Violent Conflicts, Fragile Peace : Perspectives on Africa's Security Problems 9781281741509, 9781905068982

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Violent Conflicts, Fragile Peace Perspectives on Africa's Security Problems

Published by Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd P.O. Box 43418 London SE11 4XZ http://www.adonis-abbey.com Email: [email protected]

First Edition, April 2008 Copyright 2008 © Norman Mlambo British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 9781905068999 (HB); 9781905068982 (PB) The moral right of the author has been asserted All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted at any time or by any means without the prior permission of the publisher

Printed and bound in Great Britain

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Violent Conflicts, Fragile Peace Perspectives on Africa's Security Problems

Edited by

Norman Mlambo

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Table of Contents List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Preface

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…………………………………………………………………………………... PART ONE: CAUSES OF AFRICAN CONFLICTS …………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 1 The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa Kofi Annan 19 ………………………………………………………………………………….. PART TWO: VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN AFRICA ………………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 2 The Scourge of Civil Wars in Africa: Case Study – Liberia Richard Iroanya 63 ………………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 3 Violence and Civilian Insecurity in the Darfur Region of Sudan Patrick Rankhumise 89 …………………………………………………………………………………... PART THREE: RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA …………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 4 Disputes and Conflicts over Water in Africa Peter Ashton 119 ………………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 5 Rethinking Economic Agendas in African Conflicts: A Critique of the Paul Collier Thesis Norman Mlambo 137 …………………………………………………………………………………... PART FOUR: HUMAN SECURITY AND SUPERSTITION IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS …………………………………………………………………………………..

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Table of Contents

Chapter 6 Beyond the Myth of ‘Island of Peace’: Governance and Human Security Challenges in Tanzania Mwesiga Baregu 155 …………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 7 The 1999 Riots in Mauritius: A Violent Explosion of Neo-liberal Politics Sheila Bunwaree 177 …………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 8 Witchcraft and Magic in the Darfur Conflict Cage Banseka 193 …………………………………………………………………………………... PART FIVE: PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE MERCENARY PROBLEM IN AFRICA …………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 9 Options for the Regulation of Private Military Companies and Services in Africa Norman Mlambo 217 …………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 10 The Coup Attempt in Equatorial Guinea: Implications for Private Military Companies in Africa Peter Fabricius 225 …………………………………………………………………………………... PART SIX: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA …………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 11 France in the Ivorian Civil War: A Genuine Peace Broker or Part of the Problem? Issaka Souare 237 ………………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 12 Peacekeeping in Africa: The Next Decade Cedric de Coning 253 …………………………………………………………………………………..

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Table of Contents

PART SEVEN: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY …………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 13 Building Security Through Regional Bodies: The Unhappy Case of SADC Laurie Nathan 265 …………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 14 Between the Local and the Global: Challenges to Resolving African Interlocking Conflicts Marcel Kitissou 283 …………………………………………………………………………………... Notes on Contributors 297 …………………………………………………………………………………... Index 299 ……………………………………………………………………………….......

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms AFL AMIB AMIS ANC ASF AU BCEAO CCM CDC CIO CPA CUF DITF DPA DRC DRDC ECOMIL ECOMOG ECOWAS EO EU FARDC FLS HCFA HICs HIPC ICC ICISS ICGL IDPs IGAD

Armed Forces of Liberia African Mission in Burundi African Mission in Sudan African National Congress Africa Standby Force African Union Central Bank of West African States Chama Cha Mapinduzi Congress for Democratic Change Central Intelligence Organization Comprehensive Peace Agreement Civic United Front Darfur Integrated Task Force Darfur Peace Agreement Democratic Republic of Congo Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre ECOWAS Mission in Liberia ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States Executive Outcomes European Union Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo Front Line States Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement High-Intensity Conflicts Highly Indebted Poor Countries International Criminal Court International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty International Contact Group on Liberia Internally Displaced Persons Intergovernmental Authority on Development viii

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

IGNU INPFL IPAO ISDSC ITAR JEM JHFMU LDF LICs LNC LNTG LPC LRA LURD MCPI MFA MISAB

MMM MODEL MONUC MPLA MSM NDA NPFL NPP NTGL

Interim Government of National Unity Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia International Peace Operations Association Interstate Defence and Security Committee International Traffic in Arms Regulations Justice and Equality Movement Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit Lofa Defence Force Low-Intensity Conflicts Liberia National Conference Liberian National Transitional Government Liberia Peace Council Lord’s Resistance Army Liberians United for Reconciliation and Development Mouvement Patriotique de Cote d’Ivoire Mauritius Freeport Authority Inter-Africa Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements Mouvement Militant Mauricien Movement for Democracy in Liberia United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien National Democratic Alliance National Patriotic Front of Liberia National Patriotic Party National Transitional Government of Liberia ix

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

OAU ONUB PIOOM PMCs PRSP PSCs RECs RENAMO RUF SADC SADCC SAPs SLM/A SPLA/M TANU TPDF TSNA TWP UEMOA ULIMO UN UNITA UNMIL UNMIS UNOMIL UNSC ZDI ZNP ZPPP

Organization of African Unity United Nations Mission in Burundi Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations Private Military Companies Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan/Paper Private Security Companies Regional Economic Communities Mozambique National Resistance Movement Revolutionary United Front Southern Africa Development Community Southern African Development Coordination Conference Structural Adjustment Programmes Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement Tanzania African National Union Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces Transitional Safety-net Allowance True Whig Party West African Economic and Monetary Union United Liberation Movement of Liberia United Nations National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in Sudan United Nations Military Observer Group in Liberia United Nations Security Council Zimbabwe Defence Industries Zanzibar Nationalist Party Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party x

Preface Twentieth Century Africa was punctuated by violent conflicts that spanned the length and breath of the continent. The first wave of these conflicts were the wars of resistance to colonial occupation. These wars started in the Nineteenth Century and continued in some countries to the 1950s. The result of these conflicts was that many African communities were conquered and colonised by West European countries such as Britain, France, Portugal, Germany and Belgium. Colonialism was itself a violent experience that devastated the African continent politically, socially and economically. The second half of the 20th Century was characterised by wars of liberation against colonial rule. The liberation struggles took a very violent nature in countries such as Algeria, Madagascar, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Namibia, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The liberation struggles in Africa were characterised by black against white racism and also by the East against West ideological conflict of the Cold War. The end of politically motivated violence and apartheid in South Africa in 1994 appeared to fit in well with the end in the late 1980s of the Cold War. The hope in Africa then was that regionally, the end of apartheid would bring with it a peace dividend and that globally, the end of the Cold War would usher in an era of international peace and security. There was also a hope that the end of the Cold War would speed up the application of a global collective security system that was hitherto blocked by the bi-polar nature of international relations. Neither of the above happened. In Africa, new conflicts emerged such as genocide in Rwanda in 1994, conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Congo, the DRC, Lesotho, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Uganda and Sudan. There are however, some encouraging “islands of peace” such as Tanzania, Mauritius and Senegal that punctuate Africa’s violent environment. But, even in these countries, peace appears to be very fragile and serious peace-building measures are required. This book highlights some examples of the stark realities of the African security problem, from the violence in the Darfur region of the Sudan, to the fragile peace in Mauritius. The book is a collection of papers, most of them written for and published in various issues of the journal, African Renaissance. The authors were kind enough to update their chapters for this book, and I thank all of them for their effort. xi

Preface

However, there are also some new chapters that were written specifically for this book. Let me also extend my appreciation to those authors who responded to the editor’s call and who contributed new chapters at short notice. In chapter 1 of this book, former Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan discusses the causes of conflicts and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development on the African continent. Annan argues that although the causes of African conflicts are as diverse and complex as the continent’s history and geographical conditions, there are a number of common themes and experiences that tend to link African conflicts. These links include historical legacies of colonialism, the nature of post-colonial political power, super-power competition for African resources and influence, and internal struggles for the control and exploitation of natural resources. Annan makes some recommendations to reduce African conflicts and to build strong and durable peace on the African continent. These include well coordinated diplomatic peacemaking, well planned and adequately resourced peacekeeping operations, principled humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. Above all, Kofi Annan calls on the international community and on African leaders in particular, to summon the necessary political will to deal effectively with African conflicts. In chapter 2, Richard Iroanya analyses the challenges of ending civil wars in Africa. Specifically, the chapter examines the concept and nature of African civil wars and the dynamics that fuel them. Using the Liberian civil war as a case study, the chapter demonstrates some of the specific obstacles encountered by peacemakers in the process of trying to end civil wars. The chapter gives a brief historical overview of the Liberian civil war and the various attempts at resolving the conflict, up to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in Accra, Ghana on 17August 2003, and the election and inauguration of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in January 2006. The concluding part of the chapter makes recommendations on how to resolve violent conflicts and sustain peace processes in Africa. In chapter 3, Patrick Rankhumise highlights the contradictions between the international focus on human security in Darfur, in the face of obvious state security inadequacies of the government of Sudan. Rankhumise argues that while the international community struggles with the government of Sudan on how to work together to end the conxii

Preface

flict, the civilian population of Darfur continues to suffer due to the delays in the implementation of a comprehensive peace mission. The chapter therefore focuses on civilian insecurity in Darfur, its origins, nature, magnitude and initiatives taken so far to contain the situation. In chapter 4, Peter Ashton tackles the debate on resource conflicts in Africa by focusing on disputes and conflicts over water. Ashton highlights some geographical and geo-political characteristics that have made water a source of rivalry in Africa. These include the degree of water scarcity, the extent to which one water source is shared by one or more states, the power relations that exist between water-sharing states, the availability of alternative water sources and the extent to which a country’s boundaries are aligned with shared water systems. However, despite the existence of numerous potential water flash points on the African continent, Ashton makes the conclusion that, “it is highly unlikely that true water wars will ever occur in Africa”. In chapter 5, Norman Mlambo joins the debate on resource conflicts through a critique of Paul Collier’s thesis on economic agendas in African conflicts. Mlambo highlights the rise of the economic agendas movement in explaining African conflicts and the centrality of Paul Collier in shaping the World Bank view that 20th Century African conflicts were caused more by the greed of African warlords than by political grievances. Mlambo critiques the Paul Collier thesis by revisiting some case studies of African conflicts that are often cited as the perfect examples of the greed versus grief theory. Mlambo also points out that the World Bank analysis ignored important case studies such as Nigeria’s numerous military coups that had little to do with economic agendas and the recent land conflict in Zimbabwe that has a history of more than one hundred years of political wrangling over land distribution between black and white farmers. Mlambo concludes that the Paul Collier thesis and the World Bank view of economic agendas in African conflicts amounts to the criminalization of African politics. In chapter 6, Mwesiga Baregu interrogates the “island of peace” status that is often labelled on Tanzania. Baregu argues that the belief that Tanzania is an island of peace in a sea of conflicts is both true and false. It is true, in the sense that the earlier ujamaa period established norms, values and institutions that favoured the peaceful resolution of conflicts but it is also false in the sense that these past values, norms and institutions have been rapidly disappearing in the face of neoliberalism and multipartism. The new policy thrusts are throwing up xiii

Preface

new challenges which the political system needs to address if the “island of peace” is not to join other African countries in violent conflict. In chapter 7, Sheila Bunwaree continues to problematise the “island of peace” notion by highlighting the explosive nature of neoliberal politics in Mauritius. Bunwaree points out that because of its economic success and its relative peace in the 1990s, Mauritius is often seen as a “zone of conviviality” where different ethnic groups live in peace and harmony with each other. However, Bunwaree points out that, if the civil and political rights enjoyed by minority groups in Mauritius are not extended to include socio-economic rights, the island could be engulfed in a very serious conflict. Bunwaree focuses her analysis on the economic deprivation of the Creole minority in Mauritius that led to the violent riots of February 1999. In chapter 8, Cage Banseka examines how superstition, witchcraft and magic continue to be regarded as formidable weapons in African conflicts. Banseka focuses on the use of charms and other magical paraphernalia in the conflict in Darfur. The chapter critically analyses the role of African religious beliefs in the prolongation and the lethality of African conflicts. It analyses the force and reach of the ocular practices, the systematic brainwashing of young people by warlords and what the warriors consider as their overarching objectives in the fighting industry. The chapter also examines the influence of superstition and witchcraft in other aspects of African life and their implication for progressive thinking and public behaviour. Banseka concludes that the use of superstition and witchcraft is disturbing and it is abnormal, but, because it is practiced so widely, it “cannot be left out in a critical account of conflicts in Africa”. In chapter 9, Norman Mlambo advances possible options for the regulation of private military companies and services in Africa. The discussion is provoked by the negative image that mercenaries and mercenary activity continue to receive on the African continent at a time when major military powers such as the United States of America are increasing their use of private military services. Mlambo points out that while the market for private military services is increasing globally, there is a serious debate for and against their use in Africa. The debate becomes very important in view of the fact that some important international organisations such as the African Union and the United Nations already have conventions that criminalize aspects of mercenary activity. Mlambo argues that the debate on the use of private military xiv

Preface

services should be thrown wide open and that all available options must be analysed before an all-encompassing international law is passed. In chapter 10, Peter Fabricius continues the debate on the use of mercenaries in Africa by focusing on the 2004 attempted military coup against the government of Equatorial Guinea. The coup was planned by a group of mercenaries most of them former South African soldiers and led by a former British Special Air Service officer, Simon Mann. The mercenaries were financed by powerful European personalities such as Mark Thatcher, son of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Fabricius agrees with Mlambo in observing that Western countries have been pushing for the positive use of private military services. Fabricius was hoping that the trend may be duplicated in Africa especially in view of the serious lack of capacity for peace operations on the African continent. However, Fabricius fears that the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea may have closed the door for any African Union consideration of the positive use of private military services on the African continent. In chapter 11, Issaka Souare makes a critical analysis of the role of France in the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. He looks at Franco – Ivorian relations since the 1960s and makes the observation that Cote d’Ivoire is so important to France’s African strategy that France cannot afford to adopt a hands-off attitude towards the country. The French Government has always maintained that they have a duty to save Cote d’Ivoire from catastrophe. However, Souare notes that some Ivorian government officials are of the view that France maintains a stranglehold on Cote d’Ivoire in order to sustain “neo-colonial” interests that appear to be under threat from the radical regime of President Laurent Gbagbo. Souare concludes that although it may not be wise to exclude France from the Ivorian peace process, France’s behaviour in the conflict does not make it a genuine peace broker. In chapter 12, Cedric de Coning reflects on the future of peacekeeping operations on the African continent. He warns against a creeping “informal peacekeeping apartheid” that characterised the post Somalia 1992 peace operation fiasco after which many European countries stopped sending peacekeepers to African missions. De Coning argues that because future peace operations on the African continent are likely to be complex, it is inconceivable that they would be totally handled by the African Union alone. This is more so in view of the fact that the AU xv

Preface

does not have the financial resources necessary to sustain any extensive and complex peace missions. De Coning also warns the African Union not to rely too much on donor support and to start thinking of possible African sources of funding for future African peace operations. In chapter 13, Laurie Nathan discusses regional security by focusing on the peace and security initiatives of the SADC region. Nathan argues that so far the SADC region has failed to pursue its stated goal of fostering regional peace and security. He believes that this failure is brought about mainly because of the absence of common values among member states and also because member states are not willing to surrender any measure of sovereignty to a security regime that may interfere with the domestic affairs of member states. In chapter 14, Marcel Kitissou highlights the difficulties of resolving Africa’s “interlocking” conflicts. The chapter makes general comments on various conflict related issues affecting the African continent. He points out that some conflicts such as those in the Sudan have “multiple protagonists, multiple agendas, and different hierarchy of priorities”, and therefore very difficult to resolve. An important element of the conflicts in Sudan is the global struggles for oil resources between the United States, China and Russia. Kitissou also highlights the fact that the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 cannot be blamed on Hutus and Tutsis alone because French forces were present when it started and so were United Nations elements. Kitissou agrees with the conclusion of the Canadian general Romeo Dellaire, that the Rwandan genocide reflects the “failure of humanity” as a whole. _____________ Norman Mlambo July 2007.

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PART ONE

CAUSES OF AFRICAN CONFLICTS

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Chapter 1

The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa Kofi Annan Introduction On 25 September 1997, the Security Council convened at the level of Foreign Ministers to consider the need for a concerted international effort to promote peace and security in Africa. The Council observed that despite the progress achieved by some African States the number and intensity of armed conflicts on the continent remained a matter of grave concern, requiring a comprehensive response. The Council requested that I submit a report regarding the sources of conflict in Africa, ways to prevent and address those conflicts, and how to lay the foundation for durable peace and economic growth following their resolution. In accordance with the wishes of the Council, and because the scope of the challenge extends beyond the purview of the Security Council alone, I hereby submit this report not only to the Security Council but also to the General Assembly and other components of the United Nations system that have responsibilities in Africa, including the Bretton Woods institutions. Africa as a whole has begun to make significant economic and political progress in recent years, but in many parts of the continent progress remains threatened or impeded by conflict. For the United Nations there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development. Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the cardinal mission of the United Nations. Genuine and lasting prevention is the means to achieve that mission. Conflict in Africa poses a major challenge to United Nations efforts designed to ensure global peace, prosperity and human rights for all. Although the United Nations was intended to deal with inter-State warfare, it is being required more and more often to respond to intraState instability and conflict. In those conflicts the main aim, increasingly, is the destruction not just of armies but of civilians and entire 19

The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace in Africa

ethnic groups. Preventing such wars is no longer a matter of defending States or protecting allies. It is a matter of defending humanity itself. Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intra-State in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of those conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples. By not averting these colossal human tragedies, African leaders have failed the peoples of Africa; the international community has failed them; the United Nations has failed them. We have failed them by not adequately addressing the causes of conflict; by not doing enough to ensure peace; and by our repeated inability to create the conditions for sustainable development. This is the reality of Africa's recent past. It is a reality that must be confronted honestly and constructively by all concerned if the people of Africa are to enjoy the human security and economic opportunities they seek and deserve. Today, in many parts of Africa, efforts to break with the patterns of the past are at last beginning to succeed. It is my aspiration, with this report, to add momentum to Africa's renewed quest for peace and greater prosperity. The report strives to do so by offering an analysis of conflicts in Africa that does justice to their reality and seeks answers in their sources. It strives to do so by proposing realistic and achievable recommendations which, in time, may reduce if not entirely end those conflicts. It aims to summon the political will of Africans and non-Africans alike to act when action is so evidently needed - the will without which no level of assistance and no degree of hope can make the difference between war and peace in Africa. The sources of conflict Africa is a vast and varied continent. African countries have different histories and geographical conditions, different stages of economic development, different sets of public policies and different patterns of internal and international interaction. The sources of conflict in Africa reflect this diversity and complexity. Some sources are purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a particular sub-region, and some have 20

Kofi Annan

important international dimensions. Despite these differences the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a number of common themes and experiences. A. Historical legacies At the Congress of Berlin in 1885, the colonial Powers partitioned Africa into territorial units. Kingdoms, States and communities in Africa were arbitrarily divided; unrelated areas and peoples were just as arbitrarily joined together. In the 1960s, the newly independent African States inherited those colonial boundaries, together with the challenge that legacy posed to their territorial integrity and to their attempts to achieve national unity. The challenge was compounded by the fact that the framework of colonial laws and institutions which some new States inherited had been designed to exploit local divisions, not overcome them. Understandably, therefore, the simultaneous tasks of Statebuilding and nation-building preoccupied many of the newly independent States, and were given new momentum by the events that followed the outbreak of secessionist fighting in the Congo. Too often, however, the necessary building of national unity was pursued through the heavy centralization of political and economic power and the suppression of political pluralism. Predictably, political monopolies often led to corruption, nepotism, complacency and the abuse of power. The era of serious conflict over State boundaries in Africa has largely passed, aided by the 1963 decision of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to accept the boundaries which African States had inherited from colonial authorities. However, the challenge of forging a genuine national identity from among disparate and often competing communities has remained. The character of the commercial relations instituted by colonialism also created long-term distortions in the political economy of Africa. Transportation networks and related physical infrastructure were designed to satisfy the needs of trade with the metropolitan country, not to support the balanced growth of an indigenous economy. In addition to frequently imposing unfavourable terms of trade, economic activities that were strongly skewed towards extractive industries and primary commodities for export stimulated little demand for steady and widespread improvements in the skills and educational levels of the workforce. The consequences of this pattern of production and exchange 21

The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace in Africa

spilled over into the post-independence State. As political competition was not rooted in viable national economic systems, in many instances the prevailing structure of incentives favoured capturing the institutional remnants of the colonial economy for factional advantage. During the cold war the ideological confrontation between East and West placed a premium on maintaining order and stability among friendly States and allies, though super-Power rivalries in Angola and elsewhere also fuelled some of Africa's longest and most deadly conflicts. Across Africa, undemocratic and oppressive regimes were supported and sustained by the competing super-Powers in the name of their broader goals but, when the cold war ended, Africa was suddenly left to fend for itself. Without external economic and political support, few African regimes could sustain the economic lifestyles to which they had become accustomed, or maintain the permanent hold on political power which they had come to expect. As a growing number of States found themselves internally beset by unrest and violent conflict, the world searched for a new global security framework. For a brief period following the end of the cold war, the international community was eager to exercise its newly acquired capacity for collective decision-making. Beginning in the early 1990s, the Security Council launched a series of ambitious peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives in Africa and elsewhere. Despite a number of important successes, the inability of the United Nations to restore peace to Somalia soured international support for conflict intervention and precipitated a rapid retreat by the international community from peacekeeping worldwide. An early and direct consequence of this retreat was the failure of the international community, including the United Nations, to intervene to prevent genocide in Rwanda. That failure has had especially profound consequences in Africa. Throughout the continent, the perception of near indifference on the part of the international community has left a poisonous legacy that continues to undermine confidence in the Organization. B. Internal factors More than three decades after African countries gained their independence, there is a growing recognition among Africans themselves that the continent must look beyond its colonial past for the causes of current conflicts. Today more than ever, Africa must look at itself. The 22

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nature of political power in many African States, together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power, is a key source of conflict across the continent. It is frequently the case that political victory assumes a "winner-takes-all" form with respect to wealth and resources, patronage, and the prestige and prerogatives of office. A communal sense of advantage or disadvantage is often closely linked to this phenomenon, which is heightened in many cases by reliance on centralized and highly personalized forms of governance. Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously high. This situation is exacerbated when, as is often the case in Africa, the State is the major provider of employment and political parties are largely either regionally or ethnically based. In such circumstances, the multi-ethnic character of most African States makes conflict even more likely, leading to an often violent politicisation of ethnicity. In extreme cases, rival communities may perceive that their security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured only through control of State power. Conflict in such cases becomes virtually inevitable. C. External factors During the cold war, external efforts to bolster or undermine African Governments were a familiar feature of super-Power competition. With the end of the cold war, external intervention has diminished but has not disappeared. In the competition for oil and other precious resources in Africa, interests external to Africa continue to play a large and sometimes decisive role, both in suppressing conflict and in sustaining it. Foreign interventions are not limited, however, to sources beyond Africa. Neighbouring States, inevitably affected by conflicts taking place within other States, may also have other significant interests, not all of them necessarily benign. While African peacekeeping and mediation efforts have become more prominent in recent years, the role that African Governments play in supporting, sometimes even instigating, conflicts in neighbouring countries must be candidly acknowledged.

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The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace in Africa

D. Economic motives Despite the devastation that armed conflicts bring, there are many who profit from chaos and lack of accountability, and who may have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and much interest in prolonging it. Very high on the list of those who profit from conflict in Africa are international arms merchants. Also high on the list, usually, are the protagonists themselves. In Liberia, the control and exploitation of diamonds, timber and other raw materials was one of the principal objectives of the warring factions. Control over those resources financed the various factions and gave them the means to sustain the conflict. Clearly, many of the protagonists had a strong financial interest in seeing the conflict prolonged. The same can be said of Angola, where protracted difficulties in the peace process owed much to the importance of control over the exploitation of the country's lucrative diamond fields. In Sierra Leone, the chance to plunder natural resources and loot Central Bank reserves was a key motivation of those who seized power from the elected Government in May 1997. E. Particular situations In addition to the broader sources of conflict in Africa that have been identified, a number of other factors are especially important in particular situations and sub-regions. In Central Africa, they include the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely populated areas. In Rwanda, for example, multiple waves of displacement have resulted in situations where several families often claim rights to the same piece of land. In African communities where oil is extracted, conflict has often arisen over local complaints that the community does not adequately reap the benefit of such resources, or suffers excessively from the degradation of the natural environment. In North Africa, the tensions between strongly opposing visions of society and the State are serious sources of actual and potential conflict in some States. Responding to situations of conflict Early warning mechanisms are widely regarded as serving an important role in conflict prevention but, without early action, early warning is of little use. The United Nations early warning capabilities have 24

Kofi Annan

been significantly improved in recent years. The critical concern today is no longer lack of early warning of impending crises, but rather the need to follow up early warning with early and effective action. Whether the response involves diplomatic efforts, a peacekeeping deployment or a humanitarian intervention, the sooner action is taken the more effective it is likely to be. When grievances arise, Governments and their opponents must reject the immediate resort to violence that is all too common. When violent conflict does erupt, a genuine effort is needed to exhaust political options, before such a confrontation intensifies. Before international action is required, I urge Governments in situations of potential or actual conflict to consider the appointment of special mediators or special commissions to look into the sources of the dispute, build confidence, and recommend practical solutions. Such efforts might include the involvement of respected persons from elsewhere in Africa or from the broader international community. A. Peacemaking The deployment of peacemaking resources is an essential part of any effort, whether national or international, to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts. Diplomatic efforts are usually the most cost-effective and the most quickly deployed. Negotiation, mediation, good offices, fact-finding missions and judicial resolution may all be involved. The objectives include facilitating dialogue, defusing tensions, promoting national reconciliation, advancing respect for human rights and institutionalising peace. Where a peace process is needed, it is the role of the United Nations, with OAU, to help create one. Where obstacles obstruct further progress, it is our role to help remove them. Where a basis for agreement exists, it is our role to help facilitate it. Cooperation by the parties and their willingness to work towards peace can sometimes be nurtured by the international community if it is able to assist with short-term stability while providing positive inducements for longer-term reconciliation. Inducements might include, for example, local infrastructure and water projects, the provision of access to small business loans or basic medical care. To employ them effectively as tools of conflict resolution requires understanding people's problems in their full complexity and being able to respond at

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several levels simultaneously and with a certain amount of flexibility. Greater international support for such efforts is required. Peacemaking efforts need to be well coordinated and well prepared. Within the United Nations system the recently created Executive Committee on Peace and Security, convened by the Under-SecretaryGeneral for Political Affairs, is intended further to enhance cooperation, policy coherence and the sharing of information. Likewise, the newly established United Nations liaison office at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa will consolidate cooperation between the two organizations and facilitate the coordinated deployment of political efforts to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts in Africa. This is also the objective of the annual meetings of officials from the United Nations and OAU Secretariats, jointly chaired by the two Secretaries-General. Cooperation between the United Nations and sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which are working actively to address issues of peace and security in their sub-regions, is also being strengthened. Harmonizing the policies and actions of external actors In many cases, both in Africa and elsewhere, the failure of the major external actors to maintain a common political approach to an erupting or ongoing crisis is one of the principal impediments to progress towards a solution. The adoption of a common stance by neighbouring States is especially critical. In the early stages, neighbouring States are likely to be the first ones approached as the protagonists search for allies and support. If the conflict is allowed to escalate it will inevitably begin to take on a life of its own, but neighbouring States and other external actors are likely still to wield considerable influence with the protagonists. Even when the conflict has further intensified, broader international efforts, such as sanctions, can succeed only if there is genuine cooperation and support of such measures by the sub-region. The Organization of African Unity has a leading role to play in ensuring such cooperation and support, in conjunction with the relevant sub-regional organizations. In southern Africa, early and concerted political action by the sub-region with OAU support has been used effectively to contain burgeoning political troubles in Lesotho. In West Africa, the eventual decision by ECOWAS countries to harmonize their policies and 26

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actions in Liberia was a key turning point in the peace process in that country. Avoiding a proliferation of mediation efforts It is critically important that international actors avoid the temptation to undertake rival or competing efforts, once a framework for mediation has been established. This is in no way intended to discourage the designation by Governments and organizations of officials with a special mandate to pay close attention to a particular crisis situation. On the contrary, the appointment of special envoys and special representatives can greatly facilitate consultations, information sharing and decision-making within the international community. This should not, however, provide opportunities for the protagonists to divide the international community, or to play one effort off against another. Invariably such an outcome results in confusion and delay rather than progress. It follows that the selection of a mediator in situations of conflict must be very carefully considered and carried out with the closest possible consultation. In 1997, the appointment of a joint United Nations/OAU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region marked a significant innovation which may also prove useful in other circumstances. Two different but equally important examples of how cooperation might be structured are the support provided by the United Nations to the mediation efforts of Togo concerning the Bakassi Peninsula, and its support for the mediation efforts of former President Nyerere with respect to Burundi. Mobilizing international support for peace efforts Unless there is adequate international support for peace efforts it may be impossible in some situations to maintain the momentum for peace. The establishment of contact groups of interested countries, whether in the form of groups of "Friends", or a special conference as in the case of Liberia, can be effective in mobilizing international support for peace efforts. The Special Conference on Liberia was convened at ministerial level and brought together the ECOWAS countries, donor countries, the Bretton Woods institutions and other relevant parts of the United Nations system. The objectives were to mobilize international 27

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political support for the peace process; help to harmonize the views of the key external political actors; and ensure that the essential resource requirements of the peace process were understood and provided for. The utility of the Special Conference during the peace process has prompted suggestions that this mechanism be retained to deal with the challenges of post-conflict peace-building that now lie ahead for Liberia. I urge that equivalent structures be created in similar conflict and post-conflict situations. Improving the effectiveness of sanctions Sanctions, as preventive or punitive measures, have the potential to be an effective tool. The multilateral threat of economic isolation may help to encourage political dialogue, while the application of rigorous economic and political sanctions can diminish the capacity of the protagonists to sustain a prolonged fight. In particular, the imposition of an arms embargo can help to diminish the availability of arms with which to pursue a conflict by making the acquisition of weapons more difficult and more expensive. Economic sanctions in particular are too often a blunt instrument, however, applied without adequate prior measurement of their impact or determination of their objectives. In some cases, the hardship imposed on the civilian population is greatly disproportionate to the likely impact of the sanctions on the behaviour of the protagonists. Better targeting of sanctions is necessary to help ensure that they will achieve their intended purpose. Greater use should be made of sanctions aimed at decision makers and their families, including the freezing of personal and organizational assets as well as restrictions on travel. Where poorer countries that are called upon to apply sanctions are likely to face significant adverse effects, adequate provisions should be made to mitigate the consequences on local populations dependent on trade with the sanctioned party. It is impossible to speak of the need for better targeted sanctions without also drawing attention to the need for much more serious enforcement of sanctions by the international community. Where arms embargoes are imposed it is necessary for countries not only to refrain from official transactions but also to seek to discourage their nationals or corporations from violating such sanctions. To enhance the effectiveness of international sanctions regimes, I call upon Member States indi-

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vidually to adopt legislation making the violation of a Security Council arms embargo a criminal offence under their national laws. Stopping the proliferation of arms All States have the right and responsibility to provide for their own defence. Africa's compelling development interests nonetheless require that a minimum of resources be diverted for military purposes. African States can help to diminish the need for large military expenditures by implementing transparency and confidence-building measures in the military and security fields - including the signing of non-aggression pacts and security cooperation agreements, participation in joint military training exercises and patrols, and the harmonization of policies against illicit arms trafficking. In 1997 only eight African countries provided information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. I urge all African countries to participate in the Register, in a manner that will make a positive contribution to regional and subregional confidence-building efforts. These could include the establishment of supplementary sub-regional registers of conventional arms. Furthermore, in order to diminish the threat which the proliferation of small arms poses for Africa, I call upon African countries to agree to reduce their purchases of arms and munitions to below 1.5 per cent of GDP, and to commit themselves to a zero-growth policy for defence budgets for a period of 10 years. Identifying the sources of arms flows into Africa is critical to any effort to monitor or regulate this trade. Arms exporting countries have a responsibility to exercise restraint, especially with respect to the export of weapons into zones of conflict or tension in Africa. Particularly close attention needs to be paid to the role of private arms merchants in supplying weapons to areas of actual or potential conflict. The goal of public identification of international arms merchants and their activities has proved elusive, but perhaps no other single initiative would do more to help combat the flow of illicit arms to Africa - a trade that is made possible largely by the secrecy that surrounds it. The Security Council should address itself to this issue as a matter of urgency, including the role the United Nations might play in compiling, tracking and publicizing such information.

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B. Peacekeeping Historically, the United Nations has deployed more of its peacekeeping operations in Africa than in any other single region. Following a decline in international tensions, the deployment in 1989 of operations in Angola and Namibia began a new era of complex, post-coldwar peacekeeping. Of the 32 operations launched by the United Nations during the succeeding nine years, 13 were deployed in Africa. Yet following the serious setback suffered by the United Nations in Somalia, and the bitter experience endured in the former Yugoslavia, the international community has shown great reluctance in recent years to assume the political and financial exposure associated with deploying peacekeeping operations. This reluctance appears to go well beyond the lessons that Somalia offers, and it has had a particularly harsh impact upon Africa. In addition to the terrible price paid in Rwanda, the broader costs of paralysis can be seen in the reaction by some African Governments, especially in the Great Lakes region, to marginalize the United Nations from further political involvement in the region's affairs. The credibility of the United Nations in Africa to a great extent depends upon the international community's willingness to act and to explore new means of advancing the objectives of peace and security on the continent. It is important therefore, that the United Nations experience in Africa be reexamined and lessons extracted that can guide us for the future. Lessons learned The international community's perception of peacekeeping has been greatly shaped by the United Nations experience in Somalia. The memories of that operation continue to hobble the United Nations capacity to respond swiftly and decisively to crises. While the civilian population in Somalia derived significant benefits from the United Nations involvement, including the end of starvation, the United Nations Operation in Somalia was also the first United Nations operation to be withdrawn by the Security Council before completing its mission. The Security Council based that decision on the fact that, despite the operation's humanitarian accomplishments, no political progress had been made because of lack of commitment on the part of key Somali factions not interested in a settlement. 30

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The consequences of the retreat from Somalia and the reluctance to again commit international resources and political capital soon became evident as the international community agonized over how to respond to the tragedy that began to unfold in Rwanda. Hundreds of thousands of lives were lost in the course of the genocide that was perpetrated in full view of the international community. That experience highlighted the crucial importance of swift intervention in a conflict and, above all, of political will to act in the face of a catastrophe. The horrifying suffering of the Rwandan people sends the clear and unmistakable message that the international community must never again tolerate such inaction. A positive lesson was drawn from the United Nations Operation in Mozambique. There, the United Nations influence was augmented through constant dialogue with the parties on the ground and with other States. The operation, became a conduit for international resources, and a binding element for international action - a focal point, a symbol and a catalyst for efforts for peace. The United Nations experience in Mozambique showed that, in the right circumstances, peacekeeping operations can offer a flexible and uniquely adapted means to confront conflict in Africa. Its success testifies to the contribution that the United Nations can make as an impartial and legitimate actor for peace. It also indicates the Organization's potential to strengthen and direct international engagement within a conflict that might otherwise be exacerbated by negligence or by manipulation from outside, and the extent to which unanimity of purpose and willingness to act in a coherent manner can enhance the authority of the international community. The successive United Nations deployments in Angola have shown the vital role that can be played by a United Nations operation in sustaining a peace process in even the most adverse circumstances, but they have also indicated the crucial need for realistic peace agreements, and the importance of having a credible deterrent capacity within a peacekeeping operation in situations that remain dangerous and volatile. The ongoing risk of conflict has demonstrated, further, how access to resources by warring parties can foster violence, and has highlighted the impact that international business interests can have on the success or failure of peace efforts.

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Roles for United Nations peacekeeping in Africa United Nations peacekeeping will not always be the best answer to every problem, either in Africa or elsewhere. Without the agreement of the protagonists, for example, the cooperation and support needed on the ground for peacekeeping will be lacking. A peacekeeping deployment in such circumstances might even be counterproductive, sidetracking other efforts to take more forceful action or creating the erroneous impression that action is being taken to stop the conflict rather than merely mitigate its symptoms. In the right conditions, however, United Nations peacekeeping operations can make the difference between peace and war in Africa. The recent experience of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovenia, Baranja and Western Sirmium shows what United Nations peacekeeping can achieve even in the most challenging environment when it is deployed with a credible deterrent capacity, equipped with appropriate resources, and backed by sufficient political will. In Africa, peacekeeping has already played a wide-ranging series of roles in promoting an end to conflict. No catalogue of such roles can be viewed as exhaustive, and the Security Council will need to consider each challenge afresh and tailor a response that best fits the particular circumstances. Separating the protagonists and monitoring their conduct. Operations of this type function on the basis of a limited agreement or understanding between the parties. They monitor ceasefires and by their presence enable combatants to pull back to a safe distance from each other, where passions may cool and an atmosphere conducive to negotiations may be created. Such operations can be a critical confidence-building measure in difficult situations. Implementation of comprehensive settlements. In Africa, the United Nations has deployed a number of complex, multidimensional peacekeeping operations incorporating a wide range of civilian elements. Largely successful operations of this type were carried out in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. Where a comprehensive settlement to a conflict has been reached the deployment of a multidisciplinary peacekeeping operation may well represent the best chance to establish peace and build a foundation for lasting development, based on respect for human rights and the rehabilitation of civic institutions. Where such opportu-

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nities arise, the international community should provide its support, demonstrating its commitment to peace in a tangible way. Preventive deployment. It is important not merely to address conflict, but also to try to prevent it. Taking action in a timely manner is critical. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United Nations successfully deployed a peacekeeping operation before conflict occurred the first preventive deployment of United Nations peacekeepers. By providing a reassuring presence and a certain amount of transparency, such a deployment can prevent the type of miscalculations that can lead to violent conflict, allow time for grievances to be settled through political channels, make it possible to strengthen peace-building institutions and be a critical confidence-building measure for peace. Preventive deployment is a pro-active response to the threat of conflict. In Africa, as elsewhere, it can make a major difference. The international community faces such an opportunity now in the Central African Republic, where an explosive situation has been contained by African mediation efforts, local perseverance and an African security force, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), supported by France and the United Nations Development Programme. When the MISAB mandate expires and that support is withdrawn, the only viable option for the maintenance of stability in the Central African Republic is the establishment and deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. All parties within the country and all countries in the region are agreed that without a credible external force violence will return. The Security Council's recent decision to authorize the deployment of such a force sends a positive and important signal to the region and to Africa as a whole. Protecting humanitarian interests. Humanitarian agencies endeavour to provide support to civilian victims of war wherever they may be. Too often, however, the warring parties, one or more of which may be irregular militias or self-proclaimed authorities, make it difficult or impossible for them to do so. This is sometimes because of the exigencies of war, but more often because the relief of a particular population is contrary to the war aims of one or another of the parties. There is also a growing tendency for the combatants to divert relief supplies for their own purposes. Humanitarian actors have worked with peacekeepers, and independently of them, to negotiate access and defend humanitarian principles. However, the unprecedented difficulties arising from the operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia illustrate the magni33

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tude of the challenges and dangers posed for peacekeepers and humanitarian workers operating in a hostile environment without the consent or support of all of the parties. Supporting regional and sub-regional initiatives Within the context of the United Nations primary responsibility for matters of international peace and security, providing support for regional and sub-regional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and desirable. Such support is necessary because the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is desirable because wherever possible the international community should strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa's problems. In recent years there have been a number of new African initiatives to resolve disputes that have long plagued particular areas or to tackle new conflicts before they can expand and escalate beyond control. While not all of those endeavours have been successful, the political leaders of Africa have persevered and the peoples of Africa deserve the support of the international community. Authorizing the use of forceful action. Within modern conflicts the recurrent characteristics of fractured lines of authority, civilian suffering and involvement of militias have meant that intervention to promote peace has frequently entailed tasks that require forceful action and may incur significant danger. Where significant force is likely to be required the Security Council has in recent years frequently chosen to authorize action by willing Member States or coalitions of States. This has been the case, for example, in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, Iraq and Somalia. The obligation to obtain Security Council authorization prior to the use of force is clear; but while authorizing forceful action by Member States or coalitions of States can sometimes be an effective response to such situations, it also raises many questions for the future, particularly the need to enhance the Council's ability to monitor activities that have been authorized. Co-deploying with regional, sub-regional or multinational forces. One means of monitoring the activities of a multinational force while also contributing to the broader aspects of a peace process was demonstrated in Liberia. A small unarmed force of United Nations military observers was co-deployed alongside the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 34

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(ECOMOG), its mandate being to work with the sub-regional force in the implementation of the Peace Agreement. In accordance with the Peace Agreement, ECOMOG had primary responsibility for ensuring implementation while the role of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was to monitor the implementation procedures in order to verify their impartial application. Political, humanitarian and electoral components were also established in UNOMIL, later followed by a human rights component. The collaboration with ECOMOG succeeded in helping to restore peace in Liberia. It is a case of cooperation between the United Nations and a sub-regional organization that might be applicable to other situations as well. We should not, however, draw the conclusion that such responsibilities can henceforth be delegated solely to regional organizations, either in Africa or elsewhere. Delegation does not represent a panacea for the difficult problems facing peacekeeping. Regional organizations can face political, structural, financial or planning limitations. At times the impartiality or neutrality of their member States may be questioned, for historical reasons or for political or economic reasons. Nonetheless, the experience in Liberia clearly showed the contribution that can be made by a sub-regional organization such as ECOWAS when dealing with so complex a situation, and the key role that the United Nations can play in support of such efforts. Judgment and caution must be exercised in associating the United Nations with regional, sub-regional or multinational efforts but the potential for positive cooperation should continue to be explored. Strengthening Africa's capacity for peacekeeping. Reinforcing the capacity of African countries to operate in peacekeeping missions remains a key priority, whether those operations take place in the framework of a United Nations peacekeeping mission or one authorized by the Security Council but conducted by a regional organization or group of States. In looking to future strategies for enhancing Africa's capacity for peacekeeping, the proposals developed in consultation with OAU officials and tabled in my predecessor's report (A/50/711-S/1995/911) remain valid. Those proposals relate to practical steps that can be taken in the areas of training assistance, joint peacekeeping exercises, greater African participation in the United Nations standby arrangements, partnerships between countries whose contingents require equipment and donors that are able to assist, and closer cooperation between the United Nations and OAU. These efforts are not in any way intended to 35

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relieve the broader international community of its collective obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, but rather within the framework of those responsibilities to make Africa's own contribution more effective. In this context, I strongly encourage all Member States to contribute to the United Nations and OAU trust funds established to improve preparedness for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa. Ensuring a consistent approach Creating clearer criteria and a more predictable basis for determining when the Security Council is likely to support the deployment of peacekeeping operations is urgently needed. Failure to act in the face of serious threats to peace and human lives in Africa threatens the credibility and legitimacy of the United Nations not only in the area of peace and security but also in other areas of its work. Moreover, wide disparities in the international community's commitment to preventing or containing conflicts in different regions impede the ability of the United Nations to promote a stable and just international order anywhere. Member States must be engaged in terms of political will and practical resources if the viability of the United Nations and the principles for which it stands are to be safeguarded, let alone advanced. C. Humanitarian assistance In Africa as elsewhere, the changing nature of conflict requires new responses. During the cold war era there was a certain predictability in the way political and humanitarian mechanisms could be used to respond to crises shaped by competing bi-polar interests. On the humanitarian front, standard approaches were used to help people who sought asylum across borders. Assistance was provided in the relative security of camps or settlements outside the immediate war zone. In situations of famine, which were seen primarily as natural disasters compounded by politics (and not the reverse), there was a momentum to help people cope with food deficiencies. Crises today, particularly in Africa, have become much more complex, having many dimensions at once and involving many actors. Governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and anti-government forces all have an important impact on humanitarian situations, and humanitarian action can have important po36

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litical, social, economic and environmental repercussions as well. A principled and coordinated approach to humanitarian assistance will best address humanitarian needs and facilitate the preparation of a coherent and effective strategy for recovery and reconstruction. The humanitarian community and the international community at large need now to take a hard look at how humanitarian assistance is provided, and for what purposes. Humanitarian imperatives Protecting civilians in situations of conflict. All combatants must abide by universal humanitarian principles. Unfortunately, clear rules have not always translated into an equally clear acceptance of those rules. In recent decades, there has been a dramatic and unacceptable deterioration in the level of adherence to humanitarian norms in crisis situations. Governments have often treated armed opponents and their supporters with indiscriminate and ruthless ferocity. Anti-government forces are often willing to employ any and all means that might advance their end. In the past, civilian populations were chiefly indirect victims of fighting between hostile armies. Today, they are often the main targets, with women suffering in disproportionate numbers while often also being subjected to atrocities that include organized rape and sexual exploitation. Increasingly, relief workers, including United Nations staff, have also been directly targeted. Such attacks are unconscionable and undermine the basic conditions of humanitarian assistance. The monitoring and reporting of respect for human rights is a critical responsibility of the international community. Adherence to international humanitarian and human rights norms by all parties to a conflict must be insisted upon, and I intend to make this a priority in the work of the United Nations. In order to make warring parties more accountable for their actions, I recommend that combatants be held financially liable to their victims under international law where civilians are made the deliberate target of aggression. I further recommend that international legal machinery be developed to facilitate efforts to find, attach and seize the assets of transgressing parties and their leaders. In working to curb war abuses, human rights missions can play an important role. Because voluntary contributions have in the past proved not to be an adequate basis for funding when special human rights missions have been deployed, I recommend that all special hu37

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man rights missions should be funded from assessed contributions. In the strongest way possible, international pressure must be brought to bear on all warring parties to respect the human rights of civilians, including relief workers, in situations of armed conflict. Special attention must be paid to the needs of children in armed conflict. The recent appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the impact of armed conflict on children constitutes an important first step in institutionalising the international community's focus on this important issue. Targeting children for attack and recruiting or abducting them into militia forces are terrible crimes that must be specifically addressed in any future war crimes statutes or prosecutions. I endorse the notion of children as "zones of peace", and urge that this concept be expanded. Negotiating temporary ceasefires to allow children in war zones to be vaccinated, for example, or to allow food supplies to pass through confrontation lines has proved useful in a number of conflict situations. This practice should be raised to a tenet of international humanitarian law. Addressing refugee security issues. Persons fleeing persecution or war deserve refuge and assistance. The safety of refugees has increasingly become a matter of international concern, as has the security of States hosting large refugee populations or having such populations near their borders. The potential threat to African States posed by the movement of large numbers of refugees when they are mingled with combatants must be acknowledged. In the area of the Great Lakes, the movement of large numbers of Rwandan refugees into neighbouring countries became a destabilizing factor for those countries, as well as for the new Government in Rwanda. Despite appeals from my predecessor and from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the international community failed to support efforts to separate former combatants from non-combatant refugees who had ensconced themselves on the territory of the former Zaire, along its border with Rwanda. As a result, combatants hiding among refugee populations remain, even today, a source of insecurity throughout the region. Every effort should be made to ensure that all refugees and internally displaced persons are adequately protected and provided for, in accordance with internationally recognized rules and procedures. Refugee camps and settlements must be kept free of any military presence or equipment, including arms and ammunition. Where there is a 38

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massive influx of people in need of asylum, immediate measures should be taken to separate the civilian population from soldiers and militiamen. The latter should be quartered separately and the neutrality and humanitarian character of the camps and settlements scrupulously maintained. Action is also required to address the special needs and vulnerabilities of women and children in such situations. For their own security, and the security of the States from which they fled, I strongly urge that refugees be settled at a reasonable distance from any border, in camps of limited size, in accordance with the OAU Refugee Convention. Where host countries have been generous enough not to require refugees to live in camps, local communities should be provided with additional support. Some of the requirements relating to the protection of refugees and the support of States hosting large refugee populations are beyond the capacity of humanitarian providers. Many relate to matters of international peace and security for which the Security Council has primary responsibility. I therefore urge the establishment of an international mechanism to assist host Governments in maintaining the security and neutrality of refugee camps and settlements. Such a mechanism might encompass training, logistics, financial support, the provision of security personnel and the monitoring of national security arrangements. An important initiative with these objectives in mind has recently been launched by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to address security issues among Burundian refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania. Mitigating the social and environmental impact of refugees on host countries. The international community often does not adequately take into account the severe social and environmental consequences that the presence of large numbers of long-term refugees may have in many African countries. In Guinea, which has the highest per capita refugee population in the world, as much as 10 per cent of the population are refugees from neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone, and many have been in the country for a number of years. This massive presence of refugees has had profound effects on Guinea, devastating forests in some areas and often overstretching the facilities of local communities. The increased presence of street children in many areas and the inability of the local economy to absorb able-bodied persons into the workforce has resulted in rising social tensions. The burden placed on local infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and sanitation facilities has also 39

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been considerable. Former combatants mingled among refugees have also helped to fuel the illicit trafficking of small arms. While continuing to encourage African countries to receive and provide for refugees, the international community must also acknowledge and assist the tremendous effort that many countries are currently making. Humanitarian coordination. The coordination of humanitarian assistance still remains one of the greatest challenges facing the international community as it struggles to respond more effectively to the changing nature of today's complex conflicts. The need to achieve consensus among the multiplicity of actors - each with their own mandates, funding, approach and agenda - makes humanitarian coordination extremely difficult. Moreover, some actors have been reluctant to establish coordination mechanisms almost as a matter of principle. I am determined to ensure that United Nations humanitarian action is fully consistent with broader United Nations peace and development activities, and that our humanitarian action is coordinated. The recently established Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, convened by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, is intended to advance this objective. In the context of peacekeeping or peace-building operations, the United Nations humanitarian coordinator in the field will operate under the overall authority of my representative or special representative in the country, and will ensure that the head of mission is kept fully informed on humanitarian issues. Special challenges of humanitarian assistance Is assistance facilitating political inaction? Providing assistance to the victims of conflict is a moral imperative. It is one of the core functions of the United Nations system. Humanitarian assistance today often raises difficult challenges, however - morally, politically and operationally. In part this is because humanitarian assistance is an emergency response that addresses only the symptoms of conflict, not the causes. Humanitarian assistance cannot stop a conflict, and the diversion or abuse of humanitarian assistance may well prolong it. Of special concern is the fact that humanitarian assistance is sometimes treated as a substitute for political action rather than as a supplement. In some cases the vulnerability of humanitarian actors on the ground has even been used as the primary reason for not taking the necessary political action. 40

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In situations of conflict the purposes of humanitarian operations, as well as their limitations, need to be better understood by the public and constantly recalled, so that they do not serve as an excuse for political inaction. Is assistance helping to fuel the conflict? Humanitarian actors are now often required to negotiate access in volatile and dangerous environments, and to fend off efforts by both Governments and their opponents to use humanitarian assistance as a tool to achieve political goals, make economic gains or sustain their fighting capacity. Ensuring that the abuse of humanitarian assistance does not end up prolonging the conflict is one of the greatest challenges facing humanitarian actors in today's conflicts. The looting of humanitarian supplies and vehicles has become an all too frequent occurrence. Not only does this provide sustenance to combatants but, in the case of vehicles, cash and other valuable items, it may give them additional means to prolong or intensify the conflict. In Liberia, over $8 million in property - including nearly 500 vehicles - was looted from United Nations and non-governmental organization premises during the fighting that took place in April and May 1996. In the days and months that followed, combatants were often seen transporting themselves in those stolen vehicles while a flourishing black market developed in property stolen from the United Nations and other international organizations in the country. Are resources being diverted from other critical priorities? Of particular concern, especially to the host country, is the extent to which humanitarian expenditures diminish the pool of funds that might be available for other critical national priorities. In the Great Lakes region immense sums have been spent on humanitarian relief in recent years, though this assistance is often perceived by countries in the region as having very little impact on the issues that lie at the heart of the problems there. Many fear that the assistance may come at the expense of efforts to address root causes - a sentiment that is fuelled, for example, by the extreme funding difficulties that have surrounded the war crimes Tribunal in Arusha, and by the lack of support so far given to a number of key reconstruction and development priorities identified by the Government of Rwanda. This concern heightens the importance of ensuring a rational allocation of resources between humanitarian relief and development assistance. Does the multiplicity of actors and mandates impede the provision of effective assistance? The multiplicity of humanitarian actors and mandates 41

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operating in any given crisis is one of the striking characteristics of modern conflicts. This reflects a commendable human desire to respond to suffering, but it often entails overlap and duplication of activity that can sometimes amount to competition and rivalry. The multiplicity of actors and the failure at times to achieve consensus on operations or objectives has sometimes impeded rather than advanced humanitarian goals. It is clear that for humanitarian assistance to be most effective there must be cooperation and coordination among humanitarian actors. Relating emergency assistance to reconstruction and development Unless there is reconstruction and development in the aftermath of conflict, there can be little expectation of progress or durable peace. Rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery cannot await the completion of the peace process, however. Relief efforts must be a step towards development, and must be delivered in ways that promote, rather than compromise, long-term development objectives. Successful rehabilitation efforts require a mix of activities - some are quick-starting actions that relief staff familiar with the local situation are well placed to carry out, while others are longer-term actions that need to evolve smoothly into development efforts. What is needed during this phase is not a passing of batons from relief to development assistance, but rather partnerships in which each group brings its particular expertise and capacity to bear on the appropriate parts of the rehabilitation problem in a manner that is consistent and well coordinated. D. Post-conflict peace-building By post-conflict peace-building, I mean actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. Experience has shown that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace-building effort is needed to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a conflict. Peace-building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development. Peace-building does not replace 42

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ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crisis. It aims rather to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery. The crucial underlying need in post-conflict peace-building situations is the security of ordinary people, in the form of real peace and access to basic social facilities. In pursuing these peace-building objectives, a number of requirements are clear. First, time is of the essence. Second, a multifaceted approach, covering diplomatic, political and economic factors, must be adopted. Third, the effort must be adequately financed. Fourth, there must be high-level strategic and administrative coordination among the many actors. The transition to post-conflict peace-building A smooth and early transition to post-conflict peace-building is critical, and I urge the Security Council to look favourably on the establishment of post-conflict peace-building support structures similar to the one in Liberia. Even prior to the end of the conflict, there must be a clear assessment of key post-conflict peace-building needs and of ways to meet them. Peace-building elements should be explicitly and clearly identified and integrated into the mandates of the peacekeeping operation. When a peacekeeping operation comes to an end, the concluding mandate should include specific recommendations for the transitional period to the post-conflict phase. The priorities of post-conflict peace-building Societies that have emerged from conflict have special needs. To avoid a return to conflict while laying a solid foundation for development, emphasis must be placed on critical priorities such as encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect for human rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity; ensuring the safe, smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; reintegrating ex-combatants and others into productive society; curtailing the availability of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and international resources for reconstruction and economic

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recovery. Every priority is linked to every other, and success will require a concerted and coordinated effort on all fronts. Financing recovery Where a country's capacity to develop and implement a comprehensive economic programme has been disrupted by conflict, consideration must be given to relaxing the normally strict financial conditions imposed by international lending institutions. Conflict prevention, including post-conflict peace-building, may require an urgent infusion of funds to support a fragile State during a delicate political transition. It is particularly necessary to avoid situations in which conditionalities are imposed that are antithetical to a peace process, or in which international financial institutions and the donor community cut off funds from a weak Government making, in good faith, a popularly supported effort to pursue reconciliation or implement peace agreements. Where economic reform is needed it is necessary to consider how best to provide for a "peace-friendly" structural adjustment programme while easing the conditionality that normally accompanies loans from the Bretton Woods institutions. Where conflict has recently ended, bilateral and multilateral development agencies can make a distinct contribution by directing their assistance to areas which will facilitate the rapid re-establishment of income-earning activities. Special attention should also be paid to quick-impact micro-projects, especially when they include training and other capacity-building activities that can facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants, refugees and displaced persons into their communities. The sooner the communities are stabilized, the more durable the peace. Working towards a coordinated international response The multidimensional nature of post-conflict peace-building demands effective coordination. In Liberia, where circumstances continue to require extraordinary support from the international community, the first United Nations Peace-building Support Office has been established. The Office is intended to strengthen and harmonize United Nations post-conflict peace-building efforts, while also helping to mobilize international political support for the country's reconstruction and recovery, and assisting Liberians in their efforts to promote reconciliation 44

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and respect for human rights. The Representative of the SecretaryGeneral will be responsible for ensuring a consistent policy approach by the entire United Nations system. The United Nations Resident Coordinator in Liberia will be the Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General, and will continue to be responsible for the operational coordination of development activities carried out by the United Nations system. The Resident Coordinator will keep the Representative of the Secretary-General fully informed about relevant activities or initiatives of the United Nations, and will provide continuity once the mandate of the Office has ended. In some situations of conflict or post-conflict peace-building, a "strategic framework" approach may also be appropriate, providing the basis for a coherent effort by the entire United Nations system in countries in crisis. The strategic framework would especially embrace political, human rights, humanitarian and development activities aimed at promoting a durable peace and sustainable development. Such an effort would encompass all partners in the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as national authorities, donor organizations and non-governmental organizations. Building a durable peace and promoting economic growth A. Good governance The difficult relations between State and society in Africa owe much to the authoritarian legacy of colonial governance. Because there was little need to seek political legitimacy, the colonial State did not encourage representation or participation. The result was often social and political fragmentation, and a sometimes weak and dependent civil society. A number of African States have continued to rely on centralized and highly personalized forms of government and some have also fallen into a pattern of corruption, ethnically based decisions and human rights abuses. Notwithstanding the holding of multiparty elections in a majority of African countries, much more must be done to provide an environment in which individuals feel protected, civil society is able to flourish, and Government carries out its responsibilities effectively and transparently, with adequate institutional mechanisms to ensure accountability.

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Securing respect for human rights and the rule of law Respect for human rights and the rule of law are necessary components of any effort to make peace durable. They are cornerstones of good governance. By signalling its commitment to respecting human rights, a Government can demonstrate its commitment to building a society in which all can live freely. I welcome the recent endorsement by the OAU Council of Ministers of proposals for the establishment of an African court on human and peoples' rights. I call upon all African countries that have not done so to ratify United Nations and African instruments on human rights, and to embody those instruments in national law as a matter of priority. Government actions will speak the loudest, but important signals can also be sent. One signal might be the development of a national plan of action for human rights aimed, for example, at advancing the ratification of human rights treaties, reviewing and amending legislation to ensure that human rights are adequately protected, and promoting human rights training of judges, police officers, lawyers and prison officials. The establishment of credible, independent and impartial national human rights institutions can be a significant confidencebuilding measure, and should be reinforced by the development of indigenous non-governmental human rights organizations and institutions. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is available to assist Governments in drafting national plans of action for human rights, establishing human rights commissions, or implementing human rights objectives. Civic education by government, nongovernmental organizations, the media and others is important and should inform people about their civic rights and legal protections while also explaining civic responsibilities. Guaranteeing the fair and impartial enforcement of the law is indispensable to the protection of human rights. This requires respecting the autonomy, integrity and independence of the courts, and ensuring fair and impartial enforcement of the law by the police and State security services. If individuals or groups, including agents of the State, can act with impunity and escape punishment, citizens will live in fear of arbitrary arrest and detention. If the law is applied only selectively and is particularly harsh on certain groups, it creates resentment and fosters the environment for a violent response. Strengthening judicial institu46

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tions is a very important way in which the international community can help African countries to promote good governance. Promoting transparency and accountability in public administration Corruption is a serious worldwide phenomenon. It has critically hobbled and skewed Africa's development. Addressing the problem of corruption requires targeting both payer and recipient. I welcome the recent initiative of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development to reduce the scope for corruption in aid-funded procurement. I also welcome the signing of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which commits signatories to introducing legislation defining bribery and sanctions to punish it. These are important first steps, but much more still needs to be done. African Governments in particular must get tough on this issue, and make the fight against corruption a genuine priority. The costs of not doing so are very high - in lost resources, lost foreign investment, distorted decision-making, and failing public confidence. I call for agreement on a timetable for the early enactment of legislation in countries implementing the Convention, and call upon OAU to devise by the year 2000 a uniform African convention on the conduct of public officials and the transparency of public administration. Enhancing administrative capacity Good governance also requires the effective management of resources. Improved public sector management in Africa must therefore continue to be a high priority for the United Nations system and for African Governments. Existing efforts cover many sectors and operate at many levels. The Bretton Woods institutions have a special role to play, especially in working with African countries to reform public institutions in the financial sector and to support the development of transparent economic and regulatory procedures and practices. A strong central bank capacity, an efficient customs unit and wellmanaged government regulatory institutions are vital prerequisites for stable macroeconomic performance and the building of investor confidence.

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Strengthening democratic governance Democratic government helps to guarantee political rights, protect economic freedoms and foster an environment where peace and development can flourish. Today, as never before, countries around the world are seeking to establish pluralistic systems of government in which political leaders are elected by the will of the majority to fixed terms of office, and exercise their authority within legal limits. This is a very hopeful trend that bodes well for Africa's future, because in the absence of genuinely democratic institutions contending interests are likely to seek to settle their differences through conflict rather than through accommodation. Democratisation gives people a stake in society. Its importance cannot be overstated, for unless people feel that they have a true stake in society lasting peace will not be possible and sustainable development will not be achieved. Ensuring that people feel represented in the political life of their societies is essential, and in Africa democratisation can often build upon positive indigenous structures and traditional ways of inclusive governance. Elections play a central role in democratisation efforts in Africa and elsewhere and this focus must remain strong; but elections must also be part of a long-term undertaking that will lead to a strengthening of national institutions and democratic processes. The real test of a democratisation process is not the organization of first elections, but whether those first elections are followed by others in accordance with an agreed electoral timetable. B. Sustainable development Development is a human right, and the principal long-term objective of all countries in Africa. Development is also central to the prospects for reducing conflict in Africa. A number of African States have made good progress towards sustainable development in recent years, but others continue to struggle. Poor economic performance or inequitable development have resulted in a near-permanent economic crisis for some States, greatly exacerbating internal tensions and greatly diminishing their capacity to respond to those tensions. In many African countries painful structural adjustment programmes have led to a significant reduction in social spending and consequent reductions in the 48

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delivery of many of the most basic social services. Especially when this is coupled with a perception that certain groups are not receiving a fair share of diminishing resources, the potential for conflict is evident. While economic growth does not guarantee stability, satisfaction or social peace, without growth there can be no sustained increase in household or government spending, in private or public capital formation, in health or social welfare. The basic strategy for achieving sustainable development through economic growth is now well established. The core components of the strategy include macroeconomic stability and a stable investment environment; integration into the international economy; a reliance on the private sector as the driving force for economic growth; long-term foreign direct investment, especially in support of export-oriented activities; adequate investment in human development areas such as health and education; a fair and reliable legal framework; and the maintenance of basic physical infrastructures. Despite the broad consensus on how development and economic growth should be pursued, however, in Africa it has been difficult to achieve rapid progress, partly because of the failed policies pursued in the past by many African countries and the difficult international economic environment in which they generally must operate. Creating a positive environment for investment and economic growth Creating a positive environment for investment. To produce sustained economic growth, African countries must create and maintain an enabling environment for investment. The world economic system is highly competitive and market-based, and Africa has become largely marginalized in recent years in attracting significant inflows of longterm foreign direct investment. The importance of investment in small and medium-sized businesses should also be emphasized as such enterprises are an important source of employment in Africa and contribute significantly to the continent's GDP. If Africa is to participate fully in the global economy, political and economic reform must be carried out. It must include predictable policies, economic deregulation, openness to trade, rationalized tax structures, adequate infrastructure, transparency and accountability, and protection of property rights. Enacting needed reforms. Many Governments are in the process of successfully implementing necessary reforms, and some already enjoy stronger growth as a result. Others continue to struggle and several 49

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have yet to complete the first generation of economic reforms, which include fiscal consolidation, privatisation and deregulation programmes, trade liberalization, and policies to promote investment in human capital and economic infrastructures. These reforms need to be put in place without delay. They should be accompanied by determined efforts to stamp out corrupt practices and implement other civil service reforms that will improve the ability of government to carry out its functions. Long-term success can be achieved only if African Governments have the political will not just to enact sound economic policies but also to persevere in their implementation until a solid economic foundation has been established. This will happen only if there is greater public understanding of the measures required, and broad-based political support for those measures. Therefore, I urge the convening of national conventions on economic restructuring and reform in countries where serious adjustment is required, for the purpose of considering and explaining the need and likely ramifications of various aspects of structural adjustment. Those conventions might also suggest modifications warranted by local conditions. Drawing attention to progress and new opportunities. Where progress is being made it should be acknowledged publicly. Virtually none of the major investment guides includes information on Africa. For my part, I intend to hold, in collaboration with the Secretary-General of OAU, regular meetings with senior business leaders worldwide to discuss with them ways of promoting large-scale long-term investment in growth-promoting sectors in Africa. I intend to focus special attention on multi-country infrastructure projects and projects for the exploitation of shared natural resources, as called for in the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. On the basis of those consultations, I will recommend appropriate follow-up actions to be taken by national Governments, the United Nations system and other institutions. Emphasizing social development Too often, the majority of those living in the developing world appear to be incidental to development rather than its focus. Ultimately, all development strategies should be measured by the benefit they bring to the majority of citizens, while the value of particular develop50

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ment tactics should be measured by the extent to which they will contribute to that end. Governments should review their priorities and distribution decisions, focusing on basic human needs and placing primary emphasis on reducing poverty. The international community needs to work for social development with all of the tools at its disposal, ensuring that greater sensitivity to social development issues is matched by increased financing for anti-poverty efforts and for social development needs. Investing in human resources. Just as investment in physical capital is necessary to generate economic growth, so too investment in human resources must be recognized not merely as a by-product of economic growth but as a driving force for development. Investment in human development is an investment in long-term competitiveness, and a necessary component of a stable and progressing society. Education, for example, not only increases employment options and capacities but it also enables individuals to make broader, better and more informed choices in all aspects of life, health and culture. Technical and professional training lays an essential foundation for the acquisition of skills, and for renewing, adapting or changing those skills to better suit the evolving needs of individuals and societies. Public health priorities. Africa faces an increasingly serious public health crisis, which may also have serious consequences for development. It is the result of the worsening impact of endemic diseases such as malaria, together with the re-emergence of diseases like tuberculosis and poliomyelitis and the continuing devastation caused by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Many deaths could be prevented by vaccinations or effective preventive measures, and by investing in improved sanitation and basic health care. In the case of HIV/AIDS, two thirds of the people infected worldwide are in sub-Saharan Africa. New treatments are available that can very substantially reduce the chances of pregnant mothers transmitting the HIV virus to their unborn children, while better education on how to prevent the transmission of the disease would also have a significant impact. I call for a new focus by Africa and the international community on reducing the mortality rate of treatable and preventable diseases, and urge that consideration also be given to the use of emergency and humanitarian resources for this purpose. I appeal for substantial additional research into new prevention and treatment techniques for diseases such as malaria, which kills millions of people in Africa each year, many of them babies and children. I urge the 51

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pharmaceutical industry to work with African countries and the World Health Organization to set a timetable for achieving more affordable access by Africa to life-saving and life-enhancing drugs, including drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. Focusing on social justice. The eradication of poverty requires development in which access to the benefits of economic progress is as widely available as possible, and not concentrated excessively in certain localities, sectors or groups of the population. Economic growth does not by itself ensure that benefits will be equitably distributed, that the poor and most vulnerable will be protected or that greater equality of opportunity will be pursued. Attention to social justice is vital if development and economic growth are to produce positive results and if society is to develop in a balanced way. If only a small fraction of education resources are spent on primary education while millions remain uneducated and illiterate, and only a small fraction of expenditures on health care go for basic health services and facilities while millions suffer from easily treatable or preventable diseases, development will have little meaning. If social protections are available only to the urban minority, and lack of access overall translates into a practical lack of rights, development can only be a relative term. If economic opportunities are focused exclusively on urban centres while rural life is degraded and destroyed, turmoil and social disintegration will be the price of change. Development and spending priorities need to be broad-based, equitable and inclusive. Eliminating all forms of discrimination against women. Investing in women's capabilities and empowering them to exercise their choices is a vital and certain way to advance economic and social development. Equality of rights, opportunities and access to resources between men and women are fundamental requirements. Measures must be taken to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and girls. Institutional barriers that prevent the exercise of equal rights need to be identified and removed through comprehensive policy reform. In some countries married women still remain under the permanent guardianship of their husbands and have no right to manage property. The equalization of laws for men and women, particularly those relating to property, inheritance and divorce, is a pressing need in a number of African countries. I strongly urge all countries that have not done so to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and to do so without reservation. 52

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Restructuring international aid In Africa, long-term international aid programmes have not achieved the development goals for which they were established. Dramatic cuts in assistance to Africa have been registered in recent years. This trend has hurt rather than helped Africa's efforts to implement the difficult economic and political reforms which are now under way across the continent. Appropriate and effective aid levels need to be established. In conjunction with this, development assistance needs to be restructured, focusing on high impact areas and on reducing dependency. Attention should be directed both to the means for transmitting assistance and to its ends. It is worth noting, for example, that because urban water supply is given preference over rural services, less than 20 per cent of aid for water and sanitation services goes to rural areas or to low-cost mass-coverage programmes. Because higher education is given preference over primary schooling, less than 20 per cent of aid expenditures for education go to primary education. Because urban hospitals are given preference over primary health care, only about 30 per cent of aid for health care goes for basic health services and facilities. The manner in which technical assistance is provided also needs to be critically re-examined. Technical assistance as it was originally conceived was designed to close the technical capacity gap between industrial and developing countries by accelerating the transfer of knowledge, skills and expertise, thereby building national capacity. In some cases this has been done but, in many others, technical assistance has had precisely the opposite effect, reining in rather than unleashing national capacity. It has been observed that today, after more than 40 years of technical assistance programmes, 90 per cent of the $12 billion a year spent on technical assistance is still spent on foreign expertise despite the fact that national experts are now available in many fields. In line with the objectives outlined above, I call for an immediate examination of how best to restructure international aid to reduce dependency, promote primary social development objectives such as clean drinking water, basic literacy and health care, and reinforce efforts to make African economies more stable and competitive. First and foremost, I urge all donors to strive to ensure that at least 50 per cent of their aid to Africa is spent in Africa, and to make information on the expenditure of aid funds more easily accessible to the public. Greater 53

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aid for infrastructure development in Africa, including road and rail networks, telecommunications capacities, computer systems and port facilities, would leave a tangible mark while generating employment, expertise and revenues in Africa itself. Reducing debt burdens An unsustainable burden of debt. Many States in Africa lack the financial capital needed to address basic expectations and fundamental needs. This is one of the central crises of Africa today, and one that is due in large measure to the problem of Africa's public sector debt. When tensions rise or conflict threatens, many African countries do not have the basic resources to meet critical needs. In 1995, Africa's external debt totalled $328.9 billion - of which approximately 45 per cent was owed to official bilateral sources, 30 per cent to official multilateral sources, and 25 per cent to commercial lenders. To service this debt fully, African countries would have had to pay to donors and external commercial lenders more than 60 per cent ($86.3 billion) of the $142.3 billion in revenues generated from their exports. In fact, African countries as a whole actually paid more than 17 per cent ($25.4 billion) of their total export earnings to donors and external commercial lenders, leaving a total of $60.9 billion in unpaid accumulated arrears. The need for additional action on debt. Addressing the threat that an unsustainable debt burden poses to the economic security and longterm stability of Africa requires comprehensive and decisive action by the international community. Debt relief granted by the international community should promote and reinforce economic reforms. It should be structured in ways that will not undermine Africa's future capacity to attract investment, but will instead enhance that capacity by lifting past burdens from present operations. The recent Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative is a promising step. The principle behind the Initiative is that the international community would reduce the debt burden of poor countries, following the implementation of internationally accepted programmes of reform, to a level that would no longer hinder their economic growth and development. The results of the Initiative have been disappointing, however. At present, only four African countries meet its requirements. Significant movement on lifting Africa's crippling debt burden will require concerted political action at the highest levels. It is evident that 54

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in development terms Africa has far too little to show for the burden of debt that has now accumulated. Africa cannot avoid its share of responsibility for the present debt predicament, but the international community needs to acknowledge its own role in creating this problem. During the cold war bilateral and multilateral loans were often linked mainly to geopolitical priorities, purchasing political peace and stability in areas of interest to the super-Powers or their principal allies. In many cases bilateral loans provided the funds for extensive military expenditures by African countries. Across Africa, Governments were sometimes pressured into accepting a wide range of loans which they did not need and could not productively utilize. In many cases little or no effort was made to ensure accountability for expenditures, despite clear reasons for lenders to expect that substantial sums were likely to be diverted or misappropriated. A framework for action on debt. The Organization of African Unity has called for an international agreement to clear the entire debt stock for the poorest countries in Africa within a reasonably short period of time, and in the context of Africa's overall economic reforms. I urge that this appeal to help African countries to escape from the debt trap be given the most serious consideration. I also urge that two immediate steps be taken towards that end. First, I call upon all creditor countries to convert into grants all the remaining official bilateral debt of the poorest African countries. Second, I call upon the international financial institutions to significantly ease and quicken access to facilities for heavily indebted poor countries, and to provide countries with sufficient resources to enable them to attain a substantial and sustained pace of economic growth and social development. Opening international markets Access to markets. All countries are now part of an international trading system, but many remain imperfectly integrated into it while others are excessively vulnerable to its instability. Long-term sustained growth in Africa will depend largely upon the capacity of Africa to diversify exports and to achieve export-led growth in manufactures alongside the production of primary commodities. The transition to export-led growth will require not only sustained internal policy reform backed by macroeconomic stability and debt reduction, but also enhanced and guaranteed access to developed country markets as well 55

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as improved regional South-South cooperation. Africa's manufacturing competitiveness lies in part in items such as agro-based industries as well as apparel and textiles which are politically sensitive in developed countries. Although the average level of tariffs on Africa's major exports was reduced in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, more progress is needed. Particularly troubling is the problem of "tariff escalation", whereby tariffs on some agriculture- and naturalresource-based products increase in proportion to the degree of processing before export. This phenomenon serves to discourage and penalize African efforts to develop, and should be eliminated with respect to African products. Special efforts are needed by the developed economies to ensure access for competitive African goods, even in the face of domestic political lobbies resisting increased competition. I urge that the question of eliminating trade barriers to African products be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the group of major industrialized countries, with a view to the adoption of a common policy to be implemented on a bilateral basis and through the World Trade Organization. Adjusting to a globally competitive trade environment. With respect to Africa's own progress on tariff reduction, the international community should be sensitive to the possible impact of tariff reduction on budget revenues, fiscal deficits, macroeconomic instability and debt service burden. Assistance will be necessary to enable African countries to sustain the tariff reductions and economic reforms on which they have already embarked. Africa also requires special support to deal with the imposition of new and emerging non-tariff barriers such as new environmental, health and labour standards. Many African economies need not only greater access to the international market but also to remove domestic constraints which limit their capacity to take advantage of existing opportunities offered through the Uruguay Round agreements. The international community should also direct its assistance to the development of productive capacity in Africa and the enhancement of the competitiveness of industries on the continent. Support for regional cooperation and integration Small markets, high transaction and transportation costs, and lack of sufficient communication links are significant factors impeding the expansion of economic activity for many African countries. Greater re56

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gional cooperation and integration could help to limit some of those obstacles while enabling many countries to achieve collectively what each would be unable to achieve on its own. Also, the closer the economic ties among States members of sub-regional or regional groupings, the greater the effort likely to be devoted to preventing disputes and tensions from turning into conflicts. In the past, a range of political, institutional and physical constraints have hampered efforts to promote greater regional integration in Africa. They have included ideological differences, nationalistic policies, the non-convertibility of national currencies, tariff and non-tariff barriers, differences in legal institutions and frameworks and sometimes the lack of basic infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications facilities and transport. Today, a number of important factors favour efforts at greater regional and sub-regional cooperation. These include the Abuja Treaty, the efforts by many Governments to encourage private sector development, the convergence in macroeconomic policies resulting from the adoption of structural adjustment programmes by a large number of African countries, and the common challenge presented by the formation of new trade blocs in other regions of the world. Still greater policy convergence and harmonization are required if these efforts are truly to gain momentum. Specific activities at the sub-regional level could include cooperative projects that link two or more countries - common economic enterprise zones, common infrastructure projects, or joint tourism efforts, for example. To reinforce national economic efforts, I call upon African countries - with the support of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as the European Union and others - to examine ways in which regional and subregional integration can be used to promote economic discipline and sound macroeconomic policy, and facilitate the establishment of solid institutional and confidence-building links between neighbouring States. I also call upon African countries to give priority to establishing uniform standards for equipment and facilities relevant to sub-regional interactions. Significant progress will also require a more genuinely supportive attitude on the part of donors and trading partners, particularly with regard to the development of common standards and equipment among neighbouring countries. Too often, preferential arrangements with bilateral external partners result in a multiplicity of

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incompatible standards, technologies and equipment, thereby hindering genuine integration. Harmonizing current international and bilateral initiatives Coordination among donors, both multilateral and bilateral, is essential and should be continually re-evaluated until the assistance that is offered to Africa proves more successful in reducing poverty and promoting economic growth than in the past. To be meaningful, this effort will need to include not just the assistance provided by international financial institutions but also bilateral assistance, which is by far the largest component of international development assistance. A number of important multilateral initiatives have been launched in recent years, aimed at promoting peace and development in Africa. They include the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s and its implementing complement the United Nations System-wide Special Initiative on Africa, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, the United Nations Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the 1990s, and Commitment 7 of the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development. In the spirit of my reform proposals, it is necessary now to take a hard look at those initiatives and to ensure that the United Nations and its funds and programmes are working effectively together, as well as with African Governments and society, donors and non-governmental organizations. Summoning the necessary political will With sufficient political will - on the part of Africa and on the part of the international community - peace and development in Africa can be given a new momentum. Africa is an ancient continent. Its lands are rich and fertile enough to provide a solid foundation for prosperity. Its people are proud and industrious enough to seize the opportunities that may be presented. I am confident that Africans will not be found wanting, in stamina, in determination, or in political will. Africa today is striving to make positive change, and in many places these efforts are beginning to bear fruit. In the carnage and tragedy that afflicts some parts of Africa, we must not forget the bright spots or overlook the achievements.

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What is needed from Africa. With political will, rhetoric can truly be transformed into reality. Without it, not even the noblest sentiments will have a chance of success. Three areas deserve particular attention. First, Africa must demonstrate the will to rely upon political rather than military responses to problems. Democratic channels for pursuing legitimate interests and expressing dissent must be protected, and political opposition respected and accommodated in constitutional forms. Second, Africa must summon the will to take good governance seriously, ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law, strengthening democratisation, and promoting transparency and capability in public administration. Unless good governance is prized, Africa will not break free of the threat and the reality of conflict that are so evident today. Third, Africa must enact and adhere to the various reforms needed to promote economic growth. Long-term success can be achieved only if African Governments have the political will to enact sound economic policies, and to persevere in their implementation until a solid economic foundation has been established. What is needed from the international community. Political will is also needed from the international community. Where the international community is committed to making a difference, it has proved that significant and rapid transformation can be achieved. With respect to Africa, the international community must now summon the political will to intervene where it can have an impact, and invest where resources are needed. New sources of funding are required, but so too is a better use of existing resources and the enactment of trade and debt measures that will enable Africa to generate and better reinvest its own resources. Concrete action must be taken, as it is in deeds rather than in declarations that the international community's commitment to Africa will be measured. Significant progress will require sustained international attention at the highest political levels over a period of years. To maintain the momentum for action in support of Africa, I call upon the Security Council to reconvene at ministerial level on a biennial basis so as to assess efforts undertaken and actions needed. I also urge that consideration be given to the convening of the Security Council at summit level within five years, for this purpose.

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Conclusions In this report I set out to provide a clear and candid analysis of the sources of conflicts in Africa and the reasons why they persist. I have recommended actions and goals that are both realistic and achievable, to reduce conflict and in time help to build a strong and durable peace. I have urged Africans and non-Africans alike to summon the political will to rise to the challenge which together we must all confront. The time is long past when anyone could claim ignorance about what was happening in Africa, or what was needed to achieve progress. The time is also past when the responsibilities for producing change could be shifted on to other shoulders. It is a responsibility that we must all face. The United Nations stands ready to play its part. So must the world. So must Africa.

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PART TWO

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

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The Scourge of Civil Wars in Africa: A Case Study of Liberia Richard Iroanya Introduction. According to numerous authoritative reports, the African continent has had the highest number of civil wars in the world. Notable among these reports is the World Bank Group report, which estimates that one in every four African countries suffers from the effects of civil wars, while one-fifth of the African population live in societies devastated by armed conflicts.(World Bank, 2005). Consequently, the number of deaths in African conflicts is estimated at over one million people and the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) at over 15 million. In addition to this, about 4.5 million Africans are refugees in neighbouring African countries that are relatively at peace.(World Bank 2005) Apart from creating humanitarian crises, these armed conflicts; have also led to the phenomenon of failed or failing states in Africa and retarded the continent’s political, economic, socio-cultural, scientific and technological advancement. Several authorities have noted that while these wars were easy to start during and after the end of the Cold War, ending them has become the most daunting challenge facing, the belligerents, African leaders and the international community. Thus some of these wars, for example the Sudanese civil war, have dragged on for many years with severe consequences and little or no hope of ending any time soon. Other conflicts such as the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars have ended after a series of peace agreements and commitment of vast amounts of human and material resources. It is against this background that this chapter analyses the challenges of ending civil wars in Africa. Specifically, the chapter examines the concept and nature of civil wars and the dynamics that fuel them in Africa. Using the Liberian civil war as a case study, the paper demonstrates the obstacles usually encountered in the process of ending civil wars. This entails a brief historical overview of the Liberian civil war and attempts at resolving the conflict, up to the signing of the Compre63

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hensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in Accra, Ghana on 17August 2003, and the election and inauguration of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in January 2006. The concluding part of the chapter makes recommendations on how to resolve violent conflicts and sustain peace processes in Africa. Conceptualising civil war in Africa In ordinary usage, war refers to a ‘state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism; a struggle or competition, between opposing forces or for a particular end’ (Webster, 1983). This conceptualisation presupposes that war involves two or more opponents engaged in armed confrontation for the purpose of realizing desired ends or goals. Such end-states or goals are usually mutually incompatible to the belligerents. (Mitchell, 1989). Since each belligerent struggles to realize its goals at the expense of the goals of others, they are seen as being engaged in a kind of politics. Based on this understanding, Clausewitz points out that: “war is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means”(Snow, 1996, 25). Clausewitz’s view on war appears to have influenced the Chinese revolutionary Mao Tse-Tung who also concluded: “war cannot be divorced from politics for a single moment”.(Snow, 1996, 25) On the same hand, Hewitt also agrees with Clausewitz and Mao when he posited that war is not an end in itself but a means to realize preconceived politico-social goals.(Hewitt, 1993, 1). These classical views of Clausewitz and Mao on war are insightful to the understanding of several armed conflicts in the world. However, they appear deficient in certain respects. Particularly, they tend to apply mainly to wars between sovereign states (inter-state) and wellorganized and disciplined armies fighting over rational political ends. In this regard they provide little explanation to several large-scale organized violence happening in different parts of the world, especially in Africa and Latin America since the end of the Cold War in 1989.(Snow, 1996, 28) This is because most of these post-Cold War conflicts tend to lack easily identifiable rational goals and purposes, prompting some analysts to refer to them as “organised criminal groups”, causing unrest so as to profit from the resulting disorder. In this regard therefore, some African conflicts would appear to contradict the conventional understanding of war as a continuation of politics by 64

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other means since belligerents display disregard for discipline and orderliness associated with traditional military confrontations. Nevertheless, because these conflicts are happening within the territorial jurisdiction of sovereign states (intra-state) and between people of the same nationality, with or without external connections, they qualify to be classified as civil wars.(King, 1997, 18 – 21). Besides their brutal and unorthodox nature, a critical examination of the historical, social and economic contexts that gave rise to them will show that the conflicts qualify to be classified as civil wars. From empirical evidence however, not all internal armed conflicts constitute civil war even though they may form part of it. According to King, civil war is a matter of “political perception than objective reality”. In his view, it is difficult to “point any objective and universal criteria for what constitutes a civil war”.(King, 1997, 18 – 21). However, he posits that the use of the term ‘civil war’ by parties to a conflict demonstrates that they have rational political goals, which they seek to realize through military confrontation. But, since incumbent governments hardly recognize rebel organizations and their goals as legitimate and rational, it is difficult to define civil war especially in the context of African conflicts. For this reason, when describing African violent conflict or armed situations, several scholars prefer to use terms such as ‘intrastate armed conflict’ (Dwana and Gustavsson, 2004, 99), ‘uncivil war and new internal war’ (Snow, 1996), and ‘insurgency’. (Wilkinson, 2001, 18-19). The difficulty in defining and characterising civil wars notwithstanding, a civil war is the highest form of internal conflict or insurgency. Snow tends to reach a similar conclusion when he argues that insurgencies are civil wars in their political definition.(Snow, 1996, 65). According to him, civil war is the final stage of insurgent movement and is characterised by sustained military confrontation between the insurgents and the regime in power. Consequently, Snow defined civil wars as “organised armed violence between groups within a state for the purpose of overthrowing and replacing an existing regime or seceding from an existing state.”(Snow, 1996, 65). According to the classification of conflicts by The Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations, PIOOM (Snow, 1996, 3), this description falls neatly into the category of High-Intensity Conflicts (HICs). This is a protracted conflict in which more than 1000 deaths occur in a year. African conflicts that fall into this category are the Su65

The Scourge of Civil Wars in Africa: Case Study Liberia

danese conflict and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict. Other classifications used by PIOOM into which several other conflicts in Africa may fall into, include, Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs), in which between 100 and 1000 deaths occur per year and Violent Political Conflicts (VPCs), which involves about 25 deaths per year.(Snow, 1996, 3). From the brief review of the concept of war and civil war, it can be concluded that for a conflict to be classified as a civil war, it may possess all or some of the following characteristics: first, it must take place within the geographical territory of a state and between its nationals, even though it may still have some external dimensions. Second, the conflict must have rational socio-political cum economic goals being pursued by the belligerents, even though this may not be easily discernable. Third, it must be a high intensity conflict involving more than 1000 deaths per year in addition to being protracted. Lastly, the conflict must be recognised by parties to it as a civil war. Overview of civil wars in Africa As pointed out earlier, the African continent has been plagued by endemic civil wars caused by various mutually reinforcing historical, social, political, ideological, economic and external factors. (Dwana and Gustavsson, 2004, 99). Some of these wars date as far back as the 1950s, for example, the Sudanese civil war, while others are more recent. Among the most recent conflicts on the continent are the Rwandan, Burundian, and the Congolese (Democratic Republic) wars. Others include Liberian, Sierra Leonean, Ivorian, Angolan, Mozambican and Somali civil wars. In the literature, colonialism is often blamed for most of the conflicts in Africa. This is because colonial administrators forcefully incorporated people of diverse social, cultural, religious and ethnic origins into single states without making attempt to build nations out of them. Moreover, in dividing the continent among themselves, they arbitrarily demarcated African boundaries without regard to “African understanding of boundary as belts of separation between social units.”(Oyugi, 1994, 28). According to some scholars, the end results of this unfortunate development are irredentist agitations, ethnic animosity, unhealthy competition for scarce resources, and separatist movements in a number of African states.(Snow, 1996, 55).

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It seems however, that the ethnic argument is faulty to some extent. This is precisely because some countries, that are largely homogenous such as Rwanda and Somalia, have experienced and continues to experience devastating wars. Diversity of ethnic groups does not cause war in itself unless it is manipulated by leaders to achieve political objectives. Similarly, contemporary wars in Africa are not necessarily irredentist in nature. This is because most ethnic-based wars of secession are not necessarily aimed at uniting their kin and kiths in other African countries but to correct certain political imbalances in the sovereign states they live in. On the same hand, colonialism too cannot be completely blamed for socio-political and economic crises that have caused wars in several African states. Liberia and Ethiopia for example, are the only two countries in Africa that did not experience colonialism in the classical sense of the word, yet they have experienced civil wars. This goes to show that the search for the root causes of civil wars in Africa should go beyond the notorious ethnicity-colonialism rhetoric to include issues such as the leadership quagmire, marginalization and weak public institutions. Similarly, the Cold War has often been cited as a major contributing factor to civil wars in Africa. This is arguably one of the most plausible causes of civil wars in Africa. During the Cold War, the Super Powers fought numerous so-called “proxy wars” on the continent. This can be illustrated by the mostly ideologically based wars in Angola between Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) led by Eduardo Dos Santos and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi. While the defunct Soviet Union supported the MPLA, the United States of America (USA) backed UNITA. Ideological differences and the support of the superpowers during the Cold War also underpinned the war in Mozambique and helped to sustain dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now DRC), Col. Mengistu Hailey Mariem of Ethiopia and Samuel K. Doe of Liberia in power. When the Cold War ended in 1989 following the demise of the Soviet Union, the US became the only superpower in the world. Africa in the immediate post-Cold War years mattered less in the strategic thinking of the US government and former soviet states such as Russia. Thus, the suspension of military and financial support to former African allies by these powers resulted in the weakening of their military and political powers. Opposition groups to these governments capitalised on the new development to launch armed revolts 67

The Scourge of Civil Wars in Africa: Case Study Liberia

to oust them, thus resulting in civil wars in these countries. (Dwana and Gustavsson, 2004, 99). Dwana and Gustavsson have pointed out that most intra-state conflicts, especially in Africa are characterised by the “lack of any one goal on the part of the opposition forces.”(Dwana and Gustavsson, 2004, 99). Based on this assumption, Snow remarks that most African conflicts cannot be described as civil wars in the classical sense of the concept. He further argues that warring factions in African conflicts do not appeal to the same “centre of gravity” (same population) and unlike “traditional insurgencies” most warring factions in Africa lack ideological persuasion and are characterised by criminal tendencies. He gave instances such as the Sierra Leonean, Liberian and Rwandan wars to support his assertion. (Dwana and Gustavsson, 2004, 99). One problem with Snow‘s claim is that it fails to take into cognisance the diverse ethnic populations of most African states at war. His claim that warring factions do not appeal to the same centre of gravity is limited to the extent that it fails to see both government forces fighting to keep the unity of a state and rebel groups of a particular ethnic group attempting to secede as appealing to the same population. It is also hyperbolical to claim that warring factions lack ideological persuasion and rationale objectives. In making this claim, Snow appears to be limited only to ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism that was widely subscribed to by rebel forces during the Cold-War era. The objectives of warring factions in African civil wars are usually difficult to discern especially for those who are not very conversant with the historical political, social, cultural and economic dynamics of the countries at war. This however, does not imply that the wars lack rational objectives. Apart from diverse goals, African conflicts are also characterised by multiplicity of factions, unorthodox military strategies and lack of respect for fundamental human rights. Other common features include shifting zones of conflict and destruction of both military and civilian targets. (Dwana and Gustavsson, 2004, 99). In addition to these, African conflicts are occurring in the poorest of countries on the continent, contrary to arguments by theorists of ‘revolution of rising expectations’. These theorists opine that instability occurs mostly in countries that are at the developmental stage, especially at the stage of partial development.(Snow, 1996, 74). The effect of these unfortunate features of internecine conflicts in Africa is that they have become protracted due to the difficulty in settling them. They have also brought about failed states 68

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and humanitarian crisis on the continent; retarded the continent’s development by diverting attention and resources into resolving them at the expense of other problems such as environmental degradation, drought, diseases and unemployment. Obstacles to ending civil wars in Africa. Civil wars are usually easier to start but very difficult to end. It is even harder to figure out what actually constitutes the end of a civil war. King has made several observations as to what, perhaps, could constitute the end of a civil war. One such observation is that, it is the process by which belligerents agree on cessation of hostilities, a formal cease-fire or peace agreement.”(King, 1997, 21). Empirical evidence however, suggest that, the signing of peace agreements does not necessarily imply the end of conflicts, as fighting continues to occur intermittently after peace accords and in most cases warring factions renege on their commitments to peace accords. The second observation is that, “it is the acceptance by all sides of the military outcome as the basis for determining the political outcome of a conflict”.(King, 1997, 21). Defeating insurgencies militarily is often seen as the most effective means of ending civil wars. However, it has also been shown that even when enemy forces surrender voluntarily sporadic fighting still continues, especially in the countryside. Warring parties often claim that underlying causes of the conflict have not been addressed, hence increasing the chances of resumption of the civil war. No contemporary (post Cold War) African conflict has ended in outright military defeat by one side but through a negotiated settlement. The end of a civil war in the African context may be characterized by the signing of a peace agreement, faithful implementation of a peace deal especially disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, election, inauguration of a new government and outright cessation of hostilities by belligerents over a sustainable period of time. Several obstacles hinder the termination of civil wars, especially in Africa. One such obstacle is that, both government forces and rebel groups tend to profit from lawless situations in war-torn countries. King has observed that, as war drags on, the difference between government forces and rebel forces become thin as both employ the same tactics and use excessive force on civilian targets. The warring factions 69

The Scourge of Civil Wars in Africa: Case Study Liberia

profit from the weakness of or in most cases, lack of governmental institutions in conflict areas. They torture, loot, extort, rob, and rape civilian populations or the so-called soft targets. In the words of King “local elites amicably divide the spoils of war with erstwhile enemies.” Consequently, civil wars are prolonged rather than ended. (King, 1997, 21). As many scholars have argued, no contemporary civil war is entirely domestic due to the process of globalisation that is rapidly collapsing boundaries and making people increasingly interdependent. Thus, as peace in one country tends to beget peace in another country, so also conflict in one country may beget conflict in another country. Both countries at war and those relatively at peace suffer the political, social and economic effects of wars. As a result, external forces take serious interest in civil wars, particularly in their regions. (King, 1997, 21). For example, the war in Liberia, directly involved neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast, and countries such as Burkina Faso, and Libya. Other countries within and outside Africa and regional and international institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) were all involved in resolving the conflict. Often the involvement of these countries and institutions in the peace process compounds rather than solves the problem. The role of leaders of warring factions is an important factor in the prolongation or the ending of civil wars. Leaders of warring factions contribute to the prolongation of civil wars in three different ways. First, leaders may refuse to negotiate peace or renege on peace deals due to personal fears of what may become of them after the war. Equally important are their attitudes towards the conflict and possible economic interests in the continuation of conflict. Secondly, as conflict lingers on, its aims and objectives become lost and leaders become identified with the conflict itself. Thus, their followers tend to reject any settlement deal that would reduce the status of their leaders. Thirdly, and probably the most important one is intra-elite squabbles, which makes it difficult for warring factions to make and implement decisions as some factions may favour peace while others may not. Intra-elite squabbles may also result into breaking up of a party to a conflict into various factions. This makes it difficult to resolve conflicts as it becomes difficult to identify which of the factions to negotiate with. Moreover, a faction that was not party to a settlement deal or that does not support

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negotiated-settlement often resorts to violence to derail the peace process. (King, 1997, 21). An equally important obstacle to ending civil wars as identified by Mitchell as well as King is asymmetrical relationships between warring factions. Asymmetry in relationship is the unequal relationship between two parties engaged in negotiations to end military confrontation.(Mitchell, 1989, 204). It becomes a serious impediment to peace negotiations when one party occupies an advantageous position in the conflict at the expense of the opponent. In this situation the party in a strategic position would insist on maintaining the prevailing status quo and this would limit its choice of bargaining tactics. According to King, there are three dimensions of asymmetrical relationships. These are commitment, organisation and status. Belligerents display varying levels of commitment to conflict. While some may show strong commitment to the conflict and a continuation of it, others may show partial commitment and desire for peaceful settlement. Warring factions also differ in their organisations. While government forces may be well armed and organised with a known leader and can be engaged both politically and militarily, most insurgent forces are not well organised and there may exist several factions of the same group without an identifiable spokesperson. This makes it difficult for insurgent forces to embark on negotiations towards settlement with willing government forces. As noted earlier, incumbent governments battling insurgencies do not like recognising them and their goals as legitimate and as negotiating partners basically to discredit them before the international community. Finally, even after peace negotiations have culminated in the signing of peace agreements, warring parties still find it difficult to lay down their weapons and cease hostilities. This is due mainly to lack of mutual trust among them and fear of being attacked by other factions once they surrender their weapons. This situation commonly referred to as a “security dilemma” is mostly played out during disarmament, demobilisation, and rehabilitation and reintegration phases of peace processes. Ending of civil wars: the case of Liberia Liberia is a relatively small country located in the West African sub-region. It covers an estimated geographical area of 97,754 sq kms 71

The Scourge of Civil Wars in Africa: Case Study Liberia

and shares borders with the Republic of Guinea in the north, the Republic of Sierra Leone in the west, and the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire in the east. Freed slaves from the United States of America founded the Liberian state in about 1822. The country has a diverse population of about eighteen ethnic groups and an estimated population of 3.3 million people.(Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 637). Indigenous ethnic groups constitute about 95% of the population. They include, the Kpelle, Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, Mano, Krahn, Gola, Gbandi, Loma, Kissi, Vai, Dei, Bella, Mandingo, and Mende. Non-indigenous people are the Americo-Liberians and the Congo people who make up about 5% of the population.(Adekeye, 2002(a), 21). The Liberian civil war broke out in 1989 following an invasion by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. This is not the place to examine the causes of the civil war and its protraction. Suffice, however, to mention that, the end of the Cold War and subsequent withdrawal of US support for the dictatorial government of Samuel Doe exposed weaknesses in his administration which Charles Taylor and his NPFL took advantage of. Political marginalisation, ethnicity, corruption, weak public institutions, authoritarian leaderships, socio-economic problems, and external involvement in the war, particularly of neighbouring states, are among the reasons often cited as the causes and protraction of the Liberian civil war. (Adekeye, 2002(a), 22). At first, it appeared as if the specific aim of the invasion was to remove Samuel Doe from power and bring his corrupt and oppressive leadership to an end.(Adekeye, 2002(a), 25). However, the death of Doe in 1990 at the hands of Prince Yormie Johnson, leader of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), a break way faction of the NPFL, did not bring an end to the civil war. Rather, it triggered the country’s already tensed structural conditions of exclusionary politics, ethnic disharmony and economic decline into full-scale war that dragged on for 14 years. Some scholars refer to the fighting from 1989 to 1997 as the first civil war and the fighting from 1999 to 2003 as the second civil war. This does not suggest that there was peace and stability between 1997 and 1999. That period witnessed the most horrific dictatorial rule in Liberian history by Charles Taylor. There was weak armed opposition to his government due to disarmament and demobilisation process that took place before the general election in 1997. By 1999 however, former combatants had regrouped and militarily strengthened to confront 72

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Charles Taylor. The warring factions signed nine major peace agreements between 1989 and 2003. There were also peace conferences in Monrovia and Geneva that will not be discussed in this analysis due to lack of space. Attempt at ending the first war 1989 to 1997 Attempts at resolving the violent conflict began with the deployment of ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to Monrovia in August 1990 at the invitation of Samuel Doe. Despite coming under fierce attack from NPFL forces on arrival, the inexperienced and inadequately equipped multinational regional force was able to secure Monrovia from being captured by the NPFL. ECOMOG’s position as a peacekeeper was however compromised by its collaboration with INPFL forces against Taylor’s NPFL forces and the capture, torture, and murder of Samuel Doe by the INPFL in September 1990. It is alleged that ECOMOG may have traded Doe for peace and as a reward to the INPFL for its support in allowing the regional force to land safely in Liberia and for its collaboration in the fight against Taylor’s NPFL.(Johnson, 1996, 292). Despite its weaknesses, the poorly equipped peacekeeping force was able to create a buffer zone separating the warring factions, namely, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the NPFL and the INPFL.(Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 647). But this was after its mandate was changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.(Adebayo, 2002(a), 80). ECOMOG’s ability to create a buffer zone separating the warring factions led to the initiation of diplomatic attempts to end the civil war. The Bamako Peace Agreement 27 November, 1990 The first attempt to restore peace in the country was the Bamako Peace Agreement under the auspices of ECOWAS. The warring factions signed a cease-fire agreement in Bamako, Mali on 27 November 1990. The agreement provided for the establishment of a civilian led Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).(Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 647). The main belligerents at the time, namely the AFL, and the NPFL agreed to cooperate with the IGNU and work towards restoring peace and stability, conduct general election and establish democratic governance in Liberia. ECOMOG installed the IGNU as agreed and at a 73

The Scourge of Civil Wars in Africa: Case Study Liberia

national conference of representatives of rebel groups and Liberian politicians and the civil society. Dr. Amos Sawyer was elected as President of the IGNU at the conference. One vital omission in the composition of the IGNU was the exclusion of rebel leaders, especially the NPFL. ECOWAS sought to restore peace in the country by excluding the warring factions and their representatives and establishing an interim administration of neutral civilians. Possibly because the rebel leaders particularly Charles Taylor did not reveal their real objective of engaging in the war and probably because including them would have derailed the peace process as internal wrangling already existed within their leaderships. Nevertheless, this approach of an “all civilian interim government” backfired as shortly afterwards, the NPFL refused to recognise the IGNU despite signing the peace agreement and accepting to abide by its provisions. The rebel group proceeded to establish a parallel government in Gbarnga, the capital of Bong County.(Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 647). Fighting resumed in the countryside between AFL and the NPFL and other unidentified smaller groups that emerged at this time. ECOMOG, however, was able to secure Monrovia and its outskirts against rebel incursions and provided adequate protection for the IGNU. In April 1991, ECOMOG installed a new civilian interim government but retained Dr. Amos Sawyer as its head even though it was aware of the fact that the approach of an ‘all civilian’ interim administration was not working. The Yamoussoukro Accord When it became obvious that the Bamako Agreement had failed, a new attempt at ending the conflict was made by ECOWAS leaders. It appointed a five-nation peace committee headed by President Felix Houphouet Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire to work out modalities to achieve lasting peace in Liberia. The choice of the leader of Cote d’Ivoire as chair of the peace committee was crucial because Cote d’Ivoire under Boigny was strongly supporting Charles Taylor who launched his attack on Liberia from Cote d’Ivoire and his NPFL was allegedly, composed of regular soldiers from Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso and Liberian exiles. It was envisaged that the elderly Felix Houphouet Boigny would be able to persuade Taylor and his group into cooperating with the newly inaugurated IGNU and work towards ending the conflict. The parties signed a peace agreement on 30 October 1991 at Yamous74

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soukro. The accord included measures such as encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the auspices of an expanded ECOMOG as well as the establishment of a transitional government that would conduct general elections and inaugurate a democratic government. The Yamoussoukro agreement failed for various reasons despite the inclusion of one of the strongest backers of Charles Taylor in the peace making process. First, it failed because the main objective of the main rebel group, the NPFL, was not met or remained unclear to the peacemakers. Despite signing the two peace agreements, Taylor, backed by Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, had a hidden agenda which was however, revealed during the peace negotiations at Yamoussoukro. He clearly stated that, he aspired to be the president of Liberia and would only lay down arms if appointed to the presidency of the interim government. This was contrary to the groups initially proclaimed position of the NPFL of ousting Doe and restoring peace and democratic governance to the country. Second, there were no comprehensive incentives to the combatants to disarm and demobilise. Outram made similar conclusions when he posited that “the agreements of this period gave no incentives to the NPFL to demobilise and its participation in disarmament was perfunctorily performed and continually delayed.”(Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 647). Thirdly, Adekeye has succinctly noted that although Cote d’Ivoire publicly appeared to have reversed its position on ECOMOG’s role in Liberia after the peace conference in Yamoussoukro, it nevertheless refrained from closing its borders with Liberia thus allowing arms to reach the NPFL from Burkina Faso.(Adekeye, 2002(a), 88). As the war dragged on with little or no hope of final settlement in sight, new rebel forces began to emerge strongly along ethno-regional lines. The majority of these rebel groups had emerged to participate in the plundering of the country’s resources. For example, Taylor was heavily involved in illegal logging and diamond trade through which he financed his group. Thus, towards the end of 1991, a new powerful group called United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) emerged.(Adekeye, 2002(b), 47). It was made up of mainly Mandingo refugees in Sierra Leone and Guinea, members of the Liberian United Defence Force, and former members of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Alhaji G. V. Kromah led the group.

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ULIMO was alleged to have received strong support from President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone, who was opposed to Taylor’s attempts to destabilise Sierra Leone through the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF). Some scholars are of the view that the IGNU encouraged the formation of ULIMO with the aim of forcing Taylor and his NPFL back to the negotiating table. As a response, Taylor was believed to have orchestrated the formation of the Lofa Defence Force (LDF) as a counterforce against the ULIMO in the area.(Nanka, 2005). The LDF however, could not match the military strength of ULIMO. Fighting between ULIMO and NPFL intensified with several civilian casualties and the new group was able to capture several towns from the NPFL. The NPFL on the other hand continued to launch frequent attacks on ECOMOG positions with the objective of drawing the peacekeeping force into the war, discrediting it and calling for its replacement. As an attempt to force the warring factions back to the negotiating table, and limiting the proliferation of weapons and rebel groups, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 788, which imposed an arms embargo on Liberia.(Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 647). ECOWAS followed suit with economic sanctions on rebel held territories, particularly Gbarnga, where Taylor had his headquarters. These sanctions were however, not effectively implemented as armed proliferation and illegal economic activities continued through out the war.(Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 647). The failure of the sanctions could be attributed to the inability of ECOMOG to deploy to Liberia’s land borders due to its limited human and material resources. Consequently, the availability of illegal weapons, external support especially of neighbouring states, and easily exploitable natural resources, helped in the proliferation and sustenance of the rebel groups and the protraction of the civil war. The Cotonou Peace Agreement The imposition of sanctions by the UNSC was complimented by another diplomatic attempt at peace making on 25 July 1993 in Cotonou, Benin Republic. Prior to the signing of this agreement, the ULIMO, IGNU and NPFL had signed a cease-fire agreement in Geneva, Switzerland, on 17 July 1993.(Adekeye, 2002(b), 56). The peace negotiations in Cotonou, brought together representatives of the UN Secretary76

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General, Organisation of African Unity (OAU now African Union AU), ECOWAS, the IGNU, and NPFL. The ULIMO, which by this time had become a force to reckon with, was also invited to the peace negotiations. The peace facilitators abandoned the strategy of peace through installing completely civilian and neutral interim governments. Since it had become obvious that the main objectives of some, if not all the rebel leaders, were to control the Liberian state, the peace facilitators adopted a slightly different strategy at the peace conference. The Cotonou Agreement provided for the inclusion of influential leaders of the warring factions in a civilian interim government. The peace agreement proposed for the establishment of the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG), headed by a five-man Council of State. Members of the Council of State were drawn from the IGNU, the NPFL and ULIMO. In the spirit of the peace agreement, Dr. Amos Sawyer was to relinquish his position as head of the IGNU. (Adekeye, 2002(b), 56). Thus, he handed over power to David Kpomakpor, who was chosen as the Chair of the new Council of State, in March 1994. In order to ensure that the peace agreement succeeded, ECOWAS leaders called on the UN to increase its support for the peace process in Liberia. (Adekeye, 2002(b), 56). This led to deployment of the UN Military Observer Group in Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1993. Though, the peace agreement could not be fully implemented, the presence and support of the UNOMIL was instrumental to the acceptance by the warring faction to commit themselves to disarmament and demobilisation process. However, when it appeared that the main rebel groups, namely AFL, NPFL, and ULIMO were prepared to lay down their weapons by allowing ECOMOG and UNOMIL to disarm their combatants, emerging rebel groups that were left out of the peace process such as the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) led by George Boley and Lofa Defence Force (LDF) led by Francois Massaquoi, began launching sustained attacks in the southern parts of the country under the control of the NPFL. The sole objective of their attacks appeared to be the derailment of the peace process and their inclusion in the peace negotiations. It had become apparent that the control of territories was the sole prerequisite for invitation to the negotiating table. (Adekeye, 2002(b), 136). The group succeeded to the extent that its attacks undermined the disarmament and demobilisation process initiated by UNOMIL and ECOMOG. The attacks forced the NPFL and other rebel groups to back-

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track on their commitment to the disarmament and demobilisation process. Another contributory factor to the halting of the peace negotiations was the out break of violent disagreement within the ULIMO leadership. This resulted in the splitting of the group into ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J towards the end of 1993. Alhaji Kromah led ULIMO-K, while Roosevelt Johnson led the ULIMO-J. The break up led to fierce fighting between the two rival factions in different parts of Bomi County where they were controlling. Similarly, there was a further split in the NPFL camp as a result of dissention between Taylor and members of the NPFL’s Central Revolutionary Committee, leading to the emergence of NPFL-CRC. Due to these divisions and violent confrontations, peace negotiations were put on hold and attention was redirected to intrafactional peace making between different factions of the NPFL and ULIMO as a prerequisite for a comprehensive peace deal.(Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 648). The Akosombo Peace Agreement - September 12 1994 Although divisions in the warring factions and resumption of intra and inter factional hostilities, contributed to the failure of the Cotonou Agreement, ECOWAS leaders, and the international community continued to search for means of bringing the peace negotiations back on track. Thus, in September 1994, another comprehensive attempt at peacemaking was made in Ghana at the initiation of the Ghanaian leader President Jerry Rawlings, who assumed chairmanship of ECOWAS that year. (Adekeye, 2002(b), 58). Under the new initiative it was proposed that the idea of a civilian transitional government be reconsidered in favour of a new approach in which the main rebel leaders would be appointed members of new five-member Council of State. This move was intended to accommodate the political ambitions of rebel leaders like Charles Taylor who had declared their aspiration to the presidency of Liberia. The new proposal was welcome by all the participating parties resulting in the signing of a peace agreement on 12 September 1994 in Akosombo, Ghana. The agreement supplemented and amended the Cotonou Agreement and has been described by some scholars as “a warlords’ agreement” (Adekeye, 2002(b), 58).

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The Akosombo Agreement provided for one representative to be appointed by each of the warring factions, namely, AFL, NPFL and ULIMO, one by Liberian National Conference (LNC-made up of Liberian political parties), and one representing civil society. It was also intended to stop the proliferation of rebel factions by providing that new rebel groups would not be recognised and their members would be prosecuted as war criminals. Though the Akosombo Agreement succeeded to an extent in preventing the proliferation of rebel factions, it was heavily criticised by Liberian civil society groups because it favoured rebel groups more than civilian populations, and by so doing, it excluded the majority of the country’s population. (Adekeye, 2002(b), 59). The Akosombo Agreement was followed by yet another agreement signed in Accra, in December 1994. This was called the Acceptance and Accession Agreement. It brought together representatives of all the warring factions (ULIMO-J, the LDF, the LPC, and the NPFL-CRC) the coalition of Liberian political parties and civil society, the LNC. The principal aim of the accord was to get the warring faction to stop hostilities and allow for the implementation of peace deals that they had signed. A cease-fire agreement was signed on 21 December 1994 and the parties agreed that a general election would be held in November 1995. This was never attained as hostilities broke out again among the warring factions and their splitter groups. (Adekeye, 2002(b), 59). The Abuja Peace Accord - 19 August 1995 The resumption of armed clashes between factions signalled the collapse of the Akosombo and Accra peace deals. Consequently, another attempt was launched at Abuja the Nigerian capital in August 1995. The Abuja accord was in intent and purpose a modified version of the Akosombo and Accra agreements. It provided for the establishment of a new Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG) to be headed by a six-member Council of State (collective presidency) that would eventually lead the country to democratic elections and inauguration of a new president. The Council of State was made up of three rebel leaders and three civilians. The rebel leaders were Charles Taylor (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-K), and George Boley who represented a coalition of smaller groups such as the LPC, NPFL-CRC, and the LDF. The civilian members of the Council were Oscar Quiah and 79

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Wilson Sankawulo, who represented the LNC, and Chief Tamba Taylor who was retained as the representative of civil society groups. Wilson Sankawulo was appointed Chair of the Council. He thus, replaced David Kpomapkor. Despite the cease-fire provisions of the Abuja agreement, fighting between ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J and other factions continued unabated in different parts of the country.(Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 648). Fierce fighting broke out in December 1995 and continued well into mid January 1996, followed by sustained attack by ULIMO-J forces in collaboration with the LDF on ECOMOG positions in Tubmanburg in the Bomi County of Liberia. The heavy fighting did not only claim a significant number of lives of ECOMOG soldiers but also those of civilians and resulted in massive starvation, and gross human rights abuses. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 648). The fighting stalled the peace process and when it was finally brought to an end in early 1996, a leadership struggle erupted in ULIMO-J faction. Those who opposed Johnson’s leadership of the ULIMO-J issued a public statement to the effect that he was no longer leader of the group. This led to his removal from ministerial position in February 1995 by the Council of State. The NPFL and the ULIMO-K, took advantage of the division within the ULIMO-J to launch an attack on Roosevelt Johnson and his faction in central Monrovia on 6 April 1996. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 648). Many civilians were reportedly killed in the fighting and businesses, private homes and facilities of the UNOMIL in Monrovia were vandalised and looted. The warring factions agreed to halt attacks in May 1996. This made it possible for ECOMOG to be deployed throughout Monrovia, and for rebels to withdraw from the capital, which had been declared a “weapon-free-zone”. Fighting however did not stop in the southeast and southwest of the country, especially between the two ULIMO factions. The peace process was revived at the beginning of August 1996 and by 17 August about seven warring factions signed a revised form of the Abuja Agreement. The new agreement provided among other things for the replacement of the leadership of the LTNG. Consequently, Ruth Sando Perry replaced Wilson Sankawulo who was considered as generally ineffective as head of the Council of State. Like previous agreements, the revised agreement mandated the LTNG to organise general elections in May 1997 and inaugurate a democratic government. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 648). 80

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ECOWAS at this juncture also employed ‘carrot and stick’ tactics to compel the warring factions into reaching final agreement and ending the conflict. The sub-regional body warned that rebel leaders and their supporters who violate the peace agreement would face prosecution at a war crimes tribunal. It also threatened, with the assistance of the UN, to impose targeted sanctions on rebel leaders who obstruct the peace process. The threats appeared to have achieved the intended objective because in September 1996 the two warring ULIMO factions (ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J) signed a cease-fire agreement ending hostilities between them. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 648). The cessation of hostilities between ULIMO factions on one hand, and between them and other rebel groups on the other hand, paved the way for the commencement of the disarmament and demobilisation process in accordance with the revised Abuja Agreement. By 22 November 1996 ECOMOG with the assistance of UNOMIL began to disarm the warring factions. The exercise was completed in early 1997. Progress in the disarmament and demobilisation process paved the way for the resumption of political activities in the country. It also paved the way for the return of refugees and exiled politicians interested in the country’s presidency. Thus, Taylor, Kromah and Boley, resigned from their positions in the Council of State to contest the presidential election scheduled for July 1997.(Adekeye, 2002(a), 209). Several new political parties were formed, or rather former rebel groups metamorphosed into political parties, among them, the National Patriotic Party (NPP) formed by Charles Taylor. Politicians also revived certain old political parties as platforms for their election. One example is the Unity Party (UP) led by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. When presidential and legislative elections were held on 19 July 1997, Charles Taylor secured an outright victory in the presidential election winning 75.3% of the votes. His closest rival was Ellen JohnsonSirleaf of the Unity Party (UP) who won 9.6% of the votes. Taylor’s party the NPP also won 49 out of 64 seats in the House of Representatives, and 21 out of 26 seats in the House of Senate.(Adekeye, 2002(a), 222). He was duly inaugurated as President of Liberia on 2 August 1997. International observers described the elections as generally free and fair. Taylor’s inauguration as president officially brought an end to the first civil war. ECOWAS lifted its economic sanction on Liberia to help the new government pursue economic policies that would alleviate the country’s severe socio-economic conditions. The UN however, 81

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did not lift its armed embargo for security reasons. The UNOMIL was nevertheless dissolved, following the expiry of its final mandate. The new development encouraged the return of many refugees in the hope that the war had ended. Attempt at ending the second civil war: 1999 to 2003 Charles Taylor’s government sought reconciliation with former rebel leaders Roosevelt Johnson and Alhaji G.V. Koromah by inviting them to participate in the governance of the country. Its effort at reconciliation however, did not go beyond co-optation of these two former rebel leaders. The government made no effort to address the root causes of the war. Consequently, within a year the former rebel leaders left the government claiming that their lives were in danger. Taylor's government became very repressive and authoritarian resulting in its severe criticism and resentment by many Liberians. The government arrested, tried and sentenced most opposition politicians to prison even in absentia. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 649). It also banned most media organizations such as Radio Veritas, the Analyst newspaper and the Star Radio. The National Assembly was largely inactive under Taylor’s administration. The judiciary was neither independent nor effective. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 649). Taylor’s government used the institution to victimize its critiques, human rights activists and political opponents within the ruling NPP. On 18 September 1998, government forces attempted to arrest Roosevelt Johnson. This resulted into serious fighting between Johnson’s men and government forces. Johnson and his men sought refuge in the US Embassy in Monrovia but agents of the government followed them into the embassy thus, violating international diplomatic law. In the process they equally injured guards at the embassy. This action did not go down well with the US government. The consequences of the fighting and failure to arrest Johnson were massive killing and summary execution of several members of the Krahn ethnic group. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 649). This forced about 18,000 members of the group to leave Liberia. Apart from causing domestic problems, Taylor’s government also provided massive military support for the RUF in Sierra Leone and engaged in illegal diamond trade with the Sierra Leonean rebel group.

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In 1999 a rebel group began to attack towns in the Lofa County of Liberia from Guinea. This group would later identify itself as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Development (LURD). Mohammed Jumandy and Joe Wyie were leaders of the group. It was made up of mostly former ULIMO-J and K fighters, and members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. By the year 2000, LURD had made tremendous incursions into several towns and villages in Liberia and by early 2001, fighting had reached Monrovia. The group had the military and financial support of the government of Lassana Conte in Guinea. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 651). Like the first war, the second war was mostly inter-ethnic. The rebel group and Taylor’s government showed complete disregard for human rights and many innocent civilians were killed, raped and tortured. Moreover, the situation in Sierra Leone had deteriorated very much due to Taylor’s support of the RUF. The UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed sanctions against the government in 2001 as a measure to curb the destabilisation of Sierra Leone and heavy fighting in Liberia. The European Union (EU) also suspended aid to Liberia for the same reason. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 651). This forced Taylor to declare a state of emergency in Liberia but this could not stop fighting which continued up to early 2002. By March 2003, another rebel group emerged. The fighters identified themselves as Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). They occupied several towns in the Grand Geddeh County. MODEL was also made up of mostly members of the Krahn ethnic group. MODEL and LURD had one common objective of terminating the government of Charles Taylor. It is on the basis of similarity of objectives and membership that several observers alleged that MODEL was probably an offshoot of LURD created to intensify attacks on the government of Taylor. It is also alleged the Ivorian government provided support to the MODEL. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 652). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Accra, Ghana The combined attacks of the LURD and MODEL on government forces led to massive killing and torture along ethnic lines and mass exodus of Liberians into exile. ECOWAS leaders and the international community called on Taylor to relinquish power and go into exile so that peace could be restored in Liberia. ECOWAS leaders convened a peace conference in Accra, Ghana in June 2003 in an attempt to resolve 83

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the crisis. By June 2002 LURD and MODEL announced their preparedness to negotiate with Taylor’s government, which they had earlier rejected as illegitimate, thus, paving the way for the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) made up of representatives from the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana, the EU, United Kingdom, and the US to commence its mediating role in the conflict. While the ICGL played a chief mediation role in the conflict, the US provided financial support for the peace effort. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 652). The ICGL convened a peace conference in Accra, Ghana in June 2003. While negotiations were in progress at the peace conference in Accra, Taylor was indicted for war crimes in Sierra Leone on 4 June 2003. This caused a delay in the peace negotiations in Accra between Taylor’s government, LURD, MODEL, and representatives of civil society groups and Liberian political parties. Sustained attacks on Monrovia prompted ECOWAS to deploy the first batch of its peacekeeping troops in Liberia (ECOMIL). Eventually, Taylor agreed to relinquish power on August 11, 2003 and accepted Nigeria’s offer of exile probably because of sustained attack by LURD and MODEL, and diminished support from Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Libya to his government. Taylor handed over power to his Vice-President Moses Blah. Members of his government continued negotiations with the LURD and MODEL. On 18 August 2003 the warring factions signed a Comprehensive Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 652). The CPA provided for the establishment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and disarmament and demobilisation programme. There was also a greater involvement of civil society groups, such as Network of Liberian Women, and Liberian refugees, the media and Liberian politicians. Under UN Resolutions 1497 and1509, a new UN peacekeeping force called UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established. The UNMIL had a numerical strength of 15,000 troops and was mandated to take over the role of ECOMIL. Blah handed over power to Charles Gude Bryant who was chosen as the chair of the NTGL on 4 October 2003. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 652). The process of disarmament of ex-combatants began in December 2003 but was however stopped due to insufficient ground troops, resources, and logistical problems. It was resumed in February 2004, and was successfully completed on October 31, 2004. Rebel groups were 84

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thus, officially dissolved on 3 November 2004. (Africa South of the Sahara, 2005, 652). Despite major drawbacks the NTGL was able to fulfil its mandate of maintaining peace and security and conducting general elections to usher in a new era in Liberian history. General elections were held in Liberia on 11 October 2005. Twentythree presidential candidates including George Opong Weah of Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Unity Party (UP) contested the elections. Since no candidate won an outright majority, a run off election was held on 8 November 2005 between George Weah and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. The elections were won by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf with 58.5% of the vote against 42.5% obtained by her rival, George Weah. She was inaugurated President of Liberia on 16 January 2006. At the time of writing, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and her Unity Party have been in power for one year. At present the Liberian situation is generally stable. Armed confrontations since the signing of the CPA have considerably reduced, and Liberia could rightly be said to have entered the post conflict stage. Conclusion This chapter has examined the concept of war, civil war and the obstacles often associated with the ending of wars, especially intra-state wars in Africa. From the examination of the Liberian experience at conflict resolution, it can be seen that obstacles to ending civil wars are many. Among them is the disguising of the main objectives of war by rebel factions. This does not help the fashioning of adequate solutions to the conflict by peace mediators. For example, while Taylor’s real objective of waging the war was to become the president of Liberia and bringing back Americo-Liberian political domination, he masked this objective with the overthrow of Samuel Doe and institutionalisation of democracy in Liberia. One important reason why civil wars in Africa are protracted is due to external involvement by neighbouring countries and ill-defined peacekeeping missions. The Liberian civil war for example, dragged on for 14 years. Part of the reason why the war lasted that long was the involvement of neighbouring states and division among ECOWAS member states. Several Francophone West African states initially distrusted ECOMOG and regarded it as Nigeria’s instrument for perpetuating her hegemony over regional affairs. The absence of collective 85

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agreement among members of ECOWAS over the best approach to address the Liberian conflict obstructed rather than facilitated ECOMOG’s role in Liberia. While Nigeria, which had the largest contingent in ECOMOG initially favoured peace enforcement, other countries such as Ghana were against the adoption of such an approach. Moreover, ECOWAS member states such as Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire provided military and logistical support and safe passage for Charles Taylor and his NPFL. Libya also supplied arms and ammunition as well as training facilities for the rebels. Taylor’s notoriety in breaking peace agreements during the war was due in part to the massive support he received from these states. Undue compromise with dominant rebel forces also prolongs civil wars in Africa. As can be seen from the Liberian experience, the rebel forces were favoured in most of the peace deals at the expense of civilian victims of the war. This does not allow for the fashioning of adequate solutions to conflicts. For example, the decision by ECOWAS leaders and the international community to allow rebel leaders to participate in the 1997 election did not help the peace process in Liberia as intended. Rather, it gave rise to the election of Taylor as a matter of political expedience instead of a reflection of the actual wishes of the people of Liberia. Taylor at that time controlled over 70% of Liberia. None of the political opponents had any real chance against him in the election. The implication of his election was that he became accountable to nobody but himself. Two years later, the country reverted to civil war. Proliferation of rebel groups and illegal weapons, the recalcitrance of rebel leaders, availability of easily exploitable natural resources, and lack of disarmament incentives for rebels are among other reasons why civil wars are prolonged, in the context of Africa.

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References Adebajo Adekeye, (2002 a) Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London. Adebajo Adekeye, (2002 b) Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, The International Peace Academy: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Africa South of the Sahara (2005, 34th Edition), Europa Publications: Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York. Clausewitz V. C, (1996) quoted in Snow D. M, Uncivil Wars: International security and the New Internal Conflicts, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Colorado. Dwana, R, and Gustavsson, M, (2004) “Major Armed Conflicts”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Hewitt, C, (1993) Consequences of Political Violence, Darmouth Publishing Company. Johnson Ben, (1996) Peace-Keeping in Liberia: a Liberian Experience, in M. A. Vogt and L. S. Aminu (eds), Peace Keeping As A Security Strategy In Africa, Vol. 1, Fourth Dimension Publishing: Enugu. King, C. (1997) “Ending Civil Wars”, Adelphi Papers 308, IISS, London. Mitchell, C. R, (1989) The Structure of International Conflict. St. Martin’s Press. New York. Nanka S. Winsley, (2005) “Liberian Politician Have a History of making costly Mistakes”, The World Bank Group: Conflict and Development. Outram Quentin, (2005) Africa South of the South (34th Edition), Europa Publications: Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York. Oyugi. W, (1994) “The State in Post-Colonial East Africa: An Overview, in Politics and Administration in East Africa”, edited by Walter Oyugi. East African Educational Publishers. Nairobi. Snow, D. M, (1996) Uncivil Wars: International security and the New Internal Conflicts, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Colorado. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, (1983) MerramWebster Inc. Wilkinson, P. (2001) Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, Frank Cass. London. 87

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The World Bank Group, (2005) Conflict and Development, www.worldbank.org/conflict , March 2005.

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Chapter 3

Violence and Civilian Insecurity in the Darfur Region of Sudan1 Patrick Rankhumise2 Introduction Violent conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan has had devastating effects on the protection of the civilian population and continues to pose challenges to peace operations. Appiah-Mensah has cautioned that, “the situation is generally highly fluid and uncertain in all the country’s conflict areas and there are fears that an ‘arc of conflict’ could emerge across Sudan’s central belt, from western Darfur to the Red Sea region.”(Appiah-Mensah, 2006, 3). The continued deterioration of civilian protection is one of the reasons that motivated the African Union (AU) to seek measures to bring about peace and stability in Darfur. The Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (CHCFA) was signed at N’djamena on 08 April 2004 under the auspices of the Government of Chad. Furthermore, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government’s authorised the deployment of observers as part of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on 28 May 2004. The peace making efforts of the AU have combined both facilitation of peace talks in Abuja and deployment of AMIS. The mission was deployed with a mandate to monitor and observe compliance with the N’ Djamena HCFA. It was also tasked to assist in the process of confidence building, protect the humanitarian relief and support services to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and assist in the general improvement of human security in Darfur.(Appiah-Mensah, 2005, 7-21). The magnitude of civilian suffering continued amid concerted efforts to find a political solution and despite the deployment of the Afri-

. This chapter was earlier published as an occasional paper by the Institute for Security Studies. For more details visit www.issafrica.org. 2 The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of Mr. Mphi Maphunye, Research Intern at the Africa Institute, who assisted with technical corrections in this chapter. 1

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can Union (AU) troops to the region. Despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja on 05 May 2006, a conducive environment for sustainable peace and post-war reconstruction is yet to be created.3 The DPA remains a fragile agreement as it was only signed by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and a faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). The DPA is yet to be accepted by other important role players including some factions of the SLM/A, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and other belligerents. Contrary to the expectations of all, the HCFA and related protocols continued to be violated by all parties and other belligerents, and as such exacerbating the levels of civilian insecurity. The challenges facing AMIS was captured in the Report of the high-level symposium on enhancing capacities to protect civilians and build sustainable peace in Africa, which noted: The gap between aspiration and reality is most acute in Darfur, where the AMIS has – despite its best efforts – clearly not been able to provide effective protection or prevent massive human rights abuses. (Baranyi and Mepham, 2006, 3).

The deployment of AMIS reinforced the AU emphasis on the state use of its sovereignty to create conducive conditions for the protection of civilians. Such civilian protection is in line with the precautionary principles of ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ as stipulated in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report.(ICISS, 2001). The ICISS report specifically highlights some basic principles on the application of the right and moral intention for intervention. These include the use of military intervention as the last resort; the use of minimal military intervention that poses no threat to civilian security; and the application of reasonable chance of success in halting and averting human sufferings.(ICISS, 2001, xii). Baranyi and Mepham expanded on this view as they note that the responsibility to protect entailed the responsibility “to address both the root causes and direct

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The AU PCRD emphasises African leadership of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Such African ownership is conducted with more national and local content and is intended to draw lessons from other best practices and experiences elsewhere in the world.

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causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.”(Baranyi and Mepham, 2006, 1). The humanitarian crisis in Darfur mainly manifested itself through land dispossessions, looting of property, torture, rape and massive displacement of people creating both internationally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in the region. The humanitarian situation in Darfur continued to worsen despite the deployment of AMIS and other intervention by the international community and its effects are being felt in the neighbouring countries. For a long time, the GoS remained reluctant to allow the deployment of a more robust UN mission, calling for the continuation of the insufficiently financed and less resourced AMIS. Finding solutions to the Darfur crisis remained a major preoccupation of various actors and institutions that are committed to the provision of human security as an inherent right of the civilian population. It is against this background that this chapter seeks to highlight the state of civilian protection in the Darfur region of Sudan. Definitions Based on the growing insecurity discourse it is important to examine the definition of some concepts that are central to the understanding of the state of civilian protection in Darfur. Such concepts include sovereignty, civilian, protection, security, peace and intervention. Such definitions will be presented in the contexts that clarify contrasting paradigms of realism and critical theory. This study subscribes to the principle that the understanding of critical paradigms is crucial to proper situational analysis and the practical provision of human security and civilian protection. Sovereignty: Sovereignty refers to a state’s freedom from outside interference and the right to take decisions for the national interest. In the traditional sense that entails the use of state apparatus, especially the security forces, in ensuring the protection of civilians from external threats. According to the ICISS report, sovereignty empowers sovereign states with the primary responsibility of protecting their citizens from calamities and is obliged to create a conducive environment for survival for all its citizens – including the provision of basic human needs and fundamental human rights. In cases where sovereign states remain unwilling or fail to provide civilian protection, such protection of civilians become the responsibility of the international community.(ICISS, 91

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2001, xi). International intervention “may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.”(Baranyi and Mepham, 2006, 3). Protection: Protection refers to the state of being kept safe from dangers and other calamities viewed as having a potential to threaten ones’ existence. In the context of realism, protection refers to the ability of the state to provide a safe living environment for its citizens. That entails the drawing of state-centric or top-down programmes intended to address the socio-economic and political aspirations of the citizens. In this context the ordinary civilians remain passive recipients of protection from the state. In line with realist perspectives, the concept of protection entails the active involvement of both the state and its subjects in identifying aspects that are central to their individual and collective survival. Security: Traditionally the concept of security has been defined to mean the absence from war or the ability of any sovereign state to protect its citizens from external threats. Such a provision of security often entailed the creation of tight measures to control external intervention. They include the establishment of security services with capacity to use coercive measures in dealing with alleged threats to internal security. Sometimes that entails the imposition of tight immigration rules. Mathemba notes that such “traditional conceptions of security were parochial and often aligned with the state and the military.”(Mathemba, 2005, 49-50). On the other hand security is viewed as an all-encompassing phenomenon. In a more integrated context, security means a situation where civilians are free from any form of threat to their existence. It entails civilian access to basic services, freedom of expression, press and association and their inherent right to democratically participate in the appointment of government officials. Intervention: Intervention could be defined to mean actions taken by third parties with a view of restoring law and order. In the realm of conflict resolution and peace studies the concept refers to all efforts (diplomatic, military or humanitarian assistance) taken by nations, regional and international organisations and institutions to restore peace and human security in a conflict-ridden country. The Darfur conflict typifies the failure by the GoS to provide protection to its citizens and as such the situation called for international intervention. The growing human insecurity thus called for a need to operationalise the suggestions on the protection of civilians as pro92

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posed by the ICISS report. The effective operationalisation of the ICISS report depends on the transformation of AMIS into the proposes UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The latter could maximise the protection of civilians by using Chapter VII of the UN Charter to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to book. The deployment of a UN mission depends on the approval of the GoS and at the time of writing, seemed far from being actualised. While the political jigsaw on humanitarian intervention continued, the innocent civilians on the other hand continued to fall victims of gross human rights violations. The background history and dynamics of the Darfur conflict It is important to reflect on the history of the Sudanese conflict so as to develop a basic understanding of the persistent conflict in the Darfur region, and why it requires intervention by the international community. In spite of resolution efforts, Sudan remains one of the most waraffected countries in Africa, and Darfur has become the most waraffected region in Sudan. To a large extent, the conflicts are rooted in historical, cultural and religious disputes and issues, as well as in the ideological divide between the north and the south. In the historical context, it is worth mentioning that by the end of the Second World War, north and central Sudan were still administered as part of the British colonies while the southern part, remained politically dislocated from central and northern Sudan. The policy of dislocation formed part of the British colonial strategy that, according to Esterhuysen, was meant to prepare southern Sudan for eventual integration with British East Africa. The British colonial ambitions, however, were challenged by Sudanese nationalist movements that fought for and demanded selfdetermination and reunification with the south.(Esterhuysen, 1998, 329). It is also important to note that the Sudanese nationalist struggle in the south was fragmented in terms of philosophy, outlook and projection about the envisaged independent Sudan. These divisions were further exacerbated by physical, and especially racial, differences between the light-skinned northerners and the dark-skinned southerners. The central and northern parts (being mostly Arabic in culture and Islamic in religion) cherished the creation of a unified Sudan. To the contrary, the south, with its rich oil deposits and, being mostly Nilotic in culture

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and secularist in religion, mainly favoured the separation of the south from the northern and central parts.(Esterhuysen, 1998, 329). The politics of pigmentation led to racial divisions between the north and the south, and resulted in what Professor Ali Mazrui has referred to as “sub-Saharan pan-Africanism” which, in the context of the on-going “troubles in Sudan informs the argument that the conflict is between Arabs and Blacks.”(Mazrui, 2004, 1). These divisions have persisted throughout Sudan’s history and significantly underscore the incidence of its contemporary conflicts. When independence was ultimately gained in January 1956, the south felt marginalized because the north now dominated the newly created government and other national institutions. The dominant rebel group in the south, the Anya Nya, therefore, undertook a campaign of political destabilisation, including an armed struggle, to demand autonomy of the south from the north. The Anya Nya transformed itself into an organised political movement and military wing, the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and engaged the Khartoum government in fierce military offensives. Later, the SPLM engaged the Khartoum administration in negotiations that resulted in the creation of the government of national unity in July 2005. The establishment of the government of national unity was a major step toward operationalising the agreements on wealth sharing, southern regional autonomy and power sharing as agreed during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9 January 2005. The successful anti-GoS offensive by SPLM motivated the rise of militant nationalist sentiments in Darfur. Humanitarian crisis in Darfur Since the end of the Cold War, intra-state wars and conflicts in Africa have created unprecedented humanitarian crises within the continent. Continued intra-state conflicts and their ramifications for the security of the civilian population, especially in the Darfur region of Sudan, have been a cause of concern among various actors (political, conflict resolution and civil society), both within and outside the continent. In some academic circles, the magnitude of the Sudan-Darfur conflict has served to qualify the theory that views violence and war as socially acceptable conflict resolution mechanisms.(Galtung, 1995). This per-

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spective overlooks the vicious cycle associated with the use of violence to resolve disputes between and within groups. As noted by the United Nations (UN) in its Millennium Development Goals report, conflicts and disasters serve as sources of human insecurity and further engender poverty and hunger. (UN-MDG Report, 2005, 9). By 2003, large-scale conflicts had caused an estimated 13 million deaths worldwide, 12 million of which occurred in Africa. In addition, conflicts exacerbated refugee crises and mass displacement of innocent and vulnerable civilians.(UN-MDG Report, 2005, 9). The UN and the international community are thus compelled to broaden their focus to include the eradication of poverty and hunger, as well as the causes of conflicts and natural calamities, in order to address the nexus between socio-economic and human security factors. For this reason, the international community, led by the UN, called for collective action to eradicate sources of human insecurity, especially conflicts. Among others, such efforts at the normative level include global consensus on “embracing and operationalising the key principles relating to the ‘responsibility to protect’, as the framework for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. As part of the discourse around the ‘responsibility to protect’, it has been strongly argued that sovereign states have a primary responsibility to provide secure and peaceful living conditions for their citizens. It has been argued further that failure by a sovereign state to protect its citizens should compel collective action led by the UN, and including the use of military force, to restore civilian peace and security. In this regard, the conflict in Darfur has raised fundamental strategic and operational level challenges in the translation of the emerging notions of global action against states that fail to assume primary responsibility for the protection of civilian populations. Particularly in the Darfur region, the government of Sudan (GoS) is alleged to be complicit in serious human rights abuses, war crimes and crimes against humanity in a conflict that has claimed (and continues to claim) thousands of lives and left several million others as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The scale of the humanitarian catastrophe in the Darfur conflict and the alleged complicity of GoS thus compelled the UN to galvanise international consensus that the Khartoum administration was failing in its responsibility to protect its citizens in Darfur.

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In the wake of coercive action taken against regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and despite the urgency of the case of Darfur, sufficiently broad consensus on action has proved difficult to attain. The task of speedily resolving the Darfur crisis consequently fell to the African Union (AU), which quickly responded by deploying the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to address the human suffering in the region. However, given the same political dynamics, the mandate of AMIS, focusing largely on monitoring and observation of the humanitarian ceasefire agreements, has not been able to effect the desired change on the ground: a cessation of hostilities and atrocities against the civilian population. As a result, and coupled with other factors discussed later, there were serious discussions within the UN system and the international community about the urgent need for the UN to take over the peace mission in Darfur. However, for a long time the GoS remained reluctant to allow the deployment of a UN mission. It appeared that the majority of international actors favoured the deployment of a UN mission. To this end, various diplomatic efforts and meetings were conducted in efforts to gain the GoS approval for the deployment of a UN mission. Fearful of the repercussion associated with the UN deployment, the GoS continued with its position on antideployment of a UN mission. The diplomatic tug of war continued side by side with continued human sufferings. Annoyed by the GoS disapproval for the deployment of a UN mission the United States of America (US) threatened to consider applying “other” options to restore peace and security in Darfur. How did the CPA influence the Darfur crisis? The CPA identified and recognised the north and south as major regions in Sudan, and the national political agenda became crafted in that context. That process marginalized the Darfur region despite its long and rich history of being an autonomous political entity. It could be argued that the Sudanese peace process, especially related to developments that led to the signing of the CPA in 2005, could have taken into consideration the possibility of granting regional autonomy and a vice-presidency to the Darfur region. That might have afforded the people of Darfur an opportunity to decide their future and draw on the resources of the GoS to advance their socio-economic development. It might also have served as a motivating factor for regional dialogue and could have paved the way for the creation of a diverse and democratic Darfur.

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While progress was made towards national reconciliation between the north and south, conflict continued to ravage the Darfur region. The persistent conflict was waged as a result of the dynamics of race, ethnicity, politics and economics. The conflict was exacerbated by the GoS’s skewed provision of services that favoured the minority Arab ethnic groups. This led to dissatisfaction among the non-Arab ethnic groups, who then rallied around the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and from February 2003, they took up arms in an anti-Arab and anti-GoS offensive that resulted in the loss of lives and the destruction of properties. The Arab groups in Darfur also waged counter offensives through systematic attacks by the armed militia and the Janjaweed . The Janjaweed allegedly received support from the Khartoum government. Both the Janjaweed and the opposing forces often burned villages and looted property during the ensuing confrontations. In some cases, sexual harassment was used as a weapon of war as women and young girls became rape victims. That often affected the victims’ health status because they became vulnerable to the contraction of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmittable diseases. Again, the rapes often led to unplanned pregnancies and single parenting, all of which served to traumatise the victims and members of their families. The resultant increase in civilian casualties was met with much disapproval by the international community, and the GoS was blamed for waging war against its subjects. The emergence of the Darfur conflict showed that it is simplistic and a little erroneous to view the conflict in Sudan in a religious context only. In western Darfur, for instance, the predominantly Islamic populations have lived together as Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups, with the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa as the dominant groups. Indeed, it is pertinent that the name ‘Darfur’ meaning ‘the land of the Fur people’, derives from the ethnic name of the Fur. As mentioned earlier, as the Darfur conflict raged on, most of the non-Arab ethnic groups in the region rallied behind the JEM and the SLM/A. They thus waged military offensives in protest against the GoS’s marginalisation of the non-Arab ethnic groups in the Darfur region. As mentioned earlier, the failure by the GoS to entertain the idea of regional autonomy for Darfur as part of the 2005 CPA had a trigger effect on the militarised politics in Darfur. It should be noted, however, that both SLA and JEM have listed the regional autonomy of Darfur 97

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and representation in the GoS among their prerequisites before they sign the peace deal. Impact of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur As is the case in many conflict scenarios, women, children, the disabled and the elderly have inevitably been among the victims of the military confrontation between the GoS, the JEM and the SLA/M. The socio-economic fabric of society was seriously affected during the destruction of villages, and the looting of property and livestock during raids by the warring factions.(Appiah-Mensah, 2005, 10-11). While the GoS’s planes are alleged to be supporting the Janjaweed in the bombardment of villages viewed to be sympathetic towards the rebels, the Khartoum government denies such support or association with the Janjaweed, even though this is contradicted by accounts from local civilians, humanitarian agencies and AMIS. The persistent attacks on villages led to the displacement of an estimated 1.9 million IDPs, and another 200,000 refugees, mostly into Chad. Even at the IDP and refugee camps, women and young girls continue to be exposed to high levels of human insecurity, as a result of sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) abduction and family violence, by a few of their male counterparts. In addition, the Janjaweed and other marauding militia groups sexually harass women and young girls when they move out of the camps to search for food, water and firewood. In addition to this threat, the civilian populations in the IDP and refugee camps lack adequate clean water, which has led to diseases and deaths, especially among children. According to a Khartoum-based newspaper, The Juba Post (14 Sept. 2004), diarrhoea, fever and pneumonia account for an estimated 10,000 deaths every month, even though the Khartoum regime remains in denial about the humanitarian crisis and refuses to “respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state.”(ICISS, 2001, 8). Further to these large-scale attacks, many civilians have been arrested and detained by the GoS security forces, while several others have been held incommunicado for prolonged periods and tortured. The vast majority of the victims of these rights violations are from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Jebel, Aranga and other so-called ‘African’ tribes.(UN, 25 Jan. 2005, 3). The deterioration of human security among

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women, girls and children generally has been attested to by Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), which has reported as follows: The humanitarian situation in Darfur has recently been described as at an “equilibrium” point – but if you ask the people living in one of the crowded, unsanitary, and unsafe displaced camps in Darfur whether they feel they are experiencing an equilibrium, I have no doubt they will more likely tell you that their lives are dangling by the thin thread that is humanitarian aid. Simply because mortality rates in Darfur are now just below the emergency threshold level, in certain locations, doesn’t mean that the living conditions for the displaced in Darfur are in any way humane, safe, adequate, or acceptable. There is no such thing as reaching equilibrium when people’s lives are still hanging in the balance. (www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/speeches/2005/testim ony_sudan_7-2005.cfm, (08 December 2005).

The MSF report on the state of human security in Darfur captures the magnitude of sexual violence as follows: Since early 2003, the people of Darfur have endured a vicious campaign of violence, which has forced almost 2 million people to flee from their destroyed villages in search of safety. Rape against women children and men has sadly been a constant factor in this violence throughout this campaign of terror. More tragically, it continues to this day even long after people have fled from their villages. The stories of rape survivors give a horrific illustration of the daily reality of people in Darfur and especially of women and young girls, the primary victims of this form of violence.(Medicins Sans Frontieres, 27 October, 2005).

It is important to note that in contrast to past conflicts in Africa, the active involvement of children in combat in the Darfur conflict has been minimal. This confirms the assertion that in the context of the Darfur conflict there is “a complete disconnect between the child and the struggle”(McIntyre, 2005, 1). This serves to illustrate that there is no “one size fits all” template for the direct involvement of children in armed conflicts in Africa, as argued by McIntyre: “African children and youth have been absorbed into liberation struggles, political campaigns and insurgencies as surely they constitute the majority of the African citizens”. (McIntyre, 2005, 1). 99

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International efforts to resolve the Sudan-Darfur conflict: the AU, UN and international community The conflicts in most African countries and the consequent insecurity have provided fertile ground for academic research and discourse by opposing sides: Afro-pessimists and Afro-optimists. According to the Afro-pessimists, “in the consciousness of the world, Africa is synonymous with brutal dictatorships, military coups, stoned child soldiers, warlords, blood diamonds, corrupt officials, rigged elections, inefficient governments, street children, filth, crime, drought, famine, floods and pestilence”.(Inside AISA, 2005, 1). The Afro-optimists, on the other hand, refer to positive African efforts and commitments to take responsibility for the socio-economic, cultural, political and moral development of the continent. Such positive efforts mainly aim to change conditions from “begging-bowl-dependence to that of growth, development, good governance, democratic principles and civil liberties.”(Inside AISA, 2005, 3). As mentioned earlier, the scale of the (in)security landscape in Sudan-Darfur prompted the international community to engage the conflicting parties in peaceful dialogue so as to de-escalate the conflict and create an environment conducive to sustainable peace, post-conflict reconstruction, and development. The desire to create a stable and peaceful Darfur is predicated on the commitment and efforts to restore peace and security in Africa in accordance with the notion of finding ‘African solutions to African problems’. The UN, the AU and the international community have devoted considerable political, human, financial and material resources toward the resolution of the conflict. The commitment of these institutions towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict supports Field’s assertion that: Preventing war and maintaining peace remain among the most vital, and most elusive, goals of international relations. Indeed, the acid test for international and regional organisations is variably their efficacy in the area of peace and security nexus. (Field, 2004, 16).

In light of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, the UN and the AU were compelled to intervene to improve the plight of women, children, 100

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the aged, the disabled and the sick. The humanitarian response of these institutions, focusing on vulnerable groups, accords with ongoing discourse around the principles relating to ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ as espoused in the ICISS report that proposed the following precautionary principles for military interventions: • Application of right and moral intention for intervention; • The use of military intervention as the last resort; • The use of minimal military intervention that poses no threat to civilian security; and • Availability of reasonable chance of success in halting and averting human sufferings. (ICISS, 2001, xii).

Given the difficulties surrounding an international entry point for the deployment of a peace mission, the AU led the international efforts to restore peace and security in Darfur, through the deployment of AMIS in July 2004.(Appiah-Mensah, 2005, 7). The Darfur conflict in the context of the discourse on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ The deployment of AMIS was part of the AU’s efforts to eliminate mass human suffering. As mentioned above, AMIS formed a critical component of international efforts to restore human dignity and peace in Sudan and dovetailed with the ICISS report because it emphasised the “right of humanitarian intervention”. However, unlike some other mandates, AMIS’ mandate did not allow the use of coercive measures to deal with atrocities against the vulnerable population. That weakness in the mandate was further exacerbated by the insufficiency of its forces. The ICISS report emphasised the right of intervention during severe humanitarian crises, and is the intention to implement constructive and, where necessary, coercive intervention. According to the ICISS report, coercion would be applicable if a sovereign state was unable to protect its civilians from avoidable disasters, as is the case in Darfur. In such cases, the international community (of states and other actors) should be given the responsibility to intervene and restore the human dignity and socio-economic well being of the affected civilians through the application of coercive measures, including the international trials of perpetrators (for atrocities committed against the civilians) and the use of force to deter civilian insecurity. Against that back101

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ground, this paper argues that civilian insecurity in African peace missions, (such as AMIS in Darfur) illustrates the reluctance of the international community to effectively apply coercive measures that would provide civilian safety, as suggested by the ICISS report. Regional interventions: the inter-Sudanese peace talks on Darfur The dire humanitarian situation in Darfur compelled the negotiators at the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks to be seized with the urgent need to find solutions. The parties at the talks adopted a common position on the Declaration of Principles (DoP), to guide their path towards ending the hostilities in Sudan, with an emphasis on the Darfur region. As the Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre (DRDC) has emphasised, the talks: Would be the basis for a meaningful political process to address the root causes of the conflict in the region and help generate a just and lasting solution to end the ongoing human tragedy.(DRDC, 2005, 1)

This notwithstanding, the Darfur peace talks have not yet achieved a political settlement of the dispute, even after the seven rounds of talks held between 2004 and early 2006. As noted by the DRDC, the parties are distrustful of one another.(DRDC, 2005, 1). So far, the DoP has contributed precious little to ending armed hostilities between the opposing sides, especially by the government forces. This is in line with the report of the International Commission on Darfur, which noted that atrocities: Were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.(UN Report, 18 Sept. 2004, 3).

The GoS, whose international image has been tarnished by its handling of the Darfur crisis, has instead blamed the rebel groups for the atrocities, while the human security landscape continues to deteriorate, in spite of the presence of AU peacekeepers and the holding of the Sudan-Darfur peace talks.(Mail and Guardian Online, 22 July, 2005). During the series of peace talks mentioned above, negotiating parties promised to respect the activities of AMIS, which they requested be 102

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strengthened in order to facilitate its efficiency in monitoring the state of civilian security. The establishment of an AMIS-led Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit (JHFMU) centred on mission headquarters at El Fasher boosted the attainment of that objective. On the security issues, it was agreed during the Sudan-Darfur talks to enhance the security of civilians in Darfur, and negotiating parties were encouraged to comply with the first ceasefire agreement signed in Abeche in September 2003 and the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) on 8 April 2004. It was envisaged that the signatory parties’ adherence to the HCFA would lead to a decline in attacks against civilian targets and improved security in Darfur. To this end, the parties agreed to the following: • Commitment to respect the ceasefire agreement; • Release of prisoners detained during confrontations in Darfur; • Strengthen the AU presence on the ground. Agreeing to these aspects served to move the Sudan-Darfur peace process forward and illustrated the commitment of the parties to find lasting solutions to the broader Sudan conflict. However, the parties reached a stalemate on the establishment of a Ceasefire Commission, involving the disarmament of the Janjaweed and measures for the implementation of the agreement reached through the two Protocols.(AU, 23Aug-17Sept. 2004). The parties subsequently undermined the progress (made during the earlier rounds of talks) once they left Abuja by resuming the attacks on innocent civilians. In one such attack on 3 September 2005, a group of armed men attacked and robbed a humanitarian convoy in western Sudan of items including money, phones and radios. In addition, members of the convoy were severely beaten. The Darfur conflict has provided sufficient opportunity for a more serious and pragmatic assessment of the practicality of the principles of state sovereignty and intervention. On the one hand, while the international community, the UN, the AU and IGAD have engaged with the parties to the conflict, the security situation on the ground in Darfur has changed very little and, indeed, took a turn for the worse in early 2005. In its weekly and other reports, the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), for instance, has observed that;

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Troop movements, the illegal occupation of new positions, kidnapping, acts of banditry, including car jacking, armed robbery, theft of livestock, rapes of women by armed militias increased. (AU, 06 July 2005).

DITF further “noticed a host of violations from armed militia, particularly banditry, armed robbery, inter-militia attacks, fights and communal violence resulting in fatalities.”(AU, 06 July 2005). In the final analysis, the DITF reports point to the fact that the holding of the peace talks and the deployment of AMIS troops did little to improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur. That raises the question of whether the magnitude of the human insecurity warranted military intervention (as articulated in the ICISS report) and because of the complexity of the GoS or its inability or unwillingness to protect populations within its territorial borders. In spite of the persistent violence and civilian insecurity, the GoS has not shown substantive commitment towards the prosecution of the perpetrators. To the contrary, it has even failed to conduct investigations or effect arrests of alleged perpetrators, even where such perpetrators were known and there was sufficient and credible evidence to bring perpetrators to trial. The unwillingness of the GoS to bring perpetrators to book was emphasised by Human Rights Watch when it noted: Khartoum has feigned lame efforts to hold those responsible to account. The climate of impunity is nothing new for Sudan. Impunity for massive abuses of human rights committed by the army and ethnic militias in the separate twenty-one year civil war in southern Sudan undoubtedly contributed to the use of similar tactics in Darfur.(http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/01/sudan9971.htm, [30 November 2005]).

As already mentioned, AMIS’ ability to resolve the Darfur crisis was constrained by the nature of its mandate – hence, parties continued to violate the agreements and AMIS remained powerless to enforce them. As AMIS resources dwindled, the AU Peace and Security Council began (in January 2006) to consider handing the mission to the UN. That led to the extension of the AU mandate until March 2006, after which the mission will be converted into a UN mission. The conversion

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of the mission provided sound ground for the application of coercive measures as outlined in Chapter VII of the UN. While the humanitarian situation in Darfur continued to decline, Sudan hosted the AU’s Annual Assembly of the Heads of State. Traditionally, the host country serves as the new chair of the Union until the next assembly. The GoS’s record of human rights violation, especially its role in the Darfur crisis, compromised its chances of taking over the AU chair. This vacancy was filled by Congo-Brazzaville Consensus among African Heads of State not to hand the AU chair to Sudan served to confirm their opposition to the GoS’s repressive activities. They felt that allowing the GoS to lead the AU could damage the AU’s credibility, especially its commitment to respect human rights, democracy and good governance. Intra-SLA tension and the Darfur peace process The success of peace processes has on several occasions been affected by the spoiling tactics of the leaders of some of the parties to particular conflicts. Examples of such spoilers included Charles Taylor (Liberia), Foday Sankoh (Sierra Leone), and Agathon Rwasa (Burundi), to name but a few. Before delving into the examination of this feature, it is arguable that in the case of the Darfur conflict, there is sufficient reason to believe that the negotiating positions and stances of some of the parties are calculated to spoil the peace process. For instance, when the hard-line faction of the SLA in Darfur called for the party’s Unity Congress in November 2005 to discuss transformation within the movement, the timing of the congress had the potential to stall the peace talks.4 The division between the two factions posed a serious threat to the successful holding of the Seventh Round of Talks scheduled for Abuja, Nigeria, on 21 November 2005. Certainly, the feud also posed a serious challenge to the AU, especially regarding the recognition or non-recognition of the new chair of the movement, Minni Arko Minawi and the question of legitimate representation of the SLA/M at the talks. In this vein, the Sudan Tribune cautioned that:

The congress was held at a remote Darfur town of Haskanita and was attended by thousands of Darfurians and some 800 delegates. 4

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The in-fighting threatened to increase the level of insecurity in the region and hamper efforts to find peaceful settlement to Darfur conflict that has been raging for the past 32 months. (AFP/ST, 03 Nov. 2005).

Given the incidence of the spoilers and their spoiling tactics in conflict resolution processes, it is important to derive lessons and best practices to deal with such situations, in order to maintain the momentum of peace processes and ensure a quick return to normalcy. In this respect, the SLA congress was expected to be beneficial to the peace process because it served to achieve political unity (after the feuding between the factions of Abdewahed Mohamed al-Nur and Minni Arko Minawi) through the election of a new leadership and agreement on new strategies for finding a solution to the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur. The infighting would definitely have weakened the SLA’s negotiating position had the guarantors of the humanitarian ceasefire not stepped into the fray to aid a beleaguered, but nonetheless major player, in the conflict. The political weakness of the SLA would also, in all probability, have been exploited and exacerbated by the GoS, a view expressed by the Brussels-based think-tank, the International Crisis Group (ICG).(AFP/ST, 03 Nov. 2005). Besides the destabilising effect of the intra-faction splits and feuds, the Darfur peace process was also affected by the resumption of hostilities between the forces of the GoS and the SLA. Since the resumption of hostilities in September 2005 at Sheng al-Tobei village, about 65 km (40 miles) south of El-Fasher, capital of North Darfur state, the conflict has engulfed several other parts of Darfur.(AU, 14 Sept. 2005). One of the reasons for the continued hostilities between the warring parties was the perception of the rebel movements that the GoS was not demonstrating sufficient faith and commitment towards compliance with the ceasefire agreement and the peace process. The GoS was perceived as being too lenient with the pro-government elements. Civil society groups and organisations held similar views. It is pertinent to note the argument of the international community that the intentions and effect of the ceasefire agreement and the International Criminal Court (ICC) process have not yielded the expected outcomes. Among other things, this has led to the continued use of armed force against civilians by the warring parties, thus contributing to the contin106

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ued insecurity of the civilian population. The situation has also had implications for the integrity of the peace process because the JEM, for instance, threatened at a certain point to withdraw from the talks, blaming the GoS for its dubious role in the peace process. The weakness of these interventions has arguably contributed to and encouraged the warring parties to attack even AMIS peacekeepers. After a number of such attacks without credible counter-attack by the peacekeeping mission, AMIS eventually suffered its first fatalities on 8 October 2005: two Nigerian peacekeepers were killed. The role of the UN and AU in Darfur The magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur seized the attention of the international community after the visit in June 2004 by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell. During their visit, both Annan and Powell blamed the GoS for arming and backing the Janjaweed, and called for its immediate disarmament. Tragically, the international community could not achieve sufficient consensus on the gravity of the conflict and whether violations of human rights by the warring parties sufficiently qualified the conflict as genocide. While the US argued strongly in favour of calling it genocide, the European Union asked for more time for closer scrutiny of the situation in order to definitively determine the incidence of genocide. For its part, the AU was as forthright as the United States, but did not agree that the situation in Darfur amounted to genocide. What informed the varying positions of the key players within the international community? While it may be difficult to give definitive explanations, the fact remains that the lack of consensus played into the hands of the GoS and warring parties who had no inhibitions about the methods and means they employed to prosecute the conflict. In the end, the civilian population bore the brunt of the maelstrom of the conflict, amidst the ambivalence of the international community and its preoccupation with the precepts of the international political system. In terms of the Darfur conflict, it would be fair to argue that the first substantive intervention by the UN happened in October 2004. As part of this effort, the UN asked the UN Commission for Human Rights to look into the situation and to: •

Investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties;

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• • •

Determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred; Identify the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur; and Suggest means of ensuring that those responsible for such violations are held accountable.

After an intense fact-finding mission that received the cooperation of all parties to the conflict, the Commission concluded that: •

•

• •

The GoS and the Janjaweed conducted atrocities that contravened international human rights and international humanitarian laws. Attacks on the villagers in Darfur were planned and were intended to dispossess victims of their belongings, including land and livestock; The perpetrators of atrocities were identifiable; and The GoS’ justice system was incapable of dealing with the violation of human rights in Darfur.

In a nutshell, the Commission’s findings and conclusions confirmed the need for international intervention in Darfur. It portrayed the GoS as among the principal actors in the conflict. In such situations, the responsibility to protect vulnerable groups and other victims of militarised political disputes and conflicts remains in the hands of the international community. In light of the lack of international community consensus on the scale of the humanitarian crisis, the international community chose to establish a Commission of Enquiry to investigate reports of violations committed in Darfur, to determine whether or not acts of genocide had taken place, and identify the perpetrators of the violations against civilians in Darfur. In addition, Resolution 1564 (2004) called for political intervention in the Darfur humanitarian crisis by increasing diplomatic pressure on the Government of Sudan, to whom it reiterated its call to end the climate of impunity in Darfur. The GoS was asked to identify and bring to justice all those responsible (including members of the popular defence forces and Janjaweed militias) for the widespread human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. To add to the efforts of the AU, the resolution welcomed the AU’s intention to increase its monitoring presence in Darfur and urged UN member states to provide all the necessary support to the AU’s humanitarian efforts.(UN News, 05 Jan. 2006). Subsequently, the Security 108

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Council adopted Resolution 1593 (2005) by which it referred the issue to the International Criminal Court.(ICC, 05 Jan, 2006). Indeed, the tabling of the human atrocities at the UN Security Council emphasised the international communities’ commitment to end human suffering in Darfur. Even though the actions of the UN Security Council showed its political determination in that regard, its action fell far short of the Chapter VII measures that could have made a material difference to the situation in Sudan. By deciding to only “consider taking additional measures, such as actions to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector, should the Government of Sudan not comply fully with resolutions” the implementation of the principles of the “responsibility to protect” were compromised. It thus become obvious that, given the ambivalence the of the Security Council and the complexity of its politics, the UN chose the softer approach of outsourcing intervention in the Darfur conflict to the AU, and merely called on members of the international community to extend support to the AU’s efforts. The UN Security Council, through its Resolution 1593 (2005)(UN News, 04 Jan. 2006). referred the findings of the commission to the International Criminal Court on 31 March 2005. The referral of cases of mass violations of human rights to the ICC was viewed as a huge step (at the normative level) toward bringing to account those responsible for atrocities and the deterioration of human security. To live up to its obligations to international normative instruments, but also as a response to the political and diplomatic pressure that was being applied by the UN, the GoS established a Special Court to deal with the violations of human rights in Sudan. The GoS also acknowledged the need to reform its justice system, in order to ensure accountability. However, pressure on the GoS continues: leading GoS officials, including President Omar El Bashir and the leaders of the militia groups, have probably been included in a list of fifty-one perpetrators bearing the greatest responsibility for the crimes against humanity.(HRW, 02 Jan. 2006). These measures and responses have, however, proved to be cosmetic in nature and effect, even though the application and involvement of the ICC has served to bring the force of the international legal system to bear on the situation in Darfur. In this regard, it should be emphasised that the full weight of the ICC’s involvement may, only in the long-term, bringing those to justice who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The cases of former presidents Augusto Pinochet (Chile), Charles Taylor 109

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(Liberia), etc, underscore the reality that, in the long run, the long arm of the international legal system will catch up with the perpetrators of crimes in Darfur. In the interim, it behoves the international community to maintain the right political, diplomatic and legal pressure to ensure that the issue of impunity in the post-Cold War world is not put on the back burner. Even so, it is pertinent to emphasise the paramount importance of consensus among key international community and regional organisations and stakeholders (including AMIS) in making this a reality. It should be recalled that the international community found it difficult to define an entry point into the Darfur conflict but, given the upsurge in the conflict in 2003 and the deteriorating human security situation, the AU was seized with efforts toward the resolution and management of the Darfur conflict. Materially, though, the AU effort was undertaken pursuant to its security commitments and obligations within the framework of the Constitutive Act, the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Common African Defence and Security Policy, all of which policy instruments emphasised human security, over and above state security, as the sine qua non for peace and socio-economic development. The AU was quick to follow up on the establishment of the HCFA (April 2004) to mandate the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. On the basis of a fact-finding mission by the PSC (7-13 May 2004), the AU established AMIS under its auspices to monitor and observe compliance with the HCFA. The end state of AMIS devolved on the restoration of security throughout Darfur, underpinned by a political settlement that would allow a safe environment for the return of IDPs and refugees. However, the AU was faced with the political hurdle relating to Sudan’s apprehensions about the presence of foreign forces on its sovereign territory. This hurdle was surmounted through the establishment of the Modalities for Establishment of Ceasefire Commission (CFC, 4 Jun 2004), followed by the signature of the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on 20 October 2004. Having considered Sudan’s political sensitivities at the time, the AU deployed AMIS I (July 2004 – March 2005) and AMIS II (April 2005 to date). In total, the enhanced AMIS (II) focuses on deterrence, involving AMIS’s physical presence and soft protective security, involving liaison, monitoring and verification.(Appiah-Mensah, 2005, 9). The latter mission task focused on the softer tasks of monitoring and verifying 110

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the ceasefire, and promoting reconciliation and human rights. In technical terms, these tasks were in line with Chapter VI of the UN, and were informed by the principle of consent on the part of the warring parties, and demanded less robust action by the peacekeeping mission. The nature of the mandate often left members of AMIS vulnerable to attacks by armed militia groups. The AU has come a long way from the days of limited (military) observer missions under the OAU, particularly within the framework of the Cairo Declaration (1993). But the AU is still constrained by a shortage of human expertise, as well as by the financial and logistical capacity needed for the complex multidimensional peace missions required by Chapter VII UN peace-enforcement. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the combination of political and institutional factors combined to inform the AU’s decision to mandate a monitoring and verification mission as opposed to a mission for peace-enforcement in Darfur. (Appiah-Mensah, 2005, 8). As with other action under the UN system, the establishment of AMIS made it vulnerable to the tendency toward ‘incremental peacekeeping’. The international community often underestimates (or blatantly ignores) the need for more credible peace missions right at the beginning of a mission. Contrary to what is needed, missions (often with troops from developing states) are given insufficient forces or insufficient resources (or both) until the operational situation dictates and compels larger, better-resourced forces. This incremental approach to peacekeeping missions, whether by the UN or the AU, tends to allow the creation of armed groups, compromises force protection, and prolongs the mission, adding to the costs. Thus, AMIS lacked a sufficient mandate and force strength to make an effective contribution toward civilian protection in Darfur. To start with, the mission scenario in Darfur involved the dynamics of a complex emergency short of genocide, but involving serious crimes against humanity and a considerable amount of war crimes. In the context of the policy framework of the ASF, such a scenario required the equivalent of a UN Chapter VII mandate. Instead, AMIS was mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity and within the capabilities of the mission (or any of its components and elements). By including these conditions, the mandating authority gave AMIS a mandate with ambiguities at the operational and tactical levels,

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with regard to the protection of civilians. Appiah-Mensah, for instance, noted that: A restrictive mandate, inadequate troops to cover Darfur, serious operational, logistical and capacity pitfalls have combined in an inextricable way to present the AU’s mission to some observers as spineless and ineffective. (Appiah-Mensah, 2005, 7).

The combination of the dynamics of the conflict and the other factors therefore compelled the AU (in the form of the PSC) to revise its plans and authorise the enhancement of AMIS (I) in October 2005. This enhancement strengthened AMIS by increasing its size to about 6,000 military observers and protection force. More pertinently, the enhancement also made provision for the deployment of AU (civilian) police, a force of up to 815 personnel. This deployment was historic because it was the first time in the history of peace support interventions by the continental organisation AU that a police component was deployed in a regional peace mission. (Appiah-Mensah, 2005, 7). On the one hand, the civilian police deployment was in line with the ASF policy framework that provides for the inclusion of a police component. On the other hand, it was also significant that the deployment sought to address one of AMIS’s operational challenges: the shortage of technical police expertise and a legal mandate to deploy its military forces to operate within IDP camps. In accordance with international humanitarian law, the military is precluded from operating within such safe havens. The police deployment therefore plugged the operational gap by providing AMIS with the operational capacity and legal mandate to cover IDP camps in Darfur that were (and still are notorious for the perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Other major contributions to AMIS came from the governments of Canada and the Netherlands, which between them provided the mission with much needed logistical support, including the helmets, fragmentation jackets and helicopters. In accepting supplies, the AU noted with appreciation that the assistance would go a long way towards ensuring force protection and operational effectiveness during the protection of civilians in the Darfur conflict. The AU also acknowledged Canada’s contribution:

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It needs to be recalled that Canada has in the past within the framework of the existing partnership donated, inter alia, over twenty helicopters to the African Union Mission in the Sudan which have greatly enhanced the Operation’s activities especially in the areas of deployment of troops to various sectors across Darfur, delivery of food supplies, in theatre movement of officers and other African Union personnel. (AU, 11 Sept. 2005).

Conclusion The Darfur conflict and the resulting humanitarian crisis in Darfur have served to highlight the major dynamics and challenges that are involved when the international community focuses on human and not state security, by holding states responsible for the protection of civilians within their territories. While the crisis has led to international consensus about its negative impact on civilian protection, it also served as a litmus test to multilateral approach to conflict resolution and provision of civilian protection. In some cases some individual states within the international system attempted to use their ‘strategic’ positions to influence and lead interventions in Darfur. That occurred with minimal success, thus posing a serious challenge to the ability and/or lack of it by both the unilateral and multilateral efforts in resolving the human suffering in Darfur. In some cases that also led to big question about the relevance of the AU and UN approaches in restoring peace in the rest of the continent. In the first place, the Darfur conflict confirmed the fact that inequity in the creation and distribution of scarce national resources, coupled with ethnically motivated repression, serves as a source of violent armed conflict that can compromise national unity and nation building. In the case of Darfur, the marginalized non-Arab groups rallied behind the SLA and JEM to protest against the inequitable distribution of national resources and services by the Khartoum administration. Second, the dynamics of the conflict in Sudan impinge on the implementation of principles relating to the GoS’s responsibility to protect civilians. This assertion is based on the fact that the humanitarian insecurity in Darfur continued to escalate despite the existence of international mechanisms that could have helped deter human suffering. Third, the continuation of conflict was mainly sustained by the selfish interests of the political elite, concerned more about access to power than restoration of peace and post-conflict reconstruction. That selfish113

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ness was manifest in the continued violations of peace agreements and intra-party tensions that often fuelling the conflict. In the final analysis, the conflict in Darfur continues to claim lives and contribute towards human insecurity in Africa. Fourth, the Darfur conflict serves to highlight, on the one hand, the AU’s political will to find African solutions to African problems through timely political and operational interventions. On the other hand, however, it also underscores the AU’s lack of human, financial and material resources, and institutional expertise. Some members of the international community provided support, which enabled the AU to contemplate intervention. Fifth, It should be noted that while the international community pursues efforts at the normative level to gain consensus for a more credible intervention in Darfur, the AU has some work to do to speed up the establishment of the ASF. Ideally, the ASF should provide a readily deployable response force for intervention in devastating regional conflicts. The AU also needs to work to improve the existing African security architecture, to ensure that the mandates assigned to peace missions correspond to the realities of conflicts. Sixth, the dynamics of the conflict in Darfur show beyond doubt that more needs to be done by and within the international community to deter and prevent, rather than react to internal conflicts. But because prevention measures will not always ensure de-escalation of the conflict, more concrete efforts are needed to answer the crucial question: How should the AU gain sufficient and broad consensus for concerted intervention as part of efforts to operationalise the principles relating to the protection of civilians in violent conflicts? In summation, the AU, the UN and the broader international community should be seized with efforts to ensure the security of vulnerable civilians. Failure to achieve this will add to the dire consequences seen in the Balkans, the Mano River region and the Great Lakes region, and will make deterrence more difficult and unpredictable. This conclusion is premised on the fact that, other than for rapid response, peace missions such as AMIS, that are deployed by the AU, should have the requisite mandate and resources to make a profound contribution to reducing human suffering and creating conditions that ease the deployment of a UN mission, when necessary. Unless the former condition is the case, the inability of the AU to project coercive measures to

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restore peace and human security will make it difficult for AU missions to prevail upon conflicting parties to comply with peace agreements.

References AISA, (2005) Editorial. AISA’s dedication to the broad African cause: The state of Africa, Inside AISA, No. 3, June/July 2005. AFP/ST, (2005) Darfur’s SLM set to split as vote loams, http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=12380 (03 November 2005). AFP/ST, (2005) Darfur’s SLM set to split as vote loams, http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=12380 (03 November 2005). Appiah-Mensah, S, (2006) The African Mission in Sudan: Darfur dilemmas, African Security Review (15) 1. Appiah-Mensah, S, (2005) AU’s critical assignment in Darfur: Challenges and constraints, African Security Review, (14) 2. AU, (2005) African Union, Press Release, 11 September 2005. AU,(2005) Chairman’s conclusions, Second Round of the InterSudanese Peace Talks on Darfur, Abuja, Nigeria, 23 August – 17 September 2004. AU DITF, (2005) Weekly Report Covering 7-30 June 2005 (released 6 July 2005). AU (2005) Situation Room, Conflict Management Directorate (CMD), Daily News Highlights, Wednesday, 14 September 2005. Baranyi and D. Mepham, S, (2006) Report from the high-level symposium on enhancing capacities to protect civilians and build sustainable peace in Africa, Addis Ababa, 16 March 2006. DRDC, (2005) Darfur Relief Documentation Centre (DRDC), Darfur: A Declaration of Principles on political negotiations is a step in the right direction, DRDC Briefing Paper No 5, Geneva, 10 June 2005. Esterhuysen, P, (1998) Africa A-Z: Continental and country profiles, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria. Field S., (2004) Foreword, S. Field (ed) Peace in Africa: Towards a collaborative security regime, Institute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg. Galtung, J, (1995) Peace by Peaceful Means, SAGE, Oslo.

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Hrw, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/01/sudan9971.htm, (30 November 2005). International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Responsibility to Protect, International Development Research Centre, Canada, 2001. Juba Post, (2004) ‘Mortality rate Darfur extreme’, The Juba Post, 14 September 2004, www.freewebs.com/jubapost/story6.html (25 July 2005). Mail and Guardian Online, (2005) “Sudan apologise after scuffles mar Rice visit”, Mail & Guardian Online, 22, July 2005. Mathemba, G, (2005) South Africa’s contribution to the security structures of Southern Africa, in S. P. Rankhumise and A. Mahlako (eds) Defence, Militarism, Peace building and Human Security in Africa, Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), Pretoria. Mazrui, A, (2004) “Pan-Africanism between globalisation and the American empire”, address to the institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, 25 July 2004. Medicins Sans Frontieres Report, (2005) Crushing burden of rape: sexual violence in Darfur, Sudan, www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke (27 October 2005). McIntyre, A, (2005) Introduction, A. McIntyre (ed), Invisible Stakeholders: Children and war in Africa, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. United Nations, (2005) The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005,United Nations, New York. United Nations, (2005) Report of the International Commission of Enquiry on Darfur to the United Nations General-Secretary, Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 2005. UN, (2004) Report of the International Commission of Enquiry on Darfur to the United Nations General-Secretary, Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004. www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites/hilites_arch_view.asp?HighID=123, (5 January 2006). www.iccnow.org/documents/declarationsresolutions/UN1593.html, (5 January 2006). www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm , (4 January 2006). 116

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www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/09/sudan12186.htm, (2 January 2006). www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/speeches/2005/testi mony_sudan_7-2005.cfm, (08 December 2005).

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PART THREE

RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

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Disputes and Conflicts over Water in Africa Peter J. Ashton Introduction Recent years have been marked by a growing awareness that the world’s freshwater supplies represent a scarce and critically important resource that is also extremely vulnerable to human activities (Biswas 1993; Delli Priscoli 1998). Indeed, since water cannot be substituted, neither biological diversity nor social and economic development can be sustained in its absence. Every country faces the challenge that it is becoming increasingly difficult to provide sufficient supplies of good quality water to meet the growing needs of increasing populations (van Wyk 1998). These tensions are heightened as freshwater supplies decline due to resource depletion and pollution, coupled with rapid urbanization and industrialization (Falkenmark 1989; Ashton 2000, 2002). This situation is particularly significant in the more arid regions of the African continent where water scarcity hampers social and economic development, prompts increased competition for water between different sectors of society, and is correlated to the prevalence of poverty, hunger and disease (Ashton 2002). Another important aspect to emerge from the growing public awareness of the importance of water is the realization that water has both productive and destructive properties. Typically, adequate supplies of good quality water enable communities and countries to attain and sustain all of their social and economic development aspirations (Falkenmark 1989; Biswas 1993). In this process, water also acts as an important agent for co-operation and benefit sharing between communities and countries (Turton 2002). Conversely, communities and countries experience considerable hardship where water supplies are inadequate, or supplies are unpredictable, or insufficient resources and infrastructure are available to ensure the provision of adequate water supplies (Falkenmark 1989; FAO 2000). This situation becomes accentuated where a limited supply of water must be shared between communities or countries, and may lead to disputes and even conflicts over access to water (Ashton 2002). Water can also have an additional 119

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and highly destructive aspect, where ‘excess’ water in the form of floods can wreak havoc with the social and economic infrastructure within a country (Christie and Hanlon 2001). Against a background formed by the availability and distribution of water and the likely trajectories of change in demand for water across the African continent, this paper briefly discusses the types of situations where disputes or conflicts have occurred over access to water. Specific consideration is given to the need for African countries to develop new collaborative policies and strategies that will allow them jointly to attain their development goals while simultaneously avoiding the looming potential for conflict over water resources. The geographic and geopolitical reality of water in Africa In contrast to many other parts of the world, Africa’s water resources have a very variable distribution in both geographical extent and time. Large areas of the African continent experience prolonged and extreme droughts that are often “relieved” by equally extreme flood events (Ashton 2002). There are also suggestions that predicted trends in global climate change could accentuate this situation in many parts of the continent (Smakhtin et al 2001). However, despite seasonal and interannual variations in rainfall and river flows, the long-term average quantity of freshwater on the African continent appears to have remained almost constant over time while the rising demands for water have reduced the per capita availability of water that can be provided by conventional technologies (Gleick 1998; Ashton 2000; Turton 2002). Future demands for additional supplies of fresh water will need to be met through the use of unconventional technologies, the exploitation of new or novel sources of fresh water, or through the long-distance transfer of ever-larger quantities of water from regions that have ample supplies (Smakhtin et al 2001). In addition, concerted attention must also be paid to reducing the demand for water and increasing the efficiency with which water is used (Ashton and Haasbroek 2002). The populations of most African countries have grown rapidly during the past century and these trends are likely to continue, despite the ravages caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic in many parts of the continent (Ashton and Ramasar 2002). In spite of the obvious inequalities caused by a variety of social, economic and political dispensations, population growth has been accompanied by an equally rapid increase in the 120

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demand for water (Falkenmark 1989; Gleick 1993). Several African countries have already reached or passed the point of severe water stress or water deficit, where the scarcity of water supplies hampers further development (Falkenmark 1989; Ashton 2000). Based on current population trends and patterns of change in water use, more African countries will exceed the limits of their economically usable, land-based water resources before 2025 (Falkenmark 1989; Ashton and Seetal 2002). These statistics emphasize the scale of the challenge each country faces in their attempts to achieve their national and regional water security goals. In addition to natural patterns of climatic variability and unequal distribution of water across Africa, most of Africa’s water resources are contained within large river basins or underground aquifers that are shared by several countries (SARDC 1996; Ashton 2002; Turton et al 2006). Importantly, the national boundaries of African countries are seldom aligned with the natural boundaries of river catchments or aquifers. This is part of the legacy of earlier colonial administrations that drew up the national boundaries of African countries in an apparently arbitrary fashion (Prescott 1979; Packenham 1991). Consequently, the extent to which the larger river systems are now shared by more than one country has often led to rivalry between countries as each strives to derive maximum benefits from the available water resources within its sovereign territory (Ashton 2000; Turton et al 2006). In such situations, “downstream" countries are more vulnerable than their "upstream" neighbours and therefore derive the least benefit (Pallett 1997). This situation has been accentuated in those cases where a downstream country may be economically "poorer" or politically and militarily "weaker" than its upstream neighbours (Turton 1999; Ashton and Turton in press). What is a “water conflict”? Much of the recent debate around existing water conflicts, and perceptions of possible future conflicts, has been phrased in highly dramatized terms of "water wars" or "water crises" (Business Report 1998; Delli Priscoli, 1998; Pretoria News 1998). This is unfortunate since growing awareness of the causes and implications of the different disputes and conflicts linked to water has revealed that such sensational terminology is inappropriate (Kirmani 1990; Turton 1999, 2000). In its simplest sense, the term "water conflict" describes any disagreement or dispute over or about water, where external social, economic, legal, political or military 121

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intervention is needed to resolve the problem. This broad definition spans a wide continuum of possible circumstances and situations, that could range from a relatively low-intensity dispute over stock watering rights between two adjacent landowners, to an armed confrontation between the governments of two countries that dispute each others "rights" to a particular proportion of the flow in a shared river basin (Ashton 2002). In the range of possible types of disputes or conflicts that can be associated with, or driven by, water, it is important to understand that water is most often "incidental" and is seldom the primary cause, objective or "driver" of the conflict (Turton 1999; Ashton 2002). Furthermore, other factors such as ideological differences can further complicate matters. A "true” water war can be defined as an armed conflict that is fought between countries with the sole or primary purpose of gaining access to water, or where water forms the central weapon of offence in the arsenal of an aggressor (Ohlsson 1995; Turton 1999). There is ample evidence (e.g. Wolf 1996; Pallett 1997) that, despite the dire predictions of some authors (e.g. Hudson 1996), "true" water wars have occurred very rarely if at all. Therefore, the broader term "water conflict" is preferred to cover the wide range of water-related disputes that have already been recorded. Some causes of water conflicts in Africa Water is a classical case of a "fugitive" resource that moves naturally from one area to another, is transformed rapidly from one state to another and, while water is widely seen to be a "renewable resource", the available evidence indicates that Africa’s freshwater resources are finite (Conley 1995). Water is also extraordinarily vulnerable to human activities and both ground water and surface waters are easily polluted when effluent is discharged (Gleick 1998). This degrades the integrity of the receiving (aquatic) system and limits the degree to which other water users might use the water. The adverse effects of such incidents can persist for decades in the case of groundwater and are extremely difficult to reverse or remedy (Falkenmark 1989). In addition, it is almost impossible to define the ownership of water and water is now universally recognized as a "common good" that should not be privately owned; instead, governments should act as custodians of their national water resources (Asmal 1998). 122

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The availability of adequate water supplies is critical to the national prosperity of a country since water is inextricably woven into irrigation and food production processes as well as into the provision of energy and, occasionally, transportation systems (Smith and Al Rawahy 1990; van Wyk 1998). The growing realization of water’s strategic importance has fuelled most of the water resource development activities in Africa during the last century, including attempts to "trap" or “impound” water, so as to provide assured supplies during drier seasons when water is not easily available, or to transfer water from areas of ample supply to areas where water is in short supply (Ashton 2002; Ashton and Turton in press; Turton et al 2006). Because very few rivers, other than relatively small systems, are contained within the borders of a single country, access to water increasingly becomes a source of potential conflict whenever a river crosses an international boundary (Delli Priscoli 1996; Wolf 1996; Pallett 1997). The potential for conflict in such situations is brought sharply into focus in the case of a country that obtains most of its water supplies from inflows that originate outside its national borders (SARDC 1996; Pallett 1997). An additional complication arises where a river system forms the boundary between neighbouring states. Seasonal patterns of flow alter the shape and position of a river channel within a river valley, causing year-to-year changes in the geographical position of a boundary (Ashton 2000; Ashton and Seetal 2002). Where specific activities are associated with the "original" river channel (for example: traditional grazing rights on islands or the dredging of riverine mineral deposits), any alteration in the position of the river and an associated international boundary can lead to disputes over ownership. At a strategic level, five key geographical and geo-political characteristics influence the ease with which water can become a source of strategic rivalry or confrontation between neighbouring states (Gleick 1998; Ashton 2002): • The degree of water scarcity that already exists in the region; • The extent to which a water supply is shared by one or more states or regions; • The relative power relationships that exist between water-sharing states; • The availability of alternative water sources and their accessibility; and • The degree or extent to which a particular country's international

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boundaries are aligned with, or located along, shared river systems.

The areas where water-related conflicts and disputes have already occurred in Africa are shown in Figure 1. The locations of these water conflict sites correspond closely to the absence or scarcity of perennial rivers and lakes, and the transition zones where perennial river flows become ephemeral or episodic. This is clearly seen in Figure 1 where most water conflicts have occurred in the dry Sahel region of West Africa, the arid north-eastern portion of East Africa and the dry southwestern portion of southern Africa. Disputes over water have also occurred in some of the more moist regions of Africa, such as around Lake Victoria in East Africa, and the middle and lower Zambezi River in southern Africa, though these have usually occurred during drought periods. In those cases where a conflict is linked to a specific river (such as the Incomati, Limpopo, Nile, Orange, Pagani, Senegal and Zambezi) or to a portion of that river, the river is a ‘trans-boundary’ or shared river system and the dispute relates most frequently to accusations that the water and other benefits derived by upstream countries are not equitable when compared to the benefits derived by downstream countries. A wide variety of more local, inter- and intra-community conflicts over water that occur within the boundaries of a single community or country can be added to these international dimensions of the causes of disputes over water in Africa (Ashton 2000, 2002). Perhaps the most frequently encountered of these smaller-scale conflicts relates to water quality problems that result from upstream activities within a single country, followed in importance by disputed local access to a single water source during critical periods such as droughts (Turton 1999). An additional source of dispute at both local and national scales can occur where insufficient provision is made to engage members of the public in decisionmaking processes around water-related issues that affect their lives and livelihoods (Ashton 2002; Turton et al 2006). Failure to provide opportunities for appropriate levels of public participation has led to several instances where the general public have openly expressed their dissatisfaction and, in some cases, rejected proposals for water infrastructure projects.

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Figure 1. Map of Africa, showing major rivers and lakes as well as sites where disputes over water have occurred (circles). Note the size of a circle reflects the relative spatial extent influenced by the dispute. Map updated and redrawn from Ashton (2002).

The importance of scale The spatial (geographic) and temporal scales of disputes or conflicts N over water can exert great influence on decision-makers when indi0 500 viduals, communities and governments are searching for Kilometres

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The importance of scale The spatial (geographic) and temporal scales of disputes or conflicts over water can exert great influence on decision-makers when individuals, communities and governments are searching for appropriate solutions (Ashton, 2000). Therefore, it is crucial to consider their correct context and importance in the debate around the potential for waterbased conflicts in Africa. A local-scale conflict between two adjacent landowners over access to water requires far less strategic (government-level) intervention than another water access problem that may be confounded by a dispute between countries over the precise location of an international boundary (Ashton 2002). Nevertheless, the smaller, local-scale conflicts can escalate very rapidly and require appropriately rapid responses. In contrast, most larger-scale or "international" conflicts tend to develop more slowly or gradually, and responses to these situations should also be appropriate to the scale of the problem confronted (Wolf 1996; Turton 1999; Ashton 2002). These differences are shown schematically in Figure 2. At the smallest or local scale, individuals and communities have relatively few options at their disposal to prevent conflicts from occurring. This is in sharp contrast to the situation at a larger national or regional scale, where countries are able to rely on a far wider range of laws, agreements and treaties to prevent or resolve conflict and, where these fail, also have access to the International Court of Jurisprudence, which will examine the merits of a dispute between parties and provide a ruling (Biswas 1993; Gleick 1998; ICJ 1999; Ashton 2000). In terms of geographical scale, four separate groups of water conflicts can be recognized (Ashton, 2000): • Within community, where conflict of some aspect of water may occur over a very small area between members of the same community; • Between community, representing a slightly larger scale, where the individuals within each community present a united front in their dispute or conflict with a neighbouring community; • National, where groups of communities or authorities within a single country may dispute the rights of neighbouring communities or authorities in the same country to water that is not located within their geographical area of jurisdiction. This is typical of inter-basin water transfers, where "donor" catchments are seldom compensated adequately, and "recipient" catchments

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reap almost all of the benefits; International, where one country may contest the rights of a neighbouring country to use water from an aquatic system that it shares.

•

Typical examples of this type would include so-called riparian rights to rivers that are located on international boundaries, and the situations where a river crosses an international boundary and gives rise to disputes between "upstream" and "downstream" countries. Figure 2. Diagram illustrating the influence of geographic scale (at local, national and regional levels), on the potential for a dispute to occur, the range of dispute prevention and resolution options that are available, and the potential consequences of a dispute.

High

Many

Consequences

Severe

Options

Few

Low Local

Regional

National Geographical scale

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P otential consequences

Alternative o ptions available for dispute preventio n o r resolution

P otential for dispu te to occur

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In addition to these strictly spatial scales, geo-political considerations can add an additional dimension of conflict to those related to the spatial scales outlined above (Ashton 2002). Here, two typical examples would include: • Disputes that arise between "upstream" and "downstream" •

countries as a result of specific activities or demands of one or both of the countries concerned; and A conflict that arises when two countries dispute the precise location of the international boundary that separates them and which also coincides with, or is aligned with, a river or other aquatic system.

The activities carried out by individual countries can also accentuate these problems of geographical and geo-political scale (Wolf 1996; Turton 1999; Ashton 2002). For example, where an upstream country constructs and operates a large impoundment, this will alter the timing, frequency, duration and quantity of water flows, as well as the corresponding silt loads and water quality received by a downstream country (Ashton and Turton in press). Similarly, effluent discharged by an industry in an upstream country can have adverse consequences for water users in the downstream country. Can conflicts be prevented? Given the evidence presented, it is important to understand that water conflicts are inevitable if nothing is done to prevent them from occurring (Ashton 2000, 2002). Whilst this response may appear to be simplistic, it is framed by the key insight that Africa’s finite fresh water resources cannot continue indefinitely to support the escalating demands that are made of them. Competition for the available water resources will continue to increase to a point where new and perhaps radically different interventions are needed (Falkenmark 1989). The common-sense statement: "prevention is better than cure" provides a perfect outline of the goals and objectives that should direct strategies and actions aimed at dealing with the complex issues of waterrelated conflicts (Ashton 2002). However, despite its apparent simplicity, this ideal often eludes us in practice. A large part of the reason for this lies in the diverse and often contradictory ways in which communities and countries strive to derive both individual and collective benefit from 128

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the use of water (Turton et al 2006). Management approaches too often have a short-term, local focus aimed at meeting objectives and solving problems today, rather than a far longer-term focus on the sustainable and equitable use of water resources on a regional or continental scale (FAO 2000; Ashton 2002). Turton (2000) has argued convincingly that water is most unlikely to be the direct cause of a “war” in Africa. Nevertheless, there is a distinct possibility that increasing demands for water could contribute to regional instability if the demands approach the limits of the available supplies and the “competing” societies are unable to adapt appropriately to this situation (Ashton 2000, 2002). Clearly, where more than one country or an entire region is involved in a dispute, a wide array of coping strategies and mechanism can be deployed to resolve the problem. The presence of effective communication mechanisms and efficient institutional structures form an extremely important component of all such strategies (Turton et al 2006). If a country’s demands for water outstrip its ability to manage water as a focus for cooperation and the achievement of common goals, there is a very real risk that it will enter an ever-tightening spiral of poverty, where social, economic and environmental consequences will threaten the fabric of society (Falkenmark 1989; Biswas 1993). In contrast, where an equitable balance can be attained between the demands made for the services and goods derived from the use of water, and effective custodianship of water resources, a far more harmonious and sustainable situation can be achieved (Turton et al 2006). However, to achieve this, all water-related policies and strategies must be guided by the values of sustainability, equity, mutual cooperation, and the attainment of optimal benefit for society (Asmal 1998; Ashton 2002). Whilst water allocation and distribution priorities in each country need to be closely aligned with national and regional development objectives, greater emphasis now needs to be placed on concerted efforts to ensure that the continent’s scarce water resources are used to derive the maximum long-term benefits for the peoples of Africa as a whole (Ashton and Haasbroek 2002; Turton et al 2006). However, achievement of this desirable goal requires water resource management to be judicious, cautious and collaborative. As a country’s water supplies become scarcer, greater attention needs to be given to reallocating water from less productive sectors to those that are able to derive greater long-term economic returns per unit of water used (Ashton and Haas129

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broek 2002). Here, it is critically important to ensure that every community still has equitable access to the available water resources to meet their basic human needs. This aspect is particularly important in the case of Africa’s shared river basins (Biswas 1993). Ideally, each country’s water resource management strategies need to be closely aligned with that of its neighbours if peace and prosperity are to be maintained and conflict is to be avoided (Ashton 2002). Neighbouring countries that share a single water resource need to answer four key questions (Ashton 2002), namely: • • • •

How will the water resource be managed to ensure compliance with any agreement? What fraction or proportion of the water can be allocated for society’s use without impairing the resource beyond unacceptable limits? How will the water requirements of rural and urban populations in each country be met equitably and in good time, within the constraints of national economies and international treaties? What constitutes a fair and equitable share of the water resource for each country?

Clearly, the countries concerned should not attempt to answer these questions in isolation from one another. Instead, the states sharing a river basin should first agree to form an appropriate, formal institutional structure that will take responsibility for the judicious management of the shared water resource (Lundqvist 2000). Several such institutional structures or river basin organizations already exist in Africa and elsewhere in the world. The formation of a suitable institutional structure should then be followed by agreement as to the most appropriate technical or investigative methods to use to answer the key questions, and, finally, agreement to abide by the results or findings produced. One of the greatest obstacles that states sharing a river basin need to overcome is the formation of a suitable institutional structure, since this will formalize and legitimise the technical deliberations that take place (Turton 2000; Turton et al 2006). The question as to what fraction of the water can be allocated for society’s use without jeopardizing or impairing the water resource will depend on the importance that each country attributes to the necessity to maintain essential ecosystem functions (SARDC 1994; Pallett 1997; Ashton 2002). This can be achieved by 130

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consensus-seeking approaches based on a thorough analysis of the structure, functioning and characteristics of the water resource and associated terrestrial systems in the catchment (Ashton 2000; Lundqvist 2000). The final question as to what constitutes a fair and equitable share of the water resource, is often viewed as the most difficult one to answer. Clearly, the answer will depend on the relative degree of importance that the participating states attach to balancing the needs of their people for water, and the necessity to maintain essential ecosystem functions and services (Wolf 1999; FAO 2000). Unfortunately, the principle of “reasonable and equitable use” embodied in Article 5 of the United Nations Convention is vaguely worded, provides little guidance, and is prone to subjective interpretations (Van der Zaag et al 2000). Essentially, each participating state needs to agree on the fraction of water to be reserved for ecosystem functions, and the criteria that should be used to calculate the “fair and equitable share” that each country is entitled to (Wolf 1999; Van der Zaag et al 2000). Preliminary evaluations have demonstrated that, if agreement can be reached on the precise nature of the criteria, then it is a relatively simple procedure to derive the respective shares of the available water (Van der Zaag et al 2000). This approach has an inherent simplicity that makes it attractive to decision-makers, though further development and testing are needed before it can be adopted. Conclusions The available evidence (e.g. Biswas 1993; Ashton 2002) suggests very strongly that water conflicts in Africa are inevitable unless appropriate and concerted preventive actions are taken. This assertion is underpinned by the continual increase in demands for water that a finite resource base cannot support indefinitely. Most of the preventive measures to avoid conflict centre on processes of joint decision-making, within suitable institutional and legislative frameworks. It is important to note that the possible options for conflict prevention are generic in nature, but these must be customized to make them site-specific, to suit the individual needs of the communities and countries involved (Turton et al 2006). The issue of the scale of actual or potential conflict is important, as well as the specific circumstances that have given rise to the problem 131

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(Ashton 2000, 2002). The relatively smaller-scale situations of waterrelated conflict consist mainly of intra-community and inter-community disputes over access to water, or to services associated with water. These disputes usually occur within a small geographical area and seldom escalate to involve communities from neighbouring countries (Turton 1999, 2000). Whilst these small-scale conflicts are very real to those involved, and can result in the death of individuals or their livestock, they are not considered to be true water wars in the widely accepted sense of a military conflict between two or more countries. Their smaller scale makes them more amenable to resolution by peaceful, negotiated means, and the resulting solutions tend to persist because each individual is involved in the resolution process (Ashton 2002). It can be concluded that "true" water wars comprise only those extreme cases of water conflicts whose primary focus is to secure access to water or where water is the primary offensive weapon (Turton 2000; Ashton 2000). Despite the dire predictions of many authors, the available evidence has shown that it is highly unlikely that "true" water wars will ever occur in Africa. However, this should not be a reason for complacency, since every person shares the responsibility of ensuring that water wars never occur in Africa or elsewhere (Ashton 2002). Similarly, every individual has a responsibility to promote the principles of equity and sustainability in all dealings with water users and water resource managers throughout Africa. New ways must be sought to convince water management institutions and authorities to focus their efforts on longer-term policies, plans and actions that will prevent water conflicts, rather than retaining a short-term focus and then trying to resolve conflicts after they have occurred (Turton et al 2006). Failure to achieve this is likely to result in an increased number of water-related disputes with the strong likelihood that their intensity may escalate progressively over time to intolerable levels of conflict between communities and, even worse, between countries. References Ashton PJ, (2000) ‘Southern African water conflicts: are they inevitable or preventable?’ In: Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality, in H Solomon and AR Turton (eds), Africa Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2, Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). 132

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Ashton PJ, (2002) ‘Avoiding conflicts over Africa’s water resources’, Ambio, vol 31, no 3, 2002. Ashton PJ, (2007) ‘The role of good governance in sustainable development’, in: AR Turton, J Hattingh, GA Maree, DJ Roux, M Claassen and WF Strydom (eds.), Governance as a Trialogue: GovernmentSociety-Science in Transition, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, in press. Ashton PJ and B Haasbroek, (2002) ‘Water demand management and social adaptive capacity: A South African case study’, in AR Turton and R Henwood (eds), Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern African perspective. Pretoria: African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU) and International water Management Institute (IWMI). Ashton PJ and V Ramasar, (2002) ‘Water and HIV/AIDS: Some strategic considerations for southern Africa’, in AR Turton and R Henwood (eds), Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective, Pretoria: African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU) and International Water Management Institute (IWMI). Ashton PJ and A Seetal, (2002) ‘The challenges of water resource management in Africa’, in H Baijnath H and Y Singh (eds), The Rebirth of Science in Africa, Pretoria: Umdaus Press. Ashton PJ and AR Turton AR, (2006) ‘Water and security in SubSaharan Africa: Emerging concepts and their implications for effective water resource management in the Southern African region’, in HG Brauch, J Grin, C Mesjasz, NC Behera, B Chourou, UO Spring, PH Liotta and P Kameri-Mbote (eds), Globalisation and Environmental Challenges – Volume II, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, in press. Asmal K, (1993) ‘Water as a metaphor for governance: issues in the management of water resources in Africa’, Water Policy, vol 1, 1998. Biswas AK, Management of International Water: Problems and Perspective, Paris: UNESCO. Business Report, (1998) ‘Ethiopia challenges Sudan, Egypt on use of Nile water’, Business Report article, 1 September 1998. Christie F and J Hanlon, (2001) African Issues: Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000, Bloomington: The International African Institute, Indiana University Press. Conley AH, (1995) ‘A synoptic view of water resources in southern Africa’, in Proceedings of the Conference of the Southern Africa Foundation for Economic Research (SAFER) on “Integrated Development of Regional Water Resources”, Nyanga: SAFER. 133

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Delli Priscoli J, (1996) Conflict Resolution, Collaboration and Management in International Water Resource Issues, Alternative Dispute Resolution Series, Working Paper #6, Washington DC: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Delli Priscoli J, (1998) ‘Water and civilization: Conflict, cooperation and the roots of a new eco-realism’, in Proceedings of the Eighth Stockholm World Water Symposium, 10-13 August 1998, Stockholm: Stockholm Water Symposium. Falkenmark M, (1989) ‘The massive water scarcity now threatening Africa: why isn't it being addressed?’, Ambio, vol 18, no 2. FAO, (2000) New Dimensions in Water Security – Water, Society and Ecosystem Services in the 21st Century, FAO Report AGL/MISC/25/2000, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Gleick PH, (1993) ‘Water and conflict: fresh water resources and international security’, International Security, vol 18, no 1. Gleick PH, (1998) The World's Water 1998-1999: Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources, Washington DC: Island Press. Hudson H, (1996) ‘Resource based conflict: water (in)security and its strategic implications’, in H Solomon (ed), Sink or Swim? Water, Resource Security and State Co-operation, ISS Monograph Series No. 6, Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies. ICJ, (1999) ‘International Court of Justice - Press Communiqué 99/53 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia)’, The Hague: International Court of Justice, 13 December 1999. Kirmani SS, (1990) ‘Water, peace and conflict management: The experience of the Indus and Mekong basins’, Water International, vol 15. Lundqvist J, (2000) ‘Rules and roles in water policy and management – need for clarification of rights and obligations’, Water International, vol 25, no 2. Ohlsson L, (1995) ‘The role of water and the origins of conflict’, In L Ohlsson (ed), Hydropolitics: Conflicts Over Water as a Development Constraint, London: Zed Books. Packenham T, (1991) The Scramble for Africa, London: Doubleday Publishers. Pallett J, (1997) Sharing Water in Southern Africa, Windhoek: Desert Research Foundation of Namibia. Prescott JRV, (1997) ‘Africa’s boundary problems’, Optima, vol 28, no 1.

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Pretoria News, (1998) ‘Water could be cause of future conflict in SADC states’, Pretoria News, 18 November 1998. SARDC, (1996) Water in Southern Africa, Harare: Southern African Research and Documentation Centre. Smakhtin V, PJ Ashton, A Batchelor, R Meyer, JP Maree, R Murray, B Barta, N Bauer, D Terblanche and J Olivier, (2001) ‘Unconventional water supply options in South Africa: Possible solutions or intractable problems?’, Water International, vol 26, no 3. Smith SE and M Al-Rawahy, (1990) ‘The Blue Nile: Potential for conflict and alternatives for meeting future demands’, Water International, vol 15. Turton AR, (1999) ‘Water and conflict in an African context’, Conflict Trends, vol 5. Turton AR, (2000) ‘Water wars in southern Africa: Challenging conventional wisdom’, Proceedings of the African Dialogue Lectures "Hydropolitical Hotspots in Southern Africa: Will There be a Water War?”, Pretoria: University of Pretoria. Turton AR, (2002) ‘Water and state sovereignty: The hydropolitical challenge for states in arid regions’, in AT Wolf (ed), Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Water Systems, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Turton AR, A Earle, D Malzbender and PJ Ashton, (2006) ‘Hydropolitical vulnerability and resilience along Africa’s international waters’, in AT Wolf (ed), Hydropolitical Resilience and Vulnerability along International Waters, Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program. Van der Zaag P, IM Seyam and HHG Savenije, (2000) ‘Towards objective criteria for the equitable sharing of international water resources’, in Proceedings of the Fourth Biennial Congress of the African Division of the International Association of Hydraulic Research, Windhoek: International Association of Hydraulic Research. Van Wyk J.A, (1998) ‘Towards water security in southern Africa’, African Security Review, vol 7, no 2. Wolf AT, (1996) ‘Middle East Water Conflicts and Directions for Conflict Resolution’, 2020 Brief No. 31, April 1996, http://www.cgiar.org/ifpri/2020/briefs/number31.htm.

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Chapter 5

Rethinking Economic Agendas in African Conflicts: A Critique of the Paul Collier Thesis Norman Mlambo Introduction Causes of conflicts, especially causes of war have been a major source of debate throughout the world and throughout history. In Africa, observers have identified a number of factors that contribute to violent conflicts on the continent. The most documented of these factors include the following: border disputes; political liberation; land disputes; dynastic conflicts; ethnic differences; religious conflicts; identity politics; cold war related ideological differences; and dictatorship etc. Outside Africa, twentieth century conflict analysis was largely dominated by the desire to understand the causes and effects of the First and Second World Wars, and the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War around 1990, international analysts were surprised to note that there were so many conflicts in many parts of the Third World especially in Africa which were not directly related to super power politics. A shocking discovery by previously Euro-centric researchers was that violent conflicts in Africa had been raging even during the Cold War, and that such wars continued up to the end of the last century and some are still going on today. There developed a sense of urgency in international conflict analysis circles to find a quick explanation to the causes of African conflicts. The economic agendas movement Starting in 1998, some analysts of Third World conflicts highlighted a possible explanation to some recent conflicts in Africa. In various World Bank sponsored papers, Paul Collier (1999a, 1999b; 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998), a British national and Professor of Economics at Oxford, expressed the theory that a new typology of conflict had emerged which he called “resource wars”. Collier highlighted “economic agendas” as the main cause of recent violent conflicts in the 137

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Third World and more so in Africa. He postulated that almost all largescale African wars since 1965 have been driven by economic opportunities (greed) rather than political grievances. The economic agendas theme was also taken up by the International Peace Academy of New York, where Paul Collier was a Research Fellow, culminating in Mats Berdal and David Malone’s (2000) book entitled Greed and Grievance: Economic Agenda’s in Civil War. The defining chapter in that book was written by Paul Collier (2000) and is entitled “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective”. In Southern Africa, in a book published in 2000 entitled Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds (Cilliers and Dietrich 2000), some researchers at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), took the use of diamonds and oil in financing Angola’s civil war as a case study that proves Paul Collier’s thesis. A couple of years later, Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman (2002) published an edited book entitled Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. That volume used examples from East Africa and from the Great Lakes Region of Africa to illustrate Paul Collier’s thesis. Follow up studies covered Africa and other parts of the Third World as well. For example, the edited collection by Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (2003) of the International Peace Academy extended the case studies to include Colombia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Burma/Myanmar. In the mean time, the United Nations Security Council decided to act on the information received from some of the above studies. The following UN actions were taken: (a) Security Council Decision to Impose Prohibition of Imports of Rough Diamonds from Sierra Leone (5 July 2000); adoption of a (b) General Assembly Resolution on the Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict in Africa (29 January 2001); publication of (c) The Fowler Report—the final report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, which examines the failure of sanctions on the former Angolan rebel group (10 March 2000); submission of reports of the (d) UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (final report submitted October 2003). I will say more about this report later.

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Revisiting some case studies Wars of liberation The most prevalent wars in Twentieth Century Africa were the wars of liberation from colonial rule. There were wars in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Kenya, the Congo, Guinea – Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Paul Collier includes some of these wars in his econometric sample of 152 countries, but Collier’s disciples do not use any liberation war in the subsequent case studies that popularise the economic agendas theory. Although economic issues such as land in Kenya and Zimbabwe were important, these were basically wars for the establishment of self-determination for the societies involved. The most important ideas were, for example, one person one vote, racial equality, citizenship, free access to places, jobs, services and of course resources. It would be a mockery of the continent-wide liberation movements to suggest that the majority of liberation movements were thinking first and foremost of looting whatever resources they could control. This is not to deny the fact that most guerrillas actually survived through the exploitation of local resources in the areas they operated, especially the liberated zones. Indeed, for those freedom fighters who received their training in the East especially from China, one of the principles of guerrilla warfare was the ability to live-off-the-land, to use both the local populations and the resources that they controlled. But, these were the tactics of guerrilla warfare, they were not an end in themselves. There was looting, as has always been the case in war from time immemorial. And there was plunder, and sometimes guerrilla groups would fight for the control of certain resources. But, the ultimate goal was never to loot resources, but the emancipation of those societies from oppression, including economic forms of oppression. Sierra Leone Sierra Leone is one case that is cited by almost every analyst who discusses economic agendas in African conflicts (Douglas 1999; Hirsch 2001). From 1991 when the Sierra Leone civil war erupted, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started mining and selling diamonds and using the proceeds to finance their rebel activities. When the United 139

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Nations Security Council identified the use of diamonds to finance rebel activity as one of the factors that prolonged that conflict, the UN in July 2000, imposed a ban on diamond exports from Sierra Leone. The ban also affected Liberia. However, despite the diamond trade ban, the conflict in Sierra Leone continued for two more years until 2002. Even then, the conflict only ended because of a confluence of other factors which included determined action by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), through its multilateral armed force, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the stationing of a 17 000 strong United Nations peace–keeping force, a UN arms embargo against Liberia, and strong tactics by British intervention forces which thwarted rebel advances. But, even though the methods of war included diamond dealing, the causes of the conflict were not primarily to capture diamond mines. The civil war in Sierra Leone has historical roots, which include political decay, social exclusion, religious instability, economic decline, and general neglect of the country by the international community. This situation was aggravated by the conflict in neighbouring Liberia that fuelled a regional war economy that included trade in diamonds, drugs, and arms. Even the regional force ECOMOG failed to contain the situation and handed over to the United Nations. It is also important, however, to note that even though the rebel RUF were dealing in diamonds and drugs, they were not the ultimate beneficiaries of the trade. The diamonds were destined to the European, American and Canadian markets, and it is the diamond magnets from these countries that were fuelling the diamond trade. The situation was complicated by the fact that international private security firms such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, both of which were based in the United Kingdom, supported both the rebels and government forces. These companies accepted and indeed preferred to be paid in diamonds. This is one of the reasons that the United Nations decided to ban the trade in what became known as “blood diamonds”. Angola Angola is one of the wealthiest countries in Africa, boasting of vast quantities of oil, diamonds, uranium, timber, ivory and other natural resources. However, the majority of the people of Angola have never enjoyed any of the riches of their country. In fact, most Angolans have 140

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actually suffered because of that wealth. First there was the war of liberation against the Portuguese that started in 1961, then there was the Cold War inspired invasion by apartheid South Africa that helped the UNITA insurgency from 1975. In more than 40 years of war, there was hardly any attention, time or resources that were set aside for the development of the Angolan economy. The result was extreme poverty in the land of plenty. In the book, Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds (Cilliers and Dietrich 2000) the authors endeavour to make a direct link between Angola's wealth in natural resources and the civil war that started in 1975. The aforementioned UN Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA (popularly known as the Fowler Report) strengthened the Collier thesis for Angola. The most significant statement in the report was that UNITA was able to pay for its war effort through the sale of diamonds to the international market through Paris and Antwerp and that these transactions were facilitated by De Beers of South Africa. On the other hand, the Angolan Government was able to finance the government war effort by selling Angolan oil, which is controlled by international corporations such as the American companies OPIC, Falcon Oil, and EXXON. Thus, while UNITA fought for continued control of the diamond fields and paid in diamonds, the government side fought for continued control of the oil fields and paid in oil. In the abovementioned book, Philippe Le Billon (2000) goes along with Paul Colliers thesis and places the Angolan conflict together with 25 other contemporary conflicts in which natural resources were at the centre of the conflict. While in a number of these conflicts the fight was over scarce resources, in Angola the fight was because of the abundance of resources, “abundant resources equal more conflicts”. Writing in the same volume, Hannelie de Beer and Virginia Gamba (2000) agree with Le Billon and add on the dimension of resources for arms and the arms for resources. On the other hand, Assis Malaquias (2000) prefers to emphasize ethnicity as the major factor that prolonged the Angolan conflict. He writes that while there might have been some accuracy in depicting the Angolan conflict as a “resource war” the conflict was, “also the result of the dominant politico–military forces’ reluctance to share power and wealth within an inclusive multi-ethnic and multi-racial political system.” (Malaquias 2000: 95). His conclusion is that the major politico141

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military forces in Angola used ethnicity for different yet equally destructive ends. For the MPLA, ethnicity institutionalised a culture of corruption in the allocation of oil revenue, while UNITA used military force to redistribute power and wealth along ethnic lines thereby fostering a culture of violence. (Malaquias 2000: 111-112) While agreeing that the conflict had both intended and unintended economic consequences, another descending voice, Jackie Cilliers (2000: 16) wrote that, “there can be little doubt that the opportunities for selfenrichment … helped to propel resource rich countries such as Angola into war and serve to perpetuate conflict…. But the argument that 'greed not grievance' lies at the root of insurgency war in a country such as Angola is not convincing.” The political, ethnic and regional hegemonic factors are as important to the Angolan conflict as are economic factors. In fact, in the long history of conflict in Angola, diamonds and oil were the latecomers. It can therefore be said that oil and diamonds further complicated a long drawn out conflict that for a long time was encouraged by both sides of the Cold War. Mozambique Whilst all the noise about Angola was going on, analysts conveniently forgot the case of Mozambique. There is no oil in Mozambique, there are no diamonds, and no other precious and exploitable resource except hydro-electric power from the Zambezi river. And yet, between 1975 and 1990, the country endured fifteen years of civil war waged by Alphonso Dlakama and his National Resistance Movement (RENAMO). That conflict was so brutal that it left hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans dead, millions displaced as refugees, and tens of thousands without limbs, having been maimed by landmines or hacked off by machetes. The Homoine massacre of 1987 is a case in point and it was particularly gruesome and horrifying. The Mozambican civil war was an ideological war fuelled by the Cold War. The western world used RENAMO as a proxy force to keep the Marxist government of Samora Machel in Mozambique in a weak position so that it could not threaten apartheid South Africa. Arms for RENAMO came from South Africa, and so did all other supplies and intelligence information. It is also difficult to disprove the allegation that in 1986, it was the South African forces who engineered the crash of the presidential plane that killed Samora Machel. 142

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The Mozambican civil war was one of Africa’s biggest and ugliest wars. It sucked in five regional countries, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique itself. Of course, the final result was that apartheid South Africa managed to destroy African National Congress (ANC) and other bases in Mozambique, Zimbabwe managed to keep its Beira economic corridor open, the former Soviet Union continued to fish off the Mozambican coast, and RENAMO transformed itself from a rebel movement to a well funded opposition political party. But, the war was never, from the beginning, about economic gain. The Mozambican civil war was essentially a hot proxy war fought less for local reasons, and more as an extension of the global Cold War. It was not about the plunder of non-existent resources in Mozambique. The Sudan For more than 40 years, Sudan has experienced turmoil, punctuated by military coups, civil war and failed democratic experiments. The result is more than two million people dead, hundreds of thousands of refugees, starvation, economic chaos, and general terrorism. Recently, in line with Paul Collier’s thesis, analysts have cited the use of oil revenue by the Sudanese government to finance its military operations as an example of the greed rather than grievance theory. In a paper published by the Institute for Global Dialogue in 2000, Garth le Pere and Shannon Field (2000: 1) describe, “the role of foreign oil companies and national government oil consortiums as directly and indirectly implicated in fomenting an international humanitarian disaster [in Sudan] with few recent parallels.” Again, it is proper to acknowledge the fact that oil revenue is indeed being used to finance government operations in the Sudan. Also important is the observation that international oil companies are reaping huge profits and have formed an alliance with the Sudanese government, which make it difficult for peace negotiations to succeed. That, in essence, is the major emphasis of this paper, that it is more the greed of the international plunderers and less of local warlords that fuel conflicts over resources in Africa. But the major question remains, is the conflict in the Sudan merely a contest for the control of oil? The answer is certainly no. We are all aware of the divide between Northern and Southern Sudan that was accentuated during the colonial period creating two unequally developed regions. The Southern communities under the leadership of the 143

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late John Garang of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) naturally rebelled against the domination of the North. That North-South divide is further aggravated by religious separatism between the Muslim North and the non Muslim South to the extent that from 1983, the National Islamic Front considered that it was fighting a Holy war to Islamise the Southern parts of the country. Yes, oil revenue was used by the government, but only as a means to a politico–religious end. For the Southerners, the Sudanese civil war was about identity, it was about self-determination, about freedom of worship, about equality and about social and economic development. In other words, it was African politics as usual, and the wish of many was that such politics could have been played in a much more peaceful way without violent conflict. Just as African Union sponsored peace negotiations between the SPLA and the Sudanese government appeared were showing signs of success, a much more violent conflict erupted in the Darfur region of western Sudan (Adar et al. 2004). The conflict started in 2003 when two rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), accused the Khartoum government of oppressing black Sudanese in favour of Sudanese of Arab origin. The two groups then attacked government forces and installations, to which the government replied with heavy bombardments of villages suspected of supporting and harbouring rebel forces. Government backed militia groups, the Janjaweed, supported these government bombardments on the ground. The Darfur conflict has been characterized as ethnic cleansing, the United States of America has declared that it is genocide, and the United Nations has labelled it the worst humanitarian disaster in the world today. The issues at stake in Darfur are complex, and they include ethnicity, religion, unequal allocation of resources for regional development, and a desire for self-determination and political autonomy from the Khartoum government. Again, in Darfur, Africa’s hottest current conflict at the time of writing, there is no evidence that looting of resources and the enrichment of local warlords is at the centre of the conflict. The Democratic Republic of the Congo On the DRC, the Collier thesis was strengthened by the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 144

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and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was set up in the year 2000. The panel’s first report released by the UN Security Council in April 2001 concluded that the war in the DRC was more about economic plunder of the resources of the DRC by Uganda and Rwanda than the political grievances and security concerns that the two countries had advanced to the international community (UNSC 2001a). However, the UN report was challenged by the British representative to the UN Security Council on the basis that the panel did not fully investigate the economic agendas of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in the DRC. The panel of experts was therefore given more time to investigate the three Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) allies. They then came up with an Addendum to the original report, which was presented to the UN Security Council in November 2001 (UNSC 2001b). The Addendum shifted the experts’ findings and accused the three SADC countries (Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe) of being less the liberators and more the greedy looters of the resources of the DRC. At the same time, the experts toned down their language on the role of Uganda and Rwanda as the invaders of the DRC. Fortunately, or unfortunately for some, the UN Security Council rejected that Addendum, and the panel was given yet more time to produce a more credible report. The final report was presented in 2002, and it included details of local, regional and international actors who were involved in plundering resources in the DRC (UNSC 2002). When that UN final report was presented, analysts immediately shied away from the international plunderers mentioned, and zeroed in on the role of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the DRC. Zimbabwean generals, ministers and business tycoons, even those operating from South Africa were hunted down, and calls were made for UN action against them. W.J. Breytenbach (2002) provided one commentary in an article entitled “Rulers, Rebels and Mercantilists,” which was published in Africa Insight, a periodical publication of the Africa Institute of South Africa. Breytenbach (2002: 7) wrote that, “the Zimbabwean army is simultaneously acting like a multinational corporation undertaking foreign investment, and like a private military company offering protection in exchange for rewards.” But, the Zimbabwean connection is interesting, to say the least. Early in 2004, a group of 70 mercenaries were arrested in Harare on suspicion that they were part of a force planning to effect a military 145

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coup in Equatorial Guinea. They denied the charges, but they said they were on their way to the Democratic Republic of Congo to do mining operations. Now, that is a piece of information that should have excited the United Nations panel of experts on the DRC. Having spent two years trying to find out who was plundering the DRC, when such interesting evidence presented itself, there was not a word from the international team of experts. This casts a shadow on the real mission of the UN team of experts, whether they were really interested in knowing who was exploiting the DRC or whether the experts were simply out to criminalize African politics. Nigeria – A noticeable omission An important observation is that Nigeria was left out of the discussion on economic agendas in African conflicts. This may seem like an innocent oversight, but it raises eyebrows. Nigeria is one of Africa’s regional powers and it is inconceivable to hold a meaningful discussion of developments on the African continent especially on issues of war, conflict, peace, and security without including the country. We all remember that between 1966 and 1970 Nigeria was embroiled in a bitter civil war that left thousands of Nigerians dead. The Biafra war, as it was known, was fought to keep the country united in the face of an attempted secession. That attempted breakaway by Biafra had less to do with economic issues and more with Nigerian politics. There were questions on the efficacy of the federal system, problems with military arrangements, fundamental religious differences, suspicions over census figures, dissatisfaction with the electoral process, all of which culminated in the military coup of January 1966 and the counter coup of July the same year. In those political developments, the Easterners were on one side and the rest of the country on the other. That was the political division which was exploited by both sides leading to the attempted secession by Biafra. Of course, there was the fact that Biafra as a region was more endowed with resources especially oil than other parts of the country. But, in Nigerian politics of the time, the question was never, which local warlord would get their foothold into the oil wells of Nigeria? Even in later years, when the relationship between oil and politics became much more intertwined, the issue of the exploitation of oil remained the domain of large international oil companies such as Mobil, Chevron, 146

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Shell, Elf, and others. So much so that, even the environmentalist struggles of the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta and the tragic killing of their leader Ken Saro–Wiwa in 1995, cannot be viewed as an attempt by any local warlord to control and plunder the region’s resources. That tragedy can only be interpreted as the height of the brutality of the military regime of Nigeria at that time. Also, multinational oil companies have been accused of bribing the military and other government officials so that these companies are allowed access to the continued exploitation of Nigerian resources. Land conflicts in Southern Africa Another major deficit in the economic agendas theory is the lack of a comprehensive discussion on conflicts over land. In the Scarcity and Surfeit (Lind and Sturman 2002) study mentioned earlier, one chapter discusses, “Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda” (Bigagaza, Abong and Mukarubuga 2000: 51 - 82). In Southern Africa, land conflicts are simmering, with the Zimbabwean case having exploded already. A study by Margaret Lee and Karen Colvard (2003) entitled Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa emphasizes the implications and effect of Zimbabwe’s land crisis on the SADC region. Also, a recent publication by the International Crisis Group (2004) entitled Blood and Soil, seeks to draw lessons for South Africa from the Zimbabwean crisis. The latter two studies are not part of, and do not identify with the greed versus grievance school of thought. Zimbabwe’s land conflict The current Zimbabwean conflict is the culmination of more than a century of grief over land belonging to black Zimbabweans which was forcibly occupied by European farmers who, with support from the Western democracies refused to share that land with black farmers (Moyana 1984). The land question has been at the centre of Zimbabwean politics for the past one hundred years and already, several wars have been fought over land starting from 1893. If there is any greed involved, it is the greed of the European farmers who for 20 years after independence in 1980 refused to share the land with aspiring black farmers, even though the European farmers were utilising only a third of the land that they were holding (Moyo 2000). 147

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However, some have reduced the Zimbabwean conflict to the madness of one tired old man, president Robert Mugabe. But, how many people seriously think that when Mugabe goes that it will be the end of land struggles in Southern Africa? In any case, Zimbabwe's land question is not an isolated case in the region. Land struggles have been going on and are still going on in Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa. The land question and land struggles are not even unique Southern African issues, as land conflicts have happened in Peru, Brazil, Chile, China, India, and other regions. In one study entitled Land is Life (Dudley et al: 1992: ix) a Filipino peasant is quoted as having said, “for us the land is our life; we would defend it to the last drop of our blood.” Conclusion After the initial propagation of his greed rather than grievance theory, Paul Collier’s thesis has been applied locally mainly to African conflicts such as Angola’s civil war, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, and the DRC. The other case studies carried out by the International Peace Academy showed that there are more political grievances than simple economic greed in Third World conflicts. In any case, most of the studies deal mainly with tradable resources, and only one tackled land conflict, and yet land is a major source of conflict especially in Southern Africa. The case studies also ignore other important resources such as labour. Paul Collier and his disciples focused too much on the economic agendas of belligerents or local warlords. They did not equally tackle the economic agendas of multinational companies, of western governments that benefit from the oil, diamonds, land, cheap labour etc. In his Zimbabwe Mirror article entitled “Greed, Grief and Hypocrisy in Angola and the DRC,” Mwesiga Baregu, (2000: 16), a Tanzanian Professor of Political Science at the University of Dar-es-Salaam writes that contemporary African conflicts “are essentially driven by the greed of modern day pirates, plunderers and arms merchants.” Baregu believes that one of the critical weaknesses of the Collier thesis is its definition of African conflicts as “civil wars.” He says that the greed thesis may be understood only when conflicts are internationalised, so that the local and international moments are captured in their interaction and inter-

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dependence. In other words, it is more the greed of global capitalism that uses local warlords as pawns to drive African conflicts. Paul Collier’s thesis is based on a contrast between economic motivation and political grievance. But, in traditional political analysis, the two have always been complimentary, not necessarily contradictory factors. In most modern philosophies it has been accepted that one of the major causes of political confrontation is the economic factor. The other problem is with Collier’s research methods. Collier’s whole theory is based on an econometric regression of quantitative data collected from 152 Third World countries which was presented in his jointly authored article, “Justice–Seeking and Loot–Seeking in Civil War” (Collier and Hoeffler 1999b). There are certain mathematical conclusions in that study which do not auger well with social science research. It has also been pointed out that number games do not adequately enlighten humanity on complex social phenomena such as civil wars and other conflicts and it certainly does not adequately enlighten us on the causes and nature of African conflicts. What then is the way forward? The analysis of African conflicts and how to effectively deal with them should revisit the United Nations Secretary General’s Report on Africa which was presented by Kofi Anan in 1998 (Anan: 1998). That report, prepared with the assistance of eminent African scholars, emphasized the need for political will and decisive political action to stop the many conflicts afflicting the African continent. It is important to note that, with the creation of the Peace and Security Council, the African Union has started to show such political will and has been actively engaged in the resolution of conflicts in Burundi, Somalia and Sudan. The work of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union should therefore be encouraged, and it should receive all the financial and other resources that the international community can assist with. The World Bank diversion to focus on the greed of African politicians, while it may have been important in some respects, also diverted UN resources from harnessing African political will for conflict resolution. The observation in this chapter is that, African political cooperation will not necessarily be improved by focusing too much on northern-based theories that tend to criminalize African politics such as that advanced by Paul Collier and his disciples.

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References Adar, Korwa., John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka, (2004) Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. Annan, Kofi, (1998) The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Secretary General’s Report to the United Nations Security Council. 16 April 1998. New York. [Online] Available on http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/ geninfo/afrec/sgreport/main.htm Ballentine, Karen and Jake Sherman, (eds.) (2003), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. New York: International Peace Academy. Baregu, Mwesiga, (2000), Greed, Grief and Hypocrisy in Angola and the DRC. Zimbabwe Mirror Weekly Newspaper. 24 – 30 March. Harare. 16. Berdal, Mats and David Malone, (eds), (2000), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. London: Lynne Reinner. Bigagaza, Jean; Carolyne Abong and Cecile Mukarubuga, (2002), “Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda”, In, Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts, eds. Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman. Pretoria. Institute for Security Studies. 51 – 82. Breytenbach, WJ. (2002), “Rulers, Rebels and Mercantilists”. Africa Insight. Vol. 32, No. 2. Pretoria. Africa Institute of South Africa. 3 – 9. Cilliers, Jakkie and Christian Dietrich, eds. (2000), Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Cilliers, Jakkie, (2000), “Resource Wars – A New Type of Insurgency”. In, Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds. Pretoria. Institute for Security Studies. 1 – 19. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, (1998), “On Economic Causes of Civil War”. Report of the World Bank: in Collaboration with the University of Oxford. Published in Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998). 563 – 73. Collier, Paul. (1999a), “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War”. Report of the World Bank: in Collaboration with the University of Oxford. Published in Oxford Economic Papers 51 (1999). 168 – 183.

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Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, (1999b), “Justice Seeking and Loot Seeking in Civil War.” Report of The World Bank: in Collaboration with the University of Oxford, February. Collier, Paul, (2000), “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective.” In, Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 91 – 111. De Beer, Hannelie and Virginia Gamba, (2000), “The Arms Dilemma: Resources for Arms or Arms for Resources?” In Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds. Eds. Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich. Pretoria. Institute for Security Studies. 69 – 93. Douglas, Ian, (1999), “Fighting for diamonds: Private military companies in Sierra Leone.” In, Peace, Profit or Plunder?: The Privatisation of Security in War – torn African Societies, eds. Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 175 – 200. Dudley, Nigel., John Madeley, and Sue Stolton, (1992), Land is Life: Land Reform and Sustainable Agriculture. London: Intermediate Technology Development Group Publishing. Field, Shanon and Garth le Pere, (2000), The Civil War in Sudan: The role of the oil industry. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue. Fogel, Robert William and Stanley L. Engerman, (1974), Time on The Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery. Boston: Little Brown and Company. Hirsch, John, (2001), “War in Sierra Leone.” Survival 43 (3): 146 – 162. International Crisis Group (ICG), (2004), Blood and Soil: Land Politics and Conflict Prevention in Zimbabwe and South Africa, Brussels: International Crisis Group. Le Billon, Philippe, (2000), “The Political Economy of Resource Wars”. In Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, eds. Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich. Pretoria. Institute for Security Studies. 21 – 42. Lee, Margaret and Karen Colvard, (2003), Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. Lind, Jeremy and Kathryn Sturman, eds., (2002), Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 151

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Malaquias, Assis, (2000), “Ethnicity and Conflict in Angola: prospects for reconciliation.” In Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, eds. Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 95 -113. Moyana, H.V., (1984), The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe, Masvingo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press. Moyo, Sam, (2000), Land Reform under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe. Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), (2001a). “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” 12 April. [Online] Available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/ latest/drcongo.htm United Nations Security Council (UNSC), (2001b), “Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” S/2001/1072. [Also online] Available on the UN Website and on http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres. docsindex.html United Nations Security Council (UNSC), (2002), “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” S/2002/1146. 16 October. [Online] Available at http://www.afrol.com/ Countries/documents/un_resources_2002_intro.htm

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PART FOUR

HUMAN SECURITY AND SUPERSTITION IN AFRICA

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Beyond the Myth of “Island of Peace": Governance and Human Security Challenges in Tanzania Mwesiga Baregu Introduction The dominant image of Africa today is that the continent is conflict ridden and that violent conflicts, in particular, are responsible for Africa’s persistent economic and social backwardness. In brief, apart from being at war with itself, Africa is widely understood to be poor, sick, corrupt and deeply in external debt. These problems are believed to be the cause and consequence of the violent conflicts on the continent. Poverty and conflict, in particular, have become so analytically and politically interlinked that poverty alleviation and conflict management and resolution have become the major policy planks in most African countries. Because of this orientation there are few African countries thinking and much less acting, in terms of long-term fundamental economic transformations. Rather, most countries are so enmeshed in the web of ‘poverty alleviation and conflict resolution’ that they fail to realize that the conflicts and poverty are mere symptoms of an underlying structural malaise in the African economy and polity.5 As a result, neither the conflicts are resolved nor is poverty alleviated over the longterm. Only recently, for example, one of the ministers in the new Kikwete government in Tanzania was quoted complaining that the country’s debt was still hovering around the same level that it was at the time of signing the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) agreement in 1998. External debt stood at US$7.7billion in 1999 and was estimated at US $7.32billion in 2004.6 As will be shown later, conflicts, which are the 5 Almost all African countries including Tanzania have had to produce a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in order to qualify for the IMF’s Highly Indebted Poor Country program and to qualify for some debt reduction. 6 www.indexmundi.com/tanzania/debt. The debt was $6.8bi., 2000; $6.8bi., 2002; $6.5bi.,2003.

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focus of this paper, have also been growing in their diversity as well as intensity. To be sure, conflicts are not necessarily negative. Only when they turn violent do they endanger the peace, security, stability and development of societies and countries. Conflicts are also quite normal in all societies and indeed, if well managed and transformed, they can be a healthy phenomenon in terms of leading to improved (win-win) situations for the parties involved.(Lederach, 1995). At any rate conflicts are, dialectically, a necessary component (if not engine) of fundamental social change which may involve gainers and losers, at least in the short term. In this context, conflicts are an indication of incompatibilities between different interests, expectations or aspirations and are thus an expression of contests about certain values in a society. In this sense, conflicts are merely symptoms of deeper problems that need to be addressed and, accordingly, they are a positive phenomenon if they are seen as a warning signal to address the challenges they pose. Unfortunately in the African setting conflicts have largely been interpreted and approached as negative phenomena to be resolved ‘once and for all’. Consequently, rather than taking them as springboards for social transformation the tendency has been to suppress them as soon as they arise. The result has been that what could have been healthy early warning signals for reform and adaptation have been turned into violent confrontations after so many aspirations are persistently blocked and frustrated even as a veneer ‘peace and tranquillity’ is maintained as is the case in Tanzania. The challenge facing the Tanzanian government therefore is whether it can creatively transform old and new conflicts from irritants to be suppressed into springboards for socioeconomic and political transformation. A small team of scholars (of which the author is a member), led by Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, recently launched an important publication entitled “Africa Conflict, Peace and Governance Monitor: An annual publication on the state of governance in Africa”.(ACDESS, 2005). This is the first publication of its kind by a team of African scholars committed to continuously following up the major conflicts and emerging trends in conflicts in Africa. In the first issue of the publication the spotlight was focused on three categories of conflicts namely; Forgotten conflicts, Ignored conflicts and Bubbling conflicts. In this issue there was no study on peaceful situations, what drives them and how they may be sustained. Presumably this was not the immediate concern. But the danger in this 156

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reticence is that the understandable preoccupation with ongoing violent conflicts may divert attention away from best practices in peace making and peace maintenance. Even worse, it may blind us from emerging and not-so-violent conflicts in traditionally peaceful zones. Tanzania is one such zone which rarely receives the attention of students of conflicts simply because it is believed to be “an island of peace” in the turbulent ocean of African politics.(Hirschler, 2004). It is in this spirit that this paper interrogates the ‘island of peace’ notion by attempting to examine the old and new challenges facing the new government in Tanzania bearing in mind three things. The first is that the 2005 elections and their rhetoric not withstanding, are not necessarily a harbinger of change in policy- they could indeed herald more continuity than change. The second is that the new government in Tanzania is only ‘new’ in the sense that a new President, cabinet and some new members of parliament were elected but the ruling party and its basic policies have not changed. The third is that the image of ‘island of peace’ is at once description and propaganda. As description it seeks to present the reality in the country but as propaganda it seeks to create the impression that Tanzania is exceptional and unchanging. This carries the danger of the government believing in its own propaganda and therefore underplaying emerging and persistent conflicts thus risking their exacerbation and escalation. These three factors are bound to have a significant impact upon the will and capacity to address the challenges no matter how much “new commitment, speed and energy” the new president may have. A background to contemporary conflicts in Tanzania It should be pointed out that the conflicts facing the new government are both old and new. It may thus be helpful to present a brief historical background to conflicts in Tanzania in order to provide some context to contemporary conflicts in the country. Apart from the shortlived and relatively bloodless military mutiny in January 1964 – only two years into Tanganyika’s independence as well as the violence associated with the revolution in Zanzibar (which led to the union) at around the same time, Tanzania has not had any major internal conflicts. To be sure, Zanzibar has always been restive with persistent tension between the revolutionists and their opponents. This tension which predates the revolution, culminated in the assassination of the 157

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first president of Zanzibar Abeid Amani Karume in 1972 and continues to define the political landscape in the islands. Its most visible manifestation is the persistent conflict between the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF). On the mainland the country had a number of conflicts precipitated by the Arusha Declaration and the forced villagization program of the 1970s but these conflicts were effectively managed within the closed single-party political system and the then hegemonic ideology of ‘ujamaa’. During that period, similar conflicts emerged between the state, employers and the working people leading to the adoption of ‘Mwongozo’- a set of guidelines on the empowerment of workers that resulted in the formation of workers’ councils as a conflict management mechanism in industrial relations. Peoples’ militias based on workers and peasant councils were also formed as vigilante groups to protect the ‘ujamaa’ revolution from ‘subversives’ and ‘ideological deviants’ defined by the all-dominant and sole political party – TANU and after 1977 by the CCM. A military coup attempt staged in 1969 against the Arusha declaration was foiled.(Mapolu, 1979). As a union, Tanzania fought a war with Uganda in 1978 but apart from the fact that the war was an external conflict, it had the overall effect of politically galvanizing the population and, perhaps unintentionally, making the country better prepared to swallow the bitter pills of structural adjustment that were to follow in the wake of the war. Certainly the war had the impact of blurring the line between belt tightening due to the outcomes of the war or arising from structural adjustment conditionalities. The general picture that emerges during this period is that whereas the country was not conflict free, it had a corresponding capacity to manage and transform the conflicts it faced. For better or worse, Ujamaa had established an environment in which the Tanzanian society was (and still is) widely consensual with largely unquestioning loyalty to the state. In a study on Tanzania’s political culture carried out in the early 1990s, it was established that on the average, the political competence of Tanzanians was low with a subject rather than a citizen political culture marked by quiescence.(Baregu, Mukandala, and Mushi,2001.). This was the image and indeed the reality that prevailed in Tanzania until the 1980s and 90s when the country embarked upon a triple transition involving both domestic and external dimensions. Domestically, there was a largely dual but more pervasive transition first in the 158

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economy from ‘ujamaa’ socialism to the free market system and, nearly ten years later, upon the political transition from single party rule to a multiparty system.7 Both of these transitions have not been free of conflicts. The economic transition largely featured a conflict between the state and ruling party, on one side and the international financial institutions (IMF & World Bank), on the other in the early 1980s. This conflict was largely verbal and did not precipitate significant popular dissent with the exception of a few popular demonstrations in support of the government’s resistance. The more pronounced conflicts were domestic. At one level there was the conflict that emerged between the state and the so-called ‘economic saboteurs’ who were essentially a combination of private entrepreneurs responding to pervasive shortages of necessities and some criminal elements both operating outside the highly restrictive statist economic framework before trade liberalization was introduced. It is instructive to note that the operation to combat the economic saboteurs also coincided with an attempted coup in 1982/3. At another level there was the conflict between the state and the people whereby the state was retreating from the production of goods and provision of social services in a situation where there was no viable private sector to replace it. This is what led to the loss of state legitimacy and precipitated demands for political change. Thus the political transition, which began in the late 1980s and was partly induced by the economic policy changes, pitted the state against democracy activists demanding the liberalization of politics to match the liberalization of the economy. Again no significant violent conflicts ensued mainly because although it had initially resisted the pressures for change, the state was eventually able to peacefully convert the political demands into policy outputs through a Presidential Commission on ‘One or many political parties’ and to embark on a controlled transition.(Nyalali Commission, 1991). Externally, Tanzania’s foreign policy towards Africa up to the mid1980s had largely been defined and shaped by the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. As the founder and long-time chair of the Frontline States and host of the OAU Liberation Committee, Tanzania led the

Hirschler (ibid) elaborates the transitions into six, i.e. the political, economic, social, constitutional, administrative and a normative-cultural transition. 7

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rest of the African countries in providing support for the liberation forces of Mozambique and South Africa, in particular. By the early1980s with the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (1979) and the introduction of the US’s Reagan policy of Constructive Engagement (1982) towards South Africa, Tanzania embarked upon the long transition from confrontation to co-operation with South Africa. This was to result in a regional rapprochement when South Africa joined the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in 1994 after the country was democratised. These developments have since turned the two countries from confrontation to co-operation and elevated South Africa to the position of one of the major investors in the country. That in itself has given rise to new conflicts between the state, local investors and the South African investors, as will be shown later. This development has meant however that with the possible exception of the intermittent tension with Burundi, the country has no external enemies. The contemporary conflict profile Hirschler has pointed out that Tanzania is experiencing a rise in the range and intensity of conflicts in an environment in which national consensus and the capacity to handle these conflicts have been declining. Both the increase and the intensity of these conflicts may be traced to “…the context of changed modes of interaction between the state and society and within the society”.(Hirschler, 2004). The context of ‘changed modes of interaction’ essentially refers to the shift from broadly socialist egalitarian norms in which the state and the public interest played a predominant role in the production and distribution of resources to a liberal capitalistic environment in which private interests and market forces are the key players in production and distribution. This shift would seem to have resulted in a transition in which relative anomy or a normative vacuum reigns with large sections the society calling for a new national consensus on norms and values particularly in the run up to the elections. This has presented the newly elected government with a challenge which bordered on a crisis of political legitimacy for the previous government.(Kaduma, 2004). Such a period is well captured by Antonio Gramsci in his ‘Prison Notebooks’: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying the new

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can not be born, in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear”.(Gramsci, 1971, 210). As a result of this ‘crisis’ the ruling party (CCM)’s traditional slogan “solidarity, peace and tranquillity” which is grounded in the old norms and values is progressively ringing hollow as seemingly uncontrollable violent crime is raging across the country in the wake of a peaceful but corruption marred election. This situation has been exacerbated by the rampant corruption in government and the disarray within the police force which has rendered it almost completely ineffective in responding to the armed robberies in Dar es Salaam in particular. It is instructive to note that in the course of their activities the new wave of criminals have appropriated the CCM election slogan: “Ari Mpya, Nguvu Mpya na Kasi Mpya”; meaning “New Spirit, New Energy and New Pace” in committing crime! It is also worth noting, among Gramsci’s ‘morbid symptoms’, that in some of the latest incidents, members of the Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF) have also been implicated. But the rise in armed crime is not the only threat in the ‘Island of Peace’. Below is a presentation of an overview of the types of conflicts that are manifest or emerging in Tanzania which if left unchecked, are likely to affect the peace environment in the country and probably beyond. They include political conflicts arising primarily from the constitution as it applies to both the union affairs and to the transition to multi-party rule in the country as a whole; economic conflicts largely emanating from the liberalization and privatisation transition and social conflicts resulting from ideological liberalization resulting in a general rise in religious fundamentalism particularly among Christians and Moslems. Significant ecological conflicts are also emerging mainly as a consequence of pressure on resources such as the over-harvesting of forests, etc. without appropriate state regulation. The Union: Teething or aging problems? What is arguably the most important achievements of Tanzania over the last forty years, i.e. the union, also constitutes its Achilles heel as a persistent source of conflicts. It is also by far the most important and potentially most damaging source of conflicts. On 26th April 1964, the then Tanganyika and Zanzibar governments inaugurated a union of the two countries which, to be fair, has not only been the most im161

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portant achievement but also the most significant and lasting contribution to Africa’s continuing quest for unity. That the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar has lasted for forty years now should be a source of some lessons for the rest of the continent. There were other initiatives such as the Ghana, Guinea, Mali Federation which did not fare so well. This should not, however, be a cause of complacence on the part of Tanzania because there are a number of important problems with the union that need to be seriously and urgently addressed if the union is to survive and thrive over the next forty years. The initial name of the Union was the ‘United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar’ but this name was quickly replaced by the present name ‘The United Republic of Tanzania’ after a union-wide competition held for a new name. This was not just a cosmetic change of name. Apart from being crafted from the names of the two parts of the union the name ‘Tanzania’ denoted a unitary merger of the two parts of the union. In that sense the name was more of an aspiration than a reflection of the reality on the ground at the time. This, at least in part, reflects the circumstances in which the union was born in the midst of the Cold War, the wave of independence in Africa and the aspiration for African unity, an army mutiny on the mainland as well as in Kenya and Uganda and a political revolution in Zanzibar. It should be remembered that the islands and the mainland had acceded to independence via different though interrelated paths. The mainland had gone through a classical de-colonization process with Britain convening a Tanganyika Independence Constitutional Conference in London and subsequently having Prince Phillip ceremonially hand over the instruments of independence to then Prime Minister J.K. Nyerere in 1961. Nyerere then proceeded to serve briefly as Prime Minister under a Governor-General before yielding power to Rashid Kawawa as care taker until Tanganyika became a Republic in 1962 when Nyerere re-emerged as the first president. This was Tanganyika’s evolutionary path in which the country remained relatively well disposed to the British government even after it had cast off the ‘trusteeship’ and temporary ‘dominion’ status. Zanzibar, on the other hand, traversed a revolutionary path with some violence and considerable tension with the British government. Having undergone a number of closely fought elections in the late 1950s and early 60s and a failed attempt to convene a constitutional conference, Zanzibar was finally brought to independence in 1963 162

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through a coalition government between the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP) largely representing the Arab minority under Prince Jamshid, the Sultan, as head of state. This ruling coalition excluded most of the majority indigenous or African population. This meant that the government that came to power enjoyed only questionable legitimacy and was challenged immediately by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) which overthrew it within three months to set up a revolutionary government in January 1964. The new government, under the leadership of President Karume, then entered into negotiations with President Nyerere on the mainland to form some kind of union. Some have argued that the fledgling ASP government was seeking protection from a counter-revolution in the union while others have argued that the mainland was seeking to tame and control the revolution. Yet others have argued that Tanganyika was colluding with the Americans in their anti-communist designs over the island. At any rate these negotiations culminated in the formation of the Union within two months of the revolution in Zanzibar. This meant that the old differences in Zanzibar were not addressed and thus mutual suspicion between the old political adversaries remained rife. This suspicion submerges and re-emerges at different times particularly when the political system comes under severe stress at times of elections. In such a situation as the present it is not surprising that old labels are revived and political feuds re-enacted. The current state of affairs in the union is, to a large extent, the continuing legacy of these two backgrounds and the short time available for negotiating the union. Moreover the agreement and the resulting Articles of Union were hurriedly negotiated by two inexperienced governments in the face of the Cold War struggles for spheres of influence. Specifically, in this case, the US was threatening to intervene in Zanzibar, lest another Cuba sprung up off the African coast in the Indian Ocean. The United Kingdom, for her part, was just embarking on an East of Suez defence policy (in the wake of the Suez Crisis) in which the East African Coast line would form the eastern defence perimeter under the new policy. As a result of these pressures the detailed arrangements relating to sovereignty and the distribution of power between the two countries were never fully worked out. The process was largely left to incrementalism, whereby gradual adjustments would be

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made as need arose and circumstances permitted. But, as we have now learned, “the devil is in the details”!. It was not made clear at that time, for example, whether the idea was to proceed gradually from a loose federation towards an eventual unitary government or to set up a federal arrangement composed of two sovereign states collaborating, through the union government, in selected areas. In a conversation with a student delegation in 1968, President Karume expressed a preference for a unitary government in keeping with Nkrumah’s pan-Africanism. He blamed Nyerere for the loose arrangement. It was Nyerere, in a separate interview with the same delegation, who was more cautious arguing that he did not want to create the impression that Tanganyika had swallowed Zanzibar.(Tanzania Students Association, 1968). The formation of a union government and a Zanzibar government without a corresponding Tanganyika government testifies to this uncertainty and remains a major bone of contention revolving around the issue of one, two or three governments. This uncertainty can also be seen in the political parties. Although there was close collaboration between TANU and ASP in the run up to independence and even closer relations in the wake of the union, each party remained relatively autonomous until the two parties were merged to form CCM over ten years after the union. To this day the merger remains contentious with CCM in Zanzibar tending to act independently of the central organization. This is particularly the case in the present situation where the central party seems to support the idea of a coalition government while the Zanzibar party remains intransigent and uncompromising on that question. But the greater conflict afflicting the union is the CUF-CCM (State) conflict in Zanzibar. At one level there have been clashes between government functionaries, e.g. the police and political leaders and their followers. The most serious and highly publicized incident of this type at the national level, was the January 2001 Pemba clashes between the police and CUF supporters in which at least 31 people were killed, 294 injured and nearly 2000 people took flight into exile in Shimoni, Mombasa, Kenya. In the aftermath of the Pemba incidents there was put in place a ‘muafaka’ – an agreement between CCM and CUF in October, 2001 to search for a long-term solution to the conflict. However, recent experience suggests that the Muafaka is all but dead.

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More recently there have been discussions on the possibility of forming a government of national unity or coalition governments. This would be in recognition of the relatively equal strength between the two political parties as reflected in the very close results as was the case in Zanzibar in 1995, 2000 and the 2005 elections. This situation has also manifested itself in local government elections raising serious questions on the efficacy of the first-past-the-post (FPP) or winner-take-all electoral system in a multi-party political system. The winner-take-all system is generally democratically deficient because, unlike proportional representation (PR), it junks the non-winning votes and encourages zero-sum, cut-throat struggles rather than compromises suggested by the balance of forces as reflected in the votes obtained by each party. FPP is not suitable particularly for fractious societies such as Zanzibar. The recent attempt to deny voter registration to CUF Presidential candidate and other members is a clear case of a desperate move to block CUF from winning. These problems can only be addressed through a consensual constitutional review combined with a union-wide referendum in a comprehensive union constitutional framework. This kind of constitutional review should be informed by the Nyalali, TLS and Kisanga recommendations which have largely been ignored by a government not fully committed to democratisation. This review should also be informed by a clear grasp of the imperatives that brought about and continue to sustain the union.8 Among others the exercise should consider the following issues: • •

The possibility of a power-sharing government arrangement or government of national unity. The structure of the union government whereby the union must either adopt a unitary government or three governments. Two governments is certainly anomalous.

8 Such imperatives present themselves in two types; those arising from necessity (threat and power) and those from Choice (gain and affection). The more that countries come together the greater the success of union and vice versa. See M. Baregu, The African Economic Community and the EAC: any lessons from the EU? In R. Ajulu, ed. The Making of a Region – The Revival of the East African Community. (Midrand, S. Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005)

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•

•

•

•

Restructuring regional/local government across the union through the adoption of a ‘majimbo’ policy which would establish more politically powerful, economically diverse and ethnically mixed provinces. The harmonization of laws between the two parts of the union in favour of common statutes in critical areas such as citizenship, human rights, elections, etc. A clear and negotiated separation of powers between the union and state governments if the three government option is adopted. Legitimisation and popularisation of the new constitutional order through a union-wide referendum.

The constitution, democracy and governance. The second category of conflicts revolves roughly around the constitution. For thirty years after independence Tanzania was, for all intents and purposes, a constitutional one party state. Having come to independence with a number of competing political parties in Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the multiparty system was abolished in 1964 with the institution of a one-party state. Among the justifications advanced was that multi-party-ism could be divisive in terms of courting ethnic or class loyalties above national unity. It was also feared that the system could be diversionary in terms of dividing the people and diverting their attention away from the clear and consensual goals of combating the obvious enemies – ignorance, poverty and disease. Just as the country could not afford differences in the struggle for independence, so could it not in the struggle for development.(Nyerere, 1967, 157-158). Unfortunately, good intentions apart, this resulted in the concentration of power in the single party and the dominance of its leaders leading to the suppression of political participation. Thirty or so years later, the enemies were still as virulent, the single party had atrophied and ‘gone to sleep’, the people had become politically quiescent, economically dormant and socially moribund. Society in general had lost a sense of direction and become de-mobilized by a political system that had lost legitimacy and progressively resorted to force to maintain its rule. The people felt politically suffocated. These were the forces that spawned a movement in the form of the National Convention for Constitutional Reform (NCCR) in the mid-80s demand-

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ing the opening up of political space through the introduction of a new constitution. Although the state was and has remained hesitant and reluctant it finally yielded to these pressures by setting up the Nyalali Commission on One Party or Many Parties implicitly deciding on a controlled transition rather than a negotiated one. Within nine months the commission produced a serious report recommending, inter alia, the following: • • • • • •

•

The restoration of a multi-party system and the creation of a conducive environment for the new political parties. The protection of fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary as well as parliament/ house of representatives. A federal system of government with a union government and a government for Tanganyika and Zanzibar respectively. The repeal or fundamental amendment of 40 repressive laws. The creation of an independent body to oversee the transition to a multiparty system. The drafting of a new constitution, a public discussion of the same and the convening of a constituent Assembly to pass the constitution. The launching of a major public education campaign on multiparty-ism and democracy.

Needless to say only the recommendation reinstating multi-partyism was adopted and the timetable for easing in the rest of the recommended changes was ignored. An office of the registrar was formed not as guardian of the new political parties and promoter of democracy but as controller of political parties. Symbolically and instructively the incumbent party (CCM) was not required to register under the new Act. This created an atmosphere of mistrust and uncertainty between the incumbent party and the new fledgling parties which were to come into existence. As a result of this faulty beginning there has, of late, emerged a spate of political clashes between various categories of political actors in the country. To be sure, conflicts between competing political actors are not new. Indeed it can be persuasively argued that conflicts are the very stuff of politics. The concern in this paper is of two kinds. The first is the violent dimension of these conflicts particularly when violent conflicts not only result in bodily harm and damage to property but also when such conflicts tend to nurture a culture of violent politics 167

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and impunity as opposed to a culture of peaceful conflict transformation, tolerance and compromise. The second concern arises from the fact that violence negatively affects the fundamental democratic principle of political tolerance by deliberately muzzling legitimate dissent. Political tolerance is premised on the understanding that each individual in society has the right to be heard which is contingent upon the duty to listen to others. In my view this is arguably the most important element of a democratic political order. Since there can never be rights without obligations, the violation of the other people’s right to be listened to implicitly carries the relinquishment of one’s own right to speak. Simply put, if you deny somebody the right to be heard you have no right to expect the same. And when that happens, meaningful communication breaks down. Instead, people either scream at each other or speak right past each other. In such a situation there cannot be any democracy worth the name. That is why it is vital to ensure not only that there is a continuous dialogue between all political actors but also that this dialogue creates an environment in which political competition is not perceived as a zero sum but as a positive sum game. In this kind of game everybody gains. In this case, in particular, the mutual gain from creative and constructive dialogue comes in the form of deepening and widening the roots of democracy. The nation gains through the maintenance of political stability and the enhancement of the common good. This is of particular relevance in a country like Tanzania which, despite ten years of multi-party politics, is still only hesitantly emerging from decades of single-party rule into a multi-party system. In the old order, politics was dominated by monolithic ideas while in the new one we are slowly learning to ‘let a thousand flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend’, to quote Chairman Mao’s famous dictum. In this transition, a number of conflicts, some of them verging on violent clashes have occurred and unfortunately have found the system ill prepared to handle them. A clear case of such un-preparedness is the conflict in Pemba, in which over thirty people died with over one thousand others taking flight into exile. The conflicts that have emerged cluster themselves roughly into four groups. These are: ‘party-state’, ‘inter-party’, ‘inter-party followers’ and ‘intra-party’ conflicts, all of which call for various methods of prevention, management and response.

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The economy, ideology and society. As pointed out earlier, the ultima ratio of single party rule was to put in place a political and institutional framework which would make it possible for the government to wage the war on ignorance, poverty and disease. There were at least two guiding assumptions in this process. One was that there was general consensus about the enemies and the need for a concerted war to fight them. There could have been some differences on how to prosecute the war but not on whether the war was necessary. The other guiding assumption was that all the people subscribed to a common ideology of African socialism first expounded by Nyerere in “Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism” in 1961. Nyerere expended lots of effort to explain and justify why, for the African countries emerging from colonial rule, socialism was the rational choice of ideology if they wanted to exert some control over their economies. By 1967 these assumptions were ultimately enshrined in the policy pronouncement in “ The Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Self reliance”. The Arusha declaration was a comprehensive ideological and policy framework defining the major socio-economic and political problems of Tanzania and drawing up a strategy on how to confront these problems. It stated the principles of TANU and spelled out the policy of socialism covering such issues as the absence of exploitation, control of the major means of production by peasants and workers, the existence of democracy and socialism as a belief or attitude of mind. It also elaborated the policy of self reliance stressing the war against the three enemies, reliance on hard work rather than money for development, the dangers of depending on foreign aid, agriculture as the basis of development and the role of land, the people, good policies and good leadership in development. The declaration was not merely a political program but also a mechanism for channelling aspirations and resolving conflicts. The distinguishing features of the AD were that it was comprehensive, clear, concise and focused. It was at once a visionary statement as it was easy to translate into practical programs which were undertaken in the wake of the declaration. These programs included; Education for Self-reliance, Mwongozo (empowering of workers), Ujamaa village formation in rural development, UPE (universal primary education), Kisomo cha Watu Wazima (Eradication of illiteracy), maji ni uhai (clean and 169

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potable water), mtu ni Afya (health and medical services). It should be stressed that the AD also called on the government to implement the party policy of socialism, not to depend on foreign loans and grants in its development plans and to put more emphasis on actions which would raise the standard of living of the peasants and the rural community. Whatever one thinks of the outcomes, all agree that during that period (1967 – 1980) Tanzanians became highly politically, economically and socially mobilized, innovative and self-confident in what they did before this energy was drained by the advent of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). In the wake of liberalization policies it has now become fashionable to direct unrelenting criticism at the Arusha Declaration and to blame this period as the source of the countries economic ills. To be sure, the results of the AD were uneven and with contradictory impacts. Although the tendency has been to dismiss the AD as a failure mainly because of the ‘ujamaa’ policies which are held responsible for disrupting agricultural production, such criticism has not taken into account the hostile global environment in which Tanzania was groping around for alternative paths to self-reliant development. Ali Mazrui, for example, asserts that; “Nyerere’s policies of Ujamaa amounted to a case of HEROIC FAILURE. They were heroic because Tanzania was one of the few African countries which attempted to find its own route to development instead of borrowing the ideologies of the West. But it was a failure because the economic experiment did not deliver the goods of development”(Mazrui, 2002). But the record even at this level speaks differently. It is generally acknowledged that under Arusha literacy rates and school attendance soared, schools and health centres increased and peoples’ incomes and quality of life improved. In his own defence in an interview with Ikaweba Bunting, having stated that the British Empire left Tanganyika with 85% illiteracy, two engineers and twelve doctors, Nyerere has the following to say: “When I left office, we had 99% illiteracy and thousands of engineers and doctors. In 1988 Tanzania’s per-capita income was $280. Now, in 1998 it is $140” said Nyerere. “So I asked the World Bank people what went wrong. Because for the last ten years Tanzania has been signing on the dotted line and doing everything the IMF and the World bank wanted . Enrolment in schools has plummeted to 63% and conditions in health and other services have deteriorated. “I asked them again: “What went wrong?” These people just sat there looking at 170

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me. Then they asked what could they do? I told them “Have some humility”. Humility – they are so arrogant”(Mbogora, 2003). It is instructive to note that when asked whether he still believed in the Arusha Declaration shortly before his death Mwalimu said that if he were to re-write the document he would not change a thing apart from some punctuation marks! It is also instructive to note that it is largely during this period that corruption has become rampant and endemic. Liberalization and privatisation are now the pillars of socioeconomic policy in Tanzania like the rest of Africa. The dominance of these policy orientations has completely changed the terms of discourse. Instead of fighting poverty we now speak of poverty alleviation under a Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan/Paper (PRSP) and MKUKUTA, MKURABITA; instead of self-reliance we now refer to ‘partnerships’ with donors; instead of socialism and public services we now speak of privatisation with services for the able to pay; etc. Nyerere captured the effects of this process very well in a speech to the Association of Commonwealth Universities in 1998: “The relentless and single-minded drive by the rich and powerful to globalise; to privatise every public enterprise; to deify the market; to weaken our governments and make it impossible for them to intervene decisively on behalf of the poor and powerless: all this will, no doubt, succeed in creating immense wealth and power for a minority of countries and a minority of citizens in every country. It is also creating massive poverty and hopelessness for the majority of the countries of the world and their citizens”.(Nyerere, 1998). It is instructive to note that Kikwete acknowledged this challenge when, while speaking to the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation, he noted that the benefits of correct economic and fiscal policies that had been applauded by many are yet to reach the ordinary Tanzanian.(Kikwete, 2006). It is this failure, in particular, that is gradually feeding the hopelessness and social discontent and the growing crime particularly in the urban areas in the country. Add to this, the rampant urban youth unemployment as well as the growing rural-urban migration and you have a ticking time bomb! But the rural areas are no more at ease than the urban areas. A number of conflicts resulting in part from policy orientation and in part from diminished state capacity to regulate the economy are emerging and increasing rather rapidly. Most of these conflicts are resource related and they include the following:

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• • • •

Disintegrates societies, fragments communities and ultimately polarizes ethnic groups; Emerging religious cleavages; Struggles between pastoralists and agriculturalists over the use of land; Struggles between people and animals (wildlife). (Daily Times, 7 March 2006).

A case of resource struggles between exports and local consumption is centred around the fish fillet export industry around Lake Victoria as depicted in the recent movie; “Darwin’s Nightmare” where the local people around the lake are left to fight over the fish bones and heads thrown out by the fish fillet plants. Ecological stress in the form of habitat loss has been reported by the World Resource Institute. By 1995 Tanzania had lost 40% of total forest cover including; 39% dry forest, 80% moist, 49% savannah and 60% mangroves. Total habitat loss was estimated at 45% with desertification creeping at 2.5% per annum.(World Resource Institute, 1995). It should be stressed that these incidents are not isolated events. They form part of a pattern of conflicts arising essentially as the logical social consequence of the decisions taken in the early 1980s to embark upon the political, economic and ideological transitions. In that context some of the conflicts may indeed be transitional in which case they will decline when the new systems have taken root. Others however, may not be transitional if either the transitions are protracted or indeed stalled creating a situation of uncertainty and spawning anomic behaviour. In any case the intensity of the conflicts will very much depend on the effectiveness and timeliness of the responses brought to bear on the conflicts. Given the erosion of the conflict resolution/transformation norms, values and institutions of the former era, new capacity will be necessary to cope with the pressures. Conflict prevention, management and resolution capacity. As we noted earlier Tanzania has evolved and almost institutionalised a culture of resolving conflicts relatively peacefully. Most of this capacity was developed during the Ujamaa period of Nyerere’s policy of ‘Socialism and self-reliance.’ Ujamaa literally meant ‘family-hood’ and the policy stressed values of caring and sharing in the process of building a self-reliant nation. Under constitutional single party rule 172

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society was highly mobilized behind these values and symbolically the popular form of address was the asexual and de-classed term ndugu, meaning ‘relative’. Thus the country perceived itself as one big family in which everyone was everyone’s relative and where differences were settled amicably if and when they arose. Institutionally, at the grass roots the ten-house cell was both a unit for party control as well as a mechanism for conflict resolution. At the national, regional and district levels the system was repeated with party committees doubling up as political as well as conflict resolution mechanisms. In the wake of the introduction of a multiparty system these institutions have continued to function at the local level although their legitimacy is progressively being questioned. The culture of consensus and unquestioning obedience upon which they were built is rapidly dissipating as Tanzania’s society becomes pluralistic and questioning under a multiparty system. Apart from the general socio-political framework just described, the country has evolved a number of other mechanisms in response to the conflicts described. The Union Question: Despite the fact that the union question is still largely unresolved a number of mechanisms have been put in place to manage and if possible to transform the conflict. Of these mechanisms the most well known is the Mwafaka (consensus) I & II. These were agreements negotiated between the CCM and CUF political parties in the wake of the tragedy in 2001 in which nearly 30 people were killed in Pemba in a clash between the police and members of CUF protesting against election results. While the first agreement (facilitated by the Commonwealth) did not last long, the second one negotiated by the two political parties is still in place and its existence facilitated the relative success of the elections last year. Additionally in the wake of the last election, the government has created a new position of Minister of Union Affairs in the President’s office which should facilitate the resolution of union conflicts. What is still not initiated is a constitutional process to amend the union constitution particularly with regard to the structure of government and the distribution of power between the Union and Zanzibar. Political Culture, Democracy and Governance: The introduction of Multi-partism in 1992 was the first move in addressing the evolving crisis of political legitimacy. In the wake of that, an office of the Registrar of political parties was established, followed by the establishment of an electoral commission. The two offices still suffer from being 173

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closely controlled by the ruling party and government. They both need clearly demonstrable autonomy. The latest government also established a ministry for political party affairs but what is required is an independent body bringing together the leadership of political parties to create consensus and resolve conflicts between the parties. Tanzania, like the other countries in East Africa, needs a new constitution but pressures towards this are still being strongly resisted by the incumbent government. Economy, Ideology and Society: Tanzania has embarked upon a neoliberal economic agenda which has spawned a number of conflicts. These conflicts have generated stress between the government and the general public particularly where policies have led to the neglect of agriculture and vital social services. No mechanism has been established to address these tensions which persist partly because neoliberalism has failed to become a hegemonic ideology in the same manner as ujamaa was. These tensions include the new class divisions as well as foreign domination of the economy. There is need to obtain some national consensus on basic goals and this calls for a process of consensus building. Some of the conflicts arising from resource struggles call for local autonomy in which the conflicting parties can come to some agreement on how to access resources. Authoritarian decisions by central or local government institutions have not worked well in the past and are unlikely to be effective in the future. Conclusion This paper started by describing the background to conflicts and peace in Tanzania. It noted that the belief that Tanzania is an “island of peace” in a sea of conflicts is both true and false. It is true, in the sense that the earlier ujamaa period established norms, values and institutions that favoured the peaceful resolution of conflicts but it is also false in the sense that these past values, norms and institutions have been rapidly disappearing in the face of neo-liberalism and multi-party-ism. The new policy thrusts are throwing up new challenges that the political system needs to address if the island of peace is not to join the other countries in violent conflicts. This can be accomplished in two ways. One way would be to restore the old norms and values but without the system that sustained them that would be difficult if not impossible. The other way would be 174

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to move rapidly towards establishing new stable norms which are consistent with the present system and policies, but this again is very difficult particularly given the levels of poverty and the class differences that are emerging. The best approach lies in between the two extremes. To this end the paper explored a number of old and emerging political, economic and social conflicts indicating their origins and dynamics with the view to demonstrating the extent to which their roots lie in the past and the present. On this basis the paper comes to the conclusion that Tanzania can capitalize on its past reputation and practices by demonstrating continued commitment to equity and justice in order to bring about the necessary changes in addressing its contemporary conflicts. But the present leadership can not depend on the past to resolve current conflicts ‘in the old way’.

References Africa Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS), (2005) Africa Conflict, Peace and Governance Monitor, Dokun Publishers, Ibadan. Baregu, M, (2005) The African Economic Community and the EAC: any lessons from the EU? In R. Ajulu, ed. The Making of a Region – The Revival of the East African Community. Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue. Baregu ML, Mukandala RS and Mushi SS, (2001), Tanzania’s Political Culture: A Baseline Survey, Dar es Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam. Gramsci, A, (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York, International Publishers. Hirschler, K, (2004) Tanzania in Transition – Violent Conflicts as a result of political and economic reform, Paper presented at the Symposium of Special Research Field (SRF520) on the Theme, Coping with Transition in Africa, University of Hamburg, Germany. Kaduma, I, (2004) Maadili ya Taifa na Hatma ya Tanzania: Enzi kwa Mwalimu Nyerere. Soni, Vuga press. Lederach, J.P, (1995) Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures. Syracuse University press. Mapolu,H, ed. (1979) Workers’ Management in Tanzania. (dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House. 175

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Mihyo, P, (1975) “The Struggle for Workers’ Control in Tanzania”, Review of African Political Economy 4 (1975). Mazrui, A, (2002) The Titan of Tanzania; Julius K. Nyerere’s Legacy. Inst. Of global Cultural Studies, Binghamton. Mbogora, A., (2003) The Tanzanian Poverty Puzzle: Arusha or Washington? PANOS, August 21, 2003. Nyalali Commission (1991) One or Many parties. Dar es salaam, Government printer. Nyerere, J.K, (1998) Leadership and the Management of Change. Address to the Association of commonwealth Universities, Ottawa, Canada, 17th. August, 1998. www.acu.ac.uk/conferences/nyerere Nyerere, J, (1967) Freedom and Unity, London: Oxford University Press. Lemunge, N, (1968), Report of the Tanzania Students Association in Britain and Ireland delegation to the first anniversary celebrations of the Arusha Declaration, February, 1968. [mimeo]. The members of the delegation were N. Lemunge, President, M. Baregu, Secretary General and N. Sang’udi, Member. Kikwete J, (2006), Speech by His Excellency Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, President of the United republic of Tanzania, at the First dinner with business community, Kilimanjaro Kempiski Hotel, Dar es Salaam, 14 February 2006. The Daily Times, Mar. 7, 2006. Tanzania Daima, Mar. 7, 2006. World resource Institute, Annual Report, 1995. www.indexmundi.com/tanzania/debt

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Chapter 7

The 1999 Riots in Mauritius: A Violent Explosion of Neo-liberal Politics Sheila Bunwaree Introduction Mauritius is rather atypical of the rest of the continent. Together with Botswana, they are the two rare countries in Africa, which have had a remarkable economic performance in the 1990s causing them to be classified as middle income countries and to be sometimes referred to as the African tigers. Mauritius also has an entrenched democratic system with regular and peaceful elections. The country is generally seen as a zone of conviviality, where the different ethnic groups live in peace and harmony with each other. Writing about Mauritius, a wellknown anthropologist notes: Mauritius can serve as a counter example to the depressingly numerous cases of violent ethnic conflict of recent years and can provide fresh and sometimes unexpected premises for ongoing debates on multiculturalism and minority rights worldwide. (Eriksen 1998).

This paper however argues that minority rights in Mauritius should not be seen and understood only from the point of view of civil and political rights as well as a politics of recognition and representation which accommodate diversity but should extend itself to socioeconomic rights as well. This becomes even more important in these globalising and neo liberal times since groups such as the Creoles i.e. people of African descent in Mauritius, are the ones who are more likely to remain at the bottom of the pile. The riots of February 1999 were in fact a reflection of the growing frustration and alienation of this group, and unless Mauritius adopts some kind of affirmative action and turns its growing market ideology into something more humane, peace and security will be increasingly threatened in the small Indian Ocean island state.

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The ethnic tensions of the immediate pre-independence and postindependence period coupled with the wide array of economic problems that the country faced in the late 60s just after independence provided a breeding ground for all sorts of conflicts. Interestingly however, Mauritius has in addition to diversifying its economy been able to also manage its diversity and ensure social cohesion for a long time. But when economic marginalisation and the gap between the haves and have-nots are concentrated in a group which is already very disadvantaged historically, there are new forms of identity politics that arise. These pose new challenges for governance in the country. The first part of the paper provides a brief history of Mauritius and analyses some of the factors behind the country’s remarkable economic achievements of the 1990s and the country’s successful social cohesion. The second part examines briefly the different schools of thought on neo liberalism and analyses the concept of identity politics. It discusses briefly the riots of February 1999 and shows how ethnicity and poverty are interrelated and how Creole groups are being increasingly deprived of certain fundamental socio economic rights, particularly the right to work. The third part of the paper examines the diverse economic troubles faced by the small island state. It argues that if the new challenges confronted by the country are not quickly addressed, it will become even more difficult to distribute the national cake equitably. It argues that poverty alleviation schemes are useful but that more effort should be directed at ensuring that the poverty alleviation initiatives focus on the real poor. Such initiatives should not limit themselves to simply ensuring that the poor are able to access some basic needs but rather empower them in such ways so that they can take full charge of their lives. The paper pleads for a more pro-poor holistic approach to development as well as a greater balance between the market and state intervention. History and the different layers of stratification in Mauritius Mauritius is an island state located in the Indian Ocean about 800 kilometres East of Madagascar. It has a population of almost 1.2 million people, all of whom, constituting a ‘de-territorialization’ of people from across the globe. Mauritius does not have an indigenous population. The Dutch, followed by the French, first settled the island after which it became a British possession. The Dutch did not stay long at all. Accord178

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ing to Toussaint (1977), the Dutch’s failure to stay could be attributed not only to a shortage of food on the island but also to their deficiencies as settlers and administrators. The Dutch deserted the island in 1710 and the French took control of Mauritius in 1715. The Dutch introduced sugarcane but the French are the ones who expanded the sugar industry. Slaves were brought in from Pondicherry and Chandernagore in India but much bigger contingents of slaves came from Africa (Baker, 1982). Madagascar and Mozambique were the two greatest sources of slaves for Mauritius. French colonial rule came to an end in 1810. Then it was the turn of the British to rule the island from 1810 to1968, the year in which the country gained its independence. The abolition of slavery in Mauritius in February 1835 and the end of the apprenticeship system soon after, caused the settlers to tap new sources of labour. Indentured labourers were brought from India. A leading scholar of the sugar colonies notes, “The link between sweated tropical colonial labour and non-White labour was preserved, largely undisturbed by the end of slavery”. (Mintz,1985: 71), India provided a good resource to meet the insatiable demands for cheap labour by the plantocracy. According to many critics including Best (1965), Beckford (1972) and Tinker (1974), the indentured labourers represented another form of slavery altogether. The people of Mauritius came from different parts of the globe - Africa, China, India and France. The people of African descent (commonly known as the Creoles) came as slaves whilst those of Indian origin, as indentured labourers. The small Chinese population sailed in as traders whilst those commonly known as the Franco Mauritians are people of French descent. Since Mauritius does not have an indigenous population, there is therefore no claim on land rights such as in Fiji for instance. This is perhaps an important factor, amongst many others, which contributes to successful pluralism in the country. The peopling of Mauritius explains the heterogeneity of the island in terms of ethnic groups, language and religious differences. The major ethnic communities are Hindus, Muslims, Creoles, Franco Mauritians (Whites) and Chinese. Today, Indo-Mauritians account for 68%, Creoles 27%, Sino-Mauritians 3%, and Franco-Mauritians 2% of the population, respectively. Mauritius is an ethnically diverse country due to the complex human migration at various times of its history. The Indo Mauritians are split between Muslims and Hindus. The Hindu majority

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constitutes some 50% of the population while the Muslims represent some 18%. Although many countries can speak of their independence as being fuelled by nationalist sentiment, Mauritius experienced a different history altogether. Anti colonial feelings were expressed by the Hindu majority but the other ethno/religious groups preferred to maintain ties with the mother country. Mauritius was divided as it negotiated its way towards independence. Some 44% of the population voted against independence. The inter-ethnic tensions and the economic morass prevailing during that period could have led to a social explosion but Mauritius managed to avert it. At independence in 1968, Mauritius was in an impasse. The country faced huge balance of payments deficit, soaring unemployment, an exploding population and huge levels of debt. Professor Meade, Nobel winning economist from Cambridge, was invited to advise the government on the best course of action, but like a few other people, he was quite pessimistic about the country’s future. The UNDP Country Assessment Report (2002:2) citing Meade notes that, “It is going to be a great achievement if Mauritius can find productive employment for its population without a serious reduction in the existing standard of living… the outlook for peaceful development is poor…” However, Mauritius managed to defy the apocalyptic predictions of Meade. Post colonial Mauritius - the visible hands of the State The history of postcolonial Mauritius is one based on the profound visibility of the hands of the state. The state has played a central role in the country’s social, cultural, economic and institutional development. Mauritius followed the advice of Meade in its diversification process but the country used its own state creativity, capacity and vision to manage the affairs of the country. In less than two decades, Mauritius became known as the miracle, the tiger of the Indian Ocean. The development of Mauritius was steered in such a manner that the Malthusian predicament was avoided and the island became a middle-income country with a per capita income of approximately US$5000. The Mauritian state managed to lift its people out of poverty and provoked a revolution of aspirations and expectations nation wide. Various factors explain the first phase of the Mauritian success story. These include an export-led industrialisation strategy, a national bour180

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geoisie, an able and competent bureaucracy, the absence of conflicting ideologies, a strong welfare state, human faced structural adjustment, successful demographic control, tapping of preferential arrangements, economics of ethnicity and cultures and a habit for institutional engineering. The Mauritian success story is however currently under stress. The Mauritius Competitiveness report (2004) states that the Mauritian economy is emitting important signs of distress and in its attempt to address some of the challenges that it currently confronts, Mauritius is implementing a policy of openness and further liberalisation as stated in the budget speech of 2006-2007. But this neo liberal agenda is beginning to take its toll on certain segments of Mauritian society, particularly the poor and the downtrodden. Neo-liberalism and poverty – the rise of identity politics Neo liberalism, the orthodoxy that calls for limited governmental intervention in the economy, privatisation, the demise of the welfare state, and monetary and fiscal discipline (the so-called Washington consensus), has been at the forefront of economic policies in many parts of the developing world in the guise of IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). After two decades of SAPs, there is a growing consensus that they have failed, leaving many developing countries further marginalized within the world economy. While the demand for an outward looking trade policy, namely the removal of barriers to trade, has done more to open the economies of Africa than has any regional economic organisation been able to do, such liberalisation has not resulted in increased intra regional trade among African countries, but has done so instead with the core states within the capitalist world economy. In recent years, neo liberal economists such as Berg and Kruger (2002), Bhagwati (1994); Dollar and Kraay (2001) have sought to establish the claim that economic liberalization unfailingly promotes growth and reduces poverty in the developing countries. The argument is that liberalization of markets improves on efficiency and productivity, which in turn promotes growth and human welfare. The best way to achieve economic growth, they argue, is to abandon protectionist policies and find ways and means to integrate into the global capitalist economy. They also argue that liberalization of capital accounts, trade 181

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and investment regimes and privatisation of national economies in the long run will attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) and create jobs for the poor. There are other schools of thought, which hold a contrary view to the above. Doyle (2000), Chen and Ravallion (2001) claim that neo liberal economics do not necessarily bring about a reduction of poverty. Doyle for example shows how there has been a rise in the incidence of poverty in the developing world. He mentions that the total number of people living below the ‘absolute poverty line’ in 1992 was 1.4 billion whilst in 1997 it was 1 billion. Chen and Ravallion also do not find any significant decrease in the number of poor people in the 1980s and 1990s. Poverty, entitlements, social exclusion, and ethnicity There are many conceptions of poverty but poverty has also been conceived as a process, as course of change characterized by a series of different conditions over time that people pass through. Sen’s view of poverty as a matter of entitlements emphasises the social relations by which individuals and groups of people gain command (or entitlements) over resources. Entitlements are about who ought to get what under what circumstances. Entitlements can be established through endowments (e.g property and wages) or and other assets and personal capacities, or through social institutions. Entitlements therefore depend on a person’s position in society, their occupation/class, what they can produce, the spatial arrangements in which they are found, ownership of land etc., and on rules that make their claims over resources legitimate. Such rules may be moral or legal. Sen’s concept of poverty is related to the concept of social exclusion. It stems from the idea of a failure to fully take part in society’s affairs, resulting from a lack of capabilities and entitlements and not simply material possessions. Social exclusion can be defined as, ‘the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society in which they live.” (Dehann and Maxwell, 1998) The Greek word ‘ethnos’ meaning people, provides the root meaning of the term ethnicity. Ethnic groups may be defined socially on the basis of their cultural characteristics (Yetman, 1993). Ethnicity refers to a sense of relating and identifying with and membership in a particular ethnic group. It implies the existence of a 182

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distinct culture or subculture in which people feel they are bound together by a common history, values, attitudes and behaviours. Other members of the society also regard them as distinctive. One of the crucial variables in ethnicity is power - the ability for one or more ethnic groups to realize their goals and interests (sometimes despite resistance). Superior power is important in the establishment of a system of ethnic stratification (Yetman, 1993). Marger (1998) notes that, ”in multi ethnic societies, peoples’ ethnic classification becomes an important factor in the distribution of rewards and hence, in their economic and class positions. Put simply, people receive little of different amounts of what is valued - jobs, education, wealth and so on.- in part as a result of their ethnicity. As Lenski and Lenski (1982) once claimed, ethnic groups and class are interwoven. This does not mean that members of dominated ethnic groups cannot achieve certain societal rewards (i.e. power, wealth, or status). They can - but for them there is a greater chance that they will be at the bottom of the pile. Marger notes that: As we proceed down the ethnic hierarchy, we find increasing political powerlessness, lack of economic opportunity and social discrimination and exclusion. In sum the effect of ethnicity is that minority ethnic group members encounter barriers to the attainment of the various rewards of their society that dominant ethnic group members do not face. (Marger, 1998)

Poverty in the midst of plenty There is no poverty datum line in Mauritius but a number of indicators highlight the growing poverty. There is a reversal in infant mortality rates, the ranking of the country’s human development index is declining, some segments of Mauritian society are often without electricity because they cannot pay their bills whilst some others do not have access to clean and safe water, children are made to leave school because there is no money to buy books and to pay for transport. The Mauritian welfare state, which had in many ways contributed to consolidating Mauritian pluralism is also under threat. Despite the important level of progress achieved, pockets of poverty still exist in Mauritius. The approach to addressing poverty has been rather top down for quite some time but in recent years, various initiatives emphasizing a participatory approach have been adopted. But, whether this approach 183

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is really inclusive of the poor is the question that surfaces. Before answering this question, it is important to turn to the riots of February 1999. The latter has led to a few different interpretations but the most common reading is that it was an indicator of a deepening inequality and rapidly growing frustration amongst some segments of Mauritian society. Identity politics and the riots of 1999 A lot of what goes under the rubric of ‘identity politics’ is actually about popular struggles for a more equitable distribution of goods and services and for a more just society. The emergence of a Creole consciousness in recent years and their efforts to rekindle links with Africa as their homeland, highlights both the awakening and forging of an identity. Many of the deprived and excluded who form part of the Creole community wish to see a better redistribution of the national cake, and identity politics takes a new significance in these globalising times of growing uncertainties and acute poverty in the midst of programmed success. The death of Kaya (a leading Creole ‘Seggae’ singer) in police custody, triggered a series of protest marches, amidst allegations that he had been beaten to death whilst in police custody. Kaya was arrested during a public meeting organized by the Mouvement Republicain, a small political party that was asking for the de-penalization of gandia. Some people argue that Kaya’s death was simply a detonator and that the ‘malaise créole’- (a term that is generally used to describe the deplorable conditions in which some segments of the Creole population live in), is at the root of these riots. The demonstrations of February 1999 escalated out of control and the country was brought to a standstill for almost a week. Protesters vandalized public and private property in various parts of the island. Various symbols of capitalism and wealth were targeted as well as symbols representing the state such as police stations, traffic lights and government owned buses and other vehicles such as ambulances. Although the unrest of February 1999 degenerated into some form of general attacks between the Creole community on the one side and the Muslims and the Hindus on the other, some people tend to play down the general aspect of the matter and look at it more as a class phenomenon. There is no doubt that the working class is constituted of all ethnic 184

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groups but when Creoles form a large majority of this working class, there is cause for concern. Writing about the malaise Creole, one observer argued that, “If the suffering involved in the malaise Creole is not addressed, there might come a day when it will explode into violence.” (Piat, 1993:2) The protests of February 1999 exemplify the violence that is being referred to. It is true that order and peace was re-established in less than a week but this in no way implies that peace is permanent and that the Mauritian model of social cohesion is back on the rails. There is no doubt that the entrepreneurial class of Mauritius is mostly to be found amongst the white Franco-Mauritian community, but economic diversification has also enabled members of other ethnic groups to set up a variety of businesses and to become small entrepreneurs and in some cases even grow into bigger ones. The one ethnic group, which remains highly ‘invisible’ in the business world, is the Creole community. The history of disadvantage that marks this group makes it difficult for them to come to par with other groups. Mauritius speaks of ‘equal opportunity acts’ and reparations but these remain at the level of rhetoric. Ethnicity, politics and representation Mauritius has until December 2003 always had a Hindu Prime Minister, from the ‘Vaish’ caste. In December 2000, the country went to elections under an accord that was made between the Mouvemment Militant Mauricien (MMM) and the Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien (MSM)- two main parties which formed an alliance to contest the elections. The agreement provided that Berenger, a White Franco Mauritian would be the Prime Minster as from 2003 until December 2005 – at which time Jugnauth would become the president and his son Pravind Jugnauth would become vice prime minister. The MMM/MSM coalition won the elections and for the first time in its post independence history, Mauritius had a white Franco-Mauritian Prime Minister. This very happening has, (especially through the media) been presented as an example of a mature democracy where every citizen has an equal right to aspire to govern this plural society. But within the private sphere, there is a lot of resentment on the question. The argument put forward by certain groups is that, for very long the country was able to separate economic and political power, but now that there is a white Franco-Mauritian at the helm of the country, the nexus between political and economic 185

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power is going to be much stronger. There is a strong perception that such a situation will cause those at the bottom layers to lose out even further. In an editorial of the newspaper La voix Creole of January 2004, it is made clear that some segments of the population are beginning to question the economic policies that are being implemented as well as expressing concern about the growing gap between the haves and the have not. There is increasing reference being made to the concentration of capital in the hands of a few and the need to democratise the economy (Le Mauricien, 29 March, 2004). The democratisation of the economy is a slogan that has been extensively used by the current government during the electoral campaign implying that policies and measures will be adopted with the view of redistributing income and wealth in a more equitable manner but to date the democratisation of the economy remains a rather vague concept. The one policy measure that has been adopted with the view of supposedly giving a better chance to the different socio economic groups to become entrepreneurs is the setting up of an Empowerment Fund. It is rather premature to assess the extent to which the latter can contribute to the democratisation of the economy but there is a general perception that the empowerment fund will more than likely lead to greater forms of patronage and clientelism and that the real poor will not necessarily find a niche for themselves within such a scheme. Globalisation and fragile peace When economic conditions worsen and redistribution becomes more difficult in the context of a ‘globalisation’ which respects no frontiers, social peace is threatened (Gray, 1998). The riots of February 1999 referred to above are a stark reminder of the extent to which peace remains fragile in pluri-ethnic Mauritius. The developmental state of Mauritius has in many ways contributed to the maintenance of peace for quite some years but is globalisation and the neo-liberal route adopted by the state not threatening the country’s development and successful pluralism? Now the economy is undergoing major forms of restructuring and the tripartite negotiations which were often hailed as an interesting example of Mauritius’s efforts towards social dialogue have been replaced by a national wages council which according to

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many trade unions, will make ’hiring and firing’ easier with little respect for the rights of the worker. The budget speech of 2006 - 2007 is a reflection of the greater openness of the economy and the state’s inclination towards a more accentuated neo-liberal agenda. The latter seems to be privileging growth rather than social development but growth without the creation of jobs and attention to the needs of those at the bottom rungs of the ladder will not be sustainable in the long run. Pro-poor development should focus on the creation of jobs but instead what is being witnessed currently is a growth model that leaves thousands of people jobless, futureless and voiceless. Challenges and poverty alleviation programmes The Mauritian economy has in recent years started facing some serious challenges. Most of the macro-economic indicators are in the red. The budget deficit is growing, FDI is falling, unemployment is rising very fast, the national debt is increasing. The Mauritius Times of 26th March 2004 wrote, Despite a lot of doctoring, the budget deficit is still around the high rate of 6% of GDP, unemployment has been increasing no matter which method of calculation is adopted, rising prices are hitting hard on consumers, there is no foreign direct investment; the banking sector has been rocked by one of its biggest financial scandals in history…

Mauritius, unlike many other developing countries has used its smallness as a very important tool of economic diplomacy. For many years, it has been able to obtain negotiated/preferential prices for its exports as well as protected markets. But Mauritius faces new challenges, the most important of which are perhaps the loss of protected markets and the end of the sugar protocol. The dismantling of the multi-fibre agreement (MFA) in 2005 was a severe blow to Mauritius. The MFA which has enabled Mauritian firms to receive higher prices for its clothing exports to the European Union and the US ran out in 2005. The protected markets enjoyed so far will disappear. Mauritian textiles and clothing would soon be subject to the same rules of the ruthless market. And now with an economic giant such as China (a

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cheap textiles producer) entering the WTO, Mauritius is bound to become even more vulnerable. The poor vertical and backward linkages in the Mauritian economy, the over dependence on one or two products and the failure of diversifying the export processing zone (EPZ) products are also problematic. Markets had been diversified but products not sufficiently so. The loss of FDI to other countries in the region especially postapartheid South Africa, which has become a major player, is also something that the country is having to grapple with. The erosion of the country’s only comparative advantage, cheap labour, is also provoking the import of cheap foreign labour from places such as China and Bangladesh to mention but two. The conditions in which these foreign workers live and work are quite dehumanising. (Clean Clothes campaign report, 2002). On a couple of occasions, conflicts have erupted between the employers and workers. The country runs the risk of further tensions since a sense of xenophobia is beginning to emerge. Another major challenge to the economy is the rapidly changing demographics. The population is ageing very fast and the worker pensioner ratio is deteriorating, thus putting more pressure on the country’s resources. Whether the country will be able to sustain its welfare state under such strenuous economic conditions is a question that arises. The greatest challenge that the country currently faces is perhaps the growing unemployment problem and the accompanying feminisation of poverty. The country has placed a lot of hope in what it calls its fifth pillar, the IT sector, but the reality is that the human resources required to man this sector is simply not available. There is a lack of qualified human capital in the country and therefore the jobs that are being created are either for the highly skilled or foreign workers. A growing unemployment problem in the context of globalisation and a welfare state, which does not cater for the unemployed, can only exacerbate the poverty problem in the country. It is very difficult to envisage a scenario where the government of the day will be able to come up with a policy of giving the dole to the unemployed since the welfare state already constitutes a large portion of the national budget and is under great pressure as pointed out before.

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Poverty alleviation programmes Efforts to combat poverty are not new in the country. The state’s response to the riots of February 1999 was the voting of a budget of five hundred million rupees in the year 2000 under the programme ‘Integration of Vulnerable Groups’. Other programmes such as ‘Anou dibout ansam’, funded by the European Union also tried to target the poor. The programme, ‘Integration of the vulnerable groups’, had the objectives of financing community development projects, micro credit projects, as well as financing of students who come from deprived families. On the other hand “A nou dibout ansam” has channelled resources mostly towards infrastructure work and technical assistance for the development of micro projects. It is interesting that a paper entitled ‘Le programme du gouvernment Mauricien pour la lutte contre la pauvreté’ prepared by the National Economic and Social Council (2002) and presented at the International Conference in Algeria, refers to the need to evaluate the impact of the poverty evaluation programmes. In spite of the increasing number of programmes and projects designed for the poor under the two schemes mentioned above, it is often argued that the real poor and the ‘new poor’ those who are suddenly losing their jobs, are not benefiting from the programmes. A number of recommendations were made at a workshop on the theme of poverty organized by ‘Anou dibout Ansam’, in 2002. Some of these recommendations include the setting up of a mechanism to coordinate and harmonise the operations of poverty alleviation programmes as well as among institutions in order to prevent duplication, the adoption of a ‘decentralised’ cooperation, improving the tools and techniques for Needs Assessment to enable well-planned and appropriate interventions to make optimum use of available opportunities. Also important is the carrying out of a Needs Assessment of the poor with the poor not for the poor, and the consolidation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. (National Committee on Poverty Workshop Report, 2002). Most of these recommendations are still not implemented, thus highlighting the difficulties of handling the growing poverty problem in the country. Whilst on the one hand there is a growing realization in certain quarters that poverty alleviation schemes are not working, on the other there is the pursuit of macro economic policy, which is not generating employment and therefore exacerbating the poverty problem in the country. 189

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Conclusion Polanyi (1957:159) notes that, “nothing obscures our social vision as effectively as the economistic prejudice” and there is a need to avoid blind faith in excessive neo-liberalism since this would, in the words of Polanyi, result in the ‘demolition of society’ with humanity being ‘robbed of the protective covering of social institutions’ thus defeating the very essence of democratic developmental states. The complimentarity between the state and market is the key route to follow if social development is to be consolidated and peace maintained. There is a need for a more holistic approach. Different stakeholders such as the private sector, government and civil society should work closely together so as to prevent the economy from becoming more fragile and vulnerable as well as allow for a fairer distribution of growth and at the same time ensure sustainable peace and cohesion. Addressing poverty in a piecemeal and superficial manner would not help to ensure sustainability. Sustainable social cohesion can only be possible if Mauritius pays more attention to substantive issues such as material redistribution. It will be very difficult for Mauritius to continue showcasing itself as a happy blend of so many diverse cultures and ethnic backgrounds, and to take pride in its pluralism if large sections of its citizenry continue to be discriminated against. References Bunwaree. S., (1994), Mauritian Education in a Global Economy, Editions de l’Océan Indien, Rose-Hill, Mauritius. Chang Ha Joon (1999), “The economic theory of the developmental state”, in M Woo Cummings (ed), The developmental state, Cornell University press. De Hann A and Maxwell S, (1998), ‘Poverty and Social Exclusion in the North and South,’ IDS Bulletin, 1998. Dommen, E, (1996), “Meade’s Sugar Export Tax Saved Mauritius” in Week-End, March 10, Port-Louis, Mauritius. Eriksen, T, (1998), Common Denominators, ethnicity and compromises in Mauritius, Berg, New York. Fitzgerald E, (1991), Economic reform and citizen entitlements in Eastern Europe, UNRISD Discussion Paper no 27. 190

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Gray, J. 1998, False Dawn: The delusion of global capitalism. Granta Books, London. Gulhati, R., & R, Nallari., (1990), Successful Stabilisation and Recovery in Mauritius, EDI, Policy Cast Series, World Bank, Washington, DC. Katzenstein P, T, (1998), Small States in World Markets – Industrial Policy in Europe, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. La voix Créole, January 2004, Port Louis, Mauritius L’Express, 28th March 2004, Port Louis, Mauritius. Le Mauricien, 29 March, 2004, Port Louis, Mauritius. Leftwich, A., (1995) “Bringing Politics back in: towards a model of the developmental state”, in, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp 400-427. Lenski G and Lenski J, (1982), Human Societies, Mcgraw Hill. Marger, M (1997), Race and Ethnic Relations, London, Wandsworth. Mauritius, 20th March 2004. National Committee on Poverty Workshop report (2003), Port Louis, Mauritius. Polanyi, K (1957), The Great Transformation , Rinehart and Company, Inc, New York. Sen, A (1981), Poverty and famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation, Oxford : Clarendon Press. Sen, A. K. (1992), Inequality re-examined, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard university press Sen, A (1999), Development as Freedom, Anchor Books, New York. Tinker, H, (1974), A new system of slavery- The export of Indian labour overseas, 1830-1920, London, Oxford University press. The Economist, February 28th (1998) Miracle in Trouble, London. United Nations Human Development Report,(1994), United Nations, New York. Vision 2020, (1996), The National Long Term Perspective Study, Government Printing Press, Mauritius. Wignaraja, T and Lall, S (1998), Dynamising export competitiveness in Mauritius, London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Woo Cummings, M (1999), The developmental state, Cornell University press, Ithaca, London. 191

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Yetman N (1993), “Race and Ethnicity”, in, N Calhoun and G Ritzer (eds), Sociology, New York: Mcgraw Hill.

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Witchcraft and Magic in the Darfur Conflict Cage Banseka Introduction Wearing visible amulets and charms is as important as carrying fire-arms for the rebels fighting in the war-torn Darfur region of western Sudan. These are not only meant for defence, but equally for offence. It has become commonplace for civilians and non-combatants to plant charms around their houses or farms, or to carry them around their neck or waist, with the belief that these can ward off or deter enemy infiltration and malevolent attacks. At first sight, they claim that these are religious artefacts, and that each box they wear has a verse of the Koran in it, which protects them from adversity. However, they tend to admit, upon further inquiry that there is something more to them than religion. The real contents are not Koranic verses, but skins of snakes and animals. The question posed by onlookers of this phenomenon remains whether this sort of superstition and witchcraft is a reality or just a myth, perceived or real, or merely a weapon of the defenceless and destitute caught in the crossfire of rebel gangsterism and government proxy fighting in Darfur. Seen from this perspective, the question of whether superstition and witchcraft can impact positively on their practitioners, remains something that people have found hard to answer with an empirical yes or no. The sources of superstition and their ramifications are also subjective. However, superstition and witchcraft have come to represent a remarkable presence, not only in war-infested societies, but equally in the traditions and modus vivendi of many African tribes and communities. In fact it penetrates many walks of life and is omnipresent in religious, social, political and economic life on the continent (Niels Kastfelt: 2005). The exact reasons for this stark presence can only be anyone’s guess. There is no indication that the patterns of African life are more receptive of superstitious beliefs. The load of scientific knowledge on the subject matter suggests that superstition and witchcraft existed already in biblical times and were central to some of the foundational questions that have plagued the force and reach of religion. Whatever their origins might have been, it is now evident that superstition and witchcraft 193

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have given a supernatural dimension to conflicts in Africa, and have made wars on the continent even more lethal. The recourse to this means of fighting or personal protection has increased the incidence of asymmetric warfare and prolonged battles between conventional armies and militant groups or inter-militia fighting (Kenneth Omeje: 2005). It is supposed that talismanic empowerment of factions can make them turgid and bullet-proof, and this explains why rebels in Darfur carry hips of them conspicuously in front of their cars or on camels, horses and donkeys. The recourse to such powers as a war engine could be seen as stemming from the interpretations people have come to make of charms and amulets. This is regarded by many as a practice of superstition and witchcraft in war. The book of Wisdom defined superstition as “a vice opposed to religion by way of excess; not because in the worship of the true God it does more than true religion, but because it offers divine worship to things other than God, or offers worship to God in an improper way” (Wisdom, xiii, 1-2). Generally, superstition has been considered as observances added on to prescribed or established worship. It could not be suggested that the use of defensive or offensive charms by Africans in warring communities is a sign of lack of less divinity, or that they seek to replace religious practice with other forces. On the contrary, some of the most pious believers in the world today are found in some African communities at war. Civilians, rebels and the notorious Janjaweed militia in Darfur, though wearing visible amulets and protective charms, stop for a moment to pray while in battle or in the planning thereof. However, the principal aspects of superstition, which include idolatry, divination, ocular arts, and pious vagaries (Wisdom, xiii, 1-2) are some of the assets that have come to underpin war mentality in some communities in the Darfur region of Western Sudan. Such practices, whether they originate from culpable deceit or in-culpable credulity, vitiate the warrior’s notion of power, justice and self-determination. Some of them could be seen as accepting and promoting error for truth, and as using these aspects to lubricate war machinery. This chapter examines how and why the witch mania, whether perceived or real, has come to haunt many African communities through prolonged wars and violence even in the 21st Century. The chapter seeks to put forth some critical aspects about the practice of superstition 194

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and witchcraft in fighting wars. It analyses the force and reach of the ocular practices, the systematic brainwashing of young people by warlords and what the warriors consider as their overarching objectives in the fighting industry. The chapter also examines the influence of superstition and witchcraft in other aspects of African life and their implication for progressive thinking and public behaviour. The sort of socioeconomic and political arrangements brought forth as a result of ocular beliefs will also receive careful scrutiny here. Witchcraft: The practice defined Some rebel groups, civilians and even some members of official armies might have decided to think that superstition and witchcraft are a legitimate practice.9 Apart from these many people on the continent tend to engage in tasks greater than their ability or means, and then end up seeking occultic powers to perform those tasks through the use of oracular deities, and secret societies (David Francis: 2005). This peculiar search for power is generally referred to as witchcraft, which is considered as an appeal to the intervention of the spirits of evil. Apart from the contemporary application of witchcraft in fighting wars, its practice also involves the invocation of perceived supernatural powers to compass the death of some perceived enemy, to awaken the passion of love in those who are the objects of such desires, to call upon the dead, to bring calamity or impotence upon those considered as enemies, rivals or oppressors. Furthermore the resort to witchcraft is related to the desire to get rich by unconventional means, to gain influence, command public admiration, win games and sports like football, the fun in being mysterious, having an indisputable position in an enterprise, public office and others, winning elections (Stephen Ellis:

9 The author of this chapter has observed this practice with the rebel movements in Darfur, in Western Sudan. The movements’ members carry along heavy bags of talismans and charms that even look heavier than the luggage containing personal belongings for daily use when traveling. They do not hesitate to answer questions about the reasons for this practice. In their mind it does not suffice to have a gun or to come to negotiations with mere papers backing one’s claims. They believe it is possible to charm the mediators and other stakeholders to be cooperative and more forthcoming with the demands of those who possess or are able to use charms.

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2004), passing examinations, succeeding in business, having a longer lease of life, protection from enemies, for a command of authority and legitimacy. Witchcraft is also said to be used out of envy, jealousy and malice. 10 Furthermore, a charlatan who decides to perform medical functions, a witch doctor who trades ‘protective’ charms, a self-named pardoner selling spurious indulgences for crimes committed in war, a fanatic devotee claiming to perform miracles, believers in supernatural apparitions, visions, revelations, which serve no good purpose are considered practitioners of superstition and witchcraft. Similarly, the worship of imaginary saints or relics, devotions based on false revelations, apparitions and supposed miracles and other heresies are considered as ignorance in true faith, but more so a sin especially when they become a means to exploit popular credulity for financial or material benefits and to fight bloody wars. The originators of such falsehoods are considered liars, deceivers and thieves who exploit people in desperation. Christians see such consummative causes as the influence of the devil, who offers himself as objects of worship to erring men that seek to give reason through idols and secret societies or doing certain things that to the human eye appear marvellous (David Francis: 2005). The Christian missionaries, who claim that they came to ‘free Africans from eternal damnation’ through pagan beliefs, espoused this kind of thinking. The missionaries thought these beliefs will be eliminated through the spread of Christianity. It does seem, however, that some of these so-called superstitious beliefs and the practice of witchcraft are already so engrained in warring African communities that they have survived the advent and progress of Christianity. It cannot be denied that some forms and variants of these ancient practices became eradicated by the legislation of the church and the advance of scientific knowledge. However, the tendency has never disappeared despite rationalistic philosophy and rigorous scientific methods that have come to characterise The people who have been interviewed by the author of this chapter have claimed that they can also use witchcraft to destroy those who are seen to be admiring their wives , daughters or sisters and those who are really admired by these relatives. In places like Darfur men are generally frightened by the prospect of their wives, daughters or sisters having a sentimental attachment to other men, especially if they are foreigners. They will not hesitate to use charms to protect them or harm the perceived or real admirers. 10

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modern life and thought. The abstract possibility of a pact with the devil and the diabolical interference of witches and wizards in the affairs of others can hardly be denied on religious or scientific grounds since the bible has made allusions to their practice (Stephen Ellis: 2004), and even educated people have tended to believe in it. Furthermore, people who consider themselves civilised think of witchcraft as shameful, primitive, and an incarnation of heretical beliefs. Others think of it as dangerous to morality and unworthy of reason, and consider that a lot of harm is being done to civilians and noncombatants by rebels as a result of the extravagance of their superstitious beliefs and heathen impostures. War-torn societies like Darfur or Somalia are said to be peculiarly infected with the witch epidemic, or reputed for diabolical machinations. Some traditional courts have tried to prosecute witches and wizards and those presumed to be involved in magical practices and other indecencies committed in war or peace time. These courts have sometimes proceeded against people accused of witchcraft with great severity. Wholesale witch prosecutions have led to isolation of victims, banishment from the community or tribe to places where they could be kept under jealous scrutiny and deprived of human contact. All these notwithstanding, superstition and witchcraft have remained a reality and a real security threat in war-prone communities (Cage Banseka: 2004). Superstition, witchcraft and conflict Accusations and counter-accusations of witchcraft are rife in many African societies and have indeed engineered latent and protracted conflicts and nihilist attitudes between individuals, families and communities as big as tribes (Joe Alie: 2005). The one is accused of the death of the other, for making others fail in their plans and aspirations, for sacrificing their next of kin or relatives to the devil, for becoming rich at the expense of others or for gaining public positions through elimination of opponents by bewitchment. This is made worse by the fact that people are hardly believed to have died of natural causes in some communities. In such communities, people do not fail exams because of their illpreparedness or other predispositions, but fail because they are bewitched. Simple things like sleeplessness and hallucinations brought about by individual anxiety or fear become ascribed to the practice of witchcraft by perceived enemies. This coincidentally severs relation197

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ships between people, eventually pitting them at daggers-drawn with each other. At the end of the day witchcraft causes a conflict of all against all, it fragments old relations, destroys long-standing traditions and by and large damage physical and mental health (Joe Alie: 2005). The desire to acquire supernatural powers and to be in a position that is beyond the normal cannot be excused as a fun exercise. The possession of such powers is portentous of something sinister, and as the experience in Darfur has shown, their use is bound to pawn oneself or others who believe in it, either directly or indirectly. This chapter has made biblical allusions to the phenomenon of superstition and witchcraft and some of their anthropological underpinnings. With the rapid advance of science and technology, many countries especially in the West, have tended to shun the existence of supernatural powers and to explain occurrences that were formerly considered as mysterious. Witch-hunting and the accusations thereof have been largely abandoned. Supernatural powers have however, remained glued in the minds of some communities at war in Africa. African ontology continues to subsume an ubiquity of deities and supernatural intermediaries that supposedly connect the mortal man with the apparently more decisive powers of the supernatural realm (David Francis: 2005). Some of these powers are used for therapeutic healing, for the attempted explanation of the unknown and for the control of any present or impending adversities. These powers, though not mutually exclusive in every culture, are associated with both benevolent and malevolent spirits. Practitioners of witchcraft can ritually harness the former for their positive material benefits, but the latter is used to conjure evil occurrences that can plague or destroy perceived enemies or adversaries. Such invisible but offensive capabilities of witchcraft are the ones responsible for some of the protracted conflicts among communities around the continent. Witchcraft has divided communities between closed cults of initiated adherents to superstition. (Kenneth Omeje: 2005), and those who for lack of these powers and those who despise them, choose to believe in the natural order of things. The rebels in Darfur who make others believe that they command ill-gotten powers for malevolent purposes become dreaded and this gives them even more leverage to act with impunity. This is also the situation that those involved in cults exploit to their advantage. There is equally a claim in Darfur that the powerful leaders of some traditional societies can use 198

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ocular powers for the maintenance of social order, public authority and security. These leaders could use these powers for external warfare, for the imposition of their own notion of justice and for the enforcement of sanctions on their enemies.11 They are said to monopolise the malignant powers of the spirit world which they rhetorically claim to exploit for the desirable benefits of their entire communities, for the construction of social norms and moral justice. This equally explains why in some villages that have been completely burned down by the Janjaweed in Darfur there are some huts that remain untouched. They contain pots and bags that are filled with the best talismans for the protection of the village and to conjure rain in times of intense draught. Even the infamous Janjaweed is scared of burning such huts, given the fear that it will cast malevolent spells on them.12 However, such powers and the public acclamation of their ownership by tribal leaders easily become the envy of others. This necessitates their further acquisition, which of course will lead to a regressive endorsement of counterproductive competition in ‘spiritism’ among communities. (Kenneth Omeje: 2005). The conflictual consequences of this are not hard to find. Political power and superstition In other parts of post-colonial Africa the use of ocular powers by public figures has apparently not ceased to exist. In fact they have become an infamous saga, necessitated by the prospect of gaining political office or the dreaded option of leaving it once attained. The procedures of contemporary leaders are said to be basically similar to those of traditional and pre-colonial societies,13 but with the exception that the latter seem to employ witchcraft for purely personal gains and am-

This notion is also shared by many people in Darfur, and teachers of history from this region acknowledge that this has been the practice of many rulers. 12 This is a real feature of the villages around Kabkabiya in North Darfur. The author of this chapter has documentary evidence and photos of such huts and their contents, and also accompanying evidence of the practice of witchcraft with the senior humanitarian officer of the African Union Mission who has been working in this area over a considerable period of time. 13 In colonial wars the African freedom fighters are also said to have used witchcraft in their fight against the colonizers, and to have strongly believed in its efficacy. 11

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bitions. Many African public figures have been highly suspected of ocular powers and some of them have generally accepted or shown the willingness to use such powers to impact on current political relations and development in their countries. Some leaders are reputed for their use of evil powers to sustain themselves in power and to terrorise their opponents and compatriots. This gives them a frightful public stature (Heike Behrend: 1999). Such powers might only be illusory, but they serve the purpose of maintaining the people using them in their positions and sending a strong message to anyone intent on a pre-emptive coup or insubordination and threats. These leaders, after establishing such a position for themselves, become emboldened and defiant in their resistance to criticisms for public wrong-doing (Cage Banseka: 2004). Where such practice has become commonplace the leaders use their magical powers, perceived or real, to destroy public morality, public leadership, discipline and accountability, virtuous forthrightness and propriety in the handling of official functions. The leaders create an atmosphere of tension and fear, ransack their countries, and sow the seeds for conflicts. Such stories are told in the contemporary political history of countries like Cote D’Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania, Togo, the Republic of Benin and South Africa (Cage Banseka: 2004). In these countries ocular arts are presumed to have infiltrated the public realm through several channels, including the mesmerisation and persecution of people using witchcraft, divination and oath-taking. Political leaders are said to have used talismanic empowerment for personal protection, regime security and offensive defence, and for overcoming threats (Omeje, 2001, Kohnert, 2003, Kelsall, 2003). The practice of witchcraft has strongly permeated the public realms in Africa, with the examples given above hardly exceptions, but norms. With the determination of some African leaders to stay in power for God-alone-knows what number of years, the atrocities and crimes they inflict on others during this time and their natural fear of repercussions has caused many to look for protection from deities and a plurality of related spirits believed to offer them larger-than-life images. As is claimed by the Darfur rebels and their leaders, that they are constantly vitalised and made untouchable through the invocation of supernatural powers which menace their opponents with witchcraft and visit them with sudden and mysterious maledictions. The political opponents of such leaders and their enemies do not seek to replace them only 200

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through the conventional ballot box, but also through the use of their own totems and oracular deities. Though difficult to prove scientifically, the public and manifest struggle for power through democratic means is complemented by a fight in the spirit world. In the Darfur region, for example, a substantial part of the rebellion and its politics has become tainted with ocular arts, and success in the battlefield, in office or in the fight for it have also become an issue for the forces of darkness as all the movements and parties invoke benevolence through their own ‘high priests’ who regulate access to the deities and can tell them exactly when to attack or when to expect attacks from the government or other militias forces. Members of rebel movements who have joined the government through a peace process continue to openly wear charms even during meetings with other government officials and with international and regional organisations. This open practice, though negligible to some, leads to allegations of attempts on the life of the leaders and other opponents, a situation that provokes reprisals, arrests and incarcerations. The followers of people so accused and unfairly treated become determined to fight what they see as selective punishment that is meant to distort the political ambitions of their own people. An interpersonal struggle, based on supposed ocular underpinnings, becomes a source of further conflict between groups as large as the Zaghawas, Fur or Massalit tribes. This further obliterates social order and structural balances as some of these communities become sidelined and mesmerised as punishment for their public support of the incumbent’s enemies or those of another rebel leader. Furthermore, the implicit perversions and contradictions of the practice of witchcraft become extended to the social, cultural and legal frameworks of society. Witchcraft-related antagonism and violence has been on the rise in Darfur, with death tolls rising in congruence. The immeasurable harm that such violence inflicts on those involved in the accusations and counter-accusations continue to destabilise social structures and public harmony, in addition to the havoc already caused by the nauseating and scorched-earth activities of the Janjaweed militia. The question of efficacy of the witch-mania or of verifiable evidence in the accusations thereof can hardly be consistently explained to the scientific mind. What is known for now is that witchcraft continues to instigate conflicts and cause havoc on communities and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), while remaining obscure and mysterious. In pastoralist communities in Darfur, where cattle rustling and theft of ani201

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mals is one of the underlying causes of the conflict, amulets and charms are also worn on cows, goats or sheep, either as protection of the herds from theft or a sign of sacrifice to the gods who can provide them a safe haven.14 The ‘witch mania’ becomes even more stunning in the auspices of the aforementioned claims that government legislators and rebel leaders are regular visitors to the oracular deities to obtain instrumental power that they use for personal enrichment and the victimisation of opponents. The powerful politicians so inoculated believe they can use their infamous occultic saga to stifle investigations into their public wrong-doing and any potential legal proceedings against them. The level of atrocities they inflict on others and the conflicts they cause might legally continue to haunt them even after they leave office. So that, their search for occults is inextricably linked to their personal safety while in office, and after they vacate office as well. The most dangerous connection between witchcraft and conflict is, however, not the antagonism between established state leaders and their opponents, but the power and influence espoused by substatutory elements in society like warlords, armed militants like those in Darfur, and drug barons. Their prominence in society has prompted the breakdown of states and a litany of adversities (Joe Alie: 2005). At the time political leaders engage in neo-patrimonial state plunder, elite aggrandisement and social exclusion, warlords mobilise the disaffected and growing bands of armed youth militias that can resist the predations of the politically strong and the rich who refuse to share the dividends from the exploitation of the state’s natural resources. The depredations on the part of the state have correspondingly disillusioned many factions as well as increasingly generating slow progress in the politics and economics of modernisation. The few developmental dividends that accrue are not used to improve the lives of the neediest populace, but those of cronies in the prebendal and clientelist state system. This provokes a deplorable weakening and erosion of state authority and internal order. A security vacuum is provided in some parts of the country, and we can be sure that there is always someone

The pastoralists believe that such juju-protected animals cannot be stolen or that if someone steals them they will cast a bad omen on the thief’s own animals or even family.

14

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ready to fill it, and more ready to take over the role of the state (Cage Banseka: 2005). Such a situation leads to the upsurge of local insurgencies, which in practical ways tend to substitute the absence of state influence, but also challenge or make difficult a re-instalment thereof at a later date. In some cases they incapacitate the performance of the state through the provision of grassroots responses to security threats, but are also prone to ineptitude, corruption and the inability to correct the criminal justice and law enforcement institution of the state they are perceived to be fighting against. Initially no one seems to blame this group for such activities. On the contrary they are largely seen as struggling to negotiate their identities and survival in a system that they generally consider as hostile to them. This explains why in many cases their reign remains unchallenged and unquestioned despite their evolving dispensation of criminal anarchy and mob action (Cage Banseka: 2005). The activities of this group are most often wrapped in obscurity and myth as a major defining characteristic. They are largely distinguished from ordinary people and credited with peculiar types of ocular powers that supposedly make them impervious to bullets. They undergo rigorous ocular initiation and talismanic empowerment, which they claim, make them overpowering even in the face of gun fire (Omeje Kenneth: 2001). This claim further increases the efficacy of the warlords in recruiting children and young men through the use of ocular deities, secret societies, and with a promise of invincibility or inoculation to bullets and the fire of light weapons (David Francis: 2005). The warlords claim that they derive their powers from the spirit world, and that they can dish out so-called ‘war medicines’ and charms to new recruits or punish and enfeeble them if they refused to join the camps. This brand of occultic powers that is associated with warlords and their recruits, though questionable, has prompted fetishism, arbitrary action and unlawful killings as a pervasive feature of warlordism. In Darfur, for example, they are particularly defiant, hostile and brutal against their enemies. Once initiated and made invincible by the ‘high priests of occults’ the fighters can wade off fear, embrace a die-hard faith in their cause and generally develop an addiction to bloodshed, mayhem and the promised blessings of valour and dignity. The presumed ability of the proxy Arab militia, the Janjaweed militia and other rebel groups in Darfur, to skilfully use occultic powers has earned them a great deal of awe 203

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and deference from the public in some places. The mysticism of similar groups in other civil wars makes the rebels ready to engage in asymmetric warfare in the campaign to conquer, enfeeble and defeat the armed forces of the government or other factions. They perform daily rituals in secret places, together with their highly dreaded and enigmatic leader (Kenneth Omeje: 2005), who is normally said to be the strongest of the strong. Members of the Arab Militia and Janjaweed in Darfur wear visible amulets across their neck or around their waist. They have no illusions about the great popularity and esteem that their presumed magical powers and invincibility inspire in the eyes of their admirers. The popular sentiments they raise through these open shows gain them, not only admirers, but also new recruits on whom more protracted and intense militancy thrives (Joe Alie: 2005). Their displays are also a means of scarring government soldiers or other factions that intend to engage them in face-to-face combat. The fact that government officials and soldiers are frightened by the prospect of fighting this intractable, “invincible” group sometimes leaves the action and the willingness of the latter to fight unabated, and this explains why the conflict in Darfur has become so intractable and difficult to stop. Conflicts and battles fought with magical undertakings have produced some of the most horrendous forms of barbarity and violations against humanity on the continent. The victimisation of opponents, the harassment of defenceless peoples and their communities, the ransacking of private homes and public structures like schools and hospitals often compound the jungle nature of things in conflict zones (Human Rights Watch: Darfur in Flames, 2004). The jujuadorned rebel groups use diverse charms in the process, but persecute any other person suspected of giving the same charms to their opponents (Kenneth Omeje: 2005). They also go behind so-called satanic high priests who use their own fetishism to make juju for ‘devilish people’ on the search for unscrupulous riches. The militiamen are often exonerated from such action with the argument that, unlike those seeking underserved and ill-gotten riches, they only make recourse to the powers of evil as a means of fighting forces that are inimical to their society and that constrain their personal and collective development. This uncritical recognition and acceptance of the powers of occults has canvassed a broad range of positive perceptions to the warlords and their followers in rebel controlled areas. The customary invincibility of Darfur rebels magnifies and fortifies their determination, and pro204

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longs their armed struggles against the established state governments. Fighting between such factions is set to go on and will continue to exhibit some of the most horrendous catalogues of human rights violations (Human Rights Watch: 2004). The common perception in each camp that the others belong to some secret society and therefore equally intent on committing evil acts makes Darfur’s inter-militia fighting very apocalyptic. The presumably invincible powers that warlords and their followers possess make them defiant and determined to face even government forces in a sustained military struggle for control of resources. They have held their ground in several places, and despite the ugly nature of their war tactics they remain a force to reckon with. Many people ascribe such temerity to the influence of drugs militiamen often take, but many others see in this a manifestation of their connection with the spirit world. Although this may temporarily add credence to the invincibility of such militias, governments in some states in Africa have launched severe reprisals on militia strongholds (Omeje Kenneth: 2005) and laid siege on rebel-friendly towns and cities. The ferocity of government law enforcement officers, their rampant destruction of infrastructure and the loss of civilian lives often raises questions about the rationale of their policies. Such moves are no different from the activities of militias and may end up radicalising the people even further. Evidently, the government’s use of military violence in this way has hardly succeeded in eliminating resistance and armed struggles from the warlords. The wars in Uganda, Cote D’Ivoire, Somalia, The Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are just a few cases that exemplify this phenomenon (Cage Banseka: 2004). The belief that some of the government forces also resort to occultic powers that make them impervious to bullets in combat against militiamen makes the wars even more lethargic. It becomes a conflict of deity against deity and cult power against cult power. The government, like in The Sudan, however, does not officially admit the existence of non-military tactics among its forces. They ascribe their perceived victory against militias to superior firepower, better planning and conventional soldiery. It must not be forgotten, however, that such superior military wisdom as usually claimed by the Sudanese government, for example, has often times left more casualties on civilian populations than on the militiamen themselves. Many innocent people are 205

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often caught in the cross-fire between government forces and the militia. The destruction of infrastructure affects the civilians through the advent of further hazards and economic adversities. After all in many conflict affected regions some militiamen and women live in the jungles with caves and sheds of trees as their habitat, while government forces retreat to their camps after the battle. The civilians who are rendered homeless and whose social infrastructure, like hospitals and schools, are destroyed become vulnerable to the lures of warlords. There is, however, an emerging trend like in Darfur, where combatants live among civilians in so-called Internally Displaced People’s camps. They are fighters by night and civilians by day. They hide weapons in the camps, thereby inviting government or other rebel reprisals on the camps. Consequently a lot of militia and government action become substantially disruptive, prolonging the wars and wrecking entire populations with hopelessness and chagrin. The impact of superstition and witchcraft on personal progress and development Personal progress and self-development are some of those areas where the effects of superstition and witchcraft foment deep-seated conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. If a young man from a village who decides to move to town and try his fortune in petty business brings along some talismanic powers in order to lure customers to his business, we may wonder what wrong this person is doing. If someone uses charms in order to pass an examination and in the process harm no cocandidates and examiners, it might be considered as no fault, except they are accused of cheating. Furthermore, if someone in Darfur uses talismans to protect themselves or their families from perceived harm it might again be seen as no evil. These suggestions might, however, sound like an apology or a vindication for superstition and spiritism. They might also make the definitional stigmatisation of superstition and witchcraft as evil phenomena sound like a disingenuous falsification. Some uncritical optimists will further canvass the view that not all superstition and witchcraft are evil. However, the methods of achieving supernatural powers remain questionable. It is suggested that they involve the obtaining of atavistic relics, the performance of rituals and the grim choice of sacrifice that often entails destruction and loss of lives and property (Kenneth Omeje: 206

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2005). The occultic dimension of reasoning and the recourse to the spirit world are always portentous of something sinister, especially relations with the devil that is invoked to intervene in aspects which others strive to perform in a non-secretive manner. It is hard to imagine that occultic powers could be used for benevolent purposes. The very fact that they are normally said to be gotten from the devil, who represents malevolence, is very telling. Witchcraft, real or imagined, has wrecked some warring and even peaceful societies with all kinds of mishaps, and has retarded progressive thinking in unimaginable ways. Those who have chosen to think of it as ever present see it in every walk of life. Nobody dies of natural causes, no one fails in business as a result of lack of entrepreneurial acumen and ingenuity, a child cannot fall sick except when a spell has been cast on it by jealous neighbours. Infertility is not natural or scientifically explained, but just the desire of someone wishing to see another remain childless. On the other hand some people tend to carry with them the conviction that they cannot succeed in business unless they possess the necessary charms that go with it. It is widely believed in some traditional societies that every successful business person belongs to a secret cult and that every successful warlord and his followers have bullet-proof bodies. Such perceptions might inevitably lead to competitive occultism among businessmen and rebels. Riches do not signify ingenuity and industriousness, but a pact with the devil. The death of a rich person’s child or any member of their family is seen as a sacrifice to the secret society from which his/her riches obtain. Individual members of such a family will seek their own charms for selfprotection from the rich uncle/aunt, and people will resort to an everincreasing acquisition of protective charms. This again is attempting to use the powers of evil to fight the forces of the same evil. The same is true for those who believe that someone is interested in seeing them fail to achieve their goals in life. There is always a villain, witch or wizard behind every misfortune or failure. The exaggerated faith of some people in witchcraft and secret societies is strongly reflected in their folklore, theatre and films. A number of recent film productions in Africa depict some demonic causes and the forces of evil in society. This is a common theme in the Nigerian produced and widely disseminated films. Contemporary society is presented in many of these films as one that is rank and rotten with materialism and an overpowering presence 207

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of the devil in the affairs of man. The films and plays create an atmosphere that summons awe and fright. Romance, ambition, ingenuity, propriety, industriousness or altruism, which are common themes in the film production industry of other continents, hardly find space here. Some traditional Africans might even consider some of these themes as absurd and perverse, preferring instead to watch films that tie their moral, spiritual, social, political and economic progress, development and security to the influence of fetishism and supernatural powers. These occult-related films can produce a negative effect by thwarting and discouraging youth skill acquisition and professional training, destroying their ambition and faith in personal achievements through hard work and visionary thinking that can assure them of personal progress in life. This can, in effect, greatly constrain development. This position into which the youth has been put in some places not only amounts to a regressive endorsement, but has equally led to a rapid proliferation and an over-reliance on witch-doctors, fortune tellers, witch-hunters and so-called medicine men. This chapter does not wish to cast any doubts on the genius of African traditional and herbal healing, which could equally be scientifically explained if researched. The unfortunate side effect of this is the activities of charlatans who exploit public desperation and credulity for their pecuniary benefits. They posit themselves as experts in every medical condition, and even when they use herbs in curing diseases, they attach the causes of such diseases to the jealousy and envy of the patient’s enemies or neighbours. By so doing they ignite and amplify conflicts among people. Superstitious beliefs and the practice of witchcraft are not only ire to religious teachings, but also a near strangulation of positive thinking, enthusiasm, enterprise and progressive business acumen. Superstition and witchcraft unfairly takes away attention from natural causes, while forming some of the greatest road-blocks to progress in African societies where the practice is commonplace. They defame the character of some honest and incorruptible businessmen and women by unfairly ascribing their achievements to relationships with the spirit world. An over-dependence on witchcraft, despite the subjective and rudimentary evidence of its effectiveness, can cause disillusionment when the promised riches do not come, when rigorous occultic initiations do not lead to outright victory in war, does not lead the warrior to power and fame, cannot prevent disease or accidents and when a candidate fails to ob208

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tain their certificate or the job they were applying for. The motivation to struggle further and the determination to achieve one’s goal despite the hurdles, the optimism that things can develop positively and faith in natural causes disappear when the practice of witchcraft becomes the norm. Positive personal development and self-confidence can hardly be achieved and maintained under such circumstances. People’s minds remain haunted by negative thinking and their inner peace is robbed. Conclusion It might be worthwhile stating that there are alleged advantages to the practice of superstition and witchcraft. It is said to be a source of solace for desperate and powerless people. In some traditional societies in Africa it is used to tame crime, since the fear of bewitchment makes some people to refrain from theft and wrongdoing. Superstition and witchcraft accentuate self-confidence and a feeling of victory on their practitioners. These are, however, a disturbing litany of assumptions, which unfortunately tell us little or nothing about the origin of superstition and witchcraft as is currently practiced in many African traditional societies. There is a good reason for seeing the desire and the wish to unravel and understand the unknown as a normal human instinct. The limited powers human beings possess could be considered a deprivation that is bound to cause anxiety, ambition or fear of the unknown. Life in some African traditional societies, especially when it is at war, is a daily struggle that is tainted with adversity, pain and long suffering. People find it hard to escape premature mortality, preventable morbidity, involuntary starvation and the depredations of conflicts. They might tend to have a superstitious belief or practice witchcraft as a way of sustaining their hopes while they live. This can be seen as the positive side of the story. This short chapter cannot purport to have passed a confident judgement on the reality of witchcraft and superstition, or to have offered the most evaluative scrutiny of the subject matter as it relates to or influences conflicts. It is an issue that is difficult to understand in whole, especially from the standpoint of academic analysis. However, many people would argue that most of the claims to witchcraft and the powers it can confer on their practitioners rest upon nothing better than pure delusion, the claim that some people are born with supernatural powers notwithstanding. By this logic, those who claim to have been 209

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affected by witchcraft and other kinds of satanic horrors and plagues might just have been bewildered by psychological problems, hallucinations and things that they find difficult to explain. For all its intents and purposes, the practice of superstition and witchcraft remain an abnormality, but they have become a force that cannot be left out in a critical account of conflicts in Africa. We might be tempted to excuse any Africans who decide to think that it is justifiable to turn to any powers, natural or otherwise, as a means of assuring basic survival and the ability to enjoy their lives while they live. This would look like no-fault blackmail or a struggle against the adversities that compete for attention on the sub-continent. However, the fundamental difficulty is how to explain the vexing plethora of problems and conflicts that have been engineered by the practice of superstition and witchcraft. Africa is blessed with important and strategic minerals like cobalt, uranium, copper, gold, diamond, chrome ore, iron ore, bauxite, zinc, manganese ore, rock phosphate, rutile, chromium, platinum, nickel, oil, and so on. These are the very mineral resources that in other parts of the world have emerged as a major engine of development and the survival of the automobile factories, aircraft, satellite and telecommunications, weapons and nuclear industries. Surprisingly these minerals have fomented conflicts and made some Africans weeping human beings in the face of their own blessings from the mother earth. They shed blood over their resources, and sacrifice productive men and women in the course thereof. Some have become keen about using deities and occultic powers to embolden themselves in fighting over these minerals instead of using those deities, if they could help, to exploit them for industrial advancement as is the case in other parts of the world. The heavy and sophisticated technological advancement that has been experienced in other parts of the world is not the work of deities and magical high priests, they are not the mystery and miracles of ocular arts, and no human blood is deliberately sacrificed in other places for vain promises of better achievements or victory at war. Minerals in other parts of the world do not engender violence and insecurity. The pretence that there are relevant connections between economic advancement and spiritism, victory in war and oracular inoculation, is disastrous for development and progress. Important developmental aims, as well as their enabling conditions of good health, education and ingenuity, can be positively achieved 210

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without ocular arts and talismanic empowerment. People who believe in superstitious practices and witchcraft might equally be mistaken to think that it is not possible to achieve political office and maintain it except when they are empowered by the spirit world. The same obtains for getting promotion or making career advancement in both the public and private sectors. Such convictions breathe suspicion and counter-suspicion, which have the unavoidable consequence of seeking to eliminate potential or actual opponents and competitors. Such a definition or understanding of survival in a political or economic system implies not a cultivation of initiatives for good and inclusive governance, but a round of killings either through direct or mysterious means. This is sowing the seeds for societal fragmentation, social exclusion and latent conflict, which will further keep people in bondage (Cage Banseka: 2004). Portraying the phenomena of superstition and witchcraft and their practice in Africa as a way out of adversities might seem like making a mountain out of a moll hill. In this chapter there has been an attempt to judge the phenomena of superstition and witchcraft comprehensively in terms of their origins and effects, but it has been hard to find a solid defensive justification for them. It might equally be rash and naïve to preclude the existence of any positive effects of superstition and witchcraft in particular. However, any such advantages, perceived or real, might be short-lived, and will in general not supplant the overpoweringly negative effects of ocular practice. The African environment, though sometimes beset and enfeebled by natural disasters and plagues, offers much that could be exploited for positive human development and progress. The choice of faith in armed struggle and abstract expressionism in most cases is pure and simple fiction that not only defies all rational explanations and scientific logic, but makes the recourse to arms an ever greater alternative to peaceful means of resolving differences. The practice of witchcraft can make people to lose faith in their own capabilities, as they prefer instead to trust in externalities that lead to self-defeatism and pessimism. Witchcraft and superstition, seen from several perspectives, are problem-prone. They do not only inflate and enflame conflicts that will prolong duress in society, but equally have the potentiality of delivering the youth to an evolving dispensation of criminal anarchy. The effects of superstition and witchcraft can be abetted if education came to replace the abstruse faith in ocular empowerment. Human 211

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beings, especially young people, instead of being given amulets to carry to school like in Darfur, can be made to recognise their abilities, talents and also limitations through scientific logic in an accentuated scholastic life. The abysmal behaviour of young people in warring camps and the power and prestige arrogated to firearms and Kalashnikovs, like in Darfur, are an aberration that can be abrogated by the progress of scientific reasoning. This suggestion of education in other values as a solution to conflicts and child soldiery in Africa might sound like another invalid addendum to the litany of other options, but it remains an issue that has historically proven its ability to abnegate war. This is not the only solution that could be taken into account, but there are manifold reasons to think that education is an integrated process that can permit for a simultaneous appreciation of the evil effects of war. Schooling and professional training provide a powerful detractor from idleness which is exploited by warlords. Educated people often demonstrate reflected decision and restrain, and there is a strong rationale in thinking that they can also abjure the promises that talismanic empowerment can make humans bullet-proof and invincible in warfare. This will ward off the putative efficacy of warlords in recruiting children and young men to war camps and tame the adornment with which some conflicts are being fought on the African continent. References Alie, Joe, (2005), The Kamajor in Sierra-leone: Liberators or Nihilists? in David Francis, Civil Militias: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace, Ashgate, London. Banseka, Cage, (2005), The Anti-Gang Civil Militia in Cameroon, and the Threat to Human and National Security, in David Francis, Civil Militias: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace, Ashgate, London. Behrend Heike, Ute Luig, (1999), Spirit Possession: Modernity and Power in Africa, James Curry, Oxford. Ellis, Stephen, (1999), The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War, Hurst and Co., London. Ellis Stephen and Gerrie Ter Haar, (2004), Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political practice in Africa, Hurst and Co., London. Francis, David, (2005), Civil Militias: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace, Ashgate, London. 212

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Human Rights Watch, (2004), Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, Report of the Human Rights Watch, April 2004, Vol. 16, No. 6a. Kastfelt, Niels (ed), (2005), Religion and African Civil Wars, Hurst and Co., London. Kelsall, T., (2003), ‘Rituals of Verification: Indigenous and Imported Accountability in Northern Tanzania’, Africa, vol., 73, no., 2. Kohnert, D., (2003), ‘Witchcraft and Trans-national Social Space: Witchcraft, Violence, Reconciliation and Development in South Africa’s Transition Process’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol., 41, no. 2. Omeje, Kenneth, (2001), ‘Sexual Exploitation of Cult Women: The Challenges of Problematising Harmful Traditional Practices in Africa from a Doctrinalist Approach’, Social and Legal Studies 10/1, 2001. Omeje, Kenneth, (2005), The Egbesu and Bakassi Boys: African Spiritism and the mythical Re-traditionalisation of Security, in David Francis, Civil Militias: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace, Ashgate, London. Other Sources About the Covenant of the Goddess, www.cog.org/wicca/faq.htm Children of Artemis – Witchcraft and Wicca, www.witchcraft.org Medieval Sourcebook: Witchcraft Documents, www.fordham.edu/ halsall/source/witches1.html Religious Tolerance, www.religioustolernace.org/wic_pott.htm Superstition Bash, www.csicop.org/superstition Superstition and Beliefs: How our Beliefs Shape our World, www.globalphysics.com/lp/superstition/menu.htm The Catholic Encyclopaedia, www.newadvent.org/cathen/ 15674a.htm The New Covenant Holy Bible – New Edition The Phantom Menace of Superstition, www.csicop.org/articles/ 19990527-starwars The Unacceptable Cost of Religious Superstition, www.deism.com/harrison.htm

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PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE MERCENARY PROBLEM IN AFRICA

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Options for the Regulation of Private Military Companies and Services in Africa Norman Mlambo Introduction: PSCs and PMCs. It is important from the onset, to make a clear distinction between private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies (PMCs), even though many people use the two terms interchangeably. The former includes security guards, on-site security and other safety device specialists and surveillance companies, while the later includes military escorts for politicians, weapons and de-mining experts and mercenaries. The distinction is important because private security companies are already well regulated by national and international law. In South Africa, PSCs are regulated by the Private Security Industry Regulation Act No. 56 of 2001, and the accompanying Private Security Industry Regulations of 2002. There are also a number of security professional associations that self regulate, oversee and represent the interests of PSCs such as the Security Association of South Africa and the South African Security Federation. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces defines PMCs as, “businesses that offer specialised services related to war and conflict, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence collection, operational and logistical support, training, procurement and maintenance.”(DCAF, 2006) It is the private military companies and mercenaries where laws governing their existence and operations are absent, and, even where laws exist, such laws are either outdated or the legal positions nationally and internationally are ambiguous. It is these PMCs therefore that are the subject of current concerns and it is the activities of these that need to be regulated. The mercenary problem in Africa The discussion on PMCs is often clouded by the negative perceptions that surround the word “mercenary”. Mercenary activity is as old

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as organized warfare itself, and yet nearly 400 years ago, Machiavelli wrote of them that: "Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy."(Maartensz, 2006)

In Africa, while many governments and regional and international organizations have solicited the use of private military companies, there is no agreed policy on whether or not to use such services. The existing feeling is one of resentment towards private armies mainly because of the involvement of mercenaries in regime change in a number of African countries. During the period of decolonisation in the 1960s, mercenaries were often hired to fight against national liberation movements thereby denying the right to self determination of colonised people. Mercenaries were also used in the period after independence to destabilise newly independent governments. (UN, 2002) Also, mercenaries would often fight alongside armed opposition groups. This has created a negative image and a sense of suspicion whenever private military companies are mentioned. In post-colonial Africa, the image of mercenaries was especially tarnished by counter-revolutionary coup plotters such as Bob Denard and “Mad Mike” Hoare. In the African context therefore, in advocating for the regulation of PMCs, it is important to start by debating the justification for the existence and continued usefulness of these companies. The global market for PMCs In the past few years, states, international organisations, NGOs, humanitarian organisations, development agencies and multinational corporations are increasingly using PMCs in conflict situations. Some militarily weak states do this to compensate for lack of national military capacity. International organisations, including the United Nations, use PMCs to provide security while operating in dangerous environments. In Africa, the argument has been advanced that PMCs can be deployed quickly and therefore avert situations such as in Rwanda, the DRC and Darfur where the international community was not able to deploy 218

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peace missions in good time. However, some groups use PMCs negatively to overthrow governments or for the protection of illegal activity.(DCAF, 2006) Because of the negative image in which PMCs are regarded in Africa, the justification for their usefulness and continued existence has of necessity to be strengthened by borrowing positive experiences from outside Africa. In the United States of America, there is now a well established tradition of the positive utilization of PMCs in various combat situations. Some estimates say that one in every ten people deployed by the USA in the Gulf for Operation Iraqi Freedom were employees of private security companies. (Avant, 2006) The reasoning and justification for such a policy is well documented and it can be used to advocate for their positive utilization in Africa. In Europe, several European countries such as the United Kingdom have followed the American example and are now utilizing PMCs more often. So much so that, in Europe and the United States of America, the debate has moved from justifying the use of PMCs to options for regulating their use. Positive aspects of PMCs In cases where a state’s defences has been compromised, PMCs may be the state’s last line of defence. Some of the many uses of PMCs have been in providing security in the aftermath of a war or conflict. In general however, some of the benefits associated with private security are that: • • • • •

PMCs can provide “surge”, that is to say, they can quickly mobilize and disband without political implications; They can provide the required specialized forces with particular skills and the necessary experience; PMCs can recruit internationally; PMCs can deploy for long periods of time without any political fallout. (Avant, 2006) Although data on the cost – effectiveness of PMCs is inconclusive, it is generally believed that PMC may be cheaper than the deployment of national forces. (DCAF, 2006)

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Risks associated with PMCs There are also certain risks associated with the use of PMCs. The main criticism for utilising PMCs is that they are motivated by profit and therefore their commitment to the task is limited. Also, since the business contracts for PMCs are specific, they cannot be flexible and therefore are not able to deal with the unexpected. (DCAF, 2006) Some PMCs have been used by dictators, rebel armies, terrorist groups, and drug cartels. Others have committed human rights abuses in the areas that they have operated, and some have caused social unrest, mutinies and even military coups. (Singer, 2004, 523) The following have also been mentioned: • • •

•

• •

Sometimes private companies may not appreciate the political risks associated with certain military action; Military activity is often guided by specific rules of engagement which private companies may not strictly adhere to; Unless commissioned by a government, PMCs are classified neither as combatants nor as non-combatants. As such, individuals may not be accorded POW status if captured and may be executed as illegal combatants or charged for murder if they kill people; In cases of misconduct, it is not clear under which laws individuals working for PMCs may be made answerable to as they do not fall under the military laws of any particular country; PMCs may lure away specialist forces from national military institutions; PMCs may be used by whoever hires them against the public good and outside legislative processes (Avant, 2006).

The centrality of Africa in PMC discourse While it is true that in the 1960s and 1970s, the problem of mercenaries was most acute in Africa, the situation has not always been so and it is certainly not so today. PMCs, especially traditional mercenaries have been in use all over the world ever since the start of organised warfare. And, it was not about Africa that Machiavelli expressed his distaste of mercenaries nearly 400 years ago. In more recent times, in the past 10 years, the United States of America has utilized the largest number of PMCs in combat situations. Also, in the period before 1990, the overwhelming majority of PMCs involved in foreign military opera220

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tions around the world originated in the United Kingdom, and were deployed in operations in the Middle East, the Far East, Latin America and Africa. (O’Brien, 2000) However, some “authorities” on the subject of PMCs continue to write with a tone that suggests, as Damian Lilly puts it, that “the principal reason for this emerging trend towards the privatisation of security is the inability of many fragile war-tone states to provide security within their borders and for their societies. It is not coincidental that private security groups are most active in weak states.” (Lilly, 2000, 6) This is far from the truth. One US expert, P W Singer has noted that between 1994 and 2002, the USA Defence Department entered into over 3 000 contracts with PMCs for combat services, and that he agrees with The Economist in terming the Gulf War “the first privatised war”. (Singer, 2004, 522-523) The point is that, the increasing use of PMCs is not peculiar to Africa, it is an international phenomenon. Therefore, any options for the regulation of PMCs should not target only Africa or “weak states”, but should be applicable internationally. So that, an important element in the study of PMCs in Africa would be an examination of the scale, nature and prospects for the use of PMCs on the African continent, and whether these trends conform to or contradict the global trend. Options for regulation The majority of countries globally do not have specific laws that regulate the activities of PMCs. However, some countries have laws that although most of them do not specifically address the issue of PMCs, some do mention options for dealing with PMCs. In South Africa for example, the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (Act. No. 15 of 1998), regulates foreign military assistance by South African companies and bans mercenary activity by South African nationals. The United States of America has several laws and regulations that deal with PMCs. One set of regulations is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which empowers the US State Department to regulate all forms of foreign military activity by American companies and individuals. In Europe, the United Kingdom has started the process of drafting legislation for the regulation of PMCs. (Sammi Makki, 2001) In 2004, New Zealand passed the Mercenary Activities (Prohibi-

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tion) Act, which among other things, criminalizes the use, finance, and training of mercenaries. (Gulam, 2005, 19) A major question is, whose responsibility is it to regulate the activities of PMCs? Should it be the responsibility of the countries of origin, or of the contracting states or of the international community? Another question is one of definition of the problem. It has been pointed out that so far most authorities define the private actors that need to be dealt with instead of defining the activities of PMCs and their possible consequences. (Lilly, 2002) As far as mercenaries are concerned, on the international scene, they have been criminalized by the United Nations system, and internationally, mercenaries have been condemned, with numerous laws, protocols and conventions being promulgated to stop the activities of mercenaries. The following is of particular note: • • •

The Geneva Protocols of 1977 stripped mercenaries of combat and POW status in armed conflict; In 1977 the OAU adopted the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa; The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries. This convention makes mercenary activity an international crime. It prohibits states from recruiting, using, financing and training mercenaries, and obliges them to extradite or prosecute any mercenaries found on their territory. (Nathan, 1997)

However, as far as other private military activities are concerned, it is clear that existing national and international regulations have not managed to satisfactorily regularise the activities of PMCs. Because of the current legal vacuum to deal with PMCs, a number of options are being considered by various authorities. One option that has been advanced is to create an international body to take care of all aspects of private military services, including the regulation thereof. (DCAF, 2006, 6) Other options that have been advanced include the following: 1. A ban on all private military activity. 2. A ban on the recruitment abroad of personnel for military activity. 3. A licensing regime for military services.

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4. Compulsory registration and notification of all foreign military activity. 5. The granting to PMCs and PSCs alike, of general licences for foreign military activity. 6. Enforcing the self – regulation of PMCs by insisting on the operationalization of voluntary codes of conduct. (HC 577, 2002) References DCAF Backgrounder, (2006), “Private Military Companies”, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, April 2006, available online at, http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/backgrounders accesses on 19 May 2006. Deborah Avant, (2006), “Private Military Companies and the Future of War”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, available online at http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200604.military.avant.privatemilitarycompa nies.html accessed on 19 May 2006. Gulam, Hyder, (2005), The Rise and Rise of Private Military Companies, COTIPSO Thesis presented for, The United Nations Institute for Training Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peace Operations (UNITAR POCI), New York. HC 577, (2002), “Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation, A House of Commons Green Paper”, The Stationery Office, London. Lilly, Damian, (2000), The Privatisation of Security and Peacebuilding: A Framework for Action, International Alert, London, September. Lilly Damian, (2002), “Regulating Private Military Companies: The Need for a Multidimensional Approach”, paper presented at the Seminar to consider the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green Paper, London, 24 June 2002. Maartensz Maarten, “Nicolo Machiavelli -The Prince”, Chapter XII, with a summary and comments by Maarten Maartensz, available online at http://www.xs4all.nl/~maartens/philosophy/machiavelli/prince/notes/c hapter12rem.html accessed on 22 May 2006. Nathan, Laurie, (1997), “Lethal Weapons: Why Africa needs alternatives to hired guns”, Track Two, Vol. 6, No. 2, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town. 223

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O’Brien, Kevin A, (2000), “PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: the debate on private militaries companies”, Royal United Service Institute Journal, London. Available online at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/orgs/icsa/Old/pmcs.html accessed on 18 May 2006. Sami Makki et., al., (2001, Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating the Actors, a paper co – produced by the British American Security Information Council, International Alert and Safer World. Singer, P W, (2004), “War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatised Military Firms and International Law”, Columbia Journal of International Law, Columbia. United Nations, (2002), “The Impact of Mercenary Activities on the Right of Peoples to Self Determination”, Fact Sheet No. 28, Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), New York. Wheatley Joseph, (2003), “The Wages of War: Towards a Legal and Legitimate Role for Private Military Companies in Africa”, Journal of International Law and Policy, University of Pennsylvania, Volume 1, 2003 - 2004.

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The Coup Attempt in Equatorial Guinea: Implications for Private Military Companies in Africa15 Peter Fabricius Africa was the only continent where France could still “change the course of history with a few hundred men”, Louis de Guiringaud, a former French foreign minister, famously said in 1977. In March 2004 a mere 88 men, mostly South Africans, tried to change the course of history in the oil-rich West African state of Equatorial Guinea. And indeed they may well have changed the course of history, but not quite as they intended. Their foolhardy plot to topple the government of Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo set back the chances of private military companies playing a meaningful role in conflict resolution in Africa. On March 7 2004, an aging Boeing 727 flew into Harare’s international airport from South Africa carrying 67 men. On the ground to meet them were Etonian old boy and former British SAS officer Simon Mann and two of his partners. Mann had arranged to buy a consignment of weapons from the Zimbabwe government’s arms company Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) which had a reputation for supplying all comers without asking questions. But this time something went wrong. As Mann negotiated with ZDI executives, members of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) arrived. All 70 men were arrested and the Boeing impounded. The next day, South African Nick du Toit and about 18 other men, seven of them also South African, were arrested in Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea, on the island of Bioko lying in the Atlantic Ocean off Cameroon in West Africa. It subsequently emerged that South African intelligence agencies had tipped off the Zimbabwean authorities that all these men were involved in a coup plot, though some South African government officials have denied it.

This article is based on weekly columns on African issues that Peter Fabricius writes for the Johannesburg Star, the Cape Times, the Pretoria News and the Daily News in Durban. All the above newspapers are published in South Africa.

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According to Equatorial Guinea prosecutors, Du Toit and his team planned to seize the airport in Malabo so that Mann and his colleagues could fly in to seize control of the oil-rich country. They would replace Obiang with opposition leader Severo Moto, who, according to some accounts, was waiting in an aircraft in Mali for the outcome of the coup. When word arrived that it had been thwarted, he fled back to exile in Spain, the old colonial power. Mann and his team claimed they were buying the arms and ammunition from ZDI to fulfil a contract to protect a mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo. On September 10, 2004 Mann was sentenced in the Harare magistrate’s court to seven years in jail for contravening Zimbabwe’s arms laws. The two pilots of the Boeing were sentenced to 16 months and the remainder of the men who had been in the Boeing, to 12 months each, on aviation and immigration charges. The two men who had been with Mann at Harare airport when the Boeing flew in on March 7 were acquitted of all charges and released. By July 2005, all the others who had been convicted in Zimbabwe, except Mann, had been released. In October 2004 the men in Equatorial Guinea were convicted and sentenced after a near-farcical trial. Some were acquitted. Most got sentences ranging from 14 to 24 years. Du Toit got the stiffest sentence- 34 years in Malabo’s murderous Black Beach Prison. The “Wonga Coup” as it came to be known in Britain (after Mann had appealed to his friends for “splodges of wonga” (British slang for lots of cash) to bribe his way out of prison) attracted enormous publicity in Britain when Mark Thatcher, the controversial businessman son of the former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was arrested in Cape Town for allegedly investing around $275,000 in the coup attempt. He was charged under South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, legislation which the ANC government had passed in 1998 to curb foreign mercenary activity by South Africans and South African residents, like Thatcher. He eventually struck a deal with the prosecutors, pleaded guilty and paid a fine of three million rands to avoid jail and leave the country. Thatcher claimed afterwards that he was innocent and had only pleaded guilty to avoid being harassed indefinitely. This rather bizarre and farcical adventure was, among other things, a complete anachronism which harked back to the bad old days of the legendary Congo mercenary leader Mike Hoar. It had all the ingredients of a Frederick Forsyth novel and it seemed no coincidence that Forsyth had been inspired to write his famous thriller the Dogs of War 226

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about a similar bunch of mercenaries. In fact in his fascinating book The Wonga Coup, Adam Roberts unearthed evidence that Forsyth had actually sponsored a previous attempted coup in 1973 to get rid of Obiang’s even nastier uncle –Macias Nguema who was then president. British intelligence stumbled on the coup attempt and it was aborted without arrests or publicity. To get some idea how outlandishly passé the Wonga Coup plot was, you have to go back to 1981 and the crazy failed coup attempt in the Seychelles by Hoar and his band of Froth blowers (so-called because they pretended to be on beer-tasting expedition) to find something really akin to what Mann and company were attempting. It is also necessary to look back to 1989 when Frenchman Bob Denard toppled the government of the Comoros before international powers forced him out of office. But Mann and his men seemed not to have realized that since those days, the world, and with it, Africa, had changed. In 1999 the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union) broke from its 36 year tradition of studious non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states and resolved to suspend any government which came to power through a coup. When coups took place soon after that in Cote d’Ivoire and the particularly coup-prone Indian Ocean state of Comoros, the OAU suspended both military governments and began negotiations with them to return them to civilian rule. That did happen although both countries still remain fragile. In 2003 there was a coup in Sao Tome et Principe, another tiny oilrich island state very close to Equatorial Guinea. It was pulled off by a small band of men from the same old South African Defence Force’s special operations’ 32 Battalion, which had once trained the bulk of the Wonga Coup mercenaries. The African Union sent a South Africa-led delegation to negotiate with the new leaders in Sao Tome and persuaded them it would be in their interest to hand power back to the overthrown President Fradique de Menezes – or face unpleasant consequences. It is true that the AU’s anti-coup policy has not been carried out completely consistently. For instance, the AU seems to have turned a blind eye to a coup in the Central African Republic in March 2003, apparently because of an unspoken consensus that the ousted president Felix Patasse had done such a bad job he deserved to be ousted. It remains true, nevertheless, that African coups can no longer be conducted with the same complete cavalier impunity as in the past. And for a bunch of white South African mercenaries from the apartheid 227

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era to have thought they could get away with a coup so easily in 2004, seemed to show remarkable ignorance of the changed African political context. They had apparently talked of their plans so openly in South Africa that the plot was common knowledge in intelligence circles as early as November 2003. But the coup plotters seemed unaware that the new South African authorities might frown on their enterprise. Adam Roberts wrote in his book that Mann seemed to be aware that his friend Nigel Morgan, apparently an intelligence agent, was passing on information about the planned coup to the SA authorities. Extraordinarily, it seems Mann interpreted the lack of response from the SA government as tacit approval to proceed with the plot. That’s how poorly he understood the political environment. Had the Wonga Coup succeeded in toppling Obiang, some observers close to South Africa’s intelligence community believe that the African Union would have sent in troops - probably battle-hardened Nigerians - to reverse the coup and the results would have been very bloody. But the irony- and perhaps the tragedy - of the Equatorial Guinea adventure was that, it was carried out by the very same people who had earlier begun, slowly, to alter the bad reputation of the mercenary business. In 1989 Mann and fellow Briton Greg Wales - now named by prosecutors and others, including Adam Roberts, as one of the Wonga Coup plotters -- had formed Executive Outcomes (EO), based in Pretoria and in the UK. Nick du Toit and some other participants in the Equatorial Guinea operation had also worked for EO. In Africa EO soon became the most famous of a new breed of mercenary outfits, though they themselves preferred to be called private military or private security companies. “EO” was staffed mostly with highly-trained former special forces of the South African Defence Force – now out of work because of the political changes there. EO increasingly accepted “respectable” assignments, studiously beginning to position itself on the politicallycorrect side of conflicts. Between 1993 and 1996 EO was contracted to the MPLA government in Angola, and helped it to turn the military tide against its rebel enemies, Jonas Savimbi’s Unita - alongside whom, ironically, most of the EO soldiers had fought a few years earlier when the old SA government was backing Savimbi. In May 1995 the teetering government of President Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone contracted EO to help it fight off the brutal Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels who had come close to seizing the capital. 228

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EO dispatched the RUF in short time with a handful of soldiers and a few outdated helicopters. Despite the racist reputation in the wider political community of the ex-South African special forces members who constituted the bulk of the EO operation, the contingent in Sierra Leone gained a local reputation for humane treatment of the civilian population which had been especially cruelly abused by the RUF. In one episode EO enabled an international aid agency to return some 8 000 internally displaced people to their home. “Wherever (EO) went, civilians stopped dying,” one observer said then. This may not be the universal opinion of their actions in the country, but it does seem to be the prevailing one. In both Angola and Sierra Leone, though, the residual whiff of apartheid still hanging around EO grew too pungent for the client governments after EO had done its initial rescue work, and their contracts were terminated rather prematurely, leading to a resurgence of the rebel enemies. A United Nations force - probably 20 times bigger and more expensive than that of EO - replaced it in Sierra-Leone but failed to pacify the RUF. It eventually took the British army to do that. Despite EO being on the politically correct side in both conflicts, the new ANC government in Pretoria was growing increasingly uneasy about old apartheid soldiers operating on the continent. Perhaps it feared that if they allowed their old enemies to remain armed and potentially dangerous, they could one day turn their attention back towards home. Or perhaps they simply didn’t like the reputation of white, ex-apartheid soldiers changing the fortunes of African countries, whether for better or worse. And so in 1998 the South African parliament passed a law called the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act - the same law under which Mark Thatcher was arrested in September 2004. The new law obliged South Africans to seek their government’s permission before offering their military services abroad. As a result, EO decided to close down, at least in South Africa. Most analysts believe the more British company Sandline International, became in effect the successor company to EO, as it did not suffer from the same unsavoury apartheid connotations, nor was it subject to the new South African law. Sandline also scored military successes in Sierra Leone, but embroiled itself in political controversy when it came to light that the British government had been using it as a front to avoid being seen to be intervening in the country itself. Some analysts credit 229

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EO and Sandline with coining the label “private military companies” (PMCs) in order to distance themselves from the label “mercenaries” and all its negative connotations, especially in Africa. The label PMC took off. Boosted by EO and Sandline’s successes in bringing stability to parts of Africa - and no doubt also lured by tales of the profits they made, new PMCs entered the field. In the US, the first PMC - though not then known by that name – was Vinnell which had won a contract in 1975 to train the Saudi Arabian army to protect its oil fields. But PMC’s really blossomed in the US after 1990 as a result of the downsizing of their military in the wake of the end of the Cold War which released thousands of highly qualified soldiers into the marketplace. Partly as a result of Vinnell’s successful performances - which have reportedly earned it more than half a billion dollars since 1995 - the U.S. has rapidly stepped up the outsourcing of military work. In 1995 the Defence Science Board estimated that the Pentagon could save up to $6 billion annually by 2002 if it contracted out all of its support functions to private industry. Some analysts estimate it was actually outsourcing more than that. The US-led war in Iraq has for the first time brought home to the general public the remarkable extent of PMC activity as they realized thousands of Americans employed by private companies were involved in a wide range of duties, from protecting oil fields to training Iraqi security forces. In an address to the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) in Washington in November 2003, Theresa Whelan, US deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs, described how extensively her department was using PMCs in Africa, mainly for supplying logistics, training and administrative reform to governments and the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) in West Africa. This increasing commercialisation of warfare has naturally sparked an intense debate about the merits of privatising what many deem to be a quintessentially state function. On the plus side are the generally lower costs of outsourcing some military functions. In a paper on the subject, Canadian army commander David MacDougall has offered the example of how Ethiopia hired an entire wing of Su-27 fighter jets – complete with pilots and technical back up - from the Russian firm Sukhoi for the single mission of helping defeat Eritrea in their war from 1998.

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Buying and maintaining these aircraft would have been completely unaffordable for a poor country like Ethiopia. PMCs are also generally more efficient than state militaries, able to act more quickly and often with greater skill. Engaging PMCs also allows governments to distance themselves from warfare and particularly the political fallout from taking casualties. Many, though, would consider this an argument against rather than for PMCs since they enable governments to fudge their proper responsibilities. In her address to IPOA, mentioned above, Theresa Whelan weighed up the pros and cons of outsourcing to PMCs and concluded that: “I think that from our perspective, contractors are here to stay in supporting US national security objectives overseas and really, in the aggregate, we think that they add considerable value to the process by bringing a dimension of flexibility that we really didn’t have before and that we desperately need now as things in the world are so fluid and changing.” Whelan, though, was talking about PMCs providing support to US operations, including US training and equipping of African peacekeepers, a largely secondary role. But the major, potential benefit of PMCs - certainly in Africa - could be that these outfits are usually prepared to do the dirty work of conflict resolution - including direct military engagement with the bad guys like the RUF who were defeated by EO. This is of course, also the most controversial aspect of PMCs. The United Nations is also overstretched with peacekeeping missions, most of them in Africa. And when the UN does go in, it often cannot do the job. Many blue helmets volunteer purely for the per diem and balk at the first sight of trouble. In Sierra Leone, scores of them were embarrassingly captured by the RUF soon after they arrived. If it had not been for British force, the civil war might still be raging. And one cannot depend on someone like the British coming to the rescue every time. So, the argument goes, when governments are so reluctant to put their boys in danger on distant soil, why not use people who are more than eager to do the job? Britain’s former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is one prominent advocate of the PMCs. He once stated that “states and international organizations are turning to the private sector as a cost effective way of procuring services which would once have been the exclusive preserve of the military.” He predicted that “the demand for private military services is likely to increase - the cost of employing pri-

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vate military companies for certain functions like UN operations could be much lower than that of national armed forces.” The main criticisms of PMCs are that they are not as accountable or as transparent as state militaries ought to be. They may abuse the enemy or the local population with greater impunity than regular soldiers. And they may, of course switch sides if the enemy offers them a better price since they are, after all, mercenaries, even if the word has been struck from the lexicon. In practice though, few of the negatives seem to have shown up. Disciplined by the normal business imperative of maintaining their corporate reputations to win more contracts, PMCs have mostly conducted themselves remarkably well in the field. The proponents of PMCs argue that it is probably impossible to stop them operating altogether. Better then, to have them inside the tent – by hiring them for official peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions – than outside the tent, working for rebels or other undesirables. This was in essence the argument of Princeton University professor Jeffrey Herbst in a paper delivered to a seminar on the Privatisation of Security in Africa at the South African Institute of International Affairs in 1998. Herbst suggested that countries like South Africa, instead of holding PMCs at a distance, should “engage actively” with them “so there can be at least some coordination between private force and public diplomacy.” The private provision of violence was a “force of nature; it cannot be ignored and it will not go away so it should probably be harnessed,” he said. The Equatorial Guinea adventure, however, especially involving as it did some of the very pioneers of the more legitimate private military industry, seems to have cut the ground from under the feet of the advocates of the PMCs since it apparently demonstrated that after all, PMCs were really just untrustworthy mercenaries who would sell their services to the highest bidder. Also, since Equatorial Guinea’s gushing oil fields were their real objective, the impression was created that PMCs continue to work for private gain regardless of local, regional or international consequences just like the traditional mercenaries used to do. Several PMC advocates have acknowledged that the abortive coup has set back the cause and the business by years - especially in Africa. It has certainly generated a considerable amount of negative publicity. This is illustrated by the highly critical articles in Newsweek and the British Guardian paper about Whelan’s address to IPOA mentioned above. Newsweek’s article called IPOA “the closest thing in Washing232

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ton to a lobbying group for soldiers of fortune” - a label IPOA strongly denies, insisting its members are all legitimate PMCs. Newsweek also made much of Whelan’s meeting at IPOA that day and again in February 2004 - a few days before the Wonga Coup was launched - with Greg Wales, the friend of Simon Mann whom Equatorial Guinean prosecutors subsequently suspected of complicity in the coup plot. Newsweek and the Guardian both suggested that Wales gave Whelan advance knowledge of the plot but that the US did nothing about it. The US government has denied this, acknowledging only that Wales spoke to Whelan of unspecified trouble brewing in the country – which hardly seemed a remarkable prediction at the time for a country that is rather chronically turbulent. The Guardian also said that in her IPOA speech, Whelan had advocated for “covert backing “ by the US government for operations in Africa using PMCs to avoid political scrutiny. Both magazines were clearly suggesting very strongly that Whelan had the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea in mind when she spoke. This interpretation is only possible with a considerable logical stretch of Whelan’s actual remarks, though. She had said; “Plus, the use of contractors in Africa also means that the US can be supportive in trying to ameliorate regional crises without necessarily having to put US troops on the ground, which is often times a very difficult political decision.” Later she had also said; “some times we may not want to be very visible.” Read in the context of the full speech, these remarks sound much less sinister than what these journalists saw in them. They sound more like the US advocating the use of PMCs to cosset the sensitivities of certain African governments who do not want to be publicly seen to be cooperating with the US military. But, the very negative interpretation of this episode by Newsweek and the Guardian illustrates quite graphically how extensively the Equatorial Guinea coup plot has cast suspicion over all PMCs. The Wonga Coup probably also prompted the South African government considerably to tighten up the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act in 2006, making it illegal for South African citizens to work abroad even as security guards in places like Iraq or Afghanistan. PMCs and even private security companies have already begun laying off South African staff, even before the law comes into effect. There is little doubt that the US will continue to use PMCs for the kind of secondary function Whelan described, regardless of criticism. The Wonga Coup though, may have finally killed off the more ambitious idea of 233

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using PMCs aggressively to pacify African conflicts to pave the way for the UN and other international organizations to go in. Though Mann and company must of course bear the moral and legal responsibility for their own actions, a case could be made that it was precisely because the South African government - through the original 1998 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act - shut down what was widely perceived to be useful and constructive activity by EO, that its disbanded members seized the opportunity of an illegitimate operation to earn income. That Act came into force just as Herbst was recommending to the South African and other governments, that they should harness rather than curb the mercenaries. Had they followed that advice - had EO and its ilk been brought into the UN system to act as the sharp vanguard of UN peacekeeping operations where peace has not yet been attained perhaps the tragic-comic Wonga Coup would not have happened. The devil, as they say, finds work for idle hands. As an epilogue, it should, however, be noted, that since the Wonga Coup, the UN itself has taken on a much more robust role in conflicts, certainly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where UN peacekeeping troops have fought major battles with rebels in the east of the country, clearing the way for the country’s first democratic elections in over four decades. Who knows? Perhaps that is at least one positive legacy of this otherwise rather bizarre and unfortunate chapter in African history.

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PART SIX

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

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France in the Ivorian Civil War: A Genuine Peace Broker or Part of the Problem? Issaka K Souare Introduction In many regards, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) is a very strategic country in West Africa. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is determined to stabilize the sub-region so that it can devote its efforts and scarce resources to its original project — regional integration. The African Union (AU) is also determined to break away from the inadequacies of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and wants to show that it means business when it comes to solving African problems. Given the significant importance of Côte d’Ivoire to France, Paris does not want to see the current crisis in the country resolved without French involvement. Accused of caring less for African conflicts compared to other regions, the UN are anxious to avoid the replication of such criticisms that were directed to their perceived poor responses in African conflicts in the 1990s. These explain the active involvement of all the above actors in the search for a solution to the Ivorian crisis —with their different agendas, of course. Of all these actors, this chapter focuses mainly on the involvement of France in the conflict. For, while France has been accused by the Ivorian authorities of complicity with the rebels who control the north of the country, Paris has thus multiplied efforts to remain in the centre of the crisis. The thrust of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review and analysis of the Ivorian civil war that broke out on 19 September 2002, particularly focusing on the role of France in attempts at resolving it. To the French authorities and those persuaded by their claims, the French involvement in the Ivorian crisis was a blessing that saved the country from falling apart and sliding into a more catastrophic quagmire (French government, 2006). In parallel to this view is the position of the Ivorian authorities in Abidjan and those supporting their claims, alleging that contrary to the claims of Quai d’Orsay, France is part of the problem and not the solution. They argue that the real motive of French 237

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involvement in the Ivorian crisis is to preserve its ‘neo-colonial’ interests perceived to be threatened by the regime of President Laurent Gbagbo, in power since October 2000 (Koudou, 2005; Kessé, 2005; Djéréké, 2003). Though others have tried to distance themselves from both these two extremes, preferring a more diplomatic approach to the issue, they have nevertheless maintained that France’s position in the Ivorian crisis has at best been ‘ambiguous’ (Smith, 2003:112-126). Through a comprehensive review of the Ivorian conflict, focusing on the role of France before and since the conflict broke, the chapter will attempt to answer the question; is France a genuine peace broker whose motives have been misinterpreted by those who accuse it of intrusion and neo-colonialism or, are these accusations actually credible? Following this brief introduction, the second section of the chapter will look at the history of the Franco-Ivorian relations from Côte d’Ivoire’s independence in 1960 to the start of the crisis, to see if there is anything in this relationship that may inform our understanding of the current crisis. The third section will examine the complexities surrounding the crisis, including the divergent views as to what may have led to it. Before looking at the subject matter of the French involvement in the Ivorian civil war, the chapter will in the fourth section look at the broader French policy on peacekeeping/peace-building in Africa. This section will interrogate official French claims on conflict resolution and peace-building in Africa, and contrast these claims with evidence of French operations on the ground. In other words, is Côte d’Ivoire typical or atypical and what does this tell us about the French role in the country? The chapter will conclude by arguing that though France may not be blamed for the outbreak of the crisis in the country, its involvement in the peace process has mainly been influenced by its interests, be they ‘neo-colonial’ or just ‘strategic’. It will be noted that France has been very clever and pragmatic in its pursuance of this policy to the point of using both the regional organisation, ECOWAS and the UN, whose position has been mainly shaped by France, to remain at the centre of the crisis. Franco-Ivorian relations, 1960-2000 To summarize France’s relationship with its former colony from the date of the latter’s independence in 1960 to the coming to power of Laurent Gbagbo in October 2000, one may argue that this was one of 238

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‘independence under surveillance or protection’. This was so mainly because of the deliberate ‘Africa policy’ of the successive French governments, a policy that was laid down by General de Gaulle at the beginning of the French Fifth Republic, and the political mentality of the first and long serving Ivorian leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The politics of dependency for which many African regimes are known also played a part in perpetuating this state of affairs. These three factors combined led to a total subordination of the Ivorian state — perhaps more than any other African state— to France. The situation started with a defence agreement that has become more and more unpopular since Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993. On 24 April 1961, France and Côte d’Ivoire signed a defence agreement in Paris that was presumably aimed at helping Abidjan to preserve its territorial integrity against any foreign aggression (Barry, 1997:74; Souaré, 2004a). In return for this, Houphouët-Boigny committed his country to considering France as its first contact point in its arms purchases and all defence-related matters (art. 3 of the agreement).16 Economically, for the most part in the period under review, Côte d’Ivoire was considered one of the rare ‘success stories’ in Africa. In the first 15 years of its independence, Côte d’Ivoire achieved an economic growth in the order of 7 per cent per year (Fauré, 1989:59). Its economy was based mainly on agriculture, especially coffee and cocoa that were exploited by French companies based in the country or exported to France. However, from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, owing to a multitude of factors, the Ivorian economy began to show signs of concern, not to say real crisis. To all this was added some high level mismanagement of public funds by government officials. Between 1980 and 1983, for the first time, Côte d’Ivoire appealed to the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and the International Monetary Fund —IMF). It was during this period too, in 1982, that Laurent Gbagbo secretly formed his Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian popular front —FPI) party and went into exile in France (Goba, 2000:4546). Despite a brief recovery in 1985, the pattern of deterioration of the economic situation continued. The crisis reached its peak in May 1987, when the Ivorian authorities announced debt insolvency and sus-

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A PDF version of the Accord is available on the web site of the Centre de documentation française at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/ cote-divoire/pdf/accord_de_defense_24041961.pdf> (2 September 2006). 239

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pended the servicing of their debt to all their major creditors including both the London and Paris Clubs (Fauré, 1989:59-60). However, given the country’s continuous need for foreign assistance, this decision could not be sustained and Abidjan was in desperate need of the assistance of the Bretton Woods institutions. After French recommendation, the institutions were ready again to lend. But to be convinced of the ability of the Ivorian state to service the debt, the country was forced to accept the IMF so-called Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Thus, Alassane Ouattara, an Ivorian national and former governor of the Dakar-based Central Bank of [CFA franc zone] West African States (BCEAO), was nominated first as the governor of the Ivorian central bank and, in 1990, as the country’s first ever Prime Minister. Ouattara remained so until the death of Houphouët in 1993. In all this, France proved a reliable ally of the Houphouët-Boigny regime, presenting it, rather manipulatively, as evidence of the success of its African policy and cooperation. Côte d’Ivoire relied very heavily on France during this period. Apart from the heavy and uncontested monopoly of French multi-national companies in the Ivorian economy and labour market, France had —and still has to a large extent— vested economic interests in the country. For example, the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (the [CFA franc zone] West African economic and monetary union – UEMOA) that administers the BECEAO is unarguably a French-made institution. France instigated the formation of the financial institution (in 1973) to keep ties with her former colonies in West Africa and counter-balance the Nigerian-inspired and West Africa-wide Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS. (Asante, 2004:60-61; Bach, 2004:79). This is to say that the monetary union is a major pillar in France’s West Africa policy. The death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 did not swiftly affect Côte d’Ivoire’s heavy reliance on France. This was so owing mainly to the circumstances that surrounded the coming to power of Houphouët’s successor, Henri Konan Bédié, and that of General Robert Guei, who took power after the ousting of Bédié in a military coup d’état in December 1999. This period (1993 onwards) coinciding with the end of the Cold War, the whirlwind of multiparty systems in Africa, and a change in France’s Africa policy, slowly under François Mitterrand but effectively from May 1995 under the Alain Juppé and Lionel Jospin’s governments (the latter in cohabitation with Jacque Chirac’s conservative party in power). However, during this period, France seemed to have 240

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changed its interventionist policy in Africa, including in Côte d’Ivoire, where it has a military base (Utley, 2002:129-146). This is what accounts for France’s non intervention in the country when the Bédié regime was overthrown in a military coup in 1999. The current crisis in Côte d’Ivoire seems however to have revealed the limits of this new French Africa policy as France’s vital interests were placed under threat in one of its former colonies. The Ivorian crisis in its complexities As noted above, the current conflict in Côte d’Ivoire started on 19 September 2002, initially as an insurrection by some army officers allegedly unhappy with their proposed demobilisation from the army while President Gbagbo was away. The officers had taken up arms in an uprising that led to fighting in Abidjan —the country’s economic capital— in which about 300 people were killed, including the Interior Minister and the erstwhile military Head of State, General Robert Gueï. It soon became clear that the country was heading for a full-scale civil war. Quickly, the insurgents changed their first claim to that of protest against what they called discriminatory policies that the government was applying or maintaining against some groups of the population identified as those from the North. Soon after, the Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (Patriotic movement of Côte d’Ivoire – MPCI) emerged. Two other factions later joined this main rebel group based in the north of the country, as always happens in civil wars. At the end of 2006, the country was still divided in two parts, the North (controlled by the insurgents), and the South (under the control of the government forces). Views are quite divergent as to what explains the outbreak of the conflict in the first place. To some, the explanation is to be found within the country, illustrated by some discriminatory policies and/or practices to which Ivorians of the North and/or those bearing Muslim or Dioula names were subjected. In particular, the outbreak of the conflict is blamed on what the tenants of this creed describe as the ‘xenophobic concept of ivoirité’ introduced by Bédié and maintained by his two successors, Guei and Gbagbo. This concept, in its turn, is traced back to the political rivalry between Bédié and Ouattara upon the death of Houphouët, the two being the most likely successors or paramount hopefuls to presidency —Ouattara as the Prime Minister, and Bédié as

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the President of the National Assembly. The rivalry however ended in favour of Bédié (Goba, 2000:49). Bédié then ruled the country for the rest of Houphouët’s term and confirmed himself in office following the controversial 1995 presidential elections, while Ouattara disinterested himself in running for presidency during this period. However, when he announced his intention to run for presidency at the upcoming presidential elections due in October 2000, Bédié tried unsuccessfully to dissuade him. He then tried to deny him the right to form a political party. Unsuccessful in that, he summoned him to prove his Ivorian identity, which was judged as false, thenceforth, Ouattara was described as alien. This was the birth of the concept of ivoirité, or Ivorianness, according to this creed. With the invention of this concept, Ouattara was portrayed as a foreigner and by extension, all northern Ivorians were also labelled as alien. These people would often be stopped and asked to produce their national identity cards and residence permits. Some could have their cards confiscated and/or destroyed because of their names, ways of dressing, or religion and be accused of obtaining the card fraudulently (SecureDem, 2000:14; Jaye, 2003; United Nations, 2001:40). Foreign factors Others see the real causes of the current Ivorian conflict in the role of some foreign powers not happy with the regime of President Gbagbo, perceived as ‘nationalistic’ and against the ‘national interests’ of foreign powers. Authors of this creed by and large try to deny any internal factor in the conflict. At first, the accusatory fingers were pointed at both Burkina Faso and France. However, as the conflict deepened and prolonged, the charge against Burkina Faso seemed to have been dropped. And where some persisted in this direction, this is more in a way of arguing that Burkina Faso was used by France while the latter denied any involvement. Thus, one may argue that the focusing of accusations branded by the tenants of this view is on France, maintaining that the rebels acted on behalf of, or were used by France to advance or protect France’s ‘neo-colonial’ interests in the country. A few months after the start of the conflict, Mamadou Koulibaly (2003:7-14), the President of the Ivorian National Assembly, in his preface to a booklet alleging French involvement in the Ivorian civil war, and later in a separate book (Koulibaly, 2004), maintained that the 242

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whole conflict was due to France’s perception of the government of President Gbagbo of being ‘too independent’, ‘arrogant’ and ‘not considering France as their first reference and contact point in their trade deals, etc.’. By this, he claims that France suspected its national interests would be threatened in Côte d’Ivoire if the Gbagbo government remained in place or continued behaving in this ‘too much independent’ way. He cites about eight examples of what he calls ‘unfair and badly drafted’ contracts signed between some influential French companies and the previous Ivorian governments, some of which they questioned and wanted to re-negotiate. According to the authors of the booklet, as the conflict broke out and Bouaké, the country’s second biggest city, fell into the hands of the MPCI rebels in the north, the loyalist troops were about to re-take the city from the rebels. It was at this time that the French troops, from the French military base stationed in the country, stopped them with the pretext of evacuating French and other Western expatriates who were stranded in the city. The authors argue that contrary to this claim, the French army used this pretext to provide military equipment to the rebels, thereby helping them to fight against the loyalist troops. They mention three Antonov-12 warplanes previously stationed in Franceville in Gabon, where there is another French military base. Many other accusations are also made along these lines (Ahua and Busch, 2003: 1617). A third explanation Alongside these two schools in explaining the outbreak of the Ivorian conflict is a third one. This school maintains that neither of the above two views is totally baseless, but none should be taken as the sole explanation of the conflict. To explain the interconnection between these two views, one would need to refer to the type of relationship that existed between France and Côte d’Ivoire before the coming to power of the Gbagbo regime, which was characterized, as noted above, by heavy reliance of Abidjan on and its subordination to its former colonial master, and the presence, in Côte d’Ivoire, of many French interests, not least the enormous investments that French companies had in the country. Paris would thus want to preserve those interests at all costs. In fact it is hard to assume that another nation, even African,

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given the chance and power, would have behaved differently in the world we live in. Yet, the Gbagbo regime came to power with a nationalist agenda (politique de refondation), wanting to change the politics of their country’s heavy dependence on France and reduce the latter’s unrivalled monopoly of all the economic activities in their country. For any African country, depending on where one stands in the debate, this was an appreciated and salutary course of action. However, the logic of political wisdom and pragmatism would have been for the Gbagbo regime to put the Ivorian house in order first and overcome the internal differences before engaging on this thorny and adventurous course. Even then, it had to be on a gradual basis. Yet, the Gbagbo regime, without correcting this mistake that they found in the country, connived with it or even contributed to it and still sought to embark on this adventurous journey. France was fully aware of the discontent of some groups of the population because of the aforementioned discriminatory policies (Souaré, 2006:66-68). In fact, given the reliance of the Bédié regime on France and the influence of the latter on Ivorian politicians up to the outbreak of the crisis, one may argue that some of these policies were put in place with, at least, France’s connivance. The rebels, it would seem, were not genuinely concerned about these grievances. But the regime in Abidjan provided them with the perfect pretext. This is to say that internal factors are the ones to be blamed in the first place and that without them, external ones would have had little if any chance of success. By this also one may argue that though the effect of the rebellion (hindering Gbagbo from pursuing his nationalist agenda) may have converged with the wishes of France, it is not clear whether France knew of the rebellion before hand let alone fomenting it. But with little doubt, France later found an ally in them to achieve this goal. France’s broader Africa Of all the European imperial nations in Africa, Britain and France were the two nations that benefited the most from the colonial enterprise. Yet, after decolonisation, Britain could still retain some influence in world affairs thanks to its alliance with the United States, the new superpower. This was not the case with France. Humiliated in Indochina and defeated in Algeria, France was in quite a bad posture as to 244

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power balance in international relations. Thus, on the eve of the independence of most of Africa in the 1960s, France, determined to cling on to the illusion of remaining a Great Power, sought to maintain ties with most of its former colonies, by entering into (often forceful) bilateral agreements with them in various areas, including defence agreements, as we have seen in the case of Côte d’Ivoire (Barry, 1997:74; Souaré, 2004a; Utley, 2002). While the French community or union that General de Gaulle proposed in his 1958 fifth republic constitution was a clear sign of this, the frequent Franco-Africa summits that are held every year since the 1970s between France and many African states is a striking reminder of this French desire to keep ties with Africa. Yet, it is this desire that has dictated most of French Africa policy. Thus, France has not hesitated to intervene in various African countries in order to protect what it considers its ‘national interests’. For example, in the 1960s, France intervened in different ways, sometimes militarily, in Cameroon, Chad, Gabon and Senegal to help somehow threatened friendly regimes in these countries. In the 1970s, it intervened in the Central African Republic, Mauritania and Mobutu's Zaire (Souaré, 2004a; Utley, 2002). And following Guinea’s rejection of General de Gaulle’s proposed French Community, offered instead of full independence, in 1958, French secret services were suspected of involvement in many plots to destabilize the regime in Conakry (Kaba, 1990; Keita, 2002). At times, France allied itself with some African states to pursue its policies. For example, having realised Houphouët’s obsession with his own prestige in the region, especially amongst the former French colonies, France used him as an agent in the West Africa sub-region, but not in the good sense of the word. Most notably, France sided with the Biafran secessionist rebels and supported them against the federal government during the Nigerian civil war (1967 – 1970), supplying them with arms through Abidjan (Souaré, 2006: 51; Adebajo, 2002:27; Boutet, 1992:106-107). During the Rwandan genocide in 1994, if Belgium and the United States worked against the UN having any active role in Rwanda, France threw its full political, diplomatic and military weight behind the Rwandan government officials responsible for the genocide (Melvern, 2004:56-57). According to many analysts, the ‘Opération turquoise’ that France proposed to the UN for intervention in Rwanda was a dubious strategy to allow her to aid its genocidal allies under the legitimacy of 245

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the world body (Khan, 2001:6; Verschave, 1998:76; OAU, 2000). Deployed as a peacekeeping force, the French soldiers worked solely to impede the advances of the Rwandan Patriotic Front of Paul Kagame and allow the genocidal elements, on the verge of defeat, to flee the country. In fact, some have found that French soldiers at times participated directly or indirectly in the killing of innocent Rwandan Hutus (Glaser and Smith, 2005:142; HRW, 2004). This being clear, what does this fact tell us about France’s comportment in the Ivorian conflict? France in the Ivorian conflict When the civil war broke out in Côte d’Ivoire, there were some 800 French soldiers stationed at the French military base in the country. As noted above, the authorities in Abidjan did not relent in alleging that there were foreign forces behind the rebels, thereby suggesting that the country had been attacked, at least partly, by a foreign power. By the virtue of the defence accord that exists between the two countries, France was expected to intervene in support of the Ivorian government in Abidjan. This did not happen however. In fact, less than three weeks after the outbreak of the conflict, one senior French official was reported as saying: “The Ivorian authorities have not explicitly requested from us to evoke the defence agreement. Nonetheless, in the prevailing circumstances, even if they had requested it, we would not have accepted it anyway” (Soudan, 2002a). This seems to confirm the suspicion that France, contrary to its declarations, was not concerned about respect of the territorial integrity of Côte d’Ivoire (Smith, 2003:112-126; Souaré, 2004b: 67-72). Since the start of the crisis, human rights groups have confirmed the occurrence of grave human rights abuses in both government and rebel-controlled areas. With the rest of the international community, France did condemn the killing in Abidjan of about three hundred people as the first casualties of the crisis, which was generally the responsibility of the insurgents. Apart from this however, in dealing with atrocities committed by both sides, France, while virulently condemning any such act by government troops or paramilitary groups loyal to the government, has been less vocal vis-à-vis similar acts on the rebel side. In fact, it was France that widely publicised the report of the UN mission of inquiry that confirmed such human rights abuses in Côte d’Ivoire, as

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it relates to the government, in a determined and deliberate effort to discredit the Gbagbo regime in Abidjan (Soudan, 2003). With regard to peace mediation efforts, these were initiated by the ECOWAS, which was making progress. For example, in a matter of a few weeks, ECOWAS had succeeded in persuading the warring factions to agree to a cease-fire and set a mid-November deadline for the deployment of some 1,264 ECOMOG troops in Côte d’Ivoire, which was actually deployed by the end of the year 2002 (Nyinah, 2002; Fall et Seck, 2002; Asante, 2002). ECOWAS was however cut short by France who moved the peace talks from Lomé to Paris. This is how the LinasMarcoussis (held from 15 to 24 January 2003) peace conference came about. This led some to question the intention of the French authorities in this initiative. Some argued that if the French were genuinely interested in finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis, they would/should have encouraged the ECOWAS negotiations already underway in Lomé. Was it then an attempt by France to promote its own foreign policy goals in the region to the detriment of the regional organisation, as some argue? Or was it to better control the talks and thus stamp them with its own favourable terms, as is argued by others? One cannot be sure. Delegates to the Paris peace talks were drawn from the seven political parties represented in the country’s parliament, the three rebel groups and civil society. However, although the then Ivorian Prime Minister, Pascal Afi N’Geussan, was present at the conference, the French government had only invited him in his capacity as the leader of the ruling FPI party and not as Prime Minister or representative of the Ivorian government. The Ivorian government was therefore not represented and never was it invited as such. By this, one could argue, the French authorities implicitly signalled that either they did not recognise the Gbagbo regime as the legitimate government of the country or that they did not even recognise a central government in Côte d’Ivoire. Another observation to be made here is about the terms of the Agreement. In Third World countries, owing to the nature of politics, Defence, Interior, Finance and Foreign ministries are of a particularly great importance. In case of political instability, Defence and Interior ministries command even a greater significance. During the Marcoussis peace conference, ministerial portfolios of the proposed new government were distributed. However, the Conference distributed both these key ministries —Defence and Interior— to the main rebel group 247

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of the MPCI. And the government of national reconciliation that was formed by the Conference was to be led by a Prime Minister with overwhelming executive powers, thereby sealing the constitutional isolation of president Gbagbo. This was followed by an aggressive diplomatic effort by France. Using its position in the UN Security Council, France strove and succeeded in making the Ivorian dossier a priority issue at the Council, which endorsed the Marcoussis peace accord and considered it as the main reference of all the peace agreements in the Ivorian crisis. But cleverly, France pursued the UN track, whose resolutions it influenced greatly, while charging the ECOWAS to follow up the implementation of the Marcoussis accord as its own. After numerous futile attempts to convince the Ivorian parties to abide by the terms of Marcoussis, through the Accra agreements, and following the deterioration of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the African Union got more engaged in the process by appointing a mediator in the person of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. However, to further prove France’s determination to control the peace process, arguments that Mbeki —who was not susceptible to be influenced by France’s reading of the crisis— was unfamiliar with francophone Africa, on the one hand, and West Africa, on the other, continued to occupy the front pages of French media. The French president, Jacques Chirac, on a state visit to Senegal in January 2005, said this explicitly, comments that greatly angered President Mbeki, leading him to say that he welcomed the advice and suggestions of those who thought they knew the terrain better. Perhaps worst than all this, it has been reported that well before the Marcoussis peace conference, the idea of removing Gbagbo from power by force had been canvassed in Paris (Soudan, 2002b). And in late 2006, the UN Security Council delayed the adoption of Resolution 1721 (1 November 2006) because of disagreement over a draft circulated by France with an article saying explicitly that the resolution should prevail over the Ivorian constitution. It is reported that China, Russia, the United States and Tanzania thought this impinged on the sovereignty of Cote d’Ivoire and the article had to be dropped before the resolution was adopted (IRIN, 2 November 2006). With this, it is clear that France does not appear as a neutral, disinterested peace maker in Côte d’Ivoire. Perhaps this state of affairs was described more eloquently by the BBC journalist, Henri Astier (2004) when he wrote: “From the start

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of the Ivory Coast conflict, the French force there —Unicorn— has found neutrality as elusive as the mythical creature it is named after”.17 And, as this has become a deeply rooted conviction with one party to the conflict, the government side, France can be said to be more part of the problem than a neutral actor capable of solving the current Ivorian crisis. If there is any proof of this, one may just recall the November 2004 fatal clashes between a group of the so-called ‘Youths Patriots’, supporting the Ivorian government, and the French troops in Abidjan, which had just destroyed the entire air force capacity of the Ivorian army, following the latter’s breaking of an 18-month ceasefire by carrying out ‘illegal’ raids on rebel stronghold in Bouaké, in which nine French soldiers were killed. The French retaliation resulted in a bloody confrontation in which more than 19 unarmed Ivorian civilians were shot dead by the French troops and more than 300 were injured. Conclusion This chapter looked at the Ivorian civil war, focusing on the involvement of France in efforts at resolving it. It began by providing a comprehensive review of the Franco-Ivorian relations from Côte d’Ivoire’s independence in 1960 to the coming to power of the Gbagbo regime in 2000. It is obvious that this period was characterised by the country’s heavy reliance on France and subordination to it, owing mainly to the political mentality of its first and long serving leader, Houphouët-Boigny, and France’s Africa policy as laid down by General de Gaulle in 1958. As regards the debate about the causes of the Ivorian civil war, though not the main thrust of the chapter, it noted the divergent and often conflicting views about what really lies behind the outbreak of the conflict. It found that, it was the internal factors that were to be blamed, as they were the ones that allowed the external actors to have any effect, in the conflict. France got involved in efforts to resolve the Ivorian conflict mainly out of the desire not to be left out in such an important issue concerning such a vital country in its foreign policy. With a similar desire to give prominence to its thesis on the crisis, France multiplied efforts in order

Henri Astier, “France’s Ivorian quagmire” BBC website, 8 November 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/africa/3993265.stm

17

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to control the peace process and impose this thesis while striving to spare itself of any suspicion of impartiality. It thus led the UN to espouse its own arranged peace accord and the regional organisation, ECOWAS, which had initiated the peace talks and which might have complained about its marginalisation in the process, to follow up its implementation. Through these processes however and the way they were conducted, it is clear that France is not viewed by all parties concerned as ‘neutral’. Thus, if ‘neutrality’ and being perceived as ‘impartial’ by all the parties are prerequisite for successful peace mediation, France’s continuous involvement in the Ivorian peace process may be rightly regarded as problematic. In other words, France’s behaviour in the conflict does not make it a ‘genuine peace broker’. But, it may not be pragmatic or even wise at this stage to ask France to withdraw completely from the peace process. The solution to the conflict inevitably lies in the Ivorian politicians overcoming their petty political calculations and narrow self interests in favour of long-term and visionary calculations and the stability of their country, which is the condition of the general well-being of their people. To do this, they must abide by the terms and recommendations of the peace agreements that have already been signed, regardless of their respective reservations about them or parts of them. The African actors should strive diplomatically to prevent France from manipulating the ‘international community’ for its own interests, which may mean the prolongation of the conflict. References Adebajo, Adekeye (2002), Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra and Guinea-Bissau. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ahua, Antoine and Gary-K Busch [preface of Mamadou Koulibaly] (2003), La guerre de la France contre la Côte d’Ivoires. Paris: L’Harmattan. Asante, Ben (2002), “Ecomog set to deploy”, West Africa, No. 4352, 18 – 24 November. Asante, S. K. B. (2004), “The Travails of Integration,” in Adekeye Adebajo & Ismail Rachid (eds.), West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers). 250

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Bach, Daniel C. (2004), “The Dilemmas of Regionalization” in Adekeye Adebajo & Ismail Rachid (eds.), West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Barry, Mamadou Aliou (1997), La prévention des conflicts en Afrique de l’Ouest. Paris: Karthala. Boutet, Rémy (1992), “l’effroyable guerre du Biafra”, Afrique Contemporaine, Vol. 14. Djéréké, Jean-Claude (2003), Fallait-il prendre lés armes en Côte d’Ivoire? Paris: L’Harmattan. Fall, Elimane and Cheikh Yérim Seck (2002), “Le spectre de la guerre civile”, Jeune Afrique/ L’Intelligent, No. 2188, 15 – 21 December. Fauré, Uves A. (1989), “Côte d’Ivoire: analysing the crisis”, in Donal B.Cruise. O’Brien, John Dunn and Richard Rathbone., eds.,Contemporary West African States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goba, Arsène Ouegui (2000), Côte d’Ivoire: Quelle issue pour la transition? Paris: L’Harmattan. Jaye, Thomas (2003), “Côte d’Ivoire: Roots of the crisis”, West Africa, No. 4359, January. Kaba, Lanciné (1990), “Le ‘Non’ de la Guinée à De Gaulle”, Afrique Contemporaine. Paris: Éditions Chaka. Kessé, Adolphe Blé (2005), La Côte d’Ivoire en guerre : Le sens de l’imposture française. Paris : L’Harmattan. Keita, Sidiki Kobélé (2002), Des Complots contre la Guinée de Sékou Touré (1958 –1984). Conakry: Les Classiques guinéens. Khan, Shaharyar M. (2001), The Shallow Graves of Rwanda (London & New York: I. B. Tauris. Koudou, Claude (2005), Côte d’Ivoire : Pour un nouveau mode de coopération entre l’Afrique et la France. Paris : L’Harmattan. Koulibaly, Mamadou (2004), Sur la Route de la Liberté. Paris : l’Harmattan. Melvern, Linda R. (2000), A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. Cape Town, London & New York: NAEP & Zed Books. Nyinah, Joe Bradford (2003), “ECOWAS to Ghagbo’s rescue”, West Africa, No. 4346, 7 – 13 October. Organization of African Unity (2000), Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. Addis Ababa. 251

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Secure Democracy Project (2000), Liberia Must Inform ECOWAS on the Ivorian Crisis, SecureDem Accra, Available online at http://www.cdd.org.uk/ivorycoast/liberia_ecowas_ivorycoast.htm Smith, Stephen (March 2003), “La politique d’engagement de la France à l’épreuve de la Côte d’Ivoire”, Politique Africaine, No. 89 : 112-126. Souaré, Issaka K. (2004a), “Franco-Africa relations: Half a century of an ambiguous “partnership”’, African Renaissance, Vol. 1, No. 1, June/July: 160 – 167. Souaré, Issaka K. (2004b), “Ivorian Civil War: Between Internal Grievance and External Intrusion”, African Renaissance, Vol. 1, No. 3, November/December: 67-72. Souaré, Issaka K. (2006), Civil Wars and Coups d’États in West Africa: An Attempt to Understand the Roots and Prescribe Possible Solutions. Lanham, MD.: University Press of America. Soudan, François (2002a), « Les secrets d’une “sale petite crise” », Jeune Afrique/L’Intelligent, No.2177, 30 September – 6 October. Soudan, François (2002b), “La tournade Villepin et après? ”, Jeune Afrique/ L’Intelligent, No. 2186, 2– 8 December. Soudan, François (2003), “Le choix de Gbagbo ”, Jeune Afrique/L’Intelligent, No. 2196, 9 – 15 February. United Nations (2001), Côte d’Ivoire: Rapport de la Commission d’enquête internationale pour la Côte d’Ivoire [available on the UN web site in French only]. New York: United Nations Secretariat. Utley, Rachel (2002), “Not to do less but to do better: French military policy in Africa”, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 1: 129 – 146. Verschave, François-Xavier (1998), La Françafrique: Le plus long scandale de la République. Paris: Éditions Stock.

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Chapter 12

Peacekeeping in Africa: the Next Decade Cedric de Coning Introduction While western foreign policy, security and media attention was on Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans over the last decade, Africa emerged as the major arena for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. Of the 18 peace operations currently managed by the UN, 8 are in Africa, of which 6 are large complex peace operations. This explains why 75% of the approximately 88,000 military, police and civilian UN peacekeepers currently deployed can be found in Africa. The emphasis on Africa is also reflected in the UN peacekeeping budget. Of the approximate $5 billion budgeted for 2005/2006, close to 77% was budgeted for operations in Africa. (DPKO, 2006) Peacekeeping is also a dominant theme for the African Union (AU). Over the last half-decade the AU has undertaken two major peacekeeping operations of its own, in Burundi and Sudan, involving 10,000 peacekeepers at a total cost of approximately $600 million. (ACCORD, 2005) Africa is, of course, also a significant troop contributor to UN peace operations, with 34 African countries contributing 28% of the UN’s uniformed peacekeepers. Peacekeeping post 9/11 In comparison with the small and weak UN missions of the mid- to late-1990s, the contemporary UN complex peacekeeping operations represent a significant shift in the political will of the international community to invest in peacekeeping operations in Africa, and to use the United Nations as the vehicle of choice for these types of operations. This shift should not, however, be seen as a concerted effort by the international community to improve peacekeeping in the wake of the failures of the 1990s, although such an effort was indeed made within the UN. (UN, 1999). The willingness to invest more than $5 billion in UN peace operations was generated in, and will be sustained by,

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the post-9/11 belief that failed states are ideal training, staging and breeding grounds for international terrorists. (Traub, 2004). In this context, a kind of informal peacekeeping Apartheid has come about, whereby most European and American peacekeeping and offensive forces are deployed in NATO or European Union (EU) operations in Europe and the Middle-East (de Coning, 2005, 126-132), whilst most UN peacekeeping troops are contributed by the developing world and deployed in Africa. (DPKO, 2006). Whilst this division of roles reflect the macro-pattern, it masks an interesting sub-trend that has emerged over the last three years (Cornish, 2004). Almost a decade after Somalia and Rwanda resulted in the West withholding its peacekeepers from Africa, we now see a new willingness to consider deploying European peacekeepers to Africa. In 2003 the EU deployed operation Artemis in Bunia, in the northeast of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The success of this kind of focussed but robust intervention encouraged the EU to followup with further such missions. (Operation Artemis, 2006) In June 2004, the EU deployed military, police and civilian observers and advisors in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Reliefweb, 15 May 2006) And in 2006, the EU approved a new mission to the DRC, this time in support of the elections scheduled for 30 July 2006. (EU, 27 April 2006) These developments have opened up debate around Europe’s future defence and security policy towards Africa, and have stimulated the discussions around a possible NATO role in, for instance, Darfur. Troop contributions, however, reflect only one facet of the geo-political reality. The financing of UN and African peace operations reveal another. Through the assessed contribution system, the United States of America (USA) is responsible for 26% of the UN peacekeeping budget, while Europe’s combined contribution represents approximately 43%. (UN DPKO Fact sheet, DPI/2429, May 2006) Together, America, Japan and Europe are responsible for approximately 88% of the UN peacekeeping budget. America and Europe are also major financial contributors to African peacekeeping. In 2004 the EU contributed approximately €25 million to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and it has contributed approximately €162 million to AMIS since its inception in 2004. (AU, 12 Jan. 2006) Bilateral contributions by individual EU member states amount to approximately an additional 30 million Euros. (EU, October 2005) The USA has contributed approximately $220 million to AMIS 254

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since the mission’s inception. (Frazer, 2006) From a UN and African perspective, the USA and Europe thus have a major political and financial, influence on, and stake in, the future of peacekeeping in Africa. And it is anticipated that they will have a continued interest in supporting the development of a balanced capacity to manage conflicts in Africa that will ensure that there is robustness at all levels - international, regional and sub-regional – in the system. United Nations peace operations Contemporary UN complex peace operations are in effect peacebuilding operations, in that they have mandates that combine political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of a conflict. (ACCORD, 2004) The UN’s capability to undertake such system-wide peace-building operations is what sets it apart from NATO and the AU. The EU is the only other multilateral body that has the potential to develop such a complex peacebuilding operations capacity in the mid- to long-term. The EU is also the only multilateral body that has the potential to integrate a sixth dimension, namely trade. Combining such a diverse range of functions under one institutional framework has proven to be a daunting task for the UN. (UVIN, 2002) In order to manage these interdependencies in the field, the UN has developed the Integrated Missions model that is essentially aimed at enhancing coherence between the UN Country Team, that is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and the UN peacekeeping operation, that is peace and security focussed. The UN missions in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia and Southern Sudan, all have Integrated Mission management structures. As with any new innovation, this model has not been without its detractors, and it has highlighted various technical, administrative, organizational and budgetary challenges, that need to be overcome before all aspects of the model can be fully implemented. (Dahrendorf, 2003) A comprehensive study (Eide et.al, 2005) was commissioned and completed in May 2005, and as of December 2005, Integrated Missions has now been officially accepted as the mission structure of choice. (UN, 2005) It will be the dominant management structure for UN complex peace operations in the near- to mid-term, and it is likely that the EU, 255

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AU and others will try to apply its core features to their own future missions. Another trend is the new more robust approach to the use of force that has become a defining characteristic of contemporary complex UN peace operations. Although contemporary UN complex peacekeeping operations in Africa are still grounded in, and characterized by, the core principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force, the interpretation and application of these principles in practice, have undergone significant development. Consent still implies that the parties to the conflict must agree to the UN’s peacekeeping role, but it is now recognized that strategic consent at the level of the leadership of the parties to the conflict does not necessarily translate into operational and tactical consent at all levels in the field. Impartiality still implies that the UN peacekeeping mission will not take sides in the conflict among the parties to the conflict, but does not imply that the UN will stand by when civilians are in imminent threat of danger, nor that it will not record and report (for instance to the International Criminal Court) human rights abuses that may have or are still taking place, including by the parties to the conflict. Minimum use of force still implies that the UN peacekeeping mission will use the minimum use of force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is now understood that it should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats to itself or those it has been mandated to protect. It is unlikely, for the foreseeable future, that the UN Security Council will deploy new complex peace operations in Africa, or elsewhere, without mandates that reflect this new interpretation and contain elements of Chapter seven’s enforcement authority. One of the innovations that emerged out of the nexus between peace-building and robust peacekeeping in the context of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), is collaborative offensive operations. MONUC is operating along-side, and in support of, the integrated brigades of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the FARDC), in offensive operations aimed at protecting civilians and forcefully disarming armed groups. Some of these collaborative offensive operations had the desired effect in that they have resulted in larger numbers of combatants entering the disarmament process. However, these operations have also raised various technical, budgetary and administrative challenges. The most 256

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serious concerns relate to the unintended consequences generated by these UN directed and supported actions, including the impact of the predatory behaviour of some of the FARDC troops on the populations where they have been deployed, and the human rights abuses and internal displacements that have come about as a result. Another interesting example of the trend towards greater synergy and cohesion across the traditional security and development divide is the way in which protection is emerging as a common theme for both the humanitarian and peacekeeping community. Since 1999, seven UN peace operations - Burundi, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan - have been mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. (Holt, 2006) In 2005, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination (RC/HC) of the UN Observation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ross Mountain, took the initiative to establish a Protection Working Group that explored the potential of using protection as a common theme among the military, police and civilian peacekeepers and the humanitarian community. (Bonard, 2005 , 2006) After a successful pilot period in North Kivu the concept was broadened to the rest of the country. Similar initiatives are underway in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Civilian protection is set to become one of the dominant themes of UN peace operations in the short to medium term. African peace operations Over the past half-decade, the AU, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC, have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace operations. The AU, in particular, has played a leading role by deploying it’s first two peace operations, AMIB in Burundi and AMIS in Darfur. One of the most significant developments in the African context is the informal division of roles that has emerged around the sequencing of peace operations. The pattern that is taking shape is that the AU, or one of the RECs, first deploy a stabilization operation, followed by a UN complex peacekeeping operation within approximately 90 to 120 days. This pattern was established in Burundi, where the AU deployed AMIB in 2003 followed by a UN operation (ONUB) in 2004; and repeated in Liberia, where ECOWAS deployed ECOMIL in 2003, fol257

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lowed by a UN operation (UNMIL) later in the same year; and it is set to be repeated again in Darfur where the AMIS, first established in 2004, is likely to be replaced by a UN mission (Human Rights Watch, 2006). This sequencing of operations appears to work well because it plays on the respective strengths of the UN, AU and RECs. The UN is adverse to deploying peace operations into situations where a comprehensive peace agreement is not yet in place, and when it does receive the green light to deploy, it needs approximately 90 days to muster the political process necessary to plan, organize and deploy a complex peace operation. (de Coning, 2005). African regional organizations, on the other hand, seem to more readily willing to undertake stabilization operations, especially when they have been involved in brokering a cease-fire, and feel obliged to build on that momentum. And although the AU and some of the RECs are capable of deploying military forces, they generally lack the staying power and multi-dimensional capability of the UN. It is anticipated that this pattern of sequencing will continue into the mid- to longer term. It will be very useful for all concerned, however, if this unofficial division of labour could be formalised through some form of cooperation agreement between the UN and the AU, as this would then enable those concerned to conduct a much more focussed capacity building effort. Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in place than at any other time since the OAU was founded in 1963. (Africa Leadership Forum, 1991). Many of the new structures, however, still need to become fully operational. (Bakwesegha, 1993, 377-381). One of the most important shortcomings of the AU is the lack of institutional capacity, especially the human resources, to adequately develop policy, plan and manage peace operations. (Berman and Sams, 2000). The AU only have a handful of staff dedicated to managing peace operations, significantly less than their UN and EU counterparts. It would be important for donors interested in investing in African peacekeeping capacity to understand that the investment in training and equipping peacekeepers will be unsustainable if it is not matched by a proportionate investment in developing an appropriate headquarter capacity. (AU, 2006). One of the most significant developments in the African peacekeeping context is the initiative to develop an African Stand-by Force, ASF. (AU, 2003). It is significant because, for the first time, Africa now has a 258

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common position, and action plan, for the development of its peacekeeping capacity. This means that the various disparate donor initiatives to enhance Africa’s peacekeeping capacity can be positively channelled to support one coherent effort. (de Coning, 2004). Although considerable progress has been achieved since the ASF concept was approved in 2004, the operationalisation of the ASF has been slower than anticipated, and has been predominantly focussed on the military aspects of peace operations. One of the key remaining challenges is the need to equally develop the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF framework so that the multidimensional nature of contemporary peace operations can be fully integrated into the AU peacekeeping concept. (de Coning, 2005). The single most important factor when considering the future of peacekeeping in Africa is financing. The AU experience is that even relatively small unarmed military observer missions have proven too costly to be financed solely from its own budget or from the African Peace Fund. Instead the AU, and the OAU before it, have to rely on donor funding to finance its peace missions. (AU, 2003) The AU’s first peace operation, AMIB, had an approved strength of just over 3,000 troops and an operational budget of approximately $130 million per year. This was a significant expense in the African context, for instance in comparison, the budget of the AU Commission for 2003 was approximately $32 million. The AU’s second peace operation, AMIS, is even larger still with approximately 6700 personnel and an annual budget of approximately $466 million. AMIS is also donor funded, and as indicated earlier, the EU and the USA have contributed the bulk of the missions’ budget. As can be seen from these two examples, it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, the AU will be dependent on donor support for its peace operations. This is problematic, because the AU’s dependency on external resources denies it the freedom to independently take decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peace operations it may wish to undertake. (de Coning, 1997). Finding the appropriate balance between African and partner interests will thus probably be the dominant feature of the relations between these partners over the short to medium term.

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References Aboagye Festus, (2004), ‘The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation’, in Conflict Trends, Issue 2/2004, http://www.accord.org.za/ct/20042/CT2_2004%20PG9-15.pdf, accessed on 20 May 2006. ACCORD, (2005), Conflict Trends magazine Issue 4/2005, http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2005-4/ct4_2005_pgs52_53.pdf, accessed on 20 May 2006. Africa Leadership Forum, (1991), Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa, Kampala. Amoo SG, (1992), ‘The OAU and African conflicts: Past successes, present paralysis and future perspectives’. Washington DC: Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University. African Union, (2006), Report of the Chairperson, (PSC/PR/2 (XLV)), January 12, 2006. African Union, (2006), Draft Policy Framework for Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development, http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Conferences/Past/2006/February/ PSC/ Framework_ PCRD.pdf, accessed on 22 May 2006. African Union, (2003), Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Stand-by Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I1 Annexes), 12–14 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Exp/ASF-MSC/2(1); a copy can be found at http://www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/ aurep.htm, accessed on 25 May 2006. Bakwesegha CJ, (1993), ‘The need to strengthen regional organizations: A rejoinder’, Security Dialogue, 24, 4, 1993. Barth Eide, E, Kaspersen, A.T, Kent, R. & von Hippel, K. (2005), Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, Independent Study of the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, NUPI, Oslo. Berman E & K Sams, (2000), Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. Geneva: UNIDIR. Bonard P, (2006), Author interviews and correspondence with Paul Bonard, Senior Protection Adviser to DSRSG RC/HC, MONUC, 2005 and 2006. Cornish Edward, (ed.), (2004), “Futuring: The Exploration of the Future”, World Future Society, Bethesda. 260

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de Coning, Cedric, (2005), ‘An African Perspective on United Nations Reform’ (Un Point De Vue Africain), Revue Agir, No. 22, May 2005. de Coning, C.H. (2005), “A Peacekeeping Stand-By System for SADC: Implementing the African Stand-By Force Framework in Southern Africa”, in Anne Hammerstad (ed.), People, States and Regions: Building a Co-operative Security Regime in Southern Africa, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 2005, Johannesburg. de Coning, C.H. (2004), “Towards a Common Southern African Peacekeeping System”, in Solomon, H. (ed.), Towards a Common Defence and Security Policy in the Southern African Development Community, Africa Institute, 2004, Pretoria. de Coning, C.H., (2005), “Towards a Civilian Component for the African Stand-by Force”, Center for International Political Studies (CiPS) E-Briefing Paper No 58/2005, University of Pretoria, Pretoria. de Coning, C.H. (1997), “The Role of the OAU in Conflict Management in Africa, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and PeaceBuilding”, in Lessons for Africa from a Seminar Past, ISS Monograph Series, No. 10, April 1997, Midrand, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/ No10/DeConing.html, accessed on 25 May 2006. Dahrendorf, N. (2003), A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change, King’s College, London. Donini, A. (2002), The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda, Occasional Paper #22, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence. DPKO, (2006), DPKO Background Note, 30 April 2006, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm, accessed on 20 May 2006. DPKO, (2006), DPKO Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations as of 30 April 2006, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/apr06_2.pdf, accessed on 20 May 2006. DPKO, (2006), UN DPKO Fact Sheet, DPI/2429 of May 2006. Duffield, M., Lautze S. & Jones, B. (1998), Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996-1997, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), New York.

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EU, (2006), Joint Action approved by the Council of the European Union on 27 April 2006, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_116/l_11620060429en0098010 1.pdf, accessed on 21 May 2006. EU, (2005), Council Secretariat Fact Sheet, AMIS II/02, October 2005, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/AMIS_II_October.pdf, accessed on 21 May 2006. Frazer, J, (2006), Briefing by Ambassador Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 28 April 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ask/20060428.html, accessed on 21 May 2006. Holt, Victoria K, (2006), ‘The Military and Civilian Protection: Developing Roles and Capacities’ in Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmar, “Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in MilitaryHumanitarian Relations”, HPG Report 21, March 2006 (www.odihpn.org). Human Rights Watch report, (2006), ‘Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change -The African Union Mission in Sudan’, Vol.18, No.1 (A) of January 2006 at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106/index.htm, accessed on 21 May 2006. Porter, T. (2002), An External Review of the CAP, OCHA, New York. Reindorp, N. & Wiles, P. (2001), Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience, A study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London. Smith, D. (2003), Towards a Strategic Framework for Peace building: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peace building, PRIO, Oslo, p.16. Sommers, Marc. (2000), The Dynamics of Coordination, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper #40, Providence. Stockton, N. (2002), Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Kabul. Traub, James (2004), ‘Making Sense of the Mission’, New York Times Magazine, 11 April 2004. UN, (2005), “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions”, SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, 9 December 2005. 262

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Uvin, P. (2002), “The Development/Peace building Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms”, Journal of Peace building & Development, Vol. 1, No. 1.

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PART SEVEN

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY

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Building Security Through Regional Bodies: The Unhappy Case of SADC18 Laurie Nathan Security problems in SADC The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992 with a mandate to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common political values and institutions.19 There were great expectations that the demise of apartheid and the Cold War would usher in a period of sustained stability and development. Over the subsequent decade, however, the region remained wracked by a high level of conflict that included civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, and violence in a number of other countries. SADC was largely ineffectual in these situations, distinguished less by its peacemaking efforts than by its fractious internal quarrels. The formation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, a common security regime whose functions include the prevention and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflict, was itself bedevilled by acrimonious disputes among member states over a ten-year period. There is broad agreement among local analysts that SADC has failed to pursue its goal of regional peace and security in an effective manner. (Malan, 1998) Many observers attribute the malaise to disputes over the status and structure of the Organ or to competition and animosity between South Africa and Zimbabwe. These perspectives are incomplete and superficial because they focus on manifestations of

A longer version of this article with more extensive references was published as L. Nathan, ‘SADC’s uncommon approach to common security, 1992-2003’, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol 32, no 3, September 2006, pp 605-622. 19 In 2003 the members of SADC were Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 18

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deeper problems. The aim of this article is to identify and explore the underlying problems that inhibited the development of the Organ and prevented SADC from playing a useful peacemaking role between 1992 and 2003. The first and most important problem is an absence of common values among member states. There are two key lines of division: between pacific and militarist approaches to regional security, and between democratic and authoritarian orientations in domestic politics. In order to highlight the significance of these divisions, I distinguish between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as separate requirements for cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic, which is strong in Southern Africa, refers to the interests, gains and material conditions that make the organisation a beneficial venture in the assessment of member states. The internal logic, which is weak in the case of SADC, refers to the normative congruence in the policies of member states that enables these states to engage in close political and security co-operation. In the absence of sufficient congruence, states are unable to build trust, develop common policies, resolve or transcend their major disputes and act with common purpose in crisis situations. Whereas the external logic is the fuel that drives a regional organisation, the internal logic is the glue that holds it together. The second major problem is that SADC states are loathe to surrender a measure of sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses binding rules and the possibility of interference in domestic affairs. This reluctance stems from the political weakness of states, which have a tenuous hold on sovereignty, and from the lack of common values, mutual trust and shared vision of the security regime. The third critical problem is that the region is characterised by small economies, underdevelopment and weak administrative capacity, which undermine the effectiveness of all SADC’s forums and programmes. The following two sections describe in turn SADC’s struggle to establish a security regime and its dismal record of peacemaking. The subsequent two sections seek to explain these dynamics with reference to the absence of common values and the political, economic and administrative weakness of states.

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Institutional developments on peace and security Article 5 of the SADC Treaty of 1992 provides that the organisation’s objectives include the achievement of self-sustaining development, economic growth and poverty alleviation through regional integration; the evolution of common political values and institutions; and the promotion and defence of peace and security. Article 4 stipulates that SADC and its members must act in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality of states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes. Article 22 requires states to conclude and ratify protocols spelling out the goals, scope and manner of co-operation and integration in seven sectors, one of which covers ‘politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security’. Between 1992 and 1994 the Secretariat attempted to drive the formulation of regional security policy and imbue it with a democratic and anti-militarist character. SADC’s 1993 Framework and Strategy document, prepared by the Secretariat, called for the creation of a ‘nonmilitaristic security order’ based on democratic norms, the adoption of non-offensive defence doctrines, and reductions in military force levels and spending. It also stressed the need to address non-military sources of conflict and threats to the security of people, such as underdevelopment and abuse of human rights. In July 1994 the Secretariat convened the Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in Windhoek. Attended by ministers, officials, parliamentarians and members of non-governmental groups, the workshop endorsed the anti-militarist agenda and recommended the establishment of an independent human rights commission and a SADC Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation. Unhappy with these recommendations, the Frontline States (FLS) coalition proposed the formation of a new entity, the Association of Southern African States, which would serve as the regional security body independently of the Secretariat. It appeared that a consensus prevailed on the principles, objectives and strategies of the security forum and that the issues in contention were limited to its status, structure and procedures. In retrospect, as discussed below, it is clear that many states did not support the anti-militarist and democratic norms. Antagonistic and recriminatory debates around the security body’s 267

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status and structure persisted over the next seven years as manifestations of underlying political and strategic differences. At its annual meeting in 1995 the Summit was unable to make progress on regional security arrangements. The immediate deadlock arose from Zimbabwe’s suggestion that the security forum should follow the tradition of the FLS and be chaired on a permanent basis by the longestserving head of state in the region, namely President Mugabe; other countries preferred the option of a rotating chair. Nevertheless, in June 1996 the Summit launched the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The official communiqué stated that the Organ would operate at summit, ministerial and technical levels independently of other SADC structures, it would incorporate the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the FLS, and its Chair would rotate annually among member states. (SADC, 1996) The Summit appointed Mugabe as the first Chair of the Organ. The Summit’s decisions gave rise to much confusion and tension in subsequent years. This was partly because the launch of the Organ was premature. The de jure formation of this body required a protocol approved by the Summit and ratified by two-thirds of the SADC states, a process that was only completed in 2004. Nor, for some years, did the body exist de facto: none of its envisaged structures was set up and the Organ Chair did not rotate annually. Further, the decision that the Organ would operate independently of other SADC structures gave rise to the anomalous prospect of two separate forums of heads of state being responsible for addressing conflict in the region. South Africa argued that while this responsibility fell within the Organ’s mandate, in terms of the SADC Treaty it was also a core function of the SADC Summit. (Brammer, 1999) A Zimbabwean official presented the counter-argument as follows: SADC was an inappropriate body to preside over sensitive security matters because it was funded by foreign donors; the Summit had therefore intended to create ‘a parallel and independent structure from the SADC economic forum’; and it was ‘mischievous to engage in superfluous legalese in a bid to imprison the SADC Organ in the SADC Treaty’. (Tapfumaneyi, 1999) During his tenure as the SADC Chair in 1997, Mandela became so exasperated with Mugabe’s rival authority as the Chair of the Organ that he threatened to resign if the Organ were not made accountable to the Summit. (Witherell, 1998)

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By the late 1990s it was clear that SADC was also polarised around incompatible pacific and militarist visions of the Organ. One camp, comprising Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania, viewed the Organ as a common security regime whose primary basis for co-operation and peacemaking would be political rather than military. The other camp, comprising Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, preferred a mutual defence pact and prioritised military co-operation and responses to conflict. Mugabe stated that he foresaw the Organ developing into a ‘kind of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for the region’. (SouthScan, 1997) At its annual meetings in 1998 and 1999 the Summit remained unable to resolve these disputes. In late 1999 the Foreign Minister of Swaziland, which held the rotating Chair of the ISDSC at the time, pursued the matter with a sense of purpose that had previously been lacking. He convened two extraordinary ministerial meetings to finalise the drafting of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which specifies the objectives, methods, structures and jurisdiction of the Organ. The major strategic differences could not be reconciled, leading to an uneasy compromise whereby the Organ would have a pacific orientation and states would later conclude a regional defence pact. The controversy around the Organ’s status was resolved in favour of this body being part of SADC and accountable to the Summit. Other contentious issues were finessed, ignored or left vague. After a further fifteen months of procrastination, the Summit approved the Protocol at its meeting in August 2001 and appointed President Chissano of Mozambique as the new Chair of the Organ. The Summit also consolidated a far-reaching plan to restructure SADC by centralising its operations in the Secretariat. The Treaty was amended accordingly and now provides for the Organ. By the end of 2003, however, the Organ Protocol had not been ratified by a sufficient number of states to come into force.20 In 2003 the Summit approved the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. The Pact deals with defence co-operation and with collective action in response to an armed attack. In terms of the Protocol, the Organ must promote peace and security in the region through close political, military and security co-

The requirement of ratification by two-thirds of the SADC states was met in March 2004.

20

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operation among states and through the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is mandated to resolve ‘significant intra-state conflict’ within the territory of a state party and ‘significant inter-state conflict’ between the state parties or between a state party and another state. It reports to the Summit and is headed by a Troika consisting of the current Chair, the outgoing Chair and the incoming Chair for the following year. Subordinate structures include the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee, comprising foreign ministers, and the ISDSC, comprising ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence. SADC’s response to violent conflict Between 1995 and 2003 there were a number of violent conflicts in SADC countries. They included the long-running civil war in Angola that ended in 2002 when the leader of the rebel movement Unita, Jonas Savimbi, was killed; a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents in the DRC that began in 1998; election disputes, a mutiny and an external military intervention in Lesotho in 1998; a failed secessionist bid in Namibia in 1998/1999; election disputes in Malawi in 1999; a constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001; election disputes on the Zanzibar island of Tanzania in 2001; and, continuously from early 2000, violence and political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. In 1998 Angola threatened to invade Zambia in order to halt supplies to Unita and in 2000 Zambia accused Angola of conducting military attacks on its territory. In addition to being unable to prevent such conflicts, SADC does not have a record of successful peacemaking. In most of the intra-state conflicts it refrained from critical comment and diplomatic engagement, treating violence and crises in governance as purely domestic affairs. There were several reasons for this. First, member states are keen to avoid adversarial relations that might jeopardise trade and functional co-operation. Second, governments that are not fully democratic are naturally unwilling to speak out against neighbouring states that engage in undemocratic practices. Third, SADC states are determined to maintain a posture of unity and solidarity. Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, this posture militates against public criticism of each other. The emphasis on solidarity has been most evident in the case of the political crisis and abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. In addition to a systematic drive to crush domestic opposition, Harare’s efforts 270

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to overcome the inequities in land ownership resulting from colonial rule were characterised by disregard for judicial rulings, violence perpetrated by state-sponsored militia, the accumulation of farms by the ruling elite, and the confusion of farm workers. (Human Rights Watch, 2002). In 2001 a SADC task group formed to address the Zimbabwe crisis denounced the decline in the rule of law and insisted that the crisis was due to government’s approach to land reform rather than to the need for land reform.(Granelli, 2001) Yet in 2002 the ISDSC ‘expressed serious concern on the continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of some Member States, especially in Zimbabwe which has embarked on an agrarian reform programme aimed at addressing the problem of poverty’. (SADC, 2002) In 2003 the Ministerial Committee of the Organ ‘took note that those opposed to Zimbabwe have tried to shift the agenda from the core issue of land by selective diversion of attention on governance and human rights issues’. (SADC, 2003) For its part, the Summit repeatedly expressed solidarity with Harare and ignored the abuses. SADC’s poor record of peacemaking is also attributable to the impasse around the Organ. The lack of an agreed set of norms, strategies and procedures for addressing high intensity conflict contributed to collective inertia, divergent and parochial approaches by individual states, ill-conceived interventions and a confused mixture of peacemaking and peace enforcement. As described below, most of these problems were apparent during the crises in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998. In both cases a small group of states embarked on military action in the name of SADC despite the absence of a SADC decision authorising such action. In September 1998 the Prime Minister of Lesotho requested neighbouring states to take urgent military steps to stabilise a domestic crisis. Against the backdrop of mounting dissent over the results of a national election, there were fears of an imminent coup when a group of junior officers deposed and imprisoned the commander and other senior members of the Lesotho Defence Force. In consultation with Mozambique and Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana deployed troops in Lesotho. The deployment met with unanticipated resistance from sections of the Lesotho army. Eight South African soldiers and an estimated 58 Basotho soldiers were killed in battles over several days. Anarchy and public demonstrations against the intervention ensued, lead271

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ing to the virtual sacking of the capital city, Maseru. Riddled with strategic and tactical errors, the operation was widely viewed as a political and military disaster. In response to public criticism, Pretoria insisted that the deployment had been requested by the head of a legitimate government facing an incipient coup and that the operation had only been authorised after efforts to end the mutiny through negotiations had failed. South Africa based the legality of the intervention on the following factors: the operation took place under SADC auspices; it flowed from a SADC decision to not permit coups and other unconstitutional changes of government in Southern Africa; and it was based on a 1994 agreement that South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana would be guarantors of stability in Lesotho. A former South African defence official has noted several flaws in this argument: the ‘SADC decision’ to not allow coups in the region had in fact been a proposal from the ISDSC to the SADC Summit; the proposal had included the proviso that the approval of the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and SADC be obtained prior to any military intervention; and the Summit had neither endorsed the ISDSC’s proposal nor sanctioned military action in Lesotho. (Williams, 2000). In 1996 a rebellion in Zaire led to the fall of President Mobutu and the assumption of the presidency by Laurent Kabila. The country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo and became a member of SADC. On 2 August 1998 the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy) launched a rebellion against Kabila with the support of Rwanda and Uganda which had helped to bring him to power. Kabila appealed to SADC for assistance. In his capacity as the Chair of the Organ, Mugabe convened a meeting in Victoria Falls of heads of state from Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. He excluded South Africa, which held the Chair of SADC at the time, because of the tension with Pretoria over the Organ. (Southern Africa Report, 1998, 4-5) He subsequently referred the matter to an ISDSC meeting in Harare, at the conclusion of which he declared that SADC had decided unanimously to meet Kabila’s appeal. The following day Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia announced that they would deploy troops in the DRC on behalf of SADC. The intervening states justified the deployment as an act of collective defence against the alleged invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and 272

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Uganda. They also claimed that the deployment had been authorised by the Organ and the ISDSC. Yet the Organ was not operational, the ISDSC had no mandate to initiate military action, and only a handful of SADC states were present at the meetings convened by Mugabe. Mandela’s spokesperson stated emphatically that ‘there is no way that the people who met at Victoria Falls and Harare can have met under the auspices of the SADC’. (Mail & Guardian, 21-27 August, 1998) When Mandela challenged Mugabe’s authority to send troops on behalf of SADC, the latter responded with a thinly veiled insult: ‘No one is compelled within SADC to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict. Those who want to keep out, fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help’.(UN-OCHA, 1998) Supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, South Africa pursued a diplomatic solution to the DRC crisis. Mandela convened an emergency meeting of the SADC Summit in Pretoria but Mugabe declined to attend, proclaiming that ‘it is not possible for us to resolve [the crisis] as SADC because we are divided’. (Berman and Sams, 2000, 178) The Summit insisted that military action was unacceptable and called for an immediate cease-fire and process of negotiations.(SADC, 23 August 1998) At the Non-Aligned Movement’s Summit hosted by South Africa in September, however, Mandela declared unexpectedly that SADC supported the military intervention. The apparent turnabout was intended to ease the tension with Mugabe and restore a semblance of unity to SADC. (SouthScan, 1998, 137-138) The SADC Summit meeting in 1998 sought similarly to present a united front, endorsing the positions represented by both South Africa and Zimbabwe. (SADC, 14 Sept. 1998) President Chiluba of Zambia was mandated to broker a cease-fire and former President Masire of Botswana was charged with facilitating an internal dialogue process in the DRC. In July 1999 the state belligerents signed the Lusaka peace accord, which shifted the locus of international support from SADC to the UN and the OAU. The absence of common values The development of common political values in the interests of stability, integration and community-building is one of SADC’s primary goals and was part of the rationale for its establishment. At the time of

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its inception, SADC recognised that the demise of apartheid required a new normative foundation for cohesion and co-operation. In the past, regional political solidarity and security co-operation, mainly in the context of the Frontline States, were based on the liberation struggles and common apartheid threat. As the chapter of political liberation comes to a close, and the apartheid threat is removed, it is necessary to find a more abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and co-operation in order to guarantee peace in the region. …Regional co-operation and understanding in this area, in particular, has to be underpinned by the establishment of common political, social and other values, such as democracy, respect for human rights, respect for the rule of law etc. (SADC, 1993, 24). SADC has failed to meet this challenge. In the domestic sphere there is no consensus on the basic principles of governance. In addition to Swaziland and the DRC that are not democratic, there are many de jure democracies whose executives are intolerant of dissent, hardly accountable to parliament and insufficiently committed to respect for human rights and the rule of law. The SADC Parliamentary Forum observes that politicians in the region ‘talk democracy but use undemocratic means to stay in power’. (SAPA, 2000) In the absence of common political values, SADC has been unable to address the crises that arise when states deviate substantially from its official norms. In the foreign policy sphere, the Organ floundered on a division between militarist and pacific camps. As noted earlier, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe emphasised defence co-operation and collective security through a mutual defence pact that would lead in time to a Natotype organisation. Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania, on the other hand, preferred political co-operation and diplomatic means of peacemaking through a common security regime. Neither camp holds an absolute position. The former is not opposed to diplomatic peacemaking, particularly when it accompanies or follows military action, and the latter is not opposed to the use of force in all circumstances, as was evident when South Africa and Botswana deployed troops in Lesotho in 1998. Nevertheless, the strongly held policy preferences of the two groups in relation to regional security arrangements were sufficiently divergent that they could not be bridged satisfactorily. In a frank commentary on the division, a Zimbabwean defence official has claimed that the major reason for the Organ impasse was Preto274

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ria’s opposition to the use of armed force in peacemaking. He argued that collective military force had been required as a catalyst for political solutions in all the conflicts in Southern Africa and it was therefore ‘superfluous and hypocritical for the South African government and its apologists to advocate a strict adherence to early warning and diplomatic solutions to SADC conflicts’. (Tapfumaneyi, 1999, 23-26) The DRC war in 1998 highlighted the strategic import of the rift as the pacific group promoted negotiations and a ceasefire while Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola engaged in hostilities. This cleavage generated lasting mistrust and antagonism, crippled the Organ and gave rise to the notion of ‘two SADCs’. (Williams, 2000, 97) As the Zimbabwean defence official put it, ‘the two camps have clearly worked at crosspurposes resulting in either divergent action or no action at all in the face of an increasing number of crises’. (Tapfumaneyi, 1999, 23) In order to explore further the problem of common values in relation to the Organ impasse, it is helpful to distinguish between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary but separate requirements for cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic refers to the interests and material conditions that make the organisation a beneficial venture in the judgement of member states. These states must believe that their interests will be served through institutionalised co-operation and co-ordination in respect of one or more problems and goals. Indeed, it would be illogical for states to pursue co-operation, let alone integration, if they were not convinced that the likely gains outweighed the costs. The external logic of SADC has been articulated clearly in official documents and encompasses the following concerns and incentives: regionalism and integration as a response to globalisation and Africa’s marginalisation in international trade and politics; the promotion of development and economic growth through regional projects and trade; the many socio-economic problems that transcend national borders and require a co-ordinated response; the benefits of co-operation in sectors like water, energy, policing, health and transport; the utility of a regional forum for conflict resolution; and the peacekeeping and confidence-building benefits of defence collaboration. In relation to security, the external logic is that integration and development require political stability, which in turn requires a security regime with a peacemaking mandate.

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The internal logic of a regional organisation, on the other hand, refers to the normative congruence in the domestic and foreign policies of member states that makes these states willing and able to engage in close political and security co-operation. A high level of congruence engenders the affinity and trust that are essential prerequisites for states to develop common policies on a range of sensitive issues, adopt a set of binding principles and rules, and accept the resultant constraints on their decision-making and behaviour. The internal logic holds the organisation together as the external logic drives it forward. The internal logic is a relative rather than an absolute imperative. Even when the members of a regional organisation are prepared to accept a set of rules based on shared values, they do not surrender sovereign decision-making lightly and completely. They invariably encounter serious differences of opinion and experience difficulty in collective decision-making on policy matters and in crisis situations, leading at times to independent and divergent courses of action. Some member states might also deviate occasionally from the agreed rules and policies. For the organisation to withstand these differences and deviations, there must be sufficient political commonality and trust among its members. In other words, there is a minimum threshold of normative congruence for a successful regional organisation, below which the organisation lacks cohesion and its members are unable to develop common policies. The internal logic is also relative in the sense that the degree of congruence required for success varies according to the focus, type and form of multilateral engagement. The Southern African experience suggests, unsurprisingly, that the threshold is lower in non-sensitive areas than in the arena of high politics; that it rises in the progression from co-operation to co-ordination to integration; and that it is higher in a formal regime than in an informal association. Notwithstanding their disputes, SADC states have sufficient affinity and trust to co-operate in functional sectors such as water and energy, as well as in sectors that have political dimensions but are relatively uncontroversial, a good example being their technical cooperation on military and police matters through the ISDSC and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation. In the 1980s the informal coalition of the FLS achieved cohesion on the basis of its members’ common opposition to apartheid and colonialism but it did not seek to regulate their conduct through binding rules. 276

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The requisite threshold of political congruence is much higher in the case of a formal security regime like the SADC Organ that encompasses principles and rules intended to constrain state behaviour and decision-making in the realm of high politics. If the domestic and/or foreign policies of member states are incompatible, the regime is unlikely to be effective for a host of reasons: there are no common values on which to base the rules, develop common policies and achieve cohesion; the organisation will instead be wracked by divisions that inhibit collective decision-making and action; its members will frequently breach the declared norms that are inconsistent with their national policies; and member states that are authoritarian will not fulfil a mandate to promote democracy. These factors constitute a summary explanation of SADC’s dismal record in relation to peacemaking and democratic governance. Weak states States do not surrender sovereign decision-making lightly in any circumstances. There are three additional factors that make Southern African states especially cautious and sensitive. First, they guard their sovereignty jealously because many of them attained it relatively recently and at great cost through liberation wars. Second, most of them do not enjoy full sovereignty in any event: they do not have a monopoly of violence within their territories; they do not have adequate control of movement across their borders; their administrative reach in rural areas is weak; and their ability to mobilise resources and collect taxes is limited. States that have weak de facto sovereignty are understandably resistant to regional mechanisms that would dilute it further through binding rules and decision-making. Third, however compelling the external logic of a regional organisation, it is improbable that states will agree to be bound by rules and decision-making in the political and security spheres if they do not support the underlying norms and trust each other. One of SADC’s founding documents noted that the envisaged process of integration would entail a shift in the locus of exercising sovereignty from the national to the regional level. (SADCC, 1992, 33) Yet this issue is so sensitive, and states are so reluctant to confront its implications, that it has not been discussed explicitly since 1992. In addition to these political factors, Southern Africa is characterised by underde277

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velopment and small economies with low productivity. Consequently, Southern African countries are heavily dependent on donor assistance. SADC itself receives approximately eighty per cent of its project funding from the European Union and other foreign sources, and it struggles to expend these funds. (Tjonneland, 2004, 15-16) The SADC enterprise assumes that the main problems of weakness are small economies and underdevelopment and that these problems can be addressed through synergies generated by integration. Yet the greater problem of weakness is the limited capacity of states to undertake development and integration. The chronic lack of resources and expertise in the public sector undermines SADC in three ways: states that cannot effect proper co-ordination between their own departments struggle to fulfil the vastly more complicated task of co-ordination between countries; states that are unable to attend adequately to their domestic priorities devote scant attention and resources to regional projects; and the skills deficit cripples all multilateral programmes and forums. In these circumstances the potential to achieve synergy through regional projects is extremely low. The problems flowing from weak state capacity have been compounded by a long-standing aversion to centralised structures at the regional level. Anxious to avoid the diminution of sovereignty that might arise from having a strong Secretariat, SADC decided at its inception to allocate responsibility for co-ordinating multilateral programmes to individual states. This approach was largely unsuccessful. Ten years after its formation, SADC estimated that only twenty per cent of its 470 projects met the criteria for properly integrated regional projects, the rest being essentially national projects. (Isaksen and Tjonneland, 2001, 3) Following an extensive organisational review, in 2001 the Summit finally decided to centralise planning, co-ordination and implementation functions in the Secretariat. Significantly, though, it did not increase the powers and authority of the Executive Secretary in relation to the governing structures of the organisation. Conclusion SADC’s efforts to create a regional security regime have been constrained and undermined by the weakness of member states, their fear of diluting sovereignty and, most importantly, their lack of shared val278

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ues. The optimistic prognosis of SADC’s security project in the early 1990s relied too much on the compelling external logic of the project and paid too little attention to its internal logic, overestimating the durability of the bonds forged during the liberation era and ignoring the substantial normative differences between states. At the heart of all SADC’s difficulties lies a systemic tension between regional goals and national constraints. The overarching dilemma is that regional integration is an endeavour intended to strengthen states in various ways, but Southern African countries are in various ways too weak to undertake this endeavour successfully. SADC’s ability to strengthen weak states and contribute to the democratic transformation of authoritarian states is severely limited because its capacity, orientation and mandate derive from these states. SADC cannot drive their transformation or attend to their domestic security problems because it is a forum of states that will not permit it to do this. As a result, the challenge of common security in Southern Africa is more of a national than a regional challenge. References Baregu, M, (2003), ‘Economic and Military Security’, in M. Baregu and C. Landsberg (eds), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Berman, E.G and K.S. Sams, (2000), Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Brammer, H, (1999), ‘In Search of an Effective Regional Security Mechanism for Southern Africa’, Global Dialogue, vol 4, no 2, August. Granelli, M, (2001), ‘SADC Heads Read Riot Act to Mugabe’, Cape Times, 11 September 2001. Human Rights Watch, (2002), ‘Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe’, Human Rights Watch Report, vol 14, no 1(A), March 2002. Mail and Guardian, (1998), ‘The Last Days of Laurent Kabila?’, Mail and Guardian, 21-27 August 1998. Isaksen J, and E.N. Tjønneland, (2001), ‘Assessing the Restructuring of SADC – Positions, Policies and Progress’, Report of the Chr. Michelsen Institute, R 2001:6, December 2001.

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Malan, M, (1998), ‘Regional Power Politics under Cover of SADC Running Amok with a Mythical Organ’, ISS Paper, no 35, Institute for Security Studies, October 1998. SADC, (1996), ‘Communiqué: Summit of Heads of State or Governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)’, Gaborone, 28 June 1996. SADC, (1998), ‘Communiqué of the Summit Meeting of the SADC on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Pretoria, 23 August 1998. SADC, (1998), ‘Communiqué. Mauritius – Grand Bay: 13-14th September, 1998’, Grand Bay, 1998. SADCC,(1992), Theme Document, Maputo, January 1992. SADC, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, Harare, January 1993. SADC, ISDSC,(2002), ‘Final Communiqué. 23rd Session of the Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation’, Luanda, 9 August 2002. SADC Organ, (2003), ‘Communiqué of the Third Session of the Committee of Ministers of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation’, Harare, 3 April 2003. SAPA, (200), ‘Leaders Should Practice Democracy’, South African Press Association, 15 October 2000. Southern Africa Report, (1998), ‘Foreign Affairs Tries to Deny Mugabe’s Snub’, Southern Africa Report, vol 16, no 32, 14 August 1998. Southscan, (1997), ‘Congo Wins Membership in Sudden Expansion of SADC’, SouthScan, vol 12, no 33, 12 September 1997 SouthScan, (1998), ‘SA Seeks to Recoup Its Diplomatic Losses on Congo Intervention at Peace Summit’, SouthScan, vol 13, no 18, 4 September 1998. Tapfumaneyi, A.W, (1999) ‘Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa: A View from Zimbabwe’, Global Dialogue, vol 4, no 2, August 1999. Tjønneland, E, (2004), ‘Foreign Aid and Regional Co-operation’, SADC Barometer, no 4, January 2004. Tsie, B, (1998), ‘Regional Security in Southern Africa: Whither the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security?’, Global Dialogue, vol 3, no 3, December 1998. UN-OCHA, (1998), ‘DRC: Zimbabwean, Angolan Troops Arrive to Back Kabila’, Integrated Regional Information Network Bulletin, 280

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United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 21 August 1998. Wetherell, I, (1998), ‘SADC Security Split Threatens’, Mail and Guardian, 17-23 July 1998. Williams, R, (2000), ‘From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding? South African Policy and Practice in Peace Missions’, International Peacekeeping, vol 7, no 3, Autumn 2000.

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Between the Local and the Global: Challenges to Resolving African Interlocking Conflicts Marcel Kitissou Introduction A critical point in the Cold War era was reached in the 1980s. In 1983, US president Ronald Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative, and in the same year, he called the Soviet Union the “evil empire”. Leonid Brezhnev responded by calling Reagan the most dangerous cowboy in the world. The actual battlefield for the Cold War warriors was the Third World, the African continent in particular. The 1980s was a turbulent decade in Africa. Analysing African conflicts of that period of time, Raymond Copson in his 1994 book, Africa’s Wars and Prospects for Peace, gave these striking estimates: For the sake of analysis, however, let us say provisionally that 3 million people have died in Africa as a result of war since 1980. According to one study, world-wide related deaths, civilian and military, totalled 141.9 million for the period 1500-1990. Death in Africa’s wars just since 1980 may thus approximate 2 percent of all deaths in wars in the entire modern era-surely a large enough proportion to qualify these wars as a global disaster. (Copson 1994, p. 4)

Eleven deadly conflicts ravaged the continent in the period aforementioned: six major wars and five lesser ones. Estimates of casualties for the six major wars were for Sudan between 500,000 and 1 million; for Ethiopia between 450 000 and 1 million; for Mozambique between 450,000 and 1 million; for Angola between 300,000 and 500,000; for Uganda between 100,000 and 500,000; and for Somalia between 300,000 and 400,000. Estimates of casualties for the five lesser ones were for Liberia between 10,000 and 13,000; 12,500 for Namibia; 16,000 for Western Sahara; 7,000 for Chad; and hundreds and more for Rwanda (Copson 1994, p. 29). All of these were intra-state conflicts but with international ramifications. 283

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African multi-level and interlocking conflicts A few examples may be used to demonstrate the “interlocking” or “embedded” nature of African conflicts. In Sudan the 1963-1972 war between the Islamic north and the Christian-Animist south set the stage for the conflict that would start ten years later, in 1983. The southernbased Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was resisting what it perceived as a triple menace of islamization, arabization and exploitation. In 1983, President Jaafar al-Numeiry declared the sharia -Islamic law- the criminal code nation-wide and universally applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims as well. The Jonglei canal project and the Bentiu oil wells in the Upper Nile province were seen as instruments of both arabization and exploitation and a threat to the way of life of the south. The SPLA armed resistance first stopped the two projects. The announcement of the sharia was the trigger of the second war that broke out in 1983 but there were pre-existing tensions internally and aggravating conditions in the international environment. First of all was the fact that the former colonial power, the British, lacked serious consideration for local issues. They left a state system that incorporated the non-Muslim Nilotic and Bantu of the south and the northern Muslim population. The south looked inward, toward the African continent. The north leaned outward, toward the Arab world and the Middle East. A crisis of identity was created at the very beginning of the new national entity, a potential for communal strife. This situation was solidified by the 1963 charter of the Organization of African Unity that kept colonial borders unchallenged by virtue of principle. The Cold war rivalry and regional competition made matters worse. For example, in 1960, Ethiopia allowed Israeli experts to cross Sudan’s border and establish links (off and on over a period of three decades) with guerrillas fighting against Khartoum; Ethiopia was itself complaining that Sudan and other (unspecified) Arab countries supported the rebels in Eritrea and the Oromo Liberation Front in south-western Ethiopia. It is reported that Uganda was supporting the Sudan Popular Liberation Army (SPLA) of southern Sudan and that Khartoum, in turn, was supporting the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda (Kitissou, 2004, p. 6). Global Security also reported about the SPLA and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) allies receiving political, military and logis284

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tical support from Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea. Uganda helped SPLA with access to weapons and training facilities. The US gave indirect assistance. It “allocated $20 million in ‘non-lethal’ military assistance to SPLA supporters (Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia) in February 1998 for defence against opposition groups in their countries backed by Sudan. Sudan has long accused Eritrea, which has a long hostile relationship with Khartoum, of providing training facilities and arms to the SPLA in the south, to rebel forces in Darfur, and another rebel group called Beja Congress in the east” (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan). There was no zero-sum game but a contest with multiple protagonists, multiple agendas and different hierarchy of priorities. Each party fights for its own goals within the “same” political game. However, in North Eastern Africa, there is one thing that binds the region together, and that is the common use of the Nile River. Although Egypt considers the waters of the Nile as a matter of national security, the country is not highly visible in the region’s conflicts as peace broker. The majority of its territory being desert, feeding an expanding population means transforming desert areas into croplands. Increased demands on the Nile water resources by upstream neighbouring states threaten the nation’s survival. Absent meaningful negotiation with the nine other riparian countries (Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo), alternatives to Egypt’s direct military action are wars and political instability in countries sharing the Nile Valley. Egypt could maintain the status quo, i.e., its acquired rights and privileged position in the use of the Nile water if the other countries lack ability to develop and are unable to make more demands on the shared water resources. It may be assumed that Egypt’s lack of an active role in the resolution of regional conflicts is a strategy of survival by omission. Some of Africa’s Cold War era conflicts were resolved in the 1990s or the beginning of the 21st Century. Among others, the Rome General Peace Accords ended the Civil war in Mozambique in 1992. Eritrea separated from Ethiopia in 1993. Liberia civil war ended with the 2003 exile of Charles Taylor to Nigeria and, more surely, his arrest in 2006. In Sudan, peace accords between the south and the north had to wait until January 2005. In between, the advent of Charles Taylor sparked a “regional” war in the Mano River area from Liberia into Sierra Leone and 285

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Guinea, and contributed to political violence in Ivory Coast. The Liberian war was a national civil war that spilled over the region to become a regional war. Another regional war started in the Great Lakes and has only been partially resolved. Interventions in the DRC from eight states or insurgency groups supporting different sides were signs of the failing state of the former Zaire. As Harbeson and Rothchild put it, “moreover, domestic state weakness, which afflicts most of the intervening regimes, has negative effects on their economies and, in the case of Zimbabwe, fuelled the opposition to the long-running government of President Robert Mugabe” (Harbeson 2000, p. 4). Sudan, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo could have functioned as regional hegemonies capable of stabilizing their respective regions, but big states have not been successful stories in Africa, except for South Africa. Therefore the hegemonic stability theory “whereby regional hegemonies underwrite the stability of neighbouring states” is inconclusive in Africa. South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho, even in this case, was met with suspicion about South Africa’s real motives. The experience of Nigeria, the leading force behind the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in restoring the rule of law and stability in Liberia and Sierra Leone was not convincing (Harbeson 2000). The 1994 Rwanda genocide was a significant event not only in Africa but also in the post-Cold war era. Internal tension between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority was the legacy of the German and Belgian colonization, exploited by local post-colonial political entrepreneurs in order to fulfil their own political ambitions. More than 5,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed every day for 100 days with casualties totalling between 500,000 and 800,000. Many circumstances may explain this “failure of humanity”, to borrow an expression of the Canadian General Roméo Dallaire who served as UN Force Commander in Rwanda in 1993 (Dallaire 2004). The lack of a regional hegemonic stabilizing force contributed to this failure of humanity in Rwanda. Among other factors was also the negative influence of outside forces in pursuit of their own strategic interests. France, in particular, trained and equipped the Hutu government forces. Pascal Krop related in his book, Le génocide franco-africain: Il faut juger les Mitterand, that on 7 April 1994, at the French embassy of Kigali, Jean-Michel Marlaud was trying to erase any trace of shameful collaboration with the genocidares. After having burnt archives, he got 286

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busy evacuating, as soon as possible, the principal people responsible for the genocide. The first instruction given by the Elysée (French presidential palace) to the Quai d’Orsay (French ministry of foreign affairs) was in fact to ‘ensure the evacuation of the widow and the family of the (Rwandan) President’. Consequently, the ambassador abandoned to their fate the Tutsi personnel that staffed his embassy and the Cooperation Mission. Many of them ended up assassinated, cut with machetes. (Krop 1994, p.101). Resolving African conflicts However, the international community was very busy trying to find a solution to African conflicts in the immediate post Cold War era, i.e., the 1990s. Generally speaking, in the heat of the Cold War, international security fell into the domain of the competing ideological and military blocs of the East and the West. The responsibility of local regimes was to effectively control their territories and their populations, and manage social and economic affairs of their states. In the immediate post-Cold War era, it was assumed that there was a link between peace, development and human rights. Links were also made between local stability and international peace. Therefore, humanitarian intervention was a legitimate concept. Negotiation and conflict resolution were the paths to sustainable peace. Non-Governmental Organizations began to mushroom, many of them specializing in conflict resolution. In the 1990s alone, the UN Security Council sent nine peacekeeping missions to Africa: Namibia from 1989 to1990; Western Sahara from 1991 to 1999; Mozambique from 1992 to1994; Chad in 1994; Angola from 1997 to 1998; Somalia from 1992 to 1995; Rwanda from 1993 to 1996; Liberia from 1993 to 1997, and Central Africa from 1996 to 1999. Special representatives of the UN Secretary General were dispatched to Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Western Sahara, Mozambique and South Africa. The United States, France and the United Kingdom sent peacekeeping missions to Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) in 1990, Rwanda (Operation Turquoise) in 1994, Liberia (evacuation and protection missions) in 1990, Central African Republic in 1996, Sierra Leone in 1997, CongoBrazzaville in 1997 and the former Zaire in 1991, 1993 and 1996. In 1993, the French government solved a crisis situation between Mauritania and Senegal 287

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Also, institutions such as the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) tried to assist with resolving conflict by sending its representatives to Zaire in 1991, 1993 and 1996; to Congo-Brazzaville in 1993 and 1997, and by dispatching peacekeeping forces to Rwanda in 1994. The military group of the Economic Community of West African States operated in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone in 1997. In 1994, the InterGovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) started its involvement in peace negotiations in Sudan. The Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC) conducted mediation in Lesotho in 1994. Prominent individuals also intervened in peace processes. Mobutu Sese Seko tried to mediate conflict in Angola in 1990. The former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, mediated in the Burundi crisis after 1995. Nelson Mandela, former President of South Africa, also intervened to mediate many conflicts on the continent. Washington Okunu, a Kenyan businessman, facilitated negotiation between parties in the period ending the apartheid regime in South Africa. Private institutions also backed peace efforts in Africa in the 1990s: the International Negotiation Network of the Carter Center intervened in Liberia, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes. The London-based International Alert was active in Sierra Leone as well as the Liberian Council of Churches (Zartman 2000, pp.2-3). “Yet African conflict remains impervious to these attentions”, concluded William Zartman (2000, p. 3). The reasons for failure are many-fold. Challenges to conflict resolution in Africa To understand the violence, the multiplicity and the intractability of current conflicts in Africa, four issues will be discussed: internal weaknesses of state systems in Africa, the interlocking nature of the conflicts, the phenomenon of transformation of war, and the consequences of dissolution of empires. African state systems are generally weak and unable to provide the services that legitimise their raison d’etre: economic development, security of the territory and protection of its inhabitants. After the Cold war was over, Africans were practically left to survive by themselves. Different countries met the challenge with various degrees of success or failure. External intervention combined with weak regulatory capacity and bad governance make matters worse.

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With increasing globalisation and the rise of global norms, reconciling the local and the global has been a Sisyphean task. For example, Charles Taylor left Liberia and found refuge in Nigeria in 2003. In the Ivory Coast, government and rebel armed forces signed a peace agreement on July 4, 2003. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a two-year transition began on June 30, 2003 (the 43rd anniversary of Congo’s independence) with the formation of a Government of National Unity. All three cases featured peace agreements among combatants. What about the politicians? The global norms of democracy, rule of law and accountability are sometimes in contradiction with the facts in the field. For example, how long one should wait before putting Charles Taylor in jail without jeopardizing the peace process in Liberia? Should Joseph Koney of the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda have been indicted in the middle of ongoing negotiations? Human rights are a particular domain of contradiction between global norms and the correlation of forces at the local level. Another complicating matter is the role of conflict-generated Diaspora. For such “long-distance nationalists”, home is still close to heart. They form associations abroad, try to influence debates at home, and even assist with financing groups in the home countries. Terrence Lyons wrote that, “Uncompromising Diaspora positions therefore often constrain homeland actors’ ability to propose different ways to understand the struggle or to engage in constructive conflict resolution. Along with serving as an important source of support, Diaspora groups can complicate the political struggles within their homelands”. (Lyons 2006, p. 3). There are also two more general global issues: the transformation of war and the dissolution of empires. Most wars today do not follow the Clausewitzian pattern of “Trinitarian war” involving government, population and army. In his 1991 acclaimed book, The Transformation of War, Martin van Creveld predicted that; “In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves. Their organizations are likely to be constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional ones, and to be motivated less by ‘professionalism’ than by fanatical, ideologically-based, loyalties” (van Creveld 1991, p.197).

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Furthermore, dissolution of empires is usually accompanied by violence. The 20th century was the bloodiest of all. It was also the one that witnessed a lot of empire dissolutions. “In 1913, around 65 percent of the world’s land and 82 percent of its population were under some kind of imperial rule”(Ferguson 2006, p. 68). Then, before World War I, the Qing lost power in China. The Romanov fell in 1917, then the Hapsburgs, the Hohenzollerns and the Ottomans. Later, colonial empires disintegrated: the British, the French and the Dutch in Asia, and the German, the French, the British, the Portuguese and the Spanish in Africa. The rate of disintegration of empires has also accelerated, thus increasing the rate of accompanying violence in the 20th century. The Ottoman Empire lasted 469 years; the Soviet Union’s empire lasted 69 years; the Japanese empire lasted 50 years; Hitler’s Reich lasted 6 years (Fergusson 2006). Regarding the United States, Martin van Creveld wrote: “The United States is another large, multiracial society where weapons are largely available and that has a tradition of internal violence second to none. During most of its history, abundant resources, an open frontier, and -later- global expansion enabled Americans to raise their standards of living. As they did so, from time to time they fought a war in which their aggressions found an outlet. However none of the three factors exists any longer. The frontier was closed long ago. America’s economic viability has been on the decline since about 1970. Partly as a result, so has its ability to dominate the rest of the world, a process that the recent eclipse of the USSR is unlikely to halt”(van Creveld 1994, pp.195-196). As empires collapse, those at the bottom, within national borders, expect more justice and those at the top are afraid of losing their privileges. Thus one witnesses an intense competition for the control of power. Ethnic and other groups are likely to fight when they feel threatened. As far as African countries are concerned, even resource wars are part of this type of conflict. It should be understood that natural resources do not have the same meaning for the supplier and the end user. A strategic resource is only strategic for those who possess the technological tools to use them strategically. In Africa, they lead mostly to rent economies.

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African conflict in today’s world There has been a 50% decrease in armed conflict around the world since its peak in the mid-1980s. Currently conflict is at its lowest level in 40 years. At the end of 2002, some 25 countries were experiencing ongoing or sporadic conflict. Most conflicts involve civil strife for control of either government or resources or some combination of both. Thirty societies are emerging from recent wars. Fifty countries are somewhere between autocracy and democracy (Crocker 2003). In the spectrum of existing regimes, extreme cases may be described on one end as military principalities and on the other end as established democracies. In-between these extremes, the great majority of countries have dominant-party systems or semi-authoritarian regimes and are therefore strife-prone. Semi-authoritarian regimes are not democracies in progress. They are incomplete systems, purposely crafted to have the appearances of democracy (thus meeting, somehow, international norms) while still effectively functioning as autocracies. As a result, they remain strife-prone. Africa shares many of the characteristics of strife-prone societies. Conflicts are often long and intractable such as those in the Horn involving Eritrea-Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan because no party has the ability to achieve quick victory. Recently, there were three regional conflicts on the continent: • •

•

The Great Lakes region where many conflicts were fought in one country (the Democratic Republic of Congo) The Mano River region in West Africa where conflict in Liberia fuelled conflicts in the neighbouring states of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast. A constellation of and mutually reinforcing conflicts in the Nile River basin, the Horn, Sudan and northern Uganda.

A report of the United Nations Security Council mission to West Africa from 26 June –05 July, 2003 diagnosed the sources of conflict in the region in the following manner: “The reasons for instability in West Africa are many, including abject poverty, poor standards of governance and irresponsible leadership in certain countries, illegal exploitation of natural resources and cross-border flows of small arms and mercenaries. An additional factor has nevertheless been the persistent tendency of certain governments, in particular that of Liberia, to exacer291

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bate already existing tensions in one or other of the neighbours by meddling in domestic disputes and using proxies to undermine governments”. The same can be said about other African regions as well. The sources of African conflicts are often seen as un-natural or of primitive nature. However, in the era of increasing globalisation, changes are coming fast and there is not much left to nature. Industrialization and development, generally regarded as good, bring along tensions and potential conflicts. Indigenous Africa is good in maintaining traditions and managing incremental changes, but it is ill-equipped to cope with major and rapid challenges of modern western-dominated transformation. In a document, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, the World Bank reviewed 52 such conflicts from 1960 to 1999. The study concluded that the roots of civil strife are more economic than ethnic: in a given five-year period, a low income country has a 17.1 percent chance of falling into civil war. The risk of conflict drops to 12.3 percent if an annual economic growth rate of 2 percent is sustained for a decade. Economic diversification is also an important factor reducing risk. If primary-commodity exports, oil particularly, account for 10 percent or less of the GDP, the risk is reduced to 11 percent but rises to 33 percent when such exports exceed 30 percent of the GDP. Similarly, societies with dominant ethnic groups are more likely to fall into civil war compared to those so diversified that no single group can dominate (Atlantic Monthly, September 2003). All things considered, history is the single best predictor of the likelihood of civil war. “A country that has just emerged from a civil war runs a 44 percent risk of return to conflict within five years”. It is my view that mechanisms of transitional justice, the International Criminal Court included, are important in bringing closure to the past and creating new and collectively shared hopes for the future. A little more than a decade ago, a human catastrophe unfolded before our eyes in Rwanda. More than half a million people were slaughtered. A similar tragedy and potentially at a greater scale, is now taking place before our eyes again in Darfur, Sudan. However, there are distinctions between Rwanda and Darfur. The first is that the US government called Darfur a “genocide” even if the implications of this qualification did not follow. The second is that in Darfur, competition for land has been aggravated by environmental degradation, a situation easily exploited by local politicians, with the 292

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backing of outside players. However, Darfur lacks the equivalent of the Rwandan Patriotic Front to intervene and help stop the killing. Another difference is the change in the world’s war order. The United States is increasing its military presence and its capacity of direct military intervention in Africa. It is to protect its interests, particularly access to oil. It is not to protect Africans against themselves. Africa by itself is not the top priority in the global politics of the only remaining super-power. Neither China nor Russia want the international community to interfere in their affairs in Tibet and Chechnya. Thus they are unwilling to support strong sanctions against Sudan at the UN. More importantly, they don’t want to jeopardize their oil contracts in Sudan. Darfur is caught in the web of the globalizing economy. Following the example of the United States, Russia and China too are militarising their access to oil sources and by so doing ignoring gross violation of human rights and increasing the chances of communal violence. External intervention to restore peace, if successful, can only create the space for negotiation, conflict resolution and peace-building at the local level. That is not impossible. Documents found in Timbuktu, written by 16th century Africans using Arabic characters, first of all prove that Africa’s history is not totally oral. Second, they contain discussions on social issues such as the use of tobacco, the rights of women and the resolution of conflict: “At a time when Europe was emerging form the Middle ages, African historians were chronicling the rise and fall of Saharan and Sudanese kings, replete with great battles and invasions. Astronomers charted the movement of the stars, physicians provided instructions on nutrition and the therapeutic properties of desert plants, and ethicists debated such issues as polygamy and the smoking of tobacco” (Hammer 2006, p. 50). If such self-confidence is regained, then Africa in the process of resolving its conflicts, can be a player and not a pawn in global politics. Then, the vision of people like Joshua Hammer can become reality. Some scholars believe that the works might even help bridge the gap between the West and the Islamic world; “Sixteen century Islamic scholars advocate expanding the rights of women, explore methods of conflict resolution and debate how best to incorporate non-Muslim into an Islamic society” (Hammer 2006, p.50). Before this mission of global reconciliation is accomplished, Africa needs more than self confidence. It has to ensure people’s personal 293

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safety and vigorously practice a politics of life. Complacencies such as the one reported by journalist Craig Timberg are no substitutes for conflict resolution and peace-building: “Sudanese in Khartoum often say that the death and destruction in Darfur is not so unusual. Angola, Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe (to name just a few) have endured massive human tragedies fuelled by conflict over the past couple of decades. Measured against them, perhaps Darfur is not shocking” (Timberg 2006, p. B5). Food shortage, water scarcity, unemployment and uncontrolled urbanization are fertile grounds for violent conflict. One immediate challenge to tackle is the HIV/AIDS pandemic with its effects on both war and peace. African countries hit by HIV/AIDS are already experiencing “youth bulges” before the epidemic. “Youth bulges” indicate that a disproportionate percentage of the populations are under 29 years of age. The arrival of HIV/AIDS aggravates these bulges, particularly in the adolescent population. According to Laurie Garrett, “In 1975, only 17 countries in the world had youth bulges so severe that more than half of their population fell in the 15-29 age brackets. Today, 37 countries belong to that category, nearly all of them in sub-Saharan Africa. Several studies show that countries that had such radically large youth bulges in the period between 1990 and 2000 were three times more likely to suffer civil wars, coups, or armed insurrections” (Garrett 2005, p. 61). Another study of 112 countries suggests a high level of human rights abuse and civil conflict in countries hard hit by HIV/AIDS (Faris 2006, p. 34). Africa has 60 percent of people with AIDS and houses 81 percent of the UN peacekeepers. At the same time, HIV/AIDS limits African countries abilities to deploy peacekeeping forces. When asked to send troops to Darfur, South Africa was unable to field a complete battalion of unaffected military. “They had to kludge together units to get enough healthy troops to send”. Similar situations, at various degrees, can be observed in the African military in general. Peace does not break out. War does. Interlocking conflicts in Africa call for multi-level approaches. Resources are needed. Political will is needed even more. If war is, after all a battle of wills, then peace is a test of intelligence.

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References Atlantic Monthly, September 2003 Copson, W. R. (1994), Africa’s Wars and Prospects for Peace, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk. Creveld, van M., (1991), The Transformation of War, The Free Press, New York. Dallaire, R. and Breadsley, B., (2004), Shake hands with the Devil: The failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Canada. Ferguson, N., (2006), The Next War of the World, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Number 5, September/October 2006. Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2003. Garrett, L., (2005), The Lessons of HIV/AIDS, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, Volume 84, Number 4. Hammer, J., (2006), The Treasures of Timbuktu, Smithsonian, December 2006. Harbeson, J. W. and Rothchild, D. (2000), Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux, Wetstview Press, Boulder. Kitissou, M (2004), Hydropolitics and Geopolitics in Africa, Africa Notes, Institute for African Development, November/December 2004. Krop, P., (1994), Le génocide franco-africain: Il faut juger les Mitterrand, Editions Jean-Claude Lattès, Paris. Lyons, T., (2006), Migration & Conflict-Generated Diaspora, Global Studies Review, Vol.2, No. 3. Stephan Faris, (2006), Containment Strategy: Iran, North Korea, Uganda? Why the Pentagon Ranks Africa’s AIDS Crisis as a Leading Security Threat, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 298, Number 5. Timberg, C., (2006), A Boomtown Ignores Reek of War, The Washington Post, November 19, 2006. Zartman, I. W. (2000), Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine”, Lynn Rienner Publishers, Boulder.

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Notes on Contributors Kofi Annan served as the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) from January 1997 to January 2007. He received the Nobel Peace Prize jointly with the United Nations in 2001. His paper was originally published with permission by the journal African Renaissance, which gave the permission for this re-print. Peter Ashton is a Principal Researcher in the Water Ecosystems Research Group of South Africa’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and an Honorary Professor of Water Resources Management at the University of Pretoria. Cage Banseka is a Political Analyst with the African Union (AU), and presently working with the African Union Mission in The Sudan (AMIS). He is also a lecturer at the Department of International Relations at the University of Muenster/Germany, and also at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Protestant University for Central Africa, in Cameroon. Mwesiga Baregu is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Sheila Bunwaree is Professor of Sociology in the Faculty of Social Studies and Humanities of the University of Mauritius. Cedric de Coning heads the Peace and Security Unit of the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and is a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo. Peter Fabricius is Foreign Editor, Independent Newspapers, South Africa. He is former Washington correspondent for the group and also covered South Africa’s transition to democracy as Political Correspondent for the Pretoria News and Johannesburg-based Star. He now writes on foreign policy and other foreign issues for the many newspapers in the Independent Group.

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Richard Iroanya is a Researcher with the Risk Analysis and Scenario Planning Unit of Area Studies Division at the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) based in Pretoria. Marcel Kitissou is Senior Visiting Research Scholar at the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University, United States of America. Norman Mlambo is Chief Research Specialist and Head of Peace, Security and Governance Unit of Programmes Division at the Africa Institute of South Africa based in Pretoria. Laurie Nathan is a Visiting Fellow with the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics and a Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town. Patrick Rankhumise is a Research Specialist on the SADC and Southern Africa Desk of Area Studies Division at the Africa Institute of South Africa based in Pretoria. Issaka K. Souaré is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal (Canada).

298

Index Biafra war, 146 Boigny, Houphouet, 74, 239, 240, 249 Botswana, 134, 177, 265, 269, 271, 272, 273, 274 Brazil, 148 Bretton Woods institutions, 19, 27, 44, 45, 47, 57, 239, 240 Britain, ii, xi, 162, 176, 226, 231, 244 Bunwaree, Sheila, vi, xiv, 177, 190, 297 Burkina Faso, 70, 74, 75, 84, 86, 242 Burundi, viii, x, xi, 27, 105, 149, 160, 253, 254, 255, 257, 260, 285, 287, 288

A Abuja, 50, 57, 79, 80, 81, 89, 90, 103, 105, 115 Adedeji,, 156 African Mission in Sudan, 89 African economies, 53, 56 African tigers, 177 African Union, viii, xiv, xv, 77, 89, 90, 96, 113, 115, 144, 149, 199, 227, 228, 237, 248, 253, 254, 260, 262, 297 African Union Mission in Sudan, 96 AISA, 100, 115, 116, 298 Akosombo, 78, 79 Akosombo Peace Agreement, 78 Algeria, xi, 139, 189, 244 AMIS, viii, 89, 90, 91, 93, 96, 98, 101, 102, 104, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 254, 257, 258, 259, 262, 297 Annan, Kofi, v, xii, 19, 107, 150, 297 Armed Forces of Liberia, 73, 75 Arusha, 41, 158, 169, 170, 176 Arusha Declaration, 171 AU, viii, xv, 77, 84, 89, 90, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 227, 237, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 297

C Cambridge, 180, 191, 251 Cameroon,, xi, 212, 245 Cape Verde, xi Central African Republic, 33, 227, 245, 287 Central Revolutionary Committee, 78 Chama Cha Mapinduzi, viii, 158 Chile, 109, 148 China, xvi, 139, 148, 179, 187, 188, 248, 290, 293 Cold War, xi, 63, 64, 67, 69, 72, 94, 110, 137, 141, 142, 143, 162, 163, 230, 240, 265, 283, 285, 287 Cold-War, 68 Collier, Paul, v, xiii, 137, 138, 139, 141, 143, 144, 148, 149, 150, 151 Commonwealth Universities, 171 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, viii, xii, 64, 83, 94 Cotonou Agreement, 77, 78

B Bamako Agreement, 74 Banseka, Cage, vi, xiv, 193, 197, 200, 203, 205, 211, 212, 297 Baregu, Mwesiga, vi, xiii, 148, 150, 155, 158, 165, 175, 176, 279, 297 Belgium., xi

299

Index

D

246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 286, 287 Frontline States, 159, 267, 274

Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, viii, 102 Darfur., xiv, 89, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 103, 104, 106, 108, 109, 111, 113, 193, 199, 254, 257, 292 de Coning, Cedric, vi, xv, 253, 254, 258, 259, 261, 297 Declaration of Principles, 102, 115 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 144, 145, 152, 205, 254, 256, 257, 280 Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 257 Doe, Samuel, 67, 72, 73, 75, 85

G Garang, John, 144 General de Gaulle, 239, 245, 249 General Robert Gueï, 241 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 217, 223 Germany, xi, 175, 297 Great Lakes, 27, 30, 38, 41, 114, 138, 261, 286, 288, 291 Guinea-Bissau, xi, 87, 250

E

H

Economic Community of West African States, viii, 26, 70, 140, 230, 237, 240, 286, 288 ECOWAS, viii, 26, 27, 34, 35, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 140, 230, 237, 238, 240, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 257, 286 ECOWAS Monitoring Group, 34, 140 El Bashir, Pressident Omar, 109 Equatorial Guinea, vi, xv, 146, 225, 226, 227, 228, 232, 233 Eritrea, xi, 230, 284, 285, 291 Ethiopia, xi, 67, 116, 133, 230, 231, 283, 284, 285, 286, 291 European Union, viii, 57, 70, 83, 107, 187, 189, 254, 262, 278 Executive Outcomes, viii, 140, 228

High-Intensity Conflicts, viii, 65 Highly Indebted Poor Country, 155 HIV/AIDS, 51, 97, 120, 133, 294, 295 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, viii, 89, 103 I Institute for Global Dialogue, 115, 143, 151, 165, 175 Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations, x, 65 Internally Displaced Persons, viii, 89, 201 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, viii, 90, 116 International Contact Group, viii, 84 International Criminal Court, viii, 106, 109, 256, 292 International Peace Academy, 87, 138, 148, 150 International Peace Operations Association, ix, 230

F Fabricius, Peter, vi, xv, 225, 297 Foreign Military Assistance Act, 221, 226, 229, 233 France, vi, xi, xv, 33, 179, 225, 237, 238, 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245,

300

Index

International Traffic in Arms Regulations, ix, 221 internationally displaced persons, 91 Iroanya, Richard, v, xii, 63, 298

Lofa Defence Force, ix, 76, 77 M Machel, Samora, 142 Madagascar, xi, 178, 179 Mann, Simon, xv Mao Tse-Tung, 64 Mauritius, vi, ix, xi, xiv, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186, 187, 190, 191, 265, 280, 297 Mazrui, Ali, 94, 116, 170, 176 Mbeki, Thabo, 248 Medicins Sans Frontieres, 99, 116 Mlambo, Norman, ii, iii, v, vi, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, 137, 217, 298 Mozambique, x, xi, 31, 32, 67, 133, 139, 142, 143, 148, 160, 179, 261, 265, 269, 271, 273, 274, 283, 285, 287 Mugabe, Robert, 148, 268, 269, 272, 273, 279, 280, 286

J Janjaweed, 97, 98, 103, 107, 108, 144, 194, 199, 201, 203 Johnson, Roosevelt, xii, 64, 72, 73, 78, 80, 81, 82, 85, 87 Johnson-Sirleaf, President Ellen, 64 Johnson-Sirleaf, Pressideeent Ellen, xii, 81, 85 Justice and Equality Movement, ix, 90, 97, 144 K Kagame, Kagame, 246 Kenya, xi, 139, 148, 162, 164, 200, 285 Khartoum, 94, 95, 97, 98, 104, 113, 144, 284, 285, 294 Kitissou, Marcel, vii, xvi, 283, 284, 295, 298 Koulibaly, Mamadou, 242, 250, 251

N N’ Djamena, 89 Namibia, xi, 30, 32, 134, 139, 145, 148, 265, 269, 270, 272, 274, 275, 283, 287 Nathan, Laurie, vii, xvi, 222, 223, 265, 298 National Patriotic Front, ix, 72 National Transitional Government, ix, 77, 79, 84 National Unity, ix, 73, 289 North-South divide, 144 NPFL, ix, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 86 Nyalali Commission, 159, 167, 176

L Lake Victoria, 124, 172 Latin America, 64, 221 Liberia, v, viii, ix, x, xi, 24, 27, 34, 35, 39, 41, 43, 44, 63, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 105, 110, 140, 148, 212, 250, 252, 255, 257, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 291, 294 Liberian civil war, xii, 63, 72, 85 Liberians United for Reconciliation and Development, ix, 83 Libya, 70, 84, 86 Limpopo, 124

O of Equatorial Guinea, xv, 225 Ogoni people, 147 Orange, 124

301

Index

Organization of African Unity, x, 21, 26, 55, 251, 284, 288

225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232, 248, 265, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 274, 286, 287, 288, 294, 297, 298 South African intelligence agencies, 225 Southern Africa Development Community, x, 145, 160 Southern African Development Community, 26, 261, 265, 280 Southern African Development Coordination Conference, x, 160 Status of Mission Agreement, 110 Structural Adjustment Programs, 170, 181 Sudan-Darfur conflict, 94, 100 Sudanese Liberation Army, 97, 144 Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement, 94

P Portugal, xi private military companies, xiv, 217, 218, 225, 230, 232 private security companies, 217, 219, 228, 233 R Rankhumise, Patrick, v, xii, 89, 116, 298 Rawlings, Jerry, 78 Regional Economic Communities, x, 257 RENAMO, x, 142, 143 Rwanda, xi, xvi, 22, 24, 30, 31, 38, 41, 67, 145, 147, 150, 218, 245, 251, 254, 261, 272, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 292, 294, 295

T Tanzania, vi, x, xi, xiii, 39, 143, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 200, 213, 248, 265, 269, 270, 272, 273, 274, 285, 288, 297 Taylor, Charles, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 105, 109, 285, 289 Thatcher, Mark, xv, 226, 229 the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 76 the World Bank Group report, 63

S Sahel region, 124 Sandline, 140, 229 Sawyer, Dr Amos, 74, 77 Security Council, x, 19, 22, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 43, 59, 76, 83, 104, 109, 110, 116, 138, 140, 141, 145, 149, 150, 152, 248, 256, 287, 291 Sierra Leone, xi, 24, 39, 70, 72, 75, 76, 82, 83, 84, 87, 105, 138, 139, 140, 148, 151, 228, 229, 231, 257, 285, 286, 287, 288, 291, 294 SLA, 97, 98, 105, 106, 113, 144 Somalia, xv, 22, 30, 31, 33, 34, 67, 149, 197, 205, 254, 283, 287, 291 Souare, Issaka, vi, xv, 237 South Africa, xi, 115, 116, 135, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 160, 175, 188, 200, 213, 217, 221,

U Uganda, xi, 145, 158, 162, 205, 272, 273, 283, 284, 285, 289, 291, 295 ULIMO, x, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83 United Nations, ix, x, xii, xiv, xvi, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 57, 58,

302

Index

60, 70, 95, 116, 131, 134, 135, 138, 140, 144, 146, 149, 150, 152, 191, 218, 222, 223, 224, 229, 231, 242, 252, 253, 255, 261, 262, 272, 279, 281, 291, 297 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 35 United Nations Operation in Somalia, 30 United Nations System-wide Special Initiative on Africa, 58 United States of America, xiv, 67, 72, 96, 144, 219, 220, 221, 254, 298

Witch-hunting, 198 Wonga Coup plot, 227 World Trade Organization., 56 Y Yamoussoukro Accord, 74 Z Zaghawas, 201 Zaire, 38, 67, 245, 272, 286, 287, 288 Zambia, 265, 270, 272, 273 Zanzibar, x, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 173, 270 Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party, x, 163 Zimbabwe, x, xi, xiii, 139, 143, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 225, 226, 265, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 279, 280, 286, 294

W West Africa, 26, 87, 124, 225, 230, 237, 240, 245, 248, 250, 251, 252, 291 witchcraft, xiv, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213

303