Albania and China: A study of an Unequal Alliance [1 ed.] 0813372305, 9780813372303

Table of contents :
First chapter: a historical background of Albania's search for security in light of its Small Power status.
Second chapter: evaluates the main determinants of the formation of the Albanian-Chinese alliance.
Third and forth chapter: The evolution of the alliance the impact of ideology and systemic factors on alliance cohesion.
Fifth chapter: Albanian-Chinese economic and military interaction and its effect on alliance maintenance.
Final chapter: recounts the emergence of political and ideological differences between Albania and China and surveys the developments that led to the disintegration of the alliance.

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8511483

B ib e ra j, Elez

ALBANIA AND C HINA 1962-1978: UNEQUAL ALLIANCE

A CASE S TU D Y OF A BILATERAL

Columbia University

University Microfilms International

Ph.D.

1985

300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

Copyright 1985 by Biberaj, Elez All Rights Reserved

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A LBANIA A N D CHINA 1962-1978: A CASE STUDY OF A BILATERAL UNEQUAL ALLIANCE

Elez Biberaj

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 1985

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ABSTRACT A L B A N I A AND CHINA 1962-1978: A CASE STUDY OF A BILATERAL UNEQUAL ALLIANCE Elez Biberaj A

The main thesis of this study is that a Small Power, such as Albania, w i t h a potentially significant ideological, political,

and strategic contribution tc the competition

between Great Powers,

may be able to extract considerable

concessions from a prospective Great Power ally,

and

manipulate the latter more effectively than vice versa. A l b a n i a ’s alliance with China is evaluated in terms of such factors as nationalism, and prestige,

ideology,

security,

foreign aid,

status

and personal power considerations

of the Albanian governing elite.

This study shows that

Albania extracted considerable concessions from China and that the benefits of the alliance for Albania outweighed the costs. partner,

Although Tirane was emphatically the weaker

the scope of China's decision-making participation

in Albania was insignificant.

Thus Albania was not a mere

client but a full-fledged partner in the alliance.

Even

when the apparent costs of the alliance for the PRC outweighed the benefits, Albania enjoyed the benefits of the alliance because China was unwilling to accept the political losses attendant upon Tirane's defection.

Albania's

defiance of China and the breakup of the alliance show that

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Small Powers have more room for maneuver than is often assumed. The first chapter provides a historical background of Albania's search for security in light of its Small Power status.

The second chapter evaluates the main determinants

of the formation of the Albanian-Chinese alliance. The evolution of the alliance and the impact of ideology and systemic factors on alliance cohesion are analyzed in the next two chapters.

The fifth chapter deals

with Albanian-Chinese economic and military interaction and its effect on alliance maintenance. The final chapter recounts the emergence of political and ideological differences between Albania and China and surveys the developments that led to the disintegration of the alliance.

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0

1985

ELEZ BIBERAJ ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

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TABLE

INTRODUCTION

OF

C O N TEN TS

..............................................

1

Chapter I. ALBANIA: A SMALL P OWER IN SEARCH OF S E C U R I T Y ..........................................

18

Alliance With Yugoslavia ..................... Alliance With the Soviet U n i o n ..............

27 41

THE FORMATION OF THE ALBANIAN-CHINESE A L L I A N C E ..........................................

51

II.

Alliance Determinants ....................... Albanian and Chinese Mutual P e r c e p t i o n s ................................... The Nature of the A l l i a n c e III.

ALBANIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS 1962-69

............

53 69 75 81

The Consolidation of the A l l i a n c e ......... 84 Relations During the Cultural R e v o l u t i o n ........................................ 106 The Invasion of Czechoslovakia and the A l l i a n c e ..................................... 117 IV.

V.

ALBANIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS 1970-76

............

129

Changing Foreign Policy Objectives ......... Sino-American Rapprochement and the A l l i a n c e ............. Albania's Foreign Policy Restructuring ................................

129

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERACTION Economic Interaction Military Interaction

138 151

............

173

......................... .........................

173 195

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IV.

ALLIANCE DISINTEGRATION

.......................

213

Prelude to the B r e a k .......................... 213 The B r e a k ........................................ 227 C O N C L U S I O N ....................................................251 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....................................

ii

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260

A CKNO W LEDG EM ENTS

In the preparation of this study,

I owe a great debt

to Professors Thomas P. Bernstein and Joseph Rothschild for their generous support and advice at various stages of my work.

Murray M. W e i s s read an earlier draft of this

m a nuscript and made v a l u a b l e comments and suggestions. Special thanks are e x pressed to my b r o t h e r s and sisters, who read my manuscript,

commented u p o n it, and thereby

contributed significantly to improving

the final version.

I owe a special debt to m y wife, Kadire, patience during the preparation of this

for her remarkable study.

Any study dealing with a subject as elusive and imperfectly understood as Albania's fore i g n policy cannot be entirely free of errors;

for the ones found in this study,

I alone am accountable.

111

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To my parents Hysen and Ajshe Biberaj who sacrificed so much that their children m a y have a better future.

Prindeve te mi Hysen dhe Ajshe Biberaj te cilet sakrifikuan aq shume ge femijte e tyre te kene nje te ardhshme m e te mire.

iv

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IN T R O D U C T IO N

A bilateral unequal alliance is one of the most striking features of international politics and one of the most frequently used instruments of statecraft by which Small Powers have pursued their foreign policy goals and objectives. within

The behavior of Small Powers toward and

such an alliance has been an intriguing question

for students of international relations. A l t h o u g h a common phenomenon in international politics, the bilateral unequal alliance has not been the subject of extensive study from the perspective of a Small Power. the scholarly literature,

In

this type of an alliance has

generally been treated only in passing,1 and has been considered as the least desirable alliance for a Small Power.

The prevailing view among scholars is that the

Small Power in a bilateral unegual alliance is likely to

1. An exception to this general rule is George T. Yu's study, China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania (New York Praeger P u b l i s h e r s , 1975)

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2 be dominated by the Great Power, cannot expect to play a significant role in alliance decision-making, result,

and as a

its sovereignty and independence are likely to

suffer.

A Small Power in an alliance with a Great Power

is thus considered a satellite rather than a freely functioning ally. In general,

Small Powers are faced with political,

economic and military constraints,

and limited alternatives.

Their subordinate position in the international system is a fact of everyday life under which they must function.

Often

a Small Power may have no alternative but to ally wit h a Great Power, on terms generally dictated by the latter.

But

while the bilateral unequal alliance may not be the ideal alliance for a Small Power, exaggerated.

its disadvantages have been

A Small Power may play a role out of proportion

with its status,

capabilities,

and contribution to the

alliance. Under certain international conditions and especially during

times of acute G reat Power competition,

with a potentially significant ideological,

a Small Power

political and

strategic contribution to the competition may be able to extract considerable concessions from a prospective Great Power ally.

Despite

the discrepancy in power and resources

between a Small Power and a Great Power,

the former may

actually be able to manipulate the latter more effectively

2. Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 116-24

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than vice versa.

3

The Small Power may also profit from what

Robert L. Rothstein has called "reverse potentiality." Because of "the propaganda and political losses attendant on admitting failure,"

a Great Power may continue to support

its Small Power ally even if the alliance "seems to perform 4

very few functions." The subject of this study is a bilateral unequal alliance between the smallest and the biggest communist •k

states:

the People's Socialist Republic of Alba n i a

and the People's Republic of China

(PRC).

primarily from the Albanian viewpoint,

(PSRA)

It examines,

the interaction

between the two countries, w hich were characterized by a basic incongruity of interests and were separated by great geographical distance, differences, capabilities.

profound historical and cultural

and great disparity in economic and military It analyzes the rationale behind Albania's

use of a bilateral unequal alliance as a strategy to pursue and secure its national objectives, led to the creation, maintenance, Tirane-Beijing alliance.

and the factors which

and disintegration of the

The focus will be on the

multifaceted relations between Albania and China as they

3. Christopher C. Shoemaker and John Spanier, PatronClient State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984) , p~! 8 4.

Rothstein,

A l l iances and Small P o w e r s , p.

119

* With the promulgation of the 1976 Constitution, the Albanian state changed its name from a People's Republic to a People's Socialist Republic. Throughout this study, the latter name is used.

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developed over a 16-year period

(1962-78), on how these

relations were affected by domestic and international developments,

and how T i r a n e 's policy toward Beijing

evolved in the context of overall Albanian policy. Through a cost-benefit analysis,

focusing on the

relationship between Tirane's political allegiance to Beijing and the latter's economic, military and political assistance to the PSRA,

an attempt will be mad e to show

that Albania extracted considerable concessions from China and that the benefits of the alliance for Albania outweighed the costs. Altho u g h there is a rich literature on Small Powers 5

and alliances,

there is no generally acceptable definition

of either concept.

Scholars have tended to develop

individual definitions,

corresponding to their theoretical

designs and research interests. study,

For the purpose of this

Rothstein's definition of a Small Power has been

adopted.

According

to Rothstein,

... a Small Power is a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of o ther states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability

5. Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959); Rothstein, Alliances and Small P o w e r s ; George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968); and Omer De Raeymaeker, et a l . , Small Powers in Alignment (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974)

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5

to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics. (6)

Albania represents a classic example of an insecure, alliance-prone state, which clearly fits Rothstein's definition of a Small Power. Balkan country,

It is an underdeveloped

with an area of 11,096 square miles and a

population in 1984 of about three million. independence,

Throughout its

Albania has not been in a position to ensure

its security by its own means,

and has had to rely on

other states or favorable international developments for its protection.

It occupies a highly strategic position,

and has been a tempting prize for any Great Power interested in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Power,

As many a Small

the PSRA has employed alliances as instruments of

statecraft to increase its power, obtain foreign assistance, enhance its prestige,

status and interests,

deter hostile

neighbors and other real or potential enemy states,

and seek

the cooperation of Great Powers to maintain or restore the balance of power affecting it. Alliance studies have generally dealt with traditional

6. Rothstein, Alliances and Small P o w e r s , p. 29. For other definitions of Small Powers, see: Annette Baker Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969," International J o u r n a l , 24, no. 4 (19 6 9 ) r PP* 751-52; Robert 0. Keohane, "T L i l i p u t i a n s ' Small States in International Politics," International Orga n i z a t i o n , 23, no. 2 (1969), p. 296; David Vital, The Inequality- of States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 87; and R. Vayrynen, "On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status," Cooperation and Conflict, 6, no. 2 (1971), pp. 91-102

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war and military alliances.

This has been reflected in

conventional alliance definitions,

which stress commitment

and joint action in the security area and the requirement of a treaty spelling out the functions,

nature and duration

7

of an alliance.

Such definitions are too restrictive and

of limited applicability because they exclude a wide range of alliances. Modern alliances,

especially bilateral unequal alliances,

have been characterized by a great emphasis on cooperation and joint action in the economic,

political,

and cultural

fields, and a m o v e m e n t away from the traditional focus on "war functions" area.

p

and the overall commitment in the security

An alliance,

therefore,

need not necessarily be a

military alliance nor be bound by a formal alliance

treaty.

Any special tie between two states whose foreign policies are closely coordinated over a considerable period of time, even though this is done in the absence of an explicit political or m i l i t a r y treaty, alliance relationship.

is tantamount to a formal

As George Liska has suggested,

a

close identification of two states in the contemporary international environment can be considered as a serious

7. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 17; Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John W iley and Sons, 1973), pp. 3-4; and John G. Gross, "Towards a Definition of Alliances," M o d e r n W o r l d , no. 6 (1968), pp. 29-36 8.

Yu,

China's African P o l i c y , p. xiv

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commitment,

tantamount to an outright alliance in a more 9

tolerant international environment. For the purposes of this study,

a bilateral unequal

alliance has been defined as a relationship between a Small Power and a Great Power,

characterized by the following:

recognition of a common threat; the mutually perceived threat; parallel foreign policies;

cooperation in dealing with the pursuit of joint or

and the expectation that political,

economic and military assistance will be rendered by alliance members to one another.

Although Albania and China did not

sign a formal alliance treaty,

their close relationship was

perceived by both sides as well as by other states as an alliance. A Small Power's decision to embark upon an alliance policy is determined by the important functions performed by an alliance as compared to other policy options.

Assuming

that a Small Power's policy makers do have a choice,

the

decision to align or to adopt an alternative policy option, such as isolation,

neutrality and active nonalignment,

will

depend on w hich of these options contributes most in the enhancement and improvement of the state's position

10 internationally,

regionally and domestically.

Options

open to a Small Power are not as clear-cut as they might seem to an outside observer.

9. 10. p . 23

In general,

Small Powers are

Liska, Alliances and the Third W o r l d , p. De Raeymaeker,

3

et a l ., Small Powers in A l i g n m e n t ,

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faced with limited policy alternatives.

To a great degree,

their options depend on the type and structure of the international system,

and changes in the latter directly

affect the choices open to national decision-makers. In deciding to join a bilateral unequal alliance,

a

Small Power's policy makers must decide on the choice of an ally.

The costs and benefits of the alliance must be kept

in mind.

A prospective ally should be in a position to add

to the combined strength of the alliance, m ust have at least complementary,

if not identical,

interests,

and should be

willing to employ its resources for the benefit of the alliance as a whole. In an attempt to expand their influence and for reasons of strategic,

political,

and economic objectives, Great

Powers have always been attracted by Small Powers and have attempted,

not always successfully,

to dominate and employ

them as pawns in their global policies. be asked,

Why,

then,

it may

does a Small Power align with a Great Power?

It

is generally recognized that Small Power alliances are determined by several inter-related factors: security,

stability,

assistance,

status,

concern for

economic and military

and i d e o l o g y . ^

Perhaps the mos t important factor in alliance formation is concern for security.

The quest for survival as an

independent and sovereign entity is the uppermost thing in

11.

I bid., pp.

23-24

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9

the minds of Small Power national policy makers.

Most Small

Powers feel that they cannot provide for their security by relying only on their own resources,

and therefore need the

addition of the power of other states to face the threat to their security,

which may be real or imagined.

security dilemma,

Faced with a

many Small Powers align with Great Powers

with the aim of deterring a potential aggressor. an alliance,

by its very existence,

deterring an aggression.

Often such

is sufficient in

If deterrence fails,

then it is

hoped that the combined strength of the alliance will result in victory over the aggressor. An alliance is especially important for Small Power regimes that have problems with internal stability. many countries,

In

especially the new non-Western states,

regime

stability may depend heavily on variables outside the domestic system.

As De Raeymaeker notes,

the decision to

align,

... is very much related to /decisionmakers'_7 quest for the security of tenure. Some governments may stay or fall by their identification w ith a Great Power or a coalition. (12)

Most,

but not all, Small Powers have limited economic

and m i l i t a r y resources,

and are dependent on foreign aid

for their development.

Economic factors may be decisive in

12.

I b i d ., p. 24

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10

determing alignment,

dealignment or realignment.

Liska

points out that alliances may entail outright subsidy or other form of material support.

13

John G. Gross has

suggested that an alliance member will attempt to gain the most it can from an alliance,

and will withdraw from it if

it can get a better deal in other alliances or outside alliances altogether.

14

A Small Power's role,

status, and prestige in the

international arena depend to a great extent on its alliance identification.

An alliance with a Great Power might accord

a Small Power high recognition and influence,

and enable it

to play a role out of proportion with its size and capabilities.

Such recognition is perceived as enhancing a

Small Power's security. In the theoretical literature on alliances,

there is

abundant evidence on the importance of the above mentioned factors in alliance formation and maintenance.

However,

there is widespread disagreement and conflicting evidence on the role of ideology.

Some scholars maintain that a

common ideology adds to the durability of an alliance and is essential for alliance cohesion,

while others maintain

13. George Liska, Nations in Alliance; the Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 37 14. John G. Gross, "Some Theoretic Characteristics of Economic and Political Coalitions," Journal of Conflict R e s o l u t i o n . 11, no. 2 (1967), p. 184. See also: M ancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Stati s t i c s , 48, no. 3 (1966), pp. 266-79

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11 that ideology is only of marginal importance to an alliance. Nevertheless, alliances,

ideology may play an important role in certain

especially those between communist states,

15

by

emphasizing common interests of alliance members and rationalizing grounds for alliance.

According to Liska,

ideology

... more than anything else makes alliances into social institutions. As a handmaid of action, ideology feeds on selective memory of the past and outlines a program for the future. A typical alliance ideology will define the basis and, by implication, the limits of alliance solidarity; it will be formulated so as to add incentive to joint action and to screen intra-alliance strains and splits. (16)

The formation, maintenance and disintegration of the Albanian-Chinese alliance will be evaluated in terms of the above m e ntioned factors.

This study is not designed as an

historical survey of Albanian-Chinese relations;

rather it

is intended as an effort to examine the nature of Tirane's interaction pattern with Beijing.

Chapter I provides

15. For an analysis of the role of ideology in alliances between communist states, see Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Future of Ideology in Alliance Systems," Journal of International A f f a i r s , 24, no. 2 (1971), pp. 238-65; Terry P. Hopmann, "International Conflict and Cohesion in the Communist System," International Studies Q u a r t e r l y , 11, no. 3 (1967) , pp. 212-36; and Nish Jamgotch, "Alliance Management in Eastern Europe: the New Type of International Relations," World P o l i t i c s , 27, no. 3 (1975), PP. 405-29 16.

Liska,

Nations in Alliance,

p. 61

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12 a historical background of Albania's struggle for survival as an independent entity and its search for security in light of its Small Power status.

It analyzes the main determinants

of Alban i a n foreign policy and reviews developments prior to the formation of the alliance with China. Chapter II deals with the formation of the alliance. Among the basic questions addressed are:

What was the

rationale behind the Tirane-Beijing alliance? m ain determinants of alliance formation?

What were the

What were the

alliance goals and objectives of Albania and China respectively? The evolution of the alliance is analyzed in the next two chapters.

Chapter III surveys Tirane-Beijing political

relations during the years 1962-69, while chapter IV deals with the period 1970-76.

Both chapters analyze the impact

of ideology and systemic factors on alliance cohesion. focus is on two central questions:

The

To what extent did

common ideology serve as a cohesive force in the alliance, and how detrimental were the emergence of contentious ideological issues to the existence of the alliance? was

What

the impact on alliance cohesion of a different perception

by Albania and China of the nature and

intensity of threat in

the international system directed against them? Albanian-Chinese economic and military interactions and

their effect on alliance maintenance are analyzed in

chapter V. Chapter VI

deals wit h the disintegration of the

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13

alliance,

and recounts the emergence of political,

ideological, China.

and economic differences between Albania and

This chapter examines national and international

developments that caused a disenchantment between Tirane and Beijing.

It surveys the developments that led to

Beijing's cessation of economic and military aid to Tirane and the disintegration of the alliance in July 197 8. The performance of the alliance will be evaluated by its effectiveness throughout the period of its duration, distribution of influence, Elite interaction,

trade,

consultation,

and cohesion.

and economic and m i l i t a r y aid

will be used as indicators of alliance interaction. Cohesion has been defined as "the ability of alliance partners to agree upon goals,

strategy and tactics,

coordinate activities directed toward those ends."

and to

17

It

will be m e a sured by a model of inter-personal communication, according to which similar evaluations by alliance members, A and B, of the same object, their relationship,

X, enhances the cohesion in

while a dissimilar evaluation of the

same object produces a negative relationship between A and B.

18

Thus,

a common p e rception of an external enemy, event,

and issue by Albania and China will be considered as an indicator of alliance cohesion, while a difference in perception will be considered as an indicator of Albanian-

17. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International A l l i a n c e s , p. 167 18.

I b i d . , p.

237

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14

Chinese divergence or conflict. This model, as Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan have 19 pointed out, has its limitations. A common perception about a particular event or object facilitates alliance cohesion about that event or object, but does not tell anything about other events or objects.

The members of an

alliance may develop a common perception about a particular object for entirely different reasons, and thus common perceptions do not always indicate cohesion.

Despite these

limitations, however, this is a useful model in measuring alliance cohesion.

In order to eliminate or reduce the

chance of error, the range of comparisons of Albanian and Chinese perceptions has been expanded to include a wide range of international events and issues. Comparison of Albanian and Chinese ideological stands on such issues as revolution, national liberation movements, imperialism, peaceful coexistence, revisionism, the superpowers, military blocs, and the Third World will serve as the basis for making judgments about the ideological similarity or dissimilarity between the two allies.

This

will be compared over a period of time, pointing out the congruity or incongruity in Albanian and Chinese positions and views.

Changes in views between the two countries will

be correlated with changes in their actions. The impact of systemic factors, i.e., changes in the

19.

Ibid., pp. 238-39

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15 nature and intensity

of threat in the international system,

on alliance cohesion will be measured by using "conflict" and "detente" environments-

as indicators of high an d low threat external "Conflict" will refer to an increased

perception of threat,

and will be indicated by such actions

by the members of the alliance toward other nations or alliances,

as increase in tensions,

m a s s media attacks,

etc.

"Detente," on the other hand, will b e used to refer to a decreased perception of threat,

and w i l l be indicated by a

relaxation of tensions wit h former enemies, contacts,

cooperation in political,

cultural fields,

increase in

military,

economic and

etc.

Albania's role in the alliance w i l l be determined by the importance and attention given to it by China.

This

will be measured by the extent to w h i c h Tirane was consulted in formulating common policies,

and Beijing's commitment to

policies which were of vital importance to Albania,

but were

not of special importance to China. Elites in communist states tend to use esoteric communications to air their differences.

An attempt has

been made to collect such evidence b y carefully screening A lbanian and Chinese official doc u m e n t s for polemical language, events,

divergent emphasis given to particular issues and

omissions,

distortions,

d i f f e r e n t interpretations,

and the patterns of response to p a r t i c u l a r issues and events. The Albanian and Chinese communist parties exert heavy control over the media,

and this s t u d y recognizes the

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16

propagandistic nature and selective character of news dissemination in both countries.

Furthermore,

it has been

assumed that the material published in official sources had the approval of the higher party echelons and reflected the dominant view of decision-makers. This study is primarily based on official party and government statements, leaders,

speeches by Albanian and Chinese

radio broadcasts,

sources.

and accounts published in official

Extensive use was made of Albanian sources,

including party first secretary Enver Hoxha's reports and speeches,

selected works,

relations.

Hoxha's

and diary on Albanian-Chinese

two-volume diary,

Reflections on C h i n a ,

allegedly written from "day to day" as events unfolded but published in 1979, provides useful information on different aspects of Albanian-Chinese relations.

However,

the diary

lacks sufficient discussion and information on tremendously important issues and events and presents a highly biased interpretation of the alliance. that deals with China,

In his other major work

Imperialism and the R e v o l u t i o n ,

published in 1978, Hoxha gives an after-the-fact justification

for Tirane's alliance with Beijing.

Extensive use was also made of Chinese sources in translation,

such as

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

and Joint Publications Research Service translations on the PRC.

Additional pertinent information has been

gathered from Western studies and newspaper accounts on Tirane-Beijing relations.

In order

to keep the.

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17

footnotes manageable,

titles of

articles published in

foreign journals are given in English. While recognizing the limitations of the case study method,

lack of capacity for generalization,

it is hoped,

this study will,

contribute to a better understanding of the

position and role of a Small Power, bilateral unequal alliance,

such as Albania,

in a

and its use of such an alliance

as an instrument of foreign policy.

It is hoped that it

will shed some new light on the utility of such a type of an alliance for a Small Power.

Also,

the

findings of this study

m ay have implications for other alliances,

especially those

between communist countries. Last,

but not least in importance,

this study may

contribute toward a better understanding of Albania's foreign policy and its attempts to pursue and secure national objectives in light of its Small Power status.

Although the

smallest and the least developed of the East European c ommunist states,

the PSRA has played an important role in

the international communist system. foreign relations,

however,

The study of Albania's

has been largely neglected.

This

study attempts to fill an important gap in the study of Tirane's external relations.

However,

it is in no way

intended as a definitive study of Albanian-Chinese relations.

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CHAPTER I ALBANIA:

A SMALL POWER IN S E A R C H OF SECURITY

Albania's foreign policy under E nver Hoxha's regime has g one through different and turbulent phases and periodically has experienced dramatic shifts.

B e t w e e n 1945-78,

changed three m ajor partners: Yugoslavia, and China.

the PSRA

the Soviet Union,

It is quite unusual for an y state, and even more

so for a Small Power,

to change so m a n y allies within such a

relatively short span of time.

But such frequent

realignments represent an attempt by Albania to assert its autonomy and break out of a depen d e n c e relationship. Tirane's maver i c k behavior w i t h i n the international communist system cannot be a ppreciated without an understanding of the relationship b e t w e e n policy and general domestic concerns.

Albania's foreign

The PSRA is a small

state, whose primary preoccupation traditionally has been the preservation of its independence and territorial integrity.

This factor has to be seen in conjunction with

the communist regime's objectives of

-

attaining economic

18-

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19

self-sufficiency in as many sectors as possible and thus eliminating or reducing foreign dependence, decision-making autonomy,

preserving

and creating a new Marxist-

Leninist value system. The P S R A 1s foreign policy has been determined by several inter-related factors, historical experience, ideology, elite.

such as geographic position,

nationalism,

economic dependence,

and personal power considerations of the ruling

Albania occupies a highly strategic position on the

southern entrance to the Adriatic,

and has been a strategic

prize for any Great Power interested in dominating the Adriatic and the Mediterranean areas. traditional enemies —

Yugoslavia,

Greece,

combined with its military weakness, vulnerable to external pressures.

Close proximity to and Italy —

have made the PSRA

Traditionally,

Albania

has searched for a distant Great Power ally, which would protect it from more powerful neighbors,

and at the same

time, would not menace its independence. Historically,

the fate of Alba n i a has been one of

domination and perpetual insult by its neighbors, supported by the Great Powers.

usually

Albania has so many times

been dominated and subordinated by other powers,

that

concern for security and the preservation of its independence have been the major objectives of its foreign policy.^-

prior

1. For a general survey of developments in Albania to World War II, see: J. Swire, Albania -- the Rise

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20

After nearly five c e nturies of Turkish occupation, Albania achieved its independence conditions. Albania's

in 1912 under m ost unusual

Serbia and M o n t e n e g r o annexed more than half of

territory -- including the province of Kosove,

which is considered by the Albanians as the cradle of their nationalism —

and more than forty percent of its people.

Greece annexed parts of southern Albania, province of £ameria,

including the

and also pressed territorial claims on

A l b a n i a ’s southern districts of G jirokaster and Korpe. There were m o r e Albanians outside than within Albania's territorial boundaries. At the 1913 London Conf e r e n c e of Ambassadors,

the

Great Powers recognized and g u aranteed Albania's independence,

and appointed a special commission to

demarcate its boundaries.

However,

the final boundaries

demarcated did not include within the boundaries of the Albanian state the territories occup i e d by its neighbors in 1912.

Thus,

Albania ha d the unusual distinction of

of a Kingdom (London: W i l l i a m s and N o r g a t e Ltd., 1929); Stavro Skendi, The A l b a n i a n National Aw a k e n i n g 1878-1912 (Princeton: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967), and The Political Evolution of Albania 1912-1944 (New York: M id - E u r o p e a n Studies Center, 1954); Vandeleur Robinson, A lbania's Road to Freedom (London: George Allen and Unwin L t d ., 1941); and the State University of Tirane, Historia e S h q i p e r i s e /The History of Albani§7, Vol. 2 (Tirane", 1965). For developments after 1945, see: Stavro Skendi, ed., A lbania (New York: Fre d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1958); Athanas Gegaj and Rexhep Krasniqi, A l b a n i a (New York: Assembly of Captive E u r o p e a n Nations, 1964); William E. Griffith, Albania and the S ino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M I T Press, 19 63) ; and Nicholas C. Pano, The People's Republic of Albania (Baltimore: The Johns H opkins P r e s s , 19 68)

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21

bordering,

on almost all its borders,

speaking people,

with its own,

Alban i a n ­

which by the principle of self-determination

should have been included within the borders of the Albanian 2 state. The Great Powers selected the G e r m a n Prince Wilhelm zu Wied as Albania's ruler. in March 1914,

Prince W i e d arrived in Albania

but was forced to flee

the country six months

later as a result of internal disturbances and the outbreak of World War I.

During the war, Alba n i a became a battleground

for the Great Powers, at one time being invaded by seven foreign armies.

Although its independence had been guaranteed

by the Great Powers,

the 1915 London Secret Treaty provided

for the partition of Albania by Italy, Yugoslavia, In 1919,

and Greece.

Rome and Athens concluded the Tittoni-Venizelos

Agreement,

calling for Albania's dismemberment.

Then at the

Paris Peace Conference, Albania's neighbors again put forth territorial claims.

However,

the P e a c e Conference rejected

these claims and Albania escaped a second dismemberment. Between 1920 and 1924, Albania experienced a period of acute political instability.

A t t e m p t s to lay the foundations

of a modern state failed because of a bitter struggle among different political factions.

In December 1924,

with assistance from Yugoslavia,

Ahmet Zogu,

o v e r t h r e w Bishop

Fan S. Noli's government that had c o m e to power six months

2. For an authoritative a n a lysis of the handling of the Albanian p r o b l e m by the Great Powers, see Arben Puto, Pavaresia Shqiptare dhe Diplomacia e Fuqive te Medha 1912-1914 /Albanian Independence and the Dip l o m a c y of the G reat Powers 1912-19147, (Tirane: "8 Nentori," 1978)

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22

earlier.

Zogu ruled Albania for fourteen years,

President,

and then as a self-proclaimed King.

first as He is

credited w ith providing stability to the country, and laying the foundations of a modern state. neutralize Yugoslavia and Greece, their ambitions toward Albania,

In order to

who made no secrets of

King Zog turned to Italy

for foreign assistance and protection.

But heavy dependence

on Rome paved the way for Italian penetration of Albania's domestic and foreign policies,

and finally led to its total

annexation in April 1939. Despite its partition in 1912, Albania was faced with an ever-present menace to its independence and territorial integrity and the prospect of further partition or dismemberment.

At the end of World War II, Greece again

put forth territorial claims on the districts of Gjirokaster and Korce.

Moreover,

partition of Albania.

Athens proposed a joint Greek-Yugoslav And during the period 1945-48, when

Albania had close relations with Yugoslavia, was severely endangered.

its independence

Albania came close to being

absorbed into the Yugoslav federation. Albania's highly turbulent and negative historical experience has given rise to a defensive nationalism. Perpetual insult by its neighbors, grievances,

combined with a sense of

have led Albanian policy makers

powerful and preferably distant allies,

to search for

with the belief

that only a friendly Great Power can protect Albania's independence and territorial integrity.

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23

The loss of Kosove and other Albanian-inhabited territories has left psychological scars on the Albanian nation, forging attitudes of xenophobia and a psychology of a besieged fortress.

Albanian minorities in neighboring

states have been denied the right to self-determination, and their national and human rights have been systematically violated.

The nationalist aspirations of the Albanian

nation remain unfulfilled.

The inability to achieve their

main national objective has been attributed by the Albanians to the hostile policies of their more powerful neighbors, supported by the Great Powers.

Thus, most foreign nations

have come to be perceived as essentially hostile or indifferent to Albania's national goals and wellbeing. This paranoic attitude toward the outside world has been reinforced by the Hoxha regime's obsession with internal and external enemies.

Although Albania's communist leaders deny

they are influenced by nationalism,

this factor has no doubt

been the most important determinant of Tirane's foreign policy. Chronic economic dependence has been another important determinant of Tirane's foreign policy.

Albania has always

been dependent on foreign assistance for its economic development.

However, foreign assistance has not been

disinterested or easy to obtain.

Economic dependence has

greatly limited Albania's foreign policy alternatives.

The

Albanian communist leaders, as their predecessors, have struggled with this dilemma ever since they came to power in

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24

194 4.

On October 17,

194 5,

Hoxha wa r n e d his countrymen

that,

In case we do not improve o u r economic sector, our obligations toward the people and the countries with w h i c h we have trade relations will be a c a u s e that will make us politically dependent, too. Let us never forget this fact, for the past has been bitter. (3)

Hoxha's fears were later confirmed by Albania's experience with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The PSRA's foreign policy has a l s o been influenced by ideology.

In its foreign and domestic policies,

Albanian Party of Labor

the ruling

(APL), has a d o p t e d a dogmatic

interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.

A l b a n i a has followed

a foreign policy rhetorically reminiscent of the Cold War era,

and in contrast to other communist states, has held

Stalin in high esteem.

The official propaganda has portrayed

the P SRA as the only truly socialist state in the world and defender of the purity of Marxism-Leninism. times,

the Tirane regime has employed

Although at

ideology "as a mask

for ancient historical factors, g e o g r aphical conditions, and 4 local pressures," there is ample evidence to suggest that

3. Enver Hoxha, Vepra /Works7, Frasheri," 1969), p. 153

Vol.

3 (Tirane:

"Naim

4. Paul Lendvai, Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkan^ (New York: Doubleday and Company, I n c ., 1969), p. 225

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25

ideology was a motive force in Albania's break with the Soviet Union and China,

as will be shown in this study.

Another factor in the PSRA's foreign policy has been the personal power considerations of its communist rulers.

Hoxha

ruled Albania with an iron hand, making it one of the most rigid and dictatorially controlled states in the world.

The

regime was characterized by a personalized pattern of power, with Hoxha maintaining a dominant position.

He was clearly

responsible for Albania's major foreign policy restructuring. Nepotism was practiced on a large scale, and the ruling elite — 1981 —

before Premier Mehmet Shehu's demise in December was closely inter-related by blood and intermarriage.

The primary objective of the regime has been to m a i ntain its power and control over the country, costs involved.

regardless of the human

Hoxha employed Stalinist methods in dealing

with potential or real opponents of his regime, former close associates.

including

It is estimated that between 1945

and 1975, more than 35,000 people were killed,

and another

40,000 sentenced to life imprisonment and concentration 5 camps. During the first two decades of its rule, Hoxha's regime was faced with stiff internal opposition and attempts from 6

outside to overthrow it.

The Yugoslavs,

from the outset of

5. Gjon Sinjonta, The Fulfilled Promise; A Documentary Account of Religious Persecution in Albania (Santa Clara, CA: H and P Composing Service-Printing, 1976) , p. 26 6. Julian Birch, "The Albanian Political Experience," Government and Opposition, 6, no. 3 (1971), pp. 361-80

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26

their encounters with Albanian communists during World War II, were distrustful of Hoxha, because of his intellectual and bourgeois background,

and attempted to replace him with

Kogi Xoxe, who was more amenable to their wishes. the Yugoslavs incited Hoxha's opponents,

After 1948,

and in 1951 formed an

organization composed of Albanian emigres in Yugoslavia, the publicly stated aim of overthrowing his regime.

with

In the

1950s,

the United States organized the Albanian opposition in

exile,

and occasionally sent in groups of infiltrators.

Apparently the Soviet Union, as it became evident

attempted to replace Hoxha

that he would side with the Chinese in

the Sino-Soviet conflict. Communist Party,

too,

At the 22nd Congress of the Soviet

held in 1961, Khrushchev openly called on the

Albanian people to overthrow Hoxha. h ostility toward Yugoslavia,

The PSRA's continued

the United States and the

S oviet Union, ma y in part be attributed to H o x h a ’s inherent m i s t r u s t of them.

Despite dramatic changes that have occurred

in the international arena, feel insecure.

Hoxha's regime continued to

This was reflected in periodic and

extensive purges involving prominent personalities. To sum up, Small Power,

the PSRA's foreign policy,

as that of m any a

has been determined by such inter-related factors

as geographic position, economic dependence, considerations.

historical experience,

ideology,

These are

and

nationalism,

its leaders' personal power

the main factors that have

determined Albania's alignments and realignments. are important in influencing

While all

the making of Tirana's foreign

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27

policy,

nationalism seems

to predominate over all other

factors.

-I-

Alliance With Yugoslavia 1945-48

7 The Tirane-Belgrade alliance

wil l be analyzed in detail,

because the issue of Yugoslavia has had an important bearing on the development of the post-194 8 Albanian foreign policy. The attitude of the PSRA's future allies -- the Soviet Union and China —

toward Yugoslavia served as a barometer of their

relations with Albania. changes,

Despite significant international

Hoxha continued to perceive Yugoslavia as a serious

threat to his own regime and to Albania's independence. Tirana's alliance with Belgrade in 1945 represented a

7. For an Albanian interpretation of the alliance with Yugoslavia, see: The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, History of the Party of Labor of Albania (Tirane: "Naim Frasheri," 1971), (hereafter cited as History of the A P L ) , and Dokumente Kryesore te Partise se Pun8s tS ShqiperisS ,/Main Documents of the Party of Labor of Albania/, Vol. 1 (Tirane, 1960, (hereafter cited as Dokumente K r y e s o r e ) ; and Enver Hoxha, The Titoites (TiranS: "8 Nentori, 1982). For a Yugoslav interpretation, see: Vladimir Dedijer, Marredhanjet Jugosllavo-Shqiptare, 1939-1948 /YugoslavAlbanian Relations, 1939-1948/1, (Belgrade: Prosveta, 19 49) ; Marko Perovid, Ekonomski Odnosi Jugoslavije i A l b a n i j e , 1947-1948 /Yugoslav-Albanian Economic Relations, 1947-19487, (Belgrade, 1951); and M i n i s t r y of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Bela Knjiga o Neprijatelskoj Politici Vlade Narodne Republike Albanije Prema Federativnoj Narodnoj Republici Jugoslaviji /White Book on Aggressive Activities by the G o vernment of the People's Republic of Albania Toward the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia/, (Belgrade, 1961), (hereafter cited as Bela K n j i g a ) .

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28

sharp departure from Albania's traditional foreign policy of preserving its independence by playing one neighbor against the other and by searching for a third, Great Power,

protector.

In the past,

usually a distant

such an alliance was

made impossible by a traditional enmity between the two states,

w h i c h had developed as a result of Yugoslav expansion

at the expense of Albanian-inhabited territories.

But at the

end of World War II, the communists seized power in both countries.

They insisted that henceforth a new type of

relations would develop between the two former hostile neighbors. The

TiranS-Belgrade

main factors:

alliance was determined by three

Yugoslav contribution to the formation of the

A l b anian Communist Party

(ACP) and its subsequent domination;

the external threat to Albania posed by renewed Greek territorial claims;

and the absence of viable policy

alternatives for Tirane. In the 1930s, Albania was characterized by a predominantly agrarian society, with high illiteracy, only a minor industrial base, and a traditional communist groups.

the absence of a developed proletariat,

social structure. However,

There were several small

they were

in constant disagreement

8 and did not exercise much influence w i t h the masses. After previous contacts between Albanian and Yugoslav communists,

8.

two prominent Yugoslav communists,

History of the APL,

Miladin Popovicf

pp. 37-63

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29

and Dugan MugoSa,

helped in 1941 the Albanian communist

groups emerge into a united communist party. the Albanian Communist Party was formed,

On November 8,

and Enver Hoxha,

a

young Western-educated schoolteacher, was elected as its 9 General Secretary. From the outset of its formation, the

10 ACP was under Yugoslav influence.

In September 1942, the

communists organized a N a t ional Liberation

Front

in the summer of 1943,

People's

Liberation Army,

formed the Albanian

(NLF),and

thus launching an organized resistance

movement against the invaders. Yugoslav interference on a large scale in the internal affairs of the ACP became evident in 19 43, when

the ACP,

under pressures from S v e tozar Vukmanovi6-Tempo,

a member of

the Yugoslav Communist P arty

(YCP)

Central

was forced to denounce the Mukaj Agreement nationalist party Balli Kombetar to the agreement,

Committee (CC), with the

(National F r o n t ) .

According

the ACP and Balli Kombetar would wage a

joint struggle against the invaders,

and the fate of Kosove

would be decided by a plebiscite at the end of the war.

The

Yugoslavs objected to the A C P 's stand on the issue of Kosove, and the Mukaj Agreement was denounced,

laying the blame for

9. DuSan MugoSa, "When I Was in Albania," NIN (Belgrade), December 5, 1971, p. 62. See also Ali Hadri, "The Formation of the Communist Party of Albania," Prilozi za Istoriju Socijalizma (Belgrade), no. 3 (1966), pp. 215-58 10. Stavro Skendi, "Albania Within the Slav Orbit: Advent to Power of the Com m u n i s t Party," Political Science Q u a r t e r l y , 63, no. 2 (1948). p. 260

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30

its conclusion on the ACP delegates

that had signed the

11 document. Kosove became a contentious issue between the ACP, Albanian communists from Kosove,

and the YCP.

Although the

pre-war YCP had twice endorsed the return of Kosove to Albania,

at its Fourth Congress in Dresden in 1928 and at

12 its Zagreb Conference in 1940, changed.

during the war its policy

The YCP tried to sidetrack the issue,

calling the

question of Kosove "naive and not pressing,"

and saying it 13 could never be a problem between two socialist neighbors.

The ACP complained about Y u g o s l a v "chauvinist manifestations" in Kosove,

the combatting of

the principle of self-

determination for Albanians in Kosove,

and acts of 14

discrimination and "extermination" In late 1943,

against the Kosovars.

Albanian partisan units liberated Diber,

Albanian-inhabited part of Macedonia,

the

and created national

11. Pano, The People's Republic of A l b a n i a , p. 52; see also: Themi Bare, Provokacione, Komplote, Deshtime /Provocations, Conspiracies, Failures/, (Tirane, 1966), p. 60; Dedijer, M a r r e dhanjet J u g osllavo-Shqiptare, p. 65; D o k u m e n t e K r y e s o r e , Vol. 1, pp. 153-54; Svetozar Vukmanovid-Tempo, Revolucija Koja Tede /j?he Continuing Revolution/, Vol. 1 (Belgrade: Komunist, 1971), pp. 366-67; Balli Kombetar, Parti Komuniste apo Terroriste? / a Communist or a Terrorist Party?/ (TiranS, 1944), pp. 11-15; and Shqiptari i Lire /The Free Albanian/, (Organ of the "Free Alba n i a Committee," New York), September-October 1968, p. 2 12. Lendvai, Eagles in C o b w e b s , p. 225; and Vuk V u n a v e r , "'The A l b a n i a n Question' in the Press of the YCP 1919-1939," Gjurmime A l b a n o l o g j i k e : Seria e Shkencave Historike (Prishtine), 1 (1971), pp. 81-83 13.

Dedijer,

Marr e d h a n j e t J u g o s l l a v o - S h q i p t a r e , p.

14.

History of the A P L , p.

225

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133

31

liberation councils.

However,

they were

forced to give up

control of the area after being threatened by VukmanovidTempo that the Yugoslavs were prepared to use force if 15 necessary to regain control of Diber. Albanian communists from Kosove,

at the first

conference of the Provincial People's Council of Kosove, held in Tropoje d i s trict of northern Albania 1943-January 2,

1944),

(December 31,

declared themselves in favor of

Kosove's union wit h Albania, maintaining

that it w a s the

desire of ethnic Albanians to unite with their mother 16 country. Such a stand, however, was contrary to the general line adopted by the YCP,

and in a letter dated

March 28,

1944, the Yugoslav party CC rejected the 17 resolution. Because of their subordinate posit i o n in relation to the YCP,

the Albanian communists from Kosove

and the ACP did not challenge the Yugoslav decision on such a vital issue for the Albanian nation.

As the wa r approached

15. Ndreci Elasari, Strategjia dhe Taktika e PKSH ne Periudhen e Luftes Nacional-glirimtare /.The Strategy and Tactics of the ACP During the National Liberation War7, (Tirane: "Naim Frasheri," 1966), pp. 84-88; and Enver Hoxha, V e p r a , Vol. 1 (Tirane: "Naim Frasheri," 1968), p. 457 16. E verteta mbi gjendjen e shqiptareve ne Jugosllavi /The Truth A bout the Plight of the Albanians in Yugoslavia/, (Tirand, 1960), p. 45. Also see: Stanoje Aksid, PoloSaj Autonomnih Pokrajina u Ustavnom Sistemu SFR Jugoslavije /The Position of the Autonomous Provinces in the Legal System of the SFR of Yugoslavia7, (Belgrade: Naudna Knjiga, 1967), p. 56; and Asllan Fazlija, Autonomija e Kosoves e Metohise ne Jugosllavine Socialiste /The Autonomy of Kosove and Metohia in Socialist Yugoslavia/, (Prishtine: Rilindja, 1966), p. 39 17.

Fazlija,

Autonomija e Kosoves...,

p. 46

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its end,

it became apparent that,

once again,

Kosove was

destined to come under renewed Y u g o s l a v rule. Yugoslav domination of the ACP during the war period reached its peak at the Second P l e n u m of the A C P 1s CC, in Berat in November

1944.

At this plenum,

succeeded in weakening Hoxha's position,

held

the Yugoslavs

and created a pro-

Yugoslav faction within the CC, headed by Xoxe, who m the 18 Yugoslavs preferred over Hoxha. On the eve of its victory and the establishment of the communist regime in November 1944, Yugoslav influence.

the ACP was under strong

The communists did not have widespread

support among the population.

A l b a n i a ' s social structure,

the absence of an influential labor movement or a Marxist tradition,

and the A C P 's close c o n t a c t s with the YCP,

contributed to the regime's weakness.

The ACP was faced

with a high-threat environment from internal and external sources.

In m a n y parts of the country,

faced with armed opposition.

the government was

The international situation,

also was unfavorable to the new regime.

The United States

and Great Britain refused to recognize Hoxha's regime, because of their dissatisfaction w i t h the elections that had ratified its coming to power in Albania.

Tirane-

Washington relations were also co m p l i c a t e d because the Albanian communist regime would not accept the validity of treaties and agreements concluded before the war.

18. 1969), pp.

Enver Hoxha, V epra, Vol. 3 (Tirane: "Naim Frasheri, 361-95; and History of the A P L , pp. 222-31

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Greece renewed its territorial claims on southern A l b a n i a in April 1946,

and requested official support from

the United States and Great Britain.

Both powers seemed

to be leaning toward supporting Greek demands. 1946,

under pressure from the Greek lobby,

On July 29

the U.S.

Senate

passed a resolution supporting Greek claims to southern 19 Albania. Although the United States Government did not officially adopt this position,

the resolution contributed

to a stalemate in Al b a n i a n - A m e r i c a n relations. Greek territorial claims were perceived as a serious threat to Albania's independence and territorial integrity At the Paris Peace Conference in 1946,

the Greek Prime

Mi n ister proposed to the Yugoslav delegate that Greece and 20 Yugoslavia jointly p a r t i t i o n Albania. The Yugoslavs, having their own p lans for the future of Albania,

rejected

the Greek proposal and emerged as the "protectors" of A l b a n i a ’s independence.

Tirane was alarmed by the renewed

Greek threat and once again the p r i m a r y foreign policy o bjective became the search for an all y that would protect Albania's independence and territorial

integrity.

Albania's real policy options in choosing a foreign protector at this time were limited. A l b anian regime,

The ideology of the

c o m bined with the sharpening of the

19. U.S. Congr e s s i o n a l R e c o r d , 79th Congress, 2nd session, 1946, XCII, Part 8, p. 10336 20. MoSe Pijade, Izabrani Govori i £lanci /Selected Speeches and Articles/, (Belgrade: " K u l t u r a , " 1948), pp. 444-50; and Hoxha, V e p r a , vol. 3, pp. 439-40

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34

East-West ideological conflict, relations with the West,

the poor state of Albania's

and the perception of W e s t e r n

support for Greek territorial claims against southern Albania, West.

ruled out the possibility of an alliance w i t h the

The Soviet Union,

on the other hand, was too

preoccupied w ith the consolidation of its newly

w o n empire

in the rest of East e r n Europe to pay m u c h attention seemingly insignificant Albania.

These factors,

to the

plus the

influence of the pro-Yugoslav faction in Albania's d e c i s i o n ­ making process,

limited Albania's vi a b l e policy alternatives

to an alliance wit h Yugoslavia —

its traditional enemy.

Yugoslavia was not only interested,

but was also in a

position to immediately provide Albania with n e c essary economic assistance,

and protection against Greece.

The Albanian ruling elite, however,

was not unanimous

in its policy of mo v i n g into the Yugoslav orbit.

W h i l e the

dominant faction led by Xoxe saw Albania's salvation in the hands of Yugoslavia and was willing to accept a relationship on Belgrade's terms,

a moderate faction within the CC,

headed by Sejfulla Maleshova, independent foreign policy.

urged that Albania p u r s u e an Maleshova was in favor of

developing as close relations with the West as w i t h East,

even if this m e a n t giving some concessions

the

to Western

21 countries.

At first,

Hoxha seems to have been sympathetic

to the views of the moderates.

21. Frasheri,"

He tried

to offset Albania's

Enver Hoxha, V e p r a , vol. 4 (Tirane: 1970), pp. 58-59

"Naim

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35

dangerous dependence on Yugoslavia by requesting the Soviet Union, The Soviets,

to visit

hoping to enlist the latter's support.

however,

did not show muc h interest,

and

22

Hoxha's request w a s from the Yugoslavs

sidetracked.

Under strong pressure

and out of fear of losing his own

position by being identified with the moderates,

Hoxha

sided with the radicals. In February 1946, Maleshova was 23 dismissed, and a m ajor obstacle to Albania's accommodation to Yugoslavia was eliminated. On July 9, 194 6, Albania and Yugoslavia signed a Treaty on Economic Cooperation, Cooperation,

and a Treaty of Friendship,

and M u t u a l Assistance,

by which Albania entered

into a political and military alliance with Yugoslavia. Albania was further drawn into the Yugoslav orbit by the signing of a Treaty on the Coordination of Economic Plans, on the Customs U n i o n and Equalization of Currencies between the two countries,

and a Treaty on the Formation of Joint 24 Albanian-Yugoslav Companies. By these agreements, the economies of the two nations were closely linked. The coordination of Tirane-Belgrade relations developed to such an extent that Albania was deprived of any

22.

Pano, T h e People's Republic of A l b a n i a , p.

23.

History of

the A P L , pp.

69

276-78

24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania Towards Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1951), pp. 4 53-56. Hereafter cited as White B o o k .

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36

significant initiative in its foreign and domestic policies. Albania adhered closely to Yugoslavia's international position.

The relationship was characterized by an asymmetry

of dominance and dependence.

Through the exercise of

preponderant influence in Albania's affairs, Yugoslavia was able to dominate Albania directly in almost all spheres of life.

Under the cover of a common ideology,

and as a result

of the inexperience and political immaturity of the ACP leadership, Tirane's economic difficulties, isolation,

and military weakness,

diplomatic

Yugoslavia found it

relatively easy to dominate Albania.

This task was made

much simpler by the assistance rendered to it by the proYugoslav faction within the Albanian leadership headed by Xoxe, who held such important positions as Minister of Interior and head of the influential secret police. In its policy toward Albania, by several factors.

First,

Yugoslavia was motivated

the end of World War II and the

elimination of Italy's influence in Albanian affairs, a power vacuum in Albania. danger,

left

The weakness of Albania invited

since a power hostile to Yugoslavia could fairly

easy dominate Albania and use it as a base against Belgrade.

Albania was of great military importance to

Yugoslavia,

and the Yugoslavs probably felt that control or

domination of Albania was essential for their defense. Second,

Yugoslavia's domination or absorption of

Albania into the Yugoslav federation, political

importance.

was of significant

This would have solved the sensitive

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37

problem of the A l b a n i a n minority in Yugoslavia,

which

represented a m a j o r dilemma for the ne w regime.

Ethnic

Albanians were the onl y minority that put up an armed resistance against the communist regime. The Albanian 25 revolt was suppressed by the Army. The option of returning Kosove to Albania was not seriously considered because Belgrade pre f e r r e d to solve the problem by a 26 "union" between Y u g o s l a v i a and Albania. Finally, A l b a n i a was important to Yugoslavia economically as well.

Although its economy was devastated,

Albania had a c o n s i d e r a b l e potential for economic development.

Subst a n t i a l l y rich in m i n e r a l resources,

the

Albanian economy c ould play a complementary role by providing Yugoslavia with important products such as 27 petroleum,

bitumen,

cotton,

and agricultural products.

Internal o p p o s i t i o n to Yugoslav domination reached serious proportions during 1947.

M a n y prominent Albanians

feared that the continuation of a dependent relationship w ith Yugoslavia m i g h t lead to a total Yugoslav absorption

25. Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 104-05 26. Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 144 27. Perovid, Ekonomski Odnosi Jugoslavije i A l b a n i j e , p. 163; For an analysis of Yugoslav "economic exploitation" of Albania during this period, see Iljaz Fishta and Veniamin Topi, "Yugoslav Revisionist Interference in Albania's Economy and the APL's Struggle Against it Until its Complete E l i m i n a t i o n (December 1944-June 1948)," Probleme Ekonomike (Tirane), no. 1 (1979), pp. 77-102

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38

of their country. from Belgrade, situation.

Hoxha,

tried to maneuver from this precarious

In July 1947,

Soviet Union,

who had come under strong pressure

the Albanian leader visited the

where he enlisted Stalin's support,

and

obtained a credit for agricultural equipment and the 28 construction of several important industrial projects. Following Hoxha's visit to the Soviet Union,

the

Yugoslav leadership launched a campaign against Hoxha, accusing him of having changed Albania's policy toward Yugoslavia and demanding that Tirane coordinate closely its policy w ith Belgrade.

Nako Spiru,

the Chairman of the

Planning Commission and a Hoxha supporter,

also came under

strong criticism for his insistance that the Albanian economy develop independently of Yugoslavia.

The pressure

on Spiru became so enormous that in November 19 47 he 29 committed suicide. The incident was used by the Yugoslavs and their supporters within the Albanian leadership,

to

further isolate Hoxha. Belgrade's envoy in Tirane, the ACP CC on December

5, 1947,

Savo Zlatid,

submitted to

a plan for Albania's "union"

with Yugoslavia on a federative basis.

During this period,

Belgrade-Moscow relations were deteriorating rapidly, Yugoslavia was eager to "solve"

28.

History of

29.

Pano,

30.

History of

and

the question of Albania as

the A P L , p. 311

The People's Republic cf A l b a n i a , p. 78 the A P L , p. 314

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39

soon as possible.

In the beginning of 1948,

the Yugoslavs

requested that they be permitted to dispatch several divisions to Albania,

on the pretext of an imminent Greek 31 invasion of southern Albania. By exaggerating the Greek threat,

Yugoslavia hoped to occupy Albania militarily,

and

present the Soviet Union and other interested powers with a fait accompli.

Hoxha immediately informed Stalin,

and on 32

the l a t t e r 's advice, However,

the Yugoslav request was turned down.

Belgrade continued to press Alba n i a for the

formation of a joint army command, 33 two countries.

and for "union"

of the

Yugoslav domination of Albania reached its peak at the Eighth Plenum of the ACP CC, which was held from February 2 6 to March 8,

1948.

The

plenum was held under a tense

atmosphere and was preceded by an extensive purge. Mehmet Shehu,

the Chief of the General Staff,

well known

for his opposition to the merger of the Alban i a n and Yugoslav armies, was relieved of his command and excluded from the CC.

He was prevented from taking part in

the deliberations of the plenum. criticized.

Hoxha was severely

Finding himself in the minority,

he tactfully

gave in and performed an act of public self-criticism.

31.

Ibid.,

pp.

The

317-18

32. Enver Hoxha, 1976), p. 350

Vepra, vol.

33. Enver Hoxha, V e p r a , vol. Fra s h e r i , " 1970), pp. 70-77

22

(Tirane:

5 (TiranS:

"8 N e n t o r i , "

"Naim

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40

plenum accepted two letters by Tito criticizing Hoxha,

and

approved such close forms of economic ties between the two countries that,

if implemented, would have resulted in the

total loss of Albania's sovereignty.

Hoxha still retained

his post as the General Secretary of the party, but without much influence.

Plans w ere allegedly underway for the

physical elimination of both Hoxha and Shehu,

and the way

was cleared for Yugoslavia's complete absorption of 34 Albania. The Tito-Stalin conflict reached its peak in June 1948, and Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform.

This provided

a perfect opportunity for Hoxha to extricate Albania from Yugoslav domination, office.

and also to insure his tenure in

Albania was the first East European state to attack

Yugoslavia publicly following the Cominform decision.

On

July 1, 1948, Tirane requested that all Yugoslav specialists, advisers,

and experts

leave Albania within forty-eight hours,

and unilaterally broke all economic treaties,

agreements and

protocols concluded w i t h Yugoslavia,

except the Treaty of 35 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was 36 renounced by Yugoslavia in November 1949. Immediately after the Tirane-Belgrade break, moved to consolidate his position.

34. History of the A P L , pp. People's Republic of A l b a n i a , pp.

At the Eleventh Plenum

314-19; 81-82

and Pano, The

35. For the text of the Albanian note, p p . 30 4-07 36.

I b i d ., pp.

Hoxha

see White B o o k ,

164-73

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41

of the CC,

in September 1948, Xoxe and his close associates

were purged,

and Spiru was rehabilitated post-mortem.

The

plenum denounced all the decisions of the Eighth Plenum, and ordered that all party members unjustly purged by Xoxe be restored to their former positions.

The name of the

Albanian Com m u n i s t Party was changed to that of the Albanian 37 Party of Labor. Shortly afterwards, Xoxe was executed.

38 -II-

Alliance With the Soviet Union

Tirane's alliance with Moscow marked the elevation of Albania's status from a Yugoslav subsatellite to a Soviet satellite.

The Kremlin moved rapidly to assist Albania.

Soviet credits w e r e granted to compensate for the loss of Y ugoslav aid,

and Soviet and East European experts were

sent in to fill the gap created by the expulsion of Yugoslav

37.

D o k u m e n t e K r y e s o r e , vol.

1, pp. 374-404

38. J.F. Brown, "Albania, Mirror of Conflict," S u r v e y , no. 40 (January, 1962), PP* 24-41; Griffith, A l b a n i a and the Sino-Soviet R i f t ; Harry Hamm, Albania — China's Beachhead in Europe (New York: Frederick A. P r a e g e r , 19 63); Charlotte Saikowski, Albania in Soviet Satellite Policy, 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 3 . U npublished thesis for the Certificate of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, 1954; Jane P. Shapiro, Alba n i a and the Socialist Camp: Challenge to Soviet Leade r s h i p ^ Unpublished thesis for the degree of Master of Arts and the Certificate of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, 1962; Stavro Skendi, "Albania and the SinoSoviet Conflict," Foreign A f f a i r s , 40, no. 3 (1962), pp. 471-78; Robert H. Steel, Dynamics of the Albanian D e v i a t i o n . U npublished thesis for the degree of Master of Arts and the Certificate of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, 1963; and T. Zavalani, "The Importance of Being Albania," Problems of Communism, 10, no. 4 (July-August, 1961), pp.~I^8

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42

experts. Assistance

Albania joined the Council of Mutual Economic (CMEA), and in 1952 the Soviets established a

submarine base on the island of Sazan, 39 Vlore.

near the port of

The Tito-Stalin break made the P S R A exceptionally important to the Soviet Union.

Thro u g h Albania,

Kremlin kept up the pressure on Tito's regime. more importantly,

the But perhaps

Albania's strategic position on the

Adriatic and its naval bases were of particular significance for the Soviet Union's military strategy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

In addition,

the Soviets were also 40 interested in obtaining raw materials from Albania. The Albanian-Soviet relationship was characterized by an asymmetrical dependence.

There was a high penetration

of Albania by Soviet economic, advisers.

technical and military

In return for protection,

granted base rights.

the Soviets were

Tirane's internationally directed

actions and transactions were almost totally concentrated toward Moscow.

As was the case during the alliance with

Yugoslavia, Albania remained d e pendent on foreign aid. Tirane's autonomy in domestic and foreign policy areas was limited by the perimeters set by Moscow. Tirane enjoyed relatively good relations with Moscow

39.

Pano,

The People's Republic of A l b a n i a , pp.

89-90

40. Jan S. Prybyla, "The Economic Causes of the SovietAlbanian Q u a r r e l , " Bulletin of the Institute for the S tudy of the USSR (Munich), 10, no. 3 (1963), p. 13

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43

until Stalin's death in 1953.

Thereafter, Soviet political

and military interests in Albania drastically declined. This fact was reflected in the reduction of Soviet and East 41 European assistance to the PSRA during 1953-55. The postStalin leadership evidently concluded that the economic costs of supporting Albania far outweighed Soviet political and strategic interests in that country.

The new Soviet

leaders also disapproved of Hoxha's highly personalized and dictatorial methods of rule. Differences between the PSRA and the USSR emerged with Khrushchev's May 1955 visit to Belgrade, and the subsequent Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement.

The Albanian leaders,

evidently feeling betrayed by their Soviet colleagues, opposed Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia.

They resented not

only the fact that Moscow failed to take into account Albania's vital interests, but did not deem it important even to consult them, since Tirane had been in the forefront of 42 the Soviet bloc's anti-Yugoslav campaign. Hoxha perceived the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement not only as a threat to Albania's national security, but, and perhaps more importantly, as a grave threat to his own regime. Under Soviet pressure, Albania agreed to a lessening of tensions with Yugoslavia.

In a speech in June 1955 to the

41. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 22; and Hoxha, The Khrushchevites (Tirane: ”8 Nentori," 1980), pp. 62-9 0 42.

Hoxha, The Khrushchevites, chapter 4

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44

Third Congress of the Democratic Front, Albania's largest mass organization, Hoxha reluctantly welcomed the SovietYugoslav rapprochement, ostensibly expressing "wholehearted" support for Moscow's new policy.

Albania, he said, had

taken a number of measures to normalize relations with 43 Belgrade. However, Albanian-Yugoslav relations remained tense.

Belgrade demanded that the Albanian regime revise

its negative assessment of the nature of Albanian-Yugoslav 44 relations prior to the 1948 break, and rehabilitate Xoxe. Hoxha rejected these demands because to accept them would have been tantamount to committing political suicide. Tirane's hostility toward Belgrade was inspired by well founded fears of Yugoslav domination.

The Albanians were

also concerned with the plight of their brethren in Yugoslavia.

Following the war, ethnic Albanians not only

were denied the right to self-determination, but were also denied equality with Yugoslavia's other ethnic groups. Albanian-inhabited territories were divided into different administrative units.

Kosove, where the majority of the

Albanians in Yugoslavia live, was proclaimed an autonomous

43. Enver Hoxha, Raport "Mbi aktivitetin e keshillit te pergjithshem dhe detyrat e metejshme te Frontit Denokratik" /Report "On the Activities of the General Council and the Future Tasks of the Democratic Front'17, (Tirane, 1955) , pp. 49-51. Passages referring to Tirane’s support for Moscow's new policy toward Belgrade were not included in a later published version of Hoxha's speech. See Hoxha, Vepra, vol. 12 (Tirane: "Naim Frasheri," 1972), pp. 393-493 44. Hoxha, Vepra, vol. 14 (Tirane: "8 Nentori," 1972), pp. 19-20

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45

region and incorporated into

the Republic of Serbia.

Albanian- i n h a b i t e d territories w e r e incorporated Montenegro and Macedonia.

O ther

into

A n A l b a n i a n revolt a g a i n s t the

new communist regime in 194 5 was ruthlessly suppr e s s e d by the Yugoslav Army,

whose b r u t a l b e h avior was d e n o u n c e d by 45 senior Y u g o s l a v officials. A l b a n i a n s were c o n s i d e r e d politically u n reliable and w e r e subjected to a p o l i c y of deprivation of their national and human rights, political and economic pressures, terror.

p e rvasive

forced emigration,

and

The h a r s h persecution of the Albanians w a s admitted

officially by Belgrade following the dismissal in 1966 of Alexander Rankovid, 46 secret police.

Vice P r e s i d e n t and head of the powerful

The So v i e t Union ignored A l b a n i a ' s concern w i t h its minority and o ther grievances a g a i n s t Belgrade.

Yugoslavia,

for obvious reasons,

was m u c h m o r e important to the Soviet

Union than Albania.

As M o s c o w - B e l g r a d e relations

there was an inverse deter i o r a t i o n

improved,

in M o s c o w - T i r a n e relations.

45. I n s t i t u t za Istoriju Radnidkog P o k r e t a Srbije, Osniva&ki K o n g r e s KP Srbije (8-12 Maj 1945) / T h e Founding Congress of the CP of Serbia (May 8-12, 1945/7# (Belgrade, 1972), pp. 38-39, 72-79, 82-83, 157-58, and 213, for comments by M i l o v a n Djilas, A l e x a n d e r Rankovid an d Tito. See also, Hoxha, The K h r u s h c h e v i t e s , p. 146; and ZSri i P o p ullit, M a r c h 24, 1957; S e p t e m b e r 9, 1958; and October 24, 1958 46. R a m a d a n Marmullaku, A l b a n i a and the Alb a n i a n s (Hamden, Conn.; Archon Books, 1975), p. 148; Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav N a t i o n a l Q u e s t i o n , pp. 216-18; and Ali Hadri, "National and P o l i t i c a l D e v e l o p m e n t of Albanians in Yugoslavia," P r e g l e d (Sarajevo), No. 4 (April 1970), pp. 492-512

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46

The Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement,

and the developments

following Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Soviet party congress,

in February 1956,

by encouraging its opponents. communists,

threatened Hoxha's regime

In mid-1955,

Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu,

two prominent

were expelled from

the CC and the party for "rightist” deviation and for 47 attempts to overthrow Hoxha. At the April 1956 conference of the Tirane party organization,

Hoxha was faced with open

opposition.

His opponents raised the issue of the cult of

personality,

demanded that the APL's policy be analyzed in

light of developments following the 20th Soviet party 48 congress, Meanwhile,

and officials purged after 1948 be rehabilitated. Khrushchev,

probably on Tito's suggestion, 49

continued to apply pressure on Hoxha to rehabilitate Xoxe. But with the 19 56 events in Hungary and Poland,

and the

subsequent deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Tirane-Moscow relations improved considerably.

Hoxha used

the opportunity to crush internal opposition to his policies and to resume polemics against "revisionist"

Yugoslavia,

blaming Tito for the unrest in Hungary and Poland. In an apparent attempt pressures,

to enlist support agai n s t Soviet

Hoxha visited Beijing in October 1956 and attended

the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

47.

Hoxha,

V e p r a , vol.

12, pp.

48.

I b i d . , pp.

49.

Dokumente K r y e s o r e , vol.

(CCP).

306-41 p a s s i m .

205-08 4, pp.

127-28

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47

J u s t how receptive he found the Chinese is not clear. Beijing's assistance to Tirane, however, 1955,

increased.

While in

Chinese credits accounted for o nly 4.2 percent of

Albania's

total passive trade balance,

17 percent,

and in 1957

in 1956 they rose 50 to 21.6 percent. The Soviets

appar e n t l y were disturbed by this development. counter China's growing influence in Albania, increased their assistance.

In order

to

to

the Soviets

On January 1, 1957, Albania was

g r a n t e d a credit of $18.5 million,

and several months later

w a s freed from debts totalling $105 million.

In November,

the Soviet Union also granted the PSR A a credit of $75 m i l l i o n to finance its Third Five-Year Plan,

ar.d committed

itself oil

to a loan of $8.75 million for the development of the 51 industry. Ye t all this did not suffice to wean

A l b a n i a away from its interest in an opening toward China. As differences between the Soviet Union ar.d China grew in the late 1950s,

Tirane's defiance of Mo s c o w and tilt

toward Beijing became more evident.

Khrushchev was

d i s t u r b e d by Albania's leaning toward China.

In an attempt

to preserve the PSRA's loyalty to the Soviet Union, K h r u s h c h e v visited Alba n i a in May 1959.

He hcped to exert

influence on Hoxha in a manner and to a degree that could n o t be done by other Soviet officials.

50.

Griffith,

Albania

But his visit was

and the Sino-Soviet R i f t , p. 28

51. Robert Owen Freedman, Economic Warfare in the C o m m u n i s t Bloc: A Study of Soviet Economic Pressure Against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China (New York: Praeger P u b l i s h e r s , 1970), p. 62

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48

unsuccessful.

Tirane continued to take a pro-Beijing stand

on man y issues of considerable importance Union.

This was clearly shown

to the Soviet

in June 1960 at the Bucharest

Conference of the ruling communist parties. representative, member of

Hysni Kapo,

the third h i g h e s t ranking

the Albanian ruling elite,

refu s e d to join the

Soviet Union and its East European allies condemnation of the C C P .

The Albanian

in a general

While Kapo did not take a clear-

cut stand on the Sino-Soviet conflict, 52 Tirane's loyalty lay with China.

it was obvious that

F o llowing the Bucharest Conference,

Mos c o w took a

series of punitive measures against Albania.

The Kremlin

cancelled all grants and credits to the PSRA,

cut off all

trade,

expelled Albanians studying in the Soviet Union,

withdrew its advisers,

and effectively excluded Albania from

participation in the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization and CMEA deliberations.

The East European states followed suit, 53 with the exception that trade was not cut off. Albania thus experienced the grave consequences of its economic vulnerability and overdependence on the Soviet Union.

The

withdrawal of Soviet experts and c e ssation of trade and assistance caused an immediate economic depression,

especially

in the industrial sector, which took A l b a n i a several years

p.

52.

Hoxha,

V e p r a , vol. 19, p.

53.

Freedman,

15

Economic Warfare in the Communist B l o c ,

80

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to

49

recover from.

The situation was further complicated by a

severe draught and a serious grain shortage that Albania suffered in I960.

The Soviets apparently also encouraged

intra-factional struggle within the Albanian leadership. Liri Belishova, Politburo member, and K0 9 0 Tashko, president of the APL's Auditing Commission, were purged because of 54 alleged opposition to Albania's break with the Soviet Union. The Tirane-Moscow conflict reached its peak at the November 1960 Moscow Conference, which was attended by 81 communist parties.

In his speech, Hoxha made it clear that,

because of Khrushchev's policies, a break in Albanian-Soviet relations was inevitable.

He denounced the Soviet leader

for his rapprochement with Yugoslavia, denunciation of Stalin, and intervention in Albania's affairs.

Khrushchev

had employed coercive measures against the Albanians, Hoxha claimed, insisting that they choose between the 250 million Russians and the 600 million Chinese.

The Soviets, he

continued, had refused to provide Albania with desperately needed assistance, at a time when it suffered from a draught, 55 earthquakes, and floods. Albanian-Soviet relations deteriorated rapidly following the Moscow Conference.

At the 22nd Soviet party congress, in

October 1961, Khrushchev denounced Hoxha and called on the

54. Hoxha, Vepra, vol. 19, pp. 17-18; and Pano, The People's Republic of Albania, pp. 137-38 55.

Ibid., pp. 382-463

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50

Albanian people to overthrow him.

In his concluding speech,

Khrushchev declared:

We do not recall an instance in which anyone shifted with such dizzying speed from protestations and vows of eternal friendship to unbridled anti-Soviet slander as the Albanians have done. Presumably they expect in this way to lay the groundwork for earning handouts from the imperialists. The imperialists are always willing to pay thirty pieces of silver to those who cause a split in the ranks of the communists. But pieces of silver have never brought anything but dishonor and shame. (56)

In a speech commemorating the 44th anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7, 1961, Hoxha angrily responded to the Soviet leader's remarks:

The Albanian people and their Party will even live on grass if need be, but they will never sell themselves for 30 pieces of silver. They would rather die honorably on their feet than live in shame on their knees. (57)

Finally, on December 3, 1961, Moscow broke diplomatic relations with Tirane. Albanian alliance.

This marked the end of the Soviet-

For the next two decades, Albania was

to serve as the center of anti-Soviet propaganda in Eastern Europe.

56.

Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 98

57.

History of the A P L , p. 502

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CHAPTER II THE FOR MATION OF THE A L B A N I A N - C H I N E S E ALLIANCE

Small Powers, such as the People's

Socialist Republic

of Albania, have time and again been warned by alliance analysts against joining bilateral unequal alliances.

Such

alliances, it has been suggested, impair the independence and sovereignty of Small Powers, because of the discrepancy in economic and military resources and capabilities between them and Great Powers and the latter's instinctive urge to assert influence and control over the former. Despite this well founded warning, bilateral unequal alliances have been fairly common.

The situational-

environmental position and the ever-present perception of permanent insecurity have made most Small Powers alliance prone.

The Great Powers' interest in courting the

friendship of Small Powers in their continuing political struggle, and the constraints under which Small Powers must operate, have induced the latter to enter into bilateral unequal alliances. -51-

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52

In entering into a close relationship, a Small Power and a Great Power will be guided by different goals.

The

latter may seek military bases and insist on international solidarity.

A Great Power is likely to demand that the

Small Power's international stand closely adhere to its own.

In order to display its political system as superior

to that of its competitors, a Great Power may also attempt to remake its ally in its own image and present it as a "showcase" of its own ideology and political system.^

The

Small Power, on the other hand, is primarily interested in security arrangements and in extracting as many political and economic concessions as possible from its ally. attempt to resist Great Power efforts its own autonomy and resources.

It will

to gain control over

A Small Power's ability to

resist or limit its ally's influence and control will depend on internal and external factors.

A divided national

leadership facing internal opposition and unrest will find it difficult to resist Great Power encroachements.

In a

high-threat external environment, such a leadership is likely to accept the alliance relationship on the Great Power's terms.

In a low-threat environment, a Small Power

leadership, with a relatively stable power base, is more likely to assert its independence and resist Great Power demands for accommodation.

1. Christopher C. Shoemaker and John Spanier, PatronClient State Relationships; Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 18

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53

As many a Small Power, Albania has traditionally employed an alliance with a Great Power as a strategy to pursue and secure its national objectives.

Such an

alliance policy cannot be understood in a vacuum.

Rather,

it can best be appreciated by understanding the constraints under which the Albanian governing elite has had to operate, the PSRA's situational-environmental position, and the relationship between Tirane's domestic concerns and its foreign policy.

-I-

Alliance Determinants

Tirane's decision to ally with Beijing was determined by such general Small Power alliance determinants as security, need for foreign assistance, status and prestige, ideology, and regime stability. The Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement in 1955 and the continued improvement in Moscow-Belgrade relations, was perceived by the Albanian ruling elite as a serious threat to its country's independence. Yugoslavia —

In reconciling with

the PSRA's perceived principal enemy —

the

Soviet Union had ignored Albania's vital national interests. With fresh memories of Yugoslav domination during the period 1945-1948, the Albanian leaders perceived the Moscow-Belgrade rapprochement as having been made at Albania's expense.

They apparently feared that Khrushchev

and Tito might reach an agreement sacrificing the PSRA's

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54

independence and territorial integrity.

The suspicions of

the highly sensitive Albanian leaders were further aroused by Khrushchev's persistent pressures for a Tirane-Belgrade rapprochement. Moscow considered the Balkans as its traditional sphere of influence.

With setbacks in Greece during the civil war,

and with the Cominform expulsion of Yugoslavia in 1948, Soviet influence in the area had considerably declined.

By

the mid- and the late 19 50s, however, Moscow-Belgrade relations had improved.

The reincorporation of Yugoslavia

into the Soviet bloc had become a major Soviet foreign policy objective.

To achieve this objective, the Soviet

leaders were apparently willing to go so far as to ignore what the Albanians considered as their vital national interests. Unhappy with Tirane's defiance in regard to Yugoslavia and other issues, Khrushchev applied in 1960 a different form of pressure on the Albanians with the intent of bringing them into line and preserving their loyalty to the Soviet Union.

He met with Sophokles Venizelos, a Greek

left-wing leader, with whom he discussed the question of the alleged mistreatment of the Greek minority in Albania. Venizelos asked Khrushchev to intervene with the Albanian leaders concerning the possibility of granting autonomy to the small Greek minority.

2

Khrushchev expressed hope that

2. Enver Hoxha, Vepra, vol. 22 (Tirane: "8 Nentori," 1976), p. 280; and Dokumente Kryesore, vol. 3 (Tirane: 1970), p. 447

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55

Greece and Albania would solve the problem "peacefully," adding that,

The communist parties salute the idea that every minority should be autonomous in order to be able to develop its language and civilization in accordance with its wishes... I can assure you I will communicate these things to Comrade Enver Hoxha when I meet him in Bucharest /at the June 1960 conference of the ruling communist partie§ 7 . (2 )

In 1960,

Greece still considered itself in a state of

war with the PSRA, because Italy had used Albania as a base for its 1941 invasion of Greece.

At the end of World War II,

Athens had renewed its territorial claims on southern Albania,

thus contributing to a freeze in relations between

the two neighbors.

To the Albanians,

Khrushchev's

conversation with Venizelos brought back memories of foreign encroachments and domination.

Sophokles Venizelos was

the

son of Eleutherios Venizelos, who had signed the TittoniVenizelos Agreement in 1919, by w h i c h Italy and Greece agreed to partition Albania.

Khrushchev's comments were

construed in Tirane as implicit Soviet support for Greek territorial claims on southern Albania.

The Albanian

leadership sent a strong protest note to Khrushchev, m a i n t a i n i n g that there were no foreign territories within

3. Quoted in Robert Owen Freedman, Economic Warefare in the Communist Bloc: A Study of Soviet Economic Pressure A g a i n s t Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 71-72

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56

the PSRA's borders,

but that there were Albanian territories

under foreign occupation,

i.e., Kosove and £ameria.^

Other developments during 1960 affected Albania's security and its security arrangements with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

In July,

the Tirane government

allegedly uncovered a plot by the Soviet-trained Rear Adm. Teme Sejko,

the Commander of the Naval Forces.

the official version, an armed uprising — by Yugoslavia,

According to

the aim of this plot was to organize in coordination with armed intervention

Greece,

and eventually the American Sixth

F leet -- to overthrow Hoxha's regime and partition the PSRA a mong its neighbors.

The Soviet Union was later implicated,

5

too.

The official v e r s i o n of the incident has not been

confirmed by independent sources. p lot against the PSRA, the Warsaw Pact,

A w idespread international

at a time when Albania was a member of

is highly doubtful.

A more plausible

explanation is that Mo s c o w had encouraged the pro-Soviet elements

led by Sejko to overthrow Hoxha and install a pro-

M o s c o w leadership. Following the Bucharest meeting of the ruling communist parties in June 1960, where Tirane refused to side with the Soviet Union and its East European allies against China,

4. Hoxha, V e p r a . vol. K r y e s o r e , vol. 3, p. 4 77

22, p. 280;

and Dokumente

5. Dokumente K r y e s o r e , vol. 4, p. 56; Hoxha, V e p r a , vol. 20, p. 115; and Themi Bare, P r o v o k a c i o n e , K o m p l o t e , Deshtime p r o v o c a t i o n s , Conspiracies, Failure§7, (Tirane, 2nd ed., 1966), pp. 180-203

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57

Moscow stopped all military supplies

to Albania.

Warsaw Pact Consultative Meeting in M a r c h 1961,

At the the Soviets

demanded that Albania either w i t h d r a w its personnel from the Vlore submarine base, giving the Soviet Union full control over the base, or the base w o u l d be dismantled altogether.

Tirane rejected the Soviet demand, maintaining

that the 1957 and 1959 Soviet-Albanian agreements provided that all ships and material in the V lore base were the property of the PSRA.

The issue could not be solved to the

satisfaction of the two parties, Soviet submarines left Vlore.

and on May 26,

On June

1961,

eight

5, all Soviet

0 military personnel left Albania. The conflict over the Vlore naval base resulted in the PSRA's de facto expulsion from the W a r s a w Pact.

This factor,

combined w i t h the continued improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations,

convinced the Albanian ruling elite that the

Soviet Union could not be relied u pon to protect Albania's security. Tirane's fear of its neighbors, was to a certain degree justified.

particularly Yugoslavia, Bu t the regime found it

advantageous for its domestic concerns foreign threat.

to exaggerate the

While it is d i f ficult to determine the

extent of the threat the PSRA faced in 1962,

it can be argued

that an imminent invasion -- be it f rom Yugoslavia, Soviet Union,

6 .

or the West -- was unlikely.

Dokumente Kryesore,

vol.

4, pp.

the

Although Belgrade

42-50

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58

despised Hoxha's regime, over a Soviet satellite.

it preferred an independent Albania Moreover,

Yugoslav aggression

against the PSRA would most likely have led to a conflict w ith the other interested countries, Greece,

namely Italy and

and would seriously have affected Belgrade's

image

in the international arena. Albania's geographical isolation from the Warsaw Pact member states hindered the possibility of Soviet military action.

Moreover,

reached its peak,

in 1962 the Sino-Soviet conflict had not and Moscow was not likely to further

antagonize Beijing by attacking Albania. other hand,

The West,

on the

was interested in promoting polycentrism within

the international communist system.

Soviet withdrawal from

Albania was seen in NATO capitals as a positive development. Legally,

the PSRA was still a member of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet Union and its East European allies were bound by an alliance treaty to protect Albania's territorial integrity.

independence and

Any Western action against Tirane

could have invited a Soviet military response,

leading to an

international crisis. Although,

in retrospect Albania did not face a serious

or imminent foreign threat,

its policy makers perceived a

high-threat external environment and the need for a Great Power ally.

Both of Albania's contiguous neighbors and

traditional enemies, with Great Powers,

Yugoslavia and Greece, had close ties

with w h i c h Tirane was at odds.

A serious

disruption of the international political system could put

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59

Albania in a precarious position.

Hoxha's personal

xenophobia was consistent with the "lessons" of Albania's history.

Albania had been a victim of frequent foreign

aggression and this had given rise to a sense of insecurity and widely held attitudes on the part of a large segment of the population that Albania needed a foreign protector. As many another Small Power, Albania searched for a distant Great Power ally, which could ensure its security from more powerful neighbors, and at the same time would not represent a threat to its own sovereignty and independence.

The Albanians had no illusions about China's

inability, because of its military weakness, to protect Albania.

Although not an ideal ally in terms of security,

China could provide Albania with a semblance of protection. Moreover, due to the great geographical distance between the two countries, the PRC could not pose a serious threat to the PSRA's independence. China fulfilled the basic conditions necessary for an alliance with Albania.

Like the PSRA, the PRC was staunchly

anti-West, and, more importantly, fiercely anti-Yugoslav. The Chinese had criticized Khrushchev for his rapprochement with Tito, and considered the toleration of Yugoslav "revisionism" dangerous to the entire communist bloc. Beijing also saw Belgrade as a competitor in obtaining Soviet assistance, and a divisive force in the Third World.

7

7. Daniel Tretiak, "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente," The China Quarterly, no. 10 (April-June, 1962), p. 124

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60

The main factor in generating the alliance between Albania and China was their common alienation from the Soviet Union.

Although the seeds of the Sino-Soviet conflict were

sown during Stalin's time, policy differences between Beijing and Moscow emerged during the mid- and the late 1950s, coinciding with the deterioration of Albanian-Soviet relations.

The crucial issues which contributed to the

rift between the two communist giants were: China's disillusionment with Khrushchev's leadership of the international communist movement; clashes of world views, especially differences over policy toward the United States and the Third World; Moscow's failure to provide Beijing with adequate economic assistance, and the long standing border dispute. Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated dramatically in 1960, following the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and advisors.

The Romanian Communist Party Congress and

the Moscow Conference of 81 communist parties in 1960 served as forums for Sino-Soviet clashes.

Both sides tried

vigorously to enlist support from other communist parties. The Chinese were supported by the Albanians, and several Asian parties, while the Soviets commanded a clear majority. A second factor that contributed to the PSRA's alliance with the PRC was Tirane's need for foreign assistance. Albania had been highly dependent on aid from, and trade with, the Soviet Union and its allies.

For twelve

consecutive years, the PSRA's trade with the Soviet Union

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61

accounted for 50 percent of its total foreign trade.

As

political differences between the two countries increased, the Soviet Union applied pressure on Tirane,

first by

deliberately delaying the signing of trade agreements and then by declaring a trade embargo, withdrawing its g

specialists,

and finally,

suspending all assistance.

Soviet punitive measures left the PSRA in a precarious situation and jeopardized its economic development.

Thus

it became necessary for Albania to find a substitute benefactor and avoid a major retardation in its i ndustrialization. The PRC was able and willing to provide Albania with assistance to satisfy its basic economic needs.

The PSRA

had sided w i t h the PRC in the Sino-Soviet conflict, political and ideological reasons,

and for

Beijing could not allow

Tirane to succumb to Moscow's pressures and be forced to change its pro-Chinese stand. Another important factor in Albania's realignment was its concern with status and prestige in the Soviet dominated international communist system.

Status and prestige are

extremely important for Small Powers and have a direct bearing on their security.

In the wake of the Soviet-

Yugoslav break in 1948, Albania enjoyed a relatively high

8. The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, History of the Party of Labor of Albania (Tirane: "Naim Frasheri," 1971), pp. 501-03. Hereafter cited as History of the APL.

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62

status and prestige in the communist bloc.

This was out of

proportion with Albania's size and capabilities.

Albania

became the subject of growing attention not only from the Soviet Union,

but other communist states,

too.

The Moscow-Belgrade rapprochement and Tirane's refusal to reach a modus vivendi with Belgrade,

contributed to a

decline in the PSRA status and prestige in the Soviet bloc. This was reflected in the Soviet failure to consult the PSRA on issues affecting not only the communist bloc as a whole, but also Albania's national interests,

the decline

of Soviet bloc media coverage of Albanian developments, a decrease in delegation exchanges. military,

and

As Soviet political,

and economic pressures on Tirane increased,

it

became evident that as f a r ‘as its status and prestige were concerned, Albania w ould be better off by withdrawing from the Soviet bloc altogether.

In an alliance with the PRC,

Albania could expect better treatment than it had received from the USSR.

The Chinese were careful to stress

that

their relations with tiny Albania were based on complete equality and independence. By the late 1950s,

ideological disagreements over

domestic as well as foreign policies had emerged between Albania and the Soviet Union.

On all important issues

affecting the international communist movement, Party of Labor

(APL)

the Albanian

took an extreme "leftist" position,

w hich came into direct conflict with the Soviet position. Tirane's ideological

stand on the mos t important issues was

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63

similar to that of Beijing. Ideological differences between Tirane and Moscow had emerged following Khrushchev's Soviet party congress,

secret speech at the 20th

in 1956,

denouncing Stalin,

and the

subsequent de-Stalinization campaign throughout the Soviet bloc.

Hoxha refused to go along with such a campaign,

for

fear that it might endanger his own position and that of his closest associates.

He emerged as Stalin's

supporter in Eastern Europe,

staunchest

maintaining that the late

Soviet leader was one of the greatest personalities of the international communist movement.

According to Hoxha,

Stalin's contribution to socialism far o u tweighed "minor" mistakes he might have c o m mitted during his lifetime, which allegedly were now being exaggerated by Khrushchev. In defending Stalin,

9

Hoxha was defending his own

position and the record of his regime.

In no other East

European country were Stalin's methods of rule implemented as in Albania.

Hoxha and his close associates who made up

the ruling elite were responsible for the execution of thousands of people, others,

torture and

imprisonment of many

and the establishment of forced labor and

concentration camps.

Hoxha had developed an extensive

personality cult, which now was being e n dangered by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy. On the issue of Stalin,

the PRC held views similar to

9.

vol.

Dokumente Kryesore,

4, pp.

104-05

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64

those of Albania.

After all, Mao Zedong was not about to

endanger his own personality cult just because Khrushchev saw the need,

for domestic reasons,

against Stalin.

to launch a campaign

Both Albanian and Chinese leaders drew

lessons f r o m developments in Hungary and Poland in 1956, and were determined that such events would not be repeated in their countries. Tirane and Beijing disagreed with Moscow on many major foreign p o l i c y issues. by the APL,

Khrushchev was denounced,

for implying that "imperialism"

aggressive nature,

especially

had changed its

and that war between capitalist and

socialist systems was no longer inevitable.

The Albanians

criticized Khrushchev for undermining the strength of world "socialist forces" and for failing to make a distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars. Anot h e r issue of ideological disagreement between the Soviet Union,

on the one hand,

and Albania and China, on the

other,

was

West.

T i r a n e and Beijing's relations with the West were

tense.

the question of peaceful coexistence with the

B oth rejected the Soviet insistence on the adoption

of the p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence as a "general line" of the foreign policy of all socialist countries.

The Albanians

and the C h i n e s e accused Khrushchev of having adopted an o pportunist interpretation of this concept, given up

and of having

the ideological and political struggle against

"imperialism.

IQ.

I b i d .t pp.

475-77

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65

At the 20th Soviet party congress,

Khrushchev had

asserted that in certain Western countries the possibility existed for a peaceful transition to socialism.

This view

was in direct opposition to the view held by the P SRA and the PRC.

This was not surprising,

since communists

in

these two u n d erdeveloped countries had come to power through long armed struggle. Khrushchev's proposition,

In emphatically rejecting

the Albanians insisted that

socialism required the elimination of the "old bourgeoisie state m a c hinery and the construction of a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat." experience,

Drawing from their own

the Albanians maintained that the bourgeoisie

would not wil l i n g l y give up its position,

and therefore

the proletariat mus t resort to r e v o l u t i o n . Albania and China were in major disagreement with the Soviet Union over

the question of "rev i s i o n i s m .11

They

accused the Soviet Union of violating the 1957 Moscow Declaration,

by ignoring the struggle against "revisionism,"

w h i c h according to the Declaration, danger

represented the main

to the international communist movement.

The Soviet

Union had adopted the view that "dogmatism" rather than " r e v i s i o n i s m ” presented the main danger to the communist movement,

and tended to identify Tirane and Beijing as

"dogmatist."

The PSRA and the PRC, on the other hand,

insisted that "revisionism,"

11.

I b i d . , pp.

especially Yugoslav

477-78

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66

"revisionism," was the chief danger.

12

The issue of Yugoslav "revisionism" was of paramount importance to Tirane,

The AP L complained that following

the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, given to Yugoslav "revisionists" communist movement,

the opportunity was

to work openly against the

under the mask of a "persecuted friend."

Tito's rehabilitation was accompanied by the rehabilitation of "revisionists"

in many communist parties,

initiation of a campaign against many "good," Stalinist,

party members.

and the i.e.,

Developments in Hung a r y and

Poland in 1956, were blamed on the activity of Yugoslav "revisionists."

In the A P L 's view,

betrayed Marxism-Leninism,

the Yugoslavs had

and were working agai n s t the

unity of the communist bloc and the international communist movement.^

Beijing fully supported Tirane's stand on

Yugoslav "revisionism." model

The PRC,

portraying itself as a

for economic development and revolution among the

less developing countries,

viewed Yugoslavia's policy of

nonalignment as running contrary to the interests of the international communist movement in the Third World.

14

An important determinant in Tirana's alliance with Beijing was

the Albanian ruling elite's concern wit h regime

stability and personal power considerations.

12.

Hoxha,

V e p r a . vol.

13.

Dokumente Kryesore,

19, pp. vol.

By the late

496-97

4, pp.

119-24

14. Tretiak, "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente," loc c i t .. p. 124

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67

1 9 5 0 s , Hoxha had lost the Soviet leaders' support,

especially that of Khrushchev.

with Hoxha's

sympathy and Mo s c o w was unhappy

failure to carry out a policy of

de-Stalinization,

and with his repressive domestic policies.

In contrast to the other East European governments,

the

Albanian government did not curtail the powers of the secret police,

S i g u r i m i , or put an end to wide s p r e a d

arbitrary arrests,

summary trials,

people in c o n c e n t r a t i o n camps.

15

and mass internment of Hoxha continued to hold

an iron grip over the country, pursuing a merciless policy against real and potential o p p o n e n t s .

The need to maintain

a rigorous internal policy could bes t be rationalized under conditions of international tensions.

16

Thus a detente

w ith Yugoslavia or the West, was perceived by Hoxha as a threat to his regime because it undermined the logic of his domestic repression. As early as 19 56,

there were indications that Moscow

was encouraging H o x h a 's replacement. the rehabilitation of Koji Xoxe,

The Soviets demanded

the former Organizational

Secretary of the APL and Minister of the Interior,

and of

other prominent communists who had fallen vi c t i m to Hoxha's bloody purges following the 19 48 break with Yugoslavia. Hoxha,

however,

c o u l d not accept such a suggestion without

15. T. Zavalani, "The Importance of Being Albania," Problems of C o m m u n i s m , 10, no. 4 (July-August, 1961), P- 3 16. Abas Ermenji, Albania (Paris: National Democratic Committee "Free Albania," 1968), p. 490; and Harry Hamm, Albania -- China's Beachhead in Europe (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), pp. 63-64

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68

endangering his own position.

The Hungarian revolution and

the subsequent deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations afforded Hoxha an opportunity to put aside the question of X o x e 1s rehabilitation and to concentrate instead on the further consolidation of his power. purges followed,

A series of bloody

resulting in the creation of a closely

knit ruling clique,

whose members were bound together by

traditional ties of clan nepotism and common complicity in many ruthless p u r g e s . ^ Moscow's disenchantment with Albania's domestic and foreign policies

led to the intensification of Soviet

pressure on H o x h a 's regime.

By 1960,

as it became apparent

that Hoxha was going ahead with his defiance of the Soviet Union, Mos c o w attempted to overthrow his regime. Soviet faction of the Albanian leadership, Liri Belishova,

Politburo member,

The pro-

headed by

and K 0 5 0 Tashko,

president

of the APL's Auditing Commission, was encouraged against Hoxha.

18

M o s c o w was apparently also involved in the

preparation of an armed uprising against Hoxha.

17. Communism in pp. 241-42

19

Paul L e n d v a i , Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and the Balkans (New York: Anchor Books, 19b y ),

13. K r y esore, vol.

H i s t o r y of the APL, 3, pp. 488-89

p. 4 56; and Dokumente

19. N i c holas C. Pano, The People's Republic of Albania (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 137-38

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69

-II-

A l b anian and Chinese Mutual Perceptions

Albania's foreign policy,

as that of other states,

has

been influenced by its ruling elite's perceptions of other states and elites.

As George T. Yu has indicated,

In the study of foreign policies and interaction patterns, the important specific images are those that elites have of themselves (representing their states) and of other elites (representing other s t a t e s ) . (2 0 )

The economic,

political and ideological ties between

Albania and China were reinforced by the positive images that the ruling elites formed of each other and their role in the international communist movement.

This contributed

to the development of a network of bonds linking the two states

together.

Given the lack of a traditional friendship,

positive

elite images were extremely important to the development of alliance interactions between Alba n i a and China. Mutual awareness between the two distant nations and their elites was relatively recent.

The PRC became aware of the

PSRA in the early and mid-1950s, interest in Eastern Europe.

as part of its general

Beijing's

interest in Tirane

was accelerated after Stalin's death and the subsequent

20. Tanzania

George T. Yu, China's Afri c a n Policy. A Study of (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 13

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70

improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

H o x h a 1s visit to

Beijing in October 1956, on the occasion of the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP)

and other

party and government delegation exchanges thereafter, involved exchanges of views on issues affecting the communist bloc in general and Albania and China in particular.

Such

visits contributed to the growth of perceptual ties between the two governing elites.

During the late 1950s,

and Beijing's relations with Moscow deteriorated,

as Tirane positive

Albanian and Chinese elite images of each other were further reinforced. The A l b anian ruling elite perceived the PRC as the "champion" of the anti-imperialist struggle.

Moscow's

adoption of a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the capitalist countries,

and the improvement in Soviet-

American relations was viewed by Tirane as proof that the Soviet Union had given up the struggle against "imperialism."

China came to be perceived as having

replaced the Soviet Union as the leader of the "anti­ imperialist struggle."

This image was reinforced by the

poor state of Beijing's relations with the capitalist countries in general,

China's conflict with the United

States over Taiwan and Southeast Asia,

Beijing's

denunciation of Khrushchev's summit meetings with Western leaders and his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and Chinese in their

support for the less developed nations

struggle against colonialism.

The Albanians

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71

considered China's

foreign policy as

... a barrier to the a g g r e s s i v e plots of U.S. imperialism and a g r e a t factor in guaranteeing peace in A s i a and the world and in promoting the l i b e r a t i o n movement of the oppressed peoples and nations. (2 1 )

The CCP and its leadership,

h e a d e d by Mao Zedong, were

regarded by the Albanians as the d e f enders of the "purity" of Marxism-Leninism.

With the a l l e g e d degeneration of the

Soviet Communist Party and the g r a d u a l restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union a n d the East European communist states,

the Albanian e l i t e came to regard itself

and its Chinese counterpart as b e i n g in the forefront of the struggle a g a i n s t revisionism. The revolutionary spirit characterizing the Chinese society was highly regarded by the A l b anian leadership, and was considered as an indication of the Marxist-Leninist character of the CCP and its p o l i c i e s . years of the alliance,

During the formative

Tirane looked to Beijing as a center

for the d e v e l opment of a new and "truly" Marxist-Leninist movement. Perhaps the m ost important A l b a n i a n perception of the PRC was that of relations.

A l b a n i a had experienced great pressures,

intimidation,

21. January 17,

the nature and c o n d u c t of Chinese foreign

and interference by Y u goslavia and the

"Sino-Albanian Joint Statement," 1964, p. 17

Peking R e v i e w ,

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72

Soviet Union, which predisposed Tirane to restructure its foreign policy.

Hoxha was determined to preserve Tirane's

autonomy in domestic and foreign affairs,

and the alliance

w ith China was an attempt to achieve that objective. The principles governing relations between Albania and China were spelled out in the 1964 Sino-Albanian Joint Statement, Tirane.

signed on the occasion of Zhou Enlai's visit to

According to the Joint Statement,

Both ^Albania and China7 hold that the relations between socialist countries are international relations of a new type. Relations between socialist countries, big or small, economically more developed or less developed, must be based on the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and must also be based on the principles of mutual support and mutual assistance in accordance with proletarian internationalism. It is necessary to oppose great-nation chauvinism and national egoism in relations between socialist countries. It is absolutely impermissible to impose the will of one country upon another, or to impair the independence, sovereignty and interests of the people of a fraternal country on the pretext of "aid" or "international division of labor." (2 2 )

The PSRA,

a Small Power chronically dependent on foreign

assistance and with painfully negative experience in dealing w ith other countries,

22.

enthusiastically welcomed this

Ibid., January 17,

1964,

p.

17

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73

statement on principles governing its relations with China. Beijing seems to have lived up, at least in the formative years of the alliance,

to Albanian expectations on the

nature of their relations. 1966,

Zhou asserted that

During a visit to Albania in "relations between our two peoples

are not those of ordinary friends but of revolutionary comrades and class brothers."

23

China's perceptions of Albania were as important to the formation and evolution of the alliance as were Albania's perceptions of China.

Beijing had declared a

common cause w ith Small Powers and the unliberated nations in the struggle against

"imperialism,"

and the PSRA was

seen as part of the general "anti-imperialist" struggle. The Chinese governing elite's image of Albania was that of a small communist state struggling for survival in the face of an "imperialist-revisionist encirclement."

This

perception was best expressed by Zhou:

The A l b anian people are surrounded on all sides by capitalism and m o d e r n revisionism and are continually confr o n t e d with difficulties created and pressures exerted by the imperialists and m o d e r n revisionists. But, holding a rifle in one hand and a pick in the other, relying on their own efforts and working hard and p e r s e v e r i n g l y , they have defeated diverse e n e m y provocations and sabotage, and established Albania as a strong anti-imperialist b a s t i o n on the southwestern front of the socialist camp. (24)

23.

Selected Hsinhua News I t e m s , July 11, 1966, p.

24.

Peking Review,

January

17,

1964,

p. 14

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9

74

The Chinese perceived Albania as being in the forefront of the struggle against Soviet and Yugoslav "revisionism," and successfully building socialism against enormous odds. Positive images of the PSRA were further reinforced by Tirane's moral support of national liberation movements,

and

the p r omotion of the concept of armed struggle and world-wide revolution.

Albania's foreign policy was considered of great

support to China,

the socialist camp, and the world

revolution. Positive images held by the two ruling elites were also influenced by similarities in the Albanian and Chinese past. Both shared a political history of long periods of domination and subjugation by other foreign powers.

The communists in

both the PSRA and the PRC had waged long armed struggle against foreign invaders and had fought costly civil wars with the nationalists. East Europ e a n countries,

In contrast to the communists in the with the exception of Yugoslavia,

the A l b a n i a n and Chinese communists came to power by their own efforts rather than wit h Soviet support or intervention. The perceptions held by the Albanian and Chinese elites were not necessarily shared by the people of the two states. In fact it appears that the population in the PSRA and the PRC generally had little knowledge of each other's history, traditions,

and development.

The lack of traditional

interaction between the two nations required a constant repetition of the recently be well

instituted.

imposed images before they could

But the governing elites'

lack of

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75

concern with domestic public opinion and aspirations in both Albania and China, made

the task of institutionalizing these

perceptual images relatively simple.

-Ill-

The Nature of the A l l i a n c e

In many respects, quite unusual.

the Albanian-Chinese alliance was

In contrast to many b i l a t e r a l unequal

alliances,

this was a political rather than a military

alliance.

It was characterized by an absence of an alliance

treaty,

specifying the goals, objectives and activities of

the alliance.

Thus,

it lacked provisions for joint m i l i t a r y

consultations or contingency plans.

The commonly perceived

interests of the two nations were c o n d i t i o n e d by different factors,

and this accounted for the a b s e n c e of an alliance

treaty.

The PSRA was a Small Power,

economic and strategic international

w i t h limited political, leverage,

interested

above all in the strengthening of its independence and sovereignty.

Interference in domestic affairs and loss of

decision-making autonomy during the p e r i o d s of alliance w i t h Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had m a d e

the Albanian elite

wary of entering into a treaty arrangement with China. The PRC, on the other hand,

a l t hough an aspiring power

with wide and varied interests and commitments,

was p r imari ly

interested in its neighboring areas and in Africa. China had no interest,

Obviously,

and given its limited military

capabilities and the g r e a t distance separating the two

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76

countries,

was not in a position to become the guarantor of

Albania. The Tirane-'Beijing alliance was a non-institutionalized alliance,

lacking an organizational structure for regular

consultations and policy coordination,

and was characterized

by an informal relationship conducted on an ad hoc basis. Relations between the two

alliance

25

members were governed by

frequent consultations between high level officials, delegation exchanges at the ministerial and lower levels, and consultation by special economic, military and trade delegations. Despite the lack of an alliance treaty, Tirane and Beijing's objectives and policies were formalized by two important alliance documents: Statements,

the Sino-Albanian Joint

concluded on January 8 , 1964, at the end of

Zhou Enlai's visit to Albania,

and on May 11,

1966,

at the

end of the Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu's visit to China.

26

These documents stressed that the alliance was based on Marxism-Leninism, prolet a r i a n internationalism, M oscow Declaration,

the 1957

and the 1960 Moscow Statement.

The

common objectives of the two alliance members were broadly

25. In many respects, the Albanian-Chinese alliance was similar to the Sino-Tanzanian alliance, which was also a formal, non-institutionalized political and economic alliance. The only major difference between the two alliances, in terms of their structure, was the existence of a Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship, while China had no such treaty with Albania. See, Yu, China's African P o l i c y . 26. Peking Review. May 20, 1966, pp. 5-12

January 17,

1964,

pp.

13-18;

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and

77

defined as struggle against imperialism, headed by the United States;

struggle against colonialism and support for

national liberation movements; revisionism,

struggle against modern

headed by the Soviet leadership;

and defense of

the purity of Marxism-Leninism and the common cause

of

socialist revolution and socialist construction. The Albanian and Chinese elites shared a common hostility toward the West,

especially the United States.

T i r a n e 1s enmity toward Washington stemmed from the Cold War period, having been reinforced by continued American support for Yugoslavia.

Beijing,

on the other hand, considered the

United States as its principal enemy because of Washington's support for Taiwan and the overall American strategy in Southeast Asia. The struggle against Soviet "modern revisionism" was put on a par with the struggle against American "imperialism."

The Soviet Union was seen as having allied

itself wit h the United States.

Thus

the two was considered inseparable, the 1966 Joint Statement. themselves

27

the struggle against as was pointed out in

The two allies also pledged

in opposition to Yugoslav

"revisionism,"

characterizing Yugoslavia as "a special detachment of U.S.

imperialism," playing the role of a saboteur against

world revolution.

27.

28

Finally,

Tirane and Beijing pledged to

I b i d ., May 20,

1966, p.

I b i d ., January

17,

1964,

12 p.

17

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78

support one another.

This reciprocal assistance consisted

essentially of Chinese assistance for the PSRA's economic development in return for Tirane's international support. Tirane's alliance with Beijing had its advantages and disadvantages.

Beijing was in a position to bail out the

PSRA from its precarious economic position and help it sustain its economic development.

China's great distance

guaranteed Albania relative freedom in domestic and foreign policies -- a factor of Albanian ruling elite. Soviet Union,

utmost importance to the xenophobic Beijing needed allies against the

and it considered Tirane an important ally.

In the early 1960s, China lacked an overall and concise Balkan strategy,

and Albania had little to fear of being

dumped for another Balkan ally. The Albanian-Chinese alliance also had its drawbacks for the PSRA.

Although China was a Great Power,

it lacked

the ability to provide Albania with a credible shield of protection.

This factor was reflected in the absence of a

security pac t between the two states. hostilities,

In the event of

small and weak Albania could be over r u n fairly

rapidly before assistance from distant China could arrive. Its small territory did not afford the PSRA the luxury of withdrawing its army to better defense positions.

The best

that the A l b anians could hope for was that the act of an alliance wit h China would in itself suffice to deter potential aggressors. Because of its own economic problems,

the PRC could not

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79

provide Albania with as much assistance as had the Soviet Union and its allies.

Also, China's lower technological

level meant that the technical aid that Albania would receive would be of a lower quality. Tirane's relations with other states were affected by its alliance with Beijing.

The chance of aligning with any

other power, if there was any to begin with, was removed, and the possibility of Hoxha's regime reconciling with the Soviet Union was eliminated.

As with any other alliance,

the possibility existed that China could one day come to terms with Albania's principal enemies.

A unilateral

Chinese rapprochement with either the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia could lead to the disintegration of the TiraneBeijing alliance. For China, the benefits of the alliance evidently outweighed its costs .

Although an economic ’burden on the

already burdened Chinese economy, the PSRA was an important political asset.

Albania could serve as an example for other

prospective Chinese allies.

The geographic distance

separating the two countries could lend credence to the validity that Beijing, in contrast to Moscow, respected the principles of equality and independence governing relations between communist states.

Albania could also serve as a

Chinese beachhead in Europe, from where Beijing could strike back at Moscow's dominance in Eastern Europe.

Finally,

Albania could serve as a model for the attractive power of Chinese communism in the less developed countries,

to which

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80

Beijing attached enormous importance. Despite the perceived common interests, Tirane and Beijing aligned for quite different reasons.

Albania was

in need of an ally who shared its hostility to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and the West, and who was able and willing to provide it with substantial economic assistance. China, on the other hand, needed to confront the Soviet Union as a bloc.

Albania and China held parallel and

complementary interests concerning their stand toward the Soviet Union, the United States, Yugoslavia, and their socialist development.

On other questions, however, the

interests of the two nations diverged, and the alliance dragged them into each other's quarrels with neighbors and other states.

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CHAPTER III ALBANIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS 19 62-69

Bilateral unequal alliances are characterized by a dynamic relationship.

The nature of Small Power-Great Power

relationships will be determined by the goals and objectives sought by each side.

Changes in members'

goals will alter

basic objectives they seek and will change the nature of the a lliance relationship.

The ability of alliance members to

c o ordinate activities toward achieving jointly-defined objectives will depend to a great extent on their unity of perc e p t i o n of the nature,

intensity and origin of the threat

in the international system directed against them,

the

political and economic advantages they derive from the alliance,

and a common ideological world outlook.

The larger the external threat,

the more likely will

the Small Power be to accept the alliance relationship on the Great Power's terms and to meet the latter's demands. In a low threat environment,

on the other hand,

the Small

Power will have significantly more leverage in its domestic

-81-

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82

and foreign affairs. environment,

Significant changes in the external

especially if accompanied by changes in

perceptions regarding principal enemies,

are likely to

affect adversely alliance cohesion. There are two academic schools of thought on the importance of ideology in alliance maintenance and its role in alliance cohesion. decision-makers, alliance,

Balance of power theory assumes that

in considering the prospects of joining an

base their decision overwhelmingly on non-

ideological estimates of the threat directed against their countries and the opportunities offered by an alliance relationship.

The mai n impetus for alliance formation,

according to this theory,

is the concern for power and

1 security;

hence ideological affinities are not crucial.

The affinity or principle theory,

on the other hand,

predicts alliance formation on the basis of ideological or institutional similarities.

It is assumed that ideological

affinity is crucial to alliances,

and that ideologically

"similar nations are more apt to form an alliance and are also likely to coordinate their intra-alliance behavior m ore effectively than are ideologically dissimilar

1. Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances; Comparative Studies (New York: Joh n Wiley and Sons, 1973), pT 53; George Liska, Nations in Alliance; the Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins P r e s s , 19 6 8 ), pp. 12-13; and Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and P r a c t i c e , " in Alliance Policy in the Cold W a r , ed. by Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), pp. 185, 189

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83 2

nations."

While not denying the possibility of "marriage of

convenience" between different nations,

the affinity theory

suggests that "the bonds of alliance often arise from considerations other than utilitarian calculations of 3 p o w e r ." The experience of many nations and the post-1945 emergence of ideology-impregnated alliance systems suggest that neither the balance of power theory nor the affinity theory fully explains the role of ideology in alliance formation and maintenance.

The utility of the ideological

factor can perhaps best be determined by an approach combining elements from both theories.

While scholars

disagree as to the importance of ideology compared to other alliance determinants,

there is widespread agreement that

when superimposed upon traditional motives, considerations,

such as security

and military and economic aid,

ideological

affinity m a y play an important role in sustaining an 4 alliance. I d e ology performs some significant alliance functions. It rationalizes the grounds for alliance formation and maintenance,

by emphasizing joint and parallel interests

among allies and idealizing the nature of their relations. According

to George Liska,

2.

I b i d ., p . 53

3.

I b i d ., p. 220

the development of an "alliance

4. George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 33

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84

ideology"

is a primary prerequisite for alliance cohesion.^

In this and the next chapter,

an attempt will be made

to analyze the evolution of the Albanian-Chinese alliance and to explore the role of changing national goals, systemic factors and ideology on the nature and cohesion of the alliance.

Albanian-Chinese economic and military

interaction will be analyzed in Chapter 6 . the introduction,

As indicated in

systemic factors will refer to the nature

and intensity of threat in the international system directed against Albania and China.

In this study,

ideology is

deemed to be a belief system that guides the attitudes and actions of governing elites.

-I-

The Consolidation of the Alliance

Albania paid a heavy price in political,

economic,

and

military terms for its break w ith the Soviet Union and alliance with China.

In addition to cutting off all

assistance and breaking off diplomatic relations,

the

Soviet Union de facto expelled the PSRA from CMEA and the W arsaw Pact.

This had serious political,

milit a r y ramifications for Albania,

economic,

and

and resulted in Tirane's

dramatic alteration of its pattern of external relations. The East European states recalled their ambassadors from Tirane,

5.

but probably on Soviet suggestions,

Liska, Nations in A l l i a n c e , pp.

stopped short of

61-62

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85

breaking off altogether diplomatic and economic relations.^ All contacts, however, were sharply reduced. The PSRA's relations with its two immediate neighbors —

Greece and Yugoslavia —

were strained, and contacts

with other nations were relatively limited.

By the end of

1962, in addition to maintaining contacts with communist states, with the exception of the Soviet Union, Albania maintained diplomatic relations with only four Western nations —

Austria, France, Italy and Turkey —

and ten

Third World nations —

Brazil, Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, 7 Guinea, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia, and Sudan. Tirane's precarious political, military and economic situation made its alliance with Beijing highly important. China recognized Tirane's vulnerability vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc and the West, and more importantly, appreciated the political significance of maintaining an alliance with a country located in what had been recognized as Moscow's sphere of influence.

Albania was the only communist state

that had openly supported China in the continuing SinoSoviet conflict.

Thus, the PRC could not afford to let

Albania give in to Soviet pressures, because this would have damaged its reputation and prestige, and in all probability would have ruled out the possibility of

6 . Nicholas C. Pano, The People's Republic of Albania (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p^ 157

7. Central Intelligence Agency, Directory of Officials of the People's Republic of Albania, A-(CR) 74-22 (Washington, D.C., June 1974)

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86

recruiting new allies against the Soviet Union.

Moreover,

Albania was of significant political importance to China not only because together they confronted the Soviet Union as a bloc, but because Tirane could, and in fact did, serve as a Chinese propaganda base in Moscow's backyard, thus representing a Chinese political challenge to the Soviet Union. Albania's political importance to Beijing in the latter's competition with Moscow became evident during the initial stages of the alliance and prior to the outbreak of public polemics between the PRC and the USSR. Union and China used proxies — respectively —

Both the Soviet

Yugoslavia and Albania

in their ideological and political struggle.

The Chinese took immediate measures to assist Albania. In April 1961, Beijing granted Tirane a loan of $125 million for the Third Five Year Plan (1961-65) and sent experts to

g fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Soviet bloc experts. Judging by their actions and public pronouncements, Albanian and Chinese elites perceived the alliance as highly important. A well orchestrated media campaign constantly reiterated positive images of the friendship between the two elites and their countries.

This was especially important in view of

the lack of historical contacts and relations between the two states. The alliance was highly asymmetric in terms of power and capabilities, and ideological affinity played a

8.

Bashkimi, April 26, 1961, p. 1

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87

significant role in forging the alliance and in idealizing Tirane-Beijing relations.

Both the PSRA and the PRC

rationalized their alliance on ideological grounds, although other factors —

China's need for allies in the

competition with the Soviet Union, and Albania's dependence on foreign aid —

probably played a greater role in the

formation of the alliance.

Similar Albanian and Chinese

views on policy and strategic alternatives were heavily veiled in ideological exegesis.

Yet behind this doctrinal

exegesis lied common and complementary national interests, dressed up in Marxist-Leninist ideological terms. In the formative stages of the alliance, it was assumed that there was a high degree of ideological convergence between Tirane and Beijing.

This perception was reinforced

by Albanian and Chinese public pronouncements which emphasized the alleged existence of an identity of standpoints and views between them.

Although there was

indeed a basic consensus on major issues, closer investigation of Albanian and Chinese ideological positions reveals that, at least until the mid-1960s, there were some notable differences between Tirane and Beijing.

These

differences were conditioned by the two countries' different national interests and perceptions.

In dealings with the

Soviets, the Chinese were more flexible than the Albanians for tactical reasons.

Some of the divergencies may have

been due to inadequate consultation between Tirane and Beijing rather than to genuine differences.

Others,

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88

however, m a y have been genuine,

e.g., when some Chinese

leaders such as Liu Shaoqi or Lo Ruiqing favored united action w i t h the Soviet Union against U.S. the conflict in Vietnam.

escalation of

Such positions w ere strongly

opposed by the Albanian leadership. Enver Hoxha's defiance of the USSR resulted in the initiation of a series of drastic Soviet punitive measures against the PSRA.

The Kremlin hoped not only to teach

Albania a lesson but, perhaps more importantly,

to send a

message to the Chinese leadership, whom it held responsible for having pushed the Albanians "to the road of open struggle against the Soviet Union and the o t h e r socialist countries and fraternal parties."

9

With his denunciation

of the Soviet Union at the November 1960 M o s c o w Conference of 81 c o mmunist parties and the subsequent b reak in diplomatic relations between Tirane and Moscow, burned his bridges with Khrushchev.

Hoxha had

Having nothing to lose,

Hoxha e m b arked on a vigorous anti-Soviet policy,

and

evidently expected his Chinese allies to follow suit. Moreover,

the Albanian p arty leader foreclosed any

possibility of a reconciliation with the Soviet Union by insisting,

among other things,

on a public apology from

Khrushchev before talks w i t h the Soviets c o u l d be held.

10

9. "Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist P arty of the Soviet Union to Its P a r t y Organizations at All Levels and to All Its Party Members," republished in Peking R e v i e w , July 26, 1963, p. 45 10.

The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the

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89

On this point, Hoxha was drawing an intentional analogy with Khrushchev's actual apology to Tito in 1955. During the period 1961-63, China apparently was still interested in reaching a compromise with the Soviet Union and avoiding a complete break.

Abiding by the strategic

formula of a "united front" —

including the Soviet Union

and its East European allies —

against U.S. "imperialism,"

Beijing was reluctant to commence public polemics.

It

also asked Tirane to mute its polemics with Moscow. China's suggestion,

At

the Albanians ceased temporarily their

public attacks against the Soviets in spring 1 9 6 2 . ^ The Chinese urged the Albanians to reconcile with the Soviets.

While publicly the Chinese demanded Khrushchev

take the first step in normalizing relations with Albania,

12

privately they suggested Tirane open talks with Moscow without preconditions.

An Albanian delegation led by

Politburo members Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia was dispatched to Beijing in June 196 2 to discuss "the tactics and

Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, History of the Party of Labor of Albania (TiranS: "Naim FrashSri," 1971) , pp~. 542-43. Hereafter cited as History of the A P L . 11. Enver Hoxha, Vepra, vol. 23 (Tirane: "8 Nentori," 1977), pp. 293, 343 12. In their April 7, 1962 letter to the Soviet leadership, the Chinese leaders declared: "We sincerely hope that the Soviet comrades and the Albanian comrades will both take positive steps to remove their differences and restore normal relations between the two Parties and the two countries. In this connection, it seems necessary for the Soviet comrades to take the initiative." See Peking Review, March 22, 1953, p. 7

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90

strategy of the common struggle of our two parties in the 13 international arena." The Chinese tried unsuccessfully, according to Hoxha,

to convince the Albanians to begin

discussions with the Soviets without preconditions and to agree to the strategic formula of a "united front" with 14 the Soviets against the main enemy -- U.S.

"imperialism."

Hoxha was obviously disappointed at Beijing's reluctance to go all the way in its dispute with Mo s c o w and Chinese attempts at reconciling with the Soviets. Concerned that the PRC might sacrifice the PSRA for a rapprochement wit h the Soviet Union,

Hoxha had every

interest in furthering the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The

A l b anian media gave scant coverage to the July 1963 SinoSoviet meeting in M o s c o w on their ideological disagreements, 15 and, as a sign of disapproval, w i t h h e l d all comment. Albanian-Chinese alliance cohesion, question.

divergencies did have some impact on

but the alliance itself never came into

Given their public commitments and pronouncements

on the major issues dividing the international communist movement,

both allies,

but especially Albania,

policy options but to stick together.

had few

The very nature of

13. Letter of the CC of the P a r t y of Labor and the Government of Alba n i a to the CC of the Communist Party and Government of China (Tirand: "8 N S n t o r i , 11 1978) , pp. 25-26. Hereafter cited a s Albanian L e t t e r .

"8

14. Enver Hoxha, Reflections on C h i n a , vol. 1 (Tirane: Nentori," 1979), pp. 19-20 15.

B a s h k i m i , July 2 and 23,

1963

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91

the alliance -- absence both of an alliance treaty and of provisions for regular joint consultations -- provided Albania and China with a great deal of latitude.

Both

allies reserved the right to interpret and implement their common Marxist-Leninist ideology according to their national interests.

Moreover,

non-ideological factors seem to have

had a greater cohesive impact on the alliance.

Beijing

continued to appreciate the importance of Tirane's political support, conflict.

especially in the context of the Sino-Soviet And Albania,

faced wit h the severance of aid

from the Soviet bloc, continued to receive vital economic assistance from China. The failure of the July 1963 Sino-Soviet talks and the signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in July 1963 between the Soviet Union,

the United States,

and Britain,

led to a deterioration of Beijing-Moscow relations —

a

development which pleased Tirane.

The PRC perceived the

Test Ban Treaty as being directed,

in part,

against itself.

Both Beijing and Tirane bitterly denounced Moscow,

accusing

the Soviet Union of having entered into an alliance wit h the United States to preserve their nuclear monopoly. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly as far as the Albanians were concerned,

the Chinese intensified

their polemics with the Soviets, charging that capitalism 16 had been restored in the USSR. The Albanian media

16. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, M a s s . : Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 418-27

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92

republished a series of Chinese editorial articles published during July 1963-july 1964.

Perhaps for the first time,

there appeared to be a close unity of perception and action between the two allies regarding the Soviet Union. It was against the background of such a unity of perception that Premier Zhou Enlai visited Albania in January 1964.

He reiterated the PRC's commitment to Albania.

At a mass rally on January 4, in the northern city of Shkoder,

near the border with Yugoslavia,

he warned

Belgrade and o ther potential aggressors that if they dared to attack Albania "they would end up by breaking their own 17 necks." And at a rally in Tirane, Zhou pledged that,

... no ma t t e r what may happen in the world, whatever perilous storms may arise on the revolutionary path along which we are m a r ching together, we will for ever steadfastly stand beside fraternal Albania and giv e her unqualified and unfaltering support in her just struggle. (18)

At the concl u s i o n of Zhou's visit, a Sino-Albanian 19 Joint Statement was signed. Zhou's talks with the Albanian leaders were characterized as having shown "a complete identity of standpoints and views between the two sides."

The A l banians expressed their gratitude to Beijing

17.

Bashkimi,

18.

Peking R e v i e w , January 17,

19.

Ibid.,

pp.

January 5, 1964,

13-18;

p.

1

1964, p. 22

and B a s h k i m i , January 10,

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1964

93

for providing

the PSRA with "all-round internationalist

assistance," characterizing it as

"an important factor in

the socialist construction and all-round development of 20 Albania." Tirane reaffirmed its support of Beijing's domestic and foreign policies, m aintaining that "no major international question" could be settled without the PRC's

21 participation.

The Albanians,

however,

had compromised

by accepting the Chinese concept of a hypothetical

"united 22

front" with the Soviet Union against the United States. The ability of the two allies to agree upon a common policy toward the Soviet Union and to coordinate their activities was,

however,

soon affected by Tirane's failure

to support Beijing on the Sino-Soviet border issue,

and

disagreements over their joint strategy following Khrushchev's ouster.

In a meeting with a delegation of the

J apanese Socialist Party in July 19 64, M a o raised the prob l e m of the rectification of the Sino-Soviet border, bitterly charging that the Russians and the Soviets had "unjustly"

acquired Chinese border territories.

20.

I b i d ., p.

14

21.

I b i d ., p.

17

Given

22. The statement pointed o u t that, "The two parties hold that a new world war can be prevented, a nuclear war can be averted and world peace can be safeguarded so long as all peace-loving forces of the world, namely, the socialist camp, the national-liberation movement, the revolutionary m o v e m e n t of the peoples and all peaceloving countries and people unite and form the broadest possible united front to wage an unremitting struggle against the aggressive and war policies of imperialism headed by the United States." See ibid., p. 15

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94

Albania's partition by its neighbors in 1912 and the continued Yugoslav occupation of Kosove, w here about 40 percent of the Albanian nation lives, one m i g h t have expected Hoxha's regime to give the Chinese unqualified support on the border issue. To China's disappointment, Mao's action.

however,

Tirane protested

In a letter to the CCP CC in September 1964,

the Albanian leadership insisted that raising the border problem w ould hinder "the ideological struggle against Khrushchevism" and would provide Moscow w ith a "powerful" weapon to neutralize the Albanian-Chinese struggle exposing 23 Soviet "betrayal" of Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese attempted to minimize the impact of Albania's action on alliance cohesion, and thus did not formally respond to the 24 Albanian letter. And b oth allies kept the disagreement secret and maintained the appearance of solidarity. The Albanians rationalized their opposition to the Sino-Soviet border rectification on ideological grounds. However,

a more plausible explanation was H o x h a 's concern

that Tirane's endorsement of Chinese territorial claims against the Soviet Union could prompt Khrushchev to exert

23.

Albanian L e t t e r , p.

29

24. In October 1964, Ma o allegedly told an Albanian delegation that, "The future will prove whether we are right or wrong. We are not going to reply to you, because, if we did, we would reject your views as you rejected ours, and thus polemics would arise. Therefore, let us wait, perhaps, after man y years we shall reply to you, but not now." See Hoxha, Reflections on China, vol. 1, p. 110

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95

pressure on Albania by encouraging Greek and Yugoslav designs on the PSRA.

The Soviet leader, it will be recalled,

had used a similar tactic in 1960, when, in discussions with a Greek left-wing leader on the problem of the Greek minority in Albania, had declared that he hoped Tirane and Athens 25 would solve the problem by "peaceful" means. In his writings, Hoxha has suggested that by calling for the rectification of the USSR's borders with Romania and some other European states, Mao was "instigating" war. The Chinese, according to the Albanian leader,

"forget that

raising territorial claims at this time (even when fully justified, as is the case of Kosove with us)

leads to the 26

creation of a situation of military conflict." The Albanians continued to be preoccupied with what they perceived as the Chinese leadership's "unprincipled" stand toward Soviet "revisionist" leaders, particularly Khrushchev.

On the occasion of Khrushchev's 70th birthday

and at a time when the Albanian media portrayed the Soviet leader as Albania's greatest enemy, the Chinese leadership sent him a message of greetings, wishing him "good health and long life."

The Chinese message, signed by Mao,

Liu,

Zhu De, and Zhou, characterized Sino-Soviet differences

25. Enver Hoxha, Vepra, vol. 22 (Tirane: "8 1976), p. 280; and Robert Owen Freedman, Economic in the Communist Bloc: A Study of Soviet Economic Against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 71-72 26.

Hoxha, Reflections on China,

Nentori," Warfare Pressure (New York:

vol. 1, pp. 72-73

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96

as "only temporary" and declared that in the event of a major world crisis, China and the Soviet Union would stand 27 together. Although the Chinese message to Khrushchev may well have not been serious, Tirane was concerned that Beijing might eventually reconcile with Moscow on the latter's terms. Albanian-Chinese differences became more evident in the wake of Khrushchev's ouster on October 15, 19 64.

The

Chinese believed that this was a good opportunity to patch up differences with the Soviets, and agreed to send a delegation to Moscow to attend the October Revolution celebrations.

Zhou urged that the Albanians too, send a

delegation, insisting that this was an opportune moment to "stretch a hand" to the new Soviet leadership and unite with 28 it "in the struggle against the common enemy, imperialism." The Albanian leadership rejected Zhou's suggestion.

In a

letter to Beijing on November 5, 1964. the Albanians

27. Peking Review, April 24, 1964, p. 4. For Albania's position, see Vangjel Moisiu, Leonora Simo, and Stefan Kenuti, Qendrimet Oportuniste dhe Veprimtaria Pergarese e PK te Kings ne Levizjen Komuniste Nd§rkomb 8 tare /The Opportunist Stands and Splinter Activities of the CP o f C h i n a in the International Communist Movement/ (Tirane: "8 NSntori," 1982), p. 124 28. Albanian Letter, pp. 30-32. Zhou summoned Albania's ambassador to China, Nesti Nase, and in the presence of several other ambassadors allegedly told him: "I know that you don't have even diplomatic relations with the Soviets because they broke them off. But now there is no one to make self-criticism because Khrushchev has been removed; therefore, /Premier/ Mehmet Shehu should pack his bag quickly and set off for the celebrations in Moscow." Hoxha, Reflections on China, vol. 1, p. 129

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97

insisted that polemics be kept up "until revisionism is 29 burried as an ideology." An unsigned editorial, later revealed to have been writ t e n by Hoxha, newspaper Zeri i Popullit

in the party

on November 1, argued that it

was a m i s t a k e to entertain illusions that Khrushchev's dismissal would result in a change in the USSR's "revisionist" course.

The editorial maintained that,

Khrushchev's removal from the leadership of the Soviet P arty and state does not me a n the death of Khrushchev revisionism, nor has it liquidated his revisionist ideology and po l i c y embodied in the line of the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU. This line is deep-seated. To prevent this danger and make its recurrence impossible, it is necessary that it be uprooted. This is the only remedy. (30)

China's disappointment with Zhou's M o s c o w trip led to a further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.

The

Albanians welcomed the resumption of Chinese polemics with the p u b l i c a t i o n of an editorial entitled "Why Khrushchev Fell?,"

that appeared in the CCP theoretical journal,

Red F l a g , in December 1964.

Subsequently,

Hoxha claimed

the e d itorial was based o n arguments contained in the

29.

I b i d ., p. 33

30. Enver Hoxha, V e p r a , vol. 28 (Tirane: "8 Nentori," 1978), pp. 99-100. Following Zhou's return from Moscow, the Chin e s e press republ i s h e d the Zeri i P o p u l l i t editorial. See Pe k i n g R e v i e w , November 27, 1964

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98

letter the Albanian leaders had sent on November 5 to their Chinese colleagues.

In fact, he insisted,

some of the

passages from the Albanian letter were quoted directly in 31 the Red Flag editorial. For the next several years,

relations between the PSRA

and the PR C were characterized by a remarkably close ideological affinity, alliance cohesion.

which significantly strengthened

There was a high degree of convergence

in A l b anian and Chinese positions regarding m any foreign and domestic policy issues. problems,

Despite its own economic

the PRC continued to provide Albania with

considerable economic,

technical and military assistance.

Albania,

adhered closely to China's

for its part,

international position and served as Beijing's spokesman at the Uni t e d Nations and other international organizations from w h i c h the PRC was barred. During this period,

party and government

were exchanged quite frequently.

In November

delegations 1964,

Vice Premier Li Xiannian led a Chinese party and government delegation to Tirane to take part in the celebrations on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of A l b ania's liberation 32 from fascist occupation. The Albanian-Chinese friendship was further reinforced with Zhou Enlai's second visit to the PSRA,

in M arch 1965.

31.

Hoxha,

32.

Peking Review,

The Chinese Premier again

Reflections on C h i n a , vol. 1, p. November 27,

1964,

p.

182

3

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99

reiterated Beijing's support for Tirane and emphasized the 33 common interests and objectives binding Albania and China. In the beginning of 1966, Tirane-Beijing relations had

there were reports that

deteriorated because of 34

Albania's disappointment with Chinese economic assistance. At the same time,

the Soviet Union and its allies made an

effort to improve relations with the PSRA.

Albania was

invited to participate at a conference designed to coordinate communist aid

efforts to North Vietnam,

received

an offer to resume trade relations wit h the Soviet Union, and was invited to send a party delegation to the 35 23rd Soviet party congress. Tirane rejected Soviet offers for a reconciliation and continued its close relationship with Beijing. with the Soviet bloc, remained tense.

As a result, Albania's relations

with the exception of Romania,

There was also no significant change in

Tirane's relations wit h its neighbors to the West. contacts with the less developed countries During

Tirane's

increased.

1965, Albania established ties w ith four Third World

countries —

Mali,

Pakistan,

Indonesia,

and Mauritania —

thus bringing to 33 the number of states with which Tirane 36 ma i n t a i n e d diplomatic relations.

33.

Ibid., April

2,

1965, pp.

6-7

34.

The New York

T i m e s , February 12,

35.

Pano, The People's Republic of A l b a n i a , pp.

36.

Directory of

1966

Officials of the P R A , June 1974

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176-77

100

A high level Albanian party and government delegation, headed by Premier Mehmet Shehu

and Politburo member Kapo,

paid an official visit to the PRC from April 26 to May 11, 1966.

The Albanian delegation was accorded a spectacular

reception,

reflecting the importance that China then

attached to its small ally.

An account in the Peking Review

described the reception given to Shehu as the biggest and most spectacular welcome ever given by Beijing to a foreign guest,

and claimed that about one million people —

more

than half of Albania's total population at the time — had 37 turned out to meet the Albanian delegation. The visit 38 received wide media coverage in both Tirane and Beijing, and was instrumental in reinforcing positive attitudes between the two allies.

This was especially important

because both countries were beset with serious domestic problems. Shehu's visit marked the peak of the Albanian-Chinese friendship.

Zhou Enlai characterized relations between the

two countries as "a model of relations" countries.

39

between communist

But the nature of the Tirane-Beijing

relationship was perhaps best expressed by Shehu:

37.

Peking R e v i e w , Ma y 6, 1966,

p. 6

38. Zeri i P o p u l l i t , April 26-May 12, Peking R e v i e w , April 29, May 6, and May 13, 39.

Peking R e v i e w , M a y 6, 1966,

p.

1966; 1966

and

25

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101

Small socialist Albania on the Adriatic and big socialist China on the Pacific are an integral whole, for they are bound together by a proletarian internationalist friendship which is not affected by space and geographic environment. It makes no difference between a big country or a small country, between a "big" nation or a "small" nation or between different races, and revolutionary Parties are not categorized into "patriarchal Party" and "filial Party." Common ideals and struggles and Marxism-Leninism have bound ^Albania and China7 together. (40)

A t the conclusion of Shehu's visit, was signed,

a Joint Statement

which once again reaffirmed the close alliance

between the two states. of the United States,

The statement was highly critical

the Soviet Union,

and Yugoslavia,

and expressed support for national liberation movements. The document portrayed the PSRA and the PRC as defenders of the purity of Marxism-Leninism and the standard bearers of the struggle against "imperialism" and "revisionism.”

Once

again,

China pledged to stand resolutely by Albania and to 41 give it all possible support and assistance. Tirane and Beijing assessed the international situation in similar terms and saw the international environment as essentially hostile. adversary,

The United States was regarded as the primary bent on dominating other countries and

irreversibly committed to opposing "socialist" China and

40.

I b i d ., p.

14

41. I b i d ., May 20, May 15, 1966, pp. 1-3

1966, pp.

5-12;

and Zeri i P o p u l l i t ,

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102

Albania.

To counter w h a t they perceived as U.S.

"aggression,"

the two allies advocated the formation of a

"very b road united front" against the United States.

The

front was said to include all countries and peoples that "opposed U.S.

imperialist aggression, 42

control,

intervention

or bullying." The USSR was excluded from the united front because its leadership allegedly pursued a "revisionist" line, and was 43 "in league with U.S. imperialism." The Soviet Union was d e p icted as having entered into a "holy alliance" with the U nited States to contain and isolate China. Beijing adopted the "dual adversary"

imagery,

Tirane and according to

w h i c h the United States and the Soviet Union represented equally dangerous adversaries.

This imagery entailed a

tw o-front struggle against "imperialism" and "modern revisionism."

The two allies rejected Soviet calls for a

w o r l d communist conference and engaged in bitter polemical exchanges with Moscow. The Albanian-Chinese friendship and the general c o n sensus on foreign policy were reinforced by Zhou's third and last visit to Albania,

in June 1966.

Hoxha,

in a speech

at a Tirane mass rally in honor of Zhou, dwelt on the nature and objectives of the alliance:

42.

I b i d ., p.

43.

Ibid.

12

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103

We all know that our two countries are far apart geographically, but no mountains or oceans, no difference in the size of the population, can hinder the peoples of our two countries from mutually stretching out powerful, sincere and comradely hands and uniting closely together like two men with a similar soul and a lofty common ideal. Their soul is the ever-victorious immortal theory of Marxism-Leninism, and their ideal is to set up a world without exploiters and imperialism, that is communism to be reached through incessant struggles.... The militant friendship and unity of both our Parties and peoples are not the result of diplomatic intrigues and bargaining, but the result of a fierce joint struggle against the common enemies of the mankind — imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism headed by the Soviet leadership, and the result of the joint struggle for socialism, freedom and peace. Our friendship and unity have become an organic part of our life, our struggle and our victory. They conform fully with the interests of the freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples of various countries. All this proves that our friendship and unity are established on the mos t solid basis and will last for ever and ever. (44)

After the break w i t h Moscow,

the Albanians and the

Chinese accused the Soviet Communist Party leadership of having

"betrayed" Marxism-Leninism.

They insisted that

Tirane and Beijing w e r e the defenders of the "purity" of the Marxist-Leninist d o c trine against Soviet "modern revisionism."

Insisting that an organizational split had

taken place within the international communist movement, APL and the CCP expressed support for splinter communist parties.

44.

In an attempt to undermine Soviet influence and

Quoted in i b i d . , July 1,

1966,

p. 20

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the

104

control,

they incited opposition groups and factions within

existing communist parties and encouraged the formation of "genuine" Marxist-Leninist parties. Asian,

Thus,

in a number of

Latin American and West European nations,

new but

relatively insignificant splinter parties emerged. There were,

however,

some differences in the treatment

Albania and China accorded the Marxist-Leninist splinter movement.

While encouraging and sponsoring the

establishment of anti-Soviet parties,

the PRC evidently 45 was not interested in setting up a rival bloc. Albania, on the other hand,

favored the establishment of a well 46 o r ganized rival bloc. Hoxha probably believed the establishment of such a bloc would improve his bargaining position vis-a-vis the Chinese, domestic standing.

and enhance his regime's

In discussions with Chinese and

Marxist-Leninist party delegations,

and in public statements,

the Albanians demanded that a general meeting of the splinter p arties be held, p resumably in Beijing.

The Albanian party

called for closer consultations and a greater coordination of activities with splinter parties.

In a conversation with

45. For a review of China's attitude toward the splinter movement, see Joseph C. Kun, "Peking and World Communism," Problems of C o m m u n i s m , 23, no. 6 (NovemberDecember, 1974), pp. 34-43 46. During a v i s i t to the PRC in May 1966, Premier Shehu asserted that, "since the betrayal by the Khrushchev clique, the center of the international communist movement has shifted from the Soviet Union to China and the eyes of the revolutionaries of the whole world have turned to Peking and Mao Tse-tung." Peking Review, May 13, 1966, p. 9

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105

Zhou during the latter's March 196 5 visit to Tirane, Hoxha reportedly said:

We think that we must organize and coordinate our struggle against /Soviet r e v i s i o n i s t better. Even without organizationally coordinated work, our two parties have performed and continue to perform their full duty in the struggle, are clear about everything, and stand unflinchingly in the front line. But we cannot say the same of other Marxist-Leninist parties, w hich hold more or less sound positions. There are other parties, which have w eak contacts, at least w ith our Party. There are some of them which possibly consider the Party of Labor of Albania "hard" /Tine/ while they consider themselves on the "correct" road, because they are "cautious." (47)

T irane also adopted an uncompromising p o s ition toward those communist parties which maintained a neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

An article in the party journal

Rruga e P a r t i s e , in M arch 1967, urged the formation of a "monolithic front"

against Soviet revisionism and rejected

the "erroneous" position of neutralist parties.

The

article asserted that,

Anyone who calls himself "neutralist" falls on revisionist positions, and eventually ends up supporting the revisionists. The issue thus becomes: either wit h Marxism-Leninism, with

47. 1965-1966

Enver Hoxha, Speeches, Conversations, (Tirane: "8 N S n t o r i ," 1977), p^ 153

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Articles,

106

revolution, with socialism, hence against revisionism, or with revisionism, h ence against MarxismLeninism, against socialism and with the counterrevolution. There has not been nor can there be another road. (4 8 )

The Chinese,

however,

were unwilling to go as far as

the A l banians and risk alienating such "neutral" parties as those of North Korea,

Japan,

Cuba and Romania.

Again,

divergencies between the two allies were conditioned by d ifferent perceptions of their national interests and by the fact that China, as a Great Power,

had multiple

commitments.

-II-

Relations During the Cultural Revolution

A l b a n i a and China shared a common revolutionary experience during the period 1966-69.

The two governing

elites subscribed to the v i e w that it was necessary to wage an "uninterrupted revolution"

in the cultural field to

prevent the emergence of revisionism and the restoration 49 of capitalism. It was widely believed at the time that Albania's Ideological and Cultural Revolution was inspired

48. Hajro Zeneli, "The Creation of a True Revolutionary Unity of the World Prolet a r i a t Will Be Achieved With o u t the Revisionists and in the Uncompromising Struggle Against Revisionism," Rruga e P a r t i s e , no. 3 (March, 1967), p. 50 49.

Peking R e v i e w , M a y 20,

1966,

p.

12

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107

by, and modeled after, Revolution.

China's Great P roletarian Cultural

A closer analysis reveals,

however,

that in

launching their respective cultural revolutions the two governing elites were motivated by different concerns and, as a result,

there were some notable differences between

the two movements. By the mid-1960s,

H oxha had consolidated his power,

having purged a pro-Soviet faction in 1960. the Chinese leadership,

In contrast to

which entered an era of turmoil,

the A l b anian leadership was characterized by a remarkable stability and policy consensus.

Nevertheless,

Hoxha was

determined to prevent the rise of alternative power centers that m i g h t potentially threaten or undermine APL control over all aspects of the Albanian society.

As a long-time

observer of the Albanian scene, Nicholas C. Pano,

has noted,

... Hoxha was anxious to complete the process of nation building in A l b a n i a by eliminating those attitudes, traditions, and institutions that in his eyes stood in the way of the regime's efforts to achieve national unity and modernization. The m ain targets of this effort were the nation's religious organizations and the deeply rooted traditions of social conservatism and sectionalism, as well as other attitudes not compatible w i t h the APL's program for Albania. (50)

50. Nicholas C. Pano, "Albania: the L a s t Bastion of S t a l i n i s m , " in East Central Europe: Yesterday, T o d a y , T o m o r r o w , ed. by Milorad M. Drachkovitch (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 200

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108

Thus began a massive campaign of "communist education." Its main features were:

a radical purge and reduction of the

size and power of the huge party and government bureaucracy; a lowering of the salaries of party and state officials to reduce differences between mental and physical work;

the

abolition of military ranks and the reintroduction of political commissars wi t h i n the Armed Forces; the emancipation of women;

an anti-religious

climaxed w i t h the proclamation of the world's

a program for campaign which "first atheist

state" in 19 67; and a reform of the educational system with 51 the aim of eradicating any remaining Soviet influence. In contrast to developments in China,

the Cultural

Revolution did not affect Albania's foreign policy nor did it lead to political turmoil,

the weakening of party

influence or economic disruptions.

W h i l e the PRC's

relations w i t h the outside world, with the exception of Albania,

Pakistan,

and a few African countries,

seriously disrupted,

there was no similar downturn in the

P S R A 1s foreign relations.

In fact, A l b a n i a maintained more

diplomatic posts than China during 1967. control of the "revolutionizing" process

Hoxha was in in Albania, which

clearly was not the case with Mao in China. party leader,

were

however,

The Albanian

did not become the object of

deification as did his Chinese counterpart.

51. See Nicholas C. Pano, "The Albanian Cultural Revolution," Problems of C o m m u n i s m , Ju l y - A u g u s t 197 4, pp. 44-57; and Peter R. Prifti, Socialist Albania Since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 197877 pp. 143-49

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109

The Albanians were evidently distressed by the chaos caused in China by the Cultural Revolution,

the

disintegration of the CCP, and the emergence of the Red 52 Guards. Nevertheless, Hoxha's regime shared an ideological affinity w i t h the radicals in China.

The

Albanian party leader welcomed their ascendancy and emphasis on an ideological approach to foreign affairs. endorsed the campaign Mao and the radicals

Hoxha

launched against

Liu Shaoqi and his supporters, who reportedly advocated a strategy of "leaning to one side,"

i.e.,

the Soviet Union.

With Liu's political demise and the radicals'

preeminance,

Hoxha probably felt assured that there was only a remote chance of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the near future. A fter initial reservations,

the Albanians publicly

endorsed in the beginning of 1967 China's Cultural Revolution and the Red Guard movement.

T i r a n e launched a

well-orchestrated media campaign in support of Beijing's domestic and foreign policy stands.

High level Albanian

party and government delegations were dispa t c h e d to the PRC to "campaign" for Mao.

Editorials in the p a r t y newspaper

and journal hailed China's Cultural Revolution as a "valuable contribution" to the theory and p r a ctice of 53 scientific socialism. Hoxha's confidant, Kapo, and

52.

Enver Hoxha, Imperializmi dhe Revolucioni 1978), pp. 381-85

(Tirane:

"8 Nentori,"

53. Zeri i P o p u l l i t , January 14, 1967; and Rruga e P a r t i s e , n o . 2 (February, 1967), pp. 14-21. Tirane later claimed it supported the Cultural Revolution at Mao's "personal request." See Albanian L e t t e r , p. 34

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110

Defense Minister Beqir Balluku paid extended visits to the PRC beginning in January and February 1967, Throughout their visit,

respectively.

the two Albanian officials,

who

were received by Mao on February 3, paid warm tribute to 5 the Chinese leader and to the PRC's "revolutionary course." In a speech in Gvangzhou,

Balluku declared:

Today, the banner of Marxism-Leninism flies over the gate of Tien An Men; it is held aloft by the hands of the glorious Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Zedong. China today and the Chinese Communist Party led by Comrade Mao Zedong have become the backbone of the workers' movement and the communist movement of the world. Those who oppose China are opposing Marxism-Leninism, and are therefore counter-revolutionaries and revi s i o n i s t s . Those who defend China are defending the proletarian revolution and MarxismLeninism. We are proud to be your friends, comrades-in-arms and brothers. (55)

In his praise of Mao, Kapo was mor e lavish than Balluku. The entire world,

he said, "is illuminated by the brilliance 56 of Mao Zedong's thought." Kapo visited again China in May 1967.

In his speeches,

he paid w a r m tribute to the Chinese leader, maintaining

that

54. For coverage of Balluku and Kapo's visits to China, see Zfe'ri i P o p u l l i t , January 12-February 11, 1967 55. added. 56.

Peking R e v i e w , February 17,

Ibid.,

1967, p. 23.

Emphasis

p. 23

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I l l

"revolutionary" people all over the world supported Mao Zedong thought.

In a significant departure from previous

Albanian pronouncements,

Kapo referred to the Chinese leader

as "the loyal successor to the great cause of Marx, Engels, 57 Lenin and Stalin." This formulation a bout the Chinese leader represented a significant concession b y Tirane,

since the Albanian media

had hitherto placed Hoxha's "thought" on a par with that of Mao.

However,

the A l banians stopped short of accepting the

Chinese leader as "a Marxist-Leninist classic" or characterizing his thought as "the third and highest stage of Marxism-Leninism,"

as Beijing insisted in referring to

Mao. Chinese correspondents,

taking advantage of the special

relationship between the two countries, Albania,

travelled throughout

interviewing people from all walks of life on what

they thought about Mao and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Reports about the "widespread" study of Mao Zedong thought and the Albanian people's

"boundless love" for the Chinese 58 leader were played prominently in the Chinese media. No

doubt,

such reports were beneficial to Mao in the factional

struggles,

providing his faction with a measure of

legitimacy and favorable publicity.

57.

I b i d . , M a y 13,

196-7, p. 35

58. See for example, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought Guides Advance of World's Revolutionary People," Peking R e v i e w , December 2, 1966, p. 2 5

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112

On the occasion of the 18th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC, toured China,

in October 1967,

Premier Shehu

visiting m ajor Maoist strongholds.

rally in Shanghai,

At a

on October 11, Shehu expressed

unqualified support for Mao's faction.

He declared:

We hold that one's attitude towards China's Great Proletarian Cultural R e v o l u t i o n is the touchstone for distinguishing between Marxist-Leninists and revisionists and opportunists and between genuine revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Keeping silent on this tremendous event of such world historic significance means lacking a clear-cut stand in the struggle between the two classes, the two lines and the two roads, w hich is a v ital q u e s t i o n of principle. If any one comes forward to oppose China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it means that he stands on the side of China's bourgeois re v i s i o n i s t forces and supports their reactionary line which opposes Marxism-Leninism and socialism and aims at burying the People's R e p u b l i c of China. (59)

A t the conclusion of Shehu's visit, was issued.

a joint communique

For the first time, an A l banian-Chinese

bilateral document characterized Ma o as "a g reat MarxistLeninist"

and "a worthy successor and heir" to Marx, Engels, 60 Lenin and Stalin. The Albanians had b y implication accepted M a o as the world's top M a r x i s t -Leninist

leader,

and in return had ensured continued Chin e s e economic aid.

59.

Ibid., October

60.

I b i d ., p. 6

27,

1967, p.

18

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113

With the intensification of the Cultural Revolution and the mobilization of the Red Guards, the PRC experienced a period of great domestic political convulsion.

China

entered a period of virtual diplomatic isolation.

Between

1965 and 1969, delegation exchanges between the PRC and other countries dropped from 1,322 to 6 6 , marking a serious 61 contraction of China's foreign relations. With the exception of the ambassador to Egypt, all other Chinese 62 ambassadors, including the one accredited to Albania, were recalled for "reeducation." As China's prestige abroad reached a low ebb, its alliance with Albania gained greater importance.

Albanian

endorsement of the Cultural Revolution must have been of great symbolic value to the Chinese, and therefore an important bargaining chip for the Albanians.

Despite

serious domestic disruptions, China continued its economic and military aid to Albania without interruption. During this period the interests of the two ruling elites converged closer than at any time during the existence of the alliance.

On most issues, Tirane and

Beijing held similar ideological positions.

In

international forums, Albania provided consistent and

61. King C. Chen, ed., China and the Three Worlds (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1979) , p"! 28 62. China's ambassador to Tirane was implicated with Liu Shaoqi. From mid-1967 until May 1969, when Beijing announced that Keng Biao had been appointed ambassador to Tirane, the Chinese embassy in Albania was headed by a charge d ’affairs. See Hoxha, Reflections on China, vol. 1, p. 395

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114

unqualified support for Beijing's policies, and skillfully led the campaign for China's entry into the United Nations. Through its remarkably impressive propaganda machine, Hoxha's regime continued to portray China as a showcase of MarxismLeninism, supporter of revolutionary and national liberation movements, and a barricade against the two superpowers. Although there was basic agreement between Tirane and Beijing on major issues, Albania did not totally subordinate its foreign policy to China.

The two countries did not act

as a single entity on all issues, and even during the period of its greatest cohesion, the alliance was marked by a lack of consultation.

According to Hoxha, the Chinese were

reluctant to exchange working delegations or coordinate activities between the two parties.

Albanian party and

government delegations that visited China, were

turned into

"friendship" delegations for "mass meetings, speeches and toasts at banquets."

The Chinese ambassador in Tirane

served merely as "a master of ceremonies," while his Albanian counterpart in Beijing was rarely informed 63 officially about developments in China. And Hoxha was never invited to visit the PRC. After the Albanian-Chinese break, Hoxha would accuse the CCP of having attempted to force other parties to accept Mao Zedong thought and apply "en bloc" the Chinese 64 experience, including the Cultural Revolution. There is

63.

Hoxha, Reflections on China, Vol. 1, p. 395

64.

Ibid., p . 37 0

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115

little evidence,

however,

to suggest that the Albanians were

under pressure to adopt Chinese-type internal policies. Beijing was mainly interested in Albania's international solidarity.

The Chinese valued the alliance and were

responsive to Albania's needs even at times of domestic upheavals.

Tirane extracted a considerable price in Chinese

economic aid,

arms transfers,

and replacements,

cadre training,

spare parts,

in return for solidarity and perceptual

association w ith the PRC. China's influence in Albania's domestic politics seems to have been quite limited,

especially if compared to the

high degree of Yugoslav and Soviet penetration of Albania in the 1940s and 1950s, respectively. was never given precedence over Hoxha's

Mao Zedong thought "thought," which

was the onl y guide for policy initiation and implementation. It is difficult to identify any areas or institutions where the Chinese penetrated Albanian state and/or party organs. The Chinese seem to have b een satisfied with Albania's public support of their foreign policy and approval of domestic policies such as the Cultural Revolution,

and less

concerned w i t h whether Albania emulated Maoist-type internal policies. Nevertheless, inspired policies.

the PSRA did in fact emulate some ChineseSuch emulations were evident in the

adoption of the principle of self-reliance, military ranks,

abolition of

and cadre participation in labor activities.

But it m ust be emphasized that these policies conformed with

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116

the objectives of the ruling APL and were most likely initiated in Tirane rather than in Beijing.

In some aspects,

such as the abolition of religion and complete farm collectivization,

both carried out in 1967,

the Albanians

w ent further than their Chinese allies. Tirane and Beijing achieved a remarkable unity of perception about the threat in the international system d irected against them.

They were committed to a joint

struggle against what they saw as a the two superpowers.

collusion between

Albanian and Chinese propaganda

depicted United States behavior as adventuristic, provocative,

aggressive, militaristic,

and exploitative.

The Soviet Union was seen as cooperating with the United States in dividing the world into spheres of influence, and conducting propaganda and political actions with the o b j ective of subverting Albanian-Chinese unity.

While

B eijing maintained minimal contacts with Washington and Moscow,

Tirane maintained no direct political,

economic or

cultural contacts with either. The two allies also had an adversary relationship with W e s t e r n industrialized countries and "revisionist" Yugoslavia,

the latter the target of a pervasive

ideological propaganda campaign.

Albanian and Chinese

relations with those countries w e r e restricted. Throughout the 1960s,

the PSRA's external transactions

w e r e highly concentrated toward the PRC. requirements for economic,

technical,

Albanian

and military

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117

assistance were m e t by the Chinese.

Trade with the PRC

accounted for nearly two-thirds of Albania's total foreign trade.

TiranS embarked upon a self-imposed isolationist

and exclusionist policy.

Contacts with countries other

than China were kept at a minimum,

and penetration by

outside actors was avoided through the rejection of foreign aid and advisers,

foreign investments,

-Ill-

and tourists.

The Invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Alliance

With the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine,

which had ominous implications even for

the former So v i e t bloc members,

Albanian-Chinese tensions

with the Soviet Union became acute.

The intensification of

direct and indirect Soviet pressures on Romania and Yugoslavia, w h i c h gave rise to speculations that Moscow might attempt to reintegrate the Balkan maverick communist countries into the Soviet bloc,

and the massive

concentration of Soviet troops in the Far East,

reinforced

Albanian and Chinese perceptions of an imminent danger of Soviet aggression. The A l b a n i a n leadership seems to have been alarmed by the apparently unexpected Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia.

A t odds with its neighbors,

other European nations,

isolated from

and dependent on a distant ally for

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118

protection,

Albania found itself vulnerable to Soviet

mi l i t a r y pressure or outright aggression.

The PSRA m o v e d

toward detente with its immediate neighbors Yugoslavia, Romania,

and Greece.

Overnight,

Yugoslavia was transformed

from a traditional Albanian enemy into a potential ally against Soviet encroachments. external environment,

Facing a high-threat

Hoxha's regime placed common security

with Yugoslavia above ideological disagreements with Tito's "revisionist" regime. The first and m o s t coherent expression of Tirane's new strategy was advanced by Enver Hoxha in a speech on September 5, 1968, at the fifth CC plenum, which approved Albania's withdrawal from the War s a w Pact.

Concerned that

the Soviets might invoke the Warsaw Pact Treaty to justify intervention in the PSRA,

Hoxha argued that Albania had

nothing to lose by withdrawing from an alliance from which it had de facto been expelled in 1961. insisted,

On the contrary,

he

such a m o v e would enhance Albania's security and

increase its international prestige. continued to be hostile to Tirane,

Although the Wes t

Hoxha did not believe

that NATO would now attack "socialist" Albania.

The new

situation created in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia,

necessitated changes in Tirane's strategy.

Despite political and ideological differences with Belgrade, Albania and Yugoslavia were now declared to be engaged in a common struggle.

Hoxha perceived Yugoslavia as a barrier

against Soviet aggression and appeared confident the

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119

Yugoslavs would resist the Soviets.

He was less optimistic,

however, about Romania's chances of preserving its independence.

In a significant departure from p a s t policies,

the Albanian party leader argued that NATO support for Yugoslavia's independence indirectly enhanced the PSRA's 65 security. In a subsequent conversation with a g roup of pro-Tirane French communists,

Hoxha expressed the opinion

that because of Albania's strategic importance,

NAT O would 66

not stand by idle if the PSRA w ere invaded by the Russians. A joint Albanian party and government statement on August 22 denounced the invasion as a "fascist-type aggression," and accused the Soviets of having transformed the Warsaw Pa c t into a mechanism for aggression against, 67 and the enslavement of, Eastern Europe. The same themes were reflected in Premier Shehu's address on September 13 before the P e o ple's Assembly,

which formally approved 68 Albania's withdrawal from the Wa r s a w Pact. In conjunction with the denunciation of the Warsaw Pact, Tirane initiated a well-orchestrated media campaign against Soviet encroachments

65. The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, Dokumente Kryesore te PartisS sd PunSs se ShqipSrisS /Main Documents of the Party of Labor of Albania/, v o l . V (Tirane: "8 Nentori," 1974), pp. 416-32 66. Enver Hoxha, Kunder Revizionizmit Mod e r n 1968-1970 /Kgainst Mod e r n Revisionism 1968-1970 J, (TiranS: "8 Ndntori," 1979), p. 487

67.

Zeri i P o p u l l i t , August 23,

68.

Ibid.,

September 14,

1968

1968

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120

in Eastern Europe. Albania's reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia was strikingly similar to that of Romania and Yugoslavia. Bucharest denounced the invasion as "a flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of a fraternal socialist, free, 69 and independent state." Belgrade called the invasion an indirect attack on Yugoslavia and rejected the Kremlin's justifications as an attempt to hide the violation of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and Prague's forced subjugation 70 to Moscow's will. The three m a v erick communist countries repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine and declared they would resist Soviet attempts to encroach upon their sovereignty. They adopted similar defense policies,

increased defense

budgets and adopted strategies which called for the total mobi l i z a t i o n of the population and the waging of guerrilla war in case of foreign aggression. Cognizant of the great geographical distance separating Tirane and Beijing,

and of China's m i l i t a r y weakness,

Albanians apparently doubted whether, Soviet invasion, ally.

the

in the event of a

the PRC would turn out to be a reliable

Immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia,

Tirane emphasized the principle of self-reliance. before the People's Assembly,

69.

In a speech

Balluku declared:

S c i n t e i a , August 2 2, 1968

70. Review of International Affairs September 5, 1968, pp. 13-14

(Belgrade),

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121

The party and the government have always based the defe n s e of the free d o m and the sovereignty of our Republic on its own forces. This Marxist-Leninist principle has been and will be the basis of our people's m i l i t a r y science and art.... For us, the m a i n and decisive factor has been and remains the Albanian people and its Armed Forces. (71)

Tirane's withdrawal from the Wa r s a w Pac t was hailed by the Chinese media as "a courageous and resolute revolutionary action,"

and as an important contribution to 72 the international com m u n i s t movement. In a telegram,

Mao,

Lin and Zhou a s s u r e d Tirane that,

The 700-million-strong Chinese people . .. will always and in any circumstances unswervingly stand on the side of the fraternal Alban i a n people. If the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet modern revisionists, and their lackeys dare touch A l b a n i a in the slightest, nothing else but a thorough, ignominious, and irrevocable defeat awaits them. (73)

Although the Chin e s e message, w h i c h spoke only of support by the Chinese people,

did not represent a

governmental c ommitment of Chinese aid to Albania,

Beijing

drew a direct link betw e e n developments in Eastern Europe

71.

Bashkimi,

September 14,

1968,

p.

3

72. N CNA International Service in E n g l i s h , 0601 GMT, September 20, 1968; and Peking R e v i e w , September 27, 1968, pp. 9-10 73. B a s h k i m i , September 19, 1968, p. Peking R e v i e w , September 20, 1968, p. 4

1; and

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and tensions along the Sino-Soviet border and dramatically increased its anti-Soviet propaganda.

On September 16, a

day after the Chinese m edia reported Albania's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact,

Beijing protested to Moscow against

alleged intrusions into Chinese airspace.

And speaking at

a banquet in Beijing honoring the v i s iting Albanian Defense Minister on September 29,

Zhou drew a link between Sino-

Soviet border tensions and the issue of Albania's 74 security. Chinese actions and pronouncements helped boost the morale of the Albanian people at a critical time when their country was pursuing an isolationist policy, characterized by low levels of external involvement.

They

also helped improve the prestige of Hoxha's regime. Alba n i a and China strengthened their military relationship.

A high-level military delegation headed by

Balluku was dispatched to Beijing at the end of September 1968.

The visit provided a good o pportunity for both sides

to p u b l i c l y reaffirm their mutual support. 75 received by both Mao and Lin.

Balluku was

On the occasion of Albania's 24th anniversary of liberation,

in November 1968, a Chinese delegation headed

by Huang Yongsheng,

Chief of the General Staff of the

Chinese People's Liberation Army and a close associate of

74. Peking R e v i e w , October 4, 1968, p. 22. See also Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard U niversity Press, 1980), p p . 67-71 75.

Ibid.,

October

11,

1968,

p.

3

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123

Lin Biao,

paid a six-day visit to the PSRA.

highest ranking military delegation ever

This was China's

to visit Tirane and

un d e r scored the PRC's military commitment to Albania. is, however, visit.

There

little information on the results of H u a n g ’s

In his diary,

Hoxha is c o n s picuously silent on wha t

clearly was one of the m o s t significant Chinese delegations ever to v i s i t Albania. Huang's visit received wide p u b l i c i t y both in Albania and in China.

At a reception,

Premier Shehu remarked that

Albania was pleased that the Chinese delegation was led by the Chief of

the General Staff.

He declared:

L e t all Albania's external enemies, those flying the NATO flag and those flying the W a r s a w Treaty flag, whoever it m a y be, kn o w that the friendship b e t w e e n Albania and China finds its expression in fraternal internationalist relations no t only in the ideological, political and economic fields, b u t also in the military field.... The possible aggressors against A l b a n i a should no t forget that the cause of the Albanian people is shared by all the revolutionary people of the world. They should not forget especially the power of the g r e a t AlbanianChinese friendship. They should well bear in m ind that an armed attack against Albania cannot be confined within A l bania's boundaries, and that, in that case, the flames of the war will spread over all borders and reach the a ggressor's den. (76)

Desp i t e false reports in the West,

Tirane and Beijing

did not conclude a defense pact during Huang's visit nor did

76.

Bashkimi,

December 3,

1968, p.

1

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124

China establish naval bases

in Albania.

Nevertheless,

the

Chinese did increase substantially their m i l i t a r y aid to Albania.

Beijing helped modernize the Albanian air force,

including the replacement of the older MiG-15s,

17s, and 77

18s w i t h short-range M i G - 2 1 defensive fighters. In order to strengthen its defense capabilities, Albania made demands on China for increased security support. But the Chinese,

c o gnizant of their m i l i t a r y weakness and

the g reat geographical distance between the PRC and the PSRA, were not willing to m a k e a long-term m i l i t a r y commitment. In discussions with Balluku,

in September-October 1968,

Zhou

al l e g e d l y insisted that regardless of ho w m u c h military a s sistance it were to receive from the PRC,

tiny Albania was

in no position to de f e n d itself alone a g a i n s t Soviet aggression.

Therefore,

the Chinese Prem i e r suggested,

the

only w a y for Albania to cope with the p o s s i b i l i t y of a Soviet a t t a c k was to enter into a military alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania, 78 invasion.

both of w h o m were also v u l n e r a b l e

to a Soviet

The Chinese p r o p o s a l presented Tirane w ith a political and ideological dilemma.

Albania's rif t w i t h the Soviet

Union had been caused primarily by K h r u s hchev's re c o n c i l i a t i o n with Tito.

Although faced with a common

77. The New York T i m e s , November 29, The Washi n g t o n P o s t , M a r c h 2, 1971 78. Albanian Letter, China, volT p"i 419

1968;

p. 37; and Hoxha,

and

Reflections on

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125

Soviet threat, Tirane could hardly provide ideological justifications for an alliance with "revisionist” Yugoslavia. That such a step would render it vulnerable to Soviet-bloc propaganda attacks is indicated by the fact that the Bulgarian party newspaper interpreted the Albanian and Yugoslav denunciations of the invasion of Czechoslovakia as confirming

... the already proven deduction that at times of sharp class clashes in the international arena and brave actions by the communist parties, the leftist pseudorevolutionaries /i.e., the Albanians/ and rightist opportunists /i.e., the Yugoslavs/ get closer together and feel like twin brothers. (79)

Such speculations were strongly refuted by the Albanians. An editorial in the party newspaper on November 3, 1968, asserted that,

The Soviet revisionists and the capitalist press are wasting their time when they insinuate that the positions of the Albanian Party of Labor and the Chinese Communist Party regarding the events in Czechoslovakia are similar to the position of the Titoites and imperialists. This is nothing but stale propaganda addressed to naive people. Our Marxist-Leninist parties have never, nor will they ever slip into the positions adopted by the imperialists, nor into those of their agents, the Belgrade revisionists. (80)

79.

Rabotnichesko Delo, September 29, 1968

80.

Zeri i Popullit, November 3, 1968

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126

The Albanians have maintained that Zhou's suggestion that Tirane enter into an alliance with Belgrade and 81 Bucharest was rejected offhand. Closer analysis of Albania's foreign policy behavior, however, reveals that Tirane initially went along with China's suggestion, until Beijing initiated its ping-pong diplomacy with Washington in 1971.

Although Tirane did not enter into direct

negotiations with either Belgrade or Bucharest, Albania recognized that its fate was closely related to that of its neighbors, especially Yugoslavia. The recognition of a security interdependence with Yugoslavia was a major factor in Albania's cautious and unexpectedly mild reaction to nationalist disturbances in the predominantly Albanian-inhabited province of Kosove during November-December 1968.

Concerned lest destabilization

of Yugoslavia give the Soviets an opportunity to intervene in the Balkans, TiranS provided minimum media coverage to demonstrations by ethnic Albanians.

Although throughout the

1960s Hoxha's regime had portrayed itself as the protector and supporter of the rights of ethnic Albanians, Tirane did not endorse the protesters' demands that the province of

81. "The leadership of our Party considered Zhou Enlai's proposal about the military alliance he was seeking to impose on us an attempt of a reactionary character on the part of the Chinese leadership to drive socialist Albania into the trap of warmongering plots through military alliances, with the final aim of turning the Balkan area into a powder keg, as the Soviet socialimperialists and the U.S. imperialists are seeking to do." See Albanian Letter, pp. 38-39

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127

Kosove be granted the status of a constituent republic within the Y u g oslav federation.

Albania subordinated its ethnic

ties wit h the Albanian minority to its overall political and security interests vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia,

China sought

to take advantage of the disarray in E a s t e r n Europe.

It

denounced the invasion as a "monstrous crime against the Czechoslovak people," and accused the S o v i e t leadership of having

"degenerated into social-imperialism and social 82 fascism." In addition to supporting Albania, the PRC

embarked upon a new and flexible policy toward Eastern Europe. region,

In an attempt to undermine Soviet influence in the Beijing signaled support for Romania and

Yugoslavia's defiance of the USSR.

B u c h a r e s t was assured of

support in the event of a Soviet invasion,

although,

as in

Tirane's case, Beijing never spelled o u t w h a t form the assistance would take.

Beijing ceased its ideological

polemics with "revisionist" Yugoslavia,

w h i c h during the

early 1960s had been used as a whipping b o y in attacks 83 against the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the

'

e nunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine had serious

82. N C N A International Service in E n g l i s h , 0116 GMT, August 23, 1968 83. Robin Alison Remington, "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe," in The International P o l itics of Eastern Europe, ed. by Charles Gati (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 82-102

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128

implications for the Albanian-Chinese alliance. the short run,

Although in

the two allies were brou g h t closer together,

in the aftermath of the crisis both Tirane and Beijing reevaluated their relationship.

Foreign policy reassessments

following the invasion of Czechoslovakia ushered in a new era in Albanian-Chinese relations.

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CHAPTER IV ALBANIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS

1970-76

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 led to significant systemic changes in the international arena and in Albanian and Chinese goals, locational concerns. and Soviet efforts

geopolitical views and

The suppression of the Prague

"spring"

to reassert control over Eastern Europe,

following a period of liberalization in the wake of Nikita S. K h r u s hchev's downfall, Albania and China's

led to an increase in

threat environment.

As a result of

growing concerns about the possibility of Soviet aggression, both Tirane and Beijing reassessed

their foreign policies,

which in turn led to the emergence of divergencies of a multitude of levels of ideology and policy, with strong implications for

-I-

the future of the alliance.

Changing Foreign Policy Objectives

The invasion of Czechoslovakia made

the Albanian ruling

-129-

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130

elite realize that exclusive reliance for protection on distant and militarily weak China was an insufficient guarantee of Albania's security.

This factor,

together with

the perception of a Soviet threat to the Balkans, drove the PSRA. to seek an accommodation with its neighbors and to expand diplomatic and commercial ties with selected West

1 European and Third World nations. By the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, Albania felt less threatened by its two immediate neighbors. This change in perception was due to political changes in both Yugoslavia and Greece.

The 19 66 purge of

Alexander Rankovid, Yugoslavia's Vice President and head of the secret police, contributed to an improvement of the position of the Albanian minority in that country. factor,

This

together with Belgrade's adoption of a more moderate

attitude toward Tirane, facilitated the process of normalization of relations between the two countries. The first indication of a Tirane'-Belgrade reconciliation came following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Albania 2

implicitly aligned with Yugoslavia.

This was followed by

a modification of Tirane's propaganda policy toward Belgrade. An editorial in Zeri i Popullit in April 1969 pledged solidarity with Yugoslavia and Romania against Soviet

1. F.B. Singleton, "Albania and her Neighbors: The End of Isolation," The World Today, 31, no. 9 (September, 1975), pp. 383-90; and The New York Times, September 24 and 29, 1968 2.

Zeri i Popullit, August 27, 1968

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131

"aggressive aims."

While noting the existence of ideological

"divergencies" with its two neighbors, Tirane said it would back the "just" resistance of the Romanian and Yugoslav 3 peoples against Soviet "revisionists." Several months later, another editorial in the party newspaper reaffirmed Tirana's solidarity with Belgrade and Bucharest.

The

editorial expressed an unusually friendly attitude toward Yugoslavia:

... irrespective of the irreconcilable ideological and political contrasts which we have with the Yugoslav leadership, we reassert that we are brothers with the peoples of Yugoslavia and should their independence be endangered we shall be on their side. (4)

Tirane's public statements gave rise to speculations that Albania would seek a military pact with Yugoslavia and possibly Romania.

Obviously, the Chinese were very much

interested in such an alliance, for it would have seriously undermined Moscow's position in the Balkans.

But despite

Tirane's softening toward Belgrade in denouncing the Brezhnev Doctrine that had been articulated to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albania was not willing to sign a military alliance with its traditional enemy. Political differences between the two governing elites were

3.

Ibid., April 11, 1969

4.

Ibid., September 4, 1969

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132

enormous and could hardly be overcome within such a short period of time.

Moreover,

Hoxha feared the negative effects

an alliance with Yugoslavia would have on his hard-line domestic policies. Furthermore, proposing

that Tirane enter into an alliance with Belgrade

and Bucharest. proposal,

the Albanians questioned China's motives in

They concluded that,

in putting forth such a

Beijing was primarily interested in promoting

China's p o litical designs in the Balkans rather than Albania's

security.

Subsequently,

Hoxha would complain that

the aim of the Chinese strategy was "to turn Albania into an 5 arena of intrigues for the rapacious imperialist powers." The post-19 68 strengthening of the Tirane-Beijing m i l itary relationship had caused political concern in Moscow, p a r t i cularly after the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes.

The

Kremlin was evidently concerned that Beijing might use A lbania as a beachhead to form an anti-Soviet front in the Balkans,

by encouraging a Tirane-Belgrade-Bucharest axis.

Moreover,

the PRC,

although mi litarily weak and far away from

the PSRA,

p otentially could station medium-range missiles

Albania.

Such weapons could be used not only against the

in

Soviet M e d i terannean Fleet, but also against targets in the Soviet Union and in the southern tier Warsaw Pact member countries.

"8

5. NSntori,"

Enver Hoxha, Reflections on China, vol. 1979), p. 110

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2 (Tirane:

133

Soviet apprehension about Albanian-Chinese military relations was reflected in an article published in April 1970 in the weekly N e w T i m e s .

Quoting Western sources on the

alleged conclusion of an Albanian-Chinese "secret military agreement,"

the N e w Times claimed that a missile base,

under

Chinese supervision,

was being b u i l t in ShkodSr,

plans were under w a y

to station Chinese medium-range missiles

in Albania.

and that

The we e k l y accused the Chinese leaders of

... doing everything to make Albania their B alkan b a s e in the hope of being able to dominate Albania, to 'Sinicize' her people, and, u sing the country as a foothold in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the M e d i t e r a n n e a n , to intensify their a n t i ­ socialist, anti-Soviet activity. (6 )

Hoxha a p p a r e n t l y feared that the conclusion of an antiSoviet m i l i t a r y alliance between the three Balkan mavericks would invite S o v i e t reaction.

He could not d i s c o u n t the

possibility of a Soviet m i l i t a r y response.

Hoxha presumably

thought it m i g h t be safer for Alba n i a to dissociate itself from China's plans. In normal i z i n g relations w i t h Yugoslavia, step ahead of Albania,

and m i g h t even have p r e s s u r e d Tirane

to move more rapi d l y in mending

fences with Belgrade,

although there is no evidence to confirm this.

6. N e w Times

C h i n a was one

In June 1970,

Va l e r y Modestov, "Albania in Peking's Plans," (Moscow), no. 14, April 7, 1970, pp. 25-26

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13 4 7

China and Yugoslavia exchanged ambassadors.

This was

followed by delegation exchanges and Chinese declarations of 8

support for Yugoslavia's independence and sovereignty. Albania was apprehensive about the Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement and did not report the developments

that led

to the exchange of ambassadors between Beijing and Belgrade. In this connection,

the Albanians wer e m ost likely drawing

an analogy with the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement in 1955, which subsequently led to T i r a n e 1s rift wit h Moscow.

Hoxha

must have surmised that a Sino-Yugoslav reconciliation would eventually result in the decline of Albania's political importance to China. Beijing was eager to see Albania normalize relations with Yugoslavia.

Shortly before

between B e l grade and Beijing,

the exchange of ambassadors

the PRC gave wide publicity to

an Albanian o v e r t u r e to Belgrade.

On a v i s i t to the

northern districts of Kukes and Tropoje near the border with Yugoslavia,

Hoxha indicated Tirane was interested in

improving relations with Belgrade despite

11irreconcilable

ideological contradictions which originate from the fact that 9 the Yugoslav leadership is not M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t ." He spoke of a Soviet threat to Romania,

Yugoslavia,

7.

Peking R e v i e w , June 12,

8.

Ibid.,

December 3,

1971,

1970, p.

p.

and Albania,

6

26

9. For Chinese coverage of H o x h a ’s o v ertures to Belgrade, see Peking Re v i e w , June 5, 1970, pp. 7-9, and June 12, 1970, pp. 18-19, and 26

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and

135

added that Tirane would stand by its neighbors against any aggressor that would menace their freedom, independence.

sovereignty and

At the same time, Hoxha refuted foreign press

reports of a cooling in Tirane-Beijing relations. Marxist-Leninist policy,"

"Our

the Albanian party leader said,

"fully complies with the Marxist-Leninist policy of the great China of Mao Zedong in every direction,

in the political

10 line, economic line and military line."

In February 1971,

two-and-a-half years after the enunciation of the ominous Brezhnev Doctrine,

Tirane and Belgrade finally announced an

11 agreement to exchange ambassadors. Meanwhile,

Albania was making progress in normalizing

relations wit h its southern neighbor,

Greece.

The Greek

military gove r n m e n t facilitated the rapprochement by renouncing territorial claims against southern Albania. January 1970,

In

the two countries resumed trade relations,

after a hiatus of 30 years,

and several mo n t h s

Albanian trade delegation visited Athens.

later an

And in May 1971,

Albania and Greece agreed to resume diplomatic relations on an ambassadorial level.

12

In addition to mending fences with

its neighbors,

the P S R A established diplomatic relations with 13 several W est European and Third World countries.

10.

Ibid.,

J u n e 5, 1970, p. 9

11.

B o r b a , February 6,

12.

Zeri i P o p u l l i t , May 7, 1971

1971, p.

4

13. Peter R. Prifti, "Albania's Expanding Horizons," Problems of C o m m u n i s m , 21, no. 1 (J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y , 1972), pp. 30-39

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13 6

Albania's reconciliation with its traditionally hostile neighbors,

Yugoslavia and Greece,

represented a pragmatic

effort of coming to terms with reality after the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

But China's flirtations

w ith Yugoslavia caused uneasiness in the PSRA.

Albania's

lack of enthusiasm for the emerging Sino-Yugoslav entente and the concern that this would result in Beijing's relegating Tirane

to second-place position were quite evident.

But

Hoxha's regime continued to support China's Balkan policy as long as it conformed

to Albania's national interests and

as long as the PSRA continued to play a leading role in the PRC's Balkan strategy. After

the invasion of Czechoslovakia,

relations deteriorated dramatically, M a r c h 1969 border clashes. threat,

Sino-Soviet

culminating in the

In response to the growing Soviet

the PRC scaled down its C u l tural Revolution and

adopted a more moderate

line in domestic and foreign affairs.

The Chinese took several steps which indicated to Albania that

henceforth realpolitik would supersede ideological

concerns border

in the PRC's foreign policy.

In order

to defuse

tensions and neutralize the Soviet threat to China,

Beijing agreed to open negotiations w i t h Moscow, ambassadors,

exchange

and sign a new trade agreement.

Beijing's

tactical m oves in 1970 toward a modus vivendi

with M o s c o w introduced an element of uncertainty in AlbanianChinese relations,

and adversely affected alliance cohesion.

Relaxation of tensions and the initiation or increase in

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137

contacts with Soviet "social-imperialism," ran counter to Albania's militant stand vis-a-vis Moscow,

and revived long­

standing Albanian fears of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. In September 1970,

at the time when China and the Soviet

Union agreed to exchange ambassadors,

Hoxha rejected Soviet

offers for normalization of relations and indicated that Albania would not compromise with Soviet "revisionists." said:

History proved that it was they /the Soviets/ who yielded and are yielding before the steel-like Party of Labor of Albania and the Albanian state, wanting to stop the polemics, wanting the resumption of trade, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, etc. Being unable to bite our hands, the Soviet revisionist traitors wan t no w to kiss them, but the fist of the Albanian people and communists is clenched, it has struck and will strike them with ever more force. (14)

A lba n i a apparently did not appreciate China's precarious situation following costly border clashes and Soviet threats of a preemptive nuclear strike against the PRC.

Beijing's failure to consult or inform

Tirane in

advance about Sino-Soviet negotiations aroused further m i s t r u s t in Albania.

Tirane expressed displeasure with

Beijing by failing to provide media coverage to increased

14. Enver Hoxha, Speeches 1969-1970 "Naim Frasheri," 1971), p. 282

(Tirane:

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He

138 15

Sino-Soviet contacts and economic cooperation. The beginning of the 1970s saw radical changes in China's external relations.

The PRC emerged from its self-

imposed isolation of the Cultural Revolution period, deemphasized ideology,

and reestablished diplomatic ties

with a growing number of Third World and European countries.

In October 1971,

selected West

the Uni t e d Nations

General A s s e m b l y adopted an Albanian resolution assigning China's seat in the world organization to the PRC in place of Taiwan.

Thereupon,

Beijing began to pla y a more active

and assertive role on the international arena, to form a "united front"

attempting

against the Soviet Union.

Albania

now found itself competing with other c o untries for China's political,

-II-

economic and m i l i t a r y support.

Sino-American Rapprochement and the Alliance

In contr a s t to the Albanian leadership,

w h i c h continued

to demonstrate a high degree of policy consensus, Chinese

the

leadership was evidently divided in its assessment

of the international situation,

with two m a i n factions

advocating d i s tinct strategies of coping w i t h the perceived external threat.

The moderates,

led by Zhou,

argued that

the Soviet U n i o n posed a greater threat to the PRC than the United States,

15.

and maint a i n e d that relations between the two

Prifti,

"Albania's Expanding Horizons,"

loc c i t .,

p. 36

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139

superpowers wer e characterized by serious contradictions. In order

to cope with the Soviet threat,

the moderates

favored a tactical alliance with Washington,

and advocated

the n o r m alization of Sino-American relations. led by Lin,

The radicals,

insisted on a dual adversary policy in which the

United States

shared with the Soviet Union the status of

primary adversary. assessment of

They reportedly rejected Z h o u ’s

the international situation, maintaining that

the two s uperpowers had embarked on an anti-China 16 alliance" to isolate and contain the PRC. With L i n Biao's demise in 19 71, Beijing m o v e d accommodation w i t h Washington,

acceleration of U.S.

toward an

w hich throughout the 1960s was

considered by bot h Beijing and Tirane as on e of principal enemies.

"holy

their

This process was facilitated by the troop withdrawals from V i e t n a m and

President R i c h a r d M. Nixon's expressed desire to normalize relations w i t h Beijing.

Taking advantage of M a o ’s theory

of differen t i a t i n g among adversaries and cooperating with enemies of enemy,

"secondary" importance against the principal

the U n i t e d States was downgraded to a secondary enemy

with w hich C hina could align in order to check the rising Soviet menace. the PRC,

By mid-1971,

when N ixon was invited to visit

the Chinese had elevated the USSR to the position of

a primary adversary.

In a departure from p a s t policies,

16. Thomas M. Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic T r i a n g l e , Rand Co r p o r a t i o n R-1902-NA (Santa Monica, C a l i f ., November 1977) , pp. 9-30, p a s s i m .

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140

China also expressed support for the strengthening of NATO and the European Common Market as a counterbalance to Soviet power in Europe. In its rapprochement with the United States,

China

took

a unilateral action without consulting or informing Albania in advance.

According

to Hoxha,

Kissinger meeting in July 1971,

the news of the Zhouabout which TiranS first

h eard from foreign news agencies, fell on the Albanians 17 a "bombshell." Albania did not share China's new

like

a ssessment of the international situation.

While sharing

Beijing's concern about the Soviet threat,

Tirane did not

believe there was a significant decrease in the American threat to warrant, reflected,

as Beijing's policy pronouncement

the transformation of Washington from a primary

adversary to a lesser one.

The Albanians insisted there were

no changes in the nature of the threat posed by the United States and refused to differentiate between the two superpowers'

"imperialist"

policies.

While Chinese

propaganda became more flexible and sophisticated in analyzing

the relationship with the superpowers, A l b a n i a n

p r opaganda remained consistently negative,

and continued to

show concern about the preservation of the "purity" of Marxism-Leninism. Hoxha strenuously opposed any rapprochement wit h the United States.

17.

Hoxha,

His stand closely paralleled that of

Reflections on China,

vol.

1, p-

577

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141

Lin Biao. sight,

During

the summer of 1971, when Lin dropped out of

the Albanian media forcefully reiterated policy views

on the dual adversary strategy and people's war,

clearly 18

signaling Tirane's support for China's Defense Minister. Tirane lost no time in letting its views be known to Beijing.

In a letter to the Chinese party Central Committee

in August 1971, to Nixon,

the Albanians condemned Beijing's invitation

describing the American president as "a frenzied

anti-communist." opposition

Expressing in unequivocal terms their

to the Sino-American rapprochement,

the Albanians

emphasized:

Our strategy calls for close alliance w i t h the peoples fighting all over the world, with all the revolutionaries, on a joint front against imperialism and social-imperialism, and never for an alliance with Soviet socialimperialism allegedly against U.S. imperialism, never for an alliance w i t h U.S. imperialism allegedly against So v i e t social-imperialism. (19)

Public pronouncements by Albanian officials also reflected an uncompromising stand. on September

29,

1971,

In an acrimonious speech

Hoxha castigated China,

with o u t naming

it, for allegedly having deviated from the M a rxist-Leninist approach toward the superpowers.

The Albanian party leader

18. S piro Shalesi, "People's War and Its Main Characteristics,'’ Rruga e P a r t i s e , no. 6 (June, 1971), pp. 27-34 19.

Albanian Letter,

pp.

41-42

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142

said he did not object to the use of tactical alliances. insisted,

however,

to our ideology,

that such alliances

He

"should always conform

they should serve our strategy,

in the 20

interest of our socialist countries and of revolution." And at the 6th APL Congress in November 1971, Hoxha said that tactical alliance wit h the United States, NATO,

support for

and encouragement of the movement toward a united

Western Europe — approach —

all part of the new Chinese foreign policy

wer e ideologically unacceptable.

He reiterated

the dual adversary theory and bitterly denounced the superpowers,

insisting they were both equally dangerous.

Hoxha was especially critical of U.S.

"imperialism,"

characterizing it as "the chief enemy of all peoples, greatest oppressor and exploiter of other countries,

the and

21 the bastion of international reaction." rejected,

for the first time,

He publicly

Chinese suggestions for the

establishment of a Tirane-Belgrade-Bucharest alliance. Albania,

he said,

did not "intend to put forward or to accept

proposals to form Balkan blocs and alliances."

The Albanian

party leader also resumed ideological attacks against Belgrade w i t h a sharp denunciation of Yugoslav "self22 m a n a g e m e n t ."

20. Enver Hoxha, Speeches 1971-1973 "8 N e n t o r i , " 1974), p. 67

(Tirane:

21. Enver Hoxha, Report Submitted to the 6th Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania (TiranS: "Naim Frasheri," 1971), p. 19 22.

Ibid.,

pp.

9-55,

237-42, p a s s i m .

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143

The Chinese did not respond to the Albanian party CC letter or to Hoxha's speeches.

However,

they expressed their

dissatisfaction with Albania's defiance by refusing to send a delegation to attend the Albanian party congress. contrast to previous APL congresses,

In

the Chinese media

provided scant coverage to the proceedings of the 6th APL Congress.

Nevertheless,

China's three major newspapers 23 carried the full text of Hoxha's report, thus raising the

p ossibility that the A l b a n i a n party leader enjoyed support at the highest echelons of the Chinese party leadership. Beijing's failure to consult Tirane on developments surrounding Sino-American relations and other issues of mutual interest,

gave rise to different perceptions on

developments in the international arena and made it increasingly more di f f i c u l t for them to coordinate activities or agree on joint objectives. r approchement Hoxha seems factors.

In rejecting the Sino-American

to have been motivated by several

China's new foreign policy orientation represented

a sharp break with its ideological approach to world affairs pursued during the 1960s,

and ran counter to Albania's stance

vis-a-vis the West and the Soviet Union.

Ideologically,

Hoxha found it difficult to accept that China, until 1971 regarded as the showcase and center of Marxism-Leninism, could suddenly "betray" Marxism-Leninism,

and the cause of

proletarian revolution and national liberation struggle.

23.

Peking Review,

November 12,

1971,

p. 7

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144

Tirane had committed itself to a "revolutionary"

foreign

policy, with the dual adversary doctrine as its cornerstone. The Albanians were sensitive to Soviet bloc ideological propaganda attacks questioning the APL's ideological purity, and went out of their way to repudiate such charges.

Were

Albania to follow China's lead in reconciling with the United States, —

it would have been v ulnerable to accusations

repeatedly made by Khrushchev in the early 1960s -- that

the A P L leadership had "sold" the country to the "imperialists."

Since both superpowers were considered

equally dangerous and accorded the same polemical treatment by the Albanian propaganda machine,

rapprochement with the

United States could hardly be justified in the absence of a similar rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Moreover,

it is plausible that Hoxha,

clearly the

leading responsible official for Albanian policy formulation, had little information on the internal power struggle in the PRC.

Given the APL's

ideological affinity with Lin Biao,

Hoxha perhaps expected the reemergence and ascendancy of the radicals who opposed the Beijing-Washington rapprochement and was positioning himself for such an eventuality. Furthermore,

Hoxha's standing distrust of the United States,

stemming from aborted American efforts in the 1950s to overthrow Albania's communist regime and Washington's close relationship with Belgrade,

played a role in Tirane's

refusal to emulate Beijing's policy toward Washington. Although

the U.S.

threat to Albania's communist regime had

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145

obviously receded,

there was no change in Tirane's

p erc eptions. Perhaps an even more important factor in Albania's rejection of rapprochement with the United States was the APL leadership's concern about the potential adverse effects of such a development on Albanian domestic policies.

The

success of Hoxha's hard-line policy and social experimentation,

the most radical in Eastern Europe,

depended

to a great extent on Albania's insulation from outside influence.

Any lessening of tensions or uncontrolled

contacts w ith the outside world,

especially with the West,

were seen by the closely knit APL leadership as internally destabilizing as it might encourage, domestic forces demanding

directly or indirectly, 24 long-overdue systemic reforms.

Changes in China's strategic posture and its newly reactivated foreign policy of the early 1970s did not bode well for Albania.

With the PRC's taking of the Chinese seat

at the United Nations, Beijing's spokesman. Tirana's political

Tirane ceased to play the role of This had the effect of reducing

leverage with Beijing.

China expanded its

economic and technical assistance resources in cultivating the friendship of many Third World countries, which meant less aid for the PSRA.

In 1971,

the Albanians were told they

could not expect Chinese aid indefinitely and were urged to

24. For a similar v i e w on this point, see Remington, "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe," loc c i t ., p. 97

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146 25

seek aid from the West. But perhaps more importantly,

China's Balkan strategy

involved putting greater emphasis on "revisionist" Yugoslavia and Romania, position.

and relegating Albania to a less important

At the time of its entry into the United Nations,

Beijing reportedly tried to have Romania, Albania,

rather than 26 argue its case before the General Assembly.

Although state-to-state relations between Albania and its two north e r n neighbors had improved considerably after the invasion of Czechoslovakia,

the Albanians continued to

insist that there were "irreconcilable"

ideological

differences between Belgrade and Bucharest, and Ti r a n e and Beijing,

on the other.

Tirane watched with

resentment the steady increase in Beijing's with B e l g r a d e and Bucharest. economic

on the one hand,

interactions

And as China's political and

links with Yugoslavia and Romania increased,

its

interest in Albania declined. By initiating a rapprochement with the United States, the PRC, Leninism,

according to the Albanian view,

betrayed Marxism-

embarked on a "revisionist" path,

"the g e n u i n e socialist countries,

and abandoned

the Marxist-Leninist

movement,

the revolution and the national-liberation struggle 27 of the peoples." Chinese leaders failed to inform or

25.

Christian Science M o n i t o r , July 13,

1972

26. Dorothy Grouse Fontana, "Recent Sino-Albanian Relations," S u r v e y , 21, no. 4 (Autumn, 1975), p. 139 27.

Albanian Letter,

p.

41

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147

consult with Albania and the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties regarding

the impending changes in the PRC's foreign

policy orientation.

With China's emergence from its self-

imposed isolation and the expansion of relations w i t h most Western and Third World countries,

Beijing deemphasized its

role as leader of the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties. As a result, dissaray.

the splinter movement was thrown into political

Gradually,

coordinating center. October 1971,

Tirane emerged as the movement's An article in the party journal in

assured the Marxist-Leninist parties of

Tirane's unqualified support, countries,

insisting that socialist

i.e., Albania and China,

had an 28

"internationalist" duty to defend and assist those parties. Albania's support for the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties was reiteriated at the 6th APL Congress,

w h i c h was

attended by dozens of Marxist-Leninist delegations.

While

Beijing's interaction with the splinter parties had declined drastically,

an increasing number of Marxist-Leninist

delegations visited Tirane for consultations,

political

instructions and possibly financial assistance.

The APL's

support and propagation of the Marxist-Leninist m o v ement played a useful legitimizing role by showing the Albanian people that regardless of the changes in China's foreign policy orientation,

the PSRA remained true to its ideology

28. Petro Ciruna, "The Merger of National and International Duties: A Fundamental Principle of the APL's 30-Year Activity," Rruga e PartisS, no. 10 (October, 1971), p. 82

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148

and that it enjoyed parties-

Given the APL's strict control of the media and

the PSRA's Albanian

the support of most Marxist-Leninist

limited interaction with the outside world,

the

people probably had little knowledge about the

relative weakness and insignificance of the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties. In conjunction with its neglect of the splinter parties and in an attempt to undermine Soviet influence, to flirt with Western 1971,

"revisionist" parties.

China began

In November

the CCP leaders welcomed to Beijing a delegation of

the Communist Party of Spain, Santiago Carillo. China,

led by its chief

While the Spanish communist leader was in

the delegate of the anti-Soviet Spanish Communist

(Marxist-Leninist)

Party to the 6th APL Congress,

Raul Marko,

denounced Carillo as a "renegade" and "an agent of the 29 oligarchy" who preached reconciliation with fascism. The APL expressed its o p position to contacts with "revisionist" parties in February 1972 when it turned down an invitation to attend the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Italy.

While recognizing

contradictions and differences "revisionists,"

the existence of

between Soviet and other

the APL maintained

that these differences

did not have "an ideological and principled character."

In

an oblique critique of the C C P 's contacts with "revisionist" parties,

29.

the APL noted that,

Zeri i P o p u l l i t , November 6, 1971

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149

One cannot have contacts and talks w it h some revisionists because they have differences with certain other revisionists... Just as one cannot side with one imperialist to oppose another, one cannot side with some revisionists in order to oppose others. (30)

In addition to policy differences in regard to the United States and the splinter movement, emerged between China and Albania.

other differences

China saw the progress

of the European Economic Community toward a "United Europe" as a favorable development which would eventually offset American and Soviet hegemony in Europe. support for NATO,

Beijing expressed

because it kept a large number of Soviet

troops engaged in Europe, which otherwise might be concentrated on the Sino-Soviet border.

Albania,

on the

other hand, viewed NATO as an aggressive alliance and the EEC as an attempt by West European capitalists to create a 31 new "imperialist superpower." Tirane continued its fierce propaganda campaign against NATO and the EEC and called for their dissolution. China appeared powerless to compel Albania to its own foreign policy.

to conform

Withholding its aid to Tirane

would mos t likely have led to the disintegration of the alliance and to China's displacement as Albania's patron. Given Tirane's

role in the initial stages of the Sino-Soviet

30.

Ibid.,

February 13,

1972

31.

Hoxha,

Report to the 6th APL C o n g r e s s , p.

21

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150

conflict and Hoxha's staunch anti-Moscow policy,

it was

politically inexpedient for the Chinese to "dump" Albania at a time when they were seeking a broad united front against the Soviets.

Moreover,

it is possible that certain elements

within the Chinese leadership were sympathetic to Hoxha's stand.

This could account for the fact that China downplayed

its political and ideological differences with Albania. The PRC had embarked on a foreign policy reorientation that ran counter to the PSRA's national and ideological line. The emergence of political and ideological divergencies between Tirane and Beijing had a negative impact on alliance cohesion.

After the 6th AP L Congress,

Albania and China

could no longer agree upon common goals,

strategy and

tactics or coordinate activities

those ends.

towards

But

while defying China on several major issues, Hoxha was careful not to provoke a break with Beijing.

Tirane's

external transactions were still highly concentrated toward the PRC,

and Chinese assistance was indispensable to

Albania's economic wellbeing.

Hoxha continued to emphasize

the importance the PSRA attached to its alliance w ith the PRC,

and the Albanian media continued

to provide extensive

and favorable coverage of Chinese developments.

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151

-III-

Albania's Foreign Policy Restructuring

Dissatisfaction with China's new course caused the Albanian governing elite to rethink its alliance with China. The PSRA and the PRC no longer shared similar goals and, from both sides' perspective, the value of the alliance had decreased.

Presumably as a result of a calculation of the

costs and benefits of exclusive reliance on the PRC, Tirana embarked on a cautious, but significant, restructuring of its foreign policy.

The new policy was motivated by the

desire to escape political and economic dependence on Beijing and avoid vulnerability to Chinese pressures for political conformity.

Ironically, ideological

considerations, though operative, did not bar the expansion of ties with capitalist and Third World countries.

In his

report to the 6th APL Congress in November 1971, Hoxha implied that Tirana's political and economic considerations would be given precedence over ideological considerations. He said:

Our country has always shown good will and has undertaken constructive steps to maintain and develop normal relations with all countries with differing social systems, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, equality, respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, non­ interference in the domestic affairs of one another, and mutual advantage. (3 2)

32.

Ibid., p . 49

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152

The restructuring of Albania's foreign policy, which began immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, made a breakthrough during 1970-73, when relations were established with nine West European and 15 Third World countries.

Tirane made a concerted effort to reduce

dependence on China by diversifying trade, diplomatic and cultural relations, especially with West European countries. The PSRA increased trade, liberalized its tourism policies, and, for the first time, permitted a considerable number of 33 Western tourists to visit the country. Between 1972 and 1974, Albania's trade with the West increased from $39.5 million to $94.2 million.

While in

1972, trade with the West accounted for 12 percent of Albania's total foreign trade, in 1974 it accounted for 18.2 percent.

Trade turnover with the PRC during the same

period rose from $167 million to $219 million.

But as a

percentage of total Albanian trade, trade with China declined from 50.6 percent in 1972 to 42.3 percent in 1974.

Albania

also expanded trade relations with Yugoslavia and CMEA, but refused to reestablish trade relations with the Soviet Union. Between 1972 and 1974, trade with Yugoslavia rose from $12 million (3.6 percent of Albania's total trade)

to

$37.8 million (7.3 percent), and with CMEA from $111.6 million (33.8 percent) (30.6 percent).

33.

to $158.4 million

A breakthrough was also made in expanding

Prifti, "Albania's Expanding Horizons," loc cit.,

p. 39

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153

trade relations with the Third World with a substantial rise in trade turnover from a negligible $0.2 million in 1973 to $8.3 million in 197 4.

As a percentage of total Albanian

trade,

trade w i t h the Third World rose from 0.1 percent to 34 1.6 percent. Within a short time, Tirane made significant strides in diversifying its foreign relations.

However,

trade relations and cultural exchanges,

except for

primarily with

Albanian regions in Yugoslavia and with Greece and Turkey, the level of transactions remained low.

While political

relations w ith neighboring countries and selected West European and T h i r d World countries improved, no breakthrough was m ade in p o litical relations with Eastern Europe. Tirane repeatedly rejected Soviet and East European offers to normalize relations. turned down,

although,

Similar U.S. offers were also beginning with 1974, Albania's trade

turnover with the United States — countries —

rose steadily.

conducted through third

Within the Third World,

Tirane

displayed the greatest interest in improving political 35 ties with radical Middle Eastern and African countries.

34. Lawrence Kessler, Prospects for Albanian Trade with the W e s t . Staff paper. Project No. D-56 (80). (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of East-West Policy and Planning, April, 1980), p. 11 35. See Elez B i b e r a j , "Albania and the Third World: Ideological, Political, and Economic Aspects," in Eastern Europe and the T hird World: East vs. S o u t h , ed. by Michael Radu (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 55-76

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154

Meanwhile, declined.

the PSRA's political importance to the PRC

Chinese diplomatic activity and attention

gradually shifted from Tirane to Belgrade and Bucharest. contrast with the 1960s,

In

there was a sharp decline in

contacts and reciprocal high-level visits between the PSRA and the PRC following Nixon's visit to Beijing.

In early

1973, Hoxha wrote in his diary that the Chinese leaders,

... have cut off their contacts with us, and the contacts w h i c h they maintain are merely formal diplomatic ones. Albania is no longer the "faithful, special friend." For ^the Chinese leaders/ it comes at the end of the line, after Romania and Yugoslavia in Europe, after Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia in Asia. China does not take part in our political manifestations because it is afraid that it might compromise i t s e l f ! It sends us the acrobats, football and volleyball teams (since they are making tours of Europe) and nothing more. They are maintaining the economic agreements, though with delays, but it is quite obvious that their "initial ardor" has died. (36)

Albania's opening to the West was accompanied by a mild liberalization at home.

Hoxha scaled down the Cultural

Revolution and agreed to a relaxation of the APL's grip on the society.

China's abandonment of its former militancy

in favor of a pragmatic flexibility in domestic and foreign policies,

which was less suited to the strict austerity of

Hoxha's thought,

36.

Hoxha,

seems to have appealed

to some members of

Reflections on China, vol.

2, p. 41

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155

the Albanian elite.

For a time,

it appeared the regime

would finally break with its Stalinist past and initiate significant social and economic changes in Albania's highly centralized and repressive system.

Segments of the

party and government elite reportedly pressed for a relaxation of party controls, acceleration of

greater internal reforms,

an

the diversification of external relations,

and a gradual disengagement from an alliance wit h the PRC. The cooling in relations with China, economic difficulties, change.

seems to have fueled demands for

The reduction of Chinese aid had an adverse effect

on the Albanian economy. met,

coupled with growing

Plan targets for 1971-73 were not

and the construction of major projects was delayed.

Trade with the PRC dropped sharply in 1973 to $136.6 million 37 from $167 m i l l i o n the previous year. To offset the loss of Chinese aid,

Albania's economic elite apparently favored

strengthening economic cooperation with the West. Hoxha's innate distrust of liberalizing tendencies, however,

was reinforced by what he came to see as an open

challenge to his hard-line policies by Albanian cultural, military,

and economic elites.

In the cultural sector,

was a serious erosion of party control.

there

As a result of an

expansion of contacts with the outside world and access to foreign radio and television broadcasts,

Albanian youth was

being influenced by "bourgeois" and "revisionist"

37. W e s t , p.

Kessler,

ideology.

Prospects for Albanian Trade with the

11

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156

In the army, there was a widespread lack of discipline, erosion of the party's influence and deemphasis of ideology. The economy was lagging because of poor planning and a decrease in China's assistance.

Leading economic experts,

apparently convinced that basic economic reforms were needed, attempted to introduce self-management policies similar to those of Yugoslavia. The Albanian party leadership was divided on how to respond to growing domestic pressures for change.

This

marked the beginning of the breakdown of a policy consensus that had characterized the leadership for more than a decade.

Despite more than thirty years of rule, Hoxha

apparently was not confident that his regime could survive a period of genuine liberalization.

Alarmed that the

situation might get out of control, Hoxha abruptly withdrew the support he had been lending to the advocates of a softer line and reimposed a stricter centralized party control, reasserting once again the APL's primacy in all spheres of life.

He launched a series of purges that by

the convening of the. 7th APL Congress in November 1976, ousted three Politburo members, four Politburo candidates and 28 Central Committee members; and 24 of the 26 district party first secretaries were dismissed or transferred. And 38 between 1972 and 1977, there were 17 cabinet changes.

38. Nicholas C. Pano, "Albania: The Last Bastion of Stalinism," in East Central Europe: Yesterday, Today, Tommorrow, ed. by Milorad M. Drachkovitch (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 206

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157

Hoxha dismissed such prominent officials as Central Committee members and main advocates of liberalization Fadil Paprami and Todi Lubonja; Defense Minister Beqir Balluku; and the Chairman of the State Planning Commission Abdyl Kellezi.

It appears that these officials

were involved in major domestic and foreign policy disputes with Hoxha.

Influenced by developments in China, and in

view of the new circumstances surrounding Albania,

the

purged officials may indeed have demanded that Albania adopt a foreign policy more consistent with its national interests, broaden its contacts with the outside world, initiate reforms in the rigidly centralized economic sector, and relax the party's overwhelming grip on the society. To offset reliance on Chinese economic aid, Hoxha emphasized the principle of self-reliance and now rejected increasing trade exchanges with the West —

an option

apparently favored by the economic elite purged in 197 5. Moreover, Hoxha called for a decrease in Albania's reliance on foreign trade.

As a result,

total trade turnover

dropped sharply from. $517.7 million in 1974, to $495.6 million in 1975 and $359.1 million a year later. From 1975 to 1976, Albanian trade turnover with major trade areas declined as follows:

CMEA, from $165.6 million

to $137.5 million; China from $168 million to $116 million; industrialized West, from $115.5 million to $85.4 million; the Third World, from $9.4 million to $0.5 million; and Yugoslavia, from $37.1 million to $19.7 million.

For the

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158

first time since the break with the Soviet Union, CMEA replaced China as Albania's largest trading bloc.

Thus in

1976, CMEA accounted for 38.3 percent of Albanian total trade turnover, followed by China, 32.3 percent, industrialized West, 23.8 percent, Yugoslavia, 5.5 percent, 39 and the Third World, 0.1 percent. From Albania's perspective, the relaxation of international tensions had a negative impact.

As

Peter R. Prifti has pointed out, detente eroded Tirane's militant foreign policy and increased pressures for change 40 and reform. With detente between the two major blocs in full swing, negotiations underway for a European Security Conference, and Tirane's normalization of relations with its neighbors, Hoxha's claim of an "imperialist-revisionist encirclement" became obsolete. Albanian media adopted a highly negative stand towrard detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, denouncing the relaxation of tensions as a deal between the superpowers to dominate and divide the world into spheres of influence.

Hoxha was quoted as having said that if in fact

there was a relaxation of tensions, it applied only to

39. Kessler, Prospects for Albanian Trade with the West, p. 11 40. Peter R. Prifti, Socialist Albania Since 1944; Domestic and Foreign Developments (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), pT 244. For Albania's negative reaction to detente see also Trond Gilberg, "Yugoslavia, Albania, and Eastern Europe," in The International Politics of Eastern Europe, ed. by Charles Gati (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 109

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159

relations between the two superpowers and could never apply to relations between the superpowers and the "real" 41 socialist countries. An article in the party journal in July 1973,

claimed that as a result of the relaxation of

international tensions,

"socialist" Albania had become the

subject of increasing "ideological, psychological pressures."

economic, cultural,

and

The author of the article appeared

especially sensitive to Western criticism of violations of human rights and lack of freedom and choice in the PSRA, and warned of increasing pressures:

It is beyond any doubt, and we ought to be prepared, that the relaxation of tensions between the superpowers, will increase their various pressures against the real socialist countries, and against revolutionary and national liberation movements. Precisely during these so-called times of "tranquillity" that the enemies try to create, we must strengthen our vigilance and denounce even more forcefully their devilish tactics. (42)

Another article in the same journal, claimed that the aim of the "imperialist-revisionist"

ideological pressure

was to raise doubts about Albania's "socialist" way of life,

disrupt its political,

economic and social stability,

41. Shaban Murati, "'Relaxation of Tensions' in International Relations: Myth and Reality," Rruqa e P a r t i s S , no. 11 (November, 1973), p. 48 42. Sofokli Lazri, "The Imperialist-Revisionist Encirclement and Our Tasks," Rruga e Part i s e , no. 7 (July, 1973), pp. 39-40

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160

spread liberalism,

and encourage "reformist and revisionist"

ideas in the APL's Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

The journal

w arned of ideological contamination through foreign radio 43 and television broadcasts. Tirane refused to participate in negotiations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was

(CSCE)

and

the only European country to boycott the signing of

the

Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

Tirane's major objection was

that the CSCE was sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, precisely the powers that in Albania's v i e w 44 threatened "peace and security" in Europe. Albania also refused to take part in the 1976 Greeksponsored Balkan Conference,

arguing that nothing

constructive could be achieved through multilateral negotiations as long as there was superpower involvement in the Balkans.

Tirane stressed,

however,

that it was in favor 45 of bilateral cooperation with its neighbors. Despite its negative stand on the issue of detente and the rejection of multilateral meetings,

the PSRA continued

to expand its foreign relations and by November 1976

43. Sotir Manushi, "The Main Characteristics of the Current Imperialist-Revisionist Ideological Diversion and Its Threat to Our Country," Rruga e P a r t i s e , no. 12 (December, 1973), pp. 52, 60 44. "Conference on European Insecurity," Zeri i P o p u l l i t , July 30, 1975 45. Ibid., M a r c h 23, 1976; and Enver Hoxha, Report to the 7th APL Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania (Tirane: "8 Nentori," 1976), p. 207

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161 46

established ties with 74 states.

Tirane paid special

attention to improving its relations wit h its neighbors. a pre-election speech on October 3,

In

1974, Hoxha welcomed

Greece's partial withdrawal from N A T O and said Tirane was 47 ready to strengthen relations with Athens and Belgrade. He was especially critical of Bulgaria and accused its leaders of having become "dangerous Soviet provocateurs" against Yugoslavia, Albania,

Greece,

and Turkey.

Hoxha

implicitly sided with Yugoslavia on the Macedonian issue, denouncing Sofia's alleged attempts to create a "Greater 48 Bulgaria." Commenting on Hoxha's speech, a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that Belgrade was "willing to consider all positive initiatives in the direction of the further development of good neighborly 49 relations w ith Albania." 50 The development of TiranS-Belgrade relations, however, was impeded by Albanian domestic developments and Tirane's apprehensions regarding the increasing cooperation between Yugoslavia and China.

Yugoslavia's relatively

liberal domestic policy and market - t y p e economic management

46.

Hoxha,

Report to the 7th C o n g r e s s , p.

199

47. Enver Hoxha, Raporte e Fjalime 1974-1975 /Reports and Speeches 1974-19757 (TiranS: "8 Nentori," 1977), pp. 56-58 48.

I b i d ., p . 58

49.

Tanjug in E n g l i s h , 1333 GMT, October 24,

1974

50. Elez B i b e r a j , "Albanian-Yugoslav Relations and the Question of Kosove," East European Q u a r t e r l y , 16, no. 4 (January, 1983), pp. 492-97

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162

system were apparently popular with some circles in Albania. One of the most serious charges leveled against leading economic officials purged in 1975 d ealt with their alleged attempts to "introduce revisionist forms and methods of self51 administration" in the Albanian economic planning system. Moreover,

as political contacts b e t w e e n Tirane and Beijing

declined there was a corresponding increase in political contacts between Belgrade and Beijing.

In September 1974, 52 a Yugoslav Federal Assembly delegation visited Beijing. A year later, Premier Dzemal Bijedid paid an official v isit to the PRC and was honored by an audience with Mao. Commenting on Bijedid's visit,

a Chinese newspaper said

Yugoslavia's foreign policy was "playing a positive role in the cause of unity against hegemonism, a cause undertaken by 53 the peoples of the world." At the same time, the Chinese continued to press Albania to conclude an alliance with Yugoslavia.

Moreover,

in an affront to the PSRA,

Beijing

allegedly refused to receive a high level Albanian party and government delegation,

first proposed by Tirane in 54

January 1974,

to discuss strains in bilateral relations.

A lba n i a expressed its dissatisfaction with Beijing's

51. Hoxha, Report to the 7th C o n g r e s s , p. 123; and P etro Dode, "The Enemy Group of A. Kellezi, K. Theodhosi, and K. Ngjela, and the Struggle for their Elimination," Sesione Shkencore per Luften e Klas a v e /Scientific Sessions on the Class Struggle^ (TiranS: "8 N S n t o r i , " 1977), p. 170 52.

Peking R e v i e w , September 27,

53.

Cited in i b i d ., October 10,

54.

Albanian Letter,

1974, pp. 5-6 1975, p. 5

p. 49

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163

diplomatic shift from Tirane to Belgrade by increasing ideological propaganda attacks against Yugoslav "revisionism." Belgrade resented the renewal of Albanian polemics but showed remarkable restraint in responding.

The Yugoslavs

wanted to develop an interdependent relationship w ith Albania and to discourage Tirane from taking advantage of Yugoslavia's vulnerability

in Kosove in view of the

resurgence of n ationalism and growing unrest among the ethnic Albanians there.

Moreover,

amid growing signs of the

disintegration of the Albanian-Chinese alliance and the resulting power vacuum,

Yugoslavia was concerned about

Tirane's future foreign policy orientation and the possibility of a reconciliation wit h Moscow.

During a visit

to Prishtine in the heart of the Albanian-populated region, in April 1975,

Tito set the tone of Yugoslavia's policy

toward Albania.

Belgrade,

he said,

was interested in

cooperating with Tirane in all fields and would not respond to Albanian polemics.

Emphasizing the importance of the two

countries for the stability in the Balkans,

Tito added that

if Tirane and Belgrade indulge in m u t u a l disagreements, other powers, 55 interfere.

p r esumably the Soviet Union, would try to

With the decline of his popularity at home as a result

55. Tanjug Domestic Service in S e r b o - C r o a t i a n , 1059 GMT, April 4, 197 5. See also Patrick F.R. Artisien, Friends or Foes? Yugoslav-Albanian Relations over the last 40 Years (Bradford: University of Bradford Postgraduate School of Yugoslav Studies, 1980), pp. 23-24

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164

of the reimposition of a hard line domestic policy, Hoxha perceived the need for Beijing's support. onto his uncompromising positions,

While holding

he continued to stress

the importance of Albania's alliance with China.

In cases

where Tirane's interests diverged from those of its ally, the PSRA pursued an independent course.

Bu t on issues of

marginal importance to its national interests, continued to support China.

Albania

This enabled Hoxha's regime to

continue enjoying the benefits of the alliance,

although on

a considerably lower scale than in the 1960s, while at the same time asserting its foreign policy independence to a greater degree than ever before. TiranS-Beijing relations improved following the 10th CCP Congress in August 1973, radicals. congress,

and the ascendancy of the Shanghai

Hoxha was pleased with the proceedings of the which reaffirmed the line of the Cultural

Revolution and stressed Beijing's struggle against 56 "imperialism and modern revisionism." In a warm gesture to the Chinese,

the Albanians staged a big meeting in

Tirane on December 26, birthday.

1973,

to celebrate Mao's 80th

APL Politburo member Hysni Kapo described the

Chinese leader as "a great Marxist-Leninist of our e r a , " and the PRC as "an invincible bastion of socialism." theoretical works,

he said,

Mao's

constituted "a brilliant example

of the theoretical generalization of the revolutionary

56.

Hoxha,

Reflections on China, vol.

2, pp. 82-83

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165

movement and an example of the concrete application of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism to every problem, whether large or small,

of revolutionary practice."

fifty years'

the CCP had successfully waged

existence,

In its

numerous struggles w i t h i n its ranks against various antiMarxist trends and deviations.

But with the confirmation

and a "new triumph" of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line and Mao's thought a t the 10th Congress,

China now

represented

... the invincible bulwark of world revolution and socialism, powerful support for the liberation struggle of the peoples and inspirer of all those fighting for democracy and social progress. (57)

Kapo joined in the denunciation of Lin Biao, careerist, conspirator, 58 traitor." Initially,

two-faced man,

the "bourgeois

renegade and

Tirane had refused to criticize Lin.

But once the resurgent radical faction accused the former Defense Minister of "rightist" crimes, in the denunciation. late Lin,

the Albanians joined

By withdrawing their support for the

the A l b a n i a n s hoped to improve their standing with

the radical faction and also strengthen the latter's position in the struggle then g o i n g on in Beijing. The Albanians w a r m l y endorsed in the beginning of 1974

57.

Zeri i P o p u l l i t , December 27,

58.

Ibid.

1973

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166

the leftist-inspired "anti-Confucius,

anti-Lin"

campaign in

China, which coincided with H o x h a 's anti-liberalism campaign. In addition to extensive coverage of the campaign in the PRC and the republication of major Chinese press articles, m ass meetings were organized throughout Albania to show 59 Tirane's support. An editorial in the Albanian party newspaper in February 1974,

characterized the campaign as

the continuation of the Cultural Revolution and as a struggle for the defense and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the PRC.

It denounced the "rightist

opportunist essence" of Lin's counterrevolutionary line,

and

accused him of having sabotaged the CCP's dual-adversary 60 line. Tirane's support for the campaign against Confucius and Lin led to a significant improvement in the atmosphere of Albanian-Chinese relations.

High ranking Chinese government

and party officials attended receptions at the Albanian embassy in Beijing.

In a symbolic gesture, Mao's wife,

Jiang Qing,

attended a performance given by the Albanian 61 National Ensemble. And in November 1974, a high level delegation,

led by Politburo member and leading Shanghai

radical Yao Wenyuan,

59.

visited Tirane and participated in the

B a s h k i m i , February 16 and 17,

1974

60. "Struggle to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius — A Great Revolutionary M o v e m e n t , " Zeri i P o p u l l i t , February 17, 1974 61.

Bashkimi,

June 29,

1974, p.

4

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167

celebrations of the 30th anniversary of Albania's liberation. Yao, who had led a Red G uard delegation to Albania in summer 19 67 and had met Hoxha,

was given a warm reception.

an audience with Hoxha,

Yao held extensive discussions with

Albanian party and gover n m e n t leaders.

Besides

Radio Tirane said the

Hoxha-Yao meeting was held "in an atmosphere of unbreakable militant,

cordial and international friendship binding our 62 two parties, peoples and countries." Yao's visit unders c o r e d the ideological congeniality

between Tirane and the Shanghai radicals.

In a speech at the

construction site of the Elbasan metallurgical combine in central Albania,

one of the most important projects being

built w i t h Chinese assistance,

Yao hailed the APL for its

resolute struggle against "imperialism" and "social63 imperialism." Upon his return to China, Yao declared he had held "extremely cordial and friendly"

talks with the

Albanian leaders and that a "complete una n i m i t y of views" 64 had been reached. The thaw in Albanian-Chinese relations, short lived.

however,

was

Although the leftist-inspired campaign against

Confucius and Lin had led to an intensification of SinoSoviet hostilities, the United States,

and an increase in m e d i a attacks against the PRC pursued a p r a gmatic foreign

62. Tirane Domestic Service in A l b a n i a n , 13 30 GMT, November 28, 1974 63.

NCNA in E n g l i s h , 1721 GMT,

64.

Peking Review,

December 27,

December 1, 1974 1974,

p.

3

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168

policy.

In a further departure from an ideological foreign

policy approach, Third World,

China reformulated its policy toward the

causing consternation in Tirane.

Speaking at

the April 1974 special session of the United Nations General Assembly,

the chairman of the Chinese delegation,

Deng Xiaoping,

proclaimed the "theory of three worlds."

According to this theory, First World,

the two superpowers m a d e up the

the developed nations,

the Second World,

the less developed countries of Asia, Africa, America,

the Third World.

and

and Latin

Deng identified the Third World

countries as the main revolutionary force in the struggle against the superpowers.

In a radical departure from

previous policy pronouncements,

the Chinese representative

asserted that because of the emergence of "sociali m p e rialism," the socialist camp no longer existed.

The PRC,

a socialist and a developing country, was a me m b e r of the 65 Third World, Deng declared. The Albanians were caught off guard by the PRC's new foreign policy theoretical framework.

A l t hough the Albanian 66 press published the full text of Deng's speech, Foreign Minister Nesti Nase,

in his address to the General Assembly, 67 made no reference to the "theory of three worlds." Upon his return to Beijing,

Deng met with Albania's ambassador

65.

Ibid., April 19,

1974, pp.

66.

Bashkimi, A pril 13,

67.

I bid., April 14, 1974, pp.

6-11

1974, pp.

3-4

3-4

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169

to the PRC in an attempt to secure Tirane's endorsement of the new policy.

The Albanian envoy was told in unambigous

terms that the "theory of

three worlds" represented "the 68

basic direction" of China's foreign policy. Beijing's new approach to the Third World presented serious ideological problems for Tirane, did not v i e w the "theory of three worlds" as the Chinese.

According to Tirane,

and the Albanians in the same light

the new theory

represented a departure from the teachings of MarxismLeninism beca u s e it ignored

"class contradictions" between

socialist and non-socialist countries,

and failed to

differentiate between "progressive" and "reactionary" Third W orld countries. to the Albanians,

A truly socialist country,

according

could not include itself in the same group

with pro-imperialist,

fascist and reactionary countries.

And although capitalism had been restored in the USSR and the East E u r o p e a n countries,

Tirane maintained that the

socialist c amp had not disintegrated since socialism existed and was a d v ancing in the true socialist countries, PSRA and the PRC.

Despite serious reservations,

i.e.,

the

the

Albanians did not immediately criticize the "theory of three worlds," w h i c h later w o u l d serve as the mai n focus of Tirana's ideological attacks against Beijing. Al l i a n c e cohesion depends,

to a great degree, on common

68. C i t e d in "Notes on /Deng Xiaoping's/ Speech at the 1977 CCP CC P l e n u m , " Background on China (Chinese Information Service, N e w York) , B"I 78-006, May 17, 1978, p. 3

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170

perceptions of the threats in the international system and on how these threats change.

By 1975, Alba n i a and China no

longer shared a unity of perception on the nature,

intensity,

and origin of the threat in the international system directed against them, This,

and reacted differently to systemic changes.

in turn, weakened alliance cohesion.

N o t only did the

APL and the CCP disagree on the stand toward the United States, EEC,

but they also differed on such issues as NATO,

the Third World,

movement,

the

the splinter Marxist-Leninist

and support for the cause of r evolution and

national liberation struggle. militant views,

The Albanians held on to their

while the Chinese, as was reflected in

Zhou's report to the Fo u r t h National People's Congress in January 1975,

reaffirmed their commitment to a pragmatic 69 foreign policy approach. In July 1975, Hoxha noted that,

The Chinese w a n t our Party and state to lose the individuality which they have won through b l oodshed and sacrifice and to become a satellite of theirs. They want our clock to tick in unison wit h the clock of /Beijing/ in everything. This will never occur if /Be i j i n g ' §7 clock does not tick like the clock of Marx, Engels, L e n i n and Stalin, w hich the Party of L abor of Albania follows loyally and consistently. (70)

69. Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966-69 (Boulder: W e s t v i e w Press, 1978), pp. 38-4 2 70.

Hoxha,

Reflections on China, vol.

2, p.

131

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171

Political and ideological differences between the two allies assumed greater importance and began to affect stateto-state relations.

In the beginning of the 1970s,

tolerated Albania's political defiance.

China

By the mid-1970s,

however,

as the political value China placed on Albania

changed,

the Chinese willingness to provide economic and

military aid to Albania also changed.

Beijing was so

irritated with Tirane's defiance that it resorted to punitive measures.

In

assistance,

1975, Beijing drastically reduced its economic

causing

serious problems with Albania's

fulfillment of plan objectives and the postponement of major projects.

The Chinese agreed to g r a n t only 20 to 25 percent

of the credits Tirane sought for the Sixth Five-Year Plan 71 (1976-80). Trade between the two countries declined continuously, dropping from

$168 m i l l i o n in 1975 to 72

$116 million a year later. Albanian and Chinese reevaluation of their foreign policy goals and objectives following

the invasion of

Czechoslovakia brought about significant changes in their alliance relationship.

Different responses

to changes in

the international milieu emphasized the incongruity of the alliance.

The primary reason for Albania's failure to

accommodate Chinese demands that the PSRA adhere to the PRC's new foreign policy orientation appears to have been

71.

West,

72. p.

I b i d ., p. Kessler, 11

198 Prospects for Albanian Trade With

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the

172

Hoxha's concern that such an accommodation would have been internally destabilizing by undermining his regime's h a r d ­ line domestic policy.

Thanks to detente between the two

superpowers and other favorable international developments, the external threat to A l b a n i a had abated.

Thus T i r a n 8 had

fewer incentives to accommodate Chinese demands for international solidarity.

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CHAPTER V ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERACTION

The aim of this chapter is to analyze joint AlbanianChinese interaction in the economic and m i l itary fields and to evaluate the role of China's assistance on the maintenance of the alliance. constraints,

It deals with the nature,

and effects of China's assistance to Albania

and addresses such questions as:

To what extent was aid

motivated by political concerns?

Was the level of

assistance an accurate measure of Albanian-Chinese relations in general?

And was aid donation linked to

foreign policy compliance on Albania's part?

Alliance

interaction will be measured by such indicators as elite interaction,

trade,

economic,

technical,

and military

assistance.

-I-

Economic Interaction

Albania lacked economic viability and was dependent -173-

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174

on foreign assistance for its economic development.

This

factor had played an important role in Tirana's political alignments and realignments.

Because of its chronic

dependence on aid from other nations, vulnerable to pressures, affairs,

threats,

the PSRA had been

interference in domestic

and its independence and decision-making autonomy

had been seriously threatened.

Through its alliances wit h

Italy in the 1930s, Yugoslavia in the 1940s, and the Soviet Union in the 19 50s, Albania learned the painful lesson that economic vulnerability could easily lead to political dependency. In the late 19 50s,

the Soviet Union extended its

p olitical differences w i t h Albania to the economic sphere. Mo s c o w began to exert economic pressure on Albania,

first

by delaying the signing of economic agreements and reducing its assistance,

and then eventually cutting

altogether its assistance,

applying a trade embargo,

1 withdrawing its experts and excluding Albania from CMEA. Tirane was highly vulnerable to Moscow's economic pressures.

The greatest share of Albania's trade was with

the Soviet Union.

Albania's Third Five-Year Plan

(1961-65),

was heavily dependent on assistance from Moscow and its allies,

and the cancellation of aid placed Albania in a

1. See: Stefan C. Stolte, "Albania Under Economic Pressure From M o s c o w , " Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U .S .S .R . , 9, no. 3 (March* 1962) , p p . 25-34; and Evgeny Glovincky, "Soviet-Albanian Economic Relations," Studies on the Soviet Union, 2, no. 2 (1962), pp. 66-79

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175 precarious position,

jeopardizing its economic development.

2

Thus the concern with finding an alternative source of desperately needed economic and military assistance was a m ajor consideration in Tirane's alliance with Beijing.

A

W est e r n expert on Albanian affairs has even suggested that Chinese assistance was the overriding factor in forging 3 the alliance. Economic interaction between Beijing and Tirane dates to the beginning of China's political interest in Albania, following Stalin's death.

In October 1954,

Beijing

p r esented to the Albanian Government a grant of $2.5 million. C hina also shipped to Albania 20,000 tons of rice, 4 2,000 tons of sugar and other goods. In December 1954,

the

PRC extended to Albania a low-interest loan of $12.5 million for goods to be provided during the period 1955-60.^

As

political differences emerged betw e e n China and Albania, on the one hand,

and the Soviet Union,

on the other hand,

Beijing increased its assistance to Tirane.

Thus,

in

2. Robert O w e n Freedman, Economic Warfare in the C o m munist Bloc; A Study of Soviet Economic Pressure Against Yugoslavia, Albania and Communist China (New York: Praeger P u b l i s h e r s , 1970) , p"! 70 3. Louis Zanga, "An Intensive Relationship of Short Duration," RAD Background Report/169 (Albania) Radio Free E urope R e s e a r c h , August 1, 1978, p. 5 4.

Zeri i P o p u l l i t , December 4, 1954

5. John F r a n k l i n Copper, China's Foreign Aid: An Instrument of Peking's Foreign P o l i c y (Lexington, M a s s .: D . C . Heath and Company, 1976), p^ 6] and Peter R. Prifti, Socialist Albania Since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments (Cambridge, M a s s . : M I T Press, 1978), pp. 80-81

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176

January 1959, Beijing doubled its aid to Tirane by extending a new loan for $13.75 mill i o n for Albania's Third Five-Year 6

Plan. In 1961, Moscow and its allies cancelled their loans the PSRA's Third Five-Year Plan,

for

totalling $118.75 million.

This had serious economic as well as political implications for Albania.

Tirane dispatched a high governmental

delegation to Beijing,

headed by Abdyl Kellezi,

Deputy-Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

then

In April 1961,

China granted Albania a loan of $125 million, which more than matched the cancelled Soviet and East European loans. The loan — time —

the largest ever extended by Beijing up to that

was intended to cover payment for the purchase of

equipment for twenty-five industrial plants, agricultural machinery,

tractors,

consumer goods an d other products.

Beijing also agreed to send to Albania experts to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Soviet and E ast European experts.

It is important to note that the Chinese gave

aid to Albania in 1961 during the height of Great Leap Forward crisis,

their domestic

when agricultural and industrial

output had nearly collapsed and there was famine.

The

Albanians were probably aware of the Chinese crisis and the substantial aid they received must have enhanced their confidence in Chinese good faith.

6.

Peking R e v i e w , January 20,

1957

7. Bashkimi, A pril 26, 1961, p. 1; and Jan S. Prybyla, "Albania's Economic Vassalage," East E u r o p e , 16, no. 1 (January, 1967), pp. 10-11

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177

China and Albania concluded yearly agreements on the u se of assistance.

In accordance with these agreements,

the PRC supplied Albania with grain, various steel products, tractors, rubber,

chemical fertilizers,

paper, cotton,

agricultural machinery,

lubricating oil,

v ari o u s types and other commodities. c hrome ore,

iron nickel ore,

tobacco and other goods.

steel tubes of

In return,

crude oil,

asphalt,

it received copper,

The two allies exchanged

scientific and technical experience and provided each other w it h aid in fields such as textile and other branches of light industry,

the chemical,

building and machine-building g

industries,

agriculture,

public health,

etc.

betw e e n the two nations increased dramatically.

Tirade By 196 4,

trade with China accounted for 55.3 percent of Albania's total foreign trade.

9

The Albanians have described the period of the Third Five-Year Plan as the m o s t critical period in their postW o r l d War II history.

10

Tirane acclaimed China's assistance

as an important factor in Albania's economic development.

8.

Peking R e v i e w , January 19,

1962, pp. 10-11

9. Vasil Kati, "The Development and Change in the Structure of Our Foreign Trade During the Years of People's Power," Ekonomia Popullore, no. 5 (September-October, 1964), p. 50 10. Hoxha's report to the 3rd APL Congress, in the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, Dokumente Kryesore te Partise se PunSs te Shqiperise ,/Rain Documents of the Party of Labor of Albania7, vol. 5~(Tirane: " 8 Nentori," 1974), pp. 62-86. Hereafter cited as Dokumente Kryesore.

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178

During 1962-65, numerous factories and plants were built and put into operation with Chinese help. ones were:

the hydroelectric power plants on the Mati and

Bistrica Rivers, and Rubik,

The most important

the copper metallurgical plants at Kukes

the tractors spare parts plant in Tirane,

textile mills in Berat,

the

and the oil refinery in Stalin

11 City. But despite considerable Chinese help,

the Albanians

were forced to postpone the construction of important industrial projects. were not met.

the overall plan targets

The plan had foreseen that in 1965,

compared to 1960, 52 percent,

Moreover,

industrial production would increase by

agricultural output 72 percent,

income 56 percent.

as

However,

and national

industrial production

increased by only 39 percent, 36 percent,

agricultural output 12 and national income 32 percent.

An Albanian economic delegation,

headed by Spiro Koleka,

Deputy-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, visited China in June 1965, and signed an agreement on a Chinese loan for 13 Albania's Fourth Five-Year Plan. No details-were disclosed,

but it was estimated that the loan amounted to

11. Murat Klosi, 25 Years of Construction Wor k in Socialist Albania (TiranS: "Naim Frasheri," 1969), pp. 17-19 12. Dokumente K r y e s o r e , vol. 5, pp. 207-08; and Nicholas C. Pano, The People's Republic of Albania (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 176-77 13. June 11,

B a s h k i m i , June 9, 1965, 1965, p. 4

p.

1; and Peking R e v i e w ,

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179 14

$214 million.

In October

1966,

the PRC granted Albania a

loan for the development of the petroleum industry, • 15 no details were disclosed. Even during the Cultural Revolution, faced wit h serious internal problems, assistance to Albania. commissioned,

but again

when China was

Beijing continued its

Between 1965 and 1970, Albania

with Chinese assistance,

41 important projects. 16 Twenty-four of these projects were in heavy industry. During September-December delegation,

1968,

an Albanian economic

headed by Adi l £ar