Unequal Treaties and China 9781623201135, 9781623201128

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Volume 2

Wang Jianlang

Unequal Treaties and China

UNEQUAL TREATIES AND CHINA Volume 2

WANG JIANLANG

Published by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. Suite 208 Davies Pacific Center 841 Bishop Street Honolulu, HI, 96813 Website: www.enrichprofessional.com A Member of Enrich Culture Group Limited Hong Kong Head Office: 11/F, Benson Tower, 74 Hung To Road, Kwun Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China China Office: Rm 309, Building A, Central Valley, 16 Haidian Middle Street, Haidian District, Beijing, China Singapore Office: 16L, Enterprise Road, Singapore 627660 Trademarks: SILKROAD PRESS and related trade dress are trademarks or registered trademarks of Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and other countries, and may not be used without written permission. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Chinese original edition © 2000 by Jiangxi People’s Publishing House By Wang Jianlang English edition © 2016 by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. With the title Unequal Treaties and China Volume 2 Translated by Li Tong Edited by Li Tong and Phoebe Poon All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without prior written permission from the Publisher. ISBN (Hardback) ISBN (pdf)

978-1-62320-112-8 978-1-62320-113-5

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.

Contents Chapter 5

The Nanjing Government’s Revolutionary Diplomacy ............... 1

Chapter 6

The Abrogation of Unequal Treaties ............................................55



during the Second Sino-Japanese War

Chapter 7

Finale: The End of the Era of Unequal Treaties ..........................105

Notes

............................................................................................................127

Bibliography

............................................................................................................143

Index

............................................................................................................151

5

Chapter

The Nanjing Government’s Revolutionary Diplomacy

UNEQUAL TREATIES AND CHINA VOLUME 2

In June 1928, the Nationalist army occupied Beijing and the Nanjing Nationalist Government became the central government of China. Having ended the situation of warlordism and national disintegration, the Nanjing government held much greater national power than the Beiyang government, and hence had greater authority in negotiations with the powers. Thus a new phase was opened for the revision of unequal treaties. To revise and abolish unequal treaties became the focus of the diplomatic endeavors of the Nanjing government in its early years, which are commonly referred to as a period of “revolutionary diplomacy”.

Revolutionary Diplomacy: An Iron Fist With a Rubbery Surface As soon as it unified the country, the Nationalist government started making known to the powers its renewed determination to conclude new treaties with them. On June 7, 1928, the Nationalist government released its foreign policy, announcing the end of the period of military rule and its plan to focus on construction and rectification thereafter. It stated that the shackles of unequal treaties constrained the development of the nation and pressed upon the urgency of concluding equal treaties. On top of making it clear that relinquishing privileges in part would not be enough to stabilize Sino-foreign relations, the government also welcomed any material assistance from friendly nations and expressed that China neither could tolerate international oppression nor survive in international isolation.1 Another important statement was issued on June 15, declaring that the existence of unequal treaties went against the principle of mutual respect of sovereignty and would not be tolerated by any independent countries. Seizing upon foreign sympathy for China, the statement demonstrated: “Now that the unification of China is being consummated we think the time is ripe for taking further steps and begin at once to negotiate — in accordance with diplomatic procedure — new treaties on a basis of complete equality and mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty.” It argued that such a move would enhance “the friendly relations between China and the other powers,” “good will among the people,” “China’s international trade,” and “other facilities for transportation,” as well as provide “even better protection” for “the lives and property of foreigners in China.”2 On July 6, the Central Committee of the Kuomintang (KMT) adopted the “Declaration on the Conclusion of New Treaties,” which was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the next day. It put forward three concrete principles: 1. Those treaties between the Republic of China and foreign countries

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which have expired should ipso facto be abrogated and new treaties concluded. 2. For those treaties which have not yet expired, the Nationalist Government shall resort to proper procedure to release [its treaty obligations] and renegotiate new ones. 3. For those countries whose treaties [with China] have expired and where new treaties have not yet been concluded, the Nationalist Government shall enact proper provisional measures to deal with the situation.3 On July 9, the provisional measures were released. It was prescribed: 1. The term [“]foreign countries[”] and [“]foreigners,[”] as hereinafter used, refer only to those foreign countries and their nationals whose old treaties have been terminated and with whom new treaties have not yet been renewed. 2. Diplomatic and consular officers of foreign countries resident in China shall be accorded such treatment as is granted by international law. 3. The persons and property of foreigners in China shall be subjected to the regulations of the Chinese law and subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese. 4. [sic] Pending enforcement of the national tariff, the customs duties payable on commodities imported into China from foreign countries or by foreigners, and on those exported from China to foreign countries shall be collected in conformity with the regulations now in force. 5. All taxes and impositions which Chinese citizens are in duty bound to pay shall be paid likewise by foreigners in China in accordance with the regulations. 6. Matters not hereby covered shall be dealt with according to international law and the law of China.4 In terms of how to abrogate unequal treaties, the government had no absolute consensus. Some advocated decisive actions and unilaterally announcing the abrogation of the treaties, while others were inclined to deal with the issue more moderately through negotiations. He Yingqing was among the radicals. He and his supporters submitted a proposal to the KMT Central Committee on July 21, pointing out that the KMT should wean itself off the diplomacy of the “traitorous and phony Beiyang government” and resolutely implemented “revolutionary diplomacy.” “To expect foreign countries’ sympathy and understanding by “a weak and pleading approach,” they said, was “the dream of a fool.” According

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to the radicals, in the implementation of revolutionary diplomacy, fearlessness of all kinds of intimidation, even military threats, was essential and sacrifices were inevitable, although it was also necessary to take advantage of the international situation and acquire an equal status for China through witty diplomatic tactics. They drew a thick line between the abolition and revision of treaties, advocating “fundamental abrogation” instead of “perfunctory revision” in revolutionary diplomacy. Arguing that what the Chinese people wished to abolish were not only the expired treaties but also “all unequal treaties that [had] yet to expire and inappropriate foreign debts,” especially those on tariff control, consular jurisdiction, and the navigation of foreign vessels in Chinese inland waters, they urged that the government employ a “revolutionary spirit” rather than formalities and announce the abrogation of all unequal treaties as soon as it unified the country.5 On the other hand, there was another group preferring a more prudent approach in dealing with foreign relations for its possible implications on a country’s rise and fall. According to them, the Nanjing government should never again repeat the Wuhan government’s forced recovery of the British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang, which could at most bring incidental success. But as far as the fundamental principle was concerned, both groups had in mind Sun Yat-sen’s unfinished mission of abrogating unequal treaties which he put down in his will; both views sought to realize Article 4 of Sun’s Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (Jianguo dagang 建國大綱), which reads: “It [the government] should resist foreign aggression, and simultaneously revise foreign treaties in order to restore our equality and independence among the nations.”6 Therefore, there existed another voice in the government: that the debate over treaty abrogation and revision was a meaningless quibble because despite the different reasoning behind the two views, they were but “different paths leading to the same destination.” In their point of view, both approaches were aimed at restoring freedom and equality, and either way, it was impossible for China to not have treaties with other countries because she was too weak to bear the risks of being isolated. Given their mild language, this middle-of-the-road group was essentially more pro-revision than otherwise. As for C. T. Wang, who was the foreign minister then, he once figuratively described his revolutionary diplomacy as “an iron fist with a rubbery surface.” Self-explanatorily, the “iron fist” denotes determination while the “rubbery surface” suggests moderate means. He identified from past experiences two kinds of attempts to abolish unequal treaties: one was to make unilateral announcements and the other was to negotiate with the powers, neither of which had proved to be particularly effective. His own principle was rather ambiguously worded: “I hold the view that the way of tackling the abrogation of unequal treaties is to resolutely

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notify upon the expiration of treaties the countries with which the treaties had expired that they were unrenewable … and then conclude new treaties on the basis of the equal spirit of mutual respect, in accordance with international law, and adapting to the change of circumstances.”7 It could be seen from his actual application of the theory that the tool of negotiation was more frequently used than unilateral action. The so-called “revolutionary diplomacy” was basically revisionary tactics in spite of its name.

The Resumption of Tariff Autonomy U.S. initiative The Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorized the privileges that foreign powers acquired through unequal treaties into five types: tariff control, consular jurisdiction, foreign concessions and leased territories, navigation in inland waters, and garrisons of foreign troops. Among them, the most devastating ones for China appeared to be tariff control and consular jurisdiction, and the termination of foreign tariff control was considered to be more imperative by the government for its severe impediment of China’s economic development. C. T. Wang illustrated the importance of restoring tariff autonomy by metaphorically comparing commerce to a duel: before tariff autonomy was restored, China was fighting with bare hands against the guns of foreign powers, in which case “which side would win and which side would lose could be told right away.”8 A reason not explicated by Wang was that the resumption of tariff autonomy would greatly relieve the financial plight of the Nationalist government. The Nanjing government divided all treaty countries into countries with expired treaties and yet-to-expired treaties, in order to deal with those having expired treaties first. At that time, the commercial treaties with Belgium, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, and Japan had successively expired. On July 1, 1928, Wang sent identic notes to the Italian and Danish ministers in China, with whose countries China’s commercial treaties had expired on June 30. Pointing out that it had been more than 60 years since the respective treaties were concluded, he argued: During that long period of time, conditions in both countries, political, economic, as well as commercial, have either undergone fundamental changes, or entirely ceased to exist. It may be noted that the stipulations contained in the Treaty of 1866 have by their very nature close relationship

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to the circumstances prevailing at the time of its conclusion. Now that such circumstances have altered, it is clear that in the common interests of China and Italy [Denmark in the Danish version], the said treaty shall not be allowed to continue in existence…. The Nationalist Government, therefore, consider the Treaty of 1866 terminated as from June 30, 1928. China also called for the conclusion of new treaties with Italy and Denmark based on the principle of equality and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty.9 Subsequently, the Nanjing government sent similar notes to France, Japan, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, informing them of the termination of the expired treaties and expressing its wish for concluding new treaties. The diplomatic corps held negative attitudes towards China’s action. In a meeting on July 18, they came to the basic consensus that the old treaties should only be invalidated after the conclusion of new ones and criticized the Nanjing government for not going through the necessary formalities. However, except for Japan, which put forward strong opposition, the powers were not against sending representatives to negotiate for new treaties with China. While most countries were hesitant as to what gestures to make, the United States took the lead in showing friendly initiatives. On June 23, in response to the Nanjing government’s request for treaty negotiations, Secretary of State Kellogg authorized Minister in China MacMurray to inform the Nationalist government that the United States was willing to start negotiations for revising the tariff provisions and was “prepared to agree that all provisions in treaties … relating to the rates of duty upon the importation and exportation of merchandise, drawbacks, and tonnage dues in China shall be annulled and become inoperative as of and from January 1, 1929, or 4 months after this treaty becomes effective.” The conditions put forward by the United States were that both contracting parties shall enjoy in each other’s territory “treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country” as far as tariff matters were concerned, and nationals of neither parties shall be compelled to pay in the other’s territory “internal charges or taxes other or higher than such charges or taxes paid by nationals of the country or by nationals of any other countries.”10 At that time, the powers had yet to grant formal recognition to the Nanjing government; the U.S. approval of negotiations on tariff rates amounted to, as Kellogg admitted to MacMurray, being “in de facto relationship with the Nanking Government.” However, Kellogg also advised MacMurray against taking up the question of recognition directly just yet.11 On July 10, MacMurray informed the Nationalist government about the readiness of the U.S. government for the negotiations on new treaties. On the

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following day, C. C. Wu, as a special representative of the Nanjing government, informed Kellogg that China had appointed plenipotentiary delegates for the purpose of treaty negotiations and requested the U.S. government to do likewise.12 Then, MacMurray was still opposed to showing “any inclination toward haste or to take any positive initiative in the matter,” and suggested that “the matter first be taken up in strict confidence and informally with the British and Japanese” before being disclosed to other signatories of the Washington Conference treaties.13 However, after giving full considerations to MacMurray’s suggestions, Kellogg insisted that the negotiations should be opened as soon as possible and personally drafted a diplomatic note on July 20 in which he elaborated on the stance of the U.S. government to be delivered to the Chinese minister of foreign affairs before July 25.14 Copies of the note were also sent confidentially to the ministers in China of the Nine Powers. The reason why the U.S. government was so willing to enter into new treaties with China was that it had noticed the irresistible strong will of the entire Chinese people to resume tariff autonomy. As his biographer observes, Nelson T. Johnson, the assistant secretary of state who would later serve as minister in China, was of the opinion that American interests would suffer more “if the United States did not realistically view what was happening in China and conduct its policy in such a way as to not unnecessarily thwart China’s attempt to regain her sovereignty.”15 Kellogg clearly entertained similar views when he admitted to President Calvin Coolidge, “we shall have to give up those rights sooner or later,” and suggested helping China realize her wish then.16 From their point of view, an American initiative would make a favorable impression on the Chinese people. Moreover, from the economic perspective, the United States would not suffer great financial losses after China resumed tariff autonomy. The U.S. Department of Commerce had estimated that an adjustment of the Chinese national tariff would not have much influence on certain types of goods to which the majority of American exports belonged. These goods included: (1) “raw materials and foodstuffs unobtainable in China,” including the 12% of Chinese imports that were mineral oils and another 12% that were cereals, both of which had large portions coming from the United States; (2) “materials essential to any further development of the textile or cigarette industries,” including dyes and colors, which took up 4% of Chinese imports, and machinery, which accounted for 2%, both mainly imported from the United States and Germany; (3) “products which China could not manufacture economically,” including the 5% iron and steel imports and 2% paper imports.17 American trade might in fact benefit from an increase of the Chinese tariff because it would be textiles and tobacco that faced the greatest increases, meaning that the greatest sufferers would be Britain and Japan, which supplied most of

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these products in China’s market and which were the two major competitors of the United States. The United States recognized that a higher Chinese textile tariff rate, along with the resulting development of the local textile industry, would increase China’s economic savings, which would eventually be used for developing her transportation and industry. Therefore, F. R. Eldridge, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of Commerce, concluded at a conference on American Relations with China: “From a purely economic standpoint Americans should welcome such a development. With it would come, we may confidently expect, greater demand from China for machinery, iron and steel products, automotive equipment and railway materials, while the decline in piece goods imports would affect us but slightly.”18 In July, Nationalist Minister of Finance T. V. Soong visited Beijing with Chiang Kai-shek, and on July 20, he met with MacMurray. When MacMurray expressed that U. S. government was ready to proceed to revise the tariff provisions, Soong caught the U.S. minister by surprise by aggressively inquiring whether the latter would be prepared to negotiate with him a treaty of such a nature before he returned to Nanjing by July 26. MacMurray replied Soong with a copy of the draft text drawn up in the autumn of 1927 between he and Kellogg as a basis of future discussion. Soong was basically satisfied with the terms except for the clause “[o]n the further condition that no tariff increases in return for any compensatory privilege or benefit shall have been assented to by China” for which he made a reservation. According to MacMurray, Soong was “very confident” that the Nationalist government would be able to abolish likin during the calendar year and suggested that “his hand as Minister of Finance in accomplishing that result might be strengthened if the proposed treaty were made to contain an additional condition that likin should be substantially abolished before tariff autonomy should become effective”. Soong added that the approval of the Political Council was necessary, but the approval of “certain persons now in Peking,” particularly Chiang, would allow the proposal to be passed “in rubber stamp fashion”.19 Upon receiving MacMurray’s report, Kellogg telegraphed the minister in China replying that the draft text contained “certain nonessential provisions” which could be omitted if China insisted their deletion and that the new arrangement need only contain “the substance of all that is essential.”20 As Kellogg reported to President Coolidge, the Sino-U.S. tariff negotiations in Beijing had “advanced with unanticipated rapidity.”21 This was thanks to the convenience of Chiang Kai-shek’s presence at Beijing, which saved the time of Soong’s going back and forth. Moreover, Kellogg’s approval of the deletion of the clause to which Soong opposed also paved way for the smooth negotiations. Shortly, on July 24, MacMurray officially sent the note drafted by Kellogg on July

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20 to C. T. Wang. It was stated that “from the moment of the negotiation of the Washington Treaty the United States had been prepared to enter into negotiations with any government of China or delegates who could represent or speak for China, not only for putting into force the surtaxes of the Washington Treaty but also for restoring to China complete tariff autonomy.” Kellogg also reiterated “the sympathy felt by the Government and people of the United States with the desire of the Chinese people to develop a sound national life of their own and to realize their aspirations for a sovereignty so far as possible unrestricted by obligations of an exceptional character,” and the government’s hope for “an administration so far representative of the Chinese people as to be capable of assuring the actual fulfillment of any obligations which China would of necessity have for its part to assume incidentally to readjustment of treaty relations.” The note asked China to provide “proper and adequate protection of American citizens, their property, and their lawful rights,” and to ensure Americans in China “treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to the interests or nationals of any other country”. Finally, there was the assurance that the American government was ready to “begin at once, through the American Minister to China, negotiations with properly accredited representatives whom the Nationalist Government [might] appoint … with a view to concluding a new treaty.”22 On the same day, Soong informed MacMurray that he had been accredited by C. T. Wang. On July 25, the Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the United States of America and the Republic of China was signed. The first article began: “All provisions which appear in treaties hitherto concluded and in force between the United States of America and China relating to rates of duty on imports and exports of merchandise, drawbacks, transit dues and tonnage dues in China shall be annulled and become inoperative, and the principle of complete national tariff shall apply…” However, the recognition of tariff autonomy was not unconditional, for the same article continued: “subject, however, to the condition that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other with respect to the above specified and any related matters treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country.” The same article also provided: “The nationals of neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be compelled under any pretext whatever to pay within the territories of the other Party any duties, internal charges or taxes upon their importations and exportations other or higher than those paid by nationals of the country or by nationals of any other country.”23 This was most favored nation treatment. Although it was not unilateral, it could not be completely fair for China so long as the other nations had not yet relinquished the treaty tariff. By this clause the United States could in fact continue to enjoy low tariff rates in China.

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That said, the conclusion of the treaty was the first accomplishment in treaty revision by the Nationalist government after the national unification. It was also the first ever treaty in which a foreign power agreed to give up the treaty tariff under normal circumstances since the Opium War. The progress was acknowledged by domestic opinion despite some criticism of the most favored nation clause. On the part of the United States, however, MacMurray was less than pleased. Although under Kellogg’s instructions to negotiate with Soong and sign the treaty, he was frustrated at Kellogg’s way of handling Chinese affairs. His preference for a sterner China policy had put him in constant conflict with his idealistic chief. In a letter to Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, MacMurray commended without reservation that the Chinese had made a great fool of Kellogg. He compared Kellogg’s close monitoring of the negotiations to a boss sitting at home and directing his hired fisherman how to fish, when he should have allowed the fisherman to observe the flow of water in order to maximize the catch while minimizing the loss of fishnets. MacMurray much preferred the way Charles Hughes, whom he revered as the “greatest Secretary of State,” relied on the work of the legation. To him, the future China which Kellogg conceived was totally unrealistic, and under Kellogg’s idealism, his four-year mission in China had been a failure.24 As the treaty was publicized on July 27, when China had just embarked on her treaty revision negotiations with countries having expired treaties, the conclusion of the U.S. treaty undoubtedly propelled the ensuing negotiations. As Kellogg said later, not without congratulatory tones: “by the signing of this treaty a benefit has been conferred upon all concerned, in that … the way has been pointed and a model has been provided for a procedure whereby the Powers may relinquish their socalled ‘control’ over China’s tariff.”25 Indeed, the principles of the Sino-American treaty were followed by other countries in the tariff provisions of new treaties.

The recovery of tariff autonomy After the conclusion of the tariff treaty between China and the United States, the ministers of Belgium, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Denmark successively showed willingness to negotiate for new tariff treaties with China. Minister of Foreign Affairs C. T. Wang negotiated with the five ministers on behalf of the Nationalist government. After months of talks, preliminary treaties of amity and commerce were signed with Belgium (November 22, 1928), Italy (November 27, 1928), Denmark (December 12, 1928), Portugal (December 19, 1928), and Spain (December 27, 1928). The content of the treaties was similar, all of them covering the recognition of China’s tariff autonomy. Take the Sino-Belgian treaty as an example. Article 1

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stated: “The two High Contracting Parties recognize that, in the matter of customs and all related matters, they are on a footing of perfect equality, and on the basis of this principle they agree that such matters shall be regulated exclusively by their respective national laws.”26 But as in the case of the U.S. treaty, such recognition was incomplete because the article was also attached with the following stipulations: “in respect of all questions of customs as well as all questions relating thereto, neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall be subject in the territory of the other to a treatment less favorable than that accorded to any other country”; and “in no case shall the nationals of one of the High Contracting Parties be compelled to pay, with respect to the importation as well as exportation of merchandise, customs dues, transit taxes, or taxes of any other kind other or higher than those which are paid by the nationals or the nationals of any other country.”27 The Nanjing government also did communicate to Japan on July 19, 1928 that the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1896 and 1903, which had expired in October 1926, should have been annulled by the end of the six months of the revision period if no new treaty was concluded had it not been the then Chinese government’s grant of extensions considering the close relations between the two countries. Nanjing raised the question again as the extension period was coming to an end on July 20, 1928. Japan was notified that the Nationalist government intended to conclude a new treaty with her on the basis of equality and mutuality according to its declaration of July 7, but pending the conclusion of the treaty, political and commercial relations between China and Japan were to be maintained according to the Provisional Regulations for the Period after the Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign Countries Have Been Abrogated and Not Replaced by New Treaties promulgated by the Chinese government.28 Noticeably, in its notes to other countries, the Nanjing government always specified that the old treaties were terminated. The note to Japan was an exception that simply implied such a termination by declaring the implementation of the provisional regulations. The prudent language was an apparent effort not to irritate Japan. But even this tactic did not work. On July 31, the Japanese minister in China replied with a memorandum, contending that Article 26 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1896 only stipulated that the contracting parties “may demand a revision” of the treaty at the end of 10 years, but there was “no stipulation providing for the abrogation or expiration of the treaty.” “It is natural,” the Japanese argued, “that the treaty can neither be abrogated nor terminated without special mutual consent or agreement between both contracting parties.” The note also asserted: “as it is expressly stipulated in the provisions of the same article that if the negotiations for the revision were not completed within six months, then the Treaty and Tariffs should remain in force for ten years more, it admits of no doubt that the Treaty and

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Tariffs should remain in force for another ten years.”29 In addition to defending the validity of the treaty, Japan also condemned the Nationalist government’s implementation of the unilaterally drawn-up provisional regulations, which would effect in the termination of the Sino-Japanese treaties, as “not only an infringement of the terms of the Treaty, which [was] inadmissible in the light of both treaty interpretation and international usages, but also an outrageous act disregarding good faith between the nations.”30 Yet overall Japan’s tactic was to offer both a carrot and stick. On the one hand, she expressed readiness to the proposal for treaty revision as long as the Nanjing government rescinded the provisional regulations and recognized the validity of the original treaties; on the other hand, she threated to “take such measures as [the Japanese government] deem[ed] suitable for safeguarding their rights and interests assured by the treaties” if Nanjing insisted on the expiration of the treaties.31 On August 14, the Nationalist government sent its replying memorandum, stating its understanding of Article 26, which was that the treaty could be extended for another 10 years only if neither party declared its desire for revision within six months after its expiry date, and that if one party demanded a revision and initiated negotiations, then the treaty would cease to be effective. In addition, the Chinese memorandum pointed out that “all unequal treaties or those not in conformity with the prevailing state of affairs in the country [would] obstruct international comity and guaranty for peace.” Based on clausula rebus sic stantibus, it further argued: “as international relations change from time to time, there should be no treaty that can remain applicable at all times. Hence the attempts of the Nationalist Government for the abrogation or suspension of the treaty for the abovementioned reason cannot be called an action of disregarding international faith on their part.” The memorandum went on to establish the Chinese government’s differentiation between treaties which had and had not expired as proof of its respect for international faith. The Nanjing government showed regret for the accusative language used by the Japanese government, stating that such “[had] not been used in diplomatic notes,” and finally requested Japan to appoint delegates for the revision negotiations.32 For countries with treaties yet to expire, Nanjing tried its best to convince them to revise the tariff provisions in the treaties. On September 12, 1928, the Nanjing government sent notes to Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Britain, and France on the matter. Negotiations with these countries went smoothly and new tariff treaties were successively signed. The treaty with Norway was signed on November 12, with the Netherlands on December 19, with Britain and Sweden on December 20, and with France on December 22. The treaty with Britain was also applicable to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, and India. By

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the end of 1928, except for Japan, all countries that had commercial relationships with China had entered into new tariff treaties with China and recognized China’s tariff autonomy. In terms of content, these treaties basically followed the U.S. example. However, there were significant specificities. For instance, the British treaty was more restrictive for China than its American counterpart. The exchange of notes in Annex III of the treaty provided additionally: [T]he ad valorem rates of duty or the specific rates based thereon in the National Customs Tariff to be adopted by the National Government are the same as the rates which were discussed and provisionally agreed upon at the Tariff Conference of 1926 and that these are the maximum rates to be levied on British goods; furthermore, that these will remain the maximum rates on such goods for a period of at least one year from the date of enforcement of the tariff; and that two months’ notice will be given of the coming into force of the said tariff. Britain also reminded the Nanjing government to put its proclamation made on July 20, 1927 — “to take as soon as possible the necessary steps effectively to abolish likin, native customs dues, coast-trade duties and all other charges on imported goods whether levied in transit or on arrival at destination” — into practice, and requested that British “goods having once paid import duties to the Maritime Customs in accordance with the rates imposed in the new or any subsequent national tariff … be freed as soon as possible from any levies of the nature specified in the above-mentioned proclamation”.33 Among the newly concluded tariff treaties, the most puzzling one was yet the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Germany entered into on August 17, 1928. The Agreement Regarding the Restoration of the State of Peace Between Germany and China in 1921 should have cancelled the treaty tariff rates previously enjoyed by Germany. However, the 1928 treaty stipulated, in Article 1, that “in all customs and related matters either of the High Contracting Parties shall not, within the territories of the other Party, be subject to any discriminatory treatment as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country,” and “the nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall under no circumstances be compelled to pay within the territories of the other Party higher or other duties, internal charges or taxes whatsoever upon the importation or exportation of the goods than those paid by nationals of the country or by nationals of any other country.”34 Similar clauses would be considered progressive if they were seen in treaties with British or the United States as a recognition of China’s tariff autonomy; however,

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considering that the Germany provisions on the treaty tariff and the most favored nation treatment had been abrogated as early as in 1921, the 1928 clauses were a setback. A possible explanation to this arrangement may be that with the war long over, the Nanjing government did not want to show discriminatory treatment to Germany as it set out to negotiate for a new tariff regime with the powers. Although these tariff treaties left something to be desired, they were a big step closer to the restoration of China’s tariff autonomy. Due to the most favored nation treatment clauses, one remaining step would be necessary: that Japan relinquished the treaty tariff. Until Japan took this key step, all other powers could hold on to the old tariff rates. But Japan had always been a tricky rival in Chinese diplomacy. Her late attitude towards the issue of Chinese tariff autonomy was spelt out in her denunciation of China’s termination of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation as an “outrageous act.” She proposed the abolition of likin and the consolidation of the unsecured loans owed to Japan as preconditions for the recognition of China’s tariff autonomy. One can imagine how difficult the Sino-Japanese negotiations could be. To mitigate Japanese opposition, when the Nanjing government released its new tariff schedule on December 7, 1928 and announced the implementation of the national tariff from February 1, 1929, it promised to appropriate 5 million yuan annually from the tax revenue to consolidate inadequately secured domestic and foreign loans. By then, Japan had become isolated with regard to the tariff autonomy matter and so decided to concede a bit. As late as January 30, 1929, two days before the implementation of the national tariff, the Japanese minister in Nanjing finally informed the Chinese government that Japanese in China could temporarily be taxed according to the new tariff schedule. To smooth the negotiations for the new tariff treaty with Japan, solutions had to be found for outstanding questions between the two nations. On March 24, 1929, the two parties entered into the Agreement in the Settlement of the Jinan Incident of May 3, 1928; and on May 2, Exchange of notes Regarding the Nanjing Incident of March 24, 1924 and the Exchange of Notes Relative to the Settlement of the Hankou Incident of April 3, 1927 were signed. Even so, in the ensuing tariff negotiations, Japan was still rather tough and proposed unacceptable conditions such as keeping the national tariff unchanged for 10 years, which was rejected by China outright. Progress was slow. An agreement was only reached on May 6, 1930, more than a year since negotiations began. In this Agreement Concluded Between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan, the two parties recognized each other’s tariff autonomy and accorded each other the most favored nation treatment.35 In the exchanges of notes that entered the annexes, China promised to “maintain for a period of three years” the rates leviable on Japanese cotton goods, fishery and sea products, and wheat flour, and “maintain for a period of one year”

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the rates leviable on Japanese miscellaneous goods.36 China also assented to the demand for a “speedy consolidation” of the “unsecured and inadequately secured obligations of China due to Japanese creditors,”37 which in effect acknowledged responsibility over such odious debts as the Nishihara Loans obtained by the Duan Qirui government in 1917 and 1918. With these compromises, all foreign powers had recognized China’s tariff autonomy by May 1930. China resumed her right to fix her national tariff.

The Unsuccessful Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction Foreign powers’ delaying tactics The abrogation of consular jurisdiction was more complicated than the tariff matter. While the powers could not find legitimate reasons to reject the Chinese claim on tariff autonomy, they managed to find more grounds to put off China from regaining her judicial sovereignty. The Nationalist government employed a similar strategy to the tariff battle in fighting against consular jurisdiction: to start with the countries whose treaties with China had already expired. In fact, for these countries, the tariff and consular jurisdiction negotiations went side by side, and the outcome was the treaties of amity and commerce with Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, and Spain which have been mentioned in the last section. As far as consular jurisdiction is concerned, the countries agreed to relinquish it; for example, in the treaty with Belgium, it was agreed that “[t]he nationals of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall be subject, in the territory of the other Party, to the laws and the jurisdiction of the courts of that Party.”38 However, Belgium’s relinquishment was conditional. It was stated in the exchange of notes in Annex 1 that the above article shall be understood to begin to be operative on January 1st, 1930. Before such date the Chinese Government will make detailed arrangements with the Belgian Government for the assumption by China of jurisdiction over Belgian subjects. Failing such arrangements on the said date, Belgian subjects shall thereafter be amenable to Chinese laws and jurisdiction as soon as the majority of the Powers now possessing extraterritorial privileges in China shall have agreed to relinquish them.”39 The second annex of the treaty stipulated that China should promulgate its own Civil Code and Criminal Code.40

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The Sino-Belgian treaty then formed the template of the treaties to follow. In the negotiations with Italy, for example, the Italian minister was reluctant to relinquish consular jurisdiction until China acceded to a similar treaty to the Belgian one. However, a divergence from the Belgian exchanges of notes is seen in the Italian, Danish, Portuguese, and Spanish annexes, where it was prescribed that if arrangements failed to be made by January 1, 1930, Chinese laws and jurisdiction would only apply to the subjects concerned “from a date to be fixed by China, after having come to an agreement for the abolition of extraterritoriality with all the Powers signatory of the Washington Treaties.”41 This was no minor difference. The Belgian provision obliged Belgium to relinquish extraterritoriality as soon as the majority of powers, without specifying which, enjoying this privilege agreed to relinquish it. Back then there were 16 countries possessing extraterritoriality, among them relatively weaker powers, making the hurdle easier to overcome than with the specified Washington Powers — Britain, the United States, France, and the toughest Japan all included — in the later treaties. All five treaties came with a controversial declaration in the annexes, which, in the Belgian example, read: [W]hen Belgian subjects in China cease to enjoy the privileges of consular jurisdiction and when the relations between the two countries are on a footing of perfect equality, the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that Chinese citizens are permitted to live and trade and to acquire property in any part of the territories of Belgium and Luxemburg, will permit Belgian and Luxemburg subjects to enjoy the same rights in China, subject to the limitations to be prescribed in its laws and regulations.42 The clause seemed to be reciprocal, but when the Chinese economy was still fragile and badly in need of protection, it could have devastating repercussions. Western powers had repeatedly pressed for expanding their area of trade and residence to inland territory in previous negotiations. Every time China had rejected the demand by the existence of consular jurisdiction, asserting that only when the powers agreed to relinquish consular jurisdiction would foreign nationals’ entry into inland China be permissible. Now that the powers had agreed to relinquish consular jurisdiction, China could no longer hold onto the same rhetoric. The provision was heavily criticized by the Chinese. The most extreme opinions preferred extraterritoriality in the coastal areas to the opening of inland territory in exchange for the end of extraterritoriality. C. T. Wang, who drove the negotiations of these treaties, however, saw the clause as reciprocal and common in international practice, emphasizing the fact that foreign nationals would be

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“subject to the limitations in [China’s] laws and regulations.”43 This first batch of countries with which China bargained in the matter of extraterritoriality were not the most influential in the Far East. Recognizing that they might not have an upper hand to resist China’s claims, they would rather play the tactic of delaying the relinquishment to a time when other powers gave their assent. Their intent was clearly to pass the buck to the bigger powers while they sat and waited for the fruit. The Nanjing government would not have been unaware of their scheme. The reason why it still accepted such a condition was, paradoxically, the knowledge of the key role of the bigger powers, whose subjects constituted the majority of foreigners in China, in the abolition of consular jurisdiction. It was thus willing to wait for the ultimate cancellation once and for all. By then, 5 of the 16 countries having extraterritoriality in China had been tackled. There remained 11 countries to persuade. C. T. Wang analyzed in an address: “The four countries of Cuba, Switzerland, Mexico, and Brazil would just go with the flow. For Japan, the treaty [with her] has expired. The three countries of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway should not be a problem. The most important are, therefore, the three countries of Britain, the United States, and France. We should start with these three countries.”44 The question was taken up with Britain and the United States when Chinese tariff autonomy was about to be restored. On December 23, 1928, Wang made the proposal to Miles W. Lampson, expressing his hope that Britain would play a leading role in the abolition. Lampson, however, warned China against haste and opposed any unilateral termination of treaties upon their expiration. As for the United States, the question was put forward by Minister Alfred Sze to Kellogg on September 27. Sze demanded that negotiations on extraterritoriality be initiated and the United States wield her influence to persuade other countries to agree to the same. Kellogg was of the opinion that China’s situation was yet unstable and only consented to unofficial talks. The first unofficial talk was not carried out until January 5, 1929 by Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, after C. C. Wu became the new minister to the United States. Hornbeck was firmly against immediate abrogation and insisted on gradual relinquishment. He denied even the proposal for a treaty in principle like the Italian one.45 In March 1929, the KMT held its Third National Congress in which a resolution on the government’s foreign policy report was adopted. The resolution reiterated the three foreign policy principles set in the First National Congress: (1) All unequal treaties with foreign powers were to be abolished and new treaties were to be concluded based on equality and mutual respect. (2) All treaties concluded between China and other countries thereafter were to be based on the principle of removing any commitments injurious to the sovereignty of the signatories. (3) All

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foreign loans incurred by China were to be consolidated based on the standard of not undermining China’s political or economic interests. The resolution held that these were not only the principles that China should base upon to abrogate unequal treaties but also the only channel to restore to China the status of freedom and equality in international society.46 In spite of the U.S. and British delaying tactics, the Nanjing government decided to take formal actions. On April 27, 1929, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent identic notes to the ministers of Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Brazil. The note pointed to the inauguration of “a new era” in the relations between China and the powers through the new tariff treaties as opposed to extraterritoriality being “a legacy of the old regime,” which had “ceased to be adaptable to the present-day conditions” and “become so detrimental to the smooth working of the judicial and administrative machinery of China that her progress as a member of the family of Nations [had] been unnecessarily retarded.” In addition, it addressed the powers’ great concern about China’s judicial system by demonstrating that the assimilation of Western legal conceptions in China had “proceeded very rapidly,” citing the planned promulgation of the new Civil Code and Commercial Code before January 1, 1930 and the nationwide presence of modern courts and prisons. Moreover, the Nationalists were confident that the few countries which had forgone extraterritorial rights in China had “found satisfaction in the protection given to their nationals by Chinese laws” and “had no cause for complaint that their interests [had] been in any way prejudiced.” The note ended by urging foreign governments to “take this desire of China into immediate and sympathetic consideration” and “have the restrictions on her jurisdictional sovereignty removed at the earliest possible date.”47 Sympathy was not immediately extended to China as her government had hoped. MacMurray reported in his cable to Henry Lewis Stimson, the new secretary of state that “any modifications of the present system would be premature.” He went on that no appreciable legal or judicial progress had been made since the Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality had been published, and the Shanghai Provisional Court’s experiment had proved extremely disappointing. The experience of nationalities who had lost their extraterritorial status did not warrant the hope that other aliens would receive justice from Chinese courts if all extraterritoriality were abolished. MacMurray advised that only after China adopted the suggestions in the Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality should the cancelation of extraterritoriality be

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The Nanjing Government’s Revolutionary Diplomacy

considered and suggested a “unanimous action of foreign states.”48 Britain also held similar views. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Austen Chamberlain wired Lampson that any “sudden and complete abolition” of extraterritoriality would impair Sino-British relations and hence jeopardize the rights of the British nationals to reside, trade, and own property in China, although he did not deny the necessity for “some system of extraterritoriality with modifications to bring it into harmony with modern conditions.” Therefore, he made known to Lampson that Britain would be “prepared to seek in consultation with the Chinese Government some gradual and progressive solution of the problem.”49 On May 16, Chamberlain drafted a reply to China in which he, having explained the necessity for the existence of extraterritoriality as well as Britain’s sympathy towards the Chinese people, raised preconditions for the relinquishment of extraterritoriality: The promulgation of codes embodying western legal principles represents only one portion of the task to be accomplished before it would be safe to abandon in their entirety the special arrangements which have hitherto regulated the residence of foreigners in China…. In order that the semblance of reform should be translated into reality it appears to His Majesty’s Government to be necessary that these western legal principles should be understood and be found acceptable by the Chinese people at large no less than by their rulers, and that the courts which administer these laws should be free from interference and dictation at the hands, not only of military satraps, but of groups and associations who desire to use the courts for the furtherance of political objects rather than for the administration of equal justice between Chinese and Chinese and between Chinese and foreigners. He held that these conditions were guarantees for British merchants to “reside, trade and own property in China with the same equality, freedom, and safety” as accorded to Chinese merchants in Britain and insisted with the strong language that “any attempt prematurely to accord such privileges would not only be no benefit to British merchants but might be fraught with serious political and economic dangers to the Government and people of China.” In addition to this, he instructed Lampson to discuss the draft reply with ministers of other powers to ensure replies which were “the same in substance” though not in language.50 Interestingly, Western powers tried to involve Japan even though China had not yet sent her a diplomatic note. Chamberlain told Lampson that France was eager to persuade Japan to act in concert with other powers although “the Chinese Note

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was not actually addressed to Japan,” and that Britain was prepared to support the French suggestion.51 This time Japan chose to act with extra prudence. Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigeru Yoshida explained to British Ambassador John Tilley that Japan’s position was “rather delicate” because “the Chinese Government had denounced their treaty with Japan, and professed to think that that ended the matter,” while “the Japanese Government held that the treaty was still in force.” In Yoshida’s understanding, with neither side taking a step, the status quo was maintained by “a sort of silent consent,” so it would be difficult for Japan to write a reply alongside the powers without being first addressed a note on the matter.52 His preference was to have the Japanese minister to China convey the view of the Japanese government to China “in some convenient manner which would show that they were in general agreement with the other Powers.”53 During the discussions among the diplomatic ministers in China, the Japanese chargé d’affaires put forward that the precondition for the settlement of the extraterritoriality dispute would be China’s enforcement of the recommendations of the Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality. Regarding this, Chinese Minister of Justice Wang Chonghui asked Lampson in a conversation on June 3 not to “lay too much stress on [the] Extraterritorial Commissioners’ report and recommendations” in his reply, threatening that the present Chinese government “would deny all cognizance of report,” as C. C. Wu had not allowed the Commission to visit Guangzhou in the first place and Wang’s own reservations for the report had not been published.”54 On July 12, the ministers of Britain, the United States, and Japan to China held a meeting in which they agreed that the ongoing propaganda in China indicated her determination to abolish extraterritoriality immediately and completely. The U.S. and Japanese ministers were concerned that if prompt actions were not taken, China might unilaterally abrogate extraterritoriality. Lampson analyzed from the treaties with Belgium, Italy, and so on the most likely date of the abolition to be January 1, 1930.55 In terms of how to conduct the gradual and progressive relinquishment of extraterritoriality, Britain proposed relinquishing “by categories of jurisdiction” in the order of civil cases, criminal cases, and personal status cases. She did not favor abolition by geographical areas as proposed by the United States, according to which consular jurisdiction could be relinquished in strategically unimportant regions before more important ones. The French government favored the British proposal while Belgian and Japan found the American proposal more preferable.56 Meanwhile, the Nanjing government had drawn up a timeline for the restitution of China’s jurisdictional sovereignty. On July 12, C. T. Wang released in a press conference held in Beijing that the government would cancel extraterritoriality

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on January 1, 1930. He also announced that starting from August 30, 1929, the provincial Commissions for Foreign Affairs in most cities would be cancelled and the rest in strategically more important areas would be abolished by the end of 1929. The responsibilities of these provincial commissioners for foreign affairs, who were the central government’s local representatives, included not only negotiations with foreign consuls but also adjudication of appeals alongside the consuls. The cancellation of these commissioners was thus a preparatory step for the eventual abolition of extraterritoriality. C. T. Wang admitted forthrightly that the purpose of this move was so that “foreign consuls would have no counterpart agency.” He explained: “The scope of authority of foreign consuls should cover only commerce and not politics and diplomacy. Foreign consuls in China, however, not only handle diplomacy but also preside over judicial affairs, which is not to be tolerated by China. The cancellation of the local Commissions in stages by the government demonstrates the determination of China to abolish consular jurisdiction.”57 The decision was much favored by the Chinese. The Shanghai Bar Association, particularly, wired the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggesting “exceptional preferential treatment” to nationals of countries which voluntarily relinquished extraterritoriality while implementing “stringent measures” on countries refusing the relinquishment. The proposed “stringent measures” included: (1) setting strict entry requirements and barring unqualified nationals from entering China; (2) canceling their nationals’ passports for inland travelling; (3) refusing to entertain requests made by their nationals to local government offices; (4) exercising the powers of investigation, arrest, trial, and adjudication if their nationals were accused in commercial ports; (5) accepting charges of their merchants only after the consul relinquished consular jurisdiction.58 MacMurray interpreted China’s cancellation of the commissions as an act to “minimize the authority and prestige of foreign consular officials in China and thereby to impair their effectiveness in protecting the interests of their respective nationals”.59 Lampson held in his telegram to the British Foreign Office that it was the “spirit of accommodation” shown by the treaty countries that led China to believe that the powers would tolerate her unilateral denunciation of extraterritoriality, and that only a “very solemn warning” to the Chinese ministers to those countries could save the West from a fait accompli.60 The powers then set out to conceive viable measures to cope with the situation. Counsellor to the British Legation in China Eric Teichman noted that if China unilaterally denounced treaties and arrested British nationals in the inland areas, Britain would be “faced with the necessity of deciding whether to resort to force, either generally, or locally,” and proposed forms of indirect pressure such as withholding the Boxer Indemnity moneys and appealing to the League of Nations or The Hague. A situation where force might

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UNEQUAL TREATIES AND CHINA VOLUME 2

have to be called upon, as he suggested, could be an incident occurring in the former British concession in Hankou, which would warrant the consideration of reoccupation.61 However, the powers were also aware of the disadvantages of such provocative actions and considered them the last resort. They were in agreement about opening negotiations with China and making some concessions, such as the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in the inland areas. On August 10, the governments of Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, and Norway replied the Chinese extraterritorial note. The purport of the British and American replies was identical. They maintained that China’s existing judicial system and experience would not warrant the hope that foreigners’ interests could be protected without extraterritoriality, making extraterritoriality indispensable just yet. The American note issued on August 10 argued that “protection from injury or confiscation by a system of known law consistently interpreted and faithfully enforced by an independent judiciary” was essential for the safety of life and property as well as development of business; hence given China’s present conditions, “the sudden abolition of the system of protection by its extraterritorial courts in the face of conditions prevailing in China today would in effect expose the property of American citizens to danger of unlawful seizure and place in jeopardy the liberty of the persons of American citizens.” The note did acknowledge China’s efforts to reform her judicial system by promulgating laws embodying western legal principles; however, it also pointed out that the recommendations of the Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality had not been “substantially carried out.”62 Norway’s reply, addressed on August 14, was a moderate exception. The Norwegian government maintained: “the administration of the Norwegian jurisdiction in China has never been extended beyond the purpose for which it was introduced, and I am directed to state in conclusion that my Government has no desire to maintain the Consular Court longer than considered necessary and is prepared to abolish the same when all other Treaty Powers will do so.”63 In early September, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs directed another circular note to the interested powers. The note attempted to correct the understanding that extraterritorial privileges would ensure foreigners protection while bringing no harm, contending that the existence of such privileges had “had the most injurious effect on their relations with the Chinese by producing in the latter the feeling of humiliation and the sense of resentment which [had] always caused mutual suspicion and the consequence loss of mutual confidence” and thereby gave rise to “complications and conflicts.” The termination of the privileges was the antidote to these complications and conflicts from the Chinese point of view. The note once again elaborated on fundamental changes in circumstances,

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asserting that conditions had “greatly changed” and both the Chinese political and judicial systems had “assumed a new aspect” since the convention of the extraterritoriality conference. It brought forth the Turkish example where the United States relinquished her privileges in Turkey “in a short space of time” in the belief that the Turkish people could “accomplish great things” with their “legitimate aspirations and under the guidance of a new and strong government,” in which case Turks had lived up to the expectation and provided full protection for the Americans in Turkey.64 In addition to this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also instructed its chief delegate to the League of Nations, C. C. Wu, to present China’s claim to the organization on the ground of Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which read: “The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.”65 On September 10, Wu submitted the proposition as instructed and claimed for the revision of the system of extraterritoriality, which had become inappropriate for the changed conditions. At first, the Assembly intended to preclude the proposition from the conference agenda, to which Wu strongly opposed with a threat of quitting the organization. Under such pressure, the Assembly “heard Dr. Wu’s plea politely and with apparent sympathy but did not act.”66 Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, and France did not reply China’s September 6 note until November 1. They agreed to enter into negotiations on the gradual and progressive abolition of extraterritoriality and requested China to put forward concrete proposals to serve as the basis of negotiations. Britain actually reminded China that the success of the negotiations relied upon “the nature and extent of the changes that can be made.” She demanded: “if the proposed negotiations are to pursue a fruitful course and lead to satisfactory results without undue delay it seems clearly desirable that the proposals which will form their subject should first be submitted to careful preliminary study.”67 This amounted to a gradual timeline of the relinquishment. On November 11, 1929, U.S. Assistant Secretary Johnson commenced negotiations with Minister Wu, and on December 4, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur Henderson ordered Lampson to leave Beijing for Nanjing to open negotiations with Wang.

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Interrupted negotiations with Britain and the United States On November 25, 1929, the Nanjing government wired Wu and Minister to Britain Alfred Sze, ordering them to proclaim to the United States and Britain the following four points: 1. To announce the abolition of Extraterritoriality on January 1 and require the submission of all foreigners to Chinese jurisdiction. 2. To establish modern courts at Harbin, Shanghai, Canton, Tientsin, and Hankow. 3. To engage foreign legal advisers to be attached to these courts for the purpose of consultation by the judges but without right of interference in the trials. 4. To allow civil cases between foreigners to be tried by foreign courts outside Chinese territory. The Chinese courts would however be prepared to execute the judgements of such foreign courts if not in conflict with Chinese law or custom.68 It was decided that the third and fourth points were to be subject to revision at the end of two years. On the next day, France also received the decision. This was the first time that China made a formal plan for the abolition of extraterritoriality. As the powers had learned, the date of abolition was set to be January 1, 1930. They had decided to act toughly towards China. Upon being informed of the plan, France instructed her ambassador in London to suggest determined concerted action, so as to compel Nanjing “if not to give up entirely its idea of making a declaration on January 1st, at least to make a moderate declaration which would not carry practical application.”69 Britain and the United States, likewise, were opposed to China’s unilateral decision; however, they preferred not to engage in forceful confrontations with China. On December 20, 1929, Henderson handed Sze a memorandum, expressing sympathetic considerations towards China’s aspirations and agreeing that “January 1st, 1930 should be treated as the date from which the process of gradual abolition of extraterritoriality should be regarded as having commenced in principle.” It was mentioned that the British government “would have no objection to any declaration comfortable with that attitude which the Chinese Government may think it desirable to issue.” Britain also showed her willingness to “enter into detailed negotiations as soon as political conditions in China render it possible to do so.”70 To examine the memorandum carefully, it would not be hard to notice a tactful twist on the part of the British to the planned Chinese declaration on January 1, 1930. This of course did not

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go unnoticed by Nanjing; however, its insistence upon the declaration had been intended more as a bluff to press the powers to commence negotiations as soon as possible than an initiation of a hard clash. For Britain, as neither total acceptance nor outright rejection of the declaration would be in her interest, it appeared more desirable to leave both sides some wiggle room for future concessions. On December 28, the Nanjing government promulgated the expected mandate. It began: In every full-sovereign State foreigners as well as its nationals are equally amenable to its laws and to the jurisdiction of its tribunals. This is an essential attribute of State sovereignty and a well-established principle of International Law. For more than eighty years China has been bound by the system of extraterritoriality, which has prevented the Chinese Government from exercising its judicial power over foreigners within its territory. It is unnecessary to state here the defects and disadvantages of such a system. As long as extraterritoriality is not abolished, so long will China be unable to exercise her full sovereignty. With this, the government declared: “on and after the first day of the first month of the nineteenth year of the Republic (January 1, 1930) all foreign nationals in the territory of China who are now enjoying extraterritorial privileges shall abide by the laws, ordinances, and regulations duly promulgated by the Central and Local Governments of China.” The Executive Yuan and the Judicial Yuan were ordered to prepare a plan for the execution of the mandate as soon as possible.71 Made under no discussions with the interested countries, the mandate faced strong opposition from them. On the day the mandate was promulgated, Hornbeck had a conversation with Wu and read him a memorandum by the Department of State. It was repeated that what the United States had agreed to was an “agreed upon and gradual process.” There was no ambiguity to the American stance: “The rights were created by agreement; they rest upon agreement; and they should be abolished only by agreement.” “Great regret” and deprecation was expressed for “any action in disregard” of the principle of gradual relinquishment and “indicative of indifference to American rights and American good will.”72 On this issue the American media was on their government’s side. It was written in an article of the New York Herald Tribune on December 29: “With all good will for China, we cannot submit to an abrupt, unilateral closing of courts whose jurisdiction is due not to Chinese law, but to an international agreement.” Likewise, the New York Times stated on December 30: “no self-respecting nation can accept

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the one-sided abrogation of a treaty without admitting the principle that treaties have no sanctity and may be denounced in part or in whole whenever it is to the convenience of one of the parties to do so.”73 The U.S. minister to China assured American nationals in China that their government did not think there was any change to their privileges. The wave of opposition continued. Successively, the governments of France and Brazil sent official protests and proclaimed that they would not be bound by China’s declaration which they considered invalid. Even Italy, which had announced its conditional relinquishment of extraterritoriality, reminded China that the annex of the 1928 treaty stipulated that the Italians would be amenable to China’s laws and jurisdiction only after China came to an agreement with all the Washington Treaty powers. Under such pressure, just two days after the December 28 mandate, the Nanjing government issued another manifesto rewording the earlier content in a more moderate tone and adding the following statement towards the end: The Chinese Government, relying on the sympathy already shown and assurances given by the Powers concerned, believes that there is no difference of opinion between those Powers and China regarding the principle involved; and it is prepared to consider and discuss within a reasonable time any representations made with reference to the plan now under preparation in Nanking. In this respect the issuance of the Mandate of December 28 should be regarded as a step towards removing the cause of constant conflict and at the same time promoting the relations between Chinese and foreigners.”74 In effect, the manifesto redefined the December 28 mandate into an echo of the British December 20 memorandum. On top of the two declarations, the Nanjing government also took advantage of public outcry to compel the powers to compromise. In January 1930, the Propaganda Department of the KMT suggested organizing a mass movement to advocate the abolition of extraterritoriality during the celebration of the party’s 19th anniversary. Local KMT branches actively organized assemblies and public addresses for not only the party and administrative organs but also schools and community interest groups in order to rally support for the government in the upcoming negotiations. The promotional effect of the declarations for the opening of extraterritoriality negotiations was self-evident. In January 1930, countries including Britain, the United States, France, and Japan finally proceeded to negotiate with China. Early

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that month, British minister Lampson left Beijing for Nanjing to meet with C. T. Wang. On January 10, Wang proposed a draft of the Chinese plan for the abolition of extraterritoriality which contained eight points. They read: 1. Beginning from January 1, 1930, all British subjects in China shall obey its laws, ordinances, and regulations duly promulgated by the central and local governments of China. 2. All British subjects in China shall be subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese modern courts. 3. In district courts in Canton, Hankow, Shanghai, Tientsin, and Harbin and in high courts having appellate jurisdiction over such district courts a special chamber shall be established for exclusively dealing with civil and criminal cases in which a British subject is the defendant. 4. The Chief judge [sic] of a special chamber shall be the President of the court to which the chamber belongs. Other judges of special chamber as well as its procurators shall be selected from among legal scholars with training of a long duration. Their names, ranks, and salaries together with their past experiences will be made known to the public. 5. To each special chamber shall be attached a certain number — say from 1 to 3 — of legal advisers who shall be selected by the Chinese Government from among foreign well-known legal experts and whose names together with their past experience will be made known to the public. 6. The legal adviser shall not in any way participate in trial of cases, but in courts of first and second instances, he may have access to the file of the proceedings and present in writing his views on legal questions. The judges shall give due consideration to the views thus expressed by the legal adviser but may always render their decisions independently of such views. 7. Any British subject arrested by the police on suspicion of having committed a crime shall, within twenty-four hours after arrest, exclusive of holidays, be sent to the nearest court for trial. 8. The arrangement regarding special chambers and legal advisers shall terminate after a period of two years.75 Drawing on the principle of gradual abolition, Lampson remarked that it should start with civil jurisdiction, not yet criminal jurisdiction. Britain was also not satisfied with just having foreign legal advisers in the special chambers, and demanded the service of foreign judges.76

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On February 3, Lampson offered a British plan of nine points. It can be summarized as follows: (1) the abolition of extraterritoriality was to be a “gradual and evolutionary process”; (2) the transfer of jurisdiction was to follow the order of civil cases, criminal cases, and personal status cases; (3) in the near future, there should only be a transfer of civil cases and criminal jurisdiction should only be transferred with sufficient “experience gained of administration of civil jurisdiction”; (4) for the transfer of civil jurisdiction, it is to be limited to cases with codes “promulgated and actually put into operation”; (5) “jurisdiction in transferred cases must be entrusted to modern courts”; (6) jurisdiction to be transferred might be widened with the promulgation and enforcement of new codes and the increase of the number of modern courts; (7) the courts should be protected from administrative interference; (8) suits between British subjects were to be heard in British courts in the meantime; (9) arbitral awards in cases between British and other foreign subjects and Chinese were to be enforced by Chinese courts.77 Wang noted that the British plan would not even transfer civil jurisdiction completely. Regarding the eighth point, Wang expressed disappointment at the demand to hear cases between British subjects in British courts as the Chinese government aimed to abolish “all foreign courts on Chinese soil.” Moreover, Wang enquired without “committing his legal colleagues or his Government” whether the British government would surrender criminal jurisdiction in exchange for the employment of foreign cojudges, which was answered by Lampson that jurisdiction of “certain classes of minor criminal cases” could be surrendered under such a case. Wang then pushed for the fixing of dates, proposing that the transfer of civil jurisdiction should be on July 1 and criminal jurisdiction January 1 next, which was rejected by Lampson.78 Eventually, Wang’s hypothetical proposal of exchanging the employment of foreign judges for Britain’s relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction did not win the support of the Judicial Yuan and had to be cancelled. Sino-American negotiations were initiated simultaneously between Wu and Hornbeck in Washington, and Wang and Johnson, who had just taken over MacMurray’s position in China. On January 23, Hornbeck presented Wu with a 12-article “Outline of Possible Provisions.” The most important points are summarized as follows: • After January 1, 1930, American citizens in China were to be subject to the jurisdiction of China’s modern courts but not that of the magistrate’s courts or military courts. • A “special bench for the trial of foreigners” should be established in the modern courts at Harbin, Shenyang [Mukden], Tianjin, Shanghai,

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•

•

•

•

•

Hankou, Chongqing, Gaugnzhou, and Kunming. For trying appeal cases involving foreigners, a Special Court of Appeals should be established at Nanjing, and a special bench should be established at the Supreme Court, which will review appeals from Nanjing. Within a period of no less than five years, China should select a number of “jurisconsults” as officials from a panel of legal experts nominated by The Hague. These legal counsellors should serve under the Minister of Justice and be stationed at Shanghai, and their duty would be to observe the hearing of cases involving foreigners enjoying extraterritorial rights “without interfering in the performance by the judges of the courts.” Within a period of five years, the United States could “evoke any case pending in any Chinese court, except the Supreme Court,” in which American citizens or groups were involved and transfer the case to the relevant American consular official or the U.S. Court for China for adjudication. Chinese courts should ensure to American citizens in China “protection in accordance with international law and the principles and methods generally adopted in other countries”. Without the issuance of warrants by the competent judicial authority “with guarantees against abuse,” houses and other properties owned or leased by American citizens should not be “entered forcibly or be searched.” American citizens in China should enjoy “all of the rights enjoyed by the nationals of the country most favored” in all matters in the provisions and should not “suffer treatment in any manner discriminatory as compared with the citizens of the Republic of China or of any other country”.79

The U.S. plan had major differences from the British idea in, first, the proposal to have legal counselors appointed as Chinese officials rather than foreign cojudges monitor the trial of foreign cases, and, second, the failure to demand the retention of criminal jurisdiction, which altogether dissatisfied Lampson. Right before handing the British proposal to Wang, Lampson communicated with Johnson and expressed that the American plan might cause the British government to “find the ground cut from under their feet.”80 The British Embassy in Washington also complained about this to the U.S. Department of State. Better coordination was seen between the two powers after they exchanged ideas. On February 26, Hornbeck proposed another draft to Wu. The suggestion of legal counsellors was dropped, and a demand was made for the appointment of

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a foreign judge from The Hague alongside a Chinese judge, both of whom would hold equal powers, to the special bench for the trial of foreigners in Chinese modern courts. It was also spelt out that the extension of criminal jurisdiction would only be further considered three years after the relinquishment of civil jurisdiction “in the light of experience of the working of the present provisions.”81 On March 10, Teichman presented a British draft for the surrender of extraterritorial rights which consisted of 16 articles. In late March, Johnson and Lampson worked together to produce a 16-article draft agreement. The draft was later revised again after deliberations between the British Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State. Major points to note include: (1) that special chambers were to be established in the district courts of a total of 12 cities, namely, Harbin, Shenyang, Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, Shanghai, Nanjing, Hankou, Chongqing, Gaungzhou, Fuzhou, and Kunming, four more than the American proposal in January; (2) that the legal advisers in these special chambers would not only have access to case files but also “sit as one of the judges hearing the cases,” their concurrence necessary any judgment; (3) that criminal jurisdiction would not be surrendered for now; (4) that British and U.S. diplomatic or consular officers in China could “evoke any case pending in any Chinese Court” in which their subjects were involved.82 Despite the close collaboration of the two powers, there remained some divergences in their emphases. Britain was ready to give up some kinds of criminal jurisdiction depending on how the negotiations proceeded, but insisted on the presence of foreign judges in hearings and the principle of evocation as well as the continuation of extraterritorial rights in Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, and Guangzhou. The United States would accept only retaining extraterritorial rights in Shanghai, but demanded a Greater Shanghai with a radius of 50 li from the Shanghai customs house and was not prepared to surrender criminal jurisdiction easily at the beginning of negotiations.83 While the Nationalists were having a hard time trying to bargain for better terms with the British and Americans, they were again troubled by the old pain of internecine warfare. In the spring of 1930, Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, and Li Zongren formed a coalition against Chiang Kai-shek, which resulted in the Central Plains War and later, the establishment of a separatist government in Beijing in September. Being dragged into clique faction, the Nanjing government had little energy to spare for the negotiations on extraterritoriality, while the existence of two Chinese governments provided foreign powers with a pretext to put off negotiations. After all, the war had severely undermined the authority and control of the Nanjing government in many places. Bandits and illegal armed forces rampaged through Nanjing territory and the lives and properties of foreigners were under no effective protection. No power would bother to negotiate with Nanjing then. Negotiations

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were thus broken off from April to August. In August, the victorious momentum of the Nanjing government in the Central Plains War became clear. Lampson thought it was time to resume negotiations. On September 9, he arrived in Nanjing and on September 11, presented the Nanjing government with the British proposal, which was a revised version of the Lampson-Johnson consisting of 17 articles. However, Wang found the demands in the revised plan too hard to be met, which turned the negotiations into a deadlock. On September 18, Zhang Xueliang issued a circular telegram, expressly stating his support for Chiang Kai-shek, and later he commanded his army in Northeastern China to occupy Beijing and Tianjin. Noticing that the Nanjing government was in an upturn, the United States, too, decided to reopen negotiations with it. On October 28, the U.S. proposal was communicated to China. It continued to be based on the principle of “transferring to the Chinese government jurisdiction over American citizens in China in civil cases and in minor police offenses, except at Shanghai and other ‘reserved’ areas where Chinese administrative jurisdiction did not already apply.”84 Even civil cases involving an American defendant were to be tried in special chambers in high courts and district courts in China’s 12 largest cities. The Chinese government was to employ a number of foreign legal advisers who could, “by refusing to concur in them” render judgments invalid. The U.S. government also laid claims to the rights of evocation, so that its diplomatic officers could evoke any case involving an American defendant whenever they found it necessary “in the interest of justice or as a result of a violation of any of the provisions” of the agreement with China.85 On November 20, Wang pointed out to Lampson areas which China could not accept of the British proposal: the employment of foreign judges, British rights to evoke cases from the Chinese courts, and the retention of British extraterritorial privileges in Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, and Guangzhou. On December 1, Wang put forward China’s draft plan which consisted of 12 articles, which read in part: 1. Beginning from January 1, 1930, British subjects in China shall be subject to the duly promulgated laws, ordinances, and regulations of China … and be subject to the jurisdiction of the modern Chinese law courts…. Any of the modern courts already established or to be established in future in China may exercise jurisdiction in any civil or criminal case where a British subject is defendant or accused. In the district courts in Harbin, Shenyang (Mukden), Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow, Chungking, Canton, and Kunmin (Yunnanfu), and in the provincial high courts having direct appellate jurisdiction over such district courts … special chambers shall be established for dealing with

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cases involving British subjects as defendants or accused…. 2. To each of the special chambers… there shall be attached legal counsellors who shall be selected and appointed … as officials of China by the Chinese Government from among Chinese and foreign legal experts of high moral character who possess the qualifications necessary for appointment to judicial offices…. The legal counsellors shall serve under the Minister of Justice and may be deputed by the Ministry of Justice…. It shall be duty of the legal counsellors to observe the workings of those special chambers without interfering in the performance of duties by the judges, and to forward to the Minister of Justice such reports as the legal counsellors may consider necessary…. 3. The special chambers established in accordance with Article 1 … shall be abolished after a period of two years. The legal counsellors will be employed by the Chinese Government for such period as it may consider necessary, not being less than two years. 4. British subjects in China shall be liable for the payment of such nondiscriminatory taxes or imposts as may be prescribed in the laws, ordinances and regulations of the Central, Provincial and Municipal Governments of China. 5. Except in cases of flagranti [sic] delicto, British subjects in China shall not be arrested, detained or imprisoned without an order emanating from the Chinese judicial authority. A British subject arrested in flagranti delicto for an act which is punishable under the Criminal Code or other criminal laws shall, within twentyfour hours after arrest, exclusive of holidays, be brought to the competent Chinese court for appropriate action. 6. All rights in immovable property legally acquired and held by British subjects in China shall be recognized as valid in accordance with Chinese law…. 7. Except in cases of flagranti delicto, premises owned or leased and occupied by British subjects in China shall not be forcibly entered or searched unless a warrant has been duly issued by the Chinese judicial authority.86 On December 5, Wu presented a proposal to Hornbeck expressing an identical purpose in different wording. To achieve a breakthrough in the negotiations as soon as possible, on December 17, Wang presented Britain with a strongly worded memorandum in which he

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requested that the question of the abolition of extraterritoriality should be settled “once and for all” before February, 1931, and the memorandum concluded that the Chinese government would not think it was necessary “to take a different course of action towards that end.”87 The subtext was that if Britain refused to take a step back, China would take a different course of action when the means of negotiation turned out to be disappointing. To ensure that the message was fully communicated, on December 21, Wang reminded Acting Chargé d’Affaires E. M. B. Ingram to relay to Lampson the last paragraph of the memo, adding that China was prepared to bear all consequences, lest she should have “the world behind her.”88 Except for Japan, all other interested powers also received a similar memorandum. Wang once expressed to the International Club that even if the whole world declared war on her for this, the Chinese would cope with it in order to achieve their end.89 The British and U.S. governments were greatly concerned by the threatening tone of the memoranda. The United States quickly expressed her concurrence that negotiation would be the only means to finding a satisfactory solution and cautioned against hasty actions, while the British said, “His Majesty’s Government do not understand necessity for message from Minister for Foreign Affairs and hesitate to believe that final sentence cloaks any intention on the part of Chinese government by precipitate action to prejudge course of normal negotiations.”90 Lampson had left Beijing for Singapore for vacation in late December 1930. Before his absence, he had reported to the British Foreign Office the four most contentious points in the negotiations with China: the retention of criminal jurisdiction, the employment of foreign judges, the right of evocation, and the exclusion of Shanghai and other treaty ports from the abrogation of extraterritoriality. According to him, Britain had two options: either to surrender criminal jurisdiction and insist on the remaining items, or to keep criminal jurisdiction and give up the exclusion of Shanghai. Lampson preferred the first option thinking that Shanghai was indispensable as the center of British interests in China. On February 18, 1931, Henderson wired the British legation in China that the stabilization of China’s political situation provided a “favourable opportunity” and an agreement should be made with China during the next few months. In order to achieve this end, he recognized the necessity to abandon certain demands in the September 11 draft; yet he instructed Lampson not to “embody these concessions in any fresh draft or series of drafts” but during the course of negotiations, “progressively to abandon so far as [might] be necessary” to get the Chinese assent to the retention of the “really vital” safeguards. He provided the acceptable sequence of concessions: 1. The right of evocation, to which the British government had never “attached great importance,” and which the Americans had made

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known to China the readiness to surrender. 2. Criminal jurisdiction, echoing Lampson’s view that “negotiations are unlikely to pursue a satisfactory course until the Chinese demand for the surrender of criminal jurisdiction is acceded to.” But this step could only be taken provided that the U.S. government agreed to do the same, the exclusion of Shanghai and the other ports and the appointment of foreign legal advisers were accepted, and satisfactory provisions were agreed on regarding other matters. 3. As a last resort, the exclusion of Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Hankou, which was “not so vital.” But the exclusion of Shanghai, even if it was only limited to the international settlement, must be safeguarded. 4. As the final concession, the provision for the legal advisers to act as cojudges, to which the Chinese government would be strongly opposed out of “national prestige.”91 That Henderson was in such a rush to enter into an agreement with China was explained in his March 7 telegram to British Ambassador in the United States Ronald Lindsay. According to Henderson, as soon as China’s political situation became stabilized and its civil war came to a halt, foreign powers would be faced with “the alternatives of negotiating immediately an agreed settlement of the question of extraterritoriality or facing a unilateral abrogation of extraterritorial jurisdiction.” While Britain had used diplomatic maneuvers to render innocuous the Chinese mandate issued at the end of 1929, the same tactics no longer seemed possible. He observed that American suggestions to the problem failed to provide “any effective means of dealing with the situation” and little could be done other than to “wait for the situation to develop.” He foresaw that the Chinese would try their best to avoid “an open clash” and eventually, after a period of “gradual encroachment,” arrest, try, and sentence British subjects while refusing international arbitration as in their last unilateral denunciation of the Belgian treaty, so that the powers “would have no remedy but force,” which Britain did not plan to use. Therefore, he spoke on behalf of the British government: “as soon as the danger of unilateral abolition of extraterritoriality has become serious and imminent, the wisest policy is to avert it by timely and liberal concessions to Nationalist sentiment”.92 While Lindsay communicated to the United States the British stance, the U.S. Department of State was contemplating the question of reaching an agreement with China as soon as possible. Stimson was considering making concessions regarding the right of evocation and the employment of foreign judges. However, Britain was of the opinion that “any further concessions on matters of substance at the present stage would … be a mistake.” British Foreign Office experts advised:

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“it might be advisable to abandon co-judges at a later stage of the negotiations, but it seems that it would be a great mistake in tactics if the United States Government … were to include any such concession at the present stage in the new draft which it now proposes to present.”93 To coordinate, the United States accepted Britain’s proposal. On February 7, Hornbeck handed Wu a statement which expressed willingness to drop the demand on the right of evocation among other things;94 on the other hand, he added in a separate oral statement that the American government could not be “stampeded into assenting to any arrangement which fail[ed] to safeguard the interests of the United States of America … on the basis of mutual and reciprocal assurance and accommodation provided by the treaties.”95 Apparently, the United States did not want to take the initiative in negotiations and would let Britain take the leading role and follow British decisions. On March 8, Sino-British negotiations were reopened. Although Lampson had been authorized to progressively make concessions, he remained very cautious and did not show any sign of softening in principle until March 20, when he said to Wang that Britain would surrender criminal jurisdiction if China agreed to the exclusion of four special areas, namely, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hankou, and Shanghai. However, Wang did not accede and held that the Central Political Council was very definite about not permitting foreign co-judges, criminal jurisdiction, or reserved areas. He especially argued that the granting of the reserved areas would weaken the Chinese ground in meeting Japanese demand for reserved areas in Manchuria. Finally, after much bargaining, Wang agreed to reserve Shanghai but rejected the 50 li-radius reservation area and 10-year reservation period.96 Henderson’s attitude seemed to be more moderate than Lampson’s. On April 2, Sze called Henderson in London and urged Britain to make concessions especially over evocation, criminal jurisdiction, and reserved areas considering that the extraterritoriality negotiations had reached a deadlock. Henderson replied that the British government was prepared to concede evocation and criminal jurisdiction, but could not agree to abandon the reserved areas “in view of the opposition which would be aroused” in Britain.97 In his telegram to Lampson on the same day, Henderson communicated that the British government would “almost certainly be prepared to surrender not only the right of evocation and the right of legal counsellors to act as co-judges, but also jurisdiction in criminal matters over British subjects”; but the four served areas were “a special problem of their own” and could not be surrendered easily.98 Meanwhile, the National People’s Convention was scheduled to open in May, and the government would certainly be criticized if no significant progress was made. Wang therefore decided to press the powers further. On April 10,

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Wang released a firm declaration to the press, expressing frustrations with the negotiations and asserting: “unless the satisfactory solution desired by the Chinese government and people is completely in sight, I shall be constrained, after due consultation with my colleagues in the National Government, to declare the present negotiations with the Powers concerned, as deadlocked.”99 On April 27, China and Britain finally arrived at a consensus over the surrender of the right of evocation and criminal jurisdiction. Lampson had attempted to use these to exchange for reserving the four areas for a period of ten years and demanded a reservation area in Shanghai with a radius of 10 miles, but Wang’s bottom line was only to include the International Settlement of Shanghai for three years.100 In fact, Henderson had authorized Lampson to abandon extraterritorial rights in Guangzhou and Hankou, and even to consider giving up the concession in Guangzhou, and Lampson was ready to yield on these two areas in last resort,101 he did not show any inclination to concede until Wang acceded to the reservation of Greater Shanghai (including Wusong) on the precondition that Britain would compromise in the matter of the extra-settlement roads in Shanghai.102 Negotiations with the United States had been proceeding in parallel, just that the Americans had been closely following the British line and would not commit themselves to anything ahead of the British. As the British came to an agreement with China, by April 27, the U.S. Department of State “had expressed a willingness to give up the provision for evocation and that which gave quasi-judicial status to the legal advisers”, and in terms of reserved areas, to keep to the minimum of the four treaty ports of Shanghai, Hankou, Guangzhou, and Tianjin over a transition period of 10 years.103 With no agreement reached by May 4, a day before the National People’s Convention, the Nationalist government promulgated the Regulations Governing the Exercise of Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals in China to be put to effect on January 1, 1932. The most important regulations provided: • All foreign nationals previously enjoying extraterritorial rights shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts. • Special chambers shall be established in the district courts of Harbin, Shenyang, Tianjin, Qingtao, Shanghai, Hankou, Chongqing, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and Kunming, as well as in the provincial high courts which belonged to these district courts, for the hearing of civil and criminal cases in which foreigners were defendants; • The arrest of foreign nationals and search of their private residences or other premises shall be effected according to the Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure, and any foreign national arrested on suspicion of

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having committed a crime shall be sent to the court within 24 hours. • Chinese or foreign lawyers could be employed by foreign nationals involved in civil or criminal cases as representatives or counsel. • Foreigners who had committed police offences shall be tried by the Courts of Justice or police tribunals, the latter of which could only impose penalty up to 15 Chinese dollars. • Legal counsellors in the special chambers might submit their views in writing to the courts but shall not interfere with trials.104 The regulations renounced consular jurisdiction on the one hand while offering foreigners more favorable legal treatment on the other. At the same time, Wang made a statement expressing his regret for Western powers’ indifference to the urgent request of the Chinese government and people. Invoking Sun Yet-sen’s will which “enjoined upon the National Government to convene a National People’s Convention and to abolish the unequal treaties with the least possible delay,” he declared: On the eve of the convocation of the National People’s Convention, the National Government is reminded of its other duty, namely, the abolition of unequal treaties, especially the abolition of extraterritoriality. In the circumstances, the National Government has no other alternative but to recognize and to declare that the extraterritoriality negotiations with the few remaining Powers have reached an unfortunate impasse, and to issue today’s Mandate as well as the Regulations Governing the Exercise of Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals in China.105 The ensuing national convention took an even tougher stance. The original agenda was put aside to discuss the renunciation of unequal treaties and specially organized a drafting committee for it. On May 13, the Manifesto on Abrogation of Unequal Treaties was adopted in the fifth plenary session of the National Assembly. The most important paragraphs of the manifesto read: In view of the foregoing circumstances, the National People’s Convention, being representative of the entire Chinese people, solemnly declares the following to the entire world: 1. The Chinese people will not recognize all the past unequal treaties imposed by the Powers upon China. 2. The National Government shall, in conformity with the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s testamentary injunction, achieve with the least possible delay

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China’s equality and independence in the family of nations.106 The convening of the National People’s Convention sped up the Sino-British negotiations and both sides decided to concede in terms of the reserved areas and the duration of special chambers. It was agreed between Wang and Lampson on May 25 that Greater Shanghai would be reserved for 10 years and Tianjin, 5 years; Greater Shanghai included the port town of Wusong while the Tianjin reserved area was restricted to the current and former concessions; and the special chambers in China’s modern courts would remain for no less than five years.107 Although Henderson was dissatisfied about having a fixed period for the reservations, which he worried would panic British subjects in the areas,108 he did not deny Lampson’s request to initial treaty.109 On June 5, 1931, Wang and Lampson signed the Draft Extraterritoriality Treaty, which was dispatched to their respective governments for ratification on the next day. The treaty contained 22 articles. It stipulated that beginning from the effective date of the treaty, British subjects in China shall “be subject to the jurisdiction of the modern Chinese courts of justice (Fa Yuan) and to the duly promulgated laws, ordinances and regulations of China.” They “shall enjoy treatment not less favourable than that accorded to Chinese citizens,” and except in “offences under the police offences code or under municipal regulations,” they shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the police courts or any tribunals other than the modern courts. The treaty also provided for the establishment of special chambers to try cases in which British subjects were defendants in the district courts of 10 cities including Harbin and in the provincial high courts having direct appellate jurisdiction over these district courts, and the attachment to these special chambers legal counsellors who “shall have access to the files of proceedings” and might “present their views in writing to the judges,” who shall “give due consideration” to their views. Regarding Greater Shanghai, it was agreed that British subjects in the area “shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts during a period of five years from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty” and discussions would be entered into within the five years on the arrangements to be made at the end of the period, but in the absence of a settlement, British subjects “shall not become amenable to the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts until the expiry of ten years.” As for Tianjin, British subjects “shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts until the expiry of five years.”110 Unfortunately, domestic changes in the political scene of both countries thwarted the ratification of the treaty. In Britain, the Labor government was ousted from power due to a financial crisis in August before Henderson submitted the draft to the Parliament, and the new Conservative government took a different stance

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on the abrogation of extraterritoriality, leading to a complete change in British policy. In China, another outburst of internal strife resulting from Chiang’s earlier imprisonment of President of Legislative Yuan Hu Hanmin developed into the formation of an independent government in Guangzhou, to which some prominent Cantonese KMT leaders defected. The most devastating to the extraterritoriality negotiations was the departure of President of Judicial Yuan Wang Chonghui, who had an important part in directing the negotiations, for Shanghai and the resignation of C. C. Wu. After Wu’s resignation, the responsibility of negotiating with the United States was transferred to C. T. Wang, to be proceeded with Johnson in Nanjing. Although the Americans adopted the same principles as the British, Wang’s attitude toughened up after signing the draft treaty with Britain, and demanded that the United States abandon the reservation of Tianjin. On July 13, the two parties reached a consensus. To compensate for the U.S. concession regarding Tianjin, China agreed to, on top of the reservation of Shanghai for 10 years in principle, the beginning of negotiations regarding the status of the reserved area as late as in the 9th year.111 An official treaty was planned to be reached by the end of 1931. However, the outbreak of the Mukden Incident changed the course of the abrogation of extraterritoriality once again. The Nanjing government had to set aside the completion of the treaties with Britain and the United States and concentrate on fighting against the Japanese. Britain and the United States could thus be at ease with the continuation of their extraterritorial rights while the agreements were left in abeyance.

Japanese opposition and the suspension of treaty revision Simultaneously with the negotiations with the United States and Britain, the Nanjing government also contacted the Japanese. However, the negotiations with Japan were of a second priority, partly because of the dominance of British and American cases in cases involving foreigners, and even more so because of the usually uncompromising attitude of Japan. The Nanjing government wanted to delay its direct confrontation with Japan until having reached agreements with Britain and the United States, so that it could compel Japan to submit to what the British and Americans had been given, as in the case of the tariff negotiations. As expected, Japan was much sterner than the two Western powers even in her unofficial negotiations with China. In November 1930, Wang presented a draft proposal similar in content to that given to Britain earlier that year to Japan’s Chargé d’Affaires in China Mamoru Shigemitsu. Shigemitsu returned a counterproposal with the following conditions in March 1931:

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1. Japan to surrender civil jurisdiction and criminal jurisdiction over minor cases in Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, Hankou, and Guangzhou. 2. Special chambers to be established in the modern courts of the treaty ports for trial of cases in which Japanese subjects were defendants or plaintiffs. Japanese judges to be attached to these special chambers and participate in adjudication equally with Chinese judges. 3. Civil cases that happened in the interior of China in which Japanese subjects were defendants to be tried in special chambers. 4. Japanese nationals to enjoy equal rights to, for example, opening factories and renting land with Chinese nationals while being subject to Chinese taxes. 5. China to recognize Japanese interests in Manchuria.112 Apparently, Japan had drafted the plan with the intention of expanding her interests in Manchuria by offering an incomplete relinquishment of her extraterritoriality outside Manchuria, to which the Chinese government would never accede. In April 1931, Shigemitsu returned to Tokyo for a debriefing, and before his departure, he called on Wang to ascertain the Chinese attitude towards the Japanese plan. Wang expressly stated that China wanted to have all foreign privileges abolished including those in Manchuria, making it explicit that the Japanese leases of Port Arthur and Dalian as well as operation of the South Manchuria Railway were to be retroceded according to the Chinese plan.113 During his stay in Tokyo, Shigemitsu once suggested Minister of Foreign Affairs Kijuro Shidehara to consider restoring to China the concessions in Suzhou and Hangzhou, which were of trivial importance, to demonstrate Japan’s goodwill. However, given the prevalence of right-wing extremist sentiments, which had lately caused the assassination of Prime Minister Osachi Hamaguchi, who favored cooperative diplomacy, and under which Imperial General Headquarters had been going all out to inhibit the Diet from ratifying the London Naval Treaty, Shidehara believed that concessions to China would not be approved by the Cabinet and the Privy Council.114 When Shigemitsu went back to China, he brought with him an even harsher proposal: 1. Japan to surrender some civil jurisdiction a considerable period after China promulgated various important codes. 2. All Japanese concessions, leased territories, and the South Manchuria Railway area to be excluded from the surrender of civil jurisdiction, and China to permit Japanese nationals to freely reside and trade in the territory of China.

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3. Foreign co-judges to be attached to Chinese courts. 4. Surrender of criminal jurisdiction to be considered dependent on the result of the abrogation of civil jurisdiction. 5. China to acknowledge the equal right of Japanese nationals to the acquisition of immovable property with the Chinese at the relinquishment of Japanese criminal jurisdiction. 6. Japan to be given most favored nation treatment.115 The plan was harsh because over 90% of the Japanese in China resided in what would be the excluded areas, and would thus not be amenable to Chinese jurisdiction. Worse still, it decided China to grant the Japanese extra privileges. It is no wonder that a Ta Kung Pao commentary assessed: “If these conditions were to be accorded, then the retrocession of jurisdiction so to speak would be less preferable than having the status quo maintained.”116 After the signing of the draft treaty with Britain, Wang again presented Shigemitsu with proposals on the abolition of extraterritoriality on July 11; however, he was replied with more unacceptable counterproposals: (1) that Manchuria be considered separately in the abrogation of extraterritoriality; (2) that the administration and jurisdiction of the Japanese concessions not be affected; (3) that the jurisdiction of the South Manchuria Railway area be preserved; (4) that consular jurisdiction be progressively surrendered in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia if China acknowledged Japan’s rights in Manchuria and Mongolia as prescribed in the 1909 Gando Convention and the 1915 treaties.117 The last demand was essentially to renew claims on the Twenty-One Demands had already been renounced by China. It was far too humiliating to be considered. Soon, any negotiations came to a stoppage because of the outbreak of Mukden Incident in September, which completely ignited the deeply entrenched enmity between China and Japan. While the Regulations Governing the Exercise of Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals in China promulgated in May 1931 were set to take effect on January 1, 1932, Japanese aggression in Manchuria upset the plan of the Nationalist government, which was in too weak a position to take any unilateral action to have them implemented. On December 29, 1931, the government had to announce: “Since in consequence of natural disasters and other calamities in various localities, the various necessary preparations have not yet been completed. It is Hereby Ordered that the enforcement of the said Regulations Governing the Exercise of Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals in China be temporarily postponed.”118 The “natural disasters” referred to a large flood on the Yangtze River which had caused severe damage to the economy, but it was the “other calamities,” namely, Japanese invasion of Manchuria, which called the original plan to a halt. Not only did it shift the

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government’s foreign policy emphasis, but the outbreak of the Mukden Incident also brought the Nationalists a political crisis as the indignant masses pressed for decision actions. On September 28, C. T. Wang was beaten up by a band of Nanjing student protesters who rushed into the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Aggrieved and enraged yet not being able to make the final decision on the Japanese issue, Wang resigned from office. As a diplomatic icon, Wang had been indispensable in making decisions on treaty revision and negotiating with foreign states. His resignation directly obstructed the negotiation process. The position of minister of foreign affairs was left vacant for as long as two months until Wellington Koo succeeded. However, arcane discussions among the Nationalists could not resolve internal disagreements as regard Japan policy. Chiang also stepped down in December, followed by Minister of Finance T. V. Soong and new Minister of Foreign Affairs Koo. Under such circumstances, the postponement of Regulations Governing the Exercise of Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals in China was inevitable.

Limited success Mexico was the only country that expressly relinquished her extraterritorial rights in China during that period. Between June and July 1929, a consensus was reached in the notes between China and Mexico: “as the extraterritorial rights of the Mexican nationals in China formerly depended upon the ‘most-favored-nation’ clause in Article I of the treaty of 1899, and whereas the said treaty expired on November 30, 1928, therefore Mexican can no longer claim extraterritorial rights in China.”119 On October 31, the Chinese government requested Mexico to “make a public declaration that Mexico has no intention to seek hereafter extraterritorial rights in China,”120 and the Mexican acting minister of foreign affairs replied: My Government has examined it with the most consistent sympathy, with its own points of view, and with the ideals of the Mexican nation; and that as a result of this corresponding study, has found that it is not possible to deny to any nation, as it is not denied in this case, the recognition of its complete rights of sovereignty, sustained in the efforts and legitimate aspirations of the respective peoples.” The Mexican government announced that it had “no intention to discuss the rights of China to adopt the laws that harmonize[d] with her people nor to demand in the future extraterritorial privileges in that country.”121 Norway conditionally relinquished her extraterritorial rights on April 23, 1931 by declaring that she would abolish such privileges provided that all signatory

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powers of the Washington Treaties agreed to do so. In addition, the Nanjing government concluded several equal treaties and built reciprocal relations with nations that were not previously in treaty relations with China. Treaties of amity and commerce were signed with Poland on November 18, 1929, with Greece on November 30, 1929, and with Czechoslovakia on February 12, 1930.

Breakthroughs with the Shanghai Provisional Court, Weihaiwei, and Other Concessions The reconstruction of the Shanghai Provisional Court In 1926, the Shanghai Mixed Court was transformed into Shanghai Provisional Court, symbolizing that its retrocession to China; however, the provisional court system still retained features that impaired China’s judicial sovereignty. The Provisional Agreement for the Rendition of the Shanghai Mixed Court was effective for three years and due to expire on December 31, 1929. If no consensus was reached within the effective period, it could be extended for another three years, and China should submit her revision request six months in advance of the expiry date if she wanted a revision. On May 8, 1929, the Nanjing government addressed a note to the ministers of Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Brazil, saying: Although since then a change has been made in the judicial machinery in the said Settlement, it is impossible to gainsay the fact that the position of the new Court is still anomalous and its system remains confusing, being different from that of the whole country. The inconveniences arising therefrom have caused much complaint and dissatisfaction on the part of the people. In view of the increasingly cordial relationship happily subsisting between China and the foreign Powers, it is necessary and opportune to exert every effort to bring about a change that is compatible with the needs of the present time.122 Upon receiving the note, the six ministers discussed immediately with the representatives of Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, and decided to have Dutch Senior Minister William. J. Oudendijk send a reply on June 7. The note suggested forming a commission consisting of representatives of the legations in Shanghai and Chinese representatives to examine the question of

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the reconstruction of the provisional court, with the conclusions submitted to the ministers concerned and the Nationalist government for consideration.123 As before, the ministers attempted to pass the buck to local representatives. The Nanjing government rejected this arrangement, contending: The said question is not of a local character and ought not be left to local representatives to examine and discuss. This had been well understood by the Ministers of the interested Powers prior to the negotiations at Peking in 1926…. Now that it is desired to effect a final settlement of the question, it is fitting that the Central Government continue the negotiations in all sincerity with the Ministers of the interested Powers. The Chinese note pointed out that the suggestion of the ministers would only “complicate the matter without helping its practical solution.”124 The diplomatic corps employed procrastination tactics and ignored China’s demand for direct talks for a long time. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not give up and under its repeated requests, the corps proposed appointing their consuls in Shanghai as representatives for negotiations. The Nanjing government again declined, holding that the consuls in Shanghai and their deputies were vested with the power to sit with the judge in court proceedings, which would incline them to safeguard their vested interests. Later, the ministers agreed to decrease the number of Shanghai consuls and send representatives from the legations. Aware that this was the biggest concession the powers could make, China accepted it. However, eventually they did not actually send legation representatives to the negotiations excusing that the legations were understaffed. On December 9, negotiations on the reconstruction of the Shanghai Provisional Court were officially opened in Nanjing. The Chinese delegation was led by Director General of the Department of European and American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Xu Mo, and the foreign delegates were consuls in Shanghai. To safeguard China’s sovereignty, the Chinese delegation based their proposals on the establishment of a Chinese court which would exercise full jurisdiction. To be specific, the Chinese strived for the abolition of the practice of consular deputies or officials watching the proceedings or sitting jointly with the judge in cases involving Chinese and foreigners; the appointment of judicial police and clerical staff by the court; and the rendition of all prisons and detention houses.125 However, the foreign delegates were quite adamant in opposing these demands. The negotiations did not make much progress until the end of December, when both sides reached some consensus in terms of the recommendation of the chief

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clerk, the abandonment of consular officers to watch proceedings and sit with the judge, the application of Chinese law and Chinese court system, court procedures, and foreign lawyers. However, even then, differences remained wide concerning the observers, Chinese procurators, process-servers, judicial police, and prisons, with the foreign delegates insisting on the presence of consular officers in mixed cases and the Municipal Council’s control of the judicial police and prisons.126 On January 21, 1930, after 28 rounds of talks, an agreement was finally reached. On February 17, Xu Mo and the consuls in Shanghai of Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, Brazil, and Norway officially signed the Agreement Relating to the Chinese Courts in the International Settlement at Shanghai. French signature was completed later on February 22. The agreement achieved six main breakthroughs from the Chinese perspective: 1. Expanding Chinese jurisdiction to the Shanghai International Settlement. Previously, the Provisional Court had its own codes of procedures which were totally different from the rest of China’s. The new agreement provided for the establishment of a district court and a branch high court in the international settlement where “all Chinese laws and regulations, substantive as well as procedural” now in force or to be enacted shall be applicable. Regarding the appellate procedure, it was stipulated in Article 2: “judgements, decisions, and rulings of the Branch High Court are subject to appeal, according to Chinese law, to the Supreme Court of China.” The court system in Shanghai was then synchronized with that of the rest of China. 2. Cancelling the old practice of foreign consuls or consular deputies appearing to watch proceedings or to sit jointly with the judge. In the Provisional Court, foreign consular officials were entitled the right to be present to watch proceedings, which had allowed them to override the adjudication of the judge. Article 3 of the new agreement discontinued this practice. 3. Replacing the foreign chief clerk with Chinese prosecutors and processservers. In the Provisional Court, the chief clerk, whose recommendation and dismissal had to gain the approval of the consular body, had access to all administrative affairs including case filing, case allocation, releasing on bail, case document checking, and court decision enforcement, and all clerks of the court had to report to him. Now, this position was cancelled, while “a certain number of prosecutors” holding inquests and autopsies and performing functions according to Chinese law were to be appointed by the Chinese government. In addition, the new courts

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would have “process-servers” who were to “serve all summonses and deliver other documents” and execute judgments in civil cases with the assistance of the judicial police. These duties were previously performed by the municipal police. 4. Transferring the house of detention for civil cases and the women’s prison attached to the Provisional Court to the new courts along with their inmates. These prisons were previously administered by the foreign chief clerk. When the Chinese delegates first raised the question about the administration of prisons in the international settlement, the foreign delegates had refused to include it in the agenda on the pretext that it was related to the general administration of the settlement. At last, under China’s repeated claims, they came to the following agreements: “All prisoners now serving sentences in the prisons attached to the Chinese Court now functioning in the International Settlement and those sentenced by the Courts established under the present Agreement shall, at the discretion of the said Courts, serve their sentences either in such prisons in the International Settlement or in Chinese prisons outside the Settlement”; “persons sentenced to death by the Courts established under the present Agreement shall be sent to the Chinese authorities outside of the Settlement for execution of such sentence.” In this way, whatever the nationality of the prisoners, the courts would have the power to send them to prisons outside of the settlement for execution of their sentences, and the prisons within the settlement would only be used for the detention of “offenders against the Police Offenses Code… and persons under arrest awaiting trial.” Regarding the management of the prisons within the Settlement, the agreement provided that they should be operated “as far as practicable” in accordance with Chinese prison regulations and be “subject to inspections, from time to time, by officers appointed by Chinese judicial authorities.” 5. Limiting the presence of foreign lawyers in the courts. In the past, foreign lawyers could be hired by any parties of a case which was watched by consular officers and they were not bound by regulations applying to Chinese lawyers. Now, foreign lawyers could only represent a foreign party, and also the Municipal Council when it was the plaintiff or when the Municipal Police was the prosecutor. These lawyers had to “apply to the Ministry of Justice for Lawyers’ Certificates” and be “subject to Chinese laws and regulations applicable to lawyers, including those governing their disciplinary punishment.” 6. Changing the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. Jurisdiction over mixed

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criminal cases arising on foreign property outside the limits of the Settlement but within Shanghai and Baoshan, and mixed civil cases arising in the surrounding areas within Shanghai and Baoshan, which belonged to the Provisional Court, was now excluded from the new Chinese courts in the settlement by the exchange of notes appended to the agreement. According to the general Chinese procedure codes, jurisdiction over such cases was to be transferred to the district courts of Shanghai.127 It is undeniable that most of China’s jurisdictional sovereign rights in the Shanghai International Settlement were restored; however, it had not yet arrived at the point where China could have her jurisdiction restored uncompromised. Disagreements were especially fierce as regards the selection, appointment, and dismissal of the judicial police. At last, the two sides came down to the following understanding: “The officers and members of the judicial police of the Courts shall be appointed by the President of the Branch High Court upon the recommendation of the Municipal Council and shall be subject to dismissal by the President of that Court upon cause shown. They … shall be subject to the orders and direction of the Courts and faithful to their duties.” It was additionally provided in the third clause of the exchange of notes that recommendation should be made for Chinese “as far as practicable.”128 The disagreements relating to the judicial police dragged out the settlement of the whole court issue. As the Municipal Council insisted that the judicial police pertained to the administrative powers of the international settlement, it could not be resolved until a solution was found for the settlement. As Minister of Justice Wang Chonghui and Minister of Foreign Affairs C. T. Wang evaluated in a joint report presented to the 216th meeting of the KMT Central Executive Committee, the new agreement failed to fully fulfill the Chinese’s hopes because: “the International Settlement has yet to be retroceded and its administrative powers are still held by others; thus restricted by the situation, there are places where it is impossible not to have regard for reality.” To be plain, the question of judicial police would be handled together with the retrocession of the international settlement. Moreover, the agreement would only remain effective for three years and could not be prolonged without the concurrence of both sides. On this the report commented: “Three years are a relatively short period of time, within which the question of the International Settlement of Shanghai must be settled to a considerable extent. What has not been satisfied at present shall in the future be naturally resolved.”129 On March 31, 1931, the Second Branch High Court of Jiangsu and the District Court of the First Special Area of Shanghai were established, and Xu Weizhen and Yang Zhaozhen were appointed as the presidents of the courts, respectively.

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China’s Ministry of Justice also announced that the agreement would begin to take effect from the following day. Soon, based on this agreement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs approached France for the restoration of the mixed court in the French concession in Shanghai. On July 28, a similar agreement titled the Agreement Relating to the Establishment of Chinese Courts in the French Concession was officially signed, according to which the Third Branch High Court of Jiangsu and the Second District Court of the Special Area of Shanghai would be established.

The rendition of Weihaiwei and other concessions The case of Weihaiwei As early as 1924, the Beiyang government had reached an agreement with Britain on the restoration of Weihaiwei; however, the agreement was not signed due to internal strife. In January 1929, after the entering into of tariff agreements with all powers except Japan, C. T. Wang raised the question with Lampson. Having already nodded agreement years before, Britain would have had limited legitimate cause to go back on her word. Lampson was instructed to insist on taking the 1924 draft as the basis of negotiation. Following this principle, Counsellor Teichman drafted a plan that offered to modify only minor details in the text. In his opinion, the fewer modifications and the longer the negotiation period, the better; the negotiation could be procrastinated to as long as two years if needs arose.130 But by then Chinese dissatisfaction towards the 1924 agreement, which consisted of a lot of compromises on the Chinese part from their perspective, had been reaching a boiling point. For them, the 25-year lease of Weihaiwei had expired for six years then, so Britain should have no right to ask for conditions as it did six years ago. Not only did they desire a rejection of the 1924 agreement, but they also demanded reparations from Britain for the delayed retrocession. The KMT’s Shanxi branch even wrote to Nanjing to demand that it resort to “revolutionary diplomacy.”131 On May 20, 1929, Wang and Lampson held their first official talk on the rendition of Weihaiwei. Lampson made it clear that his government was ready to implement the 1924 agreement as well as to go through the draft again, but it “must stand by that draft.”132 But Wang insisted on bringing up modifications of the draft. In June, he told Lampson that the Chinese government had suddenly decided to make Weihaiwei its principal naval base; therefore the clauses on opening Port Edward to foreign residence and trade had to be deleted and the loan term of naval facilities on the island of Liugongdao had to be cut down to three years with

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no possibility of renewal. But Lampson was insistent on the old idea of 10 years subject to renewal.133 Later, Lampson had for some time considered making a concession and accepting 10 years without renewal; however, this was denied by the British Foreign Office, which would not accept any modifications to the loan clauses until China agreed to “provide the facilities conceded by the 1924 agreement at some other suitable place” and to bear “the cost of providing such facilities.”134 In late 1929, friction between the Yan Xishan-Feng Yuxiang coalition and Chiang Kai-shek went increasingly tense and a civil war was on the verge of breaking out at any moment. Under such circumstances, Wang desired to solve the Weihaiwei question as soon as possible so as to focus his energy on the knottier problem of extraterritoriality, the negotiations on which were at a critical juncture. He decided to concede some rights over Weihaiwei in favor of an early agreement with Britain. Thus, agreement was reached in February 1930 and the Convention for the Rendition of Weihaiwei was concluded on April 18, abrogating the 1898 Convention for the Lease of Weihaiwei. With this, British garrison in Weihaiwei, including Liugongdao, was to be withdrawn within one month; all lands and buildings in Weihaiwei belonging to the British government were to be presented to the Chinese government; and all land previously owned by the Chinese government on Liugongdao, including the buildings on it, and the land “subsequently acquired by purchase” by the British government were to be handed to the Chinese government. In return, the Chinese government agreed to exchange all documents of title to land issued to foreigners by the British Administration of Weihaiwei for Chinese deeds of perpetual lease, and to maintain Weihaiwei “as an area for international residence and trade” unless it decided to utilize Weihaiwei “exclusively as a naval base,” in which case it would buy out the interests of foreign property owners and lease holders “at a fair compensation to be agreed upon between the Governments of China and the United Kingdom.”135 Furthermore, in the appended agreement of the convention, the Chinese government agreed to loan to the British government “as a sanatorium and summer resort … a certain number of buildings and facilities” on Liukungdao for the use of the British navy “for a period of ten years with the option of renewal on the same terms by agreement or on such other terms as may be agreed upon between the two Governments.” British ships and auxiliaries visiting Liugongdao between April and October would be “accorded the use, after the Chinese Navy, of that portion of the anchorage” previously dredged by the British navy, but they must withdraw completely in the event of war involving China or Britain. In addition to this, the British navy was “accorded the privilege of towing targets” from the anchorage and of “landing men for drill or rifle practice” on Liugongdao

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after obtaining permission from the Chinese authorities, although “in the event of local disturbance occurring, such privilege [might] be temporarily foregone on representations being made by the local authorities.”136 Generally speaking, the modifications were a long way from being satisfactory for the agitated Chinese who called for the unconditional rendition of Weihaiwei. Even worse was that seven years had passed since the expiration of Britain’s lease of Weihaiwei, and now Nanjing acquiesced to another 10 years of lease on top of the seven years. However, compared with the 1924 agreement, the 1930 convention was a little more favorable to China with regard to Liugongdao. In 1924, both sides agreed to the renewal of the loan of Liugongdao on original terms upon mutual agreement, China not to reject it “without reasonable cause” and international arbitration to be sought in the event where no consensus was reached.137 “Reasonable cause” was, as Nanjing understood, absolutely arbitrary, making international arbitration inevitable, which might not be to the advantage of China. The deletion of this cause definitely increased the Chinese bargaining power. Moreover, even if the loan was to be renewed, the provision “on such other terms as may be agreed upon between the two Governments,” compared with on original terms, gave China much more flexibility.138 Wang himself once commented that the 10-year loan of Liugongdao was “indeed a fly in the ointment.” Yet he also noted: “although the term is as along as 10 years, whether to renew the loan afterwards will be of our own accord. This is a far cry from [the provisions in] the previous draft agreement.”139 Additionally, the 1930 convention reserved for China the right to close the port of Weihaiwei for turning it into a naval base and to redeem the deeds of perpetual lease issued to foreigners, compared with the 1924 draft which demanded the concurrence of foreign lease holders in such redemption. Other prejudiced terms disposed of in the newer convention included the establishment of Weihaiwei into a special administrative area and hence foreign representation in Weihaiwei municipal affairs, as well as the Chinese repayment of British outstanding loans incurred from the construction of public utilities in Weihaiwei and the municipal expenditure of Weihaiwei at a rate no less than the average of 1920 to 1922. On October 1, 1930, the two governments exchanged their instruments of ratification of the convention. On the same day, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commissioner for the Rendition of Weihaiwei Wang Jiazhen arrived in the port with a crew of 300 marines from Qingdao on warships. In the rendition ceremony which was held in the yard of the British Administrative Commission, the national flag of the Republic of China was raised and its anthem played, and a salute of 21 guns was performed by British and Chinese ships for celebration. Soon afterwards, the British commissioner and his staff and the British navy withdrew .

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from Weihaiwei, symbolizing the retrocession of the territory after 32 years of lease to Britain. In the afternoon, the Chinese Administrative Commission of Weihaiwei was established under the direct control of the Executive Yuan, and Xu Zushan was appointed the commissioner for the administration of Weihaiwei.140

The completed rendition of British Zhenjiang, British Amoy, and Belgian Tianjin The British Zhenjiang concession was practically but not officially returned to China in 1927, as the two governments had not concluded any rendition agreement. In addition, problems on municipal administration had not been resolved yet. Therefore, in March 1929, China and Britain proceeded with the official negotiations on the rendition of Zhenjiang. Britain agreed to return the concession provided that: (1) China would pay the municipal debt; (2) China would compensate for the losses sustained by British subjects in Zhenjiang during the 1927 Northern Expedition; (3) the title deeds of British subjects in the concession would be exchanged for Chinese deeds of perpetual lease; and (4) British ships would be granted the right to be moored at the pier of Zhenjiang and to convey goods across the Bund.141 The third and fourth conditions were immediately agreed upon. The first two, however, were more controversial. After rounds of talks, it was decided that the municipal debt would be cleared by the Zhenjiang Chamber of Commerce’s acquisition of the electricity and water work in the concession.142 For the remaining divergence, the British government initially claimed a sum of 76,000 Chinese dollars and insisted that such compensation should be settled simultaneously with the rendition of the concession. The Chinese government found this sum too large. After bargaining, the amount was reduced to “68,000 dollars at the disposal of the two Commissioners,” one appointed by each government, who would “jointly scrutinize the said claims” and “distribute the necessary amounts.” Any remaining balance would be returned to the Chinese government, but no extra claims could be made on top of the agreed sum.143 On October 31, the official rendition of the British concession at Zhenjiang was completed by an exchange of note between Wang and Lampson. Lampson declared that the British government agreed “to return to the National Government of the Republic of China as from the 15th November next the area of land known as ‘the British Concession’ at Chinkiang [Zhenjiang].” “The British Municipal Administration of the said area,” he continued, would be “dissolved and the British Municipal regulations repealed as from that date.” Wang confirmed that the documents of title issued by the British government to the British subjects would be “exchanged for Chinese deeds of perpetual lease.”144 The British claims

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for losses were addressed in a separate exchange of note completed on November 9. The actual rendition ceremony took place on November 15, officiated by Dai Defu, the former special negotiator for Zhenjiang, and attended by C. T. Wang, the British consul general in Nanjing, and the representative from the British legation. A similar case was the British concession at Amoy, which had been retroceded de facto without any agreement concluded yet. In May 1930, the British government expressed voluntariness to retrocede the concession on similar terms to the rendition of Zhenjiang, mainly the exchange of documents of title issued to British subjects for Chinese deeds of perpetual lease. On September 17, Wang and Lampson exchanged notes agreeing to the cancellation of the lease of Amoy on the same day Chinese deeds of perpetual lease for lots of land with documents of title issued by the British government had been “duly executed and issued and handed to the British Consul at Amoy.”145 Another foreign concession to be officially returned to Chinese hands in this period was Belgian Tianjin. Belgium had declared her willingness to return the concession in 1927 to the Beiyang government, and this was taken up by C. T. Wang representing the Nanjing regime with the Belgian minister as early as January 1929. After eight rounds of talks, the Agreement for the Rendition of the Belgian Concession in Tianjin and its attached annexes were signed on August 31. The agreement provided: “All public properties of the Belgian Concession … as well as the bank deposits of the Belgian Municipality, shall be handed over to the National Government of the Republic of China on the day of the coming into force of the present Agreement.”146 The Chinese government would issue certificates for perpetual lease to replace the title deeds of private property previously issued by the Belgian consulate, and, as stipulated in the annex, reimburse “the debts of the Municipality of the former Belgian Concession amounting in total to Tientsin Taels 93,826.48” to the Belgian government.147 On October 1, 1929, the Chinese government unofficially took over the Belgian concession, after which negotiations continued. The ratification instruments of the agreement were not exchanged until January 15, 1931, which was followed by a rendition ceremony in March. Henceforth, the concession was changed into the Fourth Special Area of Tianjin.

How Revolutionary was “Revolutionary Diplomacy”? Compared with other phases, the treaty revision and abrogation campaign initiated by the Nanjing government between June 1928 and the end of 1931 spanned the longest period and displayed arguably the greatest momentum. The achievements gained in this period would not even be dwarfed by the conclusion of new treaties

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on an equal basis with Britain and the United States in 1943 during wartime. During the three and a half years, tariff autonomy was restored, hence the increase of tariff revenues, which boosted economic growth in the years to come. As far as foreign concessions and leased territories were concerned, Weihaiwei and Belgian Tianjin were retroceded, and formalities were completed for the rendition of British Zhenjiang and Amoy. Even judicial sovereignty was restored to some extent, with the court in the Shanghai International Settlement coming under Chinese control and a basic consensus found with Britain and the United States as regard the abrogation of extraterritoriality. The Chinese government was just one step short of resuming a large part of her jurisdiction when the Mukden Accident put planned actions on hold. Of course, it would be deceptive to overlook the compromises made to achieve the long-sought ends. For instance, the Nanjing government allowed Belgium to relinquish extraterritoriality only on the condition that “the majority of the Powers now possessing extraterritorial privileges in China shall have agreed to relinquish them.”148 This appeared less radical than the Beiyang government’s unilateral denunciation of the 1865 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation in 1926. Contemporary commentators and domestic historians have put the blame of deficiencies as such on the cowardice and indecisiveness of Wang the foreign minister. However, given the political reality of that time, it might not be fair to judge the diplomat’s performance against lofty nationalistic ideals. In fact, in the eyes of his foreign counterparts, Wang was rather tough in negotiations. A country’s diplomatic weaknesses should not be ascribed to an individual. China’s diplomatic setbacks were rooted in her weak national power, which was aggravated by clique wars and internecine rivalries. Despite general national unification and some economic improvements, China was still a weak country visà-vis foreign powers; and if a weak country might possibly force strong powers to concede by undivided unity, Nationalist China, repeatedly jeopardized by domestic wars, did not even own such a weapon. Between 1928 and 1931, the might and authority of the Nationalist government was undermined by ongoing struggles with the communists, the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the New Guangxi clique, the war between Chiang and the Zhang Fakui–Guangxi Clique coalition, the war between Tang Shengzhi and Chiang, the war between Shi Yousan and Chiang, and the most consequential Central Plains War, followed by the establishment of the Guangzhou government in 1931. A country in the deep water of domestic disorder would simply not have any bargaining power facing her stronger counterparts. Wang noted at the beginning of the extraterritoriality negotiations:

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Diplomacy does not depend upon the strength of a few diplomats; the backing of national power is essential for success. This is self-evident by comparing the pre-war and post-war diplomacy of Germany and Russia. For the diplomacy of China in the present time, we diplomats most certainly must exert our minds to achieve [what we can], but at the same time we also have to make known to the world the good phenomena in the country. However, as he observed, the Chinese nation lacked solidarity and connectivity. He also pointed out that China was in need of a unified army.149 Another inherent fault with Nanjing diplomacy during this period was the limitation of public participation. Although the mass movements at Hankou and Jiujiang in 1927 did go somewhat out of hand, they were powerful catalysts of the British concessions. After the national unification, the KMT turned to adopt a much more cautious outlook, containing similar campaigns lest it should lose control of them. The top-down propagandist activities organized by local KMT branches were no match in effectiveness for the spontaneous movements permitted by the Beijing regime a few years ago. As historian Fairbank points out, after it gained control of the whole country, the Kuomintang became a wing of the bureaucracy and lost its revolutionary mission…. These mass movements had mobilized popular support for the Northern Expedition, but the Nanking power holders now looked askance at processions, demonstrations, and mass meetings. They discouraged student movements, looking back upon all these activities of the midtwenties as useful tools to beat the warlords but no longer of value, now that power was theirs to organize for purposes of control.”150 Because of this, “revolutionary diplomacy” remained more a propagandist slogan on the part of the government than a radical national campaign.

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6

Chapter

The Abrogation of Unequal Treaties during the Second SinoJapanese War

UNEQUAL TREATIES AND CHINA VOLUME 2

The prelude to Japanese invasion of China, the Mukden Incident of 1931 discontinued the Nationalist Government’s treaty revision campaign. On the other hand, the Second Sino-Japanese War, commonly known as the “War of Resistance against Japan” (kangri zhanzheng 抗日戰爭) or “Eight Years’ War of Resistance against Japan in China” (ba nian kangzhan 八年抗戰), improved China’s international status and provided her with the opportunity to abrogate unequal treaties. Two reasons accounted for this turn of events. First, Japan’s ambition to dominate East Asia upset the world balance of power and alarmed Britain and the United States, thereby causing them to ally with China in fighting against Japan. Second, Chinese nationalism was awakened by the war, so much that the Chinese were determined to not only stop Japanese aggression but also abrogate all unequal treaties. Observing the upsurge of Chinese nationalism and strategic importance of China, Britain and the United States decided to make concessions.

British and U.S. Promises to Abrogate Extraterritoriality after the War The aborted negotiations on the abolition of extraterritoriality From the end of the 1931 extraterritoriality negotiations to the middle phase of the Second Sino-Japanese War, there were no official negotiations between the Nationalist government and foreign powers on the revision of unequal treaties. Although China did try to communicate her unfulfilled wish, she was too preoccupied to get the message across, so the powers did not take her protests seriously. In fact, the Nationalist government was just going through the motions of sounding politically correct protests in order not to alienate itself from the people. Such an attempt was obligatorily made following October 1933, when the treaties of commerce signed with Britain in 1902 and the United States in 1903 were both reaching their third decennial term. Wellington Koo, then minister in France, was the first to remind the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that if no revisions were proposed, the two treaties would be extended for another 10 years.1 The Executive Yuan thus studied the matter with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Basic Industries, and other relevant departments. Their conclusion was to follow the precedents and propose revisions on the expiration of those treaties.2 Accordingly on December 23, the Nationalist government issued diplomatic notes to Britain and the United States. However, these notes were given perfunctory replies. To the United States, Nanjing followed up with another note on January 18, 1934, stating that except for the tariff provisions which had been repealed by

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the Sino-American tariff treaty of 1928, other articles of the treaty were “mostly of a unilateral nature and [did] not conform to the principles of equality and reciprocity,” thus not in accord with the changes in conditions and circumstances. The note specified: “The provisions regarding extraterritoriality and inland and coastal navigation are extremely injurious to China’s sovereign rights and should be abrogated; this is particularly the long-standing desire of the people of China.”3 It was cabled by Minister in China Johnson to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on January 23 to seek instructions.4 Hull did not reply until March 13, and his answer was, “the Department does not desire to at the present time make a formal reply to the Chinese Government’s note of January 18, 1934.” He instructed, though, that the legation “discuss informally the question of treaty revision” with an individual Chinese official, possibly Chiang Kai-shek. It was a message of rejection that was to be communicated, with the reasons that: (1) American extraterritorial jurisdiction rested on a “broader and more comprehensive basis than merely the provisions of the treaty of 1903”; (2) American attitude about the question was made known as early as 1929 and had not been altered despite political changes, which was that although the U.S. government was “animated by a sincere desire to meet the desire of the Chinese people,” it was in favor of a gradual process of liquidation so that there would be time for “progressive adjustments” in the Chinese legal and judicial systems as well as “adequate opportunity” for American interests to “adjust themselves to the new situation”; (3) the question of extraterritoriality “should be dealt with as a whole and by all concerned,” not “with the powers separately.”5 As said, the Nationalist government had little more capacity than to complete the obligatory formalities. Therefore, after being rejected by the United States, it did not make further moves. Interestingly, when the Nanjing government was inactive about the question of extraterritoriality, the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo initiated a campaign for its abolition in Manchuria. With the puppet state under her firm grip, Japan did not need consular jurisdiction to maintain her privileges; instead, she could impair British and American power in Manchuria by crippling their interests, paving the way for her full annexation of the area. In 1934, a Commission for the Abolition of Extraterritoriality was established in Manchukuo under the patronage of the Japanese government, with a similar organization set up in Tokyo. On August 9, 1935, the Japanese cabinet formally adopted the plan to relinquish Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo and transfer the administrative rights in the South Manchurian Railway Zone.6 On June 10, 1936, Japan and Manchukuo signed the Treaty Concerning the Residence of Japanese Subjects, Taxation, etc., in Manchukuo, by which Japan relinquished part of her extraterritorial rights.7 Soon, the minister of foreign affairs of Manchukuo invited British and American

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representatives to discuss the relinquishment of their extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo. This was ignored by the governments of Britain and the United States, which did not recognize Manchukuo as legitimate. In early 1937, when a new wave of advocacy for the abolition of extraterritoriality sprang up in China, Japan displayed moderate gestures. Spokesman of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Amau Eiji openly expressed Japan’s willingness to relinquish her extraterritorial rights in China, while the Japanese press in China implied that this would be realized dependent on a change of the Chinese government’s attitude toward Japan.8 Superficial goodwill on the part of Japan ignited Chinese hope for the cause once again. The Chinese Bar Association and the Ratepayers Association of the International Settlement at Shanghai wired new Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Chonghui and urged him to proceed with negotiations for the abolition of extraterritoriality. On February, 29, 1937, the third plenary session of the KMT’s Fifth Central Committee adopted a motion concerning the abolition of extraterritoriality which obliged the government to negotiate with the powers for its early realization so as to safeguard of China’s jurisdictional integrity. The motion pointed out that the injury of extraterritoriality to China’s sovereign rights was now more severe than ever because of Japan’s abuse of her extraterritorial rights in conniving with her subjects to trade cigars and drugs, gather military intelligence, participate in or instigate coups, and run large-scale smuggling organizations which caused tens of millions of financial losses to China’s tariff revenue. “The existence of consular jurisdiction,” the motion put forward, is undoubtedly doing fatal harm to China’s sovereignty. If it is not abrogated soon, then all national plans to appease domestic unrest and repel foreign enemies would hardly lead to any substantive effects. Therefore, our Government must be determined to negotiate with the powers in accordance with its mandate regarding the abrogation of consular jurisdiction so that the Regulations Governing the Exercise of Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals in China promulgated in 1931 would come into force as soon as possible. The motion also provided specific steps for the abolition: to negotiate with Britain first for she had revealed her sympathy towards China’s quest, and then with France and the United States. It was believed that if negotiations with these three powers turned out to be smooth, then the rest of the powers would follow their decision.9 In the meantime, Spain was caught in a civil war. The nationalist government thus took advantage of the opportunity to renounce Spanish extraterritoriality. On

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March 2, 1937, it declared that because of the absence of official Spanish diplomatic or consular representation in China, all Spanish subjects would be subject to Chinese jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters.10 These developments dealt a considerable blow to Britain and the United States. Understanding Japan’s motive behind her voluntary relinquishment of extraterritorial rights, the two Western powers were anxious to bring China on her side. As Fishel observes, after the British Foreign Office and the Department of State considered the problem, it was recognized that some improvement had been made in the Chinese judicial system since 1931, and that the National government … had succeeded in achieving a considerable degree of unity in the country…. Furthermore, the incursions of Japanese armies into various areas of north China had stimulated national consciousness to perhaps a greater extent than ever before. Accordingly, it was the opinion of many persons in the Department of State that the display of a liberal attitude by the United States in regard to the abolition of extraterritoriality and such related issues as the withdrawal of American army and marine detachments from China would react to the benefit of both the American and the Chinese governments. It would impress the Chinese once again with the fact that the United States was China’s traditional friend….11 However, as the United States was prepared to discuss with China the relinquishment of extraterritoriality, the occurrence of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937, which marked the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, disrupted all conceived plans.

British and U.S. wartime proposals In less than one and a half years, the Japanese army occupied all major cities in eastern China and several major cities in Central China, including Wuhan. Not only did the war deprive the Chinese government of the energy to make demands on the powers, but it actually led to the feeling that the continual existence of extraterritoriality would be needed for some time. Because most of the foreign concessions, which were located in major cities, had fallen into the occupied zones, “the Chinese saw that the foreign concessions were of great value as places of refuge, as sources of economic strength and stability, and as secure centers of Nationalist propaganda and agitation.”12 As Secretary of State Hull recounted in his memoir, “The Japanese invasion… upset all these calculations….The Chinese themselves,

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although previously eager to have the extraterritorial rights annulled, were now anxious for us to stay, since they felt that withdrawal of our troops would appear like abandoning China to her fate.13 This change of attitude was evident in the fact that neither of the two documents adopted by the provisional national congress of the KMT in April 1938, namely the Declaration of the KMT Provisional National Congress and the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Program, mentioned the abolition of extraterritoriality. The theme of the documents was to win foreign support against the Japanese war. The diplomatic principles set in the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Program were: (1) to unite all anti-Japanese forces against Japanese aggression; (2) to strengthen existing friendly relations with nations of the world in order to increase sympathy towards China; (3) to deny and abolish all political institutions in Chinese territory which had been established by the Japanese by force, and to halt all their activities.14 While China was in no haste to get rid of foreign privileges, in the eyes of Japan, the existence of isolated foreign concessions was a thorn in her flesh. Japan repeatedly protested against foreign protection to persons hostile to Japan, going as far as to seal off the British concession at Tianjin in 1939. Both of her puppet regimes in China had called for the abolition of extraterritoriality. In November 1937, Japan signed a treaty with Manchukuo regarding the abolition of extraterritoriality and the transfer of administrative rights in the South Manchurian Railway Zone. On December 1, the Manchukuo government announced the abolition of foreign extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo. In March 27, 1938, the so-called “Reformed Government of the Republic of China” led by Wang Jingwei in Nanjing declared that it would deal with foreign interests in China in accordance with international law and practice and deny all the treaties entered into by the former governments with foreign countries along with all responsibilities incurred from them. In September 1940, the Wang Jingwei regime renounced the extraterritorial rights of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway when they were conquered by Germany. As the war went on, Japan became even less restrained in violating foreign interests in their concessions. The Japanese held much higher regard for their own martial law than consular jurisdiction, much less the inviolability of the latter. It became increasingly difficult for Britain and the United States to safeguard their interests under the shelter of extraterritoriality. Worse still, they were criticized by Japan and her puppet regimes for possessing privileges in China. In the propaganda of the Japanese government and the Wang regime, Japan was portrayed as the an ally of China in defending Chinese sovereign rights and of East Asia in fighting against Western imperialism, whereas Britain and the United States were upholders of discriminatory privileges in China; Chiang Kai-shek was a tool of Western imperialism in China while Wang was more concerned about the national

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interests of China. Under such a circumstance, voices in the West came to table the abolition of extraterritoriality again. In the spring of 1940, President of the Yenching University John Leighton Stuart wired President Franklin Roosevelt after a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek and suggested providing “further financial assistance to China.” Towards the end of the telegram, he added: “When the time for peace discussions draws near there are relevant questions as to anachronistic rights in China (extra territoriality, settlements, etc.), which should be included. Among other advantages this would ease the Japanese approach to the whole issue.”15 The British and American governments also noticed that their offer to relinquish extraterritoriality would boost the morale of Chinese soldiers. Hence in January 1939, Britain addressed a note to the Chinese government, expressing that she was ready to discuss with China the revision of treaties at an appropriate time after the end of the war in the Far East. In July 1940, when Britain was forced to close the Burma Road by which she transported military supplies to China, Prime Minister Winston Churchill said before the British House of Commons: “We are ready to negotiate with the Chinese Government, after the conclusion of peace, the abolition of extraterritorial rights, the rendition of concessions and the revision of treaties on a basis of reciprocity and equality.”16 In the same month, U.S. Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles reviewed at a press conference the traditionally friendly attitude of the United States towards China, recounting that the 1931 discussions on the abolition of extraterritoriality were suspended only by the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, and in 1937 when the American government was “giving renewed favorable consideration to the question,” it was again interrupted by the “current Sino-Japanese hostilities.” He spelt out: It has been this Government’s traditional and declared policy and desire to move rapidly by process of orderly negotiation and agreement with the Chinese Government, whenever conditions warrant, toward the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights and of all other so-called “special rights” possessed by this country as by other countries in China by virtue of international agreements.17 These statements were made on a voluntary basis rather than in response to the plea of the Chinese government, and the scope of relinquishment as offered was not limited to extraterritoriality, but included other rights such as concessions. In addition to this, demands for gradual and progressive relinquishment were replaced with offers to “move rapidly” towards the goal. The dramatic change in language and attitude was a direct result of China’s role in the war in the Far

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East. It was evident that China was treated as a potential ally of the United States and Britain and they hoped China could play a more important role in fighting against Germany’s ally in Asia. This was the first time that China was considered strategically as a friend rather than a source of cheap raw materials or a market for dumping in the modern era. However, in April 1941 the Nationalist government was much disturbed by the conclusion of the Pact of Neutrality between the Soviet Union and Japan and winds of secret negotiations between the United States and Japan. To improve the country’s diplomatic position, the KMT Central Standing Committee resolved to instruct Quo Tai-chi (Guo Taiqi), who was on his way back to assume the office of minister of foreign affairs from London, to propose to the American government during his transit in the United States the conclusion of an equal treaty. What he was to ask for then was not the immediate implementation of the new treaty, but the assurance of the abrogation of the old treaty after the conclusion of peace, which would boost Chinese morale and enhance China’s international status in the future. During his stay in the United States, Quo discussed specific matters regarding the abolition of unequal treaties with Hull, but Hull expressed that although his government was pleased to see a full restoration of Chinese sovereign rights, it was not ready to proceed to treaty revision at that time.18 Under the suggestion of Advisor on Political Relations to the Department of State Stanley K. Hornbeck, Hull settled the matter with China in an exchange of notes. In an official reply to Quo on May 31, Hull assured: It goes without saying that the Government of the United States … expects when conditions of peace again prevail to move rapidly by processes of orderly negotiation and agreement with the Chinese Government, toward relinquishment of the last of certain rights of a special character which this country, together with other countries, has long possessed in China by virtue of agreements providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction and related practices.19 Likewise, in July 4, the British ambassador at Chongqing Archibald Clark Kerr informed Quo in a similar note that pledged to discuss with the Chinese government “the abolition of extraterritorial rights, the rendition of concessions, and the revision of treaties on a basis of reciprocity and equality” when peace was restored in the Far East.20 The United States and Britain had yet to formally renounce the existing treaties, but they had given assurances to do so as soon as the war was over. During this period, three minor states did enter into treaties of amity with China: the Dominican

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Republic, Estonia, and Liberia on May 11, 1940, December 21, 1937, and December 11, 1937, respectively. These treaties provided that the contracting parties shall “have the right reciprocally to send duly accredited diplomatic representatives who shall enjoy, in the country to the Government of which they are accredited, all the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions generally recognized by public international law,” and “the nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territory of the other full protection for their persons and property in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country and with the principles of international law.”21 They were all concluded on a completely equal basis.

The Abrogation of Unequal Treaties and the Enhancement of China’s International Status The abrogation of treaties with Britain and the United States On December 7, 1941, Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor symbolized the start of the Pacific War. With the entry of the United States on the side of the Allies, the balance of power between the two camps was redistributed. Feeling assured, the Nationalist government soon officially declared war on the Axis Powers. In January 1942, it signed the Declaration by United Nations jointly with 25 other countries including the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, becoming a member of the alliance against the Axis Powers. The outbreak of the Pacific War provided China with a historic opportunity for the abolition of unequal treaties. The declaration of war on the Axis Powers annulled all her previous treaties with Italy and Japan. Along with it, China declared: “all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan are and remain null and void,” and “all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Germany and between China and Italy are and remain null and void.”22 Moreover, the endurance of the Chinese army during its war with the Japanese impressed the United States and Britain, which suffered heavy losses and defeats on the Southeast Asian front. Not only had the Chinese army held out against the Japanese forces, whose might had been underestimated by the Western powers, for nearly four years, but it also began to gain ground against the Japanese in certain areas, winning the decisive Battle of Changsha in 1942. China also sent expeditionary forces into Burma to aid Britain. Events as such increased the strategic value of the Chinese battlefield. Britain and the United States hoped that China could tie up as much of the Japanese forces as possible. Roosevelt’s regard for the strategic value of the Chinese battlefield is well-

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known from his words: “Without China, if China goes under, how many divisions of Japanese troops do you think will be freed — to do what? Take Australia, take India — and it’s as ripe as a plum for the picking. Move straight on to the Middle East.”23 This would be a dire strait for the Allies. Encouraging China to withstand Japanese troops was an important part of British and American strategy in the war. The conflict between China’s newly gained status as an equal ally of the Western powers and the discriminatory provisions of the old treaties prompted an urgent rethink of the problem of treaty revision. In the initial discussions, some advocated the early relinquishment of consular jurisdiction, but others thought that such an act at that particular time when Britain and the United States had just suffered major setbacks in the Far East would weaken their prestige vis-à-vis their enemies. In a memorandum by Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Maxwell M. Hamilton on March 27, he analyzed the pros and cons of immediate relinquishment of extraterritoriality. Arguments against immediate relinquishment can be summarized as follows: 1. The American government had “comparatively recently” informed the Chinese government that it was ready to “move rapidly” to relinquish extraterritorial and other special rights when peace was restored. 2. Relinquishment of rights which American citizens in China could not then enjoy due to Japanese military occupation would be “seized upon by the enemy” as evidence of weakness. 3. The Chinese were “more interested in military deeds and accomplishments” than in the “words and diplomatic phrases” of renouncing extraterritoriality. 4. “Unsettled conditions” were expected to continue for a period of time when the war was over, making special protection necessary for American nationals in China. 5. Retention until the war was over would give the American government “a bargaining factor of some importance.” 6. Trouble over the holding of real property in each other’s country was expected. 7. A new treaty concluded during the war, which was expected to continue for some time, when unforeseeable changes would happen might be “outmoded and inappropriate to the situation obtaining at the conclusion of hostilities.”24 Considerations for relinquishment were given as follows:

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1. The idea that “the present war is a people’s war” and “the United States and the United Nations are fighting not only for self-preservation but also for human rights and decencies and for greater equalities in the general political, economic, and social system” became increasingly prevalent in the United States, and extraterritoriality appeared to be an “anachronism” especially against this ideal. 2. The Chinese people were “keen bargainers” who were aware of the general American support for the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights, meaning that retention of these rights until the conclusion of hostilities “would not unlikely to constitute a bargaining factor of significance.” 3. If extraterritorial jurisdiction was to be retained until stability was restored after the end of the war, American nationals who had left China would be encouraged to return to resume activities which were deemed “practicable under an extraterritorial system.” This would pave the way for conflict between the two countries when China wanted to abolish extraterritorial rights but interested Americans protested against it.25 In the opinion of Hamilton, although the considerations contra outnumbered the considerations pro, the latter were “of a more substantial and enduring character than those contra.” He suggested that a small committee be established jointly by the Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements and the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to “begin in strict confidence preparatory work” for the drafting of “a suitable treaty” that would be concluded with the Chinese government “in the not too distant future”.26 The U.S. government accepted Hamilton’s suggestions and discussed with the British government specific matters relating to the relinquishment of extraterritoriality. Back in early March, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had formulated its principles for the abolition of extraterritoriality which were centered on the unconditional abolition of all provisions of unequal treaties. It was decided that negotiations in the manner of the past would not be repeated but rather new treaties would be concluded entirely based on equality and reciprocity. China would not give any consideration to any transitional arrangement such as the employment of foreign judges. As regard the question of foreign residence and trade in the interior, which the powers had repeatedly raised in previous negotiations on extraterritoriality, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found it hard to reject this claim, considering international practice and the fact that other countries had long accorded such a right to Chinese subjects. To prevent foreigners from abusing the right, it put forward four measures: (1) imposing strict limitations on foreigners’

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rights to land ownership, land pawning, perpetual lease, and farming in the land law; (2) restricting foreigners’ commercial and industrial investment in China in relevant regulations; (3) implementing a foreigners’ resident permit system which placed restraints on foreigners’ relocation in order to prevent the concentration of foreigners in certain areas; (4) when needs arose, restricting the annual number of immigrants after American practice.27 The time for the Chinese government to demand the termination of extraterritoriality had arrived, for after the outbreak of the Pacific War, foreign concessions in China had fallen into the hands of Japanese troops, so the only reason for China’s toleration of the concessions — the provision of refuge for antiJapanese activities — no longer held. In March 1942, an outcry against unequal treaties prevailed in China. Under such a background, Minister of Foreign Affairs T. V. Soong, who was in the United States for a discussion about the matter of American aid, renewed the demand for the abolition of unequal treaties. On April 19, Mayling Soong Chiang published an article titled “First Lady of the East Speaks to the West” in the New York Times in which she denounced extraterritorial rights and called for their abolition. The article provoked great response among the Americans and aroused a lot of sympathy for China. It was followed by domestic editorials advocating the same cause, and letters were addressed to the government urging immediate action. Later, Secretary Hull was brought to notice “the trend of public opinion,” feeling from editorial comment, speeches, and letters that “popular sentiment in favor of action toward abolishing extraterritoriality” was widespread, and he believed that “any request by the Chinese Government for abolition would receive strong support in the United States.”28 Hence the Department of State communicated with the British Foreign Office about whether to consider abolition during the war. In the British government there had also been two opposite opinions. British Ambassador to China Horace James Seymour and some mid-level diplomats advocated immediate abolition of unequal treaties. Seymour, an experienced diplomat who had served as Assistant Undersecretary of State at the Division of the Far Eastern and Chinese Affairs before he performed as British Ambassador to China and who had close connections with personalities such as Zhou Enlai, Madame Chiang, and Lin Boqu, was very much concerned for and sympathetic towards the calls of the Chinese people. In March 1942, the British Foreign Office consulted Seymour about the question, asking him if the Chinese would regard British negotiations to abolish extraterritorial rights as a generous gesture or an act of weakness, and what strategies should be taken to safeguard British interests during the negotiations. Seymour replied in April: “I agree to the proposal to take the initiative in concluding a treaty with China now for abolition of extraterritorial

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rights. An offer to do so would inevitably be regarded as a symptom of our weakness in the Far East, but this should not deter us from making it.” He advised against attempting to “attach too many strings” to the negotiations, which he believed would complicate the issue, explaining that the Chinese would in no case “accept any provisions other than such as [were] ordinarily included in treaties between equal States.” Instead of special rights, he favored the maintenance of British interests in China by securing “general guarantees such as reciprocal and most favored nation treatment for trade, taxation of residents and land ownership.”29 However, some British leaders such as Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Prime Minister Winston Churchill opined that the present moment was not suitable for relinquishment of extraterritoriality. Eden worried that this kind of action at that stage of war “would be constructed as a sign of weakness and would fail to produce desired effect.” Bringing up the earlier U.S. announcement to negotiate the abolition of extraterritoriality when peace was restored in the Far East, he asked the British ambassador in Washington to secure from the Department of State a promise of parallel action. The intent was clearly to safeguard as many British interests in China as possible through collaborative action and to eliminate the possibility that the United States took any initiatives that would jeopardize the British position in future negotiations.30 However, China was not inclined to wait any longer. In fact, the Chinese government then was considering abolition of all foreign rights that impaired China’s sovereign rights rather than that of extraterritoriality alone. In July 1942, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs formulated the Measures Respecting the Rendition of Foreign Concessions, Leased Territories, and Other Special Areas and Measures Respecting the Abolition of Other Special Rights and Systems of Special Character. As regards the rendition of foreign concessions, leased territories, and other special areas, the government categorized them into three cases according to the countries to which they were accorded: 1. Those belonging to enemy countries were to be retroceded unconditionally and immediately. 2. Those belonging to the Allies were to be retroceded immediately in principle, and in cases where special circumstances warranted special regulations, these would be promulgated and executed by the Chinese government provided that: (a) administrative affairs would be managed by officials appointed by the Chinese government; (b) the police right would rest entirely with China; (c) special chambers would not be established anymore; (d) all municipal property and archives would be handed over to China; and (e) foreigners’ privilege to purchase

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property would be abolished, and the Chinese government, should it deem it necessary, would acquire their private property at a fair price. 3. Those belonging to neutral countries were to be handled according to the principles in the second provision.31 The document ended with a stipulation that foreigners’ special rights in the retroceded territories would be cancelled accordingly. As for the second set of measures, there were six kinds of special rights and systems to be abolished: 1. Military rights: rights of foreign naval vessels to cruise or anchor in Chinese waters; rights to garrison troops or police forces; treaty provisions that forbad China to garrison troops or build forts in specified areas. 2. Rights relating to spheres of influence: provisions that prevented China from ceding or leasing her territory to third parties; railway and mining rights in specified areas; agreements between foreign countries delineating their spheres of influence in China; declarations and the like that restricted China from building parallel railways. 3. Commercial rights: rights to coastal trade and inland navigation; provisions that compelled China to regulate a certain river and place it under international regulation; the practice of foreign subjects serving as pilots in Chinese territory. Additionally, foreign warehouses, factories, schools, churches, and hospitals in China were to be regulated under Chinese jurisdiction, and those established by enemy subjects were to be treated as enemy property. 4. Rights in transportation and communication: rights to operate wired and wireless telegraphy and to send and receive telegrams; rights to establish post offices; the practice of hiring a foreign director general and other foreign employees in postal service (the retention and dismissal of foreign employees to be deliberated by the Chinese government); provisions to have foreign mails inspected by foreign staff. Regarding railways, those invested or operated by enemy states were to be treated as enemy property, while those by countries that had friendly relations with China would be redeemed at a fair price; administrative affairs and the hiring of staff would be managed by the Chinese government, which would deliberate on the retention and dismissal of the existing foreign employees. 5. Financial rights: exemption from tax; issuance of banknotes by foreign

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banks; the practice of hiring a foreign inspector general and other foreign employees in the Chinese customs (the retention and dismissal of foreign staff to be deliberated by the Chinese government). 6. Other special rights: most-favored-nation treatment provisions not concluded on a basis of reciprocity and equality; Japan’s special rights in Manchuria, Britain’s special rights in Tibet, and the Soviet Union’s special rights in Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, and northern Manchuria.32 In the summer of 1942, the situation in the Pacific theatre turned to be favorable for the Allies. Japan suffered great losses in the Battle of Midway, which signaled the loss of Japanese naval and air control in the Pacific and caused Japan to shift from offensive to defensive operations. On the other hand, the British-Chinese alliance in the Burma Campaign was not faring that well, with the last British and American supply line to China cut off following a British defeat, which increased the material as well as psychological burdens of the Chinese troops. Under these circumstances, Hull found that the time for abolition of extraterritorial and related rights was ripe because there was much less need to worry about giving out a signal of weakness than to give China a badly needed boost in morale. On August 27, Hull wired American Ambassador in Britain John G. Winant and asked him to advise Eden to “take some affirmative steps” in abolishing extraterritoriality. Considering that the “orthodox way of proceeding” of entering into negotiations with the Chinese government on the conclusion of new treaties based on “the best modern international practices” to override extraterritorial rights would be time consuming and easily leaked to enemy governments, which were likely to “seek every available opportunity to criticize to their own advantage” any differing of views, Hull suggested the conclusion of “brief treaties which would provide for the relinquishment … [of] extraterritorial and related rights in China and for the adjustment of a few broad questions which would arise upon and in connection with relinquishment of extraterritorial rights.” More general treaties would be negotiated later.33 However, the British authorities were not yet ready to take the “affirmative step” as Hull advocated. On September 5, Hull rewired Winant emphasizing the necessity of taking immediate action while the initiative was still in their control. He outlined three principle objectives to support his view: (1) “some psychological and political benefit to the cause of the United Nations which would be of concrete assistance to China and thus tend to strengthen the determination of that country in its war effort”; (2) “the wiping out once and for all of an existing anomaly in [their] relations with China”; and (c) “the achievement of agreement in principle to regularize in China the usual rights normally accruing to American and British

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nations in friendly foreign countries.”34 The Chinese government officially took up the issue in late September. On October 4, Chiang Kai-shek communicated to Republican Party leader Wendell L. Willkie, who was on a mission to China as Roosevelt’s personal representative, the Chinese desire to attain an equal status in the family of nations through abolition of unequal treaties.35 On October 5, he drafted the major arguments for urging the United States to initiate relinquishment of unequal treaties. His first point was that the promise for relinquishment after the war as given in the earlier exchange of notes was too distant for the general public. More importantly, he pointed to the fact that it was for liberty and justice, on top of survival, that China participated in the war, claiming equal obligation and responsibility between China and her allies. According to Chiang, voluntary relinquishment on the part of the United States at an early time would both crush deceptive propaganda by the enemies and boost Chinese morale.36 Willkie responded positively to Chiang’s proposals. He made an affirmative statement in Chongqing on October 7: “We believe that this war must mean an end to the empire of nations over other nations. No foot of Chinese soil, for example, should be or can be ruled from now on except by the people who live on it. And we must say so now, not after the war.”37 In fact, British and American privileges in China had by then been largely smashed by the Japanese. The treaty ports and concessions in which British and American interests in China used to concentrate were now occupied by Japanese troops, rendering their extraterritorial rights no more than nominal. Even in the areas controlled by the Nationalist government, the interests of foreigners could not be fully guaranteed because of the war. Therefore, after some more discussions and deliberations, on October 9, Britain and the United States notified the Chinese ambassadors in London and Washington that they desired to begin negotiations with China on “immediate relinquishment of extraterritorial and related rights.” They deliberately chose to communicate the decision on that particular day so that joy would be doubled when the news was released by the press the next morning, which was the Chinese national anniversary.38 Upon receiving the news, Chiang wired the Chinese ambassadors in Britain and the United States asking them to convey the gratitude of the Chinese people and government and at the same time remind the powers that in addition to extraterritorial and related rights, China also looked forward to the simultaneous abolition of other special rights such as foreign concessions, garrison, inland navigation, and negotiated tariff provisions.39 On October 10, Britain and the United States made a public declaration about the decision. In the afternoon of the same day, Chiang announced in a speech at the anniversary celebration in Fuzichi, Chongqing : “The shackles that unequal

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treaties had imposed on China for a hundred years are fundamentally eliminated, and the charge to abolish unequal treaties in the last will of the Father of the Nation is also completely realized.” He was apparently satisfied with the British and American offer. “To have received the American and British notice of their voluntary relinquishment of extraterritorial rights,” wrote Chiang in his diary on the same day, “I am gratified from the bottom of my heart. This is certainly the only fortunate event in my life.”40 On October 12, Chiang ordered Foreign Minister Soong to imply to the United States the further desire for the complete abolition of all unequal treaties as a whole and the conclusion of new treaties.41

The conclusion of new treaties The negotiations between China and the United States on the conclusion of new treaties proceeded smoothly. On October 25, Secretary of State Hull handed an eight-article draft treaty to Chinese Ambassador Wei Daoming. Article 1 abrogated “all previous Sino-American treaties which authorized the United States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in China,”42 so that “nationals of the United States of America in such territory shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of China in accordance with the principles of international law and practice.” The purport of Article 2 was the relinquishment of the special rights accorded to the United States under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and the transfer of the “administration and control of the Diplomatic Quarter at Peiping” along with “the official assets and the official obligations of the Diplomatic Quarter” to the Chinese government. Article 3 covered the reversion of the administration and control of the international settlements at Shanghai and Amoy to the Chinese government and the cessation of American rights relating to these settlements. The rest of the articles would acknowledge and safeguard American rights in China on a reciprocal basis: continuation of existing rights of the U.S. government and nationals in respect of existing titles to real property; rights of the nationals of both governments to reside, travel, and trade in the territory of each other; treatment to the nationals of both governments not less favorable than that accorded to the government’s own nationals in regard to “legal proceedings,” “the administration of justice,” “the levying of taxes,” and “the carrying on of commerce”; “rights, privileges, and immunities of consular officers under modern international usage.”43 China and the United States began negotiations on the basis of the draft. China proposed adding the provision “The relations between the Republic of China and the United States of America shall be based on the principles of equality and reciprocity” as the first article of the treaty. China also requested an exchange of

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notes to specify the abolition of “the systems of treaty ports and of special courts in the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, the carrying on of the coastal trade and inland navigation by the nationals of foreign countries, the employment of pilots, [and] the entering of foreign warships into Chinese ports.”44 Moreover, China had a different view with regard to the provision in Article 5 of the U.S. draft which would oblige both governments to accord national treatment to each other’s subjects in the “carrying on of commerce.” This arose from the fact that the United States was a federation, meaning that each state was protected by state law on top of federal law. As American nationals, when in a state apart from that to which they belonged, would only be accorded treatment of that state, the treatment that the federal government of the United States could accord to Chinese nationals would be very limited. Therefore China demanded that the provision as regard national treatment in the carrying on of commerce be changed to “no less than that accorded to the nationals of a third country,” that is, most favored nation treatment.45 As regard the additional Article 1, the United States considered it unnecessary because what she desired was a brief treaty on relinquishment of extraterritorial rights which would obtain instant approval of the Congress. The U.S. government wanted to “avoid bringing in extraneous matters,” but the addition of such an article would be, in the words of Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs George Atcheson, “subject to misconstruction by persons in this country as affecting broad questions which are necessarily not within the scope of our present endeavors.” Atcheson explained that provisions of the draft treaty already conveyed the spirit of reciprocity and equality, and a similar declaration was not customary in treaties between the United States and other countries. As for the national treatment clause, the United States agreed to take away “in the carrying on of commerce” and leave the matter for subsequent discussion in the negotiations on the conclusion of the commercial treaty in the future.46 The negotiations on the brief treaty between China and the United States were basically completed in late November. The Chinese representative once expressed the hope to announce the conclusion of the treaty at the final meeting of the 10th Plenary Session of the KMT’s Fifth Central Executive Committee, which was in session in Chongqing then; however, the United States pointed out that there were still minor details to refine and hoped the treaty could be completed within 10 days.47 Apart from the minor adjustments to be made, the Department of States had a consensus with the British Foreign Office to act in parallel, and it estimated that the Sino-British negotiations would be concluded in 10 days. On November 27, the Department of State handed China a revised draft in which it accepted China’s request for a provision of reciprocity and equality by, instead of adding an extra article, revising the preamble text of the treaty into the

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following: The United States of America and the Republic of China, in recognition of the friendly relations which have long prevailed between their two peoples and of their common desire as equal and sovereign States that the high principles in the regulation of human affairs to which they are committed shall be made broadly effective, have resolved to conclude a treaty for the adjustment of certain matters in regard to jurisdiction in China and related questions.…48 The U.S. government also agreed to cover in an exchange of notes the relinquishment of rights “in regard to the systems of treaty ports and of special courts in the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy and in regard to the employment of foreign pilots in the ports of the territory of China.” In terms of the coasting trade and inland navigation, it generally agreed to relinquish the special rights previously accorded to American vessels, but did not prefer “material alterations in the existing practice pending the making of further arrangements between the two Governments.”49 The Chinese government proposed adding the following clause for this question: “Should either country later accord the right of inland navigation or coasting trade to vessels of any third country such rights would similarly be accorded to the vessels of the other country.”50 However, although the United States agreed to the addition, she demanded dropping the word “later.” China had intended that the United States relinquish those rights immediately whether other countries took the same step; hence the United States would only be entitled to the rights if China later accorded them to a third country. Deleting “later” would mean that if any other country, such as Britain, refused to relinquish those rights, the United States could make the same demand. The United States insisted on the omission arguing that other countries’ refusal to do the same would subject American commercial interests to discrimination. Eventually, considering the fact that Britain had agreed to relinquish the rights to inland navigation and coasting trade, the Chinese government accepted the U.S. revision.51 The Americans would not complete the signature of the treaty until the SinoBritish treaty was ready. However, the Sino-British negotiations were not as smooth as their Sino-American counterpart. The British draft treaty was handed to the Chinese Embassy at London and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 28 and 29, respectively, a few days later than the American draft. The purport of the British treaty was similar to the American one, but the former was more complicated due to the fact that British interests in China outnumbered American interests. In the draft treaty, the British government agreed to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights, the special rights accorded under the 1901 Boxer

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Protocol, the administration and control of the Diplomatic Quarter at Beijing, and the special rights accorded to the British nationals and government in the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy. It also agreed to return the British concessions at Tianjin and Guangzhou to China. As in the negotiations with the United States, the Chinese government demanded an article specifying that Sino-British relations should be based on reciprocity and equality and a provision for the abolition of the rights of inland navigation and coasting trade. However, the British authorities considered inland navigation and coasting trade irrelevant to the subject of the treaty — the relinquishment of extraterritorial and related rights — and preferred the question to be reserved for the comprehensive treaty in the future. At that time, the same question was being negotiated between the United States and China, and the U.S. government was considering meeting the Chinese request. On October 31, the Department of State sent its draft provisions to the British Foreign Office for consultation. The British Foreign Office still insisted on the retention of the rights for the time being. Foreign Secretary Eden wrote to Hull: In the difficult question of coastal and inland navigation we feel strongly the desirability of postponing precise agreements until we come to negotiate comprehensive treaties on a reciprocal basis. If we seem to be somewhat insistent on this point you will understand that it is in part because our interest in these trades in China is, in normal times, very great — greater perhaps than that of any other foreign power except Japan — and that the subject is therefore for us one of the first importance.52 On November 17, in his communication with the British Foreign Office about the extraterritoriality negotiations, Hull suggested Britain to follow the U.S. practice with regard to inland navigation and coasting trade rights, pointing out that “it would be most unfortunate if the signing of the treaty should be delayed because of difficulty over questions relating to any special rights,” which would constitute a cause of criticism by American public opinion.53 Eden then gave further instructions to Seymour on November 27, saying that if China insisted on including the matter in an exchange of notes, the British government could in the last resort declare that they did not reserve any unilateral treaty rights in respect of coasting trade and inland navigation provided that China would permit the existing practice to continue before any further arrangements were made.54 Although the British government did not concede greatly, it agreed to include in the treaty some kind of provision about such relinquishment at an indefinite time in the future.

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Britain was also rather uncompromising in terms of the granting of reciprocal national treatment in trade. By mid-November, the United States had already decided to concede it, but Eden addressed a letter to Hull on November 27 stating, “The Foreign Office greatly regret the decision of the Department of State not to ask for national treatment in the carrying on of commerce.” He hoped the decision would be reconsidered because the omission would have a “serious effect” on the future comprehensive treaty, and asked the Department of State to postpone this offer to China until the British Cabinet meeting on November 30. In closing, he revealed that the Cabinet was unlikely to abandon insisting on this principle to which the government attached so much importance although the Foreign Office would regret “having to do this alone.”55 The British Foreign Office also proposed in the draft treaty the provision of the rights British nationals to acquire real property in Chinese territory, which was not included in the U.S. draft because China had accorded the nationals of Italy, Belgium, Denmark, and Portugal in her 1928 treaties with them the rights to reside, trade, and acquire real property in Chinese territory.56 The British government did not want its nationals to be subject to an inferior position compared with other foreign nationals in China. The pressure on the British government was increased when a basic consensus was reached in the Sino-American negotiations in late November. The British Foreign Office kept repeating its stance over the questions of national treatment in the carrying on of commerce, inland navigation and coasting trade, and acquisition of real property to the Department of State, implying that American uncooperativeness was preventing Britain from negotiating for better terms.57 However, despite her complaints, Britain had to make conditional concessions so as to accelerate the negotiation process. The Foreign Office finally decided to give up its claims on inland navigation and coasting trade rights and national treatment in exchange for China’s assent to British nationals’ acquisition of real property in China. The most difficult question in the Sino-British negotiations was yet the rendition of Kowloon. According to the Chinese government, Kowloon, as a leased territory, should revert to the administration and control of China along with its official assets and obligations as in the case of other leased territories. However, the British government was rather insistent that Kowloon should not be dealt with in the extraterritorial treaty. The divergence was so wide that until the end of December there was not any progress in the negotiations. Because the signature of the SinoAmerican treaty depended on the completion of the Sino-British negotiations, now that the British government had no intention to yield, the Chinese government decided to shelve the Kowloon question temporarily.

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Noticing American and British action regarding extraterritoriality, Japan staged the political show of signing an agreement with Wang Jingwei on the retrocession of her concessions and relinquishment of extraterritoriality on January 9 ahead of the Americans and British. Two days later, on January 11, Ambassador Wei Daoming and Hull signed the Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters in Washington, while Minister of Foreign Affairs Soong and Ambassador Seymour signed the British version of the treaty in Chongqing. As the two treaties were similar in principle and the British treaty contained more provisions than its American counterpart, it will be more valuable to look at the British treaty here. The Sino-British treaty stipulated that all the provisions of treaties or agreements that authorized Britain to exercise jurisdiction over British nationals or companies in Chinese territory were abrogated, and all British nationals and companies in Chinese territory shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Chinese government. It also provided for the termination of the 1901 Boxer Protocol and its related rights; the transfer of the administration and control, official assets, and official obligations of the Diplomatic Quarter in Beijing to the Chinese government; and the rendition of the administration and control, along with the official assets and official obligations, of the international settlements at Shanghai and Amoy and the British concessions at Tianjin and Guangzhou.58 By an exchange of notes, an annex was provided to clarify the understandings between the two parties regarding the rights to be relinquished by Britain, which included: a. all existing treaty rights relating to the system of treaty ports; b. all existing treaty rights relating to the special courts in the international settlements at Shanghai and Amoy; c. all existing treaty rights with regard to the employment of foreign pilots in the ports; d. all existing treaty rights relating to the entry of British naval vessels into Chinese waters; e. the right to claim the appointment of a British subject as inspector general of the Chinese Customs; f. British courts in Chinese territory; g. the special rights accorded to British vessels with regard to coasting trade and inland navigation in Chinese waters. For example, regarding the treaty port system, they had the following agreements: “the merchant vessels of one High Contracting Party shall be permitted freely to

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come to ports, places and waters in the territories of the other High Contracting Party which are or may be opened to overseas merchant shipping,” and “the treatment accorded to such vessels in such ports, places and waters shall be no less favourable than that accorded to national vessels and shall be as favourable as that accorded to vessels of any third country.” But concerning the knotty question of coasting trade and inland navigation, it was stipulated: Should one High Contracting Party accord in any of his territories the right of coasting trade or inland navigation to the vessels of any third country, such rights would similarly be accorded to the vessels of the other High Contracting Party provided that the latter High Contracting Party permits the vessels of the former High Contracting Party to engage in the coasting trade or inland navigation of his territories. Coasting trade and inland navigation are excepted from the requirement of national treatment and are to be regulated according to the laws of each High Contracting Party in relation thereto.59 Both sides also reached an understanding that questions which might affect the sovereignty of China and which were not covered by the treaty shall be discussed by the representatives of the two countries in accordance with “generally accepted principles of international law and modern international practice.”60 On January 12, 1943, the Chinese government issued a proclamation to the Chinese army and civilians announcing the conclusion of the two treaties, which read in part: After five decades of revolutionary bloodshed and five and a half years of sacrifices in the War of Resistance, we, the Chinese nation, have transformed the painful history of Unequal Treaties over a century into a glorious record of abrogation of Unequal Treaties. This marks not only the most important page of fundamental revival in the history of the Chinese nation, but also a bright lighthouse built for the equality and liberty of the world and human beings by the friendly nations of Britain and America.... … today as Unequal Treaties are abolished, we are in an equal status with nations such as Britain and America. It is by the fact that we are standing in an independent position which we truly become friendly nations.61 The Communist Party of China (CPC), which was in a united front with the KMT, also acclaimed the achievement and held celebration activities for it. The party ascribed the abolition of extraterritoriality to the participation in the anti-

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Japanese war, the formation of the Second United Front of which it was a part, the alliance of international powers against Fascism, and the sympathy of the powers towards China.62 Following the conclusion of the treaties with Britain and the United States, a series of treaties on the abolition of special rights were signed with other countries. These included the Treaty of Amity between with Brazil on August 20, 1943; the Treaty Relating to the Abolition of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Settlement of Related Issues with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union on October 20, 1943; the Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters with Norway on November 10, 1943; the Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters with Canada on April 14, 1944; the Treaty Concerning the Relinquishment by Sweden of Its Extraterritoriality and Related Special Rights in China on April 5, 1945; and the Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters with the Netherlands on May 29, 1945. France, Denmark, Switzerland, and Portugal announced the abrogation of past treaties after the war, while the old treaties with Peru were renounced by the Peruvian government in 1943. The French case of relinquishment of extraterritoriality is worth a special mention. The first initiative was extended by the puppet Vichy government to Wang Jingwei’s regime, much like the Japanese instance. On May 19, 1943, the Nationalist government protested to the French representative in China: It will be recalled that the National Government has officially notified all foreign countries that the National Government is the only Government of the Republic of China, and that the present illegal organization at Nanking is but a puppet in the area under Japanese military occupation. The National Government has, moreover, on many occasions solemnly declared that whatever agreements entered into by the puppet organizations with any country shall be considered null and void…. Lodging “the most emphatic protest” against the Vichy regime, the Nationalist government declared: While reserving all the rights, it hereby solemnly declares that the provisions of the treaties and agreements granting to France extraterritorial and related rights, concessions and the rights in connection with the Legation Quarter at Peiping and in the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, are no longer binding on China as a result of the illegal act of the Vichy

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Government.63 For the first time, a series of new treaties established the legal basis of China as a full sovereign state on a par with other powers based on the principles of equality and reciprocity, but even so, it would be too soon to believe that China then enjoyed a completely equal status to Britain and the United States and turn a blind eye to unresolved questions such as Kowloon and the administration of the Chinese Customs. One other notable question was with the exemption of U.S. troops from Chinese jurisdiction. This was confirmed by an exchange of notes on May 21, 1943 between Political Vice Minister in Charge of Ministerial Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs K. C. Wu (Wu Guozhen) and Atcheson, who was then the chargé d’affaires in China. The Chinese government concurred with Atcheson’s statement, “it is the desire of the Government of the United States that the service courts and authorities of its military and naval forces shall during the continuance of the present conflict against our common enemies exercise exclusive jurisdiction over criminal offenses which may be committed in China by members of such forces.” The arrangement would stay effective during the war and for another six months after the war. To make it sound reciprocal, the U.S. note also stipulated, “the Government of the United States will be ready to make arrangements to ensure to such Chinese forces as may be stationed in territory under United States jurisdiction a position corresponding to that of the United States forces in China.”64 On October 1, the Chinese government promulgated the Regulations Governing the Handling of Criminal Offenses Committed by Members of the Armed Forces of the United States in China. The extension of military jurisdiction to the United States received much criticism, some seeing it as a revival of consular jurisdiction. Dissatisfaction was especially fueled by the poor conduct of U.S. military personnel, who committed crimes from alcohol-induced violence to rape, and the unjust rulings of the service courts. By 1945, there were 60,000 members of the U.S. armed forces in China. As Fairbank describes in The United States and China, “At war’s end Shanghai streets for many months were filled with GI’s and roistering sailors far beyond the memory of treaty port days. This ill suited China’s new great power status. China’s new-found sovereignty took on a quizzical character.”65 However, according to international practice, this special arrangement itself cannot be seen as discriminatory. There were wartime precedents of such between allies. For example, the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act promulgated by the British government in 1942 stipulated that “no criminal proceedings shall be prosecuted in the United Kingdom before any court of the United Kingdom against a member of the military or naval forces of the United States of America.”66 Moreover, the Sino-American exchange of notes did contain a reciprocal provision

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even though China had never sent any troops to any U.S. territories. This kind of wartime arrangement was after all legitimate per se.

China among the big powers China’s status in international society rose greatly after the abolition of foreign extraterritorial rights. In October 1943, Chinese Ambassador in the Soviet Union Foo Ping-sheung (Fu Bingchang) signed the Moscow Declarations jointly with the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference. Among them was the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, which established the postwar framework of general security that would regulate international relations. This is the first time that China participated in an international conference as a major power, symbolizing the rise of China among the “Big Four.” In the following days, from November 22 to November 26, 1943, Chiang Kaishek attended the Cairo Conference and discussed with Churchill and Roosevelt collaborative military operations against Japan and the postwar arrangements. The conference produced the Cairo Declaration in which the three powers “expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure” against Japan until her unconditional surrender. The declaration proclaimed: “It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”67 For China, whose claims and opinions had always been ignored in previous international conferences, the Cairo Conference was a historic milestone. In this event, the Chinese head of state met his British and American counterparts on an equal footing, and the Cairo Declaration fully reflected the Chinese aspirations for the restoration of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In fact, all Sino-Japanese treaties including the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ceded Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan were invalidated at China’s declaration of war on Japan, but the Cairo Declaration afforded China additional assurance for the restoration of these territories by an international guarantee. Based on Moscow Declarations of October 1943, representatives from Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China met for a conference at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington in August 1944 and discussed arrangements to establish a new world organization that would be committed to maintaining world peace: the United Nations. It was agreed that the organization would be constituted by four principal bodies, among which the Security Council would shoulder the responsibility for preventing future war. Five permanent members with veto

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power were decided upon, the seats given to the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. China’s status as a great power was thus confirmed by this institutional arrangement. The powerful tool of veto in an international council would have been unimaginable for the Chinese people in the past.

Resumption of British Rule in Hong Kong The Kowloon question The abolition of extraterritoriality in 1942 aroused such great excitements among the Chinese people that they would not have left the question of Kowloon and Hong Kong untouched. On the diplomatic level, before official negotiations on the new treaty commenced, Foo Ping-sheung, as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs then, raised the question with the British Embassy in China in a meeting on July 15, 1942. After British willingness to negotiate with China for the conclusion of a new treaty was publicized on October 10, the British government repeatedly made known that the Hong Kong question would not be included in the present negotiations. On October 14, for example, when Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Richard K. Law was questioned by a member of the House of Commons as to whether the British Foreign Office was prepared to return Hong Kong, he resolutely replied, “No, Sir. The proposed agreement with the Chinese Government relates only to the surrender of extraterritorial rights in Chinese territory.”68 The Hong Kong question was not mentioned in the draft treaty proposed by the British government in late October. Considering Britain’s tough attitude and the fact that Hong Kong Island and the area of Kowloon Peninsula south of Boundary Street were ceded rather than leased to Britain, the Nationalist government decided to start with the leased area of Kowloon, that is, the New Territories. The obstacles were expected to be relatively fewer because British concessions and leased territories were covered in the scope of the negotiations. On the other hand, the New Territories including New Kowloon made up as much as 90% of the whole territory of Hong Kong and was heavily depended upon by the rest of the colony; its retrocession would render the restoration of the whole colony eventually inevitable. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ position was made clear in its memorandum on the draft of the new Sino-British treaty on November 7.69 The counterdraft presented to the British Embassy on November 13 included the claim on the leased area of Kowloon with the following clause: “The administration and control of British leased area at Kowloon as shown on the annexed map in the last paragraph of the convention

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including its official assets and obligations shall be transferred to the Government of the Republic of China, it being mutually understood that the Government of the Republic of China in taking over the administration and control of the said area will make provision for the assumption and discharge of its official obligations and liabilities….”70 The British Foreign Office showed no intention to make any concession. British ambassador in China Seymour, however, took a different view. He reported to the Foreign Office: “It is not surprising that the Chinese Government have raised the question of New Territory. Having once done so, they are unlikely to drop it since they acknowledge leased territories as in the same category of unequal treaty … derogatory of Chinese sovereignty as our concessions and Shanghai Settlement.” Seymour interpreted the fact that the Chinese did not place Hong Kong Island and Kowloon within the scope of negotiations as “tacit acceptance” that they were British which “would be worth something.” He therefore suggested considering meeting the Chinese demand.71 Ashley Clarke from the Far Eastern Department did not support Seymour’s view. In his minutes on November 20, he quoted the opinion of the governor of Hong Kong in 1931 that “not only Kowloon, but the greater part of the New Territories are absolutely necessary to Hong Kong, both on economic and strategic grounds.” He opined strongly, “the Chinese proposal is a piece of sharp practice which we are entitled to resist: their plan is no doubt one of prising us out of Hong Kong step by step,” and concurred with the Colonial Office’s position that any form of concession had to be “in fact and in appearance spontaneous and in no way attributable to pressure from the U.S.A.”72 On November 30, the British cabinet endorsed the principle of the British Foreign Office. On December 5, Eden instructed Seymour to convey to the Chinese government that the New Territories would be “outside the scope of the present treaty.” However, to appease the Chinese, Seymour was given the liberty to inform them, if inevitable, that the British government “should be ready to consider with the Chinese Government what should be the future status of the New Territories during the currency of the lease” at the victory of the war when the Allies worked on a reconstruction in the Far East.73 But Seymour was convinced that the Chinese would not acquiesce, and he especially cautioned against using such words as “during current lease,” thinking that the Chinese would not be satisfied with anything other than “an assurance that the question of the lease [would] be reviewed after the war.”74 Before he received further guidance, Seymour abided by the instructions of the Foreign Office and informed Soong in their meeting on December 14 that the British government considered the Kowloon question outside the scope of the matter of negotiation. Soong made it clear that a treaty

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without securing a settlement of the question “would fail to achieve this object.”75 The conversation reached a deadlock. In the evening, Hang Liwu from the Ministry of Education who was also the secretary of the Sino-British Cultural Association and who had close connections with the British paid a visit to the British Embassy at the request of Soong. Hang proposed in personal capacity to Britain the suggestion that both sides should recognize in an exchange of note the irrelevancy of the Kowloon question to the current negotiations but China desired to discuss the question at a more appropriate time later. His suggestion was conveyed by Seymour to the British Foreign Office.76 As such an arrangement would involve no specific commitment on the part of the British beyond agreeing to discuss the question in the future, Eden thought it was acceptable.77 After the cabinet meeting of December 21, on December 23 and 24, Eden formally authorized Seymour that he could tell the Chinese government the Kowloon question was out of the scope of the current negotiations but the terms of lease of the territory could be discussed upon the victory of the war.78 However, Soong and his colleagues were suspicious of the use of the phrase “terms of lease,” which would imply that the lease would continue subject to changes with the terms only. To alleviate the tension, Seymour proposed replacement of the expression with ”the lease” or “question of lease,”79 and Eden accepted it. On the Chinese side, while Soong still insisted on the inclusion of the Kowloon question in the treaty in the meeting on December 25, he began to waver. That afternoon, he met for a discussion with Wu Guozhen, Wellington Koo, and Wang Chonghui. During their talk, Wang expressed his concern for the breakdown of the negotiations because of China’s insistence on the restoration of the Kowloon leased area. Koo trusted the sincerity of the British in settling the question after the war, and estimated that if the negotiations on the treaty broke off, the British would likely issue a statement to declare that they were ready to relinquish their extraterritorial rights and had already drafted the treaty, only that China insisted on the inclusion of Kowloon, which was not in the hands of Britain then. He worried the consequences of the breakdown would be ascribed to the Chinese government as the mainstream opinion in the West held that the priority at the time should be to collaborate in combating against their common enemies rather than quarrel over occupied territories. In his opinion, the only face-saving plan that would not compromise China’s principles was to secure a declaration from Britain on two points: that she desired to return the Kowloon leased area to China, and that she was ready to enter into discussions with China on this desire any time.80 An experienced diplomat the incumbent ambassador in the United Kingdom, Koo had the respect of his colleagues. His words carried considerable weight. The

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Chinese officials also considered the importance of cooperation with Britain in withstanding Soviet influence, worrying that the breakdown of the negotiations would cast a shadow on Sino-British relations. Most importantly, the British had been displaying such sternness of attitude that everyone knew they were unlikely to concede further. In the end, they agreed to give up the claim on the immediate rendition of the New Territories on the precondition that Britain declared the intention to return the territory to China and pledged to start negotiations on this within six months after the conclusion of peace. They immediately referred this proposal to Chiang, who gave it the green light while emphasizing that the proposed declaration must be secured.81 On December 27, Koo visited Seymour and conveyed to him China’s new plan, expressing no objection to settling the matter outside the treaty and having the actual arrangements sort out after the war, but threatening that unless the British government made a statement of its intention to return the territory China would not sign the new treaty. Seymour was clear that the Foreign Office would not agree to the Chinese proposal. He could have little to offer except to admit that “it was most unfortunate if the very satisfactory settlement of so many important questions and the removal of so many sources of friction was to be rejected for this reason.” He described his situation with a metaphor: “As in the case of credit we offered to do one thing and then were blamed because we could not do something totally different.”82 The subtext was that the consequences of the breakdown of the negotiations would be solely ascribed to the Chinese government. The situation was a deadlock. Believing that Britain would not make any more concessions, Koo advocated signing the new treaty at the cost of Kowloon, which was supported by Soong. Soong advised that Koo go to persuade Chiang. On the evening of December 27, Koo called Chiang and conveyed his understanding that the British were prepared to return Hong Kong, and were only kept by the emergency of the war from discussing the Hong Kong question just yet. He saw the new treaty as a gesture of British goodwill and opined that China’s rejection of the treaty would offend them as a lack of understanding. Comparing the new treaty to a gift to the door, he persuaded Chiang to accept the first “gift” as the country waited for the second, implied one. To make her claim, according to Koo’s suggestion, China could announce separately her desire that Britain return Hong Kong to China after the war simultaneously with the signature of the treaty. Chiang accepted his suggestion but ordered him to refrain from releasing the new stance to the British government for now and asked Soong to press Seymour one last time by stating that China would only sign the treaty after the question of the New Territories was settled.83 On the morning of December 28, Soong invited Seymour and Eric Teichman

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for a meeting. He informed the British officials that the Chinese government had had two discussions on the British-proposed exchange of notes but still found it unacceptable, reiterated the strong opposition of the Chinese people against the continued presence of leased territories, and persuaded once more that the British government accept the Chinese counterproposal. According to Seymour, this time Soong “refrained from stating categorically that the Chinese government would not sign the new treaty” in the absence of the desired declaration but “evidently wished to convey that impression.” While Seymour was uncertain how firm the Chinese were about rejection, he viewed the consequence of such a possibility with “great misgivings,” which might cause the British government to be embarrassed by China’s unilateral abolition of extraterritorial rights.84 However, the attitude of Britain was as just firm. Eden’s stance that the Chinese demand could not be met was supported by the cabinet, and after the cabinet meeting on the same morning, Eden authorized Seymour to replace “the terms of lease” with “the question of lease” in the last British draft. As for the latest Chinese proposal, he instructed: “Beyond this we are not prepared to go. The solution proposed by Dr. Koo is unacceptable to us, and if the Chinese persist we shall have to do without the treaty.”85 On December 30, Seymour informed Soong of Eden’s instruction.86 Seeing no hope for a more favorable solution, Soong, together with Wang Chonghui and Koo went to persuade Chiang to accept the treaty. Even then Chiang was very determined, raising the two equally uncompromising alternatives of rejecting the treaty or remaining silent on the Kowloon question and yet restoring it by military means later. None of the three visitors would back him on this, though. In Soong’s opinion, the current British offer was already quite favorable, and it was not a bad idea to first secure what they could in the meantime. He also pointed out that because of the most favored nation treatment clauses, rejection of the British treaty might cause the American treaty to lose effect, and the Americans would have no sympathy for China for insisting on a question not so imminent at that time. Koo then brought up his earlier suggestion that China should sign the treaty first and subsequently declare her reservation of the right to discuss the Kowloon question with Britain.87 It was with great reluctance that Chiang accepted their suggestion on the next day. From his diary we can see that his feeling of impotence: diplomacy with the British was “quite mind exhausting”; to Britain’s stern refusal to settle the Kowloon question in the treaty he could only “bear with it temporarily.” He was still considering the use of force as the last resort to restore Kowloon from the hands of the Japanese after the war, so that although British were “cunning,” there would be little they could do.88

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On January 11, 1943, the Sino-British treaty was signed. On the same day, Soong sent a note to Seymour which declared that the Chinese government reserved its right to propose the Kowloon question again “for discussion at a later date.”89 Seymour acknowledged receipt of the telegram and stated that he had conveyed this message to the British government without further comment.90

British seizure of the right to accept Japanese surrender at Hong Kong Although the Chinese government continued to express its desire to settle the question of Kowloon after the war and Chiang detailed his advocacy in the book China’s Destiny (Zhongguo zhi mingyun 中國之命運), the Chinese government was in general too overoptimistic and politically naive about what would happen to Kowloon when war ended. Limited concrete preparations were done beyond political propaganda. They did not even have a detailed plan on the restoration of Hong Kong. China missed her critical moment at the Cairo Conference between Chiang, Churchill, and Roosevelt in late November 1943, which would have been a perfect opportunity for Chiang to press Churchill to give in, for Roosevelt was generally anticolonial and favored national self-determination for British-controlled territories under a new system of free trade. However, perhaps out of concern of British intransigence, the Chinese government had decided before the conference that it would not raise the Hong Kong question unless Britain did it first.91 At Cairo, Roosevelt once proposed to Chiang that China resume her sovereignty in Hong Kong after the war and turn it into an international free port, and now that he brought it up, Chiang suggested that Roosevelt first discuss it with Churchill. In fact, the Americans had already communicated with the British and were met with a strong response. According to Koo, Roosevelt once said to Churchill that over 90% of the Hong Kong residents were Chinese and Hong Kong was very close to Guangzhou; therefore, it should be returned to China. Churchill, however, indignantly answered that as long as he was prime minister, he would not want the British Empire to disintegrate.92 As the meeting moved to Tehran, Churchill continued to maintain that Britain intended to hold on to what they had and although part of the British Empire might have to be released eventually, this “would be done entirely by Great Britain herself, in accordance with her own moral precepts.”93 During the strategic discussions at the Cairo Conference, China and Britain clashed over the Hong Kong question again. General Joseph W. Stilwell who served as commander of U.S. Army forces in the China theater proposed a joint AmericanChinese operation for the recapture of Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Shanghai.

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British Chief of Staff Alan Brooke, however, was taken aback that the British army would have no part in the operation to land at Guangzhouwan, maintaining that Hong Kong was British territory. Chiang refuted that Hong Kong was originally Chinese territory and it was occupied by the British under unequal treaties; now that the British were expelled by the Japanese, it should be returned to China, especially when the Chinese people were fighting for freedom and equality with their sweat and blood.94 However, Chongqing’s determination for the retrocession of Hong Kong was only embodied in words more than action. Unlike their Chinese counterparts, the British were more practical. They were aware that the Hong Kong question could not be completely settled only by normal diplomatic means and that Hong Kong belonged to the one who won the race of landing there. The British Foreign Office had considered several solutions on the future of Hong Kong including joint Anglo-Chinese control and international control, but by 1944 the British government had decided that colonial rule must be resumed in Hong Kong after the war. Accordingly, the Colonial Office devised a scheme in which the British Army Aid Group (B.A.A.G.) would “rapidly infiltrate British personnel into Hong Kong on the first sign of Japan’s withdrawal”.95 From 1944 onwards, Britain started training officials who would take over the administration of Hong Kong. At the same time, the British government also began its propaganda to influence the public opinion of the Allied countries, demonstrating that Hong Kong was taken by the Japanese from Britain and hence it was a matter of national pride for Britain to have it recovered by the British army. In the diplomatic arena, Britain, under Churchill’s leadership, would not be moved an inch either. During a conversation with U.S. Ambassador in China Patrick J. Hurley, who was on a mission to London, Churchill used the expression “Hong Kong will be eliminated from the British Empire only over my dead body” as he expressed his determination to retain Hong Kong, adding that “the British Empire would ask for nothing and would give up nothing.” Hurley, being no less frank than Churchill, held that the British Empire was “lost up until the time [the United States] entered the war” and Britain had accepted so many of the free resources and lives of America that Churchill’s statement was “logically and factually incorrect.” When Hurley attempted to warn Churchill by the possibility that British failure to observe the principles of the Atlantic Charter would encourage the Russians to make similar demands on North China, Churchill blatantly refused to be bound by the charter.96 The British became more anxious when Japan announced her acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August 10. On the same day, Alan Brooke submitted to the Cabinet a plan for the dispatch of British fleets to Hong Kong to accept Japan’s surrender and the establishment of a military government in Hong Kong. On August 14, the day before Japan’s surrender, the British army instructed Supreme

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Allied Commander, South East Asia Command Louis Mountbatten to lead the British Pacific Fleet to execute the mission of reoccupying Hong Kong. Despite Chiang’s initial determination to recover Hong Kong by force, his plan proved to have changed. Now, he preferred settling the question by negotiation. In August, the Department of European Affairs of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a proposal on the recovery of Hong Kong or at least the Kowloon leased territory. The proposal suggested dispatching through the Kowloon-Canton Railway a regiment of picked soldiers to occupy the Kowloon leased territory and using this as a bargaining chip in negotiations. The drafters also believed that as long as the Chinese government could act with planning, prudence, and good coordination, Hong Kong would definitely be restored to China.97 However, Chiang was not persuaded. In the following days, his government made it clear that China had no territorial ambitions in Hong Kong and hoped to resolve the Hong Kong question by diplomatic means, but insisted that Japan surrender to Chiang.98 The British government was yet apprehensive of the hassles of the twostep arrangement and fought hard to have Hong Kong directly restored to Britain. The British were in a disadvantaged position in their claim. All along, the China theater of operations included the whole of China and French Indochina north of 16 degrees north latitude; Hong Kong was obviously in the China theater rather than the Southeast Asia theater. Additionally, General Order No. 1 of the Instruments for the Surrender of Japan issued by President Harry S. Truman to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Douglas MacArthur prescribed: “The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China, (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China North of 16 degrees North latitude, shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.”99 Hong Kong was included in this area. However, Britain interpreted the order differently. On August 16, the British government notified China that it was making preparations to reoccupy and resume its administration of Hong Kong. The Chinese government replied that Hong Kong was “not included in the places to be surrendered to the Supreme Allied Commander of Southeast Asia Command” and that the arrangements that the British government made conflicted with General Order No. 1.100 The British responded, “irrespective of the confines of an operational theater, wherever a sovereign power has sufficient forces available, it should resume its authority and accept the Japanese surrender in its own territory.”101 The divergence was so wide that both sides sought Truman’s interpretation. On August 18, T. V. Soong wired Secretary of State James F. Byrnes: “Since Hong Kong is in the China Theatre it seems to me perfectly logical to say to the British that surrender of the Japanese there should be tendered to the Supreme Commander of

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the China Theatre or his nominee, leaving abeyance the question as to the eventual disposition of Hong Kong.”102 Although the Americans had sympathy for China on the Hong Kong question, they would not risk challenging Britain for China because they needed Britain’s cooperation in European questions. After consultation with Byrnes and other policy advisors, Truman decided to interpret the order in favor of Britain. By August 18, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee had received an agreeable telegram from Truman. At this Attlee took the opportunity to clarify once more that the British government could not accept the general order as meaning that Hong Kong, which was “British territory,” was “included in the expression of ‘within China’”.103 Being informed of the president’s telegram by Ambassador Winant, Chiang immediately wired Truman on August 21 to propose remedial action. Inquiring Truman whether he had indeed sent the telegram, Chiang advised that if it had not been sent, any “unilateral alteration of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and the surrender terms” should not be changed because any change could “create a bad precedent that might have more serious consequences in places other than Hong Kong.” If Truman had already sent the telegram, Chiang proposed that the Japanese forces surrender to his representative at a ceremony participated by representatives from Britain and the United States. Chiang also promised in the telegram, “After the surrender the British will be authorized by me to land troops for the reoccupation of the island of Hong Kong.”104 Clearly, that was not a point at which Truman would change his position. The president replied Chiang on the same day quoting a message he sent Attlee on August 18: “From the U.S. standpoint there is no objection to the surrender of Hong Kong being accepted by a British officer….” Truman explained that the Japanese surrender in Hong Kong was to him “primarily a military matter of an operational character” and assured, “No question arises with regard to British sovereignty in the area.” He hoped Chiang would act “in the spirit of cooperation and understanding.”105 Under such a circumstance Chiang had to concede because he did not want to confront with Britain and the United States for the surrender question. Practically, the Chinese army was also not prepared to take Hong Kong with speed. As a face-saving act, on August 23, he wired Truman that he agreed to “delegate” his authority to a British commander to accept the Japanese surrender,106 to which Truman duly expressed appreciation. On the next day, General MacArthur ordered the Japanese army in Hong Kong to surrender to the British commander. But the British were not satisfied with this arrangement either. On August 25, Seymour was instructed to tell Chiang orally that Britain must restore the status quo in Hong Kong and was unable to accept the Chinese proposal to have

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the British commander accept the surrender of Japan in the British territory as Chiang’s delegate.107 The message was first communicated to Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs K. C. Wu on the same day, and then followed up with Chiang on August 27.108 Chiang was also told that Britain had designated Rear Admiral C. H. J. Harcourt as the commander to accept the Japanese surrender. Having already made a big compromise, Chiang was now very insistent in his delegation of power to Harcourt.109 According to Wu, Chiang felt that the British were causing him to lose face by gaining face for themselves.110 Chiang recorded in his diary having warned Seymour that if Britain turned down the Chinese commission and take surrender unilaterally, then the responsibility of violating the agreement of the United Nations would be ascribed to Britain, and he would take action to resist arbitrary power.111 Chiang’s attitude was tough enough to cause misgivings of severe impairment of Sino-British relations. Finally, the British Foreign Office agreed that Harcourt would sign the surrender document on behalf of the British government and Chiang as the commander-in-chief of the China theater at the same time.112 On August 30, a British fleet led by Harcourt landed in Hong Kong. On September 16, Harcourt accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces in Hong Kong on behalf of the British government and the commander-in-chief of the China theater, and Hong Kong returned to British rule.

The missed opportunity of restoring Macau Along with the call for the restoration of Hong Kong, the voice of restoring Macau also prevailed among the Chinese people after the victory of the anti-Japanese war. According to information from a spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan following the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration of 1987, the Nationalist government once wired the Portuguese ambassador in September 1945 that China desired to restore Macau.113 At that time, General Zhang Fakui’s Second Front Army had already marched into the Pearl River Delta area while there were fewer than a thousand armed policemen guarding Macau. It would not be difficult for the Chinese to restore Macau by force. However, Chiang’s government had no plan to take such a course of action, and Chiang ordered that Zhang and his subordinates exercise restraint. But the order could not stop the army commanders and locals from carrying out mass campaigns. In October, the Chinese in Macau held public assemblies to protest against Portuguese rule, while the Cantonese in the neighboring county of Zhongshan organized groups to enter into Macau in support of the protest. To bring the situation under control, the Portuguese authorities in Macau closed the

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border with Chinese mainland. In response, the Cantonese asked the Portuguese government in Macau to extradite the Japanese war criminals to China immediately and declared that the Chinese army reserved the right to enter Macau to search for and arrest these criminals. In November, Zhang Fakui ordered his army to impose a military blockade on Macau and conduct live fire exercises near Macau at night, which panicked the Macau government into seeking help from the Hong Kong British government. At the same time, the Macau government agreed to leave all Japanese in Macau to the handling of the Chinese authorities and extradite as well as confiscate the property of Chinese traitors; allow Chinese nationals to enter and exit Macau freely; grant permission to public activities of all Chinese political parties and organizations in Macau; and grant the Chinese in Macau the freedom of assembly. Nationalist sentiments thus subsided for a while. In the late spring of 1947 another wave of public outcry sprang up as events such as the Macau government’s detention of Chinese fishing boats and a Portuguese policeman beating a Chinese to death at Portas de Cerco infuriated the masses. Subsequently, the National Political Consultative Council (guomincanzhenghui 國民參政會) passed the motion of restoring Macau as soon as possible, and the Legislative Yuan also proposed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs restore Macau through negotiation.114 However, the Nationalist government at that time was preoccupied by the Civil War with the Communists and it decided to set the Macau question aside.

Two Controversial Treaties at the Close of WWII The Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance In February 1945, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union concluded the Yalta Conference with an agreement that included a clause to the disadvantage of China: a provision for the Soviet Union to conclude a pact of friendship and alliance with China. Later, the Soviet Union pushed the Nationalist government to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance that accorded to the former many privileges detrimental to China’s sovereignty. The Yalta Agreement was a quid pro quo for Soviet participation in the war against Japan. Estimating that to defeat Japan from the sea by the U.S. navy alone would cost the Americans 18 months and casualties of 1,000,000 soldiers, the United States and Britain were eager to secure Soviet support as soon as possible. In addition to this, the two powers worried that the Soviet Union would not agree

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to declare war on Japan until the United States had already suffered great losses and victory had been confirmed. Therefore, they wanted to ascertain the Soviet military plan and the price asked for so as to check Soviet expansion. The Soviet desire for an ice-free port was made known as early as the Teheran Conference of December 1943. According to Joseph Stalin, “there was no port in the Far East that was not closed off, since Vladivostok was only partly ice-free, and besides covered by Japanese controlled Straits.” At this Roosevelt suggested the idea of establishing a free port in the Far East, possibly Dalian.115 But an ice-free port alone was not enough to persuade the Soviet Union to enter into the war with Japan. On December 14, 1944, upon Roosevelt’s instruction, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman inquired Stalin about the conditions on which the Soviet Union would enter into the war against Japan. Using a map, Stalin drew a line around the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula and indicated to Harriman that the Soviet Union wished to lease Port Arthur, Dalian, and their surrounding area again after laying claim on the Kurile and lower Sakhalin. Stalin also expressed the wish to lease the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway connecting Dalian, and to secure “the maintenance of the Republic of Outer Mongolia as an independent identity.”116 These conditions were later proposed by Stalin during the Yalta Conference. At Yalta, Roosevelt tried hard to bargain with Stalin. Regarding Dalian, for example, the American president said that he had not yet communicated with Chiang Kia-shek yet but he himself preferred turning Dalian into a free port over Stalin’s lease proposal. However, Stalin further pressed that if his conditions could not met it would be difficult for him to explain to his people why the Soviet Union would “enter a war against a country with which they had no great trouble.” If the conditions were met, he argued vice versa, “the people would understand the national interest involved and it would be very much easier to explain the decision to the Supreme Soviet.”117 Having no alternatives, the United States and Britain had to offer the Soviet government with what it desired. On February 11, 1943, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt concluded the Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan in which the Soviet Union agreed to enter into the war against Japan within two or three months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe. The conditions, apart from the handing over of southern Sakhalin as well as its adjacent islands and the Kuril Islands from Japan to the Soviet Union, included the preservation of the status quo of Outer Mongolia; the internationalization of the commercial port of Dalian, with the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union safeguarded, and the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the Soviet Union; and the joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad

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to provide an outlet to Dalian by a joint Soviet-Chinese company.118 Although it was stipulated that the clauses concerning China would require concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek,119 it goes without saying that this was no more than a face-saving provision as Chiang would definitely have to submit to the pressure of the three powers. The Chinese who had looked up to the Russian Soviets as pioneers against imperialism would soon be completely disillusioned when they learned of the content of the Yalta Agreement. The way the Soviet Union laid claim on Port Arthur, Dalian, and the railways in Manchuria as “the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904” was demonstration of her blatant ambitions.120 It was a declaration that the Soviet Union wanted to inherit Tsarist rights and no longer felt any need to hide this desire. Yet the agreement was highly confidential. For a period of time even U.S. Secretary of State Edward Reilly Stettinius was concealed from its details. In March 1945 Chinese Ambassador in Washington inquired Roosevelt directly but was answered ambiguously, which gave the impression that no final agreement had been arrived at in terms of the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base.121 In April 1945, Franklin Roosevelt passed away and Truman succeeded as president. Only a few days after his assumption of office, Truman asked the military departments three questions in order to determine U.S. policy in connection with the Soviet entry into the Pacific war: 1. Is the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war at the earliest possible moment of such vital interest to the United States as to preclude the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to certain desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to such entry? 2. Should the Yalta decision in regard to Soviet political desires in the Far East be reconsidered or be carried into effect in whole or in part? 3. Should a Soviet demand, if made, for participation in the military occupation of Japanese home islands be granted … ?122 For the first question, the War Department maintained its original position that the Soviet entry into the Pacific war would “almost certainly … materially shorten the war” and “save American lives.” As regard the second and third questions, it held that the rediscussion of the Yalta decision would not bring much good for the United States and concurred in granting the Soviet desires for the Chinese ports and railways lest Soviet forces should advance by themselves to “areas giving them close contact with the Chinese Communists” and complicate the situation in China.123

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On May 22, U.S. Ambassador in China Hurley unofficially disclosed the Yalta decision to Chiang Kai-shek.124 Chiang was disturbed and worried that the United States which China had heavily depended on in diplomatic bargaining for a long time would conspire with other countries to impair China’s sovereign rights. On the next day, Chiang ordered Soong who was at the San Francisco Conference to communicate to Truman that the United States should prevent China’s sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity from being impaired and that no special rights in Chinese territory would be tolerated any more.125 On June 3 and 12, Chiang met Soviet Ambassador to China Appolon A. Petrov twice and expressed to him that provided that the Soviet Union assisted China in restoring Manchuria and defending China’s territorial sovereignty and administrative independence, China would consider giving the Soviet Union convenience in regard to the use of the commercial ports and railways in Manchuria, even providing a naval base for joint use. But he emphasized that such terms as “lease territory” could not appear in the text of the treaty because of their humiliating connotation, hoping that the Soviets would be content with a joint use rather than lease agreement. Petrov defended by distinguishing between concessions, which came with extraterritorial and related rights, and leased territories. This explanation was further refuted by Chiang, who argued that the proposed lease would deprive China of any access to the use and management of the naval base, thereby violating territorial integrity. Chiang demanded Petrov solemnly to report the Chinese attitude to the Soviet government.126 To prevent the Soviet Union from occupying Port Arthur alone, when Hurley was instructed to deliver Truman’s message to Chiang on June 15, Chiang proposed that if the United States was interested in the joint use of Port Arthur as a naval base, China would suggest to the Soviet Union the idea of joint use by the “Big Four” nations, that is, China, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States. He also requested that the United States be present as a third party in China’s negotiations with the Soviet Union on their agreement.127 Chiang’s intention was obvious: to leverage the influence of the United States to counterbalance Soviet ambitions in Manchuria. However, the United States did not want to be entangled and declined Chiang’s suggestion. On June 30, T. V. Soong arrived in Moscow as a plenipotentiary of the Nationalist government with Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Victor Hoo Chi-tsai (Hu Shize) for negotiations of the new SinoSoviet agreement. Detailed negotiations began on July 2 and Stalin was present to chair the meeting. At the start of the meeting, Stalin handed Soong the Yalta Agreement and asked if he was aware of the details of the document. This was a coercive question to bring China under the pressure of the Big Three.

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Despite being informed of the contents of the Yalta Agreement and mentally prepared to meet difficult demands, Song was still surprised by the demand that China recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. According to the understanding of the Chinese, the provision to preserve the status quo of Outer Mongolia in the Yalta Agreement would mean that the area was to remain independent de facto but a part of China de jure, so that the issue could be left for future discussion. However, Stalin interpreted the term to mean that China must accept and recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. Soong rejected the demand outright by stating that the Chinese government could in no way announce to its people that it would give up any part of Chinese territory. To show sincerity, he nonetheless implied that as long as the question of independence was not mentioned, China would not raise opposition to the free movement of Russian troops in Outer Mongolia. However, Stalin was too stubborn to change his mind and the negotiations had no sooner begun than they reached a deadlock.128 On July 7, Soong proposed a formula which would grant Outer Mongolia a high degree of autonomy in military and diplomatic matters, including the right to discuss with the Soviet Union the entry of Soviet troops. China was prepared to accept the entry of Soviet armed forces into the area by an agreement that would sanction the right of the Soviet Union to station troops in Outer Mongolia.129 This was essentially a formula that acceded to independence except for the use of the term, but even such a concession could not satisfy Stalin, who would not take anything other than “the formal recognition by China of Outer Mongolia as an independent republic.”130 At this point, Stalin’s intransigence made Soong consider discontinuing the negotiations and returning to China with his delegation. But back in Chongqing, Chiang Kai-shek had been contemplating ways to make concessions, given that Outer Mongolia had been controlled by the Soviet Union for over 20 years and hoping that Stalin could in return be more conciliatory on the other questions. In his July 6 telegram to Soong, Chiang had said on the one hand that the independence of Outer Mongolia concerned the success and failure of the future of China and was to be valued as much as Manchuria, but on the other hand that independence might be considered if the unification of China, including Manchuria and Xinjiang, could truly be realized with full sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity. Then, he instructed Soong about the preconditions under which the recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia could be considered by China: 1. That the sovereign and territorial and administrative integrity over Manchuria including administration over Port Arthur would be respected. Port Arthur could be offered as a naval base under joint use

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but not joint control; Dalian would be a free port but under Chinese administration; the two railways would be under joint operation rather than joint control. 2. That the whole of Xinjiang, including Ili and Altai, would be restored. 3. That the Communists in China would submit to central political and military decrees. The Nationalist government could include the CPC in the Executive Yuan during its reorganization but would not accept a coalition government.131 On July 7, Chiang clarified the purposes of the compromise in another telegram which crossed Soong’s and did not arrive until the next morning. By conceding on the Outer Mongolia question, Chiang desired to win Soviet recognition of China’s sovereignty in Manchuria and Xinjiang and secure Soviet promise to withdraw moral and material aids from the Chinese Communists.132 Along the lines of the newest instruction from Chiang, Soong met with Stalin on July 9 and proposed that China would recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia provided that a plebiscite was held and it favored independence.133 As the voting result would be expectable, Stalin was satisfied with the proposal. Regarding the conditions, however, he only agreed to the second and third lists. As reported by Soong, Stalin agreed not to send military aid to Xinjiang and finding the demand of centralizing military and political decrees reasonable, promised to give material support only to the Nationalist government. On Manchuria, Stalin insisted that the naval base of Port Arthur and Dalian both be included in the military zone and managed by the Soviets, and demanded half of the ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the South Manchuria Railway, and relating properties including the coal mines along the railroads operated by Russia under the Tsarist regime.134 As the other matters were temporarily settled, thereafter the subject of negotiation was focused on Manchuria. The Soviet demands in Manchuria went beyond the Yalta formula. In the July 11 and 12 talks, Stalin demanded that, at Port Arthur, the Soviets be permitted to station air and land forces as well as establish military facilities. He wanted to place not only the naval base, but also the city area under Soviet administration, China only to be responsible for civil affairs. Regarding Dalian, Stalin demanded that its port be managed by Russians and the bay in the port be used as a Soviet naval base. As for the Chinese Eastern railway and the South Manchuria Railway, the Soviet plan would have all of their properties including industrial enterprises, mines, and timber operations transferred to the Soviet Union, with Russians managing the railway guards.135 It is obvious that Stalin had used the Yalta formula as a license to demand more interests from China.

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As a defensive measure, Soong insisted that the military zone should be limited to Port Arthur and its neighboring area, and the administration of Port Arthur should remain under Chinese control. China could accept Dalian as a free port with some docks for merchant shipping leased to the Soviet Union, but would not offer its port as a naval base. In regard to the two Manchurian railways, Soong insisted that they should be jointly administrated by China and the Soviet Union on equal footing with Chinese railway guards. But Stalin only assented to Soong’s proposal on the railways.136 On July 14, Stalin left for Potsdam for his meeting with the heads of the United States and Britain, and the negotiations had to be adjourned temporarily. Soong returned to China to report to Chiang. During adjournment, Chiang wired Truman copying him a message concerning the Sino-Soviet negotiations to be sent to Stalin, hoping that the president would sway Stalin at Potsdam so that the latter would not “insist on the impossible.” Chiang explained in the message to Stalin that recognizing the independence of Outer Mongolia was the “greatest sacrifice” to make and this demand could only be met provided that the Soviet Union promised not to extend aid to Chinese Communists, not to support the rebel forces in Xinjiang, and to respect China’s territorial and administrative integrity in Manchuria. He confirmed that Soong’s offers were already “all the cards on the table”: (1) the president of the two railways as well as manager of the South Manchurian Railway had to be Chinese; (2) the administration of Dalian must be run by the Chinese, although Russian technical experts could be employed; (3) the civil administration of Port Arthur must be Chinese, although the defense of the military zone, which must not include the railways from Changchun to Dalian, could be entrusted to the Soviet government with a joint Chinese-Soviet Military Commission established to “work out the joint use of the Port.” Chiang made it clear to Truman that the Nationalist government had “gone as far as the public opinion of China [would] stand,” if not “beyond the limit that the Chinese people [would] support.”137 To Chiang’s disappointment, Truman’s feedback was less than enthusiastic. Truman’s short reply conveyed the message, “I asked that you carry out the Yalta agreement but I had not asked that you make any concession in excess of that agreement.” The president did not say more than asking Chiang to arrange for Soong to continue to reach “complete understanding” with Stalin.138 In late July, the United States learned that the Soviet Union again raised new demands after Soong and Stalin returned to the negotiating table. The Soviet Union not only proposed the inclusion of Dalian south of Port Arthur and the railroad between Changchun and Dalian into the Soviet military zone, but also demanded that China do not station armed forces on the islands within a 100 km radius south of Port Arthur prior to obtaining Soviet permission. With these demands granted,

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Soviet influence in China would extend to Bohai Bay, thereby threatening the sea route to Beijing and Tianjin. Ambassador Harriman believed that Soong and the Chinese government had done as much as they could, and China was “not in a strong position to resist unaided the present exaggerated Soviet demands,” so he recommended Secretary of State Byrnes to authorize him to inform Stalin that the United States opposed to the inclusion of the port of Dalian into the Soviet military zone.139 If Stalin could not accept Soong’s proposal for turning Dalian into a free port under Chinese administration, Harriman suggested proposing “the creation of an international commission consisting of representatives of the Chinese, Soviet, United States and possibly British governments” for the supervision of the administration of Dalian as a free port.140 On August 5, Harriman was authorized to inform Stalin: “While we have no intention of withdrawing our support of the agreed Yalta proposals we believe that Soong has already met the Yalta agreements and we hope very much the Generalissimo will not press for further concessions.” It was spelt out: “We would request that no agreement be made involving further concessions by China that might adversely affect our interests, particularly with reference to the inclusion of Port Dairen in the Soviet military zone, without consultation with us.” Harriman was instructed to remind Stalin to “observe the ‘Open Door’ policy in Manchuria” as he had verbally assured to the United States on July 28.141 Stalin returned to Moscow on August 5. Soong, along with Chiang Chingkuo and newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Shih-chieh, went for Moscow from Chongqing on the next day. Soong’s decision to appoint a new foreign minister to conclude the Sino-Soviet agreement instead of continuing to hold the concurrent office was made in expectation of dire results of the negotiations. As Hurley reported after Soong consulted him about this decision: Soong is distressed about his political future. He fears the proposed agreement with the Soviet will be damaging to him personally. The first time I saw Soong after his return from Moscow he threw up his hands and said, “I am a broken man. I am personally ill from overstrain and overwork.” Later he said, “This proposed agreement with Soviet will be destructive politically to the man responsible for it.”142 Apparently, he knew that the agreement would not possibly be concluded unless China conceded her interests to the Soviet Union and he did not want his name to be associated with such a humiliating agreement. On August 7, the negotiations resumed. Stalin agreed to the exclusion of the Dalian port and the railroad from Changchun to Dalian from the Soviet military

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zone but insisted that the administrative affairs of the port and the city of Dalian should be run by a joint Soviet-Chinese military commission rather than the Chinese government.143 On the next day when Harriman met Stalin and expressed the U.S. expectation for the application of the Open Door principle on Dalian, Stalin laid claim to the Yalta provision for Soviet “preeminence” in the area. He asserted that the Soviets had been “generous enough” with the Chinese, saying that both the railroad and the port had been funded and built by Russians but they had agreed to their “joint use and possession”; the railroad used to be guarded by Russians but now they accepted Chinese guards; there was no Chinese administration of the railroad but now they allowed the Chinese to participate in the railroad administration.144 He had entirely put the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Questions at the back of his mind. Around the time of the resumption of the negotiations, the situation in the Far East changed dramatically. On August 6, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and attacked the Kwantung Army on the following day. These events had profoundly impacts on the Sino-Soviet negotiations: On the part of the Soviet Union, she worried that the possession of atomic weaponry would expedite American landing on Japan, North Korea, and China, enabling the United States to interfere more actively in the Soviet-Sino negotiations; therefore Stalin was willing to give up plans for a large Soviet military zone and the administration of Dalian which agitated both China and the United States. On the Chinese side, Chiang was alarmed by the prospect of Soviet support for the Chinese Communists’ alreadybooming activities in Manchuria; thus he authorized the Chinese delegation to use their discretion.145 As a result, both sides were eager to conclude the agreement as soon as possible. On August 14, Wang Shih-chieh and People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., two exchanges of notes, and several attached agreements including the Agreement Concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Agreement on Port Arthur, and the Agreement on Dalian. The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was a general document providing the basis for cooperation against the Japanese and mutual respect. Details about the arrangements on Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Port Arthur, and Dalian were stated in the exchanges of notes and attached agreements: 1. In regard to Outer Mongolia, China recognized in the second exchange of notes the independence of Outer Mongolia “with the existing boundary as its boundary” after the defeat of Japan if a plebiscite confirmed the

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desire of the people of Outer Mongolia for independence.146 2. In regard to the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway united into one railway under the name of “Chinese Changchun Railway,” which shall be jointly owned and operated by China and the Soviet Union. A SinoSoviet company with a Board of Directors was to be established for the administration of the railway. The president of the Board shall be selected from Chinese directors and the vice president from Soviet directors. There shall also be a Board of Auditors in the company with a Soviet chairman and a Chinese vice chairman. The term of the agreement shall be 30 years, after which “the Chinese Changchun Railway with all its properties shall be transferred without compensation to the ownership of the Republic of China.”147 3. In regard to Port Arthur, the two countries agreed to the joint use of Port Arthur as a naval base and the establishment of a Sino-Soviet Military Commission for the handling of matters in relation to the joint use of the naval base. The Soviet government shall be entrusted to the defense of the naval base and the Chinese government shall be responsible for the civil administration of the area. But “taking account into Soviet interests in the Area,” the appointment and dismissal of the leading posts of the civil administration shall be “in agreement with the Soviet military command.” The term of the agreement shall be 30 years.148 4. In regard to Dalian, the port of Dalian shall be a free port open to all nations and the administration of Dalian shall belong to China. The post of harbor master shall be served by a Soviet national and deputy harbor master a Chinese, and they shall be appointed by the manager of the Chinese Changchun Railway in agreement with the mayor. Dalian shall not be included in the military zone “determined by the Agreement on Port Arthur of August 14, 1945” in peace times unless during wartime against Japan. One half of all port installations and equipment shall be leased to the Soviet Union for free for 30 years. The sections of the Chinese Changchun Railway from Dalian to Shenyang which lied within the military zone of Port Arthur shall be free from the military control of the region.149

The Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Whether the 1945 Sino-Soviet agreements were necessitated by time, they were definitely detrimental to China’s sovereign rights. In 1946 another treaty which

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was principally reciprocal and yet practically disadvantageous to China came about: the Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. In the 1943 Sino-American Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China the two governments agreed that within six months of the cession of “hostilities in the war against common enemies” they would negotiate for a treaty based on “the principles of international law and practices as reflected in modern international procedures.”150 However, after the conclusion of the extraterritorial treaty, the United States was so anxious to conclude the new treaty that she finished the draft during wartime in February 1945. The draft had 30 articles which spanned 58 pages and covered nearly all fields except for political and military affairs.151 Not only was it the lengthiest commercial treaty China had ever been presented with, but its coverage also unprecedentedly wide. The United States aimed to popularize the principle of free trade through the treaty, making it a template for establishing economic relations with other countries after the war. After some modifications by the U.S. Embassy in China, the draft was handed to Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs K. C. Wu on April 2, 1945. The draft was immediately studied by various ministries of the Nationalist government in Chongqing. The Ministry of Economic Affairs saw into the intention of the United States and while recognizing the treaty’s expressed basis of equality, worried that the gap in national power between the two countries would place China in a disadvantaged position.152 This view was concurred by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. China was most adverse to the clauses on national treatment, unconditional most favored nation treatment, and the juridical status of American companies in China. Regarding nation treatment, the Chinese concern was the same as that leading to their opposition to national treatment during the extraterritorial negotiations: that the United States practiced federalism and thus practically would only be able to extend “federal state treatment” to Chinese nationals there. Therefore China preferred granting conditional most favored nation treatment that guaranteed only reciprocal benefits. As for the recognition of the juridical status of foreign companies in China, the Nationalist government, which was drafting its new Company Law, found the provision that the juridical status of all corporations shall be recognized in the territories of the other country whether or not they had a permanent establishment in their home country contrary to the new Chinese regulations. According to the new Company Law, only the corporations that had business in their home country could establish branches in China. In addition to these, the Chinese government also proposed several modifications to the terms on foreign exchange, copyrights, and exportation of national treasures of historical value.

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To buy time for study and research, the Nationalist government took maximum advantage of the six-month window provided by the extraterritorial treaty. It did not initiate official negotiations with the United States until February 1946, exactly six months following the conclusion of peace. On February 5, 1946, Director of the Treaty Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wang Huacheng began negotiations with Counsellor Robert Smyth of the U.S. Embassy in China in Chongqing. The negotiations lasted as long as seven months. The major point of contention was with the juridical status of foreign firms in China. At first, China insisted that only corporations that transacted business in their home country should qualify to register in China, as its Legislative Yuan was considering the inclusion of such a limit in the revising Company Law. The Chinese delegate explained that such a provision could prevent local crisis profiteers from transferring their assets and capital to foreign states and then running business in China in the name of foreign corporations as well as bar shell corporations from the country. Without such a limitation, foreign companies would be able to compete with Chinese companies on an unfair basis without being taxed in their home country.153 However, the United States strongly opposed this practice, arguing that it did not exist in the U.S. state laws or the laws of other countries. Under U.S. pressure, Chiang Kai-shek pressed the Supreme National Defense Council and the Legislative Yuan to delete the provision from the new Company Law, and the Chinese delegate gave up the corresponding proposition in the treaty negotiations. China also conceded with respect to national treatment and only insisted on adding the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the laws of that High Contracting Party” after the statement that the nationals, corporations, and associations of either contracting party shall exercise all rights and privileges under the same terms as those of the other contracting party in Article 3.154 The United States did not even want to accept such a modification and only acquiesced because of Chinese insistence. The question that dragged the negotiations on for the longest was unconditional most favored nation treatment. While China had agreed to accord to the nationals of the United States such treatment de facto, she demanded the deletion of the provision for the maintenance of most favored nation treatment “in its unconditional and unlimited form” from Article 15.155 For China, a stated provision as such would encourage similar demands from other countries, which would cause her a lot of trouble. The United States later proposed ways of clarifications hoping China would accept the retention of the provision. In the end, as China still refused to compromise after many exchanges, the United States agreed to the deletion. The two countries arrived at an agreement on August 31, 1946 and signed the treaty on November 4. The purport of the treaty was basically to accord national

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treatment and most favored nation treatment to the nationals of each other. Concerning national treatment, for example, the nationals of either contracting party shall be permitted, “throughout the whole extent of the territories of the other High Contracting Party,” to “reside, travel and carry on trade” as well as “to engage in and to carry on commercial, manufacturing, processing, scientific, educational, religious and philanthropic activities.”156 The associations and corporations of either contracting party shall receive the same treatment as that accorded to associations and corporations of the other contracting party. National treatment shall also be extended to “articles grown, produced or manufactured within the territories of either High Contracting Party in whole or in part by nationals, corporations and associations of the other High Contracting Party” in taxation matters.157 Examples of provisions for most favored nation treatment include: each contracting party shall accord to articles of the other country treatment no less favorable than those of a third country in the “taxation, sale, distribution or use within the country of imported articles”;158 the vessels of either contracting party “shall have liberty, equally with the vessels of any third country, to come with their cargoes to all ports, places and waters” of the other contracting party;159 if either contracting party accord inland navigation or coasting trade rights to vessels of a third country, it would accord the same rights to the other party.160 The treaty was an embodiment of the Open Door principle. It appeared to be equal because every of its articles emphasized the reciprocal enjoyment of rights and privileges, but the wide disparity between the economic strength of the United States and China disabled Chinese nationals, corporations, and associations from enjoying within the territory of the United States the rights and privileges that were enjoyed by the American nationals and corporations within the territory of China. Therefore some Chinese editorials at that time criticized the Nationalist government for signing such a treaty. Ta Kung Pao commented that if even Britain dared not completely open herself to free trade with the United States, China should by no means take this course.161 No matter what, the Nationalist government ratified the treaty within five days after its signature. The Chinese Communists, now in a hot battle with the Nationalists, took the chance to criticize their adversaries, denouncing the treaty as “the most humiliating treaty in history that sells out the country,” “a major sign that the Chiang government views China as a subordinate of the United States,” and “a new national humiliation of the Chinese nation.”162 On February 1, 1947, the CPC issued a declaration purporting that it would deny all foreign loans secured by the Nationalist government alone, all “humiliating” treaties, agreements, and understandings concluded by the Nationalist government, and all the diplomatic negotiations that were not ratified by the CPC’s Political Consultative Conference.163

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Chapter

Finale: The End of the Era of Unequal Treaties

UNEQUAL TREATIES AND CHINA VOLUME 2

The Rise of the People’s Republic of China and Its Foreign Policy As the world was split into the capitalist and communist blocs and dominated by the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union after their common enemies were defeated, a civil war broke out between the Nationalists and the Communists in China. After another four years of war the result was confirmed: the Communists conquered the seat at Beijing, while the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. On October 1, 1949, the CPC established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at Beijing. Communist by nature, the new regime belonged to the socialist camp, following the leadership of the Soviet Union. As far as foreign policy is concerned, New China — as the regime called itself — was enthusiastic to take advantage of the unique international situation and abrogate foreign privileges once and for all. As early as before the establishment of the PRC, the CPC had formulated the diplomatic principle of denying all the existing foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel in China, believing that this would give them the initiative in foreign relations and free them from the constraints of traditional diplomacy. Regarding foreign privileges, the party viewed that they should be abrogated in principle but dealt with case by case in actual practice.1 The principle of abrogating foreign privileges in China was set in the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC held in March 1949. In the meeting, Mao Zedong heralded the growth of strength of the anti-imperialist Soviet camp, saying that this would enable China to eradicate imperialistic domination manifested in the fields of politics, economics, and culture step by step. He pinpointed the steps to be taken as soon as the Communists took hold of the big cities: “Refuse to recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel of the Kuomintang period, refuse to recognize all the treasonable treaties of the Kuomintang period, abolish all imperialist propaganda agencies in China, take immediate control of foreign trade and reform the customs system.”2 The resolution concluded based on Mao’s statement later became the guidance document on the PRC’s foreign policy. After taking Nanjing, the Central Committee of the CPC issued an instruction on the disposal of the foreign envoys in Nanjing to the Huadong General Front Committee on April 25: avoid all official contacts with these envoys as well as oral or textual gestures that would indicate recognition of their diplomatic or consular status. Foreign envoys were to be treated with a “cold” attitude. No one was to take the initiative to visit them, and if approached by the envoys, CPC members should treat them as ordinary foreign nationals, convey their requests to their superiors, and demonstrate clearly that they were not received as diplomatic officials.3 The

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CPC Central Committee dispatched Huang Hua to Nanjing to handle negotiations as chief of the Aliens Affairs Office of the new local government of Nanjing. During the late spring of 1949, Mao put forward three slogans to summarize the foreign policy of New China: (1) “Building a brand new stove” (lingqi luzao 另起爐灶), that is, to refuse to recognize the foreign relations established by the KMT government and to establish new diplomatic relations with foreign countries through negotiations on the basis of mutual respect for sovereign rights, territorial integrity, and reciprocal and equal benefits; (2) “Cleaning the house before entertaining guests” (dasao ganjing wuzi zai qingke 打掃乾淨屋子再請客), that is, to review all treaties previously concluded with foreign countries, abrogate foreign privileges, and abolish all unequal treaties before building new foreign relations; (3) “Leaning to one side” (yibiandao 一邊倒), that is, to ally with Soviet countries without scarifying national interests. On the eve of the establishment of the PRC, the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference adopted the party’s Common Program which acted as a provisional constitution pending the promulgation of an official one. Article 3 of the document declared: “The People’s Republic of China must abolish all the prerogatives of imperialist countries in China.” In addition, considering that the countries that concluded treaties with the KMT government included countries both friendly and hostile to the PRC, the Common Program adopted a preferential approach towards treaties and agreements: “The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China shall examine the treaties and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign governments, and shall recognize, abrogate, revise, or re-negotiate them according to their respective contents” (Article 55). Article 59 of the document guaranteed protection for lawabiding foreign nationals, while Article 57 stated that the PRC would “resume and develop commercial relations with foreign governments on a basis of equality and mutual benefit.”4 Despite its firm general principle, the PRC government left itself enough flexibility to deal with the treaties concluded by the KMT government. Preference was actually given along the line of the two camps of the Cold War. Treaties previously concluded with the so-called “imperialist countries” from the capitalist bloc like the United States and the United Kingdom were rejected, as were existing diplomatic relations with these countries. The foreign policy of CPC was simple and clear: countries that wished to establish diplomatic relations with China should negotiate with the PRC government, not simply announce their recognition; those preferring otherwise should withdraw their diplomatic personnel as soon as possible. No powers would have treaty relations with China unless they made a new deal with the new regime. Such an extreme foreign policy was bound to face obstacles. In January 1950

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when the Beijing Municipal Military Control Commission declared the takeover of former American, French, and Dutch military barracks areas, they protested that the barracks had been reconstructed into consular offices. The U.S. Department of State, for example, criticized Beijing’s action as a “flagrant violation” of the “long standing treaty rights” confirmed by the 1943 Sino-American extraterritorial treaty and announced preparations to withdraw all American officials from Communist China.5 But the new regime refused to recognize all old treaties and cared little for any threats of diplomatic withdrawal. The editorial of the CPC’s organ wrote: “Before the stance of defending their own interests and safeguarding the sovereignty of their people and country, the Chinese people never consider the will of any imperialists. All unequal treaties and aggressive special rights created by the imperialists in China must be abolished.”6 The PRC government took over the three bases ignoring the foreign protests. In April 1950, the British barracks in Beijing were expropriated, followed by the French barracks in Shanghai and Tianjin in June 1950 and May 1951, respectively. The PRC government also took action to claim sovereignty over Chinese territorial waters. In April 1950, the Ministry of Transport issued the Provisional Regulations Governing the Entry and Exit of Foreign Vessels at the Ports and the Provisional Rules Governing Inspection of Incoming and Outgoing Ships, Crews, Passengers, and Baggage. It was provided that foreign vessels should report their entry, exit, and anchorage to Chinese ports for approval in advance and they should not make movements at will. Moreover, once they arrived in Chinese ports, their use of transmitters, radars, and weapons was forbidden, and they were subject to compulsory pilotage by Chinese pilots. On July 26, the Finance and Economy Committee of the central government introduced regulations to centralize management of shipping in Chinese waters. Since then, only under specific conditions could foreign vessels navigate into the Yangtze by special permission. To assume total authority over the Customs the PRC government cancelled the post of director general, which had been staffed by Lester K. Little, an American, after the 1943 Sino-British treaty put an end to British monopoly over the post. In April and May 1951, the Government Administration Council promulgated the Provisional Customs Act and the Regulations for Import and Export Duties. State control was imposed on foreign trade through import and export permits. Since then, foreign interference in the Chinese Customs and monopoly in foreign trade have been eradicated.

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New Relations with the Soviet Union To the Soviet Union, the PRC did not take radical actions regarding the 1945 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, but instead sought to open negotiations for the conclusion of a new treaty based on equality and reciprocity. Nevertheless, the negotiations proceeded with more twists and turns that the Chinese Communists had expected.

Mao’s initial frustration at Moscow Only one month after the establishment of the PRC, Chairman Mao proposed to Stalin’s personal representative in China and Consultant General of the All-Union Communist Party (i.e., the Bolsheviks) to the Central Committee of the CPC Ivan Kovalev that he hoped to talk to Stalin during his visit to the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a new Sino-Soviet treaty. On December 16, 1949, Mao arrived in Moscow and made a short speech at the Moscow train station. Although he did not make clear the aim of his visit, he alluded to it by recalling the root of friendly relations between the two countries: “After the October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet government, following the practices of Lenin and Stalin, took the lead in abrogating the unequal treaties [concluded] with China under Imperial Russia.”7 On the same day, Stalin received him in Kremlin where they had a two-hour talk. Speaking of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945, Mao expressed interest for the conclusion of a new treaty. Arguing that the conclusion of the 1945 treaty was based on the Yalta agreements relating to the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin, and Port Arthur, Stalin said, “the given treaty was concluded, so to speak, with the consent of America and England.” He further elaborated, “we [heads of the Big Three], within our inner circle have decided not to modify any of the points of this treaty for now, since a change in even one point could give America and England the legal grounds to raise questions about modifying also the treaty’s provisions concerning the Kuril Islands, South Sakhalin, etc.” To find a way out, Stalin proposed retaining the treaty “formally” but “actually” changing it, that is, to withdraw Soviet troops from Port Arthur “at the request of the Chinese government” and “effectively modify” the points with respect to the Chinese Changchun Railway while retaining relevant treaty provisions on paper.8 Mao was surprised by Stalin’s proposal because it was different from the offer of Anastas Mikoyan, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when he was sent by Stalin to visit Xibaipo in February 1949. Back then, Mikoyan referred to the 1945 treaty as an unequal treaty and revealed

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the Soviet government’s decision to abrogate it and withdraw from Port Arthur as soon as a peace treaty was concluded with Japan. Moreover, before his arrival in Moscow, Mao had repeatedly made known to the Soviet government his desire to conclude a new treaty. But surprised as he was, Mao seemed unwilling to argue with Stalin at their first interview. He conceded that the Chinese Communists had failed to consider the American and English positions regarding the Yalta Agreement and said to Stalin: “We must act in a way that is best for common cause. This question merits further consideration. However, it is already becoming clear that the treaty should not be modified at the present time, nor should one rush to withdraw troops from Port Arthur.”9 Mao’s own account of the conversation went beyond that, though. According to his telegram to Liu Shaoqi on December 18, he had told Stalin that although it was essential to respect the legitimacy of the Yalta Agreement, there was the voice in public opinion that since the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty was concluded with the KMT, now that the party had fallen, the treaty should not hold anymore.10 In Mao’s account, Stalin replied that the treaty could be revised two years later but in the meantime, a joint declaration would suffice. On December 24, Mao and Stalin had a second conversation, the record of which has not been released to the public. The official diplomatic history of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs only contains a brief description of the conversation, revealing that it was mainly about matters relating to Communist “brother” countries in Asia and Stalin did not mention a word about the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty.11 But in his talk with the Soviet ambassador to China in 1956 Mao recollected that he did propose to Stalin that Zhou Enlai be summoned to Moscow to sign the treaty with the Soviet government as minister of foreign affairs on December 24, 1949, and Stalin rejected this by saying, “it is inconvenient to act in this way, since the bourgeois press will cry that the whole Chinese government is located in Moscow.”12 It is possible that Mao briefly or subtly took up the question but Stalin did not answer it. Mao had been in a bad mood since the second talk with Stalin, who had not met with Mao henceforth. Once he made a phone call to Stalin’s residence but was replied that Stalin was not at home and that he could meet with Mikoyan if he had any problems. Such disregarding treatment ignited Mao’s anger. “All this offended me,” said Mao, “and I decided to undertake nothing further and to wait it out at the dacha. Then an unpleasant conversation took place with [I. V.] Kovalev and [N. T.] Fedorenko, who proposed that I go on an excursion around the country. I sharply rejected this proposal and responded that I prefer ‘to sleep through it at the dacha.’”13 It is rather abnormal for a head of state to be received in such a cold way in

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another country. The reason may lie in a confidential report handed by Kovalev to Stalin during Mao’s stay in Moscow, which accused the CPC Central Committee leaders of being pro-American and anti-Soviet. The presence of delegates from other political parties and independent members in the Political Consultative Conference might have alarmed the Soviet Union that the CPC would be derailed from Communism. Moreover, the CPC had disobeyed the orders of the Comintern and Stalin. The report might have made Stalin worry that Mao would become the next Josip Broz Tito. During this period, Stalin did send representatives to see Mao and talk about other issues. Such procrastination only agitated Mao more. He once complained to Kovalev who was asked by Stalin to take him on a trip around the country that he had only three tasks in Moscow: eat, sleep and shit, and that he had not come to Moscow only to congratulate Stalin on his birthday.14 By then, no official reports on Mao’s activities in Moscow had been released for so long that rumors began to spread that Mao was under house arrest by Stalin. Considering that tension with the new Chinese Communist regime would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union in the long term, and perhaps disturbed by the rumors in the West, Stalin decided to have TASS, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, publish an interview with Mao which was in fact drafted by Stalin himself on January 2, 1950. In the interview, Mao was asked how long he would stay in the Soviet Union, and he answered, “I plan to stay for a few weeks. The length of my stay in the Soviet Union will be partly determined by the time it will take to resolve the various problems related to the interests of the People’s Republic of China.” As regard these “various problems,” Mao specified, “Foremost among these are the matters of the current Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Soviet Union, and of the Soviet Union’s loan to the People’s Republic of China and the matter of trade and of a trade agreement between our two countries.”15 With this, Mao was aware that Stalin’s attitude had changed. On the same day, First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union Vyacheslav Molotov visited Mao with Mikoyan. They addressed the treaty question and asked about Mao’s position. Mao proposed three alternative arrangements: (1) conclude a new treaty; (2) issue a communiqué through the news agencies of the two countries stating that the two governments had exchanged views and gained common ground on important questions relating to the old treaty; (3) sign a declaration that would define the important points in the relations of the two countries.16 Mao clearly stated that he favored the first alternative for it would “do great good”: domestically this would inspire the enthusiasm of the common people and isolate the national bourgeois right wing, while internationally they would have greater political capital to confront the imperialist states and examine the treaties that were

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concluded by previous Chinese governments with imperialist countries.17 Molotov gave his assent on the spot and asked Mao to send for Zhou Enlai. Mao wired the CPC Central Committee on the same day that great progress had been achieved and instructed Zhou to prepare the necessary documents and come to Moscow with the minister of trade and other assistants on January 9.18 On January 6, Mao met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Vyshinskii and officially raised the treaty question. Mao elaborated on the necessity of examining the old treaty, saying that one of its “significant components,” Japan, had “ceased to exist as an armed force” while the other, the KMT, had collapsed; hence a new treaty would be “in the best interests of both sides.” Mao also expressly spoke about the dissatisfaction of the Chinese people with the existing treaty. Vyshinskii, however, repeated the rhetoric employed by Stalin in his first meeting with Mao: that any revision of the existing treaty could be “used as an excuse by the Americans and the English for reviewing and altering parts of the treaty, changing which [might] cause damage to Soviet and Chinese interests.”19 On January 20, Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow with a delegation consisting of the vice chairman of the Northeast People’s Government Li Fu, Minister of Foreign Trade Ye Jizhuang, and dozens of administrative and technical specialists. It was at the first meeting joined by Zhou on January 22 when Stalin officially signaled the change of mind. Now he stated, “The existing agreements, including the treaty, should be changed because war against Japan figures at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war is over and Japan has been crushed, the situation has been altered, and now the treaty has become an anachronism.” After Stalin and Mao exchanged general opinions about the new treaty, they agreed that the drafting of the new treaty would be carried out by Zhou Enlai and Vyshinskii.20

Negotiations on the new Sino-Soviet Treaty A look at the record of the exchange between the two leaders on January 20 will find Stalin’s change rather dramatic. Considering that Stalin had agreed on the conclusion of the new treaty, Mao tried to be conciliatory by saying in echo of Stalin, “We must act so as to take into account the interests of both sides, China and the Soviet Union.” This time Stalin responded in favor of Mao’s demands: “True. We believe that agreement concerning Port Arthur is not equitable.” Mao tested the water further: “But changing this agreement goes against the decisions of the Yalta Conference?!” The Soviet leader now sounded recklessly magnanimous: “True, it does — and to hell with it! Once we have taken up the position that the treaties must be changed, we must go all the way. It is true that for us this entails certain inconveniences, and we will have to struggle against the Americans. But

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we are already reconciled to that.” Mao was pleased though not entirely free of apprehension. Trying to appear considerate, he added, “This question worries us only because it may have undesirable consequences for the USSR.” At last, they agreed that before the Soviet Union’s conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, the agreement concerning Port Arthur would stay valid; after that, Soviet forces would be withdrawn.21 Concerning Dalian, Stalin generously offered, “We have no intention of securing any Soviet rights in Dalny [Dalian].” Mao offered in return, “We believe that Port Arthur could serve as a base for our military collaboration, while Dalny could serve as a base for Sino-Soviet economic collaboration. In Dalny there is a whole array of enterprises that we are in no position to exploit without Soviet assistance.”22 The discussion then proceeded onto the Chinese Changchun Railway, on which the Soviets were not as ready to give in. The Chinese opined that the Soviets should have no claim on it because although part of the construction of the railroad was funded by the Tsarist government under the Sino-Russian treaty of 1896, the Soviets had sold it to Manchukuo during the period of Japanese occupation. Only on account of the strong Soviet demand for joint administration, coupled with the fact that the Chinese Changchun railroad would indeed greatly shorten the travel distance to Vladivostok compared with the route via the Russian Far Eastern Railway, did the Chinese side agree to extend convenience to the Soviets for a while more.23 Feeling that was already a great concession, Mao and Zhou insisted that China should play the main role in the administration of the railroad, the term of the agreement should be shortened, and the shareholding ratio should be adjusted. However, Molotov defended the Soviet administrative rights as accorded by the old agreement and seized the initiative to suggest the alternation of management functions at intervals of two or three years. Zhou connoted objection by a mention that his Chinese colleagues believed the existing management and office of the director of the railway should be replaced with an administration commission and office of the director composed of Chinese staff. To this Stalin’s answer was a no: the leadership role should be held in rotation now that they were talking about joint administration. Likewise, Zhou’s proposal that the Chinese share be increased from parity to 51% was met with opposition. The Soviet side held fast to the principle of parity. The matter was postponed for further study.24 On January 23 they started discussing the treaty terms. The Soviet government had already completed a draft earlier that month and had only to make slight modifications before presenting it to the Chinese. The draft was titled after the 1945 treaty, as the “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China.” Having “studied, deliberated, and revised it item by item, sentence by sentence, and word by word,”25 the Chinese

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presented their revised draft on January 24 with the modified title “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” in order to distinguish it from its older counterpart. This was accepted by the Soviet Union. Despite having offered to renounce all rights at Dalian, Stalin suddenly put out a draft respecting the port of Dalian on January 26, demanding the lease of some docks and warehouses at the port, the exemption of customs duties for Soviet goods imported and exported via the port, the rotation of the posts of harbor master and vice harbor master between Soviet and Chinese nationals, and the exercise of military control on the port like Port Arthur pending the conclusion of the Soviet peace treaty with Japan.26 This diverged too much from the original consensus than could be accepted by the Chinese. The Chinese delegation therefore came up with a counterdraft on Port Arthur, Dalian, and the Chinese Changchun Railway under the leadership of Zhou. It covered the following areas: (1) The Soviet Union was to relinquish her right to lease Port Arthur as a naval base and all of her rights relating to Dalian and the Chinese Changchun Railway, and to declare the transfer of all the above rights and obligations to the PRC. (2) All property that was temporarily administered or leased by the Soviet Union in Dalian and Port Arthur was to be taken over by China. (3) The Soviet government was to return to China the Chinese Changchun Railway and all the property belonging to it without compensation within three years after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan or the coming into force of the present agreement.27 When Stalin received the Chinese draft agreement on January 28, he was surprised and dissatisfied because it almost rejected all Soviet demands. In fact, he was so angry that he initially crossed out every point of the Chinese draft. But as seen in the Soviet draft returned to China on the same day, after prudent consideration, Stalin accepted most of the Chinese amendments: to relinquish the Soviet rights in Port Arthur and the Chinese Changchun Railway after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan but not later than the end of 1952 and to rest the administration of Dalian completely with the Chinese government. The arrangements of the transfer of all property temporarily administered by or leased to the Soviet government in Dalian would be discussed after the conclusion of the agreement.28 From January 31 to February 2, the two sides discussed the draft treaty and agreement in detail. The fiercest dispute concerned the Chinese Changchun railway. The Soviet draft contained a clause that would permit the Soviet Union to transport military units and materials via the railway.29 Although the Chinese had before agreed to grant such a right, Zhou demanded the addition of two preconditions: (1) that the movement of Soviet troops must be conditioned by the threat of war; and out of reciprocity, (2) that Chinese military units and goods

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would also be “transported unhindered on the Siberian and Turkestan-Siberian Railroads and on the stretch from Alma-Ata-Sinkiang at the tariffs valid for Soviet military transports from Mandzhuriia Station via Chita-Novosibirsk- Alma-Ata to Kulja (Sinkiang Province) Station and back.”30 The Soviet delegation did not raise any objection straightaway, but on the following day, Mikoyan drew Zhou’s attention to the fact that the Soviet government had decided to alter the article in relation to the movement of Soviet troops, so that the Soviet Union could only make use of this right when it was threatened in the Far East. The alteration made the Soviet demand a highly legitimate one made out of pure military concern. This also gave the Soviets ground to reject the Chinese demand for reciprocity. Mikoyan criticized the Chinese suggestion as “a counterproposal getting at the Soviet suggestion concerning the movement of Soviet military units along the Chinese Chungchun Railway between Manzhouli and the Pogranichnaia, which was a special and subtle way to oppose the Soviet suggestion,” holding that China would under no circumstance be able to make use of a reciprocal right. For one thing, the Soviets could not see that Xinjiang was or would in the future be under any military threat; for another, they understood the route from Manzhouli via Siberia and Alma-Ata to Urumqi as longer and less convenient. Mikoyan expressed that the Soviets were taken aback by the Chinese demand because Zhou had personally assented to permit the transportation of Soviet military units and materials along the Chinese Changchun railroad de facto if the Soviet government agreed to return the railroad to China. “But now the Chinese have changed their minds,” commented Mikoyan, “They oppose the movement of our troops along the Chinese Changchun Railway, not even movement between Manzhouli and the Pogranichnaia.”31 The sharpness of the Soviet criticism “clearly embarrassed” Zhou, who was eager to make amends by proving that his was not a “counterproposal.” He explained that the Chinese side felt the need to ensure the reciprocity of rights as the details of the agreement were being discussed, and the Chinese government was thinking of using the railway segment from Manzhouli to Urumqi to transport grain and other materials for the troops stationed in Xinjiang, which would save time and expenses. At this, Mikoyan threatened that if China rejected the Soviet demand for the transportation of troops, the Soviet side could withdraw it, but in return they would demand that the term of the agreement remain in force for a “shortened period of 10 years.” Finding this less desirable, Zhou said he had no objections to the idea of Soviet troops using the Chinese Changchun Railway under threat of war from the Far East, but he had to discuss it with Mao.32 Clearly, Mao would not want to see the agreement extended to 1962, but he was not satisfied with the present arrangement either. On February 2, Zhou said that

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the Chinese side had no comment on the Soviet drafts but asked Mikoyan whether it would be possible to “establish in writing” the possibility of transporting Chinese troops and materials from Manchuria to Xinjiang via the Siberian railroad should need arise. Mikoyan replied that his last rejection of the Chinese demand was not meant to opt out such a possibility “in the case of real necessity,” but deliberately expressed “amazement” at the Chinese position while signaling this indirect approval: The Soviet Union as an alliance partner is transferring, without any compensation, tremendous riches — the CCR [Chinese Changchun Railway], Dairen, Port Arthur, all its rights to these areas — and yet the Chinese side does not wish to approve the transportation of Soviet troops in only one direction. What kind of alliance partners are we if the Chinese side does not even want to make such a concession?33 For the construction of an industrialized China, the CPC had asked for a loan from the Soviet Union in February 1949. During his visit to Moscow, Mao put the issue on the table again and proposed a credit agreement involving USD300 million, which Stalin approved. On January 29 the Soviets handed the draft credit agreement to Mao and Zhou.34 The final agreement was filled with terms that were favorable to the Soviet Union at the expense of Chinese economic interests: (1) from 1950 to the end of 1963, China was to sell all the surplus industrial raw materials to the Soviet Union; (2) Sino-Soviet joint-stock companies were to be set up in return for Soviet technical assistance in the establishment of Chinese aviation, shipbuilding, oil production, and nonferrous metal industries; (3) unreasonably high remuneration was demanded for the Soviet experts rendering assistance to China. In need of Soviet political and economic support, the Chinese delegation accepted these conditions nonetheless. Particularly of note is a secret Additional Agreement to the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance proposed by Molotov on February 10, which the Chinese side accepted with only slight modifications in terminology. It was in fact a declaration to the effect of establishing reciprocal spheres of influence, for it provided: “No right to concessions will be granted to foreigners and no actions will be allowed by industrial, financial, trade, or other companies or by institutions, companies, or organization in which capital from third countries or citizens of these states participate either directly or indirectly either on the territory of the Far East region or of the central Asian republics of the USSR or on the territory of Manchuria or Sinkiang [Xinjiang] of the Chinese People’s Republic.”35 Mao was evidently displeased about the additional agreement. This was partly because the seemingly reciprocal clause would not really benefit China, which did not yet have

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the economic power to engage in any commercial or industrial activities in the Soviet Union then, but more so because Manchuria and Xinjiang had always been a sensitive factor in Sino-Russian relations. The Tsarist and Soviet governments had repeatedly claimed special rights in these areas; the agreement no doubt got on Mao’s nerves. He had complained more than once that Stalin had secured two Soviet “colonies” or “spheres of influence” out of the agreement.36 But he had to concede on this point, just as he did on the other matters. Finally, on February 14, Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Vyshinskii signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance — with its confidential additional agreement — the Agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalian, and the Agreement on Granting Credits to the People’s Republic of China. With the second document, the Soviet government was to transfer gratis to the Chinese government “all its rights in the joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway, with all the property belonging to the Railway”; Soviet troops were to be “withdrawn from the jointly utilized naval base of Port Arthur”; and the administration in Dalian was recognized to belong fully to the PRC, which was to take over all property in the area “provisionally in charge of or under lease to the Soviet side.”37 On the same day, Vyshinskii and Zhou also exchanged notes which invalidated the treaty and agreements concluded on August 14, 1945 and affirmed “a full guarantee of the independent position of the Mongolian People’s Republic as a result of the referendum of 1945 and of the establishment with it of diplomatic relations by the People’s Republic of China.”38 Mao was especially cautious about public reception of the Sino-Soviet agreements. Apart from keeping the additional agreement from the public, he drafted a telegram to instruct local central party bureaus, bureau branches, and front-line committees which read: “A new Sino-Soviet treaty and a series of agreements will be signed and published in days. Then, when different regions hold mass rallies, conduct discussions, and offer opinions, it is essential to adhere to the position adopted by the Xinhua News Agency’s editorial. No inappropriate opinions should be allowed.”39 The transfer of the Chinese Changchun Railway to the PRC was completed at the end of 1952 and the return of the administration of Dalian was completed in advance in early 1951. The withdrawal of Soviet troops in Port Arthur, however, was delayed at the request of the Chinese due to the Korean War and was completed in October 1954. Regarding the secret additional agreement, the Chinese government repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction to the Soviet government, and on May 10, 1956, the Soviet government proposed in a note that it be abolished. Chinese agreement was officially declared on May 29. With this, all outstanding questions in Sino-Soviet relations had been resolved.

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The Return of Hong Kong and Macau Temporary maintenance of the status quo Different from concessions and other treaty rights which obviously violate the general principles of international law, Hong Kong and Macau could not be easily restored by means of negotiation, for they were transferred to foreign parties by cession or permanent lease, which legitimized foreign ownership of these territories. In history, the cession of territories and the restoration of them had generally been carried out by violence. Back then, the cases of Hong Kong and Macau were complicated by the context of the Cold War, which rendered peaceful negotiations across the two camps next to impossible. For a new born regime like Communist China, violence was a most undesirable recourse; paradoxically, visà-vis the Western economic blockade, Hong Kong provided quite a convenient gateway of communication with the West. Thus, China decided to find a “flexible way” of dealing with the issue. As Mao said to Mikoyan during the latter’s mission to China in February 1949, when half of the Chinese territories had yet to be “liberated,” the continent could be dealt with relatively easily by dispatching troops, but the islands would be more complicated and asked for a more flexible approach. Mao continued that it would be rather meaningless to resolve the questions of Hong Kong and Macau given that situation; on the contrary, the status of Hong Kong and Macau, especially Hong Kong, could be utilized to the advantage of China’s overseas relations and foreign trade.40 For a long period of time after the establishment of the PRC, the government did not make clear its attitude towards the Hong Kong question, lest a panic be stirred up before the time was ripe. Later, this stance on the Hong Kong question was confirmed in a speech by Premier Zhou Enlai on April 28, 1957, in which he said: “As we … carry out socialist construction, Hong Kong can act as our base for establishing economic ties with other countries through which we absorb foreign capital and obtain foreign currencies.” On the one hand he recognized, “preserving and expanding the base of Hong Kong will be desirable”; on the other hand, he explicitly declared, “someday we will definitely restore our sovereignty over Hong Kong.”41 Based on this mentality, the Chinese government devised the principle of “long-term planning, full utilization” (changqi dasuan, chongfen liyong 長期打算，充分利用) to deal with the Hong Kong and Macau questions. Such a policy became a cause of criticism by radicals within the country and some of the CPC’s foreign allies, which could not tolerate the existence of colonies in the socialist world. In response, the PRC published an editorial in People’s Daily

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to explicate its foreign policy. It first established the PRC’s policy as distinctive by the fact that as early as its establishment, the government had declared its desire to examine in order to decide whether to recognize, abolish, revise, or renegotiate the treaties concluded by previous Chinese governments with foreign states in the light of their respective contents. To justify the PRC’s Hong Kong and Macau policy, the editorial went on: “With regard to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy from the past, we have always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be maintained. Within this category are the questions of Hongkong, Kowloon and Macao….”42 Mao reemphasized this stance to the visiting Somali prime minister in August 1963. Although it would not be difficult for China to recover Hong Kong, which had limited military strength, Mao said that his government was temporarily not prepared to alter the situation. “Hong Kong is an important commercial gateway,” said Mao, “if we take control of it now, this will be to the disadvantage of world trade as well as to our trade relations with the world.” On the other hand, he remarked, “That we make no move on it now does not mean that we will never make any move. The United Kingdom is at ease for now, but it will not be at ease in the future.”43

The settlement of the Hong Kong question The time for the move arrived in October 1971, when the PRC was recognized as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. In March 1972, China’s Ambassador to the United Nations Huang Hua submitted a letter to the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, asking the organization to formally remove Hong Kong and Macau from its list of colonial territories. The letter argued: The questions of Hong Kong and Macau belong to the category of questions resulting from the series of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. Hong Kong and Macau are part of Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the questions of Hong Kong and Macau is entirely within China’s sovereign right and does not at all fall under the ordinary category of “colonial territories.” Consequently they should not be included in the list of colonial territories covered by the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People. With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macau, the Chinese Government has consistently held that they should be settled in an appropriate way when

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conditions are ripe.44 After discussion, the Special Committee on Decolonization and the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions that excluded Hong Kong and Macau from the list of colonial territories. By this, Hong Kong and Macau would not be turned into independent states or condominiums but returned to China. Conditions for negotiations with Britain become ripe in the late 1970s as British attitudes on the Hong Kong question and Chinese internal and external policies underwent significant shifts. According to the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, the lease of the territories north of Boundary Street and south of the Sham Chun River as well as the surrounding islands, which have come to be known as the New Territories, would expire in 1997. Given the vast expanse of the New Territories, practically it would be difficult for Hong Kong to stand on its own after the termination of the lease. For Britain, the 1997 barrier crippled them from approving deeds and other documents of title beyond that year, while growing concern about the future of Hong Kong deterred international investors from committing to long-term investment in the territory. Under such a circumstance, the British government started to reveal its intention to discuss the Hong Kong question with China. On the Chinese side, the Cultural Revolution had come to an end and the government shifted to a more open policy which inaugurated the era of “Reform and Opening Up.” Flexibility was seen in the Sino-American negotiations to open diplomatic relations in 1979, when the Chinese government first expressed tolerance for the coexistence of “two kinds of social systems” in one country — which was later formulated into the “One Country, Two Systems” approach — with respect to the Taiwan question. At the beginning of 1979, the Chinese government considered applying this concept to Hong Kong and Macau. In March, Deng Xiaoping made it clear to Governor of Hong Kong Murray MacLehose, who was invited to Beijing, that Hong Kong was a part of Chinese territory while at the same time suggesting that the capitalist system could be maintained there for a considerable period after 1997. Soon, the CPC Central Committee established its Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs and its offices in Hong Kong and Macau, putting the question of the two colonies on the table. The concept of “One Country, Two Systems” was formally raised in the early 1980s. To maintain local stability, it was decided that Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan would maintain their capitalist system while the Chinese mainland practiced socialism. In April 1982, the Chinese government moved for an amendment to its constitution to incorporate the new policy, which was adopted by the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress in December that year. The amended

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constitution provides that “the state may establish special administrative regions when necessary” and “the systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of the specific conditions.”45 The PRC government never recognized the legality of the lease of the New Territories despite its choice of 1997 as the deadline for the settlement of the Hong Kong question — this was a pragmatic choice to give itself the greatest leverage and also to let Britain save face. The Chinese claim was not confined to the New Territories, but as Premier Zhao Ziyang said to British Deputy Foreign Secretary Humphrey Atkins in January 1982, covered the whole area of Hong Kong. In September 1982, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited Beijing and started negotiating with the Chinese leaders on September 23. The “Iron Lady” was rather tough-minded, insisting on the validity of the three 19th-century treaties concerning Hong Kong under international law and maintaining that they could only be revised through negotiations and not abolished unilaterally. At the same time, she knew very well that Britain would lose the New Territories no matter what, and her bottom line was to consider the question of sovereignty if China could agree to the continuation of British administration beyond 1997 for the sake of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong — that was, to make it plain, a formula to exchange sovereignty for administration. However, the Chinese leaders were equally adamant. Affirming that the Chinese government would take back the entire territory of Hong Kong, Zhao said that the central government would take special measures to ensure the continued prosperity of Hong Kong after the resumption of sovereignty and emphasized that compared to economic concerns, the question of sovereignty would always come first.46 On the following day, Thatcher met with Deng and repeated the proposal of continued British administration under Chinese sovereignty. Deng did not consider Thatcher’s proposal and directly put forward the basic Chinese position. He identified three issues concerning Hong Kong: first, that of sovereignty; second, that of in what ways Hong Kong would be administered after 1997 to ensure its continued prosperity; third, that of how to prevent major disturbances in Hong Kong during the 15-year transitional period up to 1997. With regard to the first issue, Deng was very firm: To be frank, the question is not open to discussion. The time is ripe for making it unequivocally clear that China will recover Hong Kong in 1997. That is to say, China will recover not only the New Territories but also Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. It must be on that understanding that China and the United Kingdom hold talks on the ways and means of settling the Hong

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Kong question. The Chinese leaders saw the recovery Hong Kong as a matter of political life and death. They believed that if the PRC failed to recover Hong Kong in 1997, which was when it would have been established for 48 years, “no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world,” and losing the trust of the people, “any Chinese government would have no alternative but to step down and voluntarily leave the political stage.” Deng went on that China would have to officially announce the decision to take back Hong Kong in one or two years. With regard to the second issue, he proposed the principle of “One Country, Two Systems” in defiance of the British assertion that British administration was indispensable to the prosperity of Hong Kong.47 Thatcher left Beijing with no consensus reached. In the press conference she held in Hong Kong on September 27, she continued to defend the validity of the three 19th-century treaties, saying: “But one point about the treaties, I believe they are valid in international law. And if countries try just to abrogate treaties like that, then it is very serious indeed, because if a country will not stand by one treaty, it would not stand by another treaty.” She also spoke emphatically of “moral obligation and duty,” which she elaborated as “a main commitment and responsibility” to the people of Hong Kong.48 In Beijing, at about the same time, the spokesman of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the PRC government was not to be bound by those unequal treaties and would recover the whole Hong Kong area when conditions were ripe.49 Later, Deng would further elaborate his “One Country, Two Systems” formula on various occasions. For example, to a trade delegation from Hong Kong in June 1984 he explained, “Hong Kong’s current social and economic systems will remain unchanged, its legal system will remain basically unchanged, its way of life and its status as a free port and an international trade and financial centre will remain unchanged and it can continue to maintain or establish economic relations with other countries and regions.” He also reassured that this policy would stay unchanged for a period of 50 years. At the same time, he added that China would station troops in Hong Kong to safeguard China’s national security — this was a claim of full sovereignty over Hong Kong.50 In the meantime, although the initial Deng-Thatcher discussion did not come down to any concrete decision, it opened the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong’s future. The first stage of the negotiations was preparatory talks. Lasting from October 1982 to June 1983 in Beijing under the leadership of Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wenjin (with Yao Guang taking over from

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January 1983) on the one hand and British Ambassador Percy Cradock on the other hand, these meetings mainly dealt with matters of principles and procedures. The Chinese side insisted that China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong was not negotiable and what they should discuss were how to transfer the sovereignty rights and how to preserve Hong Kong’s prosperity. The British, however, were opposed to the setting of any preconditions and opined that sovereignty should be part of the exchange. The divergence of opinions was huge. In March 1983, the British government learned that the PRC government had drafted its own proposal on the future of Hong Kong and the draft would possibly be submitted for the approval of the National People’s Congress in June. To avoid a complete deadlock and to gain more space for maneuver, Thatcher wrote a letter to Zhao Ziyang on March 10 stating that if “agreement could be reached between the British and Chinese on administrative arrangements for Hong Kong which would guarantee the future prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and would be acceptable to the British Parliament and to the people of Hong Kong as well as to the Chinese Government,” she “would be prepared” to recommend to the Parliament the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong to China.51 After that, negotiations proceeded with more substance. In May 1983, the two sides agreed on the issues of post-1997 arrangements, the arrangements of the next 14 years, and the transfer of administration. The question of sovereignty was not explicitly addressed, but the discussion of actual handover arrangements implied tacit agreement. Soon, in July 1983 they entered the second stage of negotiations which were presided over by Yao and Cradock until April 1984, followed by Zhou Nan and Richard Evans. After 22 rounds of talks and countless informal conversations, consensus was reached and the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed on December 19. It was ratified and took effect on May 7, 1985. According to the declaration, the Chinese government would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong from the date of July 1, 1997. The basic principles of the Chinese government regarding Hong Kong were: 1. Upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which would be directly under the authority of the Central People’s Government of the PRC, was to be established. The Special Administrative Region would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power including that of final adjudication, except in foreign and defense affairs which would be the responsibilities of the Central People’s Government. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong were to remain basically unchanged. The government of Hong Kong would

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be composed of local inhabitants. 2. The current social and economic systems, as well as lifestyle in Hong Kong would remain unchanged. Residents of Hong Kong would continue to enjoy rights and freedoms as provided for by law. Private property would also be protected by law. 3. Economic interests of the United Kingdom and other countries in Hong Kong would be given due regard, and Hong Kong could establish economic relations with the United Kingdom and other countries. 4. A Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was to be formulated to stipulate that the above policies would remain unchanged for 50 years.52 In April 1985, the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee was established. The committee started drafting the law in July and completed its work at the end of five years. In April 1990, the mini constitution was passed by the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress.

The settlement of the Macau question As in the case of Hong Kong, the PRC government had always refused to recognize the 1887 Sino-Portuguese treaty, insisting that Macau was part of China and the question would be resolved by negotiation at an appropriate time. In February 1979, the PRC established diplomatic relations with Portugal. Although the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Sino-Portuguese Diplomatic Relations made no mention of the question of Macau, the two countries had reached a secret understanding that Macau was Chinese territory under Portuguese rule, that it would be returned to China in the future, the date and specific arrangements of the return to be discussed by the two governments at an appropriate time, and that pending the transfer, the Portuguese government would respect and protect the interests of Chinese in Macau. The Sino-British Joint Declaration provided a model for the settlement of the Macau question. When Deng met with delegations from Hong Kong and Macau that were invited to Beijing to observe the PRC’s anniversary celebrations on October 3, 1984, he said that the settlement of the Macau question would not be far from the principle of “One Country, Two Systems.”53 In 1985, Portuguese President António Ramalho Eanes visited China and talked with Deng about the question of Macau, and they agreed to hold formal negotiations within a short period. The negotiations began on June 30, 1986 in Beijing and after nine months of talks the two sides signed the draft of the Sino-

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Portuguese Joint Declaration on March 26, 1987. The formal document was signed on April 13 together with its annexes and ratified on January 15, 1988. The contents of the declaration basically mirrored its Sino-British counterpart. It was declared, “the Macau region (including the Macau Peninsula, Taipa Island and Coloane Island, hereinafter referred to as Macau) form part of Chinese territory and that the Government of the People’s Republic of China will resume the exercise of sovereignty over Macao with effect from 20 December 1999.” China was to establish the Macau Special Administrative Region under the direct authority of the Central People’s Government. The Macau Special Administrative Region would enjoy a high degree of autonomy except in external relations and defense, which would be the responsibilities of the Central People’s Government. The government of the Macau Special Administrative Region would be composed of local inhabitants. The current social and economic systems in Macau would remain unchanged, and so would “the existing way of life” and “the laws in force.” The economic interests of Portugal and other foreign states in Macau would be given due regard. These basic policies would be stipulated in a Basic Law and would remain unchanged for 50 years.54 The Macau Basic Law Drafting Committee was established in September 1988, and the Basic Law of Macau was passed by the First Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress in 1993.

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Notes Chapter 5 “External Declaration on the Establishment of the Nationalist Government”, in Lin, ed., Historical Documents on the Abolition of Unequal Treaties during the War of Resistance, 435–36. 2. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, June 17, 1928, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, vol. 2, 413–14. 3. Chiu Hungdah, ed. Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 5 (1985), 12. 4. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, July 16, 1928, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, vol. 2, 416–17. 5. Memorandum of He et al. to plead for the exercise of revolutionary diplomacy, July 21, 1928, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, ser. 5, vol. 1, Foreign Relations, 35–40. 6. Sun, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 10. 7. “On Abolition of Unequal Treaties,” August 6, 1928, Collection of Dr. C. T. Wang’s Recent Speeches, 9–10. 8. “Diplomatic Endeavors and the Abolition of Unequal Treaties,” December 31, 1928, Collection of Dr. C. T. Wang’s Recent Speeches, 29. 9. Wang to Daniele Varè, July 1, 1928, The China Year Book, 1928, 864. 10. Kellogg to MacMurray, telegram, June 23, 1928, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, vol. 2, 450. 11. Ibid. 12. Wu to Kellogg, July 11, 1928, ibid, 415. 13. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, July 12, 1928, ibid, 457–58. 14. Text, Kellogg to MacMurray, telegram, July 20, 1928, ibid, 465–66. 15. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy Toward China, 1925–1941, 27. 16. Buckley, “John Van Antwerp MacMurray: The Diplomacy of an American Mandarin,” 35. 17. American Relations with China: A Report of the Conference Held at John Hopkins University, September 17–20, 1925, 77–78. 18. Ibid, 79. 19. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, July 20, 1928, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, vol. 2, 467–68. 20. Kellogg to MacMurray, telegram, July 21, 1928, ibid, 469. 21. Kellogg to Coolidge, July 25, 1928, ibid, 474. 22. Kellogg to MacMurray, telegram, July 20, 1928, ibid, 465–66. 23. “Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the United States of America and the Republic of China,” July 25, 1928, ibid, 476. 24. Buckley, “John Van Antwerp MacMurray: The Diplomacy of an American Mandarin,” 42. 25. Kellogg to Coolidge, telegram, December 1, 1928, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 1.

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States, 1928, vol. 2, 492. 26. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 19. 27. Ibid. 28. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gazette 1 (4), 115–16; The China Year Book, 1929–30, 835. 29. Yoshizawa Kenkichi to Wang, July 31, 1928, The China Year Book, 1929–30, 836. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Memorandum of the nationalist Government, August 14, 1928, World Peace Foundation Pamphlets 12 (3), 150–51. 33. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 533. 34. Ibid, 194. 35. Text, ibid, 233–34. 36. Ibid, 238. 37. Ibid, 242. 38. Ibid, 20. 39. Ibid, 21. 40. Ibid, 22. 41. From the Italian treaty. Ibid, 216. 42. Ibid, 22–3. 43. Ibid, 23. 44. “The Strength of Diplomacy and the Abrogation of Unequal Treaties,” January 14, 1929, Collection of Dr. C. T. Wang’s Recent Speeches, 48. 45. See Hornbeck’s memorandum of his conversion with Wu, January 5, 1929, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, vol. 2, 543–45. 46. Rong and Sun, ed., Materials on the Congresses and Central Committee Plenums of the KMT, vol.1, 651. 47. Wu to Henry Lewis Stimson, May 2, 1929, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, vol. 2, 559–61. 48. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 154. 49. Chamberlain to Lampson, telegram, May 14, 1929, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 33–34. 50. Chamberlain to E. M. B. Ingram, May 16, 1929, telegram, ibid, 47. 51. Ibid, 50. 52. Ibid, 59 53. Ibid, 60. 54. Ibid, 64. 55. Lampson to Henderson, telegram, ibid, 113–115.

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Notes

56. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 168. 57. “Diplomatic Process in the Past Year and Future Principles,” July 12, 1929, Collection of Dr. C. T. Wang’s Recent Speeches, 74. 58. Kuowen Weekly 6, (47) (December 1, 1929). 59. MacMurray to Stimson, September 10, 1929, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, vol. 2, 677. 60. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 170. 61. Teichman’s memorandum, August 7, 1928, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 137–38. 62. Stimson to MacMurray, August 1, 1929, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, vol. 2, 597. 63. The China Year Book, 1929–30, 912. 64. Wang to MacMurray, September 5, 1929, quoted in MacMurray to Stimson, September 10, 1929, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, vol. 2, 604. 65. Grenville and Wasserstein, ed., The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts, vol. 1, 104. 66. Millard, The End of Exterritoriality in China, 76. 67. Lampson to Wang, November 1, 1929, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 190. 68. Ibid, 208–9. 69. Claudel to Stimson, December 10, 1929, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, vol. 2, 647. 70. Henderson’s aide-memoire, December 21, 1929, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, vol. 2, 659. 71. The China Year Book, 1931, 487. 72. Department of State to Chinese Legation, December 28, 1929, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, vol. 2, 665–66. 73. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Memorandum Regarding the Retirement Benefits of the American Employees of the International Settlement at Shanghai, China, 83th Cong., 2nd sess., 1954, S. Rep. 1466, serial 11729, 11–12. 74. The China Year Book, 1931, 487. 75. Lampson to Henderson, telegram, January 10, 1930, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 265. 76. Ronald Campbell (British Chargé in the United States) to Hornbeck, March 4, 1930, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, vol. 2, 394. 77. Lampson to Henderson, telegram, January 18, 1930, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 274–75. 78. Lampson to Henderson, telegram, February 4, 1930, ibid, 279–80. 79. Department of State to Chinese Legation, January 23, 1930, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of

129

Notes

the United States, 1930, vol. 2, 363–67. The plan was titled “An Outline of Possible Provisions” because it was just presented to Wu for study. Hornbeck could not give China any definite offer before the Secretary of State, who was absent from Washington, returned from the London Naval Conference. 80. British Embassy to Department of State, aide-mémoire, March, 4, 1930, ibid, 401. 81. Hornbeck to Wu, February 26, 1930, ibid, 390. 82. “Summary of Draft Treaty Covering Proposals for the Gradual Abolition of Extraterritoriality,” Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 414–15. 83. See Lampson to Henderson, telegram, March 10, 1930 and March 28, 1930, Ibid, 310–315 and 332–336, for example. 84. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 175. 85. Ibid, 175–76; Draft Agreement of October 28, 1930, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, vol. 2, 473–76. 86. “Text of Draft Treaty for the Abolition of Extraterritoriality Handed to His Majesty’s Minister by Dr. Wang on December 1, 1930,” Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 432–33. 87. Note of Lampson to Henderson, telegram, December 19, 1930, Ibid, 449. 88. FO 228/4318, Wang to Lampson, December 17, 1930. 89. FO 228/4319, letter from Consul-general (Nanking) to Lampson, December 21, 1930. 90. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 177; Stimson to Johnson, telegram, December 27, 1930, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, vol. 2, 502; Ray Atherton (American Chargé d’Affaires in Britain) to Stimson, telegram, January 2, 1931, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, vol. 3, 717. 91. Henderson to Ingram, telegram, February 18, 1931, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 470. 92. Henderson to Lindsay, telegram, March 7, 1931, ibid, 476–77. 93. Charles G. Dawes (Ambassador in Great Britain) to Stimson, telegram, February 3, 1931, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, vol. 3, 725. 94. Department of State to Chinese Legation, February 7, 1931, ibid, 727. 95. Hornbeck’s memorandum, February 7, 1931, ibid, 731. 96. Lampson to Henderson, telegram, March 30, 1931, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 487–88. 97. Henderson to Lampson, telegram, April 2, 1931, ibid, 490. 98. Ibid. 99. The China Weekly Review, April 18, 1931, 223. 100. Lampson to Henderson, telegram, April 27, 1931, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 506. 101. Henderson to Lampson, telegram, April 13, 1931, ibid, 494; Lampson to Henderson, telegram, April 21, 1931, ibid, 500. 102. Li, “Sino-British Negotiations on the Abrogation of Consular Jurisdiction before the Mukden Incident of 1931”; Lampson to Henderson, May 4, 1931, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, ser.2, vol. 8, 513.

130

Notes

103. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 182. 104. Text, The China Year Book, 1932, 263. 105. Millard, The End of Exterritoriality in China, 12. 106. The China Year Book, 1932, 536. 107. Li, “Sino-British Negotiations on the Abrogation of Consular Jurisdiction before the Mukden Incident of 1931”; Johnson to Stimson, May 26, 1931, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, vol. 3, 864–65; Johnson to Stimson, May 29, 1931, ibid, 868. 108. Henderson to Lampson, May 29, 1931, 538. 109. Li, “Sino-British Negotiations on the Abrogation of Consular Jurisdiction before the Mukden Incident of 1931.” 110. “Draft Extraterritoriality Treaty,” Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, ser. 2, vol. 8, 546–54. 111. William Richards Castle (Acting Secretary of State) to Johnson, July 13, 1931, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, vol. 3, 891. 112. Sun and Zhao, ed., The Question of Extraterritoriality, 270. 113. Shigemitsu, The Inside Story of Japanese Invasion of China, trans. Qi et al., 31. 114. Ibid, 34. 115. Kuowen Weekly 8, (17) (May 4, 1931). 116. Ta Kung Pao, April 30, 1931. 117. Kuowen Weekly 8, (31) (1931). 118. The China Year Book, 1932, 264. 119. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Treaties Between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 311. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid, 313. 122. Wang to interested ministers, May 8, 1929, The China Year Book, 1929–30, 902. 123. Oudendijk to Wang, June 7, 1929, ibid. 124. Wang to Oudendijk, July 3, 1929, ibid, 903. 125. Perkins (Chargé d’affaires) to Stimson, December 10, 1929, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, vol. 2, 723; Perkins to Stimson, December 15, 1929, ibid, 727–29. 126. Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, ser. 5, vol. 1, Foreign Relations, 56. 127. Millard, The End of Exterritoriality in China, 251–58. 128. Ibid, 253, 258. 129. Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, ser. 5, vol. 1, Foreign Relations, 55–60. 130. Li, “Revolutionary Diplomacy” Before and After the Northern Expedition, 296; Teichman’s minute, February 19, 1929, FO228/4033. 131. FO 228/4033, Peking and Tientsin Times, February 4, 1929, quoted in Li, “Revolutionary Diplomacy” Before and After the Northern Expedition, 297. 132. Lampson to Henderson, telegram, June 28, 1929, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, ser.

131

Notes

2, vol. 8, 1919-1939, 100. 133. Lampson to Henderson, telegram, June 21, 1929, ibid, 89; Lampson to Henderson, telegram, June 22, 1929, ibid, 90. 134. Ibid, 20. 135. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Treaties Between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 545–47. 136. Ibid, 550–51. 137. Zhu, The Weihai Question, 48. 138. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Treaties Between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 550; Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ explanation on the rendition of Weihaiwei, April 1930, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, ser. 5, vol. 1, Foreign Relations, 1245–46. 139. “Thoughts on the Rendition of Weihaiwei,” April 22, 1930, Collection of Dr. C. T. Wang’s Recent Speeches, 82. 140. Weihai Chronicle Office, ed., Weihai Chronicle, 55. 141. Memorandum of Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Executive Yuan, November 5, 1929, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, ser. 5, vol. 1, Foreign Relations, 1237. 142. Ibid. 143. Exchange of notes regarding claims for losses sustained by British subjects at Zhenjiang, November 9, 1929, British and Foreign State Papers, 1929, pt. 1, vol. 130, 100. 144. Exchange of notes regarding the rendition of the British Concession at Zhenjiang, October 31, 1929, ibid, 97–98. 145. Exchange of notes regarding the rendition of the British Concession at Amoy, September 17, 1930, ibid, 554. 146. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Treaties Between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 24–5. 147. Ibid, 28. 148. Ibid, 21. 149. “Internal Consolidation and The Success and Failure of Diplomacy,” January 7, 1929, in Wu, ed., Collections of Dr. C. T. Wang’s Recent Speeches, 33. 150. Fairbank, The United States and China, 247.

Chapter 6 1. 2. 3.

132

Koo to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 19, 1933, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, ser. 5, vol. 1, Foreign Relations, 70. Report of the Review of Koo’s Proposals by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Basic Industries, and Finance, October 28, 1933, ibid, 71. Quoted in Johnson to Cordell Hull (Secretary of State), telegram, January 23, 1934, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, vol. 3, 525.

Notes

4. Ibid. 5. Hull to Johnson, telegram, March 13, 1934, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, vol. 3, 526–27. 6. South Manchurian Railway Company, Fifth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1936, 230. 7. Ibid, 246. 8. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 196 9. Lin, ed., Historical Documents on the Abolition of Unequal Treaties during the War of Resistance, 196–97. 10. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 196. 11. Ibid, 196–97. 12. Ibid, 197–98. 13. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1, 566. 14. Rong and Sun, ed., Materials on the Congresses and Central Committee Plenums of the KMT, vol. 2, 485. 15. Leighton to Roosevelt, April 10, 1940, telegram, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, vol. 4, 316. 16. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 363 (1940), col. 400. 17. Quoted in oral statement by Ballantine (Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs), February 14, 1941, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. 4, 31. 18. Quo to Hu Shi (Ambassador to the United States), telegram, April 20, 1941, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, ser. 5, vol. 2, 532. 19. Hull to Quo, May 31, 1941, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931– 1941, vol. 1, 929–30. 20. Kerr to Quo, July 4, 1941, Council of International Affairs, ed., The Chinese Year Book, 1943, 243. 21. Text from the treaty with Estonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 104–5. 22. Contemporary China: A Reference Digest, vol. 1, no. 15, December 15, 1941. 23. Roosevelt, As He Saw It, 53. 24. Memorandum by Hamilton, March 27, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 271–72. 25. Ibid, 273. 26. Ibid, 274. 27. Document from Main Office of Military Affairs Commission, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, ser. 5, vol. 2, Foreign Relations, 138–39. 28. Hull to John Gilbert Winant (Ambassador in the United Kingdom), telegram, August 27, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 282. 29. Chungking to British Foreign Office, telegram, April 4, 1942, FO 371/31657, F2757/828/10. 30. Foreign Office to Washington, telegram, April 20, 1942, FO 371/31657, F2757/828/10. 31. Document from Main Office of Military Affairs Commission, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, ser. 5, vol. 2, Foreign Relations, 148–49.

133

Notes

32. Ibid, 147–48. 33. Hull to Winant, telegram, August 27, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 283–84. 34. Hull to Winant, telegram, September 5, 1942, ibid, 287–88. 35. Minutes of conversation between Chiang and Willkie, October 4, 1942, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 1, 759–60. 36. Lin, ed., Historical Documents on the Abolition of Unequal Treaties during the War of Resistance, 523–24. 37. Willkie, Prefaces to Peace, 132. 38. Memorandum of conversation by Hamilton, October 9, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 307. 39. Chiang to Wei, telegram, October 9, 1942, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 3, 712. 40. Keiji Furuya, Secret Records of President Chiang: Testimonial Words from Eight Decades of SinoJapanese Relations, vol. 13, 38. 41. Chiang to Soong, telegram, October 12, 1942, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 3, 714. 42. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 221. 43. Department of State to Chinese Embassy, Draft Treaty With Regard to Relations Between the United States of America and China, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 333–36. 44. Wei to Hull, November 10, 1942, ibid, 346–47. 45. Soong to Chiang, October 30, 1942, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 3, 723. 46. Memorandum by Atcheson of a conversation with Liu Chieh [Liu Kai] (Minister Counselor of the Chinese Embassy), November 13, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 351; Wei to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, November 16, 1942, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 3, 729. 47. Wei to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, November 27, 1942, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 3, 730; Clarence E. Gauss (Ambassador in China) to Hull, telegram, November 24, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 364. 48. Department of State to Chinese Embassy, November 27, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 378. 49. Draft Exchange of Notes Between the United States and China, ibid, 381.

134

Notes

50. Gauss to Hull, telegram, December 20, 1942, ibid, 399. 51. Wang Chonghui (Secretary of National Defense Commission) to Chiang, December 16, 1942, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 3, 738–39. 52. Quoted in Winant to Hull, telegram, November 13, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 349. 53. Hull to Winant, telegram, November 17, 1942, ibid, 356–57. 54. Eden to Seymour, telegram, November 27, 1942, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print; China, Japan, Siam, and Nepal, October 1942–June 1943, 63. 55. Quoted in Winant to Hull, telegram, November 27, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China, 383. 56. Winant to Hull, telegram, November 5, 1942, ibid, 342–43. 57. See for example, Winant to Hull, telegram, December 4, 1942, ibid, 386–88; Winant to Hull, telegram, December 7, 1942, ibid, 390–92. 58. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government, Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 590–92. 59. Ibid, 595–97. 60. Ibid, 597. 61. “Letter to the Army and Civilians of the Nation on the Conclusion of New Sino-American and SinoBritish Equal Treaties,” January 12, 1943, KMT Party History Compilation Committee, ed., Complete Collection of the Thoughts and Speeches of Late President Chiang, vol. 32, 4–7. 62. “Decision of the Central Executive Committee Concerning Celebrations of the Abrogation of SinoAmerican and Sino-British Unequal Treaties,” January 25, 1943, Archive of the CPC Central Committee, ed., Selected Documents of the CPC Central Committee, vol. 14, 18. 63. K. C. Wu (Political Vice Minister in Charge of Ministerial Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Paul Boncour (Representative from French Embassy), May 19, 1943, China Handbook 1937–1943, 169. 64. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government, Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 669–73. 65. Fairbank, The United States and China, 337. 66. United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, c. 31. 67. Bevans, ed., Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, vol. 3, 858. 68. Parliamentary question, October 14, 1942, FO 371/31659, 7144/828/10, 101. 69. Text, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 3, 765. 70. Seymour to Eden, telegram, November 14, 1942, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print; China, Japan, Siam, and Nepal, October 1942–June 1943, 59.

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Notes

71. Seymour to Eden, telegram, November 17, 1942, ibid, 61. 72. Clarke’s minutes, November 20, 1942, FO 371/31663, F7822/828/10, 2–3. 73. Eden to Seymour, telegram, December 5, 1942, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print; China, Japan, Siam, and Nepal, October 1942–June 1943, 68. 74. Seymour to Eden, telegram, December 7, 1942, ibid, 69. 75. Seymour to Eden, telegram, December 15, 1942, ibid, 80. 76. Seymour to Eden, telegram, December 15, 1942, ibid, 81. 77. Eden to Seymour, telegram, December 19, 1942, ibid, 84. 78. Eden to Seymour, telegram, December 23, 1942, ibid, 86; Eden to Seymour, December 24, 1942, ibid. 79. Seymour to Eden, telegram, December 25, 1942, ibid, 87. 80. Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 5, 176–77. 81. Chinese Modern History, (1-4) (1995), 122. 82. Seymour to Eden, telegram, December 27, 1942, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print; China, Japan, Siam, and Nepal, October 1942–June 1943, 90. 83. Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 5, 17–18. 84. Seymour to Eden, telegram, December 28, 1942, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print; China, Japan, Siam, and Nepal, October 1942–June 1943, 90. 85. Eden to Seymour, telegram, December 28, 1942, ibid, 91. 86. Seymour to Eden, telegram, December 30, 1942, ibid, 104. 87. Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 5, 176–77. 88. Keiji Furuya, Secret Records of President Chiang: Testimonial Words from Eight Decades of SinoJapanese Relations, vol. 13, 42. 89. Quoted in Seymour to Eden, telegram, January 12, 1943, FO 371/35680, F285/1/10, 105. 90. Seymour to Eden, telegram, January 12, 1943, FO 371/35680, ibid, 104; Eden to Seymour, January 15, 1943, ibid, 107. 91. Draft of Counsellors’ Office, Military Affairs Commission on questions to be raised by China at Cairo, November 1943, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 3, 500. 92. Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 5, 14. 93. Bohlen Minutes, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, 534. 94. Du, “Recollection of the Cairo Conference,” The Mirror, May 1984. 95. Chan Lau, China, Britain and Hong Kong, 1895-1945, 319.

136

Notes

96. Hurley to Edward Reilly Stettinius (Secretary of State), telegram, April 14, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 331. 97. “The Question of the Rendition of Hong Kong,” August 1945, quoted in Wu, ed., Diplomatic History of China: The Period of the Republic of China, 1911–1949, 635–36. 98. Seymour to Ernest Bevin (Foreign Secretary), telegram, August 16, 1945, FO 371/46252, F5236/1147/ G, 30; Seymour to Bevin, telegram, August 16, 1945, ibid, 31. 99. Directive by Truman to MacArthur, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 530. 100. Quoted in Hurley to Byrnes, telegram, August 16, 1945, ibid, 501. 101. Quoted in Hurley to Byrnes, telegram, August 21, 1945, ibid, 507. 102. Soong to Byrnes, telegram, August 18, 1945, ibid, 503. 103. Attlee to Truman, telegram, August 18, 1945, ibid, 504. 104. Quoted in Hurley to Byrnes, telegram, August 21, 1945, ibid, 508. 105. Quoted in Byrnes to Hurley, telegram, August 21, 1945, ibid, 509. 106. Quoted in Hurley to Byrnes, telegram, August 23, 1945, ibid, 511. 107. Bevin to Seymour, telegram, August 25, 1945, FO 371/46252, F5589/1147/G, 202. 108. Seymour to Bevin, telegram, August 26, 1945, FO 371/46253, F5452/1149/G, 13; Seymour to Bevin, August 27, 1945, ibid, F5865/1147/G, 51. 109. Chiang to Truman, quoted in Hurley to Byrnes, telegram, August 27, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 512–13. 110. Seymour to Bevin, telegram, August 29, 1945, FO 371/46253, F5997/1147/G, 110. 111. Keiji Furuya, Secret Records of President Chiang: Testimonial Words from Eight Decades of SinoJapanese Relations, vol. 14, 40. 112. Bevin to Seymour, telegram, August 31, 1945, FO 371/46253, F6064/1147/G, 176. 113. Tan, Disputes Concerning Macau’s Sovereignty between China and Portugal, 1553–1993, 210. 114. Fei, Macau 400 Years, 424–26. 115. Bohlen minutes, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, 567. 116. Harriman to Roosevelt, telegram, December 15, 1944, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, 378–79. 117. Minutes of Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, February 8, 1945, ibid, 769. 118. Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan, ibid, 984. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid. 121. Wei to Chiang, telegram, March 12, 1945, quoted in Liang, “The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945: The Inside Story,” 374. 122. Memorandum by Joseph C. Grew (Acting Secretary of State) to James Forrestal (Secretary of the Navy), May 12, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 869. 123. Henry L. Stimson (Secretary of War) to Grew, May 21, 1945, ibid, 876. 124. Wang Shih-chieh (Chairman of Main Office of the Military Affairs Commission) to Soong, telegram, May

137

Notes

22, 1945, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 2, 546. 125. Chiang to Soong, telegram, May 23, 1945, ibid, 547. 126. Minutes of conversations between Chiang and Petrov, June 3, 1945, ibid, 550, June 12, 1945, ibid, 559– 61. 127. Hurley to Byrnes, telegram, June 15, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 903. 128. Minutes of second conversation between Stalin and Soong, July 2, 1945, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 2, 576–90; see also Averell Harriman (Ambassador in the Soviet Union) to Truman and Byrnes, July 3, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 912. 129. Minutes of third conversation between Stalin and Soong, July 7, 1945, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 2, 601; Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 8, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 920. 130. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 8, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 920. 131. Chiang to Soong, telegram, July 6, 1945, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 2, 593–94. 132. Chiang to Soong, telegram, July 7, 1945, ibid, 596; Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 8, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 920–21. 133. Soong to Chiang, telegram, July 9, 1945, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 2, 609; Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, telegram, July 10, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 927. 134. Soong to Chiang, telegram, July 9, 1945, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 2, 609–10. 135. Minutes of fifth conversations between Stalin and Soong, July 11, 1945, ibid, 628–30. 136. Ibid; minutes of sixth conversation between Stalin and Soong, July 12, 1945, ibid, 632–33. 137. Quoted in Hurley to Byrnes, telegram, July 19, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 948–49. 138. Quoted in Truman to Hurley, telegram, July 23, 1945, ibid, 950. 139. Harriman to Byrnes, telegram, July 28, 1945, ibid, 950–51; Harriman to Byrnes, telegram, July 31, 1945, ibid, 953–54. 140. Harriman to Byrnes, telegram, July 31, 1945, ibid, 954. 141. Byrnes to Harriman, telegram, August 5, 1945, ibid, 955. 142. Hurley to Byrnes, telegram, July 29, 1945, ibid, 952–53.

138

Notes

143. Harriman to Byrnes, telegram, August 8, 1945, ibid, 958. 144. Memorandum of Conversation by George F. Kennan (Minister Counselor in the Soviet Union), Moscow, August 8, 1945, ibid, 960–61. 145. Chiang to Soong, telegram, August 13, 1945, Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, ser. 3. Wartime Diplomacy, vol. 2, 649. 146. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government, ed., Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 510. 147. Ibid, 512–15. 148. Ibid, 516–17. 149. Ibid, 518–20. 150. Ibid, 663. 151. Text, ibid, 1259–89. 152. Ren, “On the 1946 Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,” 17. 153. Ibid, 18. 154. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government, ed., Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 692. 155. U.S. draft of the treaty, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 7, 1274. 156. Article 2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government, ed., Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States, 1927–1957, 659–90. 157. Article 18, ibid, 704–5. 158. Article 16, ibid, 702. 159. Article 19, ibid, 708. 160. Article 24, 710. 161. Article 3, ibid, 691–92. 162. Ta Kung Pao (Tianjin), November 7, 1946. 163. Liberation Daily, February 4, 1947.

Chapter7 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

CPC Central Committee’s instructions on diplomatic work, January 19, 1949, Archive of the CPC Central Committee, ed., Selected Documents of the CPC Central Committee, vol. 18, 44. “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” March 5, 1949, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 4, 370. Archive of the CPC Central Committee, ed., Selected Documents of the CPC Central Committee, vol. 18, 283. Text of whole document, The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 1–20. Department of State press release, January 14, 1950, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, January 23, 1950, 119.

139

Notes

“The Sophistries, Slanders, and Threats of the U.S. Department of State” [Meiguo Guowuyuan de jiaobian, wulai he weixie 美國國務院的狡辯、誣賴和威脅 ], People’s Daily, January 19, 1950. 7. “Speech on Arrival at Moscow Train Station,” December 16, 1949, Leung and Kau, ed., The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976, vol. 2, 51. 8. Record of conversation between Stalin and Mao, December 16, 1949, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 5. 9. Ibid. 10. Pei ed., 1949–1956 Diplomatic History of the People’s Republic of China, 18. 11. Ibid. 12. Pavel F. Yudin’s record of conversation with Mao, March 31, 1956, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 165. 13. Ibid. 14. Record of first conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao, July 31, 1958, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Fall/Winter 2001, 255. 15. “Interview Given to TASS Correspondent in Moscow,” January 2, 1950, Leung and Kau, ed., The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976, 58. 16. Shi, At the Side of a Historical Giant: Memoirs of Shi Zhe, 440. 17. Ibid. 18. Mao’s telegram to CPC Central Committee, January 2, 1950, Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 1, 211. 19. Vyshinskii’s memorandum of conversation with Mao, January 6, 1950, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Winter 1996/1997, 231. 20. Record of conversation between Stalin and Mao, January 22, 1950, ibid, Winter 1995/1996, 7–8. 21. Ibid, 8. 22. Ibid, 8. 23. Wu, Memories and Thoughts, 241. 24. Record of conversation between Stalin and Mao, January 22, 1950, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 8–9. 25. Wu, Memories and Thoughts, 237. 26. “Part of the Russian Archival Documents on the Sino-Soviet Treaty Negotiations in 1950.” 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Text, see Heinzig’s translation in The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance, 357. 30. Vyshinskii’s letter to Stalin, February 1, 1950, quoted in ibid. 31. Vyshinskii’s letter to Stalin, February 2, 1950, in “Russian Archival Materials on the Sino-Soviet Treaty Negotiations, December 1949–February 1950.” Vyshinskii’s letter to Stalin, February 2, 1950, quoted in Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance, 358. 32. Ibid. 6.

140

Notes

33. Vyshinskii’s letter to Stalin, February 1950, quoted in Wingrove, “Mao in Moscow, 1945–50: Some New Archival Evidence”. 34. Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance, 359. 35. Attachment of Vyshinskii’s letter to Stalin, February 12, 1950, quoted in ibid, 348–49. 36. Yang, “The Initial Clashes of National Interests and National Sentiments Between China and the Soviet Union”. For example, see Yudin’s record of conversation with Mao, March 31, 1956, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Winter 1996/1997, 166; Minutes of conversation between Mao and Yudin, July 22, 1958, ibid, 155; “Talks at the Chengdu Conference,” March 10, 1958, Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 7, 108–25. 37. “Soviet-Chinese Treaty and Agreements Are Concluded in Moscow,” USSR Information Bulletin 10, (4) (1950), 110. 38. Ibid, 108. 39. Mao to Liu Shaoqi, telegram, February 12, 1950, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Winter 1996/1997, 236. 40. Shi, At the Side of a Historical Giant: Memoirs of Shi Zhe, 380. 41. Yu and Liu, ed., Hong Kong in the 20th Century, 245. 42. “A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.” [Ping Meiguo Gongchandang shengming 評 美 國 共 產 黨 聲 明 ], People’s Daily, March 8, 1963; English translation published in Peking Review, March 15, 1963, 61. 43. “The Downtrodden People Would Stand Up One Day,” August 9, 1963, Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong, 502. 44. Huang Hua to Chairman of Special Committee on Decolonization, UN Doc. A/AC 109/396 (1972). 45. PRC Constitution, c. 1, art. 31. 46. Wang, The Reversion of Hong Kong, 37. 47. “Our Basic Position on the Question of Hong Kong,” conversation between Deng and Thatcher, September 24, 1982, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1982–1992, vol. 3, 23. 48. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: China, September 28, 1982, W7. 49. Jin Fu, “China’s Recovery of Xianggang (Hong Kong Area) Fully Accords with International Law,” Beijing Review, September 26, 1983, 14. 50. “One Country, Two Systems,” summation of separate talks with members of a Hong Kong industrial and commercial delegation including Sze-yuen Chung, June 22 and 23, 1984, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1982–1992, vol. 3, 68. 51. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 489. 52. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Cap. 2301, annex 1.

141

Notes

53. Tan, Disputes Concerning Macau’s Sovereignty between China and Portugal, 1553–1993, 266. 54. Joint declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Portuguese Republic on the Question of Macau, UN Treaty Series, vol. 1498, 229.

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149

Index Allies 56, 60, 63–64, 67, 69–70, 79, 82, 107 Amoy 52–53, 132 Anti-Japanese National Salvation Program 60 Attlee, Clement 89, 137 Axis Powers 63

Dalian (Dairen / Dalny) 40, 92–93, 96–97, 99–100, 113–14, 117 Denmark 5–6, 10, 15, 43, 75, 78 Department of State 25, 29–30, 34, 36, 59, 62, 66–67, 72, 74–75, 108, 140 Diplomatic Quarter 71, 74

Brazil 17–18, 26, 43, 45, 78 Byrnes, James F. 89, 137–39

Eden, Anthony 67, 69, 74–75, 82–83, 85, 135–36 extraterritorial jurisdiction 34, 62, 65 extraterritoriality 16–26, 30, 34, 40, 49, 57– 61, 64–67, 78, 128–31, 133–34, 145, 147

Cairo Conference 80, 86, 136 Central Plains War 30–31 Chamberlain, Austen 19, 128 Chiang Ching-kuo 94, 98 Chiang Kai-shek 8, 30–31, 53, 57, 60–61, 70, 93–95, 102, 143 China theater 86, 88–90 Chinese Changchun Railway 99–100, 109, 113–17 Chinese Eastern Railway 92, 96, 100 Chinese government Nationalist government 2–3, 5–6, 8–12, 15, 36, 41, 56–58, 62–63, 78, 90–91, 96–97, 101–3, 127–28, 135, 139 PRC government 107–8, 121–24 Churchill, Winston 61, 80, 86–87, 92 coasting trade 73–77 Common Program 107 Coolidge, Calvin 127 Communist Party of China (CPC) 77, 96, 103, 106–7, 111, 116, 118, 139, 143 Court, Supreme 29 courts, district 27, 30–31, 36, 38, 45, 47 CPC Central Committee 107, 112, 120, 135, 139–40, 143

Far East 17, 61–62, 64, 67, 82, 92–93, 99, 115–16, 148–49 Guangzhou 20, 30–31, 34–36, 39–40, 74, 76, 86 Hague 21, 29–30 Hamilton, Maxwell M. 64, 65, 133–34 Hankou 29–31, 34–36, 40, 54 Harbin 24, 27–28, 30–31, 36, 38 Harcourt, C. H. J. 90 Harriman, W. Averell 92, 98–99, 137–39 Henderson, Arthur 23, 24, 33–36, 38, 130– 131 Hong Kong 81, 82, 86–90, 118–24, 137, 141, 146–47. See also New Territories Special Administrative Region 123–24 Hornbeck, Stanley K. 17, 25, 28–29, 32, 35, 62, 129–30 Hull, Cordell 57, 62, 69, 74–75, 133–35, 148 Hurley, Patrick J. 87, 94, 98, 137–38

151

Index

Jurisdiction civil 27–28, 30, 40–41 criminal 27–28, 30, 33–36, 40–41 Kellogg, Frank B. 6–10, 17, 127 Koo, Wellington 42, 56, 83, 136, 143 Kowloon 75, 79, 81–84, 86, 88, 119 Kunming 29–30, 36 Kuomintang (KMT) 2–3, 17, 26, 54, 58, 60, 72, 77, 110, 112, 128, 133, 145 Kuril Islands 92, 109 Lampson, Miles W. 17, 19–21, 27–31, 33– 36, 38, 48–49, 51–52, 128–31 League of Nations 21, 23, 148 Legislative Yuan 91, 102 likin 8, 13–14 Liugongdao 48–50 Macau 90–91, 120, 124–25, 137, 142, 149 Special Administrative Region 125 MacMurray, John Van Antwerp 6–8, 10, 18, 21, 127, 129, 147 Manchuria 35, 40–41, 57, 69, 80, 88, 93–99, 116–17 Manchukuo 57–58, 60, 113 Manzhouli 115 Mao Zedong 106, 140 Mayling Soong Chiang 66 Mikoyan, Anastas 109–11, 115–16, 118 Molotov, Vyacheslav 112–13, 116 Moscow 94, 98, 109–12, 116, 139, 141, 149 most favored nation treatment conditional 101 unconditional 101–2 Mukden Incident 39, 41–42, 56, 61, 130– 131, 144

152

National People’s Convention 35–38 national tariff 3, 7, 13–15 national treatment 72, 75, 77, 101–3 New Territories 81–82, 84, 120–121. See also Hong Kong Northern Expedition 51, 54, 131, 144 Norway 12, 17–18, 22, 42–43, 45, 60, 78 Oudendijk, William, J. 43, 131 Outer Mongolia 69, 95, 99–100 Petrov, Appolon A. 94, 138 Political Consultative Conference 103, 107, 111, 139 Port Arthur 40, 92–97, 99–100, 109–10, 112–14, 116–17 Portugal 5–6, 10, 15, 43, 75, 78, 124–25, 137, 142, 145 Potsdam 97 PRC (People’s Republic of China) 106–7, 109, 114, 117–19, 122–24 Roosevelt, Franklin 70, 80, 86, 92, 133, 137 Seymour, Horace James 66, 74, 82–86, 89– 90, 135–37 Shanghai International Settlement 36, 45, 47, 53 Shanghai Mixed Court 43 Shanghai Provisional Court 18, 43–44 Shigemitsu, Mamoru 39, 40, 41, 131, 145 Sino-British Joint Declaration 123–24 Sino-Japanese War, Second 55–57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85 Soong, T. V. 8–10, 42, 66, 82–86, 88, 94–98, 134, 137–39 South Manchuria Railway 40, 92, 96, 100 Stalin, Joseph 92, 94–99, 109–14, 116–17,

Index

138, 140–141 Stimson, Henry Lewis 34, 129–31

treaty revision 10, 12, 39, 42, 52, 57, 62, 64 Truman, Harry S. 89, 93–94, 97, 137–38

tariff autonomy 5, 8–10, 14–15, 53 control 4–5 negotiations 8, 14, 39 revenue 58 treaties 10, 13–14 territories colonial 119–20 inland 16 leased 5, 40, 53, 67, 75, 81–82, 85, 88, 94 Thatcher, Margaret 121–23, 141, 148 Tianjin 28, 30–31, 34–36, 38–40, 60, 74, 76, 98, 139 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and the Republic of China 100–101, 139, 145 of Friendship and Alliance between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China 91, 109, 137 of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China 114, 116, 117, 147 of Amity between Brazil and the Republic of China 78 Relating to the Abolition of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Settlement of Related Issues with the BelgiumLuxembourg Economic Union 78 for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China: Sino–Canadian 78; Sino–Norwegian 78; Sino–Swedish 78 of Amity and Commerce: Sino–Belgian 10; Sino–Italian 10; Sino–Portuguese 10; Sino–Spanish 10; Sino–Danish 10

United Nations 63, 65, 69, 80, 90, 119 Wang Chonghui 20, 39, 47, 58, 83, 85, 135 Wang Huacheng 102 Wang Jingwei 60, 76, 78 Weihaiwei 43, 48–51, 132 Willkie, Wendell L. 70, 134, 149 Yalta Agreement 91, 93–95, 110 Yalta Conference 91–92, 112 Zhou Enlai 66, 110, 112

153

A Thorough Review of China’s Endeavors to Abrogate Unequal Treaties “Unequal treaties” — the result of China’s unsuccessful defense against foreign aggression in the final century of imperial rule — forced China to grant foreign powers access to treaty ports and inland waters, tariff authority, land leases, concessions, extraterritoriality, and troop presence, severely damaging China’s sovereignty. Unequal Treaties and China reviews Republican and Communist China’s endeavors to abrogate and reverse the damaging legacy of unequal treaties amidst the power changes in the warlord-dominated government in Beijing, the national unification efforts of the Southern revolutionary government, and the ascendancy of the Chinese Communist Party, with detailed and solid materials researched from domestic and foreign records. Volume 2 covers the Nanjing Nationalist Government’s regime from 1928 to its fall and the years from 1949 when the PRC was established to 1999 when Macau was recovered with emphatic highlights of: • The achievements gained through the so-called “revolutionary diplomacy” — the recovery of tariff autonomy, the reconstruction of the Shanghai Provisional Court, and the rendition of Weihaiwei and other concessions

• The U.S. and British initiative to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights and conclude new treaties with China, the resumption of British rule in Hong Kong, and the conclusion of two controversial treaties with the United States and the Soviet Union at the close of WWII • The PRC government’s foreign policy, the abolition of the controversial treaty with the Soviet Union, and the return of Hong Kong and Macau

Wang Jianlang is the President and Dean of the Graduate School at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, specializing in the modern history of China’s foreign relations. He recently served as the Secretary-General of the Association of Chinese Historians. His major works include The International Relations of the Far East from 1937 to 1945 and The Diplomatic Strategy and Foreign Policy of the KMT Government after the Outbreak of the Pacific War. Chinese Historical Studies