When Bad States Win: Rethinking Counterinsurgency Strategy 9780228013518

Table of contents :
Cover
WHEN BAD STATES WIN
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Figures and Tables
Preface
Introduction
1 Civil Wars and Insurgencies
2 Understanding Counterinsurgency Strategy
3 When Bad States Defeat Insurgencies
4 Statistical Analysis of Barbarism
5 Failed Cases of Barbarism
6 Successful Cases of Barbarism
Conclusion
Appendix A
Appendix B
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

when bad states win

When Bad States Win Rethinking Counterinsurgency Strategy

jeffrey treistman

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2022 I SB N 978-0-2280-1113-2 (cloth) I SB N 978-0-2280-1351-8 (eP df) I SB N 978-0-2280-1352-5 (eP UB) Legal deposit third quarter 2022 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: When bad states win : rethinking counterinsurgency strategy / Jeffrey Treistman. Names: Treistman, Jeffrey, author. Description: Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20220174423 | Canadiana (ebook) 2022017444X | ISBN 9780228011132 (cloth) | IS BN 9780228013518 (eP D F ) | ISBN 9780228013525 (eP UB) Subjects: lc sh: Counterinsurgency—Case studies. | l csh: Civilians in war— Violence against—Case studies. | l cs h: Failed states—Case studies. | lcsh : Military police—Case studies. | l cgf t : Case studies. Classification: l cc u 241.t 74 2022 | ddc 355.02/18—dc23

This book was typeset in 10.5/13 Sabon.

To my lovely wife, Paulina.

Contents

Figures and Tables | ix Preface | xi Introduction | 3 1 Civil Wars and Insurgencies | 16 2 Understanding Counterinsurgency Strategy | 30 3 When Bad States Defeat Insurgencies | 41 4 Statistical Analysis of Barbarism | 58 5 Failed Cases of Barbarism | 83 6 Successful Cases of Barbarism | 107 Conclusion | 129 Appendix A | 147 Appendix B | 153 Notes | 161 Bibliography | 189 Index | 211

Figures and Tables

f ig u r es 1.1

Evolution of an insurgency | 25

2.1

coin Strategy Spectrum | 39 Hypothesized relationship between barbarism and war outcomes | 55 Outcomes | 67 Outcomes by regime type | 68 Outcomes by time period | 69 Likelihood of incumbent win by level of barbarism | 70

3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

ta b l es 4.1

Descriptive statistics | 65

4.2

Logistic regression | 72

4.3

Ordered logistic regression | 73

4.4

Regional checks | 76

4.5

Robustness checks | 78

A.1 Multiple imputation by chained equations (mice ) | 148 A.2 Irregular dichotomous | 149 A.3 Irregular interactive | 150 A.4 Duration 2 days or more | 151 A.5 Duration 3 days or more | 152 B.1

Cases for statistical analysis | 154

Preface Evil governments may quell virtuous rebellions, and virtuous governments may lose to evil rebellions. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf

On 23 March 2007, while sitting at my desk at the US Embassy in Baghdad, I received a frantic phone call from the Iraqi deputy prime minister’s adviser: “The Deputy Prime Minister has been attacked ... There is blood everywhere ... Please send help!,” he exclaimed into the phone. The deputy prime minister, Salam al-Zoubai, had been the target of an assassination attempt by an individual believed to have been affiliated with Al-Qaeda. The perpetrator had detonated a suicide vest packed with ball bearings, killing two bodyguards and leaving the deputy prime minister and several of his staff severely wounded. I immediately coordinated with the US military to ensure that the deputy prime minister would be able to gain access to the hospital in the International Zone. Under the blazing afternoon sun, I then sprinted down the street from the embassy to the hospital. I arrived just in time to see one of the deputy prime minister’s staff being wheeled into the emergency room for treatment. His body was riddled with small scars where the ball bearings had penetrated his flesh. Droplets of blood slowly oozed from the holes. A few moments later, medical personnel quickly wheeled the deputy prime minister past me on a gurney, heading for the operating room. His face was so severely burned from the heat of the bomb blast that it resembled burnt charcoal. I spent the next several hours in the emergency room, relaying updates on his condition to US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, whose staff forwarded my reports directly to the White House. My story is not unique. Like many others, my personal and professional life has been profoundly shaped by the dramatic events of 11 September

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2001 and by the subsequent military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This book is a humble reflection on my personal and intellectual journey. The premise of this book is that gross violations of human rights are counterproductive and only fuel further civil unrest. But when taken to the extreme, the most brutal and systematic forms of repression can squash a domestic rebellion. Rape, torture, and the indiscriminate killing of civilians can be an effective weapon of war. As a result, bad states may sometimes win. I believe there is an urgent need for us to refine our collective understanding of how bad states defeat insurgencies. It is non-democracies that are most likely to experience domestic rebellion and to employ brute force to crush dissent. Sadly, that violence will only increase as the number of democratic states in the world continues to decline and existing democracies backslide toward authoritarianism. My theory and findings may be difficult for many readers to accept. For several decades, scholars and practitioners have been transfixed by population-centric approaches to countering an insurgency that involve establishing democratic institutions, promoting economic development, and protecting civilians. Unfortunately, there is little robust generalizable evidence that population-centric approaches are effective. More critically, an undying devotion among Western military strategists to the population-centric approach has created a salient void in our understanding of alternative counterinsurgency strategies employed by non-democratic regimes. Their myopia not only limits our knowledge of intrastate warfare but also weakens our ability to protect and support human rights in conflict zones. I hope this book will galvanize the international community to better protect civilians caught in the middle of internal wars. As with any book project, there are countless individuals I must acknowledge for their invaluable contributions. At every step along my intellectual and professional journey I have received guidance and support from individuals who have had a lasting impact on my life. First and foremost, I must recognize my Iraqi counterpart, Dhia al-Mahdi. As young, inexperienced policy-makers tasked with countering a raging insurgency in Iraq, we both found ourselves in the middle of a global effort to combat terrorism. We were forced to adapt and learn, relying on each other for mutual comfort and support. I will never forget him. The deputy prime minister’s chief of staff, Khalid al-Juboory, also played a prominent role in managing the affairs of his office in the aftermath of the assassination attempt. We worked together tirelessly to bring about a brighter future for Iraq.

Preface

xiii

During my time in Iraq, I attended weekly meetings with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and General David Petraeus. I consider myself fortunate to have been able to observe senior political and military leaders making critical policy decisions. The experience left a lasting impression on how I viewed international affairs and high-level diplomacy. But Ambassador Joseph Saloom and General Vincent Brooks had a far more direct impact on my professional development. I considered them both to be mentors, and I will be forever grateful to have served with them. I must also recognize the colleagues with whom I served: Kristen Ballantine, Michael Baumgartner, Dan Bisbee, Colonel Timothy Clapp, and Andy Passen. Together we affectionately referred to ourselves as the “Baghdad Brain Trust,” and during the military surge we were responsible for advancing the civilian component of US counterinsurgency operations. While in graduate school I was privileged to learn under the tutelage of several renowned scholars and practitioners. During my time at Harvard University, the former deputy secretary of defense, John P. White, graciously served as my adviser and shaped my understanding of the administration of defense policy. Meanwhile, Monica Toft and Stephen Walt influenced my theoretical view of international relations and global conflict. I must also thank my former classmate, Jeffrey Friedman, who read some of the earliest drafts of this book and provided insightful comments and suggestions that helped shape the final version. At Syracuse University I was fortunate to study under Colin Elman, who further refined my understanding of international relations theory and helped sharpen my methodological approach to studying warfare. I must also recognize Michael Jensen, who was instrumental in broadening my knowledge and appreciation of the various theories of counterinsurgency strategy. His influence permeates this book. Finally, I must express my profound gratitude to my colleagues in the Department of National Security at the University of New Haven. I feel truly fortunate to have such an amazing group of former practitioners and scholars as colleagues. Moreover, this book project was generously supported by the University of New Haven’s Summer Research Grant for faculty members. I thank the anonymous reviewers who took the time to read the initial draft of my manuscript as well as my revisions. Their suggestions and comments helped significantly improve the final draft. Of course, any errors or omissions are mine alone. Portions of this book also benefited from the insightful comments of panel participants at the International Studies Association’s Joint Human Rights Conference. I must also express

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my deepest gratitude to my editor at McGill-Queen’s University Press, Jacqueline Mason. Right from our initial conversation, she believed in my project and recognized the impact it might have on the existing literature. She did a commendable job shepherding the manuscript through the anonymous review process amidst a pandemic and seeing the project to completion. Without her efforts this book would not have been possible. Finally, I wish to thank my copy editor, Matthew Kudelka, for his careful attention to detail and for ensuring the final manuscript was polished. Above all, I must thank my wife, Paulina, for her loving patience and understanding as I laboured at researching and writing this book. I often worked through the night into the early morning hours with little sleep. She has sacrificed a great deal as I pursued my career as a scholar. I love you.

when bad states win

Introduction

This book is largely the result of more than a decade of theorizing and policy-making experience as both an academic and a practitioner. Beginning in 2006, I spent over two years in Baghdad with the US Department of State as a policy adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister’s office. Thus, I was in a unique position to witness the evolution of American counterinsurgency (coin ) policy. Most of my time was devoted to formulating the civilian component of “the surge” – a decision by President George W. Bush to increase the number of US troops deployed to Baghdad in an effort to stem the tide of violence and insurrection in Iraq. The surge was meant to mark a “new way forward”: the injection of additional troops would provide breathing room for political reconciliation and economic development. Put simply, the objective was to provide security and develop the nation. During the surge I attended weekly meetings with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, US Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and General David Petraeus. The fundamental belief among leading policy-makers was that civilians were physically and economically vulnerable to the malign influence of insurgents. My colleagues and I worked tirelessly to help develop Iraq’s infrastructure and ensure the delivery of essential services such as electricity and clean drinking water. We also sought to prop up the local economy and to provide Iraqi civilians with opportunities for employment. The logic was simple – if Iraqis were provided with jobs and the opportunity to participate in the development of their own country, they would become stakeholders in it. They would become invested in the efforts of the US Embassy, and their success and ours would thus intertwine. But throughout my time in Iraq as a diplomat and in subsequent years as an academic, I continued to ponder simple yet critical questions: Why was the protection of civilians and the development of essential services

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When Bad States Win

assumed to be the best strategy for countering an insurgency? Was temporary employment a sustainable solution for defeating insurgents? What metric did military and civilian planners reference to measure and define success? Most of my questions and concerns stemmed from my experience in Iraq, where I was often bewildered by US policies and programs. For example, I recall attending a meeting with the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team (prt) during which we discussed the temporary funding and employment of local Iraqi citizens to collect trash throughout Baghdad. In another meeting, I listened to my military and civilian colleagues debate which sidewalks should be repaved in the city. From my vantage point, it was simply unclear to me how such initiatives could be regarded as a viable or even long-term solution to defeating an armed insurgency. Even on a broader conceptual basis, it was never clear to me what constituted the “hearts and minds” approach, more formally known as population-centric counterinsurgency. Was it democracy promotion? Economic development? Foreign military assistance and training? Policing and protection of civilians? Mediation and conflict resolution? If all of these components mattered (and some contended they did), then which mattered most? In other words, which of these factors did the most to pacify an insurgency? And assuming that one of the aforementioned elements of a hearts and minds approach was most critical in defeating insurgent groups, how were we to measure “progress”? Was it the number of development projects, the megawatts of electrical power delivered, the number of local police officers trained, or the number of insurgent casualties? The distinction between outputs and outcomes was never clearly defined. Meanwhile, I was struck by the contrasting approaches taken by other states that were countering their own insurgencies but employing far different methods. In 2001, for example, Russia began to withdraw its troops from Chechnya after pacifying that rebellious republic. The military had used heavy artillery and indiscriminate air strikes to defeat opposition forces. All the while, Chechen civilians were subjected to illegal detentions, rape, torture, and summary executions. At roughly the same time, Sri Lanka was waging its own brutal war against Tamil insurgents using tactics that showed little regard for the human rights of innocent civilians. The Sri Lankan government denied civilians food and medical supplies, carried out extrajudicial executions, and bombed population centres, including hospitals. In each of these conflicts, the government relied on barbaric methods that made little distinction between

Introduction

5

civilians and combatants. Perhaps even more remarkable is that both governments were able to successfully defeat the insurgencies they faced, in stark contrast to the United States, which continued to struggle in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Even more recent conflicts suggest that the violent repression of non-combatants can be effective. In 2011, Syrian protesters inspired by the Arab Spring demanded the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian government responded with brute force, committing a number of war crimes, including torture and the extrajudicial killing of detainees. Perhaps the most serious allegation, however, was that the regime used chemical weapons against civilians. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, the long-persecuted Rohingya minority were being subjected to a heinous campaign of violence. The international community roundly condemned the Buddhist government for engaging in ethnic cleansing and accused it of genocide. Despite the strong disapproval of the global community, the Syrian and Burmese governments both succeeded in squashing the domestic opposition. This book reflects my own intellectual curiosity and profound desire to better understand these two completely different approaches to countering domestic insurgencies. Western strategies based on respect for human rights and the protection of civilians undoubtedly have normative appeal, but are devoid of rigorous theorizing and are often associated with failure. Meanwhile, more barbaric and repressive methods that clearly violate international law and are morally repugnant have historically been more successful at defeating insurgents. This book seeks to explain these divergent outcomes for those who craft national security policy. In the present era, it is vitally important to understand counterinsurgency strategy. Intrastate conflicts and insurgencies are the most common form of warfare today, as well as the most deadly. Knowing how these conflicts end is therefore of paramount importance to military strategists and the global community. For the past several decades, most Western experts have assumed that addressing political grievances and providing social services is the most effective means of reducing political violence. This “hearts and minds” approach to counterinsurgency is premised on the protection of civilians. The historical record, however, reveals many instances in which governments systematically violated human rights in order to suppress a rebellion. But are such barbaric strategies successful in defeating insurgencies? The central finding presented in this book is that the violation of human rights is largely a flawed strategy, but when governments use the most extreme forms of brutality they can effectively crush a rebellion.

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When Bad States Win

k e y t e r m in ology To better understand the implications of counterinsurgency strategy, readers must first familiarize themselves with key terminology. This section introduces definitions of insurgent warfare that will be referenced throughout the book. Unfortunately, previous scholars have failed to articulate accepted definitions of these concepts, which are often confused or even conflated with other distinct terms. Indeed, one of the main contributions I hope this book makes is to provide conceptual clarity of concepts frequently referenced by practitioners and scholars when discussing insurgent warfare. Bad States

The central task of this study is to understand how bad states are able to defeat insurgencies. I use the term “bad states” to broadly refer to governments that violate international humanitarian law or universal principles of human rights. International humanitarian law (ihl ) is largely based on the Geneva Conventions. The first convention, which dates back to 1864, was a response to the lack of care for sick and wounded soldiers fighting in the Italian War of Independence. In 1929 two additional conventions were added, but it would be the Second World War and the horrific events of the Holocaust that served as the primary catalyst for new agreements to limit the impacts of war on civilians. The result was the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) which not only reaffirmed the previous three conventions but also stipulated additional protections for civilians caught in the middle of a war. The Additional Protocols were then added in 1977 and 2005; these established legal protection for all victims of war, in particular humanitarian protection for non-combatants in an internal or non-internationalized war. According to Protocol II, “the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”1 Collectively, the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols declared that civilians should be protected from all forms of physical violence. International humanitarian law also strictly prohibits the use of starvation as a weapon of war, guarantees due process and rights for captured combatants, and requires that a distinction be made between

Introduction

7

civilians and combatants. The International Committee of the Red Cross has conventionally been considered the “guardian” of international humanitarian law. Bad states also include those that violate universally accepted principles of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (udhr) was approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. The Declaration contains thirty articles that specify a wide range of individual rights, including the right to physical security and legal equality, as well as general provisions to ensure a dignified and healthy life. The udhr served as the basis for two additional documents that sought to further codify principles of human rights: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The former established fundamental rights associated with political freedoms and participation, and the latter concerned broad rights related to standards of living and acceptable social conditions. Collectively, the udhr and the two covenants form the International Bill of Human Rights, establishing legal and normative guidelines to which all states are expected to adhere.2 This book focuses primarily on identifying the conditions in which governments that violate international humanitarian law or universally accepted principles of human rights are able to defeat an insurgency. Insurgencies and Intrastate Warfare

Although humanitarian law and human rights have been clearly defined and established, there remains a great deal of ambiguity as to what constitutes an insurgency and how it differs from other forms of intrastate violence. In general, I define an insurgency as the sustained use of violence by a non-state actor against a central authority. The target of this violence may be an incumbent government or an external occupier. As I point out in chapter 1, however, the definition of an insurgency has been diluted with competing terms that undermine our collective ability to study this unique and important type of conflict. Perhaps the most salient sources of confusion are scholars who articulate a definition based on battlefield tactics. I argue that insurgencies should not necessarily be equated with power asymmetries, guerrilla tactics, or even duration of conflict. First off, insurgencies are sometimes fought between combatants with equal military capabilities; other times, there may be an unequal distribution of material resources between adversaries. It is important to stress here that the distribution of resources is a dynamic factor and may

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When Bad States Win

fluctuate over the course of a single conflict. Not surprisingly, Robert Cassidy has argued that the term “asymmetric warfare” has become so diluted with a myriad of contrasting definitions that it has lost “its utility and clarity” as a concept.3 Second, insurgencies are not necessarily synonymous with guerrilla warfare. Rebel fighters may employ either conventional or guerrilla warfighting tactics to challenge an incumbent government. Indeed, as just noted, insurgents may sometimes achieve power parity relative to counterinsurgents and assemble a large military force. For example, Tamil insurgents during the Sri Lankan Civil War not only marshalled a large, organized army but also maintained a navy and even an air force. Meanwhile, many well-known insurgents throughout history have advocated for guerrilla fighters to transition to more conventional forms of combat. Mao Zedong famously argued that “there must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to orthodox regimental organization.”4 Lastly, scholars should not identify insurgencies based strictly on the duration of a conflict. Rebel groups may certainly wish to prolong a conflict, but not all insurgencies are protracted struggles. Many rebellions and violent coups have either quickly succeeded or been quickly crushed by government forces. The Ramadan Revolution, for example, lasted a mere two days, yet it succeeded in overthrowing the prime minister of Iraq in 1963.5 Thus, omitting brief insurgencies will bias our understanding of intrastate conflicts and the efficacy of a particular counterinsurgency strategy. To be clear, this is not to suggest that power asymmetries, guerrilla tactics, and conflict duration have no bearing on the outcome of a war. Indeed, such factors may have a significant causal effect. Instead, I contend that it is critical for social scientists to establish agreed-upon scope conditions that delineate the parameters for analyzing counterinsurgency strategy and subsequent war outcomes.6 Insurgencies are a broad classification of intrastate war and should not be examined simply in terms of battlefield tactics. Counterinsurgency Strategy

I argue that states have three different strategies they may implement in order to counter an insurgency: enemy-centric, population-centric, and barbarism. The focus of chapter 2 of this book is on providing a more complete description of the various strategies; a brief summary will suffice here for readers unfamiliar with the concepts. First, as the name implies, an enemy-centric strategy focuses on targeting an insurgency using military force. This most often implies offensive

Introduction

9

military operations to kill or capture enemy forces, but the strategy is often expanded to include attacks on an adversary’s communication or supply lines. An enemy-centric strategy resembles traditional military principles of war, in which success is determined on the battlefield. “Over the past 3,000 years,” observes Ralph Peters, “insurgencies overwhelmingly have been put down thoroughly by killing insurgents.”7 In contrast, a population-centric strategy shifts the emphasis from the insurgent to the civilian population. Although military operations remain a critical component of a population-centric approach, success is believed to be more effectively obtained through political and economic means. The critical assumption here is that an insurgency is due to underlying socio-economic grievances and that guerrillas thrive off the support of the wider civilian population. Thus, the fundamental goal of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy is to shift the balance of support away from insurgents so that the population accepts the government as legitimate. According to the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual, “success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides.”8 The third type of counterinsurgency strategy is barbarism and is the primary focus of this study. Whereas an enemy-centric strategy attacks insurgent fighters and a population-centric strategy seeks the support of civilians, a barbaric counterinsurgency strategy targets non-combatants. It relies on brute force and violent repression to compel a population not to support insurgents. According to Alexander Downes, “violence is used to influence the behavior of some target group, in this case civilians who are potential supporters of insurgents or status quo incumbents.”9 Violent coercion – not positive inducement – is the primary tool employed by governments to weaken or suppress opposition forces, and this generally entails the gross violation of international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights.10 The effectiveness of barbarism is generally ignored by Western scholars despite numerous historical examples that highlight its successful implementation. In the mid-twentieth century, China’s brutal actions toward Tibet crushed a number of revolts, at an enormous cost to innocent civilians. Indeed, China was condemned for violating several articles of the un ’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Commission of Jurists (icj ) accused China of committing genocide in Tibet. During the Biafran War in the late 1960s, Nigeria imposed a brutal blockade that led to widespread starvation and a humanitarian crisis during which nearly two million citizens died. Nigeria’s use of starvation

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When Bad States Win

as a weapon of war generated global attention and condemnation. Even Western powers have a history of effectively employing barbaric methods in order to suppress an insurgency. For example, during the Second Boer War at the turn of the century, the United Kingdom relied on a scorched earth policy that destroyed crops and livestock, and even detained civilians in concentration camps.

t h e p u z zle Barbarism has long been employed as a means of countering insurgents, but there has been little theorizing as to its effectiveness. Scholars and practitioners have largely ignored the violation of human rights as a viable counterinsurgency strategy. This is understandable, given that Western states are prohibited by international law from even considering such a policy. A population-centric approach is widely assumed to be far more effective. Addressing socio-economic grievances is considered to be a pragmatic solution to reducing levels of popular discontent, and providing social services is normatively appealing to Western powers. Nevertheless, many governments around the world defy normative constraints and employ brute force to quash domestic opposition. How bad states defeat insurgencies through the brutal application of force is understudied and constitutes a salient lacuna in the existing literature. “This fact is remarkable,” writes Ahmed Hashim, since “it is mainly non-Western nation-states that face serious irregular conflict.”11 Democracies rarely experience a violent insurgency, yet democratic approaches to counterinsurgency dominate the literature. Yuri Zhukov notes that “the authoritarian model of counterinsurgency has largely eluded systematic empirical investigation.”12 That said, it should be acknowledged that some scholars have made laudable attempts to assess the efficacy of barbarism. In his seminal article, Andrew Mack discussed the “morality of war” and noted that barbaric attacks against civilians elicit strong opposition within democracies where the survival of the state is not threatened.13 But it has been Ivan Arreguín-Toft and Gil Merom who are primarily responsible for shaping our contemporary understanding of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. Specifically, Arreguín-Toft has posited that the success of barbarism is contingent on the military strategy each combatant chooses to employ, while Merom has argued that only the most extreme acts of brutality perpetrated by authoritarian regimes will defeat a rebellion.14 Although their respective studies have been enormously valuable, neither

Introduction

11

scholar developed a formal theory of barbarism with an operationalized metric that differentiates between various degrees of repression. Indeed, researchers who have attempted to study barbarism often ignore the broad array of counterinsurgency tactics states may pursue. In particular, most studies have limited themselves to genocide without recognizing other repressive measures that non-democratic regimes employ to counter domestic opposition. I contend that restrictive definitions that consider only mass killings as incidents of barbarism fail to capture the realities of conflict. Moreover, genocide is a rare phenomenon. Instead, brutality can vary and may encompass a wide range of activities. Indeed, Peter Liberman notes that “sanctions can range from the denial of educational and professional opportunities to imprisonment, torture, and execution.”15 Previous scholars studying barbarism have referenced diverse datasets, but most of these do not accurately represent the phenomenon of interest. For example, many include in their analysis interstate wars or conventional conflicts that have little relevance to our understanding of insurgencies. Also, these datasets tend to erroneously conceptualize barbarism and political violence as a dichotomous variable, but this does not capture the complexity of insurgent warfare and the wide range of policy options available to counterinsurgents. According to Scott Gartner and Patrick Regan, “repression is not a dichotomous choice, where a government either does or does not engage a repressive strategy, but rather can be thought of as a continuous outcome.”16 Lastly, the existing literature is plagued by competing studies that reach conflicting conclusions. Some scholars have found that brutal repression can negatively affect the likelihood of an incumbent defeating insurgents, while others have uncovered a positive relationship.17 Robert Thompson, a well-known advocate of the population-centric approach, explicitly disapproved of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. “Not only is this morally wrong,” he insisted, “but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves.”18 Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher similarly argue that barbarism only drives neutral civilians to support insurgents: “When the state relies on indiscriminate violence, insurgent organizations may respond by providing protection to the targeted civilian population. Survival-maximizing civilians will then be more likely to join such an organization than they would otherwise have been.”19 Other scholars disagree and insist that barbarism can be an effective strategy. According to James Clancy and Chuck Crossett, “combat operations have defeated insurgencies by overwhelming and

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When Bad States Win

annihilating the insurgency and its supporters through bombings, massive raids, heavy shelling, and even torture and executions.”20 Thus, myriad contrasting arguments have been articulated by scholars who cite evidence to substantiate their claims. How is it possible that such divergent conclusions can all be supported?

m y t h e o ry a n d argument The central argument of this book is that only the most extreme and repressive forms of barbarism will increase the likelihood that an incumbent will defeat an insurgency. The brutal application of force imposes exceedingly high costs, which civilians and insurgents are not willing to bear. In sum, high levels of brutality can exact acquiescence from civilians and enervate an insurgency. At the same time, I argue that moderate levels of barbarism do not impose enough costs to dissuade a population from supporting an insurgency. Moderate forms of repression are counterproductive since potential rebels are not sufficiently deterred; indeed, such moderation can bolster an insurgency by expanding the potential pool of recruits. In such conditions, an incumbent is less likely to defeat an insurgency. Finally, I contend that low levels of barbarism are most often associated with liberal regimes that are better able to accommodate the grievances of opposition groups. Conflicts with limited or even no levels of repression are more likely to end with a government victory or a negotiated settlement, or simply dwindle over time. My theory of barbarism thus resembles a convex or U-shape function. As an incumbent government increases its level of repression, it engenders greater levels of domestic opposition since the costs are not sufficiently high to deter a rebellion. Thus, moderate levels of barbarism decrease the odds of an incumbent defeating insurgents. But by ratcheting up its brutality, a government can thoroughly crush opposition forces and dissuade civilians from supporting an insurgency. Therefore, only the most extreme forms of barbarism increase the likelihood of defeating insurgents. However, there are two important caveats to my theory. First, and perhaps obvious, the government must possess the requisite military resources to wage a counterinsurgency campaign. Failed or weak states simply lack the wherewithal to combat insurgents. But the military must also be sufficiently trained and equipped for counterinsurgency operations that restrict civil liberties or even entail the indiscriminate slaughter of innocent civilians. It is one thing to have a big stick, but the owner of the stick must also know how to swing it effectively.

Introduction

13

Second, given the controversial nature of barbarism, the government needs the full support of the political elite and security forces. The individuals who issue orders, and those responsible for carrying them out, must be comfortable with violating human rights and accept the potential costs associated with war crimes. In other words, government officials must fully commit to barbarism if they choose to pursue it as a counterinsurgency strategy. Equivocation, willingness to negotiate, or the temporary cessation of violence is counterproductive. As will be demonstrated throughout this book, my theory of barbarism appears to be substantiated by empirical evidence. I test my theory using a mixed-method approach that encompasses both quantitative and qualitative analysis. This provides a greater degree of confidence in my findings, which I hope will better inform national security policy-making and the international community. Consequently, this book sets out to achieve two interrelated objectives. The first and primary goal is to identify the conditions in which the violation of human rights may succeed in crushing a rebellion. In this regard, I propose a theory that incorporates more nuanced metrics and advances the existing literature on counterinsurgency warfare. My second goal is to provide policy options for the international community to consider when dealing with an authoritarian regime that is brutally suppressing its citizens. My task is not to determine which counterinsurgency strategy is “best” or whether barbarism is a feasible alternative for Western democracies (it is not), but rather to consider how the international community can confront brutal regimes and better protect global human rights. As I detail in the concluding chapter, there are a number of policy options the international community may consider when confronted with a barbaric regime. These options are broadly bifurcated between preventive policies that seek to advance the economic and political liberalization of a state, and coercive policies which entail direct military intervention in order to protect human rights. Other alternative strategies include the withholding of foreign aid, legal prosecution through international criminal tribunals, and “naming and shaming” to publicly pressure governments to adhere to international laws and norms. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the international community could simply choose to “do nothing” and allow combatants to fight until a decisive military resolution is reached. Each policy option has its own set of unique advantages and drawbacks, with any outcome being highly contingent upon a wide range of complex factors. I believe my theory of barbarism offers a novel contribution that advances our collective understanding of counterinsurgency warfare. First off, it helps

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When Bad States Win

resolve the existing debate among scholars as to whether the brutal suppression of civilians can be an effective counterinsurgency strategy. As argued above, war outcomes are contingent on the level of barbarism an incumbent pursues. Relatedly, this book underscores the importance of broadening our conceptualization of barbarism to include other repressive political actions as opposed to restricting itself to genocide. Governments have many oppressive tactics at their disposal, including strict media censorship, torture, rape, and illegal detentions. The indiscriminate slaughter of civilians is just one of many potential options available to a barbaric regime. In sum, barbarism is largely a flawed strategy that only generates domestic and international condemnation, but when pursued to the extreme it can be effective in crushing a rebellion. Only the most lethal and ruthless forms of suppression will defeat an insurgency. In other words, governments that chose to employ barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy must go “all in” and fully commit to violating human rights. Consequently, the findings of this book may give readers cause for both optimism and concern.

o u t l in e o f book Chapter 1 of this book establishes the parameters for analysis by defining an insurgency. A salient drawback to the existing literature is that it has failed to articulate a clear definition of an insurgency and explain how it differs from other terms, such as guerrilla warfare. Indeed, it may well be that scholars have reached contradictory findings because they fall back on imprecise definitions and convoluted jargon when discussing intrastate conflict. Chapter 2 introduces readers to the different types of counterinsurgency (coin ) strategy an incumbent government may pursue in response to a rebellion. I present two novel advancements to the existing literature. First, I propose a more comprehensive definition of barbarism that includes a wide variety of repressive tactics. Second, I introduce the Counterinsurgency Strategy Spectrum, which illustrates how the various strategies relate to one another. In Chapter 3, I formally present my theory of barbarism and articulate the various conditions in which bad states defeat insurgencies. In particular, I outline what I hypothesize to be a curvilinear relationship between barbarism and war outcomes: intermediate levels of repression are not likely to deter a rebellion, but higher levels of brutality can crush an insurgency. The chapter also proposes a variety of other factors that may influence a state’s ability to defeat a rebellion.

Introduction

15

Chapter 4 consists of a series of quantitative tests for evaluating the effectiveness of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. I first establish the key variables of interest and then provide the results of my statistical models. The analysis offers a broad empirical overview of the average effect of barbarism across a wide range of cases. Chapters 5 and 6 are qualitative studies of both failed and successful cases of barbarism. Chapter 5 examines the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1977–79 as well as the Nepalese Civil War, which lasted from 1996 to 2006. In both these conflicts, the regime relied on moderate forms of repression and was subsequently overthrown by the insurgents. Chapter 6 investigates the Sri Lankan Civil War of 1989–2009 as well as the Chechen Wars, which lasted from 1994 to approximately 2009. In both these cases, the regime employed extreme levels of brutality with great success. Finally, the concluding chapter discusses the policy implications of my findings and highlights important factors the international community may want to consider when faced with a barbaric regime that violates human rights and international law in an effort to suppress a domestic insurrection. This chapter raises difficult questions as to whether external actors should even intervene to stop gross violations of human rights and, if so, whether such interventions can succeed. The concluding chapter also offers several suggestions for future research to help advance our collective understanding of counterinsurgency strategy.

1 Civil Wars and Insurgencies

The study of civil wars and insurgencies is a complex matter. The debates among scholars and subsequent formulations of national security policy are often contentious, with little consensus among experts. One of the primary causes of such disagreement is a failure to define key terms or specify the scope conditions of insurgent warfare. Indeed, very few scholars have attempted to differentiate insurgencies from guerrilla tactics, or even explain their relationship to other acts of political violence such as terrorism. As a result, most studies are laden with convoluted terminology and talk past one another. This chapter seeks to rectify this unfortunate state of affairs by proposing an explicit definition of insurgent warfare that helps distinguish it from other forms of internal conflict.

d is t in g u is h in g in t e r nal confli cts The first task of any study on civil wars and insurgencies is to delineate the parameters for analysis, which social scientists generally refer to as establishing the universe of cases. First off, it is important to distinguish civil wars from interstate wars, which has long been the focus of much scholarly research on warfare. Interstate wars are conflicts between sovereign states that are recognized members of an international system. It is generally presumed that the combatants possess roughly equal levels of power and that they employ similar conventional tactics against each other on the battlefield. Most theorizing has long concentrated on only the most powerful states in the international system in the belief that their conflicts have the greatest impact on global outcomes.1 The rise in the number of internal conflicts, however, has attracted the attention of both scholars and practitioners. The number of civil conflicts has been rising steadily since the end of the Second World War. Paul

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Hensel has found that “over three-fourths of the wars between 1945–1995 were primarily internal in nature, featuring combat between communities within a state or between a community and the state itself rather than combat between states.”2 Meanwhile, James Fearon and David Laitin have calculated that approximately 2.31 civil wars have occurred each year since 1945 but end at a rate of only 1.85 per year. “The result has been a steady, almost-linear accumulation of unresolved conflicts.”3 Consequently, the most common form of conflict today is civil war. Yet it is not just the sheer number of conflicts that has captured the attention of scholars; so too has the increasing number of casualties stemming from civil wars. According to Hensel, since 1960 “intrastate wars have produced roughly three times as many deaths as interstate wars.”4 Fearon and Laitin paint an even darker picture, finding that civil wars are responsible for nearly five times as many casualties as interstate wars.5 In sum, civil wars are the most frequent – and most deadly – type of conflict. Although most experts agree that civil wars are the most deadly form of contemporary conflict, there is little consensus as to how to actually define a civil war. A wide range of domestic disputes all potentially fall under the broad rubric of civil wars, including ethnic conflicts, guerrilla warfare, acts of genocide, colonial wars, coups, etc. Meanwhile, most debates concern the number of casualties that need to be incurred in order to distinguish a civil war from other forms of domestic violence, including riots or mass protests. Scholars have proposed a number of generic and wide-ranging definitions to capture the phenomenon of interest. Martin Edmonds advances a broad definition of civil war as being a “direct challenge to the authority of the government and its place within the political system of the state.”6 This necessarily entails the use of illegitimate violence of sufficient intensity to distinguish it from other forms of domestic violence. An emphasis on the clash of competing domestic groups is a central feature of other scholarly definitions. Mark Gersovitz and Norma Kriger, for example, define a civil war as a “politically organized, large-scale, sustained, physically violent conflict that occurs within a country principally among large/numerically important groups of its inhabitants or citizens over the monopoly of physical force within the country.”7 Meanwhile, Stathis Kalyvas defines a civil war as “armed conflict within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.”8 The notion of challenging the monopoly of force suggests that a rebel group seeks to either replace the incumbent government for control over a given piece of territory or secede altogether from a state.

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When Bad States Win

According to Melvin Small and J. David Singer, a civil war is “any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides.”9 Their notion of internality implies a distinction between integrated and dependent territories such that colonial wars or third-party interventions are not considered civil wars but more akin to extra-systemic wars. Other scholars have also viewed extra-systemic wars as a separate class of conflict, arguing that they are qualitatively different from civil wars.10 On the other hand, those who study insurgencies and guerrilla warfare explicitly include colonial or imperial wars in their analysis, since a rebellion can be against any central authority without regard to geographic location. As will be discussed below, however, the existing literature on insurgencies often amalgamates internal guerrilla wars and external third-party interventions, with little discussion or analysis as to how they may differ. The conditions that lead to an incumbent victory in one conflict may not yield the same outcome in other conflicts. Other scholars base their definitions of civil war on casualty counts and battlefield deaths. Thus, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis specify several criteria for identifying a civil war: causes more than 1,000 deaths overall and in at least a single year; challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; occurs within the recognized boundary of that state; involves the state as a principal combatant; includes rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state; and has parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war.11 Meanwhile, Patrick Regan defines “intrastate conflict as armed, sustained combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities.”12 He acknowledges that his casualty count is significantly lower than traditional thresholds for war but counters that it is sufficiently high to omit coups, riots, and demonstrations. Nathan Canestaro, however, objects to the reliance on casualty thresholds as a measure of civil wars on the basis that they are of little relevance to national security policy-making: “Current casualty-based definitions of civil war are designed to facilitate quantitative research, but the characteristics that make them ideal for political scientists limit their suitability for practitioners.”13 The basic contention is that casualty thresholds are arbitrary, unreliable, and often subject to manipulation.

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Also, unlike academics, policy-makers need to consider the diplomatic implications of labelling a conflict a “civil war” since it may potentially damage relations with another government or confer unwarranted legitimacy upon a rebel group.14 Canestaro therefore proffers a practitioneroriented definition of civil war, one that is premised on the rebels’ ability to be sufficiently organized to challenge a state’s sovereignty and mobilize enough support to wage a sustained military campaign, or that is characterized by international recognition of the rebels or even the conflict itself. “This proposed operational definition for civil war adopts a two-tier standard,” explains Canestaro, “meaning that the threshold can be met if a conflict demonstrates recognition, or alternatively both the mobilization and organization requirements.”15 His practitioneroriented definition represents a novel approach to identifying intrastate conflicts and arguably complements existing academic research. Other challenges exist in terms of specifying the criteria for defining the onset and duration of a civil war. Scholars frequently debate whether a conflict should be counted as a civil war in the first year it reaches a particular casualty threshold (typically 1,000 deaths), or whether a conflict may be coded as a civil war so long as it reaches the casualty threshold within a certain period of time (e.g., 1,000 deaths within a three-year period). Another challenge for scholars is how to address temporary cessations of violence. In particular, it is unclear how much time needs to have elapsed before a conflict is coded as an entirely separate civil war should violence eventually resume. As Sambanis points out, the debates over how to define civil war are not esoteric exercises in academic futility; in fact, they have important consequences in terms of the analyses and inferences drawn in the study of intrastate wars.16 Nevertheless, a reliance on casualty thresholds is understandable despite the complexity and fierce debate surrounding its use as an indicator of civil wars. As Small and Singer make clear, the presence of violence and death is a necessary criterion for war since the goals of combatants are unimportant and, in many respects, irrelevant.17 Indeed, many manifestations of human behaviour contain clear political goals but fall far short of being considered acts of war, for example, incidents of mass protest and civil unrest. The onset of civil wars is also a contentious topic of debate, and a number of competing hypotheses have been proposed, such as disputes over territory or political influence, quest for independence, ethnic divisions, etc. Some scholars point to political instability or poverty as socio-economic causes or to regime type as a political source of conflict. Still others cite topography, the presence of natural resources, or even a

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When Bad States Win

country’s history of conflict and war-proneness. Jeffry Frieden and colleagues have observed a multitude of causal factors, reporting that “we tend to see civil conflict in states that are poor, have weak police and military forces, and have a hard time projecting government authority throughout the country due to insufficient infrastructure or rugged terrain.”18 To be sure, the list is vast and the debates contentious.19 Indeed, Jeffrey Dixon conducted a broad survey of existing research on the causes of civil wars. He found that more than 200 different variables have been proffered by scholars to explain the occurrence of civil wars; he also found a jarring absence of any consensus among the competing accounts. “Despite the sheer volume of recent quantitative work on civil wars,” he concluded, the extant literature “still lacks a hard core of generally accepted propositions.”20 That said, he did find notable commonalities, including population size, geographic region, regime type, presence of natural resources, economic prosperity, and whether a state had experienced a prior war as all potentially affecting the likelihood of civil war. Scholars have clearly found it difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a widely agreed upon definition of civil war. Upon surveying the existing literature, Melvin Small and J. David Singer conclude that “there is neither a unified approach to the task of defining a typology of internal violence nor even a single agreed-upon concept of what civil war is or is not.”21 According to Sambanis, “the quantitative literature on civil war reveals a remarkable degree of disagreement on how to code the onset and termination of wars, and the literature is fuzzy on how to distinguish among different forms of political violence.”22

d e f in in g in s u rgency The challenge of defining civil war is further complicated when considering whether insurgencies are civil wars. This adds an entirely new layer of complexity since battlefield tactics are often treated as yet another defining factor. Even more problematic is that scholars have yet to reach a consensus on the relationship between insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. In general, an insurgency is any sustained act of violence intended to challenge an incumbent government’s control over its territory. The US Department of Defense’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines an insurgency as an “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”23 The US Department of State’s Counterinsurgency Guide similarly defines

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21

an insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. As such, it is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective.”24 As will be demonstrated below, however, scholars have proposed a multitude of additional factors and characteristics when attempting to define an insurgency. The three most commonly added traits are asymmetric power, guerrilla tactics, and conflict duration. The next section examines each of these elements and the contrasting approaches scholars have taken to defining an insurgency. Power Asymmetry

For many scholars, what distinguishes an insurgency as a specific subtype of civil war is power asymmetry between combatants. Mao Zedong described guerrilla warfare as a “weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.”25 “The fundamental fact about insurgency,” explain Fearon and Laitin, “is that insurgents are weak relative to the governments they are fighting, at least at the start of operations.”26 T. David Mason and his colleagues have suggested that all insurgencies begin with an inherent material disadvantage relative to incumbent forces. “Civil wars differ from interstate wars,” they explain, “in that presumably all rebel movements start out with a force level of zero, and to succeed they must build their troop strength in the shadow of an already existing army controlled by the very state the rebels seek to overthrow.”27 Insurgencies have attracted the attention of scholars as they defy the conventional understanding of the role that power plays in international relations theorizing and military studies. It has long been assumed that power, specifically military power, is the ultimate arbiter of war outcomes. In the fifth century bc , Thucydides famously dramatized the Melian Dialogue and enshrined the notion of power: “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”28 In terms of contemporary theorizing, Kenneth Waltz argued that the distribution of power influences the behaviour of states.29 Indeed, the concept of power and its relative distribution among actors is a central tenet of many variants of international relations theory. According to Stephen Biddle, “many believe that states with larger populations, larger or more industrialized economies, larger militaries, or greater military expenditures should prevail in battle.”30 This long-standing assumption is therefore challenged when weak, non-state insurgents defeat a more powerful state actor.

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When Bad States Win

“The idea that militarily inferior protagonists can prevail in a violent conflict,” observes Gil Merom, “poses a paradox for realism.”31 That material power does not necessarily translate into military victory was exemplified by the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War. In the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, Andrew Mack wrote that “the importance of these wars lies in the fact that the simplistic but once prevalent assumption – that conventional military superiority necessarily prevails in war – has been destroyed.”32 To be fair, many international relations scholars have proposed qualifications to explain away empirical anomalies. Waltz argued that military power can only influence another state and has little impact in terms of ensuring domestic control. “Military forces,” asserted Waltz, “are insufficient for the task of pacification.”33 He points to the difficulties the United States encountered in South Vietnam as evidence of the futility of material power in domestic conflicts. Meanwhile, other scholars have emphasized that military strategy plays an equally important role in determining war outcomes. “The root of the problem is that power calculations alone do not determine which side wins a war,” argues John Mearsheimer. “Clever strategies,” he adds, “sometimes allow less powerful states to defeat more powerful foes.”34 Specifically in terms of guerrilla warfare, Ivan Arreguín-Toft has argued that relative strategies can help explain why strong states are sometimes defeated by weaker nonstate actors.35 Guerrilla Tactics

Guerrilla tactics are often referenced when defining insurgencies. Such tactics usually entail avoiding set-piece battles and the subsequent irrelevance of territorial control. “The main empirical indicator of irregular war,” explains Kalyvas, “is the dearth of large-scale direct military confrontations or ‘set battles’ and the absence of frontlines.”36 Another common characteristic of guerrilla warfare is the use of sabotage and hit-and-run attacks in an effort to avoid direct confrontation with a superior adversary. Insurgents also rely heavily on local populations for supplies, funding, intelligence, and even their complicit endorsement.37 Alexander Downes describes guerrilla wars as “conflicts in which a rebel force, rather than fighting pitched battles in the open, avoids its more powerful opponent’s main forces and engages in hit-and-run operations, attacking when an advantage presents itself and melting away into the wilderness or the surrounding civilian population when reinforcements or superior firepower are brought to bear.”38

Civil Wars and Insurgencies

23

Many scholars explicitly include guerrilla tactics in their definitions of insurgency. James Fearon and David Laitin, for example, describe insurgencies as a “technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas.”39 Similarly, Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells characterize insurgencies as “an instance of asymmetric warfare” typified by “guerrilla” or “irregular” methods of war-fighting.40 Meanwhile, Shelton et al. identify asymmetric conflicts as occurring when rebel groups “adopt irregular (non-conventional) guerilla warfare strategies and/or terrorist tactics.”41 Other theorists define insurgencies by referencing battlefield tactics. “The essential features of guerrilla warfare,” explains John Nagl, “are avoiding the enemy’s strength – his main fighting forces – while striking at outposts and logistical support from unexpected directions. This principle is now often described as ‘asymmetric.’”42 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson are perhaps the most deliberate in their attempt to define an insurgency. In their view, an insurgency is a conflict involving a non-state actor that employs guerrilla tactics. They carefully distinguish between the two concepts, defining an insurgency as a “protracted struggle by non state actors to obtain their political objectives” and guerrilla warfare as a “strategy of armed resistance that (1) uses small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding direct battle when possible and (2) seeks to win the allegiance of at least some portion of the noncombatant population.”43 Guerrilla tactics are assumed to pose a challenge for incumbents because conventional military operations based on territorial conquest and the destruction of enemy forces are largely irrelevant in guerrilla warfare.44 Insurgents are difficult to identify since they do not form regular armies with discernible uniforms and thus can blend into the local population. Mao Zedong famously analogized this special relationship between civilians and insurgents as being akin to “fish inhabiting water.”45 Insurgents are willing to relinquish territory in order to avoid direct confrontation with a stronger adversary. This prolongs the conflict; it also renders useless any attempt by conventional counterinsurgents to reclaim territory. Guerrilla warfare also poses a unique paradox for conventional forces that have been trained to apply maximum firepower against enemy combatants. When insurgents merge into the general population – which they often do – they become indistinguishable from civilians, thereby compelling conventional armies to restrain their use of force to avoid killing non-combatants. Some theorists posit that this forces counterinsurgents

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When Bad States Win

to patrol on foot among civilians in order to acquire intelligence on guerrilla operations, though they also recognize this may place troops at greater risk by exposing them to enemy fire.46 Duration

Guerrilla tactics have an enormous impact on the duration of intrastate wars. Since insurgents are unable and unwilling to fight counterinsurgents in direct confrontation, the only way they can succeed is by employing guerrilla tactics over a long period of time. In other words, the absence of decisive battle necessitates a long war. As Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman explain, guerrilla warfare strategies “rely on simply surviving in a way that is highly visible and disruptive to the stronger powers’ policies. Over time, the continued survival of an adversary, punctuated emphatically with occasional episodes of violence, can call into question whether the coercer is succeeding, thereby eroding domestic support for continuing the intervention.”47 The goal of insurgents is not necessarily to win the military battles but to “prolong the war indefinitely” until the incumbent can no longer bear the costs of war.48 This phenomenon led Mao to suggest that guerrilla fighters may be “compared to innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant both in front and in rear, ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing.”49 Robert Taber later extended Mao’s metaphor, famously referring to an insurgency as the “war of the flea,” with the insurgents as a flea and the incumbents as a dog. The individual flea may be weak, but over time it can procreate and eventually wear down the dog, who is stronger but is unable to capture a flea. “The dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia,” explains Taber, “without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws.”50 Taber’s analogy also helps elucidate the role of mobility and hit-and-run tactics. “The flea bites, hops, and bites again, nimbly avoiding the foot that would crush him. He does not seek to kill his enemy at a blow, but to bleed him and feed on him, to plague and bedevil him, to keep him from resting and to destroy his nerve and his morale.”51 This emphasis on extending the duration of war led Mao to propose the notion of trading space for time. “The tactics of defence have no place in the realm of guerrilla warfare,” argued Mao, who acknowledged that for guerrilla tactics to succeed, insurgents must be willing to relinquish territory to the incumbent.52 Edward Katzenbach is well-known

Civil Wars and Insurgencies Asymmetry

Guerrilla tactics

25 Duration

Figure 1.1 | Evolution of an insurgency

for his interpretation of Mao’s dictum and proposed three intangibles of guerrilla warfare: space, time, and will. According to Katzenbach, insurgents avoid pitched battles and surrender territory to the incumbent. This allows them to survive longer and, more importantly, mobilize the will of the population to resist the incumbent.53 To succeed, guerrillas simply need to survive and prolong the war.54 According to David Kilcullen, “exhaustion is an insurgent tactic that seeks to impose costs on the opponent government, overstress its support system, tire its troops, and impose costs in terms of lives, resources, and political capital, in order to convince that government that continuing the war is not worth the cost.”55 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf write that an insurgency “emphasizes staying power rather than firepower, endurance and attrition rather than traditional victory.”56 The three elements of asymmetry, tactics, and duration have all been broadly referenced by scholars to define an insurgency. Moreover, a great deal of the existing literature implicitly conceptualizes an insurgency as evolving through a process similar to that in figure 1.1. The general assumption is that insurgent organizations initiate hostilities while at a significant power disadvantage. Given their relative weakness, insurgents are compelled to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics to challenge an incumbent government. But insurgents must also prolong the conflict to exhaust their opponent given that guerrilla tactics deliberately avoid direct confrontation and decisive battles. Challenging the Assumption

Although asymmetry, tactics, and duration are frequently referenced in the literature, not everyone accepts their inclusion – indeed, each of these has been the focus of intense debate among scholars. To be sure, not all internal wars can be characterized as asymmetric since many entail two combatants with some degree of power parity who contest each other by conventional means. Asymmetric conflicts are not a strict subset of civil wars. As Shelton et al. point out, “asymmetric conflicts, in which one actor possesses a significant material capability advantage over its adversaries, can take place within states, between states, or both.”57

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When Bad States Win

There is also some discrepancy in terms of how scholars define asymmetry. Studies have defined “asymmetry” in many different and sometimes contrasting ways with respect to goals, willingness to assume costs, and physical versus psychological dispositions.58 While most define asymmetry in terms of imbalances of material capabilities, Andrew Mack proposes a slightly different interpretation based on the presence of an external occupying force. In such cases, insurgents are presumed to be fighting an existential threat to their independence and sovereignty.59 Mack proposes that guerrilla warfare be defined by an “asymmetry of interests”: for insurgents, their very survival is at stake, whereas the counterinsurgent faces no such existential crisis.60 Scholars have even questioned whether it is useful to identify an insurgency in terms of guerrilla tactics. Perhaps one of the greatest misconceptions of insurgent warfare is that such conflicts always remain asymmetric or that guerrillas eschew power parity. Indeed, scholars have highlighted many different manifestations of insurgent conflict, which may certainly encompass guerrilla tactics but also include instances in which combatants possess equivalent levels of power and fight each other using conventional methods.61 More recent research has cast doubt on whether guerrilla tactics even benefit insurgents, suggesting instead that power parity may yield a more favourable outcome in that insurgents can better extract concessions from an incumbent. The assumption is that conventional warfighting imposes greater costs on an adversary than guerrilla tactics and thus compels the government to seek a negotiated outcome. “Governments ought to be concerned about the condition of parity because it demonstrates the possibility of losing,” argues Philip Hultquist. He adds that “while under asymmetry, though the probability of government military victory was not necessarily high, the probability of defeat was very low.”62 Many theorists have long advocated for insurgencies to transition from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfighting. Even Mao emphasized the importance of conventional armies, arguing that they are the only means of destroying an adversary. “If we view the war as a whole,” stated Mao, “there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision.”63 David Galula, the renowned counterinsurgency theorist, similarly described an insurgency as being protracted until guerrillas are able to “reach a balance with the opponent, and to overpower him.”64 He argued that there is a particular point in time when insurgents should “pass from guerrilla warfare to a higher form of operations, to create a regular army.”65 In essence, both Mao and Galula believed

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that an insurgency must evolve into a conventional force to increase the probability of defeating an incumbent regime. Even the United States’ Counterinsurgency Guide described the stages of an insurgency as potentially evolving from popular unrest to an open, semi-conventional armed conflict.66 Thus, it would be short-sighted to define an insurgency strictly in terms of an asymmetry of power and guerrilla tactics. It is a far more complex and dynamic form of conflict than is generally assumed. Relationship to Other Terminology?

The challenge of developing an agreed-upon definition has been further complicated by the presence of additional terms all competing to describe a similar phenomenon. For example, the concept of fourthgeneration warfare (4gw ), which emerged in the late 1980s, emphasized the increasing involvement of societal actors in internal conflicts and the concomitant decline in the need for major military power.67 The notion was more recently articulated by Thomas Hammes, who broadly described 4gw as using “all available networks – political, economic, social, and military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.”68 However, other scholars and even practitioners have denounced 4gw as a vacuous attempt to formulate a theory and characterized it as “elegant irrelevance.”69 Even more problematic is the term low-intensity conflict (lic ), which has been used to describe any manifestation of political violence short of major conventional war. This term has become so pervasive that it has been used to reference guerrilla warfare, terrorism, information operations, counter-narcotics, nation-building, and even peacekeeping operations.70 In a poignant critique, Grant Hammond decried low-intensity conflict as an “ill-chosen term, intemperate in judgement, inaccurate in description, inherently inexplicable and unpredictable.”71 The failure to clearly operationalize key terminology such as low-intensity conflict diminishes social science research that endeavours to understand intrastate war outcomes. Yet another potential source of confusion is the relationship between an insurgency and terrorism. Some scholars tend to conflate terrorism and insurgency; for example, Kilcullen argues that Al-Qaeda’s brand of Islamic extremism should be better conceptualized as a “global insurgency” but at the same time refers to it as “guerrilla terrorism.”72 This can be problematic, however, as it ignores the clear differences between terrorists and insurgents.

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When Bad States Win

An insurgency is a form of political violence that is distinct from terrorism. Insurgents generally seek to conquer and seize territory; terrorists do not. The former seek to overthrow an incumbent government; the latter may be seeking a change in existing policy rather than regime change. The target of political violence is another important distinction between an insurgency and terrorism. Insurgents typically strike government forces; terrorists target civilians.73 John Mueller and Mark Stewart are quite insistent that this distinction between terrorism and insurgencies must be maintained, otherwise most civil wars would be incorrectly classified as a form of terrorism.74 To be fair, the distinction is often blurred. Insurgents may certainly target civilians just as terrorists may sometimes attack government forces. Many non-state actors embrace both forms of political violence and have territorial ambitions in addition to political, economic, and religious objectives.75 For example, the Islamic State, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab have all been characterized as simultaneously terrorists and insurgents.76 But at the same time, some scholars counter that such groups constitute an entirely different subset of political violence. Audrey Cronin, for example, points out that many of these groups are far more sophisticated, with advanced infrastructure, and should instead be classified as pseudo-states.77 Although there is some inconsistency in the literature, many scholars and experts agree that insurgencies and terrorism – and by extension counterinsurgency and counterterrorism – are two separate types of political violence. As Michael Boyle argues, “counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are two distinct models of war.”78 Meanwhile, in the introduction to the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Sarah Sewall describes recent attempts to link counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as “doctrinal miscegenation” and insists that the two should be considered distinct from each other as they often entail “different actors . . . with conflicting operational approaches.”79 The difference often lies in the number of tactics available to counter an enemy. Counterinsurgency is generally much broader and entails not only military operations but also good governance and economic development. For their part, insurgents have a wide range of potential tactics at their disposal including intimidation, extortion, and kidnapping. They can also influence a population by bestowing certain benefits such as job training, employment, health care, and delivery of social services.80 As a result, insurgencies and terrorism should not be confused with each other.81

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Competing Definitions and Imprecise Literature

Overall, the existing literature betrays a great deal of confusion when it comes to defining an insurgency. Many scholars and practitioners refer to asymmetric conflicts, guerrilla wars, terrorism, and insurgencies as all synonymous with one another, and in most cases they use the terms interchangeably without addressing any potential discrepancies. In his historical review of intrastate conflicts, Sam Sarkesian finds that “few military and civilian leaders appreciated the fundamental distinction between guerrilla war, insurgency, and revolution/counter-revolution.”82 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf similarly argue that the terms insurgency and counterinsurgency have been used in so many different ways that they have lost all substantive meaning.83 That said, recent scholarship has made a commendable effort to better differentiate the various forms of political violence. Michael Findley and Joseph Young, for example, stress that it is important to draw distinctions: “Insurgents pursue both military and political means to achieve their goal of replacing the sovereign authority. Guerrilla warfare, or what is commonly referred to as ‘small war’ tactics, is one means to achieving this end.”84 Eli Berman et al. also note that civil wars cannot be defined by a single military tactic: “Conflicts can shift along the symmetric-asymmetric spectrum,” and certain wars, they argue, “have both symmetric and asymmetric fronts.”85 Even government agencies have recently taken steps to disaggregate tactics from their official definitions. The cia , for example, explicitly separated guerrilla tactics from its revised definition of an insurgency and instead emphasized the challenge to an incumbent government’s legitimacy or control. In doing so, it acknowledged that insurgents may pursue a variety of tactics or “activities,” including guerrilla warfare.86 The central focus of this book is therefore on the broad class of insurgencies that entail the sustained use of military violence against a central authority. It recognizes that tactics and power asymmetries can fluctuate over the course of a single conflict and that strict dichotomies are not helpful in obtaining a comprehensive understanding of counterinsurgency outcomes.87 Additionally, the target of political violence may be a domestic government or an external occupier. This is consistent with other scholars, including Gil Merom, who defines an incumbent authority as an “indigenous government that fights on its own or with external participation, or a foreign power that imposes itself on the population.”88

2 Understanding Counterinsurgency Strategy

With the universe of cases defined, I now turn to outlining the different strategies incumbents have used to counter domestic challenges to their authority. Three distinct counterinsurgency (coin ) strategies are discussed: enemy-centric, population-centric, and barbarism. I seek to make a number of conceptual advancements in our collective understanding of these strategies. My primary goal is to propose an expansive definition of barbarism that encompasses many more repressive activities than are currently recognized by existing studies. I also introduce what I refer to as the Counterinsurgency Strategy Spectrum, which provides a more coherent representation as to how the different strategies relate to one another. By clarifying these subtle yet important differences, scholars and practitioners will achieve a better understanding of the conditions that lead to the defeat of an insurgency.

e n e m y- c e n t r ic coi n Enemy-centric counterinsurgency is a strategy in which the incumbent directly targets an insurgency’s military capabilities. This may include directly attacking its armed forces, military equipment, communication lines, supplies, etc. It emphasizes the “defeat of the insurgents on the battlefield through the application of military force.”1 As such, enemycentric actions resemble conventional fighting, in that each combatant generally limits its offensive operations to the other. According to Spyridon Plakoudas, enemy-centric coin is essentially a “variant of conventional warfare.”2 The defeat and removal of rebel fighters is assumed to correlate with the termination of an insurgency. The enemy-centric strategy views an insurgency as essentially a military problem that requires a military solution. According to the US

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Counterinsurgency Guide, “the enemy-centric approach conceptualizes coin as a contest with an organized enemy, and focuses coin activity on the insurgent organizations.”3 The objective is to halt a domestic insurrection through the use of military force. “In order to defeat the enemy,” explains Nagl, “it is only necessary to defeat his armed forces.”4 But an enemy-centric approach is far more comprehensive than simply killing or capturing insurgents. The strategy includes actions against the supplies, materiel, weaponry, safe havens, and potential recruits of insurgent organizations. All of these elements are regarded as key ingredients that fuel a rebellion. Christopher Paul and colleagues contend that such inputs are critical determinants of insurgent success – indeed, that the “ability of the insurgents to replenish and obtain personnel, materiel, financing, intelligence, and sanctuary (tangible support) perfectly predicts success or failure.”5 A 1970 study conducted by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf is generally regarded as the quintessential text on enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Conceptualizing insurgent warfare as an economic system, Leites and Wolf approached an insurgent organization as a business that requires certain inputs to sustain its operations. Inputs may include recruits, information, military equipment, and finances; outputs are acts of political violence. Much like a large corporation, an insurgency “recruits, trains, and promotes its personnel; obtains and generates information, including information relating to immediate and potential adversaries; locates and procures other inputs that its operations require; raises and allocates funds; and produces and distributes services or products.”6 Thus, an enemy-centric strategy sets out not only to destroy guerrilla forces but also to deprive the insurgents of access to resources, thereby reducing their operational capacity and augmenting the incumbent’s ability to absorb an attack. Leites and Wolf’s theory marked an important advancement in the literature by broadening the range of available tactics under an enemy-centric approach. Many scholars believe that an enemy-centric strategy is a pragmatic and effective means to suppress a rebellion. “By systematically attacking insurgents’ strongholds,” argues Bernard Finel, “an army can erode insurgent combat power, overturn the narrative that the insurgency is winning, and ultimately compel the insurgents to compromise. Military force in this case becomes instrumental.”7 Others insist that eliminating high-ranking officers of an insurgent organization is key to a successful counterinsurgency. Rank-and-file guerrilla fighters can easily be replaced, but the leadership is a far more valuable commodity that, if removed, can engender severe organizational problems.8 Even Charles Callwell, whom

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contemporary scholars often view as a progenitor of population-centric strategies, was a strong advocate for militarily defeating guerrilla fighters in pitched battles. “Opposing forces should be beaten so thoroughly that they will not offer further opposition,” he argued.9 Yet some would counter that an enemy-centric approach ignores the fact that insurgents can simply blend into the wider civilian population to evade an incumbent. In other words, offensive military operations are rendered useless if there is not a clear target. Insurgents will avoid direct conflict or even go underground if the pressure becomes too severe. As a result, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual advises against a purely enemy-centric strategy. “Killing insurgents,” it states, “by itself cannot defeat an insurgency... [and] is normally impossible.”10 Critics of an enemy-centric strategy point to the United States’ emphasis on attrition during the Vietnam War as stark evidence of the inadequacy of killing insurgents as a primary objective. This has led many practitioners to conclude that an insurgency cannot be eradicated solely through force and to insist on alternative strategies such as a population-centric approach.

p o p u l at io n - c e ntri c coi n A population-centric strategy shifts the emphasis from the insurgent to the civilian. The goal is to protect the wider population and to address the underlying grievances that may have contributed to a rebellion. This approach is premised on the belief that economic deprivation, social inequalities, bureaucratic corruption, ethnic patronage, and absence of political inclusion fuel an insurgency. Thus, the population-centric strategy is often synonymous with securing the “hearts and minds” of the civilian population. At the root of this strategy, assert Eli Berman et al., is that “combining traditional military operations with interventions based on ideology, humanitarian aid, and other measures that establish government legitimacy can achieve a reduction in conflict at lower cost in lives or money than does a purely military campaign, and has a greater chance of success.”11 The primary emphasis of a population-centric strategy is on protecting civilians and securing their support. Indeed, the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual insists that protecting civilians is the “most important part” of a successful counterinsurgency strategy.12 A population-centric strategy thus perceives the role of the population in slightly different terms than an enemy-centric approach, which views citizens as a mere source of supply.13

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Since its goal is not to defeat an insurgency on the battlefield but rather to ensure the protection and security of civilians, the population-centric approach stands in contrast to other strategies in terms of the application of military force. In particular, counterinsurgents are advised to use the least amount of military force necessary to subdue an insurgency; aggressive military action would only alienate the citizenry and potentially cost innocent lives. Excessive violence can provoke animosity toward the government, thereby fuelling an insurgency’s recruitment efforts. Nagl cautions that “military operations that do not exercise minimum force . . . diminish the support of the people for the government, which they feel should protect them – not destroy them.”14 A population-centric strategy also strongly emphasizes addressing socio-economic grievances that may have given rise to the insurgency. “Population-centric coin ,” explains Bernard Finel, “uses military force to foster the conditions for long-term economic development and good government.”15 The goal is to establish an effective system of governance that can provide goods and services to the broader population. Bolstering the capacity of an incumbent government usually involves extensive nation-building and development efforts. According to Chaim Kaufmann, population-centric strategies entail “political, economic, and social reforms that redress popular grievances such as poverty, inequality, corruption, and physical insecurity.”16 The ultimate intent of population-centric strategies is to dissuade citizens from joining an insurgent organization as either active or passive members. Counterinsurgents attempt to discourage individuals from supplying intelligence, money, or logistical assistance to insurgents. At the same time, they seek to convince the population to provide intelligence on insurgent activities and to support the political efforts of the incumbent government. With respect to active cadres, counterinsurgents may extend offers of amnesty in exchange for laying down their arms and renouncing any allegiance to the insurgent organization. “Victory is achieved,” explains the Field Manual, “when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency.”17 David Galula was among the first contemporary scholars to shift the emphasis of counterinsurgency strategy away from a purely military approach toward securing the well-being and support of the population. “The battle for the population,” he famously argued, “is a major characteristic of the revolutionary war.”18 Conventional warfare is based on the balance of material power, whereas the central focus of counterinsurgency warfare is on shifting the balance of popular support. More

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recently, the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual has been considered a milestone in the development of the population-centric approach to countering insurgencies. According to John Nagl, the doctrinal manual was built around two big ideas: first, that protecting the population was the key to success in any counterinsurgency campaign, and second, that to succeed in counterinsurgency, an army has to be able to learn and adapt more rapidly than its enemies. Neither of these ideas was especially new, but both were fundamental changes for an American Army that had traditionally relied on firepower to win its wars.19 Many scholars and practitioners are convinced that population-centric strategies are the most effective means of countering an insurgency. Paul et al. examined thirty historical cases of counterinsurgency operations and found that all successful outcomes exhibited “good” counterinsurgency practices consistent with population-centric approaches. They concluded that “successful implementation of identified good practices always allows the coin force to prevail, independent of any uniqueness.”20 Using more sophisticated research methods, Findley and Young created an agent-based computational model that simulated the behaviour of various actors and discovered that population-centric strategies were most effective in quelling an insurgency.21 Meanwhile, Andrew Enterline and colleagues assessed the strategies of foreign interventions and found that while a hearts and minds approach did increase the likelihood that the insurgents would be defeated, the increase was only modest and required a significant investment of time.22 Historians who study insurgencies point to several cases where a population-centric strategy had a positive outcome. The exemplar of a successful hearts and minds campaign is Britain’s involvement in the Malayan Emergency. General Gerald Templer is often credited with turning the tide of the war upon assuming command of British forces. He immediately restructured his military forces, emphasizing intelligence collection over excessive use of firepower. He also collaborated with the indigenous population to form popular militias, funded local development projects, and promoted democracy through state elections. Nagl offers a positive assessment of Templer’s efforts, suggesting that “it is difficult to overstate the impact that Templer’s energetic personal leadership and desire to solve problems in Malaya had on the course of the emergency.”23 But while Western governments and practitioners have eagerly adopted a population-centric approach, many critics argue there is little

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empirical evidence that it is an effective strategy for countering an insurgency. They point out that a population-centric strategy is tantamount to international development, which, they contend, has a poor track record of any meaningful accomplishments.24 Others reject the assumption that widespread popular support is a precondition for defeating an insurgency. A quick survey of authoritarian regimes around the world provides an immediate counterfactual: governments do not require the support of the citizenry to ensure domestic stability. Furthermore, population-centric approaches may not even be suitable for conflicts grounded in religious or sectarian strife, let alone irredentist aspirations. Building schools and delivering clean drinking water will simply not subdue such deep-seated antagonisms. Skeptics thus insist that population-centric approaches are simply not feasible and point out that even successful cases of population-centric coin took many years to achieve.25 The fact that Western governments have blithely adopted a hearts and minds approach despite little evidence that it is an effective strategy has generated a great deal of resentment and debate. Gian Gentile believes that the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual is laden with “unproven theories and assumptions about insurgencies and how to counter them” and is therefore an ill-considered guide for US warfighting.26 Ralph Peters is especially critical of the Field Manual, which, he declares, “lies about history.” He asserts that the manual culls only successful examples of population-centric strategies while ignoring its abysmal failures. “Many of the claims made about the historical track record of insurgencies are absurd,” he concludes.27 Also, proponents of population-centric counterinsurgency have failed to specify which of its elements possess the greatest leverage. Populationcentric coin is an umbrella term for multitude of policies that often overlap; there is little consensus as to what constitutes or even defines a population-centric strategy. Paul Dixon argues that previous attempts to define “classic” counterinsurgency remain ambiguous and open to extreme interpretation.28 For example, he points out that the dictum of “minimum use of force” could be construed to mean anything from curfews to torture. He also argues that proponents of population-centric strategies tend to overgeneralize their efficacy and fail to appreciate the nuanced complexities inherent in every conflict. Watts et al. seem to agree, noting that practitioners often cite a few select cases as evidence supporting a particular strategy but “without providing any indication of the generalizability.”29 By and large, the literature has yet to specify the elements of a hearts and minds approach that are necessary or sufficient to successfully defeat an insurgency.

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Those who object to population-centric strategies often insist that an enemy-centric approach is far more effective and harnesses existing competencies. They decry the United States for setting aside its conventional military doctrine and discarding many of the hard lessons learned in war. However, there remains a third approach to countering an insurgency – one that scholars have often overlooked.

ba r ba r is m Put most simply, barbarism is the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Ivan Arreguín-Toft provides the most straightforward definition of barbarism: “the systematic violation of the laws of war in pursuit of a military or political objective.”30 Whereas an enemy-centric strategy targets an adversary’s military, barbarism targets non-combatants. The assumption is that targeting civilians weakens an insurgency through two interrelated mechanisms. First, civilians may be coerced into providing counterinsurgents with intelligence on guerrilla fighters in exchange for a reduction in the level of political repression. Second, the slaughter and mistreatment of innocent civilians may compel an insurgent organization to consider alternative tactics since latent proponents of an insurgency will be dissuaded from providing material or even political support to rebel groups. Under such conditions, an insurgency is less likely to spread or secure popular support, which is a critical component of their overall strategy. Unfortunately, the extant literature has largely ignored barbarism as a distinct counterinsurgency strategy. The little research that does exist conceptualizes barbarism as strictly entailing widespread killings and genocide.31 I counter that such measures of barbarism are only partly accurate and that existing theories harbour several fundamental flaws. First, genocide and the indiscriminate aerial bombardment of population centres are relatively rare events and do not encapsulate the full range of tactical options that counterinsurgents have at their disposal. So it is no surprise that scholars often reach contradictory findings regarding the efficacy of barbarism. Second, and perhaps more important, the wholesale killing of civilians is a sufficient indicator but not a necessary condition of barbarism. I contend that torture, rape, mass dislocations of populations, imprisonment without due process, and kidnappings must also be included as part of a barbaric counterinsurgency strategy. “Like other forms of control,” argues Jennifer Earl, “repression

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can be manifested in a range of ways.”32 An important contribution of this book, then, is to expand the definition and range of activities that fall under barbarism. The logic of barbarism is straightforward. Attacking a non-combatant population deprives insurgents of a key source of support as civilians will choose not to accept the high costs associated with resisting state control. Barbarism is based on the assumption that populations are comprised of rational, utility-maximizing agents who are sensitive to costs. Given that assumption, barbarism is a sensible strategy for altering the behaviour of civilians and dissuading them from supporting an insurgency. “Government violence against civilians during war,” explain Valentino et al., “is often designed to influence patterns of civilian support.”33 It also signals to insurgents the extreme lengths to which a counterinsurgent force is willing to go in order to achieve a desired outcome. In other words, the counterinsurgent will tolerate widespread condemnation, violate international and humanitarian law, cast aside moral constraints, and even accept the risk that an outside force may choose to intervene. Barbarism may be seen as rational for counterinsurgents operating in an unpredictable conflict setting with few legitimate military targets. “In an environment where it is impossible to tell civilian from enemy combatant,” explains Kalyvas, “it pays to be violent.”34 As a result, many scholars believe that barbarism is most likely to occur in the context of guerrilla wars in which the enemy often refuses to identify itself and blends into the general population. According to Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino, “governments are most likely to perpetrate mass killing when they are fighting insurgencies or engaged in civil wars.”35 But some analysts reach the opposite conclusion: that barbarism, specifically mass killing, is less likely in guerrilla wars and more common in conventional wars. “Contrary to the influential draining the sea argument,” explains Daniel Krcmaric, “the results show that state-led mass killing onset is less likely during guerrilla wars than during conventional wars.”36 Krcmaric’s finding is insightful because it based on the very logic used to justify a hearts and minds strategy. In other words, if mass violence against civilians during an insurgency is assumed to generate grievances or cause the public to support guerrillas given the inherent motivation of self-preservation, then incumbents should instead employ indiscriminate attacks during conventional wars when they do not have to be concerned about public opinion. To a certain degree, barbarism and population-centric strategies share similar ends but use different means. On the one hand, each strategy

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seeks to deprive insurgents of popular support. On the other hand, the means differ as population-centric strategies rely on non-violent inducement whereas barbarism employs violent coercion. Barbarism also makes the critical assumption that civilians can lobby an insurgency to cease or moderate its actions.37 During the Portuguese Colonial Wars, for example, insurgents were forced to reassure civilians that continued support of the revolution was preferable to colonization: “Insurgent groups feared that Portuguese reprisal attacks on pro-guerrilla villages would undermine public support for their cause rather than engender animosity towards the colonizers.”38 In essence, both population-centric and barbaric strategies see the population as central to incumbent success; however, victory is obtained using different tactics: the former extends benefits to a population, while the latter imposes costs. Perhaps the historical example of barbarism most often cited is the one the British implemented during the Second Boer War. The conflict between the British Empire and the Boer republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State revolved around Britain’s growing imperialist influence in the region. Having been defeated in conventional battle against the British, the Boers shifted to guerrilla tactics and found themselves confronted with a fierce counterinsurgency campaign that included a scorched earth policy and concentration camps. “In combination, the three aspects of British counterinsurgency strategy – obliterating Boer sources of supply through farm-burning, crop destruction, and killing of livestock; preventing the sympathetic Boer civilians from helping the rebels by removing the population to concentration camps; and driving the Boer commandos against blockhouse and barbed-wire barriers with flying columns – proved effective.”39

ov e rv ie w o f s trategi es a n d s t r at e g ic s pectrum I now introduce what I refer to as the Counterinsurgency Strategy Spectrum to better conceptualize how the different strategies relate to one another and, in particular, to distinguish between population-centric and barbaric strategies. The coin Strategy Spectrum also provides a visual map that highlights the range of policy options incumbents have at their disposal (see figure 2.1). The most immediate observation to make about the Counterinsurgency Strategy Spectrum is that population-centric and barbaric approaches are mutually exclusive. It is not possible for an incumbent to claim that it is protecting the well-being of citizens while simultaneously engaging

Understanding Counterinsurgency Strategy

Population-centric

Enemy-centric

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Barbarism

Figure 2.1 | coin Strategy Spectrum

in torture or mass killings. Indeed, repressive counterinsurgency tactics belie any assertion that an incumbent is seeking to improve civilian welfare. It is simply not reasonable to conclude that a counterinsurgent force sincerely cares about the well-being of non-combatants when it is simultaneously massacring civilians. According to the coin Field Manual, “civilian casualties tangibly undermine the counterinsurgent’s goals.”40 Yet the Strategy Spectrum also indicates that some approaches to counterinsurgency do, in fact, overlap and that it is possible for an incumbent to pursue a mixture of two strategies. Indeed, the United States’ counterinsurgency strategy is explicitly based on both population- and enemy-centric approaches. The US Department of State advocates a “careful balance between constructive dimensions (building effective and legitimate government) and destructive dimensions (destroying the insurgent movements).”41 Michael Boyle, for his part, contends that American counterinsurgency strategy is a combination of enemy- and population-centric strategies that “focuses alternatively on direct (or coercive) and indirect (or ‘hearts and minds’) ways to separate insurgents from the local population.”42 Incumbents rarely pursue a pure strategy and often rely on a mixture of different approaches. Moreover, counterinsurgency strategies often evolve over the course of a single conflict. Christopher Paul and colleagues argue that “the traditional population-centric and enemy-centric logics in coin thinking are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the dichotomy is a caricature and most historical coin campaigns blend the two philosophies, with the coin force seeking to deny the insurgents the support of the population while simultaneously seeking to reduce the number of insurgents through attrition and arrest.”43 It should also be stressed

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that my Counterinsurgency Strategy Spectrum is an idealized conceptualization and that incumbents have sometimes resorted to a mixture of all three strategies. In some instances, incumbents have employed both population-centric and barbaric approaches in their efforts to suppress a rebellion.44 For example, during the Malayan Emergency the British instituted food denial operations and committed a number of atrocities such as the Batang Kali massacre, yet simultaneously, they were praised for their hearts and minds approach to combating the insurgency.45 Finally, the Counterinsurgency Strategy Spectrum helps illustrate a salient lacuna in the literature as most scholars only acknowledge population- and enemy-centric strategies. Indeed, Nagl identifies only two approaches to countering an insurgency: “direct” or enemy-centric, and “indirect” or population-centric.46 Paul Melshen similarly proposes a dichotomized interpretation of guerrilla warfare as consisting of either kinetic or non-kinetic operations.47 Meanwhile, Enterline and colleagues argue that “coin strategies can be roughly divided into two types, population- or enemy-centered.”48 There has been very little theorizing on the far right of the Counterinsurgency Strategy Spectrum concerning barbarism. To a certain extent this is not surprising given that most Western scholars have been transfixed by population-centric strategies. As Plakoudas notes, the population-centric strategy “has won a large number of adherents among the academic community and military establishments of the West.”49 But even recent scholarship that attempts to move beyond populationcentric strategies to include enemy-centric approaches still excludes barbarism as a strategic option.50 Consequently, a primary aim of this chapter has been to introduce barbarism as a distinct counterinsurgency strategy that encompasses a broad range of repressive tactics besides genocide and mass murder. The question remains, however – under what conditions will barbarism succeed in suppressing an insurgency? The remainder of this book seeks to answer that question, beginning with the next chapter, in which I introduce my theory as to when repressive regimes are able to defeat an insurgency.

3 When Bad States Defeat Insurgencies

Barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy is extremely controversial. There are instances in which it has overwhelmingly annihilated an insurgency, but other cases in which it was counterproductive by galvanizing domestic and international opposition to an incumbent government. Sri Lanka, for example, successfully defeated the Tamil Tigers by committing a number of war crimes including the use of death squads that targeted civilians. On the other hand, Pakistan was unable to defeat insurgents in the Bangladesh Liberation War despite committing genocide and violating human rights. This chapter introduces a theory of barbarism that seeks to account for this variation. It identifies the circumstances in which barbarism is most likely to defeat an insurgency as well as the conditions that cause it to fail as a counterinsurgency strategy. I begin by outlining the empirical puzzle and debate among scholars as to whether barbarism and the systematic violation of human rights can quell a rebellion. I then specify the factors that influence the effectiveness of barbarism, focusing on the provision of foreign aid, punitive diplomacy, military intervention, and domestic opposition. The chapter concludes by introducing a theory premised on a curvilinear relationship between barbarism and war outcomes. In particular, I hypothesize that barbarism is largely counterproductive as a strategy and will only generate domestic resistance and international condemnation. However, as an incumbent government increases its level of repression and pursues more extreme forms of domestic violence, it is more likely to defeat an insurgency. In other words, if a counterinsurgent decides to employ barbarism it must fully commit and go “all in” to increase its chances of defeating an insurgency since moderate levels of repression are counterproductive and only incite resentment. My theory helps clarify the existing debate and demonstrates that both sides of

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the argument are correct, that is to say, that there are circumstances in which barbarism is effective as a counterinsurgency strategy, but others in which it is not.

t he e x is t in g d e bat e : s u cces s or fai lure? Scholars fiercely debate whether the gross violation of human rights can suppress domestic opposition. The literature is filled with contrasting results, with little consensus among experts. As highlighted in the previous chapters, many of the discrepancies are a consequence of failures to define key terms or establish the types of cases suitable for analysis. For example, most studies fail to address the role of external actors, do not specify whether insurgencies can only be defined by the use of guerrilla tactics, and have a restrictive interpretation of barbarism as only entailing genocide. An additional source of confusion in the literature stems from the fact that scholars employ different methodologies in their research. Nevertheless, existing studies have made a valuable contribution to our understanding of barbarism and can help inform the development of new theories. For starters, a small number of researchers insist that barbarism can be an effective strategy. Their assumption is that indiscriminate violence will compel the population to either support counterinsurgents or, at the very least, abstain from supporting insurgent fighters. The threat of incumbent violence and victimization provides an incentive to comply with government demands. “Judicious use of terror against civilians,” argues Alexander Downes, “can pay high dividends in guerrilla wars.”1 Meanwhile, from the perspective of counterinsurgents, barbarism can be a pragmatic and cost-effective strategy. Civilians become the de facto target in the absence of a clear battlefield with a self-identified enemy force. Gil Merom contends that barbarism is generally cost-effective since “indiscriminate annihilation requires relatively little investment and military skills, and produces long-lasting results.”2 It precludes the need for placing troops in unpredictable environments where it is difficult to differentiate insurgent from civilian. This also reduces the need for robust intelligence collection and analysis since the target of violence is established. Other scholars acknowledge that barbarism may have a short-term pacifying effect but insist that it is an inadequate strategy in the long run. “The single-minded employment of brutal, coercion-driven strategies,” explain Kelly Greenhill and Paul Staniland, “might prove militarily successful in the short term, but politically untenable over the longer term.”3

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Paul et al. reach a similarly nuanced assessment that barbarism can be effective in the short term but rarely results in an incumbent victory in the long term: “repression can win phases by dealing the insurgents a blow and making support for the insurgents more costly for supporters, [but] the vast majority of phases that were won with repression ultimately increased popular support for the insurgency and ended in a coin defeat for the entire case.”4 Another nuanced perspective considers the interaction of strategies as the deciding factor as to whether an incumbent will defeat an insurgency using barbarism. In particular, Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s seminal study specified the conditions under which barbarism may defeat an insurgency. His strategic interaction thesis proposed that when counterinsurgents and insurgents pursue similar strategies the former will generally win. Thus, incumbents should use barbarism as a strategy only when facing an insurgency that employs guerrilla tactics. Arreguín-Toft concluded that barbarism “appears to be an effective strategy” for defeating an insurgency, though he recognized that it may not be ideal if the goal is long-term political control.5 Indeed, in subsequent research he argued that the “indiscriminate use of force will prove counterproductive.”6 But the vast majority of the existing literature has concluded that barbarism is ineffective. “Indiscriminate violence,” argues Stathis Kalyvas, “is at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive.”7 Jason Lyall agrees, noting that most “evidence largely supports the conclusion that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive.”8 The widespread assumption is that barbarism drives neutral civilians to support insurgents and engenders international condemnation. According to Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, “it is often affirmed that being severe toward the population, or worse, inflicting considerable amounts of damage on it, does not pay: one is more apt to arouse than intimidate.”9 Meanwhile, in his influential study of strategic bombing, Robert Pape concluded that “coercion based on punishing civilians rarely succeeds.”10 The preceding discussion underscores the fact that there is very little consensus as to whether barbarism is an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Some experts argue it is effective, and some are more cautious, claiming that it only works in the short term, but most insist that it is an ineffective strategy. Is it possible that all of these scholars are correct? To adjudicate between the competing explanations, I now turn to identifying the types of states that are most likely to employ barbarism as well as the various factors that may undermine the implementation of a barbaric strategy.

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r e g im e t y p e a n d barbari s m To evaluate the efficacy of barbarism, we must begin by identifying the types of states that are most likely to employ coercive counterinsurgency strategies. This is important in terms of both empirical research and national security policy-making. Additionally, the likelihood of a state relying on barbaric methods to suppress domestic opposition is believed to correspond with the onset and termination of conflict. It is generally accepted that democratic states are the least likely to experience an outbreak of violent rebellion within their borders. In democracies, dissent is generally attenuated through free and fair electoral systems, the co-option of opposition groups, and myriad freedoms including expression and assembly. Domestic rivals typically have legitimate avenues to convey their grievances and to influence public policy. “The strengths of well-working democracies,” explains Alex Schmid, “can minimise the probability that domestic terrorist groups emerge.”11 Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis concur, finding that democracy is “negatively associated with civil war prevalence.”12 When faced with an insurgency, democracies will often reject the use of indiscriminate violence to counter rebel fighters, be it at home or abroad. Many studies have confirmed that democratic states will eschew repressive tactics in favour of population- or enemy-centric approaches. Indeed, Scott Gartner and Patrick Regan find that democracies are “less likely to employ highly repressive means to stifle dissent.”13 Michael Engelhardt likewise concludes that “the record tends to support the view that democratic governments choose less harsh counterinsurgency tactics, though there are clear exceptions and lapses.”14 Democracies renounce barbarism, given the institutional constraints and normative principals they face. Myriad procedural checks and balances curb the ability of democratic elites to pursue political violence as a means of stifling dissent. Indeed, Helen Fein points out that human rights violations are “inversely related to democracy, political rights, and civil liberties.”15 Domestic constituencies, for their part, can impose moral constraints on a state’s ability to pursue barbaric military strategies. Pape explains that “coercion is seen as morally repugnant because it usually involves hurting civilians,” adding that “many considered the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam immoral as well as ineffective. Coercion has thus come to be viewed as the ‘dark side’ of international relations theory.”16 In sum, democracies lack the institutional capability to violate human rights and are morally averse to doing so.

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In contrast, authoritarian regimes are presumed to be more likely to use force in order to repress dissent given the lack of normative constraints and the prominence of their security-oriented institutions. “Nondemocratic regimes,” argues Engelhardt, “are free to use much harsher tactics in dealing with [an] insurgency than are democratic regimes.”17 Moreover, the military and the police are well-developed and their leaders play an integral role in the state’s decision-making processes. As a result, explain T. David Mason and Dale Krane, “the military comes to see itself as the only institution capable of enforcing the political tranquility.”18 Many observers have subsequently concluded that democracies are less likely to defeat an insurgency since they are not willing to violate humanitarian law. Indeed, there is a fairly substantial amount of research suggesting democracies are less capable than non-democracies in defeating an insurgency. According to Victor Asal et al., democracies are “less likely to be successful at suppressing insurgencies” because they are “less likely to be willing to be as repressive and ruthless as might be called for.”19 Gil Merom similarly argues that “democracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory.”20 Even former President John F. Kennedy is reputed to have said that democracies are at a disadvantage when it comes to war.21 The assumption is that intrastate conflicts are especially savage and require a degree of brutality that is simply not conducive to liberal norms. Other studies assess the likelihood of a democracy defeating an insurgency outside their own territory. It is much more difficult to retain domestic support for a foreign conflict that does not necessarily threaten the very survival of the state. In particular, the general public is unlikely to tolerate the high costs of war when confronted with a mounting casualty rate. “A war with no visible payoff against an opponent who poses no direct threat,” explained Andrew Mack, “will come under increasing criticism as battle casualties rise and economic costs escalate.”22 This assumption is so prevalent that scholars have reached near universal agreement that democracies are sensitive to high casualties.23 As casualty rates increase the public will be less likely to support a war and more likely to seek the removal of their leader, typically through an election. It is important to stress, however, that experts disagree on whether regime type affects counterinsurgency outcomes. A number of studies have concluded that regime type is irrelevant to war outcomes and that a state’s level of democracy has no bearing on its ability to defeat an

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insurgency. The argument that “democratic institutions inhibit government’s performance in counterinsurgency” is not supported by evidence, concluded Anna Getmansky.24 Other scholars have found that democracies are just as likely as non-democracies to rely on repressive strategies to defeat insurgents, and in some cases are more likely to kill non-combatants.25 Thus, contrary to the widely accepted assumption, these scholars contend that democracies do not make for inferior counterinsurgents.

c o s t s o f e x t r e m e barbari s m Although regime type provides some insight regarding the outbreak of an insurgency, it offers little information as to whether the brutal and inhumane treatment of civilians is an effective approach to suppressing a rebellion. A theory of counterinsurgency warfare must account for those factors that may influence the use of barbarism as a strategy. I contend that four factors in particular affect the success of barbarism: the provision of foreign aid, diplomatic punishment and sanction, third-party military interventions, and domestic opposition. Although by no means an exhaustive list, each of these constituent elements is diverse enough to capture the wide array of dynamics that affect the outcome of insurgent warfare. Foreign Aid

Foreign aid is an important resource for an incumbent government combating an insurgency within its borders. Indeed, Martin Edmonds goes so far as to argue that “external support is generally a crucial factor” in civil wars.26 Rescinding foreign aid could therefore impact a state’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, outside benefactors can use foreign aid as leverage to alter an incumbent’s behaviour (i.e., to punish human rights abuses). Put simply, adjustments in the amount of foreign aid can alter the effectiveness or willingness of an incumbent government to employ barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. It is generally assumed that most Western governments tie the delivery of foreign aid to a recipient’s human rights record. Indeed, most US agencies are quite explicit in prohibiting any assistance to a state that has a pattern of violating humanitarian law. According to the Leahy Amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act, no assistance shall be provided “to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation

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of human rights.”27 Stephen Cohen adds that a large body of international law prohibits governments “not to support another engaged in serious violations of internationally recognized human rights.”28 Several studies provide empirical support that foreign aid is in fact tied to a recipient’s human rights record. For example, Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl found that human rights violations corresponded to a decrease in allocation of foreign aid: “A country’s human rights performance significantly determined how much aid the country received. Those countries with bad human rights records received less U.S. bilateral economic aid than those countries with better records. . . . In sum, we find that human rights do play a role in the decision of who receives U.S. bilateral foreign assistance, and how much aid they are allotted.”29 Examining the decisions of several members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd ) during the final years of the Cold War, SimonPeter Gomez found that human rights considerations played a role in determining whether a recipient state received aid, although not the quantity of such aid.30 Even the most recent studies on US foreign aid indicate that appropriations remain based on human rights considerations. For example, Jessie Rumsey’s analysis “demonstrates that foreign aid decisionmakers, at least rhetorically, are committed to the principles of the human rights regime.”31 Other scholars, however, offer a more nuanced assessment. There is some evidence that recipients and non-recipients of foreign aid do not differ in their human rights performance.32 In other words, the provision of foreign aid is not contingent on whether a recipient is adhering to international law. Evan Sandlin takes a more balanced approach, suggesting that the allocation of foreign aid is dictated by national security considerations: “When recipient states do not contribute to US national security, they will be allocated less aid when they violate human rights, since reducing their aid allotment is consistent with US values. However, when recipient states do contribute to US national security, they will be allocated more aid when they violate human rights, as the usa will want to assist friendly regimes facing internal political pressure or dissent.”33 Foreign aid is equally important to rebel groups challenging an incumbent through insurgent warfare. This has long been noted by counterinsurgency theorists. David Galula, for example, highlighted the various types of external support that may benefit an insurgency, including financial support and diplomatic endorsement.34 More recently, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual stressed that “access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies.”35

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International benefactors may be more inclined to provide support if insurgents are facing a particularly ruthless regime. As a state ramps up its brutality toward civilians, outside parties may feel compelled to “do something.” Early in the Syrian Civil War, Senator John McCain advocated for military action to protect civilians. “The Assad regime should not consider that it can get away with mass murder,” he declared.36 Several studies have found that foreign aid to rebels does increase their probability of defeating a government. According to Jeffrey Record, there is a striking “correlation between external assistance and insurgent victory.”37 Other scholars contend that foreign support to insurgents can alter the course of a war by causing them to last longer, can result in a higher number of casualties, and can make conflicts more difficult to resolve through negotiations.38 Punitive Diplomacy

A repressive government may be subject to diplomatic sanctions for its treatment of civilians during an insurgency. This may entail a variety of diplomatic tactics such as recalling an ambassador or expelling the target state’s ambassador, closing an embassy or consulate, isolating the regime diplomatically, suspending previous protocols or agreements, generating public opprobrium, issuing travel bans, etc. Diplomacy also overlaps with the provision of foreign aid, which means that sanctions and embargoes can be imposed, restrictions (including tariffs) can be placed on trade, and targeted financial penalties can be applied to freeze the assets of key decision-makers. Diplomatic interventions thus encompass a broad range of alternative approaches and utilize different instruments of foreign policy, and these may impact a counterinsurgent’s calculus with regard to using barbarism as a strategy. Economic sanctions are perhaps the most salient instrument and arguably impose the greatest costs on a target state to compel it to alter its behaviour. However, scholars and analysts have long debated whether sanctions are effective. One of the most optimistic studies was conducted by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliott, who found that sanctions were effective in 36 per cent of the cases they evaluated.39 Although on the surface a seemingly low success rate, many point out that these results suggest that sanctions are far more cost-efficient than military operations. But Robert Pape famously disputed Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott’s findings, countering that their data were flawed and that most conflicts were in fact settled by other means, including military force. Also, states are willing to endure far higher costs than many

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observers assume, and a globalized economy means that states are able to withstand sanctions by substituting either goods or trading partners. “There is little valid social science support for claims that economic sanctions can achieve major foreign policy goals,” argued Pape.40 Another common tool for altering the behaviour of a target state is an arms embargo. However, similar to the literature on sanctions, existing studies reach mixed results as to whether it is an effective instrument of coercion. Michael Brzoska, for example, finds that arms embargoes may reduce the flow of weaponry to a target state but are less effective in actually altering behaviour or yielding policy concessions. Brzoska concludes that “arms embargoes have had, on average, notable effects on arms import patterns” but “rather little effect on targeted policies.”41 In contrast, Abel Escribà-Folch finds that economic embargoes are an effective coercive instrument, particularly in reducing the duration of intrastate conflicts.42 Despite the ambiguity surrounding the effect of economic instruments, many experts insist that diplomacy is still a valuable tactic for leveraging a target’s behaviour and imposing costs for the inhumane treatment of citizens. Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, for example, maintain that human rights have been successfully leveraged as a “global norm of appropriate state behavior to pressure states to improve actual human rights practices.”43 Meanwhile, in their case study on the Kosovo War, Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon found that Milosevic “so repulsed Western publics with his barbaric actions that the alliance found a resolve it would almost certainly not have otherwise displayed.” The Serbians’ treatment of Albanians backfired, galvanizing the international community to intervene. “If Milosevic had hunkered down and restrained his military and paramilitary forces during the bombing,” Daalder and O’Hanlon surmise, “support within nato countries for sustaining the operation probably would have quickly dissipated.”44 Diplomacy is not simply a tactic employed by the international community to punish wayward regimes that violate human rights; it is also a tool frequently utilized by insurgents themselves to solicit support for their cause. As Reyko Huang points out, “many rebel groups seek and receive foreign support during civil war; dispatching representatives, opening offices abroad, lobbying in foreign capitals, and creating foreign affairs departments.”45 The goal is to either secure material support for their fight against the counterinsurgent or to convince foreign powers to take some punitive action against the incumbent government. It is a “tactical choice for rebel groups seeking political capital within an international system,” argues Huang, “to signal to international audiences that they are serious contenders for state power.”46

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Rebel activity at the international level may thus have important consequences for domestic violence and insurgent war outcomes. Related to the preceding discussion on foreign aid, diplomatic engagement may convince external actors to withhold aid to incumbent governments or provide material support to help the insurgents champion their cause. In more extreme circumstances, rebel diplomats may convince external actors to directly intervene in an ongoing conflict using military force. Indeed, as hypothesized below, external military intervention can dramatically alter the course of events or increase the cost of selecting barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. Ultimately, if we accept the premise that insurgent warfare is an extension of politics by other means, then diplomacy should be regarded as another theatre of conflict. Indeed, Huang asserts that diplomacy is another dimension of civil wars.47 The combatants compete against each other not only within the state on the battlefield but also in the international arena. Military Intervention

An incumbent’s decision to employ indiscriminate violence against civilians may elicit a forceful response by outside actors in the form of direct military intervention. Actual or threatened intervention is intended to accelerate the termination of a conflict or to influence a target state’s behaviour by imposing significant costs on an incumbent’s decision to employ barbarism.48 This can be achieved by militarily supporting an ally or through direct combat against an adversary. The actual type of military intervention can vary, ranging from small special forces operations to much larger conventional engagements. “One widely documented feature of the epidemic of civil wars in the post-World War II era,” observe T. David Mason et al., “has been the frequency with which they have become internationalized through the intervention of other nations.”49 Scholarly debate on the impact of third-party interventions in civil wars generally revolves around two factors: outcome and duration. In terms of war outcomes, several studies indicate that military interventions on behalf of a rebel group increase the probability that it will defeat an incumbent. “Rebel-biased interventions,” asserts Stephen Gent, “have a significant impact on the likelihood that a rebel group will win a civil conflict.”50 Balch-Lindsay et al. agree, finding that “third-party support increases the risk that a civil war will end in an opposition military victory.”51 But most scholars also concur that the timing of a military intervention may bias the results. In particular, military interventions

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on behalf of a rebel group usually occur when they are strongest, while interventions on behalf of an incumbent government typically occur when they are weakest or most threatened by opposition forces. On the other hand, the literature lacks any consensus regarding the effect of military intervention on the duration of intrastate wars. Benjamin Jones finds that direct support for insurgent groups is effective only during the early stages of a conflict: “Both indirect support and direct-conventional support increase the likelihood of a rebel victory early in a war, but become less effective over time. Thus, there is a critical window relatively early in a war during which external support is most likely to help rebels defeat governments.”52 Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew Enterline are more skeptical, having discovered that interventions can actually increase the duration of a conflict rather than hasten its end.53 Some contend the mixed findings regarding the relationship between third-party interventions and duration of conflict is a result of selection bias.54 In particular, it is not surprising that some conflicts last longer when third parties intervene to support the weaker combatant since the latter can now sustain military operations far longer than would have otherwise been the case. Domestic Opposition

The final and arguably most important factor that influences a barbaric counterinsurgency strategy is the role of domestic actors. High levels of barbarism can backfire by boosting support for the insurgency. Civilians are forced to either absorb the costs imposed by counterinsurgents or turn to the insurgents for protection. “Confronted with high levels of indiscriminate violence,” reasons Kalyvas, “many people prefer to join the rival actor rather than die a defenseless death.”55 Barbarism can radicalize an otherwise neutral population, spurring them to pick up arms against the incumbent. In other words, repression increases domestic dissent, thereby strengthening an insurgency and reducing the chances that the incumbent will be able to quell it. According to Philip Hultquist, “state repression can backlash and increase the threat of armed challengers by deepening grievances against the government and, in some cases, solving the rebels’ recruitment problem.”56 That said, the population’s response to government repression may vary depending on whether the violence is discriminate or selective. A barbaric campaign that is indiscriminate and entails widespread collective violence is more likely to engender domestic opposition. “When violence is indiscriminate,” explain Kocher et al., “individuals cannot avoid

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being victimized simply by refusing to participate in the insurgency.”57 In such instances, an absence of survival-maximizing alternatives may compel individuals to collaborate with insurgents. Many scholars thus believe that selective violence may do more to help an incumbent defeat an insurgency since it does not drive broad swaths of the population to support the rebels.58 This line of thinking has led other scholars to theorize that barbarism may be effective specifically in the context of ethnic wars in which particular segments of the population have been singled out and targeted. “Attrition matters,” explains Kaufmann, “because [each] side’s mobilization pools are separate and can be depleted.”59 Downes agrees, finding that ethnic cleansing “can be remarkably successful under certain circumstances.”60 Nevertheless, the likely increase in domestic opposition as a result of widespread violence has led many experts to conclude that barbarism is simply not an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Having studied counterinsurgency efforts in the North Caucasus, Monica Toft and Yuri Zhukov found that barbaric strategies that rely on the lethal use of force only increase insurgent activity. “Punishment actions have a strong inflammatory effect on new and recurring cases of insurgent violence,” they conclude.61 In his study of the Kosovo War, William Hayden argues that insurgents welcomed and even provoked Serbian government reprisals since it boosted recruitment. The strategy employed by the Kosovar rebels, explains Hayden, “was to mobilize mass support for armed insurrection by provoking the fry [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] to target civilians, which would also contribute to ‘internationalizing’ the conflict to the point of compelling international intervention.”62 His finding also serves to further underscore the proposition that many of the factors identified above are all closely related. The Importance of Duration

It is important to stress that the impacts of the aforementioned factors are all heavily influenced by the duration of a conflict. Indeed, it has been widely assumed that insurgencies of longer duration are less likely to result in an incumbent victory, especially when barbarism is employed as a counterinsurgency strategy. Conflicts that become protracted afford rebels and the international community more time to formulate a response. For example, the international community and third-party actors have more time to withhold foreign aid to an incumbent government or send aid to rebel groups. Additionally, a protracted war not only allows them to impose punitive diplomatic measures but also affords enough time to

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ensure that the negative repercussions are felt by the target state. Finally, rebels can use extended periods of government repression to disseminate their propaganda and recruit new fighters. Thus, the duration of war can have an enormous impact on the efficacy of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. Consistent with the maxim of Thomas Hobbes, barbarism is believed to be successful only when “nasty, brutish and short.”

w h e n ba d s tates defeat in s u r g e n c ie s : a theory I have argued that several significant flaws in the literature have impaired our understanding of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. First and foremost, restrictive definitions that consider only mass killings as incidents of barbarism fail to capture the realities of conflict. Doing so ignores the broad array of repressive policy options that incumbents may pursue. For example, barbarism can also entail torture, rape and sexual violence, arbitrary detention, kidnappings, and extrajudicial killings. Moreover, previous studies have tended to measure the occurrence of barbarism dichotomously, thus undermining the validity of their findings. As Gartner and Regan explain, “repression is not a dichotomous choice, where a government either does or does not engage a repressive strategy, but rather can be thought of as a continuous outcome.”63 Finally, there has been little theorizing of instances in which barbarism was unequivocally successful in defeating an insurgency. States that employ barbarism are not destined for defeat. The Russians were able to rout the Chechen insurgents, and, more recently, Bashar al-Assad defeated a diverse array of rebel groups plaguing Syria. In formulating a theory of barbarism I turn to the broader literature on political violence and government repression. Although an extensive field of research, it generally refers to human rights violations that are rationally employed to coerce a population into submission. The broad objective is to ensure a government’s monopolization on the use of force and violence – one of the fundamental definitions of a state.64 Some scholars working in this domain have found that repression can have a negative effect on internal dissent, while others have uncovered a positive effect. The contrasting results have led to the fairly widespread acceptance of a curvilinear relationship – political repression can both deter opposition and incite protest. “The overwhelming result,” explains Karen Rasler, “is that repression has both positive and negative effects on government opposition.”65 The notion of a concave or inverted-U function suggests that low levels of government repression are not sufficient to provoke mass protest.

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However, greater levels of government brutality will increase the level of domestic unrest and opposition. Stated differently, the careful application of government repression at low levels will not trigger domestic unrest, but widespread opposition will increase as a government escalates its use of indiscriminate force. Otherwise neutral citizens feel compelled to oppose government repression, safeguard civil liberties, and ensure their own security. But citizens will be less likely to fight back as a government continues to increase the severity and intensity of violence to the most extreme levels. Rebellion and insurgency simply become too costly and dangerous, especially given asymmetries of power. Thus, only under the most draconian and oppressive conditions can a government hope to quell internal dissent. This dynamic has long been theorized by scholars. In his seminal study of political violence, Ted Gurr posited a curvilinear relationship between government repression and rebellion: “Men subject to mild sanctions for their actions are little angered by them; men subject to severe sanctions are intensely angered but deterred from the sanctioned acts and, in the short run, from retaliation against the sanctioning agents. But if men anticipate or experience sanctions of intermediate severity, their anger is likely to outweigh their fear.”66 More recent research has verified this proposition. “The form of the relationship between governmental acts of coercion and political violence should be an inverted U-curve,” explain Edward Muller and Erich Weede, “such that low rates of political violence are most likely when the current levels of negative sanctions are either low or high and high rates of political violence are most likely at intermediate levels of negative sanctions.”67 Some scholars have further developed the relationship between government violence and rebellion by proposing the “more murder in the middle” (mmm ) hypothesis, which holds that semi-authoritarian or semi-democratic states are more likely to employ repression as a means of stifling dissent.68 This is premised on the assumption that democracies and authoritarian regimes face low levels of threat and therefore have little need to repress their citizens in order to retain control. Conversely, semi-democracies are the most prone to violence since they face the most severe or destabilizing threats.69 “Because leaders of semi-democracies view their regimes as more vulnerable to threats, they respond more harshly to threats,” explain Patrick Regan and Errol Henderson, adding that “it is this interaction among the prevalence of threats, the paucity of political institutionalisation and the perception of political vulnerability on the part of elites that make semi-democratic states more likely to repress their dissidents.”70

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Low

Probability of incumbent win

High

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Low

Barbarism

High

Figure 3.1 | Hypothesized relationship between barbarism and war outcomes

My theory of barbarism accepts the proposition of a concave function modelling the relationship between repression and dissent, but I invert this function in order to explain insurgent war outcomes. If both low and extremely high levels of barbarism are best at stifling dissent, then these are the most likely scenarios in which an incumbent will be able to defeat an insurgency. Conversely, an incumbent is less likely to defeat a rebellion if moderate levels of repression only engender widespread discontentment and drive civilians to support insurgents. As a result, I argue that the relationship between barbarism and counterinsurgency outcomes is best modelled with a convex function or U-curve. As seen in figure 3.1, my model demonstrates that initial increases in the level of human rights violations have a negative effect on securing a counterinsurgency victory; however, continued increases in the level of repression will eventually increase the chances of an incumbent victory. I theorize that moderate levels of barbarism do not impose sufficient costs on civilians to deter them from supporting an insurgency or taking up arms against an incumbent. But as a government increases the severity and cruelty of its counterinsurgency strategy, a rebellion becomes far too costly and risky to pursue. The overwhelming and brutal application of force against civilians will squash domestic opposition.

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Thus, my theory of barbarism is premised on three distinct hypotheses:

h1. Low levels of barbarism are more likely to be associated with an incumbent victory or negotiated settlement. h2. Moderate levels of barbarism are more likely to result in an insurgent victory / incumbent defeat. h3. High levels of barbarism are more likely to be associated with an incumbent victory. It is important to stress, however, that the theory is based on the assumption that an incumbent possesses the requisite military capabilities and political support to effectively implement a brutal campaign of violence. Security forces not only must have the extractive capacity to mobilize resources but also must be sufficiently trained and equipped to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Furthermore, the regime must maintain the full support of political elites and commit to a barbaric strategy that entails the violation of human rights. Any equivocation or relaxation of political repression will only undermine the efficacy of barbarism as opposition forces have time to regroup. Put simply, a counterinsurgent must have both the means and will to pursue barbarism. My theory underscores the importance of broadening our understanding of barbarism beyond genocide to include other repressive political actions. In addition, the ability to move along the x-axis in figure  3.1 to more severe levels of barbarism allows me to better account for a change in the probability of an incumbent defeating an insurgency. This is achieved by incorporating the many different manifestations of political repression, which in turn sheds light on the variation in counterinsurgent tactics and war outcomes. Indeed, as Daniel Krcmaric argues, “civil wars show remarkable variation in terms of civilian victimization.”71 Additionally, my theory of barbarism substantiates existing assumptions regarding not only the types of states that experience domestic rebellion but also the type of states most likely to pursue extreme forms of brutality against civilians. Low levels of political repression are commonly associated with democratic states. Those states are able to better absorb grievances through political mechanisms, thereby enervating an insurgency or precluding its outbreak altogether. Authoritarian regimes, in contrast, provide dissident groups with little opportunity for collective action and are willing to use the most severe forms of repression. Under such conditions, the incumbent is able to thoroughly crush an insurgency. Semi-authoritarian regimes are most prone to instability and lack the institutional wherewithal to pursue the most extreme forms

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of barbarism.72 Given that they are incapable of addressing grievances through either political accommodation or violent repression, I theorize that semi-authoritarian states are least likely to defeat an insurgency. In sum, I argue that by expanding the definition of barbarism beyond simply genocide to include other repressive tactics such as kidnapping and torture, we can better account for the variation in insurgent war outcomes. I hypothesize that both low and high levels of repression are most effective at countering an insurgency, while intermediate levels are least effective. My theory helps advance previous studies that examined the efficacy of a barbaric counterinsurgency strategy. Arreguín-Toft and Merom have both made important contributions to the literature, but each suffers from its own unique theoretical or methodological flaws. Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction thesis was a novel development in our understanding of war outcomes, but his typology is restricted to only two types of military strategy and does not consider the broad array of policy options available to an incumbent.73 Moreover, he relies on the Correlates of War dataset, which not only includes interstate conflicts but also omits insurgencies with a lower casualty threshold. Meanwhile, Merom in his influential study makes the broad assumption that barbarism is an effective strategy, but he does so without conducting a generalizable empirical evaluation that would verify that premise. His analysis is also limited to militarily strong democratic states, which unfortunately yields little insight as to the effectiveness of a barbaric strategy when pursued by other regime types.74 I believe that my theory constitutes a more rigorous development of counterinsurgency strategy that is systematically assembled and represents a much clearer explication of the mechanisms by which barbarism produces victory or defeat. I now turn to conducting a series of empirical tests to evaluate the validity of my theory. In the next chapter I introduce my primary variables and perform various statistical tests. This quantitative analysis provides a broad assessment of the average effect of barbarism and yields preliminary insight into the generalizability of my theory. The subsequent chapters then employ in-depth qualitative case studies to make comparisons across cases and trace the effect of barbarism on counterinsurgency war outcomes.75 Overall I find that my theory holds up relatively well to the battery of tests and yields novel insight into the effectiveness of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy.

4 Statistical Analysis of Barbarism

This chapter presents a series of empirical tests evaluating the effect of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. I begin by providing a broad overview of the data used for my analysis, discuss the key variables of interest, and introduce the preliminary descriptive statistics. I then conduct a series of statistical tests using both logistic and ordered logistic regression models. The primary objective is to determine whether an incumbent’s decision to employ brute force and violate human rights affects the likelihood of defeating an insurgency. Even after controlling for a variety of rival explanations, the results appear to substantiate my theory that barbarism is generally a failed strategy and is only effective in its most brutal form.

o u t c o m e s a nd data The first task in studying insurgent warfare is to address two difficult and interrelated challenges: defining outcomes, and selecting data for analysis. Deriving an agreed-upon definition of counterinsurgent war outcomes is notoriously difficult given the overlapping objectives. For example, outcomes could be determined based on whether one combatant is militarily defeated; however, this is inherently problematic when studying insurgencies, for rebel groups can simply disband for a brief period of time, only to re-emerge at a later date. Moreover, distinguishing outcomes based on military operations underscores the additional challenge of defining “military defeat” since some insurgent groups may reduce their activity level to only occasional or sporadic attacks. An alternative approach to coding insurgent war outcomes is premised on whether a combatant achieved its political objectives. This method is arguably even more complex if coding is contingent on whether an

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incumbent is able to retain power and deflect opposition, or if specific grievances are adequately addressed that fuelled an insurgency in the first place.1 At the same time, it is important to distinguish between the short-, medium-, and long-term objectives for all combatants involved in a conflict. Scholars have operationalized war outcomes in a variety of ways, with some approaches being more intricate than others. In general, most datasets are unanimous in coding the outright military defeat of an adversary or the absolute achievement of political aims as a victory for a combatant. The main discrepancy between the various coding schemes largely relates to how peace treaties and ceasefires are addressed. Observers may object to peace treaties being regarded as a victory for the incumbent since the insurgent was able to achieve some political aims; others may retort that peace treaties are a clear signal that the incumbent was able to avert outright military defeat. Kalyvas, for example, seems to imply that any negotiation is a “win” for insurgents as they were able to wrest concessions from the incumbent.2 Still another coding challenge arises when a conflict does not conclude with an outright military victory for either combatant and the fighting persists, albeit at lower levels of intensity. “Success in coin ,” acknowledges the US Counterinsurgency Guide, “can be difficult to define.”3 Nevertheless, several concrete approaches have been taken to defining intrastate war outcomes. For example, Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson code outcomes according to wins, draws, and losses. A win occurs when the rebels were “militarily defeated . . . or the war ends without any political concessions granted to insurgent forces,” whereas a loss means the incumbent was forced to satisfy “all, or nearly all, insurgent demands.” A draw occurs when the “incumbent is forced to concede to some, but not all, insurgent demands.”4 T. David Mason et al. similarly define three potential outcomes of civil wars as being a win, loss, or draw. For each combatant, “a win is their most preferred outcome and a loss is their least preferred outcome, with a draw (settlement) preferred to a loss but not to victory.”5 Most scholars exclude ceasefires from analysis since these do not result in any political concessions by either combatant. Moreover, ceasefires often only lengthen the conflict, which itself can influence the eventual outcome of a war. Indeed, as noted in previous chapters, guerrillas seek to prolong an insurgency and ceasefires are often indicative of such an approach. Insurgents can temporarily cease military operations in order to retrench and address any organizational weaknesses. In such cases, the outcome of a conflict largely remains uncertain. As Philip Hultquist

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points out, “uncertainty over how long the rebels can survive matters most.”6 In sum, ceasefires do not provide any conclusive evidence as to the final outcome of a conflict. For similar reasons, outcomes defined as “low activity” are also frequently excluded.7 The second challenge concerns the selection of data to be used for analysis. Many scholars have long relied on the Correlates of War (cow ) dataset, which defines a “war” largely as any violent conflict incurring at least 1,000 battlefield deaths per year.8 Since each combatant must be capable of defending itself by marshalling some form of “effective resistance,” one-sided violence such as genocide is excluded. Not surprising, experts have hotly debated the use of cow data.9 For many, the most immediate objection is that the 1,000 fatalities criteria is an arbitrary threshold and that it is notoriously difficult to obtain verifiable information on battlefield casualties. Several attempts have been made to either revise the Correlates of War or create an entirely new dataset that adheres to many of the same fundamental criteria as cow . Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis developed a dataset of civil wars that caused “more than 1,000 deaths overall and in at least a single year.”10 These data have since been used by scholars including Karl DeRouen and David Sobek.11 Other scholars decry the absence of any dataset that explicitly encompasses insurgent warfare or guerrilla tactics.12 In this regard, Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson have amalgamated several existing datasets to fill this specific lacuna.13 In terms of studying insurgent warfare, a salient drawback to the existing datasets is the high casualty thresholds they set, which results in the omission of many “small wars.” Higher casualty thresholds are problematic when studying low-intensity conflicts, which, by definition, typically do not reach the same level of intensity or severity as found in conventional wars. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (ucdp ) Conflict Termination dataset overcomes this impediment by lowering the threshold to twenty-five battlefield deaths per year.14 Any research on insurgencies and especially guerrilla warfare needs to be based on a lower casualty threshold since the objective of rebels is not necessarily to win but to avoid defeat. To be sure, this is the fundamental precept of a war of attrition as theorized by Mao. In other words, many insurgencies may never surpass a 1,000 battle deaths and so may well be excluded from datasets. As Pape explains, the objective of guerrilla warfare is to “wear down the opponent government’s political authority and thus its ability to field military forces, rather than destroy those forces in battle.”15 Guerrillas intentionally avoid direct confrontation with incumbent forces, so it should not be surprising that asymmetric conflicts have lower casualty counts.

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Given the above discussion, this book will rely on the ucdp Conflict Termination dataset to study insurgent warfare. That dataset covers the years between 1946 and 2013. Three types of conflict are included in my analysis: (1) intrastate wars, (2) internationalized internal armed conflicts, and (3) extrasystemic wars, which Uppsala defines as an armed conflict between a state and a non-state actor outside that state’s own territory; thus, it includes colonial and imperial wars.16 Each unit of observation is a single conflict. In terms of outcomes, I choose to focus on incumbent wins, insurgent wins, and peace agreements, which I treat as a draw.

ba r ba r i sm One of the fundamental arguments of this book is that definitions of barbarism should be expanded to include other repressive tactics besides genocide. As noted in previous chapters, many previous studies have examined the relationship between guerrilla warfare and mass killings; however, nearly all tend to acknowledge that mass killings are extremely rare. It should also be stressed that acts of genocide often do not constitute a war if the violence is one-sided. Alternative measures are therefore required in order to better evaluate barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. Until recently, data on political repression were fairly limited. Two notable datasets have been used extensively in previous studies. The Cingranelli-Richards (ciri) Human Rights dataset codes the human rights practices of governments based primarily on US State Department country reports.17 That dataset is best-known for its Physical Integrity variable, which is an additive index constructed from its indicators of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. Another commonly referenced data source is the Political Terror Scale (pts), which is based on reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the US State Department. It defines political terror as “violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question.”18 The pts coding scheme results in a five-tiered ordinal variable: 1 Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 2 There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

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3 There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Executions or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. 4 Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 5 The terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.19 Both datasets are extremely valuable as each offers ordinal scales of political violence and repression, thereby allowing researchers to move beyond restrictive dichotomous measures of genocide. Indeed, the variables capture the variation in barbaric methods commonly used to squash dissent and counter an insurgency. There is, however, a notable limitation to using these datasets. As Christopher Fariss points out, the standards that monitoring agencies have used to evaluate a state’s adherence to human rights have changed over time.20 This precludes the systematic comparison of results. Ann Marie Clark and Kathryn Sikkink also note that the ciri and pts datasets are susceptible to “information effects” and urge social scientists to exercise caution when interpreting their findings.21 This study will instead take advantage of a relatively new dataset on government repression and human rights violations as developed by the political scientist Christopher Fariss. Covering the years between 1946 to 2017, the dataset is dynamic in that it recognizes that standards of accountability evolve over time. Moreover, Fariss’s dataset simultaneously incorporates measures from other datasets including ciri . Yet another advantage is that his data on human rights are continuous, thus offering scholars far greater precision in their research. “The resulting data are the most comprehensive estimates of repression that currently exist,” writes Fariss.22 Fariss’s data on government respect for human rights is therefore utilized throughout this book as my primary independent variable of interest.23 More specifically, I rely on his “latent variable” to measure the degree of barbarism within a conflict. I believe this constitutes a reasonable measure of barbarism and, most critically, captures variation in the levels of repression a government may use in order to counter an insurgency.24 Indeed, Fariss’s latent variable encompasses the full spectrum of

Statistical Analysis of Barbarism

63

potential human rights violations ranging from limitations on freedom of speech to political imprisonment and finally to genocide. This is critical for my theory, which argues that barbarism is a far more diverse phenomenon than simply mass killings. I calculate the mean value of Fariss’s latent variable for each incumbent over the course of a given conflict. For ease of interpretation, the variable is relabelled Barbarism and rescaled to range from 0 to 6 such that lower values indicate lower levels of government repression and higher values indicate higher levels.

c o n t ro l va ri ables Besides measuring the effect of barbarism, I control for a variety of other combat-oriented factors that may influence war outcomes. In particular, I select variables that I hypothesize to have the largest impact on the likelihood of a successful barbarism campaign.25 Jeffrey Dixon contends that many studies on civil wars err by including a wide range of control variables that are not informed by theory. “The lesson is clear,” he argues, “there must be a clear theory that incorporates the variables in a model.”26 Indeed, T. David Mason and Patrick Fett carefully select their control variables for their study on civil wars in an “attempt to construct the most parsimonious predictive model.”27 Thus, to the greatest extent possible, the identification of controls is based on my theorizing as presented in the previous chapter. The first control variable to be included in my analysis is the duration of conflict. Wars of longer duration are assumed to be associated with incumbent defeat as their resources are drained and public support dwindles. According to David Kilcullen, “insurgents seek to prolong the conflict in order to exhaust their opponent’s resources, erode the government’s political will, sap public support for the conflict, and avoid losses.”28 As explained in chapter 1, this is often analogized as the “war of the flea.” Consistent with previous studies, this book will measure duration in terms of months. As illustrated in the previous chapter, existing research on insurgent conflicts has debated whether regime type is an accurate predictor of war outcomes. I therefore include the Polity2 variable to measure an incumbent’s political system. The variable is drawn from the Polity Project, which measures the degree of democracy in all states between 1800 and 2017 and is a widely accepted measure of democracy.29 The variable is actually a composite indicator that ranges from –10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). For this study, the Polity2 score was averaged across all years of a conflict for each incumbent.

64

When Bad States Win

I hypothesize that state capacity is correlated with the defeat of opposition forces since the ability of a state to extract its resources and mobilize its troops increases the probability of an incumbent victory. In contrast, weak or even failed states are less likely to rout an insurgency. I therefore incorporate the Composite Index of National Capability (cinc ) score from the National Material Capabilities dataset.30 cinc is an aggregate score of six indicators of national capability that include demographic, industrial, and military features.31 The variable ranges from 0 to 1 and reflects a state’s average share of the system’s total, such that higher values would indicate a state had a larger portion of the international system’s material capabilities. In order to adhere to previous studies I include the natural log of the mean cinc score. A dichotomous variable codes whether a conflict was initiated after the end of the Cold War, that is, from 1991 to the present. Many scholars have argued that the Cold War era was marked by an increased flow of material support to combatants and witnessed a number of third parties intervening in proxy wars.32 Other experts believe that the nature of combat in civil wars has changed since the conclusion of the Cold War.33 The degree of ethnic fractionalization is included as a control since it is commonly believed to affect many aspects of civil wars, including onset, duration, and intensity.34 With respect to war outcomes, it is also reasonable to hypothesize that conflicts within socially fragmented societies are more intractable. In such cases, warring combatants may be less willing to compromise or reach a negotiated settlement. I use the conventionally accepted measure of ethnic fractionalization (ethfrac) as obtained from Fearon and Laitin, “which gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethnolinguistic groups.”35 As discussed earlier, punitive diplomatic measures such as economic sanctions have frequently been used to punish states for violating the human rights of their citizens. Such measures are intended to alter the repressive and inhumane policies of an incumbent. To control for the imposition of sanctions, information was pulled from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (ties ) dataset. The ties data define economic sanctions as “actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies.”36 I reference the data to create two dummy variables for whether sanctions were threatened (Sanctions_Threatened) or imposed (Sanctions_Imposed) against the incumbent during a conflict. Another important diplomatic tool is the provision of foreign aid to a combatant involved in a civil war. Indeed, material and logistical

Table 4.1 | Descriptive statistics

N

Mean

St. dev.

Max

Min

Barbarism

187

3.7

1.2

6.0

0.0

Post Cold War

188

0.3

0.5

1.0

0.0

Duration Month

188

34.2

45.3

264.0

12.0

Polity2

183

–0.9

6.3

10.0

–10.0

lncinc

185

–1.7

1.8

3.3

–5.9

Sanctions Threatened

188

0.3

0.5

1.0

0.0

Sanctions Imposed

188

0.3

0.4

1.0

0.0

ethfrac

154

0.5

0.3

0.9

0.0

Incumbent Support

101

0.5

0.5

1.0

0.0

Rebel Support

101

0.4

0.5

1.0

0.0

Military Intervention Incumbent

188

0.3

0.5

1.0

0.0

Military Intervention Rebel

188

0.2

0.4

1.0

0.0

66

When Bad States Win

support has long been viewed as a critical factor that can influence war outcomes, especially guerrilla wars. The importance of foreign assistance was emphasized by the renowned counterinsurgency theorist David Galula, who noted the various types of external support that may benefit an insurgency, ranging from diplomatic endorsement to active military assistance.37 To control for external support I reference the ucdp External Support dataset, which covers the years 1975 to 2009 and identifies ten different types of support, including the provision of weaponry, finances, intelligence, and access to territory.38 I utilize the data to create two dichotomous variables indicating whether the incumbent (IncumbentSupport) or insurgents (RebelSupport) received any form of external support from an outside benefactor during a conflict. Finally, I consider whether a third party militarily intervened in a conflict. Data were obtained from the International Military Intervention (imi ) dataset, which covers the years 1946 to 2005. It records events involving “the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute.”39 The “target” of military intervention is the location of the intrastate conflict. Two separate dummy variables were then created indicating whether military intervention was on behalf of the incumbent (MilitaryInterventionIncumbent) or to support the insurgents (MilitaryInterventionRebel).40 Summary statistics of all variables are reported in table 4.1.

d e s c r ip t iv e s tati sti cs The first descriptive statistic of interest is the number of incumbent wins, draws, and defeats. Figure 4.1 provides the overall breakdown of outcomes for the entire dataset. The most immediate observation is that incumbents have won the majority of intrastate conflicts. To be clear, these initial results do not take into account a counterinsurgent’s strategy for defeating opposition groups. While it may provide a degree of optimism and suggests that insurgencies are not insurmountable conflicts, we still need to control for other explanatory factors. Indeed, we can further unpack these results and assess the frequency of incumbent wins by regime type and over time. Beginning with regime type, figure 4.2 provides the breakdown of all outcomes in terms of democracies and non-democracies.41 The graph indicates that democracies and non-democracies do not differ in the rate

Statistical Analysis of Barbarism

0

20

40

Frequency 60

80

100

67

Incumbent win

Draw

Rebel win

Figure 4.1 | Outcomes

at which they defeat insurgents; it also provides tentative support to the argument that regime type does not matter in terms of predicting war outcomes. “The view that democracies suffer higher and swifter rates of defeat relative to autocracies,” writes Jason Lyall, “finds little empirical support.”42 My initial findings comport with this assessment. Analysis of incumbent wins by time period, however, reveals an unsettling trend. As seen in figure 4.3, incumbents may have won the majority of intrastate conflicts during the Cold War, but there appears to have been a stark reversal in the post–Cold War era. This is also consistent with other scholarship, although the precise time frame may differ. Lyall and Wilson, for example, note that the majority of eighteenth-century insurgencies were won by incumbents but that this trend reversed itself around the First World War when militaries began to rely increasingly on mechanized forces.43 Toft points to a slightly later date, hypothesizing that after the Second World War competitive pressures of socialization led Western militaries to adopt more conventional and highly mechanized force structures.44

When Bad States Win

100

68

0

20

40

Frequency 60

80

Defeat Win

Non-democracy

Democracy

Figure 4.2 | Outcomes by regime type

My results comport with previous research indicating that incumbents are now less likely to defeat an insurgency. Figure 4.3 reveals that incumbents secured a higher frequency of wins during the Cold War than after the Cold War. A chi-square independence test confirms the results of an association between time period and war outcomes with χ2 = 5.57 and p = 0.018. Based on existing theories of counterinsurgent warfare discussed in the preceding chapters, the contrasting outcomes may be a consequence of the increasing mechanization of military forces and the institutionalization of normative constraints against the inhumane treatment of civilians.45 I conclude this section with a discussion of the curvilinear relationship I hypothesize to exist between barbarism and war outcomes. As presented in the last chapter, I argue that the relationship is best modelled with a U-curve. Moderate levels of repression do not impose enough costs to dissuade rebels and only engender widespread opposition, thereby lowering the likelihood of successfully defeating an insurgency. In contrast, extreme levels of barbarism are more likely to crush a rebellion. I thus

100

Statistical Analysis of Barbarism

69

0

20

40

Frequency 60

80

Defeat Win

Cold War

Post-Cold War

Figure 4.3 | Outcomes by time period

present this non-linear relationship by introducing a quadratic term to the model: Barbarism2. For readers unfamiliar with the technique, a squared term is used to model non-linear relationships and directional changes in a variable’s effect.46 Using my dataset, I conduct an initial assessment of the presence of a curvilinear relationship by plotting the predicted probabilities of an incumbent defeating an insurgency over the continuous scale of barbarism, ranging from low levels of barbarism (0) to extreme levels of barbarism (6). In particular, figure  4.4 plots the conditional effects of barbarism on the expected probability of an incumbent victory. The shaded region indicates the 95 per cent confidence interval. It provides preliminary visual support for the theory that moderate levels of barbarism will be counterproductive; however, with extreme forms of barbarism there is a slight increase in the probability of an incumbent win. Although this suggests a fairly close resemblance to the hypothesized relationship in figure 3.1, the positive effect of extreme forms of barbarism is not as pronounced.

When Bad States Win

.5 0

Fitted values

1

70

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Barbarism Figure 4.4 | Likelihood of incumbent win by level of barbarism

It should be emphasized, however, that the high probability of an incumbent victory associated with low levels of barbarism does not necessarily equate to a successful population-centric strategy. Stated differently, the absence of one variable does not automatically provide evidence of the effectiveness of rival variables. Indeed, upon a cursory review, many of the cases that reside on the far left of figure 4.4 entailed a wide variety of strategies. Some conflicts exhibited low levels of barbarism that simply involved restrictions on freedom of the press, while others contain evidence of both population- and enemy-centric approaches (e.g., the Tuareg Rebellion, the Dhofar Rebellion). Other cases were short-lived coups that entailed an enemy-centric approach or were failed independence referendums that concluded via negotiated settlement (e.g., Gambia in 1981, the Anjouan referendum, the Lahad Datu Incursion). In sum, although cases exhibiting low levels of barbarism may have resulted in a high probability of incumbent success, the data paint a more muddled picture, one with a great deal of variation that does not necessarily provide deductive support that population-centric strategies constitute an equally effective alternative.

Statistical Analysis of Barbarism

71

The question remains, however: Are my initial findings simply the result of random chance? Or is barbarism in fact correlated with the probability of an incumbent defeating insurgents, as hypothesized? The best tool for assessing this relationship and determining statistical significance is regression analysis.

r e g r e s s io n a nalysi s I now turn to conducting a series of statistical tests to evaluate the effect of barbarism as a strategy to defeat an insurgency. I employ two different methods of regression analysis. First, I rely on logistic regression for my binary dependent variable where a value of 1 indicates an incumbent win. Table 4.2 presents the results of my logit models with robust standard errors. All coefficients are exponentiated and provide the odds ratios. For readers unfamiliar with the method, odds ratios are interpreted relative to 1. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates an increase in the odds of an incumbent victory, while an odds ratio less than 1 suggests a decrease in the odds of an incumbent victory. This facilitates the substantive interpretation of coefficients as the percentage change in odds. Finally, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem since the variance inflation factor is low for all models.47 Model 1 is intended to control for factors that may provide insurgents with the greatest hypothetical advantage: sanctions have been imposed on an incumbent government, the insurgents have received some type of support from an external benefactor, and a third party has militarily intervened in the conflict to assist the rebels. Model 2 weakens the degree of hypothetical support by assuming that sanctions have only been threatened and that a third party has not militarily intervened. Model 3 takes the complete opposite approach by now controlling for factors that give the counterinsurgent the greatest hypothetical advantage: the incumbent is receiving outside support and a third party has intervened in the conflict to help suppress a rebellion. Finally, model 4 includes all control variables.48 The most immediate result from table  4.2 is that Barbarism and Barbarism2 are both statistically significant and in the expected direction across all four models. This suggests that initial increases in the level of barbarism – that is, moving from low to moderate levels of repression – is associated with a decrease in the probability of an incumbent defeating an insurgency. On the other hand, moving from moderate to extreme levels of barbarism is associated with an increase in the probability of defeating rebels and winning an intrastate war. These findings

Table 4.2 | Logistic regression

Barbarism Barbarism

2

Duration Month Polity2

lncinc Post Cold War ethfrac Sanctions Imposed

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.031**

0.031**

0.031**

0.034**

(0.047)

(0.049)

(0.048)

(0.051)

1.528**

1.526**

1.512**

1.502**

(0.301)

(0.307)

(0.305)

(0.288)

0.993

0.993

0.992

0.992

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.008)

0.954

0.955

0.949

0.953

(0.051)

(0.052)

(0.049)

(0.050)

1.639**

1.650**

1.730***

1.675**

(0.336)

(0.360)

(0.366)

(0.363)

0.284*

0.284**

0.288*

0.263*

(0.188)

(0.180)

(0.183)

(0.180)

0.223

0.221

0.205

0.221

(0.218)

(0.229)

(0.199)

(0.217)

0.985

1.071

(0.684) Rebel Support Military Intervention Rebel

(0.732)

0.675

0.677

0.637

(0.497)

(0.430)

(0.454)

1.029

0.950

(0.895)

(0.825)

Sanctions Threatened

0.939 (0.746)

Incumbent Support Military Intervention Incumbent

0.882

0.915

(0.566)

(0.569)

1.230

1.417

(0.870)

(1.047)

Observations Pseudo R2

75

75

75

75

0.207

0.207

0.205

0.209

aic

103.939

101.932

102.182

107.721

Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table 4.3 | Ordered logistic regression Model 5 Barbarism Barbarism

2

Duration Month Polity2

lncinc Post Cold War ethfrac Sanctions Imposed

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

0.035***

0.045***

0.053**

0.044***

(0.040)

(0.051)

(0.062)

(0.050)

1.516***

1.454**

1.403**

1.456**

(0.228)

(0.212)

(0.209)

(0.214)

0.999

0.997

0.996

0.998

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.003)

1.000

0.999

1.006

1.009

(0.043)

(0.045)

(0.046)

(0.045)

1.512**

1.454**

1.557**

1.603**

(0.257)

(0.254)

(0.286)

(0.317)

0.592

0.560

0.487

0.507*

(0.280)

(0.262)

(0.231)

(0.238)

0.770

0.756

0.745

0.772

(0.734)

(0.760)

(0.700)

(0.734)

0.605

0.640

(0.397) Rebel Support Military Intervention Rebel

(0.399)

0.890

0.895

0.829

(0.522)

(0.427)

(0.472)

0.758

0.730

(0.437)

(0.459)

Sanctions Threatened

0.913 (0.658)

Incumbent Support Military Intervention Incumbent

1.775

1.737

(1.076)

(1.009)

0.981

1.041

(0.511)

(0.582)

Observations Pseudo R2

75

75

75

75

0.086

0.080

0.086

0.092

aic

166.584

165.483

164.615

169.659

Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

74

When Bad States Win

provide fairly strong support for my theory that while moderate levels of barbarism are counterproductive, the most brutal and extreme forms of barbarism can be used to defeat an insurgency. The odds of defeating insurgents are also positively correlated with a state’s power. The capabilities index is positive and statistically significant across all models. In other words, strong states are more likely to defeat a rebellion than weak states. Finally, the coefficient for the post–Cold War dummy variable is negatively significant. This is consistent with my initial descriptive statistics and chi-square test, which indicate that counterinsurgents have been less likely to win an insurgency since the end of the Cold War. In terms of substantive interpretation, the regression result suggests that incumbents were more likely to be victorious during the Cold War than they have been since the fall of the Soviet Union. Although the time frame may differ from those of other scholars, this approximates previous research that finds incumbents are increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents.49 Surprisingly, the other variables in the models are not statistically significant. In particular, duration, punitive diplomacy, external material support, and military interventions all fail to reach any conventional statistical threshold. Although many of the coefficients for material support and military interventions are in the predicted direction, they do not appear to have any meaningful impact on war outcomes. Consistent with my initial descriptive statistics, regime type is also not significant, indicating that the degree of democratization does not influence war outcomes.50 The second method of regression analysis I use to evaluate the effect of barbarism is an ordered logistic equation. The outcome is operationalized in terms of an incumbent win (2), draw (1), or defeat (0). The objective is to not only conduct an additional test of my theory but also acquire as much precision as possible in evaluating war outcomes. The results are presented in table  4.3. All models remain the same as for the binary logistic equations. It is quite noteworthy that the majority of the results in the logit regression are retained in the ordered logit regression. Once again, all models in table 4.3 appear to support the theory that moderate levels of barbarism decrease the likelihood of winning, while the most extreme forms of barbarism increase the odds of defeating an insurgency. To be fair, the coefficients for both Barbarism and Barbarism2 are slightly smaller in the ordered logit models. State power also remains statistically significant and positively correlated with the odds of winning a war. On the other hand, the post–Cold War variable is no longer statistically significant. Nevertheless, the findings presented in table 4.3 provide additional support for my theory.

Statistical Analysis of Barbarism

75

Robustness Checks

Yet it is still important to remain attuned to the fact that these results could be sensitive to a number of changes. I therefore subject my findings to a series of robustness checks. First, given unique geographic idiosyncrasies, it is quite possible the results are actually due to unobservable regional characteristics. Indeed, a great deal of existing research indicates that Asia and the Middle East are particularly susceptible to internal political violence.51 Watts et al. also suggest that some regions are more likely to see conflicts that spill over into neighbouring states.52 To control for these potential regional effects, dummy variables were created for the five geographic regions identified in the ucdp dataset: Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. All four logistical models were then rerun with the inclusion of the regional dummy variables (see table 4.4).53 Even with the inclusion of regional fixed effects, both barbarism and its squared term remain significant, and the odds of an incumbent winning remain approximately the same. Interestingly, none of the regional variables achieved any measure of statistical significance, nor was there any noteworthy change to the overall fit of the model. Table 4.5 provides the results of several additional robustness checks using my binary dependent variable indicating an incumbent win.54 State capacity is of particular interest as it is significant across all previous models and appears to have a fairly pronounced effect. The result is consistent with other scholarship on the causes and outcomes of intrastate wars. “According to civil war theories,” explains Sambanis, “higher state capacity should discourage rebellion or allow the state to repress it in its early stages.”55 Meanwhile, Mason and Fett have hypothesized that larger militaries are less likely to negotiate with opposition forces and will instead continue fighting. “The larger the size of the government’s army,” reason Mason and Fett, “the more likely it is to annihilate the rebel movement early in the rebellion, precluding the need to negotiate a settlement at some later date.”56 I therefore evaluate this line of theorizing by conducting two additional tests. First, I replace the cinc score with an incumbent’s mean gross domestic product (lngdp ). The intention is to evaluate whether purely economic indicators are a better predictor of war outcomes. Second, I disaggregate cinc into its constituent components to investigate whether one factor has a more pronounced effect than the others. I choose to focus on the number of military personnel (lnMilper) given that some experts attribute a successful counterinsurgency strategy to the number of troops it can deploy to a conflict.57 Interestingly, the

Table 4.4 | Regional checks

Barbarism Barbarism

2

Duration Month Polity2

lncinc Post Cold War ethfrac Sanctions Imposed

Model 9

Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

0.024**

0.027**

0.024**

0.027**

(0.039)

(0.043)

(0.040)

(0.044)

1.562**

1.532**

1.526**

1.522**

(0.330)

(0.318)

(0.315)

(0.312)

0.997

0.995

0.993

0.996

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.008)

0.931

0.934

0.921

0.927

(0.060)

(0.058)

(0.056)

(0.061)

1.569**

1.599**

1.656**

1.603**

(0.348)

(0.373)

(0.394)

(0.379)

0.260

0.264

0.264*

0.231*

(0.220)

(0.216)

(0.204)

(0.199)

0.648

0.551

0.536

0.648

(0.859)

(0.713)

(0.703)

(0.860)

0.887

1.015

(0.698) Rebel Support Military Intervention Rebel

(0.776)

0.748

0.693

0.715

(0.620)

(0.541)

(0.579)

0.637

0.586

(0.660)

(0.607)

Sanctions Threatened

0.871 (0.684)

Incumbent Support Military Intervention Incumbent

0.833

0.885

(0.552)

(0.582)

1.487

1.640

(1.189)

(1.298)

Regions (omitted) Observations Pseudo R2

75

75

75

75

0.220

0.218

0.218

0.224

aic

110.566

108.763

108.799

114.193

Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Statistical Analysis of Barbarism

77

overall results appear to still hold. In model 13, the gdp variable is significant and has roughly the same effect as the cinc indicator, although with a slightly smaller coefficient and significance threshold. In model 14, the coefficient for lnMilper is similarly positive and also at the 10 per cent significance threshold. The comparatively weaker effect of the number of military personnel seems to reflect the absence of any consensus on whether force sizing is an accurate predictor of counterinsurgency outcomes.58 I perform an additional check that substitutes the degree of ethnic fractionalization with that of religious fractionalization. As discussed earlier, socially fragmented societies are believed to be more prone to violence, and subsequent conflicts are far more difficult to resolve as combatants may be less willing to offer any major concessions to adversaries. The religious fractionalization variable is also obtained from Fearon and Laitin, and the results are presented in model 15. Similar to the variable for ethnic fractionalization, the relfrac variable is statistically insignificant. While the result may contrast with that of Fearon and Laitin, it is consistent with other scholarship such as that of Balcells and Kalyvas.59 I then include a variable denoting whether a conflict is over territory. Lyall and Wilson speculate that the type of demands made by insurgents may influence war outcomes.60 For his part, Downes hypothesizes that the likelihood of barbarism is higher in cases that entail the annexation of territory, and finds evidence in support of this proposition.61 I therefore create a dummy variable indicating a territorial dispute based on the ucdp Conflict Termination dataset’s “incompatibility” variable.62 The results are striking. In model 16, both barbarism variables remain statistically significant and have the largest coefficients of any other test conducted thus far. The same result appears to have occurred with lncinc, which also presented a fairly substantial increase in its odds of a counterinsurgent victory. Notably, the territorial variable itself is significant and appears to have a fairly strong effect in reducing the probability that an incumbent will defeat an insurgency. This suggests that while counterinsurgency strategy still plays an important role in suppressing a rebellion, territorial disputes are particularly intractable, with a lower probability of an incumbent win. In many respects this is not a surprising result since territory is often theorized as being an indivisible issue that reduces the chances for a negotiated outcome.63 I also consider a test for the interactive effect between barbarism and non-democracies. If authoritarian regimes are most likely to employ a repressive counterinsurgency strategy and high levels of barbarism are most effective, then it is reasonable to assume that such instances will

Table 4.5 | Robustness checks

Barbarism

Model 13

Model 14

Model 15

0.049**

0.040**

0.038**

(0.073)

(0.063)

(0.056)

Barbarism2

1.465*

1.473*

1.483**

(0.290)

(0.293)

(0.291)

Duration Month

0.993

0.992

0.992

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.008)

Polity2

0.938

0.974

0.958

(0.051)

(0.050)

(0.051)

lngdp

1.432* (0.266)

Post Cold War

ethfrac

Rebel Support

Sanctions Threatened

0.291*

0.272**

0.288**

(0.188)

(0.171)

(0.175)

0.284

0.324

(0.305)

(0.321)

0.580

0.579

0.590

(0.370)

(0.353)

(0.372)

0.879

1.061

1.221

(0.738)

(0.797)

(1.035)

lnMilper

1.517* (0.338)

lncinc

1.526** (0.302)

relfrac

1.930 (2.898)

Territorial

Authoritarian • Barbarism2

Sanctions Imposed

Military Intervention Rebel

Sanctuary

Observations

70

75

75

Pseudo R2

0.217

0.194

0.189

aic

95.815

103.317

103.740

Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table 4.5 | Robustness checks (continued)

Barbarism

Barbarism

2

Duration Month

Polity2

Model 16

Model 17

Model 18

0.014***

0.043**

0.031**

(0.021)

(0.065)

(0.049)

1.710**

1.431

1.510**

(0.358)

(0.314)

(0.304)

0.992

0.993

0.992

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.008)

0.950

0.951

(0.054)

(0.051)

lngdp

Post Cold War

ethfrac

Rebel Support

Sanctions Threatened

0.361

0.309*

0.284*

(0.237)

(0.206)

(0.190)

0.335

0.242

0.212

(0.361)

(0.249)

(0.203)

0.773

0.669

(0.480)

(0.425)

0.865

0.934

(0.743)

(0.794)

2.058***

1.571**

1.704***

(0.561)

(0.327)

(0.344)

lnMilper

lncinc

relfrac

Territorial

0.197** (0.136) 1.067

2

Authoritarian • Barbarism

(0.070) Sanctions Imposed

1.061 (0.738)

Military Intervention Rebel

0.807 (0.643)

Sanctuary

1.414 (1.247)

Observations

75

75

75

Pseudo R2

0.251

0.218

0.205

aic

99.412

102.792

104.123

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correlate to a higher probability of incumbent victory. Model 17 includes the interactive effect, and although it is in the expected direction, the coefficient is negligible and insignificant.64 On the other hand, the statistical significance of Barbarism2 has now dropped just below conventional levels to 10.3 per cent. The associated F-test of joint significance, however, yields χ2= 0.98 and p = 0.3216, suggesting that the inclusion of the interaction term may not have been warranted. Finally, in table 4.5, I disaggregate the provision of an external sanctuary from the ucdp External Support dataset, as some scholars have argued this is a critical factor contributing to insurgent success. Indeed, Jeffrey Record goes so far as to declare that “the presence or absence of external assistance may be the single most important determinant of insurgent war outcomes.”65 Model 18 builds upon model 1 by establishing a least-likely case that assigns the greatest hypothetical advantage to insurgents but now includes access to an external sanctuary. Interestingly, the results of model 1 still largely hold in model 18 and Sanctuary fails to reach any meaningful level of significance. I further evaluate my results by conducting several additional tests.66 The formal presentation of these supplemental models may be found in the appendix. First, I recognize there was a notable decrease in the number of observations due to listwise deletion. To ensure that the removal of such observations did not bias my results, I took the added step of using multiple imputation by chained equations (mice ) to analyze the incomplete data.67 I subsequently reran all models and found that my primary results still hold. The magnitude of the coefficients on both Barbarism and Barbarism2 decreased slightly, but both remained statistically significant at the 5 per cent level across all models. Second, other scholars have suggested that the interaction between combatants’ strategies is a better predictor of insurgent war outcomes than simply examining a single actor’s chosen strategy.68 Stated differently, the success of an incumbent’s barbaric counterinsurgency strategy is contingent on the strategy of rebel groups. In order to control for this strategic interaction, I code each conflict for whether insurgents employed an irregular warfighting strategy.69 All four logistical models were then rerun with not only the inclusion of the dichotomous variable measuring insurgent strategy, but also an interaction term with Barbarism2. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficients on both Barbarism and Barbarism2 increased with the inclusion of the single dichotomous strategy variable. While there was a slight decrease in the level of significance for the models that included the interaction term, the F-test of joint significance again failed to reach any meaningful

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level that would support inclusion of the interaction term. There was also a substantial drop in the number of observations due to inadequate historical quantitative data on insurgent strategies. More critically, the variable for irregular insurgent strategy across all models failed to reach statistical significance. Finally, by relying upon the ucdp Conflict dataset it is possible that the lower casualty threshold may mean that minor or even brief skirmishes are incorrectly treated as a large-scale sustained insurgency. I subsequently replicated all models after dropping conflicts that lasted only one day (N = 40), or two days or less (N = 44).70 In all instances my results did not change to any meaningful degree. Overall, the quantitative analysis presented in this chapter appears to largely substantiate my theory. On average, barbarism is a flawed strategy that reduces the likelihood of an incumbent defeating an insurgency, but extreme forms of barbarism correspond to a slight increase in the probability of crushing a rebellion. The findings were robust to a variety of specifications. That said, there are a number of drawbacks to strictly relying upon quantitative analysis to study intrastate conflict. In particular, these broad results offer little insight as to the specific causal effect of barbaric counterinsurgency strategies within particular circumstances. The quantitative analysis also treats each case as a single event, without consideration of the multiple campaigns or fluctuation in possible outcomes over the duration of a conflict. Moreover, my theory is premised on the assumption that incumbents possess the political will to violate human rights, yet this factor can be challenging to quantify. Consequently, I turn to qualitative methodologies in order to better study counterinsurgency war outcomes. My case selection is premised on several criteria. First and foremost, I sought to maximize the variation on my independent variable of barbarism not only between cases but also within cases. The latter was critical in assessing the impact of varying degrees of barbarism over the duration of a single conflict. Second, cases were chosen on the basis of data-richness. This criterion was essential given the shorter duration or obscurity of many conflicts for which there may be few archival data available for analysis. I further selected cases that would yield a healthy variety of geographic locations and, perhaps more importantly, duration of conflict. To better analyze the dynamic shifts within a conflict I rely on process-tracing as a qualitative tool with which to evaluate the impact of counterinsurgency strategy.71 The following two chapters present a more in-depth and detailed analysis of barbarism through several qualitative case studies. The next chapter contains two cases that exhibited low to moderate levels of barbarism:

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the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1977 to 1979, and the Nepalese Civil War, which lasted from 1996 to 2006. Chapter 6 then investigates cases of extreme levels of brutality: the Sri Lankan Civil War of 1989 to 2009, and the Chechen Wars, which lasted from 1994 to approximately 2009. For each case, I provide a broad overview of the conflict and then trace the effect of key variables over the duration of the war. While the qualitative studies provide strong support for my theory of barbarism, the cases also suggest that rival variables such as international norms and domestic opposition may still possess some explanatory leverage over the outcome.

5 Failed Cases of Barbarism

In this chapter I explore the causes of insurgent war outcomes by analyzing two cases in greater detail. First, I study the Nicaraguan Revolution that resulted in the ouster of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The second case covers the Nepalese Civil War, which succeeded in overthrowing a 240-year-old monarchy. The cases reflect a good deal of diversity in terms of both geographic location and time periods. These qualitative studies provide an in-depth assessment of the failure of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy, while carefully evaluating alternative factors that may have also contributed to an insurgent victory.

n ic a r ag ua n r e vo l u ti on, 1977–79 The origins of the Nicaraguan Revolution can be traced to the rise of the Somoza family in the early twentieth century. The Somoza dictatorship emerged out of the instability and chaos surrounding what was known as the Banana Wars – a series of US military interventions throughout the Latin American region.1 The objective of US military operations in Nicaragua was to ensure a monopoly and control over the proposed Nicaragua Canal. US foreign policy was formalized through the Bryan–Chamorro Treaty of 1914, which granted the United States exclusive rights over any canal in exchange for the support of the Nicaraguan government. The Nicaraguan Civil War, however, broke out in 1926, destabilizing the country and threatening US interests. President Calvin Coolidge deployed US forces to Nicaragua to mediate hostilities, culminating in the Peace of Tipitapa, which formally ended the conflict in 1927. During the US occupation of Nicaragua, the Marines established the National Guard (Guardia Nacional) to play an important stabilizing role in face of

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lingering domestic opposition in the aftermath of the civil war. Anastasio Somoza García was appointed its chief director and subsequently used his position to bolster his personal influence and political power in Nicaragua. He was able to exploit the military and intelligence services of the National Guard, appointing loyalists to key positions as a means to further solidify his control. Somoza García was always concerned that his position in the government was tenuous and therefore intentionally exploited his command of the National Guard to elevate his stature. According to John Booth, “the National Guard constituted the core of Somoza’s political power in Nicaragua for twenty years.”2 “From its very foundation,” adds Ricardo Chavarría, “the National Guard served elite interests and its members gradually became the ‘Guardians of the [Somoza] Dynasty.’”3 Despite the presence of US Marines and the establishment of Nicaragua’s National Guard, some rebel leaders refused to adhere to the terms of the Peace of Tipitapa. In particular, Augusto César Sandino continued to organize an insurgency and frequently ambushed Marines in an effort to force all American troops out of Nicaragua. Although Sandino never succeeded in this, the United States nevertheless withdrew from Nicaragua in 1933 upon President Roosevelt’s proclamation of the Good Neighbor Policy, which pledged non-interference in Latin American affairs.4 The Marines’ departure fostered a more favourable atmosphere for dispute resolution and facilitated open dialogue between Sandino and President Juan Bautista Sacasa. Although a tentative agreement was reached on several substantive matters, Sandino remained opposed to the National Guard, which he viewed as a remnant of the US occupation, and insisted it be dissolved. Fearing a threat to his position, Somoza García ordered the assassination of Sandino. On the evening of 21 February 1934, Sandino attended a new round of talks at the Presidential Palace with Sacasa. As he left that meeting, his car was stopped by the National Guard. Along with his aides, he was kidnapped and executed. Somoza García then ordered the National Guard to attack and summarily eradicate the remainder of Sandino’s guerrilla fighters. He continued to capitalize on the initiative and launched a coup d’état that ousted Sacasa from power. In 1936, Somoza García assumed the presidency through what was widely regarded as a rigged election. “Although he ran in the 1936 elections without any significant opposition,” explains James Mahoney, “Somoza built an electoral coalition that included urban businessmen, some urban and rural laborers, rightist middle-class groups, and some ex-Conservatives.”5 Somoza García had fully secured his power, and his family would rule Nicaragua for

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the next several decades. Throughout their reign, the family oversaw a corrupt regime that siphoned large amounts of money from the state for personal gain. The Somoza regime was premised on corruption and patronage. Over the ensuing decades, power was transferred to hand-picked successors or Somoza García’s own sons. Constitutional amendments were often passed specifically to benefit the Somoza regime and provide a facade of democratic legitimacy. According to Richard Weitz, “the Somoza family thoroughly subverted Nicaragua’s major political parties through its efforts to create a rigged democracy.”6 The regime often altered the political system to ensure the election of loyalists, or it would bribe opponents to acquiesce to Somoza’s wishes. In terms of the domestic economy, the Somoza family owned a large majority of the nation’s heavy industries and profited from corruption. Rampant corruption and political nepotism generated a great deal of opposition and animosity throughout Nicaragua. Hostilities boiled over when Somoza García was shot and killed in September 1956. The presidency was first transferred to his eldest son Luis Somoza Debayle, then to his youngest son Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1967. As the years passed, opposition to the Somoza regime grew, especially in light of crumbling infrastructure and inadequate social services. Even the Roman Catholic Church publicly criticized Somoza’s leadership as repressive, and poverty continued to darken the lives of the most vulnerable segments of Nicaraguan society. An insurgency now began to emerge, largely in response to poor economic conditions and government repression. “Rampant government corruption, coupled with longer working hours, lower wages, a generalized attack on working-class living standards, and the agitational work of the fsln , all brought a corresponding rise in class consciousness.”7 On the other hand, many scholars of political violence would counter that poor economic conditions are less important than relative deprivation. Alfred Cuzán contends that Nicaragua was by no means the poorest state in Latin America, and in fact, during the onset of the insurgency the country was witnessing improvements in many indicators such as economic growth and urbanization.8 Richard Weitz seems to agree, pointing out that during the early years of the insurgency, Nicaragua’s economy experienced “slow but steady growth, with only minor and short-lived slowdowns.”9 Regardless, the seeds of antagonism toward the regime had been sown and were now sprouting. Despite growing opposition, it was a powerful earthquake in December 1972 that ignited the domestic insurgency that would ultimately topple

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the Somoza regime. The earthquake killed nearly 10,000 Nicaraguans and destroyed 80 per cent of the infrastructure in the nation’s capital, Managua.10 Widespread looting in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake exacerbated the already dire conditions. Meanwhile, relief aid was siphoned into Somoza’s coffers and reconstruction efforts were plagued with corruption. Thomas Walker writes that “in the wake of this disaster, Somoza and his accomplices used their control of the government to funnel international relief funds into their own pockets. Very little was done for the disaster victims.”11 William LeoGrande concurs, pointing out that “Somoza and his associates enriched themselves shamelessly with the international aid intended for earthquake victims.”12 Somoza’s apathetic response to the earthquake shocked the international community and would lead to his downfall. “The earthquake,” argues George Black, “accelerated the class struggle in Nicaragua.”13 Somoza’s failure to adequately address the deplorable social conditions in the aftermath of the earthquake drove scores of volunteers into the arms of opposition groups, the most notable of these being the Sandinista National Liberation Front (fsln ). Inspired by the legacy of Augusto César Sandino, several student activists had formed the fsln in 1961.14 By 1974 the fsln had grown strong enough to launch daring guerrilla operations.15 Their first major success came in December of that year, when operatives raided a government official’s home and took several officials hostage. The Somoza regime was forced to pay a $1 million ransom. Even more humiliating, it was forced to allow the fsln to demand through a radio broadcast that the regime release their fellow Sandinistas from prison. This incident elevated the prestige and popularity of the Sandinistas. Somoza was determined to eradicate the fsln through a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. William LeoGrande writes that Somoza “declared a state of siege, created an elite counterinsurgency force within the National Guard, and obtained an 80 percent increase in U.S. military aid.”16 The “siege” was a period of extreme repression in response to the fsln attack and would last until September 1977. Although the National Guard is the focus of much historical research, the Office of National Security (osn ) also played a critical role as a somewhat clandestine intelligence service. The osn relied on civilian informants for intelligence on rebel activities and the identification of supporters. “As the arm of the National Guard responsible for surveillance and interrogation of the political opposition,” explains Robert Sierakowski, “the osn was implicated in numerous acts of violence during [the] dictatorship’s final years.”17

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Somoza’s disgraceful response to the earthquake, along with growing international recognition of the regime’s human rights abuses during the siege, gave rise to permissive conditions for domestic opposition. But it was the assassination of journalist Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal that precipitated outright rebellion. Chamorro was the editor of La Prensa, an opposition newspaper that was highly critical of the Somoza regime. In the early morning hours of 10 January 1978, Chamorro was shot and killed on his way to work. Although the identity of the assassins was never confirmed, it was widely believed that Somoza ordered the killing. Chamorro’s death sparked nationwide protests and calls for Somoza’s resignation. “It was clear,” writes Morris Morley, “that the Chamorro assassination had changed things dramatically and permanently for the worse.”18 The assassination also persuaded the economic elite to join the rebellion by calling for a general strike and temporarily halting economic production. According to Thomas Walker, Chamorro’s assassination was the catalyst for the War of Liberation in Nicaragua.19 In August 1978, the insurgents raided the National Palace, where Nicaragua’s legislative body met. In broad daylight, twenty-five insurgents were able to occupy the entire building within three minutes. Nearly 2,000 hostages were captured, including members of the National Assembly and various government officials. After two days of intense negotiations, Somoza agreed to pay a $500,000 ransom and granted the release of several imprisoned members of the fsln . Thousands of civilians jubilantly lined the streets to applaud the raiders and newly released captives as they departed the country.20 The raid was an important signal, not only to the civilians of Nicaragua but also to Somoza and the entire international community, that the insurgency remained a potent force of opposition. It galvanized support for the fsln and led to insurgent attacks throughout the country. According to Thomas Walker and Christine Wade, “the success of the fsln palace operation triggered massive acts of defiance by Nicaraguan society as a whole.”21 The various factions of the fsln continued to launch a variety of subversive operations throughout the country. Given the significant power disparities between the insurgents and the National Guard, most of these attacks used guerrilla tactics.22 Christopher Paul et al. have found that “coin forces were equipped with artillery and machine guns, while many of the insurgents had only small arms, and others fought with rocks, sticks, and Molotov cocktails.”23 In addition to disparities in material capabilities, there was a clear difference in numerical strength. By the time of the Final Offensive in 1979, the guerrillas numbered around 2,500, while the National Guard had been expanded to 10,000.24

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What the insurgents lacked in material capabilities they made up for in ideological commitment to a cause. In March 1979, the rebels gained strength when their competing factions reunified. Now operating under a clear organizational structure, the insurgents launched a series of attacks throughout the country. By mid-summer the insurgency controlled all of the country except the capital Managua. Under pressure, Somoza finally resigned on 17 July. A few days later, the fsln entered Managua, signalling the end of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Counterinsurgency Strategy

Throughout the insurgency, the Somoza regime relied primarily on censorship, mass arrests, and torture. The regime passed laws that imposed fines on news outlets that “defamed” the government or its officials.25 At other points during the insurrection they declared mass censorship of the press. Reprisals against suspected supporters of the insurgency were commonplace. Troops raped and tortured suspects and summarily executed many young males whom they believed constituted the majority of insurgent recruits. “There were indiscriminate arrests of those suspected of collaborating with the guerrillas,” confirms Diederich, as well as “summary executions.”26 Other suspected rebels were charged with crimes based on insufficient evidence and tried in courts that lacked any semblance of due process. Captured rebels complained that they “were jailed without due process of law, waiting months before being taken before a judge; that they suffered beatings after capture; were left nude in dark cells, only seeing daylight months later when taken to court; and were victims of psychological and physical torture and lack of legal representation when finally brought to trial.”27 In rural areas, the government instituted “agricultural reforms” that involved the forced relocation of populations into what Harry Vanden describes as “concentration camps.”28 Such a depiction, however, is provocative and certainly an extreme interpretation of the historical record. Nevertheless, civilians were forced into what counterinsurgency theorists more often refer to as “resettlement camps,” and the uninhabited territory from which they had been driven was then deemed a freefire zone.29 The Somoza regime also used its small air force against the insurgents, bombing rebel positions and even dropping napalm on fsln strongholds.30 Sierakowski writes that “Air Force jets, or the mariposas de la muerte (butterflies of death) as they were called, began bombing guerrilla positions and homes, leaving hundreds of civilians dead and wounded.

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Entire families were incinerated within their homes, and the urban landscape was eviscerated through the indiscriminate bombardment from above.”31 It was also common for the regime to first deploy the air force to attack an insurgent stronghold, then follow up immediately with ground-level operations. “After first ‘softening up’ insurgent cities and neighborhoods with aerial strafing and bombardment,” explain Walker and Wade, “government troops moved in to ‘mop up.’ As most of the active insurgents usually had withdrawn by the time the troops took the cities, the mop-up operations frequently involved the mass summary execution of non-combatants – in particular those males who had the misfortune of being of fighting age.”32 The combination of aerial bombardment and subsequent mop-up operations further displaced both insurgents and civilians from population centres. John Booth concludes that “barbarity against ordinary citizens became so commonplace.”33 There are several indications that Somoza’s barbaric strategy was successful. In particular, a number of historians seem to agree that the most brutal period of counterinsurgency operations during the siege was also the most successful. “From its founding in the early 1960s all the way to the mid-1970s,” writes Alfred Cuzán, “the fsln made little progress in its war against the dynasty.”34 Henri Weber contends that early forms of repression had been so successful that by September 1977 it appeared that Somoza had won.35 The insurgents had been militarily pushed back and the organization fractionalized. Shirley Christian offers a similar assessment that Somoza’s oppressive counterinsurgency strategy during the siege had nearly wiped out the insurgency.36 Even as late as 1979, “Washington intelligence analysts were predicting that Somoza’s National Guard could, through sheer firepower, defeat any feasible fsln offensive.”37 That said, other historians offer a more nuanced assessment. Henri Weber, for example, does acknowledge the success of Somoza’s barbaric counterinsurgency strategy but stresses that it was only temporary and the insurgents quickly regrouped. “Savage repression,” cautions Weber, “did not cause demoralization or demobilization.”38 As the insurgency progressed, the National Guard suffered an increasing number of casualties and became afflicted with low morale. During the spring of 1979, desertion rates increased, discipline broke down, and commanders struggled to retain control of their troops. Desperately needed recruits were rushed through basic training with little instruction. By the summer, the dwindling of the National Guard prompted calls for reservists to report for duty, but few responded. Booth writes that the National Guard suffered from “deteriorating morale and discipline, high

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casualties and desertions, the hatred of the populace, some reduction of munitions due to diplomatic pressure, and harassment behind its lines by the fsln ’s underground.”39 In contrast, despite a stark imbalance in numerical strength, the rebels enjoyed enormous popular support, which grew exponentially as the conflict progressed. There is a good deal of evidence that the most repressive era of Somoza’s counterinsurgency strategy yielded some success. But it is also apparent that as Somoza lifted the siege and the insurgency dragged on, the regime began to falter. Two factors had a particularly negative effect on Somoza’s ability to defeat the insurgents: the provision of foreign aid, and increasing domestic opposition. Diplomacy and Foreign Aid

Somoza’s repressive counterinsurgency strategy during the siege had captured the attention of the international community. In response to flagrant human rights abuses, the United States explored options for suspending all foreign military sales to Nicaragua. Foreign aid to Nicaragua had remained relatively high through the 1970s, but in light of glaring human rights abuses the United States began to restrict the provision of aid beginning in 1977.40 Other states took punitive diplomatic measures of their own. The United Kingdom withdrew its ambassador in 1979, and a few months later, many Latin American states followed suit by suspending diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. For example, in 1979 Mexico severed bilateral relations for what it described as the “horrendous genocide” occurring in Nicaragua.41 Other international organizations played a critical role in terms of punitive diplomacy. The Organization of American States (oas ), for example, often served as a forum of public rebuke of Nicaragua’s human rights record. In 1977, Amnesty International reported extensive “political imprisonment” and the “use of torture and summary executions” by the National Guard.42 Although Amnesty International lacked the institutional clout to enforce any sort of compliance with human rights laws, its reports did shape international opinion of the Somoza regime. A year later, the United Nations issued a stark condemnation of Somoza’s human rights abuses, urging the regime to respect the rights of its citizens.43 There is a good deal of evidence that punitive diplomacy succeeded in altering Somoza’s counterinsurgency strategy. “To counter the unfavorable publicity and to mollify the United States,” writes Booth, “Somoza ended the state of siege on 9 September 1977.”44 Many historians

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contend that Somoza curtailed more aggressive tactics in response to public pressure. For example, Diederich believes that Somoza was personally frustrated by the criticism and took measures to reverse (or hide) negative perceptions of the regime’s policies.45 Thomas Walker focuses on the close relationship between Nicaragua and the United States, asserting that Somoza’s power was largely founded on diplomatic support from Washington. When this support was curtailed in response to human rights abuses, especially during the Carter administration, Somoza responded by lifting martial law and removing restrictions on press freedom.46 “Ultimately the loss of U.S. support proved debilitating for the Somoza regime,” argues Andrew Wilson.47 International scrutiny also affected where the regime employed barbaric tactics. In particular, the National Guard was more likely to use brute force in rural areas rather than large population centres since it could restrict the presence of outside observers and subsequently control the flow of information. Actions against more prominent suspects or members of the middle class were conducted at night, under the cover of darkness, so that responsibility for them could be denied.48 At other times, the National Guard would stage murders to make it appear as if the fsln had committed them. Dennis Gordon and Margaret Munro write that although it was hardly the deciding factor, pressure exerted by international organizations contributed notably to the downfall of the Somoza regime. They argue that international organizations helped cultivate an environment hostile to Somoza that left him with few external allies to aid his counterinsurgency efforts.49 Richard Weitz is a little more forthright in his own assessment, arguing that external support is key to defeating an insurgency. Thus, the Carter administration’s decision to withhold foreign aid “harmed Somoza’s counterinsurgency operations by reducing the amount of repression the National Guard could employ against the guerrillas and creating severe financial problems for the government.”50 On the other hand, some scholars offer a more cautious assessment, acknowledging that foreign assistance may have been an important source of leverage but counter that Somoza often made key policy decisions independent of the provision of aid.51 As noted in chapter 3, foreign aid is equally critical for insurgents, and this held true for the Sandinistas. Many states in the region provided them with financial and military assistance, as well as safe havens for their training camps. “The tangible support provided to the insurgents from abroad,” argue Paul et al., “was critical to their effectiveness in launching attacks.”52

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Panama and Venezuela became the leading supporters of the Sandinistas, delivering large stockpiles of small arms as well as logistical support. Mexico and Costa Rica also served as primary logistical hubs for the delivery of supplies into Nicaragua. Even the Palestinian Liberation Organization (plo ) supported the Sandinistas by providing weaponry.53 Additionally, Costa Rica and Honduras provided territory for training camps. Randy Pestana and Brian Latell note that Cuba became “the most crucial ally in the final months of the war” and even deployed military and intelligence officers to Nicaragua to assist in the final offensive against Somoza.54 Rebel groups also engaged in diplomacy as a means to secure the support of outside benefactors and international organizations. According to Walker and Wade, “members of the opposition – particularly The Twelve – traveled throughout the world explaining the Sandinista cause and soliciting donations.”55 The rebels also reached out to expatriates and solicited their support in deposing Somoza. The United States, specifically exiles living in San Francisco, played an important role in organizing outside support. “The fsln activists in San Francisco jump-started the anti-Somoza movement in the United States, leading the first protests and creating some of the first pro-fsln publications.”56 Foreign aid and diplomacy clearly played an important role in the Nicaraguan Revolution. This was true for both the incumbent and the insurgents. International condemnation and restrictions on foreign aid attenuated Somoza’s ferocious counterinsurgency campaign, while aid and support from foreign benefactors enhanced the capabilities and prestige of the Sandinistas. Domestic Opposition

Another critical factor when evaluating counterinsurgency outcomes is the role of domestic opposition groups, especially under conditions of extreme government repression. It is apparent that during the Nicaraguan Revolution, the plain brutality of Somoza’s campaign weakened his efforts to defeat the insurgency. According to Booth, government repression helped galvanize the opposition: “Somoza’s repression backfired – it undoubtedly cowed and destroyed some opponents, but it increased the resolve and the numbers of others.”57 Elements of Nicaragua’s Catholic Church became radicalized as a result of government repression. Religious groups devoted to community development and assisting the poor were viewed with suspicion by the

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Somoza regime, which believed such social programs served as a cloak for more subversive activities. Yet government attempts to undermine the work of the Catholic Church backfired, for they only encouraged priests to support the insurgency. Some priests offered logistical support while others took up arms against the government, most notably Father Gaspar García Laviana, who was killed in combat. “The Nicaraguan Catholic Church became a vocal and powerful opponent of the Somoza regime in the early 1970s,” observes Wilson.58 Political repression and a sagging economy even alienated Nicaragua’s social elites. Stephen Gorman notes that the abandonment of Somoza by the bourgeoisie and the business class did much to expand the rebellion.59 According to Walker and Wade, “Somoza lost much of the support that he had formerly enjoyed from Nicaragua’s economic elite . . . As a result, from 1973 on, more and more young people with impressive elite backgrounds joined the ranks of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, and some sectors of the business community began giving the fsln their financial support.”60 By the end, only the National Guard was still in Somoza’s corner.61 Richard Weitz contends that popular support was an important precondition for the insurgents to oust the Somoza regime. He writes that government repression drove otherwise moderate opponents to embrace guerrilla warfare. But he also stresses that this alone was not enough: the insurgents also had to demonstrate that they were militarily capable of challenging the government forces, which they ultimately succeeded in doing with their raid on the National Palace. Even so, argues Weitz, not until 1979 were the insurgents able to mount a coordinated campaign capable of overthrowing Somoza.62 Summary

The outcome of the Nicaraguan Revolution can arguably be attributed to three distinct factors: moderate levels of barbarism, widespread domestic opposition, and international pressure. To be fair, other developments had a prominent impact on the outcome – for example, the degree of ideological unity and a shared objective among the various opposition groups.63 According to Christopher Paul and colleagues, “the combination of effective political organization by the Sandinistas, repressive policies by the government, loss of support for President Anastasio Somoza Debayle in the United States, and a steady supply of weapons from various Latin American nations to the insurgents led to an insurgent victory in a short but bloody conflict.”64

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Another potential explanatory factor was the shift in international norms that recognized protection of human rights. “Perhaps the most important factor to shape the outcome of the struggle for power in Nicaragua,” argues Wilson, “was the international human rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.”65 The widespread acknowledgment of human rights was reflected in the behaviour of various actors, including states, international organizations, and non-state advocacy groups. The Sandinistas were able to take advantage of the renewed global emphasis on human rights in their efforts to marshall diplomatic and material support. “The ultimate success of the fsln over the Somoza regime,” argues Wilson, “was due in large part to support of friendly governments.”66 Wilson acknowledges that the rebels were able to achieve a number of important military victories, but he assigns far greater causal weight to changing global norms on human rights. Somoza’s moderate approach to counterinsurgency failed to defeat the insurgents. He frequently altered his policies in response to international pressure, even implementing token political and economic reforms. Although superficial, such actions attenuated his barbarism, and he subsequently wavered in his commitment to indiscriminate violence. In 1978 the US State Department reported that Somoza had instructed his troops to respect the human rights of innocent civilians; later, it found that the number of abuses had “diminished.”67 Arthur Mudge notes that Somoza did not always rely on repressive tactics during the insurgency and sometimes demonstrated restraint.68 It is therefore conceivable that Somoza’s repression was not brutal enough to thoroughly rout insurgents as he instead sought a middle ground. Citizens were allowed to participate in mass protests and general strikes with few repercussions, and this seemed to only embolden the opposition. According to Walker and Wade, “Nicaraguans of all classes had experienced the thrill and surge of pride that came with defying the dictator and were, therefore, in no mood to let things slip back to normal.”69 Setting aside the Somoza regime’s initial counterinsurgency successes, its downfall can be attributed to its failure to eradicate domestic insurgents and marginalize exiled rebel leaders, who continued to cultivate international support for the opposition.70 Somoza’s willingness to lessen the degree of barbarism appears to have reduced the probability of successfully defeating the insurgents. Weitz points out that while Somoza was able to repress domestic dissent through the mid-1970s, once the regime bowed to international pressure and lifted the siege, the insurgents were able to more effectively challenge the government, for the perceived benefits of rebellion now exceeded the costs. “From

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this point on,” observes Weitz, “the government was never able to bring sufficient strength to bear to quiet the regime’s opponents.”71 Thus, it is conceivable that the shift from extreme to more moderate levels of barbarism corresponded to a change in the probability of Somoza successfully defeating the insurgents.

n e pa l e s e c iv il wa r, 1996–2006 Nepal had long been governed by a royal monarchy that was established in 1768. The monarchical government was largely stable until the mid-twentieth century, when proposed political reforms and a declining economy gave rise to domestic opposition. In light of growing hostilities, King Mahendra instituted the “Panchayat system” – a form of governance that outlawed political parties but still allowed for the election of local representatives. Real power, however, was retained by the monarchy. “The Panchayat system,” explains Yurendra Basnett, “consisted of a national legislature elected indirectly by the people through three tiers of village, district and zonal assemblies. The mechanism of accountability of the national legislature was to the King and not to the people.”72 Not surprisingly, the government was subject to much criticism during the Panchayat era. Citizens had grown tired of the long-standing monarchy, which provided little room for meaningful political participation, and were angry about the corruption and ineptitude of government officials. Frustration with the Panchayat system coincided with a number of socio-economic conditions that gave rise to growing unrest and demands for democratization. Poverty has frequently been cited as the primary cause of Nepal’s domestic unrest and the subsequent insurgency; however, many historians stress that the conflict was the result of far more complex interconnected events. Stuart Gordon cites not only economic inequalities but also ethnic tensions, corruption, uneven development, and a political system that “reinforced upper-caste privilege.”73 Timothy Kreuttner points to a broad panoply of factors, including a lack of economic development, corruption, and political disputes.74 The insurgency can also be attributed to a trade dispute with India in the late 1980s that led to the closure of the India–Nepal border. That dispute brought about an economic decline that galvanized diverse segments of the population in opposition to the monarchy. “This blockade,” observes Deepak Thapa, imposed a severe strain on Nepal’s economy and “led to further bitterness against the government.”75 In the early 1990s, several political groups launched a popular campaign for democratic reforms. King Birendra agreed to establish a

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constitutional monarchy and to hold multiparty elections in May 1991. Unfortunately, the reforms were largely superficial and appeared to serve only elite interests. Meanwhile, economic decline and widespread corruption persisted. The disconnect between expectations of reform and the reality of government ineptitude fostered conditions for political violence. The newly founded parliament also faced political challenges from rivals – especially those on the far left – that weakened its ability to govern effectively. According to Kreuttner, “the elites took charge of the new democratic government with little concern for the people outside Kathmandu. Missing the opportunity to represent the people in a truly democratic fashion, the parliament rekindled popular resentment of perceived social injustice and lack of economic opportunity.”76 John Norris reaches a similar conclusion: “High expectations for the new constitutional order quickly evaporated as the political system was whipsawed by a long sequence of no-confidence votes, change in governments, supreme court disputes, internal party leadership battles, and opportunistic coalition-hopping.”77 In essence, the feeble attempt at liberalization only weakened government institutions and gave rise to greater levels of opposition. Frustrated by the lack of substantial reform, most communists interpreted these early attempts at democratization as artificial and concluded it was necessary to wage a guerrilla war against the state to seize power.78 To be fair, the communists had a long history of political activism in Nepal. The original Communist Party of Nepal was founded in 1949 but eventually experienced internal divisions that resulted in the emergence of several rival communist groups. By the mid-1990s, the most militant of these groups was the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (cpn-m ) which called for an armed revolution against the regime. Their most prominent demands included the dissolution of the monarchy, an end to what they perceived as Indian imperialism, and removal of the caste system. According to Sebastian von Einsiedel and Cale Salih, “the poorly performing democracy significantly contributed to the radicalisation of the left in the early 1990s and the emergence of the Maoist Party.”79 Given the failure of democratic reforms, many communists had concluded that they would never achieve their objectives through the political structure as it then existed. Societal tensions were further inflamed when the police launched Operation Romeo in November 1995 to crack down on domestic opposition using heavy-handed tactics such as mass detentions, torture, and even sexual violence. Romeo appears to have been the catalyst for the insurgency. “During the course of Operation Romeo,” observes Norris,

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“Maoist leaders publicly embraced violence as their modus operandi.”80 Before launching the insurgency, Maoist rebel leaders sent the monarchy a forty-point list of demands. Although the specifics of their demands varied, the central theme called for a new constitution that provided for free and fair elections and the establishment of a constituent assembly. The Maoists declared that if the government failed to act on their demands, they would be “forced to adopt the path of armed struggle against the existing state power.”81 Given a lack of any serious response by government officials to the list of demands, the communists launched the insurgency on 13 February 1996 with the goal of removing the monarchy, which had stood for nearly 240 years. At approximately 3:45 p.m., armed rebels stormed a field office of the Agricultural Development Bank in central Nepal. In the evening of the same day, insurgents attacked several police outposts. The ensuing Nepalese Civil War had two phases. The first of these began with the outbreak of political violence that lasted until 2001 and was marked by a reliance on police forces to quell the Maoist insurrection. At the time, the insurgency was widely regarded as a challenge to law and order (rather than an existential threat), and the government relied on the police to contain it. Nepal’s police force, however, was woefully incapable of combating a rebellion that had spread throughout the country. Indeed, the inability of the police to provide security resulted in large swaths of the country falling under insurgent control. By 2001 the insurgents controlled much of the countryside and in some places had established their own regional governments. As the fighting escalated, the decision not to deploy the military was sharply questioned, which ultimately led to the resignation of the prime minister in July 2001. Conditions on the ground forced the government to concede to a temporary cessation of hostilities and begin negotiating with Maoist rebels. However, in November 2001 the Maoists unilaterally withdrew from the ceasefire and the peace talks broke down, at which point the new prime minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, declared a state of emergency and deployed the Royal Nepal Army (rna ). The entrance of the army generally marks the start of the second phase of the war.82 However, by the time the military assumed responsibility for countering the insurgency, the Maoists were a formidable insurgent force.83 They had acquired several years of actual fighting experience, mobilized a large number of recruits, and built up an impressive arsenal of tactical arms. The insurgents also enjoyed a relative degree of cohesion and never suffered a major organizational rupture during the conflict. To be fair, serious tensions did exist within the organization, but these never

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undermined their military operations. In contrast, the rna had historically been a ceremonial force that guarded the royal family. It had not engaged in real combat since 1974, and even that had been a mere skirmish with Tibetan guerrillas.84 Although the army was quite large, with 50,000 soldiers, it lacked resources and administrative capacity and could only deploy a few thousand troops for actual combat against the insurgents. For much of this period, the government was weakened by revolvingdoor leadership as various individuals assumed the premiership. Meanwhile, at the local level, the withdrawal of police and the failure to hold elections brought about a political vacuum, which Maoist rebels quickly exploited. According to Human Rights Watch, “in most of these districts, the Maoists controlled development projects, courts, schools and health facilities, imposed taxes, and generally assumed the functions of a state.”85 The overall success of the insurgent operations was evidence of a pragmatic strategy that took relative balances of power into account. According to Kristine Eck, the “rebels deliberately chose to fight where there were weak state security structures when they themselves were weak.”86 As the conflict continued, direct and sustained confrontations with the rna sent a clear signal that the insurgents had reached parity with the security forces. On 1 February 2005, King Gyanendra dissolved the government and assumed full control of Nepal. His decision would undercut the state’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Troops were instead reassigned to guarding prisoners amidst the state of emergency, thereby reducing the number of personnel available for actual combat operations. According to the Congressional Research Service, nearly half the rna was now “occupied with palace security, civil administration, and efforts to restrict communications and civil rights.”87 The king’s seizure of power is generally regarded by historians as the turning point in the conflict. By curtailing civil liberties and heightening political repression, the king alienated most domestic groups and compelled international allies to halt the delivery of foreign aid. His decision to take full control of the state spurred Nepal’s opposition groups to forge a broad alliance against the monarchy. “This new partnership,” argues Bishnu Upreti, “dramatically altered the course of the conflict.”88 By 2005 the conflict had reached a stalemate: neither side could make significant military progress. In November, the rebel groups switched to non-violent tactics, relying mainly on pro-democracy demonstrations held by mobilized activist groups, student unions, and trade unions. “The humiliating defeats the Maoists and rna suffered,” explain Sebastian

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von Einsiedel and Cale Salih, “brought about a ‘mutually hurting stalemate,’ convincing both camps that victory on the battlefield was elusive and that the time was right to engage in serious peace negotiations.”89 In April 2006, King Gyanendra capitulated to widespread opposition and reinstated the House of Representatives. In November 2006, the government and the rebels agreed to sign the Comprehensive Peace Accord (cpa ), which formally ended the conflict. In 2008, the king abdicated and a newly elected democratic government was sworn into power. Counterinsurgency Strategy

Political disarray among policy-makers resulted in a haphazard and uncoordinated counterinsurgency campaign. “Even in the face of a growing insurgency,” observe Paul et al., “government bickering continued, and coin policy never showed any unity or consensus.”90 According to Gordon, the government’s counterinsurgency strategy was “slow, reactive, fragmented, and at times, even counterproductive.”91 In many instances, especially in more rural areas, counterinsurgent forces would retrench when faced with Maoist offences. The government’s inability and reluctance to more aggressively counter the insurgents’ gains precipitated a downward spiral of losses. As noted earlier, the war’s first phase was defined by a reliance on the police to tackle the growing insurrection. Unfortunately, the insurgents were far better equipped and trained than the police. “An essentially unarmed ‘watcher’ force, two-thirds of whom carried nothing heavier than a patrol stick, the police were quite unprepared for the demands of counterinsurgency,” finds Thomas Marks.92 Some police officers were completely unarmed and lacked training appropriate for countering insurgents. Even specialized police units intended to confront the insurgency lacked adequate training and equipment and were plagued with corruption. When the army assumed responsibility for counterinsurgency operations in 2001, it did not fare much better. Nepal’s army had little experience in active combat, lacked a coherent chain of command as a result of long-standing internal disputes, and had been underfunded by previous governments, which viewed it as a marginal peacetime entity. In sum, “the police force and Royal Nepalese Army (rna ) struggled to control a country with insufficient personnel and equipment, inadequate training, poor integration of agencies, and little infrastructure.”93 Nepal’s security forces were ill-prepared to combat an insurgency. Furthermore, their tactics included brutalizing or killing scores of

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innocent civilians. The police were accused of torture, theft of private property, and extrajudicial killings. For their part, the rna often conducted search-and-destroy missions, even dropping mortars by hand from helicopters as a crude form of aerial bombardment. Toward the end of the conflict, the government established “death squads” that slaughtered civilians and burned villages. In 2005, the US Department of State reported that Nepal’s “human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses.”94 The report chronicled arbitrary arrests, the torture of detainees, the suspension of basic democratic rights, and the unlawful use of force by security services. The Nepalese government also issued the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Ordinance (tado ) that provided sweeping powers to security forces in order to tackle the insurgency. It allowed them to interpret any activity as potentially “disruptive” or subversive; in effect, this suspended civil liberties and denied legal recourse to detainees. It also provided a degree of immunity to security forces that violated citizens’ basic human rights. “In effect,” observes Thapa, “the courts were rendered irrelevant.”95 In 2004, Human Rights Watch declared that the ordinance “has allowed the security forces of Nepal to literally get away with murder.”96 Some scholars contend that the government’s forceful military response weakened the insurgents’ momentum to some degree. “Had Maoists violence not been checked by military/security means,” reasons Purna Khatri, “Maoists would have achieved an easy victory.”97 The government’s inability to crush the rebels is explained by a lack of requisite resources and by policy-makers’ failure to develop an integrated strategy. Nevertheless, a tenuous argument could be offered that the military’s highly repressive response compelled the Maoists to forgo guerrilla operations in favour of non-violent protests.98 At the same time, the government attempted a “hearts and minds” approach to addressing the grievances that had launched the insurgency. In August 2001, the Integrated Security and Development Program (isdp ) was established for the purpose of generating economic development and providing social services. Gordon explains that “it was envisaged that the isdp framework would incorporate an enormous range of development programs such as work on road and bridge networks, small scale irrigation, electrification, forestry, health, education, agricultural development, food self-sufficiency, micro-credit, and income generation.”99 But like most of Nepal’s counterinsurgency programs, the isdp was short-lived and lacked the financial resources to carry out development projects. The initiative was entirely run and managed by

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government contractors with little involvement from the local populations. As a result, the government was unable to cultivate local stakeholders in development projects, and the initiative was ultimately terminated in November 2001. Thus, Nepal relied on a confused and often contradictory array of tactics and was never able to formulate a coherent counterinsurgency strategy. The government was dysfunctional, and the security forces lacked the capacity to counter rebels. According to Purna Khatri, “weak administrative infrastructure, frequent changes in government, hung parliaments, lack of determined leadership, diverse interest and different views of major political forces towards insurgency contributed to reactive, inconsistent, and sometimes counterproductive response.”100 The government’s equivocation and failure to marshal any meaningful response allowed the rebellion to flourish. Diplomacy and Foreign Aid

In the post-9/11 environment and ongoing “war on terrorism,” both the United States and the United Kingdom provided economic and military aid so that a potentially destabilizing conflict would not take hold in Nepal. The United States declared the Maoist rebels a terrorist organization, and military advisers frequently travelled to Nepal to train rna soldiers in counterinsurgency tactics. The United States also advised Nepal’s army as it formulated its own counterinsurgency manual, but by the time it was released in 2005 the government was already severely weakened and international aid had been withdrawn. Overall, the United States had invested quite heavily in Nepal, reaching a peak of $45 million in 2004.101 The United States and Britain were the strongest external supporters of the Nepalese government. Additional aid was provided by India. China had significant economic interests in Nepal, but it largely stayed out of the conflict. Overall, most observers concur that third-party support played a negligible role in the conflict. According to Kreuttner, “military aid to the Nepalese government was not of sufficient quantity or type to prevent a Maoist political victory though it at least allowed the Army to hold the insurgents to a military stalemate and mitigate the outcome.”102 In 2005, all major benefactors cut off their aid when King Gyanendra dissolved the government and assumed direct authority over the state. His power grab was decisive in convincing the international community to oppose the monarchy and terminate foreign assistance programs. International organizations and the major powers now sought a cessation

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of political violence and the restoration of civil liberties. “The king’s move had political repercussions both internationally and internally,” observes Kreuttner. “The US, UK, and India ceased providing military assistance over concerns about supporting an anti-democratic regime.”103 International ngo s also condemned the government’s human rights abuses. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists all excoriated the government’s policies and called on world leaders to sanction the government. In some instances, international pressure succeeded in changing the behaviour of the Nepalese government. Human Rights Watch reported that intense diplomatic condemnation had compelled the government to release some detainees and relax media restrictions. It also found that the presence of un monitors had a positive influence, for they were able to monitor human rights violations.104 Foreign aid to the rebels was negligible throughout the conflict. The Soviet Union had by then been dissolved, and this deprived the Maoist insurgents of any significant external aid from a major power. Indian communists did provide some assistance, and for a brief time the Maoists were able to use Indian territory as a safe haven and training ground for recruits. This supportive relationship, however, ended in 2001 after the cpn-m was declared a terrorist organization, at which time India instead began to aid the rna . India’s position changed once again in 2005 when the king dissolved the government, compelling India to oppose the monarchy’s turn toward authoritarianism. Ultimately, India’s role as a foreign actor fluctuated over the course of the war and was often characterized as “ambivalent.”105 In sum, the amount of foreign aid provided to both the incumbent and the insurgents was trivial. In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, most outside actors gave little thought to a communist insurgency in a remote corner of the world. The foreign aid that was received from outside benefactors was never “incorporated in a systematic manner” and played a negligible role in the conflict.106 Domestic Opposition

As had happened during the Nicaraguan Revolution, the brutal tactics of Nepal’s police and military pushed otherwise neutral citizens to support the insurgency. The government’s repressive measures may have succeeded in killing and capturing insurgents, but they also alienated large segments of the population. Most historians agree that brutal counterinsurgency tactics and civilian deaths only helped fuel Nepal’s

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insurgency. For example, Sebastian von Einsiedel and Cale Salih write that “excessive and indiscriminate use of force by the Nepal Police in response to Maoist mobilisation fed local resentment of the state.”107 “In the wake of the police excesses,” adds Sudheer Sharma, “many people were driven by the motive of revenge into the rebel camp and the number of Maoists saw a phenomenal increase.”108 Government repression thus provided Maoists with an opportunity to increase popular support for the insurgency by extending promises of reform and providing immediate protection. “The spread of insurgency,” argue Adhikari and Samford, “was motivated in part by the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by the Nepali security forces, which increasingly viewed civilians as valid targets for counterinsurgency, and the opportunity afforded by weak state infrastructure for complicity or participation in the Maoist insurgency.”109 Security forces were unable to protect citizens, while human rights abuses contributed to a negative opinion of the state. The brutal tactics also appear to have helped unify domestic groups in opposition of the monarchy. Liberals and intellectuals were equally opposed to the government and thus shared the objective of ousting the monarchy. The absence of major rifts among opposition groups presented a formidable challenge to the government. This is not to suggest that the insurgency was devoid of infighting, but the fractionalization was negligible when compared to other conflicts. Indeed, the International Crisis Group reported that tensions existed among insurgent leaders and that there were some challenges with command and control, but found that such problems did not constitute a fatal weakness for the rebellion.110 Ultimately, the government’s violence against civilians and long-standing marginalization of large swaths of the population contributed to its own demise. Adhikari and Samford conclude that “the case presented here clearly fits closely with the finding that indiscriminate violence is a counterproductive strategy for eliminating an insurgency.”111 Summary

The outcome of the Nepalese Civil War was the result of a flawed counterinsurgency strategy that was inefficient in nearly all respects. The government was slow to respond and lacked the resources to conduct effective military operations. Moreover, political infighting and constant turnover resulted in security forces being deprived of any meaningful support from policy-makers. In sum, Nepal’s response to the rebellion was disorderly and lacked a coherent strategy.

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This account of Nepal’s civil war indicates that acts of political violence do not necessarily equate to an effective counterinsurgency campaign. Counterinsurgency forces must be well equipped and trained, and their tactics must be comprehensive. An ineffectual and disjointed military cannot possibly suppress a rebellion. In Nepal, then, a rather weak rebellion that was largely restricted to rural areas was able to generate momentum without encountering significant government resistance. The implication and counterfactual is that a more robust and effective counterinsurgency strategy could have defeated the ragtag group of rebels. Indeed, Thapa speculates that the monarchy could have prevailed if it simply had “access to more resources to make up for battle attrition.”112 Meanwhile, the government’s attempts at economic development and the delivery of essential services – both typically associated with a population-centric strategy – were rendered ineffectual in light of institutionalized political discrimination. Development projects benefited only the elites and “tended to reinforce caste and class divisions.”113 According to Sonal Singh and colleagues, “development assistance may have unknowingly exacerbated the conflict by perpetuating the same inequalities, which led to the conflict in the first place.”114 The outcome of the Nepal Civil War was a consequence of government failures rather than insurgent success. A disorderly counterinsurgency campaign and half-hearted political reforms were a recipe for disaster. The government simply lacked the institutional capacity to quash domestic opposition.

l e s s o n s l e a rned The conflicts presented in this chapter reveal two important lessons for incumbents pursuing a barbaric counterinsurgency strategy. First, periods of political liberalization and the easing of repressive tactics only embolden opposition forces and provide insurgents breathing room to mobilize recruits. In the Nicaraguan Revolution, it is apparent that Somoza’s decision to lift the siege sapped the momentum that security forces had gained against the insurgents. Indeed, the fsln had struggled to make any meaningful progress during the most brutal periods of government repression. Meanwhile, in Nepal, early attempts to establish a constitutional monarchy allowed a relatively obscure group of communist rebels to flourish. Prakash Adhikari and Steven Samford go so far as to speculate that the Nepalese government’s acquiescence to political liberalization in the early 1990s allowed the insurgency to blossom. It would not have succeeded in the absence of any sort of democratic reform.115

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How security forces respond to an insurgency yields a second major implication. Incumbent forces must be capable of carrying out an effective counterinsurgency strategy. To be fair, this should be rather obvious to any repressive regime relying on brute military force to quash domestic groups. Weak states are simply unable to implement robust strategies that counter opposition forces. This line of reasoning served as justification for including the Composite Index of National Capability (cinc ) score in the previous chapter. That score was statistically significant in most models, thus indicating that higher levels of military capabilities are associated with a greater likelihood of defeating an insurgency. National capabilities have also been a central focus of scholars studying interstate conquest. Peter Liberman, for example, has argued that “superior coercive capabilities” are required to suppress domestic societies.116 But capacity is not limited to material capabilities; it must also include policy-making and political support. Incumbents must be able to formulate a coherent counterinsurgency strategy that receives the unwavering support of elite policy-makers. This is especially critical for states that choose to rely on barbarism and political violence as a strategy. In Nepal, the monarchy’s early decision to regard the insurgency as merely a law-and-order matter and its hesitation to deploy the army proved detrimental. Conflating population-centric and barbaric approaches also raised false expectations among Nepalese citizens. In sum, capabilities and government resolve are both critical predictors of intrastate war outcomes. Additionally, the qualitative case studies indicate that foreign aid may play a critical role in counterinsurgency warfare. In both conflicts the international community appears to have influenced the incumbent’s behaviour. In Nicaragua, Somoza was sensitive to coercive diplomacy and sometimes adjusted his counterinsurgency policies in order to maintain a positive impression of his regime. In Nepal, the king’s decision to dissolve the government unified domestic opposition and compelled the major powers to rescind foreign aid. An assessment conducted by the Congressional Research Service concluded that the international isolation of the monarchy constrained its ability to combat insurgents.117 The cases presented in this chapter appear to substantiate the core tenets of my theory. In particular, moderate levels of political repression are least likely to defeat an insurgency and only engender domestic opposition. Although their actions were abhorrent, both Nicaragua and Nepal averaged approximately 4 on the barbarism scale, which marks the lowest point in figure 4.4.118 The conflicts also underscore the importance of military capacity and political commitment to carry

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out political violence. In both cases, the counterinsurgents lacked the requisite capabilities to conduct military operations, while key decision-makers often wavered or failed to fully commit to a barbaric strategy. These circumstances led to the defeat of incumbents in both Nicaragua and Nepal. An important task remains: to shed light on the conditions that allow bad states to win wars. Thus, in the next chapter I consider how the brutal suppression of civilians and gross violation of human rights can sometimes enable an incumbent to quell a rebellion.

6 Successful Cases of Barbarism

This chapter examines two instances in which a government used brute force with convincing success. The Sri Lankan conflict was one of the longest civil wars in recent history, and notable for the Tamil insurgents being one of the original prolific users of suicide terrorism attacks. The case is also pivotal in that most observers concluded that a military solution was not feasible given the immense strength of the insurgents. Meanwhile, the two Chechen Wars provide an opportunity to investigate the different causal pathways that led to two distinct outcomes – a negotiated settlement and an insurgent defeat. Both cases demonstrate that extreme levels of barbarism may be an effective counterinsurgency strategy, but that incumbent governments must also possess the requisite military capabilities and maintain the full support of the decision-making elite.

s r i l a n k a n c iv il war, 1989–2009 The Sri Lankan Civil War was an ethnic-based conflict between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority. Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the Tamils were subjected to institutionalized discrimination that curtailed their legal standing and limited their potential for social advancement within Sri Lankan society. For example, the Ceylon Citizenship Act (1948) barred Indian Tamils from obtaining citizenship, while the Sinhala Only Act (1956), which replaced English with Sinhala as the official language, was regarded as a form of linguistic discrimination in that it limited the employment opportunities of the Tamilspeaking minority. Tamils were also discriminated against through unequal admission practices for universities and restrictions placed on Tamil-language media, and were marginalized in parliament.

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Historians have written extensively about Sri Lankan practices that were designed to marginalize Tamils. “Colombo pursued policies that were aimed at bolstering the relative position and strength of the Sinhalese majority throughout the 1970s,” writes C. Christine Fair.1 The Tamils were deliberately shut out of higher education programs and participation in government institutions. According to Chalinda Weerasinghe, “the majority government actively sought to alienate, demobilize, and humiliate the moderates among the minority.”2 In response, a plethora of groups emerged to represent the Tamil minority and achieve various socio-political objectives. The most notable among these was the Tamil independence movement, concentrated in the north and east of the country. It was fuelled in part by the realization that these areas could serve as an economically viable independent state. “Although there were legitimate grievances,” Weerasinghe explains, “the realization of the possibility of an independent state occurred when the once economically peripheral areas of the north and east became economic and agricultural centers.”3 Independence thus became the primary objective of the Tamils and of the subsequent insurgency. Frustration over continued discrimination and the desire to achieve autonomy eventually boiled over into open confrontation. A number of riots broke out in opposition to government policies, and by the late 1970s many radical groups had started to use political violence against military targets. The most notable group to emerge was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte ), founded by Velupillai Prabhakaran. On 23 July 1983, the ltte carried out a deadly ambush on a Sri Lankan army patrol, killing thirteen soldiers. The reaction of the Sinhalese majority was fierce. The following day, anti-Tamil riots erupted throughout the country. They would last for nearly a week, leaving several thousand Tamils dead. Sinhalese mobs also torched Tamil homes and businesses, and many Tamils were forced to flee the country altogether. The riots came to be remembered as Black July and are regarded as the actual start of the Sri Lankan Civil War. The ltte emerged as an especially formidable insurgent organization. It marshalled a sizable army and even maintained its own air force and navy. Moreover, it employed both guerrilla and conventional warfighting tactics. But they were most notorious, perhaps, for their prolific use of suicide attacks. Their first recorded suicide attack was in July 1987 when a ltte operative drove a truck loaded with explosives into a Sri Lankan army barracks. Over the course of the conflict, the ltte not only refined the construction of their explosive devices but also gained notoriety by using women as suicide bombers. In fact, the Tamil Tigers

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are often credited for spreading suicide tactics around the world. Kumar Rupesinghe writes that “the ltte was the group that institutionalized the suicide bomber as an offensive weapon both politically and militarily.”4 Although the precise number of suicide attacks launched by the ltte is often debated among scholars, it is nevertheless clear that the ltte utilized the tactic with deadly effect. India had initially provided only material support to Tamil insurgents but became increasingly involved after Sri Lanka launched a major offensive in 1987 against the ltte on the Jaffna Peninsula. India’s air force dropped relief supplies to rebel forces in Jaffna and even threatened direct military intervention. Sri Lanka’s president, J.R. Jayewardene, agreed to a ceasefire and signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. This paved the way for the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (ipkf ) to maintain the truce between combatants and oversee disarmament. Most Tamil rebels assented to relinquishing their arms, but the ltte refused, and this eventually led to a full-scale confrontation between the ipkf and ltte . According to C. Christine Fair, “the Indians soon found that there was in fact no peace to keep and that they had become a party to the conflict.”5 As casualties began to mount, public opinion in India turned against the war and demanded that ipkf withdraw from Sri Lanka. Upon his election in 1989, Prime Minister V.P. Singh ordered the withdrawal of all Indian peacekeepers, which brought an end to the costly thirty-twomonth campaign. The war would continue to drag on for another decade, punctuated by several ceasefire agreements that failed to gain traction. Toward the end of 2001, however, both sides began to explore options for a more comprehensive negotiated settlement that would lead to a lasting peace. The insurgents were being marginalized by the international community amidst the ongoing “war on terrorism” and had suffered a series of military setbacks. Meanwhile, the government had failed to make any tangible progress against Tamil insurgents and faced growing unrest in the south of the country, leading to a no-confidence vote and fresh elections. Conditions thus proved ripe for a ceasefire agreement, and toward that end, the two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (m ou ) in February 2002. Throughout the supposed ceasefire, however, military clashes continued, as did acts of terrorism. Although the ceasefire technically remained in place, full-scale fighting had resumed by 2006. The Sri Lankan government announced its plans to launch an offensive in the eastern theatre, and the following year the military routed the insurgents in the Battle of Thoppigala. The government then turned toward the northern province,

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where it made significant progress in pushing back ltte forces. The military also killed a number of ltte commanders, further weakening the insurgent organization. Sri Lankan forces continued to roll back the ltte and reclaim captured territory, and by January 2008 the ceasefire was formally terminated. This newfound aggressive push to defeat the insurgents stemmed from the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa to the presidency in 2005. Immediately upon assuming office he set out to utterly transform Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency strategy, committing it to the wholesale military defeat of the insurgents. This entailed dramatically increasing defence spending, restructuring the command and control of the military, devising new battlefield tactics, and providing political and diplomatic breathing room for the military to undertake highly destructive operations without regard to human rights. Indeed, the scale and intensity of humanitarian violations increased under Rajapaksa’s military offensive. Ahmed Hashim writes that civilians were “slaughtered by the thousands as the military mercilessly subjected these areas to aerial and artillery bombardment.”6 The distinction between combatant and civilian as required by international humanitarian law was thoroughly erased. International observers have since concluded that the government committed numerous war crimes in the final months of the war.7 One of the final offensives of the war began in November 2008 with the Battle of Kilinochchi, which was followed in March 2009 by the Battle of Aanandapuram. The Sri Lankan military launched a multifaceted attack on ltte forces that saw some of the most brutal violence of the entire war. The air force resorted to indiscriminate bombing that forced internally displaced civilians into internment camps. This strategy crushed the insurgents, and in May 2009 President Rajapaksa formally announced that the ltte had been defeated. It is difficult to convey the destructive ferocity of the conflict. It has been estimated that it killed more than 100,000 civilians and displaced nearly 300,000 more.8 In a scathing report, Amnesty International stated that individuals had been “detained without charge or trial” and characterized Sri Lanka’s idp camps as “places of mass arbitrary detention.”9 Human Rights Watch similarly described the camps as “military-controlled, barbed-wire camps in which those sent there, including entire families, are denied their liberty and freedom of movement.”10 The government refused to allow international aid agencies to even assist in managing the humanitarian disaster. For their part, the insurgents exploited innocent civilians as human shields to deflect the government’s offensive. A post-conflict report issued by the un detailed

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serious allegations of human rights abuses, which suggests that both the Sri Lankan government and the ltte committed numerous war crimes over the course of the war.11 Counterinsurgency Strategy

In the early phases of the conflict, the government of Sri Lanka had no coherent counterinsurgency strategy. Kumar Rupesinghe writes that the Sri Lankan government often lacked “purpose, unity, and determination.”12 Elite decision-makers would either squabble over the appropriate military response or refuse to compromise for fear of losing political legitimacy. Others contend that political interference was a major obstacle to achieving a decisive outcome. Many politicians and special interest groups reaped enormous financial gains through weapons procurement and arms purchases that fuelled the war effort. Moreover, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s election in 2001 brought about political deadlock as President Chandrika Kumaratunga was of the opposition party and deeply opposed to any negotiation with the insurgents. Hashim concludes that “there was no clear-cut political direction from the civilian rulers, no civilian-military coordination, and no effective and efficient arms procurement strategy for the material-starved forces.”13 Not surprisingly, an assessment conducted by the cia in 1986 concluded that the Sri Lankan security forces would be unable to defeat the insurgency owing to “poor organization, training, leadership, and intelligence.”14 Not until Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected president did Sri Lanka formulate a more focused and sustained counterinsurgency strategy. The army was now fully committed to the military defeat of the insurgents without regard for human rights. “The Rajapaksa regime’s approach differed from previous governments,” explains Neil DeVotta, “by giving the military carte blanche to fight the ltte to the end – irrespective of the economic, human, and diplomatic costs.”15 Military leaders and soldiers now received the full support of civilian policy-makers. The government significantly increased its defence budget and benefited from a large number of new recruits. These changes proved to be instrumental in defeating the insurgents. “Overwhelming force ratios,” argues Mark O’Connell, “enabled the slaf [Sri Lankan Armed Forces] to pursue a military defeat of the ltte .”16 Sameer Lalwani agrees, contending that Sri Lanka’s success can largely be attributed to its material preponderance.17 Another important factor was a newfound consensus that emerged after President Rajapaksa was elected. He installed trusted associates and even family members to critical cabinet positions, thus ensuring a

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degree of cohesion among policy-makers. He also forged a number of alliances with competing political parties as well as a partnership with ltte defectors. These efforts ensured broad consensus for the absolute eradication of the insurgency. According to Hashim, “the Rajapaksa government was united, determined, and unswerving, in contrast with earlier governments that were weak, indecisive, and disunited vis-à-vis the ltte .”18 The government also refused to negotiate with insurgents or yield to international pressure. Military force was now the sole strategy of the government, which did not provide the ltte with breathing room, be it through a ceasefire or political liberalization. But perhaps the most notable characteristic of Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency strategy was its sheer brutality against insurgents and civilians alike. The government engaged in indiscriminate aerial bombardments, executed prisoners of war, killed innocent civilians, and denied food and medical supplies to internally displaced persons. According to an Amnesty International report, the “Sri Lankan armed forces launched indiscriminate attacks with artillery on areas densely populated by civilians.”19 Some reports even suggest that the government used chlorine gas on civilians.20 Meanwhile, those suspected of being members of the ltte were subject to “extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearance, and torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment.”21 The US Department of State issued a report chronicling the killing of civilians and detainees, abductions, and failure to provide adequate protection to internally displaced persons. Over the course of the conflict, the Sri Lankan government was “accused of killings and disappearances, use of child soldiers, arbitrary arrests and detention, denial of fair public trial, and infringement of freedom of movement.”22 Also key to Sri Lanka’s successful counterinsurgency strategy was the strict enforcement of media censorship. Journalists were intimidated or even beaten, and those who wrote reports critical of the Sri Lankan government were expelled, arrested, or even imprisoned. The government restricted nearly all independent media coverage of the war, resulting in a near “total blackout of independent information from the conflict areas of the country.”23 By violating political liberties and the ability of independent media to access war zones, the government was able to control nearly all information related to the conflict. Rajapaksa was so pivotal to reformulating Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency strategy that some scholars have referred to it as the “Rajapaksa Model” or simply the “Sri Lankan Model.” It is based on several key principles, which include an absolute commitment to militarily defeating the rebellion, total disregard of any international criticism of its brutal

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methods, and an intransigent refusal to negotiate with insurgents.24 The Rajapaksa Model is thus the antithesis of population-centric strategies, which emphasize a political solution to redressing grievances. It insists on the application of military power to crush opposition forces. “The Rajapakse model,” explains V.K. Shashikumar, “is based on a military precept and not a political one. Terrorism has to be wiped out militarily and cannot be tackled politically.”25 Rupesinghe concurs, noting that “President Rajapaksa’s entire policy was based on military victory. It all but left out all nonmilitary aspects – political, social, or economic – that fall within the broader counterinsurgency doctrines.”26 Most observers now recognize that Sri Lanka’s brutal counterinsurgency strategy was extremely successful in defeating the ltte . David Cave acknowledges that “the Sri Lankans can justifiably claim to have destroyed an insurgency by force, achieving their strategic end state through military means.”27 In their extensive study of the Sri Lankan Civil War, Beehner et al. similarly recognize that “the Sri Lankan civil war provides a remarkable, if controversial, example of how the application of overwhelming force was brought to bear to end an insurgency.”28 Diplomacy and Foreign Aid

As with the cases presented in the previous chapter, foreign aid played an important role in the outcome of the Sri Lankan Civil War. The Sri Lankan government benefited from the support of China, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran, which provided either military supplies, economic aid, or diplomatic support. The key benefactors, however, were China and Russia as permanent members of the Security Council. They played an important role in blocking un resolutions that would otherwise have condemned Sri Lanka’s human rights violations. Niel Smith writes that “China provided more than simple financial support. It and several other states furnished the government with crucial political cover in the United Nations.”29 Regardless, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and in the thick of the ongoing “war on terrorism,” the international community largely chose to overlook Sri Lanka’s blatant violation of human rights and did not want to impede what appeared to be the demise of a notorious terrorist organization. Even the United States provided the Sri Lankan government with communications assistance and forwarded intelligence on ltte movements. The absence of foreign intervention proved to be critical to Sri Lanka’s barbaric strategy, allowing it to violate international law without repercussions.

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Restrictions on foreign aid to insurgents were equally important. When the conflict began, nearly all Tamil radical groups were supported by outside benefactors. The ltte even maintained its own diplomatic corps dedicated to securing international support. “By May 1998,” finds Kumar Rupesinghe, “the ltte ’s International Secretariat was believed to have offices and cells in at least fifty-four countries.”30 According to Hashim, “its transnational network was huge and capable of raising as much as $300 million a year from a web of fake charities and international arms and drug smuggling, among other means.”31 But international support began to dwindle in 1991 after the ltte assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India. By 1997 the US Department of State had designated the ltte as a foreign terrorist organization (fto ); Britain followed in 2001, and the European Union in 2006. External funding from diaspora communities also dried up after 9/11, and many Tamil charitable organizations in Western nations were shut down and their assets frozen. The leader of the Tamil Tigers, Prabhakaran, openly acknowledged that the decline in foreign support had reduced the ltte ’s capacity to conduct operations.32 Global condemnation of terrorism thus proved detrimental to the ltte ’s efforts to secure financial and diplomatic support. “The ltte ’s notoriety,” observes DeVotta, “resulted in the international community targeting it.”33 Domestic Opposition

It is possible that the animosity toward the government generated by its violations of human rights was counterbalanced by the ltte ’s own brutal methods. Tamil insurgents often slaughtered innocent civilians, and they orchestrated a number of violent massacres. The ltte also forced civilians to serve as human shields to deflect the government’s counterinsurgency offensive. Yet another common tactic was to recruit child soldiers to fight, even using young schoolgirls as suicide bombers. According to a State Department report, “ltte took both male and female children, some as young as 12, to join ltte cadres. In some instances, sources alleged that when parents or children resisted they were beaten or killed.”34 Meanwhile, the ltte used violence and intimidation to ensure internal cohesion and loyalty. C. Christine Fair finds that in more extreme cases, insurgent leaders would use torture or even execution to “ensure compliance among its cadres and to discourage dissent or abandonment of the organization.”35 Such draconian measures engendered a great deal of animosity even among members of the ltte .

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Other members of the ltte quarrelled over military tactics and the distribution of scarce resources. Internal disputes boiled over when the ltte ’s eastern commander, Colonel Karuna Amman, complained that his forces were being deprived of critical resources and that his theatre was being viewed as secondary to other Tamil objectives. In 2004, Colonel Karuna split from the ltte to form his own political party, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (tmvp ). Meanwhile, his military wing, the Karuna Faction, clashed with the ltte and aligned itself with Sri Lankan forces in the final push to defeat the insurgency. Colonel Karuna’s decision to leave the ltte and renounce violence is seen as a turning point in the war. “Karuna’s split and reconciliation with the Sri Lankan government,” argues Smith, “deprived the ltte of several hundred experienced fighters and significant support.”36 Ultimately, public animosity toward the government diminished given the insurgents’ equally harsh treatment of civilians. Indeed, civilians feared retribution from the government and the ltte . Shashikumar even argues, somewhat hyperbolically, that “the ltte did not have the support of the Tamil civilians.”37 Whatever the case, it is clear that for most of the conflict the government maintained the backing of the Sinhala population and was even able to secure support from pro-government Tamils. In contrast to other repressive conflicts, Sri Lankan civilians did not have a benevolent alternative to which they could turn for support or security. Summary

Against significant odds, the Sri Lankan government was able to defeat one of the most formidable insurgencies seen in recent history. The ltte not only marshalled a robust insurgent force but also maintained its own navy and air force. Yet after several decades of fighting, the insurgents still could not oust the government and secure their own independent homeland. The Sri Lankan Civil War thus constitutes an important case study for counterinsurgency warfare. In particular, it demonstrates how one government was able to finally crush an unrelenting insurgency that had plagued the country for decades. The success of the Sri Lankan government appears to have corresponded to changes in the key variables hypothesized in this study. The loss of international support, internal fractionalization, and especially increased brutality all played a role in facilitating the government’s victory over the ltte . Indeed, the election of Rajapaksa and the subsequent transformation of the government was a critical factor that

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corresponded with the defeat of insurgents. There was now unity of effort among policy-makers to destroy the insurgency through brute military force. “The Sri Lankan government had clearly adopted a very controversial position in the international community’s eyes,” observes Kumar Rupesinghe, “but that position was in line with its singular goal of military victory.”38 Some scholars counter, however, that Sri Lanka’s success in defeating the insurgency cannot be attributed strictly to its barbaric strategy. “The ltte ’s collapse was the result of cumulative external and internal forces,” argues Smith, “not simply the employment of ruthless new tactics.”39 Andrea Lopez concurs, suggesting that “it would be an error to assume that the wars were won solely because of a strategy of violence.”40 Other scholars are more direct in dismissing Sri Lanka’s brutal counterinsurgency strategy as a potential explanatory factor. Sameer Lalwani, for example, argues that “this narrative seems to serve as more of a post hoc rationalization than actual explanation because in previous campaigns, pauses stemmed from the presence or absence of military momentum, not deliberate strategic choice.”41 But such critiques are more of a minority viewpoint: most scholars recognize the within-case variation in the level of brutality. Indeed, Ahmed Hashim is quite explicit in arguing that strategic changes “proved to be the catalyst” that allowed Sri Lanka to defeat the insurgents.42 “The apparent conclusion from Sri Lanka [is] that highly repressive methods can be effective in counterinsurgency campaigns,” adds David Lewis.43 Sri Lanka’s brutal counterinsurgency strategy thus demonstrates that, under certain conditions, the gross violation of human rights can allow a repressive government to defeat an insurgency.

c h e c h e n wa r , 1994–2009 The recalcitrant republic of Chechnya had long been a headache for Russian leaders, with conflict dating back several centuries. Chechnya was eventually absorbed into the Russian Empire in the mid-nineteenth century, but deep animosities between Russians and Chechens remained. Indeed, the Chechens made several attempts to forcefully achieve independence but were brutally suppressed, and they never succeeded. After the Second World War, Joseph Stalin ordered the deportation of nearly half a million Chechens to Siberia in an effort to cleanse the republic. “Russia and the nations of the Northern Caucasus,” asserts Ariel Cohen, “have been in perpetual conflict since the 18th century.”44

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Amidst the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Chechens dissolved the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and eventually declared independence. The Russian parliament denounced the sovereignty movement as illegal and dispatched troops to regain control of the territory but were quickly repelled by Chechen forces. The dispute remained unresolved, and each side increasingly committed to using violence to achieve its own objectives. Meanwhile, lawlessness and high-profile acts of political violence in the Chechen region perturbed Russian leaders. The breakaway republic was also plagued by growing opposition to Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev and his dictatorial policies. Moscow provided furtive support to opposition forces in an effort to undermine Dudayev, including several attempts to seize Grozny in the fall of 1994 that not only failed but resulted in several Russian soldiers being captured. The incident was a colossal embarrassment for Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who feared that Chechnya’s newfound independence would set a dangerous precedent should other republics choose to break away from the Russian Republic. On 1 December 1994, President Yeltsin initiated hostilities with an aggressive aerial bombardment campaign in an effort to restore order in the breakaway republic. This was quickly followed by the deployment of Russian troops in a bold yet chaotic ground offensive, Russia’s largest military campaign since its war in Afghanistan. It rapidly became apparent, however, that the Russian forces were simply unprepared for war.45 Against the recommendation of senior officials, Yeltsin instructed the military to launch an all-out ground assault on the Chechen capital, Grozny, to begin on 31 December. According to Olga Oliker, “instead of light resistance from a few small bands, the 6,000-man Russian force that attempted to penetrate the city on New Year’s Eve found itself fighting an enemy far better prepared for battle and much larger than expected.”46 The hastily planned invasion was a failure and resulted in the near decimation of the Russian 131st Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade. Ib Faurby and Märta-Lisa Magnusson write that “this was one of the most critical phases for the Russian forces during the whole war.”47 Logistical delays and fierce ground combat slowed the Russian advance, forcing the military to resort to aerial and artillery bombardment in order to dislodge the rebels. Grozny subsequently suffered the heaviest aerial bombardment of a European city since the Second World War.48 The massive indiscriminate violence caused thousands of civilian deaths and international condemnation. By January, Russia had finally seized the Presidential

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Palace, but it was a meaningless victory, as the building had been destroyed and intense combat continued throughout the republic. In June 1995, the Russian military halted its ground assault in response to separatists taking nearly 1,500 civilians hostage at a Russian hospital in Budyonnovsk. Chechen commander Shamil Basayev had led several hundred insurgents into Russian territory, where they seized the hospital, which contained mostly women and children. After several failed attempts to dislodge the insurgents and recapture the hospital, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin turned to negotiations. Russia agreed to halt military operations in Chechnya and to permit the rebel fighters to return to Chechnya. As with other intrastate conflicts analyzed in this study, the temporary cessation of hostilities allowed the insurgents to regroup and recruit additional fighters. Indeed, some historians regard the incident as a turning point in the war, for the insurgents appeared to emerge stronger and more powerful, while Russia appeared weak and demoralized.49 In 1996, insurgents launched several successful guerrilla attacks on Russian forces in Grozny. In August, the attacks culminated in the Battle of Grozny, in which rebels seized the city despite Russian forces possessing an overwhelming material advantage. “The speed and daring of the attack led to disarray and downright panic among the numerically superior defenders,” observes Mark Galeotti.50 The bold assault belied assertions made by Russian leaders that the insurgency was nearly defeated. The Russian commander, General Konstantin Pulikovsky, threatened to level the city with strategic bombers and even ballistic missiles if the insurgents did not withdraw from Grozny. The threat was quickly rescinded by Yeltsin’s national security adviser, and negotiations soon began, culminating in the Khasavyurt Accord, which formally ended the First Chechen War. The peace agreement essentially marked a return to the status quo ante: Russia would withdraw all forces, and Chechnya would retain quasi-independence. The interwar period in Chechnya was marked by widespread crime, corruption, and political violence. The postwar economy was broken, and the Chechen president, Aslan Maskhadov, struggled to secure development assistance for rebuilding the country and to provide economic opportunities to former guerrilla fighters. Meanwhile, warlords and Islamic extremists challenged the government’s authority. “After years of social, economic, and political fragmentation, the Chechens proved incapable of self-governance in the wake of the Russian withdrawal,” observes Daniel Canfield, who adds that “original nationalistic goals and intentions gave way to a witch’s brew of corruption and competing

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self-interests fueled by organized crime and the rise of radical Islamist ideology.”51 The Chechen government simply lacked the resources and capacity to exert its authority. Stated differently, it failed to monopolize violence within its own territory. In this chaotic environment, Islamic extremism spread throughout Chechnya and gained many adherents. The Islamists increasingly exerted a great deal of pressure on political leaders, ultimately compelling Maskhadov to dissolve the Chechen parliament and establish sharia law. According to Williams, “Maskhadov hoped that the introduction of shariah law would mollify the Wahhabi extremists, but it only empowered them further. Having attained their goal of turning Chechnya into an Islamic theocracy, they began to plan the overthrow of the ‘infidel’ pro-Russian government in neighboring Dagestan.”52 Indeed, religious leaders sought build an Islamic confederation of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. On 9 August 1999, Islamic extremists from Chechnya invaded Dagestan in an attempt to expel all “nonbelievers.” According to Evangelista, “the precipitating cause of the second war was an August 1999 invasion of Dagestan by Chechen and Dagestan fighters, marching under the banner of Islam and unconstrained by the central government in Grozny.”53 The invasion of Dagestan was quickly followed in September by a series of bomb attacks that destroyed several apartment buildings throughout Russia, killing over 300 people and injuring nearly 1,000. Despite the lack of evidence, Russian authorities accused Chechen rebels of orchestrating the deadly attacks.54 This combination of events prompted Russia to respond with military force, thereby sparking the Second Chechen War. To be fair, some historians insist that the actual cause of the war was a far more complex set of interrelated factors; others point out that Russian policy-makers were clearly planning to invade Chechnya long before the invasion of Dagestan or the apartment house bombings.55 On 1 October 1999, Russian troops launched a ground campaign in Chechnya. By the end of the month Russia was conducting nearly 150 air strikes a day.56 In December 1999, Russian forces launched an allout assault on Grozny. The city quickly became the site of fierce urban guerrilla warfare: the Chechen rebels had dug trenches and established sniper positions and were using underground tunnels to navigate the city. But the Russians turned to aerial bombardment instead of engaging in close-quarters combat. By January 2000, the entrenched rebels had been forced to flee Grozny through a field littered with Russian landmines. Their escape was led by rebel leader Shamil Basayev, who lost

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his foot to a landmine. By February 2000, Russia had captured the city, albeit at enormous cost. Indeed, the United Nations later referred to Grozny as the “most destroyed city on Earth.” Major military operations had by and large ceased by the spring of 2000. Russia now restored Chechnya’s government, appointing Akhmad Kadyrov as chief administrator.57 In January 2001, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced a partial withdrawal of military forces. Though small-scale counterterrorism and special operations missions would continue for several more years, most historians agree that the insurgency had largely been neutralized by then. According to Galeotti, “the rebel movement was already a shadow of its former self.”58 On 15 April 2009, the war was officially terminated. The combined wars brought vast devastation to Chechnya. Civilians were slaughtered, and the entire republic was reduced to rubble. Because of Russia’s tight control over the conflict and the restrictions it placed on independent observers, precise figures for civilian casualties vary widely, ranging from 70,000 to 250,000.59 Meanwhile, it is estimated that nearly 300,000 Chechens were displaced by the war.60 But the lasting scars are not limited to Chechens. Russia lost over 10,000 soldiers, but that official figure is often disputed.61 Russian soldiers have also returned home with what many have referred to as “Chechen syndrome,” essentially post-traumatic stress associated with the Chechen Wars. Counterinsurgency Strategy

Russia’s counterinsurgency strategy during the first war was plagued by problems and complications. Russian troops lacked adequate training and strong leadership, and the military establishment was saturated with corruption. “Despite overwhelming superiority in firepower and logistics,” observes Ray Finch, “the untrained, ill-equipped, and poorly led Russian forces proved unable to pacify the determined Chechen insurgency.”62 Military units were often understaffed and compelled to rely on fresh conscripts who lacked military training or experience. Many had not even completed basic training. Faurby and Magnusson write that “the equipment was not maintained, training and exercises not conducted and officers and men not paid on time.”63 Limited financial resources reduced the operational capacity of Russian forces, which could not pursue much-needed upgrades. Low morale among Russian troops also hindered the implementation of counterinsurgency operations. “The Russian army,” finds Williams, “was made up of demoralized conscript troops who often did not believe in their mission, which was

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to crush the independence drive of a small nation. For this reason the Russians tended to be rather casualty-phobic and prone to avoid conflict when possible.”64 Russian leadership was also problematic during the First Chechen War. Military officers clashed over battlefield tactics, and some openly expressed their opposition to the war. Veterans of the Afghanistan War were especially vocal and regarded Chechnya as a failed endeavour. Lajos Szászdi finds that “profound political divisions inside the military are cited as the main causes of the failure of the Russian armed forces.”65 Meanwhile, among the civilian leadership there was a lack of any clear willingness to prosecute the war. An ongoing struggle in terms of civil–military affairs further hindered critical decision-making as different interest groups competed for ascendancy in a post-Soviet era. Political infighting even at the highest levels undermined Russian policy-making. During the initial phases of the conflict, Boris Yeltsin found himself at odds with Mikhail Gorbachev and the Chairman of the Russian Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, over the decision to use military force. According to Matthew Evangelista, the “threatening but indecisive Russian actions” gave the insurgents opportunity to manoeuvre.66 In sum, a weak military and indecisive leadership contributed to counterinsurgency defeat in the First Chechen War. By the time the second war started, however, Russia had learned important lessons from its earlier defeat and made critical adjustments to its overall strategy. First and foremost, Russia made extensive efforts to censor media coverage of the Second Chechen War. “Whereas in 1994–1996 journalists had enjoyed unimpeded access to the soldiers, the front lines, and especially to the Chechen resistance, in 1999–2000 the Russian government implemented a strict system of accreditation and escorts,” observes Olga Oliker.67 Russia maintained a tight grip on both domestic and international news coverage, and journalists were intimidated and sometimes imprisoned. According to Finch, “those reporters or news organizations who dared to circumvent these restrictions were not allowed access, or in some cases, subject to severe forms of repression.”68 Tight media censorship ultimately allowed Moscow to manage the public’s perception of the war. As discussed below, this effort appears to have been quite successful, given the high public approval ratings throughout the conflict. As with the Sri Lankan Civil War, a change in leadership had an enormous impact on the war effort. Even as prime minister, Putin opposed negotiations, to the point that he regarded the Moscow Peace Treaty as “irrelevant.”69 The deadly apartment house bombings would later

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serve as a rallying cry as Putin marshalled support for a full-scale military assault on Chechnya. Throughout the war, and especially in the aftermath of the apartment house bombings, Putin’s popularity soared. Mark Galeotti contends that enormous differences existed in Russia’s strategy and leadership between first and second Chechen wars. “The two wars,” he argues, “stand as stark symbols of the respective unfocused amateurism of the Yeltsin regime and the ruthless determination evident under Putin.”70 But perhaps most notable about Russia’s success was its barbaric counterinsurgency strategy. While the military certainly used indiscriminate force during the first war, there was a much greater reliance upon brutal methods during the second war as a means of avoiding casualties. Indeed, Robert Cassidy remarks that “the Russians relied more on their technological advantages in artillery and bombing . . . to avoid close urban combat since they had suffered huge losses in urban combat between 1994 and 1996.”71 During the siege of Grozny, Russian troops used heavy artillery and air strikes to essentially destroy the capital. Instead of deploying ground troops as they had done during the first war, the Russian military chose to indiscriminately attack Grozny. “There was,” notes Timothy Thomas, “very little concern for collateral damage.”72 Another common tactic was the use of “filtration camps” to weed out insurgents. Russian forces would threaten to bomb a town in order to convince residents to flee, then screen or filter individuals to identify potential insurgents. Individuals who were forced into the camps were often tortured, while those caught fleeing Russian soldiers were shot. “Those Chechens who disappeared into the camps faced humiliation, beating, electrocutions, mock executions, imprisonment in holes, and systematic rape of both men and women,” writes Williams.73 Throughout the conflict, thousands of civilians were detained without due process and later tortured or killed. Russia ignored any semblance of even attempting a population-centric strategy that would address societal needs or protect civilians.74 According to Mark Kramer, Russian forces “engaged in widespread torture, rape, forced disappearances, mass arrest operations, kidnapping, and summary executions.”75 He adds that military officials either condoned or ignored human rights violations. Finch concurs, characterizing Russia’s counterinsurgency strategy as one of “ruthlessness, massive bombardment, a media vacuum, and the employment of local quislings.”76

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Diplomacy and Foreign Aid

Russian leaders had portrayed the first conflict as a campaign to restore order against criminal elements, while the second conflict was framed as part of a global war on terrorism. Moscow was thus able to ensure greater popular support, or at the very least, international sympathy. Putin was quite adroit at linking the Chechen War to the war on terrorism by highlighting the dangers of Islamic extremism. In doing so, he established a bond between Russia and Western states; both, he argued, had suffered at the hands of terrorists. This afforded Russia critical diplomatic cover as it prosecuted a brutal campaign of violence and suppression. Consequently, very few Western governments condemned Russia’s barbaric counterinsurgency strategy. Even Russia’s massive aerial bombardment of Chechnya was difficult to criticize since it bore a degree of similarity to nato ’s bombing campaign in the Balkans. “For the most part,” observes Williams, “the American press seems to have swallowed the Kremlin’s axiomatic statements claiming that Russia was bombing Chechen villages as punishment for ‘Chechen terrorist bombing activities’ against Russian citizens.”77 Had the international community even wanted to sanction Russian brutality more forcefully, it would have encountered significant obstacles, for any resolution at the un Security Council would have been vetoed by Russia and China. This is not to suggest that all international observers refused to condemn Russia, but the efforts most organizations made were marginal or ineffective. For example, in 2002 the un Commission on Human Rights failed to secure enough votes for a resolution that would have denounced Russia’s brutality and established an international commission of inquiry.78 There were also attempts after the wars to formally censure Russian tactics, most notably in the European Court of Human Rights and the European Parliament. These efforts, though, were largely superficial and failed to yield any meaningful change.79 Amnesty International reported that “Russian federal forces were responsible for gross human rights violations against the civilian population of Chechnya.”80 Its report exposed the strict media censorship, substandard prison conditions, extensive use of torture, and killing of civilians through indiscriminate attacks. Human Rights Watch similarly found that Russian security forces responded to the insurgency with the “use of heavy weaponry and frequent large-scale, targeted sweep operations, during which numerous civilians were killed, tortured, ill-treated and ‘disappeared.’”81 These criticisms, however, did little to alter Russia’s barbarism.

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For their part, Chechen rebels did receive support in the form of foreign mercenaries willing to fight Russian troops. According to Oliker, “there is no doubt that foreigners from all over the world came to fight in Chechnya, some for money, some in support of Islamic revolution, and others, particularly those from other former Soviet states, from hatred of Russian rule.”82 For example, Ibn al-Khattab, an Islamic extremist with ties to Osama Bin Laden, helped attract foreign fighters and obtain financial support for the insurgency. The actual number of foreign fighters, however, seems to have been negligible, with most estimates being that they were fewer than 1,000.83 Moreover, external funding from Islamic charity organizations based in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had mostly dried up by the end of the conflict.84 Thus, foreign aid and support for insurgents had little bearing on the conflict. Overall, international support for or involvement in the conflicts appears to have been minimal. Indeed, both sides received very little material support. Some foreign fighters did join the insurgency in an effort to establish a bastion of Islamic extremism, but this does not appear to have been a significant component of the war. Ib Faurby and Märta-Lisa Magnusson go so far as to argue that “there were relatively few mujaheddins in Chechnya.”85 The lack of variation in terms of international involvement – be it sanction or support – provides little explanatory leverage over the outcome of the conflicts. Domestic Opposition

During the First Chechen War, domestic opposition undermined Russia’s war efforts. Yeltsin lacked political support for the war and faced a number of challenges to his authority. For example, in 1995 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation held a hearing about Russia’s use of force in Chechnya and questioned whether such brutality was legal. Also, a number of public surveys indicated that Russian soldiers gave a low approval rating to the government’s handling of the war, with some opinion polls revealing that nearly 70 per cent of the military opposed the use of force in Chechnya.86 Meanwhile, Russian brutality had a galvanizing effect that only unified disparate Chechen rebel groups, bringing them together. According to Cohen, indiscriminate attacks and violations of human rights proved “counterproductive because [they] caused severe civilian casualties and radicalized many of those who remained neutral or even supported remaining a part of Russia.”87 During the second conflict, Russia made a concerted effort to influence public opinion. Government officials pursued a comprehensive

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public relations campaign to ensure widespread support and portray all Chechens as enemies of the state. Williams argues that “the entire Chechen people were in effect tried and convicted in the eyes of Russian popular opinion, and any action against this hated nation, no matter how barbaric, was seen as morally justified.”88 Even in cases of clear brutality the Russian public continued to support the war effort. One of the most controversial incidents involved Russian colonel Yuri Budanov, who kidnapped and murdered a young Chechen girl. Despite overwhelming evidence of his crime and his subsequent conviction in court, Russian public opinion believed Budanov’s actions were justified and regarded the case as an effort to slander the military.89 Propaganda and tight media censorship ultimately helped rally the public and the policy-making elite behind the second war. To be fair, the September apartment house bombings also had an enormous impact in terms of drumming up support for the war effort. “Unlike the previous war,” observes Evangelista, “this one received widespread support from the public, owing to a spate of terrorist bombings in Moscow and other Russian cities that were attributed to Chechens.”90 As a stark reflection of the level of popular support for the Second Chechen War, one Russian newspaper openly called for the “extermination” of Chechnya and even advocated “using strategic air strikes, biological weapons, psychotropic gases, napalm and everything at the disposal of our once powerful army.”91 The absence of domestic opposition allowed Russia to pursue a barbaric counterinsurgency campaign without fear of dissent. Summary

The Chechen War appears to support the primary argument of this study: that incumbents who choose to employ barbarism must be fully committed to the strategy and willing to accept the costs. In other words, they must go “all in” and commit to a barbaric strategy. “The main insight from the Russian example,” finds Zhukov, is that “repression works, but not in moderation.”92 The same case highlights the importance of a strong military and consensus among policy-making elites. Indeed, during the First Chechen War the Russian military was an exceptionally weak institution and Yeltsin lacked political support for the invasion. By contrast, Putin was able to garner a great deal of domestic support and mobilize an effective military force that had made vital improvements since its ignominious defeat in the first war. Additionally, the absence of any serious sanction from the international community amidst the global war on terrorism created a favourable environment for Russia’s

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counterinsurgency campaign. According to Galeotti, “the two Chechen wars demonstrate both the limits of external constraints and the degree to which a still-powerful and above all determined nation can flout foreign opinion if it is willing to pay the price.”93 To be fair, the difference in outcomes between the two Chechen wars can also be attributed to tactical changes and a number of advances in technology.94 Other scholars have attempted to explain the outcomes in terms of the insurgents’ strategy; however, this is untenable given the lack of variation across the two conflicts.95 Also, such an account would have little explanatory power over other wars in this study in which insurgents relied on guerrilla tactics. Meanwhile, some have argued that Russia’s reliance on indiscriminate firepower was a primary reason why it lost the First Chechen War, but this argument similarly offers little explanatory leverage over the Second Chechen War in which the same strategy was employed. Ultimately, a qualitative analysis of the Chechen wars demonstrates that an effective campaign of extreme barbarism must receive the backing of military and policy-making elites. It also underscores the critical role of a strong leader who refuses to equivocate and remains firmly committed to a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. Under these restrictive set of conditions, the gross violation of human rights may precipitate the defeat of an insurgency.

l e s s o n s l e arned The Sri Lankan and Chechen wars reveal that extreme forms of barbarism can be an effective method for defeating an insurgency. “In both of these cases,” observes Lopez, “the government undertook a strategy that incorporated large scale violence, often targeting civilians.”96 The Sri Lankan and Russian governments both rejected a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy and instead used brute force to crush domestic opposition. Both conflicts also resulted in the mass displacement of civilians on an unprecedented scale. Most Western counterinsurgent theorists would argue that indiscriminate violence that results in the displacement of citizens generates animosity and is counterproductive in thwarting an insurgency. But the Sri Lankan and Chechen conflicts suggest that displacement may actually be an effective barbaric tactic. In many respects, this empirical observation is supported by logical reasoning. Individuals displaced by indiscriminate violence must tend to their families and seek shelter away from conflict zones. As a result, they are unable to

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contribute to an ongoing insurgency despite their willingness to do so. The indiscriminate destruction of population centres may in fact prove to be a potent instrument of war – especially amidst insurgencies, during which it is difficult to distinguish between rebel fighter and civilian. But the cases also demonstrate that highly repressive tactics are not sufficient and that additional criteria must be met in order for barbarism to succeed. First and foremost, the incumbent must possess a robust military that has the capacity to carry out a barbaric strategy. As the Sri Lankan and Russian security forces increased their defence expenditures, revised their battlefield tactics, and recruited additional troops, they became far more successful in targeting insurgents. Their success stands in stark contrast to Nepal and Nicaragua, both of which lacked the resources necessary to sustain a viable counterinsurgency campaign. Second, the military must receive the full support of the policy-making elite, which itself must be firmly committed to pursuing a barbaric counterinsurgency strategy. Rajapaksa and Putin both rejected any sort of compromise with the insurgents, and both were steadfast in their decision to violate human rights in order to crush domestic opposition. Indeed, both leaders explicitly rejected moratoriums and ceasefires. The Sri Lankan and Chechen wars overcame the challenges of the sort encountered by Nicaragua and Nepal by refusing to negotiate with insurgents and by rejecting any thought of political liberalization. Another important criterion for a successful counterinsurgency campaign is the absence of any serious threat of sanction or punishment from the international community for the use of barbaric force against civilians. Throughout both wars, except for a few rhetorical statements by Western leaders, there was little concrete action by the international community. Sri Lanka received the backing of major allies, including China and Russia, which provided critical financial and diplomatic support. As for Russia, the Western community was largely sympathetic to its plight and seemed to condone highly repressive measures to combat terrorism. Indeed, Williams finds that Chechen rebels had become “disillusioned with the Western democracies, which refused to enact sanctions against Russia for its widespread war crimes.”97 Finally, both Sri Lanka and Russia imposed tight restrictions on the media. In Sri Lanka, the government often resorted to violence and intimidation to prevent journalists from reporting on the war against the ltte . “With the media effectively censored, critics of the war silenced, the international community both cowed and caught up in the ‘war on terror,’ and the Sinhalese population eager for victory, the government pressed ahead without restraint,” reported the International Crisis

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Group.98 Russian authorities employed equally harsh tactics to censor the media and manufacture popular support for the war effort. The cases presented in this chapter demonstrate that the violent repression of civilians can in fact be an effective counterinsurgency strategy. But the cases also underscore the importance of a robust military that has the full support of the policy-making elite. In both Sri Lanka and Russia, new leadership and a reinvigorated military proved to be instrumental in changing the trajectory of the conflict. Success corresponded to an increase in the lethality and brutality of counterinsurgency operations, along with a refusal to negotiate or deviate from the strategy. In sum, the successful use of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy requires sufficient resources and the unwavering political commitment of elites. Indeed, Zhukov argues that barbarism is most effective when implemented by a strong state in which decision-making power is unconstrained: “repression typically requires political authorization, extensive material resources and joint execution by a multitude of centrally and locally based units and administrative offices.”99 Thus, under certain conditions, bad states can sometimes defeat insurgencies.

Conclusion

I set out to advance and test a new theory of how bad states defeat insurgencies. The existing literature is largely divided, with some scholars maintaining that barbarism is a failed strategy, while others insist that it can sometimes be useful in suppressing domestic dissent. This book was an attempt to help resolve the present debate as to whether the gross violation of human rights can be an effective counterinsurgency strategy. My theory posited that intermediate or moderate levels of political violence against civilians are counterproductive and only generate widespread opposition. Otherwise neutral civilians will be compelled to pick up arms and retaliate against the government. However, extreme forms of brutality may coerce a population into submission and erode the vitality of an insurgency. Widespread indiscriminate violence and political repression increase the odds of a government victory. As a result, bad states may sometimes defeat insurgencies. The theory is premised on two vital conditions: the material means and political will of the state. Security forces must be sufficiently trained and equipped to wage a brutal campaign of violence. Failed or weak states are simply ill-prepared to counter a rebellion. Indeed, this book confirmed the importance of military capabilities through both quantitative and qualitative analysis. In chapter 4, the Composite Index of National Capability (cinc ) score and the number of military personnel were both statistically significant, as was the additional control for an incumbent’s mean gross domestic product (gdp ). The case studies also underscored the need for incumbents to possess the requisite amount of military capacity to conduct counterinsurgency operations. In Nepal, the police were unprepared to tackle a mounting insurgency while the Royal Nepal Army lacked fighting experience and resources. For their part, the Russians were hindered during the First Chechen War by a lack of

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quality recruits and resources. According to Mark Galeotti, the Russian military was “an exhausted fragment of the old Soviet Armed Forces.”1 However, significant improvements in military capacity during the interwar period allowed Russia to defeat the insurgents in the subsequent Second Chechen War. Consequently, the probability of a successful outcome correlates with the incumbent’s possession of material capabilities. In terms of political will, my theory of barbarism demonstrates the need for the decision-making elite to be firmly committed to repression and the violation of human rights. Periods of political liberalization or ceasefires will only allow insurgents to regroup and remobilize. In Nicaragua, Somoza frequently altered his counterinsurgency policy and did not fully commit to a campaign of brutal repression. Meanwhile, in Nepal, periods of political liberalization allowed the relatively obscure rebellion to flourish. In both cases the incumbent failed to defeat the insurgents. In contrast, Sri Lanka was able to eradicate Tamil rebels once Rajapaksa assumed the presidency and committed to a barbaric counterinsurgency strategy. A similar outcome occurred in Russia once Putin came to power and enacted a brutal policy of political repression in order to reclaim the breakaway Chechen republic. Incumbents thus need to be relentless if their campaign of violence is to succeed. Ultimately the empirical record substantiates my theory. High levels of barbarism coupled with a strong military and government resolve increase the probability of a counterinsurgent victory. In contrast, moderate levels of barbarism or the absence of sufficient material strength decrease the probability of a counterinsurgent win. The results of this book provide new insight into the strategies and outcomes of intrastate wars.

f e asib il it y a n d r e l e va ncy of barbari s m This book sought to provide a broad understanding of the various counterinsurgency strategies, with particular emphasis on the efficacy of barbarism. In doing so, it clarified that barbarism should not be strictly associated with mass killings or genocide and, in fact, encompasses a wide range of tactical options available to government forces. But the question remains: is barbarism a feasible strategy for states? Support for the brutal application of force has a long history. Roger Trinquier, a former French officer who served in both Indochina and Algeria, was perhaps one of the few who openly called for the forcible relocation of civilians and, most controversially, was a strong proponent of torture. “The goal of modern warfare,” wrote Trinquier, “is control of the populace, and terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since

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it aims directly at the inhabitant ... It is absolutely essential to make use of all the weapons the enemy employs. Not to do so would be absurd.”2 Even contemporary scholars of counterinsurgency theory have recommended barbarism as a feasible option. Ralph Peters appears to be the most straightforward in advocating the use of brute force as a means of defeating insurgencies: “Military solutions traditionally have been the only effective tools in defeating insurgencies. To be effective, the military must be used with resolve and boldness – but no other model has a history of consistent success.”3 US policy-makers, argues Peters, must accept violence as a historically proven means of suppressing insurgents. Edward Luttwak concurs, pointing out that conventional militaries have long been successful in subduing insurgencies through the use of brute force. “Occupiers can thus be successful without need of any specialized counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing to out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of reprisals outweighs the desire to help the insurgents or their threats.”4 Of course, other scholars object and maintain that it is simply not feasible for Western democracies to pursue barbarism. “The immoral and illegal use of indiscriminate violence would require abandoning the very values Western militaries claim to protect,” argues Colin Kahl, adding that “it would be strategically disastrous.”5 Jan Pierskalla writes that “repression sometimes leads to violent escalation, a radicalization of the population, and spirals of violence that mark the downfall of the current government.”6 Others assert that only non-democratic states are suited for the brutality of insurgent warfare since leaders are not sensitive to casualty costs and have more leeway in repressing dissent. According to Shelton et al., the “evidence suggests that stable autocratic governments are better equipped to deter and prevail in civil conflicts.”7 To be clear, the results of this book reveal that barbarism is only successful at the margins of extreme violence against civilians. Only under very limited conditions will the violation of international law and human rights allow an incumbent to defeat an insurgency. For the most part, barbarism is a flawed strategy that only engenders greater levels of domestic opposition. It is simply not a feasible strategy that states can adopt. But how should the international community respond to those states that choose to violate human rights to suppress dissent? What policy options are available to protect innocent citizens caught in the middle of a violent insurgency? Thus, I conclude by considering the policy implications of these different strategies, with a brief discussion of their associated costs and benefits.

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p o l icy im p l icati ons Western democracies and the international community are intrinsically motivated and compelled to uphold international laws and norms. Indeed, at the un General Assembly’s World Summit in 2005, all member states agreed to the principle of Responsibility to Protect (r2p ) that “each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”8 Under r2p the international community is committed to using diplomatic and peaceful means to protect individuals. Only when absolutely necessary may it use coercive force to protect civilian populations. Generally speaking, the international community has two broad sets of policy options when confronting a barbaric regime: preventive and coercive. Preventive measures usually entail diplomatic and financial incentives that help shift a state away from committing human rights abuses and toward greater degrees of political and economic liberalization. As explained in chapter 2, this is a central component of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. The other policy option entails the use of military force to put an end to political violence and ensure the protection of non-combatant civilians.9 Preventive Policies

It should be acknowledged that some of the major findings of this book are consistent with the premise of the population-centric model that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive. In particular, most intermediate forms of barbarism lower the probability that an incumbent will defeat an insurgency. This does not necessarily mean, however, that a population-centric approach to countering an insurgency is more effective or should even be pursued. As stressed throughout this book, the population-centric strategy is laden with several conceptual flaws and devoid of empirical support. On the other hand, several principles of the population-centric approach may still possess a great deal of relevance when confronting oppressive regimes that employ barbarism to counter a domestic rebellion. The fundamental assumption is that movements away from extreme levels of barbarism will not only reduce the level of human rights abuses, but also help an incumbent government accommodate political grievances in a manner that is consistent with international laws and norms. Thus, in this section I briefly discuss two preventive policy options: democracy promotion and economic development.

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democracy promotion and human rights Policy-makers reading this book may conclude that democracy promotion will help veer a state toward lower levels of barbarism; this would not only reduce the extent of human rights abuses but also reduce the propensity for a domestic rebellion in the first place. There are a variety of methods by which this may be achieved. Diane Ethier, for example, distinguishes between three distinct methods of democracy promotion: control, conditionality, and incentives. Control is the forceful imposition of democratic institutions as pursued after the Second World War in Germany and Japan, and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Conditionality requires that a state undertake specific reforms before receiving foreign aid – the typical approach for states seeking membership in the European Union. Finally, incentives refer to foreign aid that is bestowed upon a recipient in order to encourage a democratic transition without any preconditions.10 But democracy promotion is extremely controversial and hotly debated among both scholars and policy-makers. Democracy promotion reached a peak in the 1990s and has since been subjected to intense scrutiny. The post-9/11 effort to liberalize Afghanistan and Iraq, and the failure to capitalize on the Arab Spring, have cast serious doubt on the utility of such programs. Even more striking is the recent trend in the number of states that are moving away from democracy.11 Meanwhile, those who argue that the war on terrorism somehow requires the promotion of democracy fail to consider how such proclamations will be received by those outside the Western community. Especially in the Muslim world, democratization is interpreted by many as the forceful replacement of sacred traditions and values. According to Doh Chull Shin, history makes it clear that outsiders should not attempt to impose their preferred ideas and practices directly upon a foreign land. Its cultural values and socioeconomic way of life may be more incompatible than compatible with many of the principles and practices underlying the American and other models. Moreover, such attempts will be construed as outside intervention in the democratic reform process. Reforms insisted on directly by outsiders will be discredited and are more likely to provoke resentment than admiration.12 Empirical studies have consistently demonstrated that democracy promotion simply does not work. In his influential study, Thomas Carothers famously concluded that “democracy aid generally does

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not have major effects on the political direction of recipient countries. The effects of democracy programs are usually modestly positive, sometimes negligible, and occasionally negative.”13 It is also unclear whether Western standards of democracy are sustainable or even suitable templates for other nations. Indigenous cultures and context must be incorporated into any program. Peter Burnell concurs, insisting that “democratisation is not something that can be done to a people or for a society. And so outside special circumstances, attempts to impose democracy from outside might be doomed to fail.”14 The results ultimately cast serious doubt on the efficacy of democracy promotion as a foreign policy strategy. “Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars and countless hours of effort,” concludes Gideon Rose, “most of the various democracy promotion efforts had little to show for themselves.”15 Those who study democracy promotion specifically in the context of foreign interventions in civil wars have also reached a negative assessment. Some scholars have flatly concluded that military interventions intended to instil democracy are ineffective and even counterproductive. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs assert that “intervention does little to promote democracy and often leads to its erosion and the substitution of largely symbolic reforms.”16 Scholars have even found that the process of democratization may lead to greater levels of conflict.17 On the other hand, some have reached a more nuanced appraisal that successful interventions into foreign counterinsurgency campaigns are context-dependent. While an intervener may insist that its host-nation partner implement specific reforms, it is unlikely, conclude Watts et al., “that conditionality can be used to press for more fundamental transformations.”18 In other words, interveners should manage their own expectations as to what is feasible when formulating counterinsurgency policies. Although a wholesale democratic transformation may be a desirable goal for Western interveners, it may not be attainable, and they should instead temper their objectives to entail more modest reforms that allow for some degree of participation by opposition groups. Indeed, in some cases the counterinsurgent must simultaneously address the grievances of opposition forces. To be fair, even the staunchest critics of democratic aid programs admit that efforts to achieve political liberalization should not be abandoned.19 Although Stephen Knack found little evidence that foreign aid contributes to democratization, he insists that the “results do not necessarily suggest that funding for democracy promotion should be curtailed.”20

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Meanwhile, contrary to the skeptics, other scholars have found some evidence that democracy assistance programs may still have a positive impact. For example, Steven Finkel and colleagues examined the impact of United States Agency for International Development (usaid ) programs between 1990 and 2003 and found that they have a positive yet moderate impact in terms of boosting a recipient’s democracy rating.21 foreign aid and economic development Another preventive policy is the provision of economic aid, which has been closely intertwined with democracy promotion. In many respects, they share important preconditions such as transparency and good governance. But as Steven Finkel et al. explain, democracy promotion is distinct from economic development: “democracy programs seek to empower key domestic agents in order to foster democratic changes in the recipient country, in contrast to other forms of development assistance that attempt to promote the transformation of social, economic, or structural forces in ways that eventually may support the establishment and survival of democracy.”22 There is some evidence that foreign aid and economic development programs may facilitate a state’s transition toward democracy. Craig Burnside and David Dollar, for example, found that under very specific conditions economic aid increases a recipient’s growth rate. “Foreign aid,” they concluded, “can have an important impact on a poor country.”23 David Epstein et al. have also found that “higher incomes per capita significantly increased the likelihood of democratic regimes, both by enhancing the consolidation of existing democracies and by promoting transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems.”24 Meanwhile, economic development is widely viewed as a major component of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. According to the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual, “economic inequalities can nurture revolutionary unrest” and therefore necessitate the provision of economic opportunities and essential services.25 However, as reflected in the literature on democracy promotion, the effect of foreign aid is contentious. In an oft-cited rejoinder to Burnside and Dollar’s study, William Easterly et al. counter that aid does not necessarily promote growth and suggest that “economists and policymakers should be less sanguine about concluding that foreign aid will boost growth in countries with good policies.”26 Peter Boone reached a similar conclusion, finding that foreign aid has no significant impact in terms of reducing poverty or increasing life expectancy. “Aid does not promote

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economic development,” argued Boone, who concluded that “the bulk of long-term aid programs have had little impact on human development and investment.”27 Even scholars who study insurgencies have reached a pessimistic verdict regarding the effect of foreign aid and development assistance. “Historically the success or failure of insurgency has not borne a simple relationship to the degree of poverty,” concluded Leites and Wolf.28 More recently, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reported that the “U.S. government was neither prepared for nor able to respond to the ever-changing demands of the contingency relief and reconstruction mission it faced in Iraq.”29 The Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction similarly concluded that the United States “greatly overestimated its ability to build and reform government institutions in Afghanistan” and that “the large sums of stabilization dollars the United States devoted to Afghanistan in search of quick gains often exacerbated conflicts, enabled corruption, and bolstered support for insurgents.”30 Both reports offered a brutally honest self-assessment of the United States’ inability to fulfill a key component of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. More critically, this suggests that preventive policies intended to alleviate poverty and develop a state’s economy as an indirect means of reducing the propensity of an insurgency often do not work well. That said, more recent research has found a positive association between foreign aid and growth, albeit only when certain conditions are present. Channing Arndt and colleagues attempt to improve upon previous studies by employing more advanced statistical techniques. “Aid has been and remains an important tool for enhancing the development prospects of poor nations,” they conclude.31 Michael Clemens et al. similarly find that “the data reveal that over the last three decades, substantial increases in aid receipts were followed on average by small increases in investment and growth.”32 But nearly all these scholars also caution that the positive statistical relationship does not necessarily mean that aid is effective and that other critical factors – most notably government institutions – exert a great deal of influence in determining growth rates. Indeed, some attribute the ongoing debate to a failure to distinguish between humanitarian and development aid, short- and long-term objectives, and the critical yet subtle distinction between outputs and outcomes. “The problem is that aid is only one of many factors or inputs which influence development outcomes,” observes Roger Riddell, adding that “aid may well influence growth rates and development, but so too do a host of other factors.”33

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authoritarian backsliding Despite notable drawbacks, preventive policies that promote democracy and facilitate economic development may still be a worthwhile endeavour in light of authoritarian backsliding. Indeed, one of the most significant implications of this book is that states can backslide into authoritarianism rather than pursue political reforms that address the underlying grievances of opposition groups. Since moderate levels of repression are counterproductive, leaders may conclude that they should be more brutal in cracking down on dissent. In other words, states that reside at mid-levels of brutality may shift toward the right and pursue more extreme forms of repression. Such an outcome would likely be the result of rational self-interested preservation: elites may be reluctant to relinquish their privileged position and realize that lower levels of brutality are less likely to crush insurgents. This was arguably the case in Nepal, where the government declined to address the Maoists’ demands and instead implemented a brutal counterinsurgency strategy. King Gynanedra pushed the Nepalese state toward authoritarianism in an attempt to defeat the Maoist rebels.34 At no point was the monarchy serious about engaging rebels or addressing the socio-economic grievances that fuelled the insurgency. The case studies on Sri Lanka and Russia also contain important implications for contemporary counterinsurgency warfighting. States may conclude that brutality pays and that population-centric strategies – such as those pursued in Iraq and Afghanistan – are ineffectual. As a result, states may become more inclined to rely on barbarism to address future domestic rebellions. This trend appears to already be occurring. According to the International Crisis Group, “now a number of other countries are considering ‘the Sri Lankan option’ – unrestrained military action, refusal to negotiate, disregard for humanitarian issues – as a way to deal with insurgencies and other violent groups.”35 The aggressive means by which Sri Lanka defeated insurgents may have grave repercussions for the future of counterinsurgency warfare. “In modern warfare,” argue Beehner et al., “it is difficult for countries to win a counterinsurgency if they follow international norms.”36 Modern states may well internalize this lesson, potentially leading to future instances in which incumbents violate human rights in an effort to suppress domestic opposition. To be sure, backsliding toward greater levels of brutality is an attractive option for autocratic governments. As Andrea Lopez points out, “it offers the opportunity for a relatively rapid and low cost victory, particularly when compared to the slow, often nonlinear, process of building legitimacy.”37

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On the other hand, if my theory is correct and only extreme forms of repression succeed, then the international community faces what I refer to as the “paradox of barbarism.” Policies intended to dissuade authoritarian regimes from barbaric practices are likely to precipitate an incumbent’s defeat if it moves toward more moderate forms of repression. Thus, an inadvertent by-product of efforts to protect human rights may be state collapse or regime failure. As a result, the international community may become culpable of provoking greater levels of domestic violence or even extending the duration of a civil war.38 Coercive Policies 

The alternative policy option that Western states and the international community could pursue in confronting a barbaric regime is the use of military force. States could intervene to physically stop a repressive regime from violating the human rights of its citizens. Doing so would not only fulfill the international community’s commitment to r2p but also serve to uphold international law and protect universal principles of human rights. Beyond simply protecting innocent civilians, an outside force may also want to intervene to actively support an insurgency. Interventions on behalf of rebels can sometimes precipitate an insurgent win or force a barbaric regime to negotiate a settlement. As briefly mentioned in chapter 3, some studies have found that interventions on behalf of a rebel group increase the probability that it will defeat an incumbent. “There is evidence,” claim Shelton et al., “that third-party involvement influences conflict outcomes.”39 The results of this book, however, did not reveal any correlation between external interventions and war outcomes. Unfortunately, humanitarian interventions in civil wars are plagued by their own unique challenges and drawbacks. The first and perhaps most immediate challenge is deciding whether an intrastate conflict warrants military intervention. The international community would need to carefully evaluate whether a situation justifies the application of military force. However, as Watts et al. point out, local and even regional conflicts are “seldom substantial enough to warrant large-scale interventions.”40 Other experts studying US foreign policy have argued that humanitarian interventions do not meet the threshold of vital interests and often entail unique challenges that make success difficult to achieve. “The claim that vital U.S. interests are at stake in numerous asymmetric wars does not hold up,” declares Michael Mazarr.41 Daniel Byman and

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Matthew Waxman agree, noting that “in most humanitarian operations, the United States and its allies have few if any vital or important geopolitical interests at stake.”42 An additional consideration involves deciding which side to support in an intrastate war. Monica Toft points out that it is often hard to decide which combatant should be supported since “most parties to a civil war have both legitimate and illegitimate grievances and motivations.”43 This was certainly true in all the cases examined in this book, in which all parties – both rebels and incumbents – violated laws of warfare. The question remains: can coercive policies prevent a regime from using political violence against civilians, effectively end a civil war, or even achieve broad foreign policy objectives? Most experts seem to agree that military interventions have a poor track record of success. “Most military interventions since the end of the Cold War,” observes Toft, “have gone badly.”44 Moreover, Carothers stresses that military interventions do not guarantee that a democracy will flourish. He finds that “interventions only sometimes get rid of the dictators they are directed against. Even when a full-scale invasion is mounted to ensure that the strongman is ousted, the underlying political pathologies are difficult to heal.”45 As discussed throughout this book, the timing of an intervention and the subsequent duration of conflict have also been hypothesized by scholars as having enormous implications for war outcomes. DeRouen and Sobek argue that the “chances for government victory plummet if quick victory is not achieved.”46 From a balance of power perspective, insurgencies are weakest during the initial period of conflict, which is therefore the most opportune time for counterinsurgents to quash a rebellion. “At the beginning of the conflict,” asserts Navin Bapat, “governments have their best opportunity to achieve total victory.”47 Meanwhile, David Edelstein has examined the conundrum that military occupations following an intervention require a significant amount of time to achieve success, yet simultaneously face the paradox that occupations of longer duration are more likely to encounter impediments to success. According to Edelstein, “the costs of occupation grow, and the citizens of the occupied territory become increasingly resentful of the presence of the occupying power. Simultaneously, the occupied territory becomes dependent on the occupying power, and the occupying power becomes economically and politically entrenched in the occupied territory, making it more difficult for the power to consider withdrawal.”48 The challenges of a successful military intervention and occupation are

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believed to be insurmountable and entail unacceptable costs. Not surprisingly, Edelstein concludes that external powers should avoid military occupations. This perspective also reflects the widespread assumption that insurgencies of longer duration are less likely to result in a counterinsurgent victory. Other scholars counter that a successful outcome actually requires a significant amount of time. David Kilcullen, for example, stresses that counterinsurgency operations and third-party military interventions are major commitments that often take decades to yield any meaningful progress.49 Watts et al. have similarly advised policy-makers to assume that interventions will be a long-term commitment and that “durable improvements in state capacity typically require decades.”50 Meanwhile, research has shown that foreign interventions entailing populationcentric strategies are only effective over long periods of time. According to Enterline et al., the nature of the population-centric approach “is one requiring relatively more time to implement successfully, as foreign powers vie for the allegiance of local populations, deter future insurgents, and demonstrate the benefits of supporting the central authority.”51 Consequently, policy-makers face enormous challenges in deciding whether direct military intervention is a sagacious approach to protecting human rights. Alternative Policies? 

The above discussion on preventive and coercive policies underscores the complexity of intrastate conflicts and the challenges the international community faces when attempting to protect human rights. Such policies have significant advantages and disadvantages, and it is unclear whether any of them will achieve the desired effect. That said, there are a number of alternative approaches that policy-makers may also pursue. The case studies presented in this book suggest that the international community may still influence a barbaric regime by withholding financial support. For example, the United States’ decision to withhold foreign aid clearly restricted Somoza’s ability to pursue barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy in Nicaragua. Withholding foreign aid, however, may also compel an incumbent to turn to alternative benefactors who are less concerned about human rights abuses. As a result, denying foreign aid may actually cause an incumbent to engage in greater levels of barbarism, not less. Indeed, Beehner et al. speculate

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that withholding foreign aid may have the perverse effect of allowing “foreign militaries to act with greater impunity” and “to prosecute the war without regard for human rights.”52 This was arguably the case in Sri Lanka: the government turned to non-Western states for support, specifically Russia and China, which not only provided military and financial assistance but also shielded the Sri Lankan government from international condemnation. Alternatively, the international community could pursue “naming and shaming,” a common tactic that involves highlighting violations of human rights in order to pressure governments to adhere to international laws and norms. The cases presented in this book provide some evidence that such a tactic may be useful in altering the behaviour of brutal regimes. In Nicaragua, for example, Somoza’s regime was effectively marginalized by the international community, and this partly compelled him to curtail human rights abuses. Non-governmental organizations similarly played an important role in highlighting human rights abuses in Nepal. That said, recent studies on naming and shaming have reached mixed results regarding its effectiveness. For example, Emilie Hafner-Burton has found that while governments do sometimes expand political rights in response to international criticism, those same governments may also continue using political violence against civilians. She observes that “governments put in the global spotlight for violations often adopt better protections for political rights afterward, but they rarely stop or appear to lessen acts of terror.”53 For their part, Amanda Murdie and David Davis argue that naming and shaming can be effective in compelling a state to improve its human rights practices, but this is conditional on the presence of other factors such as the involvement of third-party states.54 Jacqueline DeMeritt is perhaps the most optimistic, in that she has found empirical evidence that naming and shaming by international organizations can reduce the likelihood of a barbaric regime killing civilians.55 Overall, these studies indicate that naming and shaming may be a worthwhile approach to reducing a regime’s use of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. They also signify that non-governmental organizations may play a constructive role in reducing levels of political violence in a state. Beyond mere public opprobrium of naming and shaming, the international community could also undertake legal action through international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court (icc). The icc is largely a descendant of ad hoc criminal tribunals such as the

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Nuremberg trials after the Second World War, as well as the tribunals in the aftermath of the Yugoslav Wars (icty) and the Rwandan genocide (ictr ).56 The icc entered into force in July 2002 following the adoption of the Rome Statute. Its jurisdiction is limited to four specific crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.57 Since its inception, however, the icc has been the subject of a great deal of criticism regarding its role as an impartial prosecutor and defender of human rights. Many of the cases it pursues are premised on the availability of evidence and the feasibility of an investigation. As a result, it does not take into account a large number of potential crimes and reported accusations. Critics also point out that the icc has focused largely on Africa; however, such condemnation may be short-sighted given that the court has conducted investigations in other regions as well. Apropos of intrastate conflicts, many observers find little evidence that the icc or international criminal prosecution can dissuade combatants or political leaders from carrying out barbaric acts against civilians. According to Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “trials do little to deter further violence and are not highly correlated with the consolidation of peaceful democracy.”58 They instead argue that alternative strategies such as amnesties may be more effective in curbing human rights abuses so long as permissive institutional and political preconditions exist. Similarly, James Meernik and colleagues find that “neither international tribunals nor domestic human rights trials appear to exercise a significant impact on peace or human rights.”59 In short, limited resources, reliance on state cooperation, and the inability to impose severe punishment all serve to undermine the efficacy of the icc . So it is not surprising that experts have concluded it would be “wishful thinking” to believe the icc can save lives.60 However, other scholars insist that criminal tribunals and the icc may still have a deterrent effect on human rights abuses. Catherine Gegout hypothesizes that “the work of the icc could create a long-term deterrent effect, that is, potential criminals could fear the consequences of their acts, especially once they are no longer in positions of power.”61 For their part, Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim find that “countries that have prosecuted human rights violations have better human rights practices than do countries that have not.”62 Their analysis even suggests the presence of a transnational deterrent effect that may impact the decision-making calculus of other state leaders. In a more recent study, Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons find that the icc does indeed deter

Conclusion

143

humanitarian atrocities, though the effect is conditional.63 Benjamin Appel is more sanguine, finding “systematic evidence that the Court can deter leaders from committing atrocities” by imposing costs such as imprisonment.64 While his study provides fairly convincing evidence that the icc may be effective in curbing human rights abuses, he does concede that the behaviour of non-ratifiers remains unchanged. To be fair, most proponents of the icc do indeed acknowledge its limitations and the various challenges it faces in advancing international justice. Other scholars argue that a more accurate conceptualization of international justice is one of trade-offs: the court may deter atrocities, but it may also prolong conflict if the combatant fears prosecution should it lose, or accede to a peace treaty.65 Finally, Western states may simply choose to “do nothing” despite a regime’s brutal use of force to suppress dissent. Although perhaps controversial, the policy decision to forgo any meaningful action has its adherents. Indeed, Kaufmann believes that “unless the international community can agree on a clear aggressor and a clear victim, there is no moral or political case for intervention. If both sides have behaved so badly that there is little to choose between them, intervention should not and probably will not be undertaken.”66 Meanwhile, others are skeptical whether external intervention is warranted – even in light of gross violations of human rights. Instead, the international community should essentially stand by and allow combatants to “fight it out” until one side emerges victorious. The belief is that decisive victory is far more stable and may save more lives. Indeed, Beehner et al. point out that existing research on intrastate conflicts suggests that decisive military outcomes are more durable than negotiated settlements.67 Toft also challenges the widespread assumption that intervening to stop a civil war will end human suffering and loss of life. In the absence of external intervention, intrastate wars may sometimes end more quickly through outright military victory and the subsequent peace may then last longer, potentially saving more lives.68 Policy-makers thus face the unenviable and difficult task of deciding how best to respond to a barbaric regime that violates human rights. The preceding discussion highlighted an array of potential policy options, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Decisionmakers will need to carefully balance the strategic objectives of their respective entities with the idiosyncratic conditions on the ground in a particular intrastate conflict. Any decision, however, will undoubtedly be fraught with controversy.

144

When Bad States Win

f u t u r e r e s e arch Before closing, it is important to stress that this book represents what I believe to be the first serious attempt to formulate a theory of barbarism. As such, there is much room for additional research to refine our collective understanding of how political violence can be used to counter an insurgency. For example, throughout this book I have argued that the concept of barbarism must be expanded to include a broad array of tactics and not simply be limited to genocide. So the next step for future research should be a microanalysis of these different tactics to determine whether unique combinations have a greater impact on outcomes. It may be that imprisonment without due process combined with significant restrictions on freedoms of expression may be more effective at suppressing an insurgency than indiscriminate killings. Alternatively, physical torture and rape as a weapon of war may be sufficient to dissuade a civilian population from supporting a rebellion. Unpacking my conceptualization of barbarism and studying its distinct elements is a worthwhile endeavour. Another valuable avenue for future research would be to explore the intersection between enemy-centric and barbaric approaches to countering an insurgency. For example, this book found tentative evidence that the mass displacement of civilians may be an effective tactic in defeating domestic opposition. Forceful displacement imposes significant costs upon a civilian population sufficient to dissuade them from supporting a rebellion; it also deprives an insurgent organization access to quality recruits and personnel capable and willing to fight government forces. Indeed, the deliberate displacement of civilians was a salient feature in both the Sri Lankan and Chechen wars. Interestingly, with regard to ethnic-based conflicts, some scholars suggest that international military interventions that segregate populations into defensible enclaves is the best way to ensure a durable peace. Chaim Kaufmann argues that “ethnic separation does not guarantee peace, but it allows it. Once populations are separated, both cleansing and rescue imperatives disappear; war is no longer mandatory.”69 Finally, future scholarship should also study the longevity of success. In other words, do extreme forms of barbarism lead to durable and lasting government victories? A pivotal measure of the efficacy of barbarism is whether it can prevent the re-emergence of domestic opposition and result in sustainable governance after hostilities end. Short-term military victories are certainly desirable for an incumbent seeking to retain power, but stability is often elusive and it can be costly for a regime to

Conclusion

145

perpetually repress citizens. Additional research on the sustainability of barbarism is therefore needed to better understand the lasting impact and ramification of violating human rights within an intrastate conflict. I hope this book will stimulate future research on barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy. There is much room for new studies that employ a variety of methodological approaches. To be sure, I believe it is vitally important that we better understand barbarism given the frequency of intrastate conflicts and the possibility that future regimes will be more likely to violate human rights in order to suppress dissent.

f in a l t h oughts The sixteenth-century political theorist, Niccolò Machiavelli, famously declared that it is better “to be feared than loved.”70 His prophetic words appear to hold true today for brutal regimes facing a domestic rebellion. As this book has demonstrated, only the most extreme forms of political repression can quash an insurgency. Periods of liberalization or moderation are counterproductive and allow insurgents time to regroup and marshal opposition forces to challenge an incumbent government. The study of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy is therefore essential to better understand intrastate war outcomes and uphold international norms. It also helps fill a salient lacuna in the existing literature, which has thus far been focused primarily on population-centric approaches that emphasize socio-economic development. Indeed, according to Shelton et al., “the gaps in our knowledge about the relationship between coin strategies and civil war outcomes are perhaps the most serious and immediate challenge facing the current civil war outcomes literature.”71 This book has been a modest attempt to answer their call and provide some insight into how the gross violation of human rights may affect war outcomes. Above all, the study of barbarism and intrastate wars is critical for understanding contemporary trends in international security. Civil wars are the most common and deadly form of conflict today and will likely continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the international community has seen an increasing trend away from democracy in what has been referred to as a “democratic recession.”72 It is possible that fewer states will be willing to adhere to international norms and respect human rights. Unfortunately, we are least knowledgeable about the strategies used by states that are most likely to encounter a rebellion. Ultimately, I anticipate that this book may give readers cause for both concern and optimism. On the one hand, the results of my study suggest

146

When Bad States Win

that extreme forms of political repression may increase the odds of an incumbent defeating an insurgency. There is the added concern that the number of bad states relying on such repressive measures may increase in the near future given recent transitions away from democracy. On the other hand, this book demonstrated that barbarism and the violation of human rights is largely a failed counterinsurgency strategy. Those who rely on draconian measures are destined for defeat, and a variety of policy options are available that Western states and non-governmental organizations may pursue in order to uphold human rights. I hope this book serves to motivate the international community to ensure the protection of civilians caught in the middle of an internal war.

Appendix A

Table A.1 | Multiple imputation by chained equations (mice )

Barbarism Barbarism2 Duration Month Polity2 lncinc Post Cold War ethfrac

Model 19

Model 20

Model 21

Model 22

0.186**

0.217**

0.207**

0.153**

(0.133)

(0.152)

(0.152)

(0.131)

1.278**

1.247**

1.243**

1.319**

(0.130)

(0.122)

(0.129)

(0.159)

0.989*

0.987**

0.985**

0.989*

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.005)

0.991

0.998

0.977

0.985

(0.031)

(0.032)

(0.032)

(0.034)

1.455***

1.381***

1.328**

1.437***

(0.178)

(0.162)

(0.153)

(0.182)

0.455

0.453**

0.46**

0.473*

(0.180)

(0.177)

(0.174)

(0.198)

1.382

1.368

1.265

1.309

(0.902)

(0.867)

(0.799)

(0.891)

Sanctions Imposed

0.246***

0.239***

Rebel Support

0.599

0.591

(0.310)

(0.292)

(0.117)

Military Intervention Rebel

(0.111) 0.649 (0.378)

0.974

0.935

(0.433)

(0.435)

Sanctions Threatened

0.48* (0.206)

Incumbent Support Military Intervention Incumbent

0.665

0.688

(0.417)

(0.431)

1.186 (0.605)

Observations

188

188

188

188

Imputations

20

20

20

20

Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table A.2 | Irregular dichotomous Model 23

Model 24

Model 25

Model 26

0.003**

0.001**

0.001*

0.004**

(0.009)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.011)

1.991**

2.308**

2.194*

1.939*

(0.680)

(0.965)

(1.020)

(0.667)

0.987

0.997

0.988

0.985

(0.012)

(0.008)

(0.016)

(0.019)

Polity2

0.859

0.901

0.886

0.852

(0.082)

(0.078)

(0.077)

(0.093)

lncinc

2.507***

3.838***

2.720***

2.657***

(0.731)

(1.463)

(0.961)

(0.991)

0.163

0.167*

0.202

0.137*

(0.197)

(0.169)

(0.201)

(0.157)

0.025*

0.023

0.044*

0.019**

(0.051)

(0.054)

(0.072)

(0.036)

Barbarism Barbarism2 Duration Month

Post Cold War ethfrac Sanctions Imposed

0.738

0.978

Rebel Support

0.224

0.242

0.231

(0.256)

(0.265)

(0.233)

(0.825)

Military Intervention Rebel irregular

(0.925)

4.428

4.019

(5.652)

(4.399)

0.669

1.292

1.031

0.905

(0.992)

(1.970)

(1.378)

(1.615)

0.486

0.438

(0.644)

(0.483)

2.878

3.339

(4.986)

(6.822)

Sanctions Threatened

0.063* (0.103)

Incumbent Support Military Intervention Incumbent

Observations

45

45

45

45

Pseudo R2

0.376

0.416

0.353

0.393

AIC

62.230

57.775

61.644

65.194

Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table A.3 | Irregular interactive

Barbarism Barbarism2 Duration Month Polity2 lncinc Post Cold War ethfrac

Model 27

Model 28

Model 29

Model 30

0.004

0.001*

0.001

0.005

(0.013)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.016)

2.131*

2.341*

2.404

2.102**

(0.863)

(1.095)

(1.373)

(0.778)

0.991

0.998

0.990

0.990

(0.012)

(0.008)

(0.016)

(0.019)

0.862

0.901

0.891

0.849

(0.092)

(0.081)

(0.086)

(0.101)

2.663***

3.686***

2.813***

2.830***

(0.851)

(1.395)

(0.997)

(1.083)

0.105*

0.137*

0.168

0.078**

(0.131)

(0.159)

(0.193)

(0.097)

0.014

0.022

0.032*

0.008

(0.038)

(0.052)

(0.059)

(0.025)

Sanctions Imposed

0.696

0.887

Rebel Support

0.128*

0.205

(0.151)

(0.232)

(0.791)

Military Intervention Rebel irregular • Barbarism2

(0.931) 0.116* (0.134)

3.921

3.725

(5.398)

(4.338)

0.855

0.930

0.928

0.830

(0.142)

(0.144)

(0.148)

(0.173)

0.457

0.338

(0.616)

(0.371)

2.708

3.234

(4.682)

(5.680)

Sanctions Threatened

0.093 (0.150)

Incumbent Support Military Intervention Incumbent

Observations Pseudo R2

45

45

45

45

0.394

0.420

0.358

0.413

AIC

63.116

59.566

63.320

65.954

Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table A.4 | Duration 2 days or more

Barbarism Barbarism2 Duration Month Polity2 lncinc Post Cold War ethfrac

Model 31

Model 32

Model 33

Model 34

0.023**

0.020**

0.023**

0.032**

(0.039)

(0.033)

(0.043)

(0.053)

1.595**

1.645**

1.565*

1.520**

(0.348)

(0.354)

(0.371)

(0.320)

0.993

0.997

0.992

0.991

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.009)

0.937

0.946

0.944

0.946

(0.055)

(0.062)

(0.059)

(0.057)

1.630**

1.917**

1.866**

1.699**

(0.375)

(0.495)

(0.463)

(0.422)

0.213

0.223*

0.239*

0.169*

(0.205)

(0.190)

(0.186)

(0.180)

0.116*

0.104*

0.110**

0.113*

(0.137)

(0.130)

(0.123)

(0.132)

Sanctions Imposed

1.246

1.457

Rebel Support

0.313

0.300

(0.292)

(0.246)

(1.004)

Military Intervention Rebel

(1.154) 0.284 (0.265)

1.792

1.683

(1.866)

(1.726)

Sanctions Threatened

0.386 (0.335)

Incumbent Support Military Intervention Incumbent

0.933

1.117

(0.691)

(0.773)

1.281

1.620

(1.008)

(1.337)

Observations Pseudo R2

60

60

60

60

0.286

0.295

0.261

0.291

AIC

80.184

77.486

80.269

83.790

Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table A.5 | Duration 3 days or more

Barbarism Barbarism2 Duration Month Polity2 lncinc Post Cold War ethfrac Sanctions Imposed Rebel Support Military Intervention Rebel

Model 35

Model 36

Model 37

Model 38

0.029**

0.024**

0.024*

0.035**

(0.050)

(0.041)

(0.046)

(0.059)

1.543**

1.598**

1.550*

1.498*

(0.335)

(0.343)

(0.367)

(0.315)

0.992

0.997

0.992

0.992

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.009)

0.933

0.942

0.939

0.939

(0.054)

(0.061)

(0.059)

(0.057)

1.549*

1.830**

1.787**

1.593*

(0.353)

(0.464)

(0.448)

(0.402)

0.196*

0.208*

0.239*

0.166*

(0.188)

(0.176)

(0.182)

(0.173)

0.159

0.139

0.136*

0.155

(0.188)

(0.176)

(0.153)

(0.180)

1.321

1.497

(1.072)

(1.187)

0.284

0.271

(0.264)

(0.223)

0.269 (0.250)

1.793

1.660

(1.850) Sanctions Threatened

(1.689) 0.389 (0.332)

Incumbent Support Military Intervention Incumbent

0.841

0.972

(0.636)

(0.693)

1.206

1.516

(0.937)

(1.241)

Observations Pseudo R2

59

59

59

59

0.291

0.299

0.260

0.294

AIC

79.019

76.381

79.495

82.782

Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Appendix B

The following list of intrastate conflicts comprises the dataset used for all statistical analysis conducted in chapter 4. All conflicts have been obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (ucdp ) Conflict Termination dataset.1 Readers should also reference the Advanced Conflict Data Catalogue (acdc ) for detailed bibliographical references on all conflicts contained within the dataset.

Table B.1 | Cases for statistical analysis Start year

End year

Location

1946

1946

Iran

1946

1946

Bolivia

1946

1946

Iran

1947

1947

Madagascar (Malagasy)

1947

1947

China

1947

1947

Paraguay

1948

1948

Costa Rica

1948

1948

Yemen (North Yemen)

1946

1949

China

1946

1949

Greece

1949

1949

Guatemala

1946

1949

Indonesia

1950

1950

United States of America

1950

1950

Indonesia

1949

1950

Myanmar (Burma)

1950

1950

China

1951

1951

Thailand

1952

1952

Bolivia

1946

1953

Cambodia (Kampuchea)

1953

1953

Cuba

1946

1953

Laos

1946

1954

Philippines

1946

1954

Vietnam (North Vietnam)

1954

1954

Guatemala

1954

1954

Paraguay

1955

1955

Argentina

1952

1956

Kenya

1953

1956

Morocco

1957

1957

Oman

1956

1958

Cuba

1957

1958

Mauritania

1958

1958

Lebanon

1957

1958

Morocco

Start year

End year

Location

1955

1959

Cyprus

1959

1959

China

1959

1959

Iraq

1960

1960

Ethiopia

1958

1960

Malaysia

1959

1961

Laos

1961

1961

Cuba

1948

1961

Myanmar (Burma)

1961

1962

dr Congo (Zaire)

1961

1962

France

1962

1962

Venezuela Brunei

1962

1962

1960

1962

dr Congo (Zaire)

1954

1962

Algeria

1963

1963

Argentina

1963

1963

Iraq

1964

1964

Gabon Ethiopia

1964

1964

1964

1965

dr Congo (Zaire)

1965

1965

Burundi

1965

1965

Peru

1966

1966

Nigeria

1966

1966

Ghana

1966

1966

Syria

1964

1967

South Yemen

1967

1967

dr Congo (Zaire)

1967

1967

Bolivia

1961

1970

Iraq

1967

1970

Nigeria

1962

1970

Yemen (North Yemen)

1971

1971

Sri Lanka

1971

1971

Sudan

1971

1971

Pakistan

Start year

End year

Location

1971

1971

Madagascar (Malagasy)

1969

1971

India

1971

1971

Morocco

1963

1972

Sudan

1971

1972

Chad

1972

1972

Uruguay

1972

1972

Uganda

1972

1972

El Salvador

1963

1973

Laos

1963

1973

Guinea-Bissau

1973

1973

Chile

1961

1974

Angola

1974

1974

Uganda

1964

1974

Mozambique

1967

1975

Cambodia (Kampuchea)

1969

1975

Oman

1976

1976

Sudan Argentina

1974

1977

1977

1978

dr Congo (Zaire)

1975

1978

Mauritania

1979

1979

Saudi Arabia

1976

1979

Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

1977

1979

Nicaragua

1980

1980

Liberia

1980

1980

Tunisia

1981

1981

Ghana

1981

1981

Gambia

1979

1982

Syria

1982

1982

Kenya

1982

1982

Venezuela

1983

1983

Ethiopia

1983

1983

Ghana

1976

1983

Ethiopia

Start year

End year

Location

1984

1984

Cameroon

1984

1984

Indonesia

1982

1984

Somalia

1986

1986

South Yemen

1986

1986

Togo

1987

1987

Burkina Faso

1966

1988

South Africa

1979

1988

India

1986

1988

Iran

1989

1989

Haiti

1989

1989

Panama

1989

1989

Rumania

1989

1989

Paraguay

1989

1989

Comoros

1990

1990

Mali

1990

1990

Trinidad and Tobago

1990

1990

Papua New Guinea

1989

1990

Sri Lanka

1990

1990

Pakistan

1989

1990

Laos

1989

1990

Lebanon

1989

1990

Liberia

1990

1990

Russia (Soviet Union)

1991

1991

Haiti

1980

1991

El Salvador

1990

1991

Indonesia

1976

1991

Ethiopia

1975

1991

Ethiopia

1991

1992

Niger

1992

1992

India

1992

1992

Venezuela

1979

1992

Uganda

1977

1992

Mozambique

Start year

End year

Location

1993

1993

Russia (Soviet Union)

1993

1993

Azerbaijan

1992

1993

Georgia

1992

1993

Georgia

1990

1994

Rwanda

1994

1994

Yemen (North Yemen)

1993

1994

Bosnia-Herzegovina

1994

1994

Niger

1991

1994

Djibouti

1995

1995

Azerbaijan

1993

1995

Bosnia-Herzegovina

1995

1995

Croatia

1992

1995

Bosnia-Herzegovina

1982

1995

Guatemala

1996

1996

Ethiopia

1996

1996

Myanmar (Burma)

1997

1997

Comoros

1997

1997

Myanmar (Burma)

1998

1998

Lesotho

1979

1998

Cambodia (Kampuchea)

1992

1998

Tajikistan

1999

1999

Russia (Soviet Union)

1997

1999

Congo

1999

1999

Djibouti

1998

1999

Guinea-Bissau

1998

1999

Serbia (Yugoslavia)

1997

1999

Indonesia

2000

2000

Tajikistan

1991

2001

Sierra Leone

1998

2001

dr Congo (Zaire)

2001

2001

Macedonia, fyr

2002

2002

Central African Republic

1998

2002

Angola

Start year

End year

Location

2003

2003

Senegal

2000

2003

Liberia

2004

2004

Ivory Coast

2004

2004

Uzbekistan

2004

2004

Nigeria

1999

2005

Indonesia

2005

2005

Turkey

2006

2006

Central African Republic

1997

2006

Burundi

1996

2006

Nepal

1999

2007

Russia (Soviet Union)

2008

2008

India

2006

2008

dr Congo (Zaire)

2008

2008

Burundi

2007

2008

dr Congo (Zaire)

2007

2009

Mali

2009

2009

Myanmar (Burma)

2005

2009

Sri Lanka

2011

2011

Libya

2011

2011

Ivory Coast

2010

2011

Tajikistan

2012

2012

Mali

2013

2013

Malaysia

Notes

i nt roduct i on 1 icrc , “Protocol II.” 2 A number of other treaties have further enshrined international human rights law. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987) is particularly relevant to this study. 3 Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya, 6. 4 Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, 56. 5 An example of a short-lived insurgency that was defeated by government forces was the 1990 Jamaat al Muslimeen coup attempt in Trinidad and Tobago. 6 On scope conditions, see Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 193. 7 Peters, “Progress and Peril.” 8 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, 35. 9 Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 424. 10 Barbarism operates on a similar basis as a population-centric strategy by attempting to alter the decision-making calculus of civilians. Whereas a population-centric strategy seeks to provide positive incentives for civilians to support an incumbent government, a barbaric strategy imposes severe costs for supporting an insurgency. 11 Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins, 5. See also Cave, “Strategy and Adaptation in Counterinsurgency,” 24. 12 Zhukov, “Counterinsurgency in a Non-Democratic State,” 287. 13 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars.” 14 Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars”; Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars. 15 Liberman, Does Conquest Pay?, 32. 16 Gartner and Regan, “Threat and Repression,” 275.

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17 Valentino et al. observe that “scholars continue to debate why state violence and repression of rebels sometimes leads to submission and sometimes seems to provoke increased opposition to the state” (2004, 391). 18 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 52. 19 Kalyvas and Kocher, “How ‘Free’ Is Free Riding in Civil Wars?,” 189. 20 Clancy and Crossett, “Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare,” 91.

c ha p t e r on e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 73. Hensel, “The More Things Change,” 30. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 77. Hensel, “The More Things Change,” 37. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75. Edmonds, “Civil War, Internal War, and Intrasocietal Conflict,” 19. Gersovitz and Kriger, “What Is a Civil War?,” 160–1. For Gersovitz and Kriger, the violence must also be sustained and of sufficient intensity in order to differentiate a civil war from other types of domestic conflict, including coups or riots. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 17. See also Kalyvas, “Civil Wars,” 417. Small and Singer, Resort to Arms, 210. Sarkees, “The Correlates of War Data on War”; Sambanis, “What Is Civil War.” Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding,” 783. Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention,” 338. Canestaro, “Towards a Practitioner-Centric Definition of Civil War,” 362. Canestaro points out that many political leaders may employ alternative labels to designate conflicts, for example, “humanitarian crisis” or “sectarian conflict.” Consequently, he notes that practitioners tend to rely on admittedly subjective criteria for identifying civil wars based, in part, on the extent to which a civil conflict may undermine regional or even international stability. Canestaro, “Towards a Practitioner-Centric Definition of Civil War,” 373. Sambanis, “What Is Civil War,” 831. Small and Singer, Resort to Arms, 205–6. Frieden, Lake, and Schultz, World Politics, 123. For a succinct review of the literature on civil wars, see Kalyvas, “Civil Wars.” Dixon, “What Causes Civil Wars?,” 731. Small and Singer, Resort to Arms, 210. Sambanis, “What Is Civil War,” 855. US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, 2.

Notes to pages 21–5 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

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US Department of State, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” 2. Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, 2. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 79–80. Mason, Weingarten, and Fett, “Win, Lose, or Draw,” 245. Alker, “The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue,” 806. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Biddle, Military Power, 14. Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 5. Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 177. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 189. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 34. Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars.” Kalyvas, “Civil Wars,” 428. That said, insurgents do not necessarily require the full support of civilian populations but, at a minimum, their acquiescence. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 423. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 79. Kalyvas and Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion,” 415. Shelton, Stojek, and Sullivan, “What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes,” 518. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 15. Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines,” 70. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 50–1. Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, 41. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 66; US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24. Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 194–5. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 423. Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, 12. Taber, War of the Flea, 20. Taber, War of the Flea, 49–50. Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, 44, 51. Katzenbach and Hanrahan, “The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung”; Katzenbach, “Time, Space, and Will”; and Taber, War of the Flea, 44. Taber even goes so far as to equate survival with a political victory. War of the Flea, 13. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 32. Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 152. Shelton, Stojek, and Sullivan, “What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes,” 517–18.

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Notes to pages 26–7

58 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 188. 59 To be clear, external occupation is only one type of conflict in which guerrilla tactics are used. Indeed, Mack seems to acknowledge that his ‘asymmetry of interests’ hypothesis applies only to cases of external occupation. He also notes that ‘interests’ are difficult to operationalize and therefore not easily amenable to quantitative testing (196-197). For a critique of Mack’s asymmetry thesis see Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars,” 98; and Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 12–14. 60 This means that for insurgents war is “total,” while for the occupier the war is “limited.” Sam Sarkesian uses similar terminology when describing the Vietnam War, in which the “United States was engaged in a limited war” but for the “revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries it was a total war.” See Sarkesian, “The American Response to Low-Intensity Conflict,” 40. 61 Balcells and Kalyvas, “Does Warfare Matter?” See also Krcmaric, “Varieties of Civil War and Mass Killing.” 62 Hultquist, “Power Parity and Peace?,” 626. 63 Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, 13–14. In fact, Mao concluded that guerrilla warfare by itself could not defeat an incumbent. 64 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 6–8. 65 Ibid., 26. Galula referred to this evolution as the “fourth step” of an insurgency: “the enemy must be met on his own ground; an insurgent regular army has to be created in order to destroy the counterinsurgent forces” (36). However, Galula is sometimes unclear whether he believes it is appropriate for an insurgent group to switch their modus operandi. Indeed, at one point he seems to suggest it would be imprudent for an insurgency to shift to conventional war fighting (9). 66 US Department of State, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” 11. 67 Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War.” 68 Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 2. 69 McKenzie, “Elegant Irrelevance”; see also Echevarria, Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths. 70 Carey, “Low-Intensity Warfare and Limited War”; Hoffman, “Current Research on Terrorism and Low-Intensity Conflict”; Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss. 71 Hammond, “Low-Intensity Conflict,” 236. 72 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla. Indeed, Kilcullen calls for not only the integration of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency but also the incorporation of other tactics such as humanitarian relief (296). At other points, however, he seems to acknowledge a clear differentiation between terrorism and insurgency, for example, as seen in his description of “hybrid warfare” (148–51). To be fair, this is not to suggest that terrorism and insurgencies

Notes to pages 28–9

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cannot overlap; in fact, the two phenomena or tactics often coexist in many conflicts. It is simply intended to point out the logical inconsistencies of Kilcullen’s theorizing. O’Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics, 209. In his review of the Iraq War, Marc Scarcelli implicitly acknowledged this difference by noting that terrorists generally target civilians and guerrillas attack military forces; see Scarcelli, “The Uneven Application of the ‘Civil War’ Label to Iraq,” 97. Mueller and Stewart, Chasing Ghosts, 245–6. They add that terrorism and insurgencies also differ in terms of their frequency and persistence of violence. Nicholas Sambanis is also careful to differentiate between terrorism and civil wars; see Sambanis, “Terrorism and Civil War.” I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point. For reference, see Anderson and McKnight, “Understanding Al-Shabaab”; Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”; International Crisis Group, “Exploiting Disorder”; Solomon and Hentz, Understanding Boko Haram; and Congressional Research Service, “The Islamic State and U.S. Policy.” Cronin, “isis Is Not a Terrorist Group.” Boyle, “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?,” 336. Boyle seems to pinpoint the primary difference between the two models in terms of state-building, where counterinsurgency is far more ambitious in developing a stable system of governance. US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, xxiii. Treistman, “Victory over Terrorism.” According to Paul Melshen, “terrorism should not be confused with insurgency warfare” (“Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan,” 687). Sarkesian, “The American Response to Low-Intensity Conflict,” 39. He adds that “special operations, guerrilla war, insurgency, revolution and counterrevolution are generally conceived in similar terms. Yet, as has been shown, they differ considerably in their strategic and tactical dimensions as well as in their civilian and military components. These conceptual problems, in terms, are reflected in the composition, planning and training of forces designed for low-intensity conflict” (45). Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 3–4. Instead, they prefer to use the terms rebellion and authority. Findley and Young, “Fighting Fire with Fire?,” 380. Kalyvas similarly acknowledges that a single conflict may even exhibit multiple forms of warfare, including guerrilla and conventional (“Civil Wars,” 427). Berman, Felter, and Shapiro, Small Wars, Big Data, 18. cia, “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,” 29. For a similar discussion, see Small and Singer, Resort to Arms, 214–18. Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 4.

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Notes to pages 30–3

c h a p t e r two 1 2 3 4

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6

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8 9 10 11 12 13

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15 16 17

Enterline, Stull, and Magagnoli, “Reversal of Fortune?,” 180. Plakoudas, “Strategy in Counterinsurgency,” 132. US Department of State, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” 14. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 27. Kilcullen similarly describes enemy-centric strategies as “focusing on killing insurgents” (The Accidental Guerrilla, 129). Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, xxii. They also discover that material support is correlated with popular support, thereby indicating a potential overlap between population and enemy-centric strategies. Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 48. They later simplified the components of an insurgency as consisting of inputs, the ability to convert inputs into outputs, and the social or political targets of their activities (151). Finel, “A Substitute for Victory”. Finel offers additional characteristics to the definition of enemy-centric counterinsurgency. For example, he argues that the goal for counterinsurgents is not to hold territory and force insurgents to the negotiating table rather than seek outright military victory. Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 155. Callwell, Small Wars, 106. US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, 5, 41. Berman, Felter, and Shapiro, Small Wars, Big Data, 115. US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, xxv. According to Leites and Wolf, a hearts and minds approach is concerned about the “sympathies or preferences” of the population, whereas an enemy-centric approach considers the actual “behavior or conduct” of the population (Rebellion and Authority, 42). The distinction is admittedly subtle, but it is critical. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 28–9. Although he is generally regarded as a theorist of population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, Nagl offers very little explanation as to the specifics of the approach. His discussion of an “indirect approach” mentions the importance of depriving insurgents of popular support, but he offers little specificity beyond such vague references. Finel, “A Substitute for Victory.” Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 139. US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, 6. The field manual directs counterinsurgents to transform the passive or neutral middle into active supporters of the government. It contends that passivity will not suffice and even suggests that a passive populace may still aid an insurgency (35, 155).

Notes to pages 33–6

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18 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 4. Nevertheless, for Galula the military still plays a critical role in counterinsurgency operations, though it remains secondary to political efforts (63). In the absence of adequate numbers of civil servants, the military must also be called upon to perform many non-military tasks (66). 19 Nagl, “Constructing the Legacy of Field Manual 3-24,” 118. 20 Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, xix. Shelton and colleagues point out, however, that their study incorporates a wide variety of factors that are not directly associated with a particular coin strategy, thus making it difficult to compare with other research; Shelton, Stojek, and Sullivan, “What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes,” 525. 21 Findley and Young, “Fighting Fire with Fire?” 22 Enterline, Stull, and Magagnoli, “Reversal of Fortune?” They also find that the timing of when an incumbent implemented a hearts and minds strategy also had a significant impact on war outcomes. 23 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 89–90. For a critique of Nagl’s assessment and of Britain’s involvement in Malaya, see Jensen, “The Complexity of Military Change.” 24 Finel, “A Substitute for Victory”; Gilmore, “A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism.” 25 Kahl, “coin of the Realm”; Luttwak, “Dead End.” See Biddle, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual” for his contention that population-centric strategies are only applicable to ideological wars, not identity wars. 26 Gentile, “Time for the Deconstruction of Field Manual 3–24,” 116. See also Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics.” 27 Peters, “Progress and Peril.” 28 Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds?’” 29 Watts et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies, xiv, 4. 30 Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars,” 101. In subsequent work, he defines the strategy as “the systematic harm of non-combatants for a specific military or political objective;” see Arreguín-Toft, “The [f]utility of Barbarism,” 5–6. Early notions of barbarism can arguably be found in Cold War security studies literature as well. For example, Thomas Schelling distinguished “brute force,” as conventionally fighting an enemy using military power akin to enemy-centric strategies, from “coercion,” as inflicting pain to exploit “enemy wants and fears.” Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3. 31 See, for example, Pape, Bombing to Win; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, “Draining the Sea”; Ulfelder and Valentino, “Assessing Risks of StateSponsored Mass Killing”; and Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War.”

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Notes to pages 37–40

32 Earl, “Political Repression,” 262. For a similar discussion, see also Henderson, “Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression”; Carey, “The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent”; and Ritter, “Policy Disputes, Political Survival.” Meanwhile, Robert Goldstein discusses the wide range of defining traits that have been used to identify human rights abuses; Goldstein, “The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data.” 33 Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, “Draining the Sea,” 385. 34 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 69. Sewall makes a similar observation that “the insurgents’ invisibility often tempts counterinsurgents to erase the all-important distinctions between combatants and the noncombatants;” US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, xxxvii. For her part, Elisabeth Wood hypothesizes that states will use sexual violence against supporters of an insurgency; see Wood, “Variation in Sexual Violence During War.” 35 Ulfelder and Valentino, “Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing,” 14. 36 Krcmaric, “Varieties of Civil War and Mass Killing,” 19. 37 According to Kalyvas, “this assumption is reasonable because armed actors depend on their civilian collaborators and wish not to alienate them.” Indeed, his research has uncovered clear evidence of insurgents sometimes suspending their activities in light of government reprisals. Kalyvas acknowledges, however, that insurgents are “generally unwilling to stop fighting” because of the demands of civilians. See Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 158. 38 Treistman, “Home Away from Home,” 238. 39 Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 437. 40 US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, xxv. 41 US Department of State, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” 14. 42 Boyle, “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?,” 343. 43 Paul et al., “Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency,” 1020. 44 I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point. 45 For a more thorough discussion of Britain’s reliance on both “hearts and minds” and “coercive” strategies, see Hack, “Everyone Lived in Fear.” 46 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 26–29. 47 Melshen, “Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan,” 689. 48 Enterline, Stull, and Magagnoli, “Reversal of Fortune?,” 184. They base their identification of strategies on Arreguín-Toft’s (2001) strategic interaction thesis, which also refers to only two possible coin strategies. 49 Plakoudas, “Strategy in Counterinsurgency,” 133. 50 See, for example, Paul et al., “Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. EnemyCentric Counterinsurgency.”

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c h a p t e r thre e 1 Downes, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures,” 169. See also Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves.” 2 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 45. 3 Greenhill and Staniland, “Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency,” 407. Galula acknowledges that a counterinsurgent may certainly employ force, though such tactics will only result in “a state of perpetual tension, not a lasting peace” (Counterinsurgency Warfare, 72). 4 Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, xxvi. 5 Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars,” 122–3. It should be recognized, however, that several other scholars have considered the interactive effect of strategies. Some of the earliest theorizing was done by Leites and Wolf, and later Andrew Mack, in the 1970s; see Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority; and Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”. More recent research has been conducted by DeRouen and Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” 6 Arreguín-Toft, “How to Lose a War on Terror,” 143n3. 7 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 151. See also Kalyvas, “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War,” 112. 8 Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents?,” 169n9. 9 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 107. 10 Pape, Bombing to Win, 10. Interestingly, while Arreguín-Toft (2003, 7n9) does agree that barbarism is futile, he subtly notes that it may only be less effective in conventional wars and is perhaps more effective (under certain conditions) in unconventional wars. This would be consistent with his other work; see Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars.” 11 Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” 17. 12 Elbadawi and Sambanis, “How Much War Will We See?,” 325. 13 Gartner and Regan, “Threat and Repression,” 284–5. There are a few scholars, however, who contend that democracies may be more likely to target civilians than non-democracies under certain conditions; see Downes, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures.” 14 Engelhardt, “Democracies, Dictatorships, and Counterinsurgency,” 53. The notion that democracies are less likely to repress their citizens has given rise to the “domestic democratic peace” hypothesis, which mirrors a similar finding within international relations; see Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” 11. 15 Fein, “More Murder in the Middle,” 184. 16 Pape, Bombing to Win, 3.

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Notes to pages 45–9

17 Engelhardt, “Democracies, Dictatorships, and Counterinsurgency,” 56. 18 Mason and Krane, “The Political Economy of Death Squads,” 178. 19 Asal, Deloughery, and Sin, “Democracy, Inclusion, and Failure in CounterInsurgency,” 914. 20 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 15. 21 Desch, “Democracy and Victory,” 5. 22 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 185. 23 Indeed, Scott Gartner has declared that “the claim that wartime casualties lead to decreased approval represents such a common conjecture today in the news media and scholarly works that it requires neither reference nor justification”; see Gartner, “The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War,” 95. The contemporary literature generally traces its origins to John Mueller’s seminal work on the relationship between public opinion and national support; see Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion. 24 Getmansky, “You Can’t Win If You Don’t Fight,” 727. 25 Downes, “Restraint or Propellant?” 26 Edmonds, “Civil War, Internal War, and Intrasocietal Conflict,” 23. 27 US Government, “Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces.” 28 Cohen, “Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices,” 246. 29 Apodaca and Stohl, “United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance,” 195. On the other hand, they discover that human rights are not associated with the provision of military aid. They also recognize that other factors such as the amount of previous aid may influence future aid. 30 Gomez, “Human Rights and the Allocation of Foreign Aid.” 31 Rumsey, “Does Counterterrorism Trump Human Rights?,” 365. 32 McCormick and Mitchell, “Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to Human Rights in Latin America?”; McCormick and Mitchell, “Human Rights and Foreign Assistance.” 33 Sandlin, “Competing Concerns,” 440. 34 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 25–6. 35 US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, 28. 36 Washington Post, “McCain Talks about Military Options in Syria.” 37 Record, “External Assistance,” 42. 38 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” 709–10. 39 Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 80. 40 Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” 106. For a rejoinder see Elliott, “The Sanctions Glass.” Pape subsequently responded to Elliott’s counterargument; see Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work”.

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41 Brzoska, “Measuring the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes,” 23. He does uncover other interesting findings, in particular, that multilateralism and duration also have positive impacts on the effectiveness of arms embargoes. 42 Escribà-Folch, “Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts.” 43 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, “Human Rights in a Globalizing World,” 1378. 44 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 19. 45 Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” 90. 46 Ibid., 91. 47 Ibid., 124. 48 The subsequent impact and outcome of such interventions is an entirely separate empirical question. Indeed, Balch-Lindsay et al. differentiate the different tracts of research; see Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,” 348. 49 Mason, Weingarten, and Fett, “Win, Lose, or Draw,” 251. 50 Gent, “Going In When It Counts,” 730. 51 Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,” 356. 52 Jones, “Altering Capabilities or Imposing Costs?,” 61. 53 Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, “Killing Time.” However, their dataset only extends to 1992 and is largely restricted to the entirety of the Cold War era, which may bias the results as the competing superpowers intervened in various internal conflicts around the world. 54 Gent, “Going In When It Counts”; Jones, “Altering Capabilities or Imposing Costs?.” 55 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 160. 56 Hultquist, “Is Collective Repression an Effective Counterinsurgency Technique?,” 510. 57 Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,” 203. 58 Hultquist, “Is Collective Repression an Effective Counterinsurgency Technique?” 59 Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 147. 60 Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 422. 61 Toft and Zhukov, “Denial and Punishment in the North Caucasus,” 793. 62 Hayden, “The Kosovo Conflict,” 57; see also 38–9. 63 Gartner and Regan, “Threat and Repression,” 275. 64 Weber, “Politics as Vocation.” Meanwhile, for a classic discussion regarding the challenge of defining political violence, see Mars, “The Nature of Political Violence.” 65 Rasler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution,” 133.

172 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

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Notes to pages 54–60

Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 239. Muller and Weede, “Cross-National Variation in Political Violence,” 626. Fein, “More Murder in the Middle.” Gartner and Regan, “Threat and Repression.” Regan and Henderson, “Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries,” 124. Krcmaric, “Varieties of Civil War and Mass Killing,” 18. Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence”; Slinko et al., “Regime Type and Political Destabilization in Cross-National Perspective.” To be fair, his simplified typology helps achieve a more parsimonious model. Merom’s thesis is primarily based on only two individual case studies. Additionally, his independent variables concern domestic political structure and social preferences rather than the nuances of barbaric military tactics. On the utility of mixed-method research, see, for example, Berg-Schlosser, Mixed Methods in Comparative Politics; and Seawright, Multi-Method Social Science.

c ha p t e r f ou r 1 Enterline and colleagues (“Reversal of Fortune?,” 193) point out an additional consideration: whether objectives refer to levels of democracy, nation-building efforts, or even stability when evaluating third-party interventions. 2 Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless?,” 251n7. 3 US Department of State, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” 4. 4 Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines,” 71. 5 Mason, Weingarten, and Fett, “Win, Lose, or Draw,” 242. In earlier research, Mason and Fett (1996) explore the reasons why combatants may seek a negotiated settlement rather than continue fighting, which they use as their primary dependent variable. 6 Hultquist, “Power Parity and Peace?,” 624. 7 Hultquist (“Power Parity and Peace?,” 627) explicitly codes low activity as a “government victory by default”; however, I exclude on the basis of the same logic as excluding ceasefires. In particular, periods of low activity represent an opportunity for rebels to regroup, but this does not meet the threshold of a combatant granting some political concessions. 8 Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War. For a broad overview of the Correlates of War Project, see Sarkees, “The Correlates of War Data on War”. 9 The advantages and disadvantages of relying on a particular conflict dataset have been debated elsewhere in the literature. See Eck, A Beginner’s Guide; and Sambanis, “What Is Civil War.” It should also be noted that many other

Notes to pages 60–4

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datasets on intrastate wars and insurgencies have been curated by scholars but omitted from my discussion here. Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding,” 783. As DeRouen and Sobek (“The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome”) point out, this criterion differs from cow , which requires that 1,000 battlefield casualties be maintained every year. DeRouen and Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” See chapter 1 for a discussion about distinguishing insurgencies from guerrilla tactics. Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines.” Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End.” Pape, Bombing to Win, 30. Interstate wars were omitted. In terms of outcomes, ceasefires and periods of low activity were omitted. Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, “The ciri Human Rights Dataset.” Gibney et al., “The Political Terror Scale 1976–2016.” Ibid. Fariss, “Respect for Human Rights Has Improved over Time.” Clark and Sikkink, “Information Effects and Human Rights Data.” Fariss, “Respect for Human Rights Has Improved over Time,” 299. See also Schnakenberg and Fariss, “Dynamic Patterns of Human Rights Practices”; and Fariss, “Yes, Human Rights Practices Are Improving over Time”. Fariss’s dynamic latent variable has subsequently been used by many other scholars. See, for example, Hill and Jones, “An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression”. I thank Christopher Fariss for his guidance and helpful suggestions on utilizing his data. A potential drawback to using political repression is that it may not be an accurate proxy for a state’s behavior in war. However, since the universe of cases is limited to intrastate conflicts, I believe that it is an appropriate measure of how an incumbent treated its civilians – even during war. Keeping the number of included controls to a minimum also ensures a more parsimonious model. Meanwhile, some scholars even argue that “a statistical specification with more than three explanatory variables is meaningless”; see Achen, “Toward a New Political Methodology,” 446. Dixon, “What Causes Civil Wars?,” 727. Mason and Fett, “How Civil Wars End,” 560. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 31. Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, “polity iv project .” Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.”

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Notes to pages 64–8

31 More specifically, it encompasses iron and steel production (thousands of tons), military expenditures, military personnel (thousands), energy consumption, total population, and urban population. 32 Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War”; Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines,” 87; Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, chapter 3. 33 Gurr and Marshall, Peace and Conflict 2005. 34 Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War”; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, “Ethnic Polarization and the Duration of Civil Wars.” 35 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 78. See also Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country.” 36 Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, “Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005,” 542–3. 37 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 25–6. 38 Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér, “External Support in Armed Conflict 1975–2009.” The actual coding procedure matched bwd_id in the External Support dataset with TermDyad in the Conflict Termination dataset. To avoid introducing any measurement errors I ensured that all missing values were coded as na s. Other scholars have also utilized a combination of the ucdp Conflict Termination and External Support datasets, for example, Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed, “The Role of External Support in Civil War Termination.” 39 Pearson and Baumann, “International Military Intervention, 1946–1988.” 40 For end years that were unknown in imi (i.e., values 8888 or 9999), I simply set the end year to equal the start year. When imi = 1 or 2, military intervention is coded as occurring on behalf of the incumbent; if the imi = 3 or 4, military intervention is coded as occurring in support of the insurgency. 41 I code any state that averaged ≥ 7 on the Polity2 scale as a democracy. 42 Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents?,” 188. Also see Enterline et al. for a brief literature review on the effect of regime type; Enterline, Stull, and Magagnoli, “Reversal of Fortune?,” 181. 43 Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines.” 44 Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars,” 106–7. Specifically, contemporary Western militaries are now reliant on direct conventional strategies whereas guerrillas employ indirect strategies. When the two sides interact it is the weaker actor that is hypothesized to win. 45 See also Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, specifically Commentary of 1987. Meanwhile, William Hayden highlights several other elements of international law that govern the treatment of civilians; see Hayden, “The Kosovo Conflict.”

Notes to pages 69–80

175

46 Dimitrios Asteriou and Stephen Hall explain that “quadratic formulations are frequently used to fit U-shaped curves;” see Asteriou and Hall, Applied Econometrics, 179. 47 Excluding the quadratic term Barbarism2. 48 Sanctions_Threatened is omitted in model 4 in order to avoid introducing multicollinearity. 49 Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines”; Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars.” 50 With the exception of one of their models, Lyall and Wilson (“Rage against the Machines”) also fail to find any statistically significant relationship between democracy and war outcomes. 51 Dixon, “What Causes Civil Wars?,” 711. 52 Watts et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies, 13. 53 The Americas served as the omitted baseline. 54 With the exception of model 18, all models in table 4.5 build upon model 2, which represents what I believe to be the more realistic scenario in which sanctions are only threatened and no third party has militarily intervened. 55 Sambanis, “What Is Civil War,” 836n56. 56 Mason and Fett, “How Civil Wars End,” 550. 57 Following previous research, I use the natural log of both alternative variables in my models. 58 Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency.” 59 Balcells and Kalyvas, “Does Warfare Matter?” It should also be stressed that Fearon and Laitin rely on cow data and the 1,000-casualty threshold, which may omit smaller incidences of ethnic or religious violence. 60 Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines,” 102. 61 Downes, “Restraint or Propellant?” 62 That said, Dixon does point out that the ucdp Armed Conflict dataset may be limited, since civil wars have occurred “over issues other than regime or territory”; see Dixon, “What Causes Civil Wars?,” 729. 63 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.” 64 I code any state that averaged ≤ -6 on the Polity2 scale as an authoritarian regime. See Conrad and Souva, “Regime Similarity and Rivalry,” 22n22; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions,” 322n38. This measurement is also consistent with Fearon and Laitin (“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”), who code “anocracies” or “semidemocracies” as ranging from –5 to 5 on the Polity2 scale. 65 Record, Beating Goliath, 23. 66 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for helpful comments here.

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Notes to pages 80–6

67 I specified twenty imputations to be performed. For reference, see Rubin, “Multiple Imputation After 18+ Years”; Azur et al., “Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations.” 68 Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars.” On the internal organizational structure and strategies of rebel groups, see Weinstein, Inside Rebellion. 69 Data were obtained from Krcmaric, “Varieties of Civil War and Mass Killing.” I chose to match on basis of rebel groups (rather than conflicts) to ensure as much precision as possible. On the “technology of rebellion,” see also Balcells and Kalyvas, “Does Warfare Matter?” 70 I made the assumption, however, that any conflict lasting three days or longer can reasonably be considered a sustained campaign of violence. 71 For more on case selection, see George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences; King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry; and Klotz, “Case Selection.” On the diverse case selection method see Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research.” On data-richness as a qualitative case selection criterion see Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. On process-tracing see Bennett and Elman, “Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods”; and Checkel, “Process Tracing.”

c ha p t e r f i ve 1 These interventions are critical to the historical legacy of counterinsurgency warfare writ large. The US Marines, who were responsible for most of the occupations, wrote one of the earliest known manuals on counterinsurgency warfare: Small Wars Manual. 2 Booth, The End and the Beginning, 54. 3 Chavarría, “The Nicaraguan Insurrection,” 28. 4 Also, the ongoing Great Depression imposed severe financial constraints that limited US military operations abroad. 5 Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism, 233. 6 Weitz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960–1980,” 411. 7 Black, “The 1972 Earthquake and After,” 149. 8 Cuzán, “Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunity in the Nicaraguan Revolution.” On relative deprivation see Gurr, Why Men Rebel. 9 Weitz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960–1980,” 398. 10 Diederich, Somoza, 93. 11 Walker, Nicaragua in Revolution, 17. 12 LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua,” 30.

Notes to pages 86–90

177

13 Black, “The 1972 Earthquake and After,” 149. 14 The group was initially led by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomás Borge Martínez, and Silvio Mayorga. For an in-depth review of the ideological origins of the Sandinistas, see Hodges, Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution. 15 To be fair, the Sandinistas had been active throughout the 1960s; however, their operations were mostly marginal, including bank robberies. When they did attempt more significant operations they were quickly repelled by the more powerful National Guard. 16 LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua,” 31. 17 Sierakowski, “In the Footsteps of Sandino,” 205–6. 18 Morley, Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas, 106. 19 Walker, Nicaragua in Revolution, 19. 20 LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua”; Booth, The End and the Beginning. 21 Walker and Wade, Nicaragua, 37. 22 While the Sandinista insurrection was achieved primarily through use of guerrilla tactics, some rebel groups (Terceristas) called for the development of more conventional forces to defeat the National Guard; see Vanden, “The Ideology of the Insurrection,” 55. 23 Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 3. 24 Chavarría, “The Nicaraguan Insurrection,” 34. 25 Diederich, Somoza, 102. 26 Ibid., 117. 27 Ibid., 127. 28 Vanden, “The Ideology of the Insurrection,” 52. 29 LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua,” 31. 30 For reference on use of napalm see Chavarría, “The Nicaraguan Insurrection,” 37. 31 Sierakowski, “In the Footsteps of Sandino,” 261–2. 32 Walker and Wade, Nicaragua, 38. 33 Booth, The End and the Beginning, 173. 34 Cuzán, “Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunity in the Nicaraguan Revolution,” 80. 35 Weber, “The Struggle for Power,” 152. 36 Christian, “Nicaragua and the United States,” 179. 37 LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua,” 35. 38 Weber, “The Struggle for Power,” 154. 39 Booth, The End and the Beginning, 175–6. 40 That said, US foreign policy toward Nicaragua was inconsistent with a great deal of debate among policy-makers; see Washington Post, “Carter Letter to Somoza Stirs Human Rights Row.”

178 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

64 65 66

Notes to pages 90–4

Small, “Carter in Covert Support for Somoza,” 34. Diederich, Somoza, 141. United Nations General Assembly, “Situation in Nicaragua.” Booth, The End and the Beginning, 158. The “siege” was a period of extreme repressiveness that was in response to an fsln attack on a government residence in December 1974. On the other hand, the ending of the siege may have been a result of the perception that it had succeeded in pushing back insurgents rather than a result of outside pressure; see Weber, “The Struggle for Power,” 152. Diederich, Somoza, 125. Walker, Nicaragua in Revolution, Introduction. Wilson, “Conflict beyond Borders,” 185. Sierakowski, “In the Footsteps of Sandino,” 287, 298. Gordon and Munro, “The External Dimension of Civil Insurrection.” Weitz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960–1980,” 406. Mudge, “A Case Study in Human Rights and Development Assistance,” 97–100. Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 5. The alliance between Sandinistas and Palestinians was apparently close, with Sandinistas even participating in airline hijackings organized by the plo ; see Cuzán, “Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunity in the Nicaraguan Revolution,” 76. Pestana and Latell, “Nicaraguan Military Culture,” 14–15. Walker and Wade, Nicaragua, 39. Wilson, “Conflict beyond Borders,” 214. Booth, The End and the Beginning, 95. Wilson, “Conflict beyond Borders,” 191. Gorman, “Power and Consolidation in the Nicaraguan Revolution,” 135–6. Walker and Wade, Nicaragua, 32. Weber, “The Struggle for Power,” 159. Weitz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960–1980.” On the role of a unified insurgency in war outcomes, see Kenny, “Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations”; and Treistman, “Home Away from Home.” Richard Weitz, however, argues that insurgent leadership is an inclusive factor in terms of Latin American war outcomes; see Weitz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960–1980.” Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 2. Wilson, “Conflict beyond Borders,” 185. Ibid., 188.

Notes to pages 94–9

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67 Committee on International Relations, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. To be fair, most of the report is highly critical of Nicaragua’s human rights record. 68 Mudge, “A Case Study in Human Rights and Development Assistance.” 69 Walker and Wade, Nicaragua, 35. 70 Wilson, “Conflict beyond Borders.” 71 Weitz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960–1980,” 409–10. 72 Basnett, “From Politicization of Grievances to Political Violence,” 17. 73 Gordon, “Evaluating Nepal’s Integrated ‘Security’ and ‘Development’ Policy,” 582. 74 Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996–2008,” 9. 75 Thapa, A Kingdom under Siege, 29. 76 Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996–2008,” 7. 77 Norris, “How Not to Wage a Counter-Insurgency,” 13. 78 Adhikari, The Bullet and the Ballot Box, 15. 79 Von Einsiedel and Salih, Conflict Prevention in Nepal, 4. 80 Norris, “How Not to Wage a Counter-Insurgency,” 14. 81 Thapa, A Kingdom under Siege, 216. See also Adhikari, The Bullet and the Ballot Box, 36. 82 Prakash Adhikari and Steven Samford bifurcate the war into similar time periods, which they refer to as the “initiation” and “maturation” periods; see Adhikari and Samford, “The Nepali State and the Dynamics of the Maoist Insurgency.” See also Muni, “Anatomy of a South Asian Revolt,” 179. 83 Steven Letch acknowledges that estimates of insurgent numbers are nearly impossible to ascertain, but suggests that the number of hardcore fighters ranged from 5,000 to 10,000, with several additional thousand supporters; Letch, “War in Shangri-La,” 45. See also International Crisis Group, “Nepal’s Maoists,” 8; von Einsiedel and Salih, Conflict Prevention in Nepal, 4. 84 Thapa, A Kingdom under Siege, 136. 85 Human Rights Watch, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 12. 86 Eck, “Recruitment and Violence in Nepal’s Civil War,” 273. 87 Congressional Research Service, “Nepal,” 5. See also Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 297. 88 Upreti, “Nepal’s Response to the Armed Insurgency,” 197. 89 Von Einsiedel and Salih, Conflict Prevention in Nepal, 4. 90 Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 294. 91 Gordon, “Evaluating Nepal’s Integrated ‘Security’ and ‘Development’ Policy,” 592. 92 Marks, Insurgency in Nepal, 14.

180 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118

Notes to pages 99–108

Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996–2008,” 3. US Department of State, “2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.” Thapa, A Kingdom under Siege, 150. Human Rights Watch, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 15. Khatri, “An Analysis of Nepalese Government’s Counter Insurgency Operations,” 23. Indeed, the conflict resulted in a negotiated settlement rather than outright military defeat. Gordon, “Evaluating Nepal’s Integrated ‘Security’ and ‘Development’ Policy,” 599. Khatri, “An Analysis of Nepalese Government’s Counter Insurgency Operations,” 17. Congressional Research Service, “Nepal,” 18. Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996–2008,” 38. Ibid., 44. Human Rights Watch, “Nepal’s Civil War.” Upreti, “Nepal’s Response to the Armed Insurgency,” 197. Marks, Insurgency in Nepal, 18. Von Einsiedel and Salih, Conflict Prevention in Nepal, 4. Sharma, “The Maoist Movement,” 49–50. Adhikari and Samford, “The Nepali State and the Dynamics of the Maoist Insurgency,” 476. International Crisis Group, “Nepal’s Maoists.” Adhikari and Samford, “The Nepali State and the Dynamics of the Maoist Insurgency,” 478. Thapa, A Kingdom under Siege, 137. Von Einsiedel and Salih, Conflict Prevention in Nepal, 6. Singh, Dahal, and Mills, “Nepal’s War on Human Rights.” Adhikari and Samford, “The Nepali State and the Dynamics of the Maoist Insurgency,” 465. Liberman, Does Conquest Pay?, 5, 22. Congressional Research Service, “Nepal,” 5. In fact, a Washington Post article shortly after the Nicaraguan revolution described the Somoza regime as “moderately repressive”; see Washington Post, “Nicaragua and the Sins of Somoza.”

c ha p t e r si x 1 Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia, 18. 2 Weerasinghe, “From Postindependence Ethnic Tensions to Insurgency,” 234. 3 Ibid., 232.

Notes to pages 109–16 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

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Rupesinghe, “Sri Lanka,” 255. Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia, 15. Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins, 8. International Crisis Group, “War Crimes in Sri Lanka.” D’Costa, “Sri Lanka,” 107. Amnesty International, “Unlock the Camps in Sri Lanka,” 5–6. Human Rights Watch, “War on the Displaced,” 2. United Nations Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka.” Rupesinghe, “Sri Lanka,” 255. Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins, 41. Central Intelligence Agency, “Sri Lanka.” DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” 1042. O’Connell, “Taming the ltte ,” 24. Lalwani, “Size Still Matters.” Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins, 180. Amnesty International, “Unlock the Camps in Sri Lanka,” 8. Beehner et al., “The Taming of the Tigers,” 35. Amnesty International, “Unlock the Camps in Sri Lanka,” 8, 24. US Department of State, “Report to Congress on Incidents during the Recent Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 6. International Press Freedom and Freedom of Expression Mission to Sri Lanka, “Media Under Fire,” 9. Shashikumar, “Lessons from Sri Lanka’s War”; Smith, “Understanding Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers.” Shashikumar, “Lessons from Sri Lanka’s War.” Rupesinghe, “Sri Lanka,” 273. Cave, “Strategy and Adaptation in Counterinsurgency,” 27. Beehner et al., “The Taming of the Tigers,” 14. Smith, “Understanding Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers,” 43. Rupesinghe, “Sri Lanka,” 254. Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins, 190. International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the ltte ,” 7. DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” 1040. US Department of State, “Report to Congress on Incidents during the Recent Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 11. Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia, 27. Smith, “Understanding Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers,” 42. Shashikumar, “Lessons from Sri Lanka’s War.” Rupesinghe, “Sri Lanka,” 266.

182

Notes to pages 116–20

39 Smith, “Understanding Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers,” 44. 40 Lopez, “Lessons We May Not Want to Learn,” 3. Since most variables were outside of the government’s control (i.e., insurgent tactics, external support, infighting, etc.), she places a great deal of emphasis on counterinsurgent capabilities. 41 Lalwani, “Size Still Matters,” 133. 42 Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins, 180. To be fair, he does recognize several other potential factors, including serious organizational issues within the ltte (190–6). 43 Lewis, “Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka,” 322. 44 Cohen, Russia’s Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus, 3. 45 For a detailed review and comparison of Russia’s military assault in Grozny, see Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994–2000. 46 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994–2000, 13. 47 Faurby and Magnusson, “The Battle(s) of Grozny,” 80. 48 Williams, “The Russo-Chechen War,” 128. 49 Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 40; Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 40–1. 50 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 45. 51 Canfield, “The Russian Chechen Wars,” 103. 52 Williams, Inferno in Chechnya, 132. 53 Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 46. 54 Although beyond the scope of this book, there has been extensive research into the apartment bombings and identification of the reputed perpetrators. 55 Evangelista, 59–62; Williams, Inferno in Chechnya, 155. Lajos Szászdi discusses several additional factors that may have led Russia to prosecute the second war; see Szászdi, Russian Civil-Military Relations and the Origins of the Second Chechen War. 56 Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 70. 57 According to Cohen, the “active” phase of the Second Chechen War had concluded in 2000 (Russia’s Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus, 46). The Correlates of War identifies the year 2003 as the official end of hostilities (Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War: 1816–2007, 2010). For a more detailed review of the post-2005 phase of the conflict see Hahn, “The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus.” 58 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009, 65. 59 Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents?,” 2; Cohen, Russia’s Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus, 41; Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 83; Janeczko, “‘Faced with Death, Even a Mouse Bites’,” 435; Williams, “The Russo-Chechen War,” 131.

Notes to pages 120–5 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

71

72 73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

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Janeczko, “‘Faced with Death, Even a Mouse Bites,’” 435. Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 87. Finch, “Snapshot of a War Crime.” Faurby and Magnusson, “The Battle(s) of Grozny,” 83. Williams, Inferno in Chechnya, 96. Szászdi, Russian Civil-Military Relations and the Origins of the Second Chechen War, 275. Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 20. Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994–2000, 63. Finch, “Snapshot of a War Crime.” Williams, Inferno in Chechnya, 142. Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 35. Many other historians have written extensively on how the change in leadership resulted in a dramatic change in policy-making. See, for example, Desai, Conversations on Russia. Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya, 50. For an in-depth analysis of Russian air power during the Chechen wars, see Evans, Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War. Thomas, “Grozny 2000,” 51. Williams, Inferno in Chechnya, 175. Cassidy argues that “the Russians did nothing to win the battle of wills in Chechnya – no effort was made to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the people” (Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya, 31). Kramer, “The Perils of Counterinsurgency,” 9. Finch, “Snapshot of a War Crime.” Williams, “The Russo-Chechen War,” 137. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, “Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation.” Congressional Research Service, “Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus.” Amnesty International, “Russian Federation.” Human Rights Watch, “Russia/Chechnya Swept Under,” 3. Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994–2000, 72. Cohen, Russia’s Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus, 21. Congressional Research Service, “Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus.” Faurby and Magnusson, “The Battle(s) of Grozny,” 77. Szászdi, Russian Civil–Military Relations and the Origins of the Second Chechen War, 269. Cohen, Russia’s Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus, 29. Williams, “The Russo-Chechen War,” 136.

184

Notes to pages 125–33

89 Evangelista finds that 42 per cent of Russians surveyed believed that Budanov’s actions were justified; see Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 152. 90 Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 47. 91 Piontkowsky, “Russia Goes Nuclear over Chechnya.” 92 Zhukov, “Counterinsurgency in a Non-Democratic State,” 293. 93 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 70. 94 See Thomas (“Grozny 2000”) for a more thorough discussion. 95 Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya. 96 Lopez, “Lessons We May Not Want to Learn,” 1. 97 Williams, Inferno in Chechnya, 187. 98 International Crisis Group, “War Crimes in Sri Lanka,” 4. 99 Zhukov, “Counterinsurgency in a Non-Democratic State,” 289.

c onc l usi o n 1 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, 22. He points out that the military was deprived of financial resources required to even maintain a viable fighting force, let alone pursue much-needed upgrades. 2 Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 16, 113. To be fair, Trinquier’s treatise can more accurately be described as a blend of enemy-centric and barbaric strategies. For example, he often calls for the removal of all inputs that guerrilla forces require to operate, and he believes that a key to success is the complete eradication of an insurgent organization. For an insightful comparison between David Galula and Roger Trinquier see Demarest, “Let’s Take the French Experience in Algeria out of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine.” 3 Peters, “Progress and Peril.” 4 Luttwak, “Dead End,” 41–2. 5 Kahl, “coin of the Realm.” 6 Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation,” 118. 7 Shelton, Stojek, and Sullivan, “What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes,” 521. 8 United Nations General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” 30. 9 This is by no means an exhaustive list, and both policy options entail significant drawbacks. Moreover, a great deal has already been written about these subjects, well beyond the scope of this book. My intention here is merely to provide readers with a broad overview of potential policies and their implications. Practitioners will therefore need to carefully consider the unique circumstances and available resources when formulating national security policy. 10 Ethier, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective?” Meanwhile, for a broad review of existing literature on democracy promotion see Shin, “On the Third Wave of Democratization”; and Geddes, “What Causes Democratization?”

Notes to pages 133–8 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

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Mounk and Foa, “The End of the Democratic Century.” Shin, “On the Third Wave of Democratization,” 164–5. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 308. Burnell, “From Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy Promotion,” 421. Rose, “Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy,” 193. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” 647. Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight. Watts et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies, xviii. Another challenge third-party actors face is whether liberalization or democratization should be the policy objective. According to Shin, the “former encompasses the more modest goal of merely loosening restrictions and expanding individual and group rights within an authoritarian regime, the latter goes beyond expanded civil and political rights” (“On the Third Wave of Democratization,” 142). See, for example, Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 351. Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” 262. Finkel, Pérez-Liõán, and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003.” Ibid., 405–6. Burnside and Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” 847. Epstein et al., “Democratic Transitions,” 566. US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24, 18, 98–9. Easterly, Levine, and Roodman, “New Data, New Doubts,” 6. Boone, “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,” 322. Boone also found “strong evidence that aid flows primarily benefit a wealthy political elite” (293). Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 17. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 342. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization,” vi. Arndt, Jones, and Tarp, “Aid, Growth, and Development.” Clemens et al., “Counting Chickens When They Hatch,” 2. Riddell, “Does Foreign Aid Work?” 53. Muni, “Anatomy of a South Asian Revolt,” 181. International Crisis Group, “War Crimes in Sri Lanka,” ii. Beehner et al., “The Taming of the Tigers,” 5. Lopez, “Lessons We May Not Want to Learn,” 11. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point. Shelton, Stojek, and Sullivan, “What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes,” 528.

186 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60

61 62

63 64 65

Notes to pages 138–43

Watts et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies, 2. Mazarr, “The Folly of ‘Asymmetric War’,” 44. Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 184. Toft, Securing the Peace, 2. Ibid., 4. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 351. DeRouen and Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” 317. Bapat, “Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes,” 713. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards,” 2004, 76. Also see Edelstein, Occupational Hazards, 2008. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 25. Watts et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies, 16. Enterline, Stull, and Magagnoli, “Reversal of Fortune?,” 191. Beehner et al., “The Taming of the Tigers,” 40. Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones,” 707. Murdie and Davis, “Shaming and Blaming.” DeMeritt, “International Organizations and Government Killing.” Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim explain that domestic prosecution of human rights abuses became more common during the mid-1970s; however, “the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (icty ) in 1993 was the first time since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials that states returned to using individual criminal accountability at the international level”; see Sikkink and Kim, “The Justice Cascade,” 271. United Nations General Assembly, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” Snyder and Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors,” 43. Meernik, Nichols, and King, “The Impact of International Tribunals and Domestic Trials,” 311. Goldsmith and Krasner, “The Limits of Idealism,” 55. They further suggest that “it is hard to see how the icc can stop, or even affect, persons responsible for large-scale human rights abuses” (55) and even suggest that “prosecution may cause more harm” (51). Gegout, “The International Criminal Court,” 801. Sikkink and Kim, “The Justice Cascade,” 281. See also Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries”. Jo and Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” Appel, “In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court,” 22. Krcmaric, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?” This discussion concerning the efficacy of the icc is arguably related to the broader theoretical debate on

Notes to pages 143–53

66 67 68 69

70 71 72

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whether international institutions affect global affairs. In particular, see Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”; and Keohane and Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 164. Beehner et al., “The Taming of the Tigers.” Toft, Securing the Peace. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 150. Fearon and Laitin caution, however, that Kaufmann’s recommendation may entail high costs and only serves to incentivize insurgents (“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 88). Machiavelli, The Prince, 66. Shelton, Stojek, and Sullivan, “What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes,” 530. Diamond, “Facing up to the Democratic Recession”. Also see Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding.

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Index

al-Assad, Bashar, 5, 48, 53 al-Juboory, Khalid, xii Al-Qaeda, xi, 27 Amman, Karuna, 115 Amnesty International, 61, 90, 102, 110, 112, 123 Apodaca, Clair, 47 Arab Spring, 5, 133 Arndt, Channing, 136 Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, 10, 22, 36, 43, 57 authoritarian, xii, 10, 35, 45, 56–7, 77; authoritarian backsliding, 137–8. See also democracy; regime type bad states, xii, 6–7. See also Geneva Conventions; International Bill of Human Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; international humanitarian law; Italian War of Independence; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (udhr ) Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, 50–1 Banana Wars, 83

Bangladesh Liberation War, 41 Bapat, Navin, 139 barbarism, 9, 36–8. See also counterinsurgency strategy; enemy-centric strategy; population-centric strategy Basayev, Shamil, 118–19 Basnett, Yurendra, 95 Battle of Aanandapuram, 110 Battle of Grozny, 118 Berman, Eli, 29, 32 Black, George, 86 Boer Republics of Transvaal, 38 Boone, Peter, 135–6 Booth, John, 84, 89, 90, 92 Brzoska, Michael, 49 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 134 Burnell, Peter, 134 Burnside, Craig, 135 Byman, Daniel, 24, 138 Callwell, Charles, 31 Canfield, Daniel, 118 Carothers, Thomas, 133, 139 Cassidy, Robert, 8, 122 Cave, David, 113 Central Intelligence Agency (cia ), 29, 111

212

Index

Ceylon Citizenship Act (1948), 107 Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin, 83, 87 ChavarrÌa, Ricardo, 84 Chechen Syndrome, 120 Chechen War, 116–26, 144. See also Russia Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 118 Christian, Shirley, 89 Cingranelli-Richards (ciri ) Human Rights, 61–2 civil wars, 16–20. See also insurgency; intrastate conflict Clark, Ann Marie, 62 Clemens, Michael, 136 coding, 61–3 Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (cpn–m ), 96, 102 Composite Index of National Capability (cinc ), 64, 75, 105, 129 Comprehensive Peace Accord (cpa ), 99 Correlates of War (cow ), 60 counterinsurgency strategy, 8–10, 30–40; counterinsurgency strategy spectrum, 39; Nepal, 99–101; Nicaragua, 88–90; Russia, 120–2; Sri Lanka, 111–13. See also barbarism; enemy-centric strategy; insurgency; population-centric strategy Cuzan, Alfred, 85, 89 Daalder, Ivo, 49 Davis, David, 141 Dixon, Jeffrey, 20, 63 Dixon, Paul, 35 Debayle, Anastasio Somoza, 85–95, 104–5, 130, 140, 141 Debayle, Luis Somoza, 85 DeMeritt, Jacqueline, 141 Department of Defense Counterinsurgency Field Manual,

9, 20, 28, 32, 34–5, 47, 135; doctrinal miscegenation, 28 Department of State Counterinsurgency Guide, 20, 27, 31, 59 DeRouen, Karl, 60, 139 DeVotta, Neil, 111, 114 diplomacy, 48–50; Nepal, 101–2; Nicaragua, 90–2; Russia, 123–4; Sri Lanka, 113–14 Dollar, David, 135 domestic opposition, 12, 51–2; Nepal, 102–3; Nicaragua, 92–3; Russia, 124–5; Sri Lanka, 114–15 democracy, 63, 66–8; democratic recession, 145; promotion, 133–5. See also authoritarian; regime type Downes, Alexander, 9, 22, 42, 52, 77 Downs, George, 134 Doyle, Michael, 18, 60 Dudayev, Dzhokhar, 117 duration (conflict/war), 24–5, 52–3, 63, 81 Earl, Jennifer, 36 Easterly, William, 135 Eck, Kristine, 98 economic development, 28, 100, 135–6. See also foreign aid Edelstein, David, 139–40 Elbadawi, Ibrahim, 44 Elliott, Kimberly, 48 enemy-centric strategy, 8, 30–2 Engelhardt, Michael, 44, 45 Enterline, Andrew, 34, 40, 51, 140 Epstein, David, 135 Escribà-Folch, Abel, 49 essential services, 3, 104, 135. See also infrastructure; populationcentric strategy; social services Ethier, Diane, 133

Index ethnic fractionalization, 64, 77 European Court of Human Rights, 123 European Union, 114, 133 Evangelista, Matthew, 119, 121, 125 failed cases, 83–106; regime type, 44–6; Russia’s barbarism, 123; success or failure, 42–3 Fair, C. Christine, 108, 114 Fariss, Christopher, 62–3 Faurby, Ib, 117, 120, 124 Fein, Helen, 44 Fett, Patrick, 63, 75 Finch, Ray, 120–3 Finel, Bernard, 31, 33 Finkel, Stephen, 135 foreign aid, 13, 46–8, 64, 135–6, 140–1; Nepal, 101–2; Nicaragua, 90–2; Russia, 123–4; Sri Lanka, 113–14. See also economic development foreign terrorist organization (fto ), 114 fourth-generation warfare (4gw ), 27 Galeotti, Mark, 118, 120, 122, 126, 130 Galula, David, 26, 33, 47, 66 Gandhi, Rajiv, 114 García, Anastasio Somoza, 84 Gartner, Scott, 11, 44, 53 Gegout, Catherine, 142 Geneva Conventions, 6 Gent, Stephen, 50 Gentile, Gian, 35 Getmansky, Anna, 46 Gomez, SimonPeter, 47 Good Neighbor Policy, 84 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 121 Gordon, Dennis, 91

213

Gordon, Stuart, 95, 99, 100 Gorman, Stephen, 93 Greenhill, Kelly, 42 guerrilla tactics, 7–8, 21–4, 43; transition to conventional, 26–7 guerrilla warfare, 26, 29; internal guerrilla wars, 18; relationship to terrorism, 27–8 Gurr, Ted, 54 Hafner-Burton, Emilie, 49, 141 Hashim, Ahmed, 10, 110–12, 114, 116 Hayden, William, 52 hearts and minds, 4–5, 32, 34–5, 37, 39, 40, 100. See also population-centric strategy Henderson, Errol, 54 Hobbes, Thomas, 53 Huang, Reyko, 49–50 Hufbauer, Gary, 48 Hultquist, Philip, 26, 51, 59 Ibm al-Khattab, 124 Indian peacekeeping force (ipkf ), 109 infrastructure, 20, 85–6, 103. See also essential services; social services insurgency, 7–8, 20–5; coding outcomes, 58–61; competing definitions and imprecise literature, 29; domestic insurgencies, 5; evolution of an insurgency, 25. See also civil wars; counterinsurgency strategy; intrastate conflict Integrated Security and Development Program (isdp ), 100 International Bill of Human Rights, 7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7

214

Index

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 7 International Criminal Court, (icc ), 141–3 International Crisis Group, 103, 137 international humanitarian law, 6–7, 9, 37, 110 international military intervention (imi ), 66. See also military intervention interstate wars, 11, 16–17 intrastate conflict, 18. See also civil wars; insurgency Iraq, 4, 133, 136–7; infrastructure, 3 Islamic extremism, 27, 118–19, 123–4 Italian War of Independence, 6 Jo, Hyeran, 142 Jones, Benjamin, 51 Kahl, Colin, 131 Kalyvas, Stathis, 11, 17, 22–3, 37 43, 51, 59, 77 Kaufmann, Chaim, 33, 52, 143–4 Khasavyurt Accord, 118 Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 121 Khatri, Punra, 100–1 Kilcullen, David, 25, 27, 63, 140 Knack, Stephen, 134 Kosovo War, 49, 52 Kramer, Mark, 122 Krane, Dale, 45 Krcmaric, Daniel, 37, 56 Kreuttner, Timothy, 95–6, 101–2 Kumaratunga, Chandrika, 111 Lalwani, Sameer, 111, 116 Latell, Brian, 92 Leahy Amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act, 46

Leites, Nathan, 25, 29, 31, 43, 136 LeoGrande, William, 86 Lewis, David, 116 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte ), 108–6, 127 Lopez, Andrea, 116, 126, 137 low-intensity conflict (lic ), 27, 60 Luttwak, Edward, 131 Lyall, Jason, 23, 43, 59–60, 67, 77 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 145 Mack, Andrew, 10, 22, 26, 45 Magnusson, Marta-Lisa, 117, 120, 124 Mahoney, James, 84 Maskhadov, Aslan, 118 Mason, T. David, 21, 45, 50, 59, 63, 75 Mazarr, Michael, 138 McCain, John, 48 Meernik, James, 142 Melshen, Paul, 40 Merom, Gil, 10, 22, 29, 42, 45, 57 military intervention, 50–1, 66, 138– 40; Sri Lanka, 109. See also international military intervention (imi ) military personnel, 75–7, 129 Morley, Morris, 87 Munro, Margaret, 91 Murdie, Amanda, 141 Nagl, John, 23, 31, 33–4, 40 naming and shaming, 13, 141 national material capabilities, 64 Nepalese Civil War, 95–104 Nicaragua, 82, 141; Nicaraguan revolution, 83–95 Norris, John, 96 O’Connell, Mark, 111 Office of National Security (osn ), 86

Index O’Hanlon, Michael, 49 Oliker, Olga, 117, 121, 124 Orange Free State, 38 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd ), 47 Organization of American States (oas ), 90 Osama Bin Laden, 124 Palestinian Liberation Organization (plo ), 92 Pape, Robert, 43–4, 48–9, 60 Paul, Christopher, 31, 34, 39, 43, 87, 91, 93, 99 Pestana, Randy, 92 Peters, Ralph, 9, 35, 131 political terror scale (PTS), 61–2 population-centric strategy, xii, 4, 9, 32–6, 70 Portuguese colonial wars, 38 power asymmetry, 21–2 Pulikovsky, Konstantin, 118 Punitive Diplomacy, 48–50 Putin, Vladimir, 120–3, 125, 127, 130 Rajapaksa, Mahinda, 110–13, 115, 127, 130 Ramadan Revolution, 8 Rasler, Karen, 53 Record, Jeffrey, 48, 80 Regan, Patrick, 11, 18, 44, 53–4 regime type, 44–6, 63, 66–7, 74. See also authoritarian; democracy responsibility to protect (r2p ), 132, 138 Riddell, Roger, 136 Rose, Gideon, 134 Royal Nepal Army, (rna ), 97–102 Rumsey, Jessie, 47

215

Rupesinghe, Kumar, 109, 111, 113–14, 116 Russia, 4, 116–28, 130, 137, 141. See also Chechen War Salih, Cale, 96, 99, 103 Sambanis, Nicholas, 18–20, 44, 60, 75 sanctions, 48–9, 64 sanctuary, 31, 80 Sandinista National Liberation Front (fsln ), 85–94, 104 Sandino, Augusto César, 84, 86 Sandlin, Evan, 47 Schott, Jeffery, 48 Shin, Doh Chull, 133 Sikkink, Kathryn, 62, 142 Simmons, Beth, 142 Sinhala Only Act (1956), 107 small war, 29, 45, 60 Smith, Neil, 113, 115–16 Snyder, Jack, 142 Sobek, David, 60, 139 social services, 5, 10, 28, 85, 100. See also essential services; infrastructure Soviet Armed Forces, 130 Sri Lanka, 41, 126–8, 137, 141; Sri Lankan Civil War, 107–16, 144 Stohl, Michael, 47 Syrian Civil War, 48 Szászdi, Lajos, 121 Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (tmvp ), 115 Templer, Gerald, 34 terrorism, 27–8; War on Terrorism, 101, 109, 113, 123, 125, 133 Terrorist and Disruptive Act, 100 Toft, Monica, 52, 139, 143 Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, 49

216 Ulfelder, Jay, 37 United States Agency for International Development (usaid ), 135 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (udhr ), 9 Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (ucdp ) Conflict Termination, 60–1, 77, 81, 153 Valentino, Benjamin, 37 Vanden, Harry, 88 von Einsiedel, Sebastian, 96, 99, 103 Vinjamuri, Leslie, 142

Index war of liberation, 87 Watts, Stephen, 35, 75, 134, 138, 140 Waxman, Matthew, 24, 139 Weber, Henri, 89 Weerasinghe, Chalinda, 108 Weitz, Richard, 85, 91, 93–5 Williams, Brian, 119–20, 122–3, 125, 127 Wilson, Andrew, 91 Wilson, Isaiah, 23, 59–60, 67, 77 Wolf, Charles, 25, 29, 31, 43, 136 World Rwandan Genocide (ictr ), 142 Yugoslav Wars (icty ), 142

Wade, Christine, 87, 89, 92–4 Walker, Thomas, 86, 87, 89, 91–4

Zhukov, Yuri, 10, 52, 125, 128