The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Cooperation 0807815071, 9780807815076

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Introduction
Part I. Dual Policies: The Limits of Anglo-American Co-operation during a Period of Diplomatic Uncertainty, May 1937-May 1940
1. Doubts, Hopes and Fears: The State of Anglo-American Relations in the Late 1930s
2. The Diplomacy of Deterrence, October 1938-August 1939
3. Between Peace and War, September 1939-May 1940
Part II. Commitments and Dependence: The
Development of Anglo-American Relations during a Period of Global Crisis, May 1940 - March 1941
4. Britain Alone, May - July 1940
5. Americaa Destroyers, the British Fleet and the Defence of the English-Speaking World, July - October 1940
6. Lend-Lease, October 1940-March 1941
7. Getting ‘Mixed Up Together': Anglo-American Diplomacy
and Strategy in Early 1941
Part III. The Common-Law Alliance: Its Character and Development from Lend-Lease to Pearl Harbor, March-December 1941
8. War ln Masquerade: Roosevelt’s Limited, Undeclared War against Hitler
9. The Road to Pearl Harbor and Singapore
10. A New Deal for the World? Planning the Post-War Order,
1940-41
Epilogue and Conclusion: Competitive Co-operation
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

THE CREATION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE 1937-41 A Study in Competitive Co-operation

THE CREATION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE 1937-41 A Study in Competitive Co-operation D A V ID R E Y N O L D S

The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill

Published in the United States, 1982, by The University of N orth Carolina Press By arrangement with Europa Publications Ltd. © David Reynolds, 1981 Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication D ata Reynolds, David, 1952The creation o f the Anglo-American alliance, 1937-41. Bibliography: p. 373 Includes index. 1. World War, 1939-1945—Diplomatic history. 2. Great Britain—Foreign relations— 1936-1945. 3. G reat Britain—Foreign relations—United States. 4. United States—Foreign relations—Great Britain. I. Title. D750.R48 1982 ISBN 0-8078-1507-1

940.53’22’41

81-16503 AACR2

Printed and bound in England by Staples Printers Rochester Limited at The Stanhope Press

To My Three Rs—L, M, and MP

One o f the principles o f m y politics will always be to promote the good under­ standing between the English speaking communities. A t the same time alliances nowadays are useless . . . As long as the interests o f two nations coincide and as fa r as they coincide - they are and will be allies. But when they diverge they will cease to be allies. . . . Alliances uncemented by mutual interest are not worth the papers they are written on. Winston S. Churchill, 1898 [The United States]. . . will probably become what we are now, the head servant in the great household o f the World, the employer o f all employed; because her service will be the most and ablest. We have no more title against her than Venice, or Genoa, or Holland, has had against us. One great duty is entailed upon us, which we, unfortunately, neglect, - the duty o f preparing, by a resolute and sturdy effort, to reduce our public burdens, in preparation fo r a day when we shall probably have less capacity than we have now to bear them. William Ewart Gladstone, 1878 Time's wrong-way telescope will show a minute man ten years hence and by distance simplified. Keith Douglas, 1941

CONTENTS Acknowledgements Abbreviations Introduction

xi xiii 1

PART I Dual Policies: The Limits of Anglo-American Co-operation during a Period of Diplomatic Uncertainty, May 1937-May 1940 1. Doobts, Hopes and Fears: The State o f Anglo-American Relations in the Late 1930s A. B. C. - O. —E.

The British predicament British policy towards the U.S.A.—doubt, hope and fear Chamberlain, Eden and the U.S.A., 1937-38 American images of Britain Towards a coherent foreign policy—the United States, 1937-38 F. The Czech crisis, March-September 1938

7 7 10 16 23 25 33

2. The Diplomacy of Deterrence, October 1938-August 1939

37

A. —B. C. D.

37 40 44

Britain’s deterrent diplomacy American rearmament for Western defence, 1938-39 British policy on U.S. involvement in Europe Roosevelt's failure to revise the Neutrality Act, summer 1939 E. The problem of Japan, 1938-39

3. Between Peace and War, September 1939-May 1940 A. A phoney w ar? B. Washington—the politics and diplomacy of double-edged neutrality C. London: continued doubts, hopes and fears about the U.S.A. - D. Churchill, Roosevelt and Chamberlain E. Towards greater reliance upon America

54 58 63 63 64 73 83 88

PART II Commitments and Dependence: The Development of Anglo-American Relations during a Period of Global Crisis, May 1040-March 1941 4. Britain Alone, May-July 1940

95

vii

CONTENTS

A. Britain looks to America as the French collapse B. Churchill and the hope o f imminent U.S. entry into the war C. Backing Britain—the debate in Washington D. American destroyers and the British fleet

96 102 108 113

C 5. Americaa Destroyers, the British Fleet and the Defence of the English-Speaking World, July-October 1940

121

A. The Destroyers Deal, August 1940 B. The Pacific crisis and the drift towards world war C. The changing balance

121 132 143

6. Lend-Lease, October 1940-March 1941

143

A. Waiting for Roosevelt, October-December 1940 B. ‘An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States* C. Scraping the bottom of the barrel, March 1941

143 133 161

7. Getting ‘Mixed Up Together*: Anglo-American Diplomacy and Strategy in Early 1941

169

A. B. C. D.

The West Indian bases The changing texture o f Anglo-American relations The ABC staff talks, January-M arch 1941 Anglo-American diplomacy and the European neutrals

169 173 182 186

PART in The Common-Law Alliance: Its Character and Development from Lend-Lease to Pearl Harbor, March-December 1941 8. W ar la Masquerade: Roosevelt’s Limited, Undeclared W ar against Hitler A. B. C. D. E.

The spring crisis Russia—respite or turning point? Problems o f strategy and supply Towards limited, undeclared war ‘In the same boat*

9. The Rood to Pearl Harbor and Singapore A. Containing Japan: strategy, January-June 1941 B. Containing Japan: diplomacy, spring 1941 C. Tightening the screw on Japan: the Indochina crisis, July-August 1941 D. Time runs out: autumn 1941 E. Conclusion

viii

193 193 204 208 213 220 222 222 229 233 240 247

CONTENTS

10. A New Deal for the World? Planning the Post-War Order, 1940-41 — A. •—B: C. D.

First discussions of war aims, 1940-41 The ‘special relationship* and the problem o f security Towards a new economic order Leadership and the new international order

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION Competitive Co-operation A. Epilogue — B. Conclusion

251 252 261 269 280 283 283 286

Notes

295

Bibliography

373

Index

391

ACKNOW LEDGEMENTS My interest in Anglo-American relations grew out of a year o f study and travel in the U.S.A. in 1973-74. This book represents the fruit of over five years of subsequent work. The debts of gratitude I have accumulated during that time are too numerous to catalogue here, but I should like to acknow­ ledge a few of them particularly. In its preliminary states, as a Ph.D. dissertation, my work benefited from the wise counsel and careful reading of my supervisor, Professor F. H. Hinsley. I am also grateful to D r J. A. Thompson and D r H. B. Ryan for many hours of stimulating discussion, to Professor Frank Freidel and D r Jonathan Steinberg for much kindness and advice, and to my dissertation examiners, Professors A. E. Campbell and H. G. Nicholas, for their helpful criticisms. Professor Donald W att read an early version and gave me an opportunity to develop my ideas in seminar and conference papers, as did Professor Arnold Offner. Professors Warren Kimball and Bradford Lee scrutinized the final manuscript and offered many valuable suggestions. Financially, I am grateful to H.M. Department of Education and Science for a three-year studentship, and to the Master and Fellows of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, who appointed me a Research Fellow in 1978.1 have also been generously assisted by the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Idlewild Trust. Two Harvard research institutes—the Center for European Studies in 1977 and the Charles Warren Center in 1980—have provided stimulating and hospitable bases for my work in the U.S.A. In the course of my research I have visited numerous libraries and archives on both sides of the Atlantic. In each case I have found the librarians most helpful, but 1 should like to single out D r William Emerson and hisstaff atthe Roosevelt Library who make visits to Hyde Park so pleasant and worthwhile. For permission to quote from papers in their charge I am grateful to: the Baker Library, Harvard Business School; the Beaverbrook Foundation and the House of Lords Record Office; Birmingham University; the British Library of Political and Economic Science; Lady Ford; Lord Halifax and Major T. L. Ingram; H on. John Harvey and the British Library; the Houghton Library, Harvard University; Lord Linlithgow; Lord Lothian; the Trustees o f the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich; M r P. E. Paget; Lady Catherine Peake; Reading University; Yale University. If there are any other copyright holders whom I should have contacted, I hope they will accept this apology. Extracts from Crown Copyright documents appear by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office. I should like to thank those who allowed me to interview them, especially Aubrey and Constance Morgan for their interest, hospitality and friendship.

xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My appreciation also goes to Patricia Denault and Patricia McCullagh for their help in typing the manuscript. My greatest debts are inadequately recorded in the dedication. My parents, M arian and Leslie Reynolds, have been an unfailing source of love and guidance over the years. My wife Margaret—who represents my more personal interest in Anglo-American relations—has encouraged me, borne with my preoccupations and subjected all that I have written to an invaluable critical eye, despite the pressures of her own work. To my 'three Rs’ this book is gratefully dedicated.

ABBREVIATIONS The following abbreviations appear frequently in text or notes. For others see bibliography, especially sections I and U. D/S F.D .R . FO FO/A FO/FE FRU S H C Debs. HM G MEW MOI NC NEI W.S.C.

Department o f State (U.S.A.). Franklin D. Roosevelt. Foreign Office (G.B.). Foreign Office, American Department. Foreign Office, Far Eastern Department. Foreign Relations o f the United States. House o f Commons, Debates. His Majesty’s Government. Ministry o f Economic Warfare (G.B.) Ministry of Information (G.B.). Neville Chamberlain. Netherlands East Indies. Winston S. Churchill.

Except for peripheral references, books and articles are identified in the notes only by author and brief title. Full details of all works cited may be found in the bibliography.

XIII

INTRODUCTION [Churchill's] six huge volumes on the Second World War require the most careful assessment and one not yet made: soon however the scholars must get to work and what a task they will have!

,

,

,

,

J. H. Plumb, 1969 As the records become available the heroic simplicities o f the Second World War crumble away.

Michael Howard, I9781

Since its publication between 1948 and I9S4 Sir Winston Churchill's massive history, The Second World War, has guided the thinking of historians. As J. H. Plumb put it: 'They move down the broad avenues which he drove through war's confusion and complexity.'2 One of Churchill's most im­ portant themes was that of a ‘special relationship' between the British Commonwealth and the United States. He viewed their wartime alliance as the political expression of an underlying cultural unity—'the English-speaking peoples’—with the U.S.A. cast almost as the prodigal son within this great family of nations. The special relationship, according to Churchill, was the principal force for world order and peace. Despite their co-operation in the Great War, Britain and America had foolishly gone their separate ways in the 1920s and 1930s, thereby facilitating Hitler's rise to power. Their renewed alliance had been the basis of victory in 1945, and this time, Churchill argued, they must remain in partnership to secure the peace against the new totalitarian threat posed by Soviet Russia. In this way Britain could remain a great power, admittedly no longer in solitary splendour, but at least in concert with her kin across the seas. In the last decade Churchill's interpretation of the War has been keenly scrutinized by a new generation of scholars, aided by the recently opened official archives, and, unlike Churchill, not protagonists in the events they describe. Their work may lack the immediacy of contemporary accounts but, as compensation, it displays a new detachment and sense of long-term perspective. For example, earlier writers on British foreign policy in the 1930s concentrated on the failure to control Hitler, often seeking to apportion blame for the 'folly of appeasement'. Recent historians have gone beyond these 'Eurocentric' and 'Guilty Men' preoccupations to show that the German problem in the 1930s was part of a global dilemma facing British leaders, that their response to it must be set in the context of Britain's gradual decline as a world power, and that, despite significant differences of opinion, appeasement was not the brainchild of a misguided few but the consensus of

THE CREATION OP THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

opinion in Whitehall.3 Concurrently, U.S. historians have subjected the old myths about American isolation to close examination. During the inter-war years officials in Washington often used foreign economic policy as their main instrument of diplomacy—one that seemed appropriate to America's limited overseas interests and to domestic political constraints. Much of this work has been on the 1920s, but studies of the 1930s have shown clearly the heightened commercial rivalry between Britain and the U.S., as the two countries adopted different policies in response to the Depression.4 This undercurrent of transatlantic rivalry has also been discerned as a theme in wartime diplomacy. Another group of writers has examined the AngloAmerican negotiations on such matters as grand strategy, economic policy and decolonization, noting the frequent arguments and revealing some of the limits of the Grand Alliance.3 This is the starting point for my own work. First, much of the recent research has focused either on the late 1930s or on the period 1941-45.* This book tries to fill the gap by offering an account of Anglo-American relations from the r>f IQ^7 “ ntil December 1941, and particularly from Munich to Pearl Harbor. Although not a comprehensive narrative—the archives are too vast for that—it discusses most of the major events, diplo­ matic, military and economic, drawing on my own research in British and American archives and on the studies of other scholars. This account con­ stitutes the framework, secondly, for a deeper exploration of the nature of the relationship. Whereas earlier writing on the subject was prone to sentimentality, the recent work has emphasized and even exaggerated the h o stility anH