) The Acquisition of Turkish Citizenship in General States (Naturalization) aa. Conditions aaa. Compulsory Conditions As per article 11, an alien who wishes to acquire Turkish Ctizenship shall; - be of the age of majority and must have capacity to act, - be a resident of Turkey without interruption for a period of five years, - verifies his or her determination to settle down in Turkey, - must have no disease constituting an obstacle with respect of public health, - must have a good moral character, - must be able to speak a sufficient level of Turkish, - must have income or profession to be able to sustain livelihood in Turkey, - has no history which constitutes an obstacle with respect to national security and public order. bbb. Discretionary Condition: Renunciation of Previous Citizenship

114

Chapter Five

Besides the compulsory conditions of acquiring Turkish citizenship, as per article 11/2, the condition of renunciation of previous citizenship can be considered for some foreigners. As per article 11/2 “Aliens who wish to acquire Turkish citizenship may be required, in addition to the conditions aforementioned, to relinguish previous citizenship”. We can reach that conclusion while evaluating article 11/2 and article 11/1 read and interpreted together. Aliens have to comply with all the conditions of Article 11 to be able to acquire Turkish citizenship. However, renunciation of previous citizenship can be an additional condition for “some aliens” to acquire Turkish citizenship. The purpose of this article is basically regulated for some foreigners whose States do not accept dual citizenship. Statements of the general justification of the New Act explains additional condition considered for the citizens of the states where losing Turkish citizenship is a condition of acquiring their citizenship and multiple citizenship can not be admitted. The reasoning behind this rule is motivated by political concerns. When immigrant Turks in certain European States wish to acquire the nationality of those states, they have to give up Turkish nationality according to the law of those countries. The legal rules used by the Turkish legislators at this time were part of a political reason which should be supported by stronger reasoning. bb. Procedure Applicants who wish to acquire Turkish citizenship should comply with all the conditons stipulated in article 11 and shall apply in Turkey where the Governors Place of residence remains, and if residence is abroad then the overseas representative offices to apply either personally or through a designated power of attorney for using that right under article 378. The determination whether foreigners who wish to acquire Turkish citizenship fulfill the conditions or not—for application—shall be made by the Citizenship Application Examination Commission formed in the provinces under article 189. Aliens who wish to acquire Turkish citizenship by the decision of the competent authority and those who fulfill the conditions for application of citizenship can submit a file—which shall be opened in their name after being reviewed—by the Ministry and designated officials. After the examination and inquiry made by the Ministry, those who qualify on a discretionary basis or otherwise—can acquire Turkish citizenship by decision of the Ministry, whereas the citizenship applications of those whose are ineligible and do not qualify on a discretionary basis shall be rejected by the Ministry (article 19).

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

115

b) The Acquisition of Turkish Citizenship in Exceptional States (Exceptional Naturalization) aa. Conditions As per article 12, initially an aplicant has to fall in the category of a group of persons as defined and mentioned in the New Act regarding acquiring Turkish citizenship under exceptional circumstances. The group of people are as follows: - Persons who have invested in, developed and set up industrial plants in Turkey or have rendered or are being considered to render in future outstanding services in the field of scientific, technological, economic, social, sports, cultural and artistic fields and a reasoned offer has been made by the relevant ministries to such persons, - Persons whose naturalisation is considered necessary and of importance to Turkey10, - Person(s) who have been recognised as immigrants. Another condition is that the foreigner should not be a threat or an obstacle in respect of national security and public order of Turkey. bb. Procedure It is necessary that all aplications sent to the Ministry would be decided under the basis and purview of (art. 19/1). The Council of Ministers have the authority to make a decision regarding Turkish citizenship under exceptional circumstances (article 12/1). c) The Re-acquisition of Turkish Citizenship The persons who lose Turkish citizenship in any way can re-acquire Turkish citizenship. The only group of person who can not exercise this option are those whose citizenship is cancelled. In the New Act, the reacquisition of Turkish Citizenship is regulated under two titles one by residency and the other without stipulating conditions of residency. aa. The Re-acquisition of Turkish Citizenship without Stipulating the Condition of Residence As per article 13 the pre-requisite to re-acquiring Turkish citizenship, is that the persons should not be a threat or have any history and prior backround with respect to being a threat to the national security of Turkey. The other condition is being a person within the definition as regulated in the New Act: - Persons who lose Turkish citizenship by obtaining a renunciation permit,

Chapter Five

116

-

Of the persons who lose Turkish citizenship because their parents did not exercise the choice to acquire Turkish citizenship within a period of three (3) years. These persons can re-acquire Turkish citizenship by decision of the Ministry irrespective of their residence and duration of stay in Turkey. bb. The Re-acquisition of Turkish Citizenship by Residency As per article 14 the persons who will re-acquire Turkish citizenship through residency shall have the conditions mentioned below: - The persons whose citizenship has been revoked as per the method under article 2911, - The persons whose citizenship has been revoked as per the method under article 3412, can acquire Turkish citizenship provided the appropriate conditions of the Act are complied with. The other condition which has been provided by the persons included in the Act is the residency period. The persons who wish to re-acquire Turkish citizenship should have been residing in Turkey for a minimum period of three (3) years consistently13. There is discrimination between the persons and their children who lose Turkish citizenship through a process of renunciation permit (article 13) and the persons who lose Turkish citizenship by revocation or using the right of choice and election. As per article 13, there is no residence condition and requirement for them. However, the residence requirement is compulsory in other cases in Turkey. The reason for this distinction can be interpreted from the justification of article 14 which states that “citizenship is a juristical bond which bases sentiment bonds within mutual rights and obligations”. Law makers were looking for an emotional bond as much as juristical bond—that is why if a person loses the citizenship by revocation or using the right of choice, it means such class of persons does not have a strong sentiment, bonds and bearing towards Turkey. The last condition is the class of persons who are not a threat to the national security, law and order of Turkey. Those who comply with all the conditions as mentioned above can re-acquire Turkish citizenship by decision of the Council of Ministers. d) The Acquision of Turkish Citizenship through Marriage In the New Act, acquiring Turkish citizenship through marriage is restricted only towards foreigners and their applications in the event some conditions are required on a mandatory basis. On the other hand, acquiring

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

117

of Turkish citizenship through marriage is exceptional and it is not the way to acquire citizenship automatically anymore. aa. Conditions aaa. Pre-Condition: The Marriage Shall Continues at Least Three Years As per article 1614, foreigners can apply for obtaning Turkish citizenship through marriage, provided the foreigner has been married with a Turkish citizen for at least three years and the marriage still continues at the date of filing the application. Even if the marriage continues more than three years, a foreigner can not acquire Turkish citizenship if the marriage ended through a process of nullity or divorce was obtained before the filing and adjudication of the application. bbb. Other Conditions aaaa. Living Within The Unity Of Marriage As per article 16/1(a), living within the unity of marriage is one of the main conditions to acquire Turkish citizenship by foreigners after marriage. The purpose of this provision is to prevent collusive and fraudulent marriage only for the purposes of obtaining Turkish citizenship. However, if the couples are living at different places, as long as they demonstrate the bona fide nature of the marriage, it is sufficient, since a person can always travel overseas for professional reasons or to visit friends and family. Such sporadic travel will not break away the unity of marriage. As per the Turkish Civil Code such collusive marriages (only for purposes of obtaining citizenship) are valid if there is no other reason for nullity of marriage. However, after the application for acquiring Turkish citizenship, if the authorities determine that a marriage is fraudulent and only for purposes of obtaining citizenship, then procedurally citizenship will not be granted. bbbb. Abstaining From Acts Incompatible with the Unity Of Marriage Foreigners who wish to acquire Turkish citizenship must abstain from acts incompatible with the unity of marriage. Incompatible acts are regulated with respect to marriage under the Turkish Citizenship Regulations Act15. According to the Regulation, “prostitution”, “procuration of prostitution”, “being a procurer of prostitutes-pimping” are some acts incompatible with the unity of marriage. The purpose of this article is to prevent persons who engage in human trafficking from acquiring Turkish citizenship.

Chapter Five

118

cccc. Having No Background, History Constituting a Threat to National Security, Law and Public Order This condition is mandatory and applicable for all methods acquiring Turkish citizenship through approval of competent authorities and through marriage as well. bb. Nullity of The Marriage As per article 16/3, “In case of the declaration of nullity of the marriage, aliens who acquired Turkish citizenship by marriage shall keep Turkish citizenship, only if the alien demonstrates that the marriage was entered good faith.”

The children born through a marriage which is declared to be a nullity will continue to be a Turkish citizen on a condition that they were born before declaration of nullity was entered into, whether the marriage was on a good faith basis or not. There are two reasons for this conclusion: first is that the child has acquired Turkish citizenship by birth and the other is that the child would maintain Turkish citizenship because the marriage is presumed to be illegal until declared to to be a nullity through a court order. In the New Act there is no specific regulation like the Old Act, to acquire Turkish citizenship by children who were born to an alien married to a Turkish Citizen. cc. Procedure If the foreigners who intend to acquire Turkish citizenship through marriage fulfills the conditions of article 16, then the examiner of the Citizens Application Examination Commission will further scrutinize the file and then send it to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. After the examination and inquiry is made by the Ministry regarding the marriage being legitimate, an approval can lead to Turkish citizenship by decision of the Ministry, whereas the citizenship applications of those whose marriage have been deemed inappropriate shall be rejected by the Ministry (art. 18). Children who are under the custody and guardianship of the mother or the father on the date of their acquiring Turkish citizenship, if the other spouse consents, shall acquire Turkish citizenship. e) The Acquision of Turkish Citizenship through Adoption aa. Conditions The person who will be adopted must not reach puberty to acquire Turkish citizenship by adoption. And the person should not have any history,

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

119

background or be a threat to national security and public order of Turkey (art. 17)16. .

bb. Procedure The Citizenship Application Examination Commission requires that the person has no history, background or is not a threat to the national security, law and public order of Turkey and if this condition is complied with then the file is sent to the Ministry Of Interior Affairs for approval. Minor children can acquire Turkish citizenship after the examination and inquiry made by the Ministry whose background and investigation is deemed appropriate and not objectionable. 2. The Acquisition of Turkish Citizenship by the Right of Choice a) Conditions As per article 21, “Children who lose their Turkish citizenship due to their parents in accordance with Article 27 can acquire Turkish citizenship by using the right of choice if they apply within three years from the date they reach the age of majority.”

Validity and consequences of renunciation of Turkish citizensip was regulated under article 2717. The minor children who lose their Turkish citizenship since their parents lose their citizensihps by obtaining a renunciation permit, can re-acquire Turkish citizenship by using the right of choice if they apply within three years from the date they reach the age of majority. b) Procedure and Consequences Applications should be filed in Turkey in the region where the Governor resides and adjudicates on such applications. If the person applying is stationed abroad, then the person has to go to the overseas representative offices either personally or through a process of designated power of attorney. Acquiring Turkish citizenship by the right of choice shall be effective from the date of decision regarding the determination of conditions relating to the exercise of these rights (article 22). 3. The Right of Choice for North Cyprus Turkish Citizenship18 The only conditon for the citizens of KKTC to acquire Turkish citizenship is that they have to acquire KKTC citizenship by birth which is the easiest way to acquire Turkish citizenship (article 42)19.

120

Chapter Five

An evaluation and the important aspects of acquiring citizenship A. Multiple Citizenship One of the most important reforms about acquiring Turkish citizenship in the New Act is regulated “multiple citizenship”. “Multiple citizenship” was defined in article 3 and there is another provision about multiple citizenship which is referenced in article 44; this indicates that law makers have a positive approach towards it. As per article 44, multiple citizenship was clearly regulated and a note explains that the persons who hold multiple citizenships shall disclose this in their records in the civil registration office. When we evaluate and review both the articles in conjunction we can conclude that Turkish citizens do not need permission when they acquire a foreign citizenship while keeping Turkish citizenship. Basically, there was no regulation in The Old Act to prevent multiple citizenships and no requirement for foreigners to give up their original nationality in order to acquire Turkish citizenship. In contrast to this, when Turks obtained the nationality of another state, dual nationality was in principle prohibited. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, Turks had the opportunity to protect their own citizenship and to acquire one from the foreign country by obtaining permission from the government. If they acquired foreign citizenship without permission, they would face the risk of losing their status as a Turkish citizen. On the other hand, in the case of acquiring Turkish nationality by foreigners, dual citizenship was welcomed, and in doing so, those foreigners were also able to retain their original status. In the mid-1960s, Turkish workers started emigrating to Western European countries, especially to Germany. At the beginning of the process Turkish citizens started as guest workers. Those who settled desired to acquire citizenship and this has paved the way for a change in the policies of the European states as well as those of Turkey in the 1980s. Within this context, Turkey changed its policy of retaining these persons solely as Turkish citizens and aimed for such persons to acquire the citizenship of the country where they lived. As a result, such persons were able to continue to have economic, social and political relations with Turkey, while also enjoying the same rights as citizens in the country where they lived. However, during this period, an adverse reaction against dual nationality in the respective countries grew stronger in order to encourage full integration of migrant workers. As a result, Germany in particular introduced the requirement for migrant workers to acquire German nationality only by giving up their current citizenship. This

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

121

difference that arose between the policies of countries has been reflected in Turkish Law since 1980. Consequently, Turkey brought legal amendments that paved the way for dual nationality for Turkish citizens, whereas Germany chose to prevent this from happening. Germany expatriated Turks who secretly re-obtained Turkish nationality after acquiring German citizenship. Thereupon, the Turkish citizenship law that was in force during that period was re-amended in reaction to Germany’s approach, and this period lasted until the 1990s20. In summary, the New Act follows European regulations and aims to solve the problems of multiple and dual citizenships and multiple citizenship is a legal provision in the New Act. B. Marriage Acquiring Turkish citizenship by marriage is the other important regulation of the New Act. It was the most problematical regulation in the Old Act. In accordance with the first form of article 5, foreign women could automatically acquire Turkish citizenship by marriage with a Turkish citizen. After the 1990s, especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey accepted migrant workers from former constituent parts of the USSR. The easiest way for new migrants to cope with over restricted, over inclusive rules was to marry Turks and to obtain work permit righs as well. The model of acquiring Turkish citizenship by marriage was abused until the regulation amendment in 2003 was introduced and acquiring citizenship for foreign women by marrying Turks was no longer welcomed21. C. National Security and Public Order “National security and public order” is a condition for all models of acquiring citizenship by a decision of the competent authority under the New Act, unlike the Old Act. The existence of the condition in the New Act is open to criticism because of the indefinite scope and broad nature and application of the term, which ends up giving a lot of discretion to the Government. However, even though this condition was not regulated in the Old Act, in practice, it was considered by the competent authorities, which was against the principle of Constitutional article number 66/3. As per the general justification of the New Act, which describes the meaning of national security and public order as an act of rebellion, sabotage, act of spying, engaging in possession of illegal arms, drugs, smuggling contrabands, forgery of documents, campaigning against national interests, unity and territorial integrity of the State and being in

122

Chapter Five

contact with the persons and organization which commit such illegal acts or to engage in any act of terrorism.

The methods of losing Turkish citizenship under the New Act As per article 23, “Turkish citizenship shall be lost by decision of the competent authority or by exercising right of choice”. A. Losing Turkish Citizenship by Decision of a Competent Authority As per article 24, “Loss of Turkish citizenship by decision of the competent authority shall occur by renuciation, revocation or cancellation of the acquisition of citizenship”. 1. Renunciation of Turkish Citizenship Renunciation occurs when a person willingly gives up citizenship and files for it. As per the Act, the person can apply to the competent authority and if the application is accepted, the renunciation of the citizenship takes place. The competent authorities do not have to accept the renunciation application of the person applying, even though the person provides and fulfils all the necessary conditions of renunciation. a) Conditions To apply for renunciation of Turkish citizenship, a person needs to comply with the following conditions: - Being the age of majority and having the required capacity to act22, - Having acquired citizenship of a foreign state or pending adjudication of citizenship in a foreign state; - Not wanted by the Government or the military for committing a criminal offence for required military service, - Being free from any financial burden and not having committing a crime or sentence to be completed for committing a crime. A person who provides documentation and complies with the above mentioned conditions, if foreign citizenship is acquired then the government can issue a renunciation document: if the person does not acquire the foreign citizenship but there is a possibility that the person will acquire the foreign citizenship, then the government will issue a renunciation permit document.

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

123

b) Consequences Turkish citizenship can be lost when the renunciation document is handed over executed by the person concerned (article 27) who gains the status of being a foreigner. There is a special regulation dealing with a person who loses Turkish citizenship through a renunciation permit process. Accordingly, a Turkish citizen who loses the citizenship through a renunciation permit, enjoys the same rights as Turkish citizens (article 28)23. As a matter of rule and law, renunciation of Turkish citizenship only affects the person involved but will not affect the status of the person’s spouse as a citizen. Also, in case of a request made by the mother or the father, who loses Turkish citizenship and of the consent of the other spouse, the children will also lose Turkish citizenship. In case of lack of consent, the action shall be taken according to the decision of a judge presiding over the case. Children of the mother and the father, who lose Turkish citizenship together by obtaining a renunciation permit, shall also lose Turkish citizenship in the process (article 27). 2. Revocation of Turkish Citizenship The reasons for revocation of citizenship are counted in three (3) matters under the New Act. Two of these reasons are also subsumed in the Old Act, the third reason is a new amended reason which is adopted from the European Convention on Citizenship. a) Groups Liable to Revocation of Citizenship “Of the persons, who have rendered services, which are incompatible with the interests of Turkey, for a foreign state, despite the fact that they are notified to cease this task by the overseas representative offices abroad, by the directors of provincial public administration in Turkey, those who do not voluntarily cease this task within a given reasonable time period of (at least) three months” (article 29/a).

For this article to be applied, firstly, Turkish citizens have to be in the service of a foreign State. It does not matter whether this service is in Turkey or abroad, and the nature of the work can be in military or civilian work, with public or private institutions. Service has to be against Turkey's interests; the Council of Ministers will review whether the service is incompatible with Turkey’s interest or not. Also, if the person does not leave their work willingly, even though a competent authority has notified the person to leave the job within a reasonable time period then that person’s citizenship will be revoked.

124

Chapter Five “Persons, who voluntarily continue to render any kind of services for a state, which is at war with Turkey, without the permission of the Council of Ministers” (article 29/b).

Implementation of this article encompasses a person in any kind of service in a foreign country which is at war with Turkey. It does not matter about the nature of work involved or the type of service and job. The question is whether the person works willingly and the Council of Ministers have not given adequate permission and approval to continue the person’s work. “Persons who voluntarily render military service for a foreign state without obtaining permission” (article 29/c). This reason was not included in the Old Act and this new provision was adopted from the European Convention on Citizenship. b) Consequences During the revocation decision, with regard to granting a person’s status as a foreigner: if the person fulfills the requirements of lawful residence then the person can re-acquire Turkish citizenship. The revocation decisions are personal and applies to the individual person and shall not affect the spouse and children of the person. Revocation of Turkish citizenship shall be effective from the date on which the decision of the Council of Ministers is published in the Official Gazette (article 30). 3. Cancellation of Turkish Citizenship a) Conditions As per article 31, the cancellation of Turkish citizenship, acquired through competent authority, shall be cancelled by the decision-making authority only, if the person acquired citizenship by misrepresentation, fraud or by hiding essential facts constituting the basis of acquiring Turkish citizenship. Due to acts of misrepresentation cancellation can take course and the person can further be ineligible to acquire Turkish citizenship. For instance, if the person fabricates false documents with the knowledge that they are false or does not disclose the prior history of criminal convictions and related matters. If there is a material defect in acquiring the citizenship and this defect is made by deference of the competent authority then it does not cancel the citizenship (article 39). If the person acquired the citizenship because of the administration’s defect and if there is an error in evaluating the request made, then article 40 applies24.

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

125

b) Consequences The cancellation decision shall be effective from the date of decision (article 32). If the competent authority acts on both cancellation and liquidation decision simultaneously, then the person has to liquidate the assets within a time period of one (1) year at the most without further delay (article 33). During this time, the person keeps their possession but their right of possession is limited to liquidation of assets. If the person does not liquidate their assets in Turkey within a year then the assets are seized and shall be sold by the Treasury department and the proceeds shall be deposited on the person’s behalf in the State Bank account (article 33). The cancellation decision shall also be applied to the spouse and children, who acquired Turkish citizenship through the person concerned (article 32). If the spouse and children acquired Turkish citizenship through another method then as a matter of law, the cancellation decision does not affect their status. B. Losing Turkish Citizenship by the Right of Choice The easiest way to lose Turkish citizenship for people who acquired Turkish citizenship without their will and consent can be done at the time of attaining majority as an adult. Such persons have a right to relinquish their Turkish citizenship. 1. Conditions A person who intends to lose their citizenship by the right of choice has to comply with certain conditions as follows: being an adult, to use this right within three years after attaining the age of majority as an adult, being a person as referenced and interpreted in the Act which are; a) Persons, who acquired Turkish citizenship by birth through the mother or the father on the basis of descent, and those who acquired the alien mother’s or father’s citizenship by birth or after birth. b) Persons, who acquired Turkish citizenship by descent from the mother or the father, and those who acquired citizenship of a foreign state by place (situs) of birth. c) Persons, who acquired Turkish citizenship through the process of adoption. d) Persons, who had acquired Turkish citizenship by place of birth, and those who then acquired the alien mother’s or father’s citizenship. e) The persons, who acquired Turkish citizenship by descent from the mother or the father, and who acquired Turkish citizenship in any other manner.

126

Chapter Five

If loss of citizenship occurs as per the above mentioned provisions, then the person is rendered stateless, in which case the right of choice can not be exercised (article 34/2). 2. Consequences The effects of losing Turkish citizenship by using the right of choice is regulated under article 35 and the application of this article is also referred in article 27 as well. As per article 27, Turkish citizenship shall be cancelled based on an act of renunciation, wherein a document is handed over to the government executed by the person concerned who thereby attains the status of being a foreigner. There is a special regulation dealing with persons who lose their Turkish citizenship through a renunciation permit process. Accordingly, a person, originally a Turkish citizen, who loses his citizenship by a renunciation permit process, continues to enjoy some rights as a Turkish citizen (article 28)25. If a person’s citizenship is lost by exercising the right of choice, it only affects the person; it shall not affect the person’s spouse and their citizenship. Children’s citizenship can also be cancelled in case of the consent of the other spouse. Children who lose their Turkish citizenship due to their parents in accordance with article 27 can acquire Turkish citizenship by using the right of choice if they apply within three years from the date they attain the age of majority (article 21). Loss of Turkish citizenship by the right of choice shall be effective from the date of decision regarding the determination of the existence of the conditions relating to the use of the right (article 35).

An evaluation and the important aspects of losing citizenship The New Law adopted some crucial aspects regarding loss of citizenship through the process of expulsion, which is not regulated in the New Act; revocation of citizenship is limited and the process of losing citizenship through marriage is not adopted any more. A. Expulsion One of the most important features of the New Act is to remove the expulsion factor from Turkish Law. This provision was criticized for many reasons by scholars. It is necessary to elucidate these reasons. Expulsion procedure would be enforced by administrative authority on a mandatory basis, the related

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

127

person’s intention was not considered at all. As a result, the person could be without a State. The expulsion provision goes against the norms of fundamental principles of nationality which requires that everyone should have a recognized nationality. In addition, the sanction of expulsion was excessively harsh, since the expelled Turks could not obtain Turkish citizenship and their assets would be sold by the Government. Finally, the process of expulsion is also against the basic principles of human rights, due to its irrevocable nature. Expulsion under the Old Act was regulated under article 2626 and article 3527. These sanctions of expulsion were excessively heavy. This provision was not included in the New Act and this is a serious progressive step. B. Revocation Even though the concept of revocation of citizenship is present in the New Act, the scope of revocation of citizenship is reduced. Revocation of citizenship was justified on eight grounds in the Old Act. There were three reasons of revocation of citizenship about military duty in the Old Act, these reasons have been abolished28 and are not valid anymore. This is because the New Act strives to harmonize Turkish law with regulations of European Union and European Convention on Nationality. Currently, the reasons of deprivation are in compliance with the European Law. The reason of revocations, “those who have acquired citizenship of a foreign state through their own volition without receiving permission” is abolished. One of the basic features of the Old Act was to grant discretionary power to the government to take revocation decisions about Turks who obtained foreign nationality without permission. This approach taken by the government was unclear. The Government’s position on this issue had been criticized very severely due to misuse of this power for political reasons. Therefore, obtaining dual nationality without permission of the government had been a very controversial issue for years. A good reference and an example of this is the Merve Case.29 Merve, who was elected as a member of parliament from the Islamic party in the general election in April 1999 was sworn in at the Turkish Parliament with a headscarf which is against the regulation of the parliament. However, no sanction was provided therein for breaching the dress code in this regulation. It is widely accepted that wearing a headscarf in the parliament would be against the very foundation of a secular state. She subsequently obtained American citizenship as disclosed in the media without the permission of the Turkish government before the election. The basis of the decision was that as the government had removed her Turkish citizenship

128

Chapter Five

due to her obtaining US nationality without permission, her status as a member of parliament was going to be against the Constitution, since a prerequisite of being a member of parliament is to hold Turkish citizenship. Then by decision of the Council of Ministries, she lost her citizenship and this decision was published in the Official Gazette30. This case indicates that government can easily take advantage of the rules of migration for political purposes, interest and benefits. Fortunately, the concept of having “to acquire another country’s citizenship without permission” is not present in the New Act. This is because the government wants to encourage dual citizens to contribute towards the Turkish economy and keep them actively lobbying on behalf of Turkey. When we evaluate all these changes, we can say that the reasons of revocation of citizenship are reduced compared with the Old Act and currently, the revocation of citizenship is harder than the previous process under the Old Act. C. Marriage Loss of Turkish citizenship by marriage, as regulated under the Old Act is referenced in article 1931. As per this article, losing citizenship as incorporated in the Old Act for a married Turkish woman, who has acquired the foreign husband’s nationality, can leave Turkish citizenship through choice. Leaving Turkish nationality was possible only for women in the case of marriage. This provision was arguable since it was based on merely the traditional principle on unity of family, which requires that a wife should follow her husband and her freedom of choice should be ignored. This refers and leads to gender based discrimination and distinction. There are no provisions for losing Turkish citizenship based on marriage in the New Act, since marriage is no longer an option to relinquish citizenship. Therefore, Turks who married foreigners can acquire their spouses’ nationality on the one hand, and on the other hand hold Turkish nationality since the New Act accepts and encourages multiple and dual nationalities.

Conclusion The New Act combined with the European Convention on Nationality and some international conventions which Turkey has ratified, signed and executed. In this framework, because of Turkey's integration with the outside world and the parallelism with the effect of globalization, the conditions of acquiring citizenship are much easier than the Old Act.

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

129

Therefore, the New Act encourages acquiring Turkish citizenship and as a result, losing Turkish citizenship is much more difficult when compared with the Old Act. The provisions of the New Act favor citizens and there are no provisions regarding gender-based distinctions in the New Act any more. In general, the New Act has received positive reactions since it adopted dual citizenship clearly and reduced the reasons for revocation and no provision regarding expulsion exists. Although there are some deficiencies in many aspects it is a constructive improvement of Turkish Citizenship Law.

130

Chapter Five

Notes 1

For the official text of The Turkish Citizenship Act No. 403 (hereinafter referred to as “The Old Act”), see Official Gazette (hereinafter R.G.) February 22, 1964, No. 11638. 2 For the official text of The Turkish Citizenship Act No. 5901 (hereinafter referred to as “The New Act”), see R.G., June 12, 2009, No. 27256. 3 Hereinafter referred to as TOK. 4 These amendments were respectively made in May 13, 1981 Law No. 2383 (R.G., February 17, 1981, No. 17254); in April 20, 1989 Law No. 3540 (R.G., April 29, 1989, No. 20153); in May 27, 1992 Law No. 3808 (R.G., April 4, 1992, No. 21248); in June 1995 Law No. 4112 (R.G., June 6, 1995, No. 22311); June 4, 2003 Law No. 4866 (R.G., June 12, 2003, No. 25136) and in June 29, 2004 Law No. 5203 (R.G., July 6, 2001, No.25514). 5 For the official text of the 1982 Turkish Constitution R.G., November 9, 1982, No. 17863 (Reiterated). For an English version of the Constitution access this web site link: http://www.byegm.gov.tr/Content.aspx?s=tcotrot (Retrieved January 26, 2012). 6 Under Turkish Law, there is no need to have a bloodline relationship between a mother and a child. On the other hand, there needs to be a bloodline relationship between an extra marital relationship and the father. This can take place by marriage with the child’s mother or recognition of the child or through a judge’s decision (Turkish Civil Law, art. 282/2). 7 As per article 8, “A child born in Turkey, but acquiring no citizenship of any state by birth through his/her alien mother and father is a Turkish citizen from the moment of birth. A child found in Turkey is deemed born in Turkey unless otherwise proven”. 8 As per article 37, “Applications regarding the acquisition or loss of Turkish citizenship shall be made in Turkey to the governorship of place of residence, abroad to the overseas representative offices either personally or by power of attorney for using that right”. 9 As per article 18, “The determination of whether aliens who wish to acquire Turkish citizenship fulfill the conditions for application in accordance with Articles 11 and 16 shall be made by the citizenship application examination commissions formed in the provinces. The formation and the working principles of the commissions shall be prescribed by a by-law”. 10 This provision gives a wide and unlimited power to the competent authority. 11 Article 29 regulates to revocation of Turkish citizenship. For further information see infra Chapter V-A-2. 12 Article 34 regulates the losing citizenship by the right of choice. For further information see infra Chapter V-B. 13 Article 15 regulates how to calculate of residency of foreigners. As per this article, “For an alien, residence shall refer to residing in Turkey in conformity with the Turkish laws. An alien who applies for the acquisition of Turkish citizenship may stay abroad without exceeding six months within the residence

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

131

period required for the application for the application. The period spend abroad shall be evaluated within the residence period foreseen in this Law”. 14 Article 16; “Turkish citizenship shall not automatically be acquired by marriage with a Turkish citizen. Aliens who have been married to a Turkish citizen for at least three years and whose marriage still continues can apply for the acquisition of Turkish citizenship. The applicants shall fulfill the conditions mentioned below; a) living within the unity of marriage, b) abstaining from acts incompatible with the unity of marriage, c) having no quality constituting an obstacle in respect of national security and public order. In case the marriage ends by death of the spouse, who is a Turkish citizen, after the application has been lodged, the applicant shall not be required to fulfill the condition laid down in subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph. In case of the declaration of nullity of the marriage, aliens who acquired Turkish citizenship by marriage shall keep Turkish citizenship provided they had entered into marriage in good faith”. 15 R.G., April 6, 2010, No. 27544 (hereinafter referred to as “the Regulation”). 16 As per article 17, “A minor child adopted by a Turkish citizen can acquire Turkish citizenship from the date of adoption provided he/she has no quality constituting an obstacle in respect of national security and public order”. 17 As per article 27 “Turkish citizenship shall be lost when the renunciation document is handed over against signature to the person concerned. Records in the civil registration office of the persons who lost Turkish citizenship shall be closed and from the date of loss they shall be treated as aliens. Loss of Turkish citizenship of one of the spouses by obtaining a renunciation permit shall not affect the other spouse’s citizenship. In case of a request made by the mother or the father, who lost Turkish citizenship and of the consent of the other spouse, her/his children together shall also loss Turkish citizenship. In case of lack of consent, the action shall be taken according to the decision of a judge. Children of the mother and the father, who lost Turkish citizenship together by obtaining a renunciation permit, shall also loss Turkish citizenship. If loss of citizenship would render the children stateless, the provisions of this Article shall not be applied”. 18 Hereinafter referred to as “KKTC”. 19 As per article 42, “Citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, who apply for the acquisition of Turkish citizenship, shall acquire Turkish citizenship provided that they express in writing their wishes to become a Turkish citizen. The provisions of Article 11 shall be applied to the persons, who acquire the citizenship of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after birth”. 20 For further information see: Tiryakio÷lu 2006, pp. 4-7; Özkan, Tütüncübaú 2008, pp. 599-634; Gö÷er 1995, pp. 127-181. 21 For further information see: Sargn 2004, pp. 29-39. 22 Since the person is a Turkish citizen, whether the person is mature or not will be determined under the Turkish Civil Code. 23 As per article 28, “Those who had been Turkish citizens by birth but lost it by obtaining a renunciation permit and their children transacted with them shall

132

Chapter Five

continue to enjoy, without prejudice to the provisions relating to national security and public order, the rights accorded to the Turkish citizens other than those, which are the responsibility of military service, the right to vote and to be elected, the right to be employed in public office and the right to import exempted vehicles and household goods, provided that their acquired rights relating to social security are saved and they are subject to provisions of the relevant laws in the use of those rights”. For further information about previous article regarding renunciation of Turkish citizenship see: Aybay 2004, pp. 100-117. 24 As per this article, “Decisions regarding the acquisition or loss of Turkish citizenship shall be withdrawn whenever it is afterwards understood that they were granted either without legal conditions having been met or repetitiously”. 25 As per article 28, “Those who had been Turkish citizens by birth but lost it by obtaining a renunciation permit and their children transacted with them shall continue to enjoy, without prejudice to the provisions relating to national security and public order, the rights accorded to the Turkish citizens other than those, which are the responsibility of military service, the right to vote and to be elected, the right to be employed in public office and the right to import exempted vehicles and household goods, provided that their acquired rights relating to social security are saved and they are subject to provisions of the relevant laws in the use of those rights”. The first regulation about this issue was made in 1995 and a person who acquired another state’s citizenship can keep his original citizenship because of political reasons. However, Turkish citizens especially those living in Germany, tried to resist losing their original citizenship while acquiring some European countries’ citizenship. Also, Turkish citizens faced some political pressure and economic hardship because of leaving Turkish citizenship. Legislators considered this situation with respect to people and their children who acquired Turkish citizenship by birth, and then gave some rights to those people. The 1995 Regulation states the rights enjoyed by people with respect to Citizenship, however there were concerns with respect to this right. In the subsequent regulation the problem was solved with specific reference to the rights enjoyed. Except rights mentioned in article 28 which equates at the same level as the rights of Turkish citizens. For instance, people who do not have any limitation about acquiring immovable property. For this reason, such person may be designated with special status as a foreigner. In practice, after regulating in 1995, pink cards were given to those people, with effect to registration and all associated rights enjoyed with it. The name of this card had been changed by amendment and it is called “blue card” (Erdem 2010, p. 208). 26 As per article 26, “Those persons who have acquired their Turkish citizenship after [birth] and who are abroad and are involved in activities against the internal and external security of the Turkish Republic and in such a way that is considered by law to be a crime, against the economic and financial security of the Turkish Republic, or who are in the country and are involved in these kinds of activities and in any way whatsoever go abroad and for whom there is no possibility for public prosecution on this account, punishment to be applied, or sentence to be

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

133

executed, and who despite notification for them to return do not return to the country within one month may be expelled from citizenship”. 27 Article 35 was regulated the consequences and sanctions of expulsion. As per this article, “The assets in Turkey of persons who are expelled from citizenship in accordance with Art. 26 shall be liquidated by the Treasury and the proceeds therefrom shall be deposited in a national bank in their name and to their account. If these persons apply to the Council of State against the expulsion decision, the liquidation of their accounts shall be halted until the end of the case. Such person as these may come to Turkey on the condition that they not settle, and they comply with the general statutes of the law. Those who are expelled from citizenship may not acquire Turkish citizenship again in any way”. 28 Under the Old Act, these 3 reasons were as follows: 1. Those, who are abroad and without a valid excuse, do not respond to a regular procedural call up by an authorised office to do their regular military service, or on a declaration of war in Turkey, to participate in the defence of the nation, 2. Those who during mobilisation or who having joined up with their unit escape abroad and do not return within the legal period, 3. Those who, while performing their military service duty with members of the Armed Forces and finding themselves abroad on duty, on leave, for a change of scene or for medical treatment do not return within three months of the expiry of this period without a valid excuse. 29 For further information: Onar 1999, pp. 557-594. 30 R.G., May 16, 1999, No. 23697. 31 As per this article “A Turkish woman who marries an alien shall lose her citizenship in the event of her husband bestowing his citizenship upon her because of the marriage and the laws of her husband’s country and the woman declaring that she has chosen her husband’s citizenship in the way set out in Art. 42. If the woman acquires her husband’s citizenship by fulfilling the determined conditions, then her Turkish citizenship shall be lost as of that date”. Article 42 (Amended by Law number 4866 of date June 4, 2003) “Declarations mentioned in Art. 19 shall be put in writing, a) [...]during the marriage ceremony and submitted to the Turkish offices authorised to marry them, if the marriage is enacted before those offices; b) [...]to the competent Turkish offices with a registration of the marriage within a month of the commencement of the marriage, if the marriage is enacted before foreign officials authorised to marry them. The office that receives the declaration to be made in conformity with the first paragraph shall send it with the processed documents concerning the registration of the marriage to the relevant population office”.

134

Chapter Five

Bibliography Aybay, Rona. “øzin Alarak Türk Vatandaúl÷yla øliúkisi Kesilenlerin Türkiye’deki Haklar” (Some Rights for People who Lose their Turkish Citizenship through the Renunciation Process under the Turkish Law). TBB Review 52 (2004): pp. 100-117. —. Vatandaúlk Hukuku (Citizenship Law), 2nd ed. Istanbul: østanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yaynlar, 2006. Do÷an, Vahit. Türk Vatandaúlk Hukuku (Turkish Citizenship Law), 10th ed. Ankara: Seçkin Publisher, 2010. Erdem, B. Bahadr. Türk Vatandaúlk Hukuku (Turkish Citizenship Law), 1st ed. østanbul: Beta Publisher, 2010. European Convention on Nationality. Strasbourg, November 6, 1997. http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/166.htm (Retrieved January 10, 2012). Fiúek, Hicri. “øsviçre Tabiiyetinin øktibas ve Kayb Hakknda Federal Kanun—29 Eylül 1952” (Swiss Federal Act about Acquiring and Losing Citizenship September 29, 1952). AÜHFD 10 (1953): pp. 755769. Gö÷er, Erdo÷an. Türk Tabiiyet Hukuku (Turkish Citizenship Law). Ankara: Ankara University School of Law Publisher, 1972. —. “Çifte Vatandaúlk” (Double Citizenship). AÜHFD 44 (1995): pp. 127181. Güngör, Gülin. “Avrupa Vatandaúlk Sözleúmesi” (European Convention on Nationality). MHB 17-18 (1997-98): pp. 229-250. Nomer, Ergin. Türk Vatandaúlk Hukuku (Turkish Citizenship Law), 18th ed. østanbul: Filiz Publisher, 2010. Onar, Erdal and Tiryakio÷lu, Bilgin. 1982 Anayasasnda Milletvekilli÷i Vatandaúlk øliúkisi—Merve Safa Kavakç Olay (Relations between Citizenship and Member of Parliament under 1982 Constitution— Merve Safa Kavakç Case). Prof. Dr. Faruk Erem Arma÷an, TBB Publisher, 1999 (pp. 557-594). Özkan, Iúl and Tütüncübaú, U÷ur. “Türk ve Alman Hukukunda Çifte Vatandaúl÷a øliúkin Geliúmeler” (Recent Developments on Double Citizenship Issues in Turkish Citizenship Act and German Act). AÜHFD 57 (2008): pp. 599-634. Sargn, Fügen. “Türk Vatandaúl÷ Kanunu’nda De÷iúiklik Yapan 2003 tarihli ve 4866 Sayl Kanun Kapsamnda De÷erlendirme” (An Evalution under the Turkish Citizenship Act Amendment’s in 2003 No. 4866). AÜHFD 53 (2004): pp. 27-63.

Acquiring and Losing Turkish Citizenship

135

T.C. Basbakanlik Basin. “The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.” http://www.byegm.gov.tr/Content.aspx?s=tcotrot (Retrieved January 26, 2012). Tanrbilir, Feriha Bilge. “Avrupa Vatandaúlk Sözleúmesi ve Türk Hukuku” (European Convention on Nationality and Turkish Law). MHB 22 (2002): pp. 791-818. Tiryakio÷lu, Bilgin. “Multiple Citizenship and its Consequences in Turkish Law.” Ankara Law Review 3, 1 (2006): pp. 1-16.

CHAPTER SIX XENOPHOBIA, ALIENATION, HETEROTOPIAS AND CULTURAL LIMITS: FICTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF THE ATHENS PAKISTANI AND AFGHANI COMMUNITIES1 SOTIRIOS S. LIVAS

Introduction Writing in 19672, Michel Foucault defined heterotopias as places haunted by personal and/or collective imagination, as places standing out of the notion of place, as places of imaginative and mythological revendication of place. Heterotopias are the “other places”, where the imaginative or mythological reality comes in stark contrast to the “real” reality, or (in some cases) where the imaginative and the real are easily confused, where they blend together, losing their forms and their special identities. This second case could especially be held as true in places where reality is not defined in a concrete, strict, legalistic manner, where norms defining time, status and place are vague, fluid and ever-changing. This could also be held true in cases of people who exist, but are still considered literally as ghosts, as absentees by the organized system of this concrete place. The case in hand is the double heterotopia of Greece’s illegal Muslim immigrants (coming mainly from Afghanistan and Pakistan). I am referring here to a “double heterotopia”, because to the “heterotopia” of the immigrants, is added the disruptive regard of Greek society. The illegal immigrants are men and women who have no legal documents, therefore no legitimate standing in any western society. In some cases, they have renounced their country of origin, reminding us most acutely of Hannah Arendt’s “apatrides”. They came to a place where nobody recognizes them, where they stand as non-existing, a place that they did not choose (as we shall see, Greece is just the point of first entry to the European

138

Chapter Six

“paradise”), a bureaucratic limbo that does not decide and does not choose what it wants to do with them. Greek society, on the other side, has not even started to consider different models of toleration3, of integration, of incorporation. For both sides, the contact came as a shock, creating a heterotopia of imaginative reality, destined to persevere and evolve into an even bigger problem, if all the sides involved (and especially, Greek society and the Greek state) do not consider the reality as it really is. In any case, initial inertia and awkwardness have now, with Greece’s financial, political, social and moral crisis at its peak, given their place to despair and maybe even open hostility for both parts. This chapter intends to present the situation of illegal immigrants (and mainly of the Pakistani and Afghani illegal immigrants and asylumseekers) coming to Greece, in reference to the different kinds of borders they have to cross. In the last seven years, the number of illegal immigrants has increased at least ten-fold. The problems posed are many and multifarious. Data about immigrants in Greece, both legal and illegal, are scarce and sometimes unreliable and self-contradictory. The number of illegal immigrants can only be approximated; on the other hand, a concrete picture of the presence and the participation of the legal immigrants in Greek society and economy is yet difficult to shape, as for most the legalization process is still very recent. By 2004, the immigrant population (comprising legal and illegal immigrants) stood at around 900,000 individuals; this means a ratio of about 8.5% of the general population, of whom 700,000 were registered as legal. By adding the population of ethnic Greeks, who came (mainly from Albania) as immigrants (and can refer to their Greek origins), a number of about 1.15 million persons is reached – a ratio of 10.3% of the general population. Since 2004, the general immigrant population has considerably increased reaching 1.5 million persons, of whom 250,000 are illegal immigrants. As regards to citizenship procedures, Greece (together with most southern countries of EU, like Spain and Italy) follows the ius sanguinis pattern, in contrast to the ius localis system followed by other European countries, such as Germany. In general terms, Greek citizens are those who can prove the Greek nationality of one of their ancestors. There exists of course a process for the acquisition of citizenship rights by immigrants, but one which holds them in limbo for many years (six to seven is the normal period for a ruling). In these last ten years, the Greek state’s responses to citizenship petitions have been in the majority of the cases negative. Immigrants’ children, i.e. immigrants of a second generation, are thus refused citizenship in the country where they were born and which they rightly perceive as their homeland. Practically, this means that

Xenophobia, Alienation, Heterotopias and Cultural Limits

139

immigrant children risk after the age of 18 and in the absence of any legal documents, to be detained and deported to the country of their parents. In comparison, 45% of the 4.3 million Muslims living in Germany (the majority comes from Turkey and Bosnia) have a German passport and are legally, fully assimilated in the German society. New Greek legislation, introduced in November 2004, modified only slightly and in a timid way the citizenship procedures, but has been considered as extremely lax and permissive by Antonis Samaras, leader of the conservative opposition party, New Democracy (which is now part of the coalition government). Greece’s acute economic problems and its public debt crisis have exacerbated the problem, as job positions grow even scarcer, and financial opportunities and the levels of toleration of Greek society are dwindling.

Greece’s community of Muslim immigrants The Greek state as well as Greek society was totally unprepared for the mass immigrant inflow of the early 1990s. These immigrants, coming in the majority from Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Poland were lured by the high standards of living (in relation to their countries), the perceived perspectives for social mobility and a normal, peaceful existence. They were first engaged in agriculture and construction as salaried workers. Very soon they, especially the Albanians, who constitute the largest single immigrant community in Greece (800,000 in 2008, representing 70% of the total immigrant population), presented great skills of adaptability, learning the Greek language, getting to know the habits and customs of the people and assimilating in the general population. The first legalisation programme for illegal immigrants was initiated in 1997. Up until then, the Greek state tried to stop illegal immigration mainly by police measures and mass deportations and expulsions. The 6-month White Card was granted to almost 372,000 applicants, while its successor, the Green Card (valid for 1 to 3 years) was granted to 228,000 applicants. In 2001, there was another legalisation programme (again with lax procedures) for illegal immigrants, through which another 220,000 persons (out of 368,000 applicants) were legalised (Mediterranean Migration Observatory 2004, pp. 1-2). The third legalization program (2005-2006) drew 145,000 applications. Greek legalising procedure has always been arduous. Immigrants wishing to be provided with a permit of residence (whether issuing it for the first time or renewing it) had to deal with Greek bureaucracy as well as with various categories of mediators and agents. However most of the immigrants of the 1990s passed through this process.

140

Chapter Six

These immigrants can now be said to have gained a place in Greek economy and Greek society, overcoming state frontiers, everyday life micro-borders and cultural barriers. The process has not been without obstacles but in general, they seem to have acquired a viable position in Greece. The following points must be stressed with regard to the presence of these Balkan economic immigrants in Greece: first of all the importance of their participation in the economic growth of the country in the 90’s and the fact that they now constitute more than the 15% of the active workforce, second, their role in the sustenance of the Greek social security system and third the important role of immigrant children (and especially of Albanian descent) in the Greek primary and secondary education system. Foreign and immigrant schoolchildren constitute 13% of the total number of schoolchildren (Mediterranean Migration Observatory 2004, p. 4), with an even bigger proportion ratio in rural areas, abandoned by Greeks. The image of assimilation of this first community of immigrants of the 1990s clearly contradicts the image of the immigrants of the last five years. They mainly come as refugees from Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, although there now also exist sizeable communities of Kurds, Palestinians and Africans (mainly Somalis but also Sudanese, Nigerians, Gambians and from Sierra Leone). In sharp contrast to the Balkan economic immigrants of the first generation, these Middle Eastern, Asiatic and African immigrants are mainly refugees fleeing war, drought and devastation in their countries. Economic reasons also exist, as for example 20 million Afghanis have been registered in 2009 as living under the poverty line. They seem to be motivated more by day to day needs than by long term perspectives. Their exact numbers are hard to define, as is their nationality. According to estimates, there may be around 55,000 Pakistanis and 16,000-20,000 Bangladeshi. They have not chosen Greece as their final destination, as most would prefer to move on to other European countries, such as Germany, France, Great Britain, Norway or Sweden. They use, according to Frontex, the EU agency that coordinates border security with member states, Greece as their point of entrance in Europe. Under current EU rules, refugees may only apply for political asylum status in the first EU country they set foot in. For many illegal immigrants, Greece (as well as other southern European countries, such as Malta, Spain and Italy) is simply the country of the application for refugee status. The land-sea borders that separate Greece from the Turkish mainland are particularly porous. In its 2007 annual report, Frontex announced that Greece had declared a 170% increase on apprehensions of illegal

Xenophobia, Alienation, Heterotopias and Cultural Limits

141

immigrants crossing the Greek-Turkish borderline. For that year (2007), 9,300 had been arrested in their effort to pass to Greece. In 2009 (and for the months from January to August), the number increased to 69,845 illegal immigrants detained by the police and port authorities, a number representing a 45% increase in relation to the previous year (Kitsantonis 2007). 7,562 came from Iraq and 5,271 from Afghanistan. Many more immigrants attained their purpose without being arrested. In 2008, 146,000 illegal immigrants arrived, up from 112,000 in 2007 (The Economist, May 14, 2009). The rate of increase is even more impressive if we compare these data with the 45,000 illegal immigrants who arrived in 2004. Security problems for the Greek borderland can be easily attributed to the 14,900 kilometres (or 9,258 miles) of unprotected, solitary and poorly patrolled Mediterranean coastline and the country’s 3000 islands (many of them uninhabited). But of course there also exist other causes: while Spain and Italy managed to decrease the inflow of illegal immigrants between 2008 and 2009, by applying stricter border checks and via cooperation with the countries of origin of the immigrants (mainly with Senegal, Morocco and Libya), Greece has to face immigrants coming from countries torn apart from war, with power vacuums, like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Greece has lately also accused Turkey for not respecting a 2002 bilateral agreement of repatriation of illegal immigrants. It is characteristic that out of the 47,065 expulsion claims registered by Greece, only 2,013 have been accepted by Turkey. The whole situation has strained in an unexpected way relations between Greece and Turkey, with the Greek state threatening to revoke its support to Turkish demand for EU admission, if Turkey does not respect the return agreement. Greece has also accused Turkey of allowing international smuggling rings to operate freely. It is for the above reasons that Greece has repeatedly called for help from the European Union and especially for financial assistance, for Frontex patrols and for more pressure on the Turkish government. In the last three years, Frontex has literally assumed control of the task of supervision of the Thrace border situation. Plans for the construction of a fence and wall protection system limiting access to Greece’s mainland, have been delayed due to the economic crisis. Athens has, since the late ’70s, held a Muslim community mainly of Middle Eastern Arabs, coming from Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.4 They also came as salaried workers, but many moved up the social ladder to become employees, merchants and even self-employed entrepreneurs. Up until the 1990s the presence of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshi was restrained to a minimum of sailors and workers and the Afghanis were

142

Chapter Six

virtually non-existent. These Muslim economic immigrants have easily assimilated in Greek economic and social life, although there still exist serious cultural barriers. Yet again, their assimilation, their full participation in normal social life seems to exclude all easy Islamophobic and discriminatory arguments. As has become evident from related social and anthropological research, assimilation in a foreign, in our case, western society is not limited to a certain community or to persons affiliated to a certain religion or creed and does not depend upon common cultural traits. Assimilation is entirely dependent on time, needs, legal formulations and most of all conditions, particularly economic conditions (this also means availability of job opportunities). It should be noted at this point that, according to the “South European model of immigration” (King 2000, pp. 1-27) migration to Europe “corresponds to a particular type of small-scale enterprises” characterized by informal labour relationships (Cavounidis 2008, p. 43). This means that migrants, and particularly the illegal ones, work mainly as seasonal workers in the agriculture and construction domains. The informal character of their jobs means that they usually do not get paid well, that they usually do not have any kind of social security protection (health or pensions) and that they are not protected by the employment conditions legislation. The 2009 major economic crisis of Greece struck at an unprecedented scale the construction and public works realms and had as its result a huge unemployment ratio among the illegal migrants.

Greece’s community of Pakistani and Afghani refugees In recent years and especially after 2007, Greece was suddenly faced with the mass presence of Afghani and Pakistani illegal immigrants on its soil. We use the term “illegal” in the sense that these persons, usually refugees, running away from a situation of acute social, economic and political upheaval in their countries, have not had the chance to provide themselves with the necessary permits of entrance and residence. They usually try, in a clandestine way, to get inside a European country via mediators and smugglers, who charge exorbitant sums of money for their “services”. The tariff is between 3,000 and 13,000 USD per head (Buffard 2009). Their route is via Iran and Turkey, where they embark on tiny and often unpredictable vessels, with hundreds of people crammed into a space fit for a dozen. Still others resort to buying life-jackets and plastic rafts and trying to swim to the nearest Greek shore. The whole voyage is very risky and many do not reach their destinations. Only in 2009, forty eight illegal immigrants drowned trying to reach Greece. A still more dangerous route

Xenophobia, Alienation, Heterotopias and Cultural Limits

143

of entrance is through the mine fields of Evros land borders with Turkey. In the period between 1994 and 2008, 85 immigrants were killed and many more were maimed in the region. When detained by Greek officials, whether police or port authorities, they are first taken to the six reception facilities existing in the Greek islands of the Aegean Sea, Mytilini, Samos, Rhodes, Leros and Evia. These centres are now grossly overcrowded, causing concern to officials of the United Nations Human Rights Commission for the inhumane living conditions. After hundreds of illegal immigrants became seriously sick in mid-October 2008 by drinking polluted water in the Leros encampment, the charity organisation Medecins Sans Frontiers characterised the prevailing situation in these centres as a humanitarian crisis (Flynn 2008). Up until mid-2008, the lack of adequate temporary reception facilities was addressed by the immigrants being lodged in island hotels. After severe protests by the inhabitants, this measure was abandoned. Illegal immigrants are usually released after ten days with a one to three months period ahead to leave Greece and EU territory. Within this period, they can either apply for refugee or protected status and stay in Athens waiting or travel anywhere in Greece, apart from the ports of Patras and Igoumenitsa, which are prohibited areas. Nevertheless, most illegal immigrants try to sneak into these very cities, in their effort to move on to Italy. In 2008, 88,000 exit orders were issued for illegal immigrants. In reality, only 18,000 deportations were executed (The Economist, May 14, 2009). Out of these exit orders 21,735 were for the deportation of Afghanis (out of which only 28 were executed) and 3,664 for the deportation of Pakistanis (out of which 78 were executed). It is worth noting at this point that the number of intercepted Afghani illegal immigrants has increased on a ten-fold scale since 2001, climbing from 2,358 up to 25,577. At the same period, the number of detained Pakistanis increased from 1,843 to 5,512. Afghani and Pakistani illegal immigrants are always, since 2006, within the list of the main five nationalities of persons arrested for unauthorized entry, along with Algerians, Somalis and Palestinians. The illegal immigrants' presence is mostly perceived both by the Greek state and the majority of the Greek population as a grave social problem. The immigrants are usually seen as the emblematic aliens, as carriers of strange beliefs, linked to extreme, sometimes anti-western ideas. The problem is further complicated by their gathering together in certain underprivileged city areas, such as Aghios Panteleimonas of Athens, around the central Athens square of Omonia, Egaleo and the western

144

Chapter Six

precincts of Athens or in the areas near the harbour of Patras, where they seek protection from the authorities by staying with their kin in miserable, often squalid conditions in shanty towns (like the one in Patras, where 1300 Afghanis and 2,700 Africans, Pakistanis and Kurds still remain in an encampment) or in deplorable conditions in basements. The word “ghetto”, in a moment, became a stark reality. The municipalities, either of Athens or of Patras, cannot offer any kind of help to undocumented migrants due to legislative prohibitions. This creates a situation of abandonment in both encampments and city areas with heavy illegal immigrant concentration, with extremely poor sanitary conditions and want of fresh water. Especially as refers to the Patras encampment, doctors are non-existent, the city hospitals deny treatment and there is no access to proper medication.

The Greek state’s response The infrastructure for the detention of illegal immigrants and refugees is still limited to four reception areas, three of which are near Athens and one in the greater Thessaloniki area. These reception areas can together accommodate no more than one thousand five hundred persons. But according to Greek authorities, only in 2008, more than 146,500 immigrants crossed the borders (Buffard 2009). In several cases (as on December 20, 2004) (Lambropoulou 2004), the Greek police has been accused for its brutality and its abusive behaviour against illegal immigrants. Amnesty International has many times (for example, on December 15, 2004) looked on cases of alleged brutal behaviour and accusations of police torture, claiming that Greece has repeatedly breached the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees guidelines on Detention of Asylum Seekers, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (Amnesty International UK 2008). There were also accusations by the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner over what has been perceived as the general Greek policy of criminalising the illegal entry of the immigrants (Kitsantonis 2008) and an extremely negative report by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment published on February 8, 2008 (Amnesty International UK 2008). In February 2008 Norway, Sweden, Germany and Iceland stopped returning illegal immigrants to Greece, due to poor conditions of detention and what is perceived as an unjust way of examining the asylum applications. Their decision reverses the standard procedure (under the

Xenophobia, Alienation, Heterotopias and Cultural Limits

145

Dublin II regulation adopted on February 18, 2003) of returning the illegal immigrants to the country which was the point of entrance in EU ground and is characteristic of the way these countries judge the criteria and legal guarantees of the Greek asylum granting procedure (Amnesty International UK 2008). This decision was issued after a recommendation by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres: No country should return detained illegal immigrants to Greece. In 2007, the European Commission initiated a procedure against Greece for the infringement of the Dublin II regulation, under which the country which receives illegal immigrants after their expulsion by a third European country has to process their asylum applications in a prompt and swift manner. On April 19, 2007 Greece was found guilty by the European Court of Justice for failing to fully implement Council Directive 2003/9/EC of January 27, 2003 which defined the minimum legal standards for the detention of the asylum-seekers. The Greek state was also recently penalised for its lack of competent interpreters and for not providing substantial legal aid to the applicants of refugee status. The official government policy is to discourage immigrants from staying. In 2005 (after the third regularisation law was passed) it stopped granting temporary residence permits and has often since reiterated its decision of not initiating another legalising process for the illegal immigrants. Since 2006 the government has simply renewed residence permits and granted new permits for family reunification reasons only. Thus, the illegal immigrants’ only chance to remain on European ground is to apply for political asylum and refugee status under the 1951 United Nations Geneva Convention regulations, a status that would instantly guarantee a five-year residence and work permit. But out of 20,692 asylum applications submitted in 2007, only eight were initially approved by the Greek state with 132 more approved after appeal. The approved asylum applications represent less than 0.7% of the total number of applications (Hawaleshka 2008) as against a European Union average of 26.4% of approvals. The 2004 ratio was 0.9% and the 2003 was 0.6%. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees figures, Greece has the lowest recognition of refugees’ rates in the European Union, in stark contrast to countries like Sweden, which processed the most refugee asylum claims in Europe, accepting most of them. It is characteristic that no Iraqi applying for refugee status has ever achieved his recognition in Greece. On the other hand, applicants can only very rarely prove that they come from war-torn countries or from countries under oppressive regimes, as they do not have (and that is only understandable) any kind of relevant

146

Chapter Six

legal documents. Many economic immigrants like the Bangladeshi, claim to be Iraqis or Palestinians or Afghanis, so that they can apply for political asylum status (Kitsantonis 2007). The problem is exacerbated by the total absence of specialised interpreters and area studies experts. The asylum procedure is long (often taking up to six years for an decision), arduous and as we have already seen mostly in vain. Illegal immigrants applying for asylum are said to have paid three and four thousand euros to mediators, policemen and lawyers for a swifter and more successful processing of their application. On June 1, 2009 between 36,000 and 40,000 applications were pending. Another reason for criticising the Greek asylum system is that the whole procedure, in the absence of a specialised independent authority, is controlled by the police, who have not had up until now any kind of relative prior experience. The need for the creation of an independent supreme body for decisions on asylum petitions was stressed on a March 29, 2006 Council of Europe report. In this report (as in others), the need for tests to assess the age of young immigrants and of whether they belong to the protected category of minors—immigrants was also stressed. Theoretically, at least, an unaccompanied minor seeking international protection must automatically be placed under special humanitarian status. The Greek state has endorsed, by its Legislative Decree 25/2008 a relative EU regulation. In practice, application of the Decree is yet to be seen. On the other hand, the Greek state feels it is unjustly reprimanded for its perceived inability to move to swifter and more rational legalising procedures. Greece is fourth in asylum requests in the EU, after Sweden, France and Great Britain but receives less EU refugee funding than the other countries. Protection of the elongated and especially unprotected Greek borderline with Turkey needs funding, specialised expertise and the application of an EU-centralised policy. After its election, the Greek government of Georgios Papandreou tried to reverse the situation, amending the legislative framework to a more liberal direction. Unfortunately, bureaucratic inertia together with the severe financial crisis hindered the relative initiatives. In some cases, like the granting of right to vote (and election) to all immigrants for the municipal elections, these measures simply backfired (the relative law was annulled by a High Court decision). Afghanis and Pakistanis are among the nationalities of illegal migrants that have the most asylum applications. In 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 and 2011 Pakistanis were first in the relative list.

Xenophobia, Alienation, Heterotopias and Cultural Limits

147

Greek society’s response According to data forwarded by the Greek Observatory against Racism and Xenophobia, incidents of racist violence have increased by 147.6% in 2007. Violent incidents against refugees have increased by 175% in the same year. These data are official in the sense that they are the ones for which charges have been brought in the presence of the competent authorities. The real numbers must be even bigger. The majority of Greek society, on the other hand, feels in danger. Nobody of course can deny that there do exist real security problems: some of the illegal immigrants, in their desperate striving for a living, become pawns in the game of illegal traders (for example, in the drugs business), who in most of the cases are the same who are responsible for their clandestine entrance. Community differences often escalate to brutal and even lethal brawls: in late August 2008, 11 Africans were severely injured in such an incident in down-town Athens. Afghanis and Somalis often (as in mid-October 2008) fight between themselves in Patras for the control of the passage of trucks for Italy and Western Europe. Such incidents usually take on, by the helping hand of the media, a sanguinary image of internecine wars of savages. Greeks living in residential areas with heavy immigrant population deplore their fate, accusing the police and the Greek state for its inability to control developments and usually after a while prefer to abandon their rented homes. Tension between illegal immigrants and residents of city areas like Aghios Panteleimonas in Athens or between the immigrants and truck drivers and inhabitants in Patras has been constantly increasing in recent years. Afghan and Pakistani immigrants began arriving in the area around Aghios Panteleimonas square of Athens in 2005. They soon created a residential nucleus, although their living conditions were very often desperate. Police efforts to normalise the situation led to clashes and unrest in the area. In May 2009 there were again skirmishes between policemen and illegal immigrants who had occupied a former court building in central Athens. The situation was further complicated by the presence of extreme-right and extreme-left protesters. In September 2008 and yet again, in March 2009, there were clashes between Afghan refugees and riot police in Patras. The September 2008 incident was sparked off by the port police’s beating of three immigrants trying to get inside the port. On March 2, 2009 an Afghan was seriously injured while trying to board a truck entering the port. This led to extensive disturbances in Patras. The situation in Patras will continue to be explosive. It has been estimated that up to 1.000 persons try every day

148

Chapter Six

illegally to board trucks on their way to the port and Italy, hiding under tyres or in containers, in risk of their lives (Buffard 2009). Port authorities cannot inspect all of the 300 trucks which board the ferries for the Italian ports of Brindisi and Ancona every day (Mac Con Uladh 2008). On February 2008, there were again clashes between illegal immigrants and the police, when the latter tried to evict the Afghani asylum-seekers from their makeshift houses in Patras. A significant proportion of the Pakistani and Afghani illegal immigrants are unattended children, as young as nine years old. They cannot be deported or jailed but there is also no hope (or very little one) of their being legalised and of their continuing their lives in a normal way. The precarious legal situation of these immigrants and their staying in limbo for a long time excludes any thought for a normal professional, social and economic life. Most illegal immigrants (and mainly the Pakistanis and Afghanis) live virtually on the streets, scraping a living as small-time vendors, cleaners, waiters, workers and salaried land workers. They do not have any kind of stability, medical support or social security. The large majority is male and young in age, although the number of women and small children is increasing. The situation of children is especially alarming, as in March 2008 the United Nations Greek Office asked for immediate support for the 400 children scattered without any help all around the city of Patras. The recent severe socio-economic crisis in Greece led not only to the deterioration of the illegal immigrants’ predicament but also to the acute polarization of Greek society’s stance. The Greek state’s inertia leaves space for the action of the ultra-right organization Golden Dawn. Golden Dawn militia men act as guards at the Aghios Panteleimonas square, harassing foreigners. In one special occasion (after the assault, robbery and death of an innocent by passer by two Afghanis), a real pogrom was set up, a pogrom which led to the death of one person. Several others were hospitalised.

The cultural borders As has already been noted, cultural barriers are the final limits separating the immigrants from a normal life in the host country. In relation to the Muslim immigrants, both legal and illegal, these cultural borders are mainly related to the absence of a normal ritualistic life. Athens, which currently hosts a Muslim population of more than 250,000, may be the only European capital without a mosque and an Islamic cemetery. Apart from western Thrace, no Greek city has a mosque

Xenophobia, Alienation, Heterotopias and Cultural Limits

149

and an Islamic cemetery. The foundation of a mosque and a Muslim cultural centre has been the object not only of negotiations and agreements between Greece and several Muslim countries (with prominent between them Saudi Arabia, which had, on several occasions, also promised to bear the relevant cost) but also of concrete legislative regulations. Due to different reasons (for example, objections of political and religious groups and of the Church, economic insufficiency, inadequacy of chosen locations, judiciary prohibitions) the mosque has not yet been built. In 2011, all relative administrative branches agreed upon the site of the future mosque (at an ex-naval base in a former industrial area of central Athens) and decided to start its construction. It should be noted that original plans have now largely been moderated. We are now talking about a mediumscale mosque without a minaret. Lack of an authorised, official mosque is substituted by the immigrants’ creation of illegal mosques in warehouses and basements in residential areas with a heavy Muslim population. There are about 55 such unacquainted for places in Athens alone. These self-improvised mosques (which are presented as cultural centres) are usually organised by Muslims according to their place of residence or according to their nationality. For example, there are five such mosques for Pakistanis and five for Bangladeshis. The local community resumes the responsibility of running in an everyday basis the mosque and choosing an elder, with an adequate knowledge of the Koranic scripture, as the leader of prayer. Practically there exists no control of the safety and sanitary conditions at these mosques. There was recently a case of a bomb attack against such a mosque in down-town Athens, which fortunately did not claim any victims. Lack of official control also means that nobody can be certain about the exact scope and field of the Friday sermons and the Islamic direction that is given at these mosques to young, disenchanted and often angry individuals, nor about the connection between these mosques and embassies of Muslim countries. It should however be noted that in general terms, the Muslim population both in Athens as well as all over the country has not presented any signs of extremist behaviour or any inclination towards zealot ideologies. The lack of an Islamic cemetery poses an even more serious problem, as according to Muslim tradition the dead must be buried, at the latest, a day after death. Muslims are obliged to send their deceased either to Thrace, almost 600 kilometres away from Athens, or by plane to their homelands in the Middle East. Both solutions are costly and impractical. A law has recently been passed decreeing as site of the Muslim cemetery a

150

Chapter Six

location near Athens (at Schisto), but again this solution seems to have become stuck in a quagmire due to bureaucratic and judiciary problems. One should also refer to the violent, late May 2009, protests of the Muslim community of Athens, after reports that a policeman had torn down and stepped on an illegal immigrant’s pocket Koran. Although the situation very quickly returned to normal, after the intervention of the leaders of the community, one should be prepared for the worst in a similar situation in the future. The traditional prayers for the end of the feast of Ramadan took on, in September 2010, an unexpected turn, when the leaders of the Muslim community decided to celebrate them at the centre of Athens, in front of the premises of the University of Athens, the National Academy and the National Library. What was seen as a public display of Muslim aggressiveness, arrogance and hostility (Muslim community leaders only deplored the lack of an official mosque), drew angry criticism by even moderate Greeks. The celebration of the end of Ramadan for 2011 was held in a much more conservative style.

Recent developments: Greece’s economic crisis As could be expected, the country’s debt crisis that led to a major political, social, economic and even moral crisis has had its repercussions on the migrant community. Many migrants from European countries (most of them legal) decided to return to their countries of origin. The reason was not only the social and political upheaval, the deterioration of public services and the huge insecurity for the country’ s future but also the lack of job opportunities, mainly in the informal sector of the economy (construction, seasonal agricultural jobs). Afghani and Pakistani migrants do not usually have this possibility, as their flight from their shattered countries was not a choice and in some cases it did not only have as its origin the search for a better life. Due to the lack of data, we do not know how many (if any) Afghanis and Pakistanis have decided to return to their countries. Economic crisis and desperation have also led to more everyday criminality. Police plans as well as urban change programs have been abandoned and large parts of down-town Athens have literally been turned into ghettos.

Xenophobia, Alienation, Heterotopias and Cultural Limits

151

Conclusions A thorough analysis of the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the illegal immigrants passing the Greek and EU borders has to be made. This analysis should take under its consideration the gender, age, place of birth, profession and education traits of the immigrants. The community of the Muslim immigrants must also be examined by criteria of its religious inclinations, religious steadfastness and possible heterodoxies. Experts at area studies and languages of these communities must be trained so they can offer assistance to the members of these communities. Conditions of living must improve and the procedures of asylum-granting and legalization must be rationalized. A new Citizenship Code must be introduced, modifying citizenship modalities for the second generation immigrants (Delithanasi 2009, p. 8). While taking into account security precautions and adopting stricter border controls, new more humane conditions for the detention of the asylum-seekers must at any cost be guaranteed. The creation of ghettos must be avoided and minors must be looked after. Above all, the Athens Muslim community must at last be able to live a normal ritualistic life, with an authorised mosque and a cemetery. This is a precondition for the termination of their feeling of alienation and would mean the beginning of a new era for the community.

The need for further research In recent years, Greek researchers from different domains have turned their interest on Greece’s migrant community, mainly focusing on the social and economic parameters of the migrants’ intermingling with Greek society. There are also works focusing on legal matters and matters of human rights (K. Tsistselikis is a well-known Greek researcher specializing on similar matters). The scope is huge and much is needed to be done. A work such as Inan Ullah Lengari’ s paper: Pakistani immigrants in Greece: from changing pattern of migration to Diaspora politics and transnationalism should be emulated as it offers a much needed anthropological treatise, that combines field research and analysis of the patterns of migration. The country’s economic and social crisis has broadened the whole concept of relative research. It is to be hoped that further research will be able to offer a fair description of the life of the community of Afghani and Pakistani illegal migrants after the crisis.

152

Chapter Six

Notes 1

A first draft of the present was presented at the BRISMES Conference, Manchester, June 2009. 2 “Des éspaces autres”, 1967. 3 For different models of toleration, see for example: Bican Sahin and Nezahat Altuntas. “Between Enlightened Exclusion and Conscientious Inclusion: Tolerating the Muslims in Germany.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 29, 1 (March 2009): pp. 27-41. 4 According to the 2001 population census data, edited by the National Statistical Service of Greece, in 2001, there were 7448 Egyptians (representing 1% of foreign nationalities), 6936 Iraqis (0.9%) and 5552 (0.7%) in Greece. The numbers, of course, are only indicative.

Xenophobia, Alienation, Heterotopias and Cultural Limits

153

Bibliography Amnesty International UK, 2008. www.amnesty.org.uk (Retrieved December 23, 2004, February 28, 2008). Buffard, Anne Laure. “Afghan Refugees Stuck at Europe’s Door.” The Washington Times, May 4, 2009. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/04/afghan-refugeesstuck-on-threshold-of-europe/?page=all (Retrieved March 18, 2013). Cavounidis, Jennifer. “New Elements of Greek Policies Concerning Irregular Migrants: The Policy of Regularization of Unauthorized Migrants.” In: Vardan Gevorgyan, Jennifer Cavounidis and Irina Ivakhnyuk (eds.), Policies on Irregular Migrants. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, Migration Collection (2008), p. 43. Cholewinski, Ryszard. Irregular Migrants: Access to Minimum Social Rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2005. Christopoulos, Dimitris and Pavlou, Miltos. Ǿ ǼȜȜȐįĮ IJȘȢ ȝİIJĮȞȐıIJİȣıȘȢ (Immigration Greece). Athens: Kritiki, 2006. De Tapia, Stéphane. The Euro-Mediterranean Migration System. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2008. Delithanasi, Maria. “Suggestions for a New Citizenship Code.” Kathimerini 27133 (March 25, 2009): p. 8. Flynn, Daniel. “Humanitarian Crisis at Greek Migrant Camp.” Reuters, July 28, 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/28/idUSL8641636 (Retrieved March 20, 2013). Gevorgyan, Vardan; Cavounidis, Jennifer and Ivakhnyuk, Irina. Policies on Irregular Migrants, Vol. 2. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, Migration Collection, 2008. Hatziprokopiou, Panos Arion. Globalization, Migration and SocioEconomic Change in Contemporary Greece: Processes of Social Incorporation of Balkan Immigrants in Greece. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2006. Hawaleshka, Danylo. “Afghan Refugees Despair in Greece.” Al Jazeera English, July 13, 2008. http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2008/07/200871175414558663.html (Retrieved March 18, 2013). King, Russell. “Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration.” In: Russell King, Gabriella Lazaridis and Charalambis Tsardanidis (eds.), Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe. London: Macmillan (2000), pp. 1-27.

154

Chapter Six

Kitsantonis, Niki. “Greece Struggles to Curb Influx of Illegal Immigrants.” The New York Times, October 4, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/world/europe/04ihtmigrate.4.7756077.html?_r=0 (Retrieved April 12, 2013). —. “A Rising Tide of Migrants Unsettles Athens.” The New York Times, October 2, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/world/europe/02ihtgreece.4.16650775.html?_r=0 (Retrieved February 18, 2013). Lambert, Hélène. The Position of Aliens in Relation to the European Convention on Human Rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2006. Lambropoulou, Elinda. “Greek Police Officers ‘Tortured Afghans’.” The Independent, December 24, 2004. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/greek-policeofficers-tortured-afghans-6155422.html (Retrieved March 18, 2013). Mac Con Uladh, Damian. “Patra, Migration Bottleneck.” Athens News 13316, December 5, 2008. http://www.athensnews.gr/old_issue/13316/18761 (Retrieved March 18, 2013). Marvakis, Athanasios; Parsanoglou, Dimitris and Pavlou, Miltos. ȂİIJĮȞȐıIJİȢ ıIJȘȞ ǼȜȜȐįĮ (Immigrants in Greece). Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2001. Mediterranean Migration Observatory—Migration Policy Institute. Statistical Data on Immigrants in Greece. Final Report, November 15, 2004. Nielsen, Jørgen. Yearbook of Muslims in Europe. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009-2010. Sahin, Bican and Nezahat, Altuntas. “Between Enlightened Exclusion and Conscientious Inclusion: Tolerating the Muslims in Germany.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 29, 1 (March 2009): pp. 27-41. The Economist. “Greece and Immigration: Fear and Loathing in Athens.” The Economist, May 14, 2009. http://www.economist.com/node/13652874 (Retrieved March 15, 2013). Tsitselikis, Kostas. “The Legal Status of Islam in Greece.” Die Welt des Islams 44, 3 (2004): pp. 402-431. Zanfrini, Laura and Winfried, Kluth. Policies on Irregular Migrants, Vol. 1. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2008.

SECTION THREE: CITIZENSHIP AND SECOND GENERATION NETWORKS

CHAPTER SEVEN ARAB DIASPORAS IN THE UK: YEMENI CITIZENSHIP STILL IN TRANSITION? KHAWLAH AHMED

Introduction Due to the social, economic and political unrest in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, many individuals from here have emigrated to the West, especially the US and the UK (Syed 2006; UN DESA 2006). But history shows that emigration to the UK is not new to Arabs and dates back many centuries (Ermes 2002). The longest established Muslim minority to settle in the UK was the Yemeni Arabs. Today there are about five hundred thousand Arabs of which eighty thousand are Yemenis. Research shows that the Arab community as a whole, despite its extensive contributions to the UK society, is still seemingly invisible or hidden (Halliday 1992; Al-Rasheed 1996, pp. 206220; Ermes 2002). Much of the literature on Arabs in the UK make assertions that they still do not consider themselves as residents, but as guests in their host country and continue to maintain a myth of returning home (Bishtawi 1999; Nagel 2001, pp. 381-400; Nagel 2002, pp. 258-287; Al-Jalili 2004). This chapter examines whether these assertions still hold true in regard to the Yemeni Arabs’ citizenship in the UK. It presents the experiences of new wave Yemeni female immigrants’ integration into UK society, showing that the UK has become home for these females. They have been able to successfully integrate and still maintain a sense of identity and connection to their native Yemeni culture and homeland.

Immigration, Arabs and the UK: a brief introduction In recent history immigration and immigrants have been associated with the movement of individuals from poor under developed countries to the

158

Chapter Seven

more developed and economically powerful countries in the West. The diasporic communities consequently created controversy and debate on many social, economic and political levels (Syed 2006; Somerville, Sriskandarajah, Latorre 2009). Issues ranging from racism, assimilation, integration and citizenship, to cultural impacts of policies, laws and regulations have, and continue to be, topics of concern for governments and of interest for research and academia (Brown 1995; Syed 2006; Voicu 2009, pp. 71-86). At the beginning of the 21st century such issues are still of major interest and concern as many from the less developed countries still continue to migrate to more developed ones. The MENA region has been, and continues to be, an important source of immigrants to the West (UN DESA 2006). Currently, there are about five million Arabs in Europe alone (IOM 2010). Recent revolutions that are toppling many of the governments in this area are creating more instability in already unstable lands; these forecast more waves of immigration to hit the shores of these Western countries. With them, many anticipate a resurgence of old challenges and concerns and new ones befitting modern times, for both the immigrants and their host countries. Based on this assumption many governments in the West, though they may be officially supporting “attempts to make democracy emerge” in this MENA region, are unofficially providing “sufficient economic incentive to hold off a wave of Arab migration… described by the apocalyptically minded as ‘biblical’”, to their countries (Vinocur 2011, para. 1-4). As mentioned above, immigration from the Arab world to the UK is not a new phenomenon. History shows that Arabs have a long standing connection with the UK, further back than most people know. Ermes (2002) shows that this connection dates back to the 8th century when minted coins with the words “There is no God but Allah and Mohammad is His Messenger” in Arabic writing were found that declared King Offah of Meria’s Islamic orientation during his reign in Britain. Ermes states that the ancestors of today’s Arabs set foot on the UK shores before the Romans did, to mine and export metal like aluminium from places like Cornwall. Centuries later, when Britain became part of the Roman Empire, the author explains that it was ruled by a few Roman Emperors of Syrian and Libyan Arab descent and that Arab archers were brought in by the Romans establishing a town now known as South Shields (Al-Jalili 2004). More recently, the 19th century witnessed many new immigrants into the UK and in far greater numbers than at any other previous time. One of the reasons that made the UK a destination for Arabs was its colonization of many parts of the Arab and Islamic world (Ermes 2002; Salamandra

Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition?

159

2003). Some of the first Arabs to settle in the England were the Yemenis who “form the longest-established Muslim group in Britain” (BBC Religions, September 7, 2009, para. 10). Yemeni Arab seamen, called Lascars, began coming into Britain as early as the 1800s with the British Merchant Navy to places like Cardiff, South Wales, and Liverpool when Aden, the South of Yemen, came under British rule (McRoy 2000). These sailor communities later moved to the steel and engineering industries at companies such as Sheffield’s Firth Brown and Dunford Hadfields (Yemenis in the Spotlight 2007, para. 9) after World War II, and became part of the immigrant labour force in Britain's industrial cities and of industrial workers in areas such as Sheffield, Birmingham and Manchester (McRoy 2000). The 1950s saw more immigrants from the Arab World moving into western countries such as America, Britain and other European countries due to the political unrest in these areas (Bishtawi 1999; Ermes 2002). Large scale Arab immigration into the UK began after 1945 (with Palestinians, Egyptians, Sudanese, and Moroccans in the 1960s) and continued with many others into the 1990s, for professional advancement, a better life, or due to political repression in their home countries (Al-Jalili 2004). With the beginning of the 20th century in the UK, acts such as the 1905 Aliens Act, “institutionalized the idea that immigrants alone were responsible for the rapidly deteriorating conditions” of that time and were later followed by the 1914 Aliens Restriction Act and the Defence of the Realm Act which “laid down strict guidelines for local police and military authorities in their treatment of ‘aliens’” (Brown 1995, para. 12). Immigration to the UK today “is larger and more diverse than at any point in its history” with not only immigrants pouring in from the underdeveloped countries but “Since 2004, immigration levels have been boosted by an extraordinary wave of mobility from Eastern European countries” as well (Somerville, Sriskandarajah, Latorre 2009, para. 5). With these new waves of immigrants, as Somerville, Sriskandarajah, and Latorre (2009) explain, “Public anxiety about immigration, fuelled by media attention, has risen in parallel to the numbers” with policies to manage migration such as the “Points-Based System for Migration”, the “zero net immigration” and laws being enacted ranging from those in 1962, 1968, and 1971, to the implementation of concepts like “multiculturalism” and moving to “integration” and “The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006” (Somerville, Sriskandarajah, Latorre 2009, para. 2-5). Arabs in the UK, as well as elsewhere, have been placed in a predicament because of their being associated with Islam, Muslims, and therefore terrorism by the political rhetoric and the media. Today there are about 2.4

160

Chapter Seven

million Muslims in the UK, according to the UK Labour Force Survey, and they may as Somerville, Sriskandarajah, and Latorre explain, “be an exception to the UK policies movement from multiculturalism towards a ‘shared values’” (Somerville, Sriskandarajah, Latorre 2009, para. 5). Though this move, as they explain, “does not indicate a wholesale regression to the acculturation overtures of a previous generation” it is not “simply rhetorical, as the implementation of equality measures makes clear… much of the increased attention falls explicitly under the heading of preventing extremism”

and so “The reframing of Muslim integration as a security issue may have implications for incorporation outcomes in the future” (Somerville, Sriskandarajah, Latorre 2009, para. 2-5). Arabs living in the UK are bound to have felt and continue to feel the repercussions of these policies and the backlash of the media at one time or another. But no matter what the case may be, politics, coupled with economic and social instability in their homelands, have been major factors contributing to the immigration of these individuals to Western countries and Britain was, and continues to be, one of their major destinations.

Current challenges and future needs of the Arab diaspora in the UK With such a long standing history of their being in the UK, Yemenis, like their Arab counterparts, remain as a minority community that is described as “invisible” (Halliday 1992; Ermes 2002). Their invisibility, whether in the UK or the West in general, is somewhat reflected in the confusion that many have as to who they actually are and where they come from. A great deal of literature, the media and political rhetoric tend to use the term “Arab” and many times Muslim, to lump people who may be as different as the geographic regions they come from. Vertovec (2007) shows that even within the country of origin data, “within any particular population from a given country, there will be important distinctions with reference to ethnicity, religious affiliation and practice, regional and local identities in places of origin, class and social status, kinship, clan or tribal affiliation, political parties and movements, and other criteria of collective belonging” (Vertovec 2007, p. 4).

Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition?

161

When referring to Yemeni and or British Arabs in general, the complexity is intensified. In addition to their being diverse in the sense described above, their diversity becomes more complex when we start to look at the burgeoning second generation who are sometimes of mixed heritage (McRoy 2000) and are made up of Arab as well as Irish, Welsh or English origin, making up a new breed with a “hybrid British-Arab identity” (AlJalili 2004). Today, it is hard to believe, as Ermes (2002) explains, that this community of immense intellectual and financial input to the British society “is invisible”. There are, as he explains, “about 500 thousand, of which 300 thousand work in London alone, with approximately 200 banks and financial institutions with 150 billion worth of investments and over 10 billion worth of business input to the British society and up to ten daily newspapers and weekly magazines, plus about five satellite and radio station. Not to mention tens of thousands of medical doctors, engineers, professors, academics, writers, poets, film makers, artists… finance experts, political analysts, social experts and voluntary workers, etc.” (Ermes 2002, para. 1).

But their invisibility does not seem to be in the lack of numbers or input to the UK society. One challenge this diasporic minority in the UK is encountering is its lack of identification as a group. For one, it does not even have a census category, which according to Modood (1994, pp. 8796), is a social text, and the categories contained within it are the products of collective struggles over the status, rights and identities of particular groups. Though some, like Al-Rasheed (1996, pp. 206-220), maintain that Arabs are represented in the category of “other-other”, the British Arabs, according to Nagel (2001, pp. 381-400), are dispersed in different categories, such as that of “Black”, “White” and “Other” while other minorities, such as those from Bangladesh, who are less in number have census categories. This exclusion of Arabs from dominant narrative of “race”, as Nagel (2001, pp. 381-400) says, creates an ambiguity of Arabness in discourses of cultural difference and results in their not fitting into publicly recognized categories of diversity and cultural difference. She explains that “while they have not been constructed as a ‘problem’ and a ‘ghettoized’ minority, Arabs are not, by default, ideologically ‘assimilated’ into the white, English ‘mainstream’. Instead, they are, as she says, understood in public discourse to be a foreign element in Britain, an unsettled group of dubious character which is not part of British society and, indeed, is fundamentally inimical to it” (Nagel 2001, p. 387).

162

Chapter Seven

Nagel cites Said (1978) who has shown that Arabs and Arabness have had an important place as the “Other” since the 18th century. She explains that due to their middle-class status and their small numbers in comparison to the Asian and Caribbean groups, “Arab settlement has not aroused alarm or scrutiny on the part of policymakers or academics (Nagel 2001, p. 388). But while they are not present in race relations politics or in academic studies of ‘race’ and immigration in Britain” (Nagel 2001, p. 389).

She says, they are not absent from “radicalized discourses… [and] despite the emergence of a third generation of settled British Arabs, they appear more as foreigners than as minorities” (Nagel 2001, p. 389).

Another challenge for the Arabs is not just that they lack identification as a group, they are also not seemingly unified as a community. And, the Arab media, as Salamandra (2003) explains, has developed new notions of Arabism and new platforms for local disputes and rivalries. In addition they bring their political affiliations with them from their native homelands to their host countries in the west. In the case of Yemeni Arabs, this has caused “disarray to the community… [d]ivisions, confrontation and lack of trust” which has caused a great deal of “loss to the wellbeing of the community” all over the UK because “instead of concentrating of [on] the capacity building and development of the community, substantial efforts and money is spent on building political alliances and corrosion of the reputation, integrity and prosperity”

of these individuals (Al-Masyabi 2000, para. 7-8). Maybe unification is something that is not to be thought of at this stage, as Bishtawi (1999) explains, and the thoughts of unity need to be postponed until they are achieved in the Arab World. In all cases, Arabs need to make their mark in Britain as a community rather than just individual attainment, as McRoy (2000) asserts. This needs to be done especially in politics where there are no Arab Parliamentarians and few local councillors, as he maintains. Badawi, (as cited in Nussibeh 2000) explains that “it is up to them to effect this change” and that “they cannot continue acting as the guest to a host nation” because they “offer a positive contribution to the British economy” and “need to define their

Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition?

163

interests and assert themselves in the existing political structure, in order to change it” (Nussibeh 2000, para. 6-7). To become visible in a positive manner, they need to deal with the media. They are currently negatively portrayed and sometimes demonized by the media. Poole (2000) believes that the “Current debates regarding the representation of Islam in the media suggest that Islam is demonized and distorted by the West… Political Islam, which has emerged out of different experiences of colonialism and oppression, has allowed the West to construct Islam as the new enemy—a global force which represents an ideological and physical threat based on a historically polarized relationship. This, it is argued, has been necessary for the West to both reassert its power over an economically rich area and in doing so defend its supreme Western identity. Consequently, the media, as a hegemonic instrument, demonizes Islam, portraying it as a threat to Western interests, thus reproducing and sustaining the ideology necessary to subjugate Muslims both internationally and domestically” (Poole 2000, para. 1).

She explains that the few writers on Islam’s media image “attempted to examine the issue by systematic empirical rather than rhetorical means, providing mainly selective, anecdotal evidence for their claims” (Poole 2000, para. 3). She argues that “Factors impinging on the process of representation must include, for example, the processes of news production in Britain, the ownership and political affiliations of media institutions and cannot simply be attributed to a historical relationship of confrontation or Western oppression” (Poole 2000, para. 3).

So as it stands today, the Arab community has to address such issues and challenges and work collectively to take the necessary steps to move them forward into positive visibility in UK society. One of the smaller communities that make up this larger Arab community is that of Yemenis of which very little is known about in the West today.

Descendants of an ancient civilization Very little research on globalization and transmigration, other than that which deals with their demographic makeup, has addressed the Arab diasporic communities in the West, especially the Yemenis. Very little is known about these people who are considered as the forefathers of all the Arabs. Interestingly, relocation and immigration has been part of their

164

Chapter Seven

history. With the destruction of the Marib Dam its people migrated to the Arabian Peninsula, and established new settlements, and communities that still exist today. Yemen, though the least represented Middle Eastern country, is to a large extent, one of the most important countries in the Middle East in terms of history and geography. Dating back to the first millennium BC, it is known as the cradle of Arab origin and one of the oldest and most powerful civilizations in history. It is honoured by being mentioned several times in the Quran (the Holy Book of Muslims), with a Surah (chapter) dedicated to its name, and several hadiths (narrations) by the Prophet Mohammad that praise its people for their wisdom and strong faith. Geographically, this country once covered the entire southern part of the Arabian Peninsula, with one of its major cities, Sana, founded by Noah's eldest son, Sam. It was ruled during King Solomon’s time by one of the most powerful female Queens, Bilquis, the Queen of Saba, or Sheba as many in the west refer to it, and had a strategic position as the centre of one of the most important trade routes. Indeed, it still has one of the most important trade and shipping ports in the area. This strategic position is one of the reasons why Aden, part of this “Arabian Felix” or “Happy Arabia” as the Romans referred to it, came under British rule. The descendants of this civilization, and their integration into UK society today, is one of the issues this chapter addresses. The first Yemeni immigrants, like many of their Arab counterparts who emigrated to the UK, were men who, as Halliday (1992) explains, mainly left their families in search of a job to achieve some kind of financial security for them as well as their families back home. Halliday explains that they tended to live in communal houses, kept to themselves, and did not integrate with their new communities, except for the few necessities, which meant that they did not learn much of the English language or integrate into English society. Even their identity, as Halliday shows, seems to have been a mystery to the British people in the past and seem to continue to be so today. Halliday explains that since their arrival they have been referred to by various names such as lascars, coloureds, blacks, negroes, and Arabs. Today the original small community of a few hundred men of Yemeni origin is now estimated to have grown to no less than eighty thousand (BBC Religions, September 7, 2009). Since they were one of the first communities to settle in the UK, do they still consider themselves as “guests” and “foreigners” in their host countries in the beginning of the 21st century with their “citizenship” still “in transition”? Or, have globalization and transnationalism had an effect on the way the Yemeni community currently positions itself in the UK society?

Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition?

165

Perspectives from new wave Yemeni immigrants The research presented in this chapter is part of a large scale study that explores how members from new immigrant waves from the Middle East, in particular the Yemeni community, are attempting to fit into their new societies in the West and how they are integrating or being integrated into UK society. The data is collected from a survey and interviews of ten new wave immigrant females currently studying in undergraduate and graduate level universities in London. The young women who participated were either born in the UK or emigrated to it at an early age. Their ages range between nineteen and twenty nine. For the purpose of cultural considerations and convenience, only females were chosen, since the researcher, who is also female, would not have any problems getting in touch and contacting them whereas it may still be considered inappropriate if males were involved. For reasons of anonymity, pseudonyms are used to refer to the participants. The questions dealt with the demographics as well as the personal perspectives that addressed issues of identity and what is considered as home, the challenges, if any, they have faced, and the concession they have had to make in, for example, life style and social behaviour, to see how they see themselves and how they are balancing their lives in the UK society as young Yemeni women coming from a strong cultural background.

Connecting and communicating: living in both worlds One of the questions asked in the study related to their connections with their countries. For the larger study, the aim is to see if there are any connections, the type of connections and the consequences, if any, of such connections. For this study it is to see if they still maintain some connection to their homelands and see which of the two countries they identify with. The question aimed to examine the effects that maybe globalization and transnationalism may have had on this group of individuals. Results show that they all maintain very strong connections to their homelands. Mira says, “We call all the time and keep in touch with the family there… especially with the problems back there [referring to the revolution in Yemen in which many are trying to overthrow the current government]… on Skype mostly”.

Whether on a weekly or sometimes daily basis, the participants all kept in touch with those “back home” by making telephone calls or “skyping”.

166

Chapter Seven

They also maintained strong relations through as Alia says, “visit[s] every summer” because of relatives left behind. For Alia her “grandparents are still there” and “my aunty lives there with her kids”. For Maryam whose “grandparents on both sides still live in Hadramout” she explains, that she “always call[s] them”. In addition, “I have been back to Yemen once, and they have been here five times”. Sameera, whose grandparents, father and mother in-law and older brother still live in Yemen, says “I usually visit every year once”. Fardoos, though she “calls every week” still “feel[s] it is not enough”. She says she does not have “much connection” and “wish[es] it was more”. Calls and visits are not the only way these participants keep in touch with their native land of Yemen, there are many other factors in the UK that are remnant of home whether they are in the form of traditions still being followed, language being taught, or cultural artefacts such as “food” and “clothes”. Mira says, “[W]e are more Yemeni than those Yemenis in Yemen. At home it’s like you’re in Yemen [She spoke about Yemeni ornaments, clothing, furniture and food]. When you come into our house, you feel that you stepped back to Yemen. [Smiling she says] sometimes you feel that you’re in the village”.

Laila says, “I still eat Yemeni food and wear Yemeni clothes”. Khulood makes it a point to explain that “I buy Yemeni food from shops here and keep close to the Yemeni people. It reminds me of Yemen”.

Finding a balance and making efforts to fit in When talking about immigrants and diasporic communities we associate them with challenges being encountered, concessions being made that one would never think of making in the native lands, members of communities stripped of their “nativeness”, and the assimilationist and acculturation policies being in full force with all the issues that accompany them from racism to marginalization of these groups. When asked about challenges or concessions, it is worth noting that the participants’ reactions were not what was expected based on the literature read. Maryam says that she had not had any challenges nor had she had to make any concessions. She says “I have adapted especially after I married my husband. I got used to have an English mother-in-law. I still have my Muslim culture and some British

Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition?

167

and Yemeni culture. Maybe I can say that my kids are learning some Yemeni culture from me, my husband tells them about his Welsh heritage so there is a balance.”

Sameera explains that “[there are] not many alhamdulilah [thank God]. Life is easy I live in a community full of Yemenis and Arabs. It’s easy really.” What was described as challenges were mainly related to the pace of life and differences in life styles and dress code. Fardoos says, “I find England lonely. Everybody doing their own thing and nobody is nice. Life is too busy and nobody wants to talk to anyone [...] I do not wear my niqaab [face veil] anymore because I go to university. I find it hard to make male friends.”

Alia explains, “I have grown up here and there are not many difficulties in fitting in with the environment… I probably have language issues… I can express myself better in English than Arabic but we have a good Yemeni community in England.”

Saadiya compares being in Yemen and in the UK. She says: “[I don’t have] many problems [nor did she have to make] any concession [being in the UK], but maybe in Yemen as a woman I was treated kindly… in the bus or shops. But here when I go on the bus I have to stand up and nobody gives me a seat… But I miss the weddings in Taiz and just the food. It [being in the UK] has not changed me much. [she explains that] It would be good if England had universities for women only that way I would feel more comfortable.”

Sameera who works as a nurse, begins by saying that “Even at work as a nurse, I like it”. But she wears the nurse uniform, which is “a short dress,” explains “That is hard because I wear the abaya and so I have to adapt. But I can still wear my hijab which is good.” Khulood explains that “Wearing the hijab is very hard for me because I like to wear it big and long; and here it is hard. My eating patterns changes, it is cold here so I cannot go out as much as possible like in Yemen. It is not very hard [being in a British university] for me because even in Yemen I went to university so the environment is not so new to me.”

168

Chapter Seven

Though these issues that dealt with their religion, such as the hijab and the “short dress” that the nurses had to wear, and the “un-comfort” that some may have felt whether it was in university and making friends, or on the job, these young ladies like those in Zaal, Salah, and Fine’s (Zaal, Salah, Fine 2007, pp. 164-177) study on young Muslim women in the US, seemed to “refus[e] to be pigeon holed as either ‘oppressed’ or ‘liberated’ [and] drew rich and colourful commitments to faith, family, community, and self” (Zaal, Salah, Fine 2007, p. 168). They tend to refer to these issues as more of inconveniences that could be worked out and not in terms of a host society enforcing their dress code […] etc., as maybe others who want to go on the bandwagon of racism […] etc. could have interpreted such issues.

A merging of identities Identity was a one of the topics examined. One of the questions directly addressed the identity issue asking them, “How do you identity yourself?” Seven of those interviewed identified themselves as “British Yemeni”. Two saw themselves as still being mainly more “Yemeni”, than British though they were born in the UK, and one described herself as “a British Muslim Yemeni” which seemed to combine all that she identified with. These females showed resemblance to those in Zaal et al. study in that they too “demonstrated with great variation the malleable identities they chose” (Zaal, Salah, Fine 2007, p. 168). It is interesting to see that two of those born in the UK identified themselves as Yemeni rather than British. This strong sense of Yemeni identity, combined with their British one, does not just seem to be due to their strong connections with Yemen and the Yemeni culture because they come from there. If this was the case, one would have expected that the two who identified themselves as being Yemeni to have been born or come from Yemen. It seems that the UK society is conducive to maintaining their culture, and as in the case of the two participants above, has actually helped embed in them a native culture that they have not experienced in their native land but rather in the UK. In London, where these girls are from, a Yemeni PhD student who helped me find the participants in this study explained, “Parents have the opportunity to put their children into single-sex schools and most do. It is very rare to find that they attend mixed schools. [in terms of the type of education provided even in the public schools, topics] such as “sex education” which is taught from an early as 6 years old, this is a point of contention with even non-Arab families, but they segregate the classes in some schools when they show these videos etc. [...] Religious

Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition?

169

education is offered where kids learn about other religions. But in high school they can opt to take Islamic education, just like it’s possible to take Judaism or Christianity. The Islamic studies syllabus is checked by Muslims so most of it is accurate and it’s good because it allows students to compare and contrast Islamic morals with for example Jewish or Christian ones, so it fosters tolerance.”

For the Muslims of this community, there are 126 full-time Muslim schools in England according to the Department for Education and Skills (Muslim Schools 2011) and there are about 100,000 UK youngsters attending Islamic institutions (BBC News, May 17, 2007).

Conclusion Research shows that there are differences between old and new diasporic communities (Glick Schiller et al. 1995, pp. 48-63; Clifford 1999, pp. 215251; Brubaker 2005, pp. 1-19). With globalization and transnationalism this research shows that immigrants today, as Salamandra (Salamandra 2002, pp. 1470-2266) succinctly puts it, forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. Globalization, as Jaffar-Kutcher (2006) explains, has significantly altered the circumstances of immigrants in comparison to their predecessors and the nature of their social networks. This, she says, has led to new immigrants being able to maintain stronger ties to their country of origin and therefore they are more likely to maintain an affinity to their home country and less likely to feel the pressure to assimilate. From the results of this study, that is seemingly the case. If one is to compare, for example, the way the first wave generation kept in touch with their countries and how they may have identified themselves in their UK societies one would be bound to see an extreme difference. For one thing, communication for previous wave immigrants from Yemen was a barrier and many found themselves having to save years before they could go back home or wait months to be able to talk to a loved one back home. For the first generation, they were rarely in touch with their families except through letters that took months to get to their destination, especially in the remote villages such as those in the outskirts of Taiz, and Tihama. Mail was delivered though friends or acquaintances, or expatriates that have returned home for a visit, and only a decade ago, had to travel to the major cities to make a phone call. Today villagers, who may not be able to read or write, carry mobile phones and can answer and call their loved ones anywhere in the world. Those ‘early wayfarers’, as Syed (Syed 2006, p. 71) described the first generation Arabs, who were quick to return to their

170

Chapter Seven

homes once they accumulated sufficient wealth, are not present in today’s world. They also do not seem to have the problems that the second wave immigrants who, as Sayed describes, though they were highly educated professionals, were still isolated geographically and socially from their UK society. It seems that this society described by these females does not portray the symptoms it once did. For their predecessors, the UK society may have prevented them from engaging with the larger society (Halliday 1992) and made it easy for the British society to view them as foreign and as a “parasitic entity” (Syed 2006, p. 60). As Syed explains, the UK has “few opportunities for flexing the integrationist element of typical immigrant-host discourse… [and] As such culturalist symptoms described in enclaves persist until today despite the passing of multiple generations of British Muslims” (Syed 2006, p. 60).

He also explains that many policies may also be pushing “Muslims back into their enclaves” and leading them to “downward social mobility”, and that the new generation is struggling with integration and identity issues. Though this study does not support such claims, maybe a larger study with more participants and more in-depth interviews may show that to be the case. What this small study did show was that the Arab community is resilient. It shows that while the previous wave immigrants experienced isolation whether by force or through the enclaves and social networks made, which led to their “citizenship” being in “transition”, and keeping a distance from the rest of the British society, as the literature shows, the experiences of the new wave immigrants seem somewhat different. The young ladies in this study seem quite involved with both their native as well as new homelands. As well as being connected to the native lands, they seem to be adapting comfortably in their new homes, attending universities, working in hospitals, and even marrying native British men. They may still be considered as guests by the government and the consensus which does not give them a tangible place/category in the UK society, but they are actively taking part in their societies. While their ancestors may have maintained the “myth” of going back home, for the participants in this study, the concept does not seem to exist, and they see the UK as home, though they are still affiliated with Yemen. Whether it be the Yemeni culture that has been imbedded in them, or because of their strong connections, though thousands of miles away, they do not feel that they are isolated or separated from their native homeland.

Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition?

171

If in the past the Arab’s invisibility, and specifically that of the Yemenis that Halliday (1992) explains, may have been enforced on them due to racism, today it seems that their invisibility may only be due to lack of unification as a community and lack of political power and representation. The lack of involvement on these levels, may have led to their being marginalized and with the aid of today’s media, even demonized. This study seemed to support research by Nagel (2001, 2002, 2004) which shows that Arabs tend to see themselves as members of multiple communities, valued their adopted lands, felt a sense of duty and responsibility towards them and wanted to give back to their societies. But she also says that many in her study suggested that integration hinged on wider acceptance of Arabs and Arabness, as well as of Muslims, which could only be achieved by changing wider public attitude towards and perceptions of the Arab world and Islam and accordingly described integration not as the minority conforming to the majority, but as mutual accommodation and respect between different groups. Though one may consider the point that Ermes (2002) put forth which explains that Arabs come from a distinctive community based on a deep residue of subtlety in language, social and cultural values and ethics based mainly on religious teachings. He explains that individuals who come from lands in the Middle East that were birth places of religions and civilizations which have contributed significantly to humanity and have a very rich history, will naturally feel “protective” of their history, for themselves and for all humanity, and may not want to give it up. But what this study has shown is that these young ladies have not been prevented from having this sense of pride, belonging and affiliation. The degrees and ways in which today’s migrants maintain identities, activities and connections, linking them with communities outside Britain are, according to Vertovec (2007), unprecedented, and transnational practices among immigrants in Britain are highly diverse. She explains that many migrants develop and maintain strong modes of community cohesion, but the strongest senses of cohesion or belonging may still remain with others in a homeland or outside Britain. However, Vertovec (2007) says, and I as an individual who has multiple homelands agree, this needn’t mean they are not becoming integrated in UK society. Belonging, loyalty and sense of attachment, she explains, are not parts of a zero sumgame based on a single place. That is, she asserts, the “more transnational” a person is does not automatically mean the “less integrated” he or she is, and the “less integrated” one is does not necessarily prompt or strengthen “more transnational” patterns of association.

172

Chapter Seven

Bibliography Al-Jalili, Ismail. “Arab Population in the UK: Study for Consideration of Inclusion of ‘Arab’ as an Ethnic Group on Future Census Returns”, 2004. http://www.naba.org.uk/CONTENT/TheAssociation/Reports/ araabPopUK_04.htm (Retrieved November 20, 2011). Al-Masyabi, Mohammad. “The Yemeni Community in the UK”, 2000. http://www.naba.org.uk/CONTENT/articles/Diaspora/yemeni_commu nity.htm (Retrieved June 15, 2011). Al-Rasheed, Madawi. “The other-others: Hidden Arabs?” In: Ceri Peach (ed.), Ethnicity in the 1991 Census. London: HMSO (1996), pp. 206220. BBC News. “Is Islam compatible with the West?” BBC News, September 15, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4204820.stm (Retrieved February 20, 2013). —. “Q & A: Muslim Schools.” BBC News, February 7, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/6338219.stm (Retrieved February 20, 2013). —. “Imams to give Citizenship Lessons.” BBC News, May 17, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/6665317.stm (Retrieved February 15, 2012). BBC Religions. “History of Islam in the UK.” BBC Religions, September 7, 2009. http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/uk_1.shtml (Retrieved November 20, 2011). Bishtawi, Adel. “The Arab Community in Britain: The Absent Presence”, 1999. http://www.bishtawi.com/research/arabs_in-britain_uk.html (Retrieved June 7, 2012). Brown, Ruth. “Racism and Immigration in Britain.” International Socialism Journal 68, 1995. http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj68/brown.htm (Retrieved November 2, 2012). Brubaker, Rogers. “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, 1 (2005): pp. 1-19. Clifford, James. “Diasporas.” In: Stephen Vertovec (ed.), Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing (1999), pp. 215-251. Demographics of Yemen. http://securitymiddleeast.com/articles/read/yemen-demographics-200909-29 (Retrieved June 22, 2011). Ermes, Ali Omar. “Invisibility of the Arab Community in Britain”, 2002.

Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition?

173

http://www.aliomarermes.co.uk/resources/view_article.cfm?article_id= 10 (Retrieved March 20, 2013). Glick Schiller, Nina; Basch, Linda and Szanton Blanc, Cristina. “From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration.” Anthropological Quarterly 68, 1 (1995): pp. 48-63. Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3317464 (Retrieved February 4, 2013). Halliday, Fred. Arabs in Exile: Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain. London: Tauris, 1992. ICD Report. “The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in the Promotion of Human Rights”, 2011. http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/culturaldiplomacynews/content/pdf/ Cultural_Diplomacy_Outlook_Report_2011_-_09-01.pdf (Retrieved January 9, 2013). IOM (International Organization for Migration). “Intra-Regional Labour Mobility in the Arab World.” Cairo, 2010. http://egypt.iom.int (Retrieved May 6, 2012). McRoy, Anthony. “The British Arab”, 2000. http://www.naba.org.uk/content/articles/diaspora/british_arabs.htm (Retrieved October 20, 2012). Modood, Tariq. “The End of Hegemony: The Concept of ‘Black’ and British Asians.” In: John Rex and Beatrice Drury (eds.), Ethnic Mobilization in a Multicultural Europe. Aldershott: Avebury (1994), pp. 87-96. Muslim Schools. “Department for Education and Skills”, 2011. www.http://news.co.uk (Retrieved February 14, 2013). Nagel, Caroline. “Hidden Minorities and the Politics of ‘Race’: The Case of British Arab Activists in London.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27, 3 (2001): pp. 381-400. —. “Constructing Difference and Sameness: The Politics of Assimilation in London’s Arab Communities.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25, 2 (2002): pp. 258-287. —. “Skilled Migration in Global Cities from ‘other’ Perspectives: British, Arab, Identity Politics and Local Embeddedness.” Geoform 36, 2 (2004): pp. 971-987. Nusseibeh, Lana. “Diaspora Arab”, 2000. http://www.naba.org.uk/CONTENT/articles/articles/Diaspora/diaspora _arab_badawi.htm (Retrieved November 15, 2011). Poole, Elizabeth. “Media Representation and British Muslims.” Dialogue Magazine, April 2000. http://www.albab.com/media/articles/poole0005.htm (Retrieved April

174

Chapter Seven

3, 2011). Salamandra, Christa. “Globalization and Cultural Mediation: The Construction of Arabia in London.” Global Networks 2, 4 (2002): pp. 1470-2266. —. “London’s Arab Media and the Construction of Arabness.” Transnational Broadcasting Studies Journal 10, 2003. http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Spring03/salamandra.html (Retrieved May 6, 2012). Searle, Kevin. “From Farms to Foundries: An Arab Community in Industrial Britain.” Oral History Review 38, 1 (2011): pp. 249-251. Somerville, Will; Sriskandarajah, Dhananjayan and Latorre, Maria. “United Kingdom: A Reluctant Country of Immigration.” Migration Information Source, 2009. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=736 (Retrieved December 2, 2013). Syed, Farhan. Integration and Isolation: A Comparative Study of Immigrant Muslims in the United States and the United Kingdom. A thesis presented to The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 2006. Teaching Citizenship in Higher Education. “Context of UK Immigration Policy.” University of Southampton, 2007. http://www.soton.ac.uk/citizened/activities/making_citizens/task_1_co ntext.html (Retrieved February 5, 2013). UN DESA. International Migration in the Arab Region. UN Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, May 15-17, 2006. US Department of State. “U.S. Relations with Yemen”, 2012. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35836.htm (Retrieved June 10, 2012). Vertovec, Steven. “New Complexities of Cohesion in Britain: Superdiversity, Transnationalism and Civil-integration.” Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007. http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/Reports/Vert ovec%20-%20new_complexities_of_cohesion_in_britain.pdf (Retrieved May 6, 2012). Vinocur, John. “Issue of Arab Spring Migrants to Cast Shadow on G-8 Talks.” The New York Times, May 16, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/world/europe/17ihtpoliticus17.html (Retrieved April 5, 2012). Voicu, Anca. “Immigration and Integration Policies in UK.” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 9, 2 (2009): pp. 71-86. Whitaker, Brian. “Arabs in Exile: Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain.” The

Arab Diasporas in the UK: Yemeni Citizenship still in Transition?

175

Guardian, December 8, 1992. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/gdn6.htm (Retrieved June 15, 2011). Yemenis in the spotlight. Sheffield Telegraph, September 21, 2007. http://www.sheffieldtelegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/yemenis_in_spotlight_1_ 442504.htm (Retrieved May 15, 2011). Zaal, Mayida; Salah, Tahani and Fine, Michelle. “The Weight of the Hyphen: Freedom, Fusion and Responsibility embodied by Young Muslim Women during a Time of Surveillance.” Applied Development Science 11, 3 (2007): pp. 164-177.

CHAPTER EIGHT MUSLIM SOCIETY TRONDHEIM: THE DIALECTICS OF ISLAMIC DOCTRINE, INTEGRATION POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES ULRIKA MÅRTENSSON

Introduction This paper explores the interactions in the Norwegian city of Trondheim between an Islamic organisation, the Church, and a couple of public institutions, with reference to European Union integration policy, Norwegian integration policy and Islamic doctrine. The main findings are that the interactions correspond to EU and Norwegian dialogue policy; enable members of the Islamic organisation to exercise active citizenship; and promote feelings of “community” between Muslims and nonMuslims. In particular, the Church has played a key role for the Muslim participants’ feelings of belonging, recognition, and for enabling the active citizenship that their specific Islamic creed encourages.

European social inclusion policy Since the late 1990s multicultural European countries have moved towards a policy of “civic integration” which obliges all citizens to identify with liberal democracy and liberal values, and to actively exercise their civil rights through participation in society and political life (Joppke 2004, pp. 237-257; Entzinger 2003, pp. 59-86; 2006, pp. 121-144). The reasons behind civic integration are complex. By the late 1990s it was evident that some cultural groups, often of Muslim religious identity, were socially and politically excluded and Islamic extremism had become a security concern. Much political deliberation over a perceived need to abandon

178

Chapter Eight

multiculturalism has thus focused on Muslims’ and their presumed illiberal values and reluctance to integrate (Entzinger 2006, pp. 121-144). However, as the case of the Netherlands shows, “second generation” Dutch Muslims largely share the values of other young Dutch people and participate actively in society, while their families are often marginalized and identify more strongly with their countries of origins than with the Netherlands (Entzinger 2006, pp. 121-144; Verkaaik 2010, pp. 69-82). The reason for their marginalization is not “Muslim values” but Dutch multiculturalism and its concept of religious communities as separate “pillars” of society, which often run publicly funded schools for its own children. Dutch Muslims were initially encouraged to form an Islamic “pillar”, in relative isolation from the others. The Dutch situation suggests to Han Entzinger that multiculturalism needs to be combined with active participation, like in Canada. Civic integration could achieve this, if it can steer away from the tendency that is currently dominating Dutch public debate, i.e. to identify only Dutch-ness with liberal democracy and understand liberal democracy in ways which exclude cultural diversity (Entzinger 2003, pp. 59-86; 2006, pp. 121-144). Since 2000 the EU has prioritised “social cohesion”, i.e. promoting “common aims and objectives, social order, social solidarity and the sense of place attachment” (Letki 2008, p. 99; Malloy, Gazzola 2006, p. 9). The Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention (DIDCP) adopted in 2003 by the European Ministers of Cultural Affairs states that social cohesion presupposes recognition of cultural diversity and equal opportunities for members of all cultural groups (DIDCP 2003; see also Klausen 2005, pp. 72-75). The aim is an “intercultural society model” based on “the principle of equality between cultures, the value of cultural heterogeneity and the constructive dimension of dialogue and of peace. Differences and divisions must not therefore be viewed as harmful and obstructive to the devising of a collective project which requires differences to be taken into account and otherness to be respected. Cultural diversity is synonymous with exchange and enables autarky, which leads to isolation and xenophobia, to be combated” (DIDCP 2003, p. 10).

The limit to cultural diversity is the European Convention on Human Rights and dialogue is the method recommended to deliberate culture in relation to human rights (DIDCP 2003, pp. 4, 9-11). In line with DIDCP the EU, also in 2003, adopted The Common Basic Principles (CBP) which define integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation between immigrants/minorities and residents/majority (CBP 2003). The

Muslim Society Trondheim

179

CBP thus distributes responsibility for social inclusion evenly between immigrants and the general public. Some Islamic organisations have adjusted to CBP and DIDCP, notably the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE) with headquarters in Brussels. Its Charter from 2000 describes Muslim European citizenship in the following terms: “Muslims of Europe respect the laws of the land and the authorities that uphold them. This should not prevent them from individually or collectively defending their rights and expressing their opinions based on their specific concerns as a religious community or on any general matter that concerns them as citizens. Whenever there is a conflict with regard to certain laws and matters that are specific to religion, the relevant authorities should be approached in order to arrive at suitable and viable solutions. […] As European citizens, Muslims of Europe consider it their duty to work for the common good of society. Their endeavour for the common good is as important as defending their rights. Finally, an authentic understanding of Islam requires of Muslims to be active and productive citizens who are useful to society. Muslims of Europe are urged to integrate positively in their respective societies, on the basis of a harmonious balance between preservation of Muslim identity and the duties of citizenship. Any form of integration that fails to recognise the right of Muslims to preserve their Islamic personality and the right to perform their religious obligations does not serve the interests of Muslims nor the European societies to which they belong. Muslims of Europe are encouraged to participate in the political process as active citizens. Real citizenship includes political engagement, from casting one’s vote to taking part in political institutions. This will be facilitated if these institutions open up to all members and sections of society, an opening up which takes into account competence and ideas. Muslims of Europe emphasise their respect for pluralism and the religious and philosophical diversity of the multicultural societies they live in. They believe that Islam affirms the diversity and differences that exists between people and is not discomforted by this multicultural reality. Rather, Islam calls for members of society to appreciate and enrich one another through their differences” (FIOE 2011).

In line with the principle that Muslims respect the laws of the land, FIOE in 1997 established the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), a scholarly body which adapts Sharia to national law. FIOE thus aspires to provide a framework for European Muslims’ civic integration.

180

Chapter Eight

Norwegian official dialogue Norway is not an EU member state but is signatory to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen Agreement, and participant in the EU’s Europe 2020 strategy for economic growth, sustainability and social inclusion (European Union/External Action 2011). Since the 1970s integration understood as mutual accommodation has been the lead concept concerning social inclusion of immigrants. While multiculturalism was sometimes used to refer to the reality of cultural diversity, it has never been practiced in the sense of letting cultural groups live as they wish, which is incompatible with Norway’s interventionist welfare state and social engineering spirit. Nevertheless, public political use of the concept integration has changed, similarly to the Dutch case. In the 1970s and 1980s immigrants’ right to cultural difference dominated integration discourse but since the late 1990s immigrants and their descendants are criticised for not participating in society even though integration is going well. A major force behind the change is the anti-immigrant Progress Party (Hagelund 2002, pp. 401415). Dialogue has been practiced in Norway since 1993 when the national Contact Group for dialogue between the Church of Norway and the Islamic Council of Norway (IRN) was established. The Church of Norway is a Lutheran state church, and IRN is a national Islamic umbrella organisation. Some of IRN’s most active members, such as al-Rabita mosque in Oslo, are officially affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and FIOE. In 1996 the Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities (STL) was established as a dialogue initiative by Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and the secular Humanist Association. STL has an international wing called the Oslo Coalition on Freedom of Religion or Belief. The Contact Group has also committed the Church and IRN to freedom of religion and the freedom to leave religion, as expressed in a joint declaration in 2007 (Leirvik 2011, pp. 125-146; Den Norske Kirke 2007), which emphasises that freedom of and from religion is as much a Christian as a Muslim responsibility. The Contact Group became publicly known through the “Cartoon Crisis”. In 2005 the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad which sparked an international conflict.1 In 2006 Vebjørn Selbekk, editor of the Norwegian right-wing Christian journal Magazinet, reprinted the Danish cartoons claiming that Muslims needed to learn the value of freedom of expression (Leirvik 2010, 2011, pp. 125-146). However, there are reasons to doubt Selbekk’s sincerity. In

Muslim Society Trondheim

181

2004 he defended Norway’s blasphemy law against a parliament motion to abolish it, which was backed by the Church (Kapelrud 2008, p. 67); the blasphemy paragraph was eventually abolished in 2009. When Selbekk reprinted the Danish cartoons the Contact Group worked hard to stave off conflict.2 IRN and 46 imams affiliated with it advised Muslims not to rally in mass demonstrations (Leirvik 2011, pp. 125-146). The Contact Group concluded that freedom of expression includes any offended party’s right to express offence and ask for an apology, not for the offender’s exercise of his right to free speech, but for the offence this caused (Forum 2010, p. 6). IRN thus invited Selbekk to dialogue, and contacts were made with Bjarne Håkon Hanssen, minister of labour and social inclusion, who arranged a press conference with Vebjørn Selbekk and Mohammed Hamdan, head of IRN, at the state department, thus signalling to the public that the government took the issue seriously. IRN asked for an apology from Selbekk and Selbekk responded: “The right thing for me to do today is to acknowledge that in my role as editor I never fully understood how hurtful the publication of the facsimile was. Today I regret this. […] The Muslim milieu in Norway has tackled this in a dignified and restrained manner. You deserve respect and praise for that. […] In other countries the situation is completely different. Generally many Muslims experience that their everyday life has become more difficult. Now it is more important than ever that we all firmly say no to discrimination of people because of religious or ethnic background” (DN 2006).

Mohammed Hamdan responded by quoting the Prophet Muhammad saying that every human being can make a mistake and the greatest person is the one who asks forgiveness (Nærland 2006). Selbekk later withdrew his apology, claiming that he was made a scapegoat by the government; that he was threatened by Islamists; and that Muslims are about to take over Norway (Selbekk 2006). Christian members of the Contact Group, however, were pleased with the outcomes. According to Anne Hege Grung, member of the Contact Group, the Cartoon Crisis showed how important it is to engage in dialogue when things are normal: “Trustbuilding dialogue is perhaps the best resource we have when conflict breaks out” (Den Norske Kirke 2006). In the media debates, dialogue with Muslims is considered dubious, at best. A 2009 survey by the Norwegian Directorate for Diversity and Integration (IMDi) showed that “Muslims” as media topic occurs disproportionately often compared to their share of the population (ca. 3%), and that they are repeatedly accused of not sharing (sometimes even

182

Chapter Eight

threatening) “national values” (IMDi 2010). The latter view is shared by Anders Behring Breivik, the terrorist who murdered 77 people associated with the Labour Party in Oslo on July 22, 2011, on the pretext that integrating Muslims threatens the survival of the Norwegian nation.

Muslim society Trondheim Developments on the national stage are mirrored in Trondheim, Norway’s third largest city with around 173,000 inhabitants. Its Muslim population is mainly first and second generation immigrants. Trondheim hosts four Muslim organizations. Established in 1987 and with 1500 members (2011), Muslim Society Trondheim (MST) is the oldest and largest.3 The second largest is Trondheim Mevlana Cultural Organization, founded in 2003 and with 1062 members (2011) of Turkish and Kurdish origins who left MST to cultivate their specifically Turkish Islam. The third organization is Ahl O’Bait Centre. It was registered in 2002 and has 203 members (2011) who are Twelver Shiites from Iraq and Afghanistan. The fourth organization was founded in 2011 and consists of some Somali and other members of MST who formed a group around one of MST’s imams who is Somali and has special expertise in hadith and the Prophet’s sunna. MST’s members are from over 30 countries. Somalis, Arabs, Afghans and Indonesians are currently the largest groups. This multinational constitution makes MST unique: “In Oslo, as in most West-European capitals, mosques and Islamic centres are usually established on the basis of ethnicity, language and cultural backgrounds, nationality and religious affiliation. Mosques and Islamic centres organized on a pan-Islamic paradigm, for example the Muslim Society in the city of Trondheim, are the exception. The latter model reflects, according to its members, the concepts of tawhid and umma and expresses the diversity of Islam within its unity” (Naguib 2001, pp. 30-31).

MST is Trondheim’s central jami‘, housed in a riverside warehouse building in the city centre. It is the only organization in Trondheim that is member of IRN. While individual members of the other Islamic organizations have contacts with public institutions and participate in the national interfaith dialogue (STL), only MST is engaged in official dialogue with the Church and negotiates with public institutions on behalf of Muslims, an authority which the other Islamic communities grant it because of its ecumenical identity and its status as the central jami‘.

Muslim Society Trondheim

183

MST as organization In Norway all religious organizations, including the Church, receive public funding on the basis of membership records. This overlaps with a civil society model according to which citizens represent their group interests to public authorities through publicly funded associations. In 2010 MST’s income was ca. 1 100 000 NOK, around 80% of which is public funding. The organization is built around the General assembly; the Shura committee; the Steering committee; and the Imam office, which reflects a basic division between judicial, legislative and executive functions. MST’s bylaws contain an interesting paragraph, 2.1: “MST’s aim shall be to serve the interests of Islam and the Muslim community in Trøndelag in such a way that the members are able to practice Islam as a complete way of life. In all of its activities MST shall respect and abide by the country’s laws, in so far as the latter do not conflict with Islam’s spiritual principles” (MST Bylaws 2009).

In comparison, IRN, of which MST is member, does not mention potential conflicts between Norwegian laws and Islamic principles: “IRN shall be a voluntary, religious, democratic, and politically independent organization whose activities abide by Norway’s laws” (IRN Bylaws 2006). MST’s emphasis on Islam as a complete way of life and its “pan-Islamic” identity reflects the Muslim Brotherhood’s concept of Islam, although the organization does not identify with any particular Islamic creed or movement and cannot be reduced to a “Brotherhood” mosque. Yet, MST’s active civic engagement is of the same kind as that evinced by the Muslim Brotherhood in Oslo (see also Leirvik 2013) and as reflected in FIOE’s platform for European Muslim citizenship; here MST’s more ambitious objectives: “[to c]onduct seminars on different subject-matters and courses in Islamic and Norwegian history, society and tradition, in Norwegian, English and Arabic, as well as provide mother-tongue teaching, for the sake of assisting MST’s members to integrate in Norwegian society and be law-abiding citizens with supreme values and a high moral standing” (MST Bylaws 2009, par.2.9).

Recently MST has faced challenges related to demographic changes among its members. In the beginning university students dominated, often of Pakistani and Kurdish background. Some had high levels of education and wide networks. By 2010 the largest groups of members were of Somali and Arab backgrounds. Many are newly immigrated and lack

184

Chapter Eight

higher academic educations. The demographic change has involved a contestation of leadership, between academics, often with knowledge in Arabic and the Islamic scriptures, and members without academic degrees and often not Arabic speaking. The struggle involved contestation of both doctrinal authority and access to leadership functions. One member describes the situation through a personal interpretation of the Prophet: “We need everyone, from builders to craftsmen to academics, so, there were perhaps a bit of a tendency before that maybe there was a bit of an intellectual elite, who, in a way, wanted to be in charge, and there were many who reacted against that, because that is not from sunna and the Prophet (PBUH) who was himself a commoner, not a learned man, but a very wise man. So we must use that example in the best possible way, so that there won’t be an intellectual elite of some sort, so that there will be many ways in which one can be a resource” (interview February 2010).

Tensions turned into conflict. During 2009, MST went through three successive Steering committees as members struggled to solve the dispute. The above-mentioned paragraph 2.1 of the bylaws was also part of the conflict, concerning the issue of marriage. Some members argued that it was introduced through a well-intentioned but incorrect view of what Islam requires, and that members with higher Islamic education know Islam to require that Muslims abide by the law of the land. They can seek to change a law by democratic means but as long as it is in force they must abide by it, in line with Shaykh al-Azhar’s fatwa concerning the French law against hijab in public schools, and the ECFR’s approach. Concerning marriage, they hold that MST’s imams should not bless any marriage which is not registered in Norwegian civil law, which, among other things, rules out polygamy. Other members believe that Sharia is the sacred guidance for Muslims which must have priority on principle; hence, polygamy cannot be illegal, although Sharia conditions for it are such that no one can actually fulfill them (interview November 2010). Eventually the conflict got so heated that MST members contacted the police and the IRN to mediate, with good results (interview MST March 2010; see also Bajoghli 2009a, 2009b). In 2010 new bylaws were passed which stipulate that out of 15 members in the Shura committee, there can be at most 4 from each nation (par.7.2), and out of 9 members of the Steering committee, there can be at most 2 from each nation (par.8.2.2). These rules maintain MST’s “pan-Islamic” character and prevent national groups from using the organization for their own purposes; these were the “old” members’ conditions for letting “new” members assume leadership roles. Paragraph 2.1 remains, for the time being. Meanwhile, the Imam

Muslim Society Trondheim

185

office ensures that MST’s activities (including marriages) are in line with Norwegian law (interview November 2010).

MST’s interactions with the church and public institutions MST’s main institutional interlocutors are the Church of Norway; Trondheim municipality; the child care authorities; the integration authorities (IMDi); and the police. Forum for Muslim-Christian Dialogue The Forum for Muslim-Christian dialogue in Trondheim is a local branch of the national Contact Group. It was initiated by Trondheim’s Bishop in response to 9/11 and concerns over Muslim communities and public antiMuslim sentiment, and officially established on May 8, 2003. From 2003 to the present, six representatives from each side meet six times per year. With minor changes, it has been the same group throughout (interview Church March 2010; dialogue meeting April 2011). The aim of the dialogue is not to reach agreement but to understand “the other” as well as “the self” in relation to “the other”. The method is to listen, take notes, reflect, check with the others, give and receive response, document and conclude, and it is applied in the course of dialogue over agreed-upon themes (dialogue meeting April 2011; Samtalen 2003-2005; Forum 2010). The cartoon crisis motivated three dialogue themes: “Living together with respect for difference”, “Freedom of speech and blasphemy”, and “Apology and forgiveness”. MST’s initial reaction to the cartoons was to prosecute for blasphemy, but after deliberations in the Forum they decided to align themselves with the national Contact Group’s strategy. When in 2008 the local Trondheim newspaper published a new provocative cartoon, MST approached the local cartoonist and the newspaper editor and conveyed their views (interviews, the Church and MST March 2010). It soon became clear to the Christians in the Forum that their Muslim colleagues had serious concerns with the municipal child care authorities, especially regarding custody of children. The authorities placed Muslim children in non-Muslim foster homes at great distance from Trondheim. MST’s members wanted Muslim foster families so that children in custody would be raised as Muslims; and that foster families should live nearby so that the family did not lose contact with their child. In 2005 the Forum initiated a conference on immigrants’ experiences of child care authorities, in cooperation with Trondheim municipality and the Ombudsman for children. The outcome was that contacts were established between the

186

Chapter Eight

child care authorities and MST, and a number of Muslim foster families have since been approved by the authorities and have received foster children. Relations suffered a set-back when the authorities placed a Muslim child with a lesbian non-Muslim couple. The Forum then responded collectively, expressing disappointment with the municipality’s going back on their intention to accommodate minorities’ values (interviews, the Church and MST March 2010). A specific cultural practice which the child care authorities are campaigning against is female genital mutilation (FGM). In connection with the Forum’s dialogue theme “Respect for nature and preservation of the work of creation”, Imam Abdinur Mohamed wrote a treatise which argues that FGM is against Sharia because it lacks support in the Qur’an and in sound Prophetic hadiths, and because it destroys the work of creation. In 2008 the Norwegian Directorate of Health arranged a national conference on FGM in Trondheim and has funded the translation of Abdinur Mohamed’s treatise from Arabic to Norwegian, English, and Somali, as part of the national campaign against FGM (interview the Church March 2010). The Forum has thus supported work to develop Sharia to legitimize a cultural reform. Both Muslims and Christians find the Forum successful. Both parties have reached a progressively deeper understanding of each other’s religion, as the participants have become more confident to share and discuss matters. The Forum has also been represented in other dialogue groups. One of MST’s members represents Norway in a European Muslim-Christian dialogue; and in 2009 the Forum went to Copenhagen to study a project with “hospital imams” (interview MST March 2010). When asked about the evident discrepancy in power between the Church and MST, MST’s participants emphasize that precisely because the Church is so well-established the dialogue has raised MST to the level of equal partner with the Church of Norway, which they see as an important sign of recognition of Islam (interview MST March 2010; dialogue meeting April 2011). One Church representative points out that while the Church commands the agenda through mastery of Norwegian language and of “what needs to be discussed”, the Muslim colleagues are increasingly confident to contribute and ensure that they are understood correctly (communication September 2011). MST representatives also stress that the dialogue has allayed worries that Christian Norwegians might be hostile to Muslims (dialogue meeting April 2011). They feel that they have contributed substantially to their Christian colleagues’ knowledge of Islam, and see the willingness of Christians and Muslims to

Muslim Society Trondheim

187

cooperate on general and specific matters as signs of increasing religious tolerance (interview MST March 2010). That the dialogue addressed issues related to the child care authorities and the cartoon crisis is very important for MST’s representatives, as it shows that the Church wants to improve Muslims’ quality of life. By opening doors to public institutions, the Forum has furthered MST’s members’ understanding of the principles which guide these institutions. MST’s representatives emphasize that Muslims in Oslo have never succeeded in opening a dialogue with the child care authorities, and that it is the Church’s involvement that makes the difference. They even think that Trondheim’s Forum is producing better results than European counterparts. They also stress that the dialogue has provided a useful democratic method, for obtaining public apologies for offensive media humiliations, and for managing deliberations within MST’s organization after the conflict was resolved. This has enabled new members to participate in MST’s leadership which is an important democratic progress (interview MST March 2010). Another progressive measure is that one of MST’s members has been employed in a two year project as “cultural executive” at the office for hospital chaplains at Trondheim’s St. Olav’s Hospital; a similar model is in operation at Ullevål university hospital in Oslo. The project is led by the state Health Department but facilitated by the national Contact Group and the Forum, inspired by the “hospital imams” they visited in Copenhagen. MST’s member sees this as yet another sign that the Church is raising Islam to the level of equal (interview MST November 2010). MST’s representatives thus emphasize that it is not Islam or any other religion that causes trouble for Muslims but the media, by consistently portraying Norwegian Muslims as “foreigners” and making other Norwegians suspicious of Muslims. The Church representative is very pleased that the Forum has been more or less the same participants since 2003, although he remarks that MST has been unable to find women participants (interview March 2010). The trust and well-established framework ensured that the dialogue could find a common strategy during the cartoon crises. This was decisive for the peaceful developments in Norway, compared with Denmark where there is no official national dialogue (interview Church March 2010). While the media tend to ignore press releases concerning the Forum’s progressive work, public authorities respond very positively and invite the Forum to share their experiences, for example when the state Integration Directorate (IMDi) established its Trondheim branch. Reflecting on the dialogue’s branching out from theological and ethical issues to such

188

Chapter Eight

concrete matters as the child care authorities, he thinks it would have been egoistic of the Church to ignore the many challenges which their Muslim colleagues face in relation to public institutions. Taking in MST’s concerns has also allowed the Church to see new sides of Norwegian society and has challenged it to broaden its concept of pastoral care to include guidance of new religions, since the Church has long experience and much practical knowledge to convey. In multicultural Norway, the Sermon on the Mount implies recognizing the religious other as a brother and equal (interview March 2010). The Church representative has also become more aware of the inconsistencies of Norwegian immigration politics. Norwegians are happy to import laborers from Pakistan and Morocco but perceive their religion as a challenge. For him building mosques in Norway is not only about providing places for Muslim worship but also about manifesting that society has irrevocably changed. Change must involve public institutions as well. For example, Norwegian prisons and hospitals host Muslim inmates and patients who do not have access to spiritual care. In order for imams to fill this function, practical training needs to be established (interview March 2010). The above-mentioned project employment of two hospital imams in Trondheim and Oslo is a pilot study to identify where more education is needed. Concerning religious knowledge the Church representative is fascinated by the different Islamic and Christian approaches to scripture. He finds his Muslim colleagues to be much more bound to the scriptures and to applying their principles than the current Lutheran approach to scripture as an ethical guide rather than as rules for specific cases. For example, the Christians were astonished that their Muslim colleagues hold Prophetic traditions which command stoning for homosexuality to be valid commands, but that as long as there are no witnesses to the sexual act, no crime has been committed. This is very different from the rights-based approach which the Church follows according to which homosexuality is an identity that confers the right to choose a corresponding lifestyle (interview March 2010). In all the Church representative thinks the dialogue has achieved more than he ever imagined. The fact that the Forum members have become real friends is very important to him. The Child care Authorities MST’s cooperation with the municipal child care authority is a result of the conference in 2005. Many MST members did not understand the logic informing Norwegian child welfare services, i.e. that they protect

Muslim Society Trondheim

189

children’s rights to care and safety (Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion 2010). Muslim parents often perceive the concept “children’s rights” as an assault on parents’ unquestionable right to care for their children. Thus, the child care authorities received harsh criticism at the conference but they saw it as an opportunity and have collaborated with MST to establish Muslim foster homes, among other things. The authorities have also invited MST to lectures about FGM and about what the authorities consider deficient parental care. They also encourage new employees to contact religious organizations and use them as resources (interview June 2010). According to the child care representative, when the authorities intervene in Muslim families it often has to do with different approaches to upbringing. The “Norwegian” approach is that parents strictly control small children but as the child gets older it gains progressively more freedom. In the “Muslim” model small children have a lot of freedom, which is progressively restricted as the child grows older. Conflicts between the two models may occur at puberty, when non-Muslim teenagers gain more freedom while Muslim teenagers (especially girls) lose theirs. Sometimes this causes conflicts in Muslim families which the child care authorities have to deal with (interview June 2010). Another controversial issue is different views of who is responsible for a child. In many Muslim majority countries the extended family participates actively in child rearing, whereas the Norwegian social policy is individualoriented. In situations when the parents cannot provide secure surroundings for their children, the child care authorities assume responsibility and they do not automatically consider members of the extended family to have any special role (Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion 2010). The child care representative finds the collaboration with MST very useful for identifying mutually acceptable solutions. MST’s members think that Muslims have learned a lot about the guidelines for the child care authorities’ work, and that the Muslim emergency—and foster homes that exist today are a direct outcome of the cooperation. Sometimes the authorities have also asked MST members to help supervise Muslim dysfunctional families; and sometimes members of MST have asked their leaders for help in contacts with the child care authorities. The only failure in MST’s view is the case with the Muslim child who was placed with a lesbian non-Muslim couple after MST and the authorities had a mutual understanding (interview March 2010). The child care representative said that her department was not involved in this case. While she can see the reasons behind the decision, she also thinks it has been destructive for the trust that the child care authorities are trying to build with the Muslim

190

Chapter Eight

community (interview June 2010). Both MST and the child care representative stress that more information work is needed on a regular basis since new immigrants continue to arrive in Trondheim. The State Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi) IMDi was established in 2006 with the objective “to contribute to equality in living conditions and diversity through employment, integration and participation” (IMDi 2010). IMDi Trondheim seeks to cooperate with minorities’ organizations to inform about their translation services; experience concerning long-term unemployment and further education; and general elections. Because participation in religious organizations is often higher than in other kinds of minority organizations, IMDi has invited Trondheim’s Islamic organizations to information meetings. So far only MST has responded. After some initial meetings MST and IMDi co-organized an event in the mosque before the general elections in 2009. MST invited a panel of local politicians and IMDi informed about the importance of participating in general elections and how elections shape Norwegian society. The politicians presented their party programs and answered questions from the audience, most of which concerned teaching of mother tongue language, freedom of speech, religious education in school, and the child care authorities. IMDi is gathering information about Trondheim’s religious communities in order to improve their services. The department would like to interact more regularly and praises the political panel. To encourage further initiatives, IMDi is planning to hold annual information meetings which they hope that MST and other organizations will attend (interview IMDi February 2010). The MST member who took the initiative to the political panel thinks IMDi’s contributions improved MST’s members’ understanding of and interest in the general election. Because many members are immigrants, she thinks they would benefit generally from more cooperation with IMDi (interview MST February 2010). The Municipality MST and Trondheim municipality had two meetings during 2009. MST was represented by two women members, and the municipality by the mayor and her political advisor. MST’s aim was to establish a contact for future cooperation and to explain Islamic principles, in the first instance concerning a Muslim graveyard and gender segregated slots in municipal swimming pools. The municipality was most forthcoming (interview MST February 2010). Since then Kolstad graveyard has been prepared for

Muslim Society Trondheim

191

Muslims’ requirements, i.e. facilities for ritual washing of the dead, ready for use in 2011 (interview MST November 2010). However, gender segregated slots in the city’s swimming pools remain to be realized. The Police The Trondheim police have had regular contacts with MST since 2003, as a result of the police’s strategy to establish contacts with minorities and initiatives from MST. In 2003 some Somali members of MST felt very uneasy about the way media was stigmatizing Somalis as criminals and they contacted the police who helped them make sense of statistics. It showed that while some immigrant groups are overrepresented in certain types of criminal activities, immigrants and Somalis are not on average more criminal than other citizens. This was felt as a great relief for the concerned members of MST (interview Police March 2010). The police contacted MST and other Islamic organizations as part of a strategy to recruit staff of minority backgrounds. They have also engaged a range of minority organizations, including MST, in a campaign to combat racism within the police force (interview Police March 2010). In 2008 a Norwegian of Somali background was murdered in a suburb of Trondheim by a man known for his racist views (TV 2 Nyhetene 2009), which caused a lot of fear in the community and the police arranged several meetings in MST’s mosque, informing about the case and criminal proceedings in Norway. In the same year (2008) a series of robberies were committed by youth whose parents were affiliated with MST. The police, MST, and the parents met to discuss crime prevention and correction. The public approach to correction is to support the individual so that s/he can readjust to society as quickly as possible, while the Muslim parents favoured punishment, convinced that leniency would encourage further criminal behaviour. However, the parties found ways ahead that were satisfying to all; the number of robberies was reduced by 50% (interviews Police and MST March 2010). In 2009 MST contacted the police to mediate in their internal conflict. The parties met with the police on several occasions, and the police were asked to participate as observers in two General Assemblies where they drafted new constitutions and elected a new Steering committee. Commenting on this, the police reflected on the bylaws’ paragraph 2.1. “One could say that, to return briefly to the conflict about the bylaws, it is an interesting problem area: what has first priority? MST’s bylaws or Norwegian law? […] There were several different suggestions in the air, and it was very clear to me what comes first, and it was self-evident to

192

Chapter Eight many MST members as well, that Norwegian law comes first. But far from all agreed. So if you read the bylaws today, there is a paragraph that makes you doubt (laughs apologizingly, referring to paragraph 2.1). But there we are. My job was not to produce the new bylaws, I had to be clear about that, it was to defuse the conflict and the escalation that was about to take off, and help them create a working organization. […] And so one has to see, there is development with time” (interview March 2010).

Since he is well acquainted with MST’s members, he is not worried; indeed, he thinks reflection on similar issues is called for also among the general public: “We may have a lot to learn you know, for society is getting more multinational, and then we might have to have a look at the Norwegian law, I mean, the Norwegian law obviously comes first, but there is something about the Norwegian system, we should probably have a look at it. As we are becoming more and more multinational” (interview Police March 2010).

One of MST’s members initially had reservations against involving the police, because many members have bad experiences of the police in their countries of origin. However, in the end everyone agreed that the police’s mediation increased trust in the police among the members which is important for their integration into Norwegian society (interview MST February and March 2010). The police found it a challenging mediation. It was difficult to get an overview of the conflict because there were so many people involved; some of the issues at stake were not explicitly stated; and people often shifted position. However, the police too are very satisfied with the outcomes. MST is a functioning organization again; the police have realized that they have much to learn from immigrant groups regarding solving and preventing crime; their new knowledge has challenged their established views of the law; and they have got a much more nuanced picture of Islam and Muslims. The police mediator is particularly impressed that MST manages to keep together the many different nationalities, cultures and languages (interview March 2010). He attributes the success to the openness and interest in others’ views that he finds among MST’s members, a democratic spirit which he thinks is absent in many other Norwegian organizations (dialogue meeting April 2011). These experiences have made the police realize how damaging media reporting about Muslims actually is. Local media covered the conflict in MST in a way that generated a lot of public suspicion, even though smaller and more homogeneous Norwegian organizations regularly have

Muslim Society Trondheim

193

much more serious conflicts than MST but without attracting any media attention (interview March 2010).

Concluding analysis This limited study of interactions between MST, the Church and the other public institutions indicates that dialogue and institutional accommodation promotes attachment to a place, a sense of belonging and solidarity across groups in society. Since the Forum was established in 2003, the Church has played an important role as facilitator for MST’s contacts with the public institution that was a real source of concern for its members, the child care authorities. For MST’s members, practicing dialogue as a method to define and discuss different standpoints has proved useful both in contacts with the child care authorities and the local newspaper, and for deliberations within the organization. One could say that the Church dialogue empowered members of MST to engage as “active citizens” and promote their interests in a democratic manner in relation to public institutions. The fact that the Church sees Muslims as equal partners in dialogue and increasingly also as professional partners (the “hospital imam” project), and publicly supports Muslims’ rights to promote their interests in relation to public institutions, is perceived by MST’s representatives as highly significant for their feeling of recognition and inclusion in society. This is especially important for Muslims in a context where media debates express views ranging between “Muslims are responsible for integrating themselves” and “Muslims are a threat to national culture”. This outcome is in line with civic integration policy in the sense that members of MST get an enhanced understanding of the policies of public institutions and get to negotiate their interests in relation to these same institutions. In accommodating MST’s interests and values the public institutions have not compromised their basic principles and have found ways to harmonize their practices with Muslim values and concerns. Thus, selecting Muslim foster families for Muslim children has not changed the criteria for approving foster families, only expanded the range of qualified families. Similarly, when the police accommodated the Muslim parents’ views on how to correct youth delinquency they did so within the limits of national correction guidelines. Concerning the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad a solution was found which maintained freedom of expression while allowing Muslims to express their offence and their requests for explanations and apologies. This two-way process of mutual accommodation on the basis of human rights is the essence of the EU’s

194

Chapter Eight

Common Basic Principles, and corresponds to the FIOE’s charter on European Muslim citizenship as well as the commitments to freedom of religion and freedom of expression made by the national Contact Group. Both Muslims and non-Muslims perceived a major discrepancy between media discourse and institutional practices. The Muslims’ experience of media is that it makes non-Muslims suspicious and even hostile towards them; and that it blames Islam for things that Muslims do not identify with. In contrast, the interactions between members of MST, the Church and the other public institutions were, on the whole, experienced as “inclusive” because of both sides’ willingness to accommodate. We have also seen that the Church played an important part by brokering negotiations with the child care authorities. Since this has not been achieved in Oslo, even though Muslims there have the same concerns, one may wonder whether the child care authorities would have taken the Muslim requests seriously without the Church weighing in. The significance of a Muslim citizenship ethics should perhaps not be overlooked either. MST has been more active in seeking collaboration with public institutions than the other Islamic organizations which might have to do with MST’s ethos, which is close to that of FIOE and the Muslim Brotherhood. That MST is a great resource for Trondheim is illustrated by the words of this member, who was born and raised in Norway: “It is absolutely the best way, the direct contact, to sit and hear that there are other people, and that they send for example someone like the director (from the municipality) herself. A very impressive woman, a warm woman, she comes, and [one] sees that it is a person who cares, who listens, who asks questions and replies to our questions. That gives enormous benefits. And in addition to the contact also to address concrete issues, and that one gets to communicate about things that are important both for the municipality and for Muslims, for me that appears to be the best way to initiate good collaboration. […] There is in the many different institutions a great potential for good collaboration. That I have seen. I have become much more positive now than I was before. [Eli-Anne: Yes? Positive to the possibility of establishing good cooperation?] Yes, I absolutely see that that is what very many are interested in as well. Before I was perhaps a bit influenced by the media images, that this is how things are, and that’s that. But that’s not how it is when you get to know these people (in the municipality and other public institutions). Isn’t that how it is? One has to face one’s own prejudices sometimes. One thinks that a politician is only concerned with this and that, or someone who works in that place (can only be in a certain way); so all this about direct contact and getting things more regularly organized is very important and challenging, but (the challenge) must be taken. For it can give huge

Muslim Society Trondheim rewards both for our community, the Muslims, but also the municipality and the state institutions because the trust that a mosque has as a point of connection for all these cultures and all the different people, that is very significant. So then it is important to be a bit careful and not abuse it, and use it wisely” (interview February 2010).

195

196

Chapter Eight

Notes 1

For a recent analysis of the cartoon crisis with a focus on Denmark and the international stage, see Klausen 2009. 2 For a comparison with developments in Denmark, where the government supported the publication of the cartoons and there are no publicly representative national Islamic organizations and no officially recognized national ChristianMuslim dialogue, and the conflict was much more intense and violent, see Leirvik 2011b. 3 The information about MST is based on interviews conducted by Eli-Anne Vongraven Eriksen and Ulrika Mårtensson during 2010 and 2011, for the article “Muslim Society Trondheim: A Local History”, forthcoming in the special issue Public Islam and the Nordic Welfare State: Changing Realities?, edited by Ulrika Mårtensson and published jointly by Studies in Contemporary Islam and Tidskrift for islamforskning (2012).

Muslim Society Trondheim

197

Bibliography Bajoghli, Sæba. “Moskékonflikten i retten: Isfront mellom partene.” Adressa.no, 2009. http://www.adressa.no/nyheter/trondheim/article1313925.ece (Retrieved June 18, 2010). —. “Islamsk råd megler i moskékonfliten.” Adressa.no, 2009. http://www.adressa.no/nyheter/article1290638.ece (Retrieved June 28, 2010). CBP. “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union”, 2003. http://www.enaro.eu/dsip/download/euCommon-Basic-Principles.pdf (Retrieved May 20, 2011). Den Norske Kirke. “Langvarig kontakt ga plattform for samhandling i karikatyrstriden”, 2006. http://www.kirken.no/?event=showNews&FamID=4473 (Retrieved May 4, 2011). —. “Muslimer og kristne anerkjenner retten til å skifte religion”, 2007. http://www.kirken.no/?event=showNews&FamID=17453 (Retrieved April 27, 2011). —. “Felles front mot vold i nære relasjoner”, 2009. http://www.kirken.no/?event=showNews&FamID=101461 (Retrieved April 28, 2011). DIDCP. “Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention.” Adopted by the European Ministers of Cultural Affairs. Steering Committee for Culture, Council of Europe, 2003. http://www.ericarts.org/web/files/131/en/OpatijaDeclaration.pdf (Retrieved January 1, 2011). DN. “Redaktør beklager trykking”, February 10, 2006. http://www.dn.no/forsiden/politikkSamfunn/article715143.ece (Retrieved May 4, 2011). Entzinger, Han. “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the Netherlands.” In: Christian Joppke and Eva Morawska (eds.), Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2003), pp. 59-86. —. “Changing the Rules while the Game is on: From Multiculturalism to Assimilation in the Netherlands.” In: Y. Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul (eds.), Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos: Incorporation Regimes in Germany, Western Europe and North America. New York: Palgrave MacMillan (2006), pp. 121-144.

198

Chapter Eight

European Union/External Action. “European Economic Area.” Norway, 2011. http://eeas.europa.eu/norway/index_en.htm (Retrieved May 18, 2011). FIOE. “The Charter of the Muslims of Europe”, 2011. http://www.euromuslim.com/En_u_Projects_Details.aspx?News_ID=323 (Retrieved April 28, 2011). Forum (Forum for muslimsk-kristen dialog). “Trondheim: Perspektiver fra Samtalen 2005-2009”, 2010. www.menighetogmisjon.no/.../2005-2009 %20Perspektiver%20på%20dialogen-b.doc (Retrieved April 4, 2011). Hagelund, Anniken. “Problematizing Culture: Discourses on Integration in Norway.” Journal of International Migration and Integration 3, 3&4 (2002): pp. 401-415. IMDi (The Directorate of Integration and Diversity). “Immigrants in the Norwegian Media”, 2010. http://www.imdi.no/no/Nyheter/2010/Engelsk-oversettelse-av-IMDisarsrapport/ (Retrieved June 24, 2010, April 28, 2011). IRN Bylaws. “Vedtekter for Islamsk Råd Norge”, 2006. http://irn.no/2006/upload/IRN%20vedtekter%20vedtatt%202006.pdf (Retrieved October 12, 2010). Joppke, Christian. “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy.” The British Journal of Sociology 55, Issue 2 (2004): pp. 237-257. Kapelrud, Pål Espen. “Offerets makt: En diskursanalyse av karikaturstriden i Norge.” MA-thesis, University of Oslo, 2008. http://www.culcom.uio.no/publikasjoner/Masteroppgave-Kapelrud.pdf (Retrieved January 20, 2013). Klausen, Jytte. The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Leirvik, Oddbjørn. “Karikaturar av islam.” Aftenposten, October 1, 2010. http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/article3835281.ece (Retrieved May 3, 2011). —. “The Cartoon Controversy in Norway: The New Christian Right and Liberal Fundamentalism confronting Islam?” In: Ulrika Mårtensson, Jennifer Bailey, Priscilla Ringrose and Asbjorn Dyrendal (eds.), Fundamentalism in the Modern World. Volume 2: Fundamentalism and Communication: Culture, Media and the Public Sphere. London: I.B. Tauris (2011), pp. 125-146. —. “Muslims in Norway: Value Discourses and Interreligious Dialogue.” In: Ulrika Mårtensson (ed.), Tidsskrift for islamforskning/Studies in Contemporary Islam. Special issue: Public Islam and the Nordic Welfare State: Changing Realities? (Forthcoming 2013).

Muslim Society Trondheim

199

Letki, Natalia. “Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in British Neighbourhoods.” Political Studies 56 (2008): pp. 99126. Malloy, Tove and Gazzola, Michele. “The Aspect of Culture in the Social Inclusion of Ethnic Minorities.” The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), Evaluation Project under the EU’s Social Protection and Social Integration Policy, 2006. http://www.ecmi-eu.org/file admin/media/download/Final_Report.pdf (Retrieved January 1, 2011). Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion. “Child welfare institutions”, 2010. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/bld/Topics/Child-welfare/Childwelfare-service.html?id=476334 (Retrieved June 23, 2010). MST Bylaws. “Det muslimske samfunnet i Trondheim—Norge the muslim society of Trondheim—Norway”, 2009. http://www.msit.no/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/MST_FellesForslag_ VEDTEKTER.pdf (Retrieved April 3, 2011). Nærland, Mina Hauge. “Vi må legge saken bak oss.” Dagbladet.no, 2006. http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2006/02/10/457424.html (Retrieved May 4, 2011). Naguib, Safinaz-Amal. Mosques in Norway: The Creation and Iconography of Sacred Space. Oslo: Novus forlag, 2001. Samtalen. “Dialog mellom kristne og muslimer i Trondheim: Perspektiver fra Samtalen 2003-2005.” Den Norske Kirke. http://www.kirken.no/nidaros/index.cfm?id=20360 (Retrieved April 20, 2011). Selbekk, Vebjørn. Truet av islamister. Kjeller: Genesis, 2006. TV 2 Nyhetene. “Nekter skyld for drap på norsk-somalier”, 2009. http://www.tv2nyhetene.no/innenriks/krim/nekter-skyld-for-drap-paanorsksomalier-2700002.html (Retrieved October 14, 2010). Verkaaik, Oskar. “The Cachet Dilemma: Ritual and Agency in New Dutch Nationalism.” American Ethnologist 37, 1 (2010): pp. 69-82. Vongraven, Eriksen; Eli, Anne and Mårtensson, Ulrika. “Muslim Society Trondheim: A Local History.” In: Ulrika Mårtensson (ed.), Tidsskrift for islamforskning/Studies in Contemporary Islam. Special issue: Public Islam and the Nordic Welfare State: Changing Realities? (Forthcoming 2013).

CHAPTER NINE YALLA, LOMBARDS! SECOND GENERATIONS IN LOMBARDY: LOOKING FOR A MODEL FRANCESCO MAZZUCOTELLI

“SOS the balance is negative if I’m called a foreigner in the place where I live. SOS ready for execution if I’m called a foreigner in my own nation”. —Amir, Straniero nella mia nazione. 1

The Vertova paradox Vertova is a tidy, small town on the river Serio, roughly a ninety minute drive north-east of Milan. A lackluster former warehouse in the industrial area hosts an Islamic cultural centre that has been hailed by the local media as an example of successful cross-cultural understanding through language courses, a library, and joint projects with local public schools (Brambilla, Rizzi 2011, pp. 79-82, 195-198). Like other community centres that have been surveyed over the last three years in the area of Bergamo,2 the Islamic cultural centre of Vertova functions informally as a prayer hall and as a venue for faith-related gatherings, even if it is not legally recognized as a place of worship. In a political context where the word “mosque” is emotionally overloaded and is easily evoked as a looming threat, the centre is allowed to operate and is tolerated as a de facto prayer building as long as it is not formally defined and visibly marked as such. The deputy mayor of the town acknowledges the irony of a situation where “everybody knows”, but it is politically too risky to call things by their names. He despises the lack of a uniform legal framework that could solve the issue, but ultimately defends the existing modus vivendi as a pragmatic posture that is “commensurate with the reality on the ground”.3

202

Chapter Nine

Three reasons transform the relatively marginal perspective of a small town like Vertova into an interesting starting point of an analysis of migration-related trends and patterns of identity-building among second generations in Lombardy. First of all, the Islamic cultural centre in Vertova (which nobody dares to call a mosque) is a good case in point of what I shall describe later as Italy’s parochial paradigm of informal micromanagement of migrationrelated issues, with all its merits and shortcomings. Secondly, the case of Vertova offers the opportunity to raise some points on the impact of politics, and in particular on the relevance of anti-immigration (and specifically anti-Islamic) tropes in political discourses. At the same time, it cautions against extreme simplifications that do not adequately consider the existence of incongruities, inconsistencies, and differences between inflamed rhetoric and actual practices in day-to-day local management. Thirdly, Vertova is also a powerful reminder of the relatively abrupt shift from patterns of emigration to patterns of immigration, which occurred in most of Italy over quite a short span of time. This shift occurred mainly at the beginning of the 1990s in an unfavourable conjuncture: weak central government, delegitimized political elites, crumbling state institutions, and the burden of public debt and inflation all meant that the country was caught unaware, unprepared, and unable to manage a phenomenon to which it was not accustomed. The recent history of Vertova and the valleys north of Bergamo again becomes relevant. Until the 1960s, entire families relocated from the hamlets in this area to Switzerland, the north-east of France, or Belgium, where men worked as unskilled labourers or coal miners, creating ethnic clusters of Lombard villagers in the middle of French-speaking societies. These narrations, with their stories of success and integration, but also of rejection and disenchantment, are still a living legacy, and until now it is not uncommon to see third- or fourth-generation descendants of Lombard migrants coming back to their ancestral villages for their summer vacations. At the same time, these stories have been constructing the myth of a “healthy”, “hard-working” Lombard emigration in contrast to the supposedly “unregulated” and “uncivilized” immigration of non-Europeans (Dematteo 2011, p. 171). The valley around Vertova witnessed a rapid process of industrialization from the 1960s, with the consolidation of many small- and medium-sized enterprises. Similar patterns of development took place in other areas of Lombardy, such as the entire area north of Milan, and near Brescia. While the metropolitan area of Milan underwent heavy industrialization through large factories that attracted massive domestic migration from Southern

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

203

Italy (not without friction and forms of ghettoization), suburban and rural areas of Lombardy relied on small enterprises, mostly family-owned and family-operated. Dematteo describes this developmental pattern as a very peculiar combination of rapid economic growth, cultural backwardness and parochialism, a conflictual relationship with a highly-centralized Italian state and its institutions, a history of distrust between countryside and urban elites, a strong stigma traditionally attached to regional languages and folk cultures vis-à-vis urban bourgeois high culture, and finally Italy’s unresolved tension between tradition and secular modernity (Dematteo 2011, pp. 213-217, 225-228). The inception of large non-domestic immigration in Northern Italy in the early 1990s coincided with the implosion of Italy’s political system in the wake of a series of judicial investigations in 1992. The petrified political landscape that had emerged after WWII was swept away, and new actors emerged on the scene. In Lombardy, the populist Lombard League (later part of the Northern League, NL) rapidly evolved from a fringe opposition group to the stronger political party at the regional level. Campaigning variously for devolution of powers to regional governments, a vaguely phrased federalism, and even secession of Northern Italy’s regions, the NL was able to gain support from those voters who were most disgruntled with the public administration and the redistribution of tax revenues from Northern to Southern Italy’s regions, as well as a perceived dominance of “Southern Italians” in state institutions. At the same time, the NL campaigned for much tougher immigration laws, and built discourses and practices of identity politics at a regional and at a local level that frontally attacked Italian national identity and multiculturalism, articulating a localist narrative under the banner of “landlords in our home” (Dematteo 2011, pp. 83-91).

Figures and perceptions Although the discourse in the public sphere and the media is still dominated by the trope of illegal immigration and its impact on job market and crime rates, actual statistics show that the picture is much more complex and nuanced. ISMU and ORIM are two Milan-based institutes that have been collecting data and releasing reports on migration-related topics and multiculturalism. ISMU is a private foundation tied to the Cariplo Foundation and the Chamber of Commerce of Milan (Fondazione ISMU). ORIM (the Italian acronym of Regional Observatory for Integration and

204

Chapter Nine

Multiethnicity) is a joint project by ISMU and Lombardy’s regional government (Osservatorio regionale per l’integrazione e la multietnicità). Relying on data provided by ORIM, Menonna and Blangiardo construct a chart of the total migrant population in Lombardy from 2001 to 2008. The table shows a total of slightly more than one million migrants over a total population of nine millions, with digits of migrants triplicating in this period (from 419,800 in 2001 to 1,059,700 in 2008). However, the most interesting finding is the breakdown of these figures at a provincial level, which shows that the ratio of immigrants over the total population is roughly the same all over the region, whether in urban, suburban, and rural contexts (Menonna, Blangiardo 2010, p. 30).These data are consistent with the figures of the national census of October 8, 2011. In the case of Vertova, there are 425 migrants in a total population of 4,908 inhabitants.4 Despite all the hype about “illegal” immigration, another significant finding is that the ratio of migrants without a legal permit or under undefined legal status versus the total immigrant population has been actually decreasing from 2001 to 2008, even though there is a growth in absolute figures (Menonna, Blangiardo 2010, p. 31). According to data disclosed by regional government representatives, as of July 1, 2010 in Lombardy there were roughly 192,000 first-generation family units (including monoparental units) with at least one child aged under 18 out of a total of 1,130,000 statistical families. This means that, at a regional level, one household out of six was composed of firstgeneration immigrants. At the same time, figures from the term 2009-2010 indicate that children of first-generation immigrants account for more than 25% of the total population in primary- and secondary-level educational facilities (Caselli, Grandi 2011, p. 15). The combination of data about employment, income, household ownership or tenancy, level of education generally accounts for a growing stabilization of the migratory process and some absorption into the local societal fabric. Among the main factors that can shape such an absorption, statistical evidence confirms the relevance of employment opportunities, residential facilities, and easy access to services (public healthcare, public education, other networks of assistance and welfare). However, as early as of 2008, alarm bells were ringing about the impact of global financial crises and credit crunch: downsizing and bankruptcy of many small- and medium-sized enterprises (which formed the backbone of the local economy) resulted in rising rates of unemployment and underemployment, lack of access to bank loans prevented the possibility to buy or rent homes, while spending reviews and budget cuts reduced access to free-of-charge

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

205

services (Caselli, Grandi 2011, p. 16; Besozzi 2010, pp. 9-10; Menonna, Blangiardo 2010, pp. 64-65, 68-73). A breakdown of the figures of migrants based on areas of origin shows a slight predominance of Eastern Europe (Balkans and former USSR), followed by the Indian subcontinent, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. In this case, however, patterns are considerably variegated. Ethnic clusters and higher concentration of specific communities in some locations are due to specialization in labour market niches (for example, Sikhs are specialized in cattle-breeding and dairy factories, and therefore concentrated in the lower Po Valley) or contingent opportunities (for example, joint projects realized by the Roman Catholic Church dioceses of Bergamo and Cochabamba, in Bolivia, resulted in an aboveaverage concentration of Bolivians in Bergamo). Consequently, religious affiliation shows visible variations: some areas have a clear plurality or even a majority of Muslim migrants (not only from North Africa, but also from Senegal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Albania, among others), while other areas appear as distinctly more mixed, with significant proportions of non-Catholic Christians (Menonna, Blangiardo 2010, pp. 35-37, 40-42, 51-52). Using ISMU and ORIM records, Menonna and Blangiardo also challenge other assumptions that often reign supreme in local mainstream discourses. In fact, in terms of age groups, the available data confirm the perception of a pretty young majority of migrants, with a median age of 34 (not counting those under age 14). However, the same data also reveal high levels of education: 53.8% of immigrant workers hold a secondarylevel degree, and 14.2% a university-level degree. In terms of gender, the ratio of males versus females is not as uneven as it is often thought, although with a majority of males (53.7%). Finally, even though it can be problematic to agree on a definition of poverty threshold, the available data show ample pockets of discomfort, but also a plurality of immigrants that can be qualified as “safely not poor” (Menonna, Blangiardo 2010, pp. 49-51, 71). Despite some discrepancies, all the data collected over the last ten years show significantly similar trends all over Lombardy, as well as noticeable processes of improvement. This factual picture, however, must be comprehended through the prism of perceptions and narratives shaped by an approach to immigration that, as in many other Western countries, emphasized “security threats” and the fear of terrorist attacks, the perceived absence of border controls, and the perceived link between migration and criminality, particularly in terms of drug trafficking, prostitution, and sexual offences (Rhazzali 2010, pp. 63-64, 71, 73).

206

Chapter Nine

Juridically, this has morphed into sets of laws and regulations that target illegal immigrants on the grounds of “security” and public order. As Barbera argues on the basis of decrees and amendments enacted since 2008, these rules are seemingly drafted to exclude illegal immigrants from the fundamental rights and procedures granted to the rest of the population (Barbera 2010, pp. 95-97). Identity-building and identity reinvention processes among first and second generations of immigrants should also be considered against the grain of Italy’s own identity crisis during the last two decades. In this sense, the rapid creation of immigrant communities acted as a catalyst for all the unresolved tensions that loomed large in Italy’s contemporary society: ethnic and national consciousness, relations between state and civil society, and the Gordian knot of the relationship between a supposedly secular state and the dominant Roman Catholic Church.

The schizophrenia of a localist approach At a first glance, one might think that the case of the Islamic cultural centre in Vertova is an isolated oddity. Actually, however, the whole valley around the tiny town has been blossoming with plenty of intercultural activities and happenings, including language courses and classes, meetings, lectures, and village festivals, whether organized by local associations, charities, Roman Catholic parishes, and trade unions (both Catholic- and leftist-leaning) (Brambilla, Rizzi 2011, pp. 174-177). The very same valley is often described, sometimes simplistically but anyway on the basis of actual electoral results, as an unwavering (until now) stronghold of the Northern League. This populist movement has strongly capitalized on anti-immigration impulses, with a fiery rhetoric that has been branded as ridden with xenophobic, racist, and Islamophobic motifs (Dematteo 2011, pp. 164-179, 232). Municipal administrations run by NL have sometimes adopted provocative policies and regulations that have been viewed as particularly adverse to immigrants, if not outright racist (Dematteo 2011, pp. 129-131, 154-155). So how is it possible that a bastion of this political party is also a harbinger of intercultural understanding? Should one postulate that these apparently quaint villages and small towns are dramatically divided along ideological cleavages? Or is it a case of collective schizophrenia and embedded psychological dissociation, as advanced by Dematteo (2011, pp. 175, 228)? In my opinion, as the same Dematteo acknowledges, there are two salient processes at stake here. The first one is the emergence of a communitarian ethos and political representation that stands against the

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

207

notion of “political correctness” and Italy’s post-WWII dominant political cultures (the Catholic-centrist and the leftist) (Dematteo 2011, pp. 137138). The second one is the often indefinite idea of a solidarity based along ethnic lines or the idea of ethnic distance. This conception equates traditionalist, monocultural societies with altruism, and multiculturalist metropolitan areas (such as Milan) with loss of identity and spirit of community. Such a vision does not deny paternalistic benevolence on an individual basis (Dematteo 2011, pp. 173-174). I also argue that the paradox (between an anti-immigration electoral behaviour and a paternalistic benevolence in daily practice) is only apparent, and that the flourishing of local initiatives, which mostly remain confined at a local level and unnoticed to the wider public outside the local scope, is a direct consequence of what could be called the localist or parochial management system implemented in Italy. In the absence of an immigration management model, or of a clear choice between an assimilationist policy and a truly multicultural one, everything looks left to a case-by-case approach. As Barbera explains, Italy’s attitude on the whole immigration question can be best described as an example of “emergencyonly” approach. On the one hand, this means that problems are addressed only when they flare up (in reality, media coverage, or popular perception) as emergencies. On the other hand, the impromptu devised solutions often result in a set of laws and by-laws that should temporarily “fix” the problem. As in many other fields of Italy’s political and juridical system, this temporary fix often turns permanent, or appears inconsistent with other sets of laws and regulations. The combination of juridical vacuum and abrupt legislative patches sends confusingly mixed signals to the public opinion, both to the Italian society at large and to the communities of immigrants in particular (Barbera 2010, pp. 95-101). In the absence of clear policy guidelines at a national level, most questions are devolved to a micro-level negotiation, often built on personal relations. Such a context offers wide margins of flexibility and accommodation, where sometimes fierce ideological commitments morph into pragmatic approaches and practices, but also ultimately incurs the risk of arbitrariness and personalism. In fact, it is not uncommon to hear that an electoral change in a municipal administration, or the rise of a less accommodating community leader might jeopardize many long-term efforts and achievements.5 The overall characteristics of Italy’s approach to immigration can be sensibly described as haphazard, or as being in a state of flux that is closer to uncertainty than it is to flexibility and open opportunities. This situation

208

Chapter Nine

profoundly affects the way immigrants perceive themselves, and are perceived by others. There are three more aspects that must be considered at this point. The first one is the ongoing and unfinished process of federal restructuring of the Italian state institutions, which so far has resulted in a messy devolution of powers and functions to regional governments and municipalities, without however a clear redefinition of tasks and competences, and without the provision of the financial resources for the implementation of those functions. The second one is the lack of an organic law on freedom of religion, which should amend the outdated 1929 law on “admitted cults”, passed at a time when Catholicism was the state official religion. A few denominations signed a Memorandum of understanding with the Italian government, which is formally similar to the Concordat signed between Italy and the Roman Catholic Church in 1929; but most did not. This means that, for many confessional groups (including Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Orthodox Christians), nearly all issues related to religious practice are left in a legal limbo. This includes the demarcation of places of worship, the formation of clerics, the implementation of procedures for religious practices in hospitals and prisons, or for optional religious education in public schools, and the whole system of fiscal contributions and tax deductions. The third factor to be considered is the role of the Roman Catholic Church, an actor that prompted initiatives and provided a lot of services, but at the same time became a substitute for governmental action. It is not overstretched to say that public authorities could often afford the luxury of not intervening in immigration-related issues because the capillary territorial penetration of the Roman Catholic Church all over Italy was plugging many gaps. This haphazard framework seems to lead to relational patterns and processes of mutual knowledge that are scarce and occasional, with de facto solutions that are based on personal goodwill rather than on established constructive patterns. As Brambilla and Rizzi point out, media hypes and mass perceptions generated by electoral speculation and political calculations reinforce stereotypes, whereas reality is simplified and compressed into grossly inaccurate categories through pernicious essentialisms, targeting in particular Islam and Muslims. “Islam” and “the West” are therefore constructed as monolithic, mutually exclusive entities, and identities are reified as frozen and deprived of nuances and variations (Brambilla, Rizzi 2011, p. 92).

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

209

Immigrant associations in Lombardy If relational patterns with the society at large can influence mechanisms and processes of self-definition and identity-building, as well as forms of otherness, (Rhazzali 2010, p. 31) it might be argued that an extreme variety of localist patterns of management of immigration-related issues can also lead to an extreme variety of definitions of the self and identity processes, as well as idiosyncratic practices, and fragmented policyoriented behaviours. A survey realized in late 2010 on behalf of ORIM highlighted the existence of 304 associations of immigrants in Lombardy as of October 2010. Only 18 among them have an informal nature, while the others have a statute or formal code of conduct; 8 are recognized as cooperatives, 7 as non-governmental organizations, and 92 as ONLUS (Italian acronym for not-for-profit organizations). Although the associations of immigrants are usually described as marked by effervescence and instability at the same time, the authors of the survey argue that there is a trend of trying to obtain a formal recognition from public authorities, in an attempt to consolidate and stabilize grassroots activities on the ground. Formal recognition and institutional stabilization are therefore interpreted as a prerequisite for the launch and implementation of meaningful projects of cooperation at a local level with public institutions or other actors in the public sphere. However, the same authors acknowledge that the life span of these associations can be extremely variegated, ranging from those that have been active for more than ten years to the very recently established ones. Furthermore, a substantial number of groups are formed or dissolved each year, in a constant state of flux (Caselli, Grandi 2011, pp. 30-31). One of the elements that are highlighted in the survey is the markedly ethnic and/or national connotation of these associations, with 152 (50.2%) reportedly being exclusively or almost exclusively monoethnic, and 77 (25.4%) having some sort of dominant ethnic group or nationality. The ethnic nature of many of these associations is often loaded with local, tribal, village-level, and even family-level connotations and connections that often create conflictual stances (Caselli, Grandi 2011, p. 32). The authors of the ORIM survey note that some ethnic/national groups have a more marked tendency to socialize and form associations, even though a higher number of associations does not necessarily mean a higher and more effective policy-oriented leverage in the public sphere. The proliferation of groups, on the other hand, might well be interpreted as a sign of fragmentation, lack of cohesion among peers, and lack of a

210

Chapter Nine

consensually formed and representative community leadership (Caselli, Grandi 2011, p. 25). In line with what has been written above, the scope of activity of the surveyed associations is mostly parochial, with only 57 of them (18.9%) extending beyond the regional borders, and 72 (23.8%) working only in a specific municipality (Caselli, Grandi 2011, pp. 34-35). It is interesting to note that, in the description of their perceived shortfalls or problems, 190 of these associations (67.9%) cite inadequate financial resources, 173 (61.8%) cite the lack of proper offices and meeting places, while eventually only 74 (26.4%) lament the paucity of interface with public institutions (Caselli, Grandi 2011, p. 38). While issues of logistics, costs, and fund-raising are obviously important, the results of the survey suggest that several associations (and their members) are bypassing the problem of representativeness, which is instead singled out by some scholars and researchers as crucial (Brambilla, Rizzi 2011, p. 109). Highly personalistic and localized associations raise a number of questions on what exactly they are advocating, whose voices they are expressing, and whether they are representative at all of the communities or groups they are claiming to stand for. This creates a twofold problem in a context that, as seen earlier, lacks clearly established benchmarks and guidelines: public administrations are often at a loss in determining which associations are credible interlocutors, while the same associations of immigrants are equally at a loss in understanding how they can accredit themselves as legitimate interlocutors (Caselli, Grandi 2011, p. 24). However, actual data show a significant number of associations (198, or 65.1%) that claim to have a “steady” relation or cooperation projects with one or more municipal administrations (Caselli, Grandi 2011, p. 36). The range of activities of the associations of immigrants in Lombardy seems to be quite wide. In addition to the provision of spaces of socialization and leisure, they variously provide services, alternative networks of welfare and assistance, legal counsels, forms of self-help, as well as the promotion and preservation of the cultures of the area of origin (107 associations, or 35.5%). In doing so, they act as primary entrepreneurs of identity, even though they may have limited life spans or geographical ranges. These associations range from sternly closed ones to more open and engaging ones, from firmly conservative in terms of traditions and identity to those advocating closer integration (but not assimilation) into the fabric of Italian society (139 associations, or 46.2%) (Caselli, Grandi 2011, p. 36).

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

211

Rhazzali adopts the term “bricolage” to describe the identity processes that are shaping the lives of many immigrants in Northern Italy,6 (Rhazzali 2010, pp. 34, 72) because they are led to forge again their identity from a diverse range of available elements and under contrasting inputs. This process is even more evident in the case of the second generations, or the children of immigrants. Whether they arrived in Italy at a very early age, or were even born there, second generations are subject to even more complex pressures and forms of bricolage. The ordinary processes of generational dissonance with parents and construction of individual identity, as well as phenomena of group acceptance or rejection, and peer pressure, can often couple with problematic relations with the culture of origin, the Italian society, or both (Colombo 2010, pp. 117-135). Rhazzali argues that three correlated processes are crucially impacting on second generations: the deconstruction and reinvention of the “father figure”, and of parental models in general; the transformation of fatherchildren relations; and the implosion of the very notions of authority and obedience. Italy’s political, social, cultural, and economic immobilism in the late 2000s adds another layer of complexity, since it fosters gloomy prospects for the younger generations, as well as the perception of a lack of viable opportunities of personal and collective fulfillment.7

Second generation: campaigning for citizenship There’s no buzz in the room as Kibra and Sumaya recount their Kafkaesque odysseys through Italian bureaucracy in their quest for citizenship. At the launch of the “L’Italia sono anch’io” (“I am Italy, too”) legislative initiative process,8 there are speakers and representatives from many of the several civil society and non-governmental associations, trade unions, charities, and religious denominations that partake in this campaign for a review of Italy’s citizenship law (L’Italia sono anch’io 20119). The draft proposal advocates the automatic concession of Italian citizenship to all children born in Italy from non-national residents with a regular work or stay permit, (L’Italia sono anch’io 201110) as well as granting the right to vote in local elections to all those immigrants who have been residing with a regular permit for a period of five years (L’Italia sono anch’io 201111). Most of the speakers at the launch of the campaign are trying very hard to be persuasive, but none is as eloquent as Kibra and Sumaya, who, in a plain and witty language, tell their stories of second-generation young women, and inform the audience about the absurdity of their undefined legal status.

212

Chapter Nine

Their cases, however, are not isolated. The forum on the website of Rete G2, a platform for second-generation immigrants who are campaigning for citizenship rights, is full of stories of young (and less young) people who have been trapped in the pitfalls and loopholes of a the existing legislation, which seems particularly contorted and sometimes uselessly punitive for minors (Rete G2 201012). Naturalization in Italy is currently regulated by Law 91, which was enacted on February 5, 1992, (Ministero dell’Interno13) and since then has been only partly integrated by internal protocols that have added further requirements, such as the proof of a minimum income per annum (Progetto Melting Pot Europa14; Ministero dell’Interno15). Rete G2 estimates that in 2008 there were approximately one million second-generation immigrants in Italy, and that 650,000 are part of the total population of Italy’s schools and educational facilities. According to the association, a great part of them endure the same experiences of Kibra and Sumaya in their relation with public bureaucracy. In general, the difficulty in obtaining Italian citizenship can significantly hamper the chances to accede to some professional associations that have citizenship requirements, to pursue higher education abroad, to travel. It can also significantly condition chances and choices in terms of education and career choice (Colombo 2010, p. 120; Affari Italiani, June 28, 2012). The association portrays itself as a strictly non-partisan, nondenominational network of children of immigrants and refugees, who were either born in Italy or arrived there at a very early age. Interestingly, the members of the association do not describe themselves as “secondgeneration immigrants”, because the choice of this term would imply that they were, after all, immigrants. They rather prefer the term “second generation of the immigration process” to underline that they were either born in Italy or arrived on a non-voluntary basis, following the paths of their parents or relatives. Consequently, the members of the association argue that “second generations” should be subject to a legal treatment that is different to the one regarding refugees and all those who embark on a migration process. They should therefore not fall under the jurisdiction of Law 91, but be subject to a more flexible legislation that should make the acquisition of citizenship easier. Law-changing remains until now the core mission of the association. However, in a very polarized political landscape, this is bound to coalesce it with sympathetic groups and movements, in fact contradicting its non-partisan and “transversal” selfdefinition (Rete G2 201016). With a general election slated for spring 2013, chances that the incumbent Parliament may enact a new citizenship legislation based upon

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

213

the proposals of L’Italia sono anch’io campaign appear as increasingly slim (Ciavoni 2012). The activities of Rete G2 consist mainly in thematic workshops, projects, and round tables realized in cooperation with local and national public institutions. Unsurprisingly, there was a peak of activities during the centre-left-leaning Prodi II Cabinet (2006-2008) (Rete G2 201017). Contact with other associations at the grassroots level is another critical issue, with a specific focus on other second-generation groups and on associations that work with second generations. High schools, teenagers, and younger age groups in general are identified as crucial targets of a campaign of communication that widely resorts to age-specific languages, such as short ads and musical videos on YouTube and social networks, photographic exhibitions, artistic installations and theatrical productions, blogs and a variety of threads (Rete G2 201018). The association rests on a strongly voluntaristic basis and insists on its trans-ethnic and trans-confessional characteristics. It is therefore difficult to obtain an estimation of the number of its adherents with a North African or Middle Eastern background, although an activist tentatively puts the figure at around 15%. It is also difficult to ascertain whether the relations with other groups of immigrants are always straightforward, given the tendency of Rete G2 to differentiate itself from other immigrants. As one activist puts it, “we interact as long as our claims overlap, and it is constructive to participate or work together, however always as a distinct entity”.19 This is true, in particular, in the case of first generations, and their associations. It remains unclear how Rete G2, as a single-topic association, relates to more cultural aspects, such as relations between children and parents, and with the cultures of origin, in addition to its emphasis on integration within the mainstream of Italian society. The activities of the association also reveal some discrepancy among different areas, with a peak in those areas with a higher concentration of other immigrant associations, or where local arrangements provide more favourable opportunities, in line with the localist paradigm delineated earlier.

Believing, belonging, behaving: being young Muslims in Lombardy Self-promoting itself with the catchy slogan “We, protagonists with the help of God”,20 the Giovani Musulmani d’Italia (Young Muslims of Italy, GMI) association is a not-for-profit organization that was founded in Milan on September 23, 2001. Although styling itself as autonomous and

214

Chapter Nine

independent, the association was in its earlier period strongly contiguous with UCOII (the Italian acronym for Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy), perhaps the principal among several Islamic organizations in Italy. Over these last years, GMI acquired a solid organizational framework, with a general assembly that elects a president and an executive board dealing with public relations with governmental bodies and the media. There are also several local branches, with their own assemblies and elected boards, particularly all over Northern Italy (Tamimi 2011, pp. 154-156). The main target of the association is the young Muslim population, regardless of its citizenship or naturalization status, in the age group between 14 and 30. A common range of activities include religious teaching with Qur’anic reading and exegesis, moral instruction, cultural events, dissemination of information about Islam through makeshift stands (called “Da’wa Street”) with books and leaflets, intercultural gatherings, and leisure activities that offer a venue for “Islamically correct” socialization, fun, and sport. These activities are portrayed as intended to facilitate the transition from a state of anomie among teenagers deprived of guidelines and interaction with peers to a final condition described as “balancing of identities”, where both identities (Muslim and Italian) are fully developed in a combination that is seen as harmonious and without contradictions (Giovani Musulmani21). GMI appears clearly among what Allievi has individuated as the main actors or entrepreneurs of identity in Italy’s Islam: mosques, Islamic centres, prayer halls, with different organizational degrees; brotherhoods, including the marginal and the heterodox; associations based on places of origin and ethnicity; free lancers (scholars, artists, opinion makers, media personalities); collective social actors (Allievi 2002, p. 52). In fact, Islam, especially in a migration context, is not a monolith, but should be best understood as defined by a plurality of different practices enacted by and among different groups of Muslims. Most of these groups, in turn, might be vying for visibility, legitimacy, or hegemony (Brambilla, Rizzi 2011, p. 137). Allievi argues that, in the case of the first generations, the Lebenswelt (lifeworld) of Islam is located in an “elsewhere” that is almost always connected with an idealized place of origin, and arouses feelings of nostalgia and desires of return “back home”. For second generations, however, religious practices and identities are developed, and religious socialization takes place in a non-Islamic context, which constitutes the main frame and background scenario, as well as a source of symbols and meanings, even when narratives and practices of contestation and otherness are enacted (Allievi 2002, p. 70).

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

215

The generational gap might therefore lead the Muslim second generations to a process of cultural bricolage and the possible experimentation of forms of multi-layered identity as well as innovations: it is not uncommon to observe processes of distance from traditional rituals, anchored in the context of the places of origin of the first generations, accompanied by processes of re-Islamization of life, and appropriation of the religious discourse along new terms. The experience of GMI, according to Brambilla and Rizzi, could be assumed as a privileged case study of identity-building, at a time when its associates are confronted with generational dissonance with their parents and/or groups of adults, anti-Islamic stigma, forms of faith-motivated engagement (iltizƗm) in the public sphere (Brambilla, Rizzi 2011, pp. 138-140). For the time being, group activities organized by GMI seem characterized by a general atmosphere of enthusiasm and mobilization, with a strong emphasis on cohesion and peer mutual support as a tool for choosing the “the right path” and avoid un-Islamic lifestyles22. Religious activities are integrated by spaces and times of leisure, such as picnics, outdoor activities, and dinners, where the mood is jovial, but still compliant with “pious” standards, and Islamically correct dress codes and gender relations.23

Choosing who you want to be There are two keywords in GMI’s campaign. The first is “protagonists”, with a strong emphasis on individual and collective agency, and a rejection of any form of marginalization or internalized sense of inferiority. Open profession of faith as well as speaking out loud are valued practices. The underlying concept seems to be that all the members of the association are a constituent part of Italy’s society, and not just a minority that receives gracious tolerance by the mainstream. The other keyword is “choose (who we want to be)”, which again conveys feelings of agency, identity-building, and bricolage across multiple layers. Interestingly, this process is not seen as strictly dependent upon the immigration legislation or any other juridical aspect, but rather upon a personal endeavour of self-consciousness and interaction with other people. Playing with the bits and pieces of one’s own cultural heritage and identity is taken to the utmost by a group of young women and men who revolve around an editorial project launched in 2007 by a magazine called Vita, which is dedicated to not-for-profit associationism. The project was called Yalla Italia (clearly a pun related to Silvio Berlusconi’s political

216

Chapter Nine

party Forza Italia, literally “Let’s go Italy”), and involved a monthly supplement to Vita with stories, op-eds, and anecdotes of the “second generations”, their challenges, expectations, and compromises. Many issues revolved around sensitive topics, such as family relations, stereotypes and media portrayals, interfaith couples, in a tone that wanted to be predominantly ironic, humorous, and proud at the same time. As the then editor-in-chief wrote: “In all honesty, Yalla Italia was originally envisioned as a sort of Seinfeld—like blog about nothing with a humorous tone. However, the Arab and Muslim identity put into an Italian context turned out to be much more than a publication about nothing. It is, in fact, about new citizens and new citizenship in a country that is, slowly but effectively, becoming a melting pot where funny life situations based on cultural diversity occur at school, in the coffee shop and in the living room” (Altmuslim, June 24, 2008).

The printed version ceased to exist at the beginning of 2011, and the project has evolved since then into a blog-type platform with thematic threads. The purpose of the project is ostensibly to obtain visibility on the media, and to communicate an image of the second generations that dispels preconceptions and one-dimensional characterization.24 The keyword here is “normal”, because many articles are conceived in order to represent second generations as “normal individuals”. Being perceived by others as “funny” is seen as a substantial part of the construction of this discourse of normalcy (Altmuslim, June 24, 2008). However, while the intentions behind this communication strategy are understandable (rejection of stigma and stereotypes, emphasis on common needs and dreams), it is the very definition of “normal” that remains problematic: who is a normal Italian, and who sets the bar of what is normal and what is not? After all, could this discourse about normality send the message that others are acceptable only if they aren’t “too much other”? It is also interesting to observe that the profile of those who participate in the Yalla Italia project comes across as anything but “normal”: nearly all hold at least a graduate degree, are Milan-based, and work in sectors related to liberal arts or with an international dimension. Their experiences can be easily summarized as success stories, but they also yet again raise the issue of representativeness: how much are they representative of the broader circle of second generations, above all of those who do not expose or express themselves through associationism, or those who have less

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

217

successful, and less “funny” or colourful stories to narrate (Yalla Italia 201225? In a context plagued by fragmentation, exceptionalism, political uncertainty, and an alarming incremental normalization of Islamophobia in public discourses, both identity-based and transversal forms of association show all their limits: the former can overlook individual variance, agency, needs, and sensitivities; the latter can overlook the desire to put down roots and feel part of a community. The same dilemma is reflected in the distinction between associations that are keen on building and strengthening communal identities and bonds (often at the risk of being perceived as exclusivist and separatist), and those calling for closer integration (often at the risk of downplaying cultural differences, and sometimes internalizing notions of dominance and subalternity).

Challenges and opportunities Despite these limits and a trend of fragility, associationism among immigrants and second generations can still play a hugely positive role. Researchers in social sciences, journalists, public officers, community leaders, members of secular and denominational organizations concur that immigrant associations can very often bridge the gap between the immigrants themselves (especially newcomers) and the host society. Their role of mediation can also offer a precious contribution to dialogue and mutual knowledge among different cultures and faiths (Caselli, Grandi 2011, p. 39). Surveys and reports related to immigration in Lombardy have also identified a number of areas where much work remains to be done. While such a list is by no means conclusive, a brief description of them might be worthwhile at this point. Firstly, most of the actors listed above assume that it is now imperative to solve the mixture of juridical vacuum and confusion that has been hindering so many efforts in the past. Although not all advocate lax criteria for naturalization, there seems to be a wide consensus that the recognition of full civil, and possibly some political rights can be the key to an inclusion into the public sphere, as well as a way to avoid forms of alienation and de facto apartheid. According to Rhazzali, a system that fosters practices of inclusion is particularly crucial for teenagers and second generations in general, who are more vulnerable to deviance and apathy. Despite the immense challenges posed by public debt and huge spending cuts, a system that strives to provide equal chances is also seen as fundamental.26

218

Chapter Nine

Public education and public health system, in particular, are identified as the two most important venues where the government should keep investing in. The former, in particular, is singled out as the most effective and meaningful venue for practices of mutual knowledge and integration. This, however, should require a thorough review of the existing curricula, and a solution of the current impasse among those who advocate a secular education in public schools, and those who want to maintain some religious education and symbols. A controversial debate all among autochthonous Italians has very often hindered second generations (Brambilla, Rizzi 2011, pp. 117-120). The inclusion of courses or lessons of language, culture, and religion of the place of origin in the educational curriculum is also seen as a way to face two already existing phenomena: one is the success of unregistered, unofficial schools with a marked ethnic and/or confessional identity, the other is the trend of sending children back to the country of origin, in order to receive a “proper” education (Brambilla, Rizzi 2011, pp. 127-139). Practices of mutual knowledge of the other and intercultural dialogue are also considered as good practices for adults. The creation of shared projects, shared practices, shared spaces and shared times of socialization at the grassroots level is particularly emphasized by authors and activists like Brunetto Salvarani.27 In this regard, the localist system described earlier in this essay, and defined as an extreme variation of conditions, practices, and even perceptions across the territory, can be an opportunity, as well as a burden. After all, Allievi argues that it is at a local level that occasions of encounter, clash, and mutual recognition do occur, and it is at a local level that it is possible to devise adequate strategies and tools of management (Allievi 2002, pp. 57-61). Borghi very aptly underlines how clear processes of ethnic ghettoization and gentrification are impacting on urban spaces in many large-, medium-, and even small-sized cities across Northern Italy, with surprising rapidity. Whereas urban ghettoes are not unheard of in metropolitan areas such as Milan, where entire neighbourhoods mushroomed in the 1960s to accommodate domestic immigrants from Southern Italy, urban planners and decision-makers ought to possibly learn from past mistakes and avoid spatial segregation along ethnic lines (Borghi 2010, pp. 103-107). Brambilla and Rizzi also aptly describe the scarcity of proper gathering places for religious purposes that afflict many immigrant communities in Lombardy, and Muslims in particular. There is documented evidence of a number of cases of “selective rigor”, where bureaucratic requirements have been excruciatingly and selectively imposed by local administrations

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

219

(especially NL-held ones) on places intended for worship, or regarding the concession of public spaces for religious (Islamic) events and gatherings, unnecessarily causing anger and resentment (Brambilla, Rizzi 2011, pp. 112, 120-130, 135). Antonio Carminati has been working extensively on the emigration process in the early twentieth century from the valleys north of Bergamo, from villages and places like Vertova. Its work is a combination of oral history, official documents, letters, and postcards, which paint a grim image of the experience that so many Lombards had to endure in their quest for a better life, or simply for survival (Centro studi valle imagna). Only one century later, their stories of encounters with border authorities and police corps, employers, house tenants, of stigma, rejection, and marginalization in their host countries, the variety of ways they coped with it, and variety of ways they related to all they had left behind, are just so similar to the experiences that many immigrants face today in the very same towns and valleys from where they had left. It is mind-boggling, and it is a pity that there is not enough connection between the memory of emigration (and of what émigrés from all regions of Italy had to endure), and the living experience of immigration. Perhaps it is a problem related to Italy’s feeble and selective historical memory. It is a pity, nevertheless. Historical memory and a healthy, inclusive, nonabusive debate without taboos appear as sensible ways to learn from past mistakes, and to steer away from all the depressing stereotypes and misconceptions that still surround the discourses on immigration.

Acknowledgments I am deeply grateful to: don Massimo Rizzi (Diocesi di Bergamo); Paolo Branca (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano); Daniele Rocchetti, Giangabriele Vertova (ACLI, Bergamo); Brunetto Salvarani; Kibra Sebhat, Medhin Paolos (Rete G2); Mohamed Saleh, Imad El Joulani (Centro Culturale Islamico, Bergamo); Luigi Gualdi (Comune di Vertova); Omar Jibril, Ghiath El Joulani (GMI); Imane Barmaki, Akram Idries, Lubna Ammoune, Randa Ghazy, Rania Ibrahim, Martino Pillitteri (Yalla Italia); Mohammed Rhazzali (Università di Padova); Rassmea Salah; Susanna Tamimi; and many other people who shared with me their precious opinions, comments, and experiences.

220

Chapter Nine

Notes 1

Amir Issaa, more popularly known with his stage name Amir, is a Rome-based hip-hop artist of mixed (Egyptian-Italian) background. His often inflammatory lyrics convey feelings of alienation, dispossession, and rejection in the rough suburban context of the outskirts of Rome. Most of his songs revolve around issues of identity and self-representation (Amir Issaa 2010, www.amirmusic.it). 2 Bergamondo, a migration-related supplement to the local newspaper L’Eco di Bergamo, covered this topic on January 15, January 22, January 29, February 5, October 22, October 29, 2009. 3 Interview with deputy mayor Luigi Gualdi. Vertova, January 18, 2012. 4 Data obtained from the municipal offices, January 18, 2012. 5 Interview with deputy mayor Luigi Gualdi. Vertova, January 18, 2012. 6 Rhazzali’s work focusses in particular on Muslim inmates in Northern Italy’s correctional institutions. 7 Interview with the author. Bergamo, December 5, 2011. 8 Participant observation. Milan, October 10, 2011. 9 www.litaliasonoanchio.it/index.php?id=521 (Retrieved January 5, 2013) 10 www.litaliasonoanchio.it/fileadmin/materiali_italiaanchio/pdf/PROGETTO_DI_ LEGGE_-_Norme_sulla_cittadinanza_-_testo.pdf (Retrieved January 5, 2013) 11 www.litaliasonoanchio.it/fileadmin/materiali_italiaanchio/pdf/Norme_per_la_ partecipazione_e_il_diritto_di_elettorato_-_Testo_ddl.pdf (Retrieved January 5, 2013) 12 www.secondegenerazioni.it/legge-cittadinanza/ (Retrieved April 3, 2013) 13 www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/servizi/come_fare /cittadinanza/Concessione_della_cittadinanza_italiana_a_cittadini_stranieri_reside nti_in_Italia_xart._9x_legge_5_febbraio_1992x_n._91x_e_modifiche.html (Retrieved March 15, 2013) 14 www.meltingpot.org/IMG/pdf/circolare_ministero_interno_citadinanza_-_linee_ interpretative.pdf (Retrieved March 2, 2013) 15 www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/temi/immigrazione/english _version/Single_desk_for_immigration.html (Retrieved March 15, 2013) 16 www.secondegenerazioni.it/about/ (Retrieved April 3, 2013) 17 www.secondegenerazioni.it/about/ (Retrieved April 3, 2013) 18 www.secondegenerazioni.it/g2-nel-2011/ (Retrieved April 3, 2013) 19 Interview with an activist. Milan, January 6, 2012. 20 www.youtube.com/watch?v=Olh2Unq1NZQ (Retrieved February 14, 2013) 21 www.giovanimusulmani.it/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article &id=72&Itemid=54 (Retrieved March 15, 2013) 22 www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qm-PvWqiDik; www.youtube.com/user/GMIproduction (Retrieved February 14, 2013) 23 Participant observation. Bergamo, October 27, December 10, December 20, 2011. 24 Interview with a member of the project. Milan, January 12, 2012. 25 www.yallaitalia.it/chi-siamo/ (Retrieved March 4, 2013)

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

26 27

Interview with the author. Bergamo, December 5, 2011. Interview with the author. Bergamo, May 31, 2011.

221

222

Chapter Nine

Bibliography Affari italiani. “Senza cittadinanza, i figli degli immigrati scelgono gli istituti tecnici per trovare lavoro.” Affari italiani, June 28, 2012. http://affaritaliani.libero.it/sociale/figli-immigrati-scelgono-gli-istitutitecnici-per-trovare-lavoro280612.html (Retrieved February 5, 2013). Allievi, Stefano. Musulmani d’Occidente: Tendenze dell’islam europeo. Roma: Carocci, 2002. Altmuslim. “Yalla Italia magazine: Nothing with a big meaning.” Altmuslim, June 24, 2008. www.patheos.com/blogs/altmuslim/2008/06/nothing_with_a_big_mea ning/ (Retrieved January 30, 2013). Amir Issaa. Amir Music, 2010. www.amirmusic.it (Retrieved March 6, 2013). Barbera, Marzia. “L’approccio emergenziale alla questione della convivenza.” In: Elena Besozzi (ed.), Immigrazione e contesti locali. Milano: Vita e pensiero-CIRMiB (2010), pp. 95-101. Besozzi, Elena. Immigrazione e contesti locali. Milano: Vita e pensieroCIRMiB, 2010. Borghi, Paolo. “Gli studi sul quartiere Carmine di Brescia: Mutamento urbano e popolazione immigrata.” In: Elena Besozzi (ed.), Immigrazione e contesti locali. Milano: Vita e pensiero-CIRMiB (2010), pp. 103-107. Brambilla, Chiara and Rizzi, Massimo. Migrazioni e religioni: Un’esperienza locale di dialogo tra cristiani e musulmani. Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2011. Caselli, Marco and Grandi, Francesco. Volti e percorsi delle associazioni di immigrati in Lombardia. Milano: Fondazione ISMU-ORIM, 2011. Centro studi valle imagna. www.centrostudivalleimagna.it (Retrieved March 1, 2013). Ciavoni, Carlo. “L’Italia sono anch’io, futuro incerto: Pdl e Lega si alleano e fanno blocco.” La Repubblica, August 1, 2012. http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/diritti-umani/2012/08/01/ news/cittadinanza-40177790/ (Retrieved March 4, 2013). Colombo, Maddalena. “Il futuro delle giovani generazioni.” In: Elena Besozzi (ed.), Immigrazione e contesti locali. Milano: Vita e pensieroCIRMiB (2010), pp. 117-135. Dematteo, Lynda. L’idiota in politica: Antropologia della Lega Nord. Milano: Feltrinelli, 2011. [L’idiotie en politique: Subversion et néopopulisme en Italie. Paris: Fondation Maison des science de l’homme, 2007.]

Second Generations in Lombardy: Looking for a Model

223

Fondazione ISMU. Iniziative e studi sulla multietnicità. www.ismu.org (Retrieved February 26, 2013). Giovani musulmani. www.giovanimusulmani.it (Retrieved March 15, 2013). Giovani musulmani d´Italia, 2012. www.youtube.com/user/GMIproduction (Retrieved March 20, 2013). L´Italia sono anch´io. Campagna per i diritti di cittadinanza, 2011. www.litaliasonoanchio.it (Retrieved January 5, 2013). Menonna, Alessio and Blangiardo, Marta. “L’immigrazione straniera in provincia di Brescia: Anno 2008.” In: Elena Besozzi (ed.), Immigrazione e contesti locali. Milano: Vita e pensiero-CIRMiB (2010), pp. 25-75. Ministero dell´interno, Roma. www.interno.gov.it (Retrieved March 15, 2013). Molte fedi sotto lo stesso cielo. Per una convivialità delle differenze. www.moltefedisottolostessocielo.it (Retrieved April 4, 2013). Osservatorio regionale per l`integrazione e la multietnicità. www.orimregionelombardia.it (Retrieved January 9, 2013). Progetto Melting Pot Europa. Per la promozione dei diritti di cittadinanza, 2003-2010. www.meltingpot.org (Retrieved March 2, 2013). Rete G2—Seconde generazioni, 2010. www.secondegenerazioni.it (Retrieved April 3, 2013). Rhazzali, Mohammed Khalid. L’islam in carcere: L’esperienza religiosa dei giovani musulmani nelle carceri italiane. Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2010. Tamimi, Susanna. “Giovani musulmani d’Italia.” In: Marco Caselli and Francesco Grandi (eds.), Volti e percorsi delle associazioni di immigrati in Lombardia. Milano: Fondazione ISMU-ORIM (2011), pp. 153-162. Yalla Italia. Il blog delle seconde generazioni, 2012. www.yallaitalia.it (Retrieved March 4, 2013).

CONTRIBUTORS

Editors Francis Owtram has a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and is the author of “A Modern History of Oman: Formation of the State since 1920” (IB Tauris, 2004). From 2007 to 2012 he was a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kurdistan Hawler, Erbil, Iraq. His research interests include the International Relations of the Middle East, with a special interest in the Gulf States. He also has an interest in ethno-politics and contributed the chapter “The Foreign Policies of Unrecognized States” in N. Caspersen and G. Stansfield (eds.), “Unrecognized States in the International System” (Routledge 2010). He is currently an Honorary Fellow of the Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter and a Gulf History Specialist in the Qatar Partnership Programme at the British Library. Annemarie Profanter is an Associate Professor in Intercultural Pedagogy at the Faculty of Education of the Free University of Bolzano, Italy. She received her two doctorates in both Education and Psychology and a master’s degree in Psychology of Education from the University of Innsbruck, Austria, and from the University of London, UK. Since 2004 she resided periodically in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula doing fieldwork and visiting fellowships for international institutions such as “The City University of Science and Information Technology” in Peshawar, Pakistan; the American University afliated “Dhofar University” in Salalah, Sultanate of Oman; and “Prince Mohammed University” in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. She is working on projects addressing Arab women’s experiences in the Gulf and has recently published a documentary on polygyny in collaboration with the Ministry of Information in Oman. Her current research includes Islamic integration and migration issues in Europe.

226

Contributors

Contributors Khawlah Ahmed earned a PhD in English, with a minor in TESOL, from the State University of New York, USA. She has more than 15 years of experience working in institutions such as the SUNY Research Foundation (using Computer Management Instruction), New York State school system, and institutions in the Middle East in the capacity of both administrator (Dean/Associate Dean) and faculty member (undergraduate and graduate levels). She is a member of several international academic organizations/research foundations holding positions that range from reviewing articles and grant proposals to editorial board member. Her research interests include examining theories of teaching that facilitate learning in mainstream and ESP/EFL/ESL contexts, curriculum development, intercultural communication, culturally relevant pedagogy and the Arab Islamic culture and its connections to the English language and literature. Christine Difato is from Florida, USA, but her chapter draws on experiences and research conducted while living in Berlin and London. After spending a year as a Fulbright scholar in the former East Germany, various observations led to citizenship and education becoming a central theme of her research and writing. This interest was pursued throughout her postgraduate studies at the University of Cambridge and Exeter University. As a member of the Centre for Ethno-Political Studies under the direction of Professor Gareth Stansfield, numerous interviews were conducted in Germany and the UK, culminating in research presentations in several countries around Europe and the Middle East. She is currently an adjunct professor at the University of North Florida. Nigel M. Greaves lectures in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kurdistan Hawler. His subject specialism is political theory/philosophy, political history and the history of political ideas, especially that which relates to epochal shifts and revolutions; epistemology; historiology; labour and socialist movements; and fascism and the politics of reaction. Dr. Greaves was awarded a BSc (first class hons) in Politics from the University of Plymouth in 1998; an MA in Political Philosophy from the University of York in 1999 and his PhD for his work on the Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci in 2005 from the University of Northampton/University of Leicester. Dr. Greaves has taught previously at the Universities of Bristol, Thames Valley and Northampton. He has amassed a growing number of journal and book

Citizenship in Transition

227

publications in political philosophy, particularly in the area of historical materialism. Sotirios S. Livas is Assistant Professor at Corfu Ionian University, Department of Translation, Interpretation and Foreign Languages in Greece, where he teaches International Law and Middle Eastern policy. He has written extensively in Greek and English on Islam, Turkey’s relations with the Middle East and Athens Muslim community. He has written a book in Greek and many articles in Greek and English on Fethullah Güllen and his hizmet community, has translated two books about Güllen and is currently preparing a book about the meaning of jihad. He is regular contributor to the Journal of Oriental and African Studies and other international reviews. Ulrika Mårtensson is professor at the Department of Philosophy and Religion at NTNU-The Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Her research is focused on Islam in classical, modern and contemporary contexts. Across these different historical periods, the research is unified by its analytical focus on how discourses on Islam—by Muslims as well as non-Muslims—express institutional norms and practices. For the medieval period one of her major publications is the guest-edited special issue “Materialist Approaches to Islamic History” and the article “It’s the economy, stupid!” Al-Tabarî’s Analysis of the Free-Rider Problem in the Abbasid Caliphate’ in “Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient” (2011). In the field of contemporary research she has edited the special issue “Public Islam and the Nordic Welfare State: Changing Realities?” published jointly by “Studies in Contemporary Islam and Tidskrift for islamforskning” (2013). Francesco Mazzucotelli holds a PhD in Political Institutions from the Catholic University in Milan, where he is currently a teaching assistant in the course of History and Institutions of the Muslim World. He has previously studied at the American University of Beirut. With a specific reference to the post-Ottoman space, his main lines of research are the formation of sectarian identities in the public sphere; the relationship between religions, modernity, and post-modernity; and the role of urban spaces in contemporary politics. He is currently co-authoring an issue of “Storia Urbana” on the role of urban spaces in the Arab Spring.

228

Contributors

Necla Ozturk graduated from Ankara University School of Law in Turkey in 1993. After graduation she was admitted to the Ankara Bar, practising law. Between 1995 and 1998 she worked as a clerk to the Judge in Ankara before moving to academia and teaching. She then worked as a research assistant between January 1998 and December 2007 in Ankara University School of Law. Ozturk graduated with a Master’s Degree in 1999 from Ankara University Institute of Social Sciences and a PhD degree in the area of conflict of law within the framework of Private International law in 2007 also from Ankara University. She went to Emory University in the USA during the year 2004 as a visiting scholar and then to Columbia University in NYC in the year 2007. Currently she teaches in Akdeniz University School of Law as an associate professor in areas of Citizenship Law, Rights for Foreigners and Private International Law. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is Co-Director of the Kuwait Research Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, based at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and an Associate Fellow on the MENA Programme at Chatham House. His research focuses on political and security trends in the Gulf and the region’s changing position in the global order. His publications include “Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era” (2011), “The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order” (2011), and “The Political Economy of Arab Gulf States” (2012).