World War II in the Philippines: The Visayas, Palawan, Mindoro, Masbate, Mindanao and Sulu [6] 9715420869

Table of contents :
Contents
Part I: Historical Narrative
1 - The Peace is Disturbed
2 - The Philippine Defense Posture
3 - The USAFFE Deployment
4 - The VMF at War
5 - The Chief Justice is Killed
6 - The VMF Surrenders
7 - "I Have Returned"
8 - Mindoro
9 - Liberating the By-passed Islands
10 - Mindanao
11 - Pictorial Review
Part II: The Visayan-Mindano Force Defense of the Philippines
Introduction
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part III: The Guerrilla Movement
Panay Guerrillas
Negros Guerrillas
Cebu Guerrillas
Bohol Guerrillas
Leyte Guerrillas
Samar Guerrillas
Palawan Guerrillas
Mindoro Guerrillas
Masbate Guerrillas
Mindanao Guerrillas
Sulu Guerrillas
Part IV: Allied Intelligence, Demolition and Supply Penetrations from Australia and America
Introduction
The Planet Party
Part 1 - Enemy
Part 2 - Friendly Forces
Part 3 - Civil Affairs (Occupied Areas)
Part 4 - Civil Affairs (Unoccupied Areas)
Part 5 - Intelligence Nets
Part 6 - Miscellaneous
Part V: The Military War Dead
6th Military District (Panay, Romblon, Palawan)
7th Military District
Cebu Area Command
Leyte Area Command
10th Military District
Palawan Special Battalion
Epilogue
Notes
Appendices
6th Military District Order of Battle as of 25 Apr 1945
7th Military District Order of Battle as of Mar 1945
10th Military District Order of Battle
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

I

\

t

) n

VFP Veterans Federation of the Philippines (Chartered under Republic Act No. 2640)

r...i

't *,

World War

II in the Philippines

THE VISAYAS, PAJ,AWAT{, MINDORO, MASBATE, MINDAI\AOAI\D SULU

by

Fernando

R

Reyes

Leornrdo Q. Nuval

2S266 f,

H*d-

-fiffi H,.[CE

I-g ffi frH$l ffi

VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila 1996

**-

Copyright 1996 by the Veterans Federation of the Philippines.

All rights reserved.

f;l' I 6 a* .{tLF ' W"rtolt

{aal lgtot

b

Lt'4

)

.

ISBN 971-542-086-9 (6-vol. set, ISBN

97 L'542'087 -7)

I

DEDICATION

il

To the memory

of

Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos, Sr, of the Commoru,ealth of the Philippines, the most distinguished Filipino executed by the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II. Supreme Court

FOREWORD This is the sixth and final volurne of the book series wor]d war II in the Philippines. with this, the presentation of the war as it happened in the country and seen by the Filipino eye is completed.

The facts of the debacle have been objectively presented in the six (6) volumes so that now, academicians, history rovers and buffs can make their unbridled analysis and interpretation of that unique national experience. After all, it is said that history is a systemati..".oidirg or account of what have happened in the life of a people, country or institution. The Federation is gratefur to ar the authors and pubiishers mentioned in the Bibliography sections of the books for providing us pertinent and relevant information that went into our project. similarly, to all surviving Filipino veterans and knowledgeable civilians who gave first-person accounts or rent their precious private collections.

Finally, the surviving Filipino veterans, jointly with our American GI counterparts during that war, proudly say again We Done It!

Emmanuel V. de President Veterans Federation of the Philippines

Manila

July

1996

fi

ACKNOWLEDGMENT It may not seem possible to list all who and what made contributions to the preparation of this book. But it is incumbent upon the authors to make acknowledgments. The thesis of Professor Rosalie Baccay Faderon of the Institute of Library science, University of the phirippines guided us to secondary source materials. Through the use of the materials, the authors were able to locate persons and documents to validate some of the information gathered. To the authors and publishers of the books in the Bibliography, we give our unending gratefulness. Similarly, to those who were primary sources.

surviving veterans of the sulu Guerrillas, captain calvin cavanata and Technical sergeant Mahmud H. Bagis, provided valuable experience summaries that went into this l-.ook.

our research and writing associates performed exceedingly us since summer of 1993 so that their knowledge of recorded events is unbroken. They are Ma. Theresa B. Arpa (BA Philosophy, cJ, 19g8, Up) and ivy plaza (BA Philosophy, mc/, 1gg3, Up). They are now in their senior year at the College of Law, University of the philippines.

well' They have been with

The authors take responsibility for ail interpretations

made, conclusions drawn and errors of omission.

frr-lqn Manila

I

July

1996

I

CONTENTS

Part I Historical Narrative 1.

2. o.

4. 5. 6.

The Peace is Disturbed The Philippine Defense Posture The US$FE Deployment' The VMF at War The Chief Justice is Killed The VMF Surenders

"I

Have Returned." 8. Mindoro 9. Liberating the By-passed Islands l-0. Mindanao 11. Pictorial Review 7.

Part

21 OD

d t-)

35 ,1

I

43 47 61 71

II

The Visayan-Mindanao Force Defense of the Philippines ...............

Part

5 7 15

91

III

The Guerrilla Movement

L43

. Panay Guerrillas (6th Military District, PA)

145

(7th Military District, PA)

155

(8th Military District, PA)

t79

r Negros Guerrillas

. Cebu Guerrillas .

Bohol Guerrillas

189

. Leyte Guerrillas (9th Military District, PA)

. Samar Guerrillas

..

193

203

. PalawanGuerrillas

209

o Mindoro o Masbate

2L9

2t5

Guerrillas Guerrillas . Mindanao Guerrillas ( 10th Military District) . SuIu Guerrillas

223 25L

Part IV Allied Intelligence, Demolition and Supply Penetrations from America and

. Introduction

Australia ....'...........

...........

The Planet Party Charles Parsons o The Cruz Mission............. o The Silent Service, US Navy ..'....

o

.

257

259 261 353 359

373

Part V The Military trIar Dead ...

379

o

381 425 455 457 459 461

Epilogue Notes

463 465

Panay Guerrillas '. Negros Guerrillas Cebu Guerrillas . Leyte Guerrillas . Mindanao Guerrillas .............'. o Palawan Guerrillas

Appendices Bibliography Index

ILLUSTRATIONS Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos, Sr. ..... The initial Japanese landings in 1941 Intelligence missions from Australia and America in 1943

7t 72 73

The ailing President Quezon and some of his cabinet members in the Commonwealth Government

in-exile

74

The Honolulu Conference among President Roosevelt, Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur on JuIy 26, L944 The Leyte landings in October L944. Dotted lines show the preassault Ranger operations ............ Old Glory is hauled up a coconut tree by a GI shortly . after conquering a Leyte beach area .......... General MacArthur and Admiral Barbey inspect a Leyte beach after wading from their landing craft. Note their wet lower gear. (upper pic) General MacArthur turns over to President Osmefla the Philippine Government in brief ceremonies

at the Leyte Provincial Capitol in Tacloban. (lower pic) .......... Japanese prisoners-of-war captured'in the Leyte operations The Amerisan landing on White Beach, Mindoro in December 1944 ........

At center is

75 76 77

78

78 79 80

Japanese Vice Admiral Shigeru

Fukudomei, prisoner of the Cebu Guerillas Civilian Volunteer Guard Ricardo Bolo ofbarrio Balud,

San Fernando, Cebu, rescuer-captor

of

81

the

Japanese admiial

The American landing at Talisay, Cebu . Aerial photo of Cebu City showing relative positions of

81 82

Talisay, the Reservoir and Go Chan Hill, represented left to right respectively by three

vertical lines .........

h.--

82

The Puerto Princesa oPeration How Cebu City was captured by the Americai Division ' " ' How the Central Visayan Islands were cleared and liberated by the Ameriians, aided extensively by Filipino guerrillas in Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohoi The Zamboanga operation to clear and liberate the are4......... American troops advance towards Fort Pikit aboard a landing craft on the Mindanao River American troops pursue the enemy on the Sayre Highway. Note physical nature of the highway The frnal American and guerrilla operations in Eastern Mindanao A howitzer is ferried by aerial cable across a gorge of the Sayre HighwaY General MacArthur poses in Darwin, Australia with three American officer-POWs who escaped from the

Davao Penai Colony aided by the Mindanao

Guerrillas The Japanese surrender ceremonies in Tokyo Bay, above, and in Baguio City, below

/

83 84

85 86 87 87

88 89

89 90

Ulorld Llttr

Il

in the Philippine^t

THE VISAYAS, PAI,A\ryAI{, MINDORO, IVIASBATE, MINDAI{AOAI\D SULU

,

Part I Historical NarrativeE The Peace is Disturbed The Philippine Defense Posture The

US$FE Deployment

4.

The VMF at War

5.

The Chief Justice is Killed

6.

The VMF Surrenders

7.

"I Have

8.

Mindoro

9.

Liberating the By-passed Islands

10.

Returned"

Mindanao

Pictorial Review

I

the peace is disturbcd

/

5

1

The Peace is Disturbed Manila, Monday December 8, 7941. Shortly after B:00

a.m., the telephones at Number 1, Victoria Street, Intramuros, Manila startecl ringing. The place was then the headquarters of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, USAFFE for short, the new command of Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur.

A half hour later, an American army signalman, listening to a california radio station while on watch or duty rushed to the duty officer and relayed the broadcast he heard - the Japanese have juet bombed Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.

Brigadier General Richard Sutherland, MacArthur,s Chief of staff, called up General MacArthur at the Manila Hotel penthouse where he lived and relayed the whole thing. In astonishment, MacArthur exclaimed, opearl Harbor! It shoulil be our strongest'poiat!" At B:40 a.fr., a call from Washington D.C., from the Chief of the Army,s War plans Division, confirmed the news. It was then December T at pearl Harbor. From Baguio City in North Luzon, president Manuel L. Quezon, answering a call from Manila by Jorge Vargas, his Executive Secr:etary and who had just relayed the news, saicl in a high-pitched tone, oGeorge, where diit you get that nonsense?"

(i i l'lll.l Vls\\,\:,

l'\1,\\\',\N

Nll Jl)rrli|,

\l \'l l\ll"

Nll\l l)\ I \(t \Nl) rllll,l

Elsewhere in the country, the following acts of enemy aggression marked that fateful day: a

At dawn, an engineering detachment of the Japanese army steaithily took to the shores of Baluarte Bay in

Batan Island, Batanes Group and promptly seized and occupied the undefended Basco airfield;

b. At about 8:30 that morning,

a forrnation of seventeen (17) Japanese warplanes approaching frorn the general westerly direction dropped 117 bombs on the American Rest and Recreation Center of Camp John Hay, Baguio City killing 1 American-and 10 Filipino soldiers;

c. At noontime, an a\&'esolne fleet of Japanese warplanes new Mitsubishi bombers and 84 Zeroes '- roar-ing108 over the Bashi Channel in b(orth Luzort, winged

their way towards Clark Fieid, Pampanga and the fighter piarne airfiei,j[ in Iba, Zambales. ]'iftv-four Mitsubishi and 56 Zeroes blerv to bits all of the 16 P40s at Iba together with the ground radar operat,or and his set. At Clark Field, the Japanese main target, the damage inflicted by the attackers was so extensive that Clark was left "uttrecognizable." Ali the hangars had been demolished, the parked aircraft reduced to "tor-

tured and charred skeietons." It is said that the

Japanese could hardlv believe their very good fortune *- their prey, parked and bunched together, wing tips almost touching. Significantly, the Far East Air Force of N{acArthur was wiped out in the first hours of the war. Philippine skies were ceded to the enemy; and

d. In the first moments of dawn, Manila learned that Malag in Davao r,ras being hit by enelny aircrafl.

The day was one of sorrows for the new nation, largely Roman Catholic, as she prepared once again to celebrate the Feast Day of the Lady of the Immaculate Conception.

the philippine defense posture

I

7

2

The Philippine Defense Posture When the war broke out on December 8, 1941, the Commonwealth of the Phiiippines was in no way prepared for it of any scale, ?try duration.

-

The Japanese aggression caught the country while she was mobilizing her defense reserves. How trained, equipped and ready for battie were these reserves?

The Developing Philippine Army The Commonwealth of the Philippines was inaugurated on November 15, 1935 with Manuel Luis Quezon installed as its first President. Vice President was Sergio Osmefla. The military parade was made up of eiements of the United States Ar*y and Navy, the Philippine C)onstabulary and ROTC cadets of the University of the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila and Letran College. In his inaugural speech, Quezon was emphatic about goodwill towards all nations as the golden rule

of his administration.

On that day too, Quezon issued Executive Orders 1 and 2, t}ae former requiring all government officiais to take an oath of allegiance and support the Philippine Constitution, and the latter, his assumption of command over all armed forces of the Commonwealth.

fi /'t'It,) \ t:i,\\:\S l',\t,,\\\',\N.

Nl

lNl)r)li1), Nl,\slii\'l'1,1.

N]

INI)\N,\()i\Nl) slrl,lr

The National Assembly, with minimum changes, passed the National Defense biil on December 20 and Quezon signed it into law as the National Defense Act on the following day. Thus was laid the document that would start the build-up of the defense forces of the Philippines. The defense plan would be supervised by the then American Military Mission to the Philippines headed by retired General Douglas MacArthur assisted by Lieutenant Colonels Dwight Eisenhower and James Ord.

Immediately upon enactment, the national defense plan was set into motion. Among the initiai implementing activities in 1936 were:

a. The American NIilitarSr Mission began to work for the availabjlity of Enfield rifles for training purposes; b. The previously planned framework of the new army was manned; the first Chief of Staff was retired constabuiarv officer, Colonel Jose de los Reyes, appointed by Presiclent Quezon with the rank of Brigadier General;

c. Registration

of 20-5rear-olcl able-bodied males to undergo 5% months of rudimentary infantry training coupled with food

production;

d.

Officer-training for both the regular and reserve forces;

and

e. Acquisition of real estate for camps and construction of more buildings to accommodate personnel expansion. 1937 was the second year of the new Philippine Army. In January that year, the first batch of 20-year-old trainees reported to their pre-designated training camps. They num-

bered 20,000.

the philippine defense postwe

/I

l'or mosL of'the training cadres in the islands, training went on as planned. From this crop of farmers and fishermen, the country expected to develop the first protectors of the commonwealth especially in case of war. Pre-military training, PMT, was also required in elementary and high schools, primarily to imbibe nationalism and patriotism among the studentry. College students were required to enroll in Reserve Officers Tlaining Corps in some coileges and universities.

Complementing this foot soldier training was the development of air and sea defense capabilities. The philippine Army Air Corps, PAAC, grew slowiy but the Philippine Army Off-shore Patrol, the designed sea arm, was stalled. The Army led by its second Chief of Staff, Major General Paulino Santos noted the problems bugging the organization, among which were lack of trained officers, low pay of both officers and men, insufficient infrastructure and those related to weaponry. Notwithstanding, a Citizens Army was shaping up.

In January 1939, a medical doctor was sworn in as the new Chief of Staff. He was Major General Basilio Valdes, former Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, and Deputy Chief of Staff. In February that year, the Constabulary was formally separated from the Army. As the Army build-up was progressing, hampered as it was with difficult finances, tensions have been developing between the United States and Japan. There proiiferated in the Philippines Japanese "laborers" and businesses. Under these categories, the5, were free to wander all over the country. They developed the country's biggest abaca plantations in Davao, the .F'uruk awa Plantation.

10

/'t'ut: vlsAYAs, t'At,AwAN, MlNDoRo.

MAStsA'nE,IvtINDANAo AND suLU

'l'lrt, t,r'rrin ing 1tt'ogt'rtm 01'the t'hilippine Army came under witlc :rnrl v:rrit-'d criticisms - from both uniformed men and lroliticrans. It became a confused situation and it came to an extent that Quezorr is said to have been disappointed with MacArthur. Even Quezon's Executive Secretary, Jorge Vargas, spread the word that MacArthur was holding onto his job as Military Adviser to the Commonwealth "fbr the mone5'." This remark was unkind, if it were ever said.

Meantime, tensions world over intensified. But Quezon and the politicians downgraded the American-designed reserye build-up, emphasizing that the United States was obliged to defend the Philippines and that the Philippine money now being used for the trainee-program could be better used elsew,here.

Among the militar.y brass hats, they did not f'eel warm to the appointment of Basilio Vaides as Chief of Stafi a medical doctor as he was. They felt that it should have been Vicente Lim, a professional military man. As one observable result, the build-up further lagged.

From the beginning of t94L, war clouds over Asia hovered thick and low over the I'hilippines. The signs were very ominous. The country was only halfway on a 1O-year program to create and build defense forces before she will be granted political independence by the IJnited States ofAmerica on July 4, 1946.

The US$FE Background. On January 21,1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka. in an address to the Japanese Diet warned the United States against interfering on Asian affairs. On the 26th, he repeated Japan's determination to impose a New Order in Asia. The following day, 27,Llne American ambassador to Tokyo, Joseph Grew, advised Washington of reports circulating in Tokyo of a Japanese attack on the American air-

the phitippine defense postwe

I Ll

naval base of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii being planned by the Japanese military in case of trouble or conflict with the United States.

In February, American army and navy dependents in the Philippines were urged to evacuate the country and leave for the United States mainland. This was the advisory sent out by the American High Commissioner's Office in Manila.

In the cocktaii circuit, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Admirai Kichisaburo .l{omura said that there would be war between the United States and Japan only if the l.Inited States wanted it. In Europe, the German Foreign Minister advised the Japanese ambassador to tserlin that Japan should enter the war (which was then raging in Europe) oas soon as possible in its own interest." In April, the United States Navy mined the entrance channels to Manila Bay. AIso in the same month, the following happened: April

I

April 13

__ Adolf Hitler, German Chanceilor conferred with Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in Berlin and told him that "England has already lost the war. ft is only a matter of having the intelligence to admit it." Further, he urged the Japanese to attack the British and other Allies in Asia.

and the Soviet Union signed a - Japan 5-year Neutraiity Pact.

April 79 _- The military and conservative factions gained greater influence in the Japanese

cabinet with the addition of Admiral Toyoda and General Suzuki, both expansion advocates. Further, the "war hawk"

l2 I

't'ilt,1 vlsAyAS, I'At,A\\'AN,

N4

lNl)oll(),

N1

ASltAl'1,1, l\llNl)ANA() ANI)

sl.il,[]

posture was strengthened with the replacement of Prince Fushimi by Admiral Nagano as Chief of the Naval General Staff.

April 22

-

2,000 United StatesArmy personnel were sent from the United States to reinforce the Philippine Garrison.

As the year moved on, tension between the two Pacific powers, the United States and Japan, rose. Finaliy in May, the American Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, invited retired General f)ouglas MacArthur to take a new military command to be created and designed to meet the growing threat posed by Japan. This new command wouldfuse the United States Army Philippine Department and the forces of the

Philippine Commonwealth. MacArthur accepted Marshall's

invitation. The imminent new command would be the United States Army Forces of the Far East,

US$FE by acronym.

In the month of June, US naval reserves were called to active duty. Japan broke trade talks with the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia. In early July, all Japanese merchant ships in the Atlantic were ordered to return to their Japanese home ports. JAPAN CALLED UP AMILLION MEN FORMILITARY SERVICE"

More tension between the two countries grew. The Japanese government was bent on holding a hardline position in dealing with the United States and for a break of the on-going talks in Washington between America and Japan on the brewing Pacific trouble.

Then on July 18, Prince Konoye formed a new but basically identical cabinet. The only change was the relief of Foreign Minister Matsuoka with a miiitary man, Admiral Toyoda.

the philippine derlcnse posture

I

13

Orr Jtrly 26,1941, retired US Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty from retirement in the rank of Lieutenant General. On that same day too, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt nationalized the Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary. The following day, the United States War Department under General Orders No. 10 created the United States Army Forces in the Far East, USAFFE, designating MacArthur as Commanding General and directed him to organize the force.

I Lhe usaffe

dcployment

I l5

3

The USAFFE Deployment tr

t

On July 26, 7941, the President of the lJnited States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, autl:orized Major General George

Grunert, Commanding General of the Philippine f)epartment, US Army, to mobilize the Pirilippine Army using previously approved Tables of Organization which effectively prescribed infantry divisions equal to half"t,he standard strengths of ,) H -a American divisions. As planned, a Philippine Arm), division would have consisted of the following units and st;rength:

iulll

"1

'rJJ

C}

vl*

[-{

U

3 Infantry Regiments of 1400 men each 1 Artillery Regiment 1 Anti-tank Battalion 1 Engineer Battalion 1 Medical Battalion 1 Quartermaster Battalion Division Headquarters & Headquarters Company, Signal Company, 0rdnance Light Maintenance Company, Motor Transport Company Total

4,240 1,000 600 600 500 500

800 8,200

The Visayan Islands and Mindanao composed the defense area of the Visayan-Mindanao Force of the USAFFE, VMF for short. The area was loosely known as the "Southern Islands." The other forces of the USAFFE were the North Luzon Force,

e8366 CIT.CdITCE I.IBRARY

l6 i't'ntt

vtsAYAS, l'Al,AWAN.

Nl

lNl)()li(),

Nl

ASIiA'l'l'1,

Nl

lNl),\NAr)i\Nl) st,l,tl

South Luzon Force and Reserve Force. The VMF was uuder the command of Brigadier General Wm. F. Sharp, AUS.

At

a conference on August 15, 1941 at Grunert's Headquarters in Manila, he stated that the first increments of the Philippine Army will be inducted into the service of the United States on September 1, L941. The VMF was organized as follows in aceordance with the Philippine Army Military Districts previously established:

Col. W. F. Sharp, FA-Commanding

Staff Off. Maj. H.J. Edmands, Inf.(PS) - Ex" S-1, S-4 Capt. R.D. Johnston, Inf. Capt. W.L. Robinson, Inf. - S-2, S-3 - Asst. S-2 & S-3 Capt. A.J. Kircher, FA Res. Lt. Col. W.H. Braddock, MC-Res. -- Surgeon

.&. f

T' ll.

* F1 t.rg

IF

Sixth Military District (Island of Panay)

Lt. Col. C. Mclennan, Cav. - Senior Instructor Cadre School Commander Maj. A. Thayer, Inf

- instructors for Cadre School 15 American officers instructors for training 15 American & Scout NCO's centers

Tlaining Centers:

1.

Miagao

2. San Jose de Buena Vista 3. Dingle 4. Iloilo 5. Panitan 6. Banga

.tn

'

**

.ifl^f

ts

the usaffe daployment

I

L7

Seventh Military Disl.rict (Island of Negros)

Lt. Col. D.V. Bonnett, Inf. Senior Instructor - School Commander Maj. R.V. Vesey, Inf. Cadre 15 American officers for Cadre School - instructors 15 American & Scout NCO's instructors for training centers

-

Tlaining Centers:

1.

Magallon

2. Mambucal 3. Fabrica 4. Pais Eighth Military District (Islands of Cebu and Bohoi)

Lt. Col. Sledge, Inf.- Senior Instructor Capt. P.D. Wood, Inf" --- Cadre School Commander 15 American officers -_ instructors for Cadre School 15 American & Scout NCO's instructors for training centers

Tlaining Centers:

1. Lahug 2. Pinamungahan 3. Medellin 4. Argao 5. Tagbilaran 6. T\rbigon 7. Calape

Ninth Military District (Islands of Leyte and Samar) Lt. Col. J.D. Carter, Inf. (PS) Senior Instructor - School Comrnander Capt. C.T. Humber, Inf. Cadre 15 American officers : instructors for Cadre School 15

American & Scout NCO's centers

-

instr:uctors fbr tr.aining

l8 / t'tll.l VISAYi\S, l'r\1,,\\\',\N.

Nl

INI)()ll().

Nl

i\SIlr\'l'l'1,

Nl

INI)AN,\() ANI) stll,tr

T?aining Centers:

1.

Ormoc

2. Carigara 3. Matalom 4. Catbalogan 5. Tacloban 6. Borongan 7. Malitbog 8. Catarman Tenth Military District (Island of Mindanao)

Lt. Col. J.W. Thompson, Inf. - Senior Instructor Cadre School Clommander Maj. R.J. Neison, Inf.

- instructors for Cadre School 15 American officers instructors for training 15 American & Scout NCO's centers

T?aining Centers: 1. Cotabato 2. Butuan 3. Surigao 4. Malaybalay 5. Davao 6. Cagayan 7. Zamboanga The American officers for the above-mentioned assignments were designated more or less arbitrarily. Even the members

of Colonel Sharp's staff were unknown to him until the orientabion meeting; he did not know them personally, and had no information as to their qualifications or ability.

Mobilization The mobilization went on as programmed and on September 1, the 61st, 71st, 8lst, 91st, and 101st infantry regiments of the VMF were inducted into the USAFFE in appropriate

&

&-.

i l.\)

l/t,' ttsrt//t d, 1tl,'1 ttttrtl

ceremonies at the different induction centers. Local government o{Iicials and the populace were invited to witness such induction ceremonies andin them, every effortwas made to make the people realize that it was their army being called into service, in possible defense of their country if war should it break out.

Problems Encountered

After these induction ceremonies, General Sharp, then a colonel, and members of his staff visited and inspected the thirty-two (32) training camps in the Visayas and Mindanao to familiarize themselves and help solve problems where possible. Some of the more serious problems were:

a.

b.

c

Language Difficulty. This existed not only among Americans with Filipinos but also, among Filipinos themselves. In some camps, none of the Filipino officers could speak the language of their men. This problem was traced to the archipelagoic nature of the country so many islands, different dialects and - different customs and oftenly, an inherited languages, enmity towards other ethnic groups.

Unqualified. Afficexs and lVon- commissioned Of{ic-

ers. There was pronounced lack rif basic training in a lob of inst,ances, iiliteracy of the men. Lack of Disciplinary Power. Courts-Mar"tial

ar:.d

rvcre

authorized only after war broke out.

d. Lack of Adequate Supplies and, Equipment. e.

Lack of Military lhaining. Most of the men were quite proficient in close order drill and the manual of arms but very deficient in fundamental tactics, techniques and maneuver. In all camps and cadres, only 10 to 20 rounds per man were all that could be spared for training purposes.

20

/

THE VISAYAS, PALAWAN, MINDORO, MASBATE, MINDANAO AND SULU

The mobilization of succeeding units went on. As also planned, the first inducted regiments of the 7lst and 91st Divisions, were moved north to cantonment areas in Luzon after receiving their basic training at the Phiiippine Army T?aining Centers in Negros and Samar-Leyte, respectively. The 71st Infantry Regiment was cantoned in hurriedly constructed bamboo-cum-thatch huts in Camp O'Donnell, Capas,

Tarlac and the 91st Infantry regiment at Paflgatian, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.

Effort was exerted to mobilize the divisions with the following officers designated to command them: Colonel Bradford Chynoweth Colonel Guy O. Fort Colonel Joseph Vachon

-

61st Division 81st Division 101-st Division.

War broke out on December 8, 1941. The VMF was about half-mobilized. To aggravate matters, the 7Znd and 92nd Infantry regiments, embarked for Luzon on December L All these regiments were subsequently separated from the

Visayan-Mindanao Force. Subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities, the following moves of Manila to arm the VMF were effected: I)ecember

12-

the motorship Samal arrived in Cebu from Manila with a load of signal supplies, and small arms ammunition, 1600 rounds of 2.95 cannon ammunition and 8 2.95 guns

or field pieces. These were the only artillery pieces ever received by the VMF. N'{.IS Corcegidor, Don Esteban and After December L2 Panay Ieft Manila for urgent military deliveries to the VMF but all were sunk before reaching their destination.

l

lc.-

the vmf at

war I

2l

4

The WIF at War On account of the wide-dispersal of the VMF and the

necessity of moving troops and supplies by water, it was necessary that interisland shipping services be made readily avaiiabie and on-call. Shipowners, realizing the high probability of losing their vessels as "civilian ships" being sunk or damaged by enemy action, welcomed it when their boats were placed in government service. The VMF requisitioned the better of such boats. Amilitary detail was placed on guard aboard each suchvessel requisitioned inorder to prevent the crew members from leaving their ship. As previously stated, the war found the VMF only partially mobilized, disorganized as a training unit and devoid of

personnel and equipment inorder to operate on a war footing. It therefore became necessary to expand manpower with its corresponding appropriate equippage and supply.

It will be recalled that the mission of the VMF as promulgated by USAFFE headquarters was to defend the Philippine territory by an organized defense with all available troops, equipment and resources; when no longer able to carry on an organized resistance, to divide into small groups and initiate guerrilla warfare. The initial mobiiization plans provided for the 61st Division to be mobilized in Panay, the 71st in Negros, the 81st in Cebu and Bohol, the 9l-st in Samar-Leyte and the 101st in Mindanao. The 71st

22

I rau, vtsAyAS,

PALAWAN, MINDoRO, MASBATE, NIINDANAo AND

suLU

and gLst Divisions were to be moved to the north for service in Luzon.

Civil Affairs Inorder to realize the planned expansion, civilian cooperation was imperative. Civil affairs officers were appointed by General Sharp for and from each province, all under the VMF's Civil Affairs Officer and who in turn worked closely with G-4 and G-1. Selection of Civil Affairs officers was guided by the prerequisites of unquestioned loyalty to both the Philippines and the United States and the ability to perform. They were outstanding leaders of their communities and for the American entrepreneurs and traders in the area, no political axe to grind. "The civilian communities and the provinciai governments responded exceptionally we11," General Sharp wrote in his after-operations report in 1946. Among the areas of need where the civilj"ans cooperated were:

a. Motor transport - vehicles, drivers,

mechanics and

operating personnel

b.

c

Quartermaster - factor:ies were started for the manufacture of shoes, unifbrms, underwear, socks, haversacks, mosqu,i'l,o nets, c;lrtridge belts, hats, mess kits, cots and canned emergency rations. Orrlnance - shops opened for the manufacture of parts fbr rifles and machine guns, gas masks and hand grenades. Whatever raw materials were locally available were used and improvisation was the rule. In addition, bolos were made and issued to those men without Bolo Battaiions. They also firearms - the so-called mines. made anti-tarrk

the vmt

at war

I

23

On December 15, L94L, Sharp received the following message from US$FE Headquarters: -Ensure tbat prcparations ate compTete fot destruction oil stock pafiicularly at Cebu lloilo Sarigao and Tacloban comma La Union anil Bagtio mining areas to be completely ilestroyeil incluilitg tanks priot to aay itefiniti threatened eneay occapation stop a77 useful ailitary supplies including ttanspottation and oil equ.ip' ment zrust be ilenieil t},e eaemy by evacuation or destruc-

tioa MacArthur. On December 24, Sharp received a letter by an officercourier from MacArthur. This letter stated that due to overwhelming eneny forces the Luzon troops wete rctiring into the Bataan Peninsula, and, that USAFFE Headquartets was being moved from Manila to Cotregidot- The letter went on to say that in case communications were broken, General Sharp must exercise all his powers as Theater of Operation command.er to insure that a loci ofAmerican resistance would be maintained in the PhiiiPPines. On 31 December, General Sharp received another letter from General MacArthur. The gist of this letter was as folIows:

(1) That all of Luzon except the lower end of the Bataan peninsula was in the hands of the Japanese. (2) That Bataan and the fortified islands in Manila Bay would be held. (3) That General Sharp would move his headquarters to Mindanao. (4) That not less than one division would be moved from the Visayas to Mindanao.

24

I ruB vlsAyAs, (5)

pAt,AwAN, MINDoRo, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND suLU

That Colonel Morse and some 600 Air Corps were enroute to Mindanao; that these troops would be used as infantry.

(6) That no further aid could be expected from Manila. (7) That General Sharp would make every effort to establish and maintain contact with our forces in Australia and the East Indies. (8) That General Sharp was in command of the Air Force in Mindanao.

(9) That improvement and expansion of airfields would continue throughout the Visayas and Mindanao.

(10)

That the mission of the troops on Mindanao was the holding of the Air Corps installations on that island, so that they would be denied to the enemy and available for our Air Force when relief arrived.

Accordingly, the following troops were moved from the Visayas to Mindanao:

From

Panay -

62nd Inf Regt and 61st FA Regt

From

Negros -

81st Div less 81st, 82nd and 83rd Regts; 61st and 73rd Inf Regts

From Cebu

Hq & Hq Det, VMF

From Samar

93rd and 81st Inf Regts

Inf

The VMF commander and staff sailed from Cebu on January Znd and arrived at Cagayan de Oro the following morning, setting up headquarters at Del Monte near the 5th Air Base' Group.

the vmf

at war I 25

'l'he troop movement was effected without incident and its success can be readily attributed to the availability of boats already under army control. Throughout, secrecy was main-

tained.

Enemy Land Attacks On December 20, the Japanese attacked Davao, made a successfui landing and drove the defending forces inland up to the vicinity of Digos town where they were held at bay until May 7942 by troops of the 101st Division under Brigadier General Joseph P. Vachon. To the west, Jolo was invaded on December 25 where the only defending troops were constabulary men. The constables resisted but were defeated shortly after.

Mindanao Defense MacArthur's letter to Sharp on December 31 augured the unwelcome. By that date then, the US$FE South Luzon Force (Jones) was effecting its withdrawal to Bataan with the North Luzon Force of Wainwright as protective shield. The Japanese forces that landed in Albay and Atimonan-Mauban advanced and were in the outskirts of Manila, poised to seize the city unopposed as then it has been declared on December 26 an Open City under International Law principles. Upon arrival of the troops from the Visayas, Sharp divided Mindanao into five (5) sectors and a communication zone. These were the:

(1) Zamboanga Sector

-

Col. A. T. Wilson, CO

1st Bn, 102d Inf 1st Prov Bn Prov Hq & Hq & Serv Co PC units and volunteers

26

I r:Hp vlsAYAs,

PALAwAN, MINDoRo, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND suLU

(2) Lanao Sector: CG Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort

81st Div (less 81st, 82d, 63d, Inf Regts, & 81st FA) Attached: 2d Inf Regt PA 61st Inf Regt 73d Inf Regt 14th Bomb Sq, 19th Bomb GP Det 81st FA Lst Bn, 84th Inf 2 Co's, 203d Engr Bn PC units and volunteers (including Moros) (3) Cagayan Sector: CO Col. William

P.

Morse

Hq 102d Division Hq 102d Division, Special TlooPs Hq Co Special Tloops 102d Division 102d Engr Bn 102d MT Co 102d QM Serv Co 103d Inf Regt 61st FA Regt 8lst FA Regt 30th Bomb Sq, 19th Bomb GP Co A, 101st Med Bn

(4) Cotabato-Davao Sector: CG Brig. Gen J.P Vachon

a.

Digos Sub-sector: CO Lt. Col. J.M. McGee 101st Inf Regt 3d Bn 102d Inf Co E l-01st Med Corps Gen Service and Davao Co's (PC)

b.

Carmen-Ferry Sub-sector: CO Major Frandsen 101st FA Regt 2d Bn 104th Inf 28th Bomb Sq 19th Bomb Gp (Infantry)

the vmf

at war I 27

Divisional Special Troops (Rec & Motorized Inf Units) 101st Engr Bn 101st MT Co Hq Co Service Tloops 101st QM Co 101st Signai Co

c. Cotabato Sub-sector:

CO

Lt. Col. R.J. Nelson

102 Inf Regt (iess 1st and 3d Bns) 2nd Prov Bn (5) Agusan Sector: CO Col. Ben

Hur Chastaine

81st Inf Regt 3rd Inf Regt (PC) 3d Bn, 104th Inf Co B, 104th Inf (6) Communication Zone: CO Col. H.N. Frissell

2d B, 82d Inf Attached: Air Corps Det (Infantry) PC Det (7) Air Corps-Del MonteAir Base: CO Lt. Col. R.T. Elamore

Hq & Hq Sq, 5th Air Base Group CWS Det Water Purification Unit Medical Det 2d QM Aviation Supply Co 29th QM Light Maint. Co 440th Ord Co (Bomb) Signal Det Attached troops from the 19th Bomb Group

28

I ry.n vIsAyAS,

pALAWAN, MtNDoRo, MASBATE, MINI)ANAoAND suLU

(8) Visayan-Mindanao Force Headquarters (and Force T?oops)

Hq VMF: CG Maj. Gen. W.F. Sharp

Hq&HqMPCo

204th MT Co Hq & Hq Co, 203d Med Bn Co A, 203d Engr Bn Prov Labor Co Co A, 203d Engr Bn 203d AT Co (9) Force Reserve: CO CoI. W.F. Dalton 92d Inf Regt Co C, 43d Inf (PS) Co E, 43d Inf (PS) 62d Inf Regt 81st FA 2.95 Gun Det

The troops left in the Visayas were (1) Panay: CG Brig. Gen. B. H. Chynoweth

61st Div (less 61st, 6nd Inf Regts & 6Lst FA Regt) Attached: 64th Inf Regt (provisional) 65th Inf Regt (provisional) PC & volunteers (2) Negros: CO Col. Roger Hillsman

74th Inf Regt (provisional) MT Co 75th Inf (less 1 Bn) (provisional) QM Co and Hq Det PC and volunteers

E

E

the vmf

at war I 29

(il) Cebu: CO Col. I.C. Scudder Cebu Brigade 82d Inf Regt (Iess 1Bn ) (plus 1 provisional Bn) 83d Inf Regt (less 1Bn ) (plus 1 provisional Bn) Cebu Brigade Hq &Hq Co PC units Prov Med Bn Prov MP Bn PA Air Corps Det QM Depot (4) Bohol: CO

Lt.

Col. A.J. Grimes

3d Bn, 83d Inf Regt Hq & Hq Serv Co, Bohol Force PC units and volunteers (5) Samar-Leyte: CO Colonel Cornell

PC units and volunteers

Outside HeIp The VMF as composed and redeployed must obtain additional arms and ammunition if it is expected to render effective resistance against the Japanese. This was the view of General Sharp. Sharp diligently exerted effort to gain radio communications with the American forces in Australia. But it met no success. The Far East Air Force (Brereton) that evacuated to Mindanao previously has evacuated its planes farther south to bases in the.Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia) and Australia. He left one (1) B-18 at Del Monte because it needed repairs and did not have the fuel capacity to sustain a flight to Australia. A Major Emmett O'Donnell of the Air Corps volunteered to repair the plane so that he could fly her out. For additional fuel capacity, he stripped it of its armament and loaded fuel drums in its

30 / rup vISAYAS, PALAwAN, MINDoRo, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND suLU

bomb

bay. He succeeded.

On January 13, L942, O'Donnell and the VMF G-3, Major Wm. Robinson took off and reachedAustralia. General Sharp gave important instructions to Major Robinson on the VMF's urgent need for arms and ammunition and too, those of the food, medicine and antitroops in Bataan and Corregidor

aircraft ammunition.

-

Robinson, after impressing upon General Brett, Commander of the American forces inAustralia and the East Indies, all of the instructions and requests of General Sharp, was flown back to Mindanao in a flight of B-17s that brought along for Sharp 81,000 rounds of cal 30 ammunition and on their return took out some 34 pilots and other US Army Air Corps personnel. This was on January 25, 1942, the first of a series of resupply runs for the beleaguered US$FE forces in the Philippines.

Running the Japanese Blockad.e

In not a long time after Major Robinson returned

to Mindanao, the American steamship Coast Farm* with her full cargo of food was received by VMF at Anakan, Misamis Oriental. These were immediately transferred to two interisland ships and sent to Corregidor.

The other successful attempts to run the blockade were:

a. February 4, 1942 - a flight of bombers arrived at the Del Monte airfield bringing with them 30,000 rounds of cal 30 and 6,000 rounds of ca} 50 ammunition;

b. February 14, L942 - a submarine arrived in Parang, discharged 800,000 rounds of cai 30 ammunition and took aboard some 30 Air Corps personnei on her return run;

)

tha vmf C.

at war / 9L

Irel;r'uzrry 19, 7942 - the steamship Coast Farmer arrived at Gingoog, Misamis Oriental with a cargo of 2,500 tons of rations, 800,000 rounds of cal iJ0 and 30,000 rounds of cal 50 ammunition and 2,000 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition. The cal 30 and 50 ammunition were ieft in Mindanao for the VMF while the mortar projectiles and food rations were transshipped to Corregidor aboard the motor ships Elcano and Lepus. The Lepus, however, was reported captured by the enemy on February 28 off Paiawan.

On 27 February, USAFFE headquarters in Corregidor ordered the shipment of 250,000 rounds of the rifle and machine gun ammunition so far received by Mindanao to General Chynoweth at Iloilo for the Visayan troops. This considerably depleted the armory of the Mindanao forces. Then on March 4, the Visayan-Mindanao Force was separated into the Visayan Force under General Chynoweth and the Mindanao Force, under General Sharp. Not iong after, on March 12, General MacArthur and party arrived by Patrol Torpedo boats from Corregidor. They were flown to Austraiia aboard bombers on March 18.

On March 20, President Quezon and party of 17 arrived

in Misamis, taken to Dansalan (now Marawi) and flown out from Del Monte on March 26 for Australia. The Japanese Landings

The landings may be subdivided into two (2) categories, namely, (a) initial probes and (2) invasions in force. The initial probes started with the attack and capture of Davao on December 20 whereafter the Japanese pushed the USAFFE defenders farther inland up to the vicinity of Digos. On Christmas Day, the Japanese seized Jolo. These two initial enemy operations gave them two (2) airfields in the Southern Islands and effectivelv bracketted the whole country from both

E

32

I rHE

vISAyAS, PALAWAN, MINDoRo, MASIIA'IE. MINDANAo AND suLU

the north and south edges. It will be recalled that the first operations of the Japanese in North Luzon were landings that Basco, T\.r.guegarao, Vigan and Laoag. A seized 4 airfields seventh airfield was added when the enemy seized Zamboanga in the Southern Islands on March 2, 1942.

In the second category, invasions in force, these happened immediately after the enemy capture of Bataan on April 9, L942. These were:

a. April L0 Cebu b. April 16 -- Iloilo c. April 29 - Parang d. April 30 - Cotabato e. May 2-3 - Cagayan

de Oro

Day after the enemy invasion of Iloilo, the VisayanMindanao Force was reconstituted or restored by General Y[ainwright, Commanding General of the USFIP (formerly US$FE and USAFIP) with General Sharp in command. The defense of Mindanao was therefore characterized with armed confrontations since December 20, L94l in varying scales and scattered fronts.

the chief justice

iskitled I 33

5

The Chief Justice is Kilted When Chief Justice of the Suprerne Court RamonAvancefla retired on December 23, l-941, President Quezon elevated Associate Justice Jose Abad Santos, Sn. to the vacated position. Maniia was actually occupied by the Japanese on January 2, 1942 making the Commonwealth Government automaticaliy "in-exile" although Quezon was in Corregidor together with a skeleton cabinet. In his party was chief Justice Abad santos who was concunently Secretary of Agriculture, Finance and Commerce.

Corregidor was not to be a safe fortress and site of the Government-in-Exile for long. On February 20, President Quezon, chief Justice Santos and others left aboard the American submarine Swordfish for the Southern Islands, making stops at San Juan Buenavista (Antique), Iloilo and Bacolod. It is said that President Quezon vested Abad Santos with Administrative powers over the unoccupied areas in the south, effectively becoming "acting President of the commonwealth." A detail of the administrative powers concerned Cebu. He therefore, immediately proceeded by availahle transportation to Cebu to carry out the President's instructions.

This consciousness of responsibitity and sense of cluty cut short his enviable life. On April 70, 7942 the Japanese invaded Cebu both on the east and west coasts. In the company of his son Pepito (Jose Abad santos, Jr., rvho was his secretar5r and aide) and coionel Benito valeriano of the constabulary,

li.1

/'t'tttt

vtsAYAs, I'i\t,\\\'i\N.

N1

tNt)()tilr, NL\SB,\'l'I,t.

Nl

tNt),\NAr) ANt) strl,tl

the group was captured by the Japanese in Barrio I\bod, Barili during their attempt to evade the enemy troops.

The Japanese interrogated him at length and confirmed that he was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and was effectively acting President of the Commonwealth at that time. He was offered a position in the puppet Philippine Government if only he would side with the conqrierors and renounce his allegiance to both the American and Philippine Governments. He refused. He did not divulge any of Quezon's instructions nor did he accede to assist tire Japanese look for Manuel Roxas whom the Japanese were asking about. Roxas was then in Mindanao with the USAFFE as a brigadier generaL

The Japanese forces took father and son along with them when they invaded Lanao to continue their mopping-up operations.

On a summer afternoon, on May 2, 7942, detainee Jose was escorted to the enemy commanding general's headquarters in Malabang, Lanao and was informed of the order from the Japanese Military Administration in Manila of his execution. Calmly accepting his fate, the jurist requested for a few moments with his son, which was granted. Shortly after, he was taken to a coconut grove and killed by musketry. A search for his remains after the war produced negative results. He was the highest Philippine Government official executerl

by the Japanese military forces during the war.

A

A

the vmf surrenders

/

35

6

The \fA[F Surrenders The Japanese invaded Cebu on April 10, 7942 in simultaneous troop landings on both the east and west coasts of the isiand. On the west, they took to the shore at Bato, Pinamuflgahan and atArgao and Sibonga on the east. Aroadblock set up by the USAFFE defenders at Sangi on the west did not prevent the Japanese advance towards a junction with their comrades who landed on the east coast. The estimated strength of the enemy was 12,000 supported by naval and air craft. On this day, the USAFFE experienced the regrettable. Military suppiies and stores in danger of falling into enemy hands were destroyed and burned by them. This included stocks of food readied for shipment to beleaguered Bataan and Corregidor.

The unit that landed in Cebu was later identified to be the Kamaguchi force that was poised to land in Lingayen Gulf to reinforce the Bataan drive of the enemy but was diverted to Cebu when the Peninsula defenders started to falter. In the Davao front, the enemy pushed and strengthened their Digos thrust. On April 12, bombers from Australia led by General Royce arrived in Mindanao. In their return flight, certain Air Corps pilots and key personnel and the General Staff journals on the USAFFE action up to the fall of Bataan were loaded.

36 / tnn vISAYAS, PALAwAN, MINDoRo, MASrIATE, MINDANAo AND suLU

In the other areas of the Visayas and Mindanao, the following took place:

April 16

forces lan-ded on the island of - Japanese Panav.' enemy force was estimated at about - This 8,000 and supported with cavalry and tanks.

Two enemy columns, one from Iloilo and the other from Capiz, effected a junction south

of Dumarao. The Visayas and Mindanao Forces were reconstitirted and assigned to the control and comrnand of Major General SharP'

April

A flight of 3 B-17s under General

Royce, much damage Field causing Nichols bombed to buildings, personnel and parked planes.

17

Comrnunication between Cebu forces and USFIP Headquarters at Corregidor unrestored since APril 11.

April

The Japanese occupied towns from Cebu City

23

April 29

April 30

to Dalaguete on the east coast and from Toledo to Dumanjug on the west coast.

transports landed troops in Parang

5 enemy - Harbor, Cotabato.

of Cotabato

-

General Vachon reported the loss

-

Estirnated enemy force of 300 moving up on Cotabato River in steel barges and simultaneously advancing along the Cotabato-Pikit highrvaY.

lltt'vrnl srrrrlrr,l,,rs / ii7

Mirv

2

Mav

3

Alien prisoners moved north from Pikit to Maridagao.

Enemy bombed Dansalan; heavy fighting

- around Ganassi town.

-

Demolitions effected since yesterday afternoon: (1) Steel girder bridge over Cagayan River, (2) Cagayan Dock, (3) Del Monte shops at Bugo and (4) road craters on Sayre Highway Ieading to Bukidnon Plateau.

May 4-5

Enemy landings at Bugo and Tagoloan Point

air - Enemy ing of VMF

recon, slight bombing and straf-

defense positions

at Dalirig

Sector; 62nd on MLR with Artillery Detachment in general support.

-

On the Sumilao-Puntian Sector: Defense force is 6l-st FieldArtillery regiment, strength approx 650.

May

6 -

Enemy drove into the outpost at Tankulan and entered the town in force.

May

7 -

Intermittent enemy shelling sition from dawn to dusk.

May

8

of the

Dalirig po-

artillery and aerial strafrng/bomb- Enemy ing along the Sayre Highway, increased in fire

intensity. Enemy infantry attempting infiltration on the left front of Dalirig position. May

9 - Continued and increasing Dalirig position. * A Jalranese

4

prcssure against

plane dropped message from Colo-

:18 /'t'1il,r \/ts,\\'AS.

t'Al,\\\',\N. illNt)()[(). NtASt],\ 1... NINt)/\N \().\Nt):il.rt,l

nel 'Iraywick of General Wainwright's staff "desiring" a conference on the evening of this day. Decision - Suspend fighting at daybreak, May 10.

May

10

-

Japanese Lieutenant Colonel Haba of the Japanese Imperial Army, with officers from General Homma's staff, all accompanied by Col. Jesse T. Tlaywick arrived at Impasugong where a conference was held. Following the conference, communication b5, radio made rvith General MacArthur in Australia and final decision to surrender unconditionallS, the \risay:rn-Mlndanao Force was reached.

Thus coilapsed tlie Iast major component of the IISAFFE.

r

rd

"ihave returned"

I 39

7

"l Have Returnedt' On October 20, 1944, General Douglas MacArthur, with Phiiippine President Sergio Osmefla at his right and US Sixth Army commander Lieutenant General Walter Krueger at his left, and others, waded wet-to-the-hip and strode to the Leyte cluttered beach where only a few hours earlier, American troops of liberation landed. Exultantly, General MacArthur proclaimed to the Filipino people, oI have returned. By the Grace of Nmighty God our forces stand again onPhilippine soil."

Why Leyte? PIan "fieno" was MacArthur's original concept premised on that "The'Philippine Archipelago, lying directly in the main sea routes from Japan to the source of her vital raw materials and oil in the Netherlands Indies, Malaya and Indo-China, was the most important objective in the Southwest Pacitic Area. Whoever controlled the air and naval bases in the Philippine Islands logically controlled the main artery of suppl.y to iapan's factories. If the artery were severed, Japan's war potential would deteriorate." So postulated "Reno."

Initial Iodgements would be effected in southern Mindanao on November 15 and at Leyte Gulf on December 20,7944. The plan was subsequentlS, renamed "Musketeer LI" and had as its major objective the prompt seizure of Central Luzon

40

I

'rtlF) \'lsAYr\s, I'A1,,\\\',\N,

N1

lNl)()lio.

Nl

ASlli\'l'1,1,

N1

lNl)AN/\() ANI)

stll,tl

in order to destroy the principal garrison, command organization and logistic support of the defense of the Japanese mainland. The operation envisioned the full support of the United States Navy. Conformably, carrier-based aircraft of the US Navy Third Fleet under Admiral Wil}iam "Bnll" I{alsey hit Mindanao on September 9 and 10 and discovered the unexpected - serious weaknesses in the enemy's air defenses. Enemy opposition, both from the air and the ground, was insignificant. Further, enemy air installations in Mindanao were seen severely damaged by American land-based bombers that previously operated from New Guinea fields. On September 12 and 13, carrier task groups, also of the Third Fleet, hit the Visayas and again experienced surprisingly meager enemy air reactiorr and therefore inflicted heavy losses on Japanese planes on the ground and their installations.

Losing no time, Halsey radioed Washington that Leyte should be seized immediately. At that time, President Rooseveit and British Prime Minister Churchill were in conference at Quebec, Canada. Asked by Roosevelt for his views on the Halsey proposal, MacArthur gave his assent. The Mindanao operation planned was therefore shelved and the most ambitious plan to seize Leyte, without a preliminary landing in Mindanao in order to make available bases for supporting aircraft, was adopted. Leyte appeared as the "weak belly" of Japanese defense in the Philippines!

The northeastern coastal plain of Leyte, particularly the 18-mile stretch between Dulag and San Jose, was chosen as the most suitable site for the assault. This would permit the ear15, capture of the Tacloban airfield, domination of the San Juanico Strait on the north and place the Panaon Strait on the south rvithin striking distance of the invasion force.

r

rt

"i llrvc rclttrttad"

I 4l

MacArthur envisioned that Levte would be the "anvil" rrgainst which he hoped to hammer the Japanese into submission in the Central Philippines, and too, the springboard from which he could proceed for the reconquest of Luzon. The ground operations in the capture of Leyte comprised of four phases, namely:

1. the preliminary landings of the Sixth Ranger Battaiion

(Mucci) to secure the islands on the entrance to Leyte Suluan, Homonhon and Dinagat on October 17 Gulf

and -18;

2.

the main amphibious assauits from Dulag to Tacloban that included the seizure of the airfield, an advance through Leyte valley and the opening of both the San Juanico and Panaon Straits;

3.

the necessary overland and shore-to-shore operations to complete the capture of Leyte and southern Samar; and

4. the occupation of the remainder of Samar and the further neutralization

of enemy positions in the Visayas.

On October 16, the invasion armada of almost 800 ships of various categories and sizes carrying 174,000 officers and men left Hollandia in New Guinea and sailed for Leyte. As planned the isiands of Suluan, Homonhon and Dinagat were secured by the Rangers. The huge convoy was off Leyte shortly before midnight on the 19th and promptly at dawn, the naval bombarcirnenf of the chosen assault sites began. The first and second assault waves went ashore and exactly four (4) hours after, the third wave moved in. In this wave were General MacArthur, President Osmefla, Lieutenant General Krueger, Major General Basilio Valdez and Brigadier General Carlos Romulo.

12

I

rt il,t VtSi\\'AS. t',\t,,\\\',\N.

NI

tNt)()ti().

Nt

,\stJA't't,t, NltNt),\N,\() ANI) strl,tr

Approximately 50 yards from shore, the lzinrling cr:rft couid not get closer to land because of shallow waters. The craft therefore dropped its ramp and the famous "wet-to-the-hip" wade was made. On a mobile broadcasting unit a few yards inland, MacArthur proclaimed to the Filipino nation his return. Upon his arrival bach in his flagship, the heavy cruiser Nashville, MacArthur issued a general message to al.i guerrillas in the country to "unleash maximum violence' to the enemy. The Liberation Campaign has begun! The Japanese High Comrnand in retaliation resorted to their Imperial Fleet to repel the American invasion. This hatched the great naval battles from October 23 to 26,1944, collectively the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In one of these battles, the Musashi, one of the newest and largest of Japan's battleships, mounting 1S-inch guns, was sunk on the Sibuyan Sea. Her sister ship, the Yamato, was hit and a number of cruisers and destroyers were damaged. Thev belonged to the Central Force under Admiral Kurita.

The Southern Force under Admiral Nishimura sailed doggedly on onto the Mindanao Sea and intended to al,tack the invasion armada from the south through Surigat: Strait but was ambushed by a combined fleet of motor torpedo boats, destroyers, cruisers and battleships annihilating the whole Japanese Southern Force including the flagship which went down together with the admiral, Nishimura.

mindoro

I 43

8

Mindoro General MacArthur declared the Leyte-Samar operations closed on December 26, 1944" Luzon loomed!

The planned first step of the Luzon Campaign would be the seizure and deveiopment of air base sites in southwestern Mindoro in order to provide land-based air cover for convoys moving toward Lingayen Gulf and to permit the Allied Air Forces broaden the base of their attacks against Japanese air power in Luzon. This was the general plan after victory at Leyte and before the Luzon island invasion on practically the same spots as the Japanese did in L941.

Terrain Study How did Intelligence regard Mindoro? Mindoro was none too pleasant a place! This is the curt answer. It is a mountainous ovoid with some coastai plains along the east, northeast and southeast shores, much rain, high humidity, enervating climate and malaria and other tropical diseases were prevalent. The island was mostly underdeveloped and relative to the other big islands of the country, has fewer natural resources and less favorable terrain. The planners saw that the best airfield sites were Iocated in the northeast but flying weather was poor and dangerously

44 I 't'il l,t \/tSA\'AS. l'Al,AwAN,

Nl

lNl)()li().

NIASIJAI'l'1. i\llNl)ANr\() ANI) sLrl,tr

close to Japanese air concentrations on Luzon. They therefore, elected to secure a beachhead and an airfield site near San Jose in the southwest corner of the ovoid, compiemented by good anchorage nearby, Mangarin Bay. Intelligence estimated enemy strength at some 1,000 troops under the control of the 9th Division based on Luzon.

Operations U-day was the Mindoro target date, December L5, 7944. Responsibility for the operation rested on the Western Visayan Task Force of the American Sixth Army, supported by the AIIied Air and Naval Forces. Since rapid construction of airfields was a primary mission of the Task Force, the force necessarily included aside from the combat component, four (4) battalions of American airfield engineels and a working squadron from the Royal

Austraiian Air

F'orce.

The task force departed from Leyte on December 12. The convoy steamed on Mindanao Sea unmolested until mid-afternoon of the following day when Japanese planes including kamikazes from Cebu attacked off the southeastern corner of Negros Island damaging the cruiser Nashville, flagship, killing 130 men outright including ranking officers. The wounded numbered some 190 including Brigadier General William C. Dunckei, Visayan Task Force commander. The Nashville, under destroyer escort, returned to Leyte for repairs and to get from SixthArmy appropriate attention on the casualties, both living

and dead.

But the operation went on, the flagship now a destroyer. Meantime Admiral Halsey's planes (Third Fleet) kept the Japanese occupied on Luzon. On U-day, December 15, the Aliied group started for the beaches. On that day, kamikazes from Mindanao struck at the convoy off Mindoro proper and damaged some American ships, kiiling 7 and wounding 20.

mind.oro

I

45

[-Inlo:rrling from the ships proceeded far ahead of schedule, In the north, the weather continued to deteriorate because of an approaching storm. Halsey was retiring to Ulithi Island in the Carolines to replenish but sailing through the raging typhoon sank 3 destroyers, wrecked 200 planes and damaged 28 ships, 9 so severely that they were out of action for weeks. The Japanese suffered a total loss of 450 planes in the Mindoro operation. r,rnopposed.

It is indeed a sad commentary that the Allied Naval Forces' participation in the Mindoro adventure had been very costly. Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet suffered much from the wrath of Mother Nature, not the Japanese. On the troop landings, which were unopposed, no casualty was recorrled. The

Air Build-up

By late afternoon on U-day, the San Jose airstrip was secured. Expanding it, however, was not feasible but a better site almost three kilometers south of the airstrip was found and subsequently developed. The Americans and the airdrome construction squadron of the Royal Army Ai.r Force worked on the new site which they called Hill Drome. Five days later, frghter planes (P-38 and P-61) of the US Fifth Airforce started operating from it.

Northwest of Hill Drome, another airstrip was being developed. This second field, named Elmore Field, was ready for limited use on December 23 and on December 28, it was all set for continuous dry-weather operation.

The Japanese continued air attacks, reinforced from Formosa and Camranh Bay in Indochir&,rrlow Vietnam. They inflicted much damage on Allied transports, particularly the Liberty ships and LSTs. On January 4, 1945, Japanese air attacks in the Mindoro area virtually ceased.

46 /,t.HH VtSAvAS, l,Al,AWAN. MINI)olio, MAStIA'l'H, MlNl)ANAo ANI)

SLI

l,Ll

Ashore, the task fbrce instituted patrol actrons to hunt down Japanese soldiers and secure areas where possible Japanese reinforcements from Luzon may land. Along these activities,

Mindoro guerrillas guided and gave support in the various mopping up operations aii over the island.

liberating the by-passed. islanils

I 47

I

Liberating the By-passed fslands The Luzon invasion went on as planned. The Allied Liberation Forces spearheaded by and largely the American Sixth Army landed on the chosen Lingayen Gulf sites unopposed and quickly proceeded to the south to capture the national capital of Manila, liberating it completely on March 3. The support of Mindoro-based aircraft was extensive. The Luzon campaign had been underway less than a month when General MacArthur decided that the tirne was ripe to secure the by-passed southern and western parts of the Philippines. He considered this necessary because of "obvious disadvantages and dangers faced by the Filipinos so-by-passed, garrisoned as they were b5, Japanese troops who had no hope of succor and whose tempers and morals could hardly be expected to improve as they came to realize that the defeat of Japan was inevitable."

Further, he believed that to leave the Filipinos in the bypassed islands unnecessarily exposed to the evident dangers of continued direct Japanese domination for a protracted period could only tend toward undermining the prestige of the United States, seriously damaged as it was rn 1942 when the USAFFEAISFIP defense collapsed and America virtually abandoned the Philippines. That damage was repaired with the

,18

/'t'tt

H vtSAYAS.

t'Al,i\WAN, MlNl)()li(), N,lASltr\'l l,l. NllNl)ANA() ANI) stil'Ll

Leyte and Luzon campaigns of liberation but to the Filipinos of ihe Southern Islands, those appeared meaningless if they were abandoned now and left to the mercy of the ,fapanese garrisoning the Visayas and Mindanao'

The Visayan Passages

As early as January 1945, the US Eighth Army

(Eichelberger) had instituted its campaign to clear the southern side of san Bernardino strait and to seize the small islands controlling their inner passages. This was part of the deception moves of the Americans to make the Japanese believe that theAllied ianding would be in the Bicol and Tayabas areas' Instead, the Americans were on their way to Lingayen Gulf.

A small task force cleared the islets and mainland of

northwestern samar during the iater half of February and on March 4, Eighth Army relinquished responsibility for patrolling in the region to the 1st Fiiipino Infantry Regiment,

USA.rn;randattachedguerrilias.ThesouthernsideofSan Bernardino Strait was thus made secure by elements of the Americal Division. On March 3, Ticao Island and Burias in Masbate were attacked by elements of the Americal Division. No Japanese were found on Ticao but a Japanese garrison on Burias resisted. This enemy position was neutralized and on March 11, guerrillas took over both isiands. As the above were going otr, units of the American 24th Division launched attacks from Mindoro to secure the western passages of the Visayas. The Verde Island enemy garrison was attacked by foot troops during the period 23 to 25 February, Ieaving the guerrillas to garrison the island the following-clay. The guerrillas, however, were unable to overcome the remaining Japanese resistance so that the Americal sent back troops to Verde Isiand and from 27 February to 3 March, broke the last opposition killing almost a hundred Japanese.

.a

ltlt, t:rltnil llr,' /r}, l,;tr.,',1 rs/;rrr,/, /

Some

fifty miles farther west was Lubang Island

"11)

where

the Americans made an unopposed landing but caused the Japanese to flee inland. In the ensuing pursuit, the Americans lost 10 killed and 30 wounded. The Japanese lost some 200 killed among them some who fled to Lubang from the Calumpang Peninsula of Batangas province. Then came the mop-up on Romblon, Semirara and Sibuyan.

Guerrillas of the 6th Military District earlier secured the islands of Tablas and Sibuyan. The operation on Romblon started with a surprise landing during the night of 11-12 March and slowly went on until the last resistance was overcome on April 3. The Semirara operation lasted from 12 to 21 of March and eliminated a company-size enemy garrison. The seizure of Romblon and Semirara left only Masbate proper still partially under enemy control. The Masbate garrison of about 400 troops was composed largely of disorganized and ill-equipped survivors of ships sunk during the Japanese attempts to reinforce their Leyte defense after the Liberation Forces landed in October L944. By March L945, Guerrillas already controlled much of Masbate and on the 29th of the month, guerrilla reinforcement from Leyte landed on the island after a short bombardment by amphibious landing craft of the US Navy Seventh Fleet. Elements of the American 40th Division followed the guerrillas on April 7 and together, the Filipino and American troops pursued the scattered Japanese remnants through Masbate's highlands. The Eighth Army Commander, Eichelberger, had never considered the Japanese on Masbate as a force to reckon with as regards American control of the Visayan Passages was concerned since the guerrilla force from Leyte dispersed the first group of Japanese encountered on the island. With the reconquest of Masbate, the Visayan Passages came under the firm control of the Filipino and American troops.

)()/'l'lll,l VISAYi\s. l'.\l,AW;\N.

Nl

lNl)()li().

Nl

AStl,\',I'l'1,

Nl

lNl)ANA() ANI) St)l,l.l

The Need for More Airfields The Japanese lines of communication through the South China Sea must be severed. This made imperative the need to capture more airfields soonest from which the AIIied Air Forces could project land-based aircraft over the waters west of the Philippines more effectively than from Clark Field on Luzorr or from Mindoro.

Palawan. Palawan sites are 150 miies farther west than either C]ark or Mindoro. MacArthur therefore ordered the seizure of Palawan. This was on February 6, L945, three days after the Americans reached Manila. A week later, he gave additional instructions, this time for the occupation of the Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago. The capture of the three areas and development of suitable airfields on them would result in the creation of a virtually complete aerial blockade of the Netherlands East Indies and Southeast Asia and provide adequate air support for the invasion and recapture of Borneo. Also, air cover for subsequent operations to clear all remaining islands in the Southern Philippines, particular:ly Central Visayas and Mindanao.

Responsibility for the ground phases of the Palawarr, Zamboanga and Sulu operations rn'as given to the Eighth Army's 41st Division, Major General Jens Doe commanding. For the seizure of Palawan, the Palawan Force commanded by the 41st Division Assistant Commander, Brigadier General Harold Haney was tasked by General Doe. The principal combat component was the 186th Regimental Combat Team. The Palawan Force which numbered more than 8,000 was composed of a regular infantry regiment, anti-aircraft units,

engineers for the construction of airfields and the normal service force attachments. Following haif an hour of naval bombilrdment, assault wave.s of the Force landed along the northern shore of Puerto Princesa unopposed. Ttvo hor.rrs after and still encountering no enemy resistance, two air strips east

b

b-

ltlt,r;rltn11 l,itr lry'yr;tsslrl tsl,ttt,lt I ill

of the town were occupied before noon. Not a single Japanese was seen. However, during the period 3-8 March a few enemy strongpoints in the background hills were reduced. Adjoining islands were seized and by April 2L, all elements of the regimental combat team left for Mindanao.

Airfield construction on Palawan did not proceed as rapidly as planned. Thirteenth Airforce engineers did not find soil in the seized sites suitable for developing an all-weather field unless more time were given them. This necessitated the repair and extension of a concrete-paved Japanese strip which was made operational on March 20. It was, however, unabie to support the Zami:oanga landings. Zamboanga. The dela5, in the repair and development of a fighter strip at Palawan complicated to a certain degree preparations for the ianrling in Zamboanga. This problem bugging both the Eightir Arnr-v and Allied Navai Forces was solved unwittingly by the Mindanao guen'illas, particularl5,, the 105th Division commanclerd by ConstabularS' Coionei

Hipolito Garma. Garma had long held a good, prewar ianding strip at Dipolog on the north eoast of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Ailied Air Forces flying supplies to the Mindanao guerrilIas (10th Military District, Coi. Wendell Fertig)have been using

this coastal airstrip since late 7944. It has also been the emergency landing site of many Ailied planes.

Quick to react to the fact, both the Marine Corps and F'ifth Airforce flew in their planes and to augment guerrilla sectlrity over the field, the Americans fler,v in t,wo (2) infantrv companies. Colonel Fertig of the guerr:illas informed that Eighth Army could make unopposed iandings in the rricinity of Zarnboanga as the area has been seiected and marked by his troops on March 9. But the preassaLrlt bombardrnents against the:

i2 I

'rll

Fl

vtSAYi\S, t'Al,A!Vr\N,

Nt

tNt)()R(), MASltA',l',t,l, NIINI)ANA() ANI) Stll,l.l

bcaches went on. As !'ertig informed, American troops landed virtually unopposed at San Mateo, ZamLoanga. This was so because earlier, the Japanese 54th Independent Mixed Bri-

gade (Lieutenant General Tokichi Hojo) of almost 8,900 men, had withdrawn to elaborate high ground positions two miles inland. As a result, the Americans seized a leveled Zamboanga City, victim of air and naval bombardment which had probably and in all likelihood been unnecessary.

Both the Wolfe and San Roque airstrips were seized and a dry weather runway was made at San Roque, completed on March 15.

The airfield thus made ready for operation, the next problem was driving the Japanese from the high grounds overlooking it. This was where the guerrillas played an important share in the plan of offense or clearing the vicinity.

In 1942, the small USAFFE garrison at Zamboanga withdrew to the east coast of the peninsuia to the vicinity of Bolong.

Here the USAFFE assembled supplies in anticipation of conducting guerril.la warf'are but simultaneously keeping a line

of withdrawal to eastern Mindanao through the trails. But the plan did not materialize because of the surrender of Bataan and Corregidor.

Eighth Army directed Fertig to block the east coast road in exactl;, the same vicinity, Bolong, before two regiments of the 41st Division would move northward from Zamboanga city and attack General Hojo's troops through rough and overgrown terrain. Pushing slowly but steadily, supported by Marine Corps planes, the Americans entered the foothills, a lot of times followed by bulldozers before the tanks could move in. Finally on March 23, the Japanese defenses started to disintegrate so that their last defenses were overran on the 25th. The remaining troops retreated northward on the 31st because the guerrillas effectivelv trlocked the east road. The blocking force was the 121st lnfantr5u, 105th Division under Captain

b

b-

Iiberating the by-passed. islands

/

53

I)orlrld ,J. Lecouvre, a former US Army Air Corps enlisted

rn:rn. 'l'he Japanese continued retreating northward into the rvilrl interior of the Zamboanga Peninsula where they were cor-rtained by Garma's 105th Division until the end of the war. Of the original strength of 8,900, only 1,385 survived the war, .ioining 1,100 more who were earlier captured. The rest were oither killed in action or died of starvation and disease in the Zamboanga hinterlands.

Sulu. Operations to clear Sulu where additional airfields could be constructed and developed, began well before Japanese resistance in Zamboanga ceased. On March 16, Basilan was seized in an unopposed landing. On the northwest shore, a patrol torpedo boat base was developed, secured by Basilan

guerrillas.

The next to be seized was Sanga Sanga on Tawitawi Island which together with Bongao were lightly garrisoned bv the Japanese. The Americans landed on April 2 and cleared both Bongao and Sanga Sanga by April 6. As early as mid-March,

guerrillas had already controlled much of rawitawi Island because the little Japanese garrisons at both Bongao and Sanga Sanga have substantially withdrawn towards Jolo.

On April 9, the Americans landed near the town of Jolo, Jolo unopposed. By April 11, the Japanese retirecl i,land to Mounts Daho and rumataflgus. on April 1b, guerrillas unrrer colonel Alejandro suarez began attacking the enemy at Daho joined by the 1st Battalion of the lGBrd Infantry regiment, 41st Division enjoying artiiler;r and close air support by Zamboanga-based Marine Corps planes. Daho fell on April 22 and Tumatangus by May 2. A relieving American regiment, the 368th Infantry of the g3rd Division together with the Suarez guerrillas pursued the Japanese troops that retreated towards eastern Jolo island. By mid-June, Jolo IsIand had been considered cleared except for a few Japanese who took to the j,ngles but who s,rr.endered after the war.

lt'l l'rll

l,l

VlSi\\'i\S, I'A1,,\\\'AN,

Nl

lNl)()ll(),

Nl

ASIIA'l'1,1,

l\llNl)ANA() ANI) stll,tl

AII the airfieids so-far constructed in the Zamboanga-Sulu area were improved and shared in providing air support for the initial landings to reconquer Borneo.

The Central Visayan Islands Panay-Guimaras-Northern Negros. After a beach bombardment, the first assault wave of the 40th Division landed unopposed about twelve miles west of Iioilo. This was at Tighauan. What, did the-v see ashore? Tire troops of Colonel Macario Peralta, ,1r., drawn up in parade f'orrnation and "respiendent in starched khaki and shining ornaments." The beach bombardment was unnecessarv. Best guer"rilla intelligence estimated the Japanese strength on Panay Island aL 2,750 composed of combat troops and civilians. The Island commander was a LL. Col. R.yoichi Totsuka. Peralta's troops subjected the Japanese, mostly in

Iloilo, to attacks in their city garrisons until they withdrew to the rough highlands of south central Panay, a plan strikingly similar to that executed by the 61st PADivision, {ISAFFE in 7942 when its commander, Colonel A1bert Christie retired to Mount Baloy where he expected to hold out indefinitely. Christie surrendered after Corregidor fell when General Wainwright called on all units of the USFIP to give up to the Japanese. Tatsuka broke through an arc of roadblocks set up by Peralta's troops and made good their (Japanese) escape to the mountains. The Filipino-American troops were in complete control of Iloilo on March 20. The Filipirio-American troops never closed in with Totsuka's main body and wonder of it all, thev. the Japanese, came down to surrender after the war, more than half of the original Panay garrison. The Americans lost 20 men killed and 50 rvounded. The guerrillas suffered undisclosed casualties.

n

n

Irlrcral ittg I.llr,

/r,1''1r:1551,1.{

is/:rrrrls

/ 55

Subsequently, the islands of Guimaras and Inampuluflgan were cleared. There were no Japanese troops on these islands.

Northern Negros. Eichelberger set the attack for March 29. The Americans expected a lot of help from Lt. CoI. Salvador Abcede, commanding officer of the guerriilas and who by then already controlled two-thirds of the island. The enemy was led by Lieutenant General Takeshi Kono, commander of the 77th Infantry Brigade, 702nd Division. His force of 13,500 consisted 5,500 of the 102nd Division, 7,500 of the 4th Air Army's 2nd Air Division and 500 of the Navy. On March 29, tlne Americans went ashore unopposed in the vicinity of Pulupandan and moving directly inland, clashed with the surprised bridge guards of the Bago River bridge who as a consequence, were unable to set off prepared demoiitions.

By midmorning, the bulk of the American 185th Infantry regiment was ashore and immediately spread northward and eastward, followed by another regiment, the 160th. By noon on April 2, the entire coastai plain of northwestern Negros was secured at almost no casualties to the Americans. On April 9, the 503rd Infantry regiment went ashore too and there were now three regiments against Kono's cave-andbunker positions most of them corrnected with tunnels or trenches. The battle degenerated into mountain warfare of the roughest sort with all its attendant problenis. What both protagonists experienced, their comrades in Luzon are only frustrations, delays, faiiures and successes. too familiar with

-

The Filipino-American troops enjoyed liberal artillery and aircraft support but in the end, it had been the rifleman who

in. Weather too began to be bothersome -- dense fogs and rains. By early June, the 4Oth Division had overrun organized enemy resistance in northern Negros with the closed

Japanese withdrawing deep into the mountains and dispersed into small groups, fending for their food and evading the guerrillas who were in vigorous pursuit. By June 9, the

:) )

llll. \ lS.\\,\rt

1,,\1

\\\.\l!,

Nl

lNl)()li(, Ni,\Sl, \'t'I,t. I\l lNl)i\N,.\() ANI) Stll,tj

Japanese had suffered many kiiled, and many more died from disease and starvation. After V-J day on 15 August 1945, over 6,000 Japanese came down from the mountains and joined over 350 earlier captured. Total enemy killed in the northern Negros operation numbered some 7,100 while the Americans suffered 370 killed and over a thousand wounded.

Cebu. (26 March - 20 Jane 1945) Even before the 40th Division could begin its Panay-Guimaras-Northern Negros operation, the Americal Division launched on March 26 its own 3-part operation to clear Cebu, Bohol and southern Negros. One of the purposes of seizing Cebu Island is its possible use as additional staging area for the Allied assault on the Japanese mainland.

Major General Wm. H.Arnold, commander of the Americal, expected considerable help from the Cebu guerrillas under Lt. Col. James Cushing. Precisely, the Americal commander wanted Cushing to secure the Cebu City water resources Iocated in the hills west-northwest of the citv

It is said that the enemy command structure at the time was hazy. General Sosaku Suzuki, commanding general of lhe 35th Army relieved Lieutenant General Shimpei Fukue of his command , the 702nd Division for leaving Leyte without permission. Until March 24, allJapanese troops in Cebu City were nominally under RearAdmiral Kaku Haradaand suzuki left defensive operations to a Major General Takeo Manjome, commander of the 78th Infantry Brigade. The northern part of the island was under Lieutenant General radasu Kataika, commander of the 7st Division. suzukifrrmed up this arrarrgement. Accordingly, M anj o me's j uris diction als o embraced Bohol Island and Southern Negros. On March 26, tlne Americal troops landed unopposed on beaches north of ralisay, cebu. within minutes, confusion began to pervade as mines the enemy laid a few yards beyond the surf line began expioding, kiuing personnel and damaging

&

&

ltlx:ralitt14 t.lrc lr.t yrrs*r'r/ lri/:urrls

/

5"1

landing craft, LVTs. The guerrillas and the first landing wave reported this to Division headquarters, which sent bomb disposal teams but found out that the mine frelds were a lot more extensive than anticipated. The beaches were jammed as vehicles and more men came ashore. This jammed situation was only relieved two hours after and it was fortunate that there was not a single Japanese defense position manned in the Taiisay beach area, otherwise it could have been disastrous for the Americal. Once past the mine fields, the Americal Division advanced cautiously towards Cebu City. Cebu City was seized with no enemy opposition and on the 28th, Lahug airfield was similarly occupied. While rnaneuvering to take the airfreld, the Americans were subjected to machine gun and mortar fire from their left, Hill 30 and Go Chan Hill. A sad incident on the 29th was when the enemy, by remote control blew up ar1 ammunition dump Iocated in the caves :rlong an eastern spur of Chan Flill. The explosion kilied 20 and u,ounded 30 Americans, destro)red a tank and damaged two more. This happened when the troops were withdrawing from their positions towards Chan Hill in order to permit the artillery and air suppor.t components to give a thorough going-over. The big loss of personnel and armor, the tanks, Iiterally made'the alreatlv undersbrength infantry compan-v (Co. A, 182nd Inf.) cease to exist, the few remaining survivors distributed to other companies of the

battalion.

In a mood of revenge, almost the entire infantry regiment, supported by all available tanks, artillery, mortars anci even anti-aircraft automatic weapors, poured all on the h'l . By dusk, Go Chan Hill was cleared. Meanwhile, the guerrillas were not able to fully clear. the terrain of their objective forcing another American infantry

regiment, the 132nd, to secure the city's water supply sour.ces. Fighting was bitter for four (4) days and it was not until April 2 that potable water was made available. Mactan Isiand.ryas

58 /

tnr:

vISAYAS, I,ALAWAN, MINDoRo, MASBATFI, MINDANAo AND suLU

seized -next, and the port planes.

airstrip developed to accommodate trans-

General Arnold lacked information on the Japanese hinterland positions and made no significant moves to exploit the gains so far of his regiments. He had to ask Eighth Army for another regiment, the 164th less one battalion. He now had three regiments attacking Manjome's defense positions.

A series of small unit frontal attacks against the enemY, gaining ground painfully, behind close air and artiiiery support finally made Japanese resistance collapse, making organized enemy resistance in the hiils north of Cebu City come to an end on the 18th. Unknown to the Americans, however, the Japanese have withdrawn earlier to the north, some 7,500 men managing to extricate themselves. The frontal attacks of the Arnericans were considered by the Japanese as slow, thereby enabling their withdrawal.

By 20 June, most of the Americal Division, withdrawing from action to prepare for the invasion of the Japanese mainland, left further patroliing to Cushing's guerrillas. They lost 410 killed, 1,700 wounded and almost 8,000 non-batttre casuaities from an epidemic of infectious hepatitis, malaria and sexualiy-transmitted ailments. Bohol and Soutbern Negros. (11 April - 12 June) On 11 April, a battalion combat team of the 164th RCT, Americal Division, Ianded unopposed on beaches in Bohol Island already controlled by guerrilias under Major Ismael Ingeniero. Patrois located on April 15 the main body of the Japanese along the low hills approximately seven miles inland. The body numbered some 300. In a series of attacks from April 77 to 23, all organized enemy resistance were overran, the survivors fleeing further into the forested areas. On May 7, the Americans withdrew and Ieft custody of the island to Ingeniero's guerrillas and a detachment of the 21st Recon Tloop. About 50 havried and hunted Japanese survived to surrender at the end of the war.

liberating the by-passod. islands

/ 59

While a battalion of the 164th RCT rvas clearing up Bohcil, rcst of the regiment moved to southern Negros and landed rrnopposed on April 26. Almost irnmediately, they made cont.act with elements of 40th Recon T?oop which sped down the east coast without encountering enemy opposition. Lht:

There was, horvever, on southern Negros a 1300-man enemy garrison built around the 174th Independent Infantry Brigade, ground service troops of the Znd Air Division and about 150 seamen survivors from ships sunk in the Mindanao Sea during late 1944. The Americans, together with guerrillas, located this body two (2) days after in rough and partially jungled hills almost ten miles inland. On 6 May, 'Ihe Americans in all available strength including a guerrilla regiment began a concerted offensive against this concentration. By May 17, the enemy began withdrawing from its better defenses and on the 28th,

all organized resistance was overrun bv the Filipirro-American force. A final pocket of opposition was eliminated by June 12.

In .fune, the last eiements of the regiment left southern Negros, relieved by a company of the 503rd Parachute InfanThe Americans and guerrillas believed they have totally eliminated all resistance but surprisingly after the war ended, about 880 Japanese came out from hiding to surrender, losing from their original number of 1,300 some 500 to battle, starvation and tropical diseases.

try to jointly control the area with the guerrillas.

With the end of organized resistance in southern Negros, the Central Visavan Islands were recovered from enemv control. '

mindanao

/

6L

10

Mindanao In the preceding chapter, it was shown that the need for airfields and bases to carry out a southern thrust of the American Liberation Forces, resulted in the reconquest and liberation of the western portions of southern philippines, particularly Palawan, the Zamboanga peninsula and Sulu

Archipelago. The enemy as a result of the Zamboanga operation, moved farther inland arid concentrated in central and Eastern Mindanao. The central and Eastern Mindanao operation of both the American forces and the Mindanao guerrillas (10th Military District, Fertig) was in essence a mopping-up campaign rather an action of strategic importance. Earlier, it was clearly shown too, that Mindanao was one of the by-passed islands when the Allied Forces landed on and subsequently captured Leyte and samar and still much later, Mindoro and Manila. But there was big reason for the reconquest and liberation of the big isiand.

Guerrillas had been moving against the Japanese garrison at Malabang on the northwestern shore of Illana Ba5, aided by planes of the Marine corps based on the new fields developed at Zamboanga and Thirteenth Air Force planes from othertrases. By late March, the guerrilta attack had progressed so well that Liaison planes, colloquially the grasshippers, began using it and on April 5, Marine Corps fighter aircraft started operating from it. Guerrillas completed occupation

62

I run vtsAYAS, PALAwAN,

MINDoRo, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND suLU

of the entire Malabang region. Fertig lost l-7 men killed and2l wounded in the Malabang area. On the 13th, Fertig radioed Eighth Army that their troops could land unopposed at Malabang and Parang' PIanners, therefore cancelled the imminent navai bombardment against Malabang but not that at Parang, subsequent messages from Fertig notwithstanding.

Fertig estimated that there were over 43,000 members of the Japanese armed forces in Mindanao in addition to nearly 13,000 non-combatant civilians. The ground combat component was composed of roughly 28,000, 8,000 from the Air Force and over 6,000 from the Navy. They were distributed into the 100th Division (Lt. Gen. Jiro Harada), L]ne 30th Division (Lt. Gen. Morozumi), t]r:e S2ndNaval special Base Force (Rear Admiral Doil and the Hosono tJnit of the air arm. The Davao area was held by Haradaand Doi. Morozumiwas responsible for the rest of the Mindanao land mass.

Nominal command of eastern Mindanao rested in Morozumi, who became de jure commander of the 35th Army

(Suzuki) when the latter clied at sea in his effort to flee Cebu for the Mindanao mainland after the Japanese defeat at Leyte. Beset with formidable communications problems, Motozumi effectively IefL Harada and Doi to their own devices' The Japanese never intended any military offensive missions or plans. They operated according to Yamashita's 1944 plans to direct their efforts to pinning down as many American units as possible in order to delay the Allied progress towards the Japanese mainland. Then, after their main defense positions were overran, they would retreat into the unexplored highlands of east-central Mindanao for a laststand much like Yama shita did in North Luzon.

Just like Yamashita, they are devoid of aircraft and naval support, adequate food, medicine, supplies and operating in

mindanao

I

63

f lre wilrlcrnnss. Harada and Morozumi were suff'ering from thc low quality of commissioned and non-commissioned offict:r's, mcst of whom have been enjoying relatively easy garrison iives since 1942. Morozumi knew too well that they were hopelessly isolated as the Americans went on with their

reconquest operations. Adding to this isolation, the Mindanao guerrillas were continuously harassing them demolitions, roadblocks, raids on communications and supply dumps it almost im- making possible to send truck convoys up and down the roads ofeastern Mindanao.

American landing operations at Illana Bay began shortly after sunrise on 17 April. Guerrillas greeted them on the beach near Malabang and fifteen minutes later, landed unopposed on nearby Bongo Island. At midmorning, after a totally unnecessary 2-hour naval bombardment, American troops Ianded unopposed at Parang. The troop movements were so effortless and swift that an immediate drive was launched towards Kabacan via Fort Pikit, approximately 35 miles inland.

With Fort Pikit as intermediate objective, a regiment, the 19th struck overland along Route 1 and another regiment, the 2lst, was aboard LCMs of the 53Srd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, using the Mindanao River as its principal axis of advance. The twin drive took off on April 18 and the following day the "river boys" were at Paidu-Pulangi, onlv nine miles short of Fort Pikit. The "overland boys" were far, far behind and this situation of the two regiments worried the flivision commander. Consequently, General Woodruff. I)ivision Commander directed the 21st infantry to pull back from PaiduPulangi some 10 miles downstream the Mindanao River. Crews of five LCMs, however, held on Paidu-Pulangi until Aprit 20. On April 21, elements of the third regiment of the Division, the 34th Infantr-y, arrived at Paidu-Pulangi moving both

64 /

tgp

VISAYAS, PALAWAN, MINDORO, MASBATE, MINDANAO AND SULU

overland and along the river, reached Fort Pikit and were amazed tc find the Fort already in the hands of troops from the LCM gunboats of the 53Srd Engineer Regiment. The 19th Regiment did not reach Pikit until April 23 or three days behind. The engineers outdid the riflemen. 24th Division headquarters then turned its attention to the town of Kabacan on the junction of Route 1 and the Sayre

Highway, only nine miles distant. Elements of the 34th Infantry reached the junction on April 22 and by noontime on the following day, the feeble enemy resistance was eliminated. The seizure of the Kahacan road junction one week earlier than planned projected the US Army into the very center oi eastern Mindanao and opened two separate routes of attacl against the Japan ese 30th and 700th Divisions, one for each enemy division. The Seizure of Davao. The first step towards achieving the seizure was the very fast movement of elements of the 34th Infantry,24th Division aiong Route 1 from Kabacan to Digos. They started out on 24 April and on the 27th, they reached the outskirts of Digos.

Lack of communications severely handicapped enemy operations in Mindanao. As an example, it is said that General Harada of the 100th Division learned that American forces had landed in Mindanao only on April 22, a good five days late. It shail be recalled that the Americans ianded on Malaban". on the 17th and on the 18th, simultaneously at Parang e, od Cotabato. The L gos District Unit of the Japanese, a force of some 3,350 and who had almost 600 Japanese civilians with them made franiic preparations to meet the Americans advancing on Digos but instead of offering resistance, they withdrew northward on the night of the 2'ith-29th of the month to the foothills o1 ,Mt. Apo, some seventeen miles away. On the 28th, the Ameri r ns and elements of the trxpeditionary Battalion

mindanar,

/

65

o1'the guerrilla 108th Division of Fertig cleared the Davao Gulf Coast south of Digos. Other troops of the American unit pursued the Digos District Unit which held its ground on the Mt. Apo foothills until May 9 before withdrawing farther northward to join the rest of the L00th Division.

A second American regiment, the 19th Infantry, reached Digos and began driving north towards Davao encountering only negligible opposition on May 2 in front of the city. They seized it the following day, Iong since reduced to shambles by Allied planes, both land and carrier-borne. The seizure of Davao on May 3, L945, bombed as it was into a shambles by Allied land-and-carrier-based aircraft did not mean the complete Iiberation and restoration of peace in the Davao area, for some three kilometers to the northwest and north of the city were the forward lines of the Japanese 100th Division with elaborate defense positions. General Harada was indeed carrying out to the letter lhe Yamashita instruction to withdraw to the adjacent highgrounds and pin down as many American units as long as possible in order to delay their eventual hop to the Japanese mainland. Harada established three forward defenses for a withdrawing battle to the hinterland of uncharted hills 400-500 meters high up to Kibaflgay, some 20 miles to the northwest. He succeeded to pin down the American 24th Infantry Division up to June 26 or effectively two more months after Davao was seized.

The American and Filipino operation was a series of costly, laborious, small unit actions combined with close and heavy air and artillery support that produced slow but constant progress and often found themselves hemmed in on three sides by veritable hornets' nests of Japanese. The Fiiipino were those of the 107th Division commanded bv Lt. Col. Claro Laureta.

66 /

tul

vISAYAS, PAI,AwAN, MINDoRo, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND sULU

The Americans lost approximately 350 killed and 1,615 wounded, while the guerrillas suffered 17 men killed and 30 wounded in engagements north of Davao. It is estimated that the Japanese iost more than 4,000 from action and starvation

and disease. a

The Battle for Sa5rre Highway. (27 April - 23 May 1945). Sayre Highway, named after American High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre, at the time was under layout and development and relative to the connotation of the term, it was a Iittle better than a figment of the imagination. The war considerably retarded and stopped its construction and eventual use as a major public road.

It was intended that this highway cut through Central Mindanao with its western terminus between Tagoloan and Cagayan de Oro in the north and Digos, Davao in the south through the Kabacan Junction in Cotabato, a road distance of approximately 320 kilometers. It traverses the Kitanlad and Kalatuflgan Mountains and astride it are L8 volcanoes, reportedly extinct. These are Mounts Tangoon and Libadan on the west and Mounts Balatocan, Kaluayan, Sinalagas, Amaloi, Tago, Baligan, Kinabalian, Kumakata, Pantado, Tankulang, Kiokong, Malambo, Tianlud, Sinako, Buluan and Apo on the east. The Japanese defending this roadway, from Kabacan in the south to Cagayan de Oro in the north belonged to the 30th Division commanded by Lt. Gen. Gyosaku Morozumi. He had a total strength of 17,500 oniy 5,800 of whom were trained ground combat effectives, the rest being 5,000 Army Air Force personnel which according to him were more of a hindrance than a help and 4,500 other combat and service elements. He allowed the bulk of the Air Force units to move ahead into the mountains east of Sayre to "seek their salvation." He had at the Butuan area the Eastern Sector Unit of some 2,200 which he could not bring to the Sayre area because of roadblocks and destroyed bridges brought about by extensive

*

*

mindanao

/

67

gucrrill:r action. The guerrilla unit was the 110th Division commanded by Lt. Coi. Ernest Mcl,ish. Even before the battle for Sayre Highway, Morozumi already had several factors worlr ln

--

o

{o

A:

s(n 't t o tl

.'ii ii r

- r.r --s>

j:rI

'st r!-'" *:

r

qt6l. xl at.{& !_-

*$t< rril O

o, f-

ssB It-'

i[q FE*e

L{

!r l: f,Lo f:r S.r^f 5 E.F: fv x;'e* : {&_ F;.1\

{rl :tc

ll *f -4.+Y

i5t: eti'

i,{' ? i! --. ;. :' f,:i ''

ii'r r q -.-;

.,

!r tt

x3

g a $ -$.

"'tj

:}

i..*

* 5' "{ i. ": ..'

".

,. li lt, a j ;.-. .. i:: '. .1.. ':.

:

--r

.!1

t x $ :: { { :s

1!.

*..

ba'

:. *.

n g

p: \$

i: 1 .--i:i :,, ;1 ., il. :;

x*' ;*. :a * .:' *

{

o

f:-!

|j:... {: :: :.'. .} ..:

{x

It

a I

t Ii:: * ;ra --' :: ,r f S

-':

-

tll ilti

i.! .t

n

t;i

g

s'

rl

." il

:1

ii,

is

r

l.

.;

'i

i.* .i :f :.i

:

Y: Ti

nl .t!

o

a.

kr

+ o

\

A)

IJ

A) (D

(n

I

{

* r

!l t

ie {€

a

i,

!t

u, rs

ii, o

*

rit

r

sF

t

a(

ta a

(a

{a

a

, t

5

tE ,ll

$

(t.,

s I t

tI

L I

a

the guerrilla movement

/ L89

BOHOL GUERRILLAS Not much action was seen in the smalr isrand of Bohol rluring the war. Although the Japanese came ancl occupied the isl:rnd capital of raglilaran in M:ry 1g42, ancl established a puppet government under Governor Agapito Hontanosas, the Japa rlese opted to sit content in the capital. Neverthel"rr, u srnattering of resistance groups sprang up in clifferent parts of Lhe island.

Tlrc Resi.stonce Mouemen.t in the Islnnd,

A ferv m.nths afLe. w:rr b.rlr* c! '6 Ao d;--r -o cU o

=>,

Ni

E'-

o G Ei6"

vp.rAJ

5

-}l u.,

H HE.; ; g.:.=

x,rouetens

6o

I

@q

1Nt

&1 et

3!

ziv

b

Bn

&8 s

GROUP

TAPIANTANA

*

saMALES

n'.)\z -o

I

3EA

CELEEES

ol-o

"l"o \;.-;,-

e /--!.

onoup

Bn

\ rapul

clo a\

2d

0*

Mt

cRou% \

PANGUTARA N

t

JJa oo

\ o "{ "-"* tt$'

06

lst'

0

TAWI TAWI

THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO o ro 20 !P .p 3P xrLE3

5-T-;5-FF$

SULU SEA

onE

SonEa Sdnqo B

LJ

Hou' the Sulu Guerrillas were deployed.

?

a.

GROUP

Part IV Atlied Intelligence, Demolition and Supply Penetrations from Australia and America*

o o o . o

Introduction The Planet PartY "Chick Parsons"

The Cruz Report The Silent Service, US NavY

allieit intelligence . Australia

I 259

Introduction The surrender of Correg;itlor on May 6, L942 cut off all ra-

dio communication betx,een the Philippines and General MacArthur's headquarter:s in Australia except with that which was operated by Lieutennrrt Colonel Guillermo Nakar in the Cagayan Valley" Nakar''s outfit was initially the First Guerrilla Battalion organizerl r"rn l)ecember 27, L94l by Captain Manuel Enriquez, l"1th Division PA USAFFE, later the First Provisional Guerrilia R,egiment under Major Everett L. Warner, USAand when Warner surrendered sometilne in May 1942, command of the pri.,visional regimernt went back to Enriquez. Later, Enriquez gave command to Nakar on account of the latter's lineal senioritv. The last message received frorn Nakar wi)rj rl;rted August 22, L942 but on September 29, L942, communication ceased because of his capture together with the radio set. Communication in the clear,,r'ith North Luzon (Praeger) and Panay (Peralta) was estabiished in Novernber and December 1942, respectiveiy. The first direct persorial infbrmation from the Philippines was brought by Captains W'nr. L" Osborne and Damon J. Gause who escaped from Corregidol after its surrender. and proceeded toAustralia by way of Palaw;rn, North Borneo, Tawi-tawi and Makassar Strait arriving in nurthern Australia on October 1l . When interrogated on Octoherr 16 b.y a panel of G-2 officers,

they menticned information on guerrillas then lbrming in western Batangas, Brooke's Point (Palavran) and Tawi-tawi,

260 / .nun vISAYAS, PALAwAN, MINDoRo, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND sUI,U

Then followed the interrogation of Lieutenant Frank H. Young and Mr. Albert Klestadt, German. Young was a messenger from Colonel Claude A. Thorpe, Cavalry, USA who was allegedly sent out from Bataan in February t942 on a mission to organize guerrillas in Central Luzon and with special emphasis on attacking Clark Field in Pampanga to destroy the planes thereat and possibly ease the pressure the Japanese were exerting on the Bataan USAFFE forces. It is said that Young left Central Luzon and travelled via the Bicol Region, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, Negros and Panay. There he joined Klestadt, civilian and proceederl to Zamboanga arriving in Darwin, Austraiia on Decemb er 12, t942. Young and Klestadt brought lucid information on the enemy and guerrilla activi+,y in the arpas through which they'travelled.

It became clear that there existed guerrilla organizations in various parts of the Philippines aithough leading personalities were not identified. Information on the enemy police and counterespionage networks and methods and the extent of their subjugation of the Filipinos was far from complete. These initial fragments of information, though, gave impulse and thrust to launch intelligence penetration in the Philippines.

The following pages narrate to fullest possible the most signifrcant of such intelligence penetrations. These were those of Major Jesus A. Villamor, Lieutenant Commander Charles "Chick" Parsons and Major Emigdio Cruz.

Signifrcantly too, they were all awarded the Philippine Medal for Valor, the highest Philippine military individual award and counterpart of the American Congressional Medal of Honor.

atlied.

inteltigence,, Australia

I 26t

THE PLANET PARTY

Note: This reproduction does not include the mentioned sketches, location plans, drawings and other graphics that were attachments to the original report of Major Villamor in 1943. Similarly, with the papers and documents he submitted separately.

allied intelligence .

. Austratia I 263

XH

JESUS ANTONIO VILLAMOR* Captain, Philippine Army Air CorPs Iater Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force

Awarded the Philippine MEDAL FOR VALOR for "cottspicuous and extraordinary heroism above and beyond the crrll of duty rlur:ing the period from 27 Decernber 1942 to Novenrlrcr 7943."

Authority: General Orders No. 499, dated 4 June

1958,

Headquarters Armed F orces of the Philippines, Camp Murphy, Quezon City.

*Photo acknowledgement: Armed Forces of the Philippines

.

The following report is based on personal observations of the writer and information gathered from various sources. It covers the period between 15 January 1g43 to 20 october 1g48. The report almost wholly refers to the conditions in Luzon and the visayan Islands. Mary portions are direct quotations of agents, reports which have been checked and founilaccurate.

JESUS A, VII,LAMOR Major, Air Corps

allied intettigence .

TABLE OF CONTENTS PART

I

. ENEIVTY

GROUND FORCES

A.

Luzon

1. Strength and disPosition 2. Equipment.and suPPlies 3. Morale, physical condition, efficiency 4. Activities B.

Visayas

1. 2. 3. 4.

Strength and disPosition Equipment and suPPlies Morale, state of training Activities

C. Transportation D. FueI E. Communication AIR FORCES

A.

Luzon and VisaYas

1. Airfields

2. Aircraft 3. Air defense NAVAL FORCES

A.

Luzon and VisaYas

1. Bases and docks 2. Vessels in PhiliPPine 3. Mine Fields 4. Activities

waters

. Austratia

/

266

266 / r:r.n vtsAyAS, pALAwAN, MINDoRo. MASBATE, MINDANAo AND suLU

THE CONSTABULARY

1. Organization 2. Equipment, supplies and arms 3. Morale 4. Activities 5. Loyalty NOTES FOR EVAIUATION

PART

II . FRIENDLY FORCES

1. Organization 2. Strength and dispositions 3. Resources 4. Morale and state of training 5. Activities 6. Problems 7. Recommendations B.

Personal views on Guerrilla Leaders

P""TJ11;;"#:*H"'"' 1.

Political

d.

The leaders The people Morale Loyalty

e.

Inclependence

a.

b. C.

2.

Economic

a. General b. Commerce and IndustrY c. Finance 3.

Educntion

4.

Reiigion

5.

Social

allied.

intelligence . . Australia

PART IV - CIVIL AFFAIRS (Unoccupied areas)

1.

Political

a. b. c. d. e. f.

General The leaders The people Morale Problems Recommendations

PART

1.

Enemy

2.

Friendly

V. INTELLIGENCE

NETS

PART VI - MISCELI,ANEOUS

1. 2.

Communications Prisoners of War and American Internees

3. Situation of Foreigners 4 Conclusion 5. Annexes

in the Philippines

I

267

atticd inteltisence,

. Australia

I

269

PART I ENEMY Ground Forces

Air Forces Naval Forces

The Constabulary Notes for Evaluation

rl

allied

I A.

intelligence, . Australia I 27L

GROUND FORCES (ENEMY)

LUZON

1.

Strength and Dispositions

a. Due to the continllous rnovement of troops in Luzon, arrival and departure of casuals, anci the lack of an organizaLion devoted mainly to the gathering oI'information, no accurate Lhe

ostimate ran be rnade of tlrc strcngth of the Japanese Forces in Lhat Island. F'rom reports receivecl fi'orn travelers and residents of the different provinces, it is bclicvccl fliat the strength of the permanent garrison stationed ilr Luzoll is about 70,000 and cet'Lainly not more than 100,000. Reccntly, holvcver, there was the reportecl arrival (unconfirmed) of' sonre 2(i0,(X)0 troolrs which were supposedly lancled in Poro Peninsulit, La Utrion the early part of August and which were immedi:rtcl.y tlislr;rLchcd to the Cagayan Valley. The commander of Lhis ltniL rvrts rcporletl to be Lt. General AOIKI SEITCIIL b. Troops are wiclely scattered atrti st,rtt.iottcrl rrot'ltr;tlly itr towns and cities, Most of our old Army cittt)l)s ltt'c g:tt'risottccl with only caretaking detachments. McKinloy is, in :ttltlit,iou, being ttsecl as a home for the sick, wounded :tnd cotrv:tlcsccttLs and :rlso to house casuals. Stotsenberg (including Olrrk I"ieltl) and Dau apparently have strong garrisons. 'Ihose sL:tt,iottcrl irr towns and cities normally occupy school buildings ;ttrtl lrtrge private residences as barracks. The garrisons in difl'crcnL Lowns vary in strength from one squad to about 2,000 trretr. 'fltc' Manila garrison is subject to great fluctuations in ntttnltcr bub the pennanent establishment is not believed to be over 10,000 although a great number, estimated over 10,000 arrived in the City on August 28.

272 I rHE vtsAYAs, PALAwAN, MlNDoRo, MASBATE, MlNl)ANAo AND sul,u c. The following important centers are known to have bctween 1,000 to 2,000 soldiers: Legaspi, Naga, Lucena, Sta. Cruz (Laguna), San Fernando (Pampanga and La Union), Cabanatuan. Five thousand troops are reported in Stotsenberg and Clark Field and 2,000 in Dau. Corregidor is reported to be garrisoned by only 150 Army and 50 Navy men. d. The combat troops consist mainly of riflemen with a few artillery, cavalry and tanks. Most of the garrisons are colnposed exclusively of riflemen. There is a regiment of Cavalry at Sta. Cruz (Laguna) and some field artillery in San Fernando (La Union). The preserrce of artillery in Lucena has been reported. Few tanks are seen in Manila, four are reported in Lipa and four in Nasugbu.

e.

Depots in Manila are:

1.

2.

Port Area: large stock of motors, artillery pieces, ammunition and suPPIies. Muelle de la Industria: All warehouses from Ynchausfi to Farola filled with supplies. Warehottses on Cristobal street filled with arms, ammunition and supplies. Single track rail connects this area with Paco Railroad Statinn.

3. Phil. Refining Area:

4.

San Beda College: Seven warehouses f,rlled with supplies. Single track rail across Mendiola Street' Used for the repair of arms and mechanical imPlements.

5. Phil. Trade School: 6. 7.

2.

Pinaglabanan (San Juan): Small arms depot. Warehouses beyond the Manila Gas Corp': Bomb depot.

Equipment and suPPlies. a. The amount of equipment and supplies brought by the

Japanese

to Luzon and still remaining there is negligible. A

allied intelligence . . Australia

I 273

great quantity of this equipment has been loaded in boats and left the Island. on the other hand, they have practically stripped the country of everything that may be of use to maintain and operate their military establishments. b. Practically all construction and rrrrrl m:rchinery available

mi.ing materials, tools in Luzrin are rlow in their possession.

srrne remain here for bheir use, large quanfities have been slripped out. They acquire possession of goods by outright conliscation or purchase, whichever they find mor.e expedient,. In t.lre case of purchase, the price paid for (in occup:rtion notes of t:ourse) is of little concern to them. The price of a keg of nails lirr instance, is now over P1000.00. Thousarrds of people are cngaged in the "buy and sell" business, the final destination of all goods being the Japanese Army. ,Iapanese have been eslrecially active in saivage for new constructions. Corregitlor has bcen a good hunting ground {irr machinery scrap iron and various kinds of supplies; these have been loarled in ships for rrnknown ilestin:rbions. The silvel coins dumped in thr: chrrnnel between Corregidor ar-rd Cahailo have boi:n tire ohject of frarrtic cflorts to salvage on the part of, ttro Japs, llut clue t,o tirc cmrle rnethods used it is doubtfui if all of t,hcm havc boen rr-'t,r.iovecl although a quantity is known to have been salvagctl.

c. In spite of the huge quantities of equipment and supplies obtained in the Philippines, all Japanese construction projects are behind schedule. This state of affairs finds its cause in the following difficulties: (1) Practically no replacement from outside sources. (Shortage of these items or shortage of bottom) (2) Insufficiency

of fuel available

(see report on

"fuel") (3) Disruption of production in Luzon. d. In the matter of food and clothing, the Japanese enjoy here an enviable position. The people in Luzon are suffering from lack of these vital necessities, but the Japs, thanks to ttre effective control system established by them, are not only

2741

,I'HI"

VISAYAS, PAI,AWAN, I!1INI)oITo, NIASI]A'I'F], NIINI)ANAo ANI) SL] I'I'J

properly fed and clothed. but have been able to export food and .totlrirrg to their people residing in Japan and Formosa'

3. lTorale, physical

conditions and efficiency

a. Undoubtedly, the morale of the Japanese soldier is high. He believes in the justice of their cause and is sure of t6iir victory in this war. Some among the few intelligent and open mind"d g.o.,p are beginning to realize that victory is not within their grasp yet. They have been heard to remark that this war ,,will IasCoire hundred years" which is certainly quite a concession on their Part.

b.Theplrysicalappearanceofthetroopsstationedin

Luzon is excellent. They are well built, of better than average height and look well fed and well groomed. Transient casuals .urrii.rg from Japan and proceeding to the front (?) do not ,.r"ur.,"." up t, the physicai standard of the soldiers stationed in Luzon. They are younger, weaker and smaller' One agent ."po.ts seeing a whole battalion of these soldiers and not one of them was over five feet in height'

C.TheFilipinoslravealowopinionoftiremental

capacity of the Japanese Their experts and advisers stationed in the Islands do not possess the technical knowledge of the men they are suppos"d to t,tot' They are slow in grasping the situation after ail-facts have been presented to them and as a are consequence, they delay in making decisions and once these recent very a by is exempiified This macle, they are not logical. incident when ,"rurul Manila Society Girls (including Misses PILAR CAMPOS and ALICE FERIA) were arrested for disturbing the peace cluring one of those. "demonstrations of gratituie.,, when questioired by the police as to who they believed u,ould win the war, these girls answered that "at the rate could win the war'" It did not take America is going, "th"y who else *".e released. This low efficiency is a cause of Iong befor"

wondertomanyconsideringthehighaccomplishmentsofthese people.

allied intellil4ence . . Austrdia

4.

I 275

Activities

a. The Japanese troops in Luzon are carrying on no other activity than those

normally assigned to an u.."y of occupation. To accomplish this mission they make a showydisplay of their strength and execute acts of intimidation and reprisal.

b.

Troops are sc.ttered in nlany ga.r.isons, so t,hat the Japanese s.ldier can be scen all ove. the cou.t,ry. 'fhey ar.e moved around a great rleiil to gir,e the irnpression of llirger strength than they actualiy have. Airlllanes, whe, flying .ver populated areas, come clown to vcr.v lorv altiludr:s so that tire people can see and hear theni.

c. In cooperation rvith the constabulary, they conciuct patrol activities, but norm:rily retutr to the barracks before dusk except in very rare insl:rnccs when they raicl gr-rerlilla strongholds. when not on paL..l rrissior-rs, they ar"e given ieave to wander all over town cluring t,he,rlayt.ime and sLreets, stores, bars, restaurants, markets, ctc., bcc.rlo firll of'Japs in unifnrm. Their behavior is that of c,nquo.r.s tlt,.li.i1 with despisecl

people.

d. In dealing with

sr,rspecls, Lirc.y rr.t, s;rrlisLic:ill_v c.,el. They make daily displays of'their bluLalit,v. 'l'he rnilit,lr.y policc, is greatly dreaded. The acLs of tor'rure L, u,hich ir lrrr.ge ntrrnlicr of people have been subjected at Fort s;rnt,iag, r'rrrr hirr.rll.y hr_r believed. The Japanese many times follow thc lrrlit:.y ,f'lrrrrrishing whole communities for the unlawful acts ol'rru irrrtivitlu;rl or. a group of individuals. Whole torvns are even bonrbctl Iir lrcing suspected of giving assistance to gtierrillas. At prescnt, thc.v rrr.e placing the male population of some towns under' ,;rrr.esl Iirr. ,lr. long as two weeks to obtain information or fir.cirnrrs j\4rri.rlxrn and Lubang (to obtain the names of tire leaciers of' t,ht' llrnre Guard), Pagsanjan and Los Banos (to retluire the su,'c,rlcr. ,f' firearms), Tiaong (to obtain the surrender of a gucrr.ill;r it,ntler'), Lipa (for reasons unknown) and so many other places hrrvc bcen or are being the subject of this statement. In Lubang, ti,vo women were shot for attempting to deliver {'ood to thcir husbands who had been arrested. The tale of brul,aliby and crueltv is an unending one.

276

I trt,

B.

VISAYAS

vtsAYAS, PALAwAN, MINDoRO, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND

sul,u

1. Strength and disposition

2. Equipmenf and supplies a. For a detailed report on the strength, disposition, equipment and supplies of enemy troops in the Visayas, see the G-2 reports from each island which are being submitted separately. Briefl-v Lhe enemy has confined himself to the occupation and control of strategic and commercially important

b.

centers.

c. As in Luzon, the combat troops consist mainly of riflemen with some artillery pieces, cavalry units and Iight tanks and arnr.ored cars.

3.

Morale and state of training

a. The same comments apply to enemy tt'ortlls in the Visayas as were given regarding those in Luzon' b. The slale of training of Lhe pelmanenl grtt'risotrs is excellent. Discipline is strictly enforced and training is continually going on. Aiiraicls alerts Ior instance, are conducted whenever t"lr" Jrurrd of an airplane is heard. Lately (about the end of September) gas clrills were introducecl in their training although it is not known yet whether this was done for purely military l.easons or meiely to lend support to their latest propaganda whereb.rz they have threatened the people in unoccupied areas

with

gas.

4.

Acfivities

In addition to acbivilies normally associated with armies of occupation, more extensive patrol activities are conducted by these troops than those in Luzon. Penetration into friendly security areas are not infrequent and these are particulariy pronounced whenever there are a large numher of

a.

allied intelligence . . Australia

I 277

t,r'oops ;rssigncd tr: their various garrisons for "practical exer(:iscs." 'l'roops often march and deploy during bright moonlight h.urs :rncl launch their attacks shortly before daybreak. When ;rLtacks involve the use of sea borne troops, these are usually c:rrried out by use or barges from transports which are often accornpanied by several launches and, at times, escorted by one or tnore airplanes. However, when surprise landings are desired involving tlie use of a considerably smaller number of troops native sailboats are used. Sometimes the.element of surprise is :rchieved in lhese amphibious operations 'by landing troops scveral miles away from the point of attack and approaching on ftrot with lighted torches along the beach, much in the manner of fishermen. In cebu this was successfully accomplished resulting in the capture of Bvt. Lt. Col. JAKOSAIEM.

b.

On land the enemy employs all sorts of tricks in an attempt to fool the guerrillas. Thcse tricks range all the way from disguising soldiers as women planbing or haresting rice, to traveling in private cars or trucks wit,h civilians in an attempt to pass thru certain areas unmolested. The Jlrps have made it a practice to bring back their dead frorn cvory encounter and they have also made it a habit to tie or chain t. e:rch ir-rdividual soldier his weapons, presumably to make iL Lh;rt nruch more rlifficult for the guerrillas to obtain the same.

c. Their treatment of captured guerr.ill:rs ;rnrl civiliirns clepend on the "policy" presently in force. Shoultl thc :rttr.rrclirn policy be on, such captured persons are treutcrl w:rr.rnl.y, given meclicines, food and clothing and, in the case of gucr.r'ill:rs, givcn

a brief "rejuvenation" training and finally rele:rserl. On

tl-re

other hand, should the surrender-or-else policy be in efl'ccl, absolutely no mercy is shown. People, including wonrcn :rnd children, are shot as soon as they start running away fronr Lhc sight of any Japanese soldier. Guerrillas, if capturcd alivc, are tortured to death and if already found dead, are bchcrrtlcd.

C. TRANSPORTATION 1. The Japanese have done an excellent job of repairing the bridges by our forces. with the exception of the Ke.non road to

278 I tuT.,

VISAYAS, PALAWAN, MINDORO, MASBATE, MINDANAO AND SULU

l}aguio which is sornetimes closed to traflic due to some temporaly bridges being washed out during the rainy season, all roads are now open to traffic. 2. The Japanese have all the vehicles necessary to take care

of all their transportation needs. In addition to the cars and tnrcks belonging to the USAI'FE rvhich fall into their hands, they h:rve con{iscateil practically all enemy alien owned vehicles antl have purchased a large number of those privately owned.

ll. On the other hand, due principally to the diff,rculty in ob-

taining the necessar.y permit and fuel, there are very few vehicles privately operated. Motor traffic on highways and cities is very thin. Motor bus Iines which used to operate fleets of buses to service Lhe different provinces are now out of exist' ence,. A one-bus-service is available between some towns. 'Ihe -*ame is true lviLh freight trucks. In Manila, only the governrnent, some higir officials, a few prominent individuals and a number of doctors have motor tt'ansportation. Recently, the number of doctors in possession of permits to operate cars have been reduced from 100 to about 70.

in Luzon have been repaired and trafDue to the difficulty of travel and normal. fic is now almost 'railroad is carrying the main transporLation on highways, the burden in transporting freight and personnel from and to different points of the Island. Since Army needs take first priority and the rolling stock availal:le has been somewhat depleLed, the railroad is unable to tneet the most urgent transportaLion requirements of the country. 4. A11 railroacl bridges

D. FUBL. fuel situation seems to be critical and is adversely affecting the Japanese activities and operations in the rear areas. 2. Aviation gas. Little is known on the quantity stored by the Japs in the Islands. There are rumors of large underground storage built by the Japanese and filied to capacity but each case reported, when investigated by a more reliable agent, turned 1. The

altied inteltigence, . Australia

I

279

orrt to bc a hoax. I{owever', one agent reports that three of the oil Lurks in Pandacan (Manila Gas Corp.) are in use. TWo of t,hese tanks were left undamaged by the USAtr'FE, and one slightly damaged has since been repaired. The gas sent to Nielson and Nichols Fields in tank trucks or in drums are obtained fi'om these tanks. Large supplies of gasoline are also reported stored in Puro (San Fernando, La Union) where, in the words of a.Iapanese employee to an agent, they have "enough gas for one

a

yt] :1r."

3. Alcohol. As a substitute for gasoline, alcohol is the fuel normally used for motors. Many cars and trucks are charcoal t'ed. Alcohol is obtained locally from distilleries operating in l,uzon and Visayas. The outputs for the month of July this year of the distilleries in Luzon are as follows:

Del Carmen

(Pampanga)

616,000liters

Canlubang

(Luzon)

472,000liter 340,000liters

Tarlac Nasugbu

(Batangas)

210,000 liters

La Tondena

(Manila)

241,000liters

Calumpit

(Bulacan)

140,000liters

Paniqui

(Tarlac)

110,000

Bamban

(TarIac)

101,000liters

Mana-oog

(Pangasinan)

Total

liters

95.000liters 2,325,000

litcls

To obtain a clear picture of the insufficiency of the 0uLpr-tt ()f distilleries to take care of the normal needs of alcohol as well :rs the difficulty encountered in the production of this fuel, the following measures taken to decrease consumption and assist production are enumerated:

a.

Many permits to operate motor vehicles have been revoked.

280 /

,I.IIT: VISAYAS. PAI,AWAN, MINDORO, MAST}.{TI',

MINDANA0 AND SUI,U

b.

Monbhly allowance of alcohol for vehicles (not fu*y) has been reduced (average, 100 liters monthly).

c.

Issue of alcohol limited to 5 liters per day per vehicle.

d.

Alcohol is now being obtained from confiscated sugar issueri to distilleries in spite of shortage of sugar in the country. In Luzon, one sack of brown sugar now costs P200.00.

t

4. Diesel, Bunker, Coconut and Lubricating oils. AII reports tend to show that with the possibie exception of bunker oil, sirortage is heing feit in all fine and iubricating oils. One agent reports that the motor ship he is on (operated under the Army) uses a corrbination of bunker oil, coconut oil and refined petrnleurn as fuel, while the lubricating oil issued is of varied qualitv and consistency without regards to the needs of the motor parts. He understands that Japanese motor vessels also use a combination of diesel and coconut oils. The railroad is using firewood in the freight trains and coconut oil (probably mixed with other oils) for their passenger trains. The result on the efficiency of the machines and engines is exactly what should be expected. Not only the efficiency is greatly lowered but machines and engines develop troubles which put them out of commission periodically. 5. Coal. Shortage of this fuel is affecting the operation of r.rtilities and t^actories. The Manila Gas Corporation has been forced to put a quota on the consumption of gas by their custorrrers. This quota is between I07o to 307o less than the normal consunrption. The B.T.U. of the gas produced by this corporatron is about 507o less than before the war. The Gas Company has no reselve of coal left and unless shipments from Japan are received, it may have to discontinue service in the near future. The Rizal Cement Factory has sufficient coal to operate at full capacity for about three months. It recently sent coal to the Cebu Cement Factory sufficient for one month's operation. This company had to discontinue operation before due to lack of fuel.

attied intcltigelce . .Australia T].

I

28L

COMMUNICATIONS

Mail. Post Offrces in the more important cities and towns have been gradually reopened. However, inadequacy of transportation available and mail censorship cause some delay in the 1.

delivery of the mail.

2. Telephone and Telegraph. Both the local telephone service in Manila, that of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone bo outlying cities and towns and the insular telegraph are functioning. These services are very unsatisfactory due mainly to shortage of materials for repairs of lines. The high prices paid for all electric equipment and supplies has been a great temptation for thieves to steal wiring, bulbs, etc. causing disruption in the light, telephone and telegr:aph services' 3. Radio. The Japanese are known to be operating several listening stations in Manila, the most important one being that located in samanillo Bldg., Escolta. There is also a report stating that the Union college Building is now the communications center of the Japanese in Manila. Most of the personnel working in radio stations are Filipinos. Some Philippine Army Signal Corps Officers and many enlisted men have been compelled to work for them. A plan of the R.C'A. station aL Cubao (Near Camp Murphy) is attached' Following is a list of known radio stations in Manila or vicinitY:

282 I l'.tp, vrsAyAS, PALAwAN, MINDoRo, MASBATE, MtNDANAo ANr) sut,u

RADIO STATIONS IN STATION Receiving or Transmitting

LOCATION

PERSON

Receiving Station

F. del Rosario,

1Jap., 3 Fil.

Pasay

Trans. Station (Formerly RCA)

Central Blvd., Cubao, Manila IIgts.

1Jap., 15 Fil

New Rec'g Station.

Brixton IIill,

Varie

cl

Sta. Mesa

Trans. Station (Formerly Bu. of Posts)

Pasay

1Jap., 4 F'il.

Receiving Station

Paranaque

variecl

(Formerly Mackay Trans. Stafion) New Transmitting Station

B:ilintawak

Varied

Trans. Station

Caloocan (Manila Golf Course)

5 Jap., 15 Fil.

Receiving Station

Alabang (Formerly Mackay Rec'g. Station)

Varied

Transmitting Station

Central Blvd., Cubao, Manila Heights (Former Excelsor Motion picture studio.)

Approx.

15 Japs.

allied intelligence . . Australia

I 283

MANII,A

Patrol

REMARKS

OPERATED BY

tllrARI)s

onl-v

Broadctg. CorP.

Guards w/ 2 MGs; cal. 50 See Sketch.

Sqd.7 Merr

Notrc

Norrc

2 entrances 1 at F. Harrison; 1 at Dewey Blvd.

ll

Under construction

Commttnication Bu. (Densi Kyohu)

Ncar RR tracks.

nrlcr constrttction.

Nottc

U

llrrknown

Exact location unknown. Approx. before reaching former l{JlB.

Int. Com.

Notre

Co. (Kikusi

Denki)

Still under construction but 6 trans. ready in operation.

Under construction.

None

, 10 men.

Weather Bu. and

Military

Several transmitters operating. Roof w/ camouflage painL. See Sketch.

284

I

't'up', vrsAyAS, pALAwAN, MrNDoRo, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND

suLU

il. AIR FORCES (ENEMY)

A. LUZON AND VISAYAS

1. Airfields a. The following airfields are known to be

actively operated by the Japanese: Clark Field, Zablan Pield, Neilson Airport, Nichols Field, Sta. Barbara. and Lahug Field. Many others are in the process of construclion or ar.e undergoing improvements. This is the case with Tuguegarao, Naguillan, Pasig, Lipa, Lucena, Naga, Legaspi, Bacolod and Dumaguete. 'fhere is a t'eport of a huge field in operation in Puerto Pr.incesa, Palawan, but no confinnation has been receive,cl of this iuftrrmation.

b. Little infonnation has been gathered on Clark Field aithough repurts indicate that runwa-vs have been extended anci that planes are hidden under ne:rrby trees. Like in all their other bases, the number of planes vary greatly but that it averages about 60 planes of all types. Lately, how,ever', there has been consistent report of air activiLy in the north, where flights of 70 or more planes are often seen. Appltrently, however., Clark Iield is the main base. c. 'lhe same lack of detailed inforrnation applies

to Zablan l-ield, The runways have been extended ancl are reported p:rvecl. Detailed inforrnation, however, is available on Nichols Field ancl Nielson Airport. For such details see attachecl drawings.

d. It rnay reasonably be assumed Llial the air strength in the Philippines is not very large, but their' preparations show that they are getting all facilities read.y to take cat'e for future needs if and when expansion of their air force in the Islands becorne necessary. The fields are apparently being used as ju-p off places for planes coming frorn Japan on their way to the junk pile of Wewak, Rabaul and other points in the SWPA. 2, Aircraft a. All known types of Japanese aircraft have been served in the Philippine skies.

ob-

I allied inteltigence . . Australia

I 285

b. 'l'hcre is nothing to indicate, however, that the

.lirpanose are conducting periodical operational patrols from I'hilippine bases. My own personal observations have led me to the belief that such patrols are only conducted when it is known or suspected that one or more of our patrol craft are in a given ilrea and also when convoys are to pass through certain "dangerous" areas. Reports of patrol craft leaving bases at certain hours and returning "after two hours" are pure guesswork. I have had regular pilots who observed the aerial activiLies of the enemy and their reports have always been that no definite schedule are obset'ved and that it is extremely difficult for them to determine which plane or planes left at what time and where to, One thing significant, ho'uvevet', which may possibly indicate that the Japanese h:rve noL lorverecl their training stand:rrds, is the fact tirat tltere luts nevet' lteeu au.y rellorts of clashes frotn any of tire fields for tttrttrths 1tt'iot' to tny rlclllirLttt'e.

3.

Air Defense

has been notecl LhirL Lhc rttlt.i-;tit'cr:lft guns reported in or near the airfielcls are ver.y stnull in number. other antiaircraft batterics reported insballed :tre Lhosc lrtc:tted in l)aran:rque lteach opposite the Los Tamar:ru CIub consisting of 4 - 3" guns, wiLhout sights, and manned by untllrinerl I,'ilipino I)orsonnel ancl some guns scattered in Malaclrn:urg I)iu'h, S,;ln Ilctl:l colIege, Far Eastern University, and the rgg{' 9[' flrc Mlrco l)6lo Hotel. Reports also show the presence o['trvtl iJ" rtlttl t,rvo l]7 trlttr guns in Corregidor.

a. It

b. From the information receivecl, it apl)oirrs t'lrrrt' t'hc 'lapanese are practically without effective def'cnsc ['t'ottt t.lic ground against air raids. As this situation is :rlurosl rtrtltclicvubl", it is pro[ably safer and wiser to assume that t[c ct]cnr.y hits been smart and successful enotrgh in keeping his prelxlr:tLigns along this line in great secrecy, and that thcrefirt'c, attlcking forces should not be too naive in concluding Lhc situation is what it appears to be. c. Attempts are being conducted to locate raclar and RDF installations as well as details about fighter command and plotting rooms if anY.

286

I

rp.e vtsAyAS, pALAwAN, MINDoRo, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND suLU

III. NAVAL FORCES

A. LUZON AND VISAYAS

1.

Bases and Docks

a. Cavite has been reported to be completely repaired and in full use. (see attached sketch). Dewey dry dock has been refloated and is now also in use. The same holds true for the Earnshaw docks and the repair facilities in Engineer Island. All piers in the Manila area are in good condition with Nos. 1, b and 7 in use by the Army and No. 3 exclusive for the Navy. Cebu,s docks are also reported in operation.

2.

Vessels in Philippine Waters

a. It is not known whether or not any task force are permanently assigned to the Philippines.

b. There is only one vessel in operation between Manila, Iloilo, Baraldo and Cebu. Most of the inter-island traffic is by "bateles" (overgrown life boats with sails) which are sometimes towed by launches.

c.

The following information was recently obtained on

the whereabouts of ships formerly operating in Philippine waters: SS. Dn. Jose

.Damaged - afloat in harbor.

SS. Sagoland

Under water in bay - probably to be salvaged. Under water in bay - probably to be salvaged. .Under water in bay - probably to be salvaged. .Stranded offTon - probably to be salvaged. .Probably salvaged already (N. Mindanao) Probably sdvaged already (Off Corregidor)

SS.

.

Bohol ..

SS. Samal .

.

SS. Vizcaya

SS. Mayon SS. Casiana SS. Kanlaon

...

SS. Apo

MS. Carme . MS. Palawan MS. Anakan . .

Probably salvaged already Probably salvaged already . . . .Probably salvaged already Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters. Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters.

atltad lateLllgenao, .

MS. Princess of Cebu SS. Comp.

. Ausfialta

I

. . Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters.

Filipinas

Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters.

SS. Lapus

Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters.

SS. Cetus

Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters.

SS.

Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters.

Latouche . .

Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters.

SS. Pas SS.

287

Luzon

. . Salvaged and taken out of Phil. Waters.

MS. Princess of Negros

Salvaged and in actual coastwise service

for Army & Navy. Salvaged and in actual coastwise sen'ice

MS. Kolambugan MS. Esteban Riu . MS. La

.

Florecita

MS. Santa

Teresita

forArmy & Navy. . salvaged and in actual coastwise service for Army & Navy. . . . salvaged and in actual coastwise service

for Army & Navy. .

salvaged and in actual coastwise service

for Army & NavY. SS. Dos

Hermanos

ss. Zamboanga . .

O.

ss. Dn. Juan

SS. Escalante . . . SS.

.

.

Salvaged and in actual coastwise service

for Army & Navy. . . salvaged and in actual coastwise service for Army & NavY. . . . salvaged and in actual coastwise service for Army & NavY. . . Salvaged and in actual coastwise service for Army & NavY.

Ntrs. Sra. dela Paz

.

Salvaged and in actual coastwise

serice

for Army & Navy. SS.

Ntrs. Sra. De Guia .

MS. Ventura MS. Bessie Ann

. . Salvaged and

in actual coashvise serice

for Army & Navy. . . Salvaged and in actual coastwise service for Army & Navy. . . Salvaged and in actual coastwise service for Army & Navy.

288 / run vtsAyAs, pALAwAN, MINDoRo, MASBATE, MINDANAo AND suLU SS. Tangog

Salvaged and in actual coastwise service

.

SS. Pelayo

for Army & Naly. Salvaged and in actual coastwise service for Army & Navy.

SS. Pelary

Salvaged and in actual coastwise service

SS. Pathfinder

Salvaged and in actual coastwise service

SS. Tanon

for Army & Nary. Salvaged and in actual coastwise service for Army & Nary.

for Army & Nary.

Tug Baga ex Gen . Weeks

Salvaged and in actual coastwise service

for Arnry & Nary. Tug MS. Trabajaclor'

Dledger . . SS.Bisayas... SS.

SS.Arayat... SS.

Mauban

.

SS. Magallanes

. . . . .Salvaged and in actr"ral coastu'ise serwice

for Army & Naly. .ln service - dredgingbay. . . . . .At Earnshaws - uncler lepairs. . . . . .At Earnshaw - uncler repairs. . . . . .At Cavite - unclel repairs. . . . . .At Cavite - under repairs. ....

Vessels reportecl lost: SS. Montanez, Ntra. Stra. del Rosario, Ilicol, Romblon ancl Banahao.

d. Approximately 90o/o of harbor launches have been salvaged and in use. About 50o/o of lighters, barges, bancas, cilscoes, etc. have been refloated and in use. Lost materials are rapiclly being replaced from new slipways. In Manila for instance, on 15 August 1943, four wooden ships (about 200 tons) were put to service although under sail only as no motors were available. About 18 launches (approximate 30 ft.) are also awaiting motors.

3.

Mine Fields.

a. No definite information is available to indicate the presence of mine fields in any area. For one thing it has been observed that all ships enter and leave Manila Bay by the North channel only and ships travel to and from the Bay unescorted and minus the services of port pilots.

alltt,d irrt