The Greek Civil War: Strategy, Counterinsurgency and the Monarchy 1784537802, 9781784537807

Table of contents :
Cover
Author Biography
Title
Copyright
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction: What about the Greek Civil War?
Why Study the Greek Civil War?
The Different Interpretations of the Greek Civil War
Scholarly Work
Non-Scholarly Work
Structure of the Book
1. The ‘War of the Flea’: Theory and Practice
The Ambiguous Concept of Insurgency
The Strategy of the Insurgents
Strategy of the Counterinsurgents
2. A Stillborn Peace: February 1945–January 1947
The ‘White Terror’ (?): 1945
AWar by Proxy?: 1945
Weak State-building: February 1945–March 1946
Bullets and Ballots: March 1946
‘Long Live the King’: April–September 1946
Bullets and Olive Branches: September–October 1946
The Crisis of the Right: October 1946–January 1947
3. A ‘Peace-and-War’ State: January–October 1947
The ‘Seven-Headed’ Government: January–February 1947
Greece and the Great Powers: January–May 1947
The Division of Europe: June–August 1947
A Marriage of Convenience: August 1947
The Declaration of War: September–November 1947
4. ‘Communism Delenda Est’: November 1947–October 1949
From Appeasement to Repression: November 1947
‘Free Greece’: December 1947–January 1948
Periculum ex Septentrionalis (Danger from the North)?: February 1948
The Palace and Army: March–May 1948
The Tito–Stalin Schism: June 1948
The High Tide of the DSE: July–December 1948
A Militarily Supervised Democracy: November 1948–January 1949
The Insurgency’s Death Rattle: January–October 1949
Normality Restored: October 1949–50
Conclusion What does the Greek Civil War Teach Us?
The Significance of the War
The Various Myths around the War
The Impact of Strategic Culture
Appendix
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Spyridon Plakoudas is Assistant Professor of Security and Strategy at the American University in the Emirates. He was previously fixedterm lecturer at Panteion University and the Hellenic National Defence College. He holds a PhD in War Studies from the University of Reading.

‘Humanitarian concerns lead us to favour benign counterinsurgency methods focusing on “hearts and minds”. The truth is, however, that the brutal stick, combined with carrots, can be very successful as the Greek Civil War of 1946–9 illustrates. Spyridon Plakoudas brilliantly tests strategic theory against facts garnered from thorough archival research. The result is an uncomfortable testimony to the power of brute force which no student of strategy can afford to ignore.’ – Beatrice Heuser, Professor and Chair of International Relations, Reading University, and author of The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present

THE GREEK CIVIL WAR Strategy, Counterinsurgency and the Monarchy

SPYRIDON PLAKOUDAS

Published in 2017 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2017 Spyridon Plakoudas The right of Spyridon Plakoudas to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. International Library of War Studies 21 ISBN: 978 1 78453 780 7 eISBN: 978 1 78672 149 5 ePDF: 978 1 78673 149 4 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

CONTENTS

Preface Acknowledgements Introduction What about the Greek Civil War?

1.

2.

vii ix 1

Why Study the Greek Civil War? The Different Interpretations of the Greek Civil War Scholarly Work Non-Scholarly Work Structure of the Book

1 2 3 4 5

The ‘War of the Flea’: Theory and Practice

7

The Ambiguous Concept of Insurgency The Strategy of the Insurgents Strategy of the Counterinsurgents

7 9 13

A Stillborn Peace: February 1945– January 1947

20

The ‘White Terror’ (?): 1945 A War by Proxy?: 1945 Weak State-building: February 1945– March 1946 Bullets and Ballots: March 1946 ‘Long Live the King’: April– September 1946 Bullets and Olive Branches: September– October 1946 The Crisis of the Right: October 1946– January 1947

20 25 27 32 38 45 51

vi

3.

4.

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A ‘Peace-and-War’ State: January –October 1947

58

The ‘Seven-Headed’ Government: January–February 1947 Greece and the Great Powers: January–May 1947 The Division of Europe: June–August 1947 A Marriage of Convenience: August 1947 The Declaration of War: September –November 1947

58 62 66 72 77

‘Communism Delenda Est’: November 1947– October 1949

81

From Appeasement to Repression: November 1947 ‘Free Greece’: December 1947– January 1948 Periculum ex Septentrionalis (Danger from the North)?: February 1948 The Palace and Army: March– May 1948 The Tito– Stalin Schism: June 1948 The High Tide of the DSE: July–December 1948 A Militarily Supervised Democracy: November 1948–January 1949 The Insurgency’s Death Rattle: January– October 1949 Normality Restored: October 1949–50

102 107 114

Conclusion What does the Greek Civil War Teach Us?

119

The Significance of the War The Various Myths around the War The Impact of Strategic Culture Appendix Notes Bibliography Index

81 83 87 93 96 97

119 121 125 128 142 205 241

PREFACE

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, insurgency irrefutably constitutes the most prevalent type of war throughout the world. The Greek Civil War (1946–9) stands out as one of the rarest occasions of a conclusive and permanent victory of a government over an insurgency during the Cold War. In fact, the Greek monarchist regime conclusively defeated the communist insurgency in less than four years – a truly noteworthy feat compared to the humiliating failures of the European colonial powers at the hands of the insurgents during the Cold War. Yet, this episode of the Cold War has not been surveyed thoroughly from the point of view of the victor. In reality, the vast majority of the works on the Greek Civil War have studied the interventionist policies of the British and Americans and, above all, the strategy of the Greek communist insurgents. What led to the defeat of a communist insurgency that in 1947 and 1948 seemed on the verge of victory? Did the communist guerrilla movement fall victim to the feud between Stalin and Tito and the vainglory of its top leaders as several scholars maintain? Or did the massive British and, above all, American aid rescue the Greek monarchist regime – notorious for its incompetence – from collapse? Or did the royalist regime triumph over the insurgents thanks to the iron will of the political leadership and the tactical ingenuity of its military commanders? This book attempts to explain how the Greek royalist regime decided to counter the communist insurgency, how external and internal actors influenced the policies it implemented and when, how and why these policies were crowned with success. For the very first time, this book will study one of the most controversial episodes of modern Greek history from a new angle in the light of new archival material.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank, first and foremost, my primary supervisor, Professor Beatrice D. Heuser, who spared no effort in showing me how a doctoral degree can be won and, above all, taught me how to become a genuine academic and a complete personality. She has been a true mentor for me and a role model to follow. I would also like to thank my family and friends who helped me win my doctoral thesis in an indirect way. In addition, I want to thank the staff (academic and non-academic) in the various institutions in Greece and the UK who facilitated my research and broadened my mental horizons.

INTRODUCTION WHAT ABOUT THE GREEK CIVIL WAR?

Why Study the Greek Civil War? The vast literature on strategy tends to focus almost exclusively on wars between states, the nucleus of the international system since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648; however, intra-state wars have in reality considerably outnumbered inter-state wars since World War II without, however, attracting an equal amount of attention by the strategists.1 Fred Halliday pointedly remarked that insurgency, a common type of intra-state war that has influenced post-1945 world affairs as profoundly as nuclear weapons, paradoxically remained a subject ignored by orthodox strategic studies.2 Although the study of insurgency as a ‘revolutionary’ type of war thrived in France, Britain and the USA during the first years of the Cold War, the repeated defeats3 of these Western (colonial) powers at the hands of insurgents across the Third World ruined their reputation as experts on irregular warfare and sharply reduced their preoccupation with the study of the latter. By the end of the 1970s, the military and academic establishments in the West had once again reverted to the study of conventional and nuclear wars.4 In the postCold War, this trend was reversed in favour of the study of irregular warfare. Indeed, at the dawn of the twenty-first century the concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) occupy once again a pre-eminent status in the vocabulary of strategists.5

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Though it ended nearly 70 years ago, the Greek Civil War can still provide valuable insights on the theory and practice of COIN. This war deserves thorough study as a rare occasion of a permanent victory over an insurgency. After all, the successive revolts of the Kurds in Turkey throughout the twentieth century show that victory over an insurgency usually translates into a fragile truce – not permanent peace. In the case of Greece, however, the communists did not try to seize power again through force of arms. In addition, this war stands out as an uncommon occasion of victory over a communist insurgency during the Cold War. By comparison, the USA suffered a humiliating failure in Vietnam at the hands of the communist insurgents. Though eclipsed by other intra-state wars of the twentieth century such as the Vietnam War (1961 – 72), this early episode of the Cold War deserves the consideration of academics for setting in motion political developments with consequences beyond the narrow frontiers of the Balkans. For the first time after 1945, the USA intervened (in peacetime) to support a third country threatened by a communist insurgency and, hence, contain communism in the Eastern Mediterranean. For the first time in its history, the UN founded observatory agencies to monitor a conflict inside a UN member-state. In addition, Greece became the first base in the Eastern Mediterranean from which Britain withdrew in the post-1945 era. Last but not least, the Greek Civil War strained the once-close partnership between Moscow and Belgrade and, therefore, partially contributed to the Tito – Stalin schism.

The Different Interpretations of the Greek Civil War The literature on the Greek Civil War, without doubt, impresses researchers with its sheer size; two Greek scholars recently calculated that the scholarly production on the Greek Civil War alone included 171 works written between 1944 and 2002.6 The entire vast literature involves scholarly and non-scholarly works and reflects the constant debates and disputes within the Greek politicians, scholars and citizens on this still controversial episode of modern Greek history.7

INTRODUCTION

3

Scholarly Work The scholarly work on the civil war includes three chronologically and thematically distinct schools of historiography (‘traditional’, ‘revisionist’ and ‘post-revisionist’).8 These schools of thought evolved over the last 65 years owing to specific scientific and, above all, political reasons.

The ‘Traditional’ School The ‘traditional’ school surfaced after the victory of the Right in the Greek Civil War and dominated the scholarly production on the subject until the 1970s owing to the political and ideological hegemony of the Right. Since the illuminating Greek archives remained classified until the early 1990s, scholars obtained information from Western primary sources (mostly memoirs and diaries) and, therefore, interpreted the civil war from the viewpoint of the British and US ‘Cold Warriors’. According to the ‘traditional’ historians, the culpability for the Greek Civil War must be assigned exclusively to the expansionist agenda of Moscow and its Balkan underlings after World War II: by definition a proxy war, the conflict was initiated by Stalin and Tito who used their agent (i.e. the Greek communist party) to oust the British from their old protectorate in the Balkans and abandoned it to its (tragic) fate when this crisis outlived its value for the Soviet and Yugoslav geopolitical visions.9 The ‘Revisionist’ School The ‘revisionist’ school surfaced to prominence after the collapse of the military junta in 1974 and, most notably, after the rise of the socialdemocratic PASOK (the soi-disant advocate of the oppressed) to power in 1981. The collapse of the anti-communist state ideology and the spread of an ‘underdog political culture’ in Greece in the last quarter of the twentieth century opened the way for the emergence and dominance of the ‘revisionist’ school.10 In contrast to their ‘traditional’ predecessors, the ‘revisionists’ imputed the outbreak and escalation of the war to the anti-communist obsession of the Right and the Anglo-Americans. Accordingly, the violent persecution of the Left by the far Right compelled the communists to start a defensive struggle that was condemned to failure

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from the start owing to two reasons: the intervention of the ‘imperialist and neo-colonial’ Anglo-Americans in support of an oppressive royalist regime and the apathy of the Soviet Union.11

The ‘Post-Revisionist’ School The ‘post-revisionist’ school appeared in the post-Cold War era and the retraction of the communist ideology and aspired to examine this intrastate war objectively in the light of the new declassified archives in Greece and Britain.12 These ‘post-revisionist’ scholars tried to find a middle ground in the historiographic vortex of Greece; the vicious conflict between the communists and non-communists since World War II and the increasing rivalry between the Soviet and Western camp in the early Cold War led to a violent fratricidal war with regional and international implications that was terminated at the expense of the communists in the Eastern Mediterranean and democracy in Greece.13

Non-Scholarly Work The non-scholarly work on the Greek Civil War outstrips the scholarly by a ratio of 3 to 1. The two schools of thought for non-scholarly works, the right-wing and left-wing, did not try to seek the truth; instead, they tried to propagandise the ideas and arguments of each side (the victors and defeated) for the origins, course and outcome of the war.14

The ‘Right-wing’ School The right-wing memoirs, biographies and treatises were written primarily between 1945 and 1974 – a period marked by the dominance of the Right and the repression of the Left. By definition propaganda texts, these works labeled the communists as underlings of Tito and Stalin who threw the country into three fratricidal conflicts (1943, 1944–5, 1946–9) for the sake of the expansionist agenda of the communist bloc (i.e. the annexation of Greek Macedonia for Tito and exodus to the Aegean Sea for Stalin). Only the British in 1944– 5 and the USA in 1946– 9 saved Greece from Bolshevism and only NATO warranted Greek independence and territorial integrity during the Cold War according to the ‘right-wing’ school of thought.15

INTRODUCTION

5

The ‘Left-wing’ School The left-wing memoirs, biographies or treatises, written primarily after the rise of the social-democratic PASOK in power and the spread of the ‘underdog’ political culture, outnumber considerably their rightwing counterparts. Surprisingly, the collapse of communism in the 1990s reduced neither the production rate nor the popularity of these left-wing works.16 In sharp contrast to their ‘right-wing’ predecessors, these left-wing works imputed the internecine strife during the 1940s to an unholy alliance between a reactionary Right and the imperialist foreign powers (Germany, Britain, USA) to impede the rise of the Left to power: the ‘fascist’ Germans allied themselves with the anti-communist Greeks against the ‘patriotic left-wing resistance’ in World War II, the ‘imperialist’ British provoked the fratricidal wars of 1944– 5 and 1946–9 by installing a ‘reactionary right-wing regime’ and the ‘neocolonialist’ Americans intervened in the civil war of 1946– 9 in support of an ‘oppressive royalist regime’.17

Structure of the Book As a brief analysis of the vast literature on the subject clearly shows, the scholarly and non-scholarly works have studied the Greek Civil War in an oversimplified and prejudiced way. Far worse, not a single work that examines the COIN strategy or tactics of the Greek royalist regime, in a systematic and objective way, exists. This book, a product of four long years of research in primary sources (especially hitherto-inaccessible archives in Greece), tries to fill this gap precisely. The structure of this book reflects the author’s intention to present the facts in a simple and coherent way for the benefit of the readers. Chapter 1 studies the genuine nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency (a variant of irregular warfare) and synthesises the invaluable insights from the schools of thought on COIN into a standardised COIN strategy. Chapter 2 investigates the true origins of the civil war and examines the initial phase of the war (February 1945– January 1947) – the period between the ‘official’ eruption of the war on 31 March 1946 and the establishment of the first coalition government in the face of the growing communist threat and rising allied pressure.

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Chapter 3 examines the second and most controversial phase of the war (January– October 1947) – an unusual ‘peace-and-war’ phase of simultaneous peace talks and vicious fighting between the two sides that ended in September 1947 when the communists decided to declare open war. Chapter 4 analyses the third and most violent phase of the war (November 1947– October 1949) – a period interjecting between the implementation of ‘Plan Limnes’ by the insurgents for the establishment of a ‘Free Greece’ in December 1947 and the rout of the insurgents in the battles of mounts Grammos and Vitsi in October 1949. The conclusion summarises the lessons for the theory and practice of COIN and the myths for the Greek Civil War in modern historiography. Last but not least, this chapter offers an interpretation of the strategy of the winning side (the Greek royalist regime, Britain and the USA) from the under-studied angle of strategic culture.

CHAPTER 1 `

THE WAR OF THE FLEA': THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Ambiguous Concept of Insurgency Over the ages, insurgency assumed various names (e.g. revolt, small war, revolutionary people’s war, etc.) and even today over 20 terms are invariably employed to denote the same phenomenon (low intensity conflict, civil war, guerrilla warfare etc.).1 This plethora of terms creates unnecessary confusion for academics and decision-makers about the genuine nature of an insurgency. Does the concept of insurgency subsume the concept of guerrilla war? Should an insurgency be defined as an asymmetrical war or does the concept of asymmetrical warfare extend to intra-state as well as inter-state wars?2 The concept of insurgency has developed and evolved over time owing to the unique conditions in every historical cycle: the ‘small wars’ waged by the European colonial powers in their overseas territories in the nineteenth century or the ‘revolutionary wars’ undertaken by the communists in the Third World during the Cold War refer precisely to the ‘asymmetrical wars’ or ‘new wars’ at the dawn of the twenty-first century.3 How can insurgency, thus, be defined correctly? The 2006 US Field Manual on Counterinsurgency offers by far the most comprehensive definition of the term: Insurgency [is] [. . .] an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1–02) [. . .] an insurgency is an organized,

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protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1–02) [. . .] insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate.4 Insurgency constitutes a variant of irregular warfare just like terrorism.5 The two concepts (i.e. insurgency and terrorism) tend to be confused. Insurgents often use terrorist tactics (such as assassinations of political opponents and suicide attacks) to realise their objectives, but this does not qualify them as terrorists per se.6 In fact, the criterion for the designation of an armed irregular as a terrorist or an insurgent rests in the nature of the irregular threat – not its form. Terrorists literally want to terrorise the people and state authorities into fulfilling their, usually personal, demands (e.g. the release of a fellow terrorist from prison).7 In sharp contrast, an insurgency stands for a protracted politico-military struggle waged by an armed group in the name of a specific political objective (e.g. national liberation from a foreign occupier).8 The boundary between insurgency and terrorism tends, however, to be blurred nowadays, as the case of the Islamic State typifies. Should the Islamic State be classified as a terrorist group of foreign and native (Arab) jihadists? Or should the Islamic State be identified as a guerrilla group which springs from the grievances (and greed) of Sunni Arabs in the Middle East? As world history has witnessed time and time again, terrorist groups can develop into guerrilla movements and, in turn, guerrilla movements can degenerate into terrorism owing to unique circumstances in each historical period.9 Last but not least, the political considerations of the state authorities determine whether an irregular adversary will be classified as terrorist, a guerrilla or legitimate non-state actor.10 For example, al-Assad collectively labels the opposition fighters as jihadists whether they belong to jihadist groups (e.g. Jabhat al-Nusra) or not. Likewise, some countries (e.g. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, France and Britain) view the political wing of the insurgents as the legitimate political actor whith whom they can talk.

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To study this phenomenon thoroughly and objectively, several widespread misconceptions must be refuted first. Although exclusively identified as the weapon of the weaker side in an intra-state war,11 an irregular style of warfare could be also employed by the stronger side (e.g. use of commando units by a government against insurgents). An irregular style of warfare could be also used by a state against another hostile country.12 For instance, the USA tried during the Cold War to topple several unfriendly regimes in the Third World by supporting their internal armed opposition (e.g. the Contras in Nicaragua).13 After all, aspects of irregular warfare (e.g. sabotage) constitute integral elements of conventional wars.14 In summary, insurgency corresponds to an ‘armed competition’ for the control of the (local) population – which, undoubtedly, constitutes the key to victory – between a non-state actor and an established state authority.15 In other words, an insurgency stands for an irregular conflict waged ‘amongst the people’ as Sir Rupert Smith observed16 – or better a ‘war waged by the few but dependent on the support of the many’ as Basil Liddell Hart pointedly remarked.17 Mao Tse Tung, the unrivalled thinker and practitioner of insurgency in modern times, coined a helpful metaphor to clarify the essence of this type of war. Indeed, Mao likened the insurgents to fish and the population to the water within which the fish thrive.18 Mao conveyed a crystal clear message: without sufficient support from the people, the insurgency will die out. Since the insurgents and the established state authorities compete for control over the (local) people, both sides practice ‘divided’ or ‘overlapping’ sovereignties over the (local) population and compel the non-combatants – who usually stay neutral for the most part of the conflict – to choose sides.19 For example, during the vicious conflict between a secular military dictatorship and the Islamist insurgents in Algeria (1991 – 2002), the peasants in mountainous villages used to complain that they actually obeyed in two governments – the legitimate government of Algiers during the day and the Islamist one during the night.20

The Strategy of the Insurgents Over the centuries, several scholars have striven to produce typologies of insurgencies on the basis of their political objectives (e.g. anarchist,

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secessionist etc) or operational aspects (e.g. rural or urban guerrilla warfare etc)21 without any consideration for the unique characteristics of each conflict.22 Insurgencies erupt and evolve differently. Even when insurgencies share the same goal (e.g. communist revolution) and modus operandi (e.g. rural guerrilla war), they develop in their own unique way due to the different eco-system of each conflict. Indicatively, the insurgencies in Vietnam and Malaya evolved differently despite their similar goals (i.e. national liberation from colonial rule) and modus operandi (i.e. a rural insurgency by communists and outside support by Moscow amidst the Cold War). Insurgency, first and foremost, implies an asymmetry between irregulars and the established state authority: an asymmetry in strength, modus operandi and organisation. Since the insurgents cannot antagonise the strength of the state authorities (at least in the initial stages of the conflict), they adopt an irregular modus operandi and an underground organisation.23 The various theories on the strategy of the insurgents revolve around four main variables: time, space, legitimacy and support.24

Time Time, without doubt, marks the most important element in irregular warfare since the duration of insurgencies is frequently measured in years – and even decades.25 The insurgents effectively trade strength with time: they utilise time to reinforce their weak forces or regroup after defeat. In sharp contrast, established state authorities do not have the luxury of time to wage a drawn-out war since the economic and political state of affairs may worsen due to the continued instability and, most importantly, the public opinion might quickly tire of the war or lose faith in the victory of the state authority.26 Insurgencies often eventuate in stalemate (such as the separatist Kurdish insurgency in Turkey) after years of conflict; only rarely does an insurgency end in a short period of time due to fatal mistakes of the insurgents or the governments. For example, Castro toppled Batista, the corrupt dictator of Cuba, in just three years (1957 – 9); conversely, the communist insurgents in Greece were vanquished in less than four years (1946 – 9) due to their mistakes in matters of strategy and tactics.

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Mao, the theoretician of guerrilla warfare par excellence, identified three inter-related stages in an insurgency: the ‘strategic defensive, the stalemate and the strategic offensive’. In the opening phase, the insurgents adopt a strategy of exhaustion: they use hit-and-run tactics to exhaust their superior opponent. In the second phase, the insurgents apply a strategy of attrition and undertake operations to undermine the opponent’s strength and spirit. Only after developing the necessary military capabilities for a conventional war can the insurgents adopt a strategy of annihilation to exterminate their enemy in decisive engagements. According to Mao, each phase corresponds to an analogous theatre of war. In the first phase, the insurgents wage a guerrilla war in inaccessible terrain (e.g. lofty mountains); in the second phase, the insurgents spread their guerrilla war to the countryside (i.e. small towns and villages) and, in the third phase, they storm the cities.27

Space Space, yet another important element of irregular warfare, affords the insurgents the luxury to decide when, where and how to engage in combat. Vast and/or rough territory (e.g. mountains or vast wild land) offers the insurgents the opportunity to offset the superiority of their opponents in numbers, technology or resources.28 Insurgents can, nevertheless, thrive even in confined spaces as long as they possess the needed capabilities and will to paralyse their opponent.29 The EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) in Cyprus, for example, managed to force the British out of the island after six years (1955– 9) despite the small size of the island and its remoteness from EOKA’s chief supporter, Greece. In modern times, the sprawling cities have developed into a complex environment that presents the insurgents with operational advantages. The majority of the world’s population currently lives in cities and, accordingly, insurgent activity has been recently transferred into the cities. The urban environment neutralises the tactical and operational superiority of the state security organs since they can neither manoeuvre easily within the complex urban terrain nor function freely due to the concern for collateral damage (most notably civilian casualties). However, cities can be equally transformed from safe heavens into death traps for the insurgents: the state security organs may quarantine the whole city and cleanse

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neighbourhood after neighbourhood from insurgents.30 For example, the Chechen insurgents used the urban environment to their advantage against Russia’s armed forces in the First Battle of Grozny (1994–5), whereas the Iraqi insurgents were cut off and wiped out piecemeal by the US armed forces in the Second Battle of Fallujah (2004). In addition to the size and nature of the terrain, the force-to-space ratios influence the duration and outcome of an insurgency. Usually the state authorities protect the targets with the greatest military, political, symbolic and economic value and abandon the countryside to the mercy of the insurgents. Irrespective of their superiority in numbers and materiel, the state authorities cannot protect all targets at all times.31 The case of the Afghan War (2001–present) clearly illustrates the above point. The ISAF at its peak in 2012 deployed over 130,000 soldiers against 60,000 Taliban insurgents – an apparently inadequate ratio of 2:1. Unsurprisingly, the Taliban insurgency cannot be tackled by such a modest force.

Support Internal and external support, without doubt, ranks as a top priority for the insurgents. Outside support for an insurgency has been identified as a key factor or even the most crucial determinant for victory in irregular warfare. Support for the insurgents by another country includes weapons, subsidies, sanctuary, training, logistics and even foreign troops in the guise of volunteers.32 The Afghan mujahedeen, for example, could never have triumphed over the Soviets unless the USA and Pakistan supported them in every way. Internal support pertains to the active or passive aid provided by a section of the population to the insurgents. Often an ‘active minority’ supports the insurgents and the majority of the people remain neutral until the ‘active minority’ convinces or compels them to side with the insurgents.33 Victory for the insurgents does not necessarily require support from the majority of the population. However, the insurgents cannot win without support from even a minority of the population. Castro in Cuba did not enjoy support from the majority of the Cuban people but eventually overcome the weak regime of Batista. His comrade-in-arms Che Guevara did not command the support of even the few communist members in Bolivia and, quite predictably, suffered defeat and death within months of the stillborn insurgency.

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Legitimacy Legitimacy remains an important element in the equation. The insurgents try to legitimise the use of violence and translate this new legitimacy through violence into tangible support from the (local) people. The insurgents strive to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the public from their adversaries (state officials or non-state actors such as criminals, terrorists and insurgents) whom they slander as corrupt, inept and oppressive. Therefore, the insurgents strive to dispense justice and refrain from wanton violence. Several insurgent organisations, however, frequently exercise violence to extract the acquiescence of the population or even engage in illegal activities such as drug and human trafficking.34 The case of the Albanian insurgents in Kosovo stands as a typical case. In addition, the insurgents construct a parallel state by supplanting the key state functions (e.g. taxation, education, security).35 In south-east Turkey, for example, the Kurdish insurgents have created a shadow state with its thorough mechanisms for taxation, security, education and justice. Last but not least, the insurgents propagandise a convincing narrative to raise internal and external support. This message may appeal to the religious sentiment or national zeal of the local population; the closer the message to the population’s idiosyncrasy, the stronger its appeal.36 In modern times, insurgent organisations may appeal to single or multiple causes (e.g. religion, anti-imperialism etc). The Kurdish insurgency in Turkey represents a typical case as it combines communist doctrine with Kurdish nationalism and Alevi secularism.

Strategy of the Counterinsurgents How does a state authority choose to counter an insurgency? Despite the assiduous endeavours of various strategic thinkers to specify a particular type of response to insurgencies, no standard type of counterinsurgency has been invented thus far.37 Two principal schools of thought in the theory and practice of counterinsurgency (COIN) have been nonetheless identified on the basis of their ‘centre of gravity’: an enemy-centric and a population-centric approach. The advocates of the enemy-centric approach consider the military defeat of the insurgents as a state authority’s top priority. Viewing the insurgents as nothing more than criminals and/or terrorists, the partisans of this

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school of thought claim that the elimination of these subversives will terminate the upheaval. Understanding COIN as a variant of conventional warfare, this approach is associated with an offensive character and high levels of violence.38 For example, al-Assad has adopted an enemy-centric approach against the armed opposition in Syria with an acute emphasis on indiscriminate violence since he collectively considers the insurgents and their civilian sympathisers ‘terrorists’. In sharp contrast, the partisans of a population-centric approach claim that a state authority must, first and foremost, deny insurgents the support of the population and the insurgency will inescapably die out.39 The population-centric is further divided into two sub-categories on the basis of the tactics employed by a state authority to acquire control over the population: one variant prioritises tailored reforms and targeted violence and another prioritises tailored reforms and selective violence and the other prioritises coercion.40 According to the first variant of this approach, the insurgents represent nothing more than a violent minority that uses coercion to terrorise the population into submission; naturally, the state authority must outcompete the insurgents in this contest of coercion and secure control over the population by using much higher levels of coercion.41 The Soviet Union, for example, transferred en masse whole nations to Siberia and Central Asia or even used poisonous gases to suppress the various rebellions against their rule. According to the second sub-category of this approach, the insurgents represent in fact the military wing of a mass political movement which springs from popular discontent. Therefore, the state authority must redress the sources of the popular rancour and isolate the population from the insurgents by using a balanced combination of targeted military operations and reforms; without sufficient popular support, the insurgency will, without doubt, die out.42 For example, during the Malayan Emergency (1948–60) Britain suppressed the communist insurgency by promising the people of Malaya independence from colonial rule and transferring the insurgent-sympathetic peasants into new villages under state supervision. Though widely popular within academic circles and military academies of the West at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the population-centric approach has been sternly criticised as another overrated concept that offers solutions only at an operational or tactical level; in other words, this approach does not represent a strategy in

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itself.43 After all, the ‘population-centric’ focus of the US COIN campaign in Afghanistan since 2007 has not yielded results as promised by its pundits. Warfare against insurgents involves a formidable variety of principles, paradoxes and imperatives that every state authority must consider carefully.44 In summary, a successful COIN strategy broadly contains five primary variables: political, diplomatic, economic, ideological and military. However, a government may not employ all the available means or use them in different combinations at different phases of the war. The ways a government uses all available means varies for various reasons ranging from the interaction with insurgents to bureaucratic antagonisms within a government.

Good Governance Several theorists and practitioners of COIN realised that insurgency, just like every other type of war, possesses an intrinsic political nature.45 David Galula, a French soldier-theorist at the sunset of the French colonial power, went as far as to state that ‘political actions remain foremost throughout the war’.46 In effect, every action (military, economic, ideological, etc.) in COIN possesses an intrinsic political weight due to the indisputable political effects that each action produces.47 Ergo, several theorists and practitioners stress the imperative of political primacy in COIN, i.e. the need to subordinate every policy to the pursuit of specific political objectives and secure political control over the direction of the war.48 After all, the integration of civil and military actions (‘unity of effort’) constitutes one of the cornerstones of the theory and practice on COIN.49 What does, in practical terms, the ‘political aspect’ of COIN involve? The political element has been narrowly related to the imperative of ‘(good) governance’.50 David Kilcullen, a renowned Australian soldiertheorist in the twenty-first century, upheld that political actions in COIN serve four main functions: they provide lawful and just governance, strengthen the institutional capacity of the state apparatus, rally public support for the government and, last but not least, promote the social reintegration of the insurgents.51 Since insurgents and the counterinsurgents vie for control over the population of a specific territory, each side strives to propagandise a

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convincing cause around which the (local) people can rally. The more a counterinsurgent cause resonates with a population’s special traits (e.g. religious dogma, social values, ethnic identity, etc.), the greater popularity and legitimacy the counterinsurgent secures.52 An attractive cause helps the government not only win the ‘battle of ideas’ but also gain outside support.53 Targeted reforms and just governance do tend to increase the legitimacy and popularity of a state authority.54 However, legitimate and just governance must not be associated exclusively with a specific type of regime (e.g. Western-style liberal democracy).55 Occasionally, the person who governs, not the method of governance, matters most in COIN.56 A government must, thus, understand and respect the culturally-acceptable standards of legitimacy of the (local) people.57 A counterinsurgent should be pre-occupied with how to improve the quality of governance, not what political system to adopt.58 However, ‘good governance’ does not represent a panacea for every type of insurgency; nor can ‘good goveranance’ alone secure victory.59

Outside Support The diplomatic element in COIN groups all efforts of a counterinsurgent to neutralise any external assistance to the insurgents and, conversely, mobilise outside support for the counterinsurgents.60 Since outside support has been correctly recognised as a key factor61 and even the most crucial determinant of victory for the insurgents,62 the reduction of external aid to the insurgents promises to improve the prospects of success for a counterinsurgent.63 Usually, the counterinsurgents strive to isolate the insurgents from their outside sources of support through diplomacy: they either directly appeal to the insurgent-supportive countries or indirectly call upon international (e.g. the UN) or regional actors (e.g. NATO) to apply pressure on the insurgent-supportive countries. The vigorous propagandisation of a persuasive cause64 and the continuous support from powerful external allies65 increase the effectiveness of the counterinsurgent’s diplomatic campaign. Diplomacy does not always yield results and the neutralisation of outside support for the insurgents may also require military operations against the foreign supporters of the insurgents as well.66

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Therefore, an internal conflict can easily escalate into a regional or international one owing to the policies adopted by the counterinsurgents and other international or regional actors involved in the war. Such policies usually include an intervention by the counterinsurgents to neighbouring countries, the intervention by external actors in support of the insurgents or the counterinsurgents, and the peace enforcement operations by external actors (e.g. a peripheral organisation of collective security).67 Due to the evident danger of a conflict’s spill-over, a counterinsurgent should demonstrate caution and patience.68

Welfare A counterinsurgent must, inter alia, protect the welfare of the state and its citizens amidst an internal conflict. Since an insurgency springs up from greed and grievance among the (local) population, the state authorities must redress the socio-economic wellsprings of the insurgency in order to win over the people.69 Such a socio-economic policy would provide public services (e.g. electricity) and emergency humanitarian relief (e.g. food) to the people and improve the capacity-building potential of the state authorites (e.g. targeted tax reforms).70 How a counterinsurgent should implement such a policy still remains an issue of debate among scholars and policy-makers worldwide.71 A counterinsurgent may receive economic aid from external allies (and the international community as well) in support of welfare and relief initiatives. However, funds (no matter how generous) do not operate as a magic formula for victory. The donors must subsidise programmes which promote the welfare of the citizens and the reconstruction of the war-torn country; they must, in addition, insist on a fair measure of accountability and transparency in the management of the funds to eschew corruption and squandering.72 In truth, economic aid to a beleaguered government without any insistence by the donors on reforms and transparency will inevitably lead to a misuse of aid.73

Narrative Sir Frank Kitson, a British theorist and practicioner on COIN, remarked that an insurgency differed from other types of conflict by being

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‘primarily concerned with the struggle for men’s minds’.74 Obviously, ideology forms an integral element of a conflict waged for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the (local) people.75 Each side constructs a ‘narrative’ which incloses its propaganda and ideology.76 The insurgents try to win over the people with a ‘narrative’ of victimhood and martyrdom which portrays the insurgents as victims of state oppression and martyrs for higher ideals (e.g. freedom); instead, the counterinsurgents propagate a ‘narrative’ of defamation that vilifies the insurgents as ‘terrorists’.77 A counterinsurgent must utter a ‘narrative’ which the population understands or espouses in order to seize the ‘initiative of ideas’.78 In addition, the counterinsurgents must reach out not only to the citizens of the war-torn country but also to the external allies and the international community to win as much legitimacy as possible.79 In summary, the counterinsurgents must construct and propagade a ‘narrative of victory’. However, they should not cultivate unrealistic expectations of victory to avoid credibility issues.80

Security The military actions in COIN aspire to achieve two inter-related objectives: provide a fair measure of security to the people and wipe out the insurgents. Since the majority of the people usually stays neutral until coerced or convinced to side with one party,81 a government could fatally weaken the insurgents by denying them control of this ‘silent majority’.82 However, a state authority must always use the military weapon with caution. The use of indiscriminate violence83 or a legal framework alien to the people’s norms and beliefs would undoubtedly prove injurious for a government’s legitimacy.84 Military operations depend on timely and reliable intelligence for their efficacy. However, intelligence cannot be properly utilised unless an understanding of the anthropo-geography has been previously achieved.85 Nor can reliable intelligence be gathered unless the (local) people feel less threatened by the insurgents86 or fear the counterinsurgents more.87 Intelligence must not, however, be used exclusively in support of military operations. Instead, intelligence must be utilised to increase a counterinsurgent’s strategy. For example, the problem of information asymmetry (i.e. the lack of reliable information about the enemy’s intentions and capabilities) has been

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often imputed as one of the principal causes for the collapse of negotiations between belligerents in a civil war.88 Although no magic formulas for victory in COIN exist,89 the need to evolve and adapt has been established on firm grounds.90 The state authority must develop the appropriate military capability for irregular warfare,91 absorb the nasty lessons on the field of battle and adapt to the prevailing circumstances.92 Since the support of the people constitutes the core requirement for victory in COIN, the counterinsurgents must set as a priority the security of the population.93 Kitson declared that ‘no such thing as a purely military solution’ exists.94 Ergo, the (tactical) military actions of the counterinsurgents should be connected with ‘operational and strategic military objectives and essential political goals’.95 However, the selection of a military policy occasionally owes less to strategic calculi and more to other non-military considerations. In fact, the type of regime96 and its military culture97 often exert a heavy influence on military policy, as several cases attest.

CHAPTER 2 A STILLBORN PEACE: FEBRUARY 1945—JANUARY 1947

The ‘White Terror’ (?): 1945 In early December 1944, a short, yet vicious, civil war tore apart Greece – a country liberated from the tyrannical Nazi yoke barely two months before. Instead of reducing the tempo of violence in a war-ravaged country, the withdrawal of the occupying troops intensified war violence as noncommunists and communists settled old scores. By the autumn of 1944, almost all of Greece lay at the hands of the National Liberation Front (EAM) – the resistance organisation founded by the Greek Communist Party (KKE) with an impressive army and a radical agenda. In early December 1944, the EAM tried to seize power with an ill-planned and illexecuted assault against the legitimate Greek government and the allied British Army upon the capital. The ELAS, the military wing of the EAM, overwhelmed the non-communists (which included the gendarmerie, the city police, the embryonic national guard, former quislings and the army units from the Italian and African Campaigns) in the first days of urban warfighting. The British did not stay idle, however, and stepped in to stave off this communist take-over in a country within its traditional sphere of influence. Unfortunately for the communists, they could not count on Stalin for support nor could they rely on the communists in Belgrade and Sofia. Stalin honoured the ‘Percentages Agreement’ with Churchill and did not lift a finger to help the EAM. In February 1945, the EAM and the state authorities signed the Treaty of Varkiza. This peace treaty stipulated that the ELAS would be disarmed and disbanded, a general amnesty would be

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declared, and a plebiscite and elections would be organised as soon as possible.1 No sooner had the ink on the peace treaty dried than the two sides starting violating it. The vanquished violated the peace treaty first. The EAM concealed the heavy weapons of the ELAS and surrendered only the light weaponry to the Greek state authorities. The KKE established camps in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (the most famous of all, Bulkes in Yugoslavia) which initially provided sanctuary and, subsequently, military training to the thousands of veterans of the ELAS who had sought refuge (often with their families) to these regimes either as zealots who refused to conform to the onerous Treaty of Varkiza or as victims of oppression and revenge by their right-wing opponents. Indicatively, after the Treaty of Varkiza, roughly 4–5,000 veterans of the ELAS sought refuge to Balkan communist countries; by the end of 1945, their number had swollen to 8–10,000 fighters.2 In effect, the KKE established a ‘strategic military reserve’ in the northern Balkan countries that could be used whenever the need arose. Contrary to what traditional historians have claimed, the violations of the peace treaty by the KKE did not mean that the party was preparing as early as February 1945 for the ‘third round’. Instead, they show that the KKE did not trust its enemies whatsoever. The decision to resort to war was taken months later. However, the great majority of the peace treaty violations were committed by the victors – the anti-communist Right in particular. While the British (the kingmakers in Greece at the time) replaced one weak centrist government with another, the Right seized control of the security and state apparatus and organised a ruthless persecution of the Left. According to EAM, 31,632 people were tortured, 1,289 killed and 6,671 wounded in an orgy of violence that lasted from February 1945 to March 1946. The validity of these figures cannot be ascertained with 100 per cent certainty. However, the Right did unleash a wave of revanchist violence against its defeated opponents.3 The true motives behind this purge included revenge, thirst for power and fanaticism – and a mixture of the three. In the concluding stages of the occupation of Greece by the Axis Powers, a ferocious war in the Peloponnesus and Macedonia erupted between the ELAS and the Greek quislings wherein the latter were quickly overwhelmed after relentless battles at a massive toll in human lives. Indicatively of the fanaticism, the casualties among armed irregulars

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surpassed the overall military casualties in the war of resistance against the foreign occupiers (1932– 44) and the atrocities against civilians outstripped in savagery and scale the atrocities in the civil war proper (1942–44).4 In addition, the EAM-rule (EAMοkratı´a) in occupied Greece was increasingly associated in the second half of 1944 with an autocratic type of governance: the EAM imposed ‘people’s rule’ (Laοkratı´a) with an iron fist and unleashed a wave of violence against ‘Others’ – those who did not endorse the party’s ‘revolutionary regime’.5 The December Uprising added many more dead and much more hatred to this conflict between communists and non-communists. The ELAS executed thousands of political rivals (over 2,000 civilians) and deported many more (almost 8,000 souls) to the northern communist countries as hostages; and in turn, the British subjected whole neighbourhoods of Athens to aerial and naval bombardments at a dire cost in human lives and interned thousands of supporters of the EAM (roughly 12,000 people) in prison camps in the Middle East.6 After the defeat of the EAM in the December Uprising, right-wing grassroots movements and governing bodies sprang throughout the country and swiftly replaced the EAM’s ‘state institutions’ in towns and villages and oppressed the EAM’s cadres and supporters in various ways (from torturing their communist opponents to withholding humanitarian aid).7 The (unofficial) anti-communist pogrom cemented the tenuous grip of the Right over the security and state apparatus. The courts, universities, civil service, public utilities, labour unions and agricultural co-operatives were systematically purged from communists. Similarly, the security apparatus (namely the officer corps), diplomatic service and clergy were thoroughly cleansed from supporters of the EAM. However, the wartime collaborators in the state and security organs were either punished leniently and subsequently reinstated or scandalously stayed untouched.8 Worse, the right-wing paramilitary groups (tolerated or even supported by the increasingly anti-communist security and state organs) terrorised the communists and forced tens of thousands of them to migrate en masse to the northern Balkan countries.9 The refugees who had fled north numbered roughly 48,000 individuals: 5,000 in Bulgaria, 23,000 in Albania and 20,000 in Yugoslavia – the latter including a substantial number of Slavophones from northern Greece.10 The revisionist scholars have termed the period between February 1945 and March 1946 as the period of the ‘White Terror’ since the anti-

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communist faction committed acts of violence against the defeated Left.11 However, this term tends to mislead; while the Right committed the greater majority of these acts of violence, the Left initiated assaults whenever the local balance of power permitted. As a matter of fact, the anti-communist violence predominated in southern Greece (a politically conservative region that suffered severe casualties during the punitive campaign of ELAS in 1944)12 and communist violence prevailed in northern Greece – the region close to the Balkan allies of the KKE.13 Several revisionist scholars have incriminated the right-wing terror as the sole responsible for the new cycle of violence (1946– 9).14 However, this assertion cannot explain in a satisfactory way why the KKE decided to declare open war in September 1947 and not earlier when the balance of power allowed such an undertaking. Nor does it explain why the KKE did not adopt the pathway of parliamentary politics like the communists in Italy and France (although postwar violence between communists and non-communists erupted in France).15 The right-wing terror campaign against the communists did intensify the social and political polarisation but this wave of violence cannot be incriminated as the sole cause for the outbreak of the communist insurgency. The KKE resolved in late 1945 to resort to an armed struggle because the party at the time thought that the ‘revolutionary conditions’ had matured – not just because the communists were oppressed by the anti-communist Right as the revisionist scholars contend. The aforementioned violations of the Treaty of Varkiza epitomise the ‘commitment problem’ in a peace-building process; in other words, the reluctance of the former belligerents to commit to a peace process due to their mutual mistrust and fear that the other side intends to renege on the future negotiated settlement.16 In fact, the Treaty of Varkiza did not incorporate two core provisions that usually redress the problem of commitment to a peace-building process: valid guarantees by third parties or power-sharing agreements between the former belligerents.17 Britain proved unable or simply unwilling to impede the Right from violating the Treaty of Varkiza.18 The challenge of the right-wing violence did not, however, remain unanswered. By late 1945, nearly 5,000 veterans of the ELAS had formed various – yet small – guerrilla bands that wandered across the mountains of northern Greece and fought against right-wing paramilitary groups and the security forces. Nearly 6,000 Slav-Macedonian insurgents operated

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independently in Greek western Macedonia in pursuit of their own separatist agenda.19 These guerrilla bands brought together various types of individuals: the diehards who turned down the Treaty of Varkiza, the criminals who feared punishment for their past crimes (e.g. war crimes in the December Uprising) and the bandits who just lived the life of an outlaw in a war-torn country. These loose guerrilla bands were subject to no central command and co-ordination and received substantial support solely from the EAM’s local bodies since the KKE refused to recognise and organise them.20 Until early 1946 the KKE had not officially endorsed the alternative of a rural insurgency. Zachariadis repeatedly vetoed proposals by senior officials (such as Markos Vafeiadis, an experienced captain of the ELAS) to fully mobilise the thousands of communist supporters or cadres (most notably those within the armed forces) and wage a high-intensity guerrilla campaign against the still small and weak government troops. In June 1945, the KKE adopted the strategy of ‘mass popular self-defence’ (a policy including mass political struggles and occasional acts of sabotage or assassination) in response to the right-wing violence and, later in October 1945, the party reaffirmed its commitment on this defensive strategy.21 The KKE’s leadership steadily prepared for an insurrection but, until early 1946, had not resolved how and when to stage it. The true causes for this ambivalence still remain bitterly contested. Certain senior communist officials (including the EAM’s top leaders in the December Uprising) did not wish to stage another uprising. The British could have easily intervened once again and quelled a second communist revolt. The KKE could no longer count on the support of friendly political forces for an insurrection since the non-communist left-wing forces had distanced themselves from the KKE after the December Uprising and the war crimes of the ELAS. Nor could the party completely control the communist outlaws in northern Greece as the disobedience of the chief captain of the ELAS (Aris Velouchiotis) to the party orders showed. Several dogmatic party officials (such as Zachariadis) had not entirely abandoned the idea of a textbook Leninist urban uprising and expressed strong reservations about a rural insurgency. Most importantly, however, Zachariadis had not secured the explicit approval of Moscow for an uprising. Only after Moscow gave the KKE the green light did the latter launch an insurgency in northern Greece.22

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A War by Proxy?: 1945 The insurgency could not be organised without direct support from the northern Balkan neighbours of Greece. The latter would prove more than willing to support a communist insurrection in their southern neighbour since a growing number of historical, territorial, ideological and ethnic issues poisoned the relations between Greece and its northern Balkan neighbours (Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia) since World War II. Since February 1945, these three Balkan communist countries had provided support to the KKE in various ways: from sheltering civilian refugees of the right-wing violence to setting up (military) camps for the former ELAS fighters.23 The Greek state authorities protested that the neighbours had interfered in the internal affairs of a third sovereign state by providing sanctuary to insurgents and refugees who deserved trial and punishment for their past deeds.24 In addition, the Greek state authorities demanded the immediate repatriation of the civilians (over 15,000 souls) the ELAS had deported to Yugoslavia as ‘hostages’ in the December Uprising25 and the release of the civilians who had been exiled to Bulgaria during the latter’s occupation of western Thrace and eastern Macedonia between 1941 and 1944.26 These communist countries counter-argued that they only offered asylum to the victims of the ‘White Terror’ and accused the Greek state authorities of providing asylum to the various ‘counter-revolutionary elements’ from the Balkans. In fact, Greece sheltered hundreds of dissidents from the communist Balkan countries who sought refuge to the West.27 In 1945 Greece restored diplomatic relations only with its pre-war ally, Yugoslavia, although bilateral relations did not return to their pre-war amiable status.28 The three communist Balkan states offered support to the KKE partly due to their ideological affinity with the KKE and the characteristic revolutionary zeal of the neophyte communists.29 After all, Greece stood out as the only Balkan country outside the communist camp. Greek state officials consistently declared that the geography, history and political tradition of Greece dictated an alliance with the Anglo-Saxon naval powers and, in particular, the postwar nuclear superpower – the USA.30 In contrast, the three Balkan neighbours of Greece had secured their position within the communist camp without direct military support from Moscow – with the exception of Bulgaria.31

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Moreover, territorial issues caused severe disputes between Greece and its Balkan neighbours. From as early as 1941, successive Greek governments raised specific demands (the ‘national claims’ of Greece) for the annexation of foreign territory from former Axis Powers that contained native Greek populations as a form of postwar indemnity for its sacrifices. The enlargement of Greece, a vision that struck a chord with the nationalist Greek politicians and people, promised to offer: (a) national completion, since Greece would secure its natural frontiers and proper standing in the Eastern Mediterranean, (b) moral justice, since Greece would receive decent compensation for its great war sacrifices, and (c) military security by creating buffer zones within the territory of former Axis Powers (Albania and Bulgaria) that had invaded Greece in World War II.32 In summary, these ‘national claims’ of Greece included: an agreement with Britain on Cyprus, the annexation of the Dodecanese from Italy and Northern Epirus from Albania and a minor border adjustment with Bulgaria.33 The vivid memories of the war crimes of the Bulgarian occupying troops in northern Greece during World War II34 and the persecution of the Greek minority in Northern Epirus35 had critically inflamed the nationalist sentiment in Greece. In turn, the three Balkan states had not settled their scores with Greece. Albania claimed that in late 1944 a Greek resistance organisation (the right-wing EDES under Zervas, an ex-army officer)36 had violently expelled the Albanian Chams (a sizable Muslim minority in Greek Epirus) and appealed for the satisfactory reimbursement of the Albanian refugees. However, the Greek state authorities counter-argued that the Albanian Chams had voluntarily sought refuge in Albania as collaborators of Italy and Germany during World War II for fear of reprisals.37 Bulgaria, on the other side, coveted two regions of northern Greece (eastern Macedonia and western Thrace) that the Slavic country had captured in the First Balkan War, ceded to Greece after World War I and occupied briefly in World War II. Indicatively, Bulgaria reluctantly withdrew its military forces from eastern Macedonia and western Thrace months after the overthrow of the pro-Nazi monarchist regime in Sofia and only after intensive pressure from the Allies. Yugoslavia, the prewar ally of Greece, commanded the concession of Greek Macedonia on account of the professed will of the Slav-speakers in northern Greece to unite with their co-brethren in the newly-formed Yugoslav People’s Republic of Macedonia. In the post-Varkiza period, the persecution of

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the sizable Slav-speaking minority in northern Greece by the Greek state and security organs (due to the minority’s ethnic dissimilarity and record of wartime collaboration with Bulgaria) provided Tito with the pretext to present Yugoslavia as the protector and unifier of the ‘Macedonia nation’ scattered across three Balkan countries (Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia).38 The postwar rivalries among the Balkan states brought to the fore the Macedonian Question once again in the twentieth century. From late 1944 to early 1945, Sofia and Belgrade discussed the prospect of a South Slav Federation. Although the initial negotiations failed to yield any results, they revealed the ambitions of Tito to unite the different segments of Macedonia into a federal entity under the hegemony of Belgrade. Quite predictably, the negotiations stirred concern among the British and Greek governments over the fate of Greek Macedonia – even more so in the light of repeated statements by senior Yugoslav officials against the oppression of the Slav-Macedonians in Greece.39 Greek anxieties were raised much further by the manipulation of the Slavophone minority of Greece by Yugoslavia. In World War II, the Slavophone minority of Greece underwent a radical political transformation that ultimately resulted in the rise of the new Slav-Macedonian faction within a minority divided previously between the pro-Greek and the, far more numerous, pro-Bulgarian faction. The pro-Greek section of the minority upheld its identity and suffered violent pressure by the neophyte Slav-Macedonian zealots.40 Under the auspices of the Yugoslav Communist Party of Macedonia (CPM), in April 1945 the Slav-Macedonian zealots in Greece established the National Liberation Front (NOF).41 Refusing to respect the Treaty of Varkiza, the NOF started a lowintensity guerrilla war in western Macedonia where the minority was concentrated.42

Weak State-building: February 1945 –March 1946 In general, every government ought to provide four primary services to its citizens in a post-conflict environment: political stability, economic development, security, justice and reconciliation.43 In the post-Varkiza period, however, none of these services was provided in a satisfactory way by successive Greek governments since the British, the kingmakers in

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Greece at the time, proved an unwise and ineffective nation-builder beyond any doubt.44 From February 1945 to March 1946, the ambassador of Britain, Sir Reginald Leeper, played a ‘game of musical chairs’ by replacing one prime minister with another. In total, Leeper installed five political leaders in just thirteen months: the former general Nikolaos Plastiras (3 January –8 April 1945), the former commodore Petros Voulgaris (8 April– 17 October 1945), the Regent and Archbishop Damaskinos (17 October – 1 November 1945), the centrist leader Panayiotis Kanellopoulos (1– 22 November 1945) and lastly the centrist leader Themistocles Sophoulis (22 November 1945– 4 April 1946).45 The political instability was exploited by the Right which rapidly acquired control of the state and security apparatuses. Right after the Treaty of Varkiza, a national guard was hastily set up to restore the authority of the legitimate government throughout the provinces still under the rule of the EAM. Manned and led chiefly by former quislings, the national guard ruthlessly imposed the authority of the new government – abusing systematically the supporters and cadres of the EAM. The national guard was abolished in early 1946 and incorporated within the armed forces. And similarly, the police and gendarmerie (the two state agencies responsible for public order) increased rather than reduced the insecurity in postwar Greece. Staffed primarily by anti-communist extremists and former quislings with the connivance of the British Police and Prisons Mission, the gendarmerie and police systematically ill-treated the communists and supported (indirectly and directly) the right-wing paramilitaries who terrorised the communists – principally in southern Greece. After all, police brutality against communists seemed rather common in Greece. In the interwar period and, especially during the quasi-fascist dictatorship of Metaxas, the police persecuted the communists systematically. During World War II, the quisling governments used the police and gendarmerie to pursue the cadres and supporters of the EAM. And for that reason, the ELAS targeted specifically the gendarmes and policemen during the December Uprising – triggering a new wave of vindictive violence by the victors right after the Treaty of Varkiza.46 In the sector of economic development, Britain did not fare any better although Greece badly needed a sound and coherent programme

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of postwar reconstruction. By early 1945, a third of the towns and villages had been wiped from the map, the transportation networks had been wrecked and the agricultural production had regained just half of its prewar level. Nearly 400,000 people had died and 1.2 million were left homeless (7 and 18 per cent of the prewar population respectively); 2 million others depended on foreign aid to survive since the Greek state authorities could not satisfy their basic needs.47 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) supplied humanitarian aid to two million destitute Greeks and stood out as the only organ in the postwar era that worked tirelessly to remedy the problems of the population.48 The Greek state authorities, however, treated the humanitarian aid provided by the UNRRA as a political tool: they used the humanitarian aid to organise massive clientistic networks and reward their clients and, above all, punish their political opponents – i.e. the communists.49 The Byzantinism of the British and their Greek political clients hindered the postwar reconstruction of the country. The various Greek governments did not stay long enough in office to implement a sound programme of reconstruction; even when they did try to carry one out, Britain did not provide any economic support and the postwar oligarchy (on most occasions war profiteers) used its strong ties with the political elites to sabotage radical socio-economic reforms. Therefore, a series of programmes of reconstruction and stabilisation (e.g. the economic experiment of Varvaressos) proved short-lived and unsuccessful.50 The various short-lived governments did excel in one particular aspect though: they squeezed out the scanty state coffers to support their vast clientistic networks.51 Unable to cope with the challenges of postwar reconstruction, the government sought consistently to obtain external economic aid. Thus, the government requested urgent economic aid from the UN Economic and Social Council citing the terrible war sacrifices of Greece – yet without success.52 The centrist government in early 1946 stood far luckier with Britain which worried reasonably about the stability of its client regime. In January 1946, Britain and Greece concluded the London Agreement: Britain offered Greece substantial economic aid on condition that Greece would implement a very strict programme of economic stabilisation for 18 months.53 However, the agreement did not accomplish its primary objectives due to the ineffectual co-operation

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between the Greek and British officials and, above all, the insufficient resources allocated by Britain.54 Nor did Britain and the weak Greek governments prove capable in promoting postwar reconciliation. The communists were demonised as non-Greeks who deserved nothing more than punishment for their ‘antinational deeds and beliefs’. The Right used the ideology of ‘nationalmindedness’ (1unikowrosύnh), the concept of thinking [and, therefore, acting ] in accordance with the interests of the Greek nation, as the legitimising basis of the anti-communist pogrom. According to this nationalist ideology, the communists could not be considered members of the Greek nation and state since they obeyed foreign masters (i.e. the Kremlin) and foreign ideologies (i.e. Bolshevism).55 The public opinion in Greece was hyper-sensitive to national issues in the wake of World War II and the unsuccessful attempts of Bulgaria and Italy to wrestle away territory. The EAM’s partisan policies only undermined its legitimacy and popularity. Indicatively, the EAM did not demand the immediate withdrawal of the Bulgarian occupying army from northern Greece when in 1944 Bulgaria deposed the pro-German monarchy and installed a pro-Soviet communist regime under pressure from the invading Red Army – although the Bulgarians conducted ethniccleansing to annex these northern territories. Worse, the EAM repeatedly requested military aid from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the Battle of Athens in 1944 and forcibly transferred thousands of civilians to Yugoslavia as ‘hostages’ under abysmal conditions.56 Consequently, tens of thousands of fighters of ELAS and members of EAM were imprisoned on account of their (true or fabricated) participation in the December Uprising and implication in war crimes.57 On the other hand, former quislings were considered worthy members of the Greek nation since they had struggled against the ‘antinational communists’; and thanks to their anti-communist record, the increasingly anti-communist judiciary punished them leniently or pardoned them.58 As a matter of fact, Greece did not undergo a systematic purge of the state and security organs from wartime collaborators – a scandal tolerated by Britain.59 In July 1946, the rightwing government passed a law which only recognised the anti-communist resistance organisations (even those with direct contact with the Germans during the last phase of the occupation) without any reference to the EAM and ELAS.60 In 1949, right-wing and centrist politicians petitioned the

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release of the imprisoned collaborators on account of their anti-communist and, ipso facto, patriotic record.61 In sharp contrast, tens of thousands of fighters of ELAS and members of EAM were imprisoned on account of their (true or fabricated) participation in the December Uprising and implication in war crimes.62 The ideology of ‘national-mindedness’ provided the raison d’eˆtre for the reinstated parliamentary regime and a unifying cause for the heterogeneous and fragmented anti-communist faction.63 The origins of this ideology could be traced back to the corporatist dictatorship of Metaxas (1934–41) which had formulated a similar ideology centred on the triptych ‘fatherland, religion and family’.64 But how did the public opinion greet the new ideology of ‘national-mindedness’? The communists were indeed demonised as ‘anti-national elements’ who committed treason against the Greek nation and state. The scale and cruelty of the EAM’s war crimes in the ill-fated December Uprising were dramatised65 and the patriotism of the EAM’s anti-fascist struggle was questioned. Accordingly, the EAM was smeared as an underling of Stalin and Tito that conspired to seize power after the withdrawal of the Germans as several (fabricated) accords certified: the non-aggression pact with the retreating German soldiers (the ‘ELAS– German Military Agreement’ of 1944), a cooperation treaty with the Slav-Macedonian separatist rebels in Greek Macedonia (the ‘EAM– SNOF Accords’ of 1944), and the agreement for the establishment of a future Balkan Union of Soviet Republics that would prospectively incorporate a separate ‘Macedonian Republic’ (the ‘Petritsi Pact’ of 1944).66 In July 1946, the right-wing government would recognise the nationalist organisations (even those with direct contacts with Nazi Germans) as the only true resistance movements and completely shun the EAM.67 Due to the tainted record of the KKE with regards to the Macedonian Question, a sizable segment of the population in northern Greece perceived the new cycle of violence after the Treaty of Varkiza (the NOF and veterans of the ELAS vs right-wing paramilitaries and the national guard) as yet another episode of the Macedonian Struggle – the vicious undeclared war of the early twentieth century between Greek and Bulgarian guerrillas for the control of the rural Christian settlements in Ottoman-ruled Macedonia.68 Unsurprisingly, the Right would score a major triumph in northern Greece in the elections of March 1946.69 In effect, nationalism and anti-communism became the currency for

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political favours and networking in northern Greece. The anticommunist organisations (e.g. leagues of the victims of the EAM) put pressure on the MPs to implement tougher policies towards the KKE and satisfy their requests (e.g. a position in the civil service) of their members. Indicatively of the rising anti-communist sentiment, these groups based their demands on their loyalty to the Greek race and hostility toward the communists and the Slavs.70 Surprisingly enough, this clientistic system suited the political culture of Greece and proved far more viable than the programme of the ‘people’s republic’ publicised by the communists. The concept of the ‘rule of the proletariat’ not only sounded strange to the majority of the nationalist and conservative population of Greece but also seemed unrealistic for two core reasons: first, the inexistence of a peasant proletariat owing to the agrarian reforms of the interwar years and secondly, the existence of an insignificant and poorly radicalised industrial proletariat due to the low levels of industrialisation and the strong ties of the (few thousand) workers with their rural origins, customs and values (e.g. religious pietism).71

Bullets and Ballots: March 1946 In February 1946 (exactly one year after the Treaty of Varkiza), the second plenum of the KKE’s Central Committee secretly decided to adopt a ‘dual strategy’ that involved a low-intensity guerrilla war in the mountains and a legal political struggle in the towns. Once again, the party hesitated to fully mobilise its numerous supporters for an all-out war. According to the revisionist scholars, this dual strategy intended to compel the Right to accede to a (propitious to the party’s interests) peace settlement.72 However, the subsequent actions of the KKE prove that the party did not sincerely want a peace settlement. Instead, this twofold policy probably intended to sustain the party in a ‘waiting mode’ until the political and military conditions ripened (most notably, a green light from Moscow and sufficient military support from communist European states) for the transition to the next phase of the (armed) struggle. After all, Zachariadis convened with the party’s political and military cadres at the sidelines of the plenum and inquired whether an armed uprising in Athens, Thessaloniki and other major Greek towns was viewed as feasible at the time; their negative reply postponed the next phase of the struggle.73

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Indicatively of the KKE’s modus operandi, this strategy conformed to the directives of the Kremlin. Dependent on Stalin for (political) direction as every communist party after World War II, the KKE’s top leadership inquired the Kremlin first on what policy the party should adopt. In January 1946, a senior delegation of the EAM visited Moscow to request new guidelines in the light of the right-wing terror. The Soviets welcomed the latter frigidly and simply urged them to participate in the upcoming Greek elections scheduled for 31 March 1946 and, moreover, interchange emphasis on the ‘legal methods and armed struggle’ depending on the circumstances.74 The KKE requested further clarification on the final Soviet note. In mid-February, Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian communist leader and the former secretary general of the Comintern, cabled to the KKE the response of Stalin: he prescribed a dual strategy of ‘self-defence’ and ‘political mobilisation of the pop[ular] masses’ instead of an ‘armed rebellion’.75 Stalin did not desire a communist uprising in Greece at the time. However, he did not prescribe a totally peaceful course of action either. An opportunist par excellence, Stalin intended to exploit every opportunity arising in regions of secondary importance to Soviet strategic interests (e.g. Greece) with the minimum possible risk. Accordingly, the communist insurgents would undermine the legitimate Greek government and the position of its foreign patron, Britain, in the Eastern Mediterranean without direct Soviet involvement; in case the communist insurgents won, Moscow would gain an outlet to the Aegean Sea without firing a single shot.76 After all, the power of the communists in the Balkans was still being tightly secured at the time. With the exception of Albania and Yugoslavia which had been liberated by communist resistance organisations, in Bulgaria and Romania the communists won the elections (under the shadow of the guns of the Red Army) in the elections of November 2016 and November 1946 respectively.77 At the same time, the Soviet Union had not completely recovered from the titanic struggle against the Axis Powers and, thus, Moscow could not rival Washington (the atomic superpower) on equal terms. The stabilisation of the newly-acquired sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe remained the top priority for Stalin in 1946.78 Why did the KKE decide to initiate a ‘limited war’ exactly one year after the Treaty of Varkiza and not earlier? What impelled the KKE to act in this way? The firm belief that the ‘revolutionary conditions’ had

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ripened. Since late 1945, the power of the communists was steadily consolidated in Eastern Europe and, especially, in the Balkans. Therefore, the KKE possessed the necessary ‘strategic depth’ to organise a rural insurgency. The anti-communist violence since February 1945 had caused a strong desire for an armed confrontation among the party’s lower echelons. Last but not least, the USSR since early 1946 had adopted a confrontational stance towards the British (as the Iranian Crisis and the Greek Question attested). Consequently, the KKE thought that the USSR would support the party in an armed confrontation with the weak Greek clients of Britain (which might involve the British Army once again, as in the December Uprising). The KKE interpreted the cautious directives of Stalin as a first step towards that direction. Stalin had abided by the Percentages Agreeement during the December Uprising and, thus, avoided any support for the EAM or even condemnation of the intervention of the British Army.79 However, in early 1946 Stalin would not only encourage a ‘limited war’ by the KKE but also invite Zachariadis to Moscow. In this historical second plenum, the KKE decided to boycott the upcoming elections despite Soviet advice to the contrary. On 7 February, the EAM first threatened to boycott the elections and the KKE followed this line in the second plenum. A few days after the second plenum the EAM and other left-wing parties decided to abstain unless their core demands (the observance of a lawful election procedure, the suppression of right-wing terror and the postponement of the elections for two months) were satisfied. And in the following weeks, several centrist parties and politicians decided to abstain as well in protest of the unchecked right-wing violence. Until late March, the left-wing and (a few centrist ones) continued to appeal for a two-month postponement of the elections – yet to no avail.80 However, Britain remained steadfast in the decision to organise the elections on 31 March 1946. The British upheld that the agreement in November 1945 between them and the centrist government under Sophoulis had set the elections for March 1946 at the latest and the referendum for the fate of the monarchy in 1948 at the latest – a revision of the terms of the Treaty of Varkiza. The cynical British officials realised that these upcoming elections would result predictably in a victory of the monarchist Right due to the violence of the right-wing paramilitaries and the unlawful practices (e.g. the distortion of outdated

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electoral registers) of the anti-communist state organs. In fact, the British refused to postpone the elections since they regarded the royalists as a far lesser evil to the communists.81 After all, by early 1946 other developments had strained the relations between the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans. In January 1946, the Soviet delegation to the UN protested about the presence of the allied British Army in Greece.82 The timing of this protest – the climax of the Iranian Crisis – reveals the Kremlin’s ulterior motives. In fact, the Kremlin wanted to shake off the intense Anglo-American pressure for the immediate withdrawal of the Red Army from north-western Iran with a diplomatic diversion.83 The British were alarmed by the convergence of the attitudes and actions of the KKE and the Kremlin. From January 1946 onwards, every Soviet protest before the UN Security Council was accompanied by a similar protest by the KKE. The same day Moscow submitted before the Security Council a complaint against Britain, the KKE’s Central Committee publicised a lengthy manifesto which called for the prompt withdrawal of the British troops.84 The concerted attacks by the Kremlin and the KKE against Britain upset the (hitherto neutral) USA.85 In the next few months, the USA under President Truman would come closer to the British on a series of issues (e.g. the Iranian Crisis). The decision of the Left to boycott the elections has stirred endless debates within political and academic circles. Recently discovered evidence reveals that Zachariadis ignored Moscow’s counsels and imposed his own platform for a boycott on the KKE and, afterwards, the EAM and the other leftist parties since he intended to steer the Left toward the direction of an armed uprising.86 This controversial episode of the civil war spotlights two interesting aspects: first, the Kremlin did not absolutely control Zachariadis and, secondly, the KKE stiflingly dominated over the Left. The relationship between the KKE and EAM epitomises this domination. After the ill-fated December Uprising, the EAM had been severely debilitated by the desertion of a sizable section of its supporters87 and the KKE reorganised this weakened coalition of left-wing parties in such a way that secured the dominance of the KKE.88 By choosing abstention, the Left squandered this golden opportunity to curtail the power of the Right through parliamentary means89 since the Left could have won at least a quarter (even onethird) of the votes.90 No one can predict with certainty the political

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future of postwar Greece with a strong parliamentary presence of the Left (and the Centre). However, one can safely assume that the anticommunist extremists of the Right would not have enforced vindictive and repressive policies against the communists with ease or impunity; and likewise, the KKE would most likely denounce violence and adjust to a parliamentary modus operandi in the pattern of the communist parties in Italy and France. In fact, whenever electoral abstention had previously occurred in the political history of twentieth-century Greece (1915, 1923 and 1935), political instability had ensued since the political extremes acquired disproportionately immense power.91 Despite conflicting arguments over the role of the post-conflict elections in promoting peace-building and democratisation,92 ill-planned elections after a civil war tend to increase the prospect of relapse to civil war.93 The attack by communist insurgents on a gendarmerie station in Litochoro on the day of the elections foreboded the impending military escalation.94 Therefore, the first elections since 1936 resulted in a predictable triumph of the Right. The Allied Mission Observing the Greek Elections (AMFOGE) – an ad hoc body of allied observers (in which the Soviet Union did not participate, in protest of the ‘unfair’ elections) – validated the outcome of the elections despite extensive abstention and the widespread incidents of fraud and violence. In case the AMFOGE questioned the validity of the elections’ outcome, the overall policy of Britain in Greece would be delegitimised.95 The victory of the Right cannot, however, be attributed solely to violence and fraud. The Right had in fact increased its political power by attracting individuals who had been estranged by the EAM’s practices during World War II. In particular, the atrocities of the ELAS in the December Uprising had shocked the Greek public opinion and caused extensive desertions within the EAM.96 And although both sides committed atrocities during the previous civil war,97 the scale and savagery of the war crimes of the ELAS and the intensive exploitation of these crimes by the propaganda mechanism of the victors stigmatised the communists in the eyes of the nationalist public opinion.98 The KKE scorned the result of the elections and prepared its answer in secret. However, the party had learned its lesson from the December Uprising: an armed struggle would fail unless Stalin (and his satellites) lent a hand.99 Therefore, days before the elections, Zachariadis travelled

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to Belgrade to meet with Tito; after lengthy talks, he gained promises of strong Yugoslav support for an insurgency. Zachariadis Thereafter visited Prague and, in the sidelines of the congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, met with various communist leaders who voiced their open support for the KKE’s plans. The KKE’s secretary general returned to Belgrade and, after a few days, travelled to Moscow. In early April, Zachariadis discussed the KKE’s future policy with senior Soviet officials (e.g. the foreign minister Molotov); although they admonished Zachariadis for the decision to abstain from the elections, they did approve of his two-fold strategy. In a later private meeting in Crimea, Stalin advised Zachariadis to commence a rural insurgency that would compel the new Greek government to sit on the negotiation table. Stalin, nonetheless, suggested caution lest Britain should be provoked to intervene as in 1944 and urged Zachariadis to settle the military details of the uprising with Tito – his most trusted subordinate. When Zachariadis returned to Belgrade and relayed Stalin’s will to Tito, the latter promised to provide whatever assistance was required.100 Tito unreservedly supported the KKE’s risky plans owing to two strategic calculations: an insurgency would, first, provide Belgrade with the opportunity to occupy Greek Macedonia and, secondly, increase the bargaining power of Tito vis-a`-vis Britain with regards to the postwar territorial claims of Yugoslavia and the purge of the internal opposition.101 Likewise, Stalin used his satellite in Greece to cause a diversion from other issues such as the Polish Question or the Issue of the Straits (of the Dardanelles) and, if possible, expand the influence of the USSR in the warm waters of the Mediterranean Sea at a minimum cost.102 The same month, Zachariadis dispatched several officials of the KKE’s politburo to Belgrade to consult with Tito on military issues.103 In summary, by April 1946 the KKE’s secretary general had secured outside support for his plans – an important prerequisite for an insurgency. Galula outlined four conditions for a successful insurgency: a strong cause, a weak government, propitious geographical conditions and sufficient foreign support.104 The outside support that Zachariadis secured would complement the three already existing favourable factors: a weak government which could not offer solutions to the pressing issues of governance, reconstruction and security,105 the ideal geography of Greece for guerrilla warfare106 and the considerable increase in the popularity of the KKE (especially, among the ‘petits bourgeois’ and the

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workers) due to the right-wing violence and the superb organisational skills of the Left.107

‘Long Live the King’: April –September 1946 On 4 April, the victorious coalition of the royalist parties (the HPE) and an alliance of three centrist parties (the EPE) agreed to establish a new coalition government under Panayiotis Poulitsas, an apathetic extraparliamentary personality.108 The two factions disagreed on various issues but converged on their opposition to communism. After all, an anti-communist electoral alliance between the leaders of the EPE (Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, Georgios Papandreou and Sofoklis Venizelos) and the Populist Party (the strongest right-wing party) was discussed and nearly completed in early 1946. Moreover, Papandreou had served as premier during the ill-fated December Uprising of the EAM.109 Indicatively of the rising anti-communist sentiment among the old political elites, the coalition of the victorious monarchist parties included the Populist Party and the two smaller parties of Stylianos Gonatas and Apostolos Alexandris – centrist leaders who had defected to the royalist camp in World War II.110 The growing threat of Communism would induce many more centrists to switch their allegiance to the crown and, thus, undermine the very survival of the Centre as an autonomous political space.111 However, the unwillingness of the Populist Party to equitably share power with the EPE and postpone the referendum on the fate of the monarchy caused the collapse of the government just 14 days after its establishment. After all, the Populist Party had raised the restoration of the monarchy as the central slogan of its election campaign112 and could not renege on its promises. Thereafter, the coalition of the royalist parties (HPE) set up a totally royalist government. Konstantinos Tsaldaris, leader of the dominant Populist Party, was sworn-in as a prime minister and foreign minister.113 The composition of the new government reflected the Right’s doctrine and ‘clientele’. The ideology of the Right could be summarised as a commitment to the crown, the Orthodox Church and traditional social values, an anti-communist and nationalist zeal and a favourable disposition toward the wealthy and ‘highly personalised clientistic party politics’. In summary, right-wing parties drew support from white collar workers, industrialists and merchants, security forces personnel, former

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quislings, oligarchs, civil servants, former republicans and the inhabitants of the ‘Old Greece’ (the lands before the Balkan Wars 1912–13) and Macedonia – especially the regions which had suffered under the yoke of the Bulgarians (eastern Macedonia) or the terror of the Slav-Macedonians (western Macedonia) during World War II.114 Despite initial reservations about an early referendum, the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, soon changed his mind. Britain would swiftly withdraw the British Army from Greece in the aftermath of the referendum that was meant to restore political stability in Greece and, thereafter, pressure the USSR to reciprocally withdraw the Red Army from Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland). The USA agreed to assist their ally and, therefore, the referendum was arranged for 1 September – much earlier than originally envisaged in 1945.115 However, that development foreboded only trouble. Time and again, untimely postconflict elections and plebiscites have provoked severe crises by impeding the process of democratic institution-building in war-torn countries.116 As in the elections, the British Army could not guarantee proper conditions for the plebiscite. The new government intensified the erstwhile ‘unofficial’ persecution of the communists. The Populist Party publicised its rise to power as a vote of indictment against the ‘Red Terror’ of World War II (i.e. the December Uprising) and vowed to wipe out the ‘EAM-Bulgarians’. In his programmatic statements as prime minister in May, Tsaldaris vowed to restore law and order and suppress the ‘anarchic banditry’ of the communists.117 The same month, the government re-introduced the public security committees – extra-judicial organs established in the early twentieth century and empowered to deport every subversive individual.118 With the Right officially in power, the rightwing paramilitaries continued their campaign of terror against the communists with overt governmental support.119 Petros Mavromichalis, a prominent official of the Populist Party whom the US ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh despised as a fascist,120 served as a minister of military affairs and secretly channelled funds and weapons to right-wing paramilitary gangs.121 After all, in late 1945 Mavromichalis and a retired royalist general had united several right-wing paramilitary groups under an umbrella organisation – the Coalition of National Action (SED).122 How did the KKE react? Apparently, the KKE publicised through the press its commitment to the objective of ‘national reconciliation’

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throughout June and July.123 The party claimed that ‘national reconciliation’ progressed smoothly in some regions of central and northern Greece124 – unsurprisingly regions under the control of the EAM during World War II. This process was translated, in practical terms, in the ‘spontaneous’ ousting of the gendarmes and governors from the villages by the local population – under the ‘guidance’, of course, of the local party cadres.125 In July however, Zachariadis ordered Vafeiadis to set up his military headquarters in northern Greece and organise the embryonic communist insurgency; at the same time, he switched on the green light for the repatriation of thousand of irregulars stationed in the communist Balkan states.126 The veterans of the ELAS amounted to a superb reserve. In early 1948, the Central Intelligence Service (KYP) reckoned that the KKE’s reserves (women and men) totalled 22,300 fighters outside Greece (plus 6,000 reservists inside the territories of northern Greece occupied by the insurgents).127 Apart from the reservists, tens of thousands of auxiliaries inside Greece provided logistical support to the insurgents. In September 1945, the party set up the ‘self-defence [agency]’ (aytoάmyna) – a massive clandestine organisation tasked to support the insurgents and protect the cadres and members of the KKE and EAM through peaceful and violent means. Although no reliable data can be found for the precise strength of the ‘self-defence’, its members must have numbered in the tens of thousands (roughly 50,000 members) since, according to estimates by the Western intelligence services in 1946, the active supporters of the insurgents ranged between 150,000 and 200,000 people and the supporters of the Left surpassed 10 per cent of the overall population (roughly 700,000 adults).128 Once again Vafeiadis proposed a full mobilisation of the KKE’s cadres and supporters in the state and security organs and once again Zachariadis rejected his proposal as premature.129 The revisionist and left-wing historians imputed Zachariadis’ decision to various causes: his irrational character,130 his obsession with an urban insurrection in the pattern of communist revolutionary orthodoxy131 or even his unfaltering commitment to the pursuit of a peace settlement.132 In reality, however, the KKE hesitated because Stalin had not given the ‘green light’ for an all-out war. Stalin had warned the KKE against an all-out war while the British Army (16,000 men) was stationed in Greece. In addition, the KKE had received limited aid from communist Europe. After all, the

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power of the communists in several countries in Eastern Europe was stabilised only after 1947.133 This postponement would, nonetheless, cost the KKE dearly in the next years.134 Tens of thousands of communist supporters and cadres were trapped in the towns and suffered the government’s repressive policies – depriving the communists from vital manpower in the conflict’s subsequent stages.135 The revisionist scholars and left-wing historians imputed Zachariadis’s decision to various causes: his irrational character,136 his obsession with an urban insurrection in the pattern of communist revolutionary orthodoxy137 or even his unfaltering commitment to the pursuit of a peace settlement.138 However, the primary reason for such caution should be ascribed to the critical deficiency in the essentials for guerrilla warfare (namely weapons). Until mid-1946, the Greek insurgents had received limited external aid from communist Europe. After all, the communist power in Bulgaria and Romania as well as other countries in Eastern Europe was stabilised only after 1947.139 The censors of Zachariadis have claimed that the KKE still possessed in mid-1946 the military potential to topple the unstable parliamentary regime or at least dictate an honourable peace settlement.140 However, these critics have not explained in a satisfactory way how the KKE would have overpowered the Expeditionary British Army in Greece – given the fact that the Kremlin did not assist the EAM during the December Uprising against the British. Already by June, the government resolved to suppress what it viewed as ‘banditry by the far Left’141 by implementing a century-old antibanditry policy. The chief characteristics of this policy remained consistent for over 100 years. In summary, the government used a ‘carrot and stick’ policy: on the one hand, they punished the bandits and their civilian supporters with draconian laws and pursued the bandits with the gendarmerie or mercenary bandits. On the other hand, they bought off the bandits with gifts and amnesties. After all, the part-time bandits and part-time guerrillas were often employed by the Kingdom of Greece to incite rebellions in the Ottoman-occupied territories inhabited by Greeks.142 In June, the government decreed Resolution III that criminalised the incitement of uprising and participation in any paramilitary groups and ‘anti-national conspiracies’ against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.143 Soon afterwards, special courts-martial were established in several regions of northern and central Greece infested

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with communist insurgents.144 The terminology used for Resolution III resembles the laws for the ‘protection of social peace’ in the early twentieth century. These laws with a distinct anti-communist orientation had been ordained by monarchist and centrist governments which perceived the communists a threat similar to that of the bandits in the nineteenth century.145 Resolution III basically associated the internal communist threat with the external communist (i.e. Slavic) threat.146 Although the communists repeatedly pointed out that the EAM had safeguarded the territorial integrity of occupied Greece during World War II,147 the KKE’s policies since February 1945 tarnished the patriotic credentials of the EAM. The KKE received support from neighbouring Balkan countries which never ceased to covet parts of northern Greece.148 Far worse, in 1943 the KKE had reputedly signed the ‘Petritsi Pact’ – an accord between the Greek and Bulgarian communist parties that ostensibly provided for the establishment of the ‘Union of Soviet Republics in the Balkans’ and the incorporation of a ‘unified Macedonia’ as a separate republic.149 Although the KKE denied vehemently such an accord, the communists could not easily shake off the stigma of their advocacy of a ‘Macedonian entity’. Under pressure from the Comintern, in 1924 the KKE adopted the internationalist platform for an ‘autonomous Macedonia’ and endorsed the right of self-determination for the ‘Macedonian people’. In 1935 the KKE revoked this decision, but the damage to its reputation proved irreparable.150 The government used the gendarmes (often supported by small army contingents) or anti-communist former guerrillas and brigands to pursue the insurgents.151 However, these ill-suited military forces proved incapable of wiping the insurgents out and, far worse, maltreated the left-wing civilians and alienated them even further.152 In July, the government set up the Macedonian Comitato – a secret organisation staffed by senior right-wing politicians and army officers and tasked to organise right-wing paramilitary groups throughout the country.153 The clandestine organisation aspired to emulate in title and purpose the Macedonian Comitato of 1904. The latter had set up armed bands to chase off the Bulgarian ones in an undeclared war for the control of the rural Christian communities of Ottoman-ruled Macedonia.154 Moreover, the government intensified the anti-communist purge in the public sector. In August, the government decreed Resolution IX that

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cleansed the state-owned banks, public utilities, civil service and agricultural co-operatives from the communists.155 This new wave of purges cemented the control of the monarchist government over the lower middle class – one of the EAM’s principal supporters during World War II. The government also intervened in the labour unions to curb the communists’ influence among the workers. Earlier in March, the elections in the General Confederacy of the Workers in Greece (GSEE) had resulted in a resounding victory for the communist unionist faction despite the violence by right-wing paramilitaries. In May, the Council of State had declared the elections’ outcome invalid and in August the minister of labour arrested the communist leadership of the GSEE and appointed a right-wing one instead.156 The ‘petits bourgeois’ and peasants, two other pillars of the EAM’s popular support during World War II,157 would suffer gravely from the right-wing violence after the Treaty of Varkiza. Despite these flagrant wrongdoings against the Left, the British did not intervene to restrain the Right – a political force they considered a far lesser evil. The diplomatic skirmishes with Moscow in August only aggravated the growing fears of the British of an unstoppable Soviet expansionism. The Ukrainian delegate to the UN protested to the Security Council that the allegedly repressive policy of the monarchist Greek government and the unlawful presence of the (allied) British Army in Greece represented a threat to regional peace and security.158 Revealing of the Kremlin’s true motives, this protest coincided with the escalation of the Turkish Straits Crisis in the summer of 1946.159 Once again, the Soviet protest was seconded by a similar protest by the Greek communists. In August 1946, the KKE sent Stalin a lengthy memorandum in which the party outlined its proposal for a neutral Greece under the collective guarantee of the ‘Big Four’ (France, Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union); Stalin, however, rejected this proposal as immature after several weeks.160 However, the KKE reiterated the theory for the neutrality of Greece and the withdrawal of the British troops in its peace feelers in September.161 The new Soviet manoeuvre only accelerated the rapprochement between London and Washington in the face of the increased Soviet aggressiveness.162 The new Soviet manoeuvre only accelerated the rapprochement between London and Washington in the face of the increased Soviet aggressiveness.163 The Iranian and Turkish Straits Crises, which had

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been caused chiefly by Stalin’s obsession to shield the USSR with multiple buffer zones after the trauma of World War II,164 rang alarm bells among the US and British. The top US policymakers suspected that Moscow intended to exploit the vacuum of power created by the collapse of the Axis Powers, the civil conflict in Greece and China and the decline of Europe to expand its own power. However, Stalin’s course of action after World War II reveals a cautious, not an imperialist, dictator who only wanted to cement the rule of the Soviet Union in its hard-won sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe. Moscow did represent a threat – though not a military one – to the USA; Moscow, the centre of worldwide communism, stood out as the only serious challenge to the idealistic vision of Washington for the postwar reconstruction of the world’s economic and political system according to the US principles and ideas.165 Although the senior US officials progressively realised the urgent need to contain what they perceived as an aggressive behaviour by Stalin, they had not devised a particular strategy on how to constrain Moscow until March 1947.166 In sharp contrast, the British knew precisely what they wanted: a return to the status quo ante bellum (i.e. before 1940). The British wanted the Soviets to renounce their new sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and respect the old British one in the Eastern Mediterranean. Britain, nonetheless, grasped that it needed the support of the USA to fulfil its maximalist geopolitical goals: retain its colonial empire, participate in the administration of the postwar world order as a coequal partner to the USA and the USSR and thwart the expansion of the USSR beyond its prewar borders – more so within the sphere of influence of Britain in the eastern Mediterranean.167 Both Britain and the USA wished to retain peaceful relations with Stalin – but only on their own terms. These terms involved nothing less than the cessation of the Kremlin’s encroachment on the British and US spheres of influence and the drastic reduction of the Soviet one.168 Hence, when the referendum occurred on 1 September, no one doubted its outcome under the circumstances: the return of King George II was approved by 70 per cent of the voters.169 Although the support for the king’s restoration increased dramatically after the December Uprising, widespread incidents of violence and fraud impaired the validity of the referendum.170 The (new) allied commission that supervised the plebiscite (AMFOGE II) ignored these incidents and

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readily validated the outcome of the plebiscite in an untactful endeavour to protect the legitimacy of the policies of the new royalist government.171 Although senior British officials did not conceal their antipathy for the king,172 they regarded the latter as the only alternative to communism and, Moscow.173 The centrist parties readily acknowledged the plebiscite’s verdict; in fact, Themistocles Sophoulis, leader of the republican Liberal Party, confided to Clifford Norton (the British ambassador) that he would even acquiesce to a monarchist dictatorship under the aegis of Britain as a valid guarantee of the independence of Greece from the Slavs and communism.174 The plebiscite swiftly resolved another persisting problem of Greece since the quasi-fascist dictatorship of Metaxas (1935–9): the absence of a constitution. In stark violation of the Treaty Varkiza that stipulated the need for a new constitution, Tsaldaris reinstated the constitution of 1911/35 a few weeks before the referendum. This prewar constitution contained anti-communist laws that the governments in the upcoming internecine strife would re-enact. No sooner than 1952, three years after the insurgency’s suppression, was a new constitution written.175

Bullets and Olive Branches: September –October 1946 The KKE reacted to the restoration of the monarchy by re-modelling its ‘dual strategy’. On the one hand, the party intensified its military activity in northern and central Greece; on the other hand, the KKE repeatedly uttered peace offers with maximalist terms. Although it has been claimed that the KKE’s ‘dual strategy’ intended to compel the government to sit on the negotiation table,176 the actions of the party demonstrate that the communists never sincerely committed to the pursuit of a peace settlement. If the KKE really wanted peace, why didn’t the party participate in the elections earlier in March? If the party exclusively intended to undermine the legitimacy of the elections through abstention, why didn’t the party abstain from the referendum as well? If the party was moving towards an armed struggle in the second half of 1946, exclusively due to the anti-communist violence, why did the party then request guidance and help from Stalin for an armed struggle as early as February and install members of the politburo at Belgrade as liaison with Tito? How can the peace offers of the KKE then be explained? Do they constitute a smoke screen as the traditional

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historians claim? Not exactly. The KKE never approached a senior official of the government to submit its peace offers. Instead, the KKE announced its peace offers through its mouthpiece – Rizospastis. However, the peace offers amounted more to ideas than concrete peace terms. Only in 1947 would the KKE assume to initiate a peace dialogue – and for other reasons than a peace-loving mentality. Why did the KKE then publicise these maximalist peace terms (that the government would most certainly reject)? First, the KKE strove to create the profile of a peace-loving party under constant oppression – a positive image for the international public opinion. Secondly, and most importantly, the party worked to propagate the ‘narrative’ that the insurgents acted on their own in response to the regime’s violent repression (not under direct orders by the KKE). If the KKE openly endorsed the insurgency, the government would most certainly obliterate the KKE and EAM long before the communists had acquired the needed military strength to challenge the authority of the government head-on. A few days after the plebiscite, Zachariadis publicised his peace terms. On the condition that the (allied) British Army withdrew immediately, a coalition government of ‘all democratic parties’ would declare a general amnesty for all (monarchist and communist) armed irregulars, restore ‘democratic order’ in the state and security apparatuses, and reinstate the trade unionist and political freedoms. Thereafter, the new government would organise free and fair elections and a plebiscite on the fate of the monarchy. As for its foreign policy, the new government would adopt a policy of equal cooperation with the ‘Big Four’ (i.e. France, Britain, the USSR and the USA) and establish friendly relations with the three northern Balkan communist states.177 Though modest at face value, the peace terms could not be accepted by the staunchly anti-communist Right. Later that month, the KKE announced an improved version of the previous offer. An all-party government, in which the EAM would participate on equal terms, would implement all the policies outlined in the previous offer and, in addition, organise free and fair elections with proportional representation; eventually, the new constitutional assembly would author a new constitution without the need for a plebiscite on the type of the regime.178 The government did not respond to the peace feelers of the KKE at all. At the same time, the communist insurgents expanded their military activity throughout central and northern Greece and scored one military

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success after the other.179 In a long memorandum to its three principal supporters (Tito, Dimitrov, Stalin), the KKE argued that a combination of ‘popular [political] mobilisation and mass popular self-defence’ (the latter only recently upgraded to a rural insurgency) intended to oust the anglophile king and the British and overthrow the monarchist government. The KKE wanted to muster a far larger military force to fulfil its goals and, for that reason, petitioned its foreign patrons for an increase in military aid.180 By the end of September, the euphoria for the king’s restoration receded and senior officials realised that the gendarmerie confronted an insurgency – not violence by diehards from the defunct ELAS. These officials from the warlike wing of the Populist Party did not impute this new wave of violence to the government’s wrongdoings; instead, they accused the prime minister of declining a pre-emptive strike against the KKE just a few weeks prior to the plebiscite.181 In line with the warlike proposals of the anti-communist extremists, several pre-eminent practitioners and theorists on COIN have stressed that prompt and resolution action against an insurgency at its infancy stands out as the optimum solution.182 However, such action does not guarantee permanent peace;183 unless the state authorities try to mend the root causes of this crisis, the possibility of renewed violence should not be written off.184 After realising the severity of the new crisis, Tsaldaris called on the National Army (ES) to deal with the insurgents; however, the gendarmerie maintained a minor role in COIN by garrisoning the recently recaptured territories by the ES or by hunting down the small insurgent groups in southern Greece.185 ES in late 1946 amounted to just a shadow of its prewar strength. After the Treaty of Varkiza, the British Military Mission (BMM) had shouldered the uphill task of rebuilding the Greek armed forces from scratch: after their capitulation to the Wehrmacht in 1941, the Greek armed forces had ceased to exist – with the exception of a few small contingents that participated in the North African and Italian campaigns in World War II. The BMM, however, had proceeded sluggishly with the reconstruction of the Greek armed forces; in August 1946 the ES had reached a nominal strength of 80,000 men.186 Nor did the British rebuild an efficient professional army. The officer corps, decimated by World War II, was further downsized due to the

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intense political passions in Greece since 1943. The officers who had either served in the ELAS or participated in the mutiny of the Greek Expeditionary Army in Egypt (orchestrated in 1944 by a cabal of communist officers) were demoted or discharged. Some of them were even sentenced to exile or imprisonment on account of their (true or fabricated) participation in the December Uprising. Their colleagues who had served in the quisling security apparatus turned out far luckier: though initially stigmatised as ‘traitors’, after the December Uprising they were acquitted of the charges for collaboration and reinstated to active service owing to their anti-communist record (they never, however, occupied senior command posts).187 The ES would suffer from a critical shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers throughout the civil war. The BMM trained the ES neither appropriately nor expeditiously. Even after the outbreak of the insurgency, the BMM trained the new officer cadets on conventional – not irregular – warfare.188 Political interventionism remained another serious issue. The quality of the army high command declined sharply since meritocracy yielded to myopic political favouritism as the sole criterion for the appointments and promotions. After the Treaty of Varkiza, three agencies had been established to deal with military issues: (a) the Council of the Chiefs of General Staffs (SAGE) (b) the Supreme War Council (ASS) and (c) the Supreme Council of National Defence (ASEA). The commander of the BMM participated in the sessions of the three councils without voting rights – although no critical decision on security issues could be reached without prior consultation with him. The same provisions applied to the US military mission after its establishment in 1947.189 However, these agencies were transformed into an arena of party politics. The three chiefs of general staff who rapidly succeeded one another between 1945 and 1947 owed their appointment and dismissal exclusively to political intrigues. Since February 1945, politicians had put immense pressure on the general staff to restore their favoured veteran officers to active service or promote them. Far worse, politicians intervened in the army’s operational planning. They demanded the protection of the voters in their own constituencies and compelled the army commanders to disperse their under-strength units and restrain them in static defence duties.190 Only in 1948 did the political interventions in military affairs under immense pressure from the USA.191

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The situation with the army’s recruits did not seem promising either. Until late 1948, over 40 per cent of the army’s strength consisted of reservists of prewar vintage whom the ES recruited out of necessity. Though experienced, they remained reluctant to serve outside their community as state authorities offered their families unsatisfactory economic and security provisions. In addition, the reservists resented their military service for yet another term while other younger men (e.g. those of the upper classes) scandalously skipped conscription.192 Unsurprisingly, the military suffered from low morale of epidemic proportions. After years of incessant conflict, the majority of the army recruits did not welcome the prospect of participating in yet another war – especially one that seemed unwinnable against an ‘invisible’ enemy. A sizable number of the soldiers decried the corruption and inefficiency of the traditional political elites and the repressive acts of the post-Varkiza governments against the Left. In fact, a sizable number of recruits (over 15 per cent of the armed forces) sympathised with the communists – much to the chagrin of the ASEA. The ‘fifth column’ within the ES would offer the insurgents superb intelligence during the first phase of the war.193 In August and September 1946 several incidents of desertion and disobedience were recorded among army units in northern Greece that seriously perturbed the high command.194 Therefore, in September the government voted a new law that authorised the deportation of the families of the deserters. And upon the suggestion of the BMM, the same month the government decided to classify the soldiers and officers into different categories according to their political beliefs and purge the ‘unreliable’ ones. In the following years, thousands of officers and soldiers suspected of sympathising with the communists (over 29,000 men in total) were deported to a special prison camp on Makronisos. After their ‘rehabilitation’, they were assigned to unarmed auxiliary units behind friendly lines or employed by the KYP to provide intelligence and spread propaganda. The royalist regime’s effort to root out the communist infiltration in the government troops, however, took time to yield results. In the insurgency’s initial stages, the substantial support for the Left within the armed forces provided the insurgents with superb intelligence that they used effectively to score a string of victories.195 Between September and October, the ES conducted a series of small scale clearing operations in the mountains of central Greece, eastern

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Thessaly, western Macedonia and Thrace without a central operational axis. Ill-planned and ill-executed by a military leadership unversed in the art of COIN, these operations did not achieve their core objectives. In summary, the ES intended to encircle and annihilate the insurgents within a specific region with large pincer-like movements. Due to poor timing and coordination, however, the insurgents slipped through the wide gaps of the ES’s cordons virtually unscathed. By the end of autumn, they counterattacked and captured substantial territory in northern Thessaly and western Macedonia.196 Demoralised and terrorised by the insurgents, several pro-government villagers in the mountainous areas of northern and central Greece sought refuge to state-controlled towns197 or yielded to the insurgents’ authority.198 In late September, the government ordered the instant evacuation of the isolated gendarmerie stations in northern Greece and, shortly afterwards, state officials (such as the civil servants) started withdrawing from the northern regions.199 How did the local population react to the victories of the insurgents? Many mountainous villages in northern and central Greece often welcomed the insurgents as worthy successors to the ELAS200 owing to the positive recollections from the EAM-rule (EAMokratίa) during World War II and the negative experiences of the anti-communist violence after the Treaty of Varkiza.201 While the EAM had centred the ‘Free Greece’ around the society of the mountainous villages during World War II, the traditional political parties had rebuilt the oligarchic and ‘Athens-centric’ system of governance right after the Treaty of Varkiza. The deputies of the traditional parties (either centrist or right-wing) shared the same roots (the majority of them had previously worked as lawyers) and political modus operandi (e.g. highly personalised politics and clientism). They treated the office of the MP as yet another profession (one in two of the deputies in the parliament of 1946 had already served several parliamentary terms in the pre-1936 period) and a source of wealth and prestige. Apart from their personal (particularly family and kin) ties, they used their privileges and access to state resources to organise massive clientistic networks. The majority of the politicians, even the governors, stayed in Athens for prolonged periods of time and strove to achieve petty personal interests or simply indulged in the comforts of the capital – remembering the villagers only during election time.202

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Alarmed by these adverse developments, in October the government decided to organise the self-defence of the villages and establish the Units for Countryside Security (MAY) and the Units of Pursuit Contingents (MAD) under the direction of Mavromichalis. The MAD grew into well-equipped and well-disciplined militias that army officers trained and led. Although they could not rival the insurgents in fighting skill, they did succeed in constraining them in Epirus and parts of Macedonia and Thessaly – areas where nationalist (and anti-communist) guerrilla groups had sprung up during World War II.203 In sharp contrast, the MAY turned out to be a liability. Staffed with ill-equipped and untrained right-wing villagers they proved more effective in settling old scores with other communist villagers than protecting their own villages.204 During the conflict’s initial phase, war crimes (namely the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians) were systematically committed by both sides. However, these war crimes remained selective and regional in character205 – resembling vendettas in effect. Western Macedonia witnessed such vendettas between the Greek and Slavophone communities – a direct consequence of the inter-communal strife since World War II.206 The character of violence in the conflict’s initial phase confirms a basic conclusion of the recent studies on irregular warfare, namely that ‘political and private identities and actions’ interact during a civil conflict and produce a type of ‘joint violence’ on an individual and collective level.207 However, the Greek Civil War did not witness a genocide or large scale massacres like other civil wars (e.g. the Russian Civil War) in modern times.

The Crisis of the Right: October 1946 –January 1947 The successive victories of the insurgents stiffened the reaction of the government. In October, Tsaldaris invested the minister of northern Greece with the right to appoint (and abolish as well) the local governing bodies in the provinces infested with insurgents; quite predictably, the minister appointed right-wing governors and village and town councils across northern Greece.208 A few weeks later, the government installed right-wing local governing bodies throughout Greece – even in regions traditionally regarded as strongholds of the Centre (e.g. Crete and Thrace)209 and outlawed the communist

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newspapers in the provinces.210 These policies, however, did not secure a fair measure of just and lawful governance at the local level211 – an integral element of a successful COIN strategy as shown time and time again.212 Last but not least, government revised twice (in October and December) Resolution IX for the purge of the civil service from ‘anti-national elements’ and, thus, sacked with unlawful procedures every civil servant suspected of communist sympathies.213 In effect, the government institutionalised a ‘regime of emergency’ by ordaining draconian laws which stripped the insurgents and their civilian suympathisers of fundamental political liberties.214 By November, 4,750 people (including 751 women and 78 children) had been deported to prison camps across the Aegean Sea.215 These prison camps, in most cases old public installations roughly fenced with barbwire, could hardly meet the basic needs (shelter, food and healthcare) for an inmate population that grew firmly month by month.216 The deplorable conditions within the prison camps and the deportation of women and children stirred domestic and international criticism. Greek and foreign human rights groups (overtly pro-leftist) protested these repressive policies of the government,217 and even the British Police and Prisons Mission objected to these practices.218 Inundated with a constant stream of deportees, several island communities bitterly complained to the government.219 At the same time, the army (without authorisation from the government) sporadically relocated the inhabitants of pro-communist villages in northern Greece to so-called ‘security centres’ – state-run refugee camps next to towns. By January 1947, roughly 20,000 peasants had been evacuated to ‘security centres’.220 The intensifying repression alarmed Washington about the stability of the regime and the efficacy of the latter’s internal policies. In October, the US ambassador appealed to the government to adopt a policy of leniency that would improve the legitimacy and popularity of the regime.221 The British seconded this recommendation.222 As shown time and time again throughout history, indiscriminate violence by state authorities usually proves counter-productive in political terms for the counterinsurgents (e.g. Nazi Germany in occupied Greece).223 In parallel, the USA and Britain stepped up their pressure on Tsaldaris to set up a broad coalition government that would secure a high level of legitimacy and popularity.224 As several occasions throughout history

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have demonstrated, ‘inclusive politics and [a] representative government’ increase the efficacy and legitimacy of a counterinsurgent in COIN.225 After all, the two naval powers thought little of the statesmanship qualities of Tsaldaris226 and wanted to forestall the desertion of Sophoulis, who had already voiced a controversial ‘appeasement policy’ towards the KKE, to the communist side.227 Tsaldaris yielded to pressure and partly implemented the allies’ suggestions. First of all, Tsaldaris invited Braine, the representative of the labour unions in the UK, to Greece in late October and, after exhaustive deliberations, signed the Tsaldaris– Braine Accord that terminated the state persecution of the communist unionist officials and proposed a new conciliatory formula for the composition of the GSEE.228 Secondly, he invited the same period the leaders of the Centre for consultations. The leaders of the EPE and Sophoulis set demanding conditions for their cooperation that Tsaldaris rejected.229 Even the king’s calls for unity among the party leaders fell on deaf ears.230 On 28 October, the fifth anniversary of the Greco – Italian War in 1940 and the day after the collapse of the inter-party negotiations, Vafeiadis set up the General Headquarters of the Guerrillas (GAA) on 28 October – the fifth anniversary of the Greco – Italian War in 1940.231 Under the aegis of Tito, a few days later the KKE and the NOF concluded a cooperation pact – despite the denunciations of the Slavophones’ irredentist agenda by the KKE in 1945.232 Although this agreement critically increased the KKE’s military capabilities and diplomatic standing, it tarnished the party’s image in the eyes of the nationalist Greek people: for the average Greek citizen, the KKE’s actions verified the right-wing propaganda that the party operated as a ‘proxy’ of the Slavs.233 After all, the Slav-Macedonians would prove a troublesome partner who wanted to implement their own irredentist agenda.234 In November, Tsaldaris repeatedly appealed to Britain to authorise a substantial reinforcement of the ES due to conflict’s escalation – requests to which London acceded only partially. Worn out by World War II, Britain could not maintain financially a massive foreign army; nor did the BMM believe that the government army needed more men and arms to quell an embryonic insurgency. In December, Britain sanctioned a 15,000-strong increase in the size of the ES and the latter reached 100,000 men. This force, however, remained impressive only on

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paper. In truth, the administrative and support services comprised a substantial portion of the ES – a section inflated by a growing number of recruits who wished to avoid combat service.235 In December, Vafeiadis proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) and started upgrading the guerrilla companies into battalions just like the ELAS during World War II.236 Although the DSE’s combat strength totaled 12,000 fighters,237 the KKE wanted to increase the DSE’s size to 20,000 fighters within a few months and, for that reason, requested from its allies (Dimitrov, Stalin, Tito) a substantial increase in military aid.238 However, Moscow’s opposition to any further armed escalation239 and the small amount of military aid from communist Europe240 compelled the KKE to postpone the second phase of its guerrilla campaign until the spring of 1947. The sharp deterioration of the internal security situation prompted the monarchist government to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict. After all, Tsaldaris viewed the insurgency not as a civil conflict but as a ‘war by proxy’ waged by Yugoslavia and the USSR against Greece via the KKE.241 Therefore, in early December he travelled to New York to protest in person before the UN Security Council against the support of the hostile Balkan neighbours of Greece to the ongoing insurgency. Viewing the Greek insurgents and their Balkan allies as satellites of Stalin, Tsaldaris thought that high-level negotiations among the ‘Big Four’ and substantial concessions to the communist Balkan countries would terminate the war instantly. He gained the approval of Bevin, Britain’s foreign secretary, but his idea never materialised owing to the categorical objection of the US secretary of state.242 Thereafter, Tsaldaris merely proceeded to issue a complaint before the Security Council that Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria supported the insurgents and threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Greece.243 A negotiated settlement of the Greek Question among the ‘Big Four’ would have relieved the British from the strenuous task of sustaining the Greek monarchist regime in the face of the increasing economic, political and military predicaments. In the winter of 1946 – 7, the British prime minister seriously thought of withdrawing from Greece since the protection of this kingdom required constant military and economic support beyond the reduced postwar

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capabilities of Britain. Only with difficulty did Bevin eventually dissuade Attlee from setting in motion such a policy. However, the foreign secretary and prime minister recognised the urgent need to secure the commitment of the USA to the defence of Greece and, by extension, the Eastern Mediterranean against the aggressive Soviet encroachment.244 The abortive diplomatic initiative of Tsaldaris was followed by yet another diplomatic debacle: the non-realisation of the ‘national claims’. Ever since his rise to premiership, Tsaldaris consistently strove to realise the grandiose vision of a ‘Great Greece’. Britain flatly refused to converse about Cyprus and, as a result, Tsaldaris tried to persuade the ‘Big Four’ to cede territory to Greece from the former Axis Powers. Earlier in spring, the council of (allied) foreign ministers in Paris had determined to cede only the Dodecanese Islands to Greece only due to the unenthusiastic support of the Greek claims by the Anglo-Americans and, most notably, the opposition of the Soviets.245 Tsaldaris put forth the Greek territorial claims against Bulgaria and Albania at the peace summit in Paris during the second half of 1946. However, the disposition of the participants did not augur a positive result for the Greek cause. Britain and the USA did not wholeheartedly support the claims of Greece since they would perpetuate the postwar rivalries in the Balkans, the USSR strongly opposed them and supported the Albanian and Bulgarian counterdemands against Greece and the rigid negotiatory tactics of Greece alienated even traditional friends of Greece. The peace summit did not reach a decision on the issue in October and merely consigned it to the council of foreign ministers for examination without any specific recommendation.246 Ignoring the advice of his Anglo-American allies, Tsaldaris pressed on with the Greek claims to the Council of Foreign Ministers in early December – which eventually adjudicated only minor war reparations from Italy and Bulgaria and ignored the issue of Northern Epirus altogether.247 Greece suffered setbacks not only internationally but domestically. The slow recovery of the war-ravaged economy248 demanded that the government urgently stabilised the depreciated currency, re-built the war-ravaged society and secured a sustainable economic development.249 Unable to cope with the above challenges alone, the government solicited its Anglo-American allies for urgent economic aid.250

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However, Britain could not intervene once again as in January and save Greece from utter ruin.251 Britain only wished to withdraw from Greece as soon as possible and transfer the strenuous tasks of sustaining Greece and containing Communism in the Eastern Mediterranean to the USA.252 In stark contrast, the USA proved capable and willing to support a royalist regime they had previously despised for its corruption, irresponsibility and repression. Earlier in July, the US officials (just like their British colleagues) had rejected the extravagant economic demands of Tsaldaris and declined a request to visit the USA.253 By autumn, however, the disposition of the USA toward the royalist regime had changed radically. Prominent US officials soon realised that Greece would inevitably collapse and the communists would seize power unless Washington came to its rescue. In mid-December, Truman announced that a US Economic Mission under the economist Paul Porter would be dispatched to Greece to investigate the country’s socio-economic problems and recommend solutions.254 Despite the willingness of the USA to support Greece fiancially, the military situation deteriorated sharply. In late December, Field Marshall Montgomery, chief of the British general staff, urgently visited Athens and warned the top Greek officials that the insurgency should be wiped out by the spring of 1947 lest the kingdom’s very survival should be jeopardised.255 As January 1947 drew to a close, the insurgents expanded their activities to Thessaly, Thrace, central and western Macedonia and the Peloponnese – the southernmost edge of mainland Greece – and alarmed the British and Greek officials.256 According to the KKE’s secretary general at the time, Zachariadis, the royalist regime was unsettled by the insurgent successes to such an extent that the latter offered willy-nilly a peace deal. When Zachariadis visited Moscow in May 1947, he informed the senior Soviet officials that Tsaldaris approached him in secret in January and offered 100 parliamentary seats for the EAM in exchange for peace. The KKE’s secretary general claimed in front of his bewildered Soviet hosts that he had rejected this peace offer.257 However, this alleged offer by Tsaldaris has not been confirmed by other sources; in fact, Tsaldaris rejected in January (the same month the alleged peace offer was conveyed to Zachariadis) the proposal of the EAM for a (temporary) ceasefire that would remain in effect for as long as the UN Commission of

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Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents operated.258 But even if Tsaldaris had indeed presented Zachariadis with such a peace offer, how would have he implemented it unconstitutionally without a resort to the ballot box? Consequently, one can safely assume that Zachariadis invented this story to vaunt the panic-inspiring success of the insurgents in front of Stalin and secure additional military aid from Moscow to realise his objectives.

CHAPTER 3 `

A PEACE-AND-WAR' STATE: JANUARY—OCTOBER 1947

The ‘Seven-Headed’ Government: January –February 1947 In January, the US embassy urged Tsaldaris to initiate talks with other parliamentary parties once again.1 The USA strongly believed that the war against the communist insurgents could not be won by the repressive policies of the Right. Senior US officials in Greece vindicated this credo. The same month, the Porter Mission visited Greece and wrote a thought-provoking report which, inter alia, deplored the woeful state of the majority of the population and censured the ineptitude and apathy of the elites. The Porter Mission insisted on the urgent need to provide economic aid to Greece (whose supply and distribution the USA would control) and promote radical socio-economic and political reforms.2 Once again, Tsaldaris yielded to pressure and invited the opposition leaders for consultations. After exhaustive discussions,3 on 24 January seven right-wing and centrist party leaders (Venizelos, Kanellopoulos, Tsaldaris, Papandreou, Zervas, Alexandris and Gonatas) agreed to establish a coalition government under Dimitrios Maximos – a retired deputy of the Populist Party and former governor of the Bank of Greece well-known for his moderate character. Two party leaders from the Right and Centre (Tsaldaris and Venizelos respectively) were sworn-in as deputy presidents of the new coalition government.4 The latter, however, was clearly dominated by the Right since the Populist Party controlled the majority of the key ministries.

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During the civil war, the Centre would be squeezed between the communists and royalists and it would eventually be deprived of its autonomy as a political space at the expense of the anti-communist Right.5 Although the pressure of the Anglo-Americans had paid off, the new government suffered from political instability from the outset. Due to constant squabbles among the several government partners over the control of key ministries, the cabinet was reshuffled three times in less than 30 days: on 27 January and on 17 and 23 February. Indicatively of the power-hungry disposition of the seven partners, their leaders occupied (albeit briefly on most cases) several posts. For example, Tsaldaris was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. For a few days, he served as general governor of northern Greece, minister of economics, coordination and agriculture and minister of political coordination for the prime minister. This over-centralisation of power would only intensify in the following months of the civil conflict.6 The new coalition government vowed to restore law and order by declaring a general amnesty for all armed irregulars (right-wing and communist alike) and calling on all armed irregulars to surrender their weapons. At the same time, the government implemented a policy of leniency, upon the recommendation of the British, which involved the release of thousands of political prisoners and the suspension of the deportations for relatives of the (communist) insurgents (women and children).7 The policies of amnesty and leniency reflected the perceptions of the seven party leaders about the causes and solutions to the civil conflict. They subscribed to the right-wing narrative that portrayed the insurgency as a war by proxy waged by the communist Balkan countries against Greece via their ‘agent’ – the KKE. According to this narrative, the KKE consisted of nothing more than a few communist zealots that used propaganda and coercion to recruit thousands of ‘misguided [people]’ (paraplanhuέnte6) among true Greek patriots and swell the ranks of this ‘anti-national movement’. The political parties or personalities that wished to negotiate a peace settlement with the KKE were labelled as ‘misguided’ for allegedly failing to grasp the party’s treasonous nature.8 Despite initial expectations, the policies of amnesty and leniency proved unfruitful due to mutual mistrust between the two sides.

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The communist insurgents suspected that the new government would violate the amnesty and punish them in the pattern of the Treaty of Varkiza. Thus, just a few hundred right-wing irregulars responded positively to the call for amnesty and surrendered their weapons.9 After all, the anti-communist irregulars were being integrated in the MAY and MAD which were established a few months before.10 In a similar fashion, just 3,530 political prisoners were released11 – only to be rearrested within a few months. Indeed, by March, Napoleon Zervas, the anti-communist minister of public order who was swornin in late February, had ordered the arrest of hundreds of cadres and supporters of the Left – most of which for the second time in a few months).12 The ES (dominated by anti-communist officers since its reconstruction from scratch in 1945 with British help and guidance13) strongly opposed the reconciliatory policy of the new government. After the failure of the twin policies of amnesty and leniency, the military convinced Maximos to set up a colossal prison camp in Makronisos (a small desert island in the Aegean Sea) in February. In total, three prison camps would be founded that would grow into a symbol of the regime’s will to wipe out communism.14 These camps would quarter the majority of prisoners during the course of the war – from family members of the insurgents to fifthcolumnists within the military.15 Using terminology from the disciplines of education and medicine, intellectuals and state officials praised these camps as the ‘national school’ and ‘sanatorium’ of Greece which ‘rehabilitated’ the victims of communism (the ‘ideological heroin’) by means of a painstaking ‘therapeutic’ and ‘didactical’ process.16 The new government reinstated the ‘declarations of repentance’ (dhlώsei6 metanoίa6) – a legal formula of the dictatorship of Metaxas that the political prisoners could use to renounce communism. The state authorities coerced (primarily through torture) the political prisoners to sign the declarations and, by extension, prove the sincerity of their recantation through actions. The so-called ‘rehabilitated [prisoners]’ («ananήcante6») staffed the propaganda organs of the prison camps and preached against communism to fellow ‘misguided’ prisoners. Others worked as covert agents for the army intelligence service or even formed special army units that fought in the front line.17 By January

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1950, just 6.24 per cent (1,494 out of 16,768) of the political prisoners in Makronisos had refused to recant18 – although the greater majority of these ‘rehabilitated [prisoners]’ withdrew their previous statements when the regime suspended executions in late 1949.19 However, the prisoners who had renounced communism were stigmatised by the KKE as apostates and were isolated by the party.20 The communist press and parties compared the prison camps in Makronisos and elsewhere with Nazi concentration camps. The government rejected such accusations as unfounded and, instead, underscored their ‘correctional’ and ‘civilizing’ mission. Kanellopoulos went as far as to call Makronisos the ‘New Parthenon’ of Greece.21 In reality, however, Makronisos resembled in every aspect a camp for prisoners of war – not political prisoners.22 The propensity to violence by the prison authorities attested to the ruthlessness of the correctional systems in postwar Greece and Europe and, most importantly, the demonisation of the ‘Other’. In truth, the government regarded the insurgency as ‘foreign-led banditry’23 and treated the insurgents and their civilian sympathisers accordingly. Old practices of the Greek anti-banditry warfare such as the decapitation of the adversaries and the display of the dead insurgents in public were revived – to the distaste of the liberal public opinion in the West (Britain in particular). By denying the dead insurgents the traditional funeral rites that a profoundly religious society considered sacrosanct, the government declared unmistakably that no mercy would be reserved for the ‘foreign-led bandits’ even after death. The regime sought, henceforth, to inculcate the population with the idea that communists had been separated from the corpus of the Christian Greek nation beyond salvation.24 Makronisos would epitomise the commitment of the government to destroy communism. From 1947 onwards, senior state officials (including royalty) and dignitaries from allied counties visited Makronisos and glorified its ‘national mission’ in an effort to legitimise a ruthless correctional system on the domestic and international stage. This intensive propaganda campaign did not involve just ‘Potemkin village’ style inspections. Under the direction of the army, traditional (press) and modern media (photography and cinema) media were used to ‘sanitise’ Makronisos in the eyes of the international and internal public opinion and defend it against the virulent polemic of the communists.

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In essence, Makronisos represented a ‘total state-run enterprise’ that continued to operate until 1974.25 Last but not least, Makronisos would exemplify the entente between the State and the Church in postwar Greece in the context of ‘national mindedness’ – the synthesis of (anti-Slavic) nationalism, (Christian) pietism and anti-communist conservatism26 After all, the Church had already purged the clergy who supported the EAM during World War II and provided the prison authorities with the clergy and theology to ‘rehabilitate’ the ‘misguided’ – a term with an obvious Christian connotation.27 The Church additionally donated its property (even the liturgical vessels) in the ‘holy war against the atheist communists’ – as the clergy had one in the Greek War of Independence in 1821.28 The Church viewed the KKE as an existential threat because the latter, just like its external allies in Eastern Europe, were persecuting the established religious institutions (purge of the clergy, confiscation of property etc.).29 The clergy did not, however, just deliver sermons against communism. Zoe, a powerful NGO of the Church of Greece, campaigned against the KKE and, through a combination of philanthropy with missionarism, provided relief to the refugees and the poor.30 In effect, Zoe promoted through its work a ‘conservative counter-revolution’ in the country31 in the pattern of the Opus Dei.

Greece and the Great Powers: January –May 1947 In late January, internal developments in Greece came under the spotlight of a new international player: the United Nations. In answer to the Greece’s protest, in December 1946 the UN Security Council unanimously voted in favour of a US resolution calling for an hoc UN investigating agency and set up the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents.32 Interestingly, the Soviets did not veto the US resolution as in the past in the hope that the commission’s report would blame the Greek royalist regime as the primary culprit of the war.33 The commission arrived at Greece in January to ascertain whether the communist Balkan states really supported the ΔΣΕ (Democratic Army of Greece).34 The Left welcomed the commission and seized the opportunity to internationalise the civil conflict at the expense of the royalist regime and assumed a series of initiatives to achieve two main goals: first, win the support of the international public opinion and the

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neutral Western powers and, secondly, cause the intervention of the communist delegations (the Soviet Union and Poland) within Greek internal affairs.35 To that end, the EAM appealed for a ceasefire for the duration of the Commission’s operation in late January36 and, a few days later, the KKE announced a peace offer similar to the one in September.37 From the outset, contrasting petitions were submitted by the delegates to the presidency of the committee and the latter struggled to remain impartial. Much to the chagrin of the Greek government and British delegation, the commission adopted certain proposals of the Soviet delegate and (a) invited representatives of the GSEE and the central committee of the EAM to a hearing, (b) conveyed the EAM’s petition for a suspension in the executions of political prisoners to the UN secretary general, (c) visited prison camps in the Aegean and (d) agreed to interview Vafeiadis near the frontier with Albania. The government protested but, upon the advice of the US secretary of state, yielded. The government did, however, attempt to undermine the meeting with Vafeiadis by organizing an assault near the GAA on the eve of the meeting. The Soviet and Polish delegates were not dissuaded and, after a long journey into the mountains, they were introduced to Vafeiadis and wrote a report on the causes of the conflict based on the account of the communist side.38 Worse, the US delegate seconded several proposals of the communist side (e.g. the call for a general amnesty) and repeatedly clashed with his British colleague – provoking strong protests from Athens to Washington.39 On balance, however, the commission did not subscribe to the viewpoint of the communist camp. In fact, the former overcame the staunch opposition of the Soviet and Polish delegates and visited Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in search for evidence and transferred its headquarters to Thessaloniki, Greece’s second largest town, to better monitor the state of affairs in northern Greece.40 Indicative of the polarisation within the country, in March, agents of the government murdered John Zevgos (a notable figure of the KKE who monitored the commission’s work) at Thessaloniki.41 The operation of the UN commission would be overshadowed by the intervention of Washington in Greece. In February, the British informed their US allies that they would not support Greece and Turkey against communist subversion from March onwards. from the podium of the US congress, Truman stated on 13 March – in a speech full of ideological overtones – that the USA would provide emergency economic and military assistance to the beleaguered parliamentary regimes of Turkey

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and Greece in the context of a new foreign policy doctrine (called the Truman Doctrine by later historians) for the containment of communism.42 In effect, Britain had finally succeeded in drawing the USA to the arena of the Soviet-British rivalry.43 Zachariadis did not seem impressed. In April, the KKE’s secretary general ordered the ΔΣΕ’s commander-in-chief to progressively convert the insurgents into a regular army that would carve out a ‘Free Greece’ with Thessaloniki, Greece’s second largest town, as its capital.44 The same month, Zachariadis reassured Stalin and Tito in two long memoranda that the DSE would eventually prevail.45 Earlier in February, the KKE’s central committee secretly had ruled that the party would set the armed struggle as a priority – without, however, rejecting other options (e.g. peace parleys).46 After all, the state of affairs in Greece seemed to vindicate the optimism of the KKE’s secretary general. The ΕΣ had not yet acquired the military capacity to eradicate the ΔΣΕ despite the fact that Lt General Ventiris, a staunchly anti-communist army commander,47 had assumed the leadership of the armed forces.48 The BMM had only set up a school for commando units two months earlier.49 The interventionism by Zervas only worsened the situation. In February, Zervas had reinforced the gendarmerie with 8,000 ill-trained (and illsuited) recruits and ordered the latter to clear southern Peloponnesus of insurgents; however, the operation – which he personally oversaw – did not yield promising results.50 In April, King George II died unexpectedly and his younger brother Paul succeeded him. The king had consistently striven to instill unity among the political leaders in the face of the rising communist threat and retained cordial relations with Britain; his death, no wonder, stirred defeatism within the government.51 In fact, Maximos went as far as to write to the EAM in search for peace.52 As several case studies have shown, military failures or political transitions within the government camp have provided ‘transient and uncertain opportunities’ for the initiation or even acceleration of the peace negotiations between two sides in a civil conflict.53 The initiative of Maximos displeased several ministers (particularly the right-wing ones) who claimed that the negotiations amounted to a victory for the Left.54 Peace talks between state authorities and insurgents present both of them opportunities and risks. First and foremost, such talks can potentially convince the leadership of the insurgents to renounce violence (e.g. the farewell to arms by the IRA). And secondly, peace

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parleys can strengthen the position of the moderate factions within an armed group and pave the way for a peace settlement (e.g. the rise of the moderate faction to power within the FARC).55 On the other side, peace negotiations recognise an armed group as a legitimate political actor and, therefore, create the negative impression that violence could reward an armed group with official recognition (e.g. the case of the PKK in the context of the ‘solution process’ between 2013 and 2015). Moreover, peace talks can potentially injure the legitimacy of the government (e.g. the delegitimisation of the Isreali president Rabin due to the Oslo Peace Accords with the PLO) and even provoke a violent response from pro-government die-hards (e.g. the failed coup d’e´tat by the French arme´e coloniale against De Gaulle due to the latter’s peace talks with the FLN).56 Upon the request of Maximos, in late April the Central Committee of the EAM circulated to all party leaders a note with its peace terms: the prompt withdrawal of the British troops, the neutrality of Greece (guaranteed by the UN) and the establishment of an all-party government that would include the EAM.57 However, Maximos did not respond to the peace offer – probably owing to the staunch opposition of the right-wing ministers. In May, Venizelos informally discussed with the EAM the potential of a peace settlement in his capacity as a deputy president of the government. Although Venizelos suggested moderate terms,58 the KKE stressed categorically that no peace settlement could be reached unless the EAM participated in a new government.59 However, the traditional political parties would not easily accept a coalition government with the EAM since they adjudged the party as a satellite of the KKE and, by extension, Moscow. In May, just two months after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, Stalin invited Zachariadis to Moscow. He warmly welcomed the KKE’s secretary general and pledged military and economic aid in support of Zachariadis’ grandiose visions.60 That way, Stalin hoped to kill two birds with one stone: first, harass the Anglo-Saxon naval powers in their spheres of influence in the Near East and, secondly, limit the growing hegemonic tendency of Tito in the southern Balkans.61 After all, the communist insurgency in Greece seemed a rather sure bet: the insurgents already occupied one-third of Greece and increased their total number to 16,000 fighters.62

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Later that month, the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents published a report that partially confirmed the claims of the Greek government. In summary, the report verified that Belgrade (and to a lesser degree) Sofia and Tirana succored the Greek insurgents and incited separatism in Greek Macedonia. However, the report additionally reckoned that the oppressive policies of the Greek state authorities from February 1945 onwards had caused the flight of over 25,000 Greek citizens (mostly Slavophones) to neighbouring countries and the internal displacement of tens of thousands of others (the majority of whom communists). The UN report ended with an appeal toward the three Balkan communist states under investigation to cease their support for the Greek insurgents.63 However, the communist delegates denounced this report and published another report that (quite predictably) contained exactly the opposite conclusions.64 The commission’s work underscored the emerging fault-lines between the communist and capitalist blocs a division that would be accentuated with the Marshall Plan just a few weeks later.

The Division of Europe: June – August 1947 After the speech in March, Truman defined the priorities of a still inchoate strategy of containment – determining that the USA must retain the warravaged power centres of Asia and Europe within the US orbit and outside the Soviet one. In the first half of 1947, several developments in Western Europe (an exceptionally long and harsh winter, the dramatic shortages in food and fuel in Germany, the deepening recession of the British economy, the slow recovery of the economy of other Western European states and a tidal wave of strikes and demonstrations by communist labour unions in Italy and France) had stirred concerns among senior US policymakers about a potential exploitation of the explosive situation by the communists. On 5 June 1947, the US secretary of state announced a colossal programme of postwar reconstruction for Europe – the so-called Marshall Plan.65 The Marshall Plan shattered the belief of Stalin in the collective administration of the postwar world with Britain and Washington – constituting a ‘second watershed for Stalin’ after the use of the nuclear weapon by Truman.66 The Kremlin’s willingness to cooperate with the Allies in the early postwar period originated principally from a pragmatic realisation of the structural weaknesses of the Soviet Union

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vis-a`-vis the West after the titanic struggle against the Axis Powers,67 although Stalin had fatalistically prognosticated a conflict with the West as inevitable by early 1946.68 The course of the civil war in Greece and the negotiations between the communist and capitalist blocs over the Marshall Plan went hand in hand – testifying to the compliance of the KKE’s actions with the Kremlin’s overall strategy. In late June, a senior official of the KKE announced from the podium of the congress of the French Communist Party in Strasburg that the party intended to establish a ‘Free Greece’ in the near future.69 The infamous ‘Strasburg Bomb’ went off the same day the talks between the West and the East on the Marshall Plan commenced70 and just a few days before Moscow rejected the Marshall Plan conclusively. Indeed, in early July Stalin rejected the Marshall Plan as a sinister scheme to undermine Moscow’s security perimeter in Eastern Europe and prohibited other European communist states from participating in the programme.71 Like Attlee and Truman, Stalin still wanted peaceful relations with his erstwhile allies – but on his own terms: security for him, stability for his dictatorial regime and safety for Moscow’s new sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.72 The Marshall Plan induced Stalin, who suffered from an obsession with security after World War II,73 to violently consolidate the propitious status quo for the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.74 Stalin set in motion the ‘sovietisation’ of Eastern Europe – a process involving the abolition of the postwar transitional regimes and the elimination of every anti-communist dissidence.75 In contrast, the USA promoted the postwar economic and political reconstruction of Western Europe as a benevolent and liberal hegemon and, therefore, succeeded in connecting the region’s centres of power with the transatlantic superpower for the next 50 years.76 As a naval power, the USA wanted to secure control of the western and southern coastal regions of Europe (as well as other strategic regions in Asia and the Middle East) against a possible Soviet encroachment.77 The USA did, nonetheless, intervene aggressively to consolidate their control over the political and economic affairs of Greece. After all, the ruling elites did not and could not put up a stiff resistance: the USA seemed like a ‘deus ex machina’. The UNRRA had ceased its humanitarian mission in January 1947; likewise, the British had stopped offering economic aid since March 1947. The anaemic Greek economy, over-dependent on foreign aid,

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already underwent a severe crisis by mid-1946.78 The royalist regime implored the US for urgent economic aid and Washington responded positively – not before, however, dictating strict terms. The petition to the US State Department for economic aid and the Greco-American economic accord in late June were in fact dictated by the USA. The two documents stipulated that the aid programme intended to assist Greece in overcoming the twin challenges of postwar reconstruction and internal conflict; an ad hoc agency of specialised US technocrats, the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), was founded to monitor the course of the programme. The latter even reserved the right to terminate the aid programme in case of any infraction of US interests.79 In addition to the AMAG, the United States Navy Group Greece (USNGG) and the United States Army Group Greece (USAGG) were set up and put under the jurisdiction of the AMAG.80 Just a few days before the official rejection of the Marshall Plan by the communist bloc, the EAM appealed to Lambrakis, editor of a leading centrist newspaper who heavily influenced Sophoulis,81 to assume initiatives for the resumption of the peace process. The timing of this peace initiative cannot be viewed as coincidental: Stalin manipulated the communists in Greece to forestall the successful inclusion of Greece into the Marshall Plan. Upon the mediation of Lambrakis, the EAM conveyed to Maximos its peace terms – which were additionally communicated to Sophoulis and Emmanuel Tsouderos, two centrist politicians who frequently talked to the Left. The peace terms of the EAM entailed a ceasefire, a general amnesty, an all-party government that would include the EAM, the disarmament and disbandment of the right-wing paramilitary groups, the abolition of the organs of state repression (e.g. the emergency courts-martial), the dissolution of parliament and, finally, the organisation of free and fair elections.82 When informed of the content of this peace offer, MacVeagh warned against a peace settlement with the Left and proposed to Sophoulis and Maximos to issue a joint reply that would stress the unity of the parliamentary regime vis-a`-vis the Left.83 Upon MacVeagh’s advice, the two leaders replied con-jointly and counter-offered to the EAM an internationally-supervised disarmament of the DSE and a general amnesty. They, however, questioned the EAM’s capacity to credibly represent the insurgents and, ergo, demanded valid guarantees for the solid commitment of the KKE to the ongoing peace

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dialogue.84 The reservations of the two leaders spotlight in effect three recurring problems during peace negotiations in a civil war: (a) the difficulty of identifying a valid representative for the insurgents;85 (b) the reluctance of both sides to sincerely commit to the peace process – principally due to the absence of valid guarantees by third parties or power-sharing accords between the two sides;86 and (c) the problem of ‘information asymmetry’, i.e. the absence of reliable information about the intentions and capabilities of the other side.87 Predictably, the EAM rejected the joint proposal outright.88 The very same day that Maximos and Sophoulis submitted their counteroffer, Zervas ordered the arrest of thousands of cadres and supporters of the EAM and KKE (13,751 people in total) in Athens and Piraeus with the intention of seizing leading members of the two parties.89 However, the police arrested only senior officials of the EAM,90 since the KKE’s secretary general and other members of the politburo had escaped to Yugoslavia in secret months earlier.91 Although this decapitation strategy did not succeed eventually, the decapitation of the insurgents’ leadership remains one of the oldest and most successful tactics ¨ calan by the in the history of irregular warfare (e.g. the capture of O Turkish MIT in 1999 terminated the insurgency of the PKK).92 By June, the number of deported and imprisoned communists soared to 17,000 and 18,890 individuals respectively. Indicative of the unjust character of the policies, only 61 per cent of them had been convicted of any crime.93 The courts and state authorities considered every suspected communist ipso facto an enemy of the Greek state and nation and, thus, guilty of treason.94 Leader of a nationalist resistance group (EDES) in World War II that had clashed repeatedly with the EAM/ELAS,95 Zervas wanted to settle old scores with the communists. Zervas acted as a ‘spoiler’ – in other words a dissident faction within a belligerent which undermines an ongoing peace process through violence.96 His extreme anti-communism had dismayed the Anglo-American officials who demanded in earnest his removal from the Ministry of Public Order since his ruthless policies merely drove the people away from the government.97 This act embarrassed the Truman Administration which was ‘advertising’ its aggressive intervention in Greece to the US public opinion as a campaign in support of democracy.98 Although the top US officials publicly opposed the police crackdown, they secretly rejoiced at the heavy blow to the communists – in particular

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their unionist faction.99 Throughout the spring, the USA had been trying to reduce the power of the communist unionist faction. In April, a new formula for the composition of the executive council of the GSEE (the so-called ‘Tewson formula’) had been negotiated between the government and representatives of the Anglo-American trade unions that slightly favoured the right-wing faction. After intense pressure from the USA, in May the previous formula was altered in favour of the right-wing unionist faction and, later in June, a rightist-dominated provisional executive council of the GSEE was appointed with a blatant disregard for the rule of law.100 The Greek and US officials would strive until the end of the civil war to curtail the influence of the KKE and EAM on the workers – the traditional source of support for the KKE.101 Despite the intensifying repression, the KKE continued to court the centrist leaders to win them over to the communist side and cause divisions within the heterogeneous and fragmented non-communist faction. In mid-July, the KKE submitted new peace terms to Sophoulis102 as Zachariadis had identified him as the only politician with whom a peace deal could be struck – despite his occasional flirt with the Populist Party.103 However, both leaders knew that they could not trust each other. Zachariadis wooed Sophoulis solely to sow dissent among the parliamentary parties; and in turn, Sophoulis played the communists against the royalists and vice versa to weaken his rivals and seize the premiership for himself.104 After receiving the new peace terms, Sophoulis saw the king and requested an urgent mandate for a new government to implement his so-called ‘appeasement policy’. However, King Paul pointed out that the USA, which had already seized control of the economy and interfered in the political affairs of the country with growing intensity, would never permit such a development.105 Thereafter, the KKE submitted to Tsouderos the peace terms that the EAM had offered to the Maximos earlier in April. These old terms were in turn rejected outright upon the insistence of the Anglo-American embassies.106 In parallel, the party on the other hand stepped up its preparations for the establishment of an independent communist state in northern Greece.107 In late July Vafeiadis stated ominously that only a ‘Free Greece’ could guarantee a democratic future for Greece.108 Why did Vafeiadis choose that date to issue that ominous threat? The answer lies not in the internal developments, as revisionist scholars maintain, but in the external ones. In fact, while Stalin was unifying Eastern and Central

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Europe with an iron whip, his favourite prote´ge´ Tito tried hard to imitate him in the Balkans. With Stalin’s tacit consent, in July Tito and Dimitrov concluded the Bled Agreement – a roadmap, in effect, for the progressive unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia through specific political, economic and educational policies.109 British and Greek officials assumed that this agreement included secret provisions for the incorporation of the Greek Macedonia in the future Yugoslav– Bulgarian Federation in case of a communist victory.110 ‘Tradionalist’ scholars claimed that Albania’s Enver Hoxha participated in the summit and the three communist leaders agreed to establish a joint general staff which would offer operational advice and military assistance to the DSΕ.111 Archival evidence has not, however, substantiated the latter claims. Though absent from the summit at Bled, the KKE undoubtedly endorsed the accord that would establish a powerful confederation to the benefit of the struggle of the DSΕ.112 Galvanised by the Bled Accord, in early August the KKE founded the first institutions for people’s rule for administration, justice and economy and hastened its military preparations.113 The departure of the Soviet ambassador and the Yugoslav military attache´ from the Greek capital around the same period only increased the fears of the Greek royalist regime of an imminent military crisis.114 Senior Greek officials feared that the communist bloc would form ‘International Brigades’ for Greece in the pattern of the recent Spanish Civil War.115 From early as April, Greece had been submitting to the Anglo-Americans alarmist accounts about thousands of European communist volunteers streaming from Europe to the Balkans (most notably Yugoslavia) and setting up International Brigades.116 While the British questioned the validity of these claims,117 several officials in the US state department regarded them as reliable in the light of the increasing Soviet aggression in the Old Continent and elsewhere.118 These worrisome developments in Greece compelled the USA to intensify their intervention in the Greek internal affairs. The AMAG arrived in Greece in July and, without delay, drafted a budget ($300 million) for the fiscal year (July 1947– July 1948) which was distributed evenly between a military and a civil component. The civil section would cover the imports of basic consumer goods as well as the expenses for the various programmes on agriculture, welfare and reconstruction;

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conversely, the military component would pay for the expenses of the armed forces’ reorganisation.119 Implementing the Porter Mission’s recommendations by the letter, the AMAG imposed ‘a system of direct control’ over the Greek economy. Skilled US technocrats were appointed in the Foreign Trade Administration and the Currency Committee – the agencies that directed the monetary and commercial policies of Greece – and equipped with veto powers. Moreover, the AMAG established the Commission of Economic Policy – an agency staffed by senior US and Greek officials and tasked with the planning and running of the overall economic policy. The AMAG installed foreign consultants in every ministry to oversee their operation and spending as well. In other words, the AMAG set up a ‘parallel state within the Greek state apparatus’ despite the strong objections by the Greek state officials.120 The AMAG viewed the latter as a caste of inept politicians who allied themselves with of the oligarchy and utilised outdated clientistic practices to retain power instead of carrying out radical reforms.121 The reinforcement of the ΕS was not implemented as rapidly as the stabilisation of the economy. Although Athens implored Washington to authorise a colossal military build-up, the commander of the USAGG, general Livesay, acceded to only two Greek requests in June: the reassignment of 7,000 ‘unreliable’ conscripts to penal battalions and their replacement with ‘reliable’ ones and the establishment of Units of National Defence (MEA) from armed loyalist villagers. The MEA sprung up throughout the war-ravaged provinces and their numbers quickly soared to 26,000 men;122 however, these units proved unreliable in military terms.123

A Marriage of Convenience: August 1947 By August, the military state of affairs deteriorated at the expense of the ES. That month, the most crucial (until then) operation of the civil war until then, symbolically codenamed ‘Terminus’, drew to an ignominious close after five long months of vicious fighting (April – August 1947). Designed jointly by British and Greek army officers, the operation aimed at encircling and annihilating the insurgents in central Greece with massive pincer movements.124 Unfavourable weather and terrain, unsatisfactory coordination of the colossal pincer-style offensives

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and a dearth of offensive spirit and combat skills stood out as the principal reasons for the operation’s poor results. In sharp contrast, the DSE turned out more than a match for the ES mounting a flexible defence and launching counter-offensives (e.g. against Metsovo and Grevena) and diversionary attacks deep behind the enemy lines (e.g. in Peloponnesus).125 Another crucial reason for the failure of the operation was intelligence. The ES could not accurately estimate the DSE’s military capabilities and structure. Indeed, the army’s intelligence agency collected scrappy information from captured insurgents and deserters.126 However, such ‘primary sources’ were in short supply. The insurgents, the greater majority of them volunteers until late 1947, fought to the bitter end without any thought of surrender or desertion owing to a romantic credo in the ‘socialist revolution’, revanchism for past injustices by the anti-communist state organs or fear of cruel punishment at the hands of the enemy.127 The police stepped in to solve the riddle. The police slowly – but steadily – drew up a detailed catalogue of the KKE’s cadres and supporters thanks to two factors: a) the unsealed voting cards of the communists (due to their abstention in March 1946) and b) the regular police sweeps in the towns since February 1947.128 In August, the BMM estimated that the insurgents operated in 29 of the 46 provinces (even in the Peloponnese in southern Greece) and controlled substantial territory in northern and central Greece.129 The ghost of the Asia Minor Catastrophe of 1922 now haunted the royalist regime. In August, King Paul told the commander of the BMM that the danger of a new Asia Minor Catastrophe could not be ruled out.130 The military failures caused a severe inter-governmental crisis. In late August, the three centrist leaders of the coalition government demanded the removal of Zervas from his post and the inclusion of Sophoulis lest the latter should desert to the communist side131 instead; however, their demand was rejected and, thus, the three leaders quit the government. Maximos resigned the same day.132 The king delegated Tsaldaris a mandate to establish a broad coalition government, a conditio sine qua non for the unobstructed delivery of US economic aid according to the chief of the AMAG.133 Tsaldaris twice invited Sophoulis to accept a political co-operation on equal terms; the leader of the Liberal Party, however, demanded the premiership to

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implement his so-called ‘appeasement policy’ and the negotiations ended in stalemate. Even the intercession of MacVeagh failed to yield results.134 Thereafter, Tsaldaris approached the other party leaders and almost established the last coalition government. However, the disagreements among the party leaders over the control of the key ministries of war and public order could not be bridged and the negotiations were brought to a dead end.135 In late August, he decided to establish a wholly right-wing government despite strong objections by senior US officials.136 In fact, days earlier Dwight P. Griswold had undiplomatically condemned the prospect of a right-wing government as ‘entirely inadmissible’.137 During the political crisis of August, Griswold intervened repeatedly to impose a marriage of convenience among the two suitors (Tsaldaris and Sophoulis) for the premiership.138 After all, the US secretary of state had delegated such supreme powers to the chief of the AMAG. Ever since July, the AMAG had set three core priorities: restore security, stabilise the economy, and rebuild the infrastructure and productive structures of Greece.139 The AMAG realised that every effort to stabilise the economy would ultimately prove useless unless a fair measure of security and governance was secured. Marshall reached the same conclusion.140 Thus, Marshall delegated to Griswald the power to install and uninstall governments by using the aid programme as a policy tool – earning the ire of MacVeagh.141 The AMAG would even exert control over the programme of military aid to Greece.142 The brewing conflict between MacVeagh and Griswold would surface in September when Marshall tried to reassign several responsibilities of Griswold to MacVeagh; however, Griswold’s strong opposition, however, compelled Marshall to remove the ambassador instead.143 The political crisis of August shook deeply the faith of several party leaders to the parliamentary democracy. In early September, five leaders from the Centre and Right appealed to King Paul to appoint Alexandros Papagos, the revered field marshal of Greece during World War II, as a prime minister of an extra-parliamentary government with extraordinary powers.144 Obviously, this epistole augured the rise of the power of the monarch and the military at the expense of the parliamentary system. The actions of Queen Frederica represent a typical case of this phenomenon. Upon the queen’s suggestion, in mid-July 1947 Maximos to set up the Relief Fund for the Northern Provinces of

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Greece (EPBEE) a NGO under the queen’s patronage that sought to relieve refugees (most notably children) in the northern war-torn regions.145 The EPBEE complemented or, more accurately, substituted the state apparatus in the spheres of welfare and relief during the civil war.146 In fact, by mid-1947 the EPBEE had opened several ‘child cities’ (paidoypόlei6), camps for children of refugees aged between four and 14.147 The queen founded several agencies with an identical relief agenda: the Relief Fund for the Bandit-Stricken [Refugees], the Friends of the Army, and the Friends of the Village.148 As in several times in modern Greek history, the political crisis in Greece was resolved by outside intervention. Loy Henderson, the director of the Office of the Near Eastern and African Affairs in the US state department, urgently travelled to Athens to resolve the political crisis and forced the two leaders (i.e. Tsaldaris and Sophoulis) to form a coalition government by threatening to terminate the economic aid.149 On 7 September, a historical coalition government between the Populist and Liberal Parties was sworn in with Sophoulis as prime minister and Tsaldaris as deputy president.150 The new government overcame the old conflict between Right and Centre which dominated the history of the weak Greek kingdom since the early twentieth century and produced the National Schism (1915– 17) and, most notably, the Asia Minor Catastrophe (1922).151 In more practical terms, the co-option of Sophoulis terminated the ‘divide and conquer’ policy of the KKE and Sophoulis and isolated the KKE and EAM even further. In addition, the co-option of Sophoulis added the supporters of the Liberal Party to the anti-communist camp, the refugees of the Greco – Turkish population exchange of 1923 (roughly 1.4 million people) and the inhabitants of the ‘New Countries’ (the regions incorporated into Greece after the Balkan Wars); the party remained particularly strong in Macedonia and Crete.152 The co-option of political parties or personalities with close connections to the insurgents can in fact prove successful in isolating the armed movement from the (local) population153 as the case of the co-option of Kadyrov’s powerful clan in Chechnya by Putin clearly shows. Despite the occasional divergence of Sophoulis from the central anti-communist line of the other political leaders, Sophoulis did not in fact differ from his colleagues. He assumed power at an old age (the average age of prime ministers in Greece in the 1940s exceeded 65), was imbued by an

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intrinsic anti-communism (as a brainchild of the centrist, though anticommunist, founder of the Liberal Party – Eleutherios Venizelos) and adopted the traditional modus operandi of politicians (i.e. clientism and attachment to the Protector Power of Greece until 1947 – Britain).154 However, the mistrust between the two hitherto sworn rivals did not recede easily. Indicatively of this mistrust, the Populist Party had insisted on retaining possession of the two key ministries of war and internal affairs as a precaution for a possible ‘deviation to the Left’ of Sophoulis.155 True to his outlined policy, the new prime minister announced a dual ‘appeasement policy’: a policy of leniency and amnesty for the communist prisoners and insurgents respectively, on the one hand, and intense military operations for the neutralisation of the communist diehards, on the other hand.156 How did the KKE react? The party scorned Sophoulis for the socalled ‘appeasement policy’ and declared through Rizospastis that a peace settlement could be achieved only under the following terms: an armistice, a general amnesty and the co-equal participation of the EAM in an all-party government.157 A few days before the new government was sworn in, Vafeiadis had submitted a long memorandum to the UN secretary general which repeated the aforementioned peace terms with the addition of a clause about elections without external interference – without, in other words, foreign troops and observers.158 Sophoulis ignored the KKE’s terms and implemented his own policy. First of all, he ordered the release of roughly 10,000 political prisoners (out of 18,000 in total) and enjoined his ministers to ensure decent standards of living for the remaining inmates.159 However, Sophoulis neither stopped the operation of the emergency courts-martial in northern Greece nor cancelled the death sentences for prisoners already convicted.160 Sophoulis declared that amnesty would be granted to any insurgents who would surrender their weapons within a month or communist cadres who would impart information.161 However, the prospects of success seemed rather slim from the start. The KKE did not trust the new government; it did not trust the previous either. By the end of the deadline, just 4,666 armed irregulars had surrendered their arms – the majority of whom (2,937) came from right-wing paramilitary groups.162 Implementing the second component of his ‘appeasement policy’, the EΣ launched clearing operations against the ΔΣΕ in Roumeli (central Greece) and Macedonia. Initially, Sophoulis concluded

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Operation Arrow in Macedonia (which had commenced in early August) within three days upon assuming the premiership and staged Operation Whirlwind in Roumeli in late August. Both operations failed to knock out the ΔΣΕ north of the Isthmus of Corinth.163

The Declaration of War: September –November 1947 Between 10 and 13 September, the third plenum of the KKE’s central committee convened secretly in Belgrade and determined to intensify the armed struggle.164 However, the KKE did not immediately publicise the plenum’s resolution and, instead, chose to consult with the EAM first.165 Much to the chagrin of its founder, the EAM objected to the KKE’s decision. Irritated, the KKE upbraided the EAM for cowardice and imputed the objections of its leadership to an ongoing covert negotiation with centrist officials close to Sophoulis.166 In the third plenum, the KKE decided to implement ‘Plan Limnes’ – the operational plan that called for the creation of a 60,000-strong regular army equipped with a navy, air force and artillery corps (out of the 24,000 irregulars) by the spring of 1948 and the establishment of a ‘Free Greece’ with Thessaloniki as its capital. ‘Plan Limnes’ was drafted jointly by the ΔΣΕ and the Yugoslavs and approved by the Soviets for obvious reasons: the Soviets represented the suzerain of all communist parties around the world and the Yugoslavs had distinguished themselves as the best partisans in World War II.167 Following the general directives of Zachariadis to the letter, the ΔΣΕ transitioned quickly (and prematurely) to a regular army: rank insignia and a standard uniform were introduced, supporting arms (e.g. artillery) and services (e.g. logistic networks) were organised, training centres (e.g. a military academy) were established, and the guerrilla battalions were upgraded in succession to light brigades, heavy brigades and, finally, divisions (15 by the end of 1948). As expected from the KKE’s doctrinaire leadership, the Red Army served as the model for the military reorganisation of the ΔΣΕ. Therefore, ‘political commissioners’ (or ‘comisar’) and ‘democratic assemblies’ within the army units secured the tight rein of the KKE’s ‘apparatchiks’ over the ΔΣΕ’s ‘captains’, whereas an internal security service (the ‘personnel directorate’) purged unreliable officers and fighters. Likewise, the ΔΣΕ’s military doctrine stipulated the annihilation of the enemy in ‘decisive battles’ through the

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use of artillery and bayonette charges in the pattern of the Red Army during the Russian Civil War (1917– 22).168 The revisionist scholars tend to overstress the culpability of Sophoulis for the escalation of the civil conflict. They maintained that the ‘forced marriage’ between Sophoulis and Tsaldaris forced the KKE to give up hope on Sophoulis as a man of peace and, thus, give priority to its armed struggle.169 The archival evidence, however, suggests otherwise. The KKE set the armed struggle as a priority for the first time in February 1947. After all, the party never sincerely committed to the peace process that dragged on for the first half of 1947. The KKE knew that the royalist regime and, most notably, its allies would never yield to its demanding conditions for peace; in fact, the KKE tried to sow dissent among the heterogeneous and fragmented non-communist camp and, in this way, ‘buy’ time until the conditions matured for the transition to the next level. After all, the KKE’s decision to declare war suspiciously coincided with the severe deterioration of the Soviet–American relations. In September, a conference of the European communist parties in Poland produced the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) – the successor of the Comintern (Communist International).170 However, Stalin did not invite the communist parties of China and Greece in the founding conference in order to stave off any accusations from the West that the communist camp interfered in the internal affairs of third states.171 In reality, the Cominform would never discuss the Greek Question in its sessions and only issue pompous declarations of moral support from time to time.172 After the foundation of the Cominform, the diplomatic missions of Greece in Western Europe submitted a stream of alarmist accounts to Athens about the alleged establishment of ‘International Brigades’ on the soil of the communist Balkan countries.173 However, these reports proved utterly baseless. Although communists in Europe must have felt sympathy for the communist insurgency in Greece, they never formed International Brigades to help their co-idealists in the pattern of the Spanish Civil War.174 However, foreign nationals did volunteer to fight in Greece for, not against, the royalist regime. Greek diplomats reported that dozens of foreigners showed up at embassies of Greece across Western Europe in early 1947 and, surprisingly, volunteered to fight against the communists.175 Unsure about their true motives, the government ordered its diplomatic missions to terminate contacts with them.176

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The USA struggled to shield Greece from the communist threat diplomatically as well as militarily. When in mid-September the UN commission ceased operating,177 Washington put the Greek Question forth to the UN General Assembly – an organ that possessed an overwhelming majority of pro-Western and Western states at the time.178 In October, the General Assembly adopted a pro-Greek resolution that reiterated the conclusions and recommendations of the previous commission’s report and approved the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) to investigate whether Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia still aided the DSΕ. This organ consisted of the Security Council’s permanent and non-permanent member states – with the exception of the Soviet Union and Poland owing to their abstention.179 The UNSCOB consisted of three sub-committees. Sub-Committee I would operate the observer missions stationed along Greece’s northern frontiers, Sub-Committee II would seek to reconcile the three Balkan states with Greece and Sub-Committee III would try to solve the thorny refugee and minority issues.180 However, the hostile stance of the communist Balkan countries undermined the UNSCOB’s operation from the outset. They refused to send representatives to Sub-Committee III and permit investigations by the observer missions of Sub-Committee I within their territory.181 However, the absence of communist delegates turned out in favour of Greece in the long run. Washington heavily influenced the UNSCOB and used this agency to endow its own policies in Greece with international legitimacy.182 In sharp contrast, Britain complained that, just like its predecessor, the UNSCOB did not possess enforcing powers that would deter the Balkan countries from supporting the DSΕ. Accordingly, British officials stressed continuously the urgent need for US Marines in Greece.183 Similarly, Greece openly vented its frustration about the UNSCOB’s incapacity to police the northern Greek frontiers.184 The royalist regime feared that, since the UNSCOB did not take action against the three Balkan countries, the communist bloc would mobilise the rumoured International Brigades against Greece with impunity.185 The failure of the two-fold ‘appeasement strategy’ stiffened the regime’s oppression. In October, Sophoulis suspended the circulation of 62 communist newspapers, including the newspapers of the EAM and KKE.186 At the same time, the police swept through the towns of northern Greece in search for communist cadres and supporters. The Left

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claimed that the police sweeps in October swelled the number of prisoners and deportees to 19,620 and 36,948 inmates respectively – the latter including over 12,000 soldiers and army officers.187 These political prisoners were classified into four principal categories and dealt with by four different agencies (the ministries of public order, justice and war) and the army).188 The same month, the International Labour Office visited Greece upon the invitation of the royalist regime and, after two months, wrote a report that documented the ruthless persecution of the communist unionists by the regime.189 Quite predictably, the regime and the AMAG scorned the report and persecuted the communist unionists.190 In early December, the government even passed a law that outlawed strikes in the public and private sectors.191 The founding of the Cominform and the failures of the ES accelerated the reinforcement of the ES by the USAAG. In October, Livesay authorised the establishment of a 16,000-strong national guard to replace the (largely ineffective) MAY, MAD and MEA.192 The unsatisfactory performance of the ES in recent operations prompted Livesay to officially request from the USA the dispatch of senior US officers as military advisors.193 And upon the recommendation of the top US military leadership, in October Truman authorised the dispatch of military advisors to Greece.194 The war’s escalation after September 1947 compelled the AMAG to revise the aid programme twice. In September 1947 and March 1948, the AMAG transferred sizable resources from the civil to the military section of the US aid programme to pay for the successive increases in the size of the ES and, thus, sorely reduced the resources for welfare and reconstruction projects.195 In addition, the AMAG reformed the civil component of the aid programme since the food and refugee crises compelled the US officials to increase the imports of basic consumer goods (e.g. food) and reduce other elastic expenses (e.g. wages and pensions).196 In November, the AMAG instructed the government to suspend the ongoing reconstruction projects and transfer them to the aid program’s civil component. That way, just $30 million were allocated to high priority reconstruction projects.197 Carried out by the US corps of engineers, these projects involved repairs to the damaged transportation network, the provision of shelter to refugees and public services to the population (e.g. schools, aqueducts etc.).198

CHAPTER 4 `

COMMUNISM DELENDA EST' 1: NOVEMBER 1947—OCTOBER 1949

From Appeasement to Repression: November 1947 The collapse of the ‘appeasement policy’ of Sophoulis opened the way for the ES to intensify its own campaign to eliminate the DSE. Since the countryside in the mountainous zones of Greece was mostly occupied by the DSE,2 the ES decided to depopulate those regions. The number of internally displaced people increased from nearly 141,000 individuals in June3 to 413,000 in November.4 The military leadership claimed that the army relocated the peasants to refugee camps near state-controlled towns simply to protect them from the communists’ terror (namely the forcible recruitment of young males and females).5 However, archival evidence suggests otherwise. Although some villagers did voluntarily abandon their settlements to escape rebel terror and war suffering,6 the greater majority of peasants were forcibly removed by the ES on account of their support for the DSE.7 The AMAG voiced its strong disapproval of this policy, underlining its serious socio-economic and political ramifications. In reality, this policy wrecked the rural society (primarily the mountainous one) and by extension, worsened hunger, homelessness and poverty. This policy also put immense pressure on the ineffectual state apparatus to tackle the dire refugee crisis8 and prevent a general blackout of the anaemic economy.9 The AMAG did not divert funds from the aid programme in support of a relief operation since the insurgency’s escalation demanded the transfer of massive funds to the programme’s military sector.

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Therefore, the AMAG pressured Sophoulis to order a stop to population transfers. However, the military high command disregarded Sophoulis and continued these evacuations. By April 1948, the number of ‘banditstricken [refugees]’ (symmoritόplhktoi) had soared to 540,000 souls.10 Paraphrasing Mao’s famous metaphor, the military tried to drain the ‘sea’ (the people) within which the ‘fish’ (insurgents) swam.11 In retrospect, this policy undermined the war effort of the insurgents and catalytically contributed to their defeat.12 Although the AMAG did not support a relief operation, the agency did provide relief services at a minimum level to the refugees. These provisions included minimum financial benefits to each family member, rudimentary medical services, shelter and bread subsidies beyond the standard ratios.13 The refugees of ‘Category A’ (i.e. loyalist villagers and families of military personnel) received increased allowances and special treatment.14 The refugee crisis aggravated the severe economic problems of Greece even further. The AMAG had inherited an immense budget deficit – which the mission toiled to reduce via a strict austerity policy: a slight increase in state revenues, a balanced income policy, a restrictive monetary policy and a drastic decrease of public expenses. The AMAG implemented the austerity programme rigidly with just a few minor adjustments and, eventually, succeeded in stabilising the enormous budget deficit.15 The AMAG did not, however, carry out radical reforms owing to the staunch opposition of the powerful oligarchy and their political friends.16 The mission realised that success in the war critically depended on the support of the population and, as a result, tried to win certain sections of society over to the government’s side through targeted financial measures. In November, the AMAG increased salaries in the public and private sectors to win the sympathy of the workers, civil servants and white collar workers.17 These measures did benefit a sizable section of the people. In fact, the people directly and indirectly employed by the state (e.g. the military personnel, civil servants etc.) comprised over 30 per cent of salaried individuals in towns. Hundreds of thousands of pensioners or unemployed people (25 –30 per cent of the active population) depended on state support for their subsistence as well.18 In mid-1948, the AMAG compelled the Greek government to rescind the anti-strike law of December 1947 to win over the civil servants and workers.19 Likewise, special benefits for the families of the security

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personnel (e.g. gendarmes and soldiers) sought to increase the government’s popularity.20 In March 1948, the 9th Congress of the GSEE formalised the victory of the right-wing unionist faction amidst widespread fraud and violence. The GSEE’s new president, a demagogue and intriguer who used whatever means possible to seize power, sought to transform this institution into an instrument of his will (much to the chagrin of the US and Greek officials).21

‘Free Greece’: December 1947 –January 1948 The KKE monitored gratifyingly the squabble between the rightist and centrist factions,22 a cause for concern among Griswold and Marshall who wanted to keep the government afloat at all costs.23 The Populist Party that republican officials from the entourage of Sophoulis conducted clandestine peace talks with the EAM under the aegis of Lambrakis.24 Therefore, the KKE decided to exploit the intra-government quarrels for its own advantage. On Christmas Eve, the KKE jolted its rivals by forming a Provisional Democratic Government (PDK) with Vafeiadis as the prime minister, war minister and commander-in-chief at the same time.25 In January 1949, the fifth plenum of the KKE’s central committee professed that the party had been striving consistently since the third plenum to trigger a ‘proletarian socialist revolution’ in the pattern of the neighbouring countries.26 Following the monolithic Soviet doctrine to the letter, the KKE cemented the ‘People’s Rule’ (Laokratίa) with topdown radical policies (e.g. the confiscation of the property of the Orthodox Church of Greece). Zachariadis established a totalitarian regime in the image and likeness of the USSR: the party monopolised the power and governed with an iron fist (e.g. the repression by the People’s Militia in the villages achieved notoriety).27 How did the (local) population react? Paraphrasing the famous moto of Lenin, many villagers voted with their feet and migrated en masse to state-controlled areas,28 while others simply refused to rally to the KKE’s cause and swell the ranks of a ‘people’s revolutionary army’.29 The Soviet-inspired policies of the KKE30 only corroborated the regime’s anti-communist narrative that the KKE served foreign masters and subscribed to foreign ideologies.31 How did the government react to the KKE’s declaration? The government decided to proscribe communism as an ideology.

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On 27 December, emergency law 509 outlawed the KKE, EAM (and subsidiary organisations) for the ‘treasonable insurrection against the integrity’ of the country.32 In essence, the new law associated communism with an ‘anti-national crime’.33 With the tacit consent of the US embassy, the police arrested hundreds of communists across the country’s major towns and deported them to the prison camps in the archipelago without trial.34 Similarly, a new law stiffened the conditions of imprisonment for political prisoners.35 Until then conditions of imprisonment varied greatly from camp to camp, owing to the absence of an ad hoc legal framework, and several camps treated their inmates quite leniently.36 According to the new law, the penalties toughened and summary executions and torture increased drastically.37 Another law, days earlier, deprived the supporters of the Left Greek citizenship.38 In early January, emergency law 516 introduced the infamous ‘certificates of social beliefs’ (or ‘loyalty certificates’) in the civil services. Interestingly, this law demonstrated striking similarities with the legislation (the ‘Loyalty Programme’) that Truman enforced at the same time.39 Later that month, the government passed a law that instituted the principle of ‘collective responsibility’ and invested the government with the power to deport the insurgents’ relatives and confiscate their property.40 In summary, the government institutionalised an ‘emergency regime’ with draconian laws 41 which dealt the coup de graˆce to the support of the KKE among the ‘petite bourgeois’ (one of the primary sources of support for the EAM during World War II).42 The republican officials in the entourage of Sophoulis clandestinely pressured the EAM’s central committee to denounce the KKE’s actions – yet without success.43 However, not one official of the EAM eventually joined the PDK44 despite the KKE’s overwhelming pressures.45 Other left-wing parties (e.g. the Socialist Party) likewise kept a safe distance from the KKE’s actions.46 The founding of the PDK would drastically curtail the channels of communication between Sophoulis and the Left – as well as the perspectives of a peace settlement. In January, two extra-parliamentary left-wing parties (the Socialist Party and the Party of the Leftist Liberals) tried to mediate between the two sides without success.47 Similar initiatives by two centrist politicians in contact with the KKE in April48 and July49 would fail as well. The government, however, was primarily worried about the possible recognition of the PDK by the communist bloc – a strong possibility

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given the escalation of the Cold War. Athens complained to Sofia and Belgrade about their positive stance towards the KKE’s action and protested before the UN and the UNSCOB that their acquiescence violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity.50 Unable to stave off a major diplomatic setback all alone, the government turned to its two Anglo-Saxon patrons for help.51 Without delay, the Anglo-Americans warned the communist Balkan countries that a possible recognition of the PDK would violate the UN Charter and threaten the regional peace and security.52 Thanks to the heavy influence of Washington, the UNSCOB similarly censured the KKE’s action as a threat to regional peace.53 In January, Britain went as far as to suggest to the USA joint guarantees for the sovereignty of Greece but Washington refused.54 Since the British Army in Greece (5,000 soldiers plus the 1,100 advisors of the BMM) could not defend Greece, London solicited the USA for urgent military assistance.55 A similar importune by the British in 1947 had triggered a severe quarrel between Marshall and Bevin which lasted from 30 June to 21 November.56 After exhaustive deliberations among the decision-making circles in Washington, Truman eventually decided against a deployment of US Marines in Greece. Just like Stalin, Truman wanted to confine this war within the southern Balkans.57 However, Truman did authorise the establishment of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) just seven days after the formation of the PDK.58 Unlike its predecessor, the JUSMAPG reported directly to the Pentagon in Washington.59 The day this agency was established, the US state department authorised an increase in the size of the army and national defence corps by 29,000 and 12,000 men respectively – raising their total numbers to 132,000 and 50,000 men respectively.60 The JUSMAPG would try to fix four main weaknesses of the ES: training and organisation, intelligence, operational planning, and logistics. Above all, the JUSMAPG would oversee the planning and execution of operations from the strategic down to the tactical levels; nonetheless, the US military advisers were prohibited from participating directly in operations.61 The British suggested a merger of the two allied missions in February but the USA refused.62 The same month, Sophoulis conceded absolute control over the military affairs to the JUSMAPG63 – thus terminating the catastrophic political interventions in military affairs.64 The BMM and JUSMAPG would nonetheless quarrel frequently

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over jurisdiction matters and, for that reason, in October the BMM was subordinated to the JUSMAPG.65 To the surprise of the anti-communist bloc, Stalin did not recognise the PDK. He did not want to risk a war with Washington over an issue of limited value to its strategic interests and its communist Balkan satellites did not dare deviate.66 In addition, the failure of the KKE to secure a capital for ‘Free Greece’ exerted a negative impact.67 In late December, the DSE tried to storm Konitsa, a small mountainous town in Epirus cut off by the rest of Greece, to no avail. In January, senior officials of the KKE and DSE reviewed the siege of Konitsa at an urgent summit. Although Vafeiadis voiced his concern that the DSE could not wage conventional warfare skilfully, Zachariadis prevailed and the KKE stuck to the original Plan Limnes.68 However, without official recognition by third countries, the insurgents could not be treated as belligerents in an internal conflict from a legal point of view – a huge blast to the international legitimacy of the DSE.69 Despite the constant stream of weapons and materiel from communist Europe, the DSE had not been upgraded successfully into a regular army. First of all, the military aid did not fully correspond to the pompous pledges of the various communist leaders to the KKE. In addition, the expropriation of military aid by the transit countries (e.g. Albania), the overdue provision of the arms or the supply of defective equipment further fuelled the grievances of the KKE.70 Unlike the ELAS in World War II, the DSE suffered from a dearth of professional officers. Most of the war-hardened ‘captains’ of the ELAS (who had served as professional officers during the interwar era) had been either imprisoned or exiled after the Treaty of Varkiza and, far worse, the KKE recruited from the remaining commanders willing to serve only a few whom the party regarded as politically reliable. However, even these commanders were treated with suspicion by the KKE due to their noncommunist background and occupied few senior posts in the DSE.71 As a matter of fact, the DSE proved far more controllable by the KKE than the ELAS had been by the EAM.72 Unlike its predecessor, the DSE suffered from a crippling deficiency in recruits as well. Indeed, Thousands of pro-insurgent villagers were forcibly evacuated by the ES to state-run refugee camps73 and a growing number of villagers were alienated by the policies of the KKE on a series of issues deemed taboo by a conservative rural society: the alliance with

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the hostile Balkan neighbours and, most notably, separatist SlavMacedonian insurgents, a top-down programme of ‘proletarian revolution’ (e.g. the confiscation of church property) and the (mostly forcible) recruitment of young males and, above all, females.74 The urban communists proved equally unable and unwilling to volunteer for military service with the DSE. When in March the KKE belatedly called upon them to take up arms for the communist cause, this appeal did not yield any positive results. Repeated police sweeps had sent tens of thousands of communists to the prison camps or firing squads and, consequently, the remaining communist cadres could not slip through the net of vigilant security organs or simply refused to risk their lives for an unwinnable armed struggle.75 In October, Zachariadis would indeed discharge the KKE’s politburo in Athens for not providing the recruits and military supplies requested by the PDK.76 Desperate for recruits, the DSE resorted to recruiting young males and females (even children) from the captured rural settlements to the extent that the forced recruits surpassed 70 per cent of the DSE’s combat strength.77 By early 1949, the women and youngsters below the age of 25 constituted over one-third and four-fifths of the DSE’s combat strength respectively. The DSE would degenerate into an army of peasants (75 per cent of recruits), not an army of revolutionary workers and urban proletariats envisioned by Zachariadis.78 And although the KKE conceded as early as December 1947 that the ‘Plan Limnes’ did not progress as planned,79 the KKE clung onto it.

Periculum ex Septentrionalis (Danger from the North)?: February 1948 In early 1948 Moscow worried that the developments in the Balkans would slip out of her control. Stalin was especially disturbed by Tito’s apparent efforts to dominate Bulgaria and absorb Albania.80 The statement of Dimitrov after the conclusion of the Romano-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in January was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Without prior consultation with Stalin, Dimitrov had spoken of a communist confederation in Europe that would possibly include Greece but not the Soviet Union.81 Stalin urgently summoned Tito and Dimitrov to Moscow to remind them of their status in the hierarchy of the international communist system. Only Dimitrov would suffer the censure of Stalin alone since

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Tito chose to dispatch his vice president, Kardelj, to Moscow.82 Dismissing Dimitrov’s vision as unrealistic, Stalin dictated the step-bystep unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia into a loose federation; Albania would also enter the union later as a counter-weight to Tito’s hegemonic tendency.83 Stalin railed at Kardelj in turn and stressed that the open Yugoslav support for the DSE risked an Anglo-American armed intervention in the Balkans.84 Scoffing at Kardelj’s optimistic prediction for a communist victory in Greece unless the USA intervened militarily in support of the royalist regime, he replied that the insurgency ‘must be stopped and as quickly as possible’.85 Only the reasoning of the secretary general of the Bulgarian communist party convinced Stalin to change his mind.86 Unaware of this rift within the communist bloc, Athens suspected that its northern neighbours would intervene militarily in support of the insurgents.87 After all, the repeated skirmishes between Greece and its northern neighbours had raised the military and diplomatic tensions between the two sides.88 While 275 skirmishes had been recorded throughout 1947,89 nearly 150 skirmishes were reported in the first two months of 1948 along the Greco-Albanian border alone.90 The skirmishes between Greece and Bulgaria also witnessed a sharp increase in early 1948.91 In February 1948 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia staged a successful coup d’e´tat (with tacit support from Moscow) against the legitimate government in Prague, increasing the fears in the West about Stalin’s aggressiveness. The same month, the Greece suggested to the Anglo-Americans that they should draw common operational plans for the collective defence of Greece against a possible invasion from the northern communist states – in effect indirectly petitioning the deployment of allied troops.92 In March, Athens repeated its proposal to the USA and additionally requested valid guarantees by the three western great powers (Britain, France and the USA) for the independence and territorial integrity of the country.93 However, the Greek importunes did not yield any results. The same month, Athens would unsuccessfully apply for membership in the Treaty of Brussels – the first treaty of collective security among five western European states (Luxemburg, Belgium, Britain, France and the Netherlands).94 In May, the British would petition once again the dispatch of the US Marines to Greece and, yet again, Truman would decline.95

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The same month the communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, a ‘Cold Warrior’ was sent to Greece. Lt. General James Van Fleet, an aggressive army officer with an illustrious military record in World War II, was appointed as the JUSMAPG’s commander. In March Major General Ernest Downs, an equally aggressive army officer, replaced Rawlings as the BMM’s commander.96 Egged on by Van Fleet and Downs, the Greek general staff optimistically asserted that the ES could defeat the DSE within the same year.97 Van Fleet called for ‘more men, more money and more equipment’ to crush the DSE once and for all.98 Upon his insistence, Truman authorised in May a 15,000-strong increase in the size of the ES (147,000 men in total) and the provision of a plethora of non-military and military supplies.99 Van Fleet’s continuous requests for the substantial reinforcement of the ES seriously disturbed other senior US officials in Greece. In June, Griswold would request from Marshall the removal of Van Fleet from Greece since the latter understood poorly the dire economic or political problems of Greece according to the AMAG’s chief. In November, Van Fleet would open a new front with the ambassador. However, Truman chose not to dismiss Van Fleet since he valued his military qualities.100 In the meantime, the allied military missions industriously reorganised the ES for irregular warfare. Military hardware for operations on mountainous terrain had been secured in vast quantities, the units of special forces (commando) and light infantry (national guard) had swollen and the training on irregular warfare had increased. A typical division of the ES now included units specialising in operations on mountainous terrain (e.g. mountain artillery). The air force was immensely reinforced as well since Britain offered massive quantities of military hardware and training courses on the concept of close air support for ground operations. Last but not least, the generous US funds allowed the royalist regime to conscript younger classes of recruits and discharge older reservists – extinguishing sentiments of resentment among army conscripts.101 Last but not least, the quality of intelligence had decisively improved thanks to the increased control of the government over the KKE’s urban and rural supporters. The police conducted regular sweeps in towns and, step-by-step, rooted out the ‘self-defence’ (aytoάmyna) of the DSE. After the assassination of the minister of public order in May and the nation-wide operations of the police, this goal was achieved. Police

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repression proved more than successful in subjugating the urban communists: an urban insurrection in the pattern of the ‘revolutionary Leninist orthodoxy’ (as discussed during the enigmatic second plenum in 1946) was averted102 and the assistance of the urban communists to the DSE was drastically curtailed.103 In addition, the prisoners provided crucial information about the DSE and KKE. In September, the government would pass law 809 which pardoned the offences of the political prisoners on condition that they provided crucial information about the DSE.104 The JUSMAPG additionally improved the operational concept of the ES. In the past, the ES primarily garrisoned the country’s ‘nerve centres’ (e.g. towns) and, secondarily, launched cleansing operations against the DSE within a short campaigning season (April –early October). The ES used the operational concept ‘encirclement – eradication’ but the large pincer-style movements did not always yield results since the DSE simply slipped through the large gaps of the pincers. In contrast, the JUSMAPG advanced the operational concept of ‘staggered offence’: the ES would pursue the DSE year-round and without the slavery of pressing timetables.105 The new concept would be implemented in the near future by the middle and low-ranking army commanders who had acquired experience in irregular warfare.106 However, the ES still suffered from past weaknesses: several army commanders did not demonstrate the necessary determination and aggressiveness, while several army units refused to confront the DSE at close quarters or at night, and heavily depended on the artillery and air force to drive the DSE away.107 The appointment of Lt. Gen. Yiantzis as chief of the general staff in March increased expectations for a fresh start in the ES.108 The ES badly needed capable leadership that year because the situation gradually worsened. In February, ominous reports from northern Greece flooded the prime minister’s office which lamented the ‘abduction’ of tens of thousands of children by the DSE.109 The same month, the government protested to the UNSCOB against a ‘modern genocide’ against Greeks;110 the next month, Athens denounced before UNESCO and the UN secretary general the ‘crimes against humanity’ of the KKE 111 while the Archbishop of Greece invoked the assistance of the World Council of Churches.112 The anti-communist press and officials decried the KKE’s actions as a ‘child levy’ (paidomάzvma) in analogy to the impressments of the young Christian males for military

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service by the Ottoman Empire in the context of the ‘devs¸irme’ (or ‘blood tax’).113 The government utilised modern (photography and cinema) as well as traditional media of propaganda (radio and press) to demonise the KKE as the modern incarnation of ‘Herod the ChildSlayer’.114 According to the official ‘narrative’, the KKE executed a premeditated scheme to depopulate Macedonia and surrender it to the Slavs.115 The available archival evidence, however, suggests otherwise. The evacuations started in February116 and military considerations as well as philanthropy dictated this policy.117 The status of children in war-ravaged Greece could not be described as ideal. In fact, 586,000 were classified as orphans118 and 610,000 others were devoid of food, shelter and medical care.119 In addition, several thousand children sought refuge with their parents to communist countries after February 1945120 or were resettled (with their parents) by the ES to refugee camps from Operation Terminus onwards.121 Far worse, a number of children had been imprisoned with their parents after the Treaty of Varkiza.122 Understandably, the KKE and, most notably, the NOF wanted to ‘save’ the children of friendly locals from war suffering and state repression. At the same time, however, the KKE saw a military use in the children. Already recruiting children auxiliaries or combatants, the KKE seriously thought of utilising the children as reserves.123 Last but not least, the KKE intended, partly, to use these children as ‘hostages’ and compel their parents to offer military services to the communist cause. After all, the villagers in the northern provinces proved increasingly unwilling to provide the DSE with muchneeded recruits from the second half of 1947 onwards.124 Therefore, the evacuation of the children was carried out under conditions that ranged from outright coercion to genuine consent. The vast majority of children (aged between three and 14 years) were removed from Macedonia (the region with a sizable Slavophone minority) to communist Europe with the consent of their parents. However, the DSE would forcibly resettle the peasants from 200 villages in mount Grammos to Albania in August after its capture by the ES.125 The precise number of these children remains an issue of speculation and contention to this day. The DSE originally intended to evacuate 50,000 children to communist Europe.126 In 1949 the KKE recorded 27,200 children in communist European countries; in 1950 they registered only 17,699.127 In 1950, the International Red Cross

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documented 28,010 children.128 These figures may have grouped without any distinction three main groups: a) children born in communist states after March 1948, b) children already living in communist states before March 1948 and c) former child-soldiers.129 A more accurate estimate places the total number of evacuated children between 15,000130 and 20,000.131 The regime’s allegations of the government of ‘genocide’ may seem quite far-fetched; however, they do possess a legal basis. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted by the General Assembly in December 1948) identified, inter alia, the policy of ‘forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’ as an act of genocide against ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious groups’.132 In Greece, however, the KKE neither intended to commit nor perpetrate genocide. After all, the majority of the children were transferred with the consent of their parents. However, this fact did not dissuade the regime from undertaking an intense campaign to demonise the KKE.133 The dramatisation of the ‘child levy’ issue proved immensely useful in diverting the attention of the international public opinion away from the oppressive policy of the royalist regime.134 The League for Democracy in Greece (a left-wing human rights NGO in Britain) and the ‘Committee of Help to the Child’ (EBOP) (a relief agency of the KKE) tried to tell the other side of the ‘story’ – albeit with little success.135 The future actions of the UN General Assembly would attest to the relative success of the ‘narrative’ of the royalist regime. Without assigning blame, the UN General Assembly would undertake initiatives for the prompt repatriation of the children – satisfying indirectly a standing request of the Greek royalist regime. The response to the ‘child levy’ would come swiftly, though from Queen Frederica. Since the enthronement of her husband in April 1947, Queen Frederica had clearly demonstrated that she intended to rule and not just reign. During the second half of 1947, she toured with her husband the war-ravaged northern regions136 and she even visited the frontier town of Konitsa to hearten the garrison during its unsuccessful siege by the DSE in December 1947137 After all, she had established NGOs for the relief of the war refugees which she oversaw. These actions sought, partly, to refute the allegations of the KKE that the palace remained indifferent to the plight of the populace.138 The queen rose up to the challenge and put into effect a policy of ‘child saving’ (paidosώsimo).

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The Palace and Army: March –May 1948 On 6 March, the queen convened an urgent meeting with the ministers of welfare, internal affairs and military affairs to discuss this proposed policy of ‘child saving’. They finally decided to evacuate nearly 14,000 children from northern Greece to the ‘security centres’ and, thereafter, to the ‘child cities’ already operating under the direction of the EPBEE.139 After only two days, the DSE declared its intention to accelerate the evacuations of children from northern Greece to communist Europe in the face of the oppression of the ‘monarcho-fascist’ regime – indirectly confirming the allegations of the royalist regime that the DSE had been evacuating children since February 1948.140 The causality issue of the ‘child saving’ still sparks controversy in the academic and political circles in Greece: did the ‘child levy’ cause the ‘child saving’ or vice versa? Queen Frederica established the first ‘child city’ as early as July 1947 after the establishment of the EPBEE141 – i.e. before the commencement of the ‘child levy’ in February 1948. In turn, the DSE decided to evacuate thousands of children from northern Greece owing to a combination of philanthropy and military considerations regardless of the queen’s actions. One thing is certain, Queen Frederica would turn the ‘child saving’ issue into a one-woman show. In April, the government established a ‘Coordinative Committee for the Rehabilitation of Threatened Children’ (SEPAP) to implement the evacuation policy Queen Frederica envisaged.142 Accordingly, state officials identified the most vulnerable villages in the northern provinces of Greece and obtained the written consent of the parents for the evacuation of their offspring before transferring the latter to ‘security centres’ and, afterwards, to ‘child cities’.143 A few weeks later, the government established the ‘Special Service of Greek Children’s Relief” (EYPE) to operate the 53 ‘child cities’ of the EPBEE. In addition, the Commissioned Ladies of the EPBEE (an association of 72 aristocratic women affiliated with Queen Frederica) oversaw the ‘child cities’ as well.144 Some ‘child cities’ operated as lower vocational schools for technical professions or even as experimental ‘rural child cities’ with an emphasis on mechanised agriculture.145 The total number of children sheltered in the ‘child cities’ still remains unclear. The army transported (mainly between March and June 1948) from the northern regions between 12,300146, 15,016147 and 18,454 children.148 As in the ‘child

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levy’, the issue of parental consent still causes debates among academics. Although some parents willingly surrendered their offspring to the state authorities, others (such as the Slav-Macedonians and Greek communists) resisted.149 Queen Frederica used her personal contacts with foreign women’s associations and politicians to support the royalist regime’s diplomatic campaign on the ‘child levy’ issue. In fact, she convinced the General Council of the International Union for Child Welfare to issue in August 1948 a resolution that called for the children’s prompt repatriation.150 The queen established a ‘Complaint Office against the Child Levy’ and, subsequently, inundated the foreign governments, press and human rights organisations with long memoranda that deprecated the KKE’s ‘child levy’ and, at the same time, defended the ‘child saving’ campaign.151 The latter intended in effect not only to ‘rescue’ the children but also ‘shape’ the younger generation according to the monarchist regime’s vision. Therefore, the children were indoctrinated with an anti-Slavic and anti-communist hysteria, a nationalist fervour, a zeal for the Crown and the Church.152 In particular, the offspring of Slav-Macedonians and Greek communists were classified as orphans and were ‘cleansed’ from ‘anti-national ideas’.153 The leftwing historians censured the ‘child cities’ as ‘Potemkin Villages’ of an exhibitionist German aristocrat who struggled to conceal her wartime membership in the Hitler Youth with acts of philanthropy, while others characterised them as detention centres for the offspring of Greek and Slav-Macedonian parents.154 On balance, the ‘child cities’ do not merit the label of a paradise on earth; however, they did benefit the great majority of the children. They satisfactorily covered the basic needs (food, medicine and shelter) of the children and, in addition, provided them with a wide range of professional skills.155 In May the country would be caught in a spiral of violence. Early in the month, the insurgents shot the minister of public order dead in broad daylight, triggering a vindictive wave of executions of political prisoners.156 The executions stirred protests in Europe and the USA which put Truman in an awkward position. Although Marshall had openly approved of the heavy-handed tactics of the royalist regime,157 the international outcry compelled him to suggest to Sophoulis a drastic reduction in executions.158 However, the strong objections by the senior US officials in Greece to any gestures of clemency forced Marshall to

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back down.159 The new cycle of violence dramatically increased the death toll by firing squads. After the end of the civil war, the Ministry of Military Affairs calculated conservatively that over 1/7 of the individuals tried by special courts-martial during the civil war were condemned to death (4,849 out of 36,920 souls in total).160 In turn, the Ministry of Justice recorded 7,771 convictions by special courts-martial during the war – around a quarter of which (2,031) pertained to death sentences.161 How many of these death sentences were finally carried out remains unknown thus far. After the assassination of the minister, the government decreed martial law in the capital.162 The government decreed a ‘status of siege’ on a new legal basis that enabled the monarch to enact emergency legislation without the parliament’s prior consent. This modification alarmingly increased the authority of King Paul – a monarch with dictatorial ambitions, as the course of the civil war would attest.163 After a few days, the government decreed the prolongation of the maximum term for political prisoners sentenced to exile164 and, therefore, several convicts served sentences of ten or even 12 years.165 The new measures cemented the dominance of the executive over the legislature and judiciary, violating the axiom of the separation of powers. The government would enact emergency laws without any prior sanction by the parliament by invoking extraordinary circumstances for state security.166 Only one-fifth of the 1,500 laws ordained during the course of the civil war were ratified by an apathetic parliament.167 In mid-May a notable US journalist, George Polk, was found murdered under mysterious circumstances. This murder shocked the US public opinion and offered the Greek royalist regime yet another excuse to intensify the persecution of communists.168 The BPPM reported that by late May 1948 the government had imprisoned 21,853 people (only 68 per cent of whom could be classified as true ‘communists’), exiled 10,365 others and confined 15,242 others (including military personnel) to the prison camps of Makronisos.169 By the end of May, military failures would add insult to injury. In April, the ES had commenced Operation Dawn (an operation designed jointly with the JUSMAPG) to overwhelm the DSE in central Greece and, ultimately, capture its strongholds on mounts Grammos and Vitsi in northern Greece,170 Initially, the ES seized 4,500 civilian collaborators of the DSE and threw the latter into confusion about its

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next moves. Despite the initial surprise, the poor coordination of the offensives cost the ES a decisive victory and the DSE salvaged a sizable section of its military forces.171 The next phase of the operation, the assault against the DSE’s strongholds on mounts Vitsi and Grammos, in summer would prove no less ineffective.

The Tito –Stalin Schism: June 1948 The military failures did not prevent the government from pursuing its unrealistic visions of peripheral hegemony. In June, Greece requested British support for an Eastern Mediterranean Pact – an alliance that would unite Greece, Turkey and Egypt (under the auspices of Athens) against the rising communist threat.172 The British, however, rejected this thinly veiled vision of peripheral hegemony and reminded the Greek royalist regime that the communist insurgency threatened its very survival.173 A similar petition to the US state department to support a Eastern Mediterranean Pact did not yield results either.174 Nor did the Anglo-Americans support Greece enthusiastically in its endeavours to internationalise the ‘child levy’ issue. In June, UNSCOB published its meticulous findings in a report that only partially confirmed the royalist regime’s accusations. This report concluded that the DSE had systematically transferred thousands of children from northern Greece (from western Macedonia in particular with its sizable Slav-speaking population) both with and without the consent of their parents.175 Using this report as evidence, Tsaldaris demanded in June the communist host countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Poland) deliver the children back to Greece; the vice president additionally appealed to the UN secretary general to submit a similar petition to Albania on behalf of Greece due to the non-existent diplomatic relations between the two sides.176 The host states rejected this demand and claimed that they provided relief to children who suffered from state repression and war hardship.177 Greece intended to submit a new protest before the General Assembly but the USA dissuaded Athens from igniting a diplomatic conflict with an uncertain outcome.178 The USA wanted to leave a diplomatic channel open with Yugoslavia (the country which hosted the majority of the children) at a crucial period in Soviet – Yugoslav relations.179

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During the first half of 1948, relations between Stalin and Tito deteriorated sharply and, in June, the Cominform ousted Yugoslavia.180 The conflict between the two communist leaders had been simmering since early 1948 as Stalin resented the independentminded policies of Tito in Greece and his hegemonic tendencies in the Balkans. Despite Stalin’s assiduous efforts, Tito was not overthrown and, therefore, Stalin endeavoured to isolate him.181 In July, the Soviet embassy in Greece secretly approached Tsaldaris to discuss the chronic disputes between the two countries but the discussions ended abruptly after a few days.182 The timing of this initiative cannot be viewed as coincidental. The Tito – Stalin split forced the KKE to take sides. As an orthodox Stalinist party, the KKE sided with Moscow. Accordingly, the fourth plenum of the KKE’s central committee in July endorsed Tito’s excommunication, but the party did not openly announce the resolution as the DSE still depended critically on Belgrade for military support.183

The High Tide of the DSE: July –December 1948 In the second half of 1948, the USA deepened their involvement in Greek internal affairs. In July, the AMAG ceased to operate (as was originally planned) after achieving the precarious stabilisation of the economic and political state of affairs.184 On 2 July, a new Greco – American economic accord was signed which signalled the inclusion of Greece in the European Recovery Programme (ERP) of the Marshall Plan. A new mission, the subdivision of the European Cooperation Administration (ECA) for Greece (ECA/G), was thus established to oversee a second aid programme for Greece.185 From the outset, the ECA/G and Greece inundated the ECA headquarters in Paris with appeals for a massive aid programme. However, the ECA replied that Greece would receive aid only worth of $213 million (nearly two-thirds of the first aid programme). As in the previous aid programme, the principal objective of this programme remained the stabilisation of the economy until the defeat of the DSE.186 Unlike the AMAG, the ECA/G would not set the general direction of the second aid programme. The ECA/G did, nonetheless, continue the interventionist policy of its predecessor, as the actions of the agency would attest in January 1949.187 The US state department ruled that the

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ambassador in Greece would combine the powers of both the embassy and the ECA/G. This way, two persisting problems were resolved at once: the unceasing conflict between the US diplomats and technocrats in Greece and the unchecked intervention of the senior US officials in Greek internal affairs.188 From the outset, the ECA/G came upon a critical dilemma: on the one hand, the ECA/G wanted to carry out ‘a programme of reconstruction based on ‘New Deal’ parameters and Keynesian ideology’ similar to the programmes in Western Europe; and on the other hand, the suppression of the insurgency required an emphasis on the government’s war effort. Eventually, the agency decided to render the state apparatus ‘capable of implementing a reconstruction and stabilisation programme and providing security at the same time’.189 Thus, the ECA/G reinforced existing and created new overseeing agencies and state institutions.190 Just like the AMAG, the ECA/G implemented a strict austerity programme for the next fiscal year (July 1948– July 1949) which involved a restrictive income and monetary policy and a tight fiscal policy. In addition, the ECA/G strove to redress the refugee and war issues with the minimum possible cost for the shaky economy.191 The ECA/G encountered severe difficulties in implementing the austerity programme. The escalation of the insurgency in the second half of 1948 as well as the inefficiency of the corrupt and unorganised state apparatus simply worsened the acute socio-economic crisis.192 The refugee crisis stood as the most serious predicament for the economy. By April 1948, the number of internally displaced people had risen to 540,000 people and, in June, the state authorities registered 635,000 people as internal refugees.193 The ECA/G revised the civil section of the aid programme and set the imports of basic consumer goods as a priority.194 The state apparatus, however, proved utterly incapable of tackling this severe humanitarian crisis. State officials could not hide the uncomfortable truth that the majority of the state-run refugee camps could hardly fulfil the basic needs (shelter in particular) of the countless refugees. Several incidents of maltreatment and neglect by state officials (a direct consequence of the corrupt and cumbersome state organs) stirred resentment among the refugees – several of whom already sympathised with the communist cause. The US and Greek officials justifiably worried that the communists would take advantage of this popular rancour and incite unrest.195

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Despite the ‘gift’ of the rift between Stalin and Tito, the government’s fortunes did not improve from one day to another. In mid-June the ES had staged Operation Crown with a massive force (over 90,000 soldiers including the auxiliaries) to storm the twin communist strongholds on Grammos and Vitsi. The ES, however, progressed at a snail’s pace and at a terrible cost; the forts on Grammos were captured with a bayonet charge only in late August.196 Sophoulis knew that the ES won a pyrrhic victory.197 The government must have thought that the two sides had reached a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, a situation where victory seems unattainable for both sides and compels them to settle a war through negotiations.198 The Berlin Blockade in June must have upset the government as well, triggering fears of a possible Soviet incursion in the Balkans.199 Time and time again, such so-called ‘shock’ incidents have provided incentives for peace talks between two sides in a civil war.200 For example, the invasion of the Empire of Japan in China in 1937 compelled the Chinese Nationalists Party and the Chinese Communist Party to unite against the external foe. Newly-discovered archival evidence indicates that Tsaldaris seriously contemplated a peace deal with the KKE in late July – one month before the capture of the forts in mount Grammos when the advance of the ES had apparently stalled. According to the surviving draft of the peace terms of the deputy president, the government would declare an armistice, proclaim a general amnesty and repeal the deportations of the DSE’s civilian supporters; in return the DSE would surrender all weaponry to the UNSCOB and disband. Elections would take place six months after the ceasefire and a new government would decide whether to legalise the KKE and EAM and grant amnesty to the PDK’s cabinet, the KKE’s central committee and the DSE’s high command.201 The archives do not, however, tell if Tsaldaris actually submitted this peace offer. According to the left-wing historians, such a peace proposal was indeed submitted; however, Zachariadis rejected it scornfully since he speculated that the DSE would ultimately win the civil war.202 Besides, the developments on the field of battle in the next few months would vindicate such optimism. Far from being soundly routed, the DSE promptly redeployed its military forces to Mount Vitsi with a brilliant manoeuvre via Albanian territory. In late August, the exhausted ES commenced the assault on Vitsi (Operation Vitsi) but the dispirited offensive quickly stalled. The

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DSE wasted no time and staged a spirited counter-offensive that overran several units of the ES, threatening the whole northern front with collapse. Panic seized the government and Marshall rushed to Athens to rouse the spirit of the royalist regime. However, these fears proved baseless. The DSE’s offensive gradually lost momentum after the illfated siege of the (strategically unimportant) town of Kastoria and finally halted when in October the ES managed to fill the breach with fresh reinforcements. And as in the summer of 1947, the Royal Air Force (BA) had stemmed the counter-offensive of the DSE with punishing aerial bombardments.203 The failure of the operation against the DSE shattered the illusion of a quick victory among the Greek and US policy-makers.204 An enraged Van Fleet rebuked his Greek colleagues for their failure 205 and cabled to the US State Department that only an enormous army could defeat the DSE. He then petitioned a substantial increase in the war budget and size of the ES to 250,000 soldiers.206 By late autumn, the war had spread throughout the country and northern Greece especially witnessed vicious fighting. In central and eastern Macedonia, the DSE yielded territory after severe defeats, and the opposite happened in western Macedonia.207 However, the most spectacular success of the DSE occurred in the Peloponnese. A stout royalist stronghold, this southernmost province had witnessed only sporadic clashes and the regime stationed units of low quality in the area. Despite their relative isolation from the DSE’s main forces and their operation among an (unfriendly in most cases) population, the insurgents scored one success after the other and captured a quarter of the region.208 Only the islands stayed out of this carnage. With the exception of Samos and Crete (two islands with a strong left-wing tradition), the DSE did not set up insurgent cells in the archipelago. The isolation of the islands of the Aegean Sea from the epicentre of the DSE’s activity put the communists at an inherent disadvantage and, thus, they stayed low throughout the war.209 After the Tito– Stalin split, the fortunes of the KKE seemed to improve. Upon the invitation of Stalin, Zachariadis visited Moscow in September to ‘pay homage’ to Stalin; in return for his loyalty, he was rewarded with plentiful military support.210 By order of Stalin, Albania and Bulgaria replaced Yugoslavia as the primary supporters of the DSE.211 Moreover, Stalin ordered the communist states of Europe to

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contribute to the KKE’s struggle. In September, officials from four communist countries (Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland) convened in Warsaw and discussed with senior representatives of the DSE the issues of logistical and military aid. Two other conferences were organised in January and February 1949 in Prague and Budapest respectively.212 By September, Washington and London had confirmed that the communist bloc had isolated Tito. They did not, however, intervene in support of the beleaguered Yugoslav leader since they remained sceptical about the sincerity and severity of the Tito – Stalin schism.213 After all, Belgrade did not seem willing to reconcile with Athens in spite of its isolation. Tito failed to make any concessions to Greece with regards to the border skirmishes or the ‘abducted children’.214 In November, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 193 (III) which reiterated the basic conclusions of the reports written by the UNSCOB between June and October: Belgrade and, to a far lesser degree, Tirana and Sofia continued to support the DSE.215 The continued support of Tito to the DSE seemed quite odd in light of the growing frigidity between the erstwhile very close partners. However, Tito weighed his options well. He struggled to preserve the loyalty of the Slav-Macedonians of Yugoslavia to his regime by supporting the armed struggle of their co-brethren across the border with Greece.216 In fact, Belgrade would continue to provide military aid, though gradually decreasing, to the DSE across the border as late as May 1949.217 The resolution also petitioned the prompt repatriation of the ‘abducted children’ and called on the UN secretary-general to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross to this end.218 Last but not least, the resolution founded a conciliation committee that would mediate between the three Balkan countries and Greece.219 Herbert Evatt, the president of the UN General Assembly and chairman of the ad hoc conciliation committee, worked hard to mend ties between the two sides. In mid-November, Evatt put forth a radical eight-step programme for reconciliation220 that was nonetheless rejected by all four parties. In May 1949, the conciliation committee ceased to operate without yielding any results.221 Undeterred by this failure, Evatt volunteered to mediate once again and met with senior Soviet and US diplomats at the sidelines of the council of foreign ministers in Paris

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later that month. While the USSR welcomed this initiative, the USA rejected it outright.222 Although Bevin strongly believed that Tito still remained a committed communist, in December he decided to approach the latter.223 The severe political crisis in Greece from November 1948 until January 1949 and the anxiety about the war-fighting capacity of the royalist regime probably induced the British foreign secretary to reach out to Tito.224 Later that month, Belgrade and London concluded a one-year commercial treaty and received foreign loans from the USA, cementing the conviction among senior Western diplomats of an irreparable rift within the communist camp.225 The very same month, Yugoslavia tried to normalise the bilateral relations with Greece in secret to forestall any accusation of a ‘capitalist deviation’ from the communist bloc and the Yugoslav public opinion; however, this attempt failed due to a combination of Yugoslav scepticism and Greek tactlessness. A similar attempt in March 1949 would meet with failure as well.226

A Militarily Supervised Democracy: November 1948 –January 1949 The supervision of the political system by the army, a chronic pathogeny of Greece during the twentieth century, occurred once again in 1948 due to the inability of the parliamentary regime to vanquish the DSE. With the DSE expanding its military activities to almost every province of mainland Greece,227 in October the government declared martial law in the Peloponnese228 and, after a few days, throughout the country.229 This act caused an alarming expansion of the courts-martial’s jurisdiction throughout the country and, by extension, paved the way for the army’s interference in civil affairs. When Sophoulis recommended Papagos for the position of commander-in-chief in November, the latter demanded the complete control over the military affairs without any interference by the government or the allied military missions and the prompt increase of the ES to 250,000 soldiers. Predictably, Sophoulis and the JUSMAPG rejected these demanding conditions.230 The opposition parties demanded the resignation of the prime minister, while several MPs of the co-governing Populist Party accused Sophoulis of incompetence. Venizelos and 54 deputies affiliated with him (who had joined the Liberal Party in November 1947) withdrew

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their trust for the prime minister.231 Succumbing to pressure, the prime minister resigned on 12 November.232 After just four days, the Sacred Bond of Greek Officers (IDEA), a cabal of right-wing army officers,233 sent a minatory letter to Tsaldaris and threatened to incriminate both Sophoulis and him for the ‘impending disastrous consequences’ unless a new government was sworn-in under the premiership of an extraparliamentary figure whom the king would select.234 The letter of the IDEA epitomised the decay of the Greek political system: two extraparliamentary actors, the palace and the army, increasingly interfered in civil affairs at the expense of democracy in Greece.235 Likewise, in December, eight lieutenant generals would address the king and ask him to assume all action necessary (in conjunction with the allies) for the salvation of the country.236 Shaken by the minatory letter, Tsaldaris commenced talks with other party leaders and secured the co-operation of Gonatas and Zervas for the establishment of a new government. The Anglo-Americans, however, opposed the creation of a wholly right-wing government. Therefore, Henry Grady, the newly-appointed US ambassador in Greece, and Norton intervened and enjoined the three leaders to abandon the interparty negotiations.237 Days later, the two ambassadors met with Tsaldaris and Sophoulis and forced them to form a new coalition government on 19 November. Indicative of its fragility, this government weathered a motion of confidence in parliament only by a single vote.238 However, Sophoulis could no longer count on the Liberal Party for support since his own deputies had deserted him. Venizelos rallied the disaffected MPs of the Liberal Party around him. The same day the new government was sworn in, the Liberal Party designated Venizelos as its leader.239 However, the squabbles among the political parties did not stop. The king informed Grady of his willingness to establish an extra-parliamentary government under Papagos as the only alternative to the ongoing political instability; the king’s chief adviser and leader of a newly-founded right-wing party, Spyros Markezinis,240 would also serve as the vice president of a future government. Grady realised that such a government would simply camouflage a palace-led dictatorship and opposed the plot.241 Just a few days after assuming office, Sophoulis contracted a serious illness that confined him to his sickbed. The aged republican leader, however, refused to resign despite the abysmal state of

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his health and clung on to his coveted office.242 The discussions, nonetheless, flared up on who would lead the government after his (expected) death. A monarch with a quasi-fascist record,243 the king did not cease to ponder on the possibility of a non-parliamentary solution to the unending political crisis. In early January 1949, he confided to Averrell Harriman, a senior US technocrat who was visiting Athens in his capacity as the Special Representative in Europe for the ECA at the time, his intention to dissolve the current government and parliament and compel the political leaders to establish an all-party government. As a last resort, he would deliver a new mandate to Markezinis and Papagos to establish a new extra-parliamentary government.244 On 17 January, King Paul issued an ultimatum to all party leaders and threatened to resort to extra-parliamentary solutions unless they agreed to establish an all-party government within 24 hours.245 King Paul, however, did not act alone; he had first earned the acquiescence of senior US officials for his schemes. The petty rivalries of the Greek party leaders induced several US officials to condone (and even encourage) the interference of the military and palace in the political affairs of Greece.246 John Nuveen, the director of the ECA/G, and Harriman had unreservedly endorsed the king’s plots.247 Lord Mountbatten, the former Viceroy of India visiting Greece at the time, Grady and Norton intervened to stave off a thinly veiled coup d’e´tat.248 This palace coup was averted and the government was expanded with the addition of Markezinis, Kanellopoulos and Papandreou in the government.249 The Liberal Party decided to stand behind Sophoulis this time and Venizelos returned once again to the government fold.250 Although King Paul did not eventually install Papagos as an extraparliamentary prime minister, the former marshal was appointed in extremis commander-in-chief of the ES after the government and the Anglo-Americans reluctantly acquiesced to his demanding conditions.251 First, the ASEA was replaced by the Supreme War Council (APS), an organ with a mixed civilian-military membership.252 Secondly, Papagos would devise and execute the new military policy alone with only complementary advice from the allied military missions. Thirdly, Papagos would decide alone on the appointment of the army commanders or any other organisational issue of the armed forces.253 This development formalised the takeover of the political affairs by the military – a process

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that began months earlier after the imposition of martial law. In effect, Papagos concentrated all the military powers required for the war struggle in his hand, realising what the theorists and practitioners of COIN have called ‘unity of effort’.254 However, the various soldier-theorists have consistently stressed the primacy of the civil over military authority.255 In the Greek case, however, the roles were reversed; the military placed the government under tutelage. However, Papagos restored a ‘native lead’ in the war struggle by undoing the takeover of the country’s military policy by the JUSMAPG.256 As other cases in COIN have clearly demonstrated, native ownership of a COIN campaign greatly increases the legitimacy of the host government – a crucial element in an irregular conflict that amounts basically to a contest for popular support.257 For example, the president of the Philippines under Raymond Magasay restored a native lead in the campaign against the communist insurgency and suppressed it in 1954. Upon Papagos’s insistence, the size and strength of the Greek armed forces were improved in a drastic way. Despite the initial objections of the ECA/G and JUSMAPG over the colossal costs of this military buildup, they finally yielded to Papagos’s demands and sanctioned an increase of the armed forces to over 250,000 soldiers (147,000 in the army and 50,000 in the national defence corps). Moreover, the army was supported by 7,500 city police officers, 25,000 gendarmes and 50,000 men in ‘home guard’ forces258 – militias set up in pro-government villages and villages repopulated from mid-1949 onwards.259 The army received vast quantities of military and non-military supplies (e.g. mules and mountain artillery guns) that rendered its units capable of operating skilfully on mountainous terrain. The air force, a weapon that twice saved the ES from defeat, was vastly reinforced. The United States Air Force Group Greece (USAFGG), a new advisory agency set up in November 1948 and subordinated to the JUSMAPG, provided the air force with military supplies and advice on operational issues. The AngloAmericans provided large quantities of aircraft and arms including napalm bombs – an incendiary weapon developed by the USA that wreaked havoc on the DSE during the later military campaigns.260 Indicatively of the civil conflict’s viciousness, a Greek Army commander even (albeit unsuccessfully) recommended to the general staff the acquisition and use of poisonous gas from the USA.261 Last but not least, Papagos substantially improved the quality of the officer corps. His

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prestige and dynamic character impelled his subordinates to obey his central directives and stick to the operational objectives of each campaign. In addition, he cured past ills such as the rivalries between the army commanders or the incompetence of senior army officers. He reinstated General Ventiris to active service and summarily replaced senior and junior commanders of brigade and battalion level who proved incapable, thus restoring meritocracy in the ES.262 In early 1949, the ECA/G allocated $50 (one-fifth of the budget) for the repatriation programme and a similar amount for an urgent increase of the size of the ES. The emergency expanses increased the budget deficit and compelled the ECA/G to undertake initiatives to increase state revenues (primarily by taxing the wealthy) and decrease other elastic expenses – especially the resources allocated for reconstruction and welfare purposes. The ECA/G’s restrictive income policy did not permit any increases in the salaries and pensions that could counterbalance the adverse effects of the rising cost of living. From mid-1948 to early 1949, several strikes in the public and private sectors paralysed the country and compelled the government to use force to suppress them. To the chagrin of the ECA/G, the new right-wing president of the GSEE instigated these strikes. After exhaustive deliberations with the ECA/G, the government would, in May 1949, substantially increase the wages of the workers in the public and private sectors in an effort to win them over. In general terms, the ECA/G continued the restrictive monetary policy of the AMAG – although it did also undertake action to reduce the food prices so that the suffering people could purchase them with relative ease.263 However, the struggle of the ECA/G to stabilise the anaemic economy with fiscal measures that damaged the interests of the royalist regime’s supporters caused severe conflicts between the senior US and Greek officials. For example, the Greek government resisted pressure from the ECA/G to dismiss thousands of superfluous civil servants – the majority of whom owed their appointment only to political favouritism. Thus, the ECA/G and US embassy increasingly intervened to enforce an austerity programme increasingly unpopular among the royalist regime.264 Indicatively of the pervasive corruption within the regime, a corruption scandal rocked the government between March and April 1949 and caused its collapse. Several political leaders (most of whom participated in the coalition government) were charged with the crime

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of smuggling goods.265 Since the military campaign was in essence directed by Papagos and Van Fleet, this scandal did not affect the effectiveness of the regime’s COIN.

The Insurgency’s Death Rattle: January –October 1949 The year 1949 would mark the end of the civil war, an end foreseen since the first months of the year. In January 1949, the PDK publicised via radio an offer for a ceasefire on the following terms: the insurgents and the government would retain their territorial gains, the foreign military missions (i.e. the British and American ones) would withdraw from Greece, a general amnesty would be announced and a new government of universal acceptance would be set up to organise new elections within a time period of two months after the ceasefire.266 Once again, the government spurned these advances. While certain revisionist scholars have attributed this offer to the genuine willingness of the KKE to reach a peace settlement,267 in reality the KKE intended to secure its territorial gains until then before the balance of power tilted at the expense of the DSE. Until the end of the month, the DSE would have attacked three provincial capitals (Karditsa, Naousa, Karpenisi) in central and northern Greece with resounding success under the generalship of Zachariadis.268 In the aftermath of Operation Crown, the PDK had founded a Supreme War Council under the absolute control of Zachariadis269 – an act that marginalised Vafeiadis and formalised the KKE’s direct control over the DSE. However, even the optimistic Zachariadis knew that the tactical superiority of the DSE by early 1949 hung by a thread. In December 1948, the ES launched Operation Pigeon and within just five weeks wiped out the DSE’s nearly 5,000 fighters in Peloponnesus. The ES adopted the operational doctrine ‘isolation, encirclement, eradication’. The navy and gendarmerie sealed off the region while the police rooted out the ‘self-defence’ in the region’s towns before the start of the operation. The ES unleashed several incursions from the coast to the mainland, encircled the DSE in the middle of the region and annihilated it.270 Despite Zachariadis’s grandiose visions, the DSE never metamorphosed into a regular army. the DSE possessed no air force or navy (apart from a few armed fishing boats), while the artillery corps (traditionally the strongest weapon of the DSE) suffered from a

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devastating deficiency in trained staff and modern weapons.271 Worse, in 1948 the DSE reached a ceiling of 24,000 fighters (instead of the 50,000 as originally planned) and the DSE’s warfighting quality progressively deteriorated. The DSE resorted to the impressment of young males and females and as early as December 1947 the volunteers did not surpass 10 per cent of the DSE’s total numbers according to Vafeiadis. By late 1948, women comprised a quarter of the insurgents’ total strength and young people below the age of 25 over 80 per cent; even children were recruited.272 During the first half of 1949, the DSE’s combat performance sharply deteriorated and maintenance of discipline and morale among the fighters increasingly depended on coercion (including executions of deserters). Desertions (mainly among forced recruits) increased markedly, although incidents of surrender in mass numbers were never reported.273 Similarly, the DSE increasingly suffered from a stark dearth of capable captains. Until late 1948, the quality of the DSE’s leadership remained superb in the lower army echelons (up to battalion level) and superior to the enemy’s. By early 1949, several skilled commanders had been either killed on the battlefield or marginalised due to political intrigues within the PDK.274 Zachariadis resolved to throw everything into a gamble: the DSE would wipe out the ES in a war of annihilation or else the former would ultimately lose in a war of attrition. For such a risky strategy, Zachariadis would reach out to minorities in search of much-needed fighters and silence whatever dissenting voices within the PDK. In January, the fifth plenum of the KKE’s central committee issued a resolution that conformed to the monolithic line of Zachariadis. The PDK relieved Vafeiadis from his posts, denounced Tito and, worse, vowed to support the ‘just struggle’ of the Slav-Macedonians for national rehabilitation in case of a communist victory.275 Contrary to what traditional scholars claimed,276 Vafeiadis was relieved of his post because of his antithesis to the risky strategy of the PDK’s strongman – not because of his so-called Titoist temper. After all, Vafeiadis had approved the secret denunciation of Tito in the KKE’s fourth plenum earlier in 1948.277 Vafeiadis proposed a return to guerrilla tactics (an opinion openly voiced with a ‘dissident platform’ in November 1948), while Zachariadis championed the adoption of conventional warfare.278 The resolution of the fifth plenum validated the ‘narrative’ of the regime that the KKE always machinated to yield Greek Macedonia to the Slavs. Every political party

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(even non-parliamentary left-wing ones) denounced vehemently the KKE’s resolution.279 The timing of the fifth plenum cannot be viewed as coincidental. The fifth plenum was convened just a few days after the expulsion of Belgrade from the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON);280 similarly, the fourth plenum was convoked a few weeks after the excommunication of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. In February, Zachariadis addressed the second plenum of the NOF’s central council and promised the Slavophones a co-equal partnership with the KKE. Later in April, two officials of the NOF received senior posts in the PDK’s cabinet.281 Yugoslavia condemned these overtures as yet another effort by Stalin and his Greek underling to subvert the loyalty of Slav-Macedonians to Tito. The Western diplomats interpreted the developments in a similar way.282 The views of the top Yugoslav and Western officials were not entirely off the mark. In fact, Stalin urged Zachariadis to wrestle the Slav-Macedonians of Greece and, by extension, Yugoslavia away from Tito by offering them substantial concessions.283 Nonetheless, military considerations, not gestures of loyalty to Stalin, primarily motivated Zachariadis to follow this policy: the KKE badly needed the Slavophones’ military capital due to its crippling shortage in recruits.284 By mid-1949, the Slav-Macedonians constituted half of the DSE’s fighters. Apart from the Slav-speaking minority, the KKE strove – albeit ineffectively – to recruit fighters among the Muslim minority in Thrace and the Muslim Cham refugees in Albania.285 This shortage in skilled fighters and captains (as well as the dismissal of Vafeiadis) would cost dearly. In the first operation after the fifth plenum in February against Florina (a small town near the Greco –Yugoslav frontier), the DSE was soundly defeated after sustaining heavy losses in the single longest battle in the course of the war.286 The primary cause for this deficiency originated from the population transfers carried out by the ES. In December Sophoulis had set up the Ministerial Committee for the Rehabilitation of Refugees (YEAP), an agency staffed by senior Greek and US officials and tasked with the conception and execution of this new policy. Accordingly, the army would evacuate a village only whenever military necessity dictated and only after issuing a warning to its inhabitants; in addition, the army should ensure the safe transfer of the villagers to the nearest ‘security centre’. Only when security conditions improved would the army

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repatriate the peasants to their villages. The governors in provinces would concentrate all administrative powers in their hands to direct the relief programme for the refugees in their own provinces. In summary, the state authorities would provide daily bread rations, daily family benefits, clothing and housing material and indemnities in farming tools and animals. In addition, each governor should use the available state agencies and resources to provide the refugees with shelter, occupation and medical services.287 In January 1949, the number of internally displaced people reached 662,000 persons and, in May peaked at 705,000 people – over 10 per cent of Greece’s total population and 25 per cent of the population of northern Greece.288 In fact, the ES depopulated the lands occupied by the DSE to the extent that the latter could no longer collect taxes and supplies or even recruit fighters.289 The growing weakness of the DSE compelled the KKE to seek a honorouble peace deal before the scales of war tilted more in favour of the ES. In April, the PDK appealed to the UN for the conflict’s termination and vowed to offer substantial concessions in return for peace; the US officials remarked sardonically that the aforementioned petition represented the 21st peace offer of the KKE since 1946. The government responded imperiously that the DSE must first surrender their weapons and only then sit on the negotiation table.290 Yet again, the acts of the PDK coincided with external events. In April, Stalin urgently summoned Zachariadis to Moscow and ordered him to cease fire immediately.291 What impelled Stalin to act like this? Just a week before, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established in Washington and Stalin was alarmed. The Soviet dictator worried about the security of his newly-acquired empire in Central and Eastern Europe.292 In addition, Stalin worried about the security of Albania – a country threatened by Greece and Yugoslavia at the same time. In April, Athens had proposed to the Anglo-Americans an amphibious assault on Albania in case the Cominform invaded Yugoslavia.293 At the same time, the APS drew operational plans for a land invasion of Albania.294 The capture of Albania would accomplish two primary objectives of Greece: the elimination of a bellicose neighbour that assisted the DSE and the incorporation of Northern Epirus into Greece, one of the national claims of Greece.295 On the other hand, Tito wanted to occupy Albania and realise his visions of peripheral hegemony.296 The Soviets could not

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credibly protect Albania from these twin threats. In case of a Greek assault on Albania, Moscow could not deploy the Red Army in support of Tirana since Tito had cut off land access to Albania; nor could the weak Red Navy rival the mighty Anglo-American fleets in the eastern Mediterranean.297 Zachariadis initially complied with Stalin’s directive but, after returning to Greece, defied this directive.298 Upon Stalin’s orders, the communist states ceased supporting the DSE299 with the exception of Albania and Bulgaria which continued to support the insurgents in secret.300 In April, Papagos launched Operation Rocket to wipe out the DSE in Roumeli. It followed the exact same operational plans as Operation Pigeon, followed to-the-letter by army officers who were, by then, well versed in art of irregular warfare. After three months of fierce fighting, the insurgents were soundly defeated. In the aftermath of the clearing operation, auxiliary security organs (national defence corps, gendarmerie and home guard) repatriated the refugees and vigilantly policed the pacified areas while the state organs carried out infrastructural projects and delivered relief aid.301 Papagos implemented what the modern theorists and practitioners of COIN dubbed as the ‘clear-hold-build’ doctrine: initially, the army routs the insurgents in a specific region (‘clear’ phase); in the next phase, the army re-establishes state control in the region (‘hold’ phase); and in the last phase, the government regains the trust and support of the people through targeted political reforms and socio-economic development (‘build’ phase).302 Upon the suggestion of Van Fleet, Papagos had adopted a three-stage strategy earlier in March. The ES would initially seal off central Greece and wipe out the DSE there. Thereafter, the ES would ‘clear’ northern Greece and storm the DSE’s strongholds on mounts Grammos and Vitsi. Finally, the ES would garrison the northern frontiers while the gendarmerie would mop up resistance in the rest of the country (e.g. islands). On the contrary, the BMM suggested that the ES should first cut off the DSE’s routes of supply and retreat along the northern frontier and then try to wipe it out; the BMM’s plan merited consideration, but Papagos turned it down.303 The military failures of the DSE were noted by the Kremlin. In May, Gromyko (the acting head of the Soviet delegation to the UN) proposed to US officials a peace settlement involving an armistice, a general amnesty and general elections in which the KKE would participate. In effect, Gromyko reiterated the peace terms that the DSE had

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unsuccessfully submitted in April.304 When the Anglo-Americans voiced their strong reservations, Gromyko stated that Moscow could (apparently in cooperation with Washington and London) oversee the elections and police the northern frontiers of Greece on the condition that all foreign military personnel and missions (implying the AngloAmericans ones) withdrew from Greece. However, Greece opposed any peace negotiations with the KKE and offered only an amnesty on the condition that the DSE disarmed and disbanded. The USA proved equally unwilling to settle the civil war peacefully – especially at a time when the military balance had swung against the DSE.305 The monarchist regime steadily regained the lost ground despite the fact that the government was plagued by intra-governmental crises. Between March and April, the Greek government was rocked by a severe corruption scandal that implicated several prominent politicians and even party leaders (such as Markezinis and Venizelos). In mid-April, a new government under Sophoulis took office in which Venizelos would participate in time after his acquittal from the charges of corruption.306 In late June, Sophoulis died and Alexandros Diomidis, an MP of the Liberal Party and governor of the Bank of Greece, was sworn-in as a new prime minister a few days later.307 After all, the wrangles among the party leaders did not affect the course of the war; Papagos oversaw the whole campaign alone and ensured that the ES emerged victorious. In summer, the DSE was dealt another heavy blow from an unexpected direction: Tito. In mid-July, Tito stated publicly that he would close down the Greco-Yugoslav border, citing the skirmishes along that frontier as a pretext.308 In reality, Britain had offered Tito crucial economic and diplomatic aid in exchange for his commitment to terminate support to the insurgents.309 Deprived of a vital strategic depth, the DSE could no longer put up an elastic defence nor count on Belgrade to provide military support and secure a safe retreat to friendly territory as before; far worse, several thousand insurgents were stranded within Yugoslavia and transferred to other communist countries.310 Under the auspices of Britain and the USA, Yugoslavia and Greece gradually came closer – although several issues continued to cause serious discord between the two countries.311 In August, the army stood poised to inflict the coup de graˆce on the DSE, whose half forces regrouped in the safety of the twin strongholds on Grammos and Vitsi. The DSE had invested these bases on the lofty mountains with formidable fortifications that rendered them

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impregnable according to communist propaganda. Papagos committed over 100,000 soldiers (almost half the army’s strength) and devised an ingenious plan that combined adroitly the elements of manoeuvre, deception and surprise.312 Operation Torch unfolded in three phases: in the first phase, the ES staged a diversionary attack on Grammos and, thereafter, stormed the undermanned fortifications on Vitsi; in the second phase, an overpowering attack captured the forts on Grammos; in the final phase, the ES pursued the remnants of the DSE – even within Albania.313 Having secured the northern Yugoslav front, Greece wanted to invade Albania and kill two birds with one stone: annex northern Epirus and wipe out the DSE.314 Despite its appeals to the Anglo-Americans for concerted military action, Washington and London prohibited an assault and the ES only pursued the retreating units of the DSE within a few kilometres beyond the border and clashed sporadically with the Albanian border patrols.315 In September, the minister of military affairs warned Tirana in a bellicose tone that if the Albanian state authorities continued to support the retreating insurgents within their territory, Greece would invade by invoking the right of ‘self-defence’. Alarmed by the Greek war threats, Albania disarmed the insurgents and deported them to the USSR in accordance with Stalin’s instructions.316 The war scare between Greece and Albania clearly demonstrates that an internal conflict could escalate into a regional one when external actors intervene in support of one warring side.317 The Anglo-Americans prohibited the ES from invading Albania lest such an action should provoke a punishing Soviet military response in Yugoslavia or elsewhere.318 However, they did strive to overthrow the communist regime in Albania – through covert operations. Between 1949 and 1952, they staged a series of covert operations that involved Albanian anti-communist e´migre´s. However, these covert operations failed miserably.319 In October, the KKE declared a unilateral ceasefire – essentially acknowledging its defeat.320 This declaration surprised Athens and its external allies; certain Greek officials questioned its veracity and suspected that the KKE would resume its military activities as soon as possible.321 The army chased down any remaining insurgents throughout the country and, by the end of 1949, only a few hundred insurgents survived in hiding. However, thousands of insurgents and

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reservists (over 12,000 fighters) were stationed behind the Iron Curtain and, thus, Papagos could not rest on his laurels for fear of a new uprising.322 However, such fears proved utterly baseless. The communist insurgents and e´migre´s behind the Iron Curtain did nonetheless help the ES maintain its tutelage over politics for the next years for fear of the ‘red boogeyman’ – facilitating the colonels’ coup in 1967.323 The victory of the royalist regime validated the axiom that the most lasting peace settlements occur through victory on the field of battle – not accords on the negotiation table.324

Normality Restored: October 1949– 50 As security conditions steadily improved, the ECA/G stepped up its pressure on the government to repatriate the great majority of refugees.325 In the second half of 1949, the government implemented a colossal repatriation programme for nearly 300–400,000 refugees at a cost of over $54.6 million.326 The state authorities offered these returning refugees: a daily bread subsidy, a daily family allowance ($1.50 for the family’s caretaker and $1 for each protected family member), a bimonthly work benefit, an additional stipend ($200–300 depending on the number of family members) as indemnity for their lost property, new homes (nearly 25,000 units) and the necessary farming tools and livestock.327 In addition, the regime reintroduced two institutions which had rehabilitated the nearly 1.5 million refugees of the Greco–Turkish population exchange in 1922 with outstanding success: ‘welfare via work’ and ‘self-accommodation’. In summary, the state authorities recruited over 20,000 unemployed young males in reconstruction projects and provided nearly 50,000 families with building materials to reconstruct their homes.328 The emergency expenses affected the reconstruction programme in a negative way. Although the ECA/G initially allocated 76$ million from the budget for the fiscal year 1948–9, the former diverted twice (in January and June 1949) nearly 50 per cent of the funds from the reconstruction projects to the imports of basic consumer goods.329 The remaining resources were used in the following way: 30 per cent for housing and an equal amount for transportation, 21 per cent for agriculture, 7 per cent for health and just 2 per cent for industrial purposes.330 However, the government did not trust the political views of the refugees and tightly monitored their actions. Upon the recommendation

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of US officials,331 the government organised the repopulated villages in a way that secured the regime’s tight control. No more than 100 families would settle in each village and a committee of five notables would oversee the village’s civil affairs; the males would be provided with training and weapons and organised in militias under the command of an officer.332 By October, the government had repatriated 140,000 refugees and intended to resettle 250,000 more by the end of the year.333 However, this repatriation programme was not carried out in an entirely orderly way. In reality, the government forcibly repatriated thousands of refugees who refused to return to their war-ravaged villages and start a new (most likely poor) life from scratch. In other cases, the state authorities did not provide the welfare services promised to the refugees (e.g. reimbursements in farming animals) or offered them belatedly – therefore reinforcing the reluctance of a substantial number of refugees to return to their villages.334 In late 1949, the minister of social welfare (and subsequent prime minister) Constantinos Karamanlis expedited the repatriation process by implementing four shrewd policies: a) the establishment of outposts in northern Greece manned by armed loyalist villagers b) the time extension of the Work Relief Programme which benefited nearly 30,000 males directly and 150,000 dependent family members indirectly c) an increase in the provisions for refugees and d) the concentration of the administrative powers in the hands of the minister.335 Until December, 486,000 refugees had been repatriated and the remaining 236,000 were resettled in the next months.336 Despite the success of the repatriation, the war left wounds that could not be healed in just a few months. The state authorities estimated that the four-year war had caused the partial destruction of 25,700 rural households and other 102,416 buildings (public and private) at a cost of $186 million. According to Greek state officials, the war had proven equally calamitous for the Greek population: 100,000 people perished, 1,735,000 (24 per cent of the population) were reduced to destitution, 710,000 (10 per cent of the population) were displaced, 340,000 children were orphaned and 50,000 others were evacuated to communist Europe. Given the scale of the catastrophe, in late 1949 the Greek royalist regime requested emergency economic aid ($93 million) from Washington.337 However, such appeals fell on deaf ears.

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In late 1949, the ECA/G set as a priority several reconstruction projects that promised to increase the country’s industrial and agricultural productivity and improve its (slightly primitive) communication and transportation network; by early 1950, the agricultural and industrial production had regained 111.1 per cent and 105.5 per cent respectively of their prewar levels.338 Indeed, the ECA/G reserved for the reconstruction projects double the amount of resources in the budget for the fiscal year 1949 – 50 compared to the previous fiscal year. A steady improvement in the quality of the transportation and communication networks and the infrastructure for the industry and energy was recorded.339 In early 1950, the US embassy put pressure on Diomidis to reduce the military expenses (roughly 40 per cent of the budget) so as to release vital resources for reconstruction projects. Despite strong objections by the political and military leadership, the US embassy enforced a demilitarisation agenda on the former that involved the reduction of the military by almost 50 per cent within two years.340 However, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 caused the new militarisation of the US aid programme341 and the expenses of the ES continued to absorb substantial resources until the collapse of the colonels’ anti-communist junta in 1974.342 After the victory over the insurgency, the government rushed to restore political normality. The first municipal elections took place in November 1949 after 15 long years,343 a substantial number of political prisoners were granted either pardon or reductions in their sentences after strong pressures by the USA,344 and the executions of political prisoners were frozen thanks to appeals by the UN General Assembly.345 By September, the number of imprisoned and exiled individuals in Greece stood at 18,000 and 31,400 souls respectively.346 By mid1950, the prison camps on Makronisos still held 18,816 individuals sentenced to incarceration, 3,406 others to exile and 4,641 others to deportation.347 In February 1950, the parliament repealed the ‘state of siege’348 but nor the ‘state of emergency’ owing to the strong objections of the military.349 Surprisingly, the elections in March 1950 resulted in a victory for the left-wing and centrist parties just one year after the end of the war.350 The ‘child levy’ issue, nonetheless, remained a bleeding wound. In November 1949, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution

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288 on the basis of the UNSCOB’s reports. The resolution ascertained that Albania, Bulgaria and other communist countries (with the notable exception of Yugoslavia) continued to provide support, though much reduced, to the DSE. The General Assembly called on the communist states to terminate its support for the DSE and return the children evacuated by the DSE.351 In 1950 Greece appealed to Britain and the USA to apply pressure on Yugoslavia (the country with the highest number of children) with regards to the ‘child levy’ issue. However, the two powers did not wish to jeopardise the ongoing rapprochement with Yugoslavia and Greece was forced to moderate its tone.352 Although the UNSCOB ceased operating in 1952, the discussions in the General Assembly on the Greek Question continued until 1954; much reduced in intensity, these discussions primarily revolved around the ‘child levy’ issue.353 The majority of the children behind the Iron Curtain were never repatriated due to the refusal of the KKE and the host countries to cooperate with the Greece.354 Only 5,000 children were repatriated later on thanks to the industrious endeavour of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crosses of Greece and the recipient communist states. The remaining 20,000 children stayed in Eastern Europe until the 1980s. Interestingly enough, Greece did not particularly welcome the return of children with favourable views on socialism or a fully-grown SlavMacedonian consciousness.355 Similarly, the repatriation of the children sheltered in the 53 ‘child cities’ of Queen Frederica started in June 1950 and the number of the ‘child cities’ and children shrank within a few months.356 However, the queen’s relief initiatives did not stop. The EPBEE continued to provide welfare services to the population (in particular children) under a new name (the Royal Welfare Foundation). The agency founded 260 Children Houses for child care in an equal number of frontier villages in northern Greece, 14 Urban Centres for child care, 80 Units of Assistance of the Countryside for the relief of the peasants, 62 schools of cottage industry for children and even professional schools for young females. In addition, the EPBEE opened new hospitals, medical facilities and welfare centres throughout Greece.357 In a similar way, the National Foundation (the brainchild of King Paul and alter ego of the EPBEE) set up dozens of educational institutions with an emphasis on child education – even after the agency was renamed Royal National Foundation in 1950 (BIE):

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practical agricultural schools, rural housekeeping schools for young girls (primarily for girls from provinces with minority populations such as western Macedonia and western Thrace), practical technical schools (two of them specialised in rehabilitating juvenile delinquents and childsoldiers) and evening schools for illiterate people (in particular for villagers from western Macedonia).358

CONCLUSION WHAT DOES THE GREEK CIVIL WAR TEACH US?

The Significance of the War After less than four years, the civil conflict in Greece was terminated at the expense of the communist insurgents. The quick and decisive defeat of the DSE seems impressive in comparison to other communist insurgencies in the second half of the twentieth century. In fact, communist insurgencies right after World War II throughout the Third World triumphed on the vast majority of occasions. In the few cases that the insurgents failed to win, they were vanquished after years of fierce fighting; indicatively, the Malayan Emergency lasted from 1948 to 1962. The significance of this civil conflict as one of the very first battlegrounds of the Cold War should not be underestimated. In reality, this conflict possesses an enviable record of ‘firsts’. For the first time after 1945, the USA intervened (in peacetime) to support a third country threatened by a communist insurgency and, hence, contain communism in the Eastern Mediterranean. For the first time in its history, the UN established observatory agencies to investigate the causes of an intra-state conflict in a UN member-state and its spill-over to neighbouring countries. In addition, Greece stands out as the first base in the Eastern Mediterranean from which Britain withdrew after 1945. Last but not least, the conflict strained the once-close partnership between Stalin and Tito and partially contributed to the Tito – Stalin schism.

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The monarchist regime’s victory heavily influenced the attitudes of the Anglo-Americans about the postwar communist insurgencies. The USA viewed its overall policies in Greece as a stunning success and sought to repeat them in subsequent ‘small wars’. In fact, Washington thought that the Vietnam War could be won by repeating the very same policies implemented earlier in Greece. After all, President Lyndon Jonson once characterised Vietnam as the ‘Greece of South-East Asia’.1 The British also obtained invaluable lessons on strategy and tactics in COIN and utilised them during the Malayan Emergency with utter success.2 In other words, the Greek Civil War proved a testing ground for theories (e.g. containment of communism) and tactics (e.g. the use of napalm) in COIN for Britain and the USA. Above all else, however, the Greek Civil War proved a catastrophe for Hellenism. After the Asia Minor Catastrophe in 1922, the metropolis (Greece) accommodated, for the very first time, far more Greeks than the outer territories (e.g. Cyprus and northern Epirus) and diasporas (e.g. the USA and Egypt) combined. Therefore, an internecine war within Greece only promised to injure the corpus of Hellenism. Far worse, Greece (and, by extension, Hellenism) had suffered terrible losses during World War II (nearly 7– 11 per cent of the total population). The Greek Civil War simply worsened the situation. The estimates for the conflict’s casualty toll vary slightly.3 The vast majority of sources concur that the DSE suffered 24,235 dead, 9,781 deserters and 16,289 captured.4 On the other side, the regime’s casualties, according to the same sources, tally at 16,753 dead, 40,398 wounded and 4,788 missing (plus 4,288 civilians murdered).5 These numbers do not account for the thousands of political prisoners executed by firing squads (nearly 5,000 souls in total) or the hundreds of refugees who died of malnutrition and illnesses in the refugee camps across Greece. After the war, thousands of Slavophones sought refuge in Yugoslavia along with the DSE, reducing this ethnic minority to just a few thousand members.6 The descendants of these refugees within FYROM (a successor state to the Yugoslav People’s Republic of Macedonia) vigorously pushed in the 1990s for the inclusion of parts of Greek Macedonia into a unified ‘Macedonian’ state – worsening the existing tensions between Greece and FYROM. Greece suffered a terrible population loss in the order of 150,000–200,000 people if the number of the refugees behind the Iron Curtain is tallied.7

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This conflict has been correctly characterised as one of the worst catastrophes for Hellenism.8

The Various Myths around the War Like every important historical event, the Greek Civil War still causes controversies and debates among contemporary scholars. However, longlasting myths about this civil war must be examined anew under the light of new archival evidence. Hence, this new study of the Greek Civil War not only re-examines these historical myths but also offers insights to historical and policy issues. Contemporary leftist apologists argue that the communists did not intend to start a fratricidal war and reluctantly decided to revolt only as a response to the terrorism of the Right. Accordingly, the communists intended to impose a political settlement on the Right through of a ‘carrot and stick’ policy and escalated their violence only when the prospects of a political settlement collapsed owing to the ruthlessness and unreliability of the other side.9 Yet, archival evidence suggests otherwise. Since 1945, the communists had been secretly preparing for an insurgency and in mid-1946 organised a rural insurgency.10 Only Moscow’s reluctance to sanction an open uprising in the pattern of the December Uprising in 1944 compelled the KKE to adopt a ‘carrot and stick’ policy until the conditions for an all-out war ripened. These propitious conditions manifested in the second half of 1947 when Stalin, already reconciled with the idea of the division of Europe, gave the KKE a green light to stage an all-out war for the establishment of a ‘Free Greece’. Similarly, revisionist scholars claimed that Stalin never wholeheartedly supported the insurgency in Greece and, thus, the fear of the Greek royalist regime and its Anglo-American allies for an impending assault by the Kremlin cannot be justified; nor can the intervention of the USA in Greece be justified according to this point of view.11 Indeed, Moscow did not intend to invade Greece; Stalin only wanted to foment trouble in the Anglo-American traditional sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and, by extension, harass the two naval powers. However, the Kremlin did want the KKE to win the war and gain an exodus to the warm waters of the Aegean Sea; Stalin would just not lift a finger to help the KKE. The European and, in particular, Balkan

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satellites of Moscow would shoulder the responsibility to support (and rescue in case of a defeat) the KKE.12 The issue of victory in this civil war remains one of the most controversial subjects in modern Greek historiography. With the exception of a single work13, the works on the civil war do not ascribe the defeat of the DSE to the policies of the royalist regime. Instead, they attribute it to the apathy of Stalin,14 the betrayal of Tito,15 the erratic strategy of Zachariadis16 or the overwhelming intervention of the USA.17 The systematic study of the civil war, however, reveals that the Soviet realignment or the US intervention could not secure victory only by themselves. In reality, the aggressive US intervention complemented rather than substituted the royalist regime’s own strategy, as the course and outcome of the war confirms. Washington provided massive economic aid that sustained the weak Greek kingdom through rough times. However, the regime’s vast clientistic networks and the queen’s relief and welfare services ultimately won the ‘battle for the stomachs’ of the suffering Greek population. In the diplomatic stage, Washington simply threw its full weight behind the royalist regime’s industrious diplomatic efforts against the Greek insurgents and their external supporters. Nonetheless, the USA, and namely Britain, must be credited with the success of winning Yugoslavia over to the western camp. Similarly, the ideological crusade against communism was run solely by the royalist regime and, in particular, Queen Frederica with utter efficacy. In the field of internal politics, the USA and, to a far lesser degree, Britain compelled the querulous Greek leaders to unite in the face of the growing communist menace and even supported the parliamentary system against the intervention of the palace and the army. However, the ideology of ‘national-mindedness’ and the unwise choices of the KKE (especially the alliance with the Slav-Macedonians) in conjuction with the regime’s massive clientistic networks created a ‘critical mass’ of pro-government supporters. The repression of the regime, either with the wholesale resettlement of hundreds of mountainous villages (10 per cent of the country’s total population) or with the imprisonment and exile of thousands of individuals (0.5 per cent of the population), deprived the DSE of the necessary human reserves for a successful insurgency. Even in the military field, the US weaponry and guidance proved a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for victory. The battles were fought and won by

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the ES that had gradually gained invaluable experience and expertise in irregular warfare. After the end of the war, Papagos published an article in Foreign Affairs in which he outlined a strategy against a communist insurgency based on the military lessons of the Greek Civil War.18 Contrary to the claims of several scholars,19 the royalist regime did implement a strategy of its own to counter the communist insurgent threat. This strategy was conceived and implemented in two distinct phases (phase I: June 1946–November 1947 and phase II: December 1947–October 1949). Despite the critical dependence of Greece on external military, diplomatic or military aid, the USA did not shape the strategy of its unruly Greek allies according to its wishes and goals at all times. As the Greek Civil War clearly showed, a powerful ally may possess far less leverage over the weak ally owing to his strong commitment to the alliance and the relative importance of the stakes at issue.20 The evolution of the royalist regime’s strategy proves that strategy never remains static in war. In fact, the ‘reciprocal nature of all action in war’ indicates that the policies of the counterinsurgents interact with the respective policies of the insurgents.21 Since victory depends on the ability of the combatant to evolve and adapt, counterinsurgents must regularly reassess their strategy in the light of the prevailing circumstances and reject fixed laws on strategy.22 In the case of the Greek Civil War, the royalist regime proved a far more adaptable actor in Darwinian terms and prevailed over the monolithic (since late 1948) communist insurgents. The study of this civil war can help mark and weigh the impact of various external and internal actors on war and strategy. Since policymaking does not constitute a privilege of a few senior officials with supreme powers as the kings of old times, several actors (e.g. powerful ministers with autonomous agendas) influence the way a particular strategy tends to be implemented.23 In the Greek Civil War, several politicians (such as Zervas and Sophoulis) and other extra-parliamentary actors (such as the army and palace) decisively shaped the policies of successive governments. These influences were nonetheless overshadowed by an increasing US intervention in Greek internal affairs. However, top US officials never completely controlled the royalist regime’s policies – despite the fact that the weak Greek kingdom had been effectively reduced to the status of a client state. The Greek Civil War validates yet another axiom in strategy: no matter how deep an

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allied intervention may grow, the host government must indeed fight and win the war. The allies that intervene in support of a subverted regime should indeed establish ‘a close and genuine partnership with the host nation government in the lead’.24 The royalist regime triumphed over the insurgents exactly by developing national solutions to an internal and regional problem and evolving them in dynamic ways. Even so, victory would not have been achieved without the decisive support of the USA and Britain on a wide range of policy areas. The royalist regime defeated the insurgents by evolving and adapting. As the case of the Greek Civil War attests, counterinsurgents should adopt a ‘situation-dependent policy’ since fixed laws in COIN do not apply.25 For example, the royalist regime employed indiscriminate violence in a productive way against the supporters of the DSE among the population. The state authorities identified the socio-economic strata that supported the DSE and subjected them to indiscriminate violence. By using the method of ‘profiling’, the royalist regime employed selective violence at the collective level and indiscriminate violence at the personal one.26 And contrary to what conventional wisdom in COIN claims,27 the Greek Civil War proved that (under specific circumstances) indiscriminate violence against civilians can sharply reduce the support for an insurgency.28 After all, practice differs starkly from theory. The various insights of warriorscholars in COIN should be used as a ‘guide’, not as a ‘gospel’ that contains a universal and self-evident truth.29 The swift defeat of the communists seems an extra-ordinary achievement as the royalist regime won despite its repressive policies and its semi-authoritarian system of governance. Scholars have heatedly debated the impact of a country’s regime type on the conduct and outcome of COIN. Some argue that the authoritarian regimes enjoy extra operational advantages to the democratic ones in COIN and employ far more repressive policies; others contend that the democratic regimes demonstrate an enviable record of successes in COIN and use repressive policies as well.30 On balance, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes generally benefit from certain operational advantages with regards to the conduct of COIN.31 However, recent studies have not revealed a very strong connection between regime type and success in a COIN campaign32 – a finding that this book clearly supports. Indeed, the increasingly semi-authoritarian character of the regime did not pave the way to victory. Although this type of government permitted the regime to

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use repression against its opponents, the insurgents in fact possessed the upper hand in the conflict until 1948. Rather, the unity of effort under Papagos and the monolithic strategy of the DSE under Zachariadis conduced to the defeat of the DSE. However, the victory of the royalist regime also raises questions about the ethical aspect of the victory in COIN. The royalist regime obviously used repression to undermine the KKE’s internal sources of support. Over 700,000 villagers were forcibly resettled to refugee camps and nearly 50,000 others were imprisoned and exiled in notorious prison facilities; in fact, over 5,000 of them were summarily tried and shot by courts-martial. This victory did not prove costly solely in demographic and humanitarian terms; the parliamentary regime of the country (already cachectic and apathetic) paid a heavy price as well. The governments that ruled over Greece during the course of the civil war showed an alarming disrespect for human rights and political freedoms: draconian laws punished collectively any suspected supporters of the insurgents and the security organs (e.g. police) terrorised any suspected cadres and supporters of the KKE with impunity. In addition, the army and palace (two extra-parliamentary actors who had in the past repeatedly staged coups d’e´tat) increasingly intervened in political affairs and undermined the unstable parliamentary regime further. In reality, they inaugurated a new era of political anomaly that would culminate in the seven-year colonels’ junta (1967–74) years later.

The Impact of Strategic Culture Could the policies of the Greek royalist regime towards the communist insurgency be ascribed to the influence of a distinct Greek strategic culture? The terms ‘military’ and ‘strategic culture’ have recently entered the vocabulary of strategists in an effort to explain the exogenous and endogenous influences on a state’s strategy. Military culture, the sum total of ‘beliefs and attitudes within a military organisation that shape its collective preferences toward the use of force’,33 critically shapes the military response of a state authority towards an insurgency.34 ‘Strategic culture’, on the other hand, constitutes a far wider concept that includes ‘a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways to adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of

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force’.35 Without doubt, strategic culture exerts a decisive influence on a country’s strategy.36 In turn, strategic culture evolves over time in line with its core constituents (e.g. traditions, values).37 During the 200 years of its existence as an independent country, Greece developed a unique strategic culture owing to specific reasons (political, religious, etc.). The basic characteristics of Greek strategic culture can be synopsised as such: the dependence on the great powers, the nationalist zeal and religious messianism of the public opinion, the byzantinism of the elites, the intervention of the extra-parliamentary actors (the palace and army) in civil affairs and a ‘difficult’ and geostrategic territory.38 In reality, the tiny Greek kingdom implemented (with only minor variations) a ‘dual strategy’ from 1831 until 1974: on the one hand, Greece struggled to control the two shores of the Aegean Sea and increase its territory at the expense of the ‘ancestral’ enemies (i.e. the Slavs and Turks); on the other hand, the self-styled ‘Piedmont’ of the Balkans importuned the Great Powers to secure its independence and territorial integrity against external and internal threats and increase its territory (either through war or negotiations).39 From 1831 until 1974, all the governments viewed every internal and external crisis as a ‘zero-sum game’ and thus waged a war to the bitter end (with the support of their foreign patrons) to wipe out their external and/or internal opponent. In the case of the Greek Civil War, the monarchist regime treated the communist insurgency in the same way: it solicited the support of its foreign patrons (Britain and, after 1947, the USA) and suppressed the insurgency through sheer violence (the imprisonment, exile and execution of 0.5 per cent of the population and the resettlement of another 10 per cent). Even the intervention of the palace and military in political affairs were seen as ‘legitimate’ and ‘normal’ owing to the repeated coups d’e´tat in the past. Similarly, the interventionist policies of Washington reveal certain unique characteristics of the US strategic culture. Groomed to fight a conventional war, the mighty US military has often waged COIN in a conventional way – by investing vast resources and by using massive firepower and numbers to crush an irregular enemy.40 In the Greek Civil War, the USA was not engaged directly in the conflict since not even a single US soldier was eventually dispatched to Greece – despite persistent calls by top US ‘Cold Warriors’. The USA provided, however, the royalist regime with extensive military and economic aid (including

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sophisticated weaponry such as napalm bombs) to support the COIN of an allied regime. The US operational advice to the ES, namely the concept of ‘staggered offense’, underlined the US preference to engage an enemy in ‘battles of annihilation’. Last but not least, the operation of the British military mission in the Greek Civil War reflected the distinct British style on COIN. Consistent with the traditional COIN policies of the imperial power,41 British military advisers suggested to the Greek military leadership the creation of commando units and an effective use of air power. In turn, the Greek Civil War proved an invaluable experience for British military advisers who would later codify these vital lessons and put them into good use in the next COIN campaigns in the Third World.42 The Greek Civil War did not witness the development of a distinct Greek style on COIN. In the initial stage of the insurgency, however, the right-wing government under Tsaldaris implemented an old antibanditry policy which had been refined for over 100 years. In summary, the governments ordained draconian laws that collectively punished the brigands and their civilian supporters, while the gendarmes and paramilitaries pursued the brigands and resettled the pro-brigand villagers to other pacified regions. When such coercive policies failed, the governments bought off the bandits with gifts and turned them against the Ottoman Empire. This old anti-banditry policy, however, proved outdated against the DSE since the regime did not confront parttime guerrillas and part-time bandits but communist insurgents – a guerrilla force with completely different modus operandi, structure, ideology and power than the bandits of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The royalist regime was forced to find new ways to tackle this crisis. Although the regime ultimately won a stunning victory in less than four years, the causes of this victory were never codified in the doctrine. Instead, Washington studied the war carefully in an effort to standardise their COIN strategy and tactics.43 However, war does not remain static and the credo in a standard COIN strategy ultimately cost the USA the Vietnam War.

APPENDIX

Notes on the People Referenced in the Archives

Greek Officials Agnidis: Ambassador in London Ailianos: Deputy Minister of Coordination and Provisional Minister of Supply, 13 –18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Deputy Minister of Coordination, 18 April – 2 October 1946, 2 October 1946– 24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Deputy Minister of Coordination, 27 January– 17 February 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister without Portfolio who served as Deputy Minister of Press and Information, 7 May –11 August 1948 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister without Portfolio who served as Deputy Minister of Press and Information, 11 August 1948 – 20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister without Portfolio who served as Deputy Minister of Press and Information, 20 January–14 April 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister without Portfolio who served as Deputy Minister of Press and Information, 14 April –30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis)

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Minister without Portfolio who served as Deputy Minister of Press and Information, 30 June 1949– 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Alexandris: Leader of the Reformist Party Minister of National Economy, 4– 18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister of National Economy, 18 April – 2 October 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of National Economy, 2 October– 4 November 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister without Portfolio, 4 November 1946–24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Internal Affairs and Provisional Minister of Commercial Shipping and Mails, Telegraphs and Telephones, 24 January– 29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Averoff: Minister of Supply and Distribution, 20 January–14 April 1949, 14 April–30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Supply and Distribution, 30 June 1949– 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Dalietos: Ambassador in Belgrade Dalipis: Deputy Minister – General Governor of Western Macedonia, 18 April–2 October 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Deputy Minister – General Governor of Western Macedonia, 24 January– 29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Dendramis: Ambassador in Washington Diomidis: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister without Portfolio, 14 April –30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Prime Minister, 30 June 1949–6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Dragoumis: Deputy Foreign Minister, 18 April –2 October 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Deputy Foreign Minister, 2 October –4 November 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris)

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Minister of Military Affairs, 4 November 1946–24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Drosos: Member of the Political Committee of the Populist Party Deputy Minister of Press and Information, 27 January–17 February 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Gonatas: Leader of the National Liberals Minister of Public Works and Provisional Minister of Transfers and Mails, Telegraphs and Telephones, 4 –18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister of Public Works and Provisional Minister of Reconstruction, 18 April – 2 October 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Public Works and Provisional Minister of Reconstruction, 2 October 1946–21 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Public Works and Provisional Minister of Justice, Transfers, Reconstruction and Welfare, 24– 27 January 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Public Works, 27 January–29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Hatzipanos: Minister of Justice, 18 April– 2 October 1946, 2 October 1946–24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Political Coordination, 27 January–29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Transfers and Mails, Telegraphs and Telephones, 29 August– 7 September 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Transfers, 7 September 1947–7 May 1948 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Internal Affairs, 18 November 1948– 20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Transfers, 20 January– 14 April 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Transfers, 14 April –30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Transfers, 30 June 1949– 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis)

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Helmis: Minister of Economics, 13 – 18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister of Economics, 18 April– 2 October 1946, 2 October 1946– 24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Economics, 24 January – 29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Economics and Provisional Minister of Coordination and National Economy, 29 August–7 September 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Economics, 7 September 1947– 18 November 1948, 18 November 1948– 20 January 1949, 20 January–14 April 1949, 14 April– 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Economics, 30 June 1949–6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Kaloutsis: Charge´ d’Affaires in Embassy in Belgrade Kanellopoulos: Leader of the National Unitary Party, 4 –18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister without Portfolio, 4 –18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister of Naval Affairs and Provisional Minister of Public Order, 21 January–17 February 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Public Order, 17 –23 February 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Air Force, 23 February –29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Military Affairs, 20 January– 14 April 1949, 14 April – 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Military Affairs, 30 June 1949– 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Karamanlis: Minister of Labour, 24 January – 29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Transports, 7 May – 18 November 1948 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Social Welfare, 18 November 1948–20 January 1949, 14 April– 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis)

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Minister of Social Welfare, 30 June 1949–6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Kitrilakis: Head of 9th Division, 15 June 1946– 2 February 1948 Head of Army Corps II, 6 August–27 September 1948 Korozos: Minister – General Governor of Northern Greece, 7 May – 18 November 1948, 18 November 1948– 20 January 1949, 20 January –14 April 1949, 14 April –30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister – General Governor of Northern Greece, 30 June 1949– 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Kotsianos: Minister of Social Welfare, 4 November 1946–24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Welfare and Health, 29 August–7 September 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Social Welfare, 7 September 1947– 18 November 1948 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Kyrou: Active Chairman of the Delegation of Greece to the UN Londos: Minister of Reconstruction, 7 September 1947 –18 November 1948 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Transfers, 18 November 1948– 20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Makris: Head of the right-wing Unionist Faction President of the General Confederacy of Greece’s Workers (GSEE), 1948–50 Markezinis: Counsellor to the king, 1936– 46 Head of the New Party, 1947 –51 Minister without Portfolio, 20 January– 14 April 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Mavromichalis: Minister of Military Affairs and Provisional Minister of Navy and Air Force, 4–18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas)

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Minister of Military Affairs, 18 April–2 October 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Military Affairs, Navy and Air Force, 2 October 1946– 24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Internal Affairs and Provisional Minister of Naval Affairs, 29 August–7 September 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Internal Affairs and Provisional Deputy Prime Minister, 7 September 1947– 18 November 1948 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Naval Affairs, 18 November 1948–20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Mela (Alexandra): Commissioned Lady of the Fund ‘Relief of the Northern Provinces of Greece’ (or Queen’s Fund in short) Melas (Alexandros): General Director of the Foreign Ministry Melas (Georgios): Minister without Portfolio, 27 September 1947– 2 March 1948 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Justice and Provisional Minister of National Economy, 18 November 1948– 20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Justice, 20 January–14 April 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Justice and Provisional Minister of National Economy, 14 April–30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Justice, 30 June 1949 – 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Metaxas: MP of the Populist Party Mostras: Head of the First Political Directorate in the Foreign Ministry Panagiotopoulos: Deputy Minister – General Governor of Thrace, 18 November 1948– 20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Papadogiannis: Deputy Minister – General Governor of Epirus, 18 May– 2 October 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris)

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Deputy Minister – General Governor of Crete, 2 October 1946– 24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Reconstruction, 18 November 1948–20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Reconstruction, 20 January–14 April 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Reconstruction, 14 April – 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Reconstruction, 30 June 1949–6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Papagos: Commander-in-Chief, 19 January– 31 August 1949 Papandreou: Leader of the Democratic Socialist Party Minister without Portfolio, 4 – 18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister of National Economy and Provisional Minister of Education, Supply and Labour, 24 –27 January 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Internal Affairs, 21 January–29 August 1947 Pipinelis: Head of the King’s Political Office (June 1947) Permanent Deputy Foreign Minister (June 1947–November 1948) Potamianos: Chief of the Air Force General Staff, 1 January 1948– 31 August 1949 Poulitsas: Prime Minister, 4– 18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Rendis: MP of the Liberal Party Minister of Public Order, 7 September 1947–18 November 1948 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Military Affairs, 18 November 1948–20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Provisional Deputy Prime Minister, 25 November 1948– 20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Public Order, 20 January–14 April 1949, 14 April – 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis)

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Minister of Public Order, 30 June 1949– 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Rodopoulos: Minister – General Governor of Northern Greece, 2 October 1946–24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister/General Governor of Northern Greece, 24 January– 29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister/General Governor of Northern Greece, 29 August–7 September 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister/General Governor of Northern Greece, 7 –19 September 1947 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister without Portofolio and Provisional Minister of Military Affairs, 18 November 1948– 20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Health, 20 January– 14 April 1949, 14 April– 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Health, 30 June 1949 – 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Sophoulis: Leader of the Liberal Party Prime Minister, 22 November 1945– 4 April 1946 and 7 September 1947–30 June 1949 Spiliotopoulos: Chief of the Army General Staff, 15 May 1946– 20 February 1947 Stephanopoulos: Minister of Economics and Provisional Minister of Labour and Supply, 4–13 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister of Coordination, 13 – 18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister of Coordination, 18 April– 2 October 1946, 2 October 1946– 24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Supply, 24 January–29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Coordination, 7 September 1947 –18 November 1948, 18 November 1948– 20 January 1949, 20 January–14 April 1949, 14 April– 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Coordination, 30 June 1949– 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis)

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Stratos (Andreas): Minister of Labour, 13– 18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister of Labour, 18 April – 2 October 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Labour, 2 October 1946– 24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Stratos (Georgios): Minister of Military Affairs, 24 January– 29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Military Affairs and Provisional Minister of Public Works and Reconstruction, 29 August– 7 September 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Minister of Military Affairs, 7–17 September 1947 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Theotokis (Ioannis): Minister of Internal Affairs and Provisional Minister of Public Order, Agriculture and Commercial Shipping, 4– 18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Minister of Internal Affairs, 18 April – 8 May 1946 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) President of Parliament (1946–50) Theotokis (Spyros): Son of Ioannis Theotokis Minister of Public Order, 2 October 1946– 24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Tsakalotos: Head of 2nd Division, 1 June 1946–20 February 1947 Head of Army Corps I, 15 February 1948– 31 August 1949 Tsaldaris: Leader of the Populist Party Minister of Foreign Affairs and Provisional Minister of National Education, Justice, Social Welfare and Health, 1– 18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 18 April – 2 October 1946, 2 October 1946 – 24 January 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and Provisional Minister of Political Coordination next to the Prime Minister,

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Coordination, Agriculture, Economics and General Governor of Northern Greece, 24 January – 29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 29 August– 7 September 1947 (coalition government under Tsaldaris) Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 7 September 1947– 18 November 1948, 18 November 1948–20 January 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Foreign Minister, 20 January–14 April 1949, 14 April– 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 30 June 1949– 6 June 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Tsiggounis: Head of 2nd Division, 21 June 1946– 31 March 1948 Supreme Command of Peloponnesus, 6 April– 10 December 1948 Venizelos: Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party, August 1945– February 1946 Leader of the Party of Venizelist Liberals, February 1946– November 1947 Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party, November 1947– November 1948 Leader of the Liberal Party, November 1948– March 1950 Minister without Portfolio, 4 –18 April 1946 (coalition government under Poulitsas) Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Military Affairs and Provisional Minister of Health and Air Force, 24 – 27 January 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Deputy Prime Minister, Minister without Portfolio (Minister of Coordination for the Ministries that dealt with the security situation) and Provisional Minister of Mail, Telegraphs and Telephones, 27 January–17 February 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Naval Affairs, 17 February – 29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister without Portfolio and Provisional Minister of Commercial Shipping, 20 January–14 April 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister without Portfolio and Provisional Minister of Labour, 14 April– 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis)

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Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister without Portfolio, 30 June 1949– 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Ventiris: Head of Army Corps III, 15 May 1946– 12 February 1947 Chief of the Army General Staff, 20 February –23 October 1947 Head of the Army of Western Macedonia and Epirus, 17 May– 21 August 1949 Yiantzis: Chief of the Army General Staff, 23 October Zaimis: Minister of Supply, 7 September 1947–18 November 1948 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Internal Affairs, 14 April– 30 June 1949 (coalition government under Sophoulis) Minister of Internal Affairs, 30 June 1949– 6 January 1950 (coalition government under Diomidis) Zalokostas: Counsellor to King George II Zervas: Minister without Portfolio, 24 January– 23 February 1947 (coalition government under Maximos) Minister of Public Order, 23 February– 29 August 1947 (coalition government under Maximos)

US Officials Acheson: Under-Secretary and Acting Secretary of State under Stettinius, Byrnes and Marshall, 16 August 1945–30 June 1947 Secretary of State, 20 January 1949–20 January 1953 Austin: Ambassador at the UN, January 1947– January 1953 Baxter: Adviser in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department, 1946–8 Assistant Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs of the State Department 1948–52 Byrnes: Secretary of State, 3 July 1945– 21 January 1947 Cromie: Adviser in the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs of the State Department (officer in charge of the Greek Desk), 1946–9

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Drew: Delegate to the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), October 1947– 50 Ethridge: Delegate to the UN Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, December 1946–September 1947 Grady: Ambassador to Greece, May 1948– June 1950 Griswold: Chief of the AMAG, July 1947–July 1948 Harriman: Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1943– 6 Ambassador to the United Kingdom, April– October 1946 Secretary of Commerce, 1947– 8 Special Representative in Europe for the ECA, 1948–50 Henderson: Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs of the State Department, 1945– 8 Jernegan: Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department, September 1946–January 1948 Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs of the State Department, January 1948– 50 Livesay: Commander of the United States Army Group Greece (USAGG), June– December 1947 Commander of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), December 1947– February 1948 Lovett: Under-Secretary of State, 1 July 1947–20 January 1949 Marshall: Secretary of State, 8 January 1947– 20 January 1949 MacVeagh: Ambassador in Greece, 27 October 1944–11 October 1947 McGhee: Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs of the State Department, August 1946– June 1947 Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey in the State Department, June 1947–March 1949 Special Assistance to Secretary of State, March – June 1949

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Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, June 1949– December 1951 Notter: Adviser in the Office of Special Political Affairs of the State Department, November 1944– January 1948 Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs of the State Department, January 1948–50 Nuveen: Director of the ECA/G, July 1948–52 Rankin: Charge´ d’Affaires in the Embassy in Athens, 1947– 49 Rusk: Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs of the State Department, March 1947 –February 1949 Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs of the State Department, February– May 1949 Deputy Under-Secretary of State, May 1949– 50 Van Fleet: Commander of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), February 1948– March 1950 Webb: Acting Secretary of State, 28 January 1949– 29 February 1952 Wilson: Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 1946–7

British Officials Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–51 Downs: Commander of the British Military Mission (BMM), March 1948–9 Hayter: Head of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, 1945–6 Assistant Under-Secretary of the Services Liaison Department, 1948–9 Kerr (Baron Inverchapel): Ambassador to the USA, 1946– 8 Lascelles: Counsellor to the British Embassy in Athens, 1946– 9 Millar: Minister Plenipotentiary, 1948– 50 Norton: Ambassador to Greece, 1946– 51

APPENDIX

141

Rawlings: Commander of the British Military Mission (BMM), February 1945– March 1948 Reilly: First Secretary of the British Embassy in Athens, 1945– 7 Councillor at the British Embassy in Athens, 1947– 8 Wallinger: Head of Southern Department of the Foreign Office, 1947–9 Warner: Assistant Under-Secretary of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, 1946–7 Williams: Head of Southern Department of the Foreign Office, 1946–7

Notes on the KKE’s Officials Anastasiadis: Member of the Central Committee of the KKE’s Politburo in Athens Ioannidis: Member of the Politburo of the KKE’s Central Committee Kyrkos: Member of the Central Committee of the EAM Partsalidis: General Secretary of the EAM, August 1944–July 1947 Head of the Provisional Democratic Government (PDK), April – October 1949 Roussos: Member of the Politburo of the KKE’s Central Committee Vafeiadis: Commander-in-Chief of the Democratic Army of Greece, October 1946– January 1949 Prime Minister and War Minister of the Provisional Democratic Government (PDK), December 1947– January 1949 Zachariadis: Secretary General of the KKE Commander-in-Chief of the Democratic Army of Greece, January– October 1949

NOTES

Introduction

What about the Greek Civil War?

1. Kalevi J. Holsti: The State, War and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 22 –4; Lotta Themne´r and Peter Wallensteen: ‘Armed Conflicts, 1946– 2012: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2013), pp. 509– 21. 2. Fred Halliday: Rethinking International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 126 3. Analytically, France suffered defeats in Vietnam (1946 – 54) and Algeria (1954 – 62), Britain in Cyprus (1954– 8) and Aden (1956– 8) and America in Vietnam (1961– 72). 4. M. L. R. Smith: ‘Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2003), pp. 26–31. 5. Steven Metz: ‘Insurgency’ in Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (eds): Conceptualising Modern War (London: Hurst, 2011), p. 113. 6. Giorgos Antoniou and Nikos Marantzidis: ‘The Greek Civil War Historiography (1945 – 2001): Toward a New “Paradigm”’, Columbia Journal of Historiography, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003), p. 15. 7. Antoniou and Marantzidis: ‘Greek Civil War’, pp. 2 –24. 8. Giorgos Antoniou and Nikos Marantzidis: ‘The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941–2002’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2004), p. 226. 9. Typical works of this school of thought include the following: Stephen G. Xydis: Greece and the Great Powers, 1944– 1947: Prelude to the ‘Truman Doctrine’ (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963); Christopher M. Woodhouse: The Struggle for Greece, 1941– 1949 (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976); Vasilis Kondis: H Agglo-Amerikanikή Politikή kai to Ellhnikό Prόblhma, 1945– 1949 [The Anglo-American Policy and the Greek Problem, 1945– 1949 ] (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1984).

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10. Antoniou and Marantzidis: ‘Axis Occupation’, p. 226. 11. Typical works of this school of thought include the following: Lawrence S. Wittner: American Intervention in Greece, 1943 – 1949: A Study in Counterrevolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Thanasis D. Sfikas: The British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War, 1945– 1949: The Imperialism of ‘Non-Intervention’ (Keele: Ryburn, 1994); John O. Iatrides: ‘Britain, the United States and Greece, 1945– 9’, in David H. Close (ed.): The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization, 1943– 1950 (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 190– 213. 12. Antoniou and Marantzidis: ‘Axis Occupation’, p. 226. 13. Representative works of this school of thought include: David H. Close: The Origins of the Greek Civil War (London: Longman, 1995). 14. Antoniou and Marantzidis: ‘Axis Occupation’, p. 224. 15. Ibid., pp. 224– 5. Representative works of the Rightist school include the following: Dimitrios Zafeiropoulos: O Anti-sy mmoriakό6 Agώna6, 1945– 1949 [The Anti-Bandit Struggle, 1945– 1949 ] (Athens: n.p., 1956, reprinted as Athens: DOL, 2011); Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza: By Fire and Axe: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944– 1949, translated by Sarah A. Rigos (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers, 1978). 16. Antoniou and Marantzidis: ‘Axis Occupation’, pp. 224– 5. 17. Ibid. Representative of the Leftist school works include the following: Dimitris Vlandas: H Prodvmέnh Epanάstash, 1941– 1944 [The Betrayed Revolution, 1941– 1944 ] (Athens: Evangeliou, 1977); Vafeiadis Markos: Apomnhmoneύmata [Memoirs ] (Athens: Papazisis, 1992), Vol. V.

Chapter 1 The ‘War of the Flea’: Theory and Practice 1. M. L. R. Smith: ‘Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 2003), p. 21. 2. Harry G. Summers Jr.: ‘A War Is War Is a War Is a War’ in Loren B. Thompson (ed.): Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 31 – 4, 44 – 7. 3. For an overview of the history and terminology of insurgency since ancient times, see: Anthony J. Joes: Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical and Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press, 1996). 4. US Department of the Army: ‘The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: US Army Field Manual 3 –24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3– 33.5’ (Chicago; London: Chicago University Press, 2007), p. 1. 5. Colin S. Gray: War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 279– 80. 6. Ariel Merari: ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1993), pp. 213–51.

144

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7. For more information on the principal characteristics of terrorism, see: Walter Laqueur: A History of Terrorism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001); Barry Davies: Terrorism: Inside a World Phenomenon (London: Virgin, 2003). 8. Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel: ‘Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1992), pp. 287– 9. 9. James Khalil: ‘Know your Enemy: On the Futility of Distinguishing between Terrorists and Insurgents’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 36, No. 5 (2013), pp. 419– 30. 10. State authorities usually vilify collectively their irregular adeversaries as terrorists in order to undermine their legitimacy and support within the domestic and international public opinion. James D. Kiras: ‘Irregular Warfare’ in David Jordan et al. (eds): Understanding Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 229– 32. 11. Samuel P. Huntington: ‘Introduction: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice’, in Franklin Mark Osanka (ed.): Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941– 1961 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe; London: Collier-Macmillan, 1962), p. xvi. 12. Smith: ‘Guerrillas in the Mist’, p. 22. 13. Ivan Malloy: Rolling Back Revolution: The Emergence of Low Intensity Conflict (London: Pluto, 2001), pp. 72 – 85. 14. Ian F. W. Beckett: ‘The Tradition’, in John Pimlott (ed.): Guerrilla Warfare (London: Bison, 1985), p. 8. 15. Colin S. Gray: ‘Irregular Warfare, One Nature, Many Characters’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No, 2 (2007), pp. 35 – 57; Spyridon Plakoudas: ‘Strategy in Counterinsurgency: A Distilled Approach’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2015), p. 132. 16. Rupert Smith (Sir): The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2005), p. 3. 17. Basil Henry Liddell Hart: Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. xv. 18. Mao Tse Tung: On Guerrilla Warfare, translated and edited by Samuel B. Griffin (New York: Praeger, 1961), Chapter VI (The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare). 19. Alexander B. Downes: ‘Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy’, Civil Wars, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2007), pp. 423– 4. 20. Scott Peterson: ‘Algeria’s Real War: Ending the Cycle of Violence’, The Christian Science Monitor, 24/7/1997. 21. For instance, Bard O’Neil identified nine types of insurgency (anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, apocalyptic-utopian, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationists, commercialist) and four types of insurgent strategy (conspiratorial strategy, strategy of protracted popular war, military-focus strategy and urban-warfare strategy). Bard O’Neil: From Revolution to Apocalypse: Insurgency and Terrorism (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), pp. 19–29, 45–63.

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22. Colin S. Gray: ‘Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context’ (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2006). 23. Stathis N. Kalyvas: ‘Warfare in Civil Wars’, in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and JanA˚ngstro¨m (eds): Rethinking the Nature of War (Abingdton: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 91. 24. James Kiras: ‘Irregular Warfare: Insurgency and Terrorism’ in John Baylis (ed.), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 189. 25. For example, the separatist Kurdish insurgency in Turkey rages intermittently since 1985 with only two short pauses (1999 – 2004 and 2013– 2015). Similarly, the separatist insurgency of the Eritreans against the Ethiopians was concluded as late as 1991 – after almost 30 years. 26. Eric Jardine: ‘Why Time Works Against a Counterinsurgency’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4, (2009), pp. 1– 34. 27. Mao Tse Tung: Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), Chapter 3. 28. Indicatively, the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan and the vast wastelands of Russia always proved ideal territory for insurgents over the centuries. 29. Kiras: ‘Irregular Warfare’, pp. 189– 90. 30. Michael Evans: ‘City without Joy: Urban Military Operations in the 21st Century’ (Canberra: Australian Defence College, 2007); David Kilcullen: Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (London: Hurst and Company, 2013). 31. Jeffrey A. Friedman: ‘Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine’, Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2011), pp. 556–91. 32. Jeffrey Record: ‘External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success’, Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2006), pp. 36 – 49; Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and David E. Cunningham: ‘Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups’, International Organization, Vol. 64, No. 4 (2011), pp. 709– 744. 33. Paul Stanilard: ‘States, Insurgents and Wartime Political Orders’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2012), pp. 243– 64. 34. Beatrice Heuser: The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 413– 14; Kiras: ‘Irregular Warfare’, pp. 193– 5. 35. Jennifer Marie Keister: States within States: How Rebels Rule (San Diego: University of California, 2011); Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir and Zachariah Cherian Mampilly (eds): Rebel Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 36. William D. Casebeer and James A. Russell: ‘Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive “Counter-Narrative” Strategy’ Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2005), pp. 1 – 16; Kenneth Payne: ‘Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology and Terror’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2009), pp. 109–28.

146

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37. David Kilcullen: The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London: C. Hurst, 2009), p. 183. 38. Kilcullen: Accidental Guerrilla, p. xv; Beatrice D. Heuser: The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 422– 7. 39. Kilcullen: Accidental Guerrilla, p. xv; Heuser: Evolution of Strategy, pp. 427– 36. 40. Plakoudas: ‘Strategy in Counterinsurgency’, p. 132. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., p. 133. 43. Gian P. Gentile, ‘A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army’, Parameters, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2009), pp. 11 – 15; Dan G. Cox and Thomas Bruscino (eds): Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011). 44. Eliot Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency’, Military Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2006), pp. 49 –53. 45. Bruce Hoffman: ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), pp. 2 – 9; Antonija Buntak and Robert Mikac: ‘The Political Dimension of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Comparison of Two Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan’, Contemporary Issues, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2011), pp. 78 – 98; Andrew Mumford: The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 9 –10. 46. David Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, ppb. 2006), p. 8. 47. Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, Paradoxes’, p. 50; Colin S. Gray: War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (London; New York: Routledge, 2007, ppb. 2012), p. 305. 48. Anthony J. Joes: Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical and Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 8 – 9; Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes’, p. 50. 49. Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, Paradoxes’, p. 50; Gompert et al.: ‘War by Other Means’, p. 182; Nadia Schadlow: ‘Governance’ in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds): Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 184. 50. Michael D. Shafer: Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 117; Michael F. Fitzsimmons: ‘Governance, Identity and Counterinsurgency Strategy’ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Maryland, 2009), pp. 11 –14, 16– 20. 51. David Kilcullen: ‘Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency’, Remarks delivered at the US Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, D.C. (USA), 28 September 2006, p. 5. 52. Sir Robert Thompson: Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1966, ppb. 1987), pp. 63–9; John J. McCuen: The

NOTES

53.

54.

55. 56. 57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62. 63.

64.

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Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-insurgency (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp. 54–64; Bard E. O’Neill: Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington; London: Brassey’s, 2001, reprinted as Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), pp. 169–71; Grant S. Fawcett: ‘Cultural Understanding in Counterinsurgency: Analysis of the Human Terrain System’ (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), pp. 6–10. Mark O’Neill: ‘Confronting the Hydra: Big Problems with Small Wars’ (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2009), pp. 19 – 20; Kurt Amend: ‘Counterinsurgency Principles for the Diplomat’, Orbis, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2010), p. 222. O’Neill: Insurgency and Terrorism, pp. 171– 2; O’Neill: ‘Confronting the Hydra’, pp. 20 – 1; Heather S. Gregg: ‘Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency’, Parameters, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2009), p. 25. Gregg: ‘Beyond Population Engagement’, pp. 23 – 5. Fitzsimmons: ‘Governance, Identity’, pp. 278– 9. Anthony H. Cordesman: ‘The Iraq War and its Strategic Lessons for Counterinsurgency’ (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), p. 16; Gregg: ‘Beyond Population Engagement’, p. 24. Anthony H. Cordesman: ‘The Importance of Building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the Counterinsurgency in Iraq’ (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), pp. 14 – 15. For an extensive analysis of this view, see: Jacqueline L. Hazelton: ‘The False Promise of the Governance Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Studies Association (APSA), ‘Power and Persuasion’, Illinois (USA), 29 August–1 September, 2013. David J. Kilcullen: ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2005), pp. 597–617; [David J.] Kilcullen: ‘Counter-Insurgency Redux’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2006–07), pp. 121–3. Daniel Byman et al.: ‘Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), pp. 83 – 102; Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and David E. Cunningham: ‘Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups’, International Organization, Vol. 64, No. 4 (2011), pp. 709– 44. Jeffrey Record: ‘External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success’, Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2006), pp. 36 – 49. Max G. Manwaring: ‘Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response’ (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001), pp. 20 – 1; O’Neill: Insurgency and Terrorism, pp. 183– 7; Paul Staniland: ‘Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005 – 6), pp. 21 – 40. Paul Cornish: ‘The United States and Counterinsurgency: “Political First, Political Last, Political Always”’, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 1 (2009), pp. 76 – 8; Amend: ‘Counterinsurgency Principles’, pp. 222– 6.

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65. Robert L. Rothstein: Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 53; Michael I. Handel: Weak States in the International System (London: Cass, 1990), p. 120; Daniel Byman: ‘Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism’, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2006), p. 87. 66. Roger Trinquier: Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, translated by Daniel Lee (New York: Praeger, 1964, ppb. 2006), pp. 83 – 8; Idean Salehyan: ‘No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict’, Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 1 (2008), pp. 54– 66. 67. Michael E. Brown: ‘The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict’, in Michael E. Brown (ed.): The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: London: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 590 – 9. See also: Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz: ‘Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 4 (2008), pp. 479– 506. 68. Jason Campbell, Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro: ‘Assessing Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Missions’ (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009), p. 3. 69. Thomas J. Barrett: ‘Operationalizing Economics for Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations’ (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), pp. 43– 4; Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter: ‘Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 4 (2011), pp. 766– 819. 70. David C. Gompert et al.: ‘Reconstruction under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), pp. xiv–xv. 71. Mark Moyar: ‘Development in Afghanistan’s Counterinsurgency: A New Guide’ (McLean, Washington, D.C.: Orbis Operations, 2011), p. 2. Retrieved from the Small Wars Journal Blog, 1 March 2011, http://smallwarsjournal. com/blog/development-in-afghanistans-counterinsurgency, accessed on 21 January 2013 72. Andrew S. Natsios: ‘The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development’, Parameters, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2005), pp. 7 – 18. 73. Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder: ‘Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’ (Medford, MA: Tufts University, Feinstein International Center, 2012), pp. 42 – 51; Ben Connable: ‘Leveraging Development Aid to Address Root Causes in Counterinsurgency: Balancing Theory and Practice in “Hold” and “Build”’ (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2013), p. 35. 74. Sir Frank Kitson: Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 290. 75. Gray: ‘Irregular Warfare’, p. 44. 76. Montgomery McFate and Andrea V. Jackson: ‘The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition’, Military Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (2006), p. 19.

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77. William D. Casebeer and James A. Russell: ‘Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive ‘Counter – Narrative’ Strategy’, Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, No. 3 (2005), pp. 1 – 16; O’Neill: ‘Confronting the Hydra’, pp. 19 – 20; Amend: ‘Counterinsurgency Principles’, p. 222. 78. Cornish: ‘United States and Counterinsurgency’, pp. 76– 8. 79. Ibid. 80. Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, Paradoxes’, p. 51; Hoffman: ‘NeoClassical Counterinsurgency’, p. 82. 81. Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 56; Tom Marks: ‘Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1992), p. 43. 82. Kilcullen: ‘Three Pillars’, p. 5; Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, Paradoxes’, p. 50. 83. Thompson: Defeating Communist Insurgency, pp. 50 – 8; Sir Frank Kitson: Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 165; Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, Paradoxes’, pp. 51, 52. 84. Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, Paradoxes’, p. 51; Amitai Etzioni: ‘Whose COIN?’, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1 (1st Quarter 2011), pp. 21–2. 85. Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, Paradoxes’, p. 50; David Kilcullen: ‘Intelligence’, in Rid and Keaney (eds): Understanding Counterinsurgency, pp. 155–6. 86. Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 8; Cornish: ‘United States and Counterinsurgency’, p. 67; Amend: ‘Counterinsurgency Principles’, p. 219. 87. Anthony J. Joes: Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 152; Yuri Zhukov: ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2007), p. 456. 88. Barbara F. Walter: ‘Civil Wars, Conflict Resolution, and Bargaining Theory’, in Walter Carlsnaes et al. (eds): Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2001, ppb. 2013), pp. 663– 4. 89. Gray: ‘Irregular Warfare’, p. 54. 90. Kalev Sepp: ‘Best Practices in Counterinsurgency’, Military Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (2005), pp. 8– 12. 91. Trinquier: Modern Warfare, pp. 3–5; Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare, pp. 68–9. 92. Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, Paradoxes’, p. 51. See also: Alexander Alderson: ‘Counter-insurgency: Learn and Adapt? Can We Do Better?’, British Army Review, No. 142 (2007), pp. 16 – 21; Alderson: ‘Learning, Adapting, Applying US Counter-insurgency Doctrine and Practice’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 152, No. 6 (2007), pp. 12 – 19. 93. McCuen: Art, p. 58; Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare, pp. 7 – 8; Kitson: Low Intensity Operations, p. 49; Gray: ‘Irregular Warfare’, p. 43; Amend: ‘Counterinsurgency Principles’, p. 219. 94. Kitson: Bunch of Five, p. 283. 95. Cohen et al.: ‘Principles, Imperatives, Paradoxes’, p. 52.

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96. Zhukov: ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency’, pp. 458–60. See also: DeVore: ‘Institutions, Culture’, pp. 169–91. 97. Cassidy: Counterinsurgency, pp. 37 – 126; Martijn Kitzen: ‘Western Military Culture and Counterinsurgency: An Ambiguous Reality’, Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2012), pp. 1 – 24. See also: DeVore: ‘Institutions, Culture’, pp. 169– 91.

Chapter 2

A Stillborn Peace: February 1945 –January 1947

1. John O. Iatrides: Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist ‘Second Round’, 1944– 1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972); Mark Mazower: Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44 (New Heaven: Yale University Press), pp. 355–77; Sotiris Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1yuέrvsh ston Emwύlio [From Liberation to Civil War ] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2011), pp. 64–98. 2. John O. Iatrides: ‘Civil War, 1945– 1949: National and International Aspects’ in John O. Iatrides (ed.): Greece in the 40s: A Nation in Crisis (Hannover and London: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 202– 3; Charles R. Shrader: The Withered Vine: Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece, 1945– 1949 (Westport, CT; London: Praeger, 1999), pp. 79 – 80; Kostas Siaperas: Mystikoί Drόmoi toy Dhmokratikoύ Stratoύ. Apό thn Bάrkiza sto Mpoύlk16 [Secret Roads of the Democratic Army: From Varkiza to Bulkes] (Athens: Glaros, 1990). 3. Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1y uέrvsh [From Liberation], pp. 114– 41, 144– 76, 192– 6, 230– 58. 4. Stathis Kalyvas and Nikos Marantzidis: «Antίstash, Katoxή, Emwύlio6: P1riodolόghsh» [‘Resistance, Occupation, Civil War: Periodisation’], Istorika Themata, 22 May 2013. 5. Mazower: Inside Hitler’s Greece, pp. 288–91. See also: Sakis Moumtzis: H Κόκκινη Βία [The Red Violence, 1943–1946] (Thessaloniki: Epicentro, 2013). 6. Mazower: Inside Hitler’s Greece, pp. 371– 2; Stathis N. Kalyvas: «H Bίa tvn D1k1mbrianώn: Praktikέ6 kai Anaparastάs1i6» [‘The Violence of the Decemvriana: Practices and Reconstructions’], paper presented at the conference «Katoxή, Antίstash, Emwύlio6 sthn Auήna kai ti6 M1gάl16 Pόl1i6» [‘Occupation, Resistance, Civil War in Athens and the Big Cities’], Aigina (Greece), 21 – 4 June 2007. 7. David H. Close: ‘The Changing Structure of the Right 1945 – 1950’, in John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley (eds): Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 132; Giorgos Margaritis: Istorίa toy Ellhnikoύ Emwy lίoy Polέmoy , 1946 – 1949 [History of the Greek Civil War, 1946 – 1949 ] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2001), Vol. I, pp. 190 – 203; Konstantinos Loulos: «Diarurvtikέ6 Tomέ6 kai Synέx1i16 s1 Basikoύ6 Mhxa nismoύ6 Ejoysίa6 dia mέsoy tvn «Ekkauarίs1vn», 1936 – 1946» [‘Structural Ruptures and Continuities in Basic Power Mechanisms through

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9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

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22 –23

151

‘Purges’, 1936 – 1946’], in Hagen Fleischer (ed.): H Ellάda 36’ – 49’: Apό th Diktatorίa ston Emwύlio, Tomέ6 kai Sy nέx1i16 [Greece 36’-49’: From Dictatorship to Civil War, Raptures and Continuities ] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2005), p. 304. Procopis Papastratis: ‘The Purge of the Greek Civil Service on the Eve of the Civil War’, in Lars Bœrentzen, John O. Iatrides and Ole L. Smith (eds): Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945– 1949 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1987), pp. 48–54; [Procopis] Papastratis: ‘Purging the University after Liberation’ in Mark Mazower (ed.): After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 62 – 72; Theocharis Razakos: [«H «L1ykή Tromokratίa» sthn Ellάda (1945 – 1946): O Kόsmo6 th6 Eunikowrosύnh6 kai h Antim1tώpish toy «Eryuroύ Kindύnoy» [‘The “White Terror” in Greece (1945–1946): The World of National-Mindedness and the Tackling of the “Red Menace”’] (MA Dissertation, Panteion University, 2008), pp. 17–22, 26–8, 34–5. Close: Origins, pp. 156–9; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 177–88; Michalis P. Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra toy Emwylίoy : Koinvnikή Pόlvsh, Arist1rά kai Astikό6 Kόsmo6 sthn M1tapol1mikή Ellάda, apό ta D1k1mbrianά sti6 Eklogέ6 toy 1946 [On the Verge of Civil War: Social Polarisation, the Left and the Bourgeoisie in PostWar Greece, from the Decemvriana to the Elections of 1946 ] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2006), pp. 277–80; Razakos: «H «L1ykή Tromokratίa» [‘The “White Terror”’], pp. 43–8. George D. Kousoulas: The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939– 1953 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1953), p. 153; Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, pp. 199– 200; Jordan Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 sthn Ellάda: Di1un1ί6 Diastάs1i6 [The Civil War in Greece: International Dimensions ] translated by Giorgos Siakantaris (Athens: Filistor, 1996), pp. 100– 1, 103– 4. Heinz A. Richter: ‘The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War’, in Iatrides (ed.): Greece, pp. 167– 80; Lyberatos: On the Verge, pp. 277– 88. Mazower: Inside Hitler’s Greece, p. 358. David H. Close and Thanos Veremis: ‘The Military Struggle, 1945– 9’, in Close (ed.): Greek Civil War, pp. 98 –9. For example, see: Razakos: ‘The “White Terror”’, pp. 43–8; Richter: ‘Varkiza Agreement’, pp. 167–80; Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra [On the Verge ], pp. 277–88. Emma Kathryn Kuby: ‘Between Humanism and Terror: The Problem of Political Violence in Postwar France, 1944– 1962’ (PhD Thesis: Cornell University, 2011), pp. 29 – 96. For an analysis of the commitment problem in a peace-building process after a civil war, see: Barbara F. Walter: ‘Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace’, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1999), pp. 127– 55; Michaela Mattes and Burgu Savun: ‘Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2009), pp. 737– 59.

152

NOTES

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23 –25

17. Barbara F. Walter: Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 92; Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie: ‘Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2003), pp. 318– 32. 18. Close: Origins, pp. 163– 5. 19. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, pp. 199– 200; David C. Van Meter: ‘The Macedonian Question and the Guerrilla War in Northern Greece on the Eve of the Truman Doctrine’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1995), pp. 71 – 90. 20. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, pp. 200– 1; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 97 – 8. 21. Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 78 – 80; Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1y uέrvsh [From Liberation ], pp. 177– 80. 22. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, pp. 202– 3; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 79 – 80. 23. Ibid., pp. 199– 201. 24. YDIA (1945), File 56.5, No. 9261: Lt Dromazos to the Supreme Military Command of Central Macedonia, Undated [1945]; Vima, 6 October 1946; Ellinikos Vorras, 30 October 1946 and 4 February 1947; Makedonia, 4 February 1947. For more information on the Greek protests against its Balkan neighbours, see the following archival records: AKT, File No. 18.3; YDIA (1946), Files 1.9, 37.7 and 130.2 25. 561AKT, File 15.7, No. 4: Foreign Ministry to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, 6 November 1946. For more information on the fate of the Greek hostages taken by the EAM/ELAS, see the following archival records: AKT, File No. 15.7; YDIA (1946), Files 134.1 and 135.2. 26. For more information on the fate of the Greek hostages taken by Bulgarian authorities, see the following archival records: YDIA (1945), File 17.1; YDIA (1946), File 134.1. 27. Eleutheria, 14 February 1947; Ellinikos Vorras, 21 February 1947; YDIA (1947), File 90.2, No 44712: Rendis to Stratos, 23 October 1947. For more information on the migratory flows of Balkan dissidents in Greece, see the following archival records: YDIA (1946), Files 37.7, 72 and 130.2; YDIA (1947), Files 90.2, 90.3 and 90.4. 28. Iakovos D. Michailidis (a): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ: Oi EllhnoGioygkoslabikέ6 Sxέs1i6 thn Paramonή toy Ellhnikoύ Emwylίoy Polέmoy (1944– 1946) [The Faces of Janus: Greco-Yugoslav Relations on the Eve of the Greek Civil War (1944 – 1946) ] (Athens: Patakis, 2004), pp. 57 – 81. 29. Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 159. 30. Xydis: Greece, pp. 196 – 7; Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1y uέrvsh [From Liberation ], pp. 182– 3. 31. George E. Christidis: Ta Kommoy nistikά Balkάnia: Eisagvgή sthn Esvt1rikή kai Ejvt1rikή Politikή sthn Albanίa, Boy lgarίa, Gioy gkoslabίa kai Poy manίa thn P1rίodo 1945 – 1989 [The Communist

NOTES TO PAGES 25 –27

32.

33. 34.

35.

36. 37.

38.

39.

40. 41.

153

Balkans: Introduction in the Domestic and Foreign Policy of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania in the Period 1945 – 1989 ] (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 2003), pp. 17 – 26, 67 – 85, 133 – 40; Nikos Marantzidis and Kostas Tsivos: Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio 6 Pόl1 mo6 kai t o Di1 unέ6 Kommoy nistikό Sύsthma: To KKE mέsa apό ta Ts1xikά Arx1ίa, 1946 – 1968 [The Greek Civil War and the International Communist System: The KKE through the Czech Archives, 1946 – 1968 ] (Athens: Alexandria, 2012), pp. 48, 64 – 5. Periclis Christidis: «Oi Ellhnikέ6 Eunikέ6 Di1kdikήs1i6 sthn Syndiάsk1ch gia thn Eirήnh sto Parίsi» [‘The Greek National Claims in the Paris Peace Conference, 1946’] (Ph.D. Thesis, Aristoteleion University, 2007), pp. 33 – 57; Vasilis Kondis: Sosialistikά Krάth kai KKE ston Emwύlio [Socialist States and the KKE in the Civil [War] ] (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2012), pp. 85– 94. Xydis: Greece, pp. 196– 7. For more information on the Bulgarian war crimes in Northern Greece during World War II, see the following archival records: YDIA (1945), Files 12.2, 12.3 and 177.4 For more information on the postwar persecution of the Greek minority in Albania, see the following archival records: YDIA (1945), File 37.6, 37.7, 38.1, 51.8, 51.9 and 51.10; YDIA (1946), Files 37.6. A nationalist resistance movement under Napoleon Zervas (the EDES) had expelled the Albanian Chams. Most of the Albanian Chams collaborated with the Italians and, after Italy’s capitulation in 1943, the Nazi Germans and committed atrocities against the local Greek population. However, a small number of Chams enlisted in the ELAS and established a separate battalion. In 1944, the EDES stormed the villages of the Chams, committed excesses against the local Albanian villagers and compelled them to seek refuge to Albania. Eleuteria Manda: Oi Moysoylmάnoi Tsάmhd16 th6 Hp1ίroy , 1923–2000 [The Muslim Chams of Epirus, 1923–2000 ] (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2004). Evangelos Kofos: Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964), pp. 147 – 53; Kondis: AggloAm1rikanikή Politikή [Anglo-American Policy ], pp. 103– 46; For more information on the policies of Tito on the Macedonian Question, see the following archival records: YDIA (1945), Files 12.5, 37.4, 46.7, 56.4 and 56.6. Kofos: Nationalism and Communism, pp. 137– 43; Dimitris Livanios: The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans, 1939– 1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 142– 74. Kofos: Nationalism and Communism, pp. 148– 9. Evangelos Kofos: The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece (1943 – 1949) (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, 1989), pp. 17 – 19; John S. Koliopoulos: Plundered Loyalties: World War II and

154

42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

48.

49.

50.

51. 52.

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27 –29

Civil War in Greek West Macedonia (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 221– 55. Michailidis (a): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ [Faces of Janus ], p. 166. Robert C. Orr: ‘The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenges of Post-Conflict Reconstruction’, in Robert C. Orr (ed.): Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), pp. 10 – 12. Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1y uέrvsh [From Liberation ], pp. 107– 249. Sfikas: British Labour Government, pp. 50 – 62, 71 – 98. Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 128– 30; Close: Origins, pp. 152– 6; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 219– 26. AKT, File 14.3, No. 43 – 5: Memoranda to the UN Economic and Social Council, 1, 6 and 26 August 1946; AKT, File 14.6, No. 27: Report by the [Greek] Organisation for Reconstruction, Unsigned, Undated [1946]; Georgios Markos: H Oikonomikή Diάstash th6 Ewarmogή6 toy Dόgmato6 Troύman kai toy Sx1dίoy Mάrsal sthn Ellάda» [‘The Economic Dimension of the Implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in Greece’] in Fotini Tomai-Konstantopoulou (ed.): H Ellάda sto M1taίxmio Enό6 Nέoy Kόsmoy [Greece on the Borderline of a New World ] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2002), pp. 51 – 3; Giorgos Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman kai to Sxέdio Mάrsal [The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan ] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2004), pp. 67 – 84, pp. 33 – 50. AET, Box E, File 47, No. 60: Aide Memoire on the Supply of Goods by the UNRRA [November 1945]; Lycogiannis: Britain, pp. 55 – 9. For more information on the operation of the UNRRA in Greece since 1945, see the following archival records: YDIA (1945), File 60; YDIA (1946), File 22 and 112.3. Stavros B. Thomadakis: ‘Stabilization, Development, and Government Economic Authority in the 1940s’ in Iatrides and Wrigley (eds): Greece, pp. 177–8; Lyberatos: Apό thn Ap1l1yuέrvsh [From Liberation ], 233–51. Keith Legg: ‘Musical Chairs in Athens: Analyzing Political Instability, 1946– 1952’, in Bærentzen, Iatrides and Smith (eds): Studies, pp. 18 – 19; Athanasios Lycogiannis: Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis 1944– 1947: From Liberation to the Truman Doctrine (Columbia; London: University of Missouri Press, 2002), pp. 60 – 70, 97 – 111. Lyberatos: Apό thn Ap1l1y uέrvsh [From Liberation ], pp. 233– 51. AKT, File 14.3, No. 43 – 5: Memoranda to the UN Economic and Social Council, 1, 6 and 26 August 1946; AKT, File 14.4, No. 1: Memorandum to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, 4 September 1946; and No. 3: Memorandum to the UN Economic and Social Council, 12 September 1946; AKT, File 14.5, No. 12: Outline of the Reconstruction Plan, 23 October 1946. For more information on the Greek petitions to the UN Economic and Social Council, see the following archival records: AKT, Files 14.3 and 14.4; YDIA (1946), Files 54.2, 149.5 and 174.6.

NOTES

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155

53. Lykogiannis: Britain, pp. 157– 90; Panos Kazakos: Anάm1sa s1 Krάto6 kai Agorά: Oikonomίa kai Oikonomikή Politikή sth M1tapol1mikή Ellάda, 1944– 2000 [Between State and Market: Economy and Economic Policy in Postwar Greece 1944– 2000] (Athens: Patakis, 2001, ppb. 2010), pp. 70 – 6. For more information on the London Agreement in January 1949, see the following archival records: YDIA (1946), Files 35.3 and 35.4. 54. AKT, File 14.1, File 14.1, No. 46: Report on the Economic State of Affairs by Ailianos, 14 May 1946; AKT, File 14.7, No. 7: Memorandum of the British Economic Mission (BEM) to Tsaldaris, 21 October 1946; Athanasios Lykogiannis: ‘Getting Greece ‘Working Again’: The London Agreement of January 1946’ in Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas (eds): The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 17. 55. Razakos: «H «L1ykή Tromokraatίa»» [‘The ‘White Terror”’], pp. 53 – 4. For an extensive analysis of the ideology of ‘national-mindedness’, see: Despoina I. Papadimitriou: Apό ton Laό tvn Nomimowrόnvn ston Laό tvb Eunikowrόnvn: H Sy nthrhtikή Skέch sthn Ellάda, 1922 – 1967 [From the People of the Law-Abiding to the Nation of the NationalMinded: The Conservative Thought in Greece, 1922 – 1967 ] (Athens: Savallas, 2006). 56. Lyberatos: Στα Πρόθυρα [On the Verge], pp. 319–21, 336–43; Papadimitriou: Από τον Λαό [From People], pp. 177–206. Rizospastis, 9/9/2012. 57. Polymeris Voglis: Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners during the Greek Civil War (New York; Oxfam: Berghahn Books, 2002), pp. 56 – 8. 58. Mark Mazower: ‘Three Forms of Political Justice: Greece 1944 –1945’ in Mazower (ed.): After the War, pp. 35 – 8. 59. Dimitris Kousouris: «H Poinikή Dίvjh tvn Dosilόgvn th6 Katoxή6 (1944 – 1949)» [‘The Prosecution of Collaborators of the Occupation (1944 – 1949)’], in Christos Hadziiosif (ed.): Istorίa th6 Ellάda6 toy o 20 y Aiώna [History of the 20th Century Greece ] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2009), Vol. D1: Reconstruction, Civil War, Restoration, 1945 – 52, pp. 105 – 29. For more information on the judicial treatment of Greek quislings in the post-Varkiza era, see the following archival record: YDIA (1947), File 90.1. 60. Resolution 7, Government Gazette, No. 229, 26/7/1946. 61. AKT, File 34.2, No. 43: Populist MPs to Tsaldaris, 27 April 1949; AKT, File 34.3, No. 81: [Centrist and Rightist] MPs to Theotokis, 7 July 1949. See also: Tasos Kostopoulos: H Ay t ologokrimέnh M nήmh: T a T άgmata Aswal1ίa6 kai h M1tapol1mikή Eunikowrosύnh [The Self-Censored Memory: The Security Battalions and the PostWar National-Mindedness ] (Athens: Filistor, 2005), pp. 72 – 106. 62. Polymeris Voglis: Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners during the Greek Civil War (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), pp. 56 – 8. 63. Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra [On the Verge ], pp. 319– 21.

156

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64. David H. Close: ‘Conservatism, Authoritarianism and Fascism in Greece, 1915 – 45’, in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.): Fascists and Conservatives. The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe (London: Unwin Human, 1990), pp. 200 – 15; Papadimitriou: From People, pp. 61 – 142. 65. Lyberatos: Sta Prόuy ra [On the Verge ], pp. 319 – 21, 336 – 43; Papadimitriou: Apό ton Laό [From People ], pp. 177– 206. 66. Rizospastis, 9 September 2012. 67. Resolution 7, Government Gazette, No. 229, 26 July 1946. 68. Basil C. Gounaris: ««Eamoboύlgaroi» kai Mak1donomάxoi: Id1ologikέ6 kai Άll16 B1ntέt16 sthn Mak1donίa toy Emwylίoy Polέmoy» [‘‘EAM-Bulgarians’ and Macedonian-Fighters: Ideological and Other Vendettas in the Civil War Macedonia’] in Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos and Grigoris Psallidas (eds): O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6: Apό thn Bάrkiza sto Grάmmo, F1broy άrio6 1945-Aύgoysto6 1949 [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos, February 1945– August 1949 ] (Athens: Themelio, 2002), pp. 240– 2; Basil C. Gounaris: ‘Social Dimensions of AntiCommunism in Northern Greece, 1945– 1950’, in Carabott and Sfikas (eds): Greek Civil War, pp. 177–8. 69. Ilias Nikolakopoulos: Kόmmata kai Boy l1y tikέ6 Eklogέ6 sthn Ellάda, 1946 – 1964: H Eklogikή G 1vgrawίa tvn Politikώn Dy nάm1vn [Parties and Parliamentary Elections in Greece, 1946 – 1964: The Electoral Geography of Political Forces ] (Athens: Ethniko Kentro Koinonikwn Erevnon, 1985), pp. 135 – 6. 70. Gounaris: ‘Social Dimensions’, pp. 179– 80, 184. 71. Amikam Nachmani: ‘Mirror Images: The Civil Wars in China and Greece’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1993), pp. 81 – 2. 72. Ole L. Smith: ‘The Problems of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, 1946’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1985), pp. 43 – 62; Smith: ‘Self-Defense and Communist Policy, 1945– 1947’ in Bærentzen, Iatrides and Smith (eds): Studies, pp. 159 –77. 73. Rizospastis, 26 November 1996. 74. Mitsos Partsalidis: Diplή Apokatάstash th6 Eunikή6 Antίstash6 [Double Rehabilitation of the National Resistance ] (Thessaloniki: Kodikas, 1978), p. 196; Artiom Ulunian: ‘The Soviet Union and the Greek Question, 1946– 53: Problems and Appraisals’ in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds): The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943– 53 (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 144– 6. 75. Ivo Banac (ed.): The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933– 1949, German part translated by Jane T. Hedges, Russian by Timothy D. Sergay, Bulgarian by Irina Faion (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 396; Baev: Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 111– 12. 76. Peter J. Stavrakis: Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 99–101; John O. Iatrides: ‘Revolution or

NOTES TO PAGES 33 – 35

77. 78.

79.

80.

81. 82.

83.

84. 85.

86.

87.

88. 89.

157

Self-Defense: Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2005), pp. 18–19. Mark Mazower: Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Penguin, 1999), pp. 258– 61. Thanasis D. Sfikas: To «Xvlό Άlogo»: Oi Di1un1ί6 Synuήk16 th6 Ellhnikή6 Krίsh6, 1941–1949 [The ‘Lame Horse’: The International Dimensions of the Greek Crisis, 1941–1949 ] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2007), pp. 53–60. No. 61: Urgent Telegram of Kostove to the KKE, 19 December 1944 in VassilisKondis and Spyridon Sfetas (eds): Emfύlio6 Pόl1mo6: ‘Eggrafa apό ta Gioygkoslabikά kai Boylgarikά Arx1ίa [Civil War: Documents from the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Archives] (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1999, reprinted by Epikentro, 2006). Heinz A. Richter: British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War, February 1945 to August 1946, translated by Marion Sarafis (London: Merlin Press, 1985), pp. 485 –527; Nikolakopoulos: Kax1ktikή Dhmokratίa [Cachectic Democracy ], pp. 61 – 2; Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra [On the Verge ], pp. 587 –602. Sfikas: To «Xvlό Άlogo» [‘Lame Horse’ ], pp. 168– 72. YDIA (1946), File 94.4, No. 10952: Agnidis to Sophoulis, 23 January 1946; Van Coufoudakis: ‘The United States, the United Nations, and the Greek Question, 1946– 1952’, in Iatrides: (ed.): Greece, pp. 278– 9. For more information on the Iranian Crisis in early 1946, see: Garry R. Hess: ‘The Iranian Crisis of 1945– 1946 and the Cold War’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 1 (1974), pp. 117– 46; Jamil Hasanli: At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941– 1946 (Lanham, MD; Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). Rizospastis, 22 January 1946. Giannis N. Giannoulopoulos: O M1tapol1mikό6 Kόsmo6: Ellhnikή kai Eyrvpaϊkή Istorίa, 1945– 1963 [The PostWar World: Greek and European History, 1945– 1963 ] (Athens: Papazisis, 1992), pp. 66 –81. Haris Vlavianos: Greece, 1941– 49: From Resistance to Civil War: The Strategy of the Greek Communist Party (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with St Antony’s College, 1992), pp. 189–224; Ole L. Smith: ‘The Greek Communist Party, 1945–9’, in Close (ed.): Greek Civil War, pp. 136–8. Report of the KKE to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [‘The Situation in Greece and the Urgent Problems of Our Movement’], 12 September 1946 in Philippos Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6: H Emplokή toy KKE [The Greek Civil War: The Entanglement of the KKE ] (Athens: Themelio, 2004), pp. 44 – 5; Lyberatos: On the Verge, pp. 131– 46. Hagen Fleischer: ‘The National Liberation Front (EAM), 1941– 1947: A Reassessment’, in Iatrides and Wrigley (eds): Greece, pp. 77 – 82. Michalis P. Lyberatos: «H Arist1rά kai oi Eklogέ6 toy 1946: Oi Prouέs1i6, o Mύuo6 kai h Pragmatikόthta» [‘The Left and the Elections of 1946: The Intentions, Myth, and Reality’], in Grigoris Psallidas

158

90. 91.

92.

93.

94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

99. 100.

101. 102.

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35 –37

(ed.): Oi Eklogέ6 toy 1946: Staumό6 sthn Politikή Istorίa th6 Sύxronh6 Ellάda6 [The Elections of 1946: Milestone in the Political History of Modern Greece ] (Athens: Foundation of Constantinos Mitsotakis, 2008), pp. 145 –6. Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra [On the Verge ], pp. 353– 84. George Th. Mavrogordatos: Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936 (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 25–54; Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1yuέrvsh [From Liberation ], p. 274. Terrence Lyons: ‘The Role of Postsettlement Elections’ in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds): Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 215– 36; Benjamin Reilly: ‘Elections in Post-Conflict Scenarios: Constraints and Dangers’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002), pp. 118 –39. Timothy D. Sisk: ‘Pathways of the Political: Electoral Processes after Civil War’ in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds): The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 198– 224; Kiven J. Kewir and Banlilon V. Tani: ‘Elections and Conflict Prevention in Post Conflict Societies’, Journal of Peace, Gender and Development Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (2011), pp. 121– 8. Smith: ‘Self-Defense’, pp. 168– 70; Nikolakopoulos: Kax1ktikή Dhmok ratίa [Cachectic Democracy ], p. 63. Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra [On the Verge ], pp. 353– 84; Razakos: ‘The “White Terror”’, pp. 83 – 4. Nikolakopoulos: Kax1ktikή Dhmokratίa [Cachectic Democracy ], p. 32; Kalyvas: «H Bίa tvn D1k1mbrianώn» [‘Violence of the Decemvriana’]. Mazower: Inside Hitler’s Greece, pp. 371– 2. Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra [On the Verge ], pp. 340–3; Christos Hadziiosif: «D1kέmbrh6 1944: Tέlo6 kai Arxή» [‘December 1944: End and Beginning’] in Christos Hadziiosif and Prokopis Papastratis (eds): Istorίa o th6 Ellάda6 toy 20 y Aiώna [History of Greece of the 20th Century ] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2007), Vol. C2: World War II, Occupation, Resistance, 1940– 1945, pp. 388– 90. Kondis: Sosialistikά Krάth [Socialist States ] pp. 26, 287. Ioannis Eleftheriou: Synomilί16 m1 ton Nίko Zaxariάdh: Mόsxa: Mάrtio6-Ioύlio6 1956 [Conversations with Nikos Zahariadis: Moscow-MarchJuly 1956 ] (Athens: Kentavros, 1986), pp. 34 – 5; Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 117– 18; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 105– 106. Michailidis (a): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ [Faces of Janus ], pp. 277– 8; Livanios: Macedonian Question, pp. 216– 26. Stavrakis: Moscow and Greek Communism, pp. 99 – 101; Manolis Koumas: «Έna Ypόd1igma Paradosiakή6 Pvssikή6 Politikή6; Oi Krίs1i6 sto «Bόr1io Krhpίdvma», 1945– 1946» [‘A Model of Traditional Russian Politics? The Crises in the ‘Northern Tier’, 1945– 1946’] in Panayiotis Ifestos,

NOTES

103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

109. 110. 111. 112.

113.

114. 115. 116.

117. 118. 119. 120. 121.

TO PAGES

37 –39

159

Constantinos Koliopoulos and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (eds): H Έnarjh toy Cy xroύ Polέmoy : Strathgikά ή Id1ologikά Aίtia; [The Beginning of the Cold War: Strategic or Ideological Causes? ] (Athens: Institute for International Relations, 2012), pp. 190– 1; Kondis: Socialist States, pp. 154– 5. Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ] p. 24. Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare, pp. 11 – 28. AFD, File 79.8, No. 101: Stephanopoulos to Tsaldaris, 6 July 1946. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 98. Close: Origins, pp. 171–2; Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra [On the Verge ] pp. 156–64. Panayiotis Poulitsas had previously served as the President of the Council of State – the supreme court in Greece. Vima, 5 April 1946; Sfikas: British Labour, p. 100. Lyberatos: Sta Prόuy ra [On the Verge ], pp. 389– 403; Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1yuέrvsh [From Liberation ], pp. 120– 5. Nikolakopoulos: Kax1ktikή Dhmokratίa [Cachectic Democracy ], p. 69. Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 123– 4; Nikolakopoulos: Kax1ktikή Dhmokratίa [Cachectic Democracy ], p. 35. Konstantina E. Botsiou: «To Politikό Prόgramma toy Laϊkoύ Kόmmato6 sti6 Eklogέ6 toy 1946» [‘The Political Program of the Popular Party in the Elections of 1946’], in Psallidas (ed.): Eklogέ6 toy 1946 [Elections of 1946 ], pp. 171– 95. AtBA File 374, No. 289: Tsaldaris to King George II, 19 April 1946; FO 371/58688, R6785: Norton to Bevin, 26 April 1946; Sfikas: British Labour, p. 101; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 123– 4. John O. Iatrides: ‘Greece at the Crossroads, 1944–1950’ in Iatrides and Wrigley (eds): Greece, p. 23; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 123– 8. FRUS (1946), Vol. VII, pp. 148– 9: Memorandum of Conversation between Byrnes and Bevin (at Paris), 27 April 1946; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 102– 3. Dawn Brancati and Jack L. Snyder: ‘Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing and Sequencing on Post-Conflict Stability’, paper presented at the 50th Annual Convention of the International Scholars Association (ISA), ‘Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future’, New York (USA), 15– 18 February 2009; Thomas Edward Flores and Irfan Nooruddin: ‘The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction’, Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 2 (2012), pp. 558–70. Hellenic Parliament: «Epίshma Praktikά» [‘Official Minutes’], Vol. 126: 13 May– 20 June 1946, pp. 12 –16 (17 May 1946). Legislative Decree, Government Gazette, No, 145, 4 May 1946; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 107–8. Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 107– 8, 115. FRUS (1946): Vol. VII, pp. 233– 4, 238– 9: MacVeagh to State Department, 10 August 1946. Georgios Karagiannis: 1940 – 1952. To Drάma th6 Ellάdo6, Έph kai Auliόtht16 [1940 – 1952. The Drama of Greece, Epics and Despondencies]

160

122.

123. 124. 125.

126. 127. 128.

129. 130.

131. 132. 133. 134.

135. 136.

137. 138. 139. 140.

NOTES

TO PAGES

39 – 41

(Athens, no date and publisher), pp. 230, 234; Sfikas: British Labour, p. 115. Spyros Marketos: «H Ellhnikή Άkra D1jiά thn D1ka1tίa toy 40» [‘The Greek Far-Right in the 1940s’], in Hadziiosif (ed.): Istorίa th6 Ellάda6 [History of Greece ], Vol. D1: Reconstruction, Civil War, Restoration, 1945 – 1952, p. 311. Rizospastis, 21, 22, 25 and 29 June 1946; 10 – 13, 17– 19, 23, 25 and 27 July 1947. Rizospastis, 10 – 13, 17 – 19, 23, 25 and 27 July 1947. Lt General Ventiris to the Army General Staff, 12 June 1946 in ΓΕΣ/ΔΙΣ: Αρχεία του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου, 1944– 1949 [Archives of the Civil War, 1944– 1949] (Athens: GES/DIS, 1998), Vol. I, pp. 77–80. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, p. 206; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 98–9; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 113–14. Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 115. Resolution of the Twelfth Plenum of the KKE’s Central Committee, 27 June 1945 in KKE: Official Documents, Vol. VI: 1945– 9, pp. 32 – 8; Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, p. 201; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 61, 114– 15. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, p. 206; Sfikas: British Labour, p. 110. Giorgos Vonditsios-Gousias: Οι Αιτίες για τις Ήττες, της Διάσπασης του ΚΚΕ και της Ελληνικής Αριστεράς [The Reasons for the Defeats, the Split of the KKE and the Greek Left] (Athens: Kakoulidis, 1977), Vol. I, pp. 135– 6; Vafeiadis: Απομνημονεύματα [Memoirs], Vol. V, pp. 99 – 101. Richter: British Intervention, pp. 491– 2, 495; Vlavianos: Greece, 1941– 49, pp. 179, 188. Sfikas: Peace and War, pp. 61– 72. Close: Origins, p. 180. Vasilis Bartziotas: Εξήντα Χρόνια Κομμουνιστής: Μια Κριτική Αυτοβιογραφία [Sixty Years Communist: Critical Autobiography] (Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 1986), pp. 245, 257; Vafeiadis: Απομνημονεύματα [Memoirs], Vol. V, p. 103. Ibid., pp. 206– 7; Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 258; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 104. Giorgos Vonditsios-Gousias: Oi Aitί16 gia ti6 Ήtt16, th6 Diάspash6 toy KKE kai th6 Ellhnikή6 Arist1rά6 [The Reasons for the Defeats, the Split of the KKE and the Greek Left ] (Athens: Kakoulidis, 1977), Vol. I, pp. 135 – 6; Vafeiadis: Apomnhmon1ύmata [Memoirs ], Vol. V, pp. 99 – 101. Richter: British Intervention, pp. 491– 2, 495; Vlavianos: Greece, 1941– 49, pp. 179, 188. Sfikas: Peace and War, pp. 61– 72. Close: Origins, p. 180. Vasilis Bartziotas: Ejήnta Xrόnia Kommoy nistή6: Mia Kritikή Aytobiograwίa [Sixty Years Communist: Critical Autobiography ] (Athens:

NOTES

141. 142. 143. 144.

145.

146. 147. 148. 149. 150.

151.

152.

153. 154.

155. 156.

TO PAGES

41 – 43

161

Synchroni Epochi, 1986), pp. 245, 257; Vafeiadis: Apomnhmon1ύmata [Memoirs ], Vol. V, p. 103. AFP File 79.8, No. 23301: Stephanopoulos to Tsaldaris, 6 June 1946; Elliniko Aima, 10 July 1946. John S. Koliopoulos: Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821–1912 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 107–16, 120–1. Resolution 3, Government Gazette, No. 197, 18 June 1946. Konstantinos Oikonomopoulos: Έktakta Stratodik1ίa kai Nomou1sίa Aworώsa thn Dhmόsian Tάjin kai Aswάl1ia [Emergency Courts-Martial and Legislation Relating to the Public Order and Safety ] (Athens: n.p., 1951), pp. 5 – 8; Voglis: Becoming Subject, p. 61. Mark Mazower: ‘Policing the Anti-Communist State in Greece, 1922– 1974’, in Mark Mazower (ed.): The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997), pp. 131– 42. Sfikas: British Labour, p. 109. Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra [On the Verge ] pp. 318, 324– 6. Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 172– 4. Ibid., p. 67; Vima, 20 December 1992 and 10 January 1993. [Central Committee of the KKE]: Dέka Xrόnia Agώn16, 1935– 1945 [Ten Years of Struggles 1935– 1945 ] (Athens: Central Committee of the KKE, 1945), pp. 252ff; Aggelos Elefantis: H Epagg1lίa th6 Adύnath6 Epanάstash6: KKE kai Astismό6 ston M1sopόl1mo [The Profession of the Impossible Revolution: KKE and Bourgeoisie in the Inter-War Years] (Athens: Themelio, 1979), pp. 31 – 8; Alekos Papapanagiotou: To Mak1donikό Zήthma kai to Balkanikό Kommoynistikό Kίnhma, 1918– 1939 [The Macedonian Question and the Balkan Communist Movement, 1918– 1939 ] (Athens: Themelio, 1992), pp. 57 – 61. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 106; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, p. 140; Thanasis Kallaniotis: ‘Oi Antikommoynistέ6 Kap1tάnioi sthn Dytikή Mak1donίa, 1942–1949» [‘Anti-Communist Captains in Western Macedonia, 1942 – 1949’], in Nikos Marantzidis (ed.): Oi Άlloi Kap1tάnioi: Antikommoynistέ6 Έnoploi sta Xrόnia th6 Katoxή6 kai toy Emwylίoy [The Other Captains: Armed Anti-Communists in the Years of the Occupation and the Civil War ] (Athens: Estia, 2006), pp. 201– 95. AKT, File 12.5, No. 85: Spiliotopoulos to Tsaldaris, 23 September 1946; AKT, File 12.6, No. 60: Theotokis to Tsaldaris, 24 October 1946; Close: Origins, pp. 194– 5. AtBA, File 439, No. 35: Zalokostas to King George II, 6 July 1946. GES/DIS: O Mak1dvnikό6 Agώn kai ta G1gonόta sthn Qrάkh [The Macedonian Struggle and Events in Thrace ] (Athens: GES/DIS, 1979), pp. 346 –8. Resolution 9, Government Gazette, No. 232, 28 August 1946. Wittner: American Intervention, p. 194.

162

NOTES

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43 – 44

157. On the social dynamics of the EAM during World War II, see: David H. Close: ‘Introduction’ in Close (ed.): Greek Civil War, pp. 17 – 20; Lyberatos: Sta Prόuy ra [On the Verge ] pp. 31 – 42. 158. YDIA (1946), File 60.1, No. 27231: Dendramis to the Foreign Ministry, 12 September 1946; Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, pp. 279–81. 159. For more information, see: Eduard Mark: ‘The Turkish War Scare of 1946’ in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (eds): Origins of the Cold War: An International History (New York; London: Routledge, 1994, ppb. 2005), pp. 112 – 26; Jamil Hasanli: Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945 – 1953 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), pp. 221 – 56. 160. Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 25 – 6. 161. Rizospastis, 3 September 1946; Decision of the Politburo of the KKE’s Central Committee, 26 September 1946 in KKE: Official Documents), Volume VI, 1945 –9, pp. 222–3. 162. Melvyn P. Leffler: A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 111– 14; Stephen L. McFarland: ‘The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Onset of the Cold War’ in Leffler and Painter (eds): Origins, pp. 247 –53. 163. Melvyn P. Leffler: A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 111– 14; Stephen L. McFarland: ‘The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Onset of the Cold War’ in Leffler and Painter (eds): Origins, pp. 247 –53. 164. Dionysis Hourhoulis: «Όc1i6 tvn Sobi1tikώn Strathgikώn Prot1raiotήtvn, 1941– 1950» [‘Aspects of Soviet Strategic Priorities, 1941– 1950’], in Ifestos, Koliopoulos and Hatzivassiliou (eds): Έnarjh [Beginning ], pp. 169 –71; Koumas: ‘Model’, pp. 194–5. 165. Leffler: Preponderance of Power, pp. 19 – 24; [Melvyn P.] Leffler: The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917– 1953, consulting editor Eric Foner (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), pp. vii – viii, 57 – 63, 128– 30. 166. Melvyn L. Leffler: ‘The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945– 1952’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odde A. Westad (eds): The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Vol. I: Origins, pp. 72 – 4. 167. John Kent: British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944 – 1949 (Leicester: Leicester University Press; New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 55 – 6; Thanasis D. Sfikas: ‘Toward a Regional Study of the Origins of the Cold War in Southeastern Europe: British and Soviet Policies in the Balkans, 1945 – 1949’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1999), p. 221. 168. Leffler: Specter of Communism, pp. 44 – 7. 169. AtBA, File 375, No. 49: Stephanopoulos to Tsaldaris, 5 September 1946.

NOTES

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163

170. Nikolakopoulos: K ax 1 ktikή Dhm o kratίa [Cachectic Democracy ] pp. 88 – 94. 171. George Th. Mavrogordatos: ‘The 1946 Elections and Plebiscite: Prelude to Civil War’, in Iatrides: (ed.): Greece, p. 193. 172. Sfikas: British Labour, p. 116. 173. AtBA, File 377, No. 303– 19: Report of the British Parliamentary Delegation to Greece, 10 October 1946; FO 371/58696, R9040: Minute by Hayter, 24 June 1946; Sfikas: To «Xvlό Άlogo» [‘Lame Horse’ ], p. 178. 174. AKT, File 11.3, No. 35: Statement by Sofoulis, 8 September 1946 (in English); FO 371/58707, R13459: Norton to the Foreign Office, 2 September 1946. 175. Nikos C. Alivizatos: Oi Politikoί Q1smoί s1 Krίsh, 1922– 1974: Όc1i6 th6 Ellhnikή6 Emp1irίa6 [The Political Institutions in Crisis 1922– 1974: Aspects of the Greek Experience ] (Athens: Themelio, 1983), pp. 167– 70. 176. Thanasis D. Sfikas: Pόl1mo6 kai Eiήnh sthn Strathgikή toy KKE 1945– 1949 [War and Peace in the Strategy of the KKE 1945–1949 ] (Athens: Filistor, 2001), pp. 86 – 94; 103– 5. 177. Rizospastis, 3 September 1946. 178. Decision of the Politburo of the KKE’s Central Committee, 26 September 1946 in KKE: Epίshma K1ίm1na [Official Documents ] (Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 1995), Volume VI, 1945– 9, pp. 222– 3. 179. Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 189– 90. 180. Report of the KKE to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [‘The Situation in Greece and the Urgent Problems of Our Movement’], 12 September 1946 in Iliou: Greek Civil War, pp. 37–50; No. 5: Report of Ioannidis for the Partisan Movement in Greece, 25 August 1946, and No. 6: Letter of Roussos (?) to the Soviets for the Plans and Needs of the Democratic Army, 17 September 1946 in Vasilis Kondis and Spyridon Sfetas (eds): Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6: Έggrawa apό ta Gioygkoslabikά kai Boylgarikά Arx1ίa [Civil War: Documents from the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Archives ] (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1999, reprinted by Epikentro, 2006), pp. 50–5. 181. AKT, File 11.3, No. 98: Theotokis to Tsaldaris, 28 May 1946; AKT, File 12.5, No. 20: Stephanopoulos to Tsaldaris, 3 September 1946. 182. Marque´s de Santa Cruz de Marcenado: Reflexiones Militares (Turin: Juan Fransisco Mairesse, 1724– 7 and Paris: Simon Langlois, 1730, reprinted as Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2004), Vol. VIII, pp. 137– 8, quoted in Beatrice D. Heuser: The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2010), pp. 139–40; Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw: ‘A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency’ (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1992), pp. 3– 6, 77 – 8. 183. Colin S. Gray: ‘Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?’ (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2006), pp. 8 –9.

164

NOTES

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47 –50

184. Max G. Manwaring: ‘Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response’ (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001), pp. 5 – 7; Alan J. Vick et al.: ‘Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions’ (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2006), pp. 70 –4. 185. AFD, File 79.8, No. 78: Spiliotopoulos to Tsaldaris, 13 September 1946; AKT, File 12.6, No. 3 and 60: Theotokis to Tsaldaris, 3 and 24 October 1946; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, p. 140; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, p. 223. 186. Note by the Army General Staff for the Prime Minister, 16 September 1946 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. II, p. 394; AKT, File 15.1, No. 33: Tsaldaris to Norton, Undated [November 1946]; Eleftheria Delaporta: ‘The Role of Britain in Greek Politics and Military Operations, 1947– 1952’ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2003), pp. 41, 46; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 105. 187. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 104. 188. Ibid., pp. 104– 5; Close: Origins, p. 201. 189. Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, p. 232; Fotios Metallinos: «H Am1rikanikή Syn1isworά sthn Anadiorgάnvsh kai Epix1irhsiakή Proagvgή tvn Ellhnikώn Enόplvn Dynάm1vn sto Plaίsio toy Dόgmato6 Troύman kai toy Sx1dίoy Mάrsal» [‘The American Contribution to the Reorganisation and Operational Promotion of the Greek Armed Forces in the Context of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan’], in Tomai-Konstantopoulou (ed.): H Ellάda [Greece ], pp. 75 – 6. 190. Zafeiropoulos: O Antisymmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], p. 146; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 104– 108. 191. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, p. 214; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 106. 192. Note by the Army General Staff for the Prime Minister, 16 September 1946 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. II, p. 395; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisymmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 145– 6; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 104– 5; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 238– 9. 193. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 105– 6; Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 61. 194. For example, see: Report by the 3rd Army Corp on the Events in Skra, 28 November 1946 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwy lίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. II, pp. 520–1. 195. Law 98, Government Gazette, No. 284, 17 September 1946; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], p. 212; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 105– 6. 196. Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 185– 6; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 100; Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 220; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 244– 50.

NOTES

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165

197. AFD, File 81.7, No. 136a: Dragoumis to Tsaldaris, 10 December 1946; and No. 174: Presidents of the Villages of Macedonia to Tsaldaris and Dragoumis, 16 November 1946. 198. Lt. General Ventiris to the Army General Staff, 12 June 1946 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwy lίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. I, pp. 77 – 80; ASKI, Box 408, File 23.1, No. 161: Reports to the KKE’s Politburo of Macedonia-Thrace (Thessaloniki), 19 December 1946 and 8 January 1947. 199. AKT, File 12.6, No. 60: Theotokis to Tsaldaris, 24 October 1946; AFD, File 81.7, No. 136a: Dragoumis to Tsaldaris, 10 December 1946. 200. AKT, File 21.3, No. 5: Note of Rendis 6 June 1947; Polymeris Voglis: «H Koinvnίa th6 Ypaίuroy sta Xrόnia toy Emwylίoy Polέmoy» [‘The Society in the Countryside during the Civil War Years’], in Hadziiosif (ed.): Istorίa th6 Ellάda6 [History of Greece ], Vol. D1: Reconstruction, Civil War, Restoration: 1945– 52, p. 348. 201. AFD, File 81.7, No. 136a: Dragoumis to Tsaldaris, 10 December 1946; AET, Box E, File 49, No. 2: Note on the Greek Question, [March 1947]. 202. Close: ‘Reconstruction’, pp. 158– 9, 171– 2. 203. Plan for the Organisation of Special Rural Self-Defence Units, 7 October 1946 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwy lίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. III, p. 71; AKT, File 12.6, No. 60: Theotokis to Tsaldaris, 24 October 1946; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 101– 3; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 140– 1; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 227– 30. 204. AKT, File 22.3, No. 10: Classified Memorandum of the MPs of Macedonia, Epirus and Thrace to Tsaldaris, 6 November 1947; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 140–1. 205. Polymeris Voglis: «H Bίa toy Polέmoy: Ellάda 1941– 1949» [The Violence of War: Greece 1941– 1949’), paper presented at the conference «Q1vrήs1i6 toy Politikoύ sthn Ellhnikή Koinvnίa: Apologismό6 kai Prooptikή th6 Έr1yna6 sthn Koinvnikή Anurvpologίa kai Istorίa» [‘Perceptions of the Political in Greek Society: Account and Perspectives of Research in Social Anthropology and History’], Mytilene (Greece), 8– 11 November 2007, pp. 4– 6. See also: AKT, File 21.3, No. 50: Note of Rendis, 6 June 1947. 206. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 101. 207. Stathis N. Kalyvas: ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2003), p. 487. 208. AKT, File 21.1, No. 51: Alexandris to the Directorate of Regional SelfGovernance, 3 February 1947; AKT, File 34.3, No. 15: Korozos to Zaimis, 18 July 1949. 209. AKT, File 21.1, No. 108: Catalogue of the Appointed Governors, Undated [1947]; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 138– 9.

166

NOTES

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52 –53

210. Resolution 9, Government Gazette, No. 51, 28 August 1946; Resolution 31, Government Gazette, No. 221, 17 October 1946. 211. Close: ‘Reconstruction’, pp. 171– 2. 212. Kilcullen: Counterinsurgency, pp. 147– 64; Robert E. Kemp: ‘Local Governance and COIN in Eastern Afghanistan, 2004– 2008’, Military Review, Vol. 91, No. 1 (2011), p. 54. 213. Stylianos Matzouris: «H Nomou1sίa toy Emwylίoy Polέmoy: Ejygίansh tvn Dhmόsivn Yphr1siώn, Ektόpish-Ejorίa» [‘The Legislation of the Civil War: Purge of the Civil Services, Deportation-Exile’] (MA Dissertation, Panteion University, 2008), pp. 36 – 7. 214. Nicos C. Alivizatos: ‘The “Emergency Regime” and Civil Liberties’ in Iatrides: (ed.): Greece, pp. 220– 8. 215. AtBA, File 442.2, No. 115: Central Directorate of the National Solidarity of Greece: Report on the Status of Political Exiles, 17 December 1946. 216. AtBA, File 442.2, No. 145: Pipinelis to Theotokis, 24 October 1946 and No. 116: Report on Political Deportees by the National Solidarity of Greece, 17 December 1946; Voglis: Becoming Subject, pp. 93 – 6. 217. The League for Greece constituted a foreign non-governmental organisation based in Britain that campaigned for the rights of the Leftist prisoners. Diana Pym and Marion Sarafis: ‘The League for Democracy in Greece and its Archives’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1984), pp. 73 – 84. 218. FO 371/67007, R12018: Norton to Foreign Office, 28 August 1947. 219. AtBA, File 442.2, No. 145: Pipinelis to Theotokis, 24 October 1946. 220. AKT, File 35.1, No. 1: Memorandum of the Greek Government on Economic Problems (in English), Unsigned, Undated [Late 1949]; Angeliki E. Laiou: ‘Population Movements in the Greek Countryside during the Civil War’, in Bærentzen, Iatrides and Smith (eds): Studies, p. 74. 221. FRUS (1946), Vol. VII, pp. 233– 4: MacVeagh to Byrnes, 11 October 1946; AtBA, File 377, No 45: MacVeagh to Tsaldaris, 7 January 1947. 222. AtBA, File 442.2, No. 145: Pipinelis to Theotokis, 24 October 1946; Vima, 4 October 1946. 223. Humza Kazmi: ‘Counterinsurgency and the Rule of Law’, Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2012), pp. 884– 90. 224. AtBA, File 376, No. 78 – 83: Meeting Note, Unsigned, 11 October 1946; FRUS (1946), Vol. VII, pp. 233– 4: MacVeagh to Byrnes, 11 October 1946; Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1y uέrvsh [From Liberation ], pp. 305– 6. 225. Max G. Manwaring: ‘Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in Our Midst’ (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004), p. 43; David C. Gompert et al.: ‘War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency’ (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 78.

NOTES

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53 –54

167

226. FRUS (1946), Vol. VII, pp. 181– 2: Acheson to Harriman, 13 July 1946; FO 371/58891, R18129: Warner to Williams, 11 December 1946; FO 371/72241, R4690: Norton to Bevin, 25 February 1948. 227. AFD, File 81.2, No. 45: Note of Dragoumis, 31 October 1946. 228. Wittner: American Intervention, p. 195. 229. Vima, 2 November 1946; Embros, 2 November 1946. 230. AtBA, File 376, No. 87, 88, 90 and 92: Meetings of the King with Political Leaders [October 1946]; Vradyni, 31 October 1946. 231. Report of the KKE’s Central Committee to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, [Undated, Probably 12 June 1947] in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 110; Sfikas: British Labour, p. 124; Margaritis: Istorίa [History], Vol. I, pp. 261– 73. 232. Tasos Kostopoulos: ‘«To «Mak1donikό Zήthma» thn D1ka1tίa toy 40» [‘The Macedonian [Question] in the 1940s’] in Hadziiosif (eds): Istorίa th6 Ellάda6 [History of Greece ], Vol. D1: Reconstruction, Civil War, Restoration, 1945– 52, pp. 397–8; Kofos: ‘Impact’, pp. 300– 1. 233. On the one side, the NOF agreed to dissolve its political and military structures, integrate within the political and military structures of the KKE and DSE respectively, and distance itself from the CPM in exchange for the proportional representation of Slav-speakers within the aforementioned political and military structures, and the dissemination of Macedonian ideology in the regions of Greek Macedonia inhabited by the SlavMacedonians. Kofos: ‘Impact’, pp. 300– 1. 234. Spyridon Sfetas: «An1piuύmhtoi Sύmmaxoi kai An1jέl1gktoi Antίpa loi: Oi Sxέs1i6 KKE kai NOF sth Diάrk1ia toy Emwylίoy (1946 – 1949)» [‘Undesirable Allies and Uncontrollable Adversaries: The Relations between the KKE and NOF during the Civil War (1946– 1949)’], Balkanika Symmeikta, Vol. 8 (1996), pp. 211– 46. 235. AKT, File 15.1, No. 33: Tsaldaris to Norton, Undated [November 1946]; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 105; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, pp. 41, 46. 236. General Report of the KKE’s Central Committee to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 12 May 1947 in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 110– 11; Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 92. 237. Report on Bandit Activity, 19 January 1949 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. III, p. 200; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisymmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], p. 175; Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, p. 207; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 101; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 111– 12. 238. Report of the KKE to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [‘The Situation in Greece and the Urgent Problems of Our Movement’], 12 September 1946 in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 37–50. 239. Ioannidis to Zachariadis, 10 November 1946 in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 28.

168

NOTES TO PAGES 54 –56

240. Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 51 – 4; Kondis: Sosialistikά Krάth [Socialist States ], pp. 154– 5. 241. AKT, File 22.3, No. 35: Stratos to Tsaldaris, 22 November 1947; AKT, File 28.2, No. 17: Lt General Kitrilakis to the Army General Staff, 16 February 1948; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 73 – 7. 242. FO 371/58891, R18531: Interview between Bevin and Tsaldaris, 6 December 1946; FO 371/58891, R18129: Record of Conversation between Bevin and Molotov, 9 December 1946; Minutes of Conference between Bevin and Byrnes, 9 December 1946; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 127–8. 243. AKT, File 17.1, No. 28: Letter from Kyrou to the UN secretary general and Enclosed Memorandum, 3 December 1946. 244. Thanasis D. Sfikas: ‘Attlee, Bevin and ‘A Very Lame Horse’: The Dispute over Greece and the Middle East, December 1946– January 1947’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1992), pp. 69 – 96. 245. Xydis: Greece, pp. 270 – 86; Christidis: «Oi Ellhnikέ6 Eunikέ6 Di1kdikήs1i6» [‘Greek National Claims’], pp. 82 – 124. 246. YDIA (1946), File 172.7, No. 2432: Tsaldaris to 17 Embassies, 2 Delegations, 3 Consulates, 15 October 1946; AKT, File 17.1, No. 23: Acheson to Tsaldaris, 23 November 1946; Xydis: Greece, pp. 319–35; Christidis: «Oi Ellhnikέ6 Eunikέ6 Di1kdikήs1i6» [‘Greek National Claims’], pp. 166– 214. 247. YDIA (1946), File 57.2, No. 9998: Mostras to the Foreign Ministry, 21 December 1946; Xydis: Greece, pp. 418– 20; Christidis: «Oi Ellhnikέ6 Eunikέ6 Di1kdikήs1i6» [‘Greek National Claims’], pp. 330– 46. 248. Kazakos: Anάm1sa s1 Krάto6 kai Agorά [Between State and Market ] pp. 76 – 86; Lykogiannis: Britain, pp. 190– 4. 249. Giorgos Stathakis: «To Sxέdio Troύman kai to Sxέdio Mάrsal sthn Ellάda» [‘The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in Greece’] in Thanasis D. Sfikas (ed.): To Sxέdio Mάrsal: Anasygkrόthsh kai Diaίr1sh th6 Ey rώph6 [The Marshall Plan: Reconstruction and Division of Europe ] (Athens: Patakis, 2011), p. 295. 250. AKT, File 14.5, No. 43: Norton to Tsaldaris, 22 November 1946; AKT, Files 15.1, No. 45: History of the Greco-American Discussions on Economic Aid (21 March – 23 December 1946), Unsigned, Undated [1946]; Fotini Tomai-Konstantopoulou: «Istorikό Eisagvgikό Shm1ίvma» [‘Introductory Historical Note’], in Tomai-Konstantopoulou (ed.): H Ellάda [Greece ], pp. 28– 9. For more information on the Greek petitions to its Anglo-American allies, see the following archival record: YDIA (1946), Files 96.1 and 174.6. 251. AKT, File 14.5, No. 43: Norton to Tsaldaris, 22 November 1946; Lykogiannis: Britain, pp. 200–4. 252. George M. Alexander: The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece 1944– 1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 188– 237; Robert Frazier:

NOTES

253.

254. 255. 256. 257.

258.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10.

11.

56 – 60

169

Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942– 1947 (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 120– 56. AKT, File 15.1, No. 15: Meeting between Tsaldaris and Bevin, 3 July 1946; No. 21: Meeting between Tsaldaris and Harriman, 12 July 1946; No. 23: Meeting between Tsaldaris and Bevin, 16 July 1946; and No. 45: History of the Greco-American Talks on Economic Aid (21 March – 23 December 1946), Unsigned, Undated [1946]; Xydis: Greece, pp. 232– 4, 335– 53; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 117–18. Tomai-Konstantopoulou: «Istorikό Eisagvgikό Shm1ίvma» [‘Introductory Historical Note’], pp. 28– 9. Sfikas: British Labour, p. 129. Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 198– 9; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 251– 4. Ionna Papathanasiou: Pro6 thn Mόsxa m1 Syntrowikoύ6 Xair1 tismoύ6: H Enhmέrvsh gia ti6 Ej1lίj1i6 sthn Ellάda, 1946–1949» [‘To Moscow with Comradely Greetings: The Updating for the Developments in Greece, 1946–1949’], O Politis, Vol. 29 (December 1996), p. 32. Rizospastis, 19 January 1947; 459AKT, File 21.1, No. 25: Tsaldaris to the Liaison Service of the UN Commission, 20 January 1947.

Chapter 3 1. 2. 3. 4.

TO PAGES

A ‘Peace-and-War’ State: January– October 1947

AtBA, File 377, No 45: MacVeagh to Tsaldaris, 7 January 1947. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 147– 53. AtBA, File 377, No. 342–50: Minutes of Discussions among Political Leaders. AtBA, File 377, No. 368: Agreement of the Political Leaders, 22 January 1947; Vima, 25 January 1947; Rizospastis, 25 January 1947. Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 123– 4; Close: Origins, p. 151. Nicos C. Alivizatos: ‘The Executive in the Post-Liberation Period, 1944– 1949’ in Iatrides and Wrigley (eds): Greece, p. 163. Hellenic Parliament: «Epίshma Praktikά» [‘Official Minutes’], Vol. 128: 1 October 1946– 27 February 1947, pp. 936– 9 (27 January 1947); FO 371/66999, R1190: Lascelles to Foreign Office, 27 January 1947; Zafeiropoulos: Anti-Bandit Struggle, pp. 210–11. AKT, File 25.5, No. 15: Note of Information, Unsigned [Probably Rodopoulos], 10 May 1947. Rizospastis, 29 January 1947; AKT, File 21.3, No. 50: (Handwritten) Note of Rendis, 6 June 1947. Plan for the Organisation of Special Rural Self-Defence Units, 7 October 1946 in GES/DIS: Archives of Civil War, Vol. III, p. 71; AKT, File 12.6, No. 60: Theotokis to Tsaldaris, 24 October 1946; Zafeiropoulos: Anti-Bandit Struggle, pp. 101– 103; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 140– 1; Margaritis: History, Vol. I, pp. 227– 30. Vima, 8 October 1947.

170

NOTES

TO PAGES

60 – 62

12. Vima, 6 March 1947; AKT, File 21.1, No. 90: Sub-Director of General Security to Zervas, 7 March 1947; Roussos S. Koundouros: H Aswάl1ia toy Kau1stώto6: Politikoί Kratoύm1noi, Ektopίs1i6 kai Tάj1i6 sthn Ellάda, 1924 – 74 [The Security of the Regime Political Prisoners, Deportations and Classes in Greece, 1924 – 74 ] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 1978), p. 139. 13. Close: Origins, pp. 151– 2; Spyridon Plakoudas: ‘The Greek Civil War, 1946– 1949: How the Royalist Regime Countered the Communist Insurgency’ (PhD Thesis: University of Reading, 2014), p. 158. 14. Polymeris Voglis and Stratis Bournazos: «Stratόp1do Makronήsoy, 1947– 1950» [‘Makronisos’ Camp, 1947– 1950’], in Christos Hadziiosif (ed.): Istorίa th6 Ellάda6 [History of Greece ] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2009), Vol. D2: Reconstruction, Civil War, Reinstatement, 1945 –52, pp. 51 –81. 15. Voglis: Becoming Subject, pp. 101, 103–4. 16. Stratis Bournazos: «To M1gάlo Eunikό Sxol1ίo th6 Makronήsoy, 1947– 1950» [‘The Great National School of Makronisos, 1947– 1950’], in Stratis Bournazos (ed.): Istorikό Topίo kai Istorikή Mnήmh Memory: To Parάd1igma th6 Makronήsoy [Historical Landscape and Historical Memory: The Example of Makronisos ] (Athens: Filistor, 2000), pp. 119– 25; Voglis: Becoming Subject, pp. 77 –8. 17. Bournazos: «To M1gάlo Eunikό Sxol1ίo» [‘The Great National School’], pp. 125 –7; Voglis: Becoming a Subject, pp. 75 – 80. 18. Voglis: Becoming a Subject, p. 79. 19. Ibid., p. 82. 20. Ibid., pp. 80 – 1. 21. Bournazos: «To M1gάlo Eunikό Sxol1ίo» [‘The Great National School’], pp. 128 –33. 22. Voglis and Bournazos: «Stratόp1do Makronήsoy» [‘Makronisos’ Camp’], pp. 51 – 81. 23. AKT, File 28.2, No. 17: Lt General Kytrilakis to the Army General Staff, 16 February 1948; Vima, 1 February 1949; Voglis: Becoming a Subject, pp. 64 –8. 24. Voglis: Becoming a Subject, pp. 83 –6. 25. Bournazos: «To M1gάlo Eunikό Sxol1ίo» [‘The Great National School’], pp. 133 –42. 26. Papadimitriou: Aπό τον Λαό [From People], pp. 178–82. 27. Richter: British Intervention, pp. 141– 2, 160; Voglis: Becoming a Subject, p. 77. 28. Embros, 23 October 1949. 29. Close: ‘Introduction’, pp. 16 – 17. 30. Vasileios N. Makridis: ‘Orthodoxy in the Service of Anticommunism: The Religious Organization Zoe¨ during the Greek Civil War’ in Carabott and Sfikas (eds.): Greek Civil War, pp. 159– 74. 31. Christos Yiannaras: Οruοdοjίa kai Dύsh sthnn N1ώt1rh Εllάda [Orthodoxy and West in Newer Greece] (Athens: Domos, 1992), pp. 377–9;

NOTES TO PAGES 62 –64

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39.

40.

41. 42.

43.

44.

45.

171

Karayiannis: Η Εkklhsίa [Church], pp. 167–85; Makridis: ‘Orthodoxy’, pp. 164– 7. UN SC Resolution 15 (19 December 1946) (S/339); AKT, File 17.1, No. 103: Resolution of the UN Security Council (in French), 19 December 1946. Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, p. 283. Ibid., pp. 283– 4. Plakoudas: ‘Greek Civil War’, pp. 129– 30. Rizospastis, 19 January 1947. Rizospastis, 6 February 1947. FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 818–20: Marshall to MacVeagh, 8 February 1947; FO 371/72240, R2576: Norton to Bevin, 18 February 1948: Annual Report for 1947; Ellinikos Vorras, 2 March 1947; Fos, 5 March 1947; Alitheia, 10 March 1947; Thanasis D. Sfikas: ‘Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations Commission of Investigation in Greece, January – May 1947’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1993), pp. 252 –4. AKT, File 24.1, No. 47: Reply Note to MacVeagh, Unsigned, 18 May 1947; and No. 54: Speech of the Greek Representative before the UN Commission (at Geneva), 20 May 1947. FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 820– 1: Erthirdge to Marshall, 17 February 1947; Ellinikos Vorras, 21 February 1947; FO 371/72240, R2576: Norton to Bevin, 18 February 1948: Annual Report for 1947; Iakovos D. Michailidis (b): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ: Oi Ellhno-Gioy gkoslabikέ6 Sxέs1i6 thn P1rίodo toy Ellhnikoύ Emwylίoy Polέmoy (1947 – 1949) [Faces of Janus: Greco-Yugoslav Relations in the Period of the Greek Civil War (1947 – 1949) ] (Athens: Patakis, 2007), pp. 78– 87, 91 – 4. Rizospastis, 20 March 1947. For a thorough study of the origins of the Truman Doctrine, see: John L. Gaddis: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941– 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, ppb. 2000), pp. 316– 53; Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 70– 102; Howard Jones: ‘A New Kind of War’: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 26 – 62. For a reappraisal of the British role in the outbreak of the Cold War, see: Robert Frazier: ‘Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine’, Historical Journal, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1984), pp. 715–27; Thanasis D. Sfikas: ‘Toward a Regional Study’, pp. 209–27; John Kent: ‘British Policy and the Origins of the Cold War’ in Leffler and Painter (eds): Origins, pp. 144–66. Zachariadis and Ioannidis to Markos, 17 April 1947 in Iliou: Greek Civil War, pp. 83 – 6; No. 10: Review of Confidential Letter of Ioannidis to Markos, 17 April 1947, in Kondis and Sfetas (eds): Civil War, pp. 60 – 6. [Handwritten] Memorandum of Zachariadis to Tito, 22 April 1947 in Iliou: Greek Civil, pp. 79 – 81; Memorandum of Zachariadis to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Stalin, 13 May 1947 in Iliou: Greek Civil, pp. 91 – 7.

172

NOTES

TO PAGES

64 –66

46. Memorandum of Zachariadis to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Stalin, 13 May 1947 in Iliou (ed.): Greek Civil War, p. 96. 47. Close: ‘Changing Structure’, p. 131. 48. Minutes of the 11th Session of the ASEA, 19/2/1947 in GES/DIS: Arxeίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. III, pp. 332– 3. 49. Tim Jones: ‘The British Army and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Greece, 1945-49’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1997), pp. 92 – 4. 50. Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 137-138, 140. 51. AtBA, File 377, No. 180: Pipinelis to King Paul, 6/4/1947. 52. Moas (Partsalidis) to Denisov (Ioannidis), 22/4/1947 in Iliou: Greek Civil War, p. 143. 53. I. William Zartman: ‘Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts’, in I. William Zartman (ed.): Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 16 – 19. 54. Rizospastis, 18 April 1947. 55. Daniel Byman: ‘Talking with Insurgents: A Guide for the Perplexed,’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 127–8. See also: Patrick B. Johnston: ‘Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War: Evidence from Darfur’, Civil Wars, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2007), pp. 559 –77. 56. Byman: ‘Talking with Insurgents’, p. 129; Jeffrey Bernstein: ‘Negotiating the Insurgency: The Case for Settling Afghanistan’s War and Securing ‘Negative’ Peace’, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2012), p. 31. 57. AET, Box E, File 55, No. 22: Memorandum of the EAM to Maximos, 24 April 1947. 58. The peace terms of Venizelos involved the disarmament of the insurgents under the supervision of the UN or the Great Powers, the removal of Zervas from office, the establishment of a Centrist government that could include the EAM, and the organisation of new general elections. Moas (Partsalidis) to Denisov (Ioannidis), 19 May 1947 in Iliou: Greek Civil War, p. 144. 59. Denisov (Ioannidis) to Moas (Partsalidis), 13 June 1947 in Iliou: Greek Civil War, pp. 145– 6. 60. Iliou: Greek Civil, pp. 87 – 9; Baev: Civil War, pp. 145– 6. 61. Stavrakis: Moscow and Greek Communism, pp. 144– 50; Kenneth M. Jensen (ed.): Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan and Roberts ‘Long Telegrams’ of 1946 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1993), pp. 3 – 16; Sfikas: War and Peace, pp. 54 – 5. 62. Iatrides: ‘Revolution or Self-Defense’, p. 24. 63. FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 850–60: Ehtridge to Marshall, 20 May 1947; Thanasis D. Sfikas: ‘Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations Commission of Investigation in Greece, January– May 1947’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1993), pp. 257– 8. 64. Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, p. 284. 65. Leffler: Specter of Communism, pp. 55 – 7; Leffler: ‘Emergence’, pp. 76 – 9.

NOTES

TO PAGES

66 – 68

173

66. Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov: Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 50– 4, 102– 8; Geoffrey K. Roberts: The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945– 1991 (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 16 – 22. 67. Leffler: Specter of Communism, pp. 39 – 42; Roberts: Soviet Union, pp. 16 – 22. 68. Geoffrey Roberts: ‘Stalin and Soviet Foreign Policy’ in Leffler and Painter (eds): Origins, pp. 50 – 4; Zubok and Pleshakov: Inside Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 37, 45 – 6; Vladimir O. Pechatnov: ‘The Soviet Union and the World, 1944 – 1953’ in Leffler and Westad (eds): Cambridge History, pp. 96 – 101. 69. Denisov (Ioannidis) to Moas (Partsalidis), 12 July 1947 in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 134. 70. Ioanna Papathanasiou: «Oi Kommoynistέ6 sto «Di1unέ6» 1947» [‘The Communists in the ‘International’ 1947], in Thanasis D. Sfikas (ed.): To Sxέdio Mάrsal: Anasy gkrόthsh kai Diaίr1sh th6 Ey rώph [The Marshall Plan: Reconstruction and Division of Europe ] (Athens: Patakis, 2011), pp. 255– 7. 71. Scott D. Parrish: ‘The Marshall Plan: Soviet-American Relations and the Division of Europe, 1944 – 1949’ in Norman M. Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds): The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944 – 1949 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 267 – 90. 72. Leffler: Specter of Communism, pp. 40 – 2; Vojtech Mastny: The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11 – 29. 73. John L. Gaddis: We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 26– 43. 74. Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 29 – 30, 140– 2; Zubok and Pleshakov: Inside Kremlin’s, pp. 50 – 4, 74, 104– 8. 75. Pechatnov: ‘Soviet Union’, pp. 105 – 6; Norman M. Naimark: ‘The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944– 1953’ in Leffler and Westad (eds): Cambridge History, pp. 189– 91. 76. Michael J. Hogan: The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947– 1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Alan S. Milward: The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945– 1951 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). 77. Leffler: ‘Emergence’, pp. 77 –82. For an analysis of the general geopolitical goals of the USA, see: Geoffrey R. Sloan: Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890– 1987 (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988). 78. AKT, File 23.1, No. 14: Termination of the UNRRA’s Operation, 29 January 1947. 79. AKT, File 29.2, No. 17: Ratification of the Greco-American Economic Accords, 27 July 1947. For an analysis of the political implications of the

174

80. 81.

82. 83. 84. 85.

86.

87. 88.

89. 90.

91. 92.

93. 94. 95. 96.

NOTES

TO PAGES

68 – 69

provisions of the accords, see: Argyrios A. Fatouros: ‘Building Formal Structures of Penetration: The United States in Greece, 1947 – 1948’, in Iatrides: (ed.): Greece, pp. 245 – 8; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 144 – 5. Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 223 – 4; Jones: ‘A New Kind of War’, p. 70; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, p. 70. For the heavy influence of the Vima newspaper on the Liberal Party, see: AKT, File 22.1: No. 51: Drosos to Tsaldaris, 28 September 1947; ASKI, Box 151, File 7.38, No. 6: Moas (Parstsalidis) to Dionysis (Ioannidis), 7 July 1947. AET, Box E, File 55, No. 22: Memorandum of the EAM’s Central Committee to Maximos, 4 July 1947. FRUS (1947), Vol. V, p. 213: MacVeagh to Marshall, 7 July 1947. Ibid., p. 217: MacVeagh to Marshall, 9 July 1947. I. W. Zartman: ‘The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflict’ in Roy Licklider (ed.): Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York; London: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 25 – 7; Zartman: ‘Dynamics and Constraints ‘, p. 10. Walter: ‘Critical Barrier’, pp. 335– 6. See also: [Barbara F.] Walter: ‘Bargaining Failures and Civil War’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 12 (2009), pp. 243–61. Walter: ‘Civil Wars’, pp. 664– 5. General Report of the KKE’s Central Committee to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 17 July 1947 in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 101– 9. Rizospastis, 10 July 1947; FRUS (1947), Vol. V, p. 240: Memorandum prepared in the State Department, 17 July 1947. ASKI, Box 151, File 7.38, No. 10: Christos (Anastasiadis) to Dionysis (Ioannidis), 10 July 1947; ASKI, Box 146, File 7.33, No. 102: Christos (Anastasiadis) to Denissov (Ioannidis), 12 July 1947. Iliou: Greek Civil War, p. 70. Patrick B. Johnston: ‘Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns’, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47 – 79. FO 371/67005, R10216: Foreign Office to Norton, 16 July 1947; FO 371/67143, R11924: Reilly to Bevin, 28 August 1947. Voglis: Becoming Subject, pp. 65 – 8. Close: Origins, pp. 105– 6, 138. Stephen J. Stedman: ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5 – 53: Kelly M. Greenhilll and Solomon Major: ‘The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords’, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006– 07), pp. 7 – 40.

NOTES

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69 –71

175

97. FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 102–3: MacVeagh to Marshall, 7 March 1947; FO 371/67145, R11452: Notes of Conversation with Tsaldaris, 16 August 1947. 98. FO 371/67006, R10227: Reilly to the Foreign Office, 14 July 1947; FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 244– 5: Marshall to Embassy in Athens, 18 July 1947; FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 260– 1: MacVeagh to Marshall, 24 July 1947. 99. Wittner: American Intervention, p. 203. 100. Ibid., pp. 200, 202– 3. 101. Adamantia Pollis: ‘U.S. Intervention in Greek Trade Unions, 1947– 1950’, in Iatrides (ed.): Greece, p. 263. 102. In summary, the KKE proposed the establishment of a new Centrist government under Sophoulis (in which Tsouderos and Nikolaos Plastiras would participate), the conclusion of an agreement between the KKE and the new government (which the UN or the Allies would guarantee) and the implementation of the ‘appeasement policy’ of Sophoulis (a general amnesty with security guarantees and general elections). FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 231 –2: MacVeagh to Marshall, 13 July 1947. 103. Sfikas: Pόl1mo6 kai Eirήnh [War and Peace ], pp. 86 – 8. 104. Ibid., pp. 75 – 83, 87– 93, 104; [Thanasis D.] Sfikas: ‘A Prime Minister for All Time: Themistoklis Sofoulis from Premiership to Opposition to Premiership, 1945– 49’ in Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas (eds): The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 82 – 7, 97 – 8. 105. FO 371/67005, R10070: Aide Memoire of the British Embassy (in Washington) to the US State Department, 16 July 1947; FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 250– 2: MacVeagh to Marshall, 21 July 1947; Leonidas Kyrkos: Pίsv apό ta Kάgk1la: Έna Istorikό Ntokoy mέnto [Behind Bars: A Historical Document ] (Athens: Filistor, 1996), pp. 30 – 2. 106. FO 371/67005, R10070: Aide Memoire of the British Embassy (in Washington) to the US State Department, 16 July 1947. 107. Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 158– 66. 108. Rizospastis, 18 July 1947. 109. Kofos: Nationalism and Communism, pp. 161– 3; Michailidis (b): Faces of Janus, pp. 25 – 6; Livanios: Macedonian Question, pp. 229– 30. 110. AKT, File 24.2, No. 63: Letter from Kyrou to the UN secretary general (in English), 31 July 1947; Kondis: Anglo-American Policy, pp. 336–8; Kofos: ‘Impact’, p. 308. 111. Averoff-Tossizza: By Fire, pp. 190– 1; Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 175; Marantzidis and Tsivos: Greek Civil War, p. 98. 112. Ivo Banac: With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 37–8; Kofos: ‘Impact’, p. 309. 113. Iliou: Greek Civil War, pp. 158– 9, 175– 6. 114. YDIA (1947), File 63.3, No. 3037: Dalietos to the Foreign Ministry, 29 September 1947; Michailidis (b): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ [Faces of Janus], pp. 117– 21.

176

NOTES

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71 –73

115. Thanasis D. Sfikas: ‘Spanish Echoes in Greece, 1946– 1949: The Myth of the Participation of an ‘International Brigade’ in the Greek Civil War’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1997), p. 88. 116. FO 371/67075, R5219: Memorandum of the Greek Embassy (London) to the Foreign Office, 14 March 1947; FO 371/67146, R8258: Note of the Greek Embassy (in London) to the Foreign Office, June 1947; FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 196– 8: Greek Embassy (in Washington) to the State Department, 7 June 1947; Sfikas: ‘Spanish Echoes’, pp. 89 – 92. 117. Sfikas: ‘Spanish Echoes’, pp. 90 –3. 118. FRUS (1947), Vol. IV, pp. 577– 8: Memorandum by Notter to Rusk, 14 July 1947; FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 880– 1: Marshall to Certain Diplomatic Missions, 9 August 1947; Sfikas: ‘Spanish Echoes’, pp. 92– 5. 119. AKT, File 23.3, No. 28: Summary of the Program of Reconstruction, 30 June 1947; 23.4. No. 53: Report by Griswold: Greek Relief Program, 23 October 1947; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 177–80; 187–205. 120. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 165– 9. 121. AKT, File 23.5, No. 14: Report of the Economic Policy Committee, 11 November 1947; AKT, File 29.4: Griswold to Sophoulis, 11 May 1948; Kazakos: M1tajύ Krάtoy 6 [Between State ], pp. 111 – 17; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou: ‘Greek Reformism and its Models: The Impact of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2010), p. 3. 122. Jones: ‘A New Kind’, pp. 71 – 2. 123. AKT, File 28.5, No. 39: MPs of Northern Greece to Sophoulis, Tsaldaris and Rendis, 1 September 1948; AKT, File 39.2, No. 20: Panagiotopoulos to Tsaldaris, 26 March 1949; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 140– 1. 124. The military planners aspired to achieve two secondary objectives as well: isolate the DSE’s small units in southern Greece and, secondly, disconnect the DSE from the main lines of supply with the three Balkan countries. General Plan of Operation Terminus [by the 1st Army Corp], 10 March 1947 in GES/ DIS: Arx1ίa Emwy lίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. III, pp. 398ff; Jones: ‘British Army’, pp. 94 – 5. 125. Lt. General Rawlings to Lt. General Ventiris, 27 October 1947 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. II, pp. 179– 80; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisymmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Banditry Struggle ], pp. 261– 2, 269; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 109; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 277– 318, 326– 30. 126. YDIA (1947), File. 134.2, No. 50115: Rendis to Tsaldaris, 11 December 1947; and No. 51149: Yiantzis to Tsaldaris, 24 December 1947. For more information on how the army collected intelligence, see the following archival records: YDIA (1946), Files 1.5, 2.2, 32, 67 and 80; YDIA (1947), Files 57.6, 58.1, 120 and 121. 127. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 120.

NOTES

TO PAGES

73 –75

177

128. Close: ‘Reconstruction’, p. 176; Close: Origins, pp. 113–16, 143– 4, 155; Nikalakopoulos: Kax1ktikή Dhmokratίa [Cachectic Democracy ], pp. 32, 77 – 85; Lyberatos: Sta Prόuyra [On the Verge ], pp. 131– 46. 129. Close: ‘Changing Structure’, p. 162; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 277 –318, 326–30. 130. Thanasis D. Sfikas: «Para Bellum – O Emwύlio6 G1nik1ύ1tai, Mάrtio6 – S1ptέmbrio6 1947» [‘Para Bellum – The Civil War Becomes Widespread, March – September 1947’], in Ilias Nikolakopoulos and Ioanna Papathanasiou (eds): O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6, 1946– 1949 [The Civil War, 1946– 1949 ] (Athens: DOL, 2010), p. 82. 131. Indicatively, in August Sophoulis clandestinely came into contact with the EAM and KKE in search of a peace settlement. AKT, File 21.5, No. 6: Sophoulis to the EAM’s Central Committee, 2 August 1947; and No. 13: The EAM’s Central Committee to Sophoulis, 6 August 1947. 132. FRUS (1947): Vol. V, pp. 309 – 10: MacVeagh to Marshall, 23 August 1947; AKT, File 21.5, No. 75: MacVeagh to Tsaldaris, 24 August 1947. 133. AKT, File 21.5, No. 89: Notes and Minutes, 20 – 29 August 1947. 134. AKT, File 21.5, No. 73: Sophoulis to Tsaldaris, 24 August 1947; AKT, File 21.5, No. 8: MacVeagh to Tsaldaris, 26 August 1947. 135. AKT, File 21.5, No. 89: Notes and Minutes, 20–29 August 1947. 136. AKT, File 21.5, No. 86: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 28 August 1947; YDIA (1947), File 134.2, No. 38672: Rodopoulos to Tsaldaris and Pipinelis, 3 September 1947. 137. AKT, File 21.5, No. 8: MacVeagh to Tsaldaris, 26 August 1947. 138. Henderson to Lovett: Monthly Report to the Secretary of State from the Chief of the AMAG, 15 September 1947 in John O. Iatrides (ed.): Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933 – 1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 725 – 6. 139. Apostolos Vetsopoulos: ‘Efforts for the Development and Stabilization of the Economy during the Period of the Marshall Plan’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2009), p. 281. 140. FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, p. 32: Marshall to Dendramis, 19 January 1948. 141. FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 219– 24: Marshall to Griswold (at Washington), 11 July 1947; Fatouros: ‘Building Formal Structures’, pp. 248– 9. 142. Michael Mark Amen: ‘American Institutional Penetration into Greek Military and Political Policymaking Structures: June 1947–October 1949’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1978), p. 95. 143. Fatouros: ‘Building Formal Structures’, p. 249. 144. The Rightist leaders Gonatas and Spyros Markezinis and the Centrist leaders of the EPE appealed to King Paul. FRUS (1947): Vol. V, pp. 323– 5: MacVeagh to Marshall, 2 September 1947. 145. Royal Decree, Government Gazette, No. 141, 2 July 1947; Frederica (Queen of the Hellenes): A Measure of Understanding (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 133– 4; AtBA, File 1228, No. 307: Summary Report on the Activities of

178

146.

147.

148. 149.

150. 151.

152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158.

NOTES

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75 –76

the Fund ‘Relief for the Northern Provinces of Greece’ (in English), Unsigned, Undated [Probably 1950]. Antonis Stratakis: «Koinvnikή Politikή sthn Ellάda katά thn D1ka1tίa toy 40’: Koinvnikή Prόnoia kai to Ypoyg1ίo Eunikή6/ Koinvnikή6 Prόnoia6» [‘Social Policy in Greece during the 1940s: Social Welfare and the Ministry of National/Social Welfare’] (MA Dissertation, University of Crete, 2003), pp. 153–4; Andreas Andreou et al.: «Apό to «Paidomάzvma» sto Basilikό «Paidowύlagma»’: M1tapol1mikέ6 Όc1i6 Koinvnikή6 Dikaiosύnh6 sti6 Bόr1i16 Eparxί16 th6 Xώra6» [‘From “Child-Levy” to Royal “Child-Keeping”: Postwar Aspects of Social Justice in the Country’s Northern Provinces’], paper presented at the Fifth Scientific Conference on History of Education «Ekpaίd1ysh kai Koinvnikή Dikaiosύnh» [‘Education and Social Justice’], Patras (Greece), 19 February 2008, pp. 2–3. AtBA, File 122.2, No. 380: Cost for Every Supported Child, 7 January 1949; AtBA, File 122.2, No. 498– 594: Analytical Expenditure for the Relief of Children, 16 April 1948–4 May 1949. AtBA, Files No. 1261, 1262, 1265 and 446. Henderson named Nikolaos Plastiras, an ex-army officer of anti-Monarchist persuasion who had served as the first Prime Minister in the post-Varkiza era, and Papagos, the revered Field Marshall of Greece during World War II with strong sympathies for the Crown, as the possible heads of a service government. FO 371/72240, R2576: Norton to Bevin: Annual Report for 1947, 18 February 1948. AKT, File 22.5, No. 39: Distribution of the Ministerial Posts between Liberals and Populists, Undated [September 1947]. Alexandros Kotzias: Eunikό6 Dixasmό6: B1nizέlo6 kai Kvnstantίno6 [National Schism: Venizelos and Constantinos ] (Athens: Fytrakis, 1975); Giorgos Th. Mavrogordatos: Eunikό6 Dixasmό6 kai Mazikή Orgάnvsh: Oi Epίstratoi toy 1916 [National Schism and Mass Organisation: The Levied of 1916 ] (Athens: Alexandreia, 1996). Nikolakopoulos: Kax1ktikή Dhmokratίa [Cachectic Democracy ], pp. 38, 77. McFate and Jackson: ‘Objective’, p. 13; David R. Heines: ‘COIN in the Real World’, Parameters, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2008/09), pp. 49 – 50. Ilias Nikolakopoulos: Kόmmata [Parties ], p. 146; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, pp. 133– 4; Close: ‘Reconstruction’, pp. 158– 9, 170– 1. AKT, File 22.5, No. 39: Distribution of the Ministerial Posts between Liberals and Populists, Undated [September 1947]. YDIA (1947), File 134.2, No. 42433: Griswold to Sophoulis, 19 September 1947. Rizospastis, 9-13 October 1947; Eleutheri Ellada, 12 October 1947. Memorandum of the DSE’s Headquarters to the UN General Assembly, 5/9/1947 in KKE: Εpίshma Κ1ίm1na [Official Documents], Vol. VI, 1945– 1949, pp. 445– 6.

NOTES

TO PAGES

76 –78

179

159. Rizospastis, 9 – 13 September 1947; Eleutheri Ellada, 12 September 1947; Sfikas: ‘Prime Minister’, p. 88. 160. Vima, 16 September 1947. 161. Resolution 29, Government Gazette, No. 197, 14 September 1947; Emergency Law 809, Government Gazette, No. 255, 29 September 1947. 162. Eleutheria, 11 November 1947. 163. Νa grάcv anawοrές apό Μargarίth kai Ζaw1irόpοylο. 164. Letter of Roussos to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Review of Minutes of the Session of the KKE’s Central Committee and the Convention of the DSE’s Politico-Military Leadership] (translated from Russian) [Undated, September 1947] in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 185– 8; No 21: Note of Mosetov to Suslov for the Third Plenum of the KKE’s Central Committee, 17 October 1947 in Kondis and Sfetas (eds): Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 82 – 93. 165. Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 193. 166. Smaro (Anastasiadis) to Dionysis (Ioannidis), 8 October 1947 in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 216; Report of Stergios Anastasiadis (translated from Russian), 13 October 1947 in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 218– 23. 167. Plan ‘Limnes’ in Iliou: Ο Εllhnikός Εmwύliος Pόl1mος [Greek Civil War], pp. 207– 11; Iliou Ο Εllhnikός Εmwύliος Pόl1mος [Greek Civil War], pp. 189, 204–5; Iatrides: ‘Revolution or Self-Defense’, p. 27. 168. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, pp. 210– 12; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 69 – 71, 94 – 9; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 109–11; Nikos Marantzidis: Dhmοkratikς Stratός Εllάdaς, 1946– 1949 [Democratic Army of Greece, 1946– 1949] (Athens: Alexandria, 2010), pp. 76 – 86. 169. Sfikas: Pόl1mo6 kai Eirήnh [Peace and War ], pp. 103–4; [Thanasis D.] Sfikas: «H Eirhnopόl1mh Diάstash toy Ellhnikoύ Emwylίoy Polέmoy: Eirhn1ytikέ6 Prvtoboylί16 kai Dynatόtht16 Symbibasmoύ, 1945– 1949» [‘The Peace-and-War Dimension of the Greek Civil War: Peace Initiatives and Potentials for Comprise, 1945–1949’], in Nikolakopoulos, Rigos and Psallidas (eds): O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [The Civil War ], p. 93; Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1yuέrvsh [From Liberation ], p. 343. 170. Anna Di Biagio: ‘The Marshall Plan and the Founding of the Cominform, June-September 1947’ in Gori and Pons (eds): Soviet Union, pp. 208– 9; Mark Kramer: ‘Stalin, Soviet Policy and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe’, in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.): Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2009), p. 80. 171. Anna di Biagio: ‘The Establishment of the Cominform’ in Giuliano Procacci et al. (eds): The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949 (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1994), p. 25; Iatrides: ‘Revolution or Self-Defense’, p. 26. 172. Ioanna Papathanasiou: ‘The Cominform and the Greek Civil War, 1947– 1949’, in Carabott and Sfikas (eds): Greek Civil War, pp. 57 – 76.

180

NOTES

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78 – 80

173. YDIA (1947), File 118.1, No. 48241: Foreign Ministry to the Embassies of London, Washington, and the Permanent Representative of Greece to the U.N., 27 November 1947; and No. 49290: Metaxas to Lt General Ventiris, 30 November 1947. 174. Sfikas: ‘Spanish Echoes’, p. 98. 175. YDIA (1947), File 107.1, No. 18388: Directorate of Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry to the Directorate of Administrative and Judicial Affairs (of the Foreign Ministry), 3 February 1947. 176. YDIA (1947), File 107.1, No. 20588: Army General Staff to the Foreign Ministry, 10 March 1947; YDIA (1947), File 107.1, No. 39124: Lt. Colonel Vlachos to the Foreign Ministry, 1 September 1947; YDIA (1947), File 107.1, No. 578: Minutes of the Council of Political Affairs (of the Foreign Ministry), 21 August 1947. 177. UN SC Resolution 34 (15 September 1947) (S/555); Sfikas: ‘Britain, United States’, p. 260. 178. Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, pp. 284– 5; Sfikas: To «Xvlό Άlogo» [‘Lame Horse’ ], p. 237. 179. UN GA Resolution 109 (II) (21 October 1947); AKT, File 24.1, No. 1: Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry to All Greek Embassies, 25 September 1947. 180. Amikam Nachmani: International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The United Nations Special Committee On the Balkans, 1947– 1952 (New York; Westport, CT; London: Praeger, 1990), p. 37. 181. Ibid., pp. 37, 70 – 2, 77 – 82. 182. FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, p. 238: Marshall to Admiral Alan G. Kirk (at Salonika), 12 December 1948; Nachamani: International Intervention, pp. 103, 145. 183. Nachmani: International Intervention, p. 106. 184. Ellinikos Vorras, 14 August 1948; Alitheia, 18 August 1948; Nachmani: International Intervention, p. 135. 185. YDIA (1947), File 118.1, No. No. 48241: Foreign Ministry to the Embassies of London, Washington, and the Permanent Representative of Greece to the UN, 27 November 1947. 186. Resolution 31, Government Gazette, No. 221, 17/10/1947; Resolution 22, Government Gazette, No. 267, 22/11/1947. 187. ASKI, Box 423, File 25.5, No. 105: [Note on Political Prisoners], Undated, Unsigned, [October 1947]; Voglis: Becoming a Subject, p. 63. 188. The four categories of prisoners included: a) individuals convicted by the public security committees of the Ministry of Public Order for inciting public unrest, b) individuals convicted by the civil courts of the Ministry of Justice for committing crimes during World War II and the ‘Decemvriana’ Uprising, c) individuals sentenced by the special courts-martial of the Ministry of War for committing crimes against the state, d) soldiers and army officers exiled to prison camps, which the Army and Ministry of War operated, for their suspected sympathies toward Communism. Voglis: Becoming a Subject, p. 64.

NOTES

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80 –81

181

189. AKT, File 29.3, No. 8: Report of the International Labour Office (Geneva), 11/3/1948. 190. Pollis: ‘U.S. Intervention’, pp. 270– 273. 191. AKT, File 31.6, No. 3: Tsaldaris to Dendramis, 25/1/1948. 192. FRUS (1947), Vol. V, p. 390: Lovett to Griswold, 29/10/1947; Jones: ‘A New Kind’, pp. 105– 6; Margaritis: Istorίa [History], Vol. I, pp. 469– 470. 193. Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 233– 4; Jones: ‘A New Kind’, p. 91. 194. Wittner: American Intervention, p. 235; Jones: A New Kind, pp. 102– 103; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 114. 195. AKT, File 23.6, No. 3: Report on the [Economic] Policy of the Greek Government, Unsigned, Undated [1947]; AKT, File 29.3, No. 23: Griswold to Sophoulis, 30/3/1948; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine], pp. 177– 180; [Giorgos] Stathakis: «H Oikonomίa katά ton Emwύlio Pόl1mo [‘The Economy during the Civil War’], in Nikolakopoulos, Rigos and Psallidas (eds): O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War], p. 56. 196. AKT, File 29.2, No. 13: Total of Foreign Exchange for Imports of Basic Consumer Goods, Unsigned, Undated [February 1948]; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine], pp. 187– 95; Stathakis: «H Oikonomίa» [‘Economy’], pp. 57 – 8. 197. AKT, File 29.5, No. 56: Balance of Payments of the Greek Economy (in English), Unsigned, Undated [Probably July 1948]; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine], pp. 205– 7. 198. AKT, File 29.7, No. 8: Report of Londos, 6/9/1948; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine], pp. 208– 13.

Chapter 4 ‘Communism Delenda Est’: November 1947 –October 1949 1. The above title has been inspired by the famous Latin moto ‘Carthago delanda est’. 2. AKT, File 22.3, No. 3: Dalipis to Tsaldaris, 3/11/1947; AKT, File 22.3, No. 10: Memorandum of the MPs of Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace, 6/11/1947; AKT, File 28.1, No. 37: Papadogiannis to Tsaldaris and Sophoulis, 21 January 1948. 3. AtBA, File 1227, No. 566: Tables of the Bandit-Stricken [Refugees], 15 September 1947. 4. AKT, File 35.1, No. 1: Memorandum of the Greek Government on Economic Problems (in English), Unsigned, Undated [Late 1949] 5. AKT, File 31.8, No. 38: Karamanlis to Tsaldaris, 31 December 1948. 6. AFD, File 81.7, No. 136a: Dragoumis to Tsaldaris, 10 October 1946; and No. 174: Presidents of the Villages in Macedonia to Tsaldaris and Mavromichalis, 16 November 1946. 7. AKT, File 22.4, No. 5: Table of Evacuated Villages and Towns, 5/12/1947; Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, pp. 63– 9.

182

NOTES

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81 –83

8. AKT, File 31.8, No. 19: Helmis to Tsaldaris and Sophoulis, 14 July 1948; AKT, File 29.8, No. 15: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 6 December 1948; Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, pp. 68 – 9, 85 – 6. 9. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 233– 6. 10. AKT, File 35.1, No. 1: Memorandum of the Greek Government on Economic Problems (in English) Unsigned, Undated [Late 1949]; Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, p. 74; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 181. 11. For an analysis of the practice of population transfers by governments, see: Kelly M. Greenhill: ‘‘Draining the Sea or Feeding the Fire?’: The Use of Population Relocation in Counterinsurgency Operations’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) ‘Global Inequalities’, Chicago (Illinois, USA), 2 – 5 September 2004; Wade Markel: ‘Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control’, Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2006), pp. 35– 48. 12. Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, p. 69. 13. AKT, File 29.1, No. 26: Sophoulis to Griswold, 27 January 1948; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 182. 14. Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, pp. 83– 4. 15. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 204; Stathakis: «H Oikonomίa» [‘Economy’], pp. 56 – 61. For more information on the AMAG’s austerity programme, see the following archival records: AKT, Files 23.4, 23.5, 29.1, 29.2, 29.3, 29.4 and 29.5. 16. Wittner: American Intervention, p. 184; Vetsopoulos: ‘Efforts for Development’, pp. 282, 297. 17. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 196; Stathakis: «H Oikonomίa» [‘Economy’], pp. 58 – 9. 18. Tsoukalas: ‘Impact’, pp. 322 – 3; Nachmani: International Intervention, pp. 8 – 9. 19. Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 208– 10; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 196. 20. Tsoukalas: ‘Impact’, p. 322. 21. AKT, File 31.6., No. 13: Makris to the Ministry of Labour, 23/3/1948; Pollis: ‘U.S. Intervention’, pp. 271 – 3; Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 211 – 19. 22. ASKI, Box 151, File 7.38, No. 53: Smaro (Anastasiadis) to Dionysis (Ioannidis) 20 December 1947. 23. AKT, File 22.4, No. 49: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 25 December 1947. 24. YDIA (1947), File 134.2, No. 43162: Mavromichalis to Tsaldaris, 10 October 1947. 25. ASKI, Box 147, File 7.34, No. 222: Smaro (Anastasiadis) to Dionysis (Ioannidis), 24 December 1947. 26. Vasilis Bartziotas: O Agώna6 toy Dhmokratikoύ Stratoύ Ellάda6 [The Struggle of the Democratic Army of Greece ] (Athens: Sychroni Epochi, 1981), pp. 86 – 7.

NOTES 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

48.

TO PAGES

83 –84

183

Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army ], pp. 171– 83. AKT, File 22.3, No. 13: Stratos to Sophoulis, 7 November 1947. Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army ], pp. 63–4, 137–41. Nikos Marantzidis: «To Krάto6 toy Grάmmoy: Όc1i6 th6 Kommoynistikή6 Ejoysίa6 sthn Ellάda» [‘‘The State of Grammos’: Aspects of Communist Rule in Greece, 1943 –1949’] in Ioannis Mourelos and Iakovos D. Michailidis (eds): O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6: Mia Apotίmhsh. Politikέ6, Id1ologikέ6, Istoriograwikέ6 Pro1ktάs1i6 [The Greek Civil War: An Assessment. Political, Ideological, Historiographical Extensions ] (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2007), pp. 92 – 4. Gounaris: «Eamoboύlgaroi» [‘EAM –Bulgarians’], pp. 233– 45. Emergency Law 509, Government Gazette, No. 293, 27 December 1947. Alivizatos: Oi Politikoί Q1smoί [Political Institutions ], pp. 511– 23; Voglis: Becoming a Subject, pp. 62 – 3. FRUS (1947): Vol. V, pp. 461– 2: Rankin to Marshall, 24 December 1947; FO 371/72201, R508: Norton to Foreign Office, 8 January 1948. Emergency Law 511, Government Gazette, No. 299, 31 December 1947. Matzouris: «H Nomou1sίa » [‘Legislation’], pp. 68 – 9, 75 – 6. Voglis: Becoming a Subject, pp. 131– 8, 146– 57. Resolution 23, Government Gazette, No. 267, 7 December 1947 Law 512, Government Gazette, No. 68, 3 January 1948; Law 516, Government Gazette, 8 January 1948; Matzouris: «H Nomou1sίa» [‘Legislation’], pp. 38–43. Resolution 40, Government Gazette, No. 17, 20 January 1948. Nicos C. Alivizatos: ‘The ‘Emergency Regime’ and Civil Liberties’ in Iatrides: (ed.): Greece, pp. 220– 8. Close: ‘Introduction’, p. 18. ASKI, File 151, File 7.38, No. 106: Smaro (Anastasiadis) to Dionysis (Ioannidis), 8/2/1948; ASKI, File 151, File 7.38, No. 110: Smaro (Anastasiadis) to Dionysis (Ioannidis), 20 February 1948. Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 265. Dionysis (Ioannidis) to Smaro (Anastasiadis), 11 December 1947 in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 262– 3. Smith: ‘Greek Communist Party’, p. 145. FO 371/72236, R270: Norton to the Foreign Office, 6 January 1948; AET, Box E, File 49, No. 31: Memorandum of the Leftist Liberals to Sophoulis, 29 Janaury 1948. Constantine Despotopoulos was the ex-legal advisor at the ELAS headquarters during World War II. He submitted a memorandum to Tsouderos with the following terms: guarantees by the UN for the neutrality, territorial integrity and politico-economic sovereignty of Greece, the immediate withdrawal of all foreign military personnel (including the allied military missions and the British troops) and the establishment of a new mutually-accepted government (without the compulsory participation of the KKE) that would declare a general

184

49.

50.

51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56.

57.

58. 59. 60.

61. 62.

NOTES

TO PAGES

84 –85

amnesty and organise general elections. AET, Box E, File 54, No. 44: Prerequisites for the Cessation of Bloodshed, 2 April 1948. Ioannis Peltekis, the minister of merchant shipping in the centrist government under Sophoulis that ruled between late 1945 and early 1946, contacted Drosos – a senior official of the Populist Party – to share some thoughts on the cessation of the conflict. He argued that the conflict would end if the government authorised the emigration of 500 protagonists of the insurgency with their families and the legalisation of the KKE under a new leadership. AKT, File 28.5, No. 16: Drosos to Tsaldaris, 5 August 1948. Ellinikos Vorras, 27 December 1947; AKT, File 28.1, No. 3: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 2 January 1948; YDIA (1948), File 49.1, No. 53: Kaloutsis to Tsaldaris, 10 January 148; Michailidis (b): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ [Faces of Janus ], pp. 133– 6. AKT, File 24.5, No. 53: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 31 December 1947; AKT, File 28.1, No. 3: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 2 January 1948. YDIA (1948), File 141.3, No. 16527: Report on the Reactions of the West to the Establishment of the PDK, 27 December 1947; FO 371/67157, R16927: Foreign Office to the Embassy in Sofia, 29 December 1947; FO 371/67157, R16927: Foreign Office to the Embassy in Belgrade, 30 December 1947; FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, pp. 32 – 3: Marshall to Dendramis, 19 January 1948. Jones: A New Kind, pp. 120– 1; Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], p. 164. FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, p. 30: Kerr (Baron Inverchapel) to Marshall, 16 January 1948. Sfikas: British Labour, p. 175. Robert Frazier: ‘The Bevin – Marshall Dispute of August – November 1947 Concerning the Withdrawal of British Troops from Greece’, in Bœrentzen, Iatrides and Smith (eds.): Studies, pp. 249– 62; Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 228 –30; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 175– 8. FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, pp. 46 – 51: Report by the National Security Council to Truman, 12 February 1948; Jones: A New Kind, pp. 5– 7; Stavrakis: Moscow and Greek Communism, pp. 207– 14. FRUS (1947), Vol. V, p. 480: editorial note; Jones: A New Kind, p. 121. Livesay was put in charge of the new mission. Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, p. 71. FRUS (1947), Vol. V, pp. 478– 80: Lovett to the AMAG, 30 December 1947; Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 232– 3; Spiro C. Manolas: American Arms, Greek Blood: The Greek Guerrilla War, 1946– 1950: The Truman Doctrine, Military Operations and Historical Significance (Mt. Vernon: Va.: Phoenix, 2009), p. 111. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p.114; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, p. 71. AKT, File 28.2, No. 20: Jurisdictions of the JUSMAPG and BMM, 14/2/1948; Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 239– 40; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, pp. 80 –1; Jones: ‘British Army’, pp. 98 – 9.

NOTES

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85 –87

185

63. Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 241– 2; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, p. 79. 64. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 106. 65. Wittner: American Intervention, p. 241; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, p. 80; Jones: ‘British Army’, p. 100. 66. Peter Stavrakis: ‘Soviet Policy in Areas of Limited Control. The Case of Greece, 1944– 1949’, in Iatrides and Wrigley (eds): Greece, pp. 249– 50; Jones: ‘A New Kind’, pp. 134– 5; Sfikas: British Labour, p. 210. 67. Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 269; Tasos Sakellaropoulos: ‘Oi Dύo Stratoί, 1945– 1949» [‘The Two Armies, 1945– 1949’] in Hadziiosif (ed.): Istorίa th6 Ellάda6 [History of Greece ], Vol. D1: Reconstruction, Civil War, Restoration, 1945– 1952, p. 291; Marantzidis and Tsivos: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 112. 68. Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 83; Veremis and Close: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 110– 11; Marantzidis and Tsivos: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 112– 13. 69. Nicos Zaikos: «Di1unέ6 Dίkaio kai Emwύlioi Pόl1moi: H P1rίptvsh toy Ellhnikoύ Zhtήmato6» [‘International Law and Civil Wars: The Case of the Greek Question’] in Mourelos and Michailidis (eds): Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 37 –42. 70. No. 27: Report of Kapicic to Rankovic for the Total Aid Provided from Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist Countries to the Democratic Army from 26 October 1946 to 31 December 1947 [Undated, 1948] in Kondis and Sfetas (eds): [Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6] Civil War, pp. 103– 11; Marantzidis and Tsivos: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 108– 12. 71. Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 143–4; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 103; Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army], pp. 67, 101– 3. 72. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 101; Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army], p. 65. 73. Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, p. 77. 74. Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army], pp. 138– 9, 172– 83. 75. Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 258–9; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 104, 118; Polymeris Voglis: «Mάx16 xvrί6 Nikhtή Winner: To Krίsimo 1948» [‘Battles without Winner: The Crucial 1948’] in Nikolakopoulos and Papathanasiou (eds): Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [The Civil War ], p. 122. 76. Sfikas: British Labour, p. 243. 77. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, pp. 207–8; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 108–13, 158–214; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 102–3, 104, 120; Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army], pp. 32–51, 52–4, 137–41. 78. Ioanna Papathanasiou: ««To Όplo Parά Pόda»: L1ktikή Pol1mikή ή Politikή Anasygkrόthsh6» [‘ ‘The Gun by the Foot’: Verbal Polemic or

186

79.

80.

81. 82. 83.

84. 85.

86. 87.

88.

89.

90.

NOTES

TO PAGES

87 –88

Policy of Reconstruction?’] in Nikolakopoulos, Rigos and Psallidas (eds): Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 147– 8. Decision of the 2nd Division of the Central Committee’s Politburo, 2 December 1947 in Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 250; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 111. Leonid Ia. Gibianskii: ‘The Beginning of the Soviet –Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform’ in Procacci et al. (eds): The Cominform, pp. 469– 72, 474; [Leonid Ia.] Gibianskii: ‘The Soviet –Yugoslav Split and the Cominform’ in Norman M. Naimark and Leonid Ia. Gibianskii (eds.): The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944– 49 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 291– 312. Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 261– 2. Vladimir Dedijer: Tito (New York: Arno Press, 1972), pp. 313– 14, 316– 17. Gibianskii: ‘The Soviet – Yugoslav Conflict and the Soviet Bloc’ in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds): The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943– 53 (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 226– 7. Gibianskii: ‘Beginning’, pp. 469– 72, 474. Milovan Djilas: Conversations with Stalin, translated by Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Hartcourt Brace and World, 1962), pp. 181– 92; Vladimir Dedijer: The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948– 1953 (New York: Viking Press, 1971), pp. 68 – 9; Banac: Diary, pp. 442– 3. Dedijer: Tito, pp. 321– 2; Banac: Diary, pp. 442–3. FO 371/72236, R224: Memorandum of the Greek Embassy (in London) to the Foreign Office, 3 January 1948; FO 371/72238, R814: Memorandum of the Greek Embassy (in London) to the Foreign Office, 10 January 1948; FO 371/72238, R926: Memorandum of the Greek Embassy (in London) to the Foreign Office, 15 January 1948. YDIA (1947), File 64.3, No. 45: Note Verbale of the Embassy (in Belgrade) to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, 26/9/1947; YDIA (1947), File 64.3, No. 167: Note Verbale of the Yugoslav Embassy (in Athens) to the Foreign Ministry, 13 October 1947; YDIA (1948), File. 53.3., No. 201: Note Verbale of the Yugoslav Embassy (in Athens) to the Foreign Ministry, 9 February 1948. For more information on the sharp increase of the border skirmishes in early 1948, see the following archival records: YDIA (1947), Files 64, 74, 78, 91, 102 and 123. Third Army Corps: Dύo Xrόnia Polέmoy th6 Ellάdo6 katά toy Kόkkinoy Fasismoύ [Two Years of War of Greece against the Red Fascism ] (Thessaloniki: Third Army Corps, 1948), p. 30. For more information on the repeated border skirmishes during 1947, see the following archival records: YDIA (1947), Files 64, 65, 74, 78, 91, 102 and 123. Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], p. 181. For more information on the issue of the rising border tensions between Greece and Albania, see the following archival record: YDIA (1948), File 16.5.

NOTES

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88 – 90

187

91. Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], p. 181. For more information on the issue of the rising border tensions between Greece and Bulgaria, see the following archival record: YDIA (1948), File 13. 92. AKT, File 28.2, No. 16: Pipinelis to Dendramis and Melas, 10 February 1948; FO 371/72240, R2684: Foreign Office to Norton, 25 February 1948; FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, pp. 56 – 7: Memorandum by Baxter to Henderson, 2 March 1948. 93. FO 371/72240, R2684: Foreign Office to Norton, 25 February 1948; FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, pp. 56 – 7: Memorandum by Baxter to Henderson, 2 March 1948; AKT, File 28.2, No. 16: Pipinelis to Dendramis and Melas, 5 February 1948; AKT, File 28.3, No. 11: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 11 March 1948. 94. The treaty was directed apparently against a possible German threat. In reality, however, the treaty signalled the willingness of the five European countries to unite in the face of the growing Soviet menace. Eleutheria, 17 March 1948; Vima, 20 March 1948. 95. Kondis: H Agglo – Am1rikanikή Politikή [Anglo-American Policy ], pp. 344– 5; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 218–19. 96. Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, pp. 79 – 80. 97. AKT, File 28.2., No. 17: Lt. General Kitrilakis to the Army General Staff, 16 February 1948; AKT, File 28.3, No. 22: Lt. General Yiantzis to Stratos, 17 March 1948. 98. FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, p. 183: Grady to Marshall, 13 November 1948; FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, pp. 193– 4: Memorandum by McGhee to Lovett, 24 November 1948; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, p. 88. 99. AKT, File 28.3, No. 39: Griswold to Rendis, 11 May 1948; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, p. 78. 100. Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 246– 7. 101. AKT, File 28.1, No. 13: Chart with the Military Supplies by the British Military Mission, 8 January 1948; No. 32: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 19 Janaury 1948; and No. 46: Stratos to Sophoulis and Tsaldaris, 26 January 1948; AKT, File 28.3, No. 88: Potamianos to ASEA, 27 April 1948; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 114; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 452–55, 468–9. 102. Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 258; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 104, 118. 103. Close: ‘Introduction’, p. 23. 104. Law 809, Government Gazette, No. 255, 29 September 1948; Close: ‘Reconstruction’, pp. 176– 7; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 104, 118; Voglis: Becoming a Subject, p. 81. 105. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 114– 15; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, p. 80. 106. Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], p. 284; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 113– 14. 107. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, p. 214; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 107.

188

NOTES TO PAGES 90 – 91

108. AKT, File 28.3, No. 22: Lt. General Yiantzis to Stratos, 17 March 1948; Voglis: «Mάx16 Dίxv6 Nikhtή» [‘Battles without Winner’], p. 127. 109. Joes: ‘A New Kind’, p. 140. 110. Akropolis, 28 March 1948; Vima, 29 March 1948; Lars Bærentzen: ‘The ‘Paidomazoma’ and the Queen’s Camps’ in Bærentzen, Iatrides and Smith (eds): Studies, pp. 128– 9. 111. Akropolis, 28 March 1948. 112. Ethnos, 12 March 1948. 113. Kathimerini, 29 February 1948; Eleutheria, 4 March 1948. For more information on the diatribes of the government and press against the ‘childlevy’, see the following archival record: YDIA (1948), File 130.1. 114. Eleni Papageorgiou: «To «Paidomάzvma» katά ton Ellhnikό Emwύlio Pόl1mo» [‘The ‘Child-Levy’ during the Greek Civil War’] (MA Dissertation, Panteion University, 2008), pp. 24 – 5. 115. Georgios X. Manoukas: «Paidomάzvma»: H Agvgή kai h Didaskalίa tvn Apaxuέntvn Paidiώn [‘Child-Levy’: The Education and Teaching of the Abducted Children ] (Athens: Pelasgos, 1969), p. 22. 116. Milan Ristovic: A Long Journey Home: Greek Refugee Children in Yugoslavia, 1948– 1960 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2000), pp. 15, 18 – 22; Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, pp. 44 – 5. 117. Papageorgiou: «To «Paidomάzvma»» [‘The “Child-Levy”’], pp. 16–17, 20–3. 118. Eleutheria, 14 September 1949. 119. Vima, 15 January 1949; Ellinikos Vorras, 9 July 1948; Georgios D. Gagoulias: «Paidomάzvma». Paidiά sth Dίnh toy Emwy lίoy Polέmoy kai Argόt1ra [‘Child-Levy’: Children in the Maelstrom of the Civil War and Afterwards ] (Athens: Iolkos, 2004), pp. 44 – 5. 120. George D. Kousoulas: The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939– 1953 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1953), p. 153; Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 103– 4. 121. Ethnikos Kiryx, 4 March 1948; Ellinikos Vorras, 9 January 1948; Vima, 23 November 1948; Alitheia, 5 December 1948. 122. Vima, 4 March 1950; Gagoulias: «Paidomάzvma» [‘Child-Levy’ ], pp. 49 – 53. 123. Grigoris Farakos: «H Qέsh kai o Pόlo6 tvn Politikώn Proswύgvn sto Kommoynistikό Kίnhma kai ti6 Politikέ6 Ej1lίj1i6 sth Xώra ma6» [‘The Position and Role of the Political Refugees in the Communist Movement and the Political Developments of Our Country’] in Eleni Voutira et al. (eds): «To Όplo Parά Pόda»: Oi Politikoί Prόswyg16 toy Ellhnikoύ Emwylίoy Polέmoy sthn Anatolikή Ey rώph [‘Gun by the Foot’: The Political Exiles of the Greek Civil War in Eastern Europe ] (Thessaloniki: University of Macedonian Press, 2005), p. 21. 124. Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, p. 610; Papageorgiou: «To «Paidomάzvma»» [‘The “Child-Levy”’], pp. 20 – 1; Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, p. 46.

NOTES

TO PAGES

91 – 93

189

125. Report of Jovan Kapicic to Rankovic for the Assistance of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Other Countries to the Greek Insurgents from 26 October 1946 to 31 December 1947, Undated [1948] in Kondis and Sfetas (eds.): Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 110– 11; Report of Grozev for the State of Greek Children in Bulgaria [April 1948] in Kondis and Sfetas (eds): Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 201– 3; Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 104– 5, 148– 9; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 17 – 18; Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, pp. 48– 53, 60 – 3. 126. Manoukas: «Paidomάzvma» [‘Child-Levy’ ], p. 22. 127. Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, p. 47. 128. The International Red Cross classified the children into three categories: those removed by the insurgents (12,491 without their parents and 721 with their parents), those who sought refuge with their parents to communist Europe during or after the conflict (12,248 children), and those already residing abroad (2,100 children). Hellenic Red Cross: «Drasthriόtht16 katά th6 Xronikέ6 P1riόdoy6: I. B’ Pagkόsmio6 Pόl1mo6 kai II.Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6»» [‘Activities during the Time Periods: I. World War II, and II. Greek Civil War’] (Athens: Hellenic Red Cross, 1997), p. 55. 129. Tasoula Vervenioti: «P1rί «Paidomazώmato6» kai «Paidowylάgmato6» o Lόgo6 ή ta Paidiά sthn Dίnh th6 Emwύlia6 Diamάxh6» [‘On ‘Child-Levy’ and ‘Child-Guard’ Discourse or the Children in the Maelstrom of the Civil Conflict’] in Voutira et al. (eds): «To Όplo Parά Pόda» [‘Gun by the Foot’ ], pp. 109– 10. 130. Vervenioti: «P1rί «Paidomazώmato6»» [‘On “Child-Levy”’], pp. 109– 10. 131. Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, p. 48. 132. UN GA Resolution 260 (III) (9 December 1948) (A/RES/260). 133. Ellinikos Vorras, 11 January 1948; Makedonia, 16 January 1948; AKT, File 28.2, No. 17: Lt. General Kitrilakis to the Army General Staff, 16 February 1948; Gounaris: «Eamoboύlgaroi» [‘EAM – Bulgarians’], pp. 239 – 40. 134. Vervenioti: «P1rί «Paidomazώmato6»» [‘On “Child-Levy”’], pp. 116– 17. 135. Vervenioti: «P1rί «Paidomazώmato6»» [‘On “Child-Levy”’], p. 116. 136. For more information on the tours of the royal couple, see the following archival records: AtBA, Files 535, 536 and 537. 137. Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, pp. 85 – 6. 138. Vervenioti: «P1rί «Paidomazώmato6»» [‘On “Child-Levy”’], p. 103, 117. 139. Vima, 6 March 1948; Baerentzen: ‘The “Paidomazoma”’, p. 138; Vervenioti: «P1rί «Paidomazώmato6»» [‘On “Child-Levy”’], p. 106. 140. Ellinikos Vorras, 9 March 1948; Papageorgiou: «To «Paidomάzvma»» [‘The “Child-Levy”’], pp. 12 – 13. 141. AtBA, File 1222, No. 541: Report of Mela to the Coordinating Committee of the Fund ‘Relief of the Northern Provinces of Greece’, 15 August 1947; Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, pp. 92 – 3.

190

NOTES

TO PAGES

93 – 95

142. This state agency included representatives from the ministries of reconstruction, supply, health, military affairs, education, and welfare as well as delegates from the Hellenic Red Cross, the ‘Patriotic Institution of Social Welfare and Understanding’ (PIKPA), and the Relief Fund for the Northern Greek Provinces (EBEE). Tasoula Vervenioti: «Ta Paidiά toy Emwylίoy: Paidomάzvma ή/kai Paidowύlagma» [‘The Children of the Civil (War): Child-Levy or/and Child-Keeping’] in Vasilis Panagiotioulos (ed.): Istorίa toy Nέoy Ellhnismoύ, 1770– 2000 [History of New Hellenism, 1770– 2000 ] (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2003), Vol. VIII: Albanian Epic – Occupation and Resistance – Civil War, p. 274. 143. Ethnikos Kiryx, 23 March 1948 and 28 March 1948. 144. Vervenioti: «Ta Paidiά » [‘Children’], p. 274. 145. Eleutheria, 11 January 1967. 146. Kathimerini, 27 November 1948; Bœrentzen: ‘The “Paidomazoma”’, pp. 139–40; Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, p. 92. 147. AtBA, File 1222, No. 335: Catalogue of Supported Children, 10 December 1948. 148. AtBA, File 1222, No. 233: Catalogue of Operating Child-Cities, 31 July 1949. 149. Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, pp. 95 – 7. 150. Lina P. Tsaldaris: Eunikέ6, Koinvnikέ6, Politikέ6 Prospάu1i16 [National, Social, Political Efforts ] (Athens: n.p., 1967), pp. 35 – 43. 151. For more information on the subject, see the following archival records: AtBA, Files 1223 and 1225. 152. Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, pp. 106 –8. 153. Alexandra Mela: To Xronikό th6 Basilikή6 Prόnoia6 [The Chronicle of Royal Welfare ] (Athens: n.p., n.d.), p. 87. 154. Rizospastis, 21 April 1996; Papageorgiou: «To «Paidomάzvma»» [‘The “Child-Levy”’], pp. 41 – 2; Ethnos, 10 July 2009. See also: Thomas Theologis: H Fr1id1rίkh kai oi Paidoypόl1i6: Xvrί6 Fόbo kai Pάuo6 [Frederica and Child-Cities: Without Fear and Passion ] (Athens: Pelasgos, 2005). 155. Danforth and Van Boeschoten: Children, pp. 109 –11. 156. Jones: A New Kind, pp. 161– 2. 157. FRUS (1948): Vol. IV, pp. 59 – 60: Marshall to the Embassy in Greece, 9 March 1948; Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 145– 6. 158. FRUS (1948): Vol. IV, pp. 118– 20: Marshall to the Embassy in Greece, 6 August 1948. 159. Wittner: American Intervention, p. 147. 160. Voglis: Becoming a Subject, p. 62. 161. Voglis: Becoming a Subject, pp. 61 –2. 162. Resolution 56, Government Gazette, No. 133, 1 May 1948. 163. Alivizatos: Oi Politikoί Q1smoί [Political Institutions ], pp. 184– 7. 164. Legislative Decree 687, Government Gazette, 8 May 1948. 165. Matzouris: «H Nomou1sίa» [‘Legislation’], p. 74.

NOTES

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95 – 97

191

166. Alivizatos: ‘Executive’, pp. 161– 2; Niki Kaltsoyia-Tourvaniti: Ta Q1smikά Plaίsia toy Emwylίoy» [‘The Institutional Frameworks of the Civil (War)’], in Kleomenis S. Koutsoukis and Ioannis D. Sakas (eds): Ptyxέ6 toy Emwylίoy Polέmoy , 1946– 1949 [Aspects of the Civil War, 1946– 1949 ] (Athens: Filistor, 2000), p. 69. 167. Alivizatos: ‘Executive’, p. 162. 168. Jones: ‘A New Kind’, pp. 162– 7. 169. FO 371/72317, R8119: British Police and Prisons Mission Report, 30 June 1948. 170. Plan for Operation Dawn [by the 1st Army Corps] (27 March 1948) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa toy Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. VII, pp. 327ff; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisymmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti–Banditry Struggle ], pp. 347–9; Voglis: «Mάx16 dίxv6 Nikhtή» [‘Battles without Winner’], p. 127. 171. Report on the Military Activity of the 1st Army Corps and Report on Operation Dawn (14 April 1948– 26 May 1948) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa toy Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. VII, pp. 423ff; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 225–6; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 495– 503; Voglis: «Mάx16 dίxv6 Nikhtή» [‘Battles without Winner’], pp. 127– 8. 172. AKT, File 28.3, No. 18: Tsaldaris to Sophoulis, 16/3/1948; Vradyni, 17 March 1948. For more information on the Greek diplomatic campaign for an Eastern Mediterranean Pact, see the following archival records: YDIA (1948), Files 57.1 and 58.3. 173. Vima, 4 June 1948 and 15 July 1948. 174. AKT, File 30.8, No. 23: Tsaldaris to Dendramis, 4 April 1948; and No. 24: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 5 April 1948. 175. Bœrentzen: ‘The “Paidomazoma”’, pp. 135– 8. 176. Ellinikos Vorras, 3 June 1948. 177. Ethnikos Kiryx, 25 June 1948; Eleni Papageorgiou: «To «Paidomάzvma»» [‘The “Child-Levy”’], pp. 48 – 50. 178. Howard Jones: ‘The Diplomacy of Restraint: The United States’ Efforts to Repatriate Greek Children Evacuated during the Civil War of 1946– 49’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 3 (1985), pp. 79 – 80; Papageorgiou: «To «Paidomάzvma»» [‘The “Child-Levy”’], pp. 52 – 3. 179. Jones: ‘Diplomacy of Restraint’, pp. 66 – 7, 83 –4. 180. Banac: With Stalin, pp. 117–44; Jeronim Perovic: ‘The Tito –Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2007), pp. 52 – 62. See also the following archival records: YDIA (1948), Files 7.2, 11.2 and 11.3. 181. Gibianskii: ‘Soviet – Yugoslav Conflict’, pp. 225– 9; Perovic: ‘Tito – Stalin Split’, pp. 35 –52. 182. FRUS (1948): Vol. IV, pp. 120– 1: Grady to Marshall, 6 August 1948; FRUS (1948): Vol. IV, pp. 138–9: Grady to Marshall, 21 August 1948; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 223–4. 183. Sfikas: British Labour, p. 241.

192

NOTES TO PAGES 97 –99

184. Vetsopoulos: ‘Efforts for Development’, p. 283. 185. AKT, File 29.9, No. 46: Agreement of the ECA with Greece, Undated [Probably July 1948]; Apostolos Vetsopoulos: ‘The Economic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan in Greece, 1947– 1952: The Origins of the Greek Economic Miracle’ (PhD Thesis, London University College, 2002), p. 94. 186. AKT, File 29.5, No. 56: Balance of Payments, Fiscal Years 1947– 1948 and 1948– 1949 (in English), Unsigned, Undated [Probably July 1948]; AKT, File 29.9, No. 9: Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Economic Policy between 1946 and 1948 and Predictions for 1949, Unsigned, Undated [1949]; Stelios Zachariou: ‘Implementing the Marshall Plan in Greece: Balancing Reconstruction and Geopolitical Security’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2009), p. 307. 187. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 222. 188. AKT, File 29.5, No. 48: Dendramis to the Foreign Ministry, 9/7/1948; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 223. 189. Konstantina E. Botsiou: ‘New Policies, Old Politics: American Concepts of Reform in Marshall Plan Greece’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2009), p. 220; Zachariou: ‘Implementing Marshall Plan’, pp. 305– 7. 190. Botsiou: ‘New Policies’, pp. 221– 2. 191. AKT, File 29.9, No. 35: Summary of the First Year of the Marshall Plan in Greece (in English), Unsigned, Undated [1948]; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 227 – 33, 237 – 9; Vetsopoulos: ‘Efforts for Development’, pp. 284 – 6; Stathakis: «H Oikonomίa» [‘Economy’], pp. 62 – 4. 192. AKT, File 29.8, No. 15: Dendramis to the Foreign Ministry (in English), 6 December 1948; AKT, File 29.9, No. 6: Report on the Economic and Military State of Affairs, Unsigned, Undated [1948]; Vetsopoulos: ‘Efforts for Development’, pp. 283– 4, 294; Zachariou: ‘Implementing Marshall Plan’, p. 308. 193. AKT, File 35.1, No. 1: Memorandum of the Greek Government on Economic Problems (in English) Unsigned, Undated [Late 1949]; Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, p. 74; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 181. 194. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 233– 6; Apostolos Vetsopoulos: H Ellάda kai to Sxέdio Mάrsal. H M1tapolikή Anasygkrόthsh th6 Ellhnikή6 Oikonomίa6 [Greece and the Marshall Plan. The Post-war Reconstruction of the Greek Economy ] (Athens: Gutenberg, 2007), pp. 184– 92. 195. AKT, File 29.8, No. 20: Papadogiannis to Sophoulis, Tsaldaris and Stephanopoulos, 14 December 1948; Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, pp. 86–7. 196. Report on Operation Crown [by the 2nd Army Corps] (20 July 1948– 22 August 1948) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. VIII, pp. 515ff; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 356– 430.

NOTES

TO PAGES

99 –100

193

197. Report on Operation Crown [by the 2nd Army Corps] (20 July 1948– 22 August 1948) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. VIII, pp. 515ff; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 356– 430. 198. I.W. Zartman: ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’, Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2001), pp. 8 – 18. 199. Michel D. Haydock: City under Siege: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948 – 1949 (Washington, D.C.; London: Brassey’s, 1999); Deborah W. Larson: ‘The Origins of Containment: Truman and West Berlin’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2011), pp. 180– 212. 200. Dean G. Pruitt: ‘Whither Ripeness Theory?’ (Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2005), p. 4. 201. AKT, File 28.8, No. 4: Hand-written peace terms, Unsigned, Undated [Probably August 1948]. 202. For an analytical exposition of the polemic against Zachariadis on that issue, see: Ole L. Smith: ‘The Tsaldaris Offers for Negotiations, 1948: A Lost Opportunity or a Canard?’, Epsilon: Modern Greek and Balkan Studies, Vol. 1 (1987), pp. 83 – 9. 203. Report on Operation Vitsi [by the 2nd Army Corps] (23 August 1948 –3 December 1948) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwy lίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XI, pp. 84 – 5, 105– 9, 155– 63, 205, 224– 31; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisymmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 446– 58; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 226– 30; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 43 – 95, 108– 24; Voglis: «Mάx16 dίxv6 Nikhtή» [‘Battles without Winner’], pp. 129 –30. 204. FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, pp. 152– 3: Grady to Marshall, 29 September 1948; Jones: A New Kind, pp. 172, 183. 205. Jones: A New Kind, p. 186. 206. Jones: A New Kind, p. 187; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, pp. 87 – 8. 207. Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 229– 31; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 125– 31; Voglis: «Mάx16 dίxv6 Nikhtή» [‘Battles without Winner’], p. 130. 208. Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 551– 606. 209. AtBA, File 377, No. 255: Report of Rendis on the Military Situation, 14 December 1948; AKT, File 28.7, No. 112: Report of the Army General Staff on the Military Situation, 15 December 1948; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 423– 52; Voglis: «Mάx16 dίxv6 Nikhtή» [‘Battles without Winner’], p. 132. 210. Vonditsos-Gousias: Ta Aίtia th6 Ήtta6 [Causes of Defeat ], Vol. I, p. 440. 211. Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 207–8; Stavros G. Dayios: «O Albanikό6 Parάgonta6 sthn Lήjh toy Ellhnikoύ Emwylίoy Polέmoy, 1948– 1949») [‘The Albanian Factor in the Termination of the Greek Civil War, 1948 – 1949’], in Mourelos and Michailidis (eds): Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], p. 131.

194

NOTES

TO PAGES

101 –102

212. Ulunian: ‘Soviet Union’, p. 152; Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 207 –8. 213. Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 265– 6; Sfikas: British Labour, p. 248. 214. Makedonia, 27 June 1948; YDIA (1948), File 53.1, No. 6966: Dendramis to Foreign Ministry, 3 July 1948; YDIA (1948), File 53.2, No. 6386: Kyrou to Foreign Ministry, 27 August 1948. For more information on the unsolved issues between Athens and Belgrade, see the following archival records: YDIA (1948), Files 53, 139.2 and 139.3. 215. UN GA Resolution 193 (III) (27/11/1948); Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, pp. 285– 6. For more information on the reports of the UNSCOB, see the following archival record: YDIA (1948), File 141.6. 216. Eirini Lagani: To Paidomάzvma kai oi Ellhno-Gioygkoslabikέ6 Sxέs1i6, 1949–1953: Mia Kritikή Prosέggish [The Child-Levy and the Greco-Yugoslav Relations, 1949–1953: A Critical Approach ] (Athens: Sideris, 1996), pp. 40–2. 217. FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, p. 339: Drew to Webb, 25 May 1949; FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, pp. 316– 17: Austin to Acheson, 12 May 1949; No. 39: Report of Lt. General Jovan Kapicic to Rankovic for the Aid of Yugoslavia to the Democratic Army during 1948’ in Kondis and Sfetas (eds): Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 125– 7. 218. Van Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, pp. 285– 6. 219. UN GA Resolution 193 (III) (27 November 1948); Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, p. 286. 220. This programme involved the resumption of diplomatic relations, the recognition and respect of the existing borders, the conclusion of multilateral agreements for border issues, and the resolution of the refugee and minority issues through diplomacy. YDIA (1949), File 25.1., No. 30885: Kyrou to the Foreign Ministry, 9/5/1949; Harry N. Howard: ‘Greece and its Balkan Neighbours (1948 – 1949). The United Nations Attempts at Conciliation’, Balkan Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1996), p. 5. 221. YDIA (1949), File 25.1, No. 23840: Dendarmis to the Foreign Ministry, 21/5/1949; Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, p. 286. 222. FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, pp. 333– 5: Evatt to Acheson (at Paris), 21 May 1949; FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, pp. 341– 4: Millar to Rusk, 25 May 1949; Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, p. 286. 223. FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, pp. 220– 2: Memorandum of Conversation by Baxter, 29 December 1948. 224. Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 227– 31, 249. 225. YDIA (1948), File 7.4, No. 2828: Report of Kaloutsis to the Foreign Ministry, 9 November 1948; Michailidis (b): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ [Faces of Janus ], p. 35. 226. Joze Pirjevec: ‘The Tito – Stalin Split and the End of the Civil War in Greece’ in Bœrentzen, Iatrides and Smith (eds): Studies, pp. 311– 15; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 249– 51; Michailidis (b): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ [Faces of Janus ], pp. 178– 9, 186– 8.

NOTES 227. 228. 229. 230.

231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243.

244. 245. 246.

247. 248. 249.

250. 251.

TO PAGES

102 –104

195

Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 108. Royal Decree, Government Gazette, 25 October 1948. Royal Decree, Government Gazette, 30 October 1948. AKT, File 28.7, No. 39: Memorandum by Papagos, 11 November 1948; GAK: AfRP, File 377, No. 246: Grady to Sophoulis, 6 December 1948; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, pp. 88 – 9. AKT, File 28.6, No. 41: Stephanopoulos to Tsaldaris, 30 October 1948; AKT, File 28.7, No. 42: Stephanopoulos to Tsaldaris, 12 November 1948. AKT, File 28.7, No. 44: Stephanopoulos to Tsaldaris, 12 November 1948. Close: ‘Reconstruction’, p. 166; Close: ‘Changing Structure’, p. 131. AKT, File 28.7, No. 60: IDEA to Tsaldaris, 16 November 1948. Alivizatos: ‘Executive’, pp. 169– 70. Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 143– 148. FO 371/72249, R12922: Norton to the Foreign Office, 16 November 1948; Sfikas: British Labour, p. 230. AKT, File 28.7, No. 81: Tsaldaris to Mavromichalis, 21 November 1948. Sfikas: ‘Prime Minister’, p. 96. Close: ‘Changing Structure’, p. 143; Rizas: Apό thn Ap1l1y uέrvsh [From Liberation ], p. 45. FRUS (1948), Vol. IV, pp. 186– 7: Grady to Marshall, 20 November 1948. Sfikas: ‘Prime Minister’, p. 96. (Crown) Prince Paul had been appointed head of the neo-fascist youth organisation of the pre-war Metaxas dictatorship. Wittner: American Intervention, p. 119. AtBA, File 378, No. 315: Conversation of King Paul with Harriman, 1 January 1949. AtBA, File 378, No. 348–54: Ultimatums of the King to the Political Leaders, 17 January 1949. John O. Iatrides: ‘American Attitudes toward the Political System of Post-War Greece’ in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides (eds): Greek–American Relations: A Critical Review (New York, NY: Pella Pub. Co., 1980), pp. 67–9. AtBA, File 378, No. 318: Conversation of King Paul with Nuveen, 4 January 1949. FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, pp. 233–6: Grady to Acheson, 5 and 12 January 1949; AKT, File 34.1, No.1: Grady to Metaxas, 18 January 1949. AtBA, File 378, No. 360: Markezinis to King Paul, 18 January 1940; AKT, File 34.1, No. 19: Formation of a New Coalition Government, 19 January 1949; Spyridon Markezinis: Sύgxronh Politikή Istorίa th6 Ellάdo6 (1946 – 1975) [Modern Political History of Greece, (1936 – 1975) ] (Athens: Papyros, 1994), Vol. II: 1944– 1951, p. 316. Sfikas: ‘Prime Minister’, p. 96. AKT, File 34.1, No. 19: Formation of a New Coalition Government, 19 January 1949.

196

NOTES

TO PAGES

104 –107

252. The APS was comprised of the field marshal, the prime minister and deputy president, the ministers of foreign affairs and public order, the ministers of the armed forces (military affairs, navy and air force), the members of the coordinative council of the armed forces, and the commanders of the two allied military missions. 253. Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 533 – 5. 254. Sepp: ‘Best Practices’, p. 11; Richard A. Lacquement: ‘Integrating Civilian and Military Activities’, Parameters, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2010), pp. 15 –16. 255. Gray: War, Peace, p. 293; Robert Egnell: Complex Peace Operations and Civil – Military Relations: Winning the Peace (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 177 – 8. 256. Frank J. Abbott: ‘The Greek Civil War, 1947– 1949: Lessons for the Operational Artist in Foreign Internal Defense’ (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), p. 39. 257. Janine Davidson: ‘Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency: Evolution and Debate’ (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009), p. 4, http://www.brookings.edu/,/media/research/files/papers/2009/6/08% 20counterinsurgency%20davidson/0608_counterinsurgency_davidson.pdf (accessed on 15 October 2013). 258. Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 247– 8; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 118; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, pp. 94 – 5. 259. AtBA, File 1227, No. 57: Report by Alexandra Mela, Undated [Probably December 1948]; AKT, File 31.8, No. 37: Karamanlis to the Cabinet, 14 December 1949. 260. Jones: ‘A New Kind ’, p. 187; Manolas: American Arms, pp. 109 – 15. 261. AKT: File 28.2., No. 17: Lt. General Kytrilakis to Army General Staff, 16 February 1948. 262. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 116– 17. 263. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 237 – 51, 253 – 7; Stathakis: «H Oikonomίa» [‘Economy’], pp. 65– 6. For more information on the austerity programme of the ECA/G, see the following archival records: AKT, Files 29.6, 29.7, 29.8, 31.6, 35.1 and 35.2. 264. AKT, File 29.4, No. 31: Griswold to Sophoulis, 11 May 1948; AKT, File 36.1, No. 2: Griswold to Tsaldaris and Sophoulis, 15 June 1948; Zachariou: ‘Implementing Marshall Plan’, p. 309. 265. Markezinis: Sύgxronh Politikή Istorίa [Modern Political History ], Vol. II: 1944– 1951, p. 325. 266. AKT, File 36.2, No. 5: Peace Proposals of the Greek Guerrillas (in English), 9 August 1949. 267. For example, see: Sfikas: «H Eirhnopόl1mh Diάstash» [‘The Peace-andWar Dimension’], pp. 99– 101. 268. Report by the Directorate of the National Guard of Thessaly on the Events in Karditsa (12 December 1948 – 13 December 1948) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa

NOTES

269.

270.

271. 272. 273. 274. 275.

276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286.

TO PAGES

107 –109

197

Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XI, pp. 368– 82; Report by the Army General Staff on the Attack on Naousa (11/1/1949 – 16/1/1949) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XI, pp. 94 –7; Report by the DSE’s 2nd Battalion on the Operation in Karpenisi (19 January 1949) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwy lίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XI, pp. 121ff; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 165 –212. Resolution of the Politburo of the KKE’s Central Committee, 27 August 1948 in KKE: Epίshma K1ίm1na [Official Documents ], Vol. VI: 1945– 1949, p. 282; Kathimerini, 24 June 2012. Report by the 1st Army Corps on Operation ‘PIGEON’, 14 December 1948 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XI, pp. 291– 305; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 231– 2; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 310– 38. Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 111– 14. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 120; Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army ], pp. 137– 45. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 120; Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army ], pp. 115– 23. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 119– 20; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 259– 94. Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the KKE’s Central Committee, 31/1/1949 in KKE: Epίshma K1ίm1na [Official Documents ], Vol. VI, 1945– 1949, pp. 337 –38; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 242– 3, 245. Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 242– 3; Veremis and Close: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 120; Shradder: Withered Vine, pp. 67 – 71. Stavrakis: Moscow and Greek Communism, pp. 264–8; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 242 –4. Veremis and Close: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 120; Shradder: Withered Vine, pp. 67 – 71, 84 – 5; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 242– 3. AKT, File 34.1, No. 73: Memorandum of the National Union of Northern Greeks (Epirotes, Thracians, Macedonians), 22 February 1949. Sfikas: British Labour, p. 250. AKT, File 34.1, No. 73: National Union of Northern Greeks to Sophoulis, 22 February 1949; Sfikas: British Labour, p. 245. Kofos: ‘Impact’, pp. 312– 13. Dayios: «O Albanikό6 Parάgonta6» [‘Albanian Factor’], pp. 124– 6. Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army ], pp. 57 –8. Marantzidis: Dhmokratikό6 Stratό6 [Democratic Army ], pp. 57 –63. Report by the 2nd Division on the Assault on Florina by Bandits (From Night 11 – 12 February 1949– 15 February 1949) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwy lίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XII, pp. 219– 26, 239– 40; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ] Vol. II, pp. 229– 34.

198

NOTES

TO PAGES

110 –111

287. AKT, File 31.8, No. 43: Programme for the Rehabilitation of Refugees, Unsigned, Undated [Probably December 1948]. 288. AKT, File 35.1, No. 1: Memorandum of Greek Government on Economic Problems (in English), Unsigned, Undated [Late 1949]; Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, pp. 74; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 239. 289. Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, p. 77; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 125– 6; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 118– 19. 290. FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, p. 305, note 3: Memorandum of Conversation by Rusk, 5 May 1949. 291. Vontitsos-Gousias: Ta Aίtia th6 Ήtta6 [Causes of Defeat ], Vol. I, pp. 501– 3,506. 292. For an extensive analysis of the origins of NATO, see: Lawrence S. Kaplan: The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1984); John Baylis: The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942– 1949 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1993). 293. As in World War I, the occupation of Albania would offer the Yugoslavs a crucial base for resupply – and retreat in case of defeat. Vima, 5 April 1949. 294. YDIA (1949), File 70.1, No Number: Notes on the Albanian Issue and Future Actions, Unsigned, Undated [1949]; AKT, File 34.3, No. 29: Pipinelis to the Foreign Ministry, 7 August 1949. 295. For more information on the preoccupation of the Greek monarchist regime with the issue of Northern Epirus, see the following archival records: YDIA (1946), File 33; YDIA (1947), File 70.2. 296. The hegemonic visions of Tito had caused the earlier outburst of Stalin in early 1948 as shown in previous sections of this book. 297. Rizospastis, 2 February 1997. 298. Vontitsos-Gousias: Ta Aίtia th6 Ήtta6 [Causes of Defeat ], Vol. I, pp. 501– 3,506. 299. Kondis: H Agglo-Am1riakanikή Politikή [Anglo-American Policy ], pp. 382– 8; Stavrakis: Moscow and Greek Communism, pp. 181– 5. 300. Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], p. 216. 301. Weekly Report on Operations (16 May 1949 – 23 March 1949) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XIII, pp. 401– 2; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 584– 94; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 235– 6; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 453– 8; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, pp. 99 – 100. 302. For an extensive analysis of the ‘clear-hold-build’ operational concept, see: Stephen C. Philips: ‘Establishing a Suitable Tactical Design Model for ClearHold-Build Counterinsurgency Campaigns’ (MA Dissertation, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009); David H. Ucko: ‘The Five Fallacies of Clear-Hold-Build: Counter-Insurgency, Governance and Development at the Local Level’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 158, No. 3 (2013), pp. 54 – 61.

NOTES

TO PAGES

111 –113

199

303. Abbot: ‘Greek Civil War’, p. 34; Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 235; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, pp. 96 – 7. 304. Howard: A New Kind, p. 209. 305. FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, pp. 320–1: Editorial Note; YDIA (1949), File 32.1, No. 3028: Mostras to the Foreign Ministry, 21 May 1949; FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, pp. 345–7: Grady to Webb, 26 May 1949; FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, pp. 353–5: Grady to Webb, 6 August 1949; Sfikas: British Labour, pp. 257–60. 306. Markezinis: Sύgxronh Politikή Istorίa [Modern Political History ], Vol. II: 1944– 1951, p. 327. 307. Markezinis: Sύgxronh Politikή Istorίa [Modern Political History ], Vol. II: 1944– 1951, p. 329. 308. Ellinikos Vorras, 12 July 1949; Embros, 12 July 1949. 309. Michailidis (b): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ [Faces of Janus ], pp. 191– 8. 310. Intelligence Report by the 2nd Army Corps: Information Until 31 July 1949 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XV, pp. 33 – 51; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 114– 15, 185– 6, 193– 4; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 120– 2. 311. Ioannis D. Stefanidis: ‘United States, Great Britain and the Greek–Yugoslav Rapprochement, 1949–1950’, Balkan Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986), pp. 315–43. 312. Structure of Army: Chart of the National Army’s Units on 1 August 1949 in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XIV, pp. 127– 32; Report by the 2nd Division on Operation Torch in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XIV, p. 302; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 595 –9. 313. Report by the 1st Army Corps on Operation Torch (2 August 1949– 30 August 1949) in GES/DIS: Arx1ίa Emwylίoy Polέmoy [Archives of Civil War ], Vol. XIV, pp. 417– 54; Zafeiropoulos: O Antisy mmoriakό6 Agώna6 [Anti-Bandit Struggle ], pp. 599– 636; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 237– 40; Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. II, pp. 511– 47; Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, pp. 101– 4. 314. AKT, File 34.3, No. 29: Pipinelis to the Foreign Ministry, 7 August 1949; AtBA, File 378, No. 414: Markezinis (Leader of the New Party and Governmental Partner) to King Paul, 23 August 1949; Kofos: Nationalism and Communism, p. 185. 315. Baev: O Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Civil War ], pp. 216– 17. 316. Dayios: «O Albanikό6 Parάgonta6» [‘Albanian Factor’], p. 137. 317. Kristian Skrede Gledistch: ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2007), p. 295; Idean Salehyan: ‘Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010). 318. AKT, File 34.3, No. 41: Conversation between Tsaldaris and Bevin, 12 August 1949; Vima, 12 September 1949; FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, pp. 427– 8:

200

319.

320. 321. 322. 323. 324.

325. 326.

327. 328. 329.

330. 331. 332.

333.

334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341.

NOTES

TO PAGES

113 –116

Memorandum of Meeting with Truman by Rusk, 1 October 1949; Dayios:: «O Albanikό6 Parάgonta6» [‘Albanian Factor’], pp. 140– 2. Beatrice Heuser: ‘Covert Action within British and American Concepts of Containment, 1948– 1951’ in Richard D. Aldrich (ed.): British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945– 51 (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 71 – 2; Sarah-Jane Corke: US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945–53 (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 2 –4. Delaporta: ‘Role of Britain’, p. 104. YDIA (1949), No. 7179: Dendramis to Tsaldaris, 19 October 1949; Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 123. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, p. 123. Alivizatos: Oi Politikoί Q1smoί [Political Institutions ], p. 494. Edward N. Luttwak: ‘Give War a Chance’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4 (1999), pp. 36–44; Monica D. Toft: Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 5–6. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 237– 51, 253– 7. AKT, File 35.2, No. 15: Report of the Ministry of National Economy for the Rehabilitation of Refugees, 18 July 1949; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 239. AKT, File 35.2, No. 15: Report of Helmis on the Rehabilitation of Refugees, 18 July 1949; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], p. 239. Stratakis: «Koinvnikή Politikή» [‘Social Policy’], pp. 165–7. AKT, File 29.7, No. 14: Stephanopoulos to Tsaldaris, 11 September 1948; AKT, File 38.4, No. 1: Dendramis to the Foreign Ministry, 4 January 1949; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 229– 30, 235– 6. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 290– 1. AKT, File 31.8, No. 11: Note of the ECA/G (in English), 4 May 1949. AtBA, File 1227, No. 57: Report by Mela, Undated [Probably December 1948]; YDIA (1949), File 25.4, No. 148: Report by the Ministry of Press and Information (in English), 11 August 1949. AKT, File 40.8, No. 6: Memorandum on the Greek Refugee Problem by Tsaldaris and Venizelos (in English), 6 October 1949; Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, pp. 91 – 3. Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, pp. 88– 90, 93. AKT, File 31.8, No. 37: Karamanlis to the Cabinet, 14 December 1949. Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, p. 91. AKT, File 40.8, No. 6: Memorandum on the Greek Refugee Problem by Tsaldaris and Venizelos (in English), 6 October 1949. Vetsopoulos: ‘Efforts for Development’, p. 287. AKT, File 35.4: Report on the Budget for the Fiscal Year 1949– 1950, Unsigned, Undated [1949]; Vetsopoulos: ‘Efforts for Development’, p. 287. AKT, File 38.4, No. 2: Dendramis to the Foreign Ministry, 21 October 1949; Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 317– 21. Stathakis: To Dόgma Troύman [Truman Doctrine ], pp. 359– 61.

NOTES

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116 –120

201

342. Vetsopoulos: ‘Efforts for Development’, p. 296. 343. AKT, File 34.2, No. 51: Zaimis to Tsaldaris, 12 May 1949; AKT, File 34.3, No. 28: Tsaldaris to Venizelos, 5 August 1949. 344. AtBA, File 378, No. 459– 466: Conversation of Diomidis with Grady, 24 October 1949; Royal Decree, Government Gazette, No. 19, 17 January 1950. 345. FRUS (1949), Vol. VI, p. 430: Editorial Note; Harry N. Howard: ‘The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations’ (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 5 – 8; Voglis: Becoming a Subject, pp. 223– 4. 346. AKT, File 34.3, No. 43: Memorandum by Pipinelis, 12 August 1949. 347. Voglis: Becoming a Subject, p. 63. 348. Royal Decree, Government Gazette, No. 42, 11 February 1950. 349. Alivizatos: Oi Politikoί Q1smoί [Political Institutions], p. 494. 350. Close: ‘Introduction’, pp. 26 – 7; Close: Origins, p. 220. 351. UN GA Resolution 288 (IV) A (18 November 1949); Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, p. 287; AtBA, File 1223, No. 465: International Red Cross to the British Lord Chamberlain, 27 November 1948. For more information on Resolution 288 of the U.N. General Assembly, see the following archival collection: YDIA (1949), File 33. 352. Jones: ‘Diplomacy of Restraint’, pp. 79 – 80; Lagani: To Paidomάzvma [Child-Levy ], pp. 109– 10. 353. UN GA Resolution 288 (IV) A (18 November 1949); Coufoudakis: ‘United States’, pp. 287–8; Zaikos: «Di1unέ6 Dίkaio» [‘International Law’], pp. 49–50. 354. YDIA (1951), File 82.4: Memorandum to the UN General Assembly on the Problem of the Repatriation of the Greek Children, 3 August 1951; Papageorgiou: «To «Paidomάzvma»» [‘The “Child-Levy”’], pp. 58 – 62. 355. Danforth and Boeschoten: Children, pp. 81 – 2. 356. AtBA, File 1229, No. 588: Minutes of the 76th Session of the Executive Committee of the Fund ‘Relief for the Northern Provinces of Greece’, 28 October 1949; Vervenioti: «P1rί «Paidomazώmato6»» [‘On “ChildLevy”’], p. 119. 357. Eleutherotypia, 15 December 2002; Andreou et al.: «Apό to «Paidomάzvma»» [‘From “Child-Levy”’], pp. 4 – 5. 358. Eleutherotypia, 15 December 2002; Andreou et al.: «Apό to «Paidomάzvma»» [‘From “Child-Levy”’], pp. 6 – 7.

Conclusion

What does the Greek Civil War Teach Us?

1. Jones: ‘A New Kind ’, pp. 234–5; Wittner: American Intervention, pp. 307– 9. 2. Jones: ‘British Army’, p. 101. See also: Tim L. Jones: ‘The British Army and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Transition, 1944 – 52’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1996), pp. 279– 95. 3. Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 268– 9, footnote 16. 4. Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, pp. 55– 8.

202

NOTES

TO PAGES

120 –123

5. Kousoulas: Revolution and Defeat, p. 270, footnote 21; Shrader: Withered Vine, p. 252. 6. Close: Origins, p. 219. 7. Laiou: ‘Population Movements’, p. 60. 8. Margaritis: Istorίa [History ], Vol. I, pp. 50 – 1. 9. Sfikas: ‘Prime Minister’, p. 98; Iliou: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 159– 60. 10. Iatrides: ‘Civil War’, pp. 199– 201; Shrader: Withered Vine, pp. 78 – 81. 11. Indicative works of this historiographical thesis include: Foivos N. Gregoriadis: Istorίa toy Emwylίoy Polέmoy , 1944– 49: To D1ύt1ro Antάrtiko [History of the Civil War, 1945– 49: The Second Guerrilla War ] (Athens: Kamarinopoulos Brothers, n.d.), Vol. I – IV; Tasos Vournas: Istorίa th6 Sύgxronh6 Ellάda6: O Emwύlio6 [History of Modern Greece: The Civil (War) ] (Athens: Tolidis Brothers, 1981). 12. Marantzidis and Tsivos: O Ellhnikό6 Emwύlio6 Pόl1mo6 [Greek Civil War ], pp. 80 –92, 100–6. 13. Close and Veremis: ‘Military Struggle’, pp. 116– 17. 14. Bartziotas: Ejήnta Xrόnia [Sixty Years ], pp. 286– 7; Vonditsos-Gousias: Ta Aίtia th6 Ήtta [Causes for Defeat ], Vol. I, pp. 525– 6; Nikolaos I. Mertzos: Svarnut: The Betrayed Insurgency (in Greek) (Thessaloniki: Erodios, 1980), pp. 298– 9; Svetovar Vucmanovic (general ‘Tempo’): How and Why the People’s Liberation Struggle of Greece Met with Defeat (London: Merlin Press, 1950, ppb. 1985), p. 92. 15. Edgar O’Ballance: The Greek Civil War, 1944– 1949 (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 195; William H. McNeil: Greece: American Aid in Action, 1946– 1957 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1957), p. 42. 16. Murray: ‘Anti-Bandit War’, pp. 108–9; Kousoulas: Revolution and Defeat, p. 271; Dominque Eudes: The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943– 1949 (London: NLB, 1972), p. 313. 17. Robert E. Osgood: Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Richard V. Burks: The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 48; Dimitrios G. Kousoulas: ‘The Success of the Truman Doctrine Was Not Accidental’, Military Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1965), pp. 88 – 92. 18. Alexander Papagos: ‘Guerrilla Warfare’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1952), pp. 215 –30. 19. Amen: ‘American Institutional Penetration’, p. 113. For a similar, yet milder, view, see: Fatouros: ‘Building Formal Structures’, p. 289. 20. Robert O. Keohane: ‘The Big Influence of Small Allies’, Foreign Policy, No. 2 (1971), pp. 161– 82; Ladwig: ‘Assisting Counterinsurgency’, pp. 16 – 17. 21. Handel: Masters of War, pp. 94 – 5 (emphasis in the original). 22. Handel: Masters of War, p. 95; Kilcullen: Accidental Guerrilla, p. 183. 23. Heuser: Evolution of Strategy, pp. 493– 5.

NOTES

TO PAGES

124 –126

203

24. Joshua T. White: ‘Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan’s Frontier’ (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009), p. 4. For quite similar views, see: Cordesman: ‘Iraq War’, pp. 13, 16; Seth G. Jones: ‘Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’ (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2008), p. xi; Greg Mills and David Richards: ‘Introduction: Contemporary Insurgency’ in Greg Mills and David Richards (eds): Victory among People: Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States (London: RUSI, 2011), p. 13. 25. Kilcullen: Accidental Guerrilla, p. 183. 26. Mathew Adam Kocher, Thomas B. Pepinsky and Stathis N. Kalyvas: ‘Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2011), p. 204. 27. Stathis Kalyvas: The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 151– 60. 28. Downes: ‘Draining Sea’, pp. 420– 44. 29. John E. Galvin: ‘Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm’ in Max G. Manwaring (ed.): Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict (Boulder, CO: Oxford: Westview, 1991), pp. 9– 18. 30. Yuri M. Zhukov: ‘Evaluating Success in Counterinsurgency, 1804–2000: Does Regime Type Matter?’, paper presented at the 21st Convention of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO) ‘Fighting Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights’, Andalo – Trento (Italy), 6–13 January 2008, pp. 2–4. 31. Zhukov: ‘Examining’, pp. 458– 60. 32. Michel J. Engelhardt: ‘Democracies, Dictatorships and Counter-insurgency: Does Regime Type Really Matter?’, Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1992), p. 58; Zhukov: ‘Evaluating Success’, pp. 13 – 14. 33. Cassidy: ‘British Army’, p. 53. 34. Cassidy: Counterinsurgency, pp. 37– 126. See also: DeVore: ‘Institutions, Culture’, pp. 169– 91. 35. Ken Booth: Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), p. 121. 36. Alastair Ian Johnston: Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alan Macmillan: ‘Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1949– 52’ (Ph.D. Thesis, Aberystwyth University, 1996). 37. Colin S. Gray: ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), pp. 51 – 2; Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal: ‘Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2007), p. 289. 38. Nikolaos Ladis: ‘Assessing Greek Grand Strategic Thought and Practice: Insights from the Strategic Culture Approach’ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Southampton, 2003), pp. 9 – 24, 91 – 56.

204

NOTES

TO PAGES

126 –127

39. Spyridon Plakoudas: ‘The Strategic Culture of Greece: 1831 – 1974’ (in Greek), Foreign Affairs (Greece), Vol. 38 (2016), pp. 165– 77. 40. Kassidy: Counterinsurgency, pp. 114– 21. 41. Joes: Resisting Rebellion, p. 222 42. Jones: ‘British Army’, p. 101. 43. Murray: ‘Anti-Bandit War’, pp. 68–90; Shafer: Deadly Paradigms, pp. 104–32; Abbott: ‘Greek Civil War’, pp. 37–41.

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Published Primary Sources: Works of Military Strategists Callwell, Charles E.: Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London: HMSO, 1906, reprinted by Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). Gallie´ni, Joseph-Simon: Trois Colonnes au Tonkin, 1894– 1895 (Paris: Chapelot, 1899). ———: Neuf Ans a` Madagascar (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1908). Galula, David: Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, ppb. 2006). Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1984). Kilcullen, David: The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London: C. Hurst, 2009). Kitson, Sir Frank: Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971). ———: Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, 1977). Leites, Nathan and Charles L. Wolf: Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham, 1970). Lyautey, Hubert: Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar, 1894 –1899 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1920, ppb. 1933). ———: Lettres du Sud de Madagascar, 1900– 1902 (Paris: Librairie Armand Collin, 1935). Marcenado, Marque´s de Santa Cruz de: Reflexiones Militares (Turin: Juan Fransisco Mairesse, 1724– 7 and Paris: Simon Langlois, 1730, reprinted as Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2004), Vol. VIII. Mason, Jennifer: Qualitative Researching (London: Sage, 1996). McCuen, John J.: The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counterinsurgency (London: Faber and Faber, 1966). Mendoza, Don Bernadino de: Theo´rica y Pra´tica de Guerra (Madrid: Pedro Madigal, 1595, reprinted as Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 1998). Nasution, Abdul Haris: Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1965). Thompson, Sir Robert: Defeating Communist insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1966, ppb. 1987). Trinquier, Roger: Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, translated by Daniel Lee (New York: Praeger, 1964, ppb. 2006). Tukhachevsky, Mikhail N.: “Borbas Kontrrevoliutsionnim Vosstanian” [“Struggle with Counter-Revolutionary Uprisings”], Voina i Revoliustsiia, No. 9 (1926) Walter Laqueuer has presented excerpts of the article of Tukhachevsly under a new title: Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky: “The Struggle against Banditry”, quoted in Walter Laqueur (ed.): The Guerrilla Reader: A Historical Anthology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), pp. 179– 84.

Published Primary Sources: Newspapers Akropolis (Right-wing) Eleutheria (Centrist) Eleutheri Ellada (newspaper of the EAM) Eutherotypia (Left-wing) Elliniko Aima (Right-wing)

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Ellinikos Vorras (Right-wing) Embros (Right-wing) Ethnikos Kiryx (Right-wing) Ethnos (Right-wing) Kathimerini (Right-wing) Makedonia (Right-wing) Rizospastis (official newspaper of the EAM) Vima (Right-wing) Vradyni (Right-wing)

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Christidis, George E.: Ta Kommoy nistikά Balkάnia: Eisagvgή sthn Esvt1rikή kai Ejvt1rikή Politikή sthn Albanίa, Boy lgarίa, Gioy gkoslabίa kai Poy manίa thn P1rίodo 1945– 1989 [The Communist Balkans: Introduction in the Domestic and Foreign Policy of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania in the Period 1945– 1989 ] (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 2003). Clogg, Richard: A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Close, David H.: The Origins of the Greek Civil War (London: Longman, 1995). Cohen, A. A.: Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012). Corbett, Robin: Guerrilla Warfare: From 1939 to the Present Day (London: Guild Publishing, 1986). Couloumbis Theodore A., John. A. Petropoulos, and Harry J. Psomiades (eds): Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: A Historical Perspective (New York, NY: Pella Publishing Co., 1976). Creveld, Martin Van: The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq (New York: Pressidio Press, 2006). Danforth, Loring M. and Riki Van Boeschoten: Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). Donohue, Laura K.: The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics and Liberty (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Egnell, Robert: Complex Peace Operation and Civil-Military Relations: Winning the Peace (London; New York: Routledge, 2009). Elefantis, Aggelos: H Epagg1lίa th6 Adύnath6 Epanάstash6: KKE kai Astismό6 ston M1sopόl1mo [The Profession of the Impossible Revolution: KKE and Bourgeoisie in the Inter-War Years ] (Athens: Themelio, 1979). Ellis, John: A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1975). ———: From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and CounterInsurgency Warfare, from the Romans to the Present (London: Greenhill, 1995). Eudes, Dominique: The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943– 1949 (London: NLB, 1972). Fairbairn, Geoffrey: Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version (London: Pelican Books, 1975). Fowler, Michael C.: Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Modern Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). Frazier, Ronald: Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942– 1947 (New York: Macmillan, 1991). Gaddis, John L.: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941– 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, ppb. 2000). ———: We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). Giannoulopoulos, Giannis N.: O M1tapol1mikό6 Kόsmo6: Ellhnikή kai Ey rvpaϊkή Istorίa, 1945– 1963 [The PostWar World: Greek and European History, 1945– 1963 ] (Athens: Papazisis, 1992). Gottschalk, Louis R.: Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method (New York: Knopf, 1950). Gounaris, Vasilis: «Egnvsmέnvn Koinvnikώn Fronhmάtvn»: Koinvnikέ6 kai Άll16 Όc1i6 toy Antikommoy nismoύ sthn Mak1donίa toy Emwylίoy Polέmoy , 1945– 1949 [“Of Known Social Beliefs”: Social and Other Faces of

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Mavrogordatos, George Th.: Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922– 1936 (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1983). ———: Eunikό6 Dixasmό6 kai Mazikή Orgάnvsh: Oi Epίstratoi toy 1916 [National Schism and Mass Organisation: The Levied of 1916 ] (Athens: Alexandreia, 1996). Mazower, Mark: Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941– 1944 (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press 1993, ppb. 2001). ———: Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Penguin, 1999) McNabb, David E.: Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods (Armonk, New York; London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). Merom Gil: How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Mertzos, Nikolaos I.: Sbarnoύt: To Prodvmέno Antάrtiko [Svarnut: The Betrayed Insurgency ] (Thessaloniki: Erodios, 1980). Michailidis, Iakovos D. (a): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ: Oi Ellhno-Gioy gkosla ioygkoslabikέ6 Sxέs1i6 thn Paramonή toy Ellhnikoύ Emwylίoy Polέmoy 1944 1946 [The Faces of Janus: Greco-Yugoslav Relations on the Eve of the Greek Civil War (1944 – 1946) ] (Athens: Patakis, 2004). ——— (b): Ta Prόsvpa toy Ianoύ: Oi Ellhno-Gioy gkoslabikέ6 Sxέs1i6 thn P1rίodo toy Ellhnikoύ Emwy lίoy Polέmoy (1947– 1949) [Faces of Janus: Greco-Yugoslav Relations in the Period of the Greek Civil War (1947 – 1949)] (Athens: Patakis, 2007). Milward, Alan S.: The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945– 1951 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). Mumford, Andrew: Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future (London: Routledge, 2012). ———: The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London: Routledge, 2012). Nachmani, Amikam: International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The United Nations Special Committee On the Balkans, 1947– 1952 (New York; Westport, CT; London: Praeger, 1990). Nagl, John A.: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with A Knife (Westport, CT; London: Praeger, 2002). Nikolakopoulos, Ilias: Kόmmata kai Boyl1ytikέ6 Eklogέ6 sthn Ellάda, 1946– 1964: H Eklogikή G1vgrawίa tvn Politikώn Dynάm1vn [Parties and Parliamentary Elections in Greece, 1946– 1964: The Electoral Geography of Political Forces ] (Athens: Ethniko Kentro Koinonikwn Erevnon, 1985). ———: H Kax1ktikή Dhmokratίa: Kόmmata kai Eklogέ6, 1946– 1967 [Cachectic Democracy: Parties and Elections, 1946– 1967 ] (Athens: Patakis, 2001). O’Ballance, Edgar: The Greek Civil War, 1944– 1949 (London: Faber and Faber, 1966). Oikonomidis, Foivos: H Epanάstash sthn Ellάda: To KKE kai oi Jέnoi Fίloi (Emwύlio6 1945– 1949) [The Revolution in Greece: The KKE and the Foreign Friends (Civil War 1945– 1949) ] (Athens: Livanis, 2011). Oikonomopoulos, Konstantinos: Έktakta Stratodik1ίa kai Nomou1sίa Aworώsa thn Dhmόsian Tάjin kai Aswάl1ia [Emergency Courts-Martial and Legislation Relating to the Public Order and Safety ] (Athens, no publisher, 1951).

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Chapters in Edited Volumes Ahmad, Eqbal: “Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency”, in Norman Miller and Roderick Aya (eds): National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World (New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1971), pp. 137– 213. Alderson, Alexander: “Britain”, in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds): Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 28 – 45. Alivizatos, Nicos C.: “The ’Emergency Regime’ and Civil Liberties”, in John O. Iatrides (ed.): Greece in the 40s: A Nation in Crisis (Hannover and London: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 220– 8. ———: “The Executive in the Post-Liberation Period, 1944– 1949”, in John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley (eds): Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 157– 72.

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Sepp, Kalev I.: “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency”, Military Review, Vol. 86, No. 3 (May– June 2005), pp. 8– 12. Sfetas, Spyridon: «An1piuύmhtoi Sύmmaxoi kai An1jέl1gktoi Antίpaloi: Oi Sxέs1i6 KKE kai NOF sth Diάrk1ia toy Emwylίoy (1946 – 1949)» [“Undesirable Allies and Uncontrollable Adversaries: The Relations between the KKE and NOF during the Civil War (1946 – 1949)”], Balkanika Symmeikta, Vol. 8 (1996), pp. 211– 46. Sfikas, Thanasis D.: “Attlee, Bevin and “A Very Lame Horse”: The Dispute over Greece and the Middle East, December 1946– January 1947”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1992), pp. 69 – 96. ———: “Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations Commission of Investigation in Greece, January– May 1947”, Contemporary European History, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1993), pp. 243–63. ———: “Spanish Echoes in Greece, 1946– 1949: The Myth of the Participation of an ‘International Brigade’ in the Greek Civil War”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (May 1997), pp. 87 – 101. ———: “Toward a Regional Study of the Origins of the Cold War in Southeastern Europe: British and Soviet Policies in the Balkans, 1945– 1949”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (October 1999), pp. 209– 27. Shaffer, Michael D.: “Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 57– 80. Shultz, Richard: “Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare”, Western Research Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1979), pp. 444–66. Smith, Ole L.: “The Problems of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, 1946”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 43 – 62. ———: “The Tsaldaris Offers for Negotiations, 1948: A Lost Opportunity or a Canard?”, Epsilon: Modern Greek and Balkan Studies, Vol. 1 (1987), pp. 83 – 9. Smith, M. L. R.: “Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 19 – 37. Staniland, Paul: “Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005 – 06), pp. 21 – 40. Stedman, Stephen J.: “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5 – 53. Stefanidis, Ioannis D.: “United States, Great Britain and the Greek-Yugoslav Rapprochement, 1949–1950”, Balkan Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986), pp. 315–43. Sundar, Nandini: “Interning Insurgent Populations: The Buried Histories of Indian Democracy”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 46, No. 6 (February 2011), pp. 47 – 57. Themne´r, Lotta and Wallensteen Peter: “Armed Conflicts, 1946 –2012: A New Dataset”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 2013), pp. 509– 21. Tomes, Robert R.: “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare”, Parameters, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 16 – 28. Towle, Philip: “The Strategy of War by Proxy”, RUSI Journal, Vol. 126, No. 1 (March 1981), pp. 21 – 6.

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Ucko, David H.: “The Five Fallacies of Clear-Hold-Build: Counter-Insurgency, Governance and Development at the Local Level”, RUSI Journal, Vol. 158, No. 3 (June 2013), pp. 54 – 61. Van, Meter David C.: “The Macedonian Question and the Guerrilla War in Northern Greece on the Eve of the Truman Doctrine”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 71 –90. Vetsopoulos, Apostolos: “Efforts for the Development and Stabilization of the Economy during the Period of the Marshall Plan”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (October 2009), pp. 275– 302. Walter, Barbara F.: “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”, International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 335– 64. ———: “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace”, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 127– 55. ———: “Bargaining Failures and Civil War”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 12 (June 2009), pp. 243– 61. Wagner, Harrison B.: “Bargaining and War”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 464– 84. Zachariou, Stelios: “Implementing the Marshall Plan in Greece: Balancing Reconstruction and Geopolitical Security”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (October 2009), pp. 303– 18. Zartman, I William: “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”, Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (September 2001), pp. 8 – 18. Zhukov Yuri: “Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 2007), pp. 439– 66.

Occasional Papers Abbott, Frank J.: “The Greek Civil War, 1947– 1949: Lessons for the Operational Artist in Foreign Internal Defense” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994). Barrett, Thomas J.: “Operationalizing Economics for Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009). Byman, Daniel L.: “Going to War with the Friends You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005). Bjelajac, S. N.: “Guidelines for Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency” (Mclean, Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, 1966). Byman, Daniel et al.: “Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2001). Campbell, Jason, Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro: “Assessing Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Missions” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009). Connable, Ben: “Leveraging Development Aid to Address Root Causes in Counterinsurgency: Balancing Theory and Practice in ‘Hold’ and ‘Build’” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2013).

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Cordesman, Anthony H.: “The Iraq War and its Strategic Lessons for Counterinsurgency” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005). ———: “The Importance of Building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the Counterinsurgency in Iraq” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006). Cox, Dan G. and Thomas Bruscino (eds): “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol?: Three Monographs from the School of Advanced Military Studies” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2011). Davidson, Janine: “Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency: Evolution and Debate” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009). Fawcett, Grant S.: “Cultural Understanding in Counterinsurgency: Analysis of the Human Terrain System” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009). Fishstein, Paul and Andrew Wilder: “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan” (Medford, MA: Tufts University, Feinstein International Center, 2012). Gompert, David C. et al.: “War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2008). ——— et al.: “Reconstruction under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2009). Gray, Colin S.: “Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College: 2006). Hoffman, Bruce: “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004). Hoffman, Bruce and Jennifer Taw: “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1992). Hoffman Frank G.: “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Papers, 2007). ———: “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Papers, 2007). Howard, Harry N.: “The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations” (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1950). Jones, Seth G.: “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2008). Kofos, Evangelos: The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece (1943– 1949) (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, 1989). Leites, Nathan and Charles L. Wolf: “Rebellion and Authority: Myths and Realities Reconsidered” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1966). Long, Austin: “On ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2006). Manwaring, Max G.: “Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001). ———: “Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in Our Midst” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004).

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McBride, M. Scott and Joe Nunez: “The Interagency Process in Counterinsurgency Warfare” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006). Metz, Steven: “The Future of Insurgency” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993). ———: and Raymond Millen: “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004). O’Neill, Mark: “Confronting the Hydra: Big Problems with Small Wars” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2009). Perito, Robert M. (ed.): Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007). Pruitt, Dean G.: “Whither Ripeness Theory?” (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2005). Salehyan, Idean: “Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, March 2010). Schwarz, Ben: “American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1991). Ucko. David H.: “Counterinsurgency and its Discontents: Assessing the Value of a Divisive Concept” (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 2011) Vick, Alan J. et al.: “Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2006). White, Joshua T.: “Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan’s Frontier” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009).

Ph.D. and MA Dissertations Alderson, Alexander: “The Validity of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq, 2003 – 2009” (Ph.D. Thesis, Cranfield University, 2009). Christidis, Pericles: «Oi Ellhnikέ6 Eunikέ6 Di1kdikήs1i6 sthn Syndiάsk1ch gia thn Eirήnh sto Parίsi» [“The Greek National Claims in the Paris Peace Conference, 1946”] (Ph.D. Thesis, Aristoteleion University, 2007). Delaporta, Eleftheria: “The Role of Britain in Greek Politics and Military Operations, 1947 – 1952” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2003). Finch, Michael P.M.: “The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and Pacification Campaigning in Tonkin and Madagascar, 1885 – 1900” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010). Fitzsimmons, Michael F.: “Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency Strategy” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Maryland, 2009). Gleiman, Jan K.: “Organizational Imperative: Theory and History on Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency Campaigns” (MA Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2010), Johnson, David R.: “Soviet Counterinsurgency” (MA Dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, 1990).

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Ladis, Nikolaos: “Assessing Greek Grand Strategic Thought and Practice: Insights from the Strategic Culture Approach” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Southampton, 2003). Macmillan, Alan: “Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1949– 1952” (Ph.D. Thesis, Aberystwyth University, 1996). Matzouris, Stylianos: «H Nomou1sίa toy Emwylίoy Polέmoy: Ejygίansh tvn Dhmόsivn Yphr1siώn, Ektόpish-Ejorίa» [“The Legislation of the Civil War: Purge of the Civil Services, Deportation-Exile”] (MA Dissertation, Panteion University, 2008). Papageorgiou, Eleni: «To «Paidomάzvma» katά ton Ellhnikό Emwύlio Pόl1mo» [“The ‘Child-Levy’ during the Greek Civil War”] (MA Dissertation, Panteion University, 2008). Philips, Stephen C.: “Establishing a Suitable Tactical Design Model for Clear-HoldBuild Counterinsurgency Campaigns” (MA Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009). Plakoudas, Spyridon: “The Greek Civil War, 1946– 1949: How the Royalist Regime Countered the Communist Insurgency” (Ph.D. Thesis: University of Reading, 2014). Ranieri, Steven M.: “The Law of Force or the Force of Law? Does Following the Rule of Law Assist Security Forces in Defeating an Armed Insurgency?” (MA Dissertation, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2012). Razakos, Theocharis: [«H «L1ykή Tromokratίa» sthn Ellάda (1945– 1946): O Kόsmo6 th6 Eunikowrosύnh6 kai h Antim1tώpish toy «Eryuroύ Kindύnoy» [“The ‘White Terror’ in Greece (1945 – 1946): The World of National-Mindedness and the Tackling of the ’Red Menace’”] (MA Dissertation, Panteion University, 2008). Rigden, I. A.: “The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: Myths, Realities and Strategic Challenges” (MA Dissertation, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2008). Springer, Nathan R.: “Stabilizing the Debate between Population-Centric and Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency: Success Demands a Balanced Approach” (MA Dissertation, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2011). Stratakis, Antonis: «Koinvnikή Politikή sthn Ellάda katά thn D1ka1tίa toy 40’: Koinvnikή Prόnoia kai to Ypoyg1ίo Eunikή6/Koinvnikή6 Prόnoia6» [“Social Policy in Greece during the 1940s: Social Welfare and the Ministry of National/Social Welfare”] (MA Dissertation, University of Crete, 2003). Swartz, Frederick J.: “Doctrines of Defeat, La Guerre Re´volutionnaire and Counterinsurgency Warfare” (MA Dissertation, Indiana University, December 1992). Vetsopoulos, Apostolos: “The Economic Dimension of the Marshall Plan in Greece, 1947– 1952: The Origins of the Greek Economic Miracle” (Ph.D. Thesis, London University College, 2002). Vlavianos, Haris: “The Greek Civil War: The Strategy of the Greek Communist Party, 1944– 1947” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992).

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Conference Papers Andreou, Andreas et al.: «Apό to «Paidomάzvma» st o Basilikό «Paidowύlagma»”: M1tapol1mikέ6 Όc1i6 Koinvnikή6 Dikaiosύnh6 sti6 Bόr1i16 Eparxί16 th6 Xώra6» [“From ‘Child-Levy’ to Royal ‘ChildKeeping’: PostWar Aspects of Social Justice in the Country’s Northern Provinces”], paper presented at the Fifth Scientific Conference on History of Education «Ekpaίd1ysh kai Koinvnikή Dikaiosύnh» [“Education and Social Justice”], Patras (Greece), 19 February 2008. Brancati, Dawn and Jack L. Snyder: “Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing and Sequencing on Post-Conflict Stability”, paper presented at the 50th Annual Convention of the International Scholars Association (ISA), “Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future”, New York (USA), 15 –18 February 2009. Greenhill, Kelly M.: “’Draining the Sea or Feeding the Fire?’: The Use of Population Relocation in Counterinsurgency Operations”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) “Global Inequalities”, Chicago (Illinois, USA), 2 – 5 September 2004. Griffin, Christopher: “A Revolution in Colonial Military Affairs: Gallieni, Lyautey and the Tache d’Huile”, paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the British International Studies Association (BISA), Leicester (UK), 14– 16 December 2009. Hazelton, Jacqueline L.: “The False Promise of the Governance Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare”, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) “Power and Persuasion”, Illinois (USA), 29 August–1 September 2013. Kalyvas, Stathis N.: “Stathis N. Kalyvas: «H Bίa tvn D1k1mbrianώn: Praktikέ6 kai Anaparastάs1i6» [“The Violence of the Decemvriana: Practices and Reconstructions”], paper presented at the conference «Katoxή, Antίstash, Emwύlio6 sthn Auήna kai ti6 M1gάl16 Pόl1i6» [“Occupation, Resistance, Civil War in Athens and the Big Cities”], Aigina (Greece), 21 – 24 June 2007. Kilcullen, David: “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency”, Remarks delivered at the US Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, D.C. (USA), 28 September 2006. Ladwig Walter C.: “Assisting Counterinsurgency in the Philippines and Vietnam”, Paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Conference “Bridging Multiple Divides”, San Francisco (USA), 26 – 29 March 2008. Vaios, Kalogrias: «H Politiko-Id1ologikή Taytόthta th6 Eunikowrosύnh6 sthn Taragmέnh D1ka1tίa toy 40’» [The Politico-Ideological Identity of National-Mindedness in the Turbulent Decade of the 1940s”], paper presented at the 4th European Congress of Modern Greek Studies “Identities in the Greek World” (From 1204 to the Present Day), Granada (Spain), 9 –12 September 2010. Voglis Polymeris: «H Bίa toy Polέmoy: Ellάda 1941-1949» (“The Violence of War: Greece 1941– 1949”), paper presented at the conference «Q1vrήs1i6 toy Politikoύ sthn Ellhnikή Koinvnίa: Apologismό6 kai Prooptikή th6 Έr1yna6 sthn Koinvnikή Anurvpologίa kai Istorίa» [“Perceptions of the Political in Greek Society: Account and Perspectives of Research in Social Anthropology and History”], Mytilene (Greece), 8 –11 November 2007.

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Zhukov Yuri M.: “Evaluating Success in Counterinsurgency, 1804– 2000: Does Regime Type Matter?”, paper presented at the 21st Convention of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO) “Fighting Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights”, Andalo – Trento (Italy), 6 –13 January 2008.

Online Publications Kilcullen, David: “Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency”, Small Wars Journal Blog, 27 January 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-ofclassical-counterinsurgency, accessed on 20 December 2011. McElhatton, Emmet: “Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian Strategic Psyche”, Small Wars Journal, 8 May 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/05/guerrillawarfare-and-the-indo, accessed on 19 February 2011. Moyar Mark: “Development in Afghanistan’s Counterinsurgency: A New Guide” (McLean, Washington, D.C.: Orbis Operations, 2011), p.2. Retrieved from the Small Wars Journal Blog, 1 March 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ development-in-afghanistans-counterinsurgency, accessed on 21 January 2013.

INDEX

Afghan War (2001– present), 12 Albania, 21, 22, 26, 33, 54, 55, 63, 79, 86, 87, 88, 91, 96, 100, 109, 110, 111, 113, 117 Alexandris, Apostolos, 38, 58 Allied Mission Observing the Greek Elections (AMFOGE), 36 American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), 68, 71 – 72, 73, 74, 80, 81 – 82, 97, 98, 106 AMFOGE II, 44 Anglo-Americans, 35 anti-communist pogrom, 30 Arrow, Operation, 77 Asia Minor Catastrophe (1922), 73, 75, 120 Axis Powers, 21, 26, 33, 44, 55, 67 Balkan Wars, 39 Bevin, Ernest, 39, 54, 55, 85, 102 Bled Agreement, 71 BMM. See British Military Mission (BMM) British Army, 39. See also British intervention, British Army British intervention British Army, 20, 34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 43, 46, 85

British Military Mission (see British Military Mission) British Police and Prisons Mission, 28, 52 withdrawal from Greece, 20 British Military Mission (BMM), 47, 48, 49, 53, 64, 73, 85, 89, 111, 127 Bulgaria, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, 41, 54, 55, 63, 71, 79, 87, 88, 96, 100, 111, 117 Central Intelligence Service, 40 Chechen insurgents, 12 ‘child cities’, 75, 93, 94, 117 ‘child levy’/‘child saving’, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 116, 117 Church, the, 62, 94 Coalition of National Action (S ED), 62, 94 COIN. See concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) Cold War, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 85, 89, 119, 126 Cominform, 78, 80, 97, 110 Comintern, 33, 42, 78 communism, 2, 5, 38, 44, 45, 56, 60, 61, 62, 64, 69, 76, 81 – 118

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from appeasement to repression, 81 –83 Democratic Army of Greece, 97 – 102 ‘Free Greece’ (December 1947– January 1948), 83 – 87 insurgency’s death rattle, 107– 114 Militarily Supervised Democracy, 102– 107 palace and army (March– May 1948), 93 –96 Periculum ex Septentrionalis, 87 – 92 Tito– Stalin Schism, 96 – 97 concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), 1, 13 – 15 narrative, 17 – 18 security, 18 – 19 Council of the Chiefs of General Staffs (S AG E), 48 Crisis of the Right (October 1946– January 1947), 51 –57 Damaskinos, Regent and Archbishop, 28 December Uprising, 22, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 44, 48, 121 declaration of war (September – November 1947), 77– 80 Democratic Army of Greece (DS E), 54, 62 Dimitrov, Georgi, 33, 54, 71, 87, 88 Diomidis, Alexandros, 112, 116 division of Europe (June– August 1947), 66 – 72 Downs, Ernest, 89 emergency law, 84, 95 European Cooperation Administration (ECA), 97, 104 European Cooperation Administration for Greece (ECA/G), 97, 98, 104, 105, 106, 114, 116 European Recovery Programme (ERP), 97

First Battle of Grozny (1994– 5), 12 Frederica (Queen of Greece), 74, 92, 93, 94, 117, 122 Gonatas, Stylianos, 38, 58, 59, 103 good governance, 15– 16 Grady, Henry, 103, 104 Greco – Italian War, 53 Greek Communist Party (KKE) abstention, 35, 36, 45, 73 fifth plenum, 83, 108 fourth plenum, 97, 108, 109 ‘Free Greece’, 6, 50, 64, 67, 70, 77, 121 people’s rule, 83 second plenum, 32, 34, 90, 109 third plenum, 77, 83 Greek Question, 34, 54, 78, 79, 117 Griswold, Dwight P., 74, 83, 89 Hellenism, effect of Greek Civil War on, 120 insurgency communist, 2, 23, 40 concept of, 7 – 9 internal and external support, 12 outside support, 16– 17 rural, 24, 34, 37 Iranian Crisis, 34, 35 Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), 85, 86, 89, 90, 95, 102, 105 Kanellopoulos, Panayiotis, 28, 38, 58, 61, 104 KKE. See Greek Communist Party (KKE) Korean War, 116 Kremlin, 33, 35, 41, 43, 44, 66, 67, 111, 121

INDEX labour unions, 22, 43, 53, 66 legitimacy, 13 Liberal Party, 45, 73, 75, 76, 102, 103, 104, 112 ‘Long Live the King’ (April– September 1946), 38 – 45 Macedonia Greek Macedonia, 4, 26, 27, 31, 37, 66, 71, 108, 120 Slav-Macedonians, 27, 39, 53, 94, 101, 108, 109 Macedonian entity, 42 Macedonian Question, 27, 31 MacVeagh, Lincoln, 39, 68, 74 Makronisos political prisoners in, 61 prison camp, 49, 60, 116 total state-run enterprise, 62 Markezinis, Spyros, 103, 104 marriage of convenience (August 1947), 72 – 77 Marshall, Montgomery, 56 Marshall Plan, 66, 67, 68, 97 Mavromichalis, Petros, 39, 51 Maximos, Dimitrios, 58, 60, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74 Metaxas, 28, 31, 45, 60 Montgomery, Marshall, 56 National Army (ES ), 47 Units for Countryside Security, 51 Units of Pursuit Contingents, 51 national claims (of Greece), 26, 55, 110 National Liberation Front (EAM), 20 national-mindedness, 31, 122 National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), 11 National Schism (1915– 17), 75 Norton, Clifford, 45, 103, 104 Ottoman-occupied territories, 41

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Papagos, Alexandros, 74, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 111, 112, 113, 123, 125 Papandreou, Georgios, 38, 58, 104 Paul (King of Greece), 64, 70, 73, 74, 95, 104, 117 ‘peace-and-war’ state declaration of war (September – November 1947), 77 – 80 division of Europe (June– August 1947), 66 – 72 Greece and the Great Powers (January – May 1947), 62– 66 marriage of convenience (August 1947), 72 – 77 seven-headed government (January – February 1947), 58 –62 Petritsi Pact, 31, 42 Pigeon, Operation, 107, 111 Plastiras, Nikolaos, 28 political prisoners, 59, 60, 61, 63, 76, 80, 84, 90, 94, 95, 116, 120 Populist Party, 38, 39, 47, 58, 70, 76, 83, 102 postwar Greece, 36 Poulitsas, Panayiotis, 38 quislings, 20, 21, 28, 30 refugees, 22, 25, 62, 75, 80, 82, 92, 98, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 120 Resolution, 47, 52, 62, 77, 79, 94, 97, 101, 108, 109, 116 Resolution III, 41, 42 Resolution IX, 42, 52 Rizospastis, 46, 76 Rocket, Operation, 111 Romania, 33, 41, 96, 101 royalist regime, 4, 5, 6, 49, 56, 62, 68, 71, 73, 78, 79, 80, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 102, 106, 114, 115, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127

244

THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

Second Battle of Fallujah (2004), 12 Sophoulis, Themistocles, 28, 34, 45, 68, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76– 78, 82, 84, 99, 102, 103, 104, 109, 112, 123 appeasement policy, 53, 70, 74, 76, 81 space, irregular warfare, 11 – 12 Stalin, Josef, 45, 47, 54, 57, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 78, 85, 86, 87, 88, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 109, 110, 111, 113, 119, 121, 122 strategic culture, 125– 127 impact of, 125– 127 strategy Britain, 28 – 30, 34 – 35, 39, 43– 44, 52 –53, 54 –55, 56, 64, 85, 88, 112, 113 counterinsurgency, 15 – 19 insurgency, 9 –13 of insurgents, 9 – 10 KKE, 23 – 24, 32 – 34, 36 – 47, 40 –41, 43, 45 – 47, 64, 67, 68, 69 –70, 77, 83, 108– 109 royalist regime, 39, 41– 43, 47, 51 –52, 53 –54, 59– 60, 64, 69, 76, 80 – 81, 84, 88, 92, 96, 102, 109, 110, 112, 116 USA, 44, 52 –53, 56, 63 –64, 66, 67 –68, 69 –70, 71, 74, 79, 85, 97, 113 USSR, 33 – 34, 35, 37, 43 – 44, 54, 65, 66 – 67, 68, 78, 86, 97, 109, 110– 111, 111– 112 Yugoslavia, 27, 37, 71, 101, 102, 110, 112 support, irregular warfare, 12 Supreme Council of National Defence (AS EA), 48 Supreme War Council (ASS ), 48, 104, 107 Terminus, Operation, 72, 91 terrorist tactics, 8

time, irregular warfare, 10 – 11 Tito – Stalin Schism, 96 – 97 Treaty of Brussels, 88 Treaty of Varkiza, 20, 21, 23, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 43, 47, 48, 50, 60, 86, 91 Truman, President, 35, 56, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 80, 84, 85, 88, 89, 94 Tsaldaris –Braine Accord, 53 Tsaldaris, Konstantinos, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 73, 74, 75, 78, 96, 97, 99, 103, 127 Tsouderos, Emmanuel, 68, 70 Turkish Straits Crisis, 43 United Nations (UN) Security Council/General Assembly, 35, 43, 54, 62, 79, 92, 101, 116, 117 UN Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, 62, 66 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 29, 67 United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), 79, 85, 96, 99, 101, 117 US Field Manual on Counterinsurgency, 7 US intervention United States Air Force Group Greece (USAFGG), 105 United States Army Group Greece (USAGG), 68, 72 United States Navy Group Greece (USNGG), 68 Vafeiadis, Markos, 24, 40, 53, 54, 63, 70, 76, 83, 86, 107, 108, 109 Van Fleet, James, 89, 100, 107, 111 Velouchiotis, Aris, 24 Venizelos, Eleutherios, 58, 65, 76, 102, 103, 104, 112

INDEX Venizelos, Sofoklis, 38 Ventiris, Lt General, 64, 106 Vietnam War, 2, 120, 127 Vitsi, Operation, 6, 95, 96, 99, 111, 112, 113 Voulgaris, Petros, 128 war significance of, 119– 121 various myths, 121– 122 war by proxy, 25 – 27 weak state-building: February 1945– March 1946, 27 – 32 welfare, 17 – 18 Whirlwind, Operation, 77 ‘White Terror’, 20 – 24

245

World War II, 1, 3, 4, 5, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 47, 50, 51, 53, 54, 59, 62, 67, 69, 74, 77, 84, 86, 89, 119, 120 Yugoslav Communist Party of Macedonia (CPM), 27 Zachariadis, Nikos, 24, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 56, 57, 64, 65, 70, 77, 83, 86, 87, 99, 100, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 122, 125 Zervas, Napoleon, 26, 58, 59, 60, 64, 69, 73, 103, 123 Zevgos, John, 63