Security Dynamics in Africas Great Lakes Region 9781685853600

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Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes Region

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A project of the International Peace Academy

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Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes Region edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala

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Published in the United States of America in 2006 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2006 by the International Peace Academy, Inc. All rights reserved by the publisher Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Security dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes region / edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala. p. cm. “A Project of the International Peace Academy.” Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-58826-419-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-58826-444-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Conflict management—Great Lakes Region (Africa) 2. Great Lakes Region (Africa)—Politics and government. 3. National security—Great Lakes Region (Africa) I. Khadiagala, Gilbert M. II. International Peace Academy. III. Title. DT363.3.S43 2006 355'.0330676—dc22 2006002391

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

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Contents

Foreword, Terje Rød-Larsen Acknowledgments

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1 Toward Peace, Security, and Governance in the Great Lakes Region Gilbert M. Khadiagala

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Part 1 Regional Actors and Issues

2 Governance and Security in Rwanda Filip Reyntjens

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3 Burundi at a Crossroads René Lemarchand

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4 Congo in the Great Lakes Conflict Mwesiga Baregu

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5 Nonstate Actors and Governance in Uganda Angela Ndinga Muvumba

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6 The Economic Dimensions of Conflict in the Region Gérard Prunier

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Part 2 The Role of External Actors

7 South Africa Chris Landsberg

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8 The United Nations Adekeye Adebajo

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CONTENTS

9 Belgium, France, and the United States Peter J. Schraeder

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Part 3 Conclusion

10 Building Security for Peoples, Societies, and States Gilbert M. Khadiagala

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List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

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Foreword TERJE RØD-LARSEN PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

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t is with great pleasure that the International Peace Academy presents this unique scholarly contribution to our understanding of the challenges facing the leaders and peoples of the Great Lakes region and the ongoing efforts of the United Nations and African continental and regional organizations to bring durable peace and security to the region. This book is particularly important as it is among the few comprehensive efforts in English to address the crises in the Great Lakes region over the past decade. The analytical focus is directed to the major concerns of international and African policymakers in seeking to bring about an era of representative governance and postconflict reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. Although much has been written about these countries individually, this book proposes the urgency and importance of an integrated regional approach. It thus dovetails with the ongoing initiatives of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, as well as those of the United Nations and the international financial institutions, to transcend the country-by-country approach of the past. Its publication is most timely, coming in the aftermath of recent and prospective elections in Burundi and the DRC, as well as new commitments reached by the Group of Eight industrialized countries in Gleneagles, Scotland, in July 2005 and the high-level summit of world leaders at the United Nations in September 2005. The International Peace Academy’s Africa Program, initiated by Olara Otunnu and Margaret Vogt in 1992, focused in the 1990s on assisting the Organization of African Unity to conceptualize and operationalize its conflict resolution mechanism. In 2003, the IPA conducted an important brainstorming session in Addis Ababa to assist the successor African Union and its distinguished chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, to identify the major challenges facing the continent and to help carve out a viable multiyear strategy for meeting them. Under my predecessor, David Malone, and the Africa Provii

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gram’s second director, Adekeye Adebajo, the International Peace Academy focused in 2000–2003 on the challenges facing the major subregional organizations, such as the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the East African Cooperation. Between December 2000 and December 2003, the IPA convened four regional conferences, in Botswana, Nigeria, Uganda, and Tanzania. This book is the outgrowth of the papers delivered at the Dar es Salaam conference and the critical commentary offered on that occasion and subsequently. In producing the book, Gilbert Khadiagala worked closely with a remarkable group of African, European, and US scholars who individually and collectively brought their experience and insights to deepening our understanding of the interrelated challenges of peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region. Dr. Khadiagala was diligent in assuring that the chapters were updated to reflect important developments in the Great Lakes region during the past two years, as well as recent new initiatives by the African Union and the United Nations. Thus, it is our hope that the work will provide a contemporary context for policymakers, scholars, students, members of nongovernmental organizations, and representatives of civil society to recommit themselves to a durable resolution of the region’s structural, political, social, and economic problems. This endeavor would not have been possible without the foresight and commitment of our funders. The IPA is deeply grateful to the governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, as well as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Their sustained support of the Africa Program over many years made it possible for my predecessors and their associates to develop a long-term approach to policy development on these key issues of peace, security, and postconflict development and reconstruction. We want to express our deep appreciation to a number of distinguished African leaders and scholars who participated in the seminar, including former Organization of African Unity secretary-general Salim Ahmed Salim; former executive director of the UN Economic Commission for Africa Adebayo Adedeji; former Tanzanian prime minister Judge Joseph Warioba; and the executive secretary of the East African Cooperation, Nuwe AmanyaMushega. Our gratitude also to Ibrahima Fall, special representative of the UN Secretary-General for the International Conference on the Great Lakes, who provided us with a valuable preview of the conference. We are also very grateful to our partners—Joseph Butiku of the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation; Felix Mosha of the African Dialogue Center; Musifiky Mwanasali, formerly of the UN Sub-Regional Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, Yaoundé, Cameroon; and Adekeye Adebajo

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of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa—without whom the seminar would not have been possible. It is our hope that this book not only captures the essence of our discussions, but also, and just as important, provides useful guidance in meeting the challenges ahead for the Great Lakes region.

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Acknowledgments

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would like to thank all the contributors to this volume, who have worked collaboratively toward its successful completion. The staff at the International Peace Academy, through their time, persistence, and patience, helped coordinate the logistics for the seminar and the subsequent manuscript preparation. Adekeye Adebajo, former director of the IPA’s Africa Program, with strong support from David Malone, the former president of the IPA, was responsible for conceptualizing the seminar and identifying the key scholars and practitioners who contributed to the book. Ruth Iyob, Adebajo’s successor, provided informed guidance to me and the contributors through the lengthy process of revising and updating the chapters. I also want to express appreciation to John Hirsch, who is the acting director of the Africa Program; and Angela Muvumba, Dorina Bekoe, and Arthur Bainomugisha, who helped organize the seminar, along with their successors Mashood Issaka and Kapinga Ngandu. I am very grateful to Clara Lee and Lynne Rienner for their invaluable assistance throughout the publication process. This book is the outcome of a policy seminar on the Great Lakes region, held in Dar es Salaam in December 2003, that was organized by the International Peace Academy in partnership with four regional organizations that participated actively in the organization of this project. I would like to express my deep gratitude to IPA’s partners: Joseph Butiku of the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Dar es Salaam; Felix Mosha of the African Dialogue Center, Dar es Salaam; Musifiky Mwanasali, formerly of the UN Sub-Regional Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, Yaoundé, Cameroon; and Adekeye Adebajo, director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. Participants included a number of distinguished African leaders and scholars, including former Organization of African Unity secretary-general Salim Ahmed Salim; former Tanzanian prime minister Judge Joseph Warioba; Nuwe Amanya-Mushega, executive secretary of xi

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

the East African Cooperation, Arusha, Tanzania; and the former executive director of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, Adebayo Adedeji. We are very appreciative of their contributions to our deliberations. The objective of the Dar es Salaam seminar was to highlight the intersection of peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region, as part of the International Peace Academy’s project on strengthening Africa’s security mechanisms and actors. The seminar also served as an opportunity to assess the prospects for durable peace, security, and democratization in the Great Lakes region. The seminar proved particularly timely, as the main countries in conflict in the region continue to stand at varying degrees of transition to more stable conditions while also harboring the potential for renewed violence. The seminar coincided with preparations for the UN International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development in the Great Lakes region, held in November 2004 under the leadership of Ibrahima Fall, special representative of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral for the Great Lakes region. I am very grateful to him for sharing his insights, including those on the role of civil society, in the preparation of the international conference. Finally, I would like to express my deep appreciation to the governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden; the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development; and the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation for their strong support for the International Peace Academy Africa Program and this seminar. My hope is that this book will contribute toward providing international and African policymakers with relevant recommendations that will help strengthen their ability to address the primary challenges that still lie ahead in the region. —Gilbert M. Khadiagala

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1 Toward Peace, Security, and Governance in the Great Lakes Region GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA

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he Great Lakes region has gained new currency among policy analysts since the 1990s. Previously, the “Great Lakes” was a geographical expression that encompassed a number of freshwater lakes and their integral river basins at the heart of tropical Africa. To policymakers, Central and East Africa were more familiar categories describing regional states and their systems of interactions. In its new analytical rendition, the Great Lakes region retains its broad geographic reach, combining East and Central Africa into a complex network of political and economic interactions with implications for local actors and beyond. Since the 1960s, scholars of regional subsystems have highlighted the significance of geography in defining the patterns of amity and enmity that characterize contiguous states. In a system of multiple state actors such as the Great Lakes region, geography delimits the territorial space for the articulation of vital questions of peace, security, and governance. To analysts and policymakers, the basic puzzle of explaining regional subsystems relates to the nature and types of institutions that actors construct to deal with perennial challenges of order and stability.1 In this book, we seek to highlight the actors, issues, and institutions that have animated and propelled political, economic, and security relationships in the Great Lakes region. We recognize that the momentous events of the last quarter of the twentieth century, such as genocide, civil wars, and state collapse, have helped put an indelible stamp of conflict on the region. These events have also lent urgency and energized policy interventions by a wide array of local and international actors aimed at finding mechanisms to reverse the spates of conflicts and restore fragile polities and economies. By the same token, however, our authors seek to cast a wide analytical and historical net to capture the multifaceted causes, courses, and consequences of current convulsions. As historians and political scientists who have long pondered political developments in the region, the authors reflect on the turbulence that accompanied the end of the twentieth century through the 1

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prism of constraints that have impinged upon the postcolonial state, specifically the conundrum of reconciling ethnic diversities and identities against the backdrop of narrow political systems, elite dissensions, and meager resource endowments. The chapters on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, and Rwanda not only point to the salient postcolonial contexts that have structured the trajectories of contemporary conflicts but also reveal how civil wars and political instability in these states began to have adverse consequences on regional relationships. Thus, ethnic conflagration in Rwanda reverberated throughout the entire Great Lakes region by reopening ethnic tensions in the DRC, diminishing ethnic compromises in Burundi, and injecting a new dimension of Anglophone-Francophone “cold war” into the region. Similarly, refugees, a constant feature on the regional landscape since the late 1950s and an abiding symbol of state incapacity, emerged in the 1990s as preeminent sources of interstate strife. In revisiting the political dynamics of core states of the region, the preliminary chapters are instructive in highlighting the seized and missed opportunities at national levels and the constraints on international prescription of norms and institutions for the region. Conflicts are ubiquitous to the Great Lakes region, but so are the multiplicity of actors and agencies with wide-ranging solutions to these conflicts. The later chapters in the book that focus on the search for mechanisms of escape from misery and despair proceed from the assumption that since the 1990s the convergence of national, regional, and international actors around some core conflicts has helped forge a regime of conflict resolution that has become an essential part of the regional landscape. Genocide, child soldiers, the rape of civilians, and mineral exploitation are just some of the organizational issues that have galvanized international action. Even when the United Nations is dissuaded by momentary factors from intervention, as in the case of Rwanda’s genocide, the realities of regional instability compel the organization to return, oftentimes at a heavy price. In addition, even though neighboring states such as South Africa may ideally want to focus on their own internal problems, the burdens of leadership have forced them into conflict resolution roles in the Great Lakes region. But just as critical is the whole range of actors in the domestic domain of individual countries, a range that includes the civil society actors who are contesting the space for conflict resolution with state actors who are slow to acknowledge their own incapacity. These chapters also ground conflict resolution processes in the Great Lakes region in their historical dimensions.

Posing the Question of Peace, Security, and Governance Governance is one of the means to peace and security, enabling communities, nation-states, and regions to attain the objectives of survival and sustenance.

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Governance embraces the array of capabilities that effectively organize human affairs while promoting participation within predictable structures of norms and rules. Security is the gradual mitigation of barriers and vulnerabilities to human action across diverse contexts. As well, security is the prerequisite to effective reconstruction of war-torn societies seeking to forge covenants between ruling regimes and their constituencies. No less significant, security entails the purposeful acquisition of abilities to deal with perennial problems that stem from these contexts. Peace is inextricably linked to security, both as an outcome of secure environments and as a precondition for security. Peace, security, and governance have a temporal dimension, that is, they often entail gradual, long-drawn, and contested processes of building capacity and institutions. More critical, although security as an end is more adequately realized when structures of governance overlap with those of competition, there are often trade-offs between institutions of governance and participation, trade-offs that have been magnified by the complexities of building modern nation-states. Even when such trade-offs occur, security ultimately remains the gradual accumulation of small institutional successes for the purposes of reducing vulnerabilities and building capacities.2 These themes inform our analysis of the Great Lakes region, where the fundamental problems of peace, security, and governance center around the tasks of reconciling the novel concerns of participation with the old postcolonial challenges of state and nation building in an environment without overarching regional norms and institutions. Nation-states in the Great Lakes region are the arenas for the exercise of authority, popular mobilization, and extraction of resources, issues at the core of security; they are both the objects and subjects of security, furnishing the larger matrix for the articulation of issues of governance. But these states are also insufficient institutions of security, saddled as they are by regional pressures that accrue from territorial contiguity, historical and cultural differences, and the more contemporary burdens of the escalation and contagion of conflicts. In both their territorial and regional dimensions, therefore, the core states of the Great Lakes—the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi—face similar interlocking sources of insecurity and conflicts that are only now beginning to gradually find expression in conflict resolution mechanisms and institutions.3 The first three chapters, on the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi, capture the postcolonial crisis of extending effective authority over territories amid economic and sociocultural rivalries. The struggles to extend central power over regional and local communities that are insufficiently integrated into the nation-states have been a dominant governance and security theme in the Great Lakes region since the 1960s. In Chapter 4, on the DRC, Mwesiga Baregu traces the legacy of state fragility since independence, when regional-ethnic interests fueled by foreign powers jostled for political control, thus leading to the civil war. Although Mobutu Sese Seko arose as the strongman to restore order and stability to a fragmenting Congolese state,

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his thirty-year rule magnified the problems that still confront the DRC: authoritarian governance heightened postcolonial insecurity, diminishing the ability of the DRC to manage problems that are being replayed in state fragmentation, warlord leadership, and resource exploitation by local and international actors. If the long-running conflicts in the DRC are symptomatic of the obstacles to stabilizing national power in the Great Lakes region, the situation of its neighbors highlights the crisis of citizenship that has remained another source of postcolonial insecurity. In Chapter 2, Filip Reyntjens analyzes Rwanda in the broader context of the Hutu-Tutsi divide that has defined the lines of political contestation. The 1994 genocide, he argues, stemmed from, among other causes, democratization that scrambled ethnic bipolarization and insecurity. As the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) leadership grapples with the problems of postgenocide reconstruction, it is operating within the severe legacies of authoritarianism and social conformism that have marked Rwandan history. In discussing attempts to manage these legacies, Reyntjens warns that the RPF leadership may be repeating the mistakes of their predecessors by sacrificing participation and probity on the altars of ethnic and regime security. Thus, despite the elections that legitimated the postgenocide era of economic recovery and stability, the priorities of the RPF leadership lie in consolidating hegemonic control over the state and representative institutions. In Chapter 3, René Lemarchand proceeds in a similar analytical thread in explaining the communal strife that has characterized Burundi’s history. Competing identities and elite mobilization of ethnicity have yielded militarization and precarious leaderships in Burundi. He contends that before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Burundi had experienced genocidal violence in 1972 conducted by the Tutsi military in reaction to a localized Hutu-led insurgency that to date remains unacknowledged, with the result that the memories of this genocide loom large on the political horizon, stoking Hutu extremism and impeding lasting compromises. Lemarchand further shows that it has taken a decade of protracted negotiations interspersed with widespread violence and human suffering to restore a modicum of civility to Burundi’s fractured nation-state. Furthermore, the contiguous conflagration in Rwanda has over the years hardened ethnic positions in Burundi, underscoring the interlocking nature of conflicts in the Great Lakes region. As in most of Africa, the contemporary conflicts that have come to the fore in the Great Lakes region since the 1990s reflect, in part, the heavy price present generations are paying for the institutional mistakes committed in previous decades. These mistakes revolve around the failure to nurture governance and participatory institutions that would strengthen the basis of postcolonial statehood and nationhood. Instead of investing in institutions of governance capable of managing national issues, ruling elites

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utilized state resources for sectarian aggrandizement. Consequently, they invariably constrained the ability of present generations to deal with old and new sources of insecurity. With limited opportunities and compromised futures, the current generations face the difficult challenges of putting the Great Lakes region on sound institutional standing to complete the unfinished tasks of previous decades and also to address more virulent new threats such as demographic pressures and the massive flow of refugees. Governance and democratic renewal were popularized in the 1990s as institutional bids to recreate the essential links between democracy, development, and security. Yet as the situations in Burundi and Rwanda have demonstrated, democratization in ethnically divided polities tended to deepen the specter of civil strife. Moreover, the political leaderships that emerged from the regional tremors of the mid-1990s—the Kabilas in the DRC, Pierre Buyoya in Burundi, and Paul Kagame in Rwanda—rose from the ranks of militarism and rebellion rather than from civilian institutions. For this reason, the imperatives of regime security and state reconstruction seemed more urgent priorities for the new leaders than the broadening of democratic and governance spaces. Yet, unlike the founding fathers of the 1960s, the Kabilas, Buyoya, and Kagame did not have much latitude to entirely sacrifice the essentials of participation on the altar of order and security. When they used force to assert hegemony over their territories, they were confronted at the domestic and regional levels with assorted militias, refugee warriors, and other grievance-bearing groups ready to counter their state-building agendas. Internationally, they faced pressure from new and multifaceted actors invoking themes of human rights, justice, accountability, and democracy. The persistence of internal and external pressures explains the widespread embrace of institutional formulas of power-sharing embedded in the peace agreements that leaders have signed across the region, in an acknowledgment of the centrality of creative approaches to participation. Although there are no guarantees that broadening the space for participation would not deepen the disintegrative forces that fuel civil wars, the previous mechanisms of centralization and authoritarianism do not seem to have much of a future in stabilizing the bases of power and managing the crises of citizenship. Angela Ndinga Muvumba, in Chapter 5 on Uganda, also demonstrates that the value of the expansion of democratic space lies in the opportunities that open up for a wide array of nonstate actors to contest expansion of freedoms and influence conflict resolution. A major player in the politics of the Great Lakes region, President Yoweri Museveni’s Uganda is a stark study in contrasts. Although Museveni has rejuvenated Uganda and endowed it with effective leadership, the country still exhibits features of state fragility enhanced by a long-running civil war in the north and the unwillingness of the military to relinquish power to civilians. But, Muvumba shows, on the

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margins of authoritarianism, civil society actors have grown and become important actors in the incremental process of democratization and peace building. Fundamentally, the travails and triumphs of civic actors in Uganda are illustrative not only of organizational persistence but also of the liberalizing economic trends that Museveni’s nineteen years of rule have produced. Peace, security, and prosperity are inconceivable without functioning economies, but economic questions have decidedly governance dimensions. Although the Great Lakes region is characterized by diversities in resource endowments, from the mineral wealth of the DRC to land scarcities in Burundi and Rwanda, resource-driven wars exacerbated ethnic and political fragmentations for the better part of the twentieth century. In addition, broader governance issues have compounded questions of economic exclusion by impeding dialogue on the sources and causes of economic insecurity. Thus land scarcity in Rwanda and Burundi has been an enormous obstacle for economic viability, but the narrow base of the ruling regimes constricted the political space for managing economic conflicts.4 In Congo under Mobutu, predatory cronyism and plunder brought a once vibrant economy with tremendous mineral resources to its knees. In recent years, as Chapters 6 and 4 by Gérard Prunier and Mwesiga Baregu indicate, resource conflicts in the Great Lakes region have become intertwined with the unraveling of the Congolese state. Although Congolese mineral resources have always constituted a source of conflict and a magnet for external actors, the collapse of the Mobutu state created fresh opportunities for regional and international predators. Rather than providing a solid productive base for national wealth, the DRC’s gold and diamonds have instead become sources of regional strife and targets of predation by states and nonstate actors. As the Congolese civil war raged in the mid1990s, state sovereignty was compromised, and rebel movements supported by different regional actors were able to carve out enclaves in the country’s vast natural resources. Despite the withdrawal of regional state actors from the DRC, many private actors and informal groups with links to regional militaries and international networks continue to engage in illicit mineral exploitation. Moreover, although key political actors have coalesced around transitional institutions that are striving to remake the Congolese state, violence by the increasingly fragmented rebel movements in eastern Congo continues to reflect contestations over natural resources.

Regional and International Mechanisms Toward Peace, Security, and Governance in the Great Lakes Region Most of our contributors are interested in the efforts to manage regional conflicts that have proliferated over the years, particularly the actors in, and

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context of, these processes. The themes of conflict resolution and peace building are informed by the premise that there are three obstacles that militate against the search for indigenous solutions to conflicts in the region. First, although most of the conflicts have regional ramifications, their root causes inhere in domestic contexts. Issues of governance, democracy, and security are largely mediated in domestic domains that regional actors often cannot control. Moreover, although most outcomes of domestic conflicts, such as refugees and rebel movements, severely impact regional relations, it is much more difficult to forge multilateral consensus about dealing with sources of these conflicts. Second, it takes much longer to craft solid regional approaches to diverse problems in the absence of preexisting regional institutions. Caught between the geographical pull and push of East, Central, and southern Africa, the Great Lakes region suffers from a lack of an institutional anchor that may provide the structure for conflict resolution. Consequently, the bulk of conflict resolution proposals has emanated from outside the region. Third, the Great Lakes region demonstrates that in the long run, conflicts cannot serve as a robust basis for building regional institutions. Rather, mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts need to evolve more steadily from flourishing institutions of economic and civic interaction. The dominant regional institution in the Great Lakes region was the Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) that united Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire from the mid-1970s on. Centered largely around Mobutu and devoid of any functional objectives, the CEPGL collapsed after Mobutu’s fall and the regional tremors of the 1990s. Following the CEPGL’s demise, the institutional vacuum that ensued became a contest among East, Central, and southern Africa–driven regionalisms. Although the DRC, Burundi, and Rwanda belong to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), their economic and geographical allegiances lie more accurately in East and southern Africa. As Burundi and Rwanda have sought membership in the revamped East African Cooperation (EAC), the DRC joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Although both Rwanda and Burundi are awaiting membership in the EAC and the DRC has pledged to continue its membership in SADC, there have also been discussions about reviving the CEPGL as the institutional anchor for the region. In the long run, without a common regional framework, the Great Lakes region will remain a geographical expression at best and, at worst, a paradigm of problems. In the absence of solid regional institutions, neighboring regional states and international actors have, since the 1990s, led key initiatives to deal with the debilitating regional conflicts. These initiatives have also been critical in building a sense of community in the Great Lakes region that is gradually forming the foundation for future regional institutions. As René

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Lemarchand demonstrates in Chapter 3, the mediation efforts by Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere launched the search for a negotiated settlement in Burundi. More important, the Nyerere (and later Nelson Mandela) initiatives resulted in the regional summits on Burundi, a collaborative mechanism for articulating common positions that became an integral part of conflict resolution and served as one of the primary access channels for United Nations and other external interventions in the Great Lakes region. In addition, a momentous outcome of Mandela’s mediation in Burundi was to increase South Africa’s engagement in the process of conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. Chris Landsberg shows in Chapter 7 that the role of South Africa, which was previously reluctant to assume leadership in the region, has grown tremendously, including providing a 700-strong military force in Burundi. The South African military contingent subsequently became the core of the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping force that assisted in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armies and monitored the transition to democracy in Burundi. In June 2004, the AU force was expanded into the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Similarly, regional ad hoc efforts around the conflict in the DRC over the years broadened to embrace international institutions and actors. Chapters 4 and 7, by Mwesiga Baregu and Chris Landsberg, discuss the initiatives— starting modestly with the Lusaka Agreement in July 1999 and culminating in the Pretoria Agreements in 2002—that provided for a power-sharing transitional government. The different actors—the SADC, South Africa, the United Nations, elder statesman Ketumile Masire, and others—kept up the pressure on the parties to the conflict to reach key resolutions. Their persistence paid off, facilitating the withdrawal of regional armies from the DRC, the start of disarmament for Rwandese Hutu militias in the DRC, and the successful conclusion of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) on comprehensive power-sharing. These efforts also paved the way for the intervention of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The engagement of MONUC and ONUB in the Great Lakes conflicts underscores the theme of partnership between multilateral and regional actors that some of the chapters seek to emphasize. Policymakers frequently couch partnership in functionalist terms where regional actors and institutions serve as the fulcrums for conflict prevention and peace building while external actors, notably the United Nations, assume the essential role of mobilization of global resources and leverage. Although partnership proceeds from the assumption of African ownership of local problems, there have been tensions between ownership and partnership claims as major global players gradually reduce their engagement in regional conflict theaters.5 These tensions arise from the fact that as regional actors shoulder more responsibilities on limited resources and capabilities, they continually grapple with transforming conflict management roles into credible processes.

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In addition, external partnership with regional actors requires the presence of predictable patterns of institutions, norms, and leadership, key questions that are inextricably tied to the challenge of constructing firm institutions for regionalism. In the Great Lakes region it has been difficult to balance the ideals of ownership and partnership, largely because most of the conflicts have occurred in the post–cold war context of diminished regional involvement by external actors. In Chapter 8, in which he traces the history of UN involvement in the Great Lakes conflicts since the 1960s, Adekeye Adebajo asserts that the precipitous withdrawal of the UN from Rwanda at the height of the 1994 genocide was not a unique occurrence. The United Nations intervened in Congo in the early 1960s in a bid to save it from fratricidal nation-building conflicts but ended up taking sides at the behest of Western countries who used their privileged positions in the UN Security Council to intervene where their strategic interests were paramount. After a period of lukewarm support for United Nations deployment to support Rwanda’s peace process, the withdrawal from Rwanda dealt a severe blow to partnership. Although France tried to reclaim the sagging image of the international community by a belated intervention in Rwanda through Operation Turquoise, it took a long while for the United Nations to restore its regional credibility. With the support for deployment in Burundi and the DRC, the United Nations has signaled its intention for a more active policy in the Great Lakes region. But even in the DRC, the United Nations involvement has proceeded in fits and starts: MONUC effectively deployed following three years of protracted debates in New York about resources, size, and mandates. A less visible, yet germane, international engagement in Great Lakes conflicts has been by special United Nations and Western envoys. Working alongside local African actors, special envoys symbolize one aspect of emerging partnerships in conflict resolution, but their presence in these conflicts is also contentious. Partnership and multilateral action are inevitable in the context of resource constraints on African actors, but the latter have to frequently fend off the powerful and intrusive hands of special envoys. For instance, in Chapter 3, René Lemarchand notes that in the initial phase of the Burundian conflict, special UN envoy Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah played a critical role in tilting the terms of the settlement toward Tutsi parties. In the latter phases, Aldo Ajello, the representative from the European Union (EU) to the Great Lakes region, and Howard Wolpe, the US presidential envoy, provided essential international presence during Nyerere’s mediation. But Nyerere’s relationship with the special envoys was far from cordial. Dependent on Western funding for an admittedly expensive and protracted exercise, Nyerere had to contend with the disproportionate (and sometimes disruptive) roles of the donors and their envoys. Likewise, during the ICD, donors exerted pressure on Masire’s mediation to accept the

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appointment of Moustapha Niasse, a former Senegalese prime minister, as a special envoy to complement Masire’s role in the negotiations.6 An equally pertinent form of partnership in the Great Lakes region is the one among core Western powers—France, Belgium, and the United States— that Peter Schraeder explores in Chapter 9. In providing both the historical and contemporary contours of these relationships, Schraeder shows that past competition, influenced by the Anglophone-Francophone divide, partly postponed the articulation of common positions that would have made a difference in the mobilization of international action toward regional conflict resolution. Cold war concerns, in particular, widened the perceptual gulf between the United States and France over the Great Lakes region, a gulf that is starting to disappear as they work together under the diplomatic rubric of the troika. Consensus among the Western powers has been instrumental in deepening the engagement of United Nations and other international institutions in the Great Lakes region, with remarkable consequences on the ground. For instance, the French temporarily led the EU Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to stabilize the Ituri region in eastern Congo, pending the deployment of MONUC. Similarly, the efforts to host the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development in the Great Lakes Region succeeded in November 2004 because of the consensus on the urgency of the gathering. Our authors recognize that national, regional, and international solutions have coalesced to begin to alter the course of conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. Since the eruption in October 1990 of the region’s long-standing sources of insecurity, national actors have acknowledged the significant links between governance and security. Previously, exclusionary regimes hid under ethnic and regionalist labels to deny participation and representation to groups who invariably mobilized in various ways to contest their marginalization. Now assorted experiments in power-sharing have emerged to address both the security and governance dimensions of the Great Lakes crisis. Even “strongman” regimes that arose in the region in the mid-1990s are gradually embracing pluralism as a means to stabilize authority and expand their legitimacy. Similarly, the previous skepticism about the solidity of the postcolonial state that accompanied the regional intervention in the DRC has dissolved into a normalcy born of the endurance of borders. At their most virulent, conflicts tore asunder the bonds of the societies and states throughout the Great Lakes region, but more recently, conflict resolution efforts have started to mend these bonds, gradually expanding the interaction of peoples and communities. Diverse global actors will remain engaged in regional affairs, but more secure and confident regional actors are essential in defining the patterns and modes of international engagement.

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Notes 1. For analyses of regional subsystems see I. William Zartman, “Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations,” International Organization 21, no. 39 (1967), pp. 545–564; and Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, “The International Relations of Regions,” Polity 2, no. 4 (1970), pp. 397–425. John F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes in the Congo (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), attempts to proceed in this tradition. 2. For diverse conceptions of security and its links to governance, see Marc Howard Ross, “Democracy as Joint Problem Solving: Addressing Interests and Identities in Divided Societies,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 4, no. 4 (1998), pp. 19–46; David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23 (1997), pp. 5–26; Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8 (1983), pp. 129–153. 3. Glynne Evans, Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes, Adelphi Paper no. 311 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997). 4. David Norman Smith, “The Genesis of Genocide in Rwanda: The Fatal Dialectic of Class and Ethnicity,” Humanity and Society 19, no. 4 (November 1995), pp. 65–67; Philippe Platteau, “Land Relations Under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34 (1998), pp. 1–47. 5. For analyses of changing roles between regional organizations and the UN, see Gareth Evans, “Preventive Action and Conflict Resolution,” in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 61–87; Ismat Kittani, “Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking: The UN Experience,” in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 89–107; Salim Ahmed Salim, “The OAU Role in Conflict Management,” in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 132–145; Thomas Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs (London: Macmillan, 1998); Tobias Debiel, “Strengthening the UN as an Effective World Authority: Cooperative Security Versus Hegemonic Crisis Management,” Global Governance 6, no. 1 (January–March 2000), pp. 25–42. 6. UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), “DRC: Two Aides Proposed to Help Masire with ‘Shuttle Diplomacy,’” 5 June 2002.

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2 Governance and Security in Rwanda FILIP REYNTJENS

I

n the spring of 1994, a small and poor country hitherto unknown to the public at large suddenly became international front-page news. Following the shooting down of President Juvénal Habyarimana’s aircraft, a lowintensity civil war that had started in 1990 and supposedly had been ended by the Arusha Accord (August 1993) resumed. Genocide and large-scale massacres claimed the lives of over a million Rwandans between 7 April and the beginning of July 1994. Although the violence could be seen almost live on television, the international community did nothing to stop the carnage. The peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), was all but withdrawn, and it took weeks to formally recognize the violence for what it was: genocide. The media resorted to the comfortable stereotype of “ethnic” or “tribal” warfare, but the violence was political, at least initially (it became more complex in later stages). Those who were killed by the extremists of the old regime were their opponents, Hutu and Tutsi alike: politicians favorable to political change and those who supported the implementation of the Arusha Accord, persons active in human rights organizations, leaders of civil society, journalists, and the Tutsi generally, as a whole considered allies of the RPF rebellion. During the same period, the advancing RPF committed widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity, mostly against Hutu. Many people have attempted to understand what happened in Rwanda. Some have pointed to the steady deterioration of the economic situation and the growing inequalities from the mid-1980s on;1 others have insisted on the untenable demographic pressure and the scarcity of land.2 Another explanation discussed has been the frustrations inherent in a socially and culturally oppressive environment; 3 finally, some other authors have highlighted the impact on ethnicity of a number of measures of the colonial administration and the inherent genocidal potential of the ideology developed after the revolution of 1959–1961.4 Peter Uvin has convincingly 15

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summed up a number of factors that have contributed to the emergence of structural violence first, and acute violence later, and he assessed the impact of development aid on this tragic evolution.5 Although all of these elements contributed to the events of 1994, the more immediate context may help to understand the dramatic scope of the violence. A very specific mix of factors constituted the breeding ground for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Although there are multiple causal factors, I shall limit myself to mentioning the five immediate factors that led to Rwanda’s descent into massive violence.6 Two— democratization and control of the state—are shared with other African countries. First, democratization, like every process of major political change, has an inherent destabilizing effect. As S. P. Huntington argued, “major political changes almost always involve violence.”7 Second, what is at stake in these processes is the control of the state, which in Africa is the most important instrument of accumulation of wealth and of the reproduction of a ruling class. It is not surprising that this importance compounds the intensity and violence of the political struggle. Although these two elements played a role, the extreme nature of the violence can be explained only if a number of specific Rwandan variables are taken into account. First, unlike other African countries, Rwanda and Burundi are bipolarized along ethnic lines, a situation that is much more difficult to manage peacefully than multiethnic polarizations. Bipolarization provides a strong breeding ground for ethnic manipulation, as the “other,” the “enemy,” is easy to identify. Second, the Rwandan state is historically strong, and the population tends to be socially conformist. This combination can be an asset, but it can also be a liability: it can be a powerful tool at the service of development, but it can also be used to conduct a highly efficient and “decentralized” genocide. A third factor specific to Rwanda was the war waged by the RPF from October 1990 on. It contributed vastly to the mobilization around ethnic loyalties, as the RPF was essentially a Tutsi movement seen as a mortal threat. The war provided a context for destabilization and political stalemate, and it contributed to the fragmentation of the political landscape. In addition, it generated a culture of violence in which political solutions became increasingly discredited. After its military victory in early July 1994, the RPF inherited a devastated country. In human terms, the toll was horrendous: about 1.1 million dead, 2 million refugees abroad, over 1 million internally displaced, tens of thousands of deeply traumatized genocide survivors, and over half a million “old caseload” (that is, Tutsi) refugees returned in a chaotic fashion.8 The material damage too was substantial: destruction of infrastructure, plundered banks and businesses, dysfunctional civil service and judiciary, decrepit health care and education services, and the loss of crops and livestock.

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When the RPF took office on 19 July 1994, it reaffirmed its commitment to the terms and the spirit of the Arusha Accord and the logic of power-sharing it contained. With the exception of the former single-party Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) and the extremist Hutu-party Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), banned for their leading role in the genocide, the political parties (or what was left of them) took up the seats in government and parliament allotted to them by the accord. A Hutu from the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), Faustin Twagiramungu, became prime minister, as provided in the accord. A number of amendments made unilaterally by the RPF to the Fundamental Law, however, profoundly modified the political regime agreed to in Arusha. They introduced a strong executive presidency, imposed the dominance of the RPF in the government, and redrew the composition of parliament. The amended Fundamental Law was, in effect, a subtle piece of constitutional engineering that attempted to mask the consolidation of the RPF’s hold on political power.9 In a context where security concerns were genuine and trade-offs needed to be made between freedom and control, the RPF initially seemed to waver between, on the one hand, political openness and inclusiveness (witness the setting up of a government of national unity and the return to Rwanda of a number of non-RPF civilian and military office holders) and, on the other hand, a violent mode of management and discriminatory practices (witness the large number of civilians killed by the RPF). A strong feeling prevailed in the international community, however, that some latitude needed to be given to a regime facing the colossal task of reconstructing the country in human and material terms. When the first indications of a worrying drift appeared soon after the RPF seized power, most thought it premature to question the good faith and political will of the new regime.10 At a donors’ roundtable in Geneva in January 1995, almost US$600 million was pledged in bilateral and multilateral aid to Rwanda. The failure to tie the pledges to improvements in a rapidly deteriorating human rights situation may well have convinced the regime that it could act without restraint and that impunity was assured. In addition, the Friends of the New Rwanda, in particular the United States, the UK, and the Netherlands, squarely supported the RPF. These countries were not hindered by much knowledge of Rwanda or the region, and driven by an acute guilt syndrome after the genocide, they reasoned in terms of “good guys” and “bad guys,” the RPF naturally being the “good guys.”11 An impressive number of studies, reports, and “lessons learned” exercises, using the benefit of hindsight, have been produced on the Rwandan tragedy. In this chapter I attempt to look at the present and the future by analyzing a number of trends visible since 1994. I discuss the evolution toward authoritarian rule and renewed structural violence and assess the

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response by the international community. I make no excuse for being mainly concerned with the shortcomings of the present regime, and I do not discuss its achievements such as institutional reconstruction, relatively good bureaucratic governance, and the technical level and cosmopolitan outlook of the new elites. There are two reasons for this. First, as shown below, these positive sides have been and still are highlighted among the donor community. Second, the previous regime too enjoyed a considerable favorable prejudice; this had a blinding effect that caused major warning signs to be ignored. The same mistakes have been and are being committed after the takeover by the RPF. I shall only address a number of issues related to governance and the impact of Rwandan regime behavior on the region. Before doing that, I must, however, mention two subjects I cannot discuss here, although developments have been truly worrying.12 First, in the area of human rights, the Rwandan regime has killed tens of thousands of civilians, both in Rwanda and Zaire/Congo, before, during, and after the genocide. Hundreds of thousands of others were forcibly regrouped in an ill-conceived and securityinduced villagization program (imidugudu). The press and civil society were put under tight control and indeed disappeared as countervailing forces. Second, victor’s justice does not contribute to reconciliation: neither the courts nor the neotraditional gacaca proceedings address the crimes committed by the RPF, and the regime has, so far successfully, exerted extreme pressure on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to avoid prosecution.

Governance in Contemporary Rwanda

The Shrinking Political Base Initially a number of politicians, civil servants, judges, and military personnel who had served under the old regime either remained in the country or returned from abroad and indicated their willingness to cooperate with the RPF. The illusion of inclusiveness was soon shattered, however, by the departure into exile first of Hutu, later of Tutsi genocide survivors, and even, eventually, of RPF old hands. From early 1995 on, Hutu elites became the victims of harassment, imprisonment, and even physical elimination. Provincial governors (préfets), local mayors, head teachers, clerics, and judges were killed in increasing numbers; in most cases, the responsibility of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA, the army of the RPF, which had become the national army) was well documented. The first watershed came in August 1995, when Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga (one of the rare RPF

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Hutu), and Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito resigned.13 The first two went into exile; Nkubito stayed and died in early 1997. The many who left in this first wave included government ministers, superior judges, highranking civil servants, diplomats, army officers, journalists, leaders of civil society, and even players on the national soccer team. As soon as they arrived abroad, they made allegations of concentration and abuse of power, abuses by the army and intelligence services, massive violations of human rights, insecurity and intimidation, and discrimination against the Hutu and even the Tutsi genocide survivors.14 A second wave of departures into exile came in early 2000, in part against the background of increasing tensions between Tutsi returnees, those from Uganda in particular, and genocide survivors. The latter felt that they were becoming second-rate citizens who had been sacrificed by the RPF, which was more interested in a military victory than in saving them. On 6 January, the speaker of the National Assembly, Tutsi genocide survivor Joseph Sebarenzi, suddenly resigned under pressure from groups within the RPF who were under parliamentary scrutiny. Fearing for his life, he fled to Uganda and later settled in North America. The Sebarenzi affair was hardly over when Prime Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigema announced his resignation on 28 February; he sought asylum in the United States. Worse was to come less than a month later. On 23 March, President Pasteur Bizimungu resigned “for personal reasons.” Accusations were immediately leveled against him: Bizimungu was said to have committed tax fraud, illegally dispossessed farmers, and opposed parliamentary inquiries into corruption for fear of being investigated himself.15 Although Uganda offered him political asylum, Bizimungu stayed in the country; he was arrested a year later and remains in prison. The departure of the speaker of Parliament, the prime minister, and the head of state in just three months’ time was a strong indication that the regime was facing a profound political crisis. Although the situation was of course very different, the tension recalled that which had prevailed in early 1994 during the months preceding the genocide. Sebarenzi summed up this feeling in an interview: “The situation is becoming uncontrollable, there are deep divisions today particularly among Tutsi and these tendencies could lead to a catastrophe. . . . There are many similarities with the period which preceded the 1994 genocide.”16 The regime was increasingly challenged from within. At the beginning of 2001, the directors of the newspaper Rwanda News Line, who used to be close to the RPF, were threatened after the publication of articles criticizing the government, in particular concerning the RPA’s involvement in Congo. They wrote that they were accused of being in the pay of “negative forces” (a loosely coined term by the RPF by which it terrorizes all its critics or opponents into silence).17 The editorial staff of Imboni, another newspaper considered

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close to the RPF, left Rwanda for Brussels from where they published Imboni in Exile. In the first editorial, the staff ironically “apologized” for having publicly expressed their indignation at the spirit of sycophancy, “the deliberate process of impoverishment of society and public opinion to vassaldom.” High-ranking RPF officials and RPA officers followed suit: members of parliament (MPs) Evariste Sissi and Deus Kagiraneza (who was also an officer in the RPA and a cadre of the Department of Military Defence) left for Uganda and Belgium respectively; Bosco Rutagengwa, the founder of the genocide survivors’ organization Ibuka, found asylum in the United States; RPA majors Alphonse Furuma, Michael Mupende, Gérard Ntashamaje, and Charles Kwikiriza left for Uganda, Belgium, or Canada; the banker and former MP Valens Kajeguhakwa, an erstwhile supporter of the RPF, fled as well. In August 2001, RPA chief of staff General Kayumba Nyamwasa went on “study leave” in the UK, after a violent verbal dispute with Kagame against the background of a malaise in the army around the operations in the DRC.18 On 12 April 2001 the editorial of Rwanda News Line interpreted the “disappearance” on 4 April of retired major Alex Ruzindana as “a possible attempt to discourage new defections.” During 2004, deep intraregime tensions became increasingly apparent. In January 2004, the vice president of the Supreme Court, Gerald Gahima, and his brother Théogène Rudasingwa, an adviser in the president’s office— both considered very close to Kagame—were forced to resign after accusations of financial malpractices. Officers close to Kayumba were arrested or retired. In March, two influential officers, Colonel Patrick Karegeya and Colonel Jack Nziza, were removed as heads of the powerful External Security Organisation and Directorate of Military Intelligence respectively. In January 2005, Kayumba was replaced as head of the National Security Service and appointed ambassador in New Delhi, but he initially refused to join his new post. Early in May 2005, Karegeya was arrested; he was held incommunicado until September 2005, when he was released. Around the same period, the house of Colonel Richard Masozera, the husband of one of the RPF’s historical leaders, Aloysia Inyumba, was searched for weapons. The rumors of an impending coup became so intense that the chief of staff, General James Kabarebe, felt the need to issue a denial.19

Tutsization, RPF-ization, and the New Akazu Although it officially rejected ethnic discrimination and even the notion of ethnicity, the RPF rapidly reserved access to power, wealth, and knowledge to Tutsi. The only exception was the cabinet, where a number of Hutu served as ministers to give a symbolic expression of “national unity.” The RPF vigorously and categorically denied any ethnic factor, a denial that was an

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essential element of the hegemonic strategies of small Tutsi elites, such as the one that controlled power in Rwanda during the 1950s and in Burundi between 1965 and 1988. Political analysts J.-H. Bradol and A. Guibert insisted that “to stress the absence of ethnic identities has become a means of masking the monopoly by Tutsi military of political power. In this case, political discourse opposed to ethnism attempts to hide the domination of society by the self-proclaimed representatives of the Tutsi community.” 20 Apologists of the regime explained away this state of affairs in a paradoxical fashion: when in the past, Hutu were a majority in public institutions, this was called “ethnic discrimination”; now that Tutsi were a majority, however, this became “meritocracy.” Of course, the elimination of ethnicity is a worthwhile goal, shared by many Rwandans, but the cynical manipulation of this objective as a tool for the monopolization of power in the hands of a small group is something quite different. The former priest Privat Rutazibwa, one of the ideologues of the RPF, has proposed a revealing justification for this ethnic bias. “The Hutu élites as a whole entirely subscribe to the fundamental thesis of the ethnist ideology, namely that power belongs to the Hutu because they are a majority. Such an observation obviously allows the exclusion of “the Hutu élites” in their entirety, in order to base the exercise of power on “the qualification of competence and personal merit.”21 The government-owned weekly La Nouvelle Relève meant exactly the same thing when it expressed the hope that the road followed would be “the result of a popular consensus between the leaders and the enlightened part of the people.”22 This “enlightened part” clearly does not include the Hutu, or at least their elites; therefore, the combination of “meritocracy” and the exclusion of the elite of one ethnic group delivers the right to govern to the elite of the other ethnic group. Tutsization as a means of consolidating the hold of the RPF on the system was quite spectacular at most levels of the state: by 1996, the majority of the MPs, four of the six Supreme Court presiding judges, over 80 percent of the mayors, most permanent secretaries and university teachers and students, almost the entire army command structure, and the intelligence services were Tutsi. This phenomenon was further amplified and supported by a sociopolitical reality, namely the Tutsization of urban Rwanda that had become the sociological and economic foundation of the RPF. Many of the returned old diaspora (“old caseload refugees”) have settled in towns and cities where they became the majority, “squatting” in homes, shops, and businesses. The government as the symbol of national unity disappeared as a result of the reshuffle of March 2000 after Rwigema’s resignation. The RPF held eight of the twenty-one portfolios in the 1994 government, but it provided eleven of the twenty ministers in the 2000 one; the 1994 government included twelve Hutu and nine Tutsi, whereas in 2000, twelve of the ministers were Tutsi, and eight were Hutu. As a result, the “RPF-ization” and

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the “Tutsization” at the less visible echelons of the state that had been an ongoing process for several years was now extended also to the international image—the government itself.23 By mid-2000, the overall distribution was as shown in Table 2.1. Thus, out of a total of 169 of the most important officeholders, 135 (or approximately 80 percent) were RPF/RPA and 119 (or approximately 70 percent) were Tutsi. It is estimated in addition that more than 80 percent of mayors and university staff and students are Tutsi. In a country where Hutu number about 85 percent of the total population, these figures obviously show a strong ethnic bias in favor of a small Tutsi elite. M. Dorsey has shown the extent to which the army and the intelligence services have become the keystones of the system and how the strict control of the population has been an obsession since the beginning of the war in 1990. The instruments of power and enrichment are concentrated in small networks based on a shared past in certain refugee camps in Uganda, on belonging to the same schools, and on kinship links. 24 Under the heading “The RPF Has Renounced Itself,” the Tribun du Peuple—though considered a supporter of the RPF—in August 1997 stated that “the revolution” had failed and that the new regime was plagiarizing the methods of the former government. It denounced the misappropriation of funds, nepotism, clientelism, and corruption and asserted that “the liabilities of Habyarimana and company’s management of the country at the end of the first fifteen years of his time in office, has been largely attained by the new leaders of the country over the last three years.” Referring to the abuses committed by the RPA, it observed that—contrary to article 5 of the RPF’s program—the military “are neither honest, competent nor patriotic.”25 At the same time, members of

Table 2.1 Party Affiliations of Major Political Institutions in Rwanda (mid-2000) Institution Government Permanent secretaries Provincial governors Ambassadors Parliament President sections, Supreme Court, and Courts of Appeal Army command CEO, public/mixed enterprises

Tutsi

Hutu

RPF/RPA

Other Party/No Party/ Unknown

12 10 9 7 49

8 2 3 3 25

11 10 11 8 61a

9 2 1 2 13

7 8 17

3 0 5

— 8 18

— 0 4

Source: Based on a compilation of mostly unpublished sources. These identifications are limited to the persons for whom reliable data were available. Note: a. The parties or wings of parties having joined the RPF coalition are included under RPF/RPA. This informal platform was confirmed when six parties joined the RPF in backing Paul Kagame as a presidential candidate in July 2003.

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the RPF published a memorandum denouncing the “decadent nature” of the RPF and pointing at its “organisational shortcomings,” “moral decline,” and “intellectual bankruptcy.” Joining the analysis of the Tribun du Peuple, the memo denounced “the inexplicable accumulation of wealth, the lack of accountability, arrogance, clientship, political patronage.” The final verdict was severe: “The RPF as an organisation has ceased to exist. . . . From 1994, a group of individuals, members of the RPF, have monopolised the RPF by excluding the general membership.”26 A document circulating in Kigali in June or July 1998 and largely discussed after it was posted on the Internet claimed that a new akazu,27 united by kinship and other bonds, was unduly accumulating material resources, jobs, and privileges.28 Military management and physical control, both inside and outside the country, continue to serve as a political project. Even though military expenditure represented approximately 25 percent (average 1999–2001) of current expenditure, a large figure in itself, the official public accounts only showed part of this reality. The RPA found other sources of funding “outside the budget” in its presence in Congo, the embargo on Burundi until the beginning of 1999, the imposition of unofficial “taxes” and of “voluntary” contributions to the war effort, theft and extortion, and payments by public enterprises such as Rwandex, Sonarwa, and Rwandatel.29 During a hearing before a Belgian Senate Commission, former MP Deus Kagiraneza mentioned “accounts parallel to the national accounts” as well as a “system of fictitious billing”; with regard to operations in the DRC, he added that “we thus profit from the seizure of weapons, the impounding of stocks, the exploitation of mines ‘at a rebate’ and the ‘re-budgeting’ of war bounty.”30 There are several reports that have pointed to the widespread consequences of “military commercialism”31 and, more generally, at the way in which Rwanda is engaged in the plunder of the DRC.32 Although this contributes to the criminalization of the state and the economy, it does not appear to worry the international financial institutions, the EU, or certain bilateral donors in their generous attitude toward Rwanda.

The “Democratic Transition” As the end of the transition neared, the regime set out to embark on a “democratization process” in 2001. It held local elections on 6–7 March 2001, claiming this to be an important step on the road to democratization, an assertion accepted by some of its international partners. In fact, the election offered ominous signs for the future of democracy. The voting system itself was very indirect and of Byzantine complexity, allowing the “men of the system,” appointed by the RPF, to exercise full control over the process. According to an observer accredited by the electoral commission, the “elected” councillors represented only 20 percent of the Electoral College

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in charge of choosing the mayors.33 Various observers’ reports mentioned the pressure brought to bear on candidates, on those who would like to have been candidates, and on voters. Candidates did not run under a party label, and political parties were barred from campaigning, but the RPF recruited candidates anyway and campaigned in numerous districts; the local authorities appointed by the RPF and elements of the Local Defence Forces and the army gave the electors to understand which candidate they were expected to elect. An observer from a nongovernmental organization (NGO) considered that “the people in the party machinery” were known to all, a fact “which distorts the play of democracy and tends to transform Rwanda into an RPF State.”34 By far the most important flaw in the ballot was its lack of secrecy. Even though using voting booths, ballot papers, and ballot boxes, electors expressed their preference by putting their thumbprint opposite the name and the picture of the candidate of their choice. In Rwanda, just as elsewhere in Africa, the imposition of a thumbprint is the equivalent of a signature; it was therefore the equivalent of a voter in Europe or North America signing the ballot paper with his or her own name. Human Rights Watch found that “this election has been flawed from the beginning, and these flaws far outweigh the few election-day irregularities that have been reported.”35 The International Crisis Group (ICG) shared this concern. Its report on the elections observed that an important goal was “to begin to develop a new RPF ‘cadre’ in the countryside and to build the party’s political base ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003.” The RPF-controlled National Electoral Commission “abused its powers to veto unwanted candidates and guarantee that only supporters of government policies were selected. . . . In this context, ‘Consensual democracy’ has become the imposition of one party’s ideology.”36 The Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs (LGDL) concurred: the elections “should not deceive. . . . They took place under the total and tight control of the RPF.”37 In addition, the regime openly displayed a paternalistic and distrustful attitude toward the voters: according to Aloysia Inyumba, general secretary of the National Commission for Unity and Reconciliation and a long-standing RPF leader, “the ordinary citizens are like babies. They will need to be completely educated before we can talk about democracy.”38 The dynamics at play during the local elections were confirmed and reinforced in 2003, the “transition year.” With the constitutional referendum and the presidential and parliamentary elections in view, the regime crossed the Rubicon in the spring of 2003 and ceased attempting to hide its authoritarian drift. Despite its total physical and psychological control over the political landscape, its hold on the instruments of local, provincial, and national management, and its constitutional engineering, the RPF did not appear confident and set out to close off the last potential spaces of dissent.

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On 15 April, Parliament recommended that the main opposition party, MDR, be banned for spreading “divisionism,” a recommendation endorsed by the government on 16 May. The report of the parliamentary committee and the debate in plenary session revealed a strong fear of a “Burundi syndrome,”39 that is, the fear that the predominantly Hutu electorate could cause a surprise by refusing to vote for the RPF, no matter how controlled the elections would be. Of course, this fear was not unfounded, but the way in which it was met by the regime ran counter to any form of democratic transition and long-term stability, as will be discussed later. The report and the parliamentary debate also clarified two other developments. First, divisionism was defined as being in opposition to or even simply expressing disagreement with government policies. Second, in addition to political parties, every forum where dissidence could be voiced was now openly targeted: the human rights organization Ligue pour la Promotion des Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda (LIPRODHOR) and the last independent journal, Umuseso, were among those accused of “divisionism.” In the wake of the measures taken against the MDR, “civil society” showed its total lack of autonomy. During a meeting held at the seat of Pro-Femmes on 9 May 2003, a number of associations not only approved the banning of the MDR but also vigorously attacked national (LIPRODHOR) and international (Human Rights Watch) human rights organizations critical of the regime. The “recommendations” of the meeting read like a communiqué of the RPF.40 Despite the fact that there was considerable debate within these associations, by then the regime had neutralized civil society. The elections of the vice president of the Ibuka association, which at the time maintained close ties to the regime, as head of Coordination des Ligues et Associations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (CLADHO) (a human rights collective) and that of another influential member of Ibuka as chair of the Conseil de Concertation des Organisations d’Appui aux Initiatives de Base (CCOAIB) (a collective of development NGOs) were part of this strategy. The regional human rights organization LGDL observed that “Rwanda surprises particularly by the weird collusion between the government and important sections of civil society. Thus the spaces of free expression are almost all occupied or reduced to the minimum in order to prevent any contestation.”41 In sum, “civil society” was controlled by the regime. The refusal to tolerate dissent was illustrated by the process that was to lead to the end of the “political transition” in mid-2003. Started at the end of 2001, the work of a constitutional commission began with “popular consultations.” These were very much top-down, however, and according to the ICG, they were “highly supervised” and “they have not really opened up the debate on the future of Rwanda.”42 Several constitutional drafts were circulated, and Parliament eventually adopted a final text on 23 April 2003. Made public only on 15 May, the draft was approved by referendum on 26 May.

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After a campaign that was exclusively in support of the text, without a single dissident voice inside the country, 93 percent of the electorate (the turnout was almost 90 percent) voted yes.43 An ICG analyst was not surprised: “There was no real possibility to reject (the text) because there was no campaigning to explain why it is bad. . . . It was a state-managed referendum, and we have a state-managed result.”44 An observer mission of the EU shared this skeptical view in more diplomatic language. Although lauding the technical and organizational aspects of the referendum, it expressed “concern” over several developments. It noted that “the restrictions in the constitution . . . limit the freedoms of expression and association, as well as party political activities,” and it feared that “the restrictions of the activities of parties on the ground have frozen the political game and reinforced the position of the RPF.”45 Other concerns related to events such as the banning of the MDR, arrests and “disappearances” of opponents, and the intimidation of civil society. The report also expressed doubts about the true meaning of the massive turnout and felt that, in the eyes of the electors, the vote by fingerprinting diminished the secret character of the ballot.46 Just like the previous Fundamental Law, the 2003 constitution is tailor-made to legitimize the regime under the guise of “democratic governance.”47 The presidential and parliamentary elections confirmed the image of a cosmetic operation for international consumption. At the presidential elections of 25 August, Kagame was elected president by a massive 95 percent of the vote after a campaign marred by arrests, “disappearances,” and intimidation. In 374 stations visited (out of a total of about 10,000), members of an EU observer mission witnessed irregularities and fraud, notably through the stuffing of ballot boxes and faults in the counting procedure.48 EU observers made similar observations during the parliamentary elections at the end of September. These took place without real opposition to the RPF, as all participating parties had supported Kagame’s bid for the presidency in August and the only opposition party, Alliance pour la Démocratie, l’Équité et le Progrès–Mizero (ADEP-Mizero), was refused recognition; in addition, the main independent candidates were disqualified on the eve of the vote. Though the international observation exercise was made difficult, the EU mission observed fraud, intimidation, the manipulation of electoral lists, ballot box stuffing, lack of secrecy of the vote, and lack of transparency in the counting procedure.49 The RPF and a few small parties on its ticket gained about 74 percent of the vote; the Parti Social Démocratique (PSD) won about 12 percent and the Parti Libéral (PL) about 10 percent. As the latter two supported the RPF’s candidate at the presidential poll, all elected candidates form part of the same alliance.50 In addition, most of the MPs indirectly elected by organizations of women, youth, and disabled are members or sympathizers of the RPF. Rwanda has thus returned to a situation of de facto one-party rule. Given the total control exercised by the RPF, this was no

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real surprise. Although the international community was of course fully aware of the cosmetic nature of the whole exercise, it endorsed the outcome despite a few timid expressions of concern (for instance, by the Netherlands, the United States, and the EU).51 The regime launched an assault on the little that remained of civil society precisely one year after the elimination of the political opposition, and it did so in exactly the same fashion. At the end of June 2004, a “parliamentary commission of enquiry on the ideology of genocide” recommended the banning of a number of organizations “preaching the ideology of genocide and ethnic hatred.”52 Among these was the last remaining independent human rights association, LIPRODHOR, as well as half a dozen organizations working to promote the peasantry. Contrary to the action taken on the MDR a year earlier, it was not even necessary to formally ban LIPRODHOR. As Parliament sent a list of a dozen of its leading members to the government, along with the request to have them arrested and prosecuted, nine of them, including the chairman, fled to Uganda and Burundi in early July. This was the end of LIPRODHOR as an independent organization, a fact openly welcomed by the government: in a declaration made on 17 September, the Council of Ministers noted that “LIPRODHOR has just separated itself from those of its members infected by the ideology of genocide” and that “the general assembly of LIPRODHOR, at its meeting of 11 September, has apologised to the people and the government of Rwanda for the bad behaviour of some of its representatives and members.”53 The new board was packed with RPF sympathizers close to the regime, and so, rather than disbanding LIPRODHOR, the RPF simply took it over, thus neutralizing the organization. The constitutional and electoral processes in 2003 and the extinction of civil society in 2004 demonstrated that Rwanda was simply not ready yet to become a genuine pluralist democracy. This is not altogether exceptional in Africa, and Rwanda carries the additional burden of its recent dramatic past. More realism is therefore necessary. On the one hand, as will be discussed below, the international community is wrong in accepting the drift toward authoritarianism too lightly. But on the other hand, that community cannot impose perfect democratic governance at once. A gradual approach along a path with benchmarks will therefore be advocated.

Information Management: “A New Way of Doing Things” It often happens that the victim turns bully, and this happened in Rwanda, although it was not considered politically correct to acknowledge the reality of widespread “disappearances,” assassinations, and massacres.54 An increasing number of Rwandan and expatriate sources from inside and outside the country indicated that before, during, and after the genocide the

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RPF killed tens of thousands of innocent civilians. Some of these incidents are well documented, and a few have even met with international condemnation. Many of them remain little known, however, or were, at times deliberately, underestimated.55 From the first days after the RPF’s victory, abuse was covered by a conspiracy of silence, induced in part by an international feeling of guilt over the genocide and a comfortable “good guys–bad guys” dichotomy.56 An early report by UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) consultant Robert Gersony, who estimated that between 25,000 and 45,000 civilians were killed by the RPF between April and August 1994, was suppressed and never released.57 Apart from considerations of guilt and political correctness, other factors explain the conspiracy of silence. On the one hand, most massacres by the RPF occurred in a discreet fashion, making investigations difficult. Thus, areas where they were committed were declared “military zones” that could not be entered by outsiders, the remains of victims were removed or burned, and whole regions, such as the Akagera Parc, were closed to access and even air traffic.58 On the other hand, observers had an interest in keeping silent. Witnesses of NGOs and international organizations feared expulsion, and Rwandans ran the risk of reprisals against themselves or their families. Bradol and Guibert of Médecins sans Frontières denounced a real “law of silence” on the part of the aid organizations: “[C]losed eyes and mouths are a condition for the perpetuation of these crimes. Apart from the political and juridical impunity automatically offered by the states, the authorities thus benefit from the moral and media impunity resulting from the resignation of the witnesses.”59 With regard to the massacres by the RPA of refugees in Zaire in 1996– 1997, Nik Gowing has shown the importance of information management by the Rwandan regime. Without false modesty, Kagame stated that “[w]e used communication and information warfare better than anyone. We have found a new way of doing things.”60 One technique, first used in Rwanda and later in Zaire, was the “closure of the conflict scene”: Kagame confirmed that “the aim was to let them [the NGOs and the press] continue their work, but deny them what would be dangerous to us.”61 Intimidation was another tool: “Kagame does not like NGOs, so he paralysed them completely and terrorised them. If he did not like what they did with information, he kicked them out.”62 Likewise, journalists “knew the Rwandan government could make life unpleasant.”63 Fear was reinforced by a practice of encouraging leaks and monitoring communications. Thus “one particular NGO partial to the Rwandan government”64 would fax situation reports directly to Kagame’s office.65 A humanitarian agent indicated that “if the Save the Children person in Bukavu radioed that he had refugees . . . then those refugees would be under threat because networks were bugged.”66

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Not content with remaining silent about RPF crimes, some reporters became “RPF groupies,” ready to excuse what they did wrong: one of them recognized that “journalists and NGOs were in bed with the RPF.”67 At any rate, the choice was simple: “The RPA’s line was that you are either with the RPA or against them.”68 A final reason for this complicity of silence was the “genocide credit” the new regime in Kigali enjoyed. Of course, the genocide is a massive reality with a lasting impact, but it has also become a source of legitimacy astutely exploited to escape condemnation, not unlike the way in which the holocaust is used to deflect criticism of Israel’s policies and actions toward the Palestinians. Just as the holocaust became an ideological weapon for Israel and “the most successful ethnic group in the United States,”69 the 1994 genocide has become such a weapon for the RPF, allowing it to acquire and maintain victim status and, as a “compensation,” to enjoy complete immunity. One example among many of the use of this argument was the Rwandan reaction to a report by Amnesty International on the humanitarian disaster caused by the RPA’s occupation of eastern Congo.70 In a formal statement, the government called these findings “an unsupportable insult to the memory of the more than a million victims of the 1994 genocide.”71 The use of the genocide as a political trump card was made easier by the fact that the massacres by the former Rwandan army and the Hutu militia were committed almost “live,” which encouraged the international community to reason in terms of good and bad guys. As the “bad guys” were easily identifiable, the others (that is, the RPF) had to be the “good guys.” This presentation of the situation even allowed the RPF and its sympathizers to accuse those who denounced its crimes of being “negationist” or “revisionist,”72 even if these same persons vigorously condemned the genocide against the Tutsi. Wondering why forced villagization in imidugudu, a policy disrespectful of human rights and resulting in profound social injury, has been maintained and supported by international donors, M. Van Leeuwen observed that Rwanda has been successful in having its “narrative of difference” accepted by the international community, although this discourse was based on ambiguous and doubtful suppositions.73 His demonstration is interesting, because the Rwandan regime has formulated a similar discourse on other occasions, for instance, to justify the pitiful situation of human rights, the absence of progress in the field of democratization, or the occupation/ exploitation of a large part of the DRC. Andy Storey noted that the lessons of the past are not learned: “There is obviously a strong sense of history repeating itself here: the [World] Bank is once again displaying a willingness to lend strong support to Rwandan state power, and the consequences for ordinary people—in Rwanda itself and in the DRC—may once more be bleak.”74

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In a detailed and convincing demonstration, Johan Pottier attempted to explain why and how the RPF succeeded in “converting international feelings of guilt and ineptitude into admissions that the Front deserves to have the monopoly of knowledge construction.”75 He showed that the “rewriting project” of the RPF benefited from the empathy and services not only of (mainly Anglophone) journalists unfamiliar with the region but also of newcomer academics, diplomats, and aid workers. In addition, Kagame imposed a new doctrine of information control built around management of access and denial.

The Impact of Rwanda on the Region Rwanda has been at the core of the region’s instability since the attack by the RPF on 1 October 1990. The RPF took power in July 1994 and twice invaded neighboring Zaire/Congo, in 1996 and 1998, where the Rwandan civil war continued extraterritorially. Although security concerns were initially the driving force for war, the economic exploitation of Rwanda’s rich and vast but weak neighbor eventually became the main, though never acknowledged, reason. Three major characteristics have accompanied the Rwandan presence in the DRC. First, human rights abuse has been colossal, against both Rwandan Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians.76 In June 1998, a UN generalsecretary’s investigative team concluded that the RPA had committed largescale war crimes and crimes against humanity. The report went further by suggesting that genocide might have occurred. This needed additional investigation, however: “The systematic massacre of those [Hutu refugees] remaining in Zaire was an abhorrent crime against humanity, but the underlying rationale for the decision is material to whether these killings constituted genocide, that is, a decision to eliminate, in part, the Hutu ethnic group.”77 Some 200,000 refugees were “unaccounted for.”78 During the second Congo war, which started in August 1998, Amnesty International accused the RPA and its proxy, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Goma (RCD-Goma), of attacking and killing tens of thousands of Congolese civilians, pointing out that many massacres took place in areas rich in minerals.79 A painstaking review covering the period from August 1998 to the end of 2000 conveyed an image of large-scale systematic and deliberate atrocities.80 Second, at the same time, Rwandan “elite networks” systematically plundered the part of the DRC under their military control.81 According to a UN panel set up to examine the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources, the real long-term purpose of the RPA’s presence in Congo was to “secure property,” not to establish security.82 The involvement of Rwandan “elite networks” with international criminal groups is a worrying trend. Two UN panels pointed to the fact that Viktor Bout, a notorious and internationally

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sought arms dealer and transporter featured prominently in illegal activities in the region, operated from Kigali among other places.83 These predatory practices compounded the criminalization of the Rwandan state and economy and eventually made a lasting disengagement from the DRC unaffordable. This is why Rwanda, after officially withdrawing its troops from Congo in September 2002, changed tactics to finding alternative allies on the ground and to sponsoring autonomist movements to consolidate its long-term influence in eastern Congo and make the most out of the Kivu region.84 In addition, even after its official withdrawal, Rwanda maintained a clandestine military presence in the DRC.85 The unpublished part of the UN panel final report (October 2003) is particularly damning in this respect. At the request of the panel, this section was to remain confidential and not be circulated beyond the members of the Security Council, as it “contain[ed] highly sensitive information on actors involved in exploiting the natural resources of the DRC, their role in perpetuating the conflict as well as details on the connection between illegal exploitation and illicit trade of small arms and light weapons.”86 The findings showed a continued presence of the Rwandan army in the DRC. The army also went on shipping arms and ammunition to the Kivus and Ituri, provided training, exercised command, supported North Kivu governor Eugène Serufuli’s militia, assisted in preparing a new rebellion in Kasai Orientale Province, and manipulated ex–Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR)/Interahamwe by infiltrating Rwandan army officers into these forces. The UN panel considered the “Rwanda network” to be the “most serious threat to the Congolese Government of National Unity. The main actor in this network is the Rwandan security apparatus, whose objective is to maintain Rwandan presence in, and control of the Kivus and possibly Ituri.”87 The way in which Rwanda continued to derail the peace process in the DRC did not seem to bother the international community too much. A report noted that “in the U.K., former Secretary for International Development Clare Short successfully excluded Rwanda’s conduct in the DRC from the U.K.’s bilateral dialogue with Kigali” and found it “particularly baffling that on July 30, 2003, two days after U.N. Resolution 1493 imposed an arms embargo on groups involved in the conflict in Congo, the United States lifted its own bilateral arms embargo on Rwanda.”88 Rwandan support for dissident forces went on throughout 2004 while the DRC was engaged in its delicate and fragile political transition. A UN panel was concerned that “the territory of Rwanda continues to be used for recruitment, infiltration and destabilisation purposes,” and it observed a “residual presence” of the RPF in North Kivu.89 Amnesty International documented in detail how Rwanda continued to supply weapons and ammunition to armed groups in eastern DRC, thus contributing to the continuation of violence and derailing the Congolese political process.90

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Third, as a result of the behavior of the Rwandan army in eastern Congo and the way in which Congolese Tutsi (the Banyamulenge) were used as instruments in this war, a latent anti-Tutsi feeling rapidly grew stronger, leading to ethnogenesis: previously unrelated groups began to view themselves as part of two larger categories, Bantu and Hamitics, and began thinking of these categories as necessarily hostile one to the other. As the Tutsi are a small minority in the region, the enmity provoked against them and other Hamitic groups by the RPA’s aggressive behavior may well threaten their survival in the future. Rwanda and Uganda were allies when they invaded the DRC in 1996 and again in 1998, but by 1999 their relations had soured and they rapidly developed a profound hostility, dramatically demonstrated when their armies clashed on several occasions in Kisangani. The rift between the erstwhile allies had several causes. Uganda wished to avoid repeating the mistake made in 1996–1997 when Kabila was “parachuted” into power, but Rwanda preferred a quick military solution and the installation of another figurehead in Kinshasa. In addition, the “entrepreneurs of insecurity” of the “elite networks” in both countries were engaged in a competition to extract Congolese resources. Finally, Museveni resented the geopolitical ambitions of “little Rwanda” and the lack of gratitude displayed by Kagame, whose accession to power would not have been possible without the support of Uganda. Just like the Rwandan civil war, the conflict with Uganda is fought on foreign soil and, in part, by proxy. Both countries supported rebel movements and (ethnic) militias in a context of continuously shifting alliances in an increasingly fragmented landscape. A dangerous escalation occurred when, in early 2003, Rwanda started sending troops and supplies to the Ituri region in support of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), an erstwhile ally of Uganda.91 The attempts by the RCD-Goma and Rwanda to link up territory, and thus conflict, in North Kivu and in Ituri was seen by Kampala as a vital threat and again brought both countries to the brink of war.92

Conclusion Mamdani believed that, to contain the deep tensions (“volcanic in nature”) present in Rwanda would not only require a drawn-out cooling-off period but also need a commitment that was international, not just regional. He even suggested a “custodianship.”93 But Rwanda confronts the international community with a grave dilemma. At first sight, peace reigns inside the country (even though it has been obtained at great human cost at home and in the DRC), “democratization” has supposedly been achieved, and technocratic/bureaucratic governance is apparently satisfactory, with competent, even charming, elites articulating an intelligent discourse. In addition, in

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light of the dramatic past, there is a profound desire to see things move in the right direction and an overwhelming desire to “believe in it,” despite ominous signs to the contrary. This was confirmed with the 2003 elections, when the donor community, having abandoned Rwanda a first time in 1994, attempted to redeem itself by committing another major mistake, becoming as it did complicit in the installation of a new dictatorship.94 By engaging in wishful thinking, the international community takes an enormous risk and assumes a grave responsibility. 95 Although it is understandable that the “genocide credit” and the logic of “good guys and bad guys” have long inspired a great deal of understanding for a regime born out of the genocide, this complacent attitude has incrementally, step by step, contributed to a situation that may well be irreversible and that contains the seeds for new massive violence in the medium/long run. Indeed, on the one hand, now that it is “legitimized” by the elections, the Rwandan regime will be even less inclined to engage in any form of dialogue with the opposition at home and abroad. On the other hand, most Rwandans, who are excluded and know full well that they have been robbed of their civil and political rights, are frustrated, angry, and desperate. Such conditions constitute a fertile breeding ground for more structural violence, which “creates anger, resentment and frustration”96 and may well eventually again lead to acute violence. Notes 1. See, for example, F. Bézy, Rwanda. Bilan socio-économique d’un régime (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d’étude des pays en développement, Etudes et Documents, 1990); S. Marysse, T. De Herdt, and E. Ndayambaje, “Rwanda. Appauvrissement et ajustement structurel,” Cahiers Africains, no. 12 (1994). 2. See, for example, J. C. Willame, “Aux sources de l’hécatombe rwandaise,” Cahiers Africains, no. 14 (1995), pp.109–131; C. André and J. P. Platteau, “Land Relations Under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation (1998), pp. 1–47. 3. Willame, “Aux sources de l’hécatombe rwandaise,” pp. 132–156. 4. See, for example, C. Braeckman, Rwanda. Histoire d’un génocide (Paris: Fayard, 1994). 5. P. Uvin, Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998). 6. For a fuller treatment, see F. Reyntjens, “Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond,” Journal of Refugee Studies (1996), pp. 240–251. 7. S. P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 192. 8. These numbers were out of a total population of about 7.8 million, that is, almost 13 percent. An attempt at establishing a casualty figure can be found in F. Reyntjens, “Estimation du nombre de personnes tuées au Rwanda en 1994,” in S. Marysse and F. Reyntjens (eds.), L’Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 1996–1997 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997), pp. 179–186. A census conducted by the Rwandan

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government in 2000 arrived at the comparable, but ridiculously precise, figure of 1,074,017 (République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Administration locale, de l’information et des affaires sociales, Dénombrement des victimes du génocide. Rapport final [Kigali: 2002]). It must be made clear, however, that the two estimates do not reinforce each other, as the government figure claims that at least 94 percent of the victims were Tutsi, an assumption contradicted by demographic data (Tutsi numbered well under one million) and empirical fact (over 200,000 Tutsi survived the genocide, and hundreds of thousands of Hutu died at the hands of other Hutu and the RPF). 9. On this, see F. Reyntjens, “Constitution-Making in Situations of Extreme Crisis: The Case of Rwanda and Burundi,” Journal of African Law (1996), pp. 234– 242, at pp. 236–239. 10. Already in November 1994, however, the main opposition party, MDR, had published a document (Position du M.D.R. sur les grands problèmes actuels du Rwanda [Kigali: 6 November 1994]) quite critical of the new regime. Other early warnings can be found in Amnesty International, Reports of Killings and Abductions by the Rwandese Patriotic Front, April–August 1994 (London: 1994); Human Rights Watch, The Aftermath of Genocide in Rwanda (New York: 1994); Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: A New Catastrophe? (New York: 1994). In the same period, I publicly expressed concern in a November 1994 memo, a summary of which was later published in English (F. Reyntjens, “Subjects of Concern: Rwanda, October 1994,” Issue, no. 2 [1995], pp. 39–43). 11. Until then, the UK and the Netherlands had been minor donors and did not have embassies in Kigali. 12. For details, see my annual political chronicles in L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997–2003). 13. Twagiramungu was replaced by Pierre-Célestin Rwigema, also of the MDR, who was to quit his position and leave the country in 2000 (see later discussion in text). 14. For a few early examples, see V. Ndikumana and J. Afrika, “Lettre ouverte au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU sur la situation qui prévaut au Rwanda” (mimeographed, Nairobi, 14 November 1994); E. Ruberangeyo, “Mes inquiétudes sur la gestion actuelle rwandaise des fonds publics” (mimeographed, Brussels, 31 May 1995); S. Musangamfura, “J’accuse le FPR de crimes de génocide des populations d’ethnie hutu, de purification ethnique et appelle à une enquête internationale urgente” (mimeographed, Nairobi, 8 December 1995); F. Twagiramungu and S. Sendashonga, “Plate-forme politique” (mimeographed, Brussels, March 1996); T. Lizinde, “Rwanda: la tragédie” (mimeographed, Brussels [in fact: Kinshasa], 1 May 1996). 15. AP, Kigali, 23 March 2000. In addition, during a special parliamentary session on 24 March, Bizimungu was accused of “political crimes” and of “serious violations of the constitution” (PANA, Kigali, 24 March 2000). 16. AFP, Kigali, 4 April 2000. 17. The expression negative forces is a reference to this notion in the July 1999 Lusaka Accord on the DRC, which mentions the Interahamwe militia, among others. 18. Other symbolic departures included Kagame’s personal helicopter pilot, Djuma Kamanzi, and the private secretary of Kagame’s wife, who both left the country in March 2002. According to members of his family, Djuma Kamanzi declared that he would obey orders only from Kayumba. Although Kayumba returned in mid2002, the rift with Kagame does not seem to have disappeared. Some officers close to Kayumba were arrested or retired, and rumors accusing him of plotting a coup against Kagame continue to circulate in Kigali.

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19. “The Talk of a Coup Is Very Strange to RDF and Rwanda,” New Times (Kigali), 13 May 2005. 20. J.-H. Bradol and A. Guibert, “Le temps des assassins et l’espace humanitaire, Rwanda, Kivu, 1994–1997,” Hérodote (1997), p. 119. 21. P. Rutazibwa, “Cet ethnisme sans fin,” Informations Rwandaises et Internationales, no. 5 (November–December 1996), pp. 19–20. 22. La Nouvelle Relève, no. 323 (31 May 1996) (emphasis added). 23. As noted later in text, however, the government put in place in the fall of 2003 contains a majority of Hutu, five of whom belong to the RPF. 24. M. Dorsey, “Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” in R. Doom and J. Gorus (eds.), Politics of Identity and Economies of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region (Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000), pp. 311–348. 25. Le Tribun du Peuple, no. 97 (August 1997); for an overview of other criticisms in the national press, see Dialogue, no. 200 (September–October 1997), pp. 75–86. 26. “Memo des membres de FPR (Rwanda, Afrique du Sud, Canada, EtatsUnis)” (mimeographed, Detroit, MI, 31 August 1997). 27. This term, literally meaning “little house,” was first used to refer to President Habyarimana’s inner circle; see F. Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs en crise. Rwanda, Burundi 1988–1994 (Paris: Karthala, 1994), pp. 189–190. 28. “Analyse politique du phénomène Akazu” (mimeographed document signed by “a disappointed patriot [that is, a member of the RPF],” Kigali). 29. See Human Rights Watch, Rwanda. The Search for Security and Human Rights Abuse (New York: 2000). Examples can be found in Dorsey, “Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda.” 30. Sénat de Belgique, Session ordinaire 2001–2002, Commission d’enquête parlementaire “Grands Lacs,” Auditions, vendredi 1er mars 2002, Compte-rendu, Doc. GR14. 31. The expression is from C. Dietrich, The Commercialisation of Military Deployment in Africa (Pretoria: ISS, 2001). 32. Research has shown that in 2000, the added value of diamonds, gold, and coltan (the name commonly used for columbium-tantalite) plundered in Congo amounted to 190 percent of Rwanda’s official military budget and to 110 percent of the public aid Rwanda received (S. Marysse and C. André, “Guerre et pillage économique en République démocratique du Congo,” in S. Marysse and F. Reyntjens [eds.], L’Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 2000–2001 [Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001], p. 326). 33. AFP, Kigali, 7 March 2001. 34. Concertation Chrétienne pour l’Afrique Central [CCAC], Rapport sur l’observation des élections communales au Rwanda (Brussels: n.d.). 35. Human Rights Watch, No Contest in Rwandan Elections. Many Local Officials Run Unopposed (New York: 2001). 36. International Crisis Group, “Consensual Democracy” in Post Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, International Crisis Group report no. 34 (Nairobi: 2001), p. 35. 37. LGDL, La problématique de la liberté d’expression au Rwanda (Kigali: 2001). 38. J. Corduwener, “Wederopbouw in Rwanda, met ijzeren hand” [“Reconstruction in Rwanda, with an Iron Fist”], NRC-Handelsblad, 27 March 2002. 39. Contrary to the expectations of the former single-party Uprona and many Tutsi, the opposition party Frodebu won the 1993 elections in Burundi by a landslide. This was largely attributed to “ethnic voting” on the part of the Hutu majority. 40. The incident during the meeting also confirmed that civil society is divided by the same ethnopolitical cleavages as the political system: for example, Pro-Femmes is

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essentially Tutsi and close to the RPF; LIPRODHOR is essentially Hutu and close to the MDR. 41. LGDL, La problématique. 42. International Crisis Group, Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalization, International Crisis Group report no. 53 (Nairobi: 2002), p. 6. 43. The opposition groups abroad unanimously condemned the whole process. 44. AP, “Rwandans Endorse New Constitution,” Kigali, 27 May 2003. 45. Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union Européenne, Rwanda. Référendum constitutionnel 26 mai 2003. Rapport final (Brussels: n.d.), p. 6 (translated from French). 46. “The vote is culturally and traditionally seen as an obligation by the vast majority of the population” (ibid., p. 10); “a sizeable part of the population in all provinces appeared convinced that the vote was compulsory” (ibid., p. 19). 47. For an analysis, see F. Reyntjens, “Les nouveaux habits de l’empereur: analyse juridico-politique de la constitution rwandaise de 2003,” in S. Marysse and F. Reyntjens (eds.), L’Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 2002–2003 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003), pp. 71–87. 48. Mission d’Observation Électorate de l’Union Européene, Déclaration préliminaire des élections présidentielles (Kigali: 2003). 49. Mission d’Observation Électorate de l’Union Européene, Déclaration préminaire. Le calme et l’ordre règnent, la démocratie n’en est pas pour autant pleinement assurée (Kigali: 2003). 50. This observation needs to be qualified, however, as the PSD and the PL refused to join the RPF parliamentary list. The campaign of these parties was sabotaged by the RPF, and the PL was even accused of “divisionism” for advocating the cause of the genocide survivors, a sign that this charge essentially serves to combat dissent generally and not just ethnicity. The PSD and the PL may well feel that they have been poorly rewarded for their support for the RPF and for Kagame’s presidential bid. Although they have set the scene for their own marginalization, this frustration might tempt them into oppositional politics, provided the space is available. 51. Two positive developments must be noted, however. First, women massively entered the institutions. They now occupy half the seats in the National Assembly and almost one-third of the portfolios in the new government. Second, Hutu hold fifteen out of twenty-nine positions in the government and even thirteen out of eighteen ministerial portfolios. Of the nine RPF members of government, five are Hutu. Although it is too early to interpret this evolution, which may just be a conjuncture, it could be a sign that the RPF may be attempting to broaden its ethnic base. Another interpretation heard in Kigali is that Kagame has sent a signal to Tutsi dissidents that he can do without them and build an alternative power base. 52. “The Regime Prepares to Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Genocide,” African Confidential 45, no. 4 (20 February 2004), p. 4. 53. “Declaration du Conseil des Ministres á l’issue de Sa réunion au Village Urugwico, le Septembre 2004, relative au rapport de la Chambre des Députés sur les tueries de Gikongoro et l’ideologie génocidaire au Rwanda” (Kigali, 18 September 2004). 54. It is necessary to remember that it was not the RPF that was the victim of genocide, but the Tutsi living inside Rwanda. The idea of the bully is reflected in the title of Mamdani’s book on Rwanda (M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001]).

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55. See, however, S. Desouter and F. Reyntjens, Rwanda. Les violations des droits de l’homme par le FPR/APR. Plaidoyer pour une enquête approfondie (Antwerp: Center for the Study of the Great Lakes Region of Africa, 1995); S. Smith, “Rwanda: enquête sur la terreur tutsie,” Libération (27 February 1996); N. Gordon, “Return to Hell,” Sunday Express, 21 April 1996. An important report written by Alison Des Forges for Human Rights Watch and the Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme, Leave None to Tell the Story. Genocide in Rwanda, published in March 1999, contains a section (pp. 692–735) on the crimes committed by the RPF. 56. A good example is P. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families. Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998). Although this book was extremely well received and became something of a Bible, particularly in the United States, it adds nothing to our knowledge on the genocide. In addition, the book is a thinly veiled apology for the RPF, whose crimes are systematically minimized or explained away. 57. On the saga of the Gersony mission, see Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 726–731. 58. The dossier published by Libération on 27 February 1996 is very revealing on this aspect of the cover-up. Several sources indicated the existence of cremation sites, for example, close to Gabiro military camp. Later, “cremation ovens” were used in Zaire, where the RPA killed tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees in 1996–1997 (see “The Impact of Rwanda on the Region”). 59. Bradol and Guibert, “Le temps des assassins et l’espace humanitaire,” p. 131. 60. N. Gowing, “New Challenges and Problems for Information Management in Complex Emergencies. Ominous Lessons from the Great Lakes and Eastern Zaire in Late 1996 and Early 1997” (mimeographed, London: 1998), p. 4. 61. Ibid., p. 15. 62. Ibid., p. 22. 63. Ibid., p. 36. 64. This NGO is not identified in Gowing’s report, but in the light of the old links between the RPF and Roger Winter, director of the US Committee for Refugees, that group could well be the unidentified NGO. Another possibility is the International Rescue Committee. 65. Gowing, New Challenges and Problems for Information Management, p. 47. 66. Ibid., p. 50. 67. Ibid., p. 41. 68. Ibid., p. 62. 69. N. C. Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry. Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (London: Verso, 2000), p. 3. 70. Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwandese-controlled East: Devastating Human Toll (London: 2001). 71. Government of Rwanda, “Response to the Amnesty International Report ‘Democratic Republic of Congo—Rwandese Controlled East: Devastating Human Toll’” (Kigali, 2001). 72. A good example can be found in J.-F. Dupaquier, “Rwanda: le révisionnisme ou la poursuite du génocide par d’autres moyens,” in R. Verdier, E. Decaux, and J.-P. Chrétien (eds.), Rwanda. Un génocide du XXe. Siècle (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), pp. 127–136. 73. M. Van Leeuwen, “Rwanda’s Imidugudu Programme and Earlier Experiences with Villagisation and Resettlement in East Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies (2001), pp. 623–644.

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74. A. Storey, “Structural Adjustment, State Power and Genocide: The World Bank and Rwanda,” Review of African Political Economy (2001), p. 381. 75. J. Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda. Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 202. 76. By late 1997, compelling evidence was available through a large number of reports and testimonies. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo. What Kabila Is Hiding? Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo (New York: 1997); Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo. Deadly Alliances in Congolese Forests (New York: 1997). A list of sources can be found in F. Reyntjens, La guerre des grands lacs. Alliances mouvantes et conflits extraterritoriaux en Afrique centrale (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999), pp. 113–116. 77. United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Investigative Team Charged with Investigating Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/1998/581 (New York: 1998), p. 96. 78. Médecins sans Frontières, Refugee Numbers Analysis (Brussels: 1997). Two victims’ accounts offer moving testimony to these atrocities: M. B. Umutesi, Fuir ou mourir au Zaïre. Le vécu d’une réfugiée rwandaise (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000); M. Niwese, Le peuple rwandais un pied dans la tombe. Récit d’un réfugié étudiant (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001). 79. Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo. 80. J. Migabo Kalere, Génocide au Congo? Analyse des massacres de populations civiles (Brussels: Broederlijk Delen, 2002). 81. A UN panel put in place in 2001 published a number of increasingly detailed reports on these practices by Rwanda and a number of other states. After the extension of its mandate, the final report of the panel was published in October 2003 (United Nations, Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/1027 [New York: 2003]). The substantive findings can be found in the previous “final report,” however: United Nations, Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146 (New York: 2002). 82. United Nations, Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2002/1146, § 65. 83. Ibid., pp. 72–73; United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, S/2000/203 (New York: 2000), § 26. 84. International Crisis Group, The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict (Nairobi: 2003). 85. Many civil society sources in North and South Kivu reported Rwandan troop movements across the border, and MONUC openly suspected the presence of Rwandan troops on Congolese soil (see IRIN, “DRC: MONUC Denounces Obstruction of Verification Missions in East,” Nairobi, 29 October 2003). 86. Letter dated 20 October 2003 by Mahmoud Kassem, chairman of the panel, to UN secretary-general Kofi Annan. 87. Par. 2 of the unpublished Section V. 88. J. Shattuck, P. Simo, and W. J. Durch, Ending Congo’s Nightmare. What the U.S. Can Do to Promote Peace in Central Africa (Boston: John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, International Human Rights Law Group, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), pp. 17, 19.

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89. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/30 (New York: 2005), §§ 185, 199–200. 90. Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: Arming the East (London: 2005). 91. Only in the summer of 2003 were the supplies from Rwanda to the UPC cut off through airspace surveillance by the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) (Africa Initiative Program, Africa Peace Forum, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, and Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, Brussels, Ituri. Stakes, Actors, Dynamics [2003], p. 5). 92. On Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in the Ituri conflict, see Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood.” Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo (New York: 2003). 93. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 265. 94. Along these lines, see the analysis of J.-P. Rémy and S. Smith, “Au Rwanda, le sacre électoral de la peur dix ans après le génocide,” Le Monde, 7 November 2003. 95. Admittedly, the aid community is facing enormous difficulties and donor assessments differ considerably. On this, see P. Uvin, “Difficult Choices in the New Post-conflict Agenda: The International Community in Rwanda After the Genocide,” Third World Quarterly (2001), pp. 177–189. 96. Uvin, Aiding Violence, p. 110.

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3 Burundi at a Crossroads RENÉ LEMARCHAND

B

urundi has many claims to fame, none to be envied. Despite widespread assumptions to the contrary, it has the sad distinction of having experienced the first genocide recorded in Central Africa. Though overshadowed in public attention by the far more extensive carnage in Rwanda, to this day the killing of anywhere from 150,000 to 250,000 Hutu at the hands of an all-Tutsi army remains deeply etched in the collective memory of the Hutu people. If trust is in such dramatically short supply in Burundi society, this is in large part the legacy of a mass crime that has never been officially recognized for what it is. Burundi also has the highest rate of heads of state and of government to be sent to their graves by an assassin’s bullet. The list includes Prince Rwagasore in 1961, Pierre Ngendandumwe and Joseph Bamina in 1965, exking Ntare in 1972, and Melchior Ndadaye in 1993—not to mention the death of President Cyprien Ntaryamira in the crash that took the life of President Habyarimana in April 1994. But if the actuarial risks of holding office are nowhere higher than in Burundi, Ndadaye’s murder—measured by the rage and anger it provoked among Hutu masses—was unlike any other. It unleashed one of the most vicious and intractable civil wars in Africa, resulting in an estimated 300,000 casualties. This is as close as Burundi has come to a meltdown. If for no other reason, it must be seen as a turning point in the country’s violent history. No other strife-torn country in the continent has received more sustained remedial attention from as many international actors as Burundi since 1994. In addition to countless formal diplomatic initiatives from the UN, the EU, the AU, South Africa, and Tanzania, not to mention the cohorts of special envoys, no fewer than seventeen international NGOs have desperately been searching for a solution to the conflict but, until recently, with minimal results. In retrospect, the sheer number of actors involved in crafting conflict prevention and resolution strategies must be seen as the 41

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principal factor behind their limited achievements. From their different definitions of the nature of the conflict stemmed different agendas and strategies, sometimes working at cross-purposes with each other while presenting the parties to the conflict with ample opportunities for manipulation.

Dimensions of the Burundi Crisis Each of the foregoing brings into view key elements in the background of the present crisis. The first relates to the critical importance of the 1972 genocide in shaping the collective memory of the more radical Hutu factions, notably Agathon Rwasa’s Front National de Libération (FNL). Its radical, populist, anti-Tutsi streak is rooted in an enduring awareness of the horrors suffered by the Hutu at the hands of the Tutsi army. To this day official denials that anything like genocide of Hutu even happened only reinforce the FNL’s uncompromising stance on the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. In view of the fact that there is no consensus among scholars as to what really constitutes genocide, it is not surprising that some have raised doubts about the appropriateness of the term to describe the 1972 bloodbath. Although the killings did not result in total genocide, as in Rwanda, there is little doubt in this writer’s mind that the planned annihilation of the Hutu community, “in whole or in part,” is entirely consistent with the definition of genocide offered by the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. And yet, ironically, despite massive evidence to the contrary, the genocidal nature of the 1972 tragedy was never explicitly acknowledged by the 1995 UN-appointed commission of inquiry into the circumstances of Ndadaye’s death—even though it gave prominent emphasis to “acts of genocide” committed by Hutu against Tutsi in the wake of Ndadaye’s assassination—or for that matter by any of the international actors involved since the visit of the UN commission, a fact that did not go unnoticed by Hutu politicians.1 Ndadaye’s death did more than give Hutu radicalism a new lease on life. It set the stage for the involvement of a large number of international actors and created new sources of division between Hutu and Tutsi. The two phenomena are interlinked. Beginning with the appointment of the UN secretarygeneral’s special envoy Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah in 1994, international actors—most notably Ould-Abdallah but also former Tanzania president Julius Nyerere in his capacity as facilitator of the Arusha talks—played a key role in legitimizing the fractiousness of the Burundi political arena in the name of “inclusiveness” while doing little to tame the forces of Hutu and Tutsi radicalism. As the predominantly Hutu Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) split between moderates and radicals, an endless process of fragmentation began to set in, eventually reaching unprecedented proportions

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during the Arusha conference (1998–2000). At first the principal line of cleavage was between those who insisted on going back to the status quo ante (meaning a predominantly FRODEBU government and a Hutu president as well as a return to the 1992 constitution) and those who, albeit reluctantly, were willing to work out a power-sharing agreement giving equal representation to Hutu and Tutsi. A host of other divisive issues arose— constitutional (over the election of Ndadaye’s successor), judicial (whether or not to prosecute Ndadaye’s assassins), strategic (whether to use force or to seek political accommodation)—that helped further fragment the political arena. Radicalism by then had ceased to be the monopoly of the Hutu. With Hutu and Tutsi split into a large number of parties, and parties into factions, the state found the key to its survival in its seemingly limitless capacity to absorb its potential enemies. Though much has been said of ethnicity as a point of entry into the analysis of Burundi politics, today’s dilemma goes beyond the Hutu-Tutsi question. Not that ethnicity will ever go away. But there is little doubt that in recent times its salience has tended to recede, bringing into view a far more complex picture. A more relevant point of reference, besides regional loyalties, is the split between extremists and moderates on both sides of the ethnic fault line as well as various shades of extremism in each camp. Whether a viable state system can be reconstructed through a power-sharing formula incorporating some twenty different factions is the central question currently facing the Burundi authorities. These challenges boil down to how to stitch together a reasonably stable coalition government in a context of growing political fragmentation, increasing rural poverty, severe land hunger, chronic violence, persistent discords about the legitimacy of Arusha, and continuing vulnerability to the intrusion of regional forces—such are the dimensions of the dilemma facing domestic and international actors in today’s Burundi. Before going any further, and to properly grasp the continuing hold of the past on the present, a brief excursus into the country’s history is in order.

The Past as Present This is not the place for a detailed account of Burundi’s tortured history since independence in 1962, but it suffices to note the lasting significance of three critical junctures.2 The first concerns the impact of the Rwanda revolution on the hardening of ethnic enmities in the years following the advent of self-government; the second has to do with the legacy of the 1972 genocide; a third relates to the momentous consequences of Ndadaye’s assassination.

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The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy There is no need to explore the precolonial record of armed confrontations between Rwanda and Burundi to appreciate the importance of the regional context in shaping the course of Burundi politics. The regional dimension comes into clear focus in the wake of the Rwanda revolution (1959–1961), when tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees fled to Burundi, all with tales of horror on their lips. The result was to drastically alter the texture of HutuTutsi relations. From a society where ethnic tensions were largely eclipsed by a far more significant tug-of-war between princely factions (Bezi versus Batare), each drawing support from both Hutu and Tutsi, Burundi began to look more and more like its neighbor to the north. At the root of this phenomenon lies what I have referred to elsewhere as a self-fulfilling prophecy: along with Hutu efforts to emulate the Rwandan republican model, Tutsi perceptions of Hutu politicians as potential enemies would make their originally false imputations true.3 Thus, even though traditional Burundi differed from Rwanda in many significant ways, the Hutu revolution in Rwanda set in motion a process of ethnic polarization that reached unprecedented intensity during the 1972 genocide. By then, however, power was firmly in the hands of the predominantly Tutsi army. There is nothing in the historical record to warrant the view that Hutu and Tutsi identities were creations of the colonizer or that the removal of colonial control may have released long dormant hostilities between them. The Hutu-Tutsi conflict is preeminently a conflict about power. It is a conflict about whether power should gravitate to the hands of a minority representing 15 percent of the population or be shared with the representatives of the Hutu majority. Nothing has done more to stimulate the rise of Hutu ethnicity in the years immediately following independence (1962) than their more or less systematic exclusion from the seats of executive power. A turning point came in 1965 with the first postindependence elections to the national assembly, in which Hutu candidates scored a landslide victory, capturing twenty-three seats out of a total of thirty-three. Their victory proved illusory. Instead of appointing a Hutu prime minister, the king turned to a princely figure and long-time protégé of the court. On 18 October 1965, Hutu anger broke out in an abortive coup directed at the king’s palace, followed by sporadic attacks against Tutsi elements in the countryside. In reprisal, Tutsi units of the army and gendarmerie arrested and shot eighty-six leading Hutu politicians and army men. A pattern was set. After the discovery of an alleged Hutu plot in 1969, seventy Hutu personalities, civilian and military, were arrested on the grounds of conspiring against the state; of these, nineteen were immediately executed. By then, in the minds of those few Hutu politicians who had survived the repression, recourse to force was increasingly seen as the only

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viable option. The timing of the Hutu insurrection—April 1972—was calculated to draw maximum advantage from intra-Tutsi divisions. In the months preceding the slaughter, the country seemed to be tottering on the brink of anarchy. Bujumbura was awash in rumors of plots and counterplots, leading to the arrest and bogus trials of scores of Tutsi politicians from the north. The ruling clique, headed by President Michel Micombero, consisting mainly of Tutsi-Hima from the south, saw its legitimacy plummet. It was in this climate of diffuse fear and uncertainty, on 29 April, in the normally peaceful lakeside towns of Rumonge and Nyanza-Lac, that terror was suddenly unleashed by Hutu upon Tutsi. Possibly as many as 3,000 Tutsi civilians died in the early days of the insurrection. The response of the government was immediate and devastating. What followed was not so much a repression as a hideous and systematic slaughter of Hutu civilians. The carnage went on unabated until August. By then almost every educated Hutu was either dead or in exile. There are obvious differences between the 1972 carnage in Burundi and its 1994 counterpart in Rwanda, in terms of scale (in Burundi estimates range from 150,000 to 250,000 killed, as against 600,000 to 800,000 in Rwanda) and target group. Yet they both qualify as retributive genocides in that they came about in response to a perceived threat from the victim group: in Rwanda the threat came from the 1 October 1990 invasion of the RPF, and in Burundi from a violent, though highly localized, Hutu-led insurgency that led to the killing of hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi civilians. In both instances army units and jeunesse (youth) groups conducted the killings, with substantial auxiliary support provided by refugee communities (Hutu from Burundi in Rwanda and Tutsi from Rwanda in Burundi). And in both countries the ultimate outcome was the emergence of a state system with all the qualities of a military ethnocracy. Unlike what happened in Rwanda, however, in Burundi the genocidaires came out on top.

The Legacy of 1972 The planned, systematic extermination of Hutu elites and potential elites (including university students and schoolchildren), as well as many who would hardly qualify as either, was meant to achieve several long-term objectives: (1) to ensure the stability of the state by the wholesale destruction of its presumptive opponents, (2) to transform the instruments of force—the army, the police, and the gendarmerie—into a Tutsi monopoly, (3) to rule out the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy (hence the killing of ex-king Ntare in Gitega, on 1 May), and (4) to create a new basis of legitimacy for the ruling elites—most of them recruited among the Bururibased Tutsi-Hima subgroup—by projecting an image of the state as the benevolent protector of all Barundi against their domestic and foreign foes.

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On each count the government of President Michel Micombero met with considerable success. For the next sixteen years Burundi experienced a period of unprecedented peace under Tutsi hegemony. Those Hutu most likely to resist such hegemony were either killed or exiled. But as subsequent events were to demonstrate, this surface impression of a country at peace with itself was profoundly misleading.

The Rise of Hutu Radicalism The most threatening of all the problems inherited from the 1972 bloodbath is the enduring vitality of Hutu radicalism. It is worth recalling that the Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), the principal vehicle of anti-Tutsi radicalism, was born in 1973 in the refugee camp of Mishamo in Tanzania.4 Today the most vehemently anti-Tutsi of the halfdozen political parties identified with Hutu interests is the armed wing of the PALIPEHUTU, the so-called Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu– Forces Nationales de Libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa. Its closest rival on the scale of radicalism is the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), an offshoot of the FRODEBU, headed by the newly elected president, Pierre Nkurunziza. It was significantly less exclusionary in terms of membership, however (its leadership includes a substantial number of Tutsi elements), which helped explain why, after years of foot dragging and fruitless negotiations, it agreed to the terms of the cease-fire negotiated in Pretoria in October 2003 and joined the transitional government. The FNL has yet to follow suit. Yet both are heirs to the ideology of the PALIPEHUTU in their uncompromising rejection of Tutsi hegemony. The roots of this ideology are part of the 1972 legacy. It is not a coincidence that the most uncompromising advocates of the Hutu cause, including Agathon Rwasa of the FNL and Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye for the CNDD-FDD, all lost many of their relatives in the 1972 bloodbath. If the rise of Hutu radicalism is indeed inseparable from the refugee problem, the latter has more wide-ranging ramifications. It brings into focus the land problem and the bitter contestations that arose between 1972 and 1993 over the ownership of the plots left behind by fleeing refugees. Many were taken over by Tutsi claimants who insist on hanging on to their ill-gotten gains. To add complexity to the issue, some Tutsi have since sold or leased the refugees’ properties to Hutu elements that now press their claims as rightful owners. The seriousness of the issue of the restitution of the refugees’ land was dramatically brought to light after Ndadaye’s election to the presidency, when violent confrontations erupted between scores of Hutu returnees and the Tutsi claimants, which in turn contributed in no small way to his demise. The land issue remains unresolved, and it may still

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prove a major obstacle in the way of a lasting solution to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict.5

Ndadaye’s Murder:The Descent into Hell Unlike previous cases of political assassination (Prince Rwagasore in 1961, Ngendandumwe in 1965), Ndadaye’s murder, on 21 October 1993, ushered in a tectonic shift in the country’s political landscape. It marked Burundi’s descent into a hellish cycle of ethnic violence and counterviolence from which it has yet to fully recover. In trying to make sense of the motives behind this cataclysmic event, we are once again reminded of the legacy of 1972. Having reaped for decades the economic and political benefits of Tutsi hegemony, extremists within and outside the army were quick to grasp the implications of a transfer of power to the leading representative of the Hutu majority. And none were more eager to challenge the verdict of the polls than those Tutsi who had taken over the refugees’ land, cattle, and houses. The risks of eliminating Ndadaye seemed slight given that the army was, and still is to a considerable extent, the monopoly of the Tutsi minority. Missing from this hare-brained calculus, however, was the possibility of a massive and violent outburst of Hutu anger, fed by memories of 1972. The sudden eruption of anti-Tutsi violence only hours following the news of Ndadaye’s death, resulting in countless atrocities and random killings of Tutsi civilians, was the triggering factor behind an equally devastating display of anti-Hutu violence by the army. How many lives were lost is anybody’s guess—estimates vary from 30,000 to 100,000; what most observers agree on is that as many Tutsi were killed by enraged mobs of Hutu as Hutu by the army’s blind repression. From then on Hutu radicalism only served to encourage Tutsi extremism and vice versa. Once again hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees fled to neighboring states. Some 350,000 sought refuge in Rwanda, and at least as many in Tanzania and Congo. In the wake of this mass exodus, a new set of actors emerged on Burundi’s doorstep. Since then, the regional dimension is inseparable from the convoluted course of Burundi’s domestic politics.

The Regional Nexus of the Burundi Crisis How Burundi politics has affected the wider regional crisis, and vice versa, draws attention to three watershed events, each linked to the other through a complex ethnic dialectic: Ndadaye’s assassination, the Rwanda genocide, and the outbreak of Congo’s second civil war in August 1998. The first gave a powerful stimulus to the crystallization of “Hutu power” in Rwanda and thus contributed significantly to the radicalization of Hutu politics on

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the eve of the carnage. Among the Burundi refugees living in Rwanda, many took an active part in the killings of Tutsi in 1994. Furthermore, the seizure of power by Paul Kagame’s Rwanda Patriotic Front in July 1994 led to the mass exodus of some two million Hutu refugees from Rwanda into Congo, Tanzania, and Burundi: in each of these external “sanctuaries,” informal alliances emerged between the refugees and their kinsmen from Burundi, thus injecting a new source of tension between Hutu and Tutsi both within and outside their countries of origin while at the same time posing major security threats to the newly established Tutsi regime in Kigali and what was left of the state in Burundi after Ndadaye’s demise. By 1995 a convergence of ethnic interests had led to a mutually supportive relationship between Leonard Nyangoma’s CNDD-FDD and groups of Interahamwe and ex-FAR in eastern Congo, yet at no time did anything like a coherent cross-national alliance materialize between them. The persistence of intraethnic divisions was nowhere more evident—and politically consequential—than in the multiplicity of political parties represented in the transitional government: the post-Arusha coalition included no fewer than seven Hutu parties (the so-called G-7) and ten Tutsi parties (G-10). Behind this extreme fragmentation of the social landscape lay a variety of factors, some having to do with subethnic or regional loyalties, others with personality differences, others still with genuine disagreements over questions of tactics and strategy. Seen from a broader perspective, however, the phenomenon brought into focus two critical elements: one refers to the drastic transformation of the geopolitical map of the Great Lakes in the wake of the 1998 civil war in Congo; the other had to do with the impact of the Arusha peace talks on the process of political fragmentation.

The 1998 Civil War in Congo With the outbreak of the second civil war in Congo, new patterns of alliances came into being that made ethnic and national divisions largely irrelevant. Opportunism was the rule; the quest for tactical advantage the guiding principle. The result was an endless series of intramural tiffs and discords among presumptive Hutu leaders. The straightforward split between moderates (FRODEBU) and radicals (CNDD-FDD) brought to light in the days following Ndadaye’s death proved extremely short lived. Forced into exile in eastern Congo by the relentless pressure of the Burundi army, the CNDD-FDD, then led by Leonard Nyangoma, suffered huge losses in the wake of the destruction of the refugee camps by the RPA in and around Uvira in late 1996, only to be faced with further onslaughts by Tutsi troops as they crossed into Burundi to seek asylum in Tanzania. Bitter internecine quarrels erupted over what some described as a bungled operation.

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By 1998, with the outbreak of the second civil war in Congo, disagreements over whether to fight their way back into the country from Tanzania or to join hands with Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s army and its Mai-Mai auxiliaries drove a deep wedge between the two leading FDD personalities, Leonard Nyangoma and Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye. After deciding to cast his lot with Kabila, Ndayikengurukiye surfaced as Kabila’s most faithful ally in eastern Congo. But his meteoric rise as Kabila’s man in Katanga—at one point serving as his all-powerful emissary in Lubumbashi—did little to boost his popularity among those FDD troops who had stayed in Burundi and fought tooth and nail against the Burundi army. Predictably, another split emerged between the “internal” and “external” wings of the FDD, with Nkurunziza eventually stealing much of Ndayikengurukiye’s thunder. After the routing of the FDD and their Congolese allies by the RPA at the battle of Pweto in 2000, Ndayikengurukiye found himself increasingly isolated, a fact that goes a long way toward explaining his decision to negotiate a peace accord with the government. The internal rifts suffered by the PALIPEHUTU-FNL told a similar story of one leader replacing another, against a background of bitter quarrels over tactics and strategy and over the misappropriation of funds collected among refugees, and with even deeper disagreements between the “external” and “internal” wings. As the infiltration of Hutu rebels from Congo and Tanzania picked up momentum, they were joined by a growing number of Hutu civilians, by force or by persuasion. The army’s response was to order hundreds of thousands of Hutu peasants out of their homes into “regroupment camps,” so as to minimize the risks of “contagion” from the rebellion. The move proved utterly counterproductive. By 1997 an estimated 600,000 Hutu had been forced into what critics of this policy called “concentration camps.” 6 Most of these were located miles away from the nearest road, making it almost impossible for humanitarian workers to provide assistance. What few outside observers were able to reach the camps described the conditions there as totally inhumane. Lacking the barest necessities of life, without infrastructures, running water, or electricity, thousands died of sickness, malnutrition, and hunger. The army killed those who refused to leave their homes. Most of the camps were dismantled only after insistent protests from the international community. The important point to note, from the standpoint of this discussion, is that the majority of the camps were located in Bujumbura Rural province. That the province also happens to be the stronghold of the FNL is not a matter of coincidence. The unbearable conditions created by the government’s regroupment policies (so ominously reminiscent of French policies during the Algerian war) went far in explaining the FNL’s remarkable staying power in Bujumbura Rural, the appeal of its populist ideology, its capacity to recruit thousands of

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child soldiers, or for that matter the strong element of biblical mysticism that entered into Agathon Rwasa’s exhortations. The sufferings endured by the Hutu populations at the hands of the army within and outside the camps seemed entirely consistent with the 1972 genocidal killings of Hutu by Tutsi. What happened in 1972 is still fresh in the memory of some FNL leaders. As one of its spokesmen, Pasteur Habimana, told this writer: I have been holed up in the forest since 1973; I am fifty years old. The truth must be told about the many Hutu killed by Tutsi. We need to tell the truth. Le problème du Burundi c’est le mensonge [Burundi’s problem is that lying is omnipresent]! The members of parliament represent no one. . . . How can we agree on a fifty/fifty sharing of power with the Tutsi when they represent 15 percent of the population? . . . In 1972 I saw my brothers being killed. I was twenty years old. I remember everything.7

The streak of fanaticism in the FNL’s ideological stance is unmistakable. It helps explain why it rarely shrinks from the use of violence to force young Hutu, many of them teenage boys, to join its ranks. The closest parallel that comes to mind is not so much the FDD as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda.

Arusha: The Rush to the Trough Although the exclusion of both the CNDD-FDD and the FNL from the Arusha peace talks—largely at the request of the Tutsi parties—contributed to the growing radicalization of the CNDD-FDD and the FNL in the years following the Buyoya coup in July 1996, the more important point to note was the phenomenal proliferation of parties unleashed by the Arusha peace process. The reason for the rapid increase in the number of participants was not hard to find: participation in the conference was the safest guarantee any politician could get that he might be included in a future government in one capacity or another. The significance of the “rush to the trough” phenomenon to an understanding of the post-Arusha dilemmas could not be overestimated. For one thing, it gave birth to a flurry of parties (Hutu and Tutsi) that were nothing more than the convenient vehicles of small coteries of aspiring urban politicians. Their popular legitimacy was nil. Furthermore, the sheer number of parties represented in the transitional government—with more knocking at the door—led to an institutional monstrosity: a top-heavy political machinery whose sole purpose was to provide as many jobs as were needed to meet the requirements of political stability. The government was not meant to govern; its purpose was to offer an attractive alternative to the rebellion. What it failed to offer was a package of social and economic policies that could meet the demands of the peasant masses and thus offer a meaningful alternative to the rebellion.

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The Role of International Actors It is impossible in the context of this chapter to do justice to the enormous complexity of the subject. Those readers who are undeterred by the Kafkaesque complications of the twists and turns of the Arusha peace process will read with profit the masterful account of these tortuous negotiations by a key participant, Howard Wolpe, who served as the US special envoy to the Great Lakes during the Clinton years.8 My main concern here is to highlight some key issues. Reflecting on “the profusion of players” in Burundi, “each with its own agenda and favored solution,” Fabienne Hara argued that the result has been to “undermine the coherence of the international community’s response, and lead to competition among various Burundian factions for recognition and support.”9 Though primarily concerned with the adverse effects of the “parallel diplomacy” conducted by NGOs, her judgment applied just as well to the involvement of regional and intergovernmental organizations. Indeed, she suggested as much in her comments on the “sheer number of special envoys [which] reflects the diversity of their agendas and motivations, and tends to jeopardize the official claim that the international community wants peace, or at the least the same peace, for the region. . . . In the end it appears that every political tendency in Burundi has found a temporary ally among the international negotiators, who, in turn, become part of the problem.”10 Given the intractable nature of the Burundi crisis it was all too easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to emphasize the shortcomings of the international community as it tried to grapple with the challenge of conflict resolution in a political arena suffused with ethnic hatreds, factional strife, and revenge killings. Nonetheless, granting that the blame could not be shared evenly, there were ample grounds on which to question the wisdom of some of its peace initiatives. The first point to be reiterated is not so much a lack of foresight or wisdom on the part of any single actor as it is a commentary on the plurality of actors involved. As Hara conclusively demonstrated, much of the problem about the role of international actors was reducible to their different agendas and definitions of the Burundi crisis. It was a well-known fact, for example, that Museveni and Nyerere held radically different perceptions of the roots of the crisis, and the same was true of the very different approaches followed by the Community Sant’Egidio and the Arusha facilitators. A straightforward assessment of the role played by regional actors is rendered extremely difficult by the ambivalence of their performance and the controversy surrounding the consequences of their interventions. A case in point is the boycott strategy pursued by the Central and East African states in 1996 and 1997, following Buyoya’s coup in July 1996. This initiative, forcefully supported by Nyerere, came in for the strongest criticisms from

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a number of NGOs, including the International Crisis Group, as well as from virtually all of the special envoys. Aside from creating confusion about the role and efficacy of international community, critics of the boycott argued that it penalized mostly the rural masses, did little to prevent continuing transactions with neighboring states, and in the end encouraged radical Hutu factions to make political capital out of the boycott. Yet seen from another perspective, it is entirely conceivable that Buyoya might not have agreed to a significant political overture (notably the reopening of the National Assembly and the readmission of opposition parties in the political arena) in the absence of such sanctions. The next point is equally subject to debate: it refers to the less than constructive role played by the UN special envoy, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, in legitimizing power-sharing as a conflict resolution strategy. Anyone familiar with his highly controversial apologia pro vita sua, Burundi on the Brink: 1993–1995, cannot fail to note his pro-Tutsi sympathies, a fact perhaps related to his aristocratic origins as a representative of the Mauritanian bidan (white) community. Consider, for example, the rationale invoked by the author to explain the fifty-fifty sharing of governmental and administrative positions inscribed in the 1994 Convention of Government: the seizure of power by the RPF in Kigali is presented to the reader as one of the justifications for giving the Burundi Tutsi an equal share of power with the Hutu!11 To quote: “It was impossible to ignore this completely new political context, especially with 2 million Hutu refugees in Zaire and Tanzania, many of them under the effective control of the army of the former Rwandan regime.”12 Nor can one ignore some of the more debatable statements and patent inaccuracies offered by the author (including the notion that ex-president Bagaza financed the political campaign of the FRODEBU). Not only did the Convention of Government turn out to be a dismal failure, but its architect also deserves considerable credit for legitimizing a power-sharing formula that would exclude the more radical elements in the spectrum of Hutu parties—possibly as a concession to what he refers to as “the spiritual dimension” of his mission.13 Just as Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s special envoy may have been swayed by his ethnic origins, one is also reminded of the criticisms addressed to Nelson Mandela for projecting his experience of apartheid into the Burundi context: it has been said that by coming down so harshly on the Tutsi minority during the Arusha talks, Mandela tended to equate the plight of the Hutu community with that of the African majority and the Tutsi claims with those of the white minority. This is a fair criticism, but the Mandela stance on the Hutu-Tutsi question may have nudged the Tutsi hard-liners into a more pliant attitude than would have been the case otherwise. Whatever the case may be, we are again confronted with the problem of how best to accommodate divergent agendas into a coherent framework for conflict resolution.

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By 2003 South Africa had emerged as the decisive actor in the peace process. It played a central role in the long-drawn-out negotiations that led to the Global Ceasefire Agreement of 16 November with Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD, justly described as a milestone on the road to peace. For this remarkable achievement, much of the credit goes to former South Africa deputy president Jacob Zuma and President Thabo Mbeki. Both took an active part in the long meetings that finally broke the deadlock over the restructuring of Burundi’s security forces. As much as their strong personal commitment to the peace process, the fact that South Africa was able to assert itself as the uncontested leader in the negotiations—in no small part because of Mandela’s earlier commitment—goes a long way toward explaining their successful outcome.

Prospects for Peace For all their shortcomings, compared to the situation of near anarchy prevailing through the late 1990s, the Arusha Accords stand as a major breakthrough. The successful transition to multiparty democracy has come about because of the long and painful negotiations undertaken first in Arusha, then in Pretoria and Bujumbura. Following the start of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in 2004, Burundi adopted a new constitution by referendum in March 2005, and a new electoral code was approved by the transitional parliament. After a six-month extension of the transition period, communal elections were held in early June 2005, giving Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD 55 percent of the seats in communal councils. Despite reported cases of extremists trying to disrupt the vote by throwing grenades near the polling stations, large crowds showed up to cast their ballots. Similarly, when Burundi held legislative elections in July 2005, scores of people were injured and polling disrupted when grenades were thrown near queues of people waiting to vote. UN peacekeepers protecting international observers were also fired on. But despite more shelling around the capital, large numbers defiantly voted.14 With a majority of the legislative seats, Nkurunziza was elected president in August 2005. Given the powersharing formula inscribed in the constitution and the obligation for parties to include Hutu and Tutsi in their list of candidates, the reenactment of the 1993 scenario appears unlikely. The election of Nkurunziza fulfills two of the core objectives established by the multitude of external interveners in Burundi: the need to transfer power from the Tutsi minority to the Hutu majority and from military to civilian control. But it is too early to make predictions about whether the experiment will hold. The potential dangers stem from the continued threat to peace posed by the FNL and from the difficulties involved in the DDR. Despite Rwasa’s repeated overtures, the FNL has yet to mutate

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from an armed faction into a legitimate political party. In September 2005, the FNL rejected a government offer of peace talks. Although most observers agree that it is not in a position to derail the transition, it still has a significant nuisance potential. The slow pace of the DDR process, combined with the appalling conditions prevailing in some regroupment camps, is another source of concern, as it raises the possibility that many of the candidates for demobilization could retool themselves into armed bandits. Formally under the supervision of the National Commission for Demoblization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR), the program is intended to run over a fouryear period, at the end of which some 26,000 ex-rebels are expected to be either demobilized or reintegrated into the Burundi armed forces. As of 31 May 2005, however, only 9,300 had been demobilized, along with 2,939 child soldiers and 515 female soldiers. Little wonder if a growing number of ex-rebels appear determined to engage in banditry as the next best thing to languishing in cantonment sites. Furthermore, a number of critically important issues—impunity, justice, national reconciliation, the reinsertion of Hutu refugees, the restructuring of the army—have yet to be resolved. 15 Of these, the most potentially explosive concerns the fate of the refugee and internally displaced populations.16 Taking into account the 1972 and 1993 exodus, there were roughly 800,000 refugees in Tanzania and 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) at the time Arusha got under way. Since then tens of thousands have returned to their homeland. Many live in dire circumstances. The worst off among refugees are those who are returning on their own (rapatriés spontanés) rather than through the UNHCR, as they face countless exactions by armed bandits (majambazi), militias (banamugambo), and camp custodians (basungusungu). Yet all are living in fear and with few prospects of a better future inside Burundi. Protocol IV of the Arusha Accord provided for the reinsertion of the refugees through a politically independent commission, the Commission Nationale de Réhabilitation des Sinistrés (CNRS). That group, however, which is presently under the control of the FRODEBU, has been placed under the jurisdiction (tutelle) of the Ministry for the Reinsertion and Reinstallation of Displaced and Repatriated Persons (MRRDR), itself headed by one of the Tutsi parties of the G-10 coalition. At stake here is a competitive struggle for the control of the refugees. Given that the overwhelming majority are CNDD-FDD sympathizers, it is easy to see why the FRODEBU would want to reap the political benefits of their reinsertion and why the MRRDR would insist on exercising control over hundreds of thousands of potential opponents. To this political infighting must be added another dimension: the competition for the control of the financial resources given by international donors to meet the costs of reinsertion. Meanwhile, the five-stage action plan elaborated by the CNRS has remained a dead letter.

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So, also, have the provisions of the Arusha Accords concerning the restitution of their landed property to the refugees. The implication of this mess is tersely stated in the report of a local NGO: “It is imperatively urgent that the CNRS plan a coherent and global strategy in order to avoid another civil war, that one linked to property rights.”17

Conclusion There are no simple recipes for ensuring a durable peace, only some tentative steps toward trust and mutual tolerance. The following come to mind: • External regional pressures in support of the peace process must continue, via the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi, with the lead role assumed by South Africa. For all the quirkiness of a Thabo Mbeki and the suspicions surrounding his Burundi team, no other African state can match its expertise and degree of commitment or claim a more impressive track record. Furthermore, the continuous close contacts it has established with the protagonists, together with its well-deserved reputation as an honest broker, make South Africa the single most qualified partner in helping the Burundi government resolve the many issues left pending since the signature of the Arusha Accords. • The regional dimensions of the peace process cannot be left out of the political equation. Nowhere in the Great Lakes region is peace divisible. The conflicts that affect Burundi are bound to impact upon its neighbors, and vice versa. Unless this seemingly banal truth is recognized and acted upon, the prospects for peace in the region are bound to remain elusive. It is imperative therefore for the African Union and donors to address the interconnectedness of conflict-generating issues, ranging from the plundering and illicit diversion of natural resources by domestic warlords and foreign interlopers to the continuing flow of small arms into the region, from the plight of refugee populations to the recruitment of child soldiers by armed factions, from conflict-promoting economic activities by foreign corporations to the absence of minimum standards of conduct and effective regulatory mechanisms. A resumption of hostilities in the DRC would pose the gravest threat to the transition in Burundi. • Strengthening state capabilities in the posttransition period should be a key priority. Military means alone may not suffice to break the hold of the FNL in the countryside: only by offering the rural masses on the hills a meaningful alternative to violence, through the implementation of social and economic policies designed to meet their immediate needs, can they be persuaded to desist from supporting the rebellion. Hence the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of the government. One example among others of

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how to proceed is the highly promising series of workshops organized since 2003 in specific localities under the guidance of Howard Wolpe of the Woodrow Wilson Center (WWC) and with funding from the World Bank to develop the requisite “skills, knowledge and models for more effective economic recovery, policy development and implementation.”18 The lessons learned from the WWC experiment could provide a model for donors as well as the framework for testing similar initiatives in other parts of the country. • Among Burundi’s civil society organizations (CSO), the Observatoire pour l’Action Gouvernementale (OAG) and Ligue Iteka have established for themselves an impressive record as watchdogs of government action: both have repeatedly drawn attention to human rights violations committed by Hutu and Tutsi and made specific recommendations to bring such violations to an end. They deserve the full support of the international community in their efforts to denounce restrictions of press freedoms and human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial murders, and inhumane prison conditions. No other two CSOs have done more to promote mutual trust between Hutu and Tutsi. • The time has come for the international community to recognize the potential for renewed ethnic strife inherent in the problems faced by refugees and displaced persons: the international community, through the AU, should bring maximum pressure to bear on the CNRS and MRRDR to work jointly toward a viable action plan; additional funding from the UN is urgently needed to cope with the logistics of the problem. And unless a more proactive role is played by the Commission de Suivi des Accords d’Arusha to monitor and assist the implementation of the action plan, the refugee problem could easily spin out of control and re-ignite ethnic strife. • Though dictated by the exigencies of power-sharing, the kind of topheavy governmental machinery born of the Arusha Accords is unlikely to succeed in resolving the country’s economic problems as long as its primary purpose is to serve as a political machine for rewarding political allegiance. A sustained effort should be made by donors to promote the development of the private sector as a source of employment. As long as the state remains the only source of rewards, its legitimacy and efficiency will decline in proportion to its size. Useful though it may have been in the short run as an integrating apparatus, its long-term viability is very much open to question. It simply cannot serve as a substitute for private enterprise. • Private enterprise is not an unmitigated blessing. It can easily play into the hands of the more enterprising elements in society, that is, Tutsi elements, and thus create the basis for persistent social inequalities. The phenomenon is already apparent in some sectors of the economy (my guess is that 90 percent of the taxis operating in Bujumbura are owned by Tutsi elements). Along with the encouragement of private enterprise, it should be

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the responsibility of the government to see to it (possibly through affirmative action–type guidelines) that entry into the private sector, and therefore access to credit facilities, not be the privilege of any particular group, whether by design or by circumstances. • None of the above can become reality unless minimal conditions of security exist in the urban and rural areas. This is why the international community must make an additional effort to fund the expansion and professionalization of the African Union–sponsored African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). Currently limited to some 3,000 men from South Africa, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, the AMIB should expand to twice its present size if it is to provide adequate protection to opposition leaders and at the same time provide effective security in and around the cantonments. • Last but not least, the reality of the 1972 genocide can no longer be ignored as at present, when the killings of Tutsi in the wake of Ndadaye’s murder qualifies as the only example of “genocide” officially acknowledged. It is not by blocking out the past that Burundi will build its future. The time has come to set the record straight. Neither community has been spared the horrors of genocidal killings or the burden of responsibility for such killings. Public recognition of this irreducible fact would go a long way toward promoting a sense of trust between Hutu and Tutsi and helping them come to terms with their tragic past. The foregoing should disabuse us of the notion that free and fair elections are all that is needed to ensure a safe passage to multiparty democracy. As Fareed Zakaria reminded us, free and fair elections are no guarantee that those elected will heed the rule of law and protect basic individual rights, including minority rights.19 The threat of “illiberal democracy” is particularly ominous in a country like Burundi, where today, as in the past, the tyranny of the Hutu majority remains the perennial concern of the Tutsi minority. Whether this threat is likely to materialize is anybody’s guess. What seems reasonably clear is that much remains to be done before a consensus of sorts emerges among Barundi on how they want to be governed, by whom, and for what purpose.

Notes 1. For a comparative discussion of the politics of memory in postgenocide Burundi and Rwanda, see René Lemarchand and Maurice Niwese, “Mass Murder, the Politics of Memory and Post-Genocide Reconstruction,” in Simon Chesterman, Albert Schnabel, and Beatrice Pouligny (eds.), Mass Crime and Post-Conflict Peace-Building (New York: International Peace Academy, forthcoming). For a discussion of the circumstances of the 1972 genocide, see René Lemarchand, “Le génocide de 1972 au Burundi: Les silences de l’histoire,” Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 3 (2002), pp. 551–567.

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2. One of the most instructive accounts is by former president Sylvestre Ntibantuganya, Une démocratie pour tous les Burundais, 2 vols. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999); see also Filip Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise (Paris: Karthala, 1999), and René Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 76–105. 3. See René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Frederick Praeger; London: Pall Mall, 1970), p. 344 ff. 4. For a discussion of the relationship between exile and the “mythico-histories,” see Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 5. See International Crisis Group, Réfugiés et déplacés au Burundi: Construire d’urgence un consensus sur le repaitriement et la réinstallation (Nairobi: Africa Report 2003). 6. Filip Reyntjens, “L’évolution politique au Rwanda et au Burundi,” in F. Reyntjens and S. Marysse (eds.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 1997–98 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999), p. 74. 7. From a telephone interview with Pasteur Habimana, Bujumbura, 25 October 2003. 8. Howard Wolpe, Burundi: Facilitation in a Regionally Sponsored Peace Process (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, forthcoming). 9. Fabienne Hara, “Burundi: A Case of Parallel Diplomacy,” in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aal (eds.), Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2003), p. 135. 10. Ibid., pp. 149, 150. 11. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink: 1993–1995 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2003), p. 73. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., p. 39. 14. United Nations Operation in Burundi, “The IMC Urges Burundi’s Political Circles to Give Guarantees for Reconciliation,” ONUB/PIO/PR/88/2005 (Bujumbura, 9 August 2005). 15. For a detailed discussion of Arusha’s unfinished business, see the excellent contribution of Véronique Parqué and Louis-Marie Nindorera, “L’accord de paix au Burundi: Quel avenir?” in S. Marysse and F. Reyntjens (eds.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2002–2003 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003). 16. For much of the information in this paragraph, I am indebted to Francois Grignon’s ICG report, Réfugiés et déplacés au Burundi. 17. “NGO Demands Action on Refugees,” Foundation Hirondelle (Arusha), 22 October 2005. 18. For a fuller discussion, see Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald, Planning for Burundi’s Future: Building Organizational Capacity for Economic Recovery: Report on the First Training Workshop Held in Ngozi (Burundi), March 11–16, 2003 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003). 19. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), p. 20.

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4 Congo in the Great Lakes Conflict MWESIGA BAREGU

T

he ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo represents the tragic continuity that is the history of the country. As one of the few African countries with a vast territory, the DRC has been an equally vast scene of atrocities and political subjugation. It has also been a victim of plunder and looting of its abundant natural resources by local, regional, and international actors. For Congo, the bounty of resources has historically been a curse rather than a blessing. Referring directly to the predatory forces behind the current conflict in the country and its regional ramifications, for example, D. Montague and F. Berrigan contended that “[t]he interplay among the seemingly endless supply of mineral resources, the greed of multinational corporations desperate to cash in on that wealth, and the provision of arms and military training for political tyrants has helped to produce the spiral of conflicts that engulfed the continent—what many regard as ‘Africa’s First World War.’”1 Although subject to over three centuries of slave raiding and subjection, the plunder of Congo’s resources started in earnest with King Leopold II’s formal colonization of the territory as a personal fiefdom in 1885 after the Berlin Conference. This plunder and predation continues virtually unabated to the present day.2 The atrocities committed during Leopold’s era were driven by atavistic avarice, leading to the murder of an estimated 10 million people—nearly half of the population—and the maiming of millions more.3 The events of this period have gone down in history as some of the major atrocities of the nineteenth century, reaching genocidal proportions. In King Leopold’s Ghost, Adam Hochschild convincingly demonstrated that over 100 years later, a lot of this legacy continues to feature importantly in the conflicts in the present conflicts in Congo, for instance, in the plunder and violence in the Kivus.4 Belgium assumed formal control of the Congo Free State in 1908 when it became Belgian Congo and ruled it brutally for fifty-two years, relinquishing 59

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this control in 1960. The founding of the first Democratic Republic only marked the beginning of a new phase in Congo’s troubled history. The first government, led by Patrice Lumumba, was in power for less than three months before being overthrown in a military coup led by Joseph Désiré Mobutu, a former sergeant in the colonial army. The coup was supported by Belgium and the United States, who wanted to install a strong but compliant leader to protect their interests.5 After a period of extreme political instability and social strife, Mobutu finally took over as head of state in 1965. He later changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko and changed the country’s name from Congo to Zaire under the pretext of “indigenization.”6 Mobutu’s regime, which lasted for thirty-two years, was marked by divisiveness, patrimonialism, cronyism, economic and political crises, and exclusion of ethnic groups, especially in eastern Congo. Predictably, Congo became a collapsed state that denoted the disintegration of national society and polarization of ethnic communities. The process of political decay spawned the seeds of political renewal by giving rise to political movements that sought to “liberate” the country. Throughout this time the United States, France, and Belgium, in the pursuit and protection of their interests, backed this predatory and largely unpopular regime. The military and political support received from Western countries extended Mobutu’s rule and protected him from several armed insurgencies that tried to overthrow him. These insurgent movements included Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Parti de la Revolution Populaire (PRP), which was to lead the campaign that overthrew Mobutu. It is estimated that the United States provided more than $300 million in weapons and $100 million in military training to the Mobutu government.7 In May 1997 the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), after seven months of a swift military campaign led by Laurent Kabila, toppled Mobutu’s autocratic regime, with the support of a number of neighboring countries, notably Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe. The AFDL itself was composed of two groups: the first was the disaffected Banyamulenge (led by the Alliance Democratique du Peuples of Deo Bugera), who were harassed after Mobutu withdrew the citizenship of the Banyamulenge in 1996; the second group comprised anti-Mobutu groups led by Laurent Kabila’s PRP that had been founded in 1967. The alliance that overthrew Mobutu later split into opposing camps when a new war broke out in 1998 because of conflicting goals during the anti-Mobutu struggle. Domestically, the Banyamulenge were motivated by narrow ethnic concerns as well as their relationship with Rwanda. On the other hand, the goals of nationalism and pan-Africanism that were tied to the restoration of Congo’s sovereignty inspired the Kabila faction. The regional actors also had competing and multiple goals for intervening in Congo. Angola was interested in stopping the diamond trade of the União

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Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) and reducing the use of Congo as UNITA’s operational base. For its part, Uganda was at war with two rebel movements on its western border, and Rwanda was determined to meet the security challenge posed by the Interahamwe and exFAR in North Kivu. Finally, Zimbabwe intervened because Robert Mugabe was the chairman of the SADC organ, and his country obtained more than 10 percent of its power supply from Inga Dam in Congo. 8 In the wake of the successful campaign against Mobutu, these divergent goals imposed themselves on the new political landscape and precipitated a crisis in the tenuous solidarity that had marked the alliance.

From the Anti-Mobutu Alliance to the DRC War Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s first year in power was marked by conflict, as his regime faced a number of internal and external challenges. These challenges reflected competing motives and objectives that had given rise to the antiMobutu alliance that had brought the AFDL to power. At home, Kabila failed to meet expectations for immediate democratic reforms that would have reversed years of Mobutu’s dictatorship. For instance, the veteran opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, who had been elected prime minister by the Sovereign National Conference (1991–1992) and appointed by Mobutu (1997), expected to be made prime minister in Kabila’s government that was formed in May 1997. Kabila was unresponsive to these demands; instead, he used troops to break up opposition demonstrations, banned political party activities, and arrested Tshisekedi. Some of Kabila’s detractors began to contend that Kabila’s treatment of opposition and civil society leaders was worse than Mobutu’s. In its assessment of the first year of Kabila’s government, for example, the African Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Congo reported that “ethnic tensions are exacerbated, particularly in North and South Kivu where anti-Tutsi sentiments are very high . . . arbitrary arrests are high . . . national police and army have virtually no limits on their authority, . . . more journalists and human rights activists have been jailed than in seven years under Mobutu, . . . there is little due process of law.”9 To be fair, however, there needs to be recognition of the difficult circumstances in which the Kabila government came to power, in particular the hostility of the Western countries to the new government. Relations with these countries soured because of the government’s demand for the renegotiation of mining concessions and its questioning of its liability for the debt accumulated under the Mobutu regime. Western hostility also stemmed from what was perceived as Kabila’s strident nationalism and obstruction of UN investigations into alleged massacres of 9,000 Hutus by the AFDL.10 In addition to these pressures, Kabila was confronted with a war

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with Uganda and Rwanda that intensified domestic conflicts and engulfed the Great Lakes region as a whole.11 Kabila became increasingly autocratic, just as Mobutu had been, partly because the AFDL coalition was more of an alliance than an organized movement with a clear political program. Without a coherent agenda that would aggregate and articulate its diverse interests, the alliance was prone to disintegration after the removal of Mobutu. That is why in the absence of a coherent program, Kabila’s rule became personal, characterized by nepotism and cronyism.12 By April 1999, Kabila had dissolved what was left of the AFDL, accusing some members of “opportunism” and “self-enrichment.”13 With the personalization of power, the democratization program that Kabila had announced in May 1997 did not come to fruition. The program had envisaged the formation of a constitutional commission to draw up a new constitution by March 1998, leading to democratic elections in 1999. Political uncertainty marked Kabila’s rule as he manipulated domestic and foreign constituencies and was surrounded by a decreasing circle of cronies. Unable to build upon his initial popularity to secure popular legitimacy, Kabila’s most critical challenge was the outbreak of the war with former allies Uganda and Rwanda in August 1998. The fallout was a result of two causes. First, there was an internal power struggle on the distribution of positions between different factions of the AFDL, in particular, between the Banyamulenge supported by Rwanda and Uganda and the Kabila group stressing broader Congolese interests. Second, mutual suspicions emerged between the new government in Kinshasa and its erstwhile backers because of Rwanda’s suspicion that Kabila was backing the Interahamwe and recruiting them into the new army. For his part, Kabila was afraid that Rwanda could engineer a coup against his government in favor of a Banyamulenge leadership. Uganda was unhappy with Kabila’s warm relations with the Sudan government because of Sudanese support for rebels in northern and western Uganda. Kabila had initially granted key positions to the Banyamulenge in his government and accorded relative freedom to Uganda and Rwanda to patrol their borders within the DRC. But in making these concessions, he invited the wrath of opponents who accused him of bowing to Rwanda and Uganda and appeasing the Banyamulenge.14 Mahmood Mamdani accurately stated that any government put in power by foreign forces would have faced the same problems that confronted Kabila.15 Responding to growing public sentiments about the dominance of Rwanda and the Banyamulenge in his government, Kabila distanced himself from his former allies by expelling Rwandese military advisers and stripping the Banyamulenge of their citizenship. This, in turn, triggered Rwanda’s invasion of the DRC, claiming “legitimate security concerns,” and precipitated a rebellion among the Banyamulenge. The convergence of

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these factors led to the formation of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) by the Banyamulenge, who launched a war that nearly led to the overthrow of the Kabila government. Kabila was only saved with the intervention of SADC forces. The war, popularly dubbed “Africa’s first world war,” lasted for nearly five years and involved nearly nine African countries. It is estimated to have cost 3 million lives, 2 million internally displaced persons, and half a million refugees.16 Although Rwanda and Uganda intervened in northeastern Congo, claiming to have legitimate security concerns, it became clear that their interests were primarily to “derive substantial economic benefits from their free access to the mineral wealth of Eastern Congo,” much of which was used to cover the costs of their military involvement.17 The existence of foreign forces also became a major bone of contention and serious obstacle to the Lusaka peace process.

SADC Intervention Following the RCD rebellion and the Rwanda-Uganda invasion, the DRC approached the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security at its Victoria Falls Summit of 7–8 August 1998 seeking support, under Article 5(3) of the SADC protocol. An SADC committee of foreign ministers from Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe launched investigations and established “clear evidence of a foreign invasion.” On the basis of that finding, the SADC organ’s Interstate Defense and Security Committee met in Harare on 18 August and authorized allied intervention by SADC countries “able to do so.”18 This was the first time that countries in the region had come together and agreed on a collective decision to deploy an intervention mission in a conflict in their neighborhood. An SADC allied force of troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia subsequently deployed troops in support of Kabila’s regime. Chad and Sudan also deployed troops through bilateral agreements with the DRC government. The SADC allied mission played a crucial role in containing and stabilizing what had the potential to escalate into an explosive regional conflict. The mission also succeeded in defending the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as maintaining relative stability until the MONUC. After considerable procrastination by the UN Security Council, a decision was reached to deploy MONUC in 2000.19 The SADC allied mission was also an example of a regional initiative by members who sought to reverse the security threat by collective efforts in line with UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace.20 Despite its containment and stabilization roles, the SADC mission did not attract the support of the UN Security Council. Instead, Western countries and South Africa brought pressure on the SADC mission to withdraw from

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the DRC. In a statement to the House of Representatives International Relations Committee, for example, the then assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Susan Rice, said: “While we note that the Southern African states—Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe—that have intervened did so at the request of the Congolese government we nonetheless regard their involvement as destabilizing and very dangerous as well. . . . We have been pressing all concerned for a cessation of hostilities and the quickest possible withdrawal of all military forces.”21 Three months later, in a speech delivered in Pretoria, the US permanent representative at the UN attributed the delay for the deployment of MONUC to SADC coalition partners.22

Toward the Lusaka Peace Process The SADC mission contained the conflict by preventing the takeover of Kinshasa and provided support for the Kabila government in its efforts to restore order. It also enabled the beginning of negotiations to resolve the conflict. An emergency summit in Pretoria on 23 August 1998 confirmed SADC’s recognition of the sovereignty of the DRC and mandated the chair, President Mandela, to arrange a cease-fire in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Although there were initial misunderstandings between the organ chair (Zimbabwe) and the SADC chair (South Africa), Mandela announced on 3 September that SADC unanimously supported the military intervention in the DRC. This set in motion a number of initiatives that eventually led to the Lusaka peace process. A subsequent regular summit of SADC held in Mauritius in September 1998 not only reaffirmed the Pretoria decision but also condemned Rwanda and Uganda for “supporting DRC rebels” and commended the allied forces for the timely intervention in the DRC. The summit also appointed President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, assisted by Presidents Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania and Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, to lead mediation efforts toward a cease-fire agreement. This initiative produced a framework for the cease-fire agreement but failed to end the conflict because there were severe disagreements among the parties about the participation of the Congolese rebels in the process. In April 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1234 demanding the withdrawal of “uninvited” forces without clarifying the steps to be taken in case of failure to comply. At the same time, UN secretarygeneral Kofi Annan appointed Moustapha Niasse as a UN special envoy for the DRC peace process, to establish the positions of the parties and identify the obstacles to the signing of a cease-fire agreement. Although there were many initiatives to resolve the conflict, the decisive initiative that unlocked

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the logjam came from a meeting in Pretoria that coincided with the inauguration of President Thabo Mbeki on 17 June 1999. This meeting agreed on holding an SADC summit in Lusaka to negotiate the terms of a cease-fire agreement. In three weeks of bargaining, the belligerents sought a compromise in light of deep differences over the status of rebel movements. The critical bone of contention was whether their inclusion would imply recognition and therefore legitimization of rebellion; by the same token, excluding the rebels seemed a sure way to doom the agreement. The DRC objected to the inclusion of rebels, but Rwanda and Uganda stood firm in supporting them. The Lusaka Peace Accord was eventually signed in July 1999 in two stages. The first was among the state parties: the DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, and Uganda. The second stage involved obtaining the signatures of various rebel movements, including the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba and supported by Uganda; the RCD-Goma, led by Emile Ilunga and backed by Rwanda; and the RCD-Kisangani, led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba and backed by Uganda. The key provisions of the Lusaka Accord included the immediate cessation of hostilities and military disengagement within twenty-four hours; the cessation of violence against civilians and facilitation of humanitarian assistance; the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) composed of the belligerent parties to investigate cease-fire violations, work out mechanisms to disarm identified militias, and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops according an established calendar; the deployment of a UN force tasked with disarming armed groups (the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces [ADF], the LRA, the West Nile Bank Front, the Uganda National Rescue Front II [UNRF], the former Uganda national army, exFAR [the former Rwanda army], Interahamwe, the Burundi Force for the Defense of Democracy, and UNITA), collecting weapons from civilians, and providing humanitarian assistance and protection to the displaced persons and refugees; and initiation of a Congolese national dialogue intended to lead to a “new political dispensation in the DRC.”23 The implementation of the Lusaka Accord proved even more difficult than its negotiation. For nearly three years after the signing of the accord, very little happened by way of implementation. The cease-fire was honored in its breach by the signatories even before the ink could dry. Between September and December of 1999 the situation deteriorated, as all the belligerent parties traded accusations of cease-fire violations. Tensions persisted between Rwanda and Uganda, who had clashed in Kisangani one month before the signing of the accord. Rivalry also continued between the respective rebel factions the two countries supported in the RCD, leading to tensions over the control of North Kivu. Rwanda insisted on a comprehensive UN peacekeeping operation to ensure that the Interahamwe fighters

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and ex-FAR forces were disarmed and prevented from attacking Rwanda. Both of the RCD rebel camps continued to insist on the removal of Kabila from power. Museveni strongly resisted pressures from the Uganda parliament for the Ugandan forces to withdraw by insisting that Uganda had to remain in the conflict to “guard its national interests.”24 The Congo government established new alliances with Uganda rebel groups through ADF—a rebel umbrella alliance in western Uganda—and internally with Mai Mai forces that had not even been recognized in the Lusaka Accord. Open clashes took place between the government and RCD forces in Kabinda, South Kivu, in September as well as in Equateur Province in November 1999. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1279 in November 1999 establishing MONUC. In December 1999, the former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, was appointed to serve as facilitator of the InterCongolese Dialogue. But by then the DRC was teetering on the brink of total warfare, as Zimbabwean forces were under assault in Ikela from the combined rebel-Rwanda forces. At the same time, the government launched offensives on two fronts: fighting the Uganda-backed MLC in Equateur Province and the Rwanda-backed RCD in South Kivu. To further complicate the picture, Rwanda and Uganda clashed in Kisangani, giving rise to hostilities that lasted for nearly four years between the two former allies.25 As the year 2000 began there were two emerging trends on the political horizon. First, the deteriorating situation was causing growing concern in the region and in the international community that the DRC war would engulf the whole region with dire consequences. Second, there was a growing political will to bring the situation under control. It was the combination of these trends that led to renewed efforts at the UN for the deployment of a viable peacekeeping force. An extraordinary SADC summit meeting in Maputo in January 2000 issued a communiqué strongly urging the UN to deploy a full peacekeeping force in the DRC. Within days, the UN Security Council held a meeting in New York with seven SADC heads of state. After this meeting the Security Council pledged the deployment of 5,000 troops to protect about 500 unarmed military observers. Although many observers acknowledged that this number was grossly below the force size required for the task, the UN action set the faltering Lusaka process back on track.26 In its statement the UN Security Council recognized the urgency of the crisis and committed itself “to act promptly,” stressing the “absolute necessity of security and access for United Nations personnel deployed in support of the Lusaka process.”27 Follow-up meetings in New York and the region laid the groundwork for a timetable on the modalities of a plan, the cessation of hostilities, and the disengagement and redeployment of belligerent forces. But following the deployment of MONUC, the fighting between Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani threatened to derail the peace process and postponed the withdrawal of

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regional forces. The situation remained largely unchanged until January 2001, when the assassination of Laurent Kabila brought his son, Joseph, to power. This change transformed the negotiations decisively from Lusaka to Pretoria and Washington and led to the formal entry of new actors and interests in the Lusaka peace process.

From Lusaka to Pretoria After his inauguration, Joseph Kabila stressed the need for faster progress in the peace process, met Rwanda’s Kagame, and sent signals to Pretoria suggesting a new impetus in the process.28 Within two weeks of coming to power, Kabila paid his first foreign visit to the United States and resumed cooperation with the facilitator of the ICD, Masire. The Lusaka process really gained an irreversible momentum in May 2001 when the Congolese parties signed the declaration of principles (S/2001/466), laying the ground for negotiations for an all-inclusive dialogue that would establish a transitional government prior to elections. By August 2001 a preparatory meeting for the ICD held in Gaborone adopted a Declaration of Commitment (Acte d’Engagement) and the draft agenda and procedures for the negotiations. The first ICD meeting, which collapsed within two weeks, was held in October 2001 in Addis Ababa. Although it collapsed for technical and financial reasons, the failure was consistent with the emerging trend of shifting the process from SADC and the OAU to South Africa. After intensive informal consultations that addressed questions of representation, the ICD was reconvened at Sun City, South Africa. It brought together nearly 360 delegates who met for fifty-three days from 25 February to 2 April 2002 at an estimated cost of 37 million South African rands. This meeting reached broad agreement on the formation of a transitional government but failed to agree on the formula for power-sharing in the new government. The Sun City Agreement was essentially a deal between the DRC government and the Uganda-backed MLC, who invited the others to come on board; the latter initially rejected the overture. Some of the key provisions of the agreement were that (1) Kabila would continue as president and supreme commander of the army until the holding of elections; (2) the MLC’s Bemba would become prime minister and head of government; (3) an assembly, a senate, and a senior army council would be established; (4) the president would make ministerial appointments from names submitted by delegations with the countersignature of the prime minister; (5) a mechanism would be established to oversee the formation of a new national army to comprise government, MLC, and RCD forces with RCD–Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), RCD-Nationale (RCD-N), and Mai-Mai elements; and (6) a working group would be established to develop a transitional constitution.

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Progress in implementing the Sun City Agreement was slow, mainly because of the continued presence of foreign forces in the DRC and concerns about Rwanda’s security. In addition, it was impossible to implement an agreement that did not include all the parties. Moustapha Niasse, special envoy of the UN Security General, conducted six months of shuttle diplomacy in collaboration with South Africa to induce other Congolese to sign the agreement. At the same time, there were diplomatic attempts to resolve the question of the withdrawal of foreign forces. A landmark agreement between Rwanda and the DRC in July 2002 contributed to movement on the concurrent withdrawal of Rwanda troops and the dismantling of exFAR and Interahamwe forces. In September 2002, Uganda and Rwanda reached a similar agreement where they established a 100-day timetable for the withdrawal of Uganda’s forces and the establishment of the Ituri Pacification Committee in northeastern DRC. Subsequently, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe reached bilateral agreements with the DRC government calling for troop withdrawal in October 2002. The incremental moves by regional belligerents and internal parties cumulatively prepared the ground for the conclusion of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Progress had been stalled by the DRC’s demand that the internal political reconstruction process could not begin until foreign troops had withdrawn from its territory, on the one hand, and by Rwanda’s and Uganda’s insistence on guarantees for security of their borders, on the other hand. Together these moves led to the signing of the Global and Comprehensive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo in Pretoria on 16 December 2002. This agreement formed the basis of the new government of national unity and marked the end of the political monopoly of the Kabila government that was formed in 1997. It also reflected the position taken by the United States and South Africa prior to the establishment of the AFDL government. The agreement comprised a wide range of political elements and represented a complex balancing of different parties’ interests in the DRC: the government; the RCD; its splinter groups, the RCD-ML and the RCD-N; the MLC; the political opposition; civil society; and the Mai-Mai. The agreement essentially built upon the Sun City Agreement and provided for a twenty-four-month transition period with democratic elections at the end of it (but as mentioned below, these elections did not take place as planned); Kabila’s retention as president and supreme commander of the armed forces during that period; four vice presidents (from government, MLC, RCD, and unarmed opposition), each heading a governmental commission; thirty-six ministers and deputy ministers; a transitional parliament with a national assembly and a senate; and civil society representatives heading five independent commissions. The final session of the ICD formally endorsed the package of agreements comprising the all-inclusive agreement, the transitional

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constitution, the Memorandum on Military and Security Issues, and the thirty-six resolutions adopted at the first Sun City ICD meeting.

The Hesitant, Fragile, and Volatile Transition Following the signing of the comprehensive agreement, Congolese parties made efforts to set up an administration and begin the transition. On 7 April 2003, President Kabila took the oath of office as head of the transitional administration. To realize the goals of stability and unity, Kabila passed a decree offering an amnesty to people accused of acts of war, political crimes, and crimes of opinion in the period between 2 August 1998 and 4 April 2003.29 After nearly six months of protracted political haggling, a government of national unity and transition was inaugurated in July 2003, comprising the four vice presidents and the first council of ministers. In August 2003, Kabila and his four vice presidents convened the new parliament. After the signing of an agreement on the sharing of military positions in the new administration between the government, RCD-Goma, and MLC, Kabila optimistically stated that “the war had lost its purpose, as all pretexts put forward to justify it are void.”30 By the time two years had passed after the signing of the agreement, a number of weaknesses had slowed the implementation process, notably the elaboration of fundamental laws, the re-unification of the country through the appointment of provincial governors and vice governors, the restoration of state authority all over the country, the restructuring and integration of armies and security services, and the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs.31 Of particular concern was the lack of progress on establishing the five institutions envisaged in the agreement. These included the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the National Human Rights Observatory, the high authority for media, the national Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Ethics and the Fight Against Corruption. The local government elections slated for April 2005, parliamentary elections for July 2005, and presidential elections for September 2005 were all postponed, to the chagrin of the opposition. Yet without the presence of a viable and functioning state in the DRC, there cannot be an effective mechanism for addressing other security issues. The conflict in Ituri has also raised fears about the sturdiness of the peace process. Following the escalation of ethnic violence between the Hema and Lendu, the French led an EU Interim Emergency Multilanational Force in July 2003 prior to MONUC’s deployment. Although this force stabilized the situation (and MONUC subsequently deployed in the region), large areas of the region, especially in North Kivu, remain ungovernable.32 In addition, some reports have accused Rwanda and Uganda of continuing the proxy war

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in the Kivus, raising doubts about their purported withdrawal. As one report indicated: “Both sides [Uganda and Rwanda] want to control the oil, gold and diamonds produced there, even after the peace deal currently being worked on takes effect.”33 The unpublished part of the final report of the UN panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of the resources of the DRC revealed the possible sources of the volatility of the transition. The report argued that the networks that have developed on the plunder of the DRC’s resources will resist the restoration of effective state authority in their operational areas. Three networks are important in this regard: the Rwanda-linked network, which is considered “the most serious threat” to the government of national unity working through the RCD-Goma in the transitional government; the Kinshasa-linked network, which is rooted in the government; and the Ugandan-linked network, which has a commercial interest in the control of resource-rich Ituri in competition with Rwanda. Yet the report failed to highlight the foreign networks that interact with these regional networks in the supply of weapons, recruitment of mercenaries and private military companies, and provision of markets for the plundered resources. Although diverse international and regional actors have made considerable progress in building peace in the DRC, there remains a lot more to be done to secure durable peace in the entire region. The regional situation remains volatile, mainly because of the persistence of incompatible interests among multiple actors. One of the key sources of conflict is the problem of disarming the Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces in eastern DRC. Equally significant are the demographic pressures that drove Rwanda’s intervention in the DRC and partly led to the plunder of resources. Without adequate solutions to these problems, Rwanda’s frequent incursions into the DRC territory will persist.

Obstacles to Peacemaking and Implementation in the Great Lakes There have been two obstacles to the sluggish negotiation and implementation of the Lusaka and subsequent peace agreements: structural obstacles, which arise from the structure of power and interests, and process or operational obstacles, which arise from negotiations and implementation. Structural obstacles are part of the socioeconomic and political relations in specific countries and the region as a whole, including economic and political power and social relations between peoples. To a large extent, these relations are relatively fixed in the short term and are usually taken as givens in negotiation and implementation of peace agreements. Process obstacles, on the other hand, arise from the actions and behavior of actors. They include

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the definition of the problem, identification of the parties to the conflict and their goals, negotiation strategies and tactics, and implementation schedules and timetables. These factors are more flexible and amenable to change through information, bargaining, and exertion of coercive or persuasive pressures. Structural and process obstacles are mutually reinforcing: structural factors impinge on the process by constraining and defining the negotiation space. Furthermore, the interests of parties play important roles in these conflicts. The interplay of interests determines the parties to the conflict, their goals, and the options available to them. It is the act of balancing and reconciling interests that ultimately determines whether a violent conflict is successfully terminated or whether it becomes intractable. In negotiating peace agreements, there are always at least three types of actors who play roles that are consistent with the promotion and protection of their interests in the conflict. The first group consists of actors who have a commitment to peacemaking, particularly actors who are often victims of violent conflicts. Civil society, children, and women are good examples. The overriding goal for these groups is the restoration of peace and return to normalcy. This group comprises most of the peacemakers. The second group, peace spoilers, comprises actors who are likely to lose by the process of peacemaking. These actors will always seek to obstruct the negotiations and implementation of peace agreements. They include actors who profit from the conflict, such as arms dealers, mercenaries, drug barons, and war criminals. The third group, peace opportunists, is composed of actors whose interests are neither positively nor negatively affected by peacemaking. They may support the peace process just as easily as they may obstruct it, depending on existing circumstances and the balance of forces between the peace spoilers and the peacemakers. They include countries who have demonstrably dragged their feet on the deployment of international peacekeeping forces, UN agencies such as UNHCR that may be burdened by the “refugee industry,” international financial institutions, and multinational corporations.

Structural Obstacles Since process obstacles are largely a function of structural obstacles, it is important to identify key structural obstacles that have impeded peace processes in the Great Lakes region. These are resource struggles, the dysfunctional DRC state, structural militarism and warlordism, interimperialist and pan-Africanist rivalries, and refugeeism and migratory movements. Resource struggles. Resource availability and scarcity impinge heavily on regional peace processes. As UN reports have acknowledged, the prolongation of the conflict in the DRC lies in the illegal exploitation of precious

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and strategic resources feeding upon the virtually collapsed state.34 Resources in the DRC such as cobalt, copper, diamonds, cadmium, petroleum, gold, silver, manganese, tin, germanium, uranium, radium, bauxite, iron ore, coal, and large forests for exploitation of timber have turned out to be a bane rather than a boon. They have attracted all manner of plunderers who have combined with gun smugglers, drug pushers, money launderers, and war entrepreneurs (mercenaries and private military companies) to generate endless cycles of violence and predation by warlords. This unholy alliance obstructed the Lusaka peace agreement and others in the region and created entrenched elite networks that fuel the proliferation of arms. The successful implementation of agreements and establishment of peace will depend on the effective control of these interests, particularly by the UN system. The key to successful management of this problem is not only to sanction illegal plunder but also to facilitate licit exploitation. At another level, however, resource scarcity has unleashed conflicts. Although the DRC suffers from the pains of abundant resources, some parts of the Great Lakes region have resource scarcities that result in resource conflicts, environmental stress, and deepening poverty. Land hunger and maldistribution of resources in Rwanda and Burundi, for example, have aggravated internal conflicts, refugee flows, and the quest for additional territory.35 Apart from resource plunder, Rwanda procrastinated in withdrawing its forces from the DRC because it saw the possibility of de facto annexation of the northern Kivu region to its territory. The territorial ambitions of Rwanda and Burundi have featured prominently in popular discourse but have not, as yet, received serious and sustained attention. The question of Rwanda and Burundi’s territorial ambitions has emerged in three forms. One is the form of irredentism and annexation in which Rwanda and Burundi are said to claim “their peoples” inhabiting areas across their borders in eastern DRC. The second is the Hima-Tutsi empire thesis that attributed Rwandan and Ugandan invasion of the DRC in August 1998 to their enduring ambitions to expand and create a Great Lakes empire dominated by people of Hamitic origins. The Laurent-Désiré Kabila regime accused Uganda and Rwanda of creating, in collaboration with DRC rebels, a Tutsi-dominated alliance with expansionist ambitions, although both countries have consistently denied these claims.36 It is out of these fears that Laurent Kabila made the decision to join SADC, which effectively offered him the opportunity to reduce his dependence (militarily) on Rwanda and Uganda. Despite these denials, the accusations persist among academics and policymakers.37 In a revealing remark about long-term goals of structural militarism in Rwanda, former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs Herman Cohen observed that one of the political strategies of Kigali has been “to dismember the Congo with the objective of creating an independent state of Kivu that would be controlled by Kigali’s surrogates. It would also become the motor of Rwanda’s economic development.”38 In

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addition, the former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Walter Kansteiner, was reported to have envisaged the formation of Hutu and Tutsi states through “relocation” and breaking up the DRC.39 To remove the enduring suspicions of Rwanda’s territorial ambitions, it will be necessary for the region to have discussions on nonaggression and confidence building. Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania and mediator in Burundi, raised the third dimension of the Rwanda territorial problem. He contended that demographic pressures gave rise to the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi where nearly every bit of land is under cultivation.40 He argued strongly that the conflicts were caused neither by ethnicity, irredentism, nor the quest for mineral resources but simply by too many people occupying too little space. Consequently, there is need for a regional policy that would promote refugee resettlement rather than repatriation as a way to contain the appetite by Rwanda and Burundi for territory in the DRC. This was Tanzania’s approach to the problem in the 1960s and 1970s and may need to be revisited at the regional level. Dysfunctional state in the DRC. When Kabila came to power in 1997, he inherited a virtually collapsed state.41 The outbreak of the war a little over a year later compounded problems for the new state, which was struggling to establish political stability and gain legitimacy. The hostility of the West toward the Kabila regime and the economic embargo that accompanied it further undermined the capacity of the fledgling state. There was also uncertainty as to whether the country could remain a single entity or split into regions controlled by warlords. In these circumstances the government felt besieged and focused more on its survival than on negotiating with its opponents. Kabila was defensive and belligerent, a fact that brought him into conflict with all the other parties to the conflict, including the OAU-appointed mediator, the UN Security Council, and some of its allies. The death of Laurent-Désiré Kabila and the accession to power of his son in January 2001 gave added momentum to the Lusaka process. Joseph Kabila adopted a more positive approach to the West and a more flexible stance on negotiations by allowing Masire to mediate the conflict. Kabila also succeeded in building broad legitimacy and state capacity.42 These efforts jumpstarted the UN Security Council’s authorization of MONUC’s deployment, a process that began the reconstruction of the DRC. It is accurate to state that although there has been competition for Congo’s resources, the virtual absence of a functioning government has made it easier for the country to be vulnerable to predation by external actors more concerned with securing their own interests than fostering a stable DRC. Structural militarism and warlordism. Structural militarism is another obstacle to peace building in the DRC. In the immediate postindependence period, the country witnessed the violent overthrow of Patrice Lumumba, secessionist

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struggles in Katanga, and the subsequent rise of Lumumbist and other armed struggles. This culture of militarism culminated in the overthrow of Mobutu in 1997 and unleashed the regional conflagration. Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Sudan have all been embroiled in all kinds of conflicts that go beyond their boundaries. International and unilateral interventions driven by hegemonic ambitions and resources plunder have become regular geopolitical features of the region. Contagious armed conflicts have spawned the phenomenon of warlordism in the region where settling political differences through arms has become the norm. Most of the countries in the region have been described as “military princedoms.” Structural militarism is a consequence of state failure, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons supplied by sundry gunrunners, the culture of impunity (emanating from warlordism), retribution and revenge (resulting from unresolved grievances), and embedded mistrust (resulting from politicized ethnic and social polarization). It is instructive that warlord regimes were, at one point, lauded as “the new breed of African leaders” by the United States.43 There is a close relationship between warlordism, plunder, and the interimperialist rivalry in the region. This is attested to by the military training and arms supplies that have been extended to Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi by the United States, Britain, and France.44 Interimperialist and Pan-Africanist rivalries. The Great Lakes region has become a cauldron of multiple interests competing for the resources of the region. One of the features of this competition is the rivalry among the major Western powers and African response to this rivalry. Major Western powers have tried to redefine their interests and stake a claim on African’s resources. One arm of the interimperialistic rivalry is represented by the United States, with its quest for global dominance and an appetite for the strategic minerals of the region to feed its military-industrial complex. Its mission is to reduce the interests of former colonial powers. Franco-Belgian interests represent another arm of the contest: they have sought to maintain their colonial foothold in new coloration. In this respect, France is more aggressive than Belgium in maintaining its sphere of influence and expanding this sphere into traditionally British areas. The third arm of the contest is the EU (Britain in particular), which has sought to dislodge the French from their privileged Francophone zone in collaboration with the United States. This rivalry has been called the “second scramble for Africa,” in essence a rivalry to impose a post–Berlin Conference order upon Africa. Africa has, for the first time, joined this contest, though feebly and hesitantly. Though divided and weak, Africa is trying to stake a claim on its resources in the name of pan-Africanist ethos. This is the meaning of the African renaissance and the revitalized AU. In more concrete terms, pan-Africanism is

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what drove the SADC allied intervention in the DRC. Western regional hegemonic interests account for the failure of the UN Security Council to support the SADC allied mission. Another reason the UN Security Council procrastinated on the question of deploying a peacekeeping mission was that its members had adopted a policy of coercive diplomacy in their relations with Zimbabwe. This was demonstrated by the US move to pass the Zimbabwe Democracy Act that imposed economic sanctions on Zimbabwe and British pressures in the Commonwealth and the EU to isolate and sanction Zimbabwe and impose “smart sanctions” upon its leadership, particularly in 2001.45 The problem of refugees in regional security. One of the distinctive characteristics of the DRC conflict is its ethnic configuration that bears no correspondence with the centralized state systems in the region. Hutu and Tutsi people are found almost all over the Great Lakes region, including Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC, Uganda, and Tanzania. In North Kivu, the Banyarwanda (that is, the people from Rwanda) have settled in the Rutshuru and Masisi territories. South Kivu harbors scores of Hutu from Burundi who have settled in the Ruzizi valley. Thousands of Tutsi from Rwanda have settled in South Kivu, hence the term Banyamulenge to describe Tutsi immigrants from Rwanda. This points to a fact that the Banyamulenge identity is territorial, not ethnic, as it came to refer to all Tutsi immigrants living in eastern Congo, regardless of the date of their arrival.46 It is the vulnerability of the Banyamulenge Tutsi to Congolese nationalism that has played a critical role in fueling the DRC conflict. Having been accepted as civic citizens, but not as ethnic citizens by the 1981 law, the Banyamulenge considered themselves more Congolese than Rwandan. According to Mamdani, civic citizenship stopped recognizing any difference based on race or place of origin, but it continued to reproduce the native identity as ethnic.47 The Mobutu regime used the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) to suppress and persecute the Banyamulenge. With the support of the Rwandan regime, the Banyamulenge fought back. Kabila’s intention to expel all foreign troops from Congo did not help to calm the already volatile situation; as Lemarchand has observed, the mobilization of ethnic fault lines and the irredentist politicization of ethnicity across borders are some of the keys to understanding the dynamics of violence in the Great Lakes.48 The Rwandan genocide of 1994 exacerbated the regional problem of refugees as members of the former Rwandan army (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe (Rwandan Hutu) fled into North and South Kivu. In the refugee camps they were armed from neighboring countries. The Rwandan ex-FAR and Interahamwe also got involved in narcotics trade and used proceeds

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from the trade to purchase arms for use against the Rwandan government.49 Since the 1960s, the refugee problem has been inextricably bound up with the dynamics of conflict in the region, with the 1972 genocide of Hutu in Burundi and the 1994 genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda representing the high points of refugee flows. Refugee movements have created volatility in the eastern Kivu province. In September 2003, when addressing the General Assembly, President Joseph Kabila called upon the UN to “redouble its efforts in support of the ongoing peace and reunification process.”50 The problems of refugees need to be resolved alongside creative solutions to the demographic pressures at the regional level rather than the traditional approaches of refugee encampment and repatriation that have been popularized over the years by the UNHCR. Conclusion Efforts to produce tangible solutions to the conflict in the DRC and the Great Lakes region as a whole need to proceed from an integrated approach that takes into account the ecological sources of conflict. Although the political sources are important, they often serve as triggers rather than the root causes, hence the need to incorporate environmental and resource concerns into diplomatic efforts to prevent and resolve these conflicts. The issue of demographic pressures in Rwanda and Burundi will need to be addressed directly with the goal of arriving at a collective agreement on migration and refugee policies. It is only such policies that may make it possible to break the endless conflict-refugee cycles in the region by making land available to the landless without violating borders of countries. Ultimately, there cannot be peace and security in the region without a strong but legitimate government in the DRC, with the capacity to control and regulate resource extraction while also enjoying the support of its citizens. Notes 1. Dena Montague and Frida Berrigan, “The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Who Benefits?” World Policy Institute, Arms Trade Resource Center (July/August 2001), www.worldpolicy.org. 2. The notion of social violence is advanced by Walter Rodney to explain the impact on Africa of the warfare directed at slave raiding and slave catching over four centuries; see W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1972). 3. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila, A People’s History (London: Zed Books, 2002). See also Mwesiga Baregu, “The Clones of ‘Mr. Kurtz’: Violence, War and Plunder in the DRC,” African Journal of Political Science 7, no. 2 (June 2002).

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4. Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998). According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, the Congo Free State’s population declined from 20 or 30 million to 8 million. The atrocities included decapitation as well as the severing of hands and women’s breasts when they failed to deliver the prescribed quantity of rubber or ivory. A BBC documentary entitled “White King, Red Rubber and Black Death” attempted to reconstruct this horrific period. “King Leopold’s Legacy of DR Congo Violence,” BBC News, 24 February 2004. 5. Ibid. 6. For some of the early debates, see M. Baregu (ed.), Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999), and I. Mandaza (ed.), Reflections on the Crisis in the DRC (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999). 7. William D. Hartung and Bridget Moix, “Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War Arms” (World Policy Institute, Arms Trade Resource Center, 31 October 2003). 8. See www.empereur.com/nations/congo. 9. Africa Policy Information Center [APIC], 12 May 1998. 10. International Crisis Group [ICG}, From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo, ICG Africa Report no. 27 (Brussels: 2001), p. 18. 11. Yusuf Bangura, “Comments on Regional Security and the War in Congo,” in M. Baregu (ed.), Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999). 12. Colette Braeckman, “Pragmatic Rule in Cong-Kinshasa,” Le Monde Diplomatique, December 1997. 13. IRIN, 6 September 1999. 14. Herbert Weiss, “War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” American Diplomacy 5, no. 3 (Summer 2000). 15. Mahmood Mamdani, “Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis,” SAPEM (December 1998). 16. “DRC-Rwanda: Focus on International Reaction to Peace Accord,” www .irinnews.org, 31 July 2002. 17. See René Lemarchand, “The Crisis in the Great Lakes,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), p. 338. 18. Ambassador Gift Punungwe, “The SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security,” in M. Baregu (ed.), Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999). 19. In February 2000, the UN Security Council reluctantly authorized a force strength of only 5,537 military personnel, including observers, but by mid-2002 only just more than 3,800 had been deployed. See Mark Malan and Henri Boshoff, “A 90-day Plan to Bring Peace to the DRC? An Analysis of the Pretoria Agreement of 30 July 2002,” www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers. 20. United Nations, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992,” A/47/277– S/24111, 17 June 1992. 21. House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Hearings on Africa, statement of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan E. Rice, 102nd Cong., 3rd session, 15 September 1999, p. 340. 22. Jendayi E. Frazer, “The United States,” in M. Baregu and C. Landsberg, From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

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23. IRIN, 22 July 1999. 24. International Crisis Group [ICG], Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, ICG Africa Report no. 20 (Brussels: 2000), p. 7. 25. In a rather intriguing twist, Britain’s Tony Blair played the key role in mediating between Rwanda and Uganda, raising questions about Britain’s overall involvement in the DRC and the Great Lakes conflicts in general. 26. The delegation, which was led by SADC chairman Joaquim Chissano, included Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila of the DRC (who had missed the Maputo meeting). It was supported by DRC mediator Ketumile Masire and OAU secretary-general Ahmed Salim, with the foreign ministers of Namibia, South Africa, and Burundi. See Southern African News Features, no. 2, January 2000. 27. Cited in Sagaren Naiddo, The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Negotiations for a Democratic State or the Formalization of a New Scramble? Occasional paper no. 16 (Johannesburg: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002), p. 5. 28. Claude Kabemba and Roger Kibasomba, “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Diagnosis of the Prospect for Peace,” Issue, no. 27 (October 2003). 29. Gerrie Swart, “Less Talk, More Action: The Need to Accelerate the Transition to a Peaceful, Free and Secure DRC,” EA-Briefing Paper, January 2004, www.up.ac.za/academic/cips. 30. Ibid. 31. African Union, Peace and Security Council, www.iss.co.za. 32. International Crisis Group, “Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri,” Africa Report, no. 64 (13 June 2003). 33. BBC News, 12 March 2003. 34. The series of reports of the UN panel on the illegal exploitation of the resources of the DRC addresses this issue. See UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DR Congo, S/2002/1146 (New York: UN, 2002). See also Baregu, “The Clones of ‘Mr. Kurtz.’” 35. See Jean Bigagaza, C. Abong, and C. Mukarubuga, “Land Scarcity, Land Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda,” pp. 51–84 in J. Lind and K. Sturman, Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts (Pretoria: ISS, 2002). 36. See “Uganda: No Plot for Hima, Tutsi Empire—Museveni,” www.allafrica .com/stories. 37. Donald P. Chimanikire, “Southern African Development Community (SADC) Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case of Regional Cooperation” (paper presented at conference, “Conflict and Peacemaking in the Great Lakes,” Entebbe, Uganda, 10–12 July 2000). 38. See Cohen’s statement that “Rwanda and Uganda want to maintain their control over the eastern part of the Congo, transforming it, in a concealed way, into an extension of their own territory” in The United States Should Be More Active in Solving Conflicts, www.african-geopolitics.org/. See also Herman Cohen, “The Agony of the Congo,” American Diplomacy–Commentary, www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat. 39. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney to President Bush on DR Congo, www .inshuti.org/mckinney9.htm. 40. Personal communication in an interview, 1995. 41. Characteristically the DRC is understood as a failed state, a step from a collapsed state. See Robert Rotberg, “Nation State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon,” 6 November 2003, www.cia.gov/nic.

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42. There is plenty of evidence that Joseph Kabila became more amenable to Western demands than his father had been. See, for example, “The Congo Crisis,” a speech delivered at the World Affairs Council of Greater Fort Worth, Texas, 30 April 2001, by Ambassador Joyce E. Leader, www.fundforpeace.org, and International Crisis Group, “From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,” www.africaaction.org. 43. Marina Ottaway, Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy and State Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 27. 44. See statements by Janine Farrell Roberts, Ellen Ray, Keith Snow, James Lyons, and Wayne Madsen, all on what Cynthia McKinney described as “an indictment of Western activities in Africa,” in Covert Action in Africa: A Smoking Gun in Washington, D.C., www.truthout.org/0180.McKinney.Africa. 45. International Crisis Group, “Zimbabwe: Time for International Action,” Africa Briefing, 12 October 2001. 46. See Jean-Claude Willame, Banyarwanda et Banyamulenge (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997). 47. Mamdani, “Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis.” 48. Lemarchand, “The Crisis in the Great Lakes.” 49. Cited in René Lemarchand, “Great Lakes Rebel Activities Financed by Drugs Trade,” IRIN Reports (19 November 1998). 50. Agence France Presse, “Kabila Seeks More UN Help for Congo Peace Process,” 24 September 2003.

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5 Nonstate Actors and Governance in Uganda ANGELA NDINGA MUVUMBA

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cholars and policymakers involved with African peace-building, development, and democratization processes have concluded that a vibrant civil society is critical to preventing conflict, consolidating peace, and enhancing efforts to rebuild and reconstruct war-torn societies. Civil society has flourished throughout the Great Lakes region, most notably by contributing to peace processes and advocating the interests of marginalized groups such as women and children. Rather than attempt to analyze all the subregion’s civil societies, in this chapter I offer an assessment of the multiple roles and articulations of civil society organizations in Uganda and seek to contribute to understanding the effectiveness of civil society in peace building and democratization. The transition from war to peace in Uganda has yet to be consolidated. At the same time, Uganda’s civil society organizations have championed humanitarian causes and human rights, supported legislation that seeks to promote gender equality, sought to nurture a more inclusive politics, and addressed the roots of conflicts. The cumulative role of civil society indicates that it has the potential to foster peace and contribute to the fitful starts and stops that accompany the transition from war to peace and democracy. In addition, there are still immense opportunities for increased civic initiatives in strengthening peace processes, postconflict reconstruction, justice and reconciliation, nation building, and ultimately, democratic consolidation. This chapter is animated by a common definition of African civil society as a sociopolitical stratum outside of the state, which is occupied by institutions and actors such as nongovernmental organizations; communitybased organizations (CBOs); traditional, ethnic, and religious associations; student groups; professional and trade associations; the media; and academics and their institutions. These groups, in the context of postconflict states and societies in Africa, have coalesced around peace building and democratization agendas. 81

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In this chapter I focus on four areas. First, I consider the capacity of civil society organizations to contribute to peace processes during and after armed violence. Second, I assess the challenges and opportunities that some of Uganda’s civil society institutions and actors have faced. This assessment is guided by an understanding that civil society’s contribution to peace and democracy is linked to its effectiveness. Third, I raise questions about the implications for civil society’s contributions to peace building and the “democratization agenda.” Finally, I present some broad policy recommendations related to strengthening the capacities of civil society actors in the subregion. These recommendations are guided by the growing premium placed on including civil society voices in the Great Lakes region’s peace-building and democratization processes.

Interdependent Civil Society in the Great Lakes Region In the Great Lakes region, civil society organizations operate in contradictory contexts such as cycles of protracted conflict and relative peace, old insecurities and nascent stability, and burgeoning democracy and illiberal politics. There is also diversity in civil society organizations across Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. Because of the varied terrain, organizations and actors operate differently and function in diverse ways according to the political, social, and economic conditions of each country. Bearing in mind that civil society includes trade unions, student groups, and religious movements, many of whom represent public interests from the grassroots of these societies, this chapter focuses exclusively on civil society actors such as NGOs. Many other types of civil society actors, including religious movements or women’s organizations, grow into NGOs. This is partly a reflection of how we have come to view politics and development in Africa. A reliance on mobilizing resources from donors has led to more NGOs. A simple survey of existing NGOs in Uganda finds thousands of organizations registered. These organizations have made important contributions to democratization in Uganda and in subregional peace initiatives. Civil society organizations, particularly NGOs and CBOs, have specific roles, yet often mutually reinforcing memberships and interests. For example, women’s organizations, human rights advocacy organizations, and youth empowerment groups, many of which are institutionalized as NGOs and CBOs, are often preoccupied with the realization and protection of universal human rights norms. Religious institutions, together with local community structures, frequently focus on protecting the economic and social interests of local people against authoritarian regimes and securing benefits or protecting norms within the social dimension. Labor unions and professional organizations are generally the training ground for new political leaders and

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opponents of entrenched antidemocratic regimes. The media, even under authoritarian regimes, seek to monitor and expose encroachment on human rights and the abuse of power. In 2001 the International Peace Academy (IPA), on behalf of the Ford Foundation, evaluated African civil society organizations engaged in aspects of conflict management, resolution, and prevention in Africa. The researchers categorized civil society organizations according to the scope of their activities and beneficiaries. Regional and national CSOs were described as semiformal organizations that had a capacity to “network upwards [with international governmental and nongovernmental actors], downwards [with national and local actors], and horizontally [with each other].”1 CBOs were defined as organizations with very localized agendas and a heavy reliance on volunteers to implement their programs.2 The countries in which the evaluation was conducted included Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and eastern and western Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC-East and DRC-West). Differentiating between semiformal and community-based organizations produced interesting conclusions about the role of civil society actors in peace-building and democratization processes. These findings have both positive and negative implications. Civil society organizations operate at different, mutually reinforcing levels. Semiformal organizations took the form of supranational or even supraregional networks and institutions. These organizations, sometimes constituting crosscutting networks of NGOs and CBOs, focused much of their work on coordinating advocacy, monitoring, and facilitation of peace-building, human rights, and humanitarian activities. Their activities involved a spectrum of players ranging from parliamentarians to professional conflict management, gender, human rights, humanitarian, and economic development experts. Semiformal organizations produced the majority of public information on current conflict situations and had more capacity to host Web sites, print and distribute pamphlets and literature, organize workshops, and liaise with regional and international actors. Simultaneously, CBOs existed almost solely at the frontlines of conflicts and acted as arbiters of the interests of grassroots communities, frequently generating activities and implementing programs directly tied to the survival of local people. Many of these CBOs, particularly women’s groups, were linked to larger NGOs, and their activities in the form of peace marches or local trainings were directly supported by larger organizations. Civil society organizations also have diverse risks and opportunities to navigate. Semiformal organizations, principally NGOs, played a stronger role in interactions with external donor NGOs, governments, and multilateral actors such as UN agencies. 3 These organizations were engaged in negotiating and disbursing funding, translating the interests of local actors, and bolstering the capacity of CBOs. Because NGOs in the Great Lakes region and in other parts of Africa are closely linked to external actors, their

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position in the hierarchy of local, national, state, and international institutions results in a vertical dependency for all civil society institutions connected to external support. According to the IPA study, CBOs were financially and institutionally underdeveloped, whereas semiformal organizations had built up strong donor relations and demonstrated the capacity to engage in activities in the long term. Localized CBOs must survive within an environment where larger NGOs appear to manage relationships with external actors. Semiformal NGOs also bear their own risks. They are the most visible civil society organizations, but their visibility renders them vulnerable to harassment and co-optation by the state. Meanwhile, their main objectives are based on top-heavy policy analysis and not necessarily rooted in the realities of political and social conditions at the grassroots CBO level. Despite these two distinctions, NGOs and CBOs are interdependent. The interplay between NGOs and CBOs includes information sharing, capacity building, and other activities geared toward strengthening networks. At the same time, NGOs and CBOs have independent roles and distinct agendas, which have implications for the capacities and activities of civil society as a whole.

Civil Society’s Role in Expanding Political Participation: Ugandan Examples Various civil society organizations emerged in Uganda following the National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) assumption of power in 1986. The media and academia as well as ethnic, community, religious, professional, and student associations had existed in Uganda throughout the postindependence era. Between 1966 and 1985, however, these institutions have had to contend with hostility and harassment from successive repressive governments. During this period, the roles of the civil society organizations were frequently limited to mobilizing support for one or another warring party or providing a support network for civilian populations in the midst of war. The onset of peace, particularly in southern Uganda, ushered in a new era for civil society activism. The NRM government quickly sought ways to distribute state resources to enhance popular mobilization, service delivery, and strengthening of political participation at local levels. 4 Out of this context, NGOs emerged to carry out a diverse set of activities in the areas of postconflict reconstruction, peace building, development, human rights, and political and social reform. Several Ugandan civil society organizations have evolved since the late 1990s to work in nation building; advocate gender equality, human rights norms, and environmental protection; and end conflict in northern Uganda.

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Semiformal civil society actors working on these issues included regional and national NGOs. Together with religious and traditional associations, academic institutions, the media, community-based organizations, and CSO networks and coalitions, these civic actors helped to enlarge civil society’s center of power outside of the state and the market. Outsiders often equate Uganda’s vibrant NGO and CSO networks with an effective civil society. Recent evolutions in the political sector have helped to expose the limits of this view. Political participation and democratization processes have been eroding since the 2001 presidential elections, which were marred by accusations of electoral irregularities. The government decided in 2003 to support the lifting of a seventeen-year restriction on political parties. But the move to multiparty politics has been constrained by the NRM’s bid for an end to presidential term limits. In July 2005, Ugandan parliamentarians approved a constitutional amendment removing term limits. A public referendum approved a return to multiparty politics under these circumstances. These revisions will have enormous consequences for Uganda’s future political transitions, affecting the presidential elections in 2006 if President Yoweri Museveni chooses to run for office again under a new constitutional framework. A vigorous debate on political boundaries, the purpose of term limits, and the organization of political parties has gripped Uganda since 2003. Some civil society actors, such as religious organizations (discussed below), women’s organizations, and the media, participated widely in these debates. Nevertheless, NGOs working in the good governance sector were unable to mediate this transition and prevent the abolishment of term limits. Scholars examining these developments might reflect on the Gramscian model of civil society, whereby a separate sphere of political actors struggles against and prevents an authoritarian or dictatorial regime from controlling the state.5 NGOs are not equipped to carry out this role; they are rarely rooted in groundswell political movements and, in the African context, depend largely on external funding to finance their activities. Consequently, their role in fostering democratization is limited. Other civic actors, such as the free press, trade unions, student groups, and human rights activists, promise more in terms of constraining the abuse of political office or undemocratic transformations of political systems.

The Power of NGOs: Constitutional Processes and Governance Issues Nevertheless, civil society agendas, particularly those emerging from NGOs working for peace and democracy, and more important, the implementation of civic advocacy, monitoring, and community-based social service interventions, have helped to shape Ugandan societal norms, values, and goals. They have,

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in turn, started to build social capital that the Museveni government did not contemplate. Civil society organizations participated in the process of drafting Uganda’s 1995 constitution. Ugandan academics, professional associations, women’s organizations, and human rights groups performed critical functions to promote good governance and influence the final draft of the constitution. They also initiated debate and educated Ugandans about constitutional provisions and issues, advocated on behalf of their beneficiaries, or established parallel institutions to feed policy into the Constituent Assembly. Several individual members of civil society participated in the Constituent Assembly as delegates. A study commissioned by the Norwegian embassy in Uganda in 2002 on civil society in Uganda highlighted the contributions of several CSOs (generally national NGOs in this context) in the constitutional process.6 The National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda (NUDIPU) advocated for the rights of persons with disabilities. Action for Development (ACFODE), a large, national NGO established in 1985 to promote gender equality in all decisionmaking through advocacy, training, research, and publishing, developed a groundbreaking project to inform people about the deliberations in the Constituent Assembly. The Uganda Gender Resource Centre, in partnership with the Ministry of Gender, provided policy resources to Constituent Assembly delegates. These three CSO initiatives helped frame the outcome document and advanced the rights of marginalized peoples in Uganda. The Uganda Law Society (ULS) helped to influence the representation and composition of the Constituent Assembly. In part, as a result of these civil society initiatives, the 1995 constitution contains provisions that protect marginalized peoples. Unfortunately, the input of civic actors beyond established national NGOs in the constitutional process was very minimal. In fact, according to one source, “the impact of CSOs in the process of drafting the 1995 Constitution, with the exception of CSOs working on women’s issues and rights of people with disabilities, was marginal on the final document.”7 The synergy of powerful players in other sectors, such as parliament or government ministries, impacted the effectiveness of CSO lobbying and advocacy. A number of prominent women, such as Winnie Byanyima and Miria Matembe, were leaders in the NRM and members of parliament while simultaneously engaged with gender-focused NGOs. Miria Matembe was a founding member of ACFODE, and Winnie Byanyima founded the Forum for Women and Democracy (FOWODE). The coalition between the interests of these leaders, who had access to key decisionmakers and were active participants in the constitutional process, and the gender agenda enhanced the effectiveness of gender-equality-focused NGOs. There are other variables that make some CSOs more influential and powerful than others. The scale of membership and networks within and

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between CSOs can help influence democratization processes. ACFODE had more input into the constitutional process because its leadership was also active in NRM politics and had representation in the Constituent Assembly. ACFODE’s agenda, however, which was focused on gender equality, coincided with the interests of other CSOs as well as those of government actors. Further, ACFODE leveraged its long-established presence as a CSO. This demonstrates that CSOs that have been in operation for a longer period have built up more human capacity and have access to more financial resources. These factors may have contributed to ACFODE’s success and could help shape action plans for CSOs in neighboring countries as democratization processes evolve. In areas of governance and democratization, CBOs participate less in national political processes. CBOs tend to focus on indigenous social forces and are less likely to respond to donor models of classification. For example, they are less inclined to be aware of, or even to devote resources toward, cultivating an identity as a “service-delivery” or “advocacy” organization. Consequently, CBOs are less engaged in public policy debates.8 CBOs in Uganda are largely self-help organizations rooted in rural and urban communities. Structurally, CBOs are less institutionalized and tend to focus on economic development and social welfare needs at the local village or subcounty levels. As such, they are most commonly institutionalized in the form of primary cooperatives, informal savings and credit groups, and selfhelp associations. Although the total number of registered CBOs is unclear, primary cooperatives or organizations that function as entrepreneurial training initiatives, farming and marketing schemes, and technical assistance units make up a large portion of the formalized CBOs. In 1999, according to the Norwegian embassy report, 6,238 primary cooperatives were officially registered with the Registrar of Cooperatives.9 The Ugandan government’s adoption of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) privatization and liberalization policies in the 1990s has impacted these cooperatives negatively.

A National Dialogue and Effective Civil Society Networks of CBOs and NGOs In Uganda, networks of NGOs and CBOs are playing a critical role in the coordination of the activities and interests of local actors and engaging national or regional actors. Community-based organizations have a number of national coordinating forums that aim to advocate on behalf of their interests at the national level. The Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA), a membership-based NGO, is perhaps the most visible of these coordinating actors. Its major objectives include enhancing collective action for good governance and poverty elimination,

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encouraging dialogue and collaboration with the Ugandan government and external development actors in nation building, and providing a forum for information-sharing between member organizations and other stakeholders. These objectives are carried out through training modules and workshops, sharing of information through publications, collaborations between member organizations and the DENIVA secretariat on issues, and support of districtlevel CBOs and their local networks.10 Its current emphasis is on nurturing an NGO-friendly operating environment, strengthening local governance capacities, and addressing the effects of trade and agriculture policy on local communities. The organization has a membership of 500 indigenous community-based organizations, with a secretariat based in Kampala. DENIVA has worked closely with Uganda’s contentious NGO Forum, which was organized to advocate on behalf of Ugandan CSOs in the early 1990s. The NGO Forum’s leadership is drawn from a spectrum of civil society actors. Over the last decade, there has been an increase in tension between the forum and its members. The NGO Forum is meant to coordinate responses to national issues.11 In this regard, the forum has worked to coordinate CSO networks on legislation ranging from the Land Bill to the Domestic Relations Bill. Critics have noted, however, that the forum has been involved directly as an implementing agent and that these activities contradict its mandate to coordinate CSO responses to national issues. It is interesting that the NGO Forum is composed of a distinguished and influential cast of civic actors. Its membership comes broadly from CSOs with an urban as well as rural mandate, if not a national presence. In contrast, DENIVA’s members are rooted in small communities, and their comparative advantage lies at the local level. The contentious issues that seem to affect the NGO Forum’s operation do not face DENIVA, leading to the conclusion that CSO networks are effective and maintain legitimacy if they are relevant. Finally, locally rooted networks, even though based in the urban areas, can maintain their credibility if they have wide-ranging ownership from smaller CBOs and NGOs and if they have transparent and democratic decisionmaking structures. The voices of community-based organizations have been critical to effective advocacy and monitoring on behalf of a disenfranchised and warweary population. For instance, following Karamajong attacks in Katakwi District on 13 September 2001, DENIVA consulted with the Soroti District Association of NGO Networks, the Katakwi Integrated Development Organization, the Kapelebyong Volunteers, and the Soroti Catholic Diocese Development Organization to reverse the situation.12 In addition to calling upon the Ugandan government to issue a public condemnation of the attacks, the CSOs tried to build awareness about the deterioration of security in Teso by publicizing several factors that were contributing to instability in Katakwi and Soroti districts: no permanent Ugandan government military

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presence, an increase in idle youth in Karamoja, and nonexistent social services and development programs in Katakwi. The local CBOs also claimed that the Ugandan government was fostering divisions between the Karamajong people and neighboring Tesos by providing special treatment to the Karamajong and failing to disarm Karamajong warriors. In their advocacy, the CBOs recommended the prosecution of the perpetrators of the attacks and asked the government to assume more responsibility in boosting security and social services in marginalized areas such as Katakwi and Soroti.13

Religious Leadership: Peace Building in the Midst of War and Peace Uganda’s civil society has been engaged in peacemaking and peace building, particularly in the search for peaceful resolution to the eighteen-year-old conflict between the LRA rebels and the government in northern Uganda. Because of the conflicts that have confronted Uganda throughout its history, religious leaders have played a large role in the political sphere. In particular, Catholic, Anglican, and Islamic institutions wield influence over the political and social interests of their constituents. They have also accepted some measure of responsibility for advancing the interests of the population in the pursuit of peace and in the public discourse on democratization. The northern Uganda conflict, with its vivid local, national, and international aspects, has presented unique challenges for the local community. Nearly 85 percent of the combatants on the side of the LRA were abducted from their communities and are now involved as fighters for Joseph Kony. At the same time, the government has failed to militarily defeat the LRA or to adequately protect the local population, evidence of which was illustrated by the LRA massacre of 200 civilians in February 2004.14 Multifaith initiatives such as the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), a forum of Christian and Muslim leaders in northern Uganda, prove that religious leaders can play a critical role in peace building and peacemaking. The ARLPI is a local civil society group that has emerged to address the conflict. The NGO is composed of a cadre of Christian and Islamic leaders, many of whom have access to international and national resources and personalities through their religious institutions. The conflict’s impact on civilians has cultivated a fault-line of blame and shame, making it difficult to foster reconciliation between the rebels and the local population. Consequently, ARLPI emerged out of the commitment on the part of the religious leaders to accomplish two things. First, as the humanitarian crisis escalated and the conflict emerged as a sore spot in Uganda’s successful transformation, it became more important to engage local, national, and ultimately international actors on strategies for ending the conflict. Second, the ARLPI founders were compelled by the fact that the

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local community was missing in the attempted dialogue with the rebels. For this reason, the idea of ARLPI was meant to both localize and internationalize the peace process. The 2002 IPA study and subsequent analyses conducted by the African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in South Africa highlight the effectiveness of ARLPI’s work in peace building. The combination of high-profile religious leadership and the organization’s deep ties to the local community generates a high level of visibility and authenticity at the local, national, and international levels. The ARLPI peace-building strategy focuses on engaging local, governmental, and international actors in processes for forgiveness and reconciliation. It has worked to train local peace workers in Acholiland who are critical in engaging local civilians in reconciliation. Nearly sixty peace workers had been trained by 2000, helping to forge strong partnerships at the local level. The leaders have also used their links to churches and mosques to build a broad grassroots network that advocates for peace in local communities. At the national level, the initiative has presented Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni with memorandums on building peace in Acholiland. The government has attempted to foster good relations with ARLPI, particularly as this relationship bolsters the government position in the conflict. ARLPI also participates in forums with other religious groups from other conflicts in northern Uganda sponsored by ACCORD. As an agent of dialogue, ARLPI has openly engaged with Acholis in exile, local leaders, national leaders, parliamentarians, and the LRA. These initiatives were critical to the decision by the Uganda parliament to pass the Amnesty Act of November 1999. Internationally, ARLPI has extended its influence by meeting with southern Sudanese leaders to share information and experiences to enlarge the circle of dialogue on conflicts in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. ARLPI leaders have also traveled to Western capitals, including Washington, DC, where they have met with government officials and members of the US Congress to highlight the humanitarian crisis and the need to support the amnesty law. The Anglican and Catholic churches were also involved in Uganda’s debate on political transition to multiparty politics and the possible outcome of its constitutional review process. The Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) has openly called for government support of democratic processes. UJCC churches instituted pressure campaigns to urge the government to allow political parties to operate.15 Given the current climate in which major decisions affect the country’s political environment, rules, and methods, UJCC has organized policy forums to debate the political future of Uganda. Both the Anglican and Catholic church leadership have expressed their preference for term limits. The Church of Uganda has been surprisingly open about its views on Museveni’s future political role. In

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April 2002, the House of Bishops criticized Museveni’s relationship to the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who made several public remarks supporting Museveni’s continued leadership of the country. Various faithbased civil society actors have also urged President Museveni to refrain from monopolizing power through manipulation of democratic institutions.

NGOs and Human Rights Monitoring and Advocacy NGOs in Uganda have campaigned for human rights norms through advocacy and monitoring. Some of these organizations have made important contributions to peace, security, and governance in southern and northern Uganda. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), a training and advocacy organization working in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa, continues to develop and disseminate alternative means of preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts. The Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) is a human rights organization working to document and monitor human rights in conflict situations in northern and western Uganda. In addition to its peacebuilding and reconciliation work, ARLPI has done much in the area of promoting adherence to international human rights norms, particularly in relation to the government.16 Although CECORE and ARLPI focus mainly on conflict management issues, both organizations relate their activities to enshrining human rights norms and actively work to sensitize local populations, politicians, the media, and the military. FHRI works explicitly on human rights advocacy. FHRI also made a number of successful policy proposals during the process of drafting the 1995 Ugandan constitution, most notably helping to influence the crafting of constitutional policy on the separation of powers. These organizations are important in terms of the flow of information on the status of human rights from the community level to decisionmakers in government and the military. They are also agents for advocating the implementation of progressive provisions contained in peace agreements. Most of these agreements have broad implications for establishing power-sharing, incorporating good governance practices, and facilitating the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions. CECORE has actively supported peace processes in Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, and Uganda. Its emphasis is on disseminating information from conflict-affected communities to top-level decisionmakers in government, the military, donor communities, and the media. By developing information networks, CECORE seeks to hold actors accountable for human rights violations as well as disseminating other important information related to peace-building and postconflict reconstruction. This, in turn, influences the outcome of the democratization process by fostering principles of accountability, transparency, and adherence to human rights norms.

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CSOs that focus on social service delivery, the alleviation of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and humanitarian relief, have also adopted human rights principles into their work. But it is still unclear whether or not these organizations have the capacity to influence the state and its institutions over the long term. The bulk of activities conducted by CSOs in the area of human rights are training and publications, particularly pamphlets, newspaper supplements, posters, and reports.17 They also rely on interaction with top-level government and military officials and other more informal methods. International NGOs, governments, and multilateral actors have funded Ugandan NGOs and have also helped to influence the government on its human rights and governance policies. International NGO watchdogs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Crisis Group publish reports on the status of human rights. Their coverage of the Ugandan government’s activities has had some impact on decisionmaking. Other initiatives, such as the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have influenced government actions and responses to these allegations. The influence of external actors on domestic issues is both problematic and useful for Ugandan CSOs and for NGOs in other countries emerging out of violent conflict. The coordination between external and local actors is useful in advocacy where the latter have few resources. Yet local CSOs that rely exclusively on international actors may be viewed as unduly influenced by these interests. Nonetheless, external actors continue to work with CSOs in countries throughout the region, providing funding as well as encouraging human rights monitoring and advocacy programs.

The Media, Dissent, and New Political Leadership Uganda’s independent media has experienced a renaissance during the NRM’s tenure. One independent newspaper in particular, the Monitor, enjoys a strong reputation for its reporting and its advocacy of freedom of speech. Its editors and journalists have been incessant in focusing on political issues, sometimes facing legal prosecution, arrest, and threats from the government. The Monitor and its less prominent counterparts in print journalism continue to influence public opinion and to nurture a very open public discourse on governance and democratization issues in Uganda. FM radio talk shows, television, and countless newspapers provide an important forum for debate on political issues, not least of which would be the question of no term limits and the outcome of the Constitutional Review Commission. Furthermore, the independent media’s reporting on powerful elites and government officials highlights and exposes corruption and other governance-related scandals.

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Such explicit attention to the behavior and output of elected and nonelected officials helps to foster accountability on the part of the government. Independent media are at more risk from government censure because of their unique position. Although there may be some danger that the independent media can sometimes become biased in reporting on government activities, in the context of Uganda’s fragile democracy, there is also the temptation for the government to respond defensively to independent media. For example, in November 2003, the government filed a court injunction against the Monitor to prevent the newspaper from publishing a “leaked” version of the report of the Constitutional Review Commission (part of which was published by the Monitor on 17 November 2003).18 In July 2005, Monitor journalist Andrew Mwenda was formally charged in a Kampala court with sedition. Mwenda was accused of attacking the person of President Yoweri Museveni and making “utterances” that were a threat to national security about the death of John Garang, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and first vice president of Sudan under the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This turn of events followed the July 2005 helicopter crash and subsequent death of Garang. Mwenda made statements following previous speculations made by Museveni in southern Sudan. Museveni temporarily closed down the Monitor newspaper and has also threatened to close down other newspapers.19 Independent media outlets also play an important role as voices for the political opposition. Uganda’s independent media provide a useful platform for nongovernmental actors and the political opposition. The Monitor has published political essays written by Kiiza Besigye, a major political opponent of President Museveni and a candidate for the presidency during the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections.20 Without these outlets, political dissidents would find it difficult to mobilize support or participate in a more pluralistic political environment. Without alternative media outlets, the government would unduly influence public discourse. The presence of independent media helps to create a “level playing field” for opposition voices and actors. Other civic actors, NGOs in particular, have also trained and produced members of Uganda’s political elite. Parliamentarians, ministers, and diplomats have either come from or been closely affiliated with civil society institutions. Women politicians in particular have been associated with NGOs. Many of these women represent oppositional voices and have leveraged their connections to civil society organizations to mobilize for democratic reforms. Miria Matembe, former chairperson of ACFODE, was until 2003 a seasoned and influential minister in the government. Sheila Kawamala, former coordinator of Uganda Women’s Network and currently a representative to the East African Cooperation assembly, and Winnie Byanyima, former chairperson and founder of FOWODE, are perhaps the most

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visible members of parliament who openly challenge policies of the NRM government.21

Civil Society’s Institutional Challenges The 2002 IPA survey outlined several critical areas affecting institutional capacity. These areas included funding, training and education, long-term strategic planning, and the ability to respond to urgent issues at the national and grassroots levels.22 Participants in the survey were particularly concerned with civil society’s dependence on external funding. NGOs, in particular, often compete for the same resources from a tight circle of likeminded civil society organizations. A lack of information about funding trends and priorities complicates civil society’s relationship with the donor community. The FHRI held a perception in 2001 that over the past five years donors had shifted funding priorities to Eastern Europe and Asia, as well as changing thematic foci. This tendency highlights the role that external actors pose in defining the agendas of civil society organizations in Africa. Changing priorities in terms of thematic foci poses particular problems within a democratizing environment. Organizations are unable to implement their long-term strategic goals without first defining them in relation to the question of funding. In order to do this, some accommodation of external interests is often made. This is not to say that external support should be provided without any type of established parameters for accountability or measures of effectiveness. But the volatility of external interests has negative consequences for organizations seeking to evolve into expert proponents of democracy and good governance, engineer new approaches for holding governments accountable, or mobilize support for democratic reforms. These aims require long-term planning as well as a sense that external financial resources and other types of support will be available over time. Closely related to this point is the fact that donor guidelines and expectations, even in terms of applying for funding or lobbying for approvals, may not always be clearly defined. In this area, donor transparency is critically important. NGOs in Uganda and in other parts of Africa are frequently short staffed or face constraints in salaries and overhead. As a consequence they must utilize the most cost-effective means to secure information on funding guidelines and application procedures. Ugandan CSOs have also expressed concern that current funding restrictions undermine the development of CSO professionalism and capacity. It is possible that donors might not fully appreciate the challenges of individuals working in the nongovernmental sector in Africa. Local CSOs remain the most crucial source of information between their communities

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and decisionmakers and supporters inside and outside of their countries. These NGO professionals are not always equipped with the analytical skills or even the technological tools necessary for running effective informationsharing, outreach, and advocacy programs, especially as a counterweight to government. Because of donor restrictions, CSOs are not able to commit resources to important institutional capacity building: overhead, technology, and in-house and external training. In terms of technology, important opportunities to network “virtually” with other CSOs in Africa and beyond, conduct online research, and utilize new Internet and software tools are lost without sustainable technology and staffing financial resources. To compensate for the tendency to “underfund” these important staff costs, many CSOs limit their staff size, provide limited training, and reduce their overhead expenses. Yet, access to technology and a computer-literate and knowledgeable staff are directly linked to effective advocacy and information sharing. CSOs have increasingly relied upon various strategies to address the funding challenge, including accessing untapped resources at the community level, partnering with the private sector, and developing new funding strategies for concrete needs. The ARLPI has made unanticipated trips to conflict-affected communities in northern Uganda or meetings in Nairobi and Arusha with members of the Acholi diaspora. Because the organization emerged organically, in essence as a collective response to a vacuum of leadership on questions of peace, ARLPI’s structure has remained remarkably ad hoc. Donors provide assistance for managing and coordinating activities. In 2001 I met with one of ARLPI’s donors, a representative of the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), who explained that the MCC funds training, travel, and a permanent member of ARLPI staff. This type of funding mechanism is largely responsive to evolutions on the ground. When a need arises for ARLPI staff to attend a meeting in Nairobi or another pressing need arises in the area of conflict, then MCC covers those costs. In the meantime, ARLPI’s success in bringing together members of the community, liaising with the government, and providing leadership on peaceful conflict resolution for the war has resulted in assistance from a number of other interested donors. Finally, because of its success and its direct access to the local community, the leadership of the ARLPI has sought support from the private sector as well as from members of the Acholi diaspora. During a visit in December 2003 to CECORE, an NGO that originated as a self-funded venture, I discussed the current state of the organization’s financial planning with its executive team. In the immediate future, the organization must contend with many of the same tensions that exist between donors and other African CSOs. For example, donors have previously recommended CECORE for a project tied to specific funding opportunities. Project-based funding, however, sometimes diverges from CECORE’s long-term strategic goals or its mandate. Another concern involves personnel costs and support.

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Donors might prefer to fund a single position through direct support for a project. This conflicts with CECORE’s mission and its work culture, which requires all projects to support personnel and overhead costs and encourages all CECORE employees to view themselves as dependent on its institutional survival. A donor’s insistence on tying resources for personnel to a specific project undermines the cohesiveness of CECORE as an institution. To mediate these funding uncertainties, CECORE is creating innovative strategies for securing resources. Staff members have trained a broad array of Ugandan and regional African military officers, nonstate combatants, refugees, police officers, parliamentarians, and other CSO actors in mediation and resolution. As a result, CECORE has developed a kind of “market identity” as a trainer. CECORE staff members are beginning to spend more time as consultants helping other local, national, and international actors to develop training modules and strategic activities in the area of conflict management and resolution. A future source of funds might be through more consultancy contracts from these other institutions and actors. Because CECORE prefers to fund its projects from a core institutional budget, an increase in revenue from consultancies would augment the organization’s core work by establishing an internally driven, autonomous source of income generation. CECORE, FHRI, and other organizations view other NGOs, parliamentarians, and even the government as partners for some of their objectives. On a national level, these partnerships are manifested through the crossover of personnel, interactions and shared concerns on specific issues, and to some level, their relationship to external actors. This relationship is largely shaped by CSO efforts to provide training to civil servants. These relationships provide CSOs with the opportunity to advocate for stronger adherence to human rights norms. In addition, government often calls upon representatives of CSOs for information about international, national, and local responses to its policies. CSOs not only provide training that enhances government capacity but also help forge relationships with key decisionmakers in parliament, ministries, the Office of the President, and the diplomatic corps. This raises questions about the independence of CSOs, particularly if their institutional survival becomes linked with the state. At the same time, a climate of collaboration, where the state views civil society as contributing to its own interests, and even depends to some extent on the civic sphere, can increase power for civil society. In addition, these institutions require their own training and education programs. Some of these organizations work exclusively with external actors, at times losing their relations to the grassroots. Makerere University and Mbarara University of Science and Technology are providing some training and education in various areas, including gender, refugee policy,

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human rights, peace building, and development. CBOs, as well as NGOs, require training on salient issues, legislation, and the operability of democratic institutions. Of equal concern is the tendency to focus these training opportunities on urban-based NGOs, which are the organizations with the most links to training and education in the first place. Conversely, theoretically based training modules may obfuscate some of the emerging interests of local community members. Beyond questions of institutional survival, there are equally important questions pertaining to civil society’s coherence, human resources, roots in local communities, accountability, and transparency. It is important to distinguish among NGOs’ religious and traditional associations, communitybased organizations, professional associations, student groups, and the media with regard to these questions. Reports on the relationship between NGOs and local communities often cite the fact that highly trained professionals, often coming from the middle class or political elite, manage many of these organizations. Ugandan NGOs exemplify this characteristic. Another aspect of the NGO phenomena is that these organizations are rarely able to sustain a strong broad-based membership. At the subregional level, initiatives such as the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development in the Great Lakes involved a broad sector of civil society organizations. The idea of such an international conference was rooted in the outbreak of a second major conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998. The UN secretary-general’s appointed special representative for the Great Lakes region was mandated to prepare the conference in conjunction with the UN and the AU. The method for organizing the conference included comprehensive engagement of all countries as well as their neighbors and allies. The broad themes of the conference were peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration, and social and humanitarian progress. The organizers of the International Conference on the Great Lakes, which took place in a series of subregional meetings and culminated in a heads-of-state summit on 20 November 2004, identified civil society as one of the key stakeholders in the conference, with the UN and AU determining which civil society actors and institutions are engaged. The conference resulted in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development in the Great Lakes Region. But immediately after this document was signed, on 24 November, the Rwandan government informed the UN that it would send its army across the border to attack Hutu rebels whom it perceived to have become a direct threat its national security.23 Such actions relate directly to the need within the region to ensure security. Ultimately, civil society actors involved in the international conference have an open door for mediating such tensions and sharing information across these same borders of insecurity.

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Conclusion This chapter has highlighted the multiple roles of civic actors and institutions in strengthening peace-building processes, expanding political participation, and addressing the state’s nondemocratic impulses. It is clear that civil society organizations face internal and external obstacles: capacity deficits, competition with the state, the exclusion of marginalized peoples, and a disjuncture between the urban and rural areas as well as between elite professionals and volunteers at the grassroots level. These obstacles present challenges for developing strong, vibrant civil society organizations. Furthermore, deeper democratic values, even though propagated by civil society organizations, are under threat within these same institutions. To enhance work of all actors interested in peace in the Great Lakes region, it is important to deepen the discourse of civil society’s contribution to peace building and democratization. Beyond the cessation of hostilities, the quality of peace in the subregion is tied to the capacity of civil society to realize justice, reconciliation, development, and democracy. The Ugandan experience reveals the strategic role of civil society in peace building and democratization from a collapsed to a functional state. At the same time, war in northern Uganda and its intervention in the DRC show that there are islands of strife in Uganda’s emergence from instability. Thus civil society’s continuing role in Uganda’s transition to democracy is part of the larger contribution to the evolution of peace in the subregion. Most of the recommendations are tailored to reflect the increasing role of civil society in regional platforms such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes. Although the implementation of the provisions of the international conference remains uncertain, the unique opportunity it offered to bolster and shape a regional civil society is encouraging. Such efforts, perhaps involving grassroots movements and community-based organizations, could be useful platforms for exchange of information, collective advocacy, and mobilization and could ultimately lead to more sustainable outcomes for peace and development in the Great Lakes region.

Civil Society Actors NGOs should make every effort to develop more inclusive and good governance practices. Organizations committed to democratic principles can more effectively lobby and advocate for accountability and transparency from governments if they exemplify these ideals themselves. NGOs that have unclear governing structures and rely upon personalities are in danger of being perceived as elitist and democratically bankrupt. These institutions will also struggle with institutional survival. Beyond NGOs, traditional and religious associations must make an effort to internalize democratic principles and human rights norms and to expand participation in decisionmaking.

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NGOs can also advance their own reform by connecting their activities to the interests of local populations. NGOs should develop membership bases and maintain close ties to rural areas, the urban poor, and marginalized populations. This would increase political participation and add credibility to their work, both in terms of effective, useful lobbying on behalf of the governed and in terms of negotiating with donors as well as governments. As part of their action plans, civil society actors should implement new long-term funding strategies. NGOs and CBOs should develop funding strategies that are based on their own agendas and projected activities. These strategies would be most effective after thorough internal evaluations and external consultation with partners and like-minded organizations, members of the private sector, their constituencies, and donors. NGO funding strategies should go beyond classic donor-recipient models and adopt more aggressive outreach to the private sector and members. NGOs and other civic actors engaged in democratic processes should engage in more creative and assertive programs and partnerships. These programs can support more-activist-oriented student groups and trade unions. Supporting those organizations that have neither the time nor the capacity to get long-term donor support will be critical to strengthening the level of involvement of citizens in democratization. NGOs can leverage their capacity by supporting the assertive efforts of other less professional groups. These types of more creative partnerships would help accelerate the level of accountability and responsiveness of government decisionmakers. Local CBOs should develop strong networks with each other to build their political power and leverage their local knowledge. CBOs could work together on mutual interests. These networks could be lean and targeted around national political processes that would affect livelihoods and economic development goals at the local level. Such efforts would involve pooling resources in order to develop coherent strategies, advocate and lobby at the national level, and disseminate CBO views at the local and national level. In addition to horizontal networks, CBOs should engineer partnerships with powerful local NGOs at the national level. NGOs aiming to broaden their constituencies and develop stronger links with local communities would also benefit from an NGO-CBO partnership. CBOs can utilize the access to decisionmakers that major NGOs have in order to influence a number of processes: the creation of governing rules for institutions, legislation in parliaments, and disbursement of funding through national budgets. NGO-CBO partnerships could help establish new relationships with decisionmakers. Partnerships would also allow CBOs to observe and learn from NGOs in terms of capacity and strategizing. Media outlets can help nurture a free and open, as well as safe, public discourse by internalizing civic education, conflict management, and human rights training. Newspapers and radio and television stations should provide

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training in these areas to their reporters and staff, in order to improve reporting on peace, security, and governance issues. Media groups that are armed with meaningful tools for analysis and assessment can be a powerful catalyst for improving public debates on these issues. Furthermore, reporters who are covering these issues and have analytical and academic, as well as pragmatic knowledge, will write more useful journalistic pieces for future political debate.

Donors Donors need to disseminate funding guidelines broadly to enlarge the network of recipient civil society organizations. Clear guidelines should be made available to community-based organizations. Enhancing the dissemination of information about resources will help to bring more organizations into the circle of already established NGOs. Donors can also support new funding strategies. They can help CSOs find new methods for resource mobilization by establishing small investment schemes, linking private sector actors with nonprofits, and encouraging resource mobilization from membership bases. Donors can also diversify the type of grants available to CSOs. A renewed commitment to capacity building and strategic planning will help CSOs build their own infrastructure. Donors can work with CSOs to agree on strategic interests. For example, some NGOs may wish to continue ongoing work over the long term, whereas others may want to shift their programs to new issues in the area of governance. Much of this planning will depend upon the political climate of each country and the needs of local communities. Well-established programs on gender equality, humanitarian relief, social services, education, and peace building need not be discarded for new programs areas. Those CSOs with the capacity to enter into new arenas should be cultivated without decreasing resources for older issues.

Governments Governments can work with donors to strengthen the state’s capacity but should also see civil society as a partner in advancing national interests. CSOs are capable of providing important information and advice based on the interests of local communities. Community-based organizations, traditional and religious associations, professional associations, student groups, and trade unions, in particular, are also able to mobilize major segments of the population around their interests. In this way, CSOs can appear to be a threat to the state. In effect, they might balance one another out within a more democratic context. NGOs in particular are less likely to have their agendas hijacked by politicians if they do not have to rely on personal connections to

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protect themselves. A climate of open dialogue would help to sustain independent voices from civil society. If governments nurture a free and open public space, CSOs will be able to help generate important debates in a nonviolent way. Through the media and through forums, debates, and workshops, CSOs are able to expose the public to a number of issues. CSOs are also more likely to find peaceful solutions grounded in constitutional processes. They are also useful in crafting legal language and suggesting policy recommendations. In this way, CSOs serve multiple functions in society: they help to add less partisan voices to political debates, and they generate information and ideas that governments and decisionmakers can use to win the support of the governed.

Notes 1. International Peace Academy [IPA], The Infrastructure of Peace: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of African Institutions (New York: IPA, 2002), p. 3. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., pp. 7–8. 4. Rebecca Mukyala-Makiika, “Traditional Leaders in the Decentralization Process: Civil Society, Indigenous Populist Institutions and the Implications for Political Reform in Uganda,” in Kwesi Kwaa Prha and Abdel Ghaffar Mohammed Ahmed (eds.), Africa in Transformation: Political and Economic Transformations and Socio-Economic Development Responses in Africa, Vol. 2: Political and Economic Reforms, Transformations and Gender Issues (Addis Ababa: Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, 2000), pp. 63–65. 5. See Thomas Caruthers, “Think Again: Civil Society,” Foreign Policy (Winter 1999–2000). 6. See Nana Thue, Apollo N. Makubuya, and Maureen Nakirunda, Report of a Study of Civil Society in Uganda for the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Uganda (Kampala: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2002). 7. Joseph Oloka-Onyango, “On the Barricades: Civil Society and the Role of Human and Women’s Rights Organizations in the Formulation of the Bill of Rights of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution,” Working Paper no. 60 (Kampala: Centre for Basic Research, 2000) pp. 34–35. 8. S. Lister and W. Nyamagusarisa, “Design Contradiction in the ‘New Architecture of Aid’? Reflections from Uganda on the Roles of Civil Society Organisations,” Development Policy Review 21, no. 1, pp. 93–106. 9. Thue, Makubuya, and Nakirunda, Report of a Study of Civil Society in Uganda, p. 26. 10. Interview with DENIVA staff, 31 December 2003. See “NGOs and the Fight Against Corruption,” DENIVA News 10, no. 3 (July–September 2001). 11. Confidential interview, December 2004. 12. “Statement of Civil Society Organizations on the Recent Karamajong Attacks in Katakwi District,” in “NGOs and Health,” DENIVA News 11, no. 4 (October– December 2001), pp. 20–21. 13. Ibid.

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14. International Crisis Group [ICG], Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict, Africa Report no. 77 (Nairobi: ICG, 2004), available at: http:// www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2588&l=1. 15. For a brief discussion on the role of religious civil society organizations in Uganda’s contemporary politics, see Arthur Bainomugisha, “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in the Horn of Africa: Perspectives from Kenya and Uganda” (paper presented at an International Peace Academy conference, New York, October 2003). 16. Interviews with representatives of CECORE, FHRI, and ARLPI, Kampala, Uganda, February 2001. 17. Thue, Makubuya, and Nakirunda, Report of a Study of Civil Society in Uganda, p. 38. 18. “Don’t Arrest ‘Monitor’ Editors, Court Orders,” New Vision, 3 December 2003. 19. S. Muyita and S. Kasayate, “Journalist on Sedition Charge Is Freed on Bail,” East African Standard, 16 August 2005. 20. See, for example, Kiiza Besigye, “Political Fraud and Tyranny Main Problem,” Monitor, 24 November 2003. 21. Bainomugisha, “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in the Horn of Africa.” 22. International Peace Academy, The Infrastructure of Peace, pp. 50–53. 23. IRIN, “DRC-Rwanda: Kigali Threatens to Attack Hutu Rebels in Congo,” Kinshasa, 25 November 2004, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp? ReportID=44333.

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6 The Economic Dimensions of Conflict in the Region GÉRARD PRUNIER

S

ince 1998 the Congolese conflict that has engulfed the Great Lakes region is estimated to have killed more than 3 million people. Most of the victims did not die because of the fighting but rather because the economic collapse of the DRC reduced food production, destroyed what was left of the health system, and severely curtailed trade and banking.1 In this regard, the economic dimension of the conflict was definitely more severe than its military aspect. Seen from a different angle, the war also had enormous economic consequences for the countries that were involved in the fighting, either in support of the Kinshasa regime or in opposition to it. No country that took part in the war was left economically intact, apart perhaps for Angola, for which the DRC conflict was merely a sideshow to its own civil war between the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and UNITA.

The Impact of the War on the Government-Controlled Zone The impact of the war on Congo was particularly hard because it came as an added blow to an already collapsing structure. The shrinkage of the thenZairian economy between 1980 and the war period was more severe than during the war itself (see Table 6.1). The war did not start this shrinkage process; it was caused during the Mobutu regime period by: • Gross mismanagement of the economy. • The “Zairianization” process, which put economic assets into incompetent hands and shrank the tax base. • Massive corruption. 103

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Table 6.1 Zairian Economy, 1980 and 1998

GDP ($ millions) Per capita income ($) Value of free-on-board exports ($ millions)

1980

1998

7,531 630 2,269

5,193 140 1,180

Source: World Bank, African Development Indicators (Washington, DC: 2003).

• Overborrowing from international institutions and not servicing the debt, which eventually led to a complete halt of foreign loans and grants. • Overspending on sterile “prestige” projects without positive economic outcomes. • Progressive drying up of investments, first national and then international. • Lack of maintenance of the communications infrastructure. • Irresponsible monetary policies that caused a shrinking of the monetary sector and a partial return to a self-subsistence economy. Unreasonable as some of Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s economic policies became, it should be kept in mind that it was such an economy that he inherited when he and his allies overthrew the Mobutu regime. In the government-controlled zone, which remained the biggest and most-populated one during the whole conflict, there was a general decline of production, almost an end to investment (whether foreign or local), a growth of the informal economy that was a coping mechanism enabling people to survive, and a growing criminalization of foreign trade.2 Although “governmental” only in name, the economy regressed toward an opaque and dysfunctional entity, both because of the near collapse of the statistical indices and because the criminal elements in the economy did their best to hide as much as possible their activities from outside scrutiny. The single most important factor of economic policy on the government side was the creation of the Service d’Achat des Matières Précieuses (SASMIP) in September 1998. It tried to centralize and dedollarize the trade in gemstones, causing a near collapse of the country’s diamond export capacity because of increased smuggling.3 The monthly value of diamond exports fell, in millions of dollars, from 50 in April 1998 to 35 in December 1998, 17 in January 1999, and 16 in February 1999.4 Since diamonds were by far the biggest export item, the consequences were catastrophic. In one fell swoop, exports plummeted, tax revenue dropped, foreign exchange dried up, criminalization of the diamond trade jumped forward, and inflation grew.

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At that time a less noticeable consequence that nonetheless had longterm negative effects was that the government-controlled circuits mostly got low-value stones, of the industrial type, whereas jewelry-quality stones were almost entirely smuggled out. Thus the value of one export carat fell from $14.68 in 1998 to $4.79 in 1999, durably damaging commercial networks.5 The rate of economic growth, which was already only 0.7 percent in 1998, became negative. According to the World Bank, it fell to –10.3 percent in 1999 and then to –11.4 percent in 2000. Faced with this economic decline, the government responded clumsily by printing more paper money, thus sending inflation soaring. In the face of a depreciating Congolese franc, the government tried to keep an artificial rate of exchange by decree, which only made the dollar trade at a higher and higher value on the black market while official foreign exchange operations almost completely dried up (see Table 6.2). By May 2001 President Joseph Kabila decided to let the Congolese franc float, and it immediately jumped to 300 to the dollar. President Laurent-Désiré Kabila had been intent on prosecuting the war, and he had tried to do so with the type of centralized command economic policies that had been invented by the German General Staff during World War I and that had later served as a basis for the Bolshevik reorganization of the Russian economy after 1917. These policies included the militarization of production, control of the banking system, setting and enforcing of an artificially low foreign exchange rate, control of foreign trade, barter, and liquidization of assets. The results were predictably catastrophic. The economy was perverted, because the market system was short-circuited at the same time that corruption and deficient administrative tools made the command system impossible to operate. In addition, the government increasingly resorted to ad hoc solutions as stopgap measures, measures that mostly involved working with shadowy economic operators who offered quick returns in exchange for asset stripping through illegal dealings. The first example of that type of operation was the choice of the white Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach as Gécamines chief executive officer in early 1998. Rautenbach’s job was to produce cash quickly at any cost, and he did this by looting cobalt-rich slag heaps of dubious legal status, which he started

Table 6.2 Value of the US Dollar in Congolese Francs (black market rate in brackets) 1997 3

1999

January 2000

June 2000

October 2000

January 2001

4.5 [6.6]

9 [30]

23.5 [52]

50 [135]

50 [200]

Sources: Réseau Européen Congo (Brussels), and interviews.

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to sell abroad to the tune of $5 million to $6 million per month. This did not last very long, since various creditors of Gécamines immediately sued the purchasers and repossessed the cobalt cargoes. The government fired Rautenbach in November 1999 and replaced him with George Forrest, who operated essentially in the same way but with more outward show of respect for legal norms.6 Various other fast operators got involved in buying cheap raw materials from Congo in exchange for quickly disbursed cash—for instance, Marc Rich, a notorious oil trader who fled prosecution in the United States to run his business from Switzerland;7 Thai mineral tycoon Rakesh Saxena, who was under investigation in the United States for an $88 million swindle; 8 and Israeli diamond dealer Rami Golan, formerly Mobutu’s “diamond fixer” in various deals involving UNITA and other partners. In June 2000, in what was perhaps the most disastrous of these quick-cash-for-looseasset-management deals, Laurent-Désiré Kabila gave a complete monopoly of diamond export sales to the Israeli-based IDI company, a new and untried outfit that promised the government a minimum purchase of $20 million a month, which it never managed to deliver.9 After his father’s assassination, young Joseph Kabila eventually unilaterally cancelled the contract and, in spite of strong words, IDI never went to court.10 A large part of the stripping of assets took place in association with Zimbabwean partners. After the publication of the first UN report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources, Information Minister Kikaya bin Karubi declared that he did not regard Zimbabwe’s activities as “looting” because, unlike the Rwandans and Ugandans, the Zimbabweans had come to help the government, not to bring it down.11 This is a moot point and propelled the appointment of a new UN panel of experts headed by Ambassador Mahmood Kassem. Although the first UN Security Council report had emphasized the looting carried out by the invading armies and was criticized because of being unbalanced, the second report gave much attention to the asset stripping by the Zimbabweans in agreement with the government.12

The Impact of the War on Rebel and Foreign-Controlled Zones of Congo The reality of Congo since 1998 is that it has been divided into a mosaic of different zones, under different political dispensations, and with different military situations. Apart from the government-controlled zone, there were four main “rebel” zones, listed here in order of diminishing territorial importance:13

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• The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Goma (RCDGoma) controlled the largest area, extending from North Katanga to North Kivu with chunks of Maniema, Eastern Kasaï, and Province Orientale. • The Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC) controlled the second-largest area, covering most of Equateur and the western part of Province Orientale. • The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML) controlled most of the area composed of Province Orientale. • The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–National (RCD-N) controlled a small portion of the former province of Upper Zaire. The four rebel zones in the north and east had several points in common and also several differences. First of all, in all rebel areas the troops started the war by looting every movable asset they could lay their hands on: cash in the banks, mineral stockpiles in the mining sites they occupied, rolling stock, mining equipment, and general purpose equipment such as road maintenance machinery. In Dungu (Province Orientale), the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), working in alliance with the Ugandan army, dismantled a whole electric power plant, transported it to rebelcontrolled Yambio, in southern Sudan, and then reassembled it. In the rebel areas, almost all the movable assets that were not urgently required were taken, either to be sold or to be removed to Rwanda or Uganda. The same fate befell wildlife, with every type of animal, whether on the list of endangered species or not, being sold to foreign buyers.14 Elephants were poached mercilessly for their tusks.15 The destructive impact on wildlife has severely curtailed the possibilities of redeveloping a viable tourist industry in Congo. The extraversion of the banking system was another significant and damaging economic impact in the occupied areas. Today, despite the withdrawal of regional troops in the east, all the banks that still operate in the formerly rebel-held areas, whether in Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani, or Gbadolite, deal directly with Kampala or Kigali.16 This had the consequences of destroying any domestic saving capacity or any foreign exchange reserves in the occupied territories. This first tier of looting of resources was mostly carried out during 1998 and 1999. Subsequently, the mechanisms of exploitation became more sophisticated. By late 1999, imports into Congo were mostly duty free if the importers had the necessary connections with the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) or the Rwanda Patriotic Army. Several of the top Ugandan officers, such as Brigadier James Kazini or security boss Colonel Kahinda Otafiire, were named in the UN report for having established their

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own commercial empires in Province Orientale.17 This unfair commercial advantage had the effect of making the rebels allied with the occupying armies more eager for cash. Since they could not raise custom duties to support their budgets, they then resorted to setting up interior roadblocks or to confiscating the cash of parastatals and utility companies. In Kisangani, such “requisitions” by the RCD-Goma had a catastrophic effect when the water purification system broke down for lack of the necessary chemicals and the UN had to step in to prevent a cholera epidemic.18 The “rebels” also raised enormous taxes without providing any public service in exchange.19 Of greater interest in the economic exploitation of the occupied areas was the trade in diamonds and gold and later columbium-tantalite, the metal known in the metallurgic industry as “coltan.” Both Rwanda and Uganda became involved in illegal diamond trading, but they used slightly different approaches.20 In Rwanda, the notorious Congo Desk centralized most of the trade, leaving some of it to independent operators. The Congo Desk kept a completely separate set of books, and its financial dealings did not appear in the national accounting.21 The Congo Desk dealt in various metals, including coltan, cassiterite, gold, niobium, and mercury. It also tried to install its own diamond purchasing monopoly in Kisangani. 22 But there it quickly ran into the competing monopoly that the Victoria Group of Enterprises led by Salim Saleh, President Museveni’s half-brother, was also trying to set up. This rivalry for the control of the diamond monopoly was one of the activities that triggered the fighting between the Rwandese and Ugandan armies in August 1999 and in May–June 2000.23 As in the case of the tax exemptions, the rebels’ foreign sponsors systematically cheated their Congolese allies. In Kisangani, the RPA made about $2 million a month out of the diamond trade, but it declared only $500,000 in order to reduce the taxes it paid to the RCD-Goma. Coltan briefly became an object of public attention because its prices shot up from $30 per pound to $300 per pound in 2000 owing to the boom in the sale of cell phones, which use the metal.24 The coltan boom was relatively easy to follow up because the number of companies having a processing capacity for that rare metal was limited: Ulba Mechanical Works in Kazakhstan; Cabot, Inc. in Ohio, United States; H. C. Starck, a subsidiary of Bayer GmBH, in Germany; and Ningxia in China. What was more difficult was to trace the complex web of purchasing counters and intermediaries who, somewhat like the diamond traders, put the producers in touch with the industry. They were an extraordinarily varied group, ranging from former Soviet apparatchik Anatoly Piskunov, who ran La Conmet Company for Salim Saleh in Butembo,25 to Swiss businessman Christian Huber, who ran a whole bevy of shadow companies out of tax havens to broker the Ulba products to Western buyers.26 A great deal

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was made of the short-lived monopoly on coltan export granted by RCDGoma to Aziza Goolam Ali on 20 November 2000. But given her lack of experience in that industry and her largely political approach to business,27 she and her company, Somigl, had only a fleeting impact on the coltan trade, unlike the more experienced European buyers such as the German Karl-Heinz Albers with his Masingiro buying counter.28 In Rwanda, the Congo Desk netted $64 million out of coltan in 2000 and $44 million in 2001, with 60 to 70 percent of it reinvested in the war.29 The situation was different on the Uganda side of the coltan trade, where the Conmet operation seemed designed much more for the personal enrichment of Salim Saleh and his relatives than for supporting the UPDF military operations in the DRC.30 In July 1999 Brigadier James Kazini, head of the Uganda expeditionary force in Congo, wrote to all the rebel field commanders he was supervising that “Victoria Company has the sole authorization to do commerce in coffee, diamonds, and gold in the regions under your command. Everything that concerns the payment of that company to assure its security will be treated directly by General Headquarters in Kisangani.”31 Although coltan prices fell precipitously after the United States sold off its strategic stockpiles in December 2000, the Victoria Group of Enterprises kept dealing in it, alongside diamonds, because, according to La Conmet manager Valentina Piskunova, “we have very low labor costs,”32 a euphemism for conditions that were nearly slave labor.

The Impact of the War on the Government’s Allies: Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia The situation was very different for government allies. Angola, an oilproducing giant, had been hobbled for years by massive corruption and civil war. Its logic for intervening in Congo was motivated essentially by security concerns related to UNITA operations. Zimbabwe, on the contrary, was a resource-poor but semideveloped economy with no security concerns in the DRC. Zimbabwe thus intervened on the government’s side purely for economic reasons, some of them direct and short-term, others more complex and long-term. Namibia, the richest of the three but the smallest, was mostly a follower, with neither security nor economic interests in the war but more or less obliged to follow the lead of its Angolan patron. (See Table 6.3.) As a result, neither Angola nor Namibia played any major economic role in Congo during the three years of their intervention. Similarly, the level of their intervention was low enough (or constituted a low-enough proportion of total military expenses in the case of Angola) that the war had

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Table 6.3 Basic Economic Indicators for the Congo Government’s Allies (1998)

GDP ($ millions) Per capita ($) Exports ($ millions)

Angola

Zimbabwe

Namibia

6,458 500 3,491

8,291 570 1,925

3,892 2,170 1,214

Source: World Bank, African Economic Indicators (Washington, DC: 2003).

very little impact on their own economies. The situation was quite different for Zimbabwe. President Mugabe had two short- to medium-term economic motivations in intervening in the DRC. First, the Harare regime, contrary to the other supporters of AFDL in 1996 and 1997, had put out a fair amount of cash, and the Pretoria-based Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) estimated that by the time the first war ended in April 1997, Zimbabwe had a $200 million stake in the regime of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. In addition to that stake, Zimbabwe Defense Industries (ZDI) had received $140 million worth of orders from Kinshasa during early 1998 that it wished to preserve.33 Second, following the November 1995 land reform begun by President Mugabe, the economy started to slide down as agricultural production and exports receded. The embattled regime was faced with the growing challenge of a tough and well-organized opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and Mugabe needed more than ever to be able to redistribute economic advantages to his loyal cohorts. Many of the men who were later to be named as prominent actors in Zimbabwe’s attempt at economic profiteering in Congo were Zimbabwe African National Union/Patriotic Front (ZANU/ PF) stalwarts.34 The “joint ventures” that were later developed with the DRC provided financial benefits for these people. The first attempt at making the war pay for itself was the contract signed on 4 September 1998 with Gécamines, whereby 37.5 percent of Gécamines benefits were earmarked to finance the Zimbabwean army expeditionary force in Congo.35 But Gécamines at the time had a $1 billion overall debt, with at least $50 million as short-term commercial liabilities, and it would have needed a massive refinancing program before it could actually turn out a profit.36 Harare then frantically started to look for some kind of a moneymaking deal that would offset its considerable military expenses in Congo. The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), the Zimbabwean electricity parastatal, was given a contract allowing it to tap the Inga dam for below-cost power. But the existing power lines were not capable of carrying the needed electrical volume to Zimbabwe, and there was no money to fix and improve them. A little later Zimbabwe was given a long-term concession on 500,000 hectares of good-quality fallow farmland in Katanga.37 But

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the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture did not have the money to purchase the necessary inputs. As a result, the ZANU/PF elite decided to create a large mining joint venture outside the known mining structure of Congo, in particular Gécamines, Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), and the other traditional mining companies inherited from the colonial days. In late 1999 the Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (Osleg) company, which had been created earlier but had remained an empty shell, was associated with Oryx and Comiex in a 4040-20 percent partnership called Cosleg.38 Cosleg was immediately given the two large diamond concessions of Tshibwa and Senga Senga that had been attributed earlier by contract to MIBA. 39 With these in its portfolio, Cosleg then tried to get quoted on the London Alternative Stock Market to raise the necessary capital to go into production. But, wary of the move, the British Foreign Office blocked the quotation. In still another desperate effort at getting Congo to pay for the war, the Sengamines Company, which had recently been created, was “reorganized” with 49 percent going to Oryx, 35 percent going to Comiex, and 16 percent to MIBA. But it was soon discovered that this was simply a face-lifting operation, with Oryx standing in for the Zimbabwean army.40 Later Sengamines was caught laundering “blood diamonds” from Angola and Sierra Leone and smuggling Congolese francs to the rebel zones.41 These desperate operations, however, could not even begin to defray the costs of keeping a 13,000-strong expeditionary force in the DRC. Harare repeatedly failed to reveal the exact amount it spent in Congo, claiming it was $3 million per month.42 When the World Bank decided to cut off its loans to Zimbabwe, it estimated the war budget to be $27 million per month, which was probably much closer to the truth. Thus the Congo war was an important factor contributing to the decline of the Zimbabwean economy, even if there were other more fundamental ones.43 This was reflected in the value of the Zimbabwean currency, which fell in value to the US dollar from 12 in 1996 to 25 in 1997 and to 55 in 2001. This eventually curtailed the military capacity of the Zimbabwean army in Congo, and in October 2000 the entire Zimbabwe air force fleet deployed in the DRC had to be flown home, for fear that a lack of spare parts, itself due to a lack of foreign exchange, would lead to its being grounded in a foreign country.44

The Impact of the War on the Occupying Forces: Uganda and Rwanda It is difficult to get a clear picture of the effects of the war on the economies of Rwanda and Uganda, because a lot of the statistics are either not available or are manipulated. Moreover, unlike Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda have

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both spent a lot of resources on the conflict and also gained a lot from it. Where the balance lies is almost impossible to say. But what is clear in any case is that foreign aid was an essential factor that kept the war going, particularly in the case of Rwanda.45 The roughest of figures are shown in Table 6.4. The key question is that of budgetary allocation. Even if no foreign aid was used for war, the fact that a very large part of the normal recurrent budget was financed through foreign aid had the effect of releasing resources for financing the conflict. In other words, even if foreign aid did not directly finance the war, such aid made it possible to finance the war from a budget that would otherwise have to be used for something else. In combination with the illegal resource exploitation, foreign aid allowed the governments to keep budgetary figures within the reasonable framework set for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). From that point of view, the aid flows to different participants in the war were quite uneven (see Table 6.5). It was this differential treatment, as well as the varying “successes” in illegally appropriating Congolese natural resources, that made the difference between the various actors and enabled a country like Rwanda, already one of the poorest in Africa and impoverished by the 1994 genocide, to carry out a long-distance war of occupation in the territory of a neighbor ninety times its size and with six and a half times its population. The real defense budget of Rwanda was always, throughout the war (and even now), one of the most politically explosive questions about the conflict. The estimates varied widely.46

Table 6.4 Percentage of Budget Spending Financed Through Foreign Aid

Uganda Rwanda

1996

1997

1998

1999

36 59

36 47

35 44

39 50

Sources: Uganda: International Monetary Fund, HIPC Point (Washington, DC: January 2000); Rwanda: International Monetary Fund, Country Report (Washington, DC: January 2001). Table 6.5 Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) per Capita (US dollars)

Rwanda Uganda Congo Angola Zimbabwe

1998

1999

2000

2001

43 31 3 27 22

45 27 3 30 20

38 37 4 23 14

33 34 5 20 12

Source: World Bank, African Development Indicators (Washington DC: 2003).

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The government’s estimate of $55.6 million was obviously undervalued and the UN estimate of $400 million probably overvalued. But if the IMF estimated the Zimbabwean military spending in Congo to be $324 million in 1999, then the UN estimate for Rwanda looks less exaggerated because Rwanda did not have an air force and it had less armor. It also had to hire private transport planes at a constantly high cost. This underscores the fact that all factors are related and that foreign aid cannot be considered simply as a neutral economic factor in times of conflict. Two Belgian specialists provided interesting evaluations of these links.47 (See Table 6.6.) The data in Table 6.6 reveal that although Uganda used illegal resource acquisition to partially finance its war in Congo, Rwanda could not have fought that war at all without both the illegal acquisition of resources and a high per capita level of official development assistance (ODA).

Conclusion Instructive lessons can be drawn from the conflict in the DRC. Now that foreign troops are out of the DRC, it is imperative that both the regional states and the international community closely monitor the tendency to use proxy tribal militias, both for military purposes and to carry out the type of illegal resource acquisition that was so prevalent during the active phase of the conflict. Aid volume and use have to be much more closely monitored when countries are involved in conflict than in normal times. Simple monitoring of corruption is not enough. Budgets, especially the defense budget, have to be more transparent, and parallel sources of finance and resource allocation have to be investigated. Global economic sanctions are impossible to enforce and often result in enriching local business and political elites at the expense of the ordinary

Table 6.6 Percentage of Illegally Acquired Resources in Relationship to Main Economic Chapters Rwanda

% of gross national product % military spending % of official development assistance

Uganda

1999

2000

1999

2000

8.4 200

7.1 190

0.7 34

0.5 24

110

13

65

6

Source: S. Marysse and C. André, “Guerre et pillage en RDC,” in F. Reyntjens and S. Marysse (eds.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs (2000–2001) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001), p. 317.

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population rather than in obtaining the desired policies motivating the sanctions in the first place. They should therefore not be contemplated. But international legislation should be more progressive in terms of chasing the dubious origins of raw materials both up and down the supply line. Since illegal exploitation and smuggling are almost impossible to stop, the international community should act at the end-user level to impose penalties that would deter the purchase of “blood diamonds” and “blood coltan.” There is an urgent need to monitor and eventually regulate nonstate arms contracts. Most of the financial flows in conflicts go almost directly to arms merchants. In some cases, as exemplified by Tremalt Ltd., the illegal exploitation of resources and the sale of military equipment are part of a single seamlessly integrated process. Governments should not plead ignorance when dealing with such private intermediaries who almost openly contravene the policies the governments have established.48 There is also a need to control financial flows in and out of tax havens. This has been attempted with regard to the illegal drug trade, but arms and money acquired from economic looting are still free to transit though these havens.

Notes 1. International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the Eastern Congo: Results from Five Mortality Surveys (Washington, DC: 2002). 2. For the desperate struggle of daily life, see G. de Villers, B. Jewsiewicki, and L. Monnier, Manières de vivre: Économie de la débrouille dans les villes du Congo/Zaire (Tervuren: CEDAF; Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002). 3. Central Bank governor Jean-Claude Masangu managed to get the SASMIP disbanded, but the president re-created it in January 1999 under the name of Bourse Congolaise des Matières Premières (BCMP), with the same dismal consequences. 4. La Lettre Afrique Énergie, 31 March 1999. 5. Ibid., 24 November 1999. 6. See Rautenbach’s press release dated 18 November 2002 after he was denounced in a UN Security Council October 2002 report as having exploited a 3,000-ton pile of germanium-rich slag in a way that was detrimental to Gécamines (Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the DRC, S/2002/1146 [New York: 2002], par. 44). 7. “Marc Rich: Hero or Villain?” BBC News, 15 February 2001. 8. Nord-Sud Export, 24 April 1999. 9. Ellen Knickmeyer, “Congo Cancels Israel Diamond Supply,” Associated Press, 21 April 2001. 10. Dan Gertler, head of IDI, eventually reconciled with Joseph Kabila and is now in the process of rebuilding his diamond business in Congo on a slightly more conventional basis. 11. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, S/2001/357 (New York: 2001).

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12. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. 13. The reason for putting “rebel” in quotation marks is that all “rebel” groups were in fact largely proxies for foreign invaders. The degree of local support for each group varied from fairly solid in the case of the MLC to almost nonexistent for the RCD-Goma. 14. This included the rare Okapi antelopes and some baby gorillas that were sold by the Rwandese army. 15. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, par. 61. 16. Ibid., pars. 77 and 78. This seems to be changing somewhat in Gbadolite and Kisangani since the installation of the transitional government in Kinshasa, but it still remains true in the Kivus. 17. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, par. 104. Colonel Kahinda Otafiire was also later accused of illegal dealings in Congolese lumber (see several articles in New Vision during September 2003). 18. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, par. 88. 19. Between 1998 and 2002, taxes in rebel-held areas quadrupled (ibid., par. 89). 20. Burundi, although it also had about 2,000 troops in Congo, never became seriously involved in commodity trafficking. 21. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, par. 71. See also the 1 March 2002 questioning of Deus Kagiraneza by the Belgian Senate Commission of Inquiry. Kagiraneza, a former RPA major, was an economic operator for the Congo Desk in South Kivu. He later defected and talked quite openly about both the double accounting carried out by the Rwandese government and the reluctance of the international community to hear about it. 22. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, par. 84. 23. Rivalry for the control of the diamond trade was far from being the only cause of the fighting. But actual fighting might not have occurred if the political contest between the two allies had not been fueled on the spot by intense economic competition among their field commanders. 24. Tim Raeymakers, Network War (Antwerp: IPIS, 2002) p. 19. 25. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, pars. 109–111. 26. Raeymakers, Network War, pp. 21–23. 27. Aziza Goolam Ali, the daughter of a Pakistani businessman and a Burundian Tutsi mother from Muramvya, is a tough political and business operator who first came into prominence in the 1980s because of her staunch opposition to the Bagaza regime in Bujumbura. The cigarette tycoon of the Kivus and a main financer of RCD-Goma, she saw a number of her Swiss and Belgian bank accounts impounded in October 2002 when the UN Security Council report triggered a legal action from a Belgian court. 28. Karl-Heinz Albers is a former local manager of a large foreign company (GfE Metall und Materialen GmBH) who bought out his former employers in 1993, when the Masisi war made the Lueshe mine difficult to operate, and very successfully went into business for himself. The rise of such audacious entrepreneurs is typical of the situation in Congo.

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29. Sénat de Belgique, Commission d’Enquête Parlementaire Grands Lacs, Audition de Mr Marc Hoogsteyns (Brussels: 2002). 30. Saleh’s associates in the Victoria Group are his wife Jovia Akandwanaho and his nephew Muhoozi Kainerugaba, President Museveni’s eldest son. 31. “Uganda’s Military in DRC,” The Monitor (Kampala), 12 July 1999, p. 4. It was this letter that Kazini first pretended had been forged but later admitted to having signed when the Porter Commission interrogated him. 32. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, par. 109. 33. ZDI had been created at the time of Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, when the country was subjected to an economic and weapons embargo. With British and South African help, the then-Rhodesian Defense Industries developed a remarkable capacity in weapons production and maintenance. After black majority rule was achieved, ZDI was further developed with French and Chinese help. ZDI has the only significant weapons-producing facilities on the African continent outside of Egypt and South Africa. 34. These men included Parliament speaker and former minister for national security Emerson Mnangagwa, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, and Air Mashal Perence Shiri (United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, par. 27). 35. Gécamines was where the politically well-connected Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach had recently been made chief executive officer. 36. See African Business, September 1999. 37. Reuters, Harare, 29 September 1999. 38. Oryx was the company created by the son of former Omani oil minister Thamer bin Said Ahmed al-Shanfari. As for Comiex, it was a Congolese company with close links to a number of top people in the Kabila regime (Mwenze Kongolo, then national secretary of mines; Jean-Charles Okoto, the MIBA director; and Denis Kalume Numbi, deputy defense minister). United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, par. 25. 39. De Beers, an MIBA minority shareholder, protested the decision. 30. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, par. 38. 41. Ibid., par. 52. Owing to a smaller supply of Congolese francs and to more readily available US dollars, the Congolese franc had a higher exchange rate in the rebel areas. Many people, including MONUC officers, smuggled Congolese francs to the other side and earned a 20 to 30 percent differential. 42. The 2001 United Nations Security Council report, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, had unquestioningly accepted that figure. 43. Financial Times, 8 October 1999. See also Mungbalemwe Koyame and John F. Clark, “The Economic Impact of the Congo War,” in John F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes of the Congo War (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 213–216. 44. IRIN News, 3 October 2000. 45. The two key documents to assess that question of balance are C. André and L. Luzolela-Lola, The European Union’s Aid Policies Towards Countries Involved in the Congo War: Lever for Peace or Incitement to War? (Brussels: Réseau Européen Congo, 2001), and B. Willum, “Foreign Aid to Rwanda: Purely Beneficial or Contributing to War?” (doctoral diss., University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science, 2001).

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46. Various estimates of Rwanda’s military budget, in millions of dollars for 2001, were as follows: government’s estimate—55.6; IMF—55.6; IISS (London)— 135; ICG (Brussels)—161.8; UN panel of experts—400 (from careful reading of par. 71, UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources). 47. S. Marysse and C. André. “Guerre et pillage en RDC,” pp. 307–332 in F. Reyntjens and S. Marysse (eds.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs (2000–2001) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001). 48. This was the case, for example, when Tremalt Ltd. was used as an intermediary to sell BAE Hawk fighter-bomber parts to the Zimbabwean air force in direct contravention of recently enacted British legislation.

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7 South Africa CHRIS LANDSBERG

C

enturies of white supremacy and domination have turned South Africa into a deeply divided and highly unequal society. Similarly, colonial domination and misrule have impoverished the vast majority of African states that are still battling their underdeveloped status. Even though South Africa is Africa’s most industrialized state, it is also a society with major impoverished sectors. A key goal of both the Nelson Mandela authority (1994–1999) and the Thabo Mbeki administration (1999– ) has been to overcome these legacies in South Africa and the rest of Africa. For both governments, foreign policy is vital to realizing these goals. South Africa is interested in economic takeoff and development at home and in the region. For the new postapartheid rulers, there can be no development without peace and security and no peace and security without development. There is also a belief that there can be no development, peace, and security without democratic governance. Democratic peace at home is not sufficient for development; there is a need for broader democratic peace in the region. These are some of the central motivations underpinning South Africa’s “peacemaking” responses to regional conflicts in Africa.1 South Africa’s peacemaking policy toward conflicts in the Great Lakes region has been based on broad georegional tactics and strategies, as Pretoria located them within the framework of a broader Africa policy of continental renewal and development vision called Renaissance Africa. The policy toward Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo forms a part of South Africa’s attempts to help develop a New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union, which are seen as key for development. South Africa appears, however, to have neglected building a domestic constituency for its Great Lakes policies and its foreign policy in general. It is, for example, difficult to gauge whether there is broad domestic consensus about South African interventions in the Great Lakes region. During the April 2004 election, the opposition Democratic Alliance criticized South 121

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122 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS Africa’s interventions in the Great Lakes and in particular its military spending in the conflicts. There has been widespread support for the Africa policy among the foreign policy elite, within parliament, and in civil society. NGO leaders have been at the forefront of wide-ranging debates about foreign and security policies that represent very elitist perspectives. Gauging the general public’s perspective on foreign policy is, however, less clear. In spite of the lack of clarity over public support for South Africa’s Great Lakes strategies, South Africa has since 1994 pursued an ambitious foreign policy agenda and a linkage approach vis-à-vis regional conflicts. Foreign policy leaders have regarded peace in any one conflict-ridden country as key to stability for the broader subregion, which in turn is key for local and regional development. Mandela relied on his personality and aura and even talked tough to belligerents, as mediator in both Burundi and the DRC; in contrast, Mbeki is a staunch supporter of quiet diplomacy, opting to engage warring parties and disputants behind the scenes in an effort to move them toward negotiated settlements. Mbeki also believes in an incremental approach to conflict management; he stitches peace pacts and deals together behind the scenes and seeks to create conducive environments where belligerents make compromises. Tshwane (formerly Pretoria) long subscribed to the idea that “the situation in the Great Lakes region is a consequence of a complex and interconnected set of interacting and accumulated problems. These include bad governance, lack of democracy, monopolization of political power by an individual or ethnic group, a policy of exclusion, widespread corruption, nepotism, violation of basic human rights and ever deepening poverty.”2 Also, “these negative factors lie at the root of each and every cycle of political and ethnic violence and the almost perpetual instability in most states of the region.”3 Thus, “conflict or instability in one country sends shock waves throughout the entire area. Conflicts in any one of the core states of the region [Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania] could not remain self-contained. The porous nature of the borders, blood ties, common culture and shared values among the peoples straddling those borders further complicate and exacerbate the situation.”4 South Africa’s strategy was based on the view that peace, which is key for development, can only come to the DRC if peace comes to the entire Great Lake region. This bold and ambitious strategy raised many contradictions, as it had to juggle many contending and strategic balls. South Africa was at pains to stress that it was committed to African multilateralism in its dealings in the DRC and Burundi. But this commitment to working with Africans, and through continental and subregional bodies, was not born of altruism and nobility. It came about through much trial and error. Tswane often behaved in a way suggesting that Mandela, Mbeki, and former deputy president Jacob Zuma were the only ones acting

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for peace in the Great Lakes region. In the case of both the DRC (after 1998) and Burundi (post–Arusha I), South Africa nearly lost its credibility as the parties chose to settle their differences in a bilateral manner or to find other facilitators and mediators. For example, rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba decided to deal directly with Joseph Kabila, Burundians moved to Gabon, and Bemba even sought the support of Mozambique’s President Joaquim Chissano and Omar Bongo of Gabon. Another rebel leader, Adolphe Onusomba, tried to work with the president of Congo/Brazzaville, Sassou Nguesso. Many meetings were held in and outside Tshwane, and a great deal of pressure was quietly put on the parties by third countries. Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni was, for example, instrumental in nudging and pressuring Bemba to return to the negotiating table in Tswane. In Burundi, there was an initial perception that South Africa was invited to neutralize East Africa’s voice in the negotiations, particularly Tanzania’s. This raises the vexing issue of how South Africa is perceived in the wider region. Although Tshwane’s linkage thesis is important, there were other alternative explanations: that South Africa was invited to do the bidding of Rwandan president Paul Kagame and Burundian leader Pierre Buyoya and that South Africa was not evenhanded in its approaches in the Great Lakes region. This chapter presents the view that for South Africa, peace and security were important building blocks for development. The chapter therefore analyzes South Africa’s conflict resolution strategy in the Great Lakes region. It focuses on the regional dilemmas that South Africa’s strategy triggered and had to contend with. It considers how South Africa hoped to play the role of peacemaker and honest broker in the Great Lakes and why it often found its neutrality and sincerity questioned by some of the belligerents.5 In addition, it discusses the challenge South Africa faced in having to engage belligerents in both the DRC and Burundi while at the same time engaging in diplomatic efforts with external powers that had major stakes in these conflicts, such as Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia as well as Uganda and Rwanda. The chapter explains why states such as Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia at times questioned Tshwane’s evenhandedness. It looks at how Tshwane stressed African multilateralism, notably working with the Southern African Development Community and the former Organization of African Unity, which is now the African Union, to address these charges, both in the DRC and Burundi. Toward this end, South Africa had to reach out to, and work with, African institutions because many actors questioned its agenda and motives. Some critics even suggested that South Africa was doing Washington’s bidding. Finally, the chapter will examine how Tshwane carefully managed its relations with key regional players who found themselves in situations of domestic crisis while playing a key role in the Great Lakes, notably

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124 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS Zimbabwe. Tshwane also had to negotiate sensitive security arrangements with some of these countries, such as trying to secure the future of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security.6 All along, South Africa could not simply act as if it was regarded as an undisputed hegemon or possessed limitless leverage. Many questioned its leadership and leadership abilities, and it has struggled to achieve its diplomatic objectives and win over critics.

The Diplomacy of Peacemaking In September and October 1996, a massive rebellion of Banyamulenge Tutsi in eastern Zaire threatened the state in Zaire. This rebellion escalated into virtual civil war after autocrat Mobutu Sese Seko accused Burundi and Rwanda of provoking the conflict.7 Mobutu vowed to “eliminate all subversive networks in the region.” 8 Rwanda countered the charges by claiming that Mobutu had harbored Interahamwe and members of the former Hutu government and armed forces of Rwanda who had perpetrated the tragic genocide of 1994. The talk of war was all-pervasive, and the military situation was clearly compounded by the presence of some 300,000 to 400,000 Rwandan refugees in Congo. The dice were rolled in Zaire, and the stage was set for a debilitating war of attrition in the Great Lakes region. While the rebellion in Zaire played itself out, there were stark links with the conflicts in the Great Lakes region, notably with Burundi. Devon Curtis has argued that, although the most prevalent view of the Burundian conflict is that of an ethnic conflict, pitting the historically disadvantaged majority Hutu (85%) against the dominant minority Tutsi (14%), with the 1% Twa completely marginalized, . . . a more accurate description of the Burundian conflict takes into account political and ethnic ambitions, ethnic divisions, regional divisions, urban-rural divisions, the links to the conflicts in neighboring Rwanda and Congo, and the problems of politicized military.9

The history of colonialism in Burundi, the impact on its stability of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the failed 1993 elections made the situation highly combustible. Just three months after that poll, President Melchior Ndadaye and senior members of FRODEBU were assassinated by Tutsi army officers, sparking the killings of more than 60,000 people, with some 8,000 people fleeing to neighboring states. This was followed by the genocide of some 300,000, mainly Tutsi.10 The election failure and the Rwanda genocide shifted the focus to the search for power-sharing arrangements in Burundi, lest the Rwanda carnage should repeat itself in Burundi; in September 1994, UN Special Representative

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Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah brokered a power-sharing agreement between the predominantly Tutsi Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) party and the predominantly Hutu FRODEBU party. But this was a short-lived peace, and two years later, in July 1996, Pierre Buyoya captured power through a military coup.11 In Burundi, international responses to the conflict became fragmented, with regional states denouncing the coup while at the same time slapping sanctions on Burundi. In 1998, the most comprehensive peace process started in Burundi. Called the Arusha process, this was essentially an African-driven initiative, with international financial backing. Former president of Tanzania Julius Nyerere was the mediator of the Arusha process until his death in October 1999. South Africa entered the peacemaking efforts in the Great Lakes through its revered president, Nelson Mandela.12 In the DRC, Mandela formally entered the peacemaking fray in February 1997, and in Burundi he replaced Julius Nyerere as the official mediator of the Arusha process at the end of 1999. South African former deputy president Zuma assisted Mandela in the facilitation of the Burundian cease-fire negotiations. As the chairman of the Regional Initiative on Burundi, Ugandan president Museveni also played a key behind-the-scenes role in the negotiations. Without this assistance, Mandela and the South African government would have had difficulties in meeting their objectives. On 19 February 1997, President Mandela announced that he had invited Laurent-Désiré Kabila, chairman of the rebel AFDL and Mobutu to “discuss their problems.”13 But as soon as Mandela made the announcement of his mediation initiative, the war in Zaire/Congo escalated.14 Western powers disengaged, as the US government was reported to have moved 1,200 marines into the area in order to evacuate its citizens. France, Britain, and Belgium had also moved military units into neighboring Congo/Brazzaville to protect their citizens. In spite of the rebel advances, Mandela persisted with the offer of good offices and facilitation. Kabila held talks in South Africa with both President Mandela and his influential deputy president, Thabo Mbeki.15 Both South African leaders impressed upon Kabila the need for “a negotiated settlement” to end the conflict in Zaire/Congo.16 The promotion of negotiated settlements had by this time become a central tenet of South Africa’s foreign policy. The South Africans pushed ahead with their preferred stance of the democratic peace and sold to Kabila the need for an accommodating regime that would include Mobutu Sese Seko, a position that was said to enjoy widespread US backing behind the scenes. In April 1997, Mandela announced that Kabila and Mobutu had accepted South Africa’s mediation, ostensibly at the expense of a rival mediation bid from Nigeria.17 Even Paris came out in defense of Pretoria’s push

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126 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS for a “transitional government.” At the same time, Mobutu and Kabila agreed to meet on a South African warship, the Outeniqua, off international waters outside Point Noire, where Mandela would be mediating.18 During the Outeniqua mediation talks, Tshwane’s limited leverage revealed itself.19 Mobutu apparently offered to step down “for health reasons” and was willing to hand over power to the speaker of the Council of the Republic Transitional Parliament, an idea rejected out of hand by Kabila; he was determined to become the president. He also showed that Mandela’s revered leadership had serious limits. Kabila rejected any idea of a cease-fire and warned that his “forces [would] continue to advance on all fronts.”20 Mobutu, he insisted, should resign within eight days.21 The major problem with South Africa’s mediation breakthrough was that it was accompanied by another rebel assault on the capital, Kinshasa. Against the backdrop of this escalation, the talks collapsed; on 16 May 1997, just two weeks after South Africa’s ocean diplomacy efforts, Mobutu relinquished power, thereby ending nearly thirty-two years of dictatorial rule. When Mandela replaced Julius Nyerere as mediator for the Arusha process, the stage was already set for a comprehensive process. Mandela endorsed Nyerere’s idea of establishing five committees to deal with the conflict. These committees were mandated to deal with security arrangements and regional and international security guarantees.22 After two years of negotiations and mediation by Nyerere and Mandela, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed on 28 August 2000. This was by no means a comprehensive pact, and several parties who signed did so with serious skepticism, and many others boycotted the process and defied the pact. There were ongoing negotiations and mediation even after the formal signing, resulting in five detailed protocols negotiated in the context of the peace process. This resulted in Protocol 1 of the Arusha Accord, which dealt with the nature of the Burundi conflict, problems of genocide and exclusion, and solutions. Under this protocol, the signatories agreed to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Protocol 2 focused on democracy and good governance and set out the principles that would guide the transitional arrangement and the posttransition constitution. A transitional constitution, agreed upon in November 2001, provided for a Tutsi president and a Hutu vice president for the first eighteen months of the transition and the reverse for the second eighteen months. Protocol 3 dealt with peace and security, and in particular the challenge of bringing all rebel movements on board to sign the peace pact, and Protocol 4 dealt with the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons. This protocol also grappled with other socioeconomic challenges and the need to engage the international community in postconflict

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peace building and Burundi’s massive development needs. Protocol 5 outlined guarantees on the implementation of the agreement and set up an Implementation and Monitoring Commission (IMC) to monitor, supervise, and coordinate implementation activities. But, just like the DRC process, the Burundi progression was fraught with many difficulties, specifically because many rebel movements chose to stay outside the process and persisted with fomenting their rebellion. Many rebel movements continued their struggle in spite of the mediation efforts by South African, Tanzanian, Ugandan, and Gabonese leaders. The splits in the ranks of the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL did not help, but after the installation of the transitional government in November 2001, South Africa persisted in its engagement in Burundi, nudging the parties toward peace. In May 2003, Domitien Ndayizeye, a Hutu, succeeded Buyoya as president, under terms of the three-year transitional power-sharing arrangement. South Africa worked closely with Burundi’s neighbors and the AU to negotiate a landmark cease-fire agreement between Ndayizeye and CNDD-FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza in November 2003. This agreement was the precursor to the disarmament, demobilization, and creation of a new national army incorporating all rebel forces except the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. More important, Burundians approved a new constitution in March 2005 and held parliamentary elections in July in which the CNDD-FDD won a majority of the votes. In August 2005 both houses of parliament elected Nkurunziza as Burundi’s president, marking a new beginning in the country’s politics. Following the elections, South Africa announced the withdrawal of its troops protecting political leaders in Burundi.23

Dealing with Autocrats and Warlords Tswane thought it prudent to engage spoilers in the DRC and Burundi, as well as their various backers. On 17 May 1997, Laurent Kabila declared himself head of state and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tswane moved hastily to push for Kabila’s DRC to be anointed as the latest member of SADC. The rationale was that Tswane would have better control—and thus influence—over Kabila inside SADC (that is, would be able to apply carrots and sticks more effectively) than on the outside. It even offered Kabila some postconflict reconstruction aid in exchange for promoting democracy in the DRC. The limited leverage of South Africa again became clear as it emerged that the inclusion of the DRC in SADC had Balkanized that organization. Kabila began to accuse South Africa of arrogance and suggested that it was trying to promote democratization South Africa–style—a Pax Pretoriana— in the DRC in particular and the Great Lakes in general. By that time,

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128 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS South Africa had made the extension of democracy a central pillar of its Africa policy; this pillar helped to fuel the perception that Pretoria harbored a grand scheme in Africa, one that was bent on spreading the purported South African miracle. Even before tensions arose with Kabila, South Africa’s democratization tactics had triggered divisions in SADC as Pretoria found itself at loggerheads with Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and other SADC members over questions ranging from the leadership of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security to failed trade negotiations and its democratization policies. In Burundi, South Africa faced a major challenge: although one wing of the CNDD-FDD, led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, signed the pact, the other more active group of CNDD-FDD refused to endorse the agreement until November 2003.24 The same was true for the PALIPEHUTUFNL faction—although one of the factions signed, the other faction failed to sign. This demonstrated South Africa’s limited leverage. As Pretoria tried to broker inclusive political deals in the region, it found itself at odds with many of the parties it sought to influence. This meant that, instead of adopting an aggressive approach, Pretoria had to use a more strategic and tactical approach and attempt to win over the confidence of many of the belligerents. Many people in South Africa began to question the government’s motives and neutrality, and some critics suggested that South Africa was attempting to undermine other African actors.

The Anti-Kabila Rebellion and Tshwane’s Maneuvers Armed rebels from the ranks of the AFDL began to turn against Kabila, backed by Uganda and Rwanda, scarcely one year after he had made it to power. South Africa’s first mistake at that time was its failure to condemn the rebellion, a stance that contradicted its own doctrine of condemning coups d’état. This infuriated Kabila, who had hoped that he could depend on Tshwane in his greatest hour of need. It was left to a new grouping of Kabila’s friends—Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola—to intervene militarily in his defense. As chair of SADC, and also because of its adherence to its doctrine of the democratic peace, South Africa rejected any military involvement. Complicating matters was the fact that, by September 1998, South Africa had intervened in Lesotho militarily to roll back a coup d’état, a move interpreted by the DRC alliance as a double standard after South Africa had refused to intervene in the DRC on the side of the beleaguered Laurent Kabila. Kabila, Mugabe, Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos and Namibia’s president Sam Nujoma soon accused South Africa of promoting “regional apartheid policies.”25 They further accused Pretoria of siding with Uganda, Rwanda, and the rebels in efforts to topple Kabila.

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South Africa was also accused of harboring the Congolese rebels.26 It became a dominant strategy on the part of these states to vehemently question South Africa’s neutrality. Kabila was even more blunt in his use of words. He labeled South Africa as “puppets of the aggressors.”27 On another front, these states seemed to have reason to doubt Tswane’s presumed evenhandedness. Tswane continued to sell arms to Uganda and Rwanda while blatantly refusing to sell weaponry to Kabila. To be sure, South Africa did sell arms to Namibia and Zimbabwe. Tswane reacted by terming Kabila’s accusations as “most unfortunate because they were untrue.”28 South Africa’s minister of foreign affairs at the time, Alfred Nzo, opined that “South Africa’s neutrality in finding solutions to the current crisis in the DRC remains unquestioned.”29 In an effort to placate his critics, Mandela adopted an ostensibly more evenhanded approach. Instead of primarily engaging the rebels and their key external backers, Uganda and Rwanda, Mandela reached out to one of the DRC alliance members, Namibia’s president Nujoma, and impressed upon him the need for a speedy solution to the conflict in the DRC. It was noteworthy that he sought to cajole Mugabe and dos Santos at the same time. It should be remembered that the relations between those two and South Africa were at an all-time low by then.

Enter Mbeki Mbeki brought a new style and approach to the DRC peacemaking efforts. He was hands-on, worked hard behind the scenes, and spent many sleepless nights trying to stitch together deals between belligerents.30 In August 1999, just two months after becoming president, Mbeki hinted at a major departure in foreign policy when he announced that South Africa stood ready to contribute troops to a peacekeeping mission in the DRC.31 This was a shift away from the Mandela government’s reluctance to commit to peacekeeping. The South African negotiators also contributed to the negotiations for the Lusaka Agreement of July 1999. In January 2002, Mbeki spent days at Sun City, a resort outside the North West Province in South Africa, seeking to conclude a partial agreement between DRC president Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC. Mbeki strongly believed that only an inclusive arrangement would resolve the Congolese impasse.32 He assembled a negotiations team that included his trusted friend and former deputy president, Jacob Zuma; local government minister Sydney Mufamadi; and presidential legal adviser Mojanku Gumbi. The team enjoyed support from former director-general of foreign affairs, Jackie Selebi, and deputy director-general for Africa, Welile Nhlapo. Because all these actors were very close to Mbeki, it made it easier

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130 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS for him to trust and work with them in implementing his vision in the negotiations. He wished to ensure that those taking over the negotiations would not overshadow him by claiming victories and seeking the limelight. The new people around Mbeki were of the younger generation with strong negotiations backgrounds and the ability to interact with their young and inexperienced negotiators in the Great Lakes. Mbeki’s announcement came in the wake of South African government officials and civil society actors finalization of a White Paper on Peace Support Operations. The negotiating team continued to work hard, mainly behind the scenes, to secure another agreement between two of the Great Lakes major rivals, the DRC’s Joseph Kabila and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame. This resulted six months later in a key breakthrough; on the margins of the launching of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Durban in July 2002, Presidents Kabila and Kagame met in the presence of President Mbeki and UN secretary-general Kofi Annan to explore possibilities for peace between the two countries.33 This agreement centered on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC territory and the disbanding of the ex-FAR forces and the Interahamwe by the DRC.34 The meeting on the fringes of the AU summit led to the establishment of a Committee of Experts of the two countries. This committee prepared a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was signed by the two presidents on 30 July 2002 in the presence of President Mbeki; a representative of the UN secretary-general; Amara Essy, interim chairperson of the AU Commission; and Malawian president Bakili Muluzi in his capacity as chair of the SADC. It was thus important for Mbeki to showcase that the pact enjoyed subregional, continental, and international legitimacy. He also wished to remind the belligerents in the Great Lakes that their drama was being played out in front of an international audience and that foreign actors would help to pressurize spoilers if and when they threatened to undo the peace deals. This agreement was accompanied by an implementation program spread over ninety days, effective from the date of its signing. In seeking to conform to his commitments, President Kagame ordered the first batch of the Rwandese army to leave Kindu on 17 September, bound for Kigali. On 5 October 2002, Rwanda announced the complete withdrawal of its 23,000 troops from the Congolese territory; this departure was witnessed by MONUC and South African observers. In early November, Presidents Kagame and Kabila again met in Pretoria with President Mbeki to assess progress in implementing the MOU. President dos Santos of Angola meanwhile persisted with facilitation efforts between the governments of Uganda and the DRC to agree on withdrawal of Ugandan troops from DRC territory and to restore diplomatic relations between the two states. Between August and October 2002, most of the foreign forces from Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Burundi began to

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withdraw from DRC territory. The UN Security Council also endorsed a new concept of operations of MONUC and authorized its expansion to 8,700 troops. In September, the Congolese government announced that it was ending the activities of the Rwandese armed movements on the DRC territory. The DRC government declared twenty-five leaders of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) to be personas non grata and expelled them from the DRC. On 17 December 2002 in Pretoria, and under Mbeki’s facilitation and mediation, the Congolese parties concluded a global and comprehensive agreement on transition in the DRC. The AU recognized that, without the decisive facilitation of President Mbeki, there would not have been a global and comprehensive agreement. By early 2003, South Africa had developed a clear two-pronged approach to the conflict in the DRC: one approach was focused on the military dimension, and the second focused on the political aspects. In terms of the former, Mbeki spent most of the first quarter of 2003 engaging the heads of state of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania to try to resolve the escalating conflict in the DRC, with particular emphasis on the conflict in the Ituri region. This culminated in a meeting in Cape Town on 9 April 2003 that involved the leaders from these four countries. By that stage, South Africa had already committed more than 1,000 troops to the volatile eastern region of the DRC. Former deputy president Jacob Zuma confirmed in Parliament that Mbeki had succeeded in applying pressure on Ugandan president Museveni to pull his troops completely out of the DRC and to replace them with troops from MONUC. Aware of Tanzania’s disquiet about its low-profile role in the Great Lakes, Mbeki had requested President Mkapa to become more involved in the brokering and maintenance of peace in Central Africa. In June 2003, Mbeki announced in a letter to Parliament that South Africa’s year-long peacekeeping mission to the DRC was costing the taxpayers R819.6 million (819.6 million rand). He also confirmed that he had authorized the deployment of 1,268 members of the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) to eastern Congo to fulfill South Africa’s obligations to the UN. Tshwane also finalized plans for a further deployment of troops to northeastern Congo, around strife-torn Bunia. Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota tried to showcase South Africa’s commitment to pan-Africanist ideals by appealing for parliamentary approval of a bigger budget that would allow the SANDF to fulfill its peacekeeping duties to Africa. By July 2003, South Africa had deployed twice as many troops on the continent as it had envisaged, raising fears that it was overstretched. In line with its NEPAD strategy to build partnerships between Africa and the outside world, Tshwane engaged the UN Security Council and G-8 countries to finance peace missions in Africa in exchange for African states providing most of the troops.

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132 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS In the DRC, South Africa’s political strategy has been to support the establishment of the transitional government.35 In this respect, Tshwane sought to carve out key political positions for all the major factions and role players, including RCD-Goma, the MLC, and unarmed opposition. South Africa mapped out a quick transition phase for the installation of the transitional government. This included the installation of the chiefs of staff of the army and the vice presidents and other members of the transitional government by the end of May 2003. It also planned for the inauguration of the members of the National Assembly and the Senate by 10 June 2003. In 2004, South Africa moved to another strategy: including the DRC on its list of countries with which to establish binational commissions. With the South Africa–DRC binational commission, the two countries concluded a number of strategic agreements. The agreements included defense matters; health matters; economic cooperation matters, especially the promotion and protection of investment; cooperation in public administration; and diplomatic consultation.36 South Africa agreed to support the DRC in the area of integrating and strengthening its army. Tshwane also offered to help the DRC with the difficult transition and in particular to assist it with the elections planned for 2006.37 Throughout its engagement in strengthening governance and conflict reduction in the DRC, South Africa has stressed the theme of multilateralism.38 This engagement seems to dovetail with the domestic goal of strengthening the capacities of the state and governmental institutions to transform South Africa into a developmental state. An important facet of multilateralism is the extraction of resources from the international community.39 Part of this strategy is for South Africa to act as interlocutor between Africa and the outside world, cajoling the international community into meeting its responsibilities toward the continent. South Africa sees the UN and industrialized countries as having an obligation toward peace building and reconstruction in the DRC.

Tackling the Spoils in Burundi In Burundi, Tshwane has replicated its DRC strategy of creating the space for belligerents to have face-to-face meetings. As the violence in Burundi was threatening the already fragile peace process, former deputy president Zuma held several rounds of meetings with the Burundian parties in Tanzania between August and November 2002 in efforts to find a cease-fire. These talks were held under the auspices of the mediating team comprising Zuma; Jean Francois Ndongou, minister delegate in the Gabonese foreign ministry; and representatives of the Tanzanian authorities.40 The AU was represented by a special representative in Burundi, Ambassador Mamadou Bah, again

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highlighting Tshwane’s sensitivity for taking key African actors and partners on board. For example, Tanzania has long been severely affected by the Great Lakes wars, and South Africa felt it had to include it in any efforts to resolve the crises. It was thus sensible for South Africa to show sensitivity and reach out to Tanzania. These meetings culminated in the signing of a cease-fire agreement between the transitional government and the rebels of the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. The armed wings of these two groupings failed to sign a cease-fire agreement, however. Cease-fire talks resumed at the end of October and lasted until early November but ended without any conclusive deal. Zuma and Museveni pushed for an extension of the talks; they resumed on 26 November 2002 and ended in Arusha with the nineteenth summit on Burundi, which was held from 1 to 2 December 2002. The agreement stated that the cease-fire should take effect on 30 December. Cessation of hostilities became a factor seventy-two hours after the signing of the agreement. The deal also provided for a verification process led by an African mission. Combatants would then move to assembly points with their weapons and be disarmed at a later stage. The agreement also spelled out issues on which the parties had to pursue further negotiations, notably the return to constitutional legality, the transition, democratization, and good governance. The summit appealed to the international community to support the peace process and to make resources available to support the encampment, disarmament, demobilization, and integration of combatants into the new army. Zuma resorted to shuttle diplomacy to drum up international support for the Burundi effort. On 4 December 2002, Zuma held a meeting with the UN Security Council in New York and called on the council to back the African mission and, more generally, the cease-fire implementation process. Mbeki, in his capacity as chairperson of the AU, also took a number of initiatives with a view to supporting the cease-fire implementation process, including addressing issues around the deployment of the African mission as well as engaging countries on troop contributions. January 2003 proved to be an important month for developments in Burundi. All the players in the mediation efforts—the AU, Mbeki as chairperson, Museveni as chairperson of the regional initiative, Gabon’s President Bongo, and former deputy president Zuma—conferred over the fragility of the peace process. It was agreed that an urgent meeting should be convened with top officials of the mediation, African missions, political and technical officials, prospective troop-contributing countries, and others. That meeting took place from 15 to 17 January 2003 at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Recommendations were passed on to Zuma for implementation, and he seized the opportunity to engage stakeholders. Zuma underscored the need for AU support for the initiative and the urgent need

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134 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS for deploying a team of AU observers to monitor the truce and the prospective African mission that would be made up of contingents from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. One characteristic of Zuma’s style was to stay in touch with protagonists on all sides of the divide to dispel notions that South Africa harbored hidden motives and worked to undermine the roles of other African states and to take all the glory for the peace initiatives. For example, in January 2003, Zuma visited Bujumbura and met President Pierre Buyoya and other officials of the transitional government as well as members of the Arusha Agreement Implementation Monitoring Commission. But South Africa also considered contact with the outside world, especially former colonial powers with a responsibility to the continent, to be as important as working with local actors. In April 2003, for example, Zuma met with Belgian minister of foreign affairs Louis Michel to lobby support for an all-African peacekeeping mission that would help to stabilize Burundi after the handover of power from Tutsi leader Pierre Buyoya to Ndayizeye, a Hutu. The handover occurred under the terms of a three-year power-sharing government inaugurated in 2001. Michel made a commitment of 1 million euros to bolster the South African, Ethiopian, and Mozambican force.41 In May 2003, President Mbeki announced to Parliament that South Africa’s military involvement of 1,600 soldiers in Burundi had cost some R783 million in one year. South Africa was expected to make another threeyear commitment to the Burundi peace operation. Such financial commitments were already beginning to have a toll on South Africa’s fiscal situation, and the government announced that it would seek financial commitments from the EU, the UN, and other multilateral bodies to help foot the bill for peace support operations in Africa, including the AMIB. The EU eventually granted R174 million to the government of Burundi; R57 million was earmarked to support AMIB.42 Using a strategy in Burundi similar to that in the DRC, Mbeki’s plan relied on nudging rebel leaders to join the transitional government. Mbeki believes in an incremental approach whereby any peace is better than no peace at all. Once Mbeki obtains a peace agreement with some belligerents, he seeks to consolidate it by drawing more parties into the peace pact. In October 2003, Mbeki engaged the FDD leaders to join an interim government in Burundi.43 At the same time, Zuma met with President Ndayizeye and rebel leader Nkurunziza to finalize an agreement on Burundi. These talks focused on finalizing a command structure for the police and military in the transition period. It considered giving 40 percent of the top jobs in government and 20 percent of the National Assembly to the FDD.44 By the end of 2003, after Zuma’s exhaustive shuttle diplomacy to Burundi, some major challenges and problems persisted, especially the

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deployment of the AMIB and the expansion of the power-sharing agreement.45 The major sticking point was to persuade PALIPEHUTU-FNL leader Agathon Rwasa to commence negotiations with the transitional government.46 In addition, there were obstacles to implementing key provisions of the cease-fire agreements, in particular the demobilization, disarmament, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs.47 In light of these challenges, South Africa took a leaf out of its own negotiation experience by pushing for a model of “sufficient consensus.” This entailed working to get all the signatories—CNDD-FDD, CNDD, the Front pour la Libération Nationale (FROLINA), and FNL—to participate in the transitional government. In an attempt to show its seriousness, South Africa also started to develop a strategy toward potential spoilers. It warned the FNL that unless it was serious about joining the interim government, it ran the risk of being branded a terrorist organization. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad likened the FNL to the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) in Mozambique and Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge.48 South Africa supported the election that was slated for 1 November 2004, but two months before the date, all the parties agreed that the elections could not be held because of continuing disagreements about a posttransitional constitution and modalities of holding a referendum on the constitution.49 The referendum was finally held in March 2005, followed by June parliamentary elections. Subsequently Nkurunziza was overwhelmingly chosen as president.

Assessing Mbeki’s Strategy One way of assessing the Mbeki government’s policy strategies in the Great Lakes region is to ask the question: What is South Africa’s real interest in the DRC and Burundi? In answering this intriguing question, we will shun monocausal explanations; instead, we will go for an overall interpretation approach. To be sure, a realist would contend that South Africa is seeking regional hegemony; a liberal would contend that the newly liberated republic, as a democracy, is making a good-faith effort to encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in order to clear the way for democratization; a radical/Marxist would contend that the real motives of South African diplomacy are to allow its capital-owning classes to invest in the Great Lakes region (particularly mineral-rich Congo) and to reap other economic rewards. A careful analysis would suggest that all these motivations are at play, but there is also more to South Africa’s involvement in the Great Lakes and further afield in Africa. South Africa’s Great Lakes strategy needs to be analyzed within the broader foreign policy and pan-African regional geostrategic context. The overall strategy is focused on economic development and,

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136 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS by implication, economic opportunities. As such, the Mbeki government believes that African development cannot be divorced from peace and security, democratic governance, and economic growth. South Africa’s foreign policy therefore makes a link between development, peace and security, governance, and growth. South Africans have in recent years elevated this notion to an ideology referred to as the “new developmentalism.” For Mbeki, the new developmentalism can only come about through a linkage approach to politics. Mbeki appears genuinely committed to economic takeoff and development in Africa. He has consistently articulated the view that South Africa can only prosper if the broader southern African and African regions prosper. For South Africa to be stable, the rest of the region has to be equally stable. Thus, the Mbeki government has made links between the crisis in Zimbabwe and the war in the DRC. During Mandela’s tenure as president, South Africa and Zimbabwe were caught in a literal “cold war” over the DRC, so Mbeki has sought to mend fences and has reached out to President Robert Mugabe, since the new policy relies heavily on partnerships and cooperation. Mbeki needed Mugabe for a breakthrough in the DRC, and since Mugabe had his army in Congo, Mbeki could ill-afford to alienate him. It was for this reason that the pursuit of South Africa’s strategy toward the DRC saw Mbeki singling out Mugabe and Kagame as the regional balancers of powers, holding the key to a settlement of the war in the DRC. If Congo’s stability was key for South African and African development, Mbeki had to carefully engage all the power dealers in that region. Mbeki chose quiet diplomacy, the attempt to engage belligerents behind the scenes and move them along toward negotiated solutions, as the only rational choice for the republic to go about achieving this goal. South Africa could not hope to ostracize Mugabe for his autocratic rule in Zimbabwe while hoping to achieve its regional objectives in the DRC. These were uncomfortable trade-offs that South Africa had to make in its decision to pursue “‘quiet diplomacy.” At his inauguration ceremony as president on 16 June 1999, Mbeki invited Mugabe as his guest of honor. He held talks with Mugabe on bilateral and multilateral affairs. He was also instrumental in getting the South African Football Association (SAFA) to host “an inauguration soccer spectacular” between South Africa and Zimbabwe.50 Mbeki’s first day in office was spent with southern African counterparts engaged in efforts to end the war in the DRC, signaling that the conflicts in the Great Lakes would become a key foreign policy concern. Mbeki’s new minister of foreign affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, also announced that securing peace in the DRC would rank as her top foreign policy priority. She traveled to the DRC and Rwanda to meet with the leaders to stress the need for a “negotiated settlement” to the conflict. More important, Dlamini-Zuma made it clear to Kabila that she would be dealing with all side to the conflict, including rebel leaders.51 Mbeki’s talks with

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Wamba dia Wamba and Etienne Tshisekedi, two key rebel leaders, did not go down well with Kabila. During the first half of 2000, Mbeki worked for a peace plan for the DRC and urged the withdrawal of all foreign forces. In one of the most dramatic foreign policy reversals in early 2002, Mbeki decided to adopt a propeacekeeping posture, conceding that South Africa could not make the peace while showing a disinclination to keep the very peace that it so eagerly brokered. This decision was a far cry from the stance of the Mandela administration, which had insisted on peacemaking rather than peacekeeping. The Mbeki government was instrumental in urging the UN to establish a peacekeeping force for the DRC. It lobbied both the General Assembly and the Security Council for such a mission. In January 2000, the UN decided to establish the MONUC, and Mbeki announced that South Africa would play a leading role in this operation.52 In 2003, South Africa committed more than R1 billion on peace operations in the DRC and Burundi. With this contribution to peace operations, Tswane has tried to demonstrate its military power and commitments to African partnerships. The military and political strategies are also part of Tswane’s economic interests in Africa. In addition to the promotion of democratization as a core tenet of its diplomacy, South Africa has pursued economic interests vis-à-vis the Great Lakes region.53 Tswane’s economic strategy targeted both the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the SADC and has extended as far north as Uganda and Kenya. The fact that a potentially rich Congo had joined the SADC created further opportunities for South Africa.54

Conclusion In this chapter I have argued that South Africa was primarily concerned about economic development at home and the broader African environment. It managed to inject itself diplomatically into a civil war that brought Kabila to power and brought an end to Mobutu’s dictatorship and made ongoing efforts to bring peace to both the DRC and Burundi because stabilization of that strategic region was key for South Africa’s own development. South Africa also harbored ambitions of international prestige and influence. It was through its peacemaking attempts in the Great Lakes region that Pretoria has emerged as a regional power, which has enhanced its role as a serious middle-ranked power in world affairs. South Africa has also invested considerable political capital in forging strategic partnerships with key countries in realizing its continental and international goals, notably Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. To assert itself in the Great Lakes, it has attempted to embrace all parties to conflicts. The Mbeki government’s

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138 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS decision to become involved in peacekeeping operations has further bolstered its image as a major power in Africa and has enhanced its credibility as a genuine peacemaker. South Africa has, at times, adopted a naive obsession with its own negotiated transition as the best way to resolve conflicts. It has sought to export its model to other African states. For example, during the end game of the Mobutu Sese Seko regime in Zaire, South Africa pushed for a facesaving solution that was interpreted as an attempt to give Mobutu another lease on life in spite of the fact that he was clearly losing the war on the ground. But fundamentally, the post-1994 diplomacy of mediation and negotiated settlements is part of Pax Pretoriana. The belief that there could be no military solutions to the conflict in Zaire/Congo, Burundi, and the Great Lakes in general has triumphed in both the Mandela and Mbeki administrations. Ultimately, South Africa did not intercede in the Great Lakes for purely altruistic motivations. It sees political stability as the foundation for trade and investments.

Notes 1. For a perspective of South Africa’s peacemaking strategies in the Great Lakes, see Mark Malan and Henri Boshoff, A 90-day Plan to Bring Peace to the DRC? An Analysis of the Pretoria Agreement of 30 July 2002, Occasional Paper no. 61 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002). 2. Office of United Nations Envoy for the Great Lakes, International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region, a Concept Paper (Nairobi: 2003), p. 3. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., p. 4. 5. See Francis Kornegay and Chris Landsberg, From Dilemma to Détente: Pretoria’s Policy Options on the DRC and Great Lakes, Policy Brief 11 (Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 1999). 6. Ibid. 7. See Chris Landsberg, “South Africa’s Policy in the Congo War,” in John Clark (ed.), The African Stakes of the Congo War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 8. Keesings Record of World Events, October 1996. 9. Devon Curtis, “The Peace Process in Burundi: Successful African Intervention?” Global Insight, no. 24 (September 2003), p. 7. 10. Ibid. 11. Material in this paragraph and the next paragraph is based on the following: African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism, Report of the Interim Chairperson of the Commission on Conflict Situations in Africa (Addis Ababa: 2003). 12. See Landsberg, “South Africa’s Policy in the Congo War.” 13. Keesings Record of World Events, February 1997. 14. Ibid.

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15. See Landsberg, “South Africa’s Policy in the Congo War.” 16. Keesings Record of World Events, April 1997. 17. See Landsberg, “South Africa’s Policy in the Congo War.” 18. Keesings Record of World Events, May 1997. 19. See Landsberg, “South Africa’s Policy in the Congo War.” 20. Cited in Herbert Weiss, War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Current African Issues no. 22 (Uppsala: Norwegian Institute of African Studies, 2000), p. 6. 21. Keesings Record of World Events, May 1997. 22. Material in this paragraph and the next two paragraphs is based on Curtis, “The Peace Process in Burundi.” 23. “South Africa Cuts Troops,” Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social, and Cultural Series 42, no. 9 (September 2005), p. 163. 24. African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism. 25. See Steven Friedman and others, “State of Anxiety? Reconstructing the State, Democratisation, and Economic Growth in Southern Africa” (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, April 1999), p. 14. 26. The Citizen (Johannesburg), 17 November 1998. 27. Ibid., 10 December 1998. 28. The Star (Johannesburg), 18 November 1998. 29. Ibid. 30. Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 22 December 2002. 31. Cedric de Coning, “South African Blue Helmets in the Democratic Republic in Congo,” Global Dialogue 4, no. 2 (August 1999). 32. Material in this paragraph is based on Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 22 December 2002. 33. For an assessment of the deal, see Malan and Boshoff, “A 90-day Plan.” 34. Material in this paragraph and the next three paragraphs is based on African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism. 35. Material in this paragraph is based on Department of Foreign Affairs, “Briefing by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, at the GCIS Parliamentary Briefings” (Cape Town, 10 September 2003). 36. “DRC: Presidents Mbeki, Kabila Sign Co-operation Pact,” http://irinnews .org/report.asp?ReportID=42969&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes&Sele. 37. Ibid. 38. Great Lakes Policy Forum, Special Meeting Report (Pretoria: 2003). 39. Ibid. 40. Material in this and the next three paragraphs is based on African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism. 41. “Political Report of the European Delegation in South Africa” (Brussels: April 2003). 42. Department of Foreign Affairs, “Briefing by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad.” 43. Sowetan (Johannesburg), 31 October 2003. 44. Ibid. 45. Department of Foreign Affairs, “Briefing by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad.” 46. Ibid.

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140 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS 47. Ibid. 48. “South Africa/Great Lakes: Warning Signs,” http://www.afrika.no/Detaild/ 5874.html. 49. Jan van Eck, “Challenges to a Durable Peace in Burundi,” ISS Situation Report (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004). 50. Centre for Policy Studies, “Socio-political Monitor” (unpublished internal publication, June 1999). 51. Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesberg), 25 July 1999. 52. Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesberg), 25 January 2000. 53. Francis Kornegay, “Recasting South Africa’s Regional and Global Role for the 21st Century (unpublished paper prepared for the United Nations Development Programme in South Africa, Pretoria, July 1999), p. 3. 54. Francis A. Kornegay and Chris Landsberg, “Mayivuke iAfrika: Can South Africa Lead an African Renaissance?” Policy Issues and Actors (Centre for Policy Studies) 11, no. 1 (1998), p. 36.

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8 The United Nations ADEKEYE ADEBAJO

“N

o more Congos!” That forlorn cry rang out unmistakably across the African continent in 1964. The UN was struggling with one of its earliest peacekeeping challenges in the former Belgian Congo. The world body was expressing its deep frustration at a protracted four-year intervention: it had lost Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in a mysterious plane crash and had become bogged down in a protracted civil war in the shadow of an ideological cold war in an emerging Africa. The UN’s credibility in Africa was dented by its intervention in the turbulent civil war. Four decades later, the UN is struggling to keep peace in another protracted civil war in the same country. A large country at the heart of Africa, Congo is a symbol of the difficulties that the UN has experienced in peacekeeping in Africa.1 This chapter examines three cases of UN peacekeeping in the Great Lakes region: Congo in the 1960s, Rwanda in the 1990s, and the current mission in the DRC. I begin by placing the three cases in the broader context of UN peacekeeping in Africa. After analyzing these cases, I conclude the chapter by offering policy recommendations for the UN in Africa. There is also a brief concluding discussion of the UN-led International Conference for the Great Lakes and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi in 2004. Africa has been a giant laboratory for UN peacekeeping and has tested the capacity and political resolve of the fifteen-member UN Security Council, whose five veto-wielding permanent members—Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States—were often too divided during the cold war to take decisions. The end of the cold war ended the Security Council’s paralysis and raised great expectations that the UN would finally be able to contribute to ending Africa’s wars. Of the fifty UN operations established since the end of the cold war, about half of them have been in Africa. The election in December 1991 of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as Africa’s first 141

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142 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS UN secretary-general and his publication in 1992 of the ambitious An Agenda for Peace2 raised hopes that the UN would finally prioritize the ending of Africa’s conflicts. But despite the post–cold war expectations that the UN would help fill Africa’s security vacuum, disasters in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) have scarred the organization and made its most powerful members wary of intervening in an area of low strategic interest. Six factors have often contributed to success in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa: (1) the willingness of internal parties to disarm and accept electoral results, (2) the cooperation of regional players in peace processes, (3) the cessation of military and financial support to local clients by external actors and their provision of financial and diplomatic support to peace processes, (4) the development of an effective strategy to deal with potential “spoilers,”3 (5) the absence of conflict-fueling economic resources in war zones, and (6) the leadership of peacekeeping missions by capable UN envoys. It is worth noting that the presence or absence of these factors does not automatically determine the outcome of these peacekeeping missions. All these factors will often not be present in every case of success or failure. For instance, the UN mission in Congo in the 1960s succeeded in reuniting a fractious country in spite of regional divisions and external meddling. The client of the United States, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, eventually won power, and the Congolese parties agreed to cooperate in a political system led by Mobutu, an outcome that was also accepted by regional states. Rwanda, in contrast, was tarred with the Somali brush of failure. The UN missions in both countries were, in a sense, contrasts in failure. Somalia was a well-funded mission in which some of the best-equipped soldiers in the world participated. Rwanda was, from the start, a mission based largely on ill-equipped armies from developing countries that lacked strong political and financial backing from the UN Security Council. This weakness encouraged Rwanda’s extremist factions to force the withdrawal of the UN by killing its peacekeepers. France, which had trained and provided military support to the genocidal regime, was considered a partisan and compromised intervener, and the UN special representative, Cameroon’s former foreign minister, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, did not inspire much confidence.4 Furthermore, many of the domestic parties in Rwanda were unwilling to implement peace agreements that would force them to share power. They adopted a zero-sum approach to the conflict and signed accords that they had no intention of implementing. The regional spillover of the Rwandan genocide destabilized neighboring states, some of which sought unsuccessfully to mediate an end to the conflict. These regional actors were too weak to impose peace on the belligerents, and their role was sometimes compromised by past and continuing support for individual factions. The UN special representative in Rwanda was widely considered to be a political liability, and the UN Security Council lacked the political will to end the genocide in 1994 by strengthening the mandate and powers of its peacekeepers.

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The fate of the current UN mission in the DRC underlines the importance of the six criteria for success. The existence of mineral resources in Congo has been exploited by the warring factions, as well as by Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, according to various UN panel reports. Regional actors involved in Congo remain deeply divided. Rwanda and Uganda sent troops to support a rebellion against the government in Kinshasa in 1998, which in turn was provided military support by troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia. Kigali and Kampala soon fell out, clashing militarily in Kisangani three times, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties. The inconsistent support that UN missions in Africa enjoy can also largely be explained by the fact that members of the Security Council are often distracted by more strategically important UN missions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Scarred by experiences in Somalia and Rwanda, these council members have provided only sporadic and often inadequate assistance to peacekeeping missions in Africa. In contrast to the situation in the Balkans and East Timor, Western countries have also failed to provide significant troops for African peacekeeping missions that are staffed by ill-equipped soldiers from poor countries. The current mission in Congo demonstrates that the UN Security Council has not learned many lessons from earlier failures in Angola, Somalia, and Rwanda, nor from successes in Namibia and Mozambique.

Cold War Follies:The UN Mission in Congo (1960–1964) The 20,000-strong Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) was dispatched to Central Africa in July 1960.5 Although ONUC soon became embroiled in civil war, the new leaders of Congo had invited the UN with the original purpose of preserving their country’s sovereignty from foreign intervention. Belgium had forgotten that the world had changed and that its brand of colonialism had become an anachronism in postindependence Africa. Having hastily abandoned its former colony, Belgian paratroopers returned to their former stomping ground within days. The Congolese army mutinied, and amid the chaos, Moise Tshombe declared Congo’s richest province, Katanga, independent, with Belgian connivance. A bitter power struggle erupted between the “moderate” president Joseph Kasavubu and his “radical” premier Patrice Lumumba. The United States and the Soviet Union considered Congo, a mineral-rich, strategically located state, a vital prize in the early cold war stakes.6 Moscow provided transport aircraft for pro-Lumumba troops, whereas Washington’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in assassination attempts against Lumumba. Following Lumumba’s death, members of the “Casablanca group” of “radical” African states, such as Egypt, Guinea, and Morocco, withdrew their peacekeepers from Congo.

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144 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS The UN’s reputation suffered tremendous damage as a result of this mission. Western powers accused the Indian UN special representative in Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal, of Lumumbist leanings, and London accused the UN’s Irish representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise O’Brien, of leftist sympathies. Hammarskjöld replaced both envoys. The Soviets and many African states strongly criticized the UN’s failure to protect Lumumba, who had been killed in the presence of UN peacekeepers. Hammarskjöld was sympathetic to the Western view that Congo was threatened by Soviet expansionism and felt that Lumumba should be undercut.7 Having achieved its strategic goals of eliminating Lumumba and helping Mobutu to power, Washington eventually devised the military plan to end the secession in Katanga.8 For the first time in its history, the UN embarked on peace enforcement, using force to incorporate Katanga back into Congo by January 1963. The control of the central government in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) had become a game of musical chairs. Governmental authority was fully restored only after Mobutu staged a successful coup d’état, and by 1965 he was in control of Congo. He remained in power for the next three decades, with strong support from Washington, Paris, and Brussels. After the controversies of the Congo crisis, the UN Security Council refused to intervene in major civil wars in Africa, citing the difficulties of keeping peace in the shadow of a cold war in which two superpowers waged proxy wars, the French gendarmes intervened in their chasse gardée (private hunting ground), and obstinate Portuguese colonialists and white minority regimes in southern Africa clung desperately to power. For the next three decades, no major UN peacekeeping mission took place in Africa, even as conflicts proliferated, often fueled by cold war patrons.

Fiddling While Rwanda Burned: The UN Mission in Rwanda (1993–1994) With the end of the cold war and the emergence of unprecedented cooperation among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, new peacekeeping missions were established in Namibia, Western Sahara, Mozambique, and Angola. But the disastrous peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwanda dashed the initial hopes that the UN would play a major role in ending African conflicts. The failure of the UN mission in Rwanda between 1993 and 1994 cannot be understood without reference to its retreat from Somalia six months earlier. Somalia and Rwanda had been orphans of the cold war in an era of intervention by external powers in Africa. Somalia was fought over by the superpowers, and Rwanda was entangled in French efforts to maintain a sphere of influence in Africa. The UN

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Security Council treated both conflicts erroneously as humanitarian disasters, and the political will for stronger military action disappeared after Western peacekeepers were killed in the two countries. Political support for the UN missions in Somalia and Rwanda crumbled in the Security Council, and rather than bolstering the UN presence, its peacekeepers were withdrawn. After the death of eighteen US soldiers and about 1,000 Somalis in October 1993, the UN withdrew all its peacekeepers from Somalia. Six months after this fiasco, Washington led the opposition to a UN response to the genocide in Rwanda in a situation that was viewed through a tainted Somali prism. Before analyzing the UN mission in Rwanda, it is important to provide a brief background to the conflict. The RPF had invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990. These refugee warriors came from Rwanda’s Tutsi minority, who had been forced out of their homeland and denied the right to return by the Hutu-dominated government of Juvénal Habyarimana. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni (whose successful guerrilla army had included Tutsi exiles) backed the RPF, whereas France (which had trained and armed Habyarimana’s militias and had sent a military contingent to Rwanda as recently as 1993) and Mobutu’s Zaire supported Habyarimana. The UN Mission for Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was established in June 1993 to monitor the common border between the countries. The OAU also arranged peace talks in Arusha that resulted in a comprehensive peace settlement by August 1993. Arusha called for a transitional government involving Rwanda’s political groups, a power-sharing arrangement, the establishment of a new army composed equally of Hutu and Tutsi, and the demobilization of the remaining fighters.9 The 2,500-strong and $120 million a year United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was mandated to implement the Arusha agreement. The Security Council resolution establishing UNAMIR, however, made two crucial changes that weakened the peacekeeping force before its deployment. Arusha had called for the peacekeepers to guarantee the overall security of Rwanda and to confiscate illegal arms. The UN resolution mandated the force only to contribute to security in Kigali and its environs and did not sanction a seizure of arms. The UN peacekeepers arrived in Rwanda two months behind schedule and without the armored unit and helicopters that had been authorized by the Security Council. General Roméo Dallaire, the UN’s Canadian force commander, had also initially called for a contingent that was twice the size of the one deployed.10 The force, consisting largely of soldiers from Belgium, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Tunisia, lacked an intelligence unit and had a small civilian police unit with no human rights cell, further limiting its ability to monitor abuses.11 To make matters worse, the situation in Kigali was scarcely conducive to peacekeeping: the transitional government had not

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146 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS been installed; Rwanda’s soldiers had not been demobilized; and arms were flooding illegally into the capital. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the UN special representative in Rwanda, was seen by many to be out of his depth.12 He annoyed the RPF by calling for the inclusion of the extremist CDR in the future government and raised further suspicion by accepting an invitation to visit Habyarimana’s village.13 His criticisms of Habyarimana’s delay in establishing the transitional government infuriated Hutu parties. The personal relationship between Booh-Booh and Dallaire was also marked by conflict, with General Henry Anyidoho, the Ghanaian UN deputy force commander, often having to act as an intermediary between the two men.14 On 6 April 1994, Habyarimana’s plane was shot down over Kigali, signaling the start of the genocide against the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutu. The genocide had been planned by a group of extremists within the Habyarimana regime, including members of the ruling party, officers of the Presidential Guard, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias, and members of the CDR. These groups saw power-sharing as not only a betrayal but also a threat to their own positions and privileges. They also feared that the RPF’s presence in a new national army would facilitate the launching of a Tutsi military coup, fears heightened by the assassination of neighboring Burundi’s first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, by Tutsi military extremists in October 1993. Within twenty-four hours of the start of the genocide, 250,000 Rwandan refugees had flooded into Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire. Over the next three months, the genocidaires had eliminated 800,000 mostly Tutsi people.15 The killing of ten Belgian UN peacekeepers led to the withdrawal of Belgium’s entire contingent, the backbone of the UN force, from Rwanda in April 1994. Brussels then lobbied for the withdrawal of all UN peacekeepers from its former colony. The slaughter ended only with an RPF military victory in July 1994. The genocidal militias and Rwandan army retreated into eastern Zaire with a hostage Hutu population of about one million people. This retreat was facilitated by the controversial UNsanctioned French intervention, Operation Turquoise,16 which had ostensibly been launched to save lives. Revelations that France had trained troops and continued to allow arms to flow to Rwanda’s death squads raised troubling questions, however.17 As René Lemarchand put it: “[N]o amount of retrospective guilt can diminish its [France’s] place in history as the principal villain in the Rwandan apocalypse.”18 The fact that the Security Council granted the French-led mission a “robust” Chapter VII peaceenforcement mandate in contrast to the feeble Chapter VI peacekeeping mandate granted to UNAMIR again underlined the fact that some countries within the UN remained more equal than others. At the start of the genocide, the Africans and their allies at the UN had urged the Security Council to strengthen and reinforce UNAMIR to be able

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to protect civilians. The UN ambassador for nonpermanent member Nigeria, Ibrahim Gambari, wondered aloud whether Africa had fallen off the map of the world’s concerns,19 and the OAU condemned the UN’s “indifference or lack of sufficient concern” for Africans.20 But led by strong US and British demands, the Security Council withdrew most of its peacekeepers from Rwanda, leaving a token force of 270 by the end of April 1994. The Ghanaian contingent stayed behind, bravely protecting civilians in Kigali with 450 troops in breach of the authorized Security Council figure of 270.21 The Security Council, led by an overbearing United States that was determined to prove that it could “shut down” a UN mission,22 pursued an inappropriate diplomatic posture in search of an elusive cease-fire. Washington refused for weeks to call genocide by its proper name for fear of being pressured to act. The representative of the genocidal Rwandan regime, Jean-Damascène Bizimana, sat on the Security Council throughout the genocide, reporting back on the unwillingness of the council to take action and effectively encouraging Rwanda’s genocidaires to complete their operation. The UN Secretariat provided inadequate information and often made poor recommendations to the Security Council, forcing some of its members, like Colin Keating, New Zealand’s permanent representative to the UN, to rely on information provided by nongovernmental organizations.23 UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali also dithered before belatedly calling for a stronger UN force. He desisted from criticizing the dubious French role in Rwanda (and in fact vigorously supported Operation Turquoise), in stark contrast to his criticisms of the US role in both Rwanda and Somalia. Boutros-Ghali’s imperious leadership style and his distaste for council members’ “micromanaging” him, led to his refusal to allow Kofi Annan, the undersecretary-general for peacekeeping, to brief council members regularly. This may have contributed to the caution of bureaucrats under Boutros-Ghali’s authority.24 Many observers, including General Dallaire and his deputy, General Anyidoho, have since argued that a strengthened UN force could have prevented many of the civilian deaths that were mostly carried out by gangs using machetes, clubs, knives, and spears. Dallaire wrote several distressed cables calling for this option but never found support for such an approach within the UN Secretariat. Much controversy still remains over the failure of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping—led at the time by Kofi Annan—to report the contents of a January 1994 cable from Dallaire warning of the impending genocide and asking for authorization to take military action to forestall it. A subsequent UN inquiry report published in December 1999 criticized Annan and his deputy, Iqbal Riza, for this shortcoming.25 About two weeks after the start of the genocide, Annan and Riza argued that since a cease-fire was a dim prospect in Rwanda, the UN Secretariat must advise the council to envisage the withdrawal of UNAMIR.26

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148 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS The safety of UN personnel and Western civilians in Kigali seemed to matter more to many in New York than the slaughter of 800,000 innocent civilians in Africa. The urgent need for the UN Security Council to act to prevent genocide was abandoned. In May 1994, the council belatedly reversed its decision and authorized the dispatch of 5,500 peacekeepers (UNAMIR II) to Rwanda. The troops were fully deployed only in October 1994, far too late to save victims of genocide. Nine African countries that had volunteered troops for a UN mission to Rwanda four months earlier had failed to receive the promised logistics from foot-dragging Western countries. The international community had fiddled while Rwanda burned.27 The crisis had been dismissed as another bout of primordial bloodletting on “the dark continent.” The UN’s lethargic response to the Rwandan genocide seriously damaged its relations with the new RPF-led Rwandan government. UN calls for the investigation of massacres in eastern Congo after the Rwandanbacked ousting of Mobutu’s regime in 1997 further strained relations. The relationship reached its nadir during Kofi Annan’s visit to Kigali as UN secretary-general in May 1998, when the country’s most senior government officials boycotted a state banquet in his honor. During the commemoration of a decade of Rwanda’s genocide in April 2004, Annan decided not to risk an embarrassing repeat of this incident, sending instead Ibrahim Gambari, his special adviser on Africa at the time and current undersecretary-general for political affairs, to represent him in Kigali.

Peacekeepers, Plunderers, and Politicians: The UN Mission in the DRC (2000–2005) In the DRC, decades of bad governance under the Western-backed Mobutu dictatorship eventually resulted in state collapse and civil war by 1997. During peace negotiations, various factions have often failed to demonstrate genuine commitment to implementing peace agreements, and they have used their access to economic resources to fund their military campaigns. Despite the destabilizing regional consequences of this conflict, key regional actors have provided military support to the warring parties. Although energetic regional diplomacy has helped seal peace agreements, the permanent members of the UN Security Council have yet to demonstrate the necessary political commitment to help end this conflict. A brief background to the conflict is helpful in understanding the UN mission in Congo that was established in 2000. In early 1997, LaurentDésiré Kabila’s AFDL launched a devastating rebellion against Mobutu’s dictatorship. With help from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, the revolt succeeded in toppling the autocrat in May 1997. Despite expectations that the

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Congolese would finally be liberated from tyranny, Kabila’s rule continued in the autocratic traditions of Mobutu. In August 1998, Kabila’s former allies, Uganda and Rwanda, invaded Congo in support of antigovernment rebels.28 Burundi also sent in troops on the side of Kigali and Kampala. In response to the invasion by Uganda and Rwanda, a pro-Kabila alliance of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad sent troops to the DRC to prop up Kabila’s regime. Foreign armies in Congo sought financial rewards from the country’s rich mineral wealth and backed assorted rebels. Though most Western countries strongly criticized Zimbabwe for its role in the DRC, they were more muted in their criticism of the flagrant violation of Congolese sovereignty by Rwanda and Uganda. Not until 2000 (nearly two years after the outbreak of the conflict) did the UN Security Council find the voice to criticize Kigali and Kampala’s invasion of one of its sovereign members and to ask them to withdraw from Congo.29 Washington, particularly under the Bill Clinton administration between 1993 and 2000, was a close ally of Kigali and Kampala, providing them with military training and advice. Differences among South Africa and its interventionist neighbors— Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia—paralyzed the SADC of which the DRC was a member, and the OAU took over mediation efforts. At a meeting in Lusaka in July 1999, Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe signed a peace accord. The Lusaka Accord called for a ceasefire and the redeployment of troops to specified positions; the release of prisoners of war; the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Congo; a national dialogue among Kabila, the armed opposition groups (the RCD and the MLC), and the unarmed civilian opposition; the disarming of all militias and “armed groups”;30 the reestablishment of state administration throughout the DRC; and the creation of a new national army. The UN was asked to deploy a peacekeeping force to Congo, in collaboration with the OAU. Lusaka also called on the OAU to nominate a chair for a Joint Military Commission and to designate a neutral facilitator for the InterCongolese Dialogue. The JMC was mandated to verify the disengagement of forces and the quartering and disarmament of armed groups as well as to monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congo. To facilitate implementation of the accord, a Political Committee, consisting of the foreign and defense ministers of the parties, was established to assist the JMC.31 Ketumile Masire, the former president of Botswana, was nominated to be the facilitator of the ICD. Not until April 1999, eight months after the outbreak of hostilities in the DRC, did the UN Security Council adopt its first resolution on the conflict, with its powerful members insisting on a cease-fire before the UN could become actively involved in the crisis.32 In February 2000, the council finally established MONUC under the leadership of Kamel Morjane.

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150 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS Namanga Ngongi replaced Morjane in October 2001. Moustapha Niasse and General Abdulsaalam Abubakar have also served as roving UN envoys in Congo. After deploying ninety military liaison officers to the DRC by the end of 1999, only 4,386 out of an initially authorized strength of 5,537 MONUC peacekeepers had been deployed by February 2003. In May 2000, a UN Security Council team visited Kinshasa, Kigali, Kampala, Lusaka, and Harare on a peace mission led by Richard Holbrooke, the US ambassador to the UN at the time. The mission called for the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops from Congo and urged Kabila to cooperate with MONUC’s deployment. 33 SADC ambassadors in New York also continually lobbied the UN secretary-general and the Security Council, accusing the council of neglect and overcautiousness in expecting more stable conditions in Congo than required elsewhere before deploying a substantial UN force.34 An intricate pattern of diplomacy continued, as Luanda, Windhoek, and Harare sought to pressure Kabila to cooperate with the UN, and Pretoria, which had earlier supplied military matériel to Rwanda and Uganda, urged Kigali and Kampala to withdraw their troops from the DRC. In January 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was shot by one of his presidential bodyguards. Kabila’s son, Joseph, assumed power in Kinshasa. Four months later, another UN Security Council mission visited the Great Lakes region to consult with regional leaders on implementing Lusaka. By October 2001, sporadic fighting continued, particularly in Oriental province and the Kivu region. Laurent-Désiré Kabila had refused to cooperate with the mediator Masire, accusing him of bias and a lack of knowledge of French. Joseph Kabila extended better cooperation to the facilitator, and the ICD was finally launched with a meeting in Addis Ababa in October 2001, before reconvening in South Africa’s Sun City between 25 February and 18 April 2002. A power-sharing agreement was negotiated among the key parties, but the Rwandan-backed RCD at first declined to sign. Energetic South African diplomacy had finally produced some political results, with Pretoria also sending 1,400 troops to a strengthened MONUC. In July 2002, South African president Thabo Mbeki, in close collaboration with UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, brokered the Pretoria accord between Kinshasa and Kigali, by which Rwanda agreed to withdraw from Congo in exchange for Kabila’s promise to track down and disarm Interahamwe and ex-FAR militias that had launched attacks on Rwanda from the DRC. Most Rwandan troops withdrew from Congo by the end of 2002 in fulfillment of the accord, with US pressure playing an important part in Kigali’s withdrawal. The UN, however, received reports that Rwandan forces might have reentered areas in the DRC—particularly around Bukavu—and that withdrawing Rwandan troops had left significant quantities of arms and some personnel with its RCD-Goma allies.35 Namibia had already withdrawn its

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troops from Congo. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Burundi also started bringing the rest of their own contingents home in 2002. A month after South Africa’s diplomatic triumph, Angola brokered the Luanda Accord between Kinshasa and Kampala, by which Uganda agreed to withdraw from Congo and to restore full diplomatic relations. In December 2002, Congolese parties meeting in Pretoria signed the Global and AllInclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The accord called for a two-year transition period during which Joseph Kabila would remain president of the DRC and run the country with four vice presidents nominated by the government, RCD-Goma, the MLC, and the unarmed opposition. Many Congolese, however, expressed concerns that this government of warlords lacked popular support and consisted largely of self-serving political figures who had held office under Mobutu’s discredited dictatorship.36 This agreement was confirmed in Sun City, South Africa, in April 2003 with the signing of the Final Act of the inter-Congolese political negotiation. A week after the signing of the accord, UN special representative Namanga Ngongi convened the first meeting of the International Committee in Support of the Transition (ICST) in Kinshasa, comprising ambassadors of permanent members of the UN Security Council, representatives of the AU troika—South Africa, Mozambique, and Zambia—and diplomats from Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, the AU, and the EU. In May 2003, Kofi Annan called for an increase in MONUC’s forces to 10,800 and urged a strengthening of the UN’s mandate to enable the mission to contribute more effectively to conflict resolution efforts and to provide greater political support to the transition government in Kinshasa. 37 By November 2003, MONUC had 10,415 troops and an annual budget of $641 million. But despite progress on the political front, instability continued in the Kivu region, and the security situation in Bunia (Ituri province) deteriorated sharply following the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the northeastern town in May 2003. The departure of Ugandan soldiers left a security vacuum that ethnic-based militias rushed in to fill, slaughtering hundreds of civilians and threatening the beleaguered UN compound. Bunia had been the battleground of conflicts between Lendu and Hema militias for several years, and Kampala had been accused of supporting both sides at different periods. Given the increasing concern about “genocide” and the killing of two UN military observers, Kofi Annan called on the Security Council to deploy a well-equipped peace-enforcement force to Bunia to protect the town’s 20,000 civilians, UN staff, and key installations. In June 2003, France led the 1,000-strong largely EU IEMF to conduct Operation Artemis, which was mandated to protect civilians in Bunia until 2,400 Bangladeshi, Indian, Indonesian, Pakistani, and Uruguayan UN peacekeepers took over from the force in September 2003. MONUC thereafter conducted cordon-and-search

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152 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS operations in Bunia and its environs. Though helpful in stabilizing the situation and leading to a strengthened military mandate for MONUC, this force had as much to do with the EU’s attempts to find a testing ground for its evolving rapid-reaction force. With unilateral French military interventions having become discredited after the Rwandan debacle, widespread suspicion remains in many parts of Africa that France may be hoping to use the EU force as political cover to continue its interventionist policies in Francophone Africa. In July 2003, the UN Security Council mandated MONUC to use force to implement its mandate in Ituri and Kivu and imposed an arms embargo on the two provinces. This latter action was more symbolic than real, since there was no effective mechanism to monitor the embargo along a 2,500-kilometer border between Congo and its neighbors (Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi). In August 2003, William Swing, a veteran US diplomat, was appointed as the UN special representative in Kinshasa, raising hopes that the presence of a high-profile American in the post would encourage Washington to lend greater support to MONUC. Though there was some optimism that the inauguration of the transitional government in Kinshasa in July 2003 might finally end five years of conflict in the DRC, fighting still continued in parts of Ituri province and eastern Congo. Despite the establishment of a strengthened MONUC Ituri brigade, the province saw a continued splintering of armed factions and attacks on UN peacekeepers.38 The transitional government has also struggled, amid widespread allegations of corruption against its members and the military top brass and a lack of financial and logistical support, to implement a national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program, making it difficult to deal with fighters who were ready to surrender their arms throughout Congo. South Africa continued to be the main driving force behind the UN’s Third Verification Mechanism for implementing the Pretoria Agreement. In November 2003, Thabo Mbeki continued diplomatic efforts to bring the leaders of Congo and Rwanda to South Africa to discuss the implementation of their earlier accord.39 At a meeting in Paris in December 2003, donors pledged $3.9 billion for the reconstruction of the DRC between 2004 and 2006, though it remains unclear, based on past experience, how many of these promises will actually be delivered. Drawing lessons from Ituri, the UN announced the creation of a 3,500-strong South African–led Kivu brigade in March 2004. With increasing factionalism within the transitional government, such plans failed to stop the brief capture of Bukavu by rebels two months later, before Congolese government troops retook the town. MONUC had only 450 troops in Bukavu, a number it soon increased to 1,004. But the UN’s overstretched peacekeepers were unable to intervene effectively to bring peace to a town of 550,000 residents, though MONUC did protect 4,000 internally displaced persons who had sought shelter at the UN’s office in the town. The UN was dismissed as

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a toothless body by several senior officials of the transitional government for failing to use its Chapter VII powers to prevent the fall of Bukavu.40 These tensions lit the fuse of anti-UN sentiment that extremists had earlier stoked by calling for attacks on MONUC personnel. There were also increased negative media reports about the role of the UN in the DRC.41 These criticisms revived unpleasant memories of the UN’s days in Congo four decades earlier. The UN was accused of failing to prevent Bukavu from falling to rebels, its vehicles were burned, and there were violent demonstrations outside its offices in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kalemie, Mbandaka, Beni, Kindu, and Kisangani that led to the destruction of equipment and property estimated at $1million. UN staff were also harassed and assaulted, and their homes were looted. MONUC soldiers killed three demonstrators who had infiltrated the UN compound in Kinshasa.42 This incident, along with allegations of sexual exploitation and rape of women by MONUC staff in Bunia, further damaged the UN’s tarnished image in Congo.43 The crisis in Bukavu led to the deterioration in relations between Kinshasa and Kigali, with the Congolese accusing Rwanda of involvement in the capture of Bukavu, and the Rwandans accusing Kinshasa of failing to prevent attacks on its territory from the DRC. In June 2004, the government of Joseph Kabila announced the foiling of a coup attempt by about forty members of the presidential guards who briefly took over the national television station in Kinshasa, again underlining the unpredictable and unstable nature of this conflict. This was further underlined by the announcement, in August 2004, by the representative of RCD-Goma on the transitional government executive committee, Azarias Ruberwa, that his party was leaving the interim government. Thabo Mbeki had to fly to Kinshasa a few days later to stitch things together. Many committees and mechanisms have been established, with UN assistance, to implement the Lusaka Accord. But many of these bodies have foundered as a result of a lack of commitment and political will by domestic and regional actors. In April 2003, the UN had convened the ICST to coordinate diplomatic efforts for Congo’s peace process and to exert joint political pressure on the domestic parties. With the continuing presence of armed Ugandan rebels in northeastern DRC, MONUC helped to establish the Joint Uganda/DRC Bilateral Security Intelligence Commission in December 2003. At the AU summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004, Kofi Annan convened a meeting with key African leaders to pressure Kigali and Kinshasa to establish the Joint Verification Mechanism agreed to by Joseph Kabila and Rwandan leader Paul Kagame during a meeting in Abuja with Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. MONUC drew up the draft terms of reference for this mechanism. Since its inception, this mechanism has contributed to easing bilateral and regional tensions. The conflict in Bukavu underlined the UN’s folly in deploying an inadequate number of logistically deficient peacekeepers with an ambiguous

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154 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS mandate to help disarm over 300,000 combatants in a country the size of Western Europe. Critical guidelines of the Brahimi report on peacekeeping of August 2000 that urged the UN Security Council to send sufficient troops into conflict zones, have clear mandates, and ensure the capacity to respond decisively to threats have simply been ignored in this case.44 As Kofi Annan candidly admitted in a report to the UN Security Council in August 2004: “The establishment of MONUC’s peacekeeping mandate under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter has raised expectations that the Mission will ‘enforce’ the peace throughout the country. However, there is a wide gap between such expectations and MONUC’s capacity to deliver on them.”45 In the same report, the UN secretary-general proposed new roles for a strengthened MONUC. Annan called for MONUC to establish three joint commissions with the transitional government—on legislation (including a new constitution), security sector reform, and elections—to help coordinate efforts and mobilize international support in these important areas. Significantly, the UN secretary-general also called for an increase in MONUC’s strength from 10,800 to 23,900. He outlined a revised concept of military operations, with strengthened UN brigades in Ituri, North and South Kivu, and Katanga/Kasai mandated to preempt conflicts, assist disarmament efforts, and help the government to extend its authority throughout the country. A brigade-sized force was proposed for Kinshasa. Annan also called for MONUC to establish two rapid reaction forces—reserve battalions—to respond to emergencies.46 In October 2004, the Security Council increased MONUC’s authorized strength to 16,700, which was 7,200 fewer troops than the UN secretary-general had requested. In September 2004, Rwanda and the DRC agreed on the terms of the Joint Verification Mechanism, and both countries and Uganda signed a USbrokered tripartite agreement a month later. In the latter accord, all three countries vowed to prevent the use of their territory by foreign troops. But the reality of the situation on the ground was much different from these diplomatic niceties. Between September and December 2004, forty incidents of direct fire were reported against MONUC’s Ituri brigade.47 The UN continued its more robust “peace enforcement” role in Ituri, with infantry troops from Pakistan, Nepal, and South Africa conducting cordonand-search operations and arresting militia leaders in February and March 2005. These tactics, however, carried risks: during the operations in February, nine UN peacekeepers were killed, and MONUC also killed about sixty militia members.48 Twenty-five million potential Congolese voters are scheduled to go to the polls in parliamentary and presidential elections in April 2006. These polls will cost an estimated $422 million, amid reports of serious funding shortfalls. In December 2005, 84 percent of the voters approved the new constitution, setting the stage for the electoral contests. Despite the positive

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developments on the political front, the transition government still confronts enormous problems in the restoration of peace. The process of integration of soldiers into civilian life has been grossly underresourced, despite the efforts of Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, Angola, and the EU. For example, in July 2005, two-thirds of ex-combatants in Ituri remained unemployed.49 Strong suspicion and accusations continued that Rwanda and Uganda were still supporting militias in Kivu and Ituri respectively, and the Congolese army and the myriad of militias were accused of continued killings and abuses of civilians. In May 2005, Kofi Annan proposed that the UN Security Council increase MONUC’s peacekeepers to 19,290 to help increase security before the national elections. Of MONUC’s 16,700 troops, 11,000 were deployed in Ituri and Kivu provinces, leaving the other 5,700 thinly and dangerously spread across a massive country with dilapidated infrastructure and communication. The elections originally scheduled for June 2005 have been postponed by nearly a year, and disarmament has proceeded at a very slow pace. These factors do not bode well for future stability in this huge country at the heart of Africa. The UN Security Council clearly has not learned the lessons of Rwanda and has failed to provide the resources requested by Annan to help sustain efforts to end a seven-year war that has claimed an estimated 2.5 million lives, internally displaced 3.4 million people, involved seven foreign armies, and spanned three of Africa’s subregions.

Conclusion The three cases of UN peacekeeping in Africa surveyed in this chapter offer important lessons for the future. There remains an urgent need for Western countries to demonstrate a generosity in Africa similar to that for Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. There is also a pressing need to establish a proper division of labor between the UN and Africa’s fledgling security organizations, whose peacekeeping capacity needs to be greatly strengthened.50 Rwanda’s Arusha agreement and the DRC’s Lusaka Accord clearly revealed the military weakness of the OAU/AU, whose members lacked the resources to implement agreements they had negotiated without calling in UN peacekeepers. As the AU strengthens its fifteen-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), which was established in March 2004, and seeks to create five subregional stand-by forces by 2010, the UN must work more closely with the AU, SADC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and ECCAS to strengthen their security mechanisms.51 Lack of political support and erratic external funding and interest eventually contributed to the failure in Rwanda and could yet lead to failure in Congo. The suggestions in

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156 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS the UN high-level panel report of December 2004 and Kofi Annan’s March 2005 report In Larger Freedom that the UN provide financial support to Africa’s regional organizations must be urgently implemented.52 Despite the UN Security Council’s constant talk of strengthening regional organizations, not much has been done to strengthen the capacity of regional peacekeepers and to collaborate effectively with them in the field. The August 2000 Brahimi report on reforming UN peacekeeping was disappointingly short of details on the subject of establishing an effective division of labor between the UN and Africa’s regional organizations. 53 It is clear that the success of future UN missions will continue to depend heavily on the willingness of the Security Council to muster the political will and to provide the military and financial resources to get the job done. The willingness of Western peacekeepers, which have both the equipment and resources, to continue to contribute to UN missions in Africa remains important. The British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 that helped to stabilize a crumbling UN mission demonstrated that the involvement of such armies is important in filling gaps created by the deficiencies of armies from developing countries. French logistical support was vital to the successful deployment of African peacekeepers to the UN mission in the Central African Republic in 1997, and the French-led EU military intervention in 2003 helped stabilize a crumbling UN mission in Bunia. There is a strong case to be made for developing strategies to deal with “spoilers,” such as Rwanda’s genocidaires, who are determined to see the UN fail and attempt to ensure its withdrawal by attacking its peacekeepers. It is difficult to remain neutral under circumstances in which factions deliberately kill UN peacekeepers, and the economic, political, and legal sanctions of the sort that were imposed on Charles Taylor in Liberia and rebels in Sierra Leone and Angola would seem appropriate in such cases. The recent innovation of establishing UN panels to “name and shame” countries and leaders that are supporting rebels and plundering resources could also be a useful tool for the UN to achieve compliance with peace accords, as long as such reports are based on meticulous research and solid information. There are two potentially promising roles for the UN in the Great Lakes region. First, in a UN-led initiative to promote a regional approach to the conflicts in the Great Lakes, in July 2002 Kofi Annan appointed Ibrahima Fall, the Senegalese UN assistant secretary-general for political affairs, as his special representative to the Great Lakes region. Fall, in partnership with the AU, organized an international conference on the Great Lakes in November 2004 involving regional governments, civil society actors, and foreign donors. This idea had first been proposed in the Security Council in October 1994, but partly because it was strongly backed by France, enjoyed little support in Kigali and Kampala. Rwanda and Uganda also opposed the inclusion of Angola and Congo/Brazzaville as full participants in the conference.

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The conference aimed to address the root causes of the Great Lakes’ interlocking conflicts, to craft a regional settlement to the conflicts, and to muster donor support for the economic reconstruction of the region. Conferees were requested to forge a stability, security, and development plan for the region and to undertake regional integration projects in the energy, transport, infrastructure, and information sectors. The core countries that were involved in the conference included Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia, with other countries invited as contiguous states. The conference had four main areas of focus: peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration, and humanitarian and social issues.54 On 19 and 20 November 2004, the first heads-of-state summit of the international conference, in Dar-es-Salaam, was attended by eleven African leaders. A declaration was signed committing states to principles, plans of action, and draft protocols for promoting peace and security in the region. Four days after the meeting, officials in Kigali threatened to launch a “surgical strike” into Congo to flush out Rwandan rebels operating there. It was clear that the “spirit of Dar” had not spilled over into the treacherous politics of the Great Lakes. A second Great Lakes summit is planned for Nairobi at the end of 2006. Second, in further support of a regional approach to the conflicts in the Great Lakes, the UN Security Council finally heeded African calls to take over the cash-strapped African Mission in Burundi in which 2,612 South African, Mozambican, and Ethiopian peacekeepers and twenty-nine military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo, and Tunisia were struggling to end a decade-long civil war that has killed an estimated 200,000 people. In May 2004, the UN Security Council established the UN Operation in Burundi, with an authorized strength of 5,650 peacekeepers and a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. The mission, headed by Carolyn McAskie, was mandated to monitor and provide security for disarming troops (Burundi has about 70,000 armed combatants), collect and destroy weapons, and monitor the cantonment of troops and the disarmament of militias. The peacekeepers are also expected to protect the civilian population; report on cease-fire violations; and monitor, in cooperation with the UN mission in Congo, illegal arms shipments and cross-border movements by armed groups.55 By August 2004, there were 3,312 ONUB troops in Burundi after the integration of the former AMIB peacekeepers and the addition of significant contingents from Nepal and Pakistan. The mission experienced delays in obtaining troops, deployment was slow, and even the mission’s South African backbone expressed an unwillingness to continue providing many of its specialized units to the mission.56 One of ONUB’s earliest tasks was to provide security to refugees after a massacre of 160 Congolese Banyamulenge refugees at a transit camp in the Burundian town of Gatumba, near

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158 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS the Congolese border, in August 2004. Despite the UN’s presence in Burundi, armed skirmishes have continued, particularly in Cibitoké Province and Bujumbura Rurale. Though 7,329 combatants were demobilized between December 2004 and April 2005, internal political divisions among the fractious transitional government continued. The postconstitution referendum was finally adopted in March 2005; in presidential elections held in August 2005, rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza was elected overwhelmingly.57 With these developments, the UN must finally recognize that it cannot succeed in Congo unless it adopts a regional approach to the conflicts in Central Africa that prioritizes peace in Burundi and Rwanda as well as in the DRC. Only then can the troubled waters of the Great Lakes be calmed.

Notes 1. See Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, “Back to the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Africa,” in Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram (eds.), Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 161–188; Christopher Clapham, “The United Nations and Peacekeeping in Africa,” in Mark Malan (ed.), Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? (Braamfontein: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), pp. 25–44; Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); Ibrahim Gambari, “The United Nations,” in Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (eds.), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Marrack Goulding, “The United Nations and Conflict in Africa Since the Cold War,” African Affairs 98, no. 391 (April 1999), pp. 155–166; and Agostinho Zacarias, The United Nations and International Peacekeeping (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996). 2. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992). 3. See Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22 no. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5–53. 4. See Agnes Callamard, “French Policy in Rwanda,” in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (eds.), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 157–183; René Lemarchand, “Foreign Policy Making in the Great Lakes Region,” in Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds.), African Foreign Policies: Power and Process (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 87–106; and Gérard Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 5. See Georges Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960– 1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, January 1960–December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History (London: Hutchinson, 1962); and Indar Jit Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General: UN Peacekeeping and the Congo Crisis (London: Hurst; New York: St. Martin’s, 1993). 6. See Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), pp. 145–170. 7. Alan James, “The Congo Controversies,” International Peacekeeping 1, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 44–58.

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8. Ibid., p. 53. 9. See Turid Laegreid, “UN Peacekeeping in Rwanda,” in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (eds.), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 231–251; and Ami Mpunge, “Crisis and Response in Rwanda,” in Mark Malan (ed.), Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? (Braamfontein: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), pp. 14–24. 10. Laegreid, “UN Peacekeeping in Rwanda,” p. 232. See also Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London: Arrow Books, 2004). 11. Astri Suhrke, “UN Peacekeeping in Rwanda,” in Gunnar Sorbo and Peter Vale (eds.), Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), pp. 107–108. 12. See, for example, Ibrahim A. Gambari, “Rwanda: An African Perspective,” in David M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 514. 13. Henry Kwami Anyidoho, Guns over Kigali (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 1999), p. 11. 14. Henry Anyidoho, “Remembering Rwanda” (paper presented at a policy seminar organized by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa, 21–23 May 2004). 15. For an eyewitness account by UNAMIR’s deputy force commander, see Anyidoho, Guns over Kigali, pp. 20–38. 16. See, for example, Lemarchand, “Foreign Policy Making in the Great Lakes Region,” p. 91. 17. Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis, p. 287. 18. Quoted in Callamard, “French Policy in Rwanda,” p. 174. 19. Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000), p. 159. 20. Cited in Laegreid, “UN Peacekeeping in Rwanda,” p. 243. 21. Anyidoho, “Remembering Rwanda.” 22. Colin Keating, “Rwanda: An Insider’s Account,” in David M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 504. 23. Ibid., p. 506. 24. Ibid., p. 503. 25. Melvern, A People Betrayed, p. 93. 26. See United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257 (New York: 1999). 27. See Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Melvern, A People Betrayed; Organization of African Unity, The International Panel of Eminent Persons to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events (Addis Ababa: 2000); and United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations. 28. See Lemarchand, “Foreign Policy Making in the Great Lakes Region,” pp. 87–106; and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila, a People’s History (London: Zed Books; New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 227–240. 29. Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, p. 232. 30. These groups included the Interahamwe, the ex-FAR, the ADF, the LRA, the FDD, the former Ugandan National Army, the Uganda National Rescue Front II, the West Nile Bank Front, and UNITA.

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160 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS 31. On the Lusaka Accord, see Musifiky Mwanasali, “From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union,” in Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (eds.), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2003), pp. 213–215; and United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (New York: 2000), pp. 1–3. 32. Virgil Hawkins, “History Repeating Itself: The DRC and the UN Security Council,” African Security Review 12, no. 4 (2003), p. 49. See also Mark Malan and Joao Gomes Porto (eds.), Challenges of Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004). 33. See United Nations, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2000/566 (New York: 2000), pp. 1–2. 34. United Nations, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2000/1156 (New York: 2000), pp. 2–3. 35. United Nations, Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1180 (New York: 2002), p. 3. 36. Emeric Rogier, “MONUC and the Challenges of Peace Implementation in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (report for the Institute for Security Studies International Expert Workshop, Pretoria, 17–19 September 2003), p. 3. 37. United Nations, Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/556 (New York: 2003), pp. 9. 28. 38. United Nations, Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/251 (New York: 2004), pp. 7–8. 39. See Jean-Jacques Cornish, “In Praise of Peace in the DRC,” Mail and Guardian 19, no. 48 (28 November–4 December 2003), p. 16. 40. On the Bukavu crisis, see United Nations, Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/650 (New York: 2004), pp. 10–14. 41. United Nations, Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, p. 10. 42. See United Nations, Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, p. 12. 43. Ibid., p. 9. 44. See United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, S/2000/809 (New York: 2000). 45. See Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, p. 21. 46. See ibid., pp. 27–33. 47. United Nations, Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/1034 (New York: 2004), p. 3. 48. United Nations, Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/167 (New York: 2005), pp. 4–5. 49. United Nations, Eighteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/506 (2005), p. 5.

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50. See “The New Partnership for Africa’s Security: The United Nations, Regional Organisations, and Future Security Threats in Africa” (report of a policy seminar organized by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, 21–23 May 2004); and “A More Secure Continent: African Perspectives on the UN High-Level Panel Report” (report of a policy seminar organized by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, 23–24 April 2005), both available at http://ccrweb.ccr.uct .ac.za. 51. See International Peace Academy, The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of African Institutions (New York: IPA, 2002); IPA/Centre for Africa’s International Relations, “Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Role and Potential of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)” (report of a task force meeting in Johannesburg, March 2002); IPA/ ECOWAS, “Operationalizing the ECOWAS Security Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security” (report of a task force meeting in Dakar, August 2002); IPA/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum, “Building Peace in Eastern Africa” (report of a policy seminar in Entebbe, December 2002); and Monde Muyangwa and Margaret A. Vogt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (New York: IPA, 2000). 52. See United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, DPI/2367 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2004); and United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, A/59/2005, report of the UN secretarygeneral, follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit (New York: 2005). 53. United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, S/2000/809 (New York: 2000). See Kofi Annan, “Challenges of the New Peacekeeping,” in Olara Otunnu and Michael Doyle (eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 169– 187; Mats Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993). 54. See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Preparations for an International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, S/2003/1099 (New York: 2003). 55. See United Nations, Report of the UN Secretary-General on Burundi, S/2004/210 (New York: 2004). 56. See United Nations, First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi, S/2004/682 (New York: 2004), p. 8. 57. United Nations, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Conflict Situations in Africa. Executive Council, Seventh Ordinary Session (New York: 2005), pp. 12–14.

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9 Belgium, France, and the United States PETER J. SCHRAEDER

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ouis Michel, Belgium’s outspoken minister of foreign affairs, rationalized his country’s renewed involvement in the Great Lakes region beginning in 1999 as a moral duty. He argued that proactive involvement by Western democracies was necessary to remove the “stain” on the “collective Western conscience” of decades of self-serving and indifferent foreign policies toward Africa.1 As recently as 1994, for example, genocide in Rwanda that claimed as many as 1 million lives was downplayed by US policymakers fearful of being drawn into a military quagmire, fueled by French policies that had provided arms and aid to the Rwandan government that carried out the genocide and facilitated by Belgian policymakers who had withdrawn their military forces at the outbreak of hostilities when ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed. The magnitude of the local impacts exerted by this and other cases of intervention from the colonial era to the present has been enormous. “No other part of the continent has been so thoroughly exposed to the penetration of so many international actors on so many occasions, and with so few positive results,” explained René Lemarchand. “And all bear some degree of responsibility for either doing too little too late, or too much at the wrong time on behalf of the wrong party.”2 According to Michel, however, the ongoing violence in the Great Lakes region is not permanent or indelible. It can be resolved as long as Western democracies pursue the “right” kinds of policies, most notably by facilitating regional efforts in peace building, socioeconomic development, and democracy promotion. Although Michel does not simply suggest that the “dirty laundry” of the Great Lakes region can be “sent out” for cleaning (that is, that durable solutions can only be achieved from abroad), his approach is based on three sets of assumptions: (1) the leaders of Belgium, France, and the United States—the so-called troika or parrains (godfathers)—which have both influence and a historical stake in the Great Lakes region, need to make that region a foreign policy priority, (2) these 163

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164 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS policies need to be designed to further local and regional priorities as opposed to more self-interested foreign policy concerns, and (3) it is desirable for policymakers in Brussels, Paris, and Washington to cooperate in order to forge sustainable policies. The historical record offers some sobering counterpoints to these assumptions. Rarely has the Great Lakes region served as the foreign policy priority of Belgium, France, and the United States, and when it has, self-interested goals have tended to dominate. Cooperation among Western democracies for the betterment of the Great Lakes region has been elusive and sporadic, with the US-French relationship particularly exhibiting rising strains and tensions in the post–cold war era. This is not to say that cooperation among Western democracies in the common pursuit of peace building in the Great Lakes region is impossible. To the contrary, the primary thesis of this chapter, which focuses primarily on US, Belgian, and French foreign policies, is not only that such cooperation is possible but also that we are at a historic turning point that is especially propitious for such cooperation. How and why the US, Belgian, and French policymaking establishments have arrived at this historic juncture and the degree to which their policies have contributed to the consolidation of peace building in the Great Lakes region serve as the focal points of this chapter, which is divided into three sections: (1) policymaking legacy of the cold war era (1960–1989), (2) intensification of great power rivalry amid genocide and continental warfare (1989–1999), and (3) convergence of interests in promoting peace and security in the aftermath of Lusaka (1999–present).

Policymaking Legacy of the Cold War Era (1960–1989) Any discussion of the role of the Western countries in the Great Lakes region must begin with the legacy of Belgian colonialism in Congo, which was expanded when Belgium assumed control over the German colonies of Burundi and Rwanda in the aftermath of World War I. The consensus within the decolonization literature is that Belgium “did virtually nothing” to promote the political conditions, such as the training of an indigenous university-educated elite, that would be conducive to an orderly transfer of power.3 In no less than five days following Congo’s independence, a series of mutinies ushered in a period of civil war and foreign intervention that would become the first true African crisis of the cold war. Equally important, this decolonization process, which was followed by the granting of independence to Burundi and Rwanda in 1962, marked the beginning of the steady erosion of Belgian political ambitions in the African arena. By the end of the cold war in 1989, a process of generational change had ensured the emergence of more insular-minded policymaking elites who were largely

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disinterested in African affairs and who had a tendency to view the colonial era as a shameful period that was best left to the dustbins of Belgian political history.4 In sharp contrast, French policymakers, who were proud of French accomplishments in Africa, sought to strengthen and promote the further rayonnement (spread) of the French language and intellectual traditions. 5 Referred to as the promotion of la francophonie (a greater French-speaking community), this policy is best represented by the biennial Franco-African Summit that is attended by the leaders of France and Francophone Africa. Nineteen such summits were held during the cold war, including those in Kigali (the sixth summit, 1979), Kinshasa (the ninth summit, 1982), and Bujumbura (the eleventh summit, 1984). Regardless of whether France was led by the conservative partisans of Charles de Gaulle or the socialists of François Mitterrand, French policymakers predictably claimed that historical links and geographical proximity justified placing Francophone Africa, including Belgium’s former colonies, within France’s sphere of influence.6 The implicit assumption of the French version of the Monroe Doctrine is that Francophone Africa constituted France’s chasse gardée (private hunting ground) and therefore remained off limits to other great powers, regardless of whether they were “friends,” such as the United States, or “enemies,” such as the Soviet Union.7 This conception of Francophone Africa was accepted and even encouraged by US policymakers whose Africa policies were principally guided by the ideological interest of preventing the spread of communist regimes to the African continent.8 The White House expected its European allies, including Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, to take the lead in their former colonial territories. In those crisis situations in which a weakened and withdrawing European power was perceived by Washington as either unable or unwilling to confront a perceived communist threat in its former colony, however, the tendency was for the White House to take an active role in the policymaking process, sometimes transforming US foreign policy toward the country in question. In the Belgian Congo, for example, the combination of Belgium’s inability to maintain stability amid the specter of Soviet-bloc intervention transformed a foreign policy backwater into a series of crisis situations that from 1960 to 1967 periodically received sustained White House attention during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, a relatively rare occurrence in US foreign policy toward Africa. The net result of presidential involvement in the policymaking process was a series of interventions ranging from President Eisenhower’s authorization of a covert operation to assassinate Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba to White House backing for a 1965 military coup in which the pro-US and CIA-cultivated Mobutu Sese Seko assumed power.9

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166 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS The historic reality of White House disinterest in African affairs nonetheless ensured that US foreign policy toward Africa, perhaps more so than that toward any other region, was typically delegated during the cold war to the high-level bureaucrats and political appointees within the executive branch. To understand the continuity and change in US foreign policy toward Africa, one must focus on the policies of the African affairs bureaus of the traditional national security bureaucracies, most notably the State Department, the Defense Department (Pentagon), and the CIA. 10 In the case of genocide in Burundi in 1972, for example, the Nixon White House deferred the handling of the US policy response to the Africa specialists in the State Department’s Africa Bureau, almost certainly because the massacres were taking place in a region of little strategic interest. The net result was a bureaucratically inspired policy of inaction that underscored the need to follow the lead of the OAU and the majority of its member states, which opposed interference in the domestic affairs of African countries.11 The French policymaking system represented the polar opposite of its US counterpart. French presidents from de Gaulle to Mitterrand had to be knowledgeable of African affairs because Francophone Africa was important to their foreign policies outside of Europe. This entailed nurturing of close, high-level personal ties between French presidents and their Francophone counterparts in Africa, as witnessed by the informal reseaux (networks) created by Jacques Foccart, the architect of French-African relations in the immediate postindependence era.12 French presidents also sat at the apex of a highly centralized foreign policy apparatus that theoretically allowed for a more focused and long-term approach to the African continent, although several foreign policy actors, most notably Foccart’s Cellule Africaine (Africa Unit) within the Elysée, the Ministry of Cooperation, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, competed for influence. In short, Francophone Africa’s special place in French foreign policy ensured that the region would enjoy a high level of presidential attention and coordination that was envied by other regional specialists in the French foreign policy–making establishment and their Africanist counterparts in the US government. Differences in decisionmaking procedures did not necessarily lead to more enlightened foreign policies in the Great Lakes region by either France or the United States. The importance that both countries attached to cultivating African allies during the cold war often resulted in contradictory policies, especially when the normative goal of promoting democracy clashed with the pursuit of strategic interests. In the case of France, a desire to more closely knit Belgium’s former colonies into France’s sphere of influence prompted French policymakers to court the military regimes of Captain Michel Micombero (1966–1976) and Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza

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(1976–1987) in Burundi and the military regime of Major General Juvénal Habyarimana (1973–1994) in Rwanda, at the expense of democracy. Similar contradictions were evident in Washington’s approach to the Great Lakes region. Beginning in 1965, US presidents publicly reiterated Washington’s special relationship with Mobutu, providing his military dictatorship with approximately $1.5 billion in economic and military aid. As long as Mobutu was willing to pursue Washington’s anticommunist agenda in the Great Lakes region, US policymakers overlooked his regime’s authoritarian character and severe violations of human rights. The combination of Belgium’s gradual withdrawal from its former colonies with the fact that the United States and France were pursuing fundamentally different but complementary foreign policy interests—containment of communism for the United States and promotion of la francophonie for France—ensured that the Great Lakes region was the beneficiary of a complementary cold war order in which US-Belgian-French relations tended to be balanced, cooperative, and predictable. Especially in the strategic realm, complementary interests served as the basis for joint military interventions, such as the 1978 joint US-Belgian-French military operation in Congo’s Shaba province to defeat the Front de Libération Nationale du Congo (FNLC), which for the second time in two years had launched an invasion of Congolese territory. In this and other cases, the United States provided military transport and logistical transport for Belgian and French troops that would engage insurgents on the ground. Disagreements among Brussels, Paris, and Washington over Congo’s long-term stability in the aftermath of the Shaba interventions nonetheless demonstrated why cooperation among the Western democracies for the benefit of the Great Lakes region was sporadic and elusive during the cold war. To its credit, the Carter administration sought to usher in a new era in USCongolese relations that, over the objections of most specialists of Congo in the national security bureaucracies, sought to force the Mobutu regime to undertake political and human rights reforms. A shortcoming of this reformist approach was that the Carter administration lacked the cooperation of key US allies in Europe, particularly Belgium and France. According to Robert Remole, former head (1978–1980) of the political section of the US Embassy in Kinshasa and an outspoken critic of past US support for Mobutu, although Belgium and France welcomed reform efforts in the economic sphere, they opposed Washington’s efforts to seek political and human rights reforms. “Unless we can get the Belgians and French to agree with us, we lack leverage,” explained Remole. “All we can do, all we can expect are cosmetic changes, and that is exactly what we have had—cosmetic changes.”13 The existence of a complementary cold war order did not mean that competition did not surface in US-Belgian-French relations but rather that such conflict remained at acceptable levels and never occurred in public. In

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168 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS the case of the US-French relationship, there were muted tensions about US intervention in Congo and the creation of a special relationship with the pro-US Mobutu. Jacques Foccart aptly documented these tensions, noting that French policymakers, especially under de Gaulle, equated the potential US threat to Francophone Africa with that posed by the Soviet Union; in the extreme, some French policymakers depicted the United States as the primary long-term threat to French interests. According to Foccart, Washington’s successful effort in 1965 to put Mobutu in power was perceived as the penetration of “Anglo-Saxon influence” into Francophone Africa, a “victory” for the United States. Years later, relations between Mobutu and France warmed up considerably. Despite French misgivings over US intentions, Washington’s explicit acceptance of France’s chasse gardée ensured that tensions over Congo remained insignificant in the overall complementary cold war order of US-French relations.14

Rwandan Genocide, Emergence of Africa’s “First World War,” and the Intensification of Great Power Competition (1989–1999) The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end of the complementary cold war order and its gradual replacement by a “cold peace” in which the Western countries increasingly competed for economic and political influence in various regions of the Southern Hemisphere.15 Francophone Africa emerged in the 1990s as the most publicly contested arena of great power competition on the African continent.16 Journalists delighted in reporting on the tendency of French minister of foreign affairs Hubert Vedrine to refer to the United States as a hyper-puissance (hyperpower) that, “although lacking a worthy international opponent truly capable of challenging its power, remains incapable of implementing a viable Africa strategy—in essence conjuring up the much-acclaimed image in Gulliver’s Travels of the giant Gulliver finding himself hamstrung by hundreds of ropes tied by six-inch Lilliputians.”17 The hyperpower reference led to countercharges among US policymakers that such extreme statements reflected an ill-founded paranoia among French policymakers who were having difficulties accepting changes in France’s special role in Africa.18 It was in this context that the Rwandan genocide of 1994 emerged as one of the most contentious focal points of debates over foreign intervention on the African continent. The Clinton administration’s response to the Rwandan genocide was influenced by the earlier US-led military intervention in Somalia under a UN mandate, in which eighteen US soldiers were killed and seventy-eight others were wounded in a battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993.19 Confronted with popular demands to intervene,

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the Clinton administration not only initially blocked the dispatch of several thousand troops requested by UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali but also instructed the administration to avoid labeling the conflict as “genocide,” because such a label would have triggered intervention under international conventions.20 Belgium, which had committed peacekeeping troops to the UNAMIR, was traumatized by the assassination of ten Belgian soldiers along with Rwandan prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana on 7 April 1994. The Belgian government’s response was to order an immediate withdrawal of Belgian peacekeeping forces, which was followed on 21 April by a UN Security Council decision to withdraw the majority of UNAMIR forces, leaving behind a symbolic force of 270 peacekeepers. This event touched off a national debate over Belgium’s proper role in the Great Lakes region, with policymakers expressing reluctance to commit Belgian soldiers to future peacekeeping missions. The fact that the withdrawal of Belgian and other UN peacekeepers took place while the Rwandan genocide was unfolding also led to soul-searching among Belgian policymakers, as well as their US counterparts, as to the degree of their individual and collective moral responsibility for permitting the genocide to take place. In contrast, France took the lead in undertaking a series of military interventions in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, ranging from Operations Panda and Noroit in support of the Rwandan government to a UN Security Council–authorized humanitarian intervention, Operation Turquoise, designed to establish humanitarian safety zones in southern Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Mitterrand’s decision to intervene must be viewed against the backdrop of the long-term French goal of integrating the former Belgian colonies of the Great Lakes region into the French sphere of influence. These interventions fostered one of the rare examples of popular outrage in France regarding policy toward Francophone Africa, especially when it was learned that the administration had provided the Habyarimana military dictatorship with over $160 million in economic aid and an untold amount of military aid from 1990 to 1994, essentially contributing to the genocide that unfolded in 1994.21 French military operations prior to Operation Turquoise were aimed at stemming the invasion in October 1990 by the RPF, which was supported by Uganda and perceived by French policymakers as hostile to France and “under Anglo-Saxon influence.”22 Operation Turquoise itself permitted thousands of those responsible for the genocide to flee into eastern Congo ahead of the advancing RPF forces. From the perspective of several French policymakers, the RPF’s military victory in 1994 constituted the first time that a Francophone country had “fallen” to Anglo-Saxon influence, with long-term implications for the future role of a member of la francophonie. Some even perceived Rwanda as the beginning of a series of regional dominos that eventually could lead to Anglo-Saxon domination of the entire

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170 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS Great Lakes region.23 According to this culturally inspired fear, often referred to as France’s “Fashoda complex,” the Great Lakes region could become a Trojan horse projecting Anglo-Saxon influence throughout Francophone Africa.24 French concerns over Francophone dominos intensified with the emergence in 1997 of a guerrilla insurgency determined to overthrow the Mobutu dictatorship. As was the case with its socialist predecessor, the Chirac administration, elected in 1995, perceived this Great Lakes crisis in Francophone-Anglophone terms: the guerrilla insurgency in eastern Congo was led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who was supported by the Rwandan regime of Paul Kagame and the Ugandan regime of Yoweri Museveni. As a result, the French considered Kabila’s guerrilla movement to be under Anglo-Saxon influence and therefore hostile to France. The worst-case scenario envisioned by French policymakers occurred when Kabila’s guerrilla army overthrew Mobutu in May 1997 and installed a new regime, with Kabila as president, that was allied with US friends Rwanda and Uganda. According to this vision, Kabila’s presidency not only constituted a victory for Anglo-Saxon influence but also raised the possibility that Congo might serve as a springboard for the spread of Anglo-Saxon influence throughout Francophone Africa. This fear was dampened after Kabila fell out with his Rwanda and Uganda allies, who subsequently launched a second guerrilla insurgency in 1998 designed to install a more compliant regime in Kinshasa. French suspicions were fueled by an emerging US policy stance that underscored the benefits of promoting close ties between Washington and a “new bloc” of African leaders that included Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa and Museveni of Uganda and Kagame of Rwanda in the Great Lakes region. Having won power as a result of their control over strong and disciplined guerrilla armies, this new generation of elites shared a commitment to create “responsible and accountable” but not necessarily democratic governments.25 In the Great Lakes region, French policymakers viewed the rising fortunes of Museveni and Kagame as part of a US policy designed to supplant French influence. Although it is impossible to ignore the impact that US ties with these two leaders has had on US-French rivalry, this impact was both unintended and unforeseen. Rwanda and Uganda became important throughout the 1990s primarily owing to the US objective of containing the Islamist threat posed by the Sudanese regime of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir (1989– present). All three of the national security bureaucracies, the State Department and especially the CIA and the Pentagon, supported the containment policy that included the provision of economic and military aid to Sudan’s neighbors, especially Uganda, which served as a conduit for US support to the SPLA, led by John Garang. Rwanda under Kagame benefited in terms of US attention due to the RPF’s long exile in and continued close ties with

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Uganda. Some have argued that no other African leader in 1999 was more popular with the Pentagon than Kagame, leading to a series of US military aid programs.26 Kagame’s decision in October 1996 to launch military attacks against refugee camps in eastern Congo that were serving as bases of operation for Interahamwe militia attacks not only signaled the start of a wider war that would ultimately topple the Mobutu dictatorship seven months later but also prompted the Chirac administration to attempt to play a more proactive military role in the region in support of Mobutu. The specific strategy, French leadership of a multinational peacekeeping force into eastern Congo (ostensibly for the protection of refugees but in reality designed to stop the further advance of anti-Mobutu military forces), was stymied for a variety of reasons, two of which are particularly relevant to this analysis. 27 First, the lack of commitment from the other Western democracies, including US opposition, led to the withdrawal of UN support that originally had been granted for such an operation. Second, the option of unilateral French intervention was out of the question because of the publicly stated promise of the Rwandan regime and Kabila’s guerrilla forces to militarily engage French forces. Unlike earlier French military intervention in Rwanda, French forces would be confronted by battle-hardened troops capable of inflicting heavy casualties. The irony of rising US-French tensions over the Great Lakes region, particularly Congo, was that the Clinton administration early on adopted a conservative policy approach that, similar to that of its predecessors, perceived Mobutu as both “part of the problem” and “part of the solution” to what was expected to become a violent political situation. At the heart of the Clinton administration’s conservative approach was the implicit acceptance of the “Mobutu or chaos” argument that had been advanced by specialists in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA since Mobutu took power in 1965.28 With the experiences of Somalia and Rwanda still fresh in the minds of most policymakers, the Clinton administration sought to tread softly as, according to a Foreign Service officer, the situation in Congo “could easily turn into a Somalia and a Rwanda rolled into one, although this time in one of Africa’s largest and most populous nations.”29 In essence, the Clinton administration during spring 1997 adopted a relatively benign approach that neither actively sought to remove nor openly sought to strengthen the Mobutu regime. A gradualist approach was deemed necessary to achieve a “soft landing” for the Mobutu dictatorship. In contrast, the Chirac administration provided firm support to Mobutu that included covert military aid (complete with the hiring of Serbian, Belgian, and French mercenaries) designed to keep Mobutu in power.30 As Foccart underscored, French policy was driven by Congo’s status as the largest and most populous country in Francophone Africa and therefore as

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172 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS a linchpin to the continued strengthening of la francophonie. “Congo has the means to be a regional power,” concluded Foccart, and therefore “the long-term interest of France and its allies is evident.”31 To this must be added the close personal ties that developed between Mobutu and Chirac. As explained by Roland Marchal, it was precisely for these reasons that France “absurdly” supported Mobutu until the very end (in contrast to the policies of other Western countries), subsequently seeking to strengthen ties with the Kabila regime, most notably in the aftermath of Kabila’s falling out with his former Rwandan and Ugandan military patrons and their ordered expulsion from the country in 1998.32 The renewal of conflict in 1998 when Rwanda and Uganda invaded Congo for the second time posed several dilemmas for fostering cooperation among the troika to secure a peaceful end to a conflict that some observers had called Africa’s First World War. Belgian foreign policy was adrift, the United States was firmly associated with its “new bloc” allies of Rwanda and Uganda, and France had a particularly troubled relationship with Rwanda and to a lesser extent Congo. The fact that Rwanda, arguably the crucial intervening power, enjoyed a “genocide credit” in Brussels and Washington (that is, the tendency to mute criticisms owing to US and Belgian inaction during the events of 1994) but a near-rupture in relations with France ensured that a common (let alone critical) approach to Rwandan (and by association, Ugandan) intervention was highly unlikely. Despite President Clinton’s historic 1998 trip to Africa (including stops in Kampala and Kigali), US policy suffered from the lack of sustained highlevel attention. As a result, the national security bureaucracies assumed a critical role in the making of Africa policy. Since the State Department was in the lead, initial policy declarations were reminiscent of past pronouncements on the Mobutu regime. It was striking to hear members of the State Department’s Africa Bureau argue that, like his predecessor at the beginning of the 1990s, Kabila was both “part of the problem and part of the solution” to resolving the crisis in the Great Lakes region. There was a tendency, at the beginning of the conflict in 1998, for US diplomatic personnel to argue against pushing Kabila too hard or too fast, for fear that US efforts would unintentionally exacerbate an already chaotic situation marked by the involvement of at least seven different armies and several guerrilla groups. The net result of this diplomatic quandary was that the US response to the 1998 conflict followed the least common denominator of what was acceptable throughout the national security bureaucracies: (1) denunciation of the use of military force by all parties to the conflict; (2) desirability of a peaceful diplomatic solution, as witnessed by the undertaking of aggressive shuttle diplomacy by Susan Rice and the appointment of Howard Wolpe, former chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa, as special envoy for the Great Lakes region; (3) maintenance of smooth and stable relations with all

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parties to the conflict, most notably Congo and Rwanda, as represented by statements calling on local powers to respect the sovereignty of Congo (that is, sensitivity to Congo’s desire for the withdrawal of foreign forces) and to stop transborder attacks by genocidal groups (that is, a reference to Rwanda’s desire for security provisions against the continued attacks by Hutu militias based in eastern Congo); and (4) African solutions for African problems, as represented by a willingness to embrace regional efforts at conflict mediation, including strong support for the mediation efforts of former South African president Nelson Mandela and the importance of making African troops the centerpiece of peacekeeping in Congo. The last point was particularly characteristic of both Belgian and US approaches to the 1998 conflict. In the case of Belgium, the idea of “reciprocal responsibility,” later translated to mean “African solutions for African problems,” served as a central guideline for Belgian foreign policy toward the Great Lakes region in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide and the deaths of Belgian peacekeepers.33 In the case of the United States, this approach was primarily the result of the lead role being played by the State Department’s Africa Bureau. In the absence of a major political catastrophe, such as the complete collapse of the Congolese state and the breakup of the Congolese nation, which would prompt sustained high-level involvement on the part of President Clinton and his White House staff, the State Department’s Africa Bureau would continue to pursue a balancing act. Such an act neither fully endorsed nor fully denounced the Kabila regime, all the while supporting local and international initiatives with the hope that one such effort eventually would be successful in ameliorating the conflict. “The potential problem with such an approach,” explained a report written for the EU that aptly captured French and especially Chirac administration criticisms, “is that it can be interpreted both positively and negatively; either as a stimulus for Africans to take their fates into their own hands, or as an excuse for an attitude of indifference by the international community.”34

Convergence of Interests in Promoting Peace and Security in the Aftermath of Lusaka (1999–Present) The Lusaka Agreement of 1999 represented a watershed in the evolution of peace and security in the Great Lakes region, serving as the road map for peace. It soon became apparent, however, that among other shortcomings, the agreement had largely frozen armies in their respective positions but had failed to stop the fighting, including the eruption of warfare between allies Rwanda and Uganda in eastern Congo. This situation led one influential monitoring group to declare in December 2000 that the agreement “proved hollow.”35 The primary stumbling block, according to a rare consensus

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174 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS shared by all three members of the troika, was Kabila, whose political intransigence had fostered the worsening of ties with Brussels, Paris, and Washington since his emergence as president.36 The Congolese political dynamic dramatically changed on 16 January 2001, with the assassination of Kabila and the assumption of the presidency by his son, Joseph Kabila. Unlike his father, Joseph Kabila has reached out to and was embraced by all three members of the troika, the policymakers of which praised his commitment to implementing the Lusaka Agreement.37 Kabila met with the ambassadors of the troika ten days after his father’s death, during which time he received and accepted an invitation from US ambassador Thomas Pickering to attend a breakfast prayer in Washington, DC, with the newly elected president, George W. Bush, at which Kagame would also be present. This, the first official visit abroad of Kabila as president, began with a stop in Paris, followed by stops in Washington and Brussels, prior to returning to Kinshasa. By all accounts, Kabila enjoys excellent personal ties with the leaders of all three countries: Chirac warmly received him at the Franco-African Summit held in Paris in February 2003; he enjoys close ties with Belgian foreign minister Michel and King Albert II (the latter publicly snubbed Kabila senior in front of the Belgian cameras by refusing to shake his hand); and he has met with Bush on a number of occasions since assuming office, including during a visit to Washington, DC, in October 2003. The visit to Washington was particularly important. Kabila’s father considered the Clinton administration to be too close to and too supportive of Rwanda and Uganda, a belief that significantly strained US-Congolese ties and made progress on the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement difficult. This dynamic changed with the emergence of new presidents in both Kinshasa and Washington, most notably with the Bush administration’s decision to take a more neutral posture toward the Great Lakes region by somewhat distancing itself from Rwanda (although ties with Uganda remained steadfast) and more proactively courting the “young and untested Kabila” (a statement applicable to Bush as well). This and later meetings between the new presidents put Congo on a more equal footing with Rwanda and Uganda, signaling a shift in great power (especially US) approaches to the Great Lakes region. A second important change within the Great Lakes region involved the growing normalization of ties between Rwanda and all three members of the troika. Just as Rwanda in 1994 served as the epicenter of the political crises that would engulf the region for the next twelve years, so too will it serve as an epicenter of the success or failure of conflict resolution measures for the forseeable future. An important international dimension of this normalization process has involved various high-level “acts of contrition”38 on the part of the Western countries for their collective failure to prevent

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the 1994 genocide. These acts have ranged from the publication of highly critical legislative inquiries, such as the two-volume report of the French parliamentary commission, to public apologies offered by high-ranking government officials, such as the 7 April 2000 apology that was made in Kigali by Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt, who also oversaw his country’s parliamentary inquest on Rwanda. The evocative nature of these speeches is captured in Clinton’s 24 March 1998 statement in Kigali, which, according to Lemarchand, was “phrased in a language free of diplomatic double-talk” and therefore “well-received in Kigali, Kampala, and Bujumbura”: “We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe haven for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past. But we can and must do everything in our power to help you build a future.”39 The Rwandan side of the normalization process involves Kagame’s search for greater international legitimacy. The cornerstone of this process was the holding of national elections on 25 August 2003 in which Kagame was elected president with 95 percent of the vote; a pro-Kagame coalition of parties then won 74 percent of the vote in legislative elections held on 3 October 2003. Although criticized by various human rights groups as less than free and fair, the troika welcomed the elections as an “important step in the right direction.”40 As part of this normalization process, Kagame reached out to France, and France responded in kind, marking the beginning of a thaw in French-Rwandan relations. “We want to move forward,” explained Kagame in a statement clearly targeted toward France, “with any partner who wants to move forward with us.”41 In a striking and symbolically rich departure from the past, Kagame for the first time since the 1994 genocide participated in the twenty-second Franco-African Summit, held in February 2003 in Paris (he was not even invited to the eighteenth summit held in Biarritz, France, in November 1994), and was warmly received by Chirac. One of the most noteworthy international developments with important implications for the Great Lakes region was the election in 1999 (and reelection in 2003) of a Liberal-Socialist government in Belgium intent on playing a more activist role in Africa, especially in its former colonies. In a departure from its Christian-Democrat and Conservative predecessors, this government has raised Africa’s standing within the Belgian foreign policy–making establishment and is playing an activist role in conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. One of the reasons for this newfound activism is the leadership roles played by Prime Minister Verhofstadt and Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel.42 Michel is widely regarded as a passionate and energetic proponent for peace who has established excellent ties with both Kabila and Kagame as well as with Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin in France. It is also argued that Belgium, unlike its

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176 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS US and French counterparts, enjoys an “absolute neutrality” vis-à-vis the various African participants to the Congolese crisis and therefore is well positioned to play a leading role as a true “honest broker” in the peace process.43 In the case of the United States, however, early statements of the Bush administration suggested the continent’s decreased standing at the White House and therefore little possibility for an activist approach to conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. A statement made during the presidential election campaign of 2000 was revealing. In response to a question concerning Africa’s place in a future Bush administration, Bush noted that the continent did not “fit into the national strategic interests” of the United States “as far as I can see them.”44 Secretary of State Colin Powell and the State Department’s Africa Bureau emerged as the lead voice in Bush administration foreign policy toward Africa. During the first year in office, Powell emphasized the strategic imperative of cultivating strong links with Africa’s leading regional powers, most notably South Africa, harkening back to the Nixon administration strategy of relying on such powers to ensure stability within their specific regions. As demonstrated by Pretoria’s crucial role in promoting peace accords in the Great Lakes region, most notably via its sponsorship of the Sun City negotiations as concerns Burundi and Congo, such a policy is seemingly validated by events on the ground, although it remains unclear what influence (if any) Bush administration policy exerted in this regard. Powell’s most important theme with direct relevance to the Great Lakes region as a whole was that Africans needed to “do more for themselves” in the realm of conflict resolution. As he put it: “In Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the Congo and elsewhere, this means stopping the killing, taking the weapons out of the hands of children, ending corruption, seeking compromises, and beginning to work in peace and dialogue rather than war and killing.”45 According to what could be labeled the Powell Doctrine for Africa, African diplomats and military forces, and not those of foreign powers (including the United States), must take the lead in responding to African crises and conflicts. US forces, if they were to be used at all, must be perceived as the source of last resort and in any case must be severely limited in terms of size, mission, and timetable. In the post–September 11 era, the Bush administration has realized that failed states run the risk of becoming breeding grounds for terrorist activities. This realization, however, has led to neither the elaboration of an official policy as concerns failed states nor a willingness to commit US troops in such situations. In African countries such as Congo, which are considered to be marginal to the war on terrorism, the Bush administration, like its cold war predecessors, increasingly has relied on the conflict resolution efforts of three sets of actors: the former colonial powers, African regional

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actors, and, to a lesser extent, UN-sponsored peacekeeping forces. In north, northeast, and East Africa, however, the evolving dynamic has been one of increased military cooperation and foreign aid packages, such as the $100 million antiterrorism package for East Africa, including significant support for Uganda to combat the Lord’s Resistance Army. France has been the most activist of the troika in committing its military forces to peacekeeping operations in Congo, a policy stance that is in line with the Chirac administration’s philosophical rejection of “African solutions for African problems.” The most recent case of French military intervention involved taking the lead role in Operation Artemis, a shortterm (June–September 2003) EU-sponsored and UN Security Council– authorized military operation that was designed to temporarily quell violence in Congo’s Ituri province, subsequently paving the way for the reinforcement and deployment of UN forces already stationed in Congo as part of MONUC. Operation Artemis, also known in French circles as Operation Mamba, constituted a watershed in UN-sponsored military operations in Congo. Initially rejecting French-led intervention as “unwelcome,” Kagame ultimately relented and acceded to a French request to provide written assurances that Rwanda would pose no obstacle to the deployment of French troops in the region. This change of heart not only was indicative of the beginning of a thaw in French-Rwandan relations but also was the direct result of intense pressure that London and Washington exerted on both Kagame and Museveni to permit the entry of French-led forces. This operation also demonstrated the Bush administration’s desire for its European allies, most notably France, to take the lead in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in the Great Lakes region, as well as a willingness to pressure its regional allies to accept such operations. Indeed, perhaps the most noteworthy signal of this operation’s success was Kabila’s request in June 2004 for a second deployment of EU-sponsored military contingents to quell renewed violence in Congo’s eastern provinces. The convergence of interests among Belgium, France, and the United States in promoting peace building in the Great Lakes region, especially in the aftermath of Kabila’s assumption of power in January 2001, contributed to an international dynamic conducive to unlocking the diplomatic stalemate in the Lusaka process that existed from 1999 to 2001. Especially with Belgium willing to take the lead, there emerged an international leadership coalition that, among other actions, put pressure on foreign actors to withdraw their military forces from Congo and on domestic Congolese actors to reach an internal political settlement as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. This leadership has taken on a wide variety of forms, ranging from providing the external funding necessary for the more than 300 delegates who participated in the Sun City negotiating process for Congo and supporting the creation of the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region that

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178 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS brings together representatives from industrialized countries and intergovernmental organizations, to the direct participation of the Western leaders themselves in the negotiations. In this regard, Foreign Minister Michel is the highest-ranking Western official who also has been the most actively involved in a wide series of regional negotiations related to the Great Lakes, most notably as concerns Congo. Michel’s commitment was demonstrated by his decision to make conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region Belgium’s priority when it assumed the six-month rotating presidency of the EU in 2001. It is difficult to quantify the diplomatic efforts undertaken in the Great Lakes region by Western special envoys who have engaged in a form of “shuttle diplomacy” among the regional actors. The most renowned current special envoy to the Great Lakes region is Aldo Ajello, who represents the EU. Ajello has not shied away from speaking bluntly, as witnessed by his declaration on 1 November 2001 that the first phase of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was a “total failure,” subsequently noting that the EU was “considering a number of initiatives that could facilitate dialogue.46 The latter portion of Ajello’s statement captures the presumed benefits of the special envoy: appointed to serve a region as opposed to one country, special envoys are presumably better able to get to know all of the regional belligerents to a crisis and therefore should be more effective in either promoting or facilitating specific conflict resolution measures. According to critics, however, special envoys actually muddy the diplomatic waters by creating parallel diplomatic tracks that may run counter to existing official policy toward a particular country and in any case may not carry true diplomatic weight unless such envoys have the power to report directly to the most influential leaders in their countries as well as to have their recommendations taken seriously by those leaders. It is precisely for this reason, for example, that the Bush administration rationalized reducing the record number of special envoys that existed under the Clinton administration, which most notably included Howard Wolpe, a distinguished Africanist who served as the elected chair of the Subcommittee on Africa in the US House of Representatives, as special envoy to the Great Lakes region. At least in the special case of the EU—an intergovernmental actor in which the member states still maintain independent foreign policies—it is clear that Ajello has made a positive contribution to the harmonization of EU policies toward the Great Lakes region. Ajello’s activities as EU special envoy and Kabila’s request for a second EU-sponsored military deployment in Congo also underscore the special foreign policy role of the EU in the facilitation of peace building in the Great Lakes region. Although the EU in a sense signaled its rising importance as a separate foreign policy actor in the region when it decided to suspend EU development assistance to Congo at the beginning of the 1990s,

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it took on a more prominent role in the region in the period following the signing of the Lusaka Accords. The impetus behind this growing foreign policy role is the gradual strengthening of the EU as an independent actor, not to mention the success of the EU experiment as witnessed by the introduction of a common currency (the euro) by the majority of its members and the enlargement of EU membership from fifteen to twenty-five countries in May 2004. One manifestation of the deepening of the EU integration process has been the positive response of EU member states to institutional and elite pressures for the greater harmonization of member state foreign policies toward the Great Lakes region, the ultimate goal of course being that the EU (both member states and central institution alike) must speak with one voice. In January 2002, for example, the foreign ministers of three leading EU member states—Michel of Belgium, Vedrine of France, and Jack Straw of the United Kingdom—made a joint visit to the Great Lakes region to provide a common front for EU peace-building initiatives. This event served as a poignant symbol of the growing harmonization of EU member state policies as concerns a wide range of issues in the Great Lakes region. The degree of foreign policy independence exerted by the EU as a unified institutional actor, however, should not be exaggerated. As aptly noted by Gorm Rye Olsen, the foreign policy activities of regional organizations remain constrained by the interests and concerns of their individual members.47 The requirement of achieving consensus prior to taking action has ensured that recent policies have been representative of the lowest common denominator of the varied foreign policy interests of the EU’s twenty-five member states. Equally important, there is a tendency for EU foreign policies to follow the foreign policy lead of one of its members, if that member “demonstrates a special interest or historical involvement in a particular country.”48 According to this logic, the EU’s activist foreign policy role in the Great Lakes region is largely due to the willingness of Belgium and France to pressure their EU partners to follow their lead. For instance, the EU voted in December 2001 to resume development aid to Congo after prodding from Belgium and France, which supported the resumption of aid. But Great Britain had initially objected to the resumption, preferring to wait until Congolese parties made more progress in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.49 This demonstrates that the willingness of Belgium and France to lead remains the salient explanatory factor in the EU’s increasingly prominent role in the Great Lakes region.

Conclusion The general conclusion of this chapter is that both the local and international environments are propitious for the further strengthening of peace

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180 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS and security in the Great Lakes region. As of 2004, the leaders of the epicenters of conflict in the region (Kabila and Kagame) enjoyed close or steadily improving ties with all three members of the troika. Two members of the troika (Belgium and France) exhibited strong levels of interest at the highest levels of their policymaking establishments in playing activist roles. Belgium is particularly important in this regard, playing a catalytic role in peace-building efforts. This role, which is unique in recent Belgian history, is clearly due to the election in 1999 (and reelection in 2003) of a LiberalSocialist government under the leadership of Prime Minister Verhofstadt and Foreign Minister Michel and is unlikely to continue if this coalition does not win the elections scheduled for 2007. And although Africa and especially the Great Lakes region do not constitute US foreign policy priorities, the attacks of September 11 have made the Bush administration more willing to diplomatically and financially support the conflict resolution efforts of African (most notably South Africa) and European (especially Belgium and France) allies willing to take the lead. A potentially limited and unique window of opportunity exists to build on existing international political dynamics to facilitate regional efforts at creating more enduring forms of peace and security in the Great Lakes region. This reality has provided an important impetus behind the holding of a series of conferences, such as the UN and AU International Conference on Peace, Security, and Development in the Great Lakes in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in November 2004. The key question in Western engagement in the region revolves around how the troika can best take advantage of this historic turning point to further deepen the consolidation of a durable peace in the Great Lakes region. Based on the analysis of this chapter, at least three sets of conclusions stand out. First, diplomacy in the post-Lusaka era (1999–present) has demonstrated the importance of a consultative process that brings senior policymakers together for face-to-face meetings. In this regard, the troika’s foreign policy initiatives would greatly benefit from the creation of a regular consultative process between senior Africanists of the troika itself. The most effective policy is one in which the troika “speaks with one voice,” which in turn assumes a high degree of policy coordination that historically has not been characteristic of the troika’s policies toward the Great Lakes region. Although sporadic consultation among EU foreign policy officials represents an important start, ideally this consultation should include the United States and should regularly occur among the most senior Africanists of the equivalent of each administration’s ministry of foreign affairs (in the case of the US State Department, the level of assistant secretary of state for African affairs) and ideally at the level of minister of foreign affairs (secretary of state in the United States). Equally important is the need to support similar face-to-face confidence-building measures in the Great Lakes region.

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The troika should fund regional meetings or “summitry” among members of various groups of government officials in the Great Lakes region, including military officers, parliamentarians, ministers of justice, and ministers of foreign affairs. Funding for the implementation of the provisions of the UN International Conference in the Great Lakes region will serve as an essential part of this process. Second, the members of the troika need to reduce the “genocide credit” typically accorded Rwanda as a result of Western action and inaction during the 1994 genocide. The troika should embrace Kagame’s desire for increased legitimacy within the international system, which essentially was one of his most important reasons for holding legislative and presidential elections in 2003. This acceptance should be accompanied, however, by a willingness to publicly confront Rwanda as concerns serious domestic and international transgressions, such as evidence related to Rwandan military operations in eastern Congo during both 2003 and 2004. The ten-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide in 2004 marked an important turning point for the troika and other members of the international community to commemorate the Rwandan tragedy of 1994 and to once again underscore their collective guilt as concerns their collective response to that tragedy. The time has come, however, to treat Rwanda in a more regularized diplomatic fashion. A third and related point is the need for the troika to expand the internationally sponsored peacekeeping presence in eastern Congo to definitively suppress cross-border insurgent groups. Rwanda, in particular, will never feel secure unless the international community takes a leading role in securing the border regions that Congo, at the present time, is incapable of securing. There is an equal need to recognize the special security role to be played by the EU and especially France. The intensification during the 1990s of rivalry between Paris and Washington had serious, negative implications in the search for a durable peace within the Great Lakes region. Washington needs to publicly recognize what it already has accepted in the post–September 11 era: the special ability of France to play a constructive role in peacekeeping. Belgium does not want to shoulder this role, France— owing to historical and cultural factors—is interested in assuming this role, and Washington is willing to support such a role by France and other powers within the region but is obviously not willing to commit US troops. The success of the French-led Artemis operation in 2003 suggests that such an approach is viable, as long as French involvement is under the auspices of a multilateral EU or UN force that includes forces from other countries. French success in leading the 2003 Artemis operation in an evenhanded manner, combined with the beginning of a thaw in French-Rwandan relations, suggests that this military operation could become a model for future peacekeeping operations in the Great Lakes region. As already noted, the success of the

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182 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS Artemis operation was clearly demonstrated by Kabila’s June 2004 request for a second EU-led military operation on Congolese soil. In this regard, the international community needs to rethink whether the current UN-sponsored MONUC operation, a renewed EU-led military operation, or some combination of the two will be better equipped to effectively meet the security challenges in the region.

Notes 1. Jean-Dominique Geslin and Anne Kappes-Grange, “Louis Michel: ‘L’Afrique est une tache sur la conscience occidentale,’” Jeune Afrique Intelligent, no. 2233 (26 October–1 November 2003), p. 35. 2. René Lemarchand, “The Crisis in the Great Lakes,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), p. 343. 3. Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 38. 4. Erik Kennes and others, “The Congo Crisis: Background and International Dimension” (unpublished manuscript, 2001). 5. Edward A. Kolodziej, French Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974). 6. Claude Wauthier, Quatre presidents et l’Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1995). 7. Guy Martin, “Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 8. F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam, “Containment in Africa: From Truman to Reagan,” TransAfrica Forum 6 (Fall 1998), pp. 7–34. 9. Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo: 1960–1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974); Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa—From Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982). 10. Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 11. Michael Brown, Gary Freeman, and Kay Miller, Passing By: The United States and Genocide in Burundi, 1972 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1972), p. 12. 12. Pierre Pean, L’Homme de l’ombre: Elements d’enquete autour de Jacques Foccart, l’homme le plus mysterieux et le plus puissant de la Ve Republique (Paris: Fayard, 1990). 13. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1981, Pt. 7: Economic and Security Assistance Programs in Africa, Hearings and Markup, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 7, 12, 13, 20, 25, 26, 27, and 28 February; 5 and 6 March, 1980, p. 563. 14. Jacques Foccart, with Philippe Gaillard, Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, 2 vols. (Paris: Fayard, 1995). 15. Jeffrey E. Garten, A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany and the Struggle for Supremacy (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1993).

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16. Peter J. Schraeder, “Cold War to Cold Peace: U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 3 (2000), pp. 395–420. 17. Daniel Bourmaud, “The Clinton Administration and Africa: A View from Paris, France,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion 26 (1998), p. 47. 18. Ibid., p. 49. 19. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.), Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997). 20. Douglas Jehl, “Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings ‘Genocide,’” New York Times, 10 June 1994, p. A8. 21. Agir Ici et Survie, La France a Biarritz: Mise en examen de la politique africaine de la France (Paris: Karthala, 1995). 22. Cited in Réne Lemarchand, “The Fires of the Great Lakes,” Current History 98, no. 628 (May 1999), p. 198. 23. Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, L’Afrique sans Africains: Le reve blanc du continent noir (Paris: Editions Stock, 1994), pp. 182–185. 24. Ibid. 25. Don Connell and Frank Smith, “Africa’s New Bloc,” Foreign Affairs 77 (March– April 1998); Marina Ottaway, Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999). 26. René Lemarchand, “La politique des Etats-Unis dans l’Afrique des grands lacs,” in F. Reyntjens and S. Marysse (eds.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 1998–1999 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999), p. 364. 27. Tony Chafer, “Franco-African Relations: No Longer So Exceptional?” African Affairs 101 (July 2002), pp. 343–364. 28. Michael G. Schatzberg, Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960–1990 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991). 29. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa, p. 107. 30. Francois Ngolet, “African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire,” Africa Today 47, no. 1 (2000), pp. 65–85. 31. Foccart, with Gaillard, Foccart Parle, p. 310. 32. Roland Marchal, correspondence from author, no date. 33. Erik Kennes and others, “The Congo Crisis,” p. 147. 34. Ibid. 35. International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, ICG Africa Report no. 26 (Nairobi: 2000), p. 1. 36. Ibid., p. 83. 37. Colette Braeckman, Les nouveaux predateurs. Politique des puissances en Afrique Centrale (Paris: Fayard, 2003), pp. 136–142. 38. René Lemarchand, “The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruction” (occasional paper of the Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, September 2001), p. 100. 39. Ibid. 40. Cited in International Crisis Group [ICG], The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Time for Pragmatism, ICG Africa Report no. 69 (Brussels: 2003), p. 4. 41. Barry James, “France’s Bid to Reach Out to Africa Faces Thorny Problems,” International Herald Tribune, 20 February 2003, p. 1. 42. Geslin and Kappes-Grange, “Louis Michel,” p. 32. 43. Jean-Claude Willame, “Le processus de paix en RDC après Lusaka,” in F. Reyntjens and S. Marysse (eds), L’Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 2002–2003 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003), pp. 157–170.

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184 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS 44. Ian Fisher “Africans Ask If Washington’s Sun Will Shine on Them,” New York Times, 21 January 2001, p. A3. 45. Cited in Sagaren Naiddo, The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Negotiations for a Democratic State or the Formalization of a New Scramble? Occasional Paper no. 16 (Johannesburg: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002), p. 8. 46. IRIN News, “DRC: All Hope for Dialogue Not Lost, Says Masire,” 1 November 2001, www.irinnews.org. 47. Gorm Rye Olsen, “The European Union: An Ad Hoc Policy with a Low Priority,” in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 131–147. 48. Ibid., p. 144. 49. IRIN News, “DRC: EU Leaders to Aid Kinshasa,” 14 December 2001, www.irinnews.org.

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10 Building Security for Peoples, Societies, and States GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA

I

t is not often easy to obtain consensus on the nature and texture of security in the Great Lakes region. Part of the problem stems from the political fragmentation among actors, veritable contests over stakes, and the partisanship that underpins debates about security. In addition, NGOs and fact-finding missions dominate most of the analyses of security in the region. Scholars, too, have compounded these difficulties, embellishing positions that are frequently mobilized in perennial policy struggles. As David Newbury has observed, the region has since the 1990s attracted “instant experts” whose singular fixation and fascination with contemporary events obscures and trivializes the deeper historical anchorage in which most of these events are embedded.1 Although the multiplicity of voices about security is, in some respects, a reflection of the flourishing pluralism in the region, the failure to arrive at common analytical standards for understanding security impedes attempts to forge collective approaches to regional problems. The search for universal conceptual and policy language about security is, however, not insurmountable, as contributors to this book have attested. This book has highlighted core security issues on the regional landscape and the historical factors that continue to fuel conflict and strife. The authors have grappled with security through three foundational pillars of peoples, societies, and states, at a time when regional actors are involved in momentous bids to construct collective security arrangements. We asked our contributors to furnish explanations to political and economic trajectories that would also overcome the short-term visions that dominate regional analyses. As a result of the confluence of in-depth studies on security and growing policy dialogues on the same issues, the Great Lakes has come of age, exhibiting a remarkable level of conceptual and policy clarity. Previously uncertain about the region’s geographic boundaries and constituent units, academic analysts are now more comfortable capturing the Great Lakes 187

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region in system and subsystem terms. This is why, borrowing from Buzan, Mwesiga Baregu’s chapter speaks of the region as a conflict formation where the postcolonial patterns of conflicts are grafted onto new fissures of resource strife and societal militarization. The clarity among policymakers is most evident in the shift from bilateral to regional approaches as states contemplate possibilities of collective action. In this regard, international actors, notably the United Nations and the African Union, have been at the forefront of forcing regional dialogue about the parameters of principles and institutions that can accommodate the diverse security threats facing the region. The efforts to end the cycle of violence and human suffering in the Great Lakes region are propelled by the recognition that there are no clear boundaries between domestic and regional causes and consequences of conflicts. Geographic, cultural, and historical factors have linked the fates of peoples, societies, and states together. For external interveners in norm and institution building, the major task has been to induce the region to translate these shared concerns into proposals that may form the foundation for a cooperative security regime based on the core and contiguous states—Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda, and Uganda—but also encompassing proximate neighboring states—Angola, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and South Africa. Most of our contributors have traversed almost the same empirical terrain—genocide in Rwanda, the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko, the Arusha and Lusaka agreements, the role of Western powers, refugees, and MONUC— to mention just a few of the actors and events. The key puzzle has been to focus on these common issues from distinctive analytical vantage points and to illustrate how these events and actors illuminate the broader question of security. Our organizing theme in this book is that even though peoples and societies are the ultimate objects and subjects of security, nation-states are the mediators of core security concerns, furnishing the primary context in which these questions are articulated and resolved. In the Great Lakes region, the foundations for security are nation-states that have a modicum of coherence and organization to deal with the routine challenges of political order and economic sufficiency or development. When nation-states cannot adequately meet these goals, they often subcontract some roles to regional or international institutions. Our view of security has thus gravitated around the ability of states as the domestic institutional expressions of order and development and as participants in supranational institutions. As the foundations for order and development, states in the region have exhibited diverse capacities for managing multiple challenges pertaining to these questions, yet they share common threads. Thus broad questions of security in the region have revolved around perennial postcolonial concerns of weak state control over territories,

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narrow governance institutions, crises of citizenship, and economic underdevelopment. These problems have manifested in civil wars and ethnic conflagrations that have led to immeasurable loss of life, communal atrocities, massive violations of human rights, and migrations of people across borders. Most of these conflicts originate from political and economic marginalization as excluded ethnic and social groups have often resorted to armed violence to contest the authority of repressive governments. More recently, resourcedriven and ecologically motivated wars have added to the sources of strife that have invariably weakened the governance fabrics of most states. If the sources of internal insecurity lie in fragile institutions of order and development, then the puzzle about security in the Great Lakes region is the resurrection of institutions of governance, statehood, citizenship, and development, making them more functional and relevant to the demands of the present. One of the underlying themes has been measuring security from the viewpoint of how the exercise of public power in societies, states, and regions expands the latitude and capacities of people. Consistent with the broad-based conception of security, this perspective situates people at the center of security while acknowledging that they are embedded in wider societal contexts. By this logic, the security of peoples and societies is inconceivable without institutions that expand their productive capacities and reduce threats to their livelihoods. Hence, security as the enhancement of the rights of peoples and societies is indistinguishable from political inclusiveness and access to economic opportunities, tolerance, impartial justice, and equality under the law. Severe conflicts across the Great Lakes region meant that peoples and societies would enter the new century with a precipitous decline in almost all the socioeconomic indices of human security and development, raising fundamental questions about the ability of states to meaningfully parade as enhancers of security. In weakening the internal capability of states, these conflicts also postponed the evolution of collective interstate efforts for stability and development. The process of erecting regional institutions that may overcome the inadequacies of states has been sporadic and inchoate. Unlike other regional subsystems where sturdy economic institutions have often formed the bedrocks for regional security and stability, the Great Lakes region has not had a comprehensive economic integration scheme. The Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs, previously the subregional institution for integration comprising Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire, existed only in name. Moreover, the CEPGL was centered more intimately around Zairian dictator Mobutu’s narrow vision of regional security. In the aftermath of the decline of this vision, regionalism in the Great Lakes region was torn between the eastern, Central, and southern African economic integration schemes that were in themselves searching for region-wide mechanisms of security collaboration.

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Despite the setbacks in building security in domestic and regional contexts, the new millennium opened with a decisive shift in the principles and practices that reconcile the exercise of public power with the expansion of human security. All our contributors proceeded from the assumption that governance and participation are broad principles that have informed the quest for greater security and development in national and regional arenas. Yet, understandably, there are variations in the region on the pursuit of these principles, primarily because most of the core states are recovering from years of civil conflicts. Thus the more fragile states opted for minimalist institutions of governance and participation, notably power-sharing, ethnic-balancing formulas, and governments of national unity. For Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda, these narrow and limited variations afforded state elites room to strengthen institutions of order and control, resurrect collapsed economies, and rebuild national confidence. Ultimately, however, there is recognition that the minimalist variations are interim measures toward maximalist ones that entail opening the political space to competition by multiple civic and political actors, witnessed in Kenya, Tanzania, and reluctantly, Uganda. What is the quality of minimalist institutions of governance and participation in the Great Lakes region? Are these institutions sufficient to provide a sturdy basis for long-term security in individual states and the region as a whole? Filip Reyntjens confronts these questions in Rwanda’s context, decrying the diminution of political space and decline of societal consensus that marked the immediate postgenocide period. He argues that Kagame has effectively managed the problems of reconstructing state institutions without seeking to broaden the basis of Tutsi power. As the genocide “dividend” has dissipated domestically and internationally, the Kagame government has become more insecure, potentially recreating the structural conditions that ignited the civil conflict in the 1990s. Reyntjens’s chapter warns of the dangers of sacrificing participation on the altar of state security and of the inordinate fixation with state survival at the expense of legitimation institutions. The dilemma will nonetheless persist: although pressure for robust participation may interrupt the consolidation of the Kagame state in the short to medium terms, prolonged centralization contains the seeds of instability. Museveni’s problems in transforming Uganda from an authoritarian movement system to a democracy are illustrative of the real obstacles of transition from minimalist to maximalist institutions of governance and participation: the longer postconflict societies tolerate limited participation, the more it becomes deeply ingrained and the harder it is to revert to democratic governance. As revealed in the chapter by Angela Ndinga Muvumba, the reign of the National Resistance Movement in Uganda has fostered the emergence of civic groups in politics, but their political activism and voice in security issues have been constrained by the structures of authoritarianism.

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Along the same lines, René Lemarchand’s chapter analyzes the predicament of Burundi, demonstrating how ethnic divisions and leadership contests continue to stymie the establishment of solid transitional institutions. Burundi is symptomatic of the citizenship challenges in the security calculus of the region. Yet Burundi’s search for stability equally reveals that there are tenacious regional and international actors who have invested in Burundi’s long-term stability. This investment is beginning to produce results, as the peaceful elections throughout 2005 have demonstrated. South Africa, as Chris Landsberg indicates in his chapter, has staked its credibility in the region on a successful transition in Burundi and has been willing to mobilize international efforts to help in this process. A stable government of national unity in Burundi is only a halfway house to meeting the ongoing threats of civil strife, refugee return, and economic reconstruction. In the wider scheme of creating institutions for security, Burundi’s quest has hardly begun. Overcoming the violent legacy of sectarianism remains a major hurdle for Burundi, but this legacy also exacts a heavy price on attempts to minimize the odious dynamic of Hutu-Tutsi conflagration on regional relationships. Left unresolved, this conflict denies Burundi and Rwanda the chance to participate in the cosmopolitan economic institutions centered on the East African Cooperation. Ethnic insecurities have prevented the evolution of stable transitional institutions in Burundi and Rwanda, but it is in the DRC that brittle governance institutions have coincided with territorial fragmentation and the new strains of resource predation to produce an even weaker national base for security. Most of the chapters aptly treated the DRC as both the geopolitical center and, increasingly, the epicenter of conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The reverberations in Congolese politics since the overthrow of the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko have drastically rewritten the patterns of regional relationships. Although considerable progress has been made in restoring a semblance of order to Congo, the work ahead remains daunting: the transitional institutions are fragile, the conflict is still exacting a death toll of 1,000 per day, the Kivus are infested with motley militias that are subjecting civilians to untold atrocities, Rwanda and Uganda appear reluctant to let go of eastern Congo, and international engagement seems inadequate in the wider scheme of the tasks at hand. Moreover, the credibility of MONUC has been shattered by widespread reports of the rape and abuse of civilians. Solutions to the conflict in the DRC remain an essential foundation for peace and development in the region, yet as Adekeye Adebajo, Mwesiga Baregu, and Gérard Prunier show, the power vacuum that attracted state and nonstate actors to Congo’s mineral resources has unleashed political dynamics that defy easy solutions. Summed up as the dilemma of being “too big, too rich, and too weak,” the DRC exemplifies the enormous challenges of

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remaking stable statehoods in the face of the decay of the old rules of territoriality and sovereignty. Internally, the DRC has witnessed, particularly in the Kivus, the progressive growth of militarized and violent constituencies that thrive on resource extraction and predation. Apart from sustaining their existence, economic resources have made them less willing to be subject to the certainty of civilian institutions. Also, the magnetism of mineral extraction has invited predators to Congo who have no stake in security and development, since such extraction depends fundamentally on disorder and statelessness. Regional militaries that have fed on these resources are finding it difficult to disengage even as their governments formally announce their withdrawal. Without a frontal approach to the links between insecurity and resource exploitation in eastern Congo, this region will remain a playground for local, regional, and international “negative forces” that will task the energies of the international community for years to come. The transitions mapped out in the Sun City agreement for the DRC and the Arusha agreement for Burundi envisage a return to political stability legitimized by democratic elections. Although the implementation of these agreements has steadily gathered momentum, it is still premature to pronounce the regional triumph of democracy as a principle and practice of transition from war to peace, particularly given the Rwandan and Ugandan experiences of transitions. Governance and participation are critical ingredients in regional peace and security, but they face enormous obstacles. Even though promoting participation is recognized for its contribution to domestic and regional stabilization, most governments still fear that uncontrolled pluralism may ignite the dangerous trends of ethnicity and communalism. Though power-sharing arrangements promise to diminish ethnic contestations that are endemic to the region, the content of these arrangements conceals deeper power asymmetries that may ignite strife in the future. Similarly, although the widespread constitutional reforms that seek to decentralize power and rationalize decisionmaking are important in creating economic and political stakeholders, the latter are still constrained in their ability to challenge central authorities. In analyzing the security problems of the region, our contributors have proceeded from the realism that given the decay of old rules and institutions, creating new ones poses formidable challenges, particularly because since the 1990s the old issues of insecurity have mutated into dangerous forms that demand more creative approaches than those that regional actors have only begun to contemplate: traditional ethnic conflicts have been transformed into regional alliances of extremism, refugees in permanent camps have given birth to child soldiers who have equally become a blight on the region, violence against civilians has multiplied, and security forces are now more than ever engaged in criminal activities. In helping the region reverse the specter of these conflicts, international actors such as the United Nations

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and Western powers have expended resources on humanitarian emergencies, postponing approaches to the sustainable development that is critical to human security. But Adekeye Adebajo contends that even in its humanitarian and peacekeeping dimensions, UN intervention in the region has been half-hearted and lukewarm. In addition to meeting the humanitarian emergencies in the region, the UN confronts the enormity of rebuilding states in Burundi and the DRC on few resources and on feeble Chapter VI mandates. A similar predicament characterizes Western engagement, torn between more strategic investments elsewhere and the moral and political pressures to intervene meaningfully in the heart of Africa. Peter Schraeder’s chapter nonetheless demonstrates that the post–cold war dynamic of French, Belgian, and US collaboration on African issues has opened significant opportunities for harmonized policies that the Great Lakes region has been able to capture in resolving some of its problems. The growing convergence between the United States and France in approaching the Great Lakes region is a marked departure from the early 1990s when Anglophone-Francophone debates hampered international engagement. The Great Lakes region has been a late starter in constructing regional mechanisms for security, but the coalescence of international and regional action to convene the Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development that culminated in the Dar es Salaam Declaration in November 2004 was an innovative enterprise. Previous attempts at convening the forum had foundered on interstate mistrust, unpreparedness, and lack of sustained international leadership.2 With the secretary-general’s appointment of Ibrahima Fall as the UN special representative on the Great Lakes region in 2003, the international community injected a new lease of life into the process. Canada and the Netherlands also led corresponding donor efforts, organized as Friends of the Great Lakes Region, to provide political, technical, and financial support to the consultative process leading to the conference. The broad objective for the consultative process was to foster interdependence through the elaboration of collective regional norms and principles as a preliminary approach to building multilateral institutions for peace and security. In an echo of Europe’s 1975 Helsinki process that created the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the consultations allowed core states—Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia—a unique chance to deliberate on durable principles and guidelines to reverse the scourge of conflicts. The conference process began in June 2003 with the establishment of national preparatory committees that included government officials, religious groups, parliamentarians, trade unions, and other civil society actors. Subsequently, national committees coalesced into regional preparatory meetings to draft the principles. Women and youth also held separate regional conventions to contribute to the process. Toward the end of the consultations, the conveners invited

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Angola, the Central African Republic, and Sudan as contiguous participants. The Dar es Salaam Declaration lays out “priority policy options and guiding principles” in peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration, and humanitarian and social issues. On peace and security, the declaration touches on issues covering such topics as implementing nonaggression and common defense pacts; establishing a regional security framework for prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of conflicts; promoting common policies to put an end to the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons; and fighting genocide. With respect to democracy and good governance, the signatories have committed themselves to promoting and respecting the values, principles, and norms of democracy and good governance as well as observing human rights. More important, they agreed to “put in place national and regional policies based on democracy and good governance aimed at consolidating the rule of law, building capacity in leadership, ensuring the transparency of electoral processes, [and] strengthening the efficiency of legal and security services.”3 They also decided to promote an effective participation of the different socioeconomic actors, specifically the private sector, civil society, women, and youth in the consolidation of democracy and good governance. With regard to economic development and regional integration, regional leaders have decided to build a unified economic space for enhanced economic efficiency and the eradication of poverty and for achieving sustainable economic development. In the pursuit of such a unified economic space, they also sought to “promote growth and development through revitalization and harmonization of existing regional integration organizations and the establishment of trans-border poles/zones.”4 In the humanitarian and social spheres, the leaders pledged to adhere to obligations and principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to ratify international and regional rights instruments, including conventions on refugees, internally displaced persons, women, and children. The Dar es Salaam Declaration articulates a vision of the indivisibility of peace and security in the Great Lakes region. This vision has driven the desire to lay the foundations for an embryonic architectural framework of broad rules, norms, procedures, and institutions that may lend stability and predictability to interstate relations. For the most part, it restates the centrality of international norms that have frayed as conflicts engulfed the region. But the regional leaders were also aware of the yearning for new regional mechanisms to check egregious violations of human rights and genocide. In follow-up mechanisms, the declaration has created a regional interministerial committee to prepare a formal pact on security, stability, and development that will be adopted at a subsequent international conference. One of

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the challenges of the interministerial committee is to focus on a few allencompassing principles that reflect a shared understanding of how the region can ensure collective security and development. In addition, although the conference process has unleashed a regional convergence of views on modalities for cooperation in the political, economic, and military spheres, the key measure of commitment will be the ability to muster the will to translate this convergence into viable institutions. The search for collective norms and institutions for peace and security in the Great Lakes promises to be a protracted process that is contingent on the interplay of national political wills, bilateral determination, and regional resolve. Nonetheless, the consultative process established by the UN and AU has set in motion patterns of sensitization and socialization of a wide range of state and nonstate actors around themes of peace and security that did not exist previously. Of particular significance has been the visible role of nonstate actors, notably women, the youth, and professional organizations, that have been drawn more visibly into efforts to frame deliberations and construct institutions for peace and security. As Angela Ndinga Muvumba’s chapter demonstrates, civil society actors are assuming critical roles in strengthening the momentum for peace in the region, building bridges across states and societies where there were none before, and helping to overcome the barriers erected by conflicting national identities and sensitivities. This has begun to democratize the dialogue on security by guaranteeing the injection of new voices and also by increasing the stakeholders around regional security issues. Democratizing the dialogue on peace and security is imperative in the construction of collective security structures rooted in the aspirations and values of peoples of the Great Lakes region. A permanent place for civil society actors on the regional security horizon will solidify the people-to-people interactions that are starting to give the region a more solid sense of multilateral and collective identity. The building blocks for peace and security in the Great Lakes are states with internal control over their territories, popular legitimacy, and sufficient capacity to furnish the environment for equitable economic development. Secure states surrounded by insecure ones do not make for a peaceful region. At national levels, the security of individuals and communities is inseparable from the security of the state and nation. There is a similar interdependence at the regional level, where the processes of intrastate stability are linked closely to interstate stability. Since the sources of conflict and insecurity at national levels tend to multiply at regional levels, efforts to build a security framework need to be tailored to policies that traverse the two arenas: strategies and policies to enhance peace and security at national levels may invariably contribute to regional security. For the Great Lakes region, therefore, security is the momentous enterprise of establishing institutions and principles of order and development for states in their internal

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and regional domains. Ultimately, these institutions will have to reflect the norms and expectations that have gained widespread currency since the 1990s about how states and governments relate to peoples and communities. Pending the construction of the institutions envisaged under the Dar es Salaam Declaration, Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda began exploring possibilities of reviving the CEPGL. At a ministerial meeting in June 2004, they pledged to reactivate regional cooperation in functional areas such as energy, conservation, and social development. Although the revival of CEPGL would complement the peace processes in these countries and potentially open the vistas for expansion into the arenas of peace and security, this initiative is unrealistic at this time due to the depth of mistrust among them.5 For the long term, regional security in the Great Lakes region needs to be anchored in the institutions of the EAC and SADC, with both organizations building credible cooperative bridges between them. This may resolve the institutional problems of Rwanda and Burundi. Similarly, since the DRC membership in SADC cannot be undone, the best option would be for its continued participation in southern Africa even as most of eastern Congo deepens its natural economic links with the EAC countries. As the foundations for both security and development, SADC and the EAC would eventually form the natural institutions for the stabilization of regional relations. South Africa’s leadership role in the conflicts in Burundi and the DRC has already provided the institutional base for bridging the EAC-SADC divide in security issues. These bridge-building roles need to be formalized, particularly since the SADC organ already contains comprehensive mechanisms for security cooperation. The EAC has slowly begun to think of protocols on the promotion of common political value systems and institutions, common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern, mediation of interstate and intrastate conflicts, nonaggression pacts, and indigenous peacekeeping institutions. As Burundi and Rwanda attain membership in the EAC, these protocols will solidify the EAC’s revived economic roles.

Notes 1. David Newbury, “The Crisis of the Great Powers in the Great Lakes Crisis,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 33, no. 2 (1999), p. 674. See also the excellent contributions in the Review of African Political Economy special issue on the region, notably Saskia Van Hoyweghen, “The Crisis of the Nation-State in Central Africa: A Theoretical Introduction,” Review of African Political Economy, nos. 93–94 (2002), pp. 575–590. 2. See the analysis of previous efforts in Gilbert Khadiagala, “ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Michael Krepon and others (eds.), Global Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security: New Tools for Troubled Regions (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 131–168.

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3. “Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development in the Great Lakes” (Dar es Salaam International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development in the Great Lakes Region, First Summit of Heads of State and Government, 19–20 December 2004), p. 3. 4. Ibid. 5. For analyses of attempts to revive the CEPGL, see “Kabila Moots New Economic Bloc for Great Lakes Region,” EastAfrican (Nairobi), October 25, 2004.

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Acronyms

ACCORD ACFODE ADEP-Mizero ADF AFDL

AIDS AMIB ARLPI AU BCMP CBO CCAC CCOAIB

CDR CECORE CEPGL CIA CLADHO

African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes Action for Development Alliance pour la Démocratie, l’Équité et le Progrès (Alliance for Democracy, Equity and Progress) Allied Democratic Forces Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo) acquired immunodeficiency syndrome African Mission in Burundi Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative African Union Bourse Congolaise des Matières Premières (Congolese Stockmagnet for Raw Materials) community-based organization Concertation Chrétienne pour l’Afrique Central (Christian Consultation for Central Africa) Conseil de Concertation des Organisations d’Appui aux Initiatives de Base (Coordination Committees for Organizations in Support of Grassroots Initiatives) Coalition pour la Défense de la République (Coalition for the Defense of the Republic) Centre for Conflict Resolution Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries) Central Intelligence Agency Coordination des Ligues et Associations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (Coordination of Leagues and Associations for the Defense of Human Rights) 199

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CNDD-FDD

CNRS

CSO DDR DENIVA DRC EAC ECCAS ECOWAS EU FAR FAZ FDD FDLR FHRI FNL FNLC FOWODE FRODEBU FROLINA HIPC HIV ICD ICG ICST ICTR IDP IEMF IGAD IMC IMF IPA ISS

Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie– Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy) Commission Nationale de Réhabilitation des Sinistrés (National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Displaced People) civil society organization disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations Democratic Republic of Congo East African Cooperation Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States European Union Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwandese Armed Forces) Forces Armées Zairoises (Zairian Armed Forces) Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Forces for the Defence of Democracy) Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) Foundation for Human Rights Initiative Front National de Libération (National Liberation Front) Front de Libération Nationale du Congo (National Front for the Liberation of the Congo) Forum for Women and Democracy Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Front for Democracy in Burundi) Front pour la Libération Nationale (Front for National Liberation) Highly Indebted Poor Countries human immunodeficiency virus Inter-Congolese Dialogue International Crisis Group International Committee in Support of the Transition International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda internally displaced person Interim Emergency Multinational Force Intergovernmental Authority on Development Implementation and Monitoring Commission International Monetary Fund International Peace Academy Institute of Strategic Studies

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JMC LGDL

201

Joint Military Commission Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs (Human Rights League of the Great Lakes Region) LIPRODHOR Ligue pour la Promotion des Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda (League for the Promotion of Human Rights in Rwanda) LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MCC Mennonite Central Committee MDC Movement for Democratic Change MDR Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (Democratic Republican Movement) MIBA Minière de Bakwanga (Bakwanga Mining Company) MLC Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo MOU Memorandum of Understanding MP member of parliament MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) MRND Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (National Revolutionary Movement for Development) MRRDR Ministry for the Reinsertion and Reinstallation of Displaced and Repatriated Persons NCDRR National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NGO nongovernmental organization NRM National Resistance Movement NUDIPU National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda OAG Observatoire pour l’Action Gouvernementale (Observatory for Governmental Action) OAU Organization of African Unity ODA official development assistance ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi ONUC Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Operation in Congo) Osleg Operation Sovereign Legitimacy PALIPEHUTU Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) PALIPEHUTU- Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu–Forces FNL Nationales de Libération (Party for the Liberation of

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PL PRP PSC PSD RCD RCD-ML RCD-N RENAMO RPA RPF SADC SAFA SANDF SASMIP SPLA/M UDI UJCC ULS UN UNAMIR UNHCR UNITA UNOMUR UNRF UPC UPDF UPRONA WWC ZANU/PF ZDI ZESA

the Hutu People–National Liberation Forces) Parti Libéral (Liberal Party) Parti de la Revolution Populaire (Popular Revolutionary Party) Peace and Security Council Parti Social Démocratique (Social Democratic Party) Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Rally for a Democratic Congo) RCD–Mouvement de Libération (RCD–Liberation Movement) RCD-Nationale Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Mozambique National Resistance) Rwanda Patriotic Army Rwanda Patriotic Front Southern African Development Community South African Football Association South African National Defense Force Service d’Achat des Matières Précieuses (Service for the Acquisition of Precious Metals) Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement Unilateral Declaration of Independence Uganda Joint Christian Council Uganda Law Society United Nations United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UN High Commissioner for Refugees União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) United Nations Mission for Uganda-Rwanda Uganda National Rescue Front II Union des Patriotes Congolais (Union of Patriotic Congolese) Uganda People’s Defense Force Union pour le Progrès National (Unity for National Progress) Woodrow Wilson Center Zimbabwe African National Union/Patriotic Front Zimbabwe Defense Industries Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority

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Adekeye Adebajo is executive director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa. From 2001 to 2003, he was director of the Africa Program of the International Peace Academy in New York, where he managed projects on regional security, peace building, and conflict management in Africa. Dr. Adebajo has authored and edited four books and published numerous articles on peace and conflict issues in Africa Mwesiga Baregu is professor of political science and international relations at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. Until early 2002 he headed the Peace and Security Research Program at SAPES Trust in Harare, Zimbabwe. He is a member of the Executive Councils of the International Peace Research Association. He has written and published numerous papers and edited a number of books on political economy, peace, security, and democracy in Africa, focusing mainly on the Great Lakes region. He recently coedited, with Chris Landsberg, From Cape to Congo: Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (2003). Gilbert M. Khadiagala is associate professor of comparative politics and African studies and acting director of the African studies program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC. He is the author of Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern Africa Security, 1975–1993 (1994) and coeditor with Terrence Lyons of African Foreign Policies: Power and Process (2001). Christopher Landsberg is director of the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg and the cofounder of the Centre for African International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. He has published widely on South Africa’s and Africa’s international relations, particularly in the areas of governance, democracy, development, peace, and 211

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212 THE CONTRIBUTORS security. He recently coedited, with Mwesiga Baregu, From Cape to Congo: Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (2003). René Lemarchand is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Florida. He has written extensively on the Great Lakes region and served as a regional consultant on governance and democracy with USAID in Abidjan (1992–1996) and Accra (1996–1998) and, more recently, with the European Union. Angela Ndinga Muvumba joined the Centre for Conflict Resolution in July 2005 as program manager of the HIV/AIDS and Security Project, after serving as political officer in the cabinet of the chairperson of the African Union Commission. From 2001 to 2004, she was also senior program officer with the Africa Program of the International Peace Academy. Prior to joining the International Peace Academy, she served as the United Nations Development Programme’s postconflict focal person and prepared briefings for its Gender in Development Unit, worked as a researcher for the UN Development Fund for Women, and spent several years working in the African and US nongovernmental sectors. Gérard Prunier is a renowned analyst on East Africa, the Horn, Sudan, and the Great Lakes region and a research professor at the University of Paris. He is the author of Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (2005) and The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide (1995). Filip Reyntjens teaches courses on African law and politics at the Universities of Antwerp and Brussels. He is chairman of the Institute of Development Policy and Management, the Centre for the Study of the Great Lakes Region of Africa at the University of Antwerp, and the African Studies and Documentation Centre in Brussels. He also serves as vice president of the International Third World Legal Studies Association (New York) and vice rector of the University of Mbuji-Mayi in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A specialist on sub-Saharan Africa, his research focuses on the Great Lakes area of Central Africa, on which he has published dozens of articles and several books, including L’Afrique des grands lacs: Annuaire (1997–2003), Burundi: Prospects for Peace (2000), and La guerre des grands lacs (1999). Peter J. Schraeder is professor of African politics and international relations in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University, Chicago. His research has been published in such diverse scholarly journals as African Affairs, The Journal of Modern African Studies, The Journal of Politics, Middle East Journal, Politique Africaine, and World Politics. He

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is the author of African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation (2nd ed., 2003) and United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change (1994) and editor of Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality (2002) and Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Third World (1992).

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Index

Abubakar, Abdulsaalam, 150 Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), 89, 95 Action for Development (ACFODE), 86, 87, 93 Actors: multiplicity in Great Lakes region, 2; partnerships between, 8 Actors, civil society: constraint of abuse of political office and, 85; in Uganda, 6, 81–101 Actors, international: in Burundi, 51–53; resource exploitation by, 4 Actors, regional: goals for intervention in Democratic Republic of Congo, 60–61 Adebajo, Adekeye, 9, 141–158, 191, 193 Africa: Francophone, 165, 166, 167, 168; as lab for UN peacekeeping, 141 African Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Congo, 61 African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), 90 African Union, 121, 123; African Mission in Burundi, 57; Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 130; in Burundi, 41; Committee of Experts, 130; in Democratic Republic of Congo, 64; International Conference on Peace, Security, and Development, 180; need to address interconnectedness of conflict-generating

issues by, 55; peacekeeping by, 8 Ajello, Aldo, 9, 178 Akandwanaho, Jovia, 116n30 Albers, Karl-Heinz, 109, 115n28 Albert II (King of Belgium), 174 Ali, Aziza Goolam, 109, 115n27 Alliance Democratique du Peuples, 60 Alliance des Forces pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), 61, 62, 110, 125, 148 Amnesty International, 30, 92 An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali), 142 Angola: agreement for troop removal from Democratic Republic of Congo, 68; deployment of troops to Democratic Republic of Congo, 63–64, 64, 149; development assistance in, 112, 112tab; economic indicators in, 110tab; goals for intervention in Democratic Republic of Congo, 61; impact of Congo war on, 109–111; in Lusaka peace process, 65; peacekeeping missions in, 144; support for overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko by, 60; União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola in, 61 Annan, Kofi, 38n86, 64, 130, 147, 148, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156 Anyidoho, Henry, 146 Arms: contracts, 114; dealing, 31; smuggling, 72 Arusha Accord (1993), 15, 17, 43, 53–55, 126, 133, 188; Implementation

215

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and Monitoring Commission in, 127, 134; protocols, 126–127 Bagaza, Jean-Baptiste, 166 Bah, Mamadou, 132 Bamina, Joseph, 41 Banyamulenge, 62, 124; rebellion by, 63; relations with Rwanda, 60; withdrawal of citizenship from, 60 Belgium, 155; colonial legacy in Congo, 164–168; control of Congo by, 59, 60; election of LiberalSocialist government in, 175, 180; erosion of political ambitions in Africa, 164; in Great Lakes region, 10, 163–182; post–Cold War policymaking and Great Lakes region, 164–168 Bemba, Jean-Pierre, 65, 67, 123, 129 Berlin Conference (1885), 59 Besigye, Kiiza, 93 Bizimungu, Pasteur, 19, 78n26 Blair, Tony, 78n25 Booh-Booh, Jacques-Roger, 142, 146 Bourse Congolaise des Matières Premières (BCMP), 114n3 Bout, Viktor, 30 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 52, 63, 141, 147, 169 Brahimi Report (2000), 154, 156 Bugera, Deo, 60 Burundi: absorption of potential enemies by, 43; African Union and, 41; Arusha Accords and, 53–55; assassinations in, 41; background of present crisis, 42–43; bias of special envoys in, 52; Burundi Force for the Defense of Democracy in, 65; Centre for Conflict Resolution in, 91; chronic violence in, 43; civil war in, 41; colonialism in, 124; Commission Nationale de Réhabilitation des Sinistrés in, 54; communal strife in, 4; in Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs, 7; Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie in, 128; constitutional issues in, 43; 1994 Convention of Government in, 52; demobilization in, 53–55; in Democratic

Republic of Congo, 48–50; democratization of, 8, 53–55; disarmament in, 53–55; discord over legitimacy of Arusha Accord, 43; in East African Cooperation, 7; in Economic Community of Central African States, 7; elections in, 35n39, 53; electoral code in, 53; elite mobilization of identity in, 4; embargo on, 23; ethnic bipolarization in, 16, 43, 44; ethnic compromises in, 2; ethnicity in, 43, 44; European Union and, 41; fracture of nationstate in, 4; Front National de Libération in, 42, 53–55, 54; Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi in, 42, 46, 52, 125; genocide in, 4, 41, 42, 43, 45, 57; 2003 Global Ceasefire Agreement, 53; Hutu in, 4, 41– 57; impact of Rwanda revolution on, 43, 44; independence, 164; informal alliances in, with Rwandese refugees, 48; international actors in, 51–53; irredentism and annexation of territory by, 72; lack of coherence in response to crisis by international community, 51–53; land scarcity in, 43, 46, 73; legacy of early genocide in, 45–46; militarization of, 4; military ethnocracy in, 45; Ministry for the Reinsertion and Reinstallation of Displaced and Repatriated Persons in, 54; National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration in, 54; need to strengthen posttransition state capabilities, 55; new constitution in, 53; Observatoire pour l’Action Gouvernementale in, 56; participation in Arusha conference as “rush to the trough,” 50; Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu in, 46; Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu–Forces Nationales de Libération in, 46, 49; peace initiatives by international community, 51; political fragmentation in, 43, 48; private sector as source of employment in, 56; profusion of players in, 51; prospects for peace in, 53–55; radicalism in, 43, 46–47; regional

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INDEX nexus of crisis in, 47–50; Regional Peace Initiative for, 55; regional summits on, 8; regroupment camps in, 49, 54; reintegration in, 53–55; restitution for refugee lands, 46; rural poverty in, 43; sanctions on, 125; self-government in, 43; social inequality in, 56; South Africa in, 8, 53; special envoys in, 51; support for overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko by, 60; Tanzania in, 41; transitional government in, 50; Tutsi in, 4, 41–57; United Nations in, 9, 41; UN Operation in Burundi in, 8, 157; vulnerability to invasion, 43 Burundi Force for the Defense of Democracy, 65 Burundi on the Brink (Ould-Abdallah), 52 Bush, George W., 174, 176, 178 Buyoya, Pierre, 5, 50, 51, 123, 127, 134 Byanyima, Winnie, 86, 93 Carter, Jimmy, 167 Casablanca Group, 143 Central African Republic, 156, 194 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), 91, 95, 96 Chad: deployment of troops to Democratic Republic of Congo, 63–64 Child soldiers, 49, 54 Chiluba, Frederick, 64, 78n26 Chirac, Jacques, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177 Chissano, Joaquim, 64, 78n26, 123 Civil society: capacity to contribute to peace processes, 82; conflict prevention and, 81; defining, 81, 82; diversity in organizations of, 82; institutional challenges for, 94–97; interdependence of, 82–84; interests of marginalized groups and, 81; nongovernmental organizations and, 81; peacebuilding and, 81; role in expansion of political participation, 84–94; role in peacebuilding and democratization, 81–101; in Uganda, 81–101 Civil society organizations, 82; access to financial resources, 86, 87; in

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drafting constitutions, 86; funding challenges, 94, 95; gender equality and, 86, 87; guidelines for donors, 100; influence of, 86, 87; national, 83; operations of, 83; partnering with private sector, 95; professionalism development in, 94; recommendations for, 98–100; regional, 83; relationships with governmental decisionmakers, 96; repressive governments and, 84; scope of activities of, 83; semiformal, 83; social services and, 91; training for civil servants by, 96 Clinton, Bill, 51, 168, 171, 172, 175, 178 Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), 17 Cohen, Herman, 72 Comiex, 111 Conseil Concertation des Organisations d’Appui aux Initiatives de Base (CCOAIB), 25 Commission Nationale de Réhabilitation des Sinistrés (CNRS), 54 Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL), 7, 189 Community-based organizations, 82; advocacy of disenfranchised by, 88; economic development and, 87; financial underdevelopment of, 84; guidelines for donors, 100; impact of structural adjustment on, 87; links to nongovernmental organizations, 83; localized agendas of, 83; national coordinating forums for, 87; networks of, 87–89; recommendations for, 98–100; reliance on volunteers, 83; self-help roles of, 87; in Uganda, 81 Community of Sant’Egidio, 51 Conflict(s): civil society and prevention of, 81; divergent agendas in resolution of, 52; ecological sources of, 76; economic dimensions of, 103–114; management, 6; obstacles to solutions to, 7; prevention, 7; regional, 6, 63–64; resolution, 2, 7, 8, 91, 92; resolved by outside factors, 7; resource, 6; reversal of, 1; South Africa’s peacemaking responses to, 121–138; state incapacity and, 2; trajectories, 2

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Congo Desk, 108, 109, 115n21 Congo Free State, 77n4 Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 127, 128, 133, 135 Coordination des Ligues et Associations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (CLADHO), 25 Cosleg partnership, 111 Council of the Republic Transitional Parliament, 126 Cronyism, predatory, 6, 60 Cultural oppression, 15 Dallaire, Roméo, 145, 147 Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development in the Great Lakes Region (2004), 97, 193 Dayal, Rajeshwar, 144 de Gaulle, Charles, 165, 168 Democracy: illiberal, 57; mediation of, in domestic domain, 7 Democratic Alliance, 122 Democratic Republic of Congo, 60; accusations of, against Rwanda and Burundi for provocations, 124; Acte d’Engagement by, 67; African Union in, 64; Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo in, 61, 62, 148; Alliance Democratique du Peuples in, 60; anti-Kabila rebellion in, 128–129; anti-UN sentiments in, 153; atrocities in, 30; autocratic rule in, 62; banking system in, 107; Banyamulenge in, 60, 62; as base for União para a Independencia Total de Angola, 61; Belgian colonialism in, 164–168; Bourse Congolaise des Matières Premières in, 114n3; Burundi in, 48–50; centralized command economic policy in, 105; civil war in, 6, 48–50; clandestine military presence of Rwanda in, 31, 32; as collapsed state, 6, 60; colonial period in, 59; Commission on Ethics and the Fight Against Corruption in, 69; in Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs, 7;

compromised state sovereignty in, 6; confiscation of parastatals, 108; continuation of illegal exploitation of resources in, 70; continuation of Rwandan incursions into, 70; Council of the Republic Transitional Parliament in, 126; criminalization of foreign trade and, 104; cronyism in, 6, 60; currency depreciation in, 105; Declaration of Commitment by, 67; defense of sovereignty of by Southern African Development Community, 63–64, 64; development assistance in, 112, 112tab; early Kabila years, 61–63; early Mobutu years, 59–61; in Economic Community of Central African States, 7; economic exploitation of, 30; economic growth in, 105; economic impact of conflict in, 103–114; economic perversion in, 105; effect of war on, 103–106; effect of war on occupying forces, 111–113; elections in, 69; establishment of transitional government, 67; ethnic tensions in, 2; expulsion of Rwandan advisers from, 62; as failed state, 78n41; failure of democratization program in, 62; gem and mineral trade in, 104, 105, 108, 109, 115n21; gross domestic product in, 104tab; HimaTutsi empire thesis and, 72; impact of war on government allies, 109– 111; impact of war on rebel/foreign controlled zones, 106–109; impact of war on wildlife, 107; informal economy in, 104; infrastructure in, 104; invasion by Rwanda, 30, 62, 63; investment in, 104; Ituri Pacification Committee in, 68; looting by Rwanda, 30, 107, 108; Lusaka peace process in, 64–69; Mai-Mai in, 65, 67; massacres of Rwandan refugees in, 28; Memorandum on Military and Security Issues for, 69; Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo in, 65, 107; multinational corporations in, 59; National Electoral Commission in, 69; National Human Rights Observatory in, 69; nationalistic goals in, 60; obstacles to peace

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INDEX agreement implementation, 70–76; ongoing conflict in, 59–76; Opération des Nations Unies au Congo in, 143; overborrowing, 104; overspending on prestige projects, 104; overthrow of Mobutu, 60; Parti de la Revolution Populaire in, 60; patrimonialism in, 60; peacekeeping missions in, 143–144, 148–155; plunder of resources in, 59, 72, 106, 107; political subjugation in, 59; power-sharing transitional government in, 8; Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Goma in, 30, 107, 108; Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie in, 63, 66, 68; Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Mouvement de Libération in, 65, 67, 68, 107; Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Nationale in, 65, 67, 68, 107; rebel movements in, 6; rebel zones in, 106, 107; reconstruction pledges for, 152; refugees in, 63; resource plunder in, 6; role in Great Lakes region conflict, 59–76; Rwanda in, 23; Rwandan withdrawal from, 68; Rwanda Patriotic Army in, 19; Service d’Achat des Matières Précieuses in, 104; and Southern African Development Community, 7, 63–64, 72; Sovereign National Conference in, 61; special envoys in, 64, 68; structural militarism/warlordism in, 73–74; Sudan in, 107; Sun City Agreement and, 67–69; transitional government in, 69–70, 152; transitional institutions in, 6; Truth and Reconciliation Commission in, 69; United Kingdom in, 78n25; UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in, 7, 8, 9, 63, 66, 69, 116n41, 131, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154; Western hostility toward, 61; withdrawal of regional militaries from, 8; withdrawal of Rwandan troops from, 130; “Zairianization” process in, 103 Democratization: destabilizing effects of, 16; in ethnically divided polities, 5; incremental process of, 6;

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multiparty, 53; in Rwanda, 16, 23–27 Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA), 87, 88 Diplomacy: parallel, 51; of peacemaking, 124–127; quiet, 122, 136; shuttle, 68, 133, 134, 172, 178 Divisionism, 25 Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana, 136 dos Santos, José Eduardo, 78n26, 128, 129, 130 Drug trade, 72, 76 East African Cooperation (EAC), 7, 93 Economic: criminalization, 31; development, 87; exclusions, 6; insecurity, 6; integration, 189; interaction, 7; liberalization, 6; recovery, 56; rivalries, 3 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 7, 155 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 155 Economy: informal, 104; selfsubsistence, 104 Eisenhower, Dwight, 165 Elections: communal, 53; controlled, 25; ethnic voting in, 35n39; lack of guarantees with, 57; legislative, 53; national, 175; parliamentary, 24, 26, 69; presidential, 24, 69; stuffing ballot boxes in, 26 Eritrea: support for overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko by, 60 Essy, Amara, 130 Ethnic: bias, 21, 22; bipolarization, 4, 43, 44; discrimination, 20; diversity, 2; identities, 21; manipulation, 16; organizations and associations, 81; security, 4; violence, 47; voting, 35n39 Ethnicity: in Burundi, 43, 44; impact of colonial administrations on, 15; manipulation of, 21; politics and, 43 Ethnogenesis, 32 European Union, 155; in Burundi, 41; Interim Emergency Multinational Force, 7, 69; observer mission in Rwanda, 26; special envoys from in Great Lakes region, 9

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Fall, Ibrahima, 156 Foccart, Jacques, 166, 168, 171 Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), 31, 48, 61, 65, 68, 70, 75, 130, 159n30 Forces Armée Zairoises (FAZ), 75–76 Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), 131 Forrest, George, 106 Forum for Women and Democracy (FOWODE), 86 Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI), 91 France: Africa as chasse gardee, 165; “Fashoda complex,” 170; in Great Lakes region, 10, 163–182; Operation Turquoise and, 9; post–Cold War policymaking and Great Lakes region, 164–168; pride in accomplishments in Africa, 165; promotion of la francophonie, 165, 172; responsibility for Rwandan genocide, 146 Franco-African Summit, 165, 175 Friends of the New Rwanda, 17 Front de Libération Nationale du Congo (FNLC), 167 Front National de Libération (FNL), 42, 50, 53–55, 54 Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), 42, 46, 48, 52, 54, 125 Front pour la Libération Nationale (FROLINA), 135 Furuma, Alphonse, 20 Gaddafi, Muammar, 91 Gahima, Gerald, 20 Gambari, Ibrahim, 147, 148 Garang, John, 93, 170 Gécamines, 105, 106, 110, 111, 114n6, 116n35 Genocide, 1; in Burundi, 4, 41, 42, 43, 45, 57; credit, 172, 181, 190; decentralized, 16; described as “ethnic/ tribal” warfare, 15; jeunesse in, 45; recognition of, 15; in response to perceived threats from victim group, 45; retributive, 45; in Rwanda, 2, 4, 15–33, 168–173; support from refugee groups, 45; survivors, 16, 18, 19, 20; trauma of, 16 Gersony, Robert, 28 Gertler, Dan, 114n10

Global and Comprehensive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2002), 68 Golan, Rami, 106 Governance: authoritarian, 4; failure to nurture, 3, 4; in Great Lakes region, 1–10; as means to security, 2, 3; mediation of, in domestic domain, 7; norms and rules in, 3; promotion of, participation and, 3; in Rwanda, 15– 33; structures of competition and, 3 Great Lakes region: AnglophoneFrancophone divide in, 10; civil society in, 81; competition by Western powers for economic and political influence in, 168–173; contradictory policies on, from Western powers, 166; convergence of interests of Western powers in promotion of peace and security in, 173–179; diversity in resource endowments in, 6; economic dimensions of conflict in, 103–114; as geographical expression only, 7; governance in, 6–10; inability for conflicts to remain self-contained, 122; indivisibility of peace process in, 55; interimperialist rivalries in, 74–75; interlocking nature of conflict in, 3, 4; joint US-French-Belgian military operations, 167; lack of regional norms and institutions in, 3; multiplicity of actors in, 2; mutual suspicions between Western powers, 169, 170, 171, 172; obstacles to peacemaking in, 70–76; panAfricanism in, 74–75; peace and security in, 1–10; postcolonial contexts in, 2; power sharing in, 7; reasons for conflicts in, 122; recommendations for building security in, 187–196; resource conflicts in, 6; role of European Union in peacebuilding in, 178, 179; roles for United Nations in, 156– 158; South Africa in, 121–138; transformation of geopolitical map post-Congo civil war, 48; UN peacekeeping in, 141–158; Western powers partnership in, 10 Gumbi, Mojanku, 129

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INDEX Habimana, Pasteur, 50 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 141, 144 Hara, Fabienne, 51 Habyarimana, Juvénal, 15, 41, 145, 146, 167 Hegemony: use of force to assert, 5 HIV/AIDS, 92 Holbrooke, Richard, 150 Huber, Christian, 108 Human Rights Watch, 24, 92 Hutu: in Burundi, 4, 41–57; in Rwanda, 15–33 Ibuka, 20 Identity: competing, 4; ethnic, 21 Ilunga, Emile, 65 Imboni in Exile (newspaper), 20 Imboni (newspaper), 19 Impuzamugambi militia, 146 In Larger Freedom (Annan), 156 Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), 110 Institutions: civilian, 5; control of, 4; financial, 23; of governance, 3; international, 8, 23; participatory, 3, 4; political, 22tab; preexisting, 7; regional, 7; religious, 89; representative, 4; transitional, 6 Interahamwe, 31, 48, 61, 62, 65, 68, 70, 75, 146, 159n30 Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), 8, 66, 67, 68, 149, 177, 178 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 155 Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), 7, 39n91, 69, 150 International Committee in Support of the Transition (ICST), 150 International community: awareness of conditions in Rwanda, 27; competition for control of financial resources given by, 54; emphasis on shortcomings of, 51; guilt over genocide in Rwanda, 28; lack of action in Rwanda by, 15; lack of coherence in response to crisis in Burundi, 51–53; need to fund expansion of African Mission in Burundi, 57 International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development (2004), 7, 97, 180

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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 18 International Crisis Group (ICG), 24, 25, 26, 52, 92 International Monetary Fund, 87, 113 International Peace Academy (IPA), 83 International Rescue Committee, 37n64 Inyumba, Aloysia, 20, 24 Ituri Pacification Committee, 68 Johnson, Lyndon, 165 Kabarebe, James, 20 Kabila, Joseph, 67, 78n42, 105, 106, 114n10, 123, 129, 130, 136, 137, 150, 153, 174 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 5, 49, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 69, 72, 78n26, 104, 105, 106, 110, 125, 126, 129, 148, 149, 150, 170, 174 Kagame, Paul, 5, 20, 23n18, 28, 30, 32, 36n50, 48, 67, 123, 130, 136, 153, 170, 171, 174, 175, 177, 190 Kagiraneza, Deus, 20, 23, 115n21 Kainerugaba, Muhoozi, 116n30 Kajeguhakwa, Valens, 20 Kamanzi, Djuma, 23n18 Kansteiner, Walter, 73 Karegeya, Patrick, 20 Karubi, Kikaya bin, 106 Kasavubu, Joseph, 143 Kassem, Mahmood, 106 Kawamala, Sheila, 93 Kazini, James, 107, 109, 116n31 Keating, Colin, 147 Kennedy, John, 165 Kenya: Centre for Conflict Resolution in, 91 Khadiagala, Gilbert, 1–10, 187–196 Kony, Joseph, 89 Kwikiriza, Charles, 20 Land: reform, 110; scarcity, 6, 15, 43, 46, 73 Landsberg, Chris, 8, 121–138, 191 La Nouvelle Relève (newspaper), 21 Lemarchand, René, 4, 7, 8, 9, 41–57, 146, 163, 175, 191 Leopold II (King of Belgium), 59, 77n4 Liberia, 156

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Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs (LGDL), 24 Ligue pour la Promotion des Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda (LIPRODHOR), 25, 27, 36n40 Likota, Mosiuoa, 131 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 50 Lumumba, Patrice, 60, 73, 143, 144, 165 Lusaka Agreement (1999), 8, 64–69, 129, 149, 173, 188 Mandela, Nelson, 8, 52, 64, 121, 122, 125, 126, 129, 173 Masangu, Jean-Claude, 114n3 Masire, Ketumile, 8, 9, 66, 67, 78n26, 149, 150 Masozera, Richard, 20 Matembe, Miria, 86, 93 Mauritius, 64 Mbeki, Thabo, 53, 55, 65, 121, 123, 129–135, 150, 152, 153 McAskie, Carolyn, 157 Mdadaye, Melchior, 41, 42, 46, 47, 57, 124, 146 Médecins sans Frontières, 28 Media: debate on political issues and, 92; exposure of corruption and, 92, 93; governmental accountability and, 93; human rights and, 83; independent, 92, 93; radio/television, 92; in Rwanda, 18, 19; in Uganda, 81, 92–94 Michel, Louis, 134, 163, 174, 178, 179 Micombero, Michel, 45, 46, 166 Military: commercialism, 23; ethnocracy, 45; leaders from ranks of, 5; politicized, 124; unwillingness to relinquish power to civilians, 5 Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), 111 Mitterrand, François, 165, 169 Mkapa, Benjamin, 64, 131 Mnangagwa, Emerson, 116n33 Mobutu Sese Seko, 3, 6, 7, 60, 103, 104, 106, 108, 116n30, 124, 125, 126, 142, 144, 148, 150, 165, 167, 170, 171, 172, 188 Monitor (newspaper), 92, 93 Morjane, Kamel, 149 Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), 23n13, 24, 25, 26, 36n40

Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), 65, 67, 107, 129, 132, 150 Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), 17 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 110 Mufamadi, Sydney, 129 Mugabe, Robert, 61, 78n26, 110, 128, 136 Multinational corporations, 59 Muluzi, Bakili, 130 Mupende, Michael, 20 Museveni, Yoweri, 5, 6, 32, 51, 66, 78n26, 86, 90, 91, 93, 123, 125, 131, 133, 170, 177, 885 Muvumba, Angela Ndinga, 5, 81–101, 190 Mwenda, Andrew, 93 Namibia: agreement for troop removal from Democratic Republic of Congo, 68; deployment of troops to Democratic Republic of Congo, 63–64, 64, 149; economic indicators in, 110tab; impact of Congo war on, 109–111; in Lusaka peace process, 65; peacekeeping missions in, 144; on Southern African Development Community, 63–64 National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR), 54 National Commission for Unity and Reconciliation (Rwanda), 24 National Resistance Movement (NRM), 84, 85, 92 National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda (NUDIPU), 86 Ndayikengurukiye, Jean-Bosco, 46 Ndayizeye, Domitien, 127, 134 Ndongou, Jean Francois, 132 Ndayikengurukiye, Jean-Bosco, 49 Netherlands, 155; assistance to Rwanda, 34n11; support for Rwanda Patriotic Front by, 17 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 121 Ngendandumwe, Pierre, 41, 47 NGO Forum, 88 Ngongi, Namanga, 149, 150

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INDEX Nguesso, Sassou, 123 Nhlapa, Welile, 129–130 Niasse, Moustapha, 10, 64, 68 Nixon, Richard, 166, 176 Nkubito, Alphonse, 19 Nkurunziza, Pierre, 46, 49, 53, 127, 134, 158 Nongovernmental organizations, 37n64; civil society and, 81; constitutional processes and, 85–87; cooptation by the state, 84; dependence on outside funding, 85; development, 25; differences among, 97; efforts to develop inclusive governance practices, 98–100; external donor, 83; funding for, 92, 94; gender equality and, 84, 86, 93; governance issues and, 85–87; guidelines for donors, 100; human rights and, 91–92; institutional challenges for, 94–97; international, 92; International Rescue Committee, 37n64; nation building and, 84; networks of, 87–89; parallel diplomacy conducted by, in Burundi, 51; peacebuilding and, 84; postconflict reconstruction and, 84; recommendations for, 98– 100; role in fostering democratization, 85; in Rwanda, 24; sociopolitical reform and, 84; in Uganda, 81–101; US Committee for Refugees, 37n64; vulnerabilities of, 84 Ntare (Burundian king), 41, 45 Ntaryamira, Cyprien, 41 Ntashamaje, Gérard, 20 Nujoma, Sam, 128, 129 Nyamwasa, Kayumba, 20 Nyangoma, Leonard, 48, 49 Nyerere, Julius, 9, 42, 51, 52, 73, 125, 126 Nziza, Jack, 20 Nzo, Alfred, 129 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 153 O’Brien, Conor Cruise, 144 Observatoire pour l’Action Gouvernementale (OAG), 56 Operation Artemis, 150, 177, 182 Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (UNOC), 143 Operation Mamba, 177

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Operation Noroit, 169 Operation Panda, 169 Operation Sovereigh Legitimacy (Osleg) company, 111 Operation Turquoise, 9, 146, 147, 169 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 193 Organizations and associations: aid, 28; civil society, 56; ethnic, 81; human rights, 25, 27; intergovernmental, 51; international, 28; nongovernmental, 24, 25; professional/trade, 81, 82, 97; regional, 51; religious, 81, 82, 85, 89–91, 97; semiformal, 83; student, 97; traditional, 81; women’s, 82, 85 Oryx company, 111 Osleg company, 111 Otafiire, Kahinda, 108, 115n17 Ould-Abdallah, Ahmedou, 9, 42, 52, 125 Outeniqua (warship), 126 Pahad, Aziz, 135 Parti de la Revolution Populaire (PRP), 60 Parti Libéral (PL), 26, 36n50 Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu–Forces Nationales de Libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), 46, 49, 127, 128, 133, 135 Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), 46 Parti Social Démocratique (PSD), 26, 36n50 Peace: building, 7; democratic governance and, 121; developmental need for, 121; mechanisms toward, in Great Lakes region, 6–10 Peace agreement implementation: absence of conflict-fueling economic resources in war zones, 142; actors in, 71; cessation of military/financial support to local clients by outside actors, 142; cooperation of regional players and, 142; development of strategies to deal with spoilers, 142; leadership of peacekeeping missions by UN envoys, 142; pan-Africanist rivalries and, 74–75; peacemakers/peace spoilers/ and

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peace opportunists and, 71; provision of financial/diplomatic support for process, 142; resource struggles and, 71–73; structural militarism/ warlordism and, 73–74; structural obstacles to, 71–74; willingness of parties to disarm and accept electoral results, 142 Pickering, Thomas, 174 Pluralism: expansion of legitimacy and, 7 Political: boundaries, 85; changes, 16; correctness, 28; crimes, 69; dissent, 92–94; fragmentation, 16, 48; inclusiveness, 17; instability, 2; institutions, 22tab; participation, 84–94; parties, 17, 23, 54; patronage, 23; systems, 2; violence, 15 Porter Commission, 116n31 Powell, Colin, 176 Pretoria Agreements (2002), 8 Pro-Femmes, 25, 36n40 Prunier, Gérard, 6, 103–114, 191 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Goma (RCD-Goma), 30, 65, 107, 108, 132, 150, 153 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), 65, 67, 68, 107 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Nationale (RCD-N), 65, 67, 68, 107 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), 63, 65, 66, 67, 68 Rautenbach, Billy, 105, 106, 114n6, 116n35 Refugees/internally displaced persons, 2, 5, 146; competition for control of, 54; in Democratic Republic of Congo, 63; “old caseload,” 21; regional security and, 75–76; from Rwanda, 16; in Tanzania, 54 Regimes: authoritarian, 4, 5, 82, 85; dictatorial, 85; strongman, 7 Regional: conflict resolution, 7; instability, 2; institutions, 7; security, 75–76 Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi, 55 Remole, Robert, 167

Renaissance Africa, 121 Resources: availability, 71; diversity in endowments of, 6; exploitation, 4, 30; extraction of, 3; meager endowments, 2; and peace agreement implementation, 71–73; scarcity of, 72; struggles for, 71–73; utilization for sectarian aggrandizement, 5 Reyntjens, Filip, 4, 190 Rice, Susan, 64, 172 Rich, Marc, 106 Rights, human, 5, 18, 19, 27, 30, 81, 82, 83, 84, 91–92 Rights, minority, 57 Riza, Iqbal, 147 Ruberwa, Azarias, 153 Rudasingwa, Théogène, 20 Rutagengwa, Bosco, 20 Rutazibwa, Privat, 21 Ruzindana, Alex, 20 Rwagasore (Burundian prince), 41, 47 Rwanda: accusations of abuse of power in, 19; Arusha Accord and, 15; authoritarian drift in, 24; Centre for Conflict Resolution in, 91; civil war in, 15, 144–148; clandestine military presence in Democratic Republic of Congo, 31, 32; Coalition pour le Défense de la République in, 17; Conseil de Concertation des Organisation d’Appui aux Initiatives de Base in, 25; in Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs, 7; condemnation of for support of Democratic Republic of Congo rebels, 64; conflict with Uganda, 32; Congo Desk in, 108, 109; conspiracy of silence over genocide in, 27–30, 144–148; constitutional restrictions in, 26; continuation of civil war extraterritorially, 30; continuation of incursions into Democratic Republic of Congo, 70; control of civil society in, 18, 25, 27; control of elections in, 23; Coordination des Ligues et Associations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme in, 25; criminalization of state in, 23, 31; de facto one-party rule in, 26, 27; defense budget, 112, 112tab, 117n46; democratic transition in, 16, 23–27;

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INDEX demographic inequalities in, 15; departure of genocide survivors from, 18, 19, 20; development assistance in, 112, 112tab; Directorate of Military Intelligence in, 20; “disappearances” in, 20, 26, 27; divisionism in, 25; in East African Cooperation, 7; in Economic Community of Central African States, 7; economic deterioration in, 15; elections in, 23, 24, 175; end of political transition in, 25; ethnic bipolarization in, 4, 16; ethnic discrimination in, 19; European Union observer mission in, 26; External Security Organisation in, 20; financial mismanagement in, 23; Forces Armées Rwandaises in, 31, 65; Fundamental Law in, 17; genocide in, 2, 4, 15–33, 144–148, 168–173; goals for intervention in Democratic Republic of Congo, 61; governance in, 15–33, 18–30; human rights in, 18, 19, 27, 30; Hutu in, 15–33; illegally acquired resources in, 113, 113tab; impact of colonial administrations on, 15; impact of Congo war on, 111–113; impact on region, 30–32; independence, 164; indirect voting system in, 23; information management in, 27–30; infrastructure destruction in, 16; international aid for, 17; international community awareness of conditions in, 27; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and, 18; intervention for resources in Democratic Republic of Congo, 63; intraregime tensions in, 20; invasion of Democratic Republic of Congo by, 62, 63; irredentism and annexation of territory by, 72; kinship bonds in, 23; lack of action by international community in, 15; lack of secrecy in elections, 24, 26; land scarcity in, 15, 73; latitude given by international community, 17; Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs in, 24; Ligue pour la Promotion des Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda in, 25, 27; Local Defense

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Forces in, 24; in Lusaka peace process, 65; media in, 18, 19; military budget, 35n32; military commercialism in, 23; Mouvement Démocratique Républicain in, 23n13, 24, 25, 26; Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement in, 17; National Commission for Unity and Reconciliation in, 24; National Electoral Commission in, 24; National Security Service in, 20; new akazu in, 23; nongovernmental organizations in, 24; normalization of ties with Western powers, 174, 175; Parti Libéral in, 26, 36n50; Parti Social Démocratie in, 26, 36n50; party affiliation in, 22, 22tab; peacekeeping missions in, 142, 144–148; plunder of Democratic Republic of Congo by, 23, 30; political base in, 18–20; political crises in, 19; political fragmentation in, 16; political institutions in, 22, 22tab; political parties in, 17; political patronage in, 23; postgenocide reconstruction in, 4; refusal to tolerate dissent in, 25; representative institutions in, 4; RPF-ization of, 20–23; Rwanda Patriotic Army in, 18, 30; Rwanda Patriotic Front in, 4, 15–33, 145, 146, 169; security in, 15–33; social conformity in, 16; state control in, 16; state-managed referenda in, 26; support for overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko by, 60; Tutsi in, 15–33; Tutsization of, 20–23; UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda in, 15, 144–148; UN withdrawal from, 9, 15; villagization program in, 18, 29; voting as cultural obligation in, 36n46; in war in Democratic Republic of Congo, 111– 113; withdrawal from Democratic Republic of Congo, 68, 130, 150; withdrawal of UN forces, 169; women in governance in, 36n50 Rwanda News Line (newspaper), 19, 20 Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), 18, 19, 20, 30, 107, 108 Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), 4, 15–33, 36n40, 48, 145, 146, 169

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Rwasa, Agathon, 42, 46, 50, 53, 135 Rwigema, Pierre-Célestin, 19, 23n13 Saleh, Salim, 108, 109, 116n30 Salim, Ahmed, 78n26 Sanctions, 113, 114 Saxena, Rakesh, 106 Schraeder, Peter, 10, 163–182 Sebarenzi, Joseph, 19 Security: democratic governance and, 121; developmental need for, 121; economic, 6; ethnic, 4; extraction of resources and, 3; in Great Lakes region, 1–10; linkages to peace, 3; mediation of, in domestic domain, 7; postcolonial, 4; as prerequisite of reconstruction of society, 3; reduction of vulnerabilities and, 3; refugees and, 75–76; regime, 5; regional, 75–76; regional/international mechanisms toward, 6–10; in Rwanda, 15–33; vacuums, 142 Selebi, Jackie, 129 Sendashonga, Seth, 18 Sengamines Company, 111 Serufuli, Eugène, 31 Service d’Achat des Matières Précieuses (SASMIP), 104, 114n3 Shiri, Perence, 116n33 Short, Claire, 31 Sierra Leone, 156 Sissi, Evariste, 20 Smith, Ian, 116n33 Smuggling, 114; arms, 72; diamond, 104 Social: capital, 86; conformism, 4, 16; inequality, 56; oppression, 15; services, 92; violence, 76n2 Somalia: peacekeeping missions in, 142, 144, 145; US intervention in, 168, 169 South Africa: accusations against, during conflict negotiations, 128, 129; African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes in, 90; arms sales by, 129; in Burundi, 41, 53; conflict resolution role for, 2; conflict resolution strategy for Great Lakes region, 121–138; dealing with autocrats/warlords in conflicts, 127–128; Democratic Alliance in,

122; foreign policy, 121, 122; intervention in Burundi, 8; interventions in Great Lakes region, 121–138; limits to peacemaking leverage, 126, 127, 128; military involvement in Burundi, 134; new developmentalism in, 136; reactions to anti-Kabila rebellion in Democratic Republic of Congo, 128–129; regional perceptions of, 123; reluctance to assume regional leadership, 8; stress on African multilateralism, 123; White Paper on Peace Support Operations by, 130; white supremacy in, 121; withdrawal of troops from Burundi, 127 South Africa–Democratic Republic of Congo binational commission, 132 South African Football Association (SAFA), 136 South African National Defense Force (SANDF), 131 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 7, 72, 123, 149, 150; Interstate Defense and Security Committee, 63–64; Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security, 63–64, 128; Victoria Falls Summit, 63–64 Sovereign National Conference (1991), 61 Special envoys, 178; in Burundi, 51–53; contentious presence of, 9; critical role of, 9; in Democratic Republic of Congo, 64, 68 State(s): authority, 70; building, 3, 5; capabilities, 55; collapsed, 1, 72, 78n41; control of, 16; criminalization of, 23; failed, 78n41, 176; fragility of, 3, 5; incapacity, 2; power, 29; reconstruction, 5; reproduction of ruling class in, 16; sovereignty, 6 Straw, Jack, 179 Sudan, 62, 90, 194; 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 93; in Democratic Republic of Congo, 107; deployment of troops to Democratic Republic of Congo, 63–64; Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in, 93 Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), 107

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INDEX Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), 93 Sun City Agreement (2002), 67–69 Swing, William, 152 Tanzania, 8; in Burundi, 41; on Southern African Development Community, 63–64 Taylor, Charles, 156 Tribun du Peuple (newspaper), 22, 23 Tshisekedi, Etienne, 61, 137 Tshombe, Moise, 143 Tutsi: in Burundi, 4, 41–57; in Rwanda, 15–33 Twagiramungu, Faustin, 17, 18, 23n13 Uganda: Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in, 89; Action for Development in, 86, 87; Amnesty Act of 1999, 90; Centre for Confict Resolution in, 91; civil society in, 6, 81–101; civil society organizations in, 82, 85–91; civil war in, 5; community-based organizations in, 81, 82, 87–89; condemnation of for support of Democratic Republic of Congo rebels, 64; conflict resolution in, 5; conflict with Rwanda, 32; Constitutional Review Commission in, 92, 93; defense budget in, 112, 112tab; democratization in, 82; development assistance in, 112, 112tab; Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations in, 87, 88; dissent in, 92–94; Domestic Relations Bill, 88; economic liberalization in, 6; Forum for Women and Democracy in, 86; Foundation for Human Rights Initiative in, 91, 92; gender equality in, 81; goals for intervention in Democratic Republic of Congo, 61; governance in, 81–101; human rights in, 91–92; illegally acquired resources in, 113, 113tab; impact of Congo war on, 111–113; intervention for resources in Democratic Republic of Congo, 63; Land Bill, 88; liberalization policies in, 87; lifting of restrictions of political parties, 85; Lord’s Resistance Army in, 50; in

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Lusaka peace process, 65; media in, 81, 92–94; multifaith initiatives in, 89, 90; multiparty politics in, 85, 90; National Resistance Movement in, 84, 85, 92; National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda (NUDIPU), 86; NGO Forum in, 88; nongovernmental organizations in, 81–101; privatization in, 87; Registrar of Cooperatives in, 87; religious leadership in, 89–91; social service delivery in, 92; support for overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko by, 60; transition to peace in, 81; Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces in, 65, 66; Uganda National Rescue Front II in, 65; unwillingness of military to relinquish power to civilians, 5; in war in Democratic Republic of Congo, 111–113; withdrawal of troops from Democratic Republic of Congo, 131, 150 Uganda/DRC Bilateral Security Intelligence Commission, 153 Uganda Gender Resource Center, 86 Uganda Law Society (ULS), 86 Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), 65, 66 Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF), 65 Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF), 107 Uganda Women’s Network, 93 União para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), 61, 65, 106, 109, 159n30 Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), 32, 39n91 Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA), 125 United Kingdom: assistance to Rwanda, 34n11; in Democratic Republic of Congo, 78n25; support for Rwanda Patriotic Front by, 17 United Nations: arms embargo by, 31; in Burundi, 41; condemned for indifference to Africa’s concerns, 147; Department of Peacekeeping, 147; intervention in Great Lakes region, 8; mission in Angola, 144; mission in Congo, 143–144; mission

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in Democratic Republic of Congo, 148–155; mission in Namibia, 144; mission in Somalia, 144, 145; peacekeeping in Great Lakes region, 141– 158; potential roles in Great Lakes region, 156–158; regional credibility of, 9; Third Verification Mechanism for Pretoria Agreement, 152 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 15, 144–148, 147, 169 United Nations Genocide Convention (1948), 42 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 28, 71, 76 United Nations International Conference for the Great Lakes, 141 United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 7, 8, 9, 38n85, 63, 66, 69, 116n41, 131, 137, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 177, 188 United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 8, 157 United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploration of Natural Resources of Democratic Republic of Congo, 92, 106 United Nations Security Council: demands by for withdrawal of foreign forces from Democratic Republic of Congo, 64; finance of peace missions in Africa, 131; intervention in Congo and, 9; meeting with Southern African Development Community, 66; report on looting of Democratic Republic of Congo, 106 United States: acceptance of Francophone Africa by, 165; authorization for assassination of Lumumba, 165; benign approach to conflicts in Great Lakes region, 171; criticisms of role in Rwanda and Somalia, 147; disinterest in African affairs, 166; expectation that European colonial powers take responsibility for former territories, 165; foreign policy on Africa delegated to bureaucrats, 166; in Great Lakes region, 10, 163–182; lifting of arms embargo on Rwanda, 31; opposition to efforts to seek

reform in Great Lakes region, 167; post–Cold War policymaking and Great Lakes region, 164–168; responsibility for length of genocide in Rwanda, 147; support for Mobutu assumption of power, 165, 167, 168; support for Rwanda Patriotic Front by, 17; willingness to overlook violations of human rights, 167 United States Congress: International Relations Committee, 64 US Committee for Refugees, 37n64 Uwilingiyimana, Agathe, 169 Vedrine, Hubert, 168, 179 Verhofstadt, Guy, 175, 180 Victoria Group of Enterprises, 108, 109, 116n30 Villepin, Dominique de, 175 Violence: acute, 16; chronic, 43; culture of, 16; ethnic, 47; extreme, 16; political, 15; political change and, 16; social, 76n2; structural, 16, 17 Wamba dia Wamba, Ernest, 65, 137 War crimes: rape, 2; in Rwanda, 15 Warlords, 4 West Nile Bank Front, 65, 159n30 Winter, Roger, 37n64 Wolpe, Howard, 9, 51, 56, 172, 178 World Bank, 29, 56, 87, 105, 111 Zaire. See Democratic Republic of Congo Zambia: on Southern African Development Community, 63–64 Zimbabwe: agreement for troop removal from Democratic Republic of Congo, 68; currency values in, 111; defense budget, 113; deployment of troops to Democratic Republic of Congo, 63–64, 149; development assistance in, 112, 112tab; economic decline in, 110; economic indicators in, 110tab; goals for intervention in Democratic Republic of Congo, 61; impact of Congo war on, 109–111; land reform in, 110; in Lusaka peace process, 65; Movement for Democratic Change in, 110; on Southern African

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INDEX Development Community, 63–64; support for overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko by, 60 Zimbabwe African National Union/ Patriotic Front (ZANU/PF), 110, 111 Zimbabwe Defense Industries (ZDI),

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110 Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, 110 Zuma, Jacob, 53, 123, 125, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134 Zvinavashe, Vitalis, 116n33

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About the Book

T

he site of genocide in Rwanda, recurrent cycles of communal massacre, deepening poverty, state fragmentation, and massive displacement of civilians, is Africa’s Great Lakes region finally moving away from decades of decay and destruction, or is it fated to remain mired in interminable strife? The authors of Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes Region explore the sources of conflict in the region as well as local and international attempts to rebuild political authority and reduce the scale of human suffering. Gilbert M. Khadiagala is associate professor of comparative politics and African studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is author of Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993 and coeditor of African Foreign Policies: Power and Process.

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