US Taiwan Strait Policy : The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity [1 ed.] 9781935049845, 9781935049449

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US TAIWAN STRAIT POLICY

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US TAIWAN STRAIT POLICY The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity Dean P. Chen

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Published in the United States of America in 2012 by FirstForumPress A division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.firstforumpress.com and in the United Kingdom by FirstForumPress A division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2012 by FirstForumPress. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: 978-1-935049-44-9 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. This book was produced from digital files prepared by the author using the FirstForumComposer. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

To my parents and to the memory of my grandparents

Contents

Preface

ix

1

U.S. Interests in Taiwan

1

2

U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations from Nixon to Obama

35

3

Wilson’s Vision for an Open China

77

4

Freeing Taiwan from Communist Domination

141

5

The Inception of Strategic Ambiguity

185

6

The Future of U.S. Policy in the Taiwan Strait

243

Bibliography Index About the Book

265 279 298

vii

Preface

Though a by-product of Cold War confrontations, the Taiwan Strait conflict remains a flashpoint that could jeopardize Sino-American relations and disrupt peace and stability across East Asia. I believe, therefore, that it is extremely important to analyze and explain the logic and rationale behind U.S. Taiwan Strait policy, known as strategic ambiguity. Contrary to the prevailing view that strategic ambiguity began in the Nixon and Carter administrations, I posit in this study that the policy actually originated during the Truman presidency. Why did the Truman administration reject a pragmatic approach to the Taiwan Strait conflict— recognizing Beijing and severing ties with Taipei—and instead choose the path of strategic ambiguity? Addressing this question, I explore the thoughts and deliberations of President Truman and his top advisers, among them Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Livingston Merchant, and Dean Rusk. My findings suggest that strategic ambiguity, more than simply a means to maintain security and balance in cross-strait relations, was chosen and implemented in 1949–1950 because of the decisionmakers’ normative commitments to the Wilsonian vision of an Open China. Across more than 60 years, this idea has continued to shape Washington’s Taiwan Strait policy, which ultimately rests on the two very unambiguous, and continuing, liberal aims of safeguarding Taiwan’s freedom, autonomy, and democracy and of promoting greater economic and political liberalization in the People’s Republic of China. The inception and completion of this project is a result of the help, guidance, and support of many people. The great faculties, staffs, and colleagues at UC Santa Barbara’s Political Science Department have made my study a pleasurable one. I am extremely grateful to Aaron Belkin, Pei-te Lien, Alan P. L. Liu, and John T. Woolley, who supported me throughout the writing and research process. Aaron encouraged me to “get my hands dirty” in the archives in order to let the data “speak” for themselves in the case studies presented in the book. He also inspired me to examine foreign policy decision-making from an ideational and cultural standpoint. Alan broadened my understanding of China’s strategic culture, politics, institutions, and foreign policy. His resourceful knowledge guided me to examine more closely China’s position toward the United States during the Cold War and the post–Cold War periods. ix

x

Preface

John provided me with useful insights that allowed me to think more deeply about the connection between the U.S. executive branch and foreign affairs. Pei-te introduced me to various Taiwanese sources and books that enriched my understanding and perspective on Taiwan’s politics and democratization. The research for the project could not have happened without generous funding from a Harry S. Truman Presidential Library Fellowship in 2009–2010. The book relies extensively on the archival and primary sources at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri; the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland; and the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University. I thank them wholeheartedly for the full assistance of their staffs, particularly David Clark, Erica Flanagan, Tammy Kelly, Randy Sowell, and Lisa Sullivan at the Truman Library; Elizabeth Gray at the National Archives; and Amanda K. Hawk and Daniel Linke at the Mudd Library. My sincere gratitude also goes to Benjamin J. Cohen, Warren I. Cohen, M. Kent Jennings, Scott L. Kastner, Rose McDermott, Robert G. Sutter, and Yuan-kang Wang, who read partial or entire drafts of my manuscript. They were unsparing in their comments and critiques, which helped raise further questions to improve my analyses. In addition, my thoughts about U.S.-China-Taiwan relations benefited enormously from conversations with Haruhiro Fukui, Dennis V. Hickey, Scott L. Kastner, Daniel Lynch, Shelley Rigger, and Shen Zihua. The publication of this book would have been impossible without the confidence of Lynne Rienner Publishers. I am truly grateful to Lynne Rienner and Jessica Gribble. Jessica did a terrific and careful job, arranging external reviews of my manuscript and also doing some editing herself. She found many mistakes that saved me from further embarrassment. Of course, all responsibility for errors is mine alone. Finally, Dad, Mom, Uncle, Auntie, Annie, Hyunsook, James, Alex, Jean, Pavel, Yuchun, Kevin, Ming, and Ben—thank you so much for your support and encouragement.

1 U.S. Interests in Taiwan

The Taiwan Strait is probably one of the most dangerous flashpoints in world politics today because the Taiwan issue could realistically trigger an all-out war between two nuclear-armed great powers, the United States and People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Since 1949, cross-strait tensions, rooted in the Chinese civil war between Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party (KMT) and Mao Zedong’s Communist Party (CCP), have been contentious and, at times, highly militarized. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the Taiwan Strait crises in 1954, 1958, 1995-96, and 2003-06 brought the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States closely to the brink of war. In each of these episodes, however, rational restraint prevailed due to America’s superior power influence to prevent both sides from upsetting the tenuous cross-strait status quo. Indeed, having an abiding interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait conflict, Washington has always assumed a pivotal role in deterring both Taipei and Beijing from aggressions and reckless behaviors. U.S. leaders seek to do this through the maintenance of a delicate balance: acknowledging the one-China principle, preserving the necessary ties to defend Taiwan’s freedom and security while insisting that all resolutions must be peaceful and consensual. The Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan administrations formalized these commitments in the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, and the Six Assurances of 1982.2 In February 2000, President Bill Clinton, referring to Taiwan’s democracy, insisted that cross-strait differences must also be resolved with the assent of the Taiwanese people.3 Yet, Beijing and Taipei each perceives Washington’s ambivalent stance as opportunistic and calculating. While China sees America as implicitly encouraging Taiwanese independence to keep China divided and weak,4 Taiwan feels insecure that the United States will sacrifice the island’s democratic and political interests to appease China.5 After all, Taipei remembers vividly

1

2

U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy

how America severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979 in order to reconcile with Beijing to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, following his inauguration as Taiwan’s new president in May 2008, Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT has pledged to reverse his predecessors’ hardline mainland policy and to reengage Beijing under the rubric of the 1992 consensus.6 The PRC president Hu Jintao responded favorably to Ma’s overture. As a result, cross-strait confrontations have greatly subsided, and the two sides reached various economic and technological accords. In June 2010, Taipei and Beijing signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to deepen bilateral economic integration and cultural exchanges.7 Welcoming these peaceful developments, President Barack Obama, in a joint statement with Hu Jintao, remarked: We also applauded the steps that the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan have already taken to relax tensions and build ties across the Taiwan Strait. Our own policy, based on the three U.S.-China Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, supports the further development of these ties—ties that are in the interest of both sides, as well as the broader region and the United States.8

Notwithstanding these positive attitudes, the current peaceful trends do not eliminate the deep-seated antagonism between China and Taiwan and their mutual lack of trust toward the United States. China has never renounced the use of force to reunify with Taiwan; in fact, Beijing’s military preparations and missile deployments targeting at Taiwan have continued unabated.9 In addition to satisfying nationalistic interest, the PRC also has a strong geostrategic rationale in recovering Taiwan. As a “gateway to the Pacific,” Taiwan, if under Chinese possession, would enhance Beijing’s control over surrounding coastal waters such as the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea and strengthen her maritime and naval-force projection capabilities to diminish American (and Japanese) influence in East Asia.10 On the other hand, Taiwan, a vibrant democracy, has increasingly emphasized its separate political identity from mainland China, expressing a strong desire for greater political autonomy and international space.11 Public opinion polls in Taiwan consistently show that an overwhelming majority of the Taiwanese people, roughly 80 percent, is in favor of maintaining the status-quo, that is, neither reunification nor independence. But, 14 percent supports independence while only less than 6 percent of Taiwanese backs reunification with China.12 It is important to note that the proportion of those supporting

U.S. Interests in Taiwan

3

independence has grown tremendously over the last 10 years.13 Even President Ma eschews the possibility of near-term political reunification, putting it off to an indefinite future and under the stringent conditions that include “both a democratic China and democratic approval from the people of Taiwan.”14 More importantly, Taiwan’s and China’s lack of confidence toward the United States could lead either actor to misinterpret Washington as siding with its opponent. In September 2011, Beijing, always annoyed by America’s arms sales to Taiwan, protested against the Obama administration’s pending decision to either upgrade Taiwan’s existing F16 A/B aircrafts or to sell 66 more advanced F-16 C/D fighter jets to the island. At the same time, Taipei charged that Washington has been intentionally delaying the sales of F-16 C/D jets to avoid alienating China and complicating other U.S. priorities requiring Beijing’s cooperation.15 Mistrust could fuel suspicion, misperception, and misjudgment, and these could “at any moment plunge Taiwan, China, and the United States into a conflict all want to avoid.”16 The presumption that Washington would eventually abandon Taiwan could compel Taipei to take policy actions that are detrimental to regional stability and U.S. interests, such as a declaration of independence or simply succumbing to Beijing. Similarly, since the CCP leadership views Washington as the primary impediment to its reunification with Taiwan, Beijing may initiate military preemption to take over Taiwan and to deter and delay any American interventions in the region.17 The Main Argument

This book, therefore, purports to explain the origins of the United States’ Taiwan Strait policy, known as strategic ambiguity. This policy rests on the notion that Washington aims to deter Beijing from militarily coercing reunification with Taiwan by suggesting it might intervene while preventing Taipei from unilaterally declaring independence by revealing it might not support such a move. Because cross-strait war may result out of China’s and Taiwan’s misinterpretations of the United States’ intention, it is necessary to examine the origins of strategic ambiguity policy to understand the ideas and interests behind its inception. I wish to raise two objections to the prevailing arguments on the subject. First, in contrast to the mainstream position that strategic ambiguity started with the Nixon and Carter administrations in the 1970s,18 I posit that policy actually began with the Truman administration at the height of China’s civil war in late 1949 and early

4

U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy

1950.19 Second, while power politics and the logic of deterrence form a strong basis behind strategic ambiguity, one must not dismiss the liberal normative commitment—the Wilsonian Open Door internationalism— underpinning the inception of that policy. To ignore it would risk attributing America’s motivation to mere materialistic consideration, which would be a gross misrepresentation of Washington’s interest toward China and Taiwan. Hence, the central question here is: why did President Harry S. Truman and his advisers (Dean Acheson, Livingston Merchant, John Foster Dulles, and Dean Rusk) reject the option, in 1949-50, of recognizing the People's Republic of China and abandoning Taiwan, and, instead, choose to maintain an ambiguous stance between Beijing and Taipei? On October 3, 1949, two days after Mao Zedong’s founding of New China, President Truman remarked that “we should be in no hurry whatever to recognize this regime.”20 According to David McLean, the United States followed a course of policy “clearly at odds with the preferred policies of most other Western and Asian states.”21 In fact, between December 1949 and January 1950, Beijing received diplomatic recognition from the following nations: Britain, Soviet Union, India, Burma, Norway, Israel, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Afghanistan. France, Italy, Australia, Canada, and Japan expressed high desire to follow suit but chose to postpone their decisions pending on Washington’s actions.22 Nevertheless, the Truman administration had, by early 1950, opted for a strategic ambiguity framework predicated on a series of inconsistent formulas: (1) promoting a PRC-Soviet split; (2) denying Taiwan to Communist control; (3) acknowledging Taiwan as part of Nationalist China without foreclosing the idea that the island’s international status remained undetermined; and (4) recognizing the Nationalist regime as the legitimate Chinese government while opposing Chiang Kai-shek’s initiative to retake the mainland. Thus, in contrast to the view that the United States had abandoned Taiwan in January 1950 and reversed its course only after the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950,23 this study agrees with the earlier findings of John Lewis Gaddis, June Grasso, David Finkelstein, and Robert Accinelli that the Truman administration never gave up on saving the island from a Communist takeover, although the means to that end must be unobtrusive to avoid compromising Washington’s overarching China policy.24 Gaddis wrote, “[At] no point during 1949 and 1950 was Washington prepared to acquiesce in control of the island by forces hostile to the United States.… The problem was to achieve this objective without getting further involved in the Chinese civil war.”25 Though

U.S. Interests in Taiwan

5

President Truman and Secretary Acheson were more inclined to defend Taiwan through nonmilitary options, evidence presented in Chapter 5 suggests that they were seriously considering the more proactive interventionist proposals put forward by Rusk and Dulles in early June 1950. The White House’s lack of an affirmative decision on the eve of the Korean War should not be construed as “writing off” Taiwan. Why Strategic Ambiguity?

From a realist state-centric perspective,26 however, recognizing Beijing and severing ties with Taipei would also have, or perhaps better, served Washington's long-term strategic interests. Nancy B. Tucker stressed that an early accommodation or recognition of the People’s Republic of China would bring America strategic gains and benefits, including expediting the Sino-Soviet split, forging a united front with Great Britain, speeding Japan’s economic recovery, and ameliorating the fervor of Asian nationalism that Moscow was so eager to exploit against the Western powers.27 Although American recognition of the People’s Republic and cutting off relations with Chiang Kai-shek would not drastically modify Mao’s radical worldview and inherent mistrust of the U.S., it would, according to Thomas Christensen, “have prevented the escalation of the Korean War in fall 1950.”28 Despite its antagonistic feeling toward the Nationalists on Taiwan, Washington remained faithful to the regime until 1979. And, even after recognizing the PRC, the United States has kept unofficial relations with the island, remained committed to its defense, and supported its economic liberalization and political democratization.29 This trend prevails in today’s U.S.-China-Taiwan relations as well. In the post-Cold War era, China’s rising stature as an international military and economic heavyweight led Robert Zoellick, the deputy secretary of state under the George W. Bush administration, to urge Beijing to assume the role of a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system.30 Despite differences with China over its human rights repression, authoritarian governance, military buildups, underdevalued currency, and trade imbalances, Washington needs the PRC’s assistance in curtailing North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, controlling global warming, fighting the war on terrorism, and restoring international economic stability following the 2008 global financial crisis. Since January 2009, the Obama administration also gives high priority to the deepening of bilateral dialogues and cultivation of “positive and constructive” relations with China.31

6

U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy

Nonetheless, Taiwan has always been a major obstacle to a smoother Sino-American relationship.32 Besides strategic ambiguity, the United States has other policy choices to deal with the Taiwan Strait conflict, including staying out, pressing Taiwan to come to terms with Beijing, and supporting Taiwan’s independence.33 Supporting reunification would be a viable option for Washington to consolidate its relations with Beijing. Certainly, giving up on Taiwan may erode America’s security commitments in East Asia and may also appear appeasing to an authoritarian power. But, if international politics, according to Kenneth Waltz, is about interactions of the great power states, then the costs of sacrificing a smaller state may be less than the benefits of maintaining stable relations between the major powers.34 “The eradication of this flashpoint [Taiwan],” said Tucker “would instantly and overwhelmingly reduce friction and the risk of accidental clashes between Washington and Beijing. Unification would unquestionably affect some U.S. interests adversely, but not nearly as much as would war between China and the United States.”35 Consequently, in both the 1949-50 and contemporary eras, national security interests as conceived by realists cannot adequately account for Washington’s strategic ambiguity policy. Domestic congressional pressure and interest group politics do play important roles. But, as will be demonstrated in my case studies in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, they are only secondary. Foreign policymaking, especially in the realm of security affairs, remains the prerogative of the president and his top executive branch officials.36 Specifically, America’s liberal ideas assume the important role in shaping the Truman administration’s decision-making toward the Taiwan Strait In essence, I argue that strategic ambiguity was chosen and implemented not simply because it helped to deter Taiwan and China from war but also because it resonated with the ideas and norms of Wilsonian Open Door internationalism.37 This Wilsonian view envisions a united, liberal, and democratic China cooperating with the United States and other allies in maintaining a free liberal international order. Strategic ambiguity, on the one hand, allows Washington to safeguard Taiwan’s freedom and political autonomy from Communist authoritarian control. An autonomous, though not de-jure independent, Taiwan, free from Chinese Communist control, where Taiwanese selfdetermination and liberal democracy could eventually take roots could act as the “beacon of hope” for China’s democratization.38 Bruce Gilley noted, “The revival of KMT electoral fortunes in Taiwan after the second presidential term of DPP president Chen Shui-bian [in 2008] could further emphasize the attractions of the Taiwan [democratic]

U.S. Interests in Taiwan

7

transition for actors in China.”39 The lessons for Beijing would be that the Communist Party, like its Kuomintang counterpart, could one day rule again through constitutional electoral processes.40 Moreover, Taiwan’s dynamic and pluralistic civil society could also be a useful template for China to contemplate as it becomes more integrated into the international liberal economic order. On the other hand, strategic ambiguity deters Taiwan from challenging China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Table 1.1 illustrates that America’s Open Door objectives cannot be attained by either permitting the PRC’s forceful reunification with Taiwan, or supporting Taiwan’s counteroffensive against the mainland (as in the era of Chiang Kai-shek) or an unilateral declaration of independence (as in the era of the late 1990s-2000s) that could rally Chinese nationalist sentiment and strengthen the legitimacy of the Communist regime. Table 1.1

U.S. Liberal Objectives in the Taiwan Strait

U.S. Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait

Staying out

Taiwan’s Freedom and Autonomy

China’s Democratization

Pressing Reunification with the PRC

Supporting Taiwan

Strategic Ambiguity

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes/No

No

Yes/No

8

U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy

The logic goes as follows: should Beijing coerce Taipei into political union, then any signs of liberty and democracy would likely be extinguished on the island, hence strengthening the prestige and authoritarian dominance of the CCP and reducing the hope of democratizing China. Conversely, if Taipei seeks to attack China or unilaterally declares independence, Beijing would be compelled to tighten its political grip and rally domestic nationalist sentiments in order to keep China’s territorial integrity intact. “The United States,” Christensen contended, “has long-term security and moral interests in the political liberalization of the mainland and that Taiwan’s status as a Chinese democracy— holding out the prospect of unification with the mainland under the right set of conditions—can be a powerful force for liberalization on the mainland.”41 Yet, if Taiwan rushes into formal independence, it would “retard the hope for political reform on the mainland because democracy would be associated with the breakup of the nation, and political reforms would seem like dupes or even agents of the United States and the Taiwan traitors who declared independence.”42 Based on these premises, the United States must carefully walk a fine line. Washington cannot abandon or pressure Taiwan to succumb to the PRC’s reunification scheme; it supports neither Taiwan’s endeavors to re-conquer the mainland in the 1950s and 1960s nor its initiative to declare de-jure independence in the 1990s and 2000s. Strategic ambiguity is ambiguous in its means, not in its ends. The conditions and parameters of American involvement in a cross-strait crisis are necessarily uncertain.43 The United States could dispatch its troops to defend Taiwan, withdraw its support from the island, or simply sit out of the conflict and wait for the dust to settle. Under that policy, Washington, as the “pivot” in the triangular relations with Beijing and Taipei, engages in dual deterrence. This involves deterring the PRC from coercing reunification with Taiwan by raising the possibility that America will intervene while constraining Taipei from provoking Beijing44 by suggesting that Washington may forsake Taiwan. The assumption is that since both Taipei and Beijing rely on Washington’s blessing (or, at least, tacit support) for their actions, the ambiguity with respect to the United States’ response in a Taiwan Strait confrontation could complicate their calculations and forestall imprudent behaviors.45 However, America’s ultimate objective is clear—a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait conflict in the long and, perhaps, indefinite, future. Either reunification or independence is acceptable for Washington as long as it is derived from mutual, peaceful, and noncoercive process by both parties.46 If the PRC were to offer a unification

U.S. Interests in Taiwan

9

plan that would preserve the island’s autonomy and democratic system and that Taiwan, through its democratic process, accepts it, the United States would find this arrangement favorable to its interest.47 Strategic ambiguity is, in short, not just a deterrence strategy providing security and stability. It seeks also to realize the Wilsonian Open Door vision of transforming China into a liberal democratic state. Signaling American Interests to Both China and Taiwan

Exploring the origins of and rationale of strategic ambiguity from the Wilsonian liberal traditions is significant because, as mentioned earlier, war between Taiwan and China could still erupt out of either side’s misperception of Washington’s intentions. Yet, reflecting America’s fundamental liberal values, Wilsonian Open Door internationalism would assume an important “signaling function” to both China and Taiwan. James Fearon noted that while wars are costly and risky, they occur because states tend to misrepresent their genuine resolve to gain a better deal from their opponents. So, in the absence of clear signaling, states, ever uncertain of each others’ true intentions, can go to war inadvertently.48 He also argued that states with strong domestic audiences, such as democracies, which may penalize leaders electorally for bluffing and mishandling foreign policies, would allow them to express their underlying resolve more credibly.49 Thus, Fearon concluded that a democracy’s stronger domestic signal helps to deter other states during crises and to ameliorate tensions short of war. In a similar vein, Wilsonianism should signal clearly to both Beijing and Taipei that Washington strives for a peaceful resolution of the crossStrait conflict, and that neither forceful reunification nor unilateral independence corresponds to its Open Door principles. Therefore, if it is in America’s genuine interest to maintain the status quo until both sides can reach a peaceful and mutually acceptable final solution then neither Beijing nor Taipei should behave belligerently toward each other or second guess United States’ motivation. The next section will discuss the recognition controversy over the PRC regime in the Truman administration, followed by an examination of the connection between ideas, strategic culture, and foreign policymaking. This chapter concludes by going over briefly the methodological approach used in the case studies and summarizing the main points of each of the subsequent chapters.

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U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy

The Truman Administration and the Recognition Debate of 1949-50

The U.S. objective with respect to Communist China, as postulated in NSC-34 series and NSC-41, was to promote Chinese Titoism by severing ties between Mao’s CCP and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in light of the fact that the Communist Party had, in fall 1949, captured the mainland and become China’s official central government, wouldn’t America’s policy of generating a Sino-Soviet wedge be better served by according formal recognition to Beijing? After all, as Livingston T. Merchant, the deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs from 1949-51, said, “By standard international practice, recognition does not imply approval. Recognition is merely the establishment of formal and traditional channels of communication.”50 In establishing a “basis for official communication and thereby enabling presence of our official representatives,” Merchant believed, Communist China and the United States could more easily square their differences.51 Formal diplomatic relations between America and the PRC, however, was only established thirty years later, on January 1, 1979. So, what happened in 1949-50? The China Lobby

Starting in the 1970s, based on the recently declassified materials from the Truman administration, scholars of Sino-American relations began to assert that Washington had missed a “golden opportunity” to reconcile with the Chinese Communists and normalize relations in the period of 1949-50. One of the explanations for this missed opportunity of rapprochement between the U.S. and PRC is domestic politics, that is, the fierce opposition waged from the China Lobby, or “friends of Chiang Kai-shek.” According to Ross Koen, the China Lobby, dating from the beginning of the Second World War, “ranged from missionaries expelled from China by the Communists, to businessmen who had large financial stakes in China’s future, military leaders disappointed by the inability of the United States to control events in China after WWII, and members of Congress who found in the China problem a lucrative source of ‘issues’ with which to challenge the [Truman] administration.”52 These affiliates tended to be politically conservative, fervently anti-Communist, and highly supportive of Chiang Kai-shek and his “mission” of mainland recovery.

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Notable individuals in the lobby included publisher Henry Luce, businessmen Alfred Kohlberg and Frederick McKee, Congressman Walter Judd (R-Minnesota), and Senators Robert Taft (R-Ohio), Styles Bridges (R-New Hampshire), Kenneth Wherry (R-Nebraska), Pat McCarran (D-Nevada), William Knowland (R-California),53 Alexander Smith (R-New Jersey), and Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisconsin). During the 1940s and 1950s, they initiated a series of malicious accusations against academic scholars like Owen Lattimore, and high ranking officials within the State Department, including Foreign Service officers John P. Davies and John S. Service and even Secretaries George Marshall and Dean Acheson, charging them as Communist conspirators for losing China to the CCP.54 Despite the earnest desire of President Truman, Secretary Acheson, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-Michigan) to forge a bipartisan foreign policy, these conservative elites and congressional members, motivated partly by politics and partly by anti-Communist and proKuomintang sentiments, threatened to upset the administration’s European Recovery Policy, or the Marshall Plan, arguing that “if Europe, why not China?”55 Thus, to mobilize domestic support for its containment policy in Europe, the Truman administration ultimately stepped up American assistance to the Nationalists and rejected any working relationships with Beijing. The Communist China, in other words, was a “useful adversary” for Truman to quell domestic oppositions to his foreign policy program.56 The China Lobby, in sum, was “credited with forcing a reluctant Truman administration to continue aid to Chiang during the Chinese civil war, preventing recognition of the People’s Republic of China and barring it from the United Nations.”57 The influence of the China Lobby on the Truman administration, however, has been overrated. To be sure, domestic politics matters, but not to the extent that national security interests will be sacrificed at the expense of placating domestic critics. Even though America has a “strong society and a weak state,” Stephen Krasner contended, foreign security policymaking is usually adopted and implemented by the executive branch, which is relatively insulated from external societal pressures.58 Indeed, Robert Sutter noted that given the Cold War security structure, China-Taiwan policymaking was largely confined within the executive branch, and it wasn’t until the post-Cold War era that we started to witness a “shift away from the elitism of the past and toward much greater pluralism.”59 President Truman, in fact, was a staunch believer in a strong executive on foreign affairs. “I never allowed myself to forget that the

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U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy

final responsibility [of foreign policymaking] was mine,” he wrote in his memoir. Furthermore, the president emphasized that “under the [U.S.] Constitution, the president is required to assume all responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. The president cannot abdicate that responsibility and he cannot turn it over to anyone else.”60 Rebutting the Republicans’ allegation that Acheson was a Communist sympathizer and their demand for his resignation, Truman put up a strong defense: “If Communism were to prevail in the world today, as it shall not prevail, Dean Acheson would be one of the first to be shot by the enemies of liberty and Christianity.”61 Most importantly, despite the “Red Scare” witch hunt of McCarthyism, the Truman White House remained steadfast in its opposition to Chiang Kai-shek’s counteroffensive campaign and in its willingness to deal with the PRC on a de-facto basis. In addition, the Truman administration never abandoned the Nationalist regime. Its decision to continue aiding Chiang, through the China Aid Act (1948), resulted neither from the domestic political pressure nor any emotional attachment to the Nationalists. Rather, it was based on the farsighted assessment that the KMT’s survival was the only viable remedy to safeguard Taiwan’s freedom and autonomy from the Communists. Similarly, whether Washington would extend diplomatic recognition to Beijing ultimately depended on the president and his top officials within the State Department, Defense Department, and the National Security Council (NSC). Twentieth century presidents, especially in the period of “post-WWII consensus,” are very skillful and charismatic in shaping public opinion to their advantage.62 The chief executive’s power and influence over the public and Congress on the China issue is vividly portrayed by Nancy Tucker: The [Truman] administration retained considerable flexibility in formulating and securing approval for its China policy. Should it decide to remain allied to Chiang Kai-shek and abandon effort to reach an accommodation with the mainland regime, emphasizing the fearsome Communist nature of the Chinese government could heighten popular anxiety to the point that Americans would welcome isolation from China. But, if Washington chose to recognize the Chinese Communists, it could capitalize on a widespread willingness to accept relations with the CCP, [utilizing] the academic, business, religious, and journalistic communities to explain to a confused and generally indifferent citizenry and Congress why dealing with the Communist Chinese would serve America’s best interests.63

U.S. Interests in Taiwan

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As a result, I contend that in defining the Taiwan Strait policy, the China Lobby’s role was epiphenomenal. The source of the policy of strategic ambiguity must be traced to the executive branch, namely the decision-making process of the president and his top advisers. The Truman Administration’s Anti-Communist Stance

Another perspective contends that it was the Truman administration’s inherent anti-CCP and pro-KMT position that alienated Mao’s new regime, forcing the latter to treat America as an adversary and foreclose all opportunities for a rapprochement.64 This version of the “lost chance” argument increasingly gained salience in the 1980s, as its proponents lamented that had diplomatic relations been established in 1949-50, hostility and confrontation between Beijing and Washington for the next 30 years could be avoided. Michael Hunt posited that Mao, recognizing Stalin’s ambitions in China, was never wholeheartedly committed to Moscow. Rather, the chairman “moved relatively slowly and half-heartedly toward meeting Soviet desires.” Moderates within the CCP “recognized the likely limits of Soviet aid, the attractive possibility of American credits, and the importance of unimpeded trade with Japan and the United States.”65 Moreover, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai even approached American officials in May 1949 to tinker with the idea of recognition, but to no avail. The Truman administration’s “cold shoulder” aggravated Mao, who then decided to “lean” to the Soviet side. A more specific explanation, described by Robert McMahon as the “Cohen-Tucker thesis,”66 attributed the loss of opportunity to the sudden eruption of the Korean War in June 1950 which rendered Acheson’s plan of accommodation impossible. Warren Cohen discussed how the secretary of state, despite opposition from the congressional China bloc and even his subordinates in the State Department, was determined to improve relations between China and the United States. He argued that Acheson’s goal “was to reach an accommodation with the People’s Republic.… [And] he hoped to encourage the [Beijing] regime to distance itself from the Soviet Union and to recognize the importance of its historic ties to the West.”67 Throughout 1949 and the first half of 1950, the secretary tried assiduously to restrain the president and his colleagues from taking more belligerent actions toward the CCP. Yet, Acheson’s efforts eventually foundered with North Korea’s invasion of the South on June 25, 1950. Nonetheless, Cohen noted that in spite of the Korean conflict, President Truman’s distaste for the Chinese Communists also played an

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important role in undermining Acheson’s plan. “Truman,” he wrote, “delayed the termination of aid to the Kuomintang and prevented steps that might have led to an early normalization of relations with the Communists.”68 Hence, if Truman had been more supportive, normalization might have occurred well before June 1950. By the same token, Tucker, in Pattern in the Dust, praised Acheson for his perspicacious and pragmatic view about America’s China policy. She wrote, “Acheson believed that America’s responsibility no longer rested in supporting a discredited [Nationalists] regime, but rather in finding ways to reconcile United States interests with those of the incoming government of China.”69 According to the secretary, the United States would “increasingly appear obstinate in refusing to adopt a policy [of normalization] which its allies favored.” Moreover, U.S. efforts to oppose the CCP would risk isolating itself from other Asian countries which, in an era of anti-colonial struggles, felt pride in the success of a resurgent China standing up against foreign powers.70 Though acknowledging that Truman was not entirely repugnant to the idea of recognition, Tucker shared Cohen’s observation that Truman’s “hesitancy” prompted Acheson to slow down and “delay substantive approaches to Beijing.”71 The president’s reluctance, in addition to the Korean War, obliterated the secretary’s hope for an early normalization. In contrast to this “America’s lost chance” view, a revisionist contention posits that given the deep-seated ideological animosity between the United States and Communist China, there never existed any golden opportunity for the CCP and the U.S. to reach an accommodation. Chen Jian, in fact, called the lost chance thesis merely a “myth.” Though there were disputes and disagreements between China and the Soviet Union, cooperation remained the dominant aspect of CCP-Soviet relations in 1949. “The CCP’s confrontation with the United States,” Chen suggested, “originated in the party’s need to enhance the inner dynamics of the Chinese revolution after its nationwide victory.”72 For Mao and his comrades, the ultimate goal of the Communist revolution was not just the total transformation of the old Chinese state and society but also to restore China’s central position and national power in the international community. Hence, Chen reasoned: Mao’s approach toward China’s external relations in general and his policy toward the United States in particular became heavily influenced by this primary concern. Throughout 1949-50, the Maoist discourse challenged the values and codes of behavior attached to

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“U.S. imperialism,” pointing out that they belonged to the “old world” that the CCP was determined to destroy. 73

Because the United States was politically and ideologically hostile to the CCP, Mao argued that improving relations with Washington would allow it to sabotage the Chinese revolution and their objective for national liberation.74 Michael Sheng’s research also attested to the fact that Mao’s antiAmerican policy resulted from “the fundamental incompatibility between the U.S. and the CCP in terms of both China’s polity and foreign relations.”75 Hence, he wrote, “there was no chance for the U.S. in either 1944-45 or 1948-49 to win over the CCP as a counterweight vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.”76 Likewise, Steven Goldstein said it is not fair to blame the “lost chance” on the United States alone. “The [Communist] Party,” he noted, “had certainly had its problems with Stalin and was not prepared to accept his directions uncritically. But, the central fact remained that in the Communist world there was a powerful tradition of support for the Soviet Union.”77 Like the United States, Beijing was also constrained in what it could do by the “weight of past policies and perceptions, and more immediately, the pressures of domestic public opinion and international commitments.”78 Consequently, even without America’s antipathy to the Chinese Communists, these authors believed that Mao would still reject diplomatic relations with Washington. Thomas Christensen offered a different argument. Agreeing with Chen, Sheng, and Goldstein, he saw conciliatory moves would not have “changed Mao’s beliefs about America’s opposition to his revolution” for, consistent with his ideology, Mao perceived the United States as the center of imperialism.79 As a result, there was no “lost chance” with respect to any genuine improvement of Sino-U.S. relations in the context of 1949-1950. However, he acknowledged that Mao’s hostility toward Washington still came from the latter’s continued political, economic, and military support of the Kuomintang. Shortly after seizing Nanjing, the capital city of Nationalist China, the CCP chairman stated, “We think that if the United States and Britain can cut off their relations with the KMT, we can consider the question of establishing diplomatic relations with them.”80 Thus, had the U.S. broken its relations with Taiwan, Mao “would have accepted recognition [from the United States], albeit with suspicion and on China’s terms.”81 Recognition would not foster immediate friendship and amity between the PRC and United States but it would, at least, help avoiding the “the disastrous escalation of the Korean War that

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occurred when China crossed the Yalu in the fall of 1950.”82 The failure of preventing that bloody encounter between the United States and Communist China is, for Christensen, the “real lost chance.” Liberal Ideas and U.S. Foreign Policymaking in the Taiwan Strait

The reality always lies somewhere in between. Neither the United States nor the Chinese Communists was entirely accountable for the failure to normalize relations in 1949-50. What Hunt, Chen, Sheng, Goldstein, Christensen, Cohen, and Tucker have failed to capture in their analyses was that there was the mutual, vicious cycle that began with the Truman administration’s inherent disdain for the Chinese Communists, which generated a hostile mentality in dealing with the CCP. The Chinese Communists, in turn, construed all American actions as nothing but willful and imperialistic, hence resorting to antagonistic actions interpreted by Washington as even more aggressive and loathsome. Essentially, the Truman administration’s unyielding attitude toward the CCP was more than just anti-Communism or a clash of material interests. Simei Qing argued that between 1945 and 1960 the origins of and evolution of U.S.-CCP antagonism was not the “direct result of two sides’ or even one side’s determination to engage in confrontation.”83 Instead, Sino-American conflicts in those years may be attributed to “fatal misjudgments of each other’s domestic conditions and foreign policy objectives.” She posited, “Cultural visions of modernity and identity in each nation played a critical role in evaluating the other’s intentions and in defining interests and principles in their interactions.”84 National interest, in other words, is seldom easily defined. Frequently, decision makers interpret and decide upon foreign policy and grand strategies through the prism of a state’s strategic culture, norms, and identity. This book, therefore, rests upon the position that Washington’s incompatible stance with Beijing stems from its liberal ideational and normative framework that guide foreign policymaking.85 David McLean correctly pointed out the importance of American ideology and deeply held “American myths” about China. The major tenet of the myths is embodied in the ideas of the Open Door policy, in which “Americans believed that they were destined to guide the Chinese toward liberal democracy and modernization and to protect them from the predatory ambitions of other powers.”86 Officials within the Truman administration, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson, believed in a monolithic world Communist menace, and that Mao’s Chinese Communists were “mere tools and clients of Moscow.”

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Truman and Acheson, as will be shown in Chapter 3, both held the view that the United States was China’s only and true friend, for it “has sought to preserve the integrity and independence of [that country], has opposed the seeking of special rights and privileges and has taken the lead in renouncing extraterritorial privilege.”87 Based on this Open Door conception, the Truman administration saw the “immense reservoir of friendly feeling all over China toward the U.S.”88 This China myth is reinforced in Acheson’s Letter of Transmittal in the China White Paper of August 1949,89 in which he stressed that the CCP would only be an aberration in China’s political development, born merely from the Chinese people’s antipathy toward the Nationalist regime. Communism is, in short, at odds with Chinese “democratic individualism,” and Mao’s government would soon be overthrown by the Chinese people. 90 Hence, in contrast to the Cohen-Tucker thesis, I would argue that Acheson was just as opposed to an early recognition of the PRC as Truman. The president’s aversion toward the CCP might have mattered little had Acheson been prepared to “pull the president in the direction of accommodation with Beijing,” yet the secretary’s support for recognition was halfhearted at best.91 My case studies illustrate that Acheson would propose recognition conditional on Beijing’s moderation of policy and its political zeal. A policy of hasty accommodation went against the China myths or the “American grain.” To preserve the goodwill of the Chinese people and avoid rallying nationalist support for the Chinese Communists and hatred against the United States, Acheson and Truman agreed that aiding and defending the Nationalists on Taiwan must be done cautiously and covertly. Taiwan’s freedom and autonomy should be safeguarded without directly impinging upon China’s sovereign claim over the island. The NSC-37 series, examined in Chapters 4 and 5, explicitly advocated denying Taiwan (Formosa) to the Chinese Communists through “diplomatic and economic means,” because “the employment of U.S. [military] forces on Formosa would enable the Chinese Communists to rally support to themselves as defenders of China’s territorial integrity and handicap [America’s] efforts to exploit Chinese irredentist sentiments with respect to Soviet actions in Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjiang.”92 The ambiguity, then, was necessary in order to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow and, hence, promoting the Open Door policy of making China free from the Soviet influence.

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President Woodrow Wilson and the Open Door Policy toward China

Chapter 3 focuses on Woodrow Wilson’s liberal thoughts, his conception of China’s Open Door, and how that impacted Truman’s Taiwan Strait policy. It is, nonetheless, important to provide here a background sketch of the Open Door policy, originally enunciated during the McKinley administration in 1899-1900. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China, under the reign of the declining and enervated Qing (Manchu) Dynasty, had suffered repeatedly from humiliating defeats in wars with the European powers and, most recently, with Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. The imperialist powers, including Japan, Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, Russia, Germany, and France, took advantage of China’s weakness by extracting from her unequal treaties demanding reparations, treaty ports, railroad concessions, territories, extraterritoriality, administrative rights, and investment privileges, essentially turning the Asian continent into “spheres of influence.”93 George Kennan recounted: At the end of 1897 and the beginning of 1898 there was a real and justifiable fear that China would be partitioned. It was in those months that the Russians made evident their determination to have a special position in Manchuria, including a naval base at Port Arthur and a commercial port at the present Dairen, both to be connected by railway with the new Trans-Siberian; that the Germans consolidated their control over the port of Jiaozhou and their influence in the Shandong peninsula; and that the French, coming up from the south, from the present Indochina, successfully negotiated with the Chinese government for the lease of a port, for railroad concessions, for the appointment of a French citizen as head of the Chinese postal services, and for other favors.94

Ironically, Great Britain, which saw the powers’ insatiable scrambling for spheres and economic concessions as detrimental to her commercial interests in China, approached Washington and tried to persuade the McKinley administration to dispatch the Open Door notes. Preoccupied by the war with Spain, President William McKinley was only lukewarm to the idea, but Secretary of State John Hay gave the proposition a much more serious thought. “[Hay] knew little if anything about China; he had never been there,” wrote Kennan, “But, he thought that we were unwise not to be sympathetic to the British in a situation where we might help them and perhaps thereby build up a sort of diplomatic credit on which we could draw later.”95 Furthermore, the missionaries, business community, and the diplomatic bureaucrats in the

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State Department also lobbied incessantly for America’s greater involvement in China, lest that Oriental state would be carved up entirely by the avaricious imperial powers.96 By the end of summer in 1899, the British Foreign Office was no longer interested in the Open Door policy, apparently as a result of gaining new railway concessions from the Chinese government. Nonetheless, Hay remained enthusiastic, and, with the help of W.W. Rockhill, a State Department expert on the Far East, and Alfred Hippisley, an Englishman working in China’s Maritime Customs Service, he sent out the first Open Door note on September 6, 1899, urging the great powers to respect “equal commercial opportunities” and nondiscrimination against trade of other countries within their spheres of influence.97 It is important to note that John Hay, in the first note, acquiesced to the spheres of influence policy pursued by the imperialists. “His objectives were limited,” argued Raymond Esthus, “for [the secretary] had no illusions about the inability of the United States to prevent the erection of spheres of influence.”98 Although the responses to the first note from the various governments were “tepid,” at best, Hay was pleased and quickly announced that he had received “satisfactory assurances from all the powers and that he regarded them as ‘final and definitive.’”99 China’s problem, however, was exacerbated in 1900, as the Boxer Rebellion, a violent and fanatical anti-foreigner movement inspired by the Qing government, led to much destruction of foreign properties and lives. The incident not only gave the great powers excuse to wage a joint military expedition against Beijing but also allowed them to demand further and harsher concessions and compensations for their loss. Seeing China in deep disarray and anarchy, its political independence in jeopardy, and territory on the edge of total dismemberment, Hay issued the second Open Door note on July 3, 1900, calling the powers for restraint and declaring that the policy of the United States is to “preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity.”100 In actuality, Kennan stressed, neither the Open Door notes of 1899 nor 1900 had much “practical effect” on the foreign governments. “There was little reason to expect that things would be otherwise,” he said.101 America’s international power at the turn of the twentieth century, while growing, was, still relatively weaker than Great Britain, and, at the very most, at parity with other emerging states such as Germany, Russia, and Japan. As a result, the Open Door policy lacked sufficient force of backing, although its “moral” underpinning could not be overtly rejected by any of the imperialist states. In addition, the Chinese government’s own blunder for agitating the Boxer Rebellion

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was “bound to lead to a net increase, rather than decrease, in the authority exerted by foreign governments in China.” As the indemnities demanded reached astronomical levels, Beijing was forced to increase borrowing from the great powers, thereby placing its political independence as collateral for financial solvency. To Hippsiley and Rockhill, then, the Boxer Rebellion meant the “breakup of China” or the “end of the Open Door.”102 Even Hay eventually backed away from supporting China’s territorial and administrative integrity. In November 1900, the McKinley administration was aiming to obtain a naval base on the coast of Fujian province. “The matter was soon dropped,” wrote Esthus, “but not before Hay suffered the embarrassment of being reminded by Japan of the recent American statement in support of China integrity.”103 Although the subsequent administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft adhered to the Open Door policy, it was clear that China’s interests were expendable. To foster a satisfactory conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan in 1905, President Roosevelt suggested that Manchuria be carved into two spheres, one for Japan and one for Russia. While Manchuria was nominally restored to China, the Russians and Japanese held such extensive rights there that Chinese sovereignty in the area remained seriously impaired.104 Believing in realpolitik, Roosevelt personally had great respect for Japan’s “paramount interest” in Manchuria, seeing the new Asian power in more favorable terms than the primitive Chinese empire. Both the president and his secretary of state, Elihu Root, shared the view that “every effort should be made to make advocacy of the Open Door and integrity of China compatible with friendship with Japan. If they had felt compelled to choose between Japan’s friendship and China’s interests, there is little doubt that they would have opted for Japan.”105 Though harboring a more anti-Japanese stance than its predecessor, the Taft administration was unable to make much progress in helping China. Through its “dollar diplomacy,” Taft and Secretary of State Philander Knox sought to increase American financial and investment activities in China to counterbalance the other powers. However, Knox’s “neutralization” plan of 1909-10 to place all the railways of Manchuria under international control faced rock-solid opposition from Japan, Great Britain, and Russia.106 The Taft administration, according to Warren Cohen, soon realized that “if [the United States] hoped to increase their economic stake in China, if [it] hoped to assist in the modernization of China, if it hoped in any way to check Japanese exploitation of China, it would have to be through cooperation with Japan.”107 Consequently, Washington decided to participate in the six-

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power financial consortium (including Great Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, and France) to cooperate with the “imperialists” in providing administrative and railroad construction loans to China’s newly established republic in 1912. By working in tandem with other imperialist powers, nonetheless, the Taft administration was effectively “co-opted” into the “league of predators.” In the wake of China’s 1911 revolution in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty, the Chinese were appalled to discover the Taft White House was “committed to withholding recognition from the nascent republic until its consortium partners were ready to act.”108 Taft’s offensive had, accordingly, given in to “concerted” action with the great powers. The inauguration of the Wilson administration in March 1913 marked a clear departure from the previous McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft administrations. President Woodrow Wilson’s unwavering defense of the Open Door in China derived from his unilateral withdrawal from the financial consortium, immediate recognition of the Chinese Republic, and challenging Japan at every turn possible to get her assurance of maintaining China’s political and territorial integrity. “I feel so keenly the desire to help China,” said the president, “that I prefer to err in the line of helping that country than otherwise.”109 Wilson’s commitment to progressivism both at home and abroad, in the words of Jerry Israel, “did manage to carve out…a unique Far Eastern personality.”110 Unlike Hay, McKinley, Roosevelt, Root, Taft, and Knox, the president and his minister to China, Paul Reinsch, shared the perception that “America would build a permanent Open Door by remaking China in its own image, using forms and designs successful at home.”111 Like Wilson, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan celebrated the creation of the Republic of China, as he sent an encyclopedia on Thomas Jefferson to Yuan Shikai, the Republican China’s first president, greeting him with the “hope that this ‘awakening’ might produce a ‘United States of China.’”112 Woodrow Wilson was setting an “independent” course of action on China by upholding her territorial and political integrity and by spreading liberal democratic values to awaken that ancient civilization.113 In other words, his “crusading” liberal vision for the world in general and China in particular revitalized the petrified Open Door policy of the Roosevelt and Taft administrations. This study does not claim that the Wilson administration had no “material” incentives in helping China. Daniel Crane and Thomas Breslin accurately pointed out that Wilson’s unilateral withdrawal from the consortium, recognition of

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the Chinese Republic, and support for the authoritarian Yuan Shikai regime were also due to the president’s hope in gaining political and economic advantage for the United States in China.114 Foreign policymaking can never be divorced from crude power calculations. Yet, there is no doubt that America’s liberal tradition and culture have had a profound and even “exceptional” effect on its external behavior.115 In fact, realists have condemned Wilsonianism for giving American foreign policy an overly crusading character which undermines U.S. national interest.116 Warren Cohen described the contrast between the Wilson administration and its predecessors: [President] Wilson’s handling of American policy toward China indicated less concern for power politics than Roosevelt had shown and less concern for Wall Street than Taft had shown. From missionary sources, he had learned of China’s surge toward modernization and he was determined to offer the Chinese the disinterested assistance of the United States. He was aware of the role played by European and Japanese imperialism in China, and if he could not reform those imperialists, he could disassociate the United States from their policies.117

While Wilson, in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, had to bow to the reality of international politics by yielding to Japan on her interest in Shandong province, the president believed that without the participation of Japan or any of the other major powers, the League of Nations “would be [nothing] but a rump organization.” Based on his principle of collective security, Wilson thought that the injustices done to China would be rectified in the League of Nations. On September 23, 1919, in a speech delivered at Salt Lake City, Wilson said: I am not going to stop my fellow citizens, to discuss the Shandong provision in all its aspects, but what I want to call your attention to is that just so soon as this covenant [for the League of Nations] is ratified, every nation in the world will have the right to speak out for China…. This is the only way to serve and redeem China.… [By] being parties to that arrangement [the League], we can insist upon the promise of Japan—the promise which the other governments have not matched—that she will return to China immediately all sovereign rights within the province of Shandong.118

In sum, for Woodrow Wilson, U.S. liberalism and the League of Nations are means to maintain the Open Door in China. Though the president lost his League fight to the Senate Republicans and

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isolationists, his ideas and normative commitment to China’s modernization, independence, and democratization became institutionalized, affecting the thinking and perception of future administrations’ China policy. Robert Keohane and Judith Goldstein posited that ideas matter for foreign policy, serving as world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. Together, they affect policymakers’ conception and understanding of national interests.119 “Whatever the reason for the enactment of a policy idea,” they wrote, “the choice itself has longlasting implications and once ideas become embedded in rules and norms, they constrain public policy.”120 Once a strategic or policy choice is selected by politicians, it has long-term ramifications. Being legitimated and institutionalized, policy ideas leave vestiges, as they constrain the options for future politicians. The Wilsonian Open Door internationalism is defined in terms of three components: (1) maintaining equal opportunities of trade and commerce with China; (2) defending China’s political independence and territorial integrity; and (3) promoting a strong, united, and liberal democratic China. Wilsonian Open Door Internationalism and the Recognition Issue, 1949-50

This book’s argument stresses that Wilsonian Open Door internationalism precluded Washington from recognizing Mao’s China. In 1949-50, a seemingly radical regime openly swearing allegiance to Leninist-Marxism and advocating for a worldwide revolutionary struggle against Western nations was not acceptable in that system of ideas. While the Truman administration supported the promotion of Chinese Titoism and a Sino-Soviet split, evidence indicated that President Truman opposed giving full and prompt recognition to the PRC, insisting that the Chinese Communists must first tone down their radical political orientations. Truman’s acceptance to an engagement policy of China (NSC-34/1, NSC-34/2 and NSC-41) was, therefore, the best he could agree to. Similarly, though Dean Acheson wanted to reconcile with the CCP, he was by no means eager to recognize Beijing. The secretary wanted to approach the Chinese Communist regime in a gradualist manner. Writing to Edmund Clubb, the consul general of Beijing, Acheson warned that the basis for establishing relations depended on the Communist regime’s “respect for treaty [and international] obligations.”121 Hence, by the end of 1949, the Truman administration already ruled out recognition as a viable policy, insisting that eventually

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Mao’s regime would either be overthrown or forced to mollify its ideological radicalism. Wilsonian Open Door Internationalism and Strategic Ambiguity

On the other side of the recognition controversy is the Taiwan issue. As reflected in the views of Merchant, Dulles, and Rusk, Washington had a “moral obligation” to protect the interests, freedom, and autonomy of the Formosans from Beijing’s tyrannical threats.122 To this end, President Truman and Secretary Acheson also concurred. But, to preserve China’s territorial unity and integrity, in line with the Open Door principle, they would not endorse formal Taiwan independence or explicit U.S. intervention to save the island. Instead, they would press the Nationalist government, through diplomatic and economic assistance, to reform its administration and to strengthen Taiwan’s defense. A free Taiwan, as Dulles posited on April 21, 1950, would serve “a concrete example [to Mainland China] of a better way to economic improvement and national and individual freedom than through Communism.”123 Strategic ambiguity is, therefore, based on this Open Door notion that until Communism is fully discarded in China, America must continue its liberal engagement policy to draw her closer toward democratic values. Taiwan, short of de-jure independence, must be preserved against the CCP’s invasion in order to maintain its freedom and political autonomy. Methodology

The research design for the case studies in Chapters 3 to 5 relies on qualitative analysis. In the words of Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, a case is “an instance of class of events, which refers to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolution, types of government regimes, kinds of economic systems, or personality types that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing a theory regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances of that class of events.”124 Process tracing, in particular, is a useful method in drawing inferences from small-N case studies. It helps to identify the complex “intervening causal chain and mechanism” between the Truman administration’s normative commitment to Wilsonianism and its Taiwan Strait policy.125

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Plan of the Book

Chapter 2 focuses on the contemporary issues and debates with respect to the strategic ambiguity policy, emphasizing specifically the period from Nixon’s opening of China in 1972 to the Obama administration. It will look at the one-China principle as embodied in the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués (1972, 1978, and 1982), the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), and the Six Assurances (1982). The Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-55, 1958, 1995-96, and 2003-06 will be examined in order to draw the connections between Wilsonian Open Door internationalism and the implementation of strategic ambiguity in the Eisenhower, Clinton, and Bush administrations. Lastly, the ECFA’s security implications on U.S.China-Taiwan relations will also be analyzed. Chapter 3 elaborates on the Wilsonian Open Door internationalism, its history, its essential belief components, and its conception of America’s national interest in the Taiwan Strait. Primary sources and documents from the Woodrow Wilson administration are used to demonstrate the president’s deep commitment to China’s Open Door. Then, the case study looks at how President Truman and Secretary Acheson, following Wilson’s idea, aimed to promote a united, strong, and democratic China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, only finding the Nationalist regime too weak and corrupt to take the responsibility. Yet the president and, especially, the secretary were relentless in pursuing a Chinese Titoist policy, seeking to split Beijing from Moscow and to foster anti-CCP sentiments among the Chinese people. Chapters 4 and 5 will focus on the Truman administration’s Taiwan policy, and its interests in an autonomous Taiwan, free from China’s civil war. However, Washington, to prevent antagonizing China, emphasized discreetness in separating the island from mainland’s control. Individuals such as Livingston Merchant, John Foster Dulles, and Dean Rusk played extremely important roles in making the moral and legal justifications to defend Taiwan. Chapter 6 concludes the study by offering some assessments on the future trajectories of U.S. Taiwan Strait policy, its continuities and possible changes.

Notes 1 Nancy B. Tucker, Strait Talk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 277. See also Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice (Washington DC: The Henry Stimson Center, 2003), p. 14.

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2 See Chapter 2 of this book. See also Dennis V. Hickey, “America’s TwoPoint Policy and the Future of Taiwan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 8 (August 1988), pp. 881-896; Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice; and Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 3 Richard Bush, Untying the Knot (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 261. 4 Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 114-115; Dennis V. Hickey, “Rapprochement between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland: Implications for American Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 20, No. 69 (March 2011), p. 235. 5 Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, pp. 5-6. 6 The so-called “1992 consensus” is a political formula, which is said to have been derived from the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong between China and Taiwan. The consensus refers to that both Beijing and Taipei have implicitly agreed to “disagree” about the meaning of one China, hence, the notion of “one China, different interpretations.” While Beijing insists that Taiwan is part of the PRC, Taipei defines it as both Taiwan and mainland belonging to the Republic of China (ROC) founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in October 1911. The Hong Kong meeting aimed to facilitate a meeting between Wang Daohan, head of the PRC’s newly created semi-official Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Koo Chen-fu, chairman of Taiwan’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF). The 1992 consensus has remained controversial. Although the KMT and CCP have in general supported it, Taiwan’s opposition, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and former presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shuibian, both proponents of Taiwan independence, denied its validity completely. See Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 190. See also David G. Brown, “Taiwan Voters Set a New Course,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 10, No.1 (April, 2008), p. 3. 7 For in-depth discussions of ECFA and its security implications for the United States, see Chapter 2 of this book. For good background information, see Scott Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), and Daniel Rosen & Zhi Wang, The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic Liberalization (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011). 8 “Joint Press Statement by President Obama and President Hu of China,” White House Press Release, November 17, 2009, Beijing, available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-press-statement-presidentobama-and-president-hu-china. 9 Robert Sutter, “Taiwan’s Future: Narrowing Straits,” The National Bureau of Asian Research (May 2011), p. 16; and Richard C. Bush, “Taiwan and East Asian Security,” Orbis (Spring 2011), p. 277. 10 Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan, pp. 138-142. 11 Daniel Lynch, “Taiwan’s Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No.4 (August, 2004), pp. 513-533. 12 See the survey data gathered and compiled by the Republic of China’s Mainland Affairs Council, from 2002 to 2010. The website is: http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=93358&ctNode=6921&mp=3.

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13 Ibid., See also Phillip Saunders & Scott Kastner, “Bridging over Troubled Water?” International Security, Vol. 33, No.4 (Spring 2009), pp. 8889. 14 Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 276. 15 Robert Sutter, “Taiwan’s Future: Narrowing Straits,” pp. 15-16; “Delicate Dance: America Balances Old Commitments with New Priorities,” Economist. September 24, 2011. Available from http://www.economist.com/ node/21530162. 16 Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 277. 17 Thomas Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No.4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 1718. 18 For origins of strategic ambiguity, which scholars have set its policy inception in 1972 when President Richard Nixon signed the Shanghai Communiqué with China, see Dennis V. Hickey, “America’s Two-Point Policy and the Future of Taiwan”; Robert Sutter, The China Quandary (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Jonathan Pollack, “China’s Taiwan Strategy: A Point of No Return?” The China Journal, No. 36 (July,1996), pp. 111-116; Robert Sutter, U.S. Policy Toward China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Martin Lasater, The Taiwan Conundrum in U.S. China Policy (Boulder: Westview Press,2000); Andrew Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring, 2000), pp. 93-106; Philip Yang, “From Strategic Ambiguity to ‘Three Nos’: The Changing Nature of U.S. policy toward Taiwan,” in Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney, eds, U.S. Allies in a Changing World (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001); Steven Goldstein and Randall Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship: the United States, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (2001), pp. 147-172; Ramon Myers, Michael Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh, eds., Making China Policy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Andrew Wedeman, “Strategic Ambiguity and Partisan Politics: American Domestic Politics and Stability in the Taiwan Strait,” Cambridge Review of International Relations, Vol. 14, No.2 (2001), pp. 222-238; Pan Zhongqi, “U.S. Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 35 (May, 2003), pp. 387-407; Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes; Lowell Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan: A Triangular Analysis,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol.10, No. 2 (Fall, 2005), pp. 21-42; Richard Bush, Untying the Knot. 19 Nancy Tucker, however, dated the origins of strategic ambiguity to the Eisenhower administration in the mid-1950s. Specifically, she wrote that “it is clear that the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait crisis had three fundamental, long-term effects on U.S.-Taiwan-China interaction…Washington’s difficulties controlling its ally and deterring its adversary produced the enduring if sometimes reviled, policy of strategic ambiguity.” See Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 14. 20 “Meeting with President: Recognition of Chinese Communist Government,” October 3, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations with the President, 1949-1952/1949/Box1/RG59/250/46/3/4, National Archives, College Park, MD.

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21 David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: The Question of Accommodation with Peking, 1949-1950,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 10, No.4 (January 1986), p. 26. 22 Ibid., p. 27. 23 Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 187; Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 128-133; Oystein Tunsjo, U.S. Taiwan Policy (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 29-30. 24 John L. Gaddis, “The Strategic Perspective: The Rise and Fall of the Defensive Perimeter Concept, 1947-1951,” in Dorothy Borg & Waldo Heinrichs, eds., Uncertain Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 61-118; June Grasso, Truman’s Two China Policy (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1987), p. 128; David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950 (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1994), pp. 315-317; Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 17-27. In addition, biographies and memoir of Dean Rusk are also useful sources to support that the Truman administration was actively searching for a satisfactory solution to defend Taiwan against PRC invasion. See Warren Cohen, Dean Rusk, p. 46; Thomas Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1989), pp. 208-209; and Dean Rusk, As I saw It (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), p. 284. 25 John L. Gaddis, “The Strategic Perspective,” p. 93. 26 The realist school of international politics sees national security interest defined in terms of power and that states, in an international system of anarchy, are only concerned with either the maximization of power or survival through the balance of power. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: McGraw Hill, 1948/2005), and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: The McGraw-Hill, 1979). 27 Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, pp. 38-39. 28 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 140. 29 Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 12. 30 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 274. 31 Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), p. 166. 32 Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? p.114. 33 Nancy B. Tucker, “China-Taiwan: U.S. Debates and Policy Choices,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 150-167; Richard Bush, Untying the Knot, pp. 258-264. 34 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 130-131. 35 Nancy B. Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 2002), p. 24. 36 Presidential power in foreign affairs, especially after World War II, has increased tremendously, prompting Aaron Wildavsky (1966) to coin term “the two presidencies,” that is a constrained president on domestic issues and a president who reins supreme in foreign affairs. In the landmark case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation (1936), Justice George Sutherland wrote that foreign policy should be considered the “very delicate, plenary, and exclusive power of the president as the sole organ of the federal government in

U.S. Interests in Taiwan

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the field of international relations.” For references on Wildavsky and Justice Sutherland’s opinion, see Steven Hook, U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2008), p. 98; pp. 115-116. 37 Oystein Tunsjo has noted that America’s identity entails a “discursive representation” of the Taiwan Strait problem through the “determined,” “undetermined,” and “red menace” discourses. The “determined discourse” enabled Washington to treat seriously PRC’s claims to sovereignty over Taiwan whereas the “undetermined discourse” rested on the United States’ commitment as the leader of the free world to defend the island from Communist aggression. Tunsjo’s work is important for this study, but he does not make the connection that these elements actually constitute the strategic ambiguity policy. Moreover, by focusing primarily on the production and reproduction of U.S. identity, intersubjective understanding, and discursive representations of the Taiwan Strait problem, he has dismissed the consistent and long-term liberal objectives underpinning Washington’s China-Taiwan policy. See Oystein Tunsjo, U.S. Taiwan Policy (New York: Routledge, 2008). 38 Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), pp. 189-191. For in-depth discussions of political comparisons between Taiwan and China and how the former’s democratic experience could bring about political changes in the mainland, see Bruce Gilley, “Taiwan’s Democratic Transition: A Model for China?” in Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond, eds., Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), pp. 215-242. See also Bruce Dickson, Democratization in China and Taiwan, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), and Daniel Lynch, Rising China and Asian Democratization, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 39 Bruce Gilley, “Taiwan’s Democratic Transition,” p. 240. 40 Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire Straits,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1 (January/February 2010), p. 53. 41 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” p. 19. 42 Ibid., p. 19. 43 Nancy Tucker, “China-Taiwan: U.S. Debates and Policy Choices,” p. 162. 44 Taiwan’s “provocation” has two different meanings. First, from early 1950s to late 1980s, when Taiwan was under the high authoritarian control of the Nationalists, Taipei claimed itself as the legitimate government of all China and boasted to re-conquer Mainland China from the Communists. But, from 1990s onward, with the emergence of democratization and rising sentiment for Taiwanese independence, Taiwan’s threat to Beijing has become a permanent separation from China and the creation of an independent Taiwan Republic. 45 This definition of strategic ambiguity is paraphrased from Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot, pp. 255-256. On the notion of “dual deterrence,” see Brett V. Benson and Emerson M.S. Niou, “Comprehending Strategic Ambiguity: U.S. Security Commitment to Taiwan,” http://www.duke.edu/ ~niou/teaching/strategic%20ambiguity.pdf; and also see Andrew Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy”; Pan Zhongqi, “U.S. Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity.” On “pivotal deterrence,” see Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

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46 Nancy Tucker, “China-Taiwan: U.S. Debates and Policy Choices,” p. 160; Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 7; Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters, pp. 193-194. 47 Ibid., p. 194; Nancy B. Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” pp. 25-26. On America’s interest in a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait impasse, see also Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes; Andrew Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy”; and Dennis V. Hickey, “Rapprochement between Taiwan and Chinese Mainland.” 48 James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414. 49 James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68-90. 50 “Draft speech by L.T. Merchant, on Recognition, to the Institute of World Organization,” January 12, 1950, Papers of Livingston Merchant (LTM)/Re: Speeches, Statements, and Testimony, 1950/Box17, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 51 Ibid. 52 Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), p. 212. It is interesting to note that Koen’s book, originally published in 1960, was banned from distribution due to political pressures exerted by the Nationalists and China Lobby. Koen’s book was very critical about the Kuomintang government and its relations with the China Lobby in the U.S. Using its political influence and connection to the China Lobby, the Nationalist government was able to prevent the book from reaching wider audience. It is estimated that approximately over 4,000 copies were destroyed by the publisher and less than 800 actually circulated. Many of these were stolen from libraries by the right wing groups or simply locked up in rare book rooms in university libraries in the United States. 53 Senator Knowland was so supportive of the Nationalist regime that he was often described as the senator from “Formosa.” 54 See Koen, The China Lobby, Chapters 2-3; See also Dean Acheson, Present at Creation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), pp. 364-365; Warren I. Cohen, “The China Lobby” in Alexander DeConde, Richard Burns, and Fredrik Logevall, eds., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy Volume 1 (Charles Scribner’s Son, 2002), pp. 185-191. 55 Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries, Chapters 3 and 4; Lewis Purifoy, Harry Truman’s China Policy (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), pp. 63-64. See also Thomas G. Paterson, “If Europe, Why Not China? The Containment Doctrine, 1947-49,” Prologue (Spring 1981), pp. 19-38. 56 Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 75-77. 57 Warren Cohen, “The China Lobby,” p. 185. 58 Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 74-75. Moreover, Jeff Frieden posited that crisis situations tend to “precipitate changes in political interests and in policymakers’ room to maneuver,” by “removing many of the institutional and ideological ties that had bound policymakers.” See Jeff Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 1, (Winter 1998), p. 89.

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31

Robert Sutter, U.S. Policy toward China, pp. 10-11. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol. 1: Year of Decisions (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1955), pp. 546-547. 61 This quote is taken from Dean Acheson, Present at Creation, p. 366. 62 The post-WWII consensus (also known as the Almond-Lippmann consensus) describes the notion that public opinion is in general volatile, incoherent, and irrelevant to foreign policymaking. Under the rubric of bipartisanship and Cold War security threats, the Congress was also compliant to the president’s objective in foreign affairs and agreed that politics should stop at the “water’s edge.” For in depth discussion, see Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), Chapter 2. 63 Nancy Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 172. 64 Several prominent of “lost-chance” scholarships include: Joseph Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China, ( New York: Random House, 1974); Warren Tozer, “Last Bridge to China: The Shanghai Power Company, the Truman Administration and the Chinese Communists,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 1, No.1 (Winter 1977), pp. 64-78; Harold Hinton, China’s Turbulent Quest, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974); Robert Sutter, China Watch (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Warren Cohen, “Acheson, His Advisors, and China, 1949-1950,” pp. 13-52; and Michael Hunt, “Mao-Tsetung and the Issue of Accommodation with the United States, 1948-1950, in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds., Uncertain Years, pp. 185-233. 65 Michael Hunt, “Mao-Tse-tung and the Issue of Accommodation with the United States.” pp. 207, 210. 66 Robert J. McMahon, “The Cold War in Asia: Toward a New Synthesis,” Diplomatic History. Vol. 12, No. 3, (July, 1987), p. 313. 67 Warren Cohen, “Acheson, His Advisors, and China, 1949-1950,” p. 49. 68 Ibid., p. 51. 69 Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 188. 70 Ibid., p. 178. 71 Ibid., p. 192. 72 Chen Jian, “The Myth of America’s Lost Chance in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 77-86. 73 Ibid, p. 85. 74 Ibid, p. 86. 75 Michael Sheng, “Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the ‘Lost Chance’ 1948-1950,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1994), p. 501. See also Michael Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 76 Michael Sheng, “America’s Lost Chance in China? A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29 (January, 1993), p. 137. 77 Steven M. Goldstein, “Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States: Opportunities and Constraints, 1944-1950,” in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds., Uncertain Years, p. 272. 78 Ibid, p. 278. 60

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79

Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 142. Mao’s quote from April 28, 1949 is taken from Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 143. 81 Ibid., pp. 144-145. 82 Ibid, p. 138. 83 Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 297-298. 84 Ibid, p. 298. 85 For works on how America’s liberal strategic culture and identity have shaped foreign policy and grand strategic decisions, see Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); John Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); and Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 86 David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine,” p. 26. 87 Ibid., p. 34. 88 Ibid. 89 For details on The China White Paper, released on August 5, 1949, see Chapters 3 and 4. 90 McLean, p. 38. 91 Ibid., p. 40. 92 “NSC 37/8: A Report to the NSC by the Acting Secretary of State on the Position of the US with Respect to Formosa,” October 6, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 47/Truman Papers/Box206, Harry S. Truman Library (Hereafter HST Library). 93 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, Chapters 2-3. See also George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), Chapter 2. 94 Ibid., p. 22. 95 Ibid., p. 27. 96 Michael Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), Chapter 1. Hunt discussed about the “Open Door constituencies.” See also Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 39-41. 97 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 43-44; George Kennan, American Diplomacy, pp. 27-29. 98 Raymond A. Esthus, “The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 18991910,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1959), p. 436. 99 George Kennan, American Diplomacy, p. 32. 100 Ibid., p. 35; Raymond Esthus, “The Changing Concept of the Open Door,” p. 436. 101 George Kennan, American Diplomacy, p. 36. 102 Ibid., p. 36. 103 Raymond Esthus, “The Open Door and the Integrity of China, 18991922: Hazy Principles for Changing Policy,” in Thomas H. Etzold, ed., Aspects of Sino-American Relations Since 1784 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1978), p. 50. 80

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33

Ibid., p 53. Ibid., p. 57. 106 Raymond Esthus, “The Changing Concept of the Open Door,” p. 452. 107 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, p. 74. 108 Ibid., p. 75. 109 The quote is taken from Roy W. Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), p. 24. 110 Jerry Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), p. 114. See also Jerry Israel, “For God, For China and For Yale: The Open Door in Action,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 75, No. 3 (1970), pp. 796-807. 111 Jerry Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door, p. 200. 112 Jerry Israel, “For God, For China, and For Yale,” p. 806. 113 Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, p. 24. 114 Daniel Crane and Thomas Breslin, An Ordinary Relationship, (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1986), Chapters 6-7. 115 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, pp. 2-3. 116 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 39-41; See also E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1946). 117 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 77-78. 118 This excerpt of President Woodrow Wilson’s speech at Salt Lake City, Utah, September 23, 1919 is quoted from Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations Volume 1, (Boston: Wadworth, 2010), p. 440. 119 Robert Keohane & Judith Goldstein, eds., Ideas & Foreign Policy, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 120 Ibid., p. 12. 121 “The Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Consul General at Beijing (Clubb),” Feb 3, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 11. 122 See Chapters 4 and 5. 123 “Memorandum on Formosa,” April 21, 1950, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/China, People’s Republic of, 1950/Box47, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 124 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 17-18. 125 Ibid, p. 206. 105

2 U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations from Nixon to Obama

This chapter discusses strategic ambiguity in the post–U.S.-Sino rapprochement and normalization period. The first section examines the formalization of strategic ambiguity in the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), Normalization Communiqué (1978), Taiwan Relations Act (1979), Joint Communiqué (1982), and the “Six Assurances” (1982). The ambivalence contained in these documents reflects Washington’s objectives to promote China’s Open Door and defend Taiwan’s freedom and security. The second section argues that strategic ambiguity is the means to foster a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait conflict, as either reunification or independence must be mutually agreed upon by Taipei and Beijing. To accomplish that goal, postwar American leaders have refrained from formally endorsing Taiwan as legally part of Mainland China. The third section provides a brief overview of the Taiwan Strait crises in 1954-55, 1958, 1995-96, and 2003-06. These episodes illustrate how the Eisenhower, Clinton, and Bush administrations had relied on coercive diplomacy—the use of deterrence and assurance—to prevent Taipei and Beijing from escalating into allout military confrontations. While China’s rise in power and Taiwan’s democratization in the post-Cold War era have called for a reexamination and even replacement of America’s current Taiwan Strait policy, the concluding section stresses that United States’ security and liberal interests in the Taiwan Strait are best served through the continuation of strategic ambiguity. The Obama administration is, in fact, on the right track to encourage closer cross-strait economic ties while supporting arms sales to Taiwan.

35

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U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy

The Legalization of Strategic Ambiguity: The “One-China” Principle and the Taiwan Relations Act

The story of President Richard Nixon’s opening to China has been thoroughly and excellently treated by others and, therefore, will not be recounted here.1 It is widely accepted that rapprochement was launched in the “national interest” of the United States.2 The president and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, clearly understood that it was impossible to ignore the existence of the People’s Republic of China in international politics.3 Indeed, in late 1960s and early 1970s, “the shared interest that brought the two countries together was their apprehension about the Soviet Union.”4 Under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, Moscow increased expansion of its military power, both conventional and nuclear, directing much of its ambition and muscle against Beijing. At the same time, sapped by the protracted Vietnam quagmire, the United States found its power in relative decline. Thus, ending the twodecade long Sino-American hostility would be most beneficial since “neither the United States nor China would have to be worried about a two-front war. Instead, that burden would be shifted to their adversaries in the Kremlin.”5 To be sure, both Nixon and Kissinger believed that Washington could exploit the rift between Beijing and Moscow by playing each against the other and enjoying better relations with each than either had with the other.6 It was also true that, during his negotiations with the CCP leadership, Kissinger sought to minimize “the significance of Taiwan as an issue for Beijing and as an impediment to progress.”7 Yet, it is important to note that the president’s visit to Beijing in February 1972 did not mark a drastic departure from the strategic ambiguity policy established by the Truman administration and followed closely by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. While staunchly supporting the KMT regime on Taiwan, Eisenhower and Dulles were receptive to a more flexible policy toward Communist China.8 The U.S.-PRC ambassadorial talks, in fact, began in August 1955 at Geneva, in response to Zhou Enlai’s peaceful overture at the Bandung Conference.9 In a similar vein, JFK and Lyndon Johnson also tinkered with the possibility of the “two Chinas”—that is, accepting both the ROC and PRC representations in the UN General Assembly—and strengthening unofficial ties with Beijing. However, Chiang’s forceful opposition, in conjunction with domestic political considerations, the Vietnam War, and Mao’s radical Cultural Revolution prevented the Johnson administration from going forward in 1966-67.10

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Hence, to charge the Nixon administration with sacrificing Taiwan would be an overstatement. Like his predecessors, Nixon also walked a fine line to balance between engaging China and defending Taiwan. “While expressing his willingness to normalize relations with China,” Harry Harding argued, “[President] Nixon said that he could not abandon Taiwan in doing so.”11 The president, as a matter of fact, remained committed to maintain some form of diplomatic or unofficial relations with Taipei. “We felt that we should not and could not abandon the Taiwanese,” Nixon posited in his memoir, “We were committed to Taiwan’s right to exist as an independent nation.”12 Kissinger was also adamant on insisting America’s interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait conflict.13 Furthermore, despite his Republican credentials, Nixon strongly shared Wilson’s vision on China’s Open Door. In his Foreign Affairs article, Nixon explained his stance: Taking the long range view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.… The world cannot be safe until China changes.… The way to do this is to persuade China that it must change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems.… For the short run, this means a policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counter-pressure designed to persuade Beijing that its interest can be served only by accepting the rules of international civility. For the long run, it means pulling China back into the world community—but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.”14

The re-conceptualization of U.S.-PRC relations rested on Nixon’s belief that China, while weak and impoverished, should someday assume the responsibility of a great power partnering with the United States.15 Deng Xiaoping’s market reform in 1978 and the gradual removal of barriers on economic trade and cultural exchanges between the United States and China should testify to that end.16 The Shanghai Communiqué (1972) and Normalization Communiqué (1978)

Most scholars have marked Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 as the origin of strategic ambiguity. Since then a series of policy texts with vague and

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equivocal wordings have made both Taipei and Beijing perplexed over Washington’s true intentions.17 In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the United States’ statement on Taiwan was, in the words of Richard Bush, “artful, subtle, misleading, and somewhat confused.” It announced: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position.”18 In addition, America reaffirmed “its interests in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” Two components are worthy of discussion here to demonstrate the ambivalence of the U.S. stance. First, the verb “acknowledges” is used in place of “recognizes,” indicating Washington’s mere cognizance of, but not necessarily agreement with, Beijing’s position.19 Henry Kissinger probably said it best, “If the United States recognized Taiwan as part of China, our saying we want a peaceful solution has no force. It is a Chinese territory.… For us to go to war with a recognized country…over a part of what we would recognize as their country would be preposterous.”20 It is also interesting to note that Taiwan is made merely a “part of China” instead of “province of China.” If the United States had referred to Taiwan as a “province of China” and then later recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China, then the island would effectively be treated as a province under Beijing’s direct sovereign jurisdiction.21 The phrase “does not challenge” can also be construed as merely “accepting” rather than agreeing to.22 Second, the phrase that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait” is extremely baffling since it ignores the self-identification of most of the Taiwanese population as not Chinese. After suffering from decades of repression from the KMT regime, a significant portion of the native residents on the island would identify themselves politically as Taiwanese, not Chinese. “If the population had been allowed to express their views,” Bush observed, “a good portion would have disagreed with the proposition that there was one China and Taiwan was a part of China.”23 As a matter of fact, with Taiwan democratized, the notion of “one China” has come under increasing attacks and vigorous disputations on the island. However, one thing is clear: the insistence on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait conflict. The Nixon administration suggested that the United States “will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.”24 The Normalization Communiqué of December 1978 set the basis for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing on January 1, 1979.25 While the Carter administration

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recognized the People’s Republic as the “sole legal government of China,” it, in light of the Shanghai Communiqué, only “acknowledged that Taiwan is part of China.”26 Moreover, showing the United States’ moral concern for the wellbeing of Taiwanese people, the communiqué also stated that “the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.”27 In the supplementary unilateral statements issued by the United States, President Carter insisted that “the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an internal interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.”28 Moreover, the president, while agreeing to the termination of the 1954 U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty29 and withdrawal of American military forces from the island, refused to renounce arms sales to Taiwan.30 Despite Washington’s assurance that the arms sales would be only “defensive” in nature, Beijing saw it as simply an attempt by the United States to continue interfering in China’s internal affairs. Seeing normalization as vital to his economic development and modernization program, Deng was willing to concede for the moment. Yet, the PRC leader made clear to Leonard Woodcock, the chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, that American arms sale to Taiwan constituted a gross violation of the “one-China” principle and that this issue must be resolved in the foreseeable future.31 The Taiwan Relations Act (1979)

In similar vein, the language contained in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 197932 is also ambiguously crafted. Though “friends of Taiwan” within the U.S. Congress strived to create the TRA as an explicit American defensive commitment to the island, similar to the 1954 treaty that was about to lapse at the end of 1979, the final act read just as vaguely as the Shanghai Communiqué. The law stipulated that it is the policy of the U.S. to “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Furthermore, America would “maintain the capacity…to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan…[while] the president is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the U.S., arising therefrom.” The president and Congress, then, “shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes,

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appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.”33 It is important to note, however, that the TRA does not assert an automatic or explicit commitment of the United States to defend Taiwan. Any possible PRC hostile actions are just matters of “grave concern.” Consequently, while Washington retains the “capacity” to act in the case of belligerence in the Taiwan Strait, it may or may not utilize that capacity, depending on the domestic constitutional processes such as executive-legislative deliberations and interpretations of U.S. national security interests.34 Though not directly stated in the act, in the event that war results from Taipei’s unprovoked agitation or unilaterally changing the status quo (i.e. declaration of independence), the United States could simply choose not to defend Taiwan for its irresponsible behavior.35 The TRA also prescribes, in Section 3(a), that the United States “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In Section 3(b), it maintains that “the president and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by U.S. military authorities in connection with recommendations to the president and the Congress.”36 Here, the formulations are, once again, imbued with the logic of ambiguity. In essence, what exactly should Washington provide to Taiwan? The term “defensive articles and services” is overly broad, and oftentimes weapons may be defensive as well as offensive.37 Taipei may ask whether Washington would only provide armaments with defensive capabilities whereas Beijing could suspect that America is effectively issuing a “blank check” of weaponry for Taiwan’s defense. Closely related to such ambiguity was that there are no standards spelled out, in the legislation, to clarify how the U.S. government should judge and evaluate Taiwan’s capability requirements. Should they be based on Beijing’s military capabilities, or intentions, or both? Finally, to maintain the unofficial relations between Washington and Taipei, the TRA, in Section 6, established the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private non-profit corporation, to which U.S. Foreign Service officers could be detailed and government funds sent.38 Henceforth, while the AIT has been responsible for all non-diplomatic matters, it effectively serves as the de-facto U.S. Embassy in Taiwan.

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The U.S.-China Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan and Reagan’s “Six Assurances” (1982)

Though showing strong support for Taiwan during his 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan eventually eschewed his ideological disdain for the PRC and embraced the one-China principle after assuming office.39 To further mollify Beijing’s discontent over Washington’s FX advanced aircraft deal to Taiwan in 1980-81, which was called off eventually,40 the Reagan administration agreed to sign another communiqué with China to address the arms sales matter. The U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982, stated that the American government “does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final solution.”41 The notion of “final solution” is extremely unclear, as it could refer to either “an end of arms sales” or the “final resolution of the Taiwan issue.” Beijing claimed the former whereas Washington the latter.42 As a matter of fact, Reagan specifically rejected an arms sales cutoff date.43 Consequently, given America’s insistence for a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait impasse, the process of reaching a final outcome or settlement can take indefinitely long and, in that instance, the “gradual reduction of arms sales” will hinge on whether the PRC would forgo coercion in resolving the Taiwan problem. Nonetheless, at about the same time, the United States also transmitted the so-called “Six Assurances” to Taipei in order to assure the latter that America pledged it (1) would not agree to set a date for ending arms sales; (2) would not agree to hold prior consultations with the PRC; (3) would not agree to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; (4) would not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; (5) would not alter its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and (6) would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.44 America’s Ultimate Goal in the Taiwan Strait Conflict

Another crucial aspect of strategic ambiguity deals with America’s ultimate intent or objective regarding Taiwan’s future status. Does the U.S. wish to see Taiwan becoming officially independent? Is it in favor of the island’s eventual reunification with China? If so, are there conditions that need to be fulfilled (such as China becoming liberalized

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and democratized) before unification could be accomplished? The United States’ attitude has always been for a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait conflict. While the conventional wisdom was that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should decide on their future, the Clinton administration added that, in light of Taiwan’s democratization, any potential resolution must also have the island’s general public’s support.45 Either reunification or independence, in other words, must be achieved through mutual, popular, and peaceful consensus by both parties. To understand Washington’s objective with respect to China and Taiwan, it is imperative to briefly discuss the United States’ postwar definitions of “China” and Taiwan’s relations to it. The Postwar Conception of China: Is Taiwan Part of Nationalist or Communist China?

The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed in both the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 and Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945 that Taiwan (also known as Formosa at that time) would be returned to the Republic of China (the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek) after the defeat of Japan.46 Following the Open Door tradition, Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman were determined to make Nationalist China a world power. Moreover, their conception of China was as one that would become a unified constitutional democracy under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership. After defeating Japan, therefore, Formosa was to be returned to the Nationalists. Nevertheless, situations had become complicated as the Chinese civil war broke out and after Mao’s victory in 1949. In the next thirty years, until 1979, Washington continued to recognize the Nationalists as China’s sole legal government.47 Furthermore, with America’s reluctant but strong support, Taipei continued to hold its seat in the United Nations as the representative of China, until its expulsion in 1971.48 The United States, to be sure, well understood that ROC’s claim as the dejure government of China was tenuous at best, as more and more countries established diplomatic relations with Beijing. Accordingly, to prevent Taiwan’s fate from being ineluctably tied down to the Chinese civil war and to preserve, as John Foster Dulles had put it, “at least in theory the right of the people on Taiwan to have some say in their future,” officials within the Truman administration sought to design ways to “detach” Taiwan from China without directly challenging the notion that “Taiwan is part of China.”49 One of the legal justifications for making Taiwan’s status undetermined concerned the postwar disposition of the island and whether it had been formally returned by

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Japan to the state called China. And, if so, which China? Indeed, following the Korean War on June 25, 1950, Truman sent in the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait and also stated that Taiwan’s status remained “undetermined.” Since then, the “undetermined discourse” gradually gained salience in Washington’s foreign policy establishment.50 From an international legal standpoint, until the actual signing of a peace treaty with Japan, Taiwan remains under Japanese possession and the Chinese Nationalist government, after 1945, had been given merely administrative responsibility, not de-jure jurisdiction, over the island. This thinking helped to draw the line between Taiwan and China and even gave rise to the notions of “one China, one Taiwan,” or Dulles’ “two Chinas.”51 Through diplomatic maneuvering of the United States and Great Britain, neither Communist nor Nationalist China was represented at the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951. As a result, Tokyo, though renouncing title to Taiwan, did not transfer or assign it to any party.52 A separate peace treaty, the Treaty of Taipei, was later concluded between the ROC government and Japan on April 28, 1952. Nonetheless, the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty remained unresolved because Tokyo, heeding to Washington’s advice, did not specifically transfer it to the Nationalists. Hence, ROC or China’s legal claim over Taiwan has remained disputable even to this day.53 In sum, the undetermined discourse of Taiwan “not only formed an important basis for U.S. defense commitments to the [ROC], but also constituted a potential for Taiwan’s independence, if that should ever become a realistic possibility.”54 Taiwan’s Undetermined Status and the Elusive One China

Notwithstanding Taiwan’s undetermined status, the United States has preferred to let Nationalist China take charge over the island. This attitude, as will be noted in Chapters 4 and 5, is also in accordance with the Open Door principle of preserving China’s territorial integrity. Even U.S.-PRC normalization in the 1970s did not change that conception. To pave the way for Nixon’s visit, Kissinger promised to Zhou Enlai that the U.S. would not broach the subject of Taiwan’s undetermined status, at least in any official channels.55 However, as we’ve seen, Washington only “acknowledged” there is “one China” and that “Taiwan is part of China.” It essentially avoids explaining what “China” means or clarifying Taiwan’s legal status. Whereas the PRC has insisted on reunification as its ultimate objective, Washington has shunned from committing to that position, seeking, instead, only a “peaceful

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resolution” of the Taiwan issue.56 Thus, it has almost been a “ritual” that whenever American officials comment on the Taiwan Strait, they will simultaneously recite America’s commitments to the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.57 Though not accepting the PRC’s jurisdiction over Taiwan, Washington’s position over Taiwan’s independence has also been less than forthright. Dennis Hickey vividly explained America’s enigmatic attitude toward the problem of Taiwan independence: Numerous American officials, including Secretary [George] Shultz, have declared that the U.S. has ‘no intention of pursuing a policy of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan.’ Some argue that this statement means that the U.S. opposes Taiwan’s independence. A careful examination, however, reveals that the key word in the phrase above would appear to be “pursue,” which means “to advance.” Therefore, it would be logical to conclude that, despite the efforts of some of the leaders of [the] Taiwan independence movement, the United States will not pressure the ROC into holding a plebiscite to determine the island’s future or otherwise promote the island’s independence. By the same token, however, simply because the U.S. has declared that it has no intention of “pursuing” such a policy, it cannot logically be argued that the U.S. necessarily opposes Taiwan’s independence or that it seeks to prevent such a move.58

In other words, while the United States has proclaimed, as its official policy, that it does “not support” Taiwan’s independence, it also has not promised to oppose it. Since the late 1940s, Washington has shown a certain degree of sympathy toward the Taiwanese cause for self-determination and political independence. Hence, the U.S. has generally welcomed the advent of political liberalization and democratization in Taiwan. Since the late 1980s, the native Taiwanese demands for a greater international role for Taiwan and separation from the mainland have become more vociferous.59 But, America has always been circumspect, stopping well short of clearly endorsing Taiwan independence, lest it would antagonize China. One, nonetheless, can surmise that, under the rubrics of peaceful resolution and popular consent, Washington sees Taiwanese independence, like reunification, as one of the feasible political outcomes that should not be foreclosed.60

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Strategic Ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait Crises: Deterrence and Assurance

Realists have explained strategic ambiguity as a tactic of coercive diplomacy, stating that America’s choice reflects a rational calculation to deter China and Taiwan from initiating belligerence and jeopardizing peace over the Taiwan Strait. Coercive diplomacy, according to Alexander George, is to “back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand.”61 More often, coercive diplomacy is related to the defensive uses of force or deterrence—that is, “the deployment of military power so as to be able to prevent an adversary from doing something that one does not want him to do and that he might otherwise be tempted to do by threatening him with unacceptable punishment if he does it.”62 Indeed, Thomas Schelling defined that deterrence “involves setting the stage—by announcements and by incurring the obligation—and waiting. The overt act is up to the opponent. The stage setting can often be non-intrusive, non-hostile, and non-provocative. The act that is intrusive, hostile, or provocative is usually the one to be deterred; the deterrent threat only changes the consequences if the act in question—the one to be deterred—is then taken.”63 Therefore, strategic ambiguity is based on the application of “dual deterrence,” in which the United States instills uncertainty into the decision-making process of both China and Taiwan. America “resists specifying the conditions under which it will become involved in the Taiwan Strait issue and instead hopes that the disputants’ lack of certainty about U.S. intentions will discourage them from provoking one another.”64 Timothy Crawford has coined the term “pivotal deterrence” to describe a great power state’s manipulation of threats and promises to prevent war by making belligerents fear the costs and by confronting them with risks they do not want to incur.65 To preserve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, the United States “must mount threats to deter the PRC from attacking Taiwan or otherwise coercing reunification, and, at the same time, it must leave open the option to abandon Taiwan in order to deflect it from declaring independence.”66 More importantly, the central pivot’s leverage derives not only from its disproportionate economic and military capabilities, but also from the deep-seated animosity between the two rival states. As a result, the dominant power can more easily align with either side than they can with each other. Washington has always maintained a flexible position to move between Taipei and Beijing. For instance, exploiting the Sino-

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Soviet split, the United States courted China and severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in the 1970s. On the other hand, the collapse of the USSR and Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s “elevated the importance of Taiwan in [the] Sino-U.S.-Taiwan triangle.”67 But, the United States has consistently maintained strategic ambiguity by “keeping the ultimate goals of American foreign policy vis-à-vis the Taiwan issue deliberately shrouded in uncertainty…thereby moderating behavior between [China and Taiwan] and leading to a peaceful resolution.”68 If Taiwan believes that it needs the United States’ support to achieve a formal independence whereas China perceives that America’s neutrality is essential to ensure reunification, then Taipei should not proclaim independence unless it is certain of American support. Beijing should not risk war unless assured that Washington will not intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict.69 “Assuming that it considers the U.S. a formidable military opponent,” in the words of Benson and Niou, “China must think twice before using military might to enforce its view that Taiwan is part of China. And, for its part, Taiwan should not take for granted that the U.S. will defend it, especially if…the U.S. believes that Taiwan was responsible for initiating [the conflict].”70 Lowell Dittmer summarized this triangular configuration as follows: Throughout the postwar period, Washington has been the principal if not the sole guarantor of Taiwan’s national security, and during crucial periods, the United States has also interceded in support of China’s national security (while at other times, it has been the main threat to PRC security). The triangular interdependencies—Taipei’s need for U.S. support to retain its independent existence, Beijing’s need of U.S. acquiescence to be able to pressure Taiwan, Washington’s need of a balance between the two to maintain the status quo—has locked the three together in a complex, ambivalent embrace. 71

Strategic ambiguity also has the advantage to induce peace-making behaviors from the antagonists, who would offer concessions to win the pivot’s support.72 In the wake of establishing relations with Washington in January 1979, Beijing initiated “unprecedented magnanimity” to Taipei, despite the latter’s “no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation” policy. The PRC, for the first time since its founding in 1949, replaced the concept of “liberating Taiwan” with “peaceful reunification.”73 It also sought, through Ye Jianying’s Nine-Point initiative of September 30, 1981,74 to assure Taiwan’s future status as a special administrative region with a considerable degree of political and socioeconomic autonomy. Deng Xiaoping later called the proposal “one country, two systems.” The Reagan administration, though stopping

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short of endorsing the Chinese proposition, commanded Beijing’s efforts as conducive to fostering peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.75 Likewise, in the immediate aftermath of the Taiwan Strait crisis in 199596, President Lee Teng-hui moderated his stance by postponing plans for live-fire military exercises in the strait and indicated that he would temporarily forgo his overseas travel as he did not want to “create trouble and bring damage to Taiwan.”76 These gestures were certainly meant to curry favor from Washington, but they also generated certain levels of goodwill between Taiwan and China, thereby ameliorating tensions across the strait. As a last point, it is important to note that strategic ambiguity cannot be based solely on “sticks,” because “carrots” are also needed to assure the antagonists that the pivotal state would not sacrifice their core interests. In light of China’s strong determination to vindicate its past humiliations, Thomas Christensen posited that “the danger to the PRC is that Taiwan might eventually move from de-facto independence to legal independence, thus posing an affront to Chinese nationalism and a danger to regime stability in Beijing.”77 Although the PRC remains militarily inferior to the United States and such an imbalance of power is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, China could still pose serious national security threats to Washington without closing their power gap. “If Taiwan were to declare independence,” Christensen said, “it is hard to imagine that China would forgo the use of force against Taiwan, regardless of the perceived economic or military costs.”78 Hence, reassuring Beijing of Washington’s continued adherence to the oneChina principle has always been part of the strategic ambiguity framework. Similarly, Washington also signals its unwavering interest in defending Taiwan’s freedom and a peaceful resolution of the crossstrait conflict. The practice of strategic ambiguity was illustrated in the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-55, 1958, 1995-96, and 2003-06. The Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and 1958

The Taiwan Strait crises in 1954-55 and 1958 demonstrated what George and Smoke have called a “partial failure of deterrence,”79 as Mao was not deterred from launching artillery shelling of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), two of the 25 offshore islands still under the KMT’s control and situated about 12 miles from China’s mainland.80 Nonetheless, in both instances, the United States did succeed in using the threat of “massive nuclear retaliation” to prevent Mao from launching an all-out attack on Taiwan and Pescadores. Mao’s decision to

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launch the first crisis, which lasted from September 1954 to April 1955, was to “punish” the Nationalists for their frequent aerial assaults on China’s coastal provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai. More significantly, in light of the emerging Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to consolidate the American security umbrella in Asia, Mao was eager to prevent the United States and Taiwan from signing their pending mutual defense treaty. The chairman saw that the U.S.-ROC alliance, if crystalized, would constitute a permanent separation between the mainland and Taiwan.81 The Taiwan Strait crisis of August 23, 1958, on the other hand, resulted from Mao’s revolutionary zeal to mobilize domestic support for his Great Leap Forward and to underscore the CCP’s ideological superiority over Khrushchev’s “revisionism.” Thus, instigating a crisis at the Taiwan Strait was conducive to manipulating nationalist and socialist sentiments in China.82 To Mao’s dismay, however, the first Taiwan Strait crisis facilitated the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between Washington and Taipei in December 1954, ratified by the Senate on February 9, 1955.83 Despite their explicit support for the Nationalists, the Eisenhower administration pressured Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw his forces from the offshore islands Yijiangshan and Dachen, near the Zhejiang province. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles believed that those islands were too far from Taiwan and too difficult to defend. Thus, keeping the Nationalist troops on them would only be a strategic liability.84 Satisfied with the evacuation of KMT forces from those islands and America’s willingness to commence the ambassadorial talks in Geneva, Mao ended the shelling campaign.85 Moreover, Eisenhower demanded Taipei not undertake offensive action against the mainland without prior American approval.86 Apparently, engaging Communist China remained crucial to the United States. In October 1954, Dulles told the National Security Council that even though the United States would stick with the non-recognition policy of the Communist regime, the Eisenhower administration would pursue a policy of dealing with Beijing “on a de facto basis when circumstances make this useful.”87 The secretary’s “two-China” or “one-China, one-Taiwan” formulations generated fierce opposition from both Chiang and Mao.88 But, ambiguity arose when Dulles did not foreclose the possibility that the administration might “unleash” Chiang Kai-shek, with U.S. military backing, to rollback China.89 Although Washington signaled its willingness to defend Jinmen and Mazu against Mao’s attacks, even employing the threat of nuclear strike, it convinced Chiang that the U.S. defense commitment to the offshore

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islands was not a blank check.90 The Formosa Resolution, passed in January 1955 with overwhelming support in Congress, authorized Eisenhower to employ military actions to protect Taiwan and the Pescadores, including the “security and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands [i.e., Jinmen and Mazu] and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.”91 Hence, while the president was affirmative in America’s defense to Taiwan and the Pescadores, he left open the offshore islands. Those were essentially contingent upon whether the PRC’s aggression against them could directly affect the security of Taiwan and whether Beijing’s attack was a result of Taipei’s provocation in the first place. Finally, Mao initiated the 1958 crisis to create an international conflagration to buttress his domestic policy. While the offensive was politically motivated, the CCP chairman’s cautious approach throughout the crisis illustrated Washington’s successful use of strategic ambiguity to preserve cross-strait stability. On August 27, 1958, the U.S. State Department publicly announced that the KMT-controlled Jinmen and Mazu were vital to the defense of Taiwan.92 Mao, therefore, specifically ordered his military generals not to shell American forces or convoy ships near those islands. He also instructed the PLA that the operations were to “remain shelling but not landing” and “cutting off [the enemy’s supplies] but not letting [the enemy] die.”93 Beijing came to terms at last that Jinmen and Mazu should be left in “Chiang Kai-shek’s hands” because those islands were the last connections between Mainland China and Taiwan.94 To reciprocate Mao’s restraint, the Eisenhower administration pulled back the Nationalists from any reckless moves. At the same time, Dulles also signaled to Beijing that the U.S. would resume the ambassadorial talks that had been briefly suspended since 1957.95 The tensions subsided by the end of September even though shelling on the offshore islands continued intermittently until 1979. The superiority of America’s strategic deterrence in the 1954-55 and 1958 crises, however, impelled Mao to seek nuclear weapons development for China’s national survival.96 The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96

Not since the Jinmen and Mazu crises in the 1950s had the attention of the American public been so “riveted on the Taiwan Strait” as in 199596.97 In May 1995, the Clinton administration agreed to grant a visa to Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui to attend his graduate school reunion in June, at Cornell University.98 The decision to issue the visa to a Taiwanese head

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of state represented a reversal of America’s decades-long diplomatic precedent of not having any forms of official contacts with Taipei. Not surprisingly, the PRC was furious, calling Clinton’s decision yet another event in a series of successive intrigues to move Taiwan farther away from China and closer toward a declaration of independence.99 Beijing was particularly enraged over Lee’s provocative actions, calling him, through the Xinhua News Agency, the “‘chief behind-the scene backer’ of Taiwan’s independence movement, [who] aimed to use his visit to the United States to boost Taiwan’s status…and to achieve a ‘domino effect’ leading to the international community’s recognition of Taiwan’s political status.”100 In the ensuing ten months following Lee’s visit, Clinton sought to pacify Beijing by reaffirming that the United States would abide by “one China” and that Lee’s visit would not constitute a precedent. Arduous diplomatic negotiations between the United States and China also began in late 1995. Un-soothed, however, President Jiang Zemin demanded that Washington must shore up its “one-China” commitment with concrete action—that is, to oppose openly Taiwan’s independence. Regarding the Taiwan issue as a “question of war and peace,” Beijing resorted to coercive diplomacy by launching rounds of military, naval, and missile exercises in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, Lee Teng-hui, undaunted by these intimidations, continued his confrontational policy, including more restrictive cross-strait economic regulations and the advocacy of Taiwan’s return to the United Nations.101 As Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election was due on March 23, 1996, Lee’s sensational rhetoric further aroused popular and nationalistic sentiments. While urging restraint and peaceful resolution of any differences, the Clinton White House was unenthusiastic about explicitly affirming America’s opposition to Taiwan independence. Disheartened, Beijing, in the early months of 1996, increased its military deployment in its coastal provinces. On March 4, just weeks before Taiwan’s presidential election, the PRC announced that the People’s Liberation Army would conduct surface-to-surface missile tests from March 8 to March 18. Concerns began to rise in the State and Defense Departments since the target areas were waters just off the coast of Taiwan’s two largest port cities. “After careful studies,” noted Robert Ross, “Chinese leaders had concluded that if the target zones were not close to Taiwan, the tests would be ineffective in opposing Taiwan splitism and U.S. policy toward Taiwan.”102 Reinforcing its threats to Taipei and aiming to influence the upcoming election, Beijing, on March 9, declared that it would stage live-fire air force and naval

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maneuvers at the southern end of the Taiwan Strait.103 Fearing that these military exercises and maneuvers could get out of control and elevate into full-blown cross-strait war, Clinton, on March 10, promptly ordered two aircraft carrier battle groups, Independence and Nimitz, to the Taiwan Strait. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, the deployment of the two carriers would signal to the Chinese that “the United States has a national interest in the security and the stability in the Western Pacific region.”104 Though China continued the missile and naval tests, the U.S. deployment was forceful enough to ensure crossstrait security and stability throughout the March election. Two days after Lee’s electoral victory, the PRC terminated its military exercises. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the crisis, the Clinton administration focused on engaging China to repair the deteriorating Sino-American relations. In November 1996, the president proclaimed that America welcomed the “emergence of a stable, an open, a prosperous China, a strong China confident of its place in the world and willing to assume its responsibilities as a great nation.”105 At another occasion, Samuel Berger, Clinton’s national security adviser, emphasized the importance of the one-China principle, which provided the “security and stability for democratic development, economic prosperity, and burgeoning cross-strait exchanges in which Chinese on both sides of the strait could resolve their issues themselves— peacefully.”106 Furthermore, Washington decided to keep Taipei at arm’s length by restricting its leaders’ visits and postponing arms sales. In summer 1998, during his state visit to China, Clinton openly declared the “three nos” in Shanghai, in which the United States does not support (1) two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan; (2) Taiwan’s independence; and (3) Taiwan’s membership in international organizations for which statehood is a prerequisite.107 Though peace was restored in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing viewed the crisis as an impetus for China’s military modernization and a challenge against America’s uni-polarity. Countries in East Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN countries viewed the PRC’s hawkish reactions toward Taiwan as threatening to regional security. Hence, many sought closer alliance ties with the United States.108 While actively promoting China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Washington also perceived China’s military rise as potentially destabilizing. Thus, in July 1999, when Lee Teng-hui stressed that China and Taiwan were effectively in a “special state-to-state relationship,”109 the Clinton administration restated America’s support of one China to calm Beijing’s anger. But, not long after, the administration also made it “absolutely clear” that the Taiwan Strait conflicts must be resolved

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peacefully and with “the assent of the people of Taiwan.” This was the first time the “assent of the Taiwan people” was specifically mentioned.110 The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 2003-06

In a campaign address delivered on November 19, 1999, the Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush signaled that, if elected, he would shift America’s foreign policy in greater support for Taiwan and deal with an increasingly militarily strong China “without ill-will but without illusions.” Accusing the Clinton administration of being overly conciliatory toward Beijing, Bush saw the People’s Republic of China as a “strategic competitor” rather than a “strategic partner.” “We do not deny there is one China,” he said, “But we deny the right of Beijing to impose their rule on a free people. As I’ve said before, we will help Taiwan to defend itself.”111 Indeed, concerned about China’s military modernization and the improving capabilities of the PLA, the Bush White House immediately approved the sale of a number of advanced weapons systems to Taiwan. These included Kidd-class destroyers for maritime air defense, P-3 Orion aircraft for antisubmarine warfare, diesel-powered submarines, mine-sweeping helicopters, and a mix of missiles and torpedoes.112 The 2001 arms sales offer to Taiwan was the largest since 1992. More importantly, when interviewed by an ABC News reporter on April 25, 2001, regarding America’s obligation to defend Taiwan against China, the president firmly responded, “Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that.… [The United States would do] whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.”113 The Bush administration clearly infuriated Beijing and aroused criticisms from many interested observers, who argued that such an obvious tilt toward Taiwan would unnecessarily exacerbate tensions across the Taiwan Strait.114 Bush’s pro-Taiwan orientation initially encouraged Taipei to embrace greater independence. Though more politically radical than his predecessor in terms of supporting Taiwan independence, Chen Shuibian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) opted for moderation when taking office in May 2000. Winning only 39 percent of the vote, Chen, a shrewd politician, knew his narrow plurality victory was due to the KMT’s internal split.115 Thus, in his inauguration speech, Chen tried to assure China and the United States in his “4 nos and 1 shall not” proclamation even though Beijing calmly stated that it would be “listening to what he says and observing what he does.”116 Moreover, during the first two years of his administration, the new president

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actually tossed out Lee’s protectionist cross-strait economic policy and supported, instead, gradual liberalization.117 Nonetheless, as Beijing continued to turn a cold shoulder to Taipei’s friendly gestures, Chen grew impatient and, sensing the political discontent of his diehard independence (deep green) supporters, moved toward a more hardline China policy.118 On August 3, 2002, in a telecast speech to the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations annual meeting, Chen energized his pro-independence comrades and enunciated that there is “one country on either side” of the Taiwan Strait. As the 2004 presidential election loomed, the Chen administration, in late 2003, provoked another Taiwan Strait crisis over the president’s defensive referendum initiatives, which proposed holding a plebiscite to decide Taiwan’s national title, anthem, flag, constitution, and sovereignty. Beijing saw these actions as tantamount to an explicit declaration of independence.119 To Chen’s surprise, the Bush administration, however, rendered him a severe blow. With China’s premier Wen Jiabao standing by his side, President Bush, in December 2003, openly rebuked Chen’s moves, saying that “the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”120 As the Bush administration was restraining Taipei from overstepping the red line, Chen remained unyielding after winning his razor-thin second term. In February 2006, for example, the DPP government effectively backtracked from its “4 nos and 1 shall not” promise by declaring that the National Unification Guideline would “cease to apply,” and the National Unification Council would “cease to operate.”121 Though the Taiwan leader justified his actions by citing China’s Anti-secession Law of March 2005122 and the PLA’s increasing deployment of short and medium range missiles across the strait, Washington expressed frustration over what it viewed as Taipei’s callousness and irresponsibility.123 When Chen sought to call for another referendum on Taiwan’s membership in the UN, the Bush administration called that “a step toward a declaration of independence.”124 Deputy Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage strictly warned that the TRA did not require the United States to defend Taiwan.125 President Chen eventually backed down. The remaining years of his administration were mired in corruption scandals that involved him and his family. There were signs that the Bush administration was reprioritizing its policy stance because it needed China’s cooperation in the war on terrorism, North Korea’s nuclear threats, Sino-American economic issues, global climate change, and the financial crises. However, while it

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may be correct to attribute Washington’s readjustment to the changing “international strategic settings” after September 11,126 it would be more accurate to suggest that Bush was merely continuing a long-time U.S. policy approach toward the Taiwan Strait: strategic ambiguity. Indeed, James Mann argued, “The practical significance of Bush’s ‘whatever it takes’ declaration [in April, 2001] was open to question. [The president] had indicated that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if it were attacked; [yet] he had left unclear what the United States would do if war broke out under other circumstances.… [It] was these blurry situations that the policy of strategic ambiguity had been intended to cover.”127 Alan Romberg also observed that Bush’s Taiwan Strait policy “has almost totally embraced that of President Clinton, including the ‘three nos,’ even though he would never mouth those words.”128 In any event, Bush remained supportive of Taiwan’s democracy and peaceful initiatives across the strait. Shortly after Ma Ying-jeou’s election in March 2008, the president praised Taiwan’s democracy “as a beacon in Asia and the world.” In a telephone conversation with Bush, President Hu Jintao suggested that cross-strait dialogue could resume on the basis of the 1992 consensus. President Bush, according to his national security adviser Stephen Hadley, welcomed Hu’s flexibility.129 Obama’s Taiwan Strait Policy in the Era of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)

Since becoming Taiwan’s president in May 2008, Ma Ying-jeou has pledged a mainland policy predicated on “no independence, no unification, and no use of force.”130 Reversing the militant cross-strait policies of Lee and Chen, the KMT president promised to reengage China under the rubric of “one China, different interpretations,” also known as the “1992 consensus.” Indeed, cross-strait tensions have greatly subsided. Responding to Taipei’s conciliations, President Hu Jintao also coined a 16-character guideline to welcome positive development, asserting that both Beijing and Taipei should “build mutual trust, lay aside differences, seek consensus while shelving differences, and create a win-win situation.”131 China, as a result, eased its longstanding policy of isolating Taiwan from the international community. Since May 2009, for instance, Taiwan has been invited to participate, as an observer, in the annual World Health Assembly, the executive arm of the World Health Organization (WHO). As of October 2011, Taiwan had joined 7 other international organizations as either a full member or an observer and 2 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).132 Beijing also acquiesced to

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Ma’s “mutual non-denial” formulation, that is, each side does not repudiate the jurisdiction of the other.133 Both sides, then, achieved a tacit diplomatic truce so that each would halt efforts to win diplomatic recognition from countries at the expense of the other.134 Since Ma became president, none of the 23 states that have formal diplomatic ties with Taipei have defected to Beijing. In fact, China even rejected pleas from Panama and Paraguay to establish ties in order to honor this rare moment of good feelings across the Taiwan Strait.135 More importantly, after almost a 10-year hiatus, bilateral dialogue resumed between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), unofficial agencies representing Beijing and Taipei, respectively, in cross-strait negotiations. Beginning in June 2008, the ARATS-SEF talks have reached various economic and technological accords, including direct flight, direct shipping, direct postal services, cooperation on food safety, fishing, finance, fighting crimes, and industrial and investment standards.136 On June 29, 2010, Taipei and Beijing signed a comprehensive economic pact, formally known as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), in Chongqing, China. The agreement expands and further institutionalizes economic liberalization ties between China and Taiwan.137 ECFA, in essence, provides an “early harvest” agreement, a set of near-term tariff eliminations along with detailed product schedules for goods and services from each side.138 The early harvest lists “involve far more items benefiting Taipei than Beijing.”139 Based on Wen Jiaboa’s assurance that China would yield to Taiwan asymmetrical preferential tariff reduction benefits, the early harvest stipulates that in the next three years (2011-13), Beijing will reduce and eliminate tariffs on 539 items, which involve 16 percent of Taiwanese exports to the mainland, valued at $13.8 billion. For its part, Taipei has assented to reducing or eliminating tariffs on 267 products, constituting 11 percent of China’s exports to Taiwan at $2.6 billion.140 As a building block for a future China-Taiwan FTA, the pact also committed the parties to a host of other elements such as dispute resolution, investment promotion, customs cooperation, industrial cooperation, trade facilitation, and creation of the Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC) for ongoing cross-strait talks under the ECFA. The economic deal, however, is not a forum for discussing political and other sensitive issues. Taipei has affirmed that the “time is not yet ripe” and it would not touch upon any questions or issues pertinent to sovereignty or national security.141

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ECFA and Security Concerns across the Taiwan Strait

It may be too early to assess the full economic implications of ECFA. Yet, observers generally agree that “although the specific impact on different sectors of the economy may not be uniformly positive, ECFA should help accelerate Taiwan’s overall economic growth in the coming years.”142 According to Rosen and Wang, the projected benefits of the ECFA are “large for Taiwan and modest for China,” as the former would “see gains greater than 4 percent on whatever GDP turns out to be after 10 years [2020] as a result of the ECFA.”143 Experts also believe that, in the absence of ECFA, Taiwan would experience continued marginalization and diminishing competitiveness when China speeds up its FTA integration in Asia (i.e., ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3).144 “Most economists expect [ECFA] to bolster two-way trade quickly, given an early harvest of tariff reductions for a wide range of products on both sides,” wrote Robert Wang.145 Indeed, Taiwan’s imports and exports are likely to increase by 11 percent and 6.3 percent respectively by 2020.146 Finally, as restrictions are eased on bilateral investments and capital movements, multinational corporations would have greater incentives to invest in Taiwan. These so-called peace dividends may very well expunge a longstanding flashpoint in world politics. But, the rosy picture could be misleading if one ignores the fact that cross-strait interdependence is essentially asymmetrical, with Taiwan being far more reliant on China in terms of its economic growth, trade, and outbound investments.147 For example, by mid-2010, China (including Hong Kong) accounted for about 30 percent of Taiwan’s aggregate world trade and 43 percent of the island’s total export. These, however, only comprise 8 percent of China’s total imports in recent years.148 Under ECFA, Taiwan’s trade dependence on China would escalate to at least more than 60 percent.149 While a significant portion of Taiwan’s exports to China are processing components for electronics, high-tech, and IT manufacturing, which are then destined for re-export to other countries, it is important to know that in recent years China has achieved substantial technological advancements and high-value productive capabilities. Consequently, Taiwan’s high-tech advantage over China is likely to decline.150 Moreover, despite the amelioration of cross-strait tensions since 2008, Beijing has not renounced the use of force as a mechanism to reunify with Taiwan. First, the PRC’s double-digit increases in annual growth of military spending contrast sharply with Taiwan’s relatively modest, if not weaker, preparation. Second, the PLA’s large-scale enhancement of naval and air forces focused on Taiwan’s contingencies

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grow unabated.151 Though President Ma Ying-jeou has insisted that China should reduce its military buildups focused on Taiwan, Beijing has made few, if any, concessions.152 For instance, there is no indication that the PLA has changed the 1200+ short and medium range ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan. China also has approximately 150 long-range DH-10 Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) deployed within range of Taiwan and U.S. bases in Japan.153 In August 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense judged that China is acquiring capabilities for three objectives: (1) to deter Taiwan’s independence; (2) to influence Taiwan to settle on Beijing’s terms, and (3) to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in the case of conflict.154 Therefore, economic dependence on the mainland could seriously compromise Taiwan’s national security and its ability to maintain the status quo if Beijing chooses coercion to strangle the island. Commercial liberals, nonetheless, have claimed that trade interdependence promotes peace because integration raises the costs of military conflict and wars. As a result, state leaders will be constrained by their domestic constituents (especially those with high stakes in internationalist trade policy) to refrain from belligerent foreign policies.155 Furthermore, economic integration also strengthens cultural, interpersonal, and ideational exchanges, which could transform and harmonize the values, interests, and policies of the trading polities. Finally, interdependence could facilitate nonviolent settlement of discords by enabling states to signal their true resolve more credibly.156 While these liberal assumptions are correct, one must not forget that states, in a self-help system, are constantly alert about each other’s intentions and relative military capabilities, especially between political rivals.157 Benefits from trade often do not accrue to states proportionately and the unequal distribution of these gains can upset interstate power balances. This is the notion of security externalities, which posits that the source of gains from trade is the increased efficiency with which domestic resources can be employed to enhance military capabilities.158 As noted, since trade interdependence is not entirely a situation of mutual and symmetrical dependence, the less dependent state often has the power leverage to coerce the behaviors of its more vulnerable counterparts.159 The resulting relative power differentials and inequality would create exploitation and domination, causing conflict and war. This image resembles the contemporary Taiwan Strait situation. It is hard to dispute the fact that China’s impressive economic growth and concurrent military modernization have benefited greatly from Taiwan’s investments and technological transfers in recent years.160 But, as

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military and economic balances across the Taiwan Strait have skewed in favor of the PRC, Beijing has gained greater influence over Taipei’s policies. Although Chinese leaders have refrained from using coercive policies to prevent instigating resentments and fears among the Taiwanese public,161 a rising China is, without a doubt, both an opportunity and threat to Taiwan. The Obama Administration and Strategic Ambiguity

Meanwhile, aiming to renew America’s influence in Asia, President Obama has been very positive about the recent cross-strait development.162 In his visit to China in November 2009, the president declared, “I am very pleased with the reduction of tensions and improvement in cross-strait relations, and it is my deep desire and hope that we will continue to see great improvement between Taiwan…and the People’s Republic in resolving many of these issues.”163 Vice President Joseph Biden also made similar remarks when visiting Beijing in August 2011, as he reiterated U.S. nonsupport for Taiwan independence and the hope that cross-strait relations will continue to move forward.164 Yet, the Obama administration also wanted the Taiwan-China rapprochement to be carried out in a secure and stable context, hence the approval of a $6 billion arms package for Taiwan in February 2010 and also a $5.85 billion deal in September 2011.165 Essentially, though Washington is pleased about cross-strait détente, there are also growing concerns that Taiwan’s security could be compromised and that Ma’s government may be conceding too much to Beijing for the sake of improving cross-strait economic relations.166 “Though seeking reductions of Chinese forces targeted at the island,” Robert Sutter noted, “the Ma government remained reluctant to take steps to build up Taiwan’s own forces or to work more closely militarily with the United States—actions that could give China an incentive to adhere to Taiwan’s demands.”167 Taipei’s halfhearted and ambivalent approach in lobbying for Washington’s arms sales packages of 2008, 2010, and 2011 is a case in point.168 U.S. security analysts continued to worry about the shifting balance of power across the Taiwan Strait to China’s advantage. Some even think that cross-strait warming could compromise the weapons and information systems that the United States has provided to the island through past arms sales and military cooperation.169 In sum, ECFA represents huge progress in the improvement of cross-strait relations, and its economic effects are generally positive for Taiwan. Yet, because the deepening of economic ties may also generate negative security

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implications for Taiwan, the United States and its strategic ambiguity policy remain essential in underpinning a robust peace in the Taiwan Strait. Should the United States Abandon Strategic Ambiguity?

As China rises in capabilities and assumes larger influence in global affairs, some scholars have begun to advocate for greater clarity on Washington’s Taiwan Strait policy.170 Charles Glaser, in a Foreign Affairs article, has urged that Washington, in order to accommodate Beijing, should consider withdrawing from its commitment to Taiwan because the island is an “insignificant” national security interest.171 Abandoning Taiwan may strengthen the relations between the United States and China. However, accommodating Beijing, as some critics have pointed out, may also be construed as America’s power decline and losing its resolve in East Asia.172 Appeasement, in other words, may not be necessarily peace-inducing and could even enlarge Beijing’s ambition. Thus, some proponents of clarity actually argue for stepping up American support for Taiwan’s defense and political independence.173 Proponents of strategic clarity, nonetheless, have failed to appreciate America’s liberal interest in maintaining the strategic ambiguity policy. Indeed, Scott Kastner observed that jettisoning strategic ambiguity would require Washington to transform its objectives in the Taiwan Strait. Essentially, the United States must renounce the desire of either preserving Taiwan’s autonomy or maintaining a constructive relationship with Beijing.174 Nancy Tucker also held the view that “strategic clarity is not the solution to U.S. policy problems in the Taiwan Strait. Even though it appears to be the direction in which many analysts currently wish to travel, it fails to remedy existing problems and could make them worse.” Moreover, strategic ambiguity “has been about peaceful resolution, [and] as policymakers push to [clarify] what they would do under specific circumstances, they edge ever closer not just to abandoning ambiguity, but also to taking sides in the standoff in the strait.”175 In a similar vein, Andrew Nathan posited that the United States “has no vested interest in the outcome of the Taiwan issue so long as the resolution is arrived at peacefully. It is not bad for American interests if Taiwan becomes reunified with the mainland…”176 He essentially refuted China’s accusation that Washington wanted to block reunification, by claiming that a Taiwan unified with China poses no serious or detrimental security and economic threats to America. “Any form of peaceful reunification,” Nathan noted, “would result in a

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diminution of tensions in the region and greater integration between the Taiwanese and mainland economies, both of which should be good for American businesses on both sides of the strait. Political risks would diminish and war risks all but disappear.”177 Should Taiwan decide to pursue unification with China, the U.S. has few viable options to prevent it.178 “Contrary to Beijing’s assumptions,” Tucker contended, “neither [Taiwanese] democratization nor arms sales would be effective tools to stop peaceful unification.”179 In fact, Taiwan’s need for American arms sales results precisely from China’s threat of attack and coercive diplomacy. Thus, if Taipei seeks unification voluntarily and trusts the PRC to honor a mutually beneficial agreement, then it would reduce its demand for arms purchases and the United States would have no leverage on that decision. Furthermore, if Taiwan’s public opinion and voters prefer unification and their democratically-elected officials declare that time has come for the reunion Washington would be “in no position to contradict them. Doing so would only risk the enmity of the island’s people and threaten to undermine the very [liberal democratic] institutions [America] seeks to defend.”180 The same can be said of Taiwanese independence. If such an option reflects the assent of the Taiwan people and is agreed upon by both China and Taiwan through peaceful means, then the United States certainly would not object it as well. Nevertheless, at present, reunification does not seem to appeal to the great majority of the Taiwanese people, who have, by far, indicated their predilection to maintain only some form of “status-quo” into the indefinite future. In the words of Chas Freeman Jr., former assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs during the first Clinton administration, “Taiwan’s democratic politics have produced no consensus on what sort of long-term relationship, if any, Taiwan should have with the rest of China.”181 Despite the increasing and deeper economic interdependence between China and Taiwan, most people on the island, including supporters of the Nationalists, believe that Taiwan has little to gain but much to lose by unifying with an authoritarian China. At the very least, talk of reunification is ripe only when China becomes more politically liberalized and starts to push for democratization. In the foreseeable future, however, the Chinese Communist Party is highly unlikely to give up its monopoly of power, whereas the Taiwanese people have become less receptive to the “oneChina” concept. In any event, until a peaceful solution can be attained, “no reunification, no unilateral independence, and no use of force” appears to be the best interim position. Kurt Campbell and Derek Mitchell emphasized that “the best option for the United States is to help

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create incentives that will encourage both Taipei and Beijing to maintain the undefined status quo—a middle ground between reunification and independence. Each side dislikes the current situation for its own reasons, but for both it is the best choice among unhappy alternatives.”182 Insisting on a peaceful resolution may be tantamount to defending Taiwan’s de-facto autonomy in the indefinite future with a good likelihood that during this time Taiwanese national identity may solidify and Taiwan’s bargaining position may improve. Yet, Nathan correctly pointed out, “At least, the United States is not seeking the permanent independence of Taiwan as an end in itself, or to contain China, or prevent China’s rise to major power status.”183 In short, strategic ambiguity helps to keep the cross-strait status quo until a mutually acceptable outcome could be hashed out by both Taipei and Beijing. This can be a long and arduous process, but the policy is, in fact, beneficial to all parties involved in the Taiwan Strait conflict.184 The Obama administration has been following strategic ambiguity by encouraging cross-strait economic cooperation and committing arms sales and defense preparations to Taiwan as “means to sustain a healthy balance in the Taiwan Strait.”185 As Chapters 3 to 5 will demonstrate, aside from national security considerations, America’s adherence to strategic ambiguity is also rooted in its Wilsonian liberal tradition that calls for China’s Open Door.

Notes 1 See Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1992), Chapter 2; William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcript (New York: The New Press, 1998); Chen Jian, Mao’s China & the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Chapter 9; Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice; Nancy Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable?” The Journal of American History, Vol. 92, No.1, (2005), pp.109135; Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Margaret MacMillan, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Opening to China,” in Fredrik Logevall & Andrew Preston, eds., Nixon in the World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 107125. 2 Nancy B. Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable?” p. 110. 3 Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 19611974, pp.104-108. See also Richard Nixon, “Asia after Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, (October, 1967), pp. 111-125. 4 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 4. 5 Ibid., p. 4. 6 John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), Chapters 9 and 10.

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7

Nancy Tucker “Taiwan Expendable?” p. 117. Robert Accinelli, “Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.2, (Spring 1990), pp. 341-342. See also Nancy Tucker, “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‘Two China’ Policy,” in Richard Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 238. 9 Despite Maoist China’s militaristic behavior in the Taiwan Strait, the mid1950s was actually a period of PRC moderation in foreign affairs. The 1954 Geneva Conference, for instance, witnessed how Premier Zhou Enlai took a leading role in devising a truce in the Indochina War. In April 1955, Zhou met with Asian and African states in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia to launch the “non-alignment” movement to stress on international cooperation instead of wars of liberation and world revolution. Zhou also worked with India’s prime minister Nehru to espouse the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” which stated: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territory; (2) non-aggression; (3) noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; 94) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. The U.S.-PRC ambassadorial talks began in this context and, given the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries, these talks provided the only channel of communications to discuss issues relating to the Taiwan Strait, the repatriation of nationals to both countries, and any other practical matters of concern. The talks commenced in Geneva, as the United States was represented by U. Alexis Johnson, American ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and the Chinese side by Wang Bingnan, the PRC ambassador to Poland. The talk suspended for a while in 1957-58 due to Johnson’s transfer to Thailand and the second Taiwan Strait crisis. It resumed in September 1958 in Warsaw but went on and off as China entered into the radical phases of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. While no specific accomplishments were attained, the ambassadorial talks symbolized both sides’ intentions to reduce hostility. See Chen Jian, Mao’s China & the Cold War pp. 191-192; June T. Dreyer, China’s Political System (New York: Longman Pearson, 2011), pp. 337-338; and Thomas Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 144. 10 Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, pp. 23-25. 11 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 44. 12 Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 46. 13 William Burr ed., The Kissinger Transcripts, p. 66. 14 Richard Nixon, “Asia after Vietnam,” pp. 121-123. 15 Evelyn Goh discussed the Nixon administration’s construction of China as a “troubled modernizer,” “resurgent power,” and a “responsible realist power.” See Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement, pp. 114-117; pp. 264266. 16 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 94-95. Following recognition in 1979, the Carter administration decided in mid-1980 to sign a trade agreement with Beijing that would extend most-favored nation (MFN) treatment to China. Since then, China’s MFN status had been subjected to annual congressional review, pending on Beijing’s behavior in several areas, including foreign economic relations, and protection of human rights. The Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989 caused a slowdown of U.S. economic engagement 8

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to China. But, the deepening of trade relations between the two countries and China’s rapid economic growth allowed China to gain MFN status from Washington. In any event, the MFN helps paved the way for China’s eventual accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 2001. See Steven Hook and Franklin Barr Lebo, “U.S.-China Trade Relations: Privatizing Foreign Policy,” in Ralph G. Carter, ed., Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2007), pp. 305-333. 17 Andrew Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy,” p. 93; Pan Zhongqi, “U.S. Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity,” p. 388; Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 124; Richard Bush, Untying the Knot, p. 255. 18 The excerpts from the Shanghai Communiqué (formally entitled, “The Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America,” February 27, 1972) are quoted from Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 128-129. See also Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, pp. 233-234. See the full text of Shanghai Communiqué at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203 19 Dennis V.V. Hickey, “America’s Two Point Policy and the Future of Taiwan,” p. 883 20 Henry Kissinger’s quote is taken from Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, p. 190. 21 Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 129. 22 Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 47. 23 Ibid., p. 129. 24 Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 234. 25 The text of “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China,” December 15, 1979 is taken from Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 238. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., See also pp. 90-92. 28 Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 140. 29 The U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (1954) was signed in December 1954 and ratified in February 1955, when Mao was shelling Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu), two offshore islands near Taiwan. The Eisenhower administration, in agreeing to defend Taiwan, also asked the Nationalist government not to take any major military offensive against the mainland without first getting Washington’s consent. In addition, America’s security guarantee would only cover Taiwan and the Pescadores. Yet, the Formosa Resolution, passed by Congress in late January 1955, stipulated that the president could decide to defend the offshore islands, such as Jinmen and Mazu and/or other territories, if determining that their loss would adversely affect the security of Taiwan and Pescadores. See Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 96-97. See also Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 285-287; Gordon Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the QuemoyMatsu Crisis,” International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4, (Spring 1988), pp. 96-123; Robert Accinelli, “Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis,” pp. 332-334; Nancy Tucker, “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‘Two China’ Policy,” pp. 235-262; Lin Bo-wen, 1949: Shipo Tienjing De

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Yinian [1949: A Shocking Year] (Taipei: Shibao [Times] Publishers, 2009), pp. 251-272; and Thomas Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith, pp. 135-145. 30 Deng Xiaoping had three conditions for normalizing relations: (1) terminate the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty; (2) cut off all diplomatic and official ties between Taipei and Washington; and (3) withdraw all American military forces and installations from Taiwan (including no arms sales to Taiwan). The Carter administration requested that Beijing not to contradict Washington’s intent in a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait conflict. Apparently, Carter saw it was against America’s tradition to stop defending the security and freedom of 17 million Taiwanese people, living peacefully and affluently and instead allow them to be coerced by an authoritarian Communist regime. See Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, pp. 87-98; see also Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 144; and Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, pp. 79-80. For its part, the PRC also extended “olive branches” to Taiwan, by stressing on peaceful reunification with Taiwan instead of the more belligerent “liberation” used in the past. In the “New Year Day’s Message to Taiwan Compatriots,” issued on January 1, 1979, the National People’s Congress’ Standing Committee pledged to “take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses.” This statement also brought up the notion of “three links” across the Taiwan Strait in trade, transportation, and postal exchanges as well as visits and exchanges in other areas. Then, on September 30, 1981, Ye Jianying, the chairman of the NPC’s Standing Committee, elaborated on the peaceful reunification plan under his “Nine Points Proposal,” in which Taiwan is promised a “high degree of autonomy” after reunification. Ye essentially underscored the essence of the “one country, two systems” principle later expressed by Deng Xiaoping. See Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, pp. 96-97; pp.124-125; and also Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, pp.139-140. 31 Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 94. 32 See The Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, enacted on April 10, 1979; H.R. 2479. 33 See the Taiwan Relations Act, Subsections 2 (b)(4), 2(b)(6), and Section 3(c); See also Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 154-155, Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, pp. 106-110; and Steven Goldstein and Randall Shriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” p. 149. 34 Steven Goldstein and Randall Shriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” p. 150. 35 Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, p. 190. 36 Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 156. 37 An example of this vague differentiation between defensive and offensive weapons is the Bush administration’s April 2001 arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing has always been adamantly opposed to any U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, but in 2001 it “singled out the [eight diesel] submarines, along with Aegis and the Patriot 3 missiles, as particular items of concern…” Submarines are sensitive because Taiwan has always wanted a new generation of subs to counterbalance China’s enhanced naval capabilities. But, the problem is that

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subs have offensive powers, which contradicted the TRA’s “defensive articles.” The Bush administration’s explanation for the sale was, in the words of Bruce Dickson, that “the increase in the number of Chinese subs and surface ships made it more likely that China could impose a blockade of Taiwan’s ports, so the conventionally powered subs were deemed necessary to allow Taiwan to defend itself from this new threat.” Nonetheless, to placate the PRC, President Bush postponed the decision of selling the Aegis system and Patriot 3 antimissile system until later, pending China’s future behavior toward Taiwan. See Bruce Dickson, “New Presidents Adjust Old Policies,” pp. 649-650. 38 Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, pp.123-124. 39 Ronald Reagan told his secretary of state Alexander Haig that “I felt we had an obligation to the people of Taiwan, and no one was going to keep us from meeting it.” The quote is from Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 136. Yet, shortly after assuming office, the president compromised to international reality. Though initially favoring the sale of the advanced fighter aircraft, FX, to Taiwan, the Reagan administration called off the deal, lest the sale would seriously jeopardize Sino-U.S. relations. Moreover, to pacify Beijing’s concern about the administration’s pro-Taiwan stance, Reagan sent Vice President George H.W. Bush, who was considered by Beijing as an “old friend,” to China to mend the relations. Bush served as the chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing from 1974 to 1975. In his personal notes to Chairman Hu Yaobang, Premier Zhao Ziyang, and Deng Xiaoping, Reagan said, “Our policy will continue to be based on the principle that there is but one China. We will not permit the unofficial relations between the American people and the Chinese people on Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this principle.” Quote is taken from Alan Romberg, Rein at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 131. 40 Ibid, pp. 124-126. 41 Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 170-171; Steven Goldstein and Randall Shriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” p. 153; Emphasis added. 42 Both Beijing and Washington often have different interpretations of the joint communiqués, taking stances that will favor each party’s own respective position. The implicit understanding has been that while each side can have its own interpretation and analysis, they do not openly object to the positions of the other. 43 Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 146. 44 See Ramon H. Myers and David Shambaugh, “The Legacy of U.S. China Policy, 1989-2000,” in Ramon Myers, Michael Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh eds., Making China Policy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), p. 14; See also Nancy Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?” in Nancy Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 194; Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 174; and Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, pp. 134-137. 45 Richard Bush, Untying the Knot, p. 262. 46 Oystein Tunsjo, U.S. Taiwan Policy (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 34. 47 According to Tunsjo, this “determined China discourse” refers to recognizing the Nationalist China or the Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China and Taiwan is part of that China. Ibid., p. 61. 48 For details on United States’ support of the Nationalists in the UN until the early 1970s, see Nancy Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable?” pp. 127-133.

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49

302.

50

David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950, pp. 301-

Oystein Tunsjo, U.S. Taiwan Policy, pp. 61-62. Ibid. See also Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 87-88; Nancy Tucker, “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‘Two Chinas’ Policy,” pp. 254-255. 52 Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 81-82; Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 93-95. 53 The British was actually hoping to return Formosa to the People’s Republic of China and the Yoshida government of Japan also wanted to sign the separate peace treaty with Beijing instead of Taipei. Yet, under America’s influence and Dulles’ skillful diplomatic persuasion, these two allies conceded. See the detailed discussion on this process in Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 82-89. 54 Oystein Tunsjo, U.S. Taiwan Policy, p. 63. 55 Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, pp. 31-32. 56 Dennis V. V. Hickey, “America’s Two Point Policy,” p. 883. 57 Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 124. 58 Dennis V. V. Hickey, “America’s Two Point Policy,” p. 891. 59 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 12-13; p. 302. 60 Nancy Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” pp. 15-28; and also Nancy Tucker & Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No.4, (Fall 2011), pp. 23-37. 61 Alexander George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in Robert Art & Kenneth Waltz, eds., The Use of Force (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 70. 62 Robert Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Spring 1980), pp. 6-7. 63 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 73. 64 Brett Benson & Emerson Niou, “Comprehending Strategic Ambiguity,” p. 3. 65 Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, p. 5. 66 Ibid., p. 187. 67 Lowell Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan,” p. 29. 68 Ibid., p. 31. 69 Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, pp. 20-21. 70 Brett Benson and Emerson Niou, “Comprehending Strategic Ambiguity,” pp. 15-16. 71 Lowell Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan,” p. 24. 72 Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, p. 22. 73 Lowell Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan,” pp. 26-27. 74 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 113; Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, pp. 124-125. A famous PRC military general, Ye Jianying was, in 1981, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. 75 Lowell Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan,” pp. 26-27. 76 Robert Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,” p. 115. 51

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77 Thomas Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma,” p. 13. See also Thomas Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. 78 Thomas Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma,” p. 36. 79 Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, Chapters 9 and 12. 80 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 185. 81 Ibid., pp. 167-170; Thomas Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith, pp.137-138. 82 Ibid., pp.150-151; Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries, Chapter 6; Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, pp. 171-173. 83 Robert Accinelli, “Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis,” p. 338. 84 Ibid., p. 333. 85 In fact, Mao was more interested in capturing Yijiangshan and Dachen than Jinmen and Mazu. The former two offshore islands were much closer to the Zhejiang province, and the KMT forces relied on those islands as bases to harass China’s coastal region. Furthermore, the PLA lacked sufficient amphibious landing capabilities to wage a successful offensive against Jinmen and Mazu. The shelling was mainly a show of force. See Chen Jian, Mao’s China & the Cold War, pp.167-168; and Lin Bo-wen, 1949: Shipo Tienjing De Yinian, p. 253. 86 Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 272. 87 Nancy Tucker, “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‘TwoChina’ Policy,” p. 257. 88 Ibid., pp. 258-259. 89 Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 272. 90 Ibid., p. 286. 91 Robert Accinelli, “Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis,” pp. 334-335. 92 Chen Jian, Mao’s China & the Cold War, p. 184. 93 Ibid., p. 197. 94 Mao said, “The advantage [of leaving Jinmen and Mazu in Chiang’s hands] is that since islands are very close to the mainland, we may maintain contacts with the KMT through them. Whenever necessary, we may shell them. Whenever we are in need of tension, we may tighten the noose. We will let them hang there, neither dead nor alive, using them as a means to deal with the Americans.” The chairman also mentioned that the shelling would punish Chiang Kai-shek’s “clique” and to highlight that there is only one China, not two Chinas. See Chen Jian, Mao’s China & the Cold War, p, 199, and p. 201. 95 Zhang Shuguang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), P. 264. Zhang’s study provides a great background on the subject of strategic deterrence between the United States and China from 1949 to 1958. 96 The Taiwan Strait crises essentially taught Mao an important lesson. Having nuclear weapons would be essential for China’s national defense.

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Despite the growing Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s, Moscow continued to provide technological experts and assistance to China, but with strict limitations. As relations between Beijing and Moscow further deteriorated after 1958, Mao believed it was important for China to become more self-reliant in developing the nuclear and other defense initiatives. The PRC became a nuclear weapon power in October 1964. For a good background on the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations in the Cold War and the “expert diplomacy” between Beijing and Moscow, see Lin Bo-wen, 1949: Shipo Tienjing De Yinian, pp. 230-231; and Shen Zhihua & Li Danhui, After Leaning to One Side (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), Chapter 5. 97 Dennis Hickey, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Implications for U.S. Security Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 7, No. 9, (1998), p. 416. 98 See Robert Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force”; See also Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait, (New York: Routledge, 1999); Allen S. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2, (Fall, 2001), pp. 103-131. 99 In 1992, the George H.W. Bush administration, in violation of the 1982 Joint Communiqué with China, sold Taiwan 150 F-16 warplanes. In 1994, the Clinton administration upgraded the protocol rules regarding America’s “unofficial treatment” of Taiwanese diplomats. See Robert Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,” p. 87. 100 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 101 Scott Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, pp. 55-60. 102 Robert Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontations,” p. 107. 103 Dennis Hickey, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996,” p. 407. 104 William Perry’s quotes are taken from Robert Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,” p. 110. 105 Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 178. 106 Ibid., pp. 179-180. 107 Prior to Clinton’s trip and the “three nos” in Shanghai, the president followed the practice of U.S. presidents since the Nixon administration by making only “confidential” assurances to China regarding America’s opposition to Taiwan independence. Before the March 1996 crisis, the Clinton administration refused to “change its declaratory policy on Taiwan’s role in international politics, and insisted that negotiations over Taiwan be removed from the agenda of U.S.-China Summits. The administration was also reluctant to exchange state visits between U.S. and Chinese leaders.” Yet, all of these rules were changed following the Taiwan Strait confrontation. See Robert Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontations,” pp. 113-115. And, see also Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 184. 108 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 278-281. 109 On July 9, 1999, in an interview with Germany’s Radio Deutsche Welle at Taipei, Lee rebuffed Clinton’s “three-nos” pledge to China by declaring that cross-strait relations were in fact “special state-to-state relations.” This so-called “two states theory” invoked consternations once again in both Washington and Beijing. As a result of Lee’s new offensive, China not only launched incessant

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recriminations and polemical attacks against the Taiwan leader but also canceled the scheduled visit of Wang Daohan, chairman of China’s unofficial Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) to Taiwan in the fall of 1999. Since 1992, Taipei and Beijing had conducted unofficial talks in Hong Kong and Singapore through China’s ARATS and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). The talks stalled after Lee’s July 1999 remarks and did not resume until after KMT’s return to power in June 2008. 110 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of Asia Pacific, pp. 282283; Alan Romberg, Rein at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 191. See also Richard Bush, “The United States Role in the Taiwan Straits Issue,” speech presented at the University of Illinois at Carbondale, December 7, 1998. It can be accessed from: http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9867.htm. See also Dennis V. Hickey, “Rapprochement between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland,” pp. 234235. 111 George W. Bush’s quote is taken from Andrew Wedeman, “Strategic Ambiguity and Partisan Politics,” p. 234. For a good overview of Bush’s China policy during his first term, see Jean Garrison, Making China Policy: From Nixon to G.W. Bush (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), Chapter 8. 112 For greater details about President George W. Bush’s arms sales policy to Taiwan in April 2001, see Bruce J. Dickson, “New Presidents Adjust Old Policies: U.S.-Taiwan Relations under Chen and Bush,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2002), pp. 645-656. 113 Ted Galen Carpenter, “Going Too Far: Bush’s Pledge to Defend Taiwan,” CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 66, (May 30, 2001), p. 2. Despite the Bush administration’s clarification that America’s China policy remains unchanged and would continue to adhere to the one-China principle, Taipei was emboldened while Beijing strongly protested that such remarks reflected Bush’s genuine inclination. 114 Ibid; See also Robert Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and US-China Relations,” International Security, (Fall 2002), pp. 48-85. Ross stressed that the Bush administration had developed policies that “contribute to conflict by unnecessarily challenging China’s interests in Taiwan.” See Ross, p. 82. 115 Scott Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, p. 61. 116 Chen’s “4 nos and 1 shall not” refers to that under the condition that the PRC has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, his administration will not (1) declare independence, (2) change the national (ROC) title, (3) push forth the inclusion of Lee’s “special state-to-state” theory into the constitution, and (4) promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification. Finally, Chen pledged that he “shall not” abolish the Guidelines for National Unification and the National Unification Council (political institutions symbolic for a possible future reunification with Mainland China). See Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 254. 117 Scott Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, p. 61. 118 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 119 Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 267. 120 Richard Bush, Untying the Knot, p. 251.

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121 Scott Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, p. 36. 122 While Beijing continued to push for a deeper economic integration with Taiwan, Hu Jintao also realized that China must strengthen its “sticks” to deter Taiwan’s independence policies. This mixed use of carrots and sticks is embodied in the Chinese dictum known as “the hard harder, the soft softer.” In January 2005, therefore, the PRC’s National People’s Congress was drafting the Anti-secession law, to legitimize military action if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.” Despite protests from Washington and Tokyo, the NPC passed the Anti-secession law on March 14, 2005. See Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, p. 273; Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? p. 15; and Dennis Hickey, “Rapprochement between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland,” p. 236. Chen Shui-bian, in fact, complained about America’s hypocrisy in its foreign policy. He said, “It’s not right that while almost all people in the world can enjoy the freedom from fear, only the people of Taiwan are denied this basic right. According to the U.S. founding spirit, the resolution and efforts of the 23 million people in Taiwan to seek peace and democracy should not be regarded as acts of provocation.” See Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 270. 123 Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 278. 124 Quote taken from Dennis Hickey, “Rapprochement between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland,” p. 235. 125 Ibid., 271. 126 See Jiemian Yang, “Sino-U.S. and Cross-Strait Relations under the Post 11 September Strategic Settings,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 11, No. 33, (2002), pp. 657-672. Yang posited that the September 11th terrorist attack transformed the global strategic setting, forcing the Bush administration to adjust its confrontational attitudes toward Beijing and moderate its support for Taiwan. Washington, then, returned to a “cooperative, constructive, and candid” relationship with China. See also Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, pp. 156-160. 127 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 285. See also Alan Romberg, “The Role of the United States in Seeking a Peaceful Resolution,” in Steve Tsang, ed., Peace and Security across the Taiwan Strait (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 127-129. 128 Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, p. 202. 129 David G. Brown, “Taiwan Voters Set a New Course,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 10, No. 1, (April 2008), p. 4. 130 David G. Brown, “Taiwan Voters Set a New Course,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 10, No. 1, (April 2008), p. 3. 131 Hu articulated those terms while meeting with Lien Chan, the honorary chairman of the Kuomintang, in Beijing on April 29, 2008. The Chinese president’s quote is taken from David G. Brown, “China-Taiwan Relations: Dialogue Resumes in Relaxed Atmosphere,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 10, No. 2, (July 2008), p.2. 132 Nancy Tucker & Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” p. 31. 133 Ibid.

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Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 233. Ibid. 136 Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, pp. 229-232. After 2008, the ARATS-SEF talks were also known as the “Chen-Chiang” talks, as Chen Yunlin is the chairman of ARATS and Chiang Pin-kung the SEF chairman. For good summary and chronological track-records of the ARATS-SEF talks, see David G. Brown’s quarterly E-journal reporting in “China-Taiwan Relations: Dialogue Resumes in Relaxed Atmosphere,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 10, No. 2, (July 2008), “Progress in the Face of Headwinds,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 10, No. 3 (October 2008), “More Progress, Stronger Headwinds,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 10, No. 4 (January 2009), “New Economic Challenges,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 11, No. 1 (April 2009), “Moving Relations toward a New Deal,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 11, No.2 (July 2009), “Temporarily in the Doldrums,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 11, No.3 (October 2009), “Moving ahead Slowly,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 11, No.4 (January 2010), “ECFA and Domestic Politics,” Vol. 12, No.1 (April 2010), “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement Signed,” Vol. 12, No.2 (July 2010), “Slow, Steady Improvements,” Vol. 12, No. 3 (October 2010), “Looking ahead to 2012,” Vol. 12, No.4 (January 2011), and “Steady as She Goes,” Vol. 13, No.1 (May 2011). The Comparative Connections can be accessed from the website of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) at http://csis.org/program/comparative-connections 137 Daniel Rosen & Zhi Wang, The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic Liberalization, Chapters 1-2. 138 Ibid., p. 61. 139 David G. Brown, “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement Signed,” p 3. 140 Daniel Rosen & Zhi Wang, The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic Liberalization, p. 61; David G. Brown, “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement Signed,” p. 2. See also Yiin Chii-ming, Buju [Strategizing], (Taipei: Tianxia Zazhi Publishers, 2011), pp. 212-213. 141 David G. Brown,“Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement Signed,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 12, No.2 (July 2010), p. 4. In spite of domestic oppositions, the Ma administration in 2009 normalized opportunities for qualified Chinese-born spouses to work in Taiwan and to permit greater latitude for Chinese students to live and study in Taiwan. But, both the KMT and DPP are committed to shield Taiwan from Chinese laborer and agricultural competition, seeing those as endangering Taiwan’s economic welfare and, thus, national security. See also Daniel Rosen and Zhi Wang, The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic Liberalization, pp. 45-46; and Nancy Tucker & Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” p. 31. 142 Robert S. Wang, “Cross-Strait Prospects: ECFA and Beyond,” Freeman Report. Center for Strategic & International Studies (September, 2010), p. 2. For in-depth analyses on the beneficial effects of ECFA, see Daniel Rosen and Zhi Wang, The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic Liberalization, pp. 4649 and Yiin Chii-ming, Buju [Strategizing], Chapter 6. 143 Daniel Rosen and Zhi Wang, The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic Liberalization, p. 96. 144 Ibid., pp. 71-73. 135

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Robert Wang, “Cross-Strait Prospects,” p. 2. Daniel Rosen & Zhi Wang, The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic Liberalization, p. 71. 147 For more in-depth discussions on the effects of cross-strait economic integration on Taiwan’s national security relations to China, see Karen Sutter, “Business Dynamism across the Taiwan Strait,” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2002), pp. 522-540; Cal Clark, “The China-Taiwan Relationship: Growing Cross-Strait Economic Integration,” Orbis (Fall 2002), pp. 753-766.; Paul Bolt, “Economic Ties across the Taiwan Strait,” Issues & Studies Vol. 37, No. 2 (March/April 2001), pp. 80-105; and Chao Chien-min, “Will Economic Integration Between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to a Congenial Political Culture?” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2003), pp. 280-304. 148 As a comparison, in 2010, Japan made up 14 percent of Taiwan’s total trade and 7 percent of its total export while the United States constituted 10 percent of Taiwan’s total trade and 11 percent of exports. See Robert Wang, “Cross-Strait Prospects,” p. 3. 149 Daniel Rosen and Zhi Wang, The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic Liberalization, p. 132. 150 Ibid., p. 95 and pp. 132-133. Moreover, Chinese firms can greatly benefit from Taiwan’s high tech industries. Closer ties and greater investment liberalization would allow PRC semiconductor firms, for example, to learn from innovations and technological skills from Taiwan. So, in the long run, China is likely to be even “less” dependent on Taiwan’s high tech industries and knowhows. 151 Robert Sutter, “Taiwan’s Future: Narrowing Straits,” p. 16. 152 Ibid., p. 11. 153 Ibid., p. 16; David G. Brown “ECFA and Domestic Politics,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 12, No.1 (April 2010), p. 3. 154 Richard C. Bush, “Taiwan and East Asian Securities,” Orbis, (Spring 2011), p. 277. 155 For good discussions on commercial liberalism, see Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder, eds., Essential Readings in World Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), pp. 12-15; Norman Angell, The Great Illusion ( New York: Garland, 1977); Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), Chapter 2; and Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace ( New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), Chapter. 4. 156 Since states are adverse to wars, which are costly, peaceful outcome will be chosen if either one of the adversaries could more credibly signal its ultimate intention and resolve in crisis situation. See James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War”; Kenneth Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International Organization. Vol. 53, No. 2, (1999), pp. 233-266; Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, “How Globalization Can Reduce International Conflict” in Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils Gleditsch, eds., Globalization and Armed Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 123-140; Scott Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, pp. 117-121. 157 Neorealists stress about the concern for relative gains. Under international anarchy, states are inevitably preoccupied by which states gain 146

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more or less because there is no higher central authority that states can turn for protection. Such anxieties and suspicions not only exacerbate the security dilemma but also render interstate cooperation difficult. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 116-140; John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; and Dale Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 25, No.2, (2000), pp. 187-212. 158 Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Joanne Gowa & Edward Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, (1993), pp. 408-420. 159 See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman Pearson, 2001), pp. 12-13; Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), and Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978). On the relations between trade and conflict, see also Edward Mansfield & Brian Pollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and International Conflict, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), and Katherine Barbieri, The Liberal Illusion (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006). 160 Scott Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, pp. 89-90. 161 Ibid., pp. 98-99. 162 On Obama’s renewal strategy in foreign policy, see Steven Hook & James Scott, eds., American Renewal? (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2011); On the president’s foreign policy toward China and East Asia, see Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations; Thomas Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, pp.255256; Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, pp.259264; and Bo Zhiyue, “Obama’s China Policy,” in Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, eds., Thirty Years of China-U.S. Relations (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 253-279. 163 President Obama’s quote is taken from Dennis Hickey, “Rapprochement between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland,” p. 239. 164 David G. Brown, “Progress Slow as Taiwan Campaign Begins,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 13, No. 2, (September 2011), pp. 3-4. 165 Robert Sutter, “Taiwan’s Future: Narrowing Strait” p. 10. The Obama administration, like its predecessor, did not approve the 66 F-16 C/D fighters that Taiwan had been trying for years to get. Yet, the packages approved by the Bush and Obama administrations, in 2008 and 2010 respectively (totaled $13 billion), had generated strong criticism from Beijing and even led to brief suspensions of military contacts in 2008-09 and 2010. In late 2010, China resumed military talks with the United States, and the Obama administration delayed the decision of whether to sell F-16 C/D to Taiwan lest that this sensitive issue would obstruct Hu’s visit to Washington in January 2011 and other high level U.S.-China events in later 2011. See Robert Sutter, U.S.-

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Chinese Relations, p. 233; David Brown “Slow, Steady Improvements,” Comparative Connections, (October 2010), p. 4. 166 Nancy Tucker & Bonne Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” p. 30. 167 Robert Sutter, “Taiwan’s Future: Narrowing Straits,” p. 14. See also Robert Sutter, “China’s Power and the Fading U.S. Goal of “Balance” in the Taiwan Strait,” Asia Policy, No. 8, (July 2009), pp. 3-9. Taiwan’s defense budget has fallen below 3 percent of Taiwan’s GDP and actual spending also dropped. Moreover, China’s missile deployments targeting at Taiwan actually increased to more than 1,500 in recent years. See Nancy Tucker & Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” p. 30. 168 As noted in footnote # 165, The Obama administration is also partly responsible for delaying the sale of F-16 C/D fighter planes to Taiwan, fearing such act would further infuriate China, hamper the recently resume U.S.-PRC military talks, and complicate other U.S. priorities that require Beijing’s cooperation and coordination (i.e., global financial recovery, U.S.-PRC trade imbalances, climate change, counterterrorism, and regional hot spots ranging from Iran to North Korea). Yet, Washington has also been working on strategic contingency planning or hedging in order to cope with actual or possible negative consequences of an assertive China in regional and world politics. In early 2011, the revelation of China’s testing of its’ first stealth fighter, J-20, the deployment of DF-16 missiles, and first aircraft carrier further suggest the urgency of strengthening Taiwan’s military defense and air-deterrent capabilities. Since spring 2011, Washington has been considering to upgrade Taiwan’s existing F-16 A/B aircrafts and possible sale of the long-requested 66 F-16 C/D jets. Yet, in late September 2011, Washington signaled its intention to only upgrade F-16 A/B and postpone F-16 C/D till later times. See Robert Sutter, “Taiwan’s Future: Narrowing Straits,” p. 15; David G. Brown, “Progress Slow as Taiwan Campaign Begins,” pp. 5-6. 169 Daniel Rosen and Zhi Wang, pp. 128-129. And, see Nancy Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” p. 21. 170 See Pan Zhongqi, “U.S. Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity”; and Joseph Nye, “A Taiwan Deal,” Washington Post, March 8, 1998. Both Pan and Nye advocated that America should signal clearly its firm opposition to Taiwan independence. Bruce Gilley also attracted controversy when proposing the “Finlandization” of Taiwan, that is, the island, like what Finland proposed to the Soviet Union in 1948, could seek an agreement with Beijing to pledge not to side with any great powers to challenge China’s interests. And, in return, the PRC should grant Taiwan greater political independence. This plan essentially called Taiwan to reposition itself as a “neutral state” rather than a U.S. strategic ally. See Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire Straits,” Foreign Affairs, (January/February, 2010), pp. 48-50. 171 Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2, (March/April, 2011), pp. 80-91. See also Shyu-Tu Lee, Douglas Paal, and Charles Glaser, “Disengaging from Taiwan: Should Washington Continue Its Alliance with Taipei?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No.4, (May/June, 2011), pp. 179-182. 172 Nancy Tucker & Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” pp. 33-35.

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173 Congressional members and Republican politicians, who have traditionally been the staunchest supporters of Taiwan, took the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis as a propitious opportunity to attack the Clinton administration and America’s long-standing strategic ambiguity policy in the Taiwan Strait. Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), for instance, claimed that “it was this vacillation on the part of the Clinton administration that led China to believe that it could get away with bullying Taiwan.” Senator Bob Dole, the 1996 Republican presidential candidate, also suggested that “our policy should be unmistakably resolute. If force is used against Taiwan, America will respond.” Both quotes are taken from Dennis V.V. Hickey, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996,” p. 409. Supporters of Taiwan also stressed the need to strengthen America’s security commitment to Taiwan’s autonomy and liberal democratic system against a rising, militarily and economically threatening PRC. In spring 1999, for instance, Senator Helms, then the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supported the House-introduced Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA), which, if passed and signed, would have authorized the Clinton administration to provide a series of more advanced weapons system to Taiwan, such as theater-missile defense equipment, AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, diesel submarines, airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), antisubmarine systems, and Aegis destroyers. Other provisions included strengthening the Taiwan Relations Act through the tightening of U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation, and, most importantly, establishing “clarity” and eliminating “ambiguity” concerning America’s commitment to the defense of Taiwan. “These provisions,” wrote James Mann, “would have suggested that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense under any circumstances, even a declaration of formal independence from China.” See James Mann, “Congress and Taiwan: Understanding the Bond,” in Ramon Myers, Michael Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh, eds., Making China Policy, p. 214. Though the act failed passage due to staunch opposition from the Clinton White House, the initiative showed that supporters of Taiwan were zealously seeking to modify strategic ambiguity in favor of the island. Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 235. While supports for TSEA died down after Clinton’s veto in 2000, there has been a revival in recent years. Congressional “Taiwan caucus” has demanded the Obama administration to step up its support for Taiwan’s security as the island is one of America’s strongest allies in Asia. Representative Lleana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), the chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, promised in June 2011 to introduce new legislation to enhance the TRA and revive elements in the TSEA. See Nancy Tucker & Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” p. 29. 174 Scott Kastner, “Ambiguity, Economic Interdependence, and the U.S. Strategic Dilemma in the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 15, No. 49, (2007), p. 663. 175 Nancy Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?” p. 210. 176 Andrew Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy?” p. 99. 177 Ibid., p. 100. 178 Nancy B. Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” p. 24. 179 Ibid., p. 25. 180 Ibid, p. 25.

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181 Chas W. Freeman Jr., “Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restraining Taiwan and Beijing,” Foreign Affairs (July/August, 1998), p. 10. 182 Kurt M. Campbell and Derek J. Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?” Foreign Affairs, (July/August, 2001), p. 24. 183 Andrew Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy?” p. 105. 184 Scott Kastner, “Ambiguity, Economic Interdependence, and the U.S. Strategic Dilemma in the Taiwan Strait,” pp. 668-669. 185 Robert Sutter, “Taiwan’s Future: Narrowing Straits,” p. 15.

3 Wilson’s Vision for an Open China

The neorealist theory assumes that the international system of anarchy compels all states, irrespective of their internal attributes, to strengthen their security either by striving for a balance of power or by becoming a hegemon through an offensive war.1 The previous chapters have pointed out that there is a clear realist motivation underpinning the U.S. Taiwan Strait policy: deterring both China and Taiwan from taking unilateral actions that could disrupt cross-strait peace and stability. The question raised, nevertheless, concerns why Washington has defined its security interest in terms of no forceful reunification, no unilateral independence, and the insistence that all resolutions must be achieved peacefully and with the mutual consent of Beijing and Taipei. Indeed, given America’s superior influence, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait could also be achieved through other policy alternatives, such as supporting the PRC’s reunification with Taiwan or backing the island’s quest for independence. As discussed, in early 1950, operating under the similar Cold War bipolar structure, Great Britain recognized Beijing and broke relations with the ROC. But, the United States only did so in 1979 and has remained steadfast in pursuing its strategic ambiguity policy. While power structure tends to establish an overarching parameter for state behaviors, top decision makers have many optimal choices to decide on a foreign policy course of action. Factors within the state are essential in determining the decision and final enactment of a policy.2 Gideon Rose properly summarized that “the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities…[yet] that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.”3 In other words, as domestic-level politics, interests, and cultural legacies vary from state to state, they serve a “filtering” function between international conditions and strategic policy outcomes. The main

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argument here posits that American liberalism—Wilsonian Open Door internationalism—plays the essential role in defining U.S. interests in the Taiwan Strait and the selecting of strategic ambiguity policy. U.S. Liberal Tradition and Strategic Choice

A state’s foreign policy choice is often shaped by its strategic culture, which is an interlocking set of values, ideas, beliefs, and norms that “relate to the legitimate and efficient conduct of political-military affairs.”4 Foreign policy leaders rely upon these preconceived traditions and causal beliefs as a road map to analyze external events, construe national interests, and to decide on policy choices.5 Moreover, strategic culture also constitutes a sense of national self-image or identity, which is itself a framework for social action and cognitive interpretation.6 For Michael Hunt, the core foreign-policy ideas would have to reflect the self-image of those who espoused them and define a relationship with the world consonant with that self-image.7 Who we are essentially influences what and how we want.8 When setting a policy, leaders are constrained to act within the bounds of certain behavioral norms and expectations that are not contradicting the state’s fundamental strategic culture and identity. Grand strategies that are inconsistent with America’s liberal tradition are unlikely to be chosen even if they are sound and viable under the prevailing international setting.9 “The seeming violation of accepted norms, or the abandonment of culturally prescribed national goals,” Colin Dueck contended, “is likely to trigger domestic opposition that is not only strong, but emotional, since such norms and/or goals are closely linked to a basic and constitutive sense of national identity.”10 The democratic peace theory provides a close examination of how liberal norms dictate foreign policy choice.11 Liberal republics, according to John Owen, tend to “perceive their situation and the correct course of action through a liberal lens.” Liberalism, in other words, is a worldview, a set of fundamental categories through which individuals understand themselves and the world. Therefore, it shapes leaders’ conceptions of their identities, national interests, and foreign policy decisions.12 Liberal democracies are more peaceful than authoritarian regimes because the former gains legitimacy from the people who suffer from the hardships and high costs of war.13 Characterized by the norms of “live and let live,” civil liberties, and human rights, democracies have the right to be free from foreign intervention and subjugation. Moreover, the institutional structures of separation of powers, free-market place of

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expressions, and checks and balances also hamper liberal states from declaring war or embarking upon reckless foreign adventures.14 Consequently, liberal states tend to enjoy a pacific union among themselves. Autocratic states, in contrast, that coerce their citizens lack moral imperatives and are prone to engage in expansionist wars and insatiable conquests. “[Under] a non-republican constitution, where subjects are not citizens,” Immanuel Kant stressed, “the easiest thing in the world to do is to declare war. Here the ruler is not a fellow citizen, but the nation’s owner, and war does not affect his table, his hunt, his places of pleasure, and his court festivals, and so on. Thus, he can decide to go to war for the most meaningless of reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure party.”15 Accordingly, the liberal dictum of non-intervention does not hold for those regimes, as liberal republics would and often do fight states that are perceived to be tyrannical and despotic. Michael Doyle summed up that “even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.”16 In sum, liberal ideas, cultures, and norms provide democratic decision-makers the guiding principles to interpret the outside world, construct national interests, and enact policies to deal with external challenges. The next section discusses how liberal tradition affects U.S. policymakers’ view toward the Taiwan Strait impasse. Wilsonian Open Door Liberalism: An Identity Framework for U.S. Decision-Makers

In the two centuries since its founding, the United States has socially created an American liberal identity and interests that differentiate from those who are aliens to them. The contrast of the American “liberal self” with the “illiberal others” is carried out and constructed through social interactions at both the international and domestic levels.17 In his trenchant analysis, Louis Hartz described how liberalism fosters a “colossal liberal absolutism” in America’s domestic politics as well as in its foreign relations. He said that “in a war of ideas, this frame of mind has two automatic effects: it hampers creative action abroad by identifying the alien with the unintelligible, and it inspires hysteria at home by generating the anxiety that unintelligible things produce. The ‘red scare,’ in other words, is not only our domestic problem; it is our international problem as well.”18 The “moral absolutist ethos” embodied in U.S. liberalism has compelled Washington leaders to treat revolutionaries, Communists, fascists, and non-Americans, both at home and abroad, as potential

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aliens and enemies. Such ideas generate dual identities of “Jeffersonian isolationist” and “Wilsonian internationalist,” with the former seeing that America’s “liberal joy lay in the escape from a decadent Old World that could only infect it with its own diseases,” and the latter believing in a moral crusade abroad, “projecting itself headlong over the strange and ancient societies of Europe and Asia.”19 “[Thus] an absolute national morality,” Hartz argued, “is inspired either to withdraw from ‘alien’ things or to transform them: it cannot live in comfort constantly by their sides.”20 As the United States rose to globalism at the dawn of the twentieth century, President Woodrow Wilson quickly linked America’s security to the creation of a liberal Open Door world order, made up of states that accept “the United States’ liberal values and democratic institutions and are open to U.S. economic penetration.”21 The assumption is that political and economic liberalism cannot flourish in the U.S. homeland unless they are also implemented abroad. This Wilsonian Open Door internationalism ultimately defines America’s relations with the world in general and with China in particular. Wilsonianism

Wilsonianism, in the words of Walter Russell Mead, is the idea that “the United States has both a moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values throughout the world, creating a peaceful international community that accepts the rule of law.”22 Offering his vision of a new world order for the postGreat War era, Wilson articulated a view that embraced the following precepts: 1. Political Open Door, which stressed that the political foundation of a peaceful order must be built on a community of liberal democratic states. 2. National self-determination, which affirmed both national sovereignty and democratic self-government. 3. Open Door economic globalization, which favored international liberal trade and investments across national borders as the means to undercut tyranny, oligopoly, and strengthen the fabric of international community.

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4. Collective security, which found expression in the postwar League of Nations and cooperation of liberal states to control arms and check against aggressive impulses. 5. Progressive history, which undergirded the Wilsonian vision of a better future for the word. 6. American mission, which stated that as the vanguard of this progressive movement, America has special responsibilities to lead, direct, and inspire the world due to its founding ideas, geopolitical position, and enlightened leadership.23 As we have seen, these tenets are also known as the political and economic Open Door traditions. “The principles, the legacy of Wilsonianism,” argued Lloyd Ambrosius, “profoundly influenced the thinking and behavior of Americans in the twentieth century, [as] they provided the dominant ideology for the United States during this socalled American Century.”24 To be sure, Wilsonian liberalism may be a misleading label since, as Mead rightfully contended, the “Wilsonian [liberals] were actively shaping American foreign policy long before Wilson moved to Washington.”25 Indeed, Hartz traced the roots of America’s two major liberal impulses—democracy and free market capitalism—back to the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian school for the former and the Hamiltonian school for the latter.26 Hence, American liberalism, from the beginning of the republic, has differentiated itself from the European political cultures because the former lacks European feudalism, aristocracy, and radicalism and treats “equality” and “democracy” as “natural phenomena.”27 Furthermore, U.S. leaders’ commitment to liberal neutrality—free maritime commerce even in times of European wars— has been the staple of American foreign economic policy since the founding. “From its inception,” wrote Mlada Bukovansky, “the United States took its cue from the Dutch (early supporters of liberal neutrality) and staked its identity upon the contested liberal interpretation of neutral rights.”28 The U.S. republicanism entailed formulating a conception of political economy distinct from British mercantilism. Despite pressures from Britain and France in the early nineteenth century, the Jefferson and Madison administrations insisted upon liberal neutrality rights, even using commercial retaliation to combat European predations.29 Nevertheless, it is important to note that throughout the nineteenth century and up until America’s entry into the First World War in April 1917, the United States’ foreign policy had more or less followed

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George Washington’s warnings against “entangling alliances” to shun away from unnecessary involvement in the European balance of power politics. Thus, isolationism was the prevailing American grand strategy until the 1890s, when the McKinley administration began the quest for territorial annexation and empire in the wake of the Spanish-American War. But, between 1900 and 1913, during the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, the idea of internationalism was embraced by only a small group of Americans. “With the exception of the Western Hemisphere,” posited Frank Ninkovich, “the nation’s policy departures generated little in the way of new commitments.”30 Though the Democratic Party supported greater freer trade and tariff reductions, Republican protectionism continued to dominate the thinking of American policymakers.31 The “crisis internationalism” in the first half of the twentieth century, however, made Wilsonianism an influential bedrock foundation of U.S. strategic culture and foreign policy identity. The enormity of the European War, which broke out in August 1914, illustrated the turbulence, danger, and extremism inherent in modernity. “Wilson was a crusader,” commented Ninkovich, “but his long-term influence would have been minimal had he not also been the first statesman to understand the self-destructive side of modern international relations and to formulate a comprehensive new approach that promised to salvage international society’s progressive machinery.”32 Even though the president’s vision has often been ridiculed as “idealistic,” his progressive state of mind, in short, actually came out of the widespread sense of crisis plaguing the United States and the world. Thus, in the words of G. John Ikenberry, “Wilson [is] the founding father of the liberal tradition of American foreign affairs.”33 Even as strong a realist as Henry Kissinger conceded that “Wilsonianism is the dominant tradition of American foreign policy.” “Though Wilson could not convince his own country of his merit,” he noted, “the idea lived on. It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency and continues to march to this day.”34 Based on the Christian tradition and Presbyterian theology, Wilson’s political beliefs and values have strong religious and ethical sentiments. He believed in a sovereign God, just and stern as well as loving, and in a moral universe, the laws of which ruled nations as well as men.35 From such a spiritual upbringing, the president developed a sense of idealism in his conduct of foreign affairs, which, for him, were the “subordination of immediate goals and material interests to superior ethical standards and the exaltation of moral and spiritual purposes.”36

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Wilson found that American liberalism is the cure for the evils of the international system and sought to project it to the rest of the world. Viewing the United States as the vanguard, he expected other nations to follow its example and develop the same way.37 Essentially, the United States, in his conception, should not only seek to change the external behaviors of other states but should also promote actively the spread of democracy, which is the most humane and Christian form of government.38 Though Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare made America’s belligerency in World War I inevitable, the goal of a “righteous and liberal peace” was the ultimate objective that justified full-scale participation in President Wilson’s mind. It was, therefore, not war in anger that he advocated, not war merely in defense of national rights, but, as the president proclaimed in his war message in 1917, a “war for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.”39 Another important component of the Wilsonian vision, embodied later in one of his Fourteen Points, was the “the removal of barriers to trade among nations.”40 The support for free trade internationalism was manifested in the president’s eager push for the passage of the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, which “lowered duties from 38 to 30 percent and placed a number of items on the free list.”41 It was Wilson’s firm belief that the deepening of commercial ties would foster mutual dependency and understanding that would illuminate the path to peaceful resolution of international problems. Hence, economic interdependence makes interstate conflicts less likely to occur, given the benefits from economic ties. More importantly, the free economic trade promotes liberal impulses and desires for freedom, thereby undermining authoritarian regimes. Wilson perceived the Great War “in terms of an epochal struggle between forces representing the past and those bearing the standard of the future.”42 He essentially attributed the breakdown of the international system in 1914 to the culmination of the excessive and pathological reliance on power politics, imperialism, and secret diplomacy by the European states. A community of powers, on the other hand, comprised of liberal and free-trade oriented democracies, would help to ensure a lasting peace. Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant exemplifies this notion of a collective security system, which stipulates that the League members should “undertake to respect and

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preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all.”43 Accordingly, for Wilson, American security and prosperity are directly linked to his vision of establishing an economic and political Open Door world system. Tony Smith believes that since WWI, the most consistent tradition in American foreign policy with respect to this global change has been the “[Wilsonian] belief that the nation’s security is best protected by the expansion of democracy worldwide.”44 “It is interesting,” Hartz asserted, “how Wilson’s world policy reflected his domestic progressivism.…Wasn’t Wilson smashing the AustroHungarian Empire into bits much as he would smash an American trust?”45 In fact, “Wilson,” William A. Williams argued, “in his ‘imperialism of idealism,’” aimed to “save the world as part of sustaining and perfecting America."46 The United States’ liberal economic and ideological expansionism strives for a world safe for democracy, and only in this Open Door international context could democracy and a free market economy continue to thrive within the United States.47 Particularly in the early twentieth century, when European fascist and Communist revolutionary forces were battling for political and ideological supremacy, Wilsonianism offered an alternative to prevent America from being engulfed in a world of closure and radicalism. At the height of World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt embraced the Wilsonian principle, believing that the U.S. could not sit out watching the world be dominated by German Nazism and Japanese militarism. “To survive in such a [totalitarian] world,” asserted FDR, “we would have to convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy.”48 If totalitarianism triumphs worldwide, the American way of life would be radically transformed. This fear of totalitarianism manifested in Wilson’s distaste for Communist revolutions. The Founding Fathers had long recognized the “perils of revolutions” even though the United States won its independence through a revolution against Great Britain. Both Thomas Jefferson and John Adams agreed that “the spirit of revolution was infectious and that it could, for better or worse, spread far beyond its places of origin.”49 Ordered liberty achieved by others would confirm for Americans their leading role in a secure world of free peoples. Revolutions gone astray, on the other hand, would leave Americans feeling repudiated, isolated, and anxious. Therefore, all revolutions abroad bore careful watching. Socialist or Communist revolutions are especially troublesome because they challenge the central principle of the free market system by advocating

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the abolishment of private property ownership and supporting state nationalization of industries and enterprises. Wilson’s desire to use U.S. moral leadership to construct an Open Door world order emphatically challenged Lenin’s belief in rectifying the flaws of international economic structure through radical revolutions. The president sought to resolve the contradictions of the world capitalist system by means of peaceful socioeconomic reforms. “The Wilsonians,” posited Gordon Levin, “feared that unless America could remain in control of all progressive international movements, Leninist revolutionary-socialism might capture Europe’s masses and destroy not only atavistic imperialism, but all liberal values and institutions as well.”50 Hence, liberalism’s inherent intolerance toward anything that is antithetical to its precepts has often led to “overreacting illiberal policies,” both at home and abroad, or “liberal imperial expansion” in order to subdue these “unintelligible” forces. The crusade to make the world safe for democracy is, for some critics, the “peculiar quality of America’s liberal hysteria.”51 Since Wilson, such liberal imperialistic proclivity has been shown repeatedly throughout U.S. foreign policymaking, and even George W. Bush, perhaps one of the most conservative and realist postwar presidents, could not avoid following Wilson’s thoughts, when he sought to use America’s ideological, political, economic, and military superiority to impose regime change in Iraq and to lead a global struggle against terrorism. The Bush Doctrine, in Ikenberry’s opinion, is the “most Wilsonian statement any president has made since Wilson himself, echoing his pledge to use American power to create a universal domination of right.”52 In sum, Wilsonianism has guided U.S. foreign policy throughout WWII and the Cold War. Even in the post-Cold War era, Wilsonian liberalism still offers compelling lessons for the United States. Wilsonian Open Door Internationalism and China

Chapter 1 has discussed that while the Open Door policy was long proclaimed by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 and 1900, President Wilson was the first who sought to assertively implement the doctrine, believing that the “mere announcement of the Open Door could not make it work; [for] it required assiduous cultivation and continuous support.”53 Unlike his predecessors—McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft— Wilson set the tone for future U.S. administrations that the Open Door policy in China is more than the respect of her territorial and administrative integrity and the promotion of equal economic opportunities and free trade. It is also essential to support and promote a

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China that is united, strong, and democratic, which is ultimately free and independent from foreign aggression and encroachment. Though having only a “veneer of knowledge” of the Far East, Woodrow Wilson was especially interested in China, viewing it as the “newly awakened giant of the Orient,” whose “huge population and undeveloped resources offered unparalleled opportunities for the development of American trade.” In fact, as the president of Princeton University, Wilson “had taken the initiative in obtaining Chinese students under the Boxer indemnity funds. He had interested himself in the Princeton work in [Beijing], through which the University supported YMCA activities there.”54 As fate would have it, Wilson’s perennial interest in China’s wellbeing, democratization, and modernization coincided with the 1911 republican revolution, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (a Chinese Christian educated in American missionary schools), which culminated in the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912. The Chinese revolutionary movement was, in some ways, fostered by the American missionaries, whose purpose was “to make China an advanced, Christian, and democratic country.”55 So, when Sun’s revolution succeeded, hopes for China’s modernization soared among Americans, chief among which was Woodrow Wilson.56 To the president, “[the Republic of] China was fertile soil where Americans might help self-government and Christianity take root.”57 He firmly believed that the United States would be the “friend and exemplar” for the Chinese people. Wilson felt, as he wrote to Sun, “the strongest sympathy with every movement which looks towards giving the people…of China the liberty for which they have so long been yearning and preparing themselves.”58 Consequently, whereas the Taft administration delayed the recognition of ROC until a concerted consensus could be reached among all other great powers, President Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan opted for prompt action to accord recognition, aiming to see that China would “establish a stable [and democratic] government and were afraid that certain great powers were trying to prevent her from doing so.”59 It was obvious to the Wilson administration that these other powers such as Great Britain, Japan, and Russia were simply trying to use recognition as a political leverage to extract more concessions and exclusive rights from China.60 To the chagrin of these countries, Wilson decided to act unilaterally, although he did insist on recognizing the republic only after the Chinese authority convened the National Assembly scheduled in late April 1913. On April 30, E.T. Williams, the American chargé d’ affaires in Beijing,

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reported to Secretary Bryan that the “Chinese Lower House elected speaker tonight, member of [President] Yuan’s party. I am informed that I shall be notified tomorrow and may present recognition message Friday.”61 Then, on May 2, 1913, the United States was the first among all powers to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the ROC government. In his recognition note, Wilson welcomed the “new China thus entering into the family of nations,” and expressed the hope that “in perfecting a republican form of government, the Chinese nation will attain to the highest degree of development and well-being.”62 President Yuan Shikai replied to Wilson the next day, expressing his gratitude for Washington’s generous action: In the name of the Republic of China, I thank you most heartily for the message of recognition which you have sent to me through your honored representative in this capital. The sentiments of amity and good will which it bespeaks and the expressions of greeting and welcome which it conveys at once testify to the American spirit of mutual helpfulness and adds another brilliant page to the history of seventy years of uninterrupted friendly [relations] between China and the United States.63

The optimism over a Western-style Chinese republic, however, proved only transient. Civil war immediately broke out between Sun’s southern revolutionary forces in Guangzhou and President Yuan’s militarist regime in Beijing. In their critical assessment of Wilson’s China policy, Crane and Breslin suggested that the U.S. support of Yuan’s dictatorship reflected “the shallow nature of America’s republican sympathies and the guile of the Wilson administration.”64 They concluded that American material interests supplanted its moral imperatives. It is without a doubt that Wilson understood fully that Yuan was not a true believer in republicanism and democratic principles.65 Yet, it is equally true that the president soon cast doubt over Sun Yatsen’s radical and nationalist principles.66 Indeed, Washington received words from American diplomats and missionaries in China, reporting that Sun and his revolutionary colleagues were essentially “atheistic socialists” and the Kuomintang Party a “seditious organization.”67 In light of China’s internal division and weakness, therefore, Wilson was more in favor of Yuan’s administrative capabilities and firm control over the various military factions. “In weighting the Chinese situation,” observed Tien-yi Li, “he placed internal stability and freedom from foreign aggression above the republican form of government.”68 The transition from a monarchy to a democratic republic is necessarily a long and arduous process, which

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could not be expected to emerge overnight. As the Chinese people were ill prepared for democracy, a strong and central government was needed in the interim to prevent China from foreign aggression and socialist radicalism.69 With America’s assistance and moral support, China, even under an autocracy, would eventually evolve into “a politically and economically integrated nation along the democratic capitalist model exemplified by the United States.”70 To foster the close connection between Washington and Beijing, America’s diplomatic representative in China would be the most vital intermediary. Shortly before Wilson’s inauguration, he was deeply preoccupied with the search for and selection of a most competent, moral, and trusted man to assume the post of minister to China. Wilson told his close adviser, Colonel Edward House, that he was “profoundly sympathetic with the Chinese people and wished to do everything possible to assist them.”71 Thus, in a private letter to his close friend, Edward Jenkins, the president told the latter to persuade John Mott, a devoted Christian and also the leader of the YMCA in China, who had just turned down his appointment for the minister to China, to reconsider. “Feel that my duty to the public interest obliges me to urge reconsideration on your part,” wrote Wilson, “the interests of China and of the Christian world are so intimately involved.”72 In spite of Wilson’s unrelenting efforts and appeals, Mott remained resolute and turned down the offer for the second time. The appointment finally landed upon Paul S. Reinsch, a political science professor at the University of Wisconsin specializing in world politics and China. Reinsch’s deep knowledge on Far Eastern affairs made him a leading expert in the Wilson administration. During his tenure in China, from 1913 to 1919, his reports and personal consultations kept the president well-informed on Chinese problems. Wilson shared Reinsch’s view that the Chinese revolution would develop into a “vast regenerative movement” for its people.73 While recognizing that the great powers’ ambitions in China would challenge the United States’ liberal vision, the minister refused to “consider them insuperable barriers to the operation of the Open Door.”74 In his memoir, Reinsch noted that the United States “had no political aims [with respect to China] and desired to abstain, particularly from anything verging on political interference.”75 Like Wilson, Reinsch was enthusiastic about the birth of the new Chinese Republic, even though he described Yuan Shikai as having “no real knowledge or conception of the commonwealth principle of government, nor of the true use and function of a parliament, and particularly of a parliamentary opposition.”76 But, the minister clearly

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perceived the emergence of democratic spirit in China, however rudimentary, when he said: It was a pleasure to see the growing manifestation of a commonwealth spirit, the organization of public opinion, and the clearer vision of the demands of public service. Even among the officials, the idea that the government was merely a taxing and office-holding organization was given away, especially among the younger men, to a desire that the functions of government should be used for developmental purposes, in helping the people towards better methods in agriculture and industry, in encouraging improved communications and public works of many kinds.77

Thus, with patience and concrete assistance, America could help China to appreciate honest and efficient government and to prosper into a liberal democratic nation. “Sound action in business and constructive work in industry should be America’s contribution to the solution of the specific difficulties of China.”78 For Wilson and Reisnch, then, America must secure for China “immunity from the constant interference, open and secret, on the part of foreign interests desirous of confusing Chinese affairs and drawing advantage from such confusion.” In other words, the Open Door must be “guarded” vigorously. “So far as American diplomatic action was concerned,” he stressed, “its essential task was to prevent such interference, and to see to it that China could not be closed even by those indirect methods which often accompany the most vociferous, ardent declarations in favor of Chinese independence and sovereignty.”79 Wilson Defends the Open Door

The Wilson administration’s insistence on defending the Open Door was put to numerous tests as European and Japanese powers demanded, whenever they could, for political and economic interference in China. Almost instantaneously after assuming office, Wilson was left with the pressing issue from the preceding Taft administration of whether American bankers and industrialists should continue to participate in the international financial consortium set up initially in 1911 by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, to supply capital to the Chinese government for currency reform and the construction of the Hukuang Railway in the Yangtze Valley. These loan assistance programs soon fell into abeyance due to the outbreak of the Chinese revolution. On June 18, 1912, the original Four-Power consortium was expanded to include Japan and Russia, thus becoming the Six-Power

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consortium. As the incipient Chinese Republic was in grave financial woe and in desperate need for external assistance for government reconstruction, the reorganization loan was agreed between Yuan Shikai’s government and the Sextuple Powers. The Taft administration believed that America’s participation in the consortium would “counterbalance the unscrupulous actions of other powers.”80 However, the loan proposal contained many provisions infringing upon China’s political and administrative integrity. For instance, China must cede her financial auditing authority to the foreign powers to ensure the effective expenditure of the loan funds. The salt taxes “to be hypothecated for the service of this loan should be administered either by the existing Maritime Customs organization or by a separate Chinese services like the customs, however, under foreign direction, thus safeguarding the proper administration of the security despite the possible continuation or recurrence of unsettled conditions in China.” And, for a period of five years, China “should appoint the [consortium] group’s financial agents to assist the administration in its work of reorganization.”81 Whereas France, Japan, Britain, Germany, and Russia disagreed with each other over the relative weight of control that each should exercise over China’s finance, American bankers, disgusted over the powers’ imperialistic tendencies, felt great unease and signaled their intention to withdraw from the consortium.82 Believing still in a concerted action and that U.S. engagement in the loan program could restrain the powers’ selfish inclinations, the Taft administration urged the financiers to stay put and to wait for the incoming Wilson administration for further instructions. Wilson and Bryan, nonetheless, never liked the consortium or any form of imperialistic exploitation of China. As “friends of China” and staunch proponents of the Open Door policy, they opposed the “placing of China under foreign control, whether political, military, or economic.”83 As a result, the president was, from the outset, supportive of America’s withdrawal from the financial arrangement, believing it was against the liberal Open Door tradition to encourage American financiers to cooperate in a greedy expedition for special profits and privileges. Therefore, the president, after securing a consensus from his advisers in the cabinet meeting on March 18, 1913, transmitted a press statement. Since Wilson’s Open Door vision was vividly revealed in this press release, it is worthwhile to quote it at length. We are informed that at the request of the last [Taft] administration a certain group of American bankers undertook to participate in the loan now desired by the government of China (approximately

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$125,000,000).… The present administration has been asked by this group of bankers whether it would also request them to participate in the loan.… The administration has declined to make such request because it did not approve the conditions of the loan or the implications of responsibility on its own part which it was plainly told would be involved in the request. The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself; and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial, and even the political affairs of that great oriental state, just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and of its obligation to its people. The conditions…[are] plain enough and [are] obnoxious to the principles upon which the government of our people rests. The government of the United States is not only willing, but earnestly desirous, of aiding the great Chinese people in every way that is consistent with their untrammeled development and its own immemorial principles. The awakening of the people of China to a consciousness of their possibilities under free government is the most significant, if not the most momentous, event of our generation. With this movement and aspiration the American people are in profound sympathy…. The present administration will urge and support the legislative measures necessary to give American merchants, manufacturers, contractors, and engineers the banking and other financial facilities which they now lack, and without which they are at a serious disadvantage as compared with their industrial and commercial rivals. This is its duty. This is the main material interest of its citizens in the development of China. Our interests are those of the Open Door—a door of friendship and mutual advantage. This is the only door we care to enter.84

Wilson’s message was clear. The Open Door could not be reconciled with the great powers’ schemes to continue subjugating China and undermining her territorial and administrative integrity, and most importantly, these “obnoxious” forces would seriously subvert the development of Chinese democracy that was still in its infant stage. By withdrawing from the consortium, the United States, therefore, would help China through other more “honorable ways.”85 Although Washington’s announcement to pull out of the consortium surprised both the European and Japanese powers, they, starting in the summer of 1913, soon wrested many railway and territorial concessions from China.86 Historians have attributed these new waves of “scramble for China” to Wilson’s unilateral withdrawal from the consortium, citing

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that the absence of a moral balancing force unfettered the imperialists’ insatiable appetites. “With the loss of the United States as a moral leader among the powers, and the abandonment of the policy of international cooperation and concerted action, so splendidly inaugurated under the Taft administration,” Joshua Bao explained, “the powers reverted to their old practices, repeating the dreadful scenes of 1898 and 1908.”87 The critics, however, miss the point that these actions would probably continue irrespective of Wilson’s decision. Indeed, as a rising power, the United States, at the turn of the twentieth century, was not taken too seriously by the great powers. Consequently, its restraining force upon nations like Great Britain, Germany, and Japan was probably overstated. On the other hand, the president’s emphasis upon an independent course of action did draw sharp contrast from the previous administrations. The significance is that Wilson’s Open Door stood for China’s territorial integrity, political independence, and democratization. These liberal tenets, in sum, could not be compromised. On March 28, 1913, ten days after proclaiming the withdrawal from the consortium, Wilson posited: “I feel so keenly the desire to help China that I prefer to err in the line of helping that country than otherwise. If we had entered into the loan with [the] other powers we would have got nothing but more influence in China and lost the proud position which America secured when Secretary Hay stood for the Open Door in China after the Boxer Rebellion.”88 To defend China’s Open Door, the Wilson administration also faced the daunting task of balancing against Japan, the rising giant in the Far East, whose triumphs in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and RussoJapanese War of 1904 elevated her into a great power status. For both security and economic expansionist reasons, Tokyo harbored strong interests in gaining and controlling South Manchuria, East Mongolia, and the Shandong province. In fact, one of the reasons that motivated Tokyo’s declaration of war against Germany in WWI was to acquire the latter’s possessions of Jiaozhou and Qingdao in Shandong.89 On January 18, 1915, the Japanese minister to China, Eki Hioki, handed President Yuan the so-called Twenty-One Demands, which was divided into five categories. Essentially, China must give in to Japan’s “paramount interest” in North China and to allow Tokyo’s quasi dominance over China’s political, military, and financial affairs.90 It is obvious that the Japanese demands were a blatant violation of the Open Door policy. As they were publicly disclosed, the Wilson administration was alarmed. In a private note to Secretary Bryan, President Wilson said it was important to secure ratification of treaties that would accord equal treatment of Japanese in America. But, with the

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Twenty-one Demands in mind, he emphasized that “there are many things to consider first: among the rest her present attitude and intentions in China and her willingness or unwillingness to live up to the obligations she has assumed towards us with regard to the Open Door in the East.”91 In dealing with Japan, the president understood that there was a fine line to walk. On the one hand, Japan’s growing international prominence and naval capability posed imminent threats to America’s security interests in the Far East. As a result, Washington would, in the meantime, seek a balance of power with Tokyo rather than a military showdown. On the other hand, Japan’s demands to China represented an explicit abrogation of the Open Door doctrine and amounted to an arrogant encroachment of China’s political and territorial integrity. To Wilson, such behavior was clearly unacceptable. Hence, in the first two weeks of March, Secretary Bryan was busily drafting a statement to Tokyo to reaffirm Washington’s position. On March 12, 1915, the president approved the draft, noting that “this note seems to me thorough and satisfactory, and I hope that it may be possible to dispatch it promptly.” On the same day, Wilson read telegrams from Paul Reinsch and E.T. Williams to Bryan explaining that “the Japanese fleet has already sailed under sealed orders and also to the fact that the requests of Group Five [of the Twenty-one Demands] are being pressed, and that more troops were dispatched to Shandong and Manchuria.” President Wilson immediately wrote to his secretary of state: “This seems to me very serious. It makes it all the more desirable that our notes to Japan should go forward at the earliest possible moment.”92 On the following day, the secretary dispatched the note to Sutemi Chinda, the Japanese ambassador. Bryan firmly asked Japan to rephrase “demands” by changing the word into “requests” because “the American government understands from this distinction between the ‘demands’ and the ‘requests’ that the latter are not to be pressed if the Chinese government should decline to consider them.” The secretary then went over the U.S. Open Door tradition and reminded that, in acceptance of the two Open Door notes from Secretary John Hay in 1899 and 1900, respectively, Tokyo pledged that her government “will have no hesitation to give their assent to so just and fair a proposal of the United States, provided that all the other powers concerned shall accept the same.”93 In addition, Bryan pointed out that the Twenty-one Demands would hinder the “growth and development of the new republic” in such a “critical stage” of China’s democratization process. Nevertheless, sharing Wilson’s concern that Japan must not be alienated, Bryan did not object to all provisions contained in the Japanese demands. He

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conceded, “The United States frankly recognizes that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts.”94 Thus, the Wilson administration was willing to compromise on certain points of the Japanese demands and to respect the latter’s interests and concessions in Shandong, South Manchuria, and East Mongolia, as long as China retained the de-jure sovereign rights over these territories. Yet, Wilson and Bryan raised strong objections against the provisions that essentially imposed on China to cede her political, military, police, and economic powers to Japanese administrators. In the words of Bryan: The United States government considers [these as] violations of the principle of equal opportunity of commerce.… [And with regard to provisions on policing power and Japanese involvement in China’s administrative affairs], if accepted by China, while not infringing the territorial integrity of the republic, [they] are clearly derogatory to the political independence and administrative entity of that country.… It is difficult for the United States, therefore, to reconcile these requests with the maintenance of the unimpaired sovereignty of China.95

While Japan accepted Bryan’s note and reaffirmed support of the Open Door policy, her agreement was mainly lip-service. For the remaining years of the Wilson administration, all exchanges between the United States and Japan over the China issue reflected a simple pattern. While Washington steadfastly insisted upon the maintenance of the Open Door, Tokyo continued, whether in explicit or discreet manners, to demand concessions from China. In short, Washington’s warning to Tokyo was noted but not followed. As a matter of fact, just a month after Bryan’s note to Ambassador Chinda, Paul Reinsch sent a telegram reporting on Japan’s intentional misrepresentation to the Chinese government about America’s “complaisance with respect to the Twentyone Demands and the futility of China’s basing any hopes upon American support.” The U.S. minister to China urged the secretary that “it is to be feared that unless our government unmistakably dissociate itself from the appearance of acquiescence in the unconscionable demands of Japan; persistent flagrant misrepresentations of its motives, such as above cited, will embitter Chinese public opinion against it.”96 On April 14, 1915, President Wilson, in his correspondence to Bryan, expressed his concern about Reinsch’s letter, noting that “I am very uneasy about what is going on, as reported by Mr. Reinsch, and must frankly admit that I do not credit the assurances the Japanese have sought to give us.” Wilson then asked Bryan to express to the Japanese ambassador “the grave concerns we feel at hearing that his government

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is insisting upon the acquiescence of the Chinese government in the ‘requests,’ because they are so clearly incompatible with the administrative independence and autonomy of the Chinese empire and with the maintenance of the policy of an open door to the world.” “In short,” Wilson said in the same letter, “I feel that we should be as active as the circumstances permit in showing ourselves to be champions of the sovereign rights of China, now as always, though with no thought of seeking any special advantages or privilege for ourselves.” He also wanted Bryan to tell Reinsch that it was “definitely not true that the United States has acquiesced in any of Japan’s demands.”97 The president’s insistence on Japan’s abidance of the Open Door illustrates, once again, his eagerness to fight for China’s wellbeing. Finally, on November 2, 1917, Robert Lansing, the new secretary of state, and Viscount Ishii, the Japanese ambassador, reached an agreement in which Washington recognized that since territorial propinquity created special relations between countries, Japan necessarily would have special interests in China, particularly in the “part to which her possessions are contiguous.” 98 In return, Japan would “always adhere to the [Open Door] principle or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.” 99 The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was meant to, once again, have Japan reassure the international community that she would stick to China’s Open Door, thus clearing the “diplomatic atmosphere of the suspicions which had been so carefully spread by German propaganda.”100 Nevertheless, while the Wilson administration persisted in using the term “special interests” to refer to Japan’s relations with China, especially in Shandong, South Manchuria, and East Mongolia, Japan was committed to describe its interests as “paramount.” Similar to Bryan’s 1915 note to Ambassador Chinda, the LansingIshii Agreement had aroused Chinese suspicions, as they saw America’s recognition of the Japanese interests as tantamount to “selling out” China. However, Lansing’s insistence with Japan to use “special” instead of “paramount” interests and his subsequent protests to Tokyo to maintain this position should suggest that the Wilson administration was not betraying China.101 Wilson, while upholding the Open Door, could not deviate too far away from the reality of power politics. The ambiguity inherent in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was based on the practical need to strike a balance between helping China and placating Japan, lest the latter would wage an all-out war against the United States and hamper the allies’ war effort against Germany. In sum, constrained by America’s limited military capabilities and resources at the time, the Wilson administration had done its best to guard the Open Door interests of China. The United States’ relentless pursuit in checking Tokyo’s

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ambitious designs in China sowed the seeds of mistrust and animosity between the two countries.102 Ever since the Wilson administration, Japan had always perceived America as her greatest impediment to dominate China. Such antagonism eventually culminated in its undeclared attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Implications of Wilsonian Open Door Internationalism

The Wilsonian Open Door tradition was unique not in its effective reining in of Japan or defending China, for on both accounts, the president did not achieve much success. The imperialist powers continued their spheres of influence policies in the mainland and would not stop their rapacious conquests until 30 years later with the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945.103 However, the essence of Wilsonian Open Door internationalism lies precisely in Wilson’s liberal, and sometimes idealistic, vision of maintaining an independent, united, and democratic Chinese Republic. The president’s concern for China never ceased, and even in the waning days of his administration, he was “occupied in organizing a relief committee to raise funds for the mitigation of the famine in China’s [Hebei], Henan, Shandong, and Shanxi provinces.”104 Wilson purchased tickets to a ball being held in Washington for the benefit of the Chinese Famine Relief Fund. He noted, “I am very glad to be any assistance, however slight.”105 Based on Wilson’s private correspondence, letters, and public statements presented in this chapter, we can readily conclude that the president’s objective for China was derived from his normative commitment to American liberalism. Wilson’s liberal interests in China have had tremendous influence upon subsequent U.S. administrations and their China policies. As Judith Goldstein pointed out, policy ideas have “vestiges,” and they have long-term ramifications for policymaking. Once chosen, an idea would continuously affect future policymakers and their decision-making even after the interests of their creators have been modified. In short, ideas become “institutionalized” and “may come to be valued not for what they can do for individuals but for the principles they embody.” Shared ideas, beliefs, and norms are internalized in “individuals’ ethical codes and thus long outlast any functional purpose.”106 By the same token, Wilson’s liberal objectives in a strong, united, and democratic China have been “institutionalized” into America’s policy stance. Even after Wilson’s departure, the isolationist Republican administrations in the 1920s remained committed to his Open Door internationalism. In the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the Harding

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administration did hold the great powers legally committed, under the Nine Power Treaty, to China’s Open Door.107 Between 1925 and 1929, President Calvin Coolidge and Secretary of State Frank Kellogg actively pushed for treaty revisions to restore China’s tariff autonomy and to abolish extraterritorial rights. They urged other powers to conform. In July 1928, as Chiang Kai-shek’s army nominally unified China, Washington recognized his Nationalist regime in Nanjing as the legal Chinese government, trusting the new KMT leader would bring order and stability.108 When Japan invaded Manchuria in late 1931, the Hoover administration responded with the Stimson Doctrine, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Japan’s claim over Manchuria and any future conquests in China.109 FDR was also sympathetic to China’s plights under Japanese aggression.110 Following Wilson, Harry Truman also strove to undercut the dichotomy between idealism and realism in making foreign policy, predicating his firm belief in the “inseparability of America’s moral mission and power.”111 Truman’s China/Taiwan Strait policy, as we shall see, followed the same line as Woodrow Wilson had set out three decades earlier.112 Truman, Acheson, and Their Objectives for China

Harry Truman was not too familiar with China affairs. Yet the president, similar to Woodrow Wilson, had a deep concern for the plight and wellbeing of the Chinese people. “Americans,” he noted in his memoir, “have always had friendly feelings toward the Chinese.”113 He also emphasized that “throughout the war, the United States had demonstrated her friendship for China in more than one way.… Appropriations for military and economic aid, for example, had exceeded one and half billion dollars.”114 After reading letters from China’s students petitioning the American government to save China from civil war, the president commented that “I know very little about Chinese politics. The one thing I am interested in is to see a strong China with a democratic form of government friendly to us. It is our only salvation for a peaceful Pacific policy.”115 Indeed, during the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Truman proposed to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers for the development of peace negotiations and territorial settlement in the postwar period. In addition to the United States, Great Britain, France, and Soviet Union, Truman suggested that China be included in the council as well, despite opposition from Stalin and Churchill.116 During the Sino-Soviet negotiations over port rights in Northern China, Truman ordered

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Ambassador Averell Harriman to tell Stalin that “we believed Soong [China’s foreign minister] had already met the Yalta Agreements. And we would request that no agreement be made involving further concessions by China.… Because of our interest in the Open Door policy, we would be opposed to the inclusion of the Port of Dairen in the Soviet military zone or its use as a Soviet naval base.”117 Hence, committed to the Wilsonian Open Door principles, Truman was not only aiming for the creation of a postwar democratic China but also for the preservation of her territorial and political independence from foreign, especially Soviet, subjugation.118 Similar to Truman, Dean Acheson never paid much attention to China and the Far East, at least in the early postwar years, placing far greater importance upon the security and economic recovery of Western Europe.119 Yet, as a supporter of the U.S. Open Door in China, he wrote in his memoir that “the U.S. clipper ships that were racing to the Orient, as intent upon the profits of the China trade as any, also carried missionaries to educate the minds and heal the bodies as well as save the souls of the heathen Chinese.”120 While studying at Yale, he spent countless evenings at the church basement hearing the missionaries’ inspiring reports about China. “Hardly a town in our land,” reflected Acheson, “was without its society to collect funds and clothing for Chinese missions, to worry about those who labored in distant, dangerous, and exotic vineyards of the Lord.”121 The future secretary of state understood and shared the long-term objective of Woodrow Wilson, and later of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, that China, with America’s assistance, guidance, and tutelage, would rise from its ashes to the position of an independent, united, and democratic great power, exercising a beneficent role in bringing stability to Asia.122 Acheson’s first less-than-perfunctory direct contact with China affairs came in December 1945,123 when President Truman appointed General George C. Marshall on a mission to China to mediate a peace settlement of China’s civil war between the KMT and CCP.124 Truman, in his letter of instructions to Marshall, released on December 15, 1945, clearly reaffirmed America’s Wilsonian Open Door vision with respect to China.125 “The fact that I have asked you to go to China,” the president explained, “is the clearest evidence of my very real concern with regard to the situation there. Secretary [James] Byrnes and I are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.”126 He also attached to the letter a formal statement of U.S. policy toward China, which stressed the following:

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It is the firm belief of this government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations Organization and for world peace. A China, disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The U.S. government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations.… It is thus in the most vital interests of the U.S., and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by methods of peaceful negotiations. The U.S. government believes it essential that (1) a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control; (2) a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal strife which will bring about the unification of China. The United States and other United Nations have recognized the present National government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China.127

The rest of the statement clearly revealed the administration’s staunch desire to bring about an immediate cessation of civil conflicts and that the ruling Nationalist government should broaden its political basis to “include other political elements in the country.”128 The president also pledged America’s continued military assistance to the Nationalist government in effecting the “disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas.” About 100,000 American Marines stayed in China for such purpose.129 However, in order to demonstrate America’s impartiality in China’s internal affairs, Truman emphasized that American support “will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.”130 Truman affirmed that he sent Marshall to China “not to intervene in the affairs of that country but to render whatever aid we could do to the cause of peace there.”131 At the same time, the president contended that the existence of an autonomous CCP army is “inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China.”132 Thus, they should be integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army. Once China achieves peace and unity, the United States would be prepared to “assist the National government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a military organization capable of

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discharging China’s national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order.”133 The Failure of Marshall’s Mission in China

General Marshall’s mission in China lasted for one year, from December 21, 1945, to December 28, 1946, but the initial hope of forging a lasting democratic government ended in disappointment. Starting in August 1945, the Nationalist government and the Communist Party began rounds of negotiations to settle their political differences and to create a united China. On October 10, 1945, representatives of the CCP and the KMT signed the “Double Ten Agreement” in Chongqing, the Nationalist China’s wartime capital, proclaiming that a Political Consultative Conference (PCC) would be convened to discuss the establishment of a coalition government. Marshall’s timely arrival ensured a military truce between the KMT and CCP forces and the convening of the PCC on January 10, 1946. At Marshall’s urging, a tripartite truce commission, consisting of Nationalist-Communist-American delegations, was also established to implement the ceasefire agreement. On January 31, the PCC passed a resolution, stipulating the formation of a democratic coalition government comprised of the KMT, the CCP, the liberal Democratic League Party, and other minor parties to rule China until the convocation of the National Assembly to draft a formal constitution. The resolution also agreed on the reorganization of China’s government and inclusion of civil liberties in the new constitution. 134 Truman supported the PCC agreements, believing that they would “convert the Central government from an agency of the Kuomintang (which it legally was), to a coalition, basing its existence on the national sovereignty of all China.”135 Despite signs of favorable progress, ruptures immediately manifested over military reorganization and the integration of Communist forces. While both the Nationalist government and the Communist Party agreed in February that the CCP armies should be merged into a unified Chinese National Army, their views clashed over the timing and procedures of implementation.136 Chiang Kai-shek, though pledging to use political and peaceful means to solve the Communist problem, demanded that the CCP surrender their armed forces and controlled territories to the current KMT government before it could participate in the new coalition government. Mao, on the other hand, insisted that the CCP armies must not be surrendered until after the setting up of the constitutional government, fearing that Chiang

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would renege on his united front pledge after the CCP was disarmed.137 Marshall soon realized that neither side was willing to reach a lasting peace. Hence, war broke out again in April 1946. Chiang decided, against the advice of Marshall and General Albert Wedemeyer, to launch a military campaign in Northern China and Manchuria, where the CCP, helped by the occupying Soviet troops there, built up its stronghold following the Japanese surrender.138 Acheson criticized Chiang’s decision, which “would obviously overextend the Nationalists and concentrate their enemies to the advantage of the latter.”139 President Truman also deplored the situation: “Chiang Kai-shek’s insistence on freedom of action in the military field...seemed to indicate that the Central government was turning its back on my effort to preserve the peace in China.”140 Meanwhile, the Communist forces never lost a chance occupying new territories and expanding their armies to prepare for a final showdown with the KMT.141 In July 1946, although Marshall managed to secure another cessation of hostilities, the truce arrangement was only short-lived. 142 Fighting resumed in October 1946, and this time an all-out civil war was irreversible, which led ultimately to the KMT’s total defeat in 1949. Truman Remains Supportive of Nationalist China

Marshall, Truman, and Acheson were disheartened by China’s ill prospects. The general was, according to Acheson, in a “rare period of discouragement” and asked the president to recall him in December.143 Though recognizing that both the KMT and CCP were irreconcilable, the Truman administration was especially indignant about Chiang’s intransigence.144 Truman recalled in his memoir that “there is no doubt in my mind that if [the generalissimo] had been only a little more conciliatory, an understanding could have been reached.”145 Acheson was more critical, stressing that the KMT leader was “too dumb to avoid standing in front of a locomotive.” He saw that only an “impossibly extravagant commitment of resources” could conceivably salvage the Nationalists.146 Their resentments were not entirely groundless. Since U.S. entry to the Pacific War in 1942, the FDR administration had placed high hope on the generalissimo to lead a united and democratic China to fight the Japanese.147 Washington, however, was frustrated by the assessments from U.S. diplomats and military advisors in China, reporting Chiang’s regime as repressive, corrupt, and weak. General Joseph Stilwell, the American commander of the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater,

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perceived the Nationalist leader as a poor military strategist who squandered U.S. military aids, weapons, and his best troops to fight the Communists instead of the Japanese.148 Roosevelt was displeased, but, trusting Chiang as indispensable to China’s unity and its resistance against Japan, gave his support to the generalissimo by dispatching Patrick Hurley, the former secretary of war in the Hoover administration, as the president’s personal emissary to Chiang Kai-shek. Hurley’s sympathy to Chiang alienated Stilwell, who was recalled from China in October 1944.149 Despite these uneasy memories, Truman shared FDR’s belief that only the generalissimo could lead China.150 On January 12, 1946, in his letter to Congressman Hugh De Lacy (D-WA), the president pointed out that the “Chiang Kai-shek government is the recognized government of China. The Chiang Kai-shek government supported us wholeheartedly in the war and I am inclined to be patient with the situation in China, always hoping for the establishment of a strong Chinese government.”151 The Truman administration envisioned that if the KMT were committed to democratization and economic reforms to improve the welfare of the people, the Communists would soon lose support and be marginalized in elections.152 Thus, while instructing Marshall to act impartially in China’s internal affairs, the president told the general that no matter what happened, the U.S. would “continue to back the National government of the Republic of China.”153 Indeed, U.S. military supplies and aids were mostly distributed to the KMT forces, prompting Mao and Zhou Enlai to denounce America’s biased support of Chiang’s reactionary regime as a clear proof of Washington’s imperialism in China.154 When the civil war resurfaced in summer 1946, Truman sent a stern message to Chiang, expressing his “grave concern” and pointing out that “such a state of affairs is violently repugnant to the American people.”155 In response, Chiang Kai-shek raised the problem of the CCP’s insurrections in China but restated his pledge to “make peace and democracy a reality in this country in the shortest possible time.” 156 Truman welcomed Chiang’s assurance and reaffirmed that: [I]t is my continuing desire that the prompt removal of the threat of widespread civil war through the achievement of political unity will render it feasible for the United States, in the sense of the final paragraph of the United States government’s policy statement of last December Fifteenth, to move forward with plans to assist China in the rehabilitation of its agrarian and industrial economy. 157

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On December 18, 1946, the one-year anniversary of the Marshall Mission, Truman issued a new policy statement to reiterate America’s long-term interest in an Open Door China. The president said, “We believed then and do now that a united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to world peace, that a broadening of the base of the National government to make it representative of the Chinese people will further China’s progress toward this goal.”158 In light of America’s unwavering support for the Nationalists, it is no wonder that the United States was highly distressed over China’s worsening condition. Truman, Acheson, and Their Views on the Chinese Communists

When Dean Acheson swore in as America’s 52nd secretary of state in January 1949, the Chinese Communists had just captured Beijing and were ready to cross the Yangtze River to sweep across Southern China. In less than ten months, Mao would proclaim the founding of the People’s Republic. “Chiang was in the last stages of collapse,” Acheson said, “I arrived just in time to have him collapse on me.”159 During the Second World War, the U.S. image of the Chinese Communists was actually quite positive.160 Starting in the mid-1930s, American journalists had been investigating the CCP. They came to the observation that the Chinese Communists had almost no connections to Moscow. The CCP was described as “independent in leadership and doctrine—perhaps not Stalinist Communists at all.”161 American Foreign Service officers in China also furnished similar assessments to Washington. Hence, in July 1944, FDR dispatched the U.S. Army Observation Group, better known as the Dixie Mission, to Yanan, the capital of the CCP-controlled territories in Northern China, to establish a liaison with the People’s Liberation Army to deepen American understanding about the Chinese Communists.162 John Service, an important member of the mission and also the State Department’s China expert, thought that the CCP, unlike the reactionary KMT, was “progressive” and “democratic.”163 He found the Nationalists, while having America’s financial and military backing, much weaker than the Communists, which enjoyed overwhelming popular support among the Chinese peasants. If a KMTCCP civil war were to break out, Service predicted that Chiang’s regime would easily crumble unless it committed to political and economic reforms.164 He advised that Washington should reach out to the Communists. At the same time, the U.S. should act as a “catalytic agent” to pressure Chiang to reform and democratize. The Nationalists must realize that the only way to save their rule in China was to compromise

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with Mao in establishing a multiparty coalition government in which the CCP played a pivotal role.165 The fundamental assumptions of Service’s policy recommendation were twofold. First, a coalition Chinese government in which the CCP occupied a prominent position was the only solution to resolve the current impasse between the two parties, thus providing the best assurance for America to attain a united and democratic China after WWII. Second, Washington’s goodwill could prevent the CCP from aligning with the Soviets and encourage Mao to follow a moderate, independent, and nationalistic political stance. Service’s analyses did have some influence over the State Department.166 Some high-ranking officials, including Secretary Brynes, regarded the CCP as merely agrarian reformers, similar to America’s Populist Party.167 Nevertheless, such formulation of the CCP was quickly dispelled.168 By 1946, the prevailing consensus in the Truman administration was that the Chinese Communists were acting on behalf of Moscow.169 In February 1947, testifying about China’s situation before the Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Marshall unequivocally affirmed that the “Chinese Communists were definitely pure Communists.”170 President Truman also never questioned the CCP as genuine Communists, believing that Mao and his party were subservient to the dictates of the Kremlin. The president wrote in his memoir that: Neither Marshall nor I was ever taken in by the talk about the Chinese Communists being just “agrarian reformers.” The general knew he was dealing with Communists, and he knew what their aims were. When he was back in Washington in March [1946], he told me that their chief negotiator, Zhou Enlai, had very frankly declared that, as Communists, he believed firmly in the teachings of Marx and Lenin and the eventual victory of the proletariat. Marshall’s message…show also that he fully assumed that the Chinese Communist would, in the end, be able to count on Russian support. Neither had I been taken in by Stalin’s declaration at Potsdam that the Chinese Communists were not really “proper” Communists nor by his later statement to Harriman that he thought the civil war in China would be foolish.171

Yet, Truman did not object to the idea of a democratic coalition government between the KMT and CCP. As noted, that was the primary objective of the Marshall Mission.172 However, since early 1946, when the U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated, Truman’s original conciliatory approach toward Moscow experienced a sharp reversal.173 In light of the aggressive Soviet

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expansions in Eastern Europe, Iran, Turkey, Greece, and East Germany, the president was convinced that the Chinese Communists were merely Stalin’s proxy to conquer China and, therefore, abandoned his hope in a KMT-CCP coalition. Indeed, Marshall noted that the U.S. was “no longer seeking a coalition government in China and would extend aid to the Nationalist government.”174 In late 1946, Truman charged the CCP as being the main culprit responsible for the breakdown of the KMTCCP negotiations.175 Furthermore, during a press and radio conference on March 11, 1948, a reporter asked Truman whether it was “still the policy of [the U.S.] government to favor the inclusion of [the] Chinese Communists in the Chinese government.” The president replied “I don’t know that that was ever the policy of this government. If it was, it’s news to me.” Then, another reporter noted, “Returning to the Chinese question, you did make a statement in December 1945, advocating a broadening of the base.” Truman interjected, “I still stick to the statement. That statement is just as good today.” The reporter pursued, “You mean the broadening does not include taking Communists into the national government?” Truman responded, “It does not. It does not. It did not include Communists at all.” When he was asked about the original purpose of the Marshall Mission, he emphasized, “I don’t think General Marshall intended to take any Communists into the Chinese government. We don’t want a Communist government in China, or anywhere else, if we can help it.” The reporter insisted that the “broadening the base” meant “taking in Communists, or at least Chinese liberals.” Truman asserted at last, “Chinese liberals…[t]here is a very great difference between the liberal element in China and the Communists.… The Chinese Communists are those people who believe in government from the top—the totalitarian state. There are a great many liberals in China.… There are a great many of them who have been educated in this country, and they are the intelligentsia, really, of China. They are the people in whom we are interested principally. We would like to see them included in the broadening of the base of the Chinese government.” Truman concluded the conference by saying that such distinction between liberals and Communists can be applied equally in the United States.176 Acheson, likewise, posited that “the Chinese [Communist] government is really a tool of Russian Imperialism in China. That gives us our fundamental starting point in regard to our relation with China.”177 Moreover, the secretary of state contended that the “Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, which

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during the past fifty years, under czars and Communists alike, has been most assiduous in its effort to extend its control in the Far East.”178 The Chinese people were only temporarily fooled as the “[Soviet] foreign domination has been masked behind the façade of a vast crusading movement which apparently has seemed, to many Chinese, to be wholly indigenous and national.”179 Yet, both Truman and Acheson believed in the eventual awakening of the Chinese people, whose “profound civilization and the democratic individualism” will “reassert themselves and…throw off the foreign yoke.”180 Thus, at a cabinet meeting on January 19, 1949, the president sternly admonished that “we can’t be in a position of making any deal with a [Chinese] Communist regime.”181 Acheson Sets the Tone for Truman’s China Policy

Despite his anti-CCP stance, however, Acheson sought to drive the Chinese Communists away from Stalin. Specifically, he maintained that the United States must not dismiss the rising tide of nationalism sweeping across post-colonial Asia in general and China in particular. Nationalism in Asia, in the words of the secretary, is a “symbol both of freedom from foreign domination and freedom from tyranny of poverty and misery.”182 Indeed, China’s quest for national liberation resulted from her suffering from more than a century of foreign subjugation, impoverishment, and wars. Millions of Chinese had hoped that Chiang’s Nationalists would accomplish the great but strenuous task of national unification and industrial development. But, the Japanese invasion accompanied by years of incessant civil strife obstructed those undertakings. Moreover, the KMT’s pervasive corruption, apathy to rural China, repressive rule, and inefficient governance exacerbated China’s woe.183 Sadden by the government’s decline, an overwhelming majority of Chinese—the peasants, urban workers, middle class, and intellectuals—rushed over to embrace Mao and the CCP. They perceived the Communist Party as a genuine homegrown revolutionary force which held the key to China’s salvation and national independence. Acheson had a fairly clear grasp of the overall situation. He said: What has happened in my judgment is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended. They did not bother to overthrow [the KMT] government. There was really nothing to overthrow. They simply ignored it throughout the country. They took the solution of their immediate village problems into their own

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hands.… They completely withdrew their support from this government, and when that support was withdrawn, the whole military establishment disintegrated.... The Communists did not create this. The Communists did not create [this] condition. They did not create a great force which moved out from under Chiang Kai-shek. But, they were shrewd and cunning to mount, to ride this thing into victory and into power.184

Given these developments, the Chinese would associate any foreign powers that sought to aid the KMT as tantamount in destroying China’s national unification. Following Marshall’s failure in late 1946, Mao repeatedly suggested that Chiang’s regime was the lackey of American imperialism in China.185 Hence, American diplomats in China began to advise the Truman administration to disengage, at least overtly, from Chiang’s KMT.186 John Leighton Stuart, American ambassador to China, wrote in December 1948 that “supporting Chiang Kai-shek “would arouse greater sympathy for Communist cause and violent anti-American feeling.” Having long years of experience in China, he advised that Washington should engage the CCP to moderate its radical outlooks: I earnestly hope that American government will not, in its wholly justifiable hatred of international Communism fail to recognize indisputable elements of progress and reform in its Chinese [Communist] variety which have so powerful an attraction for [the] more idealistic of Chinese youth, in contrast with now decrepit KMT which has long since lost most of its earlier youthful and heroic spirit of adventure. It may be naively visionary but I dare to believe that despite all suspicion, bigotry, and perversion of Chinese Communism, it can with our assistance be grafted on to this ancient culture with fruition.187

Acheson was persuaded. Meanwhile, George Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), was also preparing for a comprehensive analysis on America’s policy toward China, which gave further support to Stuart’s assessments. Originally entitled PPS-39, Kennan’s report was circulated as NSC-34 for policy discussion at the NSC’s 33rd meeting on February 3, 1949.188 NSC-34: United States Policy toward China

According to NSC-34, China, having a large population in the vicinity of 450 million, faced a classically Malthusian problem, that is, “a teeming population pressing against the limits imposed by disease,

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poverty, and recurrent wars.”189 From a strategic standpoint, China lacked the industrial potential to make herself in the foreseeable future a major military threat or a worthwhile ally for the Soviets.190 The mainland more closely resembled a “strategic morass than a strategic springboard.”191 China’s mounting chaos, moreover, created a fertile ground which the CCP was quick to exploit: With a program of nationalism and moderate reform and with a disciplined and often ruthless mode of operations, the Communists set about systemically mobilizing the peasantry in their support. Because they were in the eyes of many Chinese patriotic, progressive, and incorrupt, the Communists attracted an appreciable number of urban Chinese from towns and cities occupied by the Japanese and from Kuomintang territory. A mushrooming of nominal Communist strength resulted.192

On the other hand, the KMT’s failure rendered futile any outside assistance from America. “With regard to the Nationalists,” according to the report, “we have during the period from V-J Day through the fiscal year 1948-49 made available to the National government other military, [technical], and economic assistance which may be calculated as worth certainly not less than $2 billion.… This aid may be said to equal in dollar value well over one half of the total National government budget during the same period.”193 Yet, the KMT was in no competition to the better trained and higher-morale CCP armies. While acknowledging that the Soviets may use Mao’s Communists to dominate China, NSC-34 cautioned against treating the CCP and the Soviet as a monolith. Due to its cynical world view, the Kremlin had strong reservations about Mao’s CCP. 194 In fact, Moscow’s anxiety was justified by Tito’s recent defection from the Communist bloc. Mao, too, had qualms about Stalin’s sincerity in helping the Chinese Communist revolution. In fact, Stalin openly recognized Chiang’s Nationalists as the sole legal government of China and even signed a Friendship Treaty with the latter in August 1945. In early 1949, the Soviet Embassy also migrated to Guangzhou with the retreating Nationalists. More importantly, Moscow’s ambition in Manchuria and Xingjian worried the CCP.195 Therefore, there were potential rifts between China and the Soviet Union. Referencing Wilsonian Open Door internationalism, NSC-34 postulated that “American interest in China has…manifested itself in evangelism, advocacy of the American way of life and sympathy for China as a perennial international underdog.”196 Yet, American support

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of Chiang Kai-shek would undermine U.S. liberal objectives in China. “This continued exclusive commitment to Chiang is understandable, but it is not good diplomacy. It binds this government to a single course, leaving it no alternative, no latitude for maneuver.” An all-out aid to the KMT would amount to “overt intervention,” the ramification of which is to rally the “traditional Chinese xenophobia and the new force of nationalism” behind the Communists’ anti-imperialism stance. “Thus, the more we openly intervened in the deep-rooted Chinese revolution, the more we would become politically involved, the more the National government would tend to be regarded in Chinese eyes as a puppet…the greater our task would become, and the more the intervention would cost. All out aid to the National government is therefore a course of action of huge, indefinite, and hazardous proportions. The American government cannot rightly gamble thus with American prestige and resources.”197 Nonetheless, cutting off aid from the KMT, as will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, proved far easier said than done. In any event, NSC-34 identified that Marxist-Leninism ran against Chinese tradition and values, and “would then encounter at a minimum the passive drag and sly resistance of Chinese individualism and at a maximum disruptive social revolt.” The rising tide of Chinese nationalism would oppose CCP’s subservience to Moscow.198 Hence, Washington must encourage this Chinese nationalism to cast pressure upon the CCP to modify its behavior and to keep it from “becoming an adjunct of Soviet political military power.”199 Creating the Sino-Soviet split, however, would require long-term patience. America should stand with the Chinese popular preferences and refrain from aiding forces that are opposed by them. In sum, Washington should rely on economic trade and liberal values to lure China away from Moscow. It is, after all, a battle to win the heart and mind of China. NSC-34/1, NSC-34/2, and NSC-41

With NSC-34 laying out the overarching framework for the State Department’s proposed China policy, on January 11, 1949, a more condensed version—NSC-34/1—was submitted to the NSC for consideration.200 Essentially, NSC-34/1, in its introduction paragraph, reaffirmed that “the objective of the U.S. with respect to China is the eventual development by the Chinese themselves of a unified, stable and independent China friendly to the U.S., in order to forestall threats to our national security which arise from the domination of China by any foreign power.”201

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On February 3, 1949, at the 33rd NSC meeting, the focus was on China and Taiwan.202 Agreeing with the proposed policy of driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, Acheson added that “our historic policy has been to prevent the domination of China by a hostile power.”203 As NSC-34/1 was approved in the National Security Council without any amendments, it was subsequently submitted to Truman for final consideration. The president approved the policy on the following day. Even though Truman had a hostile perception of the CCP, his approval of NSC-34/1 signaled his support of Acheson’s position that if the Chinese Communists could be drawn over to the U.S. side, then China’s Open Door could still be realized.204 Thus, a liberal engagement policy for Communist China must be crafted. Shortly after assuming office, Acheson instructed W. Walton Butterworth, director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, to work on a definitive policy on Chinese trade. After close consultation with the secretary of state and various foreign trade experts in the State Department, Butterworth completed a 14-page report which Acheson submitted to the National Security Council on February 28, 1949, for consultation. This report, entitled “United States Policy Regarding Trade with China,” or the NSC-41, advised that the U.S. should continue trading relations with the Communist China. Aside from helping Japan’s economic recovery,205 economic trade would also foster greater political liberalization in China. The assumption was based on the Kantian notion of liberal peace through trade interdependence. As a result, the CCP would be pressed to change its anti-American policy if Mao wanted to improve China’s economic prospects and to retain people’s allegiance.206 Restrictive measures, in contrast, would compel the CCP to “eliminate any liberal elements within the party, and drive the regime further into the bosom of the USSR.”207 Hence, nonstrategic commodities were “permitted for export to China provided there was reasonable evidence or presumption of intention to use them for purposes related to the Chinese civilian economy.”208 However, this policy of “trade with moderate restrictions” would retain for Washington the “degree of flexibility necessary” to punish the CCP’s unruly behaviors.209 Should the Communists remain intransigent and follow the Soviet line of action, America could impose trade embargoes as a countermeasure.210 The 35th NSC meeting on March 3, 1949 deliberated NSC-41. Truman approved the paper the next day and ordered the policy be “implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the United States government under the coordination of the secretary of state.”211 In the same NSC meeting, an updated report, NSC-34/2, was also discussed. Written by Acheson, NSC-34/2 sternly

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confirmed the inevitable victory of the Chinese Communists.212 It is important to note that the theme of Wilsonian Open Door internationalism stood firmly in Acheson’s mind: “We should…publicly reaffirm our adherence to the traditional American policies of (1) friendship for the Chinese people; (2) respect for the territorial independence and administrative integrity of China and (3) advocacy of the Open Door.” 213 Though NSC-34/2 remained committed to fostering a Sino-Soviet split, it equally acknowledged that this was a long-term policy. “There is no short-cut,” the report stated, “[and, as a result], we have no sound alternative but to accommodate our native impatience to this fact.”214 The secretary hoped that the Chinese Communists would eventually “modify [their] composition and character [so] that they become a truly independent government, existing in amicable relations with the world community.”215 Believing in the democratic aptitude of the Chinese people, Acheson noted: “That [revolutionary] force will take time to appear and develop; but inevitably it will, simply because a China under the Communists will breed it just as surely as Chiang’s Kuomintang was the forcing ground of the Communists. It will and must necessarily be a grass-roots movement finding its expression in native Chinese form.” 216 Like NSC-34 and NSC-34/1, the current paper advised against explicit aids to the KMT forces.217 A Rugged Relationship

On March 10, 1949, Ambassador Stuart sent Dean Acheson a telegram, in which he reported that “the CCP has revealed an increasingly antiAmerican sentiment, [and] as its control spreads over the more important coastal provinces and further inland this will find concrete expression in many forms more harmful to us than their incessant vituperative broadcasts.”218 Stuart believed that the major reason for the CCP’s strong anti-Americanism was unquestionably “our military and other assistance to the National government.” “The indignation over U.S. support for the KMT,” he said, “is heartily shared by most of the [Chinese intellectuals] whether or not they are in sympathy with Communism.”219 Consequently, the ambassador sought permission from the State Department to approach top CCP leaders to dispel their misapprehensions about America’s China policy. In his reply on April 6, 1949, Acheson indicated his support for Stuart’s initiative, stating that the State Department “agrees with your statement that because of the important issues at stake such an approach is worth [the] effort.”220 Yet, the secretary cautioned the ambassador

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against giving an impression to the Communists that the United States would resort to the use of force to help the Chinese in restoring their liberty and freedom.221 Knowing that the president and the American people were not fond of the Chinese Communists, Acheson intended to keep such contacts discreet and, therefore, ordered Stuart to classify any reports on this matter as “eyes only for the secretary.”222 While Stuart was trying to create channels of communication with the CCP, the PLA had crossed the Yangtze River and occupied Nanjing, the capital of the Nationalists government, on April 23, 1949. Mao’s regime had, by this time, firmly established itself in China. As a result, on May 3, 1949, Stuart sent Acheson a telegram, advising that the Truman administration should “wait and see” on the issue of recognition and should ask other Western nations to act “in concert” with the U.S. on this issue.223 Ten days later, on May 13, 1949, Acheson replied to Stuart and expressed his agreement with the latter’s opinion. Although the secretary did not believe it wise to “withhold” recognition indefinitely as a “political weapon,” he insisted upon three conditions that the Chinese Communists must fulfill prior to any serious discussions on recognition. Those three factors were: (1) de-facto control of territory and administrative machinery of State, including maintenance of public order; (2) ability and willingness of government to discharge its international obligations; and the (3) general acquiescence of [the] people of [the] country in [the] government in power.224 Acheson would stick firmly to these “recognition rules” throughout 1949-50. Nonetheless, the second rule became a major impediment for improving Sino-American relations. Indeed, beginning in late 1948, the CCP employed a series of violent acts toward American diplomatic personnel and demonstrated complete disregard for observing international obligations ratified by the Nationalist government. In November 1948, when the PLA entered Mukden (Shenyang), the largest city in Manchuria, the CCP leadership initiated a policy of “squeezing out” American and other Western diplomats in the “liberated zone.” A Central Committee telegram (drafted by Zhou Enlai) to the CCP’s Northeast Bureau on November 10, 1949, stated that because the British, American, and French governments had not recognized the Chinese Communist regime, the CCP would not grant official status to their diplomats, thus treating them as merely ordinary foreigners without diplomatic immunity.225 On November 17, Mao instructed the CCP authority in Mukden to act resolutely to force the American, British, and French diplomats out of the city. He then authorized the PLA Military Commission in Shenyang to seize radio transmitters in the Western

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consulates to prevent any “leaks” of CCP military intelligence to the Western and KMT governments. When Angus Ward, the American consul general in Shenyang, refused to turn in the radio transmitter, stressing that it was U.S. government property, the CCP, following Soviet advice, placed Ward and his staff under house arrest, cutting off their electricity and telephone service as well as their running water. They were only allowed to leave China in December 1949 after being convicted of participating in espionage activities.226 The situation in Shanghai was no better though Consul General John Cabot tried skillfully to handle his relations with the local CCP authorities. On July 6, 1949, Cabot’s viceconsul, William Olive, was arrested by the PLA for speeding. As Olive protested his consular character in the police station and accidentally knocked an ink well off the sergeant’s desk, the Communists “grabbed him and beat the hell out of him.”227 The Communists’ affront to America reflected Mao’s determination to make a fresh start in China’s external relations. Feeling suspicious of the United States’ intentions, the CCP leader recommended that China should not attempt to win Washington’s diplomatic recognition until “the foundation of imperialism in China” was wiped clean and that, in Mao’s words, “we shall clean up our house first, before we invite our guests in.”228 The fundamental sore point remained the U.S. persistent associations with the KMT. In the CCP Central Committee’s “Directive on Diplomatic Affairs” of January 19, 1949, Mao Zedong declared that “with no exception will we recognize any of those embassies, legations, and consulates of capitalist countries, as well as the diplomatic establishments and personnel attached to them accredited to the KMT.”229 The Talks between Ambassador Stuart and Huang Hua

On another occasion, nonetheless, the Communist leader made it clear that the CCP was “willing to discuss with any foreign government the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, provided that the government was willing to sever relations with Taipei.”230 In May and June 1949, Ambassador Stuart held several meetings with Huang Hua, the CCP’s director of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs at Nanjing. With Mao’s approval, Huang, who was Stuart’s former student at the Yanjing University of Beijing, expressed to the ambassador “much interest in the recognition of the Communist government by the U.S. on terms of equality and mutual benefit.” He

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also stated that China needed commercial relations with foreign countries and assured that instructions from the CCP authority had been issued to all military units to protect the safety and property of all foreigners in China. Stuart, however, related America’s worries about the CCP behavior and asserted that the regime must be able to “perform its international obligations and respect foreign treaties.” Huang then spoke of the Chinese people’s resentment at American aid to the KMT and other mistakes of U.S. policy.231 On June 6, 1949, Huang invited Stuart out for a tea, and he again told his mentor that the CCP was “extremely anxious to have foreign governments, particularly the United States, discard a government [the Nationalists] which has completely lost the support of Chinese people.” All the Chinese Communists wanted from America was stoppage of aid and severance of relations with the KMT government. Huang again berated Stuart about America’s mistakes in aiding the Kuomintang.232 The Stuart-Huang talks, in fact, were much publicized and the CCP had regularly informed Moscow about the details. Stalin, moreover, was even supportive of Mao trying to establish a modicum of contact with the United States. 233 Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that Mao lacked sincerity to forge formal diplomatic relations with Washington. In mid-June, a new communication channel was created between Mao and Zhou and Stuart and Acheson, and this was unknown either to the public or the Soviet Union at that time. General Chen Mingshu, the prominent leader of the Chinese Democratic League, became the liaison, as he told Stuart that the request to generate this new channel came directly from Zhou Enlai, and that he was to report directly to Mao and Zhou.234 Chen was instructed by Mao to pass on the message that he had “great hope” for the future relationship between China and the United States, and that China “would like to open diplomatic and commercial relations with all countries on the basis of independence and equality.”235 The good-will of Mao and Zhou continued to come forth. On June 28, 1949, Ambassador Stuart reported that, “Huang Hua called and reported that he had received message from Mao and Zhou assuring that they would welcome me to Beijing if I wished to visit [Yanjing] University.” “I regarded Huang’s message,” he continued, “as a veiled invitation from Mao and Zhou to talk with them.… I received the clear impression that Mao, Zhou, and Huang are very much hoping that I make this trip, whatever their motives.”236 Obviously, Stuart perceived the pros and cons of traveling to Beijing. On the positive side, the ambassador posited that a visit would give him the opportunity to directly “describe American policy; its anxieties regarding Communism

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and world revolution; its desires for China’s future [as contained in the Open Door notes]; and would enable [him] to carry to Washington most authoritative information regarding CCP intentions.”237 More importantly, such trip would be a “step toward better mutual understanding and should strengthen more liberal anti-Soviet element in CCP,” and it would “provide unique opportunity for American official to talk to top Chinese Communists in informal manner which may not again present itself.” On the negative side, the trip would “undoubtedly start rumors and speculations in China.… It would probably be misunderstood…that U.S. representative was first to break united front policy which we have sponsored toward Communist regime.”238 Furthermore, Stuart’s trip must be followed by a similar one to Guangzhou, the KMT’s temporary capital, to signal American impartiality. “While visiting both capitals might effectively dramatize American interest in Chinese people as a whole, it might also appear as peace-making gesture, unwarranted interference in China’s internal affairs, and would probably be misunderstood by Chinese Communists, thus undoing any beneficial effects of visiting the north.” Finally, going to Beijing would probably help “enhancing the prestige of Mao.”239 In sum, while Stuart was receptive about the invitation, he asked for Washington’s decision. Upon receiving Stuart’s telegram, Acheson immediately sought consultations from his advisers. Assistant Secretary Butterworth believed it would be a good opportunity to “lecture” the Communists about America’s stance. But, he worried about the repercussion of U.S. public opinion, saying that “such reaction could be very violent.” He, therefore, suggested that “Stuart should accept [the invitation] only on the basis that he will fly in his own plane to Mukden to (a) make sure that all facilities were made available for the departure of the staff there and (b) to bring Mr. and Mrs. Ward back in his plane, stopping off at Beijing en route to see Mao and Zhou.” John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff agreed with Butterworth’s “formula,” as this “would make a lot of face for us in Asia and that it would be a justification in the eyes of the American public for the visit.” Still, final decisions must rest upon the judgment of the president and the secretary of state.240 While Acheson was inclined to grant permission, Truman opposed it and instructed the Ambassador that “under no circumstance [was he allowed] to make visits in Beijing.”241 One of the major reasons behind the president’s rejection was that almost simultaneously, on June 30, Mao made an open announcement of “leaning to one side,” that is, the CCP must “ally [itself] with the Soviet Union.”242 In his analysis of Mao’s pronouncement, Stuart wrote that the CCP chairman was

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“staunchly anti-West and anti-America, [for his] principal tones are of unswerving allegiance to doctrine of world revolution by violence, of devotion to USSR as center of revolutionary power, of destructive hatred of all opposing forces, of absolutism, and irreconcilability [of] Communist creed with any other political or social theory.”243 There were debates over Mao’s intention. But, suffice it to say that the Chinese Communists’ need for the Kremlin’s full political and economic support had drastically increased in June 1949, when the KMT installed naval blockades, along with deadly air strikes, of the coastal cities in Eastern China. Shanghai, the only financial center of China at the time, was particularly hit hard. The CCP leadership was extremely perturbed by the fact that the KMT’s aerial bombardments and naval blockades were made possible by American warships, planes, fuel, bombs, and ammunition. While the Truman administration protested against the Nationalists, it certainly did not take any formal actions to stop the latter. President Truman, in fact, even acquiesced to the Nationalists’ actions.244 The Kuomintang belligerence illustrated their air and naval power superiority and intensified Beijing’s suspicion about Washington. Consequently, Mao’s “leaning to one side” was made not only to counterbalance the U.S.-KMT alliance but also to gain full economic and strategic supports from Stalin. In light of this background, was Truman’s opposition to Stuart’s Beijing trip brought about by anger over Mao’s latest announcement? Based on my research, there is no evidence suggesting that the president made the decision after reading Mao’s speech, as he left no remarks or comments in his memoranda of conversations, personal diaries, or memoir. In fact, according to Simei Qing, historical documents showed that Truman made his decision before reading Mao’s public speech. She said, “[The] Truman papers indicate clearly that the State Department received the intelligent briefing on Mao’s ‘leaning to one side’ speech, which appeared in the CCP newspaper on July 1, 1949, but that Truman did not read it until he had made the decision to decline Mao’s invitation. Nor did he read Ambassador Stuart’ full analysis of Mao’s speech, which came on July 6, 1949, or a week after he made his decision.”245 Truman’s decision reflected his normative commitment to Wilsonian Open Door internationalism. Though the president endorsed the State Department’s Sino-Soviet split policy, his deep-seated antipathy toward the Chinese Communists, along with his belief that the CCP was not a genuine representative of the Chinese people, led him to the decision that no contacts should be made with Mao at this time. After Truman turned down Mao’s invitation, the CCP’s anti-

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Americanism intensified. “In retrospect,” recalled Stuart, “I can only interpret it [Mao’s invitation] as the earnest desire that I take the initiative to travel to [Beijing] and be available for conversations with some of them.” After they declined to make the trip, however, “the attitudes of the Communist authorities from the top down have changed and hardened, including our personal relations locally.”246 The Chinese Communists, nonetheless, did try to approach Stuart for one last time prior to the ambassador’s departure from China in August 1949. Chen Mingshu explained to Stuart that Mao’s “leaning to one side” remarks should not be interpreted as “dependence on the [Soviets],” and “it would be an insult to understand the phrase in that way.” The Chinese Communists would never relinquish China’s national independence. Moreover, the speech was a “sort of statement for the [Communist] Party.” Finally, Chen stated that the CCP did not “regard all Americans as imperialists,” and that the U.S. should stop aiding the Kuomintang.247 Zhou Enlai’s Telegram

President Truman’s firm stance can be demonstrated by another incident. In early June 1949, Zhou Enlai transmitted a secret message to O. Edmund Clubb, the U.S. consul general in Beijing, urging American assistance be given to Communist China. He said that the most pressing need in China was for economic reconstruction without regard to political theories and believed that China was on the brink of complete economic collapse. The United States and the West should render assistance as the Soviet Union lacked the ability to help out. Zhou felt that the U.S. should aid China because it is still not a Communist state yet and would not be for a long time if the policies of Mao were correctly implemented. A democratic China, in his view, would serve as a “mediator between the Western powers and the USSR,” whereas a China in chaos would be a “menace to peace.” Within the CCP, the liberal and radical wings had developed; therefore, good working relations between Washington and Beijing would have a “definite softening effect” on the CCP attitude toward the Western Nations.248 In his analysis for the State Department on June 6, 1949, Clubb asserted that two explanations were possible for Zhou’s action. First, Zhou and his moderate faction might be tending toward Titoism. Second, he took the action with the full knowledge of the CCP leadership and possibly even the approval of Stalin. But, the consul general believed that the CCP should still be assumed in the Soviet camp, and “so long as China is run for the political benefit of the USSR,

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it should be required to pay for what it gets whether in economic equivalent or in political concessions designed to break up the alliances with the USSR.”249 Zhou’s aids later maintained that he never sent out such a message and the copy of the note was forged.250 Notwithstanding its authenticity, the U.S. took the letter seriously at that time. On June 14, 1949, Acting Secretary of State James Webb drafted an instruction for Clubb’s reply. He wrote, “While we welcome expressions of friendly sentiments, [you] must realize that they cannot be expected to bear fruit until they have been translated into deeds capable of convincing the American people that Sino-U.S. relations can be placed upon solid basis of mutual respect and understanding to benefit both nations.”251 President Truman approved this course of action and reemphasized to Webb “to be most careful not to indicate any softening toward the Communists but to insist on judging their intentions by their actions.”252 No Hasty Recognition of the People’s Republic of China

The above correspondences testified that the Chinese Communists could not normalize relations with the U.S. unless the latter broke up with the Nationalists and its remnants in Taiwan. But, as long as it remained the Truman administration’s policies to recognize the KMT government and to assist Taiwan, relations with Beijing would not be a smooth one. In addition, the ideas of Wilsonain Open Door internationalism entailed the president to be resolute against reconciling with the Chinese Communists. Indeed, starting in fall 1949, Truman was planning to be tougher on the Chinese Communists. Acheson, nevertheless, restrained the president from embarking upon an all-out confrontation and ultimately convinced Truman that the United States must show greater tolerance and patience in engaging with the Communist regime. For instance, at the cabinet meeting on September 16, 1949, President Truman had in his hand a copy of NSC-41, approved earlier in March. Aiming to cut off economic relations with China, he remarked that the paper “was out of date and should be revised.” Acheson assured the president that the matter would be “looked into at once.”253 Yet, the secretary, believing in the merits of continuing trade with China, procrastinated for two months before responding to Truman’s call for a revision, and then argued against a change of policy. “Since NSC-41 is sufficiently broad in scope to cover a wide range of tactics,” Acheson reported, “its revision at this time is believed to be unnecessary.”254

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When Angus Ward was found guilty by the Chinese court of espionage and imprisoned, the president said that “if we could get a plane in to bring these people out, [I am] prepared to take the strongest possible measures, including some utilization of force, if necessary, and if it would be effective.”255 Once again, Acheson advised against a show of force against the PRC. At the same time, to gain greater credence to his Far East policy, the secretary of state recruited several prominent scholars and experts on China to consult the State Department. Most, if not all, of these consultants recommended that Washington should stick closely to the policies set out in NSC-34/1, NSC-34/2, and NSC-41. Yet, none was as articulate as Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick, the former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, who strongly believed that the Chinese Communists represented more of a native-born nationalist force in China than a protégé of Moscow. And, the United States would risk alienating the great majority of Chinese and Asians by confronting Mao and supporting the corrupt Kuomintang.256 He also believed that “normal trade relations with China should not be stopped, except for strategically important materials. If the U.S. were to regain our lost position in China, it is important that the U.S. should maintain its contacts there—not only trade contacts, but cultural, educational, and missionary contacts.” “We should miss no opportunity to bring home to the Chinese people America’s historic position of friendship and support over a hundred years,” he contended, “and U.S. deep and sincere sympathy with their aspirations for independence and freedom and for the complete abolition of the nineteenth century colonial status. We, as friends, should warn them that Russian Communism is the “kiss of death” to the kind of freedom to which they aspire; it is a type of imperialism far more lethal to national hopes than anything.”257 Fosdick’s view was not only shared by Acheson but also by those who attended the State Department’s China Round Table that took place on October 6-8, 1949. Chaired by Philip Jessup and Fosdick, the conference invited twenty-five participants who were leading experts and well-informed citizens on the Far East, including George Marshall, Bernard Brodie, Owen Lattimore, John K. Fairbank, and Edwin Reischauer, to name just a few.258 These “China hands” mostly agreed that the Chinese Communists were “distinctively Chinese,” and it would be erroneous to equate them with the Soviet Union. The U.S. ought to compete with Moscow for the hearts and minds of the Chinese people, who exemplified high nationalistic sentiment. In essence, their conclusion was to recognize the PRC, which would benefit American commerce, gain the trust and confidence of the Chinese people, empower the moderate-liberal elements within the CCP, and, most

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importantly, undermine Sino-Soviet relations in the long run. They also urged Washington to abandon the Nationalists in order to fully normalize relations with Beijing. The substantive and intellectual discussions caught Truman’s attention. He indicated to Acheson that he would like to have a meeting with some of these consultants to talk about the China issue. 259 The meeting was held on November 17, 1949. The president listened attentively to the positions of the experts who reiterated the need to reconcile with Beijing. Afterwards, Truman met with Acheson in private, and he was very positive about the meeting, remarking that “this had been tremendously helpful to [me] for [I] had gotten new insight into the reasons for the Communist success in China, a better understanding of the whole situation, and found [myself] thinking about it in a quite new way.”260 Secretary Acheson then presented to Truman that there were, essentially, two options in dealing with the CCP: First, the United States would oppose the CCP regime, “harass it, needle it, and, if opportunity appeared, to overthrow it.” Second, America would attempt “to detach it from subservience to Moscow and over a period of time encourage those vigorous influences which might modify it.” “This second alternative,” stressed the Secretary, “did not mean a policy of appeasement any more than it had in the case of Tito, [and] if the CCP took action detrimental to the U.S., it should be opposed with vigor.” Both Acheson and the consultants were of the opinion that “the second course was the preferable one.” The president responded that “this was the correct analysis [and] believed that today’s meeting had greatly helped him.”261 Truman’s change of attitude toward Beijing was reflected in his correspondence with Maury Maverick, the former Democratic congressman from Texas. Maverick, in his letter to Truman on November 19, 1949, wrote: “The situation is complicated. However, I am inclined to believe that a way should be found to recognize the new [Chinese] government, or at least to negotiate. I understand the arrest of our consul [Angus Ward at Mukden] and know that it is bad. However, it is my opinion that this improper conduct by the Chinese should not be permitted to get out on the limb. In my opinion, the new government is anxious for recognition.” In his reply on November 22, 1949, Truman stated, “Your letter of the nineteenth is the most sensible letter I’ve seen on the China situation. I can’t tell you how much I appreciate it.… It is a pleasure to hear from somebody who has a little common sense in the matter.”262 Nevertheless, Truman and Acheson still ruled out recognition as a viable policy because the PRC was, then, a radical and revolutionary

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regime, and, more importantly, normalization would require writing off Taiwan, whose political autonomy and liberty was of crucial concern for Washington. Hence, recognition was out of question even before the Korean War. For the remainder of 1949, Secretary Acheson sought to dissuade other foreign governments, most notably Great Britain and India, from recognizing the PRC. When meeting with the Indian ambassador to the United States, Mme. Vijaya Pandit, Acheson advocated for an “international hesitation” among the democratic countries in extending recognition to the PRC. One of the reasons being that the CCP regime, like Russia in 1917, apparently did not intend to recognize any continuing responsibilities (international obligations) inherited from preceding regimes. Beijing also did not seem to want to accord normal facilities to foreign diplomatic and consular officials. Thus, the secretary considered it “an illusion to believe that a government which extending early recognition would gain gratitude or other lasting benefits from its action.” At the present stage, it may be better to just continue the “wedge” policy of detaching Beijing from Moscow. 263 On December 8, 1949, Acheson met with Oliver Franks, the British ambassador. “[About] recognition,” Acheson said, “it seemed desirable to us to act if at all possible in concert with other concerned powers to ascertain whether the Chinese Communists intended to live up to their international obligations.” The U.S. did not believe that “hasty recognition would confer any permanent benefits on those who undertook it…Therefore, regardless of the action taken by other powers, we would not act hastily.” Unmoved, Franks coldly stated that “the British government would recognize the PRC before the year was out.”264 On December 20, 1949, the secretary reported to the president that various governments were determined to recognize the People’s Republic. However, Acheson reasserted that America would not join the club in haste and would wait “until the matter had developed further.” President Truman, who earlier complained that the “British had not played very squarely with us on this matter,” approved Acheson’s initiatives and said: “[I] was not disturbed at the possible action of other governments.”265 Conclusion

Both President Truman and Secretary Acheson supported the Wilsonian Open Door policy, that is, a strong, united, and democratic China. Initially, they placed full confidence in Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government to accomplish this task. However, subsequent

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developments—the aborted Marshall Mission, the renewed fratricidal civil war, and the total defeat of the KMT—obliterated Washington’s policy. As Mao Zedong took over in 1949, the United States was caught in a dilemma. The Truman administration, on the one hand, held great reservations, even antipathy, toward the Chinese Communists, primarily because of the party’s natural affinity to Marxist-Leninism. Yet, on the other hand, Acheson and his State Department advisers advocated that the CCP was by no means an adjunct of the Soviet Union, and, therefore, the United States should seek to promote Chinese Titoism. In the long run, the CCP could be expected to change its political and ideological orientations and embrace Western liberalism. The president, while endorsing the NSC-34 series and NSC-41, did not wholeheartedly agree with Acheson’s observations. For him, the CCP was clearly an instrument of Soviet imperialism. Engaging the regime would, thus, contradict the Open Door policy. Here, we see how ideas and identity conditioned decision-makers’ perception about a foreign government and constrained their policy choices. Because of the president’s inherent hostility, Mao was forced to “lean to the side of the Soviet Union,” and resorted to various aggressive acts, such as the improper treatment of American diplomats, which only reinforced the administration’s antagonistic feelings. Any hopes of rapprochement, accordingly, were vanished by the summer of 1949. Many years later, Dean Acheson recalled that “I think the Chinese Communists made [non-recognition possible]…because you were never out of very grave trouble with them. They had somebody in jail, or a council in jail, or seizing their embassy, and they were doing things all the time which I remember talking with Walt [Butterworth]—and rather led him to the belief that they were going to fix it so that you couldn’t recognize them.”266 His remarks were not entirely objective because, as discussed in the case study here, the Sino-American conflicts in 1949 were the consequence of a vicious cycle, in which hostility begot greater belligerence. While Acheson restrained Truman from an all-out confrontation with the PRC, both the president and the secretary rejected recognition because the PRC was a revolutionary government swearing, for the time-being, allegiance to Moscow. Having formal ties with it would not resonate with the principles of Wilsonian Open Door internationalism. More critically, establishing diplomatic relations with China at that time meant cutting off all associations with Taiwan.267 As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, the need to preserve Taiwan’s freedom and autonomous status further complicated the Truman administration’s relations with Beijing.

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Notes 1 For in-depth understanding of neorealism and its variants, defensive and offensive neorealism, see, respectively, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and John J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 2 The levels of analysis and determinants of foreign policy at each level are best explained in Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 19-21; and Michael Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security, Vol. 23, No.1, (Summer, 1998), pp. 168-169. 3 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 51, No.1, (October 1998), p. 146. On other neoclassical realists, see also Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries; Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders; Aaron Belkin, United We Stand? (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005); pp. 37-49; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions; and Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 4 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, p. 15. 5 Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas & Foreign Policy, pp. 10-17; Alexander George, Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 56-57. 6 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, p. 15. 7 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) p. 14. 8 Both social constructivism and cognitive psychological theories have contributed to the studies of identity and foreign policy. See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, (Spring 1992), pp. 391425; Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security” in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security; Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Michael Barnett, “The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable” in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, eds., Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Rawi Abdelai et al., “Identity as a Variable,” Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 4, No.4, (December 2006), pp. 695-711; Rogers Brubaker et al., “Ethnicity as Cognition,” Theory and Society. Vol. 33, No.1, (February 2004), pp. 31-64; Deborah Larson, “The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No.1, (March 1994), pp. 17-33; Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment

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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Glenn Chafetz et al., “Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy,” Security Studies,Vol.8, No. 2-3, (December, 1998), pp. 7-22. 9 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusion, p. 22-30; Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, p. 99. 10 Ibid., p. 15. 11 For theories of democratic peace, see the works of Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett. A good compilation of their scholarships and others, see Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996). 12 John Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 19-20. 13 Despite this pacific view of democratic states, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder find that incipient democracies are prone to engage in foreign wars because leaders often need to resort to nationalistic appeals to mobilize the masses to consolidate political power. See Edward Mansfield & Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” in Michael Brown, Sean LynnJones, and Steven Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 315-316. 14 For discussions on the war-constraining powers of liberal democratic institutions, see Bruce Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs”; Kenneth Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 4, (December, 1998), pp. 829-844. 15 Kant’s quote is taken from John Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War, p. 38. 16 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., Debating Democratic Peace, p. 10. 17 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests, p. 128; David Campbell, Writing Security, p. 9; and Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, pp. 7-10. 18 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: HBJ Book, 1955), p. 285. 19 Ibid., p. 286. 20 Ibid., p. 286. See also Michael Desch, “America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, (Winter, 2007-2008), pp. 7-43. 21 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusion, p. 30. 22 Walter R. Mead, Special Providence (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 17. 23 This list is drawn mostly from G. John Ikenberry et al., The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Ch.1. See also Walter R. Mead, Special Providence; Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974); Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Lloyd Ambrosius, Wilsonianism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 24 Lloyd Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, p. 2.

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Walter R. Mead, Special Providence, p. 134. Louis Hartz, pp. 111-112. 27 Ibid., p. 5. 28 Mlada Bukovansky, “American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No.2, (Spring 1997), p. 222. 29 Ibid, p. 235. 30 Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century, p. 45. 31 Ibid, p. 46. 32 Ibid, p. 49. 33 G. John Ikenberry et al, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, p. 10. 34 Henry Kissinger’s quote is taken from Ikenberry et al., The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, p. 6. 35 Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, p. 12. 36 Ibid, p. 13. 37 Lloyd Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, p. 33. 38 Ibid, p. 14. 39 Wilson’s quote is taken from Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, p. 89. See also President Woodrow Wilson’s full War Address to Congress on April 2, 1917 at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65366&st=&st1= 40 Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, p. 103. See also Woodrow Wilson’s full address on the Fourteen Points, on January 8, 1918 at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65405&st=&st1= 41 Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century, p. 50. 42 Ibid, p. 65. 43 Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, p. 120. 44 Tony Smith, America’s Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 9. 45 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, pp. 295-296. 46 William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956), p. 46. 47 Ibid, pp. 47-48. 48 FDR’s quote is taken from Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century, p. 124. For the full transcript of FDR’s fireside chat on December 29, 1940, see http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15917&st=of+war+econom y&st1= 49 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 97. 50 Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, p. 8. 51 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition of America, p. 294. 52 G. John Ikenberry, et al., The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, p. 8. 53 Noel Pugach, “Making the Open Door Work: Paul S. Reinsch in China, 1913-1919,” The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 2, (May 1969), p. 161. 54 Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921, p. 15. 55 Walter R. Mead, Special Providence, p. 134. 56 Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century, pp. 41-42. 57 Michael Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 217. 58 Quote of Wilson is taken from Michael Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship, p. 218. 26

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59 Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy, 1913-1917 (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1952), pp. 71-72. 60 Ibid, p. 62. 61 “Telegrams from E.T Williams, the American Charge in Peking, to Secretary Bryan and President Wilson, reporting the situations in China,” April 30, 1913, Papers of Woodrow Wilson Project/April 30, 1913/Box117, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 62 Wilson’s Recognition note is quoted from Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921, p. 30. 63 “Telegram from the Republic of China President Yuan Shih-kai to President Wilson” May 2, 1913, Papers of Woodrow Wilson Project/1913 May 2/Box118, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 64 Daniel Crane & Thomas Breslin, An Ordinary Relationship, p. 157. 65 Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy, 1913-1917, p. 71. 66 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, p. 99. 67 Daniel Crane & Thomas Breslin, An Ordinary Relationship, p. 136. 68 Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy, 1913-1917, p. 71. 69 Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern policy, 1913-1921, p. 31. 70 Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. ix. 71 Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy, 1913-1917, p. 17. 72 “Letter from President Woodrow Wilson to Edward Jenkins,” March 17, 1913, Papers of Woodrow Wilson Project/1913 March 16-18/Box105, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 73 Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921, p. 39. 74 Noel Pugach, “Making the Open Door Work: Paul S. Reinsch in China, 1913-1919,” p. 165. 75 Paul S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company, 1922), p. xi. 76 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 77 Ibid., p. x. 78 Noel Pugach, “Making the Open Door Work: Paul S. Reinsch in China, 1913-1919,” p. 170. 79 Paul Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China. p. xi. 80 Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy, 1913-1917, p. 23. 81 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 82 Ibid., p. 33. 83 Ibid., p. 34. 84 “President Wilson’s Statement on the Pending Chinese Loans,” March 18, 1913, Papers of Woodrow Wilson Project/1913 March 16-18/Box105, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. Emphasis added. 85 Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, p. 19. 86 On the specific concessions, see Joshua Bau, The Open Door Doctrine in Relation to China, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923), pp. 85-86. 87 Ibid., p. 84. 88 Wilson’s March 28, 1913 quote is taken from Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921, p. 24. 89 Ibid., pp. 105-107. 90 Ibid., pp. 112-117.

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91 “Letter from Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to President Woodrow Wilson,” January 23, 1915, Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memo of the Secretary of State: Correspondence of Secretary Bryan with President Wilson, 1913-1915/Box2/RG59/250/46/35/3, National Archives, College Park, MD; “Letter from President Wilson to Secretary Bryan,” January 27, 1915, Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memo of the Secretary of State: Correspondence of Secretary Bryan with President Wilson, 19131915/Box2/RG59/250/46/35/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 92 “Letter from President Wilson to Secretary of State Bryan on China, with Enclosures from E. T. Williams and Paul Reinsch,” March 12, 1915, Papers of Woodrow Wilson Project/March 12, 1915/Box189, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 93 “Letter from President Wilson to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, with Enclosures of Bryan’s notes to the Japanese Ambassador on the Twenty-Demands,” March 12-13, 1913, Papers of Woodrow Wilson Project/March 12, 1915/Box189, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. Emphasis added. 96 “Letter from Paul Reinsch (U.S. Minister to China) to Secretary of State Bryan,” April 14, 1915, Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memo of the Secretary of State: Correspondence of Secretary Bryan with President Wilson, 1913-1915/Box2/RG59/250/46/35/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 97 “Letter from President Wilson to Secretary Bryan with regards to Reinsch’s note,” April 14, 1915, Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memo of the Secretary of State: Correspondence of Secretary Bryan with President Wilson, 1913-1915/Box2/RG59/250/46/35/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 98 “Letter from Secretary of State Lansing to Viscount Ishii (Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission,” November 2, 1917, Personal and Confidential Letters to the President, 1915-1918/Box3/RG59/250/46/35/6, National Archives, College Park, MD. 99 Ibid. 100 “Letter from Secretary of State Robert Lansing to President Wilson, with enclosures of Lansing’s statements to Minister Reinsch on Lansing-Ishii Notes,” November 7, 1917, Papers of Woodrow Wilson Project/November 7, 1917/Box281, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University 101 Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern policy, p. 184. 102 Dennis Merrill and Thomas Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 2, (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), pp.111-112. 103 To some extent, President Wilson did succeed in the “reduction of Japan’s gains…He obtained her promise to return Jiaozhou [of Shandong province] to China [at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference] while retaining the economic rights in Shandong. He avoided the keen desire of Japan to have her gains recognized under the 1915 and 1918 treaties with China which would have given her position a respectful legality.” See Roy Curry, p. 321. 104 Ibid., p. 309. 105 Ibid., p. 309.

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106 Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 9. 107 Raymond Esthus, “The Open Door and Integrity of China,” pp. 68-70; Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, p, 87. 108 Ibid., pp. 110-111; See also Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947). 109 Michael Shaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, pp. 5-6. 110 Ibid, p. 14. It is important to note that despite American goodwill toward China, Washington, at least until 1941, refrained from taking more active approach in resisting Japan. The United States was sympathetic but saw China as less strategically important than Europe. However, the fact that American government repeatedly protested against foreign and Japanese encroachments in China should give weight to Washington’s liberal normative commitment to China’s Open Door. 111 Anne R. Pierce, Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and Power in American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. xv. 112 Livingston T. Merchant, who served as the counselor of the American Embassy in Nanjing, China from 1948-1949 and, later, the deputy assistant secretary of Far Eastern Affairs from 1949-1951, described America’s liberal Wilsonian sentiments toward China: “In 16 years of business and 8 in State and Foreign Service, I have never been even remotely involved in a subject so supercharged with emotion as China policy…I ask myself why—It must be because our relations for 150 years with China are bedded in romance and sentiment, the clipper trade and missionary…Our policy roots in China don’t go down to the bed rock of physical contiguity or common culture or basic economic interdependence—such as, say, Canada does. Commerce [is] negligible.” See “Draft speech by Livingston Merchant, on Recognition, to the Institute of World Organization,” January 12, 1950, Papers of Livingston T. Merchant (LTM)/ 1950 Folder/Box 17, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 113 Harry Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume 2 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956), p. 61. 114 Harry Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Vol.2, p. 64. 115 “Memorandum for Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, from President Truman,” January 25, 1946, PSF/China 1946/Truman Papers/Box151, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (Hereafter HST Library). 116 Harry Truman , Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol. 1, p. 342. 117 Ibid., pp. 423-424. On details of the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, see Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 158-164. 118 Ibid., p. 163. 119 Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972); Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993). Acheson was known as an “Atlanticist.” 120 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 8. 121 Ibid., p. 8. 122 Ernest May, The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949 (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1975), p. 10.

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123 On the eve of Marshall’s departure, Truman approved the general’s request of designating Acheson, then serving as the undersecretary of state, as his “rear echelon.” Acheson later recalled that he would “bear personal responsibility for immediate reply and for action upon [Marshall’s] requests, with authority to call on the president himself for help, if necessary, to get action.” Dean Acheson, Present at Creation, p. 143. 124 Background on Nationalist China’s collaboration with the United States during WWII, political negotiations and civil war between the KMT and CCP, and the postwar Marshall Mission, see Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China; George C. Marshall, Marshall’s Mission to China, Volumes 1 and 2 (Arlington, VA: University Publications of America, 1976); Lloyd Eastman, Seeds of Destruction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984); Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); Deng Ye, Lianhe Zhengfu Yu Yidang Xun Zheng [Coalition Government vs. One-Party State](Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2003); and Kuan Chung, Zhongguo Mingyun Guanjian Shi Nian: Meiguo Yu Guogong Tanpan Zhengxiang, 1937-1949 [The Critical Decade of China’s Destiny: The United States and KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations, 1937-1947] (Taipei: Tianxia Publishers, 2010) . 125 Herbert Feis, a long-time adviser to the State and War Departments in the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, substantiated this point, noting that, “The China we strove to create—a free, strong, democratic and friendly nation—would be a needed partner in assuring peace and security for all in the Far East. Such were our purposes and program.” Feis, The China Tangle, p. 429. See also Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, pp. 352-353. 126 Harry Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume 2, p. 67. 127 President Truman’s “U.S. Policy toward China” (Suggested draft of statement by the White House upon the Departure of General Marshall for China), December 1945, PSF/China 1945/Truman Papers/Box173, HST Library. See also the formal release of President Truman’s “US Policy toward China” December 15, 1945, PSF/China 1945/Truman Papers/Box173, HST Library. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid; see also Ernest May, The Truman Administration and China, 19451949, pp. 10-11. 130 The formal release of President Truman’s “U.S. Policy toward China,” December 15, 1945, PSF/China 1945/Truman Papers/Box173, HST Library. The rough draft of the statement included the paragraphs that “the U.S. will continue to furnish military supplies and to assist the Chinese National government in the further transportation of Chinese troops so that it can reestablish control over the liberated areas of China, including Manchuria. To facilitate arrangement for cessation of hostilities and pending provisional arrangement in the proposed national conference, National government’s troops will not be transported by the U.S. Marines into areas, such as North China, when their introduction would prejudice the objectives of the military truce and the political negotiations.” See the draft statement, p. 3. Yet, the final release statement on December 15, 1945 discarded these parts. The amended portion

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was due to the consideration of the State Department which saw the inclusion would seriously prejudice Marshall’s mission to fashion the military truce and political negotiations. In a meeting on December 9, 1945, Byrnes, Acheson, Marshall, and John Carter Vincent agreed on the amended draft of the statement. They also agreed on giving General Marshall the discretion to determine when the U.S. military should resume the transportation of Chinese troops to North China pending on the negotiation progress. Later in the day, President Truman approved these decisions as set forth in a memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the War Department. These points were further confirmed at the White House meeting, on December 11, attended by Truman, Brynes, Marshall, and Admiral William Leahy. The president’s letter of instructions to Marshall and his public statement on U.S. Policy toward China were finalized on December 14, when Truman, Acheson, and Marshall all agreed on their formal release. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 142-143. See also Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, pp. 418-421. 131 Harry Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Vol. 2, p. 92. 132 “U.S. Policy toward China,” December 15, 1945, p. 2. 133 Ibid., p. 2. 134 Dean Acheson, Present at Creation, pp. 145-146; Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, p. 77; See also Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, pp. 407-408; Kuan Chung, Zhongguo Mingyun Guanjian Shi Nian, pp. 318-319. 135 President Truman’s quote is taken from Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. 409. 136 Ibid., p. 410; Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 169170; Michael Schaller, The United States and China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 107-109; Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, pp. 65-76. 137 In 1937, the CCP had its membership at roughly 40,000. By 1947, that number grew to 1.2 million. In 1948, the CCP armed forces also expanded to 2.8 million men. In 1937, while the total population under the Communist administration was about 5 million, or less than 1percent of China’s population, that number in 1948 was more than 160 million, or roughly 36percent of China’s population (450 million). See Alan P.L. Liu, How China is Ruled (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1986), p. 30; and Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 48. Hence, Mao perceived that the Communist administration in Northern China as a fully sovereign regime, governing a large territory and population, legitimated by their war effort against the Japanese and by the allegiance of the people in their controlled areas. See Lyman Van Slyke, “Introduction to the Marshall’s Mission to China,” in George Marshall, Marshall’s Mission to China, p. xxvi. 138 Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, p. 72. 139 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 205. 140 Harry Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol.2, p. 82. 141 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. 413. 142 Ernest May, The Truman Administration and China, p. 11. 143 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 140. Marshall was also going to assume his new post—the secretary of state—in January 1947. 144 For details on the failures of the Nationalist government in China, see Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford:

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Stanford University Press, 1962); Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Ralph Thaxton, China Turned Rightside Up (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Lloyd Eastman, Seeds of Destruction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984); Kathryn Bernhardt, Rents, Taxes, and Peasant Resistance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China; Lloyd Eastman et al, eds., The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). These works mostly attributed the defeat of the KMT regime to its internal political weakness, suppression of the peasants, close ties to exploitive landlords, corruption, wars, authoritarianism, and ineffective administration. Yet, some authors also disagreed and posited that the KMT had contributed greatly to China’s political and economic developments, especially in the so-called “Nanjing Decade” between 1927 and 1937. Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts were stymied by Communist insurrections and the war against Japan. The most sympathetic treatment of Nationalist China is found in Arthur Young, China’s Nation Building Effort, 1927-1937 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971) and Paul Sih, ed., The Strenuous Decade (New York: St. John’s University Press, 1970). Jay Taylor also seeks to vindicate Chiang’s contributions to China’s state-building and Taiwan’s democratization efforts in the twentieth century. By examining Chiang’s diaries, only recently disclosed since 2005, Taylor provided a much more benign portrayal of the generalissimo and commented that contemporary China actually resembles more closely to Chiang’s political visions than those of Mao Zedong. See Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). Yang Tienshi, a famous China scholar on Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist era, also gives Chiang a more objective view. See Yang Tienshi, Jiang Jieshi Yu Nanjing Guomin Zhengfu [Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing Nationalist Government] (Beijing: Zhonguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe Publishers, 2009). 145 Harry Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol.2, p. 90. 146 Robert Beisner, Dean Acheson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 175. 147 Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, pp. 90-91. As a matter of fact, since the United States recognized Chiang’s Nationalist government in July 1928, Washington had equated the KMT leader as the symbol of China’s unity and modernization. See Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, p. 112. 148 Michael Schaller, The United States and China, pp. 73-77. The report that Chiang’s Nationalists were not actively fighting the Japanese was far from objective. Even Lloyd Eastman, a strong critic of the KMT, wrote: “Whatever may be the final judgment on the issue, it remains a fact that Nationalist forces persevered for eight long years against an enemy who possessed a vast technological superiority. The political, economic, and human costs of this war of resistance were enormous. Yet, they did not abandon the Allied war effort…” See Lloyd Eastman, et al., eds., The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949, p. 151. In recent years, scholars, while acknowledging that Chiang was more interested in fighting the Communists, have found strong evidence supporting the KMT’s bravery and sacrifices in the war. They see that the Nationalists were

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making a great effort while the CCP avoided engaging large bodies of Japanese armies in order to strengthen its capability and guerrilla warfare against the Nationalists. See Kuan Chung, Zhongguo Mingyun Guanjian Shi Nian, pp. 2938. 149 Michael Schaller, The United States and China, pp. 84-85. See also Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, Chapters 18-19. 150 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, pp. 385-389. 151 “Letter, Harry S. Truman to Congressman Hugh De Lacy,” January 12, 1946, PSF/China 1946/Truman Papers/Box 151, HST Library. 152 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. 372. 153 “Memorandum by General Marshall of a Conversation with President Truman and Undersecretary of State Acheson,” December 14, 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States (Hereafter FRUS), Vol. 7, (1945), p. 770; see also Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, pp. 419-420. 154 Michael Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism, pp. 143-144. 155 “Letter, Harry S. Truman to Chinese Ambassador Wellington Koo,” August 10, 1946, PSF/China 1946/Truman Papers/Box 173, HST Library. 156 “Memorandum of Conversation between Wellington Koo, Tan Shaohua, and John Carter Vincent, on Letter from the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,” August 13, 1946, PSF/China 1946/Truman Papers/Box151, HST Library. 157 “Letter, President Truman to Ambassador Koo, and Acknowledgment of Chiang Kai-shek’s August 28, 1946 reply to Truman’s August 10, 1946 letter,” September 5, 1946, PSF/China 1946/Truman Papers/Box151, HST Library. 158 “United States Policy toward China” December 18, 1946, HST Library. 159 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 257. 160 Throughout the 1930s and 40s, Americans’ knowledge on the CCP was essentially limited and superficial. In Acheson’s words: “While we had regular diplomatic relations with the National government and had the benefit of voluminous reports from our representatives in their territories, our direct contact with the Communists was limited in the main to the mediation efforts of General Hurley and General Marshall.” See Dean Acheson, “Letter of Transmittal to President Truman,” on July 30, 1949, p. xiv. This letter was issued along with the publication, on August 5, 1945, of The China White Paper, also known as The United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, (Washington DC: Department of State Publication 3573, 1945). See also Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 150-151. In fact, Mao’s friendly gestures toward the United States in WWII were intended to “mislead the Americans within the united front framework” in order to enlist Washington’s support to curb the KMT. See Michael Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism, pp. 78-92. 161 Ernest May, The Truman Administration and China, p. 5. For instance, Edgar Snow, who interviewed Mao in 1936, claimed that the Chinese Communists were merely agrarian reformers, seeking to improve the lots of the poor Chinese peasants who were exploited by feudal landlords and corrupt KMT officials. See Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Random House, 1938).

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162 The code name “Dixie” was selected because Yanan was considered by the Nationalist government as the “rebel” territory. See Michael Schaller, The United States and China, pp. 90-96. 163 See Michael Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism, pp. 80-81. Despite his disagreement with Service and others in the U.S. Embassy in China, Ambassador Patrick Hurley actually agreed that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists and were not deeply rooted in the ideology of Communism. After his visit to Yanan in late 1944, Hurley commented that the Chinese Communists were espousing “Lincolnian mottos and principles of government.” See Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, p. 261. 164 The China White Paper, pp. 572-3. 165 Ibid., pp. 573-4. Tang Tsou, in America’s Failure in China, Ch. 6, provided a great account of America’s image of the CCP in the war years, especially from John S. Service’s standpoint. Service got into serious political trouble, particularly after the CCP’s ultimate triumph in 1949, as he and other career diplomats in the State Department were blamed for “losing” China. At the height of the McCarthy hysteria in the early 1950s, Service was accused for being a Communist sympathizer, and, as a result, was dismissed by the State Department. In 1952, Service appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court, which eventually ruled in his favor, finding the State’s Loyalty Security Board lacked concrete evidence of the charge. Service returned to active duty in the State Department but was assigned to an obscure consular post in England between 1956 and 1962. After retiring from government post, Service went to UC Berkeley, got his Master’s degree, and worked in the university’s Center for Chinese Studies, advising graduate students and researchers. See Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China, p. xxxiii. 166 Patrick Hurley, on the other hand, advocated the opposite, that is, the U.S. government should only aid and support Chiang Kai-shek. Without American backing, the CCP would soon yield to the KMT government and the obstacle to China’s postwar unification would easily be removed. See Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, p. 263. 167 For instance, in Byrnes’ memorandum to Marshall on December 9, 1945, the term “so-called Communists” was used. See The China White Paper, p. 606. In similar vein, John P. Davies, also a top-China hand who worked in the U.S. Embassy in Chongqing, commented that the CCP was “evolutionary” rather than “revolutionary.” See Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, p. 262. 168 In November 1945, upon returning to Washington for consultation, Patrick Hurley made a ferocious attack against the State Department, criticizing Service and other “Communist sympathizers” for undercutting his effort in China. Shortly after his National Press Club speech on November 27, 1945, Hurley resigned from his post. See Dean Acheson’s Present at the Creation, pp. 133-5; As a result of Hurley’s complaints, most of the Foreign Service officers who had positive opinion of the CCP were transferred to posts outside of China. In fact, “the American diplomatic and military missions in China had by then been cleansed of practically every person prepared to consider the Chinese Communists potentially independent of Moscow.” See Ernest May, The Truman Administration and China, p.6. 169 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, p. 157.

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170 “Digest of Secretary Marshall’s Testimony before Executive Session, Foreign Relations Committee,” February 1947, PSF/China Lobby/Truman Papers/Box140, HST Library. 171 Harry Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol. 2, pp. 90-91. 172 See “United States Policy toward China,” December15, 1945, HST Library. Though Truman used the term “political elements” in the statement, there is no doubt that, in light of the existing major political forces in China, it referred to the Chinese Communist Party and the liberal Democratic League (or the Third Force). Moreover, since the Chinese civil war was fought between the KMT and CCP, a coalition government could never be attained without the participation of the Chinese Communists. Indeed, Truman’s December 18, 1946 statement on China substantiated the policy objective of including the CCP in the coalition government, as it asserted that “Events moved forward with equal promise on the political front. On January 10 th, the Political Consultative Conference began its sessions with representative of the KMT Party, the Communist Party and several minor political parties participating. The agreement provided for an interim government of a coalition type with representation of all parties, for revision of the Draft Constitution along democratic lines prior to its discussion and adoption by a National Assembly and for reduction of the government and Communist armies and their eventual amalgamation into a small modernized truly national army responsible to a civilian government.” See Truman’s statement, “United States Policy toward China,” December 18, 1946, HST Library. 173 Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 174 “Digest of Secretary Marshall’s Testimony before Executive Session, Foreign Relations Committee,” February 1947, HST Library. 175 “United States Policy toward China,” December 18, 1946, HST Library. 176 “President Truman’s Press and Radio Conference # 139,” March 11, 1948, PSF/March 1948/Truman Papers/Box189, HST Library. 177 “Memorandum of Conversations between Secretary Acheson and Senators from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the Executive Session,” October 12, 1949, October-November1949/Memorandum of Conversations 1949-1953/Papers of Dean Acheson (Hereafter DGA)/Box66, HST Library. 178 The China White Paper, p. xvi. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 181 “Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, Friday,” January 19, 1949, January 1949/Notes on Cabinet Meetings II, 1946-1953/Papers of Matthew J. Connelly/Box2, HST Library. 182 Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” Department of State Bulletin, 1950, Vol. 22, (January 23, 1950), pp. 111-118. This is better known as Acheson’s National Press Club speech, delivered on January 12, 1950, on the “defensive perimeter” concept in Asia. 183 Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p. 17. The KMT’s repressive tactics appalled Truman, who, in his letter on August 10, 1946, cautioned Chiang Kai-shek: “There exists in the United States an increasing body of opinion which holds that our entire policy toward China must be reexamined in

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the light of spreading strife, and especially by evidence of the increasing tendency to suppress freedom of the press as well as the expression of liberal views among intellectuals. The recent assassinations of distinguished Chinese liberals at Kunming [of the Yunnan province] have not gone unnoticed. Regardless of where responsibility for these cruel murders may lie, the end result has been to focus American attention on the situation on China, and there is a growing conviction that an attempt is being made to settle major social issues by resort to force, military or secret police, rather than by democratic processes.” See “Letter, Harry S. Truman to Ambassador Wellington Koo,” August 10, 1946, PSF/China 1946/Truman Papers/Box 173, HST Library. John Carter Vincent, the director of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, once said that “if the [Nationalists] showed as much zeal for bringing good government to China as it was showing for eliminating opposition there would be no question but that it could ‘out-compete’ the Communists in gaining support of the Chinese people who did not favor Communism but simply wanted some evidence of government for the people.” See “Memorandum of Conversation between John Carter Vincent and Dr. Tan Shao-hwa, on Message to President Chiang Kai-shek,” September 9, 1946, PSF/China 1946/Truman Papers/Box151, HST Library. 184 Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” pp. 111-118. 185 On February 1, 1947, Mao addressed the CCP: “The circumstances…[in China] are that U.S. imperialism and its running dog [Chiang Kai-shek] have replaced Japanese imperialism…and have adopted the policies of turning China into a U.S. colony, launching a civil war, and strengthening the fascist dictatorship.” Mao’s quote is taken from Michael Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism, p. 155. 186 “Telegram from Consul General Smyth of Tientsin to the Secretary of State (Marshall),” December 1, 1948,” PSF/Telegrams (Tientsin) China/Truman Papers/Box166, HST Library. 187 “Telegram from Ambassador John Leighton Stuart (Nanking) to the Secretary of State (Marshall),” December 22, 1948, PSF/Telegrams (Nanking) China/Truman Papers/Box166, HST Library. 188 “NSC 34: United States Policy Toward China” (drafted on October 13, 1948), February 3, 1949, PSF /NSC Meeting #33/2/3/1949/Truman Papers/Box176, HST Library. 189 Ibid., p. 1. 190 Ibid., p. 3. 191 Ibid., p. 3. 192 Ibid., p. 4. 193 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 194 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 195 Robert Blum, Drawing the Line (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), p. 12. 196 “NSC-34,” p. 11 197 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 198 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 199 Ibid., p. 16. 200 “NSC 34/1: United States Policy toward China,” (prepared January 11, 1949), PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting #33/Truman Papers/Box176, HST Library. In

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his note to the National Security Council, NSC Executive Secretary Sidney Souers explained that the enclosed report, NSC-34/1 was prepared by the NSC staff with the advice and assistance of representatives of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and of the National Security Resources Board and the Central Intelligence Agency. NSC-34/1 was written in light of an initial working draft by the Department of State, NSC-34. 201 Ibid., p. 1. 202 In this meeting, three topics were discussed: (1) United States Policy toward China, NSC-34/1; (2) The Current Position of the United States with respect to Formosa, NSC-37/2, NSC-37/1; and (3) Current Position of the United States Respecting Delivery of Aid to China, NSC-22/3. Since the latter two items are pertaining to Taiwan, they will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. See “Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the National Security Council,” February 3, 1949; “Records of Actions by the NSC at the 33 rd Meeting,” February 3, 1949; “Memorandum for the President of the 33rd Meeting of the National Security Council (2/3/1949),”February 4, 1949, PSF/NSC Meeting File/Meeting Discussions/1949/Truman Papers/Box 186, HST Library. 203 “Memorandum for the President of the 33rd Meeting of the National Security Council (2/3/1949),” February 4, 1949, PSF/NSC Meeting File/Meeting Discussions/1949/Truman Papers/Box186, HST Library. 204 Robert Blum, Drawing the Line, p. 12. 205 “NSC-41:United States Policy Regarding Trade with China,” February 28, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box205,HST Library, p.2. In Acheson’s thinking, if the U.S. were to “control every wave in the Pacific Ocean,” it would have to begin with the construction of Japan. Because Japan was the only industrialized nation in East Asia, the rebuilding of Japan and its prewar trading system could best expedite regional recovery. On the other hand, China’s trade had never “accounted for more than 1.9percent of all U.S. exports or 3.4percent of U.S. imports,” hence although the “U.S. had long been a crucial trading partner for China—accounting for 15-25percent of its imports and 11-26percent of its exports—China had no corresponding significance to U.S. economy.” The total value of American trade with China was between $100 and $125 million a year. Furthermore, American business interests had invested, in the 1930s and 40s, only about $100-$200 million in China. While China assumed only a minimal role in American commerce, it played a vital position in Japanese trade. From 1930 to 1938, Sino-Japanese trade averaged $236, 848, 000 annually and made up 15.1percent of Japan’s total foreign trade. In 1934, Japan imported 33percent of its iron ore, 72percent of its pig iron, and nearly all of its cooking coal from China. During the Second World War, the total value of Japan’s annual trade with China reached $623,192,000 or 34.6percent of Japan’s total trade, although it dropped to merely $7,200,000 after the war. See Ronald McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves, pp. 140-149. 206 Warren Cohen, “Acheson, His Advisors, and China, 1949-1950,” pp. 33-34. See also “Philip D. Sprouse’s Memorandum of Conversations,” January 6, 1949 and February 10, 1949, FRUS, Vo. 9, (1949), pp. 5-6, and pp. 823-826. 207 “NSC-41,” p. 4 208 Ibid., pp. 10-13. 209 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

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210 At a State Department meeting on February 24, 1949, the participants unanimously agreed to the notion that economic trade was the only and the best weapon available to promote Titoisim in China. See Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, p. 99. However, Korean War’s outbreak in June 1950 and the Communist China’s subsequent entry into the war in October 1950 rendered NSC-41 obsolete as the Truman administration began to impose a total trade embargo on China. Given America’s pressure, Western allies and Japan also followed suit, though with great reservations. America would not ease trade and travel restrictions until the latter years of the Johnson administration in 1967-68. Further relaxation of trade took place only after Richard Nixon came to office. See Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Chapter 3; Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974, pp. 116-117. 211 “Memorandum for the President, from Sidney Souers, the Executive Secretary of the NSC,” March 3, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box205, HST Library. 212 “NSC-34/2,” March 3, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box178, HST Library. 213 Ibid., p. 5. 214 Ibid., p. 5. 215 Ibid., p. 4. 216 Ibid., p. 4. 217 During the discussion of NSC-34/2, Kenneth Royall, the secretary of the army, disagreed with Acheson’s reluctance to commit further aids to the Nationalists and other anti-Communist forces on the mainland. As the secretary of state reiterated his support of a “negative approach” to wait out for a SinoSoviet split, Walton Butterworth came to Acheson’s defense, pointing out that an all-out aid would “commit us on the mainland and would [only] give the Communists a real propaganda issue just when the mass of Chinese wanted peace at any price.” His position, once again, underscored how an U.S. intervention would only reinforce Moscow’s propaganda and solidify Chinese allegiance to both the CCP and Soviet Union. Furthermore, he said, “the Reds could go anywhere they wanted on the mainland, [and I] did not see how we could commit this government to help any little anti-Communist group.” At the same time, Paul Hoffman, director of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), interrupted and said, “I felt that NSC-34/2 was our only possible policy at the moment.” Royall at last agreed and went along. Although NSC-34/2 was adopted without modifications and subsequently approved by President Truman, the brief conversation interchange at the meeting reveals the inherent division between the State and Defense Departments: while the former endorsed a less explicit China policy to promote, in the long-run, a Sino-Soviet split the latter supported greater and more active assistance to the Nationalist government. Such policy cleavage would persist onto the debate of Taiwan. See “Memorandum for the President, Summary of the discussion at the 35th Meeting of NSC on March 3, 1949,” March 4, 1949, PSF/NSC Memos to President, 1949/Truman Papers/Box220, HST Library. 218 “Telegram from Ambassador John L. Stuart to Dean Acheson,” March 10, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), pp. 173-177. 219 Ibid.

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220 “Airgram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador to China (Stuart),” April 6, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), pp. 230-231. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. See also Warren Cohen, “Acheson, His Advisors, and China, 19491950,” p. 34. 223 “The Ambassador to China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State (Acheson),” May 3, 1949, FRUS, Vol.9, (1949), pp. 14-15. 224 Ibid. 225 Michael Sheng, “Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the Lost Chance, 1948-1950,” p. 480. 226 Chen Jian, “The Myth of America’s Lost Chance in China,” pp. 7778;Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, Chapter 5; For a more detailed account of the Ward case, see Chen Jian, “The Ward Case and the Emergence of the Sino-American Confrontation, 1948-1949,” Australia Journal of Chinese Affairs, Vol. 30 (July 1993), pp. 149-170. 227 Ronald McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves, p. 149. See also “Cabot to Acheson,” July 7, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), pp. 1202-1205; “Cabot to Acheson,” July 8, 1949, FRUS, p. 1207, “Cabot to Acheson,” July 8, 1949, FRUS, pp. 1208-1209; and “Cabot to Acheson,” July 9, 1949, FRUS, pp. 12121213. 228 Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, p. 127. 229 Chen Jian, “The Myth of America’s Lost Chance,” p. 78. 230 Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, p. 132. 231 “U.S. Ambassador to China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State (Acheson) on Huang-Stuart Talks”, May 14, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), pp. 745-747; and “Stuart to Acheson,” May 16, 1949; FRUS, pp. 747-748. 232 “Stuart to Acheson,” June 8, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), pp. 752-753. 233 Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, p. 132. 234 Ibid. 235 Ibid., p. 133. 236 “Stuart to Acheson,” June 30, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 766-767. 237 Ibid. 238 Ibid. 239 Ibid. 240 “Memorandum by John Davies of the PPS to the Director of the Staff (Kennan),” June 30, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), pp. 768-769. 241 “The Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart),” July 1, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), p. 769. 242 Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1962), pp. 411424. 243 The Ambassador to China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State (Acheson), July 6, 1949; FRUS: 49: VIII, pp. 405-407. 244 For more discussion on the KMT’s naval blockade and air strikes on China’s coastal cities, see Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, pp. 122-123; June Grasso, Truman’s Two China Policy, pp. 104-108; It is important to know that President Truman had since the beginning supported the KMT’s initiatives. In October, 1949, when the American merchant vessels, the Isbrandtsen Line, were detained by the Kuomintang navies in Shanghai waters, the president

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indicated to the State Department that he “wished the blockade to be effective and that he desired the department to do nothing to be of assistance to these vessels.” See “Memorandum of Conversations with the President,” October 1, 1949; FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 1141. 245 “Summary of Telegrams,” July 1, 1949, NAF/May-August 1949/Truman Papers/Box25, HST Library. See also Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, p. 147. 246 Memorandum of Conversations, John Leighton Stuart to the Secretary of State (Acheson), July 14, 1949, quoted from Qing, From Allies to Enemies, pp. 146-147. 247 “Memorandum by General Chen Ming-shu, Chairman of the Shanghai Board of the KMT Revolutionary Committee (KMTRC),”August 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), pp. 771-779. 248 “Zhou Enlai’s Demarche to Edmund Clubb,” June 3, 1949; and “Clubb’s correspondence with Stuart and the State Department,” June 6-7, 1949, NAF/May-August 1949/Truman Papers/Box21, HST Library. 249 Ibid. 250 Warren Cohen, “Conversations with Chinese Friends: Zhou Enlai’s Associates Reflect on Chinese-American Relations in the 1940s and the Korean War,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 11, No. 3, (Summer 1987), pp. 283-289. 251 “Telegram, Acting Secretary of State (Webb) to the Consul General at Beijing (Clubb),” June 14, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), pp. 384-385. 252 “Memorandum of Conversations with the President,” June 16, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1949), p. 388. 253 “Discussion with the President, NSC Document No. 41 on Trade with China,” September 16, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations, 19491953/August-September1949/DGA/Box66, HST Library. 254 “Memo by the Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers),” November 4, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 890-96. 255 “Memorandum of Conversations with the President and the Acting Secretary of State (Webb),” October 31, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 1355. 256 “Memorandum of Conversations, Fosdick to Jessup,” August 29, 1949, Papers of Raymond Fosdick (RBF)/Box 9, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 257 “Memorandum of Conversations, Fosdick to Jessup,” October 25, 1949, RBF/Box 9, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 258 For the full meeting transcripts, see “Records of Round-Table Discussion by 25 Far Eastern Experts with the Department of State on American Policy toward China,” October 6-8, 1949, PSF/China 1949/China Roundtable October 6-8,1949/Truman Papers/Box 152, HST Library. 259 “Meeting with the President, China Meeting,” October 17, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations 1949-1953/Oct-Nov1949/DGA/Box66; Memorandum of Conversation with the President, “Meeting with Far Eastern Consultants” October 27, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations/OctNov1949/DGA/Box66; and “Meeting with the President: President’s Meeting with the Consultants,” November 7, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations/OctNov1949/DGA/Box66, HST Library.

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260 “Memorandum of Conversations with the President, Item 1—China and the Far East, “ November 17, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations/OctoberNovember 1949/DGA/Box64, HST Library. 261 Ibid. 262 “Correspondence between President Truman and Maury Maverick,” November 19-21, 1949, PSF/China 1949/Truman Papers/Box152, HST Library. 263 “Memorandum of Conversations, Dean Acheson with Mme. Vijaya Pandit (Ambassador of India): Recognition of Chinese Communist Regime,” Dec 6, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations/DGA/Box 64, HST Library. 264 “Memorandum of Conversations, Acheson with Sir Oliver Franks (British Ambassador) on the Far East,” Dec 8, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations/DGA/Box 64, HST Library. 265 “Meeting with the President, “UK Recognition of China,” October 17, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations/Oct-Nov 1949/DGA/Box 66; “Meeting with the President, Item 5: U.S. Policy Toward the Far East,” December 20, 1949, Memorandum of Conversations/DGA/Box 64, HST Library. 266 “Acheson’s Princeton University Seminars,” July 1953, Princeton Seminars/Reading Copy, 22-23, July 1953/Folder II/DGA/Box75, HST Library. 267 “Telegram, Consul at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State (Acheson),” September 6, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 382-83. In this telegram, McConaughy told Acheson that Mao stated that “there could be no thought of reaching an accommodation with the U.S. until it abandoned all support for the KMT and her design on Taiwan.”

4 Freeing Taiwan from Communist Domination

Mao’s victory in 1949 left the Truman administration with a clear dilemma. On the one hand, the United States, in pursuing a Sino-Soviet split, could not openly defend Formosa,1 which would flame up nationalist and anti-America sentiments in China. On the other hand, concerned about the island’s freedom and wellbeing, U.S. decisionmakers staunchly opposed writing off Taiwan to Communist totalitarianism. Committing to Wilson’s Open Door, policymakers envisioned, in the long run, a strong, united, and democratic China. They also wished, however, to maintain an autonomous and pro-West Taiwan, where Taiwanese self-rule and liberal democracy could eventually take root and serve as a guidepost to the mainland’s democratization. Hence, American leaders needed to walk a fine line to manage the delicate balance across the Taiwan Strait. This chapter and the next seek to illustrate how Truman, Acheson, Dulles, Merchant, and Rusk shaped America’s Taiwan policy by tracing their thought process and arguments as recorded in their policy papers, memos, and private notes. Notwithstanding their differences over the means to salvage Taiwan, they agreed that the island must be denied to the Chinese Communists. The Disposition of Taiwan in the Post–World War II Period

China has long considered Taiwan its “lost province,” stripped away by the Japanese in the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 which concluded the Sino-Japanese War.2 As early as fall 1942, Chiang Kai-shek insisted to the United States that after Japan’s surrender, Taiwan must be returned to China.3 FDR, who was then promoting a “Four Policemen”4 postwar security regime, supported the generalissimo’s position and pledged the restoration of China’s lost territories.5 Initially, Taiwan did not figure prominently into America’s strategic consideration, since the war in

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Europe, naval conflict in the Pacific, and struggle within the Asian mainland were far more significant.6 Yet, officials within the State, Navy, and Army Departments did identify the island as an ideal location for U.S. air and naval bases, from which Washington could maintain peace and stability in postwar East Asia. Thus, Taiwan must be denied to any hostile powers after the war.7 Nationalist China, being the United States’ close ally, was perceived to be the best solution to the future disposition of Taiwan. Indeed, the U.S. government in the early 1940s never raised any doubt that the Taiwanese people were not Chinese and that Formosa should not be returned to Chinese sovereignty.8 Therefore, Chiang’s request to reclaim Taiwan was not antithetical to America’s postwar security interests.9 In February 1943, when Madame Chiang Kai-shek visited Washington, Roosevelt was determined that Taiwan be returned to China. This decision was formalized ten months later, on December 1, 1943, in the Cairo Declaration, in which FDR, Churchill, and Chiang announced that it was “their purpose that…all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” The Cairo Declaration was further reaffirmed, on July 26, 1945, in the Potsdam Proclamation by the U.S., Britain, China, and Soviet Union.10 Taiwan as part of China seemed irrefutable. Taiwanese Aspirations for Self-Determination

Nevertheless, the powers’ decision on Taiwan was, to some observers, illegitimate, as it was based solely on secret diplomacy and political expediency. George Kerr, a U.S. Foreign Service officer and, later, the vice consul in Taipei from 1946-47, contended that the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan through a formal treaty. Thus, the U.S. and its allies had no right to divide the spoils of war before a conclusive peace treaty was signed with Japan. Cairo was a mistake.11 Furthermore, Kerr believed that Taiwan was potentially too important to be treated merely as an “ordinary Chinese province…[for] history had long since demonstrated its military importance as a strategic point on the Western Pacific Rim and its wealth and technological development placed it too far ahead of the Mainland Chinese provinces.”12 U.S. Taiwan policy, in short, must be made with careful planning and deliberation. However, America’s acquiescence in returning Taiwan to China should not simply be explained away as power politics. We must take into account how Wilsonian principles had affected American leaders’ decision. To make Nationalist China a leading world power, the

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Roosevelt administration, in 1943, abolished America’s extraterritorial rights in China and recognized her sovereign equality to the United States. In light of the heightened nationalism during the long war against Japan, both the KMT and CCP vowed to recover Taiwan and all lost territories.13 Chiang Kai-shek noted that Taiwan was especially vital to “safeguarding [China’s] existence.”14 Thus, U.S. policymakers understood that if the Nationalist government failed to bring back Taiwan it would lose its ruling legitimacy. A strong, united, and democratic China must, in other words, also rest upon territorial unification with Taiwan.15 This is not to suggest that the United States had no sympathy to the interests and expectations of the Taiwanese people. The half-century Japanese domination deprived the native population of political rights, hence leaving a relatively well-educated population hunger for political participation and self-government. “Political freedom under Japanese rule,” in the words of Douglas Mendel, “did not keep pace with economic, public health, and educational development, although comparison of the Japanese record in Formosa with their rule in Korea…and probably with most colonial regimes before 1945, might rank Formosa above other prewar colonies.”16 The Truman administration thought that as Chiang Kai-shek aimed to construct a modern democratic China, the Taiwanese aspirations for self-rule in their provincial government would be respected and satisfied. The Formosans, thus, were promised by the allied powers that their political freedom would be granted with the defeat of the Japanese armed forces.17 In sum, Washington’s alliance with Nationalist China was taken by the Taiwanese people as the ultimate guarantee that at last the island population would attain equality, dignity, and the right to manage their own political affairs, and that Taiwan would become China’s most advanced model province to contribute to the mainland’s postwar reconstruction and modernization. But, it soon became apparent that “Formosa was to be treated as a conquered territory, and its population as a subjugated people.”18 Nationalist Misrule and the Incident of February–March 1947

Beginning in September 1945, the Japanese began the transfer of its administrative power over Taiwan to the arriving Chinese Nationalist officials, who were transported from the mainland through American naval ships and assisted by a small team of United States military personnel pursuant to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender and General

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Order No. 1. While the Taiwanese were joyfully greeting the liberators, especially the Americans, they were disappointed to see the “shambling, poorly disciplined, and very dirty Chinese troops.” The natives’ confidence in the Nationalists receded further as the central government announced that the new Chinese administration on Taiwan would assume the character of a military government. Despite protests from both the Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, General Chen Yi, a close associate of Chiang Kai-shek and whose record as the former governor of Fujian province was tainted with corruption and misdeeds, was appointed to this new post on October 25, 1945.19 From 1946 to the spring of 1947, Chen’s noxious and oppressive governance on Taiwan served as the breeding ground for Taiwanese resentment, and even hatred, toward the KMT government. The Taiwanese noted the expressions frequently expressed by the mainland officials that “Formosa is a degraded territory and the Formosans are degraded people,” or that “the island was beyond the pale of true Chinese civilization.”20 Chen Yi and his associates perceived the native Taiwanese as barbarians lacking loyalty to China and incapable of political self-government. Notwithstanding that the Taiwanese constituted about 80 percent of the island population (6 million in 1946), important jobs in government, education, and law enforcement were distributed in favor of the Mainland Chinese. Moreover, the new Chinese rulers treated the island, economically well-off and left with Japanese industries and assets, as a lucrative bonanza ready for exploitation and aggrandizement.21 The KMT’s massive plundering resulted in drastic deteriorations in public order, education, health standards, and public morale. Nonetheless, when Governor Chen announced, in January 1947, that the ROC’s newly drafted constitution would not apply to Taiwan, the Taiwanese anger reached boiling point. Chen thought that while the Chinese were advanced enough to enjoy the privileges and liberties of constitutional government, the Formosans were “politically retarded” due to decades of Japanese subjugation. Two or three more years of Nationalist tutelage would be required to prepare them for full citizenship.22 Adding insult to injury, the inept governor declared, in early February, the suspension of all local popular elections until December 1949. Massive uprising erupted at last on the evening of February 27, 1947, when government agents of the Tobacco Monopoly Bureau killed a woman vendor who was selling untaxed cigarettes. The agents soon escaped as crowds gathered and sought justice. On the following day, February 28, about 2,000 Taiwanese demonstrated and marched to the

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bureau demanding redress. Receiving no satisfaction there, they moved on toward the governor’s office, but the KMT military responded with machine gunfire. The “228” incident sparked island-wide protests and prompted a general attack on the Nationalist authorities by the Taiwanese both in Taipei and elsewhere.23 Immediately, Governor Chen Yi proclaimed martial law. In the subsequent days of early March, as confrontations and violence mounted, the Taiwanese elites organized a settlement committee to negotiate with Chen to request justice and a formal official pledge to initiate political and economic reforms in Taiwan. Lacking sufficient military forces at his hand, the beleaguered governor adopted a pacifying attitude while secretly contacting the central government in Nanjing to arrange for reinforcements.24 On the afternoon of March 8, over 50,000 Chinese troops landed at Keelung Port and the real carnage began. Between 10,000 and 30,000 people were massacred, and a systematic effort was made to target and exterminate the principal Formosan leaders.25 Within weeks, the island had been virtually cowed into submission. The American Response toward the February–March 1947 Incident

Throughout the incident, the American government remained relatively quiet, and to the chagrin of Vice Consul George Kerr, this was due to the marked tendency of the U.S. Embassy in Nanjing, the Taipei Consulate, and the State Department in Washington to adhere strictly to the norms of diplomacy and no foreign intervention.26 Ralph Blake, the U.S, consul in Taipei, remarked to local Taiwanese that “this unfortunate [February-March] incident was strictly an affair between two Chinese groups; the United States had no reason to take cognizance of trouble between a provincial governor and his people.”27 Kerr, however, was unrelenting. He produced and transmitted first-hand reports to Nanjing, hoping to capture the attention of both Ambassador Stuart and Secretary of State Marshall, though to no avail. Yet, as violence escalated and culminated in the March 8 bloodbath, the Truman administration could no longer stay reticent. Stuart sent an assistant military attaché to Taiwan from March 9 through March 11 to evaluate the situation. Despite being constrained by his KMT escorts, the attaché saw enough to conclude that “only real political and economic reform can quiet Taiwan.”28 Meanwhile, Kerr dispatched another memorandum to the embassy, outlining the implications of the Nationalist repressions in Taiwan. He stressed that if Chiang Kai-shek wanted to win back the hearts of the Formosans, he

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must replace Chen Yi with “a man of integrity, preferably a civilian,” who could “restore competent administration and make Taiwan an economic asset to China and a military and ideological asset to the democracies.”29 On March 17, Kerr was summoned to Nanjing to report directly to the ambassador. “In [our] conversation,” he recalled, “I found the ambassador full of sympathy for the Formosans, but also full of continuing trust in his friend Chiang Kai-shek.”30 Stuart defended the generalissimo as the “victim of bad information” whose policy was misled by Chen Yi. While having a different opinion about Chiang, Kerr promised to prepare another memorandum for the eyes of the generalissimo.31 The vice consul warned Chiang Kai-shek that “if the central government chooses to support a policy of suppression of all criticism…and to confirm the authority of present officials by establishment of military garrisons throughout the island, the cost will be very high.”32 He also reported the inevitable socioeconomic collapse in Taiwan if “drastic efforts to revise policy and affect governmental reforms are not undertaken speedily.” Kerr assured Chiang of the Formosans’ unquestionable loyalty to the KMT government but added that “to encourage and ensure wholehearted effort the Formosan Chinese must be allowed to take a larger part in government at all levels.” The Taiwanese can be “restored to its former high level of political allegiance and of economic production by prompt and fundamental reform.”33 A Deep Scar Has Been Created

Kerr’s reports and analyses convinced Washington of the seriousness of the matter and the imminence of reforms in Taiwan. Accordingly, Stuart delivered Kerr’s memorandum to Chiang Kai-shek on April 18.34 Within days, Chiang sent Wei Tao-ming, the former Chinese ambassador to the United States, to assume Taiwan’s governorship and replaced a great majority of Chen Yi’s associates with new appointees, who were mostly native Formosans. Taiwan was made officially a Chinese province (hence no longer a military administration territory), enjoying equal political status and rights as one of the thirty-five Chinese provinces. A series of liberal reforms, including the relaxation of censorship, martial law, and the reintroduction of partial private ownership, were instituted to ameliorate the ill effects of Chen Yi’s misgovernment. Nonetheless, the gaps and discrepancies between the Formosans and their Mainland Chinese counterparts widened and became irreparable.35 Chiang Kai-shek’s overtures to remove Chen36 and appoint a more

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liberal governor did soothe the relations with the Taiwanese. But, in light of the unhappy experience, the natives were not optimistic about their prospects. In August 1947, General Albert Wedemeyer, who led a mission to China, reported to Secretary of State Marshall about Taiwan: Our experience in Formosa is most enlightening. The administration of the former governor Chen Yi has alienated the people.… The central government lost a fine opportunity to indicate to the Chinese people and to the world at large its capability to provide honest and efficient administration. They cannot attribute their failure to the activities of the Communists or of dissident elements. The people anticipated sincerely and enthusiastically deliverance from the Japanese yoke. However, Chen Yi and his henchman ruthlessly, corruptly, and avariciously imposed their regime upon a happy and amenable population.… The island is extremely productive in coal, rice, sugar, cement, fruits, and tea. Both hydro and thermal powers are abundant. The Japanese had efficiently electrified even remote areas and also established excellent railroad lines and highways. Eighty percent of the people can read and write, the exact antithesis of conditions prevailing in the mainland of China. There were indications that Formosans would be receptive toward United States guardianship and United Nations trusteeship. They fear that the central government contemplates bleeding their island to support the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine and I think their fears well founded.37

In fact, the Taiwanese fears were not groundless. As the Communists were going for a final victory in China, Chiang Kai-shek, in the latter part of 1948, was giving greater attention to create Taiwan as a last stronghold from which the Nationalist rule could be continued. Thus, internal security measures like political repression and secret police activities were tightened and increased. In early 1949, Governor Wei was abruptly replaced by General Chen Cheng, another protégé of Chiang, who reasserted martial law on January 5, 1949, hence inaugurating the four-decade long “White Terror” period in Taiwan.38 George Kerr wrote that “so long as Chiang Kai-shek, his family, or his party and army govern Formosa, this ‘betrayal’ will not be forgotten or forgiven.”39 The Truman administration also shared the view that the island was a “prime example of all that was wrong in Nationalist China, a place where poor government had wasted an opportunity to use well the assets that the island represented.” U.S. officials acknowledged the widened gaps between the Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, and, especially, the latter’s desire for independence.40 They believed that Taiwan must be

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saved, but such action must be carried out without jeopardizing America’s relations with China. America’s Policy: Denying Chinese Communist Control of Taiwan through Diplomatic and Economic Means

On January 3, 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) produced a 10-page report analyzing the strategic importance of Taiwan.41 The intelligence report clearly painted America’s China-Taiwan dilemma. It strongly emphasized that the “denial of Taiwan to effective Soviet exploitation is of major importance to the U.S. strategic position in the Far East,” since in the event of war, the “Chinese Communist control of, and consequent Soviet access to Taiwan would jeopardize U.S. security in the Western Pacific.”42 Essentially, Taiwan is a “link” in the offshore island chain extending from Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines, to Southeast Asia, providing naval and air bases for the United States to defend its interests in the Western Pacific. Taiwan also “provides the U.S. with ports for facilitating shipping in the ocean areas between Japan and Southeast Asia, and the U.S. could expect accessibility to [the Island’s] economic and [food] surpluses for the support of Japan and their denial to Communist China and the USSR.”43 The report acknowledged that while Taiwan “has been under Chinese administration since the Japanese surrender in 1945,” the island is “not legally a part of the Chinese Republic [thus] its [international legal] status remains to be determined in the Peace Treaty with Japan.”44 Washington’s concern for the Taiwanese people was also revealed in the following observations: There are strong forces in Taiwan favoring autonomy, but the situation is complicated by conflicting political trends. Assuming U.S. inactivity, Taiwan will eventually…come under the control of the Communist government in China.… The native population of Taiwan would welcome release from their domination by mainland Chinese. The Taiwanese probably do not have strong aspirations for immediate independence, but could be expected to favor a trusteeship status under the UN or some form of U.S. protectorate. A successful Taiwanese rebellion against the Chinese [Nationalist] government in the near future is quite improbable, owing to lack of effective leadership, and the presence of Nationalist military forces on the island. Even if a nonCommunist Taiwanese regime were established, furthermore, its ability over a long period of time to withstand pressure from the Communist-dominated mainland would be slight, in view of the lack of governmental experience of potential Taiwanese leaders and the regime’s economic problems.45

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Nevertheless, the CIA warned against overtly detaching Taiwan from China or supporting Taiwanese independence. “Any establishment of U.S. control over Taiwan,” it asserted, “would provide the Chinese Communists and the USSR with material for their anti-U.S. propaganda.” Therefore, Moscow could more easily conceal its ambition over Northern China and persuade the Chinese that the United States was the genuine imperialist. In addition, a “U.S. program to separate Taiwan from China might render impossible the maintenance of any normal diplomatic and consular relationships with the Communist government on the Chinese mainland.”46 The analysis, however, refrained from providing any concrete advice to prevent the fall of Taiwan to China. It only suggested that any attempts or courses of action, whether military, economic, or diplomatic, must be implemented with great care and finesse. U.S. Support of Taiwan

At the 31st NSC meeting on January 8, 1949, Taiwan was one of the major items on the agenda. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) contended that “should Formosa and its immediately adjacent islands come under an administration which would be susceptible to exploitation by Kremlin-directed Communists, the strategic implications to the security of the United States would be seriously unfavorable.”47 Sharing the CIA assessments, the JCS argued that, given the CCP’s imminent victory, Taiwan’s importance as a wartime military base, capable of use for staging of troops, strategic air operations, and control of adjacent shipping routes, had been further “enhanced.” A Communist-dominated Taiwan could pose serious security threats to Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. Yet, NSC-37 recommended the use of “diplomatic and economic steps” to “insure a Formosan administration friendly to the United States.”48 Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett commented that “there was a hydra-headed urgency for a Formosa decision.” But, he also remarked that “in view of the international commitment with respect to the return of Formosa to the Chinese and of the present Chinese [Nationalist] de facto control of the island, any open move for direct U.S. influence would be bad.” Stuart Symington, the secretary of the air force, stressed that “it was the consensus of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force that the prevention of Communist control in Formosa was of the utmost importance.” Lovett agreed to it but suggested that “the question of how was a difficult one.”49 He, therefore, decided to defer the matter until after Dean Acheson was in charge of the State Department.

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Meanwhile, the Truman administration began to fortify Taiwan. The China Aid Act, passed by Congress in April 1948, appropriated $463 million, of which $125 million would be used for military assistance and $338 million for economic aid to assist the Nationalists.50 The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the coordinating agency for all foreign economic assistance programs created by the Marshall Plan, was responsible for administering the economic package, whereas the U.S. armed services would sell and transport military supplies and ammunitions to China as prescribed by the $125 million military funds. In a White House meeting on December 30, 1948, President Truman instructed Lovett and Butterworth that the United States “would continue to support through the implementation of the China Aid Act the present Chinese government or a legal successor government which pursues an anti-Communist policy.” To prevent American supplies from falling to the CCP, the president warned that “should a government come into power which comes to terms with the Chinese Communists, all aid should cease.” Though all ECA supplies already in China could be “distributed under conditions similar to those now prevailing,” Truman, referring to Taiwan, asserted that those which have not yet arrived to Chinese mainland should be “diverted elsewhere.” In a similar vein, military supplies under the China Aid Act should be “diverted insofar as possible in accordance with the advice of our military authorities in China.”51 Yet, Truman, in an abundance of caution, also asked Lovett to study whether it was wise to halt further economic assistance and military shipments to China and divert them to Taiwan, where the bulk of the KMT troops and government personnel had already retreated.52 At the 30th NSC meeting on December 17, 1948, the acting secretary of state acknowledged that “about 60 percent of current [military shipments] were now being made to Formosa.” Despite the Secretary of Defense James Forrestal’s proposal to suspend military shipments pending the clarification of situations in China, the NSC agreed with Lovett that the United States should continue the aid to the Nationalist government and Taiwan provided that the KMT would commit to reforms on the island.53 The president was supportive of Lovett’s position. From Washington’s point of view, given America’s support and the KMT’s military/economic resources on Taiwan, the island could be adequately defended for at least a year and half. Chiang’s reckless attempt to re-conquer China, however, would only squander away these assets, unnecessarily provoke the CCP, and expedite Taiwan’s downfall. Hence, the Truman administration firmly opposed Chiang’s initiative to make Taiwan a stepping stone for recapturing the mainland. “If Chiang

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intended to use Formosa as a base from which to return [to China] in ten years,” Lovett remarked, “that would change the value of Formosa for us. Our strategy was to hold Formosa for the future by integrating it with Japan or by getting in a government free from Communistic influence…and [ensuring that Taiwan] did not become Chiang’s headquarters.”54 In addition to relocating military resources to Taiwan, Truman, at the recommendation of Lovett, also acquiesced to the continuation of ECA’s rural and industrial reconstruction and replacement program on the island.55 On January 19, 1949, Paul Hoffman, the director of the ECA, sent a letter to Lovett, indicating that the ECA, after consulting with the KMT government, had made tentative allocations for the reconstruction and replacement projects on Taiwan. “I should very much appreciate an indication of your views,” he wrote, “as to whether ECA might appropriately proceed with actual procurement on all or some of these projects, such procurement to be undertaken in each case after completion of the pre-project engineering with respect thereto.”56 Replying to Hoffman, Undersecretary of State James Webb claimed that “it is the [State] Department’s view that it would be desirable for ECA to undertake procurement for such of the projects on Taiwan as are approved by ECA after completion of necessary engineering surveys.”57 rd

The 33 NSC Meeting: NSC-37/1 and NSC-37/2

A formal discussion of the United States’ policy toward Taiwan took place on February 3, 1949, at the 33rd National Security Council meeting, where America’s China policy, as discussed in Chapter 3, was also the key subject matter. The State Department, in NSC-37/1, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” agreed with the JCS that Taiwan must be denied to Communist domination through the “appropriate application of appropriate diplomatic and economic steps.”58 Yet, its analysis was much more substantive and insightful than the previous CIA intelligence report and NSC-37 combined. From the outset, NSC-37/1 stated that Taiwan’s international legal status was anything but conclusive, hence buttressing America legitimate and moral high grounds to treat the island as a “separate entity” from Mainland China. It posited that “the present legal status of Formosa and the Pescadores is that they are a portion of the Japanese Empire awaiting final disposition by a treaty of peace...[and] the policy which the U.S. has followed since V-J Day of facilitating and recognizing Chinese de-facto control over the island.” However, because the ruling Chinese Nationalists on Formosa have since 1945

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displayed a “genius for misgovernment,” the indigenous Taiwanese people have “a strong sense of regional autonomy as well as an antiChinese [mentality] and would welcome independence under the protection of the U.S. or the UN, [even though they are] without political experience, organization or strong leadership.”59 The report proposed that the United States had four alternative courses of actions to prevent the fall of Formosa. First, America could “occupy the island under the terms of the Japanese surrender either through negotiations with the Nationalist government or by direct action after the collapse of that government.” But, such a move might encounter the KMT’s armed resistance. More importantly, since Chinese nationalism would run against Americans for detaching Taiwan from China, a U.S. administration on Taiwan would definitely “galvanize all Mainland Chinese opinion in support of the Communists,” the very thing that Washington must avoid if its primary objective was to foster Chinese Titoism and a Sino-Soviet split. The second option stipulated that the U.S. could “negotiate an agreement with the Nationalist government providing for U.S. extraterritorial and base rights in Formosa.” However, “military bases are not a sovereign remedy against Communist infection in a foreign country, and as often as not they are an aggravating factor. The Communists would be able to exploit the granting of bases…to rally public support…with the result that the U.S. position on the mainland would be jeopardized.”60 Furthermore, having military bases would commit too much American resources and prestige, thus undercutting U.S. security interests in other areas of the world. Accordingly, the State Department believed that the third and fourth options—supporting either the current Nationalist government or a local non-Communist Chinese/Formosan administration—would be the “most practical [diplomatic] means.”61 NSC-37/1 also voiced American concern for the Taiwanese desire in political participation and self-rule. “The U.S. support for the governing [Nationalist] authorities of Taiwan,” the report stated, “will inevitably depend in a large measure upon the efficiency of their regime and the extent to which they are able to contribute toward the welfare and economic needs of the Formosan people and permit and encourage active Formosan participation in positions of responsibility in government.”62 Washington demanded that the Nationalists engage in political and economic reforms to administer Taiwan effectively, and must not allow chaos to spread from China to Taiwan. Nevertheless, cognizant of the Formosans’ grievances against the KMT, the NSC

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report left open the possibility of promoting a native Taiwanese government to replace the Nationalist regime.63 After summarizing NSC-37/1, Acheson remarked that “it was bad to involve the generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] in anything with Formosa,” preferring “to develop a spontaneous independent movement in Formosa which could then lead to an agreement in the UN for a new deal for Formosa.” “This way,” he said, “we could get international sanction for U.S. intervention.”64 The secretary of state, while endorsing the use of diplomatic and economic instruments to save Taiwan, asked the JCS to “prepare a new appreciation of the strategic importance of Formosa, which would indicate whether [the U.S.] should, if necessary, use military forces to deny Formosa to the Communists in the event that [diplomatic and economic] measures are not successful.” Acheson emphasized that “the basic problem was not for us to obtain bases there but to deny the island to others [and] the best means for such a denial was the establishment of a stable Formosan government.” When W.H. Draper, the acting secretary of the army, questioned the inconsistency of NSC-37/1, in which “it proposed on the one hand to stir up a native revolution and on the other hand to support a stable Chinese government,” Acheson disagreed, explaining that “we would have to get in touch with local autonomous groups in advance to be prepared in case the [the Nationalist] government did not [perform] well.”65 Paul Hoffman of the ECA proposed the conclusions of NSC-37/1 be memorialized into NSC-37/2, including the insertion of a new paragraph which would “confirm our present policy of continuing a vigorous program of [economic] aid to Formosa through the most flexible mechanisms possible.” Thus, the addition in NSC-37/2 read as follows: “The U.S. government, through the most flexible mechanisms possible, should conduct a vigorous program of economic support for the economy of Formosa, designed to assist the Formosans in developing and maintaining a viable, self-supporting economy.”66 In sum, at the request of Acheson, the JCS would reassess Taiwan’s strategic significance and recommend to the NSC whether the United States should resort to military intervention to defend it. Yet, it was the consensus of the 33rd NSC meeting that the United States should rely on political and economic mechanisms to assist Taiwan. From Acheson’s attitude at the NSC meeting and the analyses of NSC-37/1 and NSC37/2, we clearly see that it was equally important for the United States to avoid antagonizing China and protecting a free and autonomous Taiwan. Accordingly, President Truman approved both NSC-37/1 and NSC-37/2 on February 4, 1949.

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American Aid to the Nationalist Government and Taiwan

While American officials were debating their policies toward China and Taiwan, the Nationalist forces, now under the leadership of Acting President Li-Tsung-jen, struggled to hold on to their tenuous position on the mainland.67 Yet, as the Communist troops approached Nanjing, the Nationalist capital, the NSC recommended, in the 33rd meeting, that the United States should cease further military shipments to Mainland China. In the cabinet meeting on February 4, 1949, a day after the NSC meeting, Truman “approved the recommendation of the National Security Council yesterday regarding a suspension of shipments to China.”68 On February 7, Truman, Acheson, and Vice President Alben Barkley met with several congressional leaders, to inform them about the decision to halt military shipments to China. However, Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-Michigan) warned that suspension would lead to charges that the United States had “pulled the rug from under” the Nationalists, hence giving “poor China the final push into disaster.” He believed that “no action should be taken which would, in effect, place an embargo or stoppage on continued shipments to China; [yet] if there were any ways in which shipments could be delayed without formal action until the situation clarified, it should be done.”69 The senator’s advice was well heeded, as Truman decided that “we will not suspend or embargo shipments to China. [But], whenever possible, it is desirable that shipments be delayed where this can be done without formal action.”70 Recall that as early as December 1948, the president had voiced his opinion that military aids should be delivered to Taiwan instead. And, on December 24, 1948, the Chinese ambassador in Washington also told the State Department that the Nationalist government requested that all future shipments of military goods be sent directly to the Keelung Port of Taiwan.71 Notwithstanding the ineptitude of the KMT, the Truman administration persisted with America’s military and economic assistance to the regime. This fact should substantiate the claim that Truman and Acheson never abandoned Chiang. Furthermore, the incentive to support the KMT was reinforced as the regime’s fortune was closely intertwined with maintaining the freedom of Taiwan from Communist domination. Hence, to understand the United States’ unflagging assistance to the KMT first on China, then on Taiwan, it is necessary to briefly review the background of Washington’s economic and military aid programs to the Nationalists.

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According to a State Department memorandum circulated in January 1950, it is reported that since 1937, America has authorized economic and military aids to China in the form of grants and credits totaling about $3.5 billion, of which $1.5 billion was given prior to V-J Day and $2 billion after 1945.72 During the 8 years of war between China and Japan, the Nationalists received from the U.S. about $670 million of economic aids based on the Export-Import Bank Credits, the Stabilization Fund Agreement of 1941, and the Treasury Credit of 1942. At the same time, through lend-lease, America furnished China with about $846 million worth of military supplies and equipment. Nonetheless, in the postwar years, the Nationalist China received a total of $2 billion, representing two-thirds of aids given by the U.S. since 1937. Of this total, $695 million in lend-lease military supplies, in addition to a $50 million in economic lend-lease, were received by the Nationalists. Furthermore, the United States, along with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), also contributed $474 million in economic assistance to China in 1947. Between 1946 and 1947, 131 American naval vessels valued at $140 million were delivered to China. The China Aid Act of 1948, as discussed earlier, authorized $275 million for economic development under the guidance of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and another $125 million primarily for military purposes.73 Starting in late 1948, the ECA had diverted most of the economic aids to Taiwan by “providing consumption commodities (fertilizer, crude petroleum, cotton, and medical supplies), by financing the services of an American engineering firm to advise in the operation of industry and transportation, and by supporting the program of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), [which is] carrying out projects for the improvement of agricultural techniques, production and health conditions, and is assisting in the adjustment of land-tenure relationships.”74 By November 1, 1949, the U.S. government had delivered approximately $116 million worth of military goods (from the military component of the China Aid Act) to the Nationalists, most of which were shipped to Taiwan.75 In December 1949, the U.S. Departments of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Treasury had, at the request of the KMT, procured a list of military material, costing about $8 million, waiting to be shipped.76 By the end of 1949, roughly $2 million remained from the military grant of the China Aid Act. Finally, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, passed by Congress in September 1949, authorized funds for the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Though the program’s main objective was

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to implement NATO’s mutual assistance provision, it also “contained an authorization of $75 million [under Section 303 of the act] to be used at the president’s discretion in the ‘general area of China.’”77 This contingency fund was supposed to finance the Nationalist forces in China and Taiwan while assisting anti-Communist forces in Southeast Asia. The monetary aids examined above did not incorporate the sales to the Chinese Nationalists of American government surplus properties and the approximately 6,500 tons of ammunitions transferred to the Nationalist military by the U.S. Marines after their withdrawal from Northern China in the summer of 1947. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of Japan’s surrender, the American forces promptly transported three Chinese Nationalist armies, about one-half million troops, by air to key sectors of Eastern and Northern China, including Shanghai, Nanjing, and Beijing. In order to help the Nationalists in maintaining order and repatriating the Japanese, 50,000 U.S. Marines were sent to occupy Northern China until mid-1947. Moreover, the U.S. Army Advisory Groups, comprising a total of 1,200 to 1,500 officers, assisted the Chinese government in reorganizing and consolidating the various branches of the Chinese armed services, including the supreme staff, the ground, naval, and air arms, and the services of supply. They also assisted the Chinese authority in assimilating and using large quantities of military material turned over under lend-lease, and in training Chinese government troops.78 These figures should amply illustrate America’s efforts in assisting the Nationalist government, whether in China or Taiwan. Indeed, Acheson affirmed that: The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. 79 “The role of this government in relations with China,” announced Truman, a day before the publication of the China White Paper, “has been subject to considerable misrepresentation, distortion, and misunderstanding. Some of these attitudes arose because this government was reluctant to reveal certain facts, the publication of which might have served to hasten the events in China which have now occurred. In the present situation, however, the mutual interests of the United States and China require full and frank discussion of the facts.”80 The publication of the China White Paper on August 5, 1949, aimed to

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explain to the American public that no further courses of action, on the part of Washington, could prevent the fall of the KMT in China.81 Yet, American aids continued because Truman and Acheson believed that saving the Nationalists was the most viable option to safeguard Taiwan from the Communists. th

The 35 NSC Meeting: NSC-37/3 and NSC-37/5

On February 9, 1949, fifty-one Republican congressmen sent a letter to President Truman, requesting the appointment of a commission to investigate and report on the situation in China. Five days later, Truman had a discussion with Acheson about the proper response to the Republicans. They agreed that it was best for the secretary of state to “get in touch with the signers of the letter and try to have an off-therecord and very frank discussion with them in the hope that that might serve in place of a written reply.”82 During the meeting, Acheson reviewed the Open Door policy, restating America’s objective in forming a “united, independent, and democratic” China. He then went into depths talking about Washington’s continuous endeavors to assist the Chinese government. Asked to predict the course of events, Acheson replied that “we cannot tell what the next step is until some of the dust of the disaster clears way.”83 In the press the next day, however, his remarks were represented as a simple phrase: “wait until the dust settles,” as the Republicans accused the administration of being apathetic. In fact, that was a distortion of Acheson’s words. “Quite futilely,” stated Acheson, “I attempted to explain that the phrase was not intended to describe a policy but my inability to see very far in this situation.”84 Apparently, overtaken by emotions and political calculations, the congressional Republicans were clueless about the Truman administration’s plan to create a Sino-Soviet split while assisting the KMT and Taiwan through unobtrusive means. Indeed, the 35th NSC meeting of March 3, 1949, not only discussed NSC-34/2 and NSC-41, as explained in the previous chapter, but also established the parameters for America’s Taiwan policy. Recall that Acheson had asked the JCS to reassess whether military actions would be warranted if political and economic means proved insufficient to prevent the loss of Taiwan. The JCS, accordingly, summarized their response in NSC-37/3, which was discussed during the 35th meeting. In essence, they asserted that it would be best to deny the CCP’s domination of Formosa through the “application of appropriate diplomatic and economic steps,” whereas the “resort to military

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measures [was] excluded.” 85 Hence, their opinion remained that “any overt military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time” because “the current disparity between our military strength and our many global obligations makes it inadvisable to undertake the employment of armed forces in Formosa for this might…lead to the necessity for relatively major effort there, thus making it impossible then to meet more important emergencies elsewhere.”86 Nonetheless, while Taiwan lacked “vital” strategic importance to require American military interventions, the JCS insisted on the stationing of “minor numbers of fleet units” at suitable Formosan ports for “developing and supporting in Formosa a non-Communist Chinese regime.” Unsatisfied by such equivocal propositions, the secretary of state said, “I cannot help but feel that their suggestion would impair the efficiency of what we are trying to do through diplomatic and economic means.”87 Acheson was particularly irritated by the joint chiefs’ recommendation of stationing American fleet units at various Taiwanese ports. Despite supporting the notion of a separate and free Taiwan, he did not want to jeopardize his Titoist policy in China. For no matter whether China was under a Communist or Nationalist administration, the Chinese claim over Taiwan was unrelenting. Therefore, any open moves, including military actions, to detach Formosa from China would only undermine the Wilsonian Open Door policy by openly infringing Chinese sovereignty. In explaining this position, Acheson contended: In attempting to develop separatism in Formosa, we are up against the potential threat of irredentism spreading throughout the great expanse of continental China. We are most anxious to avoid raising the specter of an American-created irredentist issue just at the time we shall be seeking to exploit the genuinely Soviet-created irredentist issue in Manchuria and Xinjiang. We cannot afford to compromise an emerging new U.S. position in China by overtly showing a pronounced interest in Formosa.88

On the other hand, Acheson did not dismiss America’s concern for Taiwan: “It is a cardinal point in our thinking that if our present policy is to have any hope of success in Formosa, we must carefully conceal our wish to separate the island from mainland control.”89 Therefore, Acheson suggested that the State Department should send in a high ranking officer to Taipei to approach General Chen Cheng, governor of Formosa, along the lines set forth in paragraph 2 of NSC-37/2. That is, Chen should be candidly informed that the United States had “no desire to see chaos on the mainland spread to Formosa and the Pescadores,” and that Washington “has not been impressed by

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Chinese administration on the island and believes that if there is continued misrule the Chinese authorities would inevitably forfeit the support of world opinion which might be expected to swing in favor of Formosan autonomy.”90 In other words, America’s support for the KMT would rest ultimately on the regime’s ability and the extent to which it could enhance the economic welfare and political participation of the native Formosans. In addition, every effort must be made to discourage the further influx of Mainland Chinese into Taiwan to prevent possible Communist infiltration and overstraining the island’s economy. Upon the receipt of appropriate assurances from the Nationalist authority, the United States would continue and even increase its economic aid program, through the ECA, to “assist in developing and maintaining a viable, self-supporting economy on the island.”91 Acheson, however, harbored no illusions that the United States could, through such diplomatic and economic measures, guarantee a denial of Formosa to the Communists. “At some date in the future,” he noted, “we may conclude that it is impossible to accomplish our aim by present measures and shall then recommend a reexamination of the problem. When that time comes, I shall place the problem of Formosa once more before this council.” He then stated that “meanwhile so long as we pursue our present policy, I would ask for two things: Firstly…I hope that the members of the council will bear in mind the necessity for restraining evidence of zeal with regard to Formosa; Secondly…if we are to intervene militarily on the island, we shall, in all probability, do so in concert with like-minded powers, preferably using UN mechanisms and with the proclaimed intention of satisfying the legitimate demands of the indigenous Formosans for self-determination under either a UN trusteeship or independence.”92 The consensus reached at the 35th NSC meeting, as incorporated in NSC-37/5, was the adoption of Acheson’s proposition set forth in NSC37/4. The NSC rejected the JCS proposal of stationing U.S. fleets in Taiwan because it would create “a heavy political liability for us.”93 Nonetheless, the NSC was “without prejudice” to a reevaluation of a possible military course of action should developments on Formosa require it. Truman approved NSC-37/5 on March 4, 1949.94 Livingston T. Merchant’s Mission to Taiwan in Spring 1949

Acheson dispatched Livingston T. Merchant, the counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Nanjing, to Taiwan in the spring of 1949.95 Merchant’s mission, lasting from late February to mid-May, had two overarching objectives. First, he was to evaluate Taiwan’s political situation and to

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convey to Governor Chen Cheng the message that America’s aid was contingent upon the regime’s ability to provide stable and efficient governance. If the assurance from the Nationalist authority was judged to be favorable and sincere, then Merchant should apprise Washington that economic assistance to Taiwan could be continued and even increased. The second task was to observe the strength of the “underground” Formosan independence movements and to “establish a relationship of mutual confidence with them.”96 If the Nationalists were incapable of governing the island and defending it against the Communists, the United States, as stipulated in NSC-37/1, must be prepared to instigate, covertly, a native Taiwanese uprising in order to set up a Formosan administration and to justify UN intervention. Certainly, Merchant’s activities in Taiwan must be carried out with deep circumspection, to avoid arousing suspicion on the part of the Chinese Communists. Thus, he was specifically instructed by Acheson to “retain title of counselor of embassy and indicate that [he was] merely going to Taiwan to oversee expanded U.S. representation on that island which military events on mainland have occasioned and in particular with respect to ECA.” “Implications that you have been transferred [to] Taipei should be avoided,” cautioned the secretary of state, “[so] you should feel free to visit Nanjing and Shanghai [as you saw fit].” Merchant was ordered not to be caught by the Communists.97 In another telegram to Merchant, Acheson reiterated that “the U.S. objective is not to take over or establish base on [Formosa] but using political and economic steps to deny Communist domination.… Separation [of] Formosa from [the] mainland will inevitably create irredentist movement which would be utilized by Communists to rally support and by both Communists and other Chinese to arouse anti-U.S. sentiment.”98 The secretary clearly wanted absolute caution so not to antagonize the Mainland Chinese. Despite Acheson’s instructions, however, Merchant had different views about what he needed to accomplish in Taiwan. Having been stationed in Nanjing for more than a year, the counselor well understood that the Communists were going to “take commanding control of China.”99 He viewed the KMT as so corrupt and lacking vitality that “money spent in aid to that government was ‘money down a rat hole.’”100 Even though the generalissimo had stepped down in January 1949, he still wielded considerable power behind the scene and controlled Nationalist politics and military in Taiwan. Consequently, Merchant did not believe Governor Chen Cheng, a loyal follower of Chiang, could be counted on to “provide [the] liberal efficient administration needed [on the island].” “Chen [also] cannot be relied on

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to prevent continued influx of least desirable mainlanders to Formosa,” wrote Merchant, “[hence] I recommend the department to instruct Ambassador [Stuart] to encourage Acting President Li [to] replace Chen Cheng soonest with Sun Li-jen.”101 General Sun Li-jen had always been America’s favorite candidate. As a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, Sun had distinguished himself during the Second World War as one of Kuomintang’s “most honest and capable field commanders.” His military achievements and valor during the Burma campaigns earned him the respect of General Stilwell. After the war, he toured the European battlefields at the invitation of Dwight Eisenhower.102 However, Sun’s disciplined and more liberal orientations insured that he would “remain distrusted by the generalissimo.” Placing high confidence in Sun, Merchant urged the secretary of state to wait and delay the implementation of NSC-37/2 and NSC-37/5 for he did not “consider the time ripe for an approach to the governor of Formosa in view of the possibility that the incumbent might be supplanted by General Sun Li-jen.”103 Though agreeing that Chen was unreliable, Acheson raised some doubts in his reply telegram to Merchant. He indicated that notwithstanding Sun Li-jen’s good reputation, his record did not include wide administrative experience. There is also no guarantee that Acting President Li would replace Chen with Sun, thus resulting in the appointment of person even less competent than the incumbent governor. “In any event,” Acheson stressed, the “possibility exists [that] Chen would become disgruntled over efforts [to] remove him and…would sabotage Sun or any other successor.”104 More importantly, time was of the essence. As Li was negotiating with the CCP, the secretary feared that delaying the enactment of NSC-37/2 and NSC-37/5 could result in the early loss of Taiwan. The more time that passed, the more opportunity the Communists would have mustered to infiltrate the Nationalist armed forces on the island, whose military commanders might lose their resolve and switch allegiance to the CCP even if the governor did not.105 An early approach, therefore, was warranted to stabilize the deteriorating situation on Taiwan and to enable the ECA to carry out its aiding plans. Adding to the imminence of the problem is that the China Aid Act of 1948 was due to expire on April 3, 1949. If Merchant could commit the economic aids to Taiwan prior to the deadline, then previously appropriated ECA funds could be used to bolster Taiwan without explicitly identifying the island as the object of U.S. interest.106 Further funding requested after April 3, nonetheless, would be subjected to new round of well-publicized congressional hearings, thereby revealing

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Washington’s intention to safeguard Taiwan from Communist control. Indeed, on March 9, Acheson sent Merchant the following message: “ECA now is prepared to approve industrial projects and proceed with program on Formosa. It should be noted that initiation [of] the program on Formosa at this stage while ECA program on the mainland is still underway would probably draw less attention on the Formosa program than would be the case at later date when ECA activities on the mainland is further restricted. Continued delay might result in further deterioration of the Formosan situation.”107 But, Merchant insisted that “the prime need is for [a] governor who is honest, liberal, effective, and not so bound to the generalissimo as to permit move by latter to Formosa for last ditch fight.” He clung to the opinion that Sun Li-jen was the best-qualified man to govern the island and his “established position” in the military would help him to prevent sabotage from Chen.108 While recognizing the April deadline, Merchant contended that it would be “desirable [to] defer any ECA action beyond pre-project stage now nearly completed [for] Formosan reconstruction until Chen has been replaced or his tenure confirmed by [the] acting president and such government has given assurances we desire.” Talking to Chen would only “encourage him and strengthen his position on the island.”109 Acheson, in spite of reservations, was convinced and accepted Merchant’s position, telling the latter, on March 11, that “if Ambassador Stuart concurs [with] your views regarding the desirability of appointing Sun, you might suggest he approaches the acting president on this matter.” On March 14, Merchant, now in Nanjing, noted that Ambassador Stuart was also in favor of Sun and would bring the issue to Li’s attention.110 However, the hope to install Sun as Taiwan’s new governor was immediately dashed. While retiring in his hometown at Xikou of Zhejiang, Chiang Kai-shek had already established a firm grip over Taiwan through Chen Cheng. There appeared no reason, accordingly, for the Nationalist leader to replace Chen with Sun, who was less controllable. On March 19, Donald Edgar, the American consul in Taipei, stated in his telegram that Sun Fo, the president of the Executive Yuan111 had issued a last-minute order to “concentrate all Taiwan’s military and civil organizations in Governor Chen.” These powers included the army, air force, navy, and civil organizations holding Nationalist gold reserves and customs. “With present concentration of military, material, and gold,” observed Edgar, “Chen’s strength equals or surpasses [the] acting president’s.” It did not seem that Chen would betray Chiang Kai-shek.112 In early April, Sun Li-jen was summoned to

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Xikou to report directly to Chiang. Stuart reported that Li had no power to replace Chen with Sun. Any such endeavor could not be conceived without the consent of Chiang Kai-shek, who only wanted Sun to continue his “good work on training the Chinese army.”113 With the generalissimo’s strong backing, Chen Cheng’s governorship on Taiwan was untouchable. What about the Taiwanese Independence Movement?

While the search for a liberal governor ran into a dead end, Livingston Merchant’s second task—to seek out a viable native Taiwanese political force—proved no more promising. Since the February 28, 1947 incident, many underground pro-independence groups had been organized in Taiwan. These local movements were mostly small-scale, sporadic, and not very effective. It was the overseas independence groups, however, that commanded the most potential for an organized rebellion in Taiwan. What eventually became the central focus of U.S. interest was the Formosan League for Re-emancipation (FLR).114 Formed in 1948, the FLR was led by Joshua Liao (Liao Wen-kuei) and his younger brother, Thomas (Liao Wen-yi), who were sons of a wealthy Christian landowning family in south-central Taiwan. Both educated and receiving doctorate degrees in the United States, the Liao brothers had anticipated that “Formosa, properly administered, could become a major asset in the rehabilitation of continental China.”115 The Kuomintang’s misrule on Taiwan since V-J Day, nevertheless, disgusted the Liao brothers, who soon became outspoken critics of the Chinese government. Their activities were mostly in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hong Kong, where Joshua and Thomas conferred with the liberal advocates who despised the totalitarian party-state and wanted to see the Nationalists overthrown before it was too late to rally the country against the Communists. In 1947, Joshua was charged as an instigator of the February uprising and arrested in Shanghai. He was later released and fled to Hong Kong to join Thomas. There, they brought together various Taiwan independence activists under the FLR, maintained contact with American and other foreign diplomats, and regularly published manifestos declaring that the allied powers had no basis to cede Taiwan to China. They essentially demanded that the United Nations should grant the Taiwanese people self-determination.116 Notwithstanding FLR’s high political vitality, the Truman administration actually knew very little about it. With the exception of George Kerr’s reports and memos, the United States, between 1946 and 1948, lacked a functioning intelligence apparatus on the island.

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Washington during those years took the more relaxed view that Formosa was already part of Nationalist China. Subsequent developments in China changed the picture. Yet, it wasn’t until Merchant’s mission in spring 1949 that the administration started to pay attention to the political activities of the native Formosans. For instance, during a conversation with J.F. Ford, the first secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, Philip Sprouse, the chief of the State Department’s Division of Chinese Affairs, informed him that the “department was interested in the activities of the Formosan League for Re-emancipation and had instructed the appropriate consular offices to keep in touch with league representatives and report to the department on their activities.” Sprouse stated that “we were, of course, interested in Formosa and the activities of the league in relation to this general problem,” pointing out that it would be helpful to know to what extent the Communists might have succeeded in penetrating the organization and its relation to the Chinese government.”117 The Liao brothers, on the other hand, had, on several occasions, contacted American diplomats to convey their intentions to inspire revolts in Taiwan, hoping to persuade America into action. In late January 1949, Joshua approached John Cabot, the U.S. consul general at Shanghai, expressing concern over the reported recent arrival to Taiwan of American military equipments, and protesting against further American aids serving to “facilitate oppression” on the Taiwanese by the central government “SS troops.” He also appealed to Cabot that the U.S. should assist or at least remain neutral toward the “spontaneous Taiwanese revolt” which Liao professed to expect in the near future. Liao insisted that the revolt will be neither anti-American nor Communist inspired and defined “success” in terms less of military victory than of world dramatization of his people’s predicament which would gain the attention and sympathy of the UN. The consul general in Hong Kong also furnished a similar report to the secretary of state.118 Nonetheless, after closer investigation, “the claims of the Liao brothers were met with skepticism as well as outright disbelief.”119 Kenneth Krentz, the U.S. consul general at Taipei, voiced the opinion that the FLR and other groups were “dis-unified” and their leadership was so “compounded of patriotism, irresponsibility and greed as [to] give doubt [about their] effectiveness beyond flash in pan.” He suspected “all of them hope to force outside action by exaggeration.”120 In mid March, the CIA’s evaluation accorded very low probability to the success of Liao’s revolt and their plans to topple the Nationalist regime.121 Unhappily, Merchant also reached a similar conclusion regarding the prospect of the FLR and other native Taiwanese political

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forces. In a long telegram to Acheson, dated March 23, he said, “Though my knowledge is limited, my impression is that Formosan independence groups currently are disunited, politically illiterate, imperfectly organized and in general worthy little reliance. There is no doubt that general and growing discontent exists but effective leadership and organization are still absent.” Merchant strongly advised against Washington taking any unilateral actions to help the native independence movements. “Communist radio is already referring to U.S. imperialistic designs on Formosa and to its impeding liberation,” he stated, “[thus] we could not intervene directly by military means without inflaming vast majority [of] Mainland Chinese as well as some Formosans and grievously injuring U.S. moral position [in] all Asia.”122 Hence, even though supporting an autonomous Taiwan under a liberal administration, Merchant believed the U.S. should try other alternatives to separate the island from mainland control and not risk its Open Door policy toward China. He, therefore, suggested a joint UN sponsorship of Taiwan: Foregoing suggests possible desirability [of] ascertaining British, French, and possibly Australian and Indian attitude toward the chance of effective UN future move or their willingness [to] share onus of joint forceful action with regional UN framework to secure and support independent status of Formosa if Mainland Communistdominated government emerges and moves to control the island. 123

Dean Acheson agreed to Merchant’s analysis. He responded to the latter, on March 30, that “there is presently no thought that U.S. government would act unilaterally to separate Formosa from mainland by military means and in [the likely] event of failure to prevent CCP domination over Formosa by political and economic means, only recourse would be action through the UN.” Consistent with his previous position that the United States must act discreetly, the secretary of state wrote the “request for [the UN] action should come from Chinese governing authorities on Formosa or possibly from Formosan independence groups or from both. Initiation of such action in the UN could most appropriately be taken by the Philippines.” Although fully recognizing the inherent weakness of the Formosan independence groups, Acheson stressed that the participation of such would be sine qua non in arrangements resulting from UN action. The appeals for UN intervention, in other words, must come from the Taiwanese or the local Chinese themselves in order to make it a legitimate case in the international community.124

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A request for UN actions, however, is essentially a complicated issue and requires long-term planning and further discussion. Meanwhile, Acheson believed that the most practical course of action would be for Merchant to approach Chen Cheng so the ECA could continue dispensing economic aids to the island before the April 3rd expiration date. “Every reasonable attempt,” Acheson instructed Merchant, “must be made to bring Formosan situation to a head sooner rather than later.”125 On April 2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconfirmed their earlier estimate that they “do not believe the strategic importance of Formosa justifies overt military action at this time.”126 Only in the event that the United States became involved in a general “war” in the Far East would the strategic importance of the island be elevated to the level where overt military actions are required. The JCS update reinforced the sense of urgency that diplomatic and economic solutions must be devised to help defend Taiwan. Thus, Merchant concluded that the United States “must deal with Chen” even though his doubts remained “regarding the governor’s ability to provide sufficiently enlightened government to satisfy Formosan aspirations and provide popular native base necessary for effective resistance.”127 The Extension of the China Aid Act Renews Merchant’s Hope

Just when Merchant was about to meet Governor Chen, a promising news from Washington gave this special envoy in Taipei an unexpected respite—that the U.S. Congress, on April 14, passed legislation which “made available to the president such portion of the appropriation for [ECA] economic aid as remained unobligated on April 3, 1949, or might subsequently be released from obligation.” It authorized the president to “use these funds in such manner and on such terms and conditions as he might determine for aid to those areas of China that remained free of Chinese Communist control, [and] the funds were made available for obligation through February 15, 1950.”128 In fact, as early as late 1948, the Truman administration tried to lobby the Congress to extend the China Aid Act. “Although there was little that the United States could do to influence the course of events in China,” the State Department argued, “it would have been inconsistent with the traditional [Open Door] relations between the United States and China for the United States, in the face of extreme adversity for the Chinese people, abruptly to cease on April 3, 1949, economic aid to the Chinese government which it continued to recognize. It was believed that the United States should certainly continue its economic relief until

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the next harvest in areas of China that remained free of Communist domination.” In truth, Acheson was focusing primarily on saving Formosa. It was “estimated that by April 3 there would remain approximately $54 million dollars unobligated [ECA funds], and that this sum would enable continuation of the commodity assistance, [rural and industrial reconstruction] programs at the existing level to Central and South China and Taiwan substantially.”129 In addition, the military assistance components under the China Aid Act would also be extended to bolster the Nationalists and Taiwan. It is interesting to note, nonetheless, that the wording of the new legislation did not specifically single out Formosa, for the island was included merely as “areas of China” that stayed free from Communist control, a great relief for the Truman administration as it sought to conceal America’s interest in protecting Taiwan. By April 7, the secretary of state knew that the extension would be granted and, accordingly, cabled Merchant to reappraise the Taiwan situation in light of this new development.130 On April 12, after returning to Taipei from China, Merchant immediately responded to Acheson with his analysis. On the positive side, he trusted that for “selfinterest” reasons Governor Chen would “refuse” to sell out the island to a Communist-dominated government. However, Merchant saw “nothing to be gained and much to be lost by approaching Governor Chen with the view [of] committing U.S. economic aid beyond the routine continuation of [the] present modest ECA commodity imports and current slow moving JCRR program.” As a result, he once again begged for approval from the secretary to continue deferring the approach to Chen “pending further development of events on the mainland.” He also recommended the U.S. government should keep at least half of the $54 million unexpended ECA funds for later “effective use” of Taiwan’s rural and industrial reconstruction projects.131 In order to more accurately and clearly present these issues, Merchant suggested that he be recalled to Washington for an in-depth consultation.132 Secretary Acheson, after apprising Truman and with the latter’s approval, accepted Merchant’s proposals and his request to be recalled to Washington.133 Yet, the administration wanted Merchant, before returning, to talk to T.V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek’s brother in law, who just arrived in Taipei to inspect the island. Essentially, he should relate the message to Soong that the National government’s own efforts on Formosa will be the “determining factor” and American aid could only be supplementary of such efforts. Moreover, the United States would “view favorably the question of economic aid to Formosa should the Chinese government takes steps to prevent Communist or coalition

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government control of the island.” However, the Truman administration wished to dispel the Nationalists of any illusions that Washington harbored strategic interests in Formosa. Taiwan represented “valuable economic assets” which could be made self-supporting with efficient administration as example of non-Communist Chinese government achievement. The United States would be prepared to continue and increase its ECA commitments if the KMT authority took sufficient measures to “establish basis for effective economic support.”134 The forgoing message, similar to NSC-37/2 and NSC-37/5, reveals a great deal of the Truman administration’s motivation with respect to Taiwan, for it summarizes the Wilsonian internationalist orientation of the central decision-makers. First of all, Taiwan lacks sufficient strategic interest to warrant wholehearted U.S. military support and intervention. As a result, the Nationalists were counted on to defend the island on their own, especially when the regime had transported the bulk of the most technologically advanced weaponry to Taiwan. Yet, the absence of strategic importance did not preclude America from trying to prevent the island from Communist domination. Second, the United States was concerned about the welfare of the native Formosans and their desires for self-determination, hence urging the Taiwan authority to proceed immediately with much-needed political and economic reforms. Finally, it was hoped that the island, if properly and effectively administered, could very well become a successful democratic model of Chinese achievement. These explain why top administration officials were so anxious to have Merchant deliver the message to the KMT elites in Taiwan. However, Merchant confided “sufficient doubt” in his mind regarding Soong’s “motivations and intentions.” He believed that it was better to postpone frank talks with this former Nationalist foreign minister to avoid any premature commitments on the part of the United States. To Merchant, the Soong family in China had long been one of the most corrupt oligarchs in the Nationalist regime. There was no reason, then, to take T.V. Soong’s words more seriously than those of Chen’s. Secretary Acheson, who depended upon Merchant’s recommendations at “every stage in the game,” concurred.135 Throughout April and May 1949, Merchant gave further thoughts about America’s policy toward Taiwan, as embodied in the NSC-37 series. His entire mission in Taiwan was commissioned on the twin objectives to (1) secure assurances from a competent and liberal Nationalist authority before giving pledges of further economic aid, and (2), in the failure of the first, to seek out a viable native Formosan political force that could supersede the Chinese administration. To his

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dismay, neither of these manifested. The moratorium of the China Aid Act in mid-April, nevertheless, emboldened both Merchant and the Truman administration as the reprieve gave extra time to explore other alternatives to salvage Taiwan. Furthermore, the Nationalists, as of May 1949, had transported to the island their best military units and ample economic resources and materials—foreign exchange, gold reserves, ammunitions, artilleries, aircrafts, etc. Therefore, in spite of his discontents with the KMT, Merchant was actually quite certain that the Nationalists would transform Taiwan into a well-defended fortress against Communist attacks. With the Chinese Communists deficient in naval and air capabilities and in amphibious landing experience, he believed Taiwan was going to hold out, militarily, for a “very considerable period of time.”136 On the eve of his departure for Washington, Merchant wrote to Acheson and proposed a revision of policies contained in NSC-37/2 and NSC-37/5 instead of simply delaying the commitment of economic aid to the present Nationalist authority. “It is reasonable assumption,” he noted, “that present governor or any replacement whether appointed by generalissimo or Acting President Li will elect to resist [the Communists] and build up island as military bastion.” But, while Taiwan could be run “as a fortress on a siege basis” for a considerable period, it would, in the long haul, be “incompatible with rational economic development of Formosa or the application of measures necessary to secure popular support and political development of Formosans.” Whether giving economic aid now or later, it would not change the simple fact that there is little chance the Nationalist regime, with its attitudes and available technical skills, could efficiently and wisely utilize such aid. Eventually, the United States would be forced to assume the direct and overwhelming responsibility to manage Taiwan, but such a move would surely antagonize Mainland China. Taiwan was a liability the United States could not afford to shoulder. Merchant urged Washington to abandon all ECA reconstruction programs on Taiwan, except some minor JCRR rural projects. While putting pressure upon the Nationalist authority to resist Communists and enact liberal reforms, America should work with other allies toward a joint UN intervention on the island. There was another option, however. If the United States was willing to blatantly go to the defense of Taiwan and to risk its relations with China, then an all-out military and economic aid should be offered. The quid pro quo from the Nationalists would be the long-term lease of naval and air bases to the U.S. military, placing Sun Li-jen in command of all military forces in Taiwan, and the employment of American

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economic advisers by the Taipei authority to oversee the ECA reconstruction programs.137 This option was, of course, only a back-up solution to be used in the worst case scenario. One should discern the high level of concern that the Truman administration had for Taiwan, not only for its security against the Communists but also for the wellbeing of the native Formosans. As China’s capital and financial center—Nanjing and Shanghai—fell respectively to the hands of the People’s Liberation Army in April and May 1949, the situation became more chaotic and complicated. In the meantime, Washington could not decisively determine which course of action to pursue for the best interest of the United States and Taiwan. One thing was for sure: the administration wanted Merchant to “proceed [to] Washington soonest for consultation.” Hours before boarding the plane for the United States, Merchant finally met with Governor Chen and told him, per Acheson’s instructions, that the Nationalist authority should guard against “further influx of Mainland Chinese to the island” and must prevent “chaos spreading from China to Formosa.” Nothing, however, was mentioned about America’s economic aids or any future supports.138 Conclusion

The case study in this chapter has concentrated upon America’s policy with respect to Taiwan from the immediate postwar period to the middle of 1949. In accordance with the Wilsonian Open Door internationalism, top decision-makers in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations originally envisaged a strong, united, and democratic China joining with the United States and the other United Nations in maintaining peace and security in the Far East. Washington’s good will toward Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government was also a major reason behind the decision of returning Formosa to China after WWII. On the other hand, Taiwan, which had been under Japanese control for 50 years, came out of the war relatively unharmed and, in many aspects, even surpassed the mainland in terms of living standards, education, social stability, rule of law, and economic advancements. Though the island was not accorded great strategic importance, as later confirmed by the assessments of the Joint Chief of Staff and the State Department, America believed that Taiwan’s location in the Western Pacific and its ample food resources such as rice and sugar could well make it a useful air and naval base in case of future war in East Asia. To secure greater support from Washington, Chiang Kai-shek did not object to allowing the American military to utilize part of Taiwan as military

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bases. Hence, as long as the Nationalist government was in charge and remained an ally to Washington, the United States had no particular reason to separate Formosa from Mainland Chinese control. The Truman administration, which shared the native Formosans’ aspirations for political participation and self-government, also trusted that the KMT authority would accede to those wishes and protect the political rights of the Taiwanese people. After all, Chiang had vowed to make China into a liberal constitutional democracy. Nevertheless, the Chinese civil war, the Nationalist misrule on Taiwan, and the imminence of Communist victory prompted the United States to reappraise its Taiwan policy. Starting in late 1948, the Truman administration was determined that the island must be denied to Communist control. In addition to strategic considerations, Truman and Acheson also felt certain moral obligations toward the native Formosans. Thus, in policy papers, whether the CIA reports, the NSC37 series, or official correspondences, we can see that the wellbeing of the Taiwanese people was consistently raised and discussed. The dilemma, however, was that Washington also needed to pursue its Open Door policy in China, and, in order to drive a wedge between the CCP and the Soviet Union, America must not antagonize the Mainland Chinese and foster anti-American sentiments. Consequently, Formosa must be separated through discreet and unobtrusive moves—economic and political means. Merchant’s mission in Taiwan during the spring of 1949 was to carry out the policies of NSC-37/2 and NSC-37/5. His firsthand experience and observations in Taiwan convinced the Truman administration that aiding the present Nationalist authority might not be best way to save Taiwan. Chapter 5 will examine whether the United States would persist with its current policies or resort to more active military and UN interventions. We will discuss how the strategic ambiguity policy was finally conceived before the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula.

Notes 1 In 1517, a Portuguese fleet under Admiral Andrade appeared in Chinese waters. There is no record, however, of the Portuguese having played a part in Taiwan, although they called the island “Ilha Formosa,” or the “beautiful island.” Not until a century later, in the 1620s, with the advent of the Dutch and the Spanish, was there any attempt by the Europeans to gain a foothold on the island. For the Westerners, then, Taiwan is Formosa. The U.S. government papers in the 1940s and 1950s often used “Formosa.” Yet, the Chinese and

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Japanese call the island “Taiwan.” See Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1952), pp. 11-12. 2 For a good overview on China-Taiwan relations since the seventeenth century, see Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? 3 Ibid., pp. 69-70. On October 7, 1942, during a private meeting between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Wendell Willkie, who was visiting China as FDR’s representative, Chiang said that “after the war, China’s coastal fortresses like Lushun, Dalian, and Taiwan must be returned to China.” The official position of the Republic of China with respect to Taiwan was made, on November 3, 1942, by the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, T.V. Soong, who proclaimed that “China will recover Manchuria, Formosa, and the Ryukyu Islands.” See Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 12. 4 The “Four Policemen” concept refers to the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China to jointly police the world, ensuring that no nation would have the ability to commit aggression. See Dennis Merrill and Thomas Paterson, eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol. 2, pp. 157159. 5 Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 27. 6 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 7 Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? p.101. 8 The Taiwanese people are mostly descendants of settlers who came from China proper. In mid-seventeenth century, they sought refuge on this island fortress under the leadership of Zheng Chenggong (better known as Koxinga) who expelled the Dutch and set up Formosa as a base to overthrow the ruling Qing Dynasty on the mainland. But, Koxinga’s kingdom was short-lived as Taiwan was soon conquered by the Qing government which ruled the island from 1683 until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. The two centuries of Manchu rule saw more Chinese immigrants, primarily from Fujian and Guangdong provinces, coming to live on Taiwan, either escaping from the corrupt Chinese officials or seeking new opportunities on this island frontier. See Douglas Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 12-16. Thus, “Formosan Chinese, comprising 91.5percent of the population,” according to Cabot Colville, “have retained, even under Japanese rule, an outlook which is more Chinese than Formosan. The toughness of China in holding out against Japanese attack since 1937 has added to the Chinese nationalistic sense among the people of the island. It seems probable that Chinese sovereignty would generally be welcomed in Formosa.” See Cabot Colville’s Draft, “Alternative Political Solutions of Formosa: Document 325 of the Territorial Subcommittee of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy,” May 25, 1943, Box 63/RG59, National Archives, College Park, MD. 9 In fact, To solidify FDR’s support for China, Chiang Kai-shek, in November 1942, broached the idea to American officials that while Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan was indisputable, he would “welcome the United States to participate in the construction of naval bases [on Formosa], and our two countries can jointly maintain and use these bases.” Roosevelt welcomed Chiang’s proposal as a sign that China would assume the role of a responsible great power. Chiang’s quote is taken from Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 29.

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10 See Joseph Ballantine, Formosa, p. 53; on the discussions of the Potsdam Proclamation, see Harry Truman, Memoirs by Harry Truman, Vol.1, pp. 390392. 11 George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1965), pp. 26-27. As the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at the State Department in 1944-1945, Joseph Ballantine probably said it best: “Although, by signing the Instrument of Surrender, Japan had relinquished sovereignty over the island, and although the Chinese reoccupied Formosa and assumed an interim administrative authority, legal transfer of that sovereignty to China would require formalization by a treaty of peace.” Ballantine, Formosa, p. 54. 12 George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, p. 20. 13 Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? pp. 98-99. 14 Ibid., p. 80. 15 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, pp. 57-58. 16 Douglas Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, pp. 24-25. 17 Joseph Ballantine, Formosa, p. 58. Depicting the thinking of the Taiwanese people, Kerr wrote: “When surrender took place, there was an upsurging good will in Formosa, an emotional anticipation of return to China, but it was expected to be the new China…a China delivered from the past by American power, and guided now by an American alliance…In Formosan eyes, the defeat of Japan and liberation of Formosa were American accomplishments. Formosans expected that henceforth the island would elect its own government, and that elected representatives would represent the island in the National central government at Nanjing.” See George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, p. 38. 18 Joseph Ballantine, Formosa, p. 58. 19 George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, pp. 47-57. 20 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 21 See Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, pp. 370-371. The Nationalist authorities arbitrarily confiscated properties, houses, and lands for their own advantage. They also lost no time in “beginning to reorganize the Japanese enterprises into a system of officially operated monopolies.” According to Ballantine, it is estimated that at least 90percent of all economic enterprises on the island were brought under government control. Taiwanese staffs, engineers, and technicians working in these industries were dismissed in order to free up employment spaces for the Mainland Chinese. In addition, through the sales of these monopolized assets to their friends and merchants in China, Chen’s government essentially made Formosan businessmen difficult to compete with their Chinese counterparts. Individual businesses also did not escape the cupidity of the Nationalist ruling elites. A licensing system, for instance, was implemented requiring permits for all entrepreneurial activities of private individuals. “This became a means for imposing arbitrary exactions that soon reduced the Formosan merchant and professional classes almost to beggary, and private enterprise almost disappeared. See Joseph Ballantine, Formosa, pp. 5960. These policies galvanized widespread Taiwanese anger. Outspoken Formosans who challenged the governor were either neglected or imprisoned. So intent were the mainland “carpet-baggers” upon achieving quick profits that they paid little attention to the pressing need of restoring the productive capacity of the island. Shortages soon developed in the supply of rice, which was

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attributed to the covert shipments of the grain to feed the Nationalist armies in China. The draining away of wealth was reflected in soaring prices. The Bank of Taiwan wholesale price indexes, based on June 1937, showed advances between November 1945 and January 1947 as follows: foodstuffs, 3,323 to 21,058; clothing 5,741 to 24, 483; fuel 963 to 14,091; fertilizers 129 to 37, 559, and building materials 949 to 13, 612. See George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, p. 60, and pp. 243-244. 22 Ibid., pp. 239-240. 23 George Kerr, as the U.S. vice consul in Taipei, produced the most extensive English-language account of the February 28 incident. As a first-hand observer at the time, he described in great and chilling details the events leading up to the outbreak of the violence and, subsequently, the brutal means and countermeasures which the KMT authority brought to suppress the Formosans. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, Chapters 12-14. For shorter summary of the event and its aftermath, see also Joseph Ballantine, Formosa, pp. 62-66, and Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 41-49. 24 In his radiogram to Chiang Kai-shek, Chen blamed the violence on the pro-Japanese members of the Taiwan elites along with pro-independence conspirators who opposed retrocession of the island to China. In the midst of China’s civil war, Chiang interpreted the event as a Communist insurrection and, therefore, wrote in his diary that the rioters had “crossed the red line of what the government can tolerate.” See Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, p. 370. 25 The official count of death figures cannot be accurately calculated given that thousands were missing and hundreds of bodies were never recovered and identified. While the targets were primarily Taiwanese prominent citizens and intellectuals, many Mainland Chinese were ruthlessly murdered and arrested. The total estimates of death toll in 1947 range from 18,000 to 28,000. For decades, the KMT government prohibited any public discussions of the 228 incident. It wasn’t until 1997 did the ROC government began the formal apology to the victims and their families. Compensations, public discussions, and museums were established since then to redress this historical tragedy. See Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, p. 310; Ballantine, Formosa, p. 63; Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, p. 37; Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, p. 371; and Cheryl Lai, “228 Museum Protests City Decision on Future,” The Taipei Times, May 15, 2000, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/ 05/15/0000036068 26 Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 48-49. 27 George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, p. 264. 28 Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 46. 29 Ibid, p. 46. 30 Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, p. 322. 31 On March 10, at the weekly Nationalist memorial service, Chiang’s initial reaction toward the February 28 incident and the March 8 massacre was to support Governor Chen Yi and to characterize the events as merely treasonous rebellion “utilized by treacherous gangs” or instigated by the “Communists.” Chiang also indicated that he had sent high officials to Taiwan to help Chen to settle the incident. On March 22, the Kuomintang’s Central Executive Committee resolved by an overwhelming vote to censure Chen Yi and demanded his resignation. Chen submitted his resignation on March 28.

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The next day, in his meeting with Ambassador Stuart, Chiang insisted that the Taiwan incident was not as serious as reported. Stuart offered to provide the generalissimo a summary of reports that the embassy was preparing “especially for him.” Chiang accepted the offer “with alacrity.” On March 31, Chiang Kaishek accepted Chen Yi’s resignation. See FRUS, Vol. 7, (1947), p 72, p. 90, and p. 444. The memorandum Stuart referred to Chiang was George Kerr’s “Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan” March 29, 1947, reprinted in The China White Paper, pp. 923-938. 32 George Kerr, “Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan” p. 936. 33 Ibid, pp. 937-938. 34 Ibid, p. 923. 35 Despite their Chinese origins, the Taiwanese had previously suffered from the harsh Qing Dynasty rule. Then, when China was defeated by the Japanese in 1895, the native Formosans were further disheartened and humiliated by their mother country’s apparent weakness, backwardness, and moribund systems. As a result, the Taiwanese had always felt apart and foreign from the Mainland Chinese. Fifty years of Japanese occupation actually prepared the ground for a “genuine sense of national unity” among the Formosans, who were provided the first effective island-wide administration and comparatively modern education. Nationalism is a sense of identity, usually aroused by common experiences in a struggle against overlords from another locality. A distinct Taiwanese nationalism had emerged under the Japanese. When the KMT officials accused the February incident as inspired by both the Communists and the former Japanese imperialists, they were completely wrong about the first and not so right on the second because Communism has never taken roots in Taiwan and no evidence could corroborate any direct Japanese involvement in the uprising. Yet, one certainly cannot understate the Japanese influence upon the Taiwanese in the forms of efficient government, law and order, honest public services, effective education, and orderly economic development. Educated Taiwanese who compared the governance of the prewar Japanese “occupiers” with the postwar Chinese “liberators” found the latter more inferior. “Fifty years of Japanese influence in Formosa,” argued Mendel, “did not make the native pro-Japanese, but they did provide a standard to which the postwar Chinese Nationalists failed to measure up.” The Formosans originally welcomed the reunification with China in 1945 but were once again disappointed by the government’s rapacious and decadent administration. In the wake of the 228 incident, they were determined that it would be preferable to seek a trusteeship under the United Nations, with the United States as the principal trustee, pending the ultimate outcome of the peace treaty with Japan. See Douglas Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, pp. 25-40. See also Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp.58-59. 36 After Chen Yi was relieved of his Taiwan governorship in May 1947, he was appointed a field commander in China’s civil war. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Chen’s arrest in March 1949 for conspiring with the Communists. He was executed on June 16, 1950. Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, p. 401. 37 “Wedemeyer’s Report on Formosa to the Secretary of State Marshall,” August 17, 1947, printed in The China White Paper, p. 309. 38 Joseph Ballantine, Formosa, p. 66.

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39 George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, p. 309; Clearly Kerr’s position was that Taiwan was betrayed by the great powers and the KMT after World War II. Taiwan should be independent or at least its status remains undetermined until after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. In his view, the United States sacrificed Taiwan in order to placate the Nationalists. Kerr’s sympathy for the cause of Formosans is understandable in light of his years of residence in Taiwan and of his friendly relations with many native Formosans. The outbreak of the February and March Incidents enraged Kerr tremendously. Yet, while Kerr’s narratives were in general objective and fact-based, he was criticized for allowing his personal emotions to interfere with his official duties as a Foreign Service officer. See Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, p. 181; Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 41. 40 Douglas Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, pp. 180-181. See also “PPS 53, Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan): United States Policy toward Formosa and the Pescadores,” July 6, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 356-364. 41 “Intelligence Memorandum, No. 111: Strategic Importance of Taiwan,” January 3, 1949, NSC-CIA/Dec 48-Dec 49/Truman Papers/Box2, HST Library. 42 Ibid., p. 1. 43 Ibid., p. 5. 44 Ibid., p. 2. This statement would serve as the principal argument for treating Taiwan as a “separate entity” apart from China. Although both the KMT and CCP viewed that Taiwan and Pescadores were “historically, ethnically, legally and in fact a part of Chinese territory,” all that was pending was the formal act of finalization—that is, the signing of a peace treaty with Japan. On this part, those in Washington who were pro-Taiwan autonomy or sympathetic to the cause of native Taiwanese aspirations for self-determination had argued that from an international legal standpoint, Taiwan was not legally part of China until the actual conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty. John Foster Dulles, who was in charge of the peace treaty negotiation process, regarded Taiwan as a “former dependent territory” and not as a “predetermined possession of either the PRC or the ROC.” He wished to preserve the right of the people of Taiwan to have some say in their future. At the insistence of the United States and Great Britain, when Japan signed the treaty in 1951 with the victors in San Francisco, neither KMT China nor CCP China was invited. In 1952, Tokyo did sign a separate peace treaty with the Nationalist Government in Taipei. In both instances, however, while Japan renounced its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, it did not specifically transfer the island to China. Hence, arguably, Taiwan’s official legal status remained “undetermined” even to this day. See Chapter 2; and Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 92-95. 45 “Intelligence Memorandum: No. 111, Strategic Importance of Taiwan,” pp. 7-8. 46 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 47 “NSC 37: The Strategic Importance of Formosa,” November 28, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 261-262. 48 Ibid. 49 “Memorandum for the President of the 31 st NSC Meeting,” January 7, 1949, PSF/NSC Meeting File 1949/Meeting Discussions/Truman Papers/Box 186, HST Library.

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50 For the economic aid package of the China Aid Act (1948), the State Department originally requested $570 million, but the 80th Congress (19471949), controlled by the Republican majority, slashed the amount to $338 million and then appropriated only $275 million, leaving the rest unspent and unavailable. See Ronald McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves, p. 92. According to Lewis Purifoy, there was a great degree of irony in that the congressional Republicans, who were firm supporters of the Chinese Nationalists, actually pressured the Truman administration to reduce the amount of the China aid. The reason was due to the fact the Republicans were made up of the “China-bloc” as well as the “balanced budget isolationists.” Together, these so-called “Asialationists,” while anti-Communists and supportive of Chiang Kai-shek, were equally adamant about balancing the budget and undermining Truman’s foreign policy initiatives. See Lewis Purifoy, Harry Truman’s China Policy, (New York: Viewpoints, 1976). 51 “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett),” December 30, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 8, (1948), pp. 667-668. 52 Chiang already placed approximately 300,000 troops and $100 million gold reserves in Taiwan. 53 “Memorandum for the President of the 30th NSC meeting,” December 17, 1948, PSF/NSC Meeting Files/Meeting Discussion1948/Truman Papers/Box 186, HST Library. 54 Ibid. 55 “Memorandum for the President, from Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett: Industrial Replacement and Reconstruction Program for Formosa,” January 14, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 267. 56 “Letter from Paul Hoffman, the Administrator of the ECA to the Acting Secretary of State (Robert Lovett),” January 19, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 270. 57 “Letter from the Undersecretary of State (James Webb) to Paul Hoffman,” January 31, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 278. 58 “NSC 37/1: The Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” February 3, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 33/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library, p. 1. 59 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 60 Ibid., p. 4. 61 Ibid., p. 6. 62 Ibid., p. 7. 63 Ibid., p. 6. 64 “Memorandum for the President of the 33rd Meeting of the National Security Council,” February 4, 1949, PSF/NSC Meeting File/Meeting Discussions/1949/Truman Papers/Box # 186, HST Library. 65 Ibid. 66 “NSC 37/2: The Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” February 3, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 33/Truman Papers/Box 205, p. 2. 67 Chiang Kai-shek and General Li Tsung-jen were elected president and vice-president of the Republic of China on April 28, 1948. Chiang resigned the presidency on January 21, 1949 as a result of the Communists’ victories in

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various decisive battles, and Li became the acting president. Chiang, nevertheless, wielded and dictated the actual political and military powers behind the scene. 68 “Memorandum, “ February 4, 1949, Memoranda of Conversations JanFeb 1949/DGA/Box65, HST Library. 69 “Memorandum of Conversations (the President, Vice-President, Secretary of State and Congressional Leaders),” February 7, 1949, Memoranda of Conversations Jan-Feb 1949/DGA/Box65, HST Library. 70 “Memorandum of Conversation between the President and the Secretary of State,” February 7, 1949, Memoranda of Conversations Jan-Feb 1949/DGA/Box 65, HST Library. 71 “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse), December 24, 1948,” FRUS, Vol. 8, (1948), p. 237. 72 “Memorandum for Harry Hopkins, from George Elsey, Enclosing Summary of United States Government Economic and Military Aid Authorized for China since 1937,” January 24, 1950, Official Files150/Truman Papers/Box758, HST Library, pp. 1-2. 73 “Interim Report on China Aid Act from the Department of State to the President,” October 11, 1948, Official Files150/Truman Papers/Box 758, HST Library. On February 18, 1949, President Truman sent to Congress a message explaining China’s declining economic conditions and urging the Congress to pass the China Aid Act. His emphasis was on the economic assistance part of the China Aid program. He said, “A genuine friendship has existed between the American people and the people of China over many years. This friendship has been accompanied by a long record of commercial and cultural association and close cooperation between our two countries. Americans have developed a deep respect for the Chinese people and sympathy for the many trials and difficulties which they have endured… The United States has long recognized the importance of a stable Chinese nation to lasting peace in the Pacific and the entire world.” Yet, the president continued, “The strains placed upon the country by eight years of war, and the Japanese occupation and blockade have been increased by internal strife at the very time that reconstruction efforts should be under way. The wartime damage to transport and productive facilities has been greatly accentuated by the continued obstruction and destruction of vital communications by the communist forces.” Suggesting that “the continued deterioration of the Chinese economy is a source of deep concern to the United States,” Truman proclaimed that “the proposed program of aid to [Nationalist] China represents what I believe to be the best course this government can follow in the light of all the circumstances. Nothing which this country provides by way of assistance can, even in a small measure, be a substitute for the necessary action that be taken only by the Chinese government. Yet, this program can accomplish the important purpose of giving the Chinese government a respite from rapid economic deterioration, during which it can move to establish more stable economic conditions.” See the full transcript of the speech in “President’s Message to the U.S. Congress,” February 18, 1948, Official Files 150/Truman Papers/Box 758, HST Library. 74 Ibid., p. 6. See also Thomas G. Paterson, “If Europe, Why Not China? ” Prologue, Vol. 13, (Spring 1981), pp. 19-38; and see also Grace M. Hawes, The

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Marshall Plan for China, Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-1949 (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company Inc., 1977), pp. 107-113. 75 “Memorandum for Harry Hopkins, from George Elsey, Enclosing Summary of United States Government Economic and Military Aid Authorized for China since 1937,” p.6. See also Joseph Ballantine, Formosa, pp. 139-146. 76 Ibid. See also “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State (Acheson),” December 7, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 438-441; in this memo, Butterworth outlined for Acheson a list of military material procured or being procured for the Chinese government by agencies of the U.S. government under the $125 million grants which has not yet been shipped (about $8 million). The Nationalist government also procured military supplies through its own funds through independent commercial agencies in the United States. For instance, it purchased approximately $6,800,000 worth of aircraft and aircraft parts. 77 Robert Blum, Drawing the Line, p. 125. 78 “Memorandum for Harry Hopkins, from George Elsey, Enclosing “Summary of United States Government Economic and Military Aid Authorized for China since 1937,” pp. 3-5. 79 Dean Acheson, “Letter of Transmittal to President Truman” The China White Paper, pp. xv-xvi. 80 “Statement by the President on the China White Paper,” August 4, 1949, Official Files150/Truman Papers/Box758, HST Library. 81 Secretary Acheson, in spring 1949, informed President Truman about congressional and press criticism of the administration’s China policy, suggesting that much of it “flowed from ignorance of the facts.” General Marshall was reluctant to present the full facts for fear of hurting the KMT’s declining fortunes. Given that the Nationalists are crumbling on the mainland and that the U.S. must not commit military intervention to save the regime, the secretary of state urged the president to consent to the preparation of a thorough account of America’s relations with China, centering primarily on the postwar years, and to the publication of it when the formal collapse came. Truman agreed and soon thereafter a knowledgeable and professionally qualified group was assembled to work under W. Walton Butterworth, subsequently with Dr. Philip C. Jessup, the ambassador at large, as editor in chief. Along with Acheson’s “Letter of Transmittal,” The China White Paper, a long document with 409 pages, extended by appendices to a total of 1054 pages, was formally released on August 5, 1949. “The China White Paper, far from mollifying the administration’s critics, was “greeted by a storm of abuse from very diverse groups in the Congress and the press.” Nonetheless, in his memoir, Acheson recalled, “After twenty years, The China White Paper still stands up well as a fair, accurate, and scholarly presentation.” Acheson, in 1969, lamented that he was like a “frustrated school teacher, persisting against overwhelming evidence to the contrary in the belief that human mind could be moved by facts and reasons.” See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 302-303. For the deliberation processes leading up to the drafting and publication of The China White Paper, consult “Publication of The China White Paper,” FRUS; Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 1365-1409. 82 “Memorandum of Conversation with the President,” February 14, 1949, Memoranda of Conversation Jan-Feb 1949/DGA/Box65, HST Library.

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83 “Secretary’s Notes for meeting with Republican Congressmen at the House Ways and Means Committee on the letter they addressed to the Secretary re China Policy,” February 24, 1949, Memoranda of Conversation Jan-Feb 1949/DGA/Box 65, HST Library. 84 Robert Beisner, Dean Acheson, p. 179; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 306. 85 “NSC 37/3: The Strategic Importance of Formosa,” February 10, 1949, PSF/MNSC//NSC Meeting #35/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library. 86 Ibid., p. 2. 87 “Statement by the Secretary of State (Acheson) at the 35th Meeting of the National Security Council on The Formosan Problem,” March 3, 1949, PSF/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box 220, HST Library. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid., Emphasis added. 90 “NSC 37/4: The Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” February 18, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library. See also paragraph 2 of “NSC 37/2:The Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” February 3, 1949, HST/PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 33/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library. 91 Ibid. 92 Statement by the Secretary of State (Acheson) at the 35th Meeting of the National Security Council,” March 3, 1949, PSF/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box 220/HST Library. 93 “NSC 37/5: Supplementary Measures with Respect to Formosa,” March 1, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library. 94 “Memorandum for the President,” March 4, 1949, PSF/NSC Meeting Memo to the President, 1949/Truman Papers/Box 220, HST Library. 95 Livingston T. Merchant was not a “China hand,” as his service for the State Department was mostly related to Economics, European, and North American affairs. In his oral interview, Merchant recalled that “Well…I entered the Foreign Service, as I recall in Feb, 1947 or thereabouts. My first assignment, to my surprise (and dismay, in many ways), was to China, in the area of the world in which I had no previous connection or knowledge…Fundamentally, I moved into the Far Eastern area in the service and in the department from a background rooted in finance and business and exclusively, as far as service experience abroad was concerned, in Western Europe.” Nonetheless, that did not undercut his performance when serving as counselor at the American Embassy in Nanjing in 1948-1949, and, then, the deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, 1949-1951. See “Oral History Interview with Livingston Merchant,” May 27, 1975, HST Library, p 17, 24. 96 Ibid., p. 31. 97 “Telegram from the Secretary of State (Acheson) to Ambassador in China (Stuart),” February 14, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 287-288. 98 “Telegram from the Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Consul General at Taipei (Krentz),” March 2, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 293-294. 99 “Oral History Interview with Livingston T. Merchant,” p. 20. 100 Ibid., p. 22. 101 “Telegram from the Council at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State,” March 6, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 297.

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David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, p. 136. “National Security Council Progress Report on the implementation of Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa (NSC-37/2) and Supplementary Measures with Respect to Formosa (NSC-37/5)” by the Secretary of State (Dean Acheson),” April 11, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library. 104 “Telegram from the Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Consul at Taipei (Edgar),” March 8, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 297-298. 105 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, p. 135. 106 In early 1949, the ECA already began its industrial and rural reconstruction programs on Taiwan. In particular, the rural program, under the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, was implemented most extensively, as it sought to (1) increase agricultural production; and (2) aid government agencies to improve local administration, land reform, agricultural health, and social education. Land reform was deemed most essential because the Chinese Communists tended to work its way up in the countryside. The ECA administrators believed that the loss of peasantry to the CCP in China must not be repeated in Taiwan. See Grace Hawes, The Marshall Plan for China, pp. 7278; the NSC-37/2 and NSC-37/5 wanted to enhance the JCRR program on Taiwan and also industrial reconstruction program, pending on securing assurances from the Nationalist authority on the island to push for reforms and efficient governance. As of April 1949, the ECA funds still had approximately unexpended $54 million, which could be put to good use on Taiwan. The Truman administration was planning to allocate $17 million for the industrial reconstruction program. See David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, p. 151. 107 “Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Consul at Taipei (Edgar),” March 9, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 298. 108 “Telegram from the Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State,” March 9, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 298-299. 109 “Telegram from the Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State,” March 11, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 299. 110 “Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart),” March 11, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 299; “Telegram from the Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State,” March 14, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 299-300. 111 The Republic of China has five branches of government: Executive Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Examination Yuan, and Control Yuan. The president of the Executive Yuan is equivalent to a prime minister in a parliamentary system. Sun Fo, the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, served as the president from December 1948 to March 1949. 112 “Telegram from the Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State,” March 19, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 300-301. 113 “Telegram from the Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State,” April 10, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 312. 114 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, p. 140. 115 George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, pp. 201-202. 116 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, pp. 140141. 103

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117 “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse),” March 23, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 301-302. 118 “Telegram, from the Consul General at Shanghai (John Cabot) to the Secretary of State,” January 27, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 276; “Telegram from the Consul General at Hong Kong (George Hopper) to the Secretary of State,” January 27, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 277. 119 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, p. 143. 120 “Telegram from the Consul General at Taipei (Krentz) to the Secretary of State,” February 3, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 280-281. 121 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, p. 143. 122 “Telegram from Ambassador Stuart to the Secretary of State,” March 23, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 302-303. 123 Ibid., p. 303. 124 “Telegram from Acheson to the Consul at Taipei (Edgar),” March 30, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 305-306. 125 “Telegram from Acheson to Stuart,” March 24, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 304. 126 “Memorandum for the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from the Secretary of Defense (Louis Johnson),” April 2, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library; Dean Acheson, at the 35th NSC meeting, asked the JCS to confirm the National Security Council’s interpretation about their assessment, as outlined in NSC37/3, that “overt military action by the United States in Formosa is not recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, either at this time or under any foreseeable future circumstances.” On April 2, 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson submitted this memo to the National Security Council, hence reaffirming the JCS’ original view regarding Taiwan. 127 “Telegram from Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State,” April 6, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 308-309. 128 The China White Paper, p. 408. 129 Ibid. 130 “Telegram from the Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot),” April 7, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 309-310. 131 “Telegram from the Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State,” April 12, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 313-314. 132 “Telegram from the Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State,” April 12, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 314-315. 133 “Memorandum for the President,” April 13, 1949, NAF/January-April 1949/Truman Papers/Box21, HST Library. 134 “Telegram from Secretary Acheson to the Consul at Taipei (Edgar),”April 15, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 315-316. 135 “Telegram from the Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State,” April 21, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 316-317; “Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot),” April 21, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 317. 136 “Oral History Interview with Livingston T. Merchant,” pp. 32-33. 137 “Telegram from the Council at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State (Acheson),” May 4, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 324-326; “Telegram from

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the Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State (Acheson),” May 4, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 326-327. 138 “Telegram from the Secretary to Edgar, containing message to Merchant,” May 9, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 329-330; See also “National Security Council Progress Report on the Implementation of Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa (NSC-37/2) and Supplementary Measures with Respect to Formosa (NSC-37/5)” by the Secretary of State (Dean Acheson),”May 18, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 35/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library.

5 The Inception of Strategic Ambiguity

On April 28, 1949, Truman met with Senators Kenneth Wherry (RNebraska) and Styles Bridges (R-New Hampshire), along with Acheson, at the White House to discuss China’s situation. When Wherry inquired about Taiwan, Acheson explained about the KMT’s blunders on the island and the dangers that Formosa could encounter from a further influx of Mainlander Chinese and the possible Communist penetration. The secretary remarked that “the best hope would grow from doing everything possible to keep carpetbaggers and refugees out of Formosa and giving the Formosans a chance to express their own desires for their own future.”1 Indeed, as the CCP consolidated its victory in the latter half of 1949, Washington was anxiously seeking a practical solution to detach Taiwan from Communist control without antagonizing Mainland China. President Truman’s appointment of John Foster Dulles as a foreign policy consultant to the State Department in April 1950 proved to be a decisive turning point. A renowned Republican foreign policy leader, international law expert, and a loyal disciple of Wilsonianism, Dulles furnished the crucial legal and moral justifications for the United States to preserve Formosa’s autonomy and to protect her people’s will for political selfdetermination. His cooperation with Dean Rusk, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, not only enhanced the Truman administration’s moral imperative to save Taiwan but also contributed to the inception of the strategic ambiguity policy on the eve of the Korean War. Merchant’s Plan: The UN Trusteeship over Taiwan

Livingston T. Merchant’s antipathy to the KMT regime on Taiwan was no secret, as he wrote to his friend and superior Walt Butterworth that “I am concerned over many things on the island and in all honesty must say that the outlook for success is not bright…”2 Chapter 4 has

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explained that Merchant, before leaving for Washington, had recommended that the United States could seek other allies’ cooperation to foster a UN intervention in Taiwan. His May 4th telegram caught Acheson’s attention. The secretary, in his daily meeting on May 10, 1949, requested the State Department’s Far Eastern experts to consider Merchant’s Formosa plan in a “very careful fashion”3 After his return to Washington on May 18, Merchant was busy in consulting with officials about Taiwan’s situations. He also worked out and submitted a formal memorandum, containing his assessment and policy suggestions, to Butterworth. In the report, Merchant noted that peace negotiations between the CCP and Acting President Li’s representatives had begun in February 1949, and the risk was that “there might emerge a coalition government which could claim wide support and…extend its authority over Formosa.” Despite this negative development, Merchant defended his decision to postpone committing the full ECA program to the current Nationalist administration on Taiwan because the governor “typified the unenlightened leadership of the most reactionary element in the KMT and by definition appeared incapable of providing Formosa with the sort of liberal [efficient] government…”4 The continued arrival of mainland refugees added strain to the island’s diminishing economic resources. Thus, the fall of Taiwan to the CCP remained a high possibility. Merchant, in a sympathetic tone, stressed that the Formosans “yearn for independence as children yearn for candy, and they have a child-like faith in the United States.”5 The memo proposed three options: (1) to give ECA assistance to the KMT government after seeking its assurance for reforms; (2) to commit U.S. armed forces to defend the island; and (3) to raise the issue of Formosa in the UN. Merchant strongly endorsed the third option because the first would “see the reservoir of Formosan goodwill to America drop sharply.” In addition, the U.S. should also secure its moral position in Asia by minimizing its association with an unpopular and inept KMT regime. As for the second alternative, Merchant contended that the JCS had already rejected military actions in Taiwan. Military intervention would also damage the Truman administration’s objective in pursuing a Sino-Soviet split in China. Placing Taiwan under a UN trusteeship, accordingly, seemed to be the most appropriate and multilateral approach to keep the island out of CCP domination.6 Convinced by Merchant’s analysis, George Kennan and John Davies (of the Policy Planning Staff), and Philip Sprouse and Kenneth Krentz (from the Divison of Chinese Affairs) in early June drafted a new memorandum intended for the National Security Council.7 They wrote,

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“We face on Formosa today a situation directly analogous to that which we faced on the mainland a year ago; the government in power is corrupt and incompetent.… Moreover, economic aid from outside cannot in the absence of a basic change in the government alter or cure this situation, and as long as it endures the passage of Formosa to Communist control…is only a matter of time.” After examining three possible alternatives, the experts agreed with Merchant in an “immediate committal of the problem of Formosa to the UN.” The UN action is “to place [by a friendly and interested power such as India or the Philippines] on the agenda of the United Nations Trusteeship Council…a request that a temporary trusteeship be assumed by the UN over Formosa until such time as its people are given the opportunity in a free and secret election to decide their own destiny.” 8 To mollify Chinese nationalism, however, Kennan and Davies advocated that the UN action be accompanied by a public statement of the president or the secretary of state “disclaiming any designs, territorial, or otherwise, on the part of the United States on Formosa.” The ECA assistance to Taiwan could also be continued under the aegis of UN trusteeship. Furthermore, the UN option could exonerate the United States from the accusation that it was “acting imperialistically” since the right to self-determination is “certainly appealing throughout Asia.” In any event, the UN could serve as a “deterrent to overt or covert action by the Chinese Communists to take over the island,” since any move of this sort on their part would “provide further public evidence of the need for the UN to intervene in the situation.”9 Walt Butterworth, the director of Far Eastern Affairs, who was already cognizant of Merchant’s May 24th memo, thought the current paper well analyzed and reasonable. He forwarded it to Dean Rusk, the deputy undersecretary of state, for his inputs and consent to pass it on to the NSC.10 Given the sensitivity involved on the Taiwan issue, especially with respect to America’s China policy, Rusk remained cautious and sought to obtain more substantive consultations from the State Department’s Division of United Nations Affairs, in order to determine both the feasibility and procedures of securing a UN trusteeship. However, after looking closely into the matter, the undersecretary decided that a UN trusteeship for Formosa was “not currently within the realm of possibility.”11 George Kennan and PPS-53

Consequently, the UN action was, for the time being, discounted and placed on hold. In the ensuing two months, officials within the State

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Department were eager to discover the best means to save Taiwan before it was too late. Observing that the increasing arrival of Chinese troops would bankrupt the island’s economy, Donald Edgar, the U.S. consul in Taipei, wrote to Acheson on June 24 that the “biggest problem is excess military here. [Taiwan] can carry two or three armies but over that produces diminishing economic, political, and military returns.” The secretary replied that “[the] Department [is] fully aware [about the] liabilities [that] excessive troops constitute on Taiwan but unwilling [to] intervene formally with governor on military matter, responsibility for which is Chinese.” Yet, Acheson instructed Edgar to tell Chen about the potential risks inherent in “idle troops in excess of island’s defense needs.”12 The Truman administration worried about Formosa’s future and the welfare of its 7 million inhabitants. But, in the absence of any practical solution, Acheson indicated that “[we are] bound to our policy as expressed in the NSC [37/2 and 37/5] papers until we change it through the NSC and get the president’s approval.”13 At this juncture, Kennan came up with a bold and radical initiative, as outlined in PPS-53, “United States Policy toward Formosa and the Pescadores.”14 He predicted that the situation in Formosa and Pescadores had degenerated “along lines which probably will culminate in Chinese Communist domination of the islands.”15 The only viable course of action was “the removal of the present Nationalist administrators” and the “establishment of a provisional…U.S. regime which would invoke the principle of self-determination for the islanders.” 16 Specifically, there were two ways in which this change of the Nationalist regime could conceivably be implemented: One would be to induce other Far Eastern powers to take the lead in initiating international action to achieve the above purpose. The other was to assert a temporary American military authority over Taiwan on the grounds that “subsequent events had invalidated all the assumptions underlying the Cairo Declaration and that U.S. intervention was required by the interests of stability in the Pacific area as well as by the interests of the inhabitants of the islands.”17 Kennan, to be sure, acknowledged that either of these courses would stir-up anti-Americanism in China and jeopardize the U.S. Open Door policy. But, as the mastermind of the containment policy, he also refused to reconcile “to the prospect of Formosa’s falling into the hands of the Chinese Communists.” Supporting a U.S. military occupation of Taiwan, he believed that if the action “were to be carried through with sufficient resolution, speed, ruthlessness, and self-assurance, the way Theodore Roosevelt might have done it, it would be not only successful but would have an electrifying effect in this country and throughout the

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Far East.”18 He, therefore, advised Acheson to discuss with Truman and other NSC officials that nothing less than a forceful U.S. military intervention could save Taiwan. “If they then feel strongly, as I do,” he posited, “and if they are prepared to assume their full share of responsibility for initiating and pursuing such a course—then my personal view is that we should take the plunge.”19 Kennan also analyzed that the problem of Formosa could be “broken down into two main components: (a) the need for a responsible and stable administration on the islands during the present period while they are awaiting a stabilization of conditions in China and a final disposition at a Japanese peace settlement, and (b) the need for discovering what the desires of the islanders are with regard to their future so that a just and constructive decision can be reached in the peace settlement on the basis of the self-determination of the inhabitants of Formosa and the Pescadores.”20 Thus, an international consensus should be established that “the final disposition” of Formosa and the Pescadores still awaited a decision at a peace settlement with Japan. The current KMT administration on Taiwan derived its authority from the Cairo Declaration but subsequent developments overruled their ruling legitimacy. “It was certainly not the intention of the American people, whose forces liberated Formosa and the Pescadores at so great a cost in blood and treasure,” Kennan thought, “that the…Chinese control of the islands should have resulted in…the suffering which has been endured by the people of Formosa during the past four years.” Confronted with further deteriorations in Mainland China and Taiwan, the United States could “no longer in good conscience remain silent and inactive.”21 Ultimately, the United States military government on Taiwan should, in collaboration with other interested powers, set up a Taiwanese plebiscite “regarding the ultimate disposition of the islands in accordance with the principles of self-determination.”22 Although Kennan’s draft paper was revolutionary, it underscored the prevailing sense of frustration over Taiwan’s fate. Yet, to maintain the balance between saving Taiwan and promoting China’s Open Door, the Truman administration had to act discreetly with its intentions over Taiwan. In late July, the draft proposal was submitted to Acheson and, while it was not formally considered, the secretary instructed the State Department to study closely Kennan’s recommendations and to remain “actively” engaged in the Taiwan question debates.23

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NSC-37/6, NSC-37/7, and NSC-37/8

In early August, Acheson advised the NSC to engage in a new round of policy reviews on Taiwan. In NSC-37/6, circulated on August 5, 1949, the secretary of state discussed the declining fortunes on Taiwan. “Following the arrival of the department’s representative [Merchant] in Washington,” Acheson stated, “a further assessment of our position has been made.” He posited that the KMT authority remained “corrupt and incompetent,” as the regime “lacks the will to take the necessary political and economic steps to modify the deep and growing resentment of the Formosans.” Moreover, the liabilities presented by the KMT personnel and their remnants on Taiwan would “accelerate the economic disintegration of the island.”24 Given the strong likelihood of the CCP’s domination of Taiwan, Acheson requested the JCS to reassess the island’s strategic importance. He said: In view of the foregoing developments…the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be asked to review their memorandum dated February 10, 1949, on the strategic importance of Formosa to the United States. Upon receipt of the current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NSC would be in a position to review the present policy in Formosa after considering the strategic factor and all political implications arising from our present global foreign policy. 25

Taking perhaps Kennan’s military option into consideration, Acheson asserted that “it would be helpful if the reexamination of the strategic factor by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would include a reply to the following question”: Under conditions short of war and on the assumption that in the absence of military measures Formosa and Pescadores will sooner or later come under Communist control, do the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard these islands as of sufficient military importance to the United States to commit U.S. forces to their occupation? It would also be of assistance if, in answering this question, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take into account, among other factors, the following possible variations of the situation as it might be encountered: (a) Occupation in the face of initial opposition from Nationalist forces on the island or later attack from the mainland by the Communists; (b) Occupation by agreement with the existing authorities on the island with implicit responsibility for the maintenance of internal security and external defense.26

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These questions should be treated “as a matter of priority.” Acheson also promised, as advocated by Merchant, to discuss the Taiwan problem “informally with selected governments, including the British” on a “possible future joint or concerted action within or without the framework of the United Nations.”27 The JCS Rejects Military Actions to Save Taiwan

On August 22, 1949, General Omar Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent their replies to the National Security Council. Enclosed as NSC-37/7, Bradley’s report contended that the JCS remained “of the opinion that Formosa is strategically important to the United States for the reasons set forth in the second and third paragraphs of their memorandum of Feb 10, 1949 (NSC-37/3). Since that date, the continuing sweep of Communist conquest in China has strengthened this view.”28 Nevertheless, the JCS reaffirm their earlier opinion that the strategic importance of Formosa does not justify overt military action, in the event that diplomatic and economic steps prove unsuccessful to prevent Communist domination, so long as the present disparity between our military strength and our global obligation exists, a disparity that may well increase as a result of budgetary limitations and the commitments implicit in the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore…the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not regard Formosa and the Pescadores as of sufficient military importance to the United States, under the circumstances set forth above, to commit United States forces to their occupation under conditions short of war and on the assumption that in the absence of military measures these islands will sooner or later come under Communist control.29

In addition, the JCS advised that any form of U.S. military occupation, whether with or without the KMT’s opposition, would be detrimental because it “could easily lead to the necessity for relatively major effort, thus making it impossible then to meet more important emergencies that might develop elsewhere.”30 Future contingency, such as war, may make overt military action with respect to Taiwan advisable. But, it is better to “face this future contingency as one of the many military problems that must be considered in the event of incipient or actual overt war than to risk undue military commitment in the Formosan area under present circumstances.”31 In short, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it would be most ideal if Taiwan could be saved by diplomatic and economic means. Military actions, however, would be

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unwise because the island was unworthy to sacrifice other more vital strategic areas. On September 9, Acheson ordered Merchant and Butterworth to seek opinions from Great Britain.32 Aiming to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China, the British had reconciled to the eventual fall of Taiwan and, therefore, opposed to any military or UN actions to forestall such inevitability. The secretary of state was certain that the United States had to rely only on economic and diplomatic means to prevent CCP’s control over Taiwan. 33 On October 6, 1949, the State submitted NSC-37/8 to the National Security Council. The document rejected the military approach, positing that “the employment of U.S. forces on Formosa would enable the Chinese Communists to rally support to themselves as defenders of China’s territorial integrity and handicap our efforts to exploit Chinese irredentist sentiment with respect to Soviet actions in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang.”34 The report also evaluated the present economic and military strengths of the KMT forces on Taiwan. In the opinion of the State Department: The present weakness of the island does not arise from lack of economic resources or military material. The major portion of the Chinese government’s gold and silver holdings and foreign currency reserves, estimated to be in excess of one hundred million U.S. dollars is located on Formosa and available to the Chinese administration there. It is believed that likewise the major portion of the military material purchased under the $125 million grants is stockpiled on Formosa.… In view of its natural resources, the economy of Formosa could be made almost completely self-sufficient under efficient administration…35

Consequently, in the absence of genuine reforms and resolve, even ample material resources or external economic assistance to the KMT would not suffice. “A program of aid…would [merely] commit American resources and prestige to what is in all probability a lost cause unless the Chinese themselves were to initiate and faithfully carry out essential measures of self-help.”36 However, NSC-37/8 advised the Truman administration to continue aiding Formosa under the existing ECA program as originally outlined in NSC-37/2 and NSC-37/5. But, the “primary objective of any course of action offering even a reasonable hope of success, must be the correction by the Chinese themselves of those administrative faults which are a major cause of the present precarious position of Formosa.”37 In other words, American support would be contingent on the KMT’s reforms to improve the political and economic lots of

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Taiwan. The paper asserted that a clear and stern warning should be delivered to Chiang Kai-shek to dispel any illusions that U.S. help could be taken for granted. To ensure effectiveness, the message should also be made public.38 th

The 47 National Security Council Meeting and the Demarche to Chiang Kai-shek

On October 20, 1949, at the 47th NSC meeting, NSC-37/8 was the first agenda item to be discussed.39 Acheson began by saying that the main point of the paper was “the communication to Chiang Kai-shek” of America’s intent. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson believed, however, that the NSC should defer these matters until after the NSC staffs had finished drafting a new comprehensive policy paper on Asia, NSC-48. Johnson also opposed any press release at this point (regarding the statements to Chiang Kai-shek) since it would “prejudice our best interests and limit our possible future courses of action.” General Bradley concurred, admitting that “whereas the joint chiefs had felt that we should not go to Formosa, the situation may change.”40 Acheson agreed with Johnson and Bradley. A week after the NSC meeting, the secretary of state instructed John J. MacDonald, the U.S. consul general in Taipei, to convey the message to Chiang Kai-shek, writing that the “[State] Department believes [generalissimo] is the ultimate real authority on Formosa and that accordingly approach should be made to him.”41 Acheson reemphasized that the “present resources on Formosa are adequate to enable substantial improvement of situation and the question of increased aid is less urgent than that of effective use of present resources.”42 In the morning of November 3, MacDonald went to see Chiang at his Taipei office and conveyed the message. Reflecting America’s concern for the Formosans’ political rights, the consul general also emphasized to the generalissimo that “it has been brought to my attention that there is growing discontent with present government among the local population which probably could be alleviated if some qualified Formosans were taken into the provincial government. This at least would make them feel that they are part of governmental organization and inspire them to assist in defense of the island.” Chiang acknowledged the suggestions and agreed to study the message with care.43

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The State and Defense Departments Clash over Taiwan Policy

December 1949 was a climatic month for the Truman administration. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson finally broke his silence and attacked the current Formosa policy.44 In fact, as early as June 1949, Johnson had requested the NSC to prepare for a comprehensive, indepth review of the United States’ overall Asia policy, known as NSC48. Essentially, the secretary of defense, while supporting the administration’s overarching goal of denying Taiwan to the Communists, disagreed with the joint chiefs’ assessment of the island’s lack of strategic value, and was dissatisfied with the reliance upon mere diplomatic and economic mechanisms.45 Johnson believed that greater military assistance should be given to Taiwan. Although Merchant, Butterworth, and Kennan, as noted earlier, also favored more forceful responses, they eventually accepted that Taiwan should not endanger the administration’s Chinese Titoist policy. By November, preliminary drafts of NSC-48 were sent to various departments and agencies for comments and revisions. Yet, on Taiwan, the NSC staffs, under Johnson’s sway, suggested the adoption of more aggressive policies than those envisioned in the NSC-37 series. The State Department raised objections. On November 28, 1949, in a memo to Dean Rusk, Butterworth explained his rejection of the NSC’s new advocacy on Taiwan.46 The NSC draft advised that the United States “should obtain title to Formosa and Pescadores and transfer them to the trusteeship of the Pacific Association.” This line of argument, in Butterworth’s opinion, ignored the fact that detachment of Formosa from China by such means could hardly be made “defensible against the inevitable charge of imperialism.” Moreover, the Communist propaganda against the United States would “constitute a political liability rather than an asset.”47 On China, Butterworth also opposed the NSC’s proposition to replace NSC-41 with economic warfare against Communist China. The Far Eastern Affairs director reasoned that economic sanctions would only “provide Chinese Communist leaders with an alibi for failure in carrying out their domestic economic programs and would tend to align the politically uncommitted parts of the Chinese public behind the government of China…and encourage them to direct against the United States rather than the Communist regime their criticism for the hardships China is bound to suffer in the coming months.”48 In sum, the State Department viewed the NSC revisions as counterproductive. In the undersecretary’s meeting on December 1, Dean Rusk commented that NSC-48 should not “amend” the conclusions derived

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from the earlier NSC papers. Butterworth felt that NSC-48 “does not add to our knowledge nor change our policy,” but that it “is presented simply because Mr. Johnson wants it.” In the light of this, he promised that the Far Eastern Division, in revising the paper, would “keep as much as possible of the original version while changing almost all the conclusions and tying them in as far as possible to earlier NSC papers.”49 The timing of Johnson’s Taiwan initiative, however, was also made in response to the changes in the prevailing political environment in Taiwan. Indeed, on December 8, Chiang Kai-shek officially transplanted the Nationalist government from Mainland China to Taiwan and, after mulling over the November 3rd demarche, promised important reforms. He asked K.C. Wu, the former Shanghai mayor and also a Western-educated liberal, to replace Chen Cheng as Taiwan’s new governor. Consul Edgar commented that “K.C. Wu’s reputation for efficient administration and his pledge to place General Sun Li-jen in charge of the island’s defense had won Taipei much greater sympathy from policymakers in Washington.”50 More importantly, the congressional “China-bloc” had sharpened up their criticism and attacks against the Truman administration’s ChinaFormosa policy. They stressed that the United States ought to do more for their Nationalist ally and to prevent Mao’s capture of the island. Among the most outspoken was Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-New Jersey). During a private meeting with Secretary Acheson, the senator dismissed the possibility of Chinese Titoism and was firmly against recognition of Beijing.51 On the topic of Formosa, Smith, who just returned from a visit to Taipei, remarked that he “had talked with many military authorities in the Far East, [including General Douglas MacArthur], who…regarded the retention of Formosa as of the utmost strategic importance to the United States.” Though acknowledging Chiang’s blunders, Smith remained supportive of the KMT leader and his last stand on Taiwan, thereby recommending saving the island either through a UN trusteeship or a U.S. military occupation. Acheson replied that this subject was “receiving constant consideration” and there were “some differences of opinion among military authorities as to the strategic importance of Taiwan.”52 Acheson promised that a firm decision would be confirmed as soon as possible. Meanwhile, Johnson sought to lobby Truman directly. On December 15, in a memorandum to the president, who was then vacationing in Key West, Florida, the secretary of defense urged for stronger and more positive actions to help Taiwan. “There is now under serious consideration,” he wrote, “between the State Department and the Defense Department a National Security Council Study [NSC-48] on

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our Asiatic Policy. Formosa is one of the important questions involved.”53 Johnson explained, “The [Joint Chief of] staffs agree that efforts should be continued and perhaps increased to deny Formosa to the Communists.… They include political and economic aid, and also military advice and assistance short of overt military action.” Apparently, Johnson had successfully persuaded the JCS to vouch for a “prompt, positive U.S. course of action…to prevent Chinese Communist domination of Taiwan.”54 To further substantiate his claims, Johnson also enclosed in his memorandum to Truman a summary of viewpoints from General MacArthur. According to the supreme commander, It would be fatal to our littoral island defense [Clark Field in the Philippines and U.S. fields in Okinawa] for Formosa to fall into predatory hands. It can be denied to the Communists with very little effort. Formosa remains legally a part of Japan until a treaty of peace.… [Until] there is a treaty of peace the Nationalist government of China is merely a custodian representing the allies.… If Formosa is threatened, it is the duty of all the Allies to defend it. Such a defense could be made without the necessity of committing U.S. troops, merely by a declaration under the Potsdam Agreement that the U.S. would treat any attempt to invade Formosa as an act of war, and similarly that it would be treated as an act of war for the Nationalist government itself to use Formosa as a base to launch an attack against China. We could contend in the peace negotiations that conditions have so changed since the Yalta Agreement that it would not be obligatory to give Formosa to the Nationalist government of China, but that it should be set up as an independent self-governing nation. Formosans are now neither truly Japanese nor Chinese but a distant race of their own. If necessary a large part of the $75 million recently appropriated to be used in connection with China matters should be employed for the protection of Formosa.55

At about the same time, on December 13, Senator Homer Ferguson (R-Michigan) also wrote to Truman that he was “greatly concerned in regard to the question of Formosa,” believing that such concern was “so urgent that he must call the president’s attention on this matter.”56 From his recent trip to the Far East, the senator came back with the conclusion that America’s defense line “has moved from the Pacific Coast to the Islands of Okinawa, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines and on down through, going up to the Aleutians. Formosa is in that direct line—in fact, it is the center of our whole defense.” Like MacArthur, Ferguson believed that the island must not fall to the Communists, and that “a mere announcement that we would not permit any act of aggression

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against that island would deter any attack.”57 Clearly, Johnson, MacArthur, and the various congressional “China bloc” advocated that while U.S military occupation might be unnecessary, the Truman administration ought to step-up military assistance to Taiwan. While there is no trace of evidence that Truman replied to JohnsonMacArthur’s memorandum, he did reply to Ferguson’s letter. In his December 17th reply to the senator, Truman was unenthusiastic about giving further military assistance to the Nationalists other than indicating that he had read this letter “with a great deal of interest” and was “more than happy to have [the senator’s] views on that most important subject.”58 Truman’s lukewarm reaction was in part a consequence of his unpleasant experience with the Nationalists since the end of World War II. Moreover, as detailed in Chapter 3, the president dropped his irreconcilable, anti-Chinese Communist stance after having several informative meetings with the State Department’s China hands and Far Eastern consultants.59 Truman Backs Acheson’s China-Taiwan Policy

Truman realized that to promote China’s Open Door, the United States must dissociate from the KMT, which “has become to all classes of Chinese the symbol of corruption and reaction.”60 Further U.S. military assistance would alienate the support of liberal opinion not only in China, but in all parts of Asia. Truman wrote to Senator Vandenberg that the “Chinese…are fundamentally anti-foreign, and we must be exceedingly careful to see that this anti-foreign sentiment is not turned in our direction.”61 The president, accordingly, agreed with the logics behind Acheson’s Sino-Soviet split policy and did not want to let Taiwan stand in the way of achieving that long-term objective. This did not suggest that Truman and Acheson were abandoning Formosa.62 They envisioned a Taiwan which could be free and independent from Chinese Communist control. America would continue its economic assistance program and put a close watch on the Nationalists, which, through genuine reforms, could defend the island based on their well-equipped financial and military capabilities. Although Secretary Acheson rejected the dispatch of a U.S. military advisory group to Taiwan on the grounds that “presence of such advisors would soon become well publicized,” he wrote to Consul General MacDonald that “the Department [of State] would not object to the KMT government’s employment of former U.S. military officers in a private and civilian capacity whose function would be as effective as official advisors.”63

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More importantly, Truman was adamant that Formosa, if anything, would be returned only to the “Republic of China” or Nationalist China, not the People’s Republic of China, as spelled out in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. On December 22, 1949, in a press conference, he said: “Formosa is a part of Nationalist China and we still recognize the Nationalist government as the government of China.”64 The president’s interpretation certainly deviated from political and international reality, not to mention that the notion was repugnant to the Chinese Communists and many other nations which wanted to maintain friendly ties with Beijing. Nevertheless, to support the island without appearing to be “detaching it” from “China,” the administration must rely upon an ideational construction that defined China as “Nationalist China” not “Communist China.”65 Hence, the accusation that the Truman administration had abandoned Formosa to Communist China is simply untruthful. Butterworth, in March 1950, wrote that “the Chinese [Nationalist] government has at its disposal the productive resources of Formosa. It has furthermore large stocks of military equipment and supplies, substantial gold and foreign currency reserves and economic assistance from the United States provided by the ECA.… At the same time, the Chinese government is able to purchase in the United States from commercial sources and with its own resources those items which are considered necessary for the defense of Formosa, and furthermore it continues to procure supplies with the remaining portion of the $125 million grants provided by the Congress in the China Aid Act of 1948. The United States continues, of course, to recognize the Chinese government and to support it diplomatically. Thus, it is scarcely accurate to say that the United States has failed to support the Chinese government.”66 In a similar vein, Philip Sprouse, the director of Chinese Affairs, remarked to Rusk that “[America’s] refusal to provide military assistance to Formosa is meaningless…as long as we provide economic assistance and permit the Chinese government to procure military supplies in the United States with its own funds. The Chinese [Communists] make no distinction between arms provided by the U.S. government and arms purchased in the United States…as a result of economic aid. From a propaganda standpoint, arms shipped from the U.S. are equally damaging regardless of the technicalities of procurement and payment.”67

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th

NSC-48/2 and the 50 NSC Meeting

From the view of Acheson and Truman, Secretary Johnson’s stand on Taiwan was dubious and politically motivated at best. Although Taiwan’s position had been perilous throughout 1949, its situation in December was no worse than that in earlier months. Moreover, throughout 1949, Acheson had asked the JCS to assess and reassess Taiwan’s strategic value to the United States, and they had, on at least three occasions, testified that Formosa, while strategically important, was not so vital as to warrant American military intervention or occupation.68 Johnson had been a close and integral participant in this process. Thus, if there were any doubts in him with respect to the State Department’s Formosa policy, he could have easily raised objections. Furthermore, it must be noted that in March 1949, Kenneth Krentz, then the U.S. consul general in Taipei, reported to Acheson that “during his visit with General MacArthur in Tokyo…the general said very emphatically that ‘There is no earthly military reason why [the United States] should need Formosa as a base. It would be no earthly use to us against our only possible major enemy and certainly they could not utilize it against us.’” Acheson, in fact, thought this comment “most interesting” for he “thought [the SCAP] took the opposite view.”69 On December 23, General Bradley modified the joint chiefs’ earlier view, and in NSC-37/9, advocated that “a modest, well-directed, and closely-supervised program of military aid to the anti-Communist government in Taiwan would be in the security interest of the United States.”70 He also recommended that the president direct the “commander in chief, Far East, with the assistance of the commander, Seventh Task Fleet, to make an immediate survey of the nature and extent of the military assistance required in Formosa in order to hold Formosa against attack.” Probably neither Truman nor Acheson believed that Johnson, Bradley, and MacArthur were playing politics with America’s national security policy. Yet, the close ties between Johnson and the KMT regime probably clouded the secretary’s judgment.71 Accordingly, in a working lunch meeting with Johnson on December 22, President Truman stated that he would not “support active military measures [whether occupation or increasing military assistance] to help defend the island.”72 The president affirmed that while he understood the Defense Department’s position from a military perspective, he would “decide with the State Department on political grounds.”73 Disheartened by Truman’s bluntness, Johnson left Washington for an early vacation on December 23. He apparently decided not to attend the upcoming 50th NSC meeting, scheduled on December 29, which

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would be chaired by Truman himself.74 On that morning, Acheson, along with Butterworth, Merchant, and Rusk, met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek greater clarification on the NSC-37/9 memorandum.75 Showing much irritation, Acheson stated that “my understanding of [the JCS’s] past pronouncements on the subject was that the strategic importance of Formosa was insufficient to warrant the use of United States armed forces; that the Department of State had been doing its best to execute the existing policies laid down by the National Security Council with respect to Formosa…The joint chiefs’ most recent memorandum, however, appeared to give a different view or weight to the matter.” General Bradley, however, denied any change in the JCS position. He pointed out that the joint chiefs had always considered Formosa “important” and mentioned that their recommendation in February to base minor American naval units on Formosa was overruled by the NSC. “A study made by the joint chiefs in October arrived at the conclusion that military assistance to the Nationalist government was desirable,” Bradley continued, “but that since no funds were then available for the purpose, the matter was not pressed.” Yet, the NSC37/9’s recommendation was “based on the existence of funds under Section 303 of the Military Assistance Act ($75 million) and on the estimate that in the recent past the situation had changed on Formosa.” The JCS chairman believed a “survey team should now assess the needs of the Chinese since money was available to meet those needs.”76 The secretary of state contended, “I would like to explain the background against which I viewed the problem of Formosa and to ascertain whether we were discussing the best methods of checking Communism in Asia.” He reminded everyone that the Communists now were in fact controlling China and that the “conquest has not primarily been by force but due to the collapse of the Kuomintang and the existence of a long smoldering agrarian revolution on which the Communists have capitalized.” “We must face the facts that there is no Chinese basis of resistance to Communism,” Acheson emphasized, “we must also face the certainty that throughout Southeast Asia the Communists will seek to extend their domination, probably by subversive methods and not invasion. We must do our utmost to strengthen the neighbors of China.… Above all we must get ourselves on the side of the nationalist movement, a task which is easier now that the dead hand of European colonialism has been moved.”77 Most importantly, the United States must continue to engage China, and “we must take the long view not of 6 or 12 months but of 6 or 12 years.” Here, Acheson clearly suggested that to pursue China’s Open Door, the U.S. must be patient with its effort to create a wedge between China and

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Soviet Russia. The secretary further remarked that the Soviet’s imperialist ambitions in Northern China inevitably would generate conflicts with Beijing since “Mao is not a true satellite” to Moscow. America should not do anything that would antagonize Chinese nationalist sentiments.78 “We ask ourselves is the risk of [Taiwan’s] falling due to assault— that seems unlikely. The real danger is the continued decay within [the KMT regime].” The secretary repeated that the Nationalists, with resolve and genuine reforms, could hold on to Taiwan. American military interventions would only “excite and bring upon ourselves the united Chinese hatred of foreigners.”79 The United States would, in other words, be portrayed as the supporters of this discredited, decayed Kuomintang government. “If at this price, we acquire an island essential to the defenses of the United States then it might be worth the price,” the secretary maintained, “but there does not appear to be demonstrated a claim that the loss of Formosa really breaches our defense.”80 General Bradley finally conceded that Acheson’s reasoning was “political” and the JCS were “only giving the military view,” while recognizing that “political considerations often must override military considerations.” Nonetheless, Acheson stressed that “from this, it did not follow that we should let Formosa go and then recognize the Communist government.”81 While opposing military actions, the secretary indicated his strong support for the continuation of economic and diplomatic means to deny Formosa to the Communists. Acheson’s long talks with the JCS and Louis Johnson’s early departure from Washington convinced Bradley that the State Department prevailed over the military points of view. In the following afternoon, at the 50th NSC meeting, Acheson repeated his earlier view that explicit U.S. military assistance to Taiwan would “turn Chinese anti-foreign feeling against us and also place us in the position of subsidizing attacks on a government which will soon be generally recognized.”82 He said, “We must also consider the effect on the rest of Asia, where we wish to be on the side of the nationalist movements and to avoid supporting reactionary governments.” “Formosa, though important to the U.S., was not vital. Military assistance with respect to Formosa would buy only a little time at the risk of losing the influence we have left in Asia.” 83 Bradley stated that “[If] for political reasons it was desired to drop support of the current Nationalist government, then perhaps the joint chiefs’ proposal went too far.” Acheson, nevertheless, added that “the Chinese Nationalists could purchase arms and supplies in the U.S. by using their large gold reserves.”84 Truman gave his support to the secretary’s recommendations “for political reasons.”85

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Hence, NSC-48/2 incorporated the conclusions reached at the 50th meeting and confirmed America’s policies of promoting Chinese Titoism and defending Taiwan through diplomatic and economic mechanisms. On December 30, 1949, President Truman approved the paper.86 Rethinking Taiwan: From January 1950 to the Eve of the Korean War

NSC-48/2 essentially formed the rudimentary concept of America’s strategic ambiguity policy. In a memorandum to Dean Rusk, Merchant, now promoted to deputy assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, insightfully described the notion of strategic ambiguity: The injunction under which we operate, to deny Formosa to the Communists and to continue recognition to the Nationalists, obviously requires that we give the Nationalists diplomatic support in the UN and elsewhere; that we provide economic aid to Formosa; and that in other ways, such as permitting them to buy weapons and munitions, we support them in their war against the mainland with the blockade and bombs. On the other hand, the secretary has set our basic policy to be the avoidance of actions which will deflect on ourselves the righteous wrath of the Chinese people which if un-obscured so surely will be concentrated on the Russians.87

He also pointed out the delicacy of keeping this balance in check. “It is out of the question that we should pursue one or the other policy to its logical extremity,” Merchant wrote, “since in the first case this would lead us to de-recognizing the Nationalists, writing Formosa off and at the earliest possible moment recognizing Beijing; whereas the logical extremity of the other would be to reverse ourselves and give all-out military support to the Nationalists regardless of the risk of direct involvement.” However, the general reaction, particularly from the congressional China bloc, toward NSC-48/2 was that Formosa was betrayed. On January 3, 1950, Senator William Knowland (R-CA) telephoned Undersecretary of State James Webb and stated, in an unfriendly tone: “There was a UP dispatch out of Tokyo today to the effect that on…December 23 there was circulated to the various military, naval, and other attaches in the Far Eastern area a memorandum of some kind from the State Department in which it was indicated that in the department’s judgment Formosa was going to fall to the Communists and that the people should be given the definite impression that Formosa

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was not necessary to the strategic defense of this country.”88 Webb tried to pacify the angry senator by promising that the memo was merely issued for the purpose of giving U.S. Foreign Service personnel certain basic information for use in the event of British recognition of Communist China. He further added that “it was a classified document and…[the State] had later instructed our people not to use the material until further notice.” Knowland, nicknamed “senator from Formosa,” contended that he, as a member of the Senate’s Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, wanted a copy of the memo. In fact, this memo, titled “Department of State Special Guidance #28: Policy Information on Formosa,” aimed to remind the FSOs not to suggest any American interests on the island, for fear of antagonizing the Chinese Communists. More importantly, it set out to prepare U.S. representatives abroad for the possible loss of Taiwan if the Nationalist regime proved to be intransigent to reforms.89 Nonetheless, the heated reaction from Capitol Hill signaled that the Truman administration was on the defensive in the face of a domestic political storm. Truman and Acheson under Fire for Formosa

On January 4, Dean Acheson met with Congressman John Kee (D-WV), the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. At Kee’s apartment, the secretary spent about 15 minutes discussing the Formosa problem. He first traced the history of Taiwan, saying that “with the exception of Japanese control for 50 years, the island had always belonged to China.” The Cairo Conference and the Potsdam Declaration both agreed to give Formosa to Nationalist China. He also stressed that “it was absolutely essential in our international dealings that our word be respected and that we not lay ourselves open for damaging Russian charges that would surely result if we were to make any overt military action to protect Formosa.” Kee agreed and said that Taiwan was “well equipped with arms, armaments, and implements of war and that as far as their military potentialities are concerned, there is no possible way that the CCP could achieve a military conquest by invasion as they do not have landing barges and necessary military equipment to bring a successful incursion.”90 Hence, the congressman promised to support the administration’s policy and agreed to call his committee into session to hear about these arguments. In addition, at another closed door meeting, Senator Tom Connally (D-TX), chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, also pledged his endorsement of NSC-48/2. Despite

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supports from the Democratic leadership in Congress, Truman believed that the Republican minority in both houses could not be pacified easily, as Formosa would be turned into a partisan issue, with rumors and political smearing campaigns ensuing. The president’s fears were well justified. Indeed, years later at the Princeton seminar in July 1953, Dean Acheson recalled: Now that [NSC-48/2] was decided on Friday, December 30, 1949. Then, move into a very active period. The papers become full of rumors of all sorts. There is a rumor on the 29th that the United States is studying military moves to hold Formosa and that the Fleet was being reinforced.… January 1 was on a Sunday, January 2 was a holiday and it is resumed on January 3. On the 2nd of January, Mr. [Robert] Taft and Mr. [Herbert] Hoover put out statements urging United States aid to Formosa by force if necessary. That made quite a sensation.… Speculations whether Formosa can or cannot be held.… Editorials on Hoover and Taft getting into the row. Demand for United States aid to Formosa stirs fight in Congress...this is on January 4. 91

Truman felt that that “whole matter was getting out of hand that all sorts of things were being leaked from within the administration [possibly from Secretary Johnson].” The president told Acheson, on the late afternoon of January 4, that he had approved NSC-48/2 last December and that he must “come out very clearly and firmly and put his foot down and say this is the end of the thing, and this is what we are going to do, and there isn’t going to be any more argument about it as to what we do...”92 They, together, drew up a statement on Formosa, which Truman would deliver the next day, January 5: The United States has always stood for good faith in international relations. Traditional United States policy toward China, as exemplified in the Open Door policy, called for international respect for the territorial integrity of China. This principle was recently reaffirmed in the UN General Assembly resolution of December 3, 1949, which, in part, calls on all states to refrain from (1) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign controlled regimes within the territory of China; (2) seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China. A specific application of the foregoing principles is seen in the present situation with respect to Formosa. In the Joint Declaration at Cairo on December 1, 1943, the president of the United States, the British prime minister, and the president of China stated that it was their purpose that territories Japan had stolen from China, such as Formosa, should be restored to the Republic of China. The United States was a signatory to the Potsdam

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Declaration of July 26, 1945, which declared that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. The provisions of this declaration were accepted by Japan at the time of its surrender. In keeping with these declarations, Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and for the past four years the United States and the other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the island. The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa. [Note: added phrase after the urging of JCS chairman Bradley: The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time] Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation [Note: deleted phrase after the urging of the JCS chairman and the defense secretary: or to detach Formosa from China]. The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese Forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the island. The U.S. government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program of economic assistance.93

The president’s statement underscored three crucial points. First, Truman reiterated the Wilsonian Open Door tradition with respect to China, that the United States and other nations should respect the mainland’s territorial integrity and political independence. These had been the bedrock foundations for the administration’s China policy since the end of World War II. Secondly, as Truman stressed on December 22, 1949, while Formosa was returned to “China” after 1945, the interpretation of China from the U.S. diplomatic lexicon was the “Republic of China,” founded in 1912 and recognized by the United States in May 1913. Consequently, the island, if anything, was returned to “Nationalist” China, not Communist China. Such an understanding helped to justify America’s continued assistance to Taiwan or Nationalist China, without appearing to separate the island from “China.” Finally, Truman’s speech clearly stated America’s strategic ambiguity policy. On the one hand, while acknowledging Taiwan as part of “China” and pledging that America would not furnish military assistance to the island, the president maintained that the KMT regime had adequate military and economic resources to defend the island and that Taipei could purchase whatever defense items from the United

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States as it saw fit to strengthen the security of Formosa. In addition, his administration would continue to aid Taiwan under the existing ECA legislation. More importantly, the wording modifications in the statement revealed that America, to meet future contingencies, would not preclude the option of using military intervention to prevent the fall of Taiwan.94 The reading of the statement, therefore, sounds like a precursor of today’s “one-China” policy and the Taiwan Relations Act. Right after the release of his statement, Truman, for caution’s sake, requested Acheson to make supplementary remarks about the “background of the statement which [he] made this morning on the subject of Formosa.” So, in the afternoon of January 5, the secretary held a press conference. “For the past week or ten days,” he said, “this subject of Formosa has become one of the foremost subjects of discussion throughout the country.”95 He explained that “we have stirred up a good deal of speculation, all of which, if allowed to continue, would be highly prejudicial to the interests of the United States of America. And, therefore, it was the president’s desire to clarify the situation. The president was not primarily concerned in stating anything new and you will find very little which is new in the statement.” Like Truman, Acheson went over the Open Door tradition, asserting that the United States would faithfully adhere to that policy. Furthermore, the secretary pointed out that the Truman administration would not contradict the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation which returned Formosa to the Nationalist Chinese administration. “The Chinese” Acheson said, “have administered Formosa for four years. Neither the United States nor any other Ally ever questioned that authority and that occupation.… That was regarded as in accordance with the commitments.” The secretary wanted to make clear that the Truman administration had no intention to stir up a separatist Taiwan from China, even though “China” here clearly meant “Nationalist China.” Hence, he posited that “whatever may be the legal situation, the United States of America, Mr. Truman said this morning, is not going to quibble on any lawyers’ words about the integrity of its position. That is where we stand.” Acheson affirmed that the decision not to intervene militarily in Taiwan was nothing new, for the president had always believed that the Nationalists could adequately defend the island on their own, and “the trouble lies elsewhere, and it is not the function of the United States nor will it or can it attempt to furnish a will to resist and a purpose for resistance to those who must provide for themselves.” Finally, regarding the addition of the phrase “at this time,” Acheson sought to dispel the notion that America was harboring a plan to detach

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Taiwan from China. “That phrase,” he stressed, “does not qualify or modify or weaken the fundamental policies stated in this declaration by the president in any respect. It is a recognition of the fact that in the unlikely and unhappy event that our forces might be attacked in the Far East the United States must be completely free to take whatever action in whatever area is necessary for its own security.” As expected, the State Department welcomed Truman-Acheson’s Formosa statements. Dean Rusk, though a supporter of Taiwan, commented that “the United States gains in two ways by abstaining from [military] intervention. In the first place…Chinese nationalism and Soviet imperialism may conceivably come into a head-on clash with each other. In the second place, the U.S. and China have a long history of friendly relations. If the U.S. should take over Formosa this action would consolidate whatever anti-American opinion among the Chinese already regards the U.S. as imperialistic.”96 Nonetheless, the statements actually sparked more intensive debates and opposition. For instance, Senators Knowland and Smith, in a meeting with Secretary Acheson, protested vehemently against Truman’s January 5th statement and regarded the administration’s China-Formosa policy fatal, one that “we would live to rue and regret.”97 Senator Robert Taft probably took it to the extreme as he lambasted that there were Communist agents infiltrating the State Department. 98 The critics’ attacks got more bitter when Acheson, on January 12, made a speech at the National Press Club. Though he reasserted that U.S. foreign policy must not deflect Chinese and Asian nationalist anger from “Russian imperialism to [us],” the secretary’s socalled “defense perimeter” concept inflamed the Republicans.99 They charged that Acheson singled out Formosa and Korea from the defense perimeter and were essentially asking those areas to fall by themselves. Later, reflecting upon the whole drama of his Press Club speech, Acheson believed his words were being twisted and misconstrued: The thing that came of this [speech] had two main ideas, I think, that got kicked around a good deal, was one of the so-called “defense perimeter,” which was attacked as being a very bad thing indeed because by not mentioning Formosa and Korea, I was supposed to have said that if you attack those countries it’s all right. Maybe that was a bad presentation, I don’t know, but what I was talking about was something wholly different and I thought the speech made it quite clear, because I went on to speak about countries and areas other than the one I was talking about. What I was attempting to do was to say, “Here are areas where the United States has defense works and troops in the Far East, and this is the line we can hold and will hold, and

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cannot be pushed out of, and it’s very strong and it’s all right.” I then went on to say that other areas [Korea, Formosa] were attacked—there was the UN and there was collective security, etc. Now maybe that was the wrong way to do it. I think that a good deal of the criticism was partisan rather than analytical.100

Whether the attacks against Acheson were motivated by parochial partisan interests is beyond the scope of this book. It is, nonetheless, true that beginning in the spring of 1950, the congressional China bloc and China Lobby waged their campaign against the State Department, accusing it for losing China to the Communists. This Red-scare hysteria reached its apex when Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI), on February 9, 1950, delivered a speech at Wheeling, West Virginia, claiming to possess a list of 205 Communists in the State Department, which included “China hand” notables like John Carter Vincent, John P. Davies, John S. Service, and even implicating former Secretary of State George Marshall for allowing them to serve in the State Department despite his knowledge that they were sympathetic to the Communists.101 Truman, as discussed in Chapter 3, firmly believed that, as the nation’s chief executive on foreign policy, he would not capitulate to domestic politics. In spite of these “non-sensible” charges, he stood behind his China-Formosa policy, writing, in a letter to his friend, that “it is the only procedure that could be followed under the circumstances.”102 Truman also rendered unwavering support to Acheson, as he complained to Senator Styles Bridges about the China bloc’s “dangerous” move to upset the nation’s Cold War security policy.103 Clearly, the president believed that on foreign policy a bipartisan united front should be the right thing to do, calling the Republicans “animals on the run” and McCarthy a “pathological liar.”104 However, Truman and Acheson well understood that the Republicans’ “uprising” must be placated. Hence, Truman turned to his old-time friend, also the leader of congressional bipartisanship, Senator Arthur Vandenberg. “I have been very much disturbed about the situation,” said Truman in a letter to the ailing senator, “as it has been developing in the Congress with regard to the whole bipartisan foreign policy.… The approach of several senators to the foreign policy program, in an effort to find an issue for the coming campaign this fall, is unfortunate.” Though a Republican, Vandenberg had always demonstrated willingness to compromise and masterfully led his Senate and House colleagues to rally behind Truman’s foreign policy. The senator replied that “we cannot fundamentally ‘divide at home’ in respect to foreign policy and expect to have much effective authority abroad.” Therefore, he advised

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Truman to bring John Foster Dulles, a prominent Republican foreign policy expert, into the State Department.105 John Foster Dulles Joins the Truman Administration

President Truman took Vandenberg’s advice seriously. In a telephone conversation with Secretary Acheson on April 4, 1950, the president said that “it would be useful if we could work out something in the line of consultant to the secretary of state on bipartisan foreign policy.” Acheson agreed, adding that Dulles would be very “helpful.”106 Dulles, therefore, was formally appointed on April 6, 1950, to the State Department as consultant to the secretary of state. The State Department’s press release said that his duty “would not be confined to any specific area of the world,” as his “broad background and wealth of experience qualify him for consideration of problems in Europe, the Far East, and other areas of the world, as well as problems affecting the work of the United Nations.”107 Indeed, John Foster Dulles was no stranger to the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Born in Washington D.C. on February 25, 1888, Dulles was the grandson of John Watson Foster, secretary of state for President Benjamin Harrison. His uncle was Robert Lansing, secretary of state under Woodrow Wilson. At the age of only 19, young Dulles had traveled with his grandfather to the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 and been appointed as secretary to the American delegation in the conference. After serving in the army, with the rank of captain and later as major, in the First World War, Dulles, in 1918, became the assistant to the chairman of the War Trade Board, then adviser to President Wilson in the Paris Peace Conference.108 Educated at Princeton, where he got his Bachelor of Arts, and at George Washington University, where he obtained his law degree, Dulles made his career in international law and public affairs. As senior partner at the prominent New York law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, Dulles, who had the ambition of becoming a secretary of state, focused exclusively on legal matters involving international relations. During the 1920s and 30s, he traveled extensively, negotiating and bargaining with foreign governments over various international laws and legal treaties. Dulles’ background, experience, and expertise made him a popular acquaintance to both the Democratic and Republican Parties. During World War II, he was frequently invited to luncheon and dinner gatherings with political notables. It was in those social meetings where Dulles met Thomas Dewey, and their friendship eventually convinced Dewey to place Dulles as his “secretary of state-to be” if he were elected

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president in 1948.109 In 1945, despite Republicans’ skepticism about the formation of the United Nations, Dulles happily accepted the Truman administration’s invitation to serve as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the San Francisco Conference on World Organization which drafted the charter of the UN. Since then, he had represented the United States at most of the regular sessions of the UN General Assembly. In addition, in 1945, 1947, and 1949, Dulles had frequently attended meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, serving as adviser to Secretaries James Byrnes, George Marshall, and Dean Acheson, respectively. Consequently, he provided an important bridge of bipartisan foreign policy between the Truman administration and the Republican opposition. There are two things about John Foster Dulles that are pertinent to our study here: (1) his Wilsonian internationalist heritage; and (2) his profound interests in Far Eastern/Chinese affairs. In an article commemorating Woodrow Wilson, in February 1949, Dulles remarked: I knew Mr. Wilson well. He was my professor and my college president when I was a student at Princeton.… I was closely associated with him at Washington, during the First World War, when I was with the War Trade Board, helping to carry on our economic warfare. His Great War addresses fired us with inspiration and with the spirit of crusade. I shared with him the jubilation of Armistice Day and I went on to work with him throughout the Paris Peace Conference where, in failing health, he struggled to make the Treaty of Versailles, such that it would, in the words of its preamble establish a “firm, just, and durable peace.” Throughout these years, my admiration for President Wilson was great, and, since then, as I have recalled what he did and said, my admiration has constantly grown. Today, as we face problems [the Cold War] similar to those that Wilson faced, we can wisely turn back to him for advice and counsel.110

Essentially, unlike most Republicans in the early half of the twentieth century, Dulles strongly shared the Wilsonian vision for a liberal international order promoting collective security and democratic peace among nations. “The United States has now joined the United Nations, which is the present-day counterpart of Wilson’s League of Nations.… The Charter of the UN may, in some respects, be an improvement over the Covenant of the League. But the differences are not great.… There was just as much reason for the U.S. not to join the UN as there was reason for our not joining the League of Nations. Yet, by 1945, our people had learned, through the evil deeds of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese warlords, that Woodrow Wilson was right

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when he preached the folly of attempting to be isolationist in a world that had become interdependent. We took Wilson’s advice after we had paid the penalty for not taking that advice when first it was given.… Wilson was 25 years ahead of his time, but it cannot be said that he failed.” The UN, while an indispensable step toward peace, does not in itself guarantee peace. Dulles reminded people that “free, liberal political institutions” must be planted in every nation, as Wilson had envisaged. “So long as the United Nations is founded on a membership that includes powerful states that do not have the political liberty of which Woodrow Wilson spoke,” Dulles asserted, “peace is still in jeopardy…for it is impossible to combine, in one order, the idea that the state is the servant of the people and the idea that the state is the master of the people.” The great international task is thus to bring it about that more and more nations have free political institutions. Then, and only then, will there be a foundation upon which can be built an adequate organization for lasting peace. For other nations to adapt to the liberal democratic model, Dulles agreed with Wilson that the “spread of political institutions of liberty depended most of all upon our own conduct, for we had the greatest opportunity. Those today who fear the Communist menace as it penetrates their body politic and threatens it with terrorism, sabotage and violence, should realize that they, each and every one of them, can play a part to combat that menace. The way to combat it is not by rushing to support whatever Communism attacks, be it good or bad. It is not by assuming the inevitability of war and concentrating on military defense. It is not by engaging in denunciation. The only permanent defense against the threat of Communist revolutionary tactics, however, is a “moral counteroffensive of the kind that Woodrow Wilson prescribed.” Dulles, therefore, exhorted, “Our major job is to make our society such that no people will want to pull it down, such that people everywhere will want to copy it; and such that people elsewhere will be unhappy until their rulers give them political liberty.”111 Indeed, like Wilson, Dulles believed that America’s foreign policy was predicated upon a sense of “fundamentals of faith” to promote freedom and liberty to all nations abroad. He once contended: “Our founders believed that there was a moral law which gave reality to such concepts as justice and righteousness.… They believed that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights and consequently that government ought to be a means of releasing, not repressing, the individual personality. They believed that men had not only rights, but also duties, to God and to each other. They felt a sense

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of mission in the world. The ‘great American experiment’ was not a selfish venture. It was the design of men and women who conceived that their conduct here could be an example which would set in motion great forces everywhere.”112 While the United States possessed strong material powers—military and economic—Dulles felt those were not sufficient enough to deter and defeat Communist expansion and aggression. To win the Cold War, he thought the United States must act upon its idealism and formulate foreign policy based on its liberal and moral traditions. “Through such invigoration of our historic policies,” he said, “we can readily assume a leadership which will make us safe. We have the ideals, we have the “know-how,” and we have the power. We should put all three to work in harness.… During the First World War, President Wilson proclaimed, as Fourteen Points, great goals of victory. They reflected the finest American tradition. They rallied the wavering forces of democracy and men went on to die that those ideals might live.”113 During the 1940s, Dulles propounded his own prescriptions or “pillars” for peace. To expose the hypocrisy of Soviet Communism, America and other free nations must cooperate wholeheartedly in the United Nations, to achieve, in practice, the establishment of political and economic Open Door, and to proclaim the subjected people’s right to self-determination. He argued: There is ferment among many peoples who are now subject to alien rule. That will make durable peace unattainable unless such peoples are satisfied that they can achieve self-rule without passive or active resistance to the now constituted authorities. We realize that autonomy, in certain cases, is not now desired, and in other cases, is presently impractical. But, judgments as to this tend to be warped, and certainly are suspect, when made by the governing power itself. There must be international agencies, which embrace persons free from the self-interest which comes from identification with the particular governing power, and which are charged with the duty to see that pledges of ultimate authority are honored and that, in the meanwhile, there is no exploitation for alien ends.114

By rendering compassion and sympathy to the subjected peoples, America not only would live up to its liberal and spiritual heritage, but would also win over the hearts and minds of those who were most vulnerable to Communist ideological indoctrination and political infiltration. Hence, America’s best defense against Soviet “encirclement” is through its “moral offensive” and the exemplification of the “Great

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American experiment.” Then, he stated, we can be confident that the “over-extended, internally rotten structure of Soviet Communist despotism will gradually fall into a State of collapse.”115 Dulles compiled his thoughts into a book, War or Peace, published in the spring of 1950. After reading it, President Truman wrote him: “I can’t tell you how much I appreciated…your book War or Peace.… I feel that those who have had an active hand in the inauguration of [those policies] do understand that it is the policy of the [this] administration.”116 Dulles and China-Formosa

As discussed, because of his grandfather, Dulles had an early encounter with diplomatic affairs. And, one of those ventures was China. After retiring from public service, John Foster took the young Dulles with him to China, accepting an invitation to become policy consultant for Li Hongzhang, the foreign minister of the Manchu (Qing) Dynasty. In the wake of the Qing Dynasty’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 189495, Foster mediated the negotiation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded Formosa, along with other Chinese territories, to Japan.117 Deeply engaged in the negotiation process, Dulles developed a great sympathy for the falling China. In 1951, talking about Sino-American friendship and the Open Door policy, he said: One of my most prized possessions is a letter I received when 8 years old from Li Hongzhang, then the great Chinese elder statesman. The opening sentence of the letter reads: ‘To the little grandchild of General Foster, my friend and counselor in my hours of perplexity and trouble.’ That letter is to me symbolic of what have been, and always should be, the relations between our peoples. It breathes the spirit of fraternal friendship between their old, and our young, society. It reflects the kindly good humor and respect for home and family ties which make it easy for Americans to understand and to love the Chinese character. It confesses the troubles and perplexities which inevitably confront an ancient civilization when it is pressed upon by the thrusts of a restless new outer world. It testifies to the value to be found in counsel which is understanding and loyal. 118

Similar to Wilson, Roosevelt, and Truman, Dulles hoped the Nationalist government could construct a liberal, independent, and democratic China. In fact, his contact with Chiang Kai-shek began as early as March 1938, when he made a three-day trip to Hankou, China’s

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temporary wartime capital, to survey the Chinese economic conditions for his New York financiers and clients. The New York Times, reporting Dulles’ trip, recorded him as saying that he “always had a profound interest in Oriental affairs which he was now gratifying by a Far Eastern visit.” He was impressed by Chiang Kai-shek’s determined will and Madame Chiang’s Westernized outlook. Dulles, in his diary, described the generalissimo as “smallish, trim, [and] alert, with sparking eyes as his most distinguishing feature.” On the other hand, Madame Chiang “was charming, speaking English of remarkable purity. She interprets for the generalissimo, who speaks no foreign language except a little Japanese learned when he was a refugee in Japan.” “Chiang’s questions are direct and pertinent,” wrote Dulles, “and I have the impression of a character which is strong in itself, quite apart from the help afforded by the perhaps more fluent mind of his wife.” Thus, on the afternoon of March 7, the three of them had a long conversation over the situations in the Far East and Japanese invasion of China.119 Consequently, Dulles expressed unequivocal support for the Nationalists. From a moralistic perspective, he saw the Chiangs as “Christian warriors” firmly resisting Japanese and Communist aggressions to defend China’s independence, territorial integrity, and its incipient democracy. In the midst of the Chinese civil war, Dulles protested against Moscow’s intervention on the side of Mao’s CCP. “In China,” he wrote, “Communist armies, with Soviet sympathy, seek to supplant the Nationalist government. That comes up against the [Open Door] policy.” Despite George Marshall’s failure to mediate peace in 1946, Dulles urged the Truman administration to “continue to safeguard the integrity of China, [and] that calls for support of the National government.” He noted that “as General Marshall has said, we ought to encourage its more liberal elements. But, we cannot abandon the [Nationalist] government without abandoning that for which we fought the Pacific war.”120 Nonetheless, Dulles’ moral sentiments did not cloud his political pragmatism. The corrupt and inept nature of the Nationalists was obvious to all, and by 1949, Dulles agreed with the Truman administration’s assessment that the KMT’s collapse was inevitable. What concerned Dulles, however, was the welfare and future of the millions of Chinese masses. Notwithstanding his Republican identity, Dulles did not join the congressional attack campaign against the administration’s China policy. When interviewed in the Columbia Broadcasting Station, Dulles disagreed that the State Department was accountable for the “loss” of China. “Well, Mr. Dulles,” inquired the

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newsroom reporter, “do you go along with the viewpoint of such men as Senators Bridges and Knowland of your party and others in holding the State Department responsible for this Communist conquest in China?” Dulles replied: “Well, I think it’s over-doing the thing a bit to say that the State Department is in any sense wholly responsible for what’s happened in China. I don’t think the State Department is quite that potent. Undoubtedly…the conditions in China themselves are far more responsible for what has happened than what anybody has done or failed to do in the State Department.”121 Therefore, Dulles supported the State Department’s initiatives to release the China White Paper and to pursue a Chinese Titoist policy.122 Yet, dismissing the Chinese Communist Revolution as only a short-term phenomenon, he opposed recognizing the CCP regime: I believe that a Chinese Communist government will probably collapse in the face of a strong resistance such as I hope could be built up in the areas around China. If you can once pin Communism down to a limited area and force it to deal constructively with such problems as exist in China then Communism will be a public failure and a scandal and it will be repudiated by the Chinese themselves. The important thing is to pin it down, allow it up sufficiently so it will have to deal with the problems and show that its promises are fakes.… Communism in the face of such problems contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. And…I do not see why we should recognize and in that way give moral support to a regime which I think is doomed to failure.123

While Dulles endorsed Wilson’s Open Door policy in China, he also thought about Taiwan. When the Truman administration was engaging in heated debate on China-Formosa policy in December 1949, Dulles met with Acheson and posited that “we should somehow take over Formosa and make a ‘show piece’ of it but it must be done with three things in mind: (1) we must not fight Chiang; (2) we must not be there as Chiang’s guest; and (3) Formosa has no strategic importance.” The secretary promised that he would think over these suggestions.124 Dulles believed that the United States had a sense of moral obligation for the inhabitants on the island and must not abandon it to either the ineffective Nationalist regime or the harmful Communist administration. Strategic importance or material incentives, he stressed, could not be the only consideration for U.S. foreign policy. Disagreeing with the administration’s sole reliance upon diplomatic and economic means to defend Formosa, Dulles said:

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On December 1, there was a highly responsible report from Washington that read: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that Formosa is not of vital strategic importance to the United States, and the State Department consequently is prepared to see the island lost to the Chinese Communists, it was learned today.… That of course, was not official, and I hope it never will become official. The fact, however, that such a report has responsible sponsorship and has gained wide credence indicates how general is the feeling that strategic factors mark the limit of our official concern.… If we believe, as we used to believe, that human liberty everywhere is our concern and our defense; if we take seriously our UN pledge to seek universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, then we need to make that clear. The psychological effect of that would be instantaneous and powerful. In Europe and in Asia millions of subject people would be heartened and the internal difficulties of their despotic and alien rulers would be vastly increased.125

In reaction to Truman-Acheson’s January 5th statements, Dulles remarked in a personal letter to Arthur Vandenberg that “events have moved so rapidly with the president’s and Acheson’s statement about Formosa that it seems to me that there is not left any chance for constructive action, and it is a case where we must cry over spilled milk.” Dulles told the senator that he was in the process of preparing a memorandum on the possibilities of “taking Formosa to the United Nations Assembly on the theory that Formosa was a non-self-governing territory and that the best solution might be an interim period at least of trusteeship under Article 77, providing for trusteeship of ‘territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War,’ and on the theory that the Charter obligation to treat the welfare of the inhabitants as paramount cut across any Cairo Declaration.” He reasoned that the present situation was unforeseen at Cairo and Potsdam, and, therefore, it seemed unfair that the native Formosans must be subjected to the cruel fate of China’s civil war. “It seems to me that that the tragedy of Formosa is the Formosans,” Dulles contended. “There is a normal population of about 6 million, probably now swelled to around 7 million.… They have a distinctive economic, social, and cultural life and for about two generations (55 years) have had no political ties with China. From the standpoint of economic development, literacy, etc., they are much in advance of most of China.… I would think that we ought to have had some respect for the 6 or 7 million people in Formosa who, ever since Cairo, have been dealt with from the standpoint of the strategy and prestige of great powers without regard to their own welfare or desires.” Dulles felt that it wasn’t merely a

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“lawyer’s quibble to say that unless there is either [a peace] treaty action or UN action, the change is not finalized. Certainly, I would think it right to keep that chance alive when it is the only chance of saving 6 or 7 million innocent people from a very cruel fate.”126 Indeed, beginning in January 1950, Dulles sought to convince the Truman administration to take a more assertive stance on Formosa, justifying his proposition on both moralistic and legal grounds. He wrote: “As regards recognition of the Communist regime in China, I agree with Secretary Acheson that it is premature to consider this now. As regards Formosa, I agree with President Truman that we should refrain from action that would involve us in fighting in the Chinese civil war or imply that we have predatory designs on Formosa. However, I suggest supplementing these negative conclusions with positive programs.” He then elaborated upon his thoughts: In China, I would give moral and, where feasible, economic support to those Chinese who are naturally disposed to resist Red rule. The 400 million Chinese have not been unified for many years and the Communist regime will find it very difficult to establish its uncontested rule unless we help that by seeming, ourselves, to accept that result. I believe that United States foreign policy should be dedicated to the goal of human freedom everywhere, in accordance with our great American tradition and that we should not encourage submission to despotism by ourselves seeming to accept despotism as a tolerable and permanent condition for much of the human race. If we espouse the cause of human liberty with the zeal that has been our custom and with zeal comparable to Communist zeal for their proletariat dictatorship, then I believe that recognition of the Red regime in China will continue, for an indefinite time, to be ‘premature’.… As regards Formosa, I would seek the welfare of the inhabitants. There are about 7 million people. They have long had a distinctive economic and cultural life…[The Formosans] are what the United Nations Charter defines as ‘inhabitants of non-self governing territories’ and by that charter, all of the members of the UN, are bound to treat their welfare as paramount. The great powers should stop looking up on Formosa merely from the standpoint of the prestige and strategic concern of great powers and the United Nations should try to save the Formosans from the cruel fate that awaits them if Formosa is made the final battleground between Chinese Communists and non-Communists. I do not believe that any declarations of intention at Cairo or Potsdam seal the fate of these un-consulted people, since there still is a Japanese Peace Treaty and the United Nations has not yet acted. Already the United Nations has considered the problems of other non-self-governing areas detached from exenemy states; for example, Korea, the Japanese Mandated Islands and

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Italy’s former African colonies. The United Nations has, in these cases, acted in the interest of the non-self governing inhabitants by providing trusteeship or assisting the establishment of selfgovernment. It is not too late to seek to neutralize Formosa in the present struggle and to seek for Formosans a future that will be a good influence throughout Asia.127

Accordingly, Dulles disagreed with the Truman administration’s depiction that Formosa, in pursuance of the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, was returned to Nationalist China. Rather, he wanted to disentangle the fate of the native Taiwanese from both Nationalist and Communist Chinas. Certainly, the idea that Formosa’s status remained inconclusive pending a peace treaty with Japan was not new, as Kennan and Merchant had frequently brought it up in their policy papers and memos. However, taking pride in his profound knowledge in international law, Dulles put forward an authoritative and formal legal argument that caught the attention of the Truman administration. While recognizing the obligations incurred under Cairo and Potsdam, he stated that “[after 1945], all the parties to the Cairo and Potsdam decisions became members of the United Nations and signed and ratified the charter. Article 73 of that charter provides that members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of selfgovernment recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants in accordance with the principles laid down in that article.”128 As a result, the United States, which was in the process of negotiating a Japanese Peace Treaty that might provide the juridical basis for a future nonJapanese administration of Formosa, had a “responsibility which it desires to discharge in accordance with the principles of the [UN] Charter.” Essentially, Dulles posited that Article 103 of the UN Charter stipulates that the “provisions of the charter shall prevail over any inconsistent prior obligations [i.e. Cairo and Postdam agreements].” Article 73 further requires, among other things, that any disposition of non-self-governing people should: (1) take account of the political aspirations of the people; (2) promote their economic advancement; and (3) further international peace and security. Moreover, even though it could be assumed, in 1943, that the Formosans would welcome political integration with post-war China, subsequent political developments had been different from what was

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anticipated in 1943 or 1945. These changes included the KMT’s misrule on Taiwan, China’s civil war, and the collapse of the Nationalist government in China. “It is possible,” Dulles wrote, “that those same changes have altered the wishes of the inhabitants of Formosa so that a course which might subject them to the rule of a Communist type ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ would not respond to ‘the political aspirations of the people.’”129 He contended that the United States should not repudiate the Cairo and Potsdam decisions but should consider their binding characters obsolete. “In this connection, it would be appropriate for the [General] Assembly to establish a commission to ascertain whether, and if so how, the purpose of the Cairo Declaration could be carried out consistently with Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.” In addition to legal corroboration, Dulles also stressed the plights and misfortunes of the Formosans. “Over the past century,” he noted, “there have been repeated manifestations of the aspirations of the Formosan people for self-government. These have been repressed only after bloody struggles.” The United States should prevent Formosa from becoming “a pawn of great power politics in the Pacific and Asia.” Now, the Formosans might even be “involved in a [civil] war in which they had no concern and where they would be innocent victims.” Therefore, in view of the UN Charter requirement the non-selfgoverning territories should be governed “to further international peace and security.” Consideration must be given as to the possibility of an “effective neutralization” of Formosa under the auspices of the United Nations. It should also be noted that Formosa is eligible for the “international trusteeship system” under Article 77 which applies “to territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War.” If this view is adopted by the UN General Assembly, it would presumably require study by a commission and it might require immediate measures to maintain a peaceful “status quo.” These measures, then, would presumably involve a “call upon the Nationalist government, now in Formosa, and the Communist regime on the mainland, to refrain from the use of violence which would make Formosa and the Formosan people as a base or object of armed attack.”130 Dulles’ thesis gave the Truman administration another turning point to think about the proper course of action to implement in order to prevent the fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communists, which were, as estimated by the CIA, preparing their military offensive against the island in the latter half of 1950.

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Dulles-Rusk Plan: Strategic Ambiguity Established on the Eve of the Korean War

It could be argued that the Truman administration’s shift toward more positive actions with respect to Formosa in the spring of 1950 was due to Beijing’s hardening of its anti-West policy. In early January, the Chinese Communist military authorities in Beijing issued a proclamation announcing their intention to requisition the former military barracks areas of foreign governments by January 13. On January 7, 1950, the CCP addressed a communication to the U.S. consul general in Beijing, O. Edmund Clubb, directing him to turn over the American military barracks area in accordance with the proclamation. The State Department instructed Clubb on January 7 to send a communication to the Chinese Communist foreign minister, pointing out that the American government had “acquired the right to use for official purposes the land in question in accordance with the Protocol signed at Beijing on September 7, 1901, between China and 11 foreign powers and that this right was reaffirmed in the Sino-U.S. Treaty of 1943, under which the United States relinquished its extraterritorial rights in China.” When the CCP followed through with their order, Acheson ordered the closedown of all U.S. official establishments and withdrawal of all official personnel from Communist China.131 Furthermore, after three months of arduous negotiations in Moscow, Mao and Stalin finally signed, on February 14, 1950, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Mao’s intention was to “employ Soviet power to establish eventually an equal relationship between China and the West.”132 Washington might be convinced, by these gestures, of the irreconcilable and radical natures of the Communist regime, and, hence, of the need to provide greater assistance to Formosa. Indeed, while Beijing’s belligerency toward America had begun in November 1948, the Truman administration remained committed to its policies of promoting Chinese Titoism and rejected the use of military intervention in Formosa for fear of antagonizing Mainland Chinese. That was the case even after Mao formalized an alliance with the Soviet Union in February. However, the combination of Dulles’ propositions on Formosa and the CCP’s increasing hostility reignited the administration’s interests in defending the island. In fact, in less than a week after the CCP’s seizure of U.S. diplomatic compounds in Beijing, President Truman approved Acheson’s suggestion to support the extension of the ECA program to Formosa and the general area of China to June 30, 1951.133

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Throughout February, March, and April, the Far Eastern Division of the State Department was busily circulating memos and drafts on Formosa, analyzing and discussing various possible means to detach the island without endangering America’s Open Door policy in China. The options ranged from engineering a coup in Formosa to having the UN administer a plebiscite for the native Formosans to choose their own political futures. It is clear that John Foster Dulles’ ideas were incorporated in these policy documents.134 Supporting Dulles, Dean Rusk, who became the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs,135 wrote, in April 1950, that “the U.S. has the legal and moral right to act in Formosa since: (1) the cession by Japan has not occurred; (2) the situation has been radically changed since Cairo-Potsdam, notably by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 14, 1950 and conduct hereunder; (3) the interests of the inhabitants, which are paramount under the UN Charter, will not be served by not permitting them to be fought over.”136 Upon Dulles’ entering the State Department in April, it was apparent that the Truman administration would be supportive of his positive approach to Taiwan. Paul Nitze, the new director of the Policy Planning Staff, and Rusk told Acheson that they discussed with Dulles earlier his views on Formosa and suggested that those ideas “should be explored further.”137 On April 28, in a telephone conversation, Dulles told Truman that he “was glad to be working again in a bipartisan approach to foreign policy” and further asked that the president’s “complete confidence” in him would be most effective. Truman assured Dulles not to be concerned on this point, that he “would not have appointed him unless he had had great confidence in him.” Dulles then went on to say that “I felt that it was important that there should be some early affirmative action in the field of foreign affairs [Formosa] which would restore the confidence of the American people that the government had a capacity to deal with the Communist menace. My impression was that many Americans had lost confidence as a result of what had happened, particularly in the [Far] East.… If we could really get going, the American people would fall in behind that leadership and attacks like McCarthy’s would be forgotten. I said that I had various ideas which I was discussing with Secretary Acheson and that I hoped to be able to make some contribution along this line.” The president said he “quite agreed with [this] analysis and that in talking yesterday with Secretary Acheson he had expressed much the same point of view.”138 Meanwhile, there were credible intelligence reports and assessments describing the improving economic and social conditions on Formosa, as well as rising military morale and spirits among the Nationalist

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troops. Chiang Kai-shek, who resumed the presidency of the Republic of China on March 1, 1950, made great efforts to push for reforms.139 As a result of the promising news, Dulles was more determined that Formosa must be saved. To soothe the administration’s concern that taking active approaches on the island would compromise America’s Open Door policy, Dulles argued that: The National government can and does perform two important missions in the world’s struggle against Communism. In the first place, the National government can establish on Formosa a concrete example of a better way to economic improvement and national and individual freedom than through Communism. In Asia and the Far East, such a practical demonstration is much needed and cannot fail to have wide-spread effects. In the second place, the National government can foster and promote an effective resistance movement on the mainland, thus exercising an important deterrent influence on the southward expansion of Communism. The people on the mainland have been disillusioned about Communism. They are suffering from famine which is due partly to natural causes and partly to the export of food to the Soviet Union and to administrative stupidity on the part of the Communists. People of all classes, including the workers, have been bitterly disappointed by the Communist rule. The National government is in the best position to take such advantage.140

In other words, if Taiwan could be transformed into a base of prosperity and freedom, it could well set an illuminating example for the mainland. Such would enhance, rather than endangering, China’s Open Door. On May 18, Dulles produced a new memorandum for Rusk and Nitze, in which he wrote: The United States faces a new and critical period in its world position. The loss of China to Communists who, it now seems, will work in Asia as junior partners of Soviet Communism has had tremendous repercussions throughout the world. It has marked a shift in the balance of power in favor of Soviet Russia and to the disfavor of the United States.… Throughout the world, in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, governments and peoples are intently watching for the next move which will provide a measure of the extent of the power shift, so that they can orient their own policies accordingly. The barometer most closely watched is that which seems to measure the judgment of the United States itself as to its present power and position in the world. If our conduct indicates a continuing disposition to fall back and allow doubtful areas to fall under Soviet Communist control, then many nations will feel confirmed in the impression, already drawn from the North Atlantic Treaty, that we do not expect to stand firm short of the North Atlantic area…and the

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Americas covered traditionally by the Monroe Doctrine and now by the Rio Pact.… If our conduct seems to confirm that conclusion, then we can expect an accelerated deterioration of our influence in the Mediterranean, Near East, Asia, and the Pacific.… This series of disasters can probably be prevented if at some doubtful point we quickly take a dramatic and strong stand that shows our confidence and resolution.… Of the doubtful areas where such a stand might be taken, Formosa has advantages superior to any other. It is not subject to the immediate future of Soviet land power. It is close to our naval and air power. It is occupied by the remnants of the non-Communists who have traditionally been our friends and allies. Its status internationally is undetermined by any international act and we have at least some moral responsibility for the native inhabitants. It is gravely menaced by a joint Chinese-Russian expedition in formation. The eyes of the world are focused upon it. If the United States were [to] announce that it would neutralize Formosa, not permitting either to be taken by Communists or to be used as a base of military operations against the mainland, that is a decision which we could certainly maintain, short of open war by the Soviet Union.… If we do not act, it will be everywhere interpreted that we are making another retreat because we do not dare risk war.… If the rest of the world feels that we are today afraid to take a stand which would involve a possible risk of war then they would judge that almost certainly we will not take that risk tomorrow unless it is forced upon us by actual attack upon either the North Atlantic or American area.… Admittedly, a strong stand at Formosa would involve a slightly increased risk of war. But, sometimes such a risk has to be taken in order to preserve peace in the world and to keep the national prestige required if we are to play our indispensable part in sustaining a free world. Action to be effective must be prompt.141

For the remaining two weeks of May, Dean Rusk was working on a formal paper on Formosa, in which he relied extensively on Dulles’ May 18th propositions. On May 30, he arranged a small meeting on Taiwan with Nitze, Dulles, Jessup, Merchant, and Sprouse. The participants agreed that more active approaches should be implemented to safeguard the island. Yet, the best way to do this was not by supporting the Nationalists, given the regime’s prior “misgovernment” record, but to engineer a UN trusteeship over Formosa. In the meantime, the U.S. Seventh Fleet should be dispatched to the Taiwan Strait to neutralize the island from either KMT’s counteroffensive against the mainland or the CCP invasion of Taiwan.142 Later on the same day, Rusk submitted his paper, “U.S. Policy toward Formosa,” to Secretary Acheson, who would be meeting the assistant secretary the next day, on May 31.

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Initially, Dean Rusk, a staunch proponent of the Open Door policy,143 refrained from endorsing a more proactive approach toward Taiwan in 1949 even though he was sympathetic to the Formosans. Emboldened by Dulles’ anti-Communist stance, however, he became more forthright to advocate for a Taiwan regime “independent of mainland control, without the pretension to being the government of China.”144 Rusk also wished to foster an autonomous Taiwan as a “showcase of liberal democracy.”145 Therefore, the assistant secretary wrote that the “increasing difficulties encountered by the Communists and the dissatisfaction with Communist rule by increasing numbers of Chinese on the mainland offer at least the possibility of the emergence of opposition on the mainland which an anti-Communist pool of Chinese on Formosa might support.” An anti-Communist Taiwan may serve as a base for “covert and psychological operations against the mainland.… Defending Taiwan would keep alive as a rallying point any symbol for anti-Communist Chinese a non-Communist Chinese area which would give them hope for the future and could serve as a model in contrast to the situation on the mainland.”146 While applauding the Nationalists’ progress on the island since early 1950, he believed that this “improvement does not go very deep and that it is not permanent.” Certainly, the resort to either UN or U.S. military options would infuriate both the Communist and anti-Communist Chinese. Yet, in light of the growing aggressiveness of the Soviet Union and Communist China, especially after their signing of the Alliance Treaty in February 1950, Rusk contended that “it should be clear that the immediate U.S. objective with respect to Formosa is the denial of the island to the Chinese Communists and that the only means of ensuring the realization of that objective is through U.S. occupation or defense of the island.” Moreover, as Dulles had emphasized, from an international legal standpoint, Formosa, prior to a conclusive peace treaty with Japan, remains a “non-self-governing” territory, and, thus, America and other United Nations have certain moral obligations to the welfare of the native inhabitants. He advised that Washington could support a coup by General Sun Li-jen to take over the Nationalist administration147 or having Chiang Kai-shek petitioning the UN to discuss a trusteeship over the island. In the interim, “The U.S. Fleet [should] put itself in control of Formosan Waters. It is assumed that the Fleet would include carrierbased aircraft which might be needed in an emergency.”148 Rusk’s advocacy eventually earned him the “enmity of Chiang Kai-shek.”149 Unfortunately, there are no memos or records of the conversations between Rusk and Acheson on their May 31st meeting, although the secretary’s appointment file did indicate that the two had met at 430PM

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on that day.150 Nonetheless, on June 9, Rusk sent another memorandum on Formosa to Acheson, once again discussing America’s moral obligations, before reaching a settlement in the Japanese Peace Treaty, to “avoid the forcible seizure of Formosa and its Chinese and Formosan inhabitants by Communist forces.”151 Rusk raised the UN option as well as greater U.S. military and economic assistance to neutralize the island. He urged the secretary to “discuss the broad lines of action with the president and [to obtain his approval].”152 Conclusion

While Truman and Acheson were pondering over Dulles-Rusk’s proposition, taking considerations from the strategic, political, legal, and moralistic angles, on June 25, 1950, war on the Korean Peninsula abruptly broke out, as North Koreans, with the encouragement of Stalin, invaded South Korea. Immediately, President Truman issued a statement, saying “the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security.” In these circumstances, Truman said: The occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.153

Although we cannot be certain whether Truman and Acheson were reversing its non-interventionist policy on Taiwan,154 the president’s immediate response to the Korean War corresponded almost exactly with the plans drawn up by Dulles and Rusk that sought to neutralize Formosa backed up by the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The war might have been the final trigger point, as the moral and legal justifications of Dulles’ and Rusk’s May 18th, May 30th, and June 6th memoranda paved the way for the administration’s June 27th policy statement.

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Nonetheless, in light of the Open Door policy, Secretary Acheson, at Truman’s request, also reaffirmed that the U.S. had no predatory design on Formosa, that is, the current military action was to “meet the exigent military requirements of the situation which resulted from that military aggression against the government of Korea.” “With the disappearance of the threat to peace deriving from that aggression, or pertinent action by the UN, or a peace settlement with Japan,” the secretary announced, “the existing provisions respecting Formosa will, of course, be adjusted accordingly.”155 Indeed, John L. Gaddis commented that the Truman administration did not consider its action as renegading on the pledge of noninterference in China’s internal affairs. Neutralizing the Taiwan Strait was merely to forestall the seizure of Taiwan by hostile forces, and American officials “repeatedly emphasized the even-handedness of their action: the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet had been aimed as much at containing Chiang’s aspirations to return to the mainland as those of the Communists to seize Taiwan.”156 While America refrained from any explicit commitments to the island’s future status, it also did not repudiate China’s sovereign claim over Taiwan. The framework of strategic ambiguity was, accordingly, institutionalized in June 1950.157 Even the Korean War did not terminate America’s hope in promoting a Sino-Soviet split and China’s Open Door. As noted in Chapter 2, despite their deep-seated hostility, semi-official contacts persisted, though intermittently, between Washington and Beijing in the 1950s and 60s.

Notes 1 “Meeting in the President’s Office with Senators Wherry and Bridges on China,” April 28, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson’s Memorandum MarchMay1949/Box8/RG59/250/49/5/6-7, National Archives, College Park, MD. 2 “Personal Letter from Livingston Merchant to Walt Butterworth,” April 8, 1949, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 194550/Taiwan, Jan-March 1949/Box16/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 3 “Memorandum of Conversation: Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary (attended also by James Webb, Jessup, Rusk, Bohlen),” May 10, 1949, Summaries of the Secretary’s Daily Meetings, 19491952/Box1/RG59/250/46/3/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 4 “Memorandum by Livingston T. Merchant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (W. Walton Butterworth),” May 24, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 337-341. Beginning in November 1948, “rich refugees and units of the armed forces streamed into Formosa from the mainland. The total of such immigrants is variously estimated to run between 500 thousand and a million.

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The present troop strength is now estimated to exceed two hundred thousand. The economic impact of this migration has been tremendous.” Although it is the firm resolution of the Nationalist regime to defend the island against any Communist military assaults and to suppress any Communist internal activity, the passage of Taiwan to the Communists remains highly likely in the foreseeable future, as the Formosan economy, in the past six months, has “deteriorated seriously and rapidly primarily because the population has suddenly been increased by between 10 and 20 percent and the new arrivals have been economically non-productive.” Moreover, the Formosan population is “restless and deeply resentful of their Chinese rulers.” 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid, pp.340-341; It is important to note that while advocating for the suspension of ECA assistance to the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, Merchant, before returning to the United States, had worked out with ECA representatives “a tentative program for the best use of the $17 million of ECA funds allocated for use on Formosa, together with plans for activities of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) and for the use of fertilizer under the ECA program.” Thus, at the end of April, ECA fertilizer was arriving in Formosa according to schedule and that wheat and cotton of a total value of approximately $500,000 were in Formosa or en route, an amount sufficient to finance the local currency expenditures for the ECA office on Formosa, the engineering survey group and the current program of the JCRR for the next few months. This shows, once again, the Truman administration’s inherent concern to strengthen Taiwan’s economy and agricultural productions in order to prolong its defense against the Chinese Communists. Merchant was also supportive of this measure. See “Memo: Implementation of NSC 37/2 and NSC 37/5 Regarding United States Policy toward Formosa,” May 12, 1949, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 1945-50/Taiwan April-May 1949/Box 16/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 7 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, p. 174. 8 The first option would be an enhanced U.S. military and economic intervention, with the direct implication of establishing an effective U.S. administration on Taiwan. “Needless to say,” the report cautioned, “the [Chinese] Communists would aggressively and effectively fan this spontaneous combustion” to denigrate the United States. The second route—a “policy of calculated inaction”—rested on the provision of “modicum economic aid” and the primary reliance upon “the self-interest of the present Chinese governing group to safeguard our own strategic interests.” It has, however, the “dreadful characteristic of passivity in the face of an active threat.” The third option was placing Taiwan under a UN trusteeship. See “Memorandum for NSC: Formosa, from the Department of State,” May/June, 1949, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 1945-50/Taiwan, April-December 1949/Box 16/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 9 Ibid. 10 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950, p. 175. In a follow-up memorandum to Dean Rusk on June 9, 1949, Butterworth reported that “at a meeting on June 8…it was tentatively agreed that the most

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promising United Nations action which could be taken to deal with the urgent problem of Formosa was to request a special meeting of the General Assembly early this summer. The request would be accompanied by a full statement of the United States position, including an explanation of the basis for revoking, in part at least, the Cairo Declaration, and making plain that the United Nations’ action envisioned was to call for and supervise an election on the island in which the people of Formosa could vote on a return to the mainland or some alternative trusteeship arrangement pending their qualification for independence.” Butterworth said that “our position before the world would be morally unassailable.” Moreover this course would “avoid a long period of delay in which the Communists might be expected to step up their activity on the Island.” See “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Deputy Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk,” June 9, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 346-350. 11 According to David Finkelstein, several reasons were brought up by Rusk to justify his decision. First, it was suggested that the UN’s limited resources would make it virtually incumbent upon the United States to assume the bulk of responsibility to sustain and maintain the UN trusteeship over Taiwan. This would “place the U.S. in too high profile a role on the island and undermine other major policy goals [chief among which would be the promotion of Titoism in China].” Second, there would be required a public justification for reversing the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. Third, it must be recognized that many members of the UN were reluctant to have that organization “embroiled in issues related to the settlement of the Second World War.” Fourth, the Chinese Nationalist representatives in the UN might fight such a move, hence breaking up the long-time U.S.-KMT alliance. Fifth, unless Taiwan was actually attacked by the PLA, an appeal for UN intervention by Formosans would not be considered legitimate. Sixth, “even if the trusteeship council raised the issue of Taiwan in its upcoming meeting, it was believed that the most it could accomplish was to pass on responsibility to the General Assembly for major decisions. In as much as the GA was not to convene until the following autumn, it could be five or six months before any real action to save the island could be accomplished.” Finally, notwithstanding that a plebiscite would be held on Formosa, it could not be entirely ruled out that the natives would vote for a national unification with Communist China. See David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, pp. 176-177. 12 “Telegram, Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State (Acheson),” June 24, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 354; “Telegram, the Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Consul at Taipei (Edgar),” June 30, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 356. 13 “Memorandum of Conversation: Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary (attended also by Webb, Rusk, Bohlen, Kennan, McWilliams),” June 29, 1949, Summaries of the Secretary’s Daily Meetings, 19491952/Box1/RG59/250/46/3/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 14 “PPS 53, Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (George Kennan): United States Policy toward Formosa and the Pescadores,” July 6, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 356-364. 15 Ibid., p. 357. 16 Ibid.

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Ibid., p. 357. Ibid., p. 358. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid., p. 361. 21 Ibid., pp. 362-363. 22 Ibid., p. 361; As for the future of Chiang Kai-shek, Kennan suggested that the “generalissimo should be informed that if he wishes to remain on the island, he will be accorded the status of a political refugee.” Ibid., p. 363. 23 “Memorandum of Conversation: Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary (attended also by Kennan, Rusk, Jessup, and Humelsine),” July 29, 1949, Summaries of the Secretary’s Daily Meetings, 19491952/Box1/RG59/250/46/3/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 24 “NSC 37/6: A Report to the NSC by the Secretary of State on the Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” August 5, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 47/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library. 25 Ibid., p. 3. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., p. 4. 28 “NSC-37/7: A Report to the NSC by the Secretary of Defense on The Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” August 22, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 47/Truman Papers/Box 205, HST Library. 29 Ibid., p. 1. 30 Ibid., p. 2. 31 Ibid. 32 “Memorandum of Conversations,” September 9, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 388-90. 33 In fact, the Truman administration’s interest in the welfare of the Taiwanese people never lessened. In early August, at the request of Secretary Acheson, Butterworth cabled Harlan Cleveland, the acting assistant administrator for the ECA on China-Formosa, instructing that during the interval of NSC policy review for Taiwan, the State Department regarded it “as desirable that ECA continue without interruption or major change its present activities on the island. These were understood to include the importation of fertilizer and general supervision of its distribution, utilization of the services of the J.G. White Engineers, for general advice with respect to the operation of the island’s economy, continued distribution of the Chinese Relief Mission medical supplies and moderate quantities of cotton, flour, etc., and finally, the continuation of the JCRR program on Formosa…” Acheson thought that, whether or not Formosa could be rescued through military means, the strengthening of its economy would, at least, boost up its morale and prolong its defense against the Communists. See “Letter, the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Acting Assistant Administrator for Program of the Economic Cooperation Administration (Harlan Cleveland),” August 4, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 371-372. 34 “NSC-37/8: A Report to the NSC by the Acting Secretary of State on the Position of the U.S. with Respect to Formosa,” October 6, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 47/Truman Papers/Box 206, HST Library, p. 3. 35 Ibid., p. 4. 36 Ibid., p. 5. 18

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37

Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., pp. 6-7. The message stated: “The U.S. has no designs on Formosa and seeks no military bases for special privileges of any kind on the island. The U.S. government will not commit any of its armed forces to the defense of the Island. It is concerned, however, lest the chaos of the mainland spread to Formosa and believes that a higher level of political and economic well-being must be provided if serious unrest is to be avoided and the legitimate aspirations of the population of Formosa met. The previous misgovernment of Formosa has been a cause for serious concern on the part of the U.S. and there have been disturbing indications of unrest among the population of Formosa as civilian refugees and military forces have arrived in large numbers on the Island. The U.S. attitude toward Formosa will depend largely on the action of the present Chinese administration in establishing an efficient administration which would seek to bring to the people a higher level of political and economic well-being. The resources of the island, together with the material assets available to the Chinese administration are believed to be sufficient to enable that administration to improve conditions through its own efforts. Unless effective steps are taken initially by the Chinese administration itself, external aid would be of little benefit and would be largely dissipated. The U.S. government will, therefore, continue to watch with interests the efforts of the Chinese administration to initiate those measures which are necessary to provide the basis for effective administration and effective utilization of the resources on Formosa. While the U.S. government will continue to furnish economic assistance to Formosa under existing legislation, the provision of any additional aid will depend upon the future performance of the Chinese administration on Formosa.” 39 “Memorandum for the President, Summary of Discussion at the 47th Meeting of the National Security Council,” October 20, 1949, PSF/NSC Memos to the President, 1949/Truman Papers/Box 220, HST Library; President Truman did not participate in the meeting, so it was chaired by Secretary Acheson and attended by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, JCS Chairman Omar Bradley, Treasury Secretary Snyder, and William Foster, the deputy administrator of the ECA, who joined in place of Paul Hoffman. 40 Both Johnson and Bradley also recommended that certain wordings in the message be revised in order to maintain America’s freedom of action in the Taiwan Strait. The original first sentence “The U.S has no designs on Formosa and seeks no military bases for special privileges of an kind on the Island” should be erased; and the sentence “The U.S. government will not commit any of its armed forces to the defense of the Island” should be rephrased by “The U.S. government does not intend to commit any of its armed forces…” See NSC-37/8, pp. 6-7. Acheson agreed to the requests of Johnson and Bradley. See “Memorandum for the President, Summary of Discussion at the 47 th Meeting of the National Security Council,” p. 2. 41 “Telegram, the Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Consul General at Taipei (MacDonald),” October 28, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 401-403; “Telegram, the Secretary of State to the Consul General at Taipei (MacDonald),” November 1, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 404-405. 42 Ibid., p. 405. 43 “Telegram, the Consul General at Taipei (MacDonald) to the Secretary of State (Acheson),” November 3, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 406-407. 38

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44 Dean Acheson, who had President Truman’s total confidence and backing, dominated the administration’s China-Taiwan policy, and, as a result, Johnson’s voice was often drowned in the discussions. 45 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, pp. 208209. 46 “Undersecretary of State’s Meeting: NSC-48: US Policy with Respect to Asia,” November 28, 1949, UM Documents, 6885/Box2/RG59/250/46/Lot58D609, National Archives, College Park, MD. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 “Minutes of Special Undersecretary’s Meeting on the Asia Paper, UM D69,” December 1, 1949, UM Minutes-Memos 2/13/194912/30/1949/Box1/RG59/250/46/3/5, National Archives, College Park, MD. 50 “Telegram, the Consul at Taipei (Donald Edgar) to the Secretary of State,” December 14, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 445. 51 Memorandum of Conversation, Acheson and Senator H. Alexander Smith (Republican of New Jersey), Nov 30, 1949, Memo of Conversations, OctNov 1949/DGA/Box 64, HST Library. Acheson assured the senator that no thought would be given to recognition until at least three factors had been served—(1) all or substantially all of the territory of China had actually been conquered; (2) any government to be recognized had shown its fitness to comply with international obligations; and (3) there was an evident will on the part of the Chinese people to accept the government that had been established. But, Acheson refused to eliminate the option of extending formal recognition, promising only that he would exercise every “form of caution and considered study” before any move in this direction was made. 52 Ibid. 53 Memorandum for the President from Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson,” December 15, 1949, FECOM/RG6/Papers of Douglas MacArthur, quoted in David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, p. 237. 54 Ibid. David Finkelstein, in Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, devoted great length discussing how Secretary Johnson had “persuaded” General Omar Bradley to modify his earlier views about Taiwan. Bradley probably felt “uneasy” about supporting such a “politically-charged” initiative. However, the combined pressure from Johnson, MacArthur, and other military experts probably trumped Bradley’s will. Years later, Bradley wrote that “I doubt seriously if Johnson knew much about military strategy or weapon systems. He was probably the worst appointment Truman made during his presidency.” Bradley’s quote is taken from Finkelstein, pp. 230-231. 55 “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (Johnson), from Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees, Enclosing Summary of General Douglas MacArthur’s views about Formosa,” December 14, 1949, FECOM/RG6/Papers of Douglas MacArthur, as quoted in David Finkelstein, p. 238. 56 “Correspondence between President Truman and Senator Homer Ferguson (R-Michigan),”December 13-17, 1949, PSF/Foreign Affairs/China 1949/Truman Papers/Box 152, HST Library. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.

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59 Meeting with the President, “China Meeting,” October 17, 1949, Memoranda of Conversation/Oct-Nov1949/DGA/Box66, HST Library; “Memorandum for Mr. Connelly: Subject-Meeting with the President,” November 14, 1949, Memos for the President/Nov1949/Box3/RG59/250/49/5/5-6, National Archives, College Park, MD; John L. Stuart was U.S. ambassador to China; Walt Butterworth was director and, later, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs; Philip Jessup, a professor of international law and diplomacy at the Columbia University, was also ambassador at large and member of U.S. delegation to the UN General Assembly; Everett Case, the president of Colgate University, and Raymond Fosdick, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, were both consultants to the secretary of state on the Far Eastern policy. The consultants, along with other notables, such as John K. Fairbank, Joseph Ballentine, Owen Lattimore, Edwin Reischauer, and George Marshall, to name just a few, were invited to the State Department in early October, to hold a three-day roundtable meeting discussing the Truman administration’s China policy. See “Records of Round-Table Discussion by 25 Far Eastern Experts with the Department of State on American Policy toward China,” October 6-8, 1949, PSF/China 1949/China Roundtable October 6-8,1949/Truman Papers/Box 152, HST Library. 60 “Memorandum, Raymond Fosdick to Philip Jessup, August 29, 1949,” RBF/Box 9, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University. 61 “Correspondence between President Truman and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, March 27-31, 1950,” PSF/Foreign Affairs/China 19501952/Truman Papers/Box 152, HST Library. In another private correspondence with Clarence Pickett, the executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, in early January 1950, the president expressed his full agreement with Pickett’s analysis, which wrote: “American intervention [continuing military and economic aid to the Nationalists] has impelled the [Chinese Communist] government in anti-American and pro-Russian direction. The Chinese people are hostile to foreign intervention from any source, and at present that hostility is directed primarily against the United States. The people of China are determined not to be puppets of any foreign government, and the Communists have adopted an aggressively nationalist attitude in order to capitalize on this determination. Further intervention will result in the hardening of Chinese resentment…” See “Correspondence between President Truman and Clarence E. Pickett, Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee,” January 16, 23, 1950, PSF/Foreign Affairs/China 19501952/Truman Papers/Box 152, HST Library. 62 John L. Gaddis, “The Strategic Perspective,” p. 83; Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 10-11. 63 “Telegram, the Secretary of State to the Consul General at Taipei (MacDonald),” November 18, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 428-431. 64 “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State,” December 23, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 456. 65 Oystein Tunsjo, U.S. Taiwan Policy, pp. 34-35. 66 “Memo from Butterworth to Ambassador Gross: Regarding the Letter from Dr. Frank Meleney Respecting China,” March 23, 1950, Records of the

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Office of Chinese Affairs, 1949-1965/ U.S. policy toward China, 1950/Box25/RG59/250/49/7/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 67 “Memorandum from Philip Sprouse of Chinese Affairs to Dean Rusk (Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs): Formosa Alternatives,” May 11, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 194550/Top Secret: Formosa and Hainan Islands, Jan-July 1950/Box18/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 68 See again NSC-37/3 (February 10, 1949); JCS reply to Secretary Acheson on April 2, 1949, and NSC-37/7 (August 22, 1949). 69 “Memorandum by Kenneth Krentz, Consul General at Taipei, to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth),” April 25, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), p. 317. 70 “NSC-37/9: Possible United States Military Action toward Taiwan not Involving Major Military Forces: Submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, circulated to the NSC for discussion,” December 23, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 460-461. 71 In 1951, the Truman administration initiated a full-scale investigation on the activities of the China Lobby. See “Confidential Memo on the China Lobby,” June 12, 1951, PSF/China Lobby, 1945-1953/Truman Papers/Box140, HST Library. The memo disclosed that former secretary of defense Louis Johnson had been a personal attorney to Dr. H.H. Kung, brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek and former governor of the Central Bank of China during World War II. As an important member of the Soong family, Kung was an important financial supplier behind the China Lobby that sought to influence America’s foreign policy toward China and Formosa. 72 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950, p. 242. 73 Ibid; Finkelstein wrote that Johnson revealed these conversations while testifying during the MacArthur Hearings in 1951. The notion of “Political grounds” essentially means that Truman saw the political imperative of driving a wedge between Beijing and Moscow as important for U.S. strategic interests. 74 See “NSC 48/1:The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” December 23, 1949, PSF/NSC Meeting # 50/Truman Papers/Box 179, HST Library. Essentially, NSC-48/1 offered nothing new, as it merely put forward two versions of policy toward Taiwan, one from the State and the other from the Defense Department, with the former maintaining the “economic and diplomatic means” of saving Taiwan while the latter stressing greater military assistance as outlined in NSC-37/9. 75 “Memorandum of Conversations, meeting with the JCS, Acheson, Butterworth, and Merchant, recorded by the Secretary of State,” December 29, 1949, FRUS, Vol. 9, (1949), pp. 463-467. 76 Ibid., p. 464. 77 Ibid., p. 465. 78 Ibid., p. 466. 79 Ibid., p. 466. 80 Ibid., p. 467. 81 Ibid., p. 467. 82 “Memorandum for the President of the 50th National Security Council Meeting,” December 30, 1949, PSF/NSC Meeting File/Meeting Discussions/1949/Truman Papers/Box # 186, HST Library.

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83

Ibid. Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 “NSC 48/2: The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” December 30, 1949, PSF/MNSC/NSC Meeting # 50/Box 206, HST Library. NSC-48/2 was the culmination of all policies proposed earlier in NSC-34/2, NSC-41, NSC-37/2, and NSC-37/5. It asserted that: “The U.S. should continue to recognize the Nationalist government of China until the situation is further clarified. The U.S. should avoid recognizing the Chinese communist regime until it is clearly in the U.S. interest to do so. The U.S. should continue to express to friendly governments its own views concerning the dangers of hasty recognition of the CCP regime but should not take a stand which would engage the prestige of the U.S. in an attempt to prevent such recognition. In general, however, it should be realized that it would be inappropriate for the U.S. to adopt a posture more hostile or policies more harsh towards a Communist China than towards the USSR itself…In the event that recognition of the CCP is anticipated, appropriate steps should be taken to make it clear that recognition should not be construed as approval of the CCP regime, or abatement of our hostility to Soviet efforts to exercise control in China…”Although nonrecognition of the Peoples’ Republic of China was to be followed, the Truman administration would also “exploit, through appropriate political, psychological and economic means, any rifts between the CCP regime and the USSR and between the Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention.” On the other hand, America should continue to rely upon diplomatic and economic means to prevent the falling of Formosa into Communist hands. Lastly, even though the Communist China would be denied of any trades with the U.S. and the West involving materials of “military utilities,” America should permit “exports to China of 1B items within quantitative limits of normal civilian use and under controls which can be applied restrictively if it becomes necessary to do so in the national interest, and should place no obstacle in the way of trade with China in non-strategic commodities.” In accordance with the Open Door policy, trade was deemed a useful mechanism to eventually liberalize Mainland China. 87 “Memos from Merchant to Rusk,” Feb 17, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, 1949-1965/U.S. Policy toward China, 1950/Box25/RG59/250/49/7/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 88 “Memorandum of Conversations among Senator William Knowland (RCA) and Undersecretary of State James Webb, Regarding Policy Information Paper,” January 3, 1950, Memos of Conversation (Dean Acheson); Jan-March 1950/Box13/RG59/250/49/5/7, National Archives, College Park, MD. 89 “Attachment: Department of State Special Guidance #28, “Policy Information Paper on Formosa,” December 23, 1949, Memos of Conversation (Dean Acheson); Jan-March 1950/Box13/RG59/250/49/5/7, National Archives, College Park, MD. 90 “Memo of Conversations, Kee, Acheson, McFall, January 4-5, 1950,” Memoranda of Conversation Jan 1950/DGA/Box 66, HST Library. 91 “Dean Acheson’s Princeton University Seminar Talks,” Princeton Seminars/Reading Copy, July 22-23, 1953/DGA/Box 75/Folder II/Wire 1, HST Library, p. 4 84

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Ibid., p. 5. “Statement by the President,” January 5, 1950, PSF/Foreign Affairs File/China/1950-1952/Truman Papers/Box151, HST Library. The revised portions were suggested by General Bradley and Secretary Johnson. See also Footnote 94. 94 On the morning of January 5, prior to Truman’s statement release, Admiral Souers of the NSC telephoned Secretary Acheson and said that the president had asked him to “read to Secretary Johnson the statement on Formosa which would be released at 1030 AM today which he had done.” Souers said he had also been requested by the president to read to General Bradley who was very much concerned about one particular point in it. The president wanted Admiral Souers to check this point with Secretary Acheson. The part in question had to do with the sentence which read “The United States had no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time or to detach Formosa from China.” Bradley stated that “the situation might arise where they will march South, in which case we may want to detach Formosa from China.” So, Bradley wanted to ask “if it might not be wise to delete the phrase ‘or to detach Formosa from China.’” Acheson agreed that “it was all right to delete the phrase in question, although he would have preferred to leave the phrase in the statement.” See “Memorandum of Conversations, Admiral Souers and Secretary Acheson,” January 5, 1950; Memoranda of Conversation/Jan1950/DGA/Box66, HST Library; Bradley also advised Truman to insert the phrase “at this time” following “The United States had no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa...” Truman said to Acheson that “General Bradley had wanted this phrase added because of the possibility that, in the event of war, we might have to recapture bases on Formosa.” See “Meeting with the President,” January 5, 1950, Memoranda of Conversation/Jan1950/DGA/Box66, HST Library. 95 “Extemporaneous Remarks by Secretary Acheson Regarding the Statement of the President Concerning United States Policy with Respect to Formosa,” January 5, 1950, PSF/Historical Files/China/Truman Papers/Box194, HST Library. 96 “Undersecretary’s Meeting of January 6, 1950,” Jan 6, 1950, UM Minutes-Memos 1//3/50-6/2/50/Box1/RG59/250/46/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 97 “Memo of Conversations, Senator William Knowland, Senator Alexander Smith, Acheson, and McFall; January 5, 1950,” Memoranda of Conversation/Jan1950/DGA/Box66, HST Library. 98 “There is not the slightest doubt in my mind,” Senator Taft proclaimed on the Senate floor on January 11, “that the proper kind of sincere aid to the Nationalist government a few years ago could have stopped Communism in China…But the State Department has been guided by a left-wing group, who obviously have wanted to get rid of Chiang, and were willing at least to turn China over to the Communists for that purpose…But Formosa is a place where a small amount of aid at a very small cost could prevent further spread of Communism.” See “Dean Acheson’s Princeton University Seminar Talks,” Princeton Seminars/Reading Copy, July 22-23, 1953/DGA/Box 75/Folder II/Wire 2, HST Library, p. 9. 93

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99 Acheson stated: “On military security in the Pacific, this defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus…[and it] runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands…So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack…Should such an attack occur…the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression. But, it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations…These other problems arise out the susceptibility of many areas…to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped by military means…[America] cannot furnish determination, it cannot furnish the will, and it cannot furnish the loyalty of a people to its government. But, if the will and if the determination exists and if the people are behind their government, then, and not always then, is there a very good chance. In that situation, American help can be effective and it can lead to an accomplishment which could not otherwise be achieved…” See “Dean Acheson’s National Press Club Speech, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy” January 12, 1950, Department of State Bulletin. 100 “Dean Acheson’s Princeton University Seminar Talks,” Princeton Seminars/Reading Copy, July 22-23, 1953/DGA/Box 75/ Folder II/Wire 2, HST Library, pp. 11-12. 101 See Lewis Purifoy, Harry Truman’s China Policy. 102 “Correspondence between President Truman and Robert E. Sherwood,” January 7-10, 1950, PSF/Foreign Affairs/China, 1950-1952/Truman Papers/Box 152, HST Library. 103 Truman wrote to Bridges, “You know as well as I do that there never was a more capable and loyal public servant than Dean Acheson. I don’t think there has ever been a public servant who has done a more honest or more conscientious job than he has done as undersecretary of the treasury, as assistant secretary and undersecretary of state, and as secretary of state…I have no objection to your attacking me and the policies of the administration on any subject you choose, but political attacks should be confined to domestic affairs and should not under any circumstances, at this critical time, upset the solid front here at home for our approach to the world situation. I fear that you are thoughtless in not remembering that we are in the midst of what is termed a Cold War…Dean and I explained to you and Senator [Kenneth] Wherry on one occasion the exact situation in China. If you and your colleagues who are so anxious to find an issue for the coming campaign would care to discuss the effect which the present unwarranted attacks on the secretary of state are having on the effective conduct of this Cold War, I believe we can convince you that what you are proposing to do is not only unpatriotic, but is most dangerous procedure, likely to cause a situation in which young Americans may lost their lives by the thousands…” See “Letter from President Truman to Senator Styles Bridges,” March 26, 1950, PSF/Foreign Affairs/China, 1950-1952/Truman Papers/Box 152, HST Library. 104 “Letter from Harry Truman to Dean Acheson,” March 31, 1950, PSF/Foreign Affairs/China, 1950-1952/Truman Papers/Box 152, HST Library.

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105 “Correspondence between President Truman and Senator Arthur Vandenberg,” March 27- 31, 1950, PSF/Foreign Affairs/China, 19501952/Truman Papers/Box 152, HST Library. 106 “Memorandum of Conversation with the President,” April 4, 1950, Memoranda of Conversation/April1950/DGA/Box67, HST Library. 107 “Department of State: For the Press on John Foster Dulles’ Background,” April 6, 1950, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re: Appointment of JFD as Consultant to Dean Acheson/Box47, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 108 Ibid; “John Foster Dulles and His Foreign Policy, in James B. Reston (Life Magazine),” October 4, 1948: John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/James Reston (1948)/Box38, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Librar, Princeton University; For Dulles’ experience at the Second Hague Peace Conference, see “Travel Notes: From June 12-August 15, 1907,” June 12-Aug 15, 1907, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re: Hague Peace Conference Travel Notes/Box1, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University; For Dulles’ experience as Peace Conference negotiator/advisor (1919-1921), see “Memorandum on the Importance to the U.S. of the Economic Provisions of the Treaty of Versailles,” April 5, 1921, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re: Versailles Treaty (1921)/Box4, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 109 Ibid. 110 “Woodrow Wilson’s Three Prescriptions for Peace,” John F. Dulles, February 1949, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re: Panama Includes an Article on Woodrow Wilson/Box1, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 111 Ibid. 112 “Foreign Policy—Ideals, not Deals,” John F. Dulles, February 10, 1947, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re: Soviet Union and the Communist Party (1947)/Box33, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 113 Ibid. 114 “Pillars of Peace: Pamphlet in Social Progress” John Foster Dulles, May 1943, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Article: Pillars of Peace, 1943/Box283, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 115 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Dulles, in various speeches and articles, emphasized that the U.S. could coexist peacefully with the Soviet Union, and that Soviet Communists would eventually “retreat” from their aggressive foreign policy as long as the United States, the leader of the free world, pushed for a liberal foreign policies predicated upon the Wilsonian 14 points or his 6 pillars of peace. See “Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy—And What to do About It,” John F. Dulles, August 1946, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Article: Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to do about it/Box284; “Our Spiritual Heritage: Address by John F. Dulles at New York Herald Tribune Forum,” October 21, 1947, John F. Dulles Papers, 18601988/Re: Soviet Union and the Communist Party (1947)/Box33; “Peace with Russia,” August 25, 1948, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Soviet Union and the Communist Party (1948)/Box38; “U.S. and Russia Could Agree But for Communist Party’s Crusade: An Interview with John Foster Dulles,” Jan 21, 1949, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Soviet Union and the Communist

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Party1949/Box46; “What I’ve Learned about the Russians,” March 2, 1949, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Article by John F. Dulles/Box40; “The Pursuit of Liberty: An Address by John Foster Dulles,” December 13, 1949, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Soviet Union and the Communist Party/Box46; “The Strategy of Soviet Communism, by John F. Dulles at the Common Cause Dinner, New York,” March 14, 1950, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Soviet Union and the Communist Party, 1950/Box50, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 116 “Letter from President Truman to Dulles,” April 4, 1950, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Harry Truman (1950)/Box50, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 117 “John Foster Dulles and His Foreign Policy: James B. Reston (Life Magazine),” October 4, 1948, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/James Reston (1948)/Box38, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 118 “Address by the Honorable John F. Dulles on Chinese-American Friendship,” May 17, 1951, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/China, People’s Republic of, 1951/Box52, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 119 “JFD Diaries: Trip to Hankow,” March 6-9, 1938, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/China and Japan Trip, 1938/Box17, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 120 “Foreign Policy—Ideals, not Deals,” February 10, 1947, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re: Soviet Union and the Communist Party (1947)/Box33, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 121 “The Columbia Broadcasting System, Capital Cloakroom Interview with John Dulles,” June 29, 1949, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re: Chinese Question, 1949/Box40, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 122 “Statements Made August 5, 1949 on White Paper on China Released to Paramount News,” John F. Dulles, August 8, 1949, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re: Chinese Question, 1949/Box40, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 123 “The Columbia Broadcasting System, Capital Cloakroom Interview with John Dulles,” June 29, 1949, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re: Chinese Question, 1949/Box40, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 124 “Memorandum of Conversation: Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary(also attended by Rusk, Kennan, Thorp, Battle, McWilliams),” December 23, 1949, Summaries of the Secretary’s Daily Meetings, 19491952/Box1/RG59/250/46/3/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 125 “The Pursuit of Liberty: An Address by John Foster Dulles,” December 13, 1949, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Soviet Union and the Communist Party/Box46, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 126 “Personal Letter from Dulles to Arthur Vandenberg on Formosa,” January 6, 1950, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re; Formosa (1950)/Box48, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 127 “Handwritten Notes by Dulles on Formosa” (undated, probably in early spring 1950), John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re; Formosa (1950)/Box48, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University; Given the cursive

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handwriting of Dulles, the contents were not very clear. Yet, with the efforts of Princeton Manuscript Library staffs, the notes were reorganized and clearly typed out. See “Notes of John F. Dulles Regarding Recognition and Formosa,” (undated): John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/China, People’s Republic of, 1950/Box47, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 128 “Memorandum on Formosa by John Foster Dulles,” October 25, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 194550/Box18/Formosa-Aug-Dec1950/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives College Park, MD: Although this memorandum is dated October 25, 1950, its contents reflect Dulles’ thoughts back in the spring of 1950. Hence, the memo could be written by Dulles shortly after his assuming the State Department Consultant in April 1950. 129 Ibid. 130 “Memorandum on Formosa by John Foster Dulles,” October 25, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 194550/Box18/Formosa-Aug-Dec1950/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives College Park, MD. 131 “Memorandum for the President, Subject: Chinese Communist Intention to Requisition U.S. Government Property in Peiping,” January 10, 1950, Memos for the President/Jan1950/Box3/RG59/250/49/5/5-6, National Archives, College Park, MD. 132 Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies, pp. 125-127. 133 “Meeting with the President: Extension of ECA China Aid,” January 19, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson’s Memorandum/JanFeb1950/Box9/RG59/250/49/5/6-7, National Archives, College Park, MD. 134 Livingston Merchant, Walton Butterworth, Philip Sprouse, and Dean Rusk were putting forward alternatives such as supporting a coup in Formosa or having the UN to administer a plebiscite for the native Formosans. See “Butterworth’s handwritten notes to Merchant,” January 21, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 1945-50/Top Secret: Formosa and Hainan Islands, Jan-July 1950/Box18/RG59/250/46/4/3-4;“Draft Statement: Formosa,” (undated; about spring 1950), Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 1945-50/Top Secret: Formosa and Hainan Islands, Jan-July 1950/Box18/RG59/250/46/4/3-4;“Memorandum from Merchant to Sprouse,” Feb 3, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs/Top Secret Subject File, 1945-1950/Box18/Formosa and Hainan Islands, Jan-July1950/RG59/250/46/4/3-4; “Memos from Sprouse to Merchant: Comments Respecting Proposal to Formosan Plebiscite,” February 15, 1950; Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs/Top Secret Subject File, 19451950/Box18/Formosa and Hainan Islands, Jan-July1950/RG59/250/46/4/3-4; “Memos from Merchant to Rusk,” Feb 17, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, 1949-1965/Box25/RG59/250/49/7/3/US Policy toward China, 1950; “Coup d’etat in Formosa: Draft Prepared at Request of Livingston Merchant,” Feb 20, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 1945-50/Top Secret: Formosa and Hainan Islands, Jan-July 1950/Box18/RG59/250/46/4/3-4 (It could be worked out by Rusk since it was declassified from the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs); “Procedures to implement decision, if made, to insure retention of Formosa in non-Communist hands,” (undated; spring 1950), Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret

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Subject File, 1945-50/Top Secret: Formosa and Hainan Islands, Jan-July 1950/Box18/RG59/250/46/4/3-4; “Memorandum of Conversation in the Secretary’s Office: China,” March 3, 1950; Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs/Top Secret Subject File, 1945-1950/U.S. Policy toward Communist China1950/Box17/RG59/250/46/4/3-3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 135 Rusk, in April 1950, volunteered to demote himself from his deputy undersecretary of state position to become the assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, previously held by Walton Butterworth. In March 1950, Butterworth became a victim of McCarthyism and, as a result, left the post. Rusk stepped in because he thought “Butterworth able and patriotic…[and] ongoing events in China and the Far East were extremely important, and since I’d had experience in the region and had not been [targeted] by McCarthy.” Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), pp. 160-161. 136 “Substance: Formosa,” April 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 1945-50/Top Secret: Formosa and Hainan Islands, Jan-July 1950/Box18/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 137 “Memorandum of Conversation: Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary (also attended by Webb, Kennan, McFall, Nitze, Battle, McWilliams),” April 27, 1950, Summaries of the Secretary’s Daily Meetings, 1949-1952/Box1/RG59/250/46/3/3, National Archives, College Park, MD. 138 “Memorandum of Conversation with President Truman,” April 28, 1950, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/Re; Japan and the Japanese Peace Treaty (1950)/Box48, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 139 “Summary of Current Developments and Problems Relating to China,” from Philip Sprouse to Butterworth, March 10, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs 1949-1965/Box25/RG59/250/49/7/3/U.S. Policy toward China, 1950, National Archives, College Park, MD; “Correspondence between Dulles and Senator Alexander Smith, Including Enclosures of Reports on Formosa” May 17, 1950, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/China, People’s Republic of, 1950/Box47/Call#MC016/Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. It is interesting to note that President Truman had his personal and secret envoys in maintaining communications with President Chiang Kai-shek. Two Chinese businessmen from San Francisco, Albert and Jack Chow, had frequently visited Taiwan for “business trips.” In May 1950, they brought back a letter from Chiang Kai-shek to Truman, in which the generalissimo appreciated Truman’s continued interest in the wellbeing of the Chinese and Formosans on the island. The Chows also told Truman, in a separate letter, that the Formosa situation had improved greatly both militarily and economically. See “Letters from President Chiang Kai-shek and Memos from Albert Chow to President Truman,” May 23, 1950, Official Files 1950-1953/Truman Papers/Box 633, HST Library. Truman also relied on Karl W. V. Nix as his secret observer in Taiwan. An Ohio businessman whose father knew Truman personally, Nix frequently traveled to Japan, China, and Taiwan for business. It was through Nix that Chiang Kai-shek pledged to Truman that he was determined to reform politics in Taiwan and was also willing to resign from the ROC presidency if that could help Taiwan’s situations. See Ronald McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves, pp. 125-126.

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140 “Memorandum on Formosa,” John F. Dulles, April 21, 1950, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/China, People’s Republic of, 1950/Box47, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 141 “Dulles’ Memorandum Regarding Defending Formosa,” May 18, 1950, John F. Dulles Papers, 1860-1988/China, People’s Republic of, 1950/Box47, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 142 “Memorandum of Conversation, from Howe (Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence) to W. Park Armstrong (Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research) on the May 30 th Formosa Meeting,” May 31, 1950, FRUS, Vol. 6, (1950), pp. 347-351. 143 Feeling regret over the CCP ascendancy in China, Rusk said in his memoir, “Beginning with my own boyhood, I can remember a warm and benevolent attitude on the part of the American people toward the Chinese…China was very much in our thoughts, and Americans in general were interested in that part of the world. We took some satisfaction that the United States had somehow opposed the attempts by wicked colonial powers to carve up China into spheres of influence…[We] had friendly attitude toward China. As a result, our reaction to the fall of China in 1949 was that of a jilted lover. ‘The Chinese people have turned against us,’ we told ourselves. “They’ve become bitter and are now our enemies. How could this have happened?” Rusk also believed that Chiang Kai-shek was solely responsible for KMT’s failure in China. Rusk posited, “I do not see what the United States could have done to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking control of the mainland. For years, the Truman administration sent substantial military and economic aid to the Nationalists, but to no avail…If anything, Chiang Kai-shek’s inability to govern and the impact of Japanese aggression, not American inaction, ‘lost China’….Personally, I held no brook with those Americans who thought that the United States lost China; China was never ours to win or lose, but rather, Chiang Kai-shek’s.” See Dean Rusk, As I saw It, pp. 157-158. 144 Warrant Cohen, Dean Rusk (New Jersey: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980), p. 46. 145 Ibid., p. 46. On China-Formosa policy, Rusk acted quite indecisively, at least in 1949 and early 1950. “In Asia, the choices were less clear and the situation vastly more complicated. Rusk’s associates complained that he had trouble making up his mind, that he ‘played his cards inside his shirt.” See Thomas Shoenbaum, Waging Peace and War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), p. 206. However, Rusk admitted good relations with John Foster Dulles and “strongly recommended” the latter’s appointment in the State Department in April 1950. Hence, it seems very logical that Rusk and Dulles worked closely to formulate the Formosa policy. See Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, pp. 160-161. 146 “Memo: U.S. Policy Toward Formosa, from Dean Rusk to Dean Acheson,” May 30, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 1945-1950/Formosa and Hainan Island 1950/RG59/Box18/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 147 When, in early June 1950, Rusk learned about General Sun Li-jen’s plan to throw a coup d’état to oust Chiang, he was supportive and referred the matter to Acheson. Rusk had known Sun when they fought in the China-Burma-India campaign during WWII and they even ate shark’s fin soup together in the bush. Rusk wrote, “Sun, if he had assumed power, would have moved to end

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government corruption and would also have shown more flexibility than Chiang in dealing with the Communists.” To prevent any possible leaks and to protect Sun, Rusk burned this secret “coup” message. See Thomas Shoenbaum, Waging Peace and War, p. 209. 148 “Memo: U.S. Policy Toward Formosa, from Dean Rusk to Dean Acheson,” May 30, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Top Secret Subject File, 1945-1950/Formosa and Hainan Island 1950/RG59/Box18/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 149 Thomas Shoenbaum, Waging Peace and War, p. 204. 150 “Secretary Dean Acheson’s Appointment Files, Jan-Jun 1950,” May 31, 1950, DGA/Box46, HST Library. 151 “Memorandum from Dean Rusk to Dean Acheson: Bipartisan Policy on China-Formosa Problems,” June 9, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs/Top Secret Subject File, 1945-50/Box17/US Policy toward China/1950/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 152 Ibid. 153 “Statement by the President,” June 27, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs/Top Secret Subject File, 1945-50/Box17/US Policy toward China/1950/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 154 Dean Acheson, as a matter of fact, announced on June 23, 1950 that America’s Formosa policy remained, as stated by President Truman in January 5, “not altered,” and “that policy ruled out direct military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists in defense of the island.” See “U.S. Defense Chiefs Back from Orient,” The New York Times, June 24, 1950, p. 18. However, it is difficult to infer from Acheson’s statement that the UN trusteeship plan and the imposition of Seventh Fleet, as proposed by Dulles and Rusk, were rejected as possible options. While Thomas Christensen provided evidence to show that the Truman administration was unlikely to reverse its course of action on Taiwan, he did not conclusively reject that possibility. He wrote, “Acheson’s reply or replies to Rusk’s memoranda are not available, so we cannot be certain of their impact on the secretary.” Acheson might be more interested in the UN protection of Taiwan than the more aggressive U.S. military neutralization plan. See Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 130. One thing is certain at least: the Truman administration did not want to lose Taiwan and was pondering whether to increase interventions in Taiwan. See Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, p. 27. The lack of a final and affirmative decision should not be construed simply as abandoning Taiwan. 155 “Draft Statement to Press, by Secretary Acheson,” June 27, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs/Top Secret Subject File, 194550/Box17/U.S. Policy toward China/1950/RG59/250/46/4/3-4, National Archives, College Park, MD. 156 John Gaddis, “The Strategic Perspective,” p. 90. 157 June Grasso made very similar assessments that the Truman administration wanted to “push the Nationalists into a strong, independent posture and to keep the lines of communication open with the new Communist administration [in China].” See June Grasso, Truman’s Two-China Policy, p. 128 and pp. 140-141.

6 The Future of U.S. Policy in the Taiwan Strait

Three major points will be discussed in this concluding chapter. First, a review of the major arguments is warranted to understand the connection between Wilsonian Open Door internationalism and the origins of strategic ambiguity. Second, I will briefly summarize and analyze the major findings from the case studies on Harry Truman’s China-Taiwan policy in 1949-50. Efforts will also be made to address real and potential criticisms of this study. Finally, it would be pertinent to see how and to what extent Wilson’s Open Door tradition is salient in explaining contemporary U.S.-China relations, which are marked by a complicated pattern of cooperation and competition. Moreover, despite the improvement of cross-strait relations since May 2008, the Taiwan issue remains a ticking time bomb for Washington and Beijing. On January 14, 2012, the island’s closely contested presidential race witnessed the reelection of the incumbent president, Ma Ying-jeou, who received 51.6 percent of the vote while his DPP rival Tsai Ing-wen drew 45.6 percent. Though both Washington and Beijing breathed a big sigh of relief over the KMT’s solid victory, the relatively narrow margin in the election outcome “highlights the deep divisions among an electorate still wary of China’s intentions.”1 Hence, the United States has a strong interest in sustaining cross-strait peace and stability. Ideas, Identity, and Foreign Policy: Wilsonian Open Door Internationalism and America’s China-Taiwan Policy

This book proposes an ideational argument to explain the origins of America’s Taiwan Strait policy. Essentially, my argument stresses that while the realists’ power politics considerations and dual deterrence imperative form a strong basis for the United States’ strategic ambiguity policy, one should not dismiss the essential filtering function that the

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liberal ideas and norms of the Wilsonian Open Door policy have accorded to decision-makers when they interpret national interest, deliberate, and select policy choices to manage the Taiwan Strait conflict. As explained in Chapter 1 and illustrated in the case studies of Chapters 3, 4, and 5, ever since the defeat of Nationalist China and its subsequent retreat to Taiwan (Formosa) in 1949, Washington’s top foreign policymakers have maintained an ambivalent balance of engaging China (i.e. fostering a Sino-Soviet split and moderating the revolutionary/revisionist outlook of the Communist regime through economic exchanges) and protecting the interests and autonomy of Taiwan. Therefore, contrary to the mainstream perspective that strategic ambiguity began in the 1970s, I argue that the policy has its origin in 1949. In 1949-50, strategic ambiguity entailed the (1) promotion of Chinese “Titoism”; (2) denial of Formosa to Chinese Communist control through economic and diplomatic means, but without separating it from “China”; (3) acknowledgment of Taiwan as part of Nationalist China without foreclosing the notion that the island’s international status remained more or less undetermined and its future should be decided by the native Taiwanese themselves; and (4) aiding and recognizing the Nationalist regime as the sole legitimate government of China while leaving the option open to abandon it should Chiang Kai-shek venture to unilaterally launch a counteroffensive against the Chinese mainland. These positions were held until the 1970s, when U.S.-PRC relations experienced a critical breakthrough with President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and President Jimmy Carter’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979. Henceforth, the United States, bounded by the three Sino-U.S. Communiqués of 1972, 1978, and 1982, has declared repeatedly its adherence to the “one-China” principle, in which Taiwan is merely “acknowledged” to be part of China. On the other hand, America was also obligated, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, to provide defense articles for Taiwan, and, if situations deemed necessary by its constitutional process, take positive actions to defend the island from the PRC’s forceful attacks. Although the substance of Washington’s ambiguity has changed since the 1970s, the underlying principle stays the same. “In fact,” stated Nancy B. Tucker, “the roots of Washington’s approach to the Taiwan Strait problem are firmly planted in the policy of [strategic] ambiguity and the overpowering reasons for that original choice have neither disappeared nor been significantly altered.”2 Indeed, since 1949, the United States has neither accepted nor challenged the notion that Taiwan is part of China, though the meaning of “China” has been subjected to

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different interpretations—an inevitable consequence of China’s civil war and the simultaneous coexistence of two Chinese regimes in Taipei and Beijing. From Washington’s perspective, then, the “China” that Taiwan was supposed to be returned to after the Second World War was Chiang’s Republic of China, America’s ally in the war against Japan, the signer of the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, and one of the founding top four members of the United Nations. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2, the fact that Mao’s People’s Republic of China was not even present during those occasions and that neither the ROC nor the PRC was invited to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951 to officially receive Taiwan from Japan gave support to the claim that the island’s international status is more or less undetermined. This formulation has allowed the United States to treat, albeit implicitly, Taiwan as an entity separate from Mainland China. Furthermore, America’s sympathy in the native Taiwanese quests for selfdetermination and political independence has long been noted, but to avoid flaming up Chinese nationalist sentiments, Washington eschewed the notions of the “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” and replaced them instead with a vaguely defined “one-China” principle. Consequently, whether it was in the pre- or post-U.S.-PRC normalization period, America has always been in a strategically ambiguous position. In the three decades between 1949 and 1979, Washington formally recognized the ROC as the only legitimate government of China while deterring Beijing from mounting an invasion of Taiwan through the threat of possible U.S. military intervention and nuclear retaliation. At the same time, its support for the Nationalists was not unequivocal, as the United States signaled that it might abandon the regime if it launched a counteroffensive to recapture the mainland. In other words, whereas the Nationalists on Taiwan were considered the government of China, it did not enjoy de jure sovereign control over the mainland. Nevertheless, in the post-1979 period, although the United States had agreed to the “one-China” principle and forged diplomatic relations with Beijing, the Republic of China on Taiwan still exists and has even transitioned into a stable liberal democracy in the subsequent decades. Under the umbrella of the Taiwan Relations Act, the island has kept its unofficial political, economic, and security ties with the United States. The ambiguity, therefore, centers now on what “one China” really means. Is it the PRC in Beijing or the ROC in Taipei? Or, is it a “one China” in the long shadow of a future when the mainland has finally gotten rid of the CCP authoritarian regime and become democratized? In addition, since democratization, the Taiwanese

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government has gradually cast away the old Nationalists’ indoctrination of returning to China and embraced the idea that Taiwan ought to have greater international space and political autonomy, if not outright independence. More and more Taiwanese citizens began to think, identify, and speak of themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese. Despite the KMT’s resounding victories in the 2008 legislative and presidential elections and the ensuing amelioration of Taiwan-China relations, the Taiwanese public stridently objects any form of political union with China.3 Beijing, nonetheless, remains adamant on reunification and has rejected the renunciation of force to prevent the island’s independence. China’s continued deployment of more than 1,200 theater ballistic missiles across Taiwan illustrates the PRC’s ubiquitous military threat.4 Meanwhile, the United States’ objective, as persistently emphasized, has been the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait impasse; that is, any final outcome, be it reunification or independence, must be reached through peaceful and mutual consensus between both Taiwan and China. Hence, strategic ambiguity inhibits the two archrivals from taking reckless and unilateral actions that would change the existing status quo. America’s Liberal Tradition and Wilsonian Open Door Internationalism

The puzzle raised in this book essentially asks the following question: Why have U.S. administrations, since the presidency of Harry Truman, consistently chosen and implemented strategic ambiguity even though there are other viable and less cumbersome policy alternatives? The United States has the option of pressuring Taipei to enter into an agreement with Beijing by accepting the latter’s “one-country, twosystems” formula and permanently forswearing independence, in exchange for greater participation in the international community and organizations. Or, Washington could simply withdraw from the ChinaTaiwan vortex, hence letting fate decide Taiwan’s lot. Indeed, America could have long abandoned Taiwan and cleared out a hurdle in its relations with the PRC. Had U.S.-PRC normalization come earlier, the CCP regime might have “leaned” less closely to the Soviet Union and behaved more moderately. Without a doubt, America’s support for Taiwan clearly hampered U.S.-PRC rapprochement, and even after 1979, their relations can be described as “fragile” and “mistrustful.” As a result, the realist national interest argument of strategic ambiguity as a deterrence to maintain peace and stability across the

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Taiwan Strait needs to be supplemented. Chapters 3 through 5 have shown that the ideas of Wilsonian Open Door internationalism played a crucial role in accounting for the origins of strategic ambiguity. In addition to instilling uncertainty to deter Taipei and Beijing from initiating belligerent actions, strategic ambiguity was also conceived because postwar U.S. leaders have held on to two liberal visions: (1) the promotion of a strong, united, and democratic China, where the Chinese Communist Party would either be overthrown or forced to transform; and (2) the creation of an autonomous, though not independent, Taiwan, free from Chinese Communist control, where Taiwanese selfdetermination and liberal democracy can eventually take roots to serve as a vanguard for political democratization in China and Asia. These two goals could not be accomplished if the PRC militarily subdued Taiwan or if Taiwan chose to attack the mainland or declare independence. If Beijing coerced Taipei into reunification then any signs of liberty and democracy would likely be extinguished on the island, hence strengthening the CCP’s prestige and authoritarian dominance and terminating any hopes of democratization in China.5 Conversely, if Taipei sought to attack China or unilaterally declare separation, Beijing would be compelled to tighten its political grips and escalate nationalistic sentiment in order to keep China’s territorial integrity intact. As Jack Snyder posited, authoritarian regimes often find nationalism a convenient instrument to justify their ruling legitimacy and garner domestic support.6 In a similar vein, Aaron Friedberg noted that there are some growing concerns that the “Beijing government [in the twenty-first century] bases its claim to rule less on Communist principles than on the promise of continued increases in prosperity, combined with appeals to nationalism; this is a dangerous and unstable mixture.” Should economic performance fall short of expectations, the CCP authority may be inclined to “resort to assertive external policies as a way of rallying the Chinese people and turning their energies and frustrations outward, most likely toward Taiwan or Japan, or the United States, rather than inward, toward Beijing.”7 Taiwan’s status, therefore, is a very sensitive issue to the CCP’s political legitimacy. Based on these premises, leaders in Washington have behaved cautiously, neither abandoning/pressuring Taiwan to succumb to the PRC’s reunification plan nor supporting Taiwan’s endeavors to re-conquer China, as in the 1950s and 1960s, or to proclaim de jure independence, as advocated by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian in the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, America could not preclude Taiwanese independence entirely from the option choices, because if it reflects the democratic public will of the

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Taiwanese population, then there is very little that the United States could do to oppose it. The United States, in sum, strives for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait conflict. Either reunification or independence is acceptable to Washington as long as it is mutually agreed upon by both parties. Strategic ambiguity, accordingly, is not merely a deterrence strategy because it aims to realize America’s long-term objective in an Open China. Contrary to Beijing’s perennial suspicion that Washington aims to obstruct reunification, American support for a free and democratic Taiwan is not meant to snatch the island from Chinese possession to weaken her power. Rather, a semi-autonomous Taiwan where politics of self-determination, liberal democracy, and the free market system can flourish provides the most potent check against the CCP’s authoritarian impulses and, hence, the best guarantee for China’s eventual democratization.8 Although such an idea, predicated on the hope of transforming the current Communist regime, is repugnant to Beijing, it rests on America’s liberal tradition and identity. Specifically, it follows from President Woodrow Wilson’s Open Door liberalism. Wilson’s liberal internationalism arose during the first critical juncture of U.S. foreign relations—in the dark hours of the great powers’ scrambling for colonies and the advent of the First World War—witnessing how the devastating balance of power politics and the lust of imperialism had destabilized world civilization. With respect to China, the president staunchly believed that American liberal interests would best be achieved by adhering to John Hay’s Open Door policies of 1899 and 1900, which called for the equal opportunity of trade and commerce and the preservation of China’s political and territorial integrity. To that end, however, Wilson added a third element: China’s democratization. Unlike the previous administrations, therefore, Wilson took the active and progressive initiative to translate America’s liberalism at home into the international arena, combating the parochial spheres of interest championed by imperialism and the radical revolutionary sentiments advocated by Marxist-Leninism. Ruggie put well the causal relations between America’s liberalism, identity, and the Wilsonian Open Door internationalism: The multilateral world order principles invoked by Wilson [then, followed by FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower] bear a striking affinity to America’s sense of self as a nation: an expressed preference for international orders of relations based on ‘a universal or general foundation open in principle to everyone,’ not on discriminatory or

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exclusionary ties. The anti-colonial, self-determination, and human right strains require little elaboration. The “Open Door” world economy is an equal opportunity principle, which, in a limited sense, is how the McKinley administration already meant it when it presented the Open Door notes regarding the future of China to the great powers at the turn of the century. In (re)constructing the security order, the appeal to, and of, collective efforts in support of general principles, as opposed to bilateral alliances based on particularistic grounds, expresses a similar normative orientation. In short, the multilateral world order principles that American leaders have invoked when the remaking of the international order has been at stake reflect the idea of America’s own foundational act of political communion.9

Consequently, as we’ve seen, President Wilson’s relentless defense of China’s Open Door was due not only to his personal emotional attachment and goodwill to that nation but also his practical assessment that a strong, united, and democratic China would be in America’s longterm interest in terms of free economic trade and global security. This is not to suggest that Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft were unconcerned about China’s welfare, but, as Warren Cohen stressed, the “United States [despite becoming an industrial power by the end of nineteenth century] was in no position to guarantee China’s territorial integrity, [and] in no position to drive the powers back from the inroads they had already made into Chinese sovereignty.”10 Recognizing the crude reality of power politics, they chose not to confront the great powers. Theodore Roosevelt, for instance, while “admiring the new spirit of nationalism emerging in China,” was unwilling to challenge Japanese encroachment in China and “chose not to strain the limits of American power by attempting to take on that burden.”11 But, Woodrow Wilson danced to a different tune. Though operating under a similar international power structure, the president took an assertive position to implement the Open Door, as demonstrated in his administrations’ unilateral withdrawal from the consortium in March 1913 and recognition of the Republic of China the following May. Notwithstanding his conciliatory approach toward Japan, Wilson requested that Tokyo to reaffirm its pledge to the Open Door doctrine. While the president ultimately conceded to Tokyo on the Shandong issue in the Paris Peace Conference, the compromise resulted less from political expediency than Wilson’s conviction that appeasing Japan was essential to the successful functioning of the League of Nations, an organization in which international grievances and injustice could be redressed. In other words, Wilson genuinely believed that China’s salvation, modernization, and democratization could only be

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safeguarded under his collective security principle, in which Japan’s imperialist proclivities could be checked. The Truman Administration and Origins of America’s Strategic Ambiguity Policy, 1949-50

Thus, in light of Wilson’s Open Door internationalism, the Truman administration was unwilling to recognize Mao’s PRC in October 1949 and cut off its ties with Taiwan. In fact, the United States, unlike most other states, stayed loyal to Nationalist China until January 1979. Since the Truman administration was aiming to split Beijing from Moscow’s influence, as outlined in the NSC-34 series, recognizing the CCP regime and abandoning Taiwan would expedite that policy objective. Moreover, many of America’s European and Asian allies were signaling their intentions to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing. And, some even felt America’s decision was out of touch with reality. Great Britain, for instance, which extended recognition to the PRC on January 6, 1950, urged Truman to follow suit. In a similar vein, for economic reasons, Japan also tried to persuade the United States to normalize relations with Beijing. Officials in the Truman administration did tinker with the idea of recognizing the PRC and abandoning the KMT/Taiwan, but rejected it as a viable option. Instead, by the end of 1949, Truman and Acheson settled on the policy, formalized in NSC-48/2, of promoting Chinese Titoism and continuing to assist the Nationalists on Formosa through economic and diplomatic means. The blueprint of strategic ambiguity was constructed. In addressing why America was unenthusiastic about recognizing the PRC, I have followed the discussions of Warren Cohen and Nancy Tucker, who praised Dean Acheson’s astute and farsighted diplomatic vision in seeking to reconcile with the PRC. But, they attributed the “lost chance of rapprochement” to Harry Truman’s intransigent and unyielding anti-Communist stance. They, accordingly, argued that the president’s antagonistic view of the CCP greatly undermined the secretary’s plan of normalization. However, in contrast to the Cohen-Tucker thesis, my position states that the Truman administration’s incompatible stance with the PRC stems from its foreign policy normative and identity framework— Wilsonian Open Door internationalism. While Truman supported an engagement policy with China (NSC-34/1, NSC-34/2, NSC-41, and NSC-48/2), he firmly opposed giving full and hasty recognition to the PRC, insisting that the CCP regime must first temper their political and ideological orientations. Although Acheson was more receptive to

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accommodating Beijing, evidence indicates that he was by no means anxious to recognizing the new Chinese government. Agreeing with Truman, the secretary wanted to approach the Communists in a very cautious and gradualist manner, preferring to wait patiently for the overthrow or transformation of that regime by the Chinese people’s eventual awakening and their spirit of “democratic individualism.” Their convictions derived from their ideational commitments to Wilsonianism and China’s Open Door. Findings

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 put forward the decision-making process of Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Livingston Merchant, John Foster Dulles, and Dean Rusk in terms of their perceptions and beliefs about China and Taiwan. Based on the evidence from their private memos, notes, and policy papers, we have seen that the objective of a “united, independent, and democratic China” has been repeatedly referred to. This line of thinking resonates with Wilson’s Open Door internationalism outlined in Chapter 3. Specifically, in the Cold War context of 1949-50, Truman and Acheson believed that Mao’s CCP was essentially a protégé or stooge of Moscow, and therefore took the view that the regime was only a transient phenomenon that would not retain the hearts and minds of the Chinese masses who were deceived merely because of their stronger antipathy toward the Nationalist regime. Their strategy was, then, to foster with patience Titoism or a Sino-Soviet split in China through economic engagements, as propounded in the NSC-34 series and NSC41, and unofficial contacts. They were hoping that the CCP would eventually throw away the Soviet Communist influence and sign up to Western liberalism. On the issue of Taiwan, the president and his secretary of state chose to be circumspect. However, their mistrust of the KMT ruling elites on the island and moral sympathy for the native Formosans allowed the passage of the NSC-37 series in the National Security Council meetings, in which Taiwan should be denied to the Communists through “economic and diplomatic means.” While Acheson instructed his subordinates that America’s attitude in defending Formosa must be kept discreet to prevent antagonizing Chinese nationalist sentiment and radicalizing the CCP, he asked Merchant to secretly survey the strengths and potential of the Taiwanese independence movements and to pass on Washington’s stern warning to the Nationalist regime to commit to further reforms on the island. Merchant’s assessments enlightened the administration’s views about

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Taiwan. Years later, he maintained the view that “a modification in [Communist China’s] foreign policy to a degree which would make possible diplomatic and commercial relations with [the U.S.] can come only from the achievement of a durable settlement between the United States and the USSR, or from the passage of sufficient time for the potential frictions between Russia and China to develop a major erosion.… [Yet, Formosa] we should continue to deny to the enemy.”12 Thus, despite domestic political accusations that the Truman administration had betrayed the KMT and Taiwan, the evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 5 proved otherwise, as economic and military aids were continuously furnished to the island. Chapter 5 also discussed how Dulles’ participation in the State Department’s Far Eastern policy in April 1950 further reinforced the administration’s determination to defend Taiwan. Collaborating closely with Dean Rusk, Dulles, a well-versed foreign affairs and international law expert, provided a mixture of legal and moral justifications for saving Formosa, concentrating upon Wilson’s liberal conception of self-determination. Dulles, furthermore, had on several occasions talked about his unrelenting support of Wilson’s Open Door policy. In short, their personal letters, notes, memos and policy papers highly substantiated the conjecture that Truman and Acheson probably already accepted the Dulles-Rusk “neutralization” of Taiwan even before the outbreak of the Korean War. Strategic ambiguity was, therefore, implemented through the Wilsonian Open Door thinking and efforts of Truman, Acheson, Merchant, Dulles, and Rusk. Some Possible Objections

As stated in Chapters 1 and 3, some critics have charged that the Open Door policy is only political rhetoric used to cover up America’s ulterior ambitions in China. Aside from espousing high-sounding principles, the United States actually did very little to bolster China’s territorial and administrative integrity and even, at times, cooperated with the imperialist states to extract concessions and spheres of influence from the mainland. During the first four decades of the twentieth century, Washington was unwilling to use its national power or military force to back the Open Door. U.S. participation in the Pacific War was only due to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and because domestic anti-Japanese sentiment reaching the boiling point. 13 In short, national interests and domestic politics weighed heavily in the United States’ China policy. By the same token, Washington’s Taiwan Strait policy today can also be explained by the United States’ security

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imperatives to balance against the PRC and to deter both Beijing and Taipei from upsetting East Asia’s regional stability. Moreover, domestic political interests such as the congressional Taiwan caucus, human rights advocates, free-trade lobbies, and arms sales dealers have actively pushed for America’s greater defense of Taiwan. However, such materialistic or realist contentions do not negate the fact that American liberal tradition is a crucial driving force behind U.S. foreign policy. In fact, it is precisely the coexistence of idealism and national interests that makes America’s foreign policy both exceptional and controversial. “Liberal assumptions encourage American officials to define American goals in unusually idealistic, expansive, and global terms,” according to Colin Dueck. “[At] the same time, the tradition of limited liability discourages Americans from making concrete sacrifices toward that liberal vision.”14 Hans Morgenthau also noted, “What is revealed is something which is not peculiar to our China policy but has been characteristic of many of our other foreign policies as well: the simultaneous pursuit of contradictory policies and the commitment to ends which could not be achieved with the means employed. The defects of our China policy reveal a style of foreign policy whose roots are embedded in the character of the nation.”15 There should be no doubt that Washington leaders believed firmly in upholding China’s Open Door and a peaceful resolution in the Taiwan Strait. Hence, while it is true that the Truman administration wanted to separate Taiwan from China, lest the island would fall to the Communists, Acheson and the joint chiefs also reported that Formosa had limited strategic value to the United States. The loss of Taiwan, in other words, would not adversely affect U.S. security in the Western Pacific. However, Washington’s liberal beliefs have demanded the protection of a free and autonomous Taiwan even at the expense of detrimental relations with Beijing. The decision makers’ normative commitments, in addition, should not be dismissed as mere political or well-embellished jargon, since many of their thoughts were revealed in confidential memos and private notes. Even if a certain degree of exaggeration or political motives were contained in these documents, “they accord with implicit understandings of the world, of the objects that populate that world, and of accepted forms of reasoning.”16 In other words, even politically charged language or rhetoric must “make sense” and “resonate” with the prevailing cultural context in order to be convincing. Michael Hunt pointed out: Public rhetoric is not simply a screen, tool, or ornament. It is also, perhaps even primarily, a form of communication, rich in symbols and mythology and closely constrained by certain rules. To be effective,

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public rhetoric must draw on values and concerns widely shared and easily understood by its audience. A rhetoric that ignores or eschews the language of common discourse on the central problems of the day closes itself off as a matter of course from any sizeable audience, limiting its own influence. If a rhetoric fails to reflect the speaker’s genuine views on fundamental issues, it runs the risk over time of creating false public expectations and lays the basis of politically dangerous misunderstanding. If it indulges in blatant inconsistency, it eventually pays the price of diminished force and credibility.… Indeed, comparisons of public rhetoric with private statements, a sensitive test that cynics might justifiably rely on, suggest that the policy elite do recognize the cost of violating these rules and do generally observe them. Interpretative naiveté may reside not in taking rhetoric seriously but rather in failing to listen carefully for its recurrent themes and values.17

Accordingly, the frequent references made to China’s Open Door in the rhetoric of Truman, Acheson, Dulles, Merchant, and Rusk could well be a strong testimony that they were committed to that policy objective. To be sure, one can certainly explain strategic ambiguity from a pure realist, dual-deterrence theory, but that would lack a more substantive and in-depth understanding of the “logics” behind that policy choice. A theory of ideas, in sum, provides “meaning” to the interpretation of national interest and explains why and how the United States has chosen strategic ambiguity over other alternatives in managing the Taiwan Strait conflict. Lastly, critics of American foreign policy have made the right observation that liberalism could actually generate illiberal and expansionist policies abroad through the imposition of American values, powers, and practices in a universalistic or absolutist manner.18 Nonetheless, to the extent that strategic ambiguity is a manifestation of America’s core liberal ideas, identity, and interest, China and Taiwan, while maybe not agreeing with Washington, could at least trust that America harbors no intent to push for either reunification or Taiwan’s independence. Any solution is acceptable as long as it is achieved through peace and mutual consent. The Future of U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations after the 2012 Elections

A few more words would be appropriate to make the connection between Wilson’s Open Door and the future of U.S.-PRC-Taiwan

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relations. U.S. policymakers, scholars, and analysts are highly alarmed at China’s recent expanding diplomatic, military, and economic initiatives in Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe. Washington’s frequent confrontations with Beijing over its human rights record, trade imbalances, currency values, and Chinese maritime ambitions in the East and South China Seas suggest a rising revisionist power aiming to challenge the existing balance of power structure.19 “A fast growing GNP,” observed Aaron Friedberg, “has made it comparatively easy for the PRC to sustain a large and expanding military effort and in recent years, China’s spending on [military modernization] has grown at an impressive pace.”20 On the other hand, the deepening of U.S.-China relations has also increased possibilities for sustained worldwide economic stability, the peaceful resolution of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, combating terrorism, and the successful management of climate change and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.21 This pattern of constrained competitions between Beijing and Washington explains why the Clinton administration described the PRC as a “strategic partner,” the Bush administration called it a “responsible stakeholder,” and the Obama administration dubbed Sino-U.S. relations “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive.”22 At present, the PRC still lags behind the United States in terms of its military capabilities and technologies, and available evidence does not clearly establish China as a revisionist state trying to balance against or wanting to undermine an “Americandominated unipolar system and replace it with a multipolar system.”23 Thus, America’s inherent concerns about China’s rise are justified precisely because Beijing is still an authoritarian regime espousing, though to a smaller extent, Communist ideology.24 “If China does not change,” Friedberg contended, “certain persistent features of America’s domestic regime appear likely to incline the United States toward conflict with the PRC.”25 In accordance with democratic peace theory, liberal states have incompatible national interests with authoritarian regimes. However, the Wilsonian vision of an Open China has never ceased. In fact, Clinton, Bush, and Obama have remained committed to multilateral economic, political, and cultural engagements to foster greater liberalization and democratization in the mainland. Since the mid-1990s, engagers have argued that, instead of isolating or containing China, the United States should “promote Chinese societal, [economic], and political interests in stable U.S.-China relations and in a stable international order. These interests will [in turn] affect PRC calculations regarding the value of revisionist foreign policies.”26

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In essence, then, what worries Washington is not China’s rising power per se but the regime type in Beijing that would utilize its newly accumulated economic wealth and military capabilities. Furthermore, the rapid emergence of Chinese economic and military powers further intensified Beijing’s nationalist appeal for territorial integrity and unification.27 “Nationalism,” in the words of Robert Sutter, “supports the CCP administration’s high priority to prevent Taiwan independence and restore this and other territory taken from China by foreign powers when China was weak and vulnerable during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”28 Thus, despite President Hu Jintao’s call for a peaceful and harmonious development, 29 the Chinese Communist Party authority views the ultimate reunification with Taiwan a critical source of their political ruling legitimacy and, thus, a major foreign policy priority. Frictions and policy divergence between China and the United States are also likely to escalate with China’s coming 5th generation leadership that is due in late 2012 at the 18th CCP Party Congress. These so-called “taizidang” or princeling leaders, headed by the new PRC president and CCP general secretary to be, Xi Jinping, are considered the “royal family” of the CCP and its members regarded as highly nationalistic and loyal to the regime that their fathers built after 1949.30 They are likely to be more intransigent on various foreign policy stances, including Taiwan. For its part, Taiwan’s vibrant democracy has attracted greater support from the United States in the last 20 years. Their closer ties and ideological affinity have, at various times, jeopardized U.S.-China relations, even though Washington always managed to reposition itself as the “neutral pivot” in the strategic triangle. As we’ve seen, TaiwanChina relations deteriorated tremendously under the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations. Since May 2008, however, the promainland Kuomintang has returned to power under Ma Ying-jeou, who, from the outset, has pledged to stabilize cross-strait relations under the 1992 consensus, an understanding that there is only one China, though disagreement persists on how to define it.31 Chapter 2 pointed out that since May 2008, Taipei and Beijing have reached various economic and non-political accords. The bilateral détente culminated in the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010, which fosters greater cross-strait economic integration. ECFA has also provided opportunities for Taiwan to negotiate FTAs with Singapore, New Zealand, and possibly Japan.32 Tensions over the Taiwan Strait, therefore, appear to be subsiding, prompting one Economist commentator to suggest that “relations between Taiwan and

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China may be better than at any time since Nationalist forces routed in China’s civil war fled for Taiwan in 1949.”33 Yet, at the same time, domestic political opposition on the island has also increased, due to fears that Ma’s mainland policy would lend opportunity for Beijing to endanger Taiwan’s sovereignty and autonomy.34 In the less than two months before Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election, Ma’s popularity plummeted substantially, hence closing the lead margin that he had enjoyed over his DPP opponent Tsai Ing-wen.35 One reason for Ma’s declining support was allegedly due to his proposal, in November 2011, of “cautiously considering” signing a peace accord with China within the next decade. Even though the president pledged that the accord must meet three conditions,36 the DPP and its political ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), voiced strident opposition, and the Taiwanese public was divided over this issue. In order to reassure his voters and soothe the public doubt, Ma eschewed his proposition. In fact, fearing that Ma would be pressured to retract his pro-China stance and that Tsai would be elected instead,37 Beijing had been unwilling to renounce coercion to take back Taiwan or to disarm the 1200+ short and intermediate range ballistic missiles installed across the island. A Tsai Ing-wen administration would certainly strengthen Taiwan’s relations with the United States and Japan, but her firm rejection of the 1992 consensus and pro-independence orientations could create greater instabilities in the Taiwan Strait. More specifically, the return of the DPP could embolden the more hawkish elements in Beijing, who have long criticized Hu Jintao’s peaceful approach to Taiwan. The new Xi Jinping administration might, therefore, become tougher on Taipei.38 In the worst-case scenario, cross-strait relations might retrogress to the crisis eras of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. Given these worries, the Obama administration, had, on several occasions, revealed indirectly its preference for Ma, insinuating that Tsai could disrupt cross-strait peace and complicate Sino-U.S. relations.39 President Ma’s successful reelection on January 14, 2012, however, has put these concerns to rest and suggested the continuation of the existing cross-strait peaceful development on the basis of the 1992 consensus. The president’s peace accord initiative reflected more of his campaign strategy to energize his KMT supporters than his genuine will. In his victory speech, Ma remarked, “The people gave their approval of our efforts to put aside disagreements and focus on peace on both sides of the straits, turning crisis into economic opportunity.” Knowing that unification is highly unpopular in Taiwan, the president also stressed, “There is no rush to open up political dialogue [with China]…. It’s not a looming issue.”40 Indeed, despite the KMT’s win in both the presidential

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and legislative races, its leading margin, compared to the 2008 elections, has been vastly shrinking,41 and a substantial portion of the Taiwanese people—46 percent of the voters—voted for Tsai’s “Taiwan consensus”42 platform. Hence, Ma’s second term is facing greater constraint and is more likely to focus on strengthening economic integration between Taiwan and China than making any major leaps on the political front. Nonetheless, to hedge against the DPP’s potential comeback in the future, Beijing may find it imperative to step up pressure on Taipei to tackle thornier political and security concerns while the KMT is in power. “Rather than stabilizing the cross-strait status quo,” in the words of Daniel Lynch, “Ma’s [re]election might usher in a new period of instability in which Chinese demands on Taiwan intensify.”43 These may include calling Taiwan to terminate its military ties with Washington and to formalize the PRC’s one-China principle into a legal agreement. Thus, a daunting challenge for Ma Ying-jeou is to strike a balance between courting China and defending Taiwan’s security. To do so, Taipei will continue to observe the 1992 consenus while deepening the island’s defense preparations and security coordination with the United States in order to gain a stronger footing to interact with Beijing. Needless to say, Taiwan’s liberal democracy is a major source of precariousness in cross-strait relations. But, a democratic outcome represents the genuine popular will and its free marketplace of ideas. As Taiwan’s democracy matures, party rotations and policy changes through competitive elections have become the norm. Consequently, Beijing should come to terms with that reality and learn to show greater respect to voices and political views that are contradictory to its own.44 As a matter of fact, Taiwan’s democratic experience may actually be conducive for China’s own political transformation in the future. The Washington Post commented that: “Taiwan’s orderly election process…nonetheless delivered a rebuke to the Communist Party, which has long sought to present democracy as a recipe for chaos and a Western import incompatible with Chinese values.”45 In a similar vein, the Obama White House congratulated Ma’s reelection, praising Taiwan as “one of the great success stories in Asia.”46 For its part, Taipei’s leadership should also understand that democratic politics does not give it the excuse to capriciously jeopardize Taiwan’s national security interests or to plunge cross-strait relations into unnecessary confrontations. Responsible governance is precisely one of the virtues of liberal democracy. In any event, the Obama administration has remained steadfast on insisting on peace and stability in cross-strait relations.47 No matter who

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wins the White House in the November 2012 elections, the United States government will be likely to continue enhancing its influence in Asia and adhering to the strategic ambiguity policy. As this book has discussed, Washington has a consistent liberal interest in the implementation of that policy. While Ma Ying-jeou’s “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” policy seems to coincide with America’s Wilsonian ideals, the U.S. could not and should not renounce strategic ambiguity, as either Taiwan or China may still unilaterally change the status quo. America’s arms sales commitments to Taiwan help to bolster the island’s democracy and its position in dealing with a rising China. At the same time, Washington must persist in reminding Taipei, whether a KMT or DPP administration, that any provocative actions that generate conflicts and frictions with Beijing would be counterproductive to cross-strait peace and detrimental to America’s interest in China’s Open Door.

Notes 1

Ma’s election in March 2008 was a landslide victory, as he won 58.5 percent of the vote whereas his DPP challenger, Frank Hsieh, got 41.5 percent. The difference was 17 percent. The January 2012 election also saw James Soong, the chairman of the People’s First Party, joining the race. Soong was originally expected to siphon off as much as a tenth of the electorate from Ma. Yet, he only received 2.8 percent of the vote. The election had 74 percent of Taiwan’s 18 million eligible voters turned out to vote. See Andrew Jacobs, “President of Taiwan is Re-elected, a Result that Appears to Please China,” The New York Times, January 14, 2012. 2 Nancy Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity,” p. 187. 3 Phillip Saunders & Scott Kastner, “Bridging over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement,” International Security. Vo. 33, No. 4, (Spring, 2009), p. 88. On a good overview of Taiwan’s democratic transition process and the deepening of Taiwanese sentiments, see Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters, Chapter 4. 4 Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security. Vol. 30, No. 2, (Fall 2005), p. 23. 5 Nancy Tucker & Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” pp. 26-27. 6 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 7 Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations,” p. 30. 8 Nancy Tucker & Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” pp. 35-36. 9 John G. Ruggie, “The Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4, (Spring 1997), p. 111. 10 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China, p. 48.

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11

Ibid., p. 68. “Estimate of a Princeton Graduate interested in the Far East,” July 18, 1951, Livingston Merchant Papers/Re: China, Japan, and the Far East, 19481951/Box1, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 13 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, pp. 8-11. 14 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, p. 5. 15 Han’s Morgenthau’s “Forward” in Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. viii. 16 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interest, pp. 114-115. 17 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 15. 18 See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America; William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions; and Michael Desch, “America’s Liberal Illiberalism.” 19 For discussions about whether China is a revisionist or status quo power, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”International Security. Vol. 27, No. 4, (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56; Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations”; and Robert Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2010), pp. 22-42. 20 Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of US-China Relations,” p. 18. 21 Ibid, p. 8. 22 “A Wary Respect: A Special Report on China and America,” The Economist, October 24, 2009, p. 15. 23 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status-Quo Power?” p. 49. 24 Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters, p. 189. 25 Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations,” p. 31. 26 Robert Ross, “Engagement in U.S. China Policy,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., Engaging China, (New York: Routledge, 1999), p 185. 27 Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Chapters 5 and 7. 28 Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 140. 29 On PRC’s peaceful development grand strategic choices in the Twentyfirst century, See Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press 2008), Chapter 7; Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, pp. 141-144; Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 2-3; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 4-7; June Dreyer, China’s Political System, pp. 351-352; and Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No.2, (March/April 2011), pp. 68-79. 30 Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 94-95. For a good overview of the princelings 5th generation and their background, see also Bruce Gilley, “Deng Xiaoping and His Successors (1976 to the Present),” in William Joseph, ed., Politics in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 103-125; and Cheng Li, “China’s Communist Party-State: The Structure and Dynamics of Power,” in William Joseph, ed., Politics in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 165-191. 12

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31 Bonnie Glaser & Brittany Billingsley, “Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential Elections and Cross-Strait Relations,” A Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies, (November 2011), p. 2. 32 Ibid., p. 2. 33 “Strait Talking,” The Economist, January 2, 2010, p. 32. 34 Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire Straits,” Foreign Affairs. (January/February 2010), p. 54. 35 According to Taiwan’s public opinion polls from November 12, 2011 to January 4, 2012, Ma was, on average, only slightly winning over Tsai Ing-wen. His lead was within the margins of error. The polls conducted by Taiwan’s two largest newspapers, The United Daily and The China Times showed that Ma generally had about between 42 and 44 percent whereas Tsai had about 37 to 39 percent. The third-party (People’s First Party) candidate, James Soong, had roughly 8 to 9 percent of support. The poll results can be accessed: http://mag.udn.com/mag/vote2012/storypage.jsp?f_ART_ID=351865 36 Those three conditions are: (1) the accord must win strong support from Taiwan’s people; (2) it must meet the actual needs of Taiwan; and (3) it must be supervised by Taiwan’s legislature. Moreover, Ma also added that the government must obtain the approval of the people through a national plebiscite before signing the peace agreement. See Bonnie Glaser & Brittany Billingsley, “Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential Elections and Cross-Strait Relations,” pp.4-5. 37 Tsai, in her policy paper released in August 2011, posited that while China is a good opportunity for Taiwan’s economy, it remains an “unpredictable factor” and “carries an unfriendly attitude toward Taiwan’s sovereignty.” She believed that Taipei and Beijing should not negotiate on the basis of one China, but rather should “reach an understanding that is based on reality and the fact that the two sides are different.” Instead of the 1992 consensus, therefore, Tsai endorsed the so-called “Taiwan consensus,” in which she pledged to employ democratic processes to formulate a consensus on Taiwan’s China policy. See Bonnie Glaser & Brittany Billingsley, “Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential Elections and Cross-Strait Relations,” pp.5-6. 38 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 39 The Obama administration had several major considerations. First, 2012 is also a big political transition period for both the United States and China. A Taiwan Strait crisis would not be optimal for all parties concerned. Second, since December 2011, U.S.-China relations have entered another turbulent juncture as President Obama unveiled America’s new grand strategic posture— returning to the Asian Pacific. Despite Washington’s reassurance, Beijing perceived such a move as United States’ containment of China. A DPP victory in Taiwan and its resumption of hardline anti-China policy could reinforce the PRC’s suspicion that the United States was backing Taiwanese independence to weaken China. Before the election, the United States sent in several highranking officials to visit the Ma administration. In late December, the AIT announced that Taiwan had been nominated as a candidate for the U.S. visa waiver program. This was interpreted as giving President Ma another boost for his foreign policy accomplishments. More interestingly, in less than 72 hours before the election, a former AIT official, Douglas Paal, explicitly said, in an in-

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terview in Taipei, that Ma’s win will be a relief for the United States as it means that “there will not be a new and undetermined element that could raise tensions and hurt chances of Chinese cooperation on North Korea, the South China Sea, and Iran.” Though Paal clarified that he was speaking merely in the capacity as a private citizen and scholar, and the AIT also reaffirmed America’s neutral stance in Taiwan’s elections, his comments did stir up controversies and prompted the DPP to accuse the Obama administration of seeking to influence the electoral outcome in subtle ways. See Andrew Higgins, “Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s Pro-China President, Wins Reelection,” The Washington Post, January 14, 2012. See also Andrew Jacobs, “Former U.S. Diplomat Rattles Taiwan before Election,” The New York Times, January 13, 2012. The Obama administration’s new policy toward the Asian Pacific is outlined in Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011. It can be accessed: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/ americas_pacific_century?page=full. 40 Andrew Jacobs, “President of Taiwan is Re-elected,” The New York Times, January 14, 2012. See also “Ma Shengxuan Tan Liangan, Bu Ji Yu Zhengzhi Xieshang [President Ma Talks about the Cross-Strait Relations after His Election Victory: No Rush on Political Negotiations],” The China Times, January 15, 2012; and Andrew Higgins, “Taiwan Unlikely to Move to Reunify with China, Despite Ma Ying-jeou’s Reelection,” The Washington Post, January 15, 2012. 41 The KMT still wins a majority of the Taiwan’s legislature. But, its seats have decreased from 82 (or 75 percent of the legislature seats) in 2008 to 64 (or 56 percent of the legislative seats) in 2012. On the other hand, the DPP’s seats increased from 27 (23 percent of the seats) in 2008 to 40 (35 percent of the seats) in 2012. The 2012 Taiwan legislative election results can be accessed: http://mag.udn.com/mag/vote2012/storypage.jsp?f_MAIN_ID=466&f_SUB_ID =5223&f_ART_ID=365953. 42 Tsai’s Taiwan consensus essentially views KMT’s interpretation of the 1992 consensus as overly naïve. First, the DPP has explained that if the world has one China, that China must be the PRC, not the ROC. Second, in 1992, the then KMT government was still an authoritarian state; therefore, even if a consensus were reached in 1992 with China, it was undemocratic. The Taiwan consensus states that any agreement with profound implication for Taiwan’s future must be attained through popular referendum or any other democratic procedures. Nevertheless, Ma’s 1992 consensus platform ultimately attracted the endorsement of many prominent industrial entrepreneurs and business elites in Taiwan. See Daniel Lynch, “Why Ma Won the Elections and What’s Next for Taiwan and China,” Foreign Affairs (January 15, 2012). This online article can be accessed: www.foreignaffairs.com/print/134292. 43 Ibid. 44 In recent years, some scholars in China began to advocate the importance to deal with the DPP on a more pragmatic basis, given the party’s robust popu-

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lar support in Taiwan. While Beijing was pleased about Ma’s reelection and the prospect of peaceful cross-strait relations in the next 4 years, the official Xinhua News Agency acknowledged that the “situation in the island is still complicated,” and that “there are still some long-term disputes and divergences existing between the two sides that await resolving.” The “Taiwan independence stance will continue to haunt the cross-strait relations development.” See “Ma’s Reelection Opens New Chances for Peaceful Cross-Strait Relations,” The Xinhua News Agency, January 15, 2012. It can be accessed at: news.xinhuanet.com/English/China/2012-01/15/c_131360614.htm. 45 Andrew Higgins, “Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s Pro-China President, Wins Reelection,” The Washington Post, January 14, 2012. People in Mainland China were also excited about Taiwan’s electoral process, hoping they could one day enjoy the fruits of democracy. A Chinese blogger wrote, “On the other side of the sea, Taiwan erected a mirror. And on this side of the sea, we saw ourselves in the future.” See Andrew Jacobs, “Taiwan Vote Stirs Chinese Hopes for Democracy,” The New York Times, January 16, 2012. 46 “U.S. Congratulates Taiwan President on Reelection,” AFP, January 14, 2012. 47 Bonnie Glaser & Brittany Billingsley, “Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential Elections and Cross-Strait Relations,” pp.13-14. See also Bo Zhiyue, “Obama’s China Policy,” pp. 263-264.

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Index Acheson, Dean, 11, 210, 230n40, 250, 251; accused of being Communist sympathizer by China Lobby, 12; agreement with Merchant analysis of independence movements, 165; belief in monolithic world Communist menace, 16; confirms inevitable victory of Chinese Communist Party, 110–111; considers trusteeship plan, 186; continued support for diplomatic and economic aid, 201; criticism of Chiang Kai-shek by, 101; domination of U.S. China-Taiwan policy, 231n44; engages in new round of policy reviews on Taiwan, 190–193; feels obligation to protect interests of Formosa, 24; under fire from Congress over Taiwan, 203–209; holds goal of democratic government for China, 98; National Security Council and, 157, 158; non-endorsement of independence or U.S. intervention in Taiwan, 24; objectives for China, 97–106; opposition to early recognition of PRC, 17; orders closedown of official establishments and withdrawal of personnel from PRC, 220; preference for defense of Taiwan through nonmilitary means, 5; presents China options to Truman, 120; promises to discuss Taiwan situation with selected governments, 191; promotes creation of wedge between People's Republic of China and Soviet Union, 200, 201; rejection of option to recognize PRC and abandon Taiwan, 4; restrains Truman from

confrontation with PRC, 122; rules out recognition as viable policy, 120, 121; seeks British opinion on Taiwan issues, 192; seeks to dissuade other governments from recognition, 121; sees U.S. as China's only friend, 17; Sino-Soviet split policy, 197; sought to drive CCP away from Stalin, 106; states that CCP a tool of Russian imperialism, 105; tries to improve relations between People's Republic of China and U.S., 13, 14; Truman's support for ChinaTaiwan policy of, 197–198; uncertain about Sun Li-jen, 161; urges Truman show tolerance toward CCP, 118; views on Chinese Communist Party, 103– 106; views on recognition of PRC, 112 Adams, John, 84 Afghanistan: diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 Almond-Lippmann consensus, 31n62 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), 39–40 Anti-Secession Law (2005), 53 Armitage, Richard, 53 “Asialationists,” 177n50 Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), 26n6, 68n109, 71n136; dialogue with Straits Exchange Foundation, 55 Australia: postponement of diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 Ballantine, Joseph, 173n11, 232n59 Bandung Conference (1955), 62n9 Barkley, Alben, 112, 154 Belgium: unequal treaties with China by, 17 Berger, Samuel, 51

279

280

Index

Biden, Joseph, 58 Blake, Ralph, 145 Boxer Rebellion (1900), 19, 20 Bradley, Omar, 191, 193, 199, 200, 201, 205, 230n40, 235n94 Brezhnev, Leonid, 36 Bridges, Styles, 11, 185, 208, 215, 236n103 Britain: agreement that Taiwan be returned to the Republic of China after World War II, 42–43; asked by U.S. not to recognize PRC, 121; commercial interests in China, 17, 18; diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4; financial consortium set up by, 21, 22, 89– 96; loss of interest in Open Door policy, 18; requests Open Door notes from U.S., 17; unequal treaties with China by, 17 Brodie, Bernard: China Round Table and, 119 Bryan, William Jennings, 21, 86; opposition to financial consortium, 90; opposition to Japanese administration of China, 94; relays Wilson's positions to Japan, 93 Bush, George H.W., 65n39, 68n99 Bush, George W., 255; accuses Clinton of being overly conciliatory to PRC, 52; arms sales to Taiwan, 52, 64n37; campaigns on policy of greater support for Taiwan, 52; need for PRC cooperation in war on terrorism, 53, 70n126; PRC policy of, 52–54, 65n37; rebukes hardline moves by Chen Shiubian, 53; reliance on coercive diplomacy in Taiwan Strait crises, 35; views PRC as strategic competitor, 52; Wilsonian Open Door internationalism and, 85 Bush Doctrine, 85 Butterworth, W. Walton, 110, 115, 122, 137n217, 150, 179n76, 179n81, 185, 186, 187, 227n10, 229n33; comments on sufficiency of resources on Taiwan, 198;

disagrees with Johnson, 195; meets JSC on military assistance to Taiwan, 200; rejects National Security Council advocacy policy for Taiwan, 194; seeks British opinion on Taiwan issues, 192 Byrnes, James, 98, 104, 129n125, 133n167, 210 Cabot, John, 113, 164 Cairo Declaration (1943), 142, 188, 198, 203, 204, 205, 206, 216, 218, 219, 227n10, 245 Canada: postponement of diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 Capitalism: free-market, 81 Carter, Jimmy, 38, 39, 64n30; establishment of diplomatic relations with People's Republic of China, 244; formalization of commitments to Taiwan/China by, 1; signs trade agreement with PRC, 62n16; strategic ambiguity and, 3, 4; U.S.-China Joint Communiqué and, 1 Case, Everett, 232n59 CCP. See Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 148, 149, 164 Chen Cheng, 147, 158, 160, 161, 165, 167; blames violence on proJapanese elites, 174n24; favoritism to by Chiang Kai-shek, 162; replaced as governor, 195 “Chen-Chiang” talks, 71n136 Chen Mingshu, 114, 117 Chen Shiu-bian, 26n6, 247, 256, 257; accuses U.S. of hypocrisy, 70n122; corruption scandals and, 53; elected to presidency of Taiwan, 6; “4 nos and 1 shall not” policy, 52, 53, 69n116; moves toward more hard-line China policy, 53; support for gradual liberalization, 52–53 Chen Yi, 146, 174n31, 175n36; alienation of Taiwanese by, 147; oppressive governance of, 144;

Index 281

proclaims martial law on Taiwan, 144 Chen Yunlin, 71n136 Chiang Kai-shek, 1, 172n3; approves naval bases on Taiwan, 172n9; attempts to reconquer China, 150; to be accorded status of refugee on Taiwan, 229n22; confidence in Chen Cheng, 160, 161, 162; contacts with Dulles, 213, 214; corruption in administration of, 101; criticized by Acheson, 101; demands for CCP to surrender territory to KMT, 100; elected president, 177n67; inability to govern, 241n143; liberal reforms on, 146; moves government from mainland to Taiwan, 195; nominal unification of China by, 97; opposition to initiative to retake mainland by, 4; opposition to “two Chinas” policy, 36; planned coup against, 241n147; potential benefits of severing relations with, 5; pressured to soften aggressive moves, 48; recognition of regime as legal Chinese government, 97; resumes presidency, 222; resumes war against People's Republic of China, 101; seen as poor military strategist, 101–102; tightens internal security measures, 147; tries to ameliorate effects of Chen Yi's misrule, 146, 147; U.S. informs need for effective use of existing resources, 193 Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 142, 214 China. See also People's Republic of China (PRC); Taiwan: American material interests in, 87; American missionaries in, 86; American myths about, 16, 17; belief that U.S. destined to guide Chinese toward liberal democracy in, 16; Boxer Rebellion in, 19, 20; civil war in, 87; collapse of Nationalist Party in, 219; communist control of due to collapse of KMT, 200; defeats

by European powers, 17; defined as “Nationalist China” rather than “Communist China,” 198; demand for reparations and concessions from European powers, 17; democratic individualism and, 17; “league of predators” in, 21; Maritime Customs Service, 19; postway conception of, 42–43; Qing Dynasty in, 17, 19, 21, 86; in Sino-Japanese War, 17; Truman calls for respect for territorial integrity of, 204; unprepared for democracy, 88; Wilsonian Open Door internationalism and, 85– 89; Wilson's vision for, 77–122 China Aid Act (1948), 12, 150, 155, 161, 177n50, 178n73, 198; extension of, 166–170; moratorium of, 169 China Lobby, 10–13, 30n52; accuses opponents as Communist conspirators, 11; continues attacks on Truman, 195; feeling that United States missed opportunity to normalize relations with China, 10; forces Truman to continue aid to Chiang Kai-shek, 11; “friends of Chiang Kai-shek,” 10; holds Truman administration responsible for loss of China, 214, 215; investigation of by Truman administration, 233n71; malicious accusations by, 11; prevents recognition of People's Republic of China, 11; threatens to upset European Recovery Plan, 11; wages campaign against State Department, 208 China White Paper (1949), 17, 156, 179n81, 215 Chinese Communist Party (CCP): American knowledge of, 132n160; Bureau of Foreign Affairs, 113; capture of mainland China by, 10; civil war with KMT, 1; cooperative relations with Soviet Union, 14; described as “evolutionary” rather than

282

Index

“revolutionary,” 133n167; firm establishment of, 112; hopes for marginalization of, 102; initial positive impressions of, 103; liberal/radical wings of, 117; membership, 130n137; need for Moscow's political/economic support, 116; refusal to reconcile with Nationalist Party, 101–103; said to be nationalistic and different than Russian communists, 119, 132n161; signs “Double Ten Agreement,” 100; strong anti-Americanism of, 111; support among peasants, 103; as tools of Moscow, 16; U.S. stance against, 13–16; views U.S. as primary impediment to reunification, 3; violence toward American diplomatic personnel by, 112 Chinese Democratic League, 114 Chinese Relief Mission, 229n33 Cleveland, Harlan, 229n33 Climate change, 53 Clinton, Bill, 68n99, 255; attempts repair of deteriorating SinoAmerican relations, 51; declaration of “three nos” by, 51, 68n107, 68n109; disagreements with Congress over Taiwan security, 75n173; grants visa to Lee Teng-hui, 49, 50; insists on assent of Taiwanese in resolution of differences, 1; makes clear that Taiwan Strait conflicts must be solved peacefully, 51–52; orders aircraft carrier groups to Taiwan Strait, 51; pacification of People's Republic of China by, 50; PRC policy of, 49–52; reliance on coercive diplomacy in Taiwan Strait crises, 35; restates support of “one China” policy, 51 Clubb, O. Edmund, 23, 117, 220 Cohen-Tucker thesis, 13, 17, 250 Connally, Tom, 203 Coolidge, Calvin, 97 Council of Foreign Ministers, 97, 210 Cultural Revolution, 36, 62n9

Davies, John, 11, 115, 133n167, 208; considers trusteeship plan, 186; disclaimer of designs on Taiwan, 187, 230n38 De Lacy, Hugh, 102 Democracy, 81; engagement in foreign wars and, 124n13; liberal, 16, 78, 224, 248, 258; as natural phenomenon, 81; pacific unions in, 79; right to be free from foreign intervention and, 78; in Taiwan, 5; U.S. obligation to promote spread of, 83; war for, 83 Democratic peace theory, 78 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 26n6, 52, 53, 257 Deng Xiaoping, 39, 65n39; conditions for normalization of relations and, 64n30; “one country, two systems” policy, 46 Deterrence: dual, 45; logic of, 4; partial failure of, 47; pivotal, 45 Dewey, Thomas, 209 Diplomacy: coercive, 35, 45, 60; “dollar,” 20 Dixie Mission, 103, 133n162 Dole, Bob, 75n173 “Double Ten Agreement,” 100 Draper, W.H., 153 Dulles, John Foster, 48, 251; appointment as foreign policy consultant, 185; belief in moral obligation to Taiwanese, 215; belief that foreign policy predicated on fundamentals of faith, 211; contacts with Chiang Kai-shek, 213, 214; discusses more active approaches to safeguard Taiwan, 223; emphasis on peaceful coexistence with Soviet Union, 237n115; feels KMT collapse is inevitable, 214; feels obligation to protect interests of Formosa, 24; interventionist proposals by, 5; joins State Department, 209–213; meets Chiang Kai-shek, 214; non-endorsement of

Index 283

independence or U.S. intervention in Taiwan, 24; opposition to recognition of People's Republic of China, 215, 217; pillars of peace, 211, 237n115; preferred Taiwanese to choose own future, 176n44; regards Taiwan as “former dependent territory,” 176n44; rejection of option to recognize PRC and abandon Taiwan, 4; at San Francisco Conference on World Organization, 210; serves as bridge between Truman administration and Republican opposition, 210; shares vision of Wilsonian Open Door internationalism, 210; strategic ambiguity plan with Rusk, 220– 225; support for KMT regime in Taiwan, 36, 214; sympathy for China, 212; tells NSC Taiwan to be dealt with on defacto basis, 48; tries to convince Truman to take more assertive stance on Taiwan, 217; War or Peace, 212 East China Sea, 2 Economic: dependence, 57; development, 155; integration, 57; interdependence, 83; liberalism, 80; liberalization, 5, 55; penetration, 80; reconstruction, 117; reforms, 102 Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), 137n217, 150, 153, 159, 162, 198, 227n6, 229n33; advisement on operation of industry and transportation by, 155; continuation of rural and industrial reconstruction programs, 151, 187; industrial and rural programs, 181n106; industrial projects and, 162; provision of consumption commodities to Taiwan, 155 Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC), 55 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), 55, 256;

benefits of, 56; customs cooperation in, 55; dispute resolution in, 55; “early harvest” agreement, 55, 56; economic implications of, 56; security concerns and, 56–58; signing by Taiwan and People's Republic of China, 2; Taiwan Strait policy and, 54–61; trade facilitation in, 55 Edgar, Donald, 162, 188 Eisenhower, Dwight, 161; authorized to employ military action to protect Taiwan, 49; follows strategic ambiguity policy, 36; insists on American approval for offensive actions by Taiwan, 48; pressures Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw forces from offshore islands, 48, 63n29; reliance on coercive diplomacy in Taiwan Strait crises, 35; support for KMT regime in Taiwan, 36 Eki Hioki, 92 European Recovery Plan (ERP), 11 Fairbank, John, 232n59; China Round Table and, 119 Feis, Herbert, 129n125 Ferguson, Homer, 196 Finland: diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” 62n9 Ford, J.F., 164 Foreign policy: belief that security is protected by expansion of democracy, 84; China-Taiwan, 243–250; commitment to liberal neutrality in, 81; driven by place in international system, 77; hypocrisy in, 70n122; irrelevancy of public opinion in, 31n62; liberalism and, 16–24, 78–79, 253; material power capabilities and, 77; presidential power and, 28n36; Taiwan Strait and, 16–24; warnings against entangling alliances in, 81–82; Wilsonian liberalism and, 81

284

Index

Formosa, 142. See Taiwan Formosan League for Reemancipation (FLR), 163, 164 Formosa Resolution (1955), 49 Forrestal, James, 150 Fosdick, Raymond, 232n59; China Round Table and, 119 Foster, John Watson, 209, 212 Foster, William, 230n40 France: financial consortium set up by, 21, 22, 89–96; postponement of diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4; unequal treaties with China by, 17 Franks, Oliver, 121 Freeman, Charles Jr., 60 Geneva Conference (1954), 62n9 Germany: financial consortium set up by, 21, 22, 89–96; unequal treaties with China by, 17 Great American Experiment, 212 Great Leap Forward, 48, 62n9 Hadley, Stephen, 54 Haig, Alexander, 65n39 Harding, Warren: commitment to Open Door policy, 96–97 Harriman, Averell, 98 Harrison, Benjamin, 209 Hay, John, 17, 18, 20, 85, 248 Helms, Jesse, 75n173 Hippisley, Alfred, 19, 20 Hoffman, Paul, 137n217, 151, 153 Hoover, Herbert, 204; refuses to recognize legitimacy of Japanese claim over Manchuria, 97; Stimson Doctrine and, 97 House, Edward, 88 Huang Hua, 113–117 Hu Jintao, 54, 70n122, 256, 257; responses to Taiwan's presidents, 2; welcomes positive development in cross-strait relations, 54 Hukuang Railway, 89 Hurley, Patrick, 102, 133n163, 133n166, 133n168 Hu Yaobang, 65n39

Imperialism, 194, 248; Soviet, 122 India: asked by U.S. not to recognize PRC, 121; diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 Iran: nuclear ambitions of, 5 Isolationism, 23, 82, 96, 211; Jeffersonian, 80 Israel: diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 Italy: postponement of diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 Japan: attack on Pearl Harbor, 252; declaration of war against Germany, 92; economic recovery in, 110; grants lip-service to Open Door policy, 94; interest in Shandong, 22; invasion of Manchuria, 97; need for reconstruction in, 136n205; perception that U.S. was greatest impediment to domination of China, 96; postponement of diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4; postwar economic recovery, 5; prewar trading system in, 136n205; relinquishes sovereignty over Taiwan, 173n11, 176n44; signs Treaty of Taipei, 43; in Sino-Japanese War, 17; Twenty-One Demands presented to China, 92; unequal treaties with China by, 17 Jefferson, Thomas, 81, 84 Jenkins, Edward, 88 Jessup, Philip, 179n81, 232n59; China Round Table and, 119; discusses more active approaches to safeguard Taiwan, 223 Jiang Zemin: demands United States abide by “one China,” 50 Johnson, Louis, 193, 197, 201, 204, 230n40, 231n44; attack on Taiwan policy by, 194; belief that Taiwan needs more military assistance, 194; close ties with KMT regime, 199; disagreement with Butterworth, 195; politically motivated stand on Taiwan, 199; relations with Chiang family,

Index 285

233n71; urges Truman use stronger actions in Taiwan, 195 Johnson, Lyndon, 137n210; follows strategic ambiguity policy, 36; interest in “two Chinas,” 36 Johnson, U. Alexis, 62n9 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): argues for strategic military importance of Taiwan 149, 149; assessment of Taiwan strategic significance with recommendations to National Security Council, 153; consensus that prevention of communist control of Taiwan of utmost importance, 149, 150; meet on military assistance to Taiwan, 200; recommend policy of diplomatic and economic assistance for Taiwan, 191–193; recommends against military action in Taiwan, 165, 182n126; rejection of military action in Taiwan, 191–193 Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), 155, 167, 181n106, 227n6 Judd, Walter, 11 Kant, Immanuel, 79 Kee, John, 203 Kellogg, Frank, 97 Kennan, George, 19, 107; considers trusteeship plan, 186; disclaimer of designs on Taiwan, 187, 230n38; fear that CCP would dominate Taiwan, 188; points out inconclusive status of Taiwan, 218; PPS-53 and, 187–189; proposes removal of Nationalist administration and establishment of provisional U.S. regime, 187– 189 Kennedy, John F.: follows strategic ambiguity policy, 36; interest in “two Chinas,” 36 Kerr, George, 142, 145, 146, 147, 163, 173n17, 174n23, 176n39 Kissinger, Henry, 43; insists on interest in peaceful resolution of Taiwan Strait conflict, 37;

interest in exploiting rift between People's Republic of China and Soviet Union, 36; on recognition of People's Republic of China, 36; tries to minimize significance of Taiwan as issue for PRC, 36; on Wilsonianism, 82 KMT. See Nationalist Party (KMT) Knowland, William, 11, 202, 203, 207, 215 Knox, Philander, 20 Kohlberg, Alfred, 11 Koo Chen-fu, 26n6 Korean War: as cause of U.S./PRC hostilities, 15, 16; ends attempts to goal of improvement of relations with People's Republic of China, 13, 15, 16; prevention of escalation of, 5; renders NSC41 obsolete, 137n210; statement by Truman administration on, 225 Koxinga, 172n8 Krentz, Kenneth, 164, 199; considers trusteeship plan, 186 Lansing, Robert, 95, 209 Lansing-Ishii Agreement (1917), 95 Lattimore, Owen, 11, 232n59; China Round Table and, 119 League of Nations, 22, 83, 210, 249 Leahy, William, 129n125 Lee Teng-hui, 247, 256, 257; advocates Taiwan's return to United Nations, 49, 50; confrontational policies of, 49, 50; granted visa to U.S., 49, 50; postpones military exercises in Taiwan Strait, 47; two-states theory and, 68n109 Liao, Joshua, 163, 164 Liao, Thomas, 163, 164 Liao Wen-kuei, 163, 164 Liao Wen-yi, 163, 164 Liberalism: as cure for evils of international system, 83; economic, 80; foreign policymaking in Taiwan Strait and, 16–24; moral absolutist ethos embodied in, 79; peace

286

Index

through trade interdependence in, 110; political, 80; role in defining U.S. interests in Taiwan Strait, 77–122; strategic choice and, 78– 79; undermines authoritarian regimes, 83; Wilsonian Open Door internationalism and, 246– 250 Liberalization: economic, 5, 55; investment, 72n150; political, 8, 44 Li Hongzhang, 212 Li Tsung-jen, 154, 177n67 Lovett, Robert, 149, 150, 151 Luce, Henry, 11 MacArthur, Douglas, 195, 196, 197, 199 MacDonald, John, 193, 197 Madison, James, 81 Manchu Dynasty. See Qing Dynasty Manchuria, 93, 94, 95, 108, 112, 142, 172n3; attempts to partition, 20; invasion by Japan, 97; “neutralization” plan for railroads in, 20; Soviet actions in, 17 Mao Zedong, 1; accuses U.S. of imperialism, 135n185; antiAmerican policies of, 15; belief in self reliance in nuclear development, 67n96; denounces U.S. biased support for Nationalist Party, 102; develops nuclear weapons, 49; doubts about Stalin's sincerity, 108; ends shelling campaign in Taiwan Strait, 48; forces Western diplomats out, 112–113; founding of New China and, 4; intentionally misleads U.S. with friendly gestures, 132n160; launches crisis in Taiwan Strait, 48, 49; learns importance of nuclear arsenal, 67n96; minimal commitment to Soviet Union, 13; mobilization of domestic support for Great Leap Forward, 48; perception of United States as center of imperialism, 15, 16; received cold shoulder from U.S.,

13; refuses Chiang Kai-shek demands for peace settlement, 100–101; restoration of China's international position as goal, 14; signs Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1950, 220; tries to prevent Taiwan and U.S. from signing mutual defense treaty, 48; underscores CCP superiority over Soviet revisionism, 48; victory creates dilemma for U.S., 141; victory in civil war, 42 Marshall, George, 11, 104, 133n167, 145, 147, 179n81, 208, 210, 232n59; China Round Table and, 119; extends aid to Nationalist Party, 105; failure of mission to China, 100–101, 129n123, 214; no longer seeks coalition government in China, 105; sent to mediate peace settlement of civil war between KMT and CCP, 98, 99, 129n123 Marshall Plan, 150. See European Recovery Plan (ERP) Matsu Island, 47, 49, 63n29, 67n85, 67n94 Maverick, Maury, 120 Ma Ying-jeou, 3, 54, 57, 71n141, 257; concessions to Beijing by, 58; mutual non-denial formulation of, 55; policy of “no independence, no unification, no use of force,” 54; reelection, 243; reversal of hardline mainland policy by, 2 McCarran, Pat, 11 McCarthy, Joseph, 11, 208 McCarthyism, 12, 133n165, 208 McKee, Frederick, 11 McKinley, William, 17, 20, 82, 249 Merchant, Livingston, 10, 128n110, 164, 180n95, 251; advises against assistance to autonomy groups, 165; belief that Nationalist Party would defend Taiwan against communist attacks, 169; concludes low probability of success for FLR, 164, 165; concludes that U.S. must deal

Index 287

with Chen, 166; criticism of Chen Cheng, 160, 161; describes notion to strategic ambiguity to Rusk, 202; discusses more active approaches to safeguard Taiwan, 223; doubts Soong's motivations, 168; feels independence movements not well organized, 164, 165; feels obligation to protect interests of Formosa, 24; meets JSC on military assistance to Taiwan, 200; mission to Taiwan, 159–170; nonendorsement of independence or U.S. intervention in Taiwan, 24; plan for UN trusteeshop over Taiwan, 185–187; points out inconclusive status of Taiwan, 218; postpones commitment to ECA program, 186; recommends joint UN intervention in Taiwan, 169; recommends Sun Li-jen as administrator, 160, 161, 162; recommends UN sponsorship of Taiwan, 165; rejection of option to recognize PRC and abandon Taiwan, 4; requests deferment of ECA action in Taiwan, 162; seeks British opinion on Taiwan issues, 192; urges U.S. to abandon ECA reconstruction programs in Taiwan, 169; view of KMT as corrupt and lacking in vitality, 160 Military Assistance Act, 200 Military Assistance Program (MAP), 155 Mongolia, 94, 95; Soviet actions in, 17 Mott, John, 88 Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949), 155 Nanjing Decade, 131n144 Nationalism: Asian, 5; Chinese, 109; support for CCP desire to prevent Taiwan independence, 256; Taiwanese, 175n35 Nationalist Party (KMT): American aid to, 154–157; authoritarian

control of, 29n44; belligerent attitude of, 116; civil war with CCP, 1; confiscation of property on Taiwan by, 173n21; corruption scandals in, 119, 173n21, 201; covert support from U.S., 17; defeated by internal weakness and corruption, 131n144; Friendship Treaty of 1945 with Soviet Union, 108; ineptitude of, 112, 154; installation of naval blockades on East China coast, 116; misrule on Taiwan, 219; pervasive corruption in, 106; plans to abandon, 120; pressured to reform administration of Taiwan, 24; refusal to reconcile with Chinese Communist Party, 101– 103; revival of electoral fortunes in Taiwan, 6; signs “Double Ten Agreement,” 100; as symbol of corruption to populace, 197; U.S. support contingent on reforms, 192–193; violent measures by, 174n23 National Security Council (NSC), 48; continuance of aid to Nationalist Party in return for reforms, 150, 151; demarche to Chiang Kaishek, 193; meets on military aid to Taiwan, 199–202; NSC-37 and, 151–153, 157–159; recommends suspension of military shipments to mainland China, 112, 154; rejection of JCS proposal to station U.S. fleets in Taiwan, 159 Neorealism, 77 Netherlands: unequal treaties with China by, 17 New China, 4 Nine Power Treaty, 97 1992 Consensus, 26n6 Nitze, Paul, 221; discusses more active approaches to safeguard Taiwan, 223 Nixon, Richard, 137n210; belief in future exchanges with People's Republic of China, 37;

288

Index

breakthrough in U.S.-PRC relations and, 244; formalization of commitments to Taiwan/China by, 1, 37; interest in exploiting rift between People's Republic of China and Soviet Union, 36; opening to China, 36, 37; PRC policy of, 36–39; strategic ambiguity and, 3, 4; U.S.-China Joint Communiqué and, 1; visit to China as beginning of strategic ambiguity, 37; Wilsonian Open Door internationalism and, 37 Normalization Communiqué (1978), 37–39 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 156 North Korea: nuclear ambitions of, 5, 53 Norway: diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 NSC-34, 122; claims MarxistLeninism runs counter to Chinese tradition and values, 109; reaffirms objective of U.S. with respect to China, 109–111; U.S. policy toward China, 107–109; Wilsonian Open Door internationalism and, 108, 109 NSC-37, 151–153, 153, 157–159, 168, 169, 190–193, 200; advocacy of denial of Taiwan to PRC through diplomatic and economic means, 17; recommends use of diplomacy and economics on Taiwan, 149 NSC-41, 118, 122, 136n205, 194; trade with China and, 110 NSC-48, 194, 195, 196, 199–202 Obama, Barack, 3, 255, 258; approves arms package for Taiwan, 58; arms sales to Taiwan by, 73n165; congressional demands to increase support for Taiwan, 75n173; encouragement of cross-strait economic ties by, 35; meets with Hu Jintao, 2; priority to cultivation of positive relations with PRC, 5; strategic

ambiguity and, 58–59; Taiwan Strait policy, 54–61; visits People's Republic of China, 58 Olive, William, 113 Pakistan: diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 Pandit, Vijaya, 121 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 22, 127n103, 209, 249 People's Liberation Army (PLA), 103; enters Manchuria, 112; occupation of Nanjing by, 112, 154 People's Republic of China (PRC): accuses U.S. of encouraging Taiwanese independence, 1; acquiesced to Taiwan mutual non-denial formulation, 55; allegiance to Leninist-Marxism, 23; ambassadorial talks with United States, 36; anger over Bush approval of arms sales, 52; angry at Clinton allowing Lee Teng-hui in United States, 50; Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, 26n6; at Bandung Conference (1955), 62n9; barred from United Nations, 11; berates diplomats about U.S. aiding KMT, 114; Bush administration and, 52–54, 65n37; Carter administration and, 62n16, 64n30; Clinton administration and, 49–52, 51, 68n107; conditions for recognition of, 112; Cultural Revolution in, 36, 62n9; debate over U.S. recognition of, 10–16; deepening relations with U.S., 255; deterring from coercing reunification with Taiwan, 8; disagreement Taiwan on meaning of “one China,” 26n6; eases policy of isolating Taiwan from international community, 54; Eisenhower administration and, 48, 63n29; at Geneva Conference (1954), 62n9; geostrategic rationale in recovery of Taiwan,

Index 289

2; Great Leap Forward in, 48, 62n9; growth in military spending, 51, 56, 57, 74n168; hardening of anti-West policy, 220; hawkish reactions cause discomfort in Asian countries, 51; holds missile tests in Taiwan Strait, 50, 51; human rights repression in, 5; lack of industrial potential in, 108; military preparations by, 2, 51; military spending, 255; misinterpretation of U.S. support for Taiwan, 3; missile deployments by, 2; most favored nation treatment of, 62n16; need for commercial relations with foreign countries, 114; 1992 Consensus and, 26n6; Nixon administration and, 36–39; Obama administration and, 54– 61, 73n165; objectives of military buildup, 57; perception of U.S. stance as opportunistic, 1; postwar U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relations, 35–61; potential benefits of early recognition of, 5; protests against U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, 3; Reagan administration and, 41, 65n39; reduction of tariffs by, 55; rejection of renunciation of force to prevent Taiwan independence, 246; relations with Bush, 52–54; remains adamant on reunification, 246; sees Taiwan as its “lost province,” 141; signs Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement with Taiwan, 2, 55; threats of use of force to reunify with Taiwan, 2, 8; total trade embargo on, 137n210; trade imbalances with, 5; Truman administration and, 97–122, 141– 170; urged by U.S. to be responsible stakeholder in international system, 5; U.S. “lost chance” argument on, 13; U.S. opposition to early recognition of, 17; use of carrot and stick policy,

47, 70n122; in World Trade Organization, 62n16 Perry, William, 51 Pickett, Clarence, 232n61 Political: autonomy, 6, 121; liberalism, 80; liberalization, 8, 44; participation, 143; pressure, 12; reform, 8; rights, 143 Politics: balance of power, 248; domestic, 10, 11, 77, 79, 208; international, 22; international realist, 28n26; liberal, 79; power, 4, 22, 95, 142 Potsdam Proclamation (1945), 97, 142, 203, 204–205, 206, 218, 219, 245 Power: balance of, 28n26, 58, 92, 93, 248; consolidation of, 124n13; maximization of, 28n26; military, 36; politics, 95, 142; presidential, 28n36; separation of, 78 Progressivism, 84 Qing Dynasty, 17, 19, 21, 86, 172n8, 175n35, 212 Quemoy, 47, 49, 63n29, 67n85, 67n94 Reagan, Ronald: calls off arms sale to Taiwan, 65n39; commends Beijing peace efforts in Taiwan Strait, 46–47; formalization of commitments to Taiwan/China by, 1; interest in one China principle, 41; PRC policy of, 41; rejection of arms sale cutoff date, 41; “Six Assurances,” 41; U.S.China Joint Communiqué and, 1 “Red Scare,” 12 Reinsch, Paul, 21, 88, 89, 93, 94 Reischauer, Edwin, 232n59; China Round Table and, 119 Republicanism, 81, 87 Revisionism, 48 Rockhill, W.W., 19, 20 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 97; displeased with Chiang Kai-shek, 102; embrace of Wilsonian Open Door internationalism, 84; holds goal of democratic government

290

Index

for China, 98; promotion of “Four Policeman” regime, 141, 172n4; sees China as a unified constitutional democracy under Chiang Kai-shek, 42–43; support for China, 172n9; welcomes Chiang Kai-shek proposal for naval bases, 172n9 Roosevelt, Theodore, 188, 249; concern for power politics, 22; Open Door policy and, 20; view of internationalism, 82 Root, Elihu, 20 Ros-Lehtinen, Lleana, 75n173 Royall, Kenneth, 137n217 Rusk, Dean, 251; belief that Chiang Kai-shek was responsible for KMT failure in China, 241n143; believes improvements in Taiwan are not deep or permanent, 224; comments on abstention from military intervention in Taiwan, 206; earns enmity of Chiang Kaishek, 224; feels obligation to protect interests of Formosa, 24; good relations with Dulles, 241n145; interventionist proposals by, 5; meets JSC on military assistance to Taiwan, 200; non-endorsement of independence or U.S. intervention in Taiwan, 24; refrains from endorsing more proactive approach to Taiwan, 224; rejection of option to recognize PRC and abandon Taiwan, 4; seeks consultation over trusteeship issue, 187; strategic ambiguity plan with Dulles, 220–225; “U.S. Policy toward Formosa,” 223; wishes to foster autonomous Taiwan as example of liberal democracy, 224 Russo-Japanese War (1904), 92 San Francisco Conference on World Organization (1945), 210, 245 San Francisco Peace Conference (1951), 43

Security: collective, 22, 81, 83; crossstrait, 51; externalities, 57; national, 28n26, 47, 71n141; regional, 51; strengthening of, 77; threats, 47; umbrella, 48 Service, John, 11, 103, 208; blamed for “losing” China, 133n165; proposes coalition government for China, 104 Shanghai Communiqué (1972), 37– 39 Shultz, George, 44 Sino-Japanese War (1894), 17, 172n8. See Qing Dynasty Sino-Japanese War (1895), 92 Sino-Soviet split, 5 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1950, 220 Sino-U.S. Treaty of 1943, 220 Six Assurances, 41 Six Assurances (1982), 1 Smith, H. Alexander, 11, 195, 207, 231n44 Snow, Edgar, 132n160 Soong, T.V., 167, 172n3 South China Sea, 2 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 48 Soviet Union: actions in Manchuria, 108; actions in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang, 17; agreement that Taiwan be returned to the Republic of China after World War II, 42–43; ambitions in China, 13; cooperative relations with Chinese Communist Party, 14; deterioration of relations with United States, 104–105; diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4; expansion of military power in, 36; Friendship Treaty of 1945 with Nationalist Party, 108; imperialist ambitions of, 201; reservations about CCP in, 108; tradition of support for in communist world, 15; unequal treaties with China by, 17 Spanish-American War, 82 Sphere of influence, 17

Index 291

Spheres of influence, 19 Sprouse, Philip, 164, 198; considers trusteeship plan, 186; discusses more active approaches to safeguard Taiwan, 223 Stalin, Josef, 13, 98, 104, 105, 117; recognition of Nationalist Party by, 108; signs Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1950, 220; supports Mao in trying to establish contact with U.S., 114 Stilwell, Joseph, 101, 102, 161 Stimson Doctrine, 97 Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), 26n6 Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), 68n109; dialogue with Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, 55 Strategic ambiguity: acknowledgement of Taiwan as part of Nationalist China, 4; based on application of “dual deterrence,” 45; carrots and sticks in, 47, 70n122; continuation best serving U.S. security interests, 35, 54–61; definition of, 3; denial of Taiwan to CCP control through economic and diplomatic means, 244; denial of Taiwan to Communist control, 4; as deterrence to Taiwan challenging PRC territorial integrity, 6; Dulles-Rusk plan, 220–225; Eisenhower administration and, 27n19; executive branch origin of, 13; first administration using, 3, 4; help in keeping cross-strait status quo until mutually acceptable outdome appears, 61; inducing peace-making behaviors from antagonists through, 46; legalization of, 36–41; logic of deterrence in, 4; manipulation of threats in, 45; as means to foster peaceful resolution of Taiwan Strait conflict, 41–44; Obama administration and, 58–59; objectives of U.S. regarding future status of Taiwan and, 41–

44; origins of, 3, 185–226; pivotal deterrence and, 45; in post-U.S./Sino rapprochement and normalization period, 35–61; power politics and, 4; promotion of Chinese “Titoism,” 244; promotion of PRC-Soviet split and, 4; questions on abandonment of, 59–61; reasons for adhering to, 5–9; recognition of Nationalist Party as legitimate Chinese government, 4; recognizing Nationalist regime as sole legitimate government of China, 244; in rethinking Taiwan issues pre-Korean War, 202–225; as tactic of coercive diplomacy, 45; in Taiwan Strait crises, 45–54; in Truman administration, 3, 4; uncertainty in decisionmaking process to discourage provocation, 45; Wilsonian Open Door internationalism and, 6, 9, 24 Strategic choice: U.S. liberal tradition and, 78–79 Strategic clarity, 59 Stuart, John Leighton, 107, 111, 145, 161, 162, 174n31, 232n59; advises wait and see regarding recognition, 112; defense of Chiang Kai-shek by, 146; favors administration of Sun Li-jen, 162; talks with Huang Hua, 113–117; Truman opposed to meeting of with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 115, 116 Sun Fo, 162 Sun Li-jen, 161, 162, 169, 224, 241n147 Sun Yat-sen, 26n6, 86, 87 Sweden: diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 Switzerland: diplomatic recognition of PRC, 4 Symington, Stuart, 149 Taft, Robert, 11, 204; blames Truman administration for loss of China, 235n98; claims communist

292

Index

infiltration in State Department, 207 Taft, William, 249; anti-Japan sentiment of, 20; belief in American participation in financial consortium, 90; concern for Wall Street, 22; delays recognition of Republic of China, 86; “dollar diplomacy” policy, 20; Open Door policy and, 20; sees need for cooperation with Japan, 20, 21; view of internationalism, 82 Taiwan: “acknowledged” as part of China, 38, 39; American aid to, 154–157; American response to “228” incident, 143–146, 174n23; Anti-Secession Law, 53; aspirations for self-determination, 142–143; with for autonomy in, 148; to be returned to the Republic of China after World War II, 42–43; claims U.S. delaying delivery of weapons to avoid offending Beijing, 3; continuance of undetermined status, 43–44; declining high-tech advantage over PRC, 56, 72n150; defense budget in, 74n167; on defense line of Pacific islands, 196, 236n99; democratization of, 5; denial of CCP control of Taiwan through diplomatic and economic means, 148–159; descendants of China proper in, 172n8; disagreement with PRC on meaning of “one China,” 26n6; drawbacks of independence for, 8; economic and military aid to, 155; economic liberalization of, 5; emphasis on separate political identity from PRC, 2; excess military on, 188; “Finlandization” of, 74n170; Formosan Chinese in, 172n8; geostrategic importance to People's Republic of China, 2; hopes to set example for mainland, 222; improvement in economic and social conditions,

221; incentives for investment in, 56; independence movement in, 160, 163–166; interest in reunification in, 2; Japanese domination of, 143; keeping from communist domination, 141–171; lack of appeal for reunification in, 59–61; lack of confidence in new administration of, 143–145; lack of confidence in U.S., 1; legally under Japanese jurisdiction barring truce signing, 43, 189; as liability for U.S., 169; as link in offshore island chain for air and naval bases, 148; mainland refugees in, 186, 226n4; massive 1947 uprising on, 143–145; misinterpretation of U.S. support for PRC, 3; Nationalist Party misrule on, 143–145; Nationalist Party plunder of, 144; Nationalist Party repressions on, 145, 146; National Unification Council in, 53, 69n116; need for political and economic reform on, 145; need for stable administration, 189; need to discover desires of islanders, 189; new rulers mistreatment of, 144; 1992 Consensus and, 26n6; not regarded as sufficiently important by JCS for military intervention, 191–193; as obstacle to smooth relations between U.S. and PRC, 6; perception of U.S. stance as opportunistic, 1; possible guardianship or trusteeship for, 147, 165, 185–187, 218, 219, 223, 228n11; postwar U.S.Taiwan-PRC relations, 35–61; in post-World War II period, 141– 148; provision of ports for U.S. shipping, 148; public opinion Formosa maintenance of status quo, 2; reduction of tariffs by, 55; signs Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, 2; signs Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement pact with PRC, 55; signs Treaty of Taipei,

Index 293

43; Strait Exchange Foundation, 26n6; strategic military importance on Western Pacific Rim, 142; support contingent on KMT reform, 192–193; support for independence in, 2, 3; trade dependence on PRC, 56; trade with U.S., 72n148; undetermined legal status of, 176n44; U.S. interests in, 1–25; U.S. support for, 149–151; “White Terror” period on, 147; withdrawal of American military from, 39 Taiwan Relations Act (1979), 1, 36– 41, 206, 245; ambiguity of, 39– 40; lack of explicit defense commitment in, 39–40; strengthening of, 75n173 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA), 75n173 Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), 257 Taiwan Strait: crises in, 1, 47–49; crisis effects on U.S.-TaiwanPRC relations, 27n19; determined/undetermined discourse and, 29n37; future of U.S. policy in, 243–259; trade, transportation, postal links across, 64n30; U.S. policy options in, 7tab, 8; Wilsonian Open Door internationalism effect on policymaking in, 79–96 Terrorism, 5, 53, 70n126 Tiananmen Square incident, 62n16 Titoism, 10, 23, 117, 137n210, 158, 194, 215, 220, 244, 251 Trade: economic, 137n210; free, 82; interdependence, 57; interstate power balances and, 57; prewar, 136n205; raising cost of military conflict/war, 57; removal of barriers to, 83 Treaty of Shimonoseki. See Qing Dynasty Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), 141 Treaty of Taipei (1952), 43 Truman, Harry S., 97; adamant on return of Taiwan to Nationalist China, 198; advised to disengage from Nationalist Party, 107; anti-

communist stance of, 13–16, 112; approval for NSC-37 by, 153; approval for NSC-34/NSC-41, 110; approves delay of military shipments to Taiwan, 112, 154; belief in strong executive, 11; calls McCarthy a liar, 208; China White Paper of, 17, 156, 179n81, 215; claims lack of predatory designs on Taiwan, 205; clear statement of strategic ambiguity by, 205; committment to Wilsonian Open Door internationalism, 97–106, 116, 117; confidence in Acheson, 231n44, 236n103; continued support for Chiang Kai-shek, 102; debate over recognition of PRC and, 10–16; declares faith in Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, 206, 207; disapproves military assistance to Taiwan, 199; feels obligation to protect interests of Formosa, 24; feels U.S. must dissociate from KMT, 197; under fire from Congress over Taiwan, 203–209; high level of concern for Taiwan and populace, 141–171; hopes for democratic form of government in China, 97; hopes for overthrow of Mao's regime, 23, 24; lobbies Congress to extend China Aid Act, 166; maintains support for Nationalist China, 101–103; nonendorsement of independence or U.S. intervention in Taiwan, 24; objectives for China, 97–106; opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's counteroffensive campaign, 12, 150; opposition to diplomat meeting with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 115; opposition to repressive tactics of KMT, 133n183; origins of strategic ambiguity and, 250–254; personal/secret observers in Taiwan, 240n139; preference for defense of Taiwan through nonmilitary means, 5; reiterates

294

Index

Wilsonian Open Door internationalism, 205; rejection of option to recognize PRC and abandon Taiwan, 4; reluctance to normalize relations with People's Republic of China, 14; reluctant to send military aid to Nationalist Party, 197; rules out recognition as viable policy, 120, 121; sees China as a unified constitutional democracy under Chiang Kaishek, 42–43; sees U.S. as China's only friend, 17; sends Seventh Fleet to neutralize Taiwan Strait, 43, 224, 225; stands behind China-Formosa policy, 208; support for Chinese Titoism, 23; supports Acheson's China-Taiwan policy, 197–198, 208; unyielding attitide toward communism, 16; urges Congress to pass China Aid Act, 178n73; views on Chinese Communist Party, 103–106 Tsai Ing-wen, 243 Underwood Tariff Act (1913), 83 United Nations, 211; appeals for intervention of in Taiwan, 165; Charter, 219; expulsion of Taipei, 42; General Assembly, 36, 204; need for cooperation in, 211; Republican skepticism about formation of, 210; Security Council, 225; Trusteeship Council, 187; trusteeship over Taiwan, 147, 165, 185–187, 218, 219, 223, 228n11 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 155 United States: accused of sacrificing Taiwan to placate Nationalists, 176n39; agreement that Taiwan be returned to the Republic of China after World War II, 42–43; aid contingent on Taiwan's ability to provide stable governance, 160; aid to Nationalist Party, 154–157; alternatives for prevention of fall of Formosa,

152–153; ambassadorial talks with People's Republic of China, 36; ambiguous position on Taiwanese independence, 44; ambivalent balance of engaging China and protecting interests of Taiwan, 244; assistance to Taiwan, 154–157; attempts to drive wedge between PRC and Soviet Union, 17, 110, 233n74; attempts to mollify People's Republic of China, 2; benefits of sacrificing Taiwan, 6; changing international strategic settings after September 11 and, 54; concealment of with to separate island from mainland control, 158, 159; constraints on Taiwan for provoking PRC, 8; counterbalances Soviet Union with Beijing, 2; creation of American liberal identity in, 79; deepening relations with PRC, 255; defense against Soviet “encirclement,” 211, 212; deterioration of relations with Soviet Union, 104–105; does not accept PRC jurisdiction over Taiwan, 44; liberalism and foreign policymaking in Taiwan Strait, 16–24; liberal tradition in, 246–250; long-term strategic interests and strategic ambiguity, 5; moral obligation to spread American democratic values globally, 80–85; need for cooperation with PRC, 5; need to balance affairs across Taiwan Strait, 141; nonrecognition of PRC policy at odds with that of other states, 4; no vested interest in outcome of Taiwan issue, 59, 60; obligation to promote spread of democracy, 83; one-China principle and, 1; opinion that Chinese Communist Party acts on behalf of Moscow, 104; as pivot in triangular relationship with PRC and Taiwan, 8; policy options in Taiwan Strait, 7tab, 8;

Index 295

post-war policy of Wilsonian Open Door internationalism, 141–171; postwar U.S.-TaiwanPRC relations, 35–61; questions on abandonment of strategic ambiguity, 59–61; recognition of People's Republic of China, 10; refrains from resisting Japan, 128n110; refuses to recognize legitimacy of Japanese claim over Manchuria, 97; relative decline due to Vietnam War, 36; response to “228” incident on Taiwan, 145–146, 174n23; restricts Taiwan arms sales, 51; retention of “capacity” to act in Taiwan Strait conflict, 40; role in deterring Taipei and Beijing from aggression, 1; sale of government surplus to Taiwan, 156; searches for means of saving Taiwan from CCP, 185–189; security interests in political liberalization of PRC, 8; seen as center of imperialism by Mao Zedong, 15, 16; sees military expansion in PRC as destabilizing, 51; sees need for cooperation with Japan, 20, 21; severs relations with Taiwan, 2; support for Chiang Kai-shek undermines liberal objectives in China, 109; support for Kuomintang as reason for Mao Zedong's hostility toward, 15; support for Taiwan, 149–151; “Taiwan caucus” in Congress, 75n173; thinks government of Mao Zedong will be overthrown, 17; threat of massive nuclear retaliation if Taiwan attacked, 47; trade with Taiwan, 72n148; tries to sever ties between PRC and Soviet Union, 10, 13; ultimate objective of peaceful resolution of Taiwan Strait conflict, 8, 9, 41–44; unofficial relations with Taiwan, 5 United States Department of Defense: clash with Department of State over Taiwan policy, 194–

198; division with State Department, 137n217 United States Department of State, 173n11; China Round Table, 119; clash with Department of Defense over Taiwan policy, 194–198; division with Defense Department, 137n217; Loyalty Security Board, 133n165; views NSC policy as counterproductive, 194, 195 United States House Foreign Affairs Committee, 203 U.S. Army Advisory Group, 156 U.S. Army Observation Group, 103 U.S.-China Joint Communique (1979), 1 U.S.-China Joint Communique (1982), 1, 41; references to arms sales to Taiwan, 41; violations of, 68n99 U.S.-China Joint Communiqué (1972), 1 U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, 203 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 203 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 104, 203 U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (1954), 38, 39, 48, 63n29, 64n30 Vandenberg, Arthur, 11, 112, 154, 197, 208, 209, 216, 232n61 Vietnam War: effect on U.S. power, 36 Vincent, John Carter, 129n125, 135n183, 208 Wang Bignan, 62n9 Wang Daohan, 26n6, 68n109 Ward, Angus, 113, 119, 120 War or Peace (Dulles), 212 Washington Conference (1921), 96 Webb, James, 118, 151, 202, 203 Wedemeyer, Albert, 101, 147 Wei Tao-ming, 146, 147 Wen Jiabao, 53; agrees to tariff reductions, 55 Wherry, Kenneth, 11, 185, 236n103

296

Index

Wilkie, Wendell, 172n3 Williams, E.T., 86, 93 Wilson, Woodrow, 210; commitment to China, 23; commitment to progressivism, 21; concern for China derived from commitment to American liberalism, 96–97; concerns with Japan, 92, 93, 94; dealing with Japan, 92, 93; defends Open Door policy, 89– 96; differences with Taft on China, 21; disassociates U.S. from European imperialist policies, 22; distaste for communist revolution, 84; as founding father of liberal tradition in foreign affairs, 82; Fourteen Points, 83, 211; goal of liberal peace in World War I, 83; holds goal of democratic government for China, 98; idealism in conduct of foreign affairs by, 82; interest in China, 86; League of Nations and, 83; Open Door policy and, 17–23; opposition to financial consortium, 90; opposition to Japanese administration of China, 94; progressivism of, 84; recognition of Republic of China, 86, 87; succeeds in reducing Japan's gains at Paris Peace Conference, 127n103; vision for open China, 77–122; withdrawal from great power financial consortium, 21, 22, 89–96 Wilsonianism, 80–85; collective security in, 81; economic globalization and, 80–85; as foundation of U.S. foreign policy identity, 82; national selfdetermination and, 80–85; political Open Door in, 80–85; religious/ethical sentiments in political beliefs of, 82 Wilsonian Open Door internationalism. See also Open Door policy; Wilsonianism: belief in deepening of commercial ties, 83; China and,

85–89; connection to origin of strategic ambiguity, 243–250; defense of, 89–96; defense of China's political independence and territorial integrity, 23; effect on policymakers' view of Taiwan Strait issues, 79–96; filtering function of, 243–244; free trade in, 83; implications of, 96–97; League of Nations and, 22; liberalism and, 22; maintenance of equal opportunities of trade and commerce with China, 23; need to preserve Taiwan from Chinese Communist Party invasion, 24; NSC-34 and, 108, 109; post-war American policy of, 141–171; preservation of China's territorial integrity through, 43–44; promotiion of liberal democratic China, 23; recognition issue and, 23–24; strategic ambiguity and, 4, 6, 9, 24; U.S.-China-Taiwan policy and, 243–250; in U.S. foreign policymaking in Taiwan Strait, 16–24; view of PRC as liberal and democratic, 6 Woodcock, Leonard, 39 World Federation of Taiwanese Associations, 53 World Health Organization (WHO): World Health Assembly, 54 World Trade Organization (WTO), 62n16; People's Republic of China membership in, 51 Wu, K.C., 195 Xi Jinping, 256 Xinjiang: Soviet actions in, 17 Ye Jianying, 46, 64n30 Yellow Sea, 2 Yuan Shikai, 21, 22, 87, 88, 90 Zhao Ziyang, 65n39 Zheng Chenggong, 172n8 Zhou Enlai, 36, 43, 62n9, 104, 112; denounces U.S. biased support for Nationalist Party, 102;

Index 297

received cold shoulder from U.S., 13; requests meeting with Stuart, 114–117; telegram to Clubb, 117–118; urges U.S. assistance to People's Republic of China, 117 Zoellick, Robert, 5

About the Book

Why did the Truman administration reject a pragmatic approach to the Taiwan Strait conflict—recognizing Beijing and severing ties with Taipei—and instead choose the path of strategic ambiguity? Dean Chen sheds light on current US policy by exploring the thoughts and deliberations of President Truman and his top advisers, among them Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Livingston Merchant, and Dean Rusk. Chen also highlights the very unambiguous, and continuing, liberal aims of US Taiwan policy. Dean P. Chen is lecturer in political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

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