Aëtiana V: An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita with a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts, Part 3. Book 4 Text and Commentary, Book 5 Text and Commentary 9789004428362

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Aëtiana V: An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita with a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts, Part 3. Book 4 Text and Commentary, Book 5 Text and Commentary
 9789004428362

Table of contents :
‎Contents
‎Sigla and Abbreviations
‎User’s Guide to the Edition and Commentary
‎Aetius Placita Book 4 Psychology: Text and Commentary
‎Introduction to Book 4
‎Liber 4 Titulus et index
‎Liber 4 ⟨Proœmium⟩
‎Liber 4 Caput 1
‎Liber 4 Caput 2
‎Liber 4 Caput 3
‎Liber 4 Caput 4
‎Liber 4 Caput 5
‎Liber 4 Caput 6
‎Liber 4 Caput 7
‎Liber 4 Caput 7a
‎Liber 4 Caput 8
‎Liber 4 Caput 9
‎Liber 4 Caput 10
‎Liber 4 Caput 11
‎Liber 4 Caput 12
‎Liber 4 Caput 13
‎Liber 4 Caput 14
‎Liber 4 Caput 15
‎Liber 4 Caput 16
‎Liber 4 Caput 17
‎Liber 4 Caput 18
‎Liber 4 Caput 19
‎Liber 4 Caput 20
‎Liber 4 Caput 21
‎Liber 4 Caput 22
‎Liber 4 Caput 23
‎Aetius Placita Book 5 Physiology: Text and Commentary
‎Introduction to Book 5
‎Liber 5 Titulus et index
‎Liber 5 Caput 1
‎Liber 5 Caput 2
‎Liber 5 Caput 3
‎Liber 5 Caput 4
‎Liber 5 Caput 5
‎Liber 5 Caput 6
‎Liber 5 Caput 7
‎Liber 5 Caput 8
‎Liber 5 Caput 9
‎Liber 5 Caput 10
‎Liber 5 Caput 11
‎Liber 5 Caput 12
‎Liber 5 Caput 13
‎Liber 5 Caput 14
‎Liber 5 Caput 15
‎Liber 5 Caput 16
‎Liber 5 Caput 17
‎Liber 5 Caput 18
‎Liber 5 Caput 19
‎Liber 5 Caput 20
‎Liber 5 Caput 21
‎Liber 5 Caput 22
‎Liber 5 Caput 23
‎Liber 5 Caput 24
‎Liber 5 Caput 25
‎Liber 5 Caput 26
‎Liber 5 Caput 27
‎Liber 5 Caput 28
‎Liber 5 Caput 29
‎Liber 5 Caput 30

Citation preview

PART 3

Aëtiana V Part 3

Philosophia Antiqua A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy

Editorial Board F.A.J. de Haas (Leiden) K.A. Algra (Utrecht) J. Mansfeld (Utrecht) C.J. Rowe (Durham) D.T. Runia (Melbourne) Ch. Wildberg (Princeton)

Previous Editors J.H. Waszink† W.J. Verdenius† J.C.M. Van Winden†

volume 153/3

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/pha

Aëtiana V An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita with a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts part 3 Book 4 Text and Commentary Book 5 Text and Commentary

Edited by

Jaap Mansfeld David T. Runia

LEIDEN | BOSTON

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/96042463

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. ISSN 0079-1687 ISBN 978-90-04-42838-6 (hardback, set) ISBN 978-90-04-42840-9 (e-book) ISBN 978-90-04-42834-8 (hardback, part 1)

ISBN 978-90-04-42835-5 (hardback, part 2) ISBN 978-90-04-42836-2 (hardback, part 3) ISBN 978-90-04-42837-9 (hardback, part 4)

Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Part 1 Preface ix Sigla and Abbreviations General Introduction

xii 1

Book 1 The Principles of Nature: Text and Commentary

101

Part 2 Sigla and Abbreviations

ix

User’s Guide to the Edition and Commentary

719

Book 2 Cosmology: Text and Commentary

727

Book 3 Meteorology and the Earth: Text and Commentary

1129

Part 3 Sigla and Abbreviations

ix

User’s Guide to the Edition and Commentary

1347

Book 4 Psychology: Text and Commentary 1355 Introduction to Book 4 1357 Title and Index 1366 Proœmium 1372 1 On the Rising of the Nile 1374 2 On the Soul 1393 3 Whether the Soul Is a Body and What Its Substance Is 1421 4 On the Parts of Soul 1449 5 On the Regent Part and in Which Part of the Body It Is Found 6 On the Motion of Soul 1495

1473

vi

contents

7 7a 8 9 10 11

On the Indestructibility of Soul 1503 On Intellect 1526 On Sensation and Sense-Objects 1537 Whether Sensations and Impressions Are True 1560 How Many Senses There Are 1583 How the Sensation and the Conception and the Reason That Is Internally Placed Occur 1591 In What Respect Impression, Impressor, Imagination, Figment Are Different 1610 On Sight, How We See 1621 On Reflections in Mirrors 1652 Whether Darkness Is Visible 1663 On Hearing 1673 On Smelling 1679 On Tasting 1683 On Voice 1688 Whether Voice Is Incorporeal and How Echo Occurs 1703 How the Soul Comes To Be Sentient and What Its Regent Part Is 1711 On Respiration 1720 On Bodily Affections and Whether the Soul Experiences Pain along with These 1731

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Book 5 Physiology: Text and Commentary 1739 Introduction to Book 5 1741 Title and Index 1754 1 On Divination 1759 2 How Dreams Occur 1772 3 What the Substance of the Semen Is 1784 4 Whether the Semen Is a Body 1796 5 Whether Females Too Release Semen 1803 6 How the Conceptions Occur 1812 7 How Males and Females Are Engendered 1817 8 How Monstrosities Occur 1830 9 Why a Woman, Although Frequently Having Intercourse, Does Not Conceive 1837 10 How Twins and Triplets Occur 1844 11 Where Resemblances to Parents or Ancestors Come From 1851 12 How It Occurs That Those Who Are Born Resemble Others and Not Their Parents 1861 13 How It Happens That Women Are Infertile and Men Without Offspring 1868

contents

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

vii

Why Female Mules Are Infertile 1876 Whether the Embryo Is a Living Being 1883 How Embryos Are Nourished 1897 What Is Fully Formed First in the Womb 1904 Why Seven-Month Babies Are Viable 1914 On the Birth of Living Beings, How They Were Born as Living Beings and Whether They Are Perishable 1934 How Many Kinds of Living Beings There Are and Whether They All Possess Sense-Perception and Reason 1948 In What Length of Time Living Beings Are Formed When They Are in the Womb 1958 Out of What Elements Each of the Generic Parts in Us Consists 1968 When and How a Human Being Commences Maturity 1978 How Sleep and Death Occur 1989 Whether Sleep and Death Pertain to the Soul or the Body 1998 How Plants Grew and Whether They Are Living Beings 2008 On Nourishment and Growth 2022 From Where the Appetites Arise in Living Beings, and Also Pleasures 2029 How Fever Occurs and Whether It Is an After-Symptom 2035 On Health and Disease and Old Age 2043

Part 4 English Translation of the Placita 2059 User’s Guide to the English Translation 2061 Book 1 The Principles of Nature 2063 Book 2 Cosmology 2089 Book 3 Meteorology and the Earth 2108 Book 4 Psychology 2120 Book 5 Physiology 2137 Appendix: List of Chapter Headings in the Translation of Qusṭā ibn Lūqā 2153 Bibliography 2158 Index of Primary and Secondary Witnesses 2283 Index of Name-Labels and Other Names 2291 Index of Fragment Collections and Extant Sources 2296 Index of Ancient and Modern Names 2309

Sigla and Abbreviations 1

Abbreviations Relating to Aëtius and His Tradition

A Ach AD Ath C E G J L Nem Nic P Ps Q (or Qusṭā) S T

Aëtius Achilles Arius Didymus Athenagoras Cyril of Alexandria Eusebius ps.Galen ps.Justin Ioannes Lydus Nemesius Nicolaus, translator of ps.Galen ps.Plutarch, Placita philosophorum and his tradition (EGQ etc.) Psellus Qusṭā ibn Lūqā Ioannes Stobaeus Theodoret of Cyrrhus

2

Sigla Relating to the Apparatus Criticus of the Edition

a

Primary Witnesses

P PP PB

tradition of ps.Plutarch papyrus, edited by J.W. Barns and H. Zilliacus (1960–1967), The Antinoopolis Papyri Parts II & III, London Byzantine manuscripts Family Manuscript Date I Mosquensis 339 12th century II Marcianus 521 13th/14th century III (Planudean family) α Ambrosianus 859 shortly before 1296 Α Parisinus 1671 1296 γ Vaticanus 139 shortly after 1296 Ε Parisinus 1672 shortly after 1302 Laur. Laurentianus 31,37 14th century

x PB

PPh

PAth PE PG

PG(Nic) PJ

PJln PC PL PQ

PSch PPs

sigla and abbreviations Plutarchi Epitome, edited by H. Diels (1879 and unaltered reprints), Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, 273–444; also edited by J. Mau (1971), Plutarchus Placita Philosophorum, Plutarchi Moralia Vol. 5.2.1, X oratorum vitae; Placita philosophorum, Leipzig (Bibliotheca Teubneriana); edited by G. Lachenaud (1993), Plutarque Œuvres morales T. 12.2, Opinions des Philosophes, Paris (Collection Budé); (for earlier editions see below §4 Works frequently cited) Philo of Alexandria, edited by J.-B. Aucher (1822), Philonis Judaei sermones tres hactenus inediti, I. et II. De Providentia et III. De animalibus, ex Armena versione antiquissima ab ipso originali textu Graeco ad verbum stricte exequuta, nunc in Latium (sic!) fideliter translati, Venice; see also M. HadasLebel (1973), De Providentia I et II, Les œuvres de Philon d’Alexandrie 35, Paris Athenagoras, edited by M. Marcovich (1990), Athenagoras Legatio pro Christianis, Berlin (abbr. Leg.) Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica, edited by K. Mras (1956), Eusebius Werke, Bd. VIII, Die Praeparatio Evangelica, 1982–19832, Vol. 2, Berlin (abbr. PE) Ps.Galen Historia philosopha, edited by H. Diels (1879 and later unaltered reprints), Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, 595–648 (abbr. HPh); partially edited by M. Jas (2018a), Nicolaus Rheginus als Übersetzer der pseudo-Galenischen Schrift De historia philosopha: ein Beitrag zur lateinischen Überlieferung des Corpus Galenicum, Wiesbaden text of PG based on 1341 Latin translation of Nicolaus of Rhegium Ps.Justinus Cohortatio ad Graecos, edited by M. Marcovich (1990), PseudoIustinus, Cohortatio ad Graecos, De monarchia, Oratio ad Graecos, Berlin; edited by C. Riedweg (1994), Ps.-Justin (Markell von Ankyra?) Ad Graecos de vera religione (bisher “Cohortatio ad Graecos”), 2 Vols., Basel Julianus Arianista, edited by D. Hagedorn (1973), Der Hiobkommentar des Arianers Julian, Berlin Cyrillus Contra Julianum, edited by C. Riedweg (2015), Kyrill von Alexandrien I Gegen Julian, Berlin (abbr. Juln.) Ioannes Lydus De mensibus, edited by R. Wuensch (1898), Ioannis Laurentii Lydi Liber de mensibus, Leipzig (abbr. Mens.) Qusṭā ibn Lūqā Arabic translation of ps.Plutarch Placita philosophorum, edited by H. Daiber (1980), Aetius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung, Wiesbaden Scholia Platonica, edited by G.C. Greene (1938), Haverford PA Michael Psellus De omnifaria doctrina, edited by L.G. Westerink (1948), Utrecht (abbr. Omn.Doctr.); other works: Michaelis Pselli Oratoria minora (abbr. Or.Min.), edited by A.R. Littlewood (1985), Leipzig; Michaelis Pselli Theologica, Vol. 1 (abbr. Op.Theol. 1), edited by P. Gautier (1989), Leipzig;

sigla and abbreviations

xi

Michaelis Pselli Philosophica minora, Vol. 1: Opuscula logica, physica, allegorica, alia, Leipzig (abbr. Phil.Min. 1), edited by J.M. Duffy (1992), Leipzig; Michaelis Pselli Philosophica minora, Vol. 2 Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica (abbr. Phil.Min. 2), edited by D.J. O’Meara (1989), Leipzig; Michaelis Pselli Theologica, Vol. 2 (abbr. Op.Theol. 2), edited by Westerink, L.G.–Duffy, J.M. (2002), Leipzig; Ἐπιλύσεις ποικίλων ἐρωτημάτων, Michael Psellus De operatione daemonum cum notis Gaulmini: accedunt inedita opuscula Pselli (abbr. Epi.), edited by J.F. Boissonade (1838), Nuremberg (repr. Amsterdam 1964) PSy Symeon Seth Conspectus rerum naturalium, edited by A. Delatte (1939), Anecdota Atheniensia et alia, T. 2: Textes relatifs à l’histoire des sciences, Liège (abbr. CRN) PTz Ioannes Tzetzes Exegesis in Homeri Iliadem, edited by G. Hermann (1812) in Draconis Stratonicensis Liber de metris poeticis; Ioannis Tzetzes Exegesis in Homeri Iliadem, Leipzig; Ἐξήγησις Ἰωάννου Γραμματικοῦ τοῦ Τζέτζου εἰς τὴν Ὁμήρου Ἰλιάδα, edited by M. Papathomopoulos (2007), Athens PArs Arsenius Paroemiographus Apothegmata, edited by E.L. von Leutsch (1851), Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum, Vol. 2, Göttingen (repr. Hildesheim 1958), 240–744 S Ioannes Stobaeus Eclogae, edited by C. Wachsmuth (1884 and unaltered reprints), Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores qui inscribi solent Eclogae physicae et ethicae, 2 Vols., Berlin (abbr. Ecl.), with the following sigla: Manuscripts Date F Farnesinus III D 15 14th century P Parisinus 2129 15th century L Laurentianus 8.22 14th century Ioannes Stobaeus Florilegium, edited by O. Hense (1894–1916 and unaltered reprints), Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo posteriores, 3 Vols., Berlin (abbr. Flor.) (for ch. 5.30) SL-ind index in ms. Laurentianus (where deviates from title in text), edited by C. Wachsmuth (1882), Studien zu den griechischen Florilegien, Berlin, pp. 5– 37 . . SP(m s ) manus secunda, where Wachsmuth has P2, e.g. at Ecl. 1.24.2d SPhot index of Photius, edited by R. Henry (1960 and unaltered reprints), Photius Bibliothèque, Vol. 2, Paris SCod.Vat. codex Vaticanus gr. 201 (according to Wachsmuth 1882, 71 derived from F) SCod.Mon. codex Monacensis gr. 396 (also named codex Augustinus, according to Wachsmuth 1882, 71 derived from F) T Theodoretus, edited by J. Raeder (1904), Theodoreti Graecarum Affectionum Curatio, Leipzig (abbr. CAG)

xii

sigla and abbreviations

In principle the manuscripts of all witnesses except PB and S are not cited; significant variation between manuscript readings is expressed through numbers, e.g. PG1, PG2 etc. b Ach

Secondary Witnesses

Achilles, edited by G. Di Maria (1996), Achillis quae feruntur astronomica et in Aratum opuscula: De universo, De Arati vita, De Phaenomenorum interpretatione, Palermo Aratus/Aratea Commentaria in Aratum, edited by E. Maass (1898), Commentariorum in Aratum reliquiae, Berlin. Anonymus I, pp. 87–98 (abbr. Anon. I); Anonymus II 1, pp. 102–133 (abbr. Anon. II); Ath Athenagoras Legatio, edited by M. Marcovich (1990), Athenagoras Legatio pro Christianis, Berlin (abbr. Leg.); (2000) Athenagorae qui fertur De resurrectione mortuorum, Leiden (abbr. de Res.) Epiphanius Epiphanius Ancoratus und Panarion, edited by K. Holl–H. Lietzmann (1915–1933), 3 Vols., Leipzig (citing 3rd ed. 1985–2013) Hermias Hermias Satire des philosophes païens, edited by R.P.C. Hanson (1993), SC 388, Paris Isidore of Pelusium Isidore de Péluse Lettres (nos. 1214–1700), edited by P. Évieux (1997–2000), SC 422, 454, Paris; MPG Vol. 78, edited by F. Morel (1638) Nem Nemesius, edited by M. Morani (1987), Nemesii Emeseni De natura hominis, Leipzig (abbr. NH) Ps.Justinus see above (a) Primary witnesses Scholia in Aratum Scholia in Aratum vetera, edited by J. Martin, Stuttgart 1974; Prolegomena (in Parisino Suppl.Gr. 607A servata), pp. 23–31 (abbr. Proleg.); Scholia in Aratum, pp. 37–527 Scholia in Basilium Scholia in Basilii Hexaemeron I, edited by G. Pasquali (1910) ‘Doxographica aus Basiliosscholien’, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, phil.-hist.Kl. (1910) 194–228 (reprinted in Scritti Filologici, Vol. 1 (Florence 1986) 539–574); Scholia in Basilii Hexaemeron II, edited by Th. Poljakov (1982–1983), ‘The unpublished doxographical scholia on St. Basil’s Hexaemeron’, Revue d’Histoire des Textes 12–13: 1982–1983, pp. 367–369

sigla and abbreviations

3

Latin Abbreviations in the Apparatus Criticus (and Elsewhere)

⟨⟩ {} x] y ][ ̣ (sub lineam) *** ~ ♦

abiud. add. ad fin. adn. al. ap. app. append. Byz. c., cc. cf. confirm. coni. conl. contam. corr. c.q. crit. crucif. dub. duce ed. edd. emend. exh. fort. fr. gloss. hab. i.q.

litterae additae litterae deletae x lectio omnium testium sola y excepta (app. crit.) litterae qui non extant (papyri) litterae dubiae (papyri) lacuna approximat, aequivalet lemma per hypothesin abiudicavit addidit ad finem adnotatio aliter apud apparatus appendix Byzantinum caput, capita confer confirmat coniecit conlato contaminatus correxit/corrector casu quo criticus crucifixit dubitanter, dubitat primus editor, editio editores emendavit exhibet, exhibuit fortasse fragmentum, fragmenta glossa, glossema habet, habent idem quod

xiii

xiv ind. init. inv. l., ll. lac. leg. mal. marg. ms., mss. n., nn. om. p., pp. pap. paraphr. per litt. prob. proœm. prop. put. recc. reiec. rest. ret. schol. sc. scr. sec. secl. seqq. sim. s.l. subst. suppl. susp. s.v. t. t.a.q. tit. t.p.q. transcr.

sigla and abbreviations indicavit initium invertit linea, lineae lacuna legit, legunt maluit margo, in margine manuscriptum, manuscripta nota, notae omittit, omisit pagina, paginae papyrus paraphrasit per litteras probat, probavit proœmium proposuit putat, putavit recentiores reiecit restituit retinuit scholion scilicet scripsit secundum seclusit et sequentia simile, similia supra lineam substituit supplevit suspicit sub voce tomus terminus ante quem titulus terminus post quem transcribit

sigla and abbreviations transp. verb. verisim. vert. ut vid. vid. v.l. Voss.

4

xv

transposuit verbum, verba verisimiliter vertit ut videtur vide varia lectio mss. Vossii in bibliotheca Lugd.Bat.

Works Frequently Cited

This section lists authors and works that are cited by name of the author in the apparatus criticus. (Full details on editions and collections of fragments cited in the first apparatus below the Greek text are to be found in the Bibliography in Part four.) Beck Bollack Canter Corsinus Coxon

Daiber Diels DG Diels PPF Diels VS DK, Vors. Gemelli Marciano

C.D. Beck (1787), Plutarchi De Physicis philosophorum decretis libri quinque, Leipzig J. Bollack (1969), Empédocle. Vol. II: Les Origines. Édition et traduction des fragments et des témoignages, Paris W. Canter (1575), Ioannis Stobaei Eclogarum libri duo, Antwerp E. Corsinus (1750), Plutarchi De placitis philosophorum libri V, Florence A.H. Coxon, (1986), The Fragments of Parmenides. A Critical Text with Introduction and Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary, Assen (revised and expanded edition with new translation by R. McKirahan, and new preface by M. Schofield, Las Vegas, 2009) H. Daiber (1980), Aetius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung, Wiesbaden H. Diels (1879 and unaltered reprints), Doxographi Graeci, Berlin H. Diels (1901a), Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta, Berlin H. Diels (1903), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 1st edition, Berlin H. Diels and W. Kranz (1951–1952 and unaltered reprints), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edition, Berlin M.L. Gemelli Marciano (2007–2010), Die Vorsokratiker Bd. 1, Thales Anaximander Anaximenes Pythagoras und die Pythagoreer Xenophanes Heraklit; Bd. 2, Parmenides Zenon Empedokles; Bd.

xvi

sigla and abbreviations

3, Anaxagoras Melissos Diogenes von Apollonia Die antiken Atomisten: Leukipp und Demokrit. Griechisch-lateinisch-deutsch, Düsseldorf Graham D.W. Graham (2010), The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy. The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics, 2 Vols., Cambridge Heeren A.H.L. Heeren (1792–1801), Ioannis Stobaei Eclogarum Physicarum et Ethicarum libri duo, 2 Vols., Göttingen Jas M. Jas (2018a), Nicolaus Rheginus als Übersetzer der pseudo-Galenischen Schrift De historia philosopha: ein Beitrag zur lateinischen Überlieferung des Corpus Galenicum, Wiesbaden Lachenaud G. Lachenaud (1993), Plutarque Œuvres morales T. 12.2, Opinions des Philosophes, Paris Laks–Most A. Laks–G.W. Most (2016), Early Greek Philosophy, 9 Vols., Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA; Les débuts de la philosophie, Paris Mansfeld R1 J. Mansfeld (1983–1986), Die Vorsokratiker Griechisch / Deutsch, 2 Vols., Stuttgart Mansfeld R2, Primavesi R2 J. Mansfeld and O. Primavesi (2011), Die Vorsokratiker Griechisch / Deutsch, Stuttgart Mau J. Mau (1971), Plutarchus Placita Philosophorum, Leipzig M–R J. Mansfeld–D.T. Runia (1997–2018), Aëtiana, 4 Vols. M–R 1 J. Mansfeld–D.T. Runia (1997), Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, Vol. 1: The Sources, Leiden M–R 2 J. Mansfeld–D.T. Runia (2009), Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, Vol. 2: The Compendium, Part I: Macrostructure and Microcontext, Part II: Aëtius Book II: Specimen Reconstructionis, Leiden M–R 3 J. Mansfeld–D.T. Runia (2010), Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, Vol. 3, Studies in the Doxographical Traditions of Greek Philosophy, Leiden M–R 4 J. Mansfeld–D.T. Runia eds. (2018), Aëtiana IV: Papers of the Melbourne Colloquium on Ancient Doxography, Leiden Mras K. Mras (1982–1983), Eusebius Die Praeparatio Evangelica, 2nd ed., 2 Vols., Berlin Meineke A. Meineke (1855–1857), Ioannis Stobaei Florilegium, 4 Vols., Leipzig Primavesi see above under Mansfeld R2 Raeder J. Raeder (1904), Theodoreti Graecarum Affectionum Curatio, Leipzig

sigla and abbreviations Reiske

Vítek Vors. Wachsmuth Westerink Wyttenbach Xylander

5

xvii

J. Reiske (1778), Plutarchi Quae supersunt omnia, Graece et Latine; principibus ex editionibus castigavit, virorumque doctorum suisque annotationibus, Vol. 9, Leipzig T. Vítek (2006), Empedoklés. II Zlomky, Prague see above DK C. Wachsmuth (1884), Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores qui inscribi solent Eclogae physicae et ethicae, 2 Vols., Berlin L.G. Westerink (1948), Michael Psellus De omnifaria doctrina, Utrecht D. Wyttenbach (1797), Plutarchi Chaeronensis Scripta Moralia, Vol. 4, Oxford G. Xylander (Holzmann) (1574), Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol. 2, Basel

Further Abbreviations

Names of authors and their works are generally abbreviated in accordance with LSJ, OLD and PGL (see below). The works of Galen are abbreviated in accordance with the list of R.J. Hankinson ed. (2008), The Cambridge Companion to Galen, Cambridge, pp. 391–397. The works of Plutarch are abbreviated in accordance with the listing in F. Montanari ed. (2015), The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek, Leiden, pp. xlvi–xlvii. BAGD W. Bauer, W.F. Arndt, F.W. Gingrich, and F.W. Danker (1979), A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 2nd ed., Chicago CErc Cronache Ercolanesi CMG Corpus Medicorum Graecorum CPF Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini CPG M. Geerard (1974–1987), Clavis Patrum Graecarum, Turnhout DPhA R. Goulet (1989–2018), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, 7 Vols. and Suppl. Vol., Paris FDS K.-H. Hülser ed. (1987–1988), Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, 4 Vols., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt FGrH F. Jacoby & alii (1923–), Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin & Leiden (later repr. Leiden; also Brill online) GCS Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller LCL Loeb Classical Library, ed. by J. Henderson LLT Latin Library of Texts (Brepols)

xviii LSJ MPG MPL OLD PGL RE SC SVF TLG

sigla and abbreviations H.G. Liddell, R. Scott and H.S. Jones eds. (1996), A Greek-English Lexicon with a Revised Supplement, 9th edition, Oxford Migne Patrologia Graeca Migne Patrologia Latina P.G.W. Glare ed. (1982), Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford G.W.H. Lampe ed. (1961), A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford Pauly-Wissowa Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. G. Wissowa and K. Ziegler (1894–1980) Sources Chrétiennes J. ab Arnim (1903–1924), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 Vols., Leipzig (repr. Stuttgart 1964) Thesaurus Linguae Graecae: A Digital Library of Greek Literature, University of California at Irvine

User’s Guide to the Edition and Commentary 1

Introduction

The aim of this user’s guide is to assist the reader in making use of the present Edition and Commentary on the Placita. It is a pared down version of section 6 of the General Introduction. For references to further discussion of details see the notes to the General Introduction in Volume One.

2

The Division into Four Parts

The sequence of the Edition and Commentary is based on the insight that ps.Plutarch’s Epitome of the original no longer extant work by and large preserves the structure of Aëtius’ compendium. Part One contains the necessary preliminaries, including the General Introduction, followed by the Edition and Commentary on Book 1 on the principles of nature. Part Two comprises Book 2 on cosmology and the heavens and Book 3 on meteorology and the earth. Part Three treats Book 4 on the psychology of the human being and Book 5 on the physiology of the human being and other animals. For each of the five books, the edition of its chapters is preceded by a compact introduction giving an overview of its transmission, subject-matter, name-labels of philosophers and schools, method and sources. Part Four presents an English translation of the edited text of all five books, together with the bibliography and the indices. For all the 135 chapters of the entire work, the Edition and Commentary use an identical method and layout. Only the chapters on the pinakes and the four proœmia to Books 1–4 differ in a few respects. The essential features of this method and layout will now be explained in detail, commencing with the edition.

3

The Edition

Following the conventions of classical scholarship, the edition of the Greek text and all its accompanying apparatus are formulated in Latin. The many abbreviations and sigla that we use are set out at the beginning of Parts One to Three. For each chapter we begin with a list of the relevant testes (witnesses). First in this list are the passages from the testes primi (primary witnesses) and the name of the editor of the text edition used. These witnesses are: ps.Plutarch

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(abbreviated P) and his tradition, Stobaeus (S) and Theodoret (T). Below them on the next line, passages from the testes secundi (secondary witnesses) are listed when available, again including their abbreviation and the name of the editor used. They are always introduced with the capitalised Latin abbreviation Cf. (abbreviation of confer, i.e. ‘compare’ or ‘see also’). The text of the chapter then follows. It begins with the titulus (chapter heading), followed by the numbered lemmata, each consisting of one or more name-labels (sometimes unspecified) plus a doxa. The lines of the text are continuously numbered, as indicated in the margin, beginning with the chapter heading. Following the heading and each lemma of the chapter the primary sources for its text are indicated by the sigla (P,S,T), or (P,S) when T is lacking, or (S,T) when P is lacking, or (P,T) when S is lacking, or only one of these when only one primary source is available. The numbers after the siglum in each case indicate the number of the doxa in the sequence of the text of the primary witness as indicated in the text used.1 This system gives the crucial information on the attestation of the lemmata at a single glance. Beneath the text we first list the references to the collections of fragments of Presocratics, Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics and others where individual lemmata can be located. In the case of the Presocratics we refer only to the sixth edition of Diels-Kranz (abbreviated DK), not to collections of individual authors. Similarly for the Stoics we use where possible Von Arnim’s collection (SVF). For other authors we use the most recent collections.2 In the case of authors whose original writings survive, we refer to passages from which the doxa is derived, whether directly or indirectly. Next we present the apparatus criticus to the text. Its aim is to give full and detailed insight into all the relevant variants of the primary and secondary witnesses. It is therefore not a negative but a positive apparatus.3 This is necessary because we are not editing a single text from manuscripts and indirect quotations, but rather are reconstructing our text from a multiplicity of witnesses both direct (primi) and indirect (secundi), each of which has its own relation to the lost original Placita as collected by Aëtius.4 Some of these, such as the frag-

1 These numbers are not found in the texts of Mau, Wachsmuth and Raeder. They have been supplied by us. 2 Rarely we list two collections when they are both current or complementary, e.g. for Strato (Wehrli, Sharples) and Posidonius (Edelstein-Kidd, Theiler). 3 Contrary to our previous practice in the specimen reconstructionis of Book 2 in M–R vol. 2.2; see General Introduction, section 2.8. 4 For detailed accounts of these witnesses and the editions used see General Introduction, section 4.2–4.

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ments of ps.Plutarch in the Antinoopolis papyrus, the Arabic version of ps.Plutarch by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā translated into German by Hans Daiber, and the new critical edition of a large part of ps.Galen by Mareike Jas, have become available only quite recently. In addition we pay due attention to a variety of earlier editions and also note significant readings, conjectures and emendations when the texts of individual doxai are included in collections of fragments. In general, it is only in the case of the primary witnesses ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus (but not Theodoret) that we give the variants of the main manuscripts. For other texts we give the preferred reading of the relevant critical edition, only mentioning manuscript variants on rare occasions. The Arabic translation of Qusta is cited in Daiber’s German version. Based on these principles, the apparatus criticus not only strives to shed light on our choices, but also to inform the user about the peculiarities of the widespread tradition. Because this apparatus is necessarily often rather extensive, it proved impossible to allocate room for the translation next to the Greek text in a synoptic format without chopping up text, translation, and apparatus and creating a succession of blank spaces. For this reason the translations of the Greek text of all 135 chapters, forming a continuous English version of the treatise as a whole, have been printed in the final part, Aëtiana 5.4. Three more sections of the edition remain. First we print the texts of the testes primi (primary witnesses) for the reconstruction. In first place is always Theodoret when he has cited this text, followed—with its own sub-heading— by the traditio ps.Plutarchi, i.e. the bevy of representatives of the tradition of the Epitome available for the relevant chapter. First when available is the Antinoopolis papyrus. This is followed by the text of ps.Galen, the most important of the witnesses to this tradition. We also include texts from ps.Justin, Cyril, Lydus, Psellus, Symeon Seth and others, all of whom excerpted ps.Plutarch. For reasons of space the texts of ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus themselves (and also Eusebius’ verbatim excerpts) are not quoted separately. They can be readily found elsewhere. But it is important to note that our debts to and differences from Diels’ DG edition of Aëtius and to other editions of the primary witnesses are fully accounted for in the apparatus criticus to the Greek text, and often also further discussed in the Commentary. Next is a section setting out the testes secundi (secondary witnesses) who can also offer some assistance for the reconstruction and analysis of the text.5 They represent the doxographical traditions closest to Aëtius. Some of these, namely

5 For detailed accounts of these witnesses and the editions used see above, General Introduction, 4.5.

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Athenagoras, Achilles, and Nemesius were included by Diels in his apparatus among the aliorum ex Aetio excerpta. Because, unlike in the case of Theodoret, it is not certain that these authors actually did excerpt Aëtius, we have preferred to group them together with other passages in the Aratea, Hermias, and Scholia to various authors, regarding them as a collection of writings that are closest to the Aëtian tradition without being part of it. They are closer than the texts that we have placed in the proximate tradition.6 It should be noted that the distinction is somewhat fuzzy. Texts very close to Aëtius such as in Varro, Philodemus, Cicero and Philo of Alexandria could have been included. The difference is that these texts antedate Aëtius, whereas the testes secundi are all later than he is and so could have used his work, whereas this was impossible for the writers just mentioned. The final sub-section of the edition is a collection of parallel passages quoted from the reconstructed text of other chapters of Aëtius, which we have given the title Loci Aetiani. These passages contain various kinds of similarities: to name-label(s) plus doxa, or to parts of doxai, or to particular formulations of doxai or name-labels. They thus provide detailed information about such uniformities as are present in the Placita as a whole. Parallels in chapter headings or in the quaestiones (questions or topics) being treated, are generally placed first, followed by those relating to particular lemmata.

4

The Commentary

The second main section of each chapter contains the Commentary. It too follows a fixed and identical schema of treatment, as indicated by alphabetically numbered sections, some of which are further divided into sub-sections and sometimes even further sub-divided. By consistently using this system of divisions, we aim to organise the mass of material involved with a maximum of clarity. Each of these sections and sub-sections will now be explained in turn. A: Witnesses. In this section we present the evidence as preserved in the primary and secondary witnesses and discuss issues that it might raise. We generally commence with (1) ps.Plutarch and his tradition, since the Epitome mostly preserves the general structure of the work and its lemmata best. Sad to say, in the case of Book 5 this tradition is virtually all that we still have. Thereafter follows an analysis of the evidence as presented in (2) Stobaeus and (3)

6 See the explanation of the distinction in the General Introduction, sections 4.1 and 5.1.

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Theodoret. In this section we often engage in a first sifting of the evidence for the reconstruction of the chapter, followed by further details in section D(b) below. B: Proximate tradition and sources. This section gives an overview of the texts that can shed light on the subject and contents of the chapter. The first sub-section (1) discusses the proximate texts, i.e. the doxographical tradition which resembles the Placita in its focus on questions of the φυσικὸς λόγος, on philosophers and the answers they gave to those questions. These texts can be earlier than Aëtius and represent the anterior tradition from which he drew his material (though the evidence for the early period is rather thin). They can be contemporaneous with him or much later, even as late as Isidore of Seville and (rarely) authors writing in Arabic. The passages discussed may relate to the chapter as a whole or to individual lemmata within it. The second sub-section (2) turns the attention to the ultimate sources of the subject-matter of the chapter. For the doxai of some philosophers it is sometimes possible to pin down the exact texts on which the doxai are based, e.g. in the extant works of Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus. More often other comparative material will need to be brought to bear, again from Plato and Aristotle, but also from Hellenistic, early Imperial and late ancient texts. Here too, passages discussed may relate to the chapter as a whole or to individual lemmata within it. For both sub-sections it is the case that many or even most of the texts discussed will be printed in the third main section Further related texts below, to which we frequently cross-refer. Given the large quantity of texts involved, it is not possible to discuss all this material in great detail, but rather we will draw attention to the salient points to which it gives rise. C: Chapter heading. In this section we give detailed discussions of the type and significance of the chapter heading, including how it relates to the standard question-types that were developed on the basis of the Aristotelian example and were used throughout antiquity. We note, where applicable, the variant readings for the heading in the witnesses and motivate our choice for the chosen formulation. We also give an overview of parallel headings that are embedded in texts or book titles elsewhere. These too are cited below in the section Further related texts. D: Analysis. This section, which contains our interpretation of the contents of the chapter, consists of five sub-sections (though not all of these are always required for every chapter). D(a) context. Here we briefly discuss the place of the particular chapter within the group of chapters of which it is a member and the position of this

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group in the context of the Book as a whole. We also note possible analogies with the way other books of the Placita are structured and point out particular links that a chapter might have with chapters elsewhere and sometimes also with ancient traditions such as the Peripatos and the Stoa. D(b) number–order of lemmata. In this sub-section we return to the witnesses for the contents of the chapter and determine where possible the number of doxai originally present and the order in which they were listed. For this we depend largely on the evidence of the witnesses themselves, as informed by the understanding that we have gained of their methods, but are sometimes assisted by the secondary witnesses and indeed also by texts in the proximate tradition and beyond. For determining the sequence of the doxai it is also important to understand the argumentative structure of the chapter, often revealed in its diaereses or diaphoniae (see also the following sub-section D(c)). Here we also note how our sequence compares with that established by Diels. Often the result is the same, but there are also many cases where we reach a substantially different result, which of course is fully explained and justified. D(c) rationale–structure of chapter. This sub-section contains the nucleus of our interpretation of a chapter. It is a distinctive feature of the Placita that its chapters have an argumentative structure which is determined by the contents and position of the individual lemmata but at the same time (at least to some extent) determines their selection. The task of this section is to elucidate that structure. It may involve a listing of doxai in order of decreasing or increasing similarity according to the method of diaeresis, or it may involve a contrasting of doxai or groups of doxai in order to emphasize the conflict between them. There is much variety among the 135 chapters. It should be emphasized that the examples used above will not apply at all to monolemmatic chapters and not necessarily to other chapters with a plurality of doxai. D(d) further comments. This sub-section is divided into General points, pertaining to the chapter as a whole (if pertinent), and individual points pertaining to individual lemmata. These latter, presented in order of the place of the doxa/doxai in the chapter, may relate to the constitution of the text, and/or may enter into detailed discussions of the interpretation of the philosophical or scientific view portrayed by the contents of the lemma concerned. It will be understood that, in the light of the astonishing breadth of topics and thinkers broached in the Placita, we have had to be necessarily selective in making such comments. References are frequently made to the secondary literature, but here too we have needed to be selective. D(e) other evidence. This final sub-section of the Commentary follows on from section B above. It embarks on more substantial discussions of evidence in the wider doxographical or anterior philosophical and scientific traditions,

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including some of the secondary witnesses (especially Achilles). These can be either of a textual or of a content-related nature, depending on what is relevant for the interpretation of the chapter and/or some of its individual lemmata.

5

Further Related Texts

Our presentation of each chapter ends with a third and final section entitled E: Further Related Texts. It too is further sub-divided into two parts. E(a) Proximate tradition. Here, as the name indicates, we present an extensive collection of texts drawn from the proximate doxographical tradition, as outlined in the General Introduction, section 5.1. We print the texts in the original Greek and Latin (with occasionally some texts translated into German or English, for we have no Arabic). These texts link up with the discussion in the earlier section B(1) of the Commentary. The selection begins with General texts dealing with the subject in question and/or covering the views of a plurality of thinkers. The next section lists, where available, the texts that contain or illustrate the chapter headings or sometimes the quaestio posed by that heading. Thereafter texts are listed under the individual lemmata of the chapter. In order to facilitate the reader’s orientation, the name-labels of the relevant lemma are printed in bold italics. For all three listings the texts are most often printed in full and are presented in approximate chronological order. E(b) Sources and other parallel texts. In this sub-section we link up with the discussion in the earlier section B(2) of the Commentary and print a collection of texts relating to the wider tradition of ancient philosophical and scientific tradition, including those texts that shed light on the sources that the doxographers may have used to formulate the doxai collected in the Placita. These follow the same basic method as in the previous sub-section. They are usually printed in full in the original Latin and Greek, are divided into the same three groups in an approximately chronological sequence, and are highlighted in the same way. In the case of some texts, either very well-known or somewhat tangential to the matter at hand, we give references only. For further discussion of the texts collected in section E of the Commentary, including a justification of their extent and the method of citing them in the ancient languages only, see the General Introduction, section 6.5.

Aetius Placita Book 4 Psychology: Text and Commentary



Introduction to Book 4 1

Transmission

In terms of its 24 chapters (plus proem) and 146 doxai, Book 4 of A’s compendium as transmitted down to us is on the short side. But because it contains a considerable number of long lemmata, it is in fact the second longest of the Books (4038 words; only Book 1 is longer). It is relatively well attested. PB and PQ are available for all of its chapters. (Note that to Diels’ 23 chapters we have added a ch. 4.7a consisting of the two lemmata which Diels dubiously included at the end of ch. 4.5.) The excerpts from A in T cease at 4.8, but are quite helpful as far as they go. In his excerpts from chs. 4.2–7 (the material parallel to ch. 4.6 was passed over) T usefully and significantly provides a number of parallels for lemmata in S not paralleled in P, and is the only source for three lemmata in ch. 4.4 and for one lemma in ch. 4.5—proof again of his crucial role as a source for A, for which see further above, General Introduction section 2.5. S, who of course was under no obligation to excerpt the whole work, seems to have lacked a chapter with contents corresponding to P 4.1 On the Nile, as there is not even a reference to the heading in Photius’ index. Other chapters of S have been lost because they were edited out by the Byzantine redactors, namely those corresponding to P 4.4 (for the most part), 4.5, 4.10 (where no corresponding heading in S either), 4.12, 4.14, 4.18, and the whole block of 4.20–23. At the end of Book 4 the transmission of S is unfortunately as defective as it is for the whole of Book 5, though for 4.7a he is our sole witness. For the tradition of P 4.2–7 we are only able to use E for chs. 4.4–5, since he did not excerpt the others. G declines to epitomize chs. 4.2–7, doubtless because of his alternative, namely c. 24 ‘On the soul’, which belongs with a different strand of the tradition but contains much material that is parallel. This chapter has been inserted early on, preceding all but a handful of his excerpts from P Book 1. Though he omits P 4.10, he epitomizes all of P 4.1, 4.9 and 4.11–23 in successive chapters at c. 89–104, thus preserving 16 out of 24 chapters, and so complements PB and PQ for large sections of the Book. Yet he retains only 46 doxai, or about 30%, which is lowest for all five Books. In addition there are three small scraps from the Antinoopolis papyrus, while some headings and lemmata are confirmed by Psellus. Thus chs. 4.2–9, 4.13–17 and 4.19 can be reconstructed from multiple witnesses, but for the remaining chapters we only have P and what is left of his tradition. In the latter case the number and order of the lemmata are fixed as we find them in the tradition of P. At most we can

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speculate on how P might have epitomized the material he found in A, in some cases comparing material found in proximate sources and other transmitted doxography or extrapolating from what we know about P’s methods elsewhere in his Epitome (for example his manipulation of name-labels). In those cases we will speak primarily about P, although it must always be borne in mind that A will be hovering in the background.

2

Subject Matter and Macrostructure

The division of subject matter between Book 4 and Books 3 and 5 on either side is not very strict. Ch. 4.1, on the Nile, belongs with the terrestrial subject matter of the second part of Book 3 (see Introduction to Book 3, section 2). The first chapters of Book 5 could also have been the last of Book 4. The exceptional absence of a proœmium for Book 5 (assuming it has not been lost, which is most unlikely) further underlines the coherence of Books 4 and 5. For the relation between Books 4 and 5 see also below, section 6. The extremely brief proœmium of Book 4 places itself in an omphalos position by referring to the treatment of the ‘parts’ of the cosmos that have been completed (sc. in Books 1–3) and to the ‘individual parts’, i.e. those pertaining to (mostly) the human being, that are to follow (sc. in Books 4–5), thus emphasizing the coherence of each of the two groups of Books of which the treatise consists as well as the unity of the treatise as a whole. For the divisions and coherence of the treatise see further above, General Introduction, section 2.7. Thus as a consequence of the inclusion of the Nile, Book 4 consists of two very different and unequal parts, namely ch. 4.1 on the exceptional river and chs. 4.2–23 on the human soul and its properties and functions, or a small hydrological part and a large psychological part. The psychological part, comprising chapters 4.2 to 4.23, can be divided into three sections: First: chs. 4.2–7 on the soul per se, i.e. its substance, parts, hegemonikon, movement and indestructibility. Groups of chapters that as to a sequential structure according to the categories and question types are comparable to chs. 4.2–7 are found in the present Book and throughout the Placita: chs. 4.8–21 on sensation and the senses, 2.1–10 on the cosmos, 2.11–12 on the heaven, 2.12–19 on the stars, 2.20–24 on the sun, 2.25–30 on the moon, 3.9–15 on the earth, and 5.3–14 on semen and insemination. Secondly: chs. 4.8–21 on epistemology, i.e. the senses in general, senseperception and its reliability, the number of the senses, two chapters on sensation and concept formation according to the Stoics, six chapters on the

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individual senses (but lacking one on touch!), two chapters on voice, and an addendum on the Stoic view of soul including sense perception and origin of concepts; And third: two further addenda, ch. 4.22 on a particular psycho-somatic theme and ch. 4.23 on psycho-somatic relations in general. The position of ch. 4.11, on the genesis of sense perceptions and the origin of concepts, and of 4.12, on the different senses of impression, impressor, imagination, and figment, after ch. 4.9 on the reliability of sense perceptions and presentations, is odd from a systematic point of view, and reveals that these two exclusively Stoic chapters have been inserted later at the end of the closeknit block of chs. 4.8–10, which deals with the senses in general and presents a variety of views in the usual dialectical way. We notice a comparable attempt at upgrading the psychology at the end of the account of the senses, after that of the close-knit block of chs. 4.13–20, which comprises the individual senses plus voice and also presents varieties of views. For ch. 4.21 adds a further Stoic account of the genesis and processes of sense perception and concept formation, and of the structure of soul and function of its regent part. To some extent this duplicates paragraphs in earlier chapters. On these added chapters and similar Stoic upgrades in Book 4 see Diels DG 61, 101, 178, and 182, where he omits this material from his reconstructed Vetusta placita. The fact that ch. 4.11 shows unmistakable symptoms of abridgement (Mansfeld 2013b) proves that it is Aëtian, P having epitomized his source in his usual way. In chs. 4.11 and 4.21 concept formation follows organically, so to speak, upon sense perception, and is integrated in the treatment of soul as a whole. The Stoic doctrine contains ingredients such as the formation of concepts from other concepts that are lacking in Aristotle. From the point of view of completeness and clarity, and so also from a didactic point of view, their doctrine is therefore superior to that of Aristotle, which explains its presence in Book 4. Diels saw this upgrading of the living text by the addition of Stoic material as a sign of decadence and a corruption of the genuine Placita method (see M–R 1.99–100). But a comparison with the proximate tradition shows that the rich Stoic material in A Book 4 is meant to be representative.

3

Name Labels

The number of different name-labels is very high, namely 61. Most of these, as usual, are of philosophers, but there also three scientists: Aristarchus, Eudoxus, and Euthymenes; four doctors: Asclepiades, Erasistratus, Herophilus, and Hippocrates; and even two historians: Ephorus and Herodotus. This is a little

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deceptive, since three of these, Euthymenes and the two historians, are only found in the exceptional ch. 4.1 ‘On the rising of the Nile’. Unusual name-labels are also found in ch. 3.17, likewise dealing with a subject not treated by Aristotle. The number of collective name-labels is definitely higher than usual: Academics 4, Peripatetics 5, Pythagoreans 2, mathematikoi 1, and of course the ubiquitous Stoics, found no less than 17 times. Hellenistic name-labels are found esp. in chapters 1 to 10, and the extent to which individual chapters have been upgraded is clear from the presence of the name-labels Asclepiades in ch. 4.2.8, Xenarchus in ch. 4.3.10 (the latest philosopher in the entire work) and Posidonius in ch. 4.13.11, while Herophilus in ch. 4.22.3 and his colleague physician Asclepiades in ch. 4.22.2 anticipate the massive presence of doctors in Book 5, with its focus on physiology. There are seven standard cases of anonymous ‘some’ or ‘others’, with three specific anonymous groups at ch. 4.9.10. There is also a quite, but not exceptionally high number of multiple name-labels per doxa—just as in Books 1 and 2—, as follows: seven times 2 and 3 names, twice 6 and 5 names, and once even a series of 11 names (ch. 4.9.1 on that the senses are false).

4

Successions and Historical Presentation

With regard to historical information we notice that the absolute chronology is pretty standard, with a peak in the fifth cent. bce. Successions play a subordinate role, Thales occurring only twice, i.e. in first position in chs 4.1.1 and 4.2.1, while Pythagoras, updated more frequently than Thales, gets initial positions in five chapters, namely 4.4.1, 4.7.1, 4.7a.1, 4.9.1, and 4.20.1 (in all cases in combination with Plato and Aristotle). With regard to the relative contributions of dialectic and historiography the Book is intermediate between Book 2 (most dialectical) and Book 3 (most historical). On the other hand it is most similar to Book 1 in respect of what name-labels are mostly used, so it may be considered more philosophical. For sections 2–4 see further the statistics and analysis of Jeremiah (2018) at M–R 4.322–336 and 354ff.

5

Proximate Tradition

The proximate tradition is very rich, with as its most important representatives Diogenes Laertius, Lucretius, and Tertullian De anima. The parallels of the Laertian physics section are found at the beginning as well as in the later part of our Book 4, namely (a) in the block of chapters about

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the soul per se and (b) in that about the mechanics of perception by the individual senses, as follows: (a) soul per se: ch. 4.3.3 corporeality, substance ~ Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.156 ll. 1349–1350 + 1352–1354 (lines as in Dorandi); ch. 4.4.4 parts ~ V.P. 7.157 ll. 1358–1360 (also in the ethics section: V.P. 7.110 ll. 811–813); ch. 4.5.7 regent part in the heart ~ V.P. 7.159 ll. 1386–1388; ch. 4.7.3 destructibility, various views about temporary survival ~ V.P. 7.156 ll. 1351–1352 + 157 ll. 1355–1357. (b) mechanics of perception: ch. 4.15.3 vision ~ V.P. 7.157 ll. 1360–1366; ch. 4.19.4 hearing (not in ch. 4.16!) V.P. 7.158 ll. 1366–1370. The rich parallels in Lucretius, for which see Runia at M–R 4.411–412, are important, because they antedate A’s account by more than a century and so provide information about the tradition to which A is indebted. Tertullian’s source Soranus derives from the same or a similar fons uberior. The Lucretian parallels also strongly suggest that as to the presentation and elucidation of doctrine the poet is not a mere parrot of his master, or Epicurean fundamentalist. We do, however, have to take into account that according to a Scholion on the Epistle to Herodotus (at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 10.66) Epicurus himself ‘in some other work’ (ἐν ἄλλοις) successively treated the substance of the soul (cf. ch. 4.3), its division into parts and the presence of the regent part in the chest (cf. ch. 4.4.7), sleep (cf. ch. 5.14), and the provenance of semen (cf. ch. 5.3). This Epicurean sequence and its contents are remarkably parallel to the section of the Stoic account cited above, so one wonders who came first. However this may be, a template, deriving from Epicurus himself and comparable to what is in DRN, will have been available to Lucretius, whose more detailed and up-todate exposition could be justified by reference to the authoritative archegete. For the situation in Book 3 see the Introduction to Book 3, section 5. Parallels between individual chapters of A (in succession 4.3, 4.5, 5.24, 5.25, 4.7, 4.4) and Tertullian’s De anima (c. 15, c. 43, c. 54, c. 14), arranged as always in double columns, are discussed by Diels DG 203–207. Since Diels it has been accepted that Tertullian is indebted to the On the Soul of the second cent. Methodist doctor Soranus, whom he cites several times. Soranus, in his turn, is indebted to the earlier doxographical tradition. The first to provide a list in two columns of the overall structural parallels between Tertullian and A Books 4 and 5, one that was also more complete than the evidence furnished by Diels, was Karpp (1934) 42–43. Karpp’s list was amplified by Waszink (1947) 31–32, who not only added further details but also a column of references to Diels’ reconstruction of the so-called Vetusta placita, apparently because in A parallels for a number of details in Tertullian are lacking. He was followed by Festugière (1953) 5–6, who omitted the Vetusta placita column. Schrijvers (1976) 233–234 = (1999) 122–123 was the first to add an overview of the important

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structural parallels in Lucretius Books 3 and 4 to the Aëtian-cum-Tertullian list, but unnecessarily came up with a third column containing parallels in Junius Martianus Rota’s unreliable Latin translation of 1541–1542 of ps.Galen’s Historia philosopha as reprinted in Kühn 1830 (for details see M–R 1.23–24). In the relevant chapters G of course merely excerpts P. Doxographical-dialectical parallels between Lucretius and A Book 4 (and some others) were discussed by Mansfeld (1990a) 3143–3154. The parallels between all of these accounts, as well as the Aristotelian background (on which see below) are discussed in some detail in M–R 2.139–153. Substantial parallels for these proximate sources of A’s material are also to be found elsewhere. Among these sources the most prominent are Cicero Lucullus and Tusculans, Philo De somniis, Arius Didymus, Galen De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, Alexander(?) De anima mantissa, Tertullian De anima, Iamblichus De anima, Porphyry De anima, Macrobius in Somnium Scipionis, Nemesius, Psellus De omnifaria doctrina, and the Commentaria in Dionysium Thracem.

6

Other Source Material

We noted already above that the post-Aristotelian topic of the rising of the Nile has been placed in ch. 4.1 at the beginning, as close as possible to the presentation of the sea in Book 3. In contrast, the organization of the account of the soul per se is mostly based on Aristotle’s On the Soul, and that of sense-perception on the On the Soul and its appendix, the Parva naturalia. This exposition has been upgraded by the insertion of more advanced epistemological material that is exclusively Stoic, for which see further below. The two final chapters, on respiration and the relation between bodily affections and the soul, reflect the separate account of respiration in the Parva naturalia and their focus on what is common to soul and body (Arist. Sens. 1), thus anticipating the account of themes of a similar nature and with the same antecedents in the next Book. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.133 reproduces the contents of the αἰτιολογικόν, the third subpart of the second main division of the Stoic diaeresis of the physikos logos, for which see M–R 2.1.105–106 and above, General Introduction section 2.8. This subpart is again divided into two parts. Issues contained in the former of these parts are studied by physicians as well as philosophers, among which that of the location of the regent part of the soul, cf. ch. 4.5, those concerned with ‘what happens in the soul’, relevant for the whole of chs. 4.8–22, and those ‘concerning seeds’. So we have both psychology and spermatology in the same subpart of the division, which further illustrates the close relationship between Books 4 and 5. Issues contained in the second of these parts are studied by

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mathematikoi as well as philosophers, such as ‘how we see’ cf. ch. 4.13, ‘what is the cause of the presentation in the mirror’ cf. ch. 4.14, followed surprisingly by meteorological subjects, for which see Introduction to Book 3 section 7. The treatment of sense-perception, including the epistemological issue of its trustworthiness, in the context of psychology as part of physics agrees with Aristotle’s procedure in the On the Soul and Parva naturalia. (Our discussion in M–R 2.1.138–139 is too cautious.) We further know that Book 2 of Theophrastus’ De anima also counted as Book 5 of his Physics (Themistius in de An. 108.11 = Theophrastus fr. 307A FHS&G). And his De sensibus belongs with physics too, even if it were part of the Physikai Doxai, for the latter, as the title shows, certainly belongs with physics. In Aristotle the part of epistemological theory that deals with concept formation in some detail is found dispersed over various places, not only in the On the Soul. The interpretation of these passages is not easy; the doctrine is not presented in a systematic way, and the various accounts are not fully, or at least not easily, compatible with each other. Aristotle moreover fails to explain the origin of concepts in and from other concepts. In the On the Parts of Animals 1.1 641a33–b10 the study of intellect insofar as it is related to the objects of thought, which perhaps amounts to the study of the objects of thought themselves, is excluded from physics (cf. Met. Ζ.1 1025b27–30). This would appear to be in conflict with what happens in the On the Soul (on this controversial passage see Kullmann 2007, 309–311, with references to the discussion). This may help to explain the preference for the Stoic account in the Placita. Epistemology was treated systematically by Chrysippus in at least two treatises belonging to the physical part of philosophy, namely his Physics and his On the Soul. Diogenes Laertius cites the second Book of the On the Soul for the explanation of what is meant by an imprint, typôsis, in the soul (V.P. 7.50, SVF 2.55). The second Book of the Physics is cited as the locus classicus for the cataleptic impression (kataleptikê phantasia as the criterion V.P. 7.54, SVF 2.105)—though disagreeing with himself he also mentioned sense perception and preconception (prolepsis) as criteria in Book 1 of his On the Logos (V.P. 7.54, SVF 2.105). This title is cited in the ethical section of his catalogue, along with other titles that indicate epistemological topics (V.P. 7.201, SVF 2.17 p. 9.24–30). The second Book of his Physics is also cited for the view that ‘voice’ is corporeal (V.P. 7.55, SVF 2.140). Diogenes of Babylon cited Zeno’s argument about the location of mind and speech in the heart at the beginning of his On the Regent Part of the Soul (Galen PHP 2.5.7, SVF 1.148, SVF 3 Diog. 23; cf. Galen PHP 2.5.12, SVF 3 Diog. 29 on voice). These descriptions of what goes on in the soul and its regent part fill out the brief account of the psychological subpart of physics at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7. 133 cited above (‘the inquiry, according to which

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they inquire about the hegemonikon and the things that happen in the soul’). It follows that the position of the epistemological chapters and paragraphs concerned with the Stoics in A’s psychological Book 4 agrees rather well with Chrysippus’ and Diogenes of Babylon’s practice in the physical part of philosophy. To be sure, Zeno, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus placed ‘logic’ first in the order of the three parts of philosophy, but we may feel sure that this ‘logic’ (or ‘dialectic’) did not include epistemology. Note on the other hand that Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.42–52 includes treatment of phantasiai (even qua imprint in the soul, 7.46) and truth in the dialectical part of philosophy, i.e. not in physics but in logic. Also see Diocles at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.49, who tells us that the Stoics are agreed to begin with the theory of impression and sense perception. This is quite different from the position of these themes in Chrysippus and in A, but has to be seen as a later, though of course not illogical development. Because the Placita are a physical treatise (cf. physikos logos, ch. 1.oa.1[1]) and not a systematic logos of philosophy that like ps.Galen’s Historia philosopha begins with logic or dialectic, the epistemological ingredients could not be accommodated at its beginning—say, after the introductory section on the parts of philosophy in the proœmium of the treatise, just as they are in Diogenes Laertius after V.P. 7.39–41. They were not so accommodated, at any rate.

7

Other Parallels and Sources

For the ultimate sources of much of the material contained in the Book we must go back to the Peripatos, and think of the otherwise lost sources used by Aristotle, Theophrastus and their predecessors. Ch. 4.1 on the Nile is dependent on the accounts of Herodotus and ps.Aristotle’s De inundacione Nili, a characteristic it shares with the widespread tradition on this subject. It is also evident that ultimately the sources that A drew on for his psychology had access to Presocratic material (in some cases their actual works). Plato’s Timaeus (and Philebus) furnish material for the twelve doxai attributed to him in the book, though these have as a rule been modernized. Chapters on the individual senses are to some extent related to Theophrastus De sensibus, as will be discussed at the relevant chapters. For many of the chapters it emerges that the general approach, the title and some of the lemmata go back to Aristotle’s On the Soul and Parva naturalia. The wider doxographical tradition, as for instance exemplified by Cicero Tusc. 1.19–21 and elsewhere in the same book, treats the themes of the soul’s substance, its mortality versus its immortality, and the location of its regent

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part simultaneously. At a first glance the Placita separates these themes rather rigorously, as is clear from the chapter headings and the contents of the chapters themselves. But some traces of a less rigorous separation remain. In ch. 4.2, on the substance of soul qua incorporeal, Alcmaeon’s soul is said at 4.2.2 to be ‘immortal’ (ἀθάνατον), thus anticipating the theme of ch. 4.7. Also note that the various references to movement at ch. 4.2.1–5 anticipate the theme of ch. 4.6. The impression that A depends on an anterior treatment that was a bit less ‘pedantically’ scholastic is unavoidable. The emphasis may be different from Aristotle’s too; e.g. the focus on the hegemonikon is Hellenistic and not earlier. Later Hellenistic sources are also utilized, as proven by chapters 11–12 and 21, which exceptionally derive from Stoic sources alone, and by the focus on Stoic doctrine in other chapters.

Liber 4 Titulus et index Τ: Theodoretus CAG 4.31 Raeder, cf. 2.95, 5.16 (titulus)—PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 897D–E, Diels p. 269—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā p. 188 Daiber (titulus), pinax in ms. Damascenus fol. 7v (ineditus)—PE: Eusebius PE 15.32.10, p. 407.5–8 Mras—PSy: Symeon Seth CRN praef., p. 18.13–14 + 4.56, p. 59.9–12 Delatte

Titulus ΑΕΤΙΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΕΣΚΟΝΤΩΝ ΤΟ Δʹ, ἐν ᾧ κεφάλαια τάδε· Index αʹ. Περὶ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως βʹ. Περὶ ψυχῆς γʹ. Εἰ σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς δʹ. Περὶ μερῶν ψυχῆς εʹ. Τί τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ ἐν τίνι ἐστίν ϛʹ. Περὶ κινήσεως ψυχῆς ζʹ. Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς ζʹ+. Περὶ νοῦ ηʹ. Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν θʹ. Εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι ιʹ. Πόσαι εἰσὶν αἰσθήσεις ιαʹ. Πῶς γίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ ἔννοια καὶ ὁ κατὰ ⟨ἐν⟩διάθεσιν λόγος ιβʹ. Τίνι διαφέρει φαντασία φανταστὸν φανταστικὸν φάντασμα ιγʹ. Περὶ ὁράσεως, πῶς ὁρῶμεν ιδʹ. Περὶ κατοπτρικῶν ἐμφάσεων ιεʹ. Εἰ ὁρατὸν τὸ σκότος ιϛʹ. Περὶ ἀκοῆς ιζʹ. Περὶ ὀσφρήσεως ιηʹ. Περὶ γεύσεως titulus : scripsimus, cf. T 4.31 et M–R 1.326 : Πλουτάρχου Τῶν ἀρεσκόντων φιλοσόφοις φυσικῶν τὸ δʹ, ἐν ᾧ κεφάλαια τάδε PB(I) : βιβλίον τέταρτον ἐν ᾧ κεφάλαια τάδε PB(IΙ) : Περί τῶν ἀρεσκόντων τοῖς φιλοσόφοις βιβλίον τέταρτον PB(III:E) : Die vierte Abhandlung aus dem Buch des Plutarchos über die naturwissenschaftlichen Ansichten, welche die Philosophen vertraten Q index : totum indicem om. PB(III:α) : exstat in PQ, sed hactenus ineditus (habemus huius versionem Daiberi; vid. append. infra t. 4) ‖ [3] ἀναβάσεως PB : Zunahme Q [4] Περὶ ψυχῆς PB : Was ist die Definition der Seele? Q [7] καὶ … ἐστίν PB : unter den Seelenteilen Q [10] addidimus ex S; vid. c. 4.7a et comm. ad loc. [14] ἡ αἴσθησις PB : die Sinnesempfindungen Q ‖ ⟨ἐν⟩διάθεσιν tit. c. 4.11, vid. ad loc. : διάθεσιν PB, die Logik des Denkens Q [15] φανταστικόν, φάντασμα PB : om. Q [16] Περὶ … ὁρῶμεν PΒ : Wie sieht der Gesichtssinn? Q [23] εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ φωνὴ PΒ : Ist der Laut ein Körper? Q

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ιθʹ. κʹ. καʹ. κβʹ. κγʹ.

Περὶ φωνῆς Εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ φωνὴ καὶ πῶς ἠχὼ γίνεται Πόθεν αἰσθητικὴ γίνεται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τί αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς Περὶ παθῶν σωματικῶν καὶ εἰ συναλγεῖ τούτοις ἡ ψυχή

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[26] Περὶ … ψυχή tit. c. 4.23 : συναλγεῖ αὐτοῖς PB : sie weiss Q

Testes primi: Theodoretus CAG 4.31 vid. lib. 1. titulus et index Traditio ps.Plutarchi: Eusebius PE 15.32.10 vid. lib. 1. titulus et index Symeon Seth CRN 4 Praef. p. 18.13–14 + 4.56 Delatte vid. lib. 1 titulus et index

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses As discussed in the equivalent chapter of Book 1, for the title of the entire work and its individual books we must rely on the evidence of T, the only witness to cite the title of the original work and give the name of its author. The titles in P and those witnesses dependent on its tradition are expanded versions of the original title. The title at the head of this Book in PB is the shortest of the five, omitting the preposition Περὶ at its beginning and making no reference to the epitome character of the work. The title in Q’s translation is also short. On these titles see further Book 1 titulus et index Commentary C. For the index of chapters PB is the chief witness, though not all mss. contain it. One of the mss. of Q, Ẓāhirīya (Damascenus) 4871 contains a translation of the list and thus provides valuable additional evidence on the manuscript tradition. Daiber did not include it in his edition, but he has kindly provided the editors with a translation (see Appendix in Vol. 4). On this translation and its source see further the Book 1 titulus et index Commentary A. Eusebius only cites two chapters from this book, chs. 4.4–5, at PE 15.60–61. For the latter he gives a shortened heading in both the index to Book 15 and in the excerpt itself, but a longer (but not complete) version in his summary at PE 15.32.10. Symeon Seth also mentions some headings from this book in his

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summary of the contents of his Book 4 which takes the place of an index. For both texts, see above, Book 1 titulus et index testes primi. For the question whether A’s text contained the index see Book 1 titulus et index Commentary D. On the practice of prefacing texts with tables of content and chapter headings see Book 1 titulus et index Commentary D(e). C Book Title See above, section A. On how this title relates to the title of the original work see Book 1 titulus et index Commentary C. D Analysis of the Index (1) For a discussion giving the reasons why we are convinced that A’s original compendium contained these indices at the beginning of each book, see M– R 2.196–204 and Book 1 titulus et index Commentary D(6) and D(e). (2) For the methodology of the reconstruction of the index see Book 1 titulus et index Commentary D(3). We argue that priority must be given to the chapter headings in the text of the chapters themselves, since A will have based his index on these when he compiled the work. It is thus to be assumed that the list of chapter headings in the index accurately reflects the chapter headings in the text of the Book. In case of this book there is a strong correlation between the headings in the index and those in the text of the chapters themselves, with only the heading of 4.7a, a chapter which P omitted, to be added and a very slight discrepancy between the heading in the pinax as preserved in the mss. (αὐτοῖς) and the intra-textual heading (τούτοις). (3) In this book Q also adheres rather closely to the headings as transmitted in the mss. tradition, but as can be seen in the app. crit. above there are a number of variants, mostly omissions and simplifications, but in the case of ch. 4.2 an expansion, altering the simple umbrella heading with Περί to a heading asking what the soul’s definition is. This is no doubt an innovation of the translator Qusṭā. For the headings in Eusebius, see section A above. D(e) Other Evidence For further discussion on the use of pinakes (tables of contents) in ancient works see Book 1 titulus et index Commentary D(e). In section E Further related texts below, we present a selection of texts ranging from Chrysippus to the very end of antiquity in which subjects relating to psychology are set in terms more or less reminiscent of the list of headings in A’s Book 4. On the groupings of themes that correspond to the contents of the Book see also above, Introduction to Book 4. Selected passages will be repeated at the relevant chapters. On these texts in general see also Mansfeld (1990a). A

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separate study was devoted to the important evidence of the Chrysippus text; see Mansfeld (1989a). The passages in Philo also go back to doxographical traditions anterior to A; see further Book 2, Introduction, and ch. 2.11 Commentary B(1). E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

Chrysippus de An. 1 verbatim at Gal. PHP 3.1.9–16 λέγω δὴ ὅτι ὁ Χρύσιππος (SVF 2.885) κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον αὐτοῦ Περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον τῶν μερῶν αὐτῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μνημονεύειν ἀρχόμενος, ἔνθα δὴ δεικνύναι πειρᾶται τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μόνῃ περιέχεσθαι οὑτωσὶ λέγει· ‘ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον ἔστ᾽ ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς εὔπνοια παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι (cf. ch. 4.3.3). ταύτης οὖν τῶν μερῶν ἑκάστῳ διατεταγμένων μορίῳ τὸ διῆκον αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὦτα ἀκοήν, τὸ δ᾽ εἰς ῥῖνας ὄσφρησιν, τὸ δ᾽ εἰς γλῶτταν γεῦσιν, τὸ δ᾽ εἰς ὅλην τὴν σάρκα ἁφὴν καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις ἕτερόν τιν᾽ ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον, σπερματικόν, εἰς ὃ δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι, μέρος ὂν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν (cf. ch. 4.4.4). οὕτω δὲ ἐχόντων αὐτῶν τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ συμφωνεῖται, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς διαφωνοῦσιν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις λέγοντες αὐτὸ εἶναι τόποις (cf. ch. 4.5). οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν θώρακά φασιν εἶναι αὐτό, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν κεφαλήν. κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαφωνοῦσι, ποῦ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τοῦ θώρακός ἐστιν, οὐ συμφωνοῦντες αὑτοῖς. Πλάτων δὲ καὶ τριμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν φήσας εἶναι τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν ἔλεγεν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς περὶ τὸν θώρακα, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν περὶ τὸν ὀμφαλόν. οὕτω φαίνεται διαφεύγειν ὁ τόπος ἡμᾶς οὔτ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἐκφανοῦς γενομένης, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συντετύχηκεν, οὔτε {τῶ} τῶν τεκμηρίων δι᾽ ὧν ἄν τις συλλογίσαιτο τοῦτο· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἀντιλογία ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προῆλθεν καὶ ἐν ἰατροῖς καὶ ἐν φιλοσόφοις.’ αὕτη πρώτη ῥῆσις γέγραπται ὑπὸ Χρυσίππου περὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον Περὶ ψυχῆς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥμισυ μέρος αὐτῷ τῆς βίβλου τὸ πρότερον ὑπὲρ οὐσίας ψυχῆς ἔχει τὴν σκέψιν. Cicero Luc. 124 tenemusne quid sit animus (cf. chs. 4.2–3)? ubi sit (cf. chs. 4.4–5)? denique sitne an ut Dicaearcho (fr. 8(f) Wehrli, 17 Mirhady) visum est ne sit quidem ullus? … si simplex (cf. ch. 4.4), utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis (cf. ch. 4.3) an ut Xenocrates (fr. 67 Heinze, F 121 Isnardi Parente2) numerus nullo corpore, quod intellegi quale sit vix potest (cf. ch. 4.2)? Tusc. 1.18 quid sit porro ipse animus (cf. chs. 4.2–3) aut ubi (cf. chs. 4.4–5) aut unde (cf. ch. 4.5a), magna dissensio est. Philo Somn. 1.30–32 ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ τὸ τέταρτον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὁ ἡγεμὼν νοῦς, καταληπτός ἐστιν; οὐ δήπου. τί γὰρ αὐτὸν οἰόμεθα κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι; πνεῦμα ἢ αἷμα ἢ σῶμα συνόλως (cf. ch. 4.2)–ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σῶμα, ἀσώματον δὲ λεκτέον—ἢ πέρας ἢ εἶδος ἢ ἀριθμὸν ἢ ἐνδελέχειαν ἢ ἁρμονίαν ἢ τί τῶν ὄντων (cf. ch. 4.3); (31) γεννώμενον δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἢ ἔξωθεν εἰσκρίνεται ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀέρος ἡ ἔνθερμος ἐν ἡμῖν φύσις οἷα σίδηρος ἐν χαλκέως πεπυρωμένος ὕδατι ψυχρῷ πρὸς τὸ κραταιότατον στομοῦται (cf. ch. 4.5a); διότι καὶ παρὰ τὴν ψῦξιν ὠνομάσθαι ψυχὴ δοκεῖ. τί δέ; τελευτώντων σβέννυται καὶ συμφθείρεται τοῖς σώμασιν ἢ πλεῖστον ἐπιβιοῖ χρόνον ἢ κατὰ τὸ παντελὲς ἄφθαρτόν ἐστι (cf. ch. 4.7); (32) ποῦ δ᾽ ἐμπεφώλευκεν ὁ νοῦς αὐτῷ; ἆρα οἶκον κεκλήρωται; οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐν ἡμῖν

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ἀνιέρωσαν αὐτῷ κεφαλήν, περὶ ἣν καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις λοχῶσιν, εἰκὸς εἶναι νομίσαντες ἐγγὺς οἷα μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐφεδρεύειν τοὺς δορυφόρους· οἱ δ᾽ ὑπὸ καρδίας αὐτὸν ἀγαλματοφορεῖσθαι διανοηθέντες γνωσιμαχοῦσιν (cf. ch. 4.5). Cher. 114 ποῦ γάρ μου τὸ σῶμα πρὸ γενέσεως ἦν; ποῖ δὲ καὶ χωρήσει μεταστάντος ⟨μου⟩; ποῦ δὲ καὶ τοῦ δοκοῦντος ὑφεστάναι τῶν ἡλικιῶν αἱ διαφοραί; ποῦ τὸ βρέφος, ποῦ ὁ παῖς, ποῦ ⟨ὁ⟩ ἀντίπαις, ποῦ ὁ ἄρτι ἡβῶν, ποῦ τὸ μειράκιον, ὁ πρωτογένειος, ὁ νεανίας, ὁ τέλειος ἀνήρ (ch. ch. 5.23); πόθεν δὲ ἦλθεν ἡ ψυχή (cf. ch. 4.7a), ποῖ δὲ χωρήσει, πόσον δὲ χρόνον ἡμῖν ὁμοδίαιτος ἔσται (cf. ch. 4.7); τίς δέ ἐστι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν (cf. chs. 4.2–3); πότε δὲ καὶ ἐκτησάμεθα αὐτήν; πρὸ γενέσεως; ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑπήρχομεν· μετὰ τὸν θάνατον; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐσόμεθα οἱ μετὰ σωμάτων σύγκριτοι ποιοί, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς παλιγγενεσίαν ὁρμήσομεν οἱ μετὰ ἀσωμάτων σύγκριτοι ποιοί. Tertullian de An. 3.2 proinde enim et animae ratio (sc. concussa est) per philosophatas doctrinas hominum miscentes aquas vino (Is. 1:22): alii immortalem negant animam, alii plus quam immortalem adfirmant (cf. ch. 4.7), alii de substantia, alii de forma (cf. chs. 4.2–3), alii de unaquaque dispositione disceptant; hi statum eius aliunde ⟨de⟩ducunt (cf. ch. 4.5a), hi exitum aliorsum abducunt (cf. ch. 4.7). de An. 5.1– 6.1 fortassean extruentur magis ad auferendam animae corpulentiam, si non alios e contrario inspexerint, et quidem plures, corpus animae vindicantes (cf. chs. 4.2–3). (5.2) nec illos dico solos qui eam de manifestis corporalibus effingunt, ut Hipparchus et Heraclitus ex igni, ut Hippon et Thales ex aqua, ut Empedocles et Critias ex sanguine, ut Epicurus ex atomis (si et atomi corpulentias de coitu suo cogunt), ut Critolaus et Peripatetici eius ex quinta nescio qua substantia (si et illa corpus, quia corpora includit), sed etiam Stoicos allego, qui spiritum praedicantes animam paene nobis cum, qua proxima inter se flatus et spiritus, tamen corpus animam facile persuadebunt (cf. ch. 4.3). (5.3) denique Zeno consitum spiritum definiens animam hoc modo instruit. quo, inquit, digresso animal emoritur, corpus est; consito autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur, ergo consitus spiritus corpus est; ergo corpus est anima (cf. ch. 4.7). (5.4) vult et Cleanthes non solum corporis lineamentis, sed et animae notis similitudinem parentibus in filiis respondere, de speculo scilicet morum et ingeniorum et adfectuum, corporis autem similitudinem et dissimilitudinem capere et animam, ⟨animam⟩ itaque corpus similitudini vel dissimilitudini obnoxium (cf. ch. 5.11). (5.5) item corporalium et incorporalium passiones inter se non communicare; porro et animam compati corpori, cui laeso ictibus vulneribus ulceribus condolescit, et corpus animae, cui afflictae cura angore amore coaegrescit per detrimentum socii vigoris, cuius pudorem et pavorem rubore atque pallore testetur (cf. ch. 4.2– 3). igitur anima corpus ex corporalium passionum communione. (5.6) sed et Chrysippus manum ei porrigit constituens corporalia ab incorporalibus derelinqui omnino non posse, quia nec contingantur ab eis (unde et Lucretius (DRN 1.304): ‘tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res’), derelicto autem corpore ab anima affici morte. igitur corpus anima, quae nisi corporalis corpus non derelinquet. (6.1) Haec Platonici subtilitate potius quam veritate conturbant. Hermias Irr. 2–3 οἱ μὲν γάρ φασιν αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ, οἱ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, οἱ δὲ τὸν νοῦν, οἱ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, οἱ δὲ δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων ῥέουσαν,

liber 4 titulus et index οἱ δὲ ἀριθμὸν κινητικόν, οἱ δὲ ὕδωρ γονοποιόν, οἱ δὲ στοιχεῖον ⟨ἢ⟩ ἀπὸ στοιχείων, οἱ δὲ ἁρμονίαν, οἱ δὲ τὸ αἷμα, οἱ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα, οἱ δὲ τὴν μονάδα, καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τὰ ἐναντία (cf. chs. 4.2–3). πόσοι λόγοι περὶ τούτων, ἐπιχειρήσεις πόσαι, πόσαι δίκαι σοφιστῶν ἐριζόντων μᾶλλον ἢ τἀληθὲς εὑρισκόντων; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστω· στασιάζουσι μὲν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς … τὴν δὲ φύσιν αὐτῆς, οἱ μὲν ἀθάνατόν φασιν, οἱ δὲ θνητήν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐπιδιαμένουσαν, οἱ δὲ ἀποθηριοῦσιν αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ εἰς ἀτόμους διαλύουσιν (cf. ch. 4.7).

b

Sources and Other Parallel Texts

Pollux Onom. 2.226–227 σύγκειται μὲν δὴ ὁ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα ἢ πῦρ ἢ αἷμα ἢ ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ τοῖς σοφοῖς (cf. ch. 4.3), μέρη δ᾽ αὐτῆς νοῦς ἐπιθυμία θυμός (cf. ch. 4.4). καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς καὶ λογισμὸς καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκεφάλῳ κατὰ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Πλάτωνα ἱδρυμένος, εἴτε ἐν παρεγκεφαλίδι ἢ μήνιγξιν, ὡς πολλοῖς τῶν ἰατρῶν δοκεῖ, εἴτε κατὰ τὸ μεσόφρυον, ὡς ἔλεγε Στράτων, εἴτε περὶ τὸ αἷμα, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, εἴτε περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὡς ἡ Στοά. θυμοῦ δὲ τόπος ἄντικρυς ἡ καρδία, καθάπερ ὁ περὶ τὸ ἧπαρ τόπος ἐπιθυμίας (cf. ch. 4.5). Seneca Ep. 88.34 innumerabiles quaestiones sunt de animo tantum: unde sit (cf. ch. 4.5a), qualis sit (cf. chs. 4.2–3), quando esse incipiat, quamdiu sit, aliunde alio transeat et domicilia mutet in alias animalium formas aliasque coniectus, an non amplius quam semel serviat et emissus vagetur in toto (cf. ch. 4.7); utrum corpus sit an non sit (cf. chs. 4.2–3); quid sit facturus cum per nos aliquid facere desierit, quomodo libertate sua usurus cum ex hac effugerit cavea; an obliviscatur priorum et illinc nosse se incipiat unde corpori abductus in sublime secessit (cf. ch. 4.7). ps.Maximus Confessor de An. prol. 1–5 πρῶτον μὲν ἁπάντων ὑποθήσομαι τίνι κριτηρίῳ πέφυκεν ἡ ψυχὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, εἶτα δι᾽ ὧν δείκνυται ὑπάρχουσα· εἶθ᾽ ἑξῆς, εἰ οὐσία τυγχάνει οὖσα ἢ συμβεβηκός (cf. chs. 4.2–3), εἶτα τούτοις ἀκολούθως εἰ ἁπλῆ ἢ σύνθετος (cf. ch. 4.4)., εἶτ᾽ αὖθις εἰ θνητὴ ἢ ἀθάνατος (cf. ch. 4.7), τελευταῖον δὲ εἰ λογικὴ ἢ ἄλογος.

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Liber 4 ⟨Proœmium⟩ PB : ps.Plutarchus Plac. 897E; DG p. 384a16–18 Diels

§1

Περιωδευμένων δὲ τῶν τοῦ κόσμου μερῶν διαβήσομαι πρὸς τὰ κατὰ μέρος. (P) Loci Aetiani: §1 A 1.4.2 τὰ μὲν οὖν κυριώτατα μέρη τοῦ κόσμου τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐγεννήθη.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses The only witnesses are PB, so we have to follow the text as transmitted there. C Chapter Heading No chapter heading is needed for a proem. We have added the word ⟨Proœmium⟩ to the text and translation for the sake of clarity. D Analysis a Context The proem looks back on Books 2 and 3 and forward to the contents of Books 4 and 5 and thus is placed in the omphalos position as regards these preceding and following Books. b Number–Order of Lemmata There is only one lemma. c Rationale–Structure of Proœmium See section D(a) above and Introduction to Book 4, section 2. On this passage as an authorial comment see also M–R 2.1.50–51. e Other Evidence See below section E(b)

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liber 4 ⟨proœmium⟩

E b

Further Related Texts Sources and Other Parallel Texts

Ocellus 3.1 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος τοῦ κόσμου ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ συνυπάρχειν (λέγω δὲ μέρη οὐρανόν, γῆν, τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων ὃ δὴ μετάρσιον καὶ ἀέριον ὀνομάζεται), οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὁ κόσμος. Ptolemy Synt. 1.2.170.2–6 συνάψομεν δ᾽ ἀκολούθως καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς τοῦ γαλακτίου κύκλου διαθέσεως, ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα, καὶ ὡς ἕκαστα τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ τετηρήκαμεν, πειρώμενοι τὰς κατὰ μέρος φαντασίας διατυπώσασθαι. Marcianus geogr. Periplus maris exteri 1.11.14 Müller ἡ τοίνυν θέσις καὶ περιγραφὴ τῶν δεξιῶν τῆς Λιβύης μερῶν τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον (χρὴ γὰρ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ μὲρος τὰς καθόλου προσηγορίας καὶ τὴν θέσιν δηλῶσαι τῶν τόπων).

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Liber 4 Caput 1 PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 897F–898B; pp. 384a19–386a8 Diels—PG: ps.Galenus HPh c. 89; pp. 634.18–635.3 Diels; pp. 286–296 Jas—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 188–191 Daiber—PPs Psellus Omn.Doctr. c. 176, p. 88 Westerink (titulus solus)

Titulus αʹ. Περὶ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως (P) §1 Θαλῆς τοὺς ἐτησίας ἀνέμους οἴεται πνέοντας τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ ἀντιπροσώπους ἐπαίρειν τοῦ Νείλου τὸν ὄγκον διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐκροὰς αὐτοῦ τῇ παροιδήσει τοῦ ἀντιπαρήκοντος πελάγους ἀνακόπτεσθαι. (P1) §2 Εὐθυμένης ὁ Μασσαλιώτης ἐκ τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ καὶ τῆς ἔξω θαλάσσης γλυκείας κατ᾽ αὐτὸν οὔσης νομίζει πληροῦσθαι τὸν ποταμόν. (P2) §3 Ἀναξαγόρας ἐκ τῆς χιόνος τῆς ἐν τῇ Αἰθιοπίᾳ, τηκομένης μὲν ἐν τῷ θέρει, ψυχομένης δὲ τῷ χειμῶνι. (P3) §4 Δημόκριτος τῆς χιόνος τῆς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἄρκτον μέρεσιν ὑπὸ θερινὰς τροπὰς ἀναλυομένης τε καὶ διαχεομένης νέφη μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἀτμῶν πιλοῦσθαι· τούτων δ᾽ ἀνελαυνομένων πρὸς μεσημβρίαν καὶ τὴν †Αἴγυπτον† ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτησίων ἀνέμων, ἀποτελεῖσθαι ῥαγδαίους ὄμβρους, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἀναπίμπλασθαι τάς τε λίμνας καὶ τὸν Νεῖλον ποταμόν. (P4) §1 Thales 11A16 DK; §2 Euthymenes FGrH647 F2; §3 Anaxagoras 59A91 DK; §4 Democritus 68A99 DK caput non hab. S titulus Περὶ … ἀναβάσεως PB : Περὶ ἀναβάσεως τοῦ Νείλου PG : Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως PPs §1 [2] ἐτησίας PB(I,III) : ἐτησίους PB(II)G : winterlichen [sic!] Winde Q ‖ οἴεται PBQ : αἰτιᾶται PG ‖ τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ PBG : in Ägypten PQ ‖ [2–3] ἀντιπροσώπους PB : von vorne Q : om. PG ‖ [3–4] post ἐπαίρειν hab. lac. PG ‖ [3] ante τῇ add. καὶ PG ‖ [4] ἀνακόπτεσθαι PB : ἀντικόπτεσθαι PG : welches ihn durchquert Q ‖ post ἀντικόπτεσθαι add. καὶ πληροῦσθαι τὸν Νεῖλον PG ex §2[5] §2 [5] ἔξω] ἔξωθεν PG ‖ [6] γλυκείας … οὔσης PB : om. PG ‖ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν PB : om. Q ‖ αὐτὸν] αὐτὴν PB(III) ‖ νομίζει PB : οἴεται post ποταμὸν PG ‖ πληροῦσθαι PB : πλημμυρεῖν PG §3 [7] Ἀναξαγόρας PB(I,III)GQ : Ἀναξιμενης PB(II) ‖ τῇ] om. PB(I) ‖ ἐν2 PBQ : om. PG prob. Diels ‖ [7–8] τηκομένης … χειμῶνι PBQ : gefrieren … Sommer inv. Q ‖ [8] post δὲ hab. ἐν PB(II) §4 [9] τῆς1] om. PG ‖ ἐν PB : om. PG Jas, rest. Diels ‖ [10] τε … διαχεομένης PB : om. PG ‖ [10–11] νέφη … πιλοῦσθαι PBG : om. Q ‖ [10] μὲν PB : om. PG ‖ [10–11] πιλοῦσθαι PB : πληροῦσθαι PG ‖ [11–13] τούτων … ἀναπίμπλασθαι P(BI,III) : om. PB(II)‖ [11] ἀνελαυνομένων PB(I,II) prob. Laks–Most : ἀπελαυνομένων PB(III) : συνελαυνόμενα PG ‖ ante μεσημβρίαν add. τὴν PG ‖ pro PBGQ †Αἴγυπτον† legendum est Ἀιθιοπίαν : ‘error est, scribendum erat Ἀιθιοπίαν’ Diels conl. Anon. Flor. §4, Diod. 1.39, ‘expectes Ἀιθιοπίαν’ Mau Lachenaud ‖ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτησίων ἀνέμων] al. Q aber aus den winterlichen [sic!] Winden ‖ [13] ἀναπίμπλασθαι PB : ἐγείρεσθαι PG ‖ τάς … καὶ PB : om. PG ‖ τάς τε λίμνας PB : die Sümpfe, die Teiche Q (‘Doppelübersetzung’) ‖ ποταμόν PB(I,III) : τὸν ποταμόν PB(II) : om. PGQ

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5

10

liber 4 caput 1

§5

§6

§7

Ἡρόδοτος ὁ συγγραφεὺς ἴσον μὲν ἐκ τῶν πηγῶν φέρεσθαι χειμῶνος καὶ θέρους, φαίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἐλάττονα τοῦ χειμῶνος διὰ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ πλησίον ἰόντα τὸν ἥλιον τῆς Αἰγύπτου ἐξατμίζειν τὰ νάματα. (P5) Ἔφορος ὁ ἱστοριογράφος κατὰ θέρος φησὶν ἀναχαλᾶσθαι τὴν ὅλην Αἴγυπτον καὶ οἱονεὶ ἐξιδροῦν τὸ πολὺ νᾶμα· συνδίδωσι δ᾽ αὐτῇ καὶ ἡ Ἀραβία καὶ ἡ Λιβύη παρὰ τὸ ἀραιὸν καὶ ὑπόψαμμον. (P6) Εὔδοξος τοὺς ἱερεῖς φησι λέγειν τὰ ὄμβρια τῶν ὑδάτων κατὰ τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν τῶν ὡρῶν· ὅταν γὰρ ἡμῖν ᾖ θέρος τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸν θερινὸν τροπικὸν οἰκοῦσιν, τότε τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸν χειμερινὸν τροπικὸν ἀντοίκοις χειμών ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν τὸ πλημμῦρον ὕδωρ καταρρήγνυται. (P7)

§5 cf. Herodotus 2.24–25; §6 Ephorus FGrH70 F65c; §7 Eudoxus F 288 Lasserre §5 [14] ὁ συγγραφεὺς PB : om. PG : der Verfasser der Bücher Q ‖ ἐκ τῶν πηγῶν PB : die Flüsse in einem […] gleichen Strömen Q ‖ [14–15] χειμῶνος … θέρους PBQ : om. θέρους PG rest. Diels, prob. Jas ‖ [16] ἰόντα PBQ : ὄντα PG ‖ τῆς Αἰγύπτου PBG : an die Erde […], besonders nahe an die Erde Ägyptens Q ‖ ἐξατμίζειν … νάματα PBG : sodaß sie aus dem Nil Dampf entstehen läßt, um welchen die Wasser geringer werden Q §6 [17] ὁ ἱστοριογράφος PB : der Verfasser der Annalen Q ‖ [17–18] τὴν … Αἴγυπτον PB : die Erde Ägyptens Q ‖ [18] οἱονεὶ ἐξιδροῦν PB : zu ihr […] durchsickert Q ‖ συνδίδωσι PB : umfassen Q ‖ [19] παρὰ … ὑπόψαμμον PB : om. Q §7 [20–21] τῶν … ἀντιπερίστασιν PB : om. Q ‖ [20] κατὰ corr. Roeper : καὶ P ‖ [21] γὰρ corr. Diels : πὰρ᾽ P ‖ ᾖ PB(III) : εἴη PB(I,II) ‖ [23] ἐξ … καταρρήγνυται PB : Dann treten dort die Wasser zusammen und fliessen zum Nil Q

Testes primi: Traditio ps.Plutarchi: ps.Galenus HPh c. 89 (~ tit.) Περὶ ἀναβάσεως τοῦ Νείλου (text Jas) 89.1 (~ P1) Θαλῆς τοὺς ἐτησίους ἀνέμους αἰτιᾶται πνέοντας τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ ἐπαίρειν […] καὶ τῇ παροιδήσει τοῦ ἀντιπαρήκοντος πελάγους ἀντικόπτεσθαι καὶ πληροῦσθαι τὸν Νεῖλον. 89.2 (~ P2) Εὐθυμένης ὁ Μασσαλιώτης ἐκ τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ καὶ τῆς ἔξωθεν θαλάττης πλημμυρεῖν τὸν ποταμὸν οἴεται. 89.3 (~ P3) Ἀναξαγόρας ἐκ τῆς χιόνος τῆς ἐν τῇ Αἰθιοπίᾳ τηκομένης μὲν τῷ θέρει, ψυχομένης δὲ τῷ χειμῶνι. 89.4 (~ P4) Δημόκριτος χιόνος τῆς τοῖς ἀρκτικοῖς μέρεσιν ὑπὸ θερινὰς τροπὰς ἀναλυομένης νέφη ἐκ τῶν ἀτμῶν πληροῦσθαι καὶ συνελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὴν μεσημβρίαν καὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτησίων ἀνέμων ἀποτελεῖσθαι ῥαγδαίους ὄμβρους, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἐγείρεσθαι τὸν Νεῖλον. 89.5 (~ P5) Ἡρόδοτος ἴσον μὲν φέρεσθαι ⟨θέρους⟩ καὶ χειμῶνος ἐκ τῶν πηγῶν, φαίνεσθαι δὲ ἐλάττονα τοῦ χειμῶνος διὰ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ πλησίον ὄντα τὸν ἥλιον τῆς Αἰγύπτου ἐξατμίζειν τὰ νάματα. Psellus Omn.Doctr. c. 176 (~ tit.) Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως

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liber 4 caput 1

Loci Aetiani: §1 A 3.7.3 (de Metrodoro) τοὺς δ᾽ ἐτησίας πνεῖν τοῦ πρὸς ταῖς ἄρκτοις παχυνθέντος ἀέρος. §4 A 3.12.2 Δημόκριτος διὰ τὸ ἀσθενέστερον εἶναι τὸ μεσημβρινὸν τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐξομένην τὴν γῆν κατὰ τοῦτο ἐγκλιθῆναι.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses The witnesses are P and his tradition, represented by PB, PG, PQ and (for the heading only) PPs. Nothing is found in S. It is possible that he found a place for it in Ecl. 1.39 Περὶ ὑδάτων, but this chapter survives only, it seems, in a severely truncated form with only a single long Aristotelian lemma taken from AD. T 4.62 (cited section E(a) General texts) refers to the discussion, but as pointed out by Raeder (1900) 90, there is no verbal parallelism (‘cum Aetianis … fortasse cohaeret, sed in verbis plurimum differt’). B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. The proximate tradition is varied and rich and consists of lists and even discussions of name-labels and doxai (often including arguments contra) in a multiplicity of authors, of whom we may mention Diodorus Siculus, Seneca, and Lucan, Ammianus Marcellinus, scholia on Apollonius Rhodius, and the so-called Anonymus Florentinus (FGrH647 F1). Excerpts in a Greek translation from both the extant and the lost part of Naturales quaestiones Book 4a are extant in Ioannes Lydus, see Diels DG 228 n. 3 and Gross (1989) 174–178 (the suggestion of Williams 2008 of a common source for Seneca and Ioannes Lydus is unfounded, cf. Hine 1996, 187–189. Because Ioannes Lydus’ excerpts from the extant part are not always exact, one should be careful with those from the lost part). Seneca states that he will begin the overview of the doxai concerned with the inundation of the Nile, starting with the most ancient authorities: Nat. 4.2.17 sed nunc ad inspiciendas causas propter quas aestate Nilus crescat accedam et ab antiquissimis incipiam. As has been often pointed out, however, unlike A and most other parallel sources he does not begin with Thales (who comes a little later at Nat. 4a.2.22) but, like the scholiast on Apollonius Rhodius, with Anaxagoras and the three tragic poets (Nat. 4a.2.17). ‘All of antiquity (omnis vetustas)’, he affirms, agrees with Anaxagoras. The ‘Posido-

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nian doxography’, as Kidd (1999) 295 formulates the heading of his translation of F 222 E.-K. (Greek text cited below at section E(a)§1), has a different set of names. (2) Sources. The contents of §§1–3 go back at least as far as Herodotus 2.20– 23, where these doxai are anonymous and follow each other in exactly the same order as in A. Herodotus may have used a source of Sophistic provenance. §5 with name-label summarizes Herodotus 2.24–25, so derives from an intermediate source too. The little Peripatetic treatise On the Inundation of the Nile (Liber Aristotelis De inundacione Nili), attributed to Aristotle (see below), is extant in a mediaeval Latin translation and a few fragments on papyrus. The text is printed as Aristotle frs. 246–247 Rose3; see esp. the new edition by Beullens (2014) 325–329, who keeps Rose’s page and line numbers. Some of A’s name-labels and doxai are absent from this treatise, though on the other hand it contains namelabels and doxai not found in A. Shared are four items concerned with early name-labels and doxai, namely Thales plus doxa, Anaxagoras plus doxa, the doxa of Euthymenes without name-label, and (significantly) Herodotus plus doxa. The relative order of these shared doxai is the same, although in A we have §4 Democritus between §3 Anaxagoras and §5 Herodotus, and in ps.Aristotle Diogenes between Thales and Anaxagoras, as well as two further doxai (Athenagoras, Nicagoras) between Anaxagoras and Herodotus. Nevertheless ps.Aristotle may be numbered not only among the representatives of the proximate tradition but also, possibly, among the sources of A. We note that the little treatise does not begin in the manner of a dialectical discussion but in the way of the Aristotelian/Peripatetic Problemata: propter quid = διὰ τί; ‘why?’, the question type of cause. The dialectical discussion is announced further down, ‘we shall speak of the things that are extant as said in the past by those who are in doubt about this issue’ (horum autem qui quidem existunt dicti a prius dubitantibus de ipso, hos nos dicemus). It is a mistake to compare the tract with the Problemata literature alone, for we do not find full-scale doxographies there. See also below at section D(e). It will be useful to bring the real Aristotle’s scattered references together (all quoted at section E(b) below). He does not mention the inundation of the Nile in the Meteorology, but may have it in mind when he states (Mete. 1.13 350b13– 14) that ‘the most important of its tributaries flows from the so-called Silver Mountains’. He also mentions the torrential summer rains in Aethiopia at Mete. 1.12 349a4–9 (for ῥαγδαῖα and Aethiopia see below, section D(d)§4), though without speaking of the Nile—so Alexander ad loc., in Mete. 53.15–16, eagerly supplies a reference to ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως, and Olympiodorus in Mete. 94.4–17 (cited below, section E(b) General texts) refers to the debate. The allusion to differences of opinion at Mete. 2.2 356a25–31 is a little puzzling

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because of the presence of a large river that does not behave in the same way as the Nile: the Ister (i.e. Danube) and the Nile travel over great distances and have many tributaries, which is why ‘different explanations are given regarding the sources of each of these rivers’ (περὶ τῶν πηγῶν ἄλλοι λέγουσιν ἑκάστου τῶν ποταμῶν ἄλλας αἰτίας). At APo. 2.15 98a29–33 we read: ‘why does the Nile flow more in the latter part of the month? Because the end of the month is more stormy. Why is the weather stormier then? Because the moon is waning’ (cf. GA 2.4 738a20–22). This is not about the exceptional behaviour of the Nile in summer (for the general behaviour of rivers see Mete. 1.13 349b7–8, ‘rivers always run higher in winter than in summer’), but belongs with the general explanation of inter alia the periodically varying levels of the terrestrial waters at GA 4.10 777b17–778a2, quoted above, ch. 3.17 section E(b)§1 and also D(d) further comments §1. The fuzzy situation in the pragmateiai helps to understand why an early follower of Aristotle wrote the Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως. Fowler (2000) attributes the Greek original to Posidonius, but argues that it in its turn is in part based on an earlier Peripatetic tract (by Theophrastus, as also others, e.g. already Valentinus Rose, have suspected, though this is by no means certain; see further Sharples 1998b, 197). The argument of De Nardi (2008) in favour of attribution to Aristotle himself, viz. that (as in the Meteorology) the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf are no yet seen as parts of the Indian Ocean, is insufficient. Beullens (2014), who opts for authenticity, follows some the ancient authors who either literally or by implication attribute the tract to Aristotle, but there is no proof that they were right. It is more likely that, like other supplementary works, such as the De coloribus or De spiritu, it came to be attributed to Aristotle himself: e.g. by Posidonius F 222 E.-K. (63 Theiler) on the authority of Callisthenes at Strabo 17.1.5, 790C.16–18 (cited at section E(a)§1), by Anonymus Photii cod. 249, p. 441a34–b7 (cited at section E(b)§7), and by Alexander in Mete. 53.15–16, cited above. The exceptional behaviour of the Nile in summer, toto caelo different from the behaviour of all other known rivers, called for exceptional explanations. Intriguing from the point of view of Peripatetic science is the fact that it is an individual phenomenon that has to be explained. This presumably also explains why Aristotle refrained from discussing it in the Meteorology: his science does not deal with particulars (e.g. APo. 1.18 81b6–7, de An. 2.5 417b22–23). Declaring the Nile to be the unique member of a species was apparently impossible. His one reference at APo. 2.15 98a31 to the Nile alone still deals with what he takes to be a general phenomenon. The lack of an orderly discussion in Aristotle himself as precedent helps to explain why the tradition on which A depends had to link up with the preAristotelian treatment of the issue. Aristotle, of course, could have followed

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his own advice to ‘make excerpts from the literature’ had he decided differently (Top. 1.14 105b13, ἐκλέγειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων λόγων); see M–R 2.1.158– 162. NB: Because several names are not paralleled in the Placita chapter we most of the time only provide lists of name-labels at section E(a) and (b) General texts, preferring to cite the parallels for the individual doxai at the relevant paragraphs. C Chapter Heading The heading given by PBQ is paralleled with insignificant variations in PG and PPs. It is much more informative than a simple umbrella formula (Περὶ Νείλου) would have been. It allows for the question type of cause and the categories of time and place. It is attested as a book title for Aristotle (i.e. ps.Aristotle) and Theon mathematicus. D Analysis a Context The chapter on the flooding of the Nile is rather isolated at the opening of Book 4, the rest of which deals with psychology including epistemology. This positioning may be explained as a consequence of, on the one hand, the intrusion of P 3.18 (now our A 3.5a) at the end of Book 3 and, on the other, of lack of space at the end of a scroll or perhaps codex containing either Book 3 alone or Books 1 to 3, cf. M–R 1.127–128. P 3.18 is not paralleled in G, whose c. 88 (corresponding to 3.17) is immediately followed by c. 89 (corresponding to 4.1), see ch. 3.5a Commentary A and D(a). Chs. 3.17 and 4.1 indeed belong together, the former dealing with the high and low waters of the sea (possibly not only during the twenty-four-hours period but also in the course of the solar year), the latter with the high and low waters in summer and winter of an exceptional river. As a set the chapters 3.16 plus 3.17 plus 4.1 deal with the terrestrial waters, and they appropriately bring up the rear of the πρόσγεια. Thus ch. 4.1 could serve as a transitional chapter, linking Book 4 to Book 3, though its isolated position at the very beginning remains odd. Alternatively we may regard ch. 4.1 as, so to speak, a mini-book, corresponding as to its relative self-sufficiency to Seneca, Nat. Book 4a on the Nile (originally Nat. Book 2), following immediately upon Book 3 on terrestrial waters (originally Nat. Book 1). A third possibility, suggested by the proem, is that the Nile is considered to be a particular part of one of the larger parts of cosmos treated in previous books. But the Milky Way, treated in the first chapter of Book 3, is also a particular rather than a general item (for the reasons of its placement at the beginning of the Book see ch. 3.1, Commentary D(a)).

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See also General Introduction, section 2.7. b Number–Order of Lemmata PBQ has seven lemmata, of which G, who omitted §§6–7, has five. The order of these lemmata rather strictly corresponds to the chronology of the namelabels, a rare phenomenon in the Placita. This almost certainly has to do with the history of the independent tradition concerned with the flooding of the Nile. The relative order of §§1–3 and §5 corresponds to that in Herodotus; before the lemma with his name-label (§5) another one, concerned with a virtually contemporaneous Presocratic, has been inserted as §4. The final lemmata, §§6–7, doxai of Ephorus and Eudoxus, are also concerned with near contemporaries. §7, which has Eudoxus citing the (ancient lore of) the Egyptian priests, not unelegantly and perhaps even intentionally links up with §1 on the earliest physicist, Thales, in a sort of ring composition. There is no reason to meddle with the sequence, which is also that of Diels in the DG. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter The main question-type at issue is that of cause, the διὰ τί (the preposition διά occurs in §1 and §5; also cf. the opening words of the De inundacione Nili: propter quid, and the use of διά and propter in the parallel passages, e.g. Seneca Nat. 4a.17.2 causas propter quas). The categories concerned are those of time: summer, winter, and place: winds from the north in §1, the outer ocean in §2, Aethiopia in §3 (and §4), the far north in §4, Egypt explicitly in §1 and §6 (and by mistake in §4), Libya in §6, and the far south in §7. The causes of the summer flooding vary from obstructing winds that only blow in summer (§1), snow that melts in summer in the far south (§3), snow that melts in summer in the far north, the clouds then being driven to the far south where they cause heavy rains (§4), evaporation because in summer the sun comes closer (§5), excess production of water locally and further south in summer (§6), and finally production of water in the far south in our summer, when it is winter down there (§7). The sweet water from the Ocean (§2), which is entirely different from the factors listed in the other lemmata, could have figured ad finem if the chapter had been set out in the usual way of the Placita, where exceptions are often found at the end of chapters. Since the lemmata are arranged in chronological order there is hardly room for such an overarching diaeresis. The date of Euthymenes is uncertain: though sometimes believed to have been a contemporary of Pytheas (between c. 350–300 bce), it is more likely that he has to be dated to around 500 bce, see Roller (2010) 133, and Brill’s New Pauly, s.v. Euthymenes.

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Other relations between lemmata: §3, snow in Aethiopia, is opposed to §4, snow in the far north, while §5 and §6 are related because they refer to water from sources (§5) or from the soil as a whole (§6), and the rainy kinds of waters of §7 are opposed to these waters from the earth. d

Further Comments Individual Points §2 The doxa of Euthymenes may be connected with the commonly found early belief that the Ocean is the origin of rivers. We note that the lemma fails to provide an explanation of the summer flooding. Euthymenes’ belief that the Niger is part of the Nile was imitated in another country: Arrian An. 6.1 tells us that Alexander, having seen crocodiles in the Indus, at first believed that the origin of the Nile was somewhere in India, that flowing through the desert it lost its name of Indus, and acquired the name Nile upon coming into another part of the world. §4 The word ῥαγδαῖα here and at Arist. Mete. 1.12 349a6 suggests that Democritus used it and Aristotle cited this when formulating his own view (it is the only instance in the Corpus Aristotelicum apart from Aud. 803a5, τῶν ὑδάτων τὰ καλούμενα ῥαγδαῖα, where note καλούμενα). This entails that the doxa may have begun its career as an excerpt from a Democritean treatise (the Κοσμογραφίη?). Diels DG ad loc., followed by other editors, points out that Αἴγυπτον is a mistake for Αἰθιοπίαν (he says ‘scribendum erat’ not ‘est’, for he does not place the correction in the text). True enough, but this mistake is hard to explain, for in the previous lemma, §3, we find Αἰθιοπίᾳ, so that perseveration of Αἰγύπτῳ in §1, further away, is not very likely. For this reason we have followed Diels’ example, too, daggered Αἴγυπτον and confined the correction to the apparatus. e Other Evidence ‘Es dürfte keinen zweiten Fall geben, daß ein Einzelproblem immer wieder mit allem Für und Wider von Herodot bis Ammianus Marcellinus in mehr oder minder geschlossenen Abhandlungen erörtert worden und soviel davon erhalten ist. Fünf größere Traktate besitzen wir noch ganz, oder wenigstens so weit, daß wir Anlage und Gedankengang überblicken: von Herodot, Aristoteles, Agatharchides, Seneca, Ailios Aristeides. Dazu kommen doxographische Zusammenstellungen verschiedener Art. … Die Nilschwelle ist geradezu ein Schulbeispiel antiker doxographisch-zetematischer Literatur. Schon Herodot zeigt den Typus voll entwickelt …’ (Rehm 1936, 572). Because of the opening formula propter quid = διὰ τί and the remark ad finem that the flooding of the Nile no longer seems to be a ‘problem’ (p. 197.2–3 R3 non iam problema videntur esse ~ Anon.Phot. p. 242.6 Thesleff/ps.Arist. fr. 246,

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p. 189.9–10 R3 φησιν ὡς τοῦτο οὐκέτι πρόβλημά), it has been argued that De inundacione Nili belongs with the Aristotelian (or Peripatetic) Problemata genre; see various contributors at Mayhew (2015) 2–3 and 16–17. Several headings of Aëtian chapters, too, begin with, or contain, the formula διὰ τί (2.30, 5.9, 5.14, 5.18). The name-labels (six) plus patronymic (four) and ethnicon (four) that are present in the opusculum are as foreign to the Problemata literature as they are at home (when providing a first introduction) in doxographical literature and similar contexts. The opusculum, dealing with a particular issue (zetema) of a causal nature and including an overview of the related discussion, combines the technique of the Problemata literature with that of dialectic. E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: Diodorus Siculus 1.36.7–41.10 (Agatharchides FGrH86 F19) μεγάλης δ᾽ οὔσης ἀπορίας περὶ τῆς τοῦ ποταμοῦ πληρώσεως, ἐπικεχειρήκασι πολλοὶ τῶν τε φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν ἱστορικῶν ἀποδιδόναι τὰς ταύτης αἰτίας, περὶ ὧν ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἐροῦμεν. … τινὲς μὲν τῶν συγγραφέων ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, … τινὲς δ᾽ ἐπιβαλόμενοι λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐπιζητουμένων πολὺ τῆς ἀληθείας διήμαρτον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν Ἑλλάνικον (FrGrH4 F173), καὶ Κάδμον, ἔτι δ᾽ Ἑκαταῖον (FGrH1a F302a), καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, παλαιοὶ παντάπασιν ὄντες, εἰς τὰς μυθώδεις ἀποφάσεις ἀπέκλιναν· Ἡρόδοτος δὲ ὁ πολυπράγμων … Ξενοφῶν δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης … οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἔφορον (FrGrH70 F65) καὶ Θεόπομπον (FrGrH115 F293) … 37.7 οἱ μὲν κατ᾽ Αἴγυπτον ἱερεῖς … 38.2 Θαλῆς (fr. 82 Wöhrle) μὲν οὖν … 38.3 Ἀναξαγόρας δ᾽ ὁ φυσικὸς (—) … 38.8 Ἡρόδοτος δέ … 39.1 Δημόκριτος δ᾽ ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης (cf. 68A99 DK) … 39.7 Ἔφορος δὲ … 40.1 τῶν δ᾽ ἐν Μέμφει τινὲς φιλοσόφων … 41.1 Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χῖός (fr. 11 Bodnár) 41.4 ἔγγιστα δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ προσελήλυθεν Ἀγαθαρχίδης ὁ Κνίδιος (see below) … 41.10 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς πληρώσεως τοῦ Νείλου, δυνάμενοι ποικιλώτερον ἀντειπεῖν πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἀρκεσθησόμεθα τοῖς εἰρημένοις (cited Theophylactes Simocatta Hist. 7.17.3–45). 1.41.4 ἔγγιστα δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ προσελήλυθεν Ἀγαθαρχίδης ὁ Κνίδιος (FGrH86 F112)· φησὶ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν ὄρεσι γίνεσθαι συνεχεῖς ὄμβρους ἀπὸ θερινῶν τροπῶν μέχρι τῆς μετοπωρινῆς ἰσημερίας· εὐλόγως οὖν τὸν Νεῖλον ἐν μὲν τῷ χειμῶνι συστέλλεσθαι, τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα ῥύσιν ἀπὸ μόνων τῶν πηγῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ θέρος διὰ τοὺς ἐκχεομένους ὄμβρους λαμβάνειν τὴν αὔξησιν κτλ. Strabo 17.1.5, C 789.23–26 (Aristotle fr. 246 R3) οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαῖοι στοχασμῷ τὸ πλέον, οἱ δ᾽ ὕστερον αὐτόπται γενηθέντες ᾔσθοντο ὑπὸ ὄμβρων θερινῶν πληρούμενον τὸν Νεῖλον, τῆς Αἰθιοπίας τῆς ἄνω κλυζομένης, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις ὄρεσι, παυσαμένων δὲ τῶν ὄμβρων παυομένην κατ᾽ ὀλίγον τὴν πλημμυρίδα. 17.1.5, C 790.9–21 θαυμαστὸν οὖν πῶς ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφορμῶν οὐ τελέως ἐναργὴς ἦν ἡ περὶ τῶν ὄμβρων ἱστορία τοῖς τότε, καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἱερέων φιλοπραγμονέστερον ἀναφερόντων εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα καὶ ἀποτιθεμένων ὅσα μάθησιν περιττὴν ἐπιφαίνει. εἰ γὰρ ἄρα, τοῦτ᾽ ἐχρῆν ζητεῖν—ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ζητεῖται—τί δή ποτε θέρους, χειμῶνος δὲ οὔ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοτιωτάτοις, ἐν δὲ τῇ Θηβαΐδι καὶ τῇ περὶ Συήνην οὔ, συμπίπτουσιν ὄμβροι, τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι ἐξ ὄμβρων

liber 4 caput 1 αἱ ἀναβάσεις μὴ ζητεῖν μηδὲ τοιούτων δεῖσθαι μαρτύρων οἵους Ποσειδώνιος (F 222 E.-K., 63 Theiler) εἴρηκε. φησὶ γὰρ Καλλισθένη (FGrH124 F12) λέγειν τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὄμβρων αἰτίαν τῶν θερινῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους (frs. 246–248 R3) λαβόντα, ἐκεῖνον δὲ παρὰ Θρασυάλκου τοῦ Θασίου (35.1 DK)—τῶν ἀρχαίων δὲ φυσικῶν εἷς οὗτος— ἐκεῖνον δὲ παρ᾽ ἄλλου, τὸν δὲ παρ᾽ Ὁμήρου (Od. 4.581) ‘διιπετέα’ φάσκοντος τὸν Νεῖλον ‘ἂψ δ᾽ εἰς Αἰγύπτοιο διιπετέος ποταμοῖο’. Seneca Nat. 6.8.3 nescis autem inter opiniones quibus enarratur Nili aestiva inundatio et hanc esse, e terra illum erumpere et augeri non supernis aquis sed ex intimo redditis? Nat. 4a.2.17 sed nunc ad inspiciendas causas propter quas aestate Nilus crescat accedam, et ab antiquissimis incipiam. Anaxagoras (59A91 DK) ait … Nat. 4a.2.22 si Thaleti (fr. 100 Wöhrle) credis … . Euthymenes Massiliensis testimonium dicit (see below §2) … . Nat. 4a.2.26 Oenopides Chius (fr. 11 Bodnár) ait … . Nat. 4a.2.28 Diogenes Apolloniates ait (64A18 DK) … the lost sequel has been excerpted by Ioannes Lydus Mens. 4.107.40 ὁ δὲ Ἡρόδοτος … 107.45 οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοί … 107.48 Ἔφορός γε μὴν ὁ Κυμαῖος (FGrH70 F65b) … 107.53 Θρασυάλκης ὁ Θάσιος (cf. DK on 35.1) … 107.58 Καλλισθένης ὁ Περιπατητικὸς (FGrH124 F12a) … 107.62 ἀλλὰ καὶ Δικαίαρχος (fr. 113 Wehrli, 126 Mirhady) … 107.64–66 ποικίλαι μὲν οὖν αἱ περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαι, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τέως οὐδαμοῦ· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ λόγιον (Or.Chald. fr. 183 Des Places) τὸ δ᾽ ἀτρεκὲς ἐν βαθεῖ ἐστι. see also below, this chapter, individual paragraphs. Anon. Florentinus (FGrH647 F1) 1 Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος (fr. 548 Wöhrle) … 2 Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ φυσικός (—) … 3 Καλλισθένης δὲ ὁ ἱστοριογράφος (FGrH124 F12) … 4 Δημόκριτος δὲ (fr. 411 Luria) … 5 Εὐθυμένης δὲ ὁ Μασσαλιώτης … 6 Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χῖος (fr. 11 Bodnár) … 7 Ἡρόδοτος δὲ … . Ammianus Marcellinus 22.15.4–7 origines fontium Nili, ut mihi quidem videri solet, sicut adhuc factum est, posterae quoque ignorabunt aetates. verum quoniam fabulantes poetae variantesque geographi in diversa latentem notitiam scindunt, opiniones eorum veritati confines, ut arbitror, expediam paucis. … affirmant aliqui physicorum (see below § 7) … ex Aethiopicis imbribus, qui abundanter in tractibus illis per aestus torridos cadere memorantur, exundationes eius erigi anni temporibus asserunt alii praestitutis … opinio est celebrior alia (see below §1) … . Theodoret CAG 4.62 διά τοι τοῦτο καὶ τὸν Νεῖλόν φασιν οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποταμοῖς πλημμυρεῖν καιρόν, ἀλλὰ μεσοῦντος τοῦ θέρους ἐπικλύζειν τὴν Αἴγυπτον, ὡς τοῦ γε ἡλίου τὴν βορειοτέραν διαθέοντος ζώνην, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὲν ποταμοῖς ἐνοχλοῦντος, τούτου δέ γε πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλας αἰτίας τῆς τούτου γε πλημμύρας εἶναί φασί τινες, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔμοιγε ἁρμόττειν τόνδε νῦν τὸν λόγον ὑπείληφα. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρεγγυῶ τῆς μὲν θείας οἰκονομίας μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰς αἰτίας, θαυμάζειν δὲ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ἀνυμνεῖν. Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium 4.269–271a, p. 276.5–277.10 Wendel περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναδόσεως διάφοροι αἰτίαι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐλέγοντο. (1) Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν γάρ (—) … (2) Νικαγόρας δέ … (3) Δημόκριτος δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς (68A99 DK) … (4) Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χῖος (41.11 DK) … (5) Ἔφορος … (6) Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιός (fr. 571 Wöhrle) … (7) Διογένης δὲ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης (64A18 DK) … . Tzetzes Exeges. in Iliad. Α.426, schol. 85.10–45 Lolos ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδήπερ τὸ πᾶν εὐκρινήσαμεν, φέρε καὶ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν δόξας τὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως εἴποιμεν· (for what fol-

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lows see below §1, §3, §5) … ἐξ Αἰθιόπων ὁ ἀὴρ ἤτοι πληροῖ τὸν Νεῖλον / ὅπερ ἑτέροις γέγονεν μακρόστιχον βιβλίον / ὡς εἶπε καὶ προέγραψε τοῦτο σοφὸς ὁ γέρων. Chapter heading: Strabo 17.1.5, 790C.22–24 ἀρκέσει δύο μηνῦσαι τοὺς ποιήσαντας καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς τὸ περὶ τοῦ Νείλου βιβλίον, Εὔδωρόν τε καὶ Ἀρίστωνα τὸν ἐκ τῶν Περιπάτων (fr. 7 Mariotti). Capitula Lucretiana at DRN 6.712 de Nilo fluvio. Irenaeus of Lyon Haer. 2.28.2 Rousseau–Doutreleau (trans. Rufini) quid enim si temptemus exponere causam ascensionis Nili? Isidore of Seville de Nat. capitul. 43 De Nilo flumine (heading in the body of the work: De Nilo). §1 Thales: Pomponius Mela Chor. 1.53 (crescit … sive quod) aut venienti obviae adverso spiritu cursum descendentis impediunt. Diodorus Siculus 1.38.2 Θαλῆς (fr. 82 Wöhrle) μὲν οὖν, εἷς τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν ὀνομαζόμενος, φησὶ τοὺς ἐτησίας ἀντιπνέοντας ταῖς ἐκβολαῖς τοῦ ποταμοῦ κωλύειν εἰς θάλατταν προχεῖσθαι τὸ ῥεῦμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸν πληρούμενον ἐπικλύζειν ταπεινὴν οὖσαν καὶ πεδιάδα τὴν Αἴγυπτον. Seneca Nat. 4a.2.22 si Thaleti (fr. 100 Wöhrle) credis, Etesiae descendenti Nilo resistunt, et cursum eius acto contra ostia mari sustinent: ita reverberatus in se recurrit; nec crescit, sed exitu prohibitus resistit, et quacumque mox potuit in se congestus erumpit. cf. Lucanus 10.239–247 … Zephyros quoque vana vetustas / his ascripsit aquis, quorum stata tempora flatus / continuique dies et in aëra longa potestas, / … / (244) vel quod aquas totiens rumpentis litora Nili / adsiduo feriunt coguntque resistere fluctu: / ille mora cursus adversique obice ponti / aestuat in campos. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 1.37 τὸν Νεῖλον εἶπε (Thales 11A1 DK) πληθύειν ἀνακοπτομένων τῶν ῥευμάτων ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτησίων ἐναντίων ὄντων. Anon. Florentinus (FGrH647 F1) §1 Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος (fr. 560 Wöhrle), εἷς τῶν ζʹ̄ σοφῶν, φησὶ διὰ τοὺς ἐτησίας γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν· πνεῖν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐναντίους τῷ ποταμῷ, καὶ τὰ στόματα κεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν πνοὴν αὐτῶν· τὸν μὲν οὖν ἄνεμον ἐξ ἐναντίας πνέοντα κωλύειν τὴν ἔκβασιν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐκπίπτειν εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν, τὸ δὲ κῦμα προσπῖπτον ἀντίον τοῖς στόμασι καὶ οὐριον ὂν ἀνακόπτειν τὸν ποταμόν, καὶ ⟨τὴν⟩ ἀναπλήρωσιν οὕτως φησὶ γίνεσθαι τοῦ ποταμοῦ. Ammianus Marcellinus 22.15.7 opinio est celebrior alia, quod spirantibus prodromis perque dies quadraginta et quinque etesiarum continuis flatibus repellentibus eius meatum velocitate cohibita superfusis fluctibus intumescit et reluctante spiritu controverso adolescens in maius hinc vi reverberante ventorum, inde urgente cursu venarum perennium progrediens in sublime integit omnia et humo suppressa per supina camporum speciem exhibet maris. Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium 4.269–271a, p. 277.3–7 Wendel Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιός (fr. 571 Wöhrle) φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτησίων συνελαυνόμενα τὰ νέφη κατὰ τὰ ὄρη τῆς Αἰθιοπίας αὐτόθι ῥήγνυσθαι· ὅταν γὰρ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐξεναντίας συστῶσιν αἱ πνοαὶ προσπίπτουσαι τῇ θαλάσσῇ, ἐκ τῆς ἀποπεμπομένης πλήσμης τὰς ὑπερχύσεις ἀναδέχεσθαι τὸν Νεῖλον. Isidore of Seville Nat. 43.1–2 Aegyptus aëris calore semper solem habet, numquam nubes vel imbres recipit. cuius loca Nilus fluvius aestatis tempore inundat, quem pro pluviis utuntur. oritur enim fluvius idem inter Austrum et ortum. Etesiarum autem flatus a Zephyri parte, id est ab occiduo, flant et habent certum tempus. nascuntur enim mense Maio. quarum flatus initio languens est, sed per dies augescit. (2) nam flant ab hora sexta in decimam.

liber 4 caput 1 harum igitur flatu resistente undis, oppositisque etiam ostiis eius, quibus in mare influit, arenarum cumulis, Nili fluctus intumescunt ac retro reverti coguntur sicque aquae erumpentes propelluntur in austrum. quibus congestis, Nilus in Aegyptum erumpit; quiescentibus quoque Etesiis ruptisque arenarum cumulis, rursus in suum alveum redit fluuius. Etym. 13.21.7 hic apud Aegyptios Nilus vocatur propter limum quem trahit, qui efficit fecunditatem; unde et Nilus dictus est, quasi νέαν ἰλύν: nam antea Nilus Latine Melo dicebatur. apparet autem in Nilide lacu, de quo in meridiem versus excipitur Aegypto, ubi Aquilonis flatibus repercussus aquis retroluctantibus intumescit, et inundationem Aegypti facit. Tzetzes Exeges. in Iliad. Α. 426, schol. 85.13–15 Lolos Θαλῆς (—) ὁμοῦ καὶ Εὐ⟨θυ⟩μενὴς ἀνὴρ Μασσαλιώτης [sic; cf. below §2] / τοὺς ἐτησίας γράφοντες ἀναπληρῶν τὸν Νεῖλον / ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς ἐκτὸς γλυκείας ὑπηργμένης. §2 Euthymenes: Seneca Nat. 4a.2.22 Euthymenes Massiliensis testimonium dicit: ‘navigavi’, inquit, ‘Atlanticum mare. inde Nilus fluit, maior quamdiu Etesiae statum tempus observant; tunc enim eicitur mare instantibus ventis. cum resederunt, et pelagus conquiescit minorque descendenti inde vis Nilo est. ceterum dulcis mari sapor est, et similes Niloticis belvae.’ = Ioannes Lydus Mens. 4.107.18–26 Εὐθυμένης δὲ ὁ Mασσαλιώτης φησὶ διαπλεῦσαι τὴν Ἀτλαντικὴν θάλατταν, ἐξ ἐκείνης τε ἰδεῖν τὸν Νεῖλον ἐκτρέχοντα καὶ τότε μᾶλλον ὀγκοῦσθαι, ὅταν οἱ λεγόμενοι ἐτήσιοι πνέωσι· τότε γάρ φησιν ἐξωθεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων τὴν θάλατταν, τούτων δὲ παυομένων ἡσυχάζειν. γλυκὺ δὲ σχεδὸν τὸ τῆς Ἀτλαντικῆς θαλάττης ὕδωρ, καὶ ὅμοια ⟨τὰ⟩ ταύτης θηρία τοῖς τοῦ Νείλου. ἀντιλέγει δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ δόξῃ ὁ Σενέκας (sc. Nat. 4a.2.23–25) φάσκων κτλ. = Ioannes Lydus Mens. 4.107.62– 64 (excerpted from Seneca Nat. 4a, lost) ἀλλὰ καὶ Δικαίαρχος (fr. 113 Wehrli, 126 Mirhady) ἐν Περιόδῳ γῆς ἐκ τῆς Ἀτλαντικῆς θαλάττης τὸν Νεῖλον ἀναχεῖσθαι βούλεται. Anon. Florentinus (FGrH647 F1) §5 Εὐθυμένης δὲ ὁ Μασσαλιώτης αὐτὸς πεπλευκώς φησιν εἰς τὴν ἔξω θάλασσαν ἐπιρρεῖν ἕως εἰς τὴν Λιβύην ἐστραμμένην τε εἶναι πρὸς βορέαν τε καὶ ἄρκτους, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἄλλον χρόνον κενὴν εἶναι τὴν θάλασσαν, τοῖς δὲ ἐτησίαις ἀνωθουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν πνευμάτων πληροῦσθαι καὶ ῥεῖν ἔσω ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις, παυσαμένων δὲ τῶν ἐτησίων ἀναχωρεῖν. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ γλυκεῖαν, καὶ κήτη παραπλήσια τοῖς ἐν τῷ Νείλῷ κροκοδείλοις καὶ ἱπποποτάμοις ἔχειν. §3 Anaxagoras: Pomponius Mela 1.53 crescit porro, sive quod solutae magnis aestibus nives ex inmanibus Aethiopiae iugis largius quam ripis accipi queant defluunt. Diodorus Siculus 1.38.4 Ἀναξαγόρας δ᾽ ὁ φυσικὸς (—) ἀπεφήνατο τῆς ἀναβάσεως αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν τηκομένην χιόνα κατὰ τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν, ᾧ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς Εὐριπίδης μαθητὴς ὢν ἠκολούθηκε· λέγει γοῦν κτλ. Seneca Nat. 4a.2.17 Anaxagoras (59A91 DK) ait ex Aethiopiae iugis solutas nives ad Nilum usque decurrere. in eadem opinione omnis vetustas fuit: hoc Aeschylus (fr. 300 Radt) Sophocles (fr. 882 Radt) Euripides (fr. 228 Kannicht) tradunt. = Ioannes Lydus Mens. 4.107.7–11 περὶ τῆς ἐν θέρει τῶν ὑδάτων ἐπιδόσεως Ἀναξαγόρας φησί, τὰς τῆς Αἰθιοπίας τηκομένας χιόνας ἀποστέλλειν τὸν Νεῖλον. καὶ ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δόξης ὅ τ᾽ Αἴσχυλος (fr. 300 Radt) καὶ Σοφοκλῆς (fr. 882 Radt) καὶ Εὐριπίδης (fr. 228 Kannicht). ὁ δὲ μέγιστος ἐν φιλοσόφοις Ῥωμαίοις Σενέκας (sc. Nat. 4a.2.17–21)

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ἀντιλέγει κτλ. cf. Lucanus 10.219–220 vana fides veterum, Nilo, quod crescat in arva, / Aethiopum prodesse nives. Hippolytus Ref. 1.8.5 (on Anaxagoras, 59A42 DK) τὸν δὲ Νεῖλον αὔξεσθαι κατὰ τὸ θέρος καταφερομένων εἰς αὐτὸν ὑδάτων ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀρκτ⟨ικ⟩οῖς χιόνων. Anon. Florentinus (FGrH647 F1) §2 Αναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ φυσικός (—) φησι τῆς χιόνος τηκομένης τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν τοῦ Νείλου γίνεσθαι· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ Εὐριπίδης (fr. 228 Kannicht) καὶ ἕτεροί τινες τραγωιδιῶν ποιηταί. ἀλλ᾽ Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν γένεσιν ποίησιν λέγει τῆς ἀναπληρώσεως, ὡς αὐτὸς εἴρηκεν, Εὐριπίδης δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἀφορίζει, λέγων οὕτως κτλ. Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium 4.269–271a, p. 276.6–8 Wendel Ἀναξαγόρας (—) μὲν γάρ φησι διὰ τῆξιν τῆς χιόνος πληθύειν αὐτόν, ᾧ ἕπεται καὶ Εὐριπίδης λέγων κτλ. Tzetzes Exeges. in Iliad. A.426, schol. 85.21–41 Lolos Ἀναξαγόρας (—) πάλιν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοκρίτου / καί τις ἀνὴρ Ἀρχέλαος ὁμοῦ καὶ Καλλισθένης / Αἰσχύλος (fr. 300 Radt) Εὐριπίδης (fr. 228 Kannicht) τε συντρέχουσιν Ὁμήρῳ (Od. 4.477 and 4.581) / σὺν τούτοις καὶ Διόδωρος ὁ ἱστοριογράφος (1.36.7–41.10) / ἐξ ὄμβρου καὶ χιόνος τε τῆς ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ / συντηκομένης λέγοντες κατάρδεσθαι τὸν Νεῖλον. / ὁ μὲν Αἰσχύλος οὑτωσὶ τοῖς στίχοις διαγράφων· κτλ. … ταῦτά φησιν Αἰσχύλος μέν, ὁ δ᾽ Εὐριπίδης λέγει· κτλ. … ὁ δ᾽ Ὅμηρος μονόστιχόν φησι βραχυλογίαν κτλ. §4 Democritus: Pomponius Mela 1.53 (crescit) sive quod per ea tempora flantes Etesiae aut actas a septentrione in meridiem nubes super principia eius imbre praecipitant, aut venienti obviae adverso spiritu cursum descendentis impediunt, aut harenis quas cum fluctibus litori adplicant ostia obducunt. Diodorus Siculus 1.39.1–3 Δημόκριτος δ᾽ ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης (68A99 DK) φησὶν οὐ τὸν περὶ τὴν μεσημβρίαν τόπον χιονίζεσθαι, καθάπερ εἴρηκεν Εὐριπίδης (—) καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας (—), ἀλλὰ τὸν περὶ τὰς ἄρκτους, καὶ τοῦτο ἐμφανὲς εἶναι πᾶσι. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῆς σωρευομένης χιόνος ἐν τοῖς βορείοις μέρεσι περὶ μὲν τὰς τροπὰς μένειν πεπηγός, ἐν δὲ τῷ θέρει διαλυομένων ὑπὸ τῆς θερμασίας τῶν πάγων πολλὴν τηκεδόνα γίνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰ γεννᾶσθαι καὶ παχέα νέφη περὶ τοὺς μετεωροτέρους τῶν τόπων, δαψιλοῦς τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως πρὸς τὸ ὕψος αἰρομένης. ταῦτα δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτησίων ἐλαύνεσθαι, μέχρι ἂν ὅτου προσπέσῃ τοῖς μεγίστοις ὄρεσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην, ἅ φησιν εἶναι περὶ τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν· ἔπειτα πρὸς τούτοις οὖσιν ὑψηλοῖς βιαίως θραυόμενα παμμεγέθεις ὄμβρους γεννᾶν, ἐξ ὧν πληροῦσθαι τὸν ποταμὸν μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐτησίων ὥραν. Anon. Florentinus (FGrH647 F1) §4 Δημόκριτος (fr. 411 Luria) δὲ λέγει περὶ μὲν χειμερινὰς τροπὰς τοὺς περὶ τὰς Ἄρκτους χιονίζεσθαι τόπους, περὶ τροπὰς δὲ θερινὰς μεταστάντος τοῦ ἡλίου τηκομένης τῆς χιόνος καὶ ἀτμιζομένης ἀπὸ τῆς τήξεως νέφη γίνεσθαι, ἃ τοὺς ἐτησίας ὑπολαμβάνοντας φέρειν πρὸς μεσημβρίαν· συνωθουμένων δὲ τῶν νεφῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν καὶ τὴν Λιβύην ὄμβρον γίνεσθαι πολύν, ὃν καταρρέοντα πληροῦν τὸν Νεῖλον. Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium 4.269 Δημόκριτος δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς (68A99 DK) *** ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ μεσημβρίαν ὑπερκειμένου πελάγους λαμβάνειν τὸν Νεῖλον τὴν ἐπίχυσιν, ἀπογλυκαίνεσθαι δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ διὰ τὸ διάστημα καὶ τὸ μῆκος τοῦ πόρου καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ καύματος ἀφεψόμενον· διὸ καὶ ἐναντίαν φησὶν ἔχειν τὴν γεῦσιν. §5 Herodotus: Pomponius Mela 1.53 (crescit) sive quod sol hieme terris propior et ob id fontem eius minuens tunc altius abit, sinitque integrum et ut est plenissimus surgere. Diodorus Siculus 1.38.8–9 Ἡρόδοτος δέ φησι τὸν Νεῖλον

liber 4 caput 1 εἶναι μὲν φύσει τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος γίνεται κατὰ τὴν πλήρωσιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ χειμῶνι τὸν ἥλιον κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην φερόμενον ἐπισπᾶσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν πολλὴν ὑγρασίαν ἐκ τοῦ Νείλου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους παρὰ φύσιν ἐλάττονα γίνεσθαι τὸν ποταμόν· τοῦ δὲ θέρους ἐπιστάντος ἀποχωροῦντα τῇ φορᾷ τὸν ἥλιον πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους ἀναξηραίνειν καὶ ταπεινοῦν τούς τε περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ποταμοὺς καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην χώραν τὴν ὁμοίως ἐκείνῃ κειμένην. Anon. Florentinus (FGrH647 F1) §7 Ηρόδοτος δὲ τοῖς μὲν λοιποῖς ὑπεναντία λέγει, παραπλησίως δὲ Οἰνοπίδῃ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ῥύσιν τοῦ Νείλου φησὶ τοιαύτην ὥστε ἀεὶ πληροῦν τὸν ποταμόν, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον τοῦ χειμῶνος κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην ποιούμενον τὴν πορείαν ἀναξηραίνειν τὸν Νεῖλον, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς θερινὰς τροπὰς μεθιστάμενον πρὸς τὴν Ἄρκτον ἰέναι. Ioannes Lydus Mens. 4.107.40–45 (excerpted from Seneca Nat. 4a, lost) ὁ δὲ Ἡρόδοτος παρὰ πάντων τῶν ποταμῶν ἕλκειν τὸν ἥλιον τὸ ὑγρόν φησι τὴν πρόσγειον νότου ζώνην διατρέχοντα, πρὸς δὲ τῷ θέρει πρὸς βορρᾶν ἐκκλίνοντα ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τὸν Νεῖλον, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτὸν ἀναχεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ θέρος. confusedly Olympiodorus in Mete. 109.3–6 ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀριστοτέλης, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πτολεμαῖος, φησὶ πηγὰς ἔχειν τὸν Νεῖλον· Ἡροδότῳ δὲ μᾶλλον πιστευτέον ἐντεῦθεν λέγοντι ἐκ τῆς ἀντοικουμένης ἔχειν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτόν· διὸ καὶ θέρους πλημμυρεῖ, ὅτε ἐκεῖσε χειμών. Tzetzes Exeges. in Iliad. Α.426, schol. 85.16–20 Lolos ὁ Χῖος Οἰνοπίδης (fr. 11 Bodnár) δὲ σὺν ἅμα Ἡροδότῳ / πηγάς φασι τὸν ποταμὸν ξηραίνεσθαι χειμῶνι, / τῷ δ᾽ ὀμβρίῳ ὕδατι τότε πληροῦσθαι μόνῳ / τῷ θέρει θερομένας δὲ μᾶλλον ἀναβλύζειν / ὁ Νεῖλος δ᾽ οὐ βρεχόμενος ἥττων ἐστὶ χειμῶνι. §6 Ephorus: Diodorus Siculus 1.39.7 Ἔφορος (FGrH70 F65e) δὲ καινοτάτην αἰτίαν εἰσφέρων πιθανολογεῖν μὲν πειρᾶται, τῆς δ᾽ ἀληθείας οὐδαμῶς ἐπιτυγχάνων θεωρεῖται. φησὶ γὰρ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἅπασαν οὖσαν ποταμόχωστον καὶ χαύνην, ἔτι δὲ κισηρώδη τὴν φύσιν, ῥαγάδας τε μεγάλας καὶ διηνεκεῖς ἔχειν, διὰ δὲ τούτων εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναλαμβάνειν ὑγροῦ πλῆθος, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὴν χειμερινὴν ὥραν συνέχειν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοῦτο, κατὰ δὲ τὴν θερινὴν ὥσπερ ἱδρῶτάς τινας ἐξ αὑτῆς πανταχόθεν ἀνιέναι, καὶ διὰ τούτων πληροῦν τὸν ποταμόν. Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium 4.269–271a, p. 277.1–3 Wendel Ἔφορος (FGrH70 F65d) δὲ ποταμόχωστον εἶναί φησι τὴν Αἴγυπτον, ῥηγνυμένης δὲ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου τῷ ἔαρι ἀναπηδᾶν τὸ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἐπαύξεσθαι τὸ ῥεῦμα. Ioannes Lydus Mens. 4.107.45–48 (excerpted from Nat. 4a, lost) Ἔφορός (FGrH70 F65b) γε μὴν ὁ Κυμαῖος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν φησιν, ἀραιὰν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν Αἴγυπτον, καὶ κατ᾽ ἔτος ἐπαγομένης ἰλύος ὑπὸ τοῦ Νείλου στεγανοῦσθαι, τὸν δὲ ποταμὸν δίκην ἱδρῶτος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ καύματος ἐπὶ τὰ κουφότερα καὶ ἀραιότερα καταρρεῖν. §7 Eudoxus: Ioannes Lydus Mens. 4.107.45–48 (excerpted from Seneca Nat. 4a, lost) οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοί φασι, τοὺς ἐτησίους πάσας ἐξ ὑπερτέρου τὰς νεφέλας ἐπὶ τὸν νότον ἐξωθεῖν καὶ ἐκεῖθεν βαρείας καταφερομένης βροχῆς ἀναβλύζειν τὸν Νεῖλον. Ammianus Marcellinus 22.15.5–6 affirmant aliqui physicorum in subiectis septemtrioni spatiis, cum hiemes frigidae cuncta constringunt, magnitudines nivium congelare easque postea vi flagrantis sideris resolutas fluxis umoribus nubes efficere gravidas, quae in meridianam plagam etesiis flantibus pulsae expressaeque tepore nimio incrementa ubertim suggerere Nilo creduntur.

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General texts: Herodotus 2.20 ἀλλὰ Ἑλλήνων μέν τινες ἐπίσημοι βουλόμενοι γενέσθαι σοφίην ἔλεξαν περὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τούτου τριφασίας ὁδούς, τῶν τὰς μὲν δύο {τῶν ὁδῶν} οὐκ ἀξιῶ μνησθῆναι εἰ μὴ ὅσον σημῆναι βουλόμενος μοῦνον (see below §§1–3). 2.23 εἰ δὲ δεῖ μεμψάμενον γνώμας τὰς προκειμένας αὐτὸν περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι, φράσω δι᾽ ὅ τι μοι δοκέει πληθύεσθαι ὁ Νεῖλος τοῦ θέρεος (see below §5). Aristotle APo. 2.15 98a29–33 τὰ δὲ τῷ τὸ μέσον ὑπὸ τὸ ἕτερον μέσον εἶναι διαφέρει τῶν προβλημάτων, οἷον διὰ τί ὁ Νεῖλος φθίνοντος τοῦ μηνὸς μᾶλλον ῥεῖ; διότι χειμεριώτερος φθίνων ὁ μείς. διὰ τί δὲ χειμεριώτερος φθίνων; διότι ἡ σελήνη ἀπολείπει. (cf. Theophrastus Vent. 17 ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ σελήνη ταὐτὰ (sc. just as the sun) πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως· οἷον γὰρ ἀσθενὴς ἥλιός ἐστι. διὸ καὶ νύκτωρ δεινότεραι ⟨αἱ πνοαὶ⟩ καὶ αἱ σύνοδοι τῶν μηνῶν χειμερινώτεραι.) Aristotle Mete. 1.13 350b13– 14 τοῦ Νείλου τὸ ῥεῦμα τὸ πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ Ἀργυροῦ καλουμένου ὄρους. Mete. 2.2 356a25–31 μεγάλοι δὲ γίγνονται τῶν ποταμῶν οἱ μακρὰν ῥέοντες διὰ κοίλης· πολλῶν γὰρ δέχονται ῥεύματα ποταμῶν, ὑποτεμνόμενοι τῷ τόπῳ καὶ τῷ μήκει τὰς ὁδούς· διόπερ ὅ τ᾽ Ἴστρος καὶ ὁ Νεῖλος μέγιστοι τῶν ποταμῶν εἰσιν τῶν εἰς τήνδε τὴν θάλατταν ἐξιόντων. καὶ περὶ τῶν πηγῶν ἄλλοι λέγουσιν ἑκάστου τῶν ποταμῶν ἄλλας αἰτίας διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμβάλλειν. ps.Aristotle Liber de inundacione Nili (fr. 248 R3) pp. 191.16–20 + 192.11–13, text Beullens propter quid [= διὰ τί] aliis fluminibus in hyeme quidem augmentatis, in estate autem multo factis minoribus, solus eorum qui in mare fluunt, multum estate excedit fitque tantus ut civitates solae supersint velut insulae? … modi quidem igitur tales et tanti, per quos utique crescet fluvius solus. horum autem qui quidem existunt dicti a prius a dubitantibus de ipso, hos nos dicemus. Thales quidem qui de Ameo (i.e. Ἐξαμύου) Milesius (fr. 548 Wöhrle) … p. 192.22 … Diogenes autem Nakithemius (i.e. Ἀπολλοθέμιδος) Apolloniates (cf. 64A18 DK) … p. 193.1 Anaxagoras autem Egisiboli Clasomenius (cf. Anaxagoras 59A91 DK) … p. 193.13–14 rubrum quidem mare aiunt quidem coniungi ad id quod extra. … p. 194.3 Athinagoras dicebat Arimnisti … p. 195.3–4 sunt autem quidam qui aiunt … hii autem … p. 195.14 Nicagoras autem Cyprius ait … p. 196.5–19 restant adhuc tres modi dictorum, secundum quos contingit amnis augeri. … quemadmodum dicit Erodotus fabularum scriptor. … reliquum autem duarum utramque dicere est. … p. 197.1–2 nunc autem relinquetur sola causa dictorum. hanc causam dicendum. Lucretius DRN 6.715 aut quia sunt …, 724 est quoque uti possit … 729 fit quoque uti … 735 forsitan … (see further below). Pliny 5.55 causas huius incrementi varias prodidere, sed maxime probabiles etesiarum …, aut imbres Aethiopiae aestivos …. Timaeus mathematicus occultam protulit rationem … Lucanus 10.237–240 quis causas reddere possit? / sic iussit natura parens discurrere Nilum, / sic opus est mundo. Aelius Theon Progymn. 2.66.31–67.4 Patillon–Bolognesi ἔχομεν δὲ καὶ ἀνασκευὰς καὶ κατασκευὰς παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρειῶν καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἀποφάσεων καὶ τοιούτων. καὶ δὴ ἁρμόττοι ἂν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος, ὅσα λέγεται ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐφόρου ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν (FGrH70 F65a) πρὸς τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιοτέρων περὶ τοῦ Νείλου καταβεβλημένας ἀποφάσεις. Aelius Aristides Aegypt. (Or. 48) p. 331.15–17 Jebb πῶς ὁ Νεῖλος ἀνέρχεται καὶ τίς ἡ πρόφασις τὸ τἀναντία αὐτὸν πεπονθέναι τοῖς ἄλλοις

liber 4 caput 1 ποταμοῖς περὶ τὰς ὥρας τοῦ ἔτους. Aegypt. p. 333.36 ὦ χαριέστατε Εὐθύμενες οἷον εἰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅτι ἀθάνατος. … Aegypt. p. 342.21 τὴν Ἡροδότου γνώμην … Aegypt. p. 348.34 … Ἔφορος (—). Proclus in Tim. 1.119.12–121.12, esp. 120.23– 121.1 λεκτέον, ὅτι γίνονται μὲν καὶ ἀποβάσεις τοῦ Νείλου πολλάκις, ὅμως καὶ ἡ συνέχεια τῶν ὄμβρων αἰτία τῆς ἀδιακόπου τοῦ ὕδατος αὐξήσεως, καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ὀρῶν, ἐν οἷς αἱ πηγαὶ τοῦ Νείλου· δεχόμενα γὰρ ταῦτα τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν συνωθουμένων ἐκ τῶν ἐτησίων εἰς αὐτὰ νεφῶν ὄμβρους κατὰ πάσας ἑαυτῶν τὰς λαγόνας ἐπιρρεῖ ταῖς πηγαῖς ἀδιακόπως, αἳ δὲ τὸν ποταμὸν αὔξουσι πληθύουσαι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἓν εἶναι αἴτιον ὄμβρων φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος (fr. 211A FHS&G), τὴν τῶν νεφῶν πίλησιν πρός τινα τῶν ὀρῶν. Heliodorus Aeth. 2.28.3–4 (cited at Psell. Omn.Doctr. c. 176) αὔξεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν θερινὴν ὥραν, οὐχ ὥς τινες ᾠήθησαν πρὸς τῶν ἐτησίων ἀντικρὺ πνεόντων ἀνακοπτόμενος ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῶν δὴ τούτων τῶν ἀνέμων κατὰ τροπὴν τὴν θερινὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρκτῴων ἐπὶ τὴν μεσημβρίαν πᾶν νέφος ἐλαυνόντων τε καὶ ὠθούντων, ἕως ἐπὶ τὴν διακεκαυμένην ζώνην συρράξωσι, (4) καθ᾽ ἣν τῆς πρόσω φορᾶς ἀνακόπτονται δι᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ περὶ τὰ μέρη πυρώδους, πάσης τῆς πρότερον καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀθροισθείσης καὶ παχυνθείσης νοτίδος ἐξατμιζομένης, κἀκ τούτου λάβρων ὑετῶν ῥηγνυμένων ὀργᾷ τε ὁ Νεῖλος κτλ. Olympiodorus in Mete. 94.4–17 τρίτη ἀπορία· εἰ διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν τῆς ὑγρότητος θέρους ὑετὸς οὐ γίνεται, τί δήποτε ἐν Ἀραβίᾳ καὶ ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ γίνεται θέρους ὑετός; καὶ λύομεν, ὅτι ἔστιν ὑγρότης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκεῖ γινομένη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ σωρευομένη. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν τῷ θέρει πνέουσιν ἐτησίαι βόρειοι ὄντες, ἐξωθοῦσιν ἐκεῖ τὰ νέφη καὶ πρῶτον προσπταίοντα Σεληναίοις ἢ Ἀργυρέοις ὄρεσι τῇ πιλήσει εἰς ὕδωρ μεταβάλλονται καὶ κατάγεται ὑετός. διὸ καὶ ὁ Νεῖλος θέρει γενέτης ἐστί. καὶ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν φασὶ τῆς ἀναβάσεως αὐτοῦ. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλας τρεῖς· μίαν μέν, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῖς Σεληναίοις ὄρεσι χιὼν ἀπόκειται, ἥτις ἀναλυομένη ἐν τῷ θέρει πλημμύραν ποιεῖ τῶν ὑδάτων. δευτέρα ἐπίλυσις· φασὶ τὸν Νεῖλον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν ἐν τῇ ἀντοικουμένῃ· ἐπειδὴ οὖν, ὅτε ἐκεῖ ἐστι χειμών, ἐν ἡμῖν θέρος ἐστί, συμβαίνει πλεονεξίας ἐκεῖ ὑδάτων οὔσης καταρρεῖν ἐνταῦθα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πλεονάζειν τὸν Νεῖλον. τρίτη αἰτία, ἥτις αἰτιᾶται τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν· θερμασίας γὰρ οὔσης τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀντιπεριιστάμενον πυκνοῖ καὶ ὕδωρ γεννᾷ. John Philoponus Opif. 4.5, pp. 169.19–170.8 Reichardt ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Νεῖλον δι᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς κεκαυμένης ἐκ τῶν ἐπέκεινα τόπων φερόμενον εἰς τὸν Ὠκεανὸν ἐκχεῖσθαι πάντως ἦν ἀνάγκη· φασὶ γάρ τινες αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀντοικουμένης τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχοντα φέρεσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς· διὸ καὶ ἐν θέρει μόνον τῶν ποταμῶν πλημμυρεῖν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐκεῖ χειμάζοντα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἔχειν γλυκύτατον· τοιαῦτα γὰρ εἶναι τὰ προθερμαινόμενα τῶν ὑδάτων. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐκ τῆς ἀντοικουμένης, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τὸν θερινὸν τροπικὸν τῆς Λιβύης μερῶν φέρεσθαι λέγοι τις αὐτόν, μάρτυρα τούτου Πτολεμαῖον ὡς ἔγνων ἐπικαλούμενος, ἠγνόησεν ὡς ἔοικεν οὗτος τὰ Πτολεμαίῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ γραφέντα· οὐδὲ γὰρ Πτολεμαῖος, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τὰς πηγὰς καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὑρεῖν τοῦ Νείλου δεδύνηται. οὐδὲ ὁ τοῦτο νομίζων τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Πτολεμαίου ἐπέστησεν· τί γάρ φησι (Geog. 4.8[9].3); ‘τῶν ἀνθρωποφάγων Αἰθιόπων ἀπὸ δυσμῶν διήκει τὸ τῆς σελήνης ὄρος, ἀφ᾽ οὗ ὑποδέχονται τὰς χιόνας αἱ τοῦ Νείλου πηγαί’. Chapter heading: ps.Aristotle Liber de inundacione Nili (fr. 248 R3). Aristotelis Vita Menagiana no. 159 Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως. Aristotelis

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Index Ptolemaei no. 26 Hein Περὶ τοῦ Νείλου γʹ. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Mete. 53.15–16 ὡς λέγει ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως. Theon of Alexandria at Sud. s.v. Θ 205, p. 2.702.14 Adler (FGrH651 F1) Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως. §1 Thales: Herodotus 2.20 (Thales fr. 13 Wöhrle) ἡ ἑτέρη μὲν λέγει τοὺς ἐτησίας ἀνέμους εἶναι αἰτίους πληθύειν τὸν ποταμόν, κωλύοντας ἐς θάλασσαν ἐκρέειν τὸν Νεῖλον. ps.Aristotle Liber de inundacione Nili (fr. 248 R3) p. 192.14–15, text Beullens Thales quidem qui de Ameo Milesius (fr. 548 Wöhrle) a ventis annualibus repulsum inquit fluvium inundare. crescit enim si illi flant et e regione fluit ipsorum. Lucretius DRN 6.712–723 Nilus in aestatem crescit campisque redundat / unicus in terris, Aegypti totius amnis. / is rigat Aegyptum medium per saepe calorem, / aut quia sunt aestate Aquilones ostia contra, / anni tempore eo, qui Etesiae esse feruntur, / et contra fluvium flantes remorantur et, undas / cogentes sursus, replent coguntque manere. / nam dubio procul haec adverso flabra feruntur / flumine, quae gelidis ab stellis axis aguntur; / ille ex aestifera parti venit amnis ab austro / inter nigra virum percocto saecla colore / exoriens penitus media ab regione diei. Pliny Nat. 5.55 causas huius incrementi varias prodidere, sed maxime probabiles etesiarum eo tempore ex adverso flantium repercussum, ultra in ora acto mari. §2 Euthymenes: Homer Il. 21.195–197 μέγα σθένος Ὠκεανοῖο, / ἐξ οὗ περ πάντες ποταμοὶ καὶ πᾶσα θάλασσα / καὶ πᾶσαι κρῆναι καὶ φρείατα μακρὰ νάουσιν. Hesiod Th. 337–338 Τηθὺς δ᾽ Ὠκεανῷ ποταμοὺς τέκε δινήεντας, / Νεῖλόν τ᾽ Ἀλφειόν τε καὶ Ἠριδανὸν βαθυδίνην κτλ. Herodotus 2.21 ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρη ἀνεπιστημονεστέρη μέν ἐστι τῆς λελεγμένης, λόγῳ δὲ εἰπεῖν θωμασιωτέρη, ἣ λέγει ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ ῥέοντα αὐτὸν ταῦτα μηχανᾶσθαι, τὸν δὲ Ὠκεανὸν γῆν περὶ πᾶσαν ῥέειν. Hanno Peripl. 10 ἐκεῖθεν πλέοντες εἰς ἕτερον ἤλθομεν ποταμὸν μέγαν καὶ πλατὺν, γέμοντα κροκοδείλων καὶ ἵππων ποταμίων. ps.Aristotle Liber de inundacione Nili (fr. 248 R3) p. 193.26–28, text Beullens hunc autem dicebant habere cocodrillos et circumfluere exterius rubrum mare, sive veraces sint hoc dicentes sive mentientes. §3 Anaxagoras: Aeschylus fr. 300 Radt γένος μὲν αἰνεῖν ἐκμαθὼν ἐπίσταμαι / Αἰθιοπίδος γῆς, Νεῖλος ἔνθ᾽ ἑπτάρροος / †γαῖαν† κυλίνδει πνευμάτων ἐπομβρίᾳ, / ἐν ᾗ πυρωπὸν ἥλιος ἐκλάμψας φλόγα / τήκει πετραίαν χιόνα· πᾶσα δ᾽ εὐθαλὴς / Αἴγυπτος ἁγνοῦ νάματος πληρουμένη / φερέσβιον Δήμητρος ἀντέλλει στάχυν. Euripides fr. 228.1–5 Kannicht Δαναὸς ὁ πεντήκοντα θυγατέρων πατὴρ / Νείλου λιπὼν κάλλιστον †ἐκ γαίας† ὕδωρ, / ὃς ἐκ μελαμβρότοιο πληροῦται ῥοὰς / Αἰθιοπίδος γῆς, ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν τακῇ χιὼν / †τέθριππεύοντος† ἡλίου κατ᾽ αἰθέρα. Hel. 1–3 Νείλου μὲν αἵδε καλλιπάρθενοι ῥοαί, / ὃς ἀντὶ δίας ψακάδος Αἰγύπτου πέδον / λευκῆς τακείσης χιόνος ὑγραίνει γύας. Herodotus 2.22 ἡ δὲ τρίτη τῶν ὁδῶν πολλὸν ἐπιεικεστάτη ἐοῦσα μάλιστα ἔψευσται. λέγει γὰρ δὴ οὐδ᾽ αὕτη οὐδέν, φαμένη τὸν Νεῖλον ῥέειν ἀπὸ τηκομένης χιόνος, ὃς ῥέει μὲν ἐκ Λιβύης διὰ μέσων Αἰθιόπων, ἐκδιδοῖ δὲ ἐς Αἴγυπτον. ps.Aristotle Liber de inundacione Nili (fr. 248 R3) p. 193.1–2, text Beullens Anaxagoras autem Egisiboli Clasomenius propter liquefieri nivem estate repleri fluvium ait. Lucretius DRN 6.735–737 forsitan Aethiopum penitus de mon-

liber 4 caput 1 tibus altis / crescat, ubi in campos albas descendere ningues / tabificis subigit radiis sol omnia lustrans. §4 Democritus: Homer Od. 4.477 & 4.581 Αἰγύπτοιο, διιπετέος ποταμοῖο (cf. Schol., below §7). Aristotle Mete. 1.12 349a4–6 γίγνεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀραβίαν καὶ τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν τοῦ θέρους τὰ ὕδατα καὶ οὐ τοῦ χειμῶνος, καὶ ταῦτα ῥαγδαῖα (cf. below, §7). Lucretius DRN 6.729–734 fit quoque uti pluviae forsan magis ad caput ei / tempore eo fiant, quo etesia flabra Aquilonum / nubila coniciunt in eas tunc omnia partis. / scilicet ad mediam regionem eiecta diei / cum convenerunt, ibi ad altos denique montis / contrusae nubes coguntur vique premuntur. Anon. Photii cod. 249, pp. 241.29–242.4 Thesleff ὅτι οἱ ἐτήσιαι πνέουσι κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ ἀκμαιοτάτου θέρους δι᾽ αἰτίαν τοιαύτην. ὁ ἥλιος μετεωρότερος καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μεσημβρινῶν τόπων ἀρκτικώτερος γινόμενος λύει τὰ ὑγρὰ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἄρκτοις· λυόμενα δὲ ταῦτα ἐξαεροῦται, ἐξαερούμενα δὲ πνευματοῦται, καὶ ἐκ τούτων γίνονται οἱ ἐτήσιαι ἄνεμοι, ἐκ τῶν πνευμάτων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς λύσεως τῶν ἀρκτικῶν ὑγρῶν γινομένων. φέρονται γοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους, τοὺς μεσημβρινούς. ἐκεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἐκφερόμενα προσπίπτει τοῖς ὑψηλοτάτοις ὄρεσι τῆς Αἰθιοπίας, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἀθρόα γινόμενα ἀπεργάζεται ὑετούς· καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑετῶν τούτων ὁ Νεῖλος πλημμυρεῖ τοῦ θέρους, ἀπὸ τῶν μεσημβρινῶν καὶ ξηρῶν τόπων ῥέων. καὶ τοῦτο Ἀριστοτέλης (fr. 246 R3) ἐπραγματεύσατο κτλ. differently Diodorus Siculus Bibl. 1.391–394. §5 Herodotus: Herodotus 2.25 διεξιὼν τῆς Λιβύης τὰ ἄνω ὁ ἥλιος τάδε ποιέει. ἅτε διὰ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου αἰθρίου τε ἐόντος τοῦ ἠέρος τοῦ κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ χωρία καὶ ἀλεεινῆς τῆς χώρης ἐούσης καὶ ⟨ἄνευ⟩ ἀνέμων ψυχρῶν, διεξιὼν ποιέει οἷόν περ καὶ τὸ θέρος ἔωθε ποιέειν ἰὼν τὸ μέσον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ· ἕλκει γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἑωυτὸν τὸ ὕδωρ, ἑλκύσας δὲ ἀπωθέει ἐς τὰ ἄνω χωρία, ὑπολαμβάνοντες δὲ οἱ ἄνεμοι καὶ διασκιδνάντες τήκουσι· καὶ εἰσὶ οἰκότως οἱ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χώρης πνέοντες, ὅ τε νότος καὶ ὁ λίψ, ἀνέμων πολλὸν τῶν πάντων. ps.Aristotle Liber de inundacione Nili at P.Oxy. 4458 col. i.5–14 Jakobi–Luppe Ἡρόδοτος δὲ ὁ μυ|[θογρ]άφος ἐν τῶι χειμῶνί | [φησι] τὸν ἥλιον κατὰ τὴν | [Λιβύ]ην ποιεῖσθαι πο|[ρεία]ν· ᾗ δ᾽ [ἄν] τύχη⟨ι⟩ φερό|[μεν]ος, ἐντεῦθεν ἀνάγειν | [τὸ ὑγρό]ν, περὶ δὲ τὰς θερι|[νὰς τρ]οπὰς πρὸς τὴν ἄρ|[κτον] ἰέναι. ἥκιστα δὲ ταῦ|[τα λέγ]εται μεμελημέ|νως· (refutation follows) = fr. 248 R3, p. 196.6–11, text Beullens in hyeme enim ablataque inerat aqua. hoc autem utique erit sole dessiccante, quemadmodum dicit Erodotus fabularum scriptor. non enim ait in hyeme solem per Libiam facere habundantiam [perhaps read ambulationem], nisi si contingat latus hinc ducere humorem, circa versiones autem estivales ad arctum venire. §7 Eudoxus: Aristotle Mete. 1.12 349a4–9 γίγνεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀραβίαν καὶ τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν τοῦ θέρους τὰ ὕδατα καὶ οὐ τοῦ χειμῶνος, καὶ ταῦτα ῥαγδαῖα, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας πολλάκις, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· ταχὺ γὰρ ψύχεται τῇ ἀντιπεριστάσει, ἣ γίγνεται διὰ τὸ ἀλεεινὴν εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἰσχυρῶς. Pliny Nat. 5.55 (causa incrementi) aut imbres Aethiopiae aestivos, isdem etesiis nubila illo ferentibus e reliquo orbe. Scholia in Odysseam schol. 4.477 Pontani πολλῶν λεγομένων περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως πρῶτος Ὅμηρος τὴν ἀληθεστάτην αἰτίαν εἶπε (Od. 4.477 and 4.581) ‘διιπετῆ’ προσαγορεύσας αὐτόν, διότι πληροῦται ἐκ τῶν ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ γινο-

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μένων ἀδιαλείπτων τοῦ θέρους καὶ σφοδρῶν ὑετῶν, ὡς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης (see above §3) καὶ Εὔδοξος (F 287 Lasserre) πεπύσθαι ταῦτα φάσκοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἱερέων.

Liber 4 Caput 2 PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 898B–C; pp. 386a9–387a8 Diels—PE: Eusebius PE 15.32.10, p. 407.6–9 Mras—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 198–201 Daiber—cf. PSy: Symeon Seth CRN 4.68, p. 68.19 + 69.7–9 Delatte S: Stobaeus Ecl. 1.49.1a; pp. 318.17–319.8 Wachsmuth; cf. Phot. Bibl. 167, p. 112b29 Henry (titulus solus) T: Theodoretus CAG 5.17–18; p. 126.22–127.4 Raeder Cf. Hermias Irr. 2.1–5 Hanson; ps.Iustinus Coh. 6.2.22, 7.2.20–22 Marcovich; Nem: Nemesius NH c. 2, pp. 16.12–17.10, 22.19 Morani

Titulus βʹ. Περὶ ψυχῆς (P,S,T) §1 Θαλῆς ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον. (P1,S1,T1) §2 Ἀλκμαίων φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον κατὰ ἀίδιον κίνησιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν καὶ προσεμφερῆ τοῖς θείοις ὑπολαμβάνει. (S4,T2) §3 Πυθαγόρας ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, τὸν δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ νοῦ παραλαμβάνει, (P2,S2,T3) §4 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ξενοκράτης. (S3,T4) §5 Πλάτων οὐσίαν νοητὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητὴν κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἐναρμόνιον κινουμένην. (P3,T5) §6 Ἀριστοτέλης ἐντελέχειαν πρώτην σώματος φυσικοῦ, ὀργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος· τὴν δ᾽ ἐντελέχειαν ἀκουστέον ἀντὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας. (P4,S7,T6) §7 Δικαίαρχος ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων. (P5,S5,T7) §8 Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ ἰατρὸς συγγυμνασίαν τῶν αἰσθήσεων. (P6,S6) §1 Thales 11A22a DK; §2 Alcmaeon 24A12 DK; §3 Pythagoras —; cf. Dörrie–Baltes 156.1; §4 Xenocrates fr. 60 Heinze, 90 Isnardi-Parente2; §5 cf. Plato Phdr. 245c, Tim. 35a–36b, 41d, ps.Plato Def. 411c; cf. Dörrie–Baltes 156.1; §6 cf. Aristoteles de An. 2.1 412a27–b1; §7 Dicaearchus fr. 12(a–c) Wehrli, cf. ap. 21A Mirhady; §8 Asclepiades cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 724, 2.37.1, p. 726 caput non hab. G (aliud c. 24 Περὶ ψυχῆς) titulus Περὶ ψυχῆς PBS : Was ist die Definition der Seele? PQ §1 [2] πρῶτος PS : om. T ‖ ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον PS : ἀκίνητον T §2 [4] Ἀλκμαίων S : Ἀλκμὰν T ‖ [5] θείοις S : θεοῖς Diels sed cf. Arist. de An. 1.2 405a32 τὰ θεῖα, Boethus ap. Eus. PE 11.28.9 τὰ θεῖα τῶν σωμάτων §3 [6] ἑαυτὸν P : αὐτὴν S : αὑτὸν Heeren Diels Wachsmuth §4 [8] Ξενοκράτης ST : ξεναγόρας SP1 ἀναξαγόρας SP2(marg.) §5 [9] κινητὴν PB(I,II)T Nem Diels DG : κινητικὴν PB(III) Mau : bewegliches Q ‖ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν PB(I,III)Q : κατὰ ῥυθμὸν PB(II) ‖ [9–10] κατ᾽ … κινουμένην P : om. T §6 [11] Ἀριστοτέλης PS : ὁ δὲ Σταγειρίτης T ‖ [12] ἐντελέχειαν PT : ἐνδελέχειαν S ‖ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ S : om. PT §7 [14] Δικαίαρχος PBQS : Κλέαρχος T : Δείναρχος Nem pp. 17.5, 17.10, 22.19 Morani (cf. Δείναρχος Hermias Irr. 2 = gloss. sec. edd.) §8 om. T

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Testes primi: Theodoretus CAG 5.16 (quaestio) οὐ μόνον ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντία γεγραφήκασιν· ἵνα δὲ τὴν πολλὴν αὐτῶν καταμάθωμεν ἔριν, φέρε πάλιν ἐπιδείξωμεν, τίνα περὶ ψυχῆς οἱ πολυθρύλητοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐδόξασαν, καὶ ὅπως αὐτοὺς ἡ κενὴ δόξα, κατὰ τὸν Τίμαιον [τίμωνα Clem. Eus.: Timon fr. 15 Wachsmuth], ‘ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι’. ἃ δέ γε ξὺν Θεῷ λέξω, ἐκ τῶν Πλουτάρχῳ καὶ Πορφυρίῳ καὶ μέντοι καὶ Ἀετίῳ ξυγγεγραμμένων ἐρῶ. Theodoretus CAG 5.17–18 17.1 (~ §1) Θαλῆς τοίνυν κέκληκε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκίνητον φύσιν· 17.2 (~ §2) Ἀλκμὰν δὲ αὐτὴν αὐτοκίνητον εἴρηκεν· 17.3 (~ §3) ὁ δέ γε Πυθαγόρας ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα· 17.4 (~ §4) ξυνεφώνησε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ Ξενοκράτης· 17.5 (~ §5) ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐσίαν νοητὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητήν· 17.6 (~ §6) ὁ δὲ Σταγειρίτης ἐντελέχειαν πρώτην σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος· ἐντελέχειαν δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν κέκληκεν· 18.1 (~ §7) Κλέαρχος δὲ τῶν τεττάρων εἶναι στοιχείων τὴν ἁρμονίαν. Traditio ps.Plutarchi: Eusebius PE 15.32.10 ἵνα δὲ τῶν σοφῶν ἔτι τὴν σοφίαν ἀποθαυμάσῃς, προσθήσω καὶ ὅσα περὶ ψυχῆς (cf. cc. 4.2–4) καὶ τοῦ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἡγεμονικοῦ (cf. c. 4.5) διεμαχέσαντο, οὐδὲ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπιγνῶναι οἵας εἶεν φύσεως δεδυνημένοι. Symeon Seth CRN 4.68 (~ tit.) Περὶ ψυχῆς 4.68 (~ P6) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐντελέχειαν αὐτὴν Ἀριστοτέλης ὡρίσατο σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος, ἐντελέχειαν λαμβάνων τὴν ὡς εἶδος καὶ τελειότητα. Testes secundi: Hermias Irr. 2.1–5 οἱ μὲν γάρ φασιν αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ (~ ch. 4.3.4–5. 4.7), οἱ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα (~ ch. 4.3.8), οἱ δὲ τὸν νοῦν (cf. cc. 4.2.3, 4.7a.1), οἱ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν (~ §§1–2) … οἱ δὲ ἀριθμὸν κινητικόν (~ §§3–4) οἱ δὲ ἁρμονίαν (~ §7) … (seqq. vid. ch. 4.3) ps.Iustinus Coh. 6.2.22 Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, ἐντελέχειαν αὐτὴν ὀνομάζων (~ §6); Coh. 7.2.20–22 οἱ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν (~ §§1–2), … οἱ δὲ ἀριθμὸν κινητικόν (~ §§3–4). Nemesius NH c. 2, pp. 16.11–17.10 (~ tit.) Περὶ ψυχῆς. διαφωνεῖται σχεδὸν ἅπασι τοῖς παλαιοῖς ὁ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος (~ quaestio). [… : p. 16.13–21 vid. testes secundi ad c. 4.3] (16.21) πάλιν δὲ καὶ τῶν λεγόντων ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἄπειρος γέγονεν ἡ διαφωνία, τῶν μὲν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀθάνατον λεγόντων, τῶν δὲ ἀσώματον μέν, οὐ μὴν οὐσίαν οὐδὲ ἀθάνατον. (~ §1) Θαλῆς (fr. 323 Wöhrle) μὲν γὰρ πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφησεν ἀεικίνητον καὶ αὐτοκίνητον, (~ §3) Πυθαγόρας δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, (~ §5) Πλάτων δὲ οὐσίαν νοητὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητὴν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἐναρμόνιον, (~ §6) Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐντελέχειαν πρώ-

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την σώματος φυσικοῦ, ὀργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος, (~ §7) Δείναρχος (sic, Dicaearchus fr. 11 Wehrli, 21B Mirhady) δὲ ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, ἀντὶ τοῦ κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῶν στοιχείων· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ τῶν φθόγγων συνισταμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν ἐναρμόνιον κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν βούλεται λέγειν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Δείναρχος ἀνούσιον. NH 2, p. 22.19 (cf. Meletius NH p. 145.3–6) ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ Δείναρχος [sic] ἁρμονίαν ὡρίσατο τὴν ψυχὴν κτλ. (~ §7). Loci Aetiani: quaestio A 4.3.1 οὗτοι πάντες οἱ προτεταγμένοι ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποτίθενται, φύσιν λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον καὶ οὐσίαν νοητὴν καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἐντελέχειαν. §1 A 1.3.1 Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀπεφήνατο τὸ ὕδωρ κτλ. A 1.7.11 Θαλῆς νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν θεόν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἅμα καὶ δαιμόνων πλῆρες· διήκειν δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ στοιχειώδους ὑγροῦ δύναμιν θείαν κινητικὴν αὐτοῦ. A 1.8.2 Θαλῆς Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων οἱ Στωικοὶ δαίμονας ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας ψυχικάς. §2 A 4.3.1 φύσιν … αὐτοκίνητον. §5 A 4.3.1 οὐσίαν νοητήν. A 4.6.1 Πλάτων ἀεικίνητον μὲν τὴν ψυχήν. §6 A 1.2.2 τὸ εἶδος ὃ καλοῦμεν ἐντελέχειαν. A 1.3.22 ἐντελέχειαν ἤτοι εἶδος. A 4.3.1 τοῦ φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἐντελέχειαν. A 4.3.10 Ξέναρχος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς καί τινες ἕτεροι τῆς αὐτῆς αἱρέσεως τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τελειότητα καὶ ἐντελέχειαν. §§7–8 al. A 5.1.4 Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Δικαίαρχος … ἀθάνατον μὲν εἶναι οὐ νομίζοντες τὴν ψυχὴν, θείου δέ τινος μετέχειν αὐτήν. §8 cf. A 4.8.6 et 4.10.2 (de Aristotele) κοινὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν …, εἰς ἣν πᾶσαι συμβάλλουσιν αἱ ἁπλαῖ τὰς ἰδίας ἑκάστη φαντασίας.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) The witnesses for P are restricted to PB and PQ (excepting some snippets in PJ). E in the final Book of the PE on the soul only includes chapters 4.4–5 of P, so 4.2 and 4.3 are absent from the Praeparatio, just like the rest of Book 4. (He announces these two chapters at PE 15.59.7, at the end of his much more generous abstracts from P’s cosmological Books 2 and 3, claiming that they show that the Greeks did not even know what concerns their own persons, as is clear from their disagreements about the parts of the soul and the seat of its regent part.) The parallel to ch. 4.2 noted in the apparatus criticus is part of a ver-

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batim quotation in E of Boethus of Sidon, and does not derive from P. G did not abstract P 4.2–7 between his chs. 89 and 90 where they would have belonged, only resuming this job after ch. 4.1 ‘On the rising of he Nile’ with P 4.8 ‘On sensation and sense-objects’. This entails that the Placita tradition proper concerned with the substance and parts and regent part and (im)mortality and (im)mobility of the soul is absent in this representative of P’s tradition. G omitted these six chapters presumably because he had already dealt with the soul and its properties in his composite c. 24 also entitled Περὶ ψυχῆς near the beginning of the Historia philosopha. The middle section of this earlier chapter deals with matters concerned with ethical issues such as the liberum arbitrium. The beginning and end sections contain some material parallel to respectively P 4.2, 4.3, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.4, and though doubtless filtered through a different tradition these passages are worth adducing; we cite a number of passages under section E(a) below. (2) S has seven lemmata. In S five lemmata corresponding to five of P’s six are found right at the beginning of the very long chapter 1.49 Περὶ ψυχῆς, ‘On the soul’, in what looks like the same order at the top and the bottom of the list: P1 (Thales) = S 1.49.1a1; P2 (Pythagoras) = S 1.49.1a2. P3 (Plato) is absent. Again: P4 (Aristotle) = S 1.49.1a7; P5 (Dicaearchus) = S 1.49.1a5; P6 (Asclepiades) = S 1.49.1a7. In both sources, therefore, we have the order Thales–Pythagoras and Dicaearchus–Asclepiades. This is correct with regard to the two final lemmata, but the sequential correspondence of the first two lemmata is the accidental result of the sort of interventions we know as distinguishing traits of each of these two sources. P epitomized the original second lemma (Alcmaeon) away, so the third lemma (Pythagoras) automatically became P2, while S modified the order because apparently he wanted to place Pythagoras, the archegete of the Pythagorean Succession, next to Thales, the archegete of the Ionian Succession, so this lemma became S2. The Xenocrates lemma, also abridged away by P, then automatically became S3. (2) S replaced the lemma extant in P as P3 (Plato) with Phaedr. 247c6–7 at Ecl. 1.49.2; P’s lemma is also extant in T, so this is one of the five significant cases of P and T in agreement against S (see General Introduction, section 2.5 with n. 42). S quite frequently replaces (or illustrates) lemmata with the name-label Plato by verbatim quotations, see Diels DG 75 n. 2, M–R 1.234–235, 1.249–254, 1.265–266, 2.1.140, 2.2.369, 3.311 n. 60, 3.378, and Jeremiah (2018) at M–R 4.286 and 353. (3) From Book 4 T abstracted only chs. 4.2–5 and 4.7, passing over ch. 4.6. Because E did not copy out chs. 4.2–3, T cannot have used E as his source for P, although at CAG 5.16 (quoted above at testes primi) he announces the abstracts of ch. 4.2 following at 5.17–18 as belonging with what he has culled from ‘Plu-

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tarch, Porphyry and Aëtius’. A, mentioned third, is his real source. Among the seven lemmata of T at CAG 5.17–18 pertaining to the matter of the present chapter, parallels to no less than five of P’s six lemmata are found, in an overall order corresponding with and so confirming that of P. T omits P7 ~ S6 (Asclepiades). What is more, in the first and second blocks of lemmata he has actually preserved two items, namely §§2 and 4, that are not in P but also found in S. This again proves that T has used the source shared with S (the so-called T,S source) that turns out to be A. He has not interfered with the order of the lemmata (or the chapters), but considerably abridged them the way he usually does, except of course the already very short Xenocrates lemma (§4). See further below, ch. 4.3 Commentary A(5), and M–R 1.288 plus 1.296–298, and Mansfeld (2016 = 2018a) at M–R 4.180–187 on the T/S source (esp. 4.183 for ch. 4.2); further above, General Introduction, section 2.5. (4) The text of Nemesius NH c. 2 is more complicated (cited at testes secundi above, and below, ch. 4.3, again at testes secundi). The first word of the chapter at p. 16.12 is διαφωνεῖται, which pertains to the dissensus on the subject of the soul among the ancients (and some of his contemporaries) in general. He begins with the corporealists and goes on with the incorporealists, whereas A’s order is the opposite. The verbal parallels with P and S for ch. 4.2 at NH c. 2, pp. 16.13–17.10 are very striking, esp. for §§3–6 and are placed by Diels DG in his apparatus with T. This also holds for the parallels of NH c. 2, p. 16.16–21 with P and S for ch. 4.3, see ad loc. See the discussion at M–R 1.293–298, where we concluded that Nem shows dependence on A, which would make him a primary witness to the compendium. We now think that it is more likely that the relationship is not a direct one, but that both authors have used a wider tradition of the Placita. But see further on ch. 4.3, Commentary A(4). Not only the corporealists disagree among themselves (Nem p. 16.15 διαφέρονται), but among the incorporealists there is even ‘endless conflict’ (p. 16.22, ἄπειρος … διαφωνία): on the one hand you have Thales Pythagoras Plato, who posit that the soul is a substance and immortal (cf. A 4.7.1), and on the other those who posit that it is neither a substance nor inmortal, namely Aristotle and ‘Dinarchus’, who make it un-substantial (ἀνούσιον). This unsubstantiality recalls the view of those who deny the existence of the soul according to some doxographical accounts; for this preliminary issue see the references at section E(b) General texts. In A’s chapter the diaeresis is presented differently: §1 Thales, §2 Alcmaeon and §5 Plato posit that the soul is a substance, §3 Pythagoras and §4 Xenocrates that it is a quantity, and §6 Aristotle, §7 Dicaearchus and §8 Asclepiades that it is a quality. (5) Ps.Justin here (corresponding to §§1–4) and in chs. 4.3–6 cites doxographical material on the soul that cannot be fully traced back to P (unlike in

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chs. 1.3 and 1.7). Moreover, there is a close parallel for the material in chs. 4.2– 3 in Hermias. It was noted by Diels at DG 261, who places the texts in parallel columns. It is also difficult to trace it back to A, e.g. the phrase ὕδωρ γονοποιόν which is found in both texts but not in the extant remains of A. We should therefore regard them both as testes secundi, as we have done above. Both texts are wholly lacking in name-labels. B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. For the proximate tradition see the various and variously detailed accounts of e.g. Cicero Luc. 124, Tusc. 1.19–21; Philo Somn. 1.30; Tertullian de An. 3.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 2 Podolak), 5.1; and Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19. To some extent these are dependent on earlier and richer versions of the tradition and include other topics, but extra material has also been incorporated subsequently: not only new doxai, but also earlier ones through retrograde contamination. The Ciceronian and Philonic parallels are particularly important because they prove the indebtedness of A to a shared anterior tradition, just as is the case in the next chapter (4.3), and in chs. 4.5, 4.7, and especially 4.9, where the parallels with Cicero show the same sort of dependence. (For Cicero as testis secundus see also above, chs. 1.3 and 1.7, and below, chs. 5.1– 2 and 5.24–25). Tertullian de An. 5.1 is explicit about the opposition between incorporealists and corporealists: the latter claim that the soul is corporeal e contrario to the former. The contrast between incorporeal and corporeal substance is also exemplified in Philo of Alexandria, Somn. 1.30, in the context of his demonstration of the unknowability of the heavens and the soul. Wendland, who discovered and analyzed this passage, at (1897) 1095 argued this proves that Philo used Diels’ Vetusta placita. In general see Mansfeld (1990a) 3065– 3085 (Aëtius and a number of parallel passages), plus 3117–3121 (Philo) and 3126–3131 (Cicero); cf. above ch. 2.11, Commentary B, and below, chs. 4.3–4.5, each time at Commentary B. These extensive earlier parallels certainly demonstrate the importance of the anterior doxographical tradition. See also Philo Cher. 114, firing off a number of questions relating to the soul several of which are parallel to issues in A Book 4 (cited at Book 4 titulus et index above, and at the appropriate chapters below). (2) Sources. The contrast between corporeal and incorporeal soul that to a large extent dominates the posterior tradition is already found in and derived from Arist. de An. 1.2; announced de An. 1.2 404b30–405a2, cited section E(b) General texts. Aristotle’s dialectical account is also among the sources of several doxai. Two pairs of lemmata ultimately derive from Arist. de An. 1.2, though in reversed order and with noteworthy modifications: §§3–4 (Middle Platonist) Pythagoras–Xenocrates derive from de An. 1.2 404b16–30, where we have

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in sequence Plato–anonymous thinkers (i.e. Xenocrates). §§1–2 Thales–Alcmaeon derive from de An. 1.2 405a19–21 plus 1.2 405a29–b1; at a first glance it is not clear whether Aristotle here presents Thales and Alcmaeon as corporealists or incorporealists (no mention of water for Thales, and no material principle at all for Alcmaeon), so a literalist doxographer could prefer the latter, though elsewhere of course Aristotle always presents Thales as a corporealist. Aristotle’s note on Alcmaeon has not been modified as strongly as the note on Thales, or as the passage on Plato and an anonymous follower, which became Pythagoras plus (correctly) Xenocrates. The Plato lemma at §5 does not echo Aristotle’s description at de An. 1.2 404b16–29; when this had been linked ad sententiam with the name-label Pythagoras, a new doxa was needed for Plato. This new doxa summarizes Tim. 35a–36b (World Soul) plus, to some extent, 41d (human souls). The corporealists Diogenes and Heraclitus, listed de An. 1.2 405a21–29 between Thales and Alcmaeon, are represented by lemmata in the complementary chapter, A 4.3, ubi vide. The emphasis on self-motion in §§3–5 may be explained by the influence of the Early Academy, with its interest in Pythagoreanism. Xenocrates’ selfmoving number and so Plato’s self-moving soul were retrospectively and creatively linked with Pythagorean number theory, see Burkert (1972) 63–64, 272 n. 165. C Chapter Heading There are no variants for the heading in Greek as found in PBS and alluded to at T 5.16, τίνα περὶ ψυχῆς οἱ πολυθρύλητοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐδόξασαν. It is a representative of the umbrella type (περὶ τοῦ δεῖνα) that dominates in the Placita (see above, ch. 1.3, Commentary C). Q’s heading ‘Was ist die Definition der Seele?’ possibly translates a longer Greek title, e.g. Περὶ ψυχῆς τί ἔστιν, but it is more likely that in the manner of Arabic translators he amplified the wording for didactic reasons. It is also possible that he anticipates the fuller heading of the next chapter. Accordingly there is insufficient support for including this added phrase in our text. Περὶ ψυχῆς is quite familiar as a book-title. Think of Aristotle’s reference to his own treatise, e.g. GA 5.7 786b25, or Callimachus’ reference to Plato’s Phaedo by what became its standard second title (fr. 23.3–4 Pfeiffer). For the numerous issues it is capable of comprising (so to speak the whole of 4.2– 23) see above, Introduction to Book 4. In the present chapter, as it turns out, it comprises incorporealist views and the question types, or categories, of substance and quality as well as the category of quantity, while the long heading of the next chapter explicitly refers to both substance and corporeality.

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D Analysis a Context The chapter follows after the last of the cosmological chapters, 4.1 ‘On the Nile’. It is the first of the twenty-two chapters dealing in a rather firm systematic order with the human soul from various systematic points of view, and the first of a cluster of seven dealing with the soul per se. The presentation of these psychological issues largely conforms to an originally Aristotelian order of treatment, see Baltussen (1993) 205–206, and (2000a) 228–230, and M–R 2.1.37, 2.1.138– 150 on A’s chapters on the soul and the senses. Themes discussed more or less simultaneously by Aristotle (such as substance, motion and cognition) are however separated more neatly and scholastically in the Placita. Cicero Tusc. 1.19–21, an early representative of the wider doxographical tradition, treats the themes of the soul’s substance (cf. A 4.1–2), its mortality versus its immortality (cf. A 4.7), and the location of its regent part (cf. A 4.5) simultaneously, and so does his near contemporary Philo of Alexandria, Somn. 1.30–33. Our Placita separates these themes rather rigorously, as is clear from the chapter headings and the chapters themselves. But there are traces of a less rigorous dissociation. In ch. 4.2, on the substance of soul qua incorporeal, Alcmaeon’s soul is said to be immortal (4.2.2 ἀθάνατον), thus anticipating the theme of ch. 4.7. Also note that the various references (no less than five) to movement at ch. 4.2.1–5 anticipate the theme of ch. 4.6 (in the next chapter the role of movement, referred to only once at ch. 4.3.11, is incidental), and recall Aristotle on his predecessors’ account of the soul as principle of movement in de An. 1.2. The surmisal that the anterior doxographical treatment attested by Cicero (see below, section D(e)) and Philo may have been rather less scholastic is unavoidable. A somewhat similar sequence of themes is found in Lucr. DRN Books 3–4, see Schrijvers (1999) 40–42, 122–123, M–R 2.1.144–145 and in general above, Introduction to Book 4. Several doxai of ch. 4.2 are summarized by means of catchwords in the first lemma of 4.3, found in P only, see Diels’ note ad loc., DG 387. The lists of the doxai on the nature of the soul of the incorporealists (ch. 4.2) is immediately followed by that of the corporealists (ch. 4.3). The diaphonia could have been accommodated in a single chapter, as is in fact the case in other sources (e.g. Nemesius NH c. 2), and also at S 1.49.1a + 1b, where the subdivision has been introduced by Wachsmuth. Chapters 4.2 plus 4.3 thus constitute a single unit. There are other examples of twinned chapters in Book 4, e.g. ch. 4.11 plus ch. 4.12, two chapters dealing with aspects of Stoic views of sensation and concept formation, or ch. 4.13 plus ch. 4.14 on vision and mirror images. Also compare, in Book 1, chs. 1.21–22 on time, chs. 1.25–26 on necessity, and chs. 1.27– 28 on fate.

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b Number–Order of Lemmata The order as reconstructed turns out to be the same as that of Diels in the DG. The opening lemma comes first in P, S, and T, as also in the parallel account in Nem; this is due to the well-known πρῶτος εὑρετής motif (M–R 2.1.95–96), explicitly acknowledged. Thales may have come first in A for chronological reasons too, see M–R 2.1.73–96 and Jeremiah (2018) 310–319. The order of S is rather different from that of P and T, who are very close to each other. It is apparent that P did not interfere with the order, but abridged away two lemmata, the content of which is similar to that of the lemma that each time came before it, so could be considered as equivalent attachments one could dispense with: in the block §§1–2 soul according to Alcmaeon at §2 is self-moved just as according to Thales at §1, and in the block §§3–4 Xenocrates at §4 agrees with Pythagoras at §3. S’s modifications of the order can be explained (see also at section A above): he wished to have Pythagoras, one of his favoured authorities, next to Thales, thus also paying homage to absolute chronology. This move brought the Xenocrates lemma along. S left out the Plato lemma §5 in favour of an almost verbatim quotation of Phaedr. 247c6–7 at Ecl. 1.49.2. The now isolated Aristotle lemma §6 was moved to the end in S, thus anticipating the position of the incomplete Aristotelian formula at the end of the summary of ch. 4.2 at 4.3.1, a lemma omitted by S. T has preserved the original order of block §§1–2, so also left the block §§3–4 in its original location. He omitted the final lemma, Asclepiades. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter The chapter deals with the question-types ‘what is it?’ and ‘how is it?’, or the categories of substance, quantity and quality, and provides several answers. This derives from Aristotle’s agenda, see de An. 1.1 402a7–8: ‘the aim of our inquiry is to study and understand its (sc. the soul’s) nature and substance, and secondly its accidents’, and 1.1 402a23–26: ‘presumably we first need to establish to which of the genera it belongs and what it is, I mean a particular thing and a substance, or a quality, or a quantity (πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν), or any other item on the list of categories’. See above, section D(a), Introduction to Book 4 section 2(1), and General Introduction section 5.2.1. Compare also cf. M–R 2.1.140–141. As is clear from the contents of the doxai and the (incomplete but) explicit summary at ch. 4.3.1, it comprises a selection of incorporealist doctrines that are opposed to the corporealist doctrines found in the next chapter, 4.3. These two chapters are analysed at Mansfeld (1990a) 3065–3085 and compared with the wider tradition (esp. Cicero) ibid. 3122–3131 and 3118–3121 (Philo). In its present form the opposition between incorporealists and corporealists (which

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recalls that between the materialists and the Friends of the Forms in Plato’s Sophist, 245e–249d) derives from Aristotle, as announced de An. 1.2 404b30–31 and then worked out in the rest of this chapter of the De anima. See Mansfeld (1990a) 3072, 3204, M–R. 2.1.57–58. It is found in numerous dialecticaldoxographical parallels, see e.g. Mansfeld (1990a) 3065–3085, and below, section E(a) & (b). §5 Aristotle provides a smooth transition from the incorporealists at §§1–4 to those of §§6–7 because the soul is the actuality of the body. §§6–7 Dicaearchus and Asclepiades are well placed at the end of the whole incorporealist series, because their views of the soul as a quality of (or supervenient on) the body are somewhat closer to those of the corporealists in the next chapter, 4.3. The series from Thales to Asclepiades virtually covers the entire time span dealt with in A’s treatise, but the chronological order is interrupted for systematic reasons, viz. by the position of §2 Alcmaeon before §3 Pythagoras and of §4 Xenocrates before §5 Plato. A diaeresis concerned with motion divides the chapter in two main parts, opposing the block of §§1–5, which stress self-motion, to that of §§6–8, which do not refer to motion. The theme of the soul’s motion occurs again as that of ch. 4.6. Within the first block §§1–2, which make the motion everlasting, are opposed to §§3–5, which do not do so. The emphasis on motion in the first part of ch. 4.2 to some extent echoes Aristotle’s discussion at de An. 1.2, where the main diaeresis is between those who make the soul the principle of motion and those who make it the principle of cognition, and where he begins with the former. For the latter in A see chs. 4.8–12 below. The negative characteristic of §§4–6 (implicitly spreading to §§7–8) relates to Aristotle’s argument against soul-motion at de An. 1.3, summarized at A 4.2.6. The doxographer takes the traditional question ‘what is the soul?’ in hand by arranging blocks of lemmata in succession according to the Aristotelian categories: of substance, §§1–2; of quantity, §§3–4; and of quality, §§6–8—thus conforming to the master’s checklist at de An. 1.1 402a22–25. A compromise or bridge position (cf. M–R 2.1.9–10, 2.1.46, 2.1.57, 2.1.59, 2.1.141, 2.1.187, 2.1.190) is occupied by §5, which combines the categories of substance and quantity. The series of lemmata as a whole is ordered according to quantity in a different way as well, viz. by number: the substances, quantities, and quality at §§1–6 are each counted as one, while at §7 the number four (explicitly) and at §8 the number five (implicitly, but explicitly in the parallels in e.g. ps.Galen Definitiones medicae and Macrobius) make their appearance.

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d

Further Comments General Points The terminology concerned with motion used by A repays a closer look. The doxographer seems to have given some thought to variatio: §1 ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον, §2 αὐτοκίνητον κατὰ ἀίδιον κίνησιν, §3(–4) ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, §5 ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητήν. The word ἀεικίνητος occurs for the first time at Plato Phdr. 245c and is a hapax in his œuvre; it does not occur in Aristotle. In A it is once found in the present chapter and once at ch. 4.6.1 (and, a rare exception, it is absent from Diels’ index in the DG). The reading αὐτ[οκ]είνητον in Phdr. 245c of the prima manus at POxy 1017 col. xx.5–6, accepted by Robin in the Budé ed. of the dialogue, was corrected by the secunda manus to ἀεικίνητον. In his commentary on the papyrus Haslam (1999) 265–267 once and for all proves the diorthotes to be right. The word αὐτοκίνητος occurs for the first time at Aristotle Phys. 8.5 258a2, and is a hapax in his oeuvre. It occurs twice in the present chapter (and is cited from this chapter at 4.3.1), but not elsewhere in the Placita. We may assume that entered the tradition because of the phrase τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν occurring in the immediate vicinity, Phdr. 245c. Individual Points §§1–2 Porphyry ad Gaur. 70F Smith at Simp. in Cat. 213.12–17 cites ‘soul is a substance that is self-moved’ (ψυχή ἐστιν οὐσία αὐτοκίνητος) as an instance of an essential definition (one of the set of οὐσιώδεις … ὅροι), or definition of the essence or substance (οὐσία). §1 The ascription to Thales of ‘everlasting motion or self-motion’ is in fact the attribution to him of an as to vocabulary modernized (and of course drastically abridged) version of Plato’s argument at Phdr. 245c–d. This transfer could be achieved because Thales is the archegete of the Ionian Succession (cf. M– R 2.1.74–96 and below ch. 4.7 Commentary D(d)§1). The Ionian Succession includes Plato, to whom as we saw self-motion (ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητήν) is attributed at §5, and everlasting motion (ἀεικίνητον) at ch. 4.6.1. (We note in passing that the Placita, just as POxy 1017 col. xx.5–6 secunda manus, does not attribute the term αὐτοκίνητος to Plato.) Influence has also been exercised by amalgamating the creative interpretation of the ensouled loadstone of de An. 1.2 405a19–21 with a creative interpretation of Aristotle’s cautious suggestion (note ἴσως, ‘presumably’) that Thales said that ‘everything is full of gods’ because like ‘some people, he probably believed that the soul is intermingled with the whole universe’ (de An. 1.5 411a7–8). The soul of the loadstone thus takes over the universe, cf. M–R. 2.1.178–179. See also below, ch. 4.3 Commentary D(d)§14. The inclusion of Thales among the incorporealists contrasts with the traditional attribution to him of water as the element and principle, as at ch. 1.3.1,

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and therefore excludes him from ch. 4.3.9, where only Hippo is left. That Thales’ soul is incorporeal is explicitly argued by Simplicius (perhaps Priscianus) in de An. 31.20–26. So our lemma ch. 4.2.1 seems to anticipate the interpretation Simplicius(?) formulates, or rather cites, five centuries later. John Philoponus, who thoughtlessly copies a traditional list at in de An. 9.7–11 (οἱ δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος, ὡς Θαλῆς καὶ Ἵππων ὁ ἐπίκλην ἄθεος) which attributes the concept of a soul consisting of water to Thales, later on in his commentary cautiously argues that Aristotle avoided to attribute to Thales the view that the soul consists of water (in de An. 86.22–34). Yet the theological doxa attributed to Thales at ch. 1.7.2 endows the principle water with a (Stoicizing) divine motive power (διήκειν δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ στοιχειώδους ὑγροῦ δύναμιν θείαν κινητικὴν αὐτοῦ). This is consistent with the doctrine of ch. 4.2.1. As to the principle or element, the Thales of the Placita to whom an ever-moving or self-moving soul, or motive divine power, is attributed has clearly been promoted to a higher level. This cannot be the invention of the doxographer, who here undoubtedly relies on an interpretative commentary tradition of which in this way we catch a glimpse. The difference of opinion among the late commentators is significant and suggests that their dispute had a long history; the texts are quoted below, section E(b)§1. §2 The Alcmaeon lemma closely follows Aristotle at de An. 1.2 405a29–b1, cf. Mansfeld (1990a) 3078 n. 80, 3090, Baltussen (1993) 219, and now Mansfeld (2015b). As a matter of fact, the gist of its second clause (about the soul’s immortality and resemblance to the gods) would be in a more appropriate position in ch. 4.7, heading ‘On the indestructibility of soul’. Though the term αὐτοκίνητος, not paralleled in Aristotle, was added, in other respects the excerpt retained its original extent, thus attesting the tenacity of the tradition. Parallel echoes are at Cicero ND 1.27, and Boethus at Porph. de An. adv. Boeth. (243F Smith) at Eus. PE 11.28.9 (cited in the apparatus criticus at §2 above). Also cf. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 8.83 ad finem: ‘Cette brève doxographie sur l’ âme semble très dépendante d’Aristote, De l’âme, I 2, 405 a 29–b 1’ writes J.-F. Balaudé ad loc., Goulet-Cazé (1999) 1009. Whether Aristotle correctly reflects Alcmaeon’s thought is maybe doubtful, because the reason he gives is so very Aristotelian: the soul is immortal because the ‘things divine, the moon, the sun, the stars, and the whole heavens are in a state of perpetual motion (κινεῖσθαι αἐί)’. At any rate Aristotle’s θεῖα shows that Diels’ conjecture θεοῖς is not good; Diels presumably forgot about or missed the relation of the lemma to Aristotle’s sentence. What is more, immediately before the Alcmaeon passage Aristotle speaks of Heraclitus’ principle as always moving: it is in ‘perpetual flux’ (de An. 2.1 405a27, ῥέον ἀεί)—an interpretation of Heraclitus’ thought, also found with Plato, that is not universally accepted today. The attribution of perpetual motion is one of the reasons for the incorporation of Alcmaeon’s doxa in ch. 4.2, since perpetual

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motion and self-motion are (more platonico) believed to be equivalent in §1. Thus, on the basis of Aristotle’s note Alcmaeon was interpreted as having anticipated Plato already in antiquity, and not only by modern scholars who add to this note the placitum deriving from his treatment as independent and so corroborative evidence. See e.g. Alcmaeon 14A10 DK3 = 24A12 DK5, Zeller–Nestle (1919) 599 n. 1, Guthrie (1962–1981) 1.351, Barnes (1981) 117–118; contra Mansfeld (2015b). §§3–4 ‘Number’ in general as tantamount to Intellect is a simplification. Aristotle de An. 1.2 404b16–18 attributes to Plato the view that the soul knows its objects—‘like by like’—because it is composed of the same ultimate principles. Immediately after, at de An. 1.2 404b22 (a reference to the Περὶ φιλοσοφίας we cannot check), he attributes to him and, presumably, other Platonists the idea that One stands for Intellect; A 1.7.21 at S 1.1.29b20 attributes this view to Xenocrates. The definitions of Plato and Xenocrates are also mentioned together at Aristotle Top. 6.3 140b2–3. The phrase ἀριθμὸν ἐαυτὸν κινοῦντα in §3 is by implication attributed to Xenocrates in §4, which finds confirmation in frs. 96–99, 101–107 Isnardi-Parente2 (e.g. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Xenocrates numerum se moventem). Note that Aristotle de An. 1.2 only alludes very briefly to the World Soul and human souls of the Timaeus, but does so at greater length in the next chapter, de An. 1.3 406b26–407a2, where he provides a remarkably succinct and precise account of the construction of the World Soul according to the ‘harmonic numbers’. The soul moves the body because it is interwoven with it, and the revolutions of the heavens are the motions of the soul. That Aristotle (a bit surreptitiously) includes the human soul is clear from his verbatim quotation at 406b30 of the formula Tim. 42a5–6, αἴσθησιν […] σύμφυτον (‘inborn perception’), from the passage dealing with the construction of the human soul. See also Dörrie–Baltes (2002) 54, 242–244, though they fail to print the Xenocrates lemma. §6 For the afterlife of Aristotle’s definition see Mansfeld (1992b) 141–146. Cicero’s ἐνδελέχειαν (Tusc. 1.22), however, is not a scribal error, as is clear from his exegesis which may be compared to that of entelecheia at AD fr. 5 Diels at Stob. (ch. Περὶ ἰδεῶν) 1.12.1b, p. 135.5–7 ἐντελέχειαν ⟨δ᾽⟩ αὐτὸ προσεῖπεν ἤτοι διὰ τὸ ἐνδελεχῶς ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ὅτι τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον παρέχεται τέλειον. Note that S has ἐνδελέχειαν σώματος the first time and ἐντελέχειαν the second; Epiphanius Haer. 3. p. 508.9 has ἐνδελέχειαν σώματος too. The other word is also at Philo Somn. 1.30; it follows that the vulgarizing corruption was in the text he used, just as in one place of that used by S. A comparable confusion seems to be behind Anon. Londiniensis Iatr. col. i.24–25 and ii.9, where we read ἐντρέχεια, ‘aptitude’. For a defence of the view that Aristotle may have used the term ἐνδελέχεια see however Dörrie–Baltes (2002) 1.159. Note that ἐνδελέχειαν at ch. 1.18.6

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ἀναιρετικὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνδελέχειαν αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ τόπου) φύσιν τῆς τε τῶν ὄντων συμπαθείας καὶ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ἀλληλουχίας, must mean something like ‘actual existence’, for if not a scribal error it means the same as ἐντελέχεια. §7 We note in passing that the doctrine of the ‘soul as harmony’, famous from the discussion in Plato’s Phaedo and Aristotle’s De anima (1.4) and found in other doxographical accounts as well (where it is sometimes attributed to Pythagoras and/or Philolaus), is absent, perhaps because of an accident in transmission, or, more likely, because the epitomator or one of his predecessors believed that the references to it in (§5 and) §7 were sufficient. The attribution to Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus elsewhere of the view that the soul does not exist has some force in the context of a diaphonic presentation (namely as a zero position, see section E(a) &(b) §§0, §§7–8). Actually, however, both these men merely held that the soul does not exist in the usual sense, viz. as something apart from the body. The attribution by implication in §7 of the idea that the soul is an incorporeal is at odds with this view. The confusion of Dicaearchus with the orator Dinarchus of Corinth or with (perhaps) the Peripatetic Clearchus occurs more often, see e.g. Sharples (2001a) 145 n. 10. It is merely a matter of the interpretation of an abbreviation. For Galen’s reference to Andronicus quoted under section E(b) see Moraux (1973) 134–135 n. 9, and Caston (1997) 351–353. §8 (Five) senses: cf. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19, ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.373.3– 5, 379.8–9K., see section E(b)§8. In view of the arrangement of the lemmata in ascending order according to number, the Asclepiades lemma (content paralleled in other sources) gives the t.p.q. of the composition of the chapter. The senses in general are the subject of ch. 4.8, their number (in the context of the present chapter in P’s version apparently less relevant) of ch. 4.10. e Other Evidence In the proximate tradition Cicero Tusc. 1.19–22 presents the corporealists before the incorporealists (though appending Democritus ad finem), and so do Philo Somn. 1.30 and Nem NH 2, p. 16.13–17.10, while Tertullian de An. 5 (Soranus de An. fr. 2 Podolak), like A, has first the incorporealists and then the corporealists. To some extent doxai and name-labels are confirmed by Nemesius, who lists Thales, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and Deinarchus (sic, for Dicaearchus). Galen PHP 7.3.19 opposes the view that the soul is incorporeal to the view that it is corporeal (i.e., pneuma), and QAM c. 5, p. 32.5–8 Bazou the view that it is corporeal to the view that it is incorporeal (‘e.g. Plato’). For the quaestio in Galen’s De propriis placitis, where it is one of the important issues (with Galen characteristically abstaining from committing himself), see below, section E(b). Tertullian de An. 3.2 (cited above at Book 4 titulus et index) lists as issues on which the philo-

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sophers disagree the soul’s mortality vs. immortality (cf. ch. 4.7), its substance (cf. chs. 4.2–3), form, condition, and origin (cf. ch. 4.7a). The contrast between calling the soul either body or incorporeal is discussed in Ptolemy’s On the Criterion and Hegemonikon §7; his point of view is that names i.e. qualifications are irrelevant (he deals with the soul as composed of corporeal elements in the sequel of the treatise). For Nemesius see above, section A(4). Twenty-two chapters in Psellus’ De omnifaria docrina share the heading Περὶ ψυχῆς, and so does G c. 24, a chapter outside the tradition of P. A doxography on the soul that to some extent depends on the Placita is found in the 13th cent. author Barhebraeus, Candélabre des sanctuaires, 8th base introd., trans. Bakoš (1948) 1–2: ‘Des opinions que les anciens ont eu sur l’âme humaine. … Certains, donc, ont dit que c’ est un corps (cf. ch. 4.3); d’autres, par contre, que c’est un accident qui subsiste dans le corps; d’ autres, par contre, que ce n’est pas un corps, mais non plus un accident dans le corps’ (thus, an incorporeal). Early names plus doxai listed for the first category are Democritus, Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, for the second Alexander of Aphrodisias, and for the third Aristotle, the Peripatetics, and Gregory of Nyssa. A similar doxography dealing with the principles is found elsewhere in Barhebraeus Candélabre des sanctuaires, namely at 2nd base introd.; see above, ch. 1.3, Commentary D(e) ad finem. See also Dörrie–Baltes (2002), texts 1.2–12, rich commentary 1.145–170 (on Cic. Tusc. 1.18–22, Macr. Somn. 1.14 + 1.19–20, and Nem NH 2 p. 16.12–17.14). E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts (see also above at Book 4 titulus et index, Related texts, and below, ch. 4.3, section E(a) General texts): Cicero Tusc. 1.19–22: see below §0. Tusc. 1.66 (= Cons. fr. 11) animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest; nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, nihil ne aut umidum quidem aut flabile aut igneum. his enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriae mentis cogitationis habeat, quod et praeterita teneat et futura provideat et complecti possit praesentia. quae sola divina sunt, nec invenietur umquam, unde ad hominem venire possint nisi a deo. singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi seiuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. Tusc. 1.70 quae est eius natura? propria, puto, et sua. sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem: nihil ad id de quo agimus. Philo of Alexandria Somn. 1.30 τί γὰρ αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν νοῦν) οἰόμεθα κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι; πνεῦμα ἢ αἷμα ἢ σῶμα συνόλως—ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σῶμα, ἀσώματον δὲ λεκτέον. Mut. 10 τίς γὰρ ψυχῆς οὐσίαν εἶδεν; ἧς ἡ ἀδηλότης μυρίας ἔριδας σοφισταῖς ἐγέννησεν ἐναντίας εἰσηγουμένοις γνώμας ἢ καὶ ὅλοις γένεσιν ἀντιστατούσας. Cher. 114 τίς δέ ἐστι τὴν οὐσίαν (sc. of the soul), ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν; Seneca Ep. 121.12 nos quoque animum habere

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nos scimus: quid sit animus, ubi sit, qualis sit aut unde nescimus. Nat. 7.25.2 habere nos animum, cuius imperio et impellimur et revocamur, omnes fatebuntur. quid tamen sit animus ille rector dominusque nostri non magis tibi quisquam expediet quam ubi sit. alius illum dicet spiritum esse, alius concentum quendam, alius vim divinam et dei partem, alius tenuissimum animae, alius incorporalem potentiam; non deerit qui sanguinem dicat, qui calorem. ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.355.11–17 K. κθʹ. ψυχή ἐστιν οὐσία ἀσώματος, αὐτοκίνητος κατὰ Πλάτωνα (but Phdr. 245c we must read ἀεικίνητον). κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς (SVF 2.780) σῶμα λεπτομερὲς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους. κατὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη (de An. 2.1 412a27–b1) ἐντελέχεια σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ἄλλως. ψυχή ἐστι πνεῦμα παρεσπαρμένον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι δι᾽ οὗ ζῶμεν καὶ λογιζόμεθα καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐνεργοῦμεν ὑπηρετοῦντος τοῦ σώματος. Galen PHP 7.7.25 εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας ἀποφήνασθαι χρή, δυοῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν· ἢ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὸ οἷον αὐγοειδές τε καὶ αἰθερῶδες σῶμα λεκτέον αὐτήν, εἰς ὃ κἂν μὴ βούλωνται κατ᾽ ἀκολουθίαν ἀφικνοῦνται Στωϊκοί (—) τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἢ αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὄχημα δὲ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς εἶναι τουτὶ τὸ σῶμα δι᾽ οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τἆλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει. Loc.Aff. 8.158.11–159.7 ὥσπερ δ᾽ ἐνταῦθα φιλονεικίαν αἰσχρὰν ἐπιδείκνυνται προφανῶς, οὕτως ἄνοιαν, ὅταν οἴωνται πάνθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν σαλεύεσθαι τὰ δόγματα, κᾂν ἓν ὁτιοῦν ἐλεγχθῇ· τινὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀκολουθεῖ, καθάπερ γε πάλιν ἕτερα μάχεται, τινὰ δὲ οὔτ᾽ ἀκολουθίαν οὔτε μάχην ἀναγκαίαν ἔχει, καθάπερ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικοῦ (cf. ch. 4.5). ἐάν τε γὰρ ἐν καρδίᾳ τις ἐάν τ᾽ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ περιέχεσθαι τοῦτό φησι, δυνατόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν στοιχείων ἣν ἂν ἐθελήσῃ δόξαν ἑλομένῳ μήτε μάχεσθαι τούτῳ μήτ᾽ ἀκολουθεῖν· καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ὁμοίως (cf. ch. 1.24), ὥσπέρ γε καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας. Propr.Plac. 3, p. 173.13–18 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami ψυχὴν μὲν ἔχειν ἡμὰς πέπεισμαι καθάπερ ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι κατὰ προαίρεσιν αἰσθάνεσθαί τε διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν ὀργάνων αἴτον ἅπαντας ὁρῶ ψυχὴν ὀνομάζοντας· ἥτις δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγνοεῖν ὁμολογῶ καὶ πολύ γε μᾶλλον, εἰ ἀθάνατος ἐστιν ἤ θνητή. Propr.Plac. 7, p. 179.13–13 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami καθάπερ οὖν ἰατρῷ περ⟨ιτ⟩τὸν το γινῶσκειν, εἴτ᾽ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴτ᾽ οὐκ ἀθάνατος …, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς εἴτ᾽ ἀσώματός ἐστιν παντάπασιν, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ὑπέλαβεν, εἴτε σωματοειδὴς ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος οἵεται κτλ. Propr.Plac. 14, p. 187.23–188.2 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami (= Sub.Nat.Fac. 4.760.13–461.4 K.) οἱ δὲ τὴν φυσικὴν ὀνομαζομένην ἐκπονήσαντες θεωρίαν, ἄλλως ἄλλοι πείσαντες ἑαυτοὺς, οἱ μὲν ἀσωμάτους τινὰς ἀπεφήναντο δυνάμεις ἐνοικεῖν ταῖς αἰσθηταῖς οὐσίαις, οἱ δὲ αὐτὰς ἐνεργεῖν τὰς οὐσίας κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ἑκάστην φύσιν … τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν ἀσώματόν τινα νομίζουσιν οὐσίαν εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ πνεῦμα, καθάπερ ἄλλοι μηδὲ εἶναί τινα ὕπαρξιν αὐτῆς ἰδίαν. Aquilius Def. 76 Rashed ψυχή ἐστιν οὐσία ἀσώματος λογικὴ (cf. ch. 4.11) ἀθάνατος (cf. ch. 4.7) αὐτοκίνητος (cf. ch. 4.6). Sextus Empiricus M. 7.348 ἐχρῆν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν … τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει συνεπιβάλλειν δι᾽ ἥν, οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐξ ἧς ἐστι, τόπῳ τῷ ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. P. 2.58 ἀλλὰ διαφωνεῖ περί τε τῆς οὐσίας αὑτῆς. P. 2.31–32 τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς διαλαβόντων, ἵνα τὴν πολλὴν καὶ ἀνήνυτον μάχην παραλίπωμεν, οἱ μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφασαν,

liber 4 caput 2 … (32) οἱ δὲ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχον. Tertullian de An. 3.2 alii de substantia, alii de forma … disceptant. de An. 5.1 (Soranus de An. fr. 2 Podolak) accerserit (sc. Plato) Eubulum aliquem et Critolaum (fr. 17 Wehrli) et Xenocratem (fr. 67 Heinze, F 122 Isnardi Parente2) et isto in loco amicum Platonis Aristotelem. fortassean exstruentur magis ad auferendam animae corpulentiam, si non alios e contrario inspexerint, et quidem plures, corpus animae vindicantes. Lactantius Op.D. 17.2 Perrin quid autem sit anima nondum inter philosophos convenit nec umquam fortasse conveniet. Arnobius Adv.Nat. 1.38, p. 33.15 Marchesi qui … monstravit … quid sit sensus, quid anima. Iamblichus de An. fr. 2 Finamore– Dillon at Stob. 1.49.32, p. 363.11–12 τινὲς εἰς τὰς τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων ἀρχὰς τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπαναφέρουσιν + pp. 363.26–364.1 μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα τοὺς εἰς μαθηματικὴν οὐσίαν ἐντιθέντας τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καταλέγω διευκρινημένως + p. 365.5–6 ἴθι δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν ἐπανίωμεν, διακρίνοντες καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐν τάξει τὰς περὶ ψυχῆς πάσας δόξας. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19–20 non ab re est ut haec de anima disputatio in fine sententias omnium qui de anima videntur pronuntiasse contineat. Platon dixit animam essentiam se moventem, Xenocrates (fr. 60 Heinze, F 96 Isnardi Parente2) numerum se moventem, Aristoteles ἐντελέχειαν, Pythagoras et Philolaus (44A23 DK) harmoniam, Posidonius (F 140 E.-K., 391b Theiler) ideam, Asclepiades (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 722) quinque sensuum exercitium sibi consonum. … (20) … obtinuit tamen non minus de incorporalitate eius quam de immortalitate sententia. Ambrose of Milan de Noe 92, p. 478.3–5 Schenkl ideo in principio sanctus Moyses informavit nos atque instruxit de insufflatione animae, ut non laberemur opinionibus diversis philosophorum, qui sibi ipsi constare non possunt. de Is. 2.4 pp. 644.23–645.5 Schenkl non ergo sanguis (cf. ch. 4.3.13) anima, quia carnis est sanguis, neque armonia anima, quia et huiusmodi armonia carnis est, neque aer (cf. ch. 4.3.2, 4.3.8) anima, quia aliud est flatilis spiritus, aliud anima, neque ignis (cf. ch. 4.3.7) anima, neque entelechia anima, sed anima est vivens, quia factus est Adam in animam viventem, eo quod insensibile atque exanimum corpus anima vivificet et gubernet. Calcidius in Tim. cc. 213–235 cf. below. Augustine de Trin. 10.6.10–7.22 Mountain–Glorie cum itaque … (sc. mens) corpus se esse putat. … (7.20) qui vero eius substantiam vitam quandam nequaquam corpoream … repererunt. ps.Galen HPh c. 24, DG p. 613.4–7 πολλὴν μὲν ἔστιν εὑρεῖν παρὰ τοῖς προτέροις ἀντίρρησιν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς γενομένην, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἵνα μὴ τὸν τῆς εἰσαγωγῆς τρόπον ὑπερβαίνειν δοκῶμεν τὰ πᾶσιν εἰρημένα περὶ ταύτης διεξιόντες, ὅσα τοῖς ὀνομαστοτάτοις εἰρῆσθαι περὶ ταύτης νομίζομεν ὡς ἐν βραχέσι πειρώμεθα λέγειν. John Philoponus in de An. 9.2–10.8 (excerpted by Psellus Phil.Min. 2 op. 13, pp. 32.18–33.3 O’Meara). Chapter heading: Calcidius in Tim. c. 7, p. 61.1 Waszink De anima et partibus eius et locis. Capitula Lucretiana at DRN 1.112 De anima. §0 Whether it exists: Lucretius DRN 3.101 … nulla cum in parte siet mens. Cicero Luc. 124 si est (sc. animus) Cicero Tusc. 1.21 Dicaearchus (fr. 7 Wehrli, 19 Mirhady) … nihil omnino esse animum et hoc esse nomen totum inane frustraque animalia et animantis appellari, neque in homine inesse animum vel

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animam nec in bestia, vimque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis aequabiliter esse fusam nec separabilem a corpore esse, quippe quae nulla sit, nec sit quicquam nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita figuratum, ut temperatione naturae vigeat et sentiat. Tusc. 1.24 quid de Dicaearcho (fr. 8(c) Wehrli, 14 Mirhady) dicam, qui nihil omnino animum dicat esse? Tusc. 1.51 Dicaearchus (fr. 8(e), 16 Mirhady) quidem et Aristoxenus (fr. 118 Wehrli, Ia 1 20 Kaiser) … nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt. Luc. 124 an, ut Dicaearcho (fr. 8(f) Wehrli, 17 Mirhady) visum est, ne sit quidem ullus (sc. animus)? Atticus fr. 7.7 Des Places at Eus. PE 15.9.10 Δικαίαρχος (fr. 8(i) Wehrli, 20 Mirhady) … ἀνῄρηκε τὴν ὅλην ὑπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.349 οἱ μὲν μηδέν φασιν εἶναι αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸ πῶς ἔχον σῶμα, καθάπερ ὁ Δικαίαρχος (fr. 8(a) Wehrli, 24 Mirhady). P. 2.31 οἱ μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν (sc. τὴν διάνοιαν) ἔφασαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεσσήνιον Δικαίαρχον (fr. 8(b) Wehrli, 18 Mirhady), οἱ δὲ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχον. Tertullian de An. 15.1 (Soranus de An. fr. 12 Podolak) qui negant principale, ipsam prius animam nihil censuerunt. confused Lactantius Op.D. 16.12 Perrin sive enim mentis locus nullus est, sed per totum corpus sparsa discurrit, quod et fieri potest et a Xenocrate (fr. 71 Heinze, F 127 Isnardi Parente2) Platonis discipulo disputatum est, siquidem sensus in qualibet parte corporis praesto est. Inst. 7.13.9 Heck–Wlosok quid Aristoxenus (fr. 120(c) Wehrli, IV 1 20 Kaiser), qui negavit omnino ullam esse animam, etiam cum vivit in corpore? Iamblichus de An. fr. 9 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. 1.49.32, p. 367.4–9 ἢ τὸ τῇ φύσει συμμεμιγμένον ἢ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ὂν ὥσπερ τὸ ἐψυχῶσθαι, αὐτῇ δὴ μὴ παρὸν τῇ ψυχῇ ὥσπερ ὑπάρχειν, οἷα δὴ λέγεται περὶ ψυχῆς παρὰ Δικαιάρχῳ τῷ Μεσσηνίῳ (fr. 8(k) Wehrli, 23 Mirhady). §1 Thales: Porphyry ad Gaur. 70F Smith at Simp. in Cat. 213.12–17 (verbatim) ἔστιν δὲ ἐννοηματικὸς (sc. λόγος) ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων τοῖς πᾶσιν εἰλημμένος καὶ κοινῇ παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογούμενος, οἷον … ‘ψυχή ἐστιν ἀφ᾽ ἧς ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν’ …. οὐσιώδεις δέ εἰσιν ὅροι οἱ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν τῶν ὁριζομένων διδάσκοντες, οἷον ‘ψυχή ἐστιν οὐσία αὐτοκίνητος’. ps.Galen HPh c. 24, DG p. 613.10–11 οἱ δὲ κινήσεως ἀρχὴν πάντων τῶν γινομένων τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων. §2 Alcmaeon: Cicero ND 1.27 Crotoniates autem Alcmaeo (24A12 DK), qui soli et lunae reliquisque sideribus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus inmortalitatem dare. Clement of Alexandria Protr. 66.9–10 Marcovich ὁ γάρ τοι Κροτωνιάτης Ἀλκμαίων (24A12 DK) θεοὺς ᾤετο τοὺς ἀστέρας εἶναι ἐμψύχους ὄντας. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 8.83 (Alcmaeon, 24A1 DK) ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον, καὶ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν συνεχὲς ὡς τὸν ἥλιον. Boethus at de An. adv. Boeth. at Porph. (243F Smith) at Eus. PE 11.28.9 εἰς ὅπερ (sc. τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ ἄπαυστον τῆς κινήσεως) ἀπιδὼν καὶ ὁ Κροτωνιάτης φυσικὸς (VS 1 add. p. 495.46–47) εἶπεν ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν ἠρεμίαν φύσει φεύγειν, ὥσπερ τὰ θεῖα τῶν σωμάτων. §§3–4 Pythagoras Xenocrates: Cicero Tusc. 1.20 Xenocrates (fr. 67 Heinze, F 119 Isnardi Parente2) animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse ullum, numerum dixit esse, cuius vis, ut iam ante Pythagorae visum erat, in natura maxuma esset. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Platon dixit animam essentiam se moven-

liber 4 caput 2 tem, Xenocrates (fr. 60 Heinze, F 96 Isnardi Parente2) numerum se moventem, … Posidonius ideam (F 140 E.-K., 391b Theiler). Iamblichus de An. fr. 4 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. 1.49.32, p. 364.9–10 ὡς δ᾽ αὐτοκίνητον (sc. ἀριθμὸν) Ξενοκράτης (fr. 60 Heinze, F 98 Isnardi Parente2). John Philoponus in de An. 81.25–29 (on de An. 1.2 404b27–28) Ξενοκράτης (fr. 60 Heinze, F 104 Isnardi Parente2) ὁ τούτου διάδοχος ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ὁρίζεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἰπὼν αὐτὴν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι κινοῦντα ἑαυτόν, διὰ μὲν τὸ γνωστικὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀριθμὸν εἰπὼν ὡς Πυθαγόρειος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ πάντων ὁ ἀριθμὸς κατ᾽ αὐτούς), διὰ δὲ τὸ κινητικὴν εἶναι τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀναθεὶς αὐτῇ. §3 Pythagoras: Philo of Alexandria Somn. 1.30 ἢ ἀριθμόν. §4 Xenocrates: Cicero Luc. 124 si simplex, … ut Xenocrates (fr. 67 Heinze, F 121 Isnardi Parente2) numerus nullo corpore, quod intellegi quale sit vix potest. Tusc. 1.20 Xenocrates (fr. 67 Heinze, F 119 Isnardi Parente2) animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse ullum, numerum dixit esse. Tusc. 1.41 si vero aut numerus quidam est animus. §5 Plato: Cicero Tusc. 1.54 cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse, quod se ipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? ND 2.32 audiamus enim Platonem … cui duo placet esse motus, unum suum alterum externum, esse autem divinius quod ipsum ex se sua sponte moveatur quam quod pulsu agitetur alieno. hunc autem motum in solis animis esse ponit, ab isque principium motus esse ductum putat. ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.355.11–12 K. see above, General texts. Ambrose of Milan Ep. 21.1, p. 154.6–8 Faller aut, ut illa patricia quaedam eorum prosapia Platonis disputat, quod ‘ipsum se movet et non movetur ab alio’, ipsa tibi anima videtur. Calcidius in Tim. c. 226 est igitur anima iuxta Platonem substantia carens corpore semet ipsam movens rationabilis. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Plato dixit animam essentiam se moventem. ps.Galen HPh c. 24. DG p. 613.12–13 τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς οἱ μὲν ἀσώματον ἔφασαν, ὡς Πλάτων. §6 Aristotle: Cicero Tusc. 1.22 Aristoteles (fr. 27 Walzer/Ross) … quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens; … quintum genus adhibet vacans nomine et sic ipsum animum ἐνδελέχειαν appellat novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem. Tusc. 1.65 sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele (fr. 27 Walzer/Ross) inducta primum, haec et deorum est et animorum. Philo Somn. 1.30 ἢ ἐνδελέχειαν. ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.355.11– 15 K. κθʹ. κατὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη (de An. 2 1.412a27–b1) ἐντελέχεια σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. Arius Didymus fr. 2 Diels at Stob. Ecl. 1.12.1b, pp. 134.19–135.7 τὸ εἶδος, ὃ καὶ μορφὴν καλεῖ καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἐνέργειαν· οὕτως αὐτῷ πλούσιόν τε καὶ πολυώνυμόν ἐστι τὸ εἶδος. …. ἐντελέχειαν ⟨δ᾽⟩ αὐτὸ προσεῖπεν ἤτοι διὰ τὸ ἐνδελεχῶς ὑπάρχειν ἢ ὅτι τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον παρέχεται τέλειον. Hippolytus Ref. 7.19.5–6 ὁ δὲ Περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῷ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀσαφής· ἐν τρισὶ γὰρ συγγράμ⟨μ⟩ασιν ὅλοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν σαφῶς ὅ τι φρονεῖ περὶ ψυχῆς Ἀριστοτέλης. ὃν γὰρ ἀποδίδωσι τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ῥᾴδιον, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ὅρου δεδηλωμένον ἐστὶ δυσεύρετον. ἔστι γάρ, φησί, ψυχὴ φυσικοῦ σώματος ὀργανικοῦ ἐντελέχεια· ἣ

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τίς ποτ᾽ ἐστι, λόγων ⟨πάνυ πολλῶν⟩ δεῖται καὶ μεγάλης ζητήσεως. Ref. 7.24.2 τήν τε ψυχὴν ἔργον καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα ⟨τοῦ σώματ⟩ός φησιν εἶναι ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, φυσικοῦ σώματος ὀργανικοῦ ἐντελέχειαν. Iamblichus de An. fr. 3 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.32, p. 363.19–25 ὡς δὲ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν τινες ὑφηγοῦνται, εἶδός ἐστι τὸ περὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ ποιότης ἁπλῆ ἀσώματος ἢ ποιότης οὐσιώδης τελεία· (ᾗ παράκειται δόξῃ οὐ παραδοθεῖσα μέν, δυναμένη δὲ πιθανῶς λέγεσθαι αἵρεσις, ἡ τὴν συνδρομὴν τῶν ὅλων ποιοτήτων καὶ τὸ ἓν αὐτῶν κεφάλαιον, εἴτε τὸ ἐπιγιγνόμενον ἢ τὸ προϋπάρχον, τιθεμένη τὴν ψυχήν). Calcidius in Tim. c. 222 Aristoteles animam definit hactenus (Arist. de An. 2.1 412a27–b1): anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis organici possibilitate vitam habens, …. hanc igitur speciem qua formantur singula generaliter Aristoteles entelechiam, id est absolutam perfectionem, vocat. in Tim. c. 223 manifestant (sc. auctores Peripatetici) principio animam neque corporeum quicquam esse vel sensibile sed intelligibile potius et sine corpore. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Aristoteles entelechiam [sive endelechiam ms P, endilichiam ms C]. in Somn. 1.14.20 Critolaus Peripateticus (fr. 18 Wehrli) constare eam de quinta essentia. Ambrose of Milan de Noe 92, p. 478.12 Schenkl Aristoteles endelechiam dixit. de Is. 2.4, MPL 14.530A neque entelechia anima. Ep. 21.8–11 Faller ut Aristoteles … quintum quoddam elementi genus induxit …, id est entelechian, ex quo componeres et velut fingeres animi substantiam. Epiphanius Haer. 3, p. 508.9 Holl τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνδελέχειαν σώματος λέγει. §7 Dicaearchus: Cicero Tusc. 1.41 Dicaearchum (fr. 8(d) Wehrli, 15 Mirhady) vero cum Aristoxeno (fr. 120(b) Wehrli, Ia 1 15 Kaiser) … omittamus, quorum alter ne condoluisse quidem umquam videtur, qui animum se habere non sentiat, alter ita delectatur suis cantibus, ut eos etiam ad haec transferre conetur. ἁρμονίαν autem etc. Philo of Alexandria Somn. 1.30 ἢ ἁρμονίαν. Tertullian de An. 15.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 12 Podolak) Messenius aliqui Dicaearchus (fr. 8(h) Wehrli, 25 Mirhady), ex medicis autem Andreas et Asclepiades (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 727) ita abstulerunt principale, dum in animo ipso volunt esse sensus, quorum vindicatur principale. Ambrose of Milan Ep. 21.4– 6 Faller aut nervorum harmoniam animam putas, ut vulgus philosophorum interpraetatur. de Is. 4, p. 645.1–2 Schenkl neque armonia anima, quia et huiusmodi armonia carnis est. Augustine de Trin. 10.7.13–17 Mountain–Glorie alii eam nullam esse substantiam quia nisi corpus nullam substantiam poterant cogitare et eam corpus esse non inveniebant, sed ipsam temperationem corporis nostri vel compagem primordiorum quibus ista caro tamquam connectitur esse opinati sunt. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Pythagoras et Philolaus (44A23 DK) harmoniam. §8 Asclepiades: Tertullian de An. 15.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 12 Podolak) Asclepiades (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 727) etiam illa argumentatione vectatur, quod pleraque animalia ademptis eis partibus corporis, in quibus plurimum existimatur principale consistere, et insuper vivant aliquatenus … si capita decideris, … si corda detraxeris etc. (cf. Aristotle de An. 1.5 411b19–20 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διαιρούμενα ζῆν καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔνια τῶν ἐντόμων κτλ.) ps.Galen

liber 4 caput 2 Def.Med. 19.373.3–5 K. ϟθʹ. Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνός (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 721)· ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τὴν ⟨συν⟩γυμνασίαν τῶν πέντε αἰσθήσεων ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. Def.Med. 19.379.8–9 K. ριστʹ. ὥσπερ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνός (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 721) φησιν καὶ τὴν ⟨σ⟩υνγυμνασίαν τῶν πέντε αἰσθήσεων ψυχὴν εἶναι. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Asclepiades (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 722) quinque sensuum exercitium sibi consonum. Caelius Aurelianus Cel.Pass. 1.14.115 etenim nihil aliud esse dicit animam quam sensuum omnium coetum. intellectum autem occultarum vel latentium rerum per solubilem fieri motum sensuum … hoc est Asclepiadis (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 713) dogma. ps.Galen HPh c. 24, DG p. 613.7–9 ψυχὴν τοίνυν οἱ μὲν πνεῦμα παντὶ τῷ σώματι περικείμενον ὅπου μὲν μᾶλλον, ὅπου δὲ ἧττον νομίζουσιν εἶναι (οὗτοι δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 714) εἰσίν).

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General texts: Aristotle de An. 1.2 403b20–28 ἐπισκοποῦντας δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγκαῖον ἅμα, διαποροῦντας περὶ ὧν εὐπορεῖν δεῖ προελθόντας, τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν, ὅσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο, ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰρημένα λάβωμεν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ καλῶς, τοῦτ᾽ εὐλαβηθῶμεν. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως προθέσθαι τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυσὶ μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. παρειλήφαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς. de An. 1.2 404b30– 405a1 διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ σωματικὰς ποιοῦντες τοῖς ἀσωμάτους, τούτοις δ᾽ οἱ μίξαντες καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποφηνάμενοι [see also at ch. 4.3, section E(b) General texts]. Chrysippus de An. I at Gal. PHP 3.1.16 (SVF 2.885) τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥμισυ μέρος αὐτῷ τῆς βίβλου τὸ πρότερον (sc. Περὶ ψυχῆς) ὑπὲρ οὐσίας ψυχῆς ἔχει τὴν σκέψιν. Anonymus Londiniensis Iatr. col. xxxi.40–42a Manetti καὶ μήν, φασίν, | ὅ[τι] ἐστὶ σῶμα ἡ ψυχή οἱ πλείους τῶν φιλοσόφων | λ[έγ]ουσι καὶ ἀσώματον δὲ αὐτὴν ἀπολεί|[πον]τες οὐσίαν ἥ⟨ν⟩τινὰ αὐτὴν ἔχειν ἔφασαν. Alcinous Did. c. 5, p. 157.27–36 H. οἷον ζητῶν εἰ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ὑποθέμενος αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ζητῶ εἰ ἀεικίνητος, καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδείξας ζητῶ εἰ τὸ ἀεικίνητον αὐτοκίνητον, καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο ἀποδείξας σκοπῶ εἰ τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀρχὴ κινήσεως· εἶτα εἰ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀγένητος, ὅπερ τίθενται ὡς ὁμολογούμενον, τοῦ ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου ὄντος· ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἀρξάμενος ἐναργοῦς ὄντος συνθήσω τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν· εἰ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀγένητον, καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, τὸ αὐτοκίνητον, τὸ αὐτοκίνητον δὲ ψυχή, ἄφθαρτος ἄρα καὶ ἀγένητος καὶ ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή. cf. ibid. c. 25, p. 178.13–23 H. ἔτι τε ἡ ψυχὴ … καθ᾽ αὑτήν. Atticus fr. 7.2–5 bis Des Places (verbatim) at Eus. PE 15.11.4 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ὅσα περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήκασιν ἄλλοι, αἰσχύνην ἡμῖν φέρει. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸς ὁ ἐντελέχειαν τιθεὶς τὴν ψυχὴν λόγος σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ. fr. 7.34–42 Des Places (verbatim) at Eus. PE 15.9.7–8 ὁ δέ (sc. Aristotle), ὅσῳπερ Πλάτων ἀπεσέμνυνε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρᾶγμα … τοσῷδε ἐφιλονείκησε καθελεῖν καὶ ἀτιμάσαι καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν μηδὲν ἀποφῆναι τὴν ψυχήν· (8) οὔτε γὰρ πνεῦμα οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε ὅλως σῶμα (see also at ch. 4.3, section E(a) General texts), ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἀσώματον οἷον εἶναί τε ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀκίνητον εἶναι καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄψυχον. Alexander

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of Aphrodisias de An. 1.2–3 ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις ἡμῖν, περὶ ψυχῆς εἰπεῖν τῆς ⟨τοῦ⟩ ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ φθορᾷ σώματος, τίς τέ ἐστιν αὐτῆς ἡ οὐσία κτλ. ps.Alexander Quaest. fr. 2 Vitelli at FS Gomperz 1902 p. 93.13–14 λέγει (sc. Plato) δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσώματόν τινα οὐσίαν καὶ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι, ὧν θάτερον περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους δείκνυται. oἱ δὲ (sc. Stoici, not in SVF) … λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι. Alexander of Aphrodisias(?) de An.Mant. 101.3, 101.13–15. Anonymus Londiniensis Iatr. col. i.21–24 Manetti ψυχὴ δὲ λέγεται τριχῶς· | [ἥ τε] τῶι ὅλωι σώματι παρεσπαρ|μένη καὶ τὸ μόριον τὸ λογιστικὸν | [κ]αὶ ἔτι ἡ ἐντρέχεια (sic). Galen PHP 7.3.19 ἴσως ἄν τις ὑπονοήσειε τὸ κατὰ τὰς κοιλίας τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου πνεῦμα δυοῖν θάτερον, εἰ μὲν ἀσώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, οἰκητήριον, εἰ δὲ σῶμα, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ {πνεῦμα} τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. QAM c. 5, p. 32.5–8 Bazou εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶδός ἐστιν ὁμοιομεροῦς σώματος ἡ ψυχή, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομεν ἐπιστημονικωτάτην· εἰ δ᾽ ὑποθοίμεθα ταύτην ἀσώματον εἶναι φύσιν ἰδίαν ἔχουσαν, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν κτλ. Ptolemy Iudic. c. 7, p. 11.10–21 καὶ σῶμα μὲν καλοῦμεν τὸ ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ σαρκῶν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων αἰσθητῶν, ψυχὴν δὲ τὸ τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἢ διὰ τούτων κινήσεως αἴτιον, οὗ τῶν δυνάμεων μόνων ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ ταύτην σῶμα δεῖ καλεῖν, οὐ πολυπραγμονητέον νῦν· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ὑποκειμένων φύσεων ζητοῦμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν αὐταῖς διαφοράν, ἣν ἔργῳ κατανενοήκαμεν ἀμετάστατον οὖσαν, κἂν μυριάκις τις ἀντιστρέφῃ τὰς ὀνομασίας αὐτῶν ἢ νῦν μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσώματον εἶναι φάσκῃ κατὰ τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας σῶμα καλεῖσθαι τὸ αἰσθήσει γνώριμον, νῦν δὲ σῶμα κατὰ τοὺς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ παθεῖν οἷόν τε σῶμα ὁριζομένους. Plotinus Enn. 4.7.[2].1–83. Enn. 4.2.[4].1.1–4 τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τίς ποτέ ἐστι ζητοῦντες σῶμα οὐδὲν αὐτὴν δείξαντες εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἀσωμάτοις αὖ ἁρμονίαν, τό τε τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὕτως, ὡς λέγεται, οὔτε δηλωτικὸν ὂν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀφέντες. Enn. 4.7.[2].2.1–3 τοῦτο οὖν τίνα φύσιν ἔχει; ἢ σῶμα μὲν ὂν … εἰ δὲ μὴ σῶμα εἴη, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἄλλης. Porphyry de An. adv. Boeth. 249F Smith at Eus. PE 15.11.4 (verbatim) τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ὅσα περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήκασιν ἄλλοι, αἰσχύνην ἡμῖν φέρει. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸς ὁ ἐντελέχειαν τιθεὶς τὴν ψυχὴν λόγος σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ; πῶς δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνης γέμων ὁ πνεῦμά πως ἔχον αὐτὴν ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ πῦρ νοερόν, τῇ περιψύξει καὶ οἷον βαφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀναφθὲν ἢ στομωθέν, ὅ τε ἀτόμων ἄθροισμα θεὶς ἢ ὅλως ἀπὸ σώματος αὐτὴν γεννᾶσθαι ἀποφαινόμενος; ὃν δὴ λόγον ἐν Νόμοις (10 891d–e) ἀσεβῶν ἀσεβῆ εἶναι ἀπεφήνατο. αἰσχύνης οὖν πάντες οὗτοι πλήρεις λόγοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ λέγοντι αὐτοκίνητον (cf. Pl. Phdr. 245c τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν) οὐσίαν οὐκ ἄν τις, φησίν, αἰσχυνθείη. Simplicius (? perhaps Priscianus Lydus) in de An. 10.32–35 οἱ μὲν οὖν Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων οὐσίαν αὐτήν φασιν· οἱ δὲ ἁρμονίαν σωμάτων εἰπόντες καὶ οἱ τοιάνδε κρᾶσιν ἐν τῷ ποιῷ τίθενται. Ξενοκράτης (fr. 60 Heinze, F 100 Isnardi Parente2) δὲ ἀριθμὸν αὐτὴν θέμενος ἐν ποσῷ δοκεῖ. Eusebius Hist.Eccl. 4.18.5 καὶ ἄλλο σχολικὸν Περὶ ψυχῆς (sc. εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐλήλυθεν), ἐν ᾧ διαφόρους πεύσεις προτείνας (sc. ὁ Ἰουστῖνος) περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προβλήματος, τῶν παρ᾽ Ἕλλησιν φιλοσόφων παρατίθεται τὰς δόξας, αἷς καὶ ἀντιλέξειν ὑπισχνεῖται τήν τε αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ δόξαν ἐν ἑτέρῳ παραθήσεσθαι συγγράμματι. John Philoponus in de An. 9.3–5 καθόλου δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ μέν φασιν ἀσώματον εἶναι, οἱ δὲ σῶμα· καὶ τῶν σῶμα οἱ μὲν ἁπλοῦν, οἱ δὲ σύνθετον· καὶ τῶν σύνθετον

liber 4 caput 2 οἱ μὲν ἐκ συνημμένων σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ ἀσυνάπτων. Barhebraeus Candélabre des sanctuaires, 8th base introd., translated Bakoš (1948) 1–2 (cited in text above, section D(e)). Chapter heading: ps.Plato Ep. 13.363a ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς λόγῳ. Aristotle de An. 1.1 402a3–4 τὴν Περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν. Sens. 1 436b10 εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς. GA 5.1 779b22–23 ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τούτων ἔτι πρότερον ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς διωρισμένοις (see also Bonitz 102b60–103a8). Callimachus Epigr. 23.3–4 Pfeiffer Πλάτωνος / ἓν τὸ Περὶ ψυχῆς γράμμ᾽ ἀναλεξάμενος. Plutarch Adv.Col. 1115A Ἀριστοτέλους … τὰ Περὶ ψυχῆς …, Δικαιάρχου (fr. 5 Wehrli, 13 Mirhady) δὲ τὰ Περὶ ψυχῆς. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 3.58 τέταρτος Φαίδων ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἠθικός. 4.4 (Speusippus fr. 1 Lang, 2 Isnardi Parente, test. 1 Tarán) Περὶ ψυχῆς αʹ. 4.13 (Xenocrates p. 158 Heinze, test. 2 Isnardi Parente2) Περὶ ψυχῆς αʹ βʹ. 5.87 (Heraclides Ponticus fr. 22 Wehrli, 1 Schütrumpf) Περὶ ψυχῆς· καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν Περὶ ψυχῆς. 7.157 (SVF 3 Antip. 49) Περὶ ψυχῆς. 9.47 (Democritus 68B5e–f DK) Tetralogia IV 3 Περὶ νοῦ. 4 Περὶ αἰσθησίων (ταῦτά τινες ὁμοῦ γράφοντες Περὶ ψυχῆς ἐπιγράφουσι). Lactantius Inst. 7.22.19 Heck–Wlosok Plato De anima disserens. Galen Foet.Form. 4.699.16–18 K. περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ Χρυσίππου (SVF 2.743) λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ γράμμασιν ἐπισκέπτομαι. PHP 3.1.9 ὁ Χρύσιππος (SVF 2.885) κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον αὐτοῦ Περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον. Origen CC 5.57, p. 368.22–23 Marcovich παρὰ τῷ Χαιρωνεῖ Πλουτάρχῳ (fr. 173 Sandbach) ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς. Themistius in de An. 108.11 (Theophr. fr. 307A FHSG) ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν, δευτέρῳ δὲ τῶν Περὶ ψυχῆς. Ambrose of Milan de Isaac vel anima. Cassiodorus de Anima. Scholia vetera in Iliadem 12.386d Erbse, Ποσειδωνίῳ (F 28a E.-K., 389a Theiler) ἐν τρίτῳ Περὶ ψυχῆς. ps.Galen HPh c. 24, DG p. 613.3 Περὶ ψυχῆς. Psellus Omn.Doctr. c. 30 and passim Περὶ ψυχῆς. §0 Whether it exists: Atticus fr. 7.51–53 Des Places (verbatim) at Eus. PE 15.9.10 ⟨τούτῳ⟩ (sc. Aristotle) τοιγαροῦν ἑπόμενος Δικαίαρχος (fr. 8(i) Wehrli, 20 Mirhady) καὶ τἀκόλουθον ἱκανὸς ὢν θεωρεῖν ἀνῄρηκε τὴν ὅλην ὑπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς. Galen Propr.Plac. 14, p. 188.1 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami (= Sub.Nat.Fac. 4.760.4–5 K). καθάπερ ἄλλοι μηδὲ εἶναί τινα ὕπαρξιν αὐτῆς ἰδίαν. Alexander of Aphrodisias(?) de An.Mant. 101.5–6 τό γε εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν γνωριμώτατον καὶ φανερώτατον. ps.Plutarch Lib.Aegr. 5 (Heraclides of Pontus fr. 72 Wehrli, 80 Schütrumpf) ἔνιοι δ᾽ ἄντικρυς καὶ δόξαν καὶ διαλογισμὸν εἰς τὸ σῶμα κατατείνουσιν, οὐδ᾽ εἶναι οὐσίαν τὸ παράπαν ψυχῆς λέγοντες, ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ σώματος διαφορᾷ καὶ ποιότητι καὶ δυνάμει συντελεῖσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ Περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου βιβλίον ἐπιγραφόμενον, ἐν ᾧ τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ οὐσίᾳ παρυπάρχειν ἀποφαίνεται ὁ λόγος, οἱ μὲν οὐδ᾽ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν Ἡρακλείδου νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς ἀντιπαρεξαγωγὴν συντετάχθαι τῶν εἰρημένων ἑτέροις περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς. ὅτῳ δὴ γεγραμμένον ἄντικρυς ἀναιρεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς, ὡς τοῦ σώματος ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ τὰς εἰρημένας δυνάμεις πάσας. §1 Thales: Plato Phdr. 245c ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον. τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς. μόνον δὴ τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον ἑαυτό, οὔποτε λήγει κινού-

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μενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. ps.Plato Def. 411c ψυχὴ τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν· αἰτία κινήσεως ζωτικῆς ζῴων. Aristotle de An. 1.2 404a20–25 ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ δὲ φέρονται καὶ ὅσοι λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν ‘τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν’· ἐοίκασι γὰρ οὗτοι πάντες ὑπειληφέναι τὴν κίνησιν οἰκειότατον εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτην δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς, διὰ τὸ μηθὲν ὁρᾶν κινοῦν ὃ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖται. de An. 1.2 405a19–21 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς (11A22 DK) ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὴν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν. Galen Trem.Palp. 7.616.13–15 καὶ ἥ γε φύσις καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν (sc. τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμὸν), ὥστ᾽ οὐσίαν αὐτοκίνητόν τε καὶ ἀεικίνητον αὐτὸ νοῶν οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοις. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 1.24 (on Thales, 11A1 DK) ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν φασιν ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχάς· ὧν ἐστι Χοιρίλος ὁ ποιητής (fr. 12 Bernabé). … Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Ἱππίας (86B7 DK) φασὶν αὐτὸν καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις μεταδιδόναι ψυχῆς, τεκμαιρόμενον ἐκ τῆς λίθου τῆς μαγνήτιδος καὶ τοῦ ἠλέκτρου. V.P. 9.7 (on Heraclitus, 22A1 DK) καὶ πάντα ψυχῶν εἶναι καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη. Sententiae Sexti (Append. 2A, 559) ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ νοῦς αὐτοκίνητος καὶ ἀεικίνητος. Themistius in de An. 13.21–23 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς (fr. 301 Wöhrle) κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ διὰ τοῦτο ἔφη τὸν σίδηρον ἕλκεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς λίθου τῆς ἡρακλείας, ὅτι ἔμψυχος ἐκείνη ἡ λίθος. Simplicius (? perhaps Priscianus Lydus) in de An. 31.20–26 τοσοῦτον δὲ περὶ Θαλοῦ (fr. 422 Wöhrle) ἱστορήσας (sc. Aristotle), καὶ τοῦτο μετά τινος ἐπιτιμήσεως, ὅτι τῇ μαγνήτιδι λίθῳ ψυχὴν ἐδίδου ὡς κινητικῇ τοῦ σιδήρου, ἵνα κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον κινητικὴν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πιστώσηται, οὐκέτι τὸ ὕδωρ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνέπεμψεν, καίτοι στοιχεῖον τὸ ὕδωρ τιθέμενον, ἐπειδὴ τῶν σωμάτων τὸ ὕδωρ ἔλεγε στοιχεῖον, εἰκὸς δὲ ἀσώματον αὐτὴν ἐκεῖνον ὑποτίθεσθαι. John Philoponus in de An. 9.10–12 οἱ δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος, ὡς Θαλῆς (fr. 440 Wöhrle) καὶ Ἵππων ὁ ἐπίκλην ἄθεος· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὴν γονὴν ἑώρων ἐξ ὑγρᾶς οὖσαν οὐσίας, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐνόμισαν. in de An. 86.23–34 οὐ γὰρ εἶπε (sc. Aristotle) φέρ᾽ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Θαλῆς (fr. 442 Wöhrle) τὸ ὕδωρ ψυχὴν τίθεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἕλκειν φησὶ τὸν σίδηρον τὴν λίθον ὡς ἔμψυχον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐξ ὕδατος οὖσαν. … διὰ ταῦτα τούτου μὲν οὐ λέγει εἶναι τὴν δόξαν ταύτην ὅτι ἐξ ὕδατος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν κίνησιν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπένειμεν. Aristotle de An. 1.5 411a7–8 καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δή τινες αὐτὴν μεμῖχθαί φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς (11A22 DK) ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας κτλ. Themistius in de An. 35.26–29 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἑτέρα τις δόξα παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας περὶ ψυχῆς, ἐν παντὶ τῷ ὄντι μεμῖχθαι λέγουσα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ διὰ παντὸς διήκειν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ πᾶν αὐτοῦ μόριον ἔμψυχον εἶναι. διὰ γὰρ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν καὶ Θαλῆς (fr. 302 Wöhrle) ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. John Philoponus in de An. 188.14–18 ἑτέραν δόξαν ἐκτίθεται (sc. Aristotle) περὶ ψυχῆς. ὑπενόησαν, φησί, τινὲς ψυχὴν ἐν παντὶ σώματι μεμῖχθαι, ὡς πᾶν εἶναι σῶμα ἔμψυχον· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης καὶ τὸν Θαλῆν (fr. 443 Wöhrle) νομίσαι πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι, τοπικῶς ὑπονοοῦντος τοῦ Θαλοῦ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, ἢ τῷ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεὸν ὑπονοεῖν, ἢ θείας μοίρας αὐτὴν εἶναι. §2 Alcmaeon: Aristotle de An. 1.2 405a29–b1 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις (sc. Thales Diogenes Heraclitus) καὶ Ἀλκμαίων (24A12 DK) ἔοικεν ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς· φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις· τοῦτο δ᾽ ὑπάρ-

liber 4 caput 2 χειν αὐτῇ ὡς ἀεὶ κινουμένῃ· κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον. Boethus at Porph. de An. adv. Boeth. (243F Smith) at Eus. PE 11.28.7–9 εἰ μὲν ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ παντὸς ὀλέθρου κρείττων τις φύσις, πολλοὺς ἀναμείναντα χρὴ καὶ περιηγησάμενον λόγους ἀποφήνασθαι. (8) τὸ μέντοι τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς ὁμοιότερον μηδὲν γενέσθαι θεῷ ψυχῆς, οὐ πολλῆς ἄν τις δεηθεὶς πραγματείας πιστεύσειεν, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ ἄπαυστον τῆς κινήσεως, ἣν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐνδίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν νοῦ. (9) εἰς ὅπερ ἀπιδὼν καὶ ὁ Κροτωνιάτης φυσικὸς (cf. VS 1 app. p. 495.45–46) εἶπεν ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν ἠρεμίαν φύσει φεύγειν, ὥσπερ τὰ θεῖα τῶν σωμάτων. Porphyry de An. adv. Boeth. (249F Smith) at Eus. PE 15.11.4 ‘ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ λέγοντι (sc. Plato) αὐτοκίνητον οὐσίαν οὐκ ἄν τις’, φησίν, ‘αἰσχυνθείη’. §§3–5 Pythagoras Xenocrates Plato: Aristotle de An. 1.2 404a20–21 ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ δὲ φέρονται καὶ ὅσοι λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν ‘τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν’ (Pl. Phdr. 245c). de An. 1.2 404b16–30 Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ … ἔνιοι (Xenocrates fr. 60 Heinze, F 85 Isnardi Parente2) συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ᾽ ἑαυτόν. Top. 6.3 140b2–4 (Xenocrates fr. 60 Heinze, F 89 Isnardi Parente2) τοιοῦτος δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸς αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κινῶν ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν ψυχή, καθάπερ Πλάτων (Phdr. 245c) ὥρισται. APo. 2.8 93a21–24 τὸ δ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχομεν, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἔχοντές τι αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον … καὶ ψυχήν, ὅτι ‘αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν’ (Pl. Phdr. 245c). Plutarch An.Procr. 1013C–D ἀριθμόν γε μὴν ὁ Πλάτων οὐδέποτε τὴν ψυχὴν προσεῖπεν ἀλλὰ κίνησιν αὐτοκίνητον ἀεὶ καὶ ‘κινήσεως πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν’ (Phdr. 245c πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως)· ἀριθμῷ δὲ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ διακεκόσμηκε τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ὑποκειμένην καὶ δεχομένην τὸ κάλλιστον εἶδος ὑπὸ τούτων ἐγγιγνόμενον. οἶμαι δὲ μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ (D) κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν συνεστάναι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἀριθμὸν ὑπάρχειν, ἐπεὶ ⟨καὶ⟩ καθ᾽ ἁρμονίαν συνέστηκεν ἁρμονία δ᾽ οὔκ ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς (Phd. 92) ἀπέδειξεν. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 3.67 (on Plato’s soul) αὐτοκίνητόν τε εἶναι. Simplicius (? perhaps Priscianus Lydus) in de An. 10.32–33 οἱ μὲν οὖν Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων οὐσίαν αὐτήν φασιν. §4 Xenocrates: Plutarch An.Procr. 1012D Ξενοκράτης (fr. 68 Heinze, F 108 Isnardi Parente2) … τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον ἀποφηνάμενος. Themistius in de An. 32.22–31 ἀλλὰ χρὴ παραβάλλειν τὰ Ἀνδρονίκου (see below §7) πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνου (sc. Porphyry’s), ὅσῳ καὶ σαφέστερα καὶ πιθανώτερα πρὸς σύστασιν τοῦ λόγου τοῦ Ξενοκράτους (fr. 61 Heinze, F 180 Isnardi Parente2). ‘ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἐκάλουν’ φησὶ ‘τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι μηδὲν ζῶον ἐξ ἁπλοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ κατά τινας λόγους καὶ ἀριθμοὺς κραθέντων τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων. σχεδὸν οὖν ταὐτὸν ἀπεφαίνοντο τοῖς ἁρμονίαν αὐτὴν τιθεμένοις, πλὴν ὅσῳ σαφέστερον οὗτοι τῇ προσθήκῃ τὸν λόγον ἐποίουν, οὐ πάντα ἀριθμόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν κινοῦντα ἑαυτὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφοριζόμενοι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ πᾶσαν ἁρμονίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν ἑαυτήν· αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς κράσεως ταύτης αἰτία καὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς μίξεως τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων.’ Favonius Eulogius in Somn. 5.6 estque numerus, ut Xenocrates (fr. 16 Heinze, F 134 Isnardi Parente2) censuit, animus. Simplicius (? perhaps Priscianus Lydus) in de An. 10.34–35 Ξενοκράτης (fr. 60 Heinze, F 100 Isnardi Parente2) δὲ ἀριθμὸν αὐτὴν θέμενος ἐν ποσῷ δοκεῖ. John Philo-

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ponus in de An. 165.24–26 (Xenocrates fr. 65 Heinze, F 117 Isnardi Parente2) ἀριθμοὺς δὲ τὰ εἴδη ἐκάλουν, ὡς εἴρηται· καὶ αὐτὸς (sc. Arist. de An. 3.4 429a2728) γοῦν ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς φησιν ‘καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν τόπον εἰδῶν’. ἀριθμὸν μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦτο, κινοῦντα δὲ αὑτὸν διὰ τὸ αὐτοζῶν αὐτῆς. §5 Plato: Plato Tim. 33c–36e. Aristotle de An. 1.3 406b25–407a2, esp. 406b29 κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονικοὺς ἀριθμούς. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 3.67–68 (on Plato) ἀρχήν τε ἔχειν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) ἀριθμητικήν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα γεωμετρικήν· ὡρίζετο δὲ αὐτὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ πάντῃ διεστῶτος πνεύματος. αὐτοκίνητόν τε εἶναι …. (68) διαιρεθεῖσάν τε κατὰ ἁρμονικὰ διαστήματα δύο κύκλους ποιεῖν συνημμένους, ὧν τὸν ἐντὸς κύκλον ἑξαχῆ τμηθέντα τοὺς ἅπαντας ἑπτὰ κύκλους ποιεῖν. καὶ τοῦτον μὲν κατὰ διάμετρον κ⟨ιν⟩εῖσθαι ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ ἔσωθεν, τὸν δὲ κατὰ πλευρὰν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιά. §6 Aristotle: Aristotle de An. 2.1 412a19–22 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια· τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια. de An. 2.1 412b4–6 εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ. Plutarch Plat.Quaest. 1006D Ἀριστοτέλης (mix of de An. 2.1 412a27–28 and b5–6) ὡρίσατο τὴν ψυχὴν ‘ἐντελέχειαν σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος’. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 16.10–14 (soul is) ἐντελέχεια οὖν ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ ὀργανικὸν σῶμα τὸ ἔχον πλείω τε καὶ διαφέροντα μέρη ψυχικαῖς δυνάμεσιν ὑπηρετεῖσθαι δυνάμενα. διὸ τὸ ὀργανικὸν σῶμα καὶ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχειν λέγει, τῷ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον ἀντὶ τοῦ δυναμένου κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ζῆν χρώμενος. Alexander of Aphrodisias(?) An.Mant. 104.21–24 ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐντελέχεια οὖσα δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος. πᾶν γὰρ ἔμψυχον τὸ ἐμψύχου μέρος. καὶ ἔστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτε ὡς τὸ σχῆμα τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων, οὔτε ὡς ἡ θέσις καὶ τάξις τῶν συγκειμένων, οὐθ᾽ ὡς διάθεσίς τις καὶ πάθος, οὔθ᾽ ὡς μῖξις ἢ κρᾶσις. Plotinus Enn. 4.2.[4].1.3–4 τό τε τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὕτως, ὡς λέγεται, οὔτε δηλωτικὸν ὂν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀφέντες. Enn. 4.7.[2].85.1–5 τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐντελεχείας ὧδ᾽ ἄν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο, πῶς περὶ ψυχῆς λέγεται· τὴν ψυχήν φασιν ἐν τῷ συνθέτῳ εἴδους τάξιν ὡς πρὸς ὕλην τὸ σῶμα ἔμψυχον ⟨ὂν⟩ ἔχειν, σώματος δὲ οὐ παντὸς εἶδος οὐδὲ ᾗ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 5.32–33 (on Aristotle) καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ ἀσώματον, ἐντελέχειαν οὖσαν τὴν πρώτην σώματος {γὰρ} φυσικοῦ καὶ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. (33) λέγει δὲ τὴν ἐντελέχειαν ἧς ἐστιν εἶδός τι ἀσώματον. διττὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὕτη κατ᾽ αὐτόν· ἡ μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὁ Ἑρμῆς ἐπιτηδειότητα ἔχοντι ἐπιδέξασθαι τοὺς χαρακτῆρας, καὶ {ὁ} ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ ἀνδριάς· καθ᾽ ἕξιν δὲ λέγεται ἐντελέχεια ἡ τοῦ συντετελεσμένου Ἑρμοῦ ἢ ἀνδριάντος. σώματος δὲ φυσικοῦ, ἐπεὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι χειρόκμητα, ὡς τὰ ὑπὸ τεχνιτῶν γινόμενα, οἷον πύργος, πλοῖον· τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, ὡς φυτὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν ζῴων. ὀργανικοῦ δὲ εἶπε, τούτεστι πρός τι κατεσκευασμένου, ὡς ἡ ὅρασις πρὸς τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀκούειν· δυνάμει δὲ ζωὴν ἔχοντος, οἷον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Porphyry de An. adv. Boeth. (249F Smith) at Eus. PE 15.11.4 πῶς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸς ὁ ἐντελέχειαν τιθεὶς τὴν ψυχὴν λόγος σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ; P. 31 Smith at Sud. s.v. Π 2098, p. 4.178.24–25 Adler Πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην ⟨περὶ⟩ τοῦ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν. Iamblichus de An. fr. 9 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl.

liber 4 caput 2 1.49.32, pp. 366.26–367.2 ἕτεροι (sc. τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν) δὲ τελειότητα αὐτὴν ἀφορίζονται κατ᾽ οὐσίαν τοῦ θείου σώματος, ἣν ἐντελέχειαν καλεῖ Ἀριστοτέλης. §7 Dicaearchus: Aristotle de An. 1.4 407b30–32 ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων. Pol. 8.5 1340b18–19 διὸ πολλοί φασι τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δ᾽ ἔχειν ἁρμονίαν. Lucretius DRN 3.98–101 sensum animi certa non esse in parte locatum, / verum habitum quendam vitalem corporis esse, / harmoniam Grai quam dicunt, quod faciat nos / vivere cum sensu, nulla cum in parte siet mens. DRN 3.117–118 nunc animam quoque ut in membris cognoscere possis / esse neque harmonia corpus sentire solere. Cicero Tusc. 1.19–20 Aristoxenus (fr. 120(a) Wehrli, I a 1 05 Kaiser) … ipsius corporis intentionem quandam, velut in cantu et fidibus quae ἁρμονία dicitur: sic ex corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos, … (20) dixit aliquid (sc. animam harmoniam esse) quod ipsum quale esset erat multo ante et dictum et explanatum a Platone. Tusc. 1.11 Aristoxeni (fr. 119 Wehrli, Ia 1 10 Kaiser) harmonia. Lactantius Op.D. Perrin 16.13–14 illud autem cave ne umquam simile veri putaveris quod Aristoxenus (fr. 120(d) Wehrli, IV 1 25 Kaiser) dicit, mentem omnino nullam esse, sed quasi harmoniam in fidibus ex constructione corporis et conpagibus viscerum vim sentiendi existere. … (14) volunt enim animum simili ratione constare in homine qua concors modulatio constat in fidibus, scilicet ut singularum corporis partium firma coniunctio membrorumque omnium consentiens in unum vigor motum illum sensibilem faciat animumque concinnet sicut nervi bene intenti conspirantum sonum. Seneca Nat. 7.25.2 alius concentum quondam. Plutarch Adv.Col. 1119A–B ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία ψυχῆς ἀλλ᾽ (B) αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα κεκραμένον ἔσχηκε τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ ζῆν δύναμιν. Galen QAM c. 4, pp. 26.9–27.1 Bazou [text after Scr.Min. p. 2.44 cf. Bazou pp. 26.9–27.1, where the name of Andronicus is attested by the Arabic version] Ἀνδρόνικον δὲ τὸν Περιπατητικόν (cf. above §4), ὅτι μὲν ὅλως ἐτόλμησεν ἀποφήνασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ⟨κρᾶσιν ἢ δύναμιν εἶναι τοῦ σώματος add. Müller non prob. Bazou⟩ ὡς ἐλεύθερος ἀνὴρ ἄνευ τοῦ περιπλέκειν ἀσαφῶς, ἐπαινῶ τε πάνυ … , ὅτι δ᾽ ἤτοι κρᾶσιν εἶναί φησιν ἢ δύναμιν ἑπομένην τῇ κράσει, μέμφομαι τῇ προσθέσει τῆς δυνάμεως (but cf. Nemesius NH c. 2, p. 23.24–24.4 Γαληνὸς δὲ ἀποφαίνεται μὲν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαρτύρεται ἐν τοῖς Ἀποδεικτικοῖς λόγοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἴη περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος· ἔοικε δέ, ἐξ ὧν λέγει, δοκιμάζειν μᾶλλον τὸ κρᾶσιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν (ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐπακολουθεῖν τὴν τῶν ἠθῶν διαφοράν), ἐκ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους κατασκευάζων τὸν λόγον). Propr.Plac. 14, p. 187.27–28 Boudon-Millot– Pietrobelli, text Lami (= Sub.Nat.Fac. 4.760.17–18 K.) ἤτοι γε ἐκ τῆς τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων κράσεως γενομένην. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 24.18–26.12. Plotinus Enn. 4.7.[2].84.2–5 ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δέ τι, οἷον ἁρμονία; τοῦτο γὰρ ἁρμονίαν τῶν ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν λεγόντων ἕτερον τρόπον ᾠήθησαν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ περὶ χορδὰς ἁρμονία. Enn. 4.2.[4].1.1–3 τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τίς ποτέ ἐστι ζητοῦντες σῶμα οὐδὲν αὐτὴν δείξαντες εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἀσωμάτοις αὖ ἁρμονίαν. Andronicus of Rhodes at Them. in de An. 32.26–31 σχεδὸν οὖν ταὐτὸν ἀπεφαίνοντο τοῖς ἁρμονίαν αὐτὴν τιθεμένοις, πλὴν ὅσῳ σαφέ-

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στερον οὗτοι τῇ προσθήκῃ τὸν λόγον ἐποίουν, οὐ πάντα ἀριθμόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν κινοῦντα ἑαυτὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφοριζόμενοι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ πᾶσαν ἁρμονίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν ἑαυτήν· αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς κράσεως ταύτης αἰτία καὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς μίξεως τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων. Simplicius (? perhaps Priscianus Lydus) in de An. 10.33–34 οἱ δὲ ἁρμονίαν σωμάτων εἰπόντες καὶ οἱ τοιάνδε κρᾶσιν ἐν τῷ ποιῷ τίθενται. §8 Asclepiades: Galen Ut.Resp. 4.484.1–3 K. Ἀσκληπιάδῃ (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 717) δὲ οὐ{δὲ} ταῦτα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δι᾽ ἑτέρων ἡμῖν εἰρημένα πρὸς τοὺς Περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ λόγους μάχεται. Libr.Propr. 11, p. 19.38–39 K. μικρὸν δ᾽ ἄλλο τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχον ‘Περὶ οὐσίας τῆς ψυχῆς κατ᾽ Ἀσκληπιάδην’ (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 720). in Off.Med. 18B.660.10–14 K. πεπεισμένοι δέ εἰσιν ὡσαύτως ἅπαντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ κίνησιν εἶναί … καὶ νοῦν καὶ μνήμην καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἃ πρὸς ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀνατρέπειν ἐπεχείρησεν Ἀσκληπιάδης (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 720) ὡς οὐκ ὄντα. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.350 καὶ οἱ μὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διά τινων ὀπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσαν, ἧς στάσεως ἦρξε Στράτων (fr. 109 Wehrli, 61 Sharples) τε ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ Αἰνησίδημος (fr. B24A Polito). Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.51 ἔλεγέ (on Protagoras, 80A1 DK) τε μηδὲν εἶναι ψυχὴν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ (cf. 152a). Tertullian de An. 14.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 11 Podolak) non longe hoc exemplum est a Stratone (fr. 108 Wehrli, 59 Sharples) et Aenesidemo (fr. B24C Polito) et Heraclito (T 652 Mouraviev); nam et ipsi unitatem animae tuentur, quae in totum corpus diffusa et ubique ipsa, velut flatus in calamo per cavernas, ita per sensualia variis modis emicet, non tam concisa quam dispensata. differently Calcidius in Tim. c. 215 aut enim moles quadam sunt leves et globosae eaedemque admodum delicatae, ex quibus anima subsistit, quod totum spiritus est, ut Asclepiades (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 714) putat.

Liber 4 Caput 3 PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 898C–D; pp. 387a9–389a7 Diels—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 190–193 Daiber S: Stobaeus Ecl. 1.49.1b pp. 319.10–320.15 Wachsmuth T: Theodoretus CAG 5.18; p. 127.5–14 Raeder Cf. Hermias Irr. 2.1–3.1 Hanson; ps.Iustinus Coh. 7.2.15–22 Marcovich; Nem: Nemesius NH c. 2, p. 16.12–21 Morani

Titulus γʹ. Εἰ σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς (P) §1 οὗτοι πάντες οἱ προτεταγμένοι ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποτίθενται, φύσιν λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον καὶ οὐσίαν νοητὴν καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἐντελέχειαν. (P1) §2 Ἀναξιμένης Ἀναξίμανδρος Ἀναξαγόρας Ἀρχέλαος Διογένης ἀεροειδῆ ἔλεγόν τε καὶ σῶμα. (P2,S1,T1) §3 οἱ Στωικοὶ πνεῦμα νοερὸν θερμόν. (P3,S2,T2) §4 Παρμενίδης δὲ καὶ Ἵππασος καὶ Ἡράκλειτος πυρώδη. (S3,T3) §5 Δημόκριτος πυρῶδες σύγκριμα ἐκ τῶν λόγῳ θεωρητῶν, σφαιρικὰς μὲν ἐχόντων τὰς ἰδέας, πυρίνην δὲ τὴν δύναμιν, ὅπερ σῶμα εἶναι. (P4,S4) §6 Ἡρακλείδης φωτοειδῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ὡρίσατο. (S5,T5) §7 Λεύκιππος ἐκ πυρὸς εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. (S6) §8 Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἐξ ἀέρος τὴν ψυχήν. (S7) §9 Ἵππων ἐξ ὕδατος τὴν ψυχήν. (S8) §2 Anaximenes ad 13A23 DK; Anaximander 12A29 DK; Anaxagoras 59A93 DK; Archelaus 60A17 DK; Diogenes T5b Laks; §3 Stoici SVF 2.779; §4 Parmenides 28A45 DK; Hippasus 18.9 DK; Heraclitus T 460 Mouraviev; §5 Democritus 68A102 DK; §6 Heraclides Ponticus fr. 98a,d Wehrli, 46a,d Schütrumpf; §7 Leucippus 67A28 DK; §8 Diogenes T5b Laks; §9 Hippo 38A10 DK caput non hab. G (aliud c. 24 Περὶ ψυχῆς) titulus Εἰ … αὐτῆς PBQ : Περὶ ψυχῆς tit. S 1.49 §1 [3] φύσιν Reiske, eine … Natur Q : φύσει PB §1 non hab. S §2 [5] Ἀναξιμένης … Διογένης scripsimus : οἱ δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ Ἀναξαγόρου P : om. Ἀναξίμανδρος S prob. Bäumker non prob. Diels DG, cui Διογένης ‘abundare’ videbatur, secl. Wachsmuth prob. Wöhrle fr. Ar 138 non prob. Laks ad T5b : Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Ἀρχέλαος T (quod typis exaratur 12A29 DK) ‖ [6] ἔλεγόν … σῶμα P : om. S : τε (δὲ Diels DG qui comma post ἀεροειδῆ pos.) … σῶμα om. T §3 [7] πνεῦμα PS : πνευματικὴν T ‖ νοερὸν S : om. PT ‖ θερμόν PS : πλείστου μετέχουσαν τοῦ θερμοῦ T §4 om. P ‖ [8] Ἵππασος SPhotT : πήγασος SFP ‖ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος T prob. Diels 18.9 DK, dub. addidimus : om. S quod prob. Diels 28A45 DK §5 [9] θεωρητῶν P : θεωρικῶν S §6 [1] Ἡρακλείδης T(MDSCV) melius T1 : Ἡράκλειτος S (marg. Ηρακλείδης SP) T(KBL) melius T2 §§7–10 om. PT ‖ §7 [13] post ψυχήν add. ἀπεφήνατο S(P)

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§10 Ξέναρχος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς καί τινες ἕτεροι τῆς αὐτῆς αἱρέσεως τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τελειότητα καὶ ἐντελέχειαν, καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν οὖσαν ἅμα καὶ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος συντεταγμένην. (S9) §11 Ἐπίκουρος κρᾶμα ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονομάστου, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὧν τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα κίνησιν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα ἠρεμίαν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὴν φαινομένην θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δ᾽ ἀκατονόμαστον τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμποιεῖν αἴσθησιν, ἐν οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων στοιχείων εἶναι αἴσθησιν. (P5,S10,T5) §12 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μῖγμα ἐξ αἰθερώδους καὶ ἀερώδους ⟨καὶ ὑδατώδους καὶ γεώδους⟩ οὐσίας. (T6) §13 Κριτίας ἐξ αἵματος εἶπε καὶ ἐξ ὑγροῦ. (T7) §14 Ἡράκλειτος τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγρῶν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως, ὁμογενῆ. (P6) §10 Xenarchus—; §11 Epicurus fr. 315 Usener; §12 Empedocles—; §13 Critias—; §14 Heraclitus 22A15 DK §11[19] post Ἐπίκουρος add. δὲ ὁ Νεοκλέους T ‖ ποιοῦ πυρώδους PB(II)S (mg. γρ. γεώδους PB(II)) : ποιοῦ γε πυρώδους PB(I) : ποιοῦ om. T : Qualität Q ‖ [19–20] ποιοῦ ἀερώδους SF : om. SP1 (marg. add. ἀερώδους· θερμοῦ SP2) : ποιοῦ1 om. T ‖ glaubte, daß add. Q ‖ [20] ποιοῦ om. T ‖ [21] τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν αὐτῷ Heeren Diels : ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ P : τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν αὐτὴ S ‖ τὸ1 S : om. P ‖ [21– 25] τοῦτο … αἴσθησιν om. T : ὧν … αἴσθησιν om. P ‖ [23] ἐμποιεῖν Heeren ex cod. Vat. : ἐμποιεῖ SFP ‖ [24] εἶναι SF : om. SP §§12–13 om. P, non hab. S ‖ [26–27] lac. indicavimus et supplevimus cf. c. 5.25.4 cum suppl. Dielesiano §14 om. TS ‖ [29] glaubte, daß add. Q ‖ [30] ἐν αὐτοῖς] von Innen Q

Testes primi: Theodoretus CAG 5.18 (5.16–17 vid. test. prim. ad c. 4.2) 18.1 (~ §2) Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Ἀρχέλαος ἀερώδη τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν φύσιν εἰρήκασιν. 18.2 (~ §3) οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ πνευματικήν, πλείστου μετέχουσαν τοῦ θερμοῦ. 18.3 (~ §4) Παρμενίδης δὲ καὶ Ἵππασος καὶ Ἡράκλειτος πυρώδη ταύτην κεκλήκασιν. 18.4 (~ §6) ὁ δὲ Ἡρακλείδης φωτοειδῆ. 18.5 (~ §11) Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ὁ Νεοκλέους τεττάρων τινῶν ποιοτήτων κρᾶμα, πυρώδους καὶ ἀερώδους καὶ πνευματικοῦ καὶ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονομάστου. 18.6 (~ §12) ὁ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μῖγμα ἐξ αἰθερώδους καὶ ἀερώδους οὐσίας. 18.7 (~ §13) Κριτίας δὲ ἐξ αἵματος εἶπε καὶ ἐξ ὑγροῦ. 18.8 (~ §§5/7/8/9/10/14) καὶ ἄλλοι δ᾽ αὖ ἄλλα λεληρήκασιν ἐναντία.

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liber 4 caput 3 Testes secundi: Hermias Irr. 2.1–3.1 οἱ μὲν γάρ φασιν αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ (~ §3–4), οἱ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα (~ §8), … οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν (~ §14), οἱ δὲ ὕδωρ γονοποιόν (~ §9), … οἱ δὲ τὸ αἷμα (~ §13), οἱ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα (~ §3), οἱ δὲ τὴν μονάδα, καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τὰ ἐναντία. πόσοι λόγοι περὶ τούτων, ἐπιχειρήσεις πόσαι, πόσαι δίκαι σοφιστῶν ἐριζόντων μᾶλλον ἢ τἀληθὲς εὑρισκόντων; στασιάζουσι μὲν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς (~ quaestio). ps.Iustinus Coh. 7.2.15–22 τὴν γοῦν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἔνιοι μὲν τῶν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν φιλοσόφων ἐν ἡμῖν, ἕτεροι δὲ περὶ ἡμᾶς εἶναί φασιν (~ §14)· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις προῄρηνται, ἀλλ᾽, ὥσπερ τὴν ἄγνοιαν διαφόρως μερισάμενοι, καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς φιλονεικεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους προῄρηνται (~ quaestio). οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φασι πῦρ εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν (~ §2), οἱ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα (~ §2), οἱ δὲ τὸν νοῦν (cf. cc. 4.2.3, 4.7a.1), οἱ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν (cf. c. 4.2.1–3), οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν (~ §14), ἄλλοι δέ τινες δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων ῥέουσαν (cf. §6, Macr. in Somn. 1.14.19), οἱ δὲ ἀριθμὸν κινητικόν (cf. c. 4.2.3–4), ἕτεροι δὲ ὕδωρ γονοποιόν (~ §9). Nemesius NH c. 2, p. 16.12–21 διαφωνεῖται σχεδὸν ἅπασι τοῖς παλαιοῖς ὁ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος (~ quaestio). Δημόκριτος (—) μὲν γὰρ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος (—) καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων σύστημα σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνονται, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαινόμενοι διαφέρονται περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς· (~ §3) οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ (SVF 2.773) πνεῦμα λέγουσιν αὐτὴν ἔνθερμον καὶ διάπυρον, (~ §13) Κριτίας (—) δὲ αἷμα, (~ §9) Ἵππων δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος (—) ὕδωρ, (~ §5) Δημόκριτος (fr. 451 Luria) δὲ πῦρ (τὰ γὰρ σφαιροειδῆ σχήματα τῶν ἀτόμων συγκιρνάμενα, πῦρ τε καὶ ἀήρ, ψυχὴν ἀποτελεῖ). (~ §14) Ἡράκλειτος (T 866 Mouraviev) δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ὑγρῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἀπό τε τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως ὁμογενῆ πεφυκέναι. Loci Aetiani: §1 A 4.2.2 Ἀλκμαίων φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον. A 4.2.5 Πλάτων οὐσίαν νοητήν. A 4.2.6 Αριστοτέλης ἐντελέχειαν πρώτην σώματος φυσικοῦ, ὀργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἐντελέχειαν. §2 A 1.3.3 Ἀναξιμένης δ᾽ ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀέρα ἀπεφήνατο· ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλύεσθαι, ‘οἷον ἡ ψυχή’, φησίν, ‘ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀὴρ οὖσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀὴρ περιέχει’· λέγεται δὲ συνωνύμως ἀὴρ καὶ πνεῦμα. §3 A 1.7.19 Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες (sc. τὸν θεόν). A 4.8.1 οἱ Στωικοὶ … πνεύματα νοερά. §4 A 1.3.9 Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἵππασος ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων τὸ πῦρ. §5 A 4.4.7 … Δημόκριτος … τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἔχουσαν ἐν τῷ θώρακι καθιδρυμένον. A 4.7a.2 … Δημόκριτος ταὐτὸν νοῦν καὶ ψυχή. §9 A 1.3.1 Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀπεφήνατο τὸ ὕδωρ … στοχάζεται δ᾽ ἐκ τούτου πρῶτον, ὅτι πάντων τῶν ζῴων ἡ γονὴ ἀρχή ἐστιν, ὑγρὰ οὖσα.

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§11[6]–[7] al. A 4.4.6 de Pythagorae successoribus ἐκ πέντε στοιχείων τὸ σῶμα κραθῆναι φάντες—τοῖς γὰρ τέτταρσι ξυνέταξαν τὸ αἰθέριον—ἰσαρίθμους εἶναι ἔφασαν ταύτῃ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς δυνάμεις. §12 A 4.5.9 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἵματος συστάσει (sc. τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικόν). A 5.24.4 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν θάνατον γεγενῆσθαι διαχωρισμὸν τοῦ πυρώδους ⟨καὶ ἀερώδουϲ καὶ ὑδατώδους καὶ γεώδους suppl. Diels⟩, ἐξ ὧν ἡ σύγκρισις τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συνεστάθη· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο κοινὸν εἶναι τὸν θάνατον σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς· ὕπνον δὲ γίνεσθαι διαχωρισμὸν τοῦ πυρώδους. §14 A 1.7.17 Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν (sc. θεόν εἶναι φασιν). A 2.3 Εἰ ἔμψυχος ὁ κόσμος καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενος. A 2.3.1 oἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον. A 2.4.4 Ἀρχέλαος ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ἐμψυχίας [60.14 DK : ἐμψυχρίας Meineke Diels DG Wachsmuth] συστῆναι τὸν κόσμον. A 4.4.8 ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος πάντα μετέχειν φησὶ ψυχῆς ποιᾶς, καὶ τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, διότι ἀεὶ διαφανῶς τινος θερμοῦ καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ μετέχει, τοῦ πλείονος διαπνεομένου. A 4.7.2 ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος ἐξιοῦσαν τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀναχωρεῖν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) In the absence of E and G, the witnesses for P are confined to PB and PQ. As we have seen at ch. 4.2 (Commentary A) and shall also see at chs. 4.4, 4.6 and 4.7, there are parallels in the mixed bag of G c. 24 (see traditio proxima), which have reached their destination via a different route. E in the final Book of the PE only includes chapters 4.4–5 of P Books 4 and 5, so ch. 4.3 is absent, cf. Commentary A(1) at ch. 4.2 above. (2) P has abridged rather thoroughly, as is clear when we set off his six lemmata, or, excluding the summarizing first lemma found in P alone, his five doxai, against the ten lemmata of S, or against the seven doxai of T. Missing are §§4, 6–9 and 12–13, but P6 (Heraclitus) is the only witness to the final lemma of the chapter. (3) S and T have left out other doxai; in his concluding remark that ‘others have said other contrary things’ T obviously refers to what he has omitted. S has left out lemmata corresponding to P6 (Heraclitus), T6 (Empedocles), and T7 (Critias), and T has omitted a lemma corresponding to P4 and S4 (Democritus). Between his Heraclides (S5) and Epicurus lemma (S10) S has preserved no less than four lemmata omitted by both P and T. P at P6 (Heraclitus) is the only witness to the final lemma of the chapter. Because E did not copy out chs.

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4.2–3, T cannot have used E as his source for P, although at CAG 5.16 (cited ch. 4.2 at testes primi) he includes the abstracts of ch. 4.3 following at 5.18 as belonging with what he has culled from ‘Plutarch, Porphyry and Aëtius’. T has preserved two rather particular lemmata ad finem, T6 (Empedocles) and T7 (Critias), which are not paralleled in either P or S, or indeed anywhere else in precisely this particular form. A, mentioned third at CAG 5.16, is his real source. (4) Several doxai and name-labels are confirmed by Nem (cited at testes secundi above), who lists the Stoics (~ §3), Critias (~ §13), Hippo (~ §9), Democritus (~ §5), and Heraclitus (~ §14). Three of these doxai are preserved in only one of the three main witnesses each, namely Heraclitus only in P, Hippo only in S, and Critias only in T. The verbal parallels with P and S for ch. 4.3 at NH c. 2, p. 16.16–21 are very striking for §§3, 5, 13, and 14. They were placed by Diels DG 389 in his apparatus to the right column together with T, where we also find the single Critias lemma in T and Nem (= §14 Diels). In the case of §14 the verbal parallelism is particularly close, as can be seen when juxtaposed: A §14: Ἡράκλειτος τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγρῶν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως, ὁμογενῆ.

Nem p. 16.19–21: Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ὑγρῶν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἀπό τε τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως, ὁμογενῆ πεφυκέναι.

It might be concluded that Nem drew on A for this doxa, as we were inclined to do in our discussion at M–R 1.293–294. But taking all the evidence into account for chs. 4.2–3 (and also 4.12–13) we now think it is better to postulate a common tradition for both texts, i.e. an uberior fons. See below, section D(e) and also our comments above on ch. 4.2, Commentary A(4). On Hermias and ps.Justin, who for this and the previous chapter reveal a striking convergence noted by Diels DG 261, see our remarks at ch. 4.2 Commentary A(5). In relation to the present chapter we may refer to his citations of doxai corresponding to §2, §14, §6, and §9. (5) T 5.18 has two extra lemmata compared with PBQ but corresponding with S, namely §4 Parmenides Hippasus and §6 Heraclides, which again proves him to have used and abstracted the source shared with S, that is, A. In S the name-label of §6 is written as Heraclitus, a common confusion (corrected in the margin of ms P). Furthermore, in §2 P summarizes several name-labels in his inaccurate phrase οἱ δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ Ἀναξαγόρου, while T and S share two name-labels, namely Ἀναξιμένης and Ἀρχέλαος, which have been left out in P. The historically improbable Ἀναξίμανδρος is found only in T’s version of §6 and could

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have been added by him, but unlike Baümker we have kept it, for a view of his followers may have been attributed to him. T on the other hand does not include Διογένης, found only in S; Diels would like to omit (‘abundare videtur’), but we have kept it. Extras in T as compared with PBQ, not confirmed by S but paralleled in the wider doxographical tradition, are §§12–13 Empedocles and Critias (we have seen above that Critias is found in the strikingly parallel passage in Nemesius). These should be assigned to A too. The addition of Heraclitus after Hippasus that T makes to A’s lemma §4 is perhaps more doubtful, see above, ch. 1.3, Commentary D(e)§7, but we prefer to keep it as well, see below, section D(e)§4/§14. Finally, T seems to have remembered a source which payed attention to personalia, for he writes ‘Epicurus the son of Nicocles’ (see app. crit. to §11), and cf. below, ch. 4.4 Commentary A(3) and ch. 4.5, Commentary D(d)§7. See further above, ch. 4.2 Commentary A(3); further M–R 1.288 and 1.296– 298, and Mansfeld (2018) at M–R 4.180–187 on the T/S source (esp. 4.183 for ch. 4.2); cf. further above, General Introduction section 2.5. B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. For the proximate tradition see the various and detailed accounts of e.g. Cicero Luc. 124, Tusc. 1.19–21; Philo Somn. 1.30; Tertullian de An. 5.1–6, 9.5 (~ Soranus fr. 2 and 5 Podolak); and Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19–20. To some extent these are dependent on earlier and richer versions of the tradition, but extra material has also been incorporated subsequently: not only new doxai, but also earlier ones through retrograde contamination Wendland, who discovered and analyzed the Philo passage, at (1897) 1095 argued this proves that Philo used Diels’ Vetusta placita. The Ciceronian and Philonic parallels are particularly important because they prove the indebtedness of A to a shared anterior tradition, just as in ch. 4.2 (where see at Commentary B), and then in chs. 4.5, 4.7, and as especially in 4.9, where the parallels with Cicero show the same sort of dependence on an anterior tradition as in chs. 4.2–3. In general see Mansfeld (1990a) 3065–3085 (Aëtius and a number of parallel passages), plus 3117–3121 (Philo) and 3126–3131 (Cicero); cf. above ch. 2.11, Commentary B and ch. 4.2, Commentary B, and below, ch. 4.5, Commentary B. (2) Sources. The name-labels and earlier versions of the contents of four lemmata are found at various places in Aristotle de An. 1.2, and they occur in the virtually the same relative order (in Aristotle, Critias is last): §5 Democritus ~ Arist. de An. 1.2 403b31–404a5, §8 Diogenes ~ 405a21–22, §13 Critias ~ 405b5– 6, §14 Heraclitus ~ 405a25–27. The contrast between corporeal and (almost) incorporeal soul too is already found in this chapter of Aristotle; also see the

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announcement de An. 1.2 404b30–405a2, quoted section E(b) General texts. So the situation is analogous to that in ch. 4.2, where see at Commentary B. C Chapter Heading In P only; no variants (S subsumes the material under the general title used for ch. 4.2). Because of its further specification it is more informative than the umbrella heading of ch. 4.2. Note the limitation to the question type or category of οὐσία, substance, and the precise reference to the dominant attribute of corporeality (which shows that substance is here corporeal, not incorporeal as in the previous chapter). For οὐσία compare the headings of chs. 1.22, 1.26, 1.28, 2.11 (where see discussion at Commentary C), 2.13, 2.20, 2.25, and 5.3. For chapter headings with εἰ compare 1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 2.9, 4.9, 4.15, 4.20, 5.4, 5.5, 5.15, and 5.20 and above, ch. 1.1 Commentary A. D Analysis a Context This is the second of the twenty-three chapters dealing with the human soul from various systematic points of view, and the second dealing with the soul per se. It is the counterpart of 4.2 on the incorporealist doxai (where see Commentary D(a) on the wider context and D(c) on rationale) and complements the account of ‘what’ the soul ‘is’ by dealing with the corporealist views. It is followed by 4.4, on the parts of soul. For the Stoic syllogisms concerned with the corporeality of the soul that are appended to the corporealist doxai elsewhere, viz. in the parallel passages in Tertullian and Nemesius see below, (e) other evidence. b Number–Order of Lemmata The relative order is the same in all three sources, so the lemmatic order of the chapter as restored (which only ad finem differs from that of Diels in the DG, who has the Heraclitus lemma not in the final position but as no. 12) is virtually independent from the lemmata contents, though encouragingly confirmed by them. P2 (Anaxagoras) + P3 (Stoics) + P4 (Democritus) correspond with S1 (Anaximenes Anaxagoras Archelaus Diogenes) + S2 (Stoics) + S4 (Democritus), as well as with T1 (Anaximenes Anaximander Anaxagoras Archelaus) + T2 (Stoics). All sources have an Epicurus lemma at or near the end, viz. at P5, T5, and S10. T4 (Heraclides) corresponds with S5 (Heraclides), and is found in the same relative location. Nem provides the parallel for the Heraclitus lemma (P6) in final position. Why the Heraclitus lemma is absent in S is not immediately clear. Perhaps the reason is that the final lemma of the series of excerpts from A 4.3 in S, with name-label Epicurus, is followed by a brief quotation from

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Plato and a short abstract as well as a series of substantial ones from Hermetic literature (1.49.1b = first sentence of Corpus Hermeticum fr. xix; 1.49.2 = Pl. Phdr. 247c; 1.49.3 = CH fr. xx; 1.49.4 = CH fr. xvii; 1.49.5 = CH fr. iii; and 1. 49.6 = CH fr. xix Nock and Festugière). This material may have made the Heraclitus lemma seem superfluous. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter The chapter, like ch. 4.2 with which it should be studied in tandem, deals with the question-types ‘what is it?’ and ‘how is it?’, or the categories of substance, quantity and quality, and provides several answers. This derives from Aristotle’s agenda, see de An. 1.1 402a7–8, and for further details above, ch. 4.2, Commentary D(c). As is clear from the contents of the doxai and the summary at ch. 4.3.1, the present chapter lists a selection of corporealist doctrines, which are opposed to the incorporealist doctrines found in 4.2. These two chapters are analysed at Mansfeld (1990a) 3065–3085 and compared with the wider tradition (esp. Cicero) ibid. 3122–3131 and 3118–3121 (Philo). The set of corporeal substances involved recalls those found in ch. 1.3 on the principles (and elements) and the cosmological chs. 2.11, 2.13, 2.20, and 2.25. When the soul consists of (a) corporeal substance(s), these are related to or even derived from substances to be found in the world outside. Ch. 4.3 consists of three individual lemmata and two blocks. The first lemma provides the explicit link with the previous chapter by summarizing its contents. The two blocks are arranged according to number, i.e. the category of quantity: the doxai of the first block, §§2–9 (plus §10) are about a single substance or, as in the Democritus lemma, a homogeneous compound, while those of the second block, §§11–13, are about a mixture, or blend, of four (§11 plus §12 as emended) respectively two (§13) substances. Thus the basic diaeresis of the chapter is one between monists and pluralists which, as we have seen at ch. 1.3 Commentary D(c) and ch. 1.7 Commentary D(c), also holds for the original structure of the chapter on the archai, and for the second part of the chapter on the gods. The arrangement itself, however, which at §13 turns into a descending series, is not what one would expect, although a series of lemmata in first ascending and then descending order, the change in number being accompanied by an additional aspect, is once also found elsewhere in the Placita, namely at ch. 3.9.1–3, ‘one–two–one-and-finite’. Also compare ch. 4.4.1–7 with Commentary D(c), and ch. 4.8.1–4 with Commentary D(c)§§1–6, and for the descending order ch. 1.11.2–5 with Commentary D(c). The Empedocles lemma (§12) as emended and containing a wet element is placed between the Epicurus lemma (§11), where no wet element is listed, and the Critias lemma (§13), which refers not only to blood but cryptically also to ‘moisture’ in general. Perhaps the

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phrase καὶ ἐξ ὑγροῦ should not be translated as ‘and from moisture’ but as ‘that is, from moisture’: blood is a liquid. The lemmata sequence is further determined by a diaeresis according to substance. §10, which is about a single substance, ends the series of the monists plus the quasi-monist Democritus, so appropriately comes at the end of the first main part of the chapter. The doxographer then begins afresh with the pluralists. The order two–four has been dispreferred in favour of four–two because (and this is the second reason for not interfering) the final lemma, §14 Heraclitus, is now smoothly associated with the penultimate lemma, §13 Critias, because the ‘moistures’ (ὑγρῶν) of the former connect up with the ‘moisture’ (ὑγροῦ) of the latter. In the context of the present series of chapters the Heraclitean doxa is exceptional in that it not only speaks of human souls but also mentions the Soul of the cosmos (the only precise parallel for the latter formula in A is 1.7.8 at S 1.1.29b7, while the equivalent formula ‘Soul of the All’ is found in the Heraclitus lemma at ch. 4.7.2). Its position at the end of the chapter is therefore fully justified. It links up with ch. 4.4.8, also a final lemma, and with 4.7.2, which is also about individual souls in relation to a general Soul. The doxai of the monists of the first block are ordered by a diaeresis (in the sense of an ordered list) according to the nature of the elements, or substances, at issue. The chief division is between §§2–5, substances leading up to or related to fire on the one hand, and on the other imitating a descensus from periphery to centre, §6 (aetherial?) light, §7 fire, §8 air, and §9 water. For §10 see below, further comments. The linkage between the lemmata at §§2–5 is noteworthy: the air-like substance of §2 Anaximenes Anaximander Anaxagoras Archelaus Diogenes links up with the warm pneuma of §3 the Stoics, while the warmth of this pneuma preludes upon the fiery substance of §4 Parmenides and Hippasus, the homogeneous fiery mixture of §5 Democritus (and the fire of §7 Leucippus). The Milesians will be first for diadochical reasons, as is more often the case. Also note the explicit connection between §2 σῶμα, §5 σῶμα, and §11 σώματος, which ensures that we do not forget that the chapter is about the corporealists. d

Further Comments General Points The opposition corporealists vs. incorporealists derives from Aristotle de An. 1.2 404b30–31 quoted section E(b) General texts, see Mansfeld (1990a) 3072, 3204, M–R. 2.57–58, and is found in numerous dialectical-doxographical parallels, see material in Mansfeld (1990a) 3065–3085, and above, ch. 4.2 Commentary B and D(c). The explicit reference at §1 to the incorporeals echoes part of the diaeresis

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as expressed in parallel sources. See also Dörrie–Baltes (2002), texts 1.2–12, rich commentary 1.145–170 (on Cicero Tusc. 1.18–22, Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19–20 and Nem NH 2 p. 16.12–17.14). Individual Points §2 Diels believed that the name-label Diogenes (S only) had been interpolated from §8 below, but there is a difference between ‘airy’ and ‘air’ affording a measure of pseudoprecision, so this part of the lemma may derive from a slightly different interpretation of Diogenes of Apollonia, or (perhaps mistakenly or) more doxographico pertain to Diogenes of Babylonia. It seems more prudent to preserve it. Cf. Commentary D(d) at A 4.9.9 below. The presence here of the name-labels Anaximenes and Diogenes is what one would expect, unlike that of Anaximander (to whom a view associated with his follower Anaximenes is attributed, a not uncommon procedure), while Anaxagoras and in his wake Archelaus are seen as successors of Anaximenes. The quasi-information provided by the lemma is taken at face value by Congourdeau (2007) 133–134. §3 The passage at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.156–157 is almost exactly parallel. For the intelligent pneuma cf. ch. 4.8.1. §§4 & 14 Heraclitus: The attribution of more than one view to one philosopher in a single chapter is paralleled elsewhere in A, see e.g. the examples cited at M.-R. 2.2.523. So we prefer to keep T’s additional name-label ‘Heraclitus’, which is moreover confirmed by Tertullian de An. 5. §4 The attribution to Parmenides of a fiery soul may be (but may also not be) a far echo of Theophrastus’ claim that ‘the better and purer understanding derives from the hot’ (Sens. 3). §5 Democritus: the formula ‘things which are perceptible by reason (alone)’ at a first glance may suggest that the substance is incorporeal, but its fiery power entails explicitly that it is corporeal. This had to be said or needed to be emphasized, hence the addition of the final clause. The formula is found eight times in P, seven times in S, and often elsewhere. Presumably Epicurean coinage, e.g. Ep.Hdt. at D.L. 10.47, so never intended to apply to the incorporeal. §6 aetherial(?) light: cf. Plutarch De E 390A τὸν δὲ πέμπτον (sc. κόσμον) οὐρανὸν οἱ δὲ φῶς, οἱ δ᾽ αἰθέρα καλοῦσιν, οἱ δ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πέμπτην οὐσίαν. §8 That the soul is air is also attributed to Heraclitus ‘according to some’ (i.e. Aenesidemus) at Tertullian. de An. 9.5 (Aenesidemus fr. B26 Polito, quoted section B(a)§2) and Sextus Empiricus M. 9.360. (But two Heraclitean doxai in this chapter will have been enough for A.) §9 Thales is not mentioned because he has been converted into an incorporealist; see above, ch. 4.2, Commentary D(d) at §1. That he is an incorporealist

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is also the view of Simplicius (perhaps Priscianus) in de An. 31.24–26 quoted above, ch. 4.2, section E(b)§1, while John Philoponus in de An. 86.23–34, quoted below section E(b)§9, not unreasonably speculates that Aristotle declined to attribute a gross materialist tenet to Thales and so refrained from attributing the view that the soul consists of water to him. §10 Xenarchus is to be dated between ca. 85 bce and the beginning of the Common Era, see Strabo 14.5.4, Diels DG 100, Moraux (1973) 1.197, Falcon (2012) 11–12. So he is even somewhat later than Posidonius and Asclepiades, the last authorities to be mentioned elsewhere in A, and the last in the socalled Vetusta placita according to Diels DG 185, who therefore believes, ibid. 100, 184, that the lemma with name-label Xenarchus is a later (i.e. in his view Aëtian) addition, foreign to the earlier and according to him better tradition he baptized Vetusta placita. Moraux, o.c . 207, believes that Xenarchus like Alexander of Aphrodisias argued that the soul is inseparable from the body, but the wording of the lemma (μετὰ τοῦ σώματος συντεταγμένην) seems to be against this. The present passage is the earliest instance of this combination of the terms εἶδος, τελειότης, and ἐντελέχεια, paralleled only in Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima (cf. Falcon 2012, 133) and ps.Alexander De anima mantissa; see below at section E(b)§10. This shows on the one hand how carefully the doxographer composed this abstract, and on the other what Alexander’s formula owes to his Peripatetic predecessors. At de An. 19.21–23 Alexander mentions—and subsequently refutes—the view of unidentified opponents who say that ‘the soul is the form of the body, but make it one of the corporeal components of the living being, such as fire or air’ (οἱ δὲ λέγοντες εἶδος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος, ἓν δέ τι τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ σωμάτων ποιοῦντες αὐτήν, οἷον πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα ἤ τι ἄλλο). He may very well have Xenarchus (and his Peripatetic colleagues) in mind. The assumption that the soul qua εἶδος is corporeal is evidence of Stoic influence (see e.g. Alex. Mixt. 226.10–14 = SVF 2.1047), and is of course at odds with the views of Aristotle and Alexander. But it is also possible that Xenarchus’ view was considered by A to be a compromise position between corporeal and incorporeal and therefore quoted at the end of the series of corporealist monists, see Mansfeld (1990a) 3093. For Alexander’s view that the soul supervenes upon the blend of the corporeal elements see Donini (1970). §11 The references to the perceptive part (αἰσθητικόν) and perception (αἴσθησις) anticipate the treatment of αἴσθησις in chs. (4.4 and) 4.8–12. The reference to the pneuma as causing movement is the only mention of movement in the present chapter, while in the previous chapter this concept plays a quite

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important part (explicitly at 4.2.1–5). The first Lucretian text quoted at section E(b)§11 is closer to Aristotle’s description of Democritus’ view cited there, §5, than to Epicurus’ doctrine. Pace Scalas (2015), Hippolytus’ testimony that the soul according to Epicurus consists of blood is just one of his inaccuracies. §§12–13 The Empedocles doxa as transmitted by T alone, which has the soul consist of a blend of the fiery and the aerial element, is unique. A blend of an aetherial and an airy substance is only attested for the moon, see Philo Somn. 1.145 (SVF 2.674), κρᾶμα … ἔκ τε αἰθερώδους οὐσίας καὶ ἀερώδους; for the doctrine cf. ch. 2.25.4, the moon as μικτὴν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. The other secondary evidence attributes to Empedocles (and sometimes to Critias as well) the tenet that the soul is blood. In the Empedocles doxa at ch. 4.5.8 the regent part is said to be blood, which flatly contradicts the doxa of ch. 4.3.12 as transmitted by T. We believe that the way out is to emend the text, following Diels’ emendation in DK (not in the DG) of a similarly mutilated Empedocles lemma at P 5.25.4 (quoted above among the Loci Aetiani), and to add the watery and earthy components. This emendation of P 5.25.4 has been missed by Mau and Lachenaud. It has been noticed and rejected by others, who however are unaware of the presence of the word ἀερώδους at ch. 4.3.12 and have neglected the latter lemma. For ἀερώδης in Empedoclean doxai see also chs. 4.22.1 and 5.15.3, and for all the adjectives at ch. 5.25.4. The contradiction with ch. 4.5.8 now disappears, when we recall that according to Empedocles as reported by Theophrastus (Sens. 10– 11) the blood ‘we chiefly think with’ consists of a blend of the (four) elements (κεκρᾶσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα), that according to the verbatim fragment 31B05.3 DK this blend will be most perfect in the region of the heart, and that according to another verbatim fragment (31B109 DK) ‘we see earth with earth, water with water, shining aether with aether, but destroying fire with fire, love with love, and sorry strife with strife’. The latter is paraphrased by Theophrastus (Sens. 10, ‘listing how we recognize each with each’), who quotes 31B107 as its sequel. Aristotle de An. 1.2 404b13–15, who quotes B109 in full, introduces the lines with the words ‘Empedocles thought that the soul is composed of all the elements (ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, our emphasis), and believes that each of these is a soul’ (i.e. that each has a cognitive capacity). We may safely assume that the lemma (as restored above) derives from this Aristotelian introduction and Theophrastean discussion of what is Empedocles’ original doctrine. The corporeal Empedoclean soul here figures as a blend of the physical elements, that is, of the famous ‘four’. We assume that T just omitted the two heavier elements, which perhaps he found insufficiently psychic. Or perhaps a partly parallel Pythagorean tenet in the Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 8.28 may help explain

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the omission. This makes the soul a blend of warm and cold aither: εἶναι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα αἰθέρος καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. Also compare a rather late passage, ps.Galen (i.e. Porphyry) Ad Gaurum ch. 11.3, who says that the soul upon entering the body may have attracted and so brings along ‘something aetherial or pneumatic or airy’ (διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἐγκόσμιος ἐφέλκοιτό τι σῶμα αἰθερῶδες ἢ πνευματῶδες ἢ ἀερῶδες). However this may be, we may safely restore the text of A, mutilated by T, by means of Diels’ emendation of the lemma in P 5.25. The doxa attributed to Critias in T alone is singular too, for in a ‘blend of blood and moisture’ the moisture seems to be superfluous. Presumably what we have here is a fabricated doxa. That the name-labels Empedocles and Critias are cited together is paralleled in those doxographical passages where the same tenet is attributed to both, viz. Galen PHP 2.8.47, αἷμά … τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Κριτίας ὑπέλαβον, and Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.20, Empedocles et Critias sanguinem. John Philoponus in de An. 9.19–21 notoriously even goes so far as to attribute Empedocles fr. B105.3 DK to Critias. §14 Polito’s suggestion (2014) 336 that this passage attributes to Heraclitus the exhalation of soul from blood and seawater is too specific. One of the ancestors of §14 Heraclitus is Aristotle’s relatively modest note on the Ephesian at de An. 1.2 405a25–27, ‘and Heraclitus says the principle is soul, since it is the evaporation (ἀναθυμίασις) from which he constructs the other things; and it is most incorporeal and forever streaming’. Note that at de An. 1.5 411a7–8, ‘and some say that it is intermingled in the universe, which presumably is why Thales though all things are full of gods’, he does not mention Heraclitus among those who think so (see above, ch. 4.2, Commentary D(d)§1). But we may believe that he has him in mind, and also thinks of Diogenes of Apollonia, whose air is mentioned de An. 1.2 405a21–24 immediately before the passage about the exhalation as the principle of soul in Heraclitus, and whose role as principle of all things and as the cause that makes the soul possess knowledge is attested for us e.g. at 64B4 DK, ‘humans and the other living being live by breathing in the air, and that is for them both soul and thought’. Theophrastus said of Diogenes that ‘the air inside perceives as it is a portion of the god’ (μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ, Sens. 42), see Burkert (2011) 474. Presumably Aristotle also has Democritus in mind, whose view that the outside air contains soul particles which we inhale when breathing is described both at de An. 1.4 403b31–404a16 and Resp. 4 471b30–472a26. He goes on to argue against the view that soul pervades the universe, de An. 1.5 411a9–13: ‘why does the soul fail to create a living being when it is in air or fire, but does so only when in a mixture of elements—and one also may wonder why soul in air is purer and less mortal than that in living beings’. This makes it all the more interesting that at De generatione animalium 3.11 762a18–

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21, explaining spontaneous generation, he says that ‘in a way all things are full of soul (τρόπον τινὰ πάντα ψυχῆς εἶναι πλήρη), since animals and plants are formed in the earth and in the water because in earth water is present, and in water pneuma is present, and in all pneuma soul-heat is present’. The contradiction is perhaps weakened by the fact that in the latter passage the elements are mixed. On this mysterious pneuma and the difficulties of Aristotle’s view see Kullmann (2007) 422 and esp. (2014) 222–226. For anathymiasis and the relation of soul to moisture one should compare the difficult fragments Heraclitus 22B36 DK, ‘for souls it is death that water is born, for water death that earth is born, and from earth water is born, and from water a soul’, and 22B12 DK, transmitted by AD on Cleanthes on Zeno (AD fr. 39 Diels, SVF 1.141 and 1.519), esp. the final clause of its Heraclitean ingredient: ‘souls too are evaporated from the moistures’. Matters paradoxically become clearer the farther away from Heraclitus one gets. The first text that is close to §14, though it by no means speaks of a World Soul or of a Soul of the Whole or the All, tells us that according to some of his followers (note the τινές) ‘the exhalation in the body occurs in the same way as in the cosmos’, ps.Aristotle Probl. 13.6 908a30–31, ‘just as some of Heraclitus’ followers say that evaporation occurs, just as in the Whole, so also in the body’ etc. (fr. 66 ( f 3) Marcovich). What we have here is already a Heraclitus interpretatus, and this group of followers may well be later than Aristotle. The term World Soul (§14 τὴν … τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν) is not found in the parallel to §14 in Nemesius, who however has the equivalent formula first found Plato Tim. 41d4–5, and then, in our context, in the Heraclitus lemma at A 4.7.2, viz. τὴν … τοῦ παντὸς ψυχήν. The attribution to Heraclitus of something like a Soul (or soul) beyond the body, or rather of a ‘regent part’ that is ‘outside’, is found Tertullian de An. 15.4, ‘that you refrain from believing that this regent part operates outside (as) according to Heraclitus’, so this was already a part of the Heraclitus material in the earlier doxographical tradition. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.349, ‘others believe that (the understanding) is outside the body, like Aenesidemus according to Heraclitus’ (fr. B24A Polito), specifies that this interpretation is linked with Aenesidemus. Also see M. 7.129–134 (fr. B29 Polito), which attributes to Heraclitus the view that we become intelligent by breathing in the Divine Logos, in a passage often believed to derive from Aenesidemus. In our present context we do not have to analyse the development of this interpretative attitude, but may observe that its various instances are not so easily harmonized. See e.g. Waszink (1947) 227; Mansfeld (1990a) 3066 with n. 18, 3164 with n. 517, 3166, also on Aenesidemus; Polito (2004) and Betegh (2007), who deal with Heraclitus’ soul-stuff outside the human body; general overview of Aenesidemus on Heraclitus on soul at Polito (2014) 320–331, 335–

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339; and Mansfeld (2015c). Ch. 4.7.2 should also be compared; this tenet goes a significant step further by speaking of a return of Heraclitean souls to the Soul of the All. Though according to the verbatim fragments of Heraclitus there is something out there that is both dominant and rational (e.g. 22B32, B64 DK), the uninhibited use of the concept of a World Soul, of which human souls are parts, shows the mark of an interpretatio Stoica. See also Calcidius in Tim. c. 251 (SVF 2.1198), ‘with the Stoics’ consent Heraclitus links our reason with the divine reason’. The affinity between human souls and a super-Soul is indeed attested abundantly for the Stoics, and the return of the souls to this super-Soul (as at 4.7.2) is also explicitly attributed to some among them, see AD fr. 39 Diels (SVF 2.821), ‘they say there is a Soul in the Whole, which they call aether and air, surrounding in a circle land and sea and exhaled from these […]. Some say that the Soul of the Whole is everlasting, and that in the end the rest are commingled with it’. These ‘some’, presumably, are Cleanthes and his followers, for according to Cleanthes all souls survive until the ekpyrosis, while Chrysippus accorded this privilege only to the souls of the wise, Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.157 (SVF 1.522 = 2.811). For the affinity and the parts (not the return) see also Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.156 (SVF 2.774), ‘it (sc. the animal soul) is destructible, but that of the Whole, of which those in living beings are parts, is indestructible’. At ch. 4.3.14 (and 4.7.2) the human soul is said to be ὁμογενῆ, ‘of the same kind’ as that of the cosmos. Although one of the questions formulated by Aristotle de An. 1.1 402b1–3 is ‘whether every soul is of the same kind (πότερον ὁμοειδὴς ἅπασα ψυχή) or not; and if not, whether the difference is one of species (εἴδει) or of genus (γένει)’, the context shows that he does not think of human souls in relation to a super-Soul, but of the different souls of various species of animals, of that of man, of a god (and surely even of plants), and esp. of the three main types of soul: vegetative, aesthetic, rational. See Aristotle de An. 2.3 414a29–b33, and Alexander de An. 16.18–17.1; the three types of soul are not ὁμοειδεῖς. e Other Evidence Nem NH c. 2, p. 17 10–14 provides a further elaboration of §14, distinguishing between (1) those who speak of a single soul of all things that fragments itself into individual beings and comes together again towards itself, as do the Manichaeans and others, (2) those who say there are many souls, different as to species (e.g. Aristotle), and (3) those who say there is one soul as well as many (sc. Plato, see NH p. 33.20 Morani). We should also refer to a series of Stoic syllogisms in Tertullian—attributed to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus—that follow paragraphs dealing with the

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various doxai concerned with the incorporeality vs. the corporeality of the soul. These syllogisms prove to Tertullian’s satisfaction that the soul is corporeal. There are important parallels in Nem, who however argues in some detail in favour of the incorporeality of the soul. At Tert. de An. 5.1–2 we have two series of doxai corresponding to those at A 4.2–3 (in that order), immediately followed, at de An. 5.3–6, by four Stoic syllogisms (~ SVF 1.137: Zeno; SVF 1.518: Cleanthes, two syllogisms; SVF 2.791: Chrysippus). In Nemesius’ much longer account we have two series of doxai corresponding to those at A 4.3–2 (in the order as reversed by him) at NH p. 16.12–17.10, followed at some distance by the two syllogisms of Cleanthes and that of Chrysippus, announced p. 20.12– 14: Cleanthes at p. 20.14–17 + 21.6–9 (~ SVF 1.518), Chrysippus at p. 22.3–6 (~ SVF 1.137, 2.790). The conclusion in our view can only be that both Tertullian and Nemesius derive from an uberior fons, that is, from an earlier representative of the doxographical tradition, which had already been updated by the insertion of Stoic syllogisms as an appendix to a plurilemmatic chapter on the corporeality of the soul, just as A is updated by the addition of the two Stoic chapters 4.11–12 after 4.9–10. Similar Stoic Wandersyllogismen are quoted elsewhere. A variety of Cleanthes’ first argument is attributed to Panaetius at Cicero Tusc. 1.79 (T 120 Alesse); this is about the immortality not the (in)corporeality of the soul, two themes that are of course related, see, e.g. Cic. Tusc. 1.18–25, Macrob. in Somn. 1.14.20 obtinuit non minus de incorporalitate eius quam de immortalitate sententia, Aug. Trin. 10.vii.17–25, Gal. Propr.Plac. 3.1, 7.1, 7.4, καθάπερ οὖν ⟨οὐ χρήσιμον⟩ ἰατρῷ πε(ρὶ τοῦ)το γινῶσκειν εἴτ᾽ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴτ᾽ οὐκ ἀθάνατος …, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς εἴτ᾽ ἀσώματός ἐστιν παντάπασιν … εἴτε σωματοειδὴς κτλ. Arguments concerned with corporeality are cited anonymously and briefly at Alexander of Aphrodisias de An.Mant. 117.9–11 (corresponding to the second syllogism of Cleanthes) and 117.21–23 (corresponding to that of Chrysippus), cf. SVF 2.792. Such syllogisms are also cited much later at Calc. in Tim. c. 220: one attributed to Zeno (~ SVF 1.138), but corresponding to that of Chrysippus, and one attributed to Chrysippus (not in SVF). The context in ps.Alexander is not doxographical, that in Calcidius only to some extent. The quotations concerning the corporeality of the soul in ps.Alexander and Calcidius, which differ among themselves, may derive from a handbook. A handbook may also have been the source of a doxographical predecessor of A used by Tertullian and Nemesius. See further Waszink (1947) 127–129, Dörrie (1959) 131–140, Sharples (2008) 162– 164, and for an overview of various suggestions concerning the sources issue Sharples–Van der Eijk (2008) 57 n. 277. In our view the varieties of attribution, formulation, and scope suggest the influence of intermediary sources, but to some extent they also depend on the aims of the quoting authors.

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E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: (see also above at ch. 4.2 section E(a) General texts) Lucretius DRN 3.161–167 haec eadem ratio naturam animi atque animai / corpoream docet esse; ubi enim propellere membra, / corripere ex somno corpus mutareque vultum / atque hominem totum regere ac versare videtur, / quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus / nec tactum porro sine corpore, nonne fatendumst / corporea natura animum constare animamque? Cicero Luc. 124 si simplex (sc. the soul), utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an ut Xenocrates (cf. ch. 4.2.4) numerus nullo corpore, quod intellegi quale sit vix potest. Philo of Alexandria Cher. 114 τίς δέ ἐστι τὴν οὐσίαν (sc. of the soul), ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν; Pollux Onomast. 2.226 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[b] Podolak) ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα ἢ πῦρ ἢ αἷμα ἢ ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ τοῖς σοφοῖς. Tertullian de An. 5.1–5 (details see below). Lactantius Op.D. 17.2 Perrin quid autem sit anima nondum inter philosophos convenit, nec umquam fortasse conveniet. alii sanguinem esse dixerunt, alii ignem, alii ventum, unde anima vel animus nomen accepit, quod graece ventus ἄνεμος dicitur: nec illorum tamen quisquam dixisse aliquid videtur. Servius auctus in Aen. 1.98, p. 49.12–15 ‘effundere’ secundum eos qui dicunt sanguinem esse animam, ut ipse alibi (Aen. 9.347) ‘purpuream vomit ille animam’. nam alio loco aliorum opinionem sequitur, qui dicunt spiritum esse animam, unde est (Aen. 4.705) ‘atque in ventos vita recessit’. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19– 20 non ab re est ut haec de anima disputatio in fine sententias omnium qui de anima videntur pronuntiasse contineat. … Hippocrates (sc. dixit animam essentiam) spiritum tenuem per corpus omne dispersum, Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 98b Wehrli, 46B Schütrumpf) lucem, Heraclitus physicus (22A15 DK) scintillam stellaris essentiae, Zenon (SVF 1.137) concretum corpori spiritum, Democritus (68A103 DK) spiritum insertum atomis hac facilitate motus ut corpus illi omne sit pervium, (20) Critolaus Peripateticus (fr. 17 Wehrli) constare eam de quinta essentia, Hipparchus [here as elsewhere mistake for Hippasus, 18.9 DK] ignem, Anaximenes (fr. 117 Wöhrle) aëra, Empedocles (—) et Critias (—) sanguinem, Parmenides (—) ex terra et igne, Xenophanes (21A50 DK) ex terra et aqua, Boethos (SVF 3 Boeth. 10) ex aëre et igne, Epicurus (fr. 314 Usener) speciem ex igne et aëre et spiritu mixtam. Calcidius in Tim. cc. 213–235 (details see below). Ambrose of Milan de Is. 2.4 non ergo sanguis anima, quia carnis est sanguis, neque armonia (cf. ch. 4.2.7) anima, quia et huiusmodi armonia carnis est, neque aer anima, quia aliud est flatilis spiritus, aliud anima, neque ignis anima, neque entelechia (cf. ch. 4.2.6) anima, sed anima est vivens, quia factus est Adam in animam viventem, eo quod insensibile atque exanimum corpus anima vivificet et gubernet. Augustine de Trin. e.g. (other examples see below) 10.10.5–8 Mountain–Glorie neque enim omnis mens aërem se existimat, sed aliae ignem, aliae cerebrum, aliaeque aliud corpus et aliud aliae sicut supra (sc. de Trin. 10.7.2–33) commemoravi. de Trin. 10.10.32–37 utrum enim aëris sit vis videndi, reminiscendi, intelligendi, volendi, cogitandi, sciendi, iudicandi; an ignis, an cerebri, an sanguinis, an atomorum, an praeter usitata quattuor

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elementa quinti necscio cuius corporis, an ipsius carnis nostrae compago vel temperamentum (cf. ch. 4.2.7) haec efficere valeat dubitaverunt homines, et alius hoc, alius illud affirmare conatus est. ps.Galen HPh c. 24, p. 613.13 οἱ δὲ σῶμα. §2 Anaximenes Anaximander Anaxagoras Archelaus Diogenes: Cicero Luc. 124 an anima. Tusc. 1.19 animum alii autem animam, ut fere nostri. Tusc. 1.40 sive illi sint animales, id est spirabiles. Tusc. 1.60 sive anima … sit animus. ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.355.11–12 K. κθʹ. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς (SVF 2.780) σῶμα λεπτομερὲς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους. Tertullian de An. 9.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 6 Podolak) non, ut aër sit substantia eius, etsi hoc Aenesidemo (fr. B26 Polito) visum est et Anaximeni (fr. 58 Wöhrle), puto secundum quosdam et Heraclito (fr. 116 (b) Marcovich). Lactantius Op.D. 17.2 Perrin alii ventum, unde anima vel animus nomen accepit quod graece ventus ἄνεμος dicitur. Op.D. 17.5 at illi ventum putant, hoc falluntur quod ex aëre spiritum ducentes vivere videmur. Varro ita definit: ‘anima est aër conceptus ore, defervefactus in pulmone, temperatus in corde, diffusus in corpore’. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.20 Anaximenes (fr. 117 Wöhrle) aëra. §3 Stoics: Cicero Tusc. 1.42 animus … ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri constat Panaetio (T 119 Alesse). Tusc. 1.65 si deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. Tusc. 1.70 sed … fac spirabilem. Pollux Onom. 2.226 πνεῦμα. Tertullian de An. 5.2–3 (Soranus de An. fr. 2 Podolak) sed etiam Stoicos (SVF 2.773) allego, qui spiritum praedicantes animam paene nobiscum, qua proxima inter se flatus et spiritus, tamen corpus animam facile persuadebunt. (3) denique Zeno (cf. SVF 1.137), consitum spiritum (sc. πνεῦμα σύμφυτον) animam definiens etc. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.156–157 τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν αἰσθητικὴν ⟨φύσιν add. ab Arnim non prob. Dorandi⟩. ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα· διὸ καὶ σῶμα εἶναι. (157) Ζήνων δ᾽ ὁ Κιτιεὺς (SVF 1.135) καὶ Ἀντίπατρος (SVF 3 Ant. 49) ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος (F 139 E.-K., 390 Theiler) πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἔμπνους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι (cf. ch. 4.6). Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Zenon (SVF 1.137) concretum corpori spiritum. Calcidius in Tim. c. 221 ergo spiritum animam esse dicentes corpus esse animam plane fatentur (SVF 2.796, 2.879). ps.Galen HPh c. 24, p. 613.13–14 πνεῦμα γὰρ εἶναι ταύτην ὑπενόησαν καὶ οὗτοι (sc. Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ (—)). Suda s.v. Ψ 164, p. 4.852.19 Adler ψυχή· πνεῦμα νοερόν. §4 Parmenides Hippasus Heraclitus: Priscian Inst.Gramm. at Gr.Lat. 2.341.20–21 Keil simplex Ennius (Varia fr. 51 Vahlen) protulit in Epicharmo (23B48 DK): ‘terra corpus est, at mentis ignis est’ pro mens. Cicero Luc. 124 utrum sit ignis. Tusc. 1.19 Zenoni Stoico (SVF 1.134) animus ignis videtur. Tusc. 1.40 sive ignei. Tusc. 1.60 sive ignis sit animus. Tusc. 1.70 sed fac igneam. Tertullian de An. 5.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 2 Podolak) ut Hipparchus [thus as often instead of Hippasus, 18.9 DK] et Heraclitus (T 650 Mouraviev) ex igne. Lactantius Op.D. 17.2 Perrin alii ignem. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Heraclitus physicus (22A15 DK) scintillam stellari essentiae. 1.14.20 Parmenides (28A45

liber 4 caput 3 DK) ex terra et igne. Augustine de Trin. 10.7.12–13 Mountain–Glorie alii ignem substantiam eius esse dixerunt. §5 Democritus: Cicero Tusc. 1.22 Democritum (fr. 449 Luria) … levibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum concursu quodam fortuito. Tusc. 1.42 illam … individuorum corporum levium et rutundorum concursionem fortuitam, quam tamen Democritus (—) concalefactam et spirabilem, id est animalem, esse volt. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.44 (on Democritus, 68A1 DK) τόν τε ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην ἐκ τοιούτων λείων καὶ περιφερῶν ὄγκων συγκεκρίσθαι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίως. Calcidius in Tim. c. 215 aut ignitae atomi iuxta Democritum (—), qui ex isdem corporibus et ignem et animam censet excudi. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Democritus (68A103 DK) spiritum insertum atomis hac facilitate motus ut corpus illi omne sit pervium. Augustine de Trin. 10.7.10–12 Mountain alii ex minutissimis individuisque corpusculis, quas atomos dicunt, concurrentibus in se atque cohaerentibus, eam confici crediderunt. §6 Heraclides: Tertullian de An. 9.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 6 Podolak) nec ut lumen, etsi hoc placuit Pontico Heraclidi (fr. 98c Wehrli, 46C Schütrumpf). Lactantius Op.D. Perrin 17.3 videtur ergo anima similis esse lumini, quae non ipsa sit sanguis, sed umore sanguinis alatur ut lumen oleo. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 98b Wehrli, 46B Schütrumpf) lucem. §7 Leucippus: Pollux Onom. 2.226 ἢ πῦρ. Lactantius Op.D. 17.2 Perrin alii ignem. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.20 Hipparchus [thus as often instead of Hippasus] ignem … Augustine de Trin. 10.7.12–13 Mountain–Glorie alii ignem substantiam eius esse dixerunt. Ambrose of Milan de Is. 4, p. 645.3 Schenkl. Ep. 21.1.4 Faller aut ignem. §8 Diogenes of Apollonia: Ambrose of Milan de Is. 2.4, p. 645.2–3 Schenkl neque aër anima, quia aliud est flatilis spiritus, aliud anima. Augustine de Trin. 10.7.12–13 Mountain Glorie alii aërem … substantiam eius esse dixerunt. de Trin. 10.10.1–3 cum ergo verbi gratia mens aërem se putat, aërem intellegere putat, se tamen intellegere scit; aërem autem se esse non scit sed putat. §9 Hippo: Tertullian de An. 5.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 2 Podolak) ut Hippon (—) et Thales (fr. 221 Wöhrle) ex aqua. Hippolytus Ref. 1.16.2 (Hippo 38A3 DK) τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ποτὲ μὲν ἐγκέφαλον λέγει, ποτὲ δὲ ὕδωρ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ἐξ ὑγροῦ, ἐξ οὗ φησι ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι. §10 Xenarchus Peripatetics: Tertullian de An. 5.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 2 Podolak) ut Critolaus (fr. 17 Wehrli) et Peripatetici eius ex quinta nescio qua substantia (si et illa corpus, quia corpora includit). Iamblichus de An. fr. 3 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.32, p. 363.19–21 ὡς δὲ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν τινες ὑφηγοῦνται, εἶδός ἐστι τὸ περὶ τοῖς σώμασιν … ἢ ποιότης οὐσιώδης τελεία. de An. fr. 9 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. 1.49.32, pp. 367.26–368.2 ἕτεροι (sc. τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν) δὲ τελειότητα αὐτὴν ἀφορίζονται κατ᾽ οὐσίαν τοῦ θείου σώματος, ἣν ἐντελέχειαν καλεῖ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὥσπερ δὴ ἐν ἐνίοις Θεόφραστος (fr. 269 FHS&G). §11 Epicurus: Lucretius DRN 3.161–176 haec eadem ratio naturam animi atque animai / corpoream docet esse etc. Capitula Lucretiana at DRN 3.94

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de animi et animae natura sensuque. at DRN 3.136 animum et animam coniuncta esse. at DRN 3.228 tertiam anima esse mentem. at DRN 3.241 quartam sine nomine animam. at DRN 3.624 de sensibus animae et animi. Tertullian de An. 5.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 2 Podolak) ut Epicurus (—) ex atomis (si et atomi corpulentias de coito suo cogunt). Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.20 Epicurus (fr. 215 Usener) speciem ex igne et aëre et spiritu mixtam. Calcidius in Tim. c. 215 vel id ipsum atomi casu quodam et sine causa concurrentes in unum et animam creantes, ut Epicuro (—) placet, ob similitudinem atomorum, quarum una commota omnem spiritum, id est animam, moveri simul. differently ps.Galen HPh c. 24, DG p. 613.11–12 Ἐπίκουρος (—) δὲ τὸν ἐφελκόμενον ἔξωθεν ἀέρα διὰ τῆς εἰσπνοῆς τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβεν. also differently Hippolytus Ref. 1.22.5 (fr. 340 Usener) τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων λύεσθαι ἅμα τοῖς σώμασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ συγγεννᾶσθαι αὐτοῖς τίθεται· αἷμα γὰρ αὐτὰς εἶναι. §§12–13 Empedocles Critias: Cicero Luc. 124 an sanguis. Tertullian de An. 5.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 2 Podolak) ut Empedocles (—) et Critias (—) ex sanguine. §12 Empedocles: Iamblichus de An. fr. 2 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.32, pp. 363.11–18 τινὲς εἰς τὰς τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων ἀρχὰς τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπαναφέρουσιν. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα σώματα ἄτομα, πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων στοιχειωδέστερα· … ταῦτα τοίνυν ἄπειρα ἔχειν σχήματα, ἓν δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ σφαιροειδές, ἀπὸ δὴ τῶν σφαιροειδῶν ἀτόμων εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. §13 Critias: Cicero Tusc. 1.19 Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem (sc. αἷμα περικάρδιον, 31B105.3 DK). Tusc. 1.41 aut in Empedocleo (—) sanguine. Luc. 124 an sanguis. Pollux Onom. 2.226 ἢ αἷμα. Lactantius Op.D. 17.2 Perrin alii sanguinem esse dixerunt. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.20 Empedocles (—) et Critias (—) sanguinem. Ambrose of Milan de Noe 92, p. 478.6–7 Schenkl ut Critias (—) et eius discipuli, sanguinem esse animam dicentes. de Is. 4, p. 644.23–645.1 Schenkl non ergo sanguis anima, quia carnis est sanguis. Ep. 21.1.4 Faller aut sanguinem. Augustine de Trin. 10.7.4 Mountain alii sanguinem. §14 Heraclitus: Cicero ND 1.27 Pythagoras (—), qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur (cf. Arist. de An. 1.2 404a16–18 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν [sc. the same as Democritus’]· ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα). Arius Didymus fr. 39.4 Diels at Eus. PE 15.20.4 (SVF 2.821) εἶναι δὲ ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ φασίν, ὃ καλοῦσιν αἰθέρα, καὶ ἀέρα κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀναθυμιάσεις, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ψυχὰς προσπεφυκέναι ταύτῃ, ὅσαι τε ἐν ζῴοις εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι· διαμένειν γὰρ ἐκεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχάς. Tertullian de An. 3.2 hi statum eius aliunde ⟨de⟩ducunt, … prout … aut Heracliti (T 646 Mouraviev) maeror … persuaserunt. de An. 15.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 13 Podolak) ut neque extrinsecus agitari putes principale istud secundum Heraclitum (at fr. 115 Marcovich, p. 395). Calcidius in Tim. c. 251 Heraclitus (T 778 Mouraviev) vere consentientibus Stoicis (SVF 2.1198) rationem nostram cum divina ratione conectit etc.

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b

Sources and Other Parallel Texts

General texts: Plato Phd. 96b καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά (Empedocles 31A76 DK) ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ (cf. Anaximenes 13A23 DK) ἢ τὸ πῦρ (—); ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων (Alcmaeon 24A11 DK). Aristotle de An. 1.2 404b30–405a2 διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ σωματικὰς ποιοῦντες τοῖς ἀσωμάτους, τούτοις δ᾽ οἱ μίξαντες καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποφηνάμενοι. Seneca Nat. 7.25 habere nos animum, cuius imperio et impellimur et revocamur, omnes fatebuntur; quid tamen sit animus ille rector dominusque nostri, non magis tibi quisquam expediet quam ubi sit. alius illum dicet spiritum esse, alius concentum quondam (cf. ch. 4.2.7), alius vim divinam et dei partem, alius tenuissimum animae, alius incorporalem potentiam (cf. ch. 4.2); non deerit qui sanguinem dicat, qui calorem. Galen PHP 7.3.19 δυοῖν θάτερον, εἰ μὲν ἀσώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν (sc. τὸ κατὰ τὰς κοιλίας τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου πνεῦμα), ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, οἰκητήριον, εἰ δὲ σῶμα, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ, πνεῦμα, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. in Epid.vi p. 272.19–25 Wenkebach– Pfaff μέγιστον δ᾽ ἐνταῦθα κινεῖται δόγμα διαπεφωνημένον καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς φιλοσόφοις. ἔνιοι μὲν ἡγοῦνται μίαν οὐσίαν εἶναι ψυχῆς τε καὶ φύσεως, οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τιθέμενοι τὴν ὕπαρξιν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἰδιότητι· τινὲς δὲ οὐ μίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἰδίαν ἑκατέρᾳ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναί φασι καὶ οὐ σμικρῷ δέ τινι διαφερούσας, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλῳ τῷ γένει. QAM c. 5, p. 32.5–8 Bazou εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶδός ἐστιν ὁμοιομεροῦς σώματος ἡ ψυχή, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομεν ἐπιστημονικωτάτην· εἰ δ᾽ ὑποθοίμεθα ταύτην ἀσώματον εἶναι φύσιν ἰδίαν ἔχουσαν, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν κτλ. HNH 15.25.1–12 K. κακῶς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν ἔνιοι κατεψεύσαντο Ξενοφάνους (—), ὥσπερ καὶ Σαβῖνος, ὡδί πως γράψας αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν· ‘οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πάμπαν ἀέρα λέγω τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὥσπερ Ἀναξιμένης (13A22 DK), οὔτε πῦρ, ὡς Ἡράκλειτος (T 579 Mouraviev), οὔτε ὕδωρ, ὡς Θαλῆς (fr. 182 Wöhrle), οὔτε γῆν, ὡς ἔν τινι Ξενοφάνης.’ οὐδαμόθι γὰρ εὑρίσκεται Ξενοφάνης ἀποφηνάμενος οὕτως. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σαβῖνος αὐτὸς εὔδηλός ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοῦ καταψευδόμενος, οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀγνοίας ἐσφαλμένος· ἢ πάντως ἂν ὀνομαστὶ προσέγραψε τὸ βιβλίον, ἐν ᾧ ταῦτα ἀπεφήνατο· νῦν δ᾽ οὕτως ἔγραψεν· ‘οὔτε γῆν, ὡς ἔν τινι Ξενοφάνης.’ καὶ Θεόφραστος (Phys.Op. fr. 5a Diels, 231 FHS&G; not in DK) δ᾽ ἂν ἐν ταῖς τῶν Φυσικῶν δοξῶν ἐπιτομαῖς τὴν Ξενοφάνους δόξαν, εἴπερ οὕτως εἶχεν, ἐγεγράφει. Propr.Plac. 7, p. 179.16–19 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς εἴτ᾽ ἀσώματός ἐστιν παντάπασιν ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ὑπέλαβεν, εἴτε σωματοειδὴς ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος οἴεται, πνεῦμα μὲν ἀποφηνάμενος ὑπάρχειν αὐτήν. Atticus fr. 7.1–9 bis Des Places at Eus. PE 15.11.4 (verbatim) τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ὅσα περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήκασιν ἄλλοι, αἰσχύνην ἡμῖν φέρει. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸς ὁ ἐντελέχειαν τιθεὶς τὴν ψυχὴν λόγος σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ (cf. ch. 4.2.6); πῶς δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνης γέμων ὁ πνεῦμά πως ἔχον αὐτὴν ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ πῦρ νοερόν, τῇ περιψύξει καὶ οἷον βαφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀναφθὲν ἢ στομωθέν, ὅ τε ἀτόμων ἄθροισμα θεὶς ἢ ὅλως ἀπὸ σώματος αὐτὴν γεννᾶσθαι ἀποφαινόμενος; Longinus fr. 20 Patillon–Brisson, 72(a–c) Männlein–Robert at Eus. PE 15.21.1 συνελόντι δ᾽ εἰπεῖν, πόρρω μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀφεστηκέναι τοῦ τὰ δέοντα λογίζεσθαι πάντες ἐφεξῆς ὁπόσοι τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα ἀπεφήναντο. ποῦ γὰρ ὅλως ἐγχωρεῖ παραπλήσιον εἶναί τινι τῶν στοιχείων τὸ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν θεῖναι, ποῦ δὲ ἐπὶ

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τὰς κράσεις καὶ μίξεις ἀνενεγκεῖν; … τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἴχνος οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τεκμήριον ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν εὑρίσκεται, κἂν εἰ φιλοτιμοῖτό τις ὡς Ἐπίκουρος (—) καὶ Χρύσιππος (SVF 2.800) ἅπαντα λίθον κινεῖν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐρευνᾶν δύναμιν σώματος εἰς γένεσιν τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς πράξεων. Porphyry de An. adv. Boeth. (249F Smith) at Eus. PE 15.11.4 πῶς δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνης γέμων ὁ πνεῦμά πως ἔχον αὐτὴν ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ πῦρ νοερόν (SVF 2.806), τῇ περιψύξει καὶ οἷον βαφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀναφθὲν ἢ στομωθέν, ὅ τε ἀτόμων ἄθροισμα θεὶς (—) ἢ ὅ ὅλως ἀπὸ σώματος αὐτὴν γεννᾶσθαι ἀποφαινόμενος; Chapter heading: Porphyry Plot. 24 ἡ δὲ τετάρτη ἐννεὰς … τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς εἴληχε συγγράμματα. ἔχει δὲ τάδε· αʹ Περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς πρῶτον· οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τίς ποτέ ἐστι. βʹ Περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς δεύτερον = Plotinus Enn. 4.1.[21]tit., 4.2.[4]tit. Cassiodorus de An. c. 4. De definitione animae. §2 Anaximenes Anaximander Anaxagoras Archelaus Diogenes: Aristotle de An. 1.2 405a21–22 Διογένης (64A20 DK) δ᾽ ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἀέρα. Lucretius DRN 3.44 aut etiam venti (sc. animi naturam esse). Plotinus Enn. 4.7.[2].6.40 εἴτ᾽ οὖν εἰς ἀέρα. Iamblichus de An. fr. 8 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.32, p. 366.16–20 ἢ τὸν ἀναπνεόμενον ἀέρα ψυχὴν νομίζουσιν· ὥσπερ Ἀριστοτέλης (de An. 1.5 410b26–30) μὲν ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔπεσί (1B11 DK, 421(I) Bernabé) φησι λέγεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν εἰσιέναι ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου ἀναπνεόντων ἡμῶν φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων. John Philoponus in de An. 9.9–10 οἱ δὲ ἀερίαν, ὡς Ἀναξιμένης (13A23 DK) καί τινες τῶν Στωικῶν (—). §3 Stoics: Chrysippus de An. I at Gal. PHP 3.1.10 (SVF 2.885, verbatim) ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον ἔστ᾽ ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς εὔπνοια παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι. Seneca Nat. 7.25.2 alius illum dicet spiritum esse. Doxography C (attributed to AD) at Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b7, p. 64.21–23 (SVF 3.305) τὴν γὰρ διάνοιαν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ συμφυὲς πνεῦμα ἡμῖν ἔνθερμον ὂν ψυχὴν ἡγοῦνται. Galen QAM c. 4, 784.10–12 K. ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία κατὰ ποιὰν κρᾶσιν ἀέρος τε καὶ πυρὸς γίγνεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκούς (SVF 2.787). PHP 7.3.19 εἰ δὲ σῶμα, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. in Epid. vi p. 273.2.1–6 Wenkebach–Pfaff τοῖς Στωικοῖς (SVF 2.715) δ᾽ ἔθος ἐστὶ φύσιν μὲν ὀνομάζειν, ᾗ τὰ φυτὰ διοικεῖται, ψυχὴν δὲ ᾗ τὰ ζῷα, τὴν οὐσίαν ἀμφοτέρων μὲν τίθενται τὸ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα καὶ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων οἴονται ποιότητι· ξηρότερον μὲν γὰρ πνεῦμα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὑγρότερον δὲ τὸ τῆς φύσεως εἶναι. Propr.Plac. 7, p. 179.18–19 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami εἴτε σωματοειδὴς ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος οἴεται, πνεῦμα μὲν ἀποφηνάμενος αὐτὴν εἶναι. Propr.Plac. 14, p. 188.1 Boudon-Millot– Pietrobelli, text Lami (= Sub.Nat.Fac. 4.761.4 K.) τινὲς δὲ πνεῦμα. SMT 11.731.3– 6 K. οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ (SVF 2.777) ταὐτὸν τοῦτο τὸ πνεῦμα τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοξάζουσιν· ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς οὔτε πάνυ τι τολμῶμεν ἀποφαίνεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα περιττὸν ὑπολαμβάνομεν. Hierocles El.Eth. col. 3.56–61 Bastianini–Long πρῶτον [το]ίνυν οὐκ ἀγνοητέον ὡς, | καθάπε[ρ] τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζ[ῴο]υ θικτόν ἐστι, ἵν᾽ οὕτως εἴπω, καὶ | ἁπτόν, οὕτως ο[ὖν] καὶ ἡ [ψ]υχή· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τῶν σω-|μά[των—ἀλλ᾽ [ἐ]ν [τοῖς] οἰκείοις τοῦτο παρίσταται λό|γοις [ἀν]ηκ[έ]σ[το]υς ἀποφαίνουσι τὰς τῶν ἄλλων | ὑ[πὲρ τῆς ψ[υχῆς ἀτο]πίας λε[γόν]των φοράς. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 26.16–17 οἵ τε ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (SVF 2.786), πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες εἶναι συγκείμενόν πως ἔκ τε πυρὸς καὶ

liber 4 caput 3 ἀέρος. Alexander of Aphrodisias(?) de An.Mant. 115.6–7 (SVF 2.785) ἔτι εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα, ἢ πῦρ ἢ πνεῦμα λεπτομερές ἐστι διὰ παντὸς διῆκον τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος. Plotinus Enn. 4.7.[2].3–8 passim. Porphyry de An. adv. Boeth. (fr. 249F Smith) at Eus. PE 15.11.4 (SVF 2.806) πῶς δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνης γέμων ὁ πνεῦμά πως ἔχον αὐτὴν ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ πῦρ νοερόν; Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.19 (on Xenophanes!, 21A1 DK) πρῶτός τε ἀπεφήνατο ὅτι … ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα. Cassiodorus de An. c. 10.1–7 Halporn De qualitate animae. qualitatem itaque substantiae huius auctores igneam esse dixerunt propterea quod mobili semper ardore vegetetur et iuncta corpori calore suo membra vivificet. deinde quod cuncta caelestia flammeo referunt vigore constare, non isto fumeo, consumptibili, et temporali, sed ex tranquillo nutritore atque immortali. §4 Parmenides Hippasus Heraclitus: Theophrastus Sens. 3 Παρμενίδης (28A46 DK) μὲν γὰρ ὅλως οὐδὲν ἀφώρικεν ἀλλὰ μόνον, ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοιν στοιχείοιν κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐστὶν ἡ γνῶσις. ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τὸ θερμὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἄλλην γίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν, βελτίω δὲ καὶ καθαρωτέραν τὴν διὰ τὸ θερμόν. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.130 (cf. Aenesidemus B29 Polito) ἡ ἐπιξενωθεῖσα τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα. John Philoponus in de An. 9.7–9 οἱ δὲ πῦρ, ὡς Ἡράκλειτος (T 969 Mouraviev), ἐπειδὴ καὶ πῦρ ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πυρίαν εἶναι διὰ τὸ εὐκίνητον. §5/§11 Democritus Epicurus: Papyrus Genevenus inv. 203, B27–29 at CPF I.1** p. 6 Democritus 2T σῶμα ἔφασ[αν οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον, καὶ ὁ] | Δημόκριτ[ος ὁμο]ίως σ[υγ]κ[ρινο]μέν[ων ἰ]|δεῶν σῶμ[α αὐτὴ]ν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) εἶπ[εν. Iamblichus de An. fr. 2 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.32, p. 363.16–17 ἀπὸ δὴ τῶν σφαιροειδῶν ἀτόμων εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. §5 Democritus: Aristotle de An. 1.2 403b31–404a2 Δημόκριτος (fr. 443a Luria) μὲν πῦρ τι καὶ θερμόν φησιν αὐτὴν εἶναι· ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέγει. Resp. 4 472a4–6 (Democritus, 68A106 DK) λέγει δ᾽ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ταὐτόν, τὰ πρῶτα σχήματα τῶν σφαιροειδῶν. Theophrastus Sens. 58 (on Democritus, 68A135 DK) φανερόν, ὅτι τῇ κράσει τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖ τὸ φρονεῖν, ὅπερ ἴσως αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἐστὶ σῶμα ποιοῦντι τὴν ψυχήν. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.44 (on Democritus, 68A1 DK) τόν τε ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην ἐκ τοιούτων λείων καὶ περιφερῶν ὄγκων συγκεκρίσθαι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίως. (differently Scholia in Epicurum Ep.Hdt. 66 at D.L. V.P. 10.66 λέγει (fr. 311 Usener) ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων, πολλῷ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός.) Porphyry de An. adv. Boeth. (fr. 249F Smith) at Eus. PE 15.11.4 πῶς δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνης γέμων … ὅ τε ἀτόμων ἄθροισμα θείς; John Philoponus in de An. 9.16–19 τῶν δὲ σύνθετον σῶμα ὑπειληφότων οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀσυνάπτων στοιχείων, ὡς Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππος (—) καὶ ἁπλῶς οἱ τὰ ἄτομα εἰσάγοντες· ἔλεγον μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων τὰ ἄτομα καὶ τὸ κενόν· εἶναι οὖν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ σφαιρικῶν ἀτόμων διὰ τὸ εὐκίνητον. §6 Heraclides: Plutarch Lat.Viv. 1130B (Heraclides Ponticus fr. 100 Wehrli, 48 Schütrumpf) αὐτήν τε τὴν ψυχὴν ἔνιοι τῶν φιλοσόφων φῶς εἶναι τῇ οὐσίᾳ νομίζουσιν κτλ. Clement of Alexandria Paed. 2.2.29.3 οὕτω δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν ὑπάρξαι καθαρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ φωτοειδής, ‘αὐγὴ δὲ ψυχὴ ξηρὰ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρί-

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στη’ (Heraclitus fr. 68 (a7) Marcovich). John Philoponus in An. 9.5–7 τῶν δὲ ἁπλοῦν σῶμα εἰρηκότων τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι οἱ μὲν εἰρήκασιν αἰθέριον εἶναι σῶμα, ταὐτὸν δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν οὐράνιον, ὥσπερ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός (fr. 99 Wehrli, 47 Schütrumpf). §§8–9 Diogenes of Apollonia Hippo: Simplicius (? perhaps Priscianus Lydus) in de An. 32.16–20 ἐτίθετο μὲν καὶ Θαλῆς (fr. 423 Wöhrle) ὕδωρ τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ σωμάτων, καὶ οὐχὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάντως σῶμα ᾤετο. ⟨τὸν⟩ δὲ Ἵππωνα … φορτικὸν καλεῖ οὐ μόνον ὡς παχυμερέστερον αὐτὴν λέγοντα στοιχεῖον κτλ. §8 Diogenes of Apollonia: Aristotle de An. 1.2 405a21–22 Διογένης (64A20 DK) δ᾽ ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἀέρα. §9 Hippo: Aristotle de An. 1.2 405b1–3 τῶν δὲ φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ Ἵππων· πεισθῆναι δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῆς γονῆς, ὅτι πάντων ὑγρά. John Philoponus in de An. 9.10–12 οἱ δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος, ὡς Θαλῆς (fr. 440 Wöhrle) καὶ Ἵππων (—) ὁ ἐπίκλην ἄθεος· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὴν γονὴν ἑώρων ἐξ ὑγρᾶς οὖσαν οὐσίας, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐνόμισαν. differently in de An. 86.23–34 οὐ γὰρ εἶπε φέρ᾽ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Θαλῆς (—) τὸ ὕδωρ ψυχὴν τίθεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἕλκειν φησὶ τὸν σίδηρον τὴν λίθον ὡς ἔμψυχον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐξ ὕδατος οὖσαν. … διὰ ταῦτα τούτου μὲν οὐ λέγει εἶναι τὴν δόξαν ταύτην ὅτι ἐξ ὕδατος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν κίνησιν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπένειμεν. ἐφεξῆς δὲ Ἵππωνά (—) φησι τοῦτο δοξάσαι ὅτι ἐξ ὕδατος ἡ ψυχή· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πάντων ἀρχὴν καὶ αὐτὸς ἔλεγε τὸ ὕδωρ. §10 Xenarchus Peripatetics: Galen PHP 7.7.25 εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας ἀποφήνασθαι χρή, δυοῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν· ἢ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὸ οἷον αὐγοειδές τε καὶ αἰθερῶδες σῶμα λεκτέον αὐτήν, εἰς ὃ κἂν μὴ βούλωνται κατ᾽ ἀκολουθίαν ἀφικνοῦνται Στωϊκοί (—) τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἢ αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὄχημα δὲ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς εἶναι τουτὶ τὸ σῶμα δι᾽ οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τἆλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 16.4–6 τὸ δὲ εἶδος, οὗ ἐστιν εἶδος, ἐδείχθη καὶ τελειότης ὄν, ἔθος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλει τὴν τελειότητα καὶ ἐντελέχειαν λέγειν. cf. de An. 17.12–13. de An. 23.30–24.1. Alexander of Aphrodisias(?) de An.Mant. 103.2–4 ψυχὴ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσία. τὸ δὲ εἶδος τελειότητά τε καὶ ἐντελέχειαν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει. Plotinus Enn. 4.7.[2].85.1– 50. §11 Epicurus: Epicurus Ep.Hdt. at D.L. 10.63 ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερές … προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι καὶ πῇ μὲν τούτῳ προσεμφερές, πῇ δὲ τούτῳ· ἔστι δέ τι μέρος πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν εἰληφὸς τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, συμπαθὲς δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἀθροίσματι· τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν αἱ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς δηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ εὐκινησίαι καὶ αἱ διανοήσεις. Lucretius DRN 3.203–205 nunc igitur quoniamst animi natura reperta / mobilis egregie, perquam constare necessest / corporibus parvis et levibus atque rutundis. DRN 3.231–242 nec tamen haec simplex nobis natura putanda est, / tenuis enim quaedam moribundos deserit aura / mixta vapore, vapor porro trahit aëra secum; / … / (237) iam triplex animi est igitur natura reperta; / nec tamen haec sat sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum, / nil horum quoniam recipit mens posse creare / sensiferos motus et quae quis [Smith, alii alia: quaedam

liber 4 caput 3 codd.] mente volutat. / quarta quoque his igitur quaedam natura necessest / adtribuatur; east omnino nominis expers. DRN 3.269–272. Plutarch Adv.Col. 1118D–E (Epicurus fr. 315 Usener) τὴν οὐσίαν συμπηγνύντες αὐτῆς ἔκ τινος θερμοῦ καὶ πνευματικοῦ καὶ ἀερώδους οὐκ ἐξικνοῦνται πρὸς τὸ κυριώτατον ἀλλ᾽ ἀπαγορεύουσι· τὸ γὰρ ᾧ κρίνει καὶ μνημονεύει καὶ φιλεῖ καὶ μισεῖ, καὶ ὅλως τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ λογιστικὸν ἔκ τινός φησιν ‘ἀκατονομάστου’ ποιότητος ἐπιγίνεσθαι. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 26.17–18 καὶ οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον (—)· καὶ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους σύνθετος ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ πλειόνων τινῶν καὶ διαφερόντων σωμάτων. §12 Empedocles: Aristotle de An. 1.2 404b11–15 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς (31B109 DK) μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων (sc. τὴν ψυχήν), εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτως: ‘γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ, / αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον’. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.115–116 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος (—) κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἁπλούστερον δοκοῦντας αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἓξ κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας παραδίδωσιν. δύο γὰρ δραστηρίους τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὰς ὑποθέμενος, Φιλίαν καὶ Νεῖκος, ἅμα τε τῶν τεσσάρων μνησθεὶς ὡς ὑλικῶν, γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, πάντων ταῦτα ἔφη κριτήρια τυγχάνειν. (116) παλαιὰ γάρ τις … ἄνωθεν παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς κυλίεται δόξα περὶ τοῦ τὰ ὅμοια τῶν ὁμοίων εἶναι γνωριστικά. M. 7.121 cites Empedocles 31B109 DK. Empedocles 31B105.3 DK αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα. Theophrastus Sens. 10 (Empedocles 31A86 DK) τῷ αἵματι μάλιστα φρονεῖν· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα κεκρᾶσθαί {ἐστι} τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν μερῶν. Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) at D.L. V.P. 8.28 εἶναι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα αἰθέρος καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.29 (on Zeno of Elea, 29A1 DK) γεγενῆσθαι δὲ τὴν τῶν πάντων φύσιν ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, λαμβανόντων αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλληλα τὴν μεταβολήν· … ψυχὴν κρᾶμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων (sc. θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ) κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν. §13 Critias: Plato Phd. 96b καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά (Empedocles 31A76 DK) ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν. Aristotle de An. 1.2 405b5–6 ἕτεροι δ᾽ αἷμα, καθάπερ Κριτίας (see also above §12). Lucretius DRN 3.43 animi naturam sanguinis esse. Seneca Nat. 7.25.2 non deerit qui sanguinem dicat. Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) at D.L. 8.30 τρέφεσθαί τε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος. Galen PHP 2.8.47 αἷμά φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Κριτίας ὑπέλαβον (v. also PHP 2.8.48 below §14). Plotinus Enn. 4.7.[2].6.40 εἴτ᾽ οὖν εἰς αἷμα. Simplicius (? perhaps Priscianus Lydus) in de An. 32.22 ὁ δὲ τὸ αἷμα τὴν ψυχὴν θέμενος Κριτίας (—) εἴτε ὁ τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενος εἷς εἴτε σοφιστής τις, οὐδὲν ἡμῖν διοίσει. John Philoponus in An. 9.19–21 οἱ δὲ ἐκ συνημμένων, ὡς Κριτίας ὁ εἷς τῶν τριάκοντα· αἷμα γὰρ ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· ‘αἷμα γάρ’, φησίν, ‘ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα’ (N.B. = Empedocles 31B105.3 DK). §14 Heraclitus: Aristotle de An. 1.2 405a25–27 καὶ Ἡράκλειτος (T 189 Mouraviev) δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα συνίστησιν· καὶ ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἀεί. ps.Aristotle Probl. 13.6 908a28–34 διὰ τί, ἐάν τις σκόροδα φάγῃ, τὸ οὖρον ὄζει, ἄλλων δὲ ἐχόντων ἰσχυρὰν ὀσμὴν οὐκ

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ὄζει ἐδεσθέντων; πότερον, ὥσπερ τινὲς τῶν Ἡρακλειτιζόντων (Heraclitus 66 ( f 3) Marcovich) φασὶν ὅτι ἀναθυμιᾶται, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, καὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι, εἶτα πάλιν ψυχθὲν συνίσταται ἐκεῖ μὲν ὑγρόν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὖρον, ἡ ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς ἀναθυμίασις, ἐξ οὗ ἐγένετο αὕτη συμμιγνυμένη, ποιεῖ τὴν ὀσμήν; αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν, ὅταν μεταβάλλῃ. Aristotle de An. 1.5 410b27–30 τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς καλουμένοις ἔπεσι (1B11 DK, 421(I) Bernabé) λόγος· φησὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων, φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων. de An. 1.5 411a7–8 καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δή τινες αὐτὴν μεμῖχθαί φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς (fr. 32 Wöhrle) ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. de An. 1.2 404a1–13 (Democritus fr. 200 Luria) πῦρ τι καὶ θερμόν φησιν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχήν) εἶναι· ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέγει (οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα, ἃ φαίνεται ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτῖσιν), … διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν· συνάγοντος γὰρ τοῦ περιέχοντος τὰ σώματα καὶ ἐκθλίβοντος τῶν σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μηδ᾽ αὐτὰ ἠρεμεῖν μηδέποτε, βοήθειαν γίνεσθαι θύραθεν ἐπεισιόντων ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν. de An. 1.2 404a16–19 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων (58B.40 DK) λεγόμενον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν· ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ δὲ τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν. Resp. 4 472a6–11 (68A106 DK) ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἀέρι πολὺν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων ἃ καλεῖ ἐκεῖνος νοῦν καὶ ψυχήν· ἀναπνέοντος οὖν καὶ εἰσιόντος τοῦ ἀέρος συνεισιόντα ταῦτα καὶ ἀνείργοντα τὴν θλίψιν κωλύειν τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις διιέναι ψυχήν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἐκπνεῖν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν. GA 3.11 762a18–21 γίνεται δ᾽ ἐν γῇ καὶ ἐν ὑγρῷ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διὰ τὸ ἐν γῇ μὲν ὕδωρ ὑπάρχειν ἐν δ᾽ ὕδατι πνεῦμα, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ παντὶ θερμότητα ψυχικήν, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ πάντα ψυχῆς εἶναι πλήρη. Cleanthes at AD fr. 39 Diels at Eus. PE 15.20.2– 3 Κλεάνθης (SVF 1.519) … φησιν ὅτι Ζήνων (SVF 1.141) τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος· βουλόμενος γὰρ ἐμφανίσαι ὅτι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀναθυμιώμεναι νοεραὶ ἀεὶ γίνονται, εἴκασεν αὐτὰς τοῖς ποταμοῖς, λέγων οὕτως· ‘ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ· καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται’ (22B12 DK). ἀναθυμίασιν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων, αἰσθητικὴν δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο λέγει ὅτι τυποῦσθαί τε δύναται τὸ μέρος τὸ ἡγούμενον αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ παραδέχεσθαι τὰς τυπώσεις. Diogenes of Babylon at Gal. PHP 2.8.44 (SVF 3 Diog. 30, verbatim) ‘τό’ φησι ‘κινοῦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις ψυχική τίς ἐστιν ἀναθυμίασις, πᾶσα δὲ ἀναθυμίασις ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς ἀνάγεται, ὥστε τὸ κινοῦν πρῶτον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις καὶ τὸ τρέφον ἡμᾶς ἀνάγκη ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι.’ Manilius 4.884–885 … nostrumque parentem / pars sua perspicimus genitique accedimus astris. Seneca Dial. 8.5.5 an illud verum sit quo maxime probatur homines divini esse spiritus, partem ac veluti scintillas quasdam astrorum in terram desiluisse atque alieno loco haesisse. Plutarch Virt.Mor. 441F ἥ τ᾽ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ μέρος ἢ μίμημα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὖσα. CN 1084F–1085A (SVF 2.847) φαντασία γάρ τις ἡ ἔννοιά ἐστι, φαντασία δὲ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ· ψυχῆς δὲ φύσις ἀναθυμίασις, ἣν τυπωθῆναι μὲν ἐργῶδες διὰ μανότητα δεξαμένην δὲ τηρῆσαι τύπωσιν ἀδύνατον. ἥ τε γὰρ τροφὴ καὶ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῆς ἐξ (1085A) ὑγρῶν οὖσα συνεχῆ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἀνάλωσιν, ἥ τε πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα τῆς ἀνα-

liber 4 caput 3 πνοῆς ἐπιμιξία καινὴν ἀεὶ ποιεῖ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξισταμένην καὶ τρεπομένην ὑπὸ τοῦ θύραθεν ἐμβάλλοντος ὀχετοῦ καὶ πάλιν ἐξιόντος. ps.Plutarch Hom. 2 c. 127, 1406–1408 Kindstrand αὐτὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οἱ Στωικοὶ (—) ὁρίζονται πνεῦμα ⟨ἠμῖν̣⟩ συμφυὲς καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικήν, ἀναδιδομένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑγρῶν. Marcus Aurelius 5.33 αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ψυχάριον ἀναθυμίασις ἀφ᾽ αἵματος. Galen PHP 2.8.48 εἰ δέ γε ἕποιτο (sc. Diogenes of Babylon, SVF 3 Diog. 30) Κλεάνθει (SVF 1.521) καὶ Χρυσίππῳ (—) καὶ Ζήνωνι (SVF 1.140) τρέφεσθαι μὲν ἐξ αἵματος φήσαντι τὴν ψυχήν, οὐσίαν δ᾽ αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν τὸ πνεῦμα (see also PHP 2.8.47 above §12). Ut.Resp. 5.502.6–8 K. καίτοι κἀκ τῆς τοῦ αἵματος ἀναθυμιάσεως οὐκ ἀπεικὸς αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα) τρέφεσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ πολλοῖς (SVF 2.782) ὅσοι γὰρ οἴονται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι πνεῦμα, διασῴζεσθαι λέγουσιν αὐτὴν ἔκ τε τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως τοῦ αἵματος καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰσπνοὴν ἀέρος ἑλκομένου διὰ τῆς τραχείας ἀρτηρίας εἴσω τοῦ σώματος. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.127–129 ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ φυσικῷ (sc. Ἡρακλείτῳ, 22A16 DK) τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικόν τε ὂν καὶ φρενῆρες. … (129) τοῦτον οὖν τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ᾽ Ἡράκλειτον δι᾽ ἀναπνοῆς σπάσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν μὲν ὕπνοις ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἔμφρονες κτλ. M. 7.349 οἱ μὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος (sc. εἶναι τὴν διάνοιαν), ὡς Αἰνησίδημος (fr. B29 Polito) κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον (T 689 Mouraviev). M. 8.286 καὶ μὴν ῥητῶς ὁ Ἡράκλειτός (T 690 Mouraviev) φησι τὸ μὴ εἶναι λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μόνον δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν φρενῆρες τὸ περιέχον. M. 9.337 ὁ δὲ Αἰνησίδημος (fr. B25 Polito) κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον (T 698 Mouraviev) καὶ ἕτερόν φησι τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου καὶ ταὐτόν· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ὅλη ἐστὶ καὶ μέρος, ὅλη μὲν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον, μέρος δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ ζῴου φύσιν. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Phys. lib. 4, schol. 47* Rashed οἱ Στωικοὶ … τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἔλεγον εἶναι τὸ λεπτομερὲς πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ πάντων διῆκον καὶ συνέχον πάντα· ὃ δὴ καὶ ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἔλεγον καὶ πλείους ψυχὰς ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, μίαν μὲν τὴν ὡς φύσιν καὶ μέρος τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς, ἄλλην δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστου. Longinus fr. 20 Patillon–Brisson (= 72(e) Männlein–Robert) at Eus. PE 15.21.3, cf. at Theod. CAG 5.27 Ζήνωνι (SVF 1.139) μὲν γὰρ καὶ Κλεάνθει (SVF 1.520) νεμεσήσειέ τις ἂν δικαίως οὕτως σφόδρα ὑβριστικῶς περὶ αὐτῆς διαλεχθεῖσι καὶ ταὐτὸν ἄμφω τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος [sic] εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν φήσασι. τί γάρ, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, κοινὸν ὅλως ἀναθυμιάσει καὶ ψυχῇ; Themistius in de An. 13.26–28 καὶ Ἡράκλειτος (T 764 Mouraviev) δὲ ἣν ἀρχὴν τίθεται τῶν ὄντων, ταύτην τίθεται καὶ ψυχήν· πῦρ γὰρ καὶ οὗτος. τὴν γὰρ ἀναθυμίασιν ἐξ ἧς τὰ ἄλλα συνίστησιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ πῦρ ὑποληπτέον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ῥέον ἀεί. Simplicius (? perhaps Priscianus Lydus) in de An. 31.26–30 σαφῆ δὲ τὰ περὶ Διογένους (—) ἱστορημένα. περὶ δὲ Ἡρακλείτου (T 955 Mouraviev) συλλογιζομένῳ ἔοικεν, οὐχ ὡς σαφῶς λέγοντος πῦρ ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν ξηρὰν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τοῦ πυρὸς πρὸς τῷ λεπτομερεῖ καὶ τὸ εὐκίνητον ἔχοντος καὶ τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὰ ἄλλα κινοῦντος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτά {τε} τῇ ψυχῇ προσήκοντος ὡς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ζῶντος ἰούσῃ σώματος καὶ ὡς τῷ κινεῖσθαι κινητικῇ καὶ ἔτι ὡς γνωστικῇ. κτλ. John Philoponus in de An. 87.10–13 (Heraclitus T 972A Mouraviev) εἴρηται πολλάκις ὅτι ἀρχὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων οὗτος τὸ πῦρ, πῦρ δὲ οὐ τὴν φλόγα· ὡς γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης (cf. GC 2.3 330b25–26, Mete. 1.3 340b23–24) φησίν, ἡ φλὸξ ὑπερβολή ἐστι πυρός· ἀλλὰ πῦρ ἔλεγε τὴν ξηρὰν ἀναθυμίασιν· ἐκ ταύτης οὖν εἶναι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς εὐκινήτου καὶ λεπτομερεστάτης κτλ.

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Diogenes of Apollonia 64B4 DK ἄνθρωποι γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναπνέοντα ζώει τῷ ἀέρι. καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχή ἐστι καὶ νόησις. Theophrastus Sens. 42 (Diogenes of Apollonia 64A19 DK) ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται μικρὸν ὢν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ. Xenophon Mem. 1.4.8 σὺ δὲ σαυτῷ δοκεῖς τι φρόνιμον ἔχειν; ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἴει φρόνιμον εἶναι; καὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι· νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα δι᾽ ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὡς οἴει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν; Plato Phlb. 30a τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ᾽ οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;—δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.—πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα; Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) at D.L. 8.30 τρέφεσθαί τε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος. at D.L. 8.32 εἶναί τε πάντα τὸν ἀέρα ψυχῶν ἔμπλεων. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 1.7 (on the Magi, Arist. fr. 36 R3) ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδώλων πλήρη εἶναι τὸν ἀέρα, κατ᾽ ἀπόρροιαν ὑπ᾽ ἀναθυμιάσεως εἰσκρινομένων ταῖς ὄψεσι τῶν ὀξυδερκῶν. Plotinus Enn. 4.3[27].1.17–33 νῦν δὲ πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς λέγοντας ἐκ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι. … παραθήσονται δὲ καὶ Πλάτωνα (cf. Phlb. 30a, Tim. 30b) τοῦτο δοξάζοντα, ὅταν πιστούμενος τὸ πᾶν ἔμψυχον εἶναι λέγῃ, ὡς σῶμα μέρος ὂν τοῦ παντὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν μέρος τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς εἶναι. καὶ τὸ συνέπεσθαι δὲ ἡμᾶς τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιφορᾷ καὶ λεγόμενον καὶ δεικνύμενον ἐναργῶς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς τύχας ἐκεῖθεν λαμβάνοντας εἴσω τε γενομένους ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡμᾶς τὴν ψυχὴν λαμβάνειν. καὶ ὅπερ ἐπὶ ἡμῶν μέρος ἕκαστον ἡμῶν παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς λαμβάνει, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μέρη πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὄντας παρὰ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς μεταλαμβάνειν ὡς μέρη.

Liber 4 Caput 4 PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 898E–F; pp. 389a8–390a23 Diels—PE: Eusebius PE 15.60 pp. 420.21–421.10 Mras—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 192–193 Daiber S: Stobaeus Ecl. 1.49.7a, p. 325.7–8 + 1.50.35, p. 477.18–19 Wachsmuth T: Theodoretus CAG 5.19–21 pp. 127.14–128.8 Raeder Cf. ps.Iustinus Coh. 6.2.17–21 Marcovich; Nem: Nemesius NH c. 15 p. 72.4–20 Morani

Titulus δʹ. Περὶ μερῶν ψυχῆς (P,S) §1 Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον διμερῆ τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν λογικὸν τὸ δ᾽ ἄλογον· κατὰ δὲ τὸ προσεχὲς καὶ ἀκριβὲς τριμερῆ, τὸ γὰρ ἄλογον διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸ θυμικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. (P1,T1) §2 Ξενοκράτης τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. (T2) §3 Ἀριστοτέλης πέντε ἐνεργείας, τὴν ὀρεκτικήν, τὴν θρεπτικήν, τὴν αἰσθητικήν, τὴν μεταβατικήν, τὴν διανοητικήν. (T3) §4 οἱ Στωικοὶ ἐξ ὀκτὼ μερῶν φασι συνεστάναι, πέντε μὲν τῶν αἰσθητικῶν, ὁρατικοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ ὀσφρητικοῦ γευστικοῦ ἁπτικοῦ, ἕκτου δὲ φωνητικοῦ, ἑβδόμου δὲ σπερματικοῦ, ὀγδόου δ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, ἀφ᾽ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέταται διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων, προσφερῶς ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις. (P2,T4) §5 Ἀπολλοφάνης ⟨ἐξ ἐννέα μερῶν φησι τὴν ψυχὴν συνεστάναι⟩. (S1) §6 οἱ δέ γε Πυθαγόρου διάδοχοι ἐκ πέντε στοιχείων τὸ σῶμα κραθῆναι φάντες—τοῖς γὰρ τέτταρσι ξυνέταξαν τὸ αἰθέριον—ἰσαρίθμους εἶναι ἔφασαν ταύτῃ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς δυνάμεις· καὶ ταύτας ὠνομάκασι νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ αἴσθησιν. (T5) §1 Pythagoras Plato cf. e.g. Resp. 4 439d–e; §2 Xenocrates fr. 70 Heinze, F 126 Isnardi Parente2; §3 cf. Arist. de An. 2.2 413b11–13, 2.3 414a31–32; §4 Stoici SVF 2.827; §5 Apollophanes cf. SVF 1.405; §6 Pythagorae successores fort. cf. Arist. de An. 1.2 404b21–24, ubi deest φρόνησις caput non hab. G titulus μερῶν ψυχῆς PBQ : τῆς add. PES : περὶ τὴν ταύτης διαίρεσιν paraphr. T §1 [3] ἔχειν PEQ Diels : ἔχει PB Mau Lachenaud : om. T §3 [7] Ἀριστοτέλης scripsimus : ὁ δὲ Νικομάχου variatio T ret. Diels in app. §4 [9] φασι PBQ : om. PE ‖ [11] δέ PE : om. PBQ ‖ δ᾽ PE cf. Q : om. PB ‖ [12] ἐπιτέταται Zeller prob. Mau Lachenaud : ἐπιτέτακται PB : τέτακται PE : τέταται Mras : geordnet werden Q ‖ [12–13] προσφερῶς … πλεκτάναις PBE : wie (bei) dem Gewebe der Füße des ‘vielfüßig’ genannten Lebewesens Q §5 om. PT ‖ [1] Ἀπολλοφάνης ⟨ἐξ ἐννέα μερῶν φησι τὴν ψυχὴν συνεστάναι⟩ ex indice Photiano atque Tert. de An. 14.2 in novem penes Apollophanem suppl. Wachsmuth Elter secutus §6 om. P non hab. S ‖ ταύτῃ Τmss.1 Raeder : τούτοις : Τmss.2 Diels, cf. Gaisford

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liber 4 caput 4

Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος διμερῆ τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἔχουσαν ἐν τῷ θώρακι καθιδρυμένον, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν τοῦ σώματος διεσπαρμένον. (P3) ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος πάντα μετέχειν φησὶ ψυχῆς ποιᾶς, καὶ τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, διότι ἀεὶ διαφανῶς τινος θερμοῦ καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ μετέχει, τοῦ πλείονος διαπνεομένου. (P4,S2)

§7 Democritus 68A105 DK, Epicurus fr. 312 Usener, cf. Schol.Ep. Hdt. 66; §8 Democritus 68A117 DK §8 [22–24] ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος … διαπνεομένου PBQ : Δημόκριτος τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων αἰσθάνεσθαι S ‖ [22] φησὶ PB Diels prob. Mau Lachenaud : φύσει PE Mras ‖ [23] αἐὶ διαφανῶς PB : ἀφανῶς PE prob. Mras, ‘vix recte’ Diels DG : etwas Leuchtendes Q

Testes primi: Theodoretus CAG 5.19–21 (CAG 5.16–17 vid. test. prim. ad c. 4.2) 5.19 (~ quaestio) καὶ μέντοι καὶ περὶ τὴν ταύτης διαίρεσιν πλείστη γε τούτοις γεγένηται διαμάχη. 5.19.1 (~ §1) Πυθαγόρας μὲν γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων διμερῆ ταύτην εἰρήκασι, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς εἶναι λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον. διχῇ δ᾽ αὖ πάλιν τὸ ἄλογον ἔτεμον, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ θυμικὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν. 5.19.2 (~ §2) ὁ δὲ Ξενοκράτης, καὶ ταῦτα τρίτος ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ὤν—Σπευσίππου γὰρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀδελφιδοῦ γεγένηται φοιτητής—τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἔφη, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. 5.20.1 (~ §3) ὁ δὲ Νικομάχου πέντε εἶναι ταύτης ἔφησεν ἐνεργείας, τὴν ὀρεκτικήν, τὴν θρεπτικήν, τὴν αἰσθητικήν, τὴν μεταβατικήν, τὴν διανοητικήν. 5.20.2 (~ §4) ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦτον οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔστερξαν· ἐξ ὀκτὼ γὰρ μερῶν ἔφασαν τὴν ψυχὴν ξυνεστάναι, τῆς ὀπτικῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀκουστικῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρητικῆς καὶ τῆς γευστικῆς καὶ τῆς ἁπτικῆς· ἕκτον δὲ τὸ φωνητικὸν ἔφασαν καὶ τὸ σπερματικὸν ἕβδομον καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ὄγδοον, ὑφ᾽ οὗ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνεργεῖται. εἶπον δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος ἐοικέναι πλεκτάναις. 5.21.1 (~ §6) οἱ δέ γε Πυθαγόρου διάδοχοι ἐκ πέντε στοιχείων τὸ σῶμα κραθῆναι φάντες—τοῖς γὰρ τέτταρσι ξυνέταξαν τὸ αἰθέριον—ἰσαρίθμους εἶναι ἔφασαν ταύτῃ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς δυνάμεις· καὶ ταύτας ὠνομάκασι νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ αἴσθησιν. Testes secundi: ps.Iustinus Coh. 6.2.17–21 Πλάτων μὲν γὰρ τριμερῆ αὐτὴν εἶναί φησι, καὶ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν εἶναι λέγει (~ §1)· Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐ κοινοτέραν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναί φησιν, ἐν ᾧ περιείληπται καὶ τὰ φθαρτὰ μόρια, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικὸν μόνον. Nemesius NH c. 15, p. 72.4–20 διαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως εἰς δυνάμεις ἢ εἴδη ἢ μέρη τὴν ψυχήν (~ quaestio), εἴς τε τὸ φυτικόν, ὃ καὶ θρεπτικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν καλεῖ-

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liber 4 caput 4 ται, καὶ εἰς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ λογικόν. (~ §4) Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Στωϊκὸς (SVF 1.143) ὀκταμερῆ φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, διαιρῶν αὐτὴν εἴς τε τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, καὶ εἰς τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις, καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικόν. Παναίτιος (T 125 Alesse) δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος τὸ μὲν φωνητικὸν τῆς καθ᾽ ὁρμὴν κινήσεως μέρος εἶναι βούλεται λέγων ὀρθότατα· τὸ δὲ σπερματικόν οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως (~ §4). (~ §3) Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν μὲν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς πέντε εἶναι λέγει τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε φυτικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν· φυτικὸν λέγων τὸ τρέφον καὶ αὔξειν καὶ γεννᾶν ποιοῦν καὶ διαπλάσσον τὰ σώματα· καλεῖ δὲ τὸ φυτικὸν καὶ θρεπτικόν, τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου μέρους καλῶν τοῦ τρέφοντος, ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ φυτικοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει. οὕτω μὲν ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς (de An. 2.3 414a31–414b1), ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς (EN 1.7 1102a27–28) εἰς δύο τὰ πρῶτα καὶ γενικώτατα διαιρεῖ τὴν ψυχήν, εἴς τε τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· ὑποδιαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ ἄλογον εἴς τε τὸ ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ κατήκοον λόγου. Loci Aetiani: §1 A 4.7.1 Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων τὸ μὲν λογικὸν … τὸ δ᾽ ἄλογον. §4 A 4.5.7 (Ἀριστο⟨τέ⟩λης) oἱ Στωικοὶ πάντες ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἢ τῷ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν πνεύματι (sc. εἶναι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν). A 4.8.1 … τὸ ἡγεμονικόν· πάλιν δ᾽ αἰσθητήρια λέγεται πνεύματα νοερὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἀφ᾽ οὗ συνίσταται ἐπὶ τὰ ὄργανα τεταμένα. A 4.10.1 οἱ Στωικοὶ πέντε τὰς εἰδικὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὅρασιν ἀκοὴν ὄσφρησιν γεῦσιν ἁφήν. A 4.15.3 Χρύσιππος κατὰ τὴν συνέντασιν τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀέρος ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς, νυγέντος μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁρατικοῦ πνεύματος, ὅπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῆς κόρης διήκει. A 4.21.2–4 (de Stoicis) ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἑπτὰ μέρη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκπεφυκότα καὶ ἐκτεινόμενα εἰς τὸ σῶμα, καθάπερ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναι· τῶν δ᾽ ἑπτὰ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε μέν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, ὅρασις ὄσφρησις ἀκοὴ γεῦσις καὶ ἁφή· ὧν ἡ μὲν ὅρασίς ἐστι πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀκοὴ δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις τῶν ὤτων, ὄσφρησις δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι μυκτήρων {λεπτῦνον}, γεῦσις δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι γλώττης, ἁφὴ δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ἐπιφανείας εἰς θίξιν εὐαίσθητον τῶν προσπιπτόντων. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τὸ μὲν λέγεται σπερματικόν, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῶν παραστατῶν· τὸ δέ ᾽φωνᾶεν᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος εἰρημένον, ὃ καὶ φωνη⟨τικ⟩ὸν (scripsimus) καλοῦσιν, ἐστὶ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι φάρυγγος καὶ γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων. A 4.23.1 οἱ Στωικοὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις, τὰς δ᾽ αἰσθήσεις ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ. §6 A 1.3.7[36–43] διὰ τοῦτο οὖν νοῦς ἡ μονάς, ᾧ ταῦτα νοοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ δυὰς δ᾽ ἡ ἀόριστος ἐπιστήμη, εἰκότως· πᾶσα γὰρ ἀπόδειξις καὶ πᾶσα πίστις ἐπιστήμης, πρὸς δὲ καὶ πᾶς συλλογισμὸς ἔκ τινων ὁμολογουμένων τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον συνάγει καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποδείκνυται ἕτερον· ὧν ἡ ἐπιστήμη κατάληψίς ἐστι, διὸ εἴη ἂν δυάς. ἡ δὲ δόξα τριὰς ἐκ καταλήψεώς ἐστιν, εὐλόγως, ὅτι πολλῶν ἐστιν ἡ δόξα. A 1.3.21 Ἀριστοτέλης … πέμπτον δέ τι σῶμα αἰθέριον. A 1.7.23 Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν εἶδος ⟨χωριστόν⟩ ἐπιβεβηκότα τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοῦ παντός, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰθέριον

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σῶμα, τὸ πέμπτον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καλούμενον. A 1.12.3 Ἀριστοτέλης βαρύτατον μὲν εἶναι τὴν γῆν ἁπλῶς, κουφότατον δὲ τὸ πῦρ· ἀέρα δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλως. μηδὲν δὲ πῦρ κυκλοτερῶς φύσει κινεῖσθαι, μόνον δὲ τὸ πέμπτον σῶμα. A 1.28.1 αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον σῶμα. A 2.30.7 … τοῦ αἰθέρος, ὃν προσαγορεύει (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης) σῶμα πέμπτον. A 4.9.11 Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων καθαρὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἑκάστου στοιχείου προσερχόμενον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν ὅρασιν τὸ αἰθηριὸν πεφυκέναι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὸ πνευματικόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν τὸ πυρῶδες, πρὸς δὲ τὴν γεῦσιν τὸ ὑγρόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν τὸ γεῶδες. §7 A 4.5.6 Παρμενίδης ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ θώρακι καὶ Ἐπίκουρος. Al. A 4.5.1 Πλάτων Δημόκριτος ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ κεφαλῇ. §8 A 4.7a.2 Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος ταὐτὸν νοῦν καὶ ψυχήν, καθ᾽ οὓς οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ζῷον ἄλογον κυρίως. A 5.20.5 Διογένης μετέχειν μὲν αὐτὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ ἀέρος.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) The witnesses are P and T (and S via Photius’ index, see at (2) below). For this chapter in the P tradition we do have the evidence of E, but are lacking G. The latter does, however, supply parallel information in a different section of his tract (cf. above at ch. 4.2, Commentary A). As we have seen at chs. 4.2 and 4.3 and shall see at chs. 4.6 and 4.7, there are parallels in the mixed bag of G c. 24 (see traditio proxima), which have reached this destination via a different route. G there moreover has lemmata concerned with the topic of the present chapter that are not paralleled in A, which perhaps entails that in A as compared with an anterior tradition some lemmata have been lost—a thought that is encouraged by the presence of a very full series of soul-parts in Tertullian De anima 14.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 10 Podolak). (2) In the mss. of S the chapter is lacking, so reconstruction is more difficult, but Wachsmuth following Elter (1880) 40 has restored in S a reference to Apollophanes, not paralleled in either P, T, or G, from Photius’ index of names and Tertullian’s enumeration of doxai. See S Ecl. 1.49.7a with annotation in the apparatus and below, section D(b). (3) As noted above, for P we have PB, PQ, and this time also PE who from Book 4 cites a mere two chapters, viz. 4.4–5, so at least includes our present chapter. P has four lemmata, T five, G five (though not directly from P). G’s five moreover contain two lemmata (anonymous philosophers who hold that there are no parts; Mnesarchus who disagrees with ‘the Stoics’) to which noth-

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ing corresponds in either P or T, but the view that the soul has no parts is also found in this context in Tertullian. Only two lemmata of P and T, one on Pythagoras–Plato (P1 and T1) and one on the Stoics (P2 and T4), correspond with each other; these are to some extent paralleled in G, as is the Aristotle lemma (T3 only). T is more wordy than usual, and must have consulted or remembered a source which payed attention to Successions and other personalia (for other cases see above, at ch. 4.3 Commentary A(5) ad finem, and below, ch. 4.5, Commentary D(d)§7), for he adds that Xenocrates is said to be third counting from Plato and to have been a pupil of Plato’s nephew Speusippus (no such details at A 1.3.20 Diels). That the name-label Aristotle is replaced by the formula ‘the son of Nicomachus’ (parallel only at A 1.3.12 Diels, patronymic as part of full credentials) is a more standard though entirely similar embellishment. We have restored the proper name in the text. And his ‘the diadochoi of Pythagoras’ probably replaces the standard formula oἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου. Because no help is available for those among T’s this time rather wordy lemmata which are not paralleled in the more austere P, reconstructing A’s text is this time trickier than usual, and impossible to determine exactly. (4) Special difficulties are caused by P’s two final lemmata. P3 (Democritus– Epicurus) is not paralleled in the other sources; P4 (Democritus) however is paralleled in an abridged form at S 1.50.35 (Δημόκριτος τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων αἰσθάνεσθαι, printed by Diels as ch. 4.9.20), i.e. not in the Stobaean chapter on the soul but in that on sensation etc. The relation of S 1.50.35 to the rest of ch. 4.9 is not obvious. Diels noticed the parallel between the two lemmata, see DG apparatus for A 4.9.20 and p. 2.111.30 DK on 68A117, but decided (we do not know his reasons) to refrain from placing the two lemmata next to each other in parallel columns either at the end of ch. 4.4 or at that of ch. 4.9. As P is an epitome, the final position of P4 ~ A 4.4.8 is secure. Because S habitually rearranges matters, that of the parallel Stobaean lemma at the end of 4.9 is less certain. See also the preliminary account at Mansfeld (1990a) 3190– 3192. (5) S, as we have seen, is missing apart from a probable reference to Apollophanes and a summary version of §8. §§2, 3, and 6 are not in PBE but present in T, who therefore cannot have taken this extra material from the tradition of P. Just as elsewhere he must have taken it from A, but this time no confirmation can be forthcoming from S. (6) On ps.Justin’s brief text, which this time is not very close to either P or A and has no parallel in Hermias, see our remarks at ch. 4.2 Commentary A(5).

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B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. The parts of souls are paralleled in detail in Tertullian, De an.14, see above, section A(1). On the Aëtian chapter and its parallels in the tradition see e.g. Mansfeld (1990a) 3085–3089. The parallel passage at the end of the mixed bag of physical and ethical excerpts deriving from a different tradition that constitute G c. 24 (cited below, section E(b) General texts ad finem) is less obviously structured by numbers in succession, though a bit of computation will go a long way to recover this structure. But while T, in preserving §6, has also preserved an intimation of the category of place, a category more clearly attested at §§7–8 as extant in P, this aspect has been lost in G. On the other hand G has preserved, though in a somewhat odd position, the entirely relevant tenet according to which the soul has no parts at all, which is not found in P and T. (2) Sources. The explicit issue of the parts derives from Arist. de An. 1.2 402b1 σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής (cf. 1.5 411b5, 3.9 432a22–23), see Mansfeld (1990a) 3087, 3203–3204, 3210, M–R. 2.139–142, and above, Introduction to Book 4, section (6). Alexander in Sens. 1.3–5 tells us that Aristotle in the De anima treated περί τε ψυχῆς τῆς συμπάσης κοινῶς καὶ καθόλου καὶ ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστης τῶν δυνάμεων αὐτῆς, πόσαι τέ εἰσι καὶ τίνες καὶ ἐν τίσιν ἑκάστῃ αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι. See also section D(e) below. C Chapter Heading Of the standard umbrella type (περὶ τοῦ δεῖνα) that dominates in the Placita (see above, ch. 1.3 Commentary C). As a heading it is found in P only, but referred to by G who begins with εἶναι δὲ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς; it is implicit in T, who speaks of the διαίρεσις of the soul, as does Nem NH 15, p. 72.3, and in Tertullian de An. 14.2, dividitur … in partes. It covers the lemmata of ch. 4 in a general way only, and in relation to the two final lemmata could have been augmented with the specification ἐν τίνι (or ποῦ) ἐστίν, pertaining to the category of place, as noted above on the proximate tradition. D Analysis a Context Ch. 4.4, dealing with a quantitative aspect of soul, follows on upon the two chapters dealing with the soul’s substance/definition, 4.2–3, just as ch. 2.12 ‘On the division of heaven, into how many circles it is divided’ follows after ch. 2.11, ‘On the heaven, what is its substance’, as ch. 2.21 ‘On the size of the sun’ follows after ch. 2.20, ‘On the substance of the sun’, and ch. 2.26, ‘On the size of the moon’, follows after ch. 2.25, ‘On the substance of the moon’. It is followed by ch. 4.5, ‘On the regent part and in what place it is’, which is in fact mostly about

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the location (category of place) of the regent part. The two final lemmata of ch. 4.4 anticipate this theme by including references to the location of parts of the soul, which at the same time helps explain their final position, close to the next chapter. Compare Chrysippus, who in Book I of his On the soul at Galen PHP 3.1.9–15 (SVF 2.885, cited above at Book 4 titulus et index, Further Related Texts), first says what the soul is, next lists its (eight) parts, and then discusses the location of its regent part. b Number–Order of Lemmata P and T confirm each other as to the relative order. Since the chapter deals with the number of the parts (category of quantity) one expects the lemmata to follow each other on either a rising or a descending scale. In a parallel dialectical-doxographical passage, viz. Tertullian de An. 14.2, we for instance find an ascending series of soul-parts from two via three, five, six, seven, eight, nine, twelve, and fourteen, to as far as seventeen: a total of ten lemmata. As we do not know to what extent Tertullian’s list may have grown in the meantime it is pointless to speculate about lemmata that may have been lost in P and T, though G’s again partly different account too suggests that more material may have been present originally. The rising scale of P and T changes to a descending scale ad finem. Compare chs. 4.3.1–13 and 4.8.1–4, both times with Commentary D(c). P moreover has only four lemmata, and T and G only have five. In P the order according to number is: P1 (Pythagoras Plato): two but also three parts, P2 (Stoics): eight parts. So a quite rigorous abridgement though still a rising scale; P then makes a new start with P 3 (Democritus Epicurus): two parts, so a descending scale beginning at P2 which is simultaneously the end of one and the beginning of another series. T has T1 (Pythagoras Plato), contents precisely parallel to ‘two or rather three’ as at P1, adds T2 (Xenocrates) as a parallel for the Pythagorean/Platonic bipartition, goes on with T3 (Aristotle): five parts, T4 (Stoics): eight parts, all on a rising scale, but then appends a lemma T5 (Pythagoreans) where we again find five parts, thus finishing with a descending scale beginning at the end of the other scale, viz. T4. The proximate parallel passage in G has G1 (Plato): three parts, G2 (Aristotle): five parts (we have to do the computation ourselves), G3 (Stoics): four parts, surprisingly, but since the αἰσθητικόν counts as five we get in fact eight parts as in the other sources. G4, no parts at all, looks out of place; it could have stood at the beginning (as in the parallel at Tert. de An. 14.1), or at the end, and seems to have been cited in its actual position as the odd view different from all the others. However this may be, G ends with G5 (Mnesarchus), a formally dissenting Stoic tenet allowing for only two parts because the speaking and the generative part have been

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included in the sensing part (now comprising seven sub-parts, not five as in G3). G5 follows upon G3, on Stoics, as T2 follows upon T1, on Pythagoreans/Platonists. We have placed the nine parts of Apollophanes (name-label of this hypothetical lemma according to the index of Photius for S, augmented with the doxa from Tertullian) at the end of the rising part of the scale. P3 (Democritus Epicurus) provides an extra reference to the location in the body of the two parts mentioned, which agrees with the position of the lemma near the end of the chapter. P4 (Democritus) comes last because of its special character: it is not about the parts of the single human soul, but about souls of things as partaking of a general soul-substance. P4 links up with 4.3.14, also a final lemma and also about individual souls in relation to an overarching Soul. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter The rationale of the chapter is quite straightforward as long as we look at the main tradition, viz. P and T. In the first part of the chapter the lemmata are listed one after the other according to the number of the parts of soul, so it is the category of quantity that determines their sequence. Number may even override other considerations: §3, the Aristotle lemma, comes before §4, the Stoics lemma, because for Aristotle we have the number five and for the Stoics the number eight. Yet it is clear that the Aristotle lemma echoes the well-known distinction between part of soul and psychic function (An. 2.3 414a29–32), and attributes functions or faculties, ‘activities’, rather than parts, to the Aristotelian concept of the soul, although Aristotle himself may use ‘part’ (μόριον) and ‘function’ (δύναμις) interchangeably. (A distinction explicitly acknowledged elsewhere, e.g. Tert. de An. 14.3, Them. in de An. 117.1–6.) The Aristotle lemma could also have been placed after the Apollophanes lemma (§5), the better to indicate that we are no longer dividing into parts but distinguishing according to function. In §6, too, ‘powers’ of soul, that is to say functions are mentioned, not parts, so from the point of view of function the Aristotle lemma could indeed have been placed immediately before the lemma with the namelabel Pythagoreans. Presumably the order in our reconstruction of the chapter (an order based on the principle of least intervention in the orderings of the sources) is as it is because §6, in mentioning the elements of the (human) body, preludes upon the body in §7 and the bodies in §8, and thus also, to some extent, upon the category of place. For in these two final lemmata of the chapter too the category of place comes into view. §7 (Democritus, Epicurus) refers to the location in the body of the two parts of soul. §8 (Democritus) is about the soul of things in general, and that there is some part (in a very literal sense) of soul everywhere. This makes for a rather smooth transition to the next chapter, 4.5,

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which is determined by the category of place. We may further note that two of the three final lemmata of ch. 4 are concerned with the category of substance as well. According to §6, name-label Pythagoreans, the five psychic functions that are listed are dependent on the five elements that constitute the body. According to §8, there exists a something that is both warm and sensing out there as well as in here. d

Further Comments General Points It is of some importance to note that the division of the soul into parts entails that into a rational and an irrational part, or parts (cf. chs. 4.5.15, 4.7.5), and/or into reason and perception. So it has cognitive import and helps to prepare the ground for the discussion of perception in chs. 4.8–12 and of thought/reason in chs. 4.7a and 4.11. Individual Points §1 On the doxai of this lemma see Vander Waerdt (1985b) and Runia (1986) 301– 306. Bipartition and tripartition of the soul could (and sometimes did) give rise to differences of opinion and open diaphonia, but here they are presented as complementary. Also note that the problematic issue of the location of the two or three parts or functions of the soul according to Plato (later reinterpreted by Galen, see Vegetti 2000, and by the tradition represented by Alcinous and Apuleius, see at section E(b) §3) is not mentioned, so the category of place plays no part in this lemma. We only read in the next chapter, 4.5.1, that according to Plato the location of regent part, the λογικόν, is the head. The necessary emendation of Tertullian de An. 14 nunc in duas a Platone, nunc in tres, ⟨nunc in quattuor a Zenone⟩ was made by Philippson (1937) 152 n. 6 (missed by Waszink). ‘The highest account (or definition)’ because these two parts are the ἀνωτάτω γένη (cf. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.110, SVF 1.211); the ‘proximate account (or definition)’ because they (sub)divide (διαιροῦσιν) the second genus into two species. For the idea see Diogenes Laertius V.P. 3.49, τοῦ δὴ ⟨δια⟩λόγου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ δύ᾽ εἰσὶν ἀνωτάτω χαρακτῆρες, ὅ τε ὑφηγητικὸς καὶ ὁ ζητητικός. διαιρεῖται δὲ ὁ ὑφηγητικὸς εἰς ἄλλους δύο χαρακτῆρας κτλ.; for the terminology cf. the division of Eudorus fr. 3 Mazzarelli at Simplicius in Phys. 181.10–13, κατὰ τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον φατέον τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς τὸ ἓν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων λέγειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον δύο ἀρχὰς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἶναι, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτῳ φύσιν. Also cf. Nem NH 15, p. 72.18–20, εἰς δύο τὰ πρῶτα καὶ γενικώτατα διαιρεῖ τὴν ψυχήν, … ὑποδιαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ ἄλογον, and Heraclitus All.Hom. 17.6–8, τὴν γὰρ ὅλην ψυχὴν διῄρηκεν εἰς γένη δύο, … τοῦ δ᾽ ἀλόγου μέρους ἰδικωτέραν ὑφίσταται διαίρεσιν, both cited at section E(b)§1.

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§3 Aristotle. The parallel in Nem explicitly states that Aristotle’s definition belongs with physics. A combination of five Platonic and Aristotelian parts/functions is at Plutarch De E 390E–F. Though the lemma, as noted at section D(c) above, reflects a preference for functions or faculties, ‘activities’, over parts, both Plutarch and Alexander of Aphrodisias may use the words μόρια and δυνάμεις interchangeably, see section E(b)§3. For Aristotle these ‘parts’ are different qua definition, not as to location, cf. de An. 2.2 413b13–16, πότερον δὲ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ μόριον ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ᾽ εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ, περὶ μὲν τινῶν τούτων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. Also see de An. 3.4 429a10–14. The issue is also discussed in ps.Plutarch Utrum pars an facultas animi affectibus subiecta sit. §§4–5 Stoics. The related passages in Nem and G are further variations on the theme of slight differences of view in the Stoic school. §6 Arist. Sens. 2 437a20–22 tells us that his predecessors were confronted with the vexing problem of connecting the five senses to the four elements: ἔνιοι μὲν ζητοῦσι κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων· οὐκ εὐποροῦντες δὲ πρὸς τέτταρα πέντ᾽ οὔσας συνάγειν, γλίχονται περὶ τῆς πέμπτης. The Pythagorean doctrine found in §6, neglected in the literature on the topic, presumably belongs with the context of Plutarch’s extensive numerological exposition on the number five at De E 387D–391E, though the parallel is not precise. The five elements are of course standard Aristotelian fare, but we should also think of the Pythagoreanism of the Ancient Academy, see Baltes (1999). Speusippus, for instance, fr. 4 Lang (F 122 Isnardi Parente, 28 Tarán), calls the five elements Pythagorean. Another backdrop is Plato’s unwritten doctrine as described by Aristotle de An. 1.2 404b22–24. In this Aristotelian passage φρόνησις is lacking, just as in the Neopythagorean parallel in the Placita itself, above ch. 1.3.7 [74–89] about the tetrad, which is also different in that there is no mention of the four (let alone five) elements. Burkert (1972) 69–70 with n. 10 correctly points out that what is at §6 is Platonism posing as Pythagoreanism, but pace Burkert we contend that, ultimately, A also depends on Aristotle de An. 1.2 404b22–24, via Platonizing and Pythagoreanizing intermediaries. The passages are proof of Neopythagorean colouring. An important parallel is found below at ch. 4.9.11, where Pythagoras(!) and Plato are said to hold that each sense (rather than, as here, each cognitive function, sensation only being one of five) is connected with one of five elements: ‘The aetherial is attached to sight, the pneumatic to hearing, the fire-like to smell, the wet to taste, and the earth-like to touch’. The only element identified in ch. 4.4.6, τὸ αἰθέριον, corresponds with the αἰθερῶδες of ch. 4.9.11, and the (probable, because not explicit) correspondence between aether/mind in the first passage with aether/sight in the second is telling: as a further backdrop we may assume an argument from the visible to the invisible,

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as in the case of Posidonius F 85 E.-K. (fr. 395a Theiler) at Sextus Empiricus M. 7.93. For the correspondence between aether and mind see also the doctrine attributed to Aristotle in the harmonizing Antiochean account of the history of philosophy at Cicero Varr. 1.26, quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. Baltes (1978) 35–36 lists thirteen passages where the senses are connected with the elements; as a fourteenth we should add A 4.4.6, and as a fifteenth the passage from ps.Hippocrates Letter to Ptolemy cited section E(b)§6. §7 The name-label Democritus has caused offence, because at ch. 4.5.1 Democritus is said to have placed the regent part, equivalent to the λογικόν, ‘in the whole head’, not in the chest as here. Cf. Diels DG ad loc., ‘Democritus male videtur a Plutarcho additus [sc. here in 4.4.7] cf. 5.1’, who thinks of a blunder by P rather than A. But the Placita tradition concerned with Democritus’ psychology is firmly Aristotelian. The substance of the soul assigned to him at A 4.3.5 derives from de An. 1.2 403b31–404a2 and 405a8–13, see section E(b)§7, where we learn that soul-atoms are breathed in (and out). Ibid. 404a26–32 we learn that according Democritus soul and mind are the same, which is echoed at A 4.7a.2 (4.5.12 Diels, again see section E(b)§7). The conclusion that for this kind of soul/mind the chest is the right location is obvious, even if it is based on Aristotle’s information only and is merely a conclusion drawn by one of A’s doxographical predecessors. Complementing our explanation so far could be the fact that, more doxographico, the tenet of Epicurus is also attributed to uratomist Democritus. Which, again from a purely doxographical point of view, need not mean that the attribution of the tenet that the regent part is in the head to Democritus at A 4.5.1 is entirely false. This alternative attribution may very well derive from a different current of the tradition, a more biographical or diadochical one, which attributed this view to Democritus because he was believed to be the teacher of Hippocrates, who is mentioned together with Democritus and Plato in T’s version of the lemma. See the preliminary discussion of the evidence at Mansfeld (1990a) 3088–3089 n. 120. It is a not uncommon practice in ancient historiography to preserve various bits of information even when these conflict with each other, for instance already at the basic level of whose son someone is or what city he came from. §8 See the parallels cited in section E(b); for the backdrop cf. above, ch. 4.3, Commentary (d)§14. The idea is attested for Parmenides and Empedocles in verbatim fragments. See also Mansfeld (1990a) 3191. e Other Evidence Parts or functions of what we may call ‘soul’ (noos/nous, thumos, menos, phrenes, ker, kradie) are of course already familiar from Homer and poetry in gen-

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eral, see Jahn (1987). In Plato the division of the soul into two or three parts is a topic in several dialogues. The theme is on Aristotle’s checklist of issues at the beginning of the De anima, 1.1 402b1, σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, and widely illustrated in the treatise. It is found in quite a few dialecticaldoxographical parallels, see material in Mansfeld (1990a) 3085–3089. The division of the soul is also an important topic in Hellenistic philosophy, and later in the treatises of Porphyry and Iamblichus partially preserved by Stobaeus. Cf. Dörrie (1959) 104: ‘Schon Aetios ließ in seiner Doxographie dem Abschnitt über das Wesen der Seele (4.3) ein Kapitel über ihre Teile (4.4) folgen. Wahrscheinlich folgte Porphyrios [sc. in the Symmikta Zetemata] dieser sinnvollen Einteilung des Stoffes.’ For curiosity’s sake one may mention the seven corporeal parts of the soul according to the (Hellenistic) pseudo-Hippocratic De hebdomadibus, cf. section E(b) General texts; see West (1971) 380–381, Mansfeld (1971) 209–211. E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: Cicero Luc. 124 si est (sc. animus, tenemus), trisne partes habeat ut Platoni placuit, rationis irae cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si simplex, utrum sit … (for the sequel see ch. 4.3, section E(a) General texts). Pollux Onom. 2.226 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[b] Podolak) μέρη δ᾽ αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) νοῦς ἐπιθυμία θυμός. Tertullian de An. 14.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 10 Podolak) dividitur autem in partes (for the details see below). ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.459.11–13 K. υξζʹ. ὁ ἐγκέφαλος τὴν ψυχικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ ταύτης τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὅπερ ἐστὶ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ νοῦς, ἡ δὲ καρδία τὸ θυμικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἧπαρ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. Galen PHP 6.2.3–6 ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ Πλάτων εἶναί (4) φησιν ἐκ τριῶν μερῶν συγκειμένην. εἰκάζει (Resp. 588c–d) δ᾽ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θηρίῳ ποικίλῳ τε καὶ πολυκεφάλῳ, τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς λέοντι, τὸ δὲ λογιστικὸν ἀνθρώπῳ. … (5) … ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτων καὶ τοῖς τόποις τοῦ σώματος κεχωρίσθαι νομίζων αὐτὰ καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις πάμπολυ διαλλάττειν εὐλόγως εἴδη τε καὶ μέρη προσαγορεύει· ὁ δ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος (F 146 E.-K., 399 Theiler) εἴδη μὲν ἢ μέρη ψυχῆς οὐκ ὀνομάζουσιν, δυνάμεις δ᾽ εἶναί φασι μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁρμωμένης· ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος (—) ὥσπερ εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν, οὕτως καὶ εἰς δύναμιν μίαν ἄγει καὶ τὸν (6) θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. Lactantius Op.D. 18.1–3 Perrin sequitur alia et ipsa inextricabilis quaestio, idem ne sit anima et animus an vero aliud sit illud quo vivimus, aliud autem quo sentimus et sapimus. non desunt argumenta in utramque partem. (2) qui unum esse dicunt, hanc rationem secuntur, quod neque vivi sine sensu possit nec sentiri sine vita, ideoque non posse esse diversum id quod separari non potest, sed quidquid est illud, et vivendi officium et sentiendi habere rationem. idcirco animum et animam indifferenter appellant duo Epicurei poetae (sc. Empedocles(?) and Lucretius). (3) qui autem dicunt esse diversa, sic argumentantur: ex eo posse intellegi aliud esse mentem, aliud animam, quia incolumi

liber 4 caput 4 anima mens possit extingui, quod accidere soleat insanis, item quod anima morte sopiatur, animus somno et quidem sic, ut non tantum quid faciat aut ubi sit ignoret, sed etiam rerum falsarum contemplatione fallatur. Porphyry de An. (251F Smith) at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a, p. 350.9–12 διαπεφώνηται δὲ … τοῖς παλαιοῖς … ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅλως τί τὸ μέρος καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις καὶ τίνι ταῦτα διενήνοχεν. Iamblichus de An. at Stob. 1.49.33, p. 367.33 (heading bracketed at fr. 10 Finamore–Dillon) ἐν ταὐτῷ [sc. the Περὶ ψυχῆς]· περὶ δυνάμεων ψυχῆς. de An. at Stob. 1.49.34, p. 369.5 (heading bracketed at fr. 12 Finamore– Dillon) ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ πλήθους δυνάμεων. de An. at Stob. 1.49.35, p. 369.18–19 (heading bracketed at fr. 13 Finamore–Dillon) ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ τῶν κατ᾽ οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν προστιθεμένων αὐτῇ δυνάμεων. Eusebius PE 15.59.7 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ θαλάσσης (i.e. ch. 3.16 at Eus. PE 15.59.1–6). ὅπως δὲ οἱ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου οὐρανίων τε πέρι καὶ αἰθερίων καὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων καταλήψεως φυσιολογεῖν ἐπαγγειλάμενοι οὐδὲ τὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ᾔδεσαν, μάθοις ἂν ἐξ ὧν καὶ περὶ τούτων ὧδέ πως διαπεφωνήκασιν· (chs. 4.4–5 follow on). ps.Galen HPh c. 24, DG p. 615.1–10 εἶναι δὲ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς Πλάτων μὲν τρία νενόμικε λογικὸν θυμικὸν ἐπιθυμητικόν (~§2). Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ προσήγαγε καὶ τὸ φυσικόν τε καὶ τὸ ζωτικόν (~§3). Στωικοὶ (—) δὲ τέσσαρα μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναί φασι λογικὸν αἰσθητικὸν φωνητικὸν σπερματικόν (~§6)· τινὲς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἁπλῆν καὶ ἀμερῆ τυγχάνειν εἰρήκασιν (~§0). οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἢ φρόνησιν ὑπάρχειν, ἣν καὶ νοῦν καὶ νόησιν προσειρήκασι (—). Μνήσαρχος δὲ τὴν Στωικῶν ὑπόληψιν ἐπικρίνων τὸ φωνητικὸν ⟨καὶ⟩ τὸ σπερματικὸν περιεῖλεν οἰηθεὶς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς δυνάμεως ταῦτα μετέχειν, μέρη δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾠήθη μόνον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ᾧ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις συγχωρήσειεν εὐλόγως (~§6). Chapter heading: Calcidius in Tim. c. 7, p. 61.1 Waszink De anima et partibus eius et locis. Suda s.v. Φ 862, p. 775.28–776.7 Adler φυσικὸς λόγος παρὰ φιλοσόφοις … ἔστι δὲ φυσικοῦ μὲν περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν διαλεχθῆναι. §0 Question of existence: Tertullian de An. 14.1 singularis alioquin et simplex et de suo tota est, non magis instructilis aliunde quam divisibilis ex se. de An. 14.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 10 Podolak) non longe hoc exemplum (sc. organum Archimedis) est a Stratone (fr. 108 Wehrli, 59 Sharples) et Aenesidemo (fr. B24C Polito) et Heraclito (p. 578 on fr. 115 Marcovich); nam et ipsi unitatem animae tuentur, quae in totum corpus et ubique ipsa, velut flatus in calamo per cavernas, ita per sensualia variis modis emicet, non tam concisa quam dispensata. §1 Pythagoras Plato: Chrysippus de An. at Gal. PHP 3.1.14 (SVF 2.885, verbatim) Πλάτων δὲ καὶ τριμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν φήσας εἶναι, τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν ἔλεγεν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς περὶ τὸν θώρακα, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν περὶ τὸν ὀμφαλόν. Cicero Luc. 124 trisne partes habeat ut Platoni placuit, rationis irae cupiditatis. Tusc. 1.20 Plato triplicem finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit, et duas partes parere voluit, iram et cupiditatem, quas locis disclusit. Tusc. 4.10 veterem illam equidem Pythagorae primum, dein Platonis discriptionem sequar, qui animum in duas partes dividunt: alteram rationis participem faciunt, alteram expertem. Divisiones Aris-

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toteleae at D.L. 3.90 = cod. Marc., p. 15.2–5 Mutschmann ἡ ψυχὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστι λογιστικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν. Tertullian de An. 16.1 Plato bifariam partitur animam, per rationale et irrationale. de An. 16.3 Plato soli Deo segregans rationale duo genera subdividit ex inrationali, indignativum, quod appellant θυμικόν, et concupiscentivum, quod vocant ἐπιθυμητικόν. de An. 14.2 (SVF 1.405) nunc in duas (sc. partes dividitur) a Platone, nunc in tres a Zenone [sic, cf. SVF 1.144; but we must accept Philippson’s emendation nunc in tres—sc. iterum a Platone—, ⟨nunc in quattuor⟩—sc. hegemonicum, aestheticum, vocem, generativum—a Zenone]. Calcidius in Tim. c. 229 est enim quaedam virtus eius (sc. of the soul according to Plato) in ratiocinando et item alia quae dicitur vigor iracundiae et item quae cupit, quae species sunt appetitus quae tamen rationi naturaliter pareant. erit igitur optima virtus eius quae ratiocinatur, ceterae secundae ac tertiae potestatis. Augustine C.D. 14.19.1–7 Dombart–Kalb illi philosophi, qui veritati proprius accesserunt, iram atque libidinem vitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, … ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente atque ratione. quam partem animi tertiam velut in arce quadam ad istas regendas perhibent conlocatam. Epiphanius Haer. 3.22, p. 507.5–6 Holl (on Plato) εἶναι δὲ αὐτῆς τρία μέρη, λογικὸν θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν. §3 Aristotle: Tertullian de An. 14.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 12 Podolak) nunc in quinque (sc. by Aristotle). de An. 14.3 (Soranus de An. fr. 12 Podolak) non tam partes animae habebuntur quam vires et efficaciae et operae, sicut de quibusdam et Aristoteles iudicavit. non enim membra sunt substantiae animalis, sed ingenia, ut motorium, ut actorium, ut cogitatorium, et si qua in hunc modum distinguunt, ut et ipsi illi quinque notissimi sensus, vuisus auditus gustus tactus odoratus. Iamblichus de An. fr. 12 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.34, p. 369.14–17 Wachsmuth Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ εἰς πέντε αὐτὰς (sc. τὰς δυνάμεις) διαιρεῖ, φύσιν (i.e., θρεπτικόν), αἴσθησιν, κίνησιν κατὰ τόπον, ὄρεξιν, διανόησιν. Nemesius NH c. 6, p. 56.5–21 ἔστι δὲ αἰσθητήρια μὲν πέντε· … ἔδει τοίνυν, … ἐπειδὴ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, τέσσαρας εἶναι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδήπερ ὁ ἀτμὸς καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀσμῶν γένος μεταξὺ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος …, τούτου χάριν πέμπτον αἰσθητήριον ἡ ὄσφρησις ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐξεύρηται, ἵνα μηδὲν τῶν δυναμένων εἰς γνῶσιν ἐλθεῖν διαφύγῃ τὴν αἴσθησιν. §§4–5 Stoics Apollophanes: Tertullian de An. 14.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 10 Podolak) (SVF 1.144, 405) ⟨nunc in quattuor—sc. hegemonicum aestheticum vocem generativum—a Zenone⟩, … in sex a Panaetio (T 128 Alesse), … etiam in octo penes Chrysippum, etiam in novem penes Apollophanem (SVF 1.405), sed et in duodecim apud quosdam Stoicorum, et in duas amplius apud Posidonium (F 147 E.-K., 396 Theiler), qui a duobus exorsus titulis, principale, quod aiunt hegemonicon, et a rationali, quod aiunt λογικόν, in decem septem inde prosecuit. §4 Stoics: Arius Didymus fr. 39.5 Diels at Eus. PE 15.20.5 (SVF 2.821) ἔχειν δὲ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικόν τι ἐν αὑτῇ, ὃ δὴ ζωὴ καὶ αἴσθησίς ἐστι καὶ ὁρμή. fr. 39 Diels at Eus. PE 15.20.3 (SVF 1.141, 1.519) αἰσθητικὴν δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο λέγει

liber 4 caput 4 (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν Ζήνων) ὅτι τυποῦσθαί τε δύναται τὸ μέρος τὸ ἡγούμενον αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ παραδέχεσθαι τὰς τυπώσεις. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.110 (SVF 2.828, in the ethics section) φασὶ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ὀκταμερῆ· μέρη γὰρ αὐτῆς τά τε πέντε αἰσθητήρια καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν μόριον καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ διάνοια, καὶ τὸ γεννητικόν. V.P. 7.157 (SVF 2.828, in the physics section) μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ὀκτώ, τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ λογιστικόν. Iamblichus de An. fr. 12 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.34, p. 369.6–9 Wachsmuth οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος (SVF 2.831) ὀκταμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν {δια}δοξάζουσι, περὶ ⟨ἣν⟩ τὰς δυνάμεις εἶναι πλείονας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ ἐνυπαρχουσῶν φαντασίας, συγκαταθέσεως, ὁρμῆς, λόγου. Clement of Alexandria Strom. 2.11.50.3–4 ἡ τὸν ἄνθρωπον συνέχουσα δεκάς, ἣν ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων τὰ προειρημένα τρία ἐδήλωσεν μέτρα. (4) εἴη δ᾽ ἂν σῶμά τε καὶ ψυχὴ αἵ τε πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ σπερματικὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητικὸν ἢ πνευματικὸν ἢ ὅπως καὶ βούλει καλεῖν. Capitula Lucretiana at DRN 3.94 de animi et animae natura sensuque. Calcidius in Tim. c. 220 haec igitur, inquit (sc. Chrysippus, SVF 2.879), octo in partes divisa invenitur; constat enim e principali et quinque sensibus, etiam vocali substantia et serendi procreandique potentia. porro partes animae velut ex capite fontis cordis sede manantes per universum corpus porriguntur omniaque membra usque quaque vitali spiritu complent reguntque et moderantur etc. sicut aranea in medietate cassis omnia filorum tenet pedibus exordia …, sic animum principale … sensuum exordia retinere etc. §7 Democritus Epicurus: ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.378.9–11 K. ριδʹ. ὑπηρετικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὑποτεταγμένον καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ, τεταγμένον δὲ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ λοιπῷ σώματι. §8 Democritus: Cicero Tusc. 1.82 fac enim sic animum interire ut corpus: num igitur aliquis dolor aut omnino post mortem sensus in corpore est? nemo id quidem dicit, etsi Democritum (68A160 DK) insimulat Epicurus (fr. 17* Usener), Democritii negant. Tertullian de An. 51.2 ad hoc (sc. ut velint credi etiam post mortem quasdam animas adhaerere corporibus) et Democritus (68A160 DK) crementa unguium et comarum in sepulturis aliquanti temporis denotat. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Top. 21.19–22 ὁμοίως καὶ εἰ λάβοι τις τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθανόμενα κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου οἴοιτο δεικνύναι ὅτι τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων αἰσθάνεται, ὡς ᾤετο Δημόκριτος (68A117 DK). Epiphanius Pan. 3.33, p. 508.11–13 Holl Στράτων{ὢν} ἐκ Λαμψάκου (fr. 48 Wehrli, 47 Sharples) τὴν θερμὴν οὐσίαν ἔλεγεν αἰτίαν πάντων ὑπάρχειν. … καὶ πᾶν ζῷον ἔλεγε νοῦ δεκτικὸν εἶναι.

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Sources and Other Parallel Texts

General texts: Aristotle de An. 1.1 402b1 σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής. EN 1.13 1102a23–32 θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ

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δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. EE 2.1 1219b32–33 διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐδὲν οὔτ᾽ εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτ᾽ εἰ ἀμερής, ἔχει μέντοι δυνάμεις διαφόρους. Corpus Hippocraticum Hebd. 10.114 West anima[m] itaque septenarium habet etc. Clement of Alexandria Paed. 3.1.1.2 τριγενοῦς οὖν ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ νοερόν, ὃ δὴ λογιστικὸν καλεῖται, ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ ἔνδον, ὁ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦδε ἄρχων ἀνθρώπου, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκεῖνον ἄλλος ἄγει, θεός· τὸ δὲ θυμικόν, θηριῶδες ὄν, πλησίον μανίας οἰκεῖ· πολύμορφον δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τρίτον, ὑπὲρ τὸν Πρωτέα τὸν θαλάττιον δαίμονα ποικίλον, ἄλλοτε ἄλλως μετασχηματιζόμενον, εἰς μοιχείας καὶ λαγνείας καὶ εἰς φθορὰς ἐξαρεσκευόμενον. Galen PHP 5.7.1–3 μεταβήσομαι δ᾽ ἤδη πρὸς τὴν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένην ἐπίδειξιν ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὑπὲρ τοῦ τρία τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι μόρια τὰ καθ᾽ ὁρμὴν ἡμᾶς κινοῦντα. γινώσκειν δὲ χρὴ κἀνταῦθα τὸ μὲν ὅτι μόρια διαφέροντ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀναγκαστικῶς ἀποδεικνύμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ μᾶλλον τρεῖς εἶναι δυνάμεις ἢ τρία μόρια δείκνυσιν ὁ λόγος· ὅτι μέν⟨τοι⟩ γε τρία τὰ σύμπαντ᾽ ἐστὶν εἴτε μόρια ψυχῆς εἴτε δυνάμεις ὑφ᾽ ὧν ὁ βίος ἡμῶν διοικεῖται, βιαστικῶς τε καὶ ἀναντιρρήτως ἀποδείκνυται. ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεχθησομένων ἡ μὲν τοῦ Χρυσίππου (—) διαβληθήσεται δόξα κατασκευασθήσεται δὲ τὸ κοινὸν Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Πλάτωνι καὶ Ποσειδωνίῳ (F 143 E.-K., 421a Theiler) δόγμα, τὸ καθ᾽ ἑτέραν μὲν ἡμᾶς δύναμιν λογίζεσθαι, καθ᾽ ἑτέραν δὲ θυμοῦσθαι, κατ᾽ ἄλλην δ᾽ ἐπιθυμεῖν. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 1.3–4 τίνες αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ πόσαι. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.234 φασὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς, τό τε συνέχον τὴν ὅλην σύγκρισιν καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Porphyry Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (253F Smith) at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a, p. 350.9–12 διαπεφώνηται … τοῖς παλαιοῖς … τὰ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅλως τί τὸ μέρος καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις καὶ τίνι ταῦτα διενήνοχεν. Servius auctus in Aen. 5.81, p. 602.4–12 Thilo nam Plato et Aristoteles et omnes periti dicunt in homine quattuor esse animas: unam vitalem, ut in vermibus, qui tantum moventur: aliam sensualem, ut in mutis animalibus, in quibus est sensus et timoris et gaudii: tertiam intellectualem, ut in hominibus, qui et cogitare et recte iudicare possunt: esse etiam quartam infra omnes quae φυσική vocatur ⟦naturalis,⟧ ut est in herbis et arboribus, quae etiam motu carentes, vitam tamen habent; nam et nascuntur et crescunt et pereunt. Proclus in Remp. 1.233.29–234.8 οἶδα δὲ ἔγωγε τὸν Πορφύριον (263F Smith) ἐν τοῖς Συμμίκτοις ἱστοροῦντα προβλήμασι Μηδίου πρὸς Λογγῖνον (fr. 21 Patillon– Brisson, 69 Männlein-Robert) συνουσίαν τινὰ περὶ τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς, ἣν οὐκ ἄξιον παραδραμεῖν. τοῦ γὰρ Μηδίου τὴν ψυχὴν ὀκταμερῆ ποιοῦντος καὶ διαιροῦντος εἰς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, εἰς τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις, εἰς τὸ σπερματικόν, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ φωνητικόν, τὸν Λογγῖνον φάναι· τί οὖν τὸ μίαν τὴν ψυχὴν ποιοῦν εἰς ὀκτὼ διῃρημένην; τὸν δὲ Μήδιον ἀντερωτῆσαι· τί δὲ τὸ μίαν ποιοῦν τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ Πλάτωνα τριμερῆ οὖσαν; Hermias in Phaedr. 3.215, p. 244.27–28 καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς δεῖ σκοπεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ μονοειδής ἐστιν ἢ τριμερὴς, καὶ εἰ τριμερὴς διελέσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς. Themistius in de An. 117.1–9 καίτοι γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀπορίαν ἔχει πολλήν, πότερον δεῖ μόρια λέγειν ψυχῆς μεγέθει καὶ τόπῳ διεστηκότα, ἢ δυνάμεις πλείους ἐν ταὐτῷ ὑποκειμένῳ διαφερούσας, ὥσπερ εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ μήλου τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ

liber 4 caput 4 τὸ εὐῶδες καὶ τὸ λευκόν. εἰ δὲ μόρια, πόσα ἄρα τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ εἰ μόνα τὰ τρία, ὡς τίθενταί τινες, ἢ καὶ πλείω. σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐκ εὐαρίθμητα φαίνεται τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τοιαύτας λαμβάνοι τις τὰς διαφοράς, αἷς τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν χωρίζουσι· φαίνεται γὰρ ἄλλα μόρια μείζω διάστασιν ἔχοντα τούτων. Servius in Aen. 8.564, p. 2.279.14–16 Thilo ‘cui tris animas’ per transitum ostendit illam Platonis et Aristotelis contentionem, qui dubitant, utrum quattuor, an tres animae sint in homine, φυσικὴ αἰσθητικὴ νοητική, remota κινητική. Suda s.v. Ψ 164, p. 4.852.19–20 Adler ψυχή· … ὅτι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ εἴδη τρία· λογιζόμενον, θυμούμενον, ἐπιθυμοῦν. Chapter heading: Philo of Alexandria Sacr. 112 τὸν περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς λόγον ἡγεμονικοῦ τε καὶ ὑπηκόου. Galen Libr.Propr. c. 16.3, 19.46.19–20 K. Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν καὶ δυνάμεων τρία (= Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰδῶν, Foet.Form. 4.701.16 K.). §1 Pythagoras Plato: Plato Resp. 4 439d–e ‘οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως’, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ‘ἀξιώσομεν αὐτὰ διττά τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον’. ‘οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰκότως’, ἔφη, ‘ἡγοίμεθ᾽ ἂν οὕτως’. ‘ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν’, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ‘δύο ἡμῖν ὡρίσθω εἴδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα· τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμούμεθα πότερον τρίτον, ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφυές’ (cited at Gal. PHP 6.2.11). Tim. 89e εἴπομεν πολλάκις, ὅτι τρία τριχῇ ψυχῆς ἐν ἡμῖν εἴδη κατῴκισται (cited at Gal. PHP 6.2.11). Aristotle Top. 5.4 133a30–31 οἷον ἐπεὶ ἀνθρώπου, ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, λέγεται ἴδιον τὸ τριμερῆ ψυχὴν ἔχειν. de An. 3.9 432a22–26 ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἅ τινες λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. ps.Aristotle MM 1.1.8 Πλάτων διείλετο τὴν ψυχὴν εἴς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄλογον. VV 1 1249a30–31 τριμεροῦς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβανομένης κατὰ Πλάτωνα. Philo of Alexandria Leg. 1.70 νοητέον οὖν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡμῶν τριμερὴς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἔχει μέρος τὸ μὲν λογικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν. ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἔχει μέρος τὸ μὲν λογικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν. καὶ συμβέβηκε τοῦ μὲν λογικοῦ χωρίον εἶναι καὶ ἐνδιαίτημα τὴν κεφαλήν, τοῦ δὲ θυμικοῦ τὰ στέρνα, τοῦ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τὸ ἦτρον. Leg. 3.115 τριμερῆ συμβέβηκε τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν μέρος μὲν ἓν λογιστικόν, δεύτερον δὲ θυμικόν, τρίτον δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν. Congr. 26 τῆς γὰρ ψυχῆς ἡμῶν διμεροῦς ὑπαρχούσης καὶ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ἐχούσης. Anon. Lond. Iatr. col. xvi.33–44 Manetti [λ]έγει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς τρι|[μ]ερής ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ μέν τι αὐτῆς ἐστιν λογικόν, | τὸ δὲ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητι|κόν. καὶ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἀπολείπει περὶ | τοὺς κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν τόπους· εὐφυεῖς γὰρ | ο[ὕ]τοι πρὸς παραδοχὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. | [τὸ] δὲ θυμικὸν ἔταξεν περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, | [οὐ] πόρρω μὲν τεταγμένον τοῦ λογικοῦ, | [ὑπ]οτεταγμένον δὲ τῶι λογικῶι, | [ἵν]α δὴ καὶ ὑπήκο⟨ον⟩ αὐτῶι γίνηται τὸ μέντοι | [γε]̣ ἐπιθυμ⟨ητ⟩ικὸν ἔταξεν μεταξὺ δια|[φρά]γματος καὶ ὀμφαλοῦ. Galen PHP 5.4.3 τὸ μὲν δὴ τὰς δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς τρεῖς εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, αἷς ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ θυμούμεθα καὶ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ Ποσειδώνιος (F 142 E.-K, 414 Theiler) ὁμολογεῖ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης· τὸ δὲ καὶ τοῖς τόποις αὐτὰς ἀλλή-

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λων κεχωρίσθαι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν μὴ μόνον ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῇ δυνάμεις πολλάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύνθετον ἐκ μορίων ὑπάρχειν ἑτερογενῶν τε καὶ διαφερόντων ταῖς οὐσίαις Ἱπποκράτους ἐστὶ καὶ Πλάτωνος δόγμα. in Tim. fr. 2.64–67 Schröder ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν τὸ λογιστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐπιθυμητικῷ φησιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐκείνου, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τῷ θυμοειδεῖ πολλάκις διαμάχεσθαι, καὶ μέντοι καὶ σύμμαχον ἔχειν ποτὲ τὸ θυμοειδὲς κατὰ τοῦ ἐπιθυμ⟨ητ⟩ικοῦ, ⟨ἐν ἄλλῳ μέρει τοῦ⟩ σώματος ᾠκισμένον. QAM c. 3, p. 13.9–12 Bazou. Maximus of Tyre Diss. 20.4 καὶ μὴν τῆς ψυχῆς δίχα νενεμημένης, ὡς ὁ Πλάτωνός φησιν λόγος, ἧς τῷ μὲν τῶν μερῶν ὄνομα λόγος, τῷ δὲ πάθος. Diss. 27.5 λέξω δὲ οὐκ ἐμαυτοῦ λόγον, ἀλλὰ ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας ὁρμηθέντα καὶ ἐπιχώριον τῆς Πλάτωνος μούσης τε καὶ ἑστίας· ἀπεδέξατο δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτοῦ· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πορρωτέρω ἐπανάγω· ὑποπτεύω γὰρ ἐξ Ἰταλίας Ἀθήναζε ἐλθεῖν τὸν λόγον, Πυθαγορείων τινῶν ἐμπορίαν ταύτην καλὴν στειλαμένων εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν Ἑλλάδα. ὁ δ᾽ οὖν λόγος ταύτῃ ἔχει. ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ νενέμηται δίχα κατὰ πρώτην νομήν, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἐστιν λόγος, τὸ δὲ πάθος. Heraclitus All.Hom. 17.6–8 (Plato as imitator of Homer) τὴν γὰρ ὅλην ψυχὴν διῄρηκεν εἰς γένη δύο, τό τε λογιστικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ προσαγορευόμενον. τοῦ δ᾽ ἀλόγου μέρους ἰδικωτέραν ὑφίσταται διαίρεσιν, εἰς δύο μερίζων, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμητικὸν ὀνομάζει, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον θυμοειδές, καὶ καθάπερ δὲ οἴκους τινὰς ἑκάστῳ μερίζει καὶ διατριβὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι διένειμεν· τὸ μὲν οὖν λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολίν τινα τὴν ἀνωτάτω τῆς κεφαλῆς μοῖραν εἰληχέναι νομίζει, πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐν κύκλῳ δορυφορούμενον, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀλόγου μέρους ὁ μὲν θυμὸς οἰκεῖ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρέξεις ἐν ἥπατι. Apuleius Plat. 1.207 tres partes animae ducat esse, rationabilem, id est mentis optumam portionem, hanc ait capitis arcem tenere; irascentiam vero procul a ratione ad domicilium cordis deductam esse obsequique eam in loco respondere sapientiae; cupidinem atque adpetitus, postremam mentis portionem, infernas abdominis sedes tenere. Plat. 1.216 tripertitam animam idem dicit: primam eius rationabilem esse partem, aliam excandescentiam vel irritabilitatem, tertiam appetitus; eandem cupiditatem possumus nuncupare. sed tunc animanti sanitatem adesse, vires, pulchritudinem, cum ratio totam regit parentesque ei inferiores duae partes concordantesque inter se iracundia et voluptas nihil appetunt, nihil commovent, quod inutile esse duxerit ratio. Apuleius Plat. lib. 3(?) sive Anonymus Compendiosa expositio 2.13–16 Stover hic animam in partes dividit et demonstrat quemadmodum una sit rationalis, altera θυμοειδής, id est animositas, tertia desiderii quam ἐπιθυμητικόν vocat. Ptolemy Harm. 3.5 ἔστι τοίνυν τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη τρία, νοερόν, αἰσθητικόν, ἑκτικόν, τὰ δὲ πρῶτα τῶν ὁμοφώνων καὶ συμφώνων εἴδη τρία, τό τε διὰ πασῶν ὁμόφωνον καὶ σύμφωνα τό τε διὰ πέντε καὶ διὰ τεσσάρων, ὥστε ἐφαρμόζεσθαι τὸ μὲν διὰ πασῶν τῷ νοερῷ— πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἀδιάφορον—τὸ δὲ διὰ πέντε τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, τὸ δὲ διὰ τεσσάρων τῷ ἑκτικῷ. Iudic. c. 14, 21.2–7 τὸ μὲν ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ ἀεροειδέστερον περὶ τὴν γαστέρα καὶ τὸ ἦτρόν πως ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν καὶ πυροειδέστερον περὶ τὰ σπλάγχνα καὶ τὴν καρδίαν· τὸ δὲ διανοητικὸν ἀμέριστον ὂν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καθιδρῦσθαι μὲν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 3.67 (on Plato) εἶναι (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) … τριμερῆ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς

liber 4 caput 4 λογιστικὸν μέρος περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καθιδρῦσθαι, τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν περὶ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν καὶ τὸ ἧπαρ συνίστασθαι. Porphyry Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων 253F Smith at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a, p. 350.12–13 παρὰ δὲ Πλατώνι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς τριμερὴς ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεται εἶναι. Iamblichus de An. fr. 11 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.33, pp. 368.23–369.2 Wachsmuth κατὰ δὲ Πλάτωνα ἄλλως μὲν λέγεται ἡ ψυχὴ τριμερής, ὡς ἐν ἑτέραις οὐσίαις τριπλῇ ζωῆς παραλλάττουσα, ἄλλως δὲ πολυδύναμος, οὐκέτι κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ζωῆς διαφέρουσα, ἐν ταὐτῷ δὲ πολλαῖς ἰδιότησι διακρινομένη. de An. fr. 12 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.34, p. 369.9–11 Wachsmuth οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρχύτας καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν ψυχὴν τριμερῆ ἀποφαίνονται, διαιροῦντες εἰς λογισμὸν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. Gregory of Nyssa Ep. ad Letoium MPG 45, p. 224.12–14 τρία ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν θεωρούμενα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην διαίρεσιν· τό τε λογικὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν, καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές. Macrobius in Somn. 1.6.42 ternarius (sc. numerus) vero adsignat animam tribus suis partibus absolutam, quarum prima est ratio quam λογιστικόν appellant, secunda animositas quam θυμικόν vocant, tertia cupiditas quae ἐπιθυμητικόν nuncupatur. Proclus in Remp. 1.234.3–5 (Porphyry 263F Smith) τὸν δὲ Μήδιον ἀντερωτῆσαι· τί δὲ τὸ μίαν ποιοῦν τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ Πλάτωνα τριμερῆ οὖσαν; τοῦτο δὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς ἀξιώσωμεν λόγου τινός. differently Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) at D.L. 8.30 τὴν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν διῃρῆσθαι τριχῆ, εἴς τε νοῦν καὶ φρένας καὶ θυμόν. νοῦν μὲν οὖν καὶ θυμὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, φρένας δὲ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ. εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ καρδίας μέχρις ἐγκεφάλου· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μέρος αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν θυμόν, φρένας δὲ καὶ νοῦν τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ. §3 Aristotle: Aristotle de An. 2.2 413b11–13 ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ τούτοις ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει. de An. 2.2 413b27–28 τά δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς. de An. 2.3 414a31–32 δυνάμεις δ᾽ εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. Iuv. 1 467b10–18 ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐν ἑτέροις διώρισται, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι σῶμα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ὅτι γ᾽ ἔν τινι τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχει μορίῳ φανερόν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τινὶ τῶν ἐχόντων δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ μόρια ἢ δυνάμεις, ὁποτέρως ποτὲ δεῖ καλεῖν, ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν. Philo of Alexandria Mos. 2.81 ἡ πεντὰς αἰσθήσεων ἀριθμός ἐστιν. Plant. 133 αἰσθήσεως πεντὰς αριθμὸς οἰκεῖος (also QE 2.97). Nicolaus of Damascus at Porph. at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a (Porphyry 253F Smith), pp. 353.12–354.4 Νικόλαος δὲ οὐκ ἠξίου τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ποιόν. … ἀκούει τοίνυν Νικόλαος τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς δυνάμεις τοῦ ἔχοντος· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἔμψυχον τῷ ψυχὴν ἔχειν πολλὰ δύναται, οἷον ζῆν, αἰσθάνεσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, νοεῖν, ὀρέγεσθαι, ὧν πάντων αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ ἡ ψυχή. ταύτας οὖν τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀφ᾽ ὧν λέγεται τὸ ἔμψυχον ταῦτα δρᾶν ἢ πάσχειν, μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεται ὡς εἴρηται. Plutarch Def.Or. 429E ἔνειμε γὰρ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰσθήσεις πέντε καὶ μέρη ψυχῆς, φυτικὸν αἰσθητικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμοειδὲς λογιστικόν. Galen QAM c. 4, p. 27.1–3 Bazou εἰ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ πολλὰς ἔχει δυνάμεις οὐσία τις οὖσα καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ὀρθῶς Ἀριστοτέλει λέλεκται. Maximus of Tyre Diss. 11.8 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν λογικῇ ψυχῇ (sc. κρεῖττον δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ἐστὶν τοῦ

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ἀλόγου), ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἡ πᾶσα ὥσπερ ἄθροισμά τι, θρεπτικόν, αὐξητικόν, κινητικόν, παθητικόν, νοητικόν. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An.Mant. 105.3 δύναμεις. de An.Mant. 105.18 μόρια. differently Doxographia Ethica C (attributed to AD) at Stob. Nicolaus of Damascus at Porph. at Stob. Ecl. 2.7.13, p. 117.11– 12 τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν εἶναι λογικόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλογον. at Stob. 2.7.20, p. 137.17–18 διμερῆ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν θεωρίαν (sc. ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς) ὑπέθεντο τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν λόγον ἔχουσαν, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλογον. Alcinous Did. c. 17, p. 173.7–15 H. τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ λόγον περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καθίδρυσαν, … ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν τῷ τόπῳ καὶ τὸ κρῖνόν τε καὶ τὸ θεωροῦν· τὸ δὲ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς κατωτέρω ἐποίησαν, τὸ μὲν θυμικὸν περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν περὶ τὸ ἦτρον καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν τόπους. Did. c. 23, p. 176.12–22 H. τὸ θεῖον αὐτῆς καὶ ἀθάνατον κατῴκισαν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τῆς οἷον ἀκροπόλεως … οἴκησίν τε ἀπονείμαντες αὐτῷ τὴν κεφαλήν, … τὸ μὲν γὰρ θυμικὸν ἔταξαν ἐν καρδίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τόπῳ τοῦ τε πρὸς τὸν ὀμφαλὸν ὅρου καὶ τῶν φρενῶν. Did. c. 24, p. 176.35–41 H. ὅτι δὲ τριμερής ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ κατὰ λόγον τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς τόποις ἰδίοις διανενέμηται, μάθοιμεν ἂν ἐντεῦθεν. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τὰ φύσει χωριζόμενα ἕτερα ὑπάρχει·φύσει δὲ χωρίζεται τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ λογιστικόν, εἴ γε τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα, προσέτι τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ περὶ τὰ ζῷα ὄντος. Did. c. 29, p. 182.19–27 H. Apuleius Plat. 13 at enim cum tres partes animae ducat esse, rationabilem, id est mentis optumam portionem, hanc ait capitis arcem tenere, irascentiam vero procul a ratione ad domicilium cordis deductam esse obsequique eam in loco respondere sapientiae, cupidinem atque appetitus, postremam mentis portionem, infernas abdominis sedes tenere. Anonymus Londiniensis Iatr. col. xvi.33–36 Manetti [λ]έγει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τρι|[μ]ερής ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ μέν τι αὐτῆς ἐστι λογικόν, | τὸ δὲ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητι|[κ]όν κτλ. Porphyry Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων 253F Smith at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a, p. 351.11–19 τὰ μὲν μέρη παρῃτεῖτο Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰς δὲ δυνάμεις οὐκέτι. τὸ γὰρ ἑτερομερὲς εὐθὺς ὑποκειμένου παραλλαγὴν εἰσάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἑτεροδύναμον καὶ περὶ ἓν ὑποκείμενον ἐνίστασθαι. Λογγῖνος (fr. 23 Patillon–Brisson, 71 Männlein–Robert) δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῷον πολυμερὲς εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ἀμερές, πολυδύναμον δέ, τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν τοῖς σώμασι πολυμερῆ φάσκων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεσθαι, καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν οὖσαν ἀμερῆ. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πολυμερής, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μονοδύναμος· ἐνδέχεσθαι γὰρ ἓν ἀμερὲς δυνάμεις πλείους ἔχειν. ps.Plutarch Utr.Pars 1 περὶ τῆς παθητικῆς καὶ ἀλόγου ζωῆς, πότερα μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἢ δύναμις, ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐοίκασι γὰρ τῶν ἀρχαίων οἱ μὲν οὕτως, οἱ δ᾽ ἐκείνως ἀποφηνάμενοι περὶ αὐτῆς. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.7 habet ergo (sc. anima) et purissimam ex mente, de qua est nata, rationem quod λογικόν vocatur et ex sua natura accipit praebendi sensus praebendique incrementi seminarium, quorum unum αἰσθητικόν alterum φυτικόν nuncupatur. sed ex his primum id est λογικόν quod innatum sibi ex mente sumpsit, sicut vere divinum est, ita solis divinis aptum; reliqua duo, αἰσθητικόν et φυτικόν, ut a divinis recedunt, ita convenientia sunt caducis. §4 Stoics: Chrysippus de An. at Gal. PHP 3.1.9–11 (verbatim) ὁ Χρύσιππος … οὑτωσὶ λέγει (SVF 2.885)· ‘ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ

liber 4 caput 4 τῷ σώματι διῆκον ἔστ᾽ ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς εὔπνοια παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι. ταύτης οὖν τῶν μερῶν ἑκάστῳ διατεταγμένων μορίῳ τὸ διῆκον αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὦτα ἀκοήν, τὸ δ᾽ εἰς ῥῖνας ὄσφρησιν, τὸ δ᾽ εἰς γλῶτταν γεῦσιν, τὸ δ᾽ εἰς ὅλην τὴν σάρκα ἁφὴν καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις ἕτερόν τιν᾽ ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον, σπερματικόν, εἰς ὃ δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι, μέρος ὂν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.’ Philo of Alexandria Opif. 117 αὐτίκα τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς τὸ δίχα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέρος ἑπταχῆ σχίζεται, εἰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὸ φωνητήριον ὄργανον καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τὸ γόνιμον· ἃ δὴ πάντα καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς θαύμασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ νευροσπαστούμενα τοτὲ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τοτὲ δὲ κινεῖται τὰς ἁρμοττούσας σχέσεις καὶ κινήσεις ἕκαστον. Her. 232 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄλογον ψυχῆς μέρος ἑξαχῆ διελὼν ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑπτὰ μοίρας εἰργάζετο, ὅρασιν, ἀκοήν, γεῦσιν, ὄσφρησιν, ἁφήν, φωνήν, γόνιμον, τὸ δὲ λογικόν, ὃ δὴ νοῦς ὠνομάσθη, ἄσχιστον εἴασε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ὁμοιότητα οὐρανοῦ. Mut. 110–111 ‘τῷ ἱερεῖ’, φησὶν οὖν (Exod 2:16), τῆς κρίσεως καὶ τῆς δίκης ‘εἰσὶν ἑπτὰ θυγατέρες’, συμβολικῶς αἱ τοῦ ἀλόγου δυνάμεις, γονή τε καὶ φωνὴ καὶ πέντε αἰσθήσεις, ποιμαίνουσαι τὰ πρόβατα τοῦ πατρός. διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἑπτὰ δυνάμεων τούτων αἱ προβάσεις καὶ παραυξήσεις τοῦ πατρὸς νοῦ ταῖς ἐγγινομέναις καταλήψεσι συνίστανται. Leg. 1.111–112 ψυχῆς γε μὴν τὸ ἄλογον ἑπταμερές, αἰσθήσεις πέντε καὶ φωνητήριον ὄργανον καὶ τὸ διῆκον ἄχρι παραστατῶν, ὃ δὴ γόνιμόν ἐστι. Fug. 182 (SVF 2.861) τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἡμῶν ἐοικὸς πηγῇ δυνάμεις πολλὰς οἷα διὰ γῆς φλεβῶν ἀνομβροῦν, τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας ἄχρι τῶν αἰσθήσεων {ὀργάνων}, ὀφθαλμῶν, ὤτων, ῥινῶν, τῶν ἄλλων, ἀποστέλλει· αἱ δ᾽ εἰσὶ παντὸς ζῴου περὶ κεφαλὴν καὶ πρόσωπον. ποτίζεται οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικοῦ τὸ σώματος ἡγεμονικὸν πρόσωπον, τὸ μὲν ὁρατικὸν πνεῦμα τείνοντος εἰς ὄμματα, τὸ δὲ ἀκουστικὸν εἰς οὖς, εἰς δὲ μυκτῆρας τὸ ὀσφρήσεως, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ γεύσεως εἰς στόμα καὶ τὸ ἁφῆς εἰς σύμπασαν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν. See also 30, Abr. 29–30. Seneca Ep. 92.1 in animo esse partes ministras, per quas movemur alimurque, propter ipsum principale nobis datas. Ep. 121.10 ‘constitutio’ inquit ‘est, ut vos dicitis, principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus’. Galen PHP 5.3.7 (SVF 2.841) ⟨μόρια δὲ⟩ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς αὐτὸς σὺ δι᾽ ἑτέρων ἐκδιδάσκεις, τό τε ἀκουστικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ὀπτικὸν ἔτι τε πρὸς τούτοις φωνητικόν τε καὶ γεννητικόν, καὶ πρὸ πάντων αὐτῶν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸν λόγον ἔφης συνίστασθαι. Sextus Empiricus M. 9.102 πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπό τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται, ὥστε πᾶσαν δύναμιν τὴν περὶ τὸ μέρος οὖσαν καὶ περὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγεμονικοῦ διαδίδοσθαι. Proclus in Remp. 1.234.3–7 (Porphyry 263F Smith) τοῦ γὰρ Μηδίου τὴν ψυχὴν ὀκταμερῆ ποιοῦντος καὶ διαιροῦντος εἰς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, εἰς τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις, εἰς τὸ σπερματικόν, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ φωνητικόν. τὸν Λογγῖνον (fr. 21 Patillon–Brisson, 69 Männlein–Robert) φάναι· τί οὖν τὸ μίαν τὴν ψυχὴν ποιοῦν εἰς ὀκτὼ διῃρημένην; Plotinus Enn. 6.1[42].12– 14 τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶς (sc. τίνι ἂν διέλοι); ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, θυμοειδοῦς, λογιστικοῦ. ἢ ταῖς διαφοραῖςτῶν ἐνεργειῶν, αἳ γίνονται κατ᾽ αὐτάς, ὅτι γεννητικαὶ αὗται τούτων. Porphyry Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων 253F Smith at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a, p. 350.13–17 αὐτίκα οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (SVF 2.830) ὀκταμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν θέντες

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καὶ πέντε μὲν μέρη τὰ αἰσθητικὰ λαβόντες, ἕκτον δὲ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ ἕβδομον τὸ σπερματικόν, {καὶ} λοιπὸν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κτλ. Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (251F Smith) at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.24, p. 348.1–9 Ἀρίστων (SVF 1.377) ἀντιληπτικὴν δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς θέμενος ταύτην διαιρεῖ εἰς δύο, τὸ μέν τι μέρος φάσκων μετά τινος τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ κινεῖσθαι, ὃ αἰσθητικὸν καλεῖ, ἀρχὴν καὶ πηγὴν ὑπάρχον τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεων, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ καὶ χωρὶς ὀργάνων, ὃ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀλόγων οὐκ ὠνομάσθαι …, ἐν δὲ τοῖς λογικοῖς, ἐν οἷς δὴ μάλιστα ⟨ἢ⟩ μόνοις φαίνεται, νοῦν προσαγορεύεσθαι. Scholia vetera in Iliadem 12.386d Erbse δοκεῖ αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ Ὁμήρῳ) καὶ τοῖς ὀστοῖς τὸ ψυχικὸν παρεσπάρθαι, ὡς καὶ Ποσειδωνίῳ (F 28a E.-K., 389a Theiler) ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ ψυχῆς. see also SVF 2.823–833. §6 Pythagoreans: Aristotle de Αn. 1.2 404b21–24 (Test.Plat. 25A Gaiser, A22 Isnardi Parente) ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο (μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἕν), τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ. Plutarch De E 390B εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἳ καὶ τὰς τῶν αἰσθήσεων δυνάμεις ἰσαρίθμους οὔσας τοῖς πρώτοις ἐκείνοις συνοικειοῦσι, τὴν μὲν ἁφὴν ὁρῶντες ἀντίτυπον οὖσαν καὶ γεώδη, τὴν δὲ γεῦσιν ὑγρότητι τῶν γευστῶν τὰς ποιότητας προσιεμένην. ἀὴρ δὲ πληγεὶς ἐν ἀκοῇ γίγνεται φωνὴ καὶ ψόφος. δυεῖν δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὀσμὴ μέν, ἣν ἡ ὄσφρησις εἴληχεν, ἀναθυμίασις οὖσα καὶ γεννωμένη θερμότητι πυρῶδές ἐστιν, αἰθέρι δὲ καὶ φωτὶ διὰ συγγένειαν διαλαμπούσης τῆς ὄψεως γίγνεται κρᾶσις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὁμοιοπαθὴς καὶ σύμπηξις. also De E 390F. Def.Or. 429E (on the parts of soul). Alexander of Aphrodisias in Sens. 14.18–23 λέγει δέ τινας τῶν περὶ αἰσθήσεων εἰρηκότων ζητεῖν ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν σωματικῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖν, καὶ {πέντε τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐσῶν} οὐκ εὐποροῦντας συνάγειν εἰς τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα πέντε οὔσας αὐτὰς ζητεῖν περὶ τῆς πέμπτης, ἐκ τίνος αὐτὴν χρὴ λέγειν εἶναι σώματος. λέγοιτο δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ δόξης, ἥτις ἀναφέρεται μὲν εἰς τοὺς Πυθαγορείους, εἴρηται δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ (Tim. 66d–e). Sextus Empiricus M. 7.93 καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος (F 85 E.-K., 395a Theiler) τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς κτλ. Porphyry Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων 253F Smith at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a, p. 351.11–12 τὰ μὲν μέρη παρῃτεῖτο Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰς δὲ δυνάμεις οὐκέτι. ps.Hippocrates Ep.Ptol., p. 287.1–7 Ermerins αἰσθητήρια δέ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πέντε· ὅρασις, ὄσφρησις, ἀκοὴ, γεῦσις καὶ ἁφή· ἡ μὲν ὅρασις ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, ἡ δὲ ὄσφρησις ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς, ἡ δὲ γεῦσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ἡ δὲ ἁφὴ ἐκ τῆς γῆς. δυνάμεις εἰσὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε· νοῦς, διάνοια, δόξα, φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις. Ammonius in Isag. 11.16–17 πάλιν δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς διτταὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι, αἱ μὲν γνωστικαὶ οἷον νοῦς διάνοια δόξα φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις κτλ. ps.Elias/David in Isag. 18.11 Westerink γνωστικαὶ μὲν δυνάμεις εἰσὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ ἀνωτέρω λεχθεῖσαι εʹ, νοῦς διάνοια δόξα φαντασία καὶ ἡ καθόλου αἴσθησις. Symeon Seth CRN 4.83 (~ §6) αἰσθήσεων πέντε οὐσῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, καθάπερ καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἤτοι νοῦ, διανοίας, δόξης, φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως κτλ. §7 Democritus Epicurus: Democritus at Gal. Med.Exp. 15.7 Walzer Δημόκριτος (68B125 DK) … ἐποίησε τὰς αἰσθήσεις λεγούσας πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως· ‘τάλαινα φρήν, παρ᾽ ἡμέων λαβοῦσα τὰς πίστεις ἡμέας καταβάλλεις; πτῶμά τοι τὸ

liber 4 caput 4 κατάβλημα’. Epicurus Ep.Hdt. at D.L. 10.63 ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς παρ᾽ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον, προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι καὶ πῇ μὲν τούτῳ προσεμφερές, πῇ δὲ τούτῳ. ἔστι δέ τὸ μέρος πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν εἰληφὸς τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, συμπαθὲς διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἀθροίσματι· … καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν δεῖ κατέχειν. Scholia in Epicurum Ep.Hdt. at D.L. 10.66 (fr. 311 Usener) λέγει ἐν ἄλλοις … τὸ μέν τι ἄλογον αὐτῆς, ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρθαι σώματι· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι, ὡς δῆλον ἔκ τε τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς. Lucretius DRN 3.136–144 nunc animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri / inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se, / sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto / consilium, quod nos animum mentemque vocamus. / idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret. / hic exultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum / laetitiae mulcent: hic ergo mens animusquest. / cetera pars animae per totum dissita corpus / paret et ad numen mentis momenque movetur. DRN 3.370– 373 illud in his rebus nequaquam sumere possis, / Democriti (68A108 DK) quod sancta viri sententia ponit, / corporis atque animi primordia singula primis / adposita alternis variare, ac nectere membra. Varro at Lact. Op.D. 17.5 Varro ita definit: anima est aër … temperatus in corde, diffusus in corpus. Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 37 col. I.1–7 Smith … μὴ ζῆν αἰτίαν ἡ ψυχὴ πα|ρέχει τῇ φύσει. καὶ γὰρ εἰ | μὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἴσον τῶν | ἀτόμων ἔχει τῷ σώμα|τι, μετά τε τοῦ λογικοῦ | τιθεμένη μέρους αὐτῆς | καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου κτλ. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.349 οἱ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι (sc. τὴν διάνοιαν περιέχεσθαι), καθάπερ τινὲς κατὰ Δημόκριτον (68A107 DK). Servius auctus in Aen. 10.487, p. 2.442.1–6 Thilo ‘[…] animusque secuntur’: ⟦‘animus’⟧ pro anima: nam animus consilii est, anima vitae. ⟦quidam secundum Epicureos (—) animam per totum corpus divisam esse volunt, et exinde posse fieri ut quis amputata parte corporis vivat: animum vero esse τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν animae, sine quo vivere non possumus: ergo secundum sectam sibi notam poetam locutum⟧. §8 Democritus: Parmenides 22B16.2–4 DK τὸ γὰρ αὐτό / ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν / καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί. ps.Epicharmus 23B4.1–2 DK, fr. 278.1–2 Kassel–Austin at D.L. 3.16 Εὔμαιε, τὸ σοφόν ἐστιν οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον, / ἀλλ᾽ ὅσσα περ ζῇ, πάντα καὶ γνώμαν ἔχει. Theophrastus Sens. 4 (Parmenides 28A46 DK) … φησι τὸν νεκρὸν φωτὸς μὲν καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ φωνῆς οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἔκλειψιν τοῦ πυρός, ψυχροῦ δὲ καὶ σιωπῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων αἰσθάνεσθαι. καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν. Sextus Empiricus M. 8.286 ὁ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔτι παραδοξότερον πάντα ἠξίου λογικὰ τυγχάνειν, καὶ οὐ ζῷα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φυτά, ῥητῶς γράφων (31B110.10 DK)· ‘πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν’. Aristotle GA 3.11 762a18–21 (on spontaneous generation) γίνεται δ᾽ ἐν γῇ καὶ ἐν ὑγρῷ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διὰ τὸ ἐν γῇ μὲν ὕδωρ ὑπάρχειν ἐν δ᾽ ὕδατι πνεῦμα, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ παντὶ θερμότητα ψυχικήν, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ πάντα ψυχῆς εἶναι πλήρη (cf. ibid. 2.3 736b29–737a7 πάσης μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι καὶ θειοτέρου τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων κτλ.). Galen Propr.Plac. 7, p. 179.24–26 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami ἢ διὰ παντὸς μορίου τῶν στερεῶν σωματῶν τεταμένον, ὡς μηδὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι ψυχῆς ἄμοιρον. Propr.Plac. 13,

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p. 186.19–31 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami (= Sub.Nat.Fac. 4.758.2–16) ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἐν Τιμαίῳ … εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον ἐκτετάσθαι λέγῃ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ … (but) οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν λίθων καὶ τῶν ὀστράκων καὶ τῆς ψάμμου καὶ τῶν κατακαιομένων ἢ σηπομένων νεκρῶν ζώων τὴν τοῦ κόσμου διήκειν ψυχήν. Hippolytus (Archelaus, 60A4 DK) Ref. 1.9.6 νοῦν δὲ λέγει πᾶσιν ἐμφύεσθαι ζῴοις ὁμοίως.

Liber 4 Caput 5 PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 899A–B; pp. 391a1–392a2 Diels—PE: Eusebius PE 15.61.1–10, p. 421.11–24 Mras—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 192–195 Daiber T: Theodoretus CAG 5.22, p. 128.8–19 Raeder

Titulus εʹ. Τί τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ ἐν τίνι ἐστίν (P,T) §1 Πλάτων Δημόκριτος ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ κεφαλῇ. (P1,T1b) §2 Ἱπποκράτης ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ. (T1a) §3 Στράτων ἐν μεσοφρύῳ. (P2,T2) §4 Ἐρασίστρατος δὲ ὁ ἰατρὸς περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου μήνιγγα, ἣν ἐπικρανίδα λέγει. (P3,T3) §5 Ἡρόφιλος ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου κοιλίᾳ, ἥτις ἐστὶ καὶ βάσις. (P4,T4) §6 Παρμενίδης ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ θώρακι καὶ Ἐπίκουρος. (P5,T5) §7 Ἀριστο⟨τέ⟩λης οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντες ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἢ τῷ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν πνεύματι. (P6,T6) §8 Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἀρτηριακῇ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας, ἥτις ἐστὶ πνευματική. (P7,T7) §1 Democritus 68A105 DK; Plato cf. e.g. Tht. 184d, Tim. 44d–e; §2 Hippocrates cf. Morb.Sacr. 14, 17; §3 Strato fr. 119a,b Wehrli, 57 Sharples; §4 Erasistratus fr. 40 Garofalo; §5 Herophilus fr. 137a Von Staden; §6 Parmenides 28A45 DK; Epicurus fr. 312 Usener; §7 cf. Aristoteles Iuv. 3 469a4–7, 469a33–b1, PA 3.4 665b18–23; Stoici SVF 2.838; §8 Diogenes 64A20 DK cf. Empedocles 31A97 DK, Diogenes S2 Laks, probabilior Diogenes Stoicus cf. SVF 3 Diog. 30 caput non hab. GS titulus τί … ἐστίν PB : περὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ PE : Über den leitenden Teil unter den Seelenteilen Q : ὅσα δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ χώρας διηνέχθησαν paraphr. T §§1–2 Πλάτων … ἐγκεφάλῳ : Πλάτων Δημόκριτος ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ κεφαλῇ P : Ἱπποκράτης μὲν γὰρ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ τοῦτο ἱδρῦσθαι εἰρήκασιν T §2 [3] Ἱπποκράτης … ἐγκεφάλῳ : om. P : nomen et placitum addidimus ex T 5.22, cf. Tert. de An. 15.5 in cerebro secundum Hippocratem §4 [5] ὁ ἰατρὸς om. P sive add. T ‖ τὴν PB(I)EQT : om. PB(I,III) ‖ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου PBET : om. PQ §5 [7] ἥτις … βάσις PB : om. T : καὶ om. PEQ §6 [8] Παρμενίδης … Ἐπίκουρος PB(I,III) : Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ θώρακι PB(II) : Parmenides und Epikuros Q : καὶ Ἐπίκουρος om. PE : olim schol. in marg. susp. Diels ‖ post θώρακι add. sine uncis τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν DK ad 28A45 §7 [9] Ἀριστο⟨τέ⟩λης … πάντες scripsimus : oἱ Στωικοὶ πάντες PBQ : Ἐπίκουρος οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντες PE : Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοκλῆς καὶ τῶν Στωικῶν ἡ ξυμμορία T : Ἀριστο⟨τέλης καὶ Διο⟩κλῆς coni. Diels DG 204 n. 1 prob. Wellmann (1901) 122 n. : Ἀριστοτέλης vulgo prob. Raeder quod Aetio tribuendum ‖ [9–10] τῷ … πνεύματι PBQ : om. PE §8 [11] Διογένης PBQ : Διοκλῆς Wellmann (1901) 122 n. ‖ τῇ … κοιλίᾳ PBT : der linken der beiden Höhlungen Q ‖ τῆς καρδίας PB(I,II) : περὶ καρδίαν PB(III)

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§9 §10 §11 §12 §13

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Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἵματος συστάσει. (P8,T6) οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ τραχήλῳ τῆς καρδίας, (P9) οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ περικαρδίῳ ὑμένι, (P10,T8) οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ διαφράγματι. (P11,T9) τῶν νεωτέρων τινὲς διήκειν ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς μέχρι τοῦ διαφράγματος. (P12) §14 Πυθαγόρας τὸ μὲν ζωτικὸν περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν καὶ νοερὸν περὶ τὴν κεφαλήν. (P13) §9 Empedocles 31A97 DK; §10 anonymi—; §11 anonymi—; §12 anonymi—; §13 recentiores—; §14 Pythagoras—

§9 om. T ‖ [13] ἐν … συστάσει PB : συστάσει om. PE, suppl. Mras (κοιλία PE(ms.B)) : glaubte, daß jener im Blut ist Q : οἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἵματι T ‖ fort. ⟨περικαρδίου⟩ post αἵματος addendum, cf. §11 et Emp. 31B105.3 DK §10 om. TPE ‖ [14] τῷ τραχήλῳ PBQ : τῇ κοιλίᾳ T §11 [15] περικαρδίῳ PB(I)ET : περὶ τὴν καρδίαν PB(III) : welches über dem Herzen liegt Q §12 [16] διαφράγματι PBT : Zwerchfell Q : διαφράγματι τῶν νεφρῶν PE, φρενῶν coni. Mras conl. Pl. Tim. 70a §§13–14 om. T §14 [20] κεφαλήν PBE : Gehirn Q

Testes primi: Theodoretus CAG 5.22 Τ 5.22 (quaestio) ὅσα δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ χώρας διηνέχθησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ῥᾴδιον διαγνῶναι. 5.22.1 (~ §1–2) Ἱπποκράτης μὲν γὰρ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ τοῦτο ἱδρῦσθαι εἰρήκασιν. 5.22.2 (~ §3) ὁ δὲ Στράτων ἐν μεσοφρύῳ. 5.22.3 (~ §4) Ἐρασίστρατος δὲ ὁ ἰατρὸς περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου μήνιγγα, ἣν ἐπικρανίδα λέγει. 5.22.4 (~ §5) Ἡρόφιλος δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου κοιλίᾳ. 5.22.5 (~ §6) Παρμενίδης δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ θώρακι. 5.22.6 (~ §§7–9) Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοκλῆς καὶ τῶν Στωϊκῶν ἡ ξυμμορία τὴν καρδίαν ἀπεκλήρωσαν τούτῳ. 5.22.7 (~ §8) οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας. 5.22.8 (~ §11) καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ περικαρδίῳ ὑμένι. 5.22.9 (~ §12) οἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ διαφράγματι. Loci Aetiani: titulus A 4.21 πόθεν αἰσθητικὴ γίνεται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τί αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. §1 A 4.4.7 Δημόκριτος vid. infra §6 A 1.6.3 σφαιροειδὴς γὰρ ὁ κόσμος, ὃ πάντων τῶν σχημάτων πρωτεύει· μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσιν ὁμοιοῦται· περιφερὴς δ᾽ ὢν ἔχει τὰ μέρη περιφερῆ· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τὸ ἱερώτατον συνέστηκε νοῦς. A 4.16.4 Πλάτων καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πλήττεσθαι τὸν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἀέρα· τοῦτον δ᾽ ἀνακλᾶσθαι εἰς τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ καὶ γίνεσθαι τῆς ἀκοῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν. A 4.21.5 αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ ἐν κόσμῳ ⟨ὁ θεὸς⟩ κατοικεῖ

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ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ σφαιροειδεῖ κεφαλῇ. A 5.17.3 Ἀλκμαίων τὴν κεφαλήν (sc. πρῶτον τελεσιουργεῖται ἐν τῇ γαστρί), ἐν ᾗ ἔστι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. §2 A 4.17.1 Ἀλκμαίων ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ εἶναι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. §3 A 5.24.4 Στράτων οἱ Στωικοὶ τὸν μὲν ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἀνέσει τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος … φερομένου δ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ⟨ἤ⟩ μεσόφρυον. §6 A 4.4.7 Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος διμερῆ τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἔχουσαν ἐν τῷ θώρακι καθιδρυμένον, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλογον καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν τοῦ σώματος διεσπαρμένον. A 4.23.2 Ἐπίκουρος καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις· τὸ γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν ἀπαθές. §7 al. A 4.21.4 (de Stoicis) αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ ἐν κόσμῳ κατοικεῖ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ σφαιροειδεῖ κεφαλῇ. §8 A 4.18.2 Διογένης … διὰ τὸ συνάπτειν τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν γλώτταν) φλέβας διαχεῖσθαι τοὺς χυμοὺς ἑλκομένους ἐπὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, καθάπερ ἀπὸ σπογγιᾶς. A 5.17.4 οἱ ἰατροὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ἐν ᾗ αἱ φλέβες καὶ αἱ ἀρτηρίαι.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) The only witnesses for this chapter are P and T. The witnesses for P are PB, PE, and PQ. P has thirteen lemmata, which makes this one of his longest chapters in terms of lemmata. As has been previously noted, in the final Book of the Praeparatio evangelica E includes P’s chapters 4.4–5. He omits §10 (= P9), and moves the name-label Epicurus from P5 to his version of P6. S is unfortunately lost, which makes the reconstruction of the chapter difficult (we do not include in the present chapter the two lemmata from S Diels DG 392 located ad finem; for these see ch. 4.7a below). Although the doxographical tradition is a living and open one, that is, one hospitable to further material, so later evidence could have come in independently from what was in A, comparison with the wider and richer dialectical-doxographical tradition leads one to suspect that P, true to his method, has abridged the chapter. T too has been abridging and summarizing and as is his wont done so even more rigorously than P, but his remaining lemmata are very close to their parallels in P. (2) T has only nine lemmata. Evidence not paralleled in P, namely §2, the information regarding Hippocrates and the brain which itself is confirmed by other representatives of the doxographical tradition, again confirms that T here does not derive from P but from A as the uberior fons. P and T’s shared ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ in §6 is in favour of preserving P’s ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ κεφαλῇ in §1. The first lemma

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in T combines the contents of the first two lemmata in A, combining the three name-labels Hippocrates Democritus Plato, and for the doxa itself omitting ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ κεφαλῇ in favour of ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ. In this way we get the required contrast between the first paragraph of the section dealing with the head and the first paragraph of the section dealing with the chest, viz. of §1 with §6. The restored name-label Ἀριστο⟨τέ⟩λης at the beginning of §7, not paralleled in P (or E), is based on T’s Ἀριστοκλῆς. The overall resemblance between P and T, and the extra lemmata concerned with early name-labels to be found in other strands of the tradition (e.g. Macrobius), suggest that A already abridged the material. At any rate the exceptionally rich and diverse dialectical-doxographical parallels suggest that P and T must have considerably abridged their source, which again makes us deplore the loss of S. B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. For the proximate tradition see the various and variously detailed accounts of e.g. Cicero Tusc. 1.19–21 (who includes related issues), Philo Somn. 1.32, and Tertullian de An. 1.5. Paul Wendland, who discovered and analyzed the Philo passage, argued at (1897) 1095 that this proves that Philo used Diels’ Vetusta placita. In general see Mansfeld (1990a) 3092–3108 (P and T, Soranus, Pollux, Anonymus Parisinus olim Darembergii sive Fuchsii), plus 3108–3131 (Alexander, Calcidius), 3117 (Philo), and 3127 (Cicero); cf. above ch. 2.11, Commentary B; ch. 4.2, Commentary B; and ch. 4.3, Commentary B. To some extent Cicero, Philo, Soranus and Tertullian are dependent on earlier and richer versions of the tradition, but extra material has also been incorporated subsequently: not only new tenets, but also earlier ones through retrograde contamination. For the much earlier version of our chapter abstracted by Chrysippus see below, section D(e). (2) Sources. See below, section E(b) General texts, for the widespread tradition. The hegemonikon is what we think with and even, according to some, the seat of our feelings. Before the term hegemonikon became popular the discussion about the location of this part or function was formulated in terms of ‘what we think with’ or ‘what is primary’. The opposition between brain and heart is already found in the Corpus Hippocraticum, namely at De morbo sacro chs. 14 and 17, where the author argues for the brain against those who favour the heart as the seat of the seat of both ‘understanding’ (ξύνεσις) and emotion. It is touched upon at Plato Phd. 96b, who lists no less than three of the fourteen alternative views in our Placita chapter, namely that ‘what we think with’ (ᾧ φρονοῦμεν) is blood (cf. §9), or air (cf. §§7–8), or the brain (cf. §2); cf. Mansfeld (2000a) 8–10 = M–R 3.191–193. The location of the regent part and the conflicting views concerning its location are not at all an issue in Aristotle’s

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psychological treatise, see M–R 2.1.142. He briefly refers to it elsewhere, viz. Met. Ζ.10 1035b25–28 and Met. Δ.1 1013a4–7, where he speaks of the ‘first (part),’ be this heart or brain, or ‘the primary (part), in which the essence and the logos are present’ (ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ οὐσία). For the problem discussed in these passages this issue is (as he says) irrelevant, which obviously implies that in another context it is not. Cf. below, ch. 5.17, Commentary B(b). According to Demetrius Laco (below section E(a)§6) Epicurus argued in favour of the position of the hegemonikon in the chest against ‘many doctors’ (we may think of Hippocratics, perhaps of Epicurus’ near contemporary Herophilus) who placed it in the head (see below, section E(b)§§7/14). Alexander of Aphrodisias updates the issue from a Peripatetic point of view by arguing at some length in favour of the chest and the heart as the seat of the hegemonikon, de An. 98.8– 100.13, and clearly refers to the diaphonia as formulated in the doxographical tradition and its dependants, see Mansfeld (1990a) 3108–3122 and Accatino– Donini (1996) 309. Bergeron–Dufour (2008) 360–364, 373 are not aware of the doxographical background. C Chapter Heading A long and detailed heading, preserved in P only. It is concerned with the question type/category of substance and the category of place. Compare the heading of ch. 2.5a, ‘Where does the cosmos have its regent part’ (ποῦ ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὁ κόσμος), derived by us from the general heading of S 1.21; see M– R 2.1.186, 2.2.374. Also cf. the heading of ch. 4.21 ‘How the soul comes to be sentient and what is its regent part’ (πόθεν αἰσθητικὴ γίνεται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τί αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν in P, τί αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν in S). It is echoed at Alexander de An. 94.7–8, see section E(b) General texts. For the τί ἐστι aspect see above, ch. 1.1, Commentary C. According to Galen PHP 7.1.1 there were far too many books dealing with the hegemonikon. E’s brief version Περὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ, presumably of his own devising, is noteworthy. A similar title is attested for one of the Stoic scholarchs, Galen PHP 2.5.7 ‘Diogenes of Babylon wrote in his On the Regent Part of the Soul’ (ἔγραψεν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικοῦ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος, SVF 3 Diog. 29), and for Ptolemy’s extant treatise On the Criterion and the Hegemonikon (Περὶ κριτηρίου καὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ). Galen PHP 3.3.24 (SVF 2.906) and elsewhere refers to Book 1 of Chrysippus’ On the Soul with the formula ὁ περὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ λόγος. D Analysis a Context Our chapter follows on after ch. 4 dealing with the parts of soul, which in §1, §2, §4 (with the term ἡγεμονικοῦ), §6 and §7 distinguishes the rational or thinking

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part of soul from another part or parts of soul, and in §7 also anticipates the category of place of ch. 4.5. It is followed at some distance (in our reconstruction) by a short chapter on intellect (ch. 7a). The regent part can be qualified as intellect, e.g. Philo Leg. 1.39, ‘just as the regent part of the body is the face, so the regent part of the soul is the intellect’ (ὥσπερ σώματος ἡγεμονικόν ἐστι πρόσωπον, οὕτως ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικόν ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς). This is not generally so in ch. 4.5, but there is a hint in the final lemma, where the regent part qua ‘rational and intelligent’ or nous-like (λογικὸν καὶ νοερὸν), is said to be in the head. By and large the chapters on the soul and the senses in Book 4 follow the order of treatment of these topics in Aristotle’s De anima and in Chrysippus’ On the Soul, see M–R 2.1.138–144, 145–147, and above, Introduction to Book 4, section 6, and ch. 4.2, Commentary D(a) and (c). At de An. 3.4 Aristotle argues that the thinking part of the soul has no bodily organ, so lacks a specific location. The insertion of the present topic in the (Aristotelian) series of psychological chapters of the doxography mirrors the priorities of the Hellenistic philosophical agenda: for the main schools, the Stoics and Epicureans, the soul is corporeal, so its regent part must have a location in physical space. Disagreement about its location virtually never stopped. b Number–Order of Lemmata The fourteen lemmata of P and the nine of T as found in the sources, that is, as not interfered with by our reconstruction (our addition of §2), occur in exactly the same relative order, so must reproduce the order of A. From this point of view the reconstruction of the chapter is very safe. The only differences as to number and sequence with Diels’ chapter in the DG are on the one hand the addition of lemma 4.5.2 (Hippocrates), and on the other our distribution of the four doxai of a single Dielsian paragraph over §§9–12. See further above at section A. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter The rationale of the chapter, which in a very conspicuous way provides answers to the question ‘where?’ and so is about the category of place, is determined by a sequence of bodily parts a capite ad calcem. At the same time it is concerned with the category of substance, because it tells us what these parts are. The main diaphonia is between first the head as a whole, §§1–5, and second the thorax as a whole, §§6–13 so the list goes down from the head to the chest. In each of these main parts we find again a movement from top to bottom: in the region of the head from the membrane of the brain to the ventricle at its basis, in the region of the chest from the pneuma about the heart to the diaphragm at the boundary between chest and belly. And in each of these main parts there is

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a further subdivision, viz. into the parts of the head and into those of the heart, respectively. At the end, §§14–15, we find two compromise positions, two varieties of ‘both’. The ‘younger ones’, not further identified (perhaps later Hellenistic philosophers or later doctors), say that the regent part outflanks the main division and reaches from the head to the diaphragm so is in both locations. A different overarching view is assigned to Pythagoras, who at a first glance is somewhat strangely said to have thought of two regent parts, a rational one in the head and a biotic one (ζωτικόν) in the heart, each occupying one of the main positions. This can actually be paralleled, see below, section D(d). d

Further Comments General Points In view of the openness of the tradition one should be reluctant to attribute to A every extra piece of information in Tertullian or Macrobius or Augustine or Caelius Aurelianus. Diels DG 202–204 attributed the richer information in Cicero and the later sources to his hypothetical Vetusta placita. We prefer to speak of the anterior doxographical tradition in general. Of specific interest is the presence of medical tenets, some with name-labels, and some without. ‘Doctors’ (no names, but some doxai correspond) were already mentioned in the passage of Chrysippus On Soul (see below, section D(e)), which constitutes our earliest evidence for a collection of doxai concerned with the location of the regent part in a diaeresis including parts of the chest and parts of the head. The third subpart of the generic division of Stoic physics, called aetiologikon and dealing with the hegemonikon and related issues, was shared between philosophers and doctors, see M–R 2.1.105–107. An even earlier discussion of the seat of the regent part, with reference to doctors (no names, but they are said to be ‘numerous’), is in Epicurus fr. 313 Usener in Demetrius Laco, cited section E(b)§§4–5. Here, however, there is no evidence of a full diaeresis, and Demetrius only tells us that Epicurus argued against the doctors, not that he did so against the philosophers as well (though it is likely enough that in the lost portion of the text he included the latter, for refraining from cricizing his philosophical opponents is not typical of Epicurus). See Mansfeld (1990a) 3177–3179. Names of doctors are also listed at Tertullian de An. 15.3: Strato (the Erasistratean), Andreas, Asclepiades, Herophilus, Erasistratus, Diocles, Hippocrates, and Soranus (who may be Tertullian’s immediate source, see Waszink 1947, 224, and Podolak 2011, 117–120, 144–148). Individual Points §1 For the name-label Democritus, whose doxa here conflicts with that of ch. 4.4.7, see the tentative explanation at ch. 4.4 Commentary D(d)§7 above.

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§2 Hippocrates is not placed first, as in T’s lemma, because he places the regent part in the brain, i.e. in a part of the head, and not in the head as a whole. The head as a whole is taken care of at the beginning of the series concerned with the head, in §1, just as the chest as a whole is taken care of in §6, at the beginning of the series concerned with the chest. For further observations on the links between this chapter on the ἡγεμονικόν and ch. 5.17 see Mansfeld (1990a) 3013, 3212–3216. §3 On Strato’s regent part in ps.Plutarch De aegritudine et libidine ch. 4, partly cited section E(b)§2, see Sandbach (1969) 42–43 n. c. §7 Diels DG 204 n. 1 naturally pointed out that T’s Aristocles must be a mistake and suggested Ἀριστο⟨τέλης καί Διο⟩κλῆς, though he did not put this reading in his text at DG 391, where he cites the traditional conjecture Ἀριστο⟨τέ⟩λης. His own conjecture is too clever (it is questioned at Mansfeld 1990a, 3095, considered too speculative by Runia 1999a, 208 = M–R 3.2.534, and not mentioned by Van der Eijk 2000–2001). It is simpler to assume a trivial case of perseveration, the -κλῆς after Ἀριστο- echoing the -κλῆς after Ἐμπεδο- in T. The mistake is scribal (a case of mishearing or -reading) and not to be explained as a wilful modification on the part of T. At CAG 5.17 (~ A 4.2.6, see ad loc.) T replaced A’s name-label by the more recherché ὁ δὲ Σταγειρίτης; he added similar information on Aristotle and Epicurus and Xenocrates and others in earlier chapters, see above, ch. 4.3 Commentary A(5) ad finem and 4.4 Commentary A(3). The ethnicon is paralleled at CAG 4.11, where it derives from A’s chapter on the principles, as is clear from P 1.3.12 (and in P it occurs only here), and confirmed at Ach 3.3, p. 9.16 (the only occurrence in Ach). So T lets on that he knows whom he is writing about. It is also relevant that the combined name-labels Aristotle and Stoa are paralleled in Pollux in a very similar context, though he ascribes different doxai to the two name-labels Aristotle and the Stoa (Onomast. 2.226– 227 εἴτε περὶ τὸ αἷμα, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, εἴτε περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὡς ἡ Στοά). The view involved is well-attested for Aristotle, e.g. Iuv. 3 469a4, 469a33– b1, PA 3.4 665b18–23. (It is attested for Diocles too, see frs. 78, 80, 102, 108 Van der Eijk, so one understands why Diels was tempted). The Stoic doxa is that of the majority. πάντες fails to take the view of those Stoics into account who placed the regent part in the head. In the Placita this minority view is stated in the Stoic chapter 4.21.1 & 4, where the regent part is the ‘highest part’, and located ‘in our spherical head’. πάντες is explicit. So there is a long-distance diaphonia, possibly unintentional, between chs. 4.5.7 and 4.21.4. §8 Perhaps a doxographer wished to suggest, or even believed, that the name-label Diogenes pertains not to the Stoic philosopher from Babylon but to the earlier philosopher from Apollonia, though qua contents it is more likely

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that the doxa represents a refinement of the general Stoic view (above, §4). A lemma in the chapter ‘On taste’, 4.18.2, links the tongue via veins ‘to the sense and the regent part’; it is more likely that this pertains to the Stoic Diogenes as well, since the route to the regent part via a sense is a Stoic idea—the said sense consisting of a pneumatic current. §9 This view goes all the way back to Empedocles 31B105 DK. Both Tertullian and Calcidius quote the third line, in a different Latin translation each time, and a partial translation is already found at Cicero Tusc. 1.19. Perhaps we should cautiously suppose that the fuller quotation entered the tradition at a later moment, though it cannot be excluded that it was quoted by A and/or already by one of his predecessors. Verbatim quotations of Empedocles have been preserved in other Placita chapters, viz. at 1.3.19 (31B6 DK) and 1.30.1 (31B8 DK). That the blood at the heart is meant and not blood in general is clear from the position of the doxa in the sequence of lemmata, so θέσει not φύσει. Perhaps, moreover, we should consider adding the adjective περικάρδιος, used by Empedocles himself, translated in a passage depending on the wider doxographical tradition by Cicero (cited above), and here used a few lines down, at §11. On the other hand ps.Plutarch Strom. 10 tells us that according to Empedocles the regent part is neither in the head nor in the breast but in the blood, and that people are more capable depending on the part of the body where it is present to a greater extent. This is a not unfair summary of (an account like) Theophrastus Sens. 10–11 as a whole, which contains the lapidary phrase ‘we think mostly with the blood’. The version of the doxa found in the (unemended) Aëtian lemma de facto turns its content into a compromise position comparable to that formulated in the Stromateis, but as pointed out above its position in the chapter shows that de iure it belongs with the second horn of the diaphonia. Even so, the parallel in the other ps.Plutarch shows what sort of inference could be based on the shorter version. Diels DG 222, in his presentation of the evidence he could find for the (partial) dependence of sections and lemmata of the Placita on Theophrastus’ De sensibus, compared §9 with Sens. 10 τῷ αἵματι μάλιστα φρονεῖν, of course adding that the point about the ἡγεμονικόν is ‘recentiore sermone expressum’. Ibid. 223 he expresses himself more strongly, arguing that the attribution to Philolaus of a ἡγεμονικόν of the cosmos at ch. 2.4.15 Diels (~ 2.5a.4 M–R—he could have referred to ch. 2.5a as a whole, inclusive of the heading) is a case of ‘fraus’, and he refers back to our §9 for the same situation. For Diels on what he sees as doxographical fraud see M–R 1.99–100. §12 E adds τῶν νεφρῶν after διαφράγμα, thus preserving extra material (rare in E, see M–R 1.139 with n. 54). From an anatomical point of view this reading is unobjectionable, because the kindneys are immediately below the diaphragm,

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the position of which is thus indicated quite precisely. Mras, referring to Plato Tim. 72a, conjectures φρενῶν (another word for diaphhragm) for E’s νεφρῶν. The phrase διαφράγμα τῶν φρενῶν presumably is supposed to mean ‘the partition consisting of the diaphragm’. However, this brilliant conjecture seems hardly necessary. Since τῶν νεφρῶν may be no more than a glossema, we have not included these words in the text. §13 In A the formula τῶν νεωτέρων τινες is only paralleled at ch. 2.29.4–5, where the context shows that later Pythagoreans are meant (the better text of S contrasts them with ‘the Pythagoreans according to the research of Aristotle and the assertion of Philip of Opus’, fr. x Tarán). The striking parallel with the psychology of Alexander Polyhistor’s Pythagorean Hypomnemata at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 8.30 (quoted section E(b) ad loc.) suggest that this identification applies also here. The doxa attributed to Pythagoras himself at §14 is paralleled at V.P. 8.30 as well; Theiler (1982) 335–336 attributes these doxai to Posidonius. §14 For two regent parts, one in the head and one in the chest, compare Calcidius in Tim. cc. 231–232 (a sentence from c. 231 is quoted section E(a)§14). There is also a link with the first two of the four principles of the rational living being according to Philolaus, see 44B13 DK (cited below section E(b)§14): ‘the head is the (seat) of the intellect, the heart of life and sensation … the brain (contains) the principle of man, the heart of the living being’. It is very likely that the doxa refers to these kinds of reports. So the name-label Pythagoras may have supplanted Philolaus. e Other Evidence The Ciceronian and Philonic parallels are important because they show the indebtedness of A to a shared anterior tradition, just as in the previous chapters (4.2 and 4.3), and as in ch. 4.9 below, where A’s parallels with Cicero show the same sort of dependence. The evidence in Tertullian, as indicated above, is also richer. More sensationally, as far as we know a version of the present Placita chapter was for the first time cited by Chrysippus in Book 1 of his On Soul (cited above Book 4 titulus et index, related texts, and in part below section E(a) General texts)—a unique testimony concerning the use of a predecessor of our Placita chapter in the third cent. bce, see Mansfeld (1989a). Qua importance for the history of doxography this testimony is on a similar level as the evidence of PPack2 1499 for ch. 4.16, where see at Commentary B, Proximate tradition. See further above at section B, sources.

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E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: Chrysippus de An. at Gal. PHP 3.1.12–15 (SVF 2.885 verbatim, i.e. ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικοῦ λόγῳ PHP 3.8.39) περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς διαφωνοῦσιν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις λέγοντες αὐτὸ εἶναι τόποις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν θώρακά φασιν εἶναι αὐτό, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν κεφαλήν. κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαφωνοῦσι, ποῦ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τοῦ θώρακός ἐστιν, οὐ συμφωνοῦντες αὑτοῖς. … οὕτω φαίνεται διαφεύγειν ὁ τόπος ἡμᾶς … · οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἀντιλογία ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προῆλθεν καὶ ἐν ἰατροῖς καὶ ἐν φιλοσόφοις. Lucretius DRN 3.548–549 et quoniam mens est hominis pars una locoque / fixa manet certo. DRN 3.615–621 denique cur animi numquam mens consiliumque / gignitur in capite aut pedibus (cf. below, Seneca Ep. 113.23) manibusve, sed unis / sedibus et certis regionibus omnibus haeret (etc.). DRN 3.789–792 = 5.133–136 quod si posset enim, multo prius ipsa animi vis / in capite aut umeris aut imis calcibus esse / posset et innasci quavis in parte soleret, / tandem in eodem homine atque in eodem vase manere. Cicero Tusc. 1.18–19 quid sit porro ipse animus aut ubi aut unde, magna dissensio est. aliis cor ipsum animus videtur. … (19) aliis pars quaedam cerebri visa est animi principatum tenere; aliis nec cor ipsum placet nec cerebri quandam partem esse animum, sed alii in corde, alii in cerebro dixerunt animi esse sedem et locum. Tusc. 1.70 in quo igitur loco est (sc. mens hominis)? credo equidem in capite et cur credam adferre possum. sed alias, ubi sit animus; certe quidem in te est. Philo of Alexandria Somn. 1.32 ποῦ δ᾽ ἐμπεφώλευκεν ὁ νοῦς αὐτῷ; ἆρα οἶκον κεκλήρωται; οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνιέρωσαν αὐτῷ κεφαλήν, περὶ ἣν καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις λοχῶσιν, εἰκὸς εἶναι νομίσαντες ἐγγὺς οἷα μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐφεδρεύειν τοὺς δορυφόρους· οἱ δ᾽ ὑπὸ καρδίας αὐτὸν ἀγαλματοφορεῖσθαι διανοηθέντες γνωσιμαχοῦσιν. Spec. 1.213–214 οὔτε δὲ καρδίαν οὔτε ἐγκέφαλον, τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτων ἐνδιαιτωμένου. Post. 137 ὅπερ (sc. ἡγεμονικὸν) εἴτε μήνιγγα εἴτε καρδίαν εἶναι συντέτευχεν, οἱ περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὶ φιλοσοφείτωσαν. Pollux Onom. 2.226–227 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[b] Podolak) μέρη δ᾽ αὐτῆς νοῦς ἐπιθυμία θυμός. καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς καὶ λογισμὸς καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκεφάλῳ κατὰ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Πλάτωνα ἱδρυμένος, εἴτε ἐν παρεγκεφαλίδι ἢ μήνιγξιν, ὡς πολλοῖς τῶν ἰατρῶν δοκεῖ, εἴτε κατὰ τὸ μεσόφρυον, ὡς ἔλεγε Στράτων, εἴτε περὶ τὸ αἷμα, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, εἴτε περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὡς ἡ Στοά. θυμοῦ δὲ τόπος ἄντικρυς ἡ καρδία, καθάπερ ὁ περὶ τὸ ἧπαρ τόπος ἐπιθυμίας. Seneca Ep. 113.23 ne putes autem primum me ex nostris non ex praescripto loqui, sed meae sententiae esse: inter Cleanthen (—) et discipulum eius Chrysippum (SVF 2.836) non convenit, quid sit ambulatio. Cleanthes ait spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum, Chrysippus ipsum principale. Plutarch Adv.Col. 1119A ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κυριώτατον, ᾧ φρονοῦμεν καὶ λογιζόμεθα καὶ πράττομεν, ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ καὶ ψυχῆς μόρια πάντα καὶ σώματος ὄργανα τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως; ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.378.4–8 K. ριγʹ. ἡγεμονικόν ἐστι ψυχῆς τὸ ἄρχον τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ βασιλεῦον καὶ ἐπιτάσσον, καθιδρυμένον δὲ ἐν τῇ βάσει τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου. οἱ δὲ οὕτως· ἡγεμονικὸν ψυχῆς ἐστι τὸ κατάρχον τῆς ὅλης τοῦ ζώου διοικήσεως, τεταγμένον δὲ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ {τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου}. Galen Loc.Aff. 8.158.11–160.7 ὥσπερ δ᾽

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ἐνταῦθα φιλονεικίαν αἰσχρὰν ἐπιδείκνυνται προφανῶς, οὕτως ἄνοιαν, ὅταν οἴωνται πάνθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν σαλεύεσθαι τὰ δόγματα, κᾂν ἓν ὁτιοῦν ἐλεγχθῇ· τινὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀκολουθεῖ, καθάπερ γε πάλιν ἕτερα μάχεται, τινὰ δὲ οὔτ᾽ ἀκολουθίαν οὔτε μάχην ἀναγκαίαν ἔχει, καθάπερ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικοῦ. ἐάν τε γὰρ ἐν καρδίᾳ τις ἐάν τ᾽ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ περιέχεσθαι τοῦτό φησι, δυνατόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν στοιχείων ἣν ἂν ἐθελήσῃ δόξαν ἑλομένῳ μήτε μάχεσθαι τούτῳ μήτ᾽ ἀκολουθεῖν. … οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὧν εἴρηκα δογμάτων οὔτ᾽ ἀκολουθία τίς ἐστιν οὔτε μάχη πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικὸν, ἐάν τε ἐν καρδίᾳ τις ἐάν τε ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ φησὶ περιέχεσθαι. προδιδόασιν οὖν ὅλην τὴν δογματικὴν αἵρεσιν οἱ τοιαύτας γράφοντες θεραπείας· περὶ γὰρ ἡγεμονικοῦ ψυχῆς ἀποδείξεων οὐσῶν ἐναργῶν, ὡς ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις πεπιστεῦσθαι τὸ μόριον ἐν ᾧ κατῴκισται, μόνοις ἰατρῶν τε καὶ φιλοσόφων τοῖς ἀρίστοις οὐ φαίνεται, τοῖς ἐν καρδίᾳ τιθεμένοις αὐτό. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν εἶπον ἐν οἷς ἔγραψα περὶ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος δογμάτων· ὅτι δὲ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πεπίστευται, τὸ μὲν λογιζόμενον ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ καθιδρύσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖόν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς ἐν καρδίᾳ, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐν ἥπατι, μαθεῖν ἔστιν ὁσημέραι λεγόντων αὐτῶν ἀκούοντα, πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνόητον, ὡς ἐγκέφαλον οὐκ ἔχει· πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄτολμον καὶ δειλὸν, ὡς ἀκάρδιος εἴη· τοῦ Τιτυοῦ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀετοῦ τὸ ἧπαρ ἐσθιόμενον, οὐ μόνον ἐν ποιήμασι λεγόντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλαττόντων τε καὶ γραφόντων. Clement of Alexandria Strom. 8.4.14.4–5.15.1 δευτέρα δ᾽ ἦν διαφορὰ προβλημάτων ἐφ᾽ οὗ τὰ μὲν ἔργα καὶ πάθη γινώσκομεν ἅπαντες, ἀγνοοῦμεν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν, οἷον ἐν τίνι τοῦ σώματος μορίῳ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς. … (5.15.1) φασὶν οὖν τινες μὴ ἐγχωρεῖν πλείους ἀρχὰς ἑνὸς εἶναι ζῴου. ὁμογενεῖς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ πλείους ὑπάρχειν ἑνὸς ζῴου, διαφερούσας δὲ τοῖς γένεσιν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον. Tertullian de An. 15.1–3 (Soranus de An. fr. 12[a] Podolak) inprimis an sit aliqui summus in anima gradus vitalis et sapientialis, quod ἡγεμονικόν appellant, id est principale, quia si negetur, totus animae status periclitatur. denique qui negant principale, ipsam prius animam nihil censuerunt. (2) Messenius aliqui Dicaearchus (fr. 8h Wehrli, 25 Mirhady) … ex medicis autem Andreas et Asclepiades (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 727) … abstulerunt principale, dum in animo ipso volunt esse sensus, quorum vindicatur principale. Asclepiades etiam illa argumentatione vectatur, quod pleraque animalia ademptis eis partibus corporis, in quibus plurimum existimatur principale consistere, et insuper vivant aliquatenus … si capita decideris, … si corda detraxeris; itaque principale non esse, quo, si fuisset, amisso cum suis sedibus vigor animae non perseveraret. (3) sed plures et philosophi adversus Dicaearchum: Plato Strato (fr. 116 Wehrli, 56 Sharples) Epicurus (—) Democritus (fr. 458 Luria) Empedocles (—) Socrates Aristoteles, et medici adversus Andrean et Asclepiaden: Herophilus (T 139 Von Staden) Erasistratus (—) Diocles (fr. 37 Van der Eijk) Hippocrates et ipse Soranus. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.313 εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὁ νοῦς qτὸν ἐν ᾧ ἔστι συγκαταλαμβάνει ἑαυτῷ, ἐχρῆν μὴ διαφωνεῖσθαι τοῦτον παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, τῶν μὲν κεφαλὴν λεγόντων εἶναι τῶν δὲ θώρακα, καὶ ἐπ᾽ εἴδους τῶν μὲν ἐγκέφαλον τῶν δὲ μήνιγγα, τινῶν δὲ καρδίαν, ἄλλων δὲ ἥπατος πύλας ἤ τι τοιοῦτο μέρος τοῦ σώματος. M. 7.348–349 τὴν διάνοιαν … (349) οἱ μὲν μηδέν φασιν εἶναι αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸ πῶς ἔχον σῶμα, καθάπερ ὁ Δικαίαρχος (fr. 8a Wehrli, 24 Mirhady), οἱ δὲ εἶναι μὲν

liber 4 caput 5 ἔλεξαν, οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος, ὡς Αἰνησίδημος (fr. B24A Polito) κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον (T 689 Mouraviev), οἱ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ τινὲς κατὰ Δημόκριτον (68A107 DK), οἱ δὲ ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος, ὧν πάλιν πολυσχιδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γνῶμαι. M. 7.380 εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, καὶ ἐν τίνι τόπῳ ἔστιν, οὐχ ὡμολόγηται, ἄλλων μὲν οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ὑπάρχειν τι λεγόντων ἡγεμονικόν, ὡς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 726), τινῶν δὲ εἶναι μὲν νομιζόντων, οὐ συμφωνούντων δὲ περὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὸ τόπου. P. 1.128 περὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοί, χυμούς τινας ὑποκειμένους θεωροῦμεν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκέφαλον εἴτε περὶ καρδίαν εἴτε περὶ ὁτιδήποτε οὖν μέρος τοῦ ζῴου τοῦτο τίθεσθαι βούλοιτό τις. Tertullian Res. 15.16 sed etsi in cerebro vel in medio superciliorum discrimine vel ubiubi philosophis placet principalitas sensuum consecrata est, quod ἡγεμονικὸν appellatur, caro erit omne animae cogitatorium. Lactantius Op.D. 16.1 Perrin mentis quoque rationem incomprehensibilem esse quis nesciat nisi qui omnino illam non habet, cum ipsa mens quo loco sit aut cuiusmodi nesciatur? varia ergo a philosophis de natura eius et loco disputata sunt. Op.D. 16.11 sive igitur in capite mens habitat sive in pectore, potestne aliquis conprehendere quae vis rationis efficiat ut sensus ille inconprehensibilis aut in medulla cerebri haereat aut in illo sanguine bipertito qui est conclusus in corde. Calcidius in Tim. cc. 213–214 quod hegemonicon a philosophis dicitur, … . sed quoniam de hoc diversae opiniones philosophorum tam veterum quam novorum extiterunt, recensendae nobis singulae sunt. Gregory of Nyssa Opif.Hom. c. 12, MPG 44, p. 156.33–53 οἱ μὲν ἐν καρδίᾳ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι τίθενται, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ τὸν νοῦν ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαί φασιν, ἐπιπολαίοις τισὶ πιθανότησι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπινοίας κρατοῦντες. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῇ καρδίᾳ προστιθεὶς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, τὴν κατὰ τόπον αὐτῆς θέσιν ποιεῖται τοῦ λόγου τεκμήριον, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν πως τὴν μέσην τοῦ παντὸς σώματος ἐπέχειν χώραν αὐτὴν, ὡς τῆς προαιρετικῆς κινήσεως εὐκόλως ἐκ τοῦ μέσου πρὸς ἅπαν μεριζομένης σῶμα, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἐνέργειαν προϊούσης. καὶ μαρτύριον ποιεῖται τοῦ λόγου τὴν λυπηράν τε καὶ θυμώδη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διάθεσιν, ὅτι δοκεῖ πως τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη συγκινεῖν τὸ μέρος τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν συμπάθειαν. οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀφιεροῦντες τῷ λογισμῷ, ὥσπερ ἀκρόπολίν τινα τοῦ παντὸς σώματος τὴν κεφαλὴν δεδομῆσθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λέγουσιν· ἐνοικεῖν δὲ ταύτῃ καθάπερ τινὰ βασιλέα τὸν νοῦν, οἷόν τισιν ἀγγελιαφόροις ἢ ὑπασπισταῖ, τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐν κύκλῳ δορυφορούμενον. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τῆς τοιαύτης ὑπονοίας ποιοῦνται, τὸ παράγεσθαι τοῦ καθεστῶτος τὸν λογισμὸν τῶν κεκακωμένων τὰς μήνιγγας κτλ. Caelius Aurelianus Cel.Pass. 1.8.53–54 see details below. Augustine Trin. 10.7.1–5 Mountain–Glorie et quia sibi bene conscia est principatus sui quo corpus regit, hinc factum est ut quidam quaererent quid corporis amplius valet in corpore, et hoc esse mentem vel omnino totam animam existimarent. itaque alii sanguinem, alii cerebrum, alii cor. differently Nemesius NH c. 3, pp. 41.5–42.8 (using a Neoplatonist source) ἡ δὲ ψυχή, ἀσώματος οὖσα καὶ μὴ περιγραφομένη τόπῳ, ὅλη δι᾽ ὅλου χωρεῖ καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς ἑαυτῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μέρος φωτιζόμενον ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς, ἐν ᾧ μὴ ὅλη πάρεστιν. οὐ γὰρ κρατεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὴ κρατεῖ τὸ σῶμα, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ σώματί ἐστιν ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ ἢ ἀσκῷ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτῇ. μὴ κωλυόμενα γὰρ ὑπὸ

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τῶν σωμάτων τὰ νοητά, ἀλλὰ διὰ παντὸς σώματος χωροῦντα καὶ διαφοιτῶντα καὶ διεξιόντα, οὐχ οἷά τέ ἐστιν ὑπὸ τόπου σωματικοῦ κατέχεσθαι· νοητὰ γὰρ ὄντα ἐν νοητοῖς καὶ τόποις ἐστίν, ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὑπερκειμένοις νοητοῖς, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ποτὲ μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἐστιν, ὅταν λογίζηται, ποτὲ δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ, ὅταν νοῇ. … ἀμέγεθες γὰρ ὂν καὶ ἄογκον καὶ ἀμερὲς τῆς κατὰ μέρος τοπικῆς περιγραφῆς κρεῖττόν ἐστιν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχον μέρος ποίῳ δύναται τόπῳ περιγράφεσθαι. … (42.4) δέδεικται γὰρ μὴ δύνασθαι περιληφθῆναι τόπῳ· ὅταν οὖν ἐν σχέσει γένηται νοητὸν τόπου τινὸς ἢ πράγματος ἐν τόπῳ ὄντος, καταχρηστικώτερον λέγομεν ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐκεῖ, τὸν τόπον ἀντὶ τῆς σχέσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας λαμβάνοντες. Chapter heading: Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.132–133 τὸν δὲ φυσικὸν λόγον διαιροῦσιν (sc. the Stoics) … (133) τόν τ᾽ αἰτιολογικὸν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν διμερῆ· μιᾷ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκέψει ἐπικοινωνεῖν τὴν τῶν ἰατρῶν ζήτησιν, καθ᾽ ἣν ζητοῦσι περί τε τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, excerpted at Suda s.v. Φ 862, p. 4.775.28–29 Adler φυσικὸς λόγος παρὰ φιλοσόφοις … διεξέρχονται περὶ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. Calcidius in Tim. c. 7 De anima et partibus eius et locis. §0 Whether it exists: Tertullian de An. 15.1 (Soranus de An. fr. 12[a] Podolak) denique qui negant principale, ipsam prius animam nihil censuerunt etc. (see General texts). Lactantius Op.D. 16.1 Perrin mentis quoque rationem incomprehensibilem esse quis nesciat nisi qui omnino illam non habet, cum ipsa mens quo loco sit aut cuiusmodi nesciatur? Calcidius in Tim. c. 214 qui dividuam fore silvae substantiam censuerunt interponentes immenso inani modo expertia, modo partes quidem, sed indifferentes, sui similes, tum atomos vel solidos moles, nullum locum certum definitumque principali animae parti dederunt; also c. 216. Caelius Aurelianus Cel.Pass. 1.14.115 (Asclepiades cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 713) deinde regnum animae aliqua in parte corporis constitutum negat. §§1–2 Plato Democritus Hippocrates: Ptolemy Iudic. c. 15, pp. 21.23–22.6 τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐφωδευμένων, ὅτι μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν γίνεται τοῦ σώματος, ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐδὲ εἷς ἂν ἀπορήσειεν· εἰ δ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν οὕτως ἁπλῶς ληπτέον καὶ οὐχ ὡς τῶν πρός τι ὄν, ὡδί πως κατὰ τὸ κεφαλαιῶδες διοριστέον· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἁπλῶς καὶ τιμιώτατον καλῶμεν ἡγεμονικόν, ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ τοῦτο ἔσται. δέδεικται γὰρ ἡμῖν ἱκανῶς, ὅτι τὸ διανοητικὸν καὶ δυνάμει καὶ οὐσίᾳ τιμιώτερον καὶ θειότερόν ἐστιν ἔν τε τῷ παντὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν· καὶ ὅτι τόπος αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀνωτάτω, τοῦ κόσμου μὲν ὁ οὐρανός, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἡ κορυφή. §1 Plato Democritus: Chrysippus de An. at Gal. PHP 3.1.14 (verbatim) Πλάτων … τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν ἔλεγεν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ εἶναι. Cicero Tusc. 1.20 Plato … principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit. Philo of Alexandria Somn. 1.32 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνιέρωσαν αὐτῷ κεφαλήν. Pollux Onom. 2.225–226 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[b] Podolak) καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς καὶ λογισμὸς καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκεφάλῳ κατὰ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Πλάτωνα ἱδρυμένος. Censorinus DN c. 6.1 Hippon (38A15 DK) vero caput (sc. primum in infante formari censuit), in quo est animi principale. Tertullian de An. 15.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[a] Podolak) in capite concludi secundum Platonem, neque in vertice

liber 4 caput 5 potius [i.e. in a part of the head, doxa not paralleled in A] praesidere secundum Xenocratem (fr. 72 Heinze, F 128 Isnardi Parente2). Lactantius Op.D. 5.6 Perrin in summo vero constructionis eius (sc. corporis) quam similem navali carinae diximus, caput conlocauit, in quo esset regimen totius animantis, ‘datumque illi hoc nomen est’, ut quidem Varro (fr. 33 Goetz & Schoell) ad Ciceronem scribit, ‘quod hinc capiant initium sensus ac nervi’. Op.D. 16.6–8 Perrin videtur enim mens, quae dominatum corporis tenet, in summo capite constituta tamquam in caelo deus, sed cum in aliqua sit cogitatione, commeare ad pectus et quasi ad secretum aliquod penetrale secedere, ut consilium tamquam ex thensauro recondito eliciat ac proferat; (7) ideoque cum intenti ad cogitandum sumus et cum mens occupata in altum se abdiderit, neque audire quae circumsonant neque videre quae obstant solemus. (8) id vero sive ita est, admirandum profecto est quomodo id fiat, cum ad pectus a cerebro nullum iter pateat, sin autem non est ita, tamen nihilo minus admirandum est quod divina nescio qua ratione fiat ut ita esse videatur. Calcidius in Tim. c. 213 principalem animae potestatem asserit in capite sedes habere (Tim. 45a–b). in Tim. c. 231 rationabili velut arx corporis et regia, utpote virtuti quae regali quadam eminentia praestet, id est domicilium capitis, in quo habitet animae principale, quod ad similitudinem mundi sit exaedificatum, teres et globosum …. dogma Platonis probatur, quod animae vis principalis in cerebri locata sit sede. §2 Hippocrates: Demetrius Laco Apor.Test., PHerc 1012 col. 47.8–11 (see below §§4–5). Cicero Tusc. 1.19 alii in cerebro dixerunt animi esse sedem et locum. Tusc.1.19 cerebrum. Tusc. 1.41 cerebrove. Tertullian de An. 15.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[a] Podolak) in cerebro … secundum Hippocratem. ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.459.11–12 K. υξζʹ. ὁ ἐγκέφαλος τὴν ψυχικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ ταύτης τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὅπερ ἐστὶ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ νοῦς. Lactantius Op.D. Perrin 16.4 alii sedem eius in cerebro esse dixerunt. Caelius Aurelianus Cel.Pass. 1.8.53 alii igitur cerebrum pati dixerunt. Tard.Pass. 1.4.60 sive quod in capite fiat, quod multorum philosophorum iudicio sacrum atque templum est partis animae in corpore natae. §3 Strato: Pollux Onom. 2.226 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[b] Podolak) εἴτε κατὰ τὸ μεσόφρυον, ὡς ἔλεγε Στράτων (fr. 121 Wehrli, app. fr. 57 Sharples). Tertullian de An. 15.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[a] Podolak) in superciliorum meditullio, ut Strato physicus (fr. 120 Wehrli, 58 Sharples). §§4–5 Erasistratus Herophilus: Demetrius Laco Apor.Test., PHerc 1012 col. xl.8–11 Puglia μετὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀντιπροφέ|ρεται (sc. Epicurus, fr. 313 Usener) τὴν σημηωσιν, ᾗ | χρῶνται πολλοὶ τῶν ἰα|τρῶ[ν ὑ]πὲρ το[ῦ τὸ]ν λογισμὸν ἐν κεφα[λῆι ἐστηρ]ίχθαι. Cicero Tusc. 1.19 aliis pars quaedam cerebri visa est animi principatum tenere. Pollux Onomast. 2.226 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[b] Podolak) εἴτε ἐν παρεγκεφαλίδι ἢ μήνιγξιν, ὡς πολλοῖς τῶν ἰατρῶν δοκεῖ. §4 Erasistratus: Tertullian de An. 15.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[a] Podolak) nec in membranulis, ut Strato (sc. the Erasistratean) et Erasistratus (fr. 41 Garofalo). Caelius Aurelianus Cel.Pass. 1.8.53 alii membranas, alii et cerebrum et membranas.

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§5 Herophilus: Tertullian de An. 15.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[a] Podolak) circa cerebri fundamenta, ut Herophilus (T 139 Von Staden). Caelius Aurelianus Cel.Pass. 1.8.53 alii eius (sc. cerebri) fundum sive basin. §6 Parmenides: Demetrius Laco Apor.Test. (PHerc 1012) col. xlvi.1–3 + xlvii.5–6 Puglia κα]|τελέξαθ᾽ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος (fr. 313 Usener) καὶ π[ε]|ρὶ τοῦ τόποῦ λογιζομέ|νου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς … φανερῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν | θώρακα ἡ ὁλκὴ γείνεται (for continuation see above §§4–5). Lucretius DRN 3.138–144 sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto / consilium, quod nos animum mentemque vocamus. / idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret. / hic exultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum / laetitiae mulcent: hic ergo mens animusquest. / cetera pars animae per totum dissita corpus / paret et ad numen mentis momenque movetur. Tertullian de An. 15.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[a] Podolak) in tota lorica pectoris, ut Epicurus (fr. 312 Usener). §7 Aristotle Stoics: Philo of Alexandria Somn. 1.32 οἱ δ᾽ ὑπὸ καρδίας αὐτὸν ἀγαλματοφορεῖσθαι. Pollux Onomast. 2.226 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[b] Podolak) εἴτε περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὡς ἡ Στοά (—). Arius Didymus fr. 39 Diels, DG p. 471.15– 16 at Eus. PE 15.20.6 (SVF 2.821) ἔχειν δὲ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικόν τι ἐν αὑτῇ, ὃ δὴ ζωὴ καὶ αἴσθησίς ἐστι καὶ ὁρμή. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.159 (SVF 2.837) ἡγεμονικὸν δ᾽ εἶναι τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ ὁρμαὶ γίνονται καὶ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἀναπέμπεται (cf. chs. 4.11–12, 4.21)· ὅπερ εἶναι ἐν καρδίᾳ. Calcidius in Tim. c. 220 Stoici (SVF 2.879) vero cor quidem sedem esse principalis animae partis consentiunt nec tamen sanguinem qui cum corpore nascitur. in Tim. 224 principalis vero animae pars … hanc vero Aristoteles asserit locatam esse in penetralibus cordis. Caelius Aurelianus Cer.Pass. 1.8.53 alii cor, alii cordis summitatem. §9 Empedocles: Cicero Tusc. 1.19 Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem (namely αἷμα περικάρδιον, 31B105.3 DK). Pollux Onom. 2.226 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[b] Podolak) εἴτε περὶ τὸ αἷμα, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης. ps.Plutarch Strom. 10 (fr. 179 Sandbach) at Eus. PE 1.8.10 (on Empedocles, 31A30 DK) τὸ δ᾽ ἡγεμονικὸν οὔτ᾽ ἐν κεφαλῇ οὔτ᾽ ἐν θώρακι ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αἵματι· ὅθεν καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν μέρος τοῦ σώματος πλεῖον ᾖ παρεσπαρμένον {τὸ ἡγεμονικόν}, οἴεται κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνο προτερεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Tertullian de An. 15.5 (Soranus de An. fr. 13a] Podolak) ut et ille versus Orphei vel Empedoclis (31B105.3 DK): ‘namque homini sanguis circumcordialis est sensus’. Calcidius in Tim. c. 218 Empedocles quidem principalem animae vim constituit in corde, dicens (31B105.3 DK): ‘sanguine cordis enim noster viget intellectus’, siquidem intimis sensibus nostris sentiamus ea quae sunt extra nos propter cognationem. ideoque ait (31B109.1–2 DK): ‘terram terreno sentimus, at aethera flammis, humorem humecto, nostro spirabile flatu’. sed de his omnibus, qualia sint quantamve inter se habeant differentiam, cordis sanguine diiudicamus (cf. also above under General texts, Augustine Trin. 10.vii.4 alii sanguinem). §11 Anonymi: Caelius Aurelianus Cel.Pass. 1.8.53–54 alii membranam, quae cor circumtegit, alii arteriarum eam, quam Graeci ἀορτήν appellant, alii venam crassam, quam iidem φλέβα παχείαν vocaverunt.

liber 4 caput 5 §12 Later anonymi: Caelius Aurelianus Cel.Pass. 1.8.54 alii diaphragma. §14 Pythagoras: Calcidius in Tim. cc. 231–232 … dogma Platonis probatur, quod animae vis principalis in cerebri locata sit sede. (232) illud vero aliud principale, quod secundae dignitatis esse praediximus, non rationabilis animantis, sed id ipsum animantis. commune ergo ut animalis in corde et medietate, ut vero rationabilis animantis in cerebro.

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Sources and Other Parallel Texts

General texts: Corpus Hippocraticum Morb.Sacr. 17 διὸ φημὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον εἶναι τὸν ἑρμηνεύοντα τὴν ξύνεσιν. … λέγουσι δέ τινες ὡς φρονέομεν τῇ καρδίῃ καὶ τὸ ἀνιώμενον τοῦτό ἐστι καὶ τὸ φροντίζον· τὸ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. Plato Phd. 96b καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν (Empedocles 31A76 DK) ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ (cf. Anaximenes 13A23 DK) ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν (cf. Alcmaeon 24A11DK) ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. Aristotle Met. Δ.2 1013a4–7 (ἀρχὴ λέγεται) … ὅθεν πρῶτον γίγνεται ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὡς πλοίου τρόπις καὶ οἰκίας θεμέλιος, καὶ τῶν ζῴων οἱ μὲν καρδίαν οἱ δὲ ἐγκέφαλον οἱ δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν. Met. Ζ.10 1035b25–28 ἔνια δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα κύρια καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ οὐσία, οἷον εἰ τοῦτο καρδία ἢ ἐγκέφαλος· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐθὲν πότερον τοιοῦτον. Cicero ND 2.29 omnem enim naturam necesse est, quae non solitaria sit neque simplex sed cum alio iuncta atque conexa, habere aliquem in se principatum, ut in homine mentem, in belva quiddam simile mentis unde oriantur rerum adpetitus; in arborum autem et earum rerum quae gignuntur e terra radicibus inesse principatus putatur. principatum autem id dico quod Graeci ἡγεμονικὸν vocant, quo nihil in quoque genere nec potest nec debet esse praestantius. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Top. 218.23–24 κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποὺ ἡ ζήτησις, ὅταν ζητῆται ἐν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ἐν καρδίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ. de An. 94.7–8 ποῦ δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐν τίνι μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ πότερον ἐν ἑνὶ ὑποκειμένῳ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις μόνον καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἔχουσα τὰς διαφοράς, ἢ καὶ κατὰ τόπον εἰσὶν ἀλλήλων αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις κεχωρισμέναι, ἄξιον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδεῖν. de An. 99.30–100.1 τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα πρὸς δεῖξιν τοῦ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν περὶ κεφαλήν τε καὶ ἐγκέφαλον εἶναι τὰ μέν ἐστι κενά κτλ. Galen PHP 2.5.40–41 λοιπὸν εἴτ᾽ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν εἴτε καρδία τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονοῦν, οὐδὲν οἶμαι διαφέρειν εἴς γε τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου λόγου διάλυσιν. PHP 7.1.1 oὐκ ἐγὼ τοῦ μήκους τῆς πραγματείας αἴτιος … ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ψευδῶν λόγων ὧν ἠρώτησαν ὑπὲρ ἡγεμονικοῦ ψυχῆς οὐκ ὀλίγας πληρώσαντες βίβλους. ArsMed. c. 37.10, 1.409.6–10 K. ὑπὲρ ἡγεμονικοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, ὅσα περὶ φυσικῶν ἢ ψυχικῶν ἐνεργειῶν ζητεῖται, διὰ πολυβίβλου πραγματείας ἐδηλώσαμεν, ἣν Περὶ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος δογμάτων ἐπιγράφομεν. Gregory of Nyssa Opif.Hom. MPG 44, p. 156.34–49 οἱ μὲν ἐν καρδίᾳ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι τίθενται, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ τὸν νοῦν ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαί φασιν, ἐπιπολαίοις τισὶ πιθανότησι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπινοίας κρατοῦντες. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῇ καρδίᾳ προστιθεὶς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, τὴν κατὰ τόπον αὐτῆς θέσιν ποιεῖται τοῦ λόγου τεκμήριον, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν πως

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liber 4 caput 5

τὴν μέσην τοῦ παντὸς σώματος ἐπέχειν χώραν αὐτὴν, ὡς τῆς προαιρετικῆς κινήσεως εὐκόλως ἐκ τοῦ μέσου πρὸς ἅπαν μεριζομένης σῶμα. … οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀφιεροῦντες τῷ λογισμῷ, ὥσπερ ἀκρόπολίν τινα τοῦ παντὸς σώματος τὴν κεφαλὴν δεδομῆσθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λέγουσιν· ἐνοικεῖν δὲ ταύτῃ καθάπερ τινὰ βασιλέα τὸν νοῦν. Stephanus in Progn. 1.48, pp. 124.30–126.15 Duffy ‘ἢν γὰρ αἱ ὄψιες πυκνὰ κινέωνται, μανῆναι τούτους ἐλπίς’ (ps.Hipp. Progn. 7, p. 2.126.6 Littré): ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ῥησειδίου κατασκευάζουσιν οἱ ἐξηγηταὶ ὅτι ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἡ βλάβη τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλοῖ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον κακῶς διακείμενον, ἡ δὲ παραφροσύνη βλάβη ἐστὶ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, οὐκοῦν ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὁ δὲ νέος ἐξηγητὴς (perhaps Asclepius) λέγει ὅτι ‘καὶ πόθεν δῆλον ὅτι ἐν καρδίᾳ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν; τί γάρ; …’. καὶ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἐν δισταγμῷ ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ζήτησις, εἴτε ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἴτε ἐν καρδίᾳ. Cassiodorus de An. c. 10.1–14 Halporn quidam sedem animae, quamvis sit corpore toto diffusa, in corde esse voluerunt, dicentes quod ibi purissimus sanguis et vitalis spiritus continetur ut inde etiam cogitationes sive malas sive bonas exire confirment; quod animae virtutem operari posse non dubium est. plurimi autem in capite insidere manifestant, si fas est cum reverentia tamen dicere, ad similitudinem aliquam divinitatis, quae licet omnia ineffabili substantia sua repleat, scriptura tamen caelos insidere confirmat. dignum enim fuit ut arcem peteret quae se noverat caelesti operatione sublimen et tali loco prae ceteris versari unde reliqua membra debuissent competenti regimine gubernari. nam et ipsa figura capitis sphaeroides pulcherrima est in qua sibi immortalis atque rationalis anima dignam faceret mansionem. Ioannes Lydus Mens. 54.2–6 κεφαλαίαν δὲ Ἀθηνᾶν τὴν φρόνησιν ἄν τις εἴποι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ βρέγματος κατὰ τὸ ἀντικέφαλον ἐναποκεῖσθαι λέγεται πρὸς ταῖς ῥίζαις τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ φρόνησις. Dionysius of Aigai Dict. at Phot. Bibl. 185, p. 130b15–18 Henry ϟηʹ. ὅτι οὐ περὶ καρδίαν τὸ διανοητικὸν ἀλλὰ περὶ κεφαλήν, ϟθʹ. καὶ ὅτι οὐ περὶ κεφαλὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ καρδίαν τὸ διανοητικόν, ρʹ. ὅτι τὸ διανοητικόν ἐστι περὶ κοιλίαν ἐγκεφάλου. Tzetzes Exeges. in Iliad. A.97, schol. 94 Lolos ‘στῆ δ᾽ ὄπιθεν’ ἐντεῦθεν διδάσκει (sc. Homer) ἡμᾶς καὶ περὶ ποῖον μέρος τῆς κεφαλῆς τὸ λογιστικὸν κεῖται, κἂν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς περὶ τὴν καρδίαν φησὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν εἶναι λέγων· ‘αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα’ (31B105.3 DK). Shakespeare Merchant of Venice 64–66 ‘Tell me where is fancy bred, or in the heart or in the head? How begot, how nourishèd?’ Chapter heading: Galen PHP 2.5.7 ἔγραψεν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικοῦ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος (SVF 3 Diog. 29). PHP 3.3.24 ἐμπέπλησται γὰρ ὁ Περὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ λόγος ὑπὸ Χρυσίππου (SVF 2.906) γεγραμμένος ἐπῶν ποιητικῶν. Cassiodorus de An. c. 10 de sede animae. §0 Whether it exists: Galen in Hipp.Off.Med. 18b.660.12–14 K. νοῦν καὶ μνήμην καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἃ πρὸς ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀνατρέπειν ἐπεχείρησεν Ἀσκληπιάδης (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 720). Sextus Empiricus M. 7.202 ἔοικε … ὁ Ἀντίοχος (fr. 66 Luck) … Ἀσκληπιάδην τὸν ἰατρὸν (—) αἰνίττεσθαι, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. M. 7.380 ἄλλων μὲν οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ὑπάρχειν τι λεγόντων ἡγεμονικόν, ὡς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 726).

liber 4 caput 5 §§1–3 Plato Democritus Hippocrates Strato: ps.Galen Int. c. 11.2, 14.710.1– 3 K. ἔστι (sc. ὁ ἐγκέφαλος) δ᾽ ἁπλοῦν σῶμα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀρχικὸν καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῷ πιστεύουσιν, ὡς Πλάτων καὶ Ἱπποκράτης (see also §2). §1 Plato Democritus: Plato Tht. 184d, Tim. 44c–d, 69d–71a, 73b–d. Alcinous Did. 17, p. 173.7–8 H. τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ λόγον περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καθίδρυσαν. Did. 23, p. 176.12–15 τὸ θεῖον αὐτῆς καὶ ἀθάνατον κατῴκισαν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τῆς οἷον ἀκροπόλεως … οἴκησίν τε ἀπονείμαντες αὐτῷ τὴν κεφαλήν. Apuleius Plat. 1.207 at enim cum tres partes animae ducat esse, rationabilem, id est mentis optumam portionem, hanc ait capitis arcem tenere. ps.Galen Int. c. 13.9, 14.732.18–733.2 K. φρενῖτις … συνίσταται δὲ περὶ ἐγκέφαλον. Galen PHP 7.6.12– 13. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.10 soli ergo homini rationem, id est vim mentis, infudit cui sedes in capite est. §2 Hippocrates: Corpus Hippocraticum Morb.Sacr. 14 τούτῳ (sc. τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ) φρονεῦμεν μάλιστα καὶ νοεῦμεν καὶ βλέπομεν καὶ ἀκούομεν καὶ γινώσκομεν τά τε αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀηδέα κτλ. Morb.Sacr. 17 διὸ φημὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον εἶναι τὸν ἑρμηνεύοντα τὴν ξύνεσιν. Soranus[?] Vit.Hipp. 12 ἐν δὲ ταῖς πολλαῖς εἰκόσιν ἐσκεπασμένος τὴν κεφαλὴν γράφεται (sc. ὁ Ἱπποκράτης), … οἱ δὲ δι᾽ ἔμφασιν τοῦ δεῖν τὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ χωρίον φρουρεῖν. Ptolemy Iudic. c. 15 p. 22.1–6 see above, section E(a)§§1–2. Galen Propr.Plac. 6, p. 177.10–13 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami (= fr. ined. 6 Helmreich 1894) πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐδείξαμεν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι τὸ μόριον, ὡς καὶ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἔδοξεν εἶναι, ⟨ἐν⟩ ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικόν ἐστιν· ἐπιρρεῖν γοῦν ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου διὰ τῶν νεύρων ἐπὶ πάντα τοῦ σώματος τὰ μόρια δύναμιν αἰσθήσεώς τε καὶ τῆς καθ᾽ ὁρμὴν κινήσεως. Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) at D.L. 8.30 φρένας δὲ καὶ νοῦν τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ. Iamblichus Protr. p. 123.13–15 Pistelli τούτῳ δὲ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ ἐγκέφαλον μη ἔσθιε· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἡγεμονικόν· ἐστι τοῦ φρονεῖν ὄργανον. Anon. Parisinus (olim Fuchsii) Morb.Acut. 1.1.4 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[c] Podolak) ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης τὸν μὲν νοῦν φησιν ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ τετάχθαι καθάπερ τι ἱερὸν ἄγαλμα ἐν ἀκροπόλει τοῦ σώματος (see also §1). §3 Strato: ps.Plutarch Lib.Aegr. 4 (Strato fr. 111 Wehrli, 63B Sharples) διὸ καὶ προσκόψαντες αὐτίκα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγομεν, τῷ πληγέντι μορίῳ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὀξέως ἀποδιδόντος. §4 Erasistratus: Galen PHP 7.3.6–10 Ἐρασίστρατος (fr. 289 Garofalo) δ᾽ ἄχρι πολλοῦ τὴν ἔξωθεν μοῖραν ὁρῶν μόνην τοῦ νεύρου τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς παχείας μήνιγγος ὁρμωμένην, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ᾤετο πεφυκέναι σύμπαν τὸ νεῦρον καὶ μεστά γε τὰ πλεῖστα τούτου τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς περιεχούσης τὸν ἐγκέφαλον μήνιγγος πεφυκέναι φάσκοντος τὰ νεῦρα. (8) ἔχει δ᾽ ἡ ῥῆσις αὐτοῦ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· ‘ἐθεωροῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου … (9) … καὶ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος παραπλήσιος ὢν νήστει καὶ πολύπλοκος, πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον τούτου ἡ ἐπεγκρανὶς πολλοῖς ἑλιγμοῖς καὶ ποικίλοις κατεσκεύαστο. (10) ὥστε μαθεῖν ⟨ἐκ⟩ τούτων τὸν θεωροῦντα ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων, ἐλάφου τε καὶ λαγωοῦ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο κατὰ τὸ τρέχειν πολύ τι τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων ὑπεραίρει τοῖς πρὸς ταῦτα χρησίμοις εὖ κατε-

1491

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liber 4 caput 5

σκευασμένον μυσί τε καὶ νεύροις, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐπειδὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων πολὺ τῷ διανοεῖσθαι περίεστι, πολὺ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι ⟨καὶ⟩ πολύπλοκον. … ’ Propr.Plac. 7, p. 179.19–22 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami οὐ διωρισάμεος δὲ σαφῶς, ὡς Ἐρασίστρατος διωρίσατο, πότερον αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κατά τινος κοίλου ἐν τῷ τοῦ ζῴου σώματι περιέχεται τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ψυχικόν, ἢ δι᾽ ὅλων διελήλυθεν τῶν στερεῶν σωμάτων. Corpus Hermeticum 10.11 τῷ ὑμένι τῆς κεφαλῆς ταύτης, ⟨ἐν ᾗ⟩ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή. Anon. Parisinus (olim Fuchsii) Morb.Acut. 1.1.1 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[c] Podolak) Ἐρασίστρατος (fr. 176 Garofalo) μὲν ἐξ ἀκολούθου τῶν ἑαυτοῦ δογμάτων φησὶ γίνεσθαι τὴν φρενῖτιν κατά τι πάθος τῶν κατὰ τὴν μήνιγγα ἐνεργειῶν· οὗ γὰρ τόπου κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ἡ νόησις φρόνησις, ἐπὶ τούτου ἡ παρανόησις παραφρόνησις ἂν εἴη. ps.Galen Int. c. 13.9, 14.732.18–733.3 K. φρενῖτις … συνίσταται δὲ περὶ … ἢ μήνιγγας. §5 Herophilus: ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.378.5–6 K. ριγʹ. … ἐν τῇ βάσει τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου. ps.Galen Int. c. 11.3, 14.711.6–8 K. κοιλίας δὲ ἔχει ὁ ἐγκέφαλος δύο· κατ᾽ ἐνίους δὲ μίαν· ἔνθα τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἵδρυται. Galen UP 8.11, 3.667.7–10 K. καὶ οἷς γε τετάρτη τις αὕτη κοιλία (sc. τὸ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τὴν κοινὴν κοιλότητα μόριον ἐγκεφάλου … οὐκ ἂν ἀλόγως δόξειεν ὠνομάσθαι καμάριόν τε καὶ ψαλιδοειδές) νενόμισται, κυριωτάτην εἶναί φασιν αὐτὴν ἁπασῶν τῶν καθ᾽ ὅλον τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. Ἡρόφιλος (fr. 78 (resp. 138) Von Staden) μὴν οὐ ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ παρεγκεφαλίδι κυριωτέραν ἔοικεν ὑπολαμβάνειν. §6 Parmenides: Parmenides 28B6.4–6 DK αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν / πλάζονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν / στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλαγκτὸν νόον. Lucretius DRN 3.138–140 sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto / consilium, quod nos animum mentemque vocamus, / idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 10.66 λέγει (Epicurus fr. 311 Usener) ἐν ἄλλοις … τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι, ὡς δῆλον ἔκ τε τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς. Lactantius Op.D. 16.3 Perrin quidem sedem mentis in pectore esse voluerunt. §7/§14 Aristotle Stoics Pythagoras: Galen PHP 1.6.3 Ἐρασίστρατος (fr. 203 Garofalo) μὲν γὰρ ζωτικοῦ πνεύματος, Χρύσιππος (SVF 2.897) δὲ τοῦ ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος πλήρη φησὶν εἶναι τὴν κοιλίαν ταύτην τὴν ἀριστερὰν τῆς καρδίας. §7 Aristotle: Aristotle Iuv. 3 469a6–9 ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ τῆς θρεπτικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῖς ἐναίμοις. GA 2.1 735a23–25 εἰ ἡ καρδία πρῶτον ἔν τισι ζῴοις γίγνεται, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσι καρδίαν τὸ ταύτῃ ἀνάλογον, ἐκ ταύτης ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῖς ἔχουσι. GA 2.6 743b25–26 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ζῴου παντός (cf. Bonitz 365b34–54, ‘animae facultates, quae in corde sedem habent’). PA 3.9 672b30–33 καλοῦνται (sc. τὸ διάζωμα) φρένες ὡς μετέχουσαί τι τοῦ φρονεῖν. αἱ δὲ μετέχουσι μὲν οὐδέν, ἐγγὺς δ᾽ οὖσαι τῶν μετεχόντων ἐπίδηλον ποιοῦσι τὴν μεταβολὴν τῆς διανοίας. ps.Aristotle Probl. 30.1 954a34–36 πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς εἶναι τοῦ νοεροῦ τόπου (sc. τῆς καρδίας) τὴν θερμότητα ταύτην (sc. τῆς χολῆς μελαίνης) νοσήμασιν ἁλίσκονται μανικοῖς ἢ ἐνθουσιαστικοῖς. ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.378.8 K. ριγʹ. … ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ. Galen PHP 6.1.1 προὔκειτο μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῶν διοικουσῶν ἡμᾶς δυνάμεων, εἴτ᾽ ἐκ τῆς καρδίας μόνης ὁρμῶνται σύμπασαι, καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης

liber 4 caput 5 τε καὶ Θεόφραστος ὑπελάμβανον. PHP 3.1.9 (SVF 3.885 ad init.) ὁ Χρύσιππος κατὰ τὸ⟨ν⟩ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον τῶν μερῶν αὐτῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μνημονεύειν ἀρχόμενος, ἔνθα δὴ δεικνύναι πειρᾶται τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μόνῃ περιέχεσθαι. Propr.Plac. 8, p. 180.23–25 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami Χρύσιππος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν περὶ μὲν ἡγεμονικοῦ ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ μορίῳ σώματος κατῴκισται γεγράψασιν. more substantial version PHP 8.1.10 (not in SVF, probably not verbatim) ὁ Χρύσιππος ἔγραψεν· ἔνθα τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν· τὰ δὲ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν καρδίᾳ· ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. criticizing other Stoics Chrysippus de An. at Gal. PHP 3.8.3–4 (SVF 2.908, verbatim) ἀκούω δέ τινας λέγειν παραμυθουμένους πρὸς τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ εἶναι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος. τὸ γὰρ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, μῆτιν οὖσαν καὶ οἷον φρόνησιν, ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς γενέσθαι τοῦ Διὸς σύμβολόν φασιν εἶναι τοῦ ταύτῃ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως ἂν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ γενέσθαι μῆτιν καὶ φρόνησιν, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν ταύτῃ ἐστί· πιθανοῦ μέν τινος ἐχόμενοι, διαμαρτάνοντες δ᾽ ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες τὰ περὶ τούτων ἱστορούμενα κτλ. also PHP 2.5.6–24 (SVF 1.148, 2.894, 3 Diog. 29). Anon. Parisinus (olim Fuchsii) Morb.Acut. 1.1.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 13[c] Podolak) Πραξαγόρας (fr. 62 Steckerl) δὲ φλεγμονὴν τῆς καρδίας εἶναί φησι τὴν φρενῖτιν, ἧς καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργον φρόνησιν οἴεται εἶναι. John Philoponus in de An. 587.25 ἐν καρδίᾳ γὰρ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δοξάζει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Scholia vetera in Iladem 10.10a Erbse ‘νειόθεν ἐκ κραδίης’: ἐκ τῶν ἐσωτάτω λογισμῶν· ἔνδον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλογισμοῖς τὰ δεινὰ ὁρῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν στένει. ἐντεῦθεν κινηθεὶς Φιλότιμος (fr. 1 Steckerl) ἐν καρδίᾳ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἔθετο· ὅθεν γὰρ τὸ χαίρειν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖθεν ἤρτηται. SVF 2.834–849. §8 Diogenes Stoicus: Galen PHP 2.8.40 οὔθ᾽ ὅταν ὁ Διογένης (SVF 3 Diog. 30) εἴπῃ: ‘ὃ πρῶτον τροφῆς καὶ πνεύματος ἀρύεται, ἐν τούτῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὃ δὲ πρῶτον τροφῆς καὶ πνεύματος ἀρύεται, ἡ καρδία’. PHP 1.6.3 Χρύσιππος (SVF 2.897) δὲ τοῦ ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος πλήρη φησὶν εἶναι τὴν κοιλίαν ταύτην (sc. τὴν ἀριστερὰν τῆς καρδίας). §9 Empedocles: Empedocles 31B105.3 DK αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα. Corpus Hippocraticum Morb. 1.30 φρενῖτις δὲ ὧδε ἔχει· τὸ αἷμα τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πλεῖστον ξυμβάλλεται μέρος συνέσιος· ἔνιοι δὲ λέγουσι, τὸ πᾶν (cited ps.Gal. de Ccausa affectionum p. 18.28–30 Helmreich). NH 6, p. 178.15–27 Jouanna ὁρέοντες ἀποσφαζομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὸ αἷμα ῥέον ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, τοῦτο νομίζουσιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Flat. 14 ἡγεῦμαι δὲ ἔμπροσθεν, μηδὲν εἶναι μᾶλλον τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ξυμβαλλόμενον ἐς φρόνησιν, ἢ τὸ αἷμα. Plato Phd. 96b καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά (on Empedocles, 31A76 DK) ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν. Theophrastus Sens. 10 (on Empedocles, 31A86 DK) διὸ καὶ τῷ αἵματι μάλιστα φρονεῖν· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα κεκρᾶσθαί {ἐστι} τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν μερῶν. Porphyry de Styge at Stob. Ecl. 1.4.53, p. 424.9–19 Wachsmuth (377F Smith) οἴεται γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρος, καθὰ καὶ πλεῖστοι τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτὸν ὑπέλαβον, ἐν τῷ αἵματι εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν περὶ τὰ θνητὰ φρόνησιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτὸν πολλοὶ τοῦτο πιστοῦνται δεικνύντες ὅτι καὶ ὑπερθερμανθὲν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ καὶ χολῆς ἀφραίνειν ποιεῖ καὶ ἀνοηταίνειν. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε οὕτω φαίνεται ὡς ὀργάνου πρὸς σύνεσιν τοῦ αἵματος ὄντος λέγειν (31B105 DK follows). cf. Hippolytus Ref. 1.22.5 (Epicurus fr. 340 Usener)

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τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων λύεσθαι ἅμα τοῖς σώμασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ συγγεννᾶσθαι αὐτοῖς τίθεται· αἷμα γὰρ αὐτὰς εἶναι. §12 Anonymi: ps.Galen Int. c. 13.9, 14.732.18–733.4 K. φρενῖτις … συνίσταται … ἢ ὥς τινες λέγουσι περὶ φρένας, ὃ διάφραγμα καλεῖται. Anon. Parisinus (olim Fuchsii) Morb.Acut. 1.1.3 ὁ δὲ Διοκλῆς (fr. 72 Van der Eijk) φλεγμονὴν τοῦ διαφράγματός φησιν εἶναι τὴν φρενῖτιν (ἀπὸ τόπου καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας τὸ πάθος καλῶν), συνδιατιθεμένης καὶ τῆς καρδίας (ἔοικε γὰρ καὶ οὗτος τὴν φρόνησιν περὶ ταύτην ἀπολείπειν). §13 Later anonymi: cf. Erasistratus fr. 112B Garofalo at Gal. PHP 4.1.25 Ἐρασίστρατος οὖν οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ οὗτοι (sc. Hippocrates and Plato) τὸ ζητούμενον λαμβάνων, ἀλλὰ μετὰ κατασκευῆς λόγων οὐκ ὀλίγης, ἐκ μὲν κεφαλῆς φησι τὸ ψυχικόν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς καρδίας τὸ ζωτικὸν ὁρμᾶσθαι πνεῦμα. §14 Pythagoras: Philolaus 44B13 DK at Iambl. Theol.Ar. 25.17–26.3 = Nicom. Ar. 25.17–26.3 καὶ τέσσαρες ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ζώιου τοῦ λογικοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ Φιλόλαος ἐν τῷ Περὶ φύσεως λέγει· ‘ἐγκέφαλος, καρδία, ὀμφαλός, αἰδοῖον· κεφαλὰ μὲν νόου, καρδία δὲ ψυχᾶς καὶ αἰσθήσιος, ὀμφαλὸς δὲ ῥιζώσιος καὶ ἀναφύσιος τοῦ πρώτου, αἰδοῖον δὲ σπέρματος {καὶ} καταβολᾶς τε καὶ γεννήσιος. ἐγκέφαλος δὲ ⟨ἔχει⟩ τὰν ἀνθρώπω ἀρχάν, καρδία δὲ τὰν ζώου, ὀμφαλὸς δὲ τὰν φυτοῦ, αἰδοῖον δὲ τὰν ξυναπάντων· πάντα γὰρ ἀπὸ σπέρματος καὶ θάλλοντι καὶ βλαστάνοντι.’ Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) ap. D.L. 8.30 εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ καρδίας μέχρις ἐγκεφάλου· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μέρος αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν θυμόν, φρένας δὲ καὶ νοῦν τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ. Ptolemy Iudic. c. 15, p. 22.10–12 ἑκάστη τῶν ψυχικῶν δυνάμεων ἡγεμονικὸν ἔσται τοῦ οἰκείου ἔργου καὶ οὕτως πανταχῇ τοῦ σώματος ἐροῦμεν τὰ ἡγεμονικά. Iudic. c. 16, p. 22.13–19 καλῶς ἂν οὖν ἔχοι συγκεράσασί πως ἀμφότερα τὰ σημαινόμενα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, δύο ποιεῖν αὐτὰ λαβοῦσιν ἀπὸ τῶν κυριωτάτων· τὸ μὲν ὡς τοῦ ζῆν αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ὡς τοῦ εὖ ζῆν αἰτιώτατον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὡς κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ ὡς κατὰ τὸ βέλτιον· κυριώτατον δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς μὲν τὸ ζῆν μόνον τὸ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν· πρὸς δὲ τό τε ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, τὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον.

Liber 4 Caput 6 PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 899B; pp. 392a3–10 Diels—PJ: ps.Iustinus Coh. 6.2.23– 25 Marcovich—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā p. 195 Daiber S: Stobaeus Ecl. 1.49.7b–c, p. 325.11–16 Wachsmuth Cf. Nem: Nemesius NH c. 2, p. 28.12–14, p. 29.13–15 Morani

Titulus ϛʹ. Περὶ κινήσεως ψυχῆς (P,S) §1 Πλάτων ἀεικίνητον μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἀκίνητον τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως. (P1,S2) §2 Ἀριστοτέλης ἀκίνητον τὴν ψυχὴν πάσης κινήσεως προηγουμένην, τῆς δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχειν, καθάπερ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ καθάπαξ τὰ περὶ τοῖς σώμασιν εἴδη. (P2,S1) §1 Plato cf. Phdr. 245b–c; §2 Aristoteles cf. de An. 1.3 405b32–406a2, 406a17–20; 1.4 408b30– 31 caput non hab. G titulus Περὶ … ψυχῆς P : Περὶ κινήσεως καῖ ἀφθαρσίας (tit. cc. 4.6–7) ψυχῆς S §1 [2–3] Πλάτων … κινήσεως P : Πλάτων ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀεικίνητον S ‖ [2] τῆς PB(I,II)Q : πάσης PB(III) §2 [4] προηγουμένην PB(I,III)JQS prob. Diels Mau : προηγουμένης PB(II) ‖ [5–6] τὰ σχήματα … καθάπαξ S : om. PBQ (per haplographiam) ‖ [6] τὰ … σώμασιν S : περὶ τὰ σώματα dub. Diels conl. 4.8.9[30] : ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν Meineke : τὰ εἴδη τῶν σωμάτων PB : wie die Körper an den Formen teilhaben Q

Testes primi: Traditio ps.Plutarchi: ps.Iustinus Coh. 6.2 (~ §1) καὶ ὁ μὲν ⟨Πλάτων⟩ ἀεικίνητον αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγει. (~ §2) Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀκίνητον αὐτὴν εἶναί φησιν, ἁπάσης κινήσεως προηγουμένην Testes secundi: Nemesius NH c. 2, p. 28.12–14 (~ ch. 4.2.6) (de Aristotele) ἔπειτά φησιν ἐντελέχειαν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν, (~ §2) ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν, κινεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. NH c. 2, p. 29.13–15 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀεικίνητος οὖσα, κινουμένη κατὰ φύσιν ἠρεμεῖν οὐ δύναται· ἡ γὰρ ἠρεμία φθορὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι καὶ παντὸς ἀεικινήτου (~ §1). Loci Aetiani: quaestio cf. A 1.13.6–7 Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἐφεξῆς τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ἀκίνητον ἀπεφήναντο. Στωικοὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὡρίσαντο κινητόν. §1 A 4.2.1 Θαλῆς τὴν ψυχήν φύσιν ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον. A 4.2.2 Αλκμαίων φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον. A 4.2.5 Πλάτων οὐσίαν νοητήν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητήν. §2 A 1.7.23 ᾽Αριστοτέλης … ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ λόγος ἀκίνητος αἴτιος τῆς κινήσεως κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν. A 4.20.1 πᾶσα δ᾽ ἐπιφάνεια ἀσώματος. συγκινεῖται μὲν γὰρ τοῖς σώμασιν.

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For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) The witnesses are P (represented by PB, PQ but not by PE; on PJ see below (2)), and S. P has two lemmata, P1 and P2. Ad sententiam the main point is the same in S. Parallel to P2, S at 1.49.7b has a single lemma with name-label Aristotle. Parallel to P1, S coalesces one name-label (Plato) and the two different attributes of the soul (ἄφθαρτον and ἀεικίνητον) from A 4.7.1 and A 4.6.1, in that order, at 1.49.7c. Lactantius Op.D. 17.1 (see section E(a)§1) and G c. 24 DG p. 613.15–16 ἀλλ᾽ ὁ Πλάτων ἀεικίνητον καὶ οὐδέποτε διαφθαρησομένην interestingly provide a parallel for S’s coalescence. (2) The diaeresis of ps.Justin is very close to P (the verbal parallels are exact), so it is very likely that in this case, differing from chs. 4.2–4, he drew on the Epitome. On the question of his relation to P and A see also General Introduction section 4.1.(3), and our remarks in ch. 4.2 Commentary A(5). (3) T has not excerpted this chapter. (4) The numbering and division at S Ecl. 1.49.7a (= A 4.4.5), 7b, and 7c based on the chapters of A in the DG introduced (as always) by Wachsmuth in S proves quite confusing here, for to our surprise he has failed to notice that S has coalesced the two chapters 4.6 and 4.7. This intervention is compounded by partly mistaken references, as Wachsmuth refers 1.49.7b to A 4.3.2 instead of 4.6.2, and 1.49.7c to A 4.3.1 instead of 4.6.1 (but his references to the pages of DG are correct). We note that S’s coalescence results in his reversing the order of the doxai. B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. In G this material probably arrived from a parallel tradition. G c. 24 DG 613.16 notes that Plato’s soul is ἀεικίνητον (as at Phdr. 245c), but this has to do more with its indestructibility (as in A 4.7) than with a contrast to something that does not move. Several lines up, p. 613.10–11, he tells us that ‘according to some it is the principle of the motion of all the things that are and are becoming’, οἱ δὲ κινήσεως ἀρχὴν πάντων τῶν γινομένων καὶ τῶν ὄντων. This is best interpreted as another reminiscence of the famous passage in Phaedrus. The parallel chapter in Iamblichus has also preserved the contrasting views of Stoics and physicists and others who attribute corporeal movements to the soul, see Festugière (1953) 11. (2) Sources. Both lemmata go back in part to passages in Plato and Aristotle, namely the famous passage in the Phaedrus on the ever-moving self-moved

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immortal soul as principle of motion (246b–c), and esp. the third chapter of Book 1 of the De anima, which begins by criticizing Plato’s view of self-motion, continues this criticism further down, and for the soul admits only motion per accidens. Thus, the diaphonia of the present chapter is anticipated in Aristotle. C Chapter Heading The heading is again a case of the umbrella type (περὶ τοῦ δεῖνα) that dominates in the Placita (see above, ch. 1.3 Commentary C), and here refers precisely to one aspect: the soul’s motion, a concept about which questions can be put in all categories, see Theophrastus fr. 153B FHS&G at ch. 1.23 above, Commentary C. It is found in PB, confirmed by PQ, and also occurs in S. It is clearly adumbrated by the embedded heading at Aristotle de An. 1.3 405b30–31, cited below section E(b) Chapter heading. But note that S coalesces the two headings of chs. 4.6 and 4.7 into a single short sub-heading of his major ch. 1.49 at 1.49.7b, p. 325.9: ‘On movement and indestructibility of soul’ (Περὶ κινήσεως καὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς). Though the phrase κίνησις ψυχῆς is not unusual, Περὶ κινήσεως ψυχῆς cannot be paralleled as a phrase, heading, or title. For parallels for the heading of ch. 4.7 see at that chapter, Commentary C. D Analysis a Context This is the penultimate chapter of the cluster of six on the soul per se. Together with ch. 7 it forms a sort of appendix in which remaining issues are mopped up, after the rather more substantial chs. 4.2–5. The Placita didactically separate themes that may be treated together in other literature and often are in fact so treated, cf. Diels (1897) 112, cited above, Introduction to Book 1, section 2. S for the sake of efficiency again combines them—an efficiency much enhanced by the ruthless Byzantine excerptors of the pages corresponding to chs. 4.6– 7. The soul’s motion is a major theme in the critical overview of doctrines in Aristotle’s De anima, see e.g. on the predecessors 1.2 403b28–29; M–R 2.1.143– 144. The νοῦς mentioned in the second clause of §1 connects up with the theme of ch. 4.7a Περὶ νοῦ. b Number–Order of Lemmata Both P and S have two lemmata. The order in S is the converse of that in P. But S at Ecl. 1.49.7b–c has interfered with the sequence, so we should follow that of P just as Diels has done in the DG. S moreover has coalesced the Plato lemma of ch. 4.7.1 with that of 4.6.1, thus reading Πλάτων ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀεικίνητον, in the process considerably abridging the contents. This new lemma S2 serves to introduce the verbatim quotation in S of Plato, Phd. 69e–70b, which in its turn justifies the abridgement of the original lemma, of which we have a much

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fuller text in P1 (cf. Jeremiah 2018 at M–R 4.286 and 353). On the other hand the text of the second lemma has (as so often) been somewhat abridged in P. Diels has bracketed {ἄφθαρτον καὶ} at 4.6.1, though he could have divided the contents of the coalesced lemma over chs. 4.6 and 4.7 in his column for S, as we do now in the text of both reconstructed chapters. The chapter comprises the main diaphonia going back to Aristotle (cf. above, section A). Now Aristotle at de An. 1.3 406b15–25 also includes Democritus’ view of the soul’s self-motion, not represented in the present chapter, as a parallel to Plato’s view. The previous ch. 4.2 moreover attributes self-motion to the soul not only to Plato in §5, but also to Thales in §1, Alcmaeon in §2, Pythagoras in §3, and Xenocrates in §4 (no Democritus here either). Xenocrates’ view that the soul is a self-moving number is sharply criticized at de An. 1.4 408b32–409a10 (followed by further criticism of Democritus) and at de An. 1.5 409a31–b8 together with that of Democritus. We note that in ch. 4.2.6 on Aristotle, motion is not mentioned. Arguably, one of A’s little chapters, anticipated in the extensive discussion of the question in de An. 1.3–5, was required for the main diaphonia regarding the soul’s motion including Aristotle’s own view, while there was apparently no need to repeat the parallels to Plato’s view. So in this sense the chapter is complete. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter The chapter is about the categories of action and passivity. The main division, or rather diaphonia, is between perpetual mobility on the one hand and immobility on the other, and recalls the diaphonia in A at S 1.13.1d = ch. 1.11.6–7, two lemmata of the chapter ‘On causes’, where according to Thales the First Cause is immobile, whereas the Stoics held it to be moving. See M–R 3.381, where it is pointed out that this diaphonia may represent a separate chapter of an earlier version. Our dilemmatic ch. 4.6 shows that two lemmata may indeed be sufficient for a diaphonic chapter, cf. ch. 4.7a, and in Book 2 chs. 2.8, 2.10, 2.12, and 2.18. We have seen that the soul’s self-motion is already a theme in ch. 4.2. In ch. 4.2 as well as in the present chapter motion is taken in a strictly corporealist sense: there is no reference to thought or perception or emotion as motions of the soul. Here, in ch. 4.6, both opposed doxai also sport an exception of their own, which to some extent conflicts with the general position in a sort of internal sub-diaeresis. Though the Platonic soul is perpetually moving, its (indwelling) mind is said to be immobile as far as locomotion is concerned. The Aristotelian soul is said to be immobile and prior to each kind of motion, yet is (exceptionally) able to participate in (loco)motion per accidens, just as the shapes and boundaries and forms of things do. These exceptions constitute a subsidiary point in the context of the debate of the soul’s motion in general.

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d

Further Comments Individual Points §1 This Plato is a Plato interpretatus. The immobility of the Platonic nous is attested in e.g. Plutarch An.Procr. 1024C. This makes the evidence of the Placita, about contemporaneous with the genuine Plutarch, quite interesting, while the Plutarchan parallel reveals the impact of Middle Platonism also in the present lemma. We must however note that Plutarch speaks of the Nous of the World Soul, A of the nous of man. Its immobility explicitly pertains to locomotion, so thinking qua motion is not excluded. Aristotle, whose Immobile Mover is a Nous, ascribes an immobile Nous to Anaxagoras at Phys. 8.5 256b24–27. For ἀεικίνητον rather than αὐτοκίνητον at Pl. Phdr. 245c see the definitive account of Haslam (1999) 265–267. §2 Aristotle. P’s abridgement does not do much harm, because ps.Justin (see testes primi) confirms the reading of S. The doxa reproduces Aristotle’s doctrine remarkably well, esp. in the longer version extant in S: the shapes, boundaries and forms echo the colour and length mentioned as moving along with things as stated in Arist. de An. 1.3, and motion per accidens is indeed Aristotle’s view of the motion permitted for soul. e Other Evidence The main opposition, between Plato and Aristotle, is echoed in various ways in the later literature; see esp. the long discussion at Macrobius in Somn. 2.12.16– 2.16. The issue of the soul’s motion is often treated together with that of its mortality or immortality, put in a different next chapter in the Placita. S coalesced the two chapters under a common heading, as is still visible from what is left of them at 1.49.7a–b. E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: Capitula Lucretiana at DRN 3.182 de mobilitate animi. ad DRN 4.722 de animi motu. Hippolytus Ref. 1.19.10 καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ μέν φασιν αὐτὸν ἀγένητον λέγειν καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ὅταν λέγῃ (Pl. Phdr. 245c)· ‘ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος· τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον’, καὶ ὅταν αὐτοκίνητον αὐτὴν ἀποδεικνύῃ καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως. Iamblichus de An. fr. 16 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.36 370.14–26 W. τίς οὖν ἀνήκοός ἐστι τῆς Περιπατητικῆς δόξης, ἣ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκίνητον μὲν εἶναί φησιν, αἰτίαν δὲ κινήσεων; εἰ δὴ καὶ ἀνενέργητόν ἐστι τὸ ἀκίνητον, ἔσται καὶ χορηγὸν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνενέργητον. εἰ δ᾽, ὡς ἔνιοι λέγουσι, τέλος καὶ συνοχὴ καὶ ἕνωσις καὶ μόνιμος αἰτία τῶν κινήσεών ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ταύτην ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνείληφεν ἡ κατ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλην ἀκίνητος ἐντελέχεια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔσται ἀπὸ τῆς τελειοτάτης ἐνεργείας προϊοῦσα {ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς} ἡ ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τῶν ζῴων ἔργοις ἀπεργασία. αὕτη τοίνυν κατά γε Πλάτωνα πολλοῦ δεῖ ἡ αὐτὴ

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εἶναι τῇ συμφύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίᾳ καὶ ζωῇ. also pp. 371.22–372.2 οὐ μὴν ἔτι γε τούτοις συγχωροῦσιν οἱ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, οἷον οἱ Στωικοὶ (SVF 2.801) καὶ ἄλλοι πλείονες· οὐδ᾽ ὅσοι συγκεκρᾶσθαι αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν οἴονται, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσικῶν· οὐδὲ ὅσοι βλάστημα αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων ποιοῦσιν ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσαν. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι σωματοειδεῖς τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῇ ἀποδιδόασιν. §1 Plato: Cicero Tusc. 1.66–67 (Cons. fr. 10) (deus) mens soluta … ipsaque praedita motu sempiterno. (67) hoc e genere atque eadem e natura est humana mens. Lactantius Op.D. 17.1 Perrin nec … immortalem esse animam non intelligemus, quoniam quidquid viget moveturque per se semper nec videri nec tangi potest, aeternum sit necesse est. ps.Galen HPh c. 24 DG p. 613.16 ἀλλ᾽ ὁ Πλάτων ἀεικίνητον. §2 Aristotle: Arius Didymus fr. 17 Diels at Stob. Ecl. 1.56, p. 496.20–23 τοῦ δὲ κινητικοῦ κατὰ τόπον ὃ δὴ προσείπομεν ὁρμητικόν, τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν, καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἀκίνητον εἶναι. Calcidius in Tim. c. 223 (on the Peripatetics) animam … , quae tamen recipiatur a corpore, quippe corpori perfectionem det ipsa sitque eius entelechia, res per semet ipsam immobilis, sicut sunt artes et disciplinae, ex accidenti vero aliquo mobilis propterea quod sit in animalibus quae, dum vivunt, moventur.

b

Sources and Other Parallel Texts

General texts: Aristotle Top. 2.4 111b4–8 ἐὰν οὖν τι τεθῇ λεγόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ὁπωσοῦν, οἷον τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖσθαι, σκοπεῖν εἰ κατά τι τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν τῆς κινήσεως ἐνδέχεται τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖσθαι, οἷον αὔξεσθαι ἢ φθείρεσθαι ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα κινήσεως εἴδη· εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδέν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ κινεῖται. de An. 1.2 403b28–31 φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν, οἰηθέντες δὲ τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον, τῶν κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι. de An. 1.3 405b31–406a2 ἴσως γὰρ οὐ μόνον ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι οἵαν (406a1) φασὶν οἱ λέγοντες ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ (Pl. Phdr. 245b–c) ἢ δυνάμενον κινεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν. 1.3 de An. 1.3 406a11–12 νῦν ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν κινεῖται καὶ μετέχει κινήσεως. Tertullian de An. 6.3 dehinc si corporis est moveri extrinsecus ab aliquo, ostendimus autem supra (sc. in the De censu animae) moveri animam et ab alio, cum vaticinatur, cum furit, utique extrinsecus, cum ab alio, merito quod movebitur extrinsecus ab alio secundum exempli propositionem corpus agnoscam. enimvero si ab alio moveri corporis est, quanto magis movere aliud? anima autem movet corpus, et conatus eius extrinsecus foris parent. Macrobius in Somn. 2.12.16–end of ch. 2.16 (too long to quote). in Somn. 2.12.16 in fine autem validissimum immortalitatis animae argumentum ponit (sc. Cicero following Plato) quia ipsa corpori praestat agitatum. 2.13.9 his praemissis iam quibus syllogismis de immortalitate animae diversi sectatores Platonis ratiocinati sint oportet aperiri. 2.14.2 Aristoteles vero adeo non adquiescit, ut animam non solum ex se non moveri, sed ne moveri quidem penitus conetur adserere. 2.15.1 contra has tam subtiles et argutas et

liber 4 caput 6 veri similes argumentationes accingendum est secundum sectatores Platonis, qui inceptum quo Aristoteles tam veram tamque validam definitionem magistri sauciare temptaverat subruerunt. Chapter heading: Aristotle de An. 1.3 405b31 (beginning of chapter) ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ κινήσεως (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς). §1 Plato: Plato Phdr. 245c (cited Calc. in Tim. c. 57) ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον κτλ. cf. Cicero Rep. 6.27 (= Somn.Scip.) nam quod semper movetur, aeternum est etc., cited Macrobius in Somn. 2.13.1–6 quod quale sit ex ipsis verbis Ciceronis quae sequuntur invenies … omnis hic locus de Phaedro Platonis ad verbum a Cicerone translatus est, in quo validissimis argumentis animae immortalitas adseritur, et haec est argumentorum summa, esse animam mortis inmunem quoniam ex se movetur. ND 2.32 audiamus enim Platonem quasi quendam deum philosophorum; cui duo placet esse motus, unum suum alterum externum, esse autem divinius quod ipsum ex se sua sponte moveatur quam quod pulsu agitetur alieno. hunc autem motum in solis animis esse ponit, ab isque principium motus esse ductum putat. Philo of Alexandria Aet. 84 τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἐὰν ἀνέλῃς ψυχῆς, καὶ αὐτὴν πάντως συνανελεῖς. Plutarch An.Procr. 1013C κίνησιν αὐτοκίνητον ἀεὶ καὶ ‘κινήσεως πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν’ (sc. ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ψυχὴν προσεῖπεν Phdr. 245c). Ep.An.Procr. 1032B ὁ δὲ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ μόνιμος ἦν καὶ ἀκίνητος. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 3.67 (soul according to Plato) αὐτοκίνητόν τε εἶναι. Alcinous Did. c. 5, p. 157.27–36 H. ζητῶν εἰ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ὑποθέμενος αὐτὸ τοῦτο ζητῶ εἰ ἀεικίνητος, καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδείξας ζητῶ εἰ τὸ ἀεικίνητον αὐτοκίνητον, καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο ἀποδείξας σκοπῶ εἰ τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, εἶτα εἰ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀγένητος, ὅπερ τίθενται ὡς ὁμολογούμενον, τοῦ ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου ὄντος· ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἀρξάμενος ἐναργοῦς ὄντος συνθήσω τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν· ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀγένητον, καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ἀρχὴ κινήσεως τὸ αὐτοκίνητον, τὸ αὐτοκίνητον δὲ ψυχή, ἄφθαρτος ἄρα καὶ ἀγένητος καὶ ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή. c. 25, p. 178.15–23 H. τό γε μὴν αὐτοκίνητον ἀρχικῶς ἀεικίνητον, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀθάνατον· αὐτοκίνητον δὲ ἡ ψυχή. τὸ δὲ αὐτοκίνητον ἀρχὴ πάσης κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως, ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, ὥστε ἥ τε τῶν ὅλων ψυχὴ τοιαύτη ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη, τοῦ αὐτοῦ γε κράματος ἀμφότεραι μεταλαβοῦσαι. αὐτοκίνητον δέ φησι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν ζωὴν ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσαν καθ᾽ αὑτήν. Plotinus Enn. 5.1.[10].8 ἥπτετο μὲν οὖν καὶ Παρμενίδης (cf. 28B3 DK) πρότερον τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης (sc. Plato’s) καθόσον εἰς ταὐτὸ συνῆγεν ὂν καὶ νοῦν … σωματικὴν πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἐξαίρων ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ. Porphyrius Sent. 21.21–24 οὐκ ἦν (sc. ἡ ψυχή) ἐξ ἀζωίας καὶ ζωῆς συγκείμενον πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ ζωὴ μόνον· καὶ τοῦτο ἦν τῷ Πλάτωνι τὸ οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ λόγον τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτοκίνητον. Macrobius in Somn. 2.15.6 Plato enim cum dicit animam ex se moveri, id est cum αὐτοκίνητον (cf. Phdr. 245c τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν) vocat, non vult eam inter illa numerari quae ex se quidem videntur moveri, sed a causa quae intra se latet moventur, ut moventur animalia auctore quidem alio sed occulto, nam ab anima moventur, aut ut moventur arbores, quarum etsi non videtur agitator, a natura tamen eas interius latente constat agitari; sed Plato ita animam dicit ex se moveri ut non aliam causam vel extrinsecus accidentem vel interius latentem huius motus dicat auctorem.

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§2 Aristotle: Aristotle de An. 1.3 408b30–31 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. de An. 1.3 406a16–20 εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κινεῖν ἑαυτήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπάρξει, ὥσπερ τῷ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ τριπήχει· κινεῖται γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ᾧ γὰρ ὑπάρχουσιν, ἐκεῖνο κινεῖται, τὸ σῶμα. de An. 3.8 433b15–17 ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 22.7–15 ὡς γὰρ ἡ βαρύτης αἰτία μὲν γίνεται τῇ γῇ τῆς εἰς τὸ κάτω φορᾶς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐστι κινητική, οὐ μὴν κινουμένη καθ᾽ αὑτήν … , οὕτως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν ζῴων πασῶν τῶν ὡς ζῴου κινήσεων ἔχουσα τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐπεὶ κατὰ ταύτην αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐξουσία, οὐκ αὐτὴ κινουμένη καθ᾽ αὑτὴν οὕτως κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα. κινουμένῳ μέντοι τῷ σώματι συγκινεῖται καὶ αὐτή, καὶ γίνεται κινουμένη κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅπερ καὶ πᾶν εἶδος πάσχειν ἀνάγκη συνὸν καὶ συνοδεῦον τῷ σώματι, οὗ ἐστι, τῷ εἶναι ἀχώριστον αὐτοῦ. Alexander of Aphrodisias(?) de An.Mant. 106.6–7 αὐτὴ γὰρ ἀκίνητος καθ᾽ αὑτήν. Porphyry de An. adv. Boeth. 247F Smith (verbatim) at Eus. PE 15.11.1 πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐντελέχειαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰπόντα καὶ ἀκίνητον παντελῶς οὖσαν κινεῖν ὑπειληφότα ῥητέον, πόθεν οἱ ἐνθουσιασμοὶ τοῦ ζῴου μηδὲν μὲν ξυνιέντος ὧν ὁρᾷ τε καὶ λέγει, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ μὴ ἐνεστὼς βλεπούσης καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ κινουμένης, πόθεν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ζῴου συστάσεως αἱ τῆς ὡς ζῴου ψυχῆς βουλαί τε καὶ σκέψεις καὶ θελήσεις, ῥοπαὶ οὖσαι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ οὐ τοῦ σώματος; Themistius in Phys. 40.19–21 ὅταν (sc. ὁ φυσικὸς) τὰ σχήματα θεωρῇ, ὡς πέρατα φυσικοῦ σώματος αὐτὰ θεωρεῖ, ὁ δὲ μαθηματικὸς οὐχ ὡς πέρατα, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εἴδη τινὰ ὄντα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἁπάσης ἔξω κινήσεως. Macrobius in Somn. 2.14.2 Aristoteles vero adeo non adquiescit, ut animam non solum ex se non moveri, sed ne moveri quidem penitus conetur adserere.

Liber 4 Caput 7 PB: ps.Plutarchus 899C; pp. 392a11–393a13 Diels—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 194– 195 Daiber S: Stobaeus Ecl. 1.49.7c, p. 325.9 + 15 Wachsmuth T: Theodoretus CAG 1.63, p. 21.3–6, 5.23–24, pp. 128.19–129.4 Raeder Cf. Nem: Nemesius NH c. 2, pp. 16.22–17.1 Morani; ps.Ath.: ps.Athenagoras de Res. 20.1, p. 45.25–29 Marcovich; Hermias Irr. 3.6–10 Hanson; ps.Iustinus Coh. 6.2.19–23 Marcovich; Epiphanius Haer. 3.508.21–24 Holl

Titulus ζʹ. Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς (P,S) §1 Πυθαγόρας Ἀναξαγόρας Διογένης Πλάτων Ἐμπεδοκλῆς Ξενοκράτης ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. (P1a,S1,T1) §2 Ἡράκλειτος ἐξιοῦσαν τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀναχωρεῖν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές. (P1b,T2) §3 οἱ Στωικοὶ ἐξιοῦσαν ἐκ τῶν σωμάτων οὔπω φθείρεσθαι· τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν ἅμα τοῖς συγκρίμασι {γίνεσθαι}, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων· τὴν δ᾽ ἰσχυροτέραν, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τοὺς σοφούς, καὶ μέχρι τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ἐκπυρώσεως ⟨ἐπιδιαμένειν⟩. (P2,T3) §1 Pythagoras—; Anaxagoras 59A93 DK; Diogenes 64A20 DK, T5c Laks; Plato cf. Phdr. 245c; Empedocles—; Xenocrates fr. 74 Heinze, F 130 Isnardi Parente2; §2 Heraclitus 22A17 DK; §3 Stoici SVF 2.810 caput non hab. G §§1[3]–2[4] τὴν ψυχήν …. ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος T (qui verisimiliter ὁ δὲ add.) : τὴν ψυχὴν*** ἐξιοῦσαν PBQ, lac. indic. Reiske prob. edd. ‖ γὰρ post ψυχὴν add. PBQ lac. occultans §1 [2] Πυθαγόρας … Ξενοκράτης T : Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων PBQ : Πλάτων S ‖ [3] ἄφθαρτον … ψυχήν PBQT : ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀεικίνητον S cf. app. crit. ad c. 4.6[2–3] §2 [4] ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος T : om. PBQ ‖ ⟨Ἡ. ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν⟩ ante ἐξιοῦσαν perperam add. Diels 22A17 DK ex T, ubi invenitur in §1 (ut etiam in P) ‖ ἐξιοῦσαν PBQ : τὰς ἀπαλλαττομένας T ‖ post ἐξιοῦσαν interpol. γὰρ P ‖ τοῦ σώματος T: om. PBQ ‖ [5] πρὸς … ὁμογενές PBQ : al. T ἔφησεν, οἷα δὴ ὁμογενῆ τε οὖσαν καὶ ὁμοούσιον §3 [6] ἐξιοῦσαν … σωμάτων PB : wenn die Seele den Körper verläßt Q : τὰς χωριζομένας τῶν σωμάτων ψυχὰς T ‖ οὔπω φθείρεσθαι coni. Diels prob. ab Arnim Lachenaud : ὑποφέρεσθαι PB : crucif. Mau : om. PQ : διαρκεῖν μὲν T ‖ [7] {γίνεσθαι} seclusimus vid. comm. D(d)§3 : verba τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν ἅμα τοῖς συγκρίμασι †γίνεσθαι† PB tamquam aliena ab hoc lemmate secl. Diels DG : bleibt die schwache (Seele) mit den Dingen zusammen, die mit ihr zusammenhängen Q : τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον T : ⟨ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιδιαμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ᾽ αὑτήν, καὶ⟩ τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν ⟨ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον⟩ coni. Diels DG in app. : ⟨καὶ⟩ τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν ἀμα⟨υρὸν⟩ {τοῖς} σύγκριμα{σι} γίνεσθαι perperam coni. Arnim prob. Algra ‖ [7–8] ταύτην … ἀπαιδεύτων PBQ : om. T ‖ [8] οἵα … σοφούς PBQ : om. T ‖ [8] καὶ PBQ : om. T ‖ [9] ⟨ἐπιδιαμένειν⟩ coniecimus : non hab. PBQ vid. comm. D(d)§3

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Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος Ἀριστοτέλης φθαρτὴν τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην. (P3,T4) Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἄφθαρτον· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ θεὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἔργον τοῦ ἀιδίου θεοῦ ὑπάρχειν· τὸ δ᾽ ἄλογον φθαρτόν. (P4,T5)

§4 Democritus 68A109 DK; Aristoteles Resp. 17 478b22–479a7; Epicurus fr. 336 Usener; §5 Pythagoras—; Plato cf. Tim. 30b, 69c–e §4 [10] Ἀριστοτέλης T : om. PBQ, prob. DK ad 68A109 §5 [12] post λογικὸν add. T αὐτῆς ‖ [12–13] καὶ … ὑπάρχειν PBQ : om. T ‖ οὐ … ἀλλ᾽ PBQ : ἀθάνατον coni. Diels ‖ [13] τὸ δ᾽ ἄλογον φθαρτόν PBQ : inv. T

Testes primi: Theodoretus CAG 1.63, 5.23–24 1.63 (quaestio) oἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατον ἔφασαν τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δὲ θνητήν, οἱ δὲ μικτήν τινα ὡρίσαντο καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς θνητόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον ἔφασαν. 5.23.1 (~ §1) καὶ Πυθαγόρας μὲν καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Διογένης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεφήναντο· 5.23.2 (~ §2) ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος τὰς ἀπαλλαττομένας τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀναχωρεῖν ψυχὴν ἔφησεν, οἷα δὴ ὁμογενῆ τε οὖσαν καὶ ὁμοούσιον. 5.23.3 (~ §3) οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς χωριζομένας τῶν σωμάτων ψυχὰς διαρκεῖν μὲν καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰς ζῆν ἔφασαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον, τὴν δὲ ἰσχυροτέραν μέχρι τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ἐκπυρώσεως. 5.24.1 (~ §4) Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φθαρτὴν εἶναι ταύτην ἀνέδην εἰρήκασι· 5.24.2 (~ §5) Πλάτων δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόρας τὸ μὲν λογικὸν αὐτῆς ἄφθαρτον εἶναι, φθαρτὸν δὲ τὸ ἄλογον. cf. 1.63 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατον ἔφασαν τὴν ψυχήν (~ §1), οἱ δὲ θνητήν (~ §4), οἱ δὲ μικτήν τινα ὡρίσαντο καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς θνητόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον ἔφασαν (~ §5). Testes secundi: Traditio ps.Plutarchi: Hermias Irr. 3.6–10 στασιάζουσι μὲν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς … τὴν δὲ φύσιν αὐτῆς οἱ μὲν ἀθάνατόν φασιν, οἱ δὲ θνητήν (~ quaestio), οἱ δὲ πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐπιδιαμένουσαν (~ P3). οἱ δὲ ἀποθηριοῦσιν αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ εἰς ἀτόμους διαλύουσιν (~ P4), οἱ δὲ τρὶς ἐνσωματοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τρισχιλίων ἐτῶν περιόδους αὐτῇ ὁρίζουσιν. ps.Iustinus Coh. 6.2.19–23 Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐ κοινὸν ὅρον τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναί φησιν, ἐν ᾧ περιείληπται καὶ τὰ φθαρτὰ μόρια, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικὸν μόνον (~ P5). καὶ ὁ μὲν Πλάτων ‘ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος’ κέκραγε λέγων· Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, ἐντελέχειαν αὐτὴν ὀνομάζων, οὐκ ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ θνητὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι βούλεται (~ quaestio).

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ps.Athenagoras de Res. 20.1 ἤτοι γὰρ παντελής ἐστι σβέσις τῆς ζωῆς ὁ θάνατος συνδιαλυομένης τῷ σώματι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ συνδιαφθειρομένης, ἢ μένει ⟨μὲν⟩ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἄλυτος ἀσκέδαστος ἀδιάφθορος, φθείρεται δὲ καὶ διαλύεται τὸ σῶμα, οὐδεμίαν ἔτι σῷζον οὔτε μνήμην τῶν εἰργασμένων, οὔτ᾽ αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ παθημάτων (~ quaestio). Nemesius NH c. 2, pp. 16.22–17.1 τῶν μὲν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀθάνατον λεγόντων, τῶν δὲ ἀσώματον μὲν, οὐ μὴν οὐσίαν οὐδὲ ἀθάνατον (~ quaestio). Loci Aetiani: titulus A 2.4 Εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος. §1 A 4.2.2 Αλκμαίων […] ἀθάνατον αὐτήν. A 5.25.1 Ἀριστοτέλης …. θάνατον δ᾽ εἶναι μόνου τοῦ σώματος οὐ ψυχῆς· ταύτης γὰρ οὐχ ὑπάρχει θάνατος. al. A 5.25.2 Ἀναξαγόρας … εἶναι δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς θάνατον τὸν διαχωρισμόν. A 5.25.4 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν θάνατον γεγενῆσθαι διαχωρισμὸν τοῦ πυρώδους ⟨καὶ ἀερώδους καὶ ὑδατώδους καὶ γεώδους⟩, ἐξ ὧν ἡ σύγκρισις τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συνεστάθη· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο κοινὸν εἶναι τὸν θάνατον σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς. §2 A 2.3 Εἰ ἔμψυχος ὁ κόσμος καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενος. A 2.3.1 oἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον. A 4.2.14 Ἡράκλειτος τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγρῶν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως, ὁμογενῆ. §4 A 5.1.4 Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Δικαίαρχος … ἀθάνατον μὲν εἶναι οὐ νομίζοντες τὴν ψυχήν, θείου δέ τινος μετέχειν αὐτήν. §5 A 4.4.1 Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον διμερῆ τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν λογικὸν τὸ δ᾽ ἄλογον.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) The witnesses for P are PB and PQ. E and G did not excerpt this chapter. P has four lemmata, T five. Comparison with T shows that four name-labels, viz. Anaxagoras, Diogenes, Empedocles, and Xenocrates have been eliminated in the first lemma of P. Either through an unfortunate application of the technique of abridgement, or, perhaps no less likely, because of an accident in the transmission the name-label Heraclitus, attested by T, has been eliminated in what originally was the second lemma. This happened in the entire tradition of P (including PQ), so at an early stage of the transmission. (For similar cases see Diels DG 64, and above at ch. 1.21, Commentary A(4)). The net result is that the return of the souls to the Soul of the All is attributed to Pythagoras and

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Plato, acceptance of which fails to surprise in relation to the Middle Platonist or Neopythagoreanizing backdrop that is regularly to be discerned in the Placita. Because of the parallels in T we are again in a position to detect the birth or fabrication of a new, though spurious, doxa here in P. The theme of the chapter is anticipated at T 1.63, see ch. 1.3 Commentary A(5)(a). (2) That T indeed used A here is proved beyond any doubt (1) by his two distinct paragraphs (§§1–2) and his preservation of the name-label Heraclitus (§2), fallen by the wayside in P’s tradition inclusive of Q’s copy of the Greek text, while in P, as we have seen, §2 has been unfortunately fused with §1. T cannot therefore have copied P here. The four extra names in T for §1 as compared with P also show that he abstracted A not P, unless one wants to avail oneself of the hypothesis that he imported them from somewhere else. But this move fails to neutralize the point about the blend of §1 with §2. For T’s contribution see Mansfeld (2018a) at M–R 4.180–187, and esp. 4.184–186 on 4.7.1–2 and on the parallel case of extra names in T (and this time also in S) as compared with P in 2.1.1–2; also above, General Introduction section 2.5. After ch. 4.7 no further chapters from Book 4 (or Book 5) are abstracted by T. (3) S has only one lemma, parallel to P1, a very brief and partly different one, in which he coalesces a single name-label (Plato) and the two different attributes of the soul (ἄφθαρτον and ἀεικίνητον) from §7.1 and §6.1, in that reversed order. For Wachsmuth’s numbering and division into 7a, 7b, and 7c based on the chapters of A in the DG see ch. 4.6 Commentary A(2) above. Lactantius Op.D. 17.1 (see section E(b) General texts) and G c. 24 p. 613.15–16 ἀλλ᾽ ὁ Πλάτων ἀεικίνητον καὶ οὐδέποτε διαφθαρησομένην interestingly provide a parallel for S’s coalescence of the two chapters. (4) The testes secundi are well-represented, but none of them (including ps.Justin) are particularly close to either P or A. (5) The parallel evidence of G in the first non-Placita part of his compendium (see section E(a) General texts), equivalent to three lemmata in the order P 4– 5–3, is useful, and he interestingly preserves the name-label Dicaearchus for §4. Though P’s chapter was not abstracted by E, his reference to Xenophanes, Pythagoras and Anaxagoras at PE 14.15.11 may be a fuzzy reminiscence of P 4.7. B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. The main division is also found in Cicero; further at G c. 24, DG p. 613.14–19, who opposes Epicurus and Dicaearchus (θνητὴν … ψυχήν) to Plato and the Stoics (ἀθάνατον—for the word cf. A 4.2.2), but corrects the Stoics lemma by adding—the sentence is mutilated—that the immortality of the soul lasts a whole cosmic period(?), but that this soul too will be destroyed (διαφθαρῆναι). The name-label Dicaearchus is lacking in P and T, but may have

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been present in A because it is extant in G, who depends on the wider doxographical tradition as well. A further difference is that G has θνητὴν and ἀθάνατον where P and T have ἄφθαρτον and φθαρτήν, though as we see G also has διαφθαρῆναι. In G we seem to have an echo of the above-mentioned notion that immortality is not the same as indestructibility. (2) Sources. In e.g. Plato’s Phaedo (followed by many) the indestructibility of the soul is a large issue, in Aristotle’s De anima it is not. The views of the Stoics and Epicurus and his followers are rather widely attested. C Chapter Heading Another umbrella heading (περὶ τοῦ δεῖνα) of the kind that dominates in the Placita (see above, ch. 1.3 Commentary C), but a precise one, focusing on a specific property. Found in P only, but note that S 49.7a ad finem combines the headings of chs. 4.6 and 4.7 into a single sub-heading of Ecl. ch. 1.49: ‘On the movement and indestructibility of soul’ (Περὶ κινήσεως καὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς). A touch insufficient, because the chapter also deals with the destructibility of soul. Compare the similarly unsatisfactory heading of ch. 2.4, ‘Whether the cosmos is indestructible’ (Εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος), on which see M–R 2.2.358, and ch. 2.4, Commentary C. See also ch. 5.26, Commentary D(b). The heading, title, or expression Περὶ κινήσεως καὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς can be paralleled. It occurs at Philo Somn. 1.181 and Strabo 15.1.59 (Megasthenes FGrH 715 fr. 33 Jacoby, comparing a doctrine of the Brahmins with one of Plato, see M–R 2.1.37). As an embedded phrase (‘eorum fit mentio quae proxime vel antecedunt vel sequntur’, Bonitz 95b33) such a formula is the predecessor or equivalent of the heading, or title, see M–R 2.1.48, 159–161, 162–163, 170, 202–204. The second book of a treatise with this title is cited for Numenius at Origen CC 5.57, p. 368.23–24 Marcovich, τῷ Πυθαγορείῳ Νουμηνίῳ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς (Numenius fr. 29 Des Places); see Des Places (1973) 117. D Analysis a Context This is the last of the group of six chapters dealing with the soul per se. Together with ch. 4.6 it forms a sort of appendix in which remaining issues are mopped up, following on after the more substantial chs. 4.2–5. The Placita didactically separates themes that may be treated together in other literature, and often are, see Diels’ acerbic remark cited in the Introduction to Book 1, section 2. The next series, chs. 4.8–12, continue the psychology by dealing in detail with the senses and sensation in general. In Aristotle’s De anima, too, the discussion of sensation and the senses in Books 2.5–3.2 follows on after that of more general issues discussed in the previous Book and chapters.

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b Number–Order of Lemmata The four lemmata of P and the five of T, taking into account that P1 is a misleading, or at any rate mistaken blend of two successive lemma, occur in exactly the same order, which therefore should correspond to the order of A. Whether originally there were more lemmata in A we cannot know, as S is almost entirely lost. T’s Aëtian material on the soul ends at CAG 5.24 with three lemmata Diels printed at the bottom of DG 393 as the final section of 4.7, although they are not about this theme at all, but about the issue of whether and in what sense a soul may be attributed to plants, and whether plants may be called ‘living beings’, ζῷα. They are precisely paralleled at Clement Strom. 8.4.10.3–4; see Mansfeld (1990a) 3187–3190 and below, ch. 5.26 Commentary D(e). c Rationale–Structure of Chapter The category at issue is that of time. The main division, or rather diaphonia, is between the indestructibility of soul, as in §1 and less explicitly stated §2, and its destructibility as in §4. It constitutes a very clear example of A’s method. In Aristotle’s De anima this is not a prominent issue, see M–R 2.1.144. We note the diaeresis on a gliding scale: §1 soul indestructible, §2 soul eventually destroyed by absorption into Soul, §3 some souls immediately destroyed, others eventually by absorption into Soul, §4 souls immediately destroyed, §5 compromise: a part of soul indestructible, another part destructible. Actually the final lemma, placed in the standard compromise position at the end of the chapter, renders the diaphonia harmless by accepting both contrasting qualifications, viz. by positing that one part of the soul is indestructible and another is not. d

Further Comments Individual Points §§1 & 5 The contrast between lemmata 1 and 5, viz. on the one hand the tenet of (Pythagoras and) Plato that the whole soul is indestructible and on the other the tenet that this only holds for its rational part mirrors the development of Plato’s unitary soul, as in Phaedo, to one with parts, as in Republic and Timaeus (though in §5 there is no emphasis on differing locations for the parts as developed in the latter work). §§1–2 See above at section A(2) on Theodoret’s use of A. §1 Alcmaeon’s acceptance of the view that the soul is immortal (ἀθάνατον not ἄφθαρτον) was included at ch. 4.2.2, and is not repeated here. The doctrine is attributed to both Plato’s purported master Pherecydes (in Cicero) and Thales (in Diogenes Laertius), as archegete of respectively the Italic/Pythagorean and

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the Ionian Succession, see section E(a)§1. At ch. 4.2.1 (where see for further information Commentary D(d)§1) the view that ‘the soul is ever-moving or rather self-moved’ is also attributed to Thales, and ibid. 4.2.2, name-label Alcmaeon, the soul’s self-motion proves its immortality—which explains by what sort of reasoning this view came to be attributed to Thales as well. A here has gathered quite an impressive number of supporters for it. For Plato the indestructibility of the soul has to be proved separately, see e.g. Phd. 96b, while Strato physicus (ap. Damascius in Phd. (versio 1) sect. 438, p. 231 Westerink = fr. 123h Wehrli, 80.185 Sharples) states that a stone, though immortal (ἀθάνατος), i.e. not ‘dying’, is not ‘indestructible’ (ἀνώλεθρος). Though these words can be used interchangeably, their meanings were sometimes carefully distinguished, e.g. Aristotle Cael. 2.1 284a11–13 ‘the ancients assigned heaven, the upper region, to the gods, in the belief that it alone is immortal; our present argument attests that it is indestructible and ungenerated’ (tr. Guthrie LCL modified: τὸν δ᾽ οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸν ἄνω τόπον οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπένειμαν ὡς ὄντα μόνον ἀθάνατον· ὁ δὲ νῦν μαρτυρεῖ λόγος ὡς ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀγένητος). Alexander of Aphrodisias(?) de An.Mant. 108.30–109.1, however, attributes to Aristotle the view that the mind which enters from outside is ‘immortal’ (εἰκότως ἀθάνατος ὑπ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλους καλεῖται νοῦς). Sharples (2008) 151 refers to Aristotle de An. 3.5 430a23, ‘and only that is immortal and everlasting’ (καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον). Note that Aristotle carefully adds ‘everlasting’ to ‘immortal’, and that Cicero, aware of this problem, translates Phdr. 245c τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον as nam quod semper movetur, aeternum est, not as immortale est (Resp. 6.27 = Somn.Scip.). Damascius reports Strato’s argument, but other late Platonists often just go on to speak of the soul’s ‘immortality’. Plato’s argument, variously reproduced by later Platonists in syllogistic form (listed Macrobius in Somn. 2,13.9–12), in later commentators (from Hermias to John Philoponus) ended up as a mere example of a syllogism; for some texts see below, section E(b)§1. Commentators on Macrobius (Flamant 1977, Regali 1990, Armisen-Marchetti 2003), who argue that the Platonists mentioned here by Macrobius are fictional, have overlooked the late followers. For the attribution to Aristotle of the view that the intellect enters from outside see below, ch. 7a, Commentary D(d)§1, and M–R 2.1.144. According to Anaxagoras as cited at ch. 5.25.2 the soul is mortal, like the body: this conflicts with the first lemma of the present chapter, where the presence of the name-label is in fact surprising. §2 Compare the Heraclitus lemma ch. 4.3.14 and our remarks there at Commentary D(d)§14. Our sources now go a quite significant step further, for here human souls are said to return to the Soul of the universe; cf. Dörrie-Baltes (2002) 2.190, 416–417, and for parallels section D(e) below. We have seen that

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Aristotle cautiously suggested that Thales said that ‘everything is full of gods’ because like ‘some people, he believed that the soul is intermingled with the whole universe’ (de An. 1.2 411a7–8). T goes further than P in adding ὁμοούσιον, ‘con-substantial’, to ὁμογενές (Heraclitus fr. 66 ( f 3) n. 2 Marcovich). The word ὁμοούσιος does not occur before the first cent. ce; it is not uncommon in Irenaeus and Origen, and may be thought to belong with bishop Theodoret’s theological vocabulary. But it occurs in a comparable way in Plotinus Enn. 4.7[2].10.19, διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς θεῖοις), so could have entered the open Placita tradition before T’s time. On the term in Gnostic, Hermetic and Christian literature before T see Beatrice (2002), who on its use in Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus points out (p. 257): ‘only in the general meaning of “made of the same nature” or “of the same substance”, without any particular theological connotation’. Aristotle’s question about affinity (402b2, ὁμοειδής) is different. The context shows that he is not thinking of souls as parts of a super-Soul, but of parts, or components, of the single human soul, which (as the component elements of Empedocles’ cognitive faculty at de An. 1.2 404b12) may be characterised as individual souls themselves. §3 For the Stoic view see the parallel passages collected by Pease ad Cic. ND 1.27 and the texts collected at SVF 2.809–822. We have restored the text ad probabilem sententiam, bracketing the superfluous γίνεσθαι (which is also odd: cf. Philo Somn. 1.31 συμφθείρεται and ps.Alexander fr. 2 Vitelli φθείρεσθαι σὺν τοῖς φθειρομένοις), and we have borrowed ἐπιδιαμένειν from the parallel accounts in Diogenes of Oenoanda, Diogenes Laertius, Hippolytus, and Origen (ἐπιμένειν or διαμένειν, found in G and AD, are also possible); see texts below at section E(a)§3. The close parallel with the physical section of the Stoic doxography at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.156–157 was indicated by Von Arnim, who prints §3 as SVF 2.810 and part of the Diogenes passage as SVF 2.811, though he also divides it over SVF 1.171, 1.522, and 2.774. §4 Aristotle restricted indestructibility to a part (or function) of nous, de An. 3.5. §5 For a generous discussion of the differences between Plato and Aristotle concerning the immortality of the soul see Atticus fr. 7 Des Places at Eusebius PE 15.9. For the view sometimes (wrongly) attributed to Plato that the soul is a god cf. Tertullian de An. 24.1–2. For the idea see the poetic line attributed to Euripides or Menander, quoted by various authors (see Kannicht 2004, 2.988 ad loc.). For Diogenes of Apollonia see ad ch. 4.3 above, Commentary D(d)§14. That the World Soul is a god is Stoic doctrine; that the human soul (or a part of the human soul) is a god, or at least divine, can be concluded from the fact that

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according to the Stoics the human soul is a part of the divine Soul (SVF 2.774, quoted at §2 above). A’s rejection, in line with Plato’s account in the Timaeus, where the soul is the creation of the Demiurge, is explicit, and may have an anti-Stoic point. For the Plutarchean parallel cited at section E(b)§5 below see Ferrari (1996). The formula ‘the product of the eternal God’ sounds Christian, but here only blends, in a Middle Platonist way, the Demiurge who produces both the World Soul and human souls in the Timaeus with Aristotle’s First God: we only have the term ‘product’, not the act of creation. e Other Evidence There are several parallels for the doctrine ascribed to Heraclitus at §2. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.19 on the soul according to Heraclitus physicus as ‘a spark of stellar essence’ (scintillam stellaris essentiae) may be due to Stoic influence. Cf. Seneca Dial. 8.5.5 ‘or whether that theory is true which strives especially to prove that man is part of the divine spirit, and that some sparks, as it were, of the stars fell down to earth and remained in a strange place’ (tr. Basore LCL, slightly modified). Or due to the influence of Platonism, cf. Plato Tim. 41d–42b, Cicero Resp. 6.15 (= Somn.Scip.) ‘humans, … and to them has the mind been given from those eternal fires you call constellations and stars’ (homines …., eisque animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis). Or of later Platonism, e.g. Numenius (fr. 31 Des Places at Porph. Antr. 21–23) and Porphyry (e.g. in Tim. 1 frs. 16, 22, 2. fr. 80 Sodano), who have the soul descend to the body through a star. Or of all of these together. On the scattered evidence for astral immortality see Burkert (1972) 360–368. See also Tardieu (1975), who mainly discusses Gnostic examples, cites the passage of Seneca, and hypothesizes that the metaphor of the ‘spark of soul’, scintilla animae, is originally Platonic. But his evidence for this hypothesis consists of Proclus’ interpretation of souls as stars in the myth of Er. Seneca’s formula ‘in a strange place’ (in alieno loco) is Platonic or Pythagorean rather than Stoic. The expression is paralleled in the Aenesidemean account of Heraclitus in Sextus Empiricus M. 7.130, where the inhaled portion of the Divine Logos is said to be ‘a stranger in our bodies’ (ἡ ἐπιξενωθεῖσα τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα). Also compare Philo Agr. 65 (on Gen 47:4, παροικεῖν, οὐ κατοικεῖν ἤλθομεν, ‘we have come to dwell as strangers, not as inhabitants’): ‘in reality each soul of a wise man has won heaven as its fatherland and been given earth as a foreign country, and it regards the house of wisdom as its own but the body as foreign, believing it dwells there as in a foreign country’ (τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πᾶσα ψυχὴ σοφοῦ πατρίδα μὲν οὐρανόν, ξένην δὲ γῆν ἔλαχε, καὶ νομίζει τὸν μὲν σοφίας οἶκον ἴδιον, τὸν δὲ σώματος ὀθνεῖον, ᾧ καὶ παρεπιδημεῖν οἴεται). And Plutarch Ex. 607C–D (commenting on the lines of Emp. 31B115

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DK he quotes): ‘we are strangers and fugitives … ; as the soul has come here from elsewhere he kindly calls its birth a “journey to foreign country” ’ (ξένους καὶ φυγάδας ἡμᾶς ὄντας … τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἀλλαχόθεν ἡκούσης δεῦρο τὴν γένεσιν ἀποδημίαν ὑποκορίζεται τῷ πραοτάτῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων). A different evaluation is found at Tranq. 477C, where the wise man ‘despises those who bewail life as a place of evils or a place of exile for our souls’ (καταφρονεῖ τῶν ὀδυρομένων καὶ λοιδορούντων τὸν βίον, ὥς τινα κακῶν χώραν ἢ φυγαδικὸν τόπον ἐνταῦθα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀποδεδειγμένον). See further Mansfeld (2015c) at Mansfeld (2018d) 231–233. For the conflict between Plato and Aristotle see above, ch. 4.6 Commentary D(e), where the question of immortality vs. mortality hinges on that of (self-)motion. Ptolemy allows himself a parody of the Stoic doctrine, in which the soul is immediately dispersed, while the body continues to exist (note the verbal form ἐπιδιαμένον); cited below section E(b)§3. E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: Cicero Luc. 124 … et quidquid est, mortale sit an aeternum, nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Tusc. 1.18 sunt enim qui discessum animi a corpore putent esse mortem; sunt qui nullum censeant fieri discessum, sed una animum et corpus occidere, animumque in corpore extingui. qui discedere animum censent, alii statim dissipari, alii diu permanere, alii semper. Tusc. 1.26–58. Tusc. 1.76–79. Philo of Alexandria Somn. 1.31 τί δέ; τελευτώντων σβέννυται καὶ συμφθείρεται τοῖς σώμασιν ἢ πλεῖστον ἐπιβιοῖ χρόνον ἢ κατὰ τὸ παντελὲς ἄφθαρτόν ἐστι; Cher. 114 ποῖ δὲ χωρήσει (sc. the soul), πόσον δὲ χρόνον ἡμῖν ὁμοδίαιτος ἔσται; Seneca Ep. 88.34 innumerabiles quaestiones sunt de animo tantum: … quamdiu sit, aliunde alio transeat et domicilia mutet in alias animalium formas aliasque coniectus, an non amplius quam semel serviat et emissus vagetur in toto; … quid sit facturus cum per nos aliquid facere desierit, quomodo libertate sua usurus cum ex hac effugerit cavea. Galen QAM c. 3, p. 13.12–16 Bazou ὅτι δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν τε καὶ μερῶν τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς τὸ λογιστικὸν ἀθάνατόν ἐστι, Πλάτων μὲν φαίνεται πεπεισμένος, ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἔστιν οὔθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔχω διατείνεσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν. Propr.Plac. 3, p. 173.16–18 BoudonMillot–Pietrobelli, text Lami ἥτις δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγνοεῖν ὁμολογῶ, καὶ πολύ γε μᾶλλον, εἰ ἀθάνατος ἐστιν ἤ θνητή. Propr.Plac. 7, p. 179.14–16 BoudonMillot–Pietrobelli, text Lami καθάπερ οὖν ἰατρῷ περ⟨ιτ⟩τὸν γινῶσκειν εἴτ᾽ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴτ᾽ οὐκ ἀθάνατος πρὸς τὰς ἰάσεις. Propr.Plac. 15, p. 188.26– 35 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli, text Lami (= Sub.Nat.Fac. 4.762.16–763.7 K.) τήν γε μὴν ψυχὴν, εἰ μὲν ἀθάνατος οὖσα ταῖς σωματικαῖς οὐσίαις κεραννυμένη τὰ ζῶα διοικεῖ, γινώσκειν βεβαίως οὐκ ἀπαγγέλλομαι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ εἰ μηδεμία καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ψυχῆς· ἐκεῖνο μέντοι φαίνεταί μοι σαφῶς ὅτι, καθὸ εἰσοικίζηται τοῖς σώμασι, δουλεύει ταῖς φύσεσιν αὐτῶν, αἵπερ εἰσὶν, ὡς ἔφην, ἐκ τῆς τῶν τετ-

liber 4 caput 7 τάρων στοιχείων ποιᾶς κράσεως γιγνόμεναι. καὶ κατά γε τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην οὐδὲν ἡγοῦμαι βλαβήσεσθαι τινα διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῆς καλουμένης ἐμψυχώσεώς τε καὶ μετεμψυχώσεως. Sextus Empiricus M. 9.72–73 (SVF 2.812) καὶ (sc. according to the Stoics) καθ᾽ αὑτὰς δὲ διαμένουσι καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος (fr. 337 Usener), ἀπολυθεῖσαι τῶν σωμάτων καπνοῦ δίκην σκίδνανται. οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερον τὸ σῶμα διακρατητικὸν ἦν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐταὶ τῷ σώματι συμμονῆς ἦσαν αἴτιαι, πολὺ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ἑαυταῖς. P 1.151 δογματικὰς δὲ ὑπολήψεις ἀλλήλαις ἀντιτίθεμεν, ὅταν λέγωμεν … τοὺς μὲν θνητὴν τὴν ψυχὴν (sc. ἀποφαίνεσθαι), τοὺς δὲ ἀθάνατον. Hippolytus Ref. 1.2.11 οὗτος (sc. ὁ Πυθαγόρας) καὶ ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον εἶπε καὶ μετενσωμάτωσιν κτλ. Ref. 1.19.10 (on Plato’s followers) καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ μέν φασιν αὐτὸν ἀγένητον λέγειν καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ὅταν λέγῃ (Phdr. 245c)· ‘ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος· τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον’ καὶ ὅταν αὐτοκίνητον αὐτὴν ἀποδεικνύῃ καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως· οἱ δὲ γενητὴν μέν, ἄφθαρτον δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ βούλησιν. οἱ δὲ σύνθετον καὶ γενητὴν καὶ φθαρτήν κτλ. Ref. 6.25.4 λέγει δὲ Πυθαγόρας … εἶναι δὲ αὐτὰς (sc. τὰς ψυχὰς) θνητὰς μέν, ὅταν ὦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι—οἱονεὶ ἐγκατορωρυγμένας {ὡς} ἐν τάφῳ—, ἀνίστασθαι δὲ καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀθανάτους, ὅταν τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολυθῶσιν. Ref. 1.20.3–4 (on Aristotle) καὶ σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα τῷ Πλάτωνι σύμφωνός ἐστιν πλὴν τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς δόγματος· (4) ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων ἀθάνατον, ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπιδιαμένειν ⟨***⟩ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ταύτην ἐναφανίζεσθαι τῷ πέμπτῳ σώματι, ὃ ὑποτίθεται εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεσσάρων, τοῦ τε πυρὸς καὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος λεπτότερον, οἷον πνεῦμα. Ref. 6.26.3 (on Pythagoras) δύνασθαι οὖν φησί ποτε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ θνητὴν γενέσθαι, ἐὰν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἐριννύων κρατῆται—τουτέστι τῶν παθῶν—, καὶ ἀθάνατον, ἐὰν τὰς Ἐριννῦς ἐκφύγῃ, ἅ ἐστι ⟨τὰ⟩ πάθη. Hermogenes Id. 1.6.8.3– 4 Patillon οἷον εἰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅτι ἀθάνατος. Tertullian de An. 3.2 alii immortalem negant animam, alii plus quam immortalem adfirmant. de An. 51.1–2 sed quidam ad immortalitatem animae, quam quidem non a deo edocti infirme tuentur, ita argumentationes emendicant, ut velint credi etiam post mortem quasdam animas adhaerere corporibus. (2) ad hoc enim et Plato, etsi quas vult animas ad caelum statim expedit, in Politia tamen cuiusdam insepulti cadaver opponit longo tempore sine ulla labe prae animae scilicet individuitate (sic; Resp. 614b is different) servatum. ad hoc et Democritus (68A160 DK) crementa unguium et comarum in sepulturis aliquanti temporis denotat. de An. 54.1– 2 omnes ferme philosophi, qui immortalitatem animae, qualiter volunt, tamen vindicant, ut Pythagoras (—), ut Empedocles (—), ut Plato, quique aliquod illi tempus indulgent ab excessu usque in conflagrationem universitatis, ut Stoici (SVF 2.814), suas solas, id est sapientium, animas in supernis mansionibus collocant. (2) Plato quidem non temere philosophorum animabus hoc praestat, sed eorum qui philosophiam scilicet exornaverint amore puerorum. … . itaque apud illum in aetherem sublimantur animae sapientes, apud Arium (?AD fr. 39 Diels) in aërem, apud Stoicos (SVF 2.814) sub lunam. Arnobius Adv.Nat. 1.38, p. 33.16–20 Marchesi (qui … monstravit) mortis particeps degat an inmortalitatis perpetuitate donata sit (sc. anima), qui status nos maneat, cum dissolutis abierimus a membris, visuri ne nos sumus an memoriam nullam nostri

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sensus et recordationem habituri. Adv.Nat. 2.57, pp. 131.16–132.2 non alia neque absimili ratione de animarum ab his condicione disseritur. hic enim eas retur et esse perpetuas et superesse mortalium functioni, superesse ille non credit, sed cum ipsis corporibus interire: alterius vero sententia est nihil eas continuo perpeti, sed post hominem positum aliquid eis ad vitam dari, mortalitatis deinde in iura succedere. et cum omnia nequeant veri esse consortia, ita tamen fortibus et validissimis probationibus omnes agunt, ut repperire non possis quidnam tibi videatur falsum, quamvis ex omni parte diversa dici aspicias et rerum contrarietatibus dissonare. Lactantius Op.D. 17.1 nec … immortalem esse animam non intelligemus, quoniam quidquid viget moveturque per se semper nec videri nec tangi potest, aeternum sit necesse est. Inst. 7.7.12–14 inmortales esse animas Pherecydes (fr. 85a Schibli) et Plato disputaverunt: haec vero propria est in nostra religione doctrina. ergo Dicaearchus (fr. 10b Wehrli 29 Mirhady) cum Democrito (fr. 466 Luria) erravit, qui perire cum corpore ac dissolui argumentatus est (cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.38–41). (13) esse inferos Zeno Stoicus (SVF 1.147) docuit et sedes piorum ab inpiis esse discretas et illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones, hos vero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis atque in caeni voraginibus horrendis: idem nobis prophetae palam faciunt. ergo Epicurus (fr. 341 Usener) erravit, qui poetarum id esse figmentum putavit et illas inferorum poenas quae ferantur in hac esse vita interpretatus est (cf. Lucr. DRN 3.978–1023). (14) totam igitur veritatem et omne divinae religionis arcanum philosophi attigerunt, sed aliis refellentibus defendere id quod invenerant nequiverunt, quia singulis ratio non quadravit, nec ea quae vera senserant in summam redigere potuerunt, sicut nos superius fecimus. Iamblichus de An. fr. 36 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.43, p. 383.15–22 ἐν ταύτῳ· Περὶ θανάτου. ἐπειδὰν μετὰ τὸν τῇδε βίον ἡ τελευτὴ συμπίπτῃ, τί ποτε συμβαῖνόν ἐστι; πότερον ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γενέσει προϋπῆρχεν ἢ συνυφίστατο ἢ ὑστέρα πως ἐπεγίγνετο τοῖς σώμασιν ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους αἱρέσεις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν προφθείρεται τοῦ σώματος ἢ συναπόλλυται αὐτῷ ἢ καὶ διαμένει καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἔξοδον; τὸ μὲν οὖν πᾶν κεφάλαιον τοιοῦτον· μέρη δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὰ εἴδη διαίρεσις δέχεται πολλὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις (continued below, section E(b) §3). Eusebius PE 14.15.11 πλὴν ἀλλὰ φυσικοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι Ξενοφάνης (—) καὶ Πυθαγόρας (—), συνακμάσαντες Ἀναξαγόρᾳ (—), περὶ ἀφθαρσίας θεοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας ἐφιλοσόφησαν. Nemesius NH 2, pp. 23.24–24.4 Γαληνὸς δὲ ἀποφαίνεται μὲν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαρτύρεται ἐν τοῖς Ἀποδεικτικοῖς λόγοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἴη περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος· ἔοικε δέ, ἐξ ὧν λέγει, δοκιμάζειν μᾶλλον τὸ κρᾶσιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν (ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐπακολουθεῖν τὴν τῶν ἠθῶν διαφοράν), ἐκ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους κατασκευάζων τὸν λόγον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ θνητὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι οἴεται, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλογον μόνην ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. περὶ δὲ τῆς λογικῆς ἀμφιβάλλει, λέγων οὕτως· ⟨***⟩ (sed cf. Galen QAM c. 4, p. 26.9–27.1 Bazou Ἀνδρόνικον δὲ τὸν Περιπατητικόν, ὅτι μὲν ὅλως ἐτόλμησεν ἀποφήνασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς … ἐπαινῶ τε πάνυ … , ὅτι δ᾽ ἤτοι κρᾶσιν εἶναί φησιν ἢ δύναμιν ἑπομένην τῇ κράσει, μέμφομαι τῇ προσθέσει τῆς δυνάμεως). ps.Galen HPh c. 24, DG p. 613.12–17 θνητὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος (—) καὶ Δικαίαρχος (fr. 10a Wehrli, 28 Mirhady) ᾠήθησαν, ἀθάνατον δὲ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ

liber 4 caput 7 Στωικοί (—). ἀλλ᾽ ὁ Πλάτων ἀεικίνητον καὶ οὐδέποτε διαφθαρησομένην. οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην τοῦ κόσμου μεταβολὴν διαμένειν ἀθάνατον, ἕως ἂν ⟨ᾖ⟩ ἡ τοῦ κόσμου μεταβολὴ συστᾶσα *** καὶ ταύτην τυχεῖν διαφθαρῆναι ᾠήθησαν. Augustine Trin. 10.7.17–24 Mountain–Glorie eique omnes eam mortalem esse senserunt quia sive corpus esset sive aliqua compositio corporis non posset utique immortaliter permanere. qui vero eius substantiam vitam quandam nequaquam corpoream … repererunt, consequenter et immortalem … probare conati sunt. Servius auctus in Aen. 4.705, p. 586.1–6 Thilo ‘in ventos vita recessit’ id est anima, ut in quarto Georgicorum (4.224) ‘quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas’. et dicendo ‘in ventos’ aut eos sequitur, qui animam aërem dicunt, hoc est in materiam suam rediit: aut certe eos qui dicunt animam perire cum corpore, ut intellegamus ‘evanuit, in ventos recessit’, ut in nono (Aen. 9.312–313) ‘sed aurae omnia discerpunt’. Commenta Bernensia in Lucanum p. 289.3–14 Usener (on Phars. 9.1) alii existimant animas statim elisas corpore solvi ac dissipari in principia sua, inter quos Epicurus (—). alii solidas quidem, postquam exierint de corpore, permanere, sed deinde tractu temporis dissipari: haec opinio Stoicorum (SVF 2.817). alii integras decedere, sicuti venerint in corpora, et semper manere. haec auctoritas in duas opiniones scinditur. alii enim dicunt liberatas a vinculo corporis in caelum reverti, inter quos sunt Peripatetici et cum Platone suo Academici. alii ire per corpora multorum animalium, quadringentesimo sexsagesimo et altero anno rursus in corpora reverti humana: huius opinionis conditor Pythagoras. p. 290.18–22 Usener (ad Phars. 9.6; cf. below) mixtum dogma cum Platonico Stoicorum (—). qui virorum fortium animas existimant in modum siderum vagari in aëre et esse sic inmortales, ut non moriantur sed resolvantur, secundum Platonem ne resolvantur quidem. §1 + §3 Pythagoras Anaxagoras Diogenes Plato Empedocles Xenocrates Stoics: Tertullian de An. 3.2 hi exitum aliorsum abducunt. de An. 54.1 omnes ferme philosophi, qui immortalitatem animae […] vindicant, ut Pythagoras (—), ut Empedocles (—), ut Plato, quique aliquod illi tempus indulgent ab excessu usque in conflagrationem universitatis, ut Stoici (—), suas solas, id est sapientium, animas in supernis mansionibus collocant. §1 Pythagoras Anaxagoras Diogenes Plato Empedocles Xenocrates: Cicero Tusc. 1.38–39 Pherecydes Syrius (7A5 DK) primus dixit animos esse hominum sempiternos …. hanc opinionem discipulus eius Pythagoras (—) maxime confirmavit. … (39) Platonem ferunt, ut Pythagoreos cognosceret, in Italiam venisse et didicisse Pythagorea omnia primumque de animorum aeternitate non solum sensisse idem quod Pythagoram, sed rationem etiam attulisse. Tusc. 5.38 humanus autem animus decerptus ex mente divina cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest. Div. 1.110 altera divinatio est naturalis, ut ante dixi; quae physica disputandi subtilitate referenda est ad naturam deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus; cumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est cognatione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 1.24 (on Thales, 11A1 DK) ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν

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πρῶτον εἰπεῖν φασιν ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχάς· ὧν ἐστι Χοιρίλος ὁ ποιητής (fr. 12 Bernabé). Commenta Bernensia in Lucanum p. 289.7–8 Usener (cf. above, General texts) alii integras (sc. animas) decedere, sicuti venerint in corpora, et semper manere. §2 Heraclitus: Cicero ND 1.27 Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur. Macrobius in Somn. 1.14.20 Heraclitus physicus (22A15 DK) scintillam stellari essentiae. Commenta Bernensia in Lucanum p. 288.9–11 Usener (cf. above, General texts) alii enim dicunt (sc. animas) liberatas a vinculo corporis in caelum reverti, inter quos sunt Peripatetici et cum Platone suo Academici. §3 Stoics: Cicero Tusc. 1.77 Stoici … diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant. Arius Didymus fr. 39.6–7 Diels, DG p. 471.18–24 at Eus. PE 15.20.6–7 τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γενητήν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν (SVF 2.809). οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν· τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσούς τινας χρόνους. (7) τὸ δὲ διαμένειν τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτως λέγουσιν, ὅτι διαμένομεν ἡμεῖς ψυχαὶ γενομένοι τοῦ σώματος χωρισθέντες καὶ εἰς ἐλάττω μεταβαλόντες οὐσίαν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῴων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασι. Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 39.iii.13–iv.12 Smith οἱ Στ[ω]ικοὶ δὲ | ([κ]αὶ γὰρ ἐντ[αῦ]θα και|νότερα λ[έ]γειν ἄλ|λων θέλ[ο]υσιν) ἁπλῶ[ς] | μὲν ἀφθ[ά]ρτους οὔ | φασι τὰς [ψυ]χάς, ἤδη | δὲ τὰς μὲ[ν τῶν ἀφυ|]ῶν εὐθέως μετὰ τὴ[ν] | διάκρισιν τοῦ σώμα|τος φθείρεσθαι λέ|γουσιν, τὰς δὲ τῶν σπ[ου]|δαίων ἐπιδιαμένειν | ἀνδρῶν, καὶ αὐτὰς | δὲ φθείρεσθαί ποτε. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.156 (physical section) (SVF 2.774) τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν αἰσθητικὴν ⟨φύσιν add. ab Arnim non prob. Dorandi⟩. ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα· διὸ καὶ σῶμα εἶναι καὶ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον ἐπιμένειν· φθαρτὴν δὲ ὑπάρχειν. τὴν δὲ τῶν ὅλων ἄφθαρτον, ἧς μέρη εἶναι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις. V.P. 7.157 Κλεάνθης (SVF 1.522) μὲν οὖν πάσας ἐπιδιαμένειν μέχρι ⟨τῆς⟩ ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος (SVF 2.811) δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνων. Hippolytus Ref. 1.21.3 τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν λέγουσι (SVF 2.807) μὲν ἀθάνατον, εἶναι δὲ σῶμα καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ τῆς περιψύξεως τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ περιέχοντος· διὸ καὶ καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν. Iamblichus de An. fr. 36 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.43, p. 383.24–384.2 ἆρά γε πνιγμῷ τῶν ἀρτηρίων ἀποκλειομένων τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐκτὸς πνεῦμα, ἢ ἐκλυομένου τοῦ τόνου καὶ παριεμένου, ἢ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐναποσβεννυμένου πως εἰς τὰ εἴσω τὰ ζῶντα πρότερον εἰσαῦθις ἀποθνῄσκει; ἀλλ᾽ εἰ οὕτως γίγνεται ὁ θάνατος, προαναιρεῖται ἢ συναναιρεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ Κουρνουτος οἴεται. Theodoret CAG 5.26 (= AD fr. 39.6 at Eus. PE 15.20.6–7, wrongly attributed to Numenius, see text cited above) τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γενητήν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν. οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν· τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσούς τινας χρόνους. τὸ δὲ διαμένειν τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτως λέγουσιν, ὅτι διαμένομεν ἡμεῖς ψυχαὶ γενομένοι τοῦ σώματος χωρισθέντες καὶ εἰς ἐλάττω μεταβαλόντες οὐσίαν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῴων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασι. Commenta Bernensia in Lucanum p. 289.5–7 Usener (SVF 2.817) alii solidas quidem, postquam exierint de cor-

liber 4 caput 7 pore, permanere, sed deinde tractu temporis dissipari: haec opinio Stoicorum (cf. above, General texts). p. 290.18–21 Usener dogma … Stoicorum (SVF 2.817). qui virorum fortium animas existimant in modum siderum vagari in aëre et esse sic inmortales, ut non moriantur sed resolvantur (cf. above, General texts). Epiphanius Haer. 3 p. 508.21–24 (SVF 1.146) ἔλεγε (sc. Zenon Citiensis) δὲ καὶ μετὰ χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος *** καὶ ἐκάλει τὴν ψυχὴν πολυχρόνιον πνεῦμα, οὐ μὴν δὲ ἄφθαρτον δι᾽ ὅλου ἔλεγεν αὐτὴν εἶναι· ἐκδαπανᾶται γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εἰς τὸ ἀφανές, ὥς φησι. §4 Epicurus Democritus Aristotle: Cicero Tusc. 1.18 una animum et corpus occidere. Iamblichus de An. fr. 36 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. 1.49.43, p. 384.12– 18 εἰ δὲ παρέσπαρται μὲν καὶ ἔνεστιν ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι καθαπερεὶ ἐν ἀσκῷ πνεῦμα, περιεχομένη ἢ συμμιγνυμένη πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγκινουμένη ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα διὰ τῶν θυρίδων φαινόμενα (cf. Arist. de An. 1.2 404a34 ~ Leucippus 67A28 DK) δῆλόν που τοῦτο ὅτι ἔξεισιν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκβαίνειν διαφορεῖται καὶ διασκεδάννυται, ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος (—) καὶ Ἐπίκουρος (fr. 337 Usener) ἀποφαίνονται. Hippolytus Ref. 1.22.5 (Epicurus fr. 340 Usener) τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων λύεσθαι ἅμα τοῖς σώμασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ συγγεννᾶσθαι αὐτοῖς τίθεται· αἷμα [sic] γὰρ αὐτὰς εἶναι, οὗ ἐξελθόντος ἢ τραπέντος ἀπόλλυσθαι ὅλον τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Ref. 1.20.6 (on Aristotle) τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τὴν μὲν ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου ἀθάνατον εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον ἀίδιον, τὴν δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ὡς προείπομεν, ἀφανιζεσθαι. Lactantius Inst. 7.13.7–8 Heck–Wlosok falsa est ergo Democriti (—) et Epicuri (fr. 336 Usener) et Dicaearchi (fr. 10b Wehrli, 29 Mirhady) de animae dissolutione sententia. … (8) quia non pervidebant animae rationem, quae tam subtilis est, ut oculos humanae mentis effugiat, interire dixerunt. ps.Galen HPh c. 24, DG p. 613.14–15 θνητὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος (—) καὶ Δικαίαρχος (fr. 10a Wehrli, 28 Mirhady). Capitula Lucretiana at DRN 3.417 animam nativam et mortalem esse. at DRN 3.445 animam et corpus simul nasci et simul interire. at DRN 5.59 animam nativam esse. Commenta Bernensia in Lucanum p. 288.3–5 Usener (cf. above, General texts) alii existimant animas statim elisas corpore solvi ac dissipari in principia sua, inter quos Epicurus (—). §5 Plato Pythagoras: Tertullian de An. 24.1 quia hoc et deum credidit. Lactantius Op.D. 17.4 Perrin unde apparet animam nescio quid esse deo similis. Proclus in Tim. 3.234.8–18 Diehl τί τὸ ἀθάνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ τί τὸ θνητόν, ἐζήτηται παρὰ τοῖς τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγηταῖς. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν μόνην ἀθάνατον ἀπολείποντες φθείρουσι τήν τε ἄλογον ζωὴν σύμπασαν καὶ τὸ πνευματικὸν ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς, κατὰ τὴν εἰς γένεσιν ῥοπὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν διδόντες αὐτοῖς μόνον τε τὸν νοῦν ἀθάνατον διατηροῦντες ὡς μόνον καὶ μένοντα καὶ ὁμοιούμενον τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ μὴ φθειρόμενον, ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιότεροι καὶ ἕπεσθαι τῇ λέξει κρίναντες, δι᾽ ἧς ὁ Πλάτων φθείρει τὴν ἄλογον, θνητὴν αὐτὴν καλῶν, τοὺς Ἀττικοὺς (fr. 15 Des Places) λέγω καὶ Ἀλβίνους (fr. 15 Gioè) καὶ τοιούτους τινάς. Suda s.v. Ψ 164, p. 4.853.3–4 Adler ὅτι Πλάτων τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων ψυχὴν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγοις θνητὴν ὡμολόγηκεν.

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Sources and Other Parallel Texts

General texts: Plato Apol. 40c δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. Aristotle SE 17 176b16–17 πότερον γὰρ φθαρτὴ ἢ ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν ζῴων, οὐ διώρισται τοῖς πολλοῖς. Top. 2.3 110a38–b3 οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι παντὶ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς διαλεχθῆναι, οἷον εἰ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ὅτι ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. ps.Plato Ax. 370d πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς εἶναι λόγους περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς. Lucretius DRN 1.112–116 ignoratur enim quae sit natura animai, / nata sit an contra nascentibus insinuetur / et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta / an tenebras Orci visat vastasque lacunas, / an pecudes alias divinitus insinuet se. Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ant.Rom. 8.62.1 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἅμα τοῖς σώμασι διαλυομένοις καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁτιδήποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο, συνδιαλύεται, καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐθὲν ἔτι ἐστίν, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως μακαρίους ὑπολάβω τοὺς μηθὲν μὲν ἀπολαύσαντας τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγαθόν, δι᾽ αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην ἀπολομένους. εἰ δ᾽ ἄφθαρτοι μέχρι τοῦ παντὸς αἱ ψυχαὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἡμῶν οὖσαι καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, ἢ χρόνον τινὰ μετὰ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἔτι διαμένουσι, μήκιστον μὲν αἱ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐλάχιστον δ᾽ αἱ τῶν κακῶν, ἀποχρῶσα τιμὴ φαίνοιτ᾽ ἄν, οἷς ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦσιν ἠναντιώθη τὰ ἐκ τῆς τύχης, ἡ παρὰ τῶν ζώντων εὐλογία καὶ μνήμη μέχρι πλείστου παραμείνασα χρόνου. Anon. Photii cod. 249, p. 240.5–7 Thesleff ὅτι καὶ Πλάτων, φησι, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀθάνατον ὁμοίως λέγουσι τὴν ψυχήν, κἄν τινες εἰς τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους νοῦν οὐκ ἐμβαίνοντες θνητὴν αὐτὴν νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν λέγειν. Diogenes of Oenoanda frs. 38–39 Smith see below. Galen QAM c. 3, p. 16.3–11 εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ λογιζόμενον εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι θνητόν, ἔσται καὶ αὐτὸ κρᾶσίς τις ἐγκεφάλου …· εἰ δ᾽ ἀθάνατον ἔσται, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων βούλεται, διὰ τί χωρίζεται ⟨αὒτη add. Bazou⟩ ψυχθέντος σφοδρῶς ἢ ὑπερθερμανθέντος ἢ ὑπερξηρανθέντος ἢ ὑπερυγρανθέντος τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, καλῶς ἂν ἐπεποιήκει γράψας αὐτός, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα τὰ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἔγραψε. in Epid. vi p. 272.19–25 Wenkebach–Pfaff μέγιστον δ᾽ ἐνταῦθα κινεῖται δόγμα διαπεφωνημένον καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς φιλοσόφοις. ἔνιοι μὲν ἡγοῦνται μίαν οὐσίαν εἶναι ψυχῆς τε καὶ φύσεως, … τινὲς δὲ οὐ μίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἰδίαν ἑκατέρᾳ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναί φασι καὶ οὐ σμικρῷ γ᾽ ⟨εἴδει⟩ τινὶ διαφερούσας, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλῳ τῷ γένει, ὅπου γε καὶ τὴν μὲν τῆς φύσεως φθαρτὴν εἶναι ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄφθαρτον. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Top. 76.26–28 ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντίως δοξάζουσιν, ἐν μὲν τοῖς σοφοῖς … περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ps.Alexander Quaest. fr. 2 Vitelli at FS Gomperz Vienna 1902 p. 93.16–17 λέγει (sc. Plato) δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσώματόν τινα οὐσίαν καὶ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι, ὧν θάτερον περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους δείκνυται. oἱ δὲ (sc. the Stoics) … λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι, λέγουσι δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν, καὶ τὰς μέν τινας τῶν ψυχῶν φθείρεσθαι σὺν τoῖς φθειρομένοις ἔχουσιν αὐτάς, τὰς δὲ σῴζεσθαι ἕως τῆς παραλογωτάτης ἐκπυρώσεως. Probl. 2 pr. 19–23 ὥσπερ γὰρ ψυχὴ ὁμολογηθεῖσα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀθάνατος διὰ τὸ ἀσώματον καὶ αὐτοκίνητον, ἑτέροις δὲ διαπεφώνητο τοὔμπαλιν ὁ λόγος. φασὶ γὰρ φθαρτὴν αὐτήν, τῷ πάθει βαπτιζομένην τῆς ὕλης. Sextus Empiricus P. 1.151 (tenth mode) δογματικὰς δὲ ὑπολήψεις ἀλλήλαις ἀντιτίθεμεν, ὅταν λέγωμεν … τοὺς μὲν θνητὴν τὴν ψυχὴν (sc. ἀποφαίνεσθα),

liber 4 caput 7 τοὺς δὲ ἀθάνατον. Plotinus Enn. 4.7.[2].1.1–4 (opening lines) εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἢ φθείρεται πᾶς, ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἄπεισιν εἰς σκέδασιν καὶ φθοράν, τὰ δὲ μένει εἰς ἀεί, ἅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτός, ὧδ᾽ ἄν τις μάθοι κατὰ φύσιν ἐπισκοπούμενος (κτλ.). Origen CC 3.22, p. 167.16–20 Marcovich ὥσπερ οἴονταί τινες περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχῆς ὡς παραχρῆμα διαφθειρομένης, διεφθάρη καὶ τούτων ἡ ψυχή· ἢ κατὰ τὴν δόξαν τῶν λεγόντων ἐπιδιαμένειν ἢ ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐπιδιαμένουσιν οὗτοι ἢ ἀθάνατοί εἰσι, καὶ θεοὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἥρωες δέ· ἢ οὐδὲ ἥρωες ἀλλ᾽ ἁπαξαπλῶς ψυχαί; CC 1.13, p. 16.21–26 Marcovich ὡς εἰ λέγοιμεν καὶ τὸν Πλατωνικόν, πιστεύοντα τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτῆς λεγομένοις περὶ μετενσωματώσεως, μωρίαν ἀνειληφέναι ὡς πρὸς τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς (SVF 2.819) διασύροντας τὴν τούτων συγκατάθεσιν, καὶ ὡς πρὸς Περιπατητικοὺς θρυλοῦντας τὰ Πλάτωνος τερετίσματα (cf. Aristotle APr. 1.22 83a33, Atticus fr. 13.1 at Eus. PE 15.13.1, Themistius in APr. 34.34–35.3), καὶ ὡς πρὸς Ἐπικουρείους (fr. 369 Usener) δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐγκαλοῦντας τοῖς εἰσάγουσι πρόνοιαν καὶ θεὸν ἐφιστᾶσι τοῖς ὅλοις. Eusebius PE 14.10.3 (Porphyry 246F Smith) ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀντέγραψε Βοήθῳ Περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ αὐτὸς ὧδε γράφων ὁμολογεῖ πρὸς λέξιν· ‘… ὡς τὰ μὲν τῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ἀναμφιλέκτως συνίστησι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀθάνατον· οἱ δὲ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων κομισθέντες λόγοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι εὐανάτρεπτοι διὰ τὴν ἐν πᾶσιν εὑρησιλογίαν τῶν ἐριστικῶν. τίς γὰρ λόγος τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ οὐκ ἀμφισβητήσιμος τοῖς ἑτεροδόξοις, ὅπου καὶ περὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἐναργῶν ἐπέχειν αὐτῶν τισιν ἐδόκει;’ Lactantius Inst. 7.13.5–6 Heck–Wlosok polites quidam consuluit Apollinem Milesium utrumne maneat anima post mortem an dissolvatur, et respondit his versibus (Greek text of poem follows) = Theosophorum graecorum fr. 37 Erbse ὅτι πυθομένου τινὸς τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, πότερον μένει ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ θάνατον ἢ διαλύεται, ἀπεκρίθη οὕτως· ‘ψυχή, μέχρι μὲν [μὲν μέχρις Lact.] οὗ δεσμοῖς πρὸς σῶμα κρατεῖται / φθαρτόν, ἐοῦσ᾽ ἀπαθὴς ταῖς τοῦδ᾽ [φθαρτὰ νοοῦσα πάθη θηνηταῖς Lact.] ἀλγηδόσιν εἴκει· / ἡνίκα δ᾽ αὖτε λύσιν βρότεον [ἀνάλυσιν βροτέην Lact.] μετὰ σῶμα μαρανθέν / ὠκίστην εὕρητ᾽ [εὕρηται Lact.], εἰς αἰθέρα πᾶσα φορεῖται / αἰὲν ἀγήραος οὖσα, μένει δ᾽ ἐς πάμπαν ἀτειρής. / τοῦτο δὲ πρωτογόνος θεία [πρωτογόνος γὰρ τοῦτο θεία Lact.] διέταξε πρόνοια’. Cyranides 1.7.76–77 Kaimakes ἐρώτησις πρὸς τὸν τεχνίτην. ‘λέγε μοι πρότερον· ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἢ θνητή’; κτλ. Olympiodorus in Phd. 10.2.1, p. 139 Westerink τρεῖς γὰρ αὗται δόξαι ψευδεῖς περὶ ψυχῆς γεγόνασι, see below §§2–3, §4. Damascius (olim Olympiodorus) in Phd. 177.1– 7, pp. 107–109 Westerink ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ἕξεως ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος (fr. 46a Des Places)· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς φύσεως, ὡς Πλωτῖνος ἔνι ὅπου (Enn. 4.7.[2]14)· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης (fr. 75 Heinze, F 131 Isnardi Parente2) καὶ Σπεύσιππος (fr. 55 Lang, 99 Isnardi Parente, 55 Tarán), τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος (de An. fr. 36 Finamore– Dillon?) καὶ Πλούταρχος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι μόνης τῆς λογικῆς, ὡς Πρόκλος (e.g. in Remp. 1.215.5–6) καὶ Πορφύριος (450F Smith)· οἱ δὲ μέχρι μόνου τοῦ νοῦ, φθείρουσι γὰρ τὴν δόξαν, ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν· οἱ δὲ (sc. the Stoics, —) μέχρι τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς, φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς μερικὰς εἰς τὴν ὅλην. Simplicius in Ench. p. 1.47–2.11 Dübner = p. 194.35–44 Hadot καὶ τοῦτο δ᾽ ἄν τις τῶν λόγων τούτων θαυμάσειεν, ὅτι τοὺς πειθομένους καὶ ἐργαζομένους τὰ λεγόμενα μακαρίους ἀποτελοῦσι καὶ εὐδαί-

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μονας, οὐδὲν δεηθέντας τὰς μετὰ θάνατον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀμοιβὰς ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, κἂν πάντως ἀκολουθῶσι καὶ αὗται. τὸ γὰρ ὡς ὀργάνοις χρώμενον τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις πάθεσι πάντη πάντως χωριστὴν ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἐπιδιαμένουσαν μετὰ τὴν ἐκείνων φθοράν, καὶ δηλονότι καὶ τὴν τελειότητα σύστοιχον τῇ οὐσίᾳ. ἀλλὰ κἂν θνητήν τις ὑποθῆται τὴν ψυχήν, συναπολλυμένην τῷ σώματι, ὁ κατὰ ταύτας ζῶν τὰς ὑποθήκας, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελειότητα ἀπολαμβάνων, τὸ οἰκεῖον καρπούμενος ἀγαθὸν, εὐδαίμων ὄντως ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος. in Ench. p. 110.25–32 Dübner = p. 394.58–62 Hadot ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἄξιον ἐπισκέψεως, εἰ περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ὅλως οὐ μαντευτέον· πῶς χρὴ ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς; πότερον θνητή ἐστιν, ἢ ἀθάνατος; καὶ εἰ χρὴ τῷδέ τινι διδασκάλῳ χρήσασθαι; πολλοὶ γὰρ τῶν παλαιῶν φαίνονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὄντων ἐρωτήσαντες, καίτοι τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν τοίως ἢ τοίως ἡμέτερόν φαμεν καὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι. Zeno of Verona Tractatus 1.2.4 philosophi de anima varia disserunt, sed tamen hanc esse inmortalem ⟨et⟩ Epicuri (—), Dicaearchi (fr. 29 app. Mirhady) Democritique (—) vanitatem argumentatione manifesta convincunt. Chapter heading: Strabo 15.1.59 (Megasthenes FGrH715 F33) Πλάτων περί τε ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς. Philo of Alexandria Somn. 1.181 ἴσως δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς ὑπαινίττεται δόγμα. Origen CC 5.57, p. 368.23–24 Marcovich τῷ Πυθαγορείῳ Νουμηνίῳ (fr. 29 Des Places) ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς. cf. Plotinus Enn. 4.7[2] title also cited by Porphyry Plot. 25 Περὶ ἀθανασίας ψυχῆς, but at Plot. 4 he writes Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας. Salustius ιϛʹ. Ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή. §1 & §3 Pythagoras Anaxagoras Diogenes Plato Empedocles Xenocrates Stoics: Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 38 i.3–7 Smith καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν μὲν γὰ[ρ ἡ] | ψυχὴ οὔτ᾽ εἶναι δύνα[ταί] | ποτε, εἰ καὶ πολλὰ π[ερὶ] | [τού]του φλυαρεῖ Πλ[άτων] | [καὶ οἱ] Στωικοί. §1 Pythagoras Anaxagoras Diogenes Plato Empedocles Xenocrates: Herodotus 2.123 πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος …· τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω. Plato Phd. 73a τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. Phd. 88b ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον. Phd. 106c–e οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθά(d)νατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος. Phdr. 245c–246a ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον. … (d) … ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητόν ἐστιν, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. … (e) … μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη. (tr. Cicero Resp. 6.27 (= Somn.Scip.) nam quod semper movetur, aeternum est. … id autem nec nasci potest nec mori. … cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse quod se ipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget?) Leg. 10.896a– b φημί γε· εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν χσπρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, ἐπειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία ἅπασιν;—οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη γε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Alex.

liber 4 caput 7 Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) at D.L. 8.28 ἀθάνατόν τ᾽ εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ τὸ ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἀπέσπασται ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. 8.30 (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) καὶ τὸ μὲν φρόνιμον ἀθάνατον, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ θνητά. ps.Plutarch Cons. 120D–E ὁ δὲ θεῖος Πλάτων πολλὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς εἴρηκεν, οὐκ ὀλίγα δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ τῷ Μένωνι καὶ τῷ Γοργίᾳ καὶ σποράδην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαλόγοις. Flavius Josephus B.J. 2.154 (on the Essenes) ἔρρωται παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἥδε ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐ μόνιμον αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους ἀεὶ διαμένειν. Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 39 iii.6–8 Smith [π]ῶς οὖν, | ὦ Πλά[τω]ν, [γε]νήσεταί | [σ]οι ἀ[φθαρσί]α; Alcinous Did. c. 5, p. 157.27–36 H. ζητῶν εἰ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ὑποθέμενος αὐτὸ τοῦτο ζητῶ εἰ ἀεικίνητος, καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδείξας ζητῶ εἰ τὸ ἀεικίνητον αὐτοκίνητον, καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο ἀποδείξας σκοπῶ εἰ τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, εἶτα εἰ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀγένητος, ὅπερ τίθενται ὡς ὁμολογούμενον, τοῦ ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου ὄντος· ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἀρξάμενος ἐναργοῦς ὄντος συνθήσω τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν· ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ἀρχὴ κινήσεως τὸ αὐτοκίνητον, τὸ αὐτοκίνητον δὲ ψυχή, ἄφθαρτος ἄρα καὶ ἀγένητος καὶ ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή. Atticus fr. 7.1 Des Places at Eus. PE 15.9.1 (verbatim) ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τί καὶ λέγοιμεν ἄν; δῆλα γὰρ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη σχεδὸν καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἅπασιν, ὅτι Πλάτων μὲν ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολείπει καὶ πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ τούτου λόγους πεποίηται, ποικίλως καὶ παντοίως ἀποδεικνὺς ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή (cf. Theodoret CAG 5.47). Apuleius Plat. lib. 3(?) sive Anon. Compendiosa expositio 8.10 Stover ab his de immortalitate animae loquitur. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 3.67 (on Plato) ἀθάνατον ἔλεγε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ πολλὰ μεταμφιεννυμένην σώματα. Porphyry VP 19 (Pythagoras 14.8a DK) μάλιστα μέντοι γνώριμα παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐγένετο πρῶτον μὲν ὡς ἀθάνατον εἶναι φησὶ τὴν ψυχήν. Macrobius in Somn. 2.13.9–14.1 his praemissis iam quibus syllogismis de immortalitate animae diversi sectatores Platonis ratiocinati sint oportet aperiri. sunt enim qui per gradus syllogismorum ad unum finem probationis evadunt, certam sibi propositionem sequentis ex antecedentis conclusione facientes. (10) apud quos hic prior est: ‘anima ex se movetur, quicquid autem ex se movetur semper movetur, igitur anima semper movetur’. secundus ita, qui nascitur ex prioris fine: ‘anima semper movetur, quod autem semper movetur immortale est, igitur anima immortalis est’. et ita in duobus syllogismis duae res probantur, id est et semper moveri animam, ut in priore, et esse immortalem ut colligitur de secundo. alii vero usque ad tertium gradum ita argumentando procedunt: ‘anima ex se movetur, quod autem ex se movetur principium motus est, igitur anima principium motus est’. rursus ex hac conclusione nascitur propositio: ‘anima principium motus est, quod autem principium motus est natum non est, igitur anima nata non est’. tertio loco: ‘anima nata non est, quod autem natum non est, immortale est; igitur anima immortalis est’. (11) alii vero omnem ratiocinationem suam in unius syllogismi compendium redegerunt: … ‘anima ex se movetur; quod ex se movetur principium motus est; quod principium motus est natum non est; quod natum non est immortale est; igitur anima immortalis est’. (14.1) sed harum omnium ratiocinationum apud eum potest postrema conclusio de animae immortalitate constare, qui primam pro-

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positionem, id est ex se moveri animam, non refellit; hac enim in fide non recepta, debilia fiunt omnia quae sequuntur. Hermias in Phdr. p. 104.4–11 Lucarini– Moreschini πρότερον δὲ αὐτὰς ψιλὰς ἐκθώμεθα τῶν συλλογισμῶν τὰς προτάσεις ἐν τάξει, ἐπειδὴ σποράδην αὐτὰς ὁ Πλάτων ἐξέθετο. ὁ μὲν οὖν πρότερος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν· ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοκίνητος· τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀεικίνητον· τὸ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀθάνατος. οὗτος οὖν ἡμῖν δείξει ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἐξ ἑαυτῆς οὐ φθείρεται. ⟨ὁ δὲ δεύτερος τοιοῦτος·⟩ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοκίνητος· τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀρχὴ κινήσεως· ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἀγένητος· τὸ ἀγένητον ἄφθαρτον· τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀθάνατον· ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀθάνατος. Ammonius Hermeiou in Isag. 35.19–22 ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς λόγον ἀποδεῖξαι βουλόμενος τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἐχρήσατο, λέγων ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοκίνητος, τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀεικίνητον, τὸ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον, ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀθάνατος. Simplicius in Cat. 14.31–33 ὁ γὰρ δεικνὺς ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος διὰ μέσου τοῦ αὐτοκινήτου λέγει οὕτως· ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοκίνητος, τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀθάνατον· καὶ οὕτως ἐπάγει τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος. John Philoponus in APr. 11.32–35. Olympiodorus Prol. 17.35–36. in Phaed. 3.3.9–10 οὕτω γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ Φαίδρῳ (245c–246a) ἔδειξε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ὁρισάμενος τὸν κατηγορούμενον ὅρον μέσον ὄντα τὸ αὐτοκίνητον. David Prol. 47.12– 15. §§2–3 Heraclitus Stoics: Clement of Alexandria Strom. 5.14.105.1 (cited Eus. PE 13.13.32) παραπλήσια τούτῳ (Heraclitus T 642 Mouraviev) καὶ οἱ ἐλλογιμώτατοι τῶν Στωϊκῶν (SVF 2.590) δογματίζουσι περί τε … καὶ τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν ἐπιδιαμονῆς. Calcidius in Tim. c. 251 Heraclitus (T 778 Mouraviev) vero consentientibus Stoicis (SVF 2.1198) rationem nostram cum divina ratione conectit regente ac moderante mundana. Olympiodorus in Phd. 10.2.11–14, p. 139 Westerink (not in SVF) τρίτη (sc. ψευδὴς περὶ ψυχῆς) δόξα ἡ λέγουσα τὴν μὲν ἀπαίδευτον ψυχὴν ἐξιοῦσαν τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς φθείρεσθαι, τὴν δὲ πεπαιδευμένην στομωθεῖσαν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐπιμένειν τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου, ἧς δόξης ἦν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος (T 1001 Mouraviev). §2 Seneca Nat. 7.25.2 alius vim divinam et dei partem (sc. dicet animum esse). Manilius 4.884–893 … nostrumque parentem / pars sua perspicimus genitique accedimus astris. / an dubium est habitare deum sub pectore nostro / in caelumque redire animas caeloque venire, / utque sit ex omni constructus corpore mundus / aëris atque ignis summi terraeque marisque / hospitium menti totum quae infusa gubernet, / sic esse in nobis terrenae corpora sortis / sanguineasque animas animo, qui cuncta gubernat / dispensatque hominem? Seneca Dial. 8.5.5 an illud verum sit quo maxime probatur homines divini esse spiritus, partem ac veluti scintillas quasdam astrorum in terram desiluisse atque alieno loco haesisse. Arius Didymus fr. 39.5 Diels, DG p. 471.13–16 at Eus. PE 15.20.5 (SVF 2.821) ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ὅλου (sc. ψυχὴν) ἀΐδιον, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς συμμίγνυσθαι ἐπὶ τελευτῇ εἰς ἐκείνην. Hippolytus Ref. 6.25.4 λέγει δὲ Πυθαγόρας … καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ζῴων ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων φέ(ρ)εσθαι. ps.Galen An.Ut. 19.172.1 K. ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ ἀπόῤῥοια μὲν τῆς πάσης ψυχῆς ⟨οὖσα⟩. Apuleius Plat. 1.9 illam fontem animarum omnium, caelestam animam. Macrobius in Somn. 1.6.20 mundi anima quae animarum omnium fons est.

liber 4 caput 7 §3 Stoics: Seneca Dial. 26.6–7 et cum tempus advenerit, quo se mundus renovaturus extinguat, viribus ista se suis caedent et sidera sideribus incurrent et omni flagrante materia uno igni quicquid nunc ex disposito lucet ardebit. (7) nos quoque felices animae et aeterna sortitae, cum deo visum erit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis et ipsae parva ruinae ingentis accessio in antiqua elementa vertemur. Ptolemy Iudic. c. 7, pp. 11.24–12.9 ὅτι δὲ καὶ τάς τε αἰσθητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ οὐ τῷ σώματι ποιούμεθα, κατανοήσαιμεν ἂν εἰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἐπιβάλοιμεν αὐτῶν τῇ διαλύσει, καθ᾽ ἣν ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς λεπτομερείας καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἢ πνεῦμα τοῦ συνέχοντος ἀνεθὲν εὐθὺς εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα στοιχεῖα πέφυκε χωρεῖν, ὡς εὐλόγως ἂν μηκέτι τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς ποιήσασθαι κινήσεις, τὸ δὲ σῶμα διὰ τὸ τῆς ὕλης παχυμερὲς ἐπιδιαμένον συχνὸν χρόνον ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς καταστάσεσιν, ὅμως οὐδεμίαν φαίνεται ποιούμενον οὔτε αἴσθησιν οὔτε ὅλως κίνησίν τινα τῶν προτέρων. Atticus fr. 7 Des Places at Eus. PE 15.9.6 (verbatim) τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων οἱ μὲν ἐπιδιαμένειν συνεχώρησαν. Marcus Aurelius 4.21. Calcidius in Tim. c. 220 (SVF 2.879). SVF 2.809–822. Themistius in de An. 17.3–5 ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως Ζήνωνι (SVF 1.145) μὲν ὑπολείπεταί τις ἀπολογία κεκρᾶσθαι ὅλην δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος φάσκοντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔξοδον αὐτῆς ἄνευ φθορᾶς τοῦ συγκρίματος μὴ ποιοῦντι. §§4–5 Epicurus Democritus Aristotle Plato Pythagoras: Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 90.13–15 ὁ νοῦς ἄρα ὁ τοῦτο νοήσας ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁ ὑποκείμενός τε καὶ ὑλικός· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ σὺν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἧς ἐστι δύναμις, φθειρομένῃ φθείρεται. §4 Epicurus Democritus Aristotle: Plato Phd. 80d ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα … ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι; Aristotle de An. 2.2 413b24–27 περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεσθαι χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. Epicurus Ep.Hdt. at D.L. 10.65 λυομένου τοῦ ὅλου ἀθροίσματος ἡ ψυχὴ διασπείρεται. Lucretius DRN 3.437–444 crede animam quoque diffundi multoque perire / ocius et citius dissolvi in corpora prima, / cum semel ex hominis membris ablata recessit; / quippe etenim corpus, quod vas quasi constitit eius, / cum cohibere nequit conquassatum ex aliqua re / ac rarefactum detracto sanguine venis, / aëre qui credas posse hanc cohiberier ullo, / corpore qui nostro rarus magis incohibens sit? Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) at D.L. 8.30 καὶ τὸ μὲν φρόνιμον ἀθάνατον, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ θνητά. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 21.22–24 οὖσα δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ εἶδος τοῦ σώματος, ὁποῖον προείρηται, τῷ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τοῦ σώματος τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος καὶ συμφθείροιτο ἂν τῷ σώματι, ὅση γε αὐτῆς φθαρτοῦ σώματος εἶδός ἐστιν. Olympiodorus in Phd. 10.2.2–6, p. 139 Westerink μία μὲν (sc. ψευδὴς δόξα περὶ ψυχῆς) ἡ λέγουσα ἅμα φθείρεσθαι τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς ἡ λέγουσα τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἧς δόξης ἦν ὁ Σιμμίας (Phd. 85e3–86d4) καί τινες τῶν Πυθαγορείων. δευτέρα δὲ ἡ λέγουσα τὴν ψυχὴν οἷον σῶμα οὖσαν λεπτομερὲς καὶ καπνῷ ἐοικυῖαν μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος σκεδάννυσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι, ἧς δόξης ἦν καὶ ὁ ποιητής κτλ. John Philoponus in de An. 10.1–3 οἱ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀχώριστον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θνητήν, ὧν ἐστιν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Ἀφροδισιεύς, ὃς καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην πειρᾶται εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν συγκατασπᾶν.

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§5 Plato Pythagoras: Plato Tim. 30b διὰ δὴ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δ᾽ ἐν σώματι συνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνετο, ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος. Tim. 72d τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅσον θνητὸν ἔχει καὶ ὅσον θεῖον. Tim. 90a τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἴδους διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ τῇδε, ὡς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμονα θεὸς ἑκάστῳ δέδωκεν. Tim. 69c– e οἱ δὲ μιμούμενοι, παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θνητὸν σῶμα αὐτῇ περιετόρνευσαν ὄχημά τε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἔδοσαν ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσῳκοδόμουν τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ (d) παθήματα ἔχον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡδονήν, … ἔτι δ᾽ αὖ θάρρος καὶ φόβον, ἄφρονε συμβούλω, θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον, ἐλπίδα δ᾽ εὐπαράγωγον· αἰσθήσει δὲ ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐπιχειρητῇ παντὸς ἔρωτι συγκερασάμενοι ταῦτα, ἀναγκαίως τὸ θνητὸν γένος συνέθεσαν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ σεβόμενοι μιαίνειν τὸ θεῖον, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἦν ἀνάγκη, χωρὶς ἐκείνου κατοικίζουσιν εἰς ἄλλην τοῦ σώματος οἴκησιν τὸ θνητόν. … (e) … ἐν δὴ τοῖς στήθεσιν καὶ τῷ καλουμένῳ θώρακι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θνητὸν γένος ἐνέδουν. (cf. Galen PHP 9.9.8 ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἓξ ὑπομνήμασι τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας οὔτε περὶ τῆς οὐσίας εἰπών τι τῶν τριῶν εἰδῶν τῆς ψυχῆς οὔτε περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας οὔθ᾽ ὅλως ζητήσας πότερα κυρίως ὀνομάζων εἴρηκεν ἐν Τιμαίῳ θνητὰ τὰ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ταύτην αὐτοῖς ἐπήνεγκε τὴν προσηγορίαν ἀθανάτοις οὖσιν ὡς χείροσι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ ὡς κατὰ τὰ θνητὰ τῶν ζῴων ἐνεργοῦσι μόνον.) Euripides fr. 1018 Snell/Kannicht = Menander Mon. 588 Jäkel ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός. Xenophon Mem. 4.3.14 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἥ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν. Cicero Resp. 6.26 (= Somn.Scip.) mens cuiusque is est quisque, non ea figura, quae digito demonstrari potest. deum te igitur scito esse, siquidem est deus, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus, cui praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus; et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse deus aeternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet. Varr. 1.29 quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant. Tusc. 1.65 divina mallem ad nos (sc. transferebat Homerus). quae autem divina? vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse. ergo animus qui *** ut ego dico, divinus est, ut Euripides (fr. 1018 Snell/Kannicht) dicere audet, deus. et quidem, si deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. ND 1.28 quo modo porro deus iste, si nihil esset nisi animus, aut infixus aut infusus esset in mundo? Seneca Ep. 31.11 quid aliud voces hunc (sc. animum bonum) quam deum in corpore humano hospitantem? Alcinous c. 25, pp. 177.16–178.26 H. τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποφαίνει τοῦτον ἐπιὼν τὸν τρόπον …· εἰ δὲ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἂν εἴη· ἀσώματος γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία. … καὶ μὴν ἡγεμονεύει ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἡγεμονικὸν τῷ θείῳ ἔοικεν· ὥστε ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ ἐοικυῖα ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἄφθαρτος. … ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ λογικαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀθάνατοι ὑπάρχουσι κατὰ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, βεβαιώσαιτ᾽ ἄν τις· εἰ δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλογοι, τοῦτο τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ὑπάρχει. Atticus fr. 7.13 Des Places at Eus. PE 15.9.6 καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ πᾶσαν βούλεται (sc. Aristotle) τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, τόν γε νοῦν ὁμολογεῖ (with Plato) θεῖόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι. Boethus at Porphyry 243F Smith at Eus. PE 11.28.7– 11 εἰ μὲν ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ παντὸς ὀλέθρου κρείττων τις φύσις, πολλοὺς

liber 4 caput 7 ἀναμείναντα χρὴ καὶ περιηγησάμενον λόγους ἀποφήνασθαι. (8) τὸ μέντοι τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς ὁμοιότερον μηδὲν γενέσθαι θεῷ ψυχῆς, οὐ πολλῆς ἄν τις δεηθεὶς πραγματείας πιστεύσειεν, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ ἄπαυστον τῆς κινήσεως, ἣν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐνδίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν νοῦ. (9) εἰς ὅπερ ἀπιδὼν καὶ ὁ Κροτωνιάτης φυσικὸς (see ch. 4.2.2 above) εἶπεν ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν ἠρεμίαν φύσει φεύγειν, ὥσπερ τὰ θεῖα τῶν σωμάτων. … (11) εἰ γὰρ ὡς ὁμοιότατον τῷ θείῳ πάντων χρημάτων ἡ ψυχὴ δείκνυται, τίς ἔτι χρεία τῶν ἄλλων δεῖσθαι λόγων εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς κτλ. John Philoponus in de An. 12.15–22 δείξομεν οὖν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τε πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀσώματος καὶ ὅτι μόνη ἡ λογικὴ χωριστὴ παντὸς σώματος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀθάνατος, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἄλογος τοῦ μὲν παχέος τούτου χωριστή, ἀχώριστος δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος, καὶ ἔτι εἰ ὅλως ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιδιαμένει μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον τὴν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ἐπί τινα χρόνον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ φυτικὴ ἐν τῷ παχεῖ τούτῳ τῷ σώματι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει καὶ συμφθείρεται αὐτῷ. Plutarch An.Procr. 1027A μὴ πᾶν ἔργον εἶναι θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ σύμφυτον ἔχουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ μοῖραν. Plat.Quaest. 1001C ἡ δὲ ψυχή … οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος. Celsus at Orig. CC 4.52, p. 269.12 Marcovich καὶ ψυχὴ μὲν θεοῦ ἔργον, σώματος δὲ ἄλλη φύσις. Seneca Ep. 66.12 ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Aristotle Met. Δ.7 1072b28–29 φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον. Alcinous Did. 10 p. 164.34 H. ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς ἀίδιός ἐστιν. ps.Athanasius Disp.Ar. MPG 28.452.32–33 ὅτι ἀϊδίου Θεοῦ τυγχάνει ἔργον ὁ κόσμος.

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Liber 4 Caput 7a S: Stobaeus Ecl. 1.48.7, p. 317.15–19 Wachsmuth; cf. Phot. Bibl. 167, p. 112b29 Henry (titulus solus)—cf. PSy CRN 4.83, p. 78.15 Delatte (titulus solus) T: Theodoretus CAG 5.28, p. 130.9–10 Raeder Cf. Hermias Irr. 2.2 Hanson; ps.Iustinus Coh. 7.2.20 Marcovich; Nem: Nemesius NH c. 1, p. 1.14–15 Morani

Titulus ε+ʹ. Περὶ νοῦ (S) §1 Πυθαγόρας Ἀναξαγόρας Πλάτων Ξενοκράτης Κλεάνθης θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν νοῦν. (S1,T1) §2 Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος ταὐτὸν νοῦν καὶ ψυχήν, καθ᾽ οὓς οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ζῷον ἄλογον κυρίως. (S2) §1 Pythagoras—; Anaxagoras 59A93 DK; Plato—; Xenocrates fr. 69 Heinze, F 125 Isnardi Parente2; Cleanthes SVF 1.523 (abiud. ab Arnim); §2 Parmenides 28A45 DK; Empedocles 31A96 DK, cf. 31B110.10 DK; Democritus— lemmata non hab. PBQG titulum addidimus ex tit. Stob. 1.48 ap. Phot. §1 [2] Πυθαγόρας … Κλεάνθης S : καὶ οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν T ‖ [2–3] θύραθεν … νοῦν S : θύραθεν τοῦτον εἰσκρίνεσθαι T ‖ ad fin. λέγουσιν add. T §2 non hab. T ‖ [4] ταὐτὸν SP : αὐτὸν SF ‖ νοῦν καὶ ψυχήν : νοῦς καὶ ψυχή S, corr. Diels

Testes primi: Theodoretus 5.28 28.1 (~ §1) καὶ οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν θύραθεν τοῦτον εἰσκρίνεσθαι λέγουσιν. Traditio ps.Plutarchi: Symeon Seth CRN 4.83 (~ tit.) Περὶ νοῦ Testes secundi: Hermias Irr. 2.2 οἱ δὲ τὸν νοῦν (sc. ψυχὴν εἶναι) (~ §2). ps.Iustinus Coh. 7.2.20 οἱ δὲ τὸν νοῦν (sc. εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν) (~ §2). Nemesius NH c. 1, p. 1.14–15 τινὲς δὲ οὐ διεστείλαντο ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν νοῦν (~ §2). Loci Aetiani: quaestio A 4.7.4 Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἄφθαρτον· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ θεὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἔργον τοῦ ἀιδίου θεοῦ ὑπάρχειν· τὸ δ᾽ ἄλογον φθαρτόν. titulus A 1.25.4 Λεύκιππος … ἐν τῷ Περὶ νοῦ.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004428409_107

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§1 A 4.7.1 Πυθαγόρας Ἀναξαγόρας Διογένης Πλάτων Ἐμπεδοκλῆς Ξενοκράτης ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. §2 A 4.7.2 Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος Ἀριστοτέλης φθαρτὴν τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην. A 4.4.8 ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος πάντα μετέχειν φησὶ ψυχῆς ποιᾶς, καὶ τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, διότι ἀεὶ διαφανῶς τινος θερμοῦ καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ μετέχει, τοῦ πλείονος διαπνεομένου.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) This material, inserted by Diels as §§11–12 at the end of ch. 4.5, is absent from P and his tradition. Both lemmata are found in S, and a shorter version of the first lemma is cited in T, which was missed by Diels but not by Raeder (cf. M– R 1.274). It is rejected by Frede (1999b) 145, who believes that this lemma does not derive from A but from a much later source, like its immediate environment in T. Frede is followed by Gourinat (2018) at M–R 4.30–32. Mansfeld (2018a) at M–R 4.183 with n. 29 argues against this view. Scholten’s footnote (2015) 369– 370 n. 45 is unclear. Diels, though expressing doubt in the apparatus, as we just saw decided to append S’s lemmata at the end of P’s ch. 4.5, the chapter on the regent part that is absent from S (and from E). Gourinat (2011) 146 n. 21 protests strongly: this combination ‘constitue sans doute le pire example des faiblesses de sa [sc. Diels’] méthode de réconstruction’. In his view Diels failed to acknowledge that S replaced P’s Hellenistic material with Neoplatonist evidence he believed to be equivalent, and which he preferred. ‘Diels fausse ainsi notre vision des pratiques de composition de Stobée, de ses orientations philosophiques et de celles de sa source’. But like Frede, Gourinat has refused the parallel for §1 in T. (2) The presence of §1 in T, paralleled in S but absent in P, is important, for it provides further incontrovertible proof that T used not P but A as a source. See Mansfeld (2016d) at M–R 4.180–187 on the T,S source, and esp. 4.183–184 with n. 29 for ch. 4.7.1 = Diels 4.5.11; further above, General Introduction, section 2.5. This consolidates the argument in favour of the derivation of the diaphonically opposed §2 (now in S alone) from A. The terse style of both these lemmata with their series of name-labels is entirely in tune with that of the Placita. The evidence of Symeon Seth is interesting because as it seems it is independent of S, but also of P. The evidence of the testes secundi is not very helpful.

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B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. The issue is mentioned in the doxographical overview of Philo Somn. 1.30, ὁ ἡγεμὼν νοῦς […] ἢ ἔξωθεν εἰσκρίνεται; cf. Opif. 67, cited section E(a) General texts, on which see Runia (2001) 219–220, and Cher. 114, cited at Book 4 titulus et index above; also above, ch. 2.11, Commentary B and ch. 4.2, Commentary A. It is also found in Sextus Empiricus P. 2.26. The parallels in Tertullian are located in a separate chapter, where he argues against the notion that intellect should be radically distinguished from soul. (2) Sources. Theophrastus’Physics as cited by Diogenes Laertius attributes to Parmenides the view that soul and intellect—psyche and nous—are the same (Phys.Op. fr. 6a Diels, 227D FHS&G at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.22), which is not paralleled verbatim in the Parmenides paragraphs of the De sensibus. What we have at Sens. 4, quoted Diels DG 222 as ‘Theophrasti vestigia’ (cf. ibid. 142) in relation to our ch. 4.7a.2 (= A 4.5.12 Diels), is slightly different: τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ λέγει—a comment on Parmenides 28B16 DK. Aristotle de An. 3.3 427a19–27 attributes this view to ‘all the ancients’; cf. Met. Γ.5 1009b11–31, where among other evidence he also cites the Parmenides fragment. That psyche and nous are the same Aristotle attributes to Democritus (de An. 1.2 404a26–32) and (reluctantly) to Anaxagoras (de An. 1.2 404b1–3). Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.44 attributes this identification to Democritus too. So Aristotle uses both formulations, while Theophrastus in the De sensibus only uses one. The phrase ‘as Theophrastus records in the Physics, citing the tenets of about all’ (καθὰ μέμνηται καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς, πάντων σχεδὸν ἐκτιθέμενος τὰ δόγματα), in this passage of Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.22, has been interpreted by Diels (DG 103, 166), followed by many and now also by Zhmud (2013a) 164, as proving that Theophrastus in the Physikôn Doxai (as Usener and Diels influentially called the work, followed by Zhmud though Physikai Doxai makes better sense) systematically discussed the tenets of the natural philosophers on the entire range of subjects later treated by Aëtius. But apart from the question of how reliable Diogenes’ reference is, the phrase itself need not imply more than that Theophrastus in the passage referred to discussed the views on the identity of soul and intellect, or of sense perception and thought, of virtually all concerned. According to Themistius in de An. 108.11 (Thphr. fr. i Barbotin; frs. 137 no. 1a, 307A FHS&G), Book 2 of Theophrastus’ De anima is Book 5 of his Physics (ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν, δευτέρῳ δὲ τῶν Περὶ ψυχῆς). The simplest solution is that Theophrastus discussed these earlier views in his De anima, just as Aristotle had done in Book 1 of his De anima. This does not entail that the De sensibus is part of the De anima, for Aristotle too wrote a De sensu next to a De anima. This would make sense of Diogenes’ reference.

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If Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.22 on Parmenides is attributed to Theophrastus, V.P. 9.44 on Democritus should be attributed to Theophrastus as well. Diels did not do this, possibly because the phrase about the identity of soul and mind is attested not for Theophrastus but for Aristotle. But the theoretical backdrop of the identity of perceiving and thinking is attested for both Peripatetics, and this could be paraphrased as the sameness of soul and mind. C Chapter Heading The heading, of the umbrella type (περὶ τοῦ δεῖνα) that dominates in the Placita (see above, ch. 1.3 Commentary C), is that of S ch. 1.48, not in the mss. but from the index of Photius, and may have been abridged in the usual way by S. According to §1 it pertains to the subsidiary question unde, according to §2 it comprises an equivalence of nous with psyche. The wording in A is not certain; it could have been e.g. Πόθεν ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς. D Analysis a Context In S’s chapter the two lemmata are sandwiched between a fragment of ps.Archytas and an abstract from Iamblichus’ treatise On Soul (which begins with πάλιν τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ νοῦ) in Ecl. 1.48 with the heading ‘On Intellect’, on which see Festugière (1953) 11. In S this separate chapter comes before ch. 49 with heading ‘On Soul’, in which abstracts from Aëtian chapters 4.2–6 are preserved. Soul follows nous in the Neoplatonist hierarchy: S’s order of treatment is often according to his own (Neoplatonist) priorities, think of his positioning of the theology of ch. 1.7 in ch. 1 of his Book 1 before the principles of ch. 1.3 in his own ch. 1.10. A separate Aëtian chapter on the possible provenance of intellect from outside and the question of whether it is identical with soul is quite well placed after the block of chapters on the soul and before the chapters on sense perception. Diels’ decision (as he was aware himself, for he wrote in the apparatus ad DG 392b ‘dubium an hoc capitulum ad c. 5 referendum’) to append the lemmata in the right-hand column of ch. 4.5 on the location of the regent part as 4.5.11–12 is arbitrary. T’s (shorter) lemma is interpolated four paragraphs down from his account of soul at CAG 5.28 in an account of views on the relation of intellect to soul and the status of intellect. The reason will have been that in the source used by him, i.e. A, the evidence on nous was distinguished from and followed after that on the soul per se. Accordingly, we have preferred to give this chapter the number 4.7a, instead of 4.5a. Diels remarkably enough failed to print the lemma from T 5.28 at DG 392. In T it is part of a series of views on the relation of intellect to soul and the status of intellect. This follows upon contrasting views concerned with what the Stoics

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believed about the mortality or relative immortality of the soul, CAG 5.26–27, and as we noted is located at some distance from T’s Aëtian material on the soul per se, which at CAG 5.24 ends with three lemmata Diels printed at the bottom of DG 393 as the final part of the Aëtian chapter 4.7 ‘On the indestructibility of soul’, although they are not about this theme at all, but on the issue of whether and in what sense a soul may be attributed to plants, and whether they may be called ‘living beings’ (ζῷα). See below, section D(b), above, ch. 4.7, Commentary D(c), and Mansfeld (1990a) 3187–3190. b Number–Order of Lemmata T has one lemma, S two. As already noted, Diels placed them at the end of ch. 4.5, that is, after the account of the location of the regent part. His motive, presumably, is that ‘intellect’ may indeed be equivalent with ‘regent part’. The fact, however, that (1) the main source is a chapter (with its own specific title) in S different from that in which the (other) lemmata of ch. 4.5 are preserved, that (2) the lemma in T is found at some distance from the material for ch. 4.5, and (3) that in Tertullian and Nemesius, too, the issues of the relation between soul and intellect and of intellect’s origin are discussed in chapters that are not found near their accounts of the regent part, further justifies our decision not to accept Diels’ reconstruction of ch. 4.5 ad finem, and to allocate the two lemmata to a chapter of their own instead. This entails that P eliminated an entire chapter. See also M–R 2.1.142–143, 2.2.470, and for the splitting up of Dielsian chapters M–R 2.2, chs. 2a, 5a, 17a. A reversal of the lemmata order in this (new) chapter is defensible, but we have preferred not to interfere with S’s order. Perhaps our two lemmata are the remains of an uberius caput. Even so the multiple name-labels give pretty good coverage. S may very well have left out one or two lemmata because he preferred the fragment from Iamblichus’ On the Soul (cited below at section E(b) General texts), which he copies out immediately after the two Aëtian lemmata. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter §1 is concerned with the subsidiary question type unde, πόθεν (cf. e.g. the headings of chs. 2.5 and 2.17 and see Mansfeld (1990a) 3092 n. 138, 3125–3126, 3133, 3138–3139, 3150, 3194), and posits a separate status for intellect. It seems a bit odd that Aristotle himself is not included, in contrast to other name-labels whose connection with such a status for intellect is, at best, a matter of interpretation. Perhaps the name-label has dropped out. §2 is about the question type and category of substance. The assumption is that there is no distinction between intellect and soul. In the De anima the latter position is attributed by Aristotle to Anaxagoras and Democritus, see sec-

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tion B above and section E(b)§2 below. The two lemmata suffice to set out a complete diaphonia, just as e.g. in ch. 4.6: §1 is about a separate status for intellect, while §2 denies that intellect and soul may be distinguished from each other, so that there can be no separate status for intellect. This further supports the separate status of the little bilemmatic chapter. d

Further Comments General Points The evidence has been streamlined. The diaphonia between §1 and §2 is to some extent false or at any rate incomplete, since soul too, according to a part of the evidence not reflected in our chapter, was believed by some to enter from outside. But the somewhat strange contrast between intellect entering from outside on the one hand and the lack of difference between soul and intellect on the other is precisely paralleled in the fragment from Iamblichus’ De anima quoted below section E(a) General texts. Finamore and Dillon (2002) 118–119, commenting on the Iamblichus passage, find this difficult to explain, but should have taken the Aëtian lemmata into account, copied out by S immediately before the Iamblichus passage. The diaphonia was used by the Pyrrhonists, see Sextus Empiricus P. 2.26, and note the parallel clause οὐδέν ἐστι ζῷον ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά ἐστι πάντα κτλ. Note that Themistius (in de An. 108.12–13), after a substantial verbatim quotation of Theophrastus on the potential and actual intellect, actually says that in what follows in Book 5 of Physics, or Book 2 of De anima, ‘concerning the potential intellect as well they (namely Aristotle and Theophrastus) find almost the same difficulties, whether it is from the outside or connate’ etc. (περὶ τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ σχεδὸν τὰ αὐτὰ διαποροῦσιν, εἴτε ἔξωθέν ἐστιν εἴτε συμφυής), as cited at greater length ad fr. i Barbotin and FHS&G fr. 307A. Individual Points §1 Because it is the purpose of the chapter to achieve a diaphonia, one should not be surprised by, or shocked (as Von Arnim apparently was) at the array of name-labels: the status of intellect as a separate component is in need of supporters. Similar views are attributed by Aristotle to the Pythagoreans (de An. 1.2 404a16–18) and ‘the Orphic poem’ (de An. 1.5 410b27–30, the soul arriving with the winds). Also cf. Varro at Lactantius Op.D. 17.5, on the ‘soul inhaled by the mouth’. Attribution to Plato may have been achieved by combining the doctrine of metensomatosis with the idea that of the three parts of the soul only the highest part is immortal. See also Alcinous Did. 25, p. 178.34 H., and cf. Tertullian de An. 3.2, hi statum eius aliunde ⟨de⟩ducunt. The attribution to Anaxagoras may

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be connected with the special status of Nous (and nous) in his system. That to Cleanthes may be an echo of the Stoic view that the embryo becomes ensouled at its first breath (SVF 2.804–808). §2 The second clause of the doxa gives the grounds for the first. Because there is no living being (animal) that does not possess some reason—the tacit other premise being that all animals are ensouled—there is no ground for distinguishing between humans and other animals as if only humans had reason, so no grounds for distinguishing between reason and non-reason, or between intellect and soul. See also Mansfeld (1990a) 3192. The combination of the name-labels Parmenides and Empedocles and Democritus plus doxa echoes Aristotle Met. Γ.5 1009b12–31 (quoted section E(b)§2), where the present identification of soul and mind (explicitly paralleled for Democritus and Anaxagoras elsewhere in Aristotle, see again section E(b)§2) is expressed as a lack of distinction between sense perception and thought. See further Mansfeld (1996) and (2018b). See also M–R 2.1.142–143. e Further Evidence One is struck by the absence of the name-label Democritus in the first doxa, since Aristotle tells us that soul-atoms (and soul does not differ from intellect for Democritus, Aristotle says, see next lemma with section E(b)§2) ‘enter from outside’, θύραθεν ἐπεισιόντων, in the act of breathing, de An. 1.2 404a13. In this context he even attributes a θύραθεν νοῦς to him, Resp. 4 472a22. The presence of this name-label would presumably have weakened the diaphonia (Democritus’ presence is at any rate restricted to the next lemma because of the identification of soul and intellect Aristotle attributed to him). Ch. 4.3 section E(b)§14, with Commentary D(d)§14, presents some evidence of antecedents in Aristotle for the attribution of a sort of exterior soul or nous to certain Presocratics. So the Aëtian lemma 4.7a.1 seems to derive from Aristotle no less than from Theophrastus. See also above, section D(d)§1, and M– R 2.1.143. As is well known, Aristotle’s text GA 2.3 736b27–28, λείπεται δὴ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον, probably in combination with de An. 3.5 430a17–22 (cf. Moraux 1973, 231), in both Middle Platonist and Aristotelian circles gave rise to the attribution to Aristotle himself of the view that the intellect enters from outside. It is attributed to Cratippus by Cicero, see section E(b)§1, who even ventures to amplify this attribution into one of a World Soul. For an argument contra of this external origin in relation to Aristotle see Berti (2008) 295–328; also cf. Moraux (1984) 2.406–425. The bald statement of §1 fails to tell us whether or not the intellect entering from outside exists separately or derives from a divine Intellect. Our chapter in

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no way anticipates the history of the views concerned with this intellect from, say, Alexander of Aphrodisias onwards. For Alexander see e.g. Moraux (2001) 343–353, 373–382, 386–394, and for this subsequent development the still useful overview of Kurfess (1911). The fragment of Iamblichus De anima quoted below, section E(a) General texts, may give some impression of the later debate. E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: Philo of Alexandria Somn. 1.30–31 ἆρ᾽ οὖν … ὁ ἡγεμὼν νοῦς … τί γὰρ αὐτὸν οἰόμεθα …, γεννώμενον δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἢ ἔξωθεν εἰσκρίνεται … ; Cher. 114 πόθεν δὲ ἦλθεν ἡ ψυχή; Tertullian de An. 12.1 proinde et animu⟨s⟩ sive mens est νοῦς apud Graecos. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.349 οἱ μὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος (sc. εἶναι τὴν διάνοιαν), ὡς Αἰνησίδημος (fr. B24A Polito) κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον (T 689 Mouraviev). Arnobius Adv.Nat. 1.38, p. 33.15–16 Marchesi (qui … monstravit) advolaritne ad nos (sc. anima) sponte an cum ipsis sata sit et procreata visceribus. Iamblichus de An. fr. 15 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. 1.48.8, pp. 317.20– 318.15 Ἰαμβλίχου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ψυχῆς. πάλιν τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ πασῶν τῶν κρειττόνων δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς οἱ μὲν Στωικοὶ (SVF 1.149, 2.835) λέγουσι μὴ εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν λόγον, ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ δεκατέσσαρα ἔτη. οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος (Tim. 43d–44a) καὶ Πυθαγόρου παρεῖναι μὲν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιγενέσι τὸν λόγον φασίν, ἐπισκοτεῖσθαί γε μὴν {ἐν} τοῖς ἔξωθεν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχάζειν. ἤδη τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ νοῦ πολλοὶ μὲν Περιπατητικοὶ τὸν ἐκ σπέρματος καὶ {τὸν} ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄλλον νοῦν ὑποθέμενοι, ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα ἀποβλαστάνοντα ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως, καὶ χωριστὸν καὶ θύραθεν ἐπικαλούμενον ἕτερον παραγίγνεσθαι λέγουσιν ὀψιαίτατα, ἐπειδὰν τελειωθῇ μὲν ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν νοῦς, ἐπιτηδείως δὲ μετέχῃ τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν νοήσεως. πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν Πλατωνικῶν καὶ τὸν νοῦν τῇ ψυχῇ ἅμα τῇ πρώτῃ εἰσόδῳ αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ σῶμα συνεισάγουσιν, οὐδὲ εἶναι ὅλως ἑτέραν μὲν αὐτήν, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτῆς τὸν νοῦν. §2 Parmenides Empedocles Democritus: Tertullian de An. 12.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 8 Podolak) tamen eundem (sc. mentem) alibi animam edicit (sc. Anaxagoras). de An. 12.6 (Soranus de An. fr. 9 Podolak) unum erunt utrumque (sc. mens et anima) et Democritus (fr. 68 Luria) obtinebit differentiam tollens. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.22 (on Parmenides, 28A1 DK) καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, καθὰ μέμνηται καὶ Θεόφραστος (Phys.Op. fr. 6a Diels, fr. 227D FHS&G) ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς, πάντων σχεδὸν ἐκτιθέμενος τὰ δόγματα. V.P. 9.44 (on Democritus, 68A1 DK) τὴν ψυχὴν … καὶ νοῦν ταὐτὸν εἶναι. Lactantius Op.D. 18.2 Perrin qui unum esse dicunt (sc. animam et animum) hanc rationem secuntur, quod neque vivi sine sensu possit neque sentiri sine vita … idcirco animum et animam indifferenter appellant duo Epicurei poetae (sc. Empedocles(?) and Lucretius).

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Sources and Other Parallel Texts

General texts: Aristotle de An. 2.2 413b24–27 περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεσθαι χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. ps.Philoponus in de An. 518.8–18 ἰστέον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ νοῦς τρία τινὰ σημαίνει παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ τρία ἄλλως μὲν λέγει Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Ἀφροδισιεύς (fr. 1 Moraux), ἄλλως δὲ ὁ Πλούταρχος· ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος πρῶτον σημαινόμενον λέγει τοῦ νοῦ τὸν δυνάμει νοῦν, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν παίδων· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς παισὶν ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς ἐστι. δεύτερον σημαινόμενον τοῦ δυνάμει ὁ καθ᾽ ἕξιν νοῦς, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν τελείων ἀνθρώπων· οἱ γὰρ τέλειοι ἄνθρωποι εἴδησιν λοιπὸν ἔχοντες τῶν πραγμάτων τὸν καθ᾽ ἕξιν νοῦν ἔχειν λέγονται. τρίτον σημαινόμενόν ἐστι τοῦ νοῦ ὁ ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦς, ὅ ἐστιν ὁ θύραθεν, ὁ παντέλειος, ὁ μὴ ὢν καθ᾽ ἕξιν ἢ κατὰ τὸ δυνάμει, ἵνα καὶ ἁπλοῦς ᾖ ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὤν, ὁ κυβερνῶν τὸ πᾶν. ταῦτα τὰ τρία σημαινόμενα τοῦ νοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον. Lactantius Op.D. 18.1 Perrrin sequitur alia et ipsa inextricabilis quaestio, idemne sit anima et animus an vero aliud sit illud quo vivimus, aliud autem quo sentimus et sapimus. Chapter heading: Diogenes Laertius V.P. 5.87 (Heraclides of Pontus fr. 22 Wehrli, 1 Schütrumpf) Περὶ νοῦ. V.P. 9.46 (Democritus 68B5e–f DK) Tetralogia IV 3 Περὶ νοῦ. 4 Περὶ αἰσθησίων (ταῦτά τινες ὁμοῦ γράφοντες Περὶ ψυχῆς ἐπιγράφουσι). ps.Archytas 47B9.5 DK at Iambl. CMSc 35.27–36.1 Περὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθάσιος (‘unecht’). ps.Brotinus p. 55.21 Thesleff at Iambl. CMSc 34.20 Βροτῖνος ἐν τῷ Περὶ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας. ps.Alexander of Aphrodisias An.Mant. 106.18 tit. Περὶ νοῦ. Porphyry Plot. 4 Περὶ νοῦ καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος. Plot. 5 Περὶ νοῦ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ. Sallustius de Deis ιεʹ. Περὶ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς. §1 Pythagoras Anaxagoras Plato Xenocrates Cleanthes: cf. Aristotle GA 2.3 736b28–29 λείπεται δὴ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι θεῖον μόνον. de An. 3.5 430a17–23 καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής … χωρισθεὶς δ᾽ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον. de An. 1.2 403b31–404a15 (on Democritus and Leucippus). Resp. 4 472a20– 22 (Democritus, 68A106 DK) οὐ λέγει δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν τί τὸ αἴτιον, πότερον ἔσωθεν ἢ ἔξωθεν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὁ θύραθεν νοῦς τηρεῖ τὴν βοήθειαν. Theophrastus fr. ia Barbotin, 307A FHS&G at Themist. in de An. 107.30–33 (verbatim) ἄμεινον δὲ καὶ τὰ Θεοφράστου παραθέσθαι περί τε τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δυνάμει τάδε φησίν· ‘ὁ δὲ νοῦς πῶς ποτε ἔξωθεν ὢν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπίθετος ὅμως συμφυής’. Philo of Alexandria Opif. 67 τὴν γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τα νῦν ὑπερθετέον διὰ τοὺς φάσκοντας θύραθεν αὐτὸν ἐπεισιέναι θεῖον καὶ ἀίδιον ὄντα. Cicero Div. 1.70 … ratio est, qua Cratippus noster uti solet, animos hominum quadam ex parte extrinsecus esse tractos et haustos (ex quo intellegitur esse extra divinum animum, humanus unde ducatur). Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 90.23–91.4 ὁ οὖν νοούμενος ἄφθαρτος ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς (οὗτός ἐστιν ὅ τ⟨ε⟩ [ὅτι mss., corr. Accatino–Donini (1994) 375] χωριστός τ⟨οῦ⟩ [τε mss., corr. Accatino–Donini (1994) 375] ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἄφθαρτος νοῦς, ὃν καὶ θύραθεν Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει, νοῦς ὁ ἔξωθεν γινόμενος ἐν ἡμῖν), ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡ δύναμις

liber 4 caput 7a τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῆς, οὐδὲ ἡ ἕξις, καθ᾽ ἣν ἕξιν ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῦτον νοεῖ. Atticus fr. 7.13 Des Places at Eus. PE 15.9.13 (verbatim) τίς μὲν οὖν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὁ νοῦς, ὅθεν ὤν, καὶ πόθεν ἐπεισκρινόμενος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αὐτὸς (sc. Aristotle) ἂν εἰδείη, εἴ γέ τι συνίησιν ὧν λέγει περὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ μὴ τὸ ἄπορον τοῦ πράγματος τῷ ἀσαφεῖ τοῦ λόγου περιστέλλων ἐξίσταται τὸν ἔλεγχον, ὥσπερ αἱ σηπίαι τὸ δυσθήρευτον ἐκ τοῦ σκοτεινοῦ ποριζόμενος. Clement of Alexandria Strom. 6.16.135.1 ἐπεισκρίνεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ προσεισκρίνεται τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ᾧ διαλογιζόμεθα, οὐ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος καταβολὴν γεννώμενον. Iamblichus de An. fr. 15 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. 1.48.8, p. 318.5–11 ἤδη τοίνυν … πολλοὶ μὲν Περιπατητικοὶ … χωριστὸν καὶ θύραθεν ἐπικαλούμενον ἕτερον (sc. νοῦν) παραγίγνεσθαι λέγουσιν ὀψιαίτατα, ἐπειδὰν τελειωθῇ μὲν ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν νοῦς, ἐπιτηδείως δὲ μετέχῃ τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν νοήσεως. Themistius in de An. 108.12–13 περὶ τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ σχεδὸν τὰ αὐτὰ διαποροῦσιν (sc. Aristotle and Theophrastus), εἴτε ἔξωθέν ἐστιν εἴτε συμφυής. ps.Alexander of Aphrodisias An.Mant. 108.22–23 θύραθέν ἐστι λεγόμενος νοῦς ὁ ποιητικός, οὐκ ὢν μόριον καὶ δύναμίς τις τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἔξωθεν γινόμενος ἐν ἡμῖν. An.Mant. 108.29–109.1 διὸ καὶ ποιητικὸς νοῦς, ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν θύραθεν ὢν τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος, εἰκότως ἀθάνατος ὑπ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλους καλεῖται νοῦς. Hermias in Phdr. 1.51, p. 52.10–11 Lucarini–Moreschini τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν ἐπικτητὸν εἶναι ἔφατο (sc. Plato), τουτέστιν ἔξωθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι (ταύτην γὰρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφατο εἶναι τὸν θύραθεν νοῦν). Simplicius in Phys. 964.29–965.4 ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον ἀρέσκει τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταίρων τὸν Θεόφραστον (fr. xiii Barbotin, 271 FHS&G) ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ κινήσεως αὐτοῦ λέγοντα, ὅτι ‘… εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς κρεῖττόν τι καὶ θειότερον, ἅτε δὴ ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιὼν καὶ παντέλειος’. §2 Parmenides Empedocles Democritus: Empedocles 31B110.10 DK. πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν. Aristotle de An. 1.2 404a25–b3 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγει τὴν κινοῦσαν, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος εἴρηκεν ὡς τὸ πᾶν ἐκίνησε νοῦς· οὐ μὴν παντελῶς γ᾽ ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος (68A101 DK). ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ταὐτὸν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν (τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον, διὸ καλῶς ποιῆσαι τὸν Ὅμηρον (—) ὡς ὁ Ἕκτωρ ‘κεῖτ᾽ ἀλλοφρονέων’· οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν) (404b) Ἀναξαγόρας (59A100 DK) δ᾽ ἧττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει, ἑτέρωθι δὲ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι ταὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ. de An. 1.2 405a8–9 Δημόκριτος (68A101 DK) δὲ καὶ γλαφυρωτέρως εἴρηκεν ἀποφαινόμενος διὰ τί τούτων ἑκάτερον· ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν. Resp. 4 472a3–14 (Democritus, 68A106 DK) λέγει δ᾽ ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ταὐτόν, τὰ πρῶτα σχήματα τῶν σφαιροειδῶν. ἐκκρινομένων οὖν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐκθλίβοντος, βοήθειαν γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναπνοήν φησιν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἀέρι πολὺν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων ἃ καλεῖ ἐκεῖνος νοῦν καὶ ψυχήν· ἀναπνέοντος οὖν καὶ εἰσιόντος τοῦ ἀέρος συνεισιόντα ταῦτα καὶ ἀνείργοντα τὴν θλίψιν κωλύειν τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις διιέναι ψυχήν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἐκπνεῖν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν· ὅταν γὰρ κρατῇ τὸ περιέχον συνθλῖβον, καὶ μηκέτι ⟨τὸ⟩ θύραθεν εἰσιὸν δύνηται ἀνείργειν, μὴ δυναμένου ἀναπνεῖν, τότε συμβαίνειν τὸν θάνατον τοῖς ζῴοις. Met. Γ.5 1009b12–31 ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι

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ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί φασιν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος τοιαύταις δόξαις γεγένηνται ἔνοχοι. καὶ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μεταβάλλοντας τὴν ἕξιν μεταβάλλειν φησὶ τὴν φρόνησιν (31B106 DK)· ‘πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἐναύξεται ἀνθρώποισιν.’ καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις δὲ λέγει (31B108 DK) ὅτι ‘ὅσσον ⟨γ᾽⟩ ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεί / καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστατο’. καὶ Παρμενίδης δὲ ἀποφαίνεται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (28B16 DK)· ‘ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ᾽ ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυκάμπτων, / τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται· τὸ γὰρ αὐτό / ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει, μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν / καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα’· Ἀναξαγόρου (59A28 DK) δὲ καὶ ἀπόφθεγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἑταίρων τινάς, ὅτι τοιαῦτ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσιν. φασὶ δὲ (cf. above Democritus 68A101 DK) καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον (—) ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἕκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς, ‘κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα’, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά. Theophrastus Sens. 25 (Alcmaeon 24A5 DK) ὡς ἕτερον ὂν τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ οὔ, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ταὐτόν. Theophrastus Sens. 3–4 (on Parmenides, 28A46 DK) δυοῖν ὄντοιν στοιχείοιν κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐστὶν ἡ γνῶσις. ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τὸ θερμὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἄλλην γίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν, βελτίω δὲ καὶ καθαρωτέραν τὴν διὰ τὸ θερμόν· μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην δεῖσθαί τινος συμμετρίας· … (4) τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ λέγει … καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν. Lucretius DRN 3.422–424 atque animam verbi causa cum dicere pergam, / mortalem esse docens, animum quoque dicere credas, / quatenus est unum inter se coniunctaque res est. Sextus Empiricus P. 2.26 δείκνυται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπῳ (i.e. P. 1.40–78), ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι ζῷον ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά ἐστι πάντα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν δογματικῶν) λεγομένοις. ps.Philoponus in de An. 71.18– 33 ταὐτὸν γὰρ ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν, ὥσπερ καὶ Δημόκριτος· ἔχομεν οὖν τοῦτο ἐναργῶς παρ᾽ αὐτῶν εἰρημένον ὅτι ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ ψυχὴ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ τοῦτο κατασκευάζει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δημόκριτος (31B133 DK), φησί, καὶ πρόδηλός ἐστι τοῦτο βουλόμενος· ἄντικρυς γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ταὐτόν ἐστι, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸ τῆι αἰσθήσει φαινόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι ἀληθές, ὥσπερ καὶ Πρωταγόρας (—) ἔλεγε, κατά γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον διαφερόντων, καὶ τῆς μὲν αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῆς φαντασίας περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐχούσης, τοῦ δὲ νοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. εἰ τοίνυν νοῦς μὲν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ψυχὴ δὲ ἔχει περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον, τὸ ἀληθὲς δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ φαινομένῳ, ὡς Δημοκρίτῳ δοκεῖ, καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἄρα ταὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ. ὡς γὰρ ἔχει ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὕτως ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ὡς τὸ φαινόμενον πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὕτως ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν. εἰ τοίνυν ταὐτὸν τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἄρα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ταὐτόν. differently Pythagorica Hypomnemata in Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) at D.L. 8.30 νοῦν μὲν οὖν καὶ θυμὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, φρένας δὲ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ.

Liber 4 Caput 8 PP: Papyrus Antinoopolis 85 fr. 4 verso (1960) p. 78, (1967) p. 182 Barns–Zilliacus—PB: ps.Plutarchus 899D–E; pp. 393a14–395a5 Diels—PG: ps.Galenus HPh c. 90; p. 635.4–12 Diels—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 196–197 Daiber S: Stobaeus Ecl. IV p. 232.7–15 Meineke = A 4.1, DG pp. 393b1–394b9 + 1.50.1– 2a, p. 472.6–15 + 1.51.3–6, p. 473.1–19 + 1.50.10–16, p. 474.6–23 Wachsmuth; cf. Phot. Bibl. 167, p. 112b29–30 Henry (titulus solus) Cf. Nem: Nemesius NH c. 6 p. 55.13–19; c. 6, pp. 56.24–57.5; c. 7 p. 59.13 Morani

Titulus ηʹ. Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν (P,S) §1 οἱ Στωικοὶ ὁρίζονται οὕτως τὴν αἴσθησιν· ‘αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἀντίληψις δι᾽ αἰσθητηρίου ἢ κατάληψις’· πολλαχῶς δὲ λέγεται ἡ αἴσθησις, ἥ τε γὰρ ἕξις καὶ ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ ἡ φαντασία ἡ καταληπτικὴ δι᾽ αἰσθητηρίου γίνεται κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν· {ἀφ᾽ οὗ συνίσταται} πάλιν δ᾽ αἰσθητήρια λέγεται πνεύματα νοερά, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ⟨ἀφ᾽ οὗ συνίσταται⟩ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄργανα τεταμένα. (P1,S1) §1 Stoici SVF 2.850 titulus Περὶ αἰσθήσεως (sive -ων) … αἰσθητῶν (sive –οῦ) P : Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν καὶ εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις (~ tit. c. 4.9) SL-indPhot ‖ αἰσθήσεως PB(I,II,III:α)G : αἰσθήσεων PB(III:AE)Q ‖ αἰσθητῶν PBQS : αἰσθητοῦ PG §1 lemma Stobaei hab. Diels DG, sed ut contam. ex P abiud. Diels (1881) 349, quem secutus Wachsmuth ‖ [2] οἱ Στωικοὶ … αἴσθησιν PBQ : al. PG κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς ‖ τὴν αἴσθησιν] die Sinnesempfindungen Q ‖ post ἀντίληψις hab. SL αἰσθητοῦ, del. Meineke, om. Diels ‖ δι᾽ SL : om. PBQ ‖ [3] αἰσθητηρίου PBS : der Sinnesobjekte Q (cf. τῶν αἰσθητῶν Nem p. 56.24–57.1) : αἰσθητοῦ PG ‖ ἢ PBQ : om. SL ‖ πολλαχῶς … αἴσθησις PB(I,III)SL : πολλαχῶς δὲ γίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις PB(II) : om. PQ : ἀντίληψις δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται PG ‖ [4] ἡ4 PB : om. SLPGQ(ut vid.) ‖ καταληπτικὴ PB : καταληπτικὰ SL : ein Erfassen Q ‖ [5] γίνεται … ἡγεμονικόν ab Arnim prob. Mau Lachenaud : γίνονται καὶ τὸ ὄγδοον ἡγεμονικόν PB (ὄγδοον ex η dittographia sec. Mau, verisimiliter glossema byzant. ex 4.4.4 ὀγδόου δ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, ὄγδοον non hab. PGQ) : durch das leitende Organ selbst Q ‖ [4–5] δι᾽ αἰσθητηρίου γίνεται] καὶ αἰσθητικὴ PG ‖ [5] κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν] καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν PG prob. Diels ‖ {ἀφ᾽ οὗ συνίσταται} uncis inclusimus vid. ad ll. 6–7 : om. PQ, textus graecus antiquitus corruptus sec. Diels, qui συνίσταται ut emblema byzant. in app. relegavit : {συνίσταται} secl. Mau Lachenaud ‖ [5–6] πάλιν δ᾽ αἰσθητήρια] πᾶσα αἰσθητὴ βία (sic pro αἰσθητήρια) γίγνεται PG ‖ δ᾽ PB : om. PG : in app. relegavit Diels, om. ab Arnim, uncis incl. Mau Lachenaud ‖ [6] αἰσθητήρια P : αἴσθησις maluit Diels DG p. 55 prob. Torraca ‖ λέγεται PBQ : λέγονται SL ‖ πνεύματα PB : τὰ πνεύματα SL : πάλιν τὰ πνεύματα PG : unter diesem Aspekt … das Vernunftpneuma Q ‖ [6–7] ⟨ἀφ᾽ οὗ συνίσταται⟩ ex l. 5 hic transponimus legem Brinkmanni secuti ‖ [7] ἐπὶ τὰ ὄργανα PBQ : ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα PG ‖ τεταμένα PB(III) : ἀνατεταμένα PG : τεταγμένα PB(I,II) : bis zu den … gehende Q

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liber 4 caput 8

Ἐπίκουρος· ‘τὸ μόριόν ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις, καὶ τὸ ἐπαίσθημα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνέργημα’· ὥστε διχῶς παρ᾽ αὐτῷ λέγεσθαι αἴσθησιν μὲν τὴν δύναμιν, αἰσθητὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνέργημα. (P2,S2) Πλάτων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποφαίνεται ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὰ ἐκτός· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δύναμις ψυχῆς, τὸ δ᾽ ὄργανον σώματος· ἄμφω δὲ διὰ φαντασίας ἀντιληπτικὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν. (P3,S3) κατὰ τοὺς Περιπατητικοὺς τετραχῶς· ἐξ οὗ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, δι᾽ οὗ τὸ ὄργανον καὶ αἰσθητήριον, καθ᾽ ὃ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ⟨οὗ⟩ ἕνεκα τὸ αἰσθητόν. (S4) Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς νοήσεις ἑτεροιώσεις εἶναι τοῦ σώματος. (S5) Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑτεροίωσιν αἰσθητ⟨ικ⟩οῦ καὶ μεσότητα ⟨αἰσθητοῦ⟩· κοινὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν τὴν τῶν συνθέτων εἰδῶν κριτικήν, εἰς ἣν πᾶσαι συμβάλλουσιν αἱ ἁπλαῖ τὰς ἰδίας ἑκάστη ⟨φαντασίας⟩, ἐν ᾗ τὸ μεταβατικὸν ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου εἰς ἕτερον οἷον σχήματος ⟨καὶ⟩ κινήσεως σώματος, ἐν μεθορίῳ τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, μνήμης καὶ νοῦ μετέχουσα, διατείνουσα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, καθὸ ποσὴν διανοίας ἀναλογίαν ἔχει· κοινὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὄψεως μὲν καὶ ἁφῆς σχῆμα, ὄψεως δὲ καὶ ἀκοῆς διάστημα, πασῶν δὲ κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἀριθμός. (S6) ⟨οἱ⟩ Στωικοὶ τήνδε τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ἐντὸς ἁφὴν προσαγορεύουσι, καθ᾽ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα. (S7) οἱ Στωικοὶ σωμάτων τὰς αἰσθήσεις. (S11) οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα ἀσωμάτων λόγων, ἅπερ ἤδη σχήματα προσαγορεύουσι. (S12)

§2 Epicurus fr. 249 Usener; §3 Plato cf. Phlb. 34a, Tim. 43c, 46c, Def. 414c; §4 Peripatetici—; §5 Leucippus 67A30 DK; Democritus frs. 68 et 436 Luria; §6 Aristoteles cf. de An. 2.4 415b24, 2.11 424a4–5, 3.1 425a13–15; §7 Stoici SVF 2.852; §8 Stoici SVF 2.851; §9 anonymi— §2 [8] Ἐπίκουρος PBSL : Die Anhänger des Epikouros Q ‖ τὸ μόριον : τό ⟨τε⟩ μόριον Usener, Wachsmuth, fort. PQ ‖ [9–10] ἐνέργημα bis PB : ἐνάργημα bis coni. Steckel ex D.L. 10.72, 10.91, 10.93, 10.96 fort. recte ‖ [9] ὅπερ SL : ὅθεν PB(I)SL : wodurch Q ‖ ὥστε … ἐνέργημα2] om. PB(I) ‖ [10] post αἴσθησιν add. ⟨αἰσθητικὴν⟩ Diels (1917a) 71 n. 1 §3 [12] τὸ δ᾽ ὄργανον] τὰ δὲ ὄργανα PG ‖ [13] διὰ φαντασίας ἀντιληπτικὰ] al. PG συνελθόντα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ‖ [φαν]τ̣ασιας PP : φαντασίας coni. Reiske prob. Diels : φαντασίαν PSL Mau Lachenaud ‖ post ἔξωθεν add. γίνεται PB : non hab. PP(ut vid.)GSL §§4–9 lemmata om. PPBG ‖ §4 [15] ⟨οὗ⟩ add. Meineke prob. edd. §6 [19] αἰσθητ⟨ικ⟩οῦ scripsimus : αἰσθητοῦ S ‖ [20–23] κοινὴν … κινήσεως iterantur infra c. 4.10.2 ‖ [20] ⟨αἰσθητοῦ⟩ addidimus : lac. post μεσότητα ind. Meineke, negant Diels Wachsmuth ‖ συνθέτων Diels ex c. 4.10.2 prob. Wachsmuth : συνθέντων SL : om. SP ‖ [21] πᾶσαι Diels ex c. 4.10.2 : πάλαι SPL ‖ τὰς ἰδίας SP cf. c. 4.10.2 : τοῖς ἰδίοις SL ‖ ⟨φαντασίας⟩ et [22] ⟨καί⟩ add. Diels ex c. 4.10.2 ‖ [23] λογικοῦ SP : λόγου SL §7 [27] ⟨οἱ⟩ add. Sarti prob. Diels Wachsmuth §9 [30] ἀπὸ … ἀρχαίων SL prob. Wachsmuth : ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων maluit Diels (qui μαθηματικῶν intendebat sec. Wachsmuth)

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liber 4 caput 8

§10 Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προσιόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος εἰδώλου. (P4,S13) §11 οἱ ἄλλοι εἰδῶν ἢ σχημάτων ἑτεροιώσει ⟨ἢ⟩ ἐν ψυχῇ τυπώσει, ἀπορροίαις πάντως μᾶλλον ἢ εἰδώλοις. (S14) §12 οἱ Στωικοὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι συγκατάθεσιν καὶ κατάληψιν. (S15) §13 ⟨οἱ⟩ Ἀκαδημαικοὶ μὴ εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις μήτε καταλήψεις μήτε συγκαταθέσεις. (S16) §14 οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν συγκαταθέσεως τὰς αἰσθήσεις, οὐ μέντοι συγκαταθέσεις. (S17) §10 Leucippus 67A30 DK; Democritus frs. 68 et 436 Luria; Epicurus—; §11 anonymi—; §12 Stoici SVF 2.72; §13 Academici—; §14 Peripatetici— §10 [32] Ἐπίκουρος S : om. PPBQ ‖ [32–33] καὶ … γͅίνεσθαι] om. PG ‖ γίνεσθαι] γένεσθαι PP ‖ [33–34] μηδενὶ … εἰδώλου om. PG ‖ [34] εἰδώλου PBQ : om. S §§11–14 om. PBG §11 [35] ἑτεροιώσει ⟨ἢ⟩ ἐν ψυχῇ : ἑτεροιώσιν ἐν πάσῃ S : ἑτεροιώσει susp. Diels, prob. Wachsmuth : ⟨ἢ⟩ add. Wachsmuth : ψυχῇ susp. Diels ‖ [36] πάντως Wachsmuth : πάντα S Diels §13 [38] οἱ add. Sarti

Testes primi: Traditio ps.Plutarchi: Papyrus Antinoopolis fr. 4 verso (~ P §3.2–3, §10.1–2 or P §3[12–13], §10[32– 33] see on ch. 4.22) [ψυχη̣ ]ς ̣ τ̣ο̣ δ̣ ο̣ργ̣ [αν]ο̣ν̣ [σωματος αμφω δε δια] [φαν]τ̣ασιας αντιλη̣ [μπτικα των εξωθεν] [Λευκ]ιππος Δημο[κριτος την αισθησιν και] [την] ν̣οησιν γεν̣[εσθαι, κτλ. ps.Galenus HPh c. 90 Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητοῦ (~ tit.) (text Diels) 90.1 (~P1) κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἀντίληψις αἰσθητοῦ· ἀντίληψις δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται. ἥ τε γὰρ ἕξις καὶ ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ φαντασία καταληπτικὴ καὶ αἰσθητικὴ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ἀφ᾽ οὗ πᾶσα αἰσθητὴ βία [sic] γίγνεται. πάλιν τὰ πνεύματα νοερὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνατεταμένα. 90.2 (~P3) Πλάτων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποφαίνεται ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὰ ἐκτός· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δύναμις ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ ὄργανα σώματος. ἄμφω δὲ συνελθόντα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν ἔξωθεν. 90.3 (~P4) Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰδώλων πρόσθεν προσιόντων. Testes secundi: Nemesius NH c. 6 p. 55.13–19 οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ … φαντασίαν μὲν λέγοντες τὸ πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐνδεικνύμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ {καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς φανταστόν} (ὅταν γὰρ

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liber 4 caput 8 λευκὸν ἴδωμεν, ἐγγίνεταί τι πάθος τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τῆς λήψεως αὐτοῦ. ὡς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐγγίνεται πάθος, ὅταν αἰσθάνηται, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅταν ἐννοήσῃ· εἰκόνα γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῇ δέχεται τοῦ νοητοῦ) (~§1). NH c. 6 pp. 56.24–57.5 καλεῖται δὲ πολλαχῶς [scripsimus, πολλάκις mss. prob. Morani, Sharples– Van der Eijk] αἴσθησις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια. ἔστι δὲ αἴσθησις ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν. δοκεῖ δὲ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος οὐκ αὐτῆς εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς. διὸ καὶ οὕτως ὁρίζονται τὴν αἴσθησιν· πνεῦμα νοερὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄργανα τεταμένον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως· δύναμιν ψυχῆς ἀντιληπτικὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, αἰσθητήριον δὲ ὄργανον τῆς ἀντιλήψεως τῶν αἰσθητῶν (~§1). Πλάτων (cf. Phlb. 34a, Tim. 43c, 46c, Def. 414c) δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν λέγει ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὰ ἐκτός. ἡ γὰρ δύναμις ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ὄργανον σώματος· ἄμφω δὲ διὰ φαντασίας ἀντιληπτικὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν (~ §3).

Loci Aetiani: §1 A 4.4.4 oἱ Στωικοὶ ἐξ ὀκτὼ μερῶν φασι συνεστάναι … ὀγδόου δ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, ἀφ᾽ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέταται διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων. Α 4.9.4 οἱ Στωικοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς … καὶ γὰρ αἰσθητῶν ἐστι φαντασία καὶ νοητῶν. A 4.11 titulus Πῶς γίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις κτλ. Α 4.12.1 Χρύσιππος … φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· οἷον ἐπειδὰν δι᾽ ὄψεως θεωρῶμέν τι λευκόν, ἔστι πάθος τὸ ἐγγεγενημένον διὰ τῆς ὁράσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. A 4.13.5 Ἵππαρχος ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρου φησὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀποτεινομένας ἀκτῖνας τοῖς πέρασιν αὑτῶν, οἱονεὶ χειρῶν ἐπαφαῖς, περικαθαπτούσας τοῖς ἐκτὸς σώμασι τὴν ἀντίληψιν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρατικὸν ἀναδιδόναι. A 4.13.8 Ἀλκμαίων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἀντίληψιν. A 4.15.3 τοῦ ὁρατικοῦ πνεύματος, ὅπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῆς κόρης διήκει. A 4.21.1 oἱ Στωικοί φασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τὸ ποιοῦν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρμάς. A 4.21.2 ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἑπτὰ μέρη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκπεφυκότα καὶ ἐκτεινόμενα εἰς τὸ σῶμα … τῶν δ᾽ ἑπτὰ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε μέν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια. A 4.23.1 οἱ Στωικοὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις, τὰς δ᾽ αἰσθήσεις ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ. §2 A 4.3.11 … τὸ δ᾽ ἀκατονόμαστον τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμποιεῖν αἴσθησιν, ἐν οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων στοιχείων εἶναι αἴσθησιν. A 4.9.6 τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστου ἑκάστῃ ἐναρμόττοντος. A 4.23.2 Ἐπίκουρος καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις· τὸ γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν ἀπαθές. §4 A 1.11.1 Πλάτων τριχῶς τὸ αἴτιον· φησὶ γὰρ ὑφ᾽ οὗ ἐξ οὗ πρὸς ὅ· κυριώτερον δ᾽ ἡγεῖται τὸ ὑφ᾽ οὗ. A 1.11.4 Ἀριστοτέλης δηλοῦν ἕκαστον χρώμενον σχήμασι τῆς ἑρμηνείας τοιούτοις, τό τε ἐξ οὗ λέγοντα τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὸ ὑφ᾽ οὗ τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ ὃ τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ δι᾽ ὃ τὸ τέλος. A 5.30.2 Ἡρόφιλος τὰς νόσους συμπίπτειν ὡς μὲν ὑφ᾽ οὗ ὑπερβολὴ θερμότητος ἢ ψυχρότητος· ὡς δ᾽ ἐξ οὗ διὰ πλῆθος τροφῆς ἢ ἔνδειαν· ὡς δ᾽ ἐν οἷς, ἢ αἷμα ἢ μυελὸν ἢ ἐγκέφαλον. §6 A 4.4.3 Αριστοτέλης πέντε ἐνεργείας, … τὴν αἰσθητικήν. A 4.9.3 Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν αἴσθησιν μὴ πλανᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ ἴδιον, περὶ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός. A 4.10.2 Ἀριστοτέλης … κοινὴν δ᾽ αἴσθησιν τὴν τῶν συνθέτων εἰδῶν κριτικήν, εἰς ἣν πᾶσαι

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συμβάλλουσιν αἱ ἁπλαῖ τὰς ἰδίας ἑκάστη φαντασίας· ἐν ᾗ τὸ μεταβατικὸν ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον, οἱονεὶ σχήματος καὶ κινήσεως. A 4.2.8 συγγυμνασίαν τῶν αἰσθήσεων. §8 A 4.9.8 Χρύσιππος τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἡδὺ νοητόν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπῖπτον ἤδη αἰσθητόν. A 4.9.18 oἱ Στωικοὶ τὸν σοφὸν αἰσθήσει καταληπτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους τεκμηριωδῶς. §9 A 1.14.1 σχῆμά ἐστιν ἐπιφάνεια καὶ περιγραφὴ καὶ πέρας σώματος. A 4.13.4 Ἀρίσταρχος σχήματα συνδιατυποῦντά πως αὑτοῖς τὸν ἀέρα (sc. ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων φέρεσθαι). §10 A 4.5a.2 … Δημόκριτος ταὐτὸν νοῦν καὶ ψυχήν …. A 4.9.5 Επίκουρος πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ κτλ. A 4.13.1 Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος κατὰ εἰδώλων εἴσκρισιν οἴονται τὸ ὁρατικὸν συμβαίνειν πάθος. A 4.14.2 Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος τὰς κατοπτρικὰς ἐμφάσεις γίνεσθαι κατ᾽ εἰδώλων ὑποστάσεις, ἅτινα φέρεσθαι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν συνίστασθαι δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατόπτρου κατ᾽ ἀντιπεριστροφήν. §11 A 4.13.2 Τιμαγόρας, εἷς τῶν παραχαραξάντων ἐν συχνοῖς τὴν Ἐπικούρειον αἵρεσιν, ἀντὶ τῶν εἰδώλων ταῖς ἀπορροίαις χρῆται. A 4.13.3 Στράτων χρώματά φησιν ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων φέρεσθαι συγχρῴζοντ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὸν μεταξὺ ἀέρα. A 4.13.4 Ἀρίσταρχος σχήματα συνδιατυποῦντά πως αὑτοῖς τὸν ἀέρα. A 4.20.1 τὸ σχῆμα τὸ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν κατὰ ποιὰν πλῆξιν γίνεσθαι φωνήν· πᾶσα δ᾽ ἐπιφάνεια ἀσώματος. συγκινεῖται μὲν γὰρ τοῖς σώμασιν, αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἀσώματος πάντως καθέστηκεν. §12 A 4.9.4 οἱ Στωικοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς. A 4.21.1 οἱ Στωικοί φασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τὸ ποιοῦν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρμάς· καὶ τοῦτο λογισμὸν καλοῦσιν. §13 A 4.9.2 οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ὑγιεῖς μέν (sc. τὰς αἰσθήσεις), ὅτι δι᾽ αὐτῶν οἷόν ⟨τε⟩ λαβεῖν ἀληθινὰς φαντασίας, οὐ μὴν ἀκριβεῖς.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) The witnesses are P and S. P has four lemmata, three of which are paralleled in G. For Book 4, beginning with the present chapter, complete chapters of S have only been preserved in L, the Florentine florilegium. Diels includes this evidence in the right-hand columns of the DG. In the manuscripts of the main tradition only lemmata with the name-labels Plato and Aristotle are extant, and sometimes not even those. Thus for the present chapter S has no less than thirteen lemmata, all except §3 (Plato) and (in ms. P only) §6 (Aristotle) extant only in SL. T, as we have seen, stopped excerpting A after ch. 4.7a, the last

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chapter to be paralleled in the CAG. Diels included the first lemma transmitted in SL (the same as P’s first) in his edition in DG. But in his article in response to Elter’s dissertation, (1880) 349, he argued that it had been interpolated by John of Damascus from PB. Wachsmuth followed Diels in his edition of S, noting in his apparatus on p. 472: ‘prima tantum illius ecl. … non Stobaei est sed ex [ps.]Plutarcho a gnomologio Laurentiano adscitum, ut nunc ipse Dielesius probavit’. Daiber (1980) 481 fails to mention that interpolation has been suggested and has not seen that Wachsmuth does not include this text. It was not yet excluded by Meineke as noted in the list of witnesses above the text. At M–R 1.267–268 and 1.295 we argued against Diels and continue to accept the lemma as genuinely present in S. (2) The situation in S (S as restored in Wachsmuth’s edition by the inclusion of the evidence of SL) is complicated. In Ecl. 1.50 S has combined blocks of lemmata from at least chs. 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 (also ch. 5.28, see below, ch. 4.9 Commentary A(2) and A(4) and ch. 5.28 Commentary A and D(c)). The blocks of ch. 4.8 have been distributed over three different places, viz. ch. 4.8.2–3 at Ecl. 1.50.1.2–2a, p. 472.6–15, ch. 4.8.4–7 at Ecl. 1.50.3–6, p. 473.1–19, and ch. 4.8.8– 14 at Ecl. 1.50.10–16, p. 474.6–23 Wachsmuth. In between blocks one and two we find at Ecl. 1.50.2b, p. 472.16–21 a verbatim excerpt from Plato’s Philebus in the usual Stobaean way illustrating ch. 4.8.3, the Plato lemma. More interestingly, in between blocks two and three S inserted three lemmata from ch. 4.10, viz. 4.10.3 + 4.10.5–6 at Ecl. 1.50.7–9, pp. 473.20–474.5 (4.10.1–2 + 4.10.4 are found in the next Stobaean chapter, Ecl. 1.51.2–4, pp. 481.17–482.8); see Commentary A at ch. 4.10 below. Thus these excerpts from ch. 4.10 interrupt the lemmata sequence of ch. 4.8. They are then followed by the remaining seven belonging to ch. 4.8, before SL moves on to the contents of ch. 4.9. Wachsmuth simply copied out the sequence of lemmata belonging to ch. 4.8 (minus §1) in L. It is surely most likely that L just copied out the sequence in S, so his decision is unobjectionable. S’s chapter ends after the last excerpt from A with six excerpts from Plato, namely one from the Phaedo, four from the Theaetetus in succession, and one from the Timaeus, which in various ways deal with the reliability of the senses (the theme of the next chapter, 4.9). (3) Eleven of S’s fourteen lemmata are not paralleled in P (but conversely none of P’s four lemmata are missing in S). G’s three lemmata too are paralleled in both P and S. Important parallels for §1 and §3 are found in Nem. We accept Diels’ view that Ecl. 1.50.7–9, both (as we have seen) preceded and followed by lemmata from ch. 4.8, belong in another chapter, viz. ch. 4.10. S must have moved them here rather than just SL. Wachsmuth in the apparatus ad c. 50.7 disagrees: ‘sed quamquam forma ad sensuum numerum, de quo illo capite agitur, spectare videtur, ex a r g u m e n t o potius ad hoc referendum est’.

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But Ecl. 1.50.7–9 are in the first place (and 50.7 and 50.9 exclusively) concerned with the number of the senses, not with sensation, and 1.50.8 (= ch. 4.10.5) is about the αἰσθήσεις as organs, not as sensations, and about their number (more than five), though also mentioning the sense objects. (4) The order of S’s fourteen lemmata and of the surviving four lemmata of P is the same. It appears that S copied out the whole chapter without disturbing the lemmata order, as becomes clear when we subtract the interpolated Plato quotation at S 50.2b and the interpolated lemmata from ch. 4.10 at S 50.7. B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. AD provides parallels for the Aristotle lemma. Fr. 15 Diels (cited below, section E(a)§6) describes the αἰσθητικόν, shared by all living beings, as fivefold, i.e. consisting of the five senses, and adds the compound sense, comprising the functions of imagination, memory, and opining which is not devoid of intellect. We have sensation when a sense is affected in some way. (2) Sources. Aristotle and Theophrastus: In de An. 1.2 Aristotle points out that the predecessors (Presocratics, Plato, even Xenocrates) made the soul the principle of movement (cf. A ch. 4.6, but also 4.2.1–5 and 4.3.11, see above, ch. 4.2, Commentary D(a)), or of sensation and knowledge, or of movement as well as of sensation and knowledge. Sensation and its objects are the theme of Theophrastus De sensu et sensibilibus, but the approach and contents there differ from what we find in A. Aristotle in his De sensu discussed the senses (singling out the theories of vision of Empedocles and Democritus) and the objects of sight, taste (mentioning Empedocles) and smell (mentioning Democritus). As to thematic issues the chapter also echoes themes from Aristotle De anima Books 2 and 3, e.g. de An. 3.4 about knowledge (nous). Note that Aristotle at de An. 2.5 first discusses sensation in general, then, at 2.6, begins his account with the objects of sense: 2.6 418a7–8, λεκτέον δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρῶτον, ‘in discussing the particular senses we must speak first of the objects of sense’, and in the chapters that follow discusses the senses one after the other together with their objects, starting with sight and the visible. Theophrastus in the De sensu systematically discusses a number of Presocratics as well as Plato for two to five senses, and then Democritus and Plato for the sense objects. In our present chapter the main roles are reserved for the Hellenistic philosophers. Of the Presocratics now only Democritus and Leucippus are left (we do not know who or what ‘the followers or successors of the ancients’ are supposed to be; for suggestions see below), while Plato, too, is included; this is perhaps an echo of the restrictions of the second part of Theophrastus’ treatise. The summaries based on the works of Plato and

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Aristotle are quite competently done. About the sources for the Hellenistic theories nothing much can be said, though such parallels as are available inspire some confidence. At DG 215 Diels includes ch. 4.8.6 among his sparse examples of a close reading—according to him by A—of the text of Aristotle’s pragmateiai (‘[i]psius Aristotelis doctrina … ex accurata eius lectione hausta’; cf. chs. 1.9.1, 1.23.2, 1.29.2, 4.9.3, and 5.3.1, each at Commentary B). The definition at the beginning of §6, Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑτεροίωσιν αἰσθητ⟨ικ⟩οῦ καὶ μεσότητα ⟨αἰσθητοῦ⟩, is close to de An. 2.11 424a4–5 ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως (‘which means that the sense is a sort of mean between the relevant sensible extremes’, tr. Hett LCL), but ad sententiam rather than ad verbum. So it is less close than Diels claimed. C Chapter Heading Another example of the umbrella type (περὶ τοῦ δεῖνα) that dominates in the Placita (cf. ch. 1.1, Commentary C). In S it is not included in the text of the mss., but is only found in the indices of L and Photius, both of which add the first part of the heading of the next chapter, Εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις (‘Whether the sensations are true’), to the Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν of the present chapter, connecting them with καί. The Aristotelian title Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν (‘On sensation and sense-objects’), nr. 44 on the list of titles in the Aristotelian catalogue of Ptolemy (Hein 1985. 527), which is the same as the heading of our chapter, is cited by Aristotle himself, e.g. PA 2.7 653a19–20, GA 5.2 781a21, and by Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias (texts below section E(b) Chapter heading). αἴσθησις may mean both ‘sense’ qua ‘organ’ or ‘sensor’, ‘seat of sensation’, and qua ‘sense of’, i.e., ‘sensation’, ‘perception’, or more generally ‘awareness’. On the basis of the various traditions of P alone a decision between Περὶ αἰσθήσεως and Περὶ αἰσθήσεων as first part of the heading for A is not easy. Diels follows G, who has Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητοῦ (the difference between αἰσθητοῦ and αἰσθητῶν is insignificant), and S, who as we saw combines the titles of chs. 4.8 and 4.9, and who has περὶ αἰσθήσεως. Mau and Lachenaud approve of Diels’ heading, and we follow suit, as sensation in general is the main theme in ch. 4.8. As an embedded phrase (‘eorum fit mentio quae proxime vel antecedunt vel sequuntur’ writes Bonitz 95b33) a formula such as περὶ αἰσθήσεων or –ως is the predecessor or equivalent of the heading, or title, see M–R 2.1.48, 159–161, 162– 163, 170, 202–204. One should compare the title of Theophrastus’ treatise (inappositely translated as ‘On sensations’ at FGS&G fr. 265.4). The treatise begins with the phrase περὶ δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως [note the singular—with περί it is repeated throughout the treatise] αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ καὶ καθόλου δόξαι δύ᾽ εἰσιν (‘the many doxai

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on sensation’ etc.). White (2002) 20–22 argues that with one exception the titles of Theophrastus’ opuscula correspond to the first noun of the opusculum concerned: the correct form of the title should be Περὶ αἰσθήσεως. But at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 5.42 and in some mss. Theophrastus’ title is given as Περὶ αἰσθήσεων, just as the title of Aristotle’s treatise begins with Περὶ αἰσθήσεων in some mss. of the Parva Naturalia. The second part of Theophrastus’ treatise begins with the formula (c. 59) περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν (‘and on the sense-objects’), thus echoing the second half of Aristotle’s title. In view of the fluctuating nature of titles in antiquity it is hard, perhaps even impossible to decide what is the correct form for Theophrastus. Also note another reference of Aristotle to ‘On the senses’ at Mete. 3.4 372b9–10, ἔστω δὲ περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν τεθεωρημένον ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεικνυμένοις. Galen De instrumento odoratus 5.3 (cited below, section E(b) Chapter heading) too adverts to variant titles. D Analysis a Context Following upon the eight chapters dealing with the soul per se, this is the first of five dealing with cognitive issues in a more general way; thereafter, in chs. 4.13–19 (or 20), the individual senses are treated. By and large, true to A’s stated purpose of presenting the physikos logos (ch. 1.1.1), the emphasis falls on the physical and mechanistic aspects of cognition, though with exceptions, namely ch. 4.9 about truth and falsity and ch. 4.12 about the distinction between trustworthy and untrustworthy presentations. But these topics too may be included in the treatment of cognition in physics, see above, Introduction to Book 4 section 6. The issues treated in this series of chapters are roughly the same as those in Aristotle de An. 1.2 (overview of the predecessors’ views on the soul as the principle of sensation and cognition), 2.5–10 (sensation), and 3.4–8 (cognition), and in Lucretius DRN Books 3–4, cf. M–R 2.1.145–146. The echoes of Theophrastus’ De sensibus listed by Diels DG 222–225 are not sufficient to support his thesis of a large-scale influence of this treatise (as part of what he called the Physikôn Doxai) on the Placita. See below, ch. 4.10 Commentary D(e), and Ax (1986) 77– 86 on A chs. 4.16 + 4.19–20, and Baltussen (1993) 203–205 and (2000b). We note that an account of touch is lacking in both A and Lucretius (only a brief mention together with sight at DRN 4.233); this shared lacuna may indeed point to common ancestry, see M–R 2.1.151. The absence of touch is more surprising in what purports to be a standard overview like the present one, for though not counting as a separate sense in the Timaeus it is of primary importance in Aristotle’s account of sense perception and generally present in literature on the senses.

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The first issue in the present group is the nature of sensation(s) and sense objects in general (category/question-type of substance), and where (category of place) and how (question-type of cause) they occur or are found, the next that of their truthfulness (category/question-type of quality). A chapter dealing with the number of the senses (category of quantity) follows. We note once again the importance of a treatment according to categories and question types. The section is concluded by two often-discussed and important chapters, 4.11–12, dealing respectively with the Stoic analysis of the cognitive process from sensation to concept-formation, and with Chrysippus’ distinctions between various forms of real and imagined impressions. b Number–Order of Lemmata P has four lemmata of which G omits one, S has twelve (for the first one see above, section A). The sequence in P still corresponds with that of S even when Diels’ excision of Ecl. 1.50.7–9 from this chapter is not accepted, as it is by us. That G’s order corresponds with that of P is not surprising, as it does so most of the time. The first lemma of A’s chapter, §1 on the Stoics, comes first because it explicitly provides a proper definition (οἱ Στωικοὶ ὁρίζονται οὕτως τὴν αἴσθησιν). Compare the same formula in the same relative position at ch. 1.6.1, ὁρίζονται δὲ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσίαν οἱ Στωικοὶ οὕτως, the formula Πλάτων τὴν φωνὴν ὁρίζεται at ch. 4.19.1, to be distinguished from the nominal definitions at the beginning of chs. 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.14, and 1.15. Also ch. 2.1 begins with a proper definition, of ‘cosmos’, in this case a discovery attributed to Pythagoras. The lemmata at ch. 4.8.2–3 have the same relative position in both P and S, while G omits §2, so in G the Plato lemma follows immediately upon the Stoics lemma. §§4–9 are not paralleled in either P or G, but there is no reason to interfere with S’s order. If, reasonably, we assume that §§4–9 were simply abridged away by P, the position of P4 (Leucippus Democritus) after these omitted lemmata perfectly corresponds with the relative position of the same lemma in S (where there is one name-label more: Epicurus). Finally, there is no reason to interfere with S’s positioning of §§12–14 at the end. Quite the contrary; this is where they belong, because to some extent they anticipate the details of the theories of cognition set out in the next chapters. Unless, of course, one wishes to place them in a brief chapter of their own—but unlike for ch. 4.7a there is no evidence for the heading of such a chapter. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter Though it comprises several themes, the overall unity of this rich chapter is certain because of the precedent not only of Aristotle’s account in De anima Books 2 and 3, but also of his monobiblos with the same title, Περὶ αἰσθήσεως

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καὶ αἰσθητῶν, and of Theophrastus’ monobiblos Περὶ αἰσθήσεων, the second part of which deals with the objects of sense (though these are not mentioned in its title). Alexander of Aphrodisias in the introduction to his Commentary on Aristotle’s De sensu mentions as one of the topics of the De anima περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τί τὸ ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθητὸν καὶ τίνι ὄντι αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν τὸ αἰσθητῷ εἶναι ὑπάρχει (in Sens. 1.14–17). These several themes, moreover, are connected by terminology and association: the Stoic and other definitions of sensation and sense object(s) include those of the sense organ(s) already largely treated by Aristotle (μὴ οἷόν τε ἦν ἄνευ αἰσθητηρίου αἰσθάνεσθαι τίνος, in Sens. 1.12–13), and involve various explanations of the sensory process, even diaphonically opposed ones. Related issues treated are questions such as to what extent soul, or body, or both are concerned; whether sensations are of bodies or incorporeals; and the extent to which according to various schools sensation amounts to cognition. The fourteen lemmata naturally fall into four blocks, the first of which, §§1– 6, has an appendix (§7). We note that three lemmata explicitly mention the number of meanings of the term αἴσθησις (see below, section D(d) General points), namely §1, Stoics: many meanings (in fact three); §2, Epicurus: two meanings; §4, Peripatetics: four meanings. §3, Plato, seems to be about a single meaning. The sequence according to the category of quantity, i.e., many (viz., 3)–2–1(?)–4 begins as a descending order (if, that is, we may take §3 as representing the number 1), but then turns into an ascending one in the last lemma. The converse of such a rather irregular order can be paralleled, cf. ch. 4.3.1–13: 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4, 4, 2: first ascending then descending, and ch. 4.4.1–7: 2 or 3, 5, 8, 9, 5, 2: first ascending then descending, too. §§5–6 are linked by the concept of ‘alteration’ (ἑτεροίωσις), though in the case of the Atomists this is an alteration of the body, and in that of Aristotle one of the sensing part/function of the soul. This opposition recalls the diaphonic contrast, stretching over two chapters, between Aristotle’s concept of soul as incorporeal at ch. 4.2.6 and Democritus’ and Leucippus’ concept of the soul as corporeal at ch. 4.3.5 and 4.3.7. §§6–7 are linked by the authentically Aristotelian concept of sensus communis, for §7 is a sort of appendix to §6 citing the quite different Stoic application of this concept. §§8–9 belong together as the two sides of a diaphonia: §8 says sensation is of bodies, the puzzling §9 that it is of incorporeals. §§10–11 also belong together as the two sides of a diaphonia: §10 says sensation comes about through images, §11 that it comes about through emanations. This opposition between incoming images and emanations is one of the main themes in chs. 4.13 and 4.14.

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§§12–14 belong together because they list three different views, viz. those of the Stoics, the Academic Sceptics, and the Peripatetics on the all-important issue, in Hellenistic theories of knowledge, of the relation between sensation (αἴσθησις), assent (συγκατάθεσις), and, especially, cognition (κατάληψις). The first two tenets constitute an obvious diaphonia, as the Stoics (§12) are said to hold that every sensation is an assent and a cognition, and the Academics (§13) that no sensations are either cognitions or assents. The affirmation that the Stoics hold every sensation to be, or rather to imply, assent and cognition, fails to represent the true state of affairs. So their tenet has been modified, more doxographico, the better to express the diaphonia. The view attributed to the Peripatetics (§14) that sensations do not occur without assent but are not (themselves) assents, clearly is a compromise position. The term cognition (κατάληψις) in §§12 (Stoics)–13 (Academics) provides a backwards link with §1, where one of two denotations of sensation according to the Stoics is κατάληψις through a sense organ: a modest variety of ring composition. d

Further Comments General Points We note the absence of the Cyrenaics, who held that only the affections (πάθη) are perceptible. §§1–6 give the definitions and explanations, linked to various namelabels and arranged on a gliding scale, or diaeresis—in the sense of a listing in an ordered sequence—, of the words ‘sensation’ (αἴσθησις), ‘sense object’ (αἰσθητόν), ‘impression’ (φαντασία), ‘sense-organ’ or ‘sensor’ (αἰσθητήριον, μόριον), and ‘cognition’ (κατάληψις). Note terms such as §1 λέγεται and §2 λεγέσθαι, which point at verbatim quotation. In §§1–4 the definitions concerned are of the nominal or conceptual variety, the Stoic definition at the beginning of §1 being an exception; see further above, ch. 1.9 Commentary D(d), general points. Individual Points Chapter heading Our decision in favour of Περὶ αἰσθήσεως in the singular is based on the fact that αἴσθησις (‘sensation’, ‘sense-perception’ in general) is not only defined in the first lemma, but is also the main subject in the others. The individual senses are dealt with in later chapters. Note moreover that the alternative heading, Περὶ αἰσθήσεων, may mean not only ‘On senses’, but also ‘On sensations’. See further section C above. §1 The practice of commencing a chapter with a definition in which its subject is the first word followed by ἐστί occurs several times elsewhere in order to

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introduce an introductory definition (chs. 1.9–12, 1.14–15, 1.23, 2.30, 3.1, cf. 1.25.1, 5.3). The present lemma, with the name-label as its first word, states explicitly that it is a definition: ὁρίζονται, and in chs. 1.6.1, 1.23.1, 4.19.1, 5.3.1 and 5.29.1 we find name-labels too. ἀντίληψις is a weaker form of αἴσθησις than κατάληψις. Part of the text as transmitted is corrupt. Diels despaired of healing it; see references in the apparatus criticus. The word ὄγδοον does not make much sense; Mau ingeniously suggested a mechanical corruption, viz. the interpretation of the first letter of ἡγεμονικοῦ as a number symbol. It is simpler to assume that a gloss deriving from ch. 4.4.4, where the regent part is counted as the eighth part, strayed into the text in the Byzantine tradition. The emendation of lines 5– 6 printed by Mau (followed, as usual, by Lachenaud), viz. ἀφ᾽ οὗ {συνίσταται} πάλιν {δ᾽} is difficult to accept, because the postulated corruption is hard, if not impossible to explain. It is in fact a combination of suggestions of earlier editors, some of whom bracketed συνίσταται or, like Diels, banished the word to the apparatus, and Von Arnim (whose apparatus is defective, as it usually is), who just omitted the δ᾽. Diels had likewise banished this connecting particle to the apparatus. Torraca in his translation (with comment p. 456 n. 128) follows Diels’ wilder suggestions. It is not only better but also simpler to assume that the words ἀφ᾽ οὗ συνίσταται were inadvertently left out, then added in the tympanon, from where they were put back in the wrong place, a not unusual phenomenon (Brinkmann’s law, see Brinkmann 1902). In the present case, this is entirely understandable: they were inserted after ἡγεμονικόν in line 5 instead of after ἡγεμονικοῦ in line 6. The ‘sensors’, or percipient currents of pneuma, are produced by the regent part, or ‘grow out of it’, as ch. 4.21.2 has it: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἑπτὰ μέρη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκπεφυκότα καὶ ἐκτεινόμενα εἰς τὸ σῶμα … τῶν δ᾽ ἑπτὰ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε μέν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια. Perception (αἴσθησις) and ‘grasping’ or cognition (κατάληψις) are not only receptive but also active, as the word κατάληψις itself and the simile of the tentacles of the octopus (ch. 4.4.4) make clear. As parallels for our translation of ἀφ᾽ οὗ συνίσταται we are able to cite Ptolemy Geog. 4.3.17 καὶ τὸ καλούμενον Κίρνα ὄρος … ἀφ᾽ οὗ αἱ λίμναι συνίστανται συνάπτουσαι ἀλλήλαις ‘der sogenannte Kirna-(Kinna)Berg—von ihm gehen Seen aus, die mit einander verbunden sind’ (tr. Stückelberger–Graßhoff). Also cf. Paulus Alexandrinus Elementa apotelesmatica p. 13.1–3 Boer. §1[3–5] The well-known Aristotelian formula πολλαχῶς λέγεται is also used e.g. by Philo Fug. 177 and Strabo 8.3.30. Just as the concepts ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια it is not part of the original Stoic phraseology. One may compare the Aristotelizing presentation at ch. 4.11.2–3, where see Commentary D(e)§§2–3 ad fin.

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§2 The Epicurus lemma exploits an ambiguity of the term αἴσθησις, which can mean both the organ or seat of sensation, and the sensation itself. Thus on the one hand αἴσθησις means ‘sense’, i.e., the organ or seat of sensation: the ‘bodily part’ or region (μόριον), which is the sensory ‘faculty’, or ‘power’, and on the other the ‘activity’ of this organ, or seat: the actually accomplished sensation which is the ‘sense object’ (αἰσθητόν). Steckel’s conjecture ἐνάργημα (a term used by Epicurus) for ἐνέργημα is very tempting but unnecessary, though a parallel for the pair δύναμις: ἐνέργημα is not found in Epicurus’ remains. In the Placita a doxa as a rule is in oratio obliqua depending on a verb of declaration. In the present lemma we have one of the rare examples of oratio recta (cf. chs. 2.5.1, 4.11, 4.12). This implies, or so we believe, that part of the lemma is an (abridged) verbatim quotation of Epicurus or at least derives from an actual Epicurean text. The formulas ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις and ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνέργημα are not part of the quotation but explicative glosses anticipating the final phrase of the lemma (where the specific Epicurean term ἐπαίσθημα—cf. the fragment of, perhaps, the Canon at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 10.32 = Epic. fr. 36 Usener—has been replaced by the neutral αἰσθητόν). §5, §6, & §10 The present chapter is the only one in the Placita to contain the word ἑτεροίωσις, and does so three times. This suggests a shared origin of these lemmata, or a shared influence. §5 That the sensations and thoughts according to Leucippus and Democritus are alterations of the body is the only echo in our chapter of the view of Aristotle, partly but importantly shared by Theophrastus, that according to the ancients sensation and thought are the same and a matter of bodily alteration. That some philosophers fail to distinguish between sensation and thought, and others not, is one of the diaeretic criteria in the De sensibus. The modest echo in the present chapter of Theophrastus’ treatise signifies a diluted influence, pace Diels’ general hypothesis. See further the passages cited below, section E(b)§5, and Mansfeld (1996). §6 The lines [20] κοινὴν … [22] κινήσεως are also found below in ch. 4.10 on the question of how many senses there are, where they are combined with a first phrase, namely Ἀριστοτέλης ἕκτην μὲν οὐ λέγει, to form the lemma 4.10.2 of S as preserved in L. In ch. 4.10 this κοινὴν … κινήσεως part of S’s lemma is paralleled in P, together with both the lemma before and the lemma after it, which occupy the same position in S as preserved in L as they do in P. This proves the authenticity of [20] κοινὴν … [22] κινήσεως and corroborates its placement in ch. 4.10. In the present chapter we do not have P for ch. 4.8.6 but only S as preserved in L, whose text here is a little bit different from his own text for ch. 4.10.2 in Ecl. 1.51.3 W. and from that of P at 4.10.2. Heeren and Meineke needlessly complicated matters further, see the apparatus of Diels DG 395b and

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399b, and Wachsmuth pp. 473 and 482. Diels used the text of ch. 4.10.2 to correct 4.8.6. (There is no reason in principle why A could not have largely repeated a lemma elsewhere if the subject-matter encouraged it. This happens in Book 2, see ch. 2.5.3 Philolaus.) Aristotle never said that sensation changes the object of sensation, so if we do not wish to impute a gross mistake to A, S’s transmitted αἰσθητοῦ (‘object of sensation’) has to be emended. The simplest change is into αἰσθητ⟨ικ⟩οῦ, ‘organ of sensation’ (the term is paralleled in AD fr. 13 Diels quoted below section E(a)§6). We may compare P 4.21.4, where φωνήν has to be changed into φωνη⟨τικό⟩ν, though Diels forgot to do so and Von Arnim at SVF 2.836 just quoted the text of the DG. Also see ch. 2.4.10, where παθητικόν, preserved in S, is corrupted into παθητόν in P; the word παθητός is not part of Aristotle’s vocabulary, and a change from παθητικόν into παθητόν is easier to understand than one the other way round. The simple error in §6 occurred through a misreading of a ligature or through haplography. Once the defective reading was there, the necessary αἰσθητοῦ after μεσότητα was omitted in a next stage because it seemed superfluous (as it seemed superfluous to Diels and others). This lemma, neglected by scholars, presents a later, though by and large correct systematisation and more precise formulation of Aristotle’s doctrine. The exact attribution, for instance, of particular common sensibles to two senses and of others to all the senses cannot be paralleled exactly in the pragmateiai. For phrases in Alexander and Themistius that come close see section E(b)§6. §7 For self-awareness, ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, see Cicero Fin. 3.16–17 on Stoic sensus sui in the context of oikeiosis, partly cited at section E(b)§7; discussion of this passage at Engberg-Pedersen (1990) 66–72. Also the citation of Chrysippus at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.85 (SVF 3.178), and esp. the three passages from Hierocles’ Stoicheiosis Ethike likewise quoted at section E(b)§7. Excellent discussion at Bastianini–Long (1992) 379–396, to some extent summarized at Ramelli–Konstan (2009) 39–41; see further below at ch. 4.11, Commentary D(d)§§2–3. A Cyrenaic parallel is at Cicero Luc. 20. For Epicureanism cf. Lucretius DRN 2.433–439, who distinguishes between two kinds of touch, one reacting to things impinging from outside, the other registering what happens in our body, and Sedley (1989). §8 κριτικήν: cf. A 4.10.2 below. The term κριτήριον, perhaps surprisingly, does not occur in the Placita, and the verb κρινεῖν is not used either. κριτήριον is used in a cognitive sense AD fr. 16 Diels at S 58.1 (on Aristotle) κριτήρια δ᾽ εἶναι τῆς τούτων (sc. τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοητικὰς κινήσεις) γνώσεως τόν τε νοῦν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸν μὲν τῶν νοητῶν, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. §9 The objects of sense are unexpectedly said to be incorporeals. Possibly the lemma has been formulated to allow for a perfect but purely doxograph-

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ical diaphonia with the corporealism of the Stoics of the preceding lemma, cf. above section D(c)§§8–9. The formula οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων is also puzzling. Diels wanted to read ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων, almost certainly intending μαθηματικῶν (as Wachsmuth suggests), ‘the followers of the mathematicians’. This formula can be paralleled—significantly enough only in the Placita, viz. at ch. 2.31.2, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, and S 1.52.16 at ch. 4.14.3, οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. In view of the parallel at ch. 4.13.4 (Ἀρίσταρχος σχήματα συνδιατυποῦντά πως αὑτοῖς τὸν ἀέρα (sc. ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων φέρεσθαι)) a possible correction would be οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων μαθηματικῶν. Wachsmuth ad loc. argues for the transmitted ‘ancients’: ‘significantur enim ei qui philosophiam τῶν ἀρχαίων i. e. Platonis Aristotelisve profitentur’, which in view of the contrast with the coporealist Stoics seems plausible, provided it is restricted to Peripatetics, and Platonists friendly towards Aristotle’s views. οἱ ἀρχαῖοι may pertain to people from long ago, but also to people from not so long ago. For the unclear name-label οἱ ἀρχαῖοι in P for A 1.17.1 (G substitutes οἱ παλαιότεροι) S has Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ. At ch. 4.2.1 Thales is included among the incorporealists, and Simplicius (perhaps Priscianus) in de An. 31.20–26 even argues explicitly that according to him the soul is incorporeal, see at ch. 4.2 Commentary D(b). Even so, it seems doubtful whether we may go as far as include to him among those who hold that sense data are ‘incorporeal logoi about bodies they also call ‘shapes’’. So it seems best to preserve the ambiguous ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων. e Other Evidence Parallels are found in the first place in Nem (just as in the case of ch. 4.12), who however abridges and paraphrases and has preserved much less material, viz. only passages dealing with the Stoics and Plato. If Nem does not depend on A and his tradition, he must depend on a closely related tradition. Some further parallels are found in Philo, Sextus Empiricus and Arius Didymus. The lemma on aisthesis in ps.Galen’s Medical Definitions is very complete. Though it lacks name-labels, it provides a good overview of the various options, just like the Aëtian chapter. See at section E(a)§5 below. For Aristotle and Theophrastus see above at section B. E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: Photius Bibl. cod. 212, p. 170b9–12 (Aenesidemus fr. 8B Polito) καὶ ὁ γʹ δὲ αὐτῷ λόγος περὶ … καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὰς ἰδιωμάτων, τὰς ὁμοίας περιεργαζόμενος ἐναντιολογίας, εἰς τὸ ἀνέφικτον καὶ ἀκατάληπτον ὑποφέρει καὶ αὐτά. Arnobius Adv.Nat. 1.38, p. 33.15 Marchesi (qui … monstravit …) quid sit sensus.

liber 4 caput 8 Chapter heading: Capitula Lucretiana at DRN 3.350 de sensu corporis et animi. ad DRN 3.624 de sensibus animi et animae. §1 Stoics: Philo of Alexandria Fug. 182 (SVF 2.861) ποτίζεται οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικοῦ τὸ σώματος ἡγεμονικὸν πρόσωπον, τὸ μὲν ὁρατικὸν πνεῦμα τείνοντος εἰς ὄμματα, τὸ δ᾽ ἀκουστικὸν εἰς οὖς, εἰς δὲ μυκτῆρας τὸ ὀσφρήσεως, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ γεύσεως εἰς στόμα, καὶ τὸ ἁφῆς εἰς σύμπασαν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν. ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.378.12–379.5 K. ριεʹ. αἴσθησίς ἐστι πάθος ψυχῆς διὰ σώματος ἀγγελικὸν τοῦ κινητικοῦ. τί διαφέρει αἴσθησις καὶ αἰσθητήριον καὶ αἰσθητὸν καὶ αἰσθητικόν; διαφέρει. αἴσθησις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἐνεργοῦσα δύναμις, αἰσθητήριον δὲ τὸ αἴσθησίν τινα ἐμπεπιστευμένον ὄργανον, αἰσθητὸν δὲ τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει ὑποπῖπτον, αἰσθητικὸν δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον αἴσθησις μέν, ὅρασις, γεῦσις, ὄσφρησις καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ αἰσθήσεις ἀκοὴ καὶ ἁφή. αἰσθητήριον ἤτοι ὀφθαλμὸς ἢ ῥὶς ἢ γλῶττα, ἃ καὶ ὄργανα αἰσθητικὰ προσαγορεύεται. αἰσθητὸν δὲ τὸ ξύλον ἢ ὁ λίθος ἢ κίων καὶ πάντα τὰ ὑποπίπτοντα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν. αἰσθητικὸν δὲ ὁ Θέων καὶ ὁ Δίων καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα αἰσθάνεται ζῶα. Alcinous Did. c. 4, p. 154.34–36 H. ἡ μὲν οὖν αἴσθησίς ἐστι πάθος ψυχῆς διὰ σώματος ἀπαγγελτικὸν προηγουμένως τῆς πεπονθυίας δυνάμεως. Arius Didymus fr. 39.3 Diels, DG p. 471.5–9 at Eus. PE 15.20.3 (SVF 1.519) ἀναθυμίασιν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ (T 257 Mouraviev) τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων (SVF 1.141), αἰσθητικὴν δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο λέγει ὅτι τυποῦσθαί τε δύναται τὸ μέρος τὸ ἡγούμενον αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ παραδέχεσθαι τὰς τυπώσεις. ταῦτα γὰρ ἴδια ψυχῆς ἐστι. fr. 39.5 Diels DG p. 471.15–16 at Eus. PE 15.20.5 (SVF 2.821) ἔχειν δὲ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικόν τι ἐν αὑτῇ, ὃ δὴ ζωὴ καὶ αἴσθησίς ἐστι καὶ ὁρμή. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.350 καὶ οἱ μὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν διάνοια) τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διά τινων ὀπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσαν, ἧς στάσεως ἦρξε Στράτων τε ὁ φυσικὸς (fr. 109 Wehrli, 61 Sharples) καὶ Αἰνησίδημος (fr. B24A Polito). Iamblichus de An. fr. 11 Finamore–Dillon at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.33, p. 368.14–16 (SVF 2.826) πνεύματα γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ φασιν οὗτοι διατείνειν ἄλλα κατ᾽ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν εἰς ὀφθαλμούς, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὦτα, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια. §6 Aristotle: Arius Didymus fr. 15 Diels at Stob. Ecl. 1.51.5, p. 482.11–19 Ἀριστοτέλους. τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ δὴ κοινῶς ἁπάντων τῶν ζῴων ἴδιον (αἰσθήσει γὰρ διαφέρειν τὸ ζῷον τοῦ φυτοῦ) πενταπλοῦν ἐοικέναι. τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὅρασιν τὸ δ᾽ ἀκοὴν τὸ δ᾽ ὄσφρησιν τὸ δὲ γεῦσιν τὸ δ᾽ ἁφήν. ὑπάρχειν δέ τινα καὶ σύνθετον αἴσθησιν, ἐν ᾗ τό τε φανταστικὸν πᾶν γίνεσθαι καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ μνημονευτικὸν καὶ τὸ δοξαστικόν, ὅπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἄμοιρον τοῦ νοῦ τυγχάνει. αἰσθάνεσθαι δ᾽ ἡμᾶς παθούσης τι τῆς αἰσθήσεως. fr. 16 Diels at Stob. Ecl. 1.58, p. 497.15–19 Ἀριστοτέλους. φαντασίαν δ᾽ εἶναι πάθος τι καὶ κίνησιν τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως, ὠνομάσθαι δ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῆς ὁράσεως· τὸ ⟨γὰρ⟩ φαίνεσθαι παρὰ τὸ φάος ἔχειν τὴν ἐπίρρησιν· τοῦτο δ᾽ οἰκεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὄψεως. Tertullian de An. 12.4 nam et sensus passiones facit Aristoteles. quidni? et sentire enim pati est, quia pati sentire est. §11 Anonymi: Aquilius Def. 4 Rashed φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἡγεμονικοῦ.

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General text pertaining to the whole: (relating to whole of chs. 4.8–10, 12– 20, and 22–23, plus 5.24–25, and 29–30) Aristotle Sens. 1 436a6–b7 φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῶν ζῴων, κοινὰ τῆς τε ψυχῆς ὄντα καὶ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον αἴσθησις καὶ μνήμη καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὅλως ὄρεξις, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα σχεδὸν ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ μὲν πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μετεχόντων ζωῆς κοινά, τὰ δὲ τῶν ζῴων ἐνίοις. τυγχάνουσι δὲ τούτων τὰ μέγιστα τέτταρες οὖσαι συζυγίαι τὸν ἀριθμόν, οἷον ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὕπνος, καὶ νεότης καὶ γῆρας, καὶ ἀναπνοὴ καὶ ἐκπνοή, καὶ ζωὴ καὶ θάνατος·περὶ ὧν θεωρητέον, τί τε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας συμβαίνει. φυσικοῦ δὲ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου τὰς πρώτας ἰδεῖν ἀρχάς· οὔτε γὰρ ὑγίειαν οὔτε νόσον οἷόν τε γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἐστερημένοις ζωῆς. διὸ σχεδὸν τῶν περὶ φύσεως οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρως τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες, οἱ μὲν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰ περὶ ἰατρικῆς, oἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄρχονται. (436b) ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ λεχθέντα κοινὰ τῆς τε ψυχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἄδηλον. πάντα γὰρ τὰ μὲν μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως συμβαίνει, τὰ δὲ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως, ἔνια δὲ τὰ μὲν πάθη ταύτης ὄντα τυγχάνει, τὰ δ᾽ ἕξεις, τὰ δὲ φυλακαὶ καὶ σωτηρίαι, τὰ δὲ φθοραὶ καὶ στερήσεις· ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ὅτι διὰ σώματος γίγνεται τῇ ψυχῇ, δῆλον. General texts: Aristotle de An. 1.2 403b25–28 τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυσὶ μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. παρειλήφαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς. de An. 1.2 404b8–11 ὅσοι δ᾽ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, ταύτας, οἱ δὲ μίαν, ταύτην. Theophrastus Sens. 1 περὶ δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ καὶ καθόλου δόξαι δύ᾽ εἰσιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ ποιοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐναντίῳ. Παρμενίδης (28A46 DK) μὲν καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς (31A86 DK) καὶ Πλάτων τῷ ὁμοίῳ, οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν (—) καὶ Ἡράκλειτον (T 205 Mouraviev) τῷ ἐναντίῳ. Sens. 58 μὲν οὖν περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ φρονεῖν δόξαι σχεδὸν αὖται καὶ τοσαῦται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι παρὰ τῶν πρότερον. Sens. 59–60 περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τίς ἡ φύσις καὶ ποῖον ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι παραλείπουσιν. … (60) Δημόκριτος (68A135 DK) δὲ καὶ Πλάτων ἐπὶ πλεῖστόν εἰσιν ἡμμένοι, καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γὰρ ἀφορίζουσι. Chapter heading: Aristotle de An. 2.6 418a7–8 λεκτέον δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρῶτον. Sens. 3 439a6–8 περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον … καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς. GA 5.2 781a21 ὥσπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς Περὶ αἰσθήσεως. PA 1.1 641b2–4 ἡ αὐτὴ θεωρία τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντων, καθάπερ καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Theophrastus Sens. 1 περὶ δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως. Sens. 59 περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τίς ἡ φύσις καὶ ποῖον ἕκαστόν ἐστιν. Galen Instr.Od. 5.3 ἔοικε δέ τι τοιοῦτον καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγειν … κἀν τῷ Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν (ἐπιγράφεται δὲ τοῦτο καὶ καθ᾽ ἕτερον τρόπον ὧδε Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητηρίων, ἐπειδὴ τὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὄργανα καλεῖν οὕτως ἔθος ἐστὶν Ἀριστοτέλει). Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 38.19– 20 ὁ περὶ αἰσθήσεως λόγος. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 5.59 (Strato fr. 18 Wehrli, 1 Sharples) Περὶ αἰσθήσεως. V.P. 7.174 (Cleanthes, SVF 1.481) Περὶ αἰσθήσεως. 7.178 (Sphaerus SVF 1.620) Περὶ αἰσθητηρίων. Porphyry Plot. 5 Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ μνήμης. Plotinus Enn. 4.6.[41] Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ μνήμης.

liber 4 caput 8 §1 Stoics: Philo of Alexandria Leg. 2.36–37 διὰ γὰρ ταύτης (sc. τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν) ποιούμεθα τὰς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλήψεις. Plutarch SR 1038C (SVF 2.724) ἡ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἴσθησις ἔοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι. Anonymus in Theaetetum col. 66.39–43 Bastianini–Sedley πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀντίλημ|ψιν εἴτε δι᾽ αἰσθητη|ρίου εἴτε δι᾽ [ἄλ]λου τι|νὸς ἐκάλουν [αἴ]σθη|σιν. Pythagorica Hypomnemata at Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B1a DK) at D.L. 8.30 φρένας δὲ καὶ νοῦν τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ· σταγόνας δ᾽ εἶναι ἀπὸ τούτων τὰς αἰσθήσεις. … τοὺς δὲ λόγους ψυχῆς ἀνέμους εἶναι. at D.L. 8.29 τήν τ᾽ αἴσθησιν κοινῶς καὶ κατ᾽ εἶδος τὴν ὅρασιν ἀτμόν τιν᾽ ἄγαν εἶναι θερμόν. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.201 (Antiochus fr. 66 Luck, verbatim) ἄλλος δέ τις (sc. Asclepiades (—)), ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ἁπτόμενος δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας, ἐπείθετο τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.45–46 (SVF 2.53) τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὀνόματος οἰκείως μετενηνεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων τῶν ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινομένων. (46) τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν μὲν καταληπτικήν, τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον. V.P. 7.51 (SVF 2.61) τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς αἱ μέν εἰσιν αἰσθητικαί, αἱ δ᾽ οὔ· αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν αἱ δι᾽ αἰσθητηρίου ἢ αἰσθητηρίων λαμβανόμεναι. V.P. 7.52 (SVF 2.71) αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τό τ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον καὶ ἡ δι᾽ αὐτῶν κατάληψις καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ᾽ ἥν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται. καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἴσθησις καλεῖται. V.P. 7.159 (SVF 2.837) ἡγεμονικὸν δ᾽ εἶναι τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ ὁρμαὶ γίνονται καὶ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἀναπέμπεται· ὅπερ εἶναι ἐν καρδίᾳ. SVF 1.55–59, 1.484, 2.52–81, 2.850–862. §2 Epicurus: Epicurus Ep. Hdt. at D.L. 10.48 οὐθὲν γὰρ τούτων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, ἂν βλέπῃ τις τίνα τρόπον τὰς ἐναργείας. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 10.32 (Epicurus fr. 36 Usener) τὸ τὰ ἐπαισθήματα δ᾽ ὑφεστάναι πιστοῦται τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν. V.P. 10.33 (Epicurus fr. 255 Usener + p. 181 adn. 7) ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προλήψεις. καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται. §3 Plato: Plato Phlb. 34a (quoted Stob. Ecl. 1.50.2b, p. 472.16–21 λέγει δὲ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ ὧδε·) τὸ δ᾽ ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ᾽ αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι᾽ ἄν. Tim. 43c διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἱ κινήσεις ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν φερόμεναι προσπίπτοιεν· αἳ δὴ καὶ ἔπειτα διὰ ταῦτα ἐκλήθησάν τε καὶ νῦν ἔτι αἰσθήσεις συνάπασαι κέκληνται. ps.Plato Def. 414c αἴσθησις ψυχῆς φορά· νοῦ κίνησις· ψυχῆς διὰ σώματος εἰσάγγελσις εἰς ὥρας ἀνθρώπων, ἀφ᾽ ἧς γίγνεται ψυχῆς ἄλογος δύναμις γνωριστικὴ διὰ σώματος. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 3.12 ἔτι φησὶν ὁ Ἄλκιμος (Ad Amynt. FGrH560 F7) καὶ ταυτί· ‘φασὶν οἱ σοφοὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ μὲν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθάνεσθαι οἷον ἀκούουσαν, βλέπουσαν, τὰ δ᾽ αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι μηδὲν τῷ σώματι χρωμένην.’ Porphyry Sent. 41.14–16 δῆλον ὡς αἱ μὲν αἰσθητικαὶ δυνάμεις διὰ σώματος κέκτηνται τὸ ἐνεργεῖν. §4 Peripatetics: Diogenes Laertius V.P. 1.21 (on Potamo) ἀρέσκει δ᾽ αὐτῷ, καθά φησιν ἐν τῇ Στοιχειώσει, κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὸ μὲν ὡς ὑφ᾽ οὗ γίνεται ἡ κρίσις, τουτέστι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν· τὸ δὲ ὡς δι᾽ οὗ, οἷον τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην φαντασίαν. §5 Leucippus Democritus: Aristotle de An. 1.2 427a19–27 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι

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liber 4 caput 8

ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν. … πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν. de An. 1.2 427b6–13 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, φανερόν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι, τοῦ δὲ ὀλίγοις τῶν ζῴων. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς, τὸ μὲν ὀρθῶς φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς τἀναντία τούτων—οὐδὲ τοῦτό ἐστι ταὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, διανοεῖσθαι δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῶς, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος. Met. Γ.5 1009b12–15 ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί φασιν (sc. the Presocratics in general). Theophrastus Sens. 3–4 Παρμενίδης (28A46 DK) μὲν γὰρ ὅλως οὐδὲν ἀφώρικεν ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοιν στοιχείοιν κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐστὶν ἡ γνῶσις. … (4) τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ λέγει. Sens. 23 (Empedocles 31A86 DK) καὶ συμβαίνει ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι. Sens. 25 (Alcmaeon 24B5 DK) ὡς ἕτερον ὂν τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ οὔ, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ταὐτόν. §6 Aristotle: Aristotle Cat. 8 9b5–8 τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται· ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἐμποιεῖ κτλ. Phys. 7.3 247a6–7 γίγνεσθαι δ᾽ αὐτὰς (sc. ἀρεταὶ and κακίαι) ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους, ἀλλοιωθήσεται δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. de An. 2.4 415b24 ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι δοκεῖ. de An. 2.5 416b33–35 ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι. de An. 2.11 424a1 τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν. de An. 2.11 424a4–5 ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. Somn. 2 459a24– 25 τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον ἡμῖν ἐμποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν. de An. 3.1 425a13–15 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ, ἑνός. de An. 3.9 432a30–31 τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε ὡς λόγον ἔχον θείη ἄν τις ῥᾳδίως. Sens. 1 437a8–9 λέγω δὲ κοινὰ μέγεθος, σχῆμα, κίνησιν, ἀριθμόν. de An. 2.6 418a17–18 κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος. Insomn. 1 458b4–6 κοινὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οἷον σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κίνησις καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. Mem. 1 450a12–13 ἡ δὲ μνήμη, καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν, οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματός ἐστιν, ⟨καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν⟩· ὥστε τοῦ νοῦ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ. Alexander of Aphrodisias de An. 59.8–9 διὸ καὶ εὐλόγως ἄν τις μεσότητα τὴν αἴσθησιν λέγοι τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. de An. 41.1–5 ἔστι δὲ τοιαῦτα (sc. κοινά), ὅσα τὸ μὲν γνωρίζεσθαι δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἔχει, πλείους μέντοι εἰσὶν αὐτῶν αἰσθήσεις διάκονοι. μεθ᾽ ὧν γὰρ τὸ ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ὑποπίπτει, μετὰ τούτων καὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτῶν ποιεῖται διάδοσιν. τοιαῦτα δέ ἐστι κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος. de An. 50.24–25 ὁμοίως δὲ τῇ ἀκοῇ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν ὑποληπτέον τοῦ διαστήματος ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. Ptolemy Iudic. c. 11, pp. 16.13–17.5 καθ᾽ αὑτὴν μὲν οὖν ἑκάστη τῶν δυνάμεων ὅταν τὸ ἴδιον καὶ οἰκεῖον μόνον ἐπισκοπῇ κατὰ τὸ τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων ἀπερίσπαστον ἀληθεύειν

liber 4 caput 8 πέφυκεν· ὡς ὅταν ὄψις μὲν χρώματα· φωνὰς δ᾽ ἀκοή· γεῦσις δὲ χυμούς· ἀτμοὺς δ᾽ ὄσφρησις· ἁφὴ δὲ †ποιότητας† [perhaps τῶν ἁπτῶν or ἁπτὰς ποιότητας]· … ἄλλαι δ᾽ ἄλλαις συμπλακεῖσαι καὶ κοινωνήσασαι τῆς τῶν ὑποκειμένων κρίσεως—τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὅταν ἤτοι τῶν αὐτῶν πλείους ὦσιν ἀντιλήψεις, ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὄγκου, μεγέθους, πλήθους, σχήματος, θέσεως, τάξεως, κινήσεως. Opt. 2.2–3, p. 12.3–13 Lejeune dicimus ergo quod visus cognoscit corpus magnitudinem colorem figuram situm motum et quietem. … prius autem incipiamus ab eo (sc. modo) qui est secundum dispositionem rerum videndarum: quarum alie videntur vere, alie prime et alie sequenter. Opt. 2.7, pp. 13.17–14.1 Lejeune colores quidem splendidos cognoscit visus simpliciter; cetera vero per istos, non secundum quod colores, sed secundum quod terminos habent tantum. figures enim et magnitudines cognoscit per terminos rei colorate, situm autem per locum eius. cognoscit etiam ipsorum colorum motum et quietum per mutationes eorum et privationem mutationis. Sextus Empiricus M. 9.146 καὶ μὴν ἡ αἴσθησις ἑτεροίωσίς τις ἐστίν· ἀμήχανον γὰρ τὸ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεώς τινος ἀντιλαμβανόμενον μὴ ἑτεροιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι, ὡς πρὸ τῆς ἀντιλήψεως διέκειτο. Themistius in de An. 57.37–38 κοινὰ δὲ πλειόνων κίνησις ἠρεμία ἀριθμὸς σχῆμα μέγεθος. ἀλλὰ κίνησις μὲν ἁπασῶν κοινόν τι τῶν αἰσθήσεων. in de An. 82.36–37 κοινὸν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα ὄψεως καὶ ἁφῆς. §7 Stoics: Cicero Fin. 3.16 fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid (sc. parvi), nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. Luc. 20 quid de tactu et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut doloris aut voluptatis, in quo Cyrenaici (fr. IV A 209 Giannantoni) solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia sentiatur. Luc. 76 quid Cyrenaei (fr. IV A 209 Giannantoni) videntur, minime contempti philosophi, qui negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus, ea se sola percipere quae tactu intumo sentiant, ut dolorem ut voluptatem. Luc. 142 Cyrenaicorum (fr. IV A 209 Giannantoni), qui praeter permotiones intumas nihil putant esse iudicii. Lucretius DRN 4.433–439 (on the Epicureans) … tactus uterque. / tactus enim, tactus, pro divum numina sancta, / corporis est sensus, vel cum res extera sese / insinuat, vel cum laedit quae in corpore natast / aut iuvat egrediens genitalis per Veneris res, / aut ex offensu cum turbant corpore in ipso, / semina confundunt inter se concita sensum. Seneca Ep. 121.5 quaerebamus, an esset omnibus animalibus constitutionis suae sensus. Ep. 121.11 infans … animal esse se sentit. Ep. 121.12 qualis ad nos … animi nostri sensus, quamvis naturam eius ignoremus ac sedem, talis ad omnia animalia constitutionis suae sensus est. necesse enim est id sentient, per quod alia quoque sentiunt. Plutarch SR 1038C ἡ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἴσθησις ἔοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι. Hierocles El.Eth. capitulatio 1a Bastianini–Long εἰ αἰσθάν[ε]ται τὸ ζῷον ἑαυτοῦ. El.Eth. col. 1.37–39 Bastianini–Long οὐκ ἀγνοητέον [ὅ]τι | τὸ ζῶιον εὐθὺς ἅμα [τῷ] γεν[έσ]θαι αἰσθάνεται [ἑα]υ|τοῦ. El.Eth. col. 4.38–44 Bastianini–Long ἐπεὶ | τοί[νυν γένος οὐδὲν] ἕτερ[όν] ἐστὶ τ[ὸ] ζ[ῷον ἢ [τὸ] σύνθετον ἐκ σώμα|τος [καὶ] ψυχῆς, ἄμφω δ᾽ ἐστὶ θι[κ]τὰ καὶ πρόσβλητα καὶ τῇ [π]ροσ|ερεί[σει] δὴ ὑπόπτωτα, ἔτ[ι] δὲ δι᾽ ὅλων κέκραται, καὶ [θά]|τερ[ον] μέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν δύναμι[ς αἰ]σθητική, τὸ δ αὐτ[ὸ] | τοῦτο καὶ τρόπον, ὃν [ὑ]πεδείξ[αμεν], κινεῖται, δῆλον ὅτι δ[ι]|ανεκῶς αἰσθάνο[ι]τ᾽ ἂν τ[ὸ ζῷον] ἑαυτοῦ. El.Eth. col. 6.1–6 Bastianini–Long καθόλου

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liber 4 caput 8

γὰρ ο[ὐ σ]υντε|λε[ῖται] τῶν ἐκτός τινος [ἀντ]ίληψις δίχα τῆς ἑ|αυ[τῶν] αἰσθήσεως. μετὰ γὰρ τ[ῆς] τοῦ λευκοῦ φέρε εἰπεῖν | [αἰσθ]ήσεως καὶ ἑαυτῶν αἰσθανόμεθα λευκαινομένων καὶ μετὰ | ⟨τῆς⟩ τοῦ γλυκέως γλυκαζομένων καὶ μετὰ τῆς τοῦ θερμοῦ | θερμαινομένων κἀπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τἀνάλογον. Ptolemy Iudic. c. 12.1–2, p. 17.17–18.1 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀπολελυμένα καὶ πρῶτα κριτήρια χωρὶς λόγου τινὸς αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ καταληπτικὰ καὶ μὴ δεόμενα κατά γε τὴν ἐνάργειαν αὐτὴν ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς· ἀντιλαμβάνεται γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων κινήσεων κατὰ τὴν ἐντὸς συναίσθησιν· ἔπειτα ἤδη τῶν πρώτων αἰσθητηρίων, καὶ τῶν ὅσα τῶν ἔξωθεν στερέμνια καὶ μετέχοντα τῶν εἰδῶν κτλ. Galen PHP 3.1.23–2532 ὁ Χρύσιππος (SVF 2.886, verbatim) … ὧδέ πως γράφει κατὰ λέξιν· ‘κοινῇ δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ φέρεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὡσανεὶ συναισθανόμενοι περὶ τὸν θώρακα αὑτοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν παθῶν γιγνομένων καὶ μάλιστα καθ᾽ ὃν ἡ καρδία τέτακται τόπον, οἷον μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν φόβων καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ θυμοῦ· ⟨ὡσανεὶ γὰρ⟩ ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ἀναθυμιωμένου καὶ ὠθουμένου ἐκτὸς ἐπί τινα καὶ ἐμφυσῶντος τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας γίγνεσθαι ἡμῖν ἐμφάσεις.’ Dig.Puls. 8.792.16–793.11 K. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ προσιόντος, ἢ ἀπιόντος, ἢ θλίβοντος, ἢ ἁπτομένου, ἢ ἀπωθουμένου πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἔχομεν, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἡμέτερον σῶμα παθημάτων, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ οἴομαι λανθάνειν. … (SVF 2.79) πρῶτα γάρ ἐστιν αἰσθητὰ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασι τὰ παθήματα, δεύτερα δὲ τὰ τούτων ποιητικὰ, ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα. Oenomaus of Gadara at Eus. PE 6.7.10 ἆρά γέ τί ἐσμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ; φαίης ἄν· τοῦτο δὲ ὁπόθεν ἴσμεν; τῷ ποτ᾽ ἄρα τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἐκρίναμεν; ἢ οὐκ ἄλλο ἱκανὸν οὕτως, ὡς ἡ συναίσθησίς τε καὶ ἀντίληψις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.85 καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος (SVF 3.178) ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον λέγων εἶναι παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν [συναίσθησιν Dyroff, συντήρησιν Giusta fort. recte sec. Dorandi]. Plotinus Enn. 3.4.[15]4.9–10 (on the World Soul) τί οὖν; συναίσθησιν (sc. ἔχει), ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τῶν ἐντὸς ἡμῶν; Enn. 4.4.[28]21–23 ἀλλὰ συναίσθησιν μὲν αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν συναισθανόμεθα, δοτέον, αἴσθησιν δὲ ἀεὶ ἑτέρου οὖσαν οὐ δοτέον; Doxography A at Stob. 2.7.3c, p. 47.12–20 ὑποτελὶς δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον τοῦ ζῴου πάθος, ἀφ᾽ οὗ κατήρξατο συναισθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον τῆς συστάσεως αὑτοῦ, οὔπω λογικὸν ⟨ὂν⟩ ἀλλ᾽ ἄλογον, κατὰ τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον ῥίζης τόπον ἐπέχει, οὐδέ πω φυτοῦ· γενόμενον γὰρ τὸ ζῷον ᾠκειώθη τινὶ πάντως εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὑποτελίς, κεῖται δ᾽ ἔν τινι τῶν τριῶν· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἡδονῇ [sc. according to Epicurus] ἢ ἐν ἀοχλησίᾳ (according to the Megarians?) ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις κατὰ φύσιν (sc. according to the Stoics). §9 The followers of the ancients: Sextus Empiricus M. 10.259 (cf. Xenocrates F 43 Isnardi Parente2) καὶ τὰ στερεὰ σχήματα προεπινοεῖται τῶν σωμάτων, ἀσώματον ἔχοντα τὴν φύσιν κτλ. Corpus Hermeticum fr. 8.4 Nock–Festugière at Stob. Ecl. 1.4.8, p. 73.14–16 τρίτον δέ ἐστιν εἶδος ἀσωμάτων ὃ περὶ τὰ σώματά ἐστι συμβεβηκός, τόπος, χρόνος, κίνησις, σχῆμα, ἐπιφάνεια, μέγεθος, εἶδος. §10 Leucippus Democritus Epicurus: Cicero Fin. 1.21 quae sequitur sunt tota Democriti (frs. 182, 470 Luria), atomi, inane, imagines, quae εἴδωλα nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus. ND 1.108 vos autem non modo oculis imagines sed etiam animis inculcatis. Lucretius

liber 4 caput 8 DRN 4.752–756 nunc igitur docui quoniam me forte leonum / cernere per simulacra, oculos quaecumque lacessunt, / scire licet mentem simili ratione moveri / per simulacra leonum ⟨et⟩ cetera quae videt aeque / nec minus atque oculi, nisi quod mage tenvia cernit. Clement of Alexandria Strom. 5.13.87.3 Δημόκριτος (69A79 DK) … τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεποίηκεν εἴδωλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προσπίπτοντα καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις ἀπὸ τῆς θείας οὐσίας. §11 Anonymi: Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.45 (SVF 2.53) τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὀνόματος οἰκείως μετενηνεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων τῶν ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινομένων. §12 Stoics: Cicero Luc. 108 (SVF 2.73) dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus esse. Porphyry Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων 253F Smith at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a, p. 349.23–27 τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (SVF 2.74) τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἱστάντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀναρτώντων ἀπὸ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως. αἰσθητικὴ γὰρ φαντασία συγκατάθεσίς ἐστιν ἢ αἴσθησις τῆς συγκαταθέσεως καθ᾽ ὁρμὴν οὔσης. §13 Academics: Porphyry Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων 253F Smith at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a, pp. 349.28–350.7 κατὰ μέντοι τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τῆς δι᾽ αἰσθητηρίου φαντασίας ψιλὴ τίθεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς μέτοχος ἰδιώματος, ὅτι μηδὲ συγκαταθέσεως μέτοχος. κἂν ᾖ δὲ μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως συγκατακειμένη φαντασία δι᾽ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ αἴσθησις, οὐ πάντως καὶ ἀρετῆς μέτοχος ἡ αἴσθησις ἔσται, εἰ μὴ συγκατάθεσις εἴη τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.

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Liber 4 Caput 9 PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 899F; pp. 396a1–397a4 Diels—PG: ps.Galenus HPh c. 90; p. 635.13–16 Diels—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 196–199 Daiber S: Stobaeus Ecl. 1.50.17–35, p. 475.1–477.17 Wachsmuth; cf. Phot. Bibl. 167, p. 112b30 Henry (titulus solus)

Titulus θʹ. Εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι (P,S) §1 Πυθαγόρας Ἐμπεδοκλῆς Ξενοφάνης Παρμενίδης Ζήνων Μέλισσος Ἀναξαγόρας Δημόκριτος Μητρόδωρος Πρωταγόρας Πλάτων ψευδεῖς εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις. (S1) §2 οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ὑγιεῖς μέν, ὅτι δι᾽ αὐτῶν οἴονται λαβεῖν ἀληθινὰς φαντασίας, οὐ μὴν ἀκριβεῖς. (S2) §3 Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν αἴσθησιν μὴ πλανᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ ἴδιον, περὶ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός. (S3) §4 οἱ Στωικοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς. (P1,S4) §5 Ἐπίκουρος πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ, τῶν δὲ δοξῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς. καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις μοναχῶς ψευδοποιεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὰ νοητά, ἡ δὲ φαντασία διχῶς· καὶ γὰρ αἰσθητῶν ἐστι φαντασία καὶ νοητῶν. (P2,S5) §1 Pythagoras—; Empedocles—; Xenophanes 21A49 DK; Parmenides 28A49 DK; cf. Zeno 29A23 DK; cf. Melissus 30A14 DK; Anaxagoras 59A96 DK; Democritus fr. 54 Luria; Metrodorus 70A22 DK; Protagoras—; Plato—; §2 Academici—; §3 Aristoteles cf. de An. 2.6 418a11–12; §4 Stoici SVF 2.78; §5 Epicurus fr. 248 Usener qui secl. καὶ ἡ […] νοητῶν quia ‘pertinent ad Stoicos l.s. §4’ titulus Εἰ … φαντασίαι PBQ : Εἰ ἀληθὴς ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ φαντασία PG : Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν (~ tit. c. 4.8) καὶ εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις SLPhot §§1–3 om. P §2 [5] οἴονται SL Diels, cf. A 4.13.1 : οἷόν τε Usener Wachsmuth §4 [9] μὲν αἰσθήσεις PB, inv. ord. PG §5 [11–12] Ἐπίκουρος … ψευδεῖς PBQS : om. PG ‖ [12–14] καὶ … νοητῶν Epicuro abiud. et Stoicis attrib. Usener, ut implicite PG omittendo Επίκουρος … ψευδεῖς : dub. Wachsmuth : non prob. ab Arnim ‖ [12–13] ψευδοποιεῖται PBQ : ψευδοποιεῖ τα SL ‖ [τὰ1] secl. Diels prob. Mau Lachenaud ‖ [13] κατὰ νοητὰ PBQ : καὶ τὰ νοήματα PG : κατανοητά SL, corr. Meineke Wachsmuth ‖ post διχῶς add. νοεῖται SL : non hab. P : secl. vel om. edd. ‖ αἰσθητῶν P : αἰσθητον SL, corr. edd. ‖ [14] νοητῶν P : νοητὸν SL, corr. edd.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004428409_109

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Παρμενίδης Ἐμπεδοκλῆς Ἀναξαγόρας Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος Ἡρακλείδης παρὰ τὰς συμμετρίας τῶν πόρων τὰς κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεις γίνεσθαι τοῦ οἰκείου, τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστου ἑκάστῃ ἐναρμόττοντος. (P3,S6) οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ παρὰ τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν αἰσθητηρίων. (S7) οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι φύσει τὰ αἰσθητά, (S8) Λεύκιππος δὲ Δημόκριτος Διογένης νόμῳ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ δόξῃ καὶ πάθεσι τοῖς ἡμετέροις· μηδὲν δ᾽ εἶναι ἀληθὲς μηδὲ καταληπτὸν ἐκτὸς τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, ἀτόμων καὶ κενοῦ· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι μόνα φύσει, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων, θέσει καὶ τάξει καὶ σχήματι διαφέροντα ἀλλήλων, συμβεβηκότα. (S9) οἱ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ οἱ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ οἱ τὰ ἀμερῆ καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα πάντ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀναμεμῖχθαι καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῶν εἰλικρινὲς ὑπάρχειν, παρὰ δὲ τὰς ἐπικρατείας ὀνομάζεσθαι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον καὶ παρὰ τὴν πολυαύγειαν. (S10) Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων καθαρὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἑκάστου στοιχείου προσερχόμενον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν ὅρασιν τὸ αἰθερῶδες πεφυκέναι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὸ πνευματικόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν τὸ πυρῶδες, πρὸς δὲ τὴν γεῦσιν τὸ ὑγρόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν τὸ γεῶδες. (S11) Ἐπίκουρος τῶν αἰσθητῶν ⟨τὰς⟩ ἡδονὰς ἤδη καὶ τὰς λύπας. (S12) οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ τῶν νοητῶν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσι φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ἡδέα τε καὶ λυπηρὰ καθάπερ λευκά τε καὶ μέλανα. (S13)

§6 Parmenides 28A47 DK; Empedocles 31A90 DK; Anaxagoras—; Democritus fr. 437 Luria; Epicurus cf. Ep.Hdt. ap. D.L. 10.49; Heraclides Ponticus fr. 122a,b Wehrli, 63A,B Schütrumpf; §7 Peripatetici—; §8 anonymi—; §9 Leucippus 67A32 DK; Democritus frs. 95 et 243 Luria; Diogenes 64A23 DK, S3 Laks; §10 Atomistae—; Homoeomeristae;—Ameristae—; Elachistae—; §11 Pythagoras—; Plato cf. Tim. 45b–c, 65c–d, 66d, 67b; §12 Epicurus fr. 261 Usener; §13 Peripatetici— §6 [15] Παρμενίδης … Ἐπίκουρος S : Παρμενίδης etἈναξαγόρας … Ἐπίκουρος om. PB ‖ [16] παρὰ PB : περὶ SL ‖ [17] ἑκάστῃ PB(II) : ἑκάστης PB(Ι,ΙΙΙ), ἑκάστην SL ‖ ἐναρμόττοντος corr. Diels ex 1.15.3 et Thphr. Sens. 9 prob. Laks–Most : ἀναρμόττοντος SL : ἁρμόζοντος PB, infolge der Einpassung Q §§7–20 om. P §7 [19] παρὰ corr. Meineke : περὶ SL §9 [21] post Δημόκριτος hab. SL καὶ, quod delevimus ‖ [23] φύσει corr. Meineke : φύσεις SL §10 [26] ‘post ἐλάχιστα audiendum λέγοντες, sed non addendum’ cf. Diels ad DG 315a1, Wachsmuth §11 [30] (π)υθαγόρας πλάτων marg. SF : Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος lemma add. SP : καὶ om. etiam SL Diels, ret. Wachsmuth ‖ καθαρὸν SF : καθόλου coni. Roethke ‖ [31] προσερχόμενον S : προερχόμενον Diels Wachsmuth §12 [35] ⟨τὰς1⟩ : add. Wachsmuth

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§14 Χρύσιππος τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἡδὺ νοητόν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπῖπτον ἤδη αἰσθητόν. (S14) §15 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὰς ἡδονὰς γίνεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ὁμοίοις ⟨ἐκ⟩ τῶν ὁμοίων κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν, ὥστε τῷ ἐλλείποντι ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὰς δ᾽ ἀλγηδόνας τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἠλλοτριῶσθαι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὅσα διαφέρει κατά τε τὴν σύγκρισιν καὶ τὴν τῶν στοιχείων κρᾶσιν. (S15) §16 Ἀναξαγόρας πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν μετὰ πόνου. (S16) §17 ⟨οἱ⟩ ἄλλοι ἐπιγίγνεσθαι ἤτοι ἡδονὴν ἢ πόνον οὐδὲ συμπεφυκέναι. (S17) §18 οἱ Στωικοὶ τὸν σοφὸν αἰσθήσει καταληπτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους τεκμηριωδῶς· (S18) §19 οἱ Ἀκαδημαικοὶ λόγῳ γνώριμον· (S19) §20 Ἐπίκουρος σοφῷ μόνῳ τὸν σοφόν. (S20) §14 Chrysippus SVF 2.81; §15 Empedocles 31A95 DK; §16 Anaxagoras 59A94 DK; §17 anonymi—; §18 Stoici SVF 1.204, 3.568; §19 Academici—; §20 Epicurus— §14 [38–39] post αἰσθητόν hab. lemma Παρμενίδης Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐλλείψει τροφῆς τὴν ὄρεξιν S (= A 4.9.14 Diels, 28A50 DK), quod cap. 5.28 attribuendum §15 [40] ⟨ἐκ⟩ τῶν ὁμοίων Meineke prob. Diels : τῶν ὁμοίων S : secl. Karsten prob. Wachsmuth Laks–Most ‖ [41] πρὸς S, prob. Wachsmuth : παρὰ Usener ‖ [42] ἠλλοτριῶσθαι corr. Meineke : ἢ ἀλλοτριῶσθαι SL (ἢ secl. Karsten) ‖ [43] ἄλληλα corr. Karsten prob. Diels Wachsmuth Laks–Most : ἄλλα SL §17 [46] ⟨οἱ⟩ add. Wachsmuth : om. vulg. ‖ πόνο⟨ν οὐδὲ⟩ coni. Wachsmuth : πόνους SL : lac. post πόνους ind. et ⟨οὐ μέντοι⟩ add. Meineke §18 [47] καταληπτὸν SL Wachsmuth : καταληπτικὸν Diels §19 [49] λόγῳ corr. Diels : λόγων SL §20 [50] post σοφὸν lac. ind. Diels, γνώριμον audiendum maluit Wachsmuth

Testes primi: Traditio ps.Plutarchi: ps.Galenus HPh c. 91 (~ tit.) Εἰ ἀληθὴς ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ φαντασία (text Diels) 91.1 (~ P1) οἱ Στωικοὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς. 91.2 (~ P2) καὶ αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις μοναχῶς ψευδοποιοῦνται καὶ τὰ νοήματα διττῶς. καὶ γὰρ αἰσθητῶν ἐστι φαντασία καὶ νοητῶν. Loci Aetiani: §2 A 4.8.13 οἱ Ἀκαδημαικοὶ μὴ εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις μήτε καταλήψεις μήτε συγκαταθέσεις. §4 A 4.15.1 Σφαῖρος ὁ Στωικὸς ὁρατὸν εἶναι τὸ σκότος … · καὶ οὐ ψεύδεται ἡ ὅρασις, βλέπεται γὰρ ταῖς ἀληθείαις, ὅτι ἔστι σκότος. §6 A 1.15.3 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸ τοῖς πόροις τῆς ὄψεως ἐναρμόττον. A 4.13.1 Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος κατὰ εἰδώλων εἴσκρισιν οἴονται τὸ ὁρατικὸν συμβαίνειν πάθος. §7 A 1.11.8 oἱ Περιπατητικοὶ τῶν αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά. A 4.14.2 Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος τὰς κατοπτρικὰς ἐμφάσεις γίνεσθαι κατ᾽

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εἰδώλων παραστάσεις, ἅτινα φέρεσθαι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν συνίστασθαι δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατόπτρου κατ᾽ ἀντιπεριστροφήν. §9 A 1.15.8 Δημόκριτος φύσει μὲν μηδὲν εἶναι χρῶμα, τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα ἄποια, τά τε ναστὰ καὶ τὸ κενόν· τὰ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκρίματα κεχρῶσθαι διαταγῇ τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ προτροπῇ, ὧν ἣ μέν ἐστι τάξις, ὃ δὲ σχῆμα, ἣ δὲ θέσις· παρὰ ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ φαντασίαι. τούτων δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν χρωμάτων τέτταρες αἱ διαφοραί, λευκοῦ, μέλανος, ἐρυθροῦ, ὠχροῦ. §10 A 1.3.28 Διόδωρος ἐπίκλην Κρόνος τὰ ἀμερῆ σώματα ἄπειρα, τὰ δ᾽ αὐτὰ λεγόμενα καὶ ἐλάχιστα. A 1.9.7 οἱ δὲ τὰ ἀμερῆ καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους ἄμορφον. A 1.13.3 Ξενοκράτης καὶ Διόδωρος ἀμερῆ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ὡρίζοντο. A 1.15.11 οἳ δὲ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ ποιότητος μετέχειν τὰ πρῶτα, οἳ δὲ τὰ ἄτομα πάντα συλλήβδην ἄχροα, ἐξ ἀποίων δὲ τῶν λόγῳ θεωρητῶν τὰς αἰσθητὰς ὑποφαίνουσι γίγνεσθαι ποιότητας. A 1.16.2 οἱ τὰς ἀτόμους ⟨εἰσάγοντες⟩ περὶ τὰ ἀμερῆ ἵστασθαι καὶ μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶναι τὴν τομήν. §11 A 4.4.6 oἱ δέ γε Πυθαγόρου διάδοχοι ἐκ πέντε στοιχείων τὸ σῶμα κραθῆναι φάντες—τοῖς γὰρ τέτταρσι ξυνέταξαν τὸ αἰθέριον—ἰσαρίθμους εἶναι ἔφασαν ταύτῃ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς δυνάμεις. A 4.6.11 Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων καθαρὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἑκάστου στοιχείου προσερχόμενον. A 4.10.5 Δημόκριτος πλείους μὲν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἀναλογίζειν τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῷ πλήθει λανθάνειν. §14 A 4.9.7 ⟨οἱ⟩ Στωικοὶ τήνδε τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ἐντὸς ἁφὴν προσαγορεύουσι, καθ᾽ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα. A 4.10.1 οἱ Στωικοὶ πέντε τὰς εἰδικὰς αἰσθήσεις. §15 A 5.28.1 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὰς μὲν ὀρέξεις γίνεσθαι τοῖς ζῴοις κατὰ τὰς ἐλλείψεις τῶν ἀποτελούντων ἕκαστα στοιχείων, τὰς δ᾽ ἡδονὰς ἐξ † ὑγροῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν κινδύνων καὶ ὁμοίων κινήσεις † (infolge der in der Art sich gleichenden Wachstumsbewegungen PQ), τὰς δ᾽ ὀχλήσεις καὶ τὰς … entsteht infolge der im Berühren und Zusammentreffen im Widerspruch stehenden Dinge PQ.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) The witnesses are P as represented by PB, PG, and PQ, as well as S. PBQ have a mere three lemmata, two of which are more or less paralleled in PG. S on the other hand has no less than twenty lemmata, all of which except §3 (Aristotle) and §11 (Pythagoras Plato) are extant only in SL, the Florentine florilegium, cf. ch. 4.8 above at Commentary A(1). T as we have seen stopped excerpting A after ch. 4.7a, the last chapter to be paralleled in the CAG. (2) It should be noted that S in Ecl. 1.50 has combined blocks of lemmata from at least three chapters, viz. 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10, see ch. 4.8 at Commentary

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A (2), and below, ch. 4.10 at Commentary A(3). The lemma on desire and food at Ecl. 1.50.25 p. 476.8–10 Wachsmuth, namely ‘Parmenides and Empedocles declare that desire arises from a deficiency of food’ (Παρμενίδης Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐλλείψει τροφῆς τὴν ὄρεξιν), which Diels incorporated in his ch. 4.9.14 because it occurs in the midst of lemmata belonging with ch. 4.9, in fact belongs in ch. 5.28 Πόθεν αἱ ὀρέξεις γίνονται τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί (‘From where do desires arise in living beings and also pleasures’), see ch. 5.28.2 (and ch. 5.28 Commentary A and D(c)), while the Democritus lemma at Ecl. 1.50.35, p. 477.18–19 Wachsmuth ‘Democritus (says) that dead bodies have sensation’ (Δημόκριτος τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων αἰσθάνεσθαι), which became ch. 4.9.20 Diels, is an abstract from ch. 4.8, so has been cited by us at the above location. B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. Parallel doxographical evidence is found in the other ps.Plutarch, Stromateis ch. 4, who however has only excerpted material dealing with Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno. For the proximate tradition we have also adduced several fragments of Aristocles, which are rather similar to what is in Cicero. For Cicero cf. below, section D(e). (2) Sources. Diels DG 222, in his too optimistic presentation of the (in our view meagre) evidence for the descent of sections and lemmata of the Placita from Theophrastus’ De sensibus, cites §15 Empedocles and Sens. 16 as ‘similia’, adding that the words κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν ‘certa a Theophrasto tacta non sunt. sed optima est memoria et cum Empedoclea doctrina egregie consentiens’, just as is the case in chs. 4.14.1 and 4.17.2. ‘Ergo nisi alibi Theophrastus illa repetierat, ipsius philosophi verba nescio quo pacto innotuisse videntur.’ Several lemmata of the present chapter are related to what is found in Theophrastus’ treatise, e.g. the pithy §16 Anaxagoras is remarkably close to the first clause at Sens. 29. The information about Presocratic philosophers is also in a more general way indebted to Aristotle. About the sources for the Hellenistic theories nothing much can be said, though such parallels as are available inspire some confidence. C Chapter Heading A very precise heading, and one of the eleven headings beginning with εἰ; for the other ten see chs. 1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 4.3, 4.9, 4.15, 4.20, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.15. S in the heading of Ecl. 1.50 (a combination of the headings of A 4.8 and 4.9) omits καὶ φαντασίαι. The wording of the full heading is to some extent paralleled in an introductory formula at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.49 (SVF 2.52) ‘the Stoics are wont to start with the account of impression and sensation’ (ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον), though the terms are

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listed the other way round. Aristotle in the De anima announced his treatment of phantasia at 3.3 427b29, ‘determining the nature of impression/imagination’ (περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας), and at the end of what has become a chapter in our modern editions neatly concluded it with 429a8–9 ‘let this suffice as to the nature and cause of impression/imagination’; he refers to this section at Mem. 1 449b30–31. This type of embedded formula is the predecessor of the heading, or title, see M–R 2.1.48, 159–161, 162–163, 170, 202–204. Epicurus wrote a book entitled On impression. For these texts see below, section E(b) Chapter heading. The title of S Ecl. 1.58 (alternative to that of P 4.12) is Περὶ φαντασίας καὶ κριτηρίου, the second ingredient of which is remarkably enough not paralleled in A. D Analysis a Context Chapter 4.9 is the second of a series of five substantial chapters concerned with cognitive issues in a more general way. It deals with the reliability of sensations and impressions (truth or falsity: category/question-type of quality), and follows upon the chapter dealing with the nature of sensation(s) and sense objects in general (category/question-type of substance), and with where (category of place) and how (question-type of cause) they occur or are found. It is itself then followed by a chapter concerned with the number of the senses (category of quantity). We note again the importance of treatment according to categories and question-types. In Aristotle (as in A) the account of the senses’ reliability is also found before that of the individual senses (de An. 2.6). In Lucretius (DRN 4.478–521) it has been wedged in between the treatment of vision and that of hearing etc. b Number–Order of Lemmata As noted T has not excerpted the chapter. The relative order of PBQ’s three lemmata is exactly the same as that of the three lemmata in SL that as to contents are parallel to those in PBQ, so we may assume that it is correct to follow the order of SL, as we have done. The large amount of material in S suggests that he excerpted A’s complete chapter. Our order of lemmata is the same as Diels’ in the DG, though we have omitted ch. 4.9.14 and 4.9.20 Diels (see at section A above), and split up 4.9.8 and 4.9.16 Diels into two lemmata each. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter The structure of this rich chapter is comparable to that of ch. 4.8, for here, too, a variety of interrelated themes are included. Six blocks of lemmata consisting of related tenets in more or less diaphonic opposition may be dis-

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tinguished. As a matter of fact the contents of ch. 4.9 could have been distributed over several separate chapters. There are a quite unusual number of name-labels occurring more than once, namely Pythagoras (twice), Parmenides (twice), Anaxagoras (three times), Empedocles (three times), Democritus (three times), Plato (twice), Academics (twice), Stoics (twice), and Epicurus (four times). This may suggest that S, our only source for §§1–3 and the long series of §§7–20, coalesced several chapters. Because it is not clear where the caesurae would have to be (there are several options), we have not ventured to interfere with the single chapter. The first block, §§1–5, comprises variously opposed views concerned with the truth-value of sensation(s), from the thesis of Pythagoras & alii in §1 that the sensations are false (the impressions are not mentioned), to the diaphonically opposed and famous thesis of Epicurus in §5 that every sensation and every impression is true, and that falsity is a matter of the opinion. In between we have three tenets that gradually grow more distant from the negative view of Pythagoras & alii and closer to the positive view of Epicurus. This gliding scale is systematic rather than chronological: the Academics of §2 are not Plato’s immediate pupils but representatives of the Sceptical Academy, just as those mentioned at chs. 4.8.13 above and 4.9.19 below. The second block, §§6–7, opposes those who argue that each sense organ perceives its proper object in a mechanical way because of the matching sizes of the pores, to those who hold that the proper sense objects are perceived depending on the (actual) capacities of the sense organs. The third block, §§8–9, opposes the majority who hold that sense objects are natural, i.e. exist in reality, to (a simplified version of the views of) Leucippus, Democritus and Diogenes, who argue that they are a matter of convention, or habit, and that only the atoms and space are natural, i.e. real, and true. The fourth block, §§10–11, opposes the Atomists and those representing similar theories, who defend the sophisticated view that all sense objects are blended and none exist in a pure state, so that things get their name from the dominating ingredient, to Pythagoras and Plato who, on the contrary, are said to argue that sense objects do exist in a pure state, and that each of the five elemental substances is adapted to a specific sense organ, or conversely. The first four blocks together deal with perception of sense data by the sense organs. The fifth block, §§12–17, deals with a different kind of sense objects, namely the pleasant and the painful. Thus awareness of internal sense data appears to be included (cf. above ch. 4.8, Commentary D(d)§7, and below, ch. 4.11, Commentary D(d)3).

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The block begins with a group of three doxai, §§12–14, comprising two diaphonically opposed tenets and one compromise view. Epicurus (§12) holds that pleasures and pains belong with the sense objects, but the Peripatetics (§13) are made to disagree: visual objects like black and white appear the same to everyone, but pleasant and painful things do not, so they must be counted among the objects of thought. The reasonable compromise tenet (§14) is adorned with the name-label Chrysippus: the pleasant in general is an object of thought, but the individual pleasant thing one encounters is a sense object. From these factual statements we then switch to a tenet concerned with a materialist and mechanical explanation of the origin of pleasant or painful sensations (the question-type of cause): Empedocles (§15) argues that pleasures come about when what is lacking is compensated for by something similar, and pains when something dissimilar intrudes. The block ends with two opposed views (§§16– 17): according to Anaxagoras every sensation is painful, but according to the others pleasure or pain do not inhere to the sense objects, but are supervenient upon them. We should make a distinction between perceptions of pleasure and pain per se on the one hand (§§12–14), and of pleasure or pain (§15), or pain (stress) alone (§16), as unavoidable ingredients of perception, or as after-effects (§17), on the other. The sixth and final block, §§18–20, returns to the issue of the contrast between sensation and thought of §§12–14, but in a particular way, viz. by dealing with the question, all-important in Hellenistic philosophy, of how you are supposed to know that someone is a Wise Man. The Stoics hold that the Wise Man can be grasped by sensation if one uses his individual appearance as a sign (which is the beginning of an argument). The Academics, on the other hand, hold that he becomes known by reason (or argument). The view attributed to Epicurus does not fit either one of the horns of this diaphonia, for he idiosyncratically applies the doctrine of like knows like, and posits that the Wise Man can only be identified by another Wise Man—thus dodging the epistemological issue. d

Further Comments Individual Points §1 The name-labels constitute a checklist of predecessors claimed by Pyrrhonists and Academics alike. See below, section E(a) & (b), both times at §1. Note that Sextus too argues that Parmenides rejects sense perception (after citing 28B7.3–5 DK immediately following on after 28B1), although the ‘tongue’ in these lines is not the organ of taste but the instrument of speech, see Barnes (1979) 296–297, Coxon (1986) 182, and Mansfeld (2018b). This quotation and interpretation are also found in D.L. 9.22, see Rocca-Serra (1987) 261–264, who

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proves that they go back to a shared source (or tradition). See now Mansfeld (2018c). Pythagoras may have been included as the predecessor of Plato, i.e. is the Platonizing Pythagoras usually encountered in the Placita. §2 For a possible connection between the contents of this lemma and the anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus and Potamo’s epistemology as described by Diogenes Laertius (cited at section E(b)§2) see Hatzimichali (2011) 88–89. §3 The account of Aristotle’s evaluation of sensation is far from complete, but not false. The phrase Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν αἴσθησιν μὴ πλανᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ ἴδιον, περὶ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός has been abstracted from de An. 2.6 418a11–12 λέγω δ᾽ ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι. His concept of phantasia is wider than ‘impression’, for it also includes imagination; but in the present chapter this does not matter. §§4–5 Usener reallocated §5 καὶ ἡ … νοητῶν from the Epicurus lemma to the Stoics lemma, §4. But perhaps the phrase ψευδοποιεῖται τὰ κατὰ νοητά pertains to the Epicurean idea of the connection of thoughts with sensations as a possible source of error. Yet one understands Usener’s problem, for the second sentence of the lemma remains difficult to explain. §6 Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus are discussed in Theophrastus De sensibus, who credits Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus with (matching) pores and perceptibles, and this doctrine is now also attributed retroactively to Parmenides, who according to Sens. 1 shares the ‘by likeness doctrine’ of sense perception with Empedocles. Laks (1990) 16 argues that the phrase ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην δεῖσθαί τινος συμμετρίας at Sens. 3 means that the hot element according to Theophrastus has to match what it perceives. It is certainly plausible that the phrase was interpreted in this way and so helps to understand our lemma, but far from certain that it is correct. We believe that Theophrastus means that the mixture should not become too hot, cf. on Democritus on the mind that becomes unhinged at Sens. 58. One cannot, at any rate, introduce pores at Sens. 3. §9 The Diogenes coupled with Leucippus and Democritus can hardly be anyone else than Diogenes of Smyrna (or Cyrene), a pupil of Metrodorus of Chius. Diels DG 676, referring to the present lemma, says ‘Placitorum fortasse hoc [sc. §9] ad eum referendum’. See Laks (2008) 239–240, who points out that there are other name-labels too that occur in the Placita only once. Whether or not the doxographer believed that the Smyrnaean is the same person as the Apollonian or did not care, is another matter. The ethnicon Ἀπολλωνιάτης of ch. 1.3.10 is also found at ch. 4.3.8. Repetition elsewhere of the ethnicon or affiliation after the first introduction is rare, and suggests that in such cases the doxographer wanted to preclude confusion. But the name-

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label Diogenes occurs several times without ethnicon, and it is (for us) sometimes difficult to know who is meant. At 1.7.7, Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν, sc. τὸν θεὸν, one should probably think of Diogenes the Stoic. But Diogenes of Apollonia cannot be excluded, see Aristotle’s view of him at de An. 1.2 405a21–24 in context, and Theophrastus’ at Sens. 42: ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται μικρὸν ὢν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ. Also cf. Commentary D(d) at ch. 4.3.2. For the doxa cf. above, ch. 1.15.8 ‘Democritus (says that) no colour exists by nature, for the elements are without quality, being the solids (i.e. atoms) and the void. But the compounds formed from these are coloured by ‘turning’, by ‘rhythm’ and by ‘inter-contact’, of which the first means order, the next shape and the last position. For it is on the basis of these that the impressions (on the senses arise)’. See further above, ch. 1.15 Commentary B, sources. The present paragraph gives us a more Skeptical Democritus. §11 The first application in the present chapter of the well-known maxim ‘like to like’ or ‘like knows like’. Aristotle first interprets and quotes Empedocles (‘by earth we see earth’ etc., see below, §15), and then refers to Plato’s construction ‘of the soul out of the elements in the Timaeus’, explaining that according to Plato ‘like can only be known by like’ and ‘things are derived from the principles’ (de An. 1.2 404b11–18). Aristotle does not tell us that the elements out of which Plato constructs the soul at Tim. 35a are derived from the Forms of the Same, the Different, and Being. A reader coming upon this passage in the De anima immediately after the quotation of Empedocles could perhaps believe that Plato’s soul is constructed out of earth etc. For the relation between the senses and the four elements fire, air, water, and earth later interpreters were in a position to refer to Tim. 45b–c (fire: sight—where note 45c4 ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον), 67b (hearing: air), 65c–d (taste: water and earth), and 66d (smell: a Zwischenelement, viz., the intermediate between water and air). See Baltes (1999) 40–42, who ibid. 35–36 lists thirteen passages where the senses are related to the elements. As a fourteenth we must add ch. 4.4.6. Baltes convincingly argues, ibid. 42–46, that the minority view according to which the five senses are connected with five elements, i.e., the standard four plus the aether, goes back to the Early Academy. Ps.Plato Epinomis 981b–c mentions five elements, with aether as fifth; the five regular bodies of Tim. 53c–56b were interpreted as representing elements; and Speusippus in Athenaeus Deipn. 2 61c (fr. 5 Lang, F 123 Isnardi Parente, 6 Tarán) speaks of what he calls a Pythagorean theory, according to which there are five elements corresponding to the five regular bodies. Only Plutarch De E 390B and A 4.9.11 (= 4.9.10 Diels) mention the aether when speaking of a correspondence between sight and one of the elements, see Baltes ibid. 35, 37 (but A 4.4.6 should be included as well, where

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a Pythagorean doctrine is cited with aether as one of five elements). See also Dörrie-Baltes (1998) 190, 192–193, with commentary 564, 567–570, where it is concluded that the five-elements-doctrine is a ‘Randerscheinung’ in ancient Platonism. A related issue occurs in long-distance diaphonic opposition at A 4.9.5, name-label Democritus: there are more senses than kinds of sense-objects. At A 2.7.4 four or rather five elements are attributed to Plato: Πλάτων πῦρ πρῶτον εἶτ᾽ αἰθέρα μεθ᾽ ὃν ἀέρα ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ὕδωρ, τελευταίαν δὲ γῆν· ἐνίοτε δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα τῷ πυρὶ συνάπτει, ‘sometimes he links up aether with fire’. See Dörrie-Baltes (1998) 190 with commentary 564; ibid. 190–194 with commentary 558–570, parallel passages. §13 This is second application of the maxim ‘like to like’ (we note the presence of the word ὁμοίου). §15 Diels DG 222 argues in favour of a clear link with Sens. 18, rightly endorsed by Baltussen (1993) 215. §16 Not mentioned by Diels or Baltussen, but the placitum is clearly dependent on a phrase in Sens. 16. According to this information Anaxagoras made no distinction between outer and inner sensation. §18 For the argument from signs see Chrysippus’ ipsissima verba at Galen PHP 2.7.6 (~ SVF 2.887) οὕτω φαίνεται διαφεύγειν ὁ τόπος ἡμᾶς οὔτε αἰσθήσεως ἐκφανοῦς γιγνομένης, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συντέτευχεν, οὔτε τῶν τεκμηρίων δι᾽ ὧν ἄν τις συλλογίσαιτο τοῦτο. §20 This view is also attributed to Xenophanes in an anecdote which has him chatting with Empedocles, see below, section E(b)§20. e Other Evidence Of particular importance is the agreement on a large scale between our present chapter and Cicero’s critical reportage of earlier views on sensation in the Lucullus, for which see at section E(a) General texts. This connection does not appear to have been noticed before. We have already observed a similar relationship between the chapters on the soul’s substance, regent part, and indestructibility (A 4.2–3 and 4.7) and Cicero’s treatment of these matters in the Tusculanae disputationes. See also below, Introduction to Book 5, section 5, on Ciceronian parallels for chs. 5.1–2 and 5.24–25. The relationship again proves dependence on a shared anterior tradition. Cicero’s stance in the Lucullus is that of an Academic. This lends some support to the suggestion of Mansfeld (1990a) 3063–3064, who argues for Academic influence on the Placita.

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E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: Cicero Luc. 19 ordiamur igitur a sensibus. quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur et ab ea deus aliqui requirat contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. nec vero hoc loco expectandum est dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam; non enim is sum qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur; Epicurus (fr. 252 Usener) hoc viderit et alia multa. meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur quae obstant et inpediunt. Luc. 142–143 venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. aliud iudicium Protagorae (—) est qui putet id cuique verum esse quod cuique videatur, aliud Cyrenaicorum (fr. IV A 209 Giannantoni), qui praeter permotiones intumas nihil putant esse iudicii, aliud Epicuri (fr. 245 Usener), qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in voluptate constituit; Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit. (143) num quid horum probat noster Antiochus (fr. 5 Luck)? Ac.Po. 44 (Arcesilaus F 9 Mette) earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et {vel ut} iam ante Socratem Democritum (frs. ii, 58 Luria) Anaxagoram (59A95 DK) Empedoclem (—) omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus imbecillos animos brevia curricula vitae, et, ut Democritus, in profundo veritatem (cf. 68B117 DK) esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.89 πρῶτοι δ᾽ ἔδοξαν οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω (fr. 142 Wöhrle) φυσικοὶ τὴν περὶ κριτηρίου σκέψιν εἰσηγήσασθαι. καταγνόντες γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν πολλοῖς ὡς ἀπίστου. M. 7.369 πῶς δὲ οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀνωτάτω πραγμάτων διάστασις παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνῶσιν; εἰ γὰρ τῶν φυσικῶν οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀνῃρήκασι τὰ φαινόμενα, ὡς οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον (68A110 DK), οἱ δὲ πάντα ἔθεσαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον (fr. 247 Usener) καὶ Πρωταγόραν (—), οἱ δὲ τινὰ μὲν ἀνεῖλον τινὰ δὲ ἔθεσαν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (—) καὶ τοῦ Περιπάτου; M. 7.388 εἰ γὰρ κριτήριον ἀπολειπτέον τὴν φαντασίαν, ἤτοι πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν λεκτέον εἶναι, καθὼς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας (—), ἢ πᾶσαν ψευδῆ, ὡς ἔφασκε Ξενιάδης ὁ Κορίνθιος (81 DK, cf. M. 7.53), ἢ τινὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τινὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (—) καὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἔτι δὲ τοῦ Περιπάτου. Μ. 8.184–186 οὔποτε πεπαύσονται περὶ αὐτῆς οἱ φυσικοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολεμοῦντες, ἐπείπερ ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος (—) μηδὲν ὑποκεῖσθαί φησι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ κενοπαθείας τινὰς αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τὰς ἀντιλήψεις αὐτῶν, καὶ οὔτε γλυκύ τι περὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑπάρχειν, οὐ πικρὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν πᾶσι φαινομένων· παθῶν γὰρ ἡμετέρων ἦν ὀνόματα ταῦτα. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος (fr. 247 Usener, p. 182.30–33) πάντα ἔλεγε τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοιαῦτα ὑποκεῖσθαι ὁποῖα φαίνεται καὶ κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν προσπίπτει, μηδέποτε ψευδομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῶν ψεύδεσθαι ταύτην δοκούντων. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (SVF 2.76) καὶ τοῦ Περιπάτου μέσην ὁδὸν τεμόντες ἔνια μὲν ὑποκεῖσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔλεξαν ὡς ἀληθῆ, ἔνια δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ψευδομένης περὶ αὐτῶν τῆς

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αἰσθήσεως. Tertullian de An. 17 (Soranus fr. 14 Podolak) see below §§1, 2, 3, 5. Eusebius PE 14.20.1 + 14.16.13–17.1 (Aristocles frs. 6–7 Chiesara) γεγόνασι δέ τινες οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις μοναις δεῖν πιστεύειν. ἔνιοι μέντοι φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον αἰνίττεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτο πάντων ἀποφαίνοντα τὸν Ὠκεανὸν ἀρχήν (Il. 14.246), ὡς ἐν ῥύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων (cf. Pl. Tht. 152d)· ὧν δ᾽ ἴσμεν ἔοικε μὲν καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χῖος (70A24 DK) τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγειν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἄντικρύς γε Πρωταγόρας ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης (—) εἶπεν. … (Eusebius himself: ἐπειδὴ τῶν φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ μὲν πάντα κατέβαλλον ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, οἱ δ᾽ αὖ πάλιν τούτοις ἀνθεῖλκον, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ξενοφάνη τὸν Κολοφώνιον (21A49 DK) καὶ Παρμενίδην τὸν Ἐλεάτην (—), οἳ δὴ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνῄρουν κτλ.) … (17.1) ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐγένοντο τούτοις τὴν ἐναντίαν φωνὴν ἀφιέντες. οἴονται γὰρ δεῖν τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς φαντασίας καταβάλλειν, αὐτῷ δὲ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ πιστεύειν. τοιαῦτα γάρ τινα πρότερον μὲν Ξενοφάνης (—) καὶ Παρμενίδης (test. 132 Coxon) καὶ Ζήνων (—) καὶ Μέλισσος (—) ἔλεγον κτλ. Chapter heading: Capitula Lucretiana at DRN 4.476 de vero sensu quare cognoscatur. at DRN 4.513 de falso sensu. §1 Pythagoras Empedocles Xenophanes Parmenides Zeno Melissus Anaxagoras Democritus Metrodorus Protagoras Plato: Cicero Varr. 30–31 tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque (sc. Academics, Peripatetics). quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus: mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem; solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur. … (31) sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur nec percipere ullo modo res eas quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quod aut essent ita parvae ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae ut nihil umquam unum esset ⟨et⟩ constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Varr. 44–45 cum Zenone (—) … ut accepimus, Arcesilas (F 9 Mette) sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi … (for what follows see above, General texts). Luc. 14 similiter vos (sc. Academics), cum … philosophiam bene iam constitutam velitis, Empedoclen (—), Anaxagoran (—), Democritum (—), Parmeniden (test. 100 Coxon) Xenophanen (—), Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Luc. 73–74 ille (sc. Democritus, cf. 68B165 DK) esse verum plane negat {esse}; sensus quidem non obscuros dicit sed tenebricosos (sic enim appellat eos) (cf. 68B11 DK). … Chius Metrodorus (70B1 DK) initio libri qui est De natura ‘nego’ inquit ‘scire nos sciamusne aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem nescire aut scire nos, nec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit’. (74) furere tibi Empedocles (—) videtur: at mihi dignissimum rebus is de quibus loquitur sonum fundere. num ergo is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam vim censet in is esse ad ea quae sub eos subiecta sunt iudicanda? Parmenides (test. 101 Coxon), Xenophanes (21A25 DK), minus bonis quamquam versibus sed tamen illi versibus increpant eorum adrogantiam quasi irati, qui cum sciri nihil possit audeant se scire dicere. et ab iis aiebat removendum Socratem et Platonem. cur, an de ullis certius possum dicere? … multi sermones perscripti sunt e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse. quid

liber 4 caput 9 dicam de Platone, qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset nisi probavisset. Luc. 142 aliud iudicium Protagorae (—) est qui putet id cuique verum esse quod cuique videatur … Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit. ps.Plutarch Strom. 4 at Eus. PE 1.8.4 (fr. 179 Sandbach) ἀποφαίνεται (on Xenophanes, 21A32 DK) δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ψευδεῖς, καὶ καθόλου σὺν αὐταῖς καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον διαβάλλει. Strom. 5 at Eus. PE 1.8.5 Παρμενίδης (28A22 DK) … τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐκβάλλει ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας. Strom. 6 at Eus. PE 1.8.6 Ζήνων δ᾽ ὁ Ἐλεάτης (29A23 DK) ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξέθετο, διηπόρησε δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ πλεῖον. Aristocles fr. 7 Chiesara at Eus. PE 14.17.1 ἄλλοι δ᾽ … οἴονται γὰρ δεῖν τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς φαντασίας καταβάλλειν, αὐτῷ δὲ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ πιστεύειν. τοιαῦτα γάρ τινα πρότερον μὲν Ξενοφάνης (21A49 DK) καὶ Παρμενίδης (—) καὶ Ζήνων (—) καὶ Μέλισσος (—) ἔλεγον κτλ. at Eus. PE 14.17.7 ὅ γέ τοι Μέλισσος (30A14 DK) ἐθέλων ἐπιδεικνύναι, διότι τῶν φαινομένων καὶ ἐν ὄψει τούτων οὐδὲν εἴη τῷ ὄντι, διὰ τῶν φαινομένων ἀποδείκνυσιν αὐτῶν· φησὶ γοῦν (30B8.2–3 DK follows). Sextus Empiricus M. 7.90 ὁ μὲν φυσικώτατος Ἀναξαγόρας (59B21 DK) ὡς ἀσθενεῖς διαβάλλων τὰς αἰσθήσεις ‘ὑπὸ ἀφαυρότητος αὐτῶν’ φησὶν ‘οὐ δυνατοί ἐσμεν κρίνειν τἀληθές’. M. 7.122 ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ λέγοντες κατὰ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα (on 31B2 DK) κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. Hippolytus Ref. 1.14.1 Ξενοφάνης … ἔφη πρῶτος ἀκαταληψίαν εἶναι πάντων, εἰπὼν οὕτως· (21B34.3–4 DK follows). Tertullian de An. 17.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 14 Podolak) fidem (sc. sensuum) … damnant, secundum quosdam et Heraclitus (T 654 Mouraviev) et Diocles (fr. 38 dub. Van der Eijk) et Empedocles (—), certe Plato in Timaeo (28c, 51aff.) inrationalem pronuntians sensualitatem et opinioni coimplicitam. Theodoret CAG 2.10, p. 38.17–20 Παρμενίδης … ὁ Ἐλεάτης (—) ὡσαύτως … ψεῦδος δὲ ἀπέφηνε τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὸ κριτήριον, ἥκιστα λέγων ἐφικνεῖσθαι τοῦτο τῆς ἀληθείας. Epiphanius Haer. 3.506.15–17 Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χῖος (70A23 DK) ἔφη μηδένα μηδὲν ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἃ δοκοῦμεν γινώσκειν ἀκριβῶς οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, οὐδὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι δεῖ προσέχειν· δοκήσει γάρ ἐστι τὰ πάντα. Sextus Empiricus M. 8.56 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον (fr. 61 Luria) καὶ Πλάτωνα ἀθετοῦντες μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀναιροῦντες δὲ τὰ αἰσθητά, μόνοις δ᾽ ἑπόμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς, συγχέουσι τὰ πράγματα. M. 7.137–139 καὶ δὴ ἐν μὲν τούτοις πᾶσαν σχεδὸν κινεῖ κατάληψιν, ⟨εἰ⟩ (138) καὶ μόνον ἐξαιρέτως καθάπτεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνησίην καλεῖ, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς (139) ἀπλανές. λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν (Democritus 68B11 DK)· ‘γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τάδε σύμπαντα, ὄψις ἀκοὴ ὀδμὴ γεῦσις ψαῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης’. §2 Academics: Cicero Luc. 103 ait (sc. Clitomachus) vehementer errare eos qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputatum, non inesse in iis pro-

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priam quae nusquam alibi esset veri et certi notam. Tertullian de An. 17.2 (Soranus de An. fr. 14 Podolak) horum (sc. sensuum) fidem Academici durius damnant. §4 Stoics: Cicero Luc. 75 sed quid eos (sc. Stilbo Diodoraus Alexinus) colligam, cum habeam Chrysippum (SVF 2.109), qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum: quam multa ille contra sensus, quam multa contra omnia quae in consuetudine probantur. ‘at dissolvit idem.’ mihi quidem non videtur, sed dissolverit sane: certe tam multa non collegisset quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi videret is resisti non facile posse. ND 1.70 Zenon (SVF 1.63) autem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. Tertullian de An. 17.4 (Soranus de An. fr. 14 Podolak) moderantius Stoici (—) non omnem sensum, nec semper, de mendacio onerant. §5 Epicurus: Cicero Luc. 79 veracis suos esse sensus dicit Epicurus (fr. 251 Usener). igitur semper auctorem habes, et eum qui magno suo periculo causam agat; eo enim rem demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam esse credendum. Luc. 82 sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri putat, discedamus. ND 1.70 timuit Epicurus (fr. 251 Usener) ne, si unum visum esset falsum, nullum esset verum: omnes sensus veri nuntios dixit esse. Aristocles fr. 6 Chiesara at Eus. PE 14.20.9 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔτι νῦν εἰσί τινες οἱ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ λέγοντες εἶναι, μικρὰ καὶ περὶ τούτων εἴπωμεν. … καὶ μὴν εἴ γε πᾶσα αἴσθησις ἀληθὴς ἦν, οὐκ ἔδει τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν αὐτάς. Tertullian de An. 17.4 (Soranus de An. fr. 14 Podolak) Epicurei (at fr. 247, p. 183.5–8 Usener) constantius parem omnibus atque perpetuam defendunt veritatem, sed alia via. non enim sensum mentiri, sed opinionem. sensum enim pati, non opinari; animam enim opinari. §9 Leucippus Democritus Diogenes: Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 7 col. 2.2– 8 Smith ἐσφά|λη δ᾽ ἀναξίως ἑαυτοῦ | καὶ Δημόκριτος (fr. 61 Luria), τὰς | ἀτόμους μόνας κατ᾽ ἀ|λήθειαν εἰπὼν ὑπάρχειν | ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ | νομιστεὶ ἅπαντα. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.44 (on Democritus, 68A1 DK) ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα πάντα νενομίσθαι. §10 Other views about smallest parts: Sextus Empiricus P. 3.32 Δημόκριτος (—) δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος (—) ἀτόμους, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος (—) ὁμοιομερείας, Διόδωρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Κρόνος (fr. 117C Döring, II F 8 Giannantoni) ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα, Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ Ποντικὸς (fr. 119b Wehrli, 60B Schütrumpf) καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνὸς (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1.726) ἀνάρμους ὄγκους (sc. τὰς ὑλικὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι).

b

Sources and Other Parallel Texts

Chapter heading: Aristotle de An. 3.3 427b29 περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας. de An. 3.3 429a8–9 περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον. Mem. 1 449b30–31, ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς. Epicurus at D.L. 10.28 Περὶ φαντασίας. Diocles Magnes at D.L. 7.49 ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωικοῖς (SVF 2.52) τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον.

liber 4 caput 9 §1 Pythagoras Empedocles Xenophanes Parmenides Zeno Melissus Anaxagoras Democritus Metrodorus Protagoras Plato: Parmenides 28B7.3–6 DK ‘μηδέ σ᾽ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω / νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν / καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον / ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα’. Sextus Empiricus, after citing these lines, comments M. 7.114 (cf. at Parmenides 28B1 DK) καὶ ἐπὶ τέλει προσδιασαφεῖ τὸ μὴ δεῖν αἰσθήσεσι προσέχειν ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῷ. … οὗτος … τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον κανόνα τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας ἀναγορεύσας ἀπέστη τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστάσεως. cf. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.22 who states κριτήριον δὲ τὸν λόγον εἶπε· τάς τε αἰσθήσεις μὴ ἀκριβεῖς ὑπάρχει, and then cites B735 in support. Aristotle GC 1.8 325a13–15 (Parmenides 28A25 DK) ὑπερβάντες τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ παριδόντες αὐτὴν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ δέον ἀκολουθεῖν, ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ πᾶν εἶναί φασι καὶ ἄπειρον ἔνιοι (sc. Melissus). differently Met. A.3 984b1–4 (Parmenides 28A24 DK) τῶν μὲν οὖν ἓν φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ πᾶν οὐθενὶ συνέβη τὴν τοιαύτην συνιδεῖν αἰτίαν πλὴν εἰ ἄρα Παρμενίδῃ, καὶ τούτῳ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον οὐ μόνον ἓν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύο πως τίθησιν αἰτίας εἶναι. differently also Met. A.5 986b27–35 Παρμενίδης (28A24 DK) δὲ … ἀναγκαζόμενος δ᾽ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς φαινομένοις, καὶ τὸ ἓν μὲν κατὰ τὸν λόγον πλείω δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὑπολαμβάνων εἶναι, δύο τὰς αἰτίας καὶ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς πάλιν τίθησι κτλ. Timon of Phlius fr. 4 Wachsmuth, 818 SH at D.L. 9.22–23 (Parmenides 28A1 DK) τάς τε αἰσθήσεις μὴ ἀκριβεῖς ὑπάρχειν. … (23) διὸ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ φησιν ὁ Τίμων· ‘Παρμενίδου τε βίην μεγαλόφρονος οὐ πολύδοξον, / ὅς ῥ᾽ ἀπὸ φαντασίας ἀπάτης ἀνενείκατο νώσεις’. fr. 5 Wachsmuth, 819 SH at D.L. 9.25 Ζήνων Ἐλεάτης (29A1 DK). … περὶ τούτου καὶ Μελίσσου (—) Τίμων φησὶ ταῦτα· ‘ἀμφοτερογλώσσου τε μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνὸν / Ζήνωνος πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος, ἠδὲ Μέλισσον, / πολλῶν φαντασμῶν ἐπάνω, παύρων γε μὲν ἥσσω’. Philodemus Rhet. fr. incert. iii.6–11, p. 2.169 Sudhaus οὐδὲ κατὰ Παρμενίδην (28A49 DK) καὶ Μέλισσον (30A14 DK) ἓν τὸ πᾶν λέγοντας εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ψευδεῖς εἶναι. Anon. Photii (on the Pythagoreans) cod. 249, p. 240.35 Thesleff ἔστι δὲ αἴσθησις μὲν γνῶσις ψευδὴς διὰ σώματος. Melissus 30B8.(2)–(5) DK. Sextus Empiricus M. 7.89–90 πρῶτοι δ᾽ ἔδοξαν οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω φυσικοὶ τὴν περὶ κριτηρίου σκέψιν εἰσηγήσασθαι. καταγνόντες γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν πολλοῖς ὡς ἀπίστου, τὸν λόγον κριτὴν τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας ἐπέστησαν· … (90) ἔνθεν ὁ μὲν φυσικώτατος Ἀναξαγόρας (59B21 DK) ὡς ἀσθενεῖς διαβάλλων τὰς αἰσθήσεις ‘ὑπὸ ἀφαυρότητος αὐτῶν’ φησὶν ‘οὐ δυνατοί ἐσμεν κρίνειν τἀληθές’. M. 7.122 κατὰ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα (on 31B2 DK) κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (differently 31B3.9–13 DK). M. 7.126 ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος (cf. 22B107 DK), ἐπεὶ πάλιν ἐδόκει δυσὶν ὠργανῶσθαι ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνῶσιν, αἰσθήσει τε καὶ λόγῳ, τούτων τὴν ⟨μὲν⟩ αἴσθησιν παραπλησίως τοῖς προειρημένοις φυσικοῖς ἄπιστον εἶναι νενόμικεν, τὸν δὲ λόγον ὑποτίθεται κριτήριον (but see on Protagoras (e.g.) D.L. 9.51 (80A1 DK) ἔλεγέ τε μηδὲν εἶναι ψυχὴν [ἐπιστήμην prop. Zeller] παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ (cf. 152a), καὶ πάντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ.) M. 8.56 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον (—) καὶ Πλάτωνα ἀθετοῦντες μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀναιροῦντες δὲ τὰ αἰσθητά, μόνοις δ᾽ ἑπόμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς, συγχέουσι τὰ πράγματα. Seneca Ep. 58.26 omnia ista quae sensibus serviunt, quae nos accendunt et inrit-

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ant, negat Plato ex iis esse quae vere sint. Plutarch Adv.Col. 1121F–1122A ὁ δ᾽ Ἀρκεσίλαος (fr. 7 Mette) τοσοῦτον ἀπέδει τοῦ καινοτομίας τινὰ δόξαν ἀγαπᾶν καὶ ὑποποιεῖσθαί τι τῶν παλαιῶν ὥστε ἐγκαλεῖν τοὺς τότε σοφιστάς ὅτι προστρίβεται Σω κράτει καὶ Πλάτωνι καὶ Παρμενίδῃ (—) καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ (—) τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς δόγματα καὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας οὐδὲν δεομένοις, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἀναγωγὴν καὶ βεβαίωσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἄνδρας ἐνδόξους ποιούμενος. Galen SMT 11.461.14–462.2 K. καί τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν (—) ἐπικαλοῦνται μάρτυρα, περὶ τῆς χιόνος ἀποφηνάμενον, ὡς οὐκ εἴη λευκή. οὗτος ἄρα, φασὶ, φυσικὸς ἀνὴρ ὑπὲρ τὴν αἴσθησίν ἐστιν καὶ καταφρονεῖ μὲν τῶν ταύτης φαντασμάτων, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον ἀνέρχεται, καὶ τούτῳ τὴν τῶν ὄντων θηρᾶται φύσιν. Clement of Alexandria Strom. 5.11.67.3 τοῦτο ἄρα βούλεται καὶ τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ ἡ τῆς πενταετίας σιωπή, ἣν τοῖς γνωρίμοις παρεγγυᾷ, ὡς δὴ ἀποστραφέντες τῶν αἰσθητῶν ψιλῷ τῷ νῷ τὸ θεῖον ἐποπτεύοιεν. ps.Plutarch Mus. 1144F Πυθαγόρας δ᾽ ὁ σεμνὸς ἀπεδοκίμαζε τὴν κρίσιν τῆς μουσικῆς τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως· νῷ γὰρ ληπτὴν τὴν ταύτης ἀρετὴν ἔφασκεν εἶναι. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.95 αἱ δ᾽ αἰσθήσεις ψεύδονται. Olympiodorus in Phaed. 4.7 ἀεὶ ψεύδεσθαι λέγει τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁ Πλάτων διότι οὐ κυρίως γινώσκει. συμπεφυρμένον γὰρ ἔχει τὸ πάθος τῇ γνώσει διὰ πάθους γινώσκουσα· καὶ τὰ πόρρω οἶδεν (ἐπεὶ τὸν πυρῆνα τῆς μήλης τὸν ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ οὐχ ὁρᾷ, καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ δὲ διὰ μέσου ἀέρος ἀντιλαμβάνεται), ὅπερ αἴτιον μὴ ἀκριβοῦς γνώσεως. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τὸν νοῦν φαμεν ἀκριβῶς γινώσκειν κτλ. §2 Academics: Anonymus in Theaetetum col. ii.23–32 Bastianini–Sedley λέγω δὲ | νῦν κριτήριον τὸ [δ]ι᾽ | οὗ κρίνομεν ὡς ὀρ[γ]ά|ν[ο]υ. [δ]εῖ γὰρ ἔχειν ὧι | κρινοῦμεν τὰ πρά|γματα. εἶτα ὅταν ἀκρκι|βὲς ἦι τοῦτο, ἡ τῶν κα|λῶς κριθέντων μό|νιμος παραδοχὴ γί|ν[ε]τ[α]ι ἐπιστήμη. Plutarch Adv.Col. 1118B ὁ δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις λόγος ἐπαγόμενος ὡς οὐκ ἀκριβεῖς οὐδ᾽ ἀσφαλεῖς πρὸς πίστιν οὔσας οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ φαίνεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμῖν ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ χρωμένοις κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὸ πιστεύειν ὡς ἀληθέσι πάντῃ καὶ ἀδιαπτώτοις οὐ δίδωσιν αὐταῖς. Sextus Empiricus P. 1.235 οἱ δὲ περὶ Φίλωνά (F 1 Mette) φασιν ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ Στωικῷ (—) κριτηρίῳ, τουτέστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν, καταληπτά. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 1.21 (on Potamo) ἀρέσκει δ᾽ αὐτῷ, καθά φησιν ἐν τῇ Στοιχειώσει, κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὸ μὲν ὡς ὑφ᾽ οὗ γίνεται ἡ κρίσις, τουτέστι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν· τὸ δὲ ὡς δι᾽ οὗ, οἷον τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην φαντασίαν. §3 Aristotle: Aristotle de An. 2.6 418a11–12 λέγω δ᾽ ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι. Sens. 4 442b5– 9 μέγεθος γὰρ καὶ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις, κοινὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ πασῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὄψεώς γε καὶ ἁφῆς. διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀπατῶνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οὐκ ἀπατῶνται, οἷον ἡ ὄψις περὶ χρώματος καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ περὶ ψόφων. Ptolemy Iudic. c. 11, pp. 16.13–17.5 καθ᾽ αὑτὴν μὲν οὖν ἑκάστη τῶν δυνάμεων ὅταν τὸ ἴδιον καὶ οἰκεῖον μόνον ἐπισκοπῇ κατὰ τὸ τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων ἀπερίσπαστον ἀληθεύειν πέφυκεν· ὡς ὅταν ὄψις μὲν χρώματα· φωνὰς δ᾽ ἀκοή· γεῦσις δὲ χυμούς· ἀτμοὺς δ᾽ ὄσφρησις· ἁφὴ δὲ †ποιότητας† [perhaps read τῶν ἁπτῶν or ἁπτὰς ποιότητας]· … ἄλλαι δ᾽ ἄλλαις συμπλακεῖσαι

liber 4 caput 9 καὶ κοινωνήσασαι τῆς τῶν ὑποκειμένων κρίσεως—τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὅταν ἤτοι τῶν αὐτῶν πλείους ὦσιν ἀντιλήψεις, ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὄγκου, μεγέθους, πλήθους, σχήματος, θέσεως, τάξεως, κινήσεως. §4 Stoics: Sextus Empiricus M. 8.63 (Epicurus fr. 253 Usener) πλανᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς τινὰς μὲν τῶν φαντασιῶν λέγοντας ἀληθεῖς, τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κτλ. M. 7.388 τινὰ (sc. τῶν φαντασιῶν) μὲν ἀληθῆ τινὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (—) καὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἔτι δὲ τοῦ Περιπάτου. M. 8.185 οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (SVF 2.76) καὶ τοῦ Περιπάτου μέσην ὁδὸν τεμόντες ἔνια μὲν ὑποκεῖσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔλεξαν ὡς ἀληθῆ, ἔνια δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ψευδομένης περὶ αὐτῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως. Diocles Magnes at D.L. 7.49 ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωικοῖς (SVF 2.52) τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον, ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων γινώσκεται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστί. Plutarch SR 1036C τοὺς πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν λόγους εἰς ταὐτὸ συμφορηθέντας οὐκ ἀξίους εἶναι παραβαλεῖν οἷς Χρύσιππος (SVF 2.109) ἔγραψεν εἰς διαβολὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων. … βουληθεὶς αὖθις συνειπεῖν τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐνδεέστερος γέγονεν αὑτοῦ. §5 Epicurus: Epicurus RS 24 εἰ τιν᾽ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς. Demetrius Laco Ap.Test. (PHerc. 1012) col. 72.2–7 Puglia ζητουμένου | γὰρ τοῦ πῶς τὰς αἰσθήσεις | λέγομεν ἀληθεῖς κατ᾽ ἀνα|φορὰν τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθη|τά, ‘καθόσον γὰρ ταῦτα ἀ|ληθῆ’, ‘δυσοδία γὰρ ἐντρο|χάζειν δοκεῖ’. Philodemus Piet. 1.673–674 Obbink τὰς φαντασ[ίας ἀλη]θεῖς εἶναι. Lucretius DRN 4.379 nec tamen hic oculos falli concedimus hilum. DRN 4.478–479 invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam / notitiem veri neque sensus posse refelli. DRN 4.482–483 quid maiore fide porro quam sensus haberi / debet? DRN 4.462–468 cetera de genere hoc mirande multa videmus, / quae violare fidem quasi sensibus omnia quaerunt, / ne quiquam, quoniam pars horum maxima fallit / propter opinatus animi, quos addimus ipsi, / pro visis ut sint quae non sunt sensibus visa; / nam nihil aegrius est quam res secernere apertas / ab dubiis, animus quas ab se protinus addit. Plutarch Adv.Col. 1109A–B Ἐπικουρείῳ (fr. 250 Usener) δόγματι κέχρηται τῷ ‘πάσας εἶναι τὰς δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς’. Sextus Empiricus M. 8.63 ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος (fr. 253 Usener) ἔλεγε μὲν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἀληθῆ, καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι, καὶ τοιαύτην ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν τὴν αἴσθησιν, πλανᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς τινὰς μὲν τῶν φαντασιῶν λέγοντας ἀληθεῖς, τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς παρὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι χωρίζειν δόξαν ἀπὸ ἐναργείας. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 10.31 ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος (p. 70, fr. 35 Usener) κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη, οἱ δ᾽ Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας. §6 Parmenides Empedocles Anaxagoras Democritus Epicurus Heraclides: Theophrastus Sens. 7 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς (31A86 DK) δὲ περὶ ἁπασῶν ὁμοίως λέγει καί φησι τῷ ἐναρμόττειν εἰς τοὺς πόρους τοὺς ἑκάστης αἰσθάνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ οὐ δύνασθαι τὰ ἀλλήλων κρίνειν, ὅτι τῶν μὲν εὐρύτεροί πως, τῶν δὲ στενώτεροι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πόροι πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν. Sens. 9 (31A86 DK) περὶ δὲ γεύσεως καὶ ἁφῆς οὐ διορίζε-

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ται καθ᾽ ἑκατέραν οὔτε πῶς οὔτε δι᾽ ἃ γίγνονται, πλὴν τὸ κοινὸν ὅτι τῷ ἐναρμόττειν τοῖς πόροις αἴσθησίς ἐστιν. Sens. 35 (Anaxagoras 59A92 DK) τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μεγέθη τὴν συμμετρίαν ἀποδιδόναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔοικεν ὁμοίως λέγειν Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ· τῷ γὰρ ἐναρμόττειν τοῖς πόροις ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν. Sens. 80 ὁρᾶν δέ φησι (Democritus 68A135 DK) διὰ τὴν ἀπορροὴν καὶ τὴν ἔμφασιν τὴν εἰς τὴν ὄψιν. Epicurus (on eidola) Ep.Hdt. at D.L. 10.49 τύπων τινῶν ἐπεισιόντων ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμοχρόων τε καὶ ὁμοιομόρφων κατὰ τὸ ἐναρμόττον μέγεθος εἰς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. Plutarch Quaest.Conv. 735A φησιν Δημόκριτος (68A77 DK) ‘ἐγκαταβυσσοῦσθαι’ τὰ εἴδωλα διὰ τῶν πόρων εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ ποιεῖν τὰς κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον ὄψεις ἐπαναφερόμενα· φοιτᾶν δὲ ταῦτα πανταχόθεν ἀπιόντα καὶ σκευῶν καὶ ἱματίων καὶ φυτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ζῴων ὑπὸ σάλου πολλοῦ καὶ θερμότητος οὐ μόνον ἔχοντα μορφοειδεῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐκμεμαγμένας ὁμοιότητας (ὡς Ἐπίκουρος (fr. 326 Usener) οἴεται μέχρι τούτου Δημοκρίτῳ συνεπόμενος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ προλιπὼν τὸν λόγον). §7 Peripatetics: Aristotle de An. 2.12 424a17–25 καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, …. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. §9 Leucippus Democritus Diogenes: Aristotle Met. Α.4 985b13–19 (Leucippus 67A6 DK) ταύτας μέντοι τρεῖς εἶναι λέγουσι, σχῆμά τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ θέσιν· διαφέρειν γάρ φασι τὸ ὂν ‘ῥυσμῷ’ καὶ ‘διαθιγῇ’ καὶ ‘τροπῇ’ μόνον· τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν ‘ῥυσμὸς’ σχῆμά ἐστιν ἡ δὲ ‘διαθιγὴ’ τάξις ἡ δὲ ‘τροπὴ’ θέσις. Theophrastus Sens. 63 (Democritus 68A135 DK) σημεῖον δ᾽ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει (sc. τὰ αἰσθητὰ) τὸ μὴ ταὐτὰ πᾶσι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ζώιοις. Plutarch Colot. 1110E τὸ γὰρ ‘νόμῳ χροιὴν’ εἶναι καὶ ‘νόμῳ γλυκύ’ καὶ νόμῳ σύγκρισιν ⟨ἅπασαν perperam add. Westman⟩ ⟨‘ἐτεῇ δὲ τὸ κενὸν καὶ add. Wyttenbach alii⟩ τὰς ἀτόμους᾽ εἰρημένον φησὶν (sc. Colotes) ὑπὸ Δημοκρίτου (fr. 61 Luria) ⟨μάχεσθαι add. Reiske alii⟩ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι. Galen Hipp.Elem. c. 2.12–13, 1.417.9–14 K. ‘νόμῳ’ γὰρ ‘χροιὴ νόμῳ γλυκὺ νόμῳ πικρὸν, ἐτεῇ δ᾽ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν’ ὁ Δημόκριτός (68A49 DK, B125 DK) φησιν, ἐκ τῆς συνόδου τῶν ἀτόμων γίγνεσθαι νομίζων ἁπάσας τὰς αἰσθητὰς ποιότητας ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς αἰσθανομένους αὐτῶν, φύσει δ᾽ οὐδὲν εἶναι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ ξανθὸν ἢ ἐρυθρὸν ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ πικρόν. Med.Exp. 15.7.6–11 Walzer ὃς γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἄρξασθαι δύναται τῆς ἐναργείας χωρίς, πῶς ἂν οὗτος πιστὸς εἴη, παρ᾽ ἧς ἔλαβε τὰς ἀρχάς, κατὰ ταύτης θρασυνόμενος; τοῦτο καὶ Δημόκριτος (68B125 DK) εἰδὼς ὁπότε τὰ φαινόμενα διέβαλε ‘νόμῳ χροιή, νόμῳ γλυκύ, νόμῳ πικρόν’ εἰπὼν ‘ἐτεῇ δ᾽ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν’ ἐποίησε τὰς αἰσθήσεις λεγούσας πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως· ‘τάλαινα φρήν, παρ᾽ ἡμέων λαβοῦσα τὰς πίστεις ἡμέας καταβάλλεις; πτῶμά τοι τὸ κατάβλημα’. Alexander of Aphrodisias Mixt. 213.18–23 οἱ μὲν ἄτομα σώματα ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει, κατὰ σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος μόνον τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορὰν ἔχοντα, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖά φασιν εἶναι, καὶ τῇ τούτων συνθέσει τε καὶ ποιᾷ περιπλοκῇ ἔτι τε τάξει καὶ θέσει τἆλλα γίνεσθαι· ἐφ᾽ ἧς δόξης πρῶτοι μὲν Λεύκιππός τε καὶ Δημόκριτος (fr. 124 Luria) γενέσθαι δοκοῦσιν, ὕστεροι δὲ Ἐπίκουρός (—) τε καὶ οἱ τὴν αὐτὴν τούτῳ τραπέντες. Sextus Empiricus 7.135–136 Δημόκριτος (68B9 DK) δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀναιρεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τούτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ δόξαν, ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀτόμους εἶναι καὶ κενόν· ‘νόμῳ’ γάρ φησι ‘γλυκύ’ καὶ ‘νόμῳ πικρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροιή, ἐτεῇ δὲ

liber 4 caput 9 ἄτομα καὶ κενόν’. (ὅπερ ⟨ἔστι⟩· νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ τὸ κενόν). ἐν δὲ τοῖς Κρατυντηρίοις, καίπερ ὑπεσχημένος ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὸ κράτος τῆς πίστεως ἀναθεῖναι, οὐδὲν ἧττον εὑρίσκεται τούτων καταδικάζων. φησὶ γάρ· ‘ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ μὲν ἐόντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκὲς συνίεμεν, μεταπίπτον δὲ κατά τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων.’ M. 8.6 Δημόκριτος (fr. 92 Luria) … μηδὲν ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσει αἰσθητόν, τῶν τὰ πάντα συγκρινουσῶν ἀτόμων πάσης αἰσθητῆς ποιότητος ἔρημον ἐχουσῶν φύσιν. See also above ch. 1.15, section E(b)§8. §10 Other views about smallest parts: Papyrus Derveni col. xix.1–2 ἐκ [τοῦ δ]ὲ [τ]ὰ ἐόντα, ἓν [ἕκ]αστον κέκ[λητ]αι ἀπὸ τοῦ | ἐπικρατοῦντος. Aristotle Phys. 1.4 187b1–7 (on Anaxagoras, not in DK) διό φασι πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμῖχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἑώρων γιγνόμενον· φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλισθ᾽ ὑπερέχοντος διὰ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων· εἰλικρινῶς μὲν γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ σάρκα ἢ ὀστοῦν οὐκ εἶναι, ὅτου δὲ πλεῖστον ἕκαστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος. Theophrastus Sens. 67 (Democritus 68A135 DK) οὗ δ᾽ ἂν ἐνῇ πλεῖστον, τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐνισχύειν πρός τε τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν. criticized by Galen Hipp.Elem. c. 6.32, 1.467.4–8 K. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταῦτά φησιν ὁ Ἀθήναιος, ἀλλὰ τὰ τούτων συνθετικὰ ὄντως εἶναι στοιχεῖα. δῆλον οὖν, ὡς ὑπερβαίνει τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ὄντως ἁπλᾶ τῷ λογισμῷ προϊών, ἃ μηκέτ᾽ ἐγχωρεῖ λέγειν ἐπικρατείᾳ τοῖα ἢ τοῖα γίγνεσθαι. Simplicius in Phys. 27.7–11 (Theophrastus Phys.Op. fr. 4 Diels, 228A FHS&G) πάντων (sc. τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν) μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντων, ἑκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ χαρακτηριζομένου. χρυσὸς γὰρ φαίνεται ἐκεῖνο, ἐν ᾧ πολὺ χρυσίον ἐστὶ καίτοι πάντων ἐνόντων. λέγει γοῦν Ἀναξαγόρας (59A41, B12 DK) ὅτι ‘ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι καὶ ὅτῳ πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν’. in Phys. 155.23–26 ὅτι δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας (on 59B1 DK) ἐξ ἑνὸς μίγματος ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει ὁμοιομερῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαί φησιν πάντων μὲν ἐν παντὶ ἐνόντων, ἑκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν χαρακτηριζομένου, δηλοῖ διὰ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Φυσικῶν λέγων κτλ. §11 Pythagoras Plato: Empedocles 31B109 DK γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ, / αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα δίᾳ, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον. Plato Resp. 508a–b τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὁρᾶν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι;—ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς.—ἆρ᾽ οὖν ὧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν;—πῶς;—οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἡ ὄψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ (b) δὴ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα.—οὐ γὰρ οὖν.—ἀλλ᾽ ἡλιοειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. Tim. 45b τοῦ πυρὸς ὅσον τὸ μὲν κάειν οὐκ ἔσχε, τὸ δὲ παρέχειν φῶς ἥμερον, οἰκεῖον ἑκάστης ἡμέρας, σῶμα ἐμηχανήσαντο γίγνεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ ἐντὸς ἡμῶν ἀδελφὸν ὂν τούτου πῦρ εἰλικρινὲς ἐποίησαν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ῥεῖν λεῖον. Tim. 67b ὅλως μὲν οὖν φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι᾽ ὤτων ὑπ᾽ ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην, τὴν δὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς κίνησιν, ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς μὲν ἀρχομένην, τελευτῶσαν δὲ περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἥπατος ἕδραν, ἀκοήν. Aristotle Sens. 2 437a20–b12 ἔνιοι μὲν ζητοῦσι κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων· οὐκ εὐποροῦντες δὲ πρὸς τέτταρα πέντ᾽ οὔσας συνάγειν, γλίχονται περὶ τῆς πέμ-

1579

1580

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πτης. ποιοῦσι δὲ πάντες τὴν ὄψιν πυρὸς … εἴ γε πῦρ ἦν, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς (31A91 DK) φησὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ (Tim. 68a) γέγραπται κτλ. Sens. 2 438b17– 439a1 φανερὸν ὡς εἰ δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτειν ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑνὶ τῶν στοιχείων, τοῦ μὲν ὄμματος τὸ ὁρατικὸν ὕδατος ὑποληπτέον, ἀέρος δὲ τὸ τῶν ψόφων αἰσθητικόν, πυρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν … τὸ δ᾽ ἁπτικὸν γῆς, τὸ δὲ γευστικὸν εἶδός τι ἁφῆς ἐστίν κτλ. de An. 1.2 404b21–24 (Test.Plat. 25A Gaiser, A22 Isnardi Parente) ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο (μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἕν), τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ. Plutarch De E 390B εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἳ καὶ τὰς τῶν αἰσθήσεων δυνάμεις ἰσαρίθμους οὔσας τοῖς πρώτοις ἐκείνοις συνοικειοῦσι, τὴν μὲν ἁφὴν ὁρῶντες ἀντίτυπον οὖσαν καὶ γεώδη, τὴν δὲ γεῦσιν ὑγρότητι τῶν γευστῶν τὰς ποιότητας προσιεμένην. ἀὴρ δὲ πληγεὶς ἐν ἀκοῇ γίγνεται φωνὴ καὶ ψόφος. δυεῖν δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὀσμὴ μέν, ἣν ἡ ὄσφρησις εἴληχεν, ἀναθυμίασις οὖσα καὶ γεννωμένη θερμότητι πυρῶδές ἐστιν, αἰθέρι δὲ καὶ φωτὶ διὰ συγγένειαν διαλαμπούσης τῆς ὄψεως γίγνεται κρᾶσις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὁμοιοπαθὴς καὶ σύμπηξις. De E 390F, Sil.Or. 429E (on the parts of soul). Sextus Empiricus M. 7.93 καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος (F 85 E.-K., 395a Theiler) τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς κτλ. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Sens. 14.18–23 λέγει δέ τινας τῶν περὶ αἰσθήσεων εἰρηκότων ζητεῖν ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν σωματικῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖν, καὶ {πέντε τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐσῶν} οὐκ εὐποροῦντας συνάγειν εἰς τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα πέντε οὔσας αὐτὰς ζητεῖν περὶ τῆς πέμπτης, ἐκ τίνος αὐτὴν χρὴ λέγειν εἶναι σώματος. λέγοιτο δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ δόξης, ἥτις ἀναφέρεται μὲν εἰς τοὺς Πυθαγορείους, εἴρηται δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ (Tim. 45b–c, 65c–d, 66d, 67b). Galen PHP 7.5.42–6.1 δεόντως οὖν ἐροῦμεν αὐγοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ὄργανον, ἀεροειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ἀτμοειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ὀδμῆς καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεύσεως ὑγρόν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς γεῶδες. (43) οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν ἑτέρως ἔχειν αὐτὰ τῆς ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀλλοιώσεως χρῄζοντα καὶ τοῦτ᾽, ἄρ᾽ ἦν ὃ βούλεται δηλοῦν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν οἷς φησι … (quotation of 31B109 DK). (44) αἰσθανόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως τῷ μὲν γεωδεστέρῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἁφή, τῆς γεώδους φύσεως ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, τῷ δ᾽ αὐγοειδεστάτῳ, ⟨τῷ⟩ τῆς ὄψεως, τῆς αὐγοειδοῦς, καθάπερ γε καὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀεροειδεῖ γιγνομένῳ τῶν ἰδίων ἀέρος παθημάτων ἡ διάγνωσις ἀποτελεῖται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ὑγρῷ καὶ σπογγοειδεῖ τὴν φύσιν ὄντι τῶν χυμῶν ἡμῖν αἴσθησις γίγνεται. (45) λοιπὸν δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ὄργανον, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ῥῖνα πόροις, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς πέρασι τῶν προσθίων ἐγκεφάλου κοιλιῶν, εἰς ἅπερ ἀνήκουσιν οἱ κατὰ τὴν ῥῖνα πόροι· κατὰ τοῦτο γάρ τοι τὸ μόριον ἀτμοειδεστάτας εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς κοιλίας αὐτοῦ. … (6.1) πέμπτον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν αἰσθητήριον, οὐκ ὄντων πέντε στοιχείων, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τῶν ὀσμῶν γένος ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἀέρος τε καὶ ὕδατος, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων εἶπεν ἐν Τιμαίῳ (Tim. 66d–e). followed by Nemesius NH 6, p. 56.6–20 καὶ τῷ μὲν γεωδεστάτῳ καὶ σωματικωτάτῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἁφή, τῆς γεώδους φύσεως αἰσθάνεται, τῷ δὲ αὐγοειδεστάτῳ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις, τῶν αὐγοειδῶν, ὡς καὶ τῷ ⟨κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν⟩ ἀερώδει τῶν τοῦ ἀέρος παθημάτων (ἀὴρ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φωνῆς οὐσία ἢ ἀέρος πληγή), καὶ τῷ σπογγοειδεῖ δὲ καὶ ὑδατοειδεῖ

liber 4 caput 9 τῷ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν τῶν χυμῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διὰ τοῦ οἰκείου γνωρίζεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἔδει τοίνυν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, τέσσαρας εἶναι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδήπερ ὁ ἀτμὸς καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀσμῶν γένος μεταξὺ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος … τούτου χάριν πέμπτον αἰσθητήριον ἡ ὄσφρησις ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐξεύρηται. Corpus Hippocraticum Ep.Ptol. p. 287.1–7 Ermerins αἰσθητήρια δέ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πέντε· ὅρασις ὄσφρησις ἀκοή γεῦσις καὶ ἁφή· ἡ μὲν ὅρασις ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, ἡ δὲ ὄσφρησις ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς, ἡ δὲ γεῦσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ἡ δὲ ἁφὴ ἐκ τῆς γῆς. δυνάμεις εἰσὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε· νοῦς διάνοια δόξα φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις. §14 Chrysippus: Philo of Alexandria Leg. 1.24 πρὸ τοῦ ἀνατεῖλαι τὰ κατὰ μέρος αἰσθητὰ ἦν τὸ γενικὸν αἰσθητὸν προμηθείᾳ τοῦ πεποιηκότος. Seneca Ep. 58.16 quod generalis est, tamquam homo generalis, sub oculos non venit; sed specialis venit, ut Cicero et Cato. animal non videtur; cogitatur. videtur autem species eius, equus et canis. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.61 (SVF 3 Diog. 25) εἶδος δέ ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ γένους περιεχόμενον …· εἰδικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ εἶδος ὂν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης. §15 Empedocles: Theophrastus Sens. 1 Παρμενίδης (28A46 DK) μὲν καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς (—) καὶ Πλάτων τῷ ὁμοίῳ (sc. ποιοῦσιν τὴν αἴσθησιν). Sens. 9 (Empedocles 31A86 DK) ἥδεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ὁμοίοις κατά τε ⟨τὰ⟩ μόρια καὶ τὴν κρᾶσιν, λυπεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. Sens. 16 (Empedocles 31A86 DK) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμολογουμένως ἀποδίδωσιν ἥδεσθαι μὲν ποιῶν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, λυπεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. §16 Anaxagoras: Aristotle EN 7.15 1154b7–8 ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι (59A94 DK) μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν. Theophrastus Sens. 29 (59A92 DK) ἅπασαν δ᾽ αἴσθησιν μετὰ λύπης. Aspasius in EN (ad loc.) p. 156.13–20 ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖν τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι λέγουσιν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρας (59A94 DK) ἔλεγεν ἀεὶ πονεῖν τὸ ζῷον διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ὡς συγκατατιθέμενος λέγει ἀλλ᾽ ἱστορῶν· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐδόκει γε αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ ἐν πόνῳ εἶναι τὸ ζῷον. καὶ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν αἰτιᾶται Θεόφραστος (fr. 555 FHS&G) ἐν Ἠθικοῖς λέγων ὅτι *** ‘ἐξελαύνει ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ γε ἐναντία’, οἷον ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ διψῆν, ‘καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα’, τουτέστιν ἥτις οὖν ἂν εἴη ‘ἰσχυρά’, ὥστε ἐνίοτε πεῖναν ἐξελαύνει καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅταν ᾄσμασιν ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀκούσμασι διαφερόντως χαίρωμεν. Theophrastus Sens. 17 καίτοι πολλάκις αἰσθανόμενοι λυπούμεθα κατ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὡς ⟨δ᾽⟩ Ἀναξαγόρας (59A92 DK) φησίν, ἀεί· πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν εἶναι μετὰ λύπης. §17 Others: Doxography C (Peripatetic, ascribed to AD) at Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10, p. 88.16–21 (SVF 3.378) ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ φόβον προηγεῖσθαι, τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον κακόν. ἐπιγίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτοις ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, ἡδονὴν μὲν ὅταν τυγχάνωμεν ὧν ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ ἐκφύγωμεν ἃ ἐφοβούμεθα· λύπην δέ, ὅταν ἀποτυγχάνωμεν ὧν ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ περιπέσωμεν οἷς ἐφοβούμεθα. Dio Chrysostomus Or. 8.23 ὁ μὲν οὖν πόνος διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ἐπιγίγνεται ὡς τὸ πολὺ καὶ ταύτῃ πρόσεισιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ κατὰ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν ὁπόσας ἄνθρωπος αἰσθήσεις ἔχει.

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§20 Epicurus: Bacchylides Pae. fr. 2.1–2 Irigoin at Clem.Alex. Strom. 5.68.5 ἕτερος ἐξ ἑτέρου σοφὸς / τό τε πάλαι τό τε νῦν. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 9.20 Ἐμπεδοκλέους δὲ εἰπόντος αὐτῷ (sc. Ξενοφάνει, 21A1 & A20 DK) ὅτι ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ὁ σοφός, ‘εἰκότως,’ ἔφη· ‘σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸν ἐπιγνωσόμενον τὸν σοφόν.’ Cf. Gnomologium Parisinum 6.54 Searby.

Liber 4 Caput 10 PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 900A; p. 399a1–14 Diels—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 198– 199 Daiber S: Stobaeus Ecl. 1.51.2–4, pp. 481.16–482.8 + 1.50.7–9, pp. 473.20–474.5 Wachsmuth; cf. Phot. Bibl. 167, p. 112b30–31 Henry (titulus solus) Cf. Nem: Nemesius NH 15, p. 72.7–9 Morani

Titulus ιʹ. Πόσαι εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις (P,S) §1 οἱ Στωικοὶ πέντε τὰς εἰδικὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὅρασιν ἀκοὴν ὄσφρησιν γεῦσιν ἁφήν. (P1,S4) §2 Ἀριστοτέλης ἕκτην μὲν οὐ λέγει, κοινὴν δ᾽ αἴσθησιν τὴν τῶν συνθέτων εἰδῶν κριτικήν, εἰς ἣν πᾶσαι συμβάλλουσιν αἱ ἁπλαῖ τὰς ἰδίας ἑκάστη φαντασίας· ἐν ᾗ τὸ μεταβατικὸν ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον, οἱονεὶ σχήματος καὶ κινήσεως. (P2,S5) §3 † Πελλῆς πλείους αἰσθήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα †. (S1) §4 Δημόκριτος πλείους εἶναι αἰσθήσεις, περὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα καὶ περὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς καὶ περὶ τοὺς θεούς. (P3,S6) §5 Δημόκριτος πλείους μὲν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἀναλογίζειν τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῷ πλήθει λανθάνειν. (S2) §6 οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι παρίσους. (S6) §1 Stoici SVF 2.853; §2 Aristoteles cf. de An. 3.1 424b22–23, 425a14–16; §3—; §4 Democritus 68A116 DK; §5 Democritus 68A115 DK; §6 anonymi— caput non hab. PEGT titulus Πόσαι … αἰσθήσεις PBQ : καὶ ποίας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας ἑκάστη add. SLPhot : αἱ om. PB(II) : εἰσὶν post αἰσθήσεις PB(I) §1 [2] εἰδικὰς PB(III) : ἰδικὰς PB(I,II)SL §2 [4] ἕκτην : ἕκτον S corr. Meineke ‖ [4–7] κοινὴν … κινήσεως PB : cf. supra c. 4.8.6[20– 22] ‖ τὴν PB : om. SL ‖ συνθέτων] συνθέντων SL ‖ [6–7] ἐν … κινήσεως PBSL : ἀφ᾽ om. PQ (?) non vertit Daiber (dabei bewegt sich der eine (Sinn) zum anderen (in gleicher Weise) wie die Fortbewegung verläuft, welche bei den Gestalten und Bewegungen stattfindet Q) ‖ [7] δείκνυται add. PB post κινήσεως non hab. PQSL secl. Diels prob. Mau Gigon, sed ret. Lachenaud §3 [8] lemma abundans crucifiximus : Ἀπελλῆς ind. Phot. : πελλῆς SL : ‘vereor ne … nihil sit nisi Ἀριστοτέλης lemma errore praefixum insequentis paragaphi’ Diels DG et crucif. †Ἀπελλῆς† (‘prima [sc. littera] rubricatori relicta’), †πελλῆς† Wachsmuth, qui add. ‘fort. Ἐμπεδοκλης’ ‖ verba πλείους … ζῷα SL : iterata ex c. 4.4[9] sec. Diels ‖ πλείους SL : ὁμοίους Usener : ‘crediderim tamen Aetium ἀλλοίους […] ἄ. ζ. scripsisse, ut haec opposita sint verbis’ (sc. 4.4[9]) ‘καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων’ Wachsmuth ‖ §4 [9–10] περὶ1 … θεούς PB(I,II) : καὶ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ σοφούς PB(III) : in den unvernünftigen [sic!] und weisen Lebewesen Q §5 [11] τῷ δὲ SL : τὸ δὲ Usener ‖ [12] ἀναλογίζειν SL prob. Wachsmuth : crucif. Diels qui prop. ἀναλογεῖν

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Testes secundi: Nemesius NH 15 p. 72.7–9 (~ §1) Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Στωϊκὸς (SVF 1.143) ὀκταμερῆ φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, διαιρῶν αὐτὴν εἴς τε τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, καὶ εἰς τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις κτλ. Loci Aetiani: §1 A 4.4.4 οἱ Στωικοὶ … πέντε (sc. μερῶν) μὲν τῶν αἰσθητικῶν, ὁρατικοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ ὀσφρητικοῦ γευστικοῦ ἁπτικοῦ. A 4.9.14 Χρύσιππος τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἡδὺ νοητόν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπῖπτον ἤδη αἰσθητόν. A 4.21.1–2 οἱ Στωικοὶ … πέντε μέν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, ὅρασις ὄσφρησις ἀκοὴ γεῦσις καὶ ἁφή. §2 = A 4.8.6 Ἀριστοτέλης … κοινὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν τὴν τῶν συνθέτων εἰδῶν κριτικήν, εἰς ἣν πᾶσαι συμβάλλουσιν αἱ ἁπλαῖ τὰς ἰδίας ἑκάστη ⟨φαντασίας⟩, ἐν ᾗ τὸ μεταβατικὸν ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου εἰς ἕτερον οἷον σχήματος ⟨καὶ⟩ κινήσεως σώματος. §5 A 4.4.6 oἱ δέ γε Πυθαγόρου διάδοχοι ἐκ πέντε στοιχείων τὸ σῶμα κραθῆναι φάντες—τοῖς γὰρ τέτταρσι ξυνέταξαν τὸ αἰθέριον—ἰσαρίθμους εἶναι ἔφασαν ταύτῃ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς δυνάμεις. A 4.9.11 Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων καθαρὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἑκάστου στοιχείου προσερχόμενον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν ὅρασιν τὸ αἰθηριὸν πεφυκέναι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὸ πνευματικόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν τὸ πυρῶδες, πρὸς δὲ τὴν γεῦσιν τὸ ὑγρόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν τὸ γεῶδες.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

Commentary A Witnesses (1) The witnesses for P are only PB and PQ. G has not excerpted the chapter. Ps prefers a chapter entitled Περὶ τῶν πέντε αἰσθήσεων that brings together a series of brief descriptions or definitions of the senses equivalent to A 4.13 & 16–19 (but using P as his model). (2) T, as we have noticed, is no longer excerpting A. (3) S has six lemmata, which are divided over two different chapters, viz. Ecl. 1.50 and 1.51: three of them, i.e. ch. 4.10.3 + 4.10.5–6, are at Ecl. 1.50.7–9, pp. 473.20–474.5. These excerpts according to Diels interrupt the sequence of lemmata S abstracted from ch. 4.8, while Wachsmuth ad loc. prefers to locate them in that chapter (see above, ch. 4.8, Commentary A(2) and ch. 4.9, Commentary A(2) and A(4)). Three more lemmata, i.e. ch. 4.10.1–2 + 4.10.4, are found in the next Stobaean chapter, Ecl. 1.51.2–4, pp. 481.17–482.8. All the lemmata of S except ch. 4.10.2 (Aristotle) are extant only in ms L, the Florentine florilegium, cf. above, ch. 4.8 Commentary A(1).

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B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. The proximate tradition is poor. Unfortunately other evidence for views pertaining to more than the five canonical senses, and in particular to the views of Democritus, is virtually non-existent. (2) Sources. Aristotle several times discusses the issue of the number of the senses and resolutely defends the number five, e.g. de An. 3.1 425a13–b11. So does Alexander of Aphrodisias, e.g. de An. 66.1–9. The Stoics too limit the number of the senses to five. We do not know how this reliable information reached the Placita. C Chapter Heading A precise heading, in P, concerned with the category of quantity, and confirmed by the first part of the heading of S 1.51, a short chapter which has the long and detailed heading ‘How many senses are there, and what is the substance and performance of each?’ (Πόσαι εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ποίας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας ἑκάστη). For the dialectical aspect of the question word see above, ch. 1.1, Commentary C. This long version, added by Wachsmuth from Photius and the index of SL, looks ahead to the chapters treating the individual senses. Alexander of Aphrodisias in the introduction to his Commentary on Aristotle’s De sensu mentions as one of the topics of the De anima ‘on the function of sensation … and saying what it is and in how many senses it is divided’ (περὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς δυνάμεως …, καὶ τίς τέ ἐστιν εἰπὼν καὶ εἰς πόσας αἰσθήσεις διαιρεῖται, in Sens. 1.5–7). D Analysis a Context Chapter 4.10 is the third of a series of five chapters concerned with cognitive issues in a more general way. It deals with the number of the senses (category of quantity), and follows upon the chapter dealing with the reliability of sensations and impressions (truth or falsity: category/question-type of quality). It is followed by two chapters (4.11–12) specially devoted to Stoic views on these issues, dealing respectively with the cognitive process from sensation to concept-formation, and with distinctions between various forms of real or imaginary impressions. b Number–Order of Lemmata P has only three lemmata, S more. As indicated above there is a difference of opinion between Diels and Wachsmuth. According to Diels S provides six lemmata for the present chapter divided between Ecl. 1.50 and 1.51, according to Wachsmuth only three, in Ecl. 1.51 (see above, section A). Diels argued

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that §§3 and 5–6 of ch. 4.10 had been wrongly coalesced by S in 1.50 with the lemmata from ch. 4.8, while Wachsmuth believed that they really belong in ch. 4.8. For the first of these L, the Florentine florilegium, which is the only source for S here, has the enigmatic name-label πελλῆς in §3. Diels DG 399b13 prints †Ἀπελλῆς, Wachsmuth Ecl. 1.473.21 †πελλῆς (see below, section D(d)§3). But Wachsmuth needed to change the text of §3 from πλείους into ἀλλοίους (and even to suggest that πελλῆς is a corruption of the regular name-label Ἐμπεδοκλῆς) in order to create a diaphonic connection between the Aristotle lemma ch. 4.8.6, according to which the sensus communis is shared to some extent by the animals, whereas ch. 4.10.3 (with this conjecture!) appears to deny this commonality. It is clear that this reconstruction needs too many extra hypotheses, and that Diels, who fished out lemmata dealing with the category of quantity, must be right. The fact that the text of §3 in Ecl. 1.50 anticipates that of §4 in Ecl. 1.51 is a further argument in favour of Diels’ rearrangement, as he already pointed out himself. The fact that the two Democritus lemmata §4 and §5 have virtually the same beginnings (§4 Δημόκριτος πλείους εἶναι αἰσθήσεις, §5 Δημόκριτος πλείους μὲν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις) may have contributed to the creation of the false lemma §3 in S, as Diels ad loc. already suggested. The strange namelabel πελλῆς is combined with a duplication of the first part of §4. It could have been relegated to the critical apparatus, but we have left it in the text, as an illustration of what may happen with doxai. The lemmata order. The sequence of lemmata from §1 to §4 is not the same in P and S if we take the order of the chapters into account. For §§5–6 we follow the order of S, and their final position is warranted by the fact that in S they come after §3, itself a misguided anticipation of §4, so they follow after §4. Our reconstruction of the chapter and the order of its lemmata thus turns out to be the same as that of Diels in the DG. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter The rationale of the chapter is quite straightforward. The lemmata are arranged according to number (category of quantity), starting with the standard quintet in §1. In §2 Aristotle too sticks to five senses, though he adds the sensus communis (as in ch. 4.8.6). The other side of the diaeresis is provided by two Democritus lemmata. The first, §4, claims that there are more senses (than five, of course)—interestingly enough claiming this not only and perhaps with some justification for gods and animals, but also for Wise Men. The second, §5, takes up the theme of chs. 4.4.6 and 4.9.11, namely the issue of the relation between the number of the senses and the number of the kinds of elemental sense objects. Democritus is credited with the view that there are more senses than kinds of sense objects, but it is not clear how this should work out in rela-

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tion to human beings, Wise Men, gods, and animals. The anonymous §6 (one wonders who these ‘others’ may be) provides a compromise tenet; or rather one which fails to fit the diaeresis, because ‘equally balanced’ may perhaps be both less and more than five. d

Further Comments Individual Points §2 For the passage [4] κοινὴν … [7] κινήσεως repeated from ch. 4.8.2 see at this chapter, Commentary D(d)§6. §3 The doxa is duplicated from the next lemma, as Diels noted. The first letter of the name-label is lacking in the Laurentianus ms., but present in Photius’ index (cod. 167, p. 114a27 Henry), as noted by Elter (1880) 41. An Ἀπελλῆς is on the list of pupils of Chrysippus at Philodemus Index Stoicorum col. 47.3, who may or may not be identical with the Ἀπολλᾶν in Chrysippus’ catalogue at Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.193 (where the recentiores read ἀπελλᾶν) and V.P. 7.197. The proper name Πελλῆς does exist but is quite rare (Apollonius Rhodius Arg. 1.177, Diodorus Siculus 4.3.23); no intellectual of this name is known. It seems safest to follow Diels and obelize the lemma. §5 A related issue occurs in long-distance diaphonic opposition at ch. 4.4.6 and ch. 4.6.11, name-labels respectively ‘Pythagoras’ followers’ and ‘Pythagoras Plato’, where the number of the kinds of sense-objects equals that of the senses. e Other Evidence The number of the senses is not only discussed by Aristotle in the De anima, but is also one of three main criteria for distinguishing and classifying doctrines in Theophrastus’ De sensibus, see Mansfeld (1996). He discusses views also according to the number of senses involved (category of quantity): a first group (who believe perception occurs ‘by similarity’) beginning with Parmenides who failed to determine the number, then Plato with two (!) senses, sight and hearing—numbered, as we know, by Plato himself as ‘third’ (Tim. 67a τρίτον) and ‘fourth’ (67c τέταρτον) ‘perceiving part’ (αἱσθητικὸν ἐν ἡμιν μέρος)—, and finally Empedocles with five. Then a second group (who believe perception occurs ‘by contrast’), comprising inter alios Alcmaeon with four senses (as it would appear) and Anaxagoras with five. See section E(b) General texts. More than five is only a side issue in de Sens. 6 (Plato did not say whether there are other senses than the canonical five), while in the present chapter the main diaeresis according to quantity is between five senses or more (more than five are attributed to Democritus), and less than five is not mentioned. The relation to the De sensibus is even more faint than in ch. 4.8; cf. above, 4.8, Commentary D(a).

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The first author to mention the five canonical senses is Empedocles (31B3.10–13 DK); one cannot say that Parmenides is concerned with sense perception in a specific way because for him eyes, ears, and tongue (as the organ of speech, 28B7.4–5 DK) are means of judgement and communication rather than sense organs, just as eyes and ears are for Heraclitus (22B55, B101a DK), see Mansfeld (1999d) and (2018b). The Hippocratic author cited at section E(b)§3– 5 puts (what we would call) mental and sensorial faculties on a par. The parallels for a discussion of the number of the senses reveal that the issue, though not spectacular, was often related to that of the number of elemental sense-objects, see Baltes (1978). We now know that animals have more or other senses than we do, think of electric sense, magnetic sense, echolocation, and infrared and ultraviolet vision (e.g. von Frisch proved that bees do not see red but see ultraviolet). For Montaigne and Leibniz speculating on animal senses unknown to us see Strickland (2016) 78–79. E a

Further Related Texts Proximate Tradition

General texts: ps.Galen Def.Med. 19.379.6–9 K. ριστʹ. αἰσθήσεις εἰσὶ πέντε, ὅρασις, ἀκοὴ, γεῦσις, ὄσφρησις, ἁφή. διακονοῦνται δὲ αὗται καὶ ὑπηρετοῦνται τῇ ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνός (cf. Vallance ANRW 2.37.1, p. 721) φησιν καὶ τὴν ⟨συγ⟩γυμνασίαν τῶν πέντε αἰσθήσεων ψυχὴν εἶναι. §2 Aristotle: Arius Didymus fr. 15 Diels at Stob. Ecl. 1.51.5, p. 482.9–19 Ἀριστοτέλους· τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικόν, … πενταπλοῦν ἐοικέναι. τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὅρασιν τὸ δ᾽ ἀκοὴν τὸ δ᾽ ὄσφρησιν τὸ δὲ γεῦσιν τὸ δ᾽ ἁφήν. ὑπάρχειν δέ τινα καὶ σύνθετον αἴσθησιν ….

b

Sources and Other Parallel Texts

General texts: Theophrastus Sens. 5 Πλάτων δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον μὲν ἧπται τῶν κατὰ μέρος, οὐ μὴν εἴρηκέ γε περὶ ἁπασῶν, ἀλλὰ μόνον περὶ ἀκοῆς καὶ ὄψεως. Sens. 6 (also on Plato) περὶ δὲ ὀσφρήσεως καὶ γεύσεως καὶ ἁφῆς ὅλως οὐδὲν εἴρηκεν [sic], οὐδὲ εἰ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλαι τινές εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀκριβολογεῖται περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Sens. 7 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς (31A86 DK) δὲ περὶ ἁπασῶν ὁμοίως λέγει. Sens. 26 (Alcmaeon 24A5 DK) περὶ δὲ ἁφῆς οὐκ εἴρηκεν οὔτε πῶς οὔτε τίνι γίνεται. Sens. 27 Ἀναξαγόρας (59A92 DK) … καθ᾽ ἑκάστην δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ πειρᾶται διαριθμεῖν. Themistius in de An. 80.4–10 οὐδεμία ἄρα αἴσθησις τοῖς ζώοις ἐλλείπει, λέγω δὲ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τελείοις καὶ μὴ κολοβοῖς μηδὲ οἷον πεπηρωμένοις· τὰ γὰρ καλούμενα ζώφυτα μίαν ἔχει τὴν ἁφήν, τὰ δὲ ἴσως καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἴσως καὶ τὴν ὄσφρησιν, ὅσα δὲ πορευτικὰ καὶ τέλεια, ταῦτα ἔχει τὰς πέντε πάσας· φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἀσπάλαξ ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα ἔχουσα ὀφθαλμούς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδήπερ πρὸς τὸν βίον οὐκ ἦν αὐτῇ ἀναγκαία ἡ ὄψις, ἐξεπλήρωσε μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης ἡ φύσις τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων. John Philoponus in de An. 450.35–451.5 ‘ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθη-

liber 4 caput 10 σις ἑτέρα παρὰ τὰς πέντε’ (de An. 3.1 424b22)—ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ πέρατι τοῦ δευτέρου λόγου ἐζήτει, εἰ μία ἐστὶν ἡ ἁφὴ ἢ πολλαί, νῦν δείκνυσιν ὅτι πέντε εἰσὶ καὶ μόνον αἰσθήσεις, ἵνα τούτου δεικνυμένου δῆλον ᾖ ὅτι μία ἐστὶν ἡ ἁφή. δικαίως δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν δύο ἔχει αἰσθήσεις, τινὰ δὲ τρεῖς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ζητεῖ πόσαι εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις· εἰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ζῷα εἶχον τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις, περιττὴ ἦν ἡ περὶ τούτου ζήτησις. Ioannes Lydus Mens. 2.10, p. 31.12–14 συγγενὴς γὰρ ἡ πεντὰς τῇ αἰσθήσει, ἥτις πενταχῶς τέμνεται, εἰς ὅρασιν ἀκοὴν γεῦσιν ὄσφρησιν καὶ ἁφήν. §1 Stoics: Philo of Alexandria Mos. 2.81 ἡ πεντὰς αἰσθήσεων ἀριθμός ἐστιν. Plant. 133. QE 2.97. Abr. 147 συμβολικῶς ἡ πεντάπολις αἱ ἐν ἡμῖν πέντε αἰσθήσεις εἰσί, τὰ τῶν ἡδονῶν ὄργανα. Aulus Gellius 19.2.1 quinque sunt hominum sensus, quos Graeci αἰσθήσεις appellant, per quos voluptas animo aut corpori quaeri videtur: gustus, tactus, odoratus, visus, auditus. Diogenes Laertius V.P. 7.110 (SVF 2.828) φασὶ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ὀκταμερῆ· μέρη γὰρ αὐτῆς τά τε πέντε αἰσθητήρια κτλ. Galen Adv.Lyc. c. 4.10, 18A.222.4–6 K. παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ οὐκ ἔχομεν ἄλλην αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱ πᾶσαι πέντε, γεῦσις καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄψις καὶ ὄσφρησίς τε καὶ ἁφή. Tertullian de An. 17.1 contingit nos illorum etiam quinque sensuum quaestio, quos in primis litteris discimus, quoniam et hinc aliquid haereticis procuratur. visus est et auditus et odoratus et gustus et tactus. Porphyry Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων 253F Smith at Stob. Ecl. 1.49.25a, p. 350.13–14 (SVF 2.830) οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὀκταμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν θέντες καὶ πέντε μὲν μέρη τὰ αἰσθητικὰ λαβόντες κτλ. Plutarch Def.Or. 429E ἔνειμε γὰρ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰσθήσεις πέντε. §2 Aristotle: Aristotle de An. 3.1 424b22–23 ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἑτέρα παρὰ τὰς πέντε (λέγω δὲ ταύτας ὄψιν, ἀκοήν, ὄσφρησιν, γεῦσιν, ἁφήν), ἐκ τῶνδε πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις κτλ. de An. 3.1 425a14–18 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει (ὥστε καὶ σχῆμα· μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα). Sens. 5 444b19–21. ps.Alexander Probl. 2.61.1–3 Ideler διὰ τί πέντε μόναι αἰσθήσεις καὶ μὴ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους; ὅτι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια. Simplicius (? perhaps Priscianus Lydus) in de An. 173.7–17 πόθεν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη αἴσθησις παρὰ τὰς πέντε; οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ἡ πίστις· πλείω γὰρ τῶν ἡμῖν φανερῶν ζῴων τὰ ἀφανῆ, τὰ μὲν καὶ θνητά, τὰ δὲ ὅσα δαιμόνια. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, ὡς ἰδίως ἑκάστου οἰκείᾳ ὑποπίπτοντος αἰσθήσει τεσσάρων ὄντων καὶ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως, ἧς λέγεται εἶναι ἡ ὄσφρησις, ὡς τοῦ πυρὸς μὲν ἡ ὄψις, ἀέρος δὲ ἡ ἀκοὴ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν αἱ λοιπαί, ὕδατος ἡ γεῦσις καὶ γῆς ἡ ἁφή. οὐ γὰρ τῇ ὄψει μόνῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ἁφῇ ὡς θερμὸν γνωρίζεται τὸ πῦρ. ἄδηλον οὖν, μὴ καὶ ἄλλη τίς ἐστιν αὐτῷ ποιότης, ἣν ἀγνοοῦμεν ἡμεῖς διὰ τὸ ἀντιληπτικὴν αὐτῆς ἐλλείπειν ἡμῖν αἴσθησιν. πόθεν οὖν, ὅτι πέντε μόναι αἱ αἰσθήσεις, πιστοῦται ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης; ἔκ τε τῆς ζωτικῆς ἐν ἡμῖν τελειότητος καὶ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων μὴ ἐλλειπόντων. §§3–5 Democritus: Corpus Hippocraticum Diaet. 23.5–8 δι᾽ ἑπτὰ σχημάτων καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἡ ἀνθρώπων, ἀκοὴ ψόφων, ὄψις φανερῶν, ῥὶν ὀδμῆς, γλῶσσα ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀηδίης, στόμα διαλέκτου, σῶμα ψαύσιος θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, πνεύματος διέξοδοι ἔσω καὶ ἔξω· διὰ τούτων γνῶσις ἀνθρώποισιν.

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§4 Democritus: Theophrastus Sens. 6 (on Plato) περὶ δὲ ὀσφρήσεως καὶ γεύσεως καὶ ἁφῆς ὅλως οὐδὲν εἴρηκεν [sic], οὐδὲ εἰ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλαι τινές εἰσιν. Sextus Empiricus 9.140 περιττοτέρας γὰρ αἰσθήσεις ἔχων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀμείνων αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ θεοῦ) γενήσεται, δέον μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Καρνεάδης (F3 Mette), σὺν ταῖς πᾶσιν ὑπαρχούσαις πέντε ταύταις αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἄλλας αὐτῷ περισσοτέρας προσμαρτυρεῖν, ἵν᾽ ἔχῃ πλειόνων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν πέντε ἀφαιρεῖν. P. 1.96–98 (Aenesidemean trope) πλείονας δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν ποιοτήτων ἔχειν τὸ μῆλον ποιότητας δύνασθαι οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. ἐννοήσωμέν τινα ἐκ γενετῆς ἁφὴν μὲν ἔχοντα καὶ ὄσφρησιν καὶ γεῦσιν, μήτε δὲ ἀκούοντα μήτε ὁρῶντα. οὗτος τοίνυν ὑπολήψεται μήτε ὁρατόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν μήτε ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ μόνα ἐκεῖνα τὰ τρία γένη τῶν ποιο(97)τήτων ὑπάρχειν ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δύναται. καὶ ἡμᾶς οὖν ἐνδέχεται τὰς πέντε μόνας αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντας μόνον ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον ποιοτήτων, ὧν ἐσμεν ἀντιληπτικοί· ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ ἄλλας οἷόν τέ ἐστι ποιότητας, ὑποπιπτούσας ἑτέροις αἰσθητηρίοις, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐ μετεσχήκαμεν, διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὰς αἰσθητῶν. (98) ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φύσις συνεμετρήσατο, φήσει τις, τὰς αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά. ποία φύσις, διαφωνίας τοσαύτης ἀνεπικρίτου παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὔσης περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς κατ᾽ αὐτήν; Montaigne Essais Livre 2 Chap. 12 (Apologie de Raimond de Sebonde) p. 625 Balsamo & alii La premiere consideration que j’ay sur le subject des sens, c’est que je mets en doubte que l’homme soit pourveu de tous sens naturels. Je voy plusieurs animaux, qui vivent une vie entiere et parfaicte, les uns sans la veue, autres sans l’ouye: qui sçait si a nous aussi il ne manque pas encore un, deux, trois, et plusieurs autres sens? Car s’il en manque quelqu’un, nostre discours n’en peut découvrir le defaut. C’est le privilege des sens d’estre l’extreme borne de nostre apercevance : Il n’y a rien au delà d’eux, qui nous puisse servir à les descouvrir. Leibniz Monadologie 25 Aussi voïons nous que la Nature a donné des perceptions relevées aux animaux, par les soins qu’elle a pris de leur fournir des organes qui ramassent plusieurs raïons de lumière ou plusieurs ondulations de l’air, pour les faire avoir plus d’efficace par leur union. Il y a quelque chose d’approchant dans l’odeur, dans le goût et dans l’attouchement, et peut-être dans quantité d’autres sens, qui nous sont inconnûs.

Liber 4 Caput 11 PP : Papyrus Antinoopolis 85 fr. 4 recto (1960) p. 78, (1967) p. 182 Barns– Zilliacus—PB: ps.Plutarchus Plac. 900B–D; pp. 400a1–401a10 Diels—PG: ps.Galenus HPh c. 92; pp. 635.17–636.6 Diels—PQ: Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pp. 198– 201 Daiber

Titulus ιαʹ. Πῶς γίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ ἔννοια καὶ ὁ κατὰ ⟨ἐν⟩διάθεσιν λόγος (P) §1 οἱ Στωικοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χαρτίον εὐεργὸν εἰς ἀπογραφήν· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται. πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων· αἰσθανόμενοι γάρ τινος οἷον λευκοῦ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν· ὅταν δ᾽ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνῆμαι γένωνται, τότε φαμὲν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐμπειρία γάρ ἐστι τὸ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν φαντασιῶν πλῆθος. τῶν δ᾽ ἐννοιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικῶς γίνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως, αἱ δ᾽ ἤδη δι᾽ ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται μόνον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. §1[1–24] SVF 2.83; §1[12–14] SVF 1.149 caput non hab. ST titulus [1] ἔννοια PB : νόησις PG : Gedanke Q ‖ ⟨ἐν⟩διάθεσιν Wyttenbach edd. : διάθεσιν PBG ‖ [2] λόγος PB : λογισμός PG : Logik des Denkens Q §1 [3] γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος PB : ἄνθρωπος γένηται PG ‖ [4] post ψυχῆς add. αὐτοῦ PG ‖ χαρτίον PB Mau Lachenaud : χάρτην PG prob. Diels ‖ εὐεργὸν PG : ἐνεργὸν sive -γῶν PB : das gut gearbeitete und vorbereitete Blatt Papier, in welchem eine Bereitschaft … ist Q ‖ [4–5] μίαν … ἐννοιῶν PB : οὖν μία ἑκάστη τῶν διανοιῶν αἰσθήσεις PG ‖ [5] ἐναπογράφεται PB(Ι,ΙΙΙ) : ἐναπογράφει τῆς αὑτοῦ φαντασίας PG : ἀπογράφει PB(ΙΙ) : aufgeschrieben Q ‖ [6–7] πρῶτος … ἔχουσιν om PG ‖ αἰσθανόμενοι PB Mau Lachenaud : αἰσθόμενοι Diels prob. Long–Sedley ‖ [7] τινος PB(I,II) : τινες PB(III) ‖ λευκοῦ PB : schwarzen [sic] Menschen Q ‖ [8] post μνῆμαι add. φαντασιῶν PG, fort. recte ‖ φαμὲν PB(ΙΙ,ΙΙΙ)G : φασὶν PB(Ι) : wird zuteil Q ‖ [8–9] ἐμπειρίαν· ἐμπειρία PBQ : ἐμπειρίαν om. PG suppl. Diels ‖ [9] τὸ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν PB : τὸ τῶν om. PG : in der Art einander ähnlichen und gleichen Dingen Q ‖ φαντασιῶν PG edd. : om. PBQ : ⟨ἐννοιῶν⟩ coni. Reiske ‖ πλῆθος PBG : Schulung durch den haüfigen Umgang Q (i.e. om. φαντασιῶν et add. διδασκαλία ut ap. [13]?) ‖ [10] ante τῶν lac. stat. Sandbach ‖ φυσικῶς PGQ : φυσικαὶ PB ‖ [11] ἀνεπιτεχνήτως PB : οὐ τεχνικῶς PG ‖ [11–12] διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας PB : ἐπιμελείας καὶ διδασκαλίας PG ‖ [12] μὲν οὖν PB : δὲ καὶ PG ‖ μόνον edd., cf. nur Q : μόναι PBG ‖ ἐκεῖναι δὲ PB : om. PG ‖ [12–13] καὶ προλήψεις PBG : Auffassungen und Deutungen Q

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ὁ δὲ λόγος, καθ᾽ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοί, ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα. ἔστι δ᾽ ἐννόημα φάντασμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζῴου· τὸ γὰρ φάντασμα, ἐπειδὰν λογικῇ προσπίπτῃ ψυχῇ, τότε ἐννόημα καλεῖται, εἰληφὸς τοὔνομα παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ. διόπερ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις ὅσα προσπίπτει φαντάσματα, ⟨φαντάσματα μόνον ἐστίν⟩· ὅσα δὲ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἡμῖν γε, ταῦτα {φαντάσματα μόνον ἐστίν· ὅσα δὲ ἡμῖν, ταῦτα} καὶ φαντάσματα κατὰ γένος καὶ ἐννοήματα κατ᾽ εἶδος· ὥσπερ τὰ δηνάρια καὶ οἱ στατῆρες αὐτὰ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχει δηνάρια ⟨καὶ⟩ στατῆρες, ἐὰν δ᾽ εἰς πλοίων δοθῇ μίσθωσιν, τηνικαῦτα πρὸς τῷ δηνάρια εἶναι καὶ ναῦλα λέγεται. (P1) [14] προλήψεων PBG : Deutungen Q ‖ [15] post συμπληροῦσθαι add. μὲν PG ‖ πρώτην PBGQ edd. : δευτέραν perperam coni. Ritter–Preller ‖ [16] ἔστι δ᾽ ἐννόημα Diels prob. Mau Lachenaud : ἔστι δὲ νόημα PBQ : τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι νόημα PG ‖ φάντασμα PB cf. PP : φαντασίας PG ‖ διανοίας PB : διάνοια PG ‖ [17] τότε PB : om. PG ‖ [18] τοῦ νοῦ PGQ edd. : τὸν νοῦν PB ‖ in der Sprache der Griechen add. Q ‖ [19] ἀλόγοις PB(II)GQ : ἀλλοίοις PB(I), ἄλλοις PB(III) ‖ [20] ὅσα ex PG (qui post διόπερ pos.) Diels prob. Mau Lachenaud : οὐ PBQ ‖ [20] φαντάσματα μόνον ἐστὶν PG, ex PG et ex PB [21] ubi antiquitus falso repetita (et ubi non hab. PG) in [20] add. Diels Mau Lachenaud : φαντάσματα, non hab. Long–Sedley ‖ [20] ὅσα … γε Mau prob. Lachenaud : ὅσα δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς PG prob. Diels : den Leuten und der Gottheit Q ‖ ἡμῖν PBG : den Leuten Q ‖ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς om. PB(II,III) ‖ [21] φαντάσματα … ταῦτα om. PB(I) del. Diels Mau Lachenaud ‖ καὶ φαντάσματα PBQ : om. PG ‖ [22] κατὰ … εἶδος PB : κατὰ γένος καὶ κατ᾽ εἶδος νοήματα PG ‖ [22–24] ὥσπερ … λέγεται om. PG ‖ [22] στατῆρες PB : Drachmen Q ‖ [23] ὑπάρχει PB(I,II) : ὑπάρχειν PB(III) ‖ ⟨καὶ⟩ add. Diels prob. Mau Lachenaud ‖ στατῆρες PB : Drachmen Q ‖ πλοίων PB(I,II) Diels prob. Mau Lachenaud : πλοίου PB(III)Q(ut vid.), Schiffsmiete an einen Seemann Q ‖ und Drachmen post δηνάρια add. Q ‖ [24] λέγεται PB(I,III) : λέγονται PB(II)

Testes primi: Traditio ps.Plutarchi: Papyrus Antinoopolis fr. 4 verso (~ P §1.16–17) εννο]η̣ μ̣ [α] φ̣α̣ν̣[τασμα] [διανοιας λογικου ζ]ω̣ου το γαρ φ[αν] [τασμα επειδαν λογικ]η προσπιπτ̣[η ψυ] [χη τοτε εννοημα καλ]ειται ειλη[φος ps.Galenus HPh c. 92 (~ tit.) Πῶς γίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ νόησις καὶ ὁ κατὰ διάθεσιν λογισμός (text Diels). 92.1 (~ P1[3–5]) οἱ Στωικοί φασιν· ὅταν ἄνθρωπος γένηται, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ χάρτην εὔεργον εἰς ἀπογραφήν· εἰς τοῦτο οὖν μία ἑκάστη τῶν διανοιῶν αἰσθήσεις ἐναπογράφει τῆς αὑτοῦ φαντασίας. 92.2 (~ P3[8–9]) 4 ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνῆμαι φαντασιῶν γένωνται, τότε φαμὲν ἔχειν ⟨ἐμπειρίαν⟩. ἐμπειρία γάρ ἐστιν ὁμοειδῶν φαντασιῶν πλῆθος.

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liber 4 caput 11 92.3 (~ P4[10–12]) τῶν δ᾽ ἐννοιῶν ⟨αἱ⟩ μὲν φυσικῶς γίγνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους καὶ οὐ τεχνικῶς, αἱ δὲ δι᾽ ἡμετέρας ἐπιμελείας καὶ διδασκαλίας. αὗται δὲ καὶ ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται μόναι καὶ προλήψεις· 92.4 (~ P5[14–15]) ὁ δὲ λόγος, καθ᾽ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοί, ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι μὲν λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα. 92.5 (~ P6[16–18]) τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι νόημα φαντασίας, διάνοια λογικοῦ ζῴου. τὸ γὰρ φάντασμα ἐπειδὰν λογικῇ προσπίπτῃ ψυχῇ, ἐννόημα καλεῖται εἰληφὸς τοὔνομα παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ· 92.6 (~ P7[19–22]) διόπερ ὅσα τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις προσπίπτει, φαντάσματα μόνον ἐστίν, ὅσα δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, ταῦτα *** κατὰ γένος καὶ κατ᾽ εἶδος νοήματα. Loci Aetiani: §1[1–12] A 1.6 [5–19] ἔσχον δ᾽ ἔννοιαν τούτου (sc. τοῦ θείου) πρῶτον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ἐμφαινομένων προσλαμβάνοντες· … καλὸς δ᾽ ὁ κόσμος· δῆλον δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ χρώματος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ἀστέρων ποικιλίας. … καὶ τὸ χρῶμα δὲ καλόν· κυανώσει γὰρ κέχρωσται, ὃ πορφύρας μέν ἐστι μελάντερον στίλβουσαν δ᾽ ἔχει τὴν ποιότητα· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν τῷ τῆς χροιᾶς συντόνῳ διακόπτον τηλικαύτην ἀέρος σύστασιν ἐκ τοσούτων διαστημάτων θεωρεῖται. §1[6–7] A 4.8.7 ⟨οἱ⟩ Στωικοὶ τήνδε τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ἐντὸς ἁφὴν προσαγορεύουσι, καθ᾽ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα. A 4.12[3–6] ἐπειδὰν δι᾽ ὄψεως θεωρῶμέν τι λευκόν, ἔστι πάθος τὸ ἐγγεγενημένον διὰ τῆς ὁράσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· καὶ ⟨κατὰ⟩ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἰπεῖν ἔχομεν, ὅτι ὑπόκειται λευκὸν κινοῦν ἡμᾶς. §1[10–13] A 1.10.5 οἱ ⟨δὲ⟩ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωικοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν. §1[14–18] A 5.20.3 Ἀναξαγόρας πάντα τὰ ζῷα λόγον ἔχειν τὸν ἐνεργητικόν, τὸν δ᾽ οἱονεὶ νοῦν μὴ ἔχειν τὸν προφορικόν, τὸν λεγόμενον τοῦ νοῦ ἑρμηνέα. al. A 4.12[18–19] φάντασμα δ᾽ ἐστίν, ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἑλκόμεθα κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν. §1[14–15] A 5.23.1 Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ ἄρχεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῆς τελειότητος περὶ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα, περὶ ἣν ὁ σπερματικὸς κινεῖται ὀρρός· τὰ γὰρ δένδρα ἄρχεται τότε τελειότητος, ὅταν ἄρχηται γεννᾶν τὰ σπέρματα, ἀτελῆ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ἄωρα καὶ ἄκαρπα ὄντα. A 5.23.2 Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα, καθ᾽ ἣν ἔννοια γίνεται καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ τῆς διδασκαλίας ἀρχή. §1[16–18] A 1.10.6 οἱ ⟨δὲ⟩ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωικοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν.

For an English translation of the Aëtian text see Volume 5.4

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Commentary A Witnesses The only witnesses for chs. 4.11 and 4.12 are PB and PQ, supported by PP with consecutive snippets for §1[16–17], and partly confirmed by PG. For this chapter G has included all but §1[6–7] and the final part from [22] ὥσπερ in his Epitome. Heading and text of S are lost, but since part of the heading of its companion chapter, 4.12, is preserved in the index of Photius, it is quite certain that originally it was also present in S. T as we have seen had no use for chapters after 4.7a. For its presence in A (Diels believed it had been added by P) see also above, Introduction to Book 4, section 5. There is no multiplicity of Placita lemmata in the usual sense of the word in our witnesses. The chapter is thus in fact monolemmatic, cf. below, section D(b). B Proximate Tradition and Sources (1) Proximate tradition. In the proximate tradition parallel accounts of concept formation according to the Stoics are provided by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius, cited below at section E(a) General texts, to which we may add the Epicurean account in Diogenes Laertius discussed below, section D(e), and cited at section E(b) General texts. Something is also found in the cousin writing of Nem, but the passage from NH c. 14, cited below (par acquit de conscience) at section E(a)§1[16–18], is rather distant from our chapter. On the other hand NH c. 12 contains a parallel to ch. 4.21.1 and begins with a backward glance at NH c. 6, which is parallel to ch. 4.12, which in its turn is a sort of continuation of the present chapter. The parallels with Ptolemy’s On the Criterion and Hegemonikon §12, an account conforming to mainstream opinion (Long 1998), show that Stoic view of concept formation is also widely taken into account by others. (2) Sources. Direct provenance from a Stoic source, as Diels DG 61 already surmised, is virtually certain because ch. 4.11 is entirely in oratio recta (‘The Stoics say’), and with the exception of the introductory phrase (‘Chrysippus says that these four are different from one another’) the companion piece ch. 4.12 is in oratio recta too. Oratio recta is comparatively rare in the Placita. As intermediary source we may suppose a Stoic handbook, or one containing Stoic doctrine, just as is the case for chs. 4.12, 4.15 and 4.21. In this context the verbal first persons plural §1[8] ‘we say’ (φαμέν) and §1[14] ‘we are called’ (προσαγορευόμεθα) and the personal pronoun §1[21] ‘(to) us’ (ἡμῖν), contrast significantly with the descriptive verbal third persons §1[3] ‘he has’ ἔχει, §1[5] ‘he transcribes’ (ἐναπογράφεται) and §1[7] ‘they have’ (ἔχουσιν). Interesting is also the difference

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between ‘we say’, that is, we teachers, philosophers, Stoics on the one hand, and ‘we are called’, that is: ‘we humans’ on the other, the possession of logos being a defining trait of being human as well as divine according to Stoic doctrine, as is also expressed by the phrase §1[20] ‘to the gods and to us’ (τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἡμῖν). The parallels show that this terminology and these notions had become ingredients of a philosophical koine. See also further below ch. 4.12, at Commentary B. C Chapter Heading A long, detailed and precise heading, focused on the question type of cause. For the dialectical aspect of the question word see above, ch. 1.1, Commentary C, and for headings containing the formula πῶς γίνεται (or γίνονται): (‘how do/does x come to be’) see above, ch. 1.4 at Commentary C. The heading also adverts us to ingredients lacking in the text of P’s excerpt. This is the only case of the formula in Book 4, but there are a further nine instances in Book 5, indicating a strong interest in causal explanation. PB’s text is confirmed by PG and PQ. This time there is not even (part of) a heading in S, though he has a partial one for the heading of ch. 4.12. D Analysis a Context Chapter 4.11 is the first of two paired chapters dealing with aspects of exclusively Stoic views on concept formation, sensation, and thought, so not set off against those of other philosophers. That they belong together, though A in his usual scholastic manner has distributed the contents over different chapters, is also clear from parallel accounts of concept formation for which see below, at section D(e). The lack of references to views ascribed to others is unusual, though there are other cases of chapters devoted to a single doctrine only, e.g. Atomist doctrine in ch. 1.4, or Stoic in chs. 4.15 and 4.21. Our two chapters follow on after chs. 4.9–10, which deal in the standard Aëtian way with multiple views concerning the issues of what sensation and sense-objects are, and of how many senses there are. They are followed by chs. 4.13–20, devoted to varieties of views concerned with the individual senses, and to views on issues connected with these individual senses, namely the nature of mirror images (4.14), of darkness (4.15), and of voice (4.19–20). The two chapters 4.11 and 4.12 are in part different from each other, because the meaning of the crucial word φάντασμα in ch. 4.11 is different from that in ch. 4.12. In this way we are perhaps made aware of a difference of views among Stoics whom we cannot identify further here. Compare e.g. ch. 1.14.5–6, where Cleanthes is ‘the only one among the Stoics’ to hold that the shape of fire is conical. The contrast may have pleased the com-

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piler of the Placita, since it agrees with the genre’s penchant for diaphonia, and thus may have favoured the inclusion of the chapters in the collection in this format. Diels DG 61 rejected chs. 4.11–12 out of hand as foreign to the original polylemmatic doxographical tradition and methodology, and solved what he saw as the problem of their presence by arguing their provenience from a Stoic source. We, however, see the presence of these items as a conscious effort to improve and upgrade the account by including in the texte vivant a substantial (and for us today indispensable) account of Stoic views after the general chapters on sense perception and before those on the individual senses, all of which provide less information on the Stoics. So here too we are faced with the insertion of other material in an exposition that by and large follows an originally Aristotelian pattern, just as is the case of ch. 4.5 on the regent part (see M–R 2.1.37, 39, 147–148). For parallels with and differences from the Stoic doxography in Diogenes Laertius V.P. Book 7 see above, Introduction to Book 4, section 5. b Number–Order of Lemmata There is no need to divide this chapter into numbered lemmata, though Diels did so (as with §1 of ch. 1.7). We are dealing with a single name-label and a single doctrine. We have divided this over eight unnumbered sections to help follow the complicated argument. c Rationale–Structure of Chapter In the absence of a plurality of views there is no diaeretic and/or diaphonic structure. The account describes and causally explains ontogenetic processes and their outcome, and cites the definitions of several important terms: §1[9] ἐμπειρία, [12–13] ἔννοια and προλῆψις as distinguished from each other, and [16– 22] ἐννοῆμα and φαντάσμα as both different from each other and to some extent convergent. These definitions are perfect and sectarian ((as opposed to nominal or conceptual definitions, see above, ch. 1.9, at Commentary D(d)), and describe the individuality of these general concepts by means of individual examples. By way of a conclusion this peculiar situation is illustrated by a typically Stoic simile. d

Further Comments General Points (1) This account of cognitive ontogenesis seems to mirror that of cognitive phylogenesis. Little is known of a Stoic Kulturentstehungslehre, but something is about their view of the origin of language from ‘primary sounds’, or ‘words’

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(πρωταὶ φωναί, Origen C.C. 1.24; cunabula verborum, Augustine De dial. c. 6.10.9) and the development of further vocabulary from these through e.g. ‘proximity’ (vicinitas), or ‘resemblance’ (similitudo), or ‘transfer’ (abusio), i.e. varieties of analogy, or through ‘contrast’ (contrarium, all in Aug. De dial. c. 6). The relation between these ‘words from the cradle’ and those in such ways derived from them is analogous to that of the relation between ‘natural’ concepts and those produced by our ‘teaching and instruction’. For well-founded suggestions in this direction see Allan (2005) 15–17, 23–30, for the texts below section E(b)§1[6– 15]. A parallel for the distinction between the two kinds of concepts is found in the two kinds of perception admitted by Diogenes of Babylon, namely ‘natural’ (αὐτοφυής) and ‘scientific’ (ἐπιστημονικός) perception; see section E(b)§1[10– 13]. (2) As to sensation the emphasis is on the receptive side of the process, unlike in ch. 4.21. (3) The chapter heading promises more than the text of the chapter delivers, for we are not told how a sensation comes about, or what is the logos we acquire. In our text no other ‘manner’ follows after the ‘first (or: primary) manner of registration’ of §1[6], which is of a particular type of sense object and so instantiates physical preconceptions. Scholars have debated whether the ‘memories’ of §1[8] represent a further such manner. Pace Long–Sedley (1987) 2.241 we believe that this is not the case. §1[10–11] speaks of ‘aforesaid ways’ (plural), but only one way has so far been mentioned and described, so a second way of primary concept formation has been the victim of epitomization. §1[14– 15] fails to tell us that the reason, or speech, mentioned there is not just reason in general but the logos endiathetos announced in the heading: further proof of abridgement. For what follows see also Mansfeld (2013b). As is clear from the examples provided at §1[6–7], this first, or primary, manner is actualized through each of the individual senses, and pertains to external objects and their sense data: colours, sounds, smells and so on (cf. also ch. 4.12.1[5–8]). This leaves room for a manner of registration that does not occur via the individual senses but through the oikeiosis (‘appropriation’) of the psycho-corporeal person as a whole: the ‘inner touch, according to which we are also aware of ourselves’, to cite ch. 4.8.7 (at this earlier chapter see also Commentary D(d) §7, and the texts there cited at section E(b)§7). The parallel passage on (Stoic) concept-formation from Ptolemy cited below section E(b) General texts, includes a reference to inner perception. Also see the passage on self-awareness and oikeiosis in Stobaeus’ Ethical Doxography A, cited ibid. Note that the Stoic Hierocles, El.Eth. col. 1.44–46 Bastianini–Long, argues against ‘slow-witted opponents who believe that sensation has only been given by nature to the living being for awareness in relation to external objects, and

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not also in relation to that of itself’ (δοκοῦσι γὰρ τὴν α