Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society in Bosnia & Herzegovina

Citation preview

VALUES, TRENDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA

Final Report January 22, 2016

Research Team Dr. Metin Toprak Dr. Mirsad Karic Dr. Tuba Boz Veysel Kükrek Dr. Dino Mujadzevic M.Sc. Edo Omercevic M.A. Fazıl Ahmet Gülşen

Chief Researcher Researcher Researcher Researcher Advisor Statistician Research Assistant

Acknowledgement We are thankful to the Organization and Duties of Abroad Turkish Citizens and Relative Communities Office (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı) for its financial support and for providing necessary guidance concerning projects implementation. We are also grateful to International University of Sarajevo for allowing research team to use their expertise in this project. Sevilay Ünal is one of the main motivators for this project. Without superior knowledge and experience of her, the project would not be finished in this quality. We would like to express our sincere thanks towards our colleagues who devoted their time and knowledge in the consultation and implementation of this project. Last but not least, we express our gratitude toward our families for their kind cooperation and sacrifice which help us in completion of this project.

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosnia i Herzegovina

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 2  Motivation .......................................................................................................................................................... 2  Content of the Report ........................................................................................................................................ 2  1. The Balkans In the Light of Diversity .............................................................................................. 2  Present Day Bosnia and Herzegovina at a Glance .......................................................................................... 3  Socio-political Structure and Inequality .......................................................................................................... 5  Transnational Issues and Security Concerns .................................................................................................. 9  Historical Peculiarity of BiH Muslims ........................................................................................................... 12  Ethnic Based Segmentation ............................................................................................................................ 14  Problems Occurring from Multi-Layer Government Structure ................................................................. 16  2. Literature Review ............................................................................................................................. 16  The Bosnian Context ....................................................................................................................................... 19  Muslim Religiosity ........................................................................................................................................... 23  Theoretical Considerations ............................................................................................................................. 27  3. Research Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 30  Research Question ........................................................................................................................................... 30  Universe and Sample ....................................................................................................................................... 30  The Preparation and Structure and Implementation of Questionnaire ..................................................... 32  4. Descriptive Findings of the Research ............................................................................................. 32  Places of Birth and Residence......................................................................................................................... 32  Gender .............................................................................................................................................................. 33  Age .................................................................................................................................................................... 34  Education ......................................................................................................................................................... 35  Marital Status .................................................................................................................................................. 35  5. Identities and Values ........................................................................................................................ 36  Socio-political Peculiarities of Bosniaks ........................................................................................................ 36  Values on Institutions ...................................................................................................................................... 37  6. Religious Practices and Evaluation of Religious Institutions ....................................................... 40  Individual Worship .......................................................................................................................................... 40  Evaluation of Religious Services Provided in the Place of Residence ......................................................... 45  Evaluation of Services Offered by the Islamic Community, Social Atmosphere and Islamic Institutions ....................................................................................................................................................... 47  Freedom to Practise Religion and Tradition ................................................................................................. 48  Ideal Number of Children ............................................................................................................................... 51 

7. Perception towards Turkey and Other Countries ......................................................................... 52  Attitudes towards Turkey ............................................................................................................................... 52  Attitudes towards Other Countries ................................................................................................................ 54  8. Youth Window: Views on Islam, Muslim Clerics, Future of BiH, the EU ................................... 55  9. Clerics Window: Views on Social and Economic Status, Quality of Education and Reforming IC ................................................................................................................................... 55  Socio-economic Status ..................................................................................................................................... 56  Reforming the Islamic Community ................................................................................................................ 56  Quality of Islamic Education .......................................................................................................................... 56  Reforming the Islamic Community ................................................................................................................ 56  Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Researches ............................................................ 57  References ............................................................................................................................................. 58 

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -1-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

VALUES, TRENDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA Introduction Motivation BiH is a unique country which ordinary explanations or theoretical approaches fail to reveal its facts. Social scientists are surprised and faced to challenge their explanatory frameworks. The main identifying concepts like nationalist, rightist, conservative, religious, modernist have very unique meanings in BiH due to the historical and cultural acquisitions of the country. During Bosnian war of 1992-95 period, all the world watched a live massacre even a genocide in the minds of some thinkers. Even some so-called politicians in the region dared to justify these organized and planned killings for the sake of homogeneity of the European culture. The long standing history of Ottoman rule in the region and dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia provoked constituent parts to open wars against their long-time neighbours to gain leverage. Before the 1992-95 war, there are many inter-religion marriages and it was hard to predict religion or ethnic background of persons from their names. Distance between ethnic and religious groups in BiH has become more evident and even polarization has arisen due to ethno-religious public discourse of political figures and the approach designed in the constitutional. There are many researches on BiH. However, each has a specific field to study. This study is based on a survey across Muslims in BiH. We aim to understand socio-political identities of Muslims, prevalence of religious practices, capability of Rijasat of Islamic Community in terms of human resources and services, perceptions towards other countries, and perceptions towards the role of religion in BiH society. Here, we try to understand the values, trends and expectations of BiH Muslim community and verify or falsify the mainstream approaches. Content of the Report This research report has ten chapters: (i) Introduction, (ii) A nutshell on Balkans in the light of diversity, (iii) Literature review, (iv) Research methodology, (v) Descriptive Findings of the Research, (vi) Identities and Values, (vii) Religious Practices and Evaluation of Religious Institutions, (viii) Perception towards Turkey and Other Countries, (ix) Youth Window: Views on Islam, Muslim Clerics, Future of BiH, the EU, (x) Clerics Window: Views on Social and Economic Status, Quality of Education and Reforming IC, and (xi) Conclusion. 1. The Balkans In the Light of Diversity1 The Balkan countries have suffered to be situated between the West and the East blocks for nearly half a century during the cold war. The religion factor is another main element for the conflicts in the region. The economies of the region are neither wealthy nor subsistence, but in between. While one half of the economic and human resources potential of Balkan countries 1

Adopted from Metin Toprak, “Economic Performance of the Balkans In the Light of Diversity”, in, Turkish – Albanian - Macedonian Relations: Past, Present and Future, Eds.M.Bulut & Mesut Idriz, Adam publishing, Ankara 2012, 229-258. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -2-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

belongs to Turkey, other half belongs to the remaining countries. The Balkan countries are not expected to compensate EU’s aging problem with their population size and age structure. Besides ethno ethno-religion problem, the region also faces illegal transnational activities occur across the region. Present Day Bosnia and Herzegovina at a Glance FB&H and RS are two main entities in the state of B&H. There are 10 Cantons in FB&H. In addition, since RS wraps around FB&H like an octopus one autonomous district called Brcko is another administrative structure that separates RS in to two parts. State, federation and canton level administrative structures create a huge bureaucracy that paralyzed functionality of state level administration. This check and balance approach barely keeping daily life alive. The Dayton Accords established the Office of the High Representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement. Since the Peace Implementation Council at its conference in Bonn in 1997 also gave the High Representative the authority to impose legislation and remove officials, the so-called "Bonn Powers". In practice, the Higher Representative is acting like a “general governor” of the EU to BH. One important issue regarding ethnic and religious identities is interchangeable using of “Bosniak” and “Muslim” terms in BH. However in the recent couple of years “Bosniak” has replaced “Muslim” as an ethnic term in part to avoid confusion with the religious term Muslim. This seems proper because there are converted Muslims from Serbs and Croats origins, and they call themselves Serb Muslim or Croat Muslim. Population

The population of BH is estimated 3,867,055 in the mid-2015. The population of BH has remained the same in the last half a century. Two main reasons for this stable population can be said: the first one is labour force needs of the Western Europe during and after cold war. The second reason is civil war. Both causes also created a very big diaspora in immigrated developed countries. Today, remittances are an important income item not just for BH but for whole Balkans countries also. Figure 1.1. Historic population of Bosnia and Herzegovina

BH Population

 5,000,000

4,622,163    4,377,033    4,124,256    3,922,205    3,791,622    3,746,111   

 4,500,000  4,000,000  3,500,000

3,277,948   

 3,000,000

2,847,459    2,564,308    2,323,555   

 2,500,000  2,000,000  1,500,000

1,898,044    1,568,092    1,336,091   

1,890,440   

 1,000,000  500,000

1,158,440   

 ‐ 1879

1885

1895

1910

1921

1931

1948

1953

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001 † 2011 † 2013 ‡

Sources: For period 1879–1991, Institute for Statistics of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for 2001 and 2011, various editions of Central Intelligence Agency's publication, The World Factbook. Cited in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina. [Accessed: 20.11.2015).

Literacy in BH is quite satisfactory. 98.5% of population over age 15 can read and write. Due Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -3-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

to transformation problems from planned economy to market economy youth unemployment (15-24) is about 63%. On the one side this would meet the needs of the EU economies partly, but on the other side, the local economy would lose its dynamisms. BH has two first-order administrative divisions (Bosniak-Croat-led FBiH and Serb-led RS) and one internationally supervised district (Brcko District) but formally held in condominium between the two entities. Constitution of BiH accepted on 14 December 1995 (included as part of the Dayton Peace Accords) and amended several times. Residency requirement for naturalization is 8 years. For citizenship one parent must have citizenship. BiH has a presidential council consisting of three elected representatives from constituent three ethnoreligious groups; each member rotates every eight months to take the post. Economy

It is hard to say that Bosnia is an emerging economy due to unstable regulatory and institutional framework and poor economic outcome. Free market reforms are still very limited. Raw materials and other natural resources, remittances and international aid are main revenue items. Multi-layered governing structure results in excessive bureaucracy and discourages investments. Three-fourths of BH production and education infrastructure was collapsed in interethnic warfare. Banking sector is dominated by EU countries and national currency is pegged to Euro. Economic crisis of 2007-08 in Europe affected also BH negatively. Unofficial and unrecorded economic activities are still at unignorable level. Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a full member of the Central European Free Trade Agreement in 2007. BH’s economic priorities are acceleration of integration into the EU, strengthening the fiscal system, public administration reform, World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, and securing economic growth by fostering a dynamic, competitive private sector. Flooding caused significant damage in the spring of 2014, and Bosnia will struggle to recover from it in 2015. Composition of GDP is 8% agriculture, 26.3% industry 65.7% services (2014 est.) (Factbook, CIA). Main agricultural products are wheat, corn, fruits, vegetables and livestock. Main industrial products are steel, coal, iron ore, lead, zinc, manganese, bauxite, aluminium, motor vehicle assembly, textiles, tobacco products, wooden furniture, ammunition, domestic appliances, oil refining. Labour force of BH is about 1.47 million (2014 est.). Distribution of labour force by sectors is agriculture: 19%, industry: 30%, services: 51% (2013). Unemployment rate is 43.9% (2014 est.). however it is estimated that actual rate of unemployment is lower than the official rate, because many “technically unemployed” persons work in the gray economy. The ratio of population below poverty line is 17.2% (2011 est.). Income distribution is not very favourable; the ratio of the highest 10% of the richest groups’ income to the lowest 10% of the poorest groups is 10 times (27.3%/2.7%). However Gini index is 36.2 (as of 2007) and not very horrible when comparing with other developing countries. Budget deficit (% of GDP) is -3.2% (2014 est.). Public debt is 44.8% of GDP (2014 est.). due to pegging BAM to Euro, inflation is very stable and fluctuates around zero. However commercial bank nominal prime lending rate is 6.64% (31 December 2014 est.). Current account balance is -$1.404 billion (2014 est.). ratio of export to import is about 45%. BH is a deficit economy with its trade with other economies. Exports partners are Slovenia 16.4%, Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -4-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Italy 16.1%, Germany 12.8%, Austria 12.3% and Croatia 12% (2014). Imports partners are Croatia 20.2%, Germany 12.6%, Slovenia 12.2%, Italy 9.8%, Russia 6.8%, Austria 5.7% and Hungary 5% (2014). Reserves of foreign exchange and gold are $4.744 billion (31 December 2014 est.). This means in short term BH would not face difficulty in performing its short-term obligations against international markets. External debt is $11.2 billion (31 December 2014 est.). Stock of direct foreign investment at home is up to $7.92 billion at a low level (2014 est.). BH is net electricity exporter country (Electricity - consumption: 12.56 billion kWh (2013 est.) Electricity exports is 5.097 billion kWh (2013 est.) and electricity imports 1.353 billion kWh (2013 est.) (CIA, Factbook, 2015) Socio-political Structure and Inequality To understand the Balkans’ social structure, besides ethnic, linguistic and religious peculiarities, migration trends, urbanization and literacy levels of the region’s countries also need to be addressed. Our argument is that more diversity in these peculiarities means more conflicts in the regions’ countries.2 Multi culture, multi identity and multi language lead to instability both in a country and among countries. The less the diversity in religions, cultures, languages, and ethnicities in a country the less the instability and conflict potential that country faces. Ethnic Identities

The Balkan countries may be classified in three groups in terms of level of ethnic homogeneity. The first group of countries has a ratio of one ethnic group over 90 percent in total population. Starting from the countries of the most homogeneous population, Greece, Kosovo and Croatia come first. The Second group comprises countries which have relatively less homogeneous ethnic structures. Countries having 75-90 percent of one ethnicity are sorted as Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia, respectively. In the third group of countries, the main component of the ethnic structure starting from 50 percent to 74 percent of the total population, there are Macedonia and Turkey. In the remaining two countries of the Balkans, Bosnia Herzegovina and Montenegro, the main component of the ethnic structure is less than 50 percent of the total population. However, the early results of the recent census of 2013 indicate that ratio of Bosniaks in BiH may exceeds 50%. In the development literature, diversification in ethnic structure of a country leads to very contradictory results in countries with different political and economic development levels. Therefore, the Western Europe and the Balkans would not enjoy diversity as if it leads to same outcomes. There are many studies on the negative correlation of the ethnic diversity and economic performance.3

2

See a relatively old source for this discussion: Guy J. Pauker, Frank H. Golay and Cynthia H. Enloe, Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia: The Coming Decade, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1977. 3 Jonathan Pool, “National Development and Language Diversity”, 1972, http://utilika.org/pubs/etc/ndld-asl.pdf, (Accessed: November 5, 2011). Also see Steven Vertovec, “Super-diversity and its implications”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.30, No.6, November 2007 p.1024-1054; Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, “Ethnic Diversity And Economic Performance”, NBER Working Paper Series, 2004, Working Paper 10313, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10313, (Accessed: November 3, 2011). Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -5-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

On the other hand, in the late democracies, i.e., the Balkans, the influence of religion in the conception of nationalism seems more accurate.4 Table 1.1. Ethnic Groups, Languages & Religions

Montenegro

Macedonia

Kosovo

Greece

Croatia

Bulgaria

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Albania

Ethnic group

4

language

Religion

Albanian 82.6%, Greek 0.9%, other 1% Albanian (official - derived from (Vlach, Roma (Gypsy), Macedonian, Tosk dialect), Greek, Vlach, Bulgarian and Egyptian), 15.5% Romani, Slavic dialects. unspecified, (2001est.).

Muslim 56.7%, Albanian Orthodox 6.8%, Roman Catholic 10%, atheist 2.5%, Bektashi 2.1%, other 5.7%, unspecified 16.2%.

note: Greece argues higher Greek population upto 12%. Bosniak 48.4%, Serb 32.7%, Croat 14,6%, other 4.3% (2013).

Bosnian (official), Croatian (official), Serbian.

Muslim 40%, Orthodox 31%, Roman Catholic 15%, other 14%.

Bulgarian (official) 76.8%, Turkish 8.2%, Roma 3.8%, other and unspecified 0.7%, unspecified 10.5% (2011 est.).

Eastern Orthodox 59.4%, Muslim 7.8%, other (including Catholic, Protestant, Armenian Apostolic Orthodox, and Jewish) 1.7%, unspecified 27.4% (2011 est.). Roman Catholic 86.3%, Orthodox 4,4%, Muslim 1,5%, other 1.5%, unspecified 2.5%, not religious or atheist 3.8% (2011 est.).

note: Bosniak has replaced Muslim as an ethnic term in part to avoid confusion with the religious term Muslim - an adherent of Islam. Bulgarian 76.9%, Turk 8%, Roma 4,4%, other 0.7% (including Russian, Armenian and Vlach) (2011 est.). Croat 90.4%, Serb 4.4%, other 4.4% (including Bosniak, Hungarian, Slovene, Czech, and Roma), unspecified 0.8% (2011 est.).

Croatian (official) 95.6%, Serbian 1.2%, other 3% (including Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, and Albanian) unspecified 0.2% (2011 est.). population: Greek 93%, other (foreign Greek (official) 99%, other 1% citizens) 7% (2001 census). (includes English and French). note: percents represent citizenship, since Greece does not collect data on ethnicity. Albanians 92.9%, Bosniak 1.6%, Serb 1.5%, Turk 1.1%, Ashkali 0.9%, Egyptian 0.7%, Gorani 0.6%, Roma 0.5% (2011 est.). Macedonian 64.2%, Albanian 25.2%, Turkish 3.9%, Roma 2.7%, Serbian 1.8%, other 2.2% (2002 est.).

Albanian (official) 94.5%, Bosnian1.7%, Serbian (official) 1.6%, Turkish 1.1%, other 0.9% (includes Romani), unspecified 0.1%. Macedonian (official) 66,5%, Albanian (official) 25,1%, Turkish 3,5%, Roma 1,9%, Serbian 1,2%, other 1,8% (2002 est.).

Greek Orthodox (official) 98%, Muslim 1,3%, other 0,7%.

Muslim 95.6%, Orthodox 1.5%, Roman Catholic 2.2%, other 0.07%, none, 0.07%, unspecified 0.6% (2011 est.). Macedonian Orthodox 64,8%, Muslim 33,3%, other Christian 0,4%, other and unspecified 1,5% (2002 census).

Montenegrin 45%, Serbian 28.7%, Serbian 42.9%, Montenegrin Orthodox 72.1%, Muslim 19.1%, Bosniak 8.7%, Albanian 4.9%, Muslim (official) 37%, Bosnian 5.3%, Catholic 3.4%, atheist 1.2%, other 3.3%, Roma 1%, Croat 1%, other 2.6%, Albanian 5.3%, Serbo-Croat 1.5%, unspecified 2.6%, (2011 unspecified 4.9% (2011 est.). 2%, other 3.5%, unspecified 4% est.). (2011 est.).

Neophytos G. Loizides, “Religion and Nationalism in the Balkans (Transnational Religious Solidarity and Conceptions of Nationhood in Turkey)”, Department of Political Science (Comparative Politics) & Ethnic and Pluralism Studies, Harvard University, 2000, 19p. Also see William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1997, Vol.112, No.4, p.1203-1250. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -6-

Turkey

Slovenia

Serbia

Romania

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Ethnic group

language

Romanian 83.4%, Hungarian 6.1%, Roma 3.1%, Ukrainian 0.3%, German 0.2, other 0.7%, unspecified 6.1% (2011 est.).

Romanian (official) 85.4%, Hungarian 6.3%, Romany (Gypsy) 1.2%, other 1%, unspecified 6.1% (2011 est.).

Religion

Eastern Orthodox (including all sub-denominations) 81.98%, Protestant (various denominations including Reformate and Pentecostal) 6.4%, Roman Catholic 4.3%, other (includes Muslim) 0.9%, none or atheist 0.2% , unspecified 6.3%, (2011 est.). Serb 83.3%, Hungarian 3.5%, Romany Serbian (official) 88.1%, Serbian Orthodox 84.6, Catholic (Gypsy) 2.1%, Bosniak 2%, other Hungarian 3.4%, Bosnian 1.9%, 5%, Muslim 3.1%, Protestant 1%, 5.7%, undeclared or unknown 3.4% Romany (Gypsy) 1.4%, other atheist 1.1%, other 0.8%, (2011 est.). 3.41%, undeclared or unknown undeclared or unknown 4.5% 1.8% (2011 est.). (2011 est.). Slovene 83,1%, Serb 2%, Croat 1,8%, Slovenian (official) 91,1%, Catholic 57,8%, Muslim 2,4%, Bosniak 1,1%, other or unspecified Serbo-Croatian 4,5%, other or Orthodox 2,3%, other Christian 12% (2002 census). unspecified 4,4%, 0,9%, unaffiliated 3,5%, other or Italian (official, only in unspecified 23%, none 10,1% municipalities where Italian (2002 census). national communities reside). Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other Turkish (official), Kurdish, other Muslim 99,8% (mostly Sunni), minorities 7-12% (2008 est.). minority languages. other 0,2% (mostly Christians and Jews).

Source: CIA, Factbook. Accessed: November 24, 2015.

It is obvious that the evolution of democracy and human rights in the Western countries should have reduced the role of religions and ethnic structures on the social consensus both in a society and among countries. However, the Balkan countries are “delayed” in terms of market economy, democracy and human rights which the entire developed world enjoyed. This retardation occurred due to internal and / or external dynamics of the region. Although the numbers of "organized" xenophobic groups are considerably low in the developed Western countries, are highly effective and listed as a major problem. It will not be surprising to see this problem in the longer period of time in the Balkans. In this context, respectively Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Turkey are the highest potential countries for ethnic and religious conflict. Although higher proportion of main ethnic group in the total population reduces the potential for instability, there is another important point to be considered: the distribution of minor ethnic groups. For example, in Bulgaria, the second largest ethnic group is Turkish minority and consists of nearly 10 percent. The share of the all Muslim population is over 12 percent. These consolidated and relatively homogenized minority group5 has the potential to create or speed up conflicts (Table 1). Religious Identities

The Balkans, until a hundred years ago, was the Ottoman territory for centuries. Therefore, 5

Valerie Bunce, “Status Quo, Reformist, or Secessionist Politics: Explaining Minority Behavior in Multinational States”, Department of Government, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850, paper prepared for the Workshop on Nationalism, Secession and Inter-Ethnic Cooperation and Conflict, April 23-24, 2004, 42p. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -7-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

the region's Muslim population density is different in the countries of the region. Despite relatively high homogeneous ethnic structure, the presence of the Muslim population in some countries makes the religion an effective factor in conflicts. The motivation behind the interethnic conflicts may lie in the gaining economic power struggle.6 There is no room for cultural impact or religious impact on economic performance of countries at Marxist or other interventionist schools. However, with the development of data production and statistical techniques, it is now possible to decompose gross economic performance into components and then compare the effects of various cultures on economies. This argument would be very useful tool to evaluate the Balkans countries’ economic performance at least in next 5 years.7 57 percent Muslim of Albania's population has a religious conflict potential if not ethnic. In this regard, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro have a high potential for conflict with their significantly different religious patterns. The problem that the Balkan countries face domestically can be attributed to “power-sharing in multi-ethnic political systems” phenomenon.8 In Turkey, despite disappear on the official records, the different sectarians which are parallel with the various ethnic groups still have neither integrated nor assimilated to other dominant ethnic and cultural group, i.e., Sunni. Alawis are the target and subject of armed conflict both during Ottoman Empire and in modern Turkey. On the one hand, left wing political parties use Alawis as pretty useful instrument to pull anti Sunni electors, the right wing parties polarize these ethnic and religious minorities and consolidate rightist or Sunni electors. This fragile appearance of Turkish ethnic and sectarian structure is a candidate to create high conflict potential (Table 1). Migration

To take net migration from other countries or to give net migration to other countries is not only related to economic prosperity, but social and political stability also has important role.9 The migration issue is a very weird issue to handle. Educated, open minded and professional ones are welcomed by many countries which suffer from aging problem. However, integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization are contradictory or substitutive outcomes and exchangeable depending on policies pursued.10 When migration serves to fulfil lack of employee, then it is called brain circulation or brain gain for the coming country. However, if educated professionals could not emigrate to other regions or countries, it is obvious that the brain waste would occur. Literacy

In terms of literacy level among the Balkan countries, except Kosovo (91.9%) and Turkey 6

Brian Shoup, Conflict and Cooperation in Multi-Ethnic States: Institutional Incentives, Myths and Counter-Balancing, Asian Security Studies, Routledge. 2008. 7 Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, “Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.20, No.2, spring 2006, p.23-48. 8 J.Bayo Adekanye, “Power-Sharing in Multi-Ethnic Political Systems”, Security Dialogue, March 1998, Vol.29, No.1, p.25-36. 9 George J. Borjas, "Issues in the Economics of Immigration", in Issues in the Economics of Immigration, January 2000, p.1-14. University of Chicago Pres. 10 Amelie F. Constanta, Liliya Gataullinab and Klaus F. Zimmermannc, “Ethnosizing immigrants”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol.69, No.3, March 2009, p.274-287. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -8-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

(95.0%), not any significant difference is observed. Excluding these two countries, the other Balkan countries have over 98 percent of literacy rate. In all countries, male literacy rate is over female literacy rate. Transnational Issues and Security Concerns11 The Balkans has its own unique and distinct international position in the last century. Each country has problems with its border neighbours, as well as transnational issues with far away countries. Refugee problem, internally displaced persons and drug trafficking are the most striking ones. Albania: There is no official international record considered as Albanian transnational issue. However, due to the ethnic Albanians that make up a significant proportion of other regional countries’ population, Albania could not be indifferent to regional ethnic problems. Bosnia and Herzegovina: The country's three major ethnic (religious-sectarian) groups have been the ground for the intervention of protector states. Serbia delimited about half of the boundary with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but sections along the Drina River remain in dispute. Bulgaria: Despite Bulgaria has had some problems with its ethnic Turk citizens in near past and drove 300 thousand Turks to Turkey, today, there's no significant problem between two countries. There is also not any official record on transnational problems related to Bulgaria. Croatia: Despite 1999 border agreement, dispute remains with Bosnia and Herzegovina over several small sections of the boundary related to maritime access. These problems hinder ratification of that agreement. The Croatia-Slovenia land and maritime boundary agreement, which would have ceded most of Pirin Bay and maritime access to Slovenia and several villages to Croatia, remain unratified and in dispute. Slovenia also protests Croatia's 2003 claim to an exclusive economic zone in the Adriatic. As a European Union peripheral state, Slovenia imposed a hard border Schengen regime with non-member Croatia in December 2007. Greece: Greece and Turkey continue discussions to resolve their complex maritime, air, territorial, and boundary disputes in the Aegean Sea. Cyprus question has become most important one with Turkey. Greece rejects the use of the name Macedonia or Republic of Macedonia due to a region in Greece named Macedonia. The mass migration of unemployed Albanians still remains a problem for the region countries, mainly Greece and Italy. Kosovo: Serbia with several other states (including Russia and some Slavic and Orthodox based countries) protest the US and other states' recognition of Kosovo's declaring itself as a sovereign and independent state in February 2008. Relying on Serbia, ethnic Serbian municipalities along Kosovo's northern border challenge final status of Kosovo-Serbia boundary. Several thousand NATO-led KFOR peacekeepers continue to keep the peace within Kosovo between the ethnic Albanian majority and the Serb minority in Kosovo. Ethnically Kosovan people are Albanian, so the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia pull Albania into conflict easily. Macedonia: Kosovo and Macedonia completed demarcation of their boundary in September 11

Mainly CIA Factbook statistics and comments used under this title. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -9-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

2008. Greece continues to reject the use of the name Macedonia or Republic of Macedonia. Montenegro: There no international record on transnational issue of Montenegro. Romania: The International Court of Justice ruled largely in favour of Romania its dispute submitted in 2004 over Ukrainian-administered Snake Island and Black Sea maritime boundary delimitation. Romania opposes Ukraine's reopening of a navigation canal from the Danube border through Ukraine to the Black Sea. Serbia: Serbia with several other states protest the U.S. and other states' recognition of Kosovo's declaring itself as a sovereign and independent state in February 2008. With the instigation of Serbia, ethnic Serbian municipalities along Kosovo's northern border challenge final status of Kosovo-Serbia boundary; several thousand NATO-led KFOR peacekeepers continue to keep the peace within Kosovo between the ethnic Albanian majority and the Serb minority in Kosovo. Serbia delimited about half of the boundary with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but sections along the Drina River remain in dispute. Slovenia: The Croatia-Slovenia land and maritime boundary agreement, which would have ceded most of Piran Bay and maritime access to Slovenia and several villages to Croatia, remains unratified and in dispute. Slovenia protests Croatia's 2003 claim to an exclusive economic zone in the Adriatic. As a member state that forms part of the EU's external border, Slovenia has implemented the strict Schengen border rules to curb illegal migration and commerce through south-eastern Europe while encouraging close cross-border ties with Croatia. Turkey: Turkey has a complex maritime, air, and territorial disputes with Greece in the Aegean Sea; status of north Cyprus question remains; Syria and Iraq protest Turkish hydrological projects to control upper Euphrates waters; Turkey has expressed concern over the status of Kurds in Iraq; in 2009, Swiss mediators facilitated an accord reestablishing diplomatic ties between Armenia and Turkey, but neither side has ratified the agreement and the rapprochement effort has faltered; Turkish authorities have complained that blasting from quarries in Armenia might be damaging the medieval ruins of Ani, on the other side of the Arpaçay valley Unemployment Rate, Poverty and Income Distribution

The Balkan countries suffer from excessive unemployment due to loss of old fashioned physical endowment and rising global competition. In 2014, on average, the highest unemployment rates belong to Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Serbia, Albania and Croatia, respectively. The lowest unemployment rate countries ranked as Romania, Slovenia and Turkey. Although there are no data from Kosovo and Montenegro, it is possible to predict high unemployment in both (Table 2). Table 1.2. Unemployment Rate (Percent of total labour force)

Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria

2014 (%) 17,5 27,5 11,5

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -10-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

2014 (%) Croatia 17,1 Greece 26,5 FYR Macedonia 28,0 Romania 6,8 Serbia 19,7 Slovenia 9,7 Turkey 9,9 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Accessed: December 20, 2015.

The Balkans countries are the poorest of European Continent. This is largely because of their Russian socialist dominance during the cold war era. Being Europe’s doorstep, a very high poverty is also a threat for European employment market in the short term. On the other hand establishing mechanism and designing instruments would require time and new understanding.12 The highest poor population ratio belongs to Greece as 44%. After Greece, Macedonia, Kosovo, Romania and Bulgaria are the other poorest countries which have poor population ratio over 20%. The countries with poor population ratios ranging from 15-20% are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey and Croatia, respectively. The third group countries have relatively modest poverty rates. The poor population ratio is under 15% in Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Albania (Table 3). Gini coefficient is an indicator shows if the income distribution is fair. The higher the Gini index the worse the income distribution. Macedonia, Turkey and Serbia have the worst income distributions. The more equal income distributions belong to Slovenia, Montenegro and Albania. The other remaining countries’ Gini indices are between the two groups’ figures (Table 3). Table 1.3. Population below Poverty Line

Population below poverty line (%), (2012 est.) Albania 14.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 17.2 Bulgaria 21.0 Croatia 19.5 Greece 44.0 (2013) Kosovo 30.0(2013) Macedonia 30.4 (2011) Montenegro 8.6 (2013) Romania 22.6 (2011) Serbia 9.2 (2013) Slovenia 13.5 Turkey 16.9 (2010) Source: CIA, Factbook. Accessed: December 3, 2015.

Distribution of family income (Gini index), (%), (2012 est.) 26.9 36.2 (2007) 35.4 32.0 34.4 30.0 43.6 26.3 27.3 38.7 (2014) 23.7 40.2 (2010)

As conclusion, the Balkan countries have suffered to be situated between the West Block and the East Block for nearly half of a century during the cold war. Religion factor is another main 12

It is not surprise that the Balkans need time to evolve towards the Western values not only economically but also politically and socially. See Douglass C. North, “Economic Performance Through Time: The Limits to Knowledge”, 1996, Washington University, St. Louis, 23p. http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpeh/9612004.html, (Accessed: December 1, 2010). Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -11-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

element in the conflicts of the region. Today, both individual countries like United States, Germany, Russia and Turkey, and collective initiative like the European Union has important impact on the road the countries in the region will go. The Balkan countries are also important source of labour force for compensating EU’s aging population. The main problem in the Balkans is still ethno religion. Especially during the 1992-95 war, some Islamic countries like Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia were source of finance to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This kind of involvement also has polarized the region ideologically. When we look at religious and ethnic structure of the region, the conflict potential seems clearly. Due to its low economic capacity, the region’s economies do not attract immigrants. On the contrary, almost all countries in the region are net emigrants. One of the most important problems of the region is illegal activities. Refugees and illicit drugs use the Balkans route in general. Internally displaced persons problem is rare in the region, except Turkey. The region’s economies are neither wealthy nor subsistence, but in between. Almost all countries are regarded as middle income and upper middle income economies. Unemployment rates are very severe and with this ongoing economic situation it is hard to solve this problem in the short or medium run. Another socioeconomic problem in the region is poverty. Although the absolute poverty is considerably low, relative poverty (deprivation) deserves to be addressed carefully. An important indicator for economic equality is Gini coefficient. This coefficient is as good as the Western developed countries’ indices, but needs time to improve. The Balkan countries need to adapt their social and political systems to the western social, political and ideological values and systems. One very important instrument for this adaptation is education of a widely spoken European language, i.e., English, German or French. Turkey seems a very useful alternative for the region to contact to other goods and labour markets. Rising Russia is another important alternative to benefit in terms of foreign trade. The most risky point is the polarization of the countries. This means inevitable conflicts and hot fights both domestically and externally. Historical Peculiarity of BiH Muslims Islam in Balkans has a longstanding history, having been introduced to the local peoples since 14th and 15th centuries. The Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim by religion and this term also implies ethnic belonging. Hanefite School of jurisprudence of Sunni Islam is the only Islamic understanding between Bosniaks through the history. Due to Bosniaks’ different Christian understanding from Catholic and Orthodox denominations, their converting into Islam was relatively easier and historical hostility between them continue with new religion of Islam. However after Ottoman Empire Bosnian Muslims (or Bosniaks) became the first class group in B&H and the Balkans region. The Muslim Community of B&H has faced severe difficulties since the late 19th century when Ottoman Empire was defeated by Russian Empire. Great Powers organized Berlin Congress after Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. B&H was de facto ceded to Austria-Hungary Empire. Due to the privileged status of Bosniaks based on their religion and Slavic dominance in the region, Austria-Hungary Empire planned to make BiH into a model colony and by doing this rising South Slav nationalism targeted to be dissipated. Habsburg rule codified laws and introduced new way of political life and initiated modernization. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -12-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnian administrator on behalf of Austria-Hungary Beni Kallay advocated pluralist and multi-confessional Bosnian nation. Efforts for making of Bosniakhood also belong to B.Kallay. He promoted Bosnian nationalism and Bosnian language. However, this approach originated from an Ottoman grand vizier named Topal Osman Pasha. Bosnians are motivated to defend “speaking the Bosnian language and divided into three religious with equal rights”.13 This visionary policy aimed to keep B&H away from its neighbours which have ambitions over B&H. When Serbian and Muslims in Bosnia called for religious and educational autonomy in 1896 and 1899, Kallay’s policy was collapsed and this policy abandoned in after his death in 1903. After then ethnic (religion) based political parties corresponding to the three groups participated elections. Austria-Hungary government accepted Islam as an official religion and made Muslim-clergy state official within the Empire aiming to isolate Bosnian Muslims from the Ottoman Empire and Muslim-clergy from the Caliph (Sultan). Nevertheless Islamic community insisted religious dependency of Muslims to Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul.14 Muslims founded the Muslim National Organization (MNO) in 1906, achieved their religious autonomy in 1909 and considered Bosnia and Herzegovina to be part of the Ottoman Empire until the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918.15 Following World War I, B&H incorporated into the South Slav Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia). After establishment of Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, Serbo-Croat dominance became more clear and continued until occupation by Germany in 1941 and Bosnia ceded to the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). The Jewish population and Serbs massacred in concentration camps or killed by Ustaše militia. Later Serbs revolted with the aim of establishing ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbia. Chetniks targeted non-Serbs, communist sympathizers, and Muslims. In 1941 Yugoslav communists under the leadership of J.Broz Tito organized a multi-ethnic resistance group called partisans. In 1943 the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia with Tito held a conference in Jajce aiming of re-establishing B&H in its Ottoman Borders and new Yugoslavian constitution accepted in 1946. Until 1992 B&H was part of Socialist Yugoslavia among six constituent republics. The first multi-party parliamentary elections held in 1990. National assembly dominated by three ethnically-based parties. After declarations of independency of Croatia and Slovenia, Bosniaks and Croats of B&H raised their voices against Yugoslav federation which overwhelmingly dominated by Serbs. After declaration of sovereignty in 1991 and referendum for independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, B&H became an independent state in 1992. Today, In B&H, three major ethnic groups were represented by their own political parties. And making of Bosnian nation via Dayton Agreement is seen mostly hopeless among all three constituent ethnic groups.

13

Ramet, Sabrina P. (2008). "Nationalism and the 'Idiocy' of the Countryside: The Case of Serbia". Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia at Peace and at War: Selected Writings, 1983–2007. LIT Verlag Münster. ISBN 3-03735912-9; Velikonja, Mitja (2003). Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 1-58544-226-7; Zovko, Ljubomir (2007). Studije iz pravne povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine: 1878. - 1941. (in Croatian). University of Mostar.ISBN 978-9958-9271-2-6. 14 Zovko, Ljubomir (2007). Studije iz pravne povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine: 1878. - 1941. (in Croatian). University of Mostar.ISBN 978-9958-9271-2-6. 15 Zovko, Ljubomir (2007). Studije iz pravne povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine: 1878. - 1941. (in Croatian). University of Mostar.ISBN 978-9958-9271-2-6. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -13-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnian war

Referendum for independence completed on 1 March 1992; independence declared on 3 March 1992. B&H is located between Balkans and the Western Europe and also represents mainly Muslim populated that makes it unique. During the so-called civil war of 1992-95 not only ethno-religious massacres performed but visibility of Islamic temples and architectural structures also were demolished. The ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims resulted in enormous internal displacement and quite homogeneous ethno-religious geographic areas. Majority adherents of Serbian Orthodox remained in Republika Srpska and Muslims and Catholics intensify in Federation of B&H. During the civil war temples were targeted intensely. Serbs and Croats destroyed mosques systematically. Almost half of Islamic architectural structures were destroyed or damaged.16

Table 1.4. Destruction of Islamic religious buildings in Bosnia (1992‐1995)

Total

by Serb extremists

by Croat extremists Total

destroyed during the

249

58

540

80

307

620

927

1,149

81%

Small neighbourhood mosque

21

20

175

43

41

218

259

557

47%

Quran schools

14

4

55

14

18

69

87

954

9%

Dervish lodges

4

1

3

1

5

4

9

15

60%

Mausolea, shrines

6

1

34

3

7

37

44

90

49%

Buildings of religious endowments

125

24

345

60

149

405

554

1,425

39%

Total

419

108

1,152

201

527

1,353

1,880

4,190

45%

Total

by Croat extremists

Congregational mosque

Total damaged during the war

by Serb extremists

Building

Damaged

Total no. before the war Percentage of pre-war damaged or destroyed

Destroyed

Source: Maya Shatzmiller (2002). Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. Queens University School of Policy. p. 100. [cited in, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina ]

Ethnic Based Segmentation17 BH administrative and democratic processes are mainly based on ethno-religious background of population. This approach legitimizes and deepens polarization in the country. However very few people from all three ethno-religious backgrounds claim themselves as Bosnian when they are asked for their “ethnic/national affiliation” during the census in 2013. This word denotes an affiliation to the state not adherence to Yugoslavia (mostly communist or 16

See also, Helen Walasek, Bosnia and the Destruction of Cultural Heritage, Ashgate, Henry Ling Ltd, UK, 2015; András J. Riedlmayer, Destruction Of Cultural Heritage In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-1996: A Post-war Survey of Selected Municipalities, Cambridge, Massachusetts USA, 2002. http://archnet.org/system/publications/contents/3481/original/DPC1420.pdf?1384775281, [Accessed: 20.11.2015]. 17 https://iwpr.net/global-voices/bosnian-census-risks-deepening-ethnic-rifts [Accessed: 10.10.2015]. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -14-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

socialist identity) or ethno-religious identities of Bosniak, Serb or Croat. This issue reminds us of cure potential of secularism in segmented societies like BH. Without taking their inherited ethno-religious backgrounds individuals are described with their state-affiliations. However, a person who does not want to be belongs to one of the three constituent peoples is excluded, to say the least. Three questions were included on the census form: ethnicity/nationality, religion and mother tongue. Civil war conditions continue to dominate BiH institutional public sphere. “Be Bosniak so you won’t be an ‘other’.”

According to the unofficial estimations, 3.8 million people now live in BiH. Of that number, around 54 per cent are Bosniaks, while the percentage of Bosniaks in RS is around 17 per cent. And the overall number of Croats in BiH is today about 570,000. Supporting these results, the numbers released until now show that 3,791,622 people were recorded in the census. They break down as 2,371,603 in the Federation (62.55 per cent), and 1,326,991 (35 per cent) in RS. About 2.5 per cent live in the self-governing Brcko district. When compared with the last census of 1991, the figures show a decline of 580,000 people. If large numbers of Bosniaks put themselves down as “Bosnians”, this could reduce their numbers relative to the Serbs. One video campaign contained the slogan, “Be Bosniak so you won’t be an ‘other’.” The term “other” has especially negative connotations in BiH, because the peace agreement that ended the war in 1995 divided certain top posts among the three “constituent peoples” – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The recent census was not anonymous; names were on the forms. The statistics agency has retained the names but guaranteed protection of the data. However, there are concerns about manipulation of the names. Muslims' attitudes towards Christians after Massacres18

According to early and unofficial results of 2013 census, Muslims make up about half of BiH’s population. And tension between two major ethno-religious groups, i.e., Muslims and Orthodoxies continue. Even very individual ethno-religious based cases may attract attention of politicians and other public opinion leaders. This shows the fragility of the country. Pew Research compiled results from its researches conducted across 38 countries. Awareness of beliefs of other religious groups is quite high among Bosnian Muslims (51%). It means Muslims are close to Christians and know their beliefs and practices. Also 59% of Muslims in BiH say Islam and Christianity have a lot in common. 18% of Muslims in BiH say they attend interfaith meetings, which were promoted by Pope Francis during a trip to Sarajevo. However, this ratio is quite low in other former communist Balkan countries and Russia (under 10%). According to a Gallup poll conducted 2010, answers of 81% of Serb respondents, 79% of Croat respondents and 49% of Bosniak respondents in BiH are ‘yes’ to the question “Is religion an important part of your daily life?”. These ratios are lower for Serbs and Croats and higher for Bosniaks in 2006 Gallup poll.19

18

Angelina E.Theodorou, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/10/how-bosnian-muslims-viewchristians-20-years-after-srebrenica-massacre-2/, [Accessed: 21.12.2015]; http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-interfaith-relations/, [Accessed: 21.12.2015]. 19 http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -15-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Despite the shared history of centuries and high level of awareness towards each other, and interfaith tolerance and engagement, divisions in BiH society are quite deep and seem hard to mitigate just with internal dynamics. Day after day relatively few Bosnian Muslims count non-Muslims among their close friends. Two likely reasons for this trend may be raised for this deepening division: one is ethno-religious division of Muslims and Orthodoxies and the other is political language and raising trend in awareness towards religious identities. Ratio of mix marriages is decreasing considerably in BiH after the civil war. Who are in favour of inter-faith mix marriage is just around 15% in BiH. Unemployment, inadequate state capacity to lead the country towards a more prosperous level and rising accusing attitude towards other ethno-religious groups feed hostilities in BiH. Problems Occurring from Multi-Layer Government Structure According to the 1991 census 43.47% of the population was Bosniak, 31.21% Serb and 17.38% Croat. Just over 5% declared themselves “Yugoslav” or something else. The formula of sharing public power is based on ethno-religious ratios of constituent groups and was calculated from the 1991 census results, the government of the FBiH has eight Bosniak, five Serbs and three Croat ministers. These proportions are based on the census returns from the territory that comprises the Federation as it was in 1991. The same goes for RS, where the entity government has 16 ministries, eight of them headed by Serbs, five by Bosniaks and three by Croats. Once again, the number of ministerial positions is derived from 1991 population figures for the area subsequently named as an entity.20 If the results of the census show a radical change; this could affect the sensitive power-sharing regulation setup according to the Dayton agreement. While posts in two top-level structures – the three-person presidency and the House of Peoples – are fixed in an equal division among the constituent peoples – there might be scope for adjusting ethnic quotas in the two entities. The 1991 census results do not just affect the two entity governments. The proportions are mirrored in state institutions like the Central Bank and dozens of other agencies, in which quotas are based on the ethnic composition which set out in the 1991 census. The same applies to ambassadors who are sent to represent BiH abroad.21 2. Literature Review There is a plethora of scholarly literature on the role religion plays in society. Much of the contemporary sociological approaches to study of religion examine subject matter concerning the “revitalization of religion” or resurgence of religion in society. This is in contrast to secularization thesis, which was dominant in the 1960s and 1970s. The secularization theory was centred on the idea that the rise of modernity will eventually lead to the decline of religion in society. Peter L. Berger addresses this issue in The Desecularisaton of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (1999). He states, the assumption that we live in secularized world is false and that the world today is religious as it ever was22. Moreover, in his article “Secularization Falsified” Berger identifies three versions of secularism: the first type involves the religions becoming institutionalized and separated from 20

https://iwpr.net/global-voices/bosnian-census-risks-deepening-ethnic-rifts https://iwpr.net/global-voices/bosnian-census-risks-deepening-ethnic-rifts [Accessed: 10.10.2015]. 22 Peter L. Berger (Ed.). (1999). The Desecularisaton of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics . Washington: WM B Eerdmans Publishing p.2. 21

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -16-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

the state, where the state recognizes the autonomy of religious institutions, is not directly involved and does not have an adverse view towards religion. The second type of secularism deems religion to be private matter only and to exclude in all forms or political life, but by law protects private religion. Finally, the third type involves the exclusion of religion from public life where it is only confined only to the private sphere as was/is in communist countries or the former Soviet Union.23 However, this does not imply that religion ceased to play a role in the lives of individuals and in society. In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all three types of secularism may be considered when examining contemporary society and the views of Bosnian Muslims towards religion taking into account its multifaceted social, cultural and political history. Further, as Grace Davie aptly states: Religion continues to influence almost every aspect human society – economic, political, social and cultural. No longer can it be relegated to the past or to the edge of social scientific analysis. Hence the challenge for the economic and social sciences: to rediscover the place of religion in both the empirical realities of the twenty-first century and the paradigms that are deployed to understand this. In short, social science itself, just as much as its subject matter, must respond to the demands of resacralization.24 Similarly, it is the aim of this study to investigate the religiosity of Bosnian Muslims and to examine the influence of religion on the values and attitudes towards issues and institutions concerning social, cultural, political and economic aspects of life. Numerous studies have been conducted on the relationship between the education and religious affiliation. They have shown that the effects of education on religion are complex. The general view, which prevailed for a long time in social sciences claims that there is a positive relationship between the level of education and the rise of percentage of people who identify themselves as non-religious. Namely, contemporary social scientists almost unquestionably believed that that education, secularization, rationalization and modernization are disadvantageous to religion.25 For them, science will proclaim eventual end of religion and since societies become increasingly differentiated that will bring a decline in religious influence.26 According to Beckwith, education is seen as/or one of the major stimulus for the decline of religion in modern societies.27 This is in line with the claim that greater levels of education erode individuals’ religious belief and participation.28 At the individual level, theories of secularization that emphasize the destructive influence of science on religious faith claim that there is negative relation between the religiosity and education whereby people

23

Peter. L. Berger, 2008 Secularisation Falsified. First Things http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/02/002secularization-falsified 24 Grace Davie, ‘Resacralization’, In Bryan S. Turner (Ed.) (2010) The New Blackwell Companion to The Sociology Of Religion. Wiley Blackwell. pp. 160-178. (p.175). 25 Casanova Jose, Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp.25-30. 26 See August Comte, A General view of Positivism, London: Trubner and Co, 1865, p.199; Durkheim Emile, The Elementary forms of Religious Life, New York: The Free Press, 1915, p.228. 27 Beckwith Burnham, The Decline of U.S. Religious Faith, 1912-1984, Palo Alto: B.P. Beckwith, 1985. 28 See Herbert David, Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public Religion in the Cotemporary World, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003; Johnson Daniel Carson, Formal education vs. religious belief: Soliciting new evidence with multinomial logit modeling, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp.231246. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -17-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

who are more educated tend to be less religious.29 According to Stark and Finke, the belief that education deteriorates religion was widely accepted in modern social sciences despite an absence of empirical support.30 However, recent empirical studies and analyses have suggested that higher education has complex effects on religion because it is a multifaceted phenomenon and is not necessary to be always detrimental to religion. Higher education seems to decrease trust in religious authority but increases voluntary participation.31 In this context, Jenny J. Lee demonstrates that the number of university students whose religious conviction strengthens is higher than those whose faith becomes weaker.32 Several studies from rather different parts of the world have shown that religious commitment of Muslims increases with modernization rooted in education. In a study of Muslims in Java, Indonesia, Tamney found that there is a positive relation between education and religiosity measures such as praying five times a day, alms-giving and fasting.33 On the other hand, although it seemed that community size and urbanization had had a negative impact on religiosity, it was slight and it was not so much that people stopped praying there as that fewer people always prayed five times a day.34 Another study conducted by the same author explains the relations between modernization and voluntary fasting, other than one during the month of Ramadan. This study found that modernization is associated with a decline in fasting as an expression of piety and increase in fasting for the purpose of self-control.35 Huge data exist that explain the reliable gender difference in religiosity. These researches have constantly found that women tend to score more than men on the scale of religiosity and those older individuals are more religious than younger individuals.36 Findings are not restricted to a given religion or to a given geographical location. Namely, these findings are result of a study whose sample was taken from 65 different countries and seven different religions and sects.37 Miller and Strak tried to explain these differences in terms of men and women’s differential preference for risk-taking behaviour.38 Namely, men are more risk-prone than women who are more risk averse and more likely to gravitate to religion.39 However, Judaism and Islam make an exception to this trend. Thus, according to Sullins, among Muslims, men report much 29

Stark Rodney, Secularization R.I.P., Sociology of Religion, Vol.60, No. Stark Rodney and Roger Finke, Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 31 Philip Schwadel, Birth Cohort Changes in the Association between College Sensenig Victor, The Rise of “Nones”: Does Education Explain the Decline in Religious Affiliations?”, Journal of Education, Vol.113, No.3, pp.335-340. 32 Jenny J. Lee, Religion and college attendance: Change among students, The Review of Higher Education, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp.369-384.(p.382) 33 Joseph B. Tamney, Established Religiosity in Modern Society: Islam in Indonesia, Sociological Analysis, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp.130-132. 34 Ibid., p.133. 35 Joseph B. Tamney, Fasting and Modernization, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol.19, No.2, pp.129-137. 36 Francis J. Leslie, The Psychology of Gender Differences in Religion: A Review of Empirical Research, Religion, Vol.27, No.1, pp.81-96 and Kenneth G. DeBono and Anja Kuschpel, Gender Differences in Religiosity: The Role of Self-Monitoring, North American Journal of Psychology, Vol.16, No.2, pp.415-426. 37 Sullins D. Paul, Gender and Religion: Deconstructing Universality, Constructing Complexity, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.112, No. 3, pp. 838-880. 38 Miller S. Alan and Stark Rodney, Gender and Religiousness: Can Socialization Explanations be Saved? American Journal of Sociology, Vol.107, No.6, pp.1399-1423. 39 Roth L. Marie and Kroll C. Jeffrey, Risky Business: Assessing Risk Preference Explanations for Gender Differences in Personality, American Sociological Review, Vol.72, No.2, pp.205-220. 30

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -18-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

higher mosque membership and attendance than women.40 The Bosnian Context Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) and Bosniaks as its majority population have been subject of so many studies conducted by local and international scholars. However, most of these studies are historical analyses based on the archive and secondary sources as well as some anthropological studies. Few were the studies based on the primary sources where the data was collected using the questionnaire being randomly distributed on the whole territory of B&H. Thus, Sancaktar studied and examined the historical construction and development of Bosniak nation and Bosniak identity. According to him, Bosniak nation and Bosniaks national identity have been products of the historical processes that have lasted for centuries. For him, major historical events and steps that have shaped and affected historical construction and development of Bosniak nation are as following: (i)

Islamization process in B&H during the Ottoman Empire which started in the middle of the 15th century; (ii) Bosnian Muslim rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in 1830s; (iii) armed resistance and political opposition of Bosniaks against the AustroHungarian empire towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century as well as the foundation of the Muslim National Organization in 1906; (iv) Political opposition of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization established in 1919 against Serbian and Croatian nationalism within the first Yugoslavia in 1920s and 1930s; (v) Clashes between Bosniaks and the Chetniks (Serbian paramilitary forces during the WWII) and between Bosniaks and the Ustashas (Croatian paramilitary forces during the WWII) in the WWII; (vi) Official recognition of Bosniak nation as one of six constituent nations in the Socialist Yugoslavia; (vii) Significant economic, political, social and cultural progress of Bosniak nations in the second Yugoslavia; (viii) Foundation of the Party of Democratic Action prior to the dissolution of the Socialist Yugoslavia; (ix) The Bosniak armed resistance against Serbian and Croatian militarist-nationalism during the Bosnian war 1992-1995; (x) Post-Dayton B&H in which Bosniak political elites undertake influential political roles and (xi) Newspapers, magazines, journals and periodicals published by Bosniak intellectuals, associations and political parties since the time of Austro-Hungarian empire until today.41 Along this line and in the context of Bosniak national identity, Boneta and Banovac (2007) claim that the process of modernization that took place in the Socialist Yugoslavia, which brought about the process of secularization, changed the essence of the Bosnian Muslims 40

Paul D. Sullins, Gender and religion: Deconstructing Universality, Constructing Complexity, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.112, No.3, p.844. 41 Caner Sancaktar, Historical Construction and Development of Bosniak Nation, Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2012, pp.1-17. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -19-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

identity in a way that Muslim as a national name lost its link with Islam and established the one with Socialism. Kamberović discusses the period of the late 1960s when Bosnian Muslims were recognized as a constituent nation in the former Yugoslavia. According to him, B&H’s Communist party did it in order to keep and control the top positions in the Islamic Community on one hand and marginalize the role and impact of the Islamic Community among Bosnian Muslims on the other hand.42 Mulaosmanović discusses the development of Bosniak national identity in the context of homogenization of three main ethnic groups in B&H in 1980s with the special focus on the Krajina region (north-western B&H).43 Mulasmonović claims that combative, religious-dedicated and poor life condition of people from that region have been the main features of Krajina population. Similar to this, Filipović (2007, 28) says that Bosniaks of this part of B&H have developed a specific way of life and internal relationships which do not exist in other parts of B&H. They have been very much dedicated to their land, religion and tradition have had a combative spirit and have developed a specific epic, which describes their life, feats and heroes and is specific only to that region. French historian Xavier Bougarel claims that in the socialist Yugoslavia it was not surprises that in addition to Muslim political leaders within the League of Communist and Marxist intellectuals linked to the process of “national affirmation” the Muslim population at large and even the ‘Ulemas of the Islamic Community became strongly committed to the principles of Tito’s Yugoslavia.44 Sarač discusses the failure of the secularism and secularization in the Socialist Yugoslavia and the role of the Islamic Community in strengthening the religious identity of the Muslims in B&H in 1980s.45 Dino Abazović, one of the leading scholars on Sociology of Religion in B&H finds out in his study that at the level of social and public life of Bosniaks the process of de-secularization has been much more visible and conspicuous than the process of secularization and consequently these processes haven’t had the same trend and effect either at the public/social level of Bosniaks or at the level of personal religious life of Bosniak individuals.46 42

Husnija Kamberovic, Bosnjaci 1968: Politicki Koncept Priznanja Nacionalnog Identiteta [Bosniaks 1968: Political Concept of Recognizing National Identity], in Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka [Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks], Institut za Istoriju: Sarajevo: 2009, pp. 59-81. 43 Admir Mulaosmanović, Nacionalni Identitet u Kontekstu Izrazenog Regionalnog Identiteta i Politickih Potresa u Bihackoj Krajini [National Identity in the Context of Accentuated Regional Identity and Political Instability in Bihac Region], in Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka [Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks], Institut za Istoriju: Sarajevo: 2009, pp.137-152. 44 See Xavier Bougarel, Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea in Yugoslavism: Histories of a failed idea 19181992 by Dejan Djokic (ed.), Hurst&Company: London, 2003, pp.107-8. See also, Steven L. Burg, The Political Integration of Yugoslavia’s Muslims: Determinants of Success and Failure, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no.203, Pittsburg, 1983. 45 Dzenita Sarac, Neuspjeh Sekularizacije i Jacanje Religijskog Identiteta Pocetkom 1980-ih Godina u Bosnni i Hercegovini [Failure of Secularization and Strengthening of Religious Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Beginning of 1980s] in Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka [Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks], Institut za Istoriju: Sarajevo: 2009, pp. 153-184. 46 Dino Abazovic, Bosanskohercegovacki Muslimani na Pocetku Novog Milenija: Socioloski Pogledi [Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslims at the beginning of a New Millennium: Sociological Views] in Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka [Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks], Institut za Istoriju: Sarajevo: 2009, pp. 219-240. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -20-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Fikret Karčić examined the first encounter of Bosniaks with the challenges of European modernity in the late 19th and the beginning of 20th century, especially with the establishment of Hapsburg rule in Bosnia in 1878. Namely, the most significant challenges, which modernity posed to Bosniaks living under the non-Muslim rule were in the domain of social life, institutions and social ethics. Karčić explained five issues faced by Bosniaks: the dilemma of whether to emigrate or to stay under the non-Muslim rule, service in a nonMuslim army, establishment of a Muslim communal organization, institutional links with the site of khalifa and relations between Islam and European culture. According to him, in terms of solutions suggested and frames of reference, Bosniak intellectuals offered responses, which are comparable with other Muslim nations living under non-Muslim rule in the same time. This resulted from the similarity of their historical situations, the common challenges of European modernity and Muslim mentality.47 Fikret Karčić tries to offer an answer to the question of what are important elements of the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks. According to him, Islamic tradition of Bosniaks consists of: (i) Ahlu-s-sunnah (‫ )ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ‬branch of Islam, including application of al-Maturidi thought in Aqidah and Hanafi school (‫ )ﺍﻟﻤﺬﻫﺐ ﺍﻟﺤﻨﻔﻲ‬of thought in Islamic Jurisprudence (‫)ﺍﻟﻔﻘﻪ‬, with respective sufi orders (tariqats); (ii) Belonging to Ottoman-Islamic cultural zone; (iii) Existence of elements of „Islamized“ practice of inhabitants of pre-Ottoman B&H; (iv) Tradition of Islamic reformism (‫ )ﺇﺻﻼﺡ‬in interpretation of Islam; (v) Institutionalization of Islam in the form of the Islamic Community; (vi) Practice of expression of Islam in a secular state.48 The same author elaborates on the position of Islam in a Secular state taking B&H as a case study. For him, secular state refers to a state, which guarantees individual and collective freedom of religion, treats individuals as citizens regardless of their religious affiliation and constitutionally is not linked to any religion or belief and does not promote any religion or interfere in it. After examining B&H, Karcic has come to the conclusion that it has accepted all elements of the definition of secular state, i.e. freedom of religion or belief, citizenship free from religious affiliation and separation between religious communities and the state.49 Author has also concluded that in a given country the acceptance of a secular state significantly influences the manifestation and institutionalization of Islam which comprises the area of belief (‫ )ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻴﺪﺓ‬without any limitation, and the area of Islamic normative system (‫ )ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ‬limited to worship (‫ )ﺍﻟﻌﺒﺎﺩﺓ‬and social affairs (‫)ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﻣﻼﺕ‬. Ahmet Alibašić examined the directions and elements of Bosniak Islamic tradition in the Bosnian context. He identifies five thematic areas that will have to be the focus of intellectual efforts in the future. They are: (i) Legitimizing an Islamic institutional framework in B&H; (ii) Continuous/permanent scrutiny of Bosniak Islamic tradition and its reconciliation with the Islamic sources; (iii) Islamic practice/exercise and functioning in democratic conditions; (iv) Islamic social thought for post-conflict societies in transition; (v) Basic Aqidah topics of

47

Fikret Karčić, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity: Late Ottoman and Hapsburg Times, El-Kalem: Sarajevo, 1999. 48 Fikret Karčić, What is “Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks”?, Preporod, December 7, 2006. 49 Fikret Karčić, Islam u sekularnoj drzavi: primjer Bosne i Hercegovine in Zbornik Radova naucnog skupa “Islamska tradicija Bosnjaka: izvori, razvoj i institucije, perspektive, Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini: Sarajevo, 2008, pp.423-436. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -21-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

contemporary time.50 The same author examined the profile of the Bosnian Islam and what West European Muslims could benefit from it. Taking into consideration Islamic tradition and experience of Bosniaks the following things might be taken into consideration by the West European Muslims: (i) The way Islamic authority is institutionalized in B&H and Muslims are represented in it; (ii) The Bosnian Islamic educational system which combines religious and secular and modern and traditional Islamic education; (iii) Intellectual legacy and the responses of Bosnian Muslim intellectuals to the challenges of modernity and European culture; (iv) Political and social experience and (v) Interreligious cooperation and dialogue.51 Valenta and Strabac examined the relationship between religiosity and support for democracy among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in B&H. They found that religiosity has a negative influence on support for democracy and it is particularly true for individuals who do not support the idea of state-church separation. This article found that there is basically no difference in support of democracy between Croats and Bosniaks, while Serbs exhibit somewhat lesser support for democracy than members of the other two ethnic groups. Serbs also seem to be somewhat less religious than Croats and Bosniaks.52 Šaćir Filandra has examined Bosniak politics in the 20th century and tried to provide a framework be used in order to analyze and understand Bosniak politics in the 21st century. Political position of the Bosniaks in the 20th century resulted from their understanding of themselves and was determined in a way others, mainly Serbs and Croats, understood them. According to him, as of today, Bosniaks have not developed a document known as national program such as the case of other nations leaving in B&H and its surrounding countries. Along this line, Bosniak stand vis-a-vis the state, nation and religion has never been clearly defined and elaborated at the theoretical level. This is mainly due to the fact that the Bosniaks did not have political freedom to create such a document. This has resulted in the fact that Bosniaks at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century do not know what they want and how to achieve it. Aggravating and determining factors of Bosniak political development were: international setup which was not in their favour, the nature of the Greater Serbia in the case of the first Yugoslavia and the communist ideology in the case of the second Yugoslavia, permanent Serbian and Croatian aspirations towards B&H, wrong Communist understanding of the national question, neglect of the Bosniak national question by the Bosniak elites and lack of Bosniak political courage in certain moments. However, Bosniaks have never considered the possibility of their existence and survival outside the Bosnian framework. They never left the idea of B&H as a multiethnic state, even in the most difficult times for their physical survival and existence. Finally, they never promoted the idea of “Bosniak B&H”. Such idea has been always implanted and imposed from outside, mainly from Serbia and Croatia, in order to justify the crimes committed by 50

Ahmet Alibasic, Pravci i elementi razvoja islamske tradicije Bosnjaka u bosanskom kontekstu [Developing Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks: The Bosnian Context] in Zbornik Radova naucnog skupa “Islamska tradicija Bosnjaka: izvori, razvoj i institucije, perspektive, Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini: Sarajevo, 2008, pp. 491-509. 51 Ahmet Alibasic, The Profile of Bosnian Islam and how West European Muslims Could Benefit from It. Paper Presented at “Bosnischer Islam fur Europa”, Akademie der Diozes Rottenburg-Stuttgart & Vereinigung islamischer Gemeinden der Bosniaken in Dutschland (VIGB), Hohenheim, 16-17 November 2007. 52 Marko Valenta and Zan Strabac, Religion and Support for Democracy in B&H-Herzegovina, Politics and Religion, Vol.5, No.3, pp.609-633. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -22-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

these two countries respectively against Bosniaks. Filandra claims that the future of Bosniak politics will depend on three pillars: first, EU integration approach, either typical traditional one based on the principles of the Christian worldview and ideology or on the premises of post-modernism; second, state and position of the Bosnian neighbours, Serbia and Croatia and their focus on B&H and finally, Bosniak internal affairs.53 Sacir Filandra and Enes Karic dedicated the book “The Bosniac Idea” to Adil Zulfikarpasic, a prominent Bosniac intellectual and political activist and according to them, an ideologist of Bosniac nationhood.54 This work brings together elements of cultural studies and political history of B&H and elaborates national and political views of Adil Zulfikarpasic. Since the WWII, Zulfikarpasic was an expatriate and because of this, his life’s work had a decisive impact on the national question and political orientation and cultural trends of the Bosnian expatriate community since WWII. Adil Zulfikarpasic was among those Bosnian and Bosniac intellectuals and cultural and political activists who were fully convicted that of all peoples of B&H, none has so intimately and emotionally linked its destiny to the painful and complex history of B&H as have the Bosniacs who identified wholly with B&H as their only country and whose own survival has depended on the preservation of country’s unity as a geopolitical entity.55 Authors are of the opinion that Zulfikarpasic had two fundamental beliefs vis-à-vis Bosniacs and the future of B&H: (i) Bosniac nationhood as the key to resolving the national issue of B&H and the Bosnian Muslims and (ii) democracy, national liberation and equality. Muslim Religiosity Recently, study on the values of Bosnian youth was conducted on the territory of the whole country on the sample of 1004 persons. This study focused on the perception of youth of their real status in the society. i.e. quality of life, (in)capability of meeting their essential needs, future perspectives, motivation to leave for foreign countries, value-system, identity crisis etc.56 Study has found that the level of unemployment among the Bosnian youth reaches 58%. Another interesting and worrying phenomenon that this study has shown is the fact that drastic demographic changes have taken place in the post-war B&H. Thus, the whole country suffers from the negative demographic trend. On one hand, many people have left the country for abroad while on the other hand, internal migration has been very uniformly from rural to urban areas especially to the cities such as Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla, Bijeljina, Prijedor and Doboj. Furthermore, study has found that almost half (49.2%) of Bosnian youth would like to leave the country. Improving the life-standard and possible employment is citied as the most important factors to immigrate. Religiosity in terms of religious belief is quite high (almost 94% believe in the existence of God) among all three denominations however, in terms of religious practices it is highest among Catholic youth followed by Muslim and Orthodox youth respectively. Study has shown also that young people do not have strong interest for a voluntary work and for either local, regional, EU or world politics.57 53

Šaćir Filandra, Bosnjacka politika u XX Stoljecu [Bosniak Politics in 20th Century], Sejtarija: Sarajevo, 1998. Sacir Filandra and Enes Karic, The Bosniac Idea, Nakladni Zavod Globus: Zagreb, 2004. 55 See Ibid., p.8. 56 Jusuf Ziga, Lejla Turcilo, Amer Osmic, Sanela Basic, Nedzma Dzananovic-Mirascija, Damir Kapidzic and Jelena Brkic-Smigoc, Studija o Mladima u Bosni i Hercegovini, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Sarajevo, 2015. 57 Ibid., p.97 and 116. 54

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -23-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Dr. Bozo Skoko conducted empirical study on perceptions, stereotypes and images among citizens of B&H.58 This study found that in spite of all efforts invested by the International community to overcome division and differences among the three constituent peoples in B&H, mutual tensions are still present, sincere cooperation between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs is relatively low, and there are no common positions about either the past or the future of the state. The study also demonstrated that the three constituent peoples in B&H, although they have been living together in the same state for centuries, have a relatively poor knowledge and interest for each other, and that their mutual perception is still burdened with stereotypes from the past and the recent war.59 This study found that in spite of all efforts invested by the International community to overcome division and differences among the three constituent peoples in B&H, mutual tensions are still present, sincere cooperation between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs is relatively low, and there are no common positions about either the past or the future of the state. The study also demonstrated that the three constituent peoples in B&H, although they have been living together in the same state for centuries, have a relatively poor knowledge and interest for each other, and that their mutual perception is still burdened with stereotypes from the past and the recent war.60 Joseph W. H. Lough examines why enacting neoliberal economic and social policies in B&H has led to outcomes contrary to those predicted by traditional neoliberal theory. For the sake of reducing market distortions and generate significant economic growth he offers five policies that country needs to introduce: 1) correction of capital market imperfections arising from oligarchic-type effect; 2) using all efforts to cultivate human capital; 3) to adequately incentivize human capital; 4) investing in the next generation of technological innovations, including nanotechnology and robotics and 5) secure independent reliable sources of information and technologies.61 Adisa Busuladzic tries to explain that Bosnian Muslims themselves as unwanted nation failed to integrate into European political culture on one hand and on the other side, the Europeans have not helped them to become part of Europe. According to her, the failure has deep roots in the historical fact that the Bosnian Muslims did not have enough time to develop and understand the sense and importance of national identity, which makes the basis for the establishment and functioning of state in the European cultural heritage.62 The mixture of traditional Islamic values on one side and the strong impact of secularization and atheisation on another have created chaotic, confusing and mostly inconsistent Bosniak political culture.63 The Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life conducted a study on the unity and diversity of the World’s Muslims where B&H was mentioned among 39 countries included in this study. 58

Bozo Skoko, What Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs Think of Each Other and What Do They Think about B&H and Herzegovina, Amosgraf: Sarajevo, 2011. 59 Ibid., p.7. 60 Ibid., p.8. 61 Joseph W. H. Lough, A Model for Economic Growth in B&H and Herzegovina, Economic Review: Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 12, No.1, pp.15-30. 62 Adisa Busuladzic, The Bosniaks: Failing Role Models for Muslim Europeans, Vol. 3., No. 2, pp.213-14. 63 Ibid., p.219. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -24-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

The survey found that 99% of Bosnian Muslims were raised as Muslims thus making religious switching or conversion very rare in B&H. Nearly all Bosnian Muslims (96%) affirmed the shahadah (‫ )ﺷﻬﺎﺩﺓ‬or belief that there is only one God and that Muhammad is His Prophet. However, this common belief does not necessarily mean that religion is equally important to the lives of Bosnian Muslims. Namely, roughly a third of Bosnian Muslims (36%) agreed that religion (‫ )ﺩﻳﻦ‬is very important in their lives.64 Although the Salat (‫ )ﺻﻼﺓ‬or prayer is the most important and the most frequent practice through which Muslims profess their faith, only about one-in-seven (14%) of Bosnian Muslims observe all five prayers. Rates of mosque attendance tend to be relatively low among Bosnian Muslims. Thus, 14% of Bosnian Muslims visit the local mosque more than once a week, while 16% attend mosque at least weekly for jumuah prayer (‫)ﺻﻼﺓ ﺍﻟﺠﻤﻌﺔ‬. Percentage of those who never attend mosque vary between 8% among Bosnian Muslim men to 13% among Bosnian Muslim women.65 Although the practice of understanding and giving zakat (‫ )ﺯﻛﺎﺓ‬tends to be less common across South-Eastern Europe, however, roughly four-fifths or more in B&H (81%) say they give alms annually. Majority of Bosnian Muslims (75%) observe the fast in the month of Ramadan (‫)ﺭﻣﻀﺎﻥ‬. Three-quarters of Muslims in B&H (75%) endorse the view that there is only one interpretation of Islam. The survey found that only 2% of Bosnian Muslims have identification with Sufism. It is very interesting that, according to this study, 22% of Bosnian Muslims claim that Sufis are not Muslims, while one-third (33%) of Bosnian Muslims have never heard of Sufis or do not know whether Sufis are Muslims or no.66 Another study conducted by the same center found that 39% of Muslims of B&H say that Shariah (‫ )ﺷﺮﻳﻌﺔ‬is developed by men and based on word of God (‫ )ﺍﻟﻠﻪ‬and more than half of Bosnian Muslims (52%) are of the view that Shariah is the revealed word of God.67 Muslims in B&H tend to lean in favour of a single interpretation of Shariah. Namely, more than onethird of Bosnian Muslims (35%) say that Shariah has multiple interpretations, while more than half of Muslims in B&H (56%) believe that there is a single interpretation of Shariah. Support for making Shariah the official legal code of the country is favoured by 15% of Muslims of B&H. However, level of religious commitment makes a big difference in attitudes about the implementation of Shariah. Almost one third of Muslims in B&H (29%) who pray several times a day favour implementing Islamic law as the law of the land comparing to only 12% of those who pray less often. Among Bosnian Muslims who support making Shariah the law of the land, almost two-thirds (61%) believe that it should be applied to Muslims only whereas less than one-third (29%) agreed that application of Shariah should extend to nonMuslims as well. However, among those Bosnian Muslims who want Shariah to be the laws of the land:

64

Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, August 9, 2012, pp.27-42. 65 Ibid., pp.43-49. 66 Ibid., pp.52-92. 67 Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, April 30, 2013, pp.42-43. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -25-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

(i) only one-third (32%) support corporal punishments such as whipping or cutting off the hands of thieves or robbers; (ii) One-fifth (21%) favour stoning as a punishment for adultery; (iii) Only 15% approve execution of apostates.68 According to this study, Muslims of B&H are almost equally divided on the preference between the strong leader and democracy whereby the former is supported by 51% Bosnian Muslims and the latter by 47%. Almost three-quarters of Muslims in B&H (74%) say that they are very free to practice their religion and 71% believe that people of other religions are very free to practice their religions. Furthermore, 94% of Muslims in B&H say it is good that others are very free to practice their faith. Fewer than two-in-ten Bosnian Muslims (17%) say that religious leaders should have large or some political influence.69 Muslims widely hold view that it is necessary to believe in God to be moral and have good values. This applies especially to countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Middle-East and North Africa. Almost two-thirds of Muslims in B&H (65%) also agree that belief in God is necessary to be moral, while on the other hand, one-third of Bosnian Muslims (33%) say it is not necessary to believe in God to be moral.70 The same survey found that most Muslims agree that certain behaviours such as drinking alcohol, suicide and sex outside marriage are morally wrong. However, significant Muslim minorities in some countries consider such behaviour morally acceptable or say they are not a moral issue. Six-in-ten Bosnian Muslims say that drinking alcohol is morally wrong while more than one-sixth of them (16%) say that drinking alcohol is acceptable.71 By this Bosnian Muslims are considered the most liberal of all Muslims in Europe vis-à-vis the consumption of alcohol. According to the same study, Bosnian Muslims are the most liberal of all European Muslims with regards to the abortion whereby 14% of Bosnian Muslims say that abortion is morally acceptable. Furthermore, 53% of Bosnian Muslims condemn pre- and extra-marital sex while more than one quarter of Muslims of B&H (26%) say sex outside marriage is morally acceptable. At the same time, Bosnian Muslims overwhelmingly (83%) say that homosexual behaviour is morally wrong. Six-in-ten Bosnian Muslims say that divorce is morally acceptable while almost one-fifth (19%) see it as morally wrong.72 More than 90% of Bosnian Muslims favour a women’s right to choose whether to wear a veil in public and for a wife to have the right to divorce her husband. More than three-quarters of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina (79%) hold the view that both, sons and daughters should have equal inheritance rights. Half of Bosnian Muslims (50%) say that they adhere to the hadith (‫ )ﺣﺪﻳﺚ‬and sunnah (‫()ﺳﻨﺔ‬words and actions of the Prophet).73 The study found that almost six-in-ten Muslims of B&H (58%) believe that Islam is the exclusive path that leads to eternal life while more than one-third (36%) say that other religions may lead to heaven as well. In this context, more than half (53%) of those who pray less often and three-quarters of those Muslims of B&H (80%) who pray several times a day believe that Islam is the one true faith leading to eternal life. Fewer than four-in-ten of 68

Ibid., pp.44-55. Ibid., pp.60-65. 70 Ibid., pp.74-75. 71 Ibid., p.76. 72 Ibid., pp.81-83. 73 Ibid., pp.79-103. 69

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -26-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnian Muslims (35%) consider conflict between religious groups in B&H as a very big national problem. More than a quarter of Bosnian Muslims (31%) perceive Christians as hostile towards Muslims, roughly twice as many as say the same about Muslims’ attitudes towards Christians (14%). B&H is the only country outside sub-Saharan Africa where more than half (51%) of Muslims say they know some or a great deal about Christianity. Based on this knowledge of Bosnian Muslims about Christianity, almost six-in-ten (59%) Muslims of Bosnia say Islam and Christianity have a lot in common. However, relatively few Muslims of B&H count nonMuslims among their close friends. In fact, a large majority of Bosnian Muslims (93%) say all or most of their close friends share their faith. Along this line, acceptance of interfaith marriage is very low among Bosnian Muslims (16% are comfortable with a son marrying a Christian, 14% with a daughter doing the same).74 Muslims of B&H tend to be less likely to see conflict between being devoted and living in the contemporary world: 40% say that there is a conflict between religion and modern life, while 54% disagree. Similar to these results, exactly half of Bosnian Muslims (50%) believe that there is no inherent tension and conflict between religion and science, while 42% say that there is a conflict. Although more than six-in-ten (62%) Muslims in B&H say they like Western music, movies and television, almost half (46%) believe that Western popular culture harms morality in B&H.75 Several studies have been conducted in order to investigate the potential of diaspora76 to support development of the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. Theoretical Considerations Measuring religiosity particularly interests scholars in the fields of sociology, psychology and politics whereby the impact religion has on daily life and social institutions is explored; the connection between religiosity, health and emotional wellbeing is investigated or the influence of religion on political loyalties and voting behaviour is examined. Much of the scholarly literature however on religiosity is based on western or Christian majority societies. Although such studies provide a useful framework for examining religion in predominantly Christian societies, these scales or dimensions when applied to Muslim majority countries are inadequate for measuring religion in the context of Islam and Muslim religiosity. For example while church membership can indicate a degree of religiosity among Christians, in Islam there is no such official membership or ‘belonging’ to a mosque. Moreover, attending the mosque regularly is rather gender specific as the Friday prayers are mandatory for males but females have no such obligation in Islam. However, females may participate in Friday prayers if they choose to do however such decisions are influenced by cultural factors of the given society. Based on such differences between religious practice in Islam and Christianity it is important to refer to studies that are culturally and theologically relevant to Islam. While Rabia Dasti and Aisha Sitwat have developed measures and dimensions suitable for Muslims, these

74

Ibid., pp.110-125. Ibid., pp.128-136. 76 The B&H diaspora should be defined through three periods. First, the pre-war period refers to emigration before the 1990s, when the migrants from B&H emigrated mainly for economic reasons. Second, the war period refers to the period between 1991 and 1995. Third, the post-war period refers to the period from 1995 onwards. 75

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -27-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

measures focus on spirituality in Pakistan.77 A study conducted by Yasemin El-Menouar “The Five Dimensions of Muslim Religiosity: Results of an Empirical Study” (2014)78 provides a useful framework for studying Muslim religiosity. Using the widely accepted and established model in the sociology of religion, Charles Glock’s (1962) multidimensional model of religion as a ‘heauristic tool’, El-Menouar provides a comprehensive analysis of Glock’s measurements, offers explanations of dimensions where applicable and makes the culturally appropriate modifications and adaptations to ensure the applicability of the dimensions to a Muslim context, hence developing new dimensions to measure Muslim religiosity. These dimensions are particularly applicable for investigating values and religious practice among Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. El-Menouar’s five dimensions consists of ‘Basic religion’, this involves the belief in the declaration of faith in Islam; ‘Central Religious Duties’ is based on adherence to the five pillars of Islam; ‘Religious Experiences’ is related to feeling the presence of Allah and being able to connect and communicate with Allah; ‘Religious Knowledge’ refers to having basic knowledge of faith and practice and ‘Orthopraxis’ is equivalent to the consequential dimension of religiosity. Orthopraxis is especially important for examining Muslim religiosity as Islam regulates the daily life of practicing Muslim. These regulations range from dietary regulation to relations with the opposite sex. El-Menouar makes an important observation and distinguishes between Islam and other faiths especially in orthopraxis as abiding by daily religious regulations in line with the principles of Islam is considered to be a form of worship itself in Islam. The questionnaire developed for this study of religiosity among Bosnian Muslims is constructed with similar considerations to the principals of Islam and the specific culture and society of BH. However, additional questions were included with regard to political and economic factors related to BH, including political persuasion, satisfaction with religious institutions and perceptions towards countries with cultural and economic ties with BH. To determine the levels of religiosity, questions were asked about the frequency of establishing regular daily prayers as required by the five pillars of Islam; attending Friday congregational prayers which is obligatory for Muslim males; attending Eid prayers and tarawih prayers during Ramadan and establish optional nafila prayers. Similar to ElMenouar’s ‘central religious duties’ dimension, questions were posed with regard to fasting in Ramadan and paying zakat. In addition to the observance of the five pillars of Islam, participants were asked if they paid voluntary alms, sadaqah. Participants were additionally asked to state whether they did not observe the fasting for health reasons or whether they were financially unable to pay zakat in which case they would be exempt from such religious duties or whether they simply chose to not observe these practices. Questions pertaining to ‘religious knowledge’ were also considered in the questionnaire, less so to determine what participants knew of their faith, but more concerned with where and how they accessed and obtained religious information; whether they used mediums such as radio and television, internet, books and publications, or whether they consulted religious figures or friends. The importance of the media in the dissemination and consumption of religious based

77

Rabia Dasti and Aisha Sitwat, (2014) Development of Multidimensional Measures of Islamic Spirituality (MMI) in Journal of Muslim Mental Health, Volume 8, No. 2. 78 Yasemin El-Menouar (2014). The Five Dimensions of Muslim Religiosity: Results of an Empirical Study. Methods, Data, Analyses. Vol. 8. No. 1. pp. 53-78. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -28-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

information is also duly emphasized by social theorist James Beckford. 79 Questions related to the consequences of religious practice, what El-Menouar’s aptly labels ‘orthopraxis’ in the context of Islam was also investigated in this study. Participants were asked questions concerning their observance of dietary regulations such as alcohol consumption as well as their views on marital and premarital relationships. In order to meet the aims and objectives of this study in the Bosnian context, it was important to consider questions related to Rijasat which deals with Islamic affairs, and the role and impact of maktabs and madrasahs in BH. Participants were asked to indicate their satisfaction with such institutions and the services they provide. Significantly, in contrast to the PEW study, Sufism and attending tekke is part of the religious culture in some sections of the Muslim communities in BH. Therefore it was necessary to investigate participation in religious activities at tekkes throughout BH. Furthermore, considering the historical cultural and religious ties shared between BH and Turkey, questions related to perceptions towards Turkey were included in the research. Participants were also asked to state the fields in which they hoped to see further Turkish support such as in the establishment of social institutions and services for the elderly, for children or in the fields of education. In addition, the perception of Bosnians towards countries that have contributed and provided economic support via investment or aid and development were also included in the study. A study of religiosity conducted in Australia in 1966 by Mol (1971, 1985) where he applied Glock and Stark’s (1965) religiosity dimensions also provides a useful framework for analyzing and comparing Muslim religiosity in the context of ‘consequences’ or ‘orthopraxis’.80 Mol found that the individuals who are deeply religious are “more likely to be patriotic, to disapprove of gambling and to vote for conservative political parties” (p. 285). He provided significant data that showed the “relationship between intensity of belief in religious entities and commitments on other moral issues”. 81 Waters (1989) explains: In general religious observance and belief tend to vary in relation to a wide range of social factors. Religiosity increases with age; it is higher for women than men, it is more intense among traditional occupational groups such as farmers, professionals and white-collar workers and less intense for industrial occupations such as entrepreneurs and managers and factory workers. However, Waters (1989) notes that in order to understand the consequences of religious observation, it is important to consider intervening variables82. Peter Berger discusses the value of survey data for examining religiosity, especially for longitudinal studies, however he also notes the limitations of questionnaire as the categories designed by researcher are often removed from the social environment of their respondents 79

James Beckford. (2003) Social Theory and Religion. U.K. Cambridge University Press. p. 212. Cited in Malcolm Waters (1989) Sociology One, Australia: Longman Cheshire p. 284. 81 Ibid p. 285 82 Malcolm Waters, Sociology One. p 286). 80

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -29-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

and therefore is likelihood for misinterpretation coupled with the likelihood of participants not responding openly. Thus, Berger also supports the use of qualitative research methods based on observation, interviews and ethnographic research in order to gain in-depth data and insight into religiosity and everyday life.83 (p vi). Although it is not in the scope of this study to collect qualitative data, future research may be conducted and expand the findings of this study.

3. Research Methodology Research Question In recent few decades there has been a huge debate related to the integration or absorption problems of Muslim migrants in the Western Europe. Some intellectuals search for causes of this practical problem in the very nature of the religion of Islam. However, in B&H case, Muslims here are neither emigrated from Muslims populated geographies nor converted to Islam soon. They are origin Muslims as much as most of Turkey and Caucasia and some other Muslims-known regions. Clash of civilizations thesis or compatibility or dialogue between different cultures or traditions (at least between monotheist religions) continue to be hot debate issues in the present day. The concept of European Islam is developed in order to make discrimination between Muslims of Northern Africa-Middle East and Europe. However this difference goes beyond various Muslim groups and implies differences in Islamic understandings and traditions of the mentioned geographies. The aim of our research is to obtain socio-political identities, institutional values, religious practices and habits, evaluations towards services of religious authorities, sources of Islamic education, perceptions towards neighbouring and other countries, perception of feeling pressure in living and working places. Universe and Sample BH-DEBA is a survey based research. The universe of the research is all cantons. The research sample is proportionately distributed among cantons. Gender, age, occupation, socioeconomic status, level of education, marital status, place of living and birth are main factual information and were used during design of the sample. Multi-stage sampling is used in the survey. Firstly clusters were specified. Cantons were taken as grand clusters, then in each canton gender, age, education, marital status are taken as selection criteria of subjects for more homogeneously sample. In the third step randomly selected addresses specified and then systematic numbering followed. As a result, the universe of this research is Bosniak population of BiH. Different groups live in BiH Muslim community. Our sample covers all 18+ people. Therefore we selected randomly all groups of BiH Muslims in terms of age, gender, residential area, spiritual inclination, societal patterns etc. we use multi-stage cluster sampling: Canton-based rural and urban residential areas, age groups, distribution and gender groups were taken into account. The computed size sample is 1171. 83

Peter Berger (2007) Foreword in Nancy T. Ammerman (Ed.) Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Lives. Oxford University Press. (p vi) Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -30-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Main data collecting instrument is a semi-structured (semi-close-ended) questionnaire. In addition in-depth interviews with intellectuals are also taken into account. Distribution of subjects according to place of residence and place of birth shows a representative sampling. The biggest difference comes from migration from Republika Srpska to FBiH because of religion-based movement. The sample size n and margin of error E are given by

x = Z(c/100)2r(100-r) n =

Nx

/((N-1)E2 + x)

E = Sqrt[(N - n)x/n(N-1)] n: the sample size N: the population size, r: the fraction of responses (50%), Z(c/100):critical value for the confidence level c. c: confidence level E: margin of error This calculation is based on the normal distribution, and assuming more than 30 samples. The margin of error is the amount of error that can tolerated. Margin of error we expect is 5%, The confidence level is the amount of uncertainty that can tolerated. Higher confidence level requires a larger sample size. The confidence level for this survey is 96%. Our population size is about 65% of 2 million (1,3 million). The sample size does not change much for populations larger than 20 thousand. The minimum recommended sample size for our survey is 1.171. Muslim population in Bosnia has become more intensified in FBiH. Therefore the research sample is mainly composed of Muslims in FBiH. However the distribution of sample is in line with the distribution of population in FBiH. Table 3.1. BiH population

Total Enumerated Persons

%

Bosnia and Herzegovina

3,791,622

100.00%

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

2,371,603

62.55%

Republika Srpska

1,326,991

35.00%

93,028

2.45%

Brčko District

Source: www.popis2013.ba, Unofficial results of 2013 census. Table 3.2. BiH population: By Cantons

Center

Population (2013 census)

1

Una-Sana Canton / Unsko-sanski kanton

Bihać

299,343

2

Tuzla Canton / Tuzlanski kanton

Tuzla

477,278

Distribution of Municipalities Population (%) 12,6 20,1

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -31-

8 13

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Center

Population (2013 census)

3

Zenica-Doboj Canton / Zeničko-dobojski kanton

Zenica

385,067

4

Bosnia-Podrinje Canton Goražde / Bosansko-podrinjski kanton Goražde

Goražde

25,336

5

Central Bosnia Canton / Srednjobosanski kanton

Travnik

273,149

6

Herzegovina-Neretva Canton / Hercegovačko-neretvanski kanton

Mostar

236,278

7

Sarajevo Canton / Kanton Sarajevo

Sarajevo

438,443

8

Canton 10 / Kanton 10, Livanjski kanton

Livno

90,727

9

Posavina Canton / Posavski kanton

Orašje

48,089

8

West Herzegovina Canton / Zapadnohercegovački kanton

Široki Brijeg

97,893

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Sarajevo 2371,603 Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine Source: www.popis2013.ba, Unofficial results of 2013 census.

Distribution of Municipalities Population (%) 16,2 1,1 11,5 10,0 18,5 3,8 2,0 4,1 100,0

12 3 12 9 9 6 3 4 79

The Preparation and Structure and Implementation of Questionnaire While constructing the questionnaire, a comprehensive literature review was done. After the pilot implementation of the questionnaire, the content, order and language of questions revised and the final form decided. The survey instrument is composed of ten chapters: (a) Demographic information, (b) Sociological trends and attitudes, and values, (c) Religious practices and attitudes, (d) Assessment towards religious services provided by Rijasat of Islamic Community, (e) Perceptions towards Tekkes, (f) Perceptions towards Rijasat of Islamic Community, (g) Perceptions towards Turkey and Jamaats from Turkey, and urgent needs of Islamic Community and expectations from Turkey (h) Perceptions towards other countries, (i) Perception of feeling pressure in the social life, (j) Perceptions of religious services officers towards their roles in society, their economic conditions and job satisfaction, (k) Perception of the youth towards Islam, religious services officers, future of B&H, EU. Pollsters were trained by the research team. However, research team members also conducted more than half of the questionnaires. In addition, online and distance support are necessary due to unexpected situations and diversified sociological background related to confusion about questionnaire. All feedbacks have been taken into account and after pilot phase the questionnaire has been started to use as main data source of the research. During the pilot phase the research team gathered daily and other related experts were also consulted when necessary. 4. Descriptive Findings of the Research Places of Birth and Residence Distribution of respondents according to place of residence and place of birth shows a representative sampling. The biggest difference comes from migration from Republika Srpska Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -32-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

to FBiH because of ethno-religion-based movement. The biggest difference comes from immigration from RS to the Cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina due to war movement of population, ethnic cleansing and post-war resettlement of Bosniaks to those areas where they constitute majority of the population. The composition of the sample roughly reflects the presence of Bosniaks taking into consideration some documents that extrapolate their presence across the country. Table 4.1. Kanton of birth

Unsko-sanski Kanton Tuzlanski Kanton Zenicko-Dobojski Kanton Bosansko Podrinjski Kanton Srednjebosanski / Zupanija Središnja Bosna Hercegovacko-neretvanski Kanton/ Zupanija Hercegovacko-neretvanska Kanton Sarajevo/Zupanija Vrhbosanska Livanjski kanton/Zapadnobosanska Zupanija Respublica Sirpska Total Total

Percent 13,7 21,0 17,6 7,2 10,1 5,1 9,9 1,0 14,4 100,0 (1222)

Table 4.2. Kanton of residence

Unsko-sanski Kanton Tuzlanski Kanton Zenicko-Dobojski Kanton Bosansko Podrinjski Kanton Srednjebosanski / Zupanija Središnja Bosna Hercegovacko-neretvanski Kanton/ Zupanija Hercegovacko-neretvanska Kanton Sarajevo/Zupanija Vrhbosanska Livanjski kanton/Zapadnobosanska Zupanija Respublica Sirpska Total Total

Percent 12,7 21,9 12,1 10,3 9,9 4,4 23,2 ,6 4,8 100,0 (1222)

Gender Gender distribution of sample is quite reasonable. In analysis gender-weighted data is used. The majority of the survey respondents were male (n = 708, 57.9%; n = 514 female, 42.1%). In terms of total population, the number of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina is higher than men, 51.05% to 48.95%. However, male population in Bosnia and Herzegovina is higher of those who are between 19-35 years old. Since, the majority of the sample includes this group, it is expected that our study is to some extent overrepresented by men. Research on gendered experiences of religiosity show that women and men experience faith Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -33-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

in different ways (Ozarak 1996: 18).84 While this may also be the case among Muslims, certainly the explanations for such differences would vary. Significantly as noted by Jessica Collet and Omar Lizardo (2009)85, women display higher patterns of religiosity then men which is reflected in much of the research findings in studies conducted in the fields of sociology of religion. There is a range of explanations for such differences. One reason provided for gender differences in religiosity can be found in the works of Neal Pollock, Bradley and Rosanna Guadagno, they state that men display religiosity to a lesser degree in order to preserve their masculinity as they perceive that religiosity is characterized and equated with femininity which confirms Eagley’s ‘social-role’ theory (1987).86 However, once again, as most of the research on gendered experience of religion is based on western Christian majority societies, these explanations cannot be applied to Muslim majority societies. In fact as males are required to attend the congregational Friday prayers, and are more likely to go to the mosque for regular prayers, it may be in fact appear that men are more practicing or religious than women. Table 4.3.Gender structure

Percent 42,1 57,9 100,0 1222

Female Male Total Total

Age Age groups of sampling biased towards young groups. Comparing to the Bosnia and Herzegovinian demographics profile, this sample inclines towards representation of young people in the sample. However each group has sufficient subjects to be analysed. The mean age of the sample was 34.45 years (Std. Dev. = 15.22) with a range of 14-94 years. Although there are no statistically significant differences in findings, age-weighted data is used in analyses. The composition of the sample of middle-age people, which makes more than 50% of our sample was similar to that reported by indexmundi in 201387 and data provided by CIA factbook.88 Table 4.4. Age Groups

Percent 18 years old 19-24 years old

10,2 25,4

84

Inger Furseth and Pal Repstad (2006) An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion. U.K. Ashgate. p.184 Jesscia Collet and Omar Lizardo .A Power-Control Theory of Gender and Religiosity. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (2009) 48(2):213–23 86 Neal Pollock, Bradley and Rosanna Guadagano. Gender Differences in Religiosity as a Means of Self Enhancement: The Impact of Perceived Audience Size and Identifiability. https://campuspress.yale.edu/yrurp/files/2015/11/2011_Pollock-Okdie-Guadagno-2011-25qdb9n.pdf accessed on December 20, 2015. 87 See http://www.indexmundi.com/bosnia_and_herzegovina/demographics_profile.html, accessed on December 18, 2015. 88 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html 85

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -34-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

25-34 years old 35-44 years old 45-54 years old 55-64 years old Over 65 years old Total Total

22,8 16,5 12,3 8,6 4,3 100,0 1222

Education Education level in BiH Bosniaks is quite high. Cosmopolite ethnic structure, relatively stronger relations with Bosniak diaspora in the West, historical connections with German speaking region and finally historical favourite position in the Ottoman rule must have motivated this unique feature when compared to Eastern and Southern neighbouring countries. Quite high level of education among Bosnian Muslims has its long historic roots. Being located in Europe, quite distanced from other Muslim nations, education has been one the main sources and guarantees for Bosnian Muslims to survive in a quite hostile environment they have lived in for centuries. Bosnian Muslims have been educated at home and abroad as well. This has made them to understand the need of local population taking into consideration international trends. Thus, according to Shakib Arslan, Bosnian Muslims along Chinese Muslims have been among the best educated of all Muslims all over the world. This trend has continued even after the last Bosnian War when many Bosniaks went abroad to get education and upon finishing their studies came back to Bosnia and started to work at the various sectors including those of higher education. Table 4.5. Education

Percent Literate (without diploma) Elementary school High school Faculty education Total Total

1,7 8,0 48,1 42,2 100,0 1222

Marital Status Almost half of the research sample consists of married persons. In general this ratio is supposed to be higher for at least two times. However, the socio economic difficulties, primarily high unemployment rate in the post-Dayton BiH have made young people to stay single. Hence, this has increased an average age for people to get married that hindered and retarded one to establish a family. Since the end of the Bosnian war, there has been a trend of less number of marriages per year, except for years 2007 and 2008. This is very obvious among those between 20-24 years old. This shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s people come closer to the Western values in term of getting married at the later stage of life. This makes Bosnia and Herzegovina to suffer from a less population as for the last five years the Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -35-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

number of dead people overtakes the number of born infants. In addition, one-in-seven of all marriages are being divorced on a yearly base and RS suffers from higher rate of percentage of divorced people. Table 4.6. Marital Status

Married Single Divorced / widow Total Total

Percent 49,7 44,9 5,4 100,0 1222

5. Identities and Values BiH Bosniaks are quite homogenized in terms of religion and world view. Considering its historical multicultural, multiethnic and multi-religious diversity, the cost of aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and ethnic cleansing, mass killing and finally genocide committed against Bosniak people in early 1990s wiped a big chance of having an example of various cultures and civilizations living together what might have been a very good example for the idea of coexistence and multiculturalism in Europe. More than eight-in-ten of Bosniaks consider themselves as conservative and religious. To some extent this is understandable taking into consideration several factors. Religious revivalism has taken very strong roots in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-Yugoslav period as a reaction to several factors. On one hand for a long time during the time of former Yugoslavia people were exposed to the very strong atheisation process and denied practicing basic religious principles, the sense and the level of nationalism among Bosnian Muslims has been quite low due to historical circumstance and the fact that Bosnian Muslims were denied of their national identification until 1993 when the old name of Bosniak was retrieved. On the other hand, left wing and Yugoslavian-minded Bosniaks consist of about 17’% of total. This polarization or ethnoreligious awareness is carrying a potential in terms of either big problems or big hopes depending the sides. Socio-political Peculiarities of Bosniaks A set of adjectives were given to each subject and they were asked to specify if each identifies himself / herself. Identifiers Bosniak and Muslim are specified by almost all subjects. Since Bosniak and Muslim are common denominators of Bosnian Muslims, it is not possible to classify people according to their ethnic and religious affiliations. Each subject was asked if he/she sees himself/herself as religious. The answer is quite different from answers given to identifiers “Bosniak” and “Muslim”. Ratio of the answer to “religious” question is about 69 percent. More than two thirds of the Bosniaks see themselves as religious.

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -36-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Socio-political identifiers asked to subjects are as follow: Bosniak, Muslim, religious, secular, modernist, leftist-social democrat, communist, Yugoslavian, nationalist, liberal. In order to specify some other identifiers not provided in the list respondents were given chance to add new identifiers. Table 5.1. Socio‐political Identity

Secular Conservative Social Democrat-Leftist Nationalist-Yugoslav Total Total

Percent 83,2 9,7 7,0 100,0 1222

Much of the research conducted in Christian dominant countries shows that those who classify themselves as religious will also identify themselves as conservative. For example, “In the United States, highly religious individuals on average tend to be politically conservative (Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt, & Green, 2006; Kelly & Morgan, 2008; Layman & Carmines, 1997; Layman & Green, 2005; Olson & Green, 2006).89 This is also reflected in studies on religiosity in Australia. 90 However, the different social, cultural and historical factors of these countries need to be taken into account when making such comparisons with Europe in general and BH specifically. Moreover, BH’s multi-religious and multi-ethnic makeup needs to be considered, as well as the applicability of the term “conservative” in the context of this country. There is no clear distinction between being politically or religiously “conservative” and or “liberal” as it is understood in Europe, or in the US. In Bosniak understanding, being conservative or religious does not need to exclude being secular or modern. Bosniak, Muslim or religious are used interchangeably among Bosniaks. The majority of Bosnian Muslims have a secular, Europe-oriented world-view. Therefore we prefer secular conservative for Bosnian type of conservatism. Social democrat or leftist group is the group of people who see themselves as left-oriented or not very religious. However it is hard to see statistically significant difference between leftist and conservative groups in terms of approaching Islam or Muslims. We describe this situation as identity of Bosniaks is still “under construction”. Communist, Yugoslav, nationalist, atheist or agnostic are grouped under same umbrella we name “Nationalist-Yugoslav”. The word of nationalist does not indicate western type patriotism or ethnic discrimination in Bosnian case. Bosnian nationalism and Yugoslav nostalgia are overlapping in Bosnian case. Less than one-in-ten of Bosniaks see themselves as nationalist or Yugo-nostalgic. Quite young people who did not live and do not remember former Yugoslavia participated in this study might be an explanation for this trend. Values on Institutions Respondents were asked for their values on various dimensions of human being. All 89

Ariel Malka, Yphtach Lelkes, Sanjay Srivastava, Adam B. Cohen and Dale T. Miller. 2012. The Association of Religiosity and Political Conservatism: The Role of Political Engagement. Political Psychology, Vol. 33, No. 2, p.20. 90 Malcolm Waters (1989) Sociology One, Australia: Longman Cheshire. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -37-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

dimensions cover whole human life in terms of social and cultural life, biological affiliation, psychological needs, and official engagements. These values are about the following concepts: family, workfellow, friends, neighbours, marriage, environment, entertainment and leisure, freedom of expression, science, state, equality of man and woman, justice and judiciary, military forces, police, BiH nation, ethnic affiliation, parliament, Council of Ministers of BiH, politics, political parties. The most appreciated values are related to individual life and needs like family, job, friends, marriage, belief, freedom of expression and environment. The second category is much related to the state and state organs like justice and judiciary, science, military forces, entertainment and leisure, state, police, and nation. The third category is about Parliament, BiH nation, council of ministers, ethnic affiliation, politics, and political parties. In conclusion it can be said that both individual and societal values are crucially shared and very vivid among Bosniaks. The least favoured values are about politics and politics related institutions and values. This trend is at least twofold. First, Bosnian Muslims have no long tradition with the state institutions and therefore are not aware of their importance for the future of these nations. Second, Bosniak political elites who have been elected to represent Bosniaks in the state institutions have not been able to meet needs and demands of Bosniaks as the most populous nation in the country. Rampant corruption, nepotism, government inefficiency, high unemployment rate especially among young people has led to the mistrust of all institutions related to the state. Rampant corruption, nepotism, inefficiency of the state institutions, high unemployment rate especially among young people have led to the mistrust of all institutions related to the state. Among other values, institution of family has the most important place in the life of Bosnian Muslims. Namely, almost all those who participated in the study see family as very important or important. After family for which more than nine-in-ten of all Bosnians claim it is very important for them on the other hand job is considered to be of crucial importance for Bosnians in general and Bosniaks in particular. Such a high rate of those who consider a job to be very important in their lives is triggered by a quite difficult economic and financial situation in the country, high rate of unemployment and permanent immigration of Bosnians in general to Europe and other well-off countries. Marriage and job are considered very important by more than seven-in-ten Bosnian Muslims. Having in mind very hard economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and quite difficult to have a job, people usually link the possibility of getting married and having family to the job security. Therefore, the percentage of those who see marriage and job very important is almost identical. Religion occupies very important place in the life of Bosniaks. More than nine-in-ten of Bosniaks consider religion as either very important or important in their lives. Considering the fact that since the conquest of Bosnia by the Ottoman Empire in the middle of the 15th century until the early 1990s of the previous century Bosniak population had no a chance to live in their own state and consequently to develop the sense of national Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -38-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

consciousness, it is quite obvious that their perception of the state and its institutions such as parliament, council of ministers and police score somehow low on the scale. It might be clearly states that Bosniak population have not been able to develop and have more mature sense and importance of the state and its institutions in today’s world. However, instead of declaring less importance to the state institutions and having in mind people’s general perception of these institutions and their supposed roles in terms of providing more services and benefits to the society it might be said that Bosniaks have become less trustful to them. Gender equality has become one of the very much debating issues in the Bosnian society in the last two decades. Being a society characterized by quite strong presence of secular values????? and due to the very active role of the civil society in promoting gender equality more than 85% of Bosniaks consider gender equality as very important or important. In this context even the law on gender equality, which is considered to be the most important instrument in developing the consciousness about the issues related to gender equality was passed in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003. The importance of the concept of neighbourhood (komsiluk) has declined in Bosnia and Herzegovina comparing to the period before and during the war. This is very obvious and observable in villages where neighbours used to meet on a daily basis, having coffee, breakfast, lunch together, helping each other during the harvest period etc. However, due to technological advancement, internet entering the houses, TV satellites, quite fast way of life, people have distanced themselves from the neighbours. This is even much more observable in the urban areas where people hardly know their neighbour, let alone to mingle and have common activities. The importance of entertainment and resting (leisure time) has become another phenomenon of the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina in general and Bosniaks in particular. Namely, it has become a norm that people are ready even to get the loans in order to go for vocation or spend few days abroad during the year. Conversely, people are less concerned about the work that is not so much profitable and requires physical work such as agriculture and work in the cultivation field. So to some extent easy-way-to-get-well-off-mentality has prevailed among Bosniaks in the post-war period. More than half of Bosniaks gives no importance or does not want to give its opinion about the executive authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Almost the same ratio applies for the parliament as the top legislative body in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is not seen as important by more than 30% of Bosniaks whereby more than 15% abstained from giving an answer. More than half of Bosniaks see politics and political parties as unimportant or do not want to declare their opinion about them. This might be explained in terms of a very complex structure of the Bosnian political system, its ineffectiveness and people being fed up of political bickering among elected political elites for almost two decades. This shows that politics, political parties and state institutions are rated as the least important for the Bosnian Muslims. Table 5.2. World Values Survey

(402 respondents)

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -39-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Family Job Friends Marriage Faith Environment Freedom of expression Science State Equality between women and men Neighbours Judiciary and Justice Military Entertainment and rest Police The Bosnian-Herzegovinian nation Ethnicity Parliament The Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina Politics Political parties

Very important + Important

Very important

Important

Not important

Undecided / No answer

99,0 95,0 94,1 93,7 91,7 90,5 90,2 86,7 86,2 85,1 79,9 78,7 78,6 74,9 73,3 70,9 67,2 50,9

92,0 73,0 63,5 73,7 68,4 50,3 58,7 55,8 60,6 42,8 34,7 42,3 37,2 29,7 25,9 32,4 28,2 15,2 17,2

7,0 22,0 30,6 20,0 23,3 40,2 31,5 30,9 25,6 42,3 45,2 36,4 41,4 45,2 47,4 38,5 39,0 35,7 28,5

0,7 3,1 4,8 3,7 5,7 7,4 7,9 9,9 9,9 10,1 17,4 14,2 14,4 20,1 17,3 19,4 18,3 30,4 29,7

0,2 1,6 0,8 2,1 1,8 1,9 1,4 3,1 3,4 3,9 2,5 6,3 6,2 4,2 7,4 6,8 12,6 15,2 20,6

15,0 13,4

23,8 17,7

39,1 35,5

19,3 29,4

45,7 38,8 31,1

6. Religious Practices and Evaluation of Religious Institutions In this section, religious practices like prayer, fasting and religious financial duties are examined. In addition, perception of religious services offered by the Islamic Community, gender composition of men and women in religious institutions, religious instructions at education institutions and Shariah wedding is analysed. The ways of gaining religious knowledge, religiosity of parental family, headscarf of women, implementation of the Islamic law of succession, the possibility of adherents of other religions into the haven, the relationship if there is a compulsory relationship between ethics and religion, the possibility of changing halals and harams in Islam in accordance with changing conditions, flirt between men and women before marriage, inter-religion marriage, ideal marriage age, ideal number of children, drinking alcohol and perception of dervish lodges are other subjects handled here. Individual Worship Prayer

Regular prayers have an important place among BiH Bosniaks. Bosniaks approach all types of prayers similarly. More than half of Bosniaks pray regularly. There are inconsistencies among findings of various surveys regarding prayer behaviours of Bosniaks.91 The state constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the state-level Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina passed in 2004 provides for freedom of religion, comprehensive rights and confers upon them a legal status which had not existed before. Individuals generally enjoy this freedom and freely practice religion on the territory of the whole country except in some cases 91

For example findings of Gallup and Pew Research are quite contradictory. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -40-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

where mainly Bosnian Muslim returnees to Republika Srpska were threaten and their places of worship attacked by the local Serbs. The state-level Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina passed in 2004. Establishing the regular daily prayers is an important marker of religious practice as it impacts everyday life. Significantly, it is part of the 5 pillars of Islam and can be considered within El-Menouar’s (2014) dimensions of “central religious duties”.92 Moreover, as Ramadan and Bajram play an important role in the social and cultural life of BH, it is not unexpected that Taravih and Bajram prayers are established by a significant number of Bosniaks. The manifest and latent functions can be reflected. While these prayers may be established for the purpose of meeting religious obligations and spiritual needs, it also functions in bringing about social cohesion and solidarity in the Bosniak community.

Table 6.1. Prayer behaviours Always

Often

Sometimes

Never

No answer

Total

Friday prayer Total Men Women

38,6% 58,1% 3,1%

10,2% 14,5% 2,4%

14,0% 14,7% 12,8%

31,6% 9,0% 72,9%

5,5% 3,8% 8,7%

100,0% 100,0% 100,0%

Total Men Women

54,1% 79,8% 5,4%

4,4% 6,0% 1,4%

5,1% 5,7% 3,9%

31,8% 6,2% 80,3%

4,6% 2,3% 9,0%

100,0% 100,0% 100,0%

Total Men Women

32,6% 37,0% 27,2%

25,7% 23,4% 28,5%

22,0% 20,8% 23,5%

14,2% 14,4% 13,9%

5,5% 4,4% 6,9%

100,0% 100,0% 100,0%

Total Men Women

9,9% 11,3% 8,2%

18,1% 14,2% 22,8%

41,7% 42,3% 41,1%

22,7% 24,5% 20,5%

7,6% 7,7% 7,4%

100,0% 100,0% 100,0%

Total Men Women

43,2% 42,7% 43,6%

16,8% 15,3% 18,5%

20,5% 22,1% 18,7%

12,6% 13,5% 11,5%

7,0% 6,4% 7,7%

100,0% 100,0% 100,0%

Bajram prayer

Taravih prayer

Nafila prayer

Daily prayers

Number of respondents: 1048, (Imams excluded)

Fasting

Almost all Bosniaks express that they fast during Ramadan if they haven’t valid excuses to break their fast. Just 5,6% of the respondents say they never fast. Visibility of Ramadan has a very strong social ground. Fasting like prayer and paying zekat is a part of the five pillars of Islam and therefore is classified under “central religious duties. Moreover, as Ramadan forms a part of the social life in Bosnia, it is difficult to determine whether fasting is practices for religious or cultural purposes. This may be an area for further research.

92

Yasemin El-Menouar (2014). The Five Dimensions of Muslim Religiosity: Results of an Empirical Study. Methods, Data, Analyses. Vol. 8. No. 1. pp. 53-78. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -41-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Table 6.2. Which of the following items in the table below best describes your attitude to fasting during Ramadan?

Percent 64,5 21,2 4,3 5,6 4,4 100,0

I fast every day during Ramadan I fast sometimes during Ramadan I am not able to fast for health reasons I never fast I do not want to answer Total Number of respondents: 1048, (Imams excluded)

Religious tax (Zakat)

In early Islamic periods zekat was seen as a tax and the state had authority to collect it. Zakat is calculated and paid on an annual basis. Zakat is having high awareness and social support among Bosniaks. Results show that more than half of Bosnian Muslims who are financially capable of paying zakat do it and in this way complete one of their religious duties. On the other hand only 2.3% of Bosniaks are negligent of this duty even if capable of doing it. Result also show that one fifth of Bosniaks do not possess nisab and during the whole year as two main conditions for paying zakat. This is very high rate of paying the zakat comparing to the period prior to the war or even some years after the war when very low number of people used to pay zakat mainly due to the lack of knowledge about it and the Riyaset not being active in explaining to the people importance of it and providing some practical ways of doing such has been the case with sadaqatu-l-fitr. Paying zakat, sadaqah and fitrah can be seen as a form of social protection whereby the community takes an active role in civic engagement. Boz and Smith (2011) assert that the definition of social protection can be widened to include religious institutions like zakat and sadaqa.93 In this context, it also important to take into account that manifest and latent functions of giving charity. While at an individual level one may be principally acting based on religious reasons, the latent function can be explored in greater depth by examining the social solidarity and cohesion that is achieved by such religious practice. Social protection and Islam in BH is an issue that could be developed for further research. Table 6.3. Which of the following items in the table below best describes your attitude towards zakat?

I give zakat every year if my financial situation is appropriate I give zakat sometimes if my financial situation is appropriate I do not give zakat even my financial situation is appropriate My financial condition is not appropriate to give zakat I do not want to answer Total Total Number of respondents: 1048, (Imams excluded)

Percent 57,7 9,6 2,3 20,8 9,6 100,0 1048

93

Boz T. and Smith W. (2011). Social Protection in Turkish Communities in Germany and Australia: The Role of Islam within the Secular State. Journal of Islamic Research. Vol. 2. No. 4 Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -42-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Fitra

Fitra is a compulsory religious financial duty like zakat. However not only the rich people have to pay fitra but people who are above poverty line also have to pay fitra during Ramadan. However the amount of fitra is relatively very low when comparing to Zekat. The amount of fitra per person is calculated according to the amount of money to feed one person for one day. Almost four fifths of Bosniaks pay fitra (sadaqatu-l-fitr) during the month of Ramadan. Furthermore, results also show that the percentage of those who pay sadaqatu-l-fitr during the Ramadan is even higher than the actual number of those who fast during the Ramadan. This shows very strong consciousness of Bosnian Muslims and their solidarity with the poor people. Those who never pay sadaqatu-l-fitr , even if capable of doing it, is even lower than those who never pay zakat. Very high rate of people paying sadaqatu-l-fitr is to a large extent due to the very active role played by the Riyaset in promoting this concept and providing to the people vet concrete way of paying it through the receipts printed and provided by the Islamic community. Table 6.4. Which of the following items in the table below best describes your position for fitra you provide during Ramadan?

Percent I give fitra in every Ramadan if my financial condition is appropriate I give fitra sometimes if my financial condition is appropriate I do not give fitra even my financial condition is appropriate My financial condition does not allow me to give fitra I do not want to answer Total Total Number of respondents: 1048, (Imams excluded)

77,9 5,8 1,4 8,2 6,8 100,0 1048

Sadaqa (alms)

Bosnian people are very fond of providing a help to those in need. This study shows that almost seven-in-ten of Bosniaks give sadaqah on a regular basis while almost one fifth of them do it rarely. The number of those who never give sadaqah is as low as those who never pay zakat and sadaqatu-l-fitr. Sadaqa is completely voluntary and can be given to the needy people any time in a year. It is a continuous charity. Bosniaks seem very charitable and just 2,7% of them expressed that they never give sadaqa. Table 6.5. Which of the following items in the table below best describes your position for Sadaqa?

Percent I often give sadaqa (alms) I rarely give sadaqa I do not give sadaqah I'm not in a financial position to give sadaqah I do not want to answer Total Total 1048, (Imams excluded)

69,6 18,0 2,7 5,3 4,4 100,0 1048

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -43-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Sacrifice (Kurban)

In Islam, festival of sacrifice is mandatory for financially available Muslims once a year. Just 3,6% of Bosniaks say that they never sacrifice. Since the cost of sacrifice is relatively high, just financially available people have to sacrifice. Visibility of Kurban is very high and also an important indicator of awareness of being Muslim. The time for Kurban festival and pilgrimage are overlapping. Therefore, these two important religious duties increase the awareness and visibility among Muslims. The practice of sacrifice - Kurban can be examined in a religious context, namely meeting a religious obligation but must also be considered as a ceremonial cultural event, especially in BH because of the cultural practices attached to the ritual. Biljana Sikimic and Petko Hristov (2007) in Kurban in the Balkans provide a comprehensive anthropological analysis of Kurban.94 This holiday strengthens intergenerational interaction, and builds family and community ties. Although officially a non working day/s, it is not uncommon to observe family visitations in contrast to other Muslim majority countries like in Turkey where there is a growing trend for people travel abroad and have a holiday instead of take part in the Kurban festivities. Slaughtering of Kurban has had very strong tradition among Bosnian Muslims. This religious duty was very much observed and practiced even during the time of Communist Yugoslavia when people used to slaughter Kurban and small kids distribute the meet to the poor and needy people, neighbours and relatives. Since the slaughtering of Kurban necessitates some financial capability it might be observed that the number of those who slaughter Kurban is almost identical to those who pay zakat, 56.2% and 57.7% respectively. At the same time, number of those who do not slaughter Kurban because of the lack of financial capability is again almost identical to those who do not give zakat due to the lack of financial resources, 19.6% and 20.8% respectively. This shows that when it comes to the fulfilment of financial religious duties Bosnian Muslims are more unified and follow the trend. On the other hand, fulfilment of immaterial religious duties varies from almost two thirds of those who regularly fast during the Ramadan to les l than half of those who perform the prayer on a regular basis. Table 6.6. Which of the following items in the table below best describes your position for Kurban?

Percent I sacrifice every year if my financial situation allows me I sacrifice some years if my financial situation allows me I do not sacrifice even if my financial situation allows me My financial situation does not allow me to sacrifice I do not want to answer Total Total 1048, (Imams excluded)

94

56,2 9,8 3,6 19,6 10,8 100,0 1048

Biljana Sikimic and Petko Hristov (2007) in Kurban in the Balkan Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -44-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Evaluation of Religious Services Provided in the Place of Residence Muslims in BiH are concentrated in terms of place of residence and this is a rising trend. Respondents were asked about their satisfactions from the services of the Islamic Community which is the only official Islamic authority in the country, Imams / Muezzins, the number of women employed in the religious institutions, the number of mevlud, tawheed and other religious activities, funeral services provided by the Islamic Community, Islamic education for adults provided by the Islamic Community, religious education in the maktabs and number of hours of religious lessons in elementary and secondary schools. The respondents were also asked if they are able to live in accordance with the traditions and customs and if they have done Shariah wedding (married, widow or divorced ones). Table 6.7. Evaluation of Religious Services Provided in the Place of Residence

D.5. Can you live in accordance with the traditions and customs? D.2. Are you satisfied with the imam / muezzin of the mosque? D.10. Are you satisfied with the religious education in the maktab? D.1. Are you satisfied with the services of the Islamic Community? D.7. Are you satisfied with the funeral services offered by the Islamic Community? D.11. Are you satisfied with the number of hours of religious instruction in elementary and secondary schools? D.4. Are you satisfied with the number of mevlud, tawheed and other religious activities? D.6. Is there propaganda of any other religion than Islam among Muslims in your place of residence? D.9. Are you satisfied with Islamic education for adults offered by the Islamic Community? D.3. Are you satisfied with the number of employed women in the religious institutions? D.8. Have you done Shariah wedding? (Question for married / married, widowers / widows, divorced)

Yes

No

Other

9,8 9,4 13,6 17,0 18,6

Do not know / No answer / Not sure 12,5 16,0 18,5 21,7 24,1

76,6 74,1 67,4 60,4 56,9 56,8

23,3

18,8

1,0

54,3

13,0

30,5

2,2

49,4

39,6

10,8

0,2

42,2

25,7

31,0

1,0

29,2

32,1

37,9

0,8

48,2

38,6

10,7

2,4

1,2 0,5 0,6 1,0 0,4

Number: 1048, Imams excluded. D.5. Can you live in accordance with the traditions and customs? Three-fourths of Muslims think that they can live in accordance with the traditions and customs. This is a very important indicator for the level of perception of feeling pressure and freedom of religion and freedom of expression. There is no statistically significant difference between Cantons. D2. Are you satisfied with the imam / muezzin of the mosque?

Three fourths of Bosniaks are satisfied with adequacy of their imams on duty. Only 9,4% of respondents voice that imams are not sufficient professionally. D.10. Are you satisfied with the religious education in the maktab?

Preschool children attend in mosques to take early religious education in BiH. Two thirds of respondents are satisfied with this service. However, almost one fifth have no idea about that. There is no difference between approaches of men and women. Married, divorced or widow persons are more satisfied with the religious education in maktabs than single persons. It can be concluded that having children experience has positive impact in that subject. Attitude towards education in maktabs is not affected by number of children families have. There is not a positively increasing or decreasing trend towards maktabs related to number of children. However age groups have significantly different views on the religious education maktabs offer. The older age groups the more positive approach to maktabs.

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -45-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

D1. Are you satisfied with the services of the Islamic Community?

While 60 percent satisfaction can be deemed a positive result, it is important to further investigate the reasons why there is dissatisfaction or lack of awareness. This could be researched further in order to meet the needs of entire community and to provide appropriate wide reaching services. Satisfaction from services provided by the Islamic Community (IC) is about 60%. However more than one third of Bosniaks either do not know what the services are or are not satisfied with them. It seems there is an important gap for IC to fill. There is no statistically significant difference between approaches of men and women. Married, divorced or widow people have higher positive approach towards the services than single people. In general, the higher ages the higher satisfaction level from the services. D.7. Are you satisfied with the funeral services offered by the Islamic Community?

Satisfaction from funeral services is quite high. However, one fourth of respondents have no idea if this service is sufficient. The ratio of unsatisfied ones is about 19%. D.11. Are you satisfied with the number of hours of religious instruction in elementary and secondary schools?

Satisfaction from amount of hours for religious education in primary and secondary schools is also high (57%). However, around one fifth of respondents have no idea if this service is enough. D.4. Are you satisfied with the number of mevlud, tawheed and other religious activities?

Traditional religious ceremonies executed during birth, death, sad and happy happenings are very important and social participation side of religion. The worships like prayer, fasting and charity seem more individual, but mevlud and tawheed are social activities and visibility of these is very high. Satisfaction level is more than half. Since these activities are not compulsory in Islam, 30% of respondents have no idea if the number of these activities is enough. Community support is fostered with holding such ceremonial events to mark such occasions related to births and deaths. These events may be considered in the context of social protection, as the community takes on an active role to provide support, both emotional and in some cases financial to help those who have gained or lost family members. As such it would be important to conduct further research into the social impact such gatherings have within the community. D.6. Is there propaganda of any other religion than Islam among Muslims in your place of residence?

Missionary activities among Muslim people seems quite common. Almost half of the respondents argue that there is propaganda of other religions among Muslims. However, while 40% of respondents specify that there are no missionary activities of other religions around themselves and 11% have no idea about the issue. There is no difference between answers of men and women, single or married person and various age groups. D.9. Are you satisfied with Islamic education for adults offered by the Islamic Community?

IC is the only national authority to regulate, perform and supervise Islamic services. IC is offering various religious education and training towards adult Muslims. The satisfaction from these services is 42%. However, 31% of respondents do not have any idea about sufficiency of the services and one fourth of the respondents think that these services are not enough. There are significant differences among attitudes of people at various marital statuses. Married people are more satisfied from education for adults offered by IC than the divorced/widow and the single. And the satisfaction of the divorced/widow group is higher Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -46-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

than that of the single group. The higher the age the higher the satisfaction from Islamic education for adults provided by IC. D.3. Are you satisfied with the number of employed women in the religious institutions?

The number of women in Islamic services is not sufficient. Just 29% of respondents are satisfied with the adequacy of number of women on duty. Feminist perspectives in sociology examine the insufficiency of numbers of women in religious institutions, namely focusing on issues of gender equality. However, the question here is not only about gender inequality in terms of holding positions in religious institutions in terms of equality with males, there are social and cultural problems that specifically concern women, and thus should be addressed by women. Moreover, “feminist theorists assert that, although women are typically the ones to socialize children into a religion, they have traditionally held very few positions of power within religions”.95 A policy that encourages women to take part in Islamic services needs to be developed in order to address this inadequacy. While 24% of women are satisfied with the number of employed women in the religious institutions, about 34% of men are satisfied with that number. However, awareness level towards this issue is very low. Even the ratio of people who have no idea about the employed women is higher than the ratios of positive or negative answers. Since there is no increasing or decreasing trends among various age groups, it is better to take account the general attitude towards number of employed women as reference. D.8. Have you done Shariah wedding?

Since Bosniaks are supposed to register to one mosque in their neighbourhood, Shariah wedding must have been common. 48% of respondents say that they solemnized Shariah wedding. However, around 39% of married or widowed respondents say that they did not perform religious wedding and 10% of married or widowed ones do not have any idea about that. An interesting finding is the highest ratio of Shariah wedding belongs to the age groups of 35-44 and 24-34. Evaluation of Services Offered by the Islamic Community, Social Atmosphere and Islamic Institutions Gaining religious background, religious services offered by the Islamic Community, gender gap in the Islamic institutions, Islamic education and training, Islamic social activities, Islamic atmosphere in family life, religions and the right to enter the Haven, woman-man sensual relationship before marriage and perceptions towards religious institutions are examined in this section. Ways of gaining religious training and knowledge

Obtaining religious knowledge is mostly based on religious books, magazines and newspapers then religious officials. Social media and communication mediums like Internet, TV and radio also have important place in offering religious knowledge. The role of circle of friends is relatively low. The importance of the media in the dissemination and consumption of religious based information is underscored by social theorist James Beckford. 96

95 96

William Little (2012) Introduction to Sociology – 1st Canadian Edition. BC Open textbooks. Openstax. James Beckford. (2003) Social Theory and Religion. U.K. Cambridge University Press. p. 212. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -47-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

6.8. What is the way you gain your religious education?

(You can choose more than one answer) Percent 1. Through the Islamic religious officials 2. Through religious books, magazines and newspapers 3. Through the Internet 4. Through radio and TV programmes 5. Over friends 6. Other Total Total

60,0 68,2 42,7 30,5 36,3 4,3 100,0 1048

Freedom to Practise Religion and Tradition Perception of Pressure

Feeling of pressure in the residential and working places is reasonably low. It can be said that the past religious-based clash experience disappeared widely. Bosniaks do not feel pressure while searching for work, working at job, taking health, education, official canton and municipality services, and at their residential place, Table 6.9. Do you feel under pressure because of your belief in yourself where you live in the following areas?

Yes I.1. When looking for a job I.2. when working in a job I.3. In the place where you live I.4. When receiving health services I.5. When receiving municipal / federal / cantonal / civil services I.6. When receiving educational services (school and university) I.7. Other

No

16,9 13,6 7,4 10,0 15,1

I do not know / Other Undecided 69,1 13,5 0,4 72,8 13,1 0,5 85,7 6,5 0,5 80,8 9,1 0,1 72,2 12,3 0,4

11,7

78,1

9,9

20,7

75,9

3,4

0,2

Social atmosphere, religious institutions and Islamic education

Religiosity of families is quite high. Four-fifths of people interviewed say that families they grew up were religious. There is no difference between religiosity of families in terms of education and age groups. Headscarf is one of the hottest issues in Islamic societies. Just more than half of people think that headscarf is religiously compulsory in Islam. Almost one-third thinks that women do not have to cover their heads according to Islam. Different age groups, education and gender have no impacts on the view people have about headscarf. However married people have slightly but statistically significant higher affirmative perception towards headscarf. Men inherit twice as much as women

In traditional Islamic texts, men are entitled to double the inheritance of women. 55% of people interviewed think that this sharing is not valid in practice. Just one third thinks that this principle is applicable.

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -48-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Under whose monopoly is Paradise?

In many classical Islamic views after Islam only the people who believe and practise Islam can enter Paradise. 18% of Bosniaks think that believers of other religions may also enter Paradise. However 39% of people interviewed have no idea about the subject. This result shows the knowledge level of Muslims who live in a mosaic society. Being moral and religious

In many aspects, Bosniaks have very secular and tolerant views in terms of culture of living together with not just believers of other beliefs but also nonbelievers. 56% of interviewed people believe that "The moral person does not necessarily have to be a believer?" Only 27% of subjects think being moral is related to belief. Halals and harams

One other hot issue is related to possibility of updating halal (order) and haram (prohibition). While 29% of people think that there is possibility to adopt halals and harams according to requirements of today, 44% of people think it is not possible to change the Islamic prohibitions and orders in accordance with the conditions of present day. However 27% of people have no certain idea about the discussion. Flirt

BiH has very cosmopolitan and therefore tolerant experience in man-woman relations. Flirt of man and woman before marriage is highly acceptable among Bosniaks. While 32% of people approve flirt before marriage, 41% are against it, but it should be kept in mind that 25% of Bosniaks do not have a certain idea about that. Mixed marriage

Mixed marriage in BiH was relatively high when comparing other Islamic societies and neighbouring Balkan countries. However after civil war of 1992-95, the situation changed radically. While only one-fifth of Bosniaks are in favour of mixed marriage, 54% of people are against it. Almost one fifth of people are not certain about this issue. While education and gender have no significant impact on the view on mixed marriage, younger age groups and single people are more favourable of mixed marriage. I am not sure about the use of the term “civil war” there is some sensitivity on the matter.. perhaps Prof. Karic can check tuba.. Corruption, bribery and games of chance

There is consensus that corruption is common in BiH. Just 6.5% of people think that corruption is not common, and 7% have no idea about prevalence of corruption. Despite the wide perception of corruption, only 10% of the people interviewed say that they have given or attempted to give bribery in the recent one year. 84% of subjects say that they have not given or attempted to give bribery in the past year. Games of chance are popular in BiH. About 27% of people played one of these games in the past year. 70% of people say that they had not played these games in the recent one year. These views towards Islam and gambling and premarital relations can be seen in light of Tone Bringa’s Being Muslim the Bosnian Way (1995), an anthropological study conducted in the 1990s which shows the complexity of the understanding and practice of Islam in Bosnia. While her ethnographic study was based on a small village in Central Bosnia, the findings can still be considered within this context. Moreover, an article published in “The National” in 2013 reflected similar trends, namely the Bosnian are Muslims but have a European culture

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -49-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

that is distinct from Turkish, Persian or Arabian culture. 97 Once again, Questions related to the consequences of religious practice, what El-Menouar’s classified as ‘orthopraxis’ in the context of Islam was investigated through these fields. Participant’s views and practice of Islam is noteworthy as the responses show that Bosniaks do not view some issues as unIslamic and therefore do not consider themselves to be deviating from religious principal or regulations. Moreover, BH’s complex multifaceted history and socialist past may influence the views of Bosniaks, especially attitudes concerning religion and morality, hijab, gambling and alcohol consumption and explanations for responses can be investigated in future research. Table 6.10. Social atmosphere, religious institutions, Islamic education

D.13. Were you brought up in a family that practiced religion? D.14. Do you think that women in Islam have to be covered? D.15. According to Islam, men are entitled to double the inheritance of women. Do you think it is applied in practice? D.16. Do you believe that those who practice a different religion than Islam will enter Paradise? D.17. Do you agree that "The moral person does not necessarily have to be a believer?" D.18. Do halal and haram in the Qur'an can change in accordance with the changing conditions for life? D.19. What is the attitude you have towards flirt between women and men before marriage? D.20. What is the attitude you have towards mixed marriages? D.21. Do you think that bribery and corruption are common in Bosnia and Herzegovina? D.22. Have you given or attempted to give a bribe over the past year? D.23. Have you played any of the games of chance (lottery, lottery, sports lottery, TV bingo-bingo, etc.) over the past year?

Yes / No / Do not know / No Other Positive Negative answer / Not sure 81,5 12,2 5,8 0,5 53,8 32,0 13,3 0,9 24,6 47,7 27,1 0,6 17,7

41,2

38,9

2,1

55,8

27,1

16,7

0,4

29,3

43,5

26,7

0,5

31,7

41,3

24,8

2,2

20,2 86,3

54,0 6,5

24,2 7,0

1,6 0,2

10,3

84,2

5,2

0,3

26,7

69,8

3,1

0,3

Using alcohol

General expectation towards using alcohol is high in Bosniaks. However, according to survey three-fourths of subjects express that they never use alcohol. 22% say that they use alcohol sometimes. And just 3% of interviewed people specify that they usually drink alcohol. Considering the socio-political history of BH, it is not surprising that Bosnian Muslims may consume alcohol. A policy may be developed that deals with the health hazards of alcohol consumption. This can be organised within an Islamic or “secular” context to ensure effective and appropriate communication on the matter. Table 6.11. Which of the following items in the table below best describes your attitude to alcohol consumption?

1. I have never consumed alcohol 2. I sometimes consume alcohol 3. I often consume alcohol 4. Other

Percent 74,5 21,8 3,0 0,7

97

Ferry Bierdermann, “We have a different kind of Islam” say Bosnia’s Muslims. July 1, 2013 The National http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/europe/we-have-a-different-kind-of-islam-say-bosnias-muslims Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -50-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Ideal marriage age

More than half of Bosniaks think that ideal marriage age is less than 25 years old. According to 32% of the interviewed people ideal marriage age is between 26-30 years old. Near 6% of people believe that ideal marriage is the age when couples have enough financial opportunity. Marriage is both a religious and civil institution. Using C. Wright Mill’s sociological imagination, like unemployment or divorce, marriage and establishing a family reflects the decisions of individuals and reveals broader societal expectations and issues. Table 6.12. What age you think is the ideal for marriage?

a. Between 15-17 years b. Between 18-20 years c. Between 21-25 years d. Between 26-30 years f. Between 31-35 years e. Ideal time for marriage is when you have enough opportunities

Percent 1,1 5,8 44,8 31,7 11,0 5,6

Ideal Number of Children Two thirds of BiH Bosniaks think that ideal number of children is at most 3. However, 4, 5 and more children are also favoured about one third of the community. These numbers explain the change in trends among the Bosniak population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, the heritage of former system made Bosniaks imitate the trend of Western nations of having less kids, in most cases one or two and rare cases of families with more than two kids. Quite difficult economic situation in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina has made people to get married later and have fewer kids. However, conservative Bosnian Muslims have broken this rule and prefer to have more than two kids. In the long run this may contribute to the natality rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general and Bosniaks in particular. While Islam encourages the institution of marriage and having children, there are cultural and socio-economic factors that may influence the ideal number of having children in BH. To ascertain the reasons for the ideal number of children is an area for further research. It is important to note the marital status and age bracket of those who prefer to have 3 or more children considering studies based on life-cycle theory shows that upon having children, most people become more connected to their faith and this in turn reflects on child-rearing practices. As Michele F. Margolis explains, the sociological “religious life cycle” theory begins with the observation that teenagers and young adults detach themselves from religious practice only to return to the religious fold after starting a family.98 Table 6.13. Ideal Number of Children

1-2 children 3 children 4 children

Percent 26,3 40,7 19,1

98

Michele F. Margolis. 2015 Rethinking the Relationship between Religion and Politics: A Test of the Life Cycle Theory, pp.1-55 p.3, http://caps.gov.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic451464.files/Margolis_LifeCycle.pdf Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -51-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

5 or more children Total Total

14,0 100,0 1222

The place of Tekkes (dervish lodge) among Bosniaks

Positive attitude of Bosniaks towards Tekkes is mainly positive. However about 39% of people have no idea about tekkes. It can be said that tekkes are not very common in societal life in BiH, because only 8% of Bosniaks say that they belong to a tekke. Around 18% of people have no idea about to be belonging to a tekke or they do not want to answer this question. 42% of Bosniaks think that activities of tekkes are helpful in the society. General attitude of Bosniaks towards tekkes and activities of tekkes are naturally are parallel. What role do tekkes play in BH in society? Can a tekke be seen as a social institution or does it only address the spiritual needs of those who attend? What is the profile and motivation of those who attend tekkes? These are all questions for further research. Table 6.14 . The place of Tekkes (dervish lodge) among Bosniaks

E1. What is the attitude you have towards tekkes? E2. Are you a member of a tekke? E.3. Do you think that the activities in tekkes helpful for religious services?

Positive / Yes 46,0 8,0 41,6

Negative / No 14,7 74,2 14,7

I do not know / Undecided 38,7 17,6 43,1

Other 0,6 0,2 0,6

Perception towards Islamic Community

IC has very positive perception among Bosniaks. Around two-thirds of Bosniaks have positive attitudes towards IC. Only 9% are negative against IC. One-fourth of Bosniaks have no idea about IC or they do not want to answer this question. 53% of Bosniaks think that IC does its job. 15% are not satisfied with IC services. 80% of the people who are not satisfied with the services of IC specify some reasons for their dissatisfactions. Table 6.15. Perception towards Islamic Community

Positive / Negative / I do not know / Yes No Undecided F1. What is the attitude you have towards the Islamic 63,8 9,0 26,8 Community? F.2. Do you think the Islamic community do its job? 52,9 15,3 30,7 F.3. If you think that the Islamic Community is not 80,0 8,9 8,9 sufficiently successful in its job; specify at least three reasons why? (The question applies to those who think that the Islamic Community is unsuccessful)

Other 0,3 1,1 2,2

7. Perception towards Turkey and Other Countries Attitudes towards Turkey General attitude towards Turkey is quite high. Positive attitude of Bosniaks towards Turkey is 89%. Although the Turkish institutions have similar positive perceptions among Bosniaks, the level is well below the level of attitude towards Turkey. The more an institution known the more Bosniaks have positive attitude towards it. Affirmative attitudes towards the Turkish Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -52-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

institutions are listed from highest to lowest below: Turkish Airlines, TIKA, Turkish educational institutions, Turkish-based religious communities, Anatolian News Agency and the Turkish Consulate and Yunus Emre Institute. Religious activities of Turkish-based religious groups (dzemat) are not common in BiH. Only 10% of Bosniaks say that Turkish religious communities have activities in their place of residence. Less than half of this 10% have positive attitudes towards these groups and 57% of Bosniaks have no idea or do not want to answer the questions. Considering the cultural and historical ties with Turkey, it is not unexpected that Bosniaks hold a positive view towards Turkey. Development agencies such as TIKA may be in a position to promote their contributions and are therefore recognised as a positive organisation in BH. Moreover, the introduction of Turkish language in schools may further promote a positive attitude towards Turkey; this is addition to the language courses offered by the Yunus Emre Institue. Prospects of employment in Turkey or Turkish institutions in BH may be a factor in this positive attitude. Furthermore, the international relations, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations developed by the Turkish government may further contribute to this positive attitude. Notwithstanding, there are areas in which Turkey can strengthen its ties with economic and cultural contributions such as investing in areas that create jobs for young Bosnians who are educated by feel the need to go abroad for the purposes of seeking employment. In this way Turkey may be able to address the issue of brain-drain in BH. Table 7.1. Attitudes towards Turkey and the Turkish institutions

Positive / Negative / I do not know / Yes No Undecided 1. What is the attitude you have towards Turkey? 88,5 2,5 8,5 2. What is the attitude you have towards the Anatolian Agency? 51,0 4,7 43,7 3. What is the attitude you have towards TIKA (Turkish 62,7 4,5 32,2 Agency for Cooperation and Coordination) 4. What is the attitude you have towards Yunus Emre Institute? 45,9 5,2 48,3 5. What is the attitude you have towards Turkish Airlines? 73,4 3,4 22,7 6. What is the attitude you have towards activities of the 50,4 4,8 44,1 Turkish consulate? 7. What is the attitude you have towards the Turkish primary 62,6 7,5 29,5 and secondary schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 8. What is the attitude you have towards Turkish universities in 68,9 6,6 24,3 Bosnia and Herzegovina? 9. What is the attitude you have towards religious and social 52,1 8,1 38,9 activities of religious communities (dzemat) originating from Turkey?

Other 0,5 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,7 0,4 0,3 0,9

Urgent needs of Muslims in BiH

Urgent needs that expected from Turkey to fulfil are listed shelter for needy children, nursing homes for elderly, university, high school, preschool education and kindergarten, mosquesmaktabs and elementary school, respectively. Table 7.2. Which of the following areas having urgent needs that Turkey should focus to meet?

Urgently needed

Not urgent need

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -53-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

1. Pre-school education and kindergarten 2. Nursing home 3.Accommodation for children in need of care 4. Elementary School 5. Secondary school 6. University 7. Mosque- Maktab 8. Other

63,2 74,2 86,7 58,7 63,8 73,2 60,0 93,6

36,8 25,8 13,3 41,3 36,2 26,8 40,0 6,4

Attitudes towards Other Countries Attitudes towards countries are classified in two categories: (i) Economic investments and aid of countries in BiH; (ii) Religious and cultural activities of countries in BiH. Investments and aid

Bosniaks’ attitude towards countries for their economic investments and aids in BiH is much diversified and it is hard to group countries according to their religious, historical and geographical backgrounds. Turkey, Germany, Austria, S. Arabia, USA, Malaysia and Kuwait are the countries having highest affirmative perceptions among Bosniaks. The most negative perceptions belong to Serbia, Russia, UK, Croatia and Italy respectively. The direction of perceptions of the third group countries is not so clear if it is positive or negative inclined. Table 7.3. What is the attitude you have towards following countries’ investment and aid activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

a. Investment and aid 1. Croatia 2. Serbia 3. Germany 4. Austria 5. Italy 6. Russia 7. England 8. Japan 9. Indonesia 10. Iran 11. Qatar 12. Kuwait 13. Malaysia 14. S. Arabia 15. Turkey 16. USA

Positive 31,1 12,3 66,2 64,4 31,2 13,8 25,2 41,3 42,6 41,9 50,4 59,1 60,3 63,4 73,1 62,8

Negative 37,1 59,8 9,2 9,9 23,7 49,8 31,3 23,8 18,3 15,3 14,8 9,5 9,0 9,3 5,7 15,9

I do not know / Undecided 31,9 27,9 24,6 25,6 45,1 36,5 43,5 34,8 39,1 42,8 34,8 31,4 30,7 27,3 21,2 21,3

Cultural and religious activities

Bosniaks’ affirmative attitude towards cultural and religious activities of other countries is relatively low when comparing to economic investments and aids. In terms of cultural and religious activities, the most affirmative countries are Turkey, S. Arabia, US and Malaysia. The most negative attitude belongs to Serbia, Croatia, UK, Japan and Italy. When familiarity of countries decreases the level of positive or negative attitudes also diminishes. Geographically and culturally farther countries have low level of positive or negative attitudes.

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -54-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Table 7.4 . What is the attitude you have towards following countries’ cultural and religious activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

b. Cultural and religious activities Positive 1. Croatia 22,2 2. Serbia 10,8 3. Germany 27,0 4. Austria 28,2 5. Italy 15,0 6. Russia 9,3 7. England 13,6 8. Japan 17,3 9. Indonesia 23,2 10. Iran 33,1 11. Qatar 38,9 12. Kuwait 45,7 13. Malaysia 47,4 14. S. Arabia 52,6 15. Turkey 62,7 16. USA 49,4

Negative 33,8 47,2 22,5 21,0 27,8 37,7 30,0 27,8 21,2 17,1 13,6 9,0 8,8 9,2 5,8 14,6

I do not know / Undecided 44,0 42,0 50,5 50,8 57,2 53,0 56,4 54,9 55,6 49,8 47,5 45,3 43,8 38,2 31,4 36,1

8. Youth Window: Views on Islam, Muslim Clerics, Future of BiH, the EU Young Bosniaks have very high affirmative attitude towards Islam. Just 1% of the youth have negative perception of Islam. Support level for membership of BiH to OIC is around 78%. Perception of Islamic clerics is about 78%. It can be said that the Muslim youth have very affirmative attitude towards Islam and international Islamic organizations. On the other side support for membership to the EU is around 64%. Despite almost two-thirds of the young Bosniaks support the EU membership, when comparing to the 78% level support to membership to OIC, this level relatively low. The support level for membership to NATO is above 69%. Young Bosniaks are prone to be international and very in favour of being affiliated to various international organizations. Table 8.1. Young attitudes

(Answer if you have less than 30 years) K.1. What is your attitude towards Islam? K2. What is the attitude you have towards religious officials in your area of residence? K.3. Do you believe in a better future for Bosnia and Herzegovina? K.4. Do you support the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the European Union? K.5. Do you support the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina into NATO? K.6. Do you support the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation?

Yes / positive 96,7 78,3

No / I do not know Other negative / Undecided 1,0 2,2 5,5 15,1 1,1

69,7 63,5

19,3 24,9

10,7 11,6

0,3

69,3

14,9

15,6

0,2

77,5

6,6

16,0

9. Clerics Window: Views on Social and Economic Status, Quality of Education and Reforming IC In BiH main three religious communities dominate that dimension in the society. There are Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -55-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

individual protocols between state and each religious community (Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic). In the time, regulations in each religious community and regulations between religious communities and the state need to update. In addition, religious schools also update their curricula. All these developments are reflected in the social status of imams of Islamic community. Social status, income, borrowing attitude, retirement right and job satisfaction of imams are crucial in this research. Since opinions of service receivers and providers should be taken into consideration together, views of imams are crucial. Perception of imams about quality of education in madrasahs, Islamic faculty of education and faculty of Islamic studies are important, because source of clergymen are these schools. Relations inside Islamic Community and relations with the state are subjected to regulation. Imams are asked about updated constitution of IC. Socio-economic Status Almost three-fourths of imams think that Bosniaks respect to imams. In addition, threefourths of imams are satisfied with their jobs. However, more than half of imams argue that the leadership role of imams declines in the time. Income level, retirement and borrowing requirement are most problematic issues of imams. Only 23% of imams think that they receive adequate payment and other benefits. 40% of imams express that they have to borrow money to survive. The most negative aspects of attitudes of imams are directly related to their economic status. Average age of imams is 34 and. One-third of imams are under 28 years old. 68% of imams are under 36 years old. Reforming the Islamic Community Amendments in IC constitution have 51% supports from imams. However one-third of imams do not have an idea about the amendments. It can be said that even primary regulation on IC have not created enough awareness. The reasons for this are versatile. On the one hand, amendments are not aiming at create a leverage for economic benefits of imams. On the other hand, the need for amendments is not reflected from feedbacks of imams. Quality of Islamic Education Affirmative attitude of Imams towards quality of education in madrasahs, Islamic faculty of education and faculty of Islamic studies is between 60%-65%. Reforming the Islamic Community More than half of imams are in favour of reforms done in organization and functions of the IC. However, almost one-third of imams are not aware of the content of the reforms. Ratio of the negative approach to the reforms is about 17%. Table 9.1. Positions of the Imams / religious official

(Answer if you are religious official) Yes

No

J.1. Do you enjoy respect in your environment as a religious officer?

73,2

14,3

I do not know / Undecided 12,5

J.2. Do you think that the leadership position of Imam in the society has been weakening? J.3. Do you think that as religious official you receive adequate payment and other benefits? J.4. Do you often have to take debt to maintain your life?

54,2

31,5

14,3

22,5

64,4

13,1

39,6

51,8

8,5

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -56-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

J.5. Do you have a right to a pension? J.6. Are you satisfied with your job? J.7. Are you satisfied with the quality of education in the madrasahs? J.8. Are you satisfied with the quality of education at the Islamic Faculty of Education? J.9. Are you satisfied with the quality of education at the Faculty of Islamic Studies? J.10. Do you think that the recent amendments to the Constitution of the Islamic Community is going in the right direction?

62,1 73,6 65,0 65,2

31,7 15,7 20,2 15,9

6,2 10,7 14,7 18,9

60,0 51,0

18,1 16,7

21,9 32,4

Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Researches Ethnic concentration is a continuing phenomenon and polarization between ethno-religious societal sectors seems to rise if the concentration contributes segmentation. Despite diseases of poor quality and corruption education level is quite high and due to insufficient employment opportunities, the EU in general and German speaking countries in specific are main target of the educated and talented youth. Bosnian society is unique in terms of socio-political identities. Nationalist, patriot, leftist, rightist, conservative and religious have very similar meaning across the Europe and the Anglo Saxon countries and of course including Turkey. We conclude that this different approach to identities is reasoned by “still under construction”. Items used in World Values Survey used in our survey and it is found that family, job, friends, marriage, faith and freedom of expression which are mostly individual-oriented or individualcentred are appreciated much more. Values related to the state and state organs are consisting of the second category that much appreciated. The third and least valued institutions are politics and political institutions. The findings of our survey show that Muslims are intensively practising religious worship. However many researchers and opinion leaders in the Islamic community argue that the real level of practising worship should be much less. It is argued that when a person portrays himself as a religious one, socially he would be more respected because the socially most accepted role model is a righteous or religious person. Therefore in many societies, people are inclined to exaggerate their religiosity. About 75% of Muslims say that they never consume alcohol. However, it is believed that using alcohol is very common among Muslims. Therefore, committing a sin is denounced normally and respondents are aware of this and correct their real situations toward socially more acceptable answers. Muslims in BiH feel free to live in accordance with their traditions and customs. Services of religious officers, quality of religious education in related institutions and performance of the IC all are evaluated very affirmatively. However, just number of employed women in the religious institutions is seen insufficient. Gaining Islamic knowledge is sourced mainly by printed materials, religious officials, internet and friends respectively. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -57-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Perception of pressure is very low for Muslims when they are looking a job, working in a job, the place of living, receiving health service, receiving municipal, cantonal or federal services and taking educational services. About 82 Muslims specify that they grow up in religious families. Here also we need to take this approach carefully. When Bosniaks say “religious” this term may be not the same term used in Middle East or Far East Islamic countries. Reinterpreting Islam in accordance with the changing conditions is accepted by 29% and rejected by about 44%. Practitioners of other religions may enter Paradise according to about 18%. However, 58% believe that there is no need to be religious for being a moral or righteous one. Mixed marriages are seen reasonable by 20% and rejected by 54%. 86% of Muslims think that bribery and corruption is common in BiH. Although just 8% of Muslims say that they belong to tekkes, 46% have positive attitude towards tekkes and 42% believe that tekkes are helpful for religious services. Perception towards the IC is quite positive (73% of valid answers) and 78% of valid answers think that the IC does it job. Perception towards Turkey and the Turkish institutions active in BiH are very positive. Turkey in general, Anatolian News Agency, TIKA, Yunus Emre Institute, Turkish Airlines, Turkish Consulate, Turkish schools, Turkey-based religious communities is highly appreciated among Muslims. Most urgent needs of Muslims are listed as accommodation for needy children, nursing home for elderly, university and secondary and elementary schools, respectively. Attitude of the youth towards Islam is very positive. Almost all respondents are positive towards Islam. Perception of religious officials is also very affirmative. 70% of the youth believe that BiH will be better in the future. Membership of BiH to Organization of Islamic Cooperation, NATO and the EU are also supported widely. 73% of the Islamic officials (clerics) think they have a respectable position in the society. And 74% are satisfied with their job. However, more than half of religious officials think that their leadership role is weakening in time. Almost two-thirds of religious officials think that their total income is not sufficient to survive. Satisfaction of religious officials from Islamic education offered in educational institutions is also high. Reform efforts related to organization and functions of the IC are also appreciated (75% of valid answers). References 1.

Abazovic, Dino, 2009, Bosanskohercegovacki Muslimani na Pocetku Novog Milenija: Socioloski Pogledi [Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslims at the beginning of a New Millennium: Sociological Views] in Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka [Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks], Institut za Istoriju: Sarajevo, pp. 219-240.

2.

Adekanye, J.Bayo, 1998, “Power-Sharing in Multi-Ethnic Political Systems”, Security Dialogue, March, Vol.29, No.1, p.25-36. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -58-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

3.

Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara, 2004, “Ethnic Diversity And Economic Performance”, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 10313, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10313, (Accessed: November 3, 2011).

4.

Alibasic, Ahmet, 2007, The Profile of Bosnian Islam and how West European Muslims Could Benefit from It. Paper Presented at “Bosnischer Islam fur Europa”, Akademie der Diozes Rottenburg-Stuttgart & Vereinigung islamischer Gemeinden der Bosniaken in Dutschland (VIGB), Hohenheim, 16-17 November.

5.

Alibasic, Ahmet, 2008, Pravci i elementi razvoja islamske tradicije Bosnjaka u bosanskom kontekstu [Developing Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks: The Bosnian Context] in Zbornik Radova naucnog skupa “Islamska tradicija Bosnjaka: izvori, razvoj i institucije, perspektive, Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini: Sarajevo, pp. 491-509.

6.

Beckford, James, 2003, Social Theory and Religion. U.K. Cambridge University Press. p. 212.

7.

Beckwith, Burnham, 1985, The Decline of U.S. Religious Faith, 1912-1984, Palo Alto: B.P. Beckwith.

8.

Berger, Peter L. (Ed.), 1999, The Desecularisaton of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics . Washington: WM B Eerdmans Publishing p.2.

9.

Berger, Peter L., 2008, Secularisation Falsified. First Things http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/02/002-secularization-falsified, [Accessed: 21.09.2015].

10. Berger, Peter, 2007, Foreword in Nancy T. Ammerman (Ed.) Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Lives. Oxford University Press. 11. Bierdermann, Ferry, 2013, “We have a different kind of Islam” say Bosnia’s Muslims. July 1, The National http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/europe/we-have-a-different-kind-of-islam-say-bosniasmuslims. 12. Borjas, George J., 2000, "Issues in the Economics of Immigration", in Issues in the Economics of Immigration, January, p.1-14. University of Chicago Pres. 13. Borjas, George J., 2000, "Issues in the Economics of Immigration", in Economics of Immigration, p.114. January, University of Chicago Pres. 14. Bougarel, Xavier, 2003, Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea in Yugoslavism: Histories of a failed idea 1918-1992 by Dejan Djokic (ed.), Hurst&Company: London, pp.107-8. 15. Boz, Tuba and Smith W., 2011, Social Protection in Turkish Communities in Germany and Australia: The Role of Islam within the Secular State. Journal of Islamic Research. Vol. 2. No. 4 16. Bunce, Valerie, 2004, “Status Quo, Reformist, or Secessionist Politics: Explaining Minority Behavior in Multinational States”, Department of Government, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850, paper prepared for the Workshop on Nationalism, Secession and Inter-Ethnic Cooperation and Conflict, April 23-24, 42p. 17. Bunce, Valerie, 2004, “Status Quo, Reformist, or Secessionist Politics: Explaining Minority Behavior in Multinational States”, Department of Government, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850, paper prepared for the Workshop on Nationalism, Secession and Inter-Ethnic Cooperation and Conflict, April 23-24, 42p. 18. Burg, Steven L., The Political Integration of Yugoslavia’s Muslims: Determinants of Success and Failure, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no.203, Pittsburg, 1983. 19. Busuladzic, Adisa, 2010, The Bosniaks: Failing Role Models for Muslim Europeans, International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies, Vol. 3., No. 2, pp.213-14, http://www.emuni.si/press/ISSN/1855-3362/3_211-222.pdf 20. Casanova, Jose, 1994, Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.25-30. 21. CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html 22. Collet, Jesscia and Omar Lizardo, 2009, A Power-Control Theory of Gender and Religiosity. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 48(2):213–23 23. Comte, August, 1865, A General view of Positivism, London: Trubner and Co. 24. Constanta, Amelie F., Liliya Gataullinab and Klaus F. Zimmermannc, 2009, “Ethnosizing immigrants”, Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -59-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol.69, No.3, March, pp.274-287. 25. Dasti Rabia, and Aisha Sitwat, 2014, Development of Multidimensional Measures of Islamic Spirituality (MMI) in Journal of Muslim Mental Health, Volume 8, No. 2. 26. Davie, Grace, 2010, ‘Resacralization’, In Bryan S. Turner (Ed.), The New Blackwell Companion to The Sociology Of Religion. Wiley Blackwell. pp. 160-178. (p.175). 27. DeBono, Kenneth G. and Anja Kuschpel, 2014, “Gender Differences in Religiosity: The Role of SelfMonitoring”, North American Journal of Psychology, Vol.16, No.2, pp.415-426. 28. Durkheim, Emile, 1915, The Elementary forms of Religious Life, New York: The Free Press. 29. Easterly, William and Ross Levine, 1997, “Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, Vol.112, No.4, p.1203-1250. 30. El-Menouar, Yasemin, 2014, The Five Dimensions of Muslim Religiosity: Results of an Empirical Study. Methods, Data, Analyses. Vol. 8. No. 1. pp. 53-78. 31. Filandra, Sacir and Enes Karic, 2004, The Bosniac Idea, Nakladni Zavod Globus: Zagreb. 32. Filandra, Šaćir, 1998, Bosnjacka politika u XX Stoljecu [Bosniak Politics in 20th Century], Sejtarija: Sarajevo. 33. Furseth, Inger and Pal Repstad, 2006, An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion. U.K. Ashgate. p.184 34. Gallup, 2010, Balkan Monitor, Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans, http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf, [Accessed: 10.08.2015] 35. Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, 2006, “Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.20, No.2, Spring, p.23-48. 36. Herbert, David, 2003, Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public Religion in the Cotemporary World, Hampshire: Ashgate. 37. IMF, International Financial Statistics, www.imf.org. 38. IntexMundi, 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina Demographics Profile, http://www.indexmundi.com/bosnia_and_herzegovina/demographics_profile.html, [Accessed:December 18, 2015]. 39. Irwin, Rachel, Dzenana Halimovic, Maja Bjelajac, Dražen HutererPew Research, 2014, “Bosnian Census Risks Deepening Ethnic Rifts”, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/bosnian-census-risks-deepeningethnic-rifts [Accessed: 10.10.2015]. 40. Johnson, Daniel Carson, 1997, “Formal education vs. religious belief: Soliciting new evidence with multinomial logit modelling”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp.231-246. 41. Kamberovic, Husnija, Bosnjaci, 1968: Politicki Koncept Priznanja Nacionalnog Identiteta [Bosniaks 1968: Political Concept of Recognizing National Identity], in Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka [Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks], Institut za Istoriju: Sarajevo: 2009, pp. 5981. 42. Karčić, Fikret, 2006, What is “Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks”?, Preporod, December 7. 43. Karčić, Fikret, 2008, Islam u sekularnoj drzavi: primjer Bosne i Hercegovine in Zbornik Radova naucnog skupa “Islamska tradicija Bosnjaka: izvori, razvoj i institucije, perspektive, Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini: Sarajevo, pp.423-436. 44. Karčić, Fikret, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity: Late Ottoman and Hapsburg Times, ElKalem: Sarajevo, 1999. 45. Lee, Jenny L., 2002, “Religion and college attendance: Change among students”, The Review of Higher Education, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp.369-384. 46. Leslie, Francis J., 1997, The Psychology of Gender Differences in Religion: A Review of Empirical Research, Religion, Vol.27, No.1, pp.81-96. 47. Little, William, 2012, Introduction to Sociology – 1st Canadian Edition. BC Open textbooks. Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -60-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

Openstax. 48. Loizides, Neophytos G., 2000, “Religion and Nationalism in the Balkans (Transnational Religious Solidarity and Conceptions of Nationhood in Turkey)”, Department of Political Science (Comparative Politics) & Ethnic and Pluralism Studies, Harvard University, 19p. 49. Lough, Joseph W. H, 2014, “A Model for Economic Growth in B&H and Herzegovina”, Economic Review: Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 12, No.1, pp.15-30. http://www.ef.untz.ba/images/maj2014/Paper2.pdf 50. Malka, Ariel, Yphtach Lelkes, Sanjay Srivastava, Adam B. Cohen and Dale T. Miller, 2012,” The Association of Religiosity and Political Conservatism: The Role of Political Engagement”, Political Psychology, Vol. 33, No. 2. 51. Margolis, Michele F., 2015, Rethinking the Relationship between Religion and Politics: A Test of the Life Cycle Theory, pp.1-55 p.3, http://caps.gov.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic451464.files/Margolis_LifeCycle.pdf 52. Miller, S. Alan and Stark Rodney, 2002, Gender and Religiousness: Can Socialization Explanations be Saved? American Journal of Sociology, Vol.107, No.6, pp.1399-1423. 53. Mulaosmanović, Admir, 2009, Nacionalni Identitet u Kontekstu Izrazenog Regionalnog Identiteta i Politickih Potresa u Bihackoj Krajini [National Identity in the Context of Accentuated Regional Identity and Political Instability in Bihac Region], in Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka [Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks], Institut za Istoriju: Sarajevo, pp.137-152. 54. Noland, Marcus, 2003, “Culture, and Economic Performance”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, East-West Center, September, Working Paper No. 03-8. 55. North, Douglass C., 1996, “Economic Performance through Time: The Limits to Knowledge”, EconWPA, Washington University, St. Louis, 23p. http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpeh/9612004.html, (Accessed: December 1, 2010). 56. Pauker, Guy J., Frank H. Golay and Cynthia H. Enloe, 1977, Diversity and development in Southeast Asia: The Coming Decade, McGraw-Hill (New York). 57. Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2012, The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, August 9, pp.27-42. 58. Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2013, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, April 30, pp.42-43, http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslimsreligion-politics-society-interfaith-relations/, [Accessed: 21.12.2015]. 59. Pollock, Neal, Bradley and Rosanna Guadagano, 2011, Gender Differences in Religiosity as a Means of Self Enhancement: The Impact of Perceived Audience Size and Identifiability. https://campuspress.yale.edu/yrurp/files/2015/11/2011_Pollock-Okdie-Guadagno-2011-25qdb9n.pdf [Accessed: December 20, 2015]. 60. Pool, Jonathan, 1972, “ National Development and Language Diversity”, http://utilika.org/pubs/etc/ndld-asl.pdf, (Accessed: November 5, 2011). 61. Ramet, Sabrina P., 2008, "Nationalism and the 'Idiocy' of the Countryside: The Case of Serbia". Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia at Peace and at War: Selected Writings, 1983–2007. LIT Verlag Münster. ISBN 303735-912-9; 62. Riedlmayer, András J., 2002, Destruction Of Cultural Heritage In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-1996: A Post-war Survey of Selected Municipalities, Cambridge, Massachusetts USA, http://archnet.org/system/publications/contents/3481/original/DPC1420.pdf?1384775281, [Accessed: 20.11.2015]. 63. Roth, L. Marie and Kroll C. Jeffrey, 2007, “Risky Business: Assessing Risk Preference Explanations for Gender Differences in Personality”, American Sociological Review, Vol.72, No.2, pp.205-220. 64. Sancaktar, Caner, Historical Construction and Development of Bosniak Nation, 2012, Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring, pp.1-17. 65. Sarac, Dzenita, 2009, Neuspjeh Sekularizacije i Jacanje Religijskog Identiteta Pocetkom 1980-ih Godina u Bosnni i Hercegovini [Failure of Secularization and Strengthening of Religious Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Beginning of 1980s] in Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -61-

Values, Trends and Expectations of the Islamic Society In Bosnia & Herzegovina

[Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks], Institut za Istoriju: Sarajevo, pp. 153-184. 66. Schwadel, Philip, 2014, “Birth Cohort Changes in the Association between College Education and Religious Non-Affiliation”, Social Forces, 93 (2): 719-746. 67. Sensenig Victor, 2013, “The Rise of “Nones”: Does Education Explain the Decline in Religious Affiliations?”, American Journal of Education, Vol.113, No.3, pp.335-340. 68. Shoup, Brian, 2008, Conflict and Cooperation in Multi-Ethnic States: Institutional Incentives, Myths and Counter-Balancing, Asian Security Studies, Routledge. 69. Sikimic, Biljana and Petko Hristov, 2007, Kurban in the Balkan Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. 70. Skoko, Bozo, 2011, What Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs Think of Each Other and What Do They Think about B&H and Herzegovina, Amosgraf: Sarajevo. 71. Stark, Rodney and Roger Finke, 2000, Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion, Berkeley: University of California Press. 72. Stark, Rodney, 1999, “Secularization R.I.P.”, Sociology of Religion, Vol.60, No. 3, pp. 249-273. 73. Sullins, D. Paul, 2006, “Gender and Religion: Deconstructing Universality, Constructing Complexity”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.112, No. 3, pp. 838-880. 74. Tamney, Joseph B., 1979, “Established Religiosity in Modern Society: Islam in Indonesia”, Sociological Analysis, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp.130-132. 75. Tamney, Joseph B., 1980, “Fasting and Modernization”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol.19, No.2, pp.129-137. 76. Theodorou, Angelina E., “How Bosnian Muslims view Christians 20 years after Srebrenica massacre”, Pew Research Center, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/10/how-bosnian-muslimsview-christians-20-years-after-srebrenica-massacre-2/, July 10, [Accessed: 21.12.2015]; 77. Toprak, Metin, 2012, “Economic Performance of the Balkans In the Light of Diversity”, in, Turkish – Albanian - Macedonian Relations: Past, Present and Future, Eds.M.Bulut & Mesut Idriz, Adam publishing, Ankara, 229-258. 78. Valenta, Marko and Zan Strabac, 2012, “Religion and Support for Democracy in B&H-Herzegovina”, Politics and Religion, Vol.5, No.3, pp.609-633. 79. Velikonja, Mitja, 2003, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Texas A&M University Press. 80. Vertovec, Steven, 2007, “Super-diversity and its implications”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.30, No.6, November, pp.1024-1054; 81. Walasek, Helen, 2015, Bosnia and the Destruction of Cultural Heritage, Ashgate, Henry Ling Ltd, UK, April. 82. Waters, Malcolm, 1989, Sociology One, Longman Cheshire, Australia. 83. Ziga, Jusuf, Lejla Turcilo, Amer Osmic, Sanela Basic, Nedzma Dzananovic-Mirascija, Damir Kapidzic and Jelena Brkic-Smigoc, 2015, Studija o Mladima u Bosni i Hercegovini, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Sarajevo. 84. Zovko, Ljubomir, 2007, Studije iz pravne povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine: 1878. – 1941, (in Croatian), University of Mostar.

Komšija: Udruženje balkanskih intelektualaca, Sarajevo – Bosna i Hercegovina -62-