The Wainwright Papers: Historical Documents of World War II in the Philippines [4]

Table of contents :
Contents
I. Report of Operations of the Philippine Division, US Army by Col H. C. Browne
II. Report of Operations of the Quartermaster Corps, US Army by Brig Gen Charles C. Drake
Part I
Part II - First War Phase (1-31 Dec 1941)
Part III - Second War Phase (1 Jan - 21 Mar 1942)
Part IV - Third War Phase (22 Mar - 6 May 1942)
Part V - Operations: Southern Islands
Part VI - Quartermaster Corps Personnel
Part VII - Conclusions
III. Signal Report, US Army by Col T. T. Teague
First Phase (8-24 Dec 1941)
Second Phase (24 Dec - 21 Jan 1942)
Third Phase (1 Jan - 20 Feb 1942)
Fourth Phase (20 Feb - 20 Mar 1942)
Fifth Phase (20 Mar - 6 May 1942)
IV. Report of Operations, Finance Officer, USFIP by Col John R. Vance
Notes and Comments
Homma Faces 42 Specific Charges of Atrocities
Appendix A: Reserve Officers' Service School Class 1936 Roster
Bibliography

Citation preview

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GEN. DOUGLAS MACARTT{UR, the picture reprodueed from a ceramic mold made for Mr. Hoskins in 1949. This is the first time it is published. (Courtesy of Realty Investments, Inc,, Metro Manila through Mr. Ramon Aranzanso)

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WAR HISTO RICAL DOCUMENTS OF WORLD IN THE PHILIPPINES

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THE WAINWRIGHT PAPERS VOLUME IV Edited BY CELEDONIO A.,ANCHETA

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with Notes and Comments

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Copyright, 1982, by CELEDONIO A. ANCHETA and NEW DAY PUBLISHEITS of the Christian

Literature Society of the Philippines City 3008, Philippines

P. O. Box 167, Quezon

Alt Rights

Reserved

THE AUTHOR.EDITOR Celedonio A. Ancheta, a native of Laoag City, Philippines, is a retired associate professor of history, University of the Philippines at U.S. Clark Air Base (Philippines); a veteran of World War II, usAIilFE; and a former guerrilla leader in Panay in the visayas and in North Luzon, Philippines during the Japanese occupation' Colonel Ancheta is a lawyer, teacher, historian, researcher, and lecturer on East Asia history and westem civilization. In 1967-68, he was in southem Illinois university as F\rlbright visiting Exchange Professor of history. He has authored a dozen of books, mostly on documentary history of world war II in the Philippines and ttre resistance movement. In 1975, Ancheta was awarded a degree of Doctor of Letters, honoris causa, by the prestigious China Academy of the Republic of china. He holds degrees in history from the university of Califomia at Berkeley, a graduate degree in history from the University of southern california at Los Angeles, and a bachelor of philosophy degree from the University of the Philippines.

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PREFACE

In spite of the tedious and long hours this writer has devoted to this work, he has no regrets. He loved and enjoyed the work. It is his fervent hope that in the near future someone might be able to publish the Japanese and the Philippine Papers to allow equal and fair presentation of facts and views on the history of World War II in the Philippines. It is to his regret that Colonel Cooper's Medical Department Report, Colonel Braddock's Report of the Force Surgeon and Colonel PhilIips' History of the POW were not available at the time

that these volumes were being published. These materials would have been more than enough to constitute another volume.

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Achnowledgmenfs. This writer would like to acknowledge and express his gratitude and thanks to Miss Bezalie P. Bautista of the New Day Publishers for her patience in helping me edit The Watn' wright Papers; to the University of the Philippines and Southern Illinois Unversity for their financial assistance enabling the writer to go to the United States for resea:ch; and to members of his family who gave him the vision and inspiration. It is enough a reward if this contribution to our history would be of help to military scholars, and to Filipinos to instill in them patriotism and love of country. Celedonio A. Ancheta Quezon Ctty, Philippines January 1982

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CONTENTS VOLUME IV General Douglas MacArthur Preface Ge ne ral To moy uki Y amashita's formal surrender

I. II. III. ry.

Frontispiece lv vi

Report of Operations of the Philippine Division, U. S. ArmY bY CoI. H. C. Browne Report of Operations of the Quartermaster Corps, U. S. Army by Brig. Gen. Charles C. Drake Signal Report, U. S. Army by Col. T. T. Teague Report of Operations, Finance Officer, USFIP by Col. John R. Vance

Notes and Comments

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37 95

17L 190 195

Homma Faces 42 Spectfic Charges of Atrocities 205 Appendtx A.' Beserve Officers' Service School Roster 2L0 Bibliography Map Front Inside Cover Fort MilIs, Corregidor Island Photo Filipino Aces of the Sixth Pursuit Squadron, 36 PAAC, WW II

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The Allied officers (left--row) and' the Japanese rlelegates (right row) at a conference table during General yamashita,s formal surrender' The Allied officers from left to right: Lt. -Gen. dnathan M. wainwright, Lt. Gen. W. D. styer, Maj. Gen. Edmund S. Leavey, Lt' Gen. A. E. Percival-(British army1, I\4ajor Gener"r w""a, Ma;. GenlRouert reightter, Commander Gillete (Navy), Brigadier General McBride, and colonel voLlmann. General Yamashita is second to the lJft ,facing the Allied officers. (u.s. Army photogtaph. Courtesy of the United States International Communication Agency)

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REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE DIVISION, UNITED STATES ARMY

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A. The Philippine Division in January 1941 Previous to 1941 the Philippine Division had been organized under special tables of organization with the old square division as a basis. However, the division was not equipped as prescribed by the tables of organization of the square division and some of the units were missing in whole or in part. The division had both motor- and animal-drawn transportation. The machine gun companies and some artillery had pack transportation and particularly in the engineer regiment there were special and extra equipment. The organizations of the division were: (a) Division Headquarters, stationed at Fort McKinley; (b) Heaoquarters Company, Fort McKinley; (c) Military Police Company (plus an American platoon), Fort McKinley; (d) 12th Signal Company, Fort McKinley; (e) 14th Engineer Regiment (actually a regiment less one battalion), Fort McKinley; (f) 12th Quartermaster Regiment [achrally consisted qf Regimental Headquarters and Companies A, B, C, D, E, and F all stationed at Fort McKinley except Companies A and B (both Truck Companies) which were at the Porb Area in Manila, and Company D (Truck Company) and one platoon of Company E (Maintenance), which were at Fort Stotsenbergl; (g) 12th Medical Regiment stationed at Fort McKinley and consisted of the Headquarters and Service Company A (Collecting), Company E (Ambulance), Company G (Hospital), and the Veterinary Company-totaled about 220 enlisted men; (h) 57th Infantry at Fort McKinley; (i) 45th Infantry, Fort McKinley (except Companies A and B and most of the 1st Battalion Headquarters Company and Headquarters Battalion which were stationed at Camp John Hay near Baguio and Companies C and E and the balance of the Headquarters Company 1st Battalion which were stationed at Pettit Barracks at Zamboanga, Mindanao); A) 24th Field Artillery stationed at Fort Stotsenberg. It consisted of Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and two battalions each consisting of a Battalion Headquarters Battery and three gun batteries. They were equipped with British 75's truck drawn; (k) 23d Field Artillery stationed at Fort Stotsenberg and attached to the 24th Field Artillery. It consisted of one battery only, a pack battery (2.95 Mountain gun). The strength of the artillery at Fort Stotsenberg totaled 998 enlisted men; (l) 12th Ordnance Company, Fbrt Stotsenberg; (m) 4th Separate Chemical Company, attached to the division at Fort McKinley.

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B. R.ecruiting Campaign

In January L94L, authority was granted to the commanding general, Philippine Department, to recruit the Philippine Scouts up to the full strength of 12,000 as authorized by Congress. All posts

were given a quota to secure and all units in the Philippine Division received a considerable increase in strength. Those at Forb McKinley were given new recruits totaling 3803. These new men were carefully selected from among over 5000 prospective recruits. The larger organizations received increases as follows: L2th Medical Regiment, 170; 12th Quartermaster Begiment, about 400; 14th Engineers, about 500; 57th Infantry, about 1100;45th Infantry, about 7625. The 45th Infantry received a much larger increase than the 57th Infantry because the five companies at Camp John Hay and Pettit Barracks became companies of the 43d Infantry and five new companies were organized at Fort McKinley to replace them in the 45th Infantry, drawing their cadres from the 45th Infantry at large. Also the 45th Infantry and the 57th Infantry each organized a Howitzer Company. The strength of these two regiments was about doubled. The 14th Engineers added a new battalion and raised all companies to full strength, more than doubling the strength of the regiment. The 12th Medical Regiment got an additional strength of 170 men and was organized into a Headquarter and Service Company and three Clearing Companies (A, B, and C each with a strength of 110), Company A (Collecting), Company E (Ambulance), and a Veterinary Company. The Veterinary Company became the 4th Veterinary Company (Serrice) and was transferred to the Philippine Department. The reason for this change was to fit the organization better into WPO-3, each Clearing Company having elements of Hospital, Ambulance, and Collecting Platoons. The 12th Quartermaster Regiment added a Service Company, three Battalion Headquarters Companies, increased the Headquarter Company from 11 to 69 men and brought all the units up to full authorized strength. The Field Artillery at Fort Stotsenberg got 1100 recruits. Key men were sent from the 23d Field Artillery and 24th Field Artillery to form new units. The 24th Field Artillery sent the British 75's of two batteries to the 23d Field Artillery and got an equal number of.2.95 Mountain guns. The one battery of the 23d Field Artillery was expanded to a battalion consisting of a Headquarter

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PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

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and Headquarter Battery, two batteries of British 75's (Partee) and one battery 2.95 pack.

The 24th Field Artillery battalions were organized into two batteries British 75's (truck-drawn) and one battery of 2.95 pack. These organizations were brought to full strength. The balance of the 1100 recruits plus key men from the 23d and 24th Field Artilleries went to form the 88th Field A.rtillery consisting of two battalions. Each battalion consisted of a Battalion Headquarter and Headquarter Battery and two gun batteries (75's truckdrawn). Also formed was one battalion of the 86th Field Artillery consisting of a'Headquarter and Headquarter Battery and two gun batteries (155 GPF). Later the headquarter battery was changed to a gun battery making three gun batteries and no headquarter battery. The recruiting campaign ended in the first week of April L94L, the required number of recruits having been obtained. C. Training

in 1941

Intensive training was started concurrently with the recruiting. The thirteen-week basic training program was made the basis of training but was condensed somewhat. Excellent results were obtained as a good corps of officers and non-commissioned officers was available. I\{ore firing especially combat firing would have been desirable, but the state of ammunition supply in the Philippines did not permit this. After basic training was completed, training of platoons, companies, battalions, and regiments was taken up in that order. A couple of combat team exercises were held at Fort McKinley and vicinity. One division CPX was held on the Fort Stotsenberg reservation and a series of division exercises was planned for on Fort Stotsenberg reservation. These were to be held in October 1941 and were to last about two weeks. They were postponed twice due to several r€osonsr The final date was set for in December but as the war started on 8 December this final series of division exercises (one and two sided) was never held. D. Special Security Measures

As the tension between the United States and Japan grew, precaution for the security of Fort McKinley and the protection of property and stores were taken. The interior guard was increased. Special guards (detached guards in some cases) were

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placed over aviation gas and bombs for the Air Corps. These were later replaced by guards furnished by Nichols Field. Plans to com-

bat incendiary bombing were made and put into effect.

Some

special fire fighting equipment were assembled. In May, a plan for defense against paratroops and protection of critical points was

drawn up. One feature called foq the holding of one company reinforced with machine guns in barracks at all times with trucks in the immediate vicinity for the instant dispatch to the threatened area" Another feature called for the establishment of several detached air guard posts manned twenty-four hours a day and special signal communication linking them up with the telephone central at Fbrt McKinley. These special guards were put on early in May 1941. The plan further called for the division of the reservation and vicinity into areas for defense, to each of which was assigned one of the major units of the division. Several exercises were held to practice all units and to insure that all men and units were familiar with their duties and the plan as a whoie. About this time, the number of guards over the stores in Bataan was increased from a company to a battalion. Barracks were built at Limay for these troops where they stayed when not actually on guard over the stores or at the out-guard on the west coast of Bataan. The stores at Bataan had been greatly increased and a large number of small warehouses and roads had been built by the 14th Engineers and civilian labor in 1940 and 1g41. This was a Philippine Department project. E. Losses of Personnel

On 28 July 1941, the USAFFE Headquarters was organized and immediately the division began to lose personnel to this and other headquarters that were called into service and to which large numbers of officers and men were taken from the division to induct, administer, and train these new units. Also a number of noncommissioned officers and specialists were taken for cadres to form new units. For example, fifty truck drivers were taken to drive trucks for self-propelled artillery battalions and a large number of specialists were taken from the Division Signal Company and the Infantry Headquarters Companies to form a communication unit for USAFFE. This loss of personnel began on 28 July and continued until war was declared, and until the time of surrender almost. All units from Division Headquarters down were affected. It is estimated that between these dates the division lost about one-third of its officers and one-third of its higher non-

t PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

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commissioned officers, and a large number of specialists. As an example, the Division Headquarters lost the division commander, the second in command division artillery officer, G-2, G-3, adjutant general, division quartermaster, surgeon, signal officer and several assistants. Fortunately replacements were available. F. Post Service Command

Starting probably in June 194L, plans for a Post Service Command were made. There were changes several times as the War Plans and th'e mission of Fort McKinley were changed. At least three Tables of Organization were made. The top figure bqsed on a large base hospital at Fort McKinley and the post being used as a temporary garison for troops passing through, called for a total of around 1000 officers and men. Some of the officers at Fort McKinley had mobilization assignments in the Post Service Command. Some units such as the Post Hospital and Post Quartermaster Detachments were exclusively the Post Service Command but due to the shortages of personnel many officers who would accompany the division in the field also had peace time duties with the post. For example, the division commander was also post commander. The chief of staff also post executive; division surgeon and division quartermaster were post surgeon and post quartermaster respectively, etc. A number of men in the Quartermaster Regiment performed duties with the post quartermaster detachment also, to cite. About the early part of September 1941 when plans were being made to shrink the Quartermaster, Engineer, and Medieal Regiments down to battalions and to use the 45th Infantry (PS) to bring the 57th Infantry (PS) up to full war strength, it was planned to use the excess in part to fully man the Post Service Command. Plans had been completed and the men selected and tentatively assigned. Since the 45th Infantry (PS) took the field as a unit, the Post Service Command was never fully manned. G. Projected Reorganization of Philippine Division

It was probably in the later part of September that Headquarters USAFFE decided to reorganize the Philippine Division as a "New Triangular Divisionl' at war strength. The division was to be part Scout units and part American units. Part of the Division Headquarters and Military Police Company was to be Filipino and part American. The same for the artillery. The 31st Infantry )

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THE WAINWRIGHTPAPERS

(American) was made part of the division and to be brought up to full war strength by replacements from the United States. The 45th Infantry (PS) was to be used largely as filler replacements to bring the 57th Infantrv (PS) up to full war strength. The excess Scout personnol gained by shrinking the Engineer, Quartermaster, and Medical Regiments to battalions used to form new units and in the Post Service Command. A National Guard Regiment was to be brought from the United States and be made the third infantry regiment in the division. It was to a great regret by all concerned that the 45th Infantry (PS), a highly efficient organization with a fine history, would have to be broken up; but with the limitation of 12,000 Scouts and the new units to be forrned or old ones brought to war strength, it was felt necessary to scrap the 45th Infantry (PS). However, this did not come to pass as war came before it was accomplished though all plans had been fully compteted. The division with the exception of the three infantry regiments was organized on the basis of the Triangular Division a few days before war was declared, the replacements for the infantry not having arived from the United States. The enlisted strength present in the infantry regiments was about as follows: 31st Infantry (US), 1500; 45th Infantry (PS) and 57th Infantry (PS) each about 2000. They had no regimental medical detachment. There was no medium artillery. On 8 December 1941 when war was declared the troops and stations were as follows: at Fort McKinley, Division Headquarters and Military Police Company (PS), 12th Medical Battalion (PS), 12th Quartermaster Battalion (PS), 45th Infantry (PS) one battalion (1st.Bn) was at Limay, Bataan, 4th Separate Chemical Company (American) attached, 57th Infantry (PS). At Manila: 31st Infantry (American) one battalion was bi' vouacked at Fort McKinley. At Fort Stotsenberg:24th Field Arbillery (PS), 23d Fleld Artillery (PS), a battalion unit consisting of two batteries 75's (Partee) and one battery 2.95 gun, 12th Ordnance Company (attached). With the exception of the newly organized 12th Engineer Battalion, all of the above units were at greatly reduced strength. There were many last minute withdrawals. H. Combat Team Organization

The units had been organized into combat teams as follows:

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PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

31 31st Inf (US) 2Sd FA (PS)

CombatTeam

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Combat Team 45

Combat Team 57

45th Inf (PS)

57 Inf (PS) 1st Bn 24th EA (PS) Co A 14th Eng Bn (PS) Co C 12th Med Bn (PS)

2dBn24tb FA (PS)

Co C 14th Engr Bn (PS) Co A 12th Med Bn (PS) Co B 12th Med Bn (PS) Co B 14th Engr Bn (PS)

very little combat team training had been done prior to the declaration of war.

I. Equipment

l.Arms.Thestatusofarmsandamrnunitioninthedivision

been available to it left much to be desired. The division had shortage serious a was there but rifle M-1 armed and trained with of the modem infantry Yveapon' i.e. light machine guns, 60-mm and 81,mm mortars, .50 caliber machine guns and the new 37-mm antitank gun (only 3 per infantry r6giment)' Some of the other gun unweapons ivere'oUsolescent, for examnle, the old 37-mm The mortars. French 3-inch rifle, automatic *oditi"d Browning medium no was There described' previously as *a, "*iftuty division. artillery in the"rrrruJ for 2. Ammunition. There was enough small arms ammunition individual requirements but there was no 60-mm ammunition' very litfle gi_mm ammunition. The 3-inch mortar ammunition grewas-about fifty per cent defective and the quality of hand was nades *at tt"giigiUle. The lack of high angle fire ammunition jungle in particularly t6ti-ort due to the value of these weapons iarfare. The lack of reserve of infantry weapons for replacements was no less serious.

3. Equtpment. The main shortage in equipment was in motor vehicles which was solved in part uy ttre acquisition of commercial vehicles on the outbreak of the war. Enough was secured to move the division. There was shortage of fire control equipment; no motor reserve. Signal equipment was adequate except there was no radio equipment una Uttt" tet"*". Salvage and the exploration of civilian resources helPed sorne. J. War Plans

The war plans obtained prior to the establishment of Headquarters usAFFE for the use of the division in case of our invaJion rraa been revoked. on b December, the commanding general,

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Philippine Division was notified verbally that in case of hostilities the division would be held in Army Reserye and initial station in the vicinity of Bongabong, Nueva Ecija province would come under his control. The area near Tayug, pangasinan was reconnoitered by the staff and the Headquarters 0tst oivision (pA) contacted such general plans as were possible. in the limited time available to the division. K. War Declared on 8 December 1g41

on 8 December 1941, \ivord was received that the Japanese had'bombed Pearl Harbor and war was declared that mornini. The troops of Fort McKinley moved out of barracks and in the area as provided in the plans for the defense of Fort McKinley. Later in the day, the airfields at Iba, Zambales, Clark Fleld, pampanga and Baguio were bombed. (The 1st Battarion, 4bth infantry moved from Limay and took a position in beach defense at Bagac, Bataan in the afternoon of 8 December.) L. Nichols Field Bombed g and 10 December

At 0310, 9 December, Nichols Field was bombed. Some of the planes flew over Fort McKinley. some bombs dropped short of their target and struck the area of the 14th Engin""rlrsy causing a few casualties. These were the first casualtG suffered uv trre division. on 10 December, Nichols Field was again bombed and Fort McKinley, Nielson Airport and zablan Field *"re strafed but no casualties were suffered by the division. The attack took place about L247 and some troops of the division fired at the low flying planes. Individuat shelters were constructed on g, g, and 10 December (property turned in and stored, etc.). M. Move into the Fleld

shortly after the- afu raid on 10 December, the commanding general was summoned to Headquarters usAFFE and was infgrmed of the reported landing of hostile paratroops in the vicinity of Arayat, Pampanga. He was informed that ihe previously discarded war Plans were again in effect and w.as insiructed to proceed without delay, investigate the reported landing of paralroogs near Angat, reduce any hostile activity ana tafe up tfre Bamban-Arayat position, prepare to reinforce ttte tto*t Luzon Force or cover its withdrawal in case such action was necessary.

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PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

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The division commander returned to Division Headquarters at once and ordered the 57th Infantry (PS) to proceed to the vicinity of Arayat and carry out the first part of the mission, and the other units of the division to proceed to their position on the BambanArayat line. Accordingly, early afternoon of 10 December, the 2d Battalion, 5?th Infantry (PS) moved out followed by the 1st and 2d Battalions al} fully motorized, its transportation augmented by

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civilian motor transportation. The regiment cleared the post before dark and followed the route Pasig-Marikina'Biga-PlaridelCalumpit-San Fbmando-Mexico. The other elements of the Combat Team 57; Company A, 14th Engineers; and CompmY C, Medical Battalion were attached. The artillery was to join enroute. The remainder of the troops of the division at Fort McKinley followed the 57th Infantry (PS) to their positions, in this order: Rear Echelon Division Headquarters under the chief of staff, Slgnal Company, Headquarters and Military Police Company and Medical Battalion; 45th Infantry (PS); 31st Infantry (US). The elements of the combat team accompanied the infantry regiments, exeept the artillery was to join enroute or at their positions. The division commander and part of the staff remained at Fort McKin' ley till all troops had cleared early in the morning of 11 December. The move out of the post was made without any serious difficulty but delay was caused by the late arrival of civilian transportation. Plan had been made for certain civilian companies to furnish motor transportation but enroute to Fort McKinley a large number of drivers deserted their vehicles due to the bombing and it was necessary for the division to locate the transportation furnish drivers and service the vehicles. While the 57th Infantry (PS) was enroute, the division commander was informed that the reported landing of hostile paratroops in the vicinity of Arayat was false and he was directed to abandon the Arayat mission and to oecupy a position from which he could cover the withdrawal of troops into the Bataan Peninsula, resist hostile landings in the vicinity of Subic Bay and prevent any advance of the enemy from the direction of Olongapo, and extend the beach defenses on the west coast of Bataan from Bagac;to Aglaloma Bay. Part of the 57th Infantry (PS) had alrgady passed through San Fernando enroute to Mexico. These were turned around an{ the 57th Infantry (PS) directed to take up the Porac-Guagua position. Some delay and confusion were caused by this but it proved not serious. It caused the temporary assignment of the artillery of Combat Team 45th and Combat Teaq 57th to be switched. Other units were given new locations and missions.

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N. Position on

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December 1941"

The morning of 11 December found all units in or entering the to accomplish their assigned mission. The 57th Infantry (PS) was in assembly areas along Guagua-Porac highway prepared to take up a position on the Guagua-Porac line to cover the withdrawal of friendly troops into the Bataan peninsula and to protect the west flank from any advance from that direction. The 45th Infantry (PS) (less the 1st Bn) was in assembly area on the Dinalupihan-Olongapo highway near the zrgzag prepared to resist hostile landing in Subic Bay and prevent hostile adtance from that direction. The 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was defending the Bagac Bay area. The 31st Infantry (US) (less 1st Bn) was in assembly area on the Pilar-Bagac highway near Km l-37.5 in division reserve. The lst Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) was in Manila defending the Port Area and Headquarters USAFFE. The 23d trleld Artillery was in support of the 45th Infantry (PS) near zigzag on the Olongapo road. The 1st Battalion, 24th Field Artillery was supporting the 57th Infantry (PS) on the Guagua-Porac line. The 2d Battalion, 24th Field Artillery was in assembly area.near the 31st Infantry (US) on the Pilar-Bagac road just west of Km 137.5. The Division Headquarters (less rear echelon ), Headquarters Provisional Artillery Brigade, Headquarters and Military Police Company and 12th Signal Company were a1l in Hermosa, Bataan. Rear Echelon Division Headquarters was in Limay. The 14th Engineer Battalion (PS) (less two companies) and 12th Medical Battalion (less three Collecting Companies) were in Orani. These companies were with the Infantry Regiments to which they were normally attached for combat. The 12th Quartermaster Battalion was in Samat. The 12th Ordnance Company was in Samat. On 11 December, the Philippine Division changed frorn Army Reserve to Bataan fbrce. areas assigned them prepared

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23 December

This period was directed mainly to the organization strengthening of the positions that the division had taken up. Only minor changes occurred. On L2 December, one battalion of the b7th Infantry (PS) was moved from the Guagua-Porac line to Abucay and placed directly under control of the division commander. On 14 December, the following moves were made to dispose units more favorable for their probable future employment: Division Headquarters (less Rear Echelon) and Special Tloops to Abucay;

PHILIPPINE DMSION, U. S.

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ARMY

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14th Engineer Battalion (less two companies) to Balanga; 12th Medical battalion (less Companies A, B, and C) to junction of Trail 10 and East road; 12th Quartermaster Battalion to Damalog tiail, two miles west of East road; 12th Ordnance Company to Pilar.

Distributing points for signal, engineer, medical, and quartermaster suppliei accompanied their respective service agencies and opened for distribution at the new location the next day' On 1? December, the Lst Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was attached to the 31st Division (PA), Brigadier General Bluemel commanding, which the day before had withdrawn from zambales province into the Bataan peninsula and bivouacked in the vicinity Lf B"gu". Bluemel was assigned to command the Bagac Bay Defense Sector and had command of all troops in that sector' On 19 December, due to the reported presence of hostile vessels in the vicinity of subic Bay, the birttalion of the 57th Infantry GS) in Division Resewe at Abucay was sent to Olongapo with orders to repel any hostile attempt at landing at or near that point. On 20 December, the 57th Infantry (less one battalion) was shifted forward to an east, west line stride Highway No. 3 through Angeles with orders to cover the withdrawal of the North Luzon Foices from the north, paying particular attention to the west flank. The 2d Infantry (PC) which had been inducted into the service of the usAFFE but three days previously was attached to the 57th Infantry (Ps) and assigned to a position on the east flank of the Angeles line. On 22 December, the threat of a hostile landing at Subic Bay having temporarily disappeared, the battalion of the 57th Infantry (PS) ient to Olongapo on 19 December was withdrawn and returnod to control of the commanding officer, 5?th Infantry (PS)' It was placed in Regimental Reserve behind the Angeles line. P. Change

of Commanders of Bataan Force 24 December

On 24 December, Brig. Gen. George Parker, Jr. arrived at the division cP at Abucay and assumed command of the Bataan Force. This placed the control of the Philippine Division under his control but caused no immediate move of any of the units.

Q. 25 December

to 15 January Division Part of Bataan

Force

This period was marked by the rapid withdrawal of the North

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Luzon and south Luzon Forces into Bataan. some changes of position of Philippine Division units occurred and positions

strengthened.

on 25 December, Division Headquarters (less rear echelon) moved from Abucay to Km lQz.r o'ihe pilar-Bagac road. Headquarters 12th Quartermaster riittation joined the r-emainder of its battalion on the Damalog trail. The 14th Engineer Battalion (less two-compahies) moved to the Damalog trail. The Blst Infantry (less 1st Bn) moved from the pilar-Bagac road at Km 1B?.8 to Abucay in reserve. on 26 December, the 12th l\{edical Battalion moved from Limay to a point about one mile northwest of Rodriguez Park opposite Km 15b.b East road. The 45th Infantry (pS) (less 1st Bn) moved from near the zigzag on the olongapo-Dinalupihan road and the vicinity of Km rrr.r on the Fil"*-Bug"" road; the 23d Fleld Artillery from vicinity of the zrgzag to positioir just south of culis; the 2d Battalion, 24th Fi;H-aruilery from near Km 137.5_on the pilar-Bagac road to a position in sujport of the 1st Battalion, 4bth Infantrv (Ps) on beach defense at Bagac. On 27 Decernber, the 31st Infantry (less 1st Bn) moved from Abucay to culis where the 2Bd rieH artiltery was already in position. on 29 December, the lst Battalion Btst tntantry (us) which had been in'Manila joined the rest of the regiment ui c.rtir. on 30 December, the Blst Infantry (less 1st Bn) moved from culis to vicinity of. zigzag to cover the west flank of the withdrawal of the south Luzon Force into Bataan; the 2Bd Field Artillery followed the 31st Infantry in support; and the 1st Battalion, Blst Infantry moved to just'south of orion and put to work on the 'seeond Battle Position in that sector. on 81 becember, the b?th Infantry (PS) was withdrawn from the Angeles position [o Abueay and took up position on the First Batfle position as follows: outpost Line of Resistance-rast and west line through samal; Main Line of Resistance-ast and west line through Mabatang; Headquarters and Regimental Reserue at Abuca-v. The 1st Battalion, 24th Field Artillery accompanied the b7th Infantry (PS) and took up a position in support oflt at Abucay. The 41st Division (pA) which,moved into Bataan on24 and, 25 December extended the line to the west. on B1 December, thc general, philippine Division placed in command -commanding of the East sector. on b January, Division Headquarters (less Rear Echelon) and special rroops moved to Damaloi trail aLout two miles west of East road. The 14th Engineer Battalion move to junction of rrail 10 and East road. rhe Stst Infantry fless 1st Bn) moved from the zrgzag on the olongapo road to a posiiion west of

I

)

PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

15

the highway to Culis. The 23d Field Artillery accompanied the 31st Infantry and took up a position in direct support to Culis. The 12th Ordnance Company moved to an area just west of the East road at junction of East road and Damalog trail. This unit was continuously engaged in servicing all artillery in the east sector or wherever needed. It rendered exceptional and outstanding service. R.6 January L942, The Ftrst Engagement, Culis* Loss of 23d Fteld Artillery

At 0145, 6 January, the last troops of the North Luzon Force withdrew into Bataan. At 0200 the Layac Junction bridge was destroyed and the North Luzon Florce was behind the covering force which was occupying a generally east and west line through Culis. The covering force was disposed in order from right to left: 71st Infantry (PA), 72d Infantry (PA), 31st Infantry (US) and the L] c4 26th Cavalry (PS). The 72d Infantry was astride the East road and }J the 31st Infantry was west of the road. One battalion of selfpropelled artillery was attached to the 31st Infantry (US) and the 28d Fleld Artillery was in direct support. The enemy followed NlIT close on the rear of the retiring North Luzon Force and about () 0830 was fired on by our artillery. This was the first engagement participated in bytroops of the Philippine Divhion. The fight on this position continued through the day and was marked by severe artillery duels. The 23d Field Artillery (consistrng of one battalion only) came under intense counter-battery and was destroyed losing eleven of its twelve guns. The enemy had complete air superiority. Under cover of darkness on the night of 6 January the covering force withdrew leaving the enemy in possession of the Culis position. The 31st Infantry (US) withdrew to Damalog trail. On 6 January the I and II Corps were formed. General Wainwright commanded the I Corps and the West Sector, and General Parker, Jr. the II Corps and the East Sector of the Bataan defen-

Ht

sive system.

S.7 January, Division in USAFFE Resenre the Philippine Division was placed in USAFFE had attached to it for supply ttre 41st Division (PA) and 51st Division (PA). The Provisional Tank Brigade, the Provisional Air Corps Begiment and the Provisional Self-Propelled Mount Battalion with the Philippine Division made over 18,000

On

7- January

Besenre.

It

22''t7

t l l -LLRt

t6

THE WAINWRIGHT PA}ERS

men and 1300 vehicles.

The 57th Infantry (PS) with 1st Battalion?4t'h Field Artillery in support remained in position on the First Battle Position (Abucay-Hacienda Line). The 45th Infantry (PS) (less 1st Bn) was in bivouac near Km 155.5 on the Pilar-Bagac road. The 1st Battalion, 45th Infantrv (PS) with the 2d Battalion,2Lth Field Artil-

lery in support was on beach defense at Bagac. The 31st Infantry (US) was engaged in preparing the Second Battle Position just south of Orion. The 23d Field Artillery had ceased to exist. Its men were transferred to other organizations.

T.8 to

14 January in USAFFE Resenre

This period was largely a period of reconnaissance and development by the Japanese for an attack on the [{ain Battle Position. After the engagement at Culis they used patrols and reconnaissance in force. They made contact with the Abucay-Hacienda line on 8 January. Contact was maintained on 8 to 10 January. On the night of 10 January and on the night of 11 January the 3d Battalion 57th Infantry (PS) on the Abucay line was attacked by the Japanese, estimated in each case as a battalion. Both attacks were repulsed with heavy loss to the Japanese. On 14 January the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry was relieved from beach defense at Bagac, moved to Km 148.5 on Pilar-Bagac road and placed on a defensive position on Trail 7. On 12 January the rear echelon moved to a point one mile west of Km 148.9 East road. On 14 and 15 January enemy pressure increased against the Abucay-Hacienda line. On the night of 14 January the 45th Infantry (PS) and 2d Battalion, 24th Fteld Artillery were moved from the West to the East Sector and went into bivouac near Bani. On 15 January an Advance CP was established. Personnel consisted of commanding general, chief of staff, G-2 and G-3 sections and detachment from Signal and Headquarters and Military Po1ice Company. The rest of the Fonnard Echelon*of Division Headquartens was left on the Damalog trail under G-4. The Advance CP fimt went to vicinity of Km 144 Pilar-Bagac road and next day to a point on the Maldica River about two kilometers north of the Pilar-Bagac road where it remained t:dl24 January. The 45th Infantry (PS) moved from Bani to an assembly area on the Silisay River on night of 15 January, and the 2d Battalion,24th Field Artillery put into position to support the Abucay-Hacienda line, and the SLst Infantry (US) moved up to an assembly area just east of Bani. On 16 January the enemy broke through the 51st Division (PA) on the extreme left of the

PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

Ll

Main Battle Position (Abueay-Hacienda-Mt. Natib). The 51st Division withdrew creating a serious situation on that flank. In the aftemoon the 31st Infantry (US) was moved up to a position on the Abucay-Hacienda line about three miles west of Abucay and orders were issued for the 45th Infantry (PS) to move at once to the Ieft flank of the Abucay-Hacienda position and halt any attempted advance of the enemy on that flank. On the moming of 17 January the 31st Infantry (US) moved into position east of the Hacienda and attacked in a northerly direction, with the 2d Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion on the left, to reestablish the main line of resistance and to protect the exposed left flank of the 41st Division (PA). The 2d Battalion advanced a short way and was stopped by heavy hostile resistance, leaving a gap between this battalion and the 41st Division (PA) on its right. The 1st Battalion pushed its attack successfully to the main line of resistanee, thus leaving a gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions on its right. The 3d Battalion 45th Infantry attacked on the left of the 1st Battalion 31st Infantry and also reached the main line of resis' tance, and in contact with the 31st Infantry, but not in contact with the rest of the regiment. The country was very much broken and wooded contact was lost between the 3d Battalion and the rest of the regiment and was extremely difficult to maintain between any unit as it went forward. The 3d Battalion, 45th In' fantry was attached to the 31st Infantry and was the left element on the Abucay-Hacienda line. Therefore the west flank was ex' posed. On the night of 1? January, the 45th Infantry (Iess 3d Bn) moved into the gap between the 41st Division (PA) and the 31st Infantry (US). On 18 January the 31st Infantry failed to mahe any advance. At 1600 the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) attacked from a position on the right of the 31st Infantry (US) in adirection slightly west of north and by 1845 reached its objective on the main line of resistance. However when it reached the main line of resistance it was in contact neither with the 41st Division (PA) on its right or the 31st Infantry on its left rear. There was a gap of about 1000 yards on its right and one of about 1200 or 1500 yards on its left. The 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry was moved into a position in reserve behind the interval between the 31st Infantry (US) ana the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS). On 19 January the 31st Infantry continued its effort to dislodge the enemy from the Hacienda pocket. Early in the day the 1st Battalion, 45th In' fantry (PS) was withdrawn to regain contact with the 31st Infan' try (US). Later in the day the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS)

,,,

_j)

18

lr;

THE WAINWRIGHT PAPERS

and the 2d Battalion, 4bth Infantry (2d Bn on the left) again attacked by the north and reached the main line of resistance. After this successful attack there still remained a gap of about 750 yards between the 4bth Infantry (ps) units trre arrt "rraBattalion, Division (PA). contact patrol was sent out by the 1st 45th Infantrv (PS) to cover the gap and coniact was established and maintained thereafter. On 20 January, there was brisk action throughout the day in the Hacienda pocket but no material change was developed. The enemy succeeded in infiltrating about one company through the line and in rear bt trre 2d Battalion, 4bth Infantry 1rs1. trris trostile force was encircled by the Blst Infantry 1us), arfir Infantry (PS) and some elements of the 41st Division (pA)-but managed to escape on the night of the 20th but left behind a large number of casualties. on 21 January, the pressure against the Stst Infantry (us) was increased greatly and it was evident that the enemy was preparing to effect a movement around the left flank from the direction of Mt. Natib. The Blst Infantry (us) made a strong effort to dislodge the enemy but with no success. About 1500, the 1st Battalion, 4bth Infantry (pS) was moved to the east so as to make contact with the 41st Division (pA) and the line was refused to the southwest towards the Abucay-Hacienda road and thus presented a uniform.front to the threatened attack from the direction of Mt. Natib. The 2d Battalion, 4bth Infantrv (ps) was ordered to conform to this movement and made contact with the Blst Infantrv (us) on its left. However, it did not fully complete the movement and make the contemplated change of front and contact. It stopped short of the desired position and left a gap between its right and the lst Battalion, 31st Infantry (US). _ on 22 January, the situation on the left flank grew worse. Repeated attacks and counterattacks took place butio material gains were made. on the contrary, the lst Bittalion, slst Infantry (us) was forced to withdraw from the main line of resistance to a position south of the Abucay-Hacienda road and facing Mt. Natib. The 3d Battalion, Blst Infantry (us) withdrew to-the rear and made contact with the 2d Battalion, Blst Infantry (us) on its right along the Abucay-Hacienda road. But there was riitt u g.p ot, its left flank and the lst Battation, 31st Infantry (us) whilh was south of the road. The Bd Battalion, 45th Infantry ifS;, *t i"t was still attaehed to the Blst Infimtry (us) and had been'on the main line of resistance and on the extreme left and abreast of the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (us), was withdrawn through the gap

I PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

19

lst Battalions, 31st Infantry (US) and placed the 31st Infantry (US) Reserve. It made several counterattacks to stop the enemy who was determined in his efforts to penetrate the gap. Those counterattacks were more or less successful but the threat against the left flank of the 1st Battalion, 4bth Infantry (pS) was becomiqg more dangerous. Late in the afternoon of 22 January, word was received at Headquarters Philippine Division from Headquarters II Corps to have a representative of the commanding general, Philippine Division at the Advance Command Post II Corps (northern exit of Pilar) at 1000, 23 January to receive orders. The commanding general, Philippine Divhion was at the Headquarters 41st Division (PA) since 18 January where he was in closer touch with the commanding officers of his three infantry regiments and where at the same time he had wire communication with his command post on the Maldica River and other headbetween the 3d and

quarters.

On 23 Januar5r, the chief of staff and G-3, Philippine Division were at the Advance Command Post II Corps, and received between 1000 and 1"230 from G-3, II Corps an oral warning order for the withdrawal from the Main Battle Position, and occupation of the Beserve Battle Position. This order directed: (1) That on the night of 23 January the artillery begin withdrawal by echelon and that the withdrawal be completed by daylight 25 January; (2) That on the night of 24 Jantary the infantry would be as follows: (a) a covering force under the command of the eommanding general, Philippine Division having one-third the strength of each of the 31st Infantry (US) and 57th Infantry (PS), to begin withdrawal from the Main Battle Position at 1900, 24 January and take up a covering position in the vicinity of Balanga to cover the withdrawal of the main elements from the Abucay-Hacienda line. (b) main elements to begin withdrawal at 230O and leaving behind a shell to screen and protect their withdrawal. (c) the shell to begin its withdrawal at 0300, 25 January. (d) the withdrawal to be completed by daylight 25 January. . (e) the 45th Infantry (PS) upon withdrawal to proceed to an ssembly area about 600 yards southwest of the junction of TYaiIs 8 and 9 in the sector of the I Corps. 3. That the covering force begin its withdrawal from the covering position at Balanga at 2330 of 25 January and complete their withdrawal by daylight on morning of 26 January. The remainder of the 23d Infantry (PA) was devoted to hold.t'j*

*

20

THE WAINWRIGHT PAPDRS

ing the enemy and making plans (and reconnaissance) for the withdrawal. On the 24th, Fleld Order No. 2 Headquarters II Corps dated 23 January was received. This order confirmed all the instructions contained in the Warning Order received on the 23d and directed that upon withdrawal from the Main Battle Positions, Headquarters Philippine Division would assume command of Subsector D of the Reserve Battle Position which would be ganisoned in the order named from east to west by the 21st Division (PA), 41st

Division (PA), and the 57th Infantry (PS) (Philippine Division); that the 31st Infantry (US) upon the completion of the covering force task, would withdraw to a bivouac area west of Limay in II Corps Reserve; that the 24th Field Arbillery (less 2d Bn) would be absorbed by the Provisional Artillery Brigade, and that the entire withdrawal would be completed on the night of 25 January. On the night of 23 January, the 24th Field Artillery began withdrawal by echelon as ordered. The 2d Battalion,24th Field Artillery went to the West Sector with the 45th Infantry (PS). On the night of 24 January, the Advance Command Post was moved from the it{aldica River to the vicinity of Km 137 on the Pilar-Bagac road.

The Provisional Air Corps Fegiment was withdrawn from the division and moved to just south of Orion on the Resenre Battle Position. The 45th Infantry (PS) moved into the West Sector and went into bivouac about 600 yards southwest of the junction of Ttails 5 and 7. The 31st Infantry (US) took up a covering position at Balanga astride of the East road. The 57th Infantry (PS) occupied a covering position on the left (west) of the 31st Infantry (US) and two units of fire and three days Class I rations were laid down on their respective subsector defense positions, each for 21st Division (PA), 41st Division (PA), and 57th Infantry (PS). This advance issue of ammunition and rations was made because the only approach to Subsector D position was via the East road and the Pilar-Bagac road, but the Pilar-Bagac road would be denied to our troops after the withdrawal; and because the service of supply to our troops in Subsector D would be extremely difficult until usable roads and trails could be opened up into the position. On the 25th, all preparations for the withdrawal were completed so far as Headquarters Philippine Division was concerned. The Forward Echelon of Division Headquarters (less Advance CP)

B.

!ry PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

2L

Division Headquarters and Military Police Comnany (less detachments) and a detachment of 12th Signal Company were moved from the Damalog trail to a position about one kilometer west of Km 148.9 on the East road, under the immediate supervision of G-4. This move placed in one locality the above and the Rear Echelons of Division Headquarters and the t2th Quartermaster Battalion. The Forward and Rear Echelons remained in this position under the supervision of G-4 until 7 April. The 12th Ordnance Company (attached) was moved to a position on the East road near LimaY. On the 25th, at L925, an officer-messenger (Captain Dunmyer) arrived at the Advance cornmand Post and transmitted a change in the withdrawal order. This change directed that the 57th Infantry (PS), upon the completion of its task in the covering force, would be withdrawn to a bivouac area just north of Limay in Army Reserve and the 33d Infantry (PA) would occupy and defend the sector of Subsector D which had previously been assigned to the 5?th Infantry (PS). Inasmuch as some elements of the 57th Infantry (PS) had already moved into Subsectot D this change neces' sitated the crossing of units in motion and resulted in some confusion. However, during the night of 25 January, the withdrawal from the Main Battle Position to Subsector D was completed as ordered, and the morning of the 26th found all troops assigned to the Subsector in or entering their assigned sector and engaged in organizing and strengthening the position. The very superior and outstanding work of the division chief of staff during this critical period of withdrawal of directing and coordinating the planning and operations of the general and special staff sections of the division staff and supenrising the movements out of the Main Battle Position and into the Reserve Battle Position is especially worthy of mention (also the work of G-3 and G-4). On 26 Janua4r, the 45th Infantry (PS) moved into an assembly area at Saysain River and cut-off Trail 39. The 57th Infantry (PS) moved into bivouac on l\'Iariveles cut-off, except one bat' talion which went into bivouac near Km 138 West roadOn the 26th, the Advance Command Post of the Philippine Division (Hq Subsector D) was established near the southern end of Tlail 44-a, southeast of Mt. Samat. U. 27 January to Aprii l942-Subsector D

'

During the period

?

January

to April, the history of the

;1

22

TI{E WAINWRIGHT PAPERS

Philippine Division (less its infantry regiments and the 24th Field Artillery) is largely the history of Subsector D as commanded and administered by the commanding general of the Philippine Division as previously stated; the combat troops garrisoning this subsector were all Philippine Army units and consisted of the 21st Division (PA), 41st Division (PA), and the 33d Infantry (pA). Throrigh the entire period, these units remained in Subsebtor D under the command of Headquarters Philippine Division without change, excepting a brief relief of the 33d Infantry (pA) on B March to 3 April 1942. Under the command of the commanding general, philippine Division, the organic units of the division performed not only their normal functions, but also carried out the function of performing or supervising all the duties of the Philippine Army units which came under the command of the Headquarters philippine Division. The 14th Engineer Battalion (PS) continued to construct and improve roads and trails leading into and within the subsector; to supervise the preparation and strengthening of the position for a defense; and to,perform all other engineering activities for the subsector falling within the scope of its responsibilities. The t2th Medicdl Battalion established and operated advance emergency hospital within the subsector (immediate evacuation for subsector troops being impossible due to the absence of roads or trails) and eontinued to evacuate all troops of the philippine Division and all American troops in the II Corps. The Division Signal Company directed and supervised the construction, maintenance, and operations of all signal communications within the subsector; and the 12th euartermaster Battalion and Division Ordnance Section procured, transported, and delivered direct to all troops in the subsector munitions and supplies of all classes. Due to the lack of roads and even usabre trails ieading into the subsector, the extremely rugged and broken terrain and the dense tropical jungle growth, the matter of supply presented a most difficult problem, the solution of which required great-ingenuity and prodigious effort and involved the combined use of pack mules, carabaos, and cargadores. In brief, during this entire ggriod, Headquarters Philippine Division, employing organic division troops, commanded and administered a force of over 14,000 men. Probably due to the very heavy casualties that he had suffered in overcoming the Main Battle Position, the enemy was slow to follow up the advantage through our withdrawar to the Resewe Battle Position. He advanced very cautiously and alowed contact

Il

tlt PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

o9

with our main forces to be broken off for two or three days after our withdrawal. This respite was of great value to our forces in that it permitted them to begin without hostile interference. The defensive installations of the Resertre Battle Position were organized and strengthened. The first contact of the enemy with our troops in Subsector D was made by small reconnaissance patrols' The strength of these patrols ]vas soon increased and these in turn were followed by reconnaissance in force.

Dailylocalcombatoccurredalongthefrontofthesubsector betweenhostilepatrolswhichcollidedwithourownpatrolsor outpost line of rlsistance (OPLR) troops, and frequently recona naissances in force were made which varied in strength from companytoabattalion,butitisbelievedthesereconnaissances a battalion in any one effort. In these encounters, ,,"u"i

losses were inflicted on the enemy by our troops, and those severe "*"u"ded would have been greatly increased had our troops been

losses

equipped with modern hand grenacles, infantry mortars and ud"q.uat" automatic weapons. However, the gupporting artillery rendered superior service and repeatedly broke up hostile concentrations, destroyed formations and frustrated attacks. The effectiveness of our artillery can hardly be overestimated. It inflicted heavy punishment on the enemy and was without doubt the defensive weapon that he feared most. Although increasing the strength of hii efforts to discover weak points in our defensive orgariization the enemy did not change his cautious attitude- This ,"r=,rlt"d in no serious situations developing in subsector D during the first few weeks of its organization. Flnally on 14 Fbbruary Lg42, the enemy made a g"teial retirement all along the front of the Ii Corps and thereafter, except for minor patrol actions and constant aLrial reconnaissance, made no further trouble for Subsector D until the later part of March. He will therefore be dropped from the narrative for the time being' ll[eanwhile, thouglr operating under the immediate cornmand of other headquarte"r, a.riirrg this period the movements and activities of the detached units of the Philippine Division (the infantry regiments and 24th Fteld Artillery) will be chronologically recorded in order to make the history of the division more complete and keep the records uP to date. a. Jinuary 1942. On 27 January, the 66th Pack Troop was attached to itre Philippine Division in order to make possible the supply of subsector D. The 1st Platoon of the 65th Pack Troop had- previously been attached on the 19th to make possible the

1,4

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24

THE WAINWRIGHT PAPERS

supply of the 51st Division (pA) on the i\ft. Natib position. These two pack units were combined and attached to the 12th euartermaster Battalion and operated as an integral and absolutely necessar5z member of the Philippine Division transportation system for the remainder of the Bataan campaign. It rendered invatuable service throughout the period. Also on 27 January, the Bd Battalion, 4bth Infantry (pS) (Major strichler in command) were sent to euinauan point (I corps sector) to participate in an engagement against a hostile force (Nofe.' These troops were identified as belonging to the 20th Imperial Marine Infantry Eegiment-crack troops *itt, tn" reputation of never having been defeated in batile.) bf about two companies which had landed at that point at 0200 on the 2Bd and dug in and was being unsuccessfully attacked by certain untrained Air 99.pr and Philippine Constabulary troops which were trying to drive them out and destroy them. On 28 January, a truck head for the supply of Subsector D was established on the san vicente River at the end of rrail 2, which was the nearest motor approach to the subsector but still from four to ten miles from the subsector troops. Ftom this point forward supplies were necessarily transported by pack train, cara-

baos and cargadores.

The 57th Infantry (pS) was placed under I Corps, and by I corps assigned to the south subsector. It immedia[ely began operations against a hostile force of about one company which had landed at Longoskawayan point on the 2Bd lprouaury got separated from the force which landed at euinauan ioint on that date) and was being attacked at that point by an untrained force of Air Corps and Naval troops. On 29 January, the 31st Infantry (US) moved into bivouac on Trail 10 except the 1st Battalion which took over the defense of subsector A on the extreme right of the II corps sector of the Beserve Battle Position and extending from Manita Bay to orion

inclusive.

The 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry (pS) was moved into an of the junction of rrails b and Z and the 57th Infantry (ps) (less two battalions) moved into a bivouac area near Km 181 west road and the other battalion reassembly area 800 yards south

maining in action at Longoskawayan point. 30 January, the 1-st Battalion, 4bth Infantry (pS) entered - On the attack against the enemy in the Tuor pocket---a hostile force of some 600 to 800 men which had penetrated the I corps sector between the 11th Division (pA) and the 1st Division 1eA; and were

I PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARJ\{Y

25

pocketed between the Cotar and Tuol Rivers. The 57th Infantry (PS) (less the battalion in action at Longoskawayan Point) moved to Salaiim Point to oppose an enemy force of about a battalion which had effected a landing at that point (probably the reserve of the force which had landed at Quinauan and Longoskawayan Points). On 31 Januaqr, the 3d Battalion, 45th Infantrv @S) entered into the attack at Quinauan Point in conjunction with the 57th Infantry (PS). b. Fbbruary 1942. On 1 February, the 57th Infantry (PS) (less 2d Battalion) with the 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) (1st Battalion, 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment attached) continued the attack against the enemy at Anyasan Point and Salaiim Point. It is probable that the hostile force which developed at Anyasan Point was a part of the force which had landed at Salaiim Point and that in the same manner had become separated ftom the Salaiim Point group; since these two points were quite close to each other, the action there may be considered more or less as one battle. The 2d Battalion, 45th Infantrv GS) was put into action against the hostile force on Anyasan Point. On this date, Headquarters 45th Infantry (PS) was in bivouac about 800 yards south of the junction of Trails 5 and 7 in which position it remained till about 11 February. During the time the battalions of the 45th Infantry (PS) were engaged in the Tuol Pocket at Anyasan Point (2d Battalion) and Quinauan Point (3d Battalion), headquarters of the regiment remained in bivouac and exercised no tactical control over actions of the battalions. On 2 February, the 14th Engineer Battalion (PS) moved up behind and into the area of Subsector D where it was employed on various engineering.tasks but principally on trail and road contructions. Battalion Headquarters and companies were bivouacked and moved according to the location and progtess of the work so no attempt will be made to trace their movements. The 12th Quartermaster Battalion (less the Truckhead Detachment at Trail 2 and San Vicente Fiver) moved up from Km 148.9 East road to the crossing of Trail 2 and Pandan River. Procurement, transportation, and distribution of all classes of supplies for all troops within Subsector D had been taken over by Headquarters Philippine Division and this move of the battalion was made in order to expedite supply and maintain closer supervision over forwlrd auxillary installations. OnIy a minimum force was retained with G-1 and G-4 Hear Echelon bivouac area at Km 148.3 East road. The Longoskawayan Point operations were successfully con-

,f*t+i;r

26

THE WAINWRIGHT PAPERS

cluded and the 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry (PS) returned from that point and went into bivouac in the regimental bivouac area near Km 181 West road in Army Reserve. On the night of 2 February, the enemy attempted to land a considerable force at Salaiim Point estimated to be about one battalion. This force was probably intended to reinforce the hostile troops already at that point. It eonsisted of twelve landing boats accompanied by a tug. It was attacked by our Air Corps and only eight boats reached the shore. The enemy suffered very severe losses and it is estimated that not more than one hundred men succeeded in landing.

On 5 February, the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) was relieved from Subsector A (II Corps Sector) and went into bivouac on Tlail 10. On 6 February, the 31st Infantry (US) (less 1st and 2d BaL talions and Antitank Company) moved into bivouac area south of Trail 10 about Km 150 on East road. The 1st and 2d Battalions and Antitank Company remained in bivouae area on Trail 10. Maj. Gen. Albert Jones was placed in command of the I Corps replacing Lt. Gen. J. M. Wainwright who was plaeed in command of the Luzon Force established on this date, L2 March. On 7 February, the 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) successfully completed operations against the enemy at Quinauan Point and returned to bivouac area on the Binuagan River at Km 204.5 West road in Army Reserve. This released Company B, 57th Infantry (PS) which had been attached to the 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) at Quinauan Point and had been badly cut up in the action there and was put in reserve on its return to the regiment. On 11 February, Headquarters 45th Infantry (PS) was moved back from bivouac area 800 yards south of the junction of Trails 5 and 7 to bivouac area with the 3d Battalion on Binuagan River at Km 204.5 West road. On 12 February, the 31st Infantry (US) has moved up to a position on the San Vicente River ridge to back up the 31st Division (PA) in Subsector C, which was being threatened by enemy attack" This hostile threat failed to develop enough force to require the use of the 31st Infantry (US) and it was not put in action. Brigadier General Brougher took charge of the operations in T\rol Poeket where the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was in action. On 13 February, the 57th Infantry (PS) successfully completed the Anyasan and Salaiim Points actions and went into bivouac on Signal Hill at Km 186.7 West road in Army Besenre.

i,i

PHILIPPINE DTVISION, U. S. ARMY

27

The action at Anyasan Point having been successfully eompleted the 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was relieved from ittaehment to the ETth Infantry (PS) and rejoined the regiment (less lst Battalion) in bivouac on the Binuangan River at Km 204.5 West road in ArmY Reserve. On 14 Fbbruary, there being no longer any need for the presence of the 31st Infantry (us) in the area of suhsector c the iegiment was returned to its original bivouac area on Trail 10 and East road (Km 150) in Army Reserve. On 15 February (approximate date), the motor maintenance section of 12th'Quartermaster Battalion was loaned to the motor transportation offieer of the Luzon Fbrce to assist in motor maintenance for Army transportation. It was moved back from its position on the Pandan Biver to Rodriguez Park (Km 155 East road) where it remained for the rest of the campaign. Only a few men were left in the 12th Quartermaster Battalion bivouac area for the purpose of carrying on first and second echelons main' tenance for Subsector D and in addition Subsector C motor transportation. On 1? February, the Tuol Pocket operations were suceessfully completed and the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was released to the commanding officer, 45th Infantry (PS) and went into bivouac 500 yards south of junction of Trails 5 and 7. Regimental Headquarters and 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) moved into bivouac area just north of Lamao along East road and the 1st and 2d Battalions moved into bivouac areas on the ArtilIery Loop road along the Alangan River. The regiment remained in these positions recuperating, reorganizing, and training till it was again called into action on 4 April to meet the final drive of the enemy. Colonel Steel was made chief of staff, II Corps on 28 February and Lt. Col. Joshua Brady took command of the 31st Infantry (US). On 18 Fbbruary, the 1st Battalion,4Sth Infantry (PS) rejoined the regiment in bivouac area on the Binuangan River at Km 204-5 West road. This put the entire regiment together at this point. It remained there resting, reorganizing, recmiting (received replace-

probationary transfer from Philippine Army on 5 March), and training until 29 March when it was again put forward to take up position for the final defense. The 2d Battalion, 24th Field Artillery was kept in the Provisional Artillery Brigade and rernained in active support of the I Corps in the West Sector for the remainder of the campaign. fn" trZtt Infantry (PS) was in bivouac area on Signal Hill

ments

by

28

THE WAINWRIGHT PAPERS

(Km 186.7 West road) where it remained in Army Reserve until it was again put in action on 4 April in the II Corps Sector for the final defense. During that time it engaged in resting, reorganizing, and reconnaissance. (Lieutenant Colonel Lilly was promoted to colonel on 23 Fbbruary 1942.) c. 19 February to 27 March inclusiue. This period may be characterized as a period of comparative quiet not only in Subsector D and for the detached units of the Philippine Division but also for the entire Bataan theater of war. There were no changes of locations and activities of the infantry regiments of the division nor were there any particular activities in Subsector D. A few items of interest are worth recording however. Up to 24 February, the enemy maintained contact with the defense forces of Subsector D and conducted feeling out operations, patrols, limited local attacks, and some reconnaissances in force more or less, but these actions decreased steadily and finally were virtually abandoned on 24 February when the enemy made a general retirement all along the front of the II Corps. Thereafter, contact was maintained mainly by patrols and the enemy did not undertake any serious activity on this front till about 28 March when he began reconnaissance in considerable force. On 3 March, the 33d Infantry (PA) was relieved from assignment to Subsector D and placed in II Corps Beserve. It went into bivouac area along Trail 64 in the left rear of Subsector C. The 41st Infantry (PA) (less one battalion) which had been up to this time attached to Subsector C was released to the command of the commanding general, Subsector D and was assig4ed to a position of the left (west) flank of Subsector D replacing the 33d Infantry (PA) in that sector. This exchange of troops reunited the 41st Infantry (PA) and likewise the 41st Division (PA) under the command of the commandirrg general of Subsector D. On 3 March, a limited number of enlisted men were transferred on probation from the Philippine Army to the 45th and 57th Infantry (PS) Regiments as replacements. About 275 men were sent to each. These were only replacements made for these regiments during the war. For the most part, these men were acceptable to the regiments and responded well to training. The 57th Infantrv (PS) kept about 250 and returned the others to their respective regiments. The 45th Infantrv eS) kept about the same number, but they were never incorporated into the units of the regiment. About the same time, the 31st Infantry (US) received approximately 375 men (Americans) as replacements from the Chemical

..

PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

29

Warfare. The time and facilities for training these men were so limited that they could not be developed into highly efficient

fighting men before the final enemy drive in early April. On 12 March, the 14th Engineer Battalion (PS) was detached from the Philippine Division and Subsector D and placed under direct control of Headquarters Luzon Force. The battalion moved into bivouac on Signal Hill, Km 186 West road and remained there under Luzon Force until it was released to II Corps and Headquarters Philippine Division on 5 April. On 25 or 26 IVIarch, the 12th Medical Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C collecting) was removed from control of Headquarters Philippine Division and Subsector D and placed under direct control of Headquarters Luzon Force. This did not entail any immediate move of the battalion or change of its functions. It remained at Km 155.5 East road and continued to function under Headquarters Luzon Force until the end of the Bataan Force. Small detachments from the battalion remained with the Advance Command Post of the Philippine Division and with the Division Headquarters units at Km 148.9 East road. On 28 March, the troops of Subsector D were disposed as shown in the following diagram:

41st Diu (PA) (Fortier)

I Corps

x x x

II

42d

Inf

Wether-

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by

Donald

43

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Subsector C

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21st Diu (PA) (O'Day)

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51 Brig. Gen.

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Lewis

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Bluemel I

x

Uhrig vs

McCaf-

Atkin-

fert

son

Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim

Brig. Gen. Mateo Capinpin

Subsector D Brigadier General Lough

During the past several weeks of comparative quiet on the front, the position had been improved and strengthened but the combat efficiency of the troops had rapidly declined due to insufit

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30

THE WAINWRIGHT PAPERS

ficient food, medicine, and clothing; and the resultant sickness. At least frfty per cent of the command were sick and all were so weak from malnutrition and four months of continuous combat duty that it was foreseen with alarming certainty that they would be unable to endure the physical strain which sustained attack by a determined enemy would impose upon them. Such as the situation on 28 March when the enemy resumed activity all along the front of Subsector D. During the day, a hostile force of about a regiment exerted severe pressure against the 42d Infantry pA) in the center of the 41st Division (PA) Sector which caused the outpost line of resistance to give way in the afternoon and retire behind the main line of resistance. A cdunterattack by the Reserve Battalion was ordered to restore the line but failed to get off before dark. On the rnorning of 29 March, the counterattack was finally made but it failed to restore the OPLR and the defense had to rest on the main line of resistance. This created serious inverted salient on the front of the 4l"st Division (PA), and the left (west) flank of the 43d Infantry (PA) had to be refused in order to maintain the continuity of the line. The main line of resistance of the 42d Infantry (PA) was on the south bank of the Tiawir River, a very strong defensive position and considered almost impregnable. However, the refused flank of the 43d Infantry (PA) constituted a weak point in the line and was the cause of grave concern. The pressure of the enemy steadily increased and it was soon apparent not only that he had come back with a serious offensive purpose but also with fresh shock troops strongly reinforced with artillery, tank, mortars, automatic weapons, and air support. On 30 March to 1 April, the enemy continued his reconnaissance and brought up additional forces and developed them for an attack. Our troops resisted with all possible force but due to their weakened condition and lack of modern infantry weapons, grenades, and artiilery ammunition the situation became more threatening. On the morning nf 2 April, the enemy opened up with an artillery bombardment which was by far the most severe yet experienced by our troops during the entire war. The artillery fire was accompanied by rnorLar and aerial fire of equal severity. The bulk of this fire was concentrated on the front of the 41st Division (PA). The heavy trombardment and fire in the bamboo which was set on fire by the shelling (some reports said white phosphorous was used) forced many of the defenders on the MLR to retire to the regi.mental resewe line.

PHILIPPINE DTVISION, U. S. ARMY

31

In the afternoon the enemy attacked on the front of the 42d (PA) and the entire MLR was overrun. The regiment was Infantry-back to the MLR and continued to resist the attack from forced the position. in view of the gathering strength of the enetny, it had been deemed wise to r"n oue all supplies from the forward area of subsector D and immediately prepare for defense. All arrangements for this rearward displacement of supplies and supply of installations were completed and checked on 2 April as were -also all measures necessary to provide and maintain unintermpted supply to the defending troops regardless of the developments on the situation. Throughout the night of 2 April, the enemy continued artillery fire. .ft d"*n, g A-pril, dive bombing attacks were made along the front of the 41st Division (PA); at the same time the hostile artillery fire, along with mortar and MG fire, was intensified. Unher corer of this fire, enemy tanks moved up against the west flank of the 42d Infantry (PA) and a heavy coordinated attack was Launched all along the front of the 41st Division (PA). The 42d and 43d Infantry Regiments gave way in complete rout. The 41st Infantry (PA) also withdrew and through some confusion of orders started to retire south along Trail 29 towards Tlail 8 at which point the regimental commander expected to receive further instructions.

Thecommandpostofthe4lstDivision(PA)withdrewfrom its loeation on the catmon River and joined the command post of the 21st Division (PA) on the Pilar River. sick and wounded were Euisembled at the junction of Trails 6 and 429 and every effort was made to evacuate them as rapidly and safely as possible.

The Artillery Regiment of the 41st Division (PA), the only artillery in direct support of subsector D, remained in position and fired most effectively against the advancing enemy repeatedly breaking up his concentrations of troops and inflicting severe efficiency, and devotion to duty of the artillosses. ih" "orrage, lery during the engagement was most commendable; some of the

uaiteries rlmaineaii position and fired till they were charged and captured by the enemy. In effort to restore order in the disorganized and confused units of the 41st Division (PA), the subsector commander, commandrng general, Philippine Division went forward from his Advance command Post to exercise personal control of the front' line units.

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THE WAINWRIGHT PAPERS

Since the chief of staff of the Philippine Division had recenfly been ordered to Headquarters II Corps for temporary duty as corps chief of staff and was not replaced in Headquarters Subsector D, the departure of the commanding general from the Advance Command Post left the command post in the charge of the asssistant chief of staff, G-3. Fortunately, early information on the confused orders and misdirected withdrawal of the 41st Infantrv (pA) was received at the Advance command Post. communications were sent out and time was a compelling factor if the 41st Infantry (pA) was to be of any further service in defense. consequenfly assistant chief of staff, G-3 Philippine Division, on his own initiative, rapidly went across country to Trail 29 where he intercepted the 41st Infantry (PA) and stopped its retirement and personally put it into position to close the Pantingan River corridor. The courageous and decisive action by G-3 was a powerful factor in blocking the advance of the enemy on the left (west) flank of the subsector. The 41st Infantry (PA) now being separated from the troops of the division was placed under command of the commanding

I Corps. The 33d Infantry (PA) (less one battalion), which since B ["{arch had been in II corps Reserve, was released to Headquarters subsector D and was ordered into position on the catmon River west of Mt. Samat to close the gap teft by the retreating troops of the 41st Division (PA). The BBd Infantry (pA), undei the command of Major Holmes who had commanded the regiment with exceptional distinction since the ..Battle of Guitol,, (about 20 January), moved into the ordered position in the afternoqn and evening of 3 April. It is now believed it was entirely wiped out because all contact was lost with it on the 5th and so far as is now known to me no member of the command has been seen since. The 21st Division (PA) was also heavily attacked throughout the day but managed to hold onto its position. However, it refused its left flank in order to meet a thrust from the west and to make contact with any friendly troops on that flank. The 45th Infantry (PS) was released from Army Reserve and attached to the I corps. By I corps it was ordered from its bivouac area on the Binuangan River to an assembly area west of the junction of Tlails 8 and 29. The 12th Quartermaster Battalion was moved from the cross_ ing of rrail 2 and the Paridan Biver to a position on Trial l-g. This move was made in order to expedite the service of supply to the defending troops to facilitate the evacuation of ,rr,ec"rrury general,

PHILIPPTNE DIVISION, U. S. ARMY

33

supplies and the sick and wounded from the front which was being hastened under the direct supervision of G-4, Philippine Division. By the morning of the 4th, the 41st Division (PA) had become completely disorganized and ceased to exist as a unit. OnIy the 41st Artillery remained in action in Subsector D and the 41st Infantry (under I Corps) was in position on the Pantingan River. The enemy continued his attack supported by artillery and air support. By noon, the 21st Division (PA) had been severely dis-

organized and had withdrawn from the RRL to positions on the southeast slope of Mt. Samat. The 31st Infantry (US) which had been in Army Reserve north of Lamao and on the Alangan River since 17 February \isas released to II Corps and by them to Subsector D. The regiment was ordered to move to an assembly area on the right of Subsector D and prepare to attack at daylight on the 5th in the direction ofthe Pilar River with its left flank 500 yards west of the junction of Trails 44 arl.d 429. At 1600, the 45th Infantry (PS) (less 3d Battalion) was released by I Corps to II Corps and by them to Subsector D. It was ordered to an assembly position at the junction of Trails 8 and 29 and prepare to attack toward the east. (The 3d Infantry Battalion, 45th Infantry was held under control of the I Corps and sent into position behind the 1st PC Regiment and the 41st Infantry in the Pantingan River area.) The 14th Engineer Battalion in Army Reserve on Signal Hill was ordered to assemble and prepare for action. The Advance Command Post of Subsector D was moved during the day to a position about 200 yards west of the junction of Trails 6 and 8. The 57th Infantry (PS) in Army Reserve on Signal Hill was released to the II Corps and moved under cover of darkness of night 4 April to a position of readiness on Trail 10 just west of Trail 2, except 2d Battalion which was held temporarily at Rodriguez Park, just west of Lamao. On the moming of the 5th, the enemy attack continued to the east accompanied by a considerable number of tanks (about 25). The 22d and 23d Infantry Regiments (PA), the center and right regiments in the 21st Division Sector, gave way before the attack and withdrew in fairly good order to a position about 1500 yards south of Tlail 429 astride Tfail 4. However, when the enemy attacked that position the division broke in complete disorder and thereafter practically ceased to exist as a unit. Remnants of the 41st Division (less 41st Infantry) struggled back cross-country

I'

34

THE WAINWRIGHT PAPERS

and along Trails 6 and 8 and an effort was made to collect them just south of Tlails 8 and 46. The number of men collected was very small and were in no condition for further fighting. A part of the 41st Artillery Regiment (PA) had withdrawn to positions just north of the junction of Tlails 6 and 8 and a small force of infantry from the division was disposed to afford some local ground support to the artillery. The 41st Infantry (PA) remained in position in the Pantingan River valley but engaged in no serious action.

The 31st Infantry (US) failed to get in position for the attack which had been ordered for daylight and was unable to make any progrcss in its assigned sector. The rapid advance of the enemy east of Mt. Samat caught the 31st Infantry (US) off balance and unprepared for offensiie action" To defend in place was the only altemative. Contact was lost with the 33d Infantry (PA) which had been sent down into the Catmon River area on the 3d and could not be reestablished.

The 45th Infantry (PS) (less 3d Battalion) attacked on 4 April. The infantry was in Army Reserve on Saysayin ridge and Bobo trail about one kilometer of the West road. And that day, they received ordem to a,ssemble and rejoin the Philippine Division. The move was made by buses and marching. The regiment was ordered to go into bivouac on Trail 29 just north of Trail 8. They were shelled enroute on Trail 7 and in the vicinity of the Corps Ordnance Dump but without effect. The movement began about 1600 4 April and the regiment less the 1st Battalion went into bivouac about one kilometer north of Tlail 8 about 0200. The 1st Battalion stopped where Trail 8 crosses the Pantingan River and formed a defensive line just north of Trail 8. On 5 April, an officer reconnaissance patrol was sent forward on Ttail 29 to contact the 41st Division (PA). They proceeded north about one mile and were stopped by an enemy antitank gun blocking the road about 2,5OA yards north of Trail 8. Company I was ordered forward to keep the enemy under close obsenration that night and early on the morning of 6 April the rest of the 3d Battation moved north and extended the line to the east. The battalion attacked but was able to advance only .about 150 yards. The 2d Battalion then moved up, extended the line further to the east and continued the attack but failed to establish contact with the 41st Division (PA). About 1600, orders were received from the Philippine Division to withdraw beginning at dusk south of Trail 29 thence, east on

PHILIPPINE DIVISION, U. S. AH\,IY

35

Trail 8 and break through the enemy line in the vicinity of the junction of Trails 6 and 8 and join the 57th Infantry (PS) which was being attacked by the enemy in that vicinity. The 2d Battalion led the movement east and the 3d Battalion held the road junction of Tlails 8 and 29. The 2d Battalion supported by tanks failed to break through and establish contact with the 57th Infantry (PS), the attack being made at daylight of 7 April. The regiment was then ordered to form a defensive line along the Pantingan River astride of Trail 8. The Lst Battalion which had been holding a position just north of Trail 8 with its left on the Pantingan River helped from this line. The 3d Battalion which had covered the movement from the junetion of Trails 8 and 29 withdrew beginning about 1400 without much difficulty though subjected to some mortar and small arms fire. The regiment held the position on the Pantingan River on the ?th. On the moming of the 8th, its iine was extended to the south. On the afternoon of 8 April, it was ordered to withdraw at dusk and proeeed to junction of Trails 7 and 8 where it was to entruck move to the West road thence south and receive further orders from a staff officer in the vicinity of CP I Corps. It received two days emergency ration enroute. The buses were slow in arriving; not enough arrived to move the whole regiment before 0100, I April. Orders were received in the vicinity of CP I Corps to move to the Quarantine Station in Mariveles. Colonel Doyle preceded the regiment leaving junction of Trails 7 and 9 shortly after 0100. The regiment was stopped by an ordnance officer near Km 190 about 0600, 9 April as the Corps Ammunition Dump was being blown up. The enemy was dive-bombing West road. The regiment bivouacked under cover west of West road in vicinity of Km 190 whereitsurrenderedtotheenemyabout1000,10April. H, C. BROWNE Colonel, GSC Chief of Staff, Philippine Diuision

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