Die digitale Mediamorphose und der Wandel der traditionellen Massenmedien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie [1. Aufl. 2019] 978-3-658-27964-6, 978-3-658-27965-3

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages I-VII
Einleitung und Problemstellung (Paul Clemens Murschetz)....Pages 9-35
Einzelbeiträge (Paul Clemens Murschetz)....Pages 37-286
Zusammenfassung und Ausblick (Paul Clemens Murschetz)....Pages 293-321

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Paul Clemens Murschetz

Die digitale Mediamorphose und der Wandel der traditionellen Massenmedien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie

Die digitale Mediamorphose und der Wandel der traditionellen Massenmedien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie

Paul Clemens Murschetz

Die digitale Mediamorphose und der Wandel der traditionellen Massenmedien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie

Paul Clemens Murschetz Salzburg, Österreich Habilitationsschrift Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, 2016 u.d.T.: Paul Clemens Murschetz: „Die „digitale Mediamorphose“ und der Wandel der traditionellen Massenmedien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie – kommunikationswissenschaftliche Konzeptionen.“

ISBN 978-3-658-27964-6 ISBN 978-3-658-27965-3  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27965-3 Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen National­ bibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. Springer Gabler © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019 Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung, die nicht ausdrücklich vom Urheberrechtsgesetz zugelassen ist, bedarf der vorherigen Zustimmung des Verlags. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Bearbeitungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Die Wiedergabe von allgemein beschreibenden Bezeichnungen, Marken, Unternehmensnamen etc. in diesem Werk bedeutet nicht, dass diese frei durch jedermann benutzt werden dürfen. Die Berechtigung zur Benutzung unterliegt, auch ohne gesonderten Hinweis hierzu, den Regeln des Markenrechts. Die Rechte des jeweiligen Zeicheninhabers sind zu beachten. Der Verlag, die Autoren und die Herausgeber gehen davon aus, dass die Angaben und Informa­ tionen in diesem Werk zum Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung vollständig und korrekt sind. Weder der Verlag, noch die Autoren oder die Herausgeber übernehmen, ausdrücklich oder implizit, Gewähr für den Inhalt des Werkes, etwaige Fehler oder Äußerungen. Der Verlag bleibt im Hinblick auf geografische Zuordnungen und Gebietsbezeichnungen in veröffentlichten Karten und Institutionsadressen neutral. Springer Gabler ist ein Imprint der eingetragenen Gesellschaft Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH und ist ein Teil von Springer Nature. Die Anschrift der Gesellschaft ist: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

INHALTSÜBERSICHT Präliminarien

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I. Einleitung und Problemstellung

9

1.1 Leitfragen der Sammelschrift

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1.2 Ziele und Methoden

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1.3 Organisation der Sammelschrift

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II. Einzelbeiträge

37

Beitrag 1: Making Media Management Matter – Some Preliminary Thoughts

37

Beitrag 2: Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle von Medien

45

Beitrag 3: Staatliche Medienförderung

67

Beitrag 4: State Aid for Newspapers: First Theoretical Disputes

89

Beitrag 5: State Support for the Press: A Critical Appraisal – Austria, France

115

Beitrag 6: Austria. Press Subsidies in Search of a New Design

131

Beitrag 7: The Theory of Market Failure in the Media Business

147

Beitrag 8: Public Service Television at the Digital Crossroads – Austria

153

Beitrag 9: Digital Pay-TV in Germany: A Viable Lesson for Market Failure

169

Beitrag 10: Connected TV - Media Convergence, Industry …

191

Beitrag 11: Social Media, Alternatives to Commercial

213

Beitrag 12: Customer Integration through Web Interactivity

217

Beitrag 13: The Business Value of Interactivity

239

Beitrag 14: Interactivity and Leadership Effectiveness: A Concept Review

279

III. Zusammenfassung und Ausblick

293

Präliminarien Die hier vorgelegte Habilitationsschrift (kumulativ) dient dem Nachweis der hervorragenden wissenschaftlichen Qualifikation auf Basis einer publikationsbasierten Einreichung einer Reihe von hochwertigen Veröffentlichungen, die der Autor über einen längeren Zeitraum verfassen konnte. Diesen Veröffentlichungen, die im Teil 2 dieser Schrift gesammelt angeboten sind, ist diese einleitende und zusammenführende Begleitschrift beigefügt, die auf jede der Einzelarbeiten eingeht und ihren thematischen Zusammenhang hervorhebt. Die vorgelegte Habilitationsschrift stellt im ersten (Teil I) und abschließenden Teil (Teil III) den Versuch dar, eine methodisch-geleitete inhaltlich-thematische Synopsis der beigelegten und im Mittelteil der Arbeit gesammelten Veröffentlichungen des Autors zu erstellen. Diese Synopsis versteht sich als integraler Beitrag zur Erforschung ausgewählter Phänomene der „digitalen Mediamorphose“. Es sollen damit Erkenntnisse aus der Medienökonomie und der Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft entsprechend miteinander verzahnt werden. Dem Autor wurde im Anschluß nach Abschluß des Habilitationsverfahrens an der Alpen-AdriaUniversität Klagenfurt die Lehrbefugnis (Venia Docendi) für das gesamte wissenschaftliche Fach der „Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft“ erteilt. Titel der überwiegend in deutscher Sprache abgelegten Habilitationsschrift aus dem Jahr 2016 war: „Die ‚digitale Mediamorphose‘ und der Wandel der ‚Leitmedien‘ aus Sicht der Medienökonomie – Kommunikationswissenschaftliche Konzeptionen.“ Der Autor dankt insbesondere seinem akademischen Mentor, Herrn Univ-Prof. Mag.DDr. Matthias Karmasin, stellvertretender Institutsvorstand am Institut für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft der Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, und Direktor des Instituts für vergleichende Medien- und Kommunikationsforschung an der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Sein Dank gilt auch den beiden Gutachtern, Univ.-Prof. Dr. Josef Trappel, Leiter der Abteilung Medienpolitik und Medienökonomie an der Paris-Lodron-Universität Salzburg, und Frau Univ.-Professorin Dr. Gabriele Siegert, Vize-Rektorin der Universität Zürich. Dem gesamten Team des Institutes für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft an der Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt dankt der Autor für die angenehme Arbeitsatmosphäre im Team.

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I.

Einleitung und Problemstellung

In den letzten Jahren haben Mediensysteme westlicher Demokratien radikale Veränderungen erfahren. Der Eintritt medienferner Unternehmen in klassische Medienmärkte, ein vor allem durch Digitalisierung1 und Medienkonvergenz2 induzierter Wandel der Medientechnologien, ein durch Globalisierung des Mediensystems und der Marktstrukturen gestiegener Wettbewerbsdruck sowie Änderungen des Nutzungsverhaltens, und die durchgehende „Ökonomisierung“ bzw. „Kommerzialisierung“ des Mediengeschäfts im Gefolge der „Sachzwänge“ des Marktes haben alte Strukturen aufgebrochen und zu einer besonders dynamischen Entwicklung am Medienmarkt geführt (Altmeppen, 2011; fög, 2015; Rau, 2014; Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2015). Trotz ihrer anhaltenden Bedeutung und Wichtigkeit für Gesellschaft und Demokratie sind die marktwirtschaftlichen Mechanismen der Organisation und Finanzierung von traditionellen Medien und ihren Redaktionen über Anzeigen und Verkaufserlöse in Zeiten von Krisen und Transformationen zunehmend schwieriger geworden (Karmasin, 2014; Kiefer, 2011; Lobigs, 2013; Picard, 2005). Und wenn sich selbst sogenannte „Leitmedien“ (Jarren & Vogel, 2011; Künzler, 2013c), also eine Gesellschaft prägende und im Mediensystem führende Medien in einer strukturellen Krise befinden sollen, welche Gründe sind dann aus Sicht der Medienökonomie für den daraus resultierenden Wandel von öffentlicher Kommunikation, ja von Wertvorstellungen und gesellschaftlichen Kommunikationspraktiken verantwortlich (Blum et al., 2011; Dal Zotto & van Kranenburg, 2008; Jarren, 1994; Trappel et al., 2015)?3 Die marktmäßige Organisation von Medieninhalten und den sie produzierenden Medienunternehmen ist in dreierlei Hinsicht problematisch: Erstens verändern sich durch den Eintritt von anfänglich reinen Technologielieferanten zu jetzt faktisch weltweit tätigen Internetkonzernen wie Google und Facebook in den Medienmarkt die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen und Medienstrukturen der traditionellen publizistischen Massenmedien substanziell. Dies führt zur Verschiebung der Medienbudgets zu Ungunsten vieler traditioneller Massenmedien. Die rückläufige Nutzung ebendieser Medien erschwert ihre Refinanzierung (Kiefer, 2011; Picard, 2002; Picot & Freyberg, 2010; Puppis & Künzler, 2011; Seufert & Sattelberger, 2013). Zweitens gilt als Grundproblem der Medienfinanzierung, dass sich Medien zu einem großen Teil indirekt, nämlich überwiegend in Form einer „Umweg-Finanzierung“ durch Werbung refinanzieren müssen, weil ihr eigentliches Produkt, die Information, ein quasiöffentliches Gut ist. Ein solches ist ja bekanntermaßen durch Nichtrivalität und

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„Digitalisierung“ beschreibt den Veränderungsprozess, in dessen Rahmen analoge, materielle Informationseinheiten durch entmaterialisierte, digitalen (binäre) Informationseinheiten ersetzt werden (Küng et al., 2008; Zerdick et al., 2001).

2 „Konvergenz“ wird in der Regel als mehrdimensionaler Prozess verstanden, der folgende Bereiche mit einschließt:

x x x x x x

Technische Konvergenz (z. B. Digitalisierung, Standardisierung) Ökonomische Konvergenz (z. B. Verschmelzung von bisher getrennten Märkten, Neuordnung von Wertschöpfungsketten) Soziale Konvergenz / Konvergenz der Mediennutzung (z. B. Nutzungspräferenzen und -muster) Kulturelle Konvergenz (z. B. transmediales Erzählen, verknüpfte Inhalte) Policy-Konvergenz (z. B. Deregulierung, Verschmelzung von Regulierungsfeldern und -institutionen) Globale Konvergenz (z. B. Internationalisierung von Strategien und Inhalten) (vgl. von Rimscha & Siegert, 2015, S. 49; zum Begriff „Konvergenz“ siehe auch Vowe & Henn, 2015).

3

Die Diskussion um das Thema „Leitmedien“ als Qualitätsmedien wurde bereits an anderer Stelle ausführlich geführt und soll daher hier nicht wiederholt werden (vgl. Ziemann, 2011; Jarren & Vogel, 2011).

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019 P. C. Murschetz, Die digitale Mediamorphose und der Wandel der traditionellen Massenmedien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27965-3_1

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Nichtausschließbarkeit im Konsum und damit durch mangelnde Marktfähigkeit gekennzeichnet (Adams, 1993; Cornes & Sandler, 1986; Cowen, 2008; Detering, 2001). Nichtrivalität und Nichtausschließbarkeit im Konsum hat weitreichende Konsequenzen: Die zusätzlichen Kosten, die entstehen, wenn jeweils ein weiterer Rezipient die Information verbraucht, sind gleich Null. Das hat zur Folge, dass die Kosten der Informationsproduktion mit zunehmender Nachfrage auf immer mehr Rezipienten verteilt werden, mit der Konsequenz, dass die Produktionskosten pro Kopf mit zunehmender Nachfrage deutlich sinken. Ersetzt man Nachfrage medientypisch durch Auflage bzw. Reichweite, so wird unmittelbar einsichtig, warum beide für Medienunternehmen eine zentrale Bedeutung haben: Medien sind erst in großer Menge, in der Masse, richtig wirtschaftlich, Minderheitsangebote haben prinzipiell wenig Chancen, wirtschaftlich vermarktet zu werden. Mangelnde Marktfähigkeit ist für Verkäufer ein zentrales Problem, weil Güter in der Regel auf dem Markt verkauft werden sollen. Ein Verkauf gelingt aber nur dann, wenn der Käufer das Eigentum am gekauften Produkt erwerben kann. Bei manchen Gütern kann man aber Eigentum nicht oder nur schwer erwerben, weil Eigentumsrechte nicht durchgesetzt werden können. Das gilt insbesondere für Eigentumsrechte an natürlichen Ressourcen wie Sonne, Luft, Wasser, aber eben auch für Eigentumsrechte an Informationen. Dies liegt an den formalen Charakteristika der Information: Sie ist kein physisches Produkt, ein Verbrauch ist nicht notwendig an den physischen Besitz gebunden, und ein unbefugter Verbrauch ist wegen der Nichtrivalität im Konsum nicht direkt erkennbar. Und drittens wird „Ökonomisierung“ (Altmeppen, 2008; ibid., 2011; McManus, 2009), „Kommerzialisierung“ (Medien Journal, 2001; Winter & Karmasin, 2001) und „Kapitalisierung“ (Knoche, 2014; ibid., 2002; ibid., 2001) längst als ein wesentlicher Entwicklungstrend kapitalistischer Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsformationen und damit auch der Medien angesehen. Im Kern geht es darum, dass durch Ökonomisierung (auf Marktebene), Kommerzialisierung (auf Produktebene), und Kapitalisierung (auf Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsebene) die grundsätzliche Orientierung von privat-kommerziellen aber auch öffentlich-rechtlichen Medien an Effizienz- und Rentabilitätskriterien der Medien noch deutlicher akzentuiert wird (Karmasin et al., 2001). Insbesondere privat-kommerzielle Medienunternehmen folgen nämlich konsequent und recht rücksichtslos dem Primat der Gewinnmaximierung, und zwar allzu oft auf Kosten der wirtschaftlichen Fairness und der Qualität und Vielfalt der angebotenen Inhalte (Altmeppen, 2013, in Bentele et al., 2013, S. 254). Die in einem Strang der kommunikationswissenschaftlich orientierten medienökonomischen Literatur seit langem geführte „Ökonomisierungsdebatte“ (vgl. Medien Journal, 2001; Rimscha & Siegert, 2015) ist heute mehr denn je aktuell, wobei die Folgen von Ökonomisierung bzw. Kommerzialisierung unterschiedlich beurteilt werden. Oftmals werden diese dezidiert kritisch bzw. pessimistisch gesehen, selbst von grundsätzlichen Befürwortern des Marktmodells für Mediengüter, vor allem aber von Vertretern einer Kritik der politischen Ökonomie der Medien (Knoche, 2014; ibid., 2013; ibid., 2002; ibid., 2001). Gerade angesichts der Spannbreite und der ungeheuren Materialfülle, die über das Phänomen des digitalen Medienwandels als sinnleitendes Paradigma des 21. Jahrhunderts bzw. des Wandels der öffentlichen Kommunikation kursiert, ist es unumgänglich, Schwerpunkte zu setzen und sich auf einige Ausschnitte der Debatte zu konzentrieren.

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1.1 Leitfragen der Sammelschrift Leitfrage 1: Was ist die „digitale Mediamorphose“? Archimedischer Punkt der hier vorliegenden Arbeit ist der Kunstbegriff der „digitalen Mediamorphose“. Der Begriff „Mediamorphose“ geht auf den Internetpionier Roger Fidler (1997) zurück, der den Begriff zur Beschreibung medialer Wandlungsprozesse entwickelte, die durch sog. „neue Medien“ angetrieben werden. „Mediamorphosis“ dient Fidler als Grundlage, um Veränderungsprozesse von Medien zu beschreiben: „The transformation of communication media, usually brought about by complex interplay of perceived needs, competitive and political pressures, and social and technological innovations“ (Fidler, 1997, p. 22). Der Musiksoziologe Kurt Blaukopf greift den Begriff auf und beschreibt damit das Phänomen des Wandels der Musik durch den Einfluss von neuen Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien („IKTs“) auf den musikalischen sowie technischen Produktionsund Distributionsprozess spätestens ab dem frühen 20. Jahrhundert (vgl. Blaukopf, 1989). Blaukopf versteht unter „Mediamorphose des Kulturschaffens“ (S. 5) einen Prozess, der die historische Entwicklung des Kulturschaffens unter dem Einfluss jeweilig historisch neuer Kommunikationstechnologien nachzeichnet. Mediamorphose“ bedeutet nach Blaukopf „eine Metamorphose, die durch Technik ausgelöst oder ermöglicht wird“ (ebd.). Die Verbindung von medialem und sozialem Wandel ist demzufolge substantiell durch die mediale Konstituiertheit des gesellschaftlich-kulturellen Wandels und der wechselseitigen Vermitteltheit von politökonomischen und ideologischen Rahmenbedingungen und den eigengesetzlichen Strukturen und Innovationsprozessen der jeweils existierenden Kommunikationstechnologien geprägt. Mit „Mediamorphose“ werden mehrere voneinander unterscheidbare Entwicklungsstufen identifiziert, die „als Ergebnisse von Mediamorphosen, d.h. umfassenden und unumkehrbaren Veränderungen des Kulturschaffens unter dem Einfluss jeweils historisch neuer Kommunikationstechnologien zu verstehen sind“ (Smudits, 2002, S. 16). Alfred Smudits (2002, S. 16ff.), Nachfolger von Blaukopf bei MEDIACULT, einem internationalen Forschungsinstitut für Medien, Kommunikation und kulturelle Entwicklung mit Sitz in Wien, fasst den Begriff etwas weiter und versteht unter einer Mediamorphose eine „umfassende und unumkehrbare Veränderung des Kulturschaffens unter dem Einfluss jeweils historischer neuer Kommunikationstechnologien“ (Smudits, 2002: 16). Diese Veränderung basiert nach Smudits im Wesentlichen auf der Digitalisierung von Gütern (vgl. Smudits, 2002, S. 173ff.). Wurden im Anfangsstadium der Mediamorphosen zunächst „alte Inhalte über neue Kommunikationstechnologien transportiert“ (Smudits, 2002, S. 91), verändern sie heute „das gesamte Beziehungsgefüge der Kommunikationskultur“ und transformieren die „Produktions, Distributions- und Rezeptionsweisen“ (ebd.). Smudits beschreibt fünf zentrale Mediamorphosen oder Entwicklungsstufen bzw. Wellen, ähnlich Kondratieff‘s (1926) längeren Wellen der Konjunkturentwicklung, wie folgt: x x x x x

die erste graphische Mediamorphose (mit der Erfindung der Schrift) die zweite graphische Mediamorphose (mit der Erfindung des Buchdrucks) die erste technische, die chemisch-mechanische Mediamorphose (mit der Erfindung von Photographie und Grammophon) die zweite technische, die elektronische Mediamorphose (mit der Erfindung von elektronischer Signalaufzeichnung und –übertragung) und die dritte technische, die digitale Mediamorphose (mit der Erfindung des Computers) 11

Die „digitale Mediamorphose“ wird als eine (letzte?) Entwicklungsstufe beschrieben, deren Auswirkungen zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt nicht abschätzbar sind. Die digitale Mediamorphose ist demnach eine Fortführung der elektronischen Mediamorphose - in einer neuen Qualität. Die Voraussetzung für die digitalen Mediamorphose stellt die Digitalisierung bzw. die digitale Kodierung von Information und Kommunikation dar. Mit dem Konzept der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ rücken somit in weiterer Folge unweigerlich die Zusammenhänge und wechselseitige Durchdringungen von digitalen Medien(-technologien), Medienwandel und Wandel von Öffentlichkeit ins Zentrum der Diskussion. Thomas Steinmaurer (2014) beschreibt diese Zusammenhänge wie folgt: „Die dynamisch sich vollziehende Durchdringung einer Vielzahl von Lebensbereichen mit Medien und Technologien der Kommunikation sowie die damit verbundenen Phänomene des gesellschaftlichen Wandels haben ein fortgeschrittenes Niveau erreicht, dessen Ausprägung und Tragweite in den Kommunikationswissenschaften mit unterschiedlichen Bezügen und Herangehensweise thematisiert wird“ (S. 3). Es liegt nahe, die Thematik der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ mit der gegenwärtig in der Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft populären Mediatisierungsforschung zu verbinden bzw. abzugrenzen (Hepp, 2013; Hepp, 2012; ibid., 2010; Hepp & Couldry, 2013; Hjarvard, 2013; ibid., 2008; Imhof, 2006; Karmasin, 2015; Krotz, 2001; ibid., 2008; Lundby, 2009; Meyen, 2009; Wendelin, 2011). Diese beschäftigt sich mit der zunehmenden Durchdringung von Alltag und Kultur mit verschiedenen Formen der Medienkommunikation und den damit verbundenen Wandlungsprozessen. „Die Mediatisierungsforschung“, so Steinmaurer, „bildet den zentralen Kristallisationskern im Rahmen ihrer analytischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen des medialen und gesellschaftlichen Wandels und trägt damit zu einer entscheidenden Dynamisierung und auch notwendigen Auseinandersetzung des Themenkanons der Kommunikationswissenschaften bei (ibid., S. 3). Die Anschlussfähigkeit der hier zentral gestellten theoretischen Perspektive der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ mit dem Mediatisierungsansatz dankt insbesondere dem Umstand, dass beide Felder ähnlichen Erklärungsstrategien folgen. Auch wenn eine solche Perspektive aus der Ferne betrachtet noch etwas vermessen erscheint, so ist doch die Behauptung der Anschlussmöglichkeit der „digitalen Mediamorphose“, die die mediale Konstituiertheit des sozialen Wandels zentralstellt, mit der Mediatisierungsthese plausibel begründbar. Sie ist insbesondere dem Umstand geschuldet, dass diese selbst davon ausgeht, dass sich in der Folge des Wandels der Medien Kultur und Gesellschaft und damit unter anderem auf der Mikro-ebene Alltag, soziale Beziehungen, Identität, auf der Meso-ebene Unternehmen, Organisationen (…) und auf der Makro-ebene Ökonomie, Politik (…) verändern“ (Krotz, 2014, S. 10). Zudem will die Mediatisierungsforschung die damit zusammenhängenden Entwicklungen „aktuell, historisch und kritisch untersuchen“, also den Mediatisierungsprozess konzeptionell als einen historischen und kulturübergreifenden Langzeitprozess – als Metaprozess – gedacht sehen (vgl. Krotz 2007, ibid. 2011). Eine weitere Perspektive, die sie mit der Idee der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ teilt.4 Die Übertragbarkeit dieser Sichtweise auf eine kommunikationswissenschaftlich ausgewiesene Medienökonomie ist evident. Wie kaum ein anderer Kultur- und Wirtschaftsbereich hat nämlich, folgt man der Medienökonomin Insa Sjurts, die Medien- und Informationswirtschaft in den letzten zehn Jahren grundlegende Veränderungen erfahren

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Dieser als Mediatisierung beschriebene, alle Handlungsfelder und Sozialebenen übergreifende und durchdringende Prozess wird von Andreas Hepp und Uwe Hasebrink (2014) als umfassendes „Entgrenzungsphänomen“ mit dem Begriff der „kommunikationen Figurationen“ erfasst (Hepp & Hasebrink, 2014; siehe auch Arbeiten des Forschungsverbunds der Universitäten Bremen und Hamburg; http://www.kommunikativefigurationen.de/).

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(Sjurts, 2013; vgl. auch Nielsen, 2012). Getrieben durch neue Technologien und den rasanten Fortschritt in diesem Feld entstanden in einem Tempo und in einem Umfang neue Möglichkeiten für die Gestaltung medialer Inhalte und für ihre Verbreitung, wie es sie vorher in dieser Dynamik und Komplexität noch nicht gegeben hat. Die vorliegende Arbeit geht von der Grundthese aus, dass das Schicksal der öffentlichen Kommunikation in steigendem Maße durch die digitalen Medien bestimmt wird. Denn was sich als Grundkonsens einer modernen Gegenwartsgesellschaft erkennen lässt, nämlich dass die allgemeine Zugänglichkeit und Verständlichkeit der Kommunikation als Grundlage von Öffentlichkeit in der Gesellschaft zu gelten hat und Öffentlichkeit in der modernen Gesellschaft als massenmedial hergestellte Öffentlichkeit zu verstehen ist (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1991), ist zunehmend in Frage zu stellen (Niedermaier, 2008). Geht man von der wechselseitigen Kausalität von Medienentwicklung und gesellschaftlichem Wandel aus, dann wird klar, dass durch die technologischen Triebkräfte von Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz ein tiefgreifender Medienwandel von einseitigen Massenmedien hin zu heute vernetzten „interaktiven“ Medien stattfindet.5 Medienwandel bezeichnet Friedrich Krotz (2007) zufolge, die „evolutionäre, gleichwohl in Sprüngen stattfindende Entwicklung, die sich als Erfindung von Medien, deren Anpassung und Aneignung durch Mensch und Gesellschaft, deren Auswirkungen auf Mensch, Kultur und Gesellschaft, und deren ständige Weiterentwicklung auf der Ebene von Kommunikationspotenzialen, Inhalten und Verwendungsweisen beschreiben lässt“ (S. 48). Der digitale Medienwandel treibt nun selbst einen möglichen Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit voran, und es bleibt zu fragen, ob nicht der digitale Medienwandel insbesondere über Anwendungen des Internet und der sozialen Medien tendenziell eine Fragmentierung und Polarisierung der Gesellschaft zur Folge hat (Holtz-Bacha, 1999). Dies würde letztlich einen Verlust der sozialen Integrationsfunktionen der klassischen Massenmedien als „Leitmedien“ im Sinne von qualitätsvollen Informationsmedien bedeuten. Diesen evidenten, aber dennoch sehr heterogenen Einfluss der digitalen Medien (und der Medienkonvergenz) auf die öffentliche Kommunikation (bzw. Grenzverschiebungen und Grenzauflösungen zur Nichtöffentlichkeit; vgl. Jünger, 2014) zu analysieren und zu beschreiben, kann und soll im Rahmen dieser Schrift in ausgewählten Ansätzen geleistet werden. Es soll versucht werden, spezifische aber dennoch zentrale Kernprozesse des Zusammenhangs der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ und des Wandels der öffentlichen Kommunikation zumindest in Grundzügen und vor allem im Hinblick auf aktuelle Situationen des Wandels von speziell ausgewählten Mediensystemen und Kommunikationspraktiken der öffentlichen Kommunikation, wie z.B. dem Fernsehen dingfest zu machen (Gundlach, 2010). Die vorliegende Schrift soll wesentliche Anregungen zu diesem zentralen Anliegen unserer Gegenwartsgesellschaft geben.

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Burkart (2002) definiert Massenmedien folgendermassen: „Die Massenmedien sind Kommunikationsmittel, die durch technische Vervielfältigung und Verbreitung mittels Schrift, Bild oder Ton Inhalte an eine unbestimmte Zahl von Menschen vermitteln und somit öffentlich an ein anonymes, räumlich verstreutes Publikum weitergeben“ (S. 169). Zu den publizistischen Massenmedien zählen allgemeinhin Printmedien wie Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, elektronische Medien wie Fernsehen und Hörfunk sowie die verschiedenen Medien der Außenwerbung.

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Leitfrage 2: Wie erklärungsstark ist das Medienmanagement als Teilgebiet der Medienökonomie zu Phänomenen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“? Medienunternehmen, aber auch Politik und Wissenschaft stehen vor großen Herausforderungen, die neuen Situationen des oben angedeuteten (epochalen?) Medienwandels, also der hier besprochenen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“, anzunehmen, zu erklären, zu bewerten, und Veränderungen desselben zu prognostizieren, um darauf antizipierend (re)agieren zu können. Auch die Medienökonomie erfährt die „digitalen Mediamorphose“ als zentrale neue Herausforderung. Ja, es ist sogar anzunehmen, dass die Integrationsfähigkeit der Medienökonomie als „Integrationsdisziplin, die zwar auf wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Methoden und Paradigmen zurück greift, diese aber für kommunikationswissenschaftliche Fragestellungen nutzbar macht und im Zuge dieser Integration auch modifiziert“, wie Matthias Karmasin et al. (2013, S. 77) einfordern, in der nächsten Zeit noch stärker herausgefordert werden wird. In der kommunikationswissenschaftlich ausgerichteten Medienökonomie führen die „Megatrends“ des digitalen Wandels, also Digitalisierung und Konvergenz, Deregulierung, Privatisierung, Kommerzialisierung, Internationalisierung, Konzentration und Globalisierung (vgl. Kiefer, 2005, S. 23-27) dazu, dass die ökonomischen Grundlagen und Bedingungen dieser Entwicklungen auf Ebene der Märkte (Makro-Perspektive) sowie auf Ebene der Unternehmung (Meso-Perspektive) als Objektbereich stärker in den Blick genommen wurden. Auch wenn „klassische“ Fragestellungen der Medienökonomie wie jene nach der Marktkonzentration dabei nicht obsolet werden (vgl. Knoche, 2007), weitet sich der Objektbereich um neue Phänomene wie beispielsweise der „Medienkonvergenz“ deutlich aus. Als methodologisches Primat der Analyse der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ kann jedenfalls gelten, die erwähnten Phänomene auseinanderzunehmen und sie hinsichtlich ihres Plausibilitätsgrades zu dem in der vorliegenden Sammelschrift interessierenden “Wandels der Leitmedien“ aus Sicht der Medienökonomie und des Medienmanagements zu untersuchen. Die Medienökonomie selbst ist eine relativ junge Wissenschaft. Sie grenzt sich von rein medienwissenschaftlichen, aber auch von betriebswirtschaftlichen Grundlagenwissenschaften ab. Allerdings wird die Diskussion über den Kompetenzbereich der Medienökonomie dadurch erschwert, dass es (noch) kein allgemein konsentiertes Verständnis von Medienökonomie (und damit auch nicht Medienmanagement) gibt (vgl. Sonderheft Medien Journal, 2003; Heinrich, 2002). Im Mittelpunkt des ersten Beitrags (siehe Beitrag 1: „Making Media Management Matter – Some Preliminary Thoughts“ im Teil II der vorliegenden Schrift) steht die prinzipielle Frage nach dem Erklärungswert einer kommunikationswissenschaftlich fundierten Medienökonomie und insbesondere ihres Teilgebietes, des Medienmanagements. Bekannt ist, dass selbst die Medienökonomie als „Mutterdisziplin“ des Medienmanagements innerhalb der Kommunikationswissenschaften, die sich selbst erst in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts auf breiter Basis an den Universitäten etablieren konnte, über Jahrzehnte hinweg nicht als Teilgebiet ausgewiesen wurde (vgl. Altmeppen, 1996; Heinrich, 2007; Just & Latzer, 2010, S. 81; Picard, 2006). Als erkenntnistheoretisches Primat der Analyse der Teildisziplin des Medienmanagements kann daher gelten, das Feld hinsichtlich ihres Erkenntniswertes zur in der vorliegenden Arbeit interessierenden Phänomens der “digitalen Mediamorphose“ zu untersuchen. Dafür wird zunächst zu untersuchen sein, ob die paradigmatische Grundposition des Wissenschaftsfeldes Medienmanagement denn überhaupt den gegenwärtigen Transformationsprozessen Stand halten kann. Es spricht nämlich vieles dafür, dass Medienunternehmen einem Wandel unterliegen, der durch verschiedene Kräfte initiiert und angetrieben wird, und dass der technologische Wandel hier eine wesentliche Rolle spielt 14

(Maier, 2004). Es geht hierbei um einen komplexen Transformationsprozess, und wie Matthias Maier bereits 2004 feststellte, „der technologische Wandel verändert nicht nur die Produkte und Leistungen von Medienunternehmen, sondern auch deren Bedingungen der Organisation und Koordination und transformiert damit bedeutende Dimensionen der Objektschicht eines Medienunternehmens (Maier, 2004, S. 15). Es wird somit für eine stärkere Integration der ausgewählten Themenfelder plädiert, die im Konzept der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ als Zentralreferenz für das Forschungsprogramm des Medienmanagements als Teilbereich einer kommunikationswissenschaftlich definierten Medienökonomie ausweisbar sind. Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich im Wesentlichen mit folgenden zwei Fragestellungen: 1. Deuten die gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ die Notwendigkeit einer Neuorientierung oder gar Re-Definition des gesamten Forschungsparadigmas der Integrationsdisziplin Medienökonomie und damit notwendigerweise auch des Medienmanagements an? 2. Welche Anpassungen (in der paradigmatischen Grundposition, dem Erkenntnisziel, und dem Objektbereich) sind in der Medienökonomie von Nöten, um den durch die „digitalen Mediamorphose“ ausgelösten techno-sozialen Veränderungen gerecht zu werden? Leitfrage 3: Ist Medienfinanzierung das Schicksalsthema der traditionellen Massenmedien in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“? Ein der Art, dem Umfang und dem Konsequenzenreichtum des gesellschaftlich-medial bedingten Wandels der öffentlichen Kommunikation angemessen dimensioniertes Forschungsfeld erfordert eine themenbezogene und die Fachdisziplinen übergreifende Forschungsleistung. Ziel ist es, auf ausgewählte Schwerpunktthemen und daraus entwickelte Fragestellungen zu fokussieren, um dadurch einen thematischen Zusammenhang der im Mittelteil der vorliegenden Arbeit eingetragenen Einzelbeiträge aufzuzeigen. Dieser Zusammenhang soll an folgenden Schwerpunktthemen und den daraus entwickelten Fragen ermittelt werden: Die Arbeit beginnt mit einem grundlegenden Kapitel zum Thema „Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle von Medien“. Es zeigt substanzielle Probleme der Refinanzierung und Erlösmodellierung von klassischen Medien aus der Perspektive der Medienökonomie auf. Es werden theoriebildende Überlegungen zur Medienfinanzierung und Erlösmodellierung von „klassischen“, aber auch „neuen“ Medien unter veränderten Rahmenbedingungen des Medienwandels angestellt. Medienfinanzierung ist ein wichtiges Forschungsthema in den Kommunikationswissenschaften und der Medienökonomie. Frank Lobigs (2013, S. 53) apostrophiert die Finanzierung des Journalismus gar als „Schicksalsthema“ (vgl. Donsbach, 2014). Der zentrale Anspruch des vorliegenden ersten Beitrags besteht folgerichtig darin, eine theoriegeleitete Reflexion der wirtschaftlichen Bedingtheiten zu Fragen der Refinanzierung und Erlösmodellierung von klassischen publizistischen Massenmedien, also Print, Radio, Fernsehen und Internet sichtbar und verstehbar zu machen. Im Vordergrund der Analyse stehen dabei Fragen auf der meso-analytischen Ebene, also der Organisation und dem Management von Medienorganisationen. An andere Stelle tragen Einblendungen von weiteren MedienTeilmärkten wie dem Buch- und dem Filmmarkt nicht nur zur thematischen Erweiterung, sondern auch zur Perspektivierung der Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten der o.a. Kernmedienmärkte bei.

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Der nächste Beitrag 2 (siehe Beitrag 2: „Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle von Medien“ im Teil II der vorliegenden Schrift) befasst sich im Wesentlichen mit folgenden drei Fragestellungen: 1. Welche Möglichkeiten einer stabileren Refinanzierung können klassische Medienunternehmen in der digitalen Medienzukunft wählen? 2. Welche theoriegeleiteten Modellansätze zur Generierung und Erzielung von Erlösen sind für Medienunternehmen in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung der Medienökonomie erkennbar? 3. Welche Praxis-Beispiele von betriebswirtschaftlich relevanten Aktivitäten können auf Managementebene sichtbar gemacht werden, um die Erlösströme eines klassischen Medienunternehmens über Zeit zu gewährleisten und damit eine mögliche „Krise der Erlösmodelle“ von Medien zu überwinden? Es wird behauptet, dass die gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen zur industriellen Medienkonvergenz und digitalen Medien-Transformation den existenziellen Refinanzierungsbedarf von traditionellen publizistischen Medienunternehmen substantiell gefährden. So soll an empirischen Fallbeispielen aus der Medienpraxis belegt werden, ob den „bewährten Partnerschaften“ von Medien und Werbung bzw. Medienangebot und zahlungsbereiter Kunde eine Tendenz innewohnt, die zur Auflösung dieser Partnerschaften neigt. Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz gefährden nämlich nicht nur traditionelle Geschäftsmodelle in den Medienindustrien und treiben eine dynamische Entwicklung vom „Mono-Erlösmodell zur multiplen Erlösstruktur“ (Sjurts, 2004, prognostiziert am Beispiel des deutschen Fernsehmarktes bereits im Jahre 2003) voran, sondern sollen auch gleichzeitig den Aufbau völlig neuartiger „digitaler Ökosysteme“ (Ammon & Brem, 2013; Englert & Senft, 2012) ermöglichen. Marktmacht, Reichweite und Integration verschiedener Dienstleistungen würden darin zu einem technisch abgegrenzten System verschmelzen, also einem gemeinsamen „Lebensraum“ von Inhalten und Dienstleistungen, welches Kunden, Partnern, Lieferanten und Mitbewerbern vernetzte Organisations- und Kommunikationsformen ermöglichen (Englert & Senft, 2012). Datenbasierte Geschäftsmodelle, das Phänomen „Big Data“ und „offene Plattformen“ auf Basis des Modells zweiseitiger Märkte sollen jedenfalls neue Geschäftsmodelle auch für klassische Medienorganisationen etablieren (Dewenter & Rösch, 2015). Für „klassische“ publizistische Massenmedien zeichnet sich jedenfalls ein fundamentaler Strukturwandel ab: Das Internet zerstört die traditionelle QuerSubventionierung durch Werbung und bricht das langjährige Geschäftsmodell der „integrierten Werbe- und Leserfinanzierung“ auf. Dieses traditionelle Subventionsmodell aus den Erlösen auf zweiseitigen Märkten (Leser- und Werbemarkt) scheint jedenfalls gefährdet und neue innovative cross-media Finanzierungsmodelle kompensieren die Verluste aus der Subventionierung durch zweiseitige Märkte noch zu geringen Teilen. Leitfrage 4: Medienförderung: Ist der Staat der geeignete „Retter in der Not“? Medienförderung bedeutet die finanzielle Unterstützung zur Produktion und dem Vertrieb von Medieninhalten und -projekten, aber auch allgemein von Medienunternehmen. Medienförderung geht über den Printmedienbereich (Tages- und Wochenzeitungen sowie Zeitschriften) hinaus, indem sowohl gattungsübergreifende als auch kanalunabhängige Unterstützung auf Medien anzuwenden ist, sodass neben gedruckten Medien zum Beispiel auch Online-Publikationen mit öffentlichen Mitteln gefördert werden. Dieses Kapitel behauptet, dass die Förderung von Medien eine demokratiepolitische Pflicht des Staates ist, die kulturelle Vielfalt zu stärken und das Angebot und damit den Konsum von Qualitätsmedien zu garantieren. Die Debatten zu Medienförderung sind allerdings kontrovers und wertstrittig 16

geführt. Viele gegenwärtige Systeme der Medienförderung sind nicht effizient und treffsicher. Daher wird der Reformdruck immer größer. Gefordert wird eine strukturell-nachhaltige, integrale Medienförderung, deren Normziele die gezielte, selektiv eingesetzte Vielfalts-, Qualitäts-, Innovations- und Infrastrukturförderung von Medien sind. Unter Medienförderung versteht man in erster Linie die Förderung der Medienwirtschaft durch Subventionen durch einen wohlgesinnten intervenierenden Staat. Neben anderen Formen der Medienregulierung wie etwa Medienwirtschaftsrecht (Medienkartellrecht, Medienwettbewerbsrecht, etc.) meint Medienförderung im engeren Sinne finanzielle oder nicht monetäre Hilfen, die von staatlichen Institutionen an Medienunternehmen geleistet werden. Medienförderung bedeutet insbesondere die staatliche Unterstützung von Fernsehen und Radio, vornehmlich in Form der staatlichen Zurechnung der Gebührenfinanzierung des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks unter dem Gebot der Staatsferne und Unabhängigkeit. In den meisten Ländern beansprucht diese mehr als 50% der gesamten Fördermittel (Finnland 55%, Italien 65%, Frankreich 71%, Großbritannien 85%, Deutschland 93%) (Nielsen & Linnebank, 2011). Daneben werden Subventionen auch an private Medien ausgerichtet. Direkte finanzielle Fördermittel an private Rundfunkveranstalter werden üblicherweise mit Auflagen hinsichtlich Inhalt (Anteil Eigenleistungen, Anteil politisch, gesellschaftlich und kulturell relevanter Themen, tägliche Nachrichten etc.), Werbung (Beschränkung, nur während bestimmter Zeiten), Reichweite oder Organisationsform und Steuerung (nicht-gewinnorientiert, Transparenz etc.) verknüpft (Künzler et al., 2013a; ibid., 2013b). In zahlreichen Ländern Europas profitieren auch private Printmedienunternehmen von finanziellen direkten Beihilfen („Presseförderung“). Frankreich, Österreich, die Niederlande und die skandinavischen Länder galten lange Zeit als Referenzmodelle für direkte Presseförderung. Mindestens teilweise zielt(e) diese explizit auf eine Förderung von Konkurrenz und Vielfalt, indem zum Beispiel sog. „Zweitzeitungen“, also Zeitungen mit zweitauflagenstärkster Marktposition im regionalen Raum und damit beschränkter Reichweite im Verbreitungsgebiet, ausschließlich oder stärker gefördert wurden. In einigen wenigen Ländern wurden diese Formen der direkten Presseförderung aber zuletzt wieder abgeschafft. Die Einzelbeiträge drei bis sechs (siehe Beitrag 3: „Staatliche Medienförderung“; Beitrag 4: „State Aid for Newspapers – First Theoretical Disputes“; Beitrag 5: „State Support for the Press: A Critical Appraisal – Austria, France, Norway and Sweden Compared“; Beitrag 6: „Austria. Press Subsidies in Search of a New Design”, alle im Teil II der vorliegenden Schrift) liefern eine umfassende theoretisch und empirisch geführte Analyse und Diskussion des Themenkomplexes „Staatliche Medienförderung“ aus Sicht der Medienökonomie und der Medienpolitikforschung. Argumentationslinie dieser Beiträge ist, die Rolle des Staates im Kontext der Medienförderung in der Ära der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zu begutachten. Es wird von Grundthese ausgegangen, dass die Entwicklung der kulturellen Kommunikation eines Landes oder einer Nation in steigendem Maße durch den Einfluss der digitalen Medien im Allgemeinen und der nationalen Medienpolitik im Besonderen beeinflusst wird. Aktive staatliche Medienförderung soll auf aktive Vielfalt- und Qualitätsförderung der publizistischen Massenmedien ausgerichtet sein und sich durch den Einsatz geeigneter Maßnahmen und Förderinstrumente den Herausforderungen von Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz stellen. Gefordert wird daher „eine spezifische Kulturpolitik für die Ära der „digitalen Mediamorphose“, d.h. eine Medienpolitik, die als integraler Bestandteil der Kulturpolitik zu verstehen wäre und ein kohärentes Konzept für alle betroffenen Bereiche verlangt. Eine solche Medienpolitik ist in Österreich erst in zaghaften Ansätzen zu entdecken. (...) Um die 17

Bemühungen um eine umfassende Medienpolitik, die den rasanten Entwicklungen gerecht wird, zu fördern, erscheinen deshalb vor allem folgende Aspekte von Bedeutung: auf der politisch-institutionellen Ebene einen Klärung bzw. Straffung der Kompetenzen, auf der inhaltlichen Ebene eine Verstärkung der Informiertheit über sachliche Probleme und auf der allgemein politischen Ebene die Schaffung einer öffentlichen Diskussion“. Es werden die folgenden drei leitenden Forschungsfragen aufgestellt: 1. Welche Grundannahmen lassen sich als zentrale Bausteine einer bislang nicht etablierten „Theorie der Medienförderung“ erstellen? 2. Welche Anforderungen hat das Konzept der „integrale Medienförderung“ zu erfüllen? 3. Welche Herausforderungen erwachsen den Medienförderungsregimen durch Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz in der Zukunft? Die Debatten zu Medienförderung sind bekanntermaßen kontrovers und wertstrittig geführt. Aktuell eingesetzte und praktizierte Angebotssysteme der Medienförderung sind nicht effizient und treffsicher. Wenn auch medienpolitische Gegensteuerung im Sinne der Gewährleistung einer pluralistischen Medienlandschaft nötig ist, so ist sie auch schwierig. Besonders wichtig ist Beitrag sechs (siehe Beitrag 6: „Austria. Press Subsidies in Search of a New Design” im Teil II der vorliegenden Schrift), der sich ausführlich mit der heiklen Situation der Medienförderung in Österreich beschäftigt. In Österreich besteht heute weitreichender Konsens darüber, dass das gegenwärtige staatliche System der Presseförderung reformiert werden muss (Grinschgl, 2012; Haas et al., 2013; Murschetz & Karmasin, 2014; Murschetz & Trappel, 2014; Trappel, 2014). Die bestehende Förderpraxis würde das Ziel „die Vielfalt der Presse in Österreich zu fördern“ nicht effektiv verfolgen. 2013 erhielten in Österreich alle Tageszeitungen aus dem Titel „Vertriebsförderung“ zwischen 96.826 Euro (Wirtschaftsblatt) und 161.377 Euro (die meisten anderen). Nur zwei nicht, weil sie nicht „richtig“ sind: Heute und Österreich. Die bleiben auf dem Trockenen sitzen, weil sie zu viele Exemplare verschenken (im Falle der Bezahlzeitung Österreich). Oder gar alle (im Falle des Gratis-Boulevardblattes Heute). Das österreichische Presseförderungsgesetz will das so. Die Unterstützung aus kulturellen Gründen dagegen sieht publizistische Massenmedien als Sphäre nationaler Kulturproduktion an, die gegen den oft hegemonial kontrollierten Markt abgeschirmt und nachhaltig wettbewerbstauglich positioniert werden muss. Was noch schwerer wiegt ist die Tatsache, dass finanzielle staatliche Zuwendungen an Printmedien in Österreich in keiner Relation zu den jährlich mehr als 600 Mio. Euro Rundfunkgebühren an den ORF (TV und Hörfunk) und den 18 Mio. Euro Förderung im Jahr an privaten und nicht-kommerziellen Rundfunk stehen. Zudem wird die freundliche Berichterstattung in bestimmten Medien durch Regierungs-Inserate im Umfang von 140 Mio. Euro jährlich belohnt. Eine erste Korrektur dieser Fehlallokation läge darin, auf gesetzlicher Ebene faire Wettbewerbsbedingungen zu schaffen, indem etwa auf nationaler Ebene für steuerliche Gleichbehandlung der Werbegattungen in Bezug auf die Werbeabgabe gesorgt wird (Institut für Höhere Studien 2014). Eine Reform des existenten Fördermodells erhält zudem vor dem Hintergrund der Entwicklungen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ neue Nahrung. Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz treiben weiterhin die Veränderung von Marktstrukturen und marktgängigen Austauschprozessen voran. Dies verändert das Verhalten der Nutzer und die Geschäftsstrategien der Medien grundlegend. Diese Trends führen mithin zur Erosion traditioneller Finanzierungsmodelle der Medien und erhöhen damit die Anforderungen an ein gleichzeitig effizientes wie effektives Medienförderungsregime der Zukunft.

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Leitfrage 5: Ist das Theorem vom Marktversagen in Medienmärkten in der digitalen Mediamorphose noch haltbar? Reformen der Medienpolitik sind offensichtlich sehr dringend nötig, um „Marktstörungen“ zu korrigieren. Politische Argumentationen für eine aktive staatliche Unterstützung von Medien klingen zunächst plausibel. In Wien hat beispielsweise der Verband Österreichischer Zeitungen (VÖZ) vom hochangesehenen Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung seiner Mitgliedsmedien erheben lassen. Demnach werden mehr als 16.000 Arbeitsplätze gesichert und jährlich knapp 470 Mio. Euro an Steuern geleistet. Vor diesem Hintergrund forderte VÖZ-Präsident Thomas Kralinger erneut die Einführung eines Leistungsschutzrechts für Presseverlage. „Österreichische Medien leisten ihren Beitrag zur Demokratie, aber auch einen wirtschaftlichen Beitrag“, erklärte der VÖZ-Präsident. Die Steuerleistungen und Arbeitsplätze würden zum überwiegenden Teil an Printprodukten hängen. Um den drängenden Herausforderungen am Werbemarkt zu begegnen (Schätzungen zufolge würden durch Google 150 bis 180 Mio. Euro an Werbegeldern vom heimischen Markt abgezogen), benötige es entsprechende Rahmenbedingungen im Urheberrecht bzw. Leistungsschutzrecht. Ob es für publizistische Massenmedien einen wirksamen Wettbewerb geben kann oder Marktversagen vorliegt, ist eine Grundfrage der Medienökonomie. Ob Staatliche Eingriffe eine fehlende Markleistung kompensieren können und sollen, daher von zentraler Bedeutung (Bator 1958; Fritsch et al., 2007; Ludwig, 2009; ibid. 1998). Medienmärkte tendieren prinzipiell zum Marktversagen. Die These vom Marktversagen ist weiterhin dominantes Paradigma in der Medienökonomie. Der Begriff „Marktversagen“ beschreibt eine Situation, wo der Marktprozess zu ökonomisch ineffizienten Ergebnissen führt, das Verhältnis von Mitteleinsatz und Ergebnis also nicht optimal ist. Güter und Dienstleistungen unter Marktbedingungen werden nicht im sozial optimalen Ausmaß produziert. Im „sozial optimalen Ausmaß“ bedeutet in der Medienökonomie eine Paretooptimalen Zustand, in welchem „durch keine Umverteilung der Produktion (...) [mehr] möglich ist, den Nutzen eines Menschen zu steigern, ohne den Nutzen eines anderen gleichzeitig zu mindern“ (Heinrich, 2013, S. 599). Aus (medien)ökonomischer Sicht gibt es verschiedene Gründe, warum Märkte nicht zu einem optimalen Ergebnis führen. Marktversagen gilt dann als Synonym für Marktmangel, der auftritt, wenn ein über den Markt bereitgestelltes Gut, etwa aufgrund von Externalitäten (Effekte, externe), in seiner Menge oder/und Qualität vom gesellschaftlich gewünschten Ergebnis abweicht, zum anderen (dann als gravierendste Form eines Marktmangels), wenn ein Gut über den Markt, etwa aufgrund fehlender Ausschließbarkeit, überhaupt nicht bereitgestellt wird (vgl. Kiefer, 2005). Darüber hinaus wird in der Diskussion um Medienmärkte auch immer ein nicht ökonomisches Argument vorgebracht – die Meritorik: Märkte liefern nicht das gewünschte Ergebnis. Die Meritorik geht davon aus, dass der Staat oder eine übergeordnete Instanz besser entscheiden kann, welche Verteilung besser für die Gesellschaft ist, als die vom Markt erreichte. Die „digitale Mediamorphose“ gibt also vor: Die Medien befinden sich in einem fundamentalen Wandel, und mit ihnen ganze Mediensysteme. Getrieben durch die rasant voranschreitende Digitalisierung entstehen fortwährend neue Märkte, entwickeln sich neue Produkte und Geschäftsmodelle und auch der gesetzliche Kontext als Rahmenbedingung des Handelns ändert sich in vielfacher Weise. Digitale Medienmärkte sind durch längerfristig wirkende Prinzipien gekennzeichnet, die sich von Spielregeln auf klassischen Medienmärkten unterscheiden. Dazu zählen die Folgen der Digitalisierung von Gütern, die Existenz von Netzeffekten, Informationsasymmetrien, und weitere Phänomen der Informations- und Internetökonomie (vgl. Birchler & Bütler, 2007; 19

Dogruel & Katzenbach, 2010; Peitz & Waldfogel, 2012). Digitale Güter und Informationsgüter haben Eigenschaften, die in der traditionellen Ökonomie zum Marktversagen führen können. In der Informations- und Internetökonomie, die im Wesentlichen von der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ initiiert wird, lassen sich diese Eigenschaften jedoch zu neuen Geschäftsmodellen nutzen. Um die Vermutung des Marktversagens in der Medienökonomie aber überhaupt zielgerichtet diskutieren zu können, sind zunächst die klassischen Bereiche der Medienmärkte zu benennen, in denen es zu marktbedingten Fehlsteuerungen kommen könnte. Im Mittelpunkt ihres Beitrags sieben (siehe Beitrag 7: “The Theory of Market Failure in the Media Business – The Case of Media as Public Goods“) steht daher die Grundsatzfrage, ob Medieninhalte öffentliche Güter sind. Es soll damit nochmals die grundlegenden Argumente zur Gültigkeit des Paradigmas des „Marktversagens“ auf klassischen Medienmärkten aus Sicht der Diskussionen nachgegangen werden, ob publizistische Massenmedien denn besondere Gutseigenschaft besäßen, die eine Legitimation zur staatlichen Intervention gewährleisten würde. In Anbetracht der gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen im Zuge der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ ist folgende Fragestellung angebracht: Ist die These vom Marktversagen in den digitalen Medien noch haltbar? Leitfrage 6: Wie bewahren traditionelle Massenmedien Marktchancen in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“? Massenmedien sind ein Teil der hochdifferenzierten Öffentlichkeitsstruktur moderner Gesellschaften, wobei in der Literatur zwischen unterschiedliche Ebenen von Öffentlichkeit unterschieden wird (Neidhardt, 1994). „Leitmedien“ wie öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk oder Qualitäts-Tageszeitungen, also gemeinhin eine Gesellschaft prägende und im Mediensystem führende bzw. die öffentliche Kommunikation dominierende Medien, können wiederum als Teil der Qualitätsmedien definiert werden (Donges & Jarren, 1998). Es geht in der vorliegenden Frage also um das Schicksal von traditionellen Massenmedien, also jener „Leitmedien“, die sich in besonderer Weise dem öffentlichen Diskurs in der demokratischen Gesellschaft widmen. Es sind Medien, denen Reputation zugeschrieben wird.6 Es sind Medien, die meinungsbildend wirken und als Leitmedien gelten. Es sind Medien, die man als Leuchttürme der öffentlichen Kommunikation bezeichnen kann. Nun ist allerdings auch anzunehmen, dass die „digitale Mediamorphose“, also der disruptive Wandel der klassischen Medienstrukturen längst auch die Qualitätsmedien, die längst als „Leuchttürme der öffentlichen Kommunikation“ (Blum et al., 2011) gegolten haben, betrifft. Tiefgreifende und weiter anhaltenden Transformationsprozesse als Folge insbesondere von Digitalisierung, Medienkonvergenz und verändertem Nutzungsverhalten bringt nun die zentralen Repräsentanten dieser klassischen Massenmedien bzw. „Leitmedien“ unter Druck, sich und ihre Geschäftsmodelle an völlig neue Bedingungen anzupassen. Die Medienökonomie hat ein relativ kleines Arsenal an theoretischen Modellen entwickelt, um den neuen Anforderungen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ besser gerecht zu werden (Wilke, 2010). In der vorliegenden Schrift wird daher auf einen traditionellen theoretischen Ansatz zurückgegriffen, nämlich auf das Marktstruktur-Marktverhalten-Marktergebnis-Paradigma (auch SCP-

6

Heinrich (in Sjurts, 2011, S. 513) definiert „Qualität“ folgendermassen: „Im Unterschied zu ökonomischer Qualität ist die publizistische Qualität aber nicht individuell durch die Präferenzen der Rezipienten determiniert, sondern bezieht die Kriterien ihrer Qualität aus objektiv beobachtbaren Quellen, vor allem aus der Rechtsprechung, aus dem Pressekodex des Presserates (Deutscher Presserat), aus den entwickelten Qualitätsvorstellungen der journalistischen Praxis und der journalistischen Wissenschaft“.

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Paradigma) aus der Industrieökonomik (Bain, 1956; ibid., 1968; Mason, 1939). Die Industrieökonomik wird in der Medienökonomik häufig als Analyserahmen eingefordert und verwendet (Müller, 1979; Busterna, 1988; Fu, 2003; Gomery, 1989; Wirth & Bloch, 1995; Ramstad, 1997). Er steht im Gegensatz zur neoklassischen Markttheorie geht die Industrieökonomie nicht vom perfekten Wettbewerb aus in dem alle Marktteilnehmer vollständige Informationen haben. Vielmehr werden Transaktionskosten – also der Aufwand für die Anbahnung eines Geschäfts –, die Unvollständigkeit von Informationen und Markteintrittsbarrieren berücksichtigt. Diese Marktunvollkommenheiten werden erfasst und auf ihre Auswirkungen auf das Verhalten der Marktakteure hin untersucht, und damit auch, wie das Verhalten wiederum das Marktergebnis prägt (vgl. von Rimscha & Siegert, 2015). Das S-C-P (Structure-Conduct-Performance)-Paradigma der Industrieökonomik bietet eine kausale volkswirtschaftlich-theoretische Erklärung für Unternehmensergebnisse durch wirtschaftliches Handeln auf unvollkommenen Märkten. Die Struktur beinhaltet die Rahmenbedingungen, die die Unternehmen einer Industriebranche in ihren Entscheidungen beachten müssen. Im Rahmen dieser Gegebenheiten besteht für die Industrie ein gewisser Handlungsraum, der das erreichbare Ergebnis festlegt. In neueren Beiträgen zur Industrieökonomik wird allerdings von einem dynamischen Prozess im Sinne einer zirkulären Verknüpfung der drei Merkmale ausgegangen, indem zum Beispiel retrograd auch von einer Einflussnahme des Ergebnisses auf das Verhalten und auch die Struktur ausgegangen wird. So kann etwa ein schlechtes Marktergebnis in Gestalt überhöhter Gewinne die Marktstruktur durch Anlocken von Newcomern beeinflussen. Ziel von industrieökonomischen Analysen ist es meist die Allokation zu optimieren, das heißt der Gesamtnutzen der Nachfrage soll bei minimalem Aufwand optimiert werden. Betrachtungsebene ist also jeweils ein ganzer Markt, eine Branche. Das Modell wird auch zur Untersuchung von Wettbewerbsmärkten angewendet, um etwa die Frage zu beantworten, ob der Wettbewerb auf einem bestimmten Markt funktioniert, und wie gewünscht zu Fortschritt, Innovation und Verteilungsgerechtigkeit führt. Das Struktur-Verhaltens-Ergebnis-Paradigma aus der Industrieökonomik eignet sich für die Analyse der strukturellen Veränderungen von Medienmärkten in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“. Es wird die These überprüft, dass das industrieökonomische Denkmodell die Möglichkeit einer Strukturtheorie liefert, die die gegenwärtige Transformationsprozesse in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ in geeigneter Form modellierbar macht. Die folgenden vier Beiträge widmen sich folgenden Themen: Beitrag 8 analysiert die Rolle des öffentlich-rechtlichen Fernsehens als (ehemaligem?; vgl. Kaumanns et al., 2008) „Leitmedium“ im digitalen Wandel und liefert einen empirischen Bezug zur Situation in Österreich (siehe Beitrag 8: “Public Service Television at the Digital Crossroads – The Case of Austria”). Beitrag neun untersucht die Frage, ob privat-kommerzielles Pay-TV in Deutschland als alternatives bzw. komplementäres Angebot auf einem überfüllten Markt funktionieren kann (siehe Beitrag 9: „Digital Pay-TV in Germany: A Viable Lesson For Market Failure?“). Beitrag zehn beleuchtet die Transformation des Fernsehens zum „Hybridmedium“ mit Hinblick auf Geschäftsmodellinnovationen zum Konvergenzmedium aus industrieökonomischer Perspektive und blickt dabei auf die Situation in Deutschland (siehe Beitrag 10: „Connected TV – Media convergence, industry structure, and corporate strategies“). Folgende zwei Fragen werden beantwortet: 1. Welche Rolle spielen traditionelle Massenmedien in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“? 2. Versagt der Markt für digitales Pay-TV in Deutschland?

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Leitfrage 7: Ist Interaktivität ein zentraler Treiber der „digitalen Mediamorphose“? Wie eingangs dargestellt, sind mit der „digitaler Mediamorphose“ jene tiefgreifenden Umwälzungen gemeint, die jeweils neue Kommunikationstechnologien und die daraus resultierenden Produktionsprozesse für den kulturellen Kommunikationsprozess und in weiterer Folge sozialen Wandel insgesamt nach sich ziehen. Ein impliziter Konsens besteht wohl darüber, dass „neue Medien“ in Differenz zu bestehenden, traditionellen Medien zu sehen sind und Veränderungen in technischen Grundlagen (insbesondere basierend auf Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz) und Rezeptionsmodi (Interaktivität, Auflösung der festen Rollen von Sender und Empfänger, etc.) einschließen. Denis McQuail (2010) bestimmt insbesondere Digitalisierung und Konvergenz als zentrale Merkmale neuer Medien. Als Differenzierungsgrundlage leitet er weiterhin Charakteristika ab, anhand derer neue und alte Medien untersucht bzw. abgegrenzt werden können: Interaktivität, sozialen Präsenz, Medienreichhaltigkeit (media richness), Autonomie, spielerischer Zugang (playfulness) sowie Privatheit und Personalisierung (vgl. McQuail 2010, S. 137 ff.). Im Lexikon Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft beschreibt Joachim R. Höflich Interaktivität „als eine besondere Eigenschaft neuer Medien“ und bezeichnet darin den Computer in seiner Anbindung an das Internet als hervorragendes Beispiel für „ein interaktives Medium“ (Höflich, in: Bentele et al., 2013, S. 131). E-banking, online shopping, interaktive Spiele und soziale Medien sind aktuelle Beispiele für solcherart technisch vermittelte, interaktive Medien. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird Interaktivität in dreifacher Weise differenziert (McMillan, 2006; Rafaeli, 1988, Stark, 2013): (a) als Eigenschaft (digitaler) Medientechnologie, (b) als kommunikativ-interpersonaler Prozess im Sinne von sozialer Interaktion zwischen Nutzerinnen, und (c) als Wahrnehmungsprozess in Form von erhöhter Kontrollwahrnehmung durch Nutzerinnen-Partizipation im Kommunikationsprozess. Vor dem Hintergrund der Verortung der Kommunikationswissenschaft als Integrationswissenschaft, die „am ehesten als ‚disziplinäres System’ mit einem gemeinsamen Fokus und einem gemeinsamen Objektbereich charakterisierbar (ist)“ (Karmasin, 2003, S. 49) wird „Interaktivität“ in der vorliegenden Arbeit eine integrale Funktion als „Prägkraft der Medien“ (Hepp, 2010) in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zugewiesen. Interaktivität wird solcherart als Grundcharakteristikum von Medien(-technologien) gesehen, die nur im Zusammenwirken von Kommunikationspraktiken und Medienumgebungen auslösende Kraft für medialen und kommunikativen Wandel entwickeln kann.7 Im Kern geht es dabei um die Erforschung des Wandels sozialer Kommunikation, die ihren Ausdruck in neuen Anwendungen und Gebrauchsweisen sowie Institutionalisierungen von interaktiven Medien(-technologien) und Medienangeboten sowie neuen Formen der Medienorganisation und Vermarktung eben dieser Medien findet (Sutter, 2010). Um diesen Diskurs über Interaktivität als Katalysator der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zu katalysieren wird in den Einzelbeiträgen 12 bis 15 (Beitrag 11: „Social Media, Alternatives to Commercial“; Beitrag 12: „Customer Integration through Web Interactivity. A Theory Building Exercise”, Beitrag 13: „The Business Value of Interactivity: Managing Customers”; Beitrag 14: „Interactivity and Leadership Effectiveness”; alle im Teil II der vorliegenden Schrift) über die Beantwortung der folgenden drei Fragen nachgedacht:

7 Nach Gläser gelten als Vorzüge des Internet: „Interaktivität, Konnektivität, Aktualität, Multimedialität, Ubiquität, zeitliche Verfügbarkeit, Informationsvielfalt, einfache Handhabung und Individualisierung“ (Gläser, in Sjurts, 2011, S. 90).

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1. Wie ist die „Interaktivität“ neuer Medien bzw. sind „interaktive“ Medien aus medienökonomischer Sicht in Form des Angebots neuer Medien(inhalte und technologien) vor dem Hintergrund des Medienwandels theoretisch zu erfassen? 2. Welche Rolle spielen Transaktionskosten bei der interaktiven Wertschöpfung durch Kundenintegration mittels digitaler Interaktionsplattformen? 3. Erhöhen interaktive Kommunikationsmedien Effizienz- und Effektivitätserfolge von Führungskommunikation?

1.2 Ziele und Methoden Es ist eine voraussetzungsvolle und weitreichende theoretische Operation, die „digitalen Mediamorphose“ und den Wandel von traditionellen Massenmedien zum Fokus der hier vorgelegten Thematisierungen entlang der vier ausgewiesenen Problemfelder zu machen. Wird doch damit nicht weniger behauptet, als dass das Herausarbeiten einer neuen wissenschaftlichen Problematik, die mit den Mitteln der existierenden Wissenschaften nicht angemessen zu bearbeiten sei, aber bearbeitet werden muss, erforderlich ist. Damit diese Operation dennoch gelingt, wird die kommunikationswissenschaftlich-orientierte Medienökonomie als disziplinäre Integrationsklammer bemüht, innerhalb welcher die vier Problemfelder situiert werden können. Erkenntnisleitendes Interesse ist es, einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur Beantwortung der gegenwärtigen stattfindenden Transformationsprozesse der am meisten entwickelten Gegenwartsgesellschaften vor dem Hintergrund der Problematiken der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zu leisten. Damit wird es aber zu einer zentralen theoretischen Aufgabe, die Gültigkeit ausgewählter Theoriebestände in der Medienökonomik auf die Konstellationen und Zusammenhänge der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ auf den möglichen Wandel von öffentlicher Kommunikation hin zu untersuchen, gewissermaßen erste Umrisse einer „Theorie der digitalen Mediamorphose“ aus Sicht der Medienökonomie zu entwerfen. Das übergeordnete Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Beantwortung der Frage, ob die „digitale Mediamorphose“ zu einem Wandel der traditionellen Massenmedien führt und welche kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Modelle diesen Wandel sichtbar machen. Vielmehr hängen die verschiedenen theoretischen Positionen unabdingbar an Hintergrundannahmen über die „digitale Mediamorphose“ und den Wandel von traditionellen Massenmedien und damit öffentlicher Kommunikation ab, von denen aus der Scheinwerfer auf die den sozialen Wandel auslösendem und ihn mittragenden sozialen Akteure gerichtet wird. Ausgangspunkt ist hier nach einer Theorie zu suchen, die die „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zum thematischen Fokus ihrer Theoriebildung macht. Potenziell anschlussfähig erweist sich dafür die kommunikationswissenschaftlich ausgerichtete Medienökonomie, deren Konstruktionsprinzipien aufzuspüren waren, um schließlich auf die Frage ihrer Verwendbarkeit und Angemessenheit als Hintergrundtheorie zur Erklärung der sozioökonomischen Transformationsprozesse zur „digitalen Mediamorphose“ überprüft zu werden. Medienökonomie ist wissenschaftliche Teildisziplin der Kommunikationswissenschaft und gesellschaftlicher Praxisbereich (Medienwirtschaft). Sie hat zum Ziel, sozial- und wirtschaftswissenschaftliche sowie kommunikations-wissenschaftliche Konzepte bzw. Theorien zur Analyse von Kommunikation und Medien anzuwenden. Sie ist Schnittstelle zwischen Disziplinen, wie Kommunikations-, Medien-, Volks- und Betriebswirtschaftslehre sowie partiell technischen, juristischen und politischen Disziplinen. Sie beschäftigt sich aus theoretischer und praktischer Perspektive mit aktuellen Fragen, die für die Medien relevant 23

sind. Hierbei geht es sowohl um ökonomische Grundlagen, Managementstrategien und Organisationsformen von Medienunternehmen als auch die Analyse und Regulierung der Medien(teil)märkte. In der Medienökonomie werden Erkenntnisse gewonnen, die sich aus makro-, meso- und mikro-ökonomischer Perspektive mit Medien als ökonomischen Gütern bzw. Dienstleistungen beschäftigen, wobei sehr wohl die Rolle der Medien für Gesellschaft und Unternehmungen thematisiert wird. Die vorliegende Sammelschrift wählt verschiedene, wenn auch nicht divergente Perspektiven der Medienökonomie und des Medienmanagements als ihres Teilgebiets, um Phänomene der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zu untersuchen. Eine zentrale Perspektive stellt die kommunikationswissenschaftliche Sicht auf die Medienökonomie dar. Diese wird von Medienund Kommunikationswissenschaftlern wie etwa Klaus-Dieter Altmeppen und Matthias Karmasin (2003a und b), Michael Schenk und Matthias Hensel (1987) vertreten. Sie nähern sich der Medienökonomie, indem sie hinterfragen und aufzeigen, inwieweit gesellschaftlich normative Faktoren in einer Ökonomie über Medien berücksichtigt werden müssen und welche ökonomischen Aspekte auf das Mediensystem, die Marktstrukturen und die Gesellschaft als Ganzes wirken. Michael Schenk und Matthias Hensel dazu: „Die Medienökonomie beschränkt sich damit nicht nur auf die Betrachtung ökonomischer Aspekte des Mediensystems, sondern betrachtet auch die Konsequenzen der Ökonomisierung für das gesamte Kommunikations- und Informationssystem einer Gesellschaft.“ (Schenk & Hensel, 1987, S. 536) Die gesammelten Beiträge gehen von den folgenden ausgewählten Theoriebausteinen einer solchermaßen kommunikationswissenschaftlich definierten Medienökonomie (und auch des Medienmanagements als deren hochsignifikanter Teilbereich) aus und basieren auf folgenden Grundkonzepten und theoretischen Ansätzen der Medienökonomie: x x x x x x x

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Konzepte der Medienökonomie, mit einem besonderen Fokus auf die ökonomischen Besonderheiten von Medienmärkten und die Gültigkeit des Paradigmas des „Marktversagens“ Analysen von Digitalisierung, Interaktivität und Konvergenz von Medien im Kontext des digitalen Wandels aus Sicht der Medienökonomie in Anlehnung an Theorien der Innovationsforschung Die Analyse des heuristischen Potenzials des „Marktstruktur-MarktverhaltenMarktergebnis“-Paradigmas aus der Industrieökonomie Die Untersuchung neuer ökonomischer Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle von Medien in der digitalen Ökonomie Die Analyse von Theorien des strategischen Managements von Medien Die Beforschung von Führungstheorien als Teiltheorie des Medienmanagements Die medienpolitischen Eingriffsnotwendigkeiten des Staates zur effizienten und effektiven (Selbst)Steuerung von Medienmärkten

1.3 Organisation der Sammelschrift Zur Systematisierung des vorliegenden Großthemas der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ bieten sich die folgenden vier Problemfelder einer kommunikationswissenschaftlich inspirierten Medienökonomie an: x x x x

Problemfeld 1: Medienökonomie und Medienmanagement in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ Problemfeld 2: Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle von Medien und Medienförderung Problemfeld 3: Traditionelle Massenmedien in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ Problemfeld 4: Interaktivität neuer Medien als Treiber der „digitalen Mediamorphose“

Die folgende Grafik stellt die thematische Kohäsion der vorliegenden Schrift bildhaft dar. Grafik 1: Thematische Kohäsion der Sammelschrift: Vier zentrale Problemfelder

MEDIENÖKONOMIE 1

INTERAKTIVITÄT 4

ERLÖSMODELLE Digitale Mediamorphose

2

TRADITIONELLE MASSENMEDIEN 3

Auf Basis dieser Systematik soll gezeigt werden, welche wesentliche Epistemologien zum Thema der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ in den vier Problemfeldern vorzufinden sind und in welcher Weise theoretische und empirische Aspekte in und zwischen diesen Feldern verknüpft werden müssen, um entsprechend qualitativ wertvolle Erkenntnisse zur „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zu erzielen (Funk et al. 2015). Nun zeichnet sich die „digitale Mediamorphose“ insbesondere dadurch aus, dass die „Megatrends“ der „digitalen Mediamorphose“, also Deregulierung, Privatisierung, Ökonomisierung und Kommerzialisierung, sowie Internationalisierung und Globalisierung auf Ebene der Märkte, der Gesellschaft und der Politik (Makro-Perspektive), der Unternehmen 25

(Meso-Perspektive), und dem individuellen Akteurshandeln (Mikro-Perspektive) miteinander in Bedeutungszusammenhang treten. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist daher, die „digitale Mediamorphose“ anhand der oben aufgezeigten ausgewählten vier Problemfelder in ihren Kernlogiken explizit zu machen.8 Zudem sind Schnittstellen zwischen den vier Feldern auszumachen, die das Thema der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ nicht nur verbinden, sondern auch zu grenzüberschreitenden Überlegungen Anlass geben sollen.9 Ausgangspunkt und Kristallisationskern ist dabei ein kommunikationswissenschaftliches Verständnis von Medienökonomie, die sich an der Schnittstelle von Kommunikationswissenschaft auf der einen Seite und Wirtschaftswissenschaft auf der anderen Seite bewegt (Pagel, 2015; Karmasin & Freienstein, 2006). Die oben angezeigte Systematik stellt somit den Versuch dar, den fundamentalen Transformationsprozess der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ entlang der Forschungsschwerpunkte und Publikationstätigkeiten des Autors zu ordnen. Damit werden die zentralen Bausteine eines integrativen Analyserahmens zu Phänomenen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ präsentiert. Die folgenden drei Prinzipien leiten die inhaltliche Ausrichtung der vorliegenden Arbeit: 1. Zentrale theoretische Herausforderung ist, konzeptionelle Grundlagen für die „digitale Mediamorphose“ aus Sicht einer kommunikationswissenschaftlich fundierten Medienökonomie zu skizzieren und gegebenenfalls zu festigen bzw. zu erweitern. Es wird die Hypothese geprüft, dass die Medienökonomie zahlreiche Aspekte zu „digitale Mediamorphose“ identifiziert hat, es aber dennoch keinen kohärenten Fundus an Ansätzen und Modellen für deren Erklärung gibt. Es ist daher erheblicher Forschungsbedarf gegeben. 2. Durch die „digitale Mediamorphose“ wird eine ganze Restrukturierungsdynamik in etlichen Sektoren der Medienindustrien angestoßen, die geprägt wird durch die Suche nach neuen Geschäftsmodellen der Kernakteure, durch das Eindringen mächtiger branchenexterner Akteure und eine signifikante Verschiebung der sektoralen Konkurrenz bzw. Kooperationsverhältnisse sowie durch eine weitreichende Neujustierung rechtlich-regulativer Rahmensetzungen. Anzunehmen ist daher, dass die Effektivität von Geschäftsmodellen über die Zukunftsfähigkeit von Medien entscheidet. Die Argumentation stützt sich auf Analyse und Synthese der vorhandenen Literatur. Der weiteren Analyse vorausgreifend spricht vieles dafür, dass den Dynamiken des Medienwandels folgend, gegenläufige Tendenzen der Erlösmodellierung von Medien existieren werden. Mit anderen Worten: Es kommt zu Grenzziehungen und Entgrenzungen, Differenzierungen und Entdifferenzierungen von Erlösmodellen in einem Prozess, in dem sich publizistische Massenmedien modernisieren und zugleich ihre Geschäftsstrategien krisenhaft werden. 3. Weiterhin stehen die Eigenschaften und Folgen sozialer Vernetzung durch interaktive Kommunikationsmedien im Fokus: Lineare, zum Teil unidirektionale

8

Herausforderung einer Modellierung von Mikro-Meso-Makro-Links in den Kommunikationswissenschaften nahme bereits das DFG-Projekt QU 260/1-1 an (vgl. Quandt & Scheufele, 2011). Altmeppen zeigte anhand des Phänomens der „Ökonomisierung“, wie die „Mikro-Makro“-Lücke durch organisationstheoretische Überlegungen (Meso-Ebene) gerschlossen werden kann (vgl. Altmeppen, 2011; Greve et al., 2009).

9

Diese Schnittstellen sind institutionell-disziplinärer (i.e. zwischen Medienökonomie und benachbarten Disziplinen), sachlich-inhaltlicher (i.e. zwischen Medienökonomie und Perspektiven auf spezifische Untersuchungsgegenstände wie etwa Marktstrukturen oder Medienorganisationen), sowie forschunsgsmethodischer Natur (i.e. zwischen Theorie und Praxis).

26

Strukturen und Prozesse der Kommunikation werden zunehmend ergänzt durch interaktive und multidirektionale Kommunikationsformen. Es gilt daher Forschungsaktivitäten in Implikationen der digitalen Mediamorphose als Wandel von Medien-Interaktivität und Interaktionsformen zu intensivieren (vgl. Sutter, 2010), insbesondere Wertschöpfungsprozesse und Anforderungen an kompetentes Medienmanagement. Das methodische Gerüst zur vorliegenden Analyse der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ und dem Wandel der Öffentlichkeit bilden die verbindende Methodiken von Sekundäranalysen (Auswertung vorhandener Daten, Statistiken, Sichtung und Auswertung von relevanter Fachliteratur), die Primärforschungsmethode des Fachgesprächs mit ausgewählten Experten, substantielle Fallstudienanalysen und die Methode des Experiments (vgl. Sonderheft Medien Journal, 2/2008; ibid., 2/2004). Die konzeptionelle und methodische Vielfalt zu konturieren und ein möglichst vollständiges Gesamtbild sind denn auch Voraussetzungen dafür, die verschiedenen Teilkonzepte komplementär zu verbinden oder eben methodisch klar abzugrenzen. Dafür liefern die einzelnen Beiträge eine gute Basis. Wie Björn von Rimscha und Juliane Lischka zuletzt festgestellten, hat die Medienökonomie und das Medienmanagement als deren Teildisziplin bislang keine eigenen Methoden entwickelt, sondern bedient sich jeweils in Abhängigkeit von Forschungsgegenstand und der Forschungsfrage aus dem Methodenkanon anderer Disziplinen, vor allem der Volkswirtschaft, Betriebswirtschaft, Soziologie und Psychologie (von Rimscha & Lischka, 2015). Die folgende Tabelle 1 zeigt die Organisation der Sammelschrift im Überblick. Angeführt sind: Die Nummer des Beitrags, der Titel des jeweiligen Einzel-Beitrags, der Gegenstandsbereich als disziplinärer Bezug, die Zuordnung zum Problemfeld und Leitfragen der Sammelschrift. Referenzen Altmeppen, K.-D. (2013). Ökonomisierung. In: G. Bentele, H.-B. Brosius, & O. Jarren (Hrsg.), Lexikon der Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft, 2. Auf. (S. 254), Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Altmeppen, K.-D. (2011). Medienökonomisch handeln in der Mediengesellschaft. Eine- MikroMeso-Makro-Skizze anhand der Ökonomisierung der Medien. In: T. Quandt, & B. Scheufele (Hrsg.), Ebenen der Kommunikation. Mikro-Meso-Makro-Links in der Kommunikationswissenschaft (S. 233-258). Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Altmeppen, K.-D. (1996). Ökonomie der Medien und des Mediensystems. Grundlagen, Ergebnisse und Perspektiven medienökonomischer Forschung. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Altmeppen, K.-D., & Karmasin, M. (2003a). Medien und Ökonomie – Intention und Überblick. In: K.-D. Altmeppen, & M. Karmasin (Hrsg.), Medien und Ökonomie. Band 1/1 Grundlagen der Medienökonomie: Kommunikationsund Medienwissenschaft, Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. Altmeppen, K.-D., & Karmasin, M. (2003b). Medienökonomie als transdisziplinäres Lehr- und Forschungsprogramm. In: K.-D. Altmeppen, & M. Karmasin (Hrsg.), Medien und Ökonomie. Band 1/2: Grundlagen der Medienökonomie: Soziologie, Kultur, Politik,

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II.

Einzelbeiträge

Beitrag 1: Making Media Management Matter Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C. (2017). Making Media Management Matter – Some Preliminary Thoughts. In M. Friedrichsen, & Y. Kamalipour (Eds.), Digital Transformation and Globalization Effects on Media Innovation, Media Management, Journalism and Education. Global Communications Association Yearbook 1 (pp. 17-28). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Introduction Media management is a young academic field that has yet to establish a universally accepted set of theoretical foundations (Küng 2007, Mierzejewska & Hollifield 2006). Albeit its strong growth in academic teaching and scholarly output, it remains a confused field. The field is neither clearly defined nor cohesively organized. It remains rather a loose agglomeration of work by researchers from various scientific fields. Some of this confusion comes from lack of scholarly agreement as to its scope, purpose, and methods (Deuze 2016, Küng 2007, Mierzejewska 2011). This is mainly due to the fact that multi-paradigmatic research communities shape its scope of research (Doyle 2013, Küng 2007). Media economics, studies in political economy, media studies, mass communication and journalism studies, business administration and management studies, to name but the most influential, make any universal agreement on a common phenomenon of interest in issues of media management difficult (Ballon 2014, Cunningham & Flew 2015, Hardy 2014, Havens et al. 2009, Küng 2007, Winseck 2011). This is a problem, it is alleged, for this fragmentation into many, often unconnected, perspectives and paradigms make the field less influential and of limited value for prescriptive applications (Mierzejewska 2011, Mierzejewska & Hollified 2006). Most media management research does not look across boundaries between media professions or academic disciplines (Aris & Bughin 2012). Second, in contrast to the field of media economics, which since its emergence in the 1970s has acquired an established set of theoretical approaches and an extensive body of literature, media management is still embryonic and, hence, tends to be underexplored and undertheorized (Mierzejewska 2011). Lucy Küng (2007) commented on this situation rather wryly: “The net result is that while the field displays deep specialist knowledge of the sector, and a rich and broad spectrum of theoretical knowledge, application of management theory is surprisingly weak. Media firms are in the main addressed as businesses rather than organizations, at a macro rather than micro level, and the majority of attention is focused on exogenous changes (technology, regulation and consumption for example), and relatively little on internal firm dynamics and how these impinge on performance outcomes” (p. 23). Further, media management as a separate field is also a relatively late arrival in terms of institutional growth. Key journals such as The International Journal of Media Management was established only in 1998, and the Journal of Media Business in 2004. EMMA, the European Media Management Association, an international not-for-profit organization was founded in 2003 in response to the – paradoxically – dramatic growth in media management courses and programs at higher education institutions throughout Europe. Likewise, IMMAA (the

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019 P. C. Murschetz, Die digitale Mediamorphose und der Wandel der traditionellen Massenmedien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27965-3_2

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International Media Management Academic Association), a collaborative professional group of academic researchers on the subject of media management, planned to develop research and teaching of media management to students and professionals, was founded only in 2004. Industry change Second, media management is facing a variety of profound and disruptive challenges that come to greatly challenge various media industry’s rationale. By offering interactive e-commerce and Web 2.0 applications and services, and thereby actively engaging consumers in communication and transaction processes, media publishers increasingly need to emphasize solid and sustainable relationships that may help them achieve improved economic viability and sustainable competitive advantage in the digital marketplace. Now, even commercial mass media are struggling to find new revenue streams that can reshape their broken business models. Many scholars posit that the mass media industry’s future is defined by experiments in monetization. New publishing business models are indeed evolving, and companies are looking for new revenue streams, while also using cost-cutting strategies as a tool to drive their business towards innovation. But the advertising and subscription business models that supported traditional media companies in the past appear to do not so in the digital age. Addressing this “capitalization gap” raises the fundamental questions of how commercial media will manage to survive as traditional sources of revenue (paid display ads, subscriptions and direct sales) shrink. Solving this issue is vital as the legacy revenue model through paid and owned media is failing. Paid advertising has found many outlets, atomized into thousands of blogs, Facebook pages, and specialized television and radio stations, so that return on investment is becoming difficult, notably for print-only media. Social media, on their side, has become another platform available to engage consumers. For example, digitization and convergence lead to what industry research suggests should be considered the future of television toward Connected TV, that is a new media ecosystem whereby TV changes in several levels concurrently: from analogue to digital, from scheduled broadcasts to ondemand TV on the internet, from a lean-back (passive) to a lean-forward (active) media, from straight watching to the consumption of content connected to additional services, from the sole TV viewer to the viewer being part in social networks and communities regarding to the TV content, from single-screening to multi-screening etc. (Murschetz 2016). But do these changes in the media really need a new research perspective, such as is promulgated and advanced in media industry studies (Holt & Perren 2009), or studies in the media as being part of the cultural industries (Hesmondhalgh 2009). Certainly, understanding the economic paradigms at work in the media industries and markets is vitally important for the analysis of the media systems as a whole. The changing dynamics of media production, distribution and consumption are stretching the boundaries of established economic paradigms. And this industry change certainly also affects research into the management of media organizations, the behaviour of their managers as (rational) actors who make choices given the resources available to them. Defining media management Given its strong output growth over the last decade, one might expect a rich theoretical literature and ample empirical insights into the important issue of media management in the way media markets are organized and media organizations manage scare resources for competitive advantage. However, our own review of the literature concludes that theory is rarely applied systematically to study the many phenomena within the media management research domain. Sadly, industry practitioners seem rarely interested in scientific output (Küng 38

2010). Thus, I consider intensified research and possible clarifications into the opaqueness and multi-formity of the media management phenomenon as paramount at least for its future as an academic research field. Hence, this chapter critically reviews this situation and wishes to present ideas in how the academic discipline of media management be strengthened more agreeably across its scientific community. Essentially, it shall address some key management issues of this emerging field in order to solidify its principle paradigmatic direction. But, let me first present a definition of media management: According to Bernd W. Wirtz (2013) the field is defined as follows: “Media and internet management covers all the goal-oriented activities of planning, organization and control within the framework of the creation and distribution processes for information or entertainment content in media enterprises.” (p. 15) This definition signifies that the core task of media management is to build a bridge between the general theoretical disciplines of management as covering the entire value creation, innovation and marketing processes in the media and the organizational specificities of media enterprises. Certainly, media management is a business administration discipline that analyzes operational and strategic phenomena and problems in the leadership of media enterprises. The business of media is the distribution of news, entertainment and advertisement. A media manager is an influential actor and has the power to conceptualize, communicate and control the institutional order of media organizations and its business. Media management thus includes all functional areas of management, from supply chain management, licensing, rights and royalties’ management, workflow and asset management, HRM, product life cycle management, to customer relationship management, finance, and sales and marketing management. Seen this way, research is dedicated to assessing the degree to which management of media firms requires a unique set of skills, highlighting similarities and differences of media firms compared with other industries in terms of management practices, HR development, strategic planning and operational aspects. The main problem with this functionalist approach is that it is both too general and narrow at the same time (Albarran 2006; ibid., 2008). It is too general because managing the media, conceptually and practically, means managing a very broad range of media: big or small, global or local, public or private, profit (commercial) or non-for profit (citizen), print (newspapers, magazines, books) or digital media (broadcasting, radio, video, internet platforms, on line services, portals, websites, search engines, e-social networks). Further, entertainment industries (restaurants, tourism attractions, sports, thematic parks, circuses, gambling, stage shows), communication companies (advertisers, public relations, exhibitions, clubs), cultural and arts organizations (opera, galleries, symphonic orchestras, antiques, architectural design, dance, theaters, sculpture, photography, ballet) or other institutions (music hall, museums, libraries) are principally all addressed. And further, a functionalist approach is too narrow as well. Managing the media is something very special. Why? Because it is unique and entails particular competences and skills not addressed by other industries and their management requirements. Hence, managing the media is different. This makes it the more difficult. Why is managing the media so difficult? Besides the problems in properly and successfully managing industry change (e.g., of digitalization and globalization), all above-mentioned organizations produce contents that are not ordinary commercial goods but goods with a social impact. For example, when media companies provide information about public health, it can affect the way people think or behave; therefore, media managers must take into consideration their social power of shaping people’s opinions and beliefs. 39

However today, quality newspapers, for example, do not only feel the squeeze of increasing competition for revenues and readers but also see their role as facilitators of social and political expression diminishing. This means that the public service function of the quality press, namely to ensure every citizen has easy access to diversified information and to stimulate their participation in public debate in order to strengthen democracy, is critically endangered. Second, media goods have special product characteristics. Some mass media are offered for-free (free downloads), others are paid-for. Some are tangible (books), others are intangible (digital music files). Some are commercial (TV shows), others are not-for-profit (citizen media). Some show traits of public goods (which are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in that individuals cannot be effectively excluded from use and where use by one individual does not reduce availability to others, e.g. watching a movie with a friend does not exclude him from doing so) and are thus difficult to market and refinance, while others are purely private and marketable (Pay-TV program). Some are meritoric to society (TV documentaries create societal benefits and increase public knowledge), others are not (violent video games). Some are analogue-only (Vinyl music records), other are digital-only (The New York Times) And there are more specificities than these. Most importantly, media are cultural and economic goods at the same time. Economical they are in that they have a price-tag. However, Stephen Lacy and Johannes M. Bauer (2006) have noticed a decisive difference for media economics as the twindiscipline of media management: “Most importantly, however, media are self-reflexive: More than other industries, they simultaneously produce economic goods and cultural goods, such as meaning and shared perceptions. Given this important role for society at large, it is not surprising that they are entrenched in intense policy debates and subject to various forms of oversight and control (…) The specific institutional framework of media is contingent upon the broader political and cultural traditions and arrangements of nations” (p. 663). Third, media production involves high start-up costs and high production, distribution and marketing costs. This urges media companies to become big-sized. Then, economies of scale are realized that is cost advantages that media enterprises obtain due to size, output, or scale of operation, with cost per unit of output generally decreasing with increasing scale as fixed costs are spread out over more units of output. Fourth, media companies mostly operate in markets that operate under conditions of imperfect competition. In these markets, high market power is exerted by a few big companies which dominate it (e.g., the “big 3” TV chains in Germany), low to moderate elasticity of consumer demand (newspaper readers are lackluster to change for another brand), constraints embedded in the organizational structures of markets (e.g., high entry barriers, low levels of direct competition, high social externality value, etc.), and media customer-side specifics (e.g., irrational behavior by consumers; Simon 1959) may give rise to imperfections where efficiency results do not hold. Additionally, dominant firms may raise market entry barriers or try to control successive value stages under their single roofs through means of ownership concentration and vertical integration. This gives rise to costs to the economy and society at large. This all affords to specific market and industry knowledge and expertise. Fifth, the people that produce media contents (journalists, artists, administrators, technicians, volunteers, composers, writers) are not ordinary employees. They are creative people. Most media organizations are labor-intensive and therefore a manager should manage people having the knowledge of their specific motivation mechanisms. Only by adopting the right “Human Resources” (or much better: People factor) policies and infrastructures (including training) will the potential of employees developed to the full. George Sylvie et al. (2008) have stressed this essential point as follows: “The next generation of media leaders will captain the industry into a new era, making their mark of the future of the industry no less than did the pioneers who led the development of early television. However, succeeding in today’s uncertain 40

industry conditions will require strong leadership traits, exceptional leadership skills, and the ability to manage change, foster creativity, and lead ethically” (p. 46). Sixth, many media productions are live events that offer simultaneity and real-life experience, which today, in the digital age, has led to audience’s wanting to participate in the creative process. For instance, as regards the music industry, fans can buy music productions directly from singers or composers. Here, the integration of social media with customer relationship management (CRM) strategies is the next frontier for media organizations that want to optimize the power of social interactions to get closer to customers. Seventh, media productions are characterized by uncertainty as consumers’ tastes are heterogeneous and demand is erratic. This means that very few of them meet sustainable commercial success. Additionally, there is a different and contradictory interest among different stakeholders as to which product is to be created and marketed: Artists, managers, owners, customers, regulators, advertisers, sponsors and others. All of them evaluate differently which contents meet the consumers’ preferences the best. Formulating a comprehensive corporate plan which includes risk-assessment and management is therefore essential. And, finally, it is very important to make the right managerial decisions in order to be economically successful. One may easily be ‘stuck in the middle’ and offer products to the mass market while missing out high margins in the niche segments. Usually, there is a linear relationship between profitability and quality. However, albeit being attractive, quality is difficult to be achieved while ‘hit-and-run’ policies into mass market success seem more profitable in the short run. Methodically, media managers may follow a cyclical approach of seven steps when strategizing on creative and productive work. The first step is the planning: they draw up longrun and shortrun scenarios after having scanned the internal structures and the value chains, the culture, the values and beliefs, and the resources, such as assets, skills, competences, knowledge. The scanning of the external business environment is a must-have too. The second step is the strategy formulation: media managers make choices about the mission, vision, goals, objectives, policy and the general strategy to achieve the planned targets. A set of generic strategies may guide media managers: growth strategies, strategies for achieving competitive advantage (cost leadership, differentiation, focus) or corporate strategies (vertical and horizontal integration, market penetration, development, product development partnerships, globalization, mergers and acquisitions) are at stake. The third step is to implement the chosen strategy, all accorded with the financial planning, the budgeting and, eventually, the marketing. Marketing strategies refer to the content, price, placement, promotion, advertising, and more. It is clear that planning human resources is key too. In fact, it is how managers organize departments, job, division of labor, span of control levels and management hierarchy, recruitment methods and industrial relations. Moreover, it is how managers direct their coworkers and employees, with which leadership style, motivation and incentive practices, communication methods, collaborative team management, conflict resolution style, as well as change and knowledge management style, all embedded in a people-friendly organizational culture. Then comes the implementation of the media productions plans that is how to select, produce and distribute contents, how to organize live events, etc. The sixth step is the implementation of accounting and financial plans and refers to how managers make budgets, analyze income statements, cash flows, equity assets and implement plans for fundraising and investment spending. Controlling the economic and social performance is the final step in the media management cycle. Performance management is tricky and complicated as, for example, social media success is difficult to measure. Therefore, benchmarking tools, vision and mission statement evaluations, input/output analyses, balanced scorecard techniques, cost-benefit analyses and corporate social responsibility techniques are applied. 41

Finally, does it need a new paradigm for the digital change? This contribution should have explained why media management research matters. However, we believe that scholarly efforts are yet not fulfilling their promise. Hence, we suggest a new paradigm for understanding – and leveraging – media management research. Now, how is research in media management scientifically more useful to explaining current practices in the industry? How can media management become a ‘good theory’ which is “practical precisely because it advances knowledge in a scientific discipline, guides research toward crucial questions, and enlightens the profession of management” (Van de Ven 1989, p. 486). In gist, do we need a new research paradigm in media management? Well, we think that two things need to change. First, in order to solidify the media management discipline, it needed to be opened toward new research orientations. What may sound contradictory in the first place as it opens doors into new directions is, however, necessary in the mid to long run. As we have seen, media management remains heterodox in nature. But, in order to become stronger and more acclaimed, it has to open towards new topical challenges (e.g., the digital media future) and that means its epistemic core needs to broaden and, essentially, its disciplinary gates opened (toward technology studies, critical management studies, stakeholder management perspective and the like; Karmasin 2003, Karmasin et al. 2014, Karmasin & Kraus 2014). This would certainly include discussing the critical political economy approach to media that helps us dealing with the ‘new realities’ in the economics and management of media today, strands of what in the discipline of media economics is called ‘heterodox’ economics, which are alternatives to mainstream neoclassicism and critical political economy (Cunningham et al. 2015, Earl & Peng 2012). Second, given the changing nature of environmental challenges on the discipline, notably through digitization, convergence, and consumer empowerment, we believe that the traditional functionalist theory variant is principally outmoded and flawed. This critique is farreaching but mainly refers to the deterministic view of media management, namely that media management is optimally efficient and effective when it adjusts its structure to material forces such as regulation, technology and the consumer. As a corollary, many approaches to media management practice are inadequate to capture the complex reality in favouring deterministic approaches over complexity. Instead, we believe that the digital era has resulted in a paradigm shift in how organizations must now manage the media (Kuhn 1970). Media management research should open itself up to change and engage in a long-term transformation process (Levin 2009). We remain convinced, however, that media management can refresh its paradigmatic framework in order to avoid cognitive blind spots and managerial misdiagnosis. References Albarran, Alan B. (2006). Historical Trends and Patterns in Media Management Research (pp. 23-36). In Alan B. Albarran, Sylvia Chan-Olmsted, & Michael O. Wirth. (Eds). Handbook of Media Management and Economics (pp. 3-23). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. Albarran, Alan B. (2008). Defining Media Management. The International Journal of Media Management, 10(4), 184-186. Aris, Annett, & Bughin, Jacques (2012). Managing Media Companies: Harnessing Creative Value (2nd ed.), Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

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Ballon, Pieter (2014). Old and New Issues in Media Economics. In Karen Donders, Caroline Pauwels, & Jan Loisen (Eds.). The Palgrave Handbook of European Media Policy (pp. 7095). Basingstoke: Palgrave. Cunningham, Stuart, & Flew, Terry (2015). Reconsidering Media Economics: From Orthodoxies to Heterodoxies. Media Industries Journal, 2(1) ISSN: 2373-9037. Cunningham, Stuart, Flew, Terry, & Swift, Adam (2015). Media Economics. London and New York: Palgrave and Macmillan. Deuze, Mark (2016). Managing Media Workers. In Gregory F. Lowe, & Charles Brown (Eds.), Managing Media Firms and Industries. What's So Special About Media Management? (pp. 329-343). Heidelberg et al.: Springer International Publishing. Doyle, Gillian (2013). Understanding Media Economics (2nd ed.). London: Sage Earl, Peter E., & Peng, Ti-Ching (2012). Brands of economics and the trojan horse of pluralism. Review of Political Economy, 24(3), 451-467. Hardy, Jonathan (2014). Critical Political Economy of the Media: An Introduction. New York, NY: Routledge. Havens, Timothy, Lotz, Amanda D., & Tinic, Serra (2009). Critical Media Industry Studies: A Research Approach. Communication, Culture & Critique, 2(2), 234-253. Holt, Jennifer, & Perren, Alisa (2009). Introduction: Does the World Really Need One More Field of Study? In Jennifer Holt, & Alisa Perren (Eds.), Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method (pp. 1-17). John Wiley & Sons: Chichester. Hesmondhalgh, David (2009). Politics, Theory, and Method in Media Industries Research. In Jennifer Holt, & Alisa Perren (Eds.), Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method (pp. 245-256). John Wiley & Sons: Chichester. Karmasin, Matthias (2003). Medienmanagement als Stakeholder Management. In Gerrit Brösel, & Frank Keuper (Hrsg.), Medienmanagement. Aufgaben und Lösungen (S. 413-431). München: Oldenbourg Verlag. Karmasin, Matthias, & Kraus, Daniela (2014). Strategies for stakeholder management and crowdsourcing. In Michal Glowacki, & Lizzie Jackson (Eds.), Public media management for the twenty-first century (pp. 59-81). New York/London: Routledge. Karmasin, Matthias, Diehl, Sandra, & Koinig, Isabell (2014). Medienökonomie und Medienmanagement als Integrationsdiziplinen – Vom Objektbereich zur Heuristik. In Matthias Karmasin, Matthias Rath, & Barbara Thomaß (2014). Kommunikationswissenschaft als Integrationsdisziplin (S. 75-95). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Küng, Lucy (2007). Does media management matter? Establishing the scope, rationale, and future research agenda for the discipline. Journal of Media Business Studies, 4(1), 21-39. Küng, Lucy (2010). Why Media Managers are not interested in Media Management - And What We Could Do About It. The International Journal on Media Management, 12, 55-57. DOI: 10.1080/14241270903558467. Lacy, Stephen, & Bauer, Johannes M. (2006). Future Directions for Media Economics Research. In Alan B. Albarran, Sylvia Chan-Olmsted, & Michael O. Wirth (Eds.), Handbook of media management and economics (pp. 655-675). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 43

Levin, Jordan (2009). An Industry Perspective: Calibrating the Velocity of Change. In Jennifer Holt, & Alisa Perren (Eds.), Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method (pp. 256-264). John Wiley & Sons: Chichester. Mierzejewska, Bozena I. (2011). Media Management in Theory and Practice. In Mark Deuze (Ed.), Managing Media Work (pp. 13-31). London: Sage Publications Inc. Mierzejewska, Bozena I., & Hollifield, C. Ann (2006). Theoretical Approaches in Media Management Research. In Alan B. Albarran, Sylvia Chan-Olmsted, & Michael O. Wirth (Eds.), Handbook of media management and economics (pp. 37-65). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Murschetz, Paul C. (2016). Connected television: media convergence, industry structure and corporate strategies. In Elisa L. Cohen (Ed.), Communication Yearbook 40. Published Annually for the International Communication Association, Routledge, New York (forthcoming). Simon, Herbert A. (1959). Theories of decision making in economics and behavioural science. American Economic Review, 49(3), 253-283. Sylvie, George, LeBlanc Wicks, Jan, Hollifield, C. Ann, Lacy, Stephen, & Broadrick Sohn, Ardyth (2008), Media Management: A Casebook Approach. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Group. Van de Ven, Andrew H. (1989). Nothing is quite so practical as a good theory. Academy of Management Review, 14, 486-489. Winseck, Dave (2011). The Political Economies of the Media and the Transformation of the Global Median Industries. In Dave Winseck, & Dal Yong Jin (Eds.), The Political Economies of the Media: The Transformation of the Global Media Industries (pp. 3-48). London: Bloombury Publishing). Wirtz, Bernd W. (2013). Media- and Internetmanagement, 7. Auflage. Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag.

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Beitrag 2: Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle von Medien Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C. (2016). Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle von Medien. In J. Krone, & T. Pellegrini (Eds.), Handbuch Medienökonomie. Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag. doi 10.1007/978-3658-09632-8_19-1

Abstrakt Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht, den theoretischen Gehalt des Konzepts „Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle in den Medien“ im Kontext der gegenwärtigen Dynamiken des digitalen Medienwandels auszuloten. Ziel ist, konzeptionelle Grundlagen für das Thema der Geschäftsund Erlösmodellierung von insbesondere publizistischen Massenmedien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie zu skizzieren und gegebenenfalls zu festigen bzw. zu erweitern. Dieser Beitrag stellt die Hypothese auf, dass die Medienökonomie zahlreiche Aspekte zu Geschäftsund Erlösmodellen in den Medien identifiziert hat, es aber dennoch keinen kohärenten Fundus an Ansätzen und Modellen für deren Erklärung gibt. Es ist allerdings anzunehmen, dass die Effektivität dieser Modelle über die Zukunftsfähigkeit von Medien mitentscheidet. Die Argumentation stützt sich auf Analyse und Synthese der vorhandenen Literatur. Im Ergebnis spricht vieles dafür, dass den Dynamiken des Medienwandels folgend, gegenläufige Tendenzen in der Geschäfts- und Erlösmodellierung in den Medien existieren. Mit anderen Worten: Es kommt zu Grenzziehungen und Entgrenzungen, Differenzierungen und Entdifferenzierungen von Modellen in einem Prozess, in dem sich publizistische Massenmedien modernisieren und zugleich ihre Unternehmensstrategien zur Refinanzierung der Leistungserstellungs- und verwertungsprozesse und -strukturen krisenhaft werden. Keywords (6-8) Digitaler Medienwandel Erlösmodell-Verständnis Geschäftsmodell-Verständnis Konzeptionelle Grundlagen Medienfinanzierung

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ÜBER DIE SCHWIERIGE FINANZIERUNG VON MEDIEN In den letzten Jahren haben Mediensysteme westlicher Demokratien radikale Veränderungen erfahren. Der Eintritt medienferner Unternehmen in klassische Medienmärkte, ein durch Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz induzierter Wandel der Medientechnologien, der Marktstrukturen, des Wettbewerbs sowie des Nutzungsverhaltens, und die durchgehende Ökonomisierung und Kommerzialisierung des Mediengeschäfts im Gefolge der „Sachzwänge“ des Marktes haben alte Strukturen aufgebrochen und zu einer besonders dynamischen Entwicklung am Medienmarkt geführt (vgl. Altmeppen 2011). Trotz ihrer anhaltenden Bedeutung und Wichtigkeit für Gesellschaft und Demokratie ist die marktmäßige Finanzierung von traditionellen Massenmedien und ihren Redaktionen über Anzeigen und Verkaufserlöse in Zeiten von Krisen und Transformationen zunehmend schwieriger geworden (Kiefer 2011, Lobigs 2013, Picard 2005). Und wenn sich selbst sogenannte „Leitmedien“ (Jarren & Vogel 2009), also eine Gesellschaft prägende und im Mediensystem führende Medien, in einer strukturellen Krise befinden sollen, welche Gründe sind dann aus Sicht der Medienökonomie dafür verantwortlich (Blum et al. 2011, Dal Zotto et al. 2012)? Die Entwicklung tragfähiger Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle in den Medien wird in dreierlei Hinsicht als besonders herausfordernd angesehen: Erstens verändert der Eintritt von anfänglich reinen Technologielieferanten zu jetzt faktisch weltweit tätigen Internetkonzernen (wie Google und Apple) in den digitalen Medienmarkt die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen und Medienstrukturen von klassischen publizistischen Massenmedien substanziell. Damit wird die Suche nach tragfähigen Erlösmodellen für klassische Medienunternehmen zunehmend schwieriger. Die meist rückläufige Nutzung klassischer Medien führt zu Umsatzeinbußen auf den Absatzmärkten (d.h. Rezipienten- und Werbemarkt). Dies hat Auswirkungen auf das Leistungssystem des Unternehmens: Die operativen Kosten können nicht gedeckt und das finanzielle Gleichgewicht nicht aufrechterhalten werden10. Zudem wird das Gewinnziel verfehlt (Apel 2010, Kiefer 2011, Picard 2002, Puppis & Künzler 2011). Zweitens gilt die Abhängigkeit vom Sekundärmarkt der Werbung (Primärmarkt: Zuschauer, Leser etc.) als Grundproblem der Erlösbildung von (vorwiegend werbefinanzierten) Medien (also Tageszeitungen, Zeitschriften, privater Hörfunk, privatkommerzielles Fernsehen, Internet). Gelingt die direkte Finanzierung über den Marktmechanismus „Leistung“ (z.B. durch den Verkauf von Einzelkopien einer Tageszeitung) und „Gegenleistung“ (Verkaufspreis) nicht, weil beim Kunden keine Zahlungsbereitschaft vorhanden ist und/oder die Leistungsangebote bzw. Produkte über Marktpreise keine Kostendeckung erzielen, ist der Versuch naheliegend, die Finanzierung über Umwege, also indirekt (insbesondere über Werbung), möglich zu machen. Man spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von „Querfinanzierung“ (bzw. „Quersubventionierung“; vgl. Ludwig 1998). Dazu kommt, dass Medieninhalte immaterielle Güter sind, deren eigentlicher Produktkern, die Information, Merkmale eines öffentlichen Gutes trägt und damit kaum marktfähig ist (vgl. Ludwig in Sjurts 2011, S. 516-517). Öffentliche Güter sind ja bekanntermaßen durch Nichtrivalität im Konsum und Versagen des Marktausschlussprinzips gekennzeichnet (Detering 2001). Dies hat weitreichende Konsequenzen für deren Erlösmodell: Nicht-Ausschließbarkeit von Marktteilnehmern als angebotsseitiges Argument sowie Nicht-Rivalität im Konsum als nachfrageseitiges Problem machen eine marktmäßige Kostendeckung von solcherart Medien grundsätzlich schwierig. Mangelnde Marktfähigkeit ist für Verkäufer ein zentrales Problem, weil Güter in der Regel auf dem Markt verkauft werden sollen. Ein Verkauf gelingt aber nur dann, wenn der Käufer das

10 „Eine Unternehmung befindet sich demnach im finanziellen Gleichgewicht, wenn sowohl die Erfüllung der finanziellen Ansprüche der Unternehmungsträger an die Unternehmung als auch die Existenz der Unternehmung selbst kurz- und längerfristig gesichert erscheinen“ (Schierenbeck 2003, S. 325).

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Eigentum am gekauften Produkt erwerben kann. Bei manchen Gütern kann man aber Eigentum nicht oder nur schwer erwerben, weil Eigentumsrechte nicht durchgesetzt werden können.11 Das gilt auch für Eigentumsrechte an Medieninhalten: Sie sind kein physisches Produkt, Inhalt und Trägermedium sind einfach zu trennen, ihr Verbrauch ist nicht notwendig an den physischen Besitz gebunden, und ein unbefugter Verbrauch ist wegen der Nichtrivalität im Konsum nicht direkt erkennbar. Es gilt also die Marktversagensvermutung, da Urheber-, Handlungs- und Verfügungsrechte nicht gesichert sind. Und drittens ist mit „Ökonomisierung“ (Altmeppen 2008 und 2011, Grisold 2001, Heinrich 2004 und 2001, Knoche 2014, 2002 und 2001, Meier & Jarren 2001, Siegert 2005 und 2001, 2003, von Rimscha 2015, Trappel 2001) längst ein wesentlicher Entwicklungspfad der Medien angesprochen, der generell alle publizistischen Massenmedien, also Print, Radio, Fernsehen und Internet, vor neue Herausforderungen stellt. Obgleich Medienökonomen dieses Metathema aus unterschiedlich variierten Perspektiven aufnehmen, geht es im Kern darum, dass durch Ökonomisierung die grundsätzliche Orientierung von privat-kommerziellen aber auch öffentlich-rechtlichen Medien an wirtschaftlichen Effizienz- und Rentabilitätskriterien noch deutlicher akzentuiert wird (Karmasin et al. 2001). Insbesondere privat-kommerzielle Medienunternehmen würden sodann nämlich konsequent und recht rücksichtslos dem Primat der Gewinnmaximierung folgen, und zwar allzu oft auf Kosten der wirtschaftlichen Fairness und der Qualität und Vielfalt der angebotenen Inhalte. Argumentationslinie dieses Beitrags ist, dass die Effektivität von Geschäfts- und Erlösmodellen von Medien über deren Zukunftsfähigkeit entscheidet. Es wird die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass die Medienökonomie zwar viele Aspekte zu Geschäfts- und Erlösmodellen in den Medien identifiziert hat, es aber dennoch keinen kohärenten Fundus an Ansätzen und Modellen für deren Erklärung gibt. Dies ist problematisch, da die erzielbaren Markterlöse publizistischer Massenmedien generell rückläufig sind und Innovationen in der Geschäfts- und Erlösmodellierung ein wichtiger Motor zur Bestandserhaltung und auch Modernisierung von klassischen publizistischen Massenmedien sind. In der Tat lässt sich beobachten, dass den „bewährten Partnerschaften“ von Medien und Werbung bzw. Medienangebot und Kunden eine Tendenz innewohnt, die zur Auflösung eben dieser „Partnerschaften“ neigt. Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz gefährden nämlich nicht nur traditionelle Geschäftsmodelle in den Medienindustrien, sondern treiben eine dynamische Entwicklung vom „Mono-Erlösmodell zur multiplen Erlösstruktur“ (Sjurts 2004, prognostiziert am Beispiel des deutschen Fernsehmarktes bereits im Jahre 2003) voran (Hass 2004, Keuper & Hans 2006). Gleichzeitig soll es sogar zum Aufbau völlig neuartiger „digitaler Ökosysteme“ (Ammon & Brem 2013) kommen. Diese werden von Apple, Amazon, Google & Co. ja gegenwärtig erfolgreich etabliert (Hass 2004 und 2002). Marktmacht, Reichweite und Integration verschiedener Dienstleistungen würden darin zu einem technisch abgegrenzten System verschmelzen, also einem gemeinsamen „Lebensraum“ von Inhalten und Dienstleistungen, welcher Kunden, Partnern, Lieferanten und Mitbewerbern vernetzte Organisations- und Kommunikationsformen ermöglicht (Englert & Senft 2012). Diese Ökoysteme führen zum Aufbau völlig neuartiger Geschäftsmodelle in der digitalen Medienwelt (Keuper et al. 2013). Der zentrale Anspruch des vorliegenden Kapitels besteht also darin, eine theoriegeleitete Reflexion der wirtschaftlichen Bedingtheiten zu Fragen der Geschäfts- und

11

Die als „Theorie der Verfügungsrechte“ (engl. „property rights theory“) bekannte Betrachtungsweise, die von angelsächsischen Ökonomen wie Alchian und Demsetz (1973), Coase (1937), North (1990) und Williamson (1985) entwickelt wurde, untersucht Eigentumsrechte als Handlungs- und Verfügungsrechte an Gütern, deren Ausgestaltung, Zuordnung und Beschränkung interessant ist, weil damit Nutzenmehrung und Gratifikation einhergeht.

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Erlösmodellierung von publizistischen Massenmedien sichtbar und verstehbar zu machen.12 Es werden im Wesentlichen die folgenden zwei Fragestellungen etabliert: (1) Welche konzeptionellen Überlegungen zu „Geschäfts- und Erlösmodellen in den Medien“ sind aus Sicht der Medienökonomie nötig, um der thematischen Vielfalt des Themas gerecht zu werden, den Objektbereich entsprechend zu konturieren, die erkennbaren Teilkonzepte zu systematisieren und gegebenenfalls komplementär zu verbinden oder eben klar voneinander abzugrenzen? (2) Ist eine diskursorientierte und metapherngestützte Annäherung an das Thema „Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle in den Medien“ zielführend, um bestehenden Forschungsdefiziten entschieden und systematisch entgegenwirken zu können? Im Vordergrund der Analyse stehen dabei Fragen auf der meso-analytischen Ebene, also der Organisation und dem Management der Medienorganisation. Medienunternehmen im Bereich der klassischen publizistischen Massenmedien, also vor allem Printmedien und Fernsehen, bilden den thematischen Ausgangspunkt und Kristallisationskern dieses Beitrags. An ausgewiesener Stelle tragen Einblendungen von weiteren Medienteilmärkten wie dem Buchund dem Filmmarkt nicht nur zur thematischen Erweiterung, sondern auch zur Einordung und Perspektivierung der Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten der beiden oben angeführten Kernmedienmärkte bei. Zudem sei hier auf digitale Erlösmodelle von neuen, also journalismusfernen, aber zunehmend publizistisch tätigen Marktakteuren verwiesen (z.B. Google, Amazon), vor allem wenn diese in Kernmärkte der klassischen publizistischen Massenmedien eindringen (z.B. Google News) und dabei mit Erlösmodell-Experimenten in der digitalen Welt zum Erfolg kommen wollen (z.B. Suchmaschinen-Marketing oder im Bereich sozialer Medien; Gustafsson & Schwarz 2013, von Rimscha 2012). Dass innovative Geschäftsmodelle im Zusammenhang der Phänomene „Big Data“ und „Cloudcomputing“ (Labes et al. 2013, Dapp & Heine 2014), Internet-basierter Medien (Gustafsson & Schwarz 2013, Schoder 2011), sozialer Medien (von Rimscha 2012), und „offener Plattformen“ auf Basis des „Modells der zweiseitigen Märkte“ (Dewenter & Rösch 2015, Gabszewicz et al. 2015, Rochet & Tirole 2003 und 2006) neue Geschäftsperspektiven auch für klassische Medienorganisationen eröffnen sollen, rückt das Thema damit in den Analysebereich von Medienökonomie vor.

2. GESCHÄFTS- UND ERLÖSMODELLE IN DEN MEDIEN – EINE ERSTE SKIZZE Das Thema „Erlösmodelle von Medien“ ist komplex, weil Formen, Ausprägungen und Praxen im Zusammenhang von Erlösmodellen von Medien äußerst vielfältig sind. Für den Verlauf dieses Beitrags ist es deshalb zunächst unumgänglich, die in der Literatur dominierenden und zum Teil in Konkurrenz zueinander stehenden konzeptionellen Zugänge im Allgemeinen zu klären und auf jene Aspekte zu fokussieren, die einen expliziten Bezug zum Thema „Medien“ im Besonderen erlauben. Es sind dies folgende: (a) Bedeutung der Begriffe „Erlös“ und „Erlösmodell“, (b) Systematisierung medienökonomischer Zugriffe auf Erlösmodelle, (c) Abgrenzung zum Themenkomplex „Medienfinanzierung“, und

12 Darüber hinaus gehende Erlösmodelle (z.B. Crowdfunding), die von neuen publizistischen Playern eingesetzt werden, werden in diesem Beitrag begleitend besprochen.

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(d) Beziehung des Konzepts zu angrenzenden Themen aus benachbarten Forschungsbereichen (insbesondere „Geschäftsmodell“ aus Sicht des strategischen Managements, der Internetökonomie und des E-Business Managements). „Erlös“ bezeichnet in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre den Gegenwert, den ein Unternehmen in Form von Geld oder Forderungen durch den Verkauf von Waren oder Dienstleistungen sowie aus Vermietung oder Verpachtung zufließt. Mit anderen Worten: Neben dem Was und dem Wie beschreibt das Erlösmodell auch, welche Einnahmen das Unternehmen aus welchen Quellen generiert. Die zukünftigen Einnahmen entscheiden über den Wert des Geschäftsmodells und damit über seine Nachhaltigkeit. Es beantwortet die Frage: Wodurch wird Geld verdient? Im „Erlösmodell“ (auch „Ertragsmodell“ oder „Ertragsmechanik“) wird den Kosten verursachenden Wertschöpfungsaktivitäten zur Leistung des Nutzenversprechens ein entsprechendes Finanzierungskonzept gegenübergestellt, das zur Kostendeckung und Erzielung möglichst hoher Gewinne dienen soll (vgl. Stähler 2001, S. 47). Es bildet die Zuflüsse finanzieller Mittel aus dem Absatz der erstellten Leistungen auf den Rezipienten- und Werbemärkten ab. Ausgangspunkt der Analyse von „Erlösmodellen von Medien“ ist der in der Medienökonomie weitgehend akzeptierte Strukturierungsansatz von Wirtz (2013). Wirtz (S. 73) betrachtet das Erlösmodell als ein „Partialmodell“ von insgesamt sechs übergeordneten Teilmodellen eines integrierten Geschäftsmodells (d.s. Beschaffungs-, Leistungserstellungs-, Leistungsangebots-, Distributions-, Kapital-, und Marktmodell), wobei das Erlösmodell dem Kapitalmodell untergeordnet wird. Zum Erlösmodell gehören zweckmäßigerweise die kundenseitige Identifikation von potenziellen Erlösmöglichkeiten bei den verschiedenen Zielgruppen, inklusive Marktpreisfestlegung und Preisgestaltung (ein solches „Preismodell“ stellt wiederum ein Teilmodell eines Erlösmodells dar). Die Vielzahl der Erlösmodelle ist der Tatsache zu verdanken, dass Zeitungen, audiovisuelle Medien, Online, etc., in Abhängigkeit von den angebots- und nachfragespezifischen Branchenbedingungen und den produkt- und unternehmensspezifischen Voraussetzungen deutlich unterschiedliche Erlösquellen und damit stark unterschiedliche Erlösmodelle entwickelt haben und einsetzen (Systematiken dazu liefern Gläser 2014, Keuper & Hans 2006, Seidel & Schwerzel 2006). Davon hebt das Finanzierungsmodell von Medien ab, welches selbst in der medienökonomischen Literatur fälschlicherweise gerne dem Erlösmodell zugeschlagen wird. Ein Finanzierungsmodell zeigt die Quellen auf, aus denen das zur Finanzierung der Unternehmenstätigkeit eingesetzte Kapital stammt (vgl. Schierenbeck 2003, S. 325). Ziel eines solchen Modells ist die Herstellung und Sicherstellung des finanzwirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts. Differenziert wird hierbei mit Hinblick auf die Herkunft der Finanzmittel in Form der so genannten „Innenfinanzierung“ (auch „Eigen“- bzw. „Selbstfinanzierung“), also die Finanzierung aus im Unternehmen selbst erwirtschafteten und zurückbehaltenen Gewinnen, der „Abschreibungsfinanzierung“13 bzw. „Vermögensumschichtung“ (d.h. die Umwandlung sonstiger Unternehmensaktiva in Zahlungsmittel bzw. geldnahe Forderungen), der „Außenfinanzierung“ wie etwa der „Rückstellungsfinanzierung“14, der „Beteiligungs- und Kreditfinanzierung“15 bzw. der 13 „Abschreibungsfinanzierung“ ist eine Form der Innenfinanzierung, bei der das Unternehmen über verdiente, aber noch nicht auszahlungswirksame Aufwandsgegenwerte bis zu deren Auszahlungswirksamkeit verfügen kann“ (Sjurts 2011, S. 3). 14

Im Unterschied zur Abschreibungsfinanzierung führen „Rückstellungsbildungen zu vorverrechneten, nicht zahlungswirksamen Aufwendungen. Da die Rückstellungsfinanzierung zur Erhöhung des Fremdkapitals führt, stellt diese eine Form der Fremdfinanzierung dar“ (Sjurts 2011, S. 533).

15 „Finanzierungsart, bei der dem Unternehmen als Kapitalnehmer finanzielle Mittel im Wege der Außenfinanzierung zur Verfügung gestellt werden und die Kapitalgeber als Eigner des Unternehmens auftreten“ (Sjurts 2011, S. 55).

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Finanzierung aus erhaltenen staatlichen Subventionen. Private Spenden, etwa durch Crowdfunding kommen als alternative und/oder komplementäre Außenfinanzierungsformen von Medien dazu (Wenzlaff et al. 2013). Zum anderen ist im Finanzierungsmodell auf die Rechtsstellung des Kapitalgebers entweder als Eigenkapital oder Fremdkapital verwiesen. Güter- und Marktbesonderheiten von Medien erlauben jedenfalls eine fast unüberschaubare Vielzahl von Medienfinanzierungsmodellen.16 Auch Zerdick et al. (1999, S. 25 f.) nahmen sich schon früh die Mühe, eine bis heute gültige „Systematik der Erlöstypen und Erlösmodelle“ im Mediensektor in Form einer „9Felder Matrix“ vorzulegen. Dabei kommen der unmittelbare Nutzer der Medien selbst in Frage (d.h. direkte Erlöse wie z.B. der Kauf einer Zeitungsausgabe am Kiosk, der Kauf eines Buches oder eine Pay-per-View-Transaktion) sowie Dritte mit einem Interesse an der Nutzung der Medien- und Kommunikationsleistung, d.h. die werbetreibende Wirtschaft oder der Staat (d.h. indirekte Erlöse). Nur die direkt vom Nutzer erhobenen Erlöse werden danach eingehender unterschieden, ob sie an einen Nutzungsvorgang geknüpft sind (d.h. transaktionsabhängig) oder nicht (d.h. transaktionsunabhängig). Weiterentwickelt wurde dieser Systematisierungsansatz später von Wirtz (2001), der das Schema mit seinem dafür entwickelten „4-C-Modell“ (Content, Commerce, Context, Connection) auf die Internetökonomie überträgt.17 Gläser (2014, S. 496ff.) bringt, basierend auf Wirtz (2013, S. 78), das Kriterium der „Unmittelbarkeit“ ein und unterteilt in direkte und indirekte Erlöse bzw. darüber hinaus zwischen „transaktionsabhängigen“ und „transaktionsunabhängigen Erlösen“. Unmittelbar erlöswirksam sind Modelle dann, wenn Erlöse durch direkte, also unmittelbare Bezahlung auf Abonnementoder Transaktionsbasis durch den Rezipienten erzielt werden (z.B. Transaktionserlöse i.e.S., Verbindungs- und Nutzungsgebühren). Im Medienbereich ist dies beispielweise bei Pay-TV der Fall. Dort zahlt der Kunde für sein Abonnement und erwartet im Gegenzug vom Pay-TVSender ein Programm nach seinen Wünschen. Bezahlfernsehen ist damit nicht auf indirekte Erlöse wie Werbung oder Sponsoring angewiesen. Beispiele hierfür sind kostenfreie, werbefinanzierte Online-Medien oder das soziale Mediennetzwerk Facebook. Direkte Modelle generieren Erlöse bei Einzeltransaktionen über Zahlung für die Nutzung entweder nach der Leistungsmenge (z.B. Preis pro Zeitungskopie) oder nach der Leistungsdauer (z.B. Minutenpreis bei Onlinenutzung). Transaktionsunabhängige Erlösmodelle werden durch AboErlösmodelle oder Flatrate-Modelle (z.B. über fixe und pauschale Gebühr für die Nutzung von

16 Darüber hinaus ist zu erwähnen, dass eine Verwendung des Kapitals für langfristige Zwecke eine Investitionsentscheidung unter Risiko darstellt. Investitionen in die Produktion, die Vermarktung und den Vertrieb gerade von klassischen Medieninhalten in diversen Medienbranchen gelten seit jeher als riskant. Für den Büchermarkt etwa stellte Ludwig schon 1998 fest, dass nur wenige Best- und Longseller den vielen unerwarteten Verlustbringern eines Verlages gegenüberstehen (Ludwig 1998). Ammon und Brem (2013) analysieren die großen Herausforderungen eines klassischen Buchverlages, die durch Betreiber der oben genannten „digitalen Ökosysteme“, also Firmen wie Apple, Amazon oder Google, entstehen (Daidj 2011). Die „Methode Amazon“ beschreibt etwa die verlegerischen Ambitionen des US-Versandriesen, erfolgreiche Autoren von großen Verlagen abzuwerben und mittels großzügiger Vorschüsse mit digitalen Inhalten von Bestsellerautoren, um Leser zu werben. Gegen einen festen monatlichen Betrag können Kunden dann beliebig viele E-Books ausleihen und auf dem E-Book Reader Amazon Kindle lesen. Damit steigt der Online-Händler in den Verdrängungswettbewerb mit den klassischen Buchverlagen ein, was wiederum deren Marktrisiko erhöht. Das Spielfilmgeschäft birgt vermutlich ein noch viel größeres Finanzierungsrisiko: Eine langfristig angelegte Ausbeutung eines erfolgreichen Stoffs wie bei Serien und Fernsehshows ist nicht möglich, und alle Produktionskosten fallen an, bevor der Markterfolg eingeschätzt werden kann (Clement 2004). Es sei darauf hingewiesen, dass eine ausführliche Diskussion zum Thema „Investitionsmodelle“ von Medien anderswo stattfinden muss (Schulz et al. 2008, Müller & Brösel 2013, Ozanich 2006, Rizzuto 2006). Auch die Frage, ob privates (Finanz)Kapital zur Rettung journalistischer Massenmedien auftreten soll, wird hier nicht beantwortet (vgl. Schulz et al. 2008). 17

Das 4-C-Modell wäre in der Internetökonomie folgerichtig auf eine „Community“-Dimension zum „5-C-Net Business Modell“ weiterzuentwickeln (vgl. Kollmann 2011, Afuah 2004).

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Kommunikationsnetzen und -diensten) erzielt. Hinzu kommt, dass sich „Big Data“ und „DataMining“18 zu weiteren Erlössäulen der Medienindustrie entwickeln. All diesen Überlegungen ist aber letztlich gemein, dass die von einem Medienunternehmen angebotenen Leistungen mit einer optimalen Preis-Mengenkombination auf den jeweiligen Absatzmärkten versehen werden müssen (Kiefer 2010). Um den gewinnmaximalen Preis zu bestimmen, müssen sowohl die Marktform (Monopol, Oligopol, etc.) berücksichtigt, das Verhalten der Konkurrenten analysiert als auch eine intensive Absatzforschung betrieben werden. Zwischen dem Preis-, dem Erlös-, und dem Geschäftsmodell eine enge Verbindung. Das Preismodell beantwortet die Frage, „was“ etwas kosten soll, während sich das Geschäftsmodell mit der zu erbringenden Leistung und das Erlösmodell mit dem damit zusammenhängenden Erlöspotential auseinandersetzt. Preismodelle umfassen folglich die Überlegung, zu welchem Preis eine im Erlösmodell als Profit generierend definierte Leistung abgesetzt werden soll (Skiera 1999). Preise sind selbst angebots- (Produktionskosten, Wettbewerbsintensität, Gütereigenschaft) und nachfrageseitigen (Preiselastizität, Kundennutzen) Einflussfaktoren ausgesetzt und müssen nun mit gewinnbringenden Erlös- und Geschäftsmodellen in Einklang gebracht werden, die ihrerseits unterschiedlichen Wertmaßstäben unterliegen (siehe oben). In diesem Zusammenhang bekommt eine weitere ökonomische Besonderheit von Medienmärkten Relevanz: Medien sind Plattformen, die Werbung und Nutzer zusammenbringen. Mit größerem Publikum steigt die Möglichkeit, Werbung zu verkaufen. Man spricht bei werbefinanzierten Medienmärkten von „zweiseitigen Märkten“ (Dewenter & Rösch 2015, Dewenter 2006, Rochet & Tirole 2003). Einerseits erzielen sie Umsätze durch die direkte Vermarktung von Inhalten, für die sie einen Preis verlangen (Publikumsmarkt). Andererseits nehmen sie dadurch Geld ein, dass sie einen Teil ihres Angebotes für Anzeigen oder Werbespots zur Verfügung stellen (Werbemarkt). Als Grundlage für einen solchen positiven Netzwerkeffekt gilt das langgediente Konzept der „Anzeigen-Auflagen-Spirale“, welches die Dynamik der Marktentwicklung von Medien im Wechselspiel von Absatzmarkt und Werbemarkt aufzeigt und zunächst am Beispiel des Tageszeitungsmarkts entwickelt wurde (Furhoff 1973, Gustafsson 1978). Dabei wird davon ausgegangen, dass sich Publikums- und Werbemarkt über „Netzwerkeffekte“ (auch „externe Effekte“) gegenseitig beeinflussen (Zerdick et al. 1999, S. 155 ff.). Ihr Zusammentreffen erzielt (i.d.R.) positive Symbiose-Effekte, die dadurch entstehen, dass der Konsum des Inhaltes mit steigender Nutzerzahl zunimmt (sog. „positive Netzwerkeffekte“). Bei sozialen Netzwerken treten solche positiven Netzwerkeffekte beispielhaft auf. Der Nutzen eines Teilnehmers hängt dann von der Anzahl der Nutzer ab, die ebenfalls das Netzwerk nutzen. „Indirekte Netzwerkeffekte“ wiederum bezeichnen Effekte zwischen unterschiedlichen Marktseiten. Ein typisches Beispiel dafür sind Spielekonsolen. Hier profitiert die Marktseite der Spieler von einer großen Anzahl von Entwicklern, die Auswahl und Qualität der Spiele erhöhen. Auf der anderen Seite erhöht sich die Nachfrage für die Produkte von Spielentwicklern mit der Anzahl der Nutzer der Konsolen. Der Hersteller der Spielekonsole liefert die Plattform und ermöglicht die Interaktion der Nutzer. Andere Beispiele finden sich auf den Märkten für Kreditkarten, Betriebssysteme und werbefinanzierte Medien (vgl. Rochet & Tirole 2006, S. 645-655; Evans & Schmalensee 2013, S. 7-27).19 Wenn also mit der Anzahl der Konsumenten der potenzielle Werbeerlös auf dem Werbemarkt zunimmt, ist ein positiver Effekt erzielt. Umgekehrt ist der Zusammenhang allerdings weniger eindeutig: Zwar kann Werbung als nützliche Information wahrgenommen werden, doch wird sie im Übermaß als störend empfunden. Bei der Optimierung ihrer Preisstrategie können Medien nicht einfach 18 Prozess der Gewinnung von Kunden-Informationen mit Hilfe von Data-Mining Software. Der Verkauf der derart gewonnenen Nutzerprofile wird als Erlösmodell für Online-Anbieter diskutiert (vgl. Siegert 2010). 19 Evans und Schmalensee (2013) identifizieren Börsen, werbefinanzierten Medien, Transaktionssysteme wie etwa Paypal und Software-Plattformen als zweiseitige Märkte.

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aufgrund der Preiselastizität der Nachfrage (von Medienkonsumenten oder Werbern) entscheiden. Höhere Abonnementpreise senken – jedenfalls bei gleichbleibender Leistung – nicht nur die Verkaufsmengen, sondern auch das Ertragspotenzial bei der Werbung. Wie Dewenter (2006) klarstellt, sind Medien bei der Wahl ihres Erlösmodells sogar bereit, ihr Produkt gegenüber den Konsumenten unter den Grenzkosten und damit mit Verlust anzubieten, damit der Ertrag aus dem Werbegeschäft maximiert wird (Dewenter 2006). Entgangene Gewinne aus Verkaufserlösen würden den Opportunitätskosten entgangener Werbeerlöse gegenübergestellt. Gratismedien wie etwa Gratiszeitungen, die etwa in London, Paris, Madrid, Zürich oder Oslo täglich massenweise vor allem an U-Bahn-Stationen verteilt werden, würden dieses Erlösmodell beispielhaft aufzeigen (Bakker 2002). Obiger Skizzierung des Objektbereichs und deren Teilkonzepte zeigt die Schwierigkeiten auf, die mit dem Versuch einer Systematisierung des Themas „Erlösmodelle von Medien“ einhergehen. Dies wird allein an Arbeiten deutlich, die eine Typologie von Erlösformen für Medien versuchen. Gläser (2014, S. 496-98) etwa fokussiert unterscheidet vier Basistypen von Erlösquellen mit Medienbezug: (1) Direkterlöse durch das Publikum bzw. Rezipienten für Medienzugang und Mediennutzung (z.B. durch Einzelentgelt20, Abonnement21), (2) Transaktionserlöse über den Markt (insbesondere durch Erlöse aus Werbung wie etwa der klassischen Anzeigen- und Spotwerbung22) und/oder aus Sonderformen wie Merchandising23, Teleshopping und Call-in-TV24 oder telefon- oder online basierte Mehrwertdienste25, (3) Erlöse über staatliche Unterstützung in Form von Subventionen, Gebühren oder Steuererleichterungen26, und (4) Erlöse aus der Lizenzierung von Inhalten und Marken, die durch den Weiterverkauf oder die Sublizenzierung an dritte Unternehmen entstehen. Während in der Medienökonomie Erlösmodelle jedoch überwiegend verkürzend im Sinne einer Gestaltung von möglichen Erlöstypen behandelt werden, also das Spektrum der Möglichkeiten 20 Einzeltransaktionen sind Zahlungen, die im direkten Zusammenhang mit dem Erwerb oder Konsum eines Gutes stehen z.B. über den Kauf eines Buches oder einer CD (also eines Speichermediums) erlauben eine dauerhafte und uneingeschränkte Nutzung der Inhalte erlauben. Mit dem einmaligen Kauf eines solchen Mediums erwirbt der Konsument die Möglichkeit, dessen Inhalt so oft und ausgiebig zu nutzen, wie es ihm gefällt. 21

Abonnements z.B. von Zeitungen, Zeitschriften od. Pay-TV-Diensten haben den Vorteil, dass sie Informationsprobleme des Nachfragers reduzieren. Die Anbieter ermöglichen es den Nachfragern, mit wiederholten Handelsbeziehungen ein Vertrauen in die Qualität der Inhalte zu entwickeln. Dieses Vertrauen ersetzt dann die Notwendigkeit der Qualitätsprüfung vor jedem Kauf.

22 Grundsätzlich unterscheidet man hier zwischen „klassischer“ oder „traditioneller“ Werbung, also direkt erkennbare Werbung in Printmedien (Zeitungen, Zeitschriften) und im Rundfunk (Radio, Fernsehen) sowie Kinound Außenwerbung. Sie steht damit im Gegensatz zur Below-the-line-Werbung. Unter dem Begriff „Below-theline“ werden „Ambient Media“ genauso subsummiert wie Sonderwerbeformen, ereignisorientierte Vermarktungsund Finanzierungsmodelle (sog. „events“), Sponsoring oder Product Placement. 23 Bezeichnet im Film- und Fernsehgeschäft den Vertrieb von Produkten, die in einem thematischen Zusammenhang mit TV- oder Kino-Produktionen stehen. Typische Merchandising-Produkte sind Begleitbücher, Soundtrack CDs, Videos, DVDs, Spielzeug. 24 Das Geschäftsmodell der Teleshopping-Sender weicht in erheblichem Umfang von den werbe- und entgeltfinanzierten Fernsehsendern ab. Die Erlösgenerierung zielt ausschließlich auf den Rezipientenmarkt, wobei die Erlöse nicht durch die Verbreitung von Content, sondern durch den Verkauf von Produkten und Dienstleistungen generiert werden. Die Präsentation dieses Sortiments findet in Form von Fernsehshows statt. 25

Wie z.B. Telefon-Votings bei TV-Castingshows.

26

Etwa in Form von staatlicher Presseförderung oder Filmförderung bzw. durch Rundfunkgebühren.

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hinsichtlich unterschiedlicher Erlösquellen (direkt/indirekt), der genauen Art/des genauen Typs (nutzungsabhängig, regelmäßig wiederkehrend, etc.) sowie ihrer genauen Kombination und Mischformen untersucht wird (vgl. Seidel & Schwertzel 2006), bemüht sich die strategische Managementforschung um eine differenzierte Auseinandersetzung (siehe unten). Wie oben bereits angedeutet, besteht zwischen Geschäfts- und Erlösmodell eine enge Verbindung. Als zentraler Unterschied gilt, dass ein Geschäftsmodell ein Konzept von multivalenter Natur ist, das mit unterschiedlichen Anwendungen und Nutzen in Verbindung gebracht wird (Baden-Fuller et al. 2010, Wirtz 2015, Zott et al. 2011). Dies bedeutet, dass durch die multivalente Natur eines Geschäftsmodells komplementäre Aktivitäten so kombiniert werden können, dass aus der neu entstehenden Verbindung und den sich daraus entwickelnden Lösungen ein Mehrwert für das Unternehmen, die Kooperationspartner und die Kunden entstehen kann. Darüber hinaus wird der Begriff „Geschäftsmodell“ meist aus abstrakter, ja „essentialistischer“ Sicht betrachtet (Baden-Fuller & Morgan 2010). Dies bedeutet, dass es der Wissenschaft nicht um eine erfahrungswissenschaftliche Erklärung, sondern vielmehr um das Erkennen des Wesens bzw. der ontologischen Grundlagen eines Geschäftsmodells geht. Zusätzlich werden dadurch materielle und performative Komponenten aufgezeigt, die es zum „intelligenten und kollektiven Instrument“ werden lassen. Geschäftsmodelle hätten so betrachtet eine narrative wie kalkulatorische Rolle und würden die innere Logik, wie Unternehmen Wert schöpfen, ebenso artikulieren wie konkrete Erfolgsziele definieren (Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009). Ein „Erlösmodell“ scheint im Gegensatz dazu ein rein deskriptives Konzept zu sein, das seine Rolle in der Beschreibung der vorwiegend umsatzwirksamen Geschäftsaktivitäten eines Medienunternehmens beschreibt. Der nächste Abschnitt nähert sich gegenwärtigen Problemen der Erlösmodellierung publizistischer Massenmedien über einen explizit interdisziplinären Erklärungsrahmen. Es wird versucht, auf die Besonderheiten des Konzepts Geschäftsmodell als Dachbegriff und Diskursfolie von Erlösmodell aus Sicht der Managementforschung einzugehen. Darüber hinaus wird versucht, den pessimistischen Gestus zu überwinden, der durch die Ansicht vertreten wird, dass selbst schon dem Dachkonzept des Geschäftsmodells in der klassischen Literatur des strategischen Managements eine theoretische Grundlage fehlen würde (Teece 2010). Dagegen ist es Absicht, einen vorsichtig optimistischen Deutungsansatz für das Thema „Erlösmodell“ als Teilthema von Geschäftsmodell zu wählen, um damit einen validen Beitrag zu einer Stabilisierung der Begriffe für den Medienbereich zu leisten. Die dabei erzielten konzeptionellen Überlegungen haben somit das zentrale Ziel, theoretische Erklärungen zur Erlösmodellierung von Medien aus der Perspektive der Medienökonomie zu etablieren (Karmasin et al. 2014). Dabei geht es zunächst primär um die – verständlicherweise ausschnitthafte – Darstellung wesentlicher Bausteine eines Modells zur Analyse von Erlösmodellen von Medien.

3. ERLÖSMODELL VON MEDIEN – WEITERE THEORETISCHE ZUGÄNGE 3.1 Geschäftsmodelle (von Medien) als Diskursfolie Der Ursprung des Themas „Geschäftsmodell“ geht auf Publikationen des Pioniers der modernen Managementlehre Drucker aus den 1950er Jahren zurück (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart 2010). Mit dem Begriff „logic of business“ schuf er einen Vorläufer dessen, was heute unter dem Konzept „Geschäftsmodell“ in der Managementlehre verstanden wird. Vereinfacht ausgedrückt ist ein Geschäftsmodell (engl. „business model“) eine modellhafte Repräsentation 53

der logischen Zusammenhänge, wie eine Organisation bzw. ein Unternehmen Mehrwert für Kunden erzeugt und einen Ertrag für die Organisation sichern kann.27 Folgt man Drucker (1954), dann unterscheidet sich ein gewinnbringendes Geschäftsmodell im Medienbereich nicht grundlegend von Geschäftsmodellen in anderen Branchen. Es geht in der Hauptsache darum, eine klare Zielgruppe zu bestimmen, dieser einen Mehrwert zu liefern, sich vom Wettbewerb abzuheben und schließlich Erlöse zu generieren (Drucker 1954). Es geht also um die Beschaffung und Verwendung von Kapital in verschiedenen Formen, d.h. letztendlich um die Frage mit welchen Aktivitäten und welchen Quellen ein Medienunternehmen Erlöse erzielen kann. Um diese vielschichtigen Thematiken zu verbinden, soll der Systematik von Stähler (2001, S. 42 ff.) gefolgt werden, der ein Geschäftsmodell aus drei Hauptkomponenten zusammensetzt: (1) Nutzenversprechen: Ein Geschäftsmodell enthält eine Beschreibung, welchen Nutzen Kunden oder andere Partner des Unternehmens aus der Verbindung mit diesem Unternehmen ziehen können. Dieser Teil eines Geschäftsmodells wird „Value Proposition“, Wertangebot oder Nutzenversprechen genannt. Es beantwortet die Frage, welchen Nutzen und Wert das Unternehmen für Kunden und strategische Partner stiftet; (2) Architektur der Wertschöpfung: Ein Geschäftsmodell ist gleichzeitig eine Architektur der Wertschöpfung, d. h. wie der Nutzen für die Kunden und die strategischen Partner generiert wird. Diese Architektur beinhaltet eine Beschreibung der verschiedenen Stufen der Wertschöpfung und der verschiedenen wirtschaftlichen Agenten und ihrer Rollen in der Wertschöpfung. Es beantwortet die Frage: Wie wird die Leistung in welcher Konfiguration erstellt? Welche Leistungen werden auf welchen Märkten angeboten?; und (3) Ertragsmodell: Neben dem Was und dem Wie beschreibt das Geschäftsmodell auch, welche Erlöse das Unternehmen aus welchen Quellen generiert. Die zukünftigen Unternehmensgewinne entscheiden über den Wert des Geschäftsmodells und damit über seine Nachhaltigkeit. Es beantwortet die Frage: Wodurch wird Geld verdient? Osterwalder und Pigneur (2010) sehen das Nutzen- bzw. Wertangebot für die Kunden (engl. „value proposition“) im Zentrum eines Geschäftsmodells. Ihr „Business Model Canvas“Modell stellt eine Heuristik zur Systematisierung der zentralen Dimensionen und Elemente eines Geschäftsmodells dar. Diese sind: (a) Wertangebote (z.B. das Paket an Nutzen aus Produkten und Dienstleistungen, das ein Unternehmen seinen Kunden anbietet); (b) Schlüsselressourcen (diese können bspw. „physischer, finanzieller, intellektueller oder menschlicher Natur … und im Besitz der Firma sein, geleast oder von Schlüsselpartnern erworben werden“ (ibid., S. 38); (c) Schlüsselaktivitäten (z.B. die wichtigsten Handlungen eines Unternehmens zum Gelingen des Geschäftsmodells. Die Schlüsselaktivitäten umfassen das Schaffen und das Unterbreiten eines Wertangebotes, das Erreichen von Märkten, den Aufbau und die Pflege von Kundenbeziehungen zur Generierung von Einnahmen); (d) Schlüsselpartner (z.B. das Netzwerk von Partnern und Lieferanten, etwa durch strategische Allianzen, um Geschäftsmodelle zu optimieren, Risiken zu minimieren und/oder Zugang zu wesentlichen Ressourcen zu erhalten); (e) Kostenstruktur: Im Wesentlichen Fixkosten und variablen Kosten, wobei zwischen dem kostenorientierten und wertorientierten Geschäftsmodell als extreme

27 Es gibt kein einheitliches Begriffsverständnis von „Geschäftsmodell“. Referenzbegriffe sind u.a. „Architektur”, „Design“, „Muster“, „Plan“, „Tool oder Methode“, „Modell“, und „Statement“.

54

(f)

(g) (h) (i)

Ausprägungen unterschieden wird. Bei Ersterem liegt der Fokus auf dem Minimieren von Kosten, während Letzteres sich auf die Wertschöpfung konzentriert, um hochwertige Angebote zu gestalten; Kundenbeziehungen (z.B. die Arten von Beziehungen, die zwischen dem Unternehmen und seinen Kundengruppen bestehen. Diese umfassen die Kundenakquise, die Kundenpflege und die Verkaufssteigerung und können persönlich oder automatisiert ablaufen); Kommunikations-, Distributions- und Verkaufskanäle, mit denen die verschiedenen Kundensegmente erreicht werden; Kundensegmente (z.B. die verschiedenen Kundengruppen eines Unternehmens und deren Wünsche und Besonderheiten); und Einnahmequellen (aus dem Verkauf von Wirtschaftsgütern, Nutzungsgebühren, Mitgliedsbeiträgen, Verleih, Vermietung, Leasing, Lizenzen, Maklergebühren und Gebühren für Werbung).

3.2 Geschäftsmodelle von Medien – eine Frage von Metaphern? Für die Analyse oder gar Gestaltung von Geschäftsmodellen in den Medien existieren heute eine Reihe äquivalenter Metaphern oder Analogien. Der Kreativität sind hier kaum Grenzen gesetzt. So spricht man etwa vom „Reichweitenmodell“ von beispielsweise print- aber auch rundfunkbasierten Medien, wenn die Erlöserzielung über Einzelverkäufe von Medieninhalten oder Abos erfolgt, gemessen am Anteil der Zielpersonen, die durch einen Werbeträger oder durch eine Werbeträgerkombination erreicht werden und diese auch tatsächlich genutzt haben. Reichweite, Nutzungsintensität und Affinität zur Zielgruppe sind dann die kritischen Faktoren, die im Kontext der journalistischen Inhalte für den Erfolg des Mediums sorgen. Dabei können die Angebote horizontal (d.h. Erweiterungen des Produktsortiments derselben Qualität etwa in Form verschiedener technischer Formate z.B. als Tablet-Version, e-paper Abo od. App) oder vertikal differenziert werden (d.h. inhaltliche Qualitätsdifferenzierung eines Angebots durch z.B. vertiefte Regionalberichterstattung). Neben den klassischen Erlösströmen aus Vertriebserlösen ist Werbung für privatkommerzielle Medien – grosso modo – immer noch und mit Abstand die wichtigste Einnahmequelle publizistischer Massenmedien. Die Integration des Reichweitenmodells mit einem „Werbemodell“ gilt damit weiterhin als zentrales Erlösmodell privat-kommerzieller Medien. Neue Finanzierungs- und Erlösmodelle kommen aber heute stets hinzu, meist in Form einer kreativen Rekombination des klassischen Reichweitenmodells in Richtung neuer Modelle, die den Möglichkeiten als auch den veränderten Rahmenbedingungen im Zeitalter web-basierter, mobiler und sozialer Medien Rechnung tragen. Klassische Medien geraten auch durch den Wandel der Mediennutzung immer mehr unter Druck. Auf der einen Seite brechen im klassischen Print-Stammgeschäft zunehmend die Erlöse ein, auf der anderen Seite schaffen es die aktuellen Online-Werbeerlöse noch nicht die laufenden Kosten zu decken. Sprachliche Entsprechungen finden neue Erlösmodelle zudem in Begriffsschöpfungen wie z.B. durch „bundling“ (von engl. „bundle“ = Bündel), also einem Geschäftsmodell, welches mehrere Bereiche wie etwa Kundenbeziehungen, Produktinnovation sowie Bereitstellung und Wartung von Infrastrukturen zu unterschiedlichen Ausprägungen vereint. So bezeichnet etwa Triple Play das von Telekommunikationsunternehmen gebündelte Angebot der drei Dienste audiovisuelle Unterhaltung (Fernsehen, Video-on-Demand), (IP-)Telefonie und Internet. Enthält das Angebot zusätzlich Mobilfunkangebote, spricht man heute auch von Quadruple Play.

55

Populär sind auch Bezeichnungen wie das „Freemium“-Modell (d.h. eine Kombination aus „Free“ und „Prämium“, wobei Grundleistungen unentgeltlich angeboten werden, erweiterte Funktionalitäten jedoch eines kostenpflichtigen Abonnements bedürfen (Beispiel: Skype, Xing). Zuletzt kehrt die Diskussion über Abo-Modelle für die Refinanzierung von journalistischen Produkten im Internet zurück. Das „Bezahl-Modell“ von Medien wie bspw. jenes von Bild.de zeigt beispielhaft auf, wie Digital-Abos die Gratiskultur im Netz verdrängen können. Eine Bezahlschranke ermöglicht dann, dass bestimmte Inhalte einer Website nur nach dem Bezahlen einer Gebühr oder dem Abschluss eines Abonnements sichtbar werden. Der Begriff ist besonders bei Websites von Zeitungen und Zeitschriften gebräuchlich, die mit einer Paywall versuchen, ein alternatives Geschäftsmodell zu entwickeln, das nicht oder nur zum Teil auf einer Finanzierung mittels Anzeigen basiert. Dass solcherart Bezahlschwelle in den klassischen Medien überwunden werden kann, zeigt eine Studie des Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2014). Demnach haben sich speziell junge und internetaffine Nutzer mittlerweile daran gewöhnt, dass Qualitätsinhalte im Netz nicht kostenlos verfügbar sind. Dazu kommt, dass neue Plattformen außerhalb der klassischen Medien das Großthema „Geschäftsmodell“ als Innovationslaboratorium zur Produktdifferenzierung entdeckt haben. Nachdem sich das „Free-Konzept“ im Sinne einer Integration kostenloser Produkte und Dienstleistungen in ein Geschäftsmodell längst als das Mustermodell in der digitalen Ökonomie etabliert hat, da Internetnutzer nur bedingt bereit sind, für Medieninhalte im Netz zu bezahlen, sind heute Kombinationen am Markt, die „Free“ zu einem einträglichen Geschäftsmodell machen und mit Pay- bzw. Bezahlmodellen auf raffinierte Weise kombinieren. Darüber hinaus werden zuletzt Geschäftsmodelle diskutiert, die auf zwei- od. mehrseitigen Plattformen beruhen: Das „Plattform-Modell ermöglicht die Interaktion von zwei oder mehr unabhängigen Gruppen. Der Wert für eine einzelne Gruppe entsteht durch die Präsenz einer anderen Gruppe (Beispiel: Google; die Gruppen sind Werbekunden und Suchmaschinennutzer) (Brousseau & Penard 2006). Traditionelle wie neue Geschäftsmodelle eröffnen mithin strategische Verhaltensspielräume von Medienunternehmen. Und tatsächlich taucht das Konzept des Geschäftsmodells in diversen Meta-Theorien der Managementlehre auf: z.B. in dem von Porter definierten Konzept der „Wertschöpfungskette“ (Porter 1985), in der „Theorie der strategischen Positionierung im Wettbewerb“ (Porter 1980), der „Ressourcentheorie zur Erzielung nachhaltiger Wettbewerbsvorteile“ (Barney 1991 und 2001, Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), oder der „Theorie des Financial Commitment“ (Lacy 1992), also der unternehmerischen Investitionsbereitschaft in innovative Produkte und neue Dienstleistungen aus portfoliotechnischer Sicht.

4. FAZIT Digitaler Medienwandel und Konvergenz, Marktversagen bzw. eingeschränkte Marktfähigkeit von Mediengütern und durchgängige Ökonomisierung sind nicht die einzigen Probleme der Finanzierbarkeit von Medien. Es sind die veränderten globalen Rahmenbedingungen von Mediensystemen insgesamt, also zunehmende Globalisierung und Dynamisierung des Wettbewerbs, Innovationsdruck, zunehmende Volatilität der Märkte sowie die veränderten Erwartungen und Bedürfnisse von Konsumentinnen und Konsumenten, aber auch Managementversagen, die strukturelle Veränderungen in den Medien insgesamt evozieren und damit zu fundamentalen Verunsicherungen in den Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle von (nicht nur klassischen) Medien beitragen. Dies hat zur Folge, dass die Art der Finanzierung bzw. der Kapitalbedarf (im Hinblick auf die Herkunft der Finanzmittel entweder in Form der Innen- od. Außenfinanzierung) sowie die Wahl des Erlösmodells heute mehr denn je die Wachstums- bzw. Überlebensfähigkeit von Medien prägen. Ein weiteres zentrales Problem liegt wiederum darin, 56

dass die marktwirtschaftlichen Mechanismen der Organisation und Finanzierung von traditionellen Medien und ihren Redaktionen über Anzeigen und Verkaufserlöse in Zeiten von Krisen und Transformationen zunehmend schwieriger geworden sind (Kiefer 2011, Lobigs 2013, Picard 2005). Auch wenn Journalismus in übereinstimmender Meinung nicht als Geschäftsmodell zu verstehen ist, weil es von der ökonomischen Sphäre zwingend zu trennen sei (vgl. Lobigs & von Nordheim 2014, Lobigs 2013, Kiefer 2011), stehen Journalismus und Ökonomie trotzdem in einer „schicksalhaften Verbindung“ (Lobigs 2013). Die damit angesprochene gesellschaftliche Bedeutung von Medien(unternehmen) und Journalismus wird aus dem Umstand erklärt, dass sie Bürger informieren, sozialisieren, bilden und eine Kontrollfunktion gegenüber der Politik ausüben sollen. Damit prägen sie maßgeblich die Informations- und Meinungspluralität in einer demokratisch verfassten Gesellschaft. Gilt Journalismus als demokratietheoretisch fundamentale Institution, dann sind Wege zu ihrer ausreichenden Finanzierung zu finden (Kiefer 2011). Zusammenfassend lassen sich die folgenden Ergebnisse festhalten: Dass sich Medienindustrien in einem massiven Wandel befinden, ist nicht neu. Die Zunahme nichtlinearer, interaktiver online-basierter Kanäle und Inhalte und die damit verbundenen neuen Werbestrategien von Unternehmen, welche diese neuen Online-Kanäle forcieren, bedeuten für viele Medienunternehmen den Wegfall von Werbeeinnahmen, wodurch deren traditionelle Geschäftsmodelle zunehmend an Bedeutung verlieren. Angesichts der Vielzahl unvorhersehbarer und dynamischer Umfeld- und Wettbewerbsentwicklungen (Wirtz & Pelz 2006, S. 275; Kind et al. 2009) sind heute die Spielregeln, nach denen Medienorganisationen finanziert und monetarisiert werden, in einem oft bedrohlichen Maß unsicher geworden. Diese Unsicherheit hat in den letzten Jahren notwendigerweise eine neue Experimentierfreudigkeit in der Medienpraxis und im Journalismus ausgelöst (Russ-Mohl 2014, Trappel 2014). Folgende erste Schlussfolgerung drängt sich daher auf: Es spricht vieles dafür, dass den gegenwärtigen Dynamiken des Medienwandels folgend, gegenläufige Tendenzen der Geschäfts- bzw. Erlösmodellierung von Medien existieren. Mit anderen Worten: Es kommt zu Grenzziehungen und Entgrenzungen, Differenzierungen und Entdifferenzierungen von Geschäfts- und Erlösmodellen in einem Prozess, in dem sich publizistische Massenmedien modernisieren und zugleich ihre traditionellen Geschäftsstrategien krisenhaft werden. Aus der vorliegenden Analyse folgt somit in erster Linie, dass mittlerweile zwar viele Aspekte zu Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle in den Medien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie angesprochen sind, es aber dennoch keinen kohärenten Fundus an Ansätzen und Modellen für deren Erklärung gibt. Der Komplexität dieses Themas, die im gegenwärtigen Prozess des digitalen Medienwandels eine erneute Dynamisierung erfährt, steht bislang jedenfalls kein angemessenes, korrespondierendes Niveau wissenschaftlicher Bearbeitung in der Medienökonomie gegenüber. Insbesondere fehlt bisher ein theoretisches Fundament, um von einer deskriptiv-phänomenalen Betrachtungsweise zu einer ökonomischen Theorie der „Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle in den Medien“ zu kommen. Eine zweite Feststellung drängt sich folgerichtig auf: Der bis dato begrenzte Erklärungswert der Medienökonomie wird freilich durch die nie auf einen Nenner zu bringende Heterogenität und Vieldeutigkeit an Perspektiven, die unter dem Begriff „Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle in den Medien“ laufen, verstärkt, sodass alle umfassenden Interpretationen ebenso berechtigt wie begrenzt ausfallen müssen. Jedenfalls ist das Fehlen zufriedenstellender theoretischer und empirischer Arbeiten zur Beschreibung und Analyse der Wandlungsprozesse der Medienindustrien und ihre Auswirkung auf Finanzierung, Erlösgenerierung und Gewinnerzielung von Medien insgesamt zu konstatieren. Diese Defizite müssen dazu führen, dass es bislang kaum zum nachhaltigen Theorieaufbau in der Frage der Geschäfts- und Erlösmodellierung von Medien gekommen ist. Dazu kommen nun prinzipielle Vorbehalte von Medienökonomen gegenüber der gegenwärtig feststellbaren Dominanz der Ökonomie und der Verwertungsinteressen des Kapitals gegenüber Journalismus/Medien als 57

Institution. „Journalismus ist kein Geschäftsmodell – und wird nie eines werden“ (Altmeppen 2014) ist dann Credo jener Medienökonomen, die im „Geschäftsmodelldenken … die Aushöhlung des Journalismus als Institution der Herstellung von Öffentlichkeit“ (ibid., S. 20) erkennen wollen. In der vorliegenden Untersuchung wird allerdings die gegensätzliche Auffassung vertreten, dass es für die Beteiligten am Marktgeschehen zweckmäßig ist zu verstehen, dass das, was als „Medienwandel“ oder „digitale Transformation“ bezeichnet wird, die vermeintliche Dichotomie von Medien und Ökonomie aufbricht. Bei „Medien“ und „Ökonomie“ handelt es sich folgerichtig nicht um zwei getrennte Bereiche, zwischen denen eine äußerliche Beziehung besteht, sondern um einen Vermittlungszusammenhang: Medien und Ökonomie existieren nicht außerhalb gesellschaftlich hergestellter Kommunikationsverhältnisse. Ebenso wenig ist es möglich, Ökonomie unabhängig von ihren medialen Kommunikationsverhältnissen und den sie antreibenden Medienwandel hinreichend zu begreifen. Beide existieren nur zusammen, miteinander verbunden, verflochten und vermischt. Hier wird also ein Forschungsdesiderat der Medienökonomie angesprochen, eine disziplinäre und inhaltliche Öffnung in mehrere Richtungen zu leisten, um das Thema „Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle in den Medien“ unter veränderten Rahmenbedingungen von Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz adäquat zu erfassen. Disziplinäre Öffnungen der Medienökonomie in Richtung der Diskurse zu den Forschungsfeldern „GeschäftsmodellInnnovationen“ (vgl. Bieger et al. 2011 und 2002, Keuper et al. 2013, Schallmo 2014 und 2013) und „Medieninnovation“ (vgl. Dogruel 2013, Størsul & Krumsvik 2013) sind nicht nur möglich, sondern notwendig und sinnvoll. Das (erweiterte) SVE-(Struktur-VerhaltensErgebnis)-Paradigma aus der Industrieökonomie böte sich jedenfalls als strukturierender Analyserahmen für die Veränderungen von Medienmärkten und deren Auswirkungen auf Geschäftsmodell-Innovationen an. Zudem könnten Ansätze zur Analyse der Bedeutung von finanziellen (und anderen) Ressourcen als wertvolle Inputfaktoren für das Medienunternehmen aufgegriffen werden (vgl. Barney 1991 und 2001, Porter 1991). Darüber hinaus sollte auch klar geworden sein, dass gerade die „Erlösarchitektur“ bzw. das Erlösmodell in den klassischen Mediensektoren mit einem hohen Erfolgsrisiko behaftet sind. Es gibt keine Erfolgsgarantie, da ein Erlösmodell von Medien heute kein monolithischer Block mehr ist. Es kann aus einer oder mehreren Quellen von Erträgen bestehen und sollte offen für Innovationen bleiben. Erlösmodellinnovationen betreffen die Auswahl der Erlöstypen und den Mix der verschiedenen Typen zum gesamten Erlösmodell hin, d.h. die Wahl, aus welchen Quellen die Erträge eines Geschäftsmodells generiert werden. In den klassischen Medien sind Budgets jedenfalls in neue Ideen zu investieren. Es muss dauerhaft innoviert, getestet, und beobachtet werden, ohne dass sich automatisch zählbare Erfolge einstellen müssen (vgl. Hacklin et al. 2013, Klang et al. 2014). Zahlreiche Beispiele aus der Medienpraxis belegen diese strukturelle Unsicherheit in den Geschäftsmodellen. Abschließend soll nochmals betont werden, dass theoretische Erklärungen zum Thema „Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle in den Medien“ bis dato nur in Fragmenten vorhanden sind. Dies bedeutet, dass nicht nur diese Modelle selbst, sondern auch deren Veränderungen im Prozess der Medienkonvergenz nicht ausreichend verstanden werden. Metaphern dienen dabei als Modelle der Wirklichkeitskonstruktion und können Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle in den Medien zwar darstellend unterstützen, bestehende analytische Forschungsdefizite in der Medienökonomie jedoch kaum kompensieren. Zudem ist die Suche nach tragfähigen Geschäfts- und Erlösmodellen derzeit eine der schwierigsten Aufgaben für Medienunternehmen in der Praxis selbst. Klassische Medienunternehmen haben jedenfalls markttechnisch epochale Zäsuren zu bewältigen, deren Langzeitwirkungen noch nicht abzusehen sind. Durch Medienkonvergenz erwächst aber auch die Möglichkeit der Etablierung 58

neuer Geschäftsmodelle (vgl. Apel 2010). Über den Zugang zum digitalen Markt eröffnen sich nämlich Chancen auf neue Erlösströme. In Zukunft wird jedenfalls mit einer ganzen Reihe von Erlösquellen experimentiert werden und die Marktakteure werden versuchen, unterschiedliche Erlösquellen als hybrides Modell für sich zu erschließen. Quellenverzeichnis Afuah, A. (2004). Business models. A strategic management approach. New York: McGrawHill. Alchian, A., & Demsetz, H. (1973). The Property Rights Paradigm. Journal of Economic History, 33, 16-27. Altmeppen, K.-D. (2014). Der Journalismus ist kein Geschäftsmodell – und wird nie eines werden. In: F. Lobigs, & G. von Nordheim (2014). Journalismus ist kein Geschäftsmodell. Aktuelle Studien zur Ökonomie und Nicht-Ökonomie des Journalismus (S. 17-31). BadenBaden: Nomos. Altmeppen, K.-D. (2011). Medienökonomisch handeln in der Mediengesellschaft. Eine MikroMeso-Makro-Skizze anhand der Ökonomisierung der Medien. In: T. Quandt, & B. Scheufele (Hrsg.), Ebenen der Kommunikation. Mikro-Meso-Makro-Links in der Kommunikationswissenschaft (S. 233-258). Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Altmeppen, K.-D. (2008). Ökonomisierung der Medienunternehmen: Gesellschaftlicher Trend und sektorspezifischer Sonderfall. In: A. Maurer, & U. Schimank (Hrsg.), Die Gesellschaft der Unternehmen - Die Unternehmen der Gesellschaft (S. 237-251). Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Ammon, T., & Brem, A. (2013). Digitale Ökosysteme und deren Geschäftsmodelle: Analyse und Implikationen für klassische Buchverlage. In: F. Keuper, K. Hamaidian, E. Verwaayen, T. Kalinowski, & C. Kraijo (Hrsg.), Digitalisierung und Innovation. Planung - Entstehung - Entwicklungsperspektiven (S. 91-123). Wiesbaden: Gabler. Apel, J. (2010). Neue Geschäftsmodelle aus der Konvergenz der Medien – Transaktions- und Werbeumsätze treiben das Zusammenwachsen der Medien- und Kommunikationsindustrie. In: A. Picot, & A. Freyberg (Hrsg.), Media Reloaded, (S. 85-95). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. Baden-Fuller, C., & Morgan, M. S. (2010). Business models as models. Long Range Planning, 43(2), 156-171. Baden-Fuller, C., Demil, B., Lecocq, X., & MacMillan, I. (2010). Business Models. Special Issue. Long Range Planning, 43(2-3), 143-462. Bakker, P. (2002). Free daily newspapers - Business models and strategies. International Journal on Media Management, 4(3), 180-187. Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17(1), 99-120. Barney, J. B. (2001). Resource-based theories of competitive advantage. A ten-year retrospective on the resource-based view. Journal of Management, 27(6), 643-650. Bieger, T., zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, D., & Krys, C. (2011). Innovative Geschäftsmodelle Konzeptionelle Grundlagen, Gestaltungsfelder und unternehmerische Praxis. Heidelberg et al.: Springer. 59

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Beitrag 3: Staatliche Medienförderung Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C. (2016). Staatliche Medienförderung. Begriffsverständnis, theroetische Zugänge und Beispiele aus der DACH-Region. In J. Krone, & T. Pellegrini (Eds.), Handbuch Medienökonomie. Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag. doi 10.1007/978-3-658-09632-8_71-1. Abstrakt Staatliche Medienförderung gilt als Instrument der Medienpolitik und bedeutet in der Regel die fortwährende finanzielle Unterstützung von Medieninhabern zur Produktion und dem Vertrieb von Medieninhalten und -projekten. Staatliche Medienförderung kann viele Formen annehmen, meint aber vorwiegend direkte Finanzbeihilfen und Steuervergünstigungen. Bei einer Förderung, die über den klassischen Printmedienbereich (Tages- und Wochenzeitungen) hinausgeht, spricht man im Allgemeinen von Medienförderung (Film, Hörfunk und Fernsehen, aber auch Buch, Spiele, Internet, und Konvergenzmedien). Es wird im vorliegenden Beitrag argumentiert, dass die staatliche Förderung von Medien eine demokratie- und kulturpolitische Pflicht des Staates ist, um Medien- und Meinungsvielfalt zu stärken, die Produktion eines qualitativ anspruchsvollen Angebots anzuregen und dessen Konsum zu unterstützen. Die Debatten zu Medienförderung sind allerdings vielfältig, kontrovers und wertstrittig geführt. Die angebotenen Systeme werden gerne als ineffizient und wenig innovativ wahrgenommen. Demgegenüber stehen Argumente, die positive Effekte von staatlicher Medienförderung wie Erhalt und Erweiterung des Marktangebots und Vielfaltsicherung im Interesse des Konsums hervorheben. Der vorliegende Beitrag gelangt auf Basis von Analysen ausgewählter Förderpraxen in der DACH-Region zum Ergebnis, dass das Phänomen Medienförderung mit dem wissenschaftlichen Instrumentarium der Medienökonomie plausibel begründbar ist. Die aktuellen Förderpraxen sind in Richtung einer „integralen Medienförderung“ auszubauen. Keywords DACH-Region Filmförderung Förderpraxis Integrale Medienförderung Presseförderung Rundfunkförderung Staatliche Medienförderung

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1. MEDIENFÖRDERUNG IN DER MEDIENÖKONOMIE Das Thema „Medienförderung“ fand in der Medienökonomie bislang wenig Beachtung bzw. scheint sich nur langsam als eigenes Forschungsfeld zu entwickeln (Murschetz & Trappel 2014, Picard 2014) Dies überrascht, da Medienförderung prinzipiell ein breites Spektrum an medienökonomischen Fragestellungen adressiert, wie etwa die mangelnde Finanzierbarkeit von Medien sowie Modelle einer modernen Regulierung im Wandel der Mediensysteme (vgl. Latzer 2015). Im Kern geht es also darum, eine systematische Aufbereitung eines Themenfeldes zu leisten, das in der Medienökonomie bislang kaum Beachtung fand. Im Laufe der folgenden Ausführungen soll deutlich gemacht werden, dass die Medienökonomie noch kein passendes Untersuchungsinstrumentarium zum Thema Medienförderung entwickelt hat. Diesem Forschungsdefizit wird mit folgender Argumentationslogik begegnet. Zunächst erfordert der normativ behaftete und vielschichtige Charakter von Medienförderung eine Kontextualisierung des Phänomens, die auch theoretische Zugänge miteinschließt. Vor diesem Hintergrund lässt sich als übergeordnetes Ziel der Arbeit die Ableitung einer medienökonomischen Konzeption von Medienförderung bestimmen, die vorhandene Basiskonzepte aus der Medienökonomie erschließt und diese für den Forschungsgegenstand Medienförderung fruchtbar macht. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass Medienförderung in unterschiedlichen Praxisfeldern untersucht werden kann, stellt sich die Frage, welchen Beitrag die Ableitung eines Begriffsverständnisses von Medienförderung für die empirische Analyse ausgewählter Medienbranchen in der DACHRegion, also Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz, leisten kann (Kap. 3). In einem abschließenden Kapitel (Kap. 4) werden die forschungsleitenden Fragen beantwortet und Perspektiven zur weiteren Beforschung des Themas aufgezeigt. Basierend auf der oben erwähnten zentralen Zielstellung werden folgende zwei Fragestellungen formuliert: x x

Welche begrifflichen Besonderheiten weist das Phänomen Medienförderung auf? Wie unterscheiden sich Fördersysteme in ausgewählten Medienteilbranchen der DACH-Region in Bezug auf politische Ziele, wirtschaftliche Ziele und eingesetzte Instrumente?

Um auf die oben angesprochenen Fragen detailliert einzugehen, ist das Thema von einer Reihe benachbarter Fragen und deren jeweiligen wissenschaftlichen Bearbeitungen abzugrenzen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird aus diesem Grund nicht verhandelt, ob – und wenn ja wie – alternative Modelle einer privaten Finanzierung zur wirtschaftlichen Sicherung von Medien (und Journalismus) Sinn ergeben (z.B. durch Stiftungsförderung und private Spenden) (vgl. Kramp & Weichert 2012). Ebenso wenig behandelt wird die Bedeutung von Finanzinvestoren als Außenfinanzierungsquelle im Medienbereich (vgl. Gerth & Trappel 2008, Schulz et al. 2008). Auch die Analyse von Formen und Wirkungen der Gründungsförderung von publizistischen Startup-Unternehmen muss anderswo stattfinden (vgl. Gerpott & Niegel 2002). Argumentationslinie dieses Beitrags ist, dass medienpolitische Intervention mittels Systeme der staatlichen Medienförderung im Sinne der Gewährleistung einer pluralistischen Medienlandschaft nötig und gerechtfertigt ist. Es liegt in der Zuständigkeit des Staates, normensetzende Aktivitäten durch institutionelle Vorkehrungen zu treffen, um aktive Vielfaltund Qualitätsförderung von publizistischen Massenmedien zu betreiben. Medienförderung soll sich durch den Einsatz geeigneter Maßnahmen und Förderinstrumente den Herausforderungen von Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz stellen. Eine so verstandene Medienförderung wird vor dem Hintergrund der Verortung des Problems, dass Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz die Erlössicherung von traditionellen publizistischen Massenmedien substantiell gefährden, umso relevanter. Diese Argumentation hat zur Folge, dass die ökonomischen Grundlagen und Bedingungen auf Ebene der Medienmärkte (Makro-Perspektive) und der Medienorganisation (Meso-Perspektive) für das Thema Medienförderung stärker in den Blick genommen werden 68

müssen.28 Auch wenn „klassische“ Fragestellungen der Medienökonomie (wie jene nach Konzentrationsursachen und -effekten) dabei nicht obsolet werden (Knoche 2005, S. 117-140), weitet sich der Objektbereich um die oben angezeigten neuen Theoriediskurse aus. So sind förderrelevante technologische Veränderungen durch Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz und deren Auswirkungen auf Medienförderung insgesamt zu erschließen. Medienförderung bezieht sich damit eben nicht mehr allein auf die traditionellen Massenmedien Print, Rundfunk, und Film, sondern betrifft auch Online-Medien und generell alle medienkonvergenten Angebote mit publizistischer Massenwirksamkeit.

2. BEGRIFFSVERSTÄNDNIS UND THEORETISCHE ZUGÄNGE Der Begriff „Förderung“ ist ein weiter und komplexer. Um ein erstes Begriffsverständnis zu etablieren, ist ein Rückgriff auf den Begriff „Subvention“ aus der volkswirtschaftlichen Wohlfahrtsökonomie ratsam (vgl. Kleinewefers 2008). Eine ‚Subvention‘ (lat. subvenire = „zu Hilfe kommen“) beschreibt dort hauptsächlich finanzielle Übertragungen (d.h. „Transfers“29), also tatsächliche Geldleistungen, aber auch (indirekte) Begünstigungen (z.B. steuerliche Ermäßigungen), die staatliche Institutionen oder öffentliche Körperschaften einmalig oder fortlaufend an bestimmte Gruppen von Empfängern (einzelne Unternehmen oder spezielle Wirtschaftszweige) ohne marktwirtschaftliche Gegenleistung gewähren (vgl. Brümmerhoff 2011).30 Der Ausdruck „Subvention“ ist allerdings wertbeladen. Dies deshalb, weil Subventionen Ausdruck einer bestimmten finanz- und wirtschaftspolitischen Konzeption sind und als Mittel zur Durchsetzung politischer Ziele herangezogen werden. In den Medienindustrien insinuiert der Begriff der Subvention von Medien in Form von direkten finanziellen Zuwendungen jedenfalls gerne den Verdacht einer staatlichen Einflussnahme auf journalistische Medieninhalte (vgl. Gehlbach & Sonin 2014). Es wundert daher kaum, dass in der Praxis der Subventionspolitik daher unterschiedliche Ausdrücke verwendet werden, wie z.B. „Zuschüsse“, „Fördermittel“, „Zuweisungen“, „Zulagen“, „Prämien“, „Anpassungs- und Überbrückungsmaßnahmen“, „Hilfen“ oder (v.a. innerhalb der EU) „Beihilfen“. Diese Begriffsvielfalt entspricht der Komplexität der Materie und den unterschiedlichen Zielsetzungen, die mit einer Begriffsbildung jeweils verfolgt werden. Daher wird auch im vorliegenden Zusammenhang davon ausgegangen, dass kein universeller Subventionsbegriff existiert. Bezieht man sich auf staatliche Eingriffe in das Marktgeschehen im Allgemeinen, durch die Unternehmen begünstigt werden (sollen), so ergibt sich ein relativ weit gefasster Subventionsbegriff, wie er auch in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften üblich ist. Dort gelten Subventionen i.w.S. als Finanzhilfen im Sinne von Geldleistungen aus öffentlicher Hand, die privaten Unternehmen und Wirtschaftszweigen zugutekommen, während es sich bei Steuervergünstigungen um spezielle steuerliche Ausnahmeregelungen handelt, die für die öffentliche Hand zu Mindereinnahmen führen (vgl. Brümmerhoff 2011). Als Zugang zur

28 Selbstverständlich können auch auf der Mikro-Ebene Affekte, Einstellungen, Wissen und taktische wie strategische Verhaltensweisen von Marktteilnehmern durch staatlich induzierte Normvorschriften der Medienförderung beeinflusst werden. 29 Laufende Übertragungen an private Haushalte und Privatpersonen werden hingegen als „Sozialleistungen“ bezeichnet. 30 Das Merkmal der fehlenden Gegenleistung schließt allerdings nicht aus, dass „die öffentliche Hand“ als Subventionsgeber meist bestimmte Verhaltensweisen fordert oder zumindest erwartet und dass sich dies in der Ausgestaltung der Subventionen in Form von Empfangs- oder Verwendungsauflagen niederschlägt (z.B. Stilllegung von Flächen als agrarpolitisches Instrument, Investitionszulagen an Unternehmen als wirtschaftspolitisches Instrument).

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Bestimmung eines eigenständigen Begriffs „Medienförderung“ bietet sich die Identifikation von Besonderheiten an, die die Entwicklung eines spezifischen Verständnisses von Medienförderung als konkreten Untersuchungsgegenstand in der Medienökonomie begründen. Die nachfolgende Systematik hat deshalb Berechtigung, weil sie einen theorienspezifischen Diskurs des Begriffs Medienförderung über die Medienbranchen hinweg ermöglicht: (a) Quellen der Medienförderung, (b) Rechtsgrundlagen und institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen, (c) Formen der Medienförderung, (d) Legitimationen, Ziele und Begründungen, (e) Erfolgskontrolle und Effekte, und (f) Kritiken an Medienförderung.31 Quellen der Medienförderung Medienförderung i.e.S. meint staatliche Subventionierung von Medien, also eine Form der meist fortwährenden finanziellen Unterstützung von Medieninhabern. Dabei kann zwischen der staatlichen Unterstützung von öffentlichen Medien (z.B. öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk) und der staatlichen Subventionierung privater Medien (z.B. Presseförderung und Förderung des privat-kommerziellen Rundfunks, Onlineförderung) unterschieden werden. Als eigentliche Quellen der Medienförderung kommen u.a. (a) eine Finanzierung aus dem allgemeinen Steuertopf, (b) eine Medienhaushaltsabgabe, oder (c) eine (anteilige) Umwidmung der Rundfunkgebühr (des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks) zur allgemeinen Mediengebühr für alle Medien gleichermaßen in Frage. Rechtsgrundlagen und institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen Medienförderung geschieht innerhalb rechtlich-institutioneller Rahmenbedingungen, die von gesellschaftlichen Erwartungen und Funktionszuweisungen an zu fördernde Medien und (politische) Regulierung geprägt werden. „Institutionen schaffen Richtlinien für Interaktionen“, meint Kiefer in diesem Zusammenhang treffender Weise (Kiefer 2005, S. 77). Eine besondere Bedeutung kommt dabei den rechtlichen Grundlagen zu. Es bestehen gesetzliche Regelungen auf europäischer Ebene (EU-Beihilfenrecht), wobei hier der Schwerpunkt auf dem Aspekt des Schutzes des freien Wettbewerbs liegt. Dazu kommen Gesetze der Medienförderung auf nationaler und regionaler Ebene für die jeweiligen Medienteilbranchen. Auch hier müssen die Modelle mit dem Beihilferecht der EU in Einklang stehen und mit den durch Medienförderung tangierten Rechtsprinzipien (Pressefreiheit, Wettbewerbsfreiheit, Gleichberechtigung und Eigentumsgarantie) übereinstimmen (vgl. Löffler 1981). Inhalte dieser Gesetze sind Gesetzessystematik, Förderungsgegenstand, Förderungsvoraussetzungen, Förderungsarten, und Berechnungs- und Verteilungsmodalitäten (vgl. Holoubek 2010). Neben klassischen Formen der Medienregulierung wie etwa dem Medienwirtschaftsrecht (z.B. Medienkartell- und

31

Die Media Governance-Forschung benennt ein breites Spektrum weiterer Aspekte eines guten (staatlichorganisierten) Steuerungs- und Regelungssystems, die für das Thema „Medienförderung“ aktivierbar sind. Insbesondere sind dies Überlegungen zu Design- und Organisationsprinzipien eines Förderregimes sowie dessen zentrale Steuerungsparameter (z.B. Fördervoraussetzungen, Förderkonzept, Förderkriterien, Förderinhalte, Regulierungs- und Gegenfinanzierungsmodell) (vgl. Kleinsteuber & Nehls 2011, Mayntz 2009, Price et al. 2013).

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Medienwettbewerbsrecht, Fusionskontrolle, etc.) kommen eigens geregelte Bereiche der Medienförderung (Presse-, Rundfunk-, Film-, Wirtschafts- oder Parteienförderungsrecht) hinzu. Medienförderungsrechtliche Vorschriften sind somit über sehr viele Rechtsgebiete verstreut. Formen der Medienförderung Es gibt eine Vielzahl an Formen der Medienförderung, wobei sich die Kategorisierung in „direkte“ und „indirekte“, bzw. „allgemeine“ und „selektive“ Förderungsinstrumente bzw. eine Kombination derselben durchgesetzt hat (vgl. Holtz-Bacha 1994, Puppis 2010).32 Direkte Förderleistungen an Einzelmedien sind etwa nicht rückzahlbare Subventionen wie monetäre Zuschüsse, Darlehen, Prämien und andere (bedingt oder unbedingt) rückzahlbare Subventionsleistungen (z.B. Innovations- und Modernisierungszuschüsse in digitales KinoEquipment). Sie können Produktions-, Vertriebs- und Vermarktungsförderung der eigentlichen Medienleistung zum Inhalt haben. Monetäre Zuschüsse gelten als „verloren“, wenn sie nicht rückzahlbar sind. Dabei handelt es sich also um Finanzhilfen, bei denen das Fehlen einer marktmäßigen Gegenleistung am deutlichsten in Erscheinung tritt und die daher als Grundtypus der staatlichen Förderung schlechthin angesehen werden können. Im Gegensatz zu den verlorenen Zuschüssen ist der Empfänger bei einer Subventionierung im Wege begünstigter Darlehen zur Rückzahlung verpflichtet. Die Förderung kann darin bestehen, dass die Zinssätze des öffentlichen Förderers geringer sind als die von Geschäftsbanken und dass auf bankübliche Sicherheiten verzichtet wird. Staatliche Medienförderung beinhaltet auch Prämien (Preise, Stipendien) in Form von (meist) einmalig erbrachten Zahlungen an erbrachte oder zu erstellende Medienprojekte. Sie stellen einen Anreiz zur Unterstützung gewünschter Aktivitäten der Antragsteller dar (z.B. Ausbildungsprämien) und dienen als medienpolitisches Instrument, um gewünschte Entwicklungen auf Medienmärkten zu stimulieren (z.B. prämierter Ideenwettbewerb in der Filmförderung). Indirekte Förderungen beinhalten keine direkten Zahlungen. Möglich sind etwa Haftungsbürgschaften in Form staatlicher Kreditbesicherungen, aber auch andere indirekte Maßnahmen der Unterstützung von Medien (z.B. Mehrwert-Steuererleichterung, Subventionierung von Gemeinkosten von Medienunternehmen, reduzierte Posttarife, etc.). Auch das Feld der indirekten staatlichen Subventionen ist weit: So zählen dazu beispielsweise Reduzierung von Forderungen wie Steuererlass, Steuerbefreiung, Steuerermäßigung, Steuerbegünstigung, aber auch begünstigte Tarife bei Post- und Fernmeldediensten und öffentlichen Transportmitteln, Unterstützung von Nachrichtenagenturen, Werbemarktregulierung, Unterstützung von Journalistenausbildung und Leseförderung.

32

Presseförderung kann bspw. über folgende Instrumente geschehen: x x x x x x x x x

Steuerliche Vergünstigungen (z.B. verringerter Mehrwertsteuersatz, günstigere Gebühren beim Postversand sowie Transport mit Bahn oder Flugzeug), Verbilligte Kommunikationswege, beispielsweise im Hinblick auf Telefongebühren, Verbilligte Nachrichtenbeschaffung, beispielsweise durch die Subventionierung von Nachrichtenagenturen bzw. durch die Verpflichtung von Nachrichtenagenturen zu einheitlichen Tarifen, Verbilligter Anschaffungspreis für Papier, Günstige Darlehen und Bürgschaften aus Steuergeldern, Staatliche Druck- und Anzeigenaufträge, Vergünstigungen beim Reiseverkehr, beispielsweise durch Rabatte bei Bahnfahrten Unterstützung bei der Aus- und Weiterbildung von Journalisten, und Direkte Subventionierung einzelner Unternehmen: Parteipresse, am Werbemarkt benachteiligte Zweitzeitungen etc.

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Daneben gibt es auch noch finanzielle Unterstützung von Kooperationen z.B. beim Vertrieb oder Druck. Indirekte Medienförderung ist darüber hinaus auch „struktureller“, indem nicht allein Geld als direktes staatliches Instrument der Regulierung eingesetzt wird, sondern Finanzierungsdefizite von Medien durch wettbewerbliche Regelungen ausgeglichen werden. Ein Beispiel ist die Quotenregelung im Rahmen der Europäischen Fernsehrichtlinie, der zufolge die europäische Produktionswirtschaft im Film- und Fernsehbereich zu schützen und zu fördern ist. Weitere indirekte Fördermaßnahmen sind etwa „Ausfallbürgschaften”, die wirtschaftlich oft einen ähnlichen Effekt wie bedingt rückzahlbare Darlehen haben. Ausgangssituation ist ein Darlehen einer Geschäftsbank, welches von der Förderinstitution verbürgt wird. Kann der Geförderte das Darlehen nicht zurückzahlen, haftet der Bürge. Die Unterscheidung zwischen „allgemeinen“ und „selektiven“ Hilfen verweist auf die Empfänger der Medienförderung. Allgemeine Maßnahmen kommen allen Medien eines Sektors gleichermaßen zugute, während selektive Formen der Medienförderung Einzelne begünstigen, meist mit dem Ziel eine wirtschaftliche Besserstellung des Förderempfängers zu erzeugen (Murschetz 1998, S. 297). Während oben bekannte Kategorien politisch legitimiert sind, gibt es noch andere, „verdeckte“ Hilfen, also meist unter Ausschluss der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung getroffene Fördermaßnahmen der öffentlichen Hand, die nicht nur schwer zu erkennen sind, sondern in Ermangelung einer offiziellen Regelung auch ungesetzlichen Charakter annehmen können. Staatlich gelenkte Subventionen sind immer auch ein Mittel zur politischen Machtausübung und können zu höchst unerwünschten Abhängigkeiten führen. Sie liefern Verdachtsmomente für Korruption und politisches Lobbying und zeigen sogar Praktiken des Subventionsmissbrauchs auf. Als umstritten gilt in dieser Hinsicht etwa die Frage der indirekten Presseförderung durch Inserate von staatsnahen Institutionen und Regierungsstellen. Beklagt werden Meinungskauf und Eigenwerbung von Politikerinnen und Politikern durch Inseratenkampagnen auf Staatskosten ebenso wie Begünstigungswirtschaft. „Rent-Seeking“ (engl.: „rent“ = Pacht, Miete) bezeichnet nach der neoklassischen Wirtschaftstheorie ein Verhalten ökonomischer Akteure, das darauf zielt, Eingriffe in die marktvermittelte Ressourcenallokation herbeizuführen, um sich hierdurch künstlich geschaffene Renteneinkommen aneignen zu können (vgl. Buchanan et al. 1980, Tullock 1967). Dies kann beispielsweise durch unmittelbare staatliche Transfers oder durch staatliche Diskriminierung von Wettbewerbern erreicht werden. Ohne gute Regierungsführung bewegt sich also Medienförderung auf politisch glattem Parkett. Staatliche Intervention via Medienförderung würde aus dieser Perspektive das Risiko von Staatsversagen in sich tragen, wenn eigennutzenmaximierende Politiker dem Gemeinwohl nur dienten, wenn sie sich daraus einen persönlichen Vorteil versprächen oder von starken Verbänden und Lobbying-Gruppen manipuliert würden (vgl. Leif & Speth 2006). Darüber hinaus können verdeckte Subventionen auch als sog. „Verbilligungssubventionen“ auftreten, indem auf die Berechnung von Marktpreisen für spezifische staatliche Leistungen verzichtet wird. Diese Art Beihilfen werden dann in Form zinsverbilligter Kredite ausbezahlt und begünstigen bestimmte Medien etwa bei öffentlichen Aufträgen, die nicht das günstigste Angebot abgegeben haben. In einem weiteren Sinn zählen zu den (verdeckten) Subventionen aber auch solche nicht haushaltswirksamen staatlichen Maßnahmen, die gezielt bestimmte einheimische Produktionen, Unternehmen und Wirtschaftszweige durch budgetwirksame Geund Verbote fördern („Verordnungssubventionen“). Dies kann z. B. dadurch geschehen, dass „künstlich“ Nachfrage für bestimmte Produkte geschaffen beziehungsweise auf bestimmte Produktionen gelenkt wird, oder dadurch, dass (ausländische) Konkurrenten durch Konzessionierung, Einfuhrabgaben, nichttarifäre Handelshemmnisse und ähnliche Zugangsbeschränkungen vom Markt ferngehalten werden.

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Legitimationen, Ziele und Begründungen Subventionen sind somit wirtschaftspolitische Eingriffe des Staates in das (vermeintlich) „freie Spiel der Marktkräfte“ und werden zumeist dann initiiert, wenn „Marktversagen“ (z.B. durch Unterproduktion) diagnostiziert wird. Dabei wird der Funktionsfähigkeit eines auf Marktkräften und freien Wettbewerb beruhenden Außenpluralismus grundsätzlich misstraut.33 Ziel ist dann, Unternehmen und ganze Wirtschaftszweige, die sich in einer schlechten Marktsituation befinden, durch staatliche Intervention zu unterstützen. Abgesehen von stabilisierungspolitischen Aspekten können Subventionen unter bestimmten Bedingungen ein legitimes Instrument der allgemeinen Wirtschaftspolitik sein. Entscheidend sind dann die wachstums-, verteilungs- und wettbewerbspolitischen sowie zunehmend die umweltpolitischen Effekte einer Förderung. Zudem müssen auch externe Effekte (positive wie negative) einschließlich ihrer Verteilung und mögliche Folgekosten bei der Ausgestaltung der Subventionspolitik berücksichtigt werden. Weitere Legitimationen einer staatlichen Förderpolitik sind besonders im Bereich der Medienförderung wirksam: So definieren z.B. Vielfalt-, Qualitäts-, und/oder Innovationsziele normative Regulierungsbereiche der Medienförderung, welche Unternehmen dazu veranlassen sollen, ein bestimmtes, vom Staat gewünschtes Marktverhalten zum Fokus ihrer unternehmerischen Aktivitäten zu machen. Solcherart präskriptiv-normative Zielsetzungen erfordern die Einbindung des Politischen in medienökonomische Diskurse über Medienförderung. Wird staatliche Medienförderung als Demokratieförderung erkannt, bilden unabhängige publizistische Massenmedien, also Produkte der öffentlichen Kommunikation wie Presse, Radio, Fernsehen und Internet das Demokratiefundament einer modernen Gegenwartsgesellschaft (Barnett 2009). Die damit angesprochene gesellschaftspolitische Bedeutung von Medien wird aus dem Umstand erklärt, dass sie Bürger informieren, sozialisieren, bilden und eine Kontrollfunktion gegenüber der Politik ausüben sollen. Damit prägen sie maßgeblich die Informations- und Meinungspluralität in einer demokratisch verfassten Gesellschaft (vgl. Jarren 2014). Wird diese These konsequent weiter gedacht, ist Medienförderung ein „natürlicher“ Bestandteil von Demokratie(förderung). Medien hätten dann eine politische und gesellschaftliche Funktion, würden öffentliche Kommunikation ermöglichen und damit einen Beitrag zur gesellschaftlichen Willens- und Entscheidungsbildung leisten. Als demokratietheoretisch fundamentale Institution wäre Journalismus demzufolge aus öffentlichen Mitteln finanziell zu unterstützen (vgl. Kiefer 2011). Die Zusicherung von staatlichen Fördergeldern an private Medien sei in Zukunft auch an Qualitätsziele gebunden, wie dies heute im Rahmen von Public Value-Auflagen im Rundfunkbereich schon der Fall ist (vgl. Gundlach & Gonser in diesem Band). Würden Medien als kulturelle Instrumente verstanden, dann ist ihr Stellenwert unabhängig von einer rein ökonomischen Verwertungslogik festzulegen. Der Staat würde hier die Verantwortung für die Schaffung der rechtlichen und finanziellen Rahmenbedingungen tragen. In der Regel wird Medienförderung damit begründet, ein bestimmtes Angebot oder ein qualitativ vielfältiges publizistisches Angebot zu ermöglichen oder wirtschaftlich schwachen Medien das finanzielle Überleben zu sichern, um damit die mediale Vielfalt und/oder die publizistische Qualität von publizistischen Medien zu erhalten und zu stärken. Medien erhalten eine ganze Reihe an staatlichen Förderungen, wobei Zuwendungstypen, -instrumente und Designs sich seit jeher mediengattungsspezifisch unterscheiden (vgl. Holtz-Bacha 2012, Murschetz 1998). Printmedien haben ja generell einen anderen Förderbedarf als Rundfunk- und Onlinemedien. Zudem ist Medienförderung durch kulturell geprägte Themenstellungen und marktstrukturell bzw. politisch bedingte Entwicklungspfade längerfristig determiniert.

33 Im Rundfunkbereich beschreibt „Außenpluralismus“ eine Organisationsform des Rundfunkangebotes, bei dem Vielfalt durch eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Programmangebote erreicht werden soll (vgl. Sjurts 2011, S. 44).

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Erfolgskontrolle und Effekte von Medienförderung Die pragmatische Dimension eines Planungserfolgs von Medienförderung als medienpolitischem Instrument besteht in der Tatsache, dass Begründung, Prinzipien, Formen und Instrumente, Verfahren und Ziele, also mithin ein gesamtes Medienförderungssystem, staatsfern und manipulationsfrei zu organisieren sind. Staatliche Medienförderpolitik hat sich zunächst unweigerlich dem Imperativ der Staatsferne in der Organisation, Steuerung und Kontrolle der Förderung sowie der geförderten Gegenstände zu stellen. Staatliche Medienförderung hat deshalb zu sein, damit Medien trotz Förderung vom Staat unabhängig sein können. Dies bedeutet, dass „der Staat“ für Rahmenbedingungen frei von Einflüssen sorgen soll, damit eine Medienlandschaft existieren und gefördert werden kann, die den demokratie- wie kulturpolitischen Anforderungen entspricht. Aus diesem Grund braucht Medienförderung ein überwiegend öffentliches Interesse, eine gesetzliche Grundlage, eine sorgfältige, verhältnismäßige Gestaltung und eine möglichst politikfreie Verwaltung. Staatliche Einflussnahme auf Medieninhalte und -unternehmen ist in allen Belangen zwingend zu vermeiden, da diese die Unabhängigkeit der Medien unterminiert und Medienfreiheit gefährdet (vgl. Gersdorf 1991, May 2008, Trappel 2015). Staatliche Medienförderung, so der Anspruch, sollte immer auch Förderung von Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht der fördergebenden Stellen und deren Instrumentarien und Verwendungsweisen sein. Um eine effiziente, zweckentsprechende und richtliniengemäße Verwendung der Fördermittel sicherzustellen, ist daher eingangs einer umfassenden Prüfung der geförderten Medien und Projekte erforderlich. Diese Zielsetzung bedingt zunächst die Erarbeitung klarer subventionspolitischer Leitlinien. Klarheit, Transparenz und Treffsicherheit sind kritische Erfolgsfaktoren eines jeden Fördersystems. Eine regelmäßige Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse von Subventionen, die auch externe Effekte berücksichtigt, sowie die zeitliche Befristung und Degression von Subventionen leisten zudem einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Subventionskontrolle. Eine hohe Bedeutung wird auch der Tatsache beigemessen, dass öffentliche Haushalte Subventionen – auch Steuervergünstigungen – durch Einsparungen unmittelbar, dauerhaft und vollständig gegenfinanzieren müssen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Finanzen 2014). Das Thema der Effekte von eingesetzten Medienförderungssystemen ist ein weites Feld. Man unterscheidet hier zwischen sozioökonomischen (z.B. Unternehmenserfolg, Steigerung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, etc.) und publizistisch-kulturellen Effekten (z.B. Qualitäts- und Vielfaltverbesserungen der Inhalte und Angebote, Stärkung der kulturellen Identität) (vgl. Puppis 2010). Auch wenn Medienförderungen die Strukturprobleme des Wettbewerbs (z.B. Marktkonzentration durch Kostenvorteile, vertikale Integration, etc.) nicht zu lösen imstande sind, können positive Wettbewerbseffekte erzielt werden. Die direkte Presseförderung in Skandinavien zielte etwa auf eine Förderung von Konkurrenz und Vielfalt, indem Zweitzeitungen mit beschränkter Reichweite (Haushaltsabdeckung im Verbreitungsgebiet) und geringem Marktanteil ausschließlich oder stärker gefördert werden. Kritisiert wird dieses Instrument aber dennoch: die Förderung sei zu undifferenziert, wenn geförderte Zweitzeitungen Ableger von Marktführern sind. Außerdem entstünde ein zu hoher Abhängigkeitsgrad vom Staat, und geförderte Medien würden sich nicht marktkonform entwickeln (Haas et. al 2013, S. 162). Medienförderung kann gesamtwirtschaftlich gesehen aber durchaus positive Effekte erzielen. Bruttoproduktionswert, Wertschöpfung, Beschäftigung, Kaufkraft und Abgaben treten dann als Indikatoren zu Tage, wobei jeweils nach direkten, indirekten und induzierten (d.h. konsum- und investitionsfördernden) Wirkungen von staatlichen Subventionen differenziert werden kann (vgl. Institut für Höhere Studien 2014). Des Weiteren ist zu unterscheiden, ob wirtschaftliche Effekte regional, national oder im Ausland wirken. Monetäre Hilfen sollen ja Investitionskosten schmälern und zudem Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten und Einkommensniveaus steigern. Mit dem erzielten Einkommen werden weitere Aufträge und Produktionen ausgelöst. Dieser so genannte „Multiplikator-Effekt“ setzt sich über mehrere 74

Stufen fort. Darüber hinaus können Medienförderungen an einzelne Marktteilnehmer selbstverständlich Einfluss auf den Wettbewerb insgesamt haben. Sie beeinflussen nicht nur Investitions- und Preisentscheidungen von Förderempfängern, sondern setzen möglicherweise auch so genannte „Mitnahme-Effekte“ in Bewegung, also Ineffizienzen, die dadurch entstehen, dass Förderempfänger von einer Fördermaßnahme profitieren, obwohl sie ihr Projekt auch ohne die Förderbeiträge realisiert hätten. Noch schwieriger abzuschätzen ist der Effekt von Fördermaßnahmen aus publizistischer Sicht, da es sich nur schwer sagen lässt, ob geförderte Angebotsvielfalt auch zu inhaltlicher Vielfalt führt. Ein generell höheres Medienangebot bedeutet eben nicht automatisch bessere Medienqualität. Gemäß Puppis (2010) dürften am ehesten direkte selektive Maßnahmen einen positiven Effekt auf das Vielfalt- und Qualitätsangebot haben. Expertinnen und Experten monieren in diesem Zusammenhang, dass Medienförderung regelmäßig einem Monitoring unterzogen werden müsse, um Verbesserungseffekte auf die publizistische Vielfalt als zentralem Effekt einer Förderung begleitend zu evaluieren (vgl. Valcke et al. 2010). Kritiken an Medienförderung Kritiken an staatlicher Intervention durch Instrumente der Medienförderung sind vielfältig. Populär ist das Argument, dass sich der Staat aus dem freien Marktwettbewerb prinzipiell besser heraushalten sollte. Eine am neoklassischen Modellrahmen orientierte Medienökonomie vertraut allein der Funktionsfähigkeit des Marktes und lehnt staatliche Eingriffe in Marktstruktur und Marktverhalten – von wenigen Ausnahmebereichen (insbesondere Kollusion) abgesehen – ab. Auch in der auf sie aufbauenden „Public-Interest-Theorie der Regulierung“ (vgl. Hantke-Domas 2003) wird davon ausgegangen, dass „der Markt“ das optimale Ordnungsprinzip darstellt und das „freie Spiel der Marktkräfte“ von Angebot und Nachfrage zur wohlfahrtstheoretisch optimalen Allokation der Ressourcen führt (vgl. Dal Bó 2006, Laffont & Tirole 1991). Auch im Medienbereich würde Medienförderung dieses marktmäßig hergestellte Gleichgewicht nur stören. Kritisiert wird auch, dass durch öffentliche Förderung Steuergelder „verschwendet“ würden und Unternehmen am Leben gehalten würden, deren Produkte vom Markt nicht (mehr) gewünscht werden. Zudem würde Medienförderung unternehmerische Eigeninitiative schwächen und Abhängigkeiten erzeugen. Außerdem sei Medienförderung nicht nur wenig effizient und marktverzerrend, sondern auch innovationsfeindlich und intransparent. Marktverzerrung des Fördersystems wird etwa dann moniert, wenn regierungsfreundliche Zeitungen in der Förderung begünstigt werden, bzw. regierungskritische Medien keine oder geringere Förderungen erhalten. Werden Fördermittel nach dem „Gießkannenprinzip“ gleichermaßen an alle Förderbegünstigten verteilt, würden Marktungleichgewichte zementiert, ohne die möglicherweise unterschiedliche Dringlichkeit der Einzelfälle zu berücksichtigen.34 Selektive Subventionen gelten demgegenüber als politisch inakzeptabel. Sie bedürfen der Zustimmung über Parteigrenzen hinweg, wofür sich selten Mehrheiten finden. Zu guter Letzt wird dem Staat und staatlicher Politik für den gesellschaftlichen Kommunikationssektor insgesamt längst eine Steuerungskrise attestiert, für die eine Kombination aus Globalisierung, Liberalisierung, Konvergenz und raschem technologischen Wandel verantwortlich sein sollen (vgl. Altmeppen 2012, Latzer et al. 2002). Auch die Frage, ob das Thema Medienförderung theoretisch gehaltvoll genug bzw. überhaupt theoriefähig sei, ist nicht geklärt. Auch wenn es nicht an Anschlussmöglichkeiten mangelt, 34

Das „Gießkannenprinzip“ wird beispielsweise in Österreich eingesetzt. Dort erhalten auch Marktführer Vertriebsförderung. Kritisch evaluiert durch Haas et al. (2013, S. 178): „Dadurch werden Marktmonopole großer Zeitungshäuser gestärkt, was dem eigentlichen Ziel der Presseförderung, dem Erhalt beziehungsweise der Förderung von struktureller Vielfalt widerspricht.“

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konzeptionelle Grundlagen von Medienförderung mit ausgewiesenen Themen der Medienökonomie als Referenzmodell zu vermitteln – „Marktversagen“, „Meritorik“, Medien als „Wirtschafts- und Kulturgut“, „Qualität“ und „Vielfalt“ in den Medien sind solchermaßen diskutable Konzepte – liefert die Medienökonomie zu Medienförderung selbst noch wenig Erkenntnisbeiträge.35 Anregungen erhielte sie jedenfalls aus Forschungsbeständen der Theorie der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie (NPÖ, auch Public-Choice-Ansatz). Dort wird u.a. auf die Beschreibung und Erklärung politischer Prozesse im Rahmen der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter, auf Fragen des Staatsversagens, des Lobbying, der Korruption als Gegenstand von Demokratietheorie, der Bürokratietheorie und der Theorie der Interessengruppen (vgl. Becker 1983, Dal Bó 2006, Dollery & Worthington 1996, Laffont & Tirole 1991, Olson 2004, Peltzman 1976) zurückgegriffen.36 Diese Ansätze sind für Medienförderung deshalb von hoher Relevanz, da Medienförderung als öffentliches Gut durch Interaktionen von politischen und wirtschaftlichen Akteuren der Medienwirtschaft entscheidend mitgeprägt wird.

3. PRAXEN DER MEDIENFÖRDERUNG IN DER DACH-REGION Aus institutioneller Sicht sind Medieninhalte und Medienunternehmen zentraler Gegenstand der Medienförderung. Instrumente der Medienförderung werden entweder gattungsspezifisch (z.B. Presseförderung an Printmedien, Rundfunkförderung an TV Programmveranstalter, Filmförderung an Filmproduzenten und -verleiher etc.) oder gattungsübergreifend (Projektförderung eines Radiounternehmens zur Etablierung einer Webradio-Plattform) typisiert. Begünstigte Mediengattungen sind dann neben den bekannten Zielmedien Print („Presseförderung“), auch privater Rundfunk („Rundfunkförderung“, z.B. in Österreich durch den „Fernsehfonds Austria“, den „Privatrundfunkfonds“ oder den „Fonds zur Förderung des Nichtkommerziellen Rundfunks“; vgl. RTR 2011). Dazu kommen weitere Fördersparten wie Film („Filmförderung“), periodische Druckschriften („Publizistikförderung“), Bücher und Büchereien („Buchförderung“ für Verlage, Subventionen an öffentliche Büchereien für den Ankauf von Medien), Online-Medien („Netzmedien- bzw. Onlinemedienförderung“ für Netzmedienbetreiber und Blogs), Spiele („Spieleförderung“), Tonträger („Musikförderung“), und Journalistinnen und Journalisten („Journalismusförderung“). Presseförderung Deutschland vergibt keine direkte finanzielle Zuwendung an Presseerzeugnisse. Tatsächlich gibt es nur einen reduzierten Mehrwertsteuersatz auf den Vertriebserlös (7% statt 19%, für 2015) und eine vergünstigte Postzustellung, also indirekte staatliche Fördermaßnahmen steuerlicher und vertrieblicher Art. Auch Österreich (10% statt 20%;) und die Schweiz (2,5% statt 8%; beide jeweils für 2015) wenden niedrigere Sätze an. In Deutschland wird direkte staatliche Subventionierung der Presse schlichtweg abgelehnt. Man ist der Meinung, dass eine staatliche Förderung mit der Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit der Presse, der Wettbewerbsfreiheit

35 Die Arbeiten beschränken sich häufig auf die Darstellung von Förderungsangeboten an die gedruckte Presse (vgl. Hollstein 1978, Holtz-Bacha 2012 und 1994, Humphreys 2006, Löffler 1981, Nielsen & Linnebank 2011, Picard 2014, Smith 1977). 36 NPÖ beschreibt das Streben von Interessengruppen, Unternehmen und anderen Marktakteuren nach der Erschließung, Verteidigung oder Verbesserung von Einkommenserzielungschancen im Marktbereich mithilfe politisch erwirkter Privilegien (vgl. Dehling & Schubert 2011, Erlei et al. 2007). Die Idee des „Rent-Seeking“ hat ihren Ursprung in einem Aufsatz von Gordon Tullock (1967).

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und dem Anspruch auf Gleichbehandlung kollidieren würde. Jedenfalls zeigte sich der Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (BDZV) skeptisch, obwohl schon in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren die ersten Titel vom Markt verschwanden und Forderungen nach staatlicher Hilfe durch Subventionen laut wurden (vgl. BDZV 2004). Auf der Homepage des BDZV heißt es unter der Überschrift „Engagement für Pressevielfalt“ dazu lapidar: „Im Interesse der kleineren Verlage setzte sich der Verband auch für eine Presseförderung ein, wandte sich aber gegen gezielte staatliche Hilfen zugunsten einzelner Verlage mit der Begründung, dadurch ließen sich Strukturprobleme, zum Beispiel Wettbewerbsnachteile, nicht dauerhaft beseitigen; außerdem berge jede Einzelförderung die Gefahr staatlicher Einflussnahme auf die begünstigten Zeitungen“ (BDZV 2004). Besonders problematisch scheint der Umstand, dass die Pressefreiheit in Deutschland ausdrücklich verfassungsrechtlich gewährleistet ist und damit ein Gebot direkter staatlicher Hilfen nach überwiegender Auffassung nicht hergeleitet werden kann. Die staatliche Verantwortung für Funktion und Bestand der Presse umfasst nur die Verpflichtung, adäquate normative Rahmenbedingungen für ihre Funktionsfähigkeit bereitzustellen (vgl. Wendt, o.J.). Im Gegensatz zu Deutschland gilt Österreich seit jeher als Musterland für Presseförderung. Sie besteht seit 1975 und hat die Förderung österreichischer Printmedien zum Zweck. Ihre Grundlage ist das Presseförderungsgesetz, das zuletzt 2004 novelliert wurde. Die zuständige Behörde ist seit 2004 die Kommunikationsbehörde Austria (KommAustria). Die Presseförderung ist seit 2004 in eine Vertriebsförderung, eine Förderung „zur Erhaltung der regionalen Vielfalt“ und eine Qualitätsförderung für Presseclubs, Ausbildungsinstitutionen und redaktionsinterne Ausbildungen aufgeteilt und insgesamt mit 10,46 Millionen Euro (2015) dotiert. Aufgrund der Vergabekriterien sind Tageszeitungen, die in keinem Bundesland die Marktführerschaft („Zweitzeitungen“) halten, die größten Empfänger der Förderung. In Österreich besteht heute weitreichender Konsens darüber, dass das gegenwärtige staatliche System der Presseförderung reformiert werden muss (vgl. Haas et al. 2013, Murschetz & Karmasin 2014, Murschetz & Trappel 2014). Die bestehende Förderpraxis würde das Ziel „die Vielfalt der Presse in Österreich zu fördern“ nicht effektiv verfolgen. 2013 erhielten in Österreich alle Tageszeitungen aus dem Titel „Vertriebsförderung“ finanzielle Zuweisungen. Keine Presseförderung erhalten die beiden Boulevardblätter Heute und Österreich, weil sie als Gratiszeitungen gewertet werden. Dazu kommt noch die „Besondere Presseförderung“ für Titel, die keine marktführende Stellung und eine „besondere Bedeutung für die politische Meinungsbildung“ haben. Also Zeitungen wie die Presse und der Standard. Schwer wiegt auch die Tatsache, dass staatliche finanzielle Zuwendungen an Printmedien in Österreich in keiner Relation zu den jährlich mehr als 600 Mio. Euro Rundfunkgebühren an den öffentlichrechtlichen ORF (TV und Hörfunk) und den 18 Mio. Euro Förderung im Jahr an privaten und nicht-kommerziellen Rundfunk stehen (vgl. RTR-GmbH 2011). Zudem wird kritisiert, dass „freundliche“ Berichterstattungen in bestimmten Print-Medien durch Regierungsinserate im Umfang von 140 Mio. Euro jährlich belohnt würden. Eine erste Korrektur dieser Fehlallokation läge darin, auf gesetzlicher Ebene faire Wettbewerbsbedingungen zu schaffen, indem für steuerliche Gleichbehandlung der Werbegattungen in Bezug auf die Werbeabgabe gesorgt wird (vgl. Institut für Höhere Studien 2014). Folgt man Matthias Karmasin (2015), wäre die Werbeabgabe „ein gutes Instrument, um Umverteilungen im Mediensektor vorzunehmen.“ Dazu müsste sie allerdings, zumindest teilweise, zweckgebunden sein. Presseförderung gälte dann als Erstattung bereits geleisteter Werbeabgaben an den Staat. Als Instrument der Wirtschaftsförderung gilt auch der reduzierte Mehrwertsteuersatz von 10 Prozent (ORF-Rundfunkgebühr und Kaufzeitungen in Österreich). Was die Umsatzsteuerregelung in Österreich betrifft, waren Vertriebserlöse der Zeitungen in früheren Zeiten als demokratieunterstützende Maßnahme umsatzsteuerbefreit. 1975 wurde eine Mehrwertsteuer von 10 Prozent gleichzeitig mit der Parteien- und Presseförderung eingeführt. 77

Zurzeit wird in Österreich im Rahmen der Steuerreform eine Anhebung der Mehrwertsteuer (Umsatzsteuer) angedacht. Bei einer Anhebung auf 20 Prozent müssten die Konsumentinnen und Konsumenten künftig laut Berechnungen der Austria Presse Agentur (APA) somit über 100 Millionen Euro mehr an den Fiskus abliefern. Das Institut für Höhere Studien mit Sitz in Wien hat vor kurzem Zahlen präsentiert, wonach Österreich im europaweiten Vergleich bei direkten oder indirekten Subventionen wie etwa Mehrwertsteuerreduktionen im hinteren Feld liegt (IHS 2014). Für die Kaufzeitungen, die derzeit wegen des digitalen Umbruchs ohnehin vor großen ökonomischen Herausforderungen stehen, wäre eine von der Regierung veranlasste Verteuerung ihrer Produkte eine Hypothek und eine Schwächung im Wettbewerb mit Gratiszeitungen. In einer zuletzt verfassten Studie zur Evaluierung der Presseförderungsinstrumente in Österreich (vgl. Haas et al. 2013) kristallisieren sich eindeutig die Vielfalt an kulturellen und ethnischen Gruppen sowie die Vielfalt gesellschaftlicher und politischer Interessen als die beiden am wichtigsten eingeschätzten Bereiche inhaltlicher Vielfalt heraus. Die Vielfalt regionaler Räume wird an dritter Stelle genannt. Inhaltliche Vielfalt ergibt sich nicht nur aus Titelvielfalt. Es ist daher zu fordern, dass redaktionelle Binnen-Vielfalt über Qualitätsförderungs-Instrumente gefördert wird (Ausbildung, Weiterbildung, Qualitätsstandards, Auslandskorrespondenten, Mindestanzahl von hauptberuflich angestellten, journalistisch tätigen Mitarbeiterinnen etc.). Lässt man obige Kritiken beiseite, dann sind auch Argumente des potenziell erfolgreichen Einsatzes von Medienförderungsinstrumenten in Österreich aufzählbar. Beispiele dafür sind z.B. die wohlfahrtssteigernde Förderung von unternehmerischen Kollektivinteressen, wie etwa die Förderung eines gemeinsamen Postzustelldienstes von Printmedien durch staatliche Mittel der Presseförderung. Oder auch Fördermaßnahmen, die auf die Modernisierung von Medienbetrieben abzielen, indem die Empfänger aufgefordert werden, über Förderprojekte Investitionen etwa in neue soziale Medien zu tätigen. Zudem sind Projekte der Förderung von Medienkompetenz durch Leseförderung (benachteiligter) Kinder und Jugendlicher erfolgversprechend. Leseförderung wird aber insbesondere auch durch Initiativen des „Offenen Journalismus“ erzielt. Der österreichische Journalismus ist in diesem Sinne als zurückhaltend bzw. mutlos zu bezeichnen (vgl. Haas et al. 2013). Was die meisten Redaktionen hierzulande bislang für die Leserbindung machen, ist altbacken: Leserfotos und -briefe werden in der Zeitung gedruckt, es gibt Hörer-Hotlines, vielleicht noch einen Leserbeirat. Hin und wieder erklärt sich irgendwo ein Lokalbüro zur gläsernen Redaktion für einen Tag. Diese Kommunikationsdistanz zum Leser ist durch weitgehende Innovationsprojekte in Richtung Zeitung 2.0 zu forcieren (vgl. Lilienthal et al. 2014). Radioförderung im Sinne der Förderung der Integration ausländischer Programmmacher und Programmmacherinnen oder sozialer Randgruppen gilt als gesellschaftliche wertvolle Maßnahme der Integrationspolitik. Auch sind Förderungen von Entwicklungen im Bereich interaktiver „serious games“ bereits Realität in der Europäischen Union (siehe MEDIA Programm). Ein gutes Beispiel für Reformbemühungen im Bereich der Presseförderung liefert auch die Schweiz (vgl. Künzler 2013). In der Schweiz wurden im Jahr 2013 rund 50 Millionen Franken für die Presseförderung ausgegeben. Mit indirekten Subventionen durch den Bund gewährt die Post zahlreichen Verlagen und Vereinen Vergünstigungen auf den Versand ihrer Zeitungen und Zeitschriften. Welche Medienunternehmen wie stark finanziell entlastet werden, bleibt jedoch geheim. Weder die Verlage selbst, noch die Post und das Bundesamt für Kommunikation (BAKOM) als Aufsichtsbehörde geben darüber Auskunft. Presseförderung in der Schweiz bleibt somit unter Verschluss. Zuletzt stellte die Eidgenössische Medienkommission (EMEK) die Wirksamkeit des aktuellen Fördermodells in Frage (vgl. EMEK 2014). Bis heute ist umstritten, ob das Gießkannenprinzip der richtige Weg sei, die Presse- und Meinungsvielfalt zu erhalten und zu stärken. Der Verband Schweizer Medien warnt derweil eindringlich davor, die indirekte Presseförderung einzustellen. Zeitungen würden durch 78

einen solchen Schritt „existenziell bedroht“. Direkte Presseförderung wird von anderer Stelle als „kontraproduktiv“ erachtet (vgl. avenir suisse 2014). Die Schweiz regte zuletzt sogar den Versuch eines Umdenkens bei der staatlichen Medienförderung an (vgl. EMEK 2014, Puppis 2012, Puppis et al. 2014). Neben zwei Volksinitiativen, die beide eine ersatzlose Abschaffung der Fernseh-Empfangsgebühren fordern und somit die vollständige Privatisierung von Radio- und Fernsehstationen anstreben, wird auch im Parlament intensiv über Änderungen des bestehenden Fördermodells diskutiert. So sind einige parlamentarische Vorstöße anhängig, die eine genauere Definition der Service Public-Leistungen der SRG beantragen, einen reduzierten Mehrwertsteuersatz für die digitale Presse fordern oder eine Schuldenbremse für die SRG verlangen. Und auch EMEK befasst sich mit dem Thema. Kurzfristig soll beispielsweise eine Angleichung der Mehrwertsteuersätze zwischen Print- und Onlineprodukten stattfinden. Weiter empfiehlt der Bundesrat, anders als von der EMEK gefordert, die indirekte Presseförderung beizubehalten. Eine gattungsunabhängige Förderung wird mit der Begründung einer notwendigen Verfassungsänderung bis auf weiteres nicht in Betracht gezogen. Ähnliches gilt für die direkte Förderung von Online-Medien (vgl. EMEK 2014, avenir suisse 2015). Rundfunkförderung Zu den traditionellen Bereichen der Medienförderung zählt die staatliche Unterstützung von Fernsehen und Radio (Rundfunk), vornehmlich in Form der staatlichen Zurechnung der Gebührenfinanzierung des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks. Aber auch im Bereich der privaten Rundfunkmedien wird eine Reihe von Förderinstrumenten eingesetzt. Bei Formen der direkten Rundfunkförderung werden entweder der Betrieb bestimmter Rundfunksender (oft lokale und alternative Sender) oder die Produktion einzelner Sendungen/Sendereihen unterstützt. Die Aus- und Weiterbildung von programmgestaltenden, kaufmännischen und rundfunktechnischen Mitarbeitern privater Rundfunkveranstalter (Ausbildungsförderung) ist ein direktes, selektiv eingesetztes Förderinstrument. Ebenso die Förderung der Durchführung und Verbesserung qualitativer und quantitativer Reichweitenerhebungen im privaten Rundfunk und vergleichbarer Datenerhebungen von oder im Auftrag von Veranstaltern (Reichweitenerhebungs- und Qualitätsstudienförderung). Auch im Rundfunkbereich ist in Deutschland prinzipiell keine direkte Förderung vorgesehen: „Eine Finanzierung privater Veranstalter aus dem Rundfunkbeitrag ist unzulässig“ (§43 Staatsvertrag für Rundfunk und Telemedien 2010). Davon ausgenommen sind jedoch „Offene Kanäle”, d.h. „Bürgermedien“, also Hörfunk- oder Fernsehsender, deren Programm Bürger gestalten und verantworten. In einigen Bundesländern fließen für die Landesmedienanstalten vorgesehene Mittel auch an diese Bürgermedien oder in die Filmförderung. Tiefgreifende Transformationsprozesse als Folge von Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz bringen jedoch die Akteure im klassischen Fernsehgeschäft in Deutschland unter Druck, sich und ihre Geschäftsmodelle an völlig neue Bedingungen anzupassen. Fakt ist: Die Fernsehnutzung verändert sich, und zwar weg vom zeitgebundenen linearen Fernsehen vor dem klassischen Bildschirm, hin zur zeit- und ortsunabhängigen Nutzung per Internet mit Hilfe unterschiedlichster Endgeräte. Sei es dank Videoplattformen wie YouTube oder Video-onDemand-Angeboten (VoD) wie Maxdome oder „Over-the-Top-Diensten“ (OTT) wie Netflix. Obwohl der lineare TV-Konsum in Deutschland pro Seher noch immer bei durchschnittlich mehr als 220 Minuten am Tag liegt (Zuschauer gesamt; AGF/GfK Fernsehpanel 2015), droht privaten wie öffentlich-rechtlichen TV-Sendern ein Schwund bei den Einschaltquoten, weil immer mehr Seherinnen auf zeit- und ortsunabhängig verbreitete Programme spezialisierter

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Web-TV-Anbieter umsteigen. Diese Entwicklungen können die Legitimationsbasis für die Gebührenfinanzierung des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks insgesamt schwächen. Auch in der Schweiz setzen sinkende Werbeeinnahmen und die wachsende Konkurrenz durch Online-Medien den klassischen Zeitungsverlagen massiv zu. So konstatiert dort fög (2014) Forschungsinstitut für Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft im zuletzt erschienenen Jahrbuch zur „Qualität der Medien“ den klassischen journalistischen Berufskulturen einen rasanten Abwärtstrend für die Schweiz. Als Ursachenkomplex für Vielfalt- und Qualitätsverluste der publizistischen Massenmedien wird insbesondere „die Genese eines kommerzialisierten Mediensystems und anschließend die Krise der Geschäftsmodelle durch den Abfluss der Werbeeinnahmen vorab zu Suchmaschinen, Onlinerubriken, sozialen Netzwerken, Onlineportalen branchenfremder Akteure und zu reichweitestarken Gratisangeboten“ (fög 2014, S. 20) gesehen. Als Antwort auf diese „Krise der Geschäftsmodelle“ empfiehlt das fög staatliche Intervention durch Medienförderung wie sie von EMEK vorgeschlagen wird (Eidgenössische Medienkommission 2014). Diese hat in einer Standortbestimmung Medienförderung als „staatliche oder staatlich unterstützte Finanzierung von Medienunternehmen“ (ebd., S. 12) verstanden. Sie soll dem Zweck dienen, „ein bestimmtes Angebot oder ein qualitativ vielfältiges publizistisches Angebot zu ermöglichen oder wirtschaftlich schwachen Medien das finanzielle Überleben zu sichern, um damit die nationale und regionale mediale Vielfalt und die publizistische Qualität der Medien zu erhalten und zu stärken“ (ebd.). Folgt man EMEK (2014, S. 16), soll Medienförderung differenzierter ausfallen und sich den neuen Anforderungen der digitalen Medienzukunft und der gegenwärtigen Finanzierungskrise der Medien gezielter stellen. Die Politik sei gefordert, da der digitale Transformationsprozess die traditionellen Geschäftsmodelle der Medien in der Schweiz gefährdet hätte. Technische Innovationen sollten gefördert und die journalistische Kultur erhalten und weiterentwickelt werden, weil die demokratiepolitische Bedeutung der Medienvielfalt und Medienqualität in der kleinräumigen und vielfältigen Schweiz besonders groß sei (ibid.). Filmförderung Als föderal verfasster Staat zählt in Deutschland Filmförderung sowohl zu den Kompetenzen des Bundes wie der Länder (vgl. Castendyk 2008, Kumb 2014). Auf Bundesebene regelt das deutsche Filmförderungsgesetz die Vergabe von Fördermitteln. Die deutsche Filmpolitik dient vor allem der Förderung und dem Erhalt des deutschen Films als Kultur- und Wirtschaftsgut. Die Filmpolitik im Speziellen besteht aus einem Wechselspiel aus regionaler Wirtschaftsförderung, Standortpolitik, Förderung des Films als Kulturgut im Inland und Vertretung des deutschen Films im Ausland. Darüber hinaus soll das filmische Erbe bewahrt und gepflegt, sowie eine Vielfalt des Filmschaffens gewährleistet werden. In Deutschland wird diese Beihilfe bei Förderungen durch die Filmförderungsanstalt (FFA) zum Teil als unbedingt rückzahlbares, zinsloses Darlehen vergeben, zum Teil als nichtrückzahlbarer Zuschuss. Bei einigen Länderförderungen bestehen hierzu abweichende Regelungen (Filmförderung der Länder). Neben den Preisen unterstützt das Staatsministerium für Kultur und Medien künstlerisch ambitionierte Filme verschiedener Sparten durch unmittelbar projektbezogene finanzielle Maßnahmen (d.h. durch Produktionsförderung, Drehbuchförderung, Verleihförderung). Zudem werden bedeutende Festivals wie die „Berlinale“ vom Bund gefördert. Im Jahr 2015 wurde der Deutsche Filmförderungsfonds (DFFF) der Filmförderungsanstalt allerdings von 60 auf 50 Mio. Euro reduziert. Das Filmförderungsinstrument des Wirtschaftsministeriums, das seit Herbst 2015 eingerichtet ist, kompensiert die Filmindustrie für Ausfälle. Kritiker werfen der Filmförderung in Deutschland ihre institutionelle Zersplitterung vor, die eine Koordinierung aller Maßnahmen, welche 80

letztlich der Qualität der Produktionen zugutekäme, praktisch unmöglich mache (vgl. Castendyk 2008). Auch werde mit einer flächendeckenden Verteilung von Zuschüssen der Anreiz erstickt, Filme zu produzieren, die ihre Produktionskosten wieder einspielen. In Österreich ist Filmförderung Gegenstand der folgenden Aktivitäten (vgl. Österreichisches Filminstitut 2015): (a) die Stoffentwicklung bzw. Drehbuchentwicklung durch Einzelautoren oder Autorenteams; (b) die Projektentwicklung, d.h. insbesondere die einer Filmproduktion (einschließlich der Erstellung des projektbezogenen Marketingkonzepts); (c) in Eigenverantwortung von Filmherstellern produzierte nationale Produktionen und internationale Koproduktionen mit jeweils nationaler Beteiligung; (d) die Vermarktung der Filme (etwa durch Verleih- und Abspielförderung); und (e)

die berufliche Aus- und Weiterbildung von im Filmwesen künstlerisch, technisch oder kaufmännisch tätigen Personen.

Filmförderung durchläuft damit alle Phasen der Produktion eines Films, von der Planung und Drehbucherstellung über die Produktion und Postproduktion bis hin zu Vertrieb, Verleih und Kinoauswertung. Es werden darüber hinaus jedoch auch eine Reihe weiterer Fördermaßnahmen wie Beratung, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Filmpreise und dergleichen getroffen. Getragen wird die Filmförderung in der Regel von öffentlichen Einrichtungen (z.B. Ministerien), aber auch von Wirtschaftsverbänden. Die öffentliche Filmförderung sowie die Filmförderung von regionalen Förderinstitutionen verfolgen das Motiv der Unterstützung heimischen Filmschaffens. Neben kulturellen Motiven war das Einführen von Filmförderungen in Europa seit den 1950er-Jahren auch dadurch motiviert, der Verdrängung europäischer Filme durch US-amerikanische Produktionen entgegenzutreten, welche in großer Anzahl hergestellt wurden, ihre Kosten meistens bereits in den USA einspielten und daraufhin mit wenig Zusatzkosten auch in Europa verbreitet werden konnten. In Österreich fördert das Österreichische Filminstitut das Filmwesen nach kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Aspekten. Ziel der Filmförderung ist es, die Herstellung, die Verbreitung und Vermarktung österreichischer Filme zu unterstützen, die geeignet sind, sowohl entsprechende Publikumsakzeptanz als auch internationale Anerkennung zu erreichen und dadurch die Wirtschaftlichkeit, die Qualität, die Eigenständigkeit und die kulturelle Identität des österreichischen Filmschaffens zu steigern. Zu diesem Zweck fördert das Filminstitut die Herstellung von Filmen einerseits nach dem Projektprinzip und andererseits nach dem Erfolgsprinzip („Referenzfilmförderung“). Für die Herstellungsförderung nach dem Projektprinzip sind mithilfe einer Expertengruppe (Auswahlkommission) Vorhaben auszuwählen, die einen künstlerischen und/oder wirtschaftlichen Erfolg erwarten lassen oder den Zielsetzungen der Nachwuchsförderung entsprechen. Durch die Nachwuchsförderung soll der Einstieg in das professionelle Filmschaffen erleichtert werden. Ein Nachwuchsfilm ist der erste und zweite Film, bei dem der Regisseur die Regieverantwortung für einen Kinofilm trägt. Voraussetzung für die Herstellungsförderung im Wege der Referenzfilmförderung ist, dass der Hersteller eines programmfüllenden Kinofilms einen künstlerisch oder wirtschaftlich erfolgreichen Referenzfilm vorweisen kann (Österreichisches Filminstitut 2014). In Deutschland wie in Österreich besteht zudem ein Film/Fernsehabkommen, in dessen Rahmen sich Fernsehsender an der Förderung von Spielfilmen beteiligen. In der Europäischen Union bestehen mehrere länderübergreifende Förderungsprogramme. So etwa das europäische Filmförderungsprogramm MEDIA und der europäische Filmförderungsfonds EURIMAGES des Europarats. Durch Filmförderungsfonds soll die Filmwirtschaft eines oder mehrerer 81

kooperierender Länder in ihrer kulturellen Bedeutung und in ihrer Wirtschaftskraft gestärkt werden.37 Auch in der Schweiz sind die Filmschaffenden stark von der Förderung durch die öffentliche Hand abhängig. Gefördert wird selektiv wie auch erfolgsabhängig (vgl. Interface / evalure 2015). In der selektiven Filmförderung wird Finanzhilfe aufgrund qualitativer Kriterien (u. a. künstlerische Qualität des Projekts, kreative Eigenständigkeit, professionelle Durchführung des Projekts) zugesprochen. Die erfolgsabhängige Filmförderung berechnet sich aus den erzielten Kinoeintritten. die Förderung der Filmkultur: Zur Sensibilisierung der Bevölkerung, Vermittlung filmkulturell relevanter Themen und Filme sowie zur Promotion des Schweizer Films unterstützt der Bund die Promotionsagentur Swiss Films, Filmfestivals, Filmzeitschriften sowie Projekte zur Erhaltung, Entwicklung und Innovation von Filmproduktion und Filmkultur. Unterstützt werden zudem die Archivierung und die Restaurierung von Filmen durch das Schweizer Filmarchiv (Cinémathèque Suisse) in Lausanne. Weitere Förderungsbereiche sind die Vielfalt und Qualität des Filmangebots (finanzielle Beiträge an Kinos, Verleih und Vertrieb), Aus- und Weiterbildung sowie Koproduktionen und internationale Zusammenarbeit (durch Koproduktionsabkommen und Beiträge an die europäischen Programme MEDIA und Eurimages).

4. FAZIT UND PERSPEKTIVEN Der vorliegende Beitrag stellte den Versuch dar, eine systematische Analyse zum Thema Medienförderung aus Sicht der Medienökonomie zu leisten. Ausgangspunkt war die Feststellung, dass der Komplexität des Themas bislang kein angemessenes, korrespondierendes Niveau wissenschaftlicher Bearbeitung in der Medienökonomie gegenüberstand. Dieser Beitrag sollte aufzeigen, welche Bedeutung Medienförderung als Garantie- und Anreizsystem für Demokratie, kulturelle Vielfalt und Innovation hat. Im Rahmen der ersten Frage, welche begrifflichen Besonderheiten dem Phänomen Medienförderung eingeschrieben werden können, wurde gezeigt, dass das erarbeitete Begriffsverständnis von Medienförderung als staatliche Intervention in den Medienmarkt zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt bestenfalls deskriptivanalytisch zu erfassen ist und in Kategorien einer ökonomisch-funktionalistischen Typologie zu beschreiben wäre. Dies bedeutet nicht weniger, als dass „dem Staat“ eine aktive ordnungsökonomische Aufgabe zugewiesen wird. Er soll das für die Erreichung bestimmter medien- und wirtschaftspolitischer Zielvorgaben jeweils gewählte optimale Instrumentarium durch gezielte Eingriffe herbeiführen und die dafür notwendigen Legitimationen, Qualifikationen und Ressourcen erbringen. Allerdings muss kritisch festgehalten werden, dass für die Entwicklung eines eigenständigen, medienökonomisch fundierten Medienförderungsbegriffs auf die Besonderheiten der Medien selbst Rücksicht zu nehmen ist, die die Entwicklung eines spezifischen Verständnisses von Medienförderung aus Sicht der Medienökonomie begründen (können). Diese Ergänzung ist besonders aus dem folgenden Grunde wichtig. Beim Austausch von Argumenten für und wider staatliches Eingreifen auf Medienmärkten fällt auf, dass Fragen nach der ökonomischen, publizistischen sowie der demokratietheoretischen Legitimation dieses Markteingriffs gerne vermischt werden. Das heißt, dass staatliche Aktivität auf dem Medienmarkt erstens danach beurteilt werden muss, inwieweit die Maßnahmen geeignet sind, ökonomisch benachteiligte Medienunternehmen für

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Für eine ausführliche Kritik zur Praxis der österreichischen Filmförderung siehe Österreichischer Rechnungshof 2011.

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den Wettbewerb zu stärken, um Konzentrationsprozesse, die den Wettbewerb einschränken, zu verhindern (ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit). Zweitens ist mit Blick auf die publizistische Leistungsfähigkeit der Medienwirtschaft zu prüfen, ob staatliche Intervention dazu beiträgt, Vielfalt zu gewährleisten. Schließlich muss drittens unter demokratietheoretischen Gesichtspunkten danach gefragt werden, inwieweit gesellschaftspolitisch relevante metaökonomische Grundwerte (z.B. Freiheit, Wohlstand, Gerechtigkeit) mit einer aktiven Rolle des Staates und seiner Funktion als Bewahrer und Förderer dieser Grundwerte mit medienpolitischen Zielen (Vielfaltförderung, Qualitätsförderung) vereinbar sind, ohne dass die Grundwerte einer wirtschaftsliberalen Marktordnung (Wirtschaftliche Freiheit, Gründung und Wirtschaftswachstum, Innovation) verletzt werden. Wollte man existierende Fördersysteme in diesem interdependenten Sinne verbessern, wäre es in jedem Fall zielführend, objektivierbare und klare Aufgriffs- und Zuteilungskriterien dieser Förderungsdimensionen zu identifizieren, die komplementär zu wirtschaftlichen eben auch auf demokratie- und medienpolitische Ziele auszurichten wären. Zweites Forschungsziel war es, aktuelle Medienförderungssysteme in ausgewählten Branchen der DACH-Region im Hinblick auf die Realisierung des hier vorgestellten (normativen) Postulats zu untersuchen. Gesucht war ja eine Antwort auf die Frage, ob die untersuchten Systeme Ansätze zur Erzielung einer integralen Medienförderung aufweisen. Im Ergebnis sind die betrachteten Fördermodelle der ausgewählten Branchen im Großen und Ganzen erfolgreich. Auf der Habenseite steht, dass staatliche Hilfen zum Abbau regionaler Disparitäten beitragen, durch Anreize oder Anschubfinanzierung den Markteintritt neuer Anbieter fördern, zukünftige Entwicklungen und ihre Marktumsetzung beschleunigen und gleichzeitig einen notwendigen Strukturwandel erleichtern sollen. Ob von staatlichen Subventionen allerdings ein Beitrag zur Förderung von Wachstum und Beschäftigung ausgeht, woraus sich dann über entsprechend höhere Steuer- und Sozialversicherungseinnahmen ein Return on Investment für die gezahlten Subventionen ergeben könnte (vgl. Bundesministerium für Finanzen 2014), ist nicht bekannt (vgl. Picard 2014). Die zentrale Kritik, dass die in den drei Untersuchungsländern eingesetzten Praxen der Medienförderung grundsätzliche Schwächen eingebaut sind, bleibt jedoch virulent. Der Reformdruck auf die Systeme erhält jedenfalls vor dem Hintergrund der Entwicklungen von Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz neue Nahrung. Zusammenfassend kann dazu festgestellt werden, dass es weitgehend Konsens darüber gibt, dass Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz die Veränderung von Marktstrukturen und marktgängigen Austauschprozessen in den Medien weiter vorantreiben werden. Die Megatrends der Digitalisierung und Konvergenz verschärfen mithin auch die Marktsituation für publizistische Qualitätsmedien. Dabei wird nicht nur der Wettbewerb zwischen „klassischen“ Marktteilnehmern verschärft, sondern diese stehen aufgrund der wachsenden Online-Konkurrenz durch häufig international tätige Akteure aus IT, Konsumelektronik, Telekommunikation, Unterhaltung und Internet- und Spieleindustrie unter zunehmendem Druck. Wenn sich nun aber Nutzerinnen und Nutzer anderen Angeboten zuwenden und damit Werbegelder vermehrt ins Internet und zu Online-Medien abfließen, sind zur Finanzierung von qualitativ hochwertigen Medieninhalten alternative Erlösquellen zu erschließen. Für Printmedien bedeutet dies z.B., dass das langjährige Geschäftsmodell „integrierte Werbe- und Leserfinanzierung“ aufgebrochen ist (sinkende Abo-Zahlen, sinkende Werbeeinnahmen, sinkende Auflagen, Entlassung von Journalistinnen, Zeitungsschließungen) und durch neue innovative cross-media Geschäftsmodelle zu erweitern wäre. Dieser Strukturwandel erzwingt jedenfalls Re-Positionierungen der Erlösmodelle von Qualitätsmedien. Modelle der staatlichen Medienförderung sind daher von gattungsspezifischen Einzelmedienfördersystemen auf neue Geltungsbereiche der Konvergenzmedien, auch und insbesondere im Online-Bereich, auszuweiten (Krone 2013). 83

Staatliche Medienförderung muss dann eben auch als Förderung der Innovationsfähigkeit von traditionellen publizistischen Massenmedien verstanden werden. Abschließend sei nochmals betont, dass eine moderne Medienförderung – und das nicht nur in Österreich – (weit) über Presseförderung hinausgehen muss. Sollte staatliche Medienförderung die gegenwärtigen Impulse nach Veränderung aufnehmen, sind Anforderungen an eine Reform bestehender traditioneller Medienförderungssysteme daran zu messen, wie diese eine strukturell-nachhaltige, qualitätsfördernde und innovationsfreundliche Medienförderung effizient zu organisieren wissen. Eine solcherart angeregte „integrale Medienförderung“ hätte die gezielte, selektiv eingesetzte, technologieneutrale und gattungsübergreifend wirkende Vielfalt-, Qualitäts-, Innovations- und Strukturförderung von publizistischen Massenmedien zum Ziel. Denn es ist die demokratie- und kulturpolitische Pflicht des Staates, Medien- und Meinungsvielfalt zu stärken, die Produktion eines qualitativ anspruchsvollen Angebots anzuregen und dessen Konsum zu unterstützen. Zudem wird an der Grundhypothese festgehalten, dass eine angemessene Analyse der gegenwärtigen Systeme der staatlichen Medienförderung kaum differenziertere Anstöße erfahren kann als durch die Medienökonomie. Referenzen Altmeppen, K.-D. (2012). Einseitige Tauschgeschäfte: Kriterien der Beschränkung journalistischer Autonomie durch kommerziellen Druck. In: O. Jarren, M. Künzler, & M. Puppis (Hrsg.), Medienwandel oder Medienkrise? Folgen für Medienstrukturen und ihre Erforschung (S. 37-52). Baden-Baden: Nomos. avenir suisse (2015). http://www.avenir-suisse.ch/44649/medienfoerderung-im-politischengrabenkampf/ (aufgerufen am 12.3.2015). avenir suisse (2014). Medienförderung im digitalen Zeitalter – Reformagenda für einen technologieund wettbewerbsneutralen Service public, Diskussionspapier, http://www.avenir-suisse.ch/40297/medienfoerderung-im-digitalen-zeitalter/ (aufgerufen am 12.3.2015). Barnett, S. (2009). Journalism, Democracy and the Public Interest. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger - BDZV (2004). Engagement für Pressevielfalt. http://www.bdzv.de/ueber-den-bdzv/aufgaben-und-ziele/50-jahre-bdzv/engagement-fuerpressevielfalt/ (aufgerufen am 12.3.2015). Becker, G.S. (1983). A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 371-400. Brümmerhoff, D. (2011). Finanzwissenschaft (10. Aufl.). München: Oldenbourg Verlag. Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D., & Tullock, G. (1980). Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station: Texas A&M University. Bundesministerium für Finanzen (2014). 24. Subventionsbericht der Bundesregierung. www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/publikationen (aufgerufen am 12.3.2015). Castendyk, O. (2008). Die deutsche Filmförderung – Eine Evaluation. Konstanz: UVK. Dal Bó, E. (2006). Regulatory Capture. A Review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2), 203-225. Dehling, J., & Schubert, K. (2011). Ökonomische Theorien der Politik. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 84

Dollery, B., & Worthington, A. (1996). The Evaluation of Public Policy: Normative Economic Theories of Government Failure. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 7(1), 27-39. EMEK - Eidgenössische Medienkommission (2014). Medienförderung: Standortbestimmung und Empfehlungen für die Zukunft. www.bakom.admin.ch (aufgerufen am 12.3.2015). Erlei, M., Leschke, M., & Sauerland, D. (2007). Neue Institutionenökonomik (2. Aufl.). Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag. Interface / evalure (2015). Evaluation der „Filmförderungskonzepte des Bundes“ (2008-2011 und 2012-2015). Auftrag des Bundesamtes für Kultur, Sektion Film, 2010 und 2015 (v. A.C. de Perrot, M. Thévenaz, & D. Wiener). Zürich/Basel. www.bak.admin.ch/ Luzern/Zürich (aufgerufen am 6.6.2015). fög – Forschungsinstitut Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft / Universität Zürich (2014). Qualität der Medien – Jahrbuch 2014. Universität Zürich, Basel: Verlag Schwabe. Gehlbach, S., & Sonin, K. (2014). Government Control of the Media. Journal of Public Economics, 114, 163-171. Gersdorf, H. (1991). Staatsfreiheit des Rundfunks in der dualen Rundfunkordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Gerpott, T.J., & Niegel, C. (2002). Mobile business start-ups in Germany: An exploration of the start-up scene and of corporate venture capital firms’ views on business success drivers and inhibitors. International Journal on Media Management, 4(4), 235-247. Gerth, M., & Trappel, J. (2008). Glücksritter, apokalyptische Plage oder kühle Rechner. Was von Finanzinvestoren im Medienbereich zu erwarten ist. Media Perspektiven, 10, 532-543. Haas, H., Kneidinger, B. & Steininger, C. (2013). Evaluierung der Presseförderung in Österreich. Status, Bewertung, internationaler Vergleich und Innovationspotenziale. Studie im Auftrag des Bundeskanzleramts Österreichs. Wien, www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=50443 (aufgerufen am 12.3.2015). Hantke-Domas, M. (2003). The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation? European Journal of Law and Economics, 15(2), 165-194. Hollstein, M. (1978). Government and the Press: The Question of Subsidies. Journal of Communication, 28(4), 46-53. Holoubek, M. (2010). Medienförderung. In: M. Holoubek, K. Kassai, & M. Traimer (Hrsg.), Grundzüge des Rechts der Massenmedien (S. 119-124). Wien/New York: Springer Notes. Holtz-Bacha, C. (2012). Überleben mit staatlicher Unterstützung? Modelle der Presseförderung am Beispiel von Schweden, Frankreich und Österreich. In: N. Springer, J. Raabe, H. Haas, & W. Eichhorn (Hrsg.), Medien und Journalismus im 21. Jahrhundert. Herausforderungen für Kommunikationswissenschaft, Journalistenausbildung und Medienpraxis. (S. 187-200). Konstanz: UVK. Holtz-Bacha, C. (1994). Presseförderung im westeuropäischen Vergleich. In: P. A. Bruck (Ed.), Medienmanager Staat. Von den Versuchen des Staates, Medienvielfalt zu ermöglichen. Medienpolitik im internationalen Vergleich (S. 443-567). München: Reinhard Fischer. Humphreys, P. (2006). Press subsidies in the context of the Information Society. Historical modalities, concept and justification. In: I. Fernandez Alonso, M. de Moragas, J. J. Blasco Gil, & N. Almiron (Eds.), Press Subsidies in Europe: Proceedings of the Symposium ‘Press Subsidies in Europe: Development, Pluralism and Transparency’, Barcelona, 19 and 20 June, 2006 (pp. 38-55). Maison d‘edition: Generalitat de Catalunya. 85

IHS - Institut für Höhere Studien (2014). Ökonomische Bedeutung von Zeitungen und Zeitschriften für Österreich, internationaler Vergleich der Presseförderung und Einflüsse des Online-Anzeigenmarkts, v. A. Schnabl, H. Hochmuth, S. Kuschej, Lappöhn, A. Pohl, & B. Wögerbauer. Wien. www.ihs.ac.at (aufgerufen am 18.3.2015). Jarren, O. (2014). Erfüllen die Medien heute einen demokratischen Auftrag? Wie sich der Medienwandel auf Gesellschaft und Politik auswirkt. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 24(3), 317-327. Karmasin, M. (2015). Ausgepresst. (aufgerufen am 1.3.2015).

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Puppis, M. (2012). Öffentliche Finanzierung als Antwort auf die Medienkrise? In: W. A. Meier, H. Bonfadelli, & J. Trappel (Hrsg.), Gehen in den Leuchttürmen die Lichter aus? Was aus den Schweizer Leitmedien wird, Vol. 8 (S. 297-312). Münster: LIT Verlag. Puppis, M. (2010). Einführung in die Medienpolitik (2. Aufl.). Konstanz: UVK. RTR – Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH (2011). Fonds zur Förderung des nichtkommerziellen Rundfunks (NKRF). Richtlinien. http://www.rtr.at/ de/foe/RichtlinienNKRF_Fonds/NKRF_Richtlinien.pdf (aufgerufen am 12.3.2015). Schulz, W., Kaserer, C., & Trappel, J. (2008). Finanzinvestoren im Medienbereich. Gutachten im Auftrag der Direktorenkonferenz der Landesmedienanstalten. Hamburg: Hans-BredowInstitut. Sjurts, I. (2011). Außenpluralismus. In: I. Sjurts (Hrsg.), Gabler Lexikon Medienwirtschaft (S. 44). Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag. Smith, A. (1977). Subsidies and the Press in Europe. Political and Economic Planning, 43(569), London: PEP. Staatsvertrag für Rundfunk und Telemedien (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag RStV) vom 31.08.1991, in der Fassung des fünfzehnten Staatsvertrages zur Änderung rundfunkrechtlicher Staatsverträge vom 15./21. Dezember 2010. http://www.diemedienanstalten.de/fileadmin/Download/Rechtsgrundlagen/Gesetze_aktuell/15_RStV_0101-2013.pdf (aufgerufen am 11.9.2015). Trappel, J. (2015). Media Subsidies: Editorial Independence Compromised? In: S. Barnett, & J. Townend (Eds.), Media Power and Plurality. From Hyperlocal to High-Level Policy. Basingstoke (pp. 187-200). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tullock, G. (1967). The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western Economic Journal, 5(June), 224-232. Valcke, P., Picard, R. G., Sükösd, M., Klimkiewicz, B., Petkovic, B., Dal Zotto, C., & Kerremans, R. (2010). The European Media Pluralism Monitor: Bridging Law, Economic and Media Studies as a First Step Towards Risk-Based Regulation in Media Markets. The Journal of Media Law, 2, 85-113. Wendt, R. (o.J.). Staatliche Maßnahmen zur Erhaltung der presserechtlichen Meinungsvielfalt. http://wendt.jura.unisaarland.de/Prof.Dr.Wendt/Aufsaetze/StaatlicheMassnahmenzurErhaltungderpresserechtlic henMeinungsvielfal.htm (aufgerufen am 11.9.2015).

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Beitrag 4: State Aid for Newspapers Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C. (Ed.), State Aid for Newspapers – First Theoretical Disputes. In P. C. Murschetz (Ed.), State Aid for Newspapers. Theories. Cases. Actions (pp. 3-21). Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag 2014.

1

First Theoretical Disputes

If one first lays aside any definitional problems – the term ‘state aid’ is used within the European Union, and the term subsidies the standard expression of the World Trade Organization, while the OECD prefers to use the word support – state aid, at a very fundamental level, commonly refers to a cash payment or financial assistance from a government or other public authority to a person or company. State aid for newspapers, more particularly, usually serves two main purposes: They should reduce a person’s or company’s cost of producing and bringing a commodity to market, and, secondly, by reducing the price of the commodity, should increase its consumption beyond what competitive market forces would provide for. State aid for newspapers in form of a financial subsidy thus works like a negative tax as they are given (and not taken) by government and, in the most general case, should encourage the production and consumption of a good. In most cases, subsidies are given out to producers in order to encourage supply but, occasionally, government can offer a cash or in-kind subsidy to the consumer which itself aims at boosting demand in a market.38 Subsidies are a notoriously difficult concept to grasp. They only seem to become more tangible when referring to their main purpose: “Subsidies are provided to promote media industries, support political activities, spur cultural development, meet the needs of minority linguistic and ethnic groups, assist religious and other organizations sanctioned by states, and reward political allies” (Picard 2008, p. 4891). Subsidies come in a variety of different forms, including direct subsidies such as cash grants, and indirect measures such as tax reductions (notably, reduced VAT rates on subscription and single copy sales and advertising revenues) and tax breaks (e.g. for investments) etc. Ronald Steenblik, senior trade policy analyst in the Trade and Agriculture Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), stressed the importance of direct subsidies but noted that other, indirect subsidies would also play an important role as they would bring regulatory relief to suffering industries: “Many subsidies are indeed provided in that form, as grants or, more generically, direct payments. Grants are the elephants in the subsidy zoo: they are large and highly visible. But there are numerous other subsidy beasts which are better camouflaged, stealthier, and keep closer to the ground” (Steenblik 1990, online). Any of these kinds of financial transfers aim at (re)funding the operational activities of companies the market does not efficiently allocate for, and, importantly, governments and other stakeholders would have an interest in to be supported.

38 Ross argued that to rise welfare of an individual at the lowest possible cost, cash grants are more efficient than subsidies to the consumption of specific commodities (Ross 1988). Equally, Peltzman (1973) looked into education subsidies and found that an in-kind subsidy, such as below-cost education provided by state universities, replaces more private consumption of the subsidized good than an equivalent money subsidy, such as a scholarship.

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Newspapers, known as the ‘chroniclers of daily life’ come in different shapes and may differ according to frequency of publication, pitch of editorial content, geographic distribution area, format and layout, etc. and normally attract funding from internal and external sources: They collect revenues from two-sided markets of audiences and advertisers (Rochet & Tirole 2003, Roson 2005). Other funding sources may come from private equity, loan capital or shareholder equity. Public subsidies, on their part, come as an additional source of funding. All of these financial resources may cover for any financial commitment needs, for example, to newsrooms (Lacy 1992), add to the organization’s survival based on its optimal utilization of both internal and external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), optimally balance these financial resources in order to relieve from financial distress (Modigliani & Miller 1958), or support the capital structure of the media firm in order to leverage any future investment needs (Myers 1984, Myers 2000).39 In order to treat such complex issues systematically, subsidy definitions tend to make reference to one of the following characteristics of government intervention in order to confine the concept: x

Subsidy types and instruments,

x

Rationale and design of a subsidy program or scheme, and

x

Effects on the market, the business firm, journalism, the consumer/citizen, and/or the public at large.

Subsidy types and instruments Indeed, state intervention to help the press can be classified according to whether they are: x x x x x

General (applying to all papers) or specific (intended to help weak papers or certain types of paper with a social, political or cultural role), Indirect (e.g. tax concessions) or direct (e.g. grants and loans), Intended for existing (perhaps ailing) papers or designed to help new entrants into the market, Aimed at local or national press markets, and Governed by selective or mandated allocation procedure mechanisms.

General aid is given to assist a selected range of newspapers, but not for a single use. 40 This type of use can be seen in operational subsidies that provide revenue that a newspaper manager can use for any purpose (e.g. tax concessions to newspapers, reduced import duties on newsprint, or reduced postal tariffs). General subsidies are likely to be allocated according to the ‘watering-can principle’, that is a procedure of subsidy distribution, with which neither the temporal sequence of the demand submission nor the subsidy urgency, but if necessary the height of the requested subsidies – if at all – are decisive. For the watering can principle it is characteristic that the subsidies without detailed examination of the actual need are distributed evenly over the entire

39 For an overview on financial issues of media management see, Rizzuto (2006), Ozanich (2006), and Picard (2011). 40 The term subsidy may also refer to assistance granted by other institutions than government, such as individuals or private non-governmental institutions, although this is more commonly described as charity.

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target group, without considering the possible differences in market power and urgency of help of the individual cases. Specific forms of financial assistance, by contrast, come as a special ‘capital injection’ and include aid that can be used only for a specific purpose, such as grants received to retrain printing personnel in the use of digital pre-press equipment. Further, specific subsidies may go to particular groups of beneficiaries, as opposed to the recipient population as a whole. These financial endowments may be paid out on a first-in, first-served basis whereby the requests of subsidy applicants are attended to in the order that they arrived, without other preferences such as, for example, the financial need. The terms direct and indirect indicate how the intervention is provided. Direct aid is given directly to specific newspapers, such as a loan provided to purchase new printing presses. Most popular are direct cash payments made to newspapers by governments to help pay their operating expenses, most commonly referred to as direct operating subsidies. Direct cash injections also include subsidies for training and research grants, grants to encourage economic improvements in the industry, low-interest loans and loan guarantees, equity injections to avoid bankruptcy, and financial aid to political newspapers and other informational activities of political parties.41 Preferably, direct cash subsidies are aligned to specific bright-line selection criteria for subsidization such as news media company size measured by printed circulation, competitive position in well-defined (i.e. geographic, product or consumer) markets, frequency of publication, or disadvantaged financial position on the advertising market. Direct selective subsidies may be granted to new market entrants in order to lower entry barriers, restore competition and reinforce the market system (Gustafsson 1993). Apart from direct financial, other forms of direct financial subsidies include support for co-operation in distribution and printing, government loans on preferential terms and government insertions - if they are explicitly declared to be press subsidies by the authorities – grants for press research and education, and grants for press exports. The following Table 1 highlights some general and selective direct subsidies.

41

Picard 1982, pp. 4-5.

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Table 1 - Types of direct subsidies (selection) General

Selective

Direct operating grants to all newspapers Support of co-operations: Joint-delivery, printing, advertising acquisition Financial grants to all newspapers (equal amount to all)

Financial grants to all newspapers which are in the red

Print-specific subsidies for investment in general (e.g. into new printing technology, innovation subsidies)

Subsidies to newspapers for special investments

General press export subsidies to encourage sales and reading of newspapers abroad

Export subsidies through low-cost loans or tax relief for exporters

Soft loans to all newspapers to stimulate capital investment

Soft loans at below market interest rates based on specific selection criteria (e.g. economic indicators)

Source: The Author

While cash grants are most visible transfer payments in the subsidy panopticon, other forms of state aid are, as mentioned above, better camouflaged, stealthier, and thus less subject to political or civil society observation and control. For example, tax concessions are common forms of indirect subsidies in many well-developed tax systems. Tax concessions are assistance programs that include tax exemptions (when a tax is not paid), tax credits (which reduce a tax otherwise due), tax deferrals (which delay the payment of a tax) and a host of other instruments. Most European countries give tax concessions on VAT to the newspaper industry. These advantages may take the form of zero-rating, exemption or the use of a positive rate lower than the standard rate, applied either on newsprint, sales revenues, advertising revenues, purchases of printing equipment, or to any combination of these. VAT reductions are used across a wide number of nations and represent a significant indirect subsidy of print (and/or online) journalism. However, research on its value and effects on newspaper markets is scarce. 42 Besides adding complexity to tax systems, tax concessions are often criticized by economists as being less transparent than grants and more resistant to change. In addition, VAT is regressive and is being equally paid by all consumers whether they are rich or poor, young or old. Another important advantage includes distribution support through reduced postal delivery rates and other transportation concessions. Reduced tariffs of newspapers delivered by postal services, in Sweden to be traced back to the last century, in France even to the French Revolution, and in the USA back to the Postal Act of 1792, are enjoyed by the press in most countries so as to alleviate general distribution costs of newspapers. As a general rule, newspapers with larger distribution, particularly supra-regional and national newspapers, benefit most from these non-selective reduced postal delivery tariffs. Other transportation

42 Timo Toivonen, researcher at Turku School of Economics in Finland, calculated the value of VAT reductions in three nations and found that VAT reductions for circulation sales in 2010 amounted for by €525m in Germany, €250m in Italy, and €748m in the United Kingdom (Toivonen, as cited in Nielsen & Linnebank 2011, pp. 31-32).

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concessions are rarer and take the form of reduced rates for the carriage of newspapers by rail or airline. Telecommunications support to newspapers is fairly popular, and ranges from reductions on telephone charges to a reduction of subscription fees to news services. Furthermore, lower import duties are another form of indirect support and are on occasion levied on the import of newsprint. Grants to journalists, research and innovation subsidies, and cooperation grants for printing and distribution may also alleviate the cost pressures. Further, news agencies may be promoted and subsidies to newsprint export may help reading abroad. On top of that, government advertising in the press represents another important yet much hidden form of indirect support to newspapers. To my knowledge, however, scholarly research on types and effects of this important issue is absent. The following Table 2 collects these indirect types of subsidies (general and selective). Table 2 - Types of indirect subsidies (selection) General

Selective

Reduced postal tariffs for newspaper delivery and delivery by train

Reduced postal tariffs for newspaper delivery and delivery by train based on specific criteria (e.g. low-circulation)

Telecommunications support Subsidies for newsprint, partly combined with the incentive to prefer domestic newsprint in order to support the domestic industry Reduced import duties on newsprint General tax reliefs, e.g. reduced VAT rate on newsprint, sales revenues, advertising revenues

Reliefs up to a specific circulation or advertising revenue level

Tax exemption for reinvestments Special support to news agencies or measures taken to increase their number State control on advertising volume in other media, e.g. TV Reallocation of advertising revenue from other media (e.g. TV to print) Education and further subsidies to journalists

promotional

Subsidies to promote reading

Subsidies to promote reading of migrant inhabitants Source: The Author

While these types of indirect subsidies are more or less known, there are also more hidden, below-the-line subsidies and other shadowy practices of public support which are not only difficult to detect, and in the absence of an official scheme act beyond legal governance and control. However, they may give rise to adverse effects of market distortion in many ways. While above-the line subsidies act to distort specific submarkets deliberately in order to support 93

needy beneficiaries, these other forms of support deliver grounds for suspicion of corruption, political lobbying seeking protection, and even practices of subsidy abuse. Because research has shown that a free press may be a powerful control on corruption (Ahrend 2002, Brunetti & Weder 2003, Lindstedt & Naurin 2005), state subsidies may come as subtle instruments that subvert this freedom in many ways. It is both political influence over media content which puts pressure on the day-to-day conditions in which journalist work, and economic influence to exert competitive pressures that distort reportage. Economic favouritism or reprisals by government for unwanted press coverage are further critical instances that endanger press freedom. In referring to the administration of assistance, the terms selective and mandated are often employed. Selective intervention refers to advantages, subsidies, or other types of regulation in which an administrative body independent from government regulates as to who should be provided with funds, and how the allocation procedure is to be organized in detail. Selective funding is awarded to subsidy applicants according to a series of qualitative selective criteria and generally involves a more rigorous selection process. Mandated intervention, by contrast, is regulation mandated by a state in order to organize the allocation procedure by an agency automatically and by transparent rules so that no discretion or even ‘agency capture’ to provide or withhold the assistance should rest within a regulatory agency respectively. Such regulatory agencies are set up and the task of regulation deputed to it because government intervention has been mandated by a law that clearly defines which beneficiary should receive the assistance and under which circumstances. These regulatory agencies may be set up from outside an industry in order to remain independent and thus ring-fenced against state intervention, or use may be made of self-regulation by bodies representing firms in an industry. The advantage of self-regulatory organizations is that while industry practitioners can be expected to be aware of its problems they may tend to identify the public interest with the interests of producers in the industry, rather than the interests of its customers, or the general public. Principally, non-market or government failure is the case when the costs of intervention are greater than the benefits. This type of failure may occur when the costs of setting up, operating, and controlling the scheme exceed the benefits (Stiglitz 1989). Regulatory capture, a form of government failure, refers to collusion between firms and government agencies assigned to regulate them (Dal Bó 2006, Laffont & Tirole 1991, Zerbe & McCurdy 1999). Here, rent-seeking behavior is an important explanatory concept in economics. In public choice theory, rent-seeking is the attempt of people to obtain economic benefit for themselves through lobbying the government for privileges.43 They typically do so by getting a subsidy for a good they produce or for belonging to a particular group of people, by getting a tariff on a good they produce, or by getting a special regulation that hampers their competitors. In fact, from a theoretical standpoint, the moral hazard of rent-seeking may considerably endanger any potential efficiency gains public subsidies are about to initiate in the first place (Buchanan et al. 1980, Congleton et al. 2008, Tullock 1967, Tullock 1987). There are various instances of government-beneficent relations which result in a negative net effect of rent-seeking. Then, total social wealth is reduced, because resources are spent wastefully and no new wealth is created. When applied to state aid for newspapers, if lobbying for a favorable regulatory environment is cheaper than building a more efficient production, a newspaper may opt for the latter, and money is thus spent on lobbying activities rather than on improved business practices. The main source of inefficiency caused by subsidies, besides their possible wasteful nature is that they tamper with market signals. This means that when state aid targets specific firms they

43

Tullock, who originated the idea in 1967, was first to point to the negative externalities through rent-seeking behaviour (Tullock 1967).

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alter the self-regulating mechanism of the marketplace (a phenomenon that Adam Smith referred to as the invisible hand of the market) by which resources are allocated to the most efficient firm. And, additionally, there is another possible adverse impact effect of state aid: the socalled soft budget constraint (Kornai et al. 2003, Kornai 1986). The ‘softening’ of the budget constraint appears when the strict relationship between the expenditure and the earnings of a firm is relaxed because excess expenditure will typically be paid by a paternalistic state. If the subsidy is soft it is negotiable, subject to bargaining, lobbying, etc. as a result of which it becomes a source of the inefficiency as it raises expectations among potential applicants that failing firms could be bailed out and subsidised. More generally, a firm’s incentives to become more efficient so as to cut costs, raise quality or innovate are likely to be dampened if it expects that the resulting competitive advantage will be offset by the granting of aid to its lazier rivals. All in all, the power of government to effectively govern state aid is seen as significantly reduced as it is susceptible to capture by special interests through activities such as lobbying and favor seeking (Becker 1983, Peltzman 1976, Stigler 1971). Subsidy rationale and design When society’s goal is to raise the welfare of an individual, household, organization, industry, or society at large, regulatory action may be taken by a government in order to affect or interfere with decisions made by individuals, groups, or organizations regarding social and economic matters. Theoretically, when discussing the rationale of government intervention into the press, three main theoretical conjectures emerge: x

x

x

The public interest theory of regulation, which assumes that the ‘free play of market forces’ of supply and demand would be the most efficient organizing principle of exchange and lead to a welfare-optimizing allocation of resources without government intervention (Barnett 2009, Hantke-Domas 2003, Pigou 1932, Posner 1974), The paradigm of market failure, a doctrine within economics which explains the notion that self-regulated markets reveal structural and behavioral instances that lead to their failure in working efficiently as a result of which corrective government action seems warranted (Bator 1958, Cowen 1988, Cowen & Crampton 2002), and Traditions in the political economy of the media which look into the issue of government control over the media whereby government may seize the media and induce bias such that media misreport the news in favor of government interests. Subsidies to these favorable media may be the price to pay for such covert government control (Gehlbach & Sonin 2011, Prat & Strömberg 2011, Strömberg 2006).

In what follows, I shall track these trajectories in more detail. Special focus shall, however, be given to economic theories of market (and government) failure, notably through the lens of the ‘market failure’ paradigm from a media economics point of view. Other theories are more briefly referred to as supporting theories. Public interest theory, for example, was first developed by Arthur Cecil Pigou (1932) and holds that regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient or inequitable market practices. Certainly, effective governance plans for supporting a whole industry will first have to identify the big picture when aiming to resolve an ailing or otherwise to be supported industry, all the way from setting clear and realistic objectives to measuring subsidy-impacted industry performance and 95

output. Naturally, effectively designing these schemes is a very difficult task. Originally, press support was indirectly distributed through the political parties to their supporting news media – mainly newspapers and other periodicals, but today subsidies are more direct in form, and are tied to certain requirements. If support to newspapers is politically approved - and market imperfections is not, in itself, a sufficient condition for concluding that public financial support is warranted - regulators face the obvious choice of tax-financed subsidy approaches, either through direct cash injections or indirect cash advantages, or anti-trust policies as means of regulatory state action, or, most likely, a combination of these. While it is notoriously difficult to strike this balance in an ever changing and highly dynamic media environment, policy-makers may need to conciliate between the following motives – among others – behind public press policy and the subsidy rationale that emanates from them (Baldwin & Cave 1999, Baldwin et al. 2010, Latzer 2007, McChesney 2008, Seabright & von Hagen 2007): x x x x x x x x x x x x

Curbing the market power of dominant firms (e.g. by handing over subsidies to ‘weaker’ newspapers), Enabling market access for new entrants (e.g. of non-profit or not-for-profit organizations), Relieving financial distress to keep companies alive, Supporting market exit (e.g. of failing companies), Supporting a political purpose (which need not be in the public interest), Supporting a national/regional/local culture and its linguistic representations, Enabling growth and innovation plans of a media company, Improving journalistic quality for general public benefit, Encouraging political discourse and the formation of public opinion, Protecting vulnerable values and groups in society (e.g. linguistic plurality and ethnic diversity), Strengthening of the national industry and offering incentives for newspapers not to relocate, and Safeguarding political plausibility and civic support.

The subsidy effects debate State aid for newspapers via financial subsidies is public monies intended to maintain and increase the revenues (incomes) of producers and whole industries during times of special difficulties, by guaranteeing supply of products offered by these companies. They may smooth or slow down the process of long-term structural decline of an industry. Yet, they may also aim at improving the competitiveness of market players in a healthy industry by supporting those products in a market which are said to confer properties of merit goods in the sense that their provision and use benefit society at large such that the provision of high-quality objective information, high culture and education are promoted (Musgrave 2008). Further, state aid may target activities that would otherwise not take place, such as investments on innovation. When considering competition effects of state support, public subsidies might come to adversely affect competition. Here, the UK’s economic government regulator, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), has developed a guidance on how to assess the competition effects of subsidies in general (OFT 2004, ibid. 2006). Accordingly, subsidies may: 96

x

Change the behavior of the recipient to the detriment of social welfare. While full competition, through efficient markets, delivers lower prices, greater choice and more popular products to consumers, subsidies have the potential to cause firms to produce at higher costs or sell their products at higher prices than it had actually cost to produce them,

x

Impact on the recipient’s costs (either fixed, variable or total) and so will affect its decisions concerning what to produce, how much to produce, how to produce it and what to charge for it. Such a change is likely to have an immediate effect on the competitive process, including the relative strengths of firms receiving and not receiving subsidies,

x

Force efficient firms out of the market, or reduce their long-term investment or reduce employment, for example, in order to ensure their short-term survival,

x

Reduce the future incentives of firms to act efficiently. If firms anticipate that poor performance might be compensated for by subsidies, they will have less strong incentives to be efficient. The dynamic profit incentive at the heart of the competitive process will be suppressed,

x

Prolong the time an inefficient firm is able to stay in the market directly distort a firm’s incentives to innovate. For example, an R&D subsidy that benefits just one firm in a market may reduce the incentives of their competitors to invest in research and development (R&D),

x

Drive competing firms to react by adjusting their behavior. In response, subsidy recipients may adjust their behavior again prompting second round and third round effects, and

x

Encourage firms to use time and resources in trying to obtain subsidies whereby such resources are unlikely to be directed in an efficient manner.

Hence, subsidy design can help determine whether the subsidy will have a material effect on competition. In particular, the magnitude, both in absolute and relative terms (i.e. in relation to the costs of the subsidized activity), and the structure of subsidy payments (i.e. periodical or one-off) all may have potential effects on recipients as well as the competitors’ behaviour. In this context, Robert Picard’s analytical framework of 1991 of analyzing competitive effects resulting from state press policies is still valid today. Picard followed Nobel prize winner Ronald H. Coase (1974) in claiming that newspapers serve two different markets, the information/ideas market (i.e. the editorial content production and services side of the market) and the economic market for goods (i.e. the revenues-creating side of audiences and advertisers’ markets) with one and the same product. As a result, public policy choices must sometimes be made in favor of the press as such that promote competition in one market while harming competition in the other. General policy goal is that, as Picard put it, “the “creating and adjusting press policies should be that no negative effect from state activity occurs in either the economic or the information/idea market” (Picard 1991, p. 3). As for selected state press policies, aimed at reducing the production costs of newspapers, they can have different effects on the economic and journalistic competition of newspapers. What may have positive effects on the economic competition may have negative effects on the information/idea market, and vice versa, or have no effect at all respectively. If one follows Picard (1991) further, the “selective production subsidies, that is cash payments made to specific papers to help cover their costs (...) and ownership regulation, that is legal 97

efforts to limit the number of publications or the amount of circulation that may be owned or controlled by a single publisher” (Picard 1991, pp. 6 and 7), best promote competition both in the economic as well as in the information/idea market. On the other side, non-selective tariff discounts on the postal delivery of newspapers, for example, promote the information/idea market, but harm economic competition because they consolidate the financial resources of high-circulation newspapers and thus lower the costs of doing business even further for the market leaders instead of singling out specifically the smaller newspapers for special aid. Picard leaves no doubt that only a balanced and coherent set of public press policies may best promote overall competition, so stressing the need to conform to the general economic policies of the nation in which they are proposed (Picard 1985). Subsidy effects through a game theory lens Now, let us consider the issue of subsidy effects on pricing competition between two newspapers competing for readers in a pre-defined market for news. Here, it is helpful to apply a non-cooperative pricing game based on simple game theory logic (Carmichael 2005, Fuldenberg & Tirole 1991, Rasmusen 2007). Let me model a two-player, two-strategy choice, single-episode, non-cooperative pricing game in a duopoly market for printed news. For this, I assume that: x x x x x x x x x x

There are two market players: Newspaper A and Newspaper B which are perfect substitutes, i.e. consumers perceived them as being homogeneous goods, Newspaper A does not receive government subsidies while Newspaper B is granted specific financial aid, Newspaper B passes (some or all) of the subsidy on to the consumer, resulting in a lower end-cover sales price per copy, Consumers prefer to read the lower priced paper, Each of the players competes in the same market for, say, printed quality news (e.g. regional daily newspapers), and they offer a homogeneous (i.e. undifferentiated) product and do thus not cooperate in any way, Both players compete by setting prices simultaneously are decision-makers and must choose between two pricing strategies: {low price} and {high price}, One player’s performance is directly related to decisions made by another player, no unilateral decisions are made (i.e. A guesses what B will do by guessing what B will guess A will do, ad infinitum), Both players tend to act non-co-operatively since it is the individual maximization, and not the joint maximization, of utility that determines their individual choice, Their plans result into behavioral actions and the dominant strategy chosen will be the one with the highest expected payoff (or utility), Both players know all the rules of the game and the preferences of the other player for each of the outcomes. Each player is fully informed about all prior choices when it is time to decide.

By using game theory design, we can now set up the pay-off matrix with possible strategies and the respective payoffs in order to find a solution to this game. Some more data is needed for this. We assume that Newspaper A and Newspaper B’s production costs are €1.00 per copy (i.e. per unit cost) and their price is either €1 or €2. Readers love to purchase the cheaper newspaper. In case of a same price they split among the paper equally. For a price of €1 100.000 newspapers are sold, for €2 only 60.000. Now the solution looks as follows (see, Matrix 1): 98

Matrix 1 – Newspaper Pricing Game Payoff Matrix Newspaper B (Subsidized)

{high price}

{high price}

{low price}

60, 60

60, 0

0, 60

0, 0

Newspaper A {low price}

Nash equilibrium Overall, there is a big incentive to cooperate in this (Bertrand) duopoly model (Bertrand 1883).44 First, if both newspapers colluded and charged the high price, they would share the market equally and at highest payoff each [60, 60].45 This would be the best decision both newspapers could choose in this set-up. However, if the government-subsidized newspaper (Newspaper B) went for the {low price} strategy, while Newspaper A remained unimpressed, it would sell more copies but accrue higher marginal costs as a result of which it would achieve zero payoff. While readers would prefer to read Newspaper B, Newspaper A would have to follow lowering its price to the level of Newspaper B. If both players decided for the {low price} strategy, we would arrive at the Nash equilibrium (Nash 1950). This equilibrium is the solution of this non-cooperative pricing game. There, each newspaper is assumed to know the equilibrium strategy of the other, and no player has anything to gain by changing only its own strategy unilaterally. Still, this Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is only a weak one. This means that the other game’s equilibrium where both players play the {high price} strategy may well be sustained as an equilibrium of a repeated game. If both firms agreed to deviate from the competitive price, they would make a profit, and only the readers would lose. What does this solution imply for public subsidy governance? Clearly, in the duopoly model scenario shown above, government subsidies which aim at lowering prices drive both competitors to reduce their prices at the cost of their individual payoff. If governmentsubsidized Newspaper B offered a competitive price below the equilibrium pre-subsidy price, Newspaper A, being a rational player, would be better off entering into a price war in order to not lose readers to the rival. Yet, at the Bertrand equilibrium zero profits are made. A government subsidy to one market player would, following this model’s logic, lead to Pareto-

44 This duopoly game model is inspired by the model of competition used in economics, named after the French mathematician Joseph Louis François Bertrand (1822-1900). 45

If Newspaper B chooses a low price its payoffs is calculated as follows: (€1 x 100,000) – (€1 x 100,000) = 0. In this competitive pricing scenario, Newspaper A would have to expect the same zero profit payoff in this equilibrium.

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efficient market result where price equals marginal costs. In order to achieve this result, governments are thus advised to offer selective subsidies to homogeneous newspapers on the basis of specific criteria (e.g. market position). However, there is still the danger that the subsidized newspaper would not lower its end-cover price but instead invested into costreduction policies in order to drive down costs. If we applied game theory to real-life situations we would probably come to a different conclusion: Newspapers are rarely identical goods because readers add to their meaning in very specific ways. They consume and interpret news content fairly individualistically and develop preferences for rather specific bundles of information (Lacy 1993, Lacy 2004). In this second scenario, let me thus argue that each player’s level of product differentiation is not decided in isolation but with respect to the strategy of its opponent. Publishers, it is assumed, will be best able to produce high-quality news when they are most insulated from competitive market pressures. Increases and decreases in competitive pressure, the argument goes, are commonly associated with increases and decreases in the quality of news (Picard 2004, Waterman 1991, Zaller 1999). When tackling product differentiation print news managers may differentiate their products according to periodicity or feature frequency, revenue model, geographic focus, editorial orientation, news style, visual complexity, content organization, or newsprint quality, or most commonly a combination of them (Reddaway 1963, Picard & Brody 1997). Hence, I assume the following game settings for this new scenario: x

There are two market players: Newspaper A and Newspaper B which are differentiated products. Readers view these as close, but not perfect, substitutes for each other,

x

Both newspapers operate under a monopolistically competitive market structure (e.g. a regional market for printed news) which means that they have to create products with unique characteristics that help them capture consumer loyalties and reduce the level of direct competition.

x

Newspaper A is the market leader and does not receive government subsidies. Newspaper B is the follower which is granted specific financial aid as is considered to be disadvantaged in the advertising market,

x

Newspaper A as market leader is the long-standing incumbent for high-quality news. Newspaper B tries hard to claim market share in this segment,

x

Newspaper B considers product differentiation as competitive strategy. Using its government subsidy, it opts for both vertical differentiation, i.e. it invests into editorial content depth and competes on quality against the market leader in the same content segments, and horizontal differentiation whereby it reports news with a political bias opposed to that of its rival (Gabszewicz et al. 2005),

x

Consumers prefer to read the paper with the higher level of quality.

In this game, I also propose that Newspaper B is the game opener. It is thus a sequential game. Newspaper B takes the first step and decides for a strategy of editorial quality differentiation {High quality}. This strategy is indicated with a higher sales cover price of its own outlet than that of its competitor. Alternatively, it may position itself at the far-side of the editorial quality market and decide for a {Low quality} strategy indicated by a low-price sales offer for its paper.

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Now, the solution to this quality game can be shown on the following Matrix 2. Matrix 2 – Newspaper Quality Game Payoff Matrix Newspaper B (Subsidized) {high quality}

{low quality}

Nash equilibrium

{high quality}

-50, -50

200, 100

100, 200

0, 0

Newspaper A {low quality}

Here, Newspaper B faces a difficult situation when having to decide on an optimal product distance. First, as differences in quality are accompanied by differences in price, given Newspaper A’s price and thus quality level to trigger a corresponding demand for its product, the further away in quality Newspaper B moves from Newspaper A, the more likely it is that readers will stick to the market leader’s product. Following a standard Hotelling-type framework and adapting it to model a non-cooperative locational game between two regional newspapers (Hotelling 1929), the smaller government-subsidized Newspaper B has got the following options: It could offset Newspaper A’s first-mover advantage by offering a slightly higher product quality which would, all else equal, be indicated by a price premium. The purpose of this exercise would be to steal readers and thus market share from its closest rival {i.e. A’s low quality, B’s high quality-strategy set}. This would end up in retaliatory measure by the market leader as a result of which both newspapers would end up in a loss (as shown by the negative payoff values above, a move from the lower left box to the upper left box, which is indicated by the dotted line). Equally, Newspaper B could directly attack Newspaper A by positioning itself as closely to Newspaper A as possible by delivering a horizontally (i.e. alternative political stance) and/or vertically (i.e. more accurate news) differentiated substitute product which would also be signaled by a higher price. Likewise, the strategic goal of this move would be to outperform its closest rival. This move would result in the same negative payoffs for both players. The Nash equilibrium shown is the solution for this game. There, the newspaper with a slightly higher journalistic quality in combination with a higher cover price will get higher sales figures, while the challenger is better off in offering a slightly lower quality in order to remain profitable and not to trigger retaliatory responses by the market leader. Again, what does this solution mean for subsidy governance? The situation is quite dilemmatic. When subsidies are given out to the market challenger in order to improve its content quality with a view to improving its market position against the leader, the only opportunity of the weaker paper is to offer a price inferior to that the market leader in order to remain profitable. But as consumers may miss information other than the price as quality indicator and may thus be confused about on the small rivals actual quality offered (Zeithamel 1988), the subsidized Newspaper B is forced to master this price-quality gap by offering a 101

relatively lower price at a distinctively better quality. In order for the subsidy to have a positive market effect, the beneficiary will need to know more about the price elasticity of demand for its product in order to find out how relative price changes would affect demand. Alternatively, it could only cheat, for example as part of a marketing and branding campaign, and pretend to offer a high-quality product while, in fact, it would offer a lower-quality newspaper, banking in on cost-reducing measures in order to improve its payoff.46 Identifying indicators for measurement A further exiting issue refers to identifying indicators for measuring the effects of newspapers to be subsidized (Jung 2003). This, again, is not a pedestrian question. Technically, in order to be eligible for state funding, quality criteria, for example, must be identified which can be measured over time without any bigger data acquisition problem. But while the direct measurement of product-related quality criteria such as objectivity (accuracy, truth, separation of news and opinion, etc.) or timeliness is a high-effort and time-consuming exercise, indirect indicators for quality may prove less demanding but are yet more intuitive. Hence, the usage of the following quality indicators seems advisable: x

Number of editors compared to the volume of editorial pages,

x

Level of education and job experience of full-time editors and free lancers,

x

Level of editorial budget in relation to the total budget,

x

Number of subscribed news agencies and in-house correspondents,

x

Prizes and awards granted to journalists, and

x

Expert evaluations to set up minimum quality standards as benchmark.

Another index is newspaper readership or reach as benchmark against which the effects of subsidies to newspapers can be measured. Arguably, newspaper demand is higher to lower priced newspapers so nations that give higher subsidies to their newspapers experience higher demand, all other things being equal, than nations that give small subsidies. Let us state an example: In Denmark, public press subsidies amount to EUR 54 million a year. With its 5.5 million inhabitants, the state thus subsidizes a Dane with 9.8 EUR per head. Austria, in comparison, would only show a subsidy per head figure of 1.3. Another difficulty that must be dealt with when balancing the positive and negative impact of subsidy measures is that the analysis of market failure to warrant intervention is mainly a prospective one. As such, the objective of ex-ante regulation would be first to identify which market failure needed correction. Alternatively, or in addition, ex-post assessment mechanisms may also be put in place in order to limit the negative impact of state aid and subsidies (OECD 2010a). Finally, this combination of instruments of state subsidies to the press and the principles of intervention applied has various effects on the business operations of newspapers themselves.

46 On the upside, incomplete information about vertical quality signalled via price would soften price competition (Daughety & Reinganum 2008).

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When subsidies relax cost pressures on printing and distribution of physical copies, for example, their effects are relative to the cost structure of the respective beneficiary. In France, for example, a report (the so-called ‘Cardoso plan’) on reforming public government support to the press found out that – by comparison – the left daily Libération would benefit from a mere €0.09 from direct aid per copy on its sales cover price, while France Soir, a French daily newspaper that prospered during the 1950s and 1960s but went online-only on December 14, 2011, would receive a share of €0.52 per copy out of the public hand, still failing to survive its printed editions. Obviously, different cost structures can reduce the efficacy of subsidies to zero (Truffy 2011). To my knowledge, little theoretical reasoning has been applied to study the impacts of government subsidies on the editorial work of journalism within a media economics or communication studies research domain. However, one may import organizational theories as conceptual frameworks in order to explain issues of internal market failure as diagnosis tool for firm inefficiency (Vining 2003). This may validly widen the canvas of media economics research towards the effects of subsidies as tools of intra-organizational incentives for journalists to achieve higher firm efficiency and improved organizational performance. Alas, the literature has yet to treat such questions more systematically. 2

State Aid as Antidote to Market Failure?

From the neoclassical economics perspective, government intervention in private markets is justified to enforce property rights, correct market failures, reign in the market power of monopolies, or address inequity by redistributing resources. Standard examples of interventions motivated by market failures include the use of taxes and subsidies to correct externalities, to organize the provision of public goods, or to redistribute resources in order to improve welfare. Market failure can be defined by multiple institutional weaknesses to coordinate economic activities efficiently and equitably. Markets may fail when competition cannot unfold or is organized deficiently. 47 Market failure describes situations where economic efficiency is greatly constrained (i.e., market imperfection or partial market failure) or is not being provided by the market at all (i.e., pure market failure) (Murschetz 2008). Market failure can be defined by multiple institutional weaknesses to coordinate economic activities efficiently and equitably. It may reside in: x

Product and cost characteristics of media goods, e.g., lack of property rights, public and merit goods, high first-copy costs, high costs of production, distribution and marketing),

x

Forces towards imperfect competition which may themselves have supply or demand-side origins, such as market power achieved through monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure (Robinson 1933, Chamberlin 1956, Rosse 1967) or a low price elasticity of consumer demand for newspapers (Blair & Romano 1993),

x

Constraints embedded in the organizational structures of markets which become manifest in high barriers to entry by means of economies of scale and brand loyalty)

47 In economic theory, the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics describes an idealized system of equilibrium conditions to efficiently coordinate economic activity (Pareto 1971/1927). Markets that do not achieve this Pareto-optimality are said to result in market failure.

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(Bain 1956, Baumol & Willig 1981, Demsetz 1982, Heinrich 1984, Stigler 1968, Weizsäcker 1980), x

The existence of externalities; Pigou 1932/1920) and transaction costs (Coase 1960, Williamson 1979), and

x

Media customer-side specifics (e.g., asymmetric information; Akerlof 1970, intransitive preferences; Tversky 1969, irrational behaviour; Kahnemann 2003).48

Additionally, dominant firms may raise market entry barriers or try to control successive value stages under their single roofs through means of ownership concentration and vertical integration. This gives rise to costs to the economy and society at large (Bator 1958, Cowen 1988, Cowen & Crampton 2002). From a publishers’ point of view this means that if firms are not rewarded for making the right decisions, or are rewarded for making the wrong decisions, then resources are used inefficiently. This gives rise to costs to the economy and society. Subsidies are possible regulatory tools that may correct market failure and work as one-way financial transfer payments that are payments of income which are not redeemed by any current factor services from the beneficiary. Although a number of other industries have been quiet victims of cyclical and structural industry changes, newspapers are a special case. Since the industry exhibits increasing returns to scale, high fixed and sunk costs, and significant economies of scope, setting prices equal to marginal cost will generally not recoup sufficient revenue to cover the fixed costs. And the standard economic recommendation to set prices at marginal cost will fail to cover total costs, thus requiring a subsidy, albeit not necessarily from the public purse (Ludwig 2000). However, with the news industry struggling to find new revenue streams that can reshape their broken business model, the industry’s future seems to be predominantly defined by experiments in news media monetization by the industry players themselves. As such, pricing and output decisions are accompanied by strategies of product and business model innovation. In any case, government cash subsidies are linked to prices in that they act as deficiency payments for producers to deliberately regulate for the differences between a sales price of a good or service and the actual price received for it in the market. Economic theory shows the effect of a subsidy on the sales price and quantity demanded. Following the law of supply and demand, subsidies are external benefits that lower the cost of production and shift the supply curve (S1-curve, pre-subsidy) vertically downwards by the amount of subsidy provided (S2-curve, post-subsidy). The vertical shift to the right is equal to the subsidy being given by unit. Consequently, a subsidy may lead to an increase in producer revenue as the post-subsidy price is lower than the pre-subsidy equilibrium price and more units of quantity are sold at each price. The following Figure 1 illustrates the potential effects of a newspaper subsidy on the equilibrium market price and quantity demanded.

48 Pigou has been called the father of the market failure paradigm. Indeed, he argued that “in any industry, where there is reason to believe that the free play of self-interest will cause an amount of resources to be invested different from the amount that is required in the best interests of the national dividend, there is a prima facie case for public intervention” (1932, p. 331). He suggested that taxes could be used when external diseconomies are present, and that the existence of external economies would warrant the use of subsidies.

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Figure 1 - The Effect of a Newspaper Subsidy Pre-subsidy Supply

Price

2.00

1.50

Amount of subsidy per Post-subsidy Supply Demand

1.00 The effect of the subsidy is to reduce prices and increase the quantity demanded – but at the cost of DWL

100 Source: The Author

150 Quantity demanded (circulation sold per day)

Total Costs of subsidies

Deadweight loss

In our example, we can see that with no subsidy newspaper publishers produce for 100 copies per day (in 1,000) at a sales cover price of €1.50 a copy. A government subsidy of 1.00 (in €) per copy would shift the supply curve rightward from the pre-subsidy supply curve S1 to postsubsidy supply curve S2. The equilibrium quantity increases to 150 (in 1,000) copies sold a day, the price falls to €1.00 per copy, and the price plus the subsidy received by publishers rises to €2.00 per copy. The entire subsidy does not fully get passed on to the consumer as the publisher will keep some of it. This creates deadweight loss (DWL) from a subsidy, a measure of the welfare that is lost when the equilibrium in a market is not market-made but governmentsupported. Consequently, the magnitude of this loss is dependent on the size of the government subsidy. In other words, the higher the subsidy given, the larger the DWL, and the bigger the market failure or inefficiency caused by the subsidy. Graphically, DWL is represented by the shaded triangle in Figure 1. In other words, government has to trade-off between a welfare loss to society of that money – in the new equilibrium, marginal social cost (on the supply curve) exceeds marginal social benefit (on the demand curve, which results in inefficient overproduction) – and the benefit the subsidy provides to readers (as the subsidy has reduced the sales cover price per copy).

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Of course, the impact of subsidies on readers will depend on the price elasticity of demand. Price elasticity of demand (PED) shows the relationship between price and quantity demanded and provides a precise calculation of the effect of a change in price on quantity demanded.49 There are several reasons why consumers may respond elastically or in-elastically to a price change, including: x

The number and ‘closeness’ of substitutes which means that a unique and desirable product is likely to exhibit an inelastic demand with respect to price;

x

The degree of necessity of the good (i.e. newspapers are no necessity like bread and will thus be demanded elastically with respect to price);

x

Whether the good is habit forming whereby consumers are relatively insensitive to changes in the price of habitually demanded products (e.g. subscribed newspaper);

x

The proportion of consumer income which is spent on the good (which means that the PED for a daily newspaper is likely to be much lower than that for a new car),

x

Whether consumers are loyal to the brand (brand loyalty reduces sensitivity to price changes and reduces PED), and

x

The life cycle of a product (e.g. when new products are launched, there are often very few competitors and PED is relatively inelastic. As other firms launch similar products, the wider choice increases PED. Finally, as a product begins to decline in its lifecycle, consumers can become very responsive to price, hence discounting is extremely common.

What does this imply for government subsidies? In effect, this would mean that a subsidy-driven decrease in the sales price of a newspaper will lead to a proportionate change in the quantity sold. Importantly, when newspapers show a low PED, the subsidy effect in increasing newspaper circulation and readership will not be too strong as the quantity demanded is relatively inelastic. This must be considered as a strong point against stimulating competition through subsidies in specific segments of a news market, particularly when print readers face a lack of substitute news sources (e.g., online news). When government identifies newspaper reading as an activity that carries positive consumption externalities, i.e. readers receive pleasure, get educated and take part in public affairs etc., all for no extra costs to them, government may want to internalize these externalities by subsidizing the publishing activities that have this positive externality. Still, the state may intervene in order to offset information deficits of newspaper readers who cannot evaluate the differences in the quality of information in order to provide all citizens with the same quality of information and opinion. With publishers tending to trade inferior information as quality and readers only aware of average qualities, an asymmetry in available information for quality newspapers may develop, with the effects of finally ceasing trade and

49 A PED is easily calculated. For example, if the price of a daily newspaper increases from €1.00 to €1.20, and the daily sales fall from 500,000 to 250,000, the PED will be: - 50% + 20% = (-) 2.5. The negative sign indicates that P and Q are inversely related, which we would expect for most price/demand relationships. This is significant because the newspaper supplier can calculate or estimate how revenue will be affected by the change in price. In this case, revenue at £1.00 is £500,000 (£1 x 500,000) but falls to £300,000 after the price rise (£1.20 x 250,000).

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driving quality newspapers out of the market.50 In these circumstances, the state can act to even out the quality uncertainty in the market either by reducing the incentive for the publisher to oversupply low quality or the reader to under-demand high quality newspapers. Building intervention on the differences in quality of information is, however, difficult because the regulator itself may find it difficult to access information other than prices whereby quality can be conveyed in economic systems.51 In real terms, however, subsidies to newspapers are controversial in themselves. Robert Picard, media economist and director of research at the Reuters institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford, argued that the ability of public subsidies to solve current pressures in print media is limited (Picard 2006, Picard 2007). Picard’s subsidy-failure hypothesis is built on the following propositions: x

Subsidies do not avoid the fundamental economic problem of market failure in the print media industries,

x

The number of newspapers has continued to decline as the state aid pays for variable costs rather than fixed costs, the latter of which weigh heavy on publishers’ business operations,

x

Public intervention into press markets is generally bad as ‘free markets’ work more efficiently. Intervention leads to net welfare losses to society,

x

Subsidies to newspapers for which there is a lack of audience interest are futile. These subsidies are a waste of taxpayers’ money, i.e. cost to taxpayers exceeds benefit to consumers and producers,

x

Although subsidies help newspapers to survive by means of a financial prop they do little to help newspapers adapt to future changes needed to get them suited to the needs of the market. The lifeboat of subsidies can thus be leaky at best,

x

Selective subsidies are considered to be politically unacceptable as far as they require consent across opposing political forces backed up by a solid and impartial method of selecting companies and channeling the money to the papers, and

x

Subsidies cannot create long-term sustainability but instead create dependence on the annual handout of subsidies.

Arguably, another bigger problem seems to be that when print media publishers receive subsidies they may not necessarily be ‘passed through’ to the end consumer, i.e. have a lowering effect on the sales price of the newspaper. Although this assumption may not always hold, and pass-through may be a matter of degree, it is conceivable that at least part of a subsidy is put to entirely different uses. And, worse yet, when the industry is experiencing an economic crisis and legacy newspapers have to see a painful and ongoing decline in advertising revenues, publishers are forced to react strategically by driving up their cover prices and thus sales revenues. This move, in turn, will effectively thwart the potential price-lowering effect of a subsidy. 50 If, on the information readily available to them, readers can discriminate between prices but are not able to discover quality and thus will not rationally price trade off against quality, publishers with high-quality newspapers will be driven out of the market, and there will be a general lowering of standards (Akerlof 1970). 51 Such means are, for example ‘signaling’, whereby information is distributed by sellers to buyers by way of quality monitoring systems, whereas ‘screening’ refers to the buyers acquiring information by the help of consumer protection groups. The aim is identical: removing the asymmetry in information.

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Overall, when coming back to the big issue whether public subsidy payments can ban the spectre of market failure or give in to agency capture and government failure is highly contested. Naturally, discussions about market failure reflect disputes among scholars of different schools of economic thought, notably between doctrinaire positions of the ‘freemarket school’ versus the market-interventionist axis of scholarly reasoning. As it stands, the academic debate about the paradigm of market failure is complex and rather confusing. It originates from the paradigm’s hybrid intellectual architecture and results in competing scholarly discourses. Here, two dominant schools fight for scholarly hegemony: On the one hand, the Harvard-MIT-axis of scholarly reasoning in economic theory argues that in case of market failure government is to intervene in the economy to correct for those and to restore the conditions for welfare optimization (Samuelson 1954, Musgrave 1959, Musgrave & Peacock 1958).52 Counter-arguments on that way of thinking come from the neo-classical ‘Chicago school’ of economic thought (Reder 1982, Stigler 1988).53 Their fundamental tenet is that competition within a perfect market will lead to efficiency, which is the desirable normative goal of the legal system. According to the Chicago analysis, intervention within the market is justified only when there is a market failure. For them, such failure exists when there are no multiple players on both sides of the market (the problem of monopoly), when these players do not have symmetric and full information relevant to their market activities, when any of the players bypass the market through involuntary actions or when the traded commodity is a public good. The general orientation of the Chicago school of economics, however, is that these circumstances are rare and that in the real world there is too much central intervention. Media markets would thus have strong tendencies towards failure. Now, these are opposing schools of thought. But is their explanatory power still strong enough today?

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Beitrag 5: State Support for the Press

Origially published in: Murschetz, P. C. (1998). State Support for the Press: A Critical Appraisal – Austria, France, Norway and Sweden Compared. European Journal of Communication, 1(3), 291-313. Abstract This article compares the subsidy schemes of the daily press in Austria, France, Norway and Sweden. In those countries, financial subsidy schemes to daily newspapers seek to balance the objective of promoting economic competitiveness in the national media grid with the wider objective of securing plurality of titles and diversity of views. This article locates financial subsidies within a broader framework of press regulation, looks into the instruments of public press intervention in the four countries and critically examines the results to safeguard economic competition and press diversity. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon minimalist approach to press regulation which rejects the interventionist approach to providing cash injections to newspapers in need, the continental-style authorities in Austria, France, Norway and Sweden adhere to a public policy of granting subsidies to their press, according to which the democratic and political function — namely to guarantee that citizens have access to information, are accurately informed and actively take part in the political process — is promoted. However, public austerity programmes, increased commercial competition, shifting audience tastes of newspaper readers and the inherent weaknesses of the current instruments have forced all four countries to rethink their subsidy schemes. This article argues that government policies that aim at engendering economic opportunity and prosperity of daily newspapers, editorial pluralism and diversity of opinion need to respond adequately and effectively to these pressures of changing market conditions, which not only endanger the normal functioning of the press market but also a public service culture of newspapers.

Introduction Since the 1950s most Western European nations have taken regulatory action in order to preserve freedom of information, which the market has arguably failed to provide. A progressive interventionism has taken place to prevent newspapers from dying, to support economically weaker newspapers commercially disadvantaged in the advertising market, to mitigate trends of economic concentration and concentration of ownership and, as a consequence, to sustain press diversity.1 Public intervention in press economics takes place against the background of constitutional guarantees for press freedom within most liberal democracies of Western Europe, according to which freedom of opinion is protected and an individual's right to publish and disseminate information freely without prior restraint through any state authority is safeguarded. In the absence of this constitutional guarantee of press freedom, the UK proves the most skilful in playing a regulatory system of official nonintervention into the press, so rejecting the interventionist approach to sustaining press diversity by subsidies.2 In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon minimalist approach to press regulation, which depends on general competition law and the publishers' voluntary adherence to ethical standards under the supervision of an independent watchdog commission, the continental-style authorities in Austria, France, Norway and Sweden have opted for far more interventionist public policies 115

into press economics, in the belief that this is the best way to safeguard plurality of titles and diversity of opinion.3 However today, significant changes have intensified pressure on the principles and practicalities of their interventionist schemes and endanger the secure funding necessary to ensure high quality press output. On the one hand, business parameters in which newspapers operate have greatly changed. Against a background of competition from free advertising sheets, direct mail and advertising in new electronic media squeezing the revenues of daily newspapers and changes in individual consumption decisions due to the diversification of news supply, daily newspapers are forced to reassess their roles, their specificities, and to redefine their objectives in order to become more competitive. On the other hand, mechanisms of intervention to provide economic support and journalistic diversity are currently undergoing changes in various countries. While interventionist measures such as direct cash payments to selected newspapers or general incentives such as reduced postal rates or VAT rates on printed matter still play a vital role in providing conditions conducive to economic stability of the industry and* importantly, promote a public interest culture in the press, their efficacy is being reviewed in order to reduce their costs. As a result, Western European regulators of the daily press are navigating among the contradictions of general expenditure-cutting public austerity budgets to act as a brake on continuing cash subsidies, anti-trust laws and proactive interventionist schemes. This article provides the opportunity to report on research findings from analyses of how state press subsidy schemes operate in Austria, France, Norway and Sweden. The main objective of this article is twofold: first, to describe the schemes according to the regulatory frameworks provided and, second, to evaluate the efficacy of the major instruments across the countries against the background of intensified competition for readers and advertisers. Political efforts to adapt to the new market parameters of commercial competition lie at the heart of current changes of the state subsidy schemes to the daily press in all four countries. The analysis and evaluation of these efforts are thus a central focus of interest as well. This article is based on a combination of two methods: first, analysis of documents, and, second, interviews with newspaper industry representatives and other key informants in the countries surveyed, conducted in Austria, Norway and Sweden in December 1995, January and May 1996, and in France and the Netherlands in January 1997. The main reasons for selecting Austria, France, Norway and Sweden for analysis of press subsidies are evident: all four countries have extensive interventionist schemes and promote their daily press through direct selective cash subsidies in order to strengthen their national daily newspapers.

Current subsidy schemes: direct and indirect support From an analytical standpoint, government support is provided to different categories of newspapers eligible for support, ranging from providing reasonable framework conditions through public regulation of advertising, sales tax advantages, postal rate advantages and telecommunication rate advantages, to indirect forms of support such as news agency aid, preferential loans and education/research grants to annual, non-refundable direct cash transfers running into millions. When used with specificity, subsidies mean actual cash injections in accordance with selection criteria of size measured by circulation, competitive position in defined markets, frequency of publication or disadvantaged financial position on the advertising market and soft criteria such as the newspaper's national importance for the opinion formation of the reading public. If the creation of newspaper competition is politically approved — and market imperfections are not, in themselves, a sufficient condition for concluding that financial 116

support is warranted — regulators face the obvious choice of publicly financed subsidy approaches, either through direct cash injections, indirect cash advantages, anti-trust policies as means of regulatory state action, or, most likely, a combination of these.4 Generally, press subsidies aim at strengthening the economies of newspapers in order to counteract current negative industry trends in advertising and circulation.3 As newspapers are not only sold to readers but also sell space to advertisers, the uneven distribution of income from advertising between dominant market leaders, which disproportionately attract more advertising due to their higher market penetration, and trailing newspapers is thought to be best mitigated by corrective state subsidies. First, direct selective subsidies may be granted to new market entrants in order to lower entry barriers, restore competition and reinforce the market system. In order to preserve structural multiplicity and editorial diversity Sweden, for example, introduced direct launching support in 1976/7 which benefited so-called 'low-periodicity' (one to three issues per week) newspapers, as well as some high coverage monopoly papers, but, for reasons of lack of success, withdrew this policy option in 1987.6 Second, in the two Nordic countries surveyed (Norway and Sweden), as well as in Austria and France, direct selective government subsidies are provided to secondary dailies which are losing out in the commercial contest for advertising. In these countries the purpose of this part of the scheme is seen as helping second position newspapers improve their market position, thus reducing the risk of local monopolies. In 1969, Norway introduced one of the first instances of European legislation which included direct subsidies to the press of this kind, Sweden followed in 1972. In both countries, direct production subsidies are calculated on the basis of circulation or level of advertising revenue and emphasize the competitive situation of the newspaper. In Norway, (in 1995) the total value of this direct form of state support was about 203 million Norwegian kroner (NOK) (£16.46 million; Euro 24.81 million) and benefited 10 regional titles of so-called ‘high-frequency No. 2 papers’, that is secondary ‘dailies’ issued six times a week (38 percent of total production subsidies, total circulation of beneficiaries: 140,000), five national daily newspapers granted more than 40 percent (total circulation of benefiting newspapers: 116,500) and 98 small low frequency newspapers, issued one to five times a week (total circulation of beneficiaries: 325,400). The main objective of direct selective press subsidies is to secure the existence of secondary papers in the small local communities. In Sweden in 1994/5, direct operating grants amounted to a considerable 411.4 million Swedish krona (SEK) (£31.31 million; Euro 47.19 million) and were granted to a broad range of socalled ‘daily’ newspapers, differing in market position, size and frequency of publication. Of 167 ‘daily’ newspapers in 1995, 77 received more than 84 percent of total financial support in the form of direct operating subsidies (total circulation of beneficiaries: 881,500). Beneficiaries were regional newspapers, so-called ‘big-city newspapers’ (like the conservative quality broadsheet Svenska Dagbladet or the largest Social Democratic morning newspaper in Malmo, Arbetet, and special national newspapers of religious and cultural importance, e.g. the Christian Dagen). In Austria, where a direct subsidy scheme was introduced in 1975, general subsidies which operate across all newspapers — a unique feature in Europe — are calculated on the basis of the value added tax of the previous fiscal year. All 15 daily newspapers received this financial support in 1995 and the value of this concession was about 70 million Austrian schilling (ATS) (£3.35 million; Euro 5 million). On top of that, Austria introduced a direct and selective financial subsidy in 1985, the so-called ‘special subsidy for the maintenance of variety’, granted to secondary daily newspapers in the market with a maximum reach of 15 percent of the regional or 5 percent of the national population, and if more than 22 percent of its yearly volume of pages accounts for advertising. Since 1985, every daily newspaper which is granted a general 117

subsidy receives a basic amount of the subsidies available, and, if conditions are met, an additional amount dependent on the two economic criteria of circulation and advertising volume. In 1995, seven broadsheets and political newspapers received a total amount of almost ATS 173 million (£8.28 million; Euro 12.36 million; total penetration of receiving dailies: 990,000 of 5,010,000 readers overall). In France, direct selective financial assistance is less prominent than indirect help. However, national daily newspapers with low advertising resources receive direct cash subsidies from the government. Reserved for national daily publications of general and political interest, with selection thresholds set for print run, sales and advertising space, these state handouts aim at vitalizing the ‘national’, effectively the Parisian, market for newspapers of political information with low advertising income in order to safeguard the weakest players which had been negatively affected by the economic crisis of the daily press.7 Granted on an annual ad hoc basis since 1972, the value of this special subsidy was 12.9 million French francs (FF) in 1995 (£1.29 million; Euro 1.95 million), not even 5 percent of total subsidies, benefiting only three opinion dailies of national importance but low circulation (total circulation of recipients: 167,500, only 6 percent of all ‘national’ dailies). Similarly, an assistance fund for daily provincial (regional and local) general and political interest newspapers with low revenues from classified advertisements was introduced in 1989, endowed with FF 5.38 million (£0.54 million; Euro 0.81 million), supporting nine small regional dailies. Apart from direct cash transfers to cover operating expenses, other forms of direct financial subsidies include support for cooperation in distribution and printing, government loans on preferential terms and government insertions — if they are explicitly declared to be press subsidies by the authorities — grants for press research and education, and grants for press exports. In Sweden and Norway, the direct distribution subsidy represents an important part of both subsidy schemes and was introduced as early as 1970 and 1978, respectively. The aim was to counteract the competitive advantages of market leaders, with large-scale distribution, and at the same time to compensate them for the extra costs of joint delivery with the secondary title. In Sweden, for example, joint distribution subsidies are granted to leading and secondary newspapers according to circulation; fees for taking part are charged according to the weight of the paper. Secondary, low circulation newspapers are thereby advantaged as they receive more and pay less than their stronger rivals. Sweden spent SEK 73 million (£5.55 million; Euro 8.37 million) on joint distribution in 1995. The collapse of the distribution subsidy scheme in Norway in 1994, however, draws attention to the limits of cooperative programmes, in that the voluntary joint agreement is highly dependent on the good will of the participating dominant player and might falter when too costly. Here, regulators might choose compulsory contracting of both partners as a remedial measure. In any event, private distribution services which are organized group by group and take place outside the postal service are regarded as a growing phenomenon and might lead regulators to abdicate their responsibility for the shortcomings of this aspect of the market. Many governments give financial support for training of journalists and research on the press, the aim of which is to achieve economic via editorial improvement. Norway, for example, offers financial support to the Norwegian Institute of Journalism, setting aside sums for scholarships, post-training courses and research scholarships for journalists as well as a number of other research and education projects of benefit to technical and managerial staff. The value of this aid was NOK 17.6 million (£1.42 million; Euro 2.15 million) in 1995. Austria also provides grants for institutions training journalists, worth around ATS 9 million (£0.43 million; Euro 0.64 million). In contrast, France has recently withdrawn income tax allowances for journalists of 30 percent of their first FF 50,000 (£5030; Euro 7572), a surprising move considering that internal plurality of opinion has become the focus of interest in countries like France where the 118

low number of daily newspapers is a structural threat to diversity.8 In this respect, strengthening the economic position of newspapers through state aid would mean that subsidies are only provided to those companies which guarantee the editorial independence of their journalists through statutory agreements between owners or publishers and employed journalists (as with the Redaktionsstatuten adopted by most daily newspapers in Austria). Another very specific form of assistance in Norway targets selective subsidies at socalled 'specific publications' representing social or political interest groups, such as weeklies of parliamentary parties, newspapers for people with reading disabilities, newspapers serving immigrant communities and published in their languages, and weekly opinion newspapers directed at the Saami minority of indigenous people which publish in the Saami language. The value of these concessions was NOK 31.9 million (£2.58 million; Euro 3.89 million) in 1995. A relatively lower grant is also paid to press agencies which operate in Norway and to the distribution of newspapers in the northernmost province of Finnmark (Skogerb0, 1997). Indirect subsidies imply the promotion of a more favourable economic environment by way of tax concessions and discounts on various types of tariffs. Most European countries give some concessions on VAT to their newspaper industry. Similarly, reduced tariffs for newspapers delivered by post are enjoyed by the press in many countries. Transportation concessions are rarer and take the form of reduced rates for the carriage of newspapers by rail or airline. More importantly, telecommunications support to newspapers is reasonably popular in Europe, and ranges from reductions on telephone charges to a reduction of subscription fees to news services. In France, for example, financial support is given both to the country's dominant player in the field of telecommunications, France Télécom, reimbursing it for reduced tariffs granted to newspapers, and to the French national rail operator, SNCF, for carrying newspapers. These concessions amounted to FF 208.8 million in 1995 (£21 million; Euro 31.62 million). In Austria and France, there are also special rates for postal newspaper delivery. As poor sales often reflect poor distribution, these indirect subsidies, awarded by criteria of circulation and weight, are regarded as important means of promoting readership. In France, this preferential treatment cost the huge sum of FF 3.341 million (£336.17 million; Euro 505.98 million). Furthermore, lower import duties are another form of indirect support and are on occasion levied on the import of newsprint. Here, France has granted temporary, one-off exceptional aid packages in order to mitigate meteoric price hikes in newsprint, particularly affecting daily newspapers with high levels of circulation. On top of that, government advertising in the daily press represents another important form of indirect support to newspapers. Newspapers in all four countries surveyed are said to have benefited from this more or less hidden support. In Norway, for example, weekly advertisements of vacancies in the civil service are published in every Norwegian daily newspaper (Skogerb0, 1997: 105). Traditionally, the republic of Austria advertises exclusively in the supplement of its state-owned Wiener Zeitung, the so-called official Amtsblatt, effectively barring competing papers from market entry. Tax relief on the sales revenues of daily newspapers introduced for the purpose of maintaining high levels of consumption appears important in all four countries under study but becomes less so when account is taken of the fact that it is financed by a special press advertising tax, a considerable hardship for newspapers and the advertising industry. In Sweden, the 4 percent advertising tax on the press greatly overfinances subsidization, raising some estimated SEK 1 billion (£76.18 million; Euro 114.70 million) annually, while the state spent less than half of that on subsidies in 1995/6. Additionally, a VAT on reading of 6 percent, imposed on daily newspapers' sales revenues by a Supplementary Budget Bill in 1995/6 could mean that low-income groups who want access to detailed public information will find it increasingly difficult to afford newspaper reading, a negative tendency not taken into 119

consideration by the Swedish regulators. In Austria, regional and local authorities benefit from advertising taxes imposed on newspapers alongside VAT on sales and advertising revenues, resulting in drastically high advertising rates by international standards. Given this milieu, critics have argued that subsidies financed by tax payers’ money should give way to a selffinancing model of proportionally levying the yearly advertising volume of a title and so presenting the bill directly to the advertising industry (Gewerkschaft Kunst, Medien und freie Berufe, 1995: 7). As noted above, to reduce the distribution costs of newspapers, Austria and France provide state subsidies which take the form of tariff reductions for newspapers delivered by their national post offices. Driven by regulation put forward by the European Commission aimed at guaranteeing the provision of a universal service, while opening up Europe's postal cartels to competition, Austrian and French regulators are now forced to review state support for the postal distribution of their newspapers. While larger dominant newspapers still receive the benefits of postal rate discounts in both countries, their financial resources are preserved and their costs of doing business reduced even further. The Austrian regulators have to this day failed to explain how they intend to mitigate the market dominance of Mediaprint in the early morning door-to-door delivery, with postal delivery tariffs set to increase, so disadvantaging those papers which Mediaprint refuses to deliver jointly. As for the French situation, it would be desirable to look for ways to support financially weaker competitors highly dependent on postal delivery rather than generally supporting the greatest possible number of newspapers. Technically speaking, changing the existing scheme would necessitate the introduction of reduced tariffs on the basis of combined criteria for weight and frequency of publications with content criteria (e.g. by charging a lower rate for the editorial element as opposed to a standard rate for the advertising element), elements of compensation (e.g. for the preparation of delivery) and time of delivery (Geretschlàger and Leinschitz, 1994: 639-41).9 While sticking to its objective of nondiscrimination of beneficiaries, France adopted some of these new criteria when it recently changed its regime of distribution subsidies (Lambert, 1996-7). Alternatively, direct and indirect costs (loss of actuality) of distribution may also be mitigated by state support for investment in satellite printing equipment as printing costs are optimized when papers are printed at the place of distribution. When interviewed, Joseph Vebret,10 editor-in-chief of the French quarterly media journal Médias-Pouvoirs, conceded that whereas satellite transmission to printing plants in the provinces has become a cost- and time-saving option for those national publications previously delivered by train, as, for example, the national opinion dailies Liberation and UHumanité reimbursements for preferential delivery to the national rail operator SNCF only seem to help Le Monde and Le Figaro, still relying on their traditional means of transport by train and airline to the provinces, an in-built bias of the scheme. French regulators might well be advised to review their policy of expansive reimbursements for preferential delivery by traditional means of transport. Subsidies and changing markets Daily newspapers do not only feel the squeeze of increasing competition for revenues and readers but also see their role as facilitators of social and political expression diminishing. Deeply entrenched in continental European and Scandinavian regulatory culture, the press in the four countries has developed in an interplay with the state, which has shouldered its responsibility to safeguard and promote the public service function of the press, i.e. to ensure every citizen has easy access to diversified information and to stimulate their participation in public debate in order to strengthen democracy. As a result, in all the countries studied, state aid is considered a politically expedient antidote to anti-democratic tendencies of the market. However similar state intervention into press economics in these countries may seem - all four 120

have or have had influential centre-left governments embarking on public policies of stability and succour of their press - it is important to take account of the differences in the historical developments of the subsidy schemes, the press tradition and institutional architecture of each country as well as the relationship between economic philosophy and democratic governance. Apart from these differences, each country does, as we have seen, of course reveal general trends of comparative interest. Pre-eminently, newspapers have to operate in the context of an increasingly commercialized market. Long shielded from market failure by generous government cash injections and other preferential legislation such as limitations on ownership concentration, the national newspaper industry is now forced into seeking new revenues by responding to the challenges of the market. Given current austerity programmes imposed on national budgets and the consequent brake on annual cash subsidies, publishers either counter limited revenue prospects with more market-oriented managerial strategies - trying to maintain profitability through cost-cutting measures, revitalizing circulation through relaunch - or are forced to sell to larger groups.11 This process of commercialization is most evident in France, where undercapitalized newspapers at the quality end of the market have established a satisfactory financial basis only by radical changes in their financial and legal structures, i.e. by turning to the market for funding.12 Despite some opportunities to modernize their businesses, a number of titles have lost in the commercial contest and have been forced to shut down.13 Government leverage by subsidies is a much cherished approach to halt the tide of newspaper closures, although British critics believe that they only defer rather than avert closure (Royal Commission, 1974-7). That dominant publishers cross national borders in order to look for an expansion of their interests comes as another reminder that newspaper markets are currently changing. But while the European Union still considers press subsidies very much as a national matter for its member states - although the European Commission is pressing for a harmonization of the national VAT regimes to be applied on the sales revenues of all members' newspapers - these transnational pressures conflict with the underlying rationale of the schemes, namely the protection of national newspapers from unfettered competition. Despite the rise of new sales-driven management philosophies, much of it driven by editorial populism, the state authorities in the countries under study continue to subsidize their press as a genuine cultural asset worthy of political protection. Nonetheless, cross-border media activities by its commonlanguage neighbour Germany have greatly changed the Austrian newspaper structure, as a result of which a debate about the objectives of the scheme has surfaced. However, where it would have been necessary to take firm and quick anti-trust measures to halt undesired foreign influence, the Austrian government has decided to stall any defensive action in order not to scare away potential foreign investors. This has caused many observers to doubt that financial subsidies alone are adequate to protect its cultural identity through safeguarding its press diversity.14 Until comparatively recently, restrictive regulation of commercial television allowed newspapers to develop favourably in all four countries. But as the dominant position of public service broadcasting has been eroded in the course of the 1980s, new advertising competitors have arrived on the scene forcing the newspapers to recognize that only more aggressive commercial policies will guarantee success. In this context, the Norwegian and Swedish experiences indicate the way in which inflexible newspapers can simply stand and watch their advertising clients being tempted away by buoyant commercial television. With private television in the pipeline in Austria, it remains to be seen how newspapers there will fare once the rigid system of checks and balances between the print media and the state broadcaster is changed. By contrast, the shake-down of the French newspaper industry caused by a drastic decline in advertising revenues at the beginning of the 1990s has been exacerbated by restrictive legislation on alcohol and tobacco advertising in the press.

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On. top of that, the latest decision of the country's regulatory authority in the broadcasting field, the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA), of July 1996 has made the state television channel TF1 an even more attractive choice for advertisers by allowing it to expand its advertising time (Lambert, 1996-7: 3). The competitive squeeze on newspapers by new electronic media may warrant further attention. Because free advertising sheets, direct mail and advertising in the electronic media may well change the economics of the newspaper business, newspaper groups themselves are starting to migrate into some of these developing fields in search of new ways to generate extra earning power. Given a continuing decline in newspaper sales on a global scale, smaller and secondary newspapers are not able to quickly come up with new marketing strategies to serve the desires of changing audiences and advertisers. For the time being, state subsidies are certainly a more stable source of income. However, regulators might wish to consider the opportunities in the new electronic media marketplace when announcing further aid packages. France has pushed forward policy activity, and has established a fund for investments into multimedia, a move that illustrates a necessary public policy response to changes in the marketplace. The fund was endowed with FF 20 million (£2.01 million; Euro 3.03 million) in 1996 (Lambert, 1996-7: 42-3). The politics of subsidy Although few serious observers would contend that the press is simply a tool of the government in power to distort the formation of public opinion in its favour, critical analyses of the historic foundation of the subsidy schemes have revealed that vested interests hidden behind politicians' appeals to the public interest may well have operated across the countries. In Austria, for example, the introduction of general subsidies to the daily press in 1975, ostensibly established to preserve and promote economic and journalistic competition between newspapers, is said to have silenced newspapers by means of tax payers' money.15 Similarly, the political role of the Swedish press system has been cited as a reason for the introduction of the Press Subsidies Act of 1971, allegedly aimed at promoting the plurality of views in the Swedish press. Since these subsidies were tailored to the needs of the newspapers of the then governing parties, the dailies of the Social Democratic Party and the weeklies of the junior coalition partner, the Centre Party, a misappropriation of democratic power for party political gain seems at least possible (Borden, 1995). Today, with readers deserting the party press, political legitimization of subsidies seems increasingly difficult if not fading. This issue eventually boils down to the question of whether to apply general or selective subsidies. While general subsidies go to all newspapers irrespective of their individual needs, selective subsidies, i.e. cash payments made to specific papers to help cover their costs, on the other hand, need consent across opposing political forces backed up by a solid and politically impartial method of selecting the companies needing help and channelling the money to the papers. Selective aid to newspapers explicitly supporting a political party is a specific case in point. As indicated above, the gap between party political interests, which still heavily determine the basis, goals and instruments of public intervention into the press, and readers who are still loyal to their party papers, is continually widening. Where circulation figures no longer reflect the levels of electoral support for the political parties they champion, subsidies may lack a legitimate basis. Conversely, party press subsidies are regarded as essential if the loss of a voice articulating a particular point of view is seen as impoverishing society as a whole. As a result, regulators may find it difficult to reconcile vague political rhetoric promoting pluralism and democratization with concrete political justification for subsidies and politically acceptable but objective criteria in favour of the dying party press. Sweden is cited as a shining example of a country which has a politically neutral allocation of subsidies to its press. Having established that advertising revenue plays the largest role in 122

newspaper economics, the principle of household coverage at the place of issue is taken as the most reliable measure of the strength of a market position. Thus, selective production grants are automatically given to newspapers having 40 percent or less of household coverage at their place of issue, and only to them (Gustafsson, 1991: 8). Although less stringent, Norway relies on similar instruments of granting selective production subsidies according to fixed rules on upper limits of circulation as well as market position, stressing the political and cultural information functions of a varied press in their small local communities.16 But while economic criteria to qualify for selective subsidies determine who will receive selective subsidies in these two Nordic countries, political factors seem more formidable and pervasive in Austria and France. Neither do general subsidies to the Austrian market leader in the tabloid newspaper market, the highly successful Neue Kronen Zeitung, divest it of a uniquely high degree of concentration of power. Nor do selective subsidies to more or less openly ideologically committed, strong supraregional broadsheets and weak party papers eliminate speculation about political bargaining. Although giving the three remaining party papers some breathing space in their struggle for survival, selective subsidies seem more to freeze the market power of the existing big regional dailies than to help spread views beyond regional borders, initiate new launches and cooperation in distribution and printing, or help improve the editorial quality of the papers under consideration. A drastic overhaul of the scheme thus seems inevitable and will pose intriguing questions for policymakers (Trappel, 1991; Grisold, 1996). The situation does not look much better for France. Here, it is not clear whether the measures taken have lived up to the objectives of the scheme, that is to safeguard the plurality of outlets and thus views, and to ease access to reading by providing a leaky lifeboat of subsidies alongside lenient anti-trust legislation. Instead of acting as an antidote to the negative effects of the market, critics argue, the French system of indirect subsidies has actually created anomalies, with an inherent bias favouring the already economically better-off newspapers, so harming competition and diversity.17 Given the economic cliffhanging situation of two national opinion dailies, the Communist LHumanité and the Catholic La Croix, critics argue that the government would do better to lift their financial burden rather than stretch its non-discriminatory, and therefore politically less controversial, scheme to breaking point.18 Subsidies — guardian of diversity? Few observers can imagine public press policies veering off in a wholly new direction, but the pressures of change from outside the schemes described above together with ongoing deficits have forced all four governments under study to consider reform. Still wary of unleashing drastic cuts in subsidies as part of a radical rethink, these governments send out mixed signals as to how to react adequately to criticisms and adapt to changing market conditions. Locked in a power struggle between the government and the newspaper business, regulators in Austria, France and even the Nordic countries of Norway and Sweden grapple with the need for change in the schemes. On the one hand, in a fit of neo-liberalism, they now shift general attention to cash-neutral policies, thus pinning hopes on effective anti-trust regulation, with rigid equity ownership rules being the winning formula needed to secure a diverse press landscape. On the other hand, subsidies are still considered a familiar answer in response to the heterogeneous problems of the newspaper industry, particularly high costs of production and distribution, accelerated concentration of ownership, a volatile advertising market and the disengagement of young readers. Austria, for example, tightened its cartel law in 1993 and introduced an obligatory control of mergers with special provisions for the media. Although the law does not set limits for media concentration, mergers must be declared to the cartel authorities, which can forbid a merger should it result in the creation or strengthening of a dominating market position or endanger media plurality. However, that the law lacks teeth became obvious when the 123

authorities pulled back from retroactive divestiture of titles, so leaving the power of the country's press empire, Mediaprint, unscathed. Subsidies have remained the main pillar of the country's quest for press diversity/France has embarked on a controversial two-pronged policy of regulation on press concentration which has allowed press giants to become considerably stronger in the domestic market. An elaborate subsidy scheme is still considered a vital contribution to the diversity of its press. Sweden, which has long prided itself on the success of its scheme, has opted for a national policy of intervening in the market by multi-million subsidies rather than by structural regulation, but has recently established a market-monitoring commission to look into ownership and press plurality. Yet it strongly sticks to a public policy of government support of its press by means of direct cash subsidies. The same holds true for Norway, where a government study called 'Pluralism in the Media' has put forward proposals for the regulation of media ownership against a background of continuing cash injections. Subsidies and the economics of the press Drawing attention to the effects of state subsidies into press economics as part of the overall regulatory mix, dissatisfaction over mounting macro-economic costs of the schemes seems to exceed benefits.19 Despite considerable amounts of tax payers' money pouring into the industry, economic concentration and 'homogenization' of editorial viewpoints remain widespread threats to a diverse press in all four countries. Declining circulation and readership, closures of small newspapers and single ownership of markets are incontestable indicators of this trend. But there is still plenty of room for a change for the better. First and foremost, too little commercial information on the daily press is available. Regulators have thus few instruments for the evaluation of the economic effects of subsidies. Particularly in Austria, information deficits regarding the efficacy of the schemes prevail, making it almost impossible to control the costs, and evaluate the benefits of subsidies (Holtz-Bacha, 1994). Some observers suggest that subsidies earmarked for specific projects would offer better budgetary control and cost planning for both the regulator and the regulated, while others consider this approach inappropriate as newspapers need to adapt to market changes on a day-today basis. In either case, stricter rules of transparency would undeniably improve access to information, thus making reviews of effectiveness and the coordination of different types of intervention more feasible. The economic effects of subsidies are best documented in the two Nordic countries, particularly in Sweden, where regulators can call on information collected by the Swedish Press Support Board, which is responsible for allotting the grants and has developed a database on newspapers receiving state support. There, small local newspapers in the countryside show the highest profitability due to their large presence in local advertising markets. 20 When interviewed, Karl Erik Gustafsson, Professor of Mass Media Economics at the University of Gothenburg, suggested that professional, cost-efficient management, a skilled staff and a much lower salary level for journalists are the key to the successful management of these small local papers.21 With circulation declining even in Scandinavia, national opinion-shaping newspapers seem less likely to squeeze more money from advertising and are thus considerably more dependent on state production subsidies. Apart from continually high costs for newsprint, collective bargaining agreements act as an impediment to higher flexibility of newspaper production. Publishers who try to maintain profitability through trimming of staff costs face rigid wage agreements with printers and editors. In Austria, for example, critics frequently take aim at collective agreements covering printers of daily newspapers in particular, who receive incomes a third higher than those employed on weekly newspapers. Furthermore, editors have negotiated controversial fringe benefits in the form of extraordinary increases in their salaries calculated according to their time with the company, so contributing to high editorial costs. 124

In general, regulatory changes would require a balancing act of finding more flexible incomes policies while not abdicating responsibility to safeguard high quality media output. Furthermore, as regards using subsidies most cost effectively, Robert G. Picard pointed out that state aid in most nations is directed primarily at the variable costs rather than the fixed costs of newspaper publishing. The most common aid, and the largest amount of aid, is given by means that affect variable costs. Fixed costs of newspapers, however, are the area in which much of the real financial difficulties of newspapers arise. (Picard, 1995: 143) Based on circulation, operational subsidies that are directed at the operating income of a firm by increasing revenue and/or decreasing expenses would therefore seem to be of limited benefit. The effectiveness of aid would be greatly multiplied and worth far more were subsidies applied after operating income is calculated rather than before, as in the case of tax reductions or interest reduction schemes. Low-interest loan funds to ease access to newspaper operations and tax reductions to lower the fixed costs of necessary investment in technical modernization and staffing are thus seen as more effective means of support. In this respect, subsidies granted to Austrian printing houses for the building of printing plants and premises as well as the purchase of new machines and technical equipment may be advocated as a policy option. However, they have turned out to be politically highly controversial with regard to their knock-on effect on who should receive how much money. Positive employment effects, the original objective of this part of the scheme, are unknown. Conclusion Newspaper regulation is underpinned by the state interventionist vs free market paradigm of the press, illustrating the deep-seated ambiguity ingrained in the role definition of the press in an advanced democratic society. What proponents of the state interventionist paradigm believe as inimical to a diverse press thought of as a public service, namely the inevitable need to turn a profit in a market-oriented environment, adherents of the free market paradigm call a necessary dependence on economic factors to improve efficiency of production and service to the public in changing markets. Whether real or imagined, regulators tend to slip between the horns of this dilemma when asked for policy action to ensure both economic vitality and editorial diversity of the daily press. On the one hand, the state authorities in Austria, France, Norway and Sweden continue to financially subsidize their daily newspapers as a genuine cultural asset worthy of political protection. On the other hand, those who question the value of continued state subsidies to the press not only criticize their political ramifications, but consider subsidies misappropriated as they slip into newspapers' pockets with no obvious return. Ending up as backdoor subsidies with no clear benefits, only artificially keeping alive those who are already economically weak, they do little to balance the structural inequalities of the market. As a result of these criticisms, regulators are increasingly shying away from their programmes as concerns over the economic efficiency get the upper hand. Together with state budgetary constraints, shrinking annual subsidies are the norm in all four countries surveyed but none of them is expected to do away with them altogether. Nonetheless, supplementary control is needed so that subsidized daily newspapers can be persuaded to adjust to more competitive economic environments. All in all, today’s policy emphasis on enabling media empires to grow sufficiently large and prosperous to compete with international rivals on many fronts may conflict with satisfying domestic readers' preferences for distinct voices. Lenient anti-trust regulation to stimulate takeovers may abuse diversity and ignore the wider needs of a reading public that regards a 125

particular point of view as essential for democracy. Cash subsidies that strengthen the public good character of daily newspapers, namely to make shared culture and community possible, may come as a remedy but be difficult to reconcile with the political goal to scale-up the industry. Of course, daily newspapers which turn their backs on the importance of the market and fail to adapt to the new requirements of both audiences and advertisers will be doomed. However, I would suggest that state subsidies should continue to be provided to culturally distinctive and ideologically committed daily newspapers where the market fails. Highly selective in determination, the objective of such subsidies is to secure a media system with a maximum number of independent units. At the other end, these subsidies need to be evaluated on the basis of concise performance indicators in order to obtain a system of executable sanctions should the receiving newspapers fail to modernize.

Notes 1. Concentration of market power is commonly defined as a situation where the top firms in an industry collectively control the vast majority of industry sales or assets in the same product and geographic market. It is usually measured by the cumulative market shares of the largest firms in the market. The theoretical concept of press diversity is more elusive in character. Not only are the terms Variety', 'plurality', 'pluralism' and 'diversity' used interchangeably, but also the relationship between plurality of ownership and titles and diversity of opinion and content is not straightforward either. While plurality of ownership may lead to diversity of editorial viewpoints, the reverse is, paradoxically, not always the case. Editorial independence may guarantee that a large number of titles controlled by the same interest expresses a diverse range of views. Policies promoting pluralism in ownership may thus even be inimical to product diversity (see Collins and Murroni, 1996: 58-75). 2. The British government's aversion to intervention is best set out in the report of the last Royal Commission on the Press, reporting in 1977. In fact, however, substantial indirect support is granted to the press by zero-rating press sales and advertising revenues. Furthermore, newspapers which are published at least weekly and are registered with the Department of Trade and Industry receive preferential treatment for postal delivery throughout the UK. Measured by weight, selected papers only pay second-class tariffs for first-class carriage by the Royal Mail. See Royal Commission on the Press (1974-7). 3. With the recent change in government in the UK, changes in the very laissez-faire commitment of British press regulation seem more likely. Having called for changes for almost 20 years, the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom (CPBF), drawing together prominent British media critics, has advocated a more interventionist approach towards safeguarding media diversity, but has so far failed to explain how subsidies should be implemented. For a critique of British press regulation see Curran (1995); the position of the CPBF is outlined in its latest manifesto (CPBF, 1996). 4. According to Picard (1995) and Holtz-Bacha (1994), state intervention by means of subsidies is either general or specific, direct or indirect, selective or mandated. General aid is given to assist a selected range of newspapers, but not for a single use (e.g. tax concessions, reduced import duties on newsprint, reduced postal tariffs). Specific assistance includes aid that can be used only for a specific purpose, such as grants received to retrain printing personnel in the use of digital prepress equipment. The terms 'direct' and 'indirect' indicate how the intervention is provided. Indirect aid is given to the industry as a whole rather than a specific newspaper, such 126

as postal rate reductions. Direct aid is given directly to specific newspapers, such as a loan provided to purchase new printing presses. In referring to the administration of assistance, the terms 'selective' and 'mandated' are often employed. Selective intervention refers to advantages, subsidies or regulation in which an administrative body decides who or what should be provided or applied. Mandated intervention is that for which no discretion to provide or withhold the assistance or regulation rests in an administrative body because the intervention has been mandated by a law that clearly defines which newspaper should receive the assistance and under which circumstances. A more functionalist way of defining subsidies to the press has been undertaken by André Santini (1990) who divided them into subsidies directed towards production such as operational subsidies {aide au fonctionnement), investment subsidies {aide à l'investissement), distribution subsidies {aide à distribution), and demand-sided reading help {aide aux lecteurs), such as reduced VAT on sales revenues and/or advertising revenues (Santini, 1990: 118-36). 5. According to the 48th World Congress of the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers in 1995, newspaper sales throughout the EU decreased by 6.8 percent between 1986 and 1994 and 1.87 percent between 1990 and 1994, while the position of the written press in the advertising market further decreased in favour of television (FIEJ, 1995: Preface). 6. This launching support was guaranteed in the form of a loan for a maximum time period of two years, exempted from interest and free of amortization, and helped to create 25 new titles (Carlsson and Anselm, 1995: 102). 7. Economic contraction reached intolerable levels for the years 1990-3, when the advertising revenue of the press sector as a whole fell by 7.5 percent (1990/1), 4.7 percent (1991/2) and even 8.3 percent (1992/3), thus altogether by 20.5 percent, with commercial advertising down by 13.7 percent and a near-meltdown of small and classified property by 43-9 percent (SJTI, 1995). 8. Nationally, only nine titles served an estimated daily readership of 9,264,000 people in 1995, with total sales amounting to only 2,430,000. 9. The two Austrian researchers Erich Geretschlager and Anton Leinschitz (1994) have suggested the following new ideas for systems of postal delivery of newspapers: (1) change the whole postal delivery system to early-morning door-to-door delivery, allowing for all press products to be delivered jointly in the early morning; this would enable delivery free of any distorting effects on competition; (2) set up a private subsidiary of the Post Office which would take over the early-morning delivery of newspapers nation-wide; this would be more cost-efficient; (3) combine early-morning postal delivery and press subsidies by means of setting up a joint-distribution company including publishers and the Post Office; newspaper companies are subsidised selectively by means of reduced tariffs; the level of the subsidy is dependent on circulation within the joint-distribution network; this would enable selective subsidization; (4) promote 'satellite-printing' of dailies in connection with postal services: the Post Office delivers ex-printing house in the region with a time obligation, the advantage of which is a reduction of direct costs of distribution. (Geretschlager and Leinschitz, 1994: 640-1) 10. Interview conducted by author with J. Vebret, editor-in-chief of the quarterly media journal MediasPouvoirs, on 16 January 1997, Paris. 11. Helen Bunting and Paul Chapman (1996) have drawn together managerial strategies for publishers looking to diversify, as follows: Firstly, publishers can build on their basic business through acquisitions and new launches, repackaging information and utilising their news-gathering activity to produce new products based on print. Secondly, there is the possibility of offering additional services to advertisers, 127

such as additional colour printing, direct mail drops, and in the future possibly targeted inserts to subscribers. The third possible course of action is to diversify into new channels, for example technologically driven opportunities in on-line services, the Internet and cable and satellite television. (Bunting and Chapman, 1996: 54-5) 12. Having become ineligible for direct subsidies since 1990, the national daily Liberation, for example, has scraped back into the black only by a life-saving capital injection from the industrial conglomerate Chargeurs in order to give the paper new breathing space to cope with its accumulated deficit. In need of at least FF 200 million to win the battle for survival — its losses soared to an estimated FF 240 million (£25.13 million) in the years 1994-6 — Chargeurs has injected some FF 175 million as part of a recapitalization programme, subsequently taking a controlling 65 percent stake, while the staff saw their share fall from 42.5 to 20 percent (Jack, 1996). 13. Notably, the conservative opinion daily Le Quotidien, which gave up the ghost in November 1994, and InfoMatin, a full-coloured tabloid of the Le Monde group which had to close in January 1996. 14. Regulators also face a trade-off as to whether their public policy should protect regional and local media by means of subsidies or, conversely, protect the national unit. Positive externalities of subsidies to smaller units may be outweighed by overall macro-economic welfare losses were strong national players not strengthened to compete in international markets. 15. Interview conducted by the author with J. Riedler, editor-in-chief of Neue Zeit, Austria, vice-president of the Austrian Newspaper Publisher Association, on 2 May 1996, Vienna. 16. Interview conducted by author with I. Andenaes, director of the Norwegian mass media regulator Statens Medieforvaltning, appended to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Fredrikstad, 22 January 1996, Fredrikstad. 17. Interview conducted by author with N. Toussaint-Desmoulins, Professor of Economics at the University of Paris II, on 14 January 1997, Paris. 18. Fax-interview conducted by author with B. Porte, chairman of the Bayard Presse group and editor-in-chief of the national opinion daily La Croix, on 11 January 1997, Paris. 19. As facilitators of sociocultural development and political and economic change, newspapers embody cumulative and transformative properties, which may become evident through the benefits of an enhanced democracy. However, these social benefits can hardly be evaluated monetarily (Bruck, 1997). 20. According to economic data collected by the independent Swedish Press Support Board, net margin figures, showing profits plus any press subsidies divided by annual turnover figures, were highest for small, local newspapers in the countryside. Only one newspaper with a nationwide distribution, the financial daily Dagens Industri, which is not eligible for operating subsidies, was found in the top 10 in 1994. Out of SEK 100 revenue, 33 contributed to the profit of the paper (Presstodsnamnden, 1994: 16). 21. Interview conducted by author with K.E. Gustafsson, Professor of Mass Media Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law at the University of Göteborg, on 19 January 1996, Göteborg.

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References Borden, W. (1995) 'Power Plays. A Comparison Between Swedish and American Press Policies', dissertation, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, Göteborg University, Sweden. Bruck, P. A. (1997) 'Die Abrechnung des Marktes', Der Standard 28 February. Bunting, H. and P. Chapman (1996) The Future of the European Media Industry. Towards the 21st Century. London: Financial Times, Telecoms and Media Publishing. Carlsson, U. and M. Anselm (1995) Media Sverige 1995, Statistik och Analys. Göteborg: Nordicom. Collins, R. and C. Murroni (1996) New Media, New Policies. Media and Communication Strategies for the Future. Cambridge: Polity Press. CPBF (Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom) (1996) 21st Century Media. Shaping the Democratic Vision, Media Manifesto, pp. 1-12. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. Curran, James (1995) 'Regulation and Deregulation of the British Media', pp. 35-63 in K. E. Gustafsson (ed.) Media Structure and the State. Concepts Issues, Measures, proceedings from an International symposium, 9-10 May 1994, Göteborg University. Göteborg Mass Media Research Unit, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University. FIEJ (International Federation of Newspaper Publishers) (1995) World Press Trends 1995. Paris: FIEJ. Geretschlager, E. and A. Leinschitz (1994) 'Rationelle Distribution', pp. 507-84 in P.A. Bruck (ed.) Print unter Druck, Zeitungsverlage auf Innovations kurs. Munich: Verlag Reinhard Fischer Gewerkschaft Kunst, Medien und freie Berufe — KMfB (1995) 'Medienpolitische Konzeption der Sektion Journalisten', Positionspapier, Vienna. Grisold, A. (1996) 'Press Concentration and Media Policy in Small Countries', European Journal of Communication, 11(4): 485-509. Gustafsson, K. E. (1991) 'Government Policies to Reduce Newspaper Industry Entry Barriers', summary of a presentation made at the Workshop III of the research programme 'Ökonomie und Zukunft der Printmedien', Salzburg. Holtz-Bacha, C. (1994) 'Presseförderung im westeuopäischen Vergleich', pp. 443-567 in P.A. Bruck (ed.) Medienmanager Staat. Von den Versuchen des Staates, Medienvielfalt zu ermöglichen. Medienpolitik im internationalen Vergleich, Munich: Verlag Reinhard Fischer Jack, A. (1996) 'French Child of the Sixties Faces up to the Modern World: Liberation has Accepted a Rescue Package which Costs it its Independence', The Financial Times 3 February Lambert, A. (1996-7) Rapport Générale fait au nom de la Commission des Finances, du contrôle budgétaires et des comptes économiques de la Nation (1) sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1997, Session Ordinaire de 1996-7, Sénat, No. 86, Paris Picard, R. G. (1995) Tree Press and Government: The Ignored Economie Relationships of US Newspapers, pp. 139-55 in K.E. Gustafsson (ed.) Media Structure and the State. Concepts, Issues, Measures. Proceedings from an international symposium, 9-10 May 1994, Goteborg University. Goteborg: Mass Media Research Unit, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Goteborg University. 129

Presstödsnämnden, Dagspressens Ekonomi (1994) ed. by Hakan Westergren and Karl Erik Gustafsson. Stockholm: Press Support Board Royal Commission on the Press (1974-7) Final Report (RCP 1977), Cmnd 6810. London: HMSO. Santini, A. (1990) L'État et la presse. Paris: Litec SJTI (Service Juridique et Technique de l'Information et de la Communication) (1995) Chiffresclés 1982-1995. Paris: SJTI. Skogerbo, E. (1997) The Press Subsidy System in Norway. European Journal of Communication, 12(1): 99-118. Trappel, J. (1991) Born Losers or Flexible Adjustment? The Media Policy Dilemma of Small States. European Journal of Communication, 6(3): 355-71.

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Beitrag 6: State Aid for Newspapers (ch. on Austria) Orginally published in: Murschetz, P. C., & Karmasin, M. (2013). Austria. Press Subsidies in Search of a New Design. In P. C. Murschetz (Ed.), State Aid for Newspapers. Theories, Cases, Actions (pp. 133-149). Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag

1. The Austrian Print Media Landscape Media in Austria have to cope with two basic and obviously unchangeable conditions: (a) the limited size and shortage of resources of the national and regional domestic markets, and (b) Germany as large neighbouring country with a highly developed range of media products belonging to the same language area. Austria itself is a small market with about 8 million inhabitants and it is divided into even smaller regional markets (with only one exception – the Viennese region with 2 million inhabitants). And it is part of the German language area, which means that a great number of widely read special interest magazines and some weekly magazines are produced and published in Germany. The same goes for the television sector. The Austrian print media market is characterized by the following structural features (Trappel 1991a, ibid. 1991b, ibid. 2007, ibid. 2010, Steinmaurer 2002, ibid. 2009): x

A small number of daily newspaper titles, i.e. 18 (in 2012), seven out of which are distributed on a national scale. Four of these seven titles are tabloid-style papers, while the remaining three titles (Presse, Standard, Wiener Zeitung) compete within the quality newspaper segment in Vienna.

x

A regional press ecosystem which is characterized by strong regional players, dominating up to 90 percent of the regional market. With the exception of two provinces, each province (Bundesland) is dominated by one regional publisher, typically controlling one, two or even three smaller newspapers. These secondary papers do not sell more than 10,000 copies each and are hardly profitable. But they help consolidate the regional market and prevent competition. The strong position of the regional publishers is challenged by the regional editions of the Neue Kronen Zeitung, which competes fiercely with the traditional regional press barons in these markets (e.g. Tiroler Zeitung for Tyrol, Salzburger Nachrichten for Salzburg, etc.). In eight (out of nine) provinces, the Neue Kronen Zeitung has either taken the lead or is as strong as the respective regional paper. Further, the Krone has even gained more power in economic terms as the daughter-in-law of the Krone’s long-time editor and shareholder manages the free-sheet Heute.

x

The market dominator Neue Kronen Zeitung (commonly known as Krone), Austria’s far biggest-selling national tabloid and, measured by population size, with one of the world’s highest reach. According to Österreichische Auflagenkontrolle (ÖAK), the industry watchdog to control and publish print circulation figures in the country, the average daily readership of the Krone was 2,724.000 (14 years or older) in 2011 (i.e. 818.859 copies sold, thus reaching more than 40% of all readers).

x

A strong orientation towards boulevard newspapers, i.e. Krone to fight against Österreich which was launched in September 2006. Österreich is a free and partially paid-for tabloid daily, and 131

x

A high degree of ownership concentration, mainly exerted through the Krone-Kurier subsidiary Mediaprint, Austria’s second biggest publishing house to belong to Westdeutscher Allgemeiner Zeitung, Raiffeisen and the Krone publisher Hans Dichand (Seethaler & Melischek 2006).

The following Table 1 depicts the number of daily newspapers in Austria (as of 2012). Table 2 shows daily newspaper by title, circulation and reach. Table 1: Number of daily newspapers in Austria – Data for 2012

2012

2011

2010

2009

Dailies (total)

18

18

18

19

Paid-for

15

15

15

15

Free

3

3

2

3

0

1

1

Hybrid

Source: VÖZ – Austrian http://www.voez.at/b200m30.

Newspaper

Publishers

Association

2012,

Table 2: Daily newspapers, circulation and reach (year average 2011) – Austria Dailies

Printed

Sold

in 1.000

Der Standard

109.128

72.693

359

Die Presse

95.757

74.032

263

Kärntner Tageszeitung

*

*

45

Kleine Zeitung

309.815

280.983

806

Kronen Zeitung

931.559

818.859

2.724

Kurier

206.629

158.469

575

Neue Vorarlberger Tageszeitung

12.292

0

39

Oberösterreichische Nachrichten

134.946

109.441

355

Salzburger Nachrichten

87.953

69.867

240

Tiroler Tageszeitung

104.800

87.149

277

Vorarlberger Nachrichten

68.518

62.762

168

WirtschaftsBlatt

32.433

0

65

Source: Österreichische Auflagenkontrolle – ÖAK (i.e. Austrian Audit Bureau of Circulation), yearly average 2011, Media-Analyse (MA) 2011. Nota Bene: Only 12 out of 15 paid-for daily newspapers are listed here. The dailies Neues Volksblatt, Salzburger Volkszeitung SVZ, and Wiener Zeitung are not covered due to the fact 132

that they do not deliver any figures on printed or sold circulation to the Austrian Audit Bureau of Circulation (Österreichische Auflagenkontrolle –ÖAK). The working group Media-Analyse offers the largest study on reach of print media in Austria (Media-Analyse 2011). Legend: * The daily Kärntner Tageszeitung did not participate in the ÖAK survey of 2011. The Handbook of the Austrian Press, edited by the Austrian Association of Newspaper Publishers (VÖZ – Verband der Österreichischen Zeitungen), lists 263 weekly newspapers. Most of them are free regional and local papers with focus on advertising or special interest. In some provinces, especially in those without a regional daily newspaper, regional weekly papers are read by a remarkable number of people. The following chapter profiles the government-mandated subsidy regime to the daily press in Austria. First, we shall present the historical framework on press subsidies in succinct terms, introducing the main mechanisms and instruments of subsidies to dailies. We shall then look more closely into current structural changes of annual appropriations, their costs for the Republic and their effects on the economic competition in the daily newspaper market segment. In the final part of this chapter, we shall present critical results of the press subsidy scheme. Attention shall only be given to subsidies to daily Austrian newspapers given out by the Austrian Federal government (Bundespresseförderung). Thus, an account of subsidies to weekly newspapers and periodicals (the so-called ‘Publizistikförderung’) shall not be offered. Subsidies granted by local authorities (Landespresseförderung) shall not be considered either.54 Here, we hypothesize that the current scheme of government subsidies to Austrian daily and weekly newspapers needs to be radically redesigned. Its guiding principles, the direction of impact, the total amount spent, and its general purpose to safeguard the future of news and quality journalism is to be radically questioned. Although there is no ‘magic bullet solution’ to all these complex issues, this chapter presents further solutions. 2. Press Subsidies – The History Financial government subsidies to the press were introduced in 1975 by the Social Democratic Party-party single-government under Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. Further amendments to this law with different motivations were enacted in the years 1976, 1980, 1985, 1992 and 2004, whereas from 1985 to 2004 the scheme remained largely unchanged. The Press Subsidy Act in its current version is thus a historical reflection of the prevailing market conditions and all other contextual changes. In 1972, the influential Austrian Printer and Publisher Association (VÖZ – Verband Österreichischer Zeitungen) addressed the federal, regional and local authorities with a wish for exempting their newspapers from tax cost increases arising through a newly introduced Value Added Tax system which imposed additional costs on newspapers in form of a tax payable on sales revenues.55 Economic and financial problems of Austrian print media companies and an on-going decline in the number of daily newspapers led the newspaper

54

These subsidies are covered by various regional Acts and, as regards weeklies, by a special Federal Government Act (Bundesgesetz über die Förderung staatsbürgerlicher Bildungsarbeit im Bereich der politischen Parteien und der Publizistik), commonly referred to as ‘subsidisation of periodicals and other printed matter’ (Publizistikförderung).

55 Additionally, the newspaper lobby called for an exemption of local business taxes, payroll tax, advertising tax, as well as reductions in postal delivery and rail transport fees.

133

companies to oppose this additional strain on their economies.56 A compromise was found three years later when the Federal Government under the then Prime Minister Bruno Kreisky set up a bill on press subsidization to daily and weekly newspapers as a means of financial compensation for the value added tax.57 As political parties and various interest groups then controlled a considerably high share of the Austrian print media market, the introduction of public press subsidies in Austria was inextricably linked with public financing of the then existing political parties (Schmolke & Feldinger 1995). As stimulated by the Federal Government, the management of economic problems of the press was coordinated with the solution of the financial problems of the political parties. Consequently, both acts, the Federal Government Act on tasks, finance, and canvassing of political parties, and the Federal Act on Press Subsidies were passed en bloc in the lower House of the National Parliament (Nationalrat) in 1975 (Republik Österreich 1975a/b58). Since then, subsidies are given to daily and weekly newspapers which meet the following conditions: x

x x x x x x x

Subsidized papers are eligible for grants so long as they concern themselves with affairs other than of local interest in the areas of politics, economics, or general culture and thus serve the political, general economic and cultural information and formation of opinion, Subsidized press products must not be mere advertising brochures (Kundenpresse) or press organs of interest groups, They must not merely be of local interest and must at least have distribution and importance in one province, They must be printed and published in Austria, They must at least be published 50 times a year and mainly sold on a single copies’ basis or on subscription, They must have been issued regularly for one year at the time of application and must have met the conditions of subsidization in that previous year, Weekly newspapers must have a proven minimum of 5,000 copies sold per issue, dailies 10,000, and both must at least employ two, respectively three full-time journalists, and Above mentioned conditions are not applicable for the promotion and preservation of non-German speaking ethnic groups (Republik Österreich 1975a).

While the original idea of subsidization was equal treatment of all daily and weekly newspapers by means of a ‘watering-can principle’, further strains on the costs of newspaper publishers made necessary major changes of the 1975 Federal Press Subsidies Act. When a constitutional commission reported the need for splitting the bill into a general section of subsidization (Presseförderung I), representing the regulations of the previous bills enacted, and a new section of selective subsidies (Presseförderung II) was introduced, the so-called ‘special subsidy for the maintenance of variety’, granted to newspapers which promoted the formation of political opinion, but were economically weaker newspapers, that is to say only ‘secondary’ papers at their place of issue. While the original idea of the Act was to support newspaper

56 Journalistic titles fell from 27 units in 1961 to 20 units in 1972 and are referred to as full journalistic units, indicating institutionally independent editing as well as journalistic independence. 57

Reasons for newspapers in crisis were seen in the structural difficulties of Austrian media companies, low capital equipment, dependence from foreign countries and overall macro-economic situation at the end of the 1960s, small internal market, and deficits of qualifications of media personnel. See, Fabris 1976.

58 Additionally, periodicals were already subsidized since 1972, when a Federal Government bill was passed in the National Parliament.

134

companies in equal proportion, under the provisions of the new Act in 1985 economically suffering newspaper were to be supported selectively to guarantee press diversity within an advanced democracy. Specifically, the then existing daily newspapers of political parties represented in the parliament and major regional daily newspapers were to be supported selectively (Republik Österreich 198559). After consulting the seven members of the commission, selective subsidies were granted to newspapers and other press products with the following conditions of eligibility: x x x

x

x x

The daily newspaper to be subsidized should be of special importance for the formation of political opinion in at least one province with a minimum circulation of 1%, and a maximum circulation of 15% of the population in the province of origin, The newspaper to be subsidized should employ full-time journalists (editors), The newspaper to be subsidized should not be a monopolist in the specific market (should not dominate the specific market under consideration); a dominant market position was reached by a circulation exceeding 15% of the total circulation in the province of origin or 5% in the whole of Austria, The newspaper should not be eligible for subsidization if the editor or publisher applying also publishes press products with major stress on advertising, calculated by volume of advertising space (by pages) of the previous year, or if there is any other economic or organizational closeness to the editor or publisher of these products, The selling price of the newspaper to be subsidized should not differ widely from comparable newspapers’ prices, and A newspaper is not considered as being eligible to subsidization if more than 20% of its yearly volume of pages is accounted for by advertising (Republik Österreich 198560).

Direct subsidies are not the only financial support to daily newspapers in Austria. Generous and highly controversial subsidies have flown to some printing houses for the building of printing plants and premises or buying new machines and technical equipment under the title ‘subsidies for the promotion of the labour market’ since the mid80s.61 Initiated rather late in European comparison, both independent and explicitly political printing houses were encouraged to create new jobs.62 Granting investment help to independent newspapers without their own printing plant was originally triggered by concerns of the intention of the Vienna-based daily Kurier to move to the province of Lower Austria near Vienna for reasons of tax avoidance. After political bargaining, the Kurier then eventually decided to stay to build its printing plant near Vienna for which it got granted 80 million Austrian schillings (2013: ca. 5.8 million euros) by the Federal Ministry of Social Welfare. Not only did Familiapress, the publishing house of Kurt Falk, get granted ca. 66.7 million schillings (2013: ca. 4.7 million euros) by the regional government in Vienna and an additional considerable amount of 133.3 million schillings (2013: ca. 9.6 million euros) by the Federal Ministry of Social Welfare in order to build a new printing plant near Vienna, but also did his market dominant counterpart Mediaprint, the joint-subsidiary of the Krone-Kurier merger, receive 180 million schillings (2013: ca. 1.3 million euros), of which 2/3 were financed by the Federal Ministry and 1/3 by the local City Council of Vienna (Holtz59 The new government bill was initiated by a controversial parliamentary debate on various models of promoting press diversity and curbing processes of concentration in Austria. Explicitly, the press subsidies model of Sweden supported the foil of argumentation for the Austrian considerations. It can only be suspected whether personal political contacts between the two countries had any influence on setting up the bill in its present form. 60 A new provision of the Press Subsidies Act in 1992 lifted this yearly volume of advertising pages to 22%. See, Republik Österreich, Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Presseförderung 1985 geändert wird, 31/7/1992. 61

For the following see Holtz-Bacha 1994, and Schmolke 1995.

62

Sweden had already adopted similar subsidies in the mid70s.

135

Bacha 1994, p. 531). Once granting these subsidies was started, a controversial ‘domino effect’ of subsidization was stimulated, which was inherently led by political consideration. Likewise, the regional print barons in the regions received considerable sums of cash grants as well. Finally, the graphical industry was filled with indignation when government support was granted by the Federal Ministry of Social Welfare of another 68 million schilling (2013: ca. 4.9 million euros) to a new printing house in Salzburg (Druckzentrum West), enforcing the market power of media giant Mediaprint. All in all, roughly 1 billion schillings (2013: ca. 72 million euros) were granted to Austrian publishing houses by the Federal Ministry of Social Welfare, regional and local authorities to set-up new printing plants and modernise existing equipment since 1984. Paradoxically, actual employment effects of new printing systems and technology were never evidenced (Rechnungshof 1992).63 As regards tax relief, the national Austrian tax authorities charge a VAT rate on newspaper sales revenues of 10% in Austria, a somewhat reduced rate compared to the standard rate of 20% on other goods and services. However, this is actually a top rate in European comparison. Moreover, 20% VAT are imposed on advertising revenues. On top of that, regional and local authorities benefit from huge tax revenues from regional and local advertising taxes. Austria is one of the few countries in the world, and the only OECD country that collects this nationwide tax on advertising, leading to drastically high advertising rates in international comparison. These taxes are highly criticized by Austrian newspaper publishers (VÖZ 1995).

3. The Current Subsidy Scheme The Austrian Communications Authority (KommAustria) was set up in 2001 in order to regulate the broadcasting sector. Since 2004, it has also been responsible for the federal press subsidy, whereas previously the power of decision lay within the Federal Government. Before taking a decision as well as before the yearly publication of detailed guidelines the KommAustria has to consult an advisory commission which is made up of seven persons: two members are appointed by the Prime Minister, two members by the Austrian Newspaper Association and another two members by the trade union responsible for the journalistic staff of daily and weekly newspapers. These six persons settle on a chairperson. Although conditions of eligibility are established for the general as well as for the selective subsidies, drawing a definite line between ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘non-beneficiaries’ is not an easy exercise. So, it is not only the expertise which makes up the importance of this advisory board, but also the fact that the professional groups of the sector are being represented. This helps to find wise solutions for difficult questions and makes sure that they are widely accepted. Conditions of eligibility The general criteria for daily and weekly papers are designed in a way that only free papers, papers owned by regional or federal authorities, press organs of interest groups (as regards

63 Grants for the establishment of new printing plants provided by the Ministry of Social Welfare were sharply criticized by the Austrian Audit Office (Rechnungshof) as both an incentive to distort competition by crowding out small private print media businesses, as well as needlessly subsidizing excess capacities.

136

ownership – not meant political parties and religious communities) and mere advertising vehicles are excluded entirely. Eligible newspapers must provide political, economic and cultural information. At least half of the editorial section of a daily and weekly newspapers must consist of contributions created by the newspaper´ s own editorial staff. Eligible newspapers must show a regular circulation and importance in at least one federal province (only local interest and distribution is not enough). The selling price must not differ widely form comparable newspapers – it has to remain a ‘fair’ market price, thus excluding newspapers practising price dumping. When filing an application, daily and weekly newspapers must have been published regularly for six months and must have met the conditions for subsidy during that period. Additional premises for daily papers x

Minimum of 240 issues per year,

x

Proven minimum of at least 6.000 sold copies per issue in one federal province or 10.000 in Austria as a whole, and

x

At least six full-time journalists,

Additional premises for weekly papers x

Minimum of 41 issues per year,

x

Proven minimum of 5.000 sold copies per issue, and

x

At least two full-time journalists.

Newspapers of the non-German-speaking national minorities (native ethnic groups) do not have to meet these additional conditions: Croatian, Slovenian, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, and Roma minority. In fact, no dailies in a minority language exist but several weeklies in Croatian and Slovenian language do. General subsidy for daily and weekly newspapers As mentioned before, the general subsidy dates form the original idea of compensation. Thus, all daily papers which meet the above-mentioned conditions get the same amount of money – with the exception that this sum is cut by 20% in case that more than one daily of a publisher or publishing house is eligible. The subsidy for weekly papers is calculated according to the number of sold copies by subscription up to 15.000 and the number of issues per year. Due to the automatism of this subsidy, it is highly calculable for publishers. In 2012, the Austrian Federal Government handed over a total sum of 2.1 million euros to 14 dailies, and 1.8 million to 35 weeklies. Special subsidy for the maintenance of variety In addition to the general subsidy described above publishers may also benefit from a selective measure directed towards the availability of a diverse range of newspapers in the different provinces. It is granted only to daily papers which are not in a leading market position – neither as regards the reader market nor the advertising market. Thus, the number of sold copies must not exceed 100.000 per issue and the annual volume of advertising pages must not exceed 50%. 137

Importantly, newspapers which are - as regards the number of sold copies - national marketleader or market leader in one of the federal provinces or in second position after the national market-leader in one of the federal provinces are excluded. In 2012, 7 daily papers were granted this selective subsidy (i.e. ca. 5.2 million euros in total). Measures to promote quality and to contribute to securing the future of the press The Press Subsidy Act of 2004 also provides for a number of new and additional measures which are aimed at enhancing quality and contributing to the future of the press sector. The reimbursement of the costs of certain activities of the publishing houses is one of the basic ideas. Thus, it represents a step away from “automatism” towards a more future- and qualityoriented approach. As journalistic training and first-hand information have been identified as crucial factors for the quality of newspaper content, publishers of eligible daily and weekly newspapers receive a reimbursement for the costs of the employment and training of young full-time journalists, and for the costs of employing foreign correspondents. Further, associations in educating journalists, and press clubs received grants under this heading? Two measures are directed towards attracting new readers for the daily and weekly press: first, associations which have defined the promotion of reading of daily and weekly papers at schools as their only purpose receive subsidies up to 50% of their yearly costs. Second, publishers which provide schools with daily and weekly newspapers free of charge can be reimbursed for up to 10% of the regular selling price. But the beneficiaries of the special measures are not only publishers or publishing houses but also others, who contribute to enhancing the chances for the print media sector. For research projects which may contribute to the development of the press sector, a subsidy up to 50% of the total costs can be granted. 15 studies have been subsidised so far, dealing with research subjects such as: self-regulation in the press sector; copy right and electronic archives; media-markets in Middle and Eastern Europe; changes in journalistic working conditions; development of instruments for the analysis of the reader market; eyetracking studies on the readability of newspaper texts; best-practise cases in the field of journalistic training. Amounts between €8.000 and €40.000 have been granted. The subsidies for non-profit associations of recognised prestige in the field of journalistic training and for press clubs (non-profit organisations which organise press conferences) have existed since the late 1970s. Subsidy for periodicals Periodicals being published at least four times a year and dealing exclusively or primarily with issues of politics, culture or religion or associated scientific disciplines on a high level and thus serve to provide civic education, are granted a subsidy by the Austrian Communications Authority if they meet the criteria of section II of the Act on Political Education. Every year, approximately 120 periodicals apply for this subsidy. In 2012, 341.000 euros were spent under this regime. Transparency Besides objective criteria drawing a precise line between eligible and “non-eligible” newspapers, transparency is another important requirement for the granting of state subsidy to 138

the media under the perspective of independence and freedom of the press. Three legal measures are directed towards ensuring this: x

Publication of the results of the allocation process: Since 2004 the Austrian Communications Authority is obliged to publish all decisions within two weeks. Therefore detailed information on the number of applications, the names of the applicants and the amount of money they are granted or the reason for rejection can be found on the internet,

x

Annual publication of guidelines before the beginning of the so-called ‘observation year’, which provide detailed definitions and explanations of the - to a certain degree rather general legal provisions, and

x

Publication of an evaluation report.

Acceptance of state subsidy In autumn 2006, the Austrian Communications Authority carried out an evaluation study of the new measures established by the present federal law and presented a written report to the Federal Government. On this occasion, the newspaper publishers and the journalists´ trade union were given the opportunity to answer to a questionnaire. By reaching 65% the rate of return was quite high. Only the largest and the second largest publishing companies in the field of the daily press and several publishers of weeklies and magazines abstained from the survey by not answering. The majority of publishers expressed a positive attitude towards the current subsidy scheme. The following reasons were mentioned: x

Press subsidy is a necessary instrument against market domination,

x

The special subsidy for the maintenance of plurality is an important contribution to the existence of smaller papers, and

x

The new measures are very helpful.

Among the new subsidies, the reimbursement for the distribution of newspapers at schools found the widest approval, followed by the reimbursement of journalistic training costs. Although predominantly satisfied with the subsidy scheme, publishers of weekly papers expressed some reservations. Most frequently, they criticised the limitation of the special subsidy for the maintenance of variety to daily papers and the total funds for weeklies. Moreover, it turned out that they benefit less from the new measures like the reimbursement of costs of international correspondents. As most of them focus on regional or even local affairs, they simply do not employ any. Whereas all publishers of daily papers have already benefited from the new measures, only half of the publishers of weekly papers have been able to do so. The journalist’s union expressed all in all a positive attitude towards press subsidy and the reform of 2004. The need for the reimbursement of additional training costs was emphasised. Stressing the necessity of press subsidy from a democratic perspective, the introduction of two further criteria of eligibility was suggested: the existence of an editorial statute governing the co-operation in journalistic matters and the commitment to a code of conduct which addresses ethical standards of journalism. Effectiveness of subsidy measures 139

The question of effectiveness of the press subsidy measures was also touched on in the course of the evaluation. It has to be mentioned, that KommAustria did not embark on the interesting but highly complex question of the impact of press subsidy measures on pluralism of content. As the measures of Section II and III are directed at maintaining a variety of newspapers, the number of newspapers was referred to as an indicator of effectiveness. In 1973, after the first round of concentration, 19 daily newspapers existed. In the following years, the number of newspapers remained stable, though the papers of political parties’ lost market shares and were financially dependent on state subsidies and financial contributions of the owners. Between 1987 and 1991 a number of those daily papers left the market. The figure went down from 8 party papers in 1986 to 3 ten years later. Today, the party press has virtually disappeared. The latest sizeable additions to the Austrian daily newspaper market include the boulevard freesheet Heute in 2004 and a newspaper called ‘Österreich’ (German for: Austria) launched in 2006. The latter is printed all in colour and frequently distributed for free in town centres. This newspaper is oriented toward young adults from 18 to 35 years old. The founders and owners of the newspaper, the Fellner brothers, are well-known Austrian publishers who managed to restructure the Austrian magazine market earlier in their professional life. They sold their highly profitable magazine group, News, to the German Bertelsmann group (Gruner+Jahr) and invested the revenue in this tabloid. The financial subsidy scheme may play a key role in supporting economically weak newspapers with low circulation and advertising revenues and thus in preserving them from dying. As regards the concentration of ownership it seems that it is not an important factor: the number of independent publishing houses as owners of the subsidised daily papers went down steadily during the last years. The effect of press subsidy on weekly papers needs a more profound analysis, but the fact that three of them were closed down after cutbacks of the amount of subsidy due to a new calculation method is striking at first glance. Table 3: The Austrian Press Subsidy Scheme, by type, amount, submitted applications, and applications subsidized (in 2012)

Subsidy type

Amount EUR

Distribution subsidy (Section II of Subsidy Act)

3.923.799,60

50

49

- of which dailies

2.118.851,90

14

14

- of which weeklies

1.804.947,70

36

35

Special subsidy for daily newspapers (Section III of Subsidy Act)

5.287.000,00

7

7

Promotion of quality and future (Section IV of Subsidy Act)

1.575.000,00

68

65

TOTAL

10.785.799,60 125

140

in Submitted applications

Subsidized applications

121

4. Conclusion: Debating the Future of the Scheme Over the years, the Press Subsidy Act has been hotly debated. It has also been evaluated (KommAustria 2006, Prognos 1998). The Austrian Press Subsidy Act was repeatedly criticized. To initiate reform, the Austrian state secretary for media, Josef Ostermeyer (Austrian Social Democratic Party – SPÖ) commissioned an academic expert group led by Hannes Haas, Professor of communications at the University of Vienna, to undertake research into proposals for reforming the current press subsidy scheme. The ‘Haas Study’, as it is more colloquially called, was later published in February 2013 (Universität Wien 2013). Pre-publication leaks of this report had already triggered some expert debate around a plethora of issues for reform of the scheme. In what follows, the main lines of this debate shall be redrawn. Notably, various print media pressure groups in journalism and education (i.e. Presseclub Concordia), the Vienna educational forum for journalism (Forum Journalismus & Medien Wien - fjum), the Austrian Press Council (Österreichische Presserat), the board of trustees in journalism education (Kuratorium für Journalistenausbildung), and the Austrian Publishers Association (VÖZ), have issued the following claims: First, to reform press subsidy law, a single majority is necessary in parliament. This may be achieved by the current grand coalition between the social democrats SPÖ and the conservative party ÖVP. Haas suggested an increase in the subsidy budget from an average € 10m allocated annually to 15 to 20 million euros per year in order to financially alleviate the structural downturn of the industry as such. In addition, Haas argued that over a period of about four years, an additional hand-out of 30 million Euros should be allocated to support the transition of print to online. Overall, the Austrian State Secretary Ostermayer resounded positively to the Haas draft and stressed that the number of subsidies allocated to newspapers would not be the critical issue of the reform. Rather, the scheme’s design needed some major refurbishing, and this would be the critical mission for its reform. In general, reforming the current subsidy scheme was deemed necessary across the board of stakeholders: It was claimed that the current system would not represent an effective, fair, and innovative scheme. On top, the new scheme would have to focus on efficiency criteria (automatic allocation, clear regime, bright-line criteria, exact and repeated controlling). As it stands, many observers demand a higher budget overall: 50 million euros should be paid out to newspapers (instead of € 11m). Fair rules, transparency, innovation and accuracy should be guiding principles of the new Act in 2013. Further, critics of the press subsidy scheme demand that the licence fee to the Austrian public service broadcaster ORF (i.e. some € 600 million are collected every year from the Austrian ORF listener/viewer) should be taken into consideration when allocating the new budget to the press. On top, the €120 million investment of government advertising into the boulevard press is another very critical issue to be discussed in the context of designing the new press subsidy scheme. These hidden subsidies needed to stop (Trappel & Zettl 2013). In theory, it was claimed, quality journalism has always been subsidized across markets. Particularly in a country like Austria, which is characterized by a corporatist political culture, government intervention to preserve and promote public value dimensions of the press is still considered to be structurally formative (Hallin & Mancini 2004, Steiner 1952). However, structural change through the Internet would now destroy the traditional business model of subsidizing print media (i.e. mixed financing from advertising and sales revenue). The debate was always centered on the question of whether print has a chance against digital information. Innovative alternative cross-media funding models have yet to prove to be sustainably attractive. Following this line of debate, it could be concluded that state funding is obliged to ensure quality journalism in the print media sector comprehensively and effectively. Now, the 141

Haas study report revealed that structural diversity in the print media market is to be ensured by press subsidies, i.e. the structural diversity of titles and views and the editorial quality of content were to be promoted rather than generally the sales of print titles (University of Vienna 2012). The economic analysis of the media markets in general and the analysis of the situation in Austria in particular show that the Austrian market is highly consolidated. This consolidation is reflected in a high degree of supplier concentration and the low diversity of titles of newspapers. This can be explained by high fixed costs, high entry barriers, efficient use of economies of scale through market-leading companies and a high degree of saturation of the recipient markets. These Austrian structural features cause a constant shift of competition from quality journalism to business imperatives. According to Matthias Karmasin, professor of communications and an expert observer of the subsidy debate for over some longer time, cuts driven by planned government austerity measures needed to be avoided at any cost. After all, newspapers would deliver almost 50 million euros on advertising taxes and would thus legitimately receive subsidies worth 50mio euros (VÖZ 1995). Further, Haas demanded that subsidies should be given out to online newspapers as well: Competition on promoting cross-media services (i.e. quality online offerings) would allow for structural diversity. Bloggers, citizen journalists etc. however, are not yet supported. Thus, grants should be given out to specified projects in this field which have evident democratic-political relevance (University of Vienna 2012). The President of the Austrian Publishers Association (VÖZ), Thomas Kralinger, claimed that Austria should follow the Danish model of reform. Denmark has just approved a subsidy for online media. Kralinger welcomed this step. As far as identifying a success performance index for subsidization is concerned, per capita funding would be a valuable one. While the Danish per capita funding is 9.8 euro (5.5 million people meet 54 million euros), Austria’s is only 1.3 euro year per head as Austria currently spends 10.6 million euros for a population of about 8.5 million. Haas also argued for a substantial widening of topics to the subsidy scheme. It claimed that the scheme should be changed into one promoting media more comprehensively across various infrastructures. In the future, non-commercial private TV and private radio should be supported, as well as new media, film and the press council. It is also conceivable to support regional media and free newspapers if an editorial content is recognizable. The funds should come from the ORF-household levy earmarked for the media promotion scheme. The fjum demanded a regular quality monitoring of the Austrian media landscape as well as a yearly monitoring of the media promoting scheme itself. Notably, to ensure quality standards, a code of ethics needed to be introduced that would be linked up to press subsidies as another way of government control. Who is not member of the Austrian Press Council (or any other self-regulatory body) should not be eligible to subsidies. Of course, hidden government advertising campaigns, and other below-the-line subsidies should be abolished. The issue of identifying indicators and metrics for subsidy success: Indicators such as the number of full-time employed journalists, the number of foreign correspondents or training days may be introduced. Taking convergence into account, Karmasin (2012) pointed out that not only public broadcasters would produce public value, but any media could do. Accordingly, it would be in the responsibility of government to safeguard and foster quality journalism if it is of public value.

142

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Trappel, J., & Zettl, V. (2013). Öffentliche Werbung: Politische Sterntaler. DerStandard.at, 5.2.2013. http://derstandard.at/1358305492833/Oeffentliche-Werbung-PolitischeSterntaler. Accessed on February 12, 2013. Universität Wien (2013). Evaluierung der Presseförderung in Österreich. Status, Bewertung, internationaler Vergleich und Innovationspotenziale. Eine Studie im Auftrage des Bundeskanzleramts Österreichs, Wien. www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=50443. Accessed on February 26, 2013. VÖZ – Verband Österreichischer Zeitungen (2012). Pressestatistik Tageszeitungen, July 2012. http://www.voez.at/b200m30. Accessed on February 5, 2013. VÖZ – Verband Österreichischer Zeitungen (1995). Luxussteuer auf Werbung – Dokumentation zur Anzeigen- und Ankündigungsabgabe, St. Pölten: Express Druck.

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Beitrag 7: The Theory of Market Failure in the Media Business Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C. (2008). Information and Entertainment: The Theory of Market Failure in the Media Business – The Case of Media as Public Goods. In C. Scholz, & U. Eisenbeis (Eds.), Looking to the Future of Modern Media Management (pp. 59-65). Lisbon: MMXI publishing. What is market failure? This article examines the extent to which the eclectic concept of market failure, and its composite theory of public goods, can help explain the doctrine of failed markets in the media sector. It reviews the theoretical approaches from a media-related economic theory research perspective about why and how media markets are conceptualized and scholarly discoursed as failed markets. Is the paradigm of market failure and its subset theory of public goods legitimately and validly explaining gross distortions of how media markets are organized and do work? What counterarguments are there? In economic theory, the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics describes an idealized system of equilibrium conditions to efficiently coordinate economic activity (Pareto 1971/1927). Markets that do not achieve this Pareto-optimality are said to result in market failure (in the following abbreviated as MF). MF describes situations where economic efficiency is greatly constrained (i.e., market imperfection or partial MF) or is not being provided by the market at all (i.e., pure MF). MF can be defined by multiple institutional weaknesses to coordinate economic activities efficiently and equitably. Product and cost characteristics of media goods (e.g., lack of property rights, differentiated goods, public goods and merit goods, high first-copy costs, high production, distribution and marketing costs), forces towards imperfect competition which may themselves have supply or demand-side origins (e.g., market power through monopoly and oligopoly, low to moderate elasticity of consumer demand), constraints embedded in the organizational structures of markets (e.g., high entry barriers, low levels of direct competition, existence of externalities, resource immobility), and media customer-side specifics (e.g., imperfect knowledge, asymmetric information) may give rise to imperfections where efficiency results do not hold. Additionally, dominant firms may raise market entry barriers or try to control successive value stages under their single roofs through means of ownership concentration and vertical integration. This gives rise to costs to the economy and society at large (Bator 1958, Cowen 1988, Cowen & Crampton 2002). The academic debate about the paradigm of market failure is complex and confusing. It originates from the paradigm’s hybrid intellectual architecture to result in competing scholarly discourses. Here, two dominant schools fight for scholarly hegemony: On the one hand, the ‘Harvard-MIT’-axis of scholarly reasoning in economic theory to argue that in case of market failure government is to intervene in the economy to correct for those and to restore the conditions for welfare optimization (Samuelson 1954, Musgrave and Peacock 1958, Stiglitz 1984). Counterarguments on that way of thinking come from the ‘Chicago school’ of thought (Reder 1982, Stigler 1988). Their fundamental tenet is that competition within a perfect market will lead to efficiency, which is the desirable normative goal of the legal system. According to the Chicago analysis, intervention within the market is justified only when there is a market failure. For the Chicago school, such failure exists when there are no multiple players on both sides of the market (the problem of monopoly), when these players do not have symmetric and full information relevant to their market activities, when any of the players bypass the market through involuntary actions or when the traded commodity is a public good. The general 147

orientation of the Chicago school, however, is that these circumstances are rare and that in the real world there is too much central intervention. Do Media Markets fail? The case of media as public goods Scholars in media economics support the notion that media markets reveal above mentioned structural and behavioural instances that may initiate MF (Albarran 1996, Doyle 2002, Noam 2004, Picard 2002, Owen & Wildman 1992). In media-related economics literature, TV and radio broadcasts are regularly categorized as public goods (Collins 1998, Doyle 2002). Additionally, broadcast programmes are said to confer properties of merit goods in the sense that their provision and use benefit society at large such as objective information, high culture and education are promoted. There is a sizeable literature on the issue of public goods identified as major source of market failure in classical as well as modern economic theory (Cornes & Sandler 1986, Cowen 1988, Cowen 2002). Public goods are goods that trigger social conflicts caused by their technical character of non- excludability and non-rivalry in consumption. If provided at all, these goods suffer from logic of collective action: If all can have it without contributing to its cost, nobody will contribute and the good will not be produced (Olson 1965). Now, are media markets really failed markets for their property as being public goods? The answer needs to be: No. This is because the theory of media goods as public goods reveals deficiencies. In my view, PG theory in the media fails for the following three reasons: Firstly, most media and entertainment goods have additional specific characteristics that need to be considered when classifying them as public goods. Besides being non-excludable and non-rival, they are intangible, content-based products that are non-depletable. Intangibility and content-basedness mean that their value is tied up with the non-physical nature of information and messages they convey, and less with the material carrier of that information (e.g., radio spectrum, CD) (Doyle 2002: 5). Non-depletability means that a good cannot be used up. Information content can be sold, yet the seller retains the content. Now, intangibility as property infers that information incorporated in media goods increase the utility of each consumer having access to it. Its value as a public good is presumed in the fact that consuming information as an intangible or intellectual good is apparently non-rival and non-excludable. However, consuming information is an individual process of receiving messages, understanding them, and attaching meaning to them, and less a process of sharing it with other users per se. Public good attributes only come in when information is shared among consumers. It may thus be assumed that sharing is not the prime objective of a user’s individual appropriation of media content. Consuming information remains a genuinely private process unless it is shared with others. Media content, on its part, is an output-related variable and may be defined as a marketable public good of maximum degree (Detering 1999: 21). This means that although media content can be perfectly prized, it perfectly meets the non-rivalrousness criterion. My consumption of the latest soap on TV does not prevent or diminish the use of anybody else watching it. Moreover, the availability of digital copying technologies has dramatically increased copying of media content. And the more frequent copying becomes, the more closely copyrighted works resemble public goods. In this sense, digitization drives non-excludability and non-rivalry of intellectual property in public goods (Abramowicz 2004). And thirdly, notably the digital nature of current state-of-the-art technology makes media goods non-depletable in the sense that they do not lose value when being repeatedly distributed and consumed. Non-depletability infers public goods attributes provided that the product consumed 148

by one party does not diminish the amount and value of that product made available to other parties (Gaustad 2002). In media practice, however, media content greatly suffers from psychological wear-out of its consumers thereby continuously losing value for them. This point is evidenced by the fact that, for the most part, broadcasters continues to provide more-of-thesame programming, especially for the entertainment genre, with relationship-based reality shows dominating prime time television. The following Figure 1 puts more graphically draws together the discussion of media as public goods. Figure 1: Media as public good1 Excludable?2 Yes

No

Pure Private goods

Common property

(e.g. CD music carrier)

(e.g. fish in ocean)

No, but

Club goods

possibly congested

(e.g. cable TV, Pay TV)

Non-marketable impure public goods

Yes

Rival?3

(e.g. public parks) Marketable public goods

No

Non-marketable pure (e.g. hit music CDs, public goods broadcast blockbuster movies, satellite (e.g., program) signals)

Legend: 1 Media goods are partly excludable and partly rival in consumption. They are thus mixed goods whose benefit of consumption is both individual and atmospheric. 2 The degree of excludability is non-intrinsic to the good. It is defined by property rights, devoted resources and technology. 3

The degree of rivalry is intrinsic to the good.

Conclusion This study has reviewed the scholarly debate on the paradigm of market failure in general economic and media-related economic theory and discussed the theoretical applicability of the theory of public goods as major source of failure for the media sector. The analysis of this paper suggests that the paradigm of market failure suffers from three central caveats: Firstly, there are many instances of market failure in most developed economies. The list of situations in which economic efficiency does not prevail is long. Consequently, analysis in market failure refers to a breadth of issues that may be tackled from divergent analytical frameworks. 149

Secondly, different schools of economic thought fight for intellectual hegemony over explaining the causes and consequences of these failures, most notably between mainstream neo-classical economics and the public choice theorists of the Chicago school on the one hand, and Keynesian economics associated with the names of Samuelson and Stiglitz on the other hand. While the neo-classical school has shown that, under certain idealised conditions, a system of free markets will lead to a Pareto-efficient outcome, their opponents argue that only state-interventionist schemes in the economy can correct for those market failures and restore the conditions for welfare optimization. For them, market failure provides a ubiquitous argument for government intervention of some form or other. Seen that way, a proper definition of media as public good is a logical starting point for this kind of market regulation. And, thirdly, there are evident problems of applying failure analysis on the media sector. This is because media markets are beset by peculiarities which greatly deviate from the neoclassical model of perfect competition. When reviewing the theory of public goods as selected sub-set theory of the MF paradigm, this study has identified that several of the constituent parts of public goods theory and the context in which they are being considered need to be redefined in the light of some of the unique characteristics of media markets. This is particularly true when considering additional properties of media goods, and tendencies towards digitalization. While the assessment of the impacts of these trends on media markets varies considerably, their relevance for changing the optimal functioning of markets remain to be analyzed more deeply. References Abramowicz, M. 2004. Copyrighted works as public goods, 1(2), ipcentral.info/review/v1n2abramowicz.pdf, accessed on 28 March 2007.

May

6.

Albarran, A. B. 1996. Media Economics: Understanding Markets, Industries and Concepts, Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press. Bator, F. M. 1958. The Anatomy of Market Failure. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72: 351379. Collins, R. 1998. Public Service Broadcasting: An Agenda for Reform. Intermedia, 26(3): 2427. Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. 1986. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. XII, Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. Cowen, T. 1988. The Theory of Market Failure. A Critical Examination. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press. Cowen, T., & Crampton, E. (2002). Market Failure or Success. The New Debate, Cheltenham: Elgar. Detering, D. (1999). Ökonomie der Medieninhalte. Allokative Effizienz und soziale Chancengleichheit in den Neuen Medien, Telekommunikation und Multimedia, Münster: LitVerlag. Doyle, G. (2002). Understanding Media Economics, London: Sage. Gaustad, T. (2002). The Problem of Excludability for Media and Entertainment Products in New Electronic Market Channels. Electronic Markets, 12(4): 248-251. Hoskins, C., McFadyen, S., & Finn, A. (2004). Media Economics. Applying Economics to New and Traditional Media, Sage Publications, London: Thousand Oaks. 150

Musgrave, R. A., & Peacock, A. T. 1958. Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, London: Macmillan. Noam, E. 2004. Market failure in the media sector, Financial Times, 16 February 2004. Olson, M. Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Owen, B. M., & Wildman, S. S. 1992. Video Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pareto, V. (1971/1927). Manual of Political Economy. 1971 translation of 1927 edition, New York: Augustus M. Kelley. Picard, R. G. 1989. Media Economics: Concepts and Issues. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. Reder, M. W. 1982. Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change. Journal of Economic Literature, 20(1): 1-38. Samuelson, P. A. 1954. The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 36(4): 387-389. Samuelson, P. A. 1955. Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 37(4): 350-356. Samuelson, P. A. 1958. Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, Review of Economics and Statistics, 40(4): 332-338. Samuelson, P. A. 1964. Public goods and subscription TV: Correction of the record. Journal of Law and Economics, 7: 81-83. Stigler, G. J. 1988. Chicago Studies in Political Economy, ed. By George J. Stigler, University of Chicago Press. Stiglitz, J. E. 1984. Markets, Market Failures, and Development, American Economic Review, 79(2), (pp. 197-203). Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and First Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. Wildman, S. S. 2006. Paradigms and Analytical Frameworks in Modern Economics and Media Economics. In: Albarran, A. B., Chan-Olmsted, S., & Wirth, O. (eds.), Handbook of Media Management and Economics, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah: New Jersey, 67-90. Zhu, K. 2001. Internet-Based Distribution of Digital Videos: The Economic Impacts of Digitization on the Motion Picture Industry. Electronic Markets, 11(4): 273-280.

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Beitrag 8: Public Service Television at the Digital Crossroads Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C. (2002). Public Service Television at the Digital Crossroads – The Case of Austria, The International Journal on Media Management, 4(2), 24-33.

Abstract The present article examines the impact of new digital technologies, services and markets on changes to television in Austria from a media-economics perspective. Austria offers a shining example for looking into changes induced by digitisation because its television market is currently in a state of flux. This is because private analogue television is finally in the pipeline with public service broadcasting and cable-TV currently switching over to digital distribution. This article started form the assumption that the process of transformation towards digital distribution modes would make questions about the role and legitimacy of public service television in Austria more prominent than ever before. Since the technical development of digitisation steps up competition in the programming, advertising and viewer markets, the continued existence of public service broadcasting in Austria is at risk. Already facing strong competition from private cross-border analogue television, private digital services promise increased competition for the ORF, will take away advertising volume and accelerate the cost spiral for rights. The ORF will have to face these challenges as the regulator has assigned it the role of a chief enabler of digital television in the market segments for satellite and terrestrial transmission. This article argues that successful transformation management starts with clearly defining the roles and functions of the state broadcaster ORF in digital competition environments. Programme universality as leading principle for public service broadcasting faces a legitimacy crisis as digital competitors may better target minority demands in fragmented audience environments. So far, ORF offers converge towards private commercial television and its digital offers show little innovation with respect to traditional programming. It remains to be seen how far the ORF is able to split itself both ways, by being both distinctive and attractive to its target audiences, and thus to ensure its position into the next millennium. Affordability and reliability of technology comes as another critical success factor. For the time being, the continuous confusion about lasting, stable and interoperable receivers in viewer homes is the main cause for the poor development of digital TV in Austria. This is aggravated by excessive prices and the difficulty at the moment in seeing any added value in new digital content. To conclude, much hope is put into the Digitale Plattform Austria, a working group of experts to produce a coherent and evaluable digitisation concept that will take up these challenges in a competent way.

Key words digital television, Austria, media economics, public service television, universality

153

Introduction ‘Intermission – media and media policy in Austria’ – is the blunt title of a sharp analysis carried out by two young Austrian journalists (Fidler and Merkle, 1999). Their résumé was radical: the Austrian state regulator failed to set an appropriate framework for a diverse media landscape. And the traditional workings of corporate consensus politics (Sozialpartnerschaft) led to mutual interweavings of politics and the media which paralysed the media development of the country such that private television was left stuck in the pipeline. In fact, the Austrian government was the last in Europe to support a state monopoly with the public broadcasting corporation, ORF. Besides technical frequency limitations it has primarily been political inertia, but also the argument that private television via antenna would not survive economically which hindered the Austrian government from opening the market in free-to-air TV (Murschetz, 1996). Much has changed with the new coalition government of the conservative People’s Party ÖVP with Mr. Haider’s far-right Freedom Party FPÖ, inaugurated in February 2000. Much-desired regulatory action was finally taken in 2002 when two new laws for increased competition in Austrian television broadcasting were introduced, the ORF law containing all regulatory matters with respect to the public broadcaster (ORF-Gesetz) and the Private TV law (Privatfernsehgesetz). Eventually, in February 2002, the commercial operator ATV was granted the third terrestrial TV-frequency chain to compete with the two channels of the state broadcaster ORF, ORF1 and ORF2, on a nation-wide scale.1 As expected, the reorganisation of the Austrian television market has also affected the state broadcaster ORF.2 The new ORF law, which came into effect on 1 January 2002, basically commits the (still) monopolist to more quality in its programmes at the same time as it restricts its advertising.3 It was no surprise that these advertising restrictions and the demanded return to public service core-values aroused fierce resistance within the ORF. Recently, the ORF had the renowned Swiss Prognos Institute establish that the government would do better not to intervene restrictively in the fortunes of the ORF. In addition, since the economic prospects of private TV are categorised as unfavourable anyway, a strong national champion would be more likely to reach the Austrian public with Austrian programmes and guarantee qualitatively superior broadcasts in the future (Trappel, 2001a: 13). But how does digitisation affect Austrian television broadcasting? Who will be the dominators in the new market segments for digital TV? As for regulation, section six of the new private TV law now regulates the introduction of digital terrestrial broadcasting into Austria. There, the regulating authority, KommAustria, is entrusted with the elaboration of a digitisation concept. To aid it, the study group Digitale Plattform Austria (DPA) has been set up by the Government. Additionally, the new ORF law commits the ORF to providing its programmes via digital terrestrial and digital satellite delivery routes (§3 Abs. 4 ORF-G 2002). The ORF is thus intended to be the pacemaker for digital TV in Austria. However, before the transformation towards digital television is started, critical issues need to be tackled. This is because digitisation raises questions of vital importance for the future of Austrian television. Therefore, a critical examination of requirements and limitations for digital TV is urgently necessary and should be on top of the agenda of the DPA study group. Study purpose and research scope The present article examines the impact of new digital technologies, services and markets on changes to television in Austria from a media-economics perspective. Essentially, it will focus on the following two central topics:

154

x

Corporate strategies of positioning in digital markets.

x

Roles and functions of public service television in the digital era.

Starting point of analysis will be an introductory overview of latest developments in the Austrian broadcasting market and a short description of technology changes caused by digitisation. Then follows a descriptive, up-to-date stock-taking of Austrian actors in digital television, depicting their offers in the respective market segments for satellite, cable and antenna. This will map out their underlying rationales for advancing into the digital arena. A further substantial aim of analysis is to discuss critical issues regarding necessary role changes in public service television on the threshold of the digital age. Here, the article will present two strands of discussion in the debate on the fulfilment of the social mission of public service television in the digital era: pressures on programme and viewer universality caused by digitisation. To answer this, it will be necessary to refer to approaches in economic broadcasting theory with a view to changes incurred by digitisation. Television in Austria: the market Developments towards digitisation must be considered against the following three major aspects: ƒ

Developments in TV equipment and distribution towards digitisation.

ƒ

Changes in regulation towards market liberalisation in analogue television.

ƒ

Competition from strong overspill of German TV programmes.

As for Austrian TV households, more than 80% of are equipped with cable and satellite, with many terrestrial households having switched to (analogue) satellite reception. However, there is still some 20% of households receiving programmes only terrestrially, statistically notwithstanding those who dually use satellite dishes but are still equipped with roof aerials to receive ORF1 and ORF2 which are not transmitted via analogue satellite (DPA, 2002: 40).

155

Table 1: Analogue TV equipment in Austria in 1000

%

Total TV households

3.116

100

Cable connected

1.178

38

Satellite, DTH

1.362

44

567

19

Terrestrial analogue 4

Source: Triconsult 2001 , author up-dates And what about digital TV equipment? 13% of all Austrian TV households have set-top-boxes in their homes to decode programmes transmitted via cable and satellite. 58% of these boxes are still analogue, 48% digital. In March 2001, 2% could watch ORF Digital via DVB-S and 4% receive the digital Pay-TV package of Premiere. Table 2: Digital TV equipment in Austria (March 2001) in 1000

%

Decoder

405

13

Decoder analogue

234

8

Decoder digital

196

6

84

3

50

2

134

4

Decoder with smart card Reception of ORF Digital* Reception of Premiere

Source: Triconsult 2001, *According to ORF data, already 100.000 viewers have switched to ORF Digital by February 2002 (ORF 2002, http://digital.orf.at on 8 April 2002). Secondly, television in Austria has long been synonymous with public broadcasting organised by the ORF. Under the technical conditions of limited frequency, the ORF was granted the only licence for radio and television broadcasting over two national frequencies chains for analogue terrestrial television: ORF1 and ORF2. Insufficient frequencies of terrestrial airwaves were the initial significant barrier to a free television market and allowed the design for a monopoly in public television to appear appropriate. As mentioned above, most legislative proposals to liberalize broadcasting in Austria ended in deadlock despite various private initiatives and rulings of the Constitutional Court (Steinmaurer, 2000).5 It took until 1997 when the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Act of 1997 (Kabel und Satellitenrundfunkgesetz – KSRG) created the legal basis for active cable broadcasting. ATV, which started as low-scale cable station Wien1, soon developed into the ORF's biggest competitor. Today, it technically reaches some 30% of Austrian cable-TV viewers and 2% of digital satellite households (Ring, 2001: 24). Content on offer is a full-programme mix of local entertainment, news, business, talk shows, sports, light entertainment, and sex. 156

Although ORF has enjoyed a long-term monopoly from a supply-side perspective, they have faced increasing competition from extensive overspill of German TV programmes. More than two thirds of all Austrian cable and satellite TV households can receive most of the German free TV programmes and major channels. These programmes compete against ORF for audience shares, and – increasingly – for advertising budgets. As for audience shares, Austrian cable and satellite households (80%) could receive an average of about 34 different foreign programmes in 2001, 31 of them in German language (ORF 2001a; IP Germany, 2001: 78). Despite this, the ORF has managed to keep both the German competitors and the Austrian newcomer ATV at bay. Two programme reforms in 1995 and 1998 could successfully win back primarily younger viewers who have been lost to foreign competition, enlarge the distance to its competitors, and increase market share with primarily Austrian-specific programming. In 2001, the ORF (48%) could steadily increase its overall market share in multi-channel homes (adults aged 12+), to the debit of its big German private competitors RTL (7%), Pro7 (6%), SAT.1 (6%), and the public stations ARD (3,6%) and ZDF (3,4%) (ORF, 2002). The ORF’s positive economics is mainly accounted for by well accepted informational programming, low-cost US-feature films and series, exclusive sports transmissions and an overall successful ‘Austrification’ of programmes, that is a stress on innovative in-house productions aiming at the preservation of Austrian culture. In 2000, ORF relaunched its TV design to reflect the different market positions of its two analogue channels. ORF1 is the dynamic entertainment and events channel for the younger urban target groups. ORF1 programming features sports, movies, international serials, comedy, entertainment and children’s programmes. ORF2 is the more traditional Austrian general interest channel, offering information, cultural and educational programmes, arts, Austrian traditional culture shows and more traditional fiction. Digital Television: the technology It is well known that digitisation is making its entry into all media. Picture and video processing on domestic PCs have been customary for a long time. TV is also increasingly deriving benefits from digitisation. It alters the complete television value chain, i.e. the entire process from filming, recording, studio editing, and dissemination, to the reception and reproduction in the viewer’s home (Deutsche TV-Plattform, 2000). The essential advantages of digital TV for providers are frequency economies, i.e. higher transmission capacity, economies of transmission costs, improvements in reception in topographically critical areas, portable or mobile reception and the possibility of the transmission of audio and data services like internet access or email via the TV screen. Digitisation is accompanied by substantial changes on the receiver-side: digital receiver-equipment, a substantially greater palette of programmes and promised interactivity with TV services. Interactivity empowering the audience is intended to offer various uses, from programmes sent on demand (VOD) or selected from a rotating palette according to various set times, to the viewer actively participating in programming. Interactivity is, however, also significant because programmes can be targeted at paying viewers and charged for. This is, of course, lucrative for pay-TV providers because is raises the possibility of direct programme marketing for a single payment. TV as pay-TV ranges from subscription to entire programme bouquets to single payments per programme viewed (payper-view). As a result, indirect financing methods via licence fees or advertising receipts may become secondary (Friedrichsen and Never, 1999: 92). Importantly, the exclusion of nonpaying TV-consumers may become possible (Kiefer, 2001; p. 146). Moreover, digital technologies render increased networking of technical formats possible, both of production and 157

transmission technologies and end-user equipment to integrated multimedia systems (keyword: convergence TV). Then nothing would stand in the way to technically fuse the TV with PC and telephone. The set-top box, the receiver device for digital TV programmes, would then be equipped for secondary activities like e.g. email, home-banking or interactive advertising in the data network (ORF, 2001b). Digital television in Austria: the actors Due to the lack of commercial television service providers, Austria’s development of digital TV is the dominated by the ORF on the one hand, and the market entry of German digital service providers on the other. ORF Digital The ORF is the only genuine player in the Austrian digital satellite TV market. Building on its financial capacity and content wealth, the ORF has gradually offered its programme palette on digital satellite, leasing transponder space on Astra 1G. According to the ORF, it is Euro 7.2 million to transmit on analogue satellite and only Euro 1.4 million on digital transponder (Zeiler, 1998). Within Austria, this move to digital satellite TV applies to the existing channels ORF1 and ORF2 (both encrypted), a narrowcast channel for tourism, weather and sports, a videotext channel (encrypted), all ORF radio programmes, and expanded regional television. Unfortunately, digital TV-broadcast programmes are encrypted and only accessible with an ORF-smart card. Only Austrian households paying the mandatory licence fee are entitled to receive these cards for their digital decoders. And only after paying an additional one-off descrambling fee will they access the digital services.6 ORF Digital also represents a platform for future narrowcast channels, ideally for sports, education and culture offered as premium content. TW1 is the ORF’s semi-public digital narrowcast channel for tourism, weather, and sports, available free-of-charge in the framework of the digital bouquet of the German ZDF (ZDF.vision), also transmitting via Astra 1G.7 As for sports, TW1 is clearly intended to be a test-bed for commercially more attractive, future sports narrowcasting. With mass-attractive sports like skiing and football remaining broadcast on its analogue mother channel ORF1, TW1 is slowly mutating into the ORF’s narrowcast minority sports channel. The Austrian lottery, casino gaming, and big newspapers are said to be buying up broadcasting time to finance it. Under the new ORF law, no licence fees must cross-subsidise TW1. Moreover, plans to introduce a digital narrowcast channel for culture (Kulturkanal) were projected and discussed but recently frozen because no appropriate business model was found (ORF, 2000). Again, the new law prescribes that the channel may only be financed by self-generated advertising revenues. This is obviously difficult for a culture channel. Given these phase-in difficulties, it came as a surprise that the ORF was recently able to agree to contribute to BR Alpha, the digital education narrowcast channel of the German PSB Bayerischer Rundfunk, also digitally transmitting via Astra 1G. This joint operation provides room for indigenous Austrian ORFproductions in the fields of culture, education, science and technology and reaches a European audience. The future of the antenna: DVB-T Digitisation is also opening up new perspectives for terrestrial transmission. DVB-T is the technical standard, which is supposed to conjure up to five digital programmes on one channel via antenna onto Austrian TV screens. The chronic scarcity of transmission frequencies could 158

be removed at one stroke with the introduction of DVB-T. More choice, crystal-clear pictures and sound in several languages are also intended to render household TV more attractive in the future via stationary reception with roof or rod antenna. The new private TV law already foresees the politically chosen basic switchover scenario to DVB-T. Thus, those frequencies which, on the basis of a frequency-study commissioned by the Federal Chancellery, have been found in addition to the new analogue frequency chain, are to be reserved for digital terrestrial television (Morgen, 2001). In the run-up to this decision, disputes naturally occurred: the ORF demanded the still unused frequency chain in order to switch over to DVB-T at an early stage (ORF, 1999). This would, on the one hand, have avoided an expensive simulcast operation but would also have meant the end for national private television. With the allocation of the new chain (offering comprehensive coverage) for the use of analogue private TV, this option became redundant. As an alternative, the DVB-T frequencies for the conurbations of Bregenz, Linz, Graz, Salzburg and Vienna could now be allocated to the ORF, which, though it would make private TV possible on the third frequency, would prevent the great plus of a country-wide third digital chain, namely the creation of broader acceptance through greater coverage. Table 3: Roll-out of ORF Digital Channel

Launch

Offer

TW1

12/1997

TW1, non-encrypted digital tourism and weather channel, free-of-charge via digital satellite Astra 1G

ORF Teletext ORF2, TW1

Digital 1/1998 4/1998

Videotext service Non-encrypted mix of ORF2 and TW1 on digital bouquet ZDF.vision. ORF2 taken off-air in 09/2000

ORF Digital (DVB- 08/2000 S)

Decision on STB-standard ‘d-box’, start of encrypted transmission of ORF1 and ORF2 as regular service ORF Digital via digital satellite Astra 1G

ORF Digital (DVB- 01/2002 T)

Discussion on piloting of DVB-T and establishment of DPA Study Group

ORF Digital (DVB- 01/2003 T)

Launch of DVB-T planned for 2003

Source: Lassnig et al. 1999, author up-dates ORF-rationale for DVB-S The ORF claims the main reason given for transmitting ORF programmes via digital satellite (DVB-S) is the fulfilment of the public service supply remit. All inhabitants of the country are to be evenly provided with ORF Digital. The particular topography of Austria is the reason why a complete supply via analogue systems would only be possible at unacceptable financial costs. Digital satellite TV then also makes possible the reception of ORF TV programmes in those Austrian households (4% of the total) which had no or only poor quality supply until now.

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Additional reasons for the ORF’s entry into digital satellite TV are evident: first of all, globalisation is a pressure difficult to escape. Providers who do not offer their programmes all over Europe will soon be seen as identity-givers with a predominantly national target-group reference, which, in the European, indeed global context seems somewhat contradictory. According to the ORF, the new transmission paths would also bring cost savings since places where terrestrial networks are not present or not sufficiently developed or do not have the necessary transmission capacity could be supplied at substantially more favourable costs by digital satellite or digital terrestrial TV than by further developing analogue terrestrial radio links (ORF, 1999). Thirdly, the ORF never closes doors to find new sales routes for its programmes. As the former ORF director general, Gerhard Zeiler, unequivocally put it as early as 1997, new business fields open up for mixed-funded public service broadcasters, fields that can supply proceeds for financing of the programme remit (Zeiler, 1997: 6). This strategy is prolonged by the new ORF management. Future commercial proceeds are used for legitimising public service programmes. The ORF calls this bluntly “reverse cross-subsidisation of public service core programmes from advertising revenues” (ORF, 2001: 38). In essence, the ORF is embarking on a triple strategy of flexible adaptation to digital markets: technical innovation will bring greater reach and better fulfil the public remit, yet at lower costs. Whatever helps reverse cross-subsidising public service core programmes from advertising revenues (e.g. through proceeds from digital sports narrowcasting) is welcomed if consistent with existing law. The competitors: Digital Pay-TV While the ORF is heading for leadership in the direct-to-home segment of the digital TV market, the Austrian market for cable TV is also gradually switching to digital technology. In September 2001, UPC Telekabel Wien, Austria’s largest cable TV provider and subsidiary of the Amsterdam-based cable operator United Pan-Europe Communications (with a 95% share, the remaining 5% being owned by the Vienna City Council), began broadcasting digital TV in Vienna via one of the biggest and two-way-capable networks in Europe.8 UPC’s basic offer includes 50 digital TV channels, 40 digital audio channels, near VOD, an interactive TV application with web contents and email via TV. Each subscriber gets an email address and can work directly on the TV screen with an infrared keyboard. However, that digital cable is still in its infancy is mainly due to the fact that the Austrian cable TV market is highly fragmented. There are more than 250 operators, but only about 100 of these have more than 500 subscribers. In contrast to Germany, where Deutsche Telekom operates a nation-wide network, Austrian cable TV network-providers tend to operate on a regional or local basis. About 19,000 Telekabel customers in Vienna have switched to digital TV during the winter months of 2001/2. With altogether 920.000 cable customers (30 September 2001), UPC has huge potential to drive up digital subscriptions. The pay-TV service of Premiere World, partly owned by the German Kirch-group and Murdoch’s BSkyB (22% in April 2002), has also gone digital. Premiere offers TV-adapted top movies, sports, live concerts, documentaries and sex on three multiplex-channels. The programmes are shown time-shifted so that subscribers can choose from three options at any one time. Furthermore, four pay-per-view channels of top movies and sports events are on offer. Interestingly, Premiere is currently not broadcast via the Viennese cable network of UPC Telekabel (by April 2002).

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Changes in public service television What role remains for public television in an expanding digital environment characterised by immense technological and commercial change? To answer this, a clear definition of the public interest in the digital age is to refer to the central principles of public television, the public remit for full-service provision. Public service television is legally obliged to achieve geographic, programme and audience universality whereby it has something at some time to offer to everyone for the viewing nation as a whole. This means that public broadcasters are forced into an almost impossible balancing act: to survive they need to produce both distinctive niche products which the rest of the marketplace does not provide (including minority programming) and cater for a wide range of tastes and interests to justify the value of public funding. Therefore, viewer-financed public television must offer people something which they cannot otherwise see, serve minorities as well as fulfil the function of a national culture-identity carrier for majorities.9 In digital competition, however, this public service provision based on values of universality is subject to the following additional challenges: new players approaching on the scene will intensify competition in multichannel television environments and may over time marginalize public provision through their dominance of content procurement, distribution networks, and consumer access systems (Steemers, 1998: 98). And, secondly, digitisation leads to narrowcasting whereby public television may be left with services aimed at commercially less attractive target groups (Steemers, 1998: 103). This may in turn further undermine the public support which forms the basis of public service broadcasting’s principle, the licence fee. Pressures on universality Digitisation is changing market conditions: this is the conclusion of an advisory group to Kommunikationsordnung 2000 of the Bertelsmann foundation. There, renowned experts proved that transition of a conventional infrastructure is a long-term, technically complicated and financially costly endeavour with high competitive risks (Glotz et al., 1998: 98). Thus, it is assumed that digitisation of television will lead to an intensification of competition in the programme, advertising and viewer markets and trigger off new distribution struggles among providers (Reiter, 1997; 1998). This means that digitisation also gains not least in economic significance through the fact that it does away with the scarcity of channels. It also intensifies the scarcity of programmes, whereby attractive content is made still more expensive. This development leads inevitably to the splitting up of viewers among the various offers. This in turn weakens the use of quota optimisation by means of full-service programmes reaching wide numbers and tends to push down advertising revenues. As a result, the budgetary pressure on public service television increases. For digital pay-TV providers also have a demand for massattractive programme content and programme rights in order to compete equally with public service providers or those financed by advertising or subscription. As a consequence, the following double-bind situation arises for public service TV in the digital era: either it faces up to the digital competition or it relinquishes digital markets and declines altogether (Siune and Hultén, 1998; Steemers 1998; Tracey 1998). The former strategy is inevitable if the legal commitment is to be fulfilled, but expensive in view of both the widening gap between fixed programme-charges and legally limited advertising revenues and everincreasing cost of rights. The latter strategy is politically undesirable because thereby the future of public service television would be called into question. In Austria, late political support and regulatory actions have shown that the ORF should be assured of universality through access to new transmission technology in the context of its public remit. However, one may criticize that the ORF has already redefined programme 161

universality in analogue broadcasting in subtle ways. Culture programming has been thinned out such that, for example, mass-attractive popular entertainment like the daily TV-show “Willkommen Österreich” is attributed culture programming status. Further, programme policies towards market-oriented quota-optimisation have evidently lowered journalistic quality standards and gradually delegitimised programme innovation in critical arts, culture and informational programming, leading to a drain in creative talents. And the share of sport programming on ORF1 is evidently getting bigger to the debit of other core public interest broadcasting. Having said all this, one has to remain sceptical as to whether ORF digital culture programming will do any better. The end of market failure? Along with normative prescriptions for the protection of programme universality, aspects of (neo-classical) economic theory provide information on the reasons why free-to-air, unencrypted broadcasting is a failed market and thus needs public regulation. Since it fails to create appropriate incentives towards cost-efficient allocation of resources, political intervention is needed to safeguard features of broadcasting which are beneficial for the public and increase consumer welfare too (Collins, 1998). Media economists largely agree that universally accessible TV leads to concentration since cost savings achieved by a certain volume of programme output (economies of scale), between different outputs within one company active in more than one market or across more steps of production (economies of scope), or between networks of different suppliers and customers (economies of networking) lead to a distortion of fair broadcasting competition with overall welfare losses for the viewing public (Müller, 1998). In this case, public regulation is warranted as dominant operators may seek to eliminate competition to achieve monopolist mark-ups, build up market entry barriers, leverage market power in one market to obtain power in another, establish programming control and keep down quality and product innovation. Since simultaneously the pressure of competition for cost-saving increases, it seems sensible to attain greatest possible advantages from multiple utilisation of journalistic content in as many channels as possible. This naturally culminates in the feeding of such information into digital networks. Secondly, free-to-air television shows characteristics of public goods that, theoretically, everybody can consume and from which nobody can be excluded. This means it is impossible or too costly for broadcasters to exclude those who do not pay for them. Viewers will thus free ride on the demands of others. Further, they consume but see no incentive to pay for particularly beneficial goods, so-called ‘merit goods’, which broadcasting programmes may confer, such as objective information, high culture, and education. Non-rivalry and non-exclusivity of consuming TV programmes thus render competitive controls powerless in unencrypted broadcasting. However, digitisation is now considerably altering the economics of information. And standard theoretical positions of broadcasting markets as failed ones needing state intervention are increasingly losing significance. This is the case because digitisation is becoming increasingly economically attractive by solving the economic problem of non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption and by generally changing the conditions of broadcasting by reinstating the market as regulatory principle. Consequently, increased competition promises to overcome market imperfections in many ways. Encoding signals regulate viewer access to programmes, thus excluding those who are not willing or able to pay for them. Cash-collection problems which have, up until now, strongly impeded the economic viability of pay-TV, are soluble via the set-top-box which is, anyhow, necessary for the reception of digitised offers 162

(Kiefer, 2001). This economic viability is now converting free-to-air programmes into subscription broadcasts. The market then serves as the best resource allocation system with prices serving as suitable instruments for viewers to best signal their consumer preferences. The d-box dilemma The situation in Austria brings further evidence to the fore that digital television is far from being fully accepted by viewers. Although it has been possible to receive ORF via satellite and the d-box since 31 August 2000, its launch has been accompanied by a series of shortcomings. Shortcomings also to be noticed by Premiere. The bone of contention is the set-top-box technology of the d-box. The ORF declared its decision for Kirch’s ‘d-box’ in spring 2000. However, by choosing the d-box, the ORF inherited all of Premiere’s problems with the box (Selhofer et al., 2000). In gist, the d-box offers no common interface with competitive encryption systems - it only understands Premiere’s Betacrypt system - and thus contradicts the European TV signal directive. Whoever wants to watch ORF Digital needs to buy the d-box for decoding the programmes. No other technically more advanced and cheaper decoders would do. Why did the ORF build on the d-box? The ORF argued that this was only sensible as there were already more than 50,000 Austrian households using it to receive Kirch’s digital package Premiere World by then. Premiere viewers thus only needed the ORF smart-card for accessing ORF Digital via the box. ORF critics claim that this policy might have been ‘doing a favour’ for the ORF’s most important content provider, the Kirch-group (Infosat, 2000). The ‘d-box dilemma’ also made manifest the crucial impediment for further market development of digital television in Austria: the uncertainty of technical specifications deters potential viewers from paying for new boxes if they do not know what programmes they will receive or not. And, secondly, uncertain retail price developments of decoders make them uneasy about switching to digital reception mode (VKI, 2000). Together with the essential lack of content surplus-value for the viewer through delivery of ‘more-of-the-same’ programming and the abundance of analogue free-TV via cable and satellite, viewer take-up of digital television seems stuck in the starting blocks. Conclusion The future of television broadcasting will be digital, and this means noise and loss-free transmission of pictures, higher capacity of broadcasting channels and a substantially larger programme palette with additional television services. But even if the attraction of digitisation is as strong as widely promised, does it really mean better television? This article started from the assumption that the process of transformation would make questions about the role and legitimacy of public service television in Austria more prominent than ever before. Since the technical development of digitisation steps up competition in the programming, advertising and viewer markets, the continued existence of public service broadcasting in Austria is at risk. Already facing strong competition from private cross-border analogue television, digital services promise increased competition for the ORF, will take away advertising volume and accelerate the cost spiral for rights. The ORF will have to face these challenges as the regulator has assigned it the role of a chief enabler of digital television in Austria. And, according to the seminal ARD white paper on roles of PSBs in the digital era, public service television will have to bind a user-friendly bouquet with attractive content to ally full-service programmes with specialist channels and new media offers. Accordingly, the aim would be deepening of content and not mere multiplication (Reiter, 1998). So far, ORF offers 163

converge towards private commercial television, with its digital offers showing little innovation with respect to traditional programming. It remains to be seen how far the ORF is able to split itself both ways, by being both distinctive and attractive to its target audiences, and thus to ensure its position into the next millennium. Media economics theory will have to react to changes induced by digitisation too. Although digitisation helps commodifying TV, programmes still carry the cultural form of public goods. The need for state intervention to safeguard spill-over benefits for society should thus remain relevant. This is to be considered by the Digitale Plattform Austria, the working group to study and consult the transition to digital television in Austria. Underlining this, programme universality is a core principle for public provision of TV broadcasts becoming ever more critical to shape and regulate in the digital future. Although the digital television market is still very small and only slowly emerging, the market players are jostling for position on the basis of the classical competition parameters product, price, and promotion. Technology comes as another critical success factor. The incumbent ORF is the driver in the market segment for digital satellite television. 100.000 viewers have already switched to ORF Digital (in February 2002). The ORF is also ambitious to play a major role regarding digital terrestrial television. Additionally, the ORF enjoys many traditional advantages in terms of content, corporate ego, rights, brand awareness and customer affiliation. The regulator should be aware of these advantages and, in turn, help newcomers play a vital part in digital TV. The ORF and Premiere use the d-box as set-top-box standard which increases software interoperability between them but, as repeatedly criticised, concentrates the end-user market in unfavourable terms for the viewer. On top of the persistent confusion regarding an affordable and enduringly stable set-top-box, viewer access to ORF Digital is as yet restricted to registered Austrian TV-households paying for an extra fee to decode the services. This is definitely close to public-service pay-TV. Premiere goes strong in live-transmitting premium sports content, offering a series of digital add-on services and no nasty advertising breaks. Another asset is pay-TV experience and time-shifted delivery of programmes. UPC has a large analogue userbase to soon drive-up the number of digital subscribers. State-of-the-art technology is ready for more interactivity with the TV-set. However, neither the d-box nor the UPC-box is as yet upgraded to the new MHP-standard. MHP would guarantee that independent of the type of digital receiver and the service consumed, every viewer would be able to use a broad range of different applications unrestrictedly. These decoders are yet not available and, even if so, much too expensive.10 Audience acceptance of digital television programmes offered by the ORF will also depend on a tangible added content value as compared with private provision. Only this would increase the ORF’s chance of market penetration in a fragmented digital TV audience environment. Above all, consumers should derive advantages from new technology and content. Email and interactive applications should supplement TV and help compensate for the loss in social integration that is said to be aggravated by digitisation (digital divide). In any case, it is reasonable to be sceptical about interactivity because transmission capacities necessary and the required return channel-capabilities in DVB-S and DVB-T are currently lacking. But only real interactivity will stimulate the multiple use of innovative content, reinforce brand loyalty and make possible the transfer to interactive TV as medium of the future. It only remains to be hoped that the legislator, with the aid of the working group Digitale Plattform Austria will produce a coherent and evaluable digitisation concept that will take up these challenges in competent ways.

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Notes 1. The Prognos-Institute views the economic viability of private TV in Austria with great scepticism. Stagnating duration of television use and a limited advertising market are seen as its main causes (Trappel, 2001b). Moreover, run-up costs of Euro 58 million are reckoned with until 2005 (Schliesselberger, 2002). 2. It therefore seems appropriate to speak of the fourth structural reform of Austrian broadcasting after 1966, 1974 and 1984 (See, Murschetz, 1996). 3. In some areas, regulation regarding permitted advertising and sponsoring activities are framed more restrictively than hitherto. Possibilities of interstitials are limited and product placement outwith cinema films, TV films and TV series is prohibited. In the future, crosspromotion of ORF radio programmes and television is forbidden. Intended limitations are said to be necessary in order to offer private TV providers sufficient possibilities of finance. 4. Triconsult researched the market potential of digital television in Austria on behalf of the ORF. 1000 people aged 14plus were interviewed face-to-face throughout the country between 2 to 21 March 2001. The ORF withdrew publishing the results. 5. In 1993, the Austrian Government was subject to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg which regarded the country’s ban on terrestrially transmitted private broadcasting as a breach of Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention. 6. Infosat regrets that public service TV like that of the ORF is only transmitted in encrypted form and is therefore only freely available for subscribed Austrians. The fact that the ORF does not wish or is unable to afford expensive Europe-wide transmission and licence rights is said, in addition, to contradict the European idea of TV without frontiers (See, Infosat, 1/2002: 9). 7. TW 1 is partly owned by the ORF (50%) and the Sitour group (50%). At the end of 2000, the ORF removed ORF2 from the digital bouquet of ZDF.vision for cost reasons. 8. Telekabel-mother UPC is itself controlled by the Liberty Media conglomerate of John Malone. 9. The Austrian writer Franz Schuh recently spoke of a ‘pluralisation of incompatibilities’ which public service television in Austria faces. According to Schuh, the ORF is, on the one hand, bound to objectivity, and, on the other hand, “it belongs to the state, that means, in plain language, the officials of the government of the day dominate it”. Furthermore, in addition to political pressure, a “superficially depoliticised market” had evolved which the ORF would have to meet. Schuh’s worst-case scenario: “The worst thing that could happen to the national public service medium, this soundbox of the voices of our homeland, the real or supposed mirror of the country, would be the absolute merger, the complete fusion of commercial channel and government broadcaster” (Schuh, 2001: 13). 10. This article does not reflect the bankruptcy of the Kirch-group and its effects on technology policy. References ARD-Projektgruppe Digital (2001). Digitales Fernsehen in Deutschland – Markt, Nutzerprofile, Bewertungen. Media Perspektiven, vol. 4/2001, Frankfurt/Main, pp. 202-219.

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ORF-G – Bundesgesetz über den Österreichischen Rundfunk (2001). BGBl. Nr. 379/1984 idF. BGBl. I Nr. 83/2001. Collins, R. (1998). Public Service Broadcasting: An Agenda for Reform. InterMedia, vol. 26, no. 3, March, London, pp. 24-7. Deutsche TV-Plattform (2000). Fernsehen Heute und Morgen. Technik – Märkte – Strategien, www.tv-plattform.de, Berlin. DPA – Digitale Plattform Austria (2002). Willkommen in der Digitalen Zukunft, Publikation Auftaktveranstaltung, RTR-GmbH Wien. Fidler, H. and A. Merkle (1999). Sendepause. Medien und Medienpolitik in Österreich. Edition lex liszt 12, Oberwart. Friedrichsen, M. and H. Never (1999). Digitalisierung als Chance? Strukturwandel der Medienwirtschaft im Zeitalter digitaler Kommunikation, eds. M. Knoche and G. Siegert, Verlag Reinhard Fischer, München, pp. 91-113. Glotz, P., Gröbel, J., and E.-J. Mestmäcker (1998). Zur Wirklichkeit der Grundversorgung. Über den Funktionsauftrag öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunkanstalten. Fernsehen auf dem Prüfstand. Kommunikationsordnung 2000, ed. by I. Hamm, Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp. 87-102. Infosat (2000). Staatlich verordnete d-box-Invasion in Österreich?, 10/2000, no. 151, pp. 6-13. Infosat (2002). Fernsehen ohne Grenzen. Von der Freiheit über den Wolken, 1/2002, no. 166, pp. 8-15. IP Germany (2001). Television 2001, European Key Facts, RTL Group, Köln. Kiefer, M. L. (2001). Medienökonomik. Einführung in eine ökonomische Theorie der Medien. Oldenbourg: München, Wien. Lassnig, M., Mulrenin, A, and H. Selhofer (1999). Marktentwicklung des digitalen Fernsehens in Deutschland und Österreich, Techno-Z Forschungs- und Entwicklung GmbH, Salzburg. Morgen, M. (2001). Studie ‚Digitales Fernsehen in Österreich’, LS telcom, Wien. Müller, M. (1998). Markt- und Politikversagen im Fernsehsektor. Verlag Peter Lang, München. Murschetz, P. C. (1996). Die Geschichte des Rechts der elektronischen Medien in Österreich 1945 – 1995’, Rot-Schwarz-Rot. Rundfunkpolitik in Österreich 1945 – 1995, ed. D. Stepan, Guthmann & Petersen, Wien, pp. 51-134. Murschetz, P. C. (1998). The Austrian Broadcasting Corporation shapes up to the digital age’, in InterMedia, vol. 26, no. 5, December, pp. 33-5. ORF (1999). Digitales Fernsehen für Österreich. Fernsehen auf neuen Übertragungswegen, ORF TD/GÖK, Wien. ORF (2000). Für einen österreichischen Kulturkanal – Ein Projekt des ORF, Wien. ORF (2001a). Der ORF im Wettbewerb. Daten, Fakten und Zusammenhänge zur Finanzierung des ORF, März 2001, Wien. ORF (2001b). Die Zukunft ist interaktiv, Broschüre, Redaktion: Kaufmännische Direktion des ORF, Wien. ORF (2001c). Ergebnisse 1998 – 2001. Arbeitsbilanz, MitarbeiterInnen, Landesintendanten, Geschäftsführung und Generalintendant Gerhard Weis, November 2001, Wien. 166

ORF (2002), Internet: http://mediaresearch.orf.at (8 April 2002). Reiter, U. (1997). Die Strategie der ARD im Digitalen Zeitalter’, Media Perspektiven, vol. 8, Frankfurt/Main, pp. 410-14. Reiter, U. (1998). ARD-Weißbuch 2000. Chancen, Risiken und Aufgaben des öffentlichrechtlichen Rundfunks in der digitalen Medienwelt. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag, Leipzig. Ring, W.-D. (2001). Entwicklung eines dualen Fernsehsystems in Österreich, gutachterliche Stellungnahme im Auftrage des Verbands Österreichischer Zeitungen, Wien. Schliesselberger, H. (2002). Ein Sender startet durch. Salzburger Nachrichten, 15 February 2002. Schuh, F. (2001). Wotan Syndrom. Der ORF als Identitätsspender und als gestörte Identität. Der Falter, vol. 29, Wien, pp. 13-4. Selhofer, H. and M. Lassnig (2000). Ich sehe was, was du nicht siehst ... Set-Top-Boxen als Gatekeeper digitaler Fernsehdienste: Medienpolitische Herausforderungen und Akzeptanzfragen. Salzburg Research Forschungsgesellschaft. Schriftenreihe zur Informationsgesellschaft, Band 15, Salzburg. Siune, K. and O. Hultén (1998), ‘Does Public Broadcasting Have a Future?’, in Media Policy. Convergence, Concentration & Commerce, ed. by McQuail, D. and K. Siune, London: Sage, pp. 23-38. Steemers, J. (1998). On the Treshold of the Digital Age: Prospects for Public Service Broadcasting. Changing Channels. The Prospects for Television in a Digital World, University of Luton Press. Steinmaurer, T. (2000). Das Rundfunksystem Österreichs. Internationales Handbuch für Hörfunk und Fernsehen 2000/1, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden. Tracey, M. (1998). The Decline and Fall of Public Service Broadcasting, Oxford University Press. Trappel, J. (1998). Werbemarkt Schweiz. Abschätzung der wirtschaftlichen Tragfähigkeit für das Fernsehen, Prognos, Basel. Trappel, J. (2001a). Fernsehmarkt Österreich, Prognos, Basel. Trappel, J. (2001b). Fernsehen in Österreich und in der Schweiz. Wenig Licht im deutschen Marktschatten. Media Perspektiven, vol. 6, Frankfurt/Main, pp. 306-314. Triconsult (2001). Marktpotenzial Digitales Fernsehen, Repräsentative österreichweite faceto-face Befragung bei 1000 Personen ab 14 Jahren (Feldzeit 2.-21. März 2001), Triconsult GmbH, Wien (unpublished manuscript) VKI – Verein für Konsumenteninformation (2000). ORF über D-box. Konsument, Wien (www.konsument.at). Zeiler, G. (1997). Der öffentliche Auftrag des ORF. Die Position des Unternehmens im Wettbewerb des digitalen Medienzeitalters. ORF-Medienreport, vol. 421, Februar-März, Wien. Zeiler, G. (1998). Quote und/oder Kulturauftrag, Podiumsveranstaltung der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Kulturpolitik und der SPÖ-Zukunftswerkstätte, 4. Mai 1998, Wien (collected by T. Swoboda, Werkstattblätter, 3/98: 8-9).

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Beitrag 9: Digital Pay-TV in Germany Originally published in: Murschez, P. C., & Karstens, E. (2009). Digital Pay-TV in Germany: A ViableLesson for Market Failure? In: J. Krone (Ed.), Fernsehen im Wandel. Mobilte TV an IPTV in Deutschland und Österreich (pp. 145-167). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

ABTRACT This article examines market failure theory and discusses its validity in explaining the efficient allocation of resources in the digital pay TV sector in Germany. It argues that German digital pay TV is and will remain to be a failed market dominated by inhibitors for market growth and efficiency. We find that pay TV uptake in Germany is near gridlocked by a set of systemic pressures for failure that hinder an optimal functioning of the market. Keywords Digital Pay TV, Germany, market analysis, market failure Acknowledgements We thank the research students Ramona Queißer, Hauke Grün and Max Franke (all students of Cologne Business School) for research assistance.

1

Introduction

Germany has remained one of the least developed markets for digital pay TV in Europe. Four main reasons are repeatedly voiced to explain this market failure: x

Intense competition from free TV: More sustainable pay TV growth has been inhibited by the incumbent market power of traditional analogue broadcasting platforms represented by the public service broadcasters ARD and ZDF and their affiliated PSB channels (notably the so-called “third” channels of ARD) on the one hand, and the two major private commercial broadcasting companies who established so-called “families” of channels, represented by the Bertelsmann/RTL group and ProSiebenSat1 Media. As Germans households enjoy an average of 35 free-to-view public and commercial channels, the viewers’ desirability and willingness to pay for additional services with no added value is predicted to remain low. Even worse, that German TV households already pay licence fees of more than 200 EUR per annum, an amount that many perceive as “forced pay TV”, will act as another brake on further customer pay TV uptake.

x

Slow market growth for pay TV: Germany’s pay TV market penetration remains low compared with other European countries. Seriously hit by the collapse of the Kirch empire in 2002, which was assumed to be the result of costly film rights deals and a misjudged foray into pay TV, the industry’s non-collaborative attitude for technical standard-setting into an interoperable receiver box, and Germany’s special competitive 169

situation have come as main failure drivers (Kiefer 2002, Gehring 2003, Witt 2003, Woldt 2002). While pay TV penetration is higher in Germany (63%) than in the UK (46%), primarily due to the widespread adoption of basic cable services, the uptake of digital services is lower (Ofcom 2007b). Still, consumer spending on pay TV has been the fastest growing revenue stream in the German TV market (CAGR 97-07 of 7.1%), mainly driven by new premium pay TV services offered on digital cable and satellite (UK: CAGR 97-07 of 14.4%). x

Fragmented cable sector: Following market liberalization in 1999/2000, the cable market suffers from a fragmented vertical structure organized alongside four levels.1 As a result, the big supra-regional cable players (Level 3 players) do have direct billing relationships with “only” 60-70 percent of their end-customers. For the remainder, they need to negotiate with small to medium-sized local cable companies (Level 4) to achieve access to end-consumers. Naturally, without knowing their names and addresses they can not apply direct mailing activities to increase subscription rates. Further, the big three cable providers (Kabel Deutschland, Unity Media, Kabel BW) today have private equity investors which are deeply indebted (FAZ 2007). This decisively impacts on efforts in modernising and upgrading their networks to offer the bundling of pay TV services with broadband and voice (i.e. triple-play). Accordingly, more digital capacities are only available if analogue TV channels are switched off. However, as analogue TV still remains the major revenue source of all cable companies and the incumbent free TV channels which themselves have a strong bargaining position relative to the platforms due to must-carry regulation, they are not expected to relinquish their vital analogue distribution (Karstens 2006).

x

Emergence of new platforms delivering pay TV services: The digital TV industry is currently experiencing. New platforms are being developed, based on new distribution technologies. The latest generation of set-top-boxes contain digital storage, upgradeable chipsets for high definition services, deliver internet services, and operate as digital video recorders (DVR) for services (Chorianopoulos & Spinellis 2005). Additionally, IPTV is expected to become a serious competitor to the existing broadcasting infrastructure channels of cable, satellite and terrestrial transmission (Breunig 2007).

The preceding discussion opens the way to question the overall economic viability of pay TV in Germany. This paper argues that the German pay TV market is not economically viable even if hopes for recovery are raised by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp.’s recent advancement into Germany’s pay TV market. To put it bluntly, German digital pay TV is and will remain to be a failed market dominated by inhibitors for market growth and efficiency. As a result, two main research questions remain: x

RQ 1: Is digital Pay TV in Germany a viable lesson for market failure?

x

RQ 2: To what degree will such a market fail to produce a satisfactory outcome?

x

RQ 3: Does the theory of market failure validly explain these shortcomings of efficiency?

The overall research design of this paper is qualitative in nature and exploratory in design. The theoretical part of this paper applied literature reviewing as prime methodology. The review surveyed scholarly work on market failure in the broadcasting industry within the media 170

management and media economics domains, with particular focus on pay TV. On aggregate, the selection of conceptual works on pay TV failure reviewed is assumed to be representative though not exhaustive. Empirical data sources included the study of official statistics, industry data, company data, in-company data, newspaper articles and other published documents, and personal interview memos. The empirical research follows a qualitative case study research design (Denzin & Lincoln 2000). In general, case study research is said to be particularly wellsuited to the study of emerging and complex phenomena (Yin 2003). This is considered to be a valid proposition for the present task. The market analysis builds on the Industrial Organization (IO) theory incorporating the SCP-paradigm to systematically analyze the German pay TV market. The IO theory is an increasingly popular approach for market analysis in the media and focuses on three concepts: (1) industry structure, (2) industry conduct, and (3) industry performance (Albarran 2002, Young 2000, Wirth & Bloch 1995, Scherer & Ross 1990, Bain 1968). These concepts interrelate causally: industry structure influences the behaviour of firms, whose joint conduct then determines the collective performance of the marketplace. IO theory has adopted the widely accepted concept of ‘workable competition’ as benchmark of the viability of competition (Clark 1940, Baumol 1982). The paper is organized as follows: Firstly, conceptual issues are presented. Then, the market structure for digital pay TV services in Germany is decomposed. Further, selected theory propositions of market failure in pay TV are discussed against qualitative empirical evidence of the situation in Germany. Finally, the research questions are answered.

2

Market Failure in Digtial Pay TV?

Economies that do not achieve Pareto-optimality are said to result in market failure. Consequently, the paradigm of market failure describes situations where economic efficiency is constrained (i.e., market imperfection or partial failure) or is not being provided by market activities at all (i.e., pure failure). Market failure is driven by multiple institutional weaknesses to coordinate economic activities efficiently and equitably.2 Renowned scholars in the media economics and media management field support the notion that media markets reveal structural and behavioural instances that tend towards failure (Albarran 2002, Davies 1999, Doyle 2002, Heinrich 1999, Kiefer 2001, Owen & Wildman 1992). Following this mindset, the following (conjectural) propositions of market failure in pay TV broadcasting can be discoursed: Proposition 1: Pay TV is a public good Public goods are goods which goods or services are not supplied by markets (or are supplied in insufficient quantities). “This may arise because of the nature of the product, such as goods which have zero or low marginal costs and which it is difficult to exclude people from using” (OECD 1993: 56). Free-to-air broadcasting programmes are repeatedly considered to be public goods. Rather surprisingly, pay TV broadcasting has properties of a public good. In fact, it is considered as a club good in nature. Access is excludable, but once effected non-rival in consumption (Sandler & Tschirhart 1980, Buchanan 1965). Standard economic theory infers that non-rivalry represents market failure.

171

Proposition 2: Premium pay TV is a merit good A merit good is a good whose value exceeds the valuation an individual would place upon it. Merit goods are deemed intrinsically desirable and provide one rationale for government intervention (Davies 1999: 203). One might even want to use a merit good argument to support the notion that some programmes need to be freely accessible by all consumers but are in fact under-consumed even under a pay TV regime (Owen et al. 1974: 167). This calls for government action. Proposition 3: Pay TV produces externalities “Externalities refers to situations when the effect of production or consumption of goods and services imposes costs or benefits on others which are not reflected in the prices charged for the goods and services being provided. Negative externalities arise when an individual or firm does not bear the costs of the harm it imposes (pollution, for example). Positive externalities arise when an individual or firm provides benefits for which it is not compensated” (OECD 1993: 44). A number of positive externalities have been claimed for TV broadcasting, including educational benefits, network externalities, and social or ‘citizenship’ benefits. Negative externalities associated with TV viewing are undesirable behavioural responses (Armstrong & Weeds 2007). Externalities arise when property rights cannot be clearly assigned. Broadcasting is considered as a central means of building social cohesion and other common values of societal communication and integration (Sunstein 2000). Proposition 4: Pay TV markets are not efficient Broadcasting market failure is defined as a situation where a market left on its own fails to allocate resources efficiently. Institutional weaknesses may reside both on the supply and the demand-side of a market transaction (Pareto 1971). Competition among firms assures that production is efficient and tailored towards what users want, and prices are kept in line with costs. By contrast, market failure may be defined as the case when: (a) productive efficiency, in which the output of the economy is being produced at the lowest cost, (b) allocative efficiency, in which resources are being allocated to the production of goods and services society most values, and (c) distributive efficiency, in which output is distributed in such a way that consumers would not wish to spend their incomes in any different way, is not or imperfectly achieved. Economic efficiency on these three types does not result when markets fail. In academic literature, market access for new entrants, fair competition among existing players across different platforms, abuse of dominant position through margin squeeze3, foreclosure of competition, and vertical integration of players active at multiple layers of the supply chain are identified as key issues in the welfare economics of pay TV on the supply side (Cave 2004b, Harbord & Ottaviani 2001, Kruse 2005, Motta & Polo 1997, Nicita et al. 2004, Nolan 1997, Speta 2004, Ofcom 2007a, Ofcom 2007b). Pay TV industries exhibit a tendency for concentration and increasing dominance of market leaders. Competition can thus be prevented, restricted or distorted.

Proposition 5: Pay TV offers high consumer satisfaction Pay TV consumer welfare can be evaluated against overall consumer satisfaction levels determined by a (comparatively) wider choice, both of the TV platform which they use and the content which they can access on this platform (Ofcom 2007a). However, viewers may face 172

choice restrictions in relation to the geographic coverage of some distribution technologies and the availability of some content across platforms. Additionally, information deficits may exist about product and service quality (Coase 1937). Further, pay TV services may be priced anticompetitively, not giving consumers good value for money. Consumers may also reveal an inelastic demand for premium content such as premium sports events and first run movies (Cave 2004b). And, is pay TV content diverse? Programme content is enormously differentiated, reflecting heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences towards television content, and a general preference for programme variety. While total production costs would be minimised if all viewers watched the same limited output, this would not be welfare maximising. Given heterogeneity in preferences, it is socially desirable for a wide variety of programmes (although not every possible programme) to be produced (Salop 1979, Dixit & Stiglitz 1977). Diversity can refer to the following concepts: product, source, and viewpoint. “Product diversity refers to the number of different program types; source diversity to the number of firms, ownership structure, and the availability of substitutes; while viewpoint diversity refers to the variety of perspectives on important issues” (Alexander & Brown, p. 261). In the present context, access, adoption, domestication, product diversity, product and service quality are main key issues of welfare in pay TV economics on the demand side (Anderson & Coate 2000, Alexander & Brown 2007, Armstrong & Weeds 2007, Atkin et al. 2003, Haddon 2007, Spence & Owen 1977). All these issues may give rise to market imperfections where efficiency results do not hold as a result of which market failure can be claimed. Today, digitisation is considerably altering the economics of pay TV markets. And standard theoretical positions of broadcasting markets as failed ones needing state intervention are increasingly losing significance. This is the case because digitisation is becoming increasingly economically attractive because it reinstates the market as regulatory principle. Consequently, increased competition promises to overcome market imperfections in many ways. Encoding signals regulate viewer access to programmes, thus excluding those who are not willing or able to pay for them. The market then serves as the best resource allocation system with prices serving as suitable instruments for viewers to best signal their consumer preferences.

3

Case Study Analysis – Digital Pay TV in Germany

Digital pay TV penetration in Germany must be considered against developments in TV household equipment and digital distribution technologies. Additionally, the broadcaster’s strategy choices in supply chain positioning and distribution and access technologies employed play a major role. Further, changes in regulation towards TV market liberalisation have shaped the industry. As shown in table 1 below, more than 95% TV households in Germany are equipped with cable and satellite reception technologies. Germany is thus considered as a classic “cable land” with an overall penetration rate of 54% of TV households.

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Table 1: TV equipment and distribution for Germany TV equipment and distribution technologies Total Number of TV households In % of all households

34.99m 95.3

Cable connected (analogue and digital)

53.3 %

Satellite private dish/ DTH (analogue and digital)

42.7 %

Terrestrial (analogue and digital)

4.0

Source: AGF/GfK Fernsehforschung, IP Deutschland 2007 Digitization in Germany has also moved forward. At the beginning of 2007, 44.1% of German households had gone digital (see, Table 2 below). Digital content is mostly distributed terrestrial and by satellite, with cable lagging considerably behind. Industry experts consider digitization as prime driver in a changing broadcasting market environment in Germany. It is assumed that four out of five German TV households will be digitized in 2012. DVB-T, replacing analogue terrestrial distribution by government decision, is now available throughout 90% of the German territory. Take-up, however, is marginal and now even declining. This is primarily due to restricted choice of channels and the well-developed customer bases of cable and satellite. Satellite has been the major driver of digitalisation since the late 1990s. This is because of a concerted strategy of DTH monopolist Astra and receiver manufacturers and broadcasters. On digital satellite, free TV remains unencrypted. The cable companies seek to drive digitization of their networks in order to monetize on additional revenues from triple play. However, in television services, cable loses market share to satellite and increasingly to IPTV. Table 2: Digital TV equipment in Germany (end 2006) Digital TV equipment in Germany

in % of all TV HH

Digital Terrestrial

3.8

Digital Satellite

28.1

Digital Cable

11.2

IPTV (TV via DSL)

1.01

Any Digital

44.1

Source: AGF/GfK Fernsehforschung, IP Deutschland 2007 Legend: 1 First DSL-IPTV offers were introduced in 2006. User acceptance is still modest (i.e. 35.000 subscribers; Goldmedia 2007)

Note that the cable-related figures in table 2 above reflect households subscribing to digital cable. However, that does not necessarily mean that they actually use digital TV channels over this infrastructure. Many cable customers switch over to digital in order to benefit from internet access and telephony while they keep watching installed analogue TV channels. This fact 174

explains why 44.1% of German households can receive digital TV, yet digital television’s audience share is only 24.9%! Market structure and player positioning in the supply chain The supply chain for the German pay TV market consists of the following four categories: (1) Programme production (category 1): this activity comprises the function of making audio-visual programmes, including, for example, television drama series, news programmes, movies and live coverage of sports events. (2) Wholesale channel providers (category 2): Providers of original television channels which aggregate content into linear programming. Examples are tv.gusto, Kinowelt TV, Spiegel TV digital, RTL passion, and Premiere. As a rule, such wholesale channel providers do not have a direct relationship with end consumers but sell their channels to retail service providers. The one exception is Premiere, which is in a quadruplicate role: The company operates its own channels, in some cases sells a selection of these channels to retail service providers (Unity Media, T-Home), provides retail service for selected third-party channel providers (Discovery Channel, RTL passion), and operates as its own retail service provider. Content right holders such as the German football association (Deutsche Fußball Liga) sell rights to wholesale channel providers. Some content production providers (such as NBC Universal, Walt Disney Company, or Spiegel TV) also operate as wholesale channel providers. (3) Retail service providers (category 3): Cable, satellite, or IP distributors who acquire channels from wholesale channel providers and create bundles of channels which they sell to end consumers, such as Kabel Digital Home, Entavio, Premiere Star, Kabelkiosk, T-Home, or Premiere. The landscape of retail service providers is divided into two groups: First, retail service providers who are an integral part or a wholly-owned subsidiary of wholesale platform service providers (Kabel Digital Home, Entavio, THome); and second, retail service providers which are independent from wholesale platform providers and thus need to purchase their technical services (Premiere, Premiere Star, Mobile 3.0). Some of these operate their own encryption services, while others rely on the wholesale platform service providers to do so. (4) Wholesale platform providers (category 4): Technical distribution platform service providers, such as Kabel Deutschland, Unity Media, Astra, Eutelsat, T-Systems, or Deutsche Telekom, supplying both distribution and, where requested, encryption services. Some of these wholesale service providers are integrated with retail service providers (Kabel Deutschland/Kabel Digital Home, Astra/Entavio), while others are operating solely as technical platforms (T-Systems, Eutelsat). The following table 4 shows the distribution of German-language pay TV subscriptions among the existing players in the German pay TV market (Q4, 2007). Usage of digital television across all distribution platforms is higher than the figures quoted below, since this would also include households using digital free TV only. Additionally, a significant number of households with migration background are subscribing to foreign-language Pay TV packages through German providers. For the purpose of this study, such subscriptions have been removed from the statistical information. They are insignificant for the German domestic pay TV market as their revenues go directly to foreign broadcasters.

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Table 4: Digital Pay TV in Germany: Operator, supply chain category, distribution platform and area, number of subscribers

Operator

Category

Distribution platform

No. of subscribers

2, 3

Cable (all major providers), Satellite (Astra)

2,330.000 (64.4%)

Premiere Star

3

Satellite (Astra)

20,000 (0.6%)

Entavio

3

Satellite (Astra)

n.a.

Unity Media

3, 4

Cable (North Rhine-Westphalia, Hessen)

Kabel BadenWürttemberg

3, 4

Cable (Baden-Wurttemberg)

Kabel Deutschland

3, 4

Cable (Rest of Germany)

Other cable providers

3, 4

Cable (small regions, urban areas)

02

Arena

3

Cable (North Rhine-Westphalia, Hessen) Satellite (Astra)

246,000 (6.8%)

Kabelkiosk

3

Satellite (Eutelsat) feed into other cable head-ends

120,000 (3.3%)

T-Home

3, 4

DSL (Deutsche Telekom)

Alice

3, 4

DSL (Hansenet)

Arcor

3, 4

DSL (Arcor)

Premiere

850.000 (23.5%)1

50,000 (1.4%)3 3,616,000 (100%)

Source: Authors (based on company publications and expert statements) Legend: 1

All major cable companies combined; separate figures for each cabler unavailable

2

Consumer subscribe either to Kabelkiosk or major cable companies

3

Estimate from total IPTV customer figures, which include Free-TV-only households

For the purpose of this study, we will focus on the companies who maintain direct B2C relations, i.e. categories 2 and 3 respectively. As of late 2007, the linear pay TV market in Germany (excluding VoD) is divided between: x

A small number of distribution network operators which also package pay TV channels as a business sideline, and

x

One dedicated pay TV broadcaster (i.e., Premiere) which is basically neutral as far as distribution is concerned, but also packages third-party channels.

In contrast to the majority of free TV, pay TV is now exclusively broadcast digitally. Remaining analogue capacities were switched off in early 2003. The common SDTV standard is MPEG176

2, while HDTV is transmitted using the more advanced MPEG-4 data reduction standard. The basic difference between the two different types of pay TV is household coverage. With one exception, all offerings by distribution network operators (i.e. cable, satellite, and internet access providers) are exclusively available to households physically connected to that particular network. In contrast, almost any cable and satellite user can subscribe to Premiere irrespective of their technical provider. Distribution and consumer access Cable in Germany is divided into regional monopolies. Unity Media serves the states (Länder) of North Rhine-Westphalia and Hessen with 4.8m households connected. Kabel BW covers Baden-Wurttemberg with its 2.3m customers. And the largest one, Kabel Deutschland, controls Germany’s remaining 9.1m cable households. The vast majority of these are still tuned to analogue reception. All three companies are owned by private equity, and each has their own pay TV package. Although prices and terms vary, they carry basically the same set of specialinterest channels. Premiere is not a part of these packages, but customers may order it separately. Altogether, an estimated 850.000 subscribers receive German-speaking pay TV packages originating from cable companies. Further 2.4 million households are connected to independent local cable networks, buying wholesale television channels mostly from satellite operator Eutelsat through their Kabelkiosk platform or from the larger cable companies. The programmes offered are essentially the same as in regional cable and do not include Premiere. As for IPTV, two telecommunications companies are offering linear pay TV via broadband IP access: Market leader Deutsche Telekom in all major cities, and Telecom Italia subsidiary Alice in selected big cities in Northern Germany. Another significant internet access provider, Vodafone affiliate Arcor, has experimentally launched IPTV in December 2007. The choice of programmes is the same as in cable. However, Deutsche Telekom is the only one in this group also carrying Premiere. In contrast to cable providers, the telcos are not by definition limited to certain regions; where they offer their service only depends on whether dependable high-speed broadband infrastructures have already been installed or upgraded. Again, only physically connected households can subscribe. Total subscription numbers have now reached about 100.000 households. SES Astra is the only relevant direct-to-home provider on satellite. Its sole competitor Eutelsat serves exclusively small local cable networks not connected to the three major operators. Out of the 14.9m German satellite users, about 66% or some 9.9m are digital, with the number of analogue households decreasing rapidly. Indeed, Astra is the largest digital television platform in Germany and primarily carries free-to-air TV, but Premiere as well. Since mid-2006, in addition to Premiere, the Arena pay TV package is available via satellite. Oddly enough, it belongs to cabler Unity Media and transmits the soccer premier league (nonexclusively in parallel with Premiere) and a selection of special interest channels. Moreover, two new pay TV packages have been launched in the fall of 2007: One, named Entavio, is operated by SES Astra, while the other, Premiere Star, is a Premiere subsidiary. The latter features both third-party and Premiere’s own thematic channels, but excludes premium content, which may be subscribed to separately. Entavio only carries the regular Premiere package, which is available directly from Premiere, but aspires to aggregate more programmes. The coexistence of these two platforms is primarily due to objections by the German anti-trust office, which otherwise anticipated a monopoly in DTH Pay TV. Arena has about 246.000 customers, while Premiere Star is reported to remain below 20.000 so far, and Entavio has not even really started marketing yet.

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Regulation Regulation plays a major role in the development of the German pay TV market. Media pluralism and competition affairs are regulation objects. Authorities have been insistent that vertical integration between television programme providers (channels), programme packagers and distribution networks must be prevented except where natural monopolies are in place. This means that cable operators which always have regional exclusivity are permitted to offer pay TV bundles to their customers. However, the tenet of net neutrality would oblige them to carry third-party platforms as well. Satellite-based and terrestrial services, on the other hand, are generally required to let independent platforms aggregate pay channels and establish customer relationships, with the network operators working as mere technical distributors. This has prompted the creation of Premiere Star, competing with Astra’s own Entavio pay TV service via satellite, and to setting up Mobile 3.0 as the sole platform to provide TV and radio for mobile devices through the DVB-H standard. Companies such as Mobile 3.0 are comparatively weak, since they depend on contracts with the programme content providers, the distribution network operators, and CE manufacturers, while they obtain leverage only from the function assigned to them by regulatory bodies. They are also prone to increase the price for consumers as they can not take advantage of any existing infrastructures. So far, the independent platforms, all founded only very recently, are not well established or were entirely short-lived.

4

Results

Qualitative case study research to test our set of propositions of market failure in digital pay TV in Germany has brought to fore the following results: Ad Proposition 1: Pay TV is a public good German pay TV providers set prices higher than zero. Restricting access to fee payers and depriving those viewers of the opportunity watching content (such as public-interest sports) at a price lower than the subscription price represent a welfare loss because the additional service could have been provided at zero cost to additional viewers (Minasian 1964, Samuelson 1958, Samuelson 1964). Principally, premium sports content, such as football matches must be considered as of public interest. Live broadcasts of these popular public-interest contents have the properties of club goods. Fans either need to pay for access to the live game in the stadium or take out a pay TV subscription. Club goods, in theory, infer deadweight loss in the form of consumer surplus lost. We can thus verify this proposition for German pay TV and conclude welfare losses for the German viewing public (Tegge 2006). Broadcasting premium sports content is a particular case in point. The Listed Events regulation of administered by the EU says that key sports events “with considerable societal importance” (e.g., Olympic games, FIFA World Cup, EURO, finals of UEFA Champions League and UEFA-Cup with German participation) are only to be broadcast under a pay TV regime when there is simultaneous freeTV broadcasting Solberg 2007, Jeanrenaud & Késenne 2006, Cave & Crandall 2001, Solberg 2001). In Germany, this rule effectively imposes a ban on pay TV exclusivity for these public interest events (Kruse 2008). Ad Proposition 2: Premium pay TV is a merit good Scholars insist that “transferring broadcasting rights to pay channels cause an overall deadweight loss because of the public good argument” (Solberg 2007: 15). In fact, there are 178

fears that as, for example, premium content broadcasts in the public interest such as elite cultural programming move to paid channels, the public’s interest in these merit goods will ultimately be reduced. Cave (2004a) has explained this phenomenon as follows: “The logic here is that pay TV has the greater chance of allowing programmes to be profitable (by capturing consumer surplus) when demand is inelastic – i.e. some viewers value a programme highly, but enthusiasm tails off quickly outside the fan base. In such cases, advertiser finance would generate insufficient revenues” (p. 4). In German pay TV practice, we identified premium cultural, documentary and news programming to be offered exclusively on pay TV channels, such as National Geographic, Discovery Channel, or BBC Prime. We may thus expect merit good effects in these premium content areas consumed exclusively by TV consumers. Ad Proposition 3: Pay TV produces externalities As for externalities, some educational benefits are expected to result from consuming documentaries and other serious, non-fictional content. From a welfare economics perspective, it is considered to be socially desirable to enable access to certain kinds of programmes (e.g. news, current affairs, documentaries, educational and arts programmes) and cater for the tastes of certain ethnic, cultural, age, or lifestyle minorities. We conclude that externality and ‘citizenship’ concerns remain in Germany for public-interest and high-culture pay TV programming. However, these externalities are hard to quantify. Ad Proposition 4: Pay TV markets are not efficient 73 digital Pay TV channels are currently competing for German eyeballs (see, Appendix). Most are available via selected distributors in the respective cable regions through Premiere or one of the satellite platforms. Market structure is important, in particular the presence in the market of firms which are vertically integrated and/or have a degree of market power. Premiere must be considered as the quasi-monopolist in the pay TV market in Germany accounting for by 6 million viewers in some 2.3m households subscribed.4 This accounts for by some 65% of all subscribers to the digital pay TV market. Premiere is also highly vertically integrated: It owns the Premiere satellite platform, produces its own branded channels, and acquires exclusive sports and film rights. However, as the choice of free-to-air channels remains high, product differentiation strategies in pay TV fail to make the package more attractive. Firms can only succeed if they offer the entire choice of FTA channels and pay TV at a low price. Even highly visible marketing campaigns have not managed to change end-consumer expectations in favour of specific pay packages. Further aggregators face very high barriers to market entry. Independent distribution networks can not be established in their own right. And the use of the existing infrastructure means subjecting one’s offers to financial and content-related conditions dictated by the incumbents, whose position is amplified by their degree of integration (cable providers who also offer pay TV bundles). Programme providers are in an ambiguous bargaining position as well: Aggregators urgently need their input, yet the money they receive from the platforms does not suffice to deliver highly attractive and unique content. The following layers of competition alongside selected supply chain categories can be identified: a) Special-interest channels: High level of competition for both audiences and distribution deals; precondition for commercial success is either cost-efficient production or vertical integration with the holders of previously amortised content. b) Second-run fictional channels: Scarcity of unique, attractive content (e.g., Kinowelt TV, Turner Classic Movies) makes for high level of competition at low programme quality 179

levels; competitive advantage for subsidiaries of large free-to-air TV chains, because they can put relatively new and still-popular content on air that has been broadcast on free-to-air channels only a few months or a year ago (RTL passion, SAT.1 Comedy). Prerequisite for commercial success is vertical integration with content and production providers or free-to-air channels in order to ensure access to cheap (previously amortised) programme content. c) Premium channels: Premiere today has no competitor for its unique content in both fictional and sports programming. Since cable providers have always regional monopolies, they do not compete directly with each other; however, there is some competitive overlap regarding the conditions of the deals with wholesale channel providers: As soon as one cable provider offers a very good or very bad deal, this will automatically affect the negotiating position of the other cablers. Further, competition between different distribution platforms must be differentiated as follows: a) Cable vs. satellite: Theoretically, satellite can be received anywhere and thus competes with all cable providers. However, in cities, satellite reception may be impossible because dishes can not be installed (buildings shadowing the signal or building regulations) or cable is included in the utilities bill and customer premises are by default equipped with cable installations. Therefore, wherever it is available, cable has a competitive advantage over satellites, and – because of regional cable monopolies – there is no choice between different cable companies. But only cities and agglomeration areas have cable; in rural regions, satellite services by the sole relevant DTH provider Astra 19.2° East are without competition. b) Cable vs. IPTV: IPTV over DSL will develop into a strong competitor with cable, because DSL can reach even more households than cable (there is virtually no household without a phone line installed), and high-speed DSL is predominantly available in the main cable strongholds, i.e. big cities. However, IPTV take-up has only just begun and it is still much more expensive than cable; this situation will change in the coming years. Two IPTV providers (Telekom, Arcor) are active nationwide in all big cities and agglomerations, with a third one closing in (Hansenet). Any household in areas reached by these providers can choose between them on grounds of price and services delivered (triple-play, flatrates, TV, and VoD packages). c) Satellite vs. IPTV: For the time being, satellite is without competition in rural areas, because there is no cable, and high-speed DSL infrastructures will not be in place anytime soon. Customers therefore have no choice other than Astra. Premiere follows a premium pricing strategy and has only temporarily introduced penetration pricing with offering a basic start-up package for € 9.99 per month. The DSL IPTV providers manage to set relatively high prices only because they offer the palpable added value of very-high-speed internet connections and telephony flat-rates. All nonPremiere Pay TV packages (cable, Premiere Star, Entavio) lack distinctive and highly attractive programme content. Offering similar sets of low-level thematic channels, these providers lie in the economy pricing segment or bundle TV subscriptions with ostensibly more attractive services such as broadband internet access. Unfortunately, the lump sum flat rate does not reveal the true costs of pay TV for the consumer. Obviously, exclusivity of content rights is a source of market power. Premiere goes strong in live-transmitting premium sports content, offering a series of digital add-on services and no nasty advertising breaks. Another market power asset is pay TV experience and time-shifted delivery of programmes. These strengths weaken existing competition and raise barriers to 180

entry. Further, Premiere forecloses competition by offering exclusionary contracts to all channels broadcast on its platform. These channels are thus not to be seen anywhere else. Vertical integration is applied as value chain strategy to assure a steady and reliable input supply. We conclude that a quasi-monopolistic market exists for pay TV subscription channels in these segments, at both the wholesale and retail level of the value chain, and that Premiere has considerable market power in these segments. High barriers to entry into these premium content markets support this view. By contrast, all non-Premiere Pay TV packages lack distinctive and highly attractive programme content. Offering similar sets of low-level thematic channels, these providers lie in the economy pricing segment. Ad Proposition 5: Pay TV offers high consumer satisfaction Provision of a diverse range of program genres, other things being equal, tends to raise viewer surplus. In Germany, however, consumers face access restrictions owing to regionally defined pay TV offerings: In the city centres, consumers can choose between the local cable monopolist or one of up to three IPTV packages (where available), and/or Premiere (via cable or Telekom IPTV). In rural areas, consumers may chose between one of three satellite platforms on Astra (Entavio, Premiere Star or Arena) and/or Premiere (over Astra). As a consequence, customers are restricted in their content choice of pay TV packages: Depending on where they live and whether they use cable or satellite, they can only select either their relevant distributor and/or Premiere. Product differentiation levels are low. On the one hand, Premiere and Arena offer high value-added premium content (movies and football) and thus provide considerable added value compared with free-to-air broadcasting. On the other hand, all other pay TV operators offer the same choice of lower-quality special-interest channels which only duplicate their freeTV competitors. Pay TV thus offers only minimal added public value as programme innovation levels are low. Customers of the largest cable provider, Kabel Deutschland, for example, have the full range of free TV (analogue and digital) channels at their disposal, which is a total of 60 German-speaking public and private channels, plus 32 foreign-language free TV stations. The pay TV selection, however, consists of 39 channels with little – if any – premium content. Not surprisingly, all programme genres in the pay TV section are also available on free TV.

5

Conclusion

This study has examined market failure theory and discussed its validity in explaining the efficient allocation of resources in the pay TV sector in Germany. To answer our research questions, we consider the following instances of market failure theory to have (qualitative) validity for German pay TV: Firstly, we conclude that digital Pay TV as club good incurs welfare losses. This is due to its theoretical property of non-rivalry in consumption. An allocative first-best price would be zero only. However, pay TV does not work on zero-based pricing schemes. And the live coverage of Fussball Bundesliga does not have listed event status so as to argue its need to become accessible for everyone on a free TV basis (Ofcom 2007c). Secondly, we identified premium quality programmes on German pay TV. We must thus consider merit good effects wasted for the general free TV viewing public. Thirdly, we conclude that externality and ‘citizenship’ concerns remain in Germany for publicinterest and high-culture pay TV programming. Fourthly, competition and market power are of considerable importance in German pay TV. Premiere was identified as the market dominator, i.e. a vertically integrated firm that has a significant downstream market share and control over revenue-critical assets. Finally, German consumers face access restrictions 181

according to geographic location. As a corollary, customers are restricted in their choice of pay TV packages. As far as consumer welfare is concerned, this geographical concentration results in certain types of consumers not well served by pay TV. However, pay TV service provider success is strongly shaped by control over scarce content rather than by means of transmission. Still, the value of content will be determined by the type of content shown (e.g., one-off topleague matches vs. series) and its durability against pirate copying in the long run (Gaustad 2002). Further, we admit that the theory of market failure is fallacious: It builds on the neoclassical model of market equilibrium under perfect competition and applies this model as benchmark for market failure. All markets that fail to meet these requirements automatically fall victim to this verdict.5 These standard assumptions (e.g., multitude of firms as price-takers, goods are perfect substitutes, no market entry and exit barriers) of neoclassical economics are, however, widely criticized as unrealistic in real-life economic media practice. Failure may thus be considered as an option under conditions that these assumptions are not met and that other models of competition come closer to explaining reality (Zerbe & McCurdy 1999). To conclude, pay TV uptake in Germany is near gridlocked by a set of pressures for market failure. Given the comprehensive choice of free TV and a regulatory environment that is conducive to pluralism yet at the same time inhibits a free functioning of the market, this situation is not likely to change – at least not as long as pay TV offerings remain in the realm of conventional broadcasting. Endnotes 1. The cable sector is divided into the following four levels: Level 1: Uplink to satellite, Level 2: Downlink to head-end, Level 3: Transmission over CATV network on public land up to the individual building, and Level 4: Transmission within the building/housing complex to the TV socket. It is rare for the same company to be both a level 3 and level 4 player. 2. Of course, analyses of MF reflect disputes among scholars of different schools of thought, notably between doctrinaire positions of the free-market school of economists versus the market-interventionist axis of scholarly reasoning in economic theory. Generally speaking, the free-market economics school argues that government intervention at all times and in all circumstances is welfare decreasing, that governments are inherently wasteful, and that attempts to redistribute income simply give rise to rent-seeking activities. The interventionist school, on the other hand, argues that government needs to intervene when markets fail to meet social needs (Bator 1958, Cowen 1988, Cowen 2003, Stigler 1988, Samuelson 1954, Musgrave & Peacock 1958). 3. Margin squeeze means that the wholesale price the dominant vertically integrated company demands from rival is so close to retail prices for consumers that other companies are in effect excluded from competition. 4. Lately, German premium satellite pay TV operator Premiere has made a major downward adjustment in its reported subscriber numbers following a strategic review by incoming

182

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187

Appendix

Appendix: Linear pay TV channels in Germany, by genre and affiliation

188

Channel

Genre

BBC Prime

Entertainment/Lifestyle BBC (UK)

Affiliation

beate-uhse.tv

Erotic

Focus Gesundheit

Documentary

tv.gusto premium

Entertainment/Lifestyle Burda Verlag (D)2

Kinowelt TV

Movies/Series

Animal Planet

Documentary

Discovery Channel

Documentary

Discovery Geschichte

Documentary

Discovery HD

Documentary

Wein TV

Dominus Fund Entertainment/Lifestyle (Grand Caiman)

E! Entertainment

Entertainment/Lifestyle E! Entertainment (US)

Junior

Children

CLB TV

Music

Jukebox

Music

Planet

Documentary

RCK TV

Music

RLX TV

Music

Gute Laune TV

Music

Blue Hustler TV

Erotic

LFP Group (US)

Extreme Sports

Sports

Liberty Media (US)

MGM

Movies/Series

MGM (US)

Motors TV

Sports

Motors TV (F)

The Adult Channel

Erotic

n/a

fashion tv

Entertainment/Lifestyle n/a

Sailing Channel

Sports

n/a

Super Sports Channel

Sports

n/a

National Geographic

Documentary

National Geographic Society (US)

13th Street

Movies/Series

NBC Universal (US)

Beate Uhse AG (D)

Canal plus (F)

Discovery Communications (US)

Ltd.

EM.Sport Media AG (D)

High View Holding (A)

SciFi

Movies/Series

The Biography Channel

Documentary

The History Channel

Documentary

Studio Universal

Movies/Series

Playboy TV

Erotic

Playboy (US)

Premiere1

Movies/Series, Sports

Premiere Medien AG (D)

Alpenglühen TVX

Erotic

Privately owned (D)

Body in Balance

Entertainment/Lifestyle Privately owned (D)

E.clips

Entertainment

Privately owned (D)

Goldstar TV

Music

Privately owned (D)

Heimatkanal

Movies/Series

Privately owned (D)

Hit 24

Music

Privately owned (D)

Lettra

Entertainment/Lifestyle Privately owned (D)

Romance TV

Movies/Series

Privately owned (D)

Silverline

Movies/Series

Privately (US/D)

Sportdigital.tv

Sports

Privately owned (D)

Deutsches Wetterfernsehen

Weather

kabel eins classics

Movies/Series

SAT.1 Comedy

Entertainment/Lifestyle

RTL Crime

Movies/Series

RTL Living

Entertainment

RTL Passion

Movies/Series

Animax

Movies/Series

AXN

Movies/Series

Sony Pictures Entertainment (US)

Spiegel TV digital

Documentary

Spiegel-Verlag (D)

Trace TV

Music

Trace TV S.A. (F)

Boomerang

Children

Cartoon Network

Children

TCM Turner Classic Movies

Movies/Series

Classica

Music

MTV Base

Music

MTV Dance

Music

MTV Entertainment

Music/entertainment

Enterprises

owned

ProSiebenSAT.1 (D)

AG

RTL Group (D)

Turner (US)

Entertainment

Unitel (D) Viacom (US)

189

MTV Hits

Music

MTV Music

Music

MTV Two

Music

Nick Premium

Children

VH 1 Classic

Music

VH 1 Europe

Music

ESPN Classic

Sports

Jetix

Children

NASN

Sports

Playhouse Disney

Children

Toon Disney

Children

Disney Channel

Children

Walt Disney (US)

Sources: KEK-Programmliste 2008, platform providers Legend: 1

Premiere offers several packages of sub-channels, also including HD offers

2

Half of tv.gusto is privately owned own (D/B)

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Beitrag 10: Connected TV Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C. (2015). Connected television: media convergence, industry structure and corporate strategies. In E. L. Cohen (Ed.), Communication Yearkook 40. Annals of the International Communication Association, 40(1), 69-93. New York: Routledge. Abstract Title: Connected Television – Media Convergence, Industry Structure and Corporate Strategies Research problem – This study offers an economic analysis of the television broadcasting industry at the convergence of broadcast and broadband connectivity. It takes the debate on media convergence as inception point to explore its wider consequences on the current structural transformation of the television broadcasting industry toward Connected TV. It applies the SCP model framework from research in Industrial Organization Economics and investigates how the model can contribute to explaining emergent issues in the economics of Connected TV. Findings – The study finds that media convergence remains a slippery and ambiguous concept with many connotations which obscures that rather obscure than enlighten the complexity of the current changes in the industry. The SCP model provided a useful diagnostic framework and can fruitfully be applied to various questions of the fundamental transformation of the television broadcasting sector towards Connected TV, notably issues of market structure and competitive behavior. Yet, the emerging ecosystem for Connected TV services in most countries is immature and each provider is struggling into realizing an optimal corporate strategy and organizational form in the Connected TV domain. Method – Literature review, case study analysis, survey Keywords – Connected TV, media convergence, industrial organization theory, Germany Introduction Television is yet reaching another tipping point in its industry evolution. Driven by the dynamic evolution of information and communication technologies (ICTs), transformations provoked by the convergence between television broadcast and internet broadband allows for the boundary between television and the internet to disappear. How is the television industry transforming, and who is in the driving seat to win the race for its future? Yet, the issues surrounding structural change in television broadcasting are far from straightforward. The underlying economics are highly complex, but their importance to all stakeholders is evident. While the seminal question of who will own the television audience and control the user interface is yet in the open, one important aspect will be the role legacy broadcasters will play when being confronted with new competitors from outside the industry, mainly by companies such as Samsung, Apple, Google and co. In fact, investments in service improvements and content wealth allow these new players to displace TV industry incumbents and offer free online video libraries with entire seasons of current TV shows by the big networks and studios. 191

As it stands, the television broadcasting networks and their most popular channels can still deliver to large audiences. But, as viewing habits have shifted, and digitization has blurred the boundaries between previously distinct access networks and technologies (in media, telecom and computing), industry architectures and business models used within this converged media ecosystem are greatly challenged. Media managers face the need to satisfy the changing expectations of the audiences and undertake convergence as competitive strategy to achieve both economies of scope and scale. Now, it is clear that these disruptive potentials arising from convergence in its full dimensionality evoke a nexus of research dimensions. These encompass issues of technology change and innovation, effects of the convergence on journalism, newsroom convergence, effects of convergence on changes in the industry structure and the competitive behavior of broadcasters and their new rivals from outside the industry, the ever more important changes in audience behavior, and any needs for public policy to protect consumers. Frankly, it is notoriously difficult to deconstruct these many inter-related phenomena. What is Connected TV? Connected TV, sometimes referred to as Smart TV or Hybrid TV, is the new buzzword in home entertainment. It includes a wide range of technical solutions that bring linear TV and the internet world together, e.g., TV sets with added internet connectivity, set-top boxes delivering audiovisual content ‘over-the-top’, connections to social media and networking services, and the ability to control and interact with gestures and voice commands, etc. Connected TV may bring these services to large flat-screen TVs that have the processing power to display HDTV or 3DTV. Connected TV is a good example for the merging of previously distinct media technologies and media forms resulting from digitization and computer networking, and an economic strategy in which the TV companies diversify and ‘attack’ the internet domain (or, alternatively, defined their old territories). As for access to Connected TV, a broadband connection is a necessary precondition. In Germany, for example, 70.9 percent of all German TV households have a broadband connection to the internet, and if equipped with Connected TV hardware or other media streamers, can combine the strengths of broadcast and internet worlds on their large screens in their living rooms. For the purpose of this study, Connected TV will be defined alongside the definition of the “Deutsche TV-Plattform” (English: “German TV platform”), an interdisciplinary forum for cross-sectoral exchange of information and opinions among developments in digital television in Germany. There, Connected TV is rather widely defined as “television sets that can display broadcast programs and services from traditional broadcasting channels as well as content from the internet, so that both sources can be equally used as suppliers of information and/or entertainment.” (Deutsche TV-Plattform, 2012, p. 6) Once connected, viewers can download Connected (or Smart) TV software applications or apps from the propriety operating systems installed or update or install apps on demand via an ‘app store’, in a similar manner to how the apps are integrated in modern smartphones. Popular apps are news-Apps (e.g., “Tagesschau” newscast app in Germany), the video library apps of the channels, Web-TV apps (e.g., YouTube), social media apps (e.g., Facebook) or games apps. Connected TV is different from HbbTV. HbbTV stands for “Hybrid Broadcast Broadband TV” and is both an industry standard (ETSI 2010) and promotional initiative for hybrid digital TV to harmonize broadcast, IPTV (i.e. television services delivered over the internet protocol), and 192

broadband delivery of entertainment to the end consumer through connected TVs (smart TVs) and set-top boxes. Simply speaking, it connects linear broadcasts with interactive internet services on your TV screen, similar to the ‘Red Button’ service on the remote control for certain digital television set top boxes in the UK, Australia, Belgium, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and by DirecTV and Comcast in the USA. Besides the traditional functions of TV sets and settop boxes provided through traditional broadcasting media, most Connected TVs have in-built apps for services like Netflix. Often, they have web browsers, games, and other ‘timesinks’. Indeed, the internet and the “online video revolution”, has also much changed how we watch TV. This is due to the likes of Netflix, a US-American provider of on-demand Internet streaming media services, and other big-name providers such as Google’s video-sharing platform Youtube, Hulu, an “over-the-top” (OTT) subscription service offering ad-supported on-demand streaming video of TV shows, movies, webisodes, or Amazon’s LoveFilm, a UKbased provider of streaming video on demand in the UK and Germany. Digital convergence is currently leading to a raft of new innovative TV services. But all is not too rosy, when considering the latest global privacy policy announcement of Samsung, the consumer electronics giant and leading provider of Connected TV services, stating that a user’s personal conversations will be recorded by the device’s microphone and transmitted to third parties. But while this privacy policy has been called Orwellian and raises accusations of digital spying, it epitomizes that Connected TV is to be associated not only with technology, but also with industrial and institutional structures, as well as social and cultural norms that shape and are shaped by converging media. Research questions and methodology Now, I start exploring the future of television and broadcasting by delineating the concept of media convergence as a key point of reference for the transformation in the audio-visual media landscape toward Connected TV. Essentially, I will offer an economic analysis of the structural transformations of television broadcasting toward the emerging Connected TV industry and their dynamics. Theoretical focus is on media convergence, industry analysis, and corporatelevel strategic positioning of media firms. Research is based on literature reviewing that explored media convergence and its impacts on industry change and strategic positioning. My own review of the comprehensive and necessarily interdisciplinary literature concludes that academia continues to wrestle with the substantial changes in the evolving Connected television landscape (Chan-Olmsted & Kang, 2003; Doyle, 2010; Hacklin, 2008; Hacklin et al., 2013a; Hacklin et al., 2013b; Kind et al., 2009; Wirth, 2006). In my view, a clear picture of the relationship between media convergence, industry transformation and the strategic options of TV companies is only emerging. Second, a questionnaire was designed and used to test questions regarding the strategic choices available to broadcasters and other new players in Connected TV. The issue of ‘strategic choice’ is one major issue within the SCP model element “Conduct”. As shown in Graph 1 below, “Conduct” is the behavioural variable of the model, specified by product and service strategies in Connected TV offered by the players, among others. Germany was as case study country for reasons of market size and data accessibility. The sample drew on all ordinary members of the German “Deutsche TV-Plattform” (altogether 45, see, http://www.tv-plattform.de/de/ueberuns/mitglieder.html), coming from all value-chain segments of the industry. The members were given a structured questionnaire containing a total of ten questions. The participants were asked for their perception about macro-environmental drivers of industry change, their Connected TV strategies, and their current levels of revenue performance in their Connected TV activities.

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And third, I have done an in-depth interview with a key proponent in the German private TV industry. Principally, I argue that in order to advance our thinking about media convergence and industry change in television, we are well-advised to explore the “Industrial Organization” theory as framework for coalescing and focusing on the ongoing and ever more intensified dynamic change blurring industry boundaries. And, further, we need to explore whether there are “gamewinning” strategies and choices broadcasters have to make in order to preserve and capture value in the ever more competitive environment of Connected TV. Hence, I pose the following three research questions: x

First, regarding the nature of convergence: What is media convergence and which factors drive or inhibit convergence toward Connected TV?,

x

Second, regarding the drivers of industry transformation: What factors affect the industry’s structure and, consequently, have an impact on the broadcasters’ competitive behaviors?, and

x

Third, regarding the need for identifying winning strategies in Connected TV: How are strategies responding to the challenges of industry transformation driving the need for the development of new business models?

Besides literature reviewing, I have organized an in-depth interview with the head of research of a key proponent of the German private TV sector. This paper proceeds with revisiting the debate on media convergence. It will then briefly describe the “Structure-ConductPerformance” model from Industrial Organization economics in an attempt to investigate how conom of Connected TV. A the model can contribute to explaining emergent issues in the economics s. conclusion will sum up key findings and critically discuss results. Media Convergence Revisited Convergence has gained an enormous amount of attention across disciplines within the last several years. In the media field, it is used to describe the merging of formerly distinct functions, markets and fields of application, which has changed the way companies operate and consumers perceive and process media content. These transformations have not only led business practices to change and required companies to adapt to new conditions, they also continue to have a lasting impact on research in this area. In their book Media Convergence: Networked Digital Media in Everyday Life, Meikle and Young (2012) define convergence alongside four dimensions:

194

x

Technological – the combination of computing, communications and content around networked digital media platforms,

x

Industrial – the engagement of established media institutions in the digital media space, and the rise of digitally-based companies such as Google, Apple, Microsoft and others as significant media content providers,

x

Social – the rise of social network media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and the growth of user-created content, and

x

Textual – the re-use and remixing of media into what has been termed a ‘transmedia’ model, where stories and media content (for example, sounds, images, written text) are dispersed across multiple media platforms.

The empirical analysis below will mainly focus on the industrial side of convergence. However, it is evident that media convergence, in reality, is more than just a shift in technology to change industry. It alters relationships between industries, technologies, audiences, genres and markets. Media convergence changes the rationality media industries operate in. It must be considered as a meta-process. But while the impacts of convergence into “Preparing for a Fully Converged Audiovisual World”, the European Commission’s 2013 Green paper title for a direction of travel for identifying key aspects of policy and regulation, are far-reaching, they bring significant challenges too. First, as already indicated above, ambivalence toward media convergence prevails (Størsul & Stuedahl, 2007; Jin, 2012; ibid., 2013). The problems are manifold and the most pressing seems to be the nature of convergence itself, which remains multi-faceted, difficult to operationalize, and dynamic in nature. When looking into the driving forces of media convergence, for example, it becomes evident that the convergence process is better viewed as being coevolutionary in origin. This means that “its direction and pace is determined by the reciprocal interplay of technological innovations, corporate strategies, political-legal reforms and changes in media reception patterns.” (Latzer, 2013b, p. 7) Latzer integrates media convergence with elements of innovation theory (Dogruel, 2013; Küng, 2011) and complexity theory (Schneider, 2012). Then, a larger-scale model of media change would emerge, thus opening the convergence paradigm into new research domains. Other scholars argue that developments toward convergence follow a more restricted and mono-causal ‘techno-economic paradigm’ (Perez, 2010), a term to depict the notion that media development and change would stem from the constant interplay of technological innovations and entrepreneurial strategy for media to grow profitably. In sum, the proposition that only convergence would result from such technoeconomic paradigm and not “de-convergence”, a process whereby media disintegrate and differentiate their product portfolio, remains problematic or is, at best, speculative, and analyses based on it are not able to give valid inferences. Second, on the supply side, media convergence affects all stages in the value chain of the traditional television and broadcasting sector. On industry level, the TV value chain is reconfigured in various ways (Wirtz, 2001). The television sector is facing a profound restructuring, as players from formerly disparate sectors, such as TV, internet and equipment vendors converge on the market. Since the economics of broadcast TV has been disrupted by the introduction of the networked Digital Video Recorders (DVRs) (Rimscha, 2006), the debate of television broadcasting losing its dominance in video distribution is opened. The impacts of technology-driven changes puts enormous pressure on the existing broadcast TV value chain, from content production and editing, content aggregation, services programming and packaging, delivery and transmission, to platforms and end-user reception, has further intensified (Hess & Matt, 2013). Still, the question of who will win over the television audience and control the user interface is yet in the open. One important aspect will be the role incumbent or ‘veteran’ TV broadcasters (terrestrial, cable and satellite) will play when being confronted with new competitors from outside the industry (electronics companies, Internet aggregators, telcos and so on), each with their own distinctive source of competitive advantage to deliver video content to consumers. And, third, huge challenges towards convergence concern changes in the audiences’ viewing behavior with regard to the offerings of these new convergent TV products and services. TV consumption is set to experience a variety of changes in usage and engagement modes from: x

Lean-back, passive to lean-forward active viewing,

x

Use of the remote control to use of voice and gesture control 195

x

Consuming live broadcasts to time-shifted and on-demand TV modes

x

From single-screen to multi-screen usage, and

x

Single-person viewing (in the child’s room) back to multi-person family viewing in the living room (where virtual co-viewers may be part of viewing experience by means of online social networks; Schrøder, 2011; Xu & Yan, 2011).

However, while the majority of viewing is said to stay with the traditional broadcasting networks and their ‘big event TV‘, which includes programs such as the Super Bowl or the matches of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, the seeds of change for TV viewing patterns are planted by a series of technological innovations. There is now a plethora of TV apps and viewers can increasingly customize what they are watching to their own interests and on their own schedules. While online video consumption via personal computers and portable devices has become an increasingly mainstream activity, the take-up of end-devices and the use of Connected TV sets come as prerequisite for an on-going market penetration, the fragmentation of the user experience is considered to being one of the biggest barriers to a more rapid adoption of Connected TV services. The question of convergence is also of long-standing interest to scientists in the field of media economics and management who try to understand the promising, fascinating, and sometimes frightening opportunities of shifts in the contours of the new media world. The Journal of Media Management, then edited by the Institute for Media and Communications Management of the University of Sankt Gallen in Switzerland, started with a series of articles devoted to various aspects of convergence already in 1999. The Journal systematically led the reader on a comprehensive tour d’horizon through the key issues involved in media convergence: types and dimensions of convergence (Stipp, 1999), processes of integration into the multimedia business (Wirtz, 1999), the need for alignment of convergence with innovation strategies (Thielmann & Dowling, 1999), or its application towards multimedia convergence in the newsroom (Palmer & Eriksen, 1999). While the general thrust on media convergence in this first issue seemed rather one of naivety, the Journal added another special issue on the topic in 2003, edited by Michael Wirth, revisiting the same theme more critically. Then, the Journal more lucidly traced the formation of convergence as a central ideology in business, politics and the communications field (and beyond). It revealed that regulatory liberalization and convergence strategies within the information and communication technology (ICT) industries were greatly political, during the 1990s, leading to a large increase in mergers and acquisitions and to the formation of a myriad of convergence-based strategic alliances within the ICT industries (Dennis, 2002; Lawson-Borders, 2002; Noll, 2003). However, key authors of the volume concluded that industry convergence of this type (e.g., notably the mega-merger of Internet superstar AOL and media giant Time Warner after the turn of the millennium, and the French company Vivendi with Universal, had not been successful (Ozanich & Wirth, 2004). Instead, during the past decade, many communication industry giants have adopted a corporate-wide strategy of focusing on a few core business areas while divesting from other fields of their businesses, be it through sales, liquidation, or spin-off of a corporate division, or subsidiary or else. Since then, scholars who are mainly informed by the critical political economy of communication studies perspective, have pontificated about various types of industry de-convergence or divergence accompanying and complementing convergence processes (Liestøl, 2007; Jin, 2012; ibid. 2011; Winseck, 2008). With these industry worries in mind, others opined pithily about convergence and suggested it to be a “dangerous word” (Silverstone, 1995, p. 11) because implicit in its use is a series of claims routinely made that are technologically deterministic in fashion. Hesmondhalgh (2007), who undertook various in196

depth analyses into the “creative industries”, criticized the concept and its promoters for the “promise of further wonders” (p. 261), as he assessed convergence. And, Jenkins, the author of a book on Convergence culture, recognized as a hallmark of research on trans-media storytelling, focuses very much on the notion that “convergence is a word that manages to describe technological, industrial, cultural, and social changes, depending on who’s speaking and what they think they are talking about. In the world of media convergence, every important story gets told, every brand gets sold, every consumer gets courted across multiple media platforms. Right now, convergence culture is getting defined top-down by decisions being made in corporate boardrooms and bottom-up by decisions made in teenagers’ bedrooms.” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 3) Seen this way, convergence would become a universal code for explaining monoculture, denouncing the lack of diversity in entertainment and news content fabricated by large media conglomerates. “It is shaped by the desires of media conglomerates to expand their empires across multiple platforms and by the desires of consumers to have the media they want where they want it, when they want it, and in the format they want.” (ibid., p. 2) Industrial Organization Economics of Connected TV A second theme is to analyze the industrial organization of Connected TV. For this purpose, I will first present the “Structure-Conduct-Performance” (henceforth SCP) paradigm from Industrial Organization (I/O) theory. Second, I will look into one single component of the SCP paradigm more deeply: the behavior variable “Conduct”. The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm Much of the literature in the field of media economics has traditionally followed neoclassical approaches which are led by the Industrial Organization model (the I/O model). (Caves, 1980; Scherer & Ross, 1990; Schmalensee, 1988; Tirole, 1988) The old I/O model (or Bainsian framework of analysis) is based on the assumption that there is a causal and one-directional link from market structure to firm conduct to market and firm performance. The SCP paradigm, first proposed by Bain (1968) is the most representative of the old I/O model and is a commonly used analytical framework in media economics. The basic tenet of the SCP paradigm to market analysis states that within the framework of certain “basic conditions” (which also includes the economic infrastructure and the “institutional framework” of government laws and policies; see graph below), the structure of a market determines the conduct of its participants (buyers and sellers), which in turn influences its performance. External factors or, following SCP jargon, “basic conditions” refer to characteristics that are often exogenous to the market (e.g., infrastructure or legal and policy environment) but may also be endogenous (e.g., available technology, product durability or purchase methods). “Basic conditions” are macro-environmental factors and determine the structure of the market and the competitive process that results from it. Usually, the “institutional framework” (see graph below) represent the government policies which themselves will have an impact on either the market structure, or the conduct of the firms in the market. Government policies in TV broadcasting are principally related to (European Commission, 2013; European Parliament, 2013; OECD, 2014): x

Citizens’ rights and consumer protection (e.g., protection of minors, privacy and personal data) 197

x

Issues related to EU Single Market and cultural policies (e.g., technical standards, interoperability, access to broadband interactivity), and

x

Anti-trust and competition issues (e.g., monopolies and abuse of dominant position, competitive bottlenecks).

In the context of Connected TV, government policies have to face the challenging task of securing a variety of choice for consumers and warranting identical conditions for the competition of platforms while at the same time taking the specificities of each use into consideration with regard to its relevance to the formation of public opinion and the public interest. As it stands, however, on a European level, there is yet no specific EU legislation for Connected TV. Attempts in regulating this emergent field seem biased towards the interests of industry. But while it would be important to include all critical stakeholders in shaping this new digital future and foster greater levels of citizen participation and empowerment, broadcasters are given free rein to develop their own business models regardless of societal impacts and responsibilities. Consequently, following this de minimis regulation approach, it is left to the market to determine how supply and demand will shape the Connected TV future. “Market structure” in the I/O model is defined as “those characteristics of the organization of the market that seem to exercise strategic influence on the nature of competition and pricing within the market” (Bain, 1968, p. 7). Issues of market structure are complex and wide, not all of which, of course, one can reasonably expect this chapter to address fully. Usually, the market structure refers to the number and size distribution of firms in relation to the size of the total market. In fact, the market structure is greatly determined by the presence of absence of barriers to entry faced by new firms (Baumol et al., 1982). These barriers mainly depend on the: x

Number of sellers (producers) and buyers (which is a result of entry barriers)

x

Vertical integration by one form that owns its upstream suppliers or its downstream buyers (which may obstruct or facilitate entry)

x

Extent of product differentiation by distinguishing a product or service from others (which eases entry)

x

Cost structures (which may obstruct entry)

x

Access to inputs (which may obstruct entry)

When clustering the key players of the emerging Connected TV ecosystem in Germany, for example, the following types of key players and their strategies, which will be explicitly and more deeply focused in the next session, to differentiate their offerings in various segments of the Connected TV market can be identified as follows:

198

x

Content owners and producers: Hollywood studios (Disney, etc.) and other (independent) producers which partner with device-based or platform-based retailers (such as HBO with Sky via the on-demand OTT pay TV service Snap); they face internal and external pressures of change on their core businesses (i.e., deep content libraries) as well as are in direct competition with giants from the manufacturing or advertising industry (Apple, Google) and established OTT players (Netflix),

x

Traditional free-to-air and pay television broadcasters: Public service broadcasters (ARD, ZDF, etc.), private free-to-air (RTL, ProSiebenSat1) and pay TV (Sky) competitors seek to position themselves in the Connected TV world in order to leverage

their trusted brand names and their large portfolio of (premium) content rights, all for extending reach with their properties, x

Over-the-top (OTT) television and VOD services: Services where audio-visual content is delivered on the ‘open’ Internet rather than over a managed IPTV architecture (e.g., Netflix, Hulu, LoveFilm) which penetrate the market of pay TV providers by offering low-cost video services and thus spark fears of cord-cutting from premium cable and pay TV operators,

x

Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) service providers: They combine premium video packages over managed facilities, or, alternatively, function as infrastructure access and service providers, such as ‘Entertain’ from Deutsche Telekom in Germany, which control the delivery network (and hence the quality of digital bandwidth), thus operating as a powerful gatekeeper for securing access to mass audiences,

x

Video sharing platforms: Examples include the Google daughter YouTube which diversified into “YouTube for TV” in January 2009, offering a version of the website tailored for set-top boxes and other TV-based media devices with web browsers, initially allowing videos to be viewed on the PlayStation 3 and Wii consoles. YouTube TV is most pressured by licensing premium catch-up TV from broadcasters and allowing for an easier access of its content on TV,

x

Consumer electronics manufacturers: Apple TV, a digital media player, developed and sold by Apple Inc. and now in its third generation, allows consumers to use an HDTV set to watch video from the iTunes store, Netflix, Hulu Plus and now many more content offerings. Notable competitors include Google TV, which itself offers a software platform for set-top-boxes and HDTV sets on the basis of its operating system, Android, and Connected TVs from companies such as Sony, Samsung, LG Electronics and others,

x

TV sets and STB manufacturers: Samsung, for instance, which manufactures end-user devices to display, store and manage content and also offer Connected TV portals in order to monetize TV viewing by integrating more interactivity (gaming, social media) into the viewing experience (which IDATE consulting named the ‘TV app store model’; in all, this cluster is much challenged by a multiplication of standards and inexperience in the content market, and

x

Supporting services: Advertising, electronic program guides, search analytics and tools facilitate both revenue-generating business opportunities around digital content but also serve as vehicles for communication among Social TV audiences (e.g., Couchfunk, Zapitano).

The number of producers is the primary characteristic that defines a market structure. Different forms of market structure range from a monopoly (one supplier), to an oligopoly (a few suppliers), to perfect competition (an infinite number of suppliers). The monopolist has the highest form of market power (i.e. the ability to price above marginal costs); suppliers in a perfect competitive market have no market power (i.e. price equals marginal costs). A monopolist is only able to retain his unique position if others face barriers to enter the market. The extent to which a supplier can exert market power is thus not only determined by the number of competitors, but also by the presence of entry barriers and, thus, by the number of possible competitors. Furthermore, as described above, the ability to raise price above marginal costs also depends on the availability of close substitutes. In other words, the extent of market power is determined by the contestability of a market and by the elasticity of demand. The 199

market power of a monopolist can then better be defined as the extent to which he can set his price above marginal costs, “without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded” (Schmalensee, 1982), for example, by encouraging new firms to enter the industry. To any firm with market power, the existence of entry barriers is of crucial importance whenever pricing and investment decisions are made. Bain (1950) was among the first to recognize the importance of entry barriers. Bain defined entry barriers as “the advantage of established sellers in an industry over potential entrant sellers. These advantages being reflected in the extent to which established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the industry.” (p. 3) Bain implicitly states here that entry barriers cause market power. Bain (1956) defined conditions in the absence of which entry barriers may be found, these conditions being: x

Established firms having no absolute cost advantages over potential entrant firms

x

Economies of large-scale firms being absent

x

Established firms having no product differentiation advantages

Conduct refers to the behaviour of firms, for example, pricing and marketing policies and tactics, overt of tacit collusion or rivalry, and product or market-related R&D activities. The conduct of market participants is generally interpreted as being focused on maximizing profits. In the most general form, profit maximization entails pricing strategies, product strategies, location choices, advertising, research and development, There are a number of ways in which convergence can be expected to change the market structure of both broadcasting and internet markets as well as the nature of competition in these markets. One of the most exciting issues refers to the question which new technologies and the dynamic effects of convergence are changing competition (OECD, 2013). Yet, companies are bound to a certain, often industry-specific conduct. Following the I/O model, conduct refers to the behavior of firms, for example, pricing and selling policies, overt or tacit collusion or rivalry; and product or market-related research and development activities. To answer this, it is plausible to refer to Michael Porter’s “Five forces” framework for industry analysis and to look into one force more deeply, namely the intensity of competitive rivalry as the major determinant of the competitiveness of the industry. Porter identified a series of determinants of industry rivalry and found that rivalry will be more intense if “competitors are numerous and equal in size and power (…), industry growth is slow, precipitating fights for market share (…), the products or services lack differentiation (…), fixed costs are high or the product is perishable (…)”, among others (Porter, 1979, p. 143). Naturally, creating and capturing value from interacting with audiences and advertisers in television broadcasting is a central tenet in strategic management research of broadcast media (Chan-Olmsted, 2006; ChanOlmsted & Li, 2002; Liu & Chan-Olmsted, 2002; Chan-Olmsted & Ha, 2003; Chan-Olmsted & Jung, 2001; Chon et al., 2003; Doyle, 2010; Rangone & Turconi, 2003). Strategic alliances for content partnership and various concentration strategies in the market, notably vertical integration and horizontal growth, seem to be those I/O-style strategies that reaffirm the approach of competitive conditions determining competitive behavior. On the one hand, some players forward-integrate their businesses and thus increase horizontal supplier market power while others become vertically integrated and differentiate-out into key specialists in niche markets. On the other hand, these challenges open ways for new supply chain partnerships (Waterman et al., 2012). 200

On top, innovation and product differentiation strategies are what today is called for in media convergence thinking (Habann, 2010; Størsul & Krumsvik, 2013). Traditional broadcasters, for example, may still operate as value chain companies, but enduring innovation in digital technology may change their plans for delivery of information and entertainment content to the end consumer through Connected TV. While holding rights and controlling access to a comprehensive range of desirable content, they may have to diversify their business model beyond linear broadcast TV and advance it into the new arena of on-demand TV, providing enhanced interactivity and enriched customer services through electronic program guides, video on demand, games, as well as information and transaction applications. Usually, performance is measured in terms of productive or allocative efficiency. In addition, innovation (i.e. the rate of technological advance) and quality are considered as further performance indicators. Neoclassical theory assumes that a competitive market maximizes the efficiency of resource allocation. Economic efficiency requires both allocative efficiency and productive (or technical) efficiency. Finally, the SCP model coalesces with the performance of an industry. Performance is the outcome variable of the SCP model and basically refers to three concepts: economic efficiency, consumer welfare and, when connected to TV broadcast competition, social benefits and costs associated with broadcast-broadband convergence (Wirth, 2006). Economic efficiency deals with the ‘size of the pie’ (the pie being defined as the total amount of social welfare that is available), whereas equity deals with the ‘distribution of the pie’. Because equity is a normative concept, its relevance to welfare strongly depends on political choices. However, when part of the consumers’ surplus is transferred to producers because of market power, equity issues may play a role within competition policy. The extent to which one surplus is valued more than the other, however, remains a normative question. When looking into firm performance as an outcome variable of Connected TV, my interview partner from a big commercial network TV station found that traditional broadcast strategies would fit the strategies in Connected TV. Offering both linear programs over traditional network channels and non-linear services over Connected TV (e.g., as apps) would be complementary strategies. The one would not cannibalize on the other. The following Graph 1 (see, next page) shows the SCP paradigm, its elments and theie relationships.

201

The SCP Paradigm Supply Raw materials Technology Cost structures

Demand Price elasticity Substitutes

Basic conditions

Structure Number of buyers and sellers Barriers to entry Vertical integration

Institutional settings

Taxes and subsidies Competition policy Anti-trust legislation Property rights

Conduct Pricing behavior Product strategies Advertising R&D

Performance Productive/allocative efficiency Rate of technological advance Quality of service Equity

Direct short-term Long-term relationships Political governance

Source: Adapted from Scherer & Ross (1990)

There are several causal relations running from structure to conduct and from conduct to performance. In addition, there are causal relations running from conduct to structure (e.g., pricing strategies may decrease the number of competitors), from performance to conduct (e.g., lack of revenues may have an influence on product strategies), and from performance to structure (e.g., bad performance may lead to market exit). Corporate Strategies Eventually, for traditional broadcasters still seeking a viable business strategy (or model) for Connected TV, the challenges of ubiquitous content and ‘TV everywhere’ connectivity may compound their problems. Nonetheless, as technology-driven convergence processes urge for business model innovation, their challenge is how to reconfigure and reinvent value in this new domain (Küng, 2013; Küng, 2011; Picard, 2011). Industry proponents have been quick in understanding that commercial mass media would be struggling to find new revenue streams for the converged media future. Their executives, 202

supported by a fleet of experts from consultancy, proposed that the broadcasting industry’s future can only be safeguarded by large-scale experiments in product innovation, market development, monetization, business model venturing and strategic customer interaction (e.g., Accenture, 2011; Accenture, 2012; FutureScape, 2011; NEM, 2012). For most traditional media companies this represents a major adaptive challenge. Media companies whose primary business models are based on advertising revenues, like television, find it increasingly difficult to reach a mass audience. So far, the industry’s responses have fallen into three categories: horizontal integration, vertical integration, and the search for new revenue sources. The strategic rationale behind horizontal and vertical integration is that in a fragmenting market, media companies can only reach a mass audience with a broad portfolio of media assets, each targeted at a different group that can be exploited along the distribution windows. In sum, media companies are trying to re-aggregate audiences by diversifying across types of media and by taking a portfolio approach to content. Moreover, the traditional rights windows, which gave broadcasters almost monopoly over quality content, have multiplied, and business-to-business revenue models are now being questioned by potentially superior business models which are based on a deeper and more direct relationship with the end consumer. In what follows, I shall introduce some selected bestpractice corporate strategies in Connected TV in Germany. The ‘TVplus’ strategy In Germany, the age of Connected TV started at the International Broadcasting Exhibition in Berlin (IFA) in 2010. Since then, all four major German FreeTV networks ARD, ZDF, RTL and ProSiebenSat1 have offered HbbTV services. The public service broadcasters focus on socalled „Mediathek“ services, that is free 7-day catch-up video library services, provided by ARD, ZDF, arte, „Das Erste“, rbb, Radio Bremen and the “Tagesschau”, the television news service produced by Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) on behalf of the German public-service television network ARD. While public service broadcasters wish to secure their competitive prominence in the era of Connected TV, the web portals of the private TV broadcasters have ventured into building up commercial video on-demand portals, from where TV programs can exclusively be downloaded in advance of the live broadcast on linear TV (e.g., RTL Now, Pro7 Connect). Both public-service broadcasting (ARD, ZDF, regional PSBs), and private free-to-air (RTL, ProSiebenSat1) and pay TV (Sky) networks are seeking to position themselves in the Connected TV world in order to leverage their trusted brand names and their portfolio of (premium) content rights. The prime focus is on extending reach with their properties, a business model which industry consultant IDATE called the ‘TVplus’ positioning model, whereby classic broadcast TV is enhanced with VOD and OTT services (IDATE, 2010). Likewise, Germany’s largest pay TV operator, Sky Deutschland, expanded its platform in order to offer additional benefits to its customers in terms of interactivity and multi-platform experience. In 2007, Sky launched Sky Anytime, a (catch-up) video-on-demand service that provides instant access to the best premium programming and is free to Sky+ customers. Sky+ is a HD receiver and has recording functionalities through the hard disk recorder and the integrated Sky Guide. In September 2012, Sky announced that Sky Anytime and Sky+ would be merged and rebranded as On Demand. The service offers around 1,000 hours of content featuring 350 movies, 500 series episodes, 150 documentaries and 400 kids’ programs. On demand is offered free of charge to all Sky customers with Sky+ HD boxes, although access to premium content depends on the subscriber’s package. Sky+ customers doubled to 929,000 in 2012, meaning that 27.6% of all Sky subscribers already use Sky+. 203

In July 2011, Sky Player and Sky Mobile TV were integrated and rebranded as Sky Go. The new platform allows customers to stream live channels depending on the Sky TV subscription at no additional cost, limited to two simultaneous devices (online, iPad, iPhone, Xbox 360). Sky Go is Sky’s answer to the “over-the-top” (OTT) threat, whereby video is delivered over the internet without a multiple system operator being involved in the control or distribution of the content, so ensuring greater flexibility and convenience for its customers. Integrating Sky Guide into Sky Go enables a whole host of new functions, such as remote programming for Sky+. With 33.3 million customer sessions in 2012, Sky Go seems to be part of a successful convergence strategy. In January 2013, a download service Sky Go Extra was launched, allowing up to four users to download their programming to their laptop, smartphones or tablet to view offline for an additional € 5 per month. In all, Sky Deutschland is facing hard times. Germany’s pay TV market is much underdeveloped and, compared to France and the United Kingdom, has a market penetration rate of only 15 percent (as opposed to ca. 50% in France and the UK). On top, internet streaming services such as LoveFilm, Maxdome and Watchever are directly competing for customers, while Netflix has entered the German market as well. Snap is Sky’s response to these threats. Launched at the end of 2013, the online video library offers 4,000 films and TV series to Sky (€ 4.90 per month) and non-Sky customers (€ 9.90 per month). The ‘paid-owned-earned’ advertising revenue strategy Until now, the TV business has been a fairly linear process, where journalists would gather facts and observations and turn them into stories, which were then committed to be broadcast over the air or via cable/satellite, and finally consumed by the audience. This ‘pipeline model’ is the simplest metaphor for that process, when content distribution was organized around the broadcast tower. Now, at the confluence of industry convergence and the increasing penetration of consumers with Connected TV devices and their properties, a new business model is emerging: the ‘paid-owned-earned advertising’ revenue strategy model. If we believe in the boundary-spanning nature of business models by emphasizing that organizations interact with their environments, which, fundamentally, create requirements for organizations that their managers address in part by adopting their business models (Amit and Zott, 2012), then business models that used to support traditional media companies in the past appear not to work in the digital age. Addressing this business model innovation gap raises the fundamental question of how commercial broadcast media will manage to survive as traditional sources of revenue (paid display ads, subscriptions and transaction sales) shrink. Solving this issue is vital as the legacy revenue model through “paid” (i.e. all forms of advertising for which a media purchase is necessary) and “owned” (i.e. all content assets a brand either owns or wholly controls) media is failing. Paid advertising has found many outlets, atomized into thousands of blogs, Facebook pages, and specialized television and radio stations, so that return on investment is becoming difficult to trace due to audience fragmentation. Social media enhancements are the best drivers of opportunity to complement paid and owned media revenue models. The latter are so-called “earned” media revenuegeneration activities and are gained through user-generated content created and/or shared by users. Still, earned media are the most elusive of the three marketing channels (Altimeter, 2013). The examples of RTLII’s Berlin – Tag & Nacht and ProSiebenSat.1’s Dirty Dancing Double Date suggest that social media enhances the television viewing experience and reconnects the medium with the typically hard-to-reach younger segment that can be monetized by advertising forms. In that context, earned and shared media support the traditional revenue models (advertising and viewer payments) which are still crucial in financing platform 204

development. Broadcasters that are able to secure a key position in commercial models for Connected TV, or even to lead the development of such commercial models, could potentially become the dominant power in the next television revolution as Connected TV gradually replaces traditional television. Broadcasters may still mainly operate as value chain companies following the pipeline model, but enduring innovation in digital technology will have an impact on the distribution and consumption of television content. Along with digital television technology, platform operators have started packaging channels in their platforms and providing enhanced interactivity and enriched customer services such as electronic program guides, video on demand, games, and information and transaction applications. The platform strategy German consumer electronics manufacturers such as Samsung, LG Electronics, Sony, Sharp, Panasonic, and Grundig are the strongest opponents to traditional broadcasting in the Connected TV era. They position themselves as downstream players and pursue backward integration strategies by slipping into the role of portals and aggregators of content and services. We call this model the ‘platform’ model. Likewise do IPTV and cable TV operators such as Deutsche Telekom, Kabel Deutschland, Unity Media, and Vodafone. Similarly, DVB-T (through Germany’s largest distributor of audio-visual media Media Broadcast) and the satellite network operator ASTRA Germany, a subsidiary of SES, a world-leading satellite operator with a fleet of 49 geostationary satellites, also create portal offerings, hoping to exploit the market of web content on the TV set. Sky Deutschland has secured the German rights to the second season of Netflix’s original drama series House of Cards and will show it exclusively on its Sky Go mobile TV and Sky Anytime on-demand services. Sky will broadcast the complete second season of 13 episodes from February 14 on Sky Go and a day later on Sky Anytime, parallel to the US launch on Netflix. Sky Go subscribers will be able to view the show on the web, iPad iPhone, iPod touch and the Xbox 360, while Sky Anytime will make the show available via the Sky+ HD DVR on-demand. Sky will also make the first season of House of Cards available on Sky Go and Sky Anytime. Additionally, the consumer electronics giant Apple, very much a technology pioneer, leverages its competences and market experience in order to establish a Connected TV innovation platform aimed at complementary products and services. In general, for players who have adopted a positioning devoted to seamless access to all content across devices, the television remains the central entertainment-delivery screen in the home and is therefore the unified point of access for all digital content, regardless of provenance (broadcast stream, VoD, catch-up TV, Web, etc.). Google TV is a prime example of this strategy. The TV app store strategy Overall, there is a growing consensus that apps will replace TV channels as part of a natural evolution, as they will provide coherent branding and smooth user interface across the different associated services and companion devices. Adopted by Yahoo! Connected TV and Samsung Apps, the ‘TV app store’ positioning model seeks to carry apps as substitutes to TV channels over to the TV set for the distribution of internet services. TV sets and STB manufacturers such as Samsung which manufacture end-user devices to display, store and manage content also offer Connected TV portals. They aim at monetizing the TV viewing by integrating more interactivity (gaming, social media) into the viewing experience (which IDATE named ‘TV app store model’); in all, this cluster is much challenged by a multiplication of standards and inexperience in the content market. 205

Parallel to its main competitor LG Electronics, Samsung launched its first Connected TV system (named Smart TV) in 2007, integrating the internet and social media into television sets and set-top boxes. Initially, the service was rolled-out under the name Power Infolink – an RSS feed service with content supplied by USA Today. Samsung’s Smart TV service enabled the viewer to receive information from the internet while at the same time watching linear television programming. Samsung later launched its Internet@TV and unveiled the upgraded version including 3D technology. Samsung’s Smart TV service offers free (or for-fee) download of applications from its Samsung Apps Store, in addition to existing services such as news, weather, stock market, YouTube videos and movies. In addition to social media services like Facebook, Twitter, Skype, and Spotify, Samsung Deutschland has closed partnerships with local content providers including Die Welt, Bild, Audi, Maxdome, and the Berliner Philharmoniker. By the end of 2012, Samsung announced a multi-year partnership with Yahoo to add an interactive layer to the television experience. By means of widgets, Yahoo Connected TV now provides interactive content like trivia, additional show insights, commerce or playable games to turn passive consumers into engaged viewers. This partnership also pens up opportunities for new forms of advertising by extending traditional 30-second commercials into immediate actions. With the Yahoo-enabled commercials, advertisers can embed calls-to-action for downloading apps or digital media, providing coupons, ordering samples, reading reviews or viewing product information via their Connected TV. In return, Yahoo provides detailed insights and statistics to track and measure the performance of TV campaigns.

Conclusion This study has shown that the television broadcasting industry is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation. Some believe that the television industry will change irrevocably. Given the findings of this research, I can reasonably conclude the following: First, it is argued here that media convergence towards new forms of Connected TV offerings is a complex process of transformation which can only be understood when its dynamisms of, and among, technological, industrial, organizational, political and socio-cultural factors are taken into consideration. In any case, media convergence is hybrid in nature and plays an important role with regard to the future of TV broadcasting. Developments toward Connected TV are driven by the interplay of the industry’s creed in “technology push” and the viewers/users demand for “application pull”. Academically, it seems that the convergence concept rather obscures than enlightens the complexities. It remains theoretically slippery and ambivalent and marginalizes other perhaps more important discourses: for example, those of ownership concentration in the media, control over consumer experience, and content diversity. Second, I explored the larger SCP framework of Industrial Organization economics, which, following a structural-functionalist paradigm, has occupied a strong position in media economics research (Albarran, 2010; Wirth & Bloch, 1995). I tried to show that the SCP paradigm provides a useful diagnostic tool to raise questions of the causal relationships between the structure of an industry, firm conduct and market performance. Generally, I believe that SCP can fruitfully be applied to various questions of the fundamental transformation the television broadcasting sector is currently undergoing. I am also aware of the fact that the SCP paradigm has its weaknesses (Fu, 2003). Structure may not be exogenous, but instead be the result of companies’ behavior and product characteristics (Young, 2000). The traditional model 206

does not capture the strategic dispositions of the media companies as such (Ramstad, 1997), and a more concentrated market structure could be the result of a better, more efficient industry performance, contrary to the predictions of the SCP model that market concentration leads to bad results. I can also conclude that both structural and behavioral factors will drive industry change. In the case of Connected TV, I can in fact offer strong suggestive evidence that technological advances and media convergence are positively affecting the conditions of competition. Collectively, and in most general terms, technological innovation and the emergence of new products and services will render broadcasting markets more competitive as different market players are currently fighting for the central position in the living room on various levels and segments of the value chain. Third, with regard to the need for identifying corporate strategies in Connected TV, I stick to the notion that corporate strategies play an important role between technological convergence and value creation and capture. Obviously, empirical evidence of business models that are more than mere narratives and come to mediate between convergence and firm performance is hard to come by. Certainly, the growing technology adoption of Connected TV in the home, the high level of broadband internet penetration, and the increasing consumption of content and services by Connected TV devices and platforms is becoming a reality in many countries. In fact, in Germany the number of TV households that is aware of owning an internetready TV receiver has been continually on the rise in recent years. In 2014, 16 per cent stated that they have at least one so-called “Smart TV” at home, i.e. a TV set which can be directly connected to the internet. This is an increase of around 45 per cent within one year. Adding to that peripheral devices permanently connected to the TV which can feed content from the internet via their own internet connection (e.g. internet-ready set-top boxes, streaming boxes, Blu-Ray players and games consoles), the share of TV households with connectable TV rises to 22.9 per cent; this is some 6 percentage points higher than 2013 (die medienanstalten 2014). This equals to some 9 million Smart TV households in Germany in 2014 (with 38.5 million TV households overall). However, despite the fact that the market continues to grow, old viewing habits are changing only slowly. Classical TV programs will remain popular, non-linear programs will however catch up. Traditional broadcasters will continue to reach out for the mass market, but will also experiment with new platforms to broadcast its programs. Hence, their dominant Connected TV strategy is ‘TVplus’. Non-traditional players in Connected TV such as Apple, Microsoft (Xbox Live), and Samsung are in a strong position and may continue to focus on service innovation and differentiating from the traditional TV user experience. These players dominantly apply the ‘platform’ and ‘TV app store’ strategy model. To conclude, the emerging ecosystem for Connected TV services is immature and each provider is struggling into realizing an optimal business model. Hence, the preliminary state of the industry evolution urged me to stress that corporate strategies and business models require permanent review in order to be fit for purpose in view of the current processes of media convergence, its effects on market structures and competitive dynamics. For now, the emerging Connected TV industry ecosystem remains one of uncertainty.

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Beitrag 11: Social Media Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C., & Friedrichsen, M. (2014). Social Media, Alternatives to Commercial. In K. Harvey, & J. G. Golson (Eds.), The SAGE International Encyclopedia of Social Media and Politics. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Vol. 3, 1155-1157. Introduction Abstract: Social media support the creation, upload, sharing and collaborative creation of user generated content. However, outcomes of participatory and collaborative ICTs and ‘prosumer’ activities via social media networks are often seen as standing in opposition to commercial interests. Along with this, business leaders are figuring out how to to harness social media for marketing, sales, customer service and other business objectives without alienating the online user. Professor of economics at Harvard University, Martin Weitzman (1984) masterminded the idea that the “share economy” might deliver even higher levels of total economic welfare for all. As a result of above considerations, one might expect a rich literature and ample empirical insights into the plethora of issues involved in social media’s potential to speed up collaborative consumption, peer-to-peer marketplaces, and private non-commercial transactions among like-minded, on the one side, and the rich array of electronic markets and networked business issues on the other side. However, our own review of the literature concludes that a clear picture of the relationship between social media as a marketing tool and the managerial economics in gaining sustainable competitive advantage through open marketplace transactions is only emerging (Picot et al., 2008; Wigand et al., 2008). This entry will address this void and pursue some crucial issues of this wide theoretical canvas. Essentially, it shall ask whether social media may come to be seen as alternatives to commercial media outlets when it comes to generating economic value or welfare as such. Arguably, the blogosphere has opened up the paradigms of mainstream media economics towards not yet commercialized spaces of mediated interaction between humans. Understanding social media economics Commercial mass media are struggling to find new revenue streams that can reshape their broken business model. Many scholars posit that the mass media industry’s future will be defined by experiments in monetization. New publishing business models are indeed evolving, and companies are looking for new revenue streams, while also using cost-cutting strategies as a tool to drive their business toward innovation. But the advertising and subscription business models that supported traditional media companies in the past appear to do not so in the digital age. Addressing the capitalization gap raises the fundamental questions of how commercial media will manage to survive as traditional sources of revenue (paid display ads, subscriptions and direct sales) shrink. Solving this issue is vital as the legacy revenue model through paid and owned media is failing. Paid advertising has found many outlets, atomized into thousands of blogs, Facebook pages, and specialized television and radio stations, so that return on investment is becoming difficult, notably for print-only media. Social media, on their side, has become another platform available to engage consumers. For example, digitization and convergence lead to what industry research suggests should be 213

considered the future of television. There is a new media ecosystem establishing whereby TV changes in several levels concurrently: from analogue to digital, from scheduled broadcasts to on-demand TV on the internet, from a lean-back (passive) to a lean-forward (active) media, from straight watching to the consumption of content connected to additional services, from the sole TV viewer to the viewer being part in social networks and communities regarding to the TV content, from single-screening to multi-screening etc. Consequently, broadcasters are developing sophisticated Social TV integration tools. They aim to drive viewer tune-in, engagement and loyalty to boost ratings, live viewing and ad revenue. In addition, social TV apps and multi-screen solutions open new avenues for usage. These apps let users: x x x x x x x

See what their friends are watching and invite them to watch it simultaneously Chat, share and tweet around TV programs Register through Facebook or Twitter Get additional information on anything they see on screen – topics, people – through direct links in the app to Wikipedia, IMDb and others Instantly purchase products and download content (songs, series, books) Download apps to their mobile phones Will be able to interact with the enabled adverts to enter competitions, votings, polls, etc.

Finally, and perhaps most important for companies seeking to protect and enhance business value, social media provide a point of entry into transforming the notion of business value from Michael Porter’s (1985) traditional model of the sequential value chain into a model of “value constellation”, a concept first coined by Richard Norman & Rafael Ramirez in 1993. There, consumers and other partners, suppliers, etc., actively co-produce relationships along with the enterprise. In their model, the business model is meant to be actively co-created between the various actors involved. To support this, interactive network technologies would potentially open organizations towards customers’ involvement for value generation. Coimbatore Prahalad and Venkat Ramaswamy (2004), another two comprehensive business thinkers, have further elaborated on changes in the traditional logic of governance in electronic commerce and analytically depicted by the concept of the linear and horizontal value chain. Briefly, they claim the need for producers to establish interaction platforms for “co-creating unique value with customers”. Only this would achieve sustainable competitive advantage for the business firm. Likewise, German and Scandinavian researchers in business and management have focused on “customer integration” (Lampel & Mintzberg, 1996), “value webs” (Reichwald et al., 2004), and “interactive value creation” (Reichwald & Piller, 2009). Social media, alternatives to commercial? Certainly, businesses are trying to make the most of social media in order to achieve competitive advantage through product differentiation and customer integration techniques, thereby reducing the pressure of direct competition from identical products or close substitutes (Bakos, 1991). So far, however, the non-commercial nature of social media artifacts and platforms and their underlying communicative social practices helps to insulate them from full commercial exploitation (Bruns, 2012). To put it in a nutshell: social media is about community, not commerce. They offer unparalleled opportunities for people to network and collaborate. On the side of social media service providers, they currently offer intangible value at best such as enhanced coverage and improved brand loyalty. However, this is, as yet, not tangible cash value. 214

But the present examination of the relationship between social media and their potential as alternative to commercial media becomes particularly meaningful when considered in the light of calling into question that business models will have to change should commercial media want to succeed in the future. As for commercial television broadcasting and its transition into connected TV of the future, managers are faced with the need to satisfy users’ expectations and also undertake convergence as an industrial strategy to achieve economies of scope and scale. Social media enhance are best drivers of opportunity to complement paid and owned media revenue models. Paid media (i.e. all forms of advertising for which a media buy is necessary), and owned media (i.e. all content assets a brand either owns or wholly controls) are today complemented by earned media revenue-generation activities through user-generated content created and/or shared by users. Still, earned media are the most elusive of the three marketing channels. Second, with social media consuming information becomes a collective process of sharing it with other users per se. Hence, public good attributes come in when information is freely shared among users and users and social platform or providers respectively. Additionally, social media are said to confer properties of merit goods in the sense that their provision and use may benefit society at large such that objective information, high culture and education are promoted. For example, interactive social media applications and services may then be used as tools for strengthening citizen integration in the democratic marketplace. Overall, non-commercial social networking activities among end-users have the potential to build-up commercial value and thus business opportunities for providers offering valuable online goods and services.

Key references Bakos, J. Yannis. “A strategic analysis of electronic marketplaces.” MIS Quarterly, v. 15/3, 295-310 (1991). Bruns, Axel. “Reconciling community and commerce? Collaboration between produsage communities and commercial operators, Information, Communication & Society.” In Oscar Westlund (Ed.), Special issue: Transforming tensions: legacy media towards participation and collaboration, v. 15/6, 815-835 (2012). Lampel, Joe and Henry Mintzberg. “Customizing customization.” Sloan Management Review, v. 38/1, 21-30 (1996). Picot, Arnold, et al. Information, Organization and Management. Berlin: Springer, 2008. Porter, Michael E. Competitive advantage: creating and sustaining superior performance. New York: The Free Press (1985). Prahalad, Coimbatore and Venkat Ramaswamy. The future of competition: Co-creating unique value with customers. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2004. Norman, Richard and Rafael Ramirez. “From Value Chain to Value Constellation: Designing Interactive Strategy.” Harvard Business Review, v.71, 65-77 (1993). Reichwald, Ralf and Frank T. Piller, Interaktive Wertschöpfung: Open Innovation, Individualisierung und neue Formen der Arbeitsteilung. Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2009.

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Reichwald, Ralf et al. “Customers as part of value webs. Towards a framework for webbed customer innovation tools.” Paper presented at the Hawaii International Conference on Computer Sciences (HICSS), Maui, 2004. Weitzman, Martin. The share economy: Conquering Stagflation, Boston: Harvard Publication Press, 1984. Wigand, Rolf et al. “Web 2.0 and beyond: implications for electronic commerce.” Electronic Commerce ACM, New York, 2008.

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Beitrag 12: Customer integation Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C. (2012). Customer Integration through Web Interactivity. A Theory Building Exercise of the Role of Transaction Costs to Impact on B2C Relations in News Publishing. In Friedrichsen, M., Mühl-Benninghaus, W., Picard, R. G., & Vartanova, E. (Eds.), Media Management and Social Media Business. Value Chain and Business Models in Changing Media Markets (pp. 775-794). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

ABSTRACT Publishing is facing a variety of profound and disruptive challenges that come to threaten the printed publishing news media industry’s race for survival. By offering interactive e-commerce applications and services, and thereby actively engaging consumers in communication and transaction processes, publishers increasingly are emphasizing solid and sustainable relationships that may help them achieve improved economic viability and sustainable competitive advantage in the electronic marketplace. This chapter explores the concept of web interactivity as potential driver for a publisher's management activities of customer integration and the role of transaction costs to impacting on various levels of interactive online publishing. I find that although web interactivity may potentially drive customer integration and thereby reduce transaction costs, these costs are contingent upon different forms and practicalities of web interactivity and customer integration, as well as different governance structures within which these transactions takes place. Transaction cost theory can deliver a solid theoretical base for analyzing interactive value exchanges more profoundly. Keywords – Web interactivity, customer integration, transaction cost theory, conceptual model

1. Introduction Publishing is facing a variety of profound and disruptive challenges that come to threaten the printed news media industry’s race for survival. By offering interactive e-commerce and Web 2.0 applications and services, and thereby actively engaging consumers in communication and transaction processes, publishers increasingly are emphasizing solid and sustainable relationships that may help them achieve improved economic viability and sustainable competitive advantage in the electronic marketplace. As a result, one might expect a rich literature and ample empirical insights into the plethora of issues involved in interactivity and social media which have both broadly impacted the evolution of e-commerce (Wigand et al., 2008). However, my own review of the literature concludes that a clear picture of the relationship between these broad phenomena is only emerging (Picot et al., 2008; Wigand et al., 2008; Yadav & Varadarajan; 2005a). I will address this void and pursue some selected crucial underpinning issues of this wide theoretical canvas. Essentially, I will develop some propositions as first principles of a (yet to be built) conceptual model integrating web interactivity, customer integration, and transaction cost theory.

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The concept of interactivity is usually thought of as a key characteristic of new media, notably the Internet, but also mobile telephony and interactive television (Durlak, 1987; Carey, 1989; Rafaeli, 1988; Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997; Jensen, 1998; Kiousis, 2002). Web interactivity, on its part, is said allow for multi-directional social interaction and exchange between and among the participants. Web interactivity even allows role changes of the interacting participants. In the extreme case, online end-users may become what Alvin Toffler (1980) named ‘prosumers’, when he predicted that the role of producers and consumers would begin to blur and merge. Customer integration is a fairly new concept emerging from management studies and innovation management research. Broadly, it refers to an interaction process whereby consumers are actively integrated into innovation and products development activtities of business firms. Transaction cost theory describes specific types of costs which emerge as possible hindrance factors between the trading partners in order to achieve more frictionless cooperation in these new forms of integrative value creation and exchange. The overall purpose of this study is to lay a conceptual groundwork for further research into the role of transactions costs in the way web interactivity and customer integration could be related. In fact, transaction cost theory (TCT) can provide a useful research perspective into the relative merits conducting transactions within bussiness firms and between the business firm and the consumer using the market as organizational governance structure (Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 2005). TCT, as developed primarily by economists Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, suggests that economic organizations emerge from costminimizing behaviour (including transaction costs) in a world of limited information and opportunism. This means that integrated consumers would, in theory, be able to deliver value contributions to a business firm more cost-efficiently compared to transactions being organized exclusively internally. Before exploring the concepts at stake more deeply, let me first give you some first notions about how web interactivity, customer integration and transaction costs may be interrelated in an online publishing context. Web interactivity is said to deliver benefits on both sides of an online exchange or transaction in the following ways: First, publishers may gain competitive advantage, widen their product range through adding interactive features, offer new content channels to audiences, or integrate once passive readers into the content creation processes of media publishing in various ways. This, in return, may leverage consumer trust and loyalty in both the print and online brands of a publishing offering. End-users, on their part, are set to experience higher degrees of involvement and personalization with information products and services offered (Franz & Robey, 1986; Hartwick & Barki, 1994; McMillan, 2002; Tseng & Piller, 2003). In turn, this shall again benefit publishers in that personalized content and services can better discriminate among elaborate end-user preferences. Further, as mentioned above, web interactivity encourages the publishing of enduser’s own content and commenting on other people’s, thus increasing both the content wealth of a website and the rate of end-user engagement on various levels. It is well known that online users do not passively consume content any more, but extensively contribute to its creation. New types of online platforms such as, for instance, Wikipedia, YouTube and Facebook emerged, which are summarized under the term ‘social media’. Social media support creation, upload, sharing and collaborative creation of user generated content (Stanoevska-Slabeva, 2011). Alternatively, customer integration describes a mode of integrated value creation. Applied to a publishing context, publishers and customers are collectively taking part in both operational and innovational value creating activities which used to be seen as the exclusive domain of the firm. This co-creation builds the basis for a voluntarily cooperation between both actors, which is driven by specific motives of both parties.

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Now, this article aims at reviewing and synthesizing selected literature on web interactivity and the management of customer integration with a view to evaluating both concepts against the role of transaction costs involved in social and economic transactions in the electronic marketplace. As for methodology, this study is exploratory in design and qualitative in nature. Literature reviewing will be applied as prime methodology. This paper proceeds with developing deeper conceptual insights to web interactivity and customer integration. It will then investigate whether transaction cost theory (TCT) has epistemological value to act as background theory for analyzing potential impacts between the two concepts. A conclusion will sum up key findings and critically discuss results.

2. Conceptual Issues Interactivity was coined as the buzzword during the late 1980s and early 1990s when the multimedia euphoria fascinated politicians, economists, and researchers alike. Over the past 20 years, however, there has been little agreement among researchers on how interactivity should be conceptualized (Bucy, 2004a; Heeter, 2000; Neumann, 2008). Therefore, it is difficult to develop concrete knowledge regarding its constituent factors and consequences for computermediated communication (CMC) in the electronic marketplace. This makes the prospect of synthesizing and integrating the literature on the business value of interactivity rather elusive. Dominant views of interactivity Academic scholars developed three dominant views alongside the structural characteristics of the phenomenon (Heeter, 2000; Jensen, 1998; Kiousis, 2002; McMillan, 2006; McMillan, 2002; Quiring & Schweiger, 2008): technology, communication process, and user perception. Each of these characteristics locate the reference point of interactivity differently according to the nature of the participants (i.e., active or passive), the level of user or receiver control (i.e., high or low), and the centre of control (i.e., human or computer) (McMillan 2006). First, the interactivity-as-technology tradition sees interaction between humans and the computer itself (or other types of new media systems) as central to new media. Rooted in HCI research (Baecker et al., 1980; Baecker & Buxton, 1987; Guedj et al., 1980; Hartson, 1998; Nielsen, 2000), this tradition defines the interaction between a single human and a single computer as the most elementary form of interactivity (Shaw et al., 1993). Key underlying constructs of this view of interactivity are: bi-directionality (McMillan, 2000; Nickerson, 1977; Noll, 2003), bandwidth (indicating the speed at which data are transferred using a particular network medium; Burke & Chidambaram, 1999), and speed of response (as explained by the timeliness construct described further below; Hanssen et al., 1996). In addition, symmetry, which refers here to (a) a technology characteristic where speed or data quantity transferred is the same in both directions; measured by down and upstream channel or bandwidth capacity by transmit time per mega bytes, and (b) a communication characteristic where the sender and receiver roles becoming virtually indistinguishable in environments such as chat rooms, bulletin boards, etc., as described in Grunig and Grunig’s (1989) model of twoway symmetric communication), and synchronicity (similar to speed of response this construct refers to the extent to which a message exchange occurs in real time or is delayed; Burgoon et al., 2000; Dennis et al., 2008; Dennis & Valacich, 1999) come to explain interactivity-astechnology. 219

The second school of thought identifies interactivity as communication process at the heart of which lies computer-mediated interaction between humans. Rooted within computermediated communication (CMC) theory, this view refers to themes of interpersonal interaction, symbolic interaction, and social interaction (Goffman, 1967; McMillan, 2006). Underlying constructs on this dimension are: reciprocality of participants (also discussed as reciprocity, participation, mutual action, action-reaction, and two-way communication; Ha & James, 1998; Gouldner, 1960; Johnson et al., 2006), exchange of (symbolic) messages (whereby networked interactivity in computer-mediated communication settings goes beyond natural interactivity in that “later messages in any sequence take into account not just messages that preceded them, but also the manner in which previous messages were reactive. In this manner interactivity forms a social reality”; Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997; para. 8), active user control (Rice & Williams, 1984), immediacy of feedback (tools such as e-mail links that allow the receiver to concurrently communicate with the sender; Dennis & Kinney 1998), and participation (defined by Laurel, 1991, p. 21, as “how immersed you are in the experience”). CMC theory, in particular, stresses the way by which the communicators process social identity and relational cues (i.e., the capability to convey meanings through cues like body language, voice, tones, that is basically social information) using different media (Fulk et al., 1990; Walther, 1992). And third, interactivity is viewed to have more anthropomorphic properties (Quiring 2009). Here, interactivity refers back to the concept of action in the social sciences, whereby action is presupposed to depend on an active human subject intentionally acting upon an object or another subject. Interaction with objects and the creators of these objects modify their actions and reactions due to the actions by their interaction partner(s) (Jaeckel, 1995). Seen this way, interactivity is understood as a subjective mode of perception and cognition and, as interpreted from a communication theory perspective, focuses on how a receiver actively interprets and uses mass and new media messages. In the CMC literature, two key themes have emerged under this rubric: individual experiential processes of interactivity (McMillan & Hwang, 2002; McMillan, 2000; Downes & McMillan, 2000), and perceptions of individual control over both presentation and content (Bezjian-Avery et al. 1998, Hanssen et al. 1996). Self-awareness (i.e., the psychological factor that impacts on social interaction as mediated by CMC; Matheson & Zanna, 1998), responsiveness (the degree to which a user perceives a system as reacting quickly and iteratively to user input; Rafaeli, 1988), a sense of presence (discoursed as virtual experience made by humans when they interact with media and simulation technologies; Lee, 2004; Lombard & Ditton, 1997; Short, 1974, Short et al., 1976; Steuer, 1992), involvement (defined as perceived sensory and cognitive affiliation with product and content; Fortin & Dholakia, 2005; Franz & Robey, 1986; McMillan, 2000; McMillan et al., 2003, Zaichkowsky, 1986), and perceived user control are further constituent psychological activities on this level of discussion (Robey, 1979). Interactivity and economic theory The idea that business value and thus profit is co-created and enhanced through the producers’ interaction with their customers is as old as Frederic W. Taylor who developed the concept of scientific management in 1911. Taylor’s concept contains aspects on the division of labor being relevant to the theory and practice for improving efficiency of existing business processes and thus making non-value adding work obsolete. Secondly, modern organization theory around Chester Barnard (1948), the author of pioneering work in management theory and organizational sociology, has originated the idea of relationship marketing whereby customers are not external actors in the business communication process but an integral part of an organization’s plan for survival through effectiveness and efficiency. 220

Thirdly, in 1993, Normann and Ramirez published their seminal work on how new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and changing consumer lifestyles transform the notion of business value from Porter’s (1985) traditional model of the sequential value chain into their new model of value constellation. There, consumers and other partners, suppliers, etc., actively co-produce relationships along with the enterprise. In their model, the business model is meant to be actively co-created between the various actors involved. To support this, interactive network technologies would potentially open organizations towards customers’ involvement for value generation. Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004), another two comprehensive business thinkers, have further elaborated on changes in the traditional logic of governance in electronic commerce as analytically depicted by the concept of the linear and horizontal value chain. Briefly, they claim the need for producers to establish interaction platforms for “co-creating unique value with customers”. Only this would achieve sustainable competitive advantage for the business firm. Likewise, German and Scandinavian researchers in business and management have focused on customer integration (Kleinaltenkamp, 1996; Lampel & Mintzberg, 1995; Wikström, 1996a; Wikström, 1996b), value webs (Reichwald et al., 2004) and interactive value creation (Reichwald & Piller, 2009), a general research perspective which this present study is based on conceptually. Adoption of the concept of interactivity within the research domain of electronic commerce can be found in studies investigating business-to-customer relationships in ecommerce research traditions (Romano & Fjermestad, 2003; Kuk & Yeung, 2002; Essler & Whitaker, 2001; Sukpanich & Chen, 2000; Yadav & Varadarajan, 2005a) and the marketing and advertising activities of firms (Blattberg & Deighton, 1991; Coviello et al., 2001; Day, 1998; Ha & James, 1998; Novak et al., 2000, Iacobucci, 1998; Liu & Shrum, 2002; Ko et al., 2005; Webster, 1996; Webster, 1998). Naturally, the possible thematic scope of interactivity within an e-commerce context is broad and rather scattered, discussing structural, processual, and perceptual dimensions across various issues. To start with, Choi, Stahl, & Winston (1997) saw interactivity as a defining criterion for digital products: “Products that are downloaded at once or in a piecemeal fashion, such as through daily updates, can be called delivered products. Interactive products, on the other hand, are products or services, such as remote-diagnosis, interactive games, and tele-education” (p. 76). Bezjian-Avery et al. (1998) defined interactivity as part of “the immediately iterative process by which customer needs and desires are uncovered, met, modified, and satisfied by the providing firm” (p. 23). Interactivity can push users to actively engage in the communication process and thus build sustainable relationships between consumer and advertiser/message provider. Romano and Fjermestad (2003) identified a number of current and emergent technologies for internet-based electronic customer relationship management (e-CRM). They developed an e-CRM IT classification scheme from the consumer’s perspective based on how consumers communicate to develop and maintain relationships via three specific levels of participation along a continuum ranging from passive to interactive. For them, interactive emergent technologies such as e-mail, forums, online focus groups, interactive interviews, survey panels, auctions, trade shows, and shopping agents are participatory. Essler and Whitaker (2001) pointed to the need of rethinking e-commerce business models impacted by interactivity in the era of cyberspace. They argued that, in the future, interactivity would drive changes from enterprise infrastructure to the so-called ‘interactional agitecture’ described as a process of reciprocal interactivity and influence between firm and customer. Alba et al. (1997) conceptualized interactivity from an e-commerce point of view as “a continuous construct capturing the quality of two-way communication between two parties […]. In the case of interactive home shopping (IHS), the parties are the buyer and seller. The two dimensions of interactivity are response time and response contingency. Because IHS involves electronic communication, the response can be immediate – similar to response time in face-to-face communications. Response contingency is the degree 221

to which the response by one party is a function of the response made by the other party” (p. 38). The concept of customer integration The concept of customer integration dates back to the mid-1990s, when several researchers in management theory began to work on the belief that new technologies, increased competition, and more assertive customers are leading firms towards customization of their products and services. By integrating customers into design, research and product development, manufacturing, assembling, or sales activities, companies, it is believed, will get efficient support to improve products for more customer satisfaction, and identify and unlock new sources of revenue (Kleinaltenkamp, 1996). Customer integration can be defined as a value creation process where “consumers take part in activities and processes which used to be seen as the domain of the companies” (Wikstroem, 1996a, p. 360). Value webs enable both customers and suppliers to be co-operatively active in team-based product and process innovation activities, as well as in product design, re-design, development, and, finally, electronically mediated transactions between organizations and customers (Chesbrough et al., 2006, von Hippel 2005). Social network effects and transaction cost efficiencies resulting from these value webs are said to emerge if customers are actively involved in and integrated into the respective e-business processes (Economides, 1996; Klemperer, 2008; Yadav & Varadarajan, 2005a).

3. The Role of Transaction Costs Transaction cost theory (TCT) provides a useful theoretical framework for analyzing whether particular business firm activities should be organized internally (e.g. within news journalists of an online web news portal) or externally (e.g. through collaborative creation of user generated content). Conceptually introduced in Ronald Coase’s 1937 paper The Nature of the Firm (1937), transaction costs are generally defined as costs incurred when using the market mechanism in buying or selling a good or service. Coase noted that there were costs using the price system, costs we know as transaction costs. Coase reasoned that firms emerge when the transaction costs associated with coordinating particular exchanges using markets exceeded those of coordinating the same exchanges using managers. In the absence of transaction costs, Coase (1937/1988) wrote, “the firm has no purpose” (p. 34). Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985, 2005) later developed transaction cost theory (TCT) more fully. The primary concern of TCT is with the relative efficiency of internal versus external organization of activities and with the conditions affecting the efficiency of the two organizational governance forms: ‘Market’ (i.e. external market mechanism) or ‘Hierarchy’ (i.e. internal organizational structure). Presenting a minimalist version of the theory, Williamson based TCT on two assumptions of human behavior: ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘opportunism’ (also see Table 1 below). Bounded rationality refers to the difficulty of making fully informed decisions. Opportunism is the tendency for one party of an exchange to change the terms in their favor once the other party has committed itself. Transactions are further characterised by three critical dimensions on the basis of which evaluations can be undertaken as to whether the transaction can be better executed within a firm or on the market (Williamson, 1973). The dimensions are (1) uncertainty, (2) the frequency with which transactions recur, and (3) the degree to which durable, transaction-specific investments are required to realise least-cost supply (asset 222

specificity). Uncertainty (1) mainly resides in the missing of adequate information about a subject. For example, uncertainty can emerge in case the future behaviour of a cooperating actor is not predictable. Hence, uncertainty generally drives the formation of hierarchies, where actors are bound to certain behaviour by contract (Williamson, 1973). Similarly, high levels of transaction frequency (2) foster the emergence of hierarchies (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997), as forming identical co-operations again and again is not efficient. As a high level of asset specificity (3) raises the danger of opportunistic behaviour and fosters the emergence of hierarchies. In what follows, selected constructs of TCT relevant for the present study shall be briefly summarized:

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Table 1: Transaction cost constructs and description (Source: The author) TC constructs

Description

Governance structure

The term was coined by Williamson in his 1979 paper “TransactionCost Economics …”: The governance structures are examples of institutions, defines as sets of laws, rules, customs, and norms that guide human behaviour. ‘Market’ and ‘hierarchy’ are the two main governance mechanisms.

Transaction

Economic exchange requires transaction, that is, transfers of goods and services across “technologically separable interface(s)” (Williamson, 1981, p. 552). Transactions are thus all explicit and implicit negotiations on property rights transfers between at least two economic actors.

Transaction costs

The effort, time, and costs incurred in searching, creating, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a product or service contract between buyers and sellers (Williamson, 1991b; Allen, 1991; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997)

Asset specificity

The degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value (Williamson, 1976, 1991b). In other words, transactions require specific investments in support of the transaction for which the investment has been made. Different types of asset specificity exist: site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, temporal specificity and brand name capital (Williamson, 1991b).

Frequency

The number of times a client organization initiates a transaction, typically categorized as either occasional or frequent (Williamson, 1991b).

Uncertainty

The degree of unpredictability or volatility of future states as it relates to the behavioural or environmental factors of a transaction (Williamson, 1991b).

Bounded rationality

Human decision making is limited by the ability to process information. “While their actions are ‘intendedly rational’, cognitive limitations render them only limitedly so”; Simon, 1957, p. xxiv).

Decision

Essentially, a 'make-or-buy’ decision in which a client organization decides to keep a transaction in-house or decides to contract with an outsourcing supplier for all or part of the transaction (Williamson, 1991b).

Information asymmetry

Information of relevance to transaction is not always shared equally by all parties (Arrow, 1963).

Opportunism

Economic agents seek “self-interest … with guile“, Williamson, 1975, p. 26). „This includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating. Opportunism more often involves subtle forms of deceit“, Williamson, 1985, p. 47).

The following sample propositions offer suggested research directions in analyzing potential impacts of web interactivity on customer integration with a view to be further hypothesized against the role of transactions costs involved in such an integration process.

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Proposition 1: Web interactivity enhances consumer value. Reviewing the interactivity concept has shown that it potentially offers greater product choices for consumers by offering a wider range of options for consumption to customers. Proposition 1 is supported by the following arguments as drawn from a review of the literature: First, that interactivity enhances consumer value is plausible if one considers the importance of the technology dimension of interactivity when predicting a positive impact relationship between interactivity and consumer value. Following the interactivity as technology school of thought, which focuses on functions of technology features, interactivity is based on how many and what types of features are available for online users to fulfil interactive communication (Steuer, 1992; Sundar, 2004). Simply speaking, once interactive technology infrastructures are in place, the more interactive features offered, the bigger the choice and thus value for the consumer. A range of theories from neighbouring disciplines such as marketing science, journalism, and advertising support this proposition (Deuze, 2003; Ghose & Dou, 1998; Liu, 2003; Woodruff, 1997; Wu, 2006). There, greater choice would improve the general attractiveness of a website by improving the consumer’s choice of options and active control over the type of product sought after and selected. On closer inspection, however, interactivity sub-dimensions may each impact differently on consumer value. Bi-directionality, bandwidth, and synchronicity may serve as necessary but not sufficient conditions for interactivity. As exemplified by Song and Bucy (2008), “it might be possible that one perceives communication through asynchronous e-mail as more interactive than synchronous communication through Instant Messenger (IM) even though objectively (technologically) the opposite appears true” (p. 7). Further, timeliness as interaction speed is perceived as a positive predictor of interactivity-induced business value. However, when defined as communication speed, the construct becomes particularly valuable for the consumer (Kiousis, 2002). In fact, consumers may wish to determine their own message timing and thus increase their control over technology and communication process (Downes & McMillan, 2000; Kiousis, 2002). Consumer value may thus eventually depend on the perceptual aspects of interactivity that may mediate the effects of technology on certain outcomes (Bucy & Tao, 2007). Past research has also indicated that greater complexity of choice available may influence consumer choice difficulty and choice overload (Ariely, 1998; Ariely, 2000; Heeter, 1989; Kim & LaRose, 2004). Interactivity thus also implies that consumers may have to afford higher amounts of effort to seek, self-select, process, use, and respond to information (Heeter 1989, Stewart & Pavlou 2002). In this case, consumers may have to undertake (significant) cognitive activities when trying to satisfy some need or goal (e.g., navigating the website and pulling information from it) (Heeter, 1989; McMillan & Hwang, 2002; Zaichkowsky, 1985). This may act as a further impediment on consumer value. Proposition 2: Web interactivity drives customer integration. As indicated, the role of the customer is changing from a pure consumer of products or services to that of equal partner in a process of adding value: consumers are becoming co-producers and co-designers (Berger et al., 2005; Picot et al., 1998; Reichwald et al., 2004; Tseng & Piller, 2003). Both e-business partners are thus tied together in these value webs. The firm’s relationship with the customer, thus the business value of any customer integration, is crucially dependent on interaction with him or her. Here, interactivity is an essential building block for enhancing an electronic commerce relationship with the customer. More strongly, 225

interactivity may even be considered as the engine of this the new fabric of interaction. Theoretically, customer integration is the ultimate form of this kind of customer orientation. Its goal is to provide customized products or services that exactly meet the desires and wishes of each individual customer (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). Among other issues, the economic view of customer integration identifies interactive value creation as an emergent paradigm at the interface of research into strategic management, innovation management, and marketing management (Kotha, 1995; Reichwald & Piller, 2009). Hence, customer integration may become a strategic necessity of business companies as electronic transactions may impact the characteristics of these markets in ways that overall efficiency gains (e.g., lower information search costs for consumers) and/or improvements in effectiveness (e.g., greater ability of consumers to purchase products better suited to their specific needs) may result from transactions in electronic marketplaces in various industries (Bakos, 1991; Lampel & Mintzberg, 1996; Yadav & Varadarajan, 2005b; Zeithaml, 1988). Business companies may benefit from so-called economies of integration (Noori, 1990; Piller et al., 2004; Wind & Rangaswamy, 2001; Vandermerve, 2000). These are defined as “cost savings potentials as a result from the direct interaction between each customer and the firm” (Piller & Moeslein, 2002, p. 6). These economies of integration arise from a process called mass customization which essentially means differentiation through customization, i.e. the production of goods in so many variants that the wishes of each relevant customer are fulfilled. A customized product can lead to lower costs when a combination of economies of scale and economies of scope is attained. The differentiation option leads to greater product attractiveness. In addition, the individual contact between supplier and customer offers possibilities of building up a lasting relationship with the customer. One can reasonably expect web interactivity-induced online transactions to push customer integration. This integration would then have potential effects on transaction costs involved, contingent upon type and intensity of web interactivity and thus the type and level of customer integration. As for customer integration to economize on this underlying trend of low transaction costs in electronic market exchanges, three areas of common concern are, however, worth specifying: First, while web interactivity may reduce transaction costs, customer integration is, however, characterized by a high intensity and volume of information exchange between publisher and consumer. As web interactivity allows consumers to feel higher perceived sensory, cognitive, and affective affiliation with online site content, their perceived value of the site may be improved (Kalyanaraman & Sundar, 2006). A corollary is that this generally improves the site’s stickiness, i.e. the site’s ability to retain online customers and prolong their duration of each stay. It is obvious, however, that the more intense and the larger the volume of transactions between producer and consumer become the higher will the investments necessary to deliver a satisfying and frustration-free experience for the consumer. A longer duration of stay, a higher engagement of the consumer, a bigger volume of transactions, simply, the more the customer is integrated, and the more likely web interactivity is pushing this integration, the more complex will be the governance of relations between them two and the underlying transaction cost situations thereof. In contrast to the popular thesis that internet-enabled business exchange would automatically lead to transaction costs efficiencies (Bakos, 1991; Brynolffson & Smith, 2000; Cordella & Simon, 1997) (also see proposition 3 below), it may thus be argued that although web interactivity may potentially reduce transaction costs, exchanges differ in their affinity to generate particular types of transaction costs (see, above) and governance structures necessary to organize these transactions cost-efficiently. This is to say that full-fledged electronic market transactions require adequate interactive communication technology architecture. But while 226

interactive broadband infrastructures provide a more efficient flow of information and facilitate transaction under complex and uncertain circumstances, and thereby reduce transaction costs (Malone et al. ,1987; Ciborra, 1993; Benjamin & Wigand, 1995), transactional risks remain prevalent in relation-specific investments. Opportunism and loss of resource control (Clemons & Row, 1992; Clemons et al., 1993) over content quality and brand reputation come as impediments for online transaction to be organized exclusively via markets. Proposition 3: Web interactivity reduces transaction costs. Reviewing the relevant literature on interactivity alludes to the possibility that it has various effects on transaction costs in online news publishing. Web interactivity-driven interactions between news provider and user involve various types of transaction costs, ranging from initiation to monitoring costs. When information is costly, various activities related to the exchange of property rights between the exchange partners give rise to transaction costs. In order for the transaction to be initiated, consumers face search costs for the product/content they demand (Stigler, 1961). The publisher, on his side, needs to communicate the product value to the consumer by signaling price and quality components of the information good demanded. The consumer faces search and first assessment costs of product samples. Second, agreement costs are bargaining costs which arise when contracts are designed and duration of usage of the information goods to be exchanged are to be established. Execution costs relate to temporal types of content delivery and the actual transfer of property rights. Further, monitoring of content quality on the supply side as well as monitoring consumers to see whether they abide by the forms of contract (e.g. copyright infringement, costs of cheating and opportunistic behavior) come as another transaction cost component (Williamson, 1975). Monitoring social costs (i.e. costs or benefits on others which are not reflected in the prices charged for the goods and services being provided and consumed; Coase, 1960), and illicit copying and intellectual property theft further are perennial problems. Following TCT, contracts need to be adjusted again and again (Picot et al., 2001). Motivation costs are costs related to information asymmetries and incomplete commitment (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), mental accounting costs are some sort of psychological transaction costs that arise when humans make decisions under the impression of perceptual fallacies (Thaler, 1985). Cognitive costs are costs related to mental effort and choice processing (Shugan, 1980). The following table 2 presents potential transaction cost types in an online publishing context.

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Table 2: Transaction costs types and occurrence in online publishing – A selection Transaction cost type

Occurrence in online publishing

Initiation

Consumer search costs for content of information goods Assessment of content samples

Agreement

Negotiation of contract design and duration of usage

Execution

One-time or recurring delivery of content Transfer of property rights

Monitoring

Monitoring of content quality, IPR, copyright infringement, social costs (Coase, 1960)

Adjustment

Re-definition and re-negotiation of contract (Picot et al., 1998)

Motivation

Informational asymmetry and imperfect commitment (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992)

Thinking

Cognitive costs (Shugan, 1980)

Perception

Mental accounting costs (Thaler, 1985) Source: The author (following Anding & Hess, 2002)

4. Conclusion This article reviewed and synthesized selected literature on web interactivity and the management of customer integration with a view to evaluating both concepts against the role of transaction costs involved in social and economic transactions in the electronic marketplace. I hope to have made the following three contributions to discussions surrounding theory development in social media management research: First, reviewing the concept of interactivity has identified a variety of themes from various scholarly perspectives. Although there are disciplinary differences in observing, defining, and interpreting interactivity, which obviously makes comparisons of different studies difficult, interactivity must be analyzed from these multiple sources in order to link the concept of interactivity with the concept of customer integration in exchanges in the electronic marketplace. I adopted the dominant three-dimensional view of interactivity and conceptualized it as an intrinsic attribute of the communication technology, as a constituent part of a social interaction and communication process between users or between users and technology interfaces and designs, and as a process of subjective user perception (McMillan, 2002; ibid., 2005; ibid., 2006; Quiring & Schweiger, 2008). This three-dimensional approach has become the canonical standard in researching the phenomenon of interactivity (Bucy & Tao, 2007; Gleason, 2009; McMillan, 2005). I conclude from the review of current literature that interactivity is highly heterogeneous in nature and thus covers a broad variety of challenging issues in building value webs through customer integration. However, the literature bodies of both concepts are wide and yet have to be researched more systematically. The problems are manifold but the most pressing seems to be the nature of the concept of web interactivity itself, which remains multi-faceted and difficult to operationalize. Theoretically, web interactivity may widen a publisher’s strategic options focusing on customer integration, cooperation, and, eventually, sourcing of business value. Customer integration may also help achieving product differentiation thereby reducing the 228

pressure of competition from identical products or close substitutes (Bakos, 1991; Bakos, 1997). Transaction cost theory may deliver a solid theoretical base for integrating both concepts more soundly. It was shown that web interactivity potentially drives up the interaction frequency of online transactions (e.g. because of open standards, anyone can interact with anyone else), reduces transaction uncertainty (by providing a wealth of transaction-specific information or establishing new contacts on a targeted basis; Richter et al., 2010), and is dependent on the type of economic and social transaction contracted. A corollary is that publishers need to carefully decide on type and organization of customer integration in order to successfully build a consumer marketplace for information goods and services. This would be strongly built on the media firm’s ability in identifying the actual consumer need and ensuring a stable and sustainable relationship with him/her. It should have become clear that offering web interactivity may involve transaction costs that exceed efficiency thresholds on both sides of the transaction which will negatively affect the welfare of both news publisher and online consumers. Planned extensions and future research of this study shall include improving the validity of analysis by generating more insightful and testable theoretical propositions to be examined against empirical evidence. This would imply to establish a structural model which postulates effects between the technological, communicative and perceptual determinants of web interactivity, customer integration strategies, and the perceived impacts on transaction costs measured on both sides of the equation. To conclude, a more nuanced investigation needs to be made into the transaction cost effectiveness of interactive media and communications in online publishing, since these costs can become critical for overall business success in digital media markets.

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Beitrag 13: The Business Value of Interactivity Originally pubished in: Murschetz, P. C. (2011). The Business Value of Interactivity: Managing Customers in the Electronic Marketplace. In C. T. Salmon (Ed.), Communication Yearbook 35 (ICA International Communication Association (pp. 387-425). New York & London: Routledge.

Introduction By offering interactive e-commerce applications and services and thereby actively engaging consumers in the communication process, organizations are building solid and sustainable relationships that may help them achieve competitive positional advantages in the electronic marketplace (Porter, 2001). One might expect a rich literature and ample empirical insights into the important issue of interactivity management in the e-commerce domain. However, my own review of this literature concludes that a clear picture of the relationship between interactivity and its efficacy on the business value of an organization has not emerged from previous studies. Although creating business value from interacting with customers in the electronic marketplace is far from being a new academic proposition (Armstrong & Hagel, 1996; Amit & Zott, 2001; Zeithaml, 1988), the concept warrants closer study from the perspective of e-commerce management (Jiang et al., 2010; Yadav & Varadarajan, 2005a & b) in an attempt to reconcile limited and contradictory findings resulting from a variety of deficiencies such as: x

inconsistent conceptual definitions of interactivity,

x

different units and levels of analysis (i.e., the question of identifying a locus of interactivity; does it reside in the infrastructure, distribution and/or end-user technology, the communication structures and processes, and/or in the perceived consumer control over the media and communication process?), and

x

a largely incoherent base of theory for examining relations and interdependencies between the above-mentioned factors.

The primary purpose of this work is to undertake a comprehensive and necessarily interdisciplinary literature review on the concept of interactivity. I intend to broaden existing knowledge of interactivity by drawing from disparate academic fields such as media and communication theory, computer-mediated communication (CMC), marketing, advertising, and e-commerce, and thereby systematize, link, and extend familiar definitions, characteristics, types and dimensions of interactivity from extant literature in these fields. By delineating the central properties of interactivity, I will attempt to make important strides towards the construction of an analytical bridge between interactivity and its potentials for creating business value for organizations in an e-commerce context. By reviewing the scholarly debate in interactivity, I also generate the scientific claim for analyzing desirable future research thrusts with regard to managerial implications of interactivity on the business value that may result from interactions between the main participants in the electronic marketplace: the business firm and the customer. Essentially, I will develop propositions as first principles of a (still to be built) conceptual model analyzing the efficacy of interactive e-commerce applications and services on the business value of customer integration in the electronic marketplace. It is this nexus of considerations that motivates this work. It needs to be stressed that I will view interactivity not as an objective, external property of technology with deterministic impact on adoption, usage 239

and performance within business firms, but as both system- and human-related artifact of computer-mediated communicative interaction (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1985; Thomas, 1992; Williams & Edge, 1996). The chapter is organized as follows: First, I provide a literature review on interactivity. This review will proceed along the three dominant research traditions focusing on the interactivity phenomenon: technology, communication process, and user perception. This will include reviewing literature streams in both the media and communication studies and ecommerce literature domains. The discussion then focuses on discussions about impacts of interactivity on potential business value impacts. By reviewing the e-commerce literature on this relationship, I highlight gaps in the debate on interactivity in the electronic marketplace and present some caveats as to the general validity of the concept discussed among scholars from various other backgrounds. Again, the purpose of this exercise is not only to organize ideas and material in a logical and meaningful way but also to formulate an analytical bridge from interactivity to creating business value in e-commerce. This conceptual model shall eventually serve the purpose of developing a guiding framework for successful interactivity management. In fact, this framework shall help integrating the concept of interactivity into existing frameworks of e-commerce management of customer integration in electronic commerce environments (McKay & Marshall, 2004; Turban et al., 2002; Vulkan, 2003).

Reviewing Interactivity The title phrase ‘thinking about the business value of interactivity for managing customers in the electronic marketplace’ invites an examination of the following key concepts: interactivity, business value, customer, electronic marketplace, and management. In what follows, I will first introduce the key concepts pertaining to this current research theme. Delineating the key concepts I follow in the vein of Yadav and Varadarajan (2005a), who offer the following constitutive definition of interactivity from an e-commerce research perspective: “Interactivity in the electronic marketplace is the degree to which computer-mediated communication is perceived by each of the communicating entities to be (a) bi-directional, (b) timely, (c) mutually controllable, and (d) responsive” (Yadav & Varadarajan, 2005a, p. 593). This definition of interactivity posits that the phenomenon has multi-formal qualities. In being bi-directional, it permits two-way flow of information between one or more senders and one or more receivers using digital communication technologies such as broadband internet connections. Timeliness and mutual control refer to communication experiences made by customers on conversational interaction. While control passes forth and back between the participants in a natural conversation and it is usually clear to both parties who is in control at any given moment, computer-mediated interactions are perceived as being (more) interactive if both participants (i.e., the sender as well as the receiver, and thus not the sender exclusively) can actively control the type of content being transmitted. On top of this, consumers may experience a sense of presence and feel that their conversation query is responded immediately (within seconds) and as a logical and direct conversational reaction to their prior interaction command. Responsiveness, on its part, refers to the degree to which the responses in a communication are perceived to be appropriate and relevant in that they resolve the information need of the interaction episode or event (Alba et al., 1997; Burgoon et al., 2002; Newhagen & Rafaeli, 1996). 240

Building on above constitutive definition, I further conceptualize interactivity as a characteristic of computer-mediated communication that resides on three fundamental dimensions: As a feature of technology (characterized by the bi-directionality construct described above), as a process of communication and message exchange (referring to the control and responsiveness constructs shown above), and as something a consumer perceives after using a technology or going through an interaction process (as affirmed by all four constitutive elements noted above; Ghose & Dou, 1998; McMillan & Hwang, 2002; Yadav & Varadarajan, 2005a & b). Further, in the tradition of Reichwald and Piller (2009), I define business value alongside the notion of interactive value creation as a “process of cooperative and deliberate collaboration between producer and customer (i.e., online user), whereby the value creation process oscillates from fully producer dominated to fully customer oriented. […] The interactive value creation will either be initiated by the producer or the customer” (p. 44, translated by the author). According to these authors, interactive value can be achieved through either new forms of organizational arrangements and division of production tasks (e.g., through commons-based peer production or crowd-sourcing as organizational principle), various scenarios and designs of open innovation between producer and consumers (e.g., toolkits for open innovation; Baldwin & von Hippel, 2009; Chesbrough et al., 2006; Franke & Piller, 2004), or through the processes of mass customization and personalization in the production of (general-purpose or commodity) goods and services (i.e., by “effectively postponing the task of differentiating a product for a specific customer until the latest possible point in the supply network”; Chase et al., 2006, p. 419; Tseng & Jiao, 2001). In brief, while traditional management theory depicts business value is an informal term that includes all forms of value that determine the economic welfare of the firm in the long-run, the current definition of business value expands the concept of value of the firm beyond producer value to substantially include consumer value and all processes pertinent to determinants of compound value creation processes and outcomes mutually contributed by both the producer and the consumer (Urban, 2004). Being offered interactivity, consumers are set to experience higher degrees of involvement with the applications, products and services offered (Franz & Robey, 1986; Hartwick & Barki, 1994; McMillan, 2002; Tseng & Piller, 2003). Content quality, control, convenience, and costs may well be the determinants of an effective integration of customers. These determinants are driven by further constituents of a successful relationship: the object of integration (i.e., content categories and domains customers prefer to consume such as individual information, static text information, entertaining information, practical-technical applications, business transactions, or interpersonal communication), the communicative relationship between the business firm and the customer, the depth and familiarity of this relationship, the customer’s goal and motivation to interact, and the governance of this exchange (Berger, 1986; Morrison, 1998; Song & Zinkhan, 2008). Moreover, interactivity has the potential to change the market communication from provider-push to consumer-pull, from one-to-many to manyto-many communication, and from real off-line to virtual on-line electronic communication (Hofmann & Novak, 1996). Interactivity thus allows role changes of the transaction participants (Bretz & Schmidbauer, 1983; Rice, 1984). In the extreme case, consumers may even become what Toffler (1980) named prosumer, when he predicted that the role of producers (or seller) and consumers (or buyer) would begin to blur and merge. Hofmann & Novak (1996) suggested that the traditional one-to-many model of communication (one firm transmitting pre-selected and standardized content to fragmented buyers) is being replaced by a many-to-many communication model (firms and buyers transmitting customized content to each other). The term many-to-many describes a communication paradigm and an associated media (and technology) form that allows consumers to abandon their relatively passive role that has been traditionally assigned to them in the communication process. In other words, “moving away 241

from being mere recipients of firm-generated content, buyers are demonstrating a keen interest in developing and exercising greater control over the communication they receive and generate” (Yadav &Varadarajan, 2002, p. 308) (Bandulet & Morasch, 2005; Hoffman & Novak, 1996; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004; Stewart & Pavlou, 2002). On top of this, I will follow Yadav and Varadarajan (2002) and define an electronic marketplace as “a networked information system that serves as an enabling infrastructure for buyers and sellers to exchange information, transact, and perform other activities related to the transaction before, during, and after the transaction” (p. 297). Hence, I will apply a wide definition of transactions in the electronic marketplace that include both tangible and intangible aspects of value creation, exchange, and outcome. This approach complies with the fact that the scope for analyses in e-commerce needs to be broadened given that online transactions in various industry domains are considered to be specific. While electronic commerce (ecommerce) is often thought simply to refer to buying and selling processes using the internet, it may actually involve much more than electronically mediated financial transactions between business firms and customers. Many commentators refer to e-commerce as all electronically mediated transactions between an organization and any third party it deals with. By this definition, non-financial transactions such as customer requests for further information would also be considered to be part of e-commerce. Further, when intangible information goods and services (such as news offered on an internet news portal and serviced in personalized ways and/or on-demand) are the transaction objects of exchange between the buyer and seller in the electronic market their properties of being non-excludable, non-rival, intangible, content-based, and non-depletable shape the nature of these transactions (Gaustad, 2002; Picard, 2005). Eventually, it is noteworthy to stress the importance of intensifying research into interactivity with a view to understanding its managerial implications for creating sustainable business value. Essentially, I fertilize on the idea that organizations achieve so-called economies of integration in the electronic marketplace when they intensify their orientation towards customers by integrating them effectively and sustainably into various value creating processes (Lampel & Mintzberg, 1996; Noori, 1990; von Hippel, 2002). Customer integration can be defined as value creation processes where “consumers take part in activities and processes which used to be seen as the domain of the companies” (Wikstroem, 1996, p. 360). However, network effects and transaction cost efficiencies will only emerge if customers are actively involved in and integrated into the respective e-business processes. By integrating customers into market research and product development, manufacturing, assembling or sales activities, organizations can get efficient support to improve products for more customer satisfaction, and identify and unlock new sources of revenue. Equally, the role of the customer is changing from a pure consumer of products or services to a coequal partner in a process of adding value. Effectively, this means that consumers may become co-producers and co-designers. Both ebusiness partners are then tied together in so-called value webs. Let me now deeply review the interactivity concept. What is interactivity? Delineating the concept of interactivity is the Archimedean point from which I will begin this research itinerary. Interactivity was coined as the buzzword during the late 1980s and early 1990s when the multi-media euphoria fascinated politicians, economists, and researchers alike. Over the past twenty years, however, there has been little agreement among researchers on how interactivity should be conceptualized (Bucy, 2004a; Heeter, 2000; Neumann, 2008). Therefore, it is difficult to develop concrete knowledge regarding its constituent factors and consequences for computer-mediated communication in the electronic marketplace. This 242

makes the prospect of synthesizing and integrating the literature on the business value of interactivity rather elusive. As has been pointed out in meta-analyses of the interactivity literature (Rafaeli & Ariel, 2007; Johnson et al., 2006; Bucy, 2004a), some of the confusion about this construct comes from lack of agreement as to its nature, role, and effects. The doyen of interactivity research, Rafaeli (1988) put it as follows: “Interactivity is a widely used term with an intuitive appeal, but it is an underdefined concept. As a way of thinking about communication, it has high face validity, but only narrowly based explication, little consensus on meaning, and only recently emerging empirical verification and actual role” (p. 110). Similarly, reflecting upon how interactivity is used within the context of new media, Heeter (2000, p. 2) pointed out that interactivity is an “overused, underdefined concept”. Heeter referred to it as basically everything a human does. As it stands, the academic debate about interactivity is confronted with three main difficulties: First, interactivity is a multi-discursive concept: significantly different meanings and connotations can be found according to their use within different disciplinary discourses. Sociology, media and communication studies, computer-mediated communication (CMC), and computer sciences are paramount. Consequently, however, differences in how interactivity is observed, defined, and interpreted are significant. Therefore, it is striving for more definition, more clarity. In fact, the academic debate about interactivity is characterized by some degree of conceptual confusion. Scholarly dispute on concept relevance and validity has never receded. Communication theory, for example, derives interactivity from social interaction in sociology and social psychology (Argyle, 1969; Goffman, 1967; Blumer, 1969). There, interaction is defined as mutually interdependent social action between individuals who exchange symbols and meanings in the communication process which itself is supposed to be sequential, that is actions of one person result in reactions of another person (Jaeckel, 1995). Jaeckel (1995), who studied the origins of the term, explained that the term interactivity extends from interaction which generally means exchange and mutual influence. In general, an explanation of interactivity or interaction refers – perhaps not surprisingly – back to action, and in the social sciences action is presupposed to depend on an active human subject intentionally acting upon an object or another subject. However, fundamentally, this type of non-computer-based mutual or reciprocal interaction between humans has been adopting significantly contradictory meanings within competing scientific discourses. While communication science derives the concept of interactivity from sociology and social psychology, informatics introduces interactivity by referring to software which accepts and responds to inputs from humans in an interactive human-computer dialogue (Baecker, 1980). There, interactivity is referred to as software which accepts and responds to inputs from humans in an human-computer dialogue. Human-computer-interaction (HCI) research, on the other hand, understands interactivity as interaction between people, the computer and the human-technology interface (Helander et al., 1997; Lowe & Hall, 1999; Myers et al., 2000; Svanæs, 2000). There, interactivity is explained as a relationship between the human operator and technology. Being a multi-paradigmatic discipline, HCI’s view of the concept of interactivity is vast. At the heart of technological aspects of HCI towards interactivity lie issues of interface hardware and software architecture, computer graphics, dialogue architecture, and design (Hewett et al., 1992). Seen this way, the human-computer interaction model is based on four main components: human, computer, task environment, and machine environment. Second, interactivity is considered a multi-dimensional and multi-attribute concept which owes to its hybrid intellectual architecture. Interactivity is defined by an array of objective, technological properties such as media and transmission technology, interactive features, and interface design. However, other dimensions of interactivity are content quality

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and breadth, the nature of human-computer interaction, human behavior and perceptions as well as situational and contextual aspects (e.g., task demands, organizational arrangements). A third central caveat in discussing interactivity lies in the fact that a systematic analysis of interactivity is accompanied by its multi-efficacy. Indeed, little effort has been directed into theorizing on the effects of interactivity (Bucy, 2004a; Gleason, 2009; Sundar, 2004). Scholars in interactive advertising effectiveness research, for example, found interactivity to have a positive impact on user attitudes (Cho & Leckenby, 1999). Others argued, by contrast, that interactivity may even be detrimental to advertising effectiveness (Bezjian-Avery et al., 1998; Liu & Shrum, 2002). Further, the multi-dimensionality of the concept infers that research needs to be conducted to understand the effects of varying levels of interactivity of a message vehicle (e.g., a website) on an individual’s capacity for effective information processing and decisionmaking (Bezjian-Avery et al., 1998; Cho & Leckenby, 1999; Coyle & Thorson, 2001). Moreover, research in personality differences and social and psychological factors would lead to a rich space of further possible research topics (Jee & Lee, 2002; Lin, 2003; Sohn & Lee, 2005). Three traditions of interactivity Notwithstanding these difficulties in conceptualizing interactivity, scholars developed three dominant concept traditions alongside the dominant characteristics of the phenomenon (Heeter, 2000; Jensen, 1998; Kiousis, 2002; McMillan, 2006; McMillan, 2002; Quiring & Schweiger, 2008): technology, communication process, and user perception. Each of these characteristics locate the reference point of interactivity differently according to the nature of the players (i.e., active or passive), the level of receiver control (i.e., high or low), and the center of control (i.e., human or computer) (McMillan, 2006).1 First, the interactivity as technology tradition sees interaction between humans and the computer itself (or other types of new media systems) as central to new media. Being rooted in human-computer interaction (HCI) research (Baecker, 1980; Baecker & Buxton, 1987; Guedj et al., 1980; Hartson, 1998; Nielsen, 2000), it defines the interaction between a single human and a single computer as the most elementary form of interactivity (Shaw et al., 1993). As indicated above, key underlying constructs of this view of interactivity are: Bi-directionality (McMillan, 2000; Nickerson, 1977; Noll, 2003), bandwidth (indicating the speed at which data are transferred using a particular network medium; Burke & Chidambaram, 1999), speed of response (as explained by the timeliness construct described above; Hanssen et al., 1996), symmetry (referring to (a) a technology characteristic where speed or data quantity transferred is the same in both directions; measured by down and upstream channel or bandwidth capacity by transmit time per Mega Bytes, and (b) a communication characteristic where the sender and receiver roles becoming virtually indistinguishable in environments such as chat rooms, bulletin boards, etc.; as described in Grunig & Grunig’s (1989) model of two-way symmetric communication), and synchronicity (similar to speed of response this construct refers to the extent to which a message exchange occurs in real time or is delayed; Burgoon et al., 2000; Dennis et al., 2008; Dennis & Valacich, 1999). Essentially, no computer-mediated interactivity would occur without the provision of a physical return-path and adequate communication technology architecture. The second school of thought identifies interactivity as communication process at the heart of which lies computer-mediated interaction between humans. Rooted within CMC theory, this view refers to themes of interpersonal interaction, symbolic interaction, and social interaction (Goffman, 1967; McMillan, 2006). Underlying constructs on this dimension are: reciprocality of participants (also discussed as reciprocity, participation, mutual action, action-reaction, 244

and two-way communication; Ha & James, 1998; Gouldner, 1960; Johnson et al., 2006), exchange of (symbolic) messages (whereby networked interactivity in computer-mediated communication settings goes beyond natural interactivity in that “later messages in any sequence take into account not just messages that preceded them, but also the manner in which previous messages were reactive. In this manner interactivity forms a social reality”; Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997, para. 8), active user control (Rice & Williams, 1984), immediacy of feedback (tools such as e-mail links that allow the receiver to concurrently communicate with the sender; Dennis & Kinney, 1998), and participation (defined by Laurel as “how immersed you are in the experience”; Laurel, 1991, p. 21). CMC theory, in particular, stresses the way by which the communicators process social identity and relational cues (i.e., the capability to convey meanings through cues like body language, voice, tones, that is basically social information) using different media (Fulk et al., 1990; Walther, 1992). And third, interactivity is viewed to have anthropomorphic properties (Quiring, 2009). Here, interactivity refers to action and in the social sciences whereby action is presupposed to depend on an active human subject intentionally acting upon an object or another subject. Interaction with objects and the creators of these objects modify their actions and reactions due to the actions by their interaction partner(s) (Jaeckel, 1995). Seen this way, interactivity is understood as a subjective mode of perception and cognition and, as interpreted from a communication theory perspective, focuses on how a receiver actively interprets and uses mass and new media messages. In the CMC literature, two key themes have emerged under this rubric: individual experiential processes of interactivity (McMillan & Hwang, 2002; McMillan, 2000; Downes & McMillan, 2000), and perceptions of individual control over both presentation and content (Bezjian-Avery et al., 1998; Hansen et al., 1996). Self awareness (i.e., psychological factor that impacts on social interaction as mediated by CMC; Matheson & Zanna, 1988), responsiveness (the degree to which a user perceives a system as reacting quickly and iteratively to user input; Rafaeli, 1988), a sense of presence (discoursed as virtual experience made by humans when they interact with media and simulation technologies; Lee, 2004; Lombard & Ditton, 1997; Short et al., 1976; Short, 1974; Steuer, 1992), involvement (defined as perceived sensory and cognitive affiliation with product and content; Fortin & Dholakia, 2005; Franz & Robey, 1986; McMillan, 2000; McMillan et al., 2003; Zaichkowsky, 1986), and perceived user control are further constituent psychological activities on this level of discussion (Robey, 1979). McMillan (2002, 2003, 2005), whose conceptual typology will be used more explicitly below, identified three types of interactivity in the literature. First, human-to-computer interactivity, also known as medium or man-machine interactivity, focuses on the technostructural properties of human-computer interaction. It looks at interactivity is a machine attribute and at interaction as the process that takes place when a human user operates a machine (Jensen, 1998). HCI research addresses this type of interactivity and deals with issues of design, evaluation and implementation of interactive computing, telecommunication, and media systems for human use (Kirsh, 1997; Lim et al., 2009; Sears & Jacko, 2009; Sundar et al., 2010). Typical examples of features that drive human-to-computer interactivity are: search function/engine, choice of language, choice of browser support, retrieval of audio files, retrieval of moving images, adaptive interactivity in start area (personalization tools), reference to other areas of the same site, hyperlinks to other websites (see Table 1 below). Heeter (1989) conceived of this type of interactivity as complexity of choice available and defined it as “the extent to which users are provided with a choice of available information” (Heeter, 1989, p. 222), such that when users are forced to make more choices, they are engaging in a behavior that may be described as being more interactive. Similarly, Heeter’s dimension monitoring of

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information use which considers the potential of a system to track users’ usage patters and locates individual user profiles also falls under this category. Stimulated by Heeter’s (1989) construct of facilitation of interpersonal communication, human-to-human interactivity (also known as user-to-user interactivity), the second main type of interactivity, sees interactivity as mode of social interaction between participants and as natural to a communication process between and among humans (Blattberg & Deighton 1991; Goertz, 1995; Milheim, 1996). There, exchange of meaning between interaction partners shall take place (Haeckel, 1998; Rafaeli, 1988; Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997; Williams et al., 1988). Typical examples for human-to-human interactivity in computer-mediated settings are: scheduled chat sessions, newsgroup forums, subscriber blogs, reader polls on current topics, and hypertextual cross-reference to editorial content related to the current topic under surveillance. Finally, human-to-content interactivity refers to the concept of interactivity as mode of the individual receiver’s perception and cognition. Potential drivers among this type of interactivity are: the direction of communication, the time flexibility, the sense of place, the level of control, the perceived system responsiveness, and the perceived purpose of communication (Downes & McMillan, 2000; Kiousis, 2002; McMillan, 2006). Here, typical examples are websites which allow users to add web pages, hobby or special interest pages, announcements of births, marriages, death, and reviews of games, movies, and other entertainment events. Heeter (1989) referred to this type of interactivity as ease of adding information. The easier it is to add information to a website, the more interactive it is supposed to be. Other facets that constitute perceived interactivity on this level are: reciprocity, responsiveness, and speed of response (Alba, 1997; Bezjian-Avery et al., 1998; Heeter, 1989). Interactivity in traditional and new media Historically, the term interactivity has been attributed to personal, face-to-face communication (Bretz & Schmidbauer, 1983; Duncan, 1989; Durlak, 1987; McMillan, 2006). Face-to-face communication between people typically is interactive, so are telephone conversations (Carey, 1989). Durlak (1989) even claimed that interpersonal communication and especially face-toface communication is the ideal type of interactive communication: “Face-to-face communication is held up as the model because the sender and receiver use all their senses, the reply is immediate, the communication is generally closed circuit, and the content is primarily informal or ‘ad lib‘” (p. 744). The importance of interactivity as distinctive variable of mediated communication has grown with the emergence of the world wide web (Bucher, 2002; Bucher, 2004; Huhtamo, 1998; Jensen, 1998; Kiousis, 1998; Manovich, 2001; Morris & Ogan, 1996) and other digital media such as interactive digital television (Jensen, 2005) and mobile media (Gao et al., 2009; Lee, 2005). In this chapter, I will review interactivity from a communication theory perceptive. According to Steuer (1992), traditional media refer to interactivity as “the degree to which users of a medium can influence the form or content of the mediated environment in real time” (p. 83). Steuer focused on the relationship between an individual who is both a sender and a receiver, and on the mediated environment with which he or she interacts in face-to-interface communication. Steuer suggested an alternative view of mediated communication and draws attention to a fundamental difference with conventional media. “Traditionally, the process of communication is described in terms of the transmission of information, as a process linking sender and receiver. Media are therefore important only as a conduit, as a means of connecting sender and receiver, and are only interesting to the extent that they contribute to or otherwise interfere with transmission of the message from sender to receiver” (p. 80). In addition, Steuer

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claimed that “information is not transmitted from sender to receiver; rather, mediated environments are created and then experienced” (p. 80). Jensen (1999) employed the model of information traffic patterns of Bordewijk and Van Kaam (1986) to examine scientific images of interactivity. Their classification system begins with what they call allocution, a traditional communications flow to distribute information from a centre simultaneously to many peripheral receivers. Allocution is typically one-way communication with little or no feedback or control by the recipient (e.g., public speaking, TV broadcasting). Second, conversation takes place when individuals interact directly with each other without intermediary, choosing partner, time, topic (e.g., talk, e-mail, telephone). The parties are equal in exchange. Further, consultation occurs when an individual looks for information at a central store of information (e.g., library, data base, archive). Here, the receiver determines time, place, and topic. The decision is peripheral. Finally, registration is a process whereby a centre requests and receives information from a participant at the periphery (e.g., recording systems). Jensen (1999) adopted these patterns of information traffic to assess whether particular media are interactive or not. To achieve this, Jensen proposed to apply these information patterns to the concept of interactivity. For this, they needed to be broken down into the following four dimensions: (1) Transmissional interactivity – a measure of media’s potential ability to let the user choose from a continuous stream of information in a one-way media system without a return channel and therefore without a possibility for making requests (e.g., teletext, near-video-on-demand, be-your-own-editor, multi-channel systems, datacasting, multicasting; (2) Consultational interactivity – a measure of media’s potential ability to let the user choose, by request, from an existing selection of preproduced information in a two-way media system with a return channel (e.g., video-on-demand, online information services, CDROM encyclopaedias, FTP, WWW, Gopher); (3) Conversational interactivity – a measure of a media’s potential ability to let the user produce and input his/her own information in a two-way media system, be it stored or in real-time (e.g., video conferencing systems, newsgroups, email, mailing lists); and (4) Registrational interactivity if information is produced by the information consumer, but processed and controlled by the information providing centre. Jensen’s taxonomy thus delivered a complex typology of the concept of ‘interactivity’ to reveal some central inherent properties: interactivity is functional, processual, auctorial, and situational. Looking at interactivity from the perspective of communication studies, Hanssen et al. (1996) pioneered a slightly different approach in stating that interactivity is a multi-dimensional construct and allows for the overlapping of three dimensions that are central to interactivity. In their own words: “Aspects of interactivity were clustered around three terms: (1) equality (containing aspects such as participants, mutual activity, role exchange, control); (2) responsiveness (e.g., mutual discourse, nature of feedback, response time); and (3) functional communicative environment (e.g., bandwidth, transparency, social presence, artificial intelligence)” (p. 71). Heeter (2000) observed seven central aspects about interactivity when tracing developments from traditional to new media systems: “(1) information is always sought or selected not merely sent; (2) media systems require different levels of user activity (i.e., users are always active to some extent); (3) activity is a user trait as well as a medium trait. Some media are more interactive than others; some receivers are more active than others. the extent of responsiveness to the user; (4) person-machine interactions are a special form of communication; (5) continuous feedback is a special form of feedback in which behavior of all users is measured on an ongoing basis by a source (e.g., videotext system) or gatekeeper (e.g., cable operator); and (6) the distinction between source and receiver is not present in all media systems; and (7) media systems may facilitate mass communication, interpersonal 247

communication, or both”. Heeter suggested domains for designed experiences in TV versus computer contexts such as screen resolution, input devices, viewing distance, user posture, room, number of users, and user engagement. Against this backdrop, Heeter developed a list of requirements for new and improved interactive interfaces, referring to the notions of time, space, participation, and user affordances. The idea of affordances plays an important role in the study of human-computer interaction. For Norman, who adopted the term to HCI, affordances are action possibilities that are readily perceivable by an actor (Norman, 1988). Similarly, Steuer (1992) came to define interactivity as “the degree to which users of a medium can influence the form or content of the mediated environment” (p. 80). Steuer considered interactivity (and vividness) as an experiential antecedent to tele-presence. Telepresence, on its part, is defined as a sense of presence in a mediated environment, wherein the user experiences the computer-mediated environment as less mediated than it actually is (Steuer, 1992; Klein, 2003). Consequently, Steuer offered three dimensions of interactivity: speed, range, and mapping, which are all technological elements. “Speed refers to the rate at which input can be assimilated into the mediated environment; range, which refers to the number of possibilities for action at any given time; and mapping, which refers to the ability of the system to map its controls to changes in the mediated environment in a natural and predictable manner” (p. 15). A review of the literature led Fortin (1997, as cited in Dholakia et al., 2000) to define interactivity as “the degree to which a communication system can allow one or more end users to communicate alternatively as senders or receivers with one or many other users or communication devices, either in real time (as in video teleconferencing) or on a storeand-forward basis (as with electronic mail), or to seek and gain access to information on an ondemand basis where the content, timing and sequence of the communication is under control of the end user, as opposed to a broadcast basis” (p. 4). Apart from more theoretical backup, studies in web design have tried to empirically verify the effects of interactivity on media offers. Dholakia et al. (2000), for example, focused on interactivity as it affects revisits to websites. Following an extensive literature review in CMC research on interactivity, they identified six key dimensions of the interactivity construct: user control, responsiveness, real-time interactions, connectedness, personalization/customization, and playfulness. Focusing on revisits, they proposed a framework that traces the effect of interactivity dimensions through intermediate stages of perceived interactivity, social presence, empowerment, and satisfaction. A closer look at the relationship between interactivity dimensions and revisits takes into consideration four types of websites – shopping, entertainment, information and communication. However, it took until the advent of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) that the concept of interactivity was scholarly discussed more explicitly. In this regard, Rafaeli (1988), an often-cited expert to study interpersonal and group computer-mediated communication, focused on the concept of responsiveness as interactive exchange and argues that interactivity is “an expression of the extent that, in a given series of communication changes, any third (or later) transmission (or message) is related to the degree to which previous exchanges referred to event earlier transmissions” (p. 111). On Rafaeli’s (1988) reading, interactivity is defined as a property of the communication process itself rather than a medium, although the medium “may set upper bounds, remove barriers, or provide necessary conditions for interactivity levels” (pp. 119-20). This model uses three progressive levels in its continuum: (1) Two way communication takes place when messages are delivered both ways; (2) Reactive and the communication also requires that a later message reacts to a previous message; (3) Finally, full interactivity requires that a later message responds to a sequence of previous messages. In this conceptual construction, responsiveness plays a central role. Responsiveness obviously requires that the media registers and stores information about a given user’s input 248

and actions and can then adjust to the user’s wishes and distinctive characteristics. This concept of interactivity refers therefore (contrary to Rogers’) primarily to the registration communication pattern. This aspect can be stated such that a media – in one sense or another – understands the user, and in this way approaches themes related to smart technologies, artificial intelligence etc. Once again, interpersonal communication functions as an ideal to be measured with characteristics similar to the sociological concept of interaction, and its requirement of reciprocity. Stressing the notion of interactivity as technology feature, Kiousis (2002) suggested that “interactivity is an attribute of the channel through which the dynamic interdependence between senders and receivers in communication becomes possible” (p. 359). In his concept explication concerning interactivity, Kiousis (2002) formulated a definition which assigns three central dimensions to interactivity: (1) the information technological structure of the medium; (2) the context of communication settings; and (3) the perception of users. Kiousis (2002) offered the following conceptual and operational definitions of interactivity: “To restate, interactivity can be defined as the degree to which a communication technology can create a mediated environment in which participants can communicate (one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-tomany) both synchronously and asynchronously and participate in reciprocal message exchanges (third-order dependency)” (p. 379). With regard to human users, interactivity additionally refers to the ability of users to perceive the experience to be a simulation of interpersonal communication and increase their awareness of tele-presence. Operationally, interactivity is then established by three factors: technological structure of the media used (e.g., speed, range, timing flexibility, and sensory complexity), characteristics of communication settings (e.g., third-order dependency, i.e., A’s response to B depends on B’s prior response to A’s initial communication acts, and social presence), and individual user’s perceptions (e.g., proximity, perceived speed, sensory activation, and tele-presence). Perception, on its part, is a popular category among many scholars who seek to identify the inner workings of the concept of interactivity (Lee, 2000; McMillan, 2000; Morrisson, 1998; Sohn & Lee, 2005). Burgoon et al. (2000), for example, suggested that one way to conceptualize interactivity is based on the qualitative experiences that users equate with interactivity. Morrison (1998) noted that it is important to understand how individuals perceive interactivity in order to grasp the influence of newer media technologies in their lives. McMillan and Hwang (2002) found that online users’ attitude toward websites is positively related to their perceived interactivity of the website. Lee (2000) suggested that the most important thing to be examined in measuring the level of interactivity is not counting more provisions of technological features, but rather investigating how users perceive and/or experience those features. Seen from a slightly different view, Williams et al. (1988) defined interactivity as “the degree to which participants in a communication process have control over, and can exchange roles in, their mutual discourse”. By mutual discourse, Williams et al. (1988) meant “the degree to which a given communication act is based on a prior series of communication acts” (pp. 10-1). By exchange of role, Williams et al. defined “the ability of individual A to take the position of individual B and thus to perform B’s communication acts”. Control is defined as “the extent to which an individual can choose the timing, content, and sequence of a communication act, search out alternative choices, enter content into a storage for other users, and perhaps create new system capabilities (ibid.)”. User control has been conceptualized as one key component of interactivity by a number of researchers. Studying the importance of presence and active personal experience as success variable for interactive digital media, Lombard and Snyder-Duch (2001) defined “interactivity as a characteristic of a medium in which the user can influence the form and/or content of the mediated presentation or experience. It is not dichotomous (a medium is not just interactive or not), but can vary in degree (from not interactive to highly interactive) as well as type (different aspects of the form and/or content that can be influenced by the user)” (p. 2). For them, “central 249

to the idea of interactivity is the concept of control, either of elements of the physical world or of information”. They proposed that interactivity has five critical components: Number of inputs acceptable; number and type of characteristics that are modifiable, range of response possible, speed of response, degree of correspondence between input and response. Drawing from studies in computer-mediated-communications (CMC) research and communication theory, Rafaeli (1988) recounted further key elements of interactivity: Bi-directionality, quick response, bandwidth, user control, amount of user interactivity, ratio of user to medium interactivity, feedback, transparency, social presence, and artificial intelligence (p. 115). However, all these dimensions would fall short of explaining the intuitive appeal of interactivity that captures the ultimate essence of interactivity: User and content-oriented qualities that go beyond mere user responsiveness and reaction (p. 110). Rafaeli and Sudweeks (1997) put it as follows: “We note that communication is mostly about and for the purpose of interaction. Interactivity places shared interpretive contexts in the primary role. Interactivity describes and prescribes the manner in which conversational interaction as an iterative process leads to jointly produced meaning. Interactivity merges speaking with listening. And it is a general enough concept to encompass both intimate, person-to-person, face-to-face communication and other forums and forms” (Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997; para. 7). Interactivity and e-commerce Adoptions of the concept of interactivity within the research domain of electronic commerce can be found in studies investigating business-to-customer relationships in e-commerce research traditions (Romano & Fjermestad, 2003; Kuk & Yeung, 2002; Essler & Whitaker, 2001; Sukpanich & Chen, 2000; Yadav & Varadarajan, 2005a) and the marketing and advertising activities of firms (Blattberg & Deighton, 1991; Coviello et al., 2001; Day, 1996; Ha & James, 1998; Novak et al., 2000; Iacobucci et al., 1998; Liu & Shrum, 2002; Ko et al., 2005; Webster, 1996; Webster, 1998). Naturally, the possible thematic scope of interactivity within an electronic commerce context is broad and rather scattered, discussing structural, processual, and experiential dimensions across various issues. Starting from Choi’s et al. (1997) notion of interactivity as a defining criterion for digital products, Bezjian-Avery et al. (1998) defined interactivity as part of “the immediately iterative process by which customer needs and desires are uncovered, met, modified, and satisfied by the providing firm” (p. 23). Interactivity can push users to actively engage in the communication process and thus build sustainable relationships between consumer and advertiser/message provider. Romano and Fjermestad (2003) identified a number of current and emergent technologies for internet-based electronic customer relationship management (e-CRM). They developed an e-CRM IT classification scheme from the consumer’s perspective based on how consumers communicate to develop and maintain relationships via three specific levels of participation along a continuum ranging from passive to interactive. For them, interactive emergent technologies such as e-mail, forums, online focus groups, interactive online interviews, survey panels, auctions, online trade shows, and shopping agents are participatory. Essler and Whitaker (2001) pointed to the need of rethinking e-commerce business models impacted by interactivity in the era of cyberspace. They argued that, in the future, interactivity would drive changes from enterprise infrastructure to the so-called interactional agistructure described as a process of reciprocal interactivity and influence between firm and customer. Alba et al. (1997) conceptualized interactivity from an e-commerce point of view as “a continuous construct capturing the quality of two-way communication between two parties […]. In the case of interactive home shopping (IHS), the parties are the buyer and seller. The two dimensions of interactivity are response time and response contingency. Because IHS involves electronic communication, the response can be immediate – similar to response time in face-to-face communications. Response contingency is 250

the degree to which the response by one party is a function of the response made by the other party” (p. 38). The concept of interactivity has received considerable attention within the etailing domain in recent years, especially with the help of consumer behaviour concepts and tools (Ballantine, 2005; Szymanski & Hise, 2000; Yoo et al., 2010). Within these studies, interactivity takes on manifold meanings, either as “physical interactivity between store and customer” (Merrilees & Miller, 2001), as “image interactivity (that) allows the customer to create and manipulate visual images of a product on a Web site” (Fiore & Jin, 2003), or as “interactive service quality” between the service provider’s and the service receiver’s expectations and perceptions (Svensson, 2003). While images on a website may enhance responses towards an online retail store (Fiore & Jin, 2003), the success of interactive features offered may depend on the consumer’s level of satisfaction with the interface provided. This view was supported by Schumann (2001) who claimed the following: “Ultimately it is the consumer’s choice to interact, thus interactivity is a characteristic of the consumer, and not a characteristic of the medium. The medium simply serves to facilitate the interaction” (Schumann et al., 2001, para. 11).

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Table 1. Typology of types and dimensions of interactivity and definitions of interactivity in e-commerce A synoptic overview

Dimensions of interactivity Type

Technology

H-t-C

x Navigational tools x Site search tools x Choice of language x XML-based web browsers x Links to other site content x Hyperlinks to external content

Communication Process x Navigating a website x Using a search engine x Browsing a product catalogue x Choosing preferred language x Choosing preferred browser x Retrieving different types of (on-site or hyperlinked) website content

User Perception

x Finding a website easy to control and engaging x Based on experience with the technology and involvement with issue

Definitions of interactivity in ecommerce x “Products that are downloaded at once or in a piecemeal fashion, such as through daily updates, can be called delivered products. Interactive products, on the other hand, are products or services, such as remotediagnosis, interactive games, and tele-education” (Choi, 1997) x Ha & James (1998) studied business web site to identify five characteristics of interactivity: playfulness, choice, connectedness, information collection, and reciprocal communication x “Interactive speed is a construct that contributes to flow and is based on measures such as waiting time, loading time, and degree to which interacting with the Web is 'slow and tedious'” (Novak et al., 2000).

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H-t-H

x Instant messaging (IM) x Email x Live or scheduled chat x Newsgroup forums x Subscriber blogs x Reader polls x Hyper-textual cross-reference to related editorial content

x Communicating with website editors and other consumers x Communicating to web editors and/or peers x Facilitating and enforcing interpersonal computer-mediated communications between and among participants x Facilitating transaction between participants

x Believing that interactive feature facilitates communication x May be based on personal interest or involvement with communication participants

x “In interactive systems, a customer controls the content of the interaction requesting or giving information…. The hallmark of these new media is their interactivity – the consumer and the manufacturer enter into dialogue in a way not previously possible” (BezjianAvery et al., 1997) x Interactivity defined as “facility for persons and organizations to communicate directly with one another regardless of distance or time” (Blattberg & Deighton 1991) x Defined interactivity as “the degree to which two or more communication parties can act on each other, on the communication medium, and on the messages and the degree to which such influences are synchronized” (Liu & Shrum, 2002) x Interactive e-CRM technologies are participatory (Romano & Fjermestad, 2003) x Physical interactivity, image interactivity, interactive service quality (Merrilees & Miller, 2001; Fiore & Jin, 2003; Svensson, 2003) x “Ultimately it is the consumer’s choice to interact, thus interactivity is

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characteristic of the consumer, and not a characteristic of the medium. The medium simply serves to facilitate the interaction” (Schumann et al., 2001) x Interactivity as interactional agistructure described as a process of reciprocal interactivity and influence between firm and customer (Essler & Whitaker, 2001) H-t-C

x Tools that facilitate personalized content and delivery formats x Tools that allow adding web pages

x Retaining and relinquishing control of content x Influencing the communication direction x Etc.

x Believing that customized and personalized content format is interactive x User perception of positive manipulation of communication

x Image interactivity (that) allows the customer to create and manipulate visual images of a product on a Web site (Fiore & Jin, 2003)

x User perception of control over content Source: The author (based on McMillan, 2002, 2005, 2006)

Preliminary findings and outlook This section highlights key preliminary findings on interactivity as resulting from the literature review and undertakes an outlook on further steps necessary to build the analytical bridge between interactivity and business value:

254

x

Research design: first, due to the considerable range of phenomena discussed under the rubric of interactivity, I have organized my ideas around one significant research theme: the business value of interactivity for managing customers in the electronic marketplace. As has been shown in starting chapter, the key concepts of this theme were delineated accordingly.

x

Interactivity definition: there is no unanimously accepted definition of interactivity in any field. This owes to the fact that the concept is opaque. Consequently, scholarly differences in observing, defining, interpreting interactivity are far from being negligible when trying to formulating relationships with other constructs. This also counts for the many antecedent constructs of interactivity, be they first-order (e.g., bidirectionality, timeliness, mutual control, responsiveness, sense of presence, participation, involvement, etc.), or second-order (e.g., personality traits or contextual aspects).

x

Research trajectory: as next step, I will design my research alongside McMillan’s three-by-three typology of interactivity to systematize its key epistemological properties with a view to exploring relationships with the business value concept. As noted previously, McMillan identified the following three functional dimensions in the literature: technology, communication process, and user perception (McMillan, 2002, 2003, 2005). Equally, McMillan found the following three phenomenological types of interactivity: human-to-computer, human-to-human, and human-to-content (McMillan, 2002). This typology will later help structuring the debate on relationships between interactivity and business value (see Table 2 below).

x

E-commerce: as the thematic scope of interactivity within an e-commerce context (as will be drawn from the literature review on the concept below) is also broad and scattered, McMillan’s three-by-three typology will be used such that relevant ecommerce literature that refers to the concept of interactivity will be identified, reviewed and later entered into the 3x3 typology table of interactivity.

The Business Value of Interactivity: Some Key Propositions Now, what types and dimensions of computer-mediated interactivity create business value for both organization and consumer in the electronic marketplace? And how does interactivity, if at all, advance theoretical insights into economic analyses of interactions between buyers and sellers in the electronic marketplace? The following key arguments have repeatedly been voiced as major drivers for change in the governance of electronic commerce relations, be it sharing business information, maintaining relationships, conducting actual business transactions and generating value streams by means of telecommunication and computer networks (Amit & Zott, 2001; Wigand, 1997). First, the idea that business value is co-created and enhanced through the producers’ interaction with their customers may be traced back to F. W. Taylor who developed the concept of scientific management in 1911. Taylor’s concept of analyzing the improved efficiency in mass production contains aspects that are relevant to the theory and practice of mass customization in the electronic marketplace. Mass customization, which is defined as producing goods and services to meet individual customer’s needs with near mass production efficiency” (Tseng & Jiao, 2001, p. 685), integrates the customers deeply into a firm’s systems of value creation. As a result, customer integration systems aim at combining the low unit costs of classical Taylorist mass production processes with the flexibility of individual customization (Piller et al., 2004). Second, modern organization theory around Barnard (1948), the author of pioneering work in management theory and organizational sociology, has originated the idea of relationship marketing whereby customers are not external actors in the business communication process but an integral part of an organization’s plan for survival through effectiveness and efficiency (Barnard, 1948). Third, in 1993, Normann and Ramirez published their seminal work on how new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and changing consumer lifestyles transform the notion of business value from Porter’s (1985) traditional model of the sequential value chain into their new model of value constellation. There, consumers and other partners, suppliers, etc., actively co-produce relationships along with the enterprise. In their model, the business model is meant to be actively co-created between the various actors involved. To support this, interactive network technologies would potentially open organizations towards customers’ involvement for value generation. Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004), another two comprehensive business thinkers, have further elaborated on changes in the traditional logic of governance in electronic commerce as analytically depicted by the concept 255

of the linear and horizontal value chain. Briefly, they claim the need for producers to establish interaction platforms for co-creating unique value with customers (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). Only this would achieve sustainable competitive advantage for the business firm. Likewise, German and Scandinavian researchers in business and management have focused on customer integration (Kleinaltenkamp, 1996; Lampel & Mintzberg, 1995; Wikstroem, 1996a, 1996b), value webs (Reichwald et al., 2004) and interactive value (Reichwald & Piller, 2009), a general research perspective which this present study is based on conceptually and analytically. The business value of customer integration The concept of customer integration dates back to the mid 1990s, when several researchers in management theory began to work on the belief that new technologies, increased competition, and more assertive customers are leading firms towards customization of their products and services. By integrating customers into design, research and product development, manufacturing, assembling or sales activities, companies, it is believed, will get efficient support to improve products for more customer satisfaction, and identify and unlock new sources of revenue (Kleinaltenkamp, 1996). Customer integration can be defined as a value creation process where “consumers take part in activities and processes which used to be seen as the domain of the companies” (Wikstroem, 1996, p. 360). Value webs, on their part, enable both customers and suppliers to be co-operatively active in team-based product and process innovation activities, as well as in product design, re-design, development, and, finally, electronically mediated transactions between organizations and customers (Chesbrough et al., 2006; von Hippel, 2005). Social network effects and transaction cost efficiencies resulting from these value webs are said to emerge if customers are actively involved in and integrated into the respective e-business processes (Economides, 1996; Klemperer, 2008; Yadav & Varadarajan, 2005a). Equally, the role of the customer is changing from a pure consumer of products or services to a coequal partner in a process of adding value: consumers are becoming co-producers and co-designers (Berger et al., 2005; Picot et al., 1998; Reichwald et al., 2004; Tseng & Piller, 2003). Both e-business partners are thus tied together in these value webs. Finally and essentially, the firm’s relationship with the customer, thus the business value of any customer integration, is crucially dependent on interaction with him or her. This is when interactivity as essential building block of any infrastructure technology for building up an electronic commerce relationship with the customer steps in. More strongly, interactivity may even be considered as the engine of this the new fabric of interaction with the customer. Theoretically, customer integration is the ultimate form of this kind of customer orientation. Its goal is to provide customized products or services that exactly meet the desires and wishes of each individual customer (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). Among other issues, the economic view of customer integration identifies interactive value creation as an emergent paradigm at the interface of research into strategic management, innovation management, and marketing management (Kotha, 1995; Reichwald & Piller, 2009). Hence, customer integration may become a strategic necessity of business companies as electronic transactions may impact the characteristics of these markets in ways that overall efficiency gains (e.g., lower information search costs for consumers) and/or improvements in effectiveness (e.g., greater ability of consumers to purchase products better suited to their specific needs) may result from transactions in electronic marketplaces in various industries (Bakos, 1991; Lampel & Mintzberg, 1996; Yadav & Varadarajan, 2005b; Zeithaml, 1988). As for customer integration, companies may benefit from so-called economies of integration (Noori, 1990; Piller et al., 2004; Wind & Rangaswamy, 2001; Vandermerve, 2000). These are defined as “cost savings 256

potentials as a result from the direct interaction between each customer and the firm” (Piller & Moeslein, 2002, p. 6). Potential impacts of interactivity on business value: Some key propositions Reviewing the extant literature on interactivity and business value has illustrated the complexity of studying the relationships between these two concepts. The following sample propositions offer a suggested research direction in analyzing potential impacts of interactivity on business value. Proposition 1 [P1]: Interactivity enhances consumer choice and thus perceived consumer value. This has a positive impact on business value. Reviewing the interactivity concept has shown that it potentially offers greater product choices for consumers by offering a wider range of options for consumption to customers. Proposition 1 is supported by the following arguments as drawn from literature review: First, that interactivity enhances consumer choice is plausible if one considers the importance of the technology dimension of interactivity when predicting a positive impact relationship between interactivity and consumer value. Following the interactivity as technology school of thought, which focuses on functions of features, interactivity is based on how many and what types of features are available for online users of a website to fulfill interactive communication [see Proposition 1.1 in Table 2] (Steuer, 1992; Sundar, 2004). A range of theories from neighboring disciplines such as marketing science, journalism, and advertising support this proposition (Deuze, 2003; Ghose & Dou, 1998; Liu, 2003; Woodruff, 1997; Wu, 2006). There, greater choice would improve the general attractiveness of a website by improving the consumer’s choice options and active control over the type of product sought after and selected [Proposition 1.2]. On closer inspection, however, interactivity sub-dimensions as discussed in the review may each impact differently on consumer value. Bi-directionality, bandwidth, and synchronicity may serve as necessary but not sufficient conditions for interactivity [Proposition 1.3]. As exemplified by Song & Bucy (2009), “it might be possible that one perceives communication through asynchronous e-mail as more interactive than synchronous communication through Instant Messenger (IM) even though objectively (technologically) the opposite appears true” (Song & Bucy, 2008, p. 7). Further, timeliness as interaction speed is perceived as a positive predictor of interactivity-induced business value [Proposition 1.4]. However, when defined as communication speed, the construct becomes particularly valuable for the consumer (Kiousis, 2002). In fact, consumers may wish to determine their own message timing and thus increase their control over technology and communication process [Proposition 1.5] (Downes & McMillan, 2000; Kiousis, 2002). Consumer value may thus eventually depend on the perceptual aspects of interactivity that may mediate the effects of technology on certain outcomes (Bucy & Tao, 2007). Past research has also indicated that greater complexity of choice available may have an effect on consumer choice difficulty and choice overload [Proposition 1.6] (Ariely, 1998; Ariely, 2000; Heeter, 1989, Kim & LaRose, 2004). Interactivity thus also implies that consumers may have to afford higher amounts of effort to seek, self-select, process, use, and respond to information (Stewart & Pavlou, 2002; Heeter, 1989). In this case, consumers may have to undertake (significant) cognitive activities when trying to satisfy some need or goal (e.g., navigating the website and pulling information from it) (Heeter, 1989; McMillan & Hwang, 2002; Zaichkowsky, 1985). This may act as a further impediment on consumer value effectiveness [Proposition 1.7]. 257

Proposition 2 [P2]: Interactivity enhances perceived product and service quality and thus consumer satisfaction and perceived communication quality and satisfaction. This has a positive impact on business value. Interactivity enhances perceived product & service quality (Chen & Yen, 2004; Hsiu-Fe, 2007; Svensson, 2003; Yoo et al., 2010), and perceived communication quality and process satisfaction (Lowry et al., 2009). Proposition 2 is justified by the following arguments: First, product and service quality improvements are viewed to be triggered by various forms and levels of interactivity that allow consumers using an online shopping environment to access higher product quality, gain greater control of their shopping experience, and experiences higher levels of satisfaction through more convenient shopping environments (Ariely, 2000; Chen & Dubinsky, 2002; Chen & Yen, 2004). When linked with the interactivity concept, this proposition is mainly supported by the CMC dimension of interactivity [Proposition 2.1]. Seen this way, message-based approaches define interactivity of a particular communication message as directly responsive to, or contingent on, a previous message received (Rafaeli, 1988). As aptly exemplified by Sundar (2007): “(…) in a chat room if both people post messages without acknowledging each other’s messages, then it is non-interactive. If one interactant posts a message that is a direct response to another’s postings, then it is considered to be reactive. If the latter interactant then responds to this posting in a manner that takes into account not only the latest posting but also those before them, then it is considered to be responsive. For a message exchange to be fully interactive, the messages should have a flow or coherence, i.e., they can be threaded together in sequence” (p. 95) [Proposition 2.2]. When consumer experience features of interactivity which provide for bi-directional and multidirectional communication, they may feel a sense of increased control not only over the communication process, but also over timing and choice of subject (Bordewijk & van Kaam, 1986) [Proposition 2.3]. As reviewed, Jensen’s conversational interactivity underpins this rationale (Jensen, 1999).

Proposition 3 [P3]: Interactivity enables participation and interpersonal communication. This has a positive impact on business value. Interactivity builds, facilitates and enforces interpersonal computer-mediated communication between and among participants thereby activating and engaging them. This includes all forms of CMC processes “by which people create, exchange, and perceive information using networked telecommunication systems and facilitate encoding, transmitting, and decoding messages” (December, 1996; as cited in Romiszowski & Mason, 2004, p. 398; Soukup, 2000). Proposition 3 builds on the following arguments: If websites make it easy for users to add information, then they empower users by making it easier for them to add information [Proposition 3.1]. Further, the degree to which interactive media systems facilitate interpersonal communication between specific customers is said to be correlated with interactivity. E-mail addresses can make communication easy between participants in the electronic marketplace [Proposition 3.2]. Discussion forums and live chat areas attract and keep consumers at a website. In addition, an interactive website may offer “synchronous communication with data transfers occurring at fractions of a second” (Kenney at al., 2000, para. 17). Further, interactivity encourages the publishing of end-user’s own contributions and commenting on other people’s, thus increasing both the content of a website and the rate of end-user engagement on various levels [Proposition 3.3]. Encouraging participation may, however, 258

solely reside in the mind of the consumer interacting with technology. Laurel (1991), for example, made participation an experience of feeling mediated by a computer interface: “You either feel yourself to be participating in the ongoing action of the representation or you don’t” (pp. 20-21) [Proposition 3.4].

Proposition 4 [P4]: Interactivity customizes products, services, and exchange processes between business firm and consumer. This has a positive impact on business value. Customization on a website may lead to a more interactive experience for the consumer (McMillan et al., 2003). Once consumers have disclosed relevant information, an interactive website may use the collected information and then tailor it to the consumer’s preferences. Proposition 4 is justified on the following grounds: By defining involvement as a hybrid facet of technological and perceptual interactivity, consumers may feel higher perceived sensory, cognitive, and affective affiliation with product and website content [Proposition 4.1]. This potentially improves their perceived value of the website (Kalyanaraman & Sundar, 2006) and thus generally improves website stickiness, i.e. the website’s ability to retain online customers and prolong his/her duration of each stay. On the sell-side, interactivity is said to constitute new generation web-based interactions which, in turn, may drive new interactive Web 2.0 business models (Tredinnick, 2005; Wirtz et al., 2010). By developing an ongoing learning relationship with customers, business firms can tailor their product and service portfolio not only to the actual customer needs, wants, and preferences but also according to their contribution to the business firm’s economic success (Melville et al., 2004; Rangaswamy & Pal, 2003; Tseng & Piller, 2003). Interactivity may thus influence the strategic decisions of business firms in producing, delivering and exchanging products in accordance with the dynamic preferences of their consumers [Proposition 4.2]. Taking this argument further, business firms may achieve cost efficiencies when they intensify orientation towards customers by integrating them into various value creation processes (Lampel & Mintzberg, 1996; von Hippel, 2002). The customer, on its part, benefits from integration when his/her social valuation of the product exceeds the price actually paid [Proposition 4.3]. Proposition 5 [P5]: Interactivity lowers transaction costs. This has a positive impact on business value. Past research has shown that interactivity impacts on transaction processes and outcomes as it may reduce the transaction costs between and among the market participants (Bakos, 1991; Benjamin & Wigand, 1995; Brynolffson & Smith, 2000; Cordella & Simon, 1997). Conceptually introduced in Coase’s 1937 paper The Nature of the Firm (Coase, 1937) who analysed why firms exist, what determines the number of firms and what firms do and later attributed to the work of Williamson (1975, 1985), transaction costs are generally defined as costs incurred when using the market mechanism in buying or selling a good or service. Williamson based transaction cost theory on two assumptions of human behaviour (bounded rationality and opportunism, i.e., results from human limits to cognitive abilities and imperfect information) and three key dimensions of transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency) (Williamson, 1975). Asset specificity terms the significance of certain assets that support a specific transaction (i.e., Williamson mentioned four types of asset specificity: site, physical asset, human asset, and dedicated asset specificity). Uncertainty is embodied in any kind of future action and frequency describes how often a specific transaction takes place. The magnitude of these five parameters determines the scale of transaction costs occurring. 259

Typically, the frequency of a transaction lowers transaction costs due to economies of scale, while all other four parameters have an increasing effect whereby asset specificity carries most influence (Williamson, 1981). Proposition 5 is supported by the following arguments: Reviewing the extant literature on interactivity alludes to the possibility that interactivity drives up the frequency of interaction and thus transactions (because of open standards, anyone can interact with anyone else), reduces transaction uncertainty (by providing a wealth of transaction-specific information), and a leads to reduction in asset specificity (for example, through lower site specificity - the next site is only ‘one click away’) (Amit & Zott, 2001) [Proposition 5.1]. Surprisingly, however, interactivity-induced e-commerce transactions may lead to counterintuitive effects on transaction costs involved. Offering interactivity-driven B2C e-commerce goods and services may involve transaction costs that exceed efficiency thresholds on both sides of the transaction (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1996). This “interactivity paradox” would negatively affect the welfare of both business firm and consumer (Bucy, 2004b) [Proposition 5.2]. The business firm may thus wish to ensure that the consumer’s additional costs are kept as small as possible, while the benefits s/he experiences through interactivity have to be clearly perceptible (Piller, 2002). Proposition 6 [P6]: Interactivity widens the range of strategic e-commerce management options for competitive positional advantages of business firms. This has a positive impact on business value. Proposition 6 relies on the following arguments: Interactivity widens a business firm’s strategic options because it may help achieving product and distribution channel differentiation thereby reducing the pressure of competition from identical products or close substitutes (Bakos, 1991; Bakos, 1997) [Proposition 6.1]. For customer integration to be successful, hybrid product differentiation and cost reduction strategies are necessary so as to reconcile the cost advantages of standardized production with the disadvantages of customization (Reichwald & Piller, 2000). Interactivity management may thus imply that business firms find e-business strategies that integrate market opportunities, sufficient resources to implement these strategies, and etailing objectives that fit their plans (Varadarajan & Yadav, 2002) [Proposition 6.2]. The following Table offers an integrative view on dimensions of interactivity and their relations to potential business value impacts. Propositions to explain these relations are indexed accordingly.

260

Table 2. Dimension of interactivity and business value impacts including contingencies Interactivity Dimensions Technology structure

Business Value Impact

Contingencies

x Interactivity enhances consumer choice and thus perceived consumer value [P1]

x Consumer value contingent upon adequate transmission technology infrastructure and interactive features offered by a website [P1.1]

x Greater choice leads to higher website attractiveness improving consumer choice options and active control [P1.2] x Bi-directionality, bandwidth, and synchronicity as necessary but not sufficient conditions for interactivity [P1.3] x Timeliness as positive predictor of business value [P1.4]

x Timeliness as positive predictor of perceived consumer value [P1.5] x Greater choice as negative predictor when consumers face choice overload [P1.6] x Greater choice as negative predictor when consumers face considerable cognitive costs [P1.7]

261

Communication process

262

x

Interactivity enhances perceived product and service quality and thus consumer satisfaction and perceived communication quality and satisfaction [P2]

x

Consumer value contingent upon increased control over communication process, timing and choice of subject [P2.3]

x

Participation is a mere perceptual category [P3.4]

x

Consumer value contingent upon CMC dimension [P1.2]

x

x

Message-centric interactivity is fully effective if communication flow is achieved [P2.2]

Optimal transaction cost efficiency level contingent upon both producer and consumer [P5.2]

x

Interactive e-business strategies contingent upon integration of market opportunities, sufficient resources to implement these strategies, and e-tailing objectives that fit business plans [P6.2]

x

Interactivity enables participation and interpersonal communication [P3]

x

Consumer feel empowerment when being able to add information [P3.1]

x

Interactivity facilitates interpersonal communication [P3.2]

x

Interactivity encourages participation and consumer cooperation [P3.3]

x

Interactivity customizes products, services, and exchange processes between business firm and consumer [P4]

x

Interactivity drives strategic decisions of business firms in tailoring their offers toward dynamic consumer preferences [P4.2]

x

Interactivity enables customer integration [P4.3]

x

Interactivity lowers transaction costs [P5]

x

Interactivity drives up the frequency of interaction, reduces transaction uncertainty, and leads to reduction in asset specificity [P5.1]

x

Interactivity widens the range of strategic e-commerce management options for competitive advantage [P6]

x

Interactivity helps achieving product and distribution channel differentiation [P6.1]

Consumer perception

x

Involvement enhances sensory, cognitive, and affective affiliation with product and website content [P4.1]

Source: The author

Conclusion and managerial implications The present reconstruction of the concept of interactivity has driven home a gallery of themes from various scholarly perspectives. Although there are disciplinary differences in observing, ciplin defining, and interpreting interactivity, which obviously makes es comparisons of different studies difficult, I insist on analyzing interactivity from these multiple sources in order to provide pointers for discussion in bridging the concept of interactivity with the concept of business value in electronic commerce research. Alas, the literature on electronic commerce has yet to treat the concept more systematically. The problems are manifold but the biggest seems to be the nature of the concept of interactivity itself, which remains multi-faceted and difficult to operationalize. This paper used the scholarly dominant three-dimensional view of conceptualizing interactivity. It conceptualized interactivity as an intrinsic attribute of the communication technology or format, as constituent part of a social interaction and communication process between users or between users and technology interfaces and designs, and, third, as process of subjective user perception. Meanwhile, this three-dimensional approach has become canonical standard in researching the phenomenon of interactivity (Bucy & Tao, 2007; Gleason, 2009; McMillan, 2005). I conclude from the review of current literature that interactivity is a complex and ambiguous concept. It must be considered as being of heterogeneous nature, covering a broad area of tools, processes, and perceptual practices in online communication. While theorizing on interactivity itself is subtle and sophisticated, skepticism as to its epistemological value of analyzing its business value for managing active customers in the electronic marketplace prevails (Agrawal et al., 2001; Dellaert & Stremersch, 2005; Zipkin, 2001). Ultimately, however, research into the business value of customer integration needs to confront this deficit because, as it appears, interactivity seems to be conditional for economically efficient and thus successful customer integration in electronic commerce environments. To advance our theoretical understanding of how interactivity adds business value to a business firm’s e-commerce activities of customer integration, triangulation from multiple sources has evidenced that interactivity can have significant business value on various levels of interactivity because, essentially, companies that support interactivity can dynamically adapt to customer preferences and buying behavior. By reducing transaction costs in interactive media settings, business firms may gain competitive advantage, widen their product range through adding more interactive features, offer richer and new content channels to customers, or integrate once passive consumers into the production processes of their ventures in various ways. This, in turn, may leverage consumer trust and loyalty in the online brand of the producer’s offering (Gefen, 2000; McWilliam, 2000). On-line retailers may incorporate features to take advantage of the Internet’s two-way communication affordances such as customer service, e-mail inquiries to sales representatives, discussion forums for customers, and voice and video applications. And customers, on their part, are set to experience higher degrees of (cognitive and affective) involvement with the products and services portfolio offered (Franz & Robey, 1986; Hartwick & Barki, 1994; McMillan, 2002; Tseng & Piller, 2003). Content quality, control, convenience, and costs may well be the determinants for an 263

effective integration. These determinants are driven by further constituents of a successful relationship: The object of integration, the communicative relationship between the business firm and the customer, the depth and familiarity of this relationship, the customer’s goal and motivation to interact, and the governance of this exchange (Song & Zinkhan, 2008). But while Internet-enabled business exchange is said to lead to transaction costs efficiencies (Bakos, 1991; Benjamin & Wigand, 1995; Brynolffson & Smith, 2000; Cordella & Simon, 1997; Piller et al., 2004; Reichwald & Piller, 2009), I argue that although interactivity may potentially reduce these transaction costs, these would remain contingent upon different forms and practicalities of interactivity. On the consumer side, the effectiveness of these forms and practicalities of interactivity will much depend on perceived consumer values which are themselves driven by a bundle of antecedent forces. It seems obvious that the mere availability of interactive features and technologies do not inherently constitute interactivity by nature. Interactive features may be present on a website but “without necessarily eliciting the perception of interactivity. Rather, its features and interactive functionality hold the potential to yield the perception of interactivity for individual users under certain circumstances” (Gleason, 2008, p. 14). Managerial implications To deliver business value, interactive e-commerce managers may set up the following agenda according to the type of interactivity offered: Human-to-Computer interactivity management x

provide a website design intended to accommodate site usage using different browsers and settings particularly required for high-bandwidth formats to provide users with innovations on product promotions such as full motion video and webTV formats,

x

provide consumers with tools to move between different information on a website,

x

provide consumers with tools for information seeking queries of consumers,

x

provide consumers with tools whose first language is not English, and

x

manage accessibility of high-bandwidth formats to provide users with innovations such as full motion video and webTV formats.

Human-to-Human interactivity management Human-to-human interactivity management would imply to:

264

x

‘right touch’ your customers by means of contextual marketing or sense and respond marketing, where every customer interaction or response to a communication is to be followed up by a series of relevant communications delivered by the right combinations of channel (web, email, phone, direct mail) to elicit a response or further dialogue (Chaffey, 2010),

x

intensify orientation towards customers by integrating them into various value creation processes,

x

while it is possible to manufacture at a mass-produced price, producers have the option to charge a premium price while still retailing below the price of a customized product (Dewan et al., 2000), and

x

encourage interaction and creation of user-generated content.

Human-to-Content interactivity management Human-to-human interactivity management would mean to: x

create compelling persuasive experiences which engages consumers through relevant messages and content, encouraging them to stay on the site and return,

x

deliver an online presence is developed to support branding and customer service quality objectives,

x

provide tailored products to meet particular customer needs would make customer’s comparative shopping difficult and would shift the customer’s focus away from price to quality and other intrinsic values,

x

personalize and customize products and services to differentiate against commodity products (Rangaswamy & Pal, 2003),

x

forge a close relationship with your customers as these may return time and time again for shopping further unique products, allowing a better utilization of its customer base (‘re-use’ of existing customers for additional sales), and

x

let consumers self-configurate their products to allows access to ‘sticky local information’, a typical information transaction cost that is located in the user who does not want to reveal his/her preferences at any price (von Hippel, 1984; von Hippel, 1986).

Finally, more research that improves the validity of analysis by generating better testable propositions (i.e., hypotheses) is needed. This would imply to establish a conceptual model which postulates effects between the technological, communicative and perceptual determinants of interactivity alongside the three different types of interactivity and the perceived impacts on value on both sides of the equation, i.e., the consumer as well as the business firm. Essentially, a more nuanced investigation needs to be made into the transaction cost effectiveness of interactive media and communication technologies in electronic commerce settings of customer integration in the electronic marketplace, since these costs can become critical for overall business success.

Notes 1. Alternatively, academia has systematized the concept alongside actual (i.e., objectively assessed) versus perceived interactivity (Williams et al., 1988; Wu, 2005), human-to-human and human-to-media interaction (Stromer-Galley, 2004), feature-based versus perceptionbased interactivity (McMillan, 2002), or structural versus experiential interactivity (Liu & Shrum, 2002). Other scholars have defined interactivity as prototype (e.g., conversational media whose communication form is essentially two-way), criterion (i.e., as a certain trait or feature that must be fulfilled), and continuum (i.e., from declarative one-way to reactive two-way communication (Goertz, 1995; Jensen, 1998; Rafaeli, 1988; Rogers, 1986). Deuze (2003) translated interactivity dimensions of news websites into navigational interactivity, adaptive interactivity and functional interactivity. 265

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Beitrag 14: Interactivity and Leadership Effectiveness Originally published in: Murschetz, P. C. (2006). Interactivity and Leadership Effectiveness: A Concept Review and Analysis of Email as Interactive Leadership Tool. In L. Küng (Ed.), Leadership in the Media Industries. Changing Contexts, Emerging Challenges (pp. 137-153), Jönköping: JIBS Research Report Series, No. 2006-1

Abstract This article offers preliminary explanations of how executive managers perceive and use interactive email communication to improve their performance. The concept of interactivity is reviewed, and managers’ use of email as an interactive leadership tool is empirically tested. It is proposed that interactivity contributes to leadership effectiveness at three levels: it changes modes of adoption and use of technology of executive managers; it affects behavioral interactions between leaders and their subordinate team members; and it alters the perceptions of both interaction partners. The findings support the view that managers perceive email as an important instrument to improve their leadership performance, and that all three dimensions of interactivity, i.e. technology, communication process, and perception, contribute to the effectiveness of email as an interactive leadership tool. Introduction Developing leadership talent is critical to success in a changing business environment. Leaders are considered as main contributors to business success in that they mobilize their employees around a shared vision and strategy in order to achieve results. Leadership effectiveness is however constrained by multiple barriers (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977). The choice, adoption and use of interactive media and information technologies can make a contribution, but need not improve the effectiveness of leaders at all. Resistance to or an inability to use interactive technologies may limit task achievement, communicative efficiency, and thus overall organizational success. What role does interactivity play in changing leaders’ adoption and use of technology? Interactivity is usually thought of as a key characteristic of new media, notably the Internet. It allows multi-directional communications between senders and receivers, offers complex choices of content, requires some user effort, is responsive to users, monitors information use, makes it easy to add information, and facilitates interpersonal communication (McMillan, 2005). Although the use of interactivity in every-day management is growing in that managers use interactive technologies for organizational communications, theoretical understanding of this phenomenon remains elusive. Bucy (2004: 375) summarized his disappointment at the lack of a bona fide theory of interactivity as follows: Interactivity has been identified as a core component of new media, yet despite nearly three decades of analysis, we scarcely know what it is, let alone what it does, and have scant insight into the conditions in which interactive processes are likely to be consequential for members of a social system1. Similarly, understanding of leadership effectiveness also remains elusive. Firstly, there is a longstanding and substantial debate over what constitutes leadership (e.g., Burns, 1978): the subject of leadership encompasses individual traits, leadership 279

behaviors and styles, interaction patterns between the interacting partners, role relationships, organizational culture, and situational and environmental contexts. Secondly and consequently, defining leadership effectiveness is problematic. Dhar and Mishra (2001: 255) summarize the debate on leadership effectiveness as follows: Most researchers evaluate leader effectiveness in terms of the consequences of the leader’s actions for the followers and other stakeholders using different types of outcomes. They include the performance and growth of leads, group or organization, its preparedness to deal with challenges or crisis, follower’s satisfaction with the leader, follower’s commitment to the group objectives, the psychological well-being and development of the followers, the leader’s retention of high status in the group and the leader’s advancement to higher positions of authority on the organization. The most commonly used measure to leadership effectiveness is the extent to which the leader’s organizational unit performs its task successfully and attains its goals. In some case, objective measures of performance or goal attainment are available, such as profits, profit margin, sales increase, market share, sales relative to targeted sales, return on investment, productivity, cost per unit of output, cost in relation to budgeted expenditure, and so on. In some cases, subjective ratings of effectiveness are obtained from the leader’s superiors, peers, and subordinates. This study looks at a central subjective measure of leadership effectiveness: the cost effectiveness of email communication between leaders and their employees. Cost effectiveness is understood as cost savings arising from time-saving effects, improvements in decisionmaking effectiveness, and improvements in employee motivation. Research Questions, Objectives and Methodology The preceding discussion raises two sets of research questions: a) Exploring the nature of interactivity: What is interactivity? How can it be explained? b) Epistemological issues concerning the impact of interactivity (as an independent variable) on leadership effectiveness (as a dependent variable): How does interactivity affect leadership effectiveness? Empirical research on the relationship between interactivity and leadership effectiveness is sparse. However, interactivity does feature as a conceptual substratum in a variety of theories in various disciplinary frameworks, notably computer-mediated communications (CMC). This paper therefore explores the appropriateness of CMC theories for this research. The main objective of this study is to offer some preliminary explanations for the relationship between interactivity as central feature of technology and communications activities, and its managerial adoption and use, as well as its perceived usability by leaders to improve individual and organizational performance. The following methodology was used: The first step was a multi-disciplinary literature review that explored the core properties of interactivity. The purpose of this review was to identify hypotheses concerning interactivity which can serve as conceptual nodes for bridging the issues of interactivity and leadership effectiveness. Secondly, a questionnaire was used to empirically test hypotheses regarding the use of interactive communication by email and its effectiveness as a leadership instrument. The sample drew on managers in Switzerland in diverse cross-industry companies. The theoretical framework drew mainly on media richness theory (MRT) which is part of Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) systems research. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a review of research into the concept of interactivity from multiple research disciplines. The subsequent 280

section discusses potential conceptual bridges from interactivity to leadership effectiveness from selected disciplines and sub-set theories. Specific literatures from the media richness theory (MRT) framework are selected that identify the managerial use of interactive technology and apply this as a constitutive construct for leadership performance. This is important because one of the primary objectives of this study is to provide some (albeit preliminary) theoretical foundations upon which managers can make decisions about the use of interactive information technologies. This is exploratory in orientation because investigations into interactivity-induced leadership effectiveness are at an early stage and a theoretical model of the relationship between these entities does not exist. The next section presents empirical evidence as to the use of interactive email technology and its impact on the leadership effectiveness of managers across diverse industries in Switzerland. The paper concludes with a discussion of these results and of further research needs. Interactivity – A Literature Review The Academic Debate The academic debate about interactivity has been repeatedly criticized. Terminological confusion and misuse, a fixation with taxonomy, a lack of scientific progress an absence of analysis, and a widespread desire to make interactivity the new magic feature of user empowerment are seen as having weakened the academic relevance of the concept (McMillan, 2005; Bucy, 2004). If there is any common explanation for this confusion, it may originate from the concept’s hybrid intellectual architecture. Indeed, research on the concept of interactivity is confronted with three main difficulties. Firstly, interactivity is a ‘multi-discursive’ concept: significantly different meanings and connotations can be found according to their use within different discourses. Communication theory, for example, derives the concept of ‘interactivity’ from ‘social interaction’ in sociology and social psychology (e.g., Goffman, 1967). There, interaction is defined as mutually interdependent social action between individuals (Jäckel, 1995). Informatics, by contrast, introduces interactivity by referring to software which accepts and responds to inputs from humans in an interactive human-computer dialogue. A corollary is that interactivity is addressed by many different theoretical research traditions and academic disciplines (Heeter, 2000) and consequently differences in how it is observed, defined, and interpreted are significant. According to Heeter (2000: 1): On the human side, communication theory, graphic and industrial design, linguistics, social sciences and cognitive psychology, and human performance are relevant. And, of course, engineering and design methods are relevant. Technological issues, on the other hand, are covered by disciplines such as cybernetics and systems theory, information theory, computer science and design, information systems research and software engineering. Naturally, each of these core disciplines has developed its own language and meaning for the concept of interactivity. As it stands, epistemic approaches have remained largely mono-disciplinary and thus failed to capture the conceptual breadth of interactivity. Secondly, interactivity is considered a multi-dimensional and multi-attribute construct, defined by media technology and media features, interface design, content, human-computer interaction, human perceptions as well as situational and contextual aspects (e.g. task demands, organizational arrangements). There is as yet no scholarly agreement as to how these factors interrelate.

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A third central caveat in discussing interactivity lies in the fact that a systematic analysis of interactivity is accompanied by its multi-efficacy. Indeed, research on the effects of interactivity has been inconclusive (Sundar, 2004) Scholars in interactive advertising effectiveness research, for example, have found interactivity to have a positive impact on user attitudes (Cho and Leckenby 1999). Others argue, by contrast, that interactivity may even be detrimental to advertising effectiveness (Bezjian-Avery et al. 1998). Interactivity is thus a complex concept. A preliminary conclusion is that the complexity of interactivity can only be captured by recognizing the multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon. Consequently, in addition to following the three object-related dimensions described above (i.e. technology, communication process, perception), this paper also recognizes three different viewpoints which are described below. Interactivity – A Systematic View There is no single definition of interactivity and three distinct epistemological approaches can be identified (following Jensen, 1998): 2 a. Interactivity as technology: The concept of ‘interactivity’ as a function or feature of technology. This approach is rooted in Information Systems (IS) research and computer theory and focuses on structural properties of human-computer interaction. This view may be called the technology-driven view of interactivity and addresses issues of interactivity in interactive media technology environments from the technological-functional side of information transmission and reception, i.e. channel/network and media characteristics or technical attributes, and system quality. In particular, systems-related literatures such as IS and computer theory but also communications research introduce a set of technologyrelated properties and constructs of interactive communications in human-computer interactions. The underlying constructs of this view of interactivity are manifold: Bidirectionality (McMillan, 2000), bandwidth, speed of response (Hanssen, 1996), symmetry and synchronicity (Burgoon et al., 2000) are all discussed in IS and computer theory and come to serve as core system requirements for interactivity on a techno-structural level. b. Interactivity as communication process: The concept of interactivity as mode of social interaction and communication process. This view focuses on reciprocal social relations and processes of computer-mediated interaction between leaders and subordinates in organizations (Trevino et al., 1990). This view may be called the communicative interaction-driven view of interactivity. It looks at the communicative, social and individual dimensions of computer-mediated interactions. People play an important role in ensuring successful implementation and utilization of interactive media and information systems applications in any types of organizations. Rooted within CMC theory, this view refers to constructs of reciprocality of participants (Rafaeli, 1988, the exchange of (symbolic) messages (Rafaeli, 1988), active user control (Rice, 1984), feedback (Dennis & Kinney, 1998) and participation (Bonito et al., 2000). This approach is processual and focuses on dynamic activities such as social and communicative interchange and responsiveness that are central to interactivity (McMillan & Hwang, 2002). CMC theory in particular stresses the way by which the communicators process social identity and relational cues (i.e. social information) using different media (Walther, 1992; Fulk et al., 1990). Early researchers in this domain adopted a ‘social cues’-perspective to criticize that text-based computermediated communication lacks physical and social cues (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). More recent studies, however, emphasized the social construction that occurs over time in a CMC environment, which, in turn, influences the nature of user interactions (Walther, 1996). Both of these theoretical approaches hold valuable insights on how factors such as the temporal 282

structure and the nature of identity facilitated by the communications environment have profound implications on the outcomes of social interactions as part of an interactive episode. c. Interactivity as human perception: The concept of interactivity as mode of human perception and cognition which focuses on individual experiential processes of interactivity (McMillan & Hwang, 2002; McMillan, 2000). This view may be called the human perceptions-related view of interactivity. Burgoon et al. (2000), for example, suggested that perceptions of interactivity flow from individual involvement, mutuality, and individuation. Elsewhere, Burgoon et al. (2002) proposed that one way to conceptualize interactivity is based on the qualitative experiences that users equate with interactivity. For Lee (2000) the most important thing to be examined in measuring the level of interactivity is not counting the provisions of technological features but investigating how users perceive and/or experience interactive features. Technology adoption, use, and impact models are a specific case within IS research (Ginzberg, 1981; Robey, 1979). In this context, the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) involves a technology’s perceived usefulness and perceived ease-of-use as indicators of a user’s likelihood to adopt and use the technology (Bagozzi et al., 1992; Davis, 1989). Self awareness, responsiveness, sense of presence, involvement, and user control are further constituent psychological activities on this level of discussion. Let me now turn to the question of what makes interactivity attractive for investigations into research of leadership effectiveness. Interactivity and Leadership Effectiveness – Theoretical Framework Media richness theory Several theoretical approaches to communication processes have emphasized the role of executive managers to select effective communication media (see, for example, Russ et al., 1990). Considerable scholarly attention has been given to explanations focusing on the choice, use, and consequences of communication media (Hiltz & Turoff, 1986; Rice, 1984; Rice 1987; Short et al., 1976). Although various factors have been proposed to be influential in predicting an individual’s media choice (Culnan & Markus, 1987; Markus, 1994; Rice, 1992), the research has been dominated by the rational choice perspective that focuses on media-task interaction. According to this perspective, media choice is objectively determined by the congruence between the inherent characteristics of the media and the requirements of organizational information processing tasks. The rational choice perspective is represented by one of the most widely cited media choice theories: media richness theory (MRT). Daft and Lengel (1986) originally proposed this theory as starting from the question ‘Why do organizations process information?’ (Daft & Lengel, 1986). For them, media richness specified a process in which achieving a match between information processing requirements (i.e., uncertainty and equivocality reduction) and communication channels (e.g., face-to-face interactions and written memos) was posited as essential for organizational effectiveness. The main premises of MRT are (Daft & Lengel, 1986: 560): 1. Communication media run along a hierarchy ranging from “rich” to “lean” according to their capability to process rich information, with face-to-face (f2f) communication being the richest. Other interactive media (such as the telephone or emails) that provide fewer cues (i.e. eye contact, gaze, blush etc.) or slower feedback are “leaner” (e.g., letter and memos, written documents). 283

2. The criteria for richness differences lie in the medium’s capacity for (a) immediate feedback, (b) the number of cues and channels utilized (i.e. the capability to convey meanings through cues like body language, voice, tones), (c) language variety (i.e. the capability to tailor message by using different types of languages to increase understanding, and (d) personalization (i.e. the extent to which a sender can customize the message to meet the individual needs of the receiver). Using these criteria, oral media (e.g., face-to-face and telephone) have been considered richer than written media because they provide opportunities for immediate feedback and can have multiple cues in a natural language. 3. Individuals choose media higher in richness for those managerial tasks higher in equivocality (i.e. where there are multiple and possibly conflicting interpretations to the available information) or ambiguity. 4. MRT has potentially important implications for managers because it suggests that performance improves when managers use richer media for equivocal tasks and leaner media for non-equivocal tasks (Daft et al., 1987). More concretely, email should not be used for messages that require richness but be reserved for communications such as transmission of facts and details (Adam et al., 1998). MRT research has been criticized for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, empirical studies have called into question the validity of MRT and its framework for managerial decisionmaking about electronic communication media (Lee, 1994; Markus, 1994; Rice, 1992). In a study of interactive media such as email, for example, the notion of richness was found not to be an inherent property of the medium (Lee, 1994). This led some to argue that modern communication medium, such as email, is in fact richer than has been thought (Markus, 1994; Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). Similarly, Dennis and Kinney (1998) found that although managers perceived differences in richness due to both cues and feedback, matching these rich media to task equivocality did not improve manager performance. Instead, use of media providing fewer cues (i.e. computer-mediated communication) led to slower decisions and more so for the less equivocal task.3 This review of MRT provides the basic hypothesis for this study. According to MRT, managers view email as a ‘lean’ medium compared with richer oral communication and will chose email for simpler tasks. This gives rise to a hypothesis to be tested empirically: The effective managerial use of email as interactive IT application depends on the complexity of the task. 4 Empirical Evidence – The Questionnaire The research method used in this study can be described as follows: Phase 1: A questionnaire was developed based on academic literature and used to collect data (Dennis & Kinney, 1998; Lengel & Daft, 1988). Phase 2: A sample of 40 managers across various industries was given structured questionnaires containing a total of six questions. 18 questionnaires were returned, four of them were invalid Managers were asked to respond to three main question modules (the terms ‘leader’ and ‘manager’ were used interchangeably). Question Module A referred to the general use of email. Question Module B asked for more specific details of email as an interactive leadership tool applied, while Question Module C tackled the cost-effectiveness of email as an interactive leadership instrument. Respondents were given additional space for personal comments to each question module. Respondents could also select multiple answers. The rationale for this questionnaire was twofold: Firstly, to test whether and to what extent managers considered email as an appropriate interactive tool for effective leadership in a real284

life intra-organizational context. Secondly, to generate answers that inform on the nature and extent of interactivity in the managerial use of email. This included developing questions that tackle the three dimensions of interactivity and its underlying constructs analyzed in this study: technology, communication process, and perception. The effectiveness of email as interactive IT application was analyzed with ‘leadership effectiveness’ as the dependent variable. The particular focus was cost-effectiveness as indicator for leadership effectiveness, although it is recognized that there are a variety of other measures for leadership effectiveness (such as employee satisfaction or manager preparedness in times of crisis). Results The results confirmed that managers use email as an interactive leadership tool. All respondents considered email as valuable leadership tool. The majority of managers (nine out of fourteen) found the speed of the medium as the main reason of selecting email as leadership tool. Communication effectiveness was ranked second for seven managers. Placing instructions came third (five respondents). Twelve managers (out of fourteen) replied that organizational and administrative tasks were being completed by email, and only four respondents considered email as an appropriate medium for difficult tasks. Supporting this trend is the view that the majority of managers found routine day-to-day tasks best handled by email. When asked for evaluating the general effectiveness of email as leadership instrument, most managers (ten out of fourteen) considered email is being equally effective to other leadership tools (e.g., f2f communication). When asked for a personal comment on the effectiveness of email as a leadership tool, one manager found that email was a valuable add-on for leadership but could not replace f2f staff appraisal. Email could best be applied for routine messages and when employees can not be instructed by physical presence or by telephone. Additionally, email’s archiving function for leader’s instructions was raised as a further advantage. When asked for more specific details of email as an interactive leadership tool, most managers (twelve out of fourteen) found speed and system reliability as being the most significant advantages. Five managers found that once email had been introduced, the number of employee reactions to manager instructions was improved. This could well be an indicator for higher and more intense interactivity of the communication process between managers and their employees as being induced by email technology. However, four managers considered email as an inappropriate medium and preferred other interactive media when tasks afforded it. Managers were further asked to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of email as an interactive leadership tool. Thirteen out of fourteen managers praised the time-saving capacities of email as information processing tool. Nine managers committed to the idea that email could more efficiently coordinate organizational tasks. Workflow and decision-making processes would be improved. Six managers thought that email improved their decision-making productivity and speed. Messages could be distributed quicker and even to physically distant employees. This would save time for drafting meetings. On the downside of speed, one manager commented that email would lead to communication failure as data glut would increase. Overall, our findings support the view that managers perceive electronic mail as an important leadership instrument to improve their job performance. However, other leadership tools such as f2f communications with employees are seen as equally important if not superior when non-routine messages and instructions have to be processed. This result is in line with MRT and confirms our conjecture. 285

It turned out that that the overall effectiveness of leadership by means of email communication addresses all three dimensions of interactivity – technology, communication process and perception. Email leadership would improve speed of communication (technology), intensify feedback with employees (communication process), and reduce communication time with employees (perceived cost effectiveness). Conclusions and Future Research Revisiting the central research questions brings the following preliminary results. When reviewing the concept of interactivity from the selected theory domains and its respective strands, it is identified as a comprehensive term combining many dimensions. This paper uses a three-dimensional view of analyzing interactivity. It conceptualizes interactivity as a function of features of the communication technology or format, as constituent part of a social interaction and communication process between users or between users and technology interfaces and designs, and, thirdly, as human perception. Meanwhile, this three-dimensional approach has become standard in researching the phenomenon of interactivity (McMillan, 2005). Although there are disciplinary differences in observing, defining, and interpreting interactivity, interactivity needs to be analyzed from multiple disciplinary perspectives to grasp its complex nature. Secondly, literature review suggests that a clear picture of the concept of interactivity and its relevance for leadership effectiveness research has not yet emerged. The problems are manifold but the biggest seems to be the nature of the concept of interactivity, which remains multi-faceted. The literature review shows that interactivity has epistemological value for researching leadership effectiveness on three levels: it may change modes of adoption and use of technology of executive managers, it may impact on behavioral interactions between leaders and their subordinates, and it may alter perception of the interaction partners. Saying this, a set of background theories within CMC (and partly IS research), notably media richness theory, are well worth further investigation for research into these preliminary findings. In order to improve the validity of analysis, however, more insightful questions and, consequently, pertinent hypotheses about the issues need to be to generated and further tested against empirical evidence. This is the more important as the issue of email interactivity has important implications for email management in real-life organizations (Rocheleau, 2002). To include, the preliminary findings support the view that managers perceive electronic mail as an important leadership instrument to improve their job performance, and that all three dimensions of interactivity, technology, communication process and perception, contribute to the performance success of email as an interactive leadership tool. Essentially, a more nuanced investigation needs to be made into the cost effectiveness of interactive email communications, since managers can choose media for symbolic purposes (Trevino et al., 1987), select communication media as negotiated in social interaction among the members of a group or use email for even the most complex of communications. Endnotes 1

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The doyen of interactivity research, Rafaeli (1988: 110) lamented over the concept’s fluidity as follows: “Interactivity is a widely used term with an intuitive appeal, but it is an underdefined concept. As a way of thinking about communication, it has high face validity, but only narrowly based explication, little consensus on meaning, and only recently emerging empirical verification and actual role”. Similarly, reflecting upon how interactivity is used within the context of new media, Likewise, Heeter (2000, p. 2) pointed

out that interactivity is an “over-used, underdefined concept”. She referred to it as basically everything a human does. Seen this way, interactivity can be referred to as mediated social interaction. Following Heeter, interactivity occurs as a “synonym for navigation”, “good web design”, “mouse events” or “more complex programming in Javascript to provide logic for gaming or database calls to dynamically compose content”. 2

A typology of intellectual perspectives on technology-related and non-technology-related issues of interactivity has been developed by Kiousis (2002).

3

There is a sizeable literature concerning the managerial use of email and its effects on individuals and groups (Markus, 1994; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997). Importantly, however, none of theses studies have explicitly referred to leadership effectiveness in real-life organizations.

4

MRT aspects of ‘personalness’ and ‘emotionality’ of email messages have thus not been addressed in this investigation.

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Appendix The Questionnaire: The instructions along with demographic questions are not included due to space constraints but a full version of the questionnaire is available on request. This questionnaire benefited from the research assistance of Matthias Klotz, communications student of the University of Bern, Switzerland. Table 1: The Questionnaire on Interactivity via Email and Leadership Effectiveness – The Question Modules Module 1

Email as leadership tool

Q1

Do you deliberately apply email as leadership instrument?

Q2

For what reasons do you select email as leadership instrument?

Q3

For which tasks do you use email?

Q4

How do you evaluate the effectiveness of email as a leadership tool?

Module 2

Email as interactive communication process tool

Q1

How do you evaluate email as interactive tool for effective leadership?

Module 3

Cost-effectiveness of email as leadership instrument

Q1

How do you evaluate the cost-effectiveness of email as interactive leadership tool?

Table 2: The Questionnaire – Questions and respondent answer features Q1

Yes / No / I do not know

Q2

Because it is faster Because the tasks affords it Because I can communicate with employees more efficiently Because I am a leader Because the employee ‘demands’ it Because I can issue instructions more effectively Because I can carry out my leader task more effectively Because email has only got advantages compared to other communication media Because there is few other platforms to communicate with employees Because it is part of the company’s media strategy

Q3

Easy tasks Difficult tasks

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Organizational and administrative tasks Day-to-day business (routine tasks) Strategic tasks Q4

Email is a not a good leadership instrument and worse than other instruments Email is equally good as other leadership instruments Email is a very good leadership instrument and better than other instruments Using email does not affect my leadership

Q5

Email is a reliable and fast medium Email is a perfect two-way communication medium The introduction of email raised the number of instructions The introduction of email raised the number of employee reactions to my instructions Email improved my perception of advantages of interactive media Email improved my perception of advantages of interactive media used by my employees Email furthers the social disintegration of my employees I only use email when f2f communication is not possible Email is really inappropriate for some tasks. I thus use other interactive communications media

Q6

Employing email saves time Employing email helps communicating better with my employees Employing email helps coordinate work more efficiently Employing email makes me decide faster Employing email raised motivation of my employees Employing email has raised communication costs in the company Employing email has made me instruct everything twice Employing email has made task fulfillment to take longer Employing email has introduced expansive support measures (such as training) because employees were unable to cope in a technical, social and communicative sense

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III. Zusammenfassung und Ausblick Gegenstand der Arbeit war der fragmentarische Versuch, kommunikationswissenschaftliche Konzeptionen und Befunde aus der Medienpraxis zur Deutung der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ und den Wandel von öffentlicher Kommunikation aus Sicht der Medienökonomie in den Blick zu nehmen, zu analysieren und zu bewerten. Das Erkenntnisziel der theoretischen Durchsicht war die Untersuchung der Frage, ob die „digitale Mediamorphose“ zu einem Wandel der Öffentlichkeit führt und welche kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Modelle und Befunde aus der Medienpraxis diesen Wandel sichtbar werden lassen. Die vorangestellte Diskussion über ausgewählte Themen zur „digitalen Mediamorphose“ führt zunächst zu einem ersten ambivalenten Ergebnis: Der Wandel der Medien- und Kommunikationsstrukturen, wie er mit den Prozessen der „Digitalisierung“ (Becker, 2013; McQuail, 2010), der „Medienkonvergenz“ (Lugmayr & Dal Zotto, 2016; McQuail, 2010), oder der „Mediatisierung“ (Karmasin, 2015; Krotz, 2014; ibid., 2011; ibid., 2007; ibid., 2001) beschrieben werden kann, geht in vielen Bereichen mit einer Reihe von Transformationen einher, deren weitere Entwicklung sich gerade in der Phase des Übergangs jedoch nur bedingt abschätzen lässt. Phänomene des Wandels auf Ebene der individuellen kommunikativen Handlungsstrukturen korrespondieren dabei strukturell mit Veränderungen auf der Ebene gesamtgesellschaftlicher Kommunikationsprozesse und umgekehrt. Der Strukturwandel, der darüber hinaus mit Effekten einer zunehmenden Ökonomisierung und Kommerzialisierung von Produktionsprozessen im Medien- und Kommunikationsfeld verbunden ist, bleibt schließlich auch nicht ohne Auswirkung auf unternehmerische Kommunikationsherausforderungen, die mit neuen Strategien und Maßnahmen auf Veränderungsdruck zu reagieren haben (Rest & Steinmaurer, 2014; Steininger, 2013). Im Folgenden werden (theoretisch-konzeptionelle wie vorläufige empirische) Ergebnisse der Arbeit entlang der ausgewiesenen vier Problemfelder zusammengefasst. Zugleich wird der Versuch unternommen, in den dabei erzielten Resultaten Ansatzpunkte für weitergehende zukünftige Fragestellungen in der medienökonomischen Forschung aufzuzeigen. Die vorliegenden Überlegungen orientierten sich dabei an den in der Einleitung definierten vier Problemfelder der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ und den damit einhergehenden Fragenkomplexen. x x x x

Problemfeld 1: Medienökonomie und Medienmanagement in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ Problemfeld 2: Geschäfts- und Erlösmodelle von Medien und Medienförderung Problemfeld 3: Traditionelle Massenmedien in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ Problemfeld 4: Interaktivität von Medien als Treiber der „digitalen Mediamorphose“

Problemfeld 1: Medienökonomie und Medienmanagement in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ Zum Erklärungswert der Medienökonomie Als theoretisches Standbein der vorliegenden Untersuchung diente das vom Wiener Forschungsinstitut MEDIACULT (weiter)entwickelte und zentralgestellte Konzept der „digitalen Mediamorphose“. An diesem Konzept ließ sich nämlich darstellen, dass das, was als „Medienwandel“ bezeichnet wird die vermeintliche Dichotomie von Medien und Gesellschaft aufbricht. Bei ‚Medien‘ und ‚Gesellschaft‘ handelt es sich folgerichtig nicht um zwei getrennte Bereiche, zwischen denen eine äußerliche Beziehung besteht, sondern um einen

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019 P. C. Murschetz, Die digitale Mediamorphose und der Wandel der traditionellen Massenmedien aus Sicht der Medienökonomie, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27965-3_3

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Vermittlungszusammenhang: Medien existieren für Gesellschaft nicht außerhalb gesellschaftlich hergestellter Kommunikationsverhältnisse, ebenso wenig ist es möglich, Gesellschaft unabhängig von ihren Kommunikationsverhältnissen und den sie antreibenden Medienwandel zureichend zu begreifen. Beide existieren nur zusammen, miteinander verbunden, verflochten und vermischt. Zentrale Gründe und Herausforderungen sind Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz, die damit verbundene wirtschaftliche Umwälzung, die Internationalisierung des Mediengeschäfts und die veränderte Mediennutzung. Die Transformation der Medien bezieht sich auf alle Mediengattungen: Print, Fernsehen, Radio und Online. Der Komplexität dieses wechselseitigen Vermittlungszusammenhangs, der im gegenwärtigen Prozess des digitalen Medienwandels eine erneute Dynamisierung erfährt, steht jedoch bislang kein angemessenes, korrespondierendes Niveau wissenschaftlicher Bearbeitung in einer kommunikationswissenschaftlich dimensionierten Medienökonomie gegenüber. Es muss an dieser Stelle zunächst gesagt werden, dass hier nicht der Eindruck erweckt werden soll, dass durch einen solcherart umfassenden Erklärungsanspruch in vorliegender Arbeit eine neue, umfassende kommunikationswissenschaftliche Großtheorie zur „digitalen Mediamorphose“ aus Sicht der Medienökonomie entstehen soll, die den unüberschaubaren Nexus von aufzuzeigenden Beziehungen als universalistische Theorie zur Erklärung und Lösung der aufgeworfenen Fragen zur „digitalen Mediamorphose“ anbietet. Stattdessen wurde versucht, einen methodisch gemachten Zweifel an der Medienökonomie als Disziplin in seiner bisherigen Gestalt zu gebären. Denn bislang scheint die Medienökonomie noch keine geeignete Sprache zur Erklärung der Phänomene der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ gefunden zu haben. Welche Ordnungsbemühungen und methodischen Arrangements waren also notwendig, damit die Medienökonomie in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ an Erklärungswert hinzugewinnt? Damit wurde durch diese Arbeit ein Forschungsdesiderat der Medienökonomie angesprochen, um disziplinäre und inhaltliche Öffnungen in Richtung der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zu leisten. Es wurde gezeigt, dass die gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ die Notwendigkeit einer Neuorientierung der Medienökonomie als Integrationsdisziplin erfordern (Karmasin et al., 2014). Eine Erforschung der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ in Form einer Vermittlungsforschung bezog sich dabei auf die Notwendigkeit und Unausweichlichkeit der Analyse gesellschaftlicher Kommunikationsverhältnisse als wechselseitiger Vermitteltheit und Bedeutungsabhängigkeit von Medien/Kommunikation und Gesellschaft. Nur damit kann eine angemessene Aufmerksamkeitsschwelle der neuartigen, individuellen und gesellschaftlichen Erfahrungsformen und Problemlagen in der digitalen Mediengegenwart und Zukunft überwunden werden. Welche Anpassungen sind in der Medienökonomie und dem Medienmanagement von Nöten, um den durch die „digitalen Mediamorphose“ ausgelösten techno-sozialen Veränderungen gerecht zu werden? Folgt man dem Primat der Kommunikationswissenschaften, so ist davon auszugehen, dass Medienökonomie und Medienmanagement zur Erklärung publizistischer Massenkommunikation als ein „transdisziplinäres Lehr -und Forschungsprogramm“ (Altmeppen & Karmasin, 2003) zu konzipieren sind. So postulieren Matthias Karmasin und Carsten Winter, dass „das erfolgreiche Management von Medienunternehmen zusätzlich zu betriebswirtschaftlichen weiter medienspezifischen, kulturellen, sozialen, ästhetischen und anderen Qualifikationen“ (Karmasin & Winter, 2000, S. 17) erfordern würde. „Medienmanagement sollte sich deshalb nicht auf die Funktion der Erklärung von Gewinnmaximierungszusammenhängen beschränken, sondern auch die kommunikative Dimension in den Blick nehmen“ (ebd., S. 36 f.) Und weiter: „Es geht nicht nur um eine Theorie des Managements von Medien und Medienunternehmen, sondern um die genuine Integration kommunikativer, ethischer und ökonomischer Rationalität“ 294

(ebd., S. 37). Dieses Postulat war auch für eine Analyse von Phänomenen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ richtungweisend. Erst wenn die Medienökonomie den neuartigen Mischungsund Entmischungsphänomenen in ihren Grundbegrifflichkeiten Rechnung trägt und sich damit immanent dem Bezug auf andere Forschungsrichtungen öffnet, kann eine Analyse der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ sowohl medienökonomische Partialbeobachtungen machen als auch sozial- und technikwissenschaftliche Konzepte reflektiert gebrauchen. Und somit führt nur eine weiter angelegte medienökonomische Analyse der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zu leistungsfähigeren Erklärungsansätzen. Die Leistungsfähigkeit wird daran zu messen sein, inwieweit ein solcher Ansatz zur „Aufklärung und Steuerung“ (Hans Albert) eines sozialwissenschaftlichen Problems beitragen kann (über Probleme medienpolitischer Steuerung in der „digitalen Mediamorphose vgl. Brosda, 2015; Emmer & Strippel, 2015). Eine weitere zentrale Frage bleibt dabei virulent: Welche unternehmenspolitisch relevanten Aktivitäten sind auf Produkt-, Unternehmens- und Marktebene erforderlich, um auf die durch die „digitale Mediamorphose“ einsetzenden fundamentalen Veränderungen entsprechend (re)agieren zu können? Antworten auf diese Frage können, müssen aber nicht einfach sein. Dies ist auf die Unhandlichkeit und Sperrigkeit des Untersuchungsobjekts, bzw. auch der Veränderungsfreudigkeit und des fluiden Charakters der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zurückzuführen. Obgleich es begrifflich und inhaltlich nicht an verwandten Analysekonzeptionen mangelt – Michael Latzer beschrieb schon 1997 Konvergenzprozess von Telekommunikation, Computer und Rundfunk als „Mediamatik“ – ist es doch die komplexitätsbedingte Gemengelage der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ selbst, welche plausible Erklärungen erschwert. Zusammenfassend ist – wie ich meine – ein angemessener Zugang zur Analyse der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ über folgende Systematisierung zielführend: a) Zur Identifizierung der wesentlichen Determinanten, Ursachen, Formen und Wirkungsweisen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ in den ausgewiesenen Problemfeldern sind theoretische Ansätze aus der kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Medienökonomie mit transdisziplinärintegrativer Perspektive zu erschließen. Die Vielförmigkeit und Komplexität der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ als gleichzeitig medialer und gesellschaftlicher Wandel bedingt dies. b) Zur Analyse der langfristigen Veränderungen des Mediensystems ist auf die verschiedenen Werte-, Struktur-, Handlungs- und Ergebnisdimensionen des Medienwandels in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ einzugehen, die im Fokus medienökonomischer Forschung stehen (Kolo et al., 2012; Seufert & Sattelberger, 2013). In Anlehnung an Wolfgang Seufert und Felix Sattelberger (2013, S. 10) betrifft dies: a. Veränderungen in Umfang und Struktur der Nutzung medialer Inhalte durch Rezipienten und ihrer Nutzungsmotive; b. Veränderungen in Umfang und Struktur der angebotenen medialen Inhalte im Hinblick auf Themenschwerpunkte, Darstellungsformen und andere Inhaltskategorien; c. Veränderungen in der Struktur der Anbieter medialer Inhalte, also in der Zusammensetzung derjenigen Akteure, die über Umfang und Struktur des Angebotes entscheiden; d. Veränderungen bei den Kriterien, die die Medienanbieter bei ihren Auswahlentscheidungen zugrunde legen, d. h. bei den Zielen, die mit diesen Auswahlentscheidungen verfolgt werden;

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e. Veränderungen in der politischen Einflussnahme auf die Angebotsentscheidungen der Medienanbieter durch Medienrecht, finanzielle Anreizsysteme oder andere medienpolitische Instrumente. c) Zudem gilt es zu berücksichtigen, dass „klassische“ Fragestellungen der Medienwirtschaft wie jene nach der Konzentration in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zwar nicht obsolet werden, sich jedoch ihr Objektbereich um neue Phänomene wie Konvergenz ausweitet. Anpassungen des Objektbereiches (und wohl auch des methodischen Instrumentariums) sind von Nöten, da „existing business models are clearly expiring, but the volume and velocity of change makes outcomes non-linear and unpredictable“ (Küng, 2007, p. 26). Vor dem Hintergrund der Überschneidung vormals getrennter und unabhängiger Medienfunktionen und services, aber auch Industrien, wächst die Notwendigkeit, die involvierten Branchen an die neuen Gegebenheiten anzupassen und neue Rahmenbedingungen für den globalen Wettbewerb zu erlassen. Forschungsausblick: Konzeptionelle Öffnungen Öffnungen der Medienökonomie sind in Richtung der dominanten Diskurse zu den sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungsfeldern „Medienwandel“ (Kinnebrock et al., 2015), zu den Theorie-Diskursen zu „Medieninnovation“ (Dogruel, 2013; ibid., 2012; Dal Zotto & van Kranenburg, 2008; Habann, 2003; ibid., 2010; Stöber, 2008; Størsul & Krumsvik, 2013; Størsul & Stuedahl, 2007; Trappel, 2015), und zum kulturwissenschaftlichen Diskurs um Werte sowie Rollen von Medien und Kommunikation in der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung möglich (Karmasin et al., 2013). Wie Susanne Kinnebrock et al. (2015) und Mitautorinnen darstellen, ist Medienwandel eines der bestimmenden Schlagwörter im medien- und kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Fachdiskurs geworden. Zugleich zeigt sich, dass dieses ‚Totalphänomen‘ begrifflich schwer zu fassen ist. Auffällig häufig wird der Begriff ‚Medienwandel‘ primär auf „neue“ Medien, Technologien und Innovationen bezogen. Dabei wird systematisch vernachlässigt, dass jeder Wandel ein Vorher und Nachherhat und dass aktuelle Phänomene erst durch eine diachrone Betrachtung und die Einordnung in größere historische Zusammenhänge zu verstehen sind (Kinnebrock et al., 2015). Zum Thema Medieninnovation führt Leyla Dogruel (2013, S. 12) aus, dass eine „Zunahme der Bedeutung von Innovationen (…) insbesondere in der ökonomischen Innovationsforschung diskutiert und Innovationen als zentraler Wettbewerbsfaktor propagiert [werden] (…), gleichzeitig jedoch empirische Belege [fehlen], die einen solchen Anstieg stützen könnten. Zudem liegt diesen Annahmen eine verkürzende Argumentationsweise zugrunde, da beispielsweise Forschungsansätze zum Medienwandel schlüssig darstellen, dass ein auf entweder technologische- oder gesellschaftsinduzierte Einflussfaktoren bzw. ‚Triebkräfte‘ von Veränderungsprozessen reduziertes Verständnis von Innovationen der komplexen Beziehung und wechselseitigen Kausalität gesellschaftlicher und technologischer Veränderungsprozesse nicht gerecht wird (vgl. Bruns, 2014; Münch & Schmid, 2005; S. 201 ff.; Steinmaurer, 2003, S. 104). Innovation ist ein definitiv multi-diskursives Konzept: Man findet deutlich unterschiedliche Bedeutungen und Konnotationen von Innovation in unterschiedlichen disziplinären Diskursen. Nun sieht es aber so aus, dass die akademische Debatte mit einer zentralen Hauptschwierigkeit konfrontiert ist. Soziologie, Medienund Kommunikationswissenschaft, Designwissenschaft, Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 296

und Studien der Medienorganisation stehen dabei im Vordergrund. Folglich sind jedoch Unterschiede in Begriffsdefinitionen und Auslegungen signifikant. Medieninnovation ist multiperspektivisch. Und da der Begriff Medieninnovation schwer zu operationalisieren ist, sind sehr heterogene Themen aus unterschiedlichen, forschungsprogrammatisch zu beforschen: Methoden der Invention im Design, innovative Organisationsstrategien von Medienorganisationen, der Einfluss von Unternehmensgröße und Ressourcenkontrolle auf Innovationsverhalten in Printmedien, Auswirkungen von digitalen Infrastrukturen auf Management von TV-Programmstrategien, sowie Klärungen auf die Frage der Verschiebung von Privatheit und Öffentlichkeit durch Innovationen in neuen Medien. Medieninnovationen sind nicht zuletzt auch durch neue Produkte sowie Medien- und Kommunikationsdienste charakterisiert. Einen sehr interessanten und wohl auch wegweisenden Ansatz liefert Frank Habann (2010), der eine kausalanalytische empirische Erhebung zu Medieninnovation in der DACH Region durchführte. Der Diskurs zum Thema Medieninnovationen hat also gerade erst begonnen und sollte daher auch zukünftig einen zentralen Platz in der kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Forschung einnehmen. Eine Erweiterung der Erkenntnisse der in und an der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ wirksamen Kräfte, eine noch größere Sicherheit sowohl im Verständnis historischer Abläufe als auch in der Prognose künftigen Medienwandels liefern die Analysen von Michael Latzer (2013). Latzer analysiert Medienwandel als innovationsgetriebenem, ko-evolutionären Prozess unter den Bedingungen von Komplexität. Mit der Kombination aus Innovations-, KoEvolutions- und Komplexitätsansätzen lassen sich veränderte und zusätzliche Erkenntnisse zu Triebkräften, Verlauf, Folgen und Steuerbarkeit des Medienwandels erzielen. Sie liefert grundlegende Muster für ein besseres Verständnis von Veränderungsprozessen und ermöglicht die differenzierte Integration technischer Innovationen in das Gesamtbild des Medienwandels. Gleichzeitig verändern sich damit die Einschätzungen der Rahmenbedingungen für Steuerungsversuche und in der Folge die Richtlinien für kommunikationspolitische und ökonomische Strategien (vgl. Latzer, 2009).

Problemfeld 2: Erlösmodelle von Medien und Medienförderung Die Medienindustrie befindet sich in einem massiven Wandel. Die Zunahme nicht-linearer, interaktiver on-line Kanäle und Inhalte und die damit verbundenen neuen Werbestrategien von Unternehmen, welche diese neuen Online-Kanäle forcieren, bedeuten für viele Medienunternehmen den Wegfall von Werbeeinnahmen, wodurch deren traditionelle Geschäftsmodelle zunehmend an Bedeutung verlieren. Angesichts der Vielzahl unvorhersehbarer und dynamischer Umfeldentwicklungen (insbesondere Digitalisierung, Medienkonvergenz und Veränderung der Nutzerinnenpräferenzen; Wirtz & Pelz, 2006, S. 275) sind heute die Spielregeln, nach denen Medienorganisationen und mithin Journalismus refinanziert und monetarisiert in einem oft bedrohlichen Maß unsicher geworden. Diese Unsicherheit hat in den letzten Jahren notwendigerweise eine neue Experimentierfreudigkeit in der Medienpraxis ausgelöst (Ruß-Mohl, 2014). Die Beforschung des Problemfeldes 2 ergab die folgenden Resultate: Strukturelle Unsicherheit in den digitalen Geschäftsmodellen Zunächst ist die Refinanzierung von Produktion, Vermarktung und Vertrieb von Medieninhalten als problematisch zu beurteilen. Dies aus den folgenden guten Gründen:

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Erstens verändern sich durch den Eintritt von anfänglich reinen Technologielieferanten zu jetzt faktisch weltweit tätigen Internetkonzernen wie Google und Apple in den Medienmarkt die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen und Medienstrukturen der publizistischen Massenmedien substanziell. Dies führt zur Verschiebung der Medienbudgets zu Ungunsten vieler traditioneller Massenmedien. Die rückläufige Nutzung ebendieser Medien erschwert ihre Refinanzierung (Kiefer, 2011; Picard, 2002; Picot & Freyberg, 2010; Puppis & Künzler, 2011; Seufert & Sattelberger, 2013). Zweitens gilt als Grundproblem der Medienfinanzierung, dass sich Medien zu einem großen Teil indirekt, nämlich überwiegend in Form einer „Umweg-Finanzierung“ durch Werbung refinanzieren müssen, weil ihr eigentliches Produkt, die Information, ein quasiöffentliches Gut ist. Ein solches ist ja bekanntermaßen durch Nichtrivalität und Nichtausschließbarkeit im Konsum und damit mangelnde Marktfähigkeit gekennzeichnet. Im Gegensatz dazu führt die „digitale Mediamorphose“ zu einer „Reprivatisierung“ der Bereitstellung von öffentlichen Gütern bzw. leitet zumindest Möglichkeiten der (teilweisen) Refinanzierung der Medieninhalte durch Einführungen von Pay-Modellen und Bezahlschranken ein. Und drittens wird „Ökonomisierung“ (Altmeppen, 2008; ibid., 2011), „Kommerzialisierung“ (Medien Journal, 2003; Siegert, 2003) und „Kapitalisierung“ (Knoche, 2001; ibid., 2014) längst als ein wesentlicher Entwicklungstrend der Medien angesehen. Im Kern geht es darum, dass durch Ökonomisierung (auf Marktebene), Kommerzialisierung (auf Produktebene), und Kapitalisierung (auf Industrie- und Gesellschaftsebene) die grundsätzliche Orientierung von privat-kommerziellen aber auch öffentlich-rechtlichen Medien an Effizienzund Rentabilitätskriterien der Medien noch deutlicher forciert und akzentuiert wird (Karmasin et al., 2001). Erlösmodellerfolge für die Medienzukunft in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ sind durch hohe Risikobereitschaft ausgezeichnet, Budgets werden in neue Ideen investiert, es wird innoviert, getestet, und beobachtet (Hacklin et al., 2013; ibid., 2008). Die Diversifikation in neue Geschäftsfelder bei gleichzeitiger Veränderung bestehender Geschäftsmodelle stellt zudem hohe Anforderungen an das Management von traditionellen Massenmedien, um sich nicht unkontrolliert von den Kernkompetenzen zu entfernen. Theoretische Erklärungen zum Thema „Erlösmodelle von Medien“ sind bis dato nur in Fragmenten vorhanden. Die vorgestellten deskriptiven Modelle aus dem Bereich des Diskurses „Geschäftsmodelle“ haben heuristisches Potenzial, sind aber vergleichsweise unspezifisch, noch vortheoretisch und empirisch wenig abgesichert. Dies bedeutet, dass nicht nur Erlösmodelle von Medien selbst, sondern auch deren Veränderungen im Prozess der Medienkonvergenz nicht ausreichend verstanden werden. Die Suche nach tragfähigen Erlösmodellen ist derzeit eine der schwierigsten Aufgaben für Medienunternehmen. Durch Medienkonvergenz erwächst jedenfalls die Möglichkeit der Etablierung neuer Geschäftsmodelle. Klassische Medienunternehmen haben jedenfalls markttechnisch epochale Zäsuren zu bewältigen, deren Langzeitwirkungen noch nicht abzusehen sind. Die strukturellen Unsicherheiten in den Geschäfts- und Erlösmodellierungen von Medienprodukten und – diensten in der digitalen Mediamorphose werden zudem durch folgende Dynamik erschwert: „Mit der nachlassenden Attraktivität und Ergiebigkeit einer indirekten Finanzierung der Medien durch Werbung sind die Versuche einer direkten (Entgelt-)Finanzierung allerdings verstärkt worden; und die Chancen dazu sind mit der verbesserten Ausschließbarkeit, insbesondere bei den audiovisuellen Medien, auch gestiegen. Damit verschärfen sich aber auch die Konflikte zwischen den allokativen Zielen, die mit der Bereitstellung von Medien als individuellen Wirtschaftsgütern verfolgt werden und den verteilungs- bzw. gesellschaftspolitischen Zielen die Medien – unabhängig von der individuellen Kaufkraft – als 298

Kulturgüter und als zentrale Institution für öffentliche Kommunikation erfüllen sollen“ (Kops, in Sjurts, 2011, S. 43). Die empirische Untersuchung zu Geschäftsmodellstrategien im Bereich des Konvergenzfernsehens in Deutschland bestätigen die vorliegenden Ergebnisse aus der Theorie, nämlich dass in einer von Unsicherheiten und Unübersichtlichkeiten gekennzeichneten Situation allen Aktivitäten die wichtige Rolle zukommt, adäquate Situationsdeutungen zu liefern und Steuerungsmöglichkeiten zu eruieren, mit denen dem gewachsenen Problemdruck der ausreichenden und nachhaltigen Medienfinanzierung besser begegnet werden kann (BadenFuller & Morgan, 2010; Baden-Fuller & Mangematin, 2015; Einav, 2015). Hier sind vor allem Anschlüsse an die kommunikationswissenschaftliche Mediennutzungsforschung sinnvoll (z.B. Aslama & Napoli, 2010; Hasebrink & Schmidt, 2013; Taneja et al., 2012; Webster, 2014; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012). Staatliche Medienförderung: Plausibel, aber wenig valide Ergebnisse zu staatlichen Interventionen in Mediensysteme haben erbracht, dass diese zwar prinzipiell legitim und plausibel begründbar, aber gleichsam wenig effizient und effektiv sind. Manche gegenwärtig auf Pressemärkten eingesetzten Förderinstrumente sind generell funktionstüchtig (Leseförderung, Modernisierungsförderung), andere wiederum müssen an neuen Anforderungen in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ angepasst und daher verbessert werden. Letzteres trifft insbesondere auf Förderungen in digitale Innovationen als weiterer wichtiger Systembaustein einer „integralen“, also gattungsübergreifenden und technikneutralen Medienförderung zu. Leif Kramp und Stephan Weichert (2012) stellen in Ihrem „Innovationsreport Journalismus“ für die Situation in Deutschland jedenfalls fest, dass ein dringend benötigtes Innovationsmanagement in deutschen Verlags- und Rundfunkhäusern häufig an eingefahrenen Alltagsroutinen und auch intellektueller Trägheit scheitert. Die Führungsebenen würden meist schwerfällig oder gar nicht handeln, was dem vermeintlichen Grundbekenntnis der Branche widerspricht, sich dem Wandel generell stellen zu wollen. Hier fehlt es ebenso an einem ausgeprägten Willen zur nachhaltigen Umsetzung und Implementierung von Innovationen wie auch an einem professionellen (Selbst)-Bewusstsein zur Neujustierung des Metiers. Die Restrukturierung der existenten Medienförderungssysteme in Europa ist darum ein erzwungener Schritt, da die gegenwärtigen Systeme in vielen Ländern den Anforderungen an ein effektives, faires und innovatives Medienförderungssystem nicht gerecht werden. Internationale Beispiele zeigen, dass sich in vielen Ländern ein „Konsens“ zur Reform der Medienförderungssysteme besteht, selbst in den Modell-Ländern Norwegen, Schweden, Finnland und Dänemark wird mit innovativen Modellen experimentiert. „Twitter“, „open journalism“, „user-generated co-production“-Projekte sind mögliche förderungswürdige Innovationsprojekte für Zeitungen. Gegenstände der Förderung sind hier jedenfalls mannigfaltig. In den rezenten Diskursen ist in internationaler Betrachtung weitgehend unbestritten, dass eher früher als später eine Reform mit einer Erweiterung von der Presse- zur Medienförderung notwendig und sinnvoll sein wird. Bei einer solchen Medienförderung werden Qualitätsziele eine zentrale Rolle spielen, wie dies heute im Rahmen der ‚Public Value‘Auflagen im Rundfunkbereich bereits der Fall ist. Wenn hier in weiterer Folge Journalismus als ‚demokratienotwendige‘ Institution beschrieben wird, deren „kollektiv anerkannte Leitidee und Statusfunktion die Ermöglichung und Sicherung von Volkssouveränität ist“ (Kiefer 2010, S. 163), wird deutlich, dass es in erster Linie um die Förderung von Journalismus gehen muss. 299

Denn Medien gewinnen ihren Institutionencharakter erst durch ihre Verknüpfung mit der Institution Journalismus. Medien ermöglichen Öffentlichkeit, gewinnen aber erst durch diese Verknüpfung selbst institutionellen Charakter. D.h. ein etwaiger Wandel der Presseförderung hin zu einer Medienförderung greift zu kurz. Der Adressat der Förderung muss der Journalismus selbst sein, wird von prominenter Stelle gefordert. Journalismus ist es, der Wirklichkeitsbeschreibungen der Gesellschaft und gesellschaftlicher Vorgänge bereitstellt. Er bedarf der Förderung, aber auch des Schutzes, da seine Macht durch „journalistische wie auch journalistische Akteure“ (Kiefer, 2010, S. 211) missbrauchsgefährdet ist. Medienunternehmen als Organisationen versuchen institutionell eröffnete Spielräume (Gewinnmöglichkeiten) auszunutzen. Marie Luise Kiefer (ebd., S. 213) meint dazu: „In dem institutionell-organisatorischen Arrangement privatwirtschaftlicher Medienorganisation gibt es einen Schutzmechanismus gegen politische aber nicht gegen ökonomische Einflussnahmen auf die Konkretisierung der Institution Journalismus.“ Altmeppen (2012, S. 38) betont diesen Umstand im Rahmen seiner Feststellung, dass Journalismus kein Geschäftsmodell sei. „Denn so intensiv auch der Journalismus mit seiner Leistung (gesellschafts-)rechtlich abgesichert ist, so wenig dauerhafte und verlässliche Absicherung kann er in ökonomischer Hinsicht reklamieren.“ (Altmeppen, 2012, S. 38) Journalismus ist letztlich auf die von Verlagen bereitgestellten (redaktionellen) Ressourcen angewiesen. Will man die Autonomie der Redaktionen stärken, muss genau diesem Umstand Rechnung getragen werden. Auch wenn hier Journalismus als Adressat der Förderung bezeichnet wird, darf diese Kopplung nicht vergessen werden, da die Medienpolitik vor allem Organisationen adressiert, an diese Forderungen stellt und von diesen Leistungen einfordert. Gerade im Kontext Förderung ist dies zu berücksichtigen. Dass aufgrund von Medienwandel auch Meinungsmacht außerhalb des traditionellen Journalismus entsteht, bleibt unbestritten. Obgleich die Forschung zu Leistungen des Bürgerjournalismus bislang noch als lückenhaft gilt, kann zumindest konstatiert werden, dass Inhaltsanalysen von Angeboten, die Nutzung sowie Einschätzungen des Publikums dagegen sprechen, „dass in Social Media in erheblichem Maße und auf ähnlichem Niveau Berichterstattung betrieben wird wie im professionellen Journalismus.“ (Neuberger, 2012, S. 71) Es reicht nicht, wenn Laienkommunikatoren sich selbst als Journalisten begreifen. In der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ treiben Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz weiterhin die Veränderung von Marktstrukturen und marktgängigen Austauschprozessen voran. Dies verändert das Verhalten der Nutzer und die Geschäftsstrategien der Medien grundlegend. Diese Trends führen mithin zur Erosion traditioneller Finanzierungsmodelle der Medien und erhöhen damit die Anforderungen an ein gleichzeitig effizientes wie effektives Medienförderungsregime der Zukunft. Die Megatrends der Digitalisierung und Konvergenz verschärfen die Marktsituation für publizistische Qualitätsmedien (Kaye & Quinn, 2010). Dabei wird nicht nur der Wettbewerb zwischen „klassischen“ Marktteilnehmern verschärft, sondern diese stehen aufgrund der wachsenden Online Konkurrenz durch häufig international tätige Akteure aus IT, Konsumelektronik, Telekommunikation, Unterhaltung, und Internet- und Spieleindustrie unter zunehmendem Druck. Wenn sich nun aber Nutzerinnen anderen Angeboten zuwenden und damit Werbegelder vermehrt ins Internet und zu Online-Medien abfließen, sind zur Refinanzierung von qualitativ hochwertigen Medieninhalten alternative Finanzierungsquellen zu erschließen. Für Printmedien bedeutet dies z.B., dass das langjährige Geschäftsmodell „integrierte Werbe- und Leserfinanzierung“ aufgebrochen ist (sinkende Abozahlen, sinkende Werbeeinnahmen, sinkende Auflagen, Entlassung von Journalistinnen, Zeitungsschließungen) und durch neue innovative cross-media Finanzierungsmodelle zu erweitern wäre. Dieser Strukturwandel erzwingt jedenfalls Re-Positionierungen der Finanzierungsmodelle von traditionellen Massenmedien, aber auch am Modell der staatlichen Medienförderung, die von gattungsspezifischen Einzelmedienfördersystemen auf den neuen 300

Geltungsbereich der Konvergenzmedien, auch und insbesondere im Online-Bereich, ausgeweitet werden sollten (Stark, 2013b). Staatliche Medienförderung wird im vorliegenden Kontext daher als Förderung der Innovationsfähigkeit von traditionellen publizistischen Massenmedien verstanden. Es folgt damit einer institutionalistischen Denkweise und versteht Medien und Journalismus als Organisationen (Kiefer, 2011), die einem institutionellen Wandel ausgesetzt sind und sich dadurch verändern. Sind Journalismus und journalistische Medien für die Demokratie unverzichtbar, ist es nur konsequent, ein Modell öffentlicher Finanzierung in die Zukunft von Journalismus und publizistischen Massenmedien zu entwickeln. Dies ist vor allem dann geboten, wenn Journalismus nicht allein aus einem privatwirtschaftlichen Geschäftsmodell refinanziert werden kann (Kiefer, 2011). Forschungsausblick: Staatliche Filmförderung – Evaluierungsnotwendigkeiten Der Autor der vorliegenden Sammelschrift ist mit Roland Teichmann, Direktor des Österreichischen Filminstituts, und Matthias Karmasin, Ordinarius am Institut für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft der Universität Klagenfurt, übereingekommen, ein international angelegtes Forschungsprojekt über gegenwärtig angebotene Systeme der staatlichen Filmförderung im internationalen Vergleich einer Bilanzierung und Evaluierung zu unterziehen. Dies soll mit dem Ziel geschehen, einen Referenz-Standard zur Evaluierung von staatlicher Filmförderung auf internationalem Niveau zu erarbeiten. Dieser Referenzstandard wird bei Springer als Sammelband erscheinen und vom Autor zusammen mit Teichmann und Karmasin herausgegen (Murschetz et al., 2016). Grundsätzlich verfolgt dieses Projekt ein problemorientiertes Erkenntnisinteresse. Es soll das Gesamt der Wertschöpfungsprozesse und -ergebnisse von staatlichen Filmförderungssystemen im internationalen Vergleich dargestellt werden und insbesondere die Summe der Maßnahmen zur Erreichung der Ziele im Bereich der Filmförderung im Zusammenhang dieser Wertschöpfungsleistungen bilanziert und bewertet werden. Formales Ergebnisziel ist die Erarbeitung eines neuen langfristig wirkenden neuen Standards im Sinne der Bilanzierung und Evaluierung von Leistungen von staatlicher Filmförderung. Der Wertschöpfungsprozess von Filmen ist in technologischer Hinsicht vor allem den tiefgreifenden Veränderungen der Digitalisierung ausgesetzt. Dieser Megatrend beeinflusst sowohl die Filmherstellung und Endbearbeitung wie auch die Filmauswertung über klassische und neuartige Verwertungsstufen. Die geänderten technologischen Rahmenbedingungen sind daher auch für die Filmförderung in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ von hoher Relevanz. Eingesetzte Materialien sind die Analyse von hauseigenen Primär-Dokumenten des Österreichischen Filminstitutes, aber auch die Hinzunahme externer Sekundärmaterialien von anderer Seite. Zudem sind der Einsatz von Primärerhebungsmethoden („Best-Of-Voices“) von kritischen Stakeholdern des Wertschöpfungsprozesses Film, insbesondere über semistrukturierte Experteninterviews vorgesehen. Zur Bilanzierung und Evaluierung der Leistungen zur Filmförderung werden zwei Methoden aus dem Strategischen Planungsmanagement bzw. der Industrieorganisationsforschung eingesetzt: a) SWOT (Stärken/Schwächen)-Analyse und KEF (Kritische Erfolgsfaktoren)-Analyse (kombinierte Methode) b) Umwelt-Marktstruktur-Marktverhalten-Marktergebnis (UMMM)-Analysemodell Die „SWOT-Analyse“, zu Deutsch: Stärken-Schwächen-Analyse (engl. Akronym für Strengths (Stärken), Weaknesses (Schwächen), Opportunities (Chancen) und Threats (Gefahren)) ist ein 301

Instrument der strategischen Unternehmensplanung. Sie dient allgemein der Positionsbestimmung und der Strategieentwicklung von Projekten/Produkten und ganzen Organisationen. Die SWOT-Analyse hat zum Ziel, geeignete Strategiekombinationen zu identifizieren, um den Untersuchungsgegenstand nach bestimmten Zielkriterien zu untersuchen und zu bewerten. Die „KEF-Analyse“ ist die Analyse kritischer Erfolgsfaktoren, d.h. von Faktoren und Schlüsselgrößen, die für die Erreichung der Gesamtziele einer Unternehmung oder eines Projekts von zentraler Bedeutung sind. Stimmen diese Faktoren, so wird die Unternehmung als Ganzes bzw. ein spezifisches Projekt im Besonderen erfolgreich sein, zeigen sich dagegen hier Defizite, so beeinträchtigt dies unmittelbar den Gesamterfolg des Projekts. Das Projekt im vorgegebenen Sinne meint die Evaluierung des Systems der Filmförderung in Österreich. Erfolgsfaktoren lassen sich in filmspezifische, studioabhängige und gesellschaftsspezifische Erfolgsfaktoren einteilen. Filmspezifische Erfolgsfaktoren sind diejenigen, die das Produkt Film beinhaltet. Der fertige Film wird später an seiner Qualität gemessen und die in diesem Abschnitt auf- geführten Faktoren Stars, Regisseur, Genre und Inhalt sind die wesentlichen Qualitätsmerkmale des Films. Studioabhängige Erfolgsfaktoren beeinflussen den Erfolg des Films von außen. Filmbudget, Werbekampagne, Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung und die Distribution so wie die Kopien sollen den Filmerfolg positiv beeinflussen. Das Filmbudget steht genau zwischen den beiden ersten Bereichen. Es umfasst sowohl das Produktions- als auch das Marketingbudget. Gesellschaftliche Erfolgsfaktoren können, wie das Wort schon sagt, nicht direkt vom produzierenden Studio beeinflusst werden. Der Konsument, die Presse und unabhängige Jurys beurteilen allein die Qualität des Films. Einen indirekten Einfluss üben mit Sicherheit die Werbekampagne und der Einsatz von Stars auf die Konsumenten aus. Dieser ist jedoch höchstens für das Eröffnungswochenende relevant, da danach die Mund zu Mund-Propaganda ins Rollen kommt. Zur Evaluierung der angebotsseitig ansetzenden Fördersysteme der Filmförderung wird insbesondere auf Effizienzund Wirkungsmechanismen im Sinne von kritischen Erfolgsfaktoren des Subventions-Systems als Ganzes einzugehen sein. Es wird vom Industrieökonomischen Ansatz ausgegangen und das grundlegende Analyserasters „Umwelt, Marktstruktur, Marktverhalten, und Marktergebnis“-Wirkungsketten Paradigma eingesetzt. Diese Vorgehensweise ist insofern gerechtfertigt als ihr gemeinsames, vereinendes Element, das „Struktur-Verhalten-Ergebnis“-(SVE)-Paradigma, auch den zentralen Rahmen des Referenzmodells zur Messung effektiven Wettbewerbs bildet (Haas & Wallner, 2008). Das ‚SVP-Paradigma‘, das sich mit dem englischsprachigen Äquivalent übereinstimmend als ‚Structure-Conduct-Performance‘-(S-C-P)-Paradigma durchgesetzt hat, ist ein Modell aus der Industrieökonomik und bietet eine kausale volkswirtschaftlichtheoretische Erklärung für Unternehmensergebnisse durch wirtschaftliches Handeln auf unvollkommenen Märkten. Nach dem SCP-Paradigma haben die Rahmenbedingungen des Marktes direkten, kurzfristigen Einfluss auf die Marktstruktur. Diese hat wiederum direkten Einfluss auf das Marktverhalten und das Marktverhalten beeinflusst ihrerseits das Marktergebnis. Dabei treten Rückkopplungseffekte auf, so dass das Marktergebnis auch das Marktverhalten und die Marktstruktur beeinflussen kann, als auch das Marktverhalten Einfluss auf die Marktstruktur nehmen kann. Zudem wirken sich äußere Einflüsse der Ordnungen und politische Eingriffe auf die Rahmenbedingungen des Marktes, Marktstruktur, Marktverhalten und Marktergebnis aus. Mit anderen Worten: Es wird also gefragt, welchen Einfluss das FörderSystem zur Filmförderung auf den Markt für Filme in Österreich hat, wo wesentliche Leistungstreiber und Leistungsinhibitoren zu identifizieren sind, und wie das gegenwärtige Förder-System auf den effektiven Wettbewerb und das Marktergebnis einwirkt. Die Leistungsbilanz soll zudem durch internationale Fallstudien (i.e. Erfolgsmodelle geförderter Film) empirisch untermauert werden. 302

Problemfeld 3: Mediamorphose“

Traditionelle

Massenmedien

in

der

„digitalen

Problemszenario 3 setzte zunächst am von Medienökonominnen dogmenhaft vorgetragenen Problem des Marktversagens auf Medienmärkten an. Aus (medien)ökonomischer Sicht würde es viele Gründe geben, warum Austauschprozesse auf dem „freien Markt“ nicht zu einem optimalen Ergebnis führen: Öffentliche Güter, externe Effekte (Externalitäten), asymmetrische oder unvollständige Informationen, natürliche Monopole, Marktmacht und Meritorik sind die bekanntesten. Wie Ralf Dewenter und Jürgen Rösch (2015) zuletzt in ihrer wettbewerbsökonomischen Analyse von Medienmärkten aus Sicht der Theorie der zweiseitigen Märkte resümierten, gilt auch im vorliegenden Fall: „Das Vorliegen einer dieser Gründe rechtfertigt aber nicht automatisch ein staatliches Eingreifen. Sind die Externalitäten beispielsweise eher klein oder die Informationsasymmetrien nur gering ausgeprägt, sind auch die dadurch verursachten Verwerfungen gering. Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Marktes ist vielleicht (minimal) eingeschränkt, aber nicht gefährdet. Außerdem ist nicht klar, ob und wie in den Markt eingriffen werden soll. Regulatorische Maßnahmen können zu einem besseren Ergebnis führen, können die Situation aber auch verschlechtern. Ein falscher Regulierungsansatz kann schlimmere Auswirkungen auf das Marktergebnis haben, als das ursprüngliche Marktversagen“ (Dewenter & Rösch, 2015, S. 42). Theoretische Analysen betreffend die Frage, ob und aus welchen Gründen Fernsehmärkte versagen, haben gezeigt, dass das Leitmedium Fernsehen alleine aufgrund der Gutscharakteristiken als öffentliches Gut Marktversagenspotenziale aufweist. Das gilt für öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk ebenso wie für privates Pay-TV, das ein Klubgut darstellt. Hier ist Matthias Karmasin (2003) zu folgen, der ausführt, dass gerade Medienunternehmen nicht nur als ökonomische Akteure zu gelten haben, sondern auch in ihrer kulturrelevanten und gesellschaftlichen Dimension und Verantwortung zu stehen haben. „Da die Medienunternehmung „quasi-öffentliche“ Güter produziert, ist sie als genuiner Kompromiss, als (institutionalisierte) Abwägung unterschiedlicher Ansprüche aufzufassen, da sie ja öffentliche und private Güter nicht gleichzeitig im optimalen Ausmaß herzustellen vermag“ (Karmasin, 2003, S. 416).64 Beim Austausch von theoretischen Argumenten für und wider staatliches Eingreifen auf Medienmärkten ist aufgefallen, dass Fragen nach der ökonomischen, publizistischen sowie der demokratietheoretischen Legitimation des aktiven staatlichen Markteingriffs durch korrigierende Maßnahmen gerne vermischt werden. Denn staatliche Aktivität auf Medienmärkten muss danach beurteilt werden, inwieweit die Maßnahmen geeignet sind, ökonomische benachteiligte Medienunternehmen für den Wettbewerb zu stärken und Konzentrationsprozesse, die den Wettbewerb einschränken, zu verhindern (ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit). Zweitens ist mit Blick auf die publizistische Leistungsfähigkeit zu prüfen, ob staatliche Intervention dazu beiträgt, Vielfalt zu gewährleisten. Schließlich muss drittens unter demokratietheoretischen Gesichtspunkten danach gefragt werden, inwieweit gesellschaftspolitisch relevante metaökonomische Grundwerte (Freiheit, Wohlstand, Gerechtigkeit) mit einer aktiven Rolle des Staates und seiner Funktion als Bewahrer und Förderer dieser Grundwerte mit medienpolitischen Zielen (Vielfaltsförderung,

64 Ganz im Sinne des Stakeholder-Ansatzes (vgl. Freeman, 1984) ist damit auch eine Redefinition des Begriffs „Unternehmen“ im Sinne einer sozialkontraktualen Wertschöpfungsgemeinschaft möglich.

303

Qualitätsförderung) vereinbar ist, ohne dass die Grundwerte einer wirtschaftsliberalen Marktordnung (Wirtschaftliche Freiheit, Gründung und Wirtschaftswachstum, Innovation) verletzt werden. Im Hinblick auf die Herausforderungen an die Medienpolitik in der digitalen Medienwelt von heute verliert die These vom „Marktversagen“ in den klassischen Medienmärkten aber zunehmend an Gewicht. In der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ sind publizistische Leitmedien insbesondere durch neue wirtschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen herausgefordert (neue Marktspieler, geänderte Werteschöpfungs- und Kostenstrukturen, hohe Substitutionskonkurrenz unter den Inhalteanbietern, etc.). Publizistische Vielfalt sowie die demokratiepolitisch wichtige Erzielung von Öffentlichkeit sind herausgefordert (vgl. Blum et al., 2011; Wentzel, 2002). Es kann angenommen werden, dass die Hypothese eines allgemeinen Marktversagens in den privat-kommerziell organisierten Rundfunkmedien heute vollständig falsifiziert ist. In den meisten Programmsegmenten begünstigen das Eigeninteresse der Medienunternehmer und der wettbewerbliche Druck ein Programmangebot, das den Präferenzen der Zuschauer entspricht. Die Märkte funktionieren. Dies gilt sowohl für den werbefinanzierten Bereich des Free-TV als auch für das Pay-TV. Das Angebot von Pay-TV führt zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten, weil öffentliches Interesse an bestimmten Programmsegmenten, insbesondere bei LiveSportereignissen und Prämiumangeboten (Erstausstrahlung für die dritte Staffel der NetflixSerie „House of Cards“) vorhanden ist. Der Markt für Bezahlfernsehen galt jedenfalls in Deutschland lange Zeit als Musterbeispiel für Marktversagen (Woldt, 2002). Eine üppiges FreeTV Angebot konnte Zusehern lange Zeit keine Zahlungsbereitschaft entlocken. Mit der steigenden Bekanntheit von VoD-Diensten meldet Pay-TV-Angebot aber wachsende Abonnentenzahlen (Puffer, 2015). Der deutsche Pay-TV Markt gilt heute als gesund. Braucht es in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ noch öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk? Braucht es in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ noch öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk? Wenn ja, wofür? Aus den voranstehenden Argumenten folgen wichtige Leitplanken für die Rolle des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks in der digitalen Medienwelt (vgl. Krone, 2011; Lowe & Berg, 2013; Nissen, 2015; ibid., 2013; Picard & Siciliani, 2013). Seine Legitimation basiert nicht auf einem unterstellten ökonomischen Marktversagen, sondern auf der Vermutung einer unzureichenden Nachfrage nach gesellschaftlich wertvollen Medieninhalten. Die Debatte um die Rolle des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks und ihren Auftrag in einer sich rasant verändernden Medienwelt hat sich zuletzt verschärft (Berg et al., 2014; Langenbucher, 2013; Thomaß et al., 2015). Der Paradigmenwechsel ist längst vollzogen, meinen Kritiker. Die Quote gilt als Messkriterium für ein öffentlich-rechtliches Programm. Qualität wird der Quote geopfert, Einheitsbrei im Programm ist das Ergebnis. Während es für kommerzielle Anbieter in erster Linie darum geht, ihr Geschäftsmodell anzupassen, loten die öffentlich-rechtlichen Sender nach innen aus, was Digitalisierung und Medienkonvergenz für ihren Programmauftrag bedeutet (vgl. Mayer, 2013; für Österreich RTR-GmbH, 2014). Aus liberalen ordnungspolitischen Kreisen ist im Bereich des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks gar die Abschaffung der Rundfunkgebühr, eine Privatisierung der Rundfunkanstalten und eine öffentliche Förderung eines gesellschaftlich bedeutenden Programmangebotes nach Auswahl eines politikunabhängigen Gremiums diskutiert (Haucap et al., 2015). Diese Argumentation sei auch theoretisch nachvollziehbar: „Die öffentliche GutsArgumentation in Bezug auf die Notwendigkeit eines öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks stammt aus den Anfängen des Rundfunks, als es mit dem analogen Signal tatsachlich kaum möglich 304

war, Nachfrager vom Konsum auszuschliesen. Der Konsum von Rundfunkinhalten ist außerdem durch Nicht-Rivalitat gekennzeichnet. Audiovisuelle Medien, wie wir sie heutzutage nutzen, ermöglichen hingegen einen relativ einfachen Konsumausschluss über Verschlüsselungsverfahren, weshalb die obige Argumentation heute nicht mehr als Begründung eines öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks hervorgebracht werden kann (ibid., S. 29; vgl. auch Armstrong, 2005). Genau entlang dieser Schnittstelle ist nun eine Reihe von weiteren zentralen Konflikten ausgebrochen. Etwa: Was darf beispielsweise eine Online-App eines öffentlich-rechtlichen Anbieters bieten und was nicht? Welche Inhalte sollen in den Sendermediatheken des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks zu sehen sein? Wie sinnvoll ist der Ausbau von öffentlichrechtlichen Sendern zu Senderfamilien mit einer Anzahl von Nischensendern für bestimmte Zielgruppen, insbesondere junge Zuschauer? etc. Die medienpolitischen Weichenstellungen für die Zukunft werden jedenfalls von großer Bedeutung sein. Soll der öffentlich-rechtliche Rundfunk seine Angebote aus- oder abbauen? Ist eine Konkretisierung des Auftrags für den öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks von Nöten? Die Analyse der Zukunftstauglichkeit des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks in Österreich hat ergeben, dass das „Leitmedium“ Fernsehen einem Strukturwandel unterliegt, der auf neuen technologischen Entwicklungen und einem damit einhergehenden Mediennutzungswandel fußt. In Österreich steht der ORF, mit der Rolle als treibende Kraft in der Digitalisierung der Medien beauftragt, in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ auf dem Weg zum Konvergenzfernsehen vor abermals neuen Herausforderungen. Die wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen (maßgebliche Akteure der neuen Fernsehens stammen gar nicht aus der Medienwelt in engeren Sinne, hohe Produktionskosten, hohe Lizenzkosten für Sportrechte, hohe Personalkosten, Immobilien-Investitionen, etc.) erschweren die Erfüllung des Programmauftrags. Mit den Reichweitenverlusten in einer Vielkanalumgebung drohen auch der Reputationsverlust und der Verlust der Breitenwirkung. Dies führt zu Legitimationsverlusten für die Gebührenfinanzierung. Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, dass der kommunikationswissenschaftlich ausgerichtete Forschungsstand zu Fragen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zumindest aus medienökonomischer Perspektive derzeit noch eher disparat ist. Theoretische Vertiefungen zur Diagnose des Wandels des Leitmediums Fernsehen sind im Bereich der Medienökonomie jedenfalls nötig. Speziell die Diskussion um die Rolle des öffentlichrechtlichen Rundfunks im Internet ist weiterhin defizitär. Es geht um die Frage, welchen „Public Value“ die Medienökonomie in Zukunft leistet und wie eine sinnvolle Regulierung des Fernsehens in der Zukunft zu gestalten ist (vgl. Medien Journal, 2010; Gundlach, 2009; Benington & Moore, 2011; Karmasin, 2009; ibid., 2011; Lowe & Martin, 2014; Moe, 2010; ORF, 2011; Ruß-Mohl, 2013; Steininger & Woelke, 2011). In diesem Zusammenhang sei abschließend Matthias Karmasin (2012) zuzustimmen, der zum öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk als Generator von „Public Value“ folgendes meint: „Sicher: Der Beitrag des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks zur Qualität von Öffentlichkeit ist höchst relevant. Aber der öffentlich-rechtliche Rundfunk ist nicht der einzige Garant für Produktion von Public Value, denn auch andere Medien gestalten und schaffen Öffentlichkeit“ (S. 11). Und führt weiter aus: „Der Sinn von Öffentlichkeit ist mit Peters (2007, S. 59 ff.) nicht Legitimation durch Verfahren, sondern Meinungs- und Willensbildung über die Regelung der öffentlichen Angelegenheiten. Daran wirken alle, also auch kommerzielle und nicht-kommerzielle, private und öffentlichrechtliche Medien mit und daraus ergibt sich ihre besondere – und wohl auch besonders reizvolle, weil machtvolle – Stellung, aber auch ihre spezifische Verantwortung“ (ebd.). (vgl. Heinrich, 1994; ibid., 2000).

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Traditionelles Massenmedium Tageszeitung – Wege aus der Krise? Die Tageszeitung als publizistisches Leitmedium steckt in der Krise: die Haushaltsabdeckung gedruckter Zeitungen geht zurück, die Anzeigenerlöse sinken im Langzeittrend, im Internet kämpfen Tageszeitungen mit Social Media-Angeboten um die Aufmerksamkeit beim Nutzer. Wie weiter oben bereits kurz dargestellt, zeigt die vorliegende Arbeit mögliche Wege aus der Krise auf: Zunächst wird es für Print-Medien also notwendig sein, neue Erlösquellen zu erschließen. Die Debatte dreht sich immer wieder um die Frage, ob Printmedien auf Dauer eine Chance gegen digitale Informations- und Nachrichtenangebote haben. Bei der Frage nach der dauerhaften Tragfähigkeit des immer noch dominanten Mischfinanzierungsmodells der Printmedien geht es auch darum, die damit induzierte Ertragserosion zu minimieren. Daher setzen Medienunternehmen heute auf Bezahl- bzw. Paywall-Modelle im Internet. So versuchen gerade Online-Zeitungen und Zeitschriften mit Paywall-Systemen ein alternatives Geschäftsmodell zu entwickeln, das nicht oder nur zum Teil auf einer Finanzierung mittels Anzeigen basiert. Bezahlmodelle sind wiederum vielfältig (Metered paywall, Micropayment, etc.). Das Konzept der „metered paywall“ sieht zum Beispiel vor, dass ein Leser, der im Monat beim Aufruf von Online-Artikeln eine bestimmte Anzahl überschreitet, zu einer Zahlung aufgefordert wird. Micropayment bezeichnet ein Zahlungsverfahren mittels geringer Summen, die vor allem beim Kauf von „Paid Content“, also digitalen Gütern wie Musikstücken und Zeitungsartikeln eingesetzt wird. In Österreich setzen allerdings bis dato nur drei der 19 Printunternehmen Bezahlschranken für ihre Webplattformen ein, wobei auch Prämieninhalte und Dienste angeboten werden. Auf vorarlbergernachrichten.at sind Zeitungsinhalte z.B. hinter der Bezahlschranke. Mit krone.at, kurier.at und diePresse.com wird derzeit lediglich von drei weiteren Medien eine Bezahlschranke im Web angedacht. Als Argument gegen Bezahlschranken führen viele Medien ein mögliches Sinken der Reichweite und damit der Werbeerlöse an. Der Standard verfolgt mit einem für Anfang 2014 geplanten kostenpflichtigen Zugang zu einer werbefreien Online-Version einen anderen Ansatz. Viele Zeitungsverlage haben Aktivitäten jenseits der gedruckten Zeitung entwickelt, sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb journalistischer Felder. Bereits heute bedienen sie neue Geschäftsfelder, die weitestgehend unabhängig von journalistischen Inhalten sind. Hierzu gehören digitale Rubrikenmärkte und Portale für digitale Prospekte, Plattformen für Preisvergleiche oder E-Shopping, sowie Dienstleistungen wie Marketing-Support oder Consulting, Internetoder Telekommunikationsdienste und Briefdienste. Prognos (2014) gibt allerdings zu bedenken, dass sich Zeitungsverlage dann zunehmend selbst in Frage stellen müssten, je positiver sich die Aktivitäten außerhalb des Zeitungs-Kerngeschäfts entwickeln. Diversifikationserfolge würden dann eben die Legitimität des Kerngeschäfts, nämlich das journalistische Arbeiten, langfristig gefährden. Auch wenn diese Entwicklung in Österreich erst mit Verzögerung die gleiche Wucht wie in anderen Märkten entwickelt – etwa wegen langfristig angelegter Abo-Systeme oder Abfederung von Verlusten im Print-Anzeigengeschäft durch steigende öffentliche Ausgaben – sind auch hier die klassischen Erlössäulen bedroht. Es eröffnen sich über den Zugang zum digitalen Markt zwar auch Chancen auf neue Erlösströme, Medienunternehmen befinden sich derzeit noch in einem Lernprozess und in einer Umdenk- und Übergangsphase. Wolfgang Bergmann, Geschäftsführer von Der Standard Holding, die viertgrößte kostenpflichtige Tageszeitung Österreichs, die mit 62,4 Mio. Euro Umsatz im Jahr 2013 mit einem Umsatzschwund (2012: 63,2 Mio.) konfrontiert ist, gibt sich in einem Interview über die Zukunft seines Blattes kämpferisch: „Wir sind ein Medienhaus mit verlegerischer Herkunft und verlegerischer Zukunft. Wir sind ein journalistisches Produkt und unser Online-Lungenflügel ist eine relevante Diskussionsplattform der gesellschaftlichen Themen des Landes. Darum drehen sich unsere Geschäftsmodelle – wir organisieren die Werbung um unsere 306

Kernkompetenz, nicht umgekehrt. Rein kaufmännisch könnte man es wie Nokia anlegen: mit einem Wechsel von der Gummistiefel- zur Handyproduktion. Springers aktuelle digitale Plattformen haben auch vielfach nichts mehr mit Journalismus zu tun, ihr einziger Zweck ist es Geld zu verdienen.“ (Bergmann, 2014; in Horizont.at, S. 8) Ähnlich zeigt sich die Situation in Deutschland. Dort verloren die „Großen Vier“ überregionalen deutschen Tageszeitungen: Bild Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung und Die Welt massiv an Reichweite, wie aus der zuletzt veröffentlichten deutsche Media-Analyse aus dem Dezember 2014 hervorging (agma, 2014). Die Bild verlor innerhalb eines Jahres 830.000 Leser, das entspricht einem Reichweitenminus von 6,8 Prozent. Bei der FAZ sind es sogar 13,6 Prozent, in absoluten Lesern 120.000. Sinkende Auflagen und Anzeigenerlöse sowie der zunehmende Konkurrenzkampf zwischen konventionellen und neuen Medien sind Indikatoren für die Krise am Zeitungsmarkt. Apologeten der „Print ist tot“Religion haben damit frischen Stoff. Um zukünftig erfolgreich agieren zu können, müssen sich Verlage jedenfalls neu orientieren und mit der Entwicklung digitaler Marktsegmente auseinandersetzen und nach digitalen Geschäftsmodellen suchen. Das Bezahlmodell von Bild.de zeigt beispielhaft auf, wie Digital-Abos die Gratis-Kultur im Netz verdrängen können. Dass die Bezahlschwelle überwunden werden kann, zeigt eine Studie des Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2014). Demnach haben sich speziell junge und internetaffine Nutzerinnen mittlerweile daran gewöhnt, dass Qualitätsinhalte im Netz nicht kostenlos verfügbar sind. Dazu kommt, dass neue Plattformen außerhalb der klassischen Medien das Großthema „Geschäftsmodell“ als Innovationslaboratorium zur Produktdifferenzierung entdeckt haben. Nachdem sich das „Free-Konzept“ im Sinne einer Integration kostenloser Produkte und Dienstleistungen in eine Geschäftsmodell längst als das Mustermodell in der digitalen Ökonomie etabliert hat, da Internetnutzerinnen nur bedingt bereit sind, für Medieninhalte im Netz zu bezahlen, sind heute Kombinationen am Markt, die „Free“ zu einem einträglichen Geschäftsmodell machen und mit Pay-Modellen auf raffinierte Weise kombinieren (Anderson, 2009; Dogruel et al., 2014). Auch in der Schweiz setzen sinkende Werbeeinnahmen und die wachsende Konkurrenz durch Online-Medien den klassischen Zeitungsverlagen massiv zu. So konstatiert dort fög – Forschungsinstitut für Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft (2014) im zuletzt erschienen Jahrbuch zur „Qualität der Medien“ den klassischen journalistischen Berufskulturen einen rasanten Abwärtstrend für die Schweiz. Als Ursachenkomplex für Vielfalts- und Qualitätsverluste der publizistischen Massenmedien wird insbesondere „die Genese eines kommerzialisierten Mediensystems und anschließend die Krise der Geschäftsmodelle durch den Abfluss der Werbeeinnahmen vorab zu Suchmaschinen, Online-Rubriken, sozialen Netzwerken, OnlinePortalen branchenfremder Akteure und zu reichweitestarken Gratisangeboten“ (fög, 2014, S. 20) gesehen. Als Antwort auf diese „Krise der Geschäftsmodelle“ empfiehlt das fög staatliche Intervention durch Medienförderung wie sie von der Eidgenössischen Medienkommission vorgeschlagen wird (Eidgenössische Medienkommission, 2014). Konvergenzfernsehen als Triebkraft der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ Fernsehen galt lange Zeit als klassisches Qualitätsmedium im Sinne eines Leitmediums.65 Die gegenwärtig stattfindende „digitale Mediamorphose“ führt allerdings zu strukturellen

65

Folgende zusammenführende Definition von Ziemann (2011, S. 202, ohne Fußnoten) zeigt die Komplexität des Begriffs aus soziologischer Perspektive auf: “Ein Leitmedium, so lässt sich nach alledem resümieren, ist eine evolutionäre gesellschaftliche Errungenschaft, welche (a) weder teleologischer/finalistischer Art ist noch zwingend notwendig war, (b) Weltkomplexität reduziert und parallel interne Komplexität steigert, (c) bis auf

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Transformationen dieses klassischen Leitmediums: Denn mit mehr Intelligenz, Interaktion und konvergenten Infrastrukturen wird das Fernsehen von Morgen, das sogenannte internet-fähige „Konvergenzfernsehen“ (auch „Smart-TV“ oder „Connected TV“), zum Element einer neuen medialen Nutzungssituation (Przybylski, 2010; Sewczyk & Wenk, 2012; Murschetz, 2015a; ibid., 2016). Auch das interaktive Medium „Smart TV“ steht kurz vor einem Durchbruch. Doch was bedeutet das für die Fernsehbranche und ihr ursprüngliches Geschäftsmodell? Welche neuen Player drängen in die sich noch in der Herausbildung befindende neue Wertschöpfungskette? Welche neuen Geschäftsmodelle entstehen und wie wirken sie sich auf existierende Geschäftsmodelle aus? Im Markt für „Smart-TV“ sind sowohl direkte als auch indirekte Erlösmodelle zu erkennen (die medienanstalten, 2015; Kaumanns, 2013). Direkten Erlöse gruppieren sich hauptsächlich um den Verkauf von Smart TV-Geräten und Smart TVfähigen Set-Top-Boxen. Indirekte Erlösmodelle entstehen durch Provisionen für den Verkauf von Apps, die Vergabe von Lizenzen oder Provisionen für sonstige Transaktionserlöse. In der Zukunft wird mit einer ganzen Reihe von Erlösquellen experimentiert und die Marktakteure werden versuchen, unterschiedliche Erlösquellen als hybrides Modell für sich zu erschließen. In der Tat ändert sich die Fernsehnutzung (im Untersuchungsland Deutschland), und zwar weg vom zeitgebundenen linearen Fernsehen vor dem klassischen Bildschirm, hin zur zeit- und ortsunabhängigen Nutzung per Internet mit Hilfe unterschiedlichster Endgeräte wie iPad, Tablet PC oder Smartphone (die medienanstalten, 2015; ibid., 2014). Zudem stehen heute eine Reihe neuer Bewegtbildangebote über Videoplattformen wie YouTube, Video-onDemand-Angeboten (VoD) wie Maxdome oder „Over-the-Top-Diensten“ (OTT) wie Netflix zur Verfügung. Der zügige Ausbau der breitbandigen Infrastruktur treibt diese Entwicklung weiter voran. Obwohl der lineare TV-Konsum in Deutschland pro Seher noch immer bei durchschnittlich mehr als 220 Minuten am Tag liegt (Zuschauer gesamt; AGF/GfK Fernsehpanel 2015), droht privaten wie öffentlich-rechtlichen TV-Sendern ein Schwund bei den Einschaltquoten, weil immer mehr Seherinnen auf zeit- und ortsunabhängig verbreitete Programme spezialisierter Web-TV-Anbieter umsteigen. Werbefinanzierte Privatsender wie RTL und ProSieben diversifizieren ihr Geschäftsmodell ins Netz. Denn auch Werbekunden haben die Macht des bewegten Bildes im Netz erkannt und folgen den Zuschauern dorthin. Digitale Abonnements und damit direkte Erlösmodelle gelten als das zukünftige Geschäftsmodell für das Fernsehen. Im Online-Videobereich zeigt sich dieser Trend bereits deutlich. Mit Maxdome, Watchever, Netflix, Amazon und Sky konkurrieren in Deutschland inzwischen mindestens fünf Subscription Video-on-Demand-(S-VoD) Anbieter bei digitalen Video-Abonnements. Mit mehr Intelligenz, Interaktion und konvergenten Infrastrukturen wird auch das Fernsehen von Morgen, das sogenannte internet-fähige „Konvergenzfernsehen“ (auch „Smart-TV oder „Connected TV“), zum Element einer neuen medialen Nutzungssituation. Im Markt für „Smart-TV“ in Deutschland sind sowohl direkte als auch indirekte Erlösmodelle zu erkennen (Kaumanns, 2013). Direkten Erlöse gruppieren sich hauptsächlich um den Verkauf von Smart TV-Geräten und Smart TV-fähigen Set-Top-Boxen. Indirekte Erlösmodelle entstehen durch Provisionen für den Verkauf von Apps, die Vergabe von Lizenzen oder Provisionen für sonstige Transaktionserlöse. In der Zukunft wird mit einer ganzen Reihe von

Weiteres irreversible Strukturvorteile und funktionale Überlegenheit für die Lösung/Bearbeitung eines bestimmten Problems besitzt, (d) dadurch Sich erheit(en) garantiert und Vertrauen generiert, (e) aufgrund ihrer Nachhaltigkeit sowohl interne Erweiterungen bzw. Ergänzungen – einerseits technologischer Art im Modus der Pfadabhängigkeit, andererseits sozialer Art durch spezialisierte Rollenmuster und Berufsformen – als auch externe Abhängigkeiten ausbildet und forciert, (f) durch kulturelle Aneignung, Akzeptanz und Tradierung etabliert und legitimiert wird und (g) ihren Status selbst nur wiederum durch einen alternativen Prozess von Variation/Selektion/Restabilisierung verlieren kann, ohne dass vorhersehbar wäre, mit welchen gesamtgesellschaftlichen Risiken oder Gefahren und mit welchen destruktiven Struktureffekten und Ordnungsumbrüchen dies verbunden ist.“

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Erlösquellen experimentiert und die Marktakteure werden versuchen, unterschiedliche Erlösquellen als hybrides Modell für sich zu erschließen. Forschungsausblick: Hinwendung zur Spieltheorie Weitere Ergebnisse liefert eine Analyse von Wettbewerbsstrategien, die Tageszeitungen Verbesserungen der eigenen Marktposition im Wettbewerb mit der Konkurrenz ermöglichen. Nach Michael Porter‘s Konzept der „generischen Strategien“ (1980) sind grundsätzlich drei Ausrichtungen denkbar: die Kostenführerschaft, die Differenzierung sowie die Schwerpunktbildung. Erstere impliziert für Zeitungsverlage Kostenvorteile gegenüber der Konkurrenz zu erwirtschaften. Diese lassen sich z.B. durch eine Ausweitung des Verbreitungsgebietes der Zeitung erzielen. Kostenführerschaft ist problematisch, da die Auflage dabei gesamtheitlich erhöht werden muss, um in den Genuss von Fixkostendegressionen zu kommen. Dies widerspricht Anstrengungen im inhaltlichqualitativen Bereich und in der verstärkten Regionalisierung der Inhalte. Das ist der Grund, weshalb Verlage zunehmend auf Differenzierung auf einzelne Produktsegmente setzen. In vorliegender Arbeit wird in Anlehnung an die mikroökonomische Tradition der Medienökonomie angeregt, wettbewerbstheoretische Fragen aus der Sicht der Spieltheorie zu untersuchen (Camerer, 2003; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1989). Spieltheoretische Erklärungsansätze zu wettbewerblichem Verhalten sind in der Medienökonomie bislang noch selten (Gal-Or & Dukes, 2003). Dies zu Unrecht, da spieltheoretische Modelle dafür geeignet sind, die Lücke zwischen dem perfekt-rationalen Ansatz der traditionellen Medienökonomik (i.e. dem Modell des ‚homo oeconomicus‘ als Nutzenmaximierer folgend) und dem strategische Aspekte berücksichtigen pragmatisch-rationalen Ansatz der Gewinnmaximierung zu schließend (Murschetz, 2015b). Die Spieltheorie ist für Analysen der wettbewerblichen Auseinandersetzung bestens geeignet, da sie eine Theorie der sozialen Interaktion von rationalen Akteuren ist (Behnke, 2013). Ein mögliches Experiment eines duopolitischen Wettbewerbs zwischen zwei direkten Rivalen aus dem Tageszeitungssektor nach dem (einfachen) spieltheoretischen Modell des Gefangenendilemmas würde aufzeigen, dass einseitige Preis- noch Qualitätsdifferenzierungsansätze kaum zum erhofften Markterfolg führen müssen. Stattdessen zeigt sich, dass sich die beiden Spieler besser „vereinbaren“ und „Abmachungen“ treffen anstatt „blinden“, das heißt unabgestimmten und das Verhalten der Konkurrenz nicht berücksichtigenden Preis- und Qualitätswettbewerb zu betreiben. Spieltheoretische Modell-Designs lassen sich auf beliebige Beispiele in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ anwenden, beispielweise bei der geplanten Einführung von Bezahlschranken. Verschließen die Konkurrenten ihre Inhalte hinter Bezahlwänden, dann würden sie auf substanzielle Werbeeinnahmen verzichten. Gleichzeitig bestünde die Hoffnung, dass die Nutzerinnen reichlich Abos abschlössen, um qualitativ gute Inhalte zu bekommen. Sollte ein Anbieter ohne Absprache des Anderen auf ein kostenpflichtiges Modell umstellen, würde der Konkurrent gewinnen und Leser wie Werbeeinnahmen abziehen. Damit ist die Ausgangssituation hergestellt: Keiner installiert Bezahlinhalte, und die finanzielle Situation bleibt für beide prekär.

Problemfeld 4: Interaktivität neuer Medien als Treiber der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen zu diesem Problemfeld war, dass interaktiven Medien eine ideale Projektionsfläche für Hoffnungen auf Alternativen zur Kommerzialisierung von Massenmedien bieten würde (Olson, 2013; Winter, 2010). Interaktive Medien, so das 309

Desiderat, sollten die vielkritisierte Dominanz der Massenmedien in der allgemeinen Gegenwartsbeschreibung durchbrechen (Schrape, 2011), neuartige Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten bieten (Wehner, 1997), und emanzipatorische Potenziale für mehr und andere Öffentlichkeit(en) freilegen (Imhof, 2006; Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010; Sutter, 2010). Im Rahmen der Kontextualisierung durch die „digitale Mediamorphose“ bzw. den digitalen Medienwandel erhält der durch Interaktivität angetriebene, behauptete Wandel der Medienkommunikation von einseitigen Massenmedien zu vernetzten, interaktiven und sozialen Medien weitere Brisanz, was Tilmann Sutter (2010) berechtigter Weise folgende Feststellung entrang: „Vor allem bedingt der Wandel der medialen Form von einseitiger Massenkommunikation zu vernetzter Kommunikation im Internet einen Wandel des Publikums: vom passiven, auf Distanz gehaltenen Rezipienten zum aktiven Nutzer, der nicht nur empfangen und rezipieren, sondern auch senden und gestalten kann. Unter dem Einfluss dieses Medienwandels stellt sich die Frage, ob man bei der Analyse neuer Formen der Medienkommunikation im Bereich des Internet das hergebrachte Begriffsinstrumentarium überdenken und neu sortieren muss. Zur Diskussion steht, ob man die neuen Möglichkeiten der Kommunikation im Netz mit traditionellen Begriffen von Kommunikation und Interaktion, aber auch von Massenkommunikation noch angemessen beschreiben kann“ (S. 84). Die hier interessierende Frage, ob „interaktive“ Medien eine Alternative zur Kommerzialisierung der Massenmedien darstellen würde, legte es nahe, zunächst den Begriff „Interaktivität“ einer näheren Untersuchung aus Sicht der Medienökonomie zu unterwerfen. Wie, so lautete die Frage, ist Interaktivität aus medienökonomischer Sicht in Form des Angebots neuer Medien(inhalte und -technologien) theoretisch zu erfassen? Die Beschäftigung mit dem unscharfen wie gleichermaßen gehaltvollen Begriff Interaktivität ergab, dass dieser vorteilhafterweise als mehrdimensionales Konstrukt zu bestimmen ist. In Übereinstimmung mit Forschungsergebnissen aus der kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Interaktivitätsforschung, waren im vorliegenden Zusammenhang daher folgende drei zentrale Dimensionen von Interaktivität identifiziert worden (Heeter, 1989; Rafaeli, 1988; Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997): die Kombination aus technischer Apparatur, dem Setting der Kommunikation und der psychischen Struktur der Beteiligten tragen, je nach Ausprägung, zu Interaktivität von Medien bei. Diesem Ansatz ist zu entnehmen, dass es vorteilhaft ist, Interaktivität aus einer multi-dimensionalen Perspektive zu betrachten, um Innovationsprozesse nicht ausschließlich als technische, sondern einschließlich der beteiligten Akteure, also dem „sozialen Faktor“ zu analysieren. Es geht also vor allem darum, keinem einseitigen Technikdeterminismus zu verfallen und den Einfluss digitaler Medientechnologien auf den Medienwandel mit anderen Triebkräften des Wandels zu verbinden (Hartmann & Wimmer, 2011; Gillespie et al., 2014). Medien-Interaktivität ist nur als soziales Konstrukt zu verstehen. „Die Technik bestimmt Geschwindigkeit, Reichweite, Flexibilität und sensorische Komplexität der Kommunikation. Das Setting ist bestimmt durch soziale Präsenz bzw. Abwesenheit und wechselseitige Bezugnahme von ausgetauschten Informationen oder Botschaften, die so genannte third-order-dependency (Rafaeli, 1988; Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997). Der Wahrnehmungsaspekt betrifft die subjektiven Wahrnehmungen von Technik und Setting, die Telepräsenz und die Simulation von Nähe zunehmend bewusst machen und inkorporieren“, erklären Christoph Bieber und Claus Leggewie dazu (ibid., 2004, S. 2). Die kommunikationswissenschaftlich geleitete Medienökonomie hat den Begriff „Interaktivität“ jedenfalls erst sehr spät aufgegriffen. Ist der Begriff schon in der Kommunikationswissenschaft wenig bestimmt (Neuberger, 2007), fehlen begriffliche Auseinandersetzungen im Teilgebiet der Medienökonomie fast vollständig (Ausnahme bilden: Gerpott, 2004; Gerpott & Wanke, 2004; Leiner & Quiring, 2008; Murschetz, 2011; Neuberger, 2007; Quiring & Schweiger, 2006; Quiring, 2007; Stark, 2013a). Welche realen Ergebnisse 310

Medien-Interaktivität in medienwirtschaftlichen Anwendungsszenarien liefert, war erklärtes Ergebnisziel der vorliegenden Arbeit in diesem Problemfeld. Zwei Teilaspekte wurden im Detail fokussiert: 1. Die Rolle der Transaktionskosten bei Prozessen der interaktiven Wertschöpfung, die durch unternehmerische Aktivitäten der Kundenaktivierung, und 2. die Rolle des Interaktivitätskonzepts als Instrument der betrieblichen Führungskommunikation. Triangulation aus mehreren Quellen belegt, dass Online-Interaktivität nachweislich positive Effekte auf die Senkung von Transaktionskosten hat. Medienvermittelte Online-Interaktivität ermöglicht Einsparungen in Informationsbeschaffung, Anbahnung, Vereinbarung, Abwicklung und Kontrolle von Marktaustauschprozessen. Interaktive Anwendungen erweitern zudem die Produktpalette, fügen neue Inhalte-Channels an, um Kunden zu integrieren. Interaktivität führt zu gemeinsamen Wertschöpfungsaktivitäten zw. Produzenten, Händlern und Kunden. Dynamische Anpassungen an Kundenwünsche erhöhen die Loyalität zur Marke des Herstellers, vor allem in Prozessen der „offenen Innovation“, also in Prozessen der Öffnung von Innovationsprozessen von Organisationen (Digmayr & Jacobs, 2013; Reichwald & Piller, 2009). Auch Forschung im Bereich Führungskommunikation hat ergeben, dass Medienmanager interaktive Kommunikationsinstrumente zur Steigerung von Führungseffizienz einsetzen. Forschungsausblick: Konzeptionelle Präzisierung, Modellbildung und Fallstudienanalyse In Summe gesehen muss gesagt werden, dass der Weg für den ökonomisch-effizienten und sozial-effektiven Einsatz von „Medien-Interaktivität“ noch ein weiter ist. Hier ist jedenfalls kommunikationswissenschaftliche Forschung von Nöten, die sich verstärkt dem Feld der „Medien-Interaktivität“ als zentraler Treiber von sozialen Kommunikationsprozessen in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zuwendet (Stark, 2013a; Sutter, 2010). Wie oben ausführlich dargestellt, gilt „Medien-Interaktivität“ als Grundeigenschaft digitaler Medien und wird in Anlehnung an die dominante wissenschaftliche Meinung in dreifacher Weise definiert: (1) als Eigenschaft (digitaler) Medientechnologie, (2) als kommunikativ-interpersonalen Prozess von Nutzerinnen mit dem Ziel sozialer Interaktion, und (3) als Wahrnehmungsprozess in Form erhöhter Kontrollwahrnehmung durch Nutzerinnen-Partizipation. Aus Sicht der Medienökonomie ergibt sich eine weitere Forschungsperspektive im Feld der Interaktivitätsforschung. Im Kern geht es darum, die Effekte medienvermittelter Interaktivität an den Kommunikationserfolgen evidenzbasiert messbar zu machen. Denn zu überprüfen gilt, dass der mit Interaktivität beschriebene Medienwandel nicht nur auf der Seite der medial eröffneten Möglichkeiten, sondern auch auf der Seite der von den Nutzerinnen wahrgenommenen und realisierten Umgangsweisen beschrieben werden muss und nur auf Basis dieser nachweisbaren Nutzungserfolge auch Kommunikationserfolge über interaktive Medien evident werden. Es gilt hier Tilmann Sutter’s (2010) Position zu unterstützen: „Es führt nicht weiter, den in vielen Bereichen der Medienforschung gepflegten Medienzentrismus mit dem Fokus auf die mediale Formproblematik bei der Analyse von Interaktivität fortzuführen. Aber auch die Dimension der Mediennutzung allein reicht nicht aus, um den Medienwandel angemessen zu erfassen. Es kommt darauf an, beide Seiten zu berücksichtigen, ein Desiderat, das mittlerweile in zunehmendem Maße gesehen wird (S. 97)“. Erste Ansätze in Richtung Erfolgsmessung von Angeboten „interaktiver“ Medien sind mit dem „Outcome Interactivity Theory“-Modell von Jim Gleason (2009) zu erkennen. Zusammen mit Gleason (USA, Kentucky University) unternimmt der Autor der vorliegenden Schrift den Versuch, Interaktivitätspotentiale von Online-Zeitungen zur Erzielung strategischer 311

Wettbewerbsvorteile auf elektronischen Informationsmärkten aus Sicht der kommunikationswissenschaftlichen geprägten Medienökonomie zu untersuchen und nachweislich zu messen (Gleason & Murschetz, 2016). Zentrales Forschungsziel ist damit die Analyse von Wirkungspotentialen von Interaktivitätsangeboten auf die Geschäftsstrategie und den Geschäftserfolg von traditionellen Print-Zeitungsverlagen, deren Erlösmodelle in der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ unter starken Veränderungsdruck geraten sind. Es ist heute wichtiger denn je, klar zu verstehen, auf welche Weise Leserinnen Online-Inhalte konsumieren (bzw. klare Präferenzmuster etablieren), als auch Analysen durchzuführen, wie dieser Prozess sich vom Nachrichten-Konsum über die traditionellen Quellen wie Printzeitungen und Rundfunkmedien unterscheidet. Auf Basis des Erklärungsmodells der „OutcomeInteractivity“-Theory (Gleason, 2009) sollen Regionalzeitungsmärkte in USA und Österreich verglichen werden, um Merkmalsausprägungen von Interaktivität auf die Nachfrage von qualitativ hochwertigen Inhalten auf die Online-Leserschaft zu messen. Ergebnisse dieser Studie dienen dem Vergleich von möglichen Kulturunterschieden im Konsum sowie Differenzen in der Wahrnehmung des nutzenstiftenden Potenzials von „interaktiven“ Medien zwischen amerikanischen und europäischen Online-Konsumentinnen. Daraus sollen Empfehlungen an das Zeitungsmanagement abgeleitet werden. Abschließend lässt sich festhalten, dass es nicht an Anschluss- und Verwendungsmöglichkeiten mangelt, eine kommunikationswissenschaftlich ausgerichtete Theorie der Medienökonomie mit Themen der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ zu vermitteln. Matthias Karmasin hält folgendes fest: „Evidenzbasiert lässt sich mittlerweile festhalten, dass sich mediale Nutzungspraktiken geändert haben, dass die Durchdringung der Gesellschaft mit Medien durch die Verbreitung von mobilen und konvergenten Endgeräten sich intensiviert hat und dass Medien via Social Media (via Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagramm) in die Alltags- und Lebenswelt sowie durch Prozesse der Konvergenz und Komprimierung auch in die Produktionsprozesse (Industrie 4.0) integriert werden“ (Karmasin, 2015, S. 11). In der „digitalen Mediamorphose“ entwickelt sich also eine neue soziale Infrastruktur globaler Reichweite mit weitreichenden Folgen für die Informations- und Kommunikationsbedingungen von Individuen und Gesellschaft, für Alltagskulturen und Demokratie heraus. Es ist dies ein Wandel, der vielmehr das Ergebnis längerer Such- und Neustrukturierungsprozesse sein wird, die durch eine Vielzahl aufeinander bezogener technologischer und sozioökonomischer Veränderungen geprägt werden (vgl. Dolata, 2011). Ich halte an der Grundhypothese der Interpretation fest, dass eine angemessene Analyse der gegenwärtig stattfindenden dynamischen Prozesse von digitalem Medienwandel – auf der allgemeinsten Ebene ihrer Grundorientierungen – kaum differenziertere Anstöße erfahren kann als durch Medienökonomie.

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